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of State 



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bulletin 



Jhe Ofticial Monthly Recofd-^q l IJiiited States Foreign Policy / Volume 88 / Number 2139 



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October 1988 






Secretary's Trips: 

Latin America/2 

East Asia and the Pacific/21 

Nicaragua/1, 82 
Economics/43, 46 
Human Rights/54, 57 




Dpparimvnt of Staip 

bulletin 



Ml 



Volume 88 / Number 2139 / October M 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public Com- 
munication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and govern- 
ment agencies with information on de- 
velopments in U.S. foreign relations 
and the work of the Department of 
State and the Foreign Service. The 
Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; se- 
lected press releases issued by the 
White House, the Department, and the 
U.S. Mission to the United Nations; 
and treaties and other agreements to 
which the United States is or may be- 
come a party. Special features, articles, 
and other supportive material (such as 
maps, charts, photographs, and graphs) 
are published frequently to provide ad- 
ditional information on current issues 
but should not necessarily be inter- 
preted as official U.S. policy 
statements. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

CHARLES REDMAN 

Assistant Secretary 
for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

COLLEEN LUTZ 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

SHARON R. HAYNES 

Assistant Editor 



The Secretary of State has determined that 
the publication of this periodical is neces- 
sary in the transaction of the public busi- 
ness required by law of this Department. 
Use of funds for printing this periodical 
has been approved by the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget through 
September :50, 1989. 



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For sale by the Sui>erintendent of Docu- 
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Washington, D.C. 20402. 



CONTENTS 



fi9 President 

; Aid to the Nicaraguan Demo- 
cratic Resistance 



^ Secretary 

; Secretary Shultz Visits Latin 
America (Ricardo Acevedo 
PeraUo. Alfonso Cabrera 
Hildago, Carlos Lopez 
j Contreras, Rodric/o Madrigal 
9 Nieto, Secretari/ SIndtz) 
I Secretary's Trip to East Asia 
I and the Pacific 



\ms Control 

Nuclear Testing T^lks Open 

Round Three (White House 

Stateinent) 
U.S. -Soviet Union Conduct First 

Phase of JVE {White House 

Statement) 
ABM Treaty Review Session 

Opens (White House 

Statement) 



\ St Asia 

I Situation in Vietnam, Cambodia, 
and Laos (David F. 
Lambert son) 



honomics 

Strategy for An LDC Debt 
Workout: A U.S. Perspective 
(William B. Milam) 
I U.S. Export Control Policy: Its 
Present and Future Course 
(E. Allan Wendt) 



Europe 

49 Visit of Icelandic Prime Minister 

(Thorsteinn Palsson, President 
Reagan) 

50 27th Anniversary of the Berlin 

Wall (President Reagan) 
50 38th Report on Cyprus (Message 
to the Congress) 



General 

51 American Foreign Policy: Oppor- 
tunities and Challenges (Colin 
L. Powell) 



Human Rights 

54 U.S. Human Rights Policy: An 
Overview (Paula Dohriansky) 

57 Helsinki Human Rights Day, 
1988 (Proclamation) 

57 Captive Nations Week, 1988 

(Proclamation) 

International Law 

58 Compensation for Iranian Airbus 

Tragedy (Abraham D. Sofaer) 



Middle East 

60 Visit of Kuwaiti Prime Minister 

(President Reagan, Saad al- 
Abdallah al-Salim Al Sabah) 

61 Review of U.S. Policy in the 

Middle East (Richard W. 
Miuyh;/) 



Oceans 

64 Fisheries Negotiations and 

Ti-ade Opportunities (Edward 
E. Wolfe) 



Science & Technology 

67 U.S. Views on Waste Exports 
(Frederick M. Bernthal) 



South Asia 

69 Pakistan's President Zia, U.S. 
Ambassador Die in Plane 

Crash (Secretarji Shultz. Johv 
C. Whitehead) 



United Nations 



70 



U.S. Assessments for the United 
Nations (Dennis C. Goodman) 



Western Hemisphere 

72 FY 1989 Assistance Requests for 
Latin America and the Carib- 
bean (Elliott Abrams) 

82 Situation in Nicaragua (White 
House Statement) 



Treaties 

83 Current Actions 

Press Releases 

85 Department of State 

Publications 

86 Department of State 

86 CSCE Semiannual Report 
Released 

Index 



-^H^^i?^'M 



% NOV! W88 ■ 1 



T\E PRESIDENT 



^d to the Nicaraguan Democratic Government 



Iesidents radio address, 

:.V 30, 1988' 

at a moment of hope it was 1 year 
when Central American leaders 
eluded their meeting in Guatemala. 

Sandinista government of Nic- 
gua, a communist regime fighting a 
il war against 15,000 Nicaraguan 
sdom fighters opposed to their op- 
ssion, agreed to a series of sweeping 
nocratic reforms. If carried out, 
se reforms would have ended the 
ing and brought peace to Nicaragua 
1 Central America. It would also 
'6 meant that Nicaragua would at 
t join the family of free, democratic 
ions. 

At first, there were a few hopeful 
ns. To much media fanfare, the op- 
ition newspaper in Nicaragua, La 
■nsa, was reopened. Independent ra- 
stations were allowed to broadcast 
lin. A few political prisoners were 
eased, and jjolitical groups were al- 
,'ed more latitude. Most important, 
ndinistas finally agreed to the free- 
m fighters' request for direct negotia- 
ns for a peaceful, democratic 
,tlenient. 

Now, the main reason the San- 
listas agreed to those steps a year 
was the steady progress of the 
jedom fighters, including important 
ttlefield victories like the one at Los 
inas. But tragically, at the very mo- 
mt when continued strength and de- 
rmination by the United States might 
ve meant the continued success of the 
ace plan, the United States House of 
'presentatives decided, and by only a 
ry narrow margin, to refuse my re- 
lest for further effective aid to the 
eedom fighters. This, of course, re- 
oved the principal prod — the military 



victories and popular success of the 
freedom fighters— to Sandinista par- 
ticipation in the peace plan and sent an 
immediate signal of American weakness 
to the communists. 

This failure to support the freedom 
fighters has had costly and sad conse- 
quences, just how costly and sad we've 
seen during the past few weeks. Com- 
munist Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega 
has been visiting Castro in Cuba and 
voicing solidarity with the tyrant who 
has brought so much sadness and mis- 
ery to that country. While in Nic- 
aragua, a renewed attack on political 
dissent is being led by the head of the 
secret police, Thomas Borge, a dedi- 
cated communist and grim, hardened 
repressor of human rights whose office, 
according to our Commission on Orga- 
nized Crime, has also been actively en- 
gaged in the international drug trade. 
Acting under the orders of the commu- 
nist leaders and Borge's supervision, 
Sandinista police and goon squads have 
brutally broken up a peaceful demon- 
stration by 3,000 Nicaraguans. Opposi- 
tion leaders were jailed or beaten and 
now sentenced to prison. Political, re- 
ligious liberties have again been cur- 
tailed. The communists ordered the 
Catholic Archbishop to shut down the 
Catholic radio station. And for almost 
2 weeks the independent newspaper, La 
Prensa, was refused permission to pub- 
lish. And the American ambassador 
was expelled. 

And yet, while the cutoff of aid to 
the freedom fighters was a dreadful 
mistake, getting the cause of peace and 
freedom back on track, not recrimina- 
tion, must now be our goal. There is a 
chance for real bipartisan consensus in 
support of renewed contra aid. Indeed, 
one of its strong supporters [Senator 
Lloyd Bentsen] has recently been 
named to be the vice presidential candi- 
date of the Democratic Party. Senator 
Bob Dole intends soon to offer legisla- 
tion to renew effective assistance to the 



freedom fighters. The final details are 
being worked out. And I urge the 
Members of the Senate to support the 
aid package, and I also ask the House 
of Representatives to move speedily 
and favorably on the Senate legislation. 
Meanwhile, we continue to pursue ag- 
gressively our diplomatic efforts with 
the Central American democracies. 

So much is at stake. A few years 
ago, there were those who said the 
cause of freedom and democracy was 
lost in El Salvador Well, perhaps some 
of you remember that incredible scene 
when the people of that country defied 
communist threats and bullets to march 
to the polls and vote for democracy. 
The American aid package that helped 
make democracy victorious in El Sal- 
vador passed by only two votes in the 
House. But pass it did, and democracy 
did come. 

A few weeks ago, both Vice Pres- 
dent Bush and I visited the bedside of 
one of the heroes of that struggle, Pres- 
ident Duarte of El Salvador. President 
Duarte has had no easy life. He has 
been continually threatened by extrem- 
ists of both left and right. His daughter 
was kidnaped by communist guerrillas. 
And now, while in a desperate sti'uggle 
with cancer, he continues to lead his 
nation on the high road to democracy. I 
cannot tell you how deeply moved Vice 
President Bush and I were by our visit 
to this brave and remarkable man and 
how determined we both were that his 
dream for his people and all the peoples 
of Central America should he made a 
reality: the dream of peace and freedom 
for every man, woman, and child. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 8, 1988. 



epartment of State Bulletin/October 1988 



THE SECRETARY 



Secretary Shultz Visits Latin America 



Secretary Shultz departed Washington, B.C., 

to visit Guatemala (August 1, 1988), 
Argentina (August 2-k), Uruguay (August U), 

Brazil (August 4-8), Bolivia (August 8-9), 

Costa Rica (August 9), Honduras (August 9), 

El Salvador (August 9), Costa Rica (August 9-10) 

and Ecuador (August 10). 

He returned to the United States on August 11. 

Following are the texts of addresses, 

news conferences, and remarks 

he made on various occasions 

during the trip. 



JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE, 
GUATEMALA CITY, 
AUG. 1, 1988' 

Guatemalan Foreign Minister Cabrera. 

We are reaching the conclusion of a 
very promising and fruitful meeting. As 
you know, as a result of an agreement 
among the four Central American coun- 
tries, we decided to meet with the Sec- 
retary of State of the United States, 
Mr. George Shultz, in Guatemala City 
in order to analyze the problems of 
Central America, to study the Es- 
quipulas II peace process, to analyze 
the problems of security in the region, 
and to discuss economic and social 
problems, in order to have a joint dis- 
cussion and in order to move in the 
direction of defining specific solutions 
for each one of these topics. 

We recognize the United States is a 
friend, which has shown its concern and 
its political determination to help in the 
Central American peace process and to 
help with the economic and social devel- 
opment of this area on a regional basis, 
and bilaterally with each of our coun- 
tries. This is why we have carried out 
this meeting. Let me say to you that 
we, the Central American foreign min- 
isters, are extremely satisfied with re- 
sults we have obtained and which you 
will be aware of after we read the joint 
communique, which will happen in a 
matter of minutes. 



I would like to highlight something 
I think is very important. A number of 
speculations have circulated with re- 
gard to this meeting — about the e.xist- 
ence of a so-called Shultz plan — about 
some sort of a declaration of war and 
about pressures that were being e.x- 
erted on governments, specifically 
Guatemala and Costa Rica. Let me tell 
you all of that is pure speculation. No 
pressure was exercised. No "Shultz 
plan" has been presented, and we have 
not been invited to sign any declaration 
of war. 

From the time we [previously] met 
in Guatemala, Guatemala proposed a 
process to this meeting, and that proc- 
ess entailed the establishment of tech- 
nical committees to draft documents to 
define the topics that were to be dis- 
cussed together at this meeting. What 
happened was that we have had a dis- 
cussion of the basic document — which 
was submitted initially by Guatemala — 
and it was then enhanced, and a 
number of proposals from other Central 
American countries were received. Un- 
doubtedly, this led to speculation. I 
want to take advantage of this occasion 
to make the situation very clear and to 
say there was none of what was de- 
scribed in some of these speculative 
statements. 

After this process of thinking and 
reflecting, the technical committees of 
the four Central American countries 
and the United States worked very. 



very hard. We came up with this fin&.'| 
communique, which is, in fact, the be, 
ginning of a process of reflection that; 
will lead us to develop certain mecha-, 
nisms. We, the Central Americans, 
have spoken to the Secretary of State j 
Mr. Shultz has understood us. And w. 
all know it is not enough to have a . 
political determination conveyed in a 
document; rather, we must clearly ar 
objectively put forth mechanisms so 
can convert the aspirations listed in 
this document into reality. These asp 
rations are those of peace, progress, 
development for 2.5 million Central 
Americans. I will now turn to Ms. 
Claudia Arenas, Director of Public R 
lations of the Presidency, to be kind 
enough to read the document. 

Ms. Arenas. [Translation of Spa 
ish text] The Ministers analyzed the 
present Central American situation . 
discussed the peace process in Centi 
America and measures to promote d 
mocracy, development, peace, and s( 
curity in the region. 

The Ministers confirmed their r 
spect for the principles of peace, de- 
mocracy, security, social justice, and 
economic development expressed in 
United Nations Charter and the Ch. 
ter of the Organization of American 
States and reiterated the importanc 
the Esquipulas II agreement and th 
declaration of Alajuela as Central 
American instruments which are fu: 
mental for the democratization, se- 
curity, and economic and social 
development of the region. 

They agreed the establishment 
genuine democratic governments 
throughout the region is essential ii( 
order to achieve peace. Likewise, tif 
agreed on their vision of a democra: 
truly pluralistic, prosperous, just, f 
ble, and secure Central America. 

They reaffirmed that authentic 
mocracy needs, among other requir 
ments: political pluralism, freedom 
association, freedom of the press, ai 
impartial judicial system that guars, 
tees due process, armed forces whe 
ever they exist which are apolitical, 
honest and open electoral system, ; tl 
respect for human rights and indivi |i 
freedoms. 

These basic principles and func 
mental freedoms as a whole create 
democratic, representative system 
which the will of the people is ex- 
pressed periodically through free ai 
honest elections that permit the pe 
ful and orderly transfer of power. 

They declared their firm deteri 
nation to consolidate democratizatic 



THE SECRETARY 



Irts being undertaken in the region 
to strengthen the bonds of coopera- 
and solidarity that exist between 

They invited the international com- 
nity to assist them in their efforts 
I to encourage democratic govern- 
nts. They considered this a vital ele- 
tit that must be taken into account 
the international community in its 
nomic relations with the region. 

The Ministers reiterated their in- 
tion to agree upon political and eco- 
nic actions to promote their common 
ectives. 

At the conclusion of the meeting, 

Foreign Ministers of Costa Rica, El 
vador, and Honduras and the Secre- 
■y of State of the United States of 
lerica thanked the people and the 
vernment of Guatemala for their hos- 
ality and courtesies which contrib- 
d toward fully achieving the 
oected objectives of peace and de- 
cracy in the region. 

(Signed) Rodrigo Madrigal Nieto, 
nister of Foreign Relations and Wor- 
p of Costa Rica; Ricardo Acevedo 
ralta, Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
Salvador; Carlos Lopez Contreras, 
cretary of Foreign Relations of Hon- 
Tas; George R Shultz, Secretary of 
ate of the United States of America; 
tfonso Cabrera Hidalgo, Minister of 
'reign Relations of Guatemala. 

Q. We understand from declara- 
)ns made by Honduras yesterday 
at Honduras has very special con- 
rns regarding the peace process and 
' at it wishes to make those very 
iblic. The concern appears to be 
ost of all that Honduras is the 
luntry which right now has some 
,00(1 contras in its own territory and 
ong the border with Nicaragua, 
hat kind of reassurances can the 
merican Government offer Honduras 
garding the future of those contrasl 

Secretary Shultz. As far as the 
mtras ai'e concerned, they are an 
iportant element e.xpressing a strong 
asire for freedom and democracy in 
icaragua, and we continue to support 
lem. I did not come here, basically, to 
iscuss that subject, and we did not 
ave very much discussion of it, al- 
hough I certainly hope that in my 
ountry we will have a vote before long 
hat once again extends the funding for 
he cuntras. I think it is very important 
n this whole process. 

But our focus of attention here was 
m the centrality of democracy as the 
vay to peace in the region; the impor- 
ance of the security interests of all of 



the countries. There was a very clear 
expression in our discussions of how 
deleterious it is for the Soviet Union to 
be sending such huge supplies of arms 
into the region. Also we had some very 
fruitful discussions — and I hope quite 
prospective — about the problems of eco- 
nomic development and how we may 
organize ourselves to pursue that more 
systematically. 

Q. Is Guatemala's active neu- 
trality policy toward Central Ameican 
problems going to be maintained? You 
said a while ago that there had been 
speculation, with regard to the state- 
ments by a member of Congress here. 
Is there still a commitment that there 
not be militarization of Nicaragua on 
the part of the United States? That is 
not contained in the statement, in the 
communique? 

Foreign Minister Cabrera. We 
have indicated that we participated in 
all meetings in order to make whatever 
effort is necessary to find peaceful solu- 
tions to the Central American conflict, 
to strengthen economic and social 
development. 

Q. What happened to your pres- 
sure on the Central American coun- 
tries, in order to pressure Nicaragua 
into the democratic system? 

Secretary Shultz. What pressures 
Nicaragua — and I hope that at some 
point they will feel the pressure, al- 
though all the evidence is that they are 
going backwards — but what pressures 
Nicaragua, I should think, is first and 
foremost the sad state of affairs inside 
Nicaragua resulting from the use of 
central authority, of bringing every- 
thing under government's control. That 
restricts the freedom of their people; 
that robs them of the incentive to 
produce. 

This has resulted in a drastic de- 
cline in the standard of living and an 
inflation that is totally out of control. 
That is a fundamental pressure. And 
with the steps they have taken to close 
newspapers, stop opposition rallies, and 
things of that kind, they basically are 
turning off the international community 
all over the world, including in the 
United States. That is where the pres- 
sure comes from. And I might say, the 
fact that there are Nicaraguans who 
are willing to stand up for the freedom 
and independence of their country is a 
very admirable additional point. 

Q. What role will human rights 
play in the future awarding of mili- 



tary aid to the burgeoning democ- 
racies of Central America, such as 
Guatemala? 

Secretary Shultz. We have set out 
here, in this document, a short and elo- 
quent statement of the importance we 
all attach to the principles of democ- 
racy, of genuine democratic govern- 
ment. It has set out all of these 
criteria, and we take them very seri- 
ously in the United States. I believe 
they are taken very seriously by all of 
the governments that are represented 
here at this table. The United States, 
thereby, has responded to the needs of 
these governments, and we are trying 
to be helpful to them in security as- 
sistance, in economic assistance, and in 
assistance having to do with the gen- 
eral operation of democratic govern- 
ments and the rule of law. What we 
need is a Central America that has all 
of the countries here following these 
principles. That is what we are working 
for. 

Q. You have said that there was 
no pressure from the U.S. Secretary 
of State. Nevertheless, there was a 
communique in the press today from 
the Christian Democratic Party, the 
administration party, and you are the 
Secretary General of that party. Are 
you denying what your own party has 
published in the paper today? 

Foreign Minister Cabrera. I would 
like to say that the statement that I 
made rejected what appears to be an 
erroneous statement. There have been 
apocryphal statements that have been 
attributed to the Christian Democratic 
Party, and I have been trying to ascer- 
tain whether it was, in fact, my party 
that issued that statement. I have 
asked the National Committee of the 
party to assess the situation and to as- 
certain the facts. 

Q. Since the Central American 
people are the poorest people on this 
planet, what proposal have you 
brought with you to the Central 
American governments on behalf of 
the U.S. Government, specifically to 
get them out of their state of misery, 
of poverty, as a guarantee to sustain 
peace in this region? 

Secretary Shultz. I think that eco- 
nomic development in a free system is 
the way out of the poverty that is seen 
in this region. I want to say the con- 
trast between what is now happening in 
the four countries represented here and 
what takes place under a different sys- 
tem among basically similar people in 
Nicaragua is eloquent testimony to 
what is the right approach. And the 



department of State Bulletin/October 1988 



THE SECRETARY 



right approach is to have free and open 
systems of government, free and open 
systems of economic development. 

Of course, it is important for coun- 
tries that can do so, such as the United 
States, to be helpful with resources and 
with ideas, and we try to do that. Be- 
yond that, I have felt at the meeting we 
have had here today, we progressed 
quite a bit. We had a really good, can- 
did, frank exchange. I think all of my 
fellow ministers here would agree with 
me. We have talked about the impor- 
tance of continuing our meetings and 
having a systematic way of constructing 
agendas and using our meetings to 
make something happen in various 
areas, including economic development. 

I hope, by the time we have our 
next meeting, we will be able to con- 
struct a plan of action that will include 
resources from the United States but 
also will be a way of coordinating what 
might come from other countries and 
international organizations that also 
have an interest and resources to bring 
to bear — so we have on a systematic 
basis an idea of how to go about this in 
a way that can truly be fruitful. I think 
it is quite possible to give the whole 
situation a lift. But I say that with full 
recognition of the important fact that 
all four of these countries now have real 
economic growth. They all have their 
inflation under control. Things are get- 
ting better. There is a long way to go. 
We all have our problems, but things 
are getting better. So that is an aspect 
of this meeting that I found very con- 
structive and important for the future. 

Not every foreign minister had a 
chance to give a view at this meeting, 
and it seems to me we ought to hear 
from them. You [Foreign Minister 
Cabrera] and I did most of the talking; 
I think we did all of it. I found in the 
meetings the other three had a lot to 
say. 

Honduran Foreign Minister 
Lopez. On behalf of Honduras, I would 
simply like to state very clearly that in 
no way has the Government of Hon- 
duras come to this meeting forced, 
pressured, or under any other type of 
obligation. We have come here volun- 
tarily and on the basis of an agreement 
and of a consensus of the five demo- 
cratic governments represented here. 

As far as Honduras is concerned, I 
can say to you very categorically, there 
is no basis, no foundation, for the spec- 
ulation there might have been an effort 
to obtain a document that was imposed 
by any one country. From the informa- 
tion I have been able to obtain from the 



Honduran delegation that took part in 
three of the phases of the negotiations, 
all of the countries, all of the govern- 
ments, made contributions to the com- 
munique that has been produced. 

I would also like to add that, in my 
view, the document has more depth 
than the depth it had yesterday. It has 
this additional depth because in the 
course of this morning's meeting, we 
had very deep discussions, which in my 
view is really a set of guidelines of the 
type of course of action that we can 
follow — by means of consultation among 
the five governments represented here. 

Salvadoran Foreign Minister 
Acevedo. El Salvador supports the 
message that has been conveyed by my 
colleagues, in the sense that we are 
meeting here in order to strengthen the 
democratic principles that inspire our 
governments in their work. 

We are here to initiate a new phase 
in the diplomatic relations among all of 
our countries. We are searching for 
strategies and solutions that will favor 
and support the economic development 
of our countries. We are searching for a 
closeness based on democracy and so- 
cial justice. We are strengthening de- 
mocracy here — the principles of 
Esquipulas II. We are working on the 
basis of a dialogue, an agreement. And 
those countries, or the country which 
unfortunately has not joined in this 
meeting of the minds, the country that 
is taking measures against democracy, 
is invited to participate — [once it has 
the] credentials of democracy and free- 
dom — in these meetings that are so 
important for the consolidation of 
peace, based on liberty and 
development. 

Costa Riean Foreign Minister 
Madrigal. Since we have not been 
asked any questions, we will have to 
figure out what to say, since you did 
not seem to be interested in asking us 
questions. The time was used up by Mr. 
Shultz and Mr. Cabrera. They were the 
stars of the show. 

In any case, let me say we came 
here with a very constructive spirit to 
reaffirm Esquipulas. The leadership of 
Central America will not be abandoned, 
will not be given up. We are very inter- 
ested in having the Central American 
countries retain their leadership in this 
entire effort for peace and for democ- 
racy. We are fully convinced we need a 
democratic basis, a common democratic 
denominator, so we can make progress 
in the field of peace; so we can develop 
economically; so we can develop a com- 
mon market; so we can interrelate more 



and more culturally, politically, and e 
nomically within Central America. V-, 
believe this is fundamental in this ne' 
world of today. 

Five small countries, if isolated, 
are going to have a much more diffici 
task than if we were united. Therefoij 
for those who felt we came here to I 
bury Esquipulas, for those who felt ' 
would disregard that effort, we comtl 
here to tell you, together and united i 
is quite the opposite. We want to I 
strengthen the principles that inspiri| 
Esquipulas. We are meeting here be I 
cause we are five countries which arl 
very closely interconnected demo- i 
cratically, and that is important. I h; 
believed for a while — and I have ex- 
plained it here, and I have obtained 
understandings of my fellow Central 
American colleagues and from Secre 
tary Shultz — that when the time is 
right, we should have a meeting of t 
five Central American foreign minis 
ters, including Nicaragua, with the 
Secretary of State. Nicaragua has t( 
help us pave the road. 

A country like Costa Rica, that 
totally unarmed, has no army and h 
not had one for 40 years, that wants 
peaceful and negotiated solution, re 
quires, needs, a Nicaragua that will 
move toward democracy so that we 
become the best interlocutors for n(| 
development, for a new stage of spi| 
itual and political growth, and for b« 
ter economic growth as well. 

We believe in the disarmament 
all of the Central American countri| 
honestly. We believe we have to st 
looking at the disproportionate mil 
escalation and help from the Soviet; 
Union to Nicaragua. I believe Pres 
Arias was very right when he wrot 
General Secretary Gorbachev some 
time ago telling him he should stop 
eliminate, limit sending arms to Ni 
aragua. If that were to happen, we 
would like a decrease in sending wt 
ons to any other country in Centra 
America. We have got to reduce th 
We are small countries, and we mu 
devote as much as possible of our 
monies to education, health, and ec 
nomic development. 

What is important at this meet 
is there has been no one who has ii 
posed his view. It would be inaccur i 
to say there was an imposition of v 
on the part of the United States, o; 
the part of any other country. We 1 
had a dialogue, we have cleared up 
document, and we have reached a c 
sensus. It seems to us this is an im 
tant consensus. It is a consensus tl 



Department of State Bulletin/October B 



THE SECRETARY 



s up a sense of hope and shows the 
toward new understandings in sup- 
of values that are common to all of 
Centi'al American countries. 
I believe we must defend proudly, 
our heads high, with pride, our 
locratic principles. I am personally 
ily convinced that only by having 
ictive democracies in Central Amer- 
will we be able to have a dialogue 
t will lead us to peace. We are not, 
eby, trying to impose a system, a 
cifie model, on anyone. We want to 
re values that are indispensable. No 
! can imagine Europe would have 
in united as it is today. No one could 
'e envisioned the organizations and 
titutions that feed the Common Mar- 
, in Europe had it not been for the 
:t all of the governments there are 
mocratic. We want to do the same 
ng in Central America. We want to 
smulate that constructive spirit in 
s )port and in defense of man himself, 
\ h respect for man himself. That is 
i we are asking for. We are asking for 
I :hiiig else. 

That is why we are very pleased to 
I ill (luatemala. The extraordinary 
<l>it;ility of Guatemala must be 
Hiked. We want to thank President 
rezii and Foreign Minister Cabrera 
■ theii- many courtesies and the envi- 
inient that has been tendered to us 
we can address you with so much 
I mkness and with so much independ- 
I ce, as we are now doing. If we plan 
I have future meetings, I hope we can 
ve them with the five foreign minis- 
rs, because we will all be involved in 
process of democratization which will 
sure those values that are so dear to 
e history, the culture, and the civi- 
,ation of Central America. 



UNCHEON TOAST, 
UENOS AIRES, 

UG. 2, 19882 

.r. Minister and distinguished ladies 
id gentlemen; distinguished in many 
ays but most especially by the par- 
cipation in the vitality of the demo- 
ratic process here which has such a 
trong meaning all over the world, as 
'ell as here. 

I deeply appreciate your kind per- 
3nal comments, and I can reciprocate 
lem. I remember very well our meet- 
ig about 5 years ago when we dis- 
issed important topics, and we found 
lat we could do so in a frank and open 
ay. We wound up with great personal 
infidence, and that has helped us 



through these 5 years to make our con- 
tribution to the constructive rela- 
tionship between the United States and 
Argentina. 

The people of the Argentine Re- 
public have overcome great difficulties 
in returning their nation to the demo- 
cratic fold, where it so rightfully be- 
longs, and in establishing a social peace 
based on consensus and mutual respect. 
And in doing so successfully, Argentina 
has provided an e.xample to future gen- 
erations of its citizens and to the world. 

For those who have followed your 
history, Argentina's political achieve- 
ments over the past 5 years are fully 
worthy of the nation which gave birth 
to the liberator, San Martin; the il- 
lustrious educator, Sarmiento; five No- 
bel Prize winners; and a legion of 
world-famed celebrities like poet-novel- 
ist Borges and composer Ginastera. 

While separated by great dis- 
tances, our two nations are inextricably 
linked in the common task of building 
democracy and achieving freedom, 
prosperity, and social justice. Total- 
itarian societies in tyranny don't work. 
They drain people's energies and re- 
sources; they strip away freedom and 
dignity. Argentina and the United 
States must continue working together 
to achieve stable, free, and democratic 
governments in this hemisphere. 

To this end, we must solve prob- 
lems. A stable, advancing economy is 
needed to generate confidence at home 
and abroad. Nothing consolidates politi- 
cal freedom as much as economic prog- 
ress and well-being which needs, in 
turn, sound macroeconomic policies and 
long-term structural reform. It is 
important to keep open the channels of 
international finance and so keep alive 
prospects for sustained growth. 

We are both engaged in the battle 
against international drug trafficking 
and the use of drugs in our societies. 
Drugs threaten the very basic fabric of 
both our nations. A long, hard struggle 
remains ahead. We want to expand still 
further the cooperation between our 
two governments. That cooperation can 
produce results as was shown in the 
seizure of a huge amount of cocaine just 
last month by your federal authorities. 
The United States and Argentina 
are both young nations. The role of im- 
migrants in shaping our societies un- 
derscores the fact that both nations 
have served as a refuge for those seek- 
ing freedom and a better life. Our coun- 
tries are blessed with abundant natural 
resources. The export of commodities 
and raw materials has played a key role 
in the economic development of both 
nations. 



The people of the United States 
and Argentina both aspire to raise 
their children in a climate of democracy 
where peace, justice, and equality of 
opportunity prevail. These similarities 
and many others we hold in common 
provide us with a great potential for 
deepening and expanding our relations. 
Let us commit ourselves to this goal. 

Let us raise our glasses to our 
friendship and to the freedom that we 
share and which is such an integral 
part of our friendship, and to you, Mr. 
Foreign Minister, for all that you have 
done and are doing to further both the 
friendship and the freedom that we 
toast. 



NEWS CONFERENCE, 
BUENOS AIRES, 
AUG. 3, 1988' 

1 have had an extraordinary opportu- 
nity to see many people during 2 days 
here in Argentina, and I want to ex- 
press my warm thanks to President 
Alfonsin and all the others whom I saw 
for the generous hospitality. I had a 
chance to visit with the President, and 
I'll visit with him again this evening at 
a dinner. Of course, my host has been 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, but I've 
also seen the Minister of Finance, the 
Minister of Interior, the Minister of 
Economy, and the Minister of Defense. 
I've had a chance to have a wonderful 
lunch out on the pampas. I've visited 
with a group of other citizens who came 
and joined me for breakfast, and I've 
had a chance to have a session with 
each of the three candidates for 
president. 

So you can see that it's been a busy 

2 days but an extraordinarily interest- 
ing time. Out of this, of course, I have 
many impressions, but the outstanding 
one is how strong and vital is the proc- 
ess of democracy in this country. Of 
course that is som.ething of great mo- 
ment and acclaim throughout the 
world. Argentina has once again 
[taken] its rightful place in world coun- 
cils. And to get a sense of how strongly 
people feel about this question of de- 
mocracy and human rights and the rule 
of law here has been very heartening to 
me. 

We look forward to continuing the 
very good relationship between the 
United States and Argentina through 
the balance of President Alfonsin's 
presidency and with the presidency of 
whoever the people of Argentina decide 
to put there. 



lepartment of State Bulletin/October 1988 



THE SECRETARY 



Q. During your meeting with 
President Alfonsin, we have the infor- 
mation that you talked about the ex- 
ternal debt. What's the meaning of 
the United States about this problem? 
Can America support the last proposi- 
tion of our President in the first days 
of June, in the America Society in 
New York? 

A. There is currently a set of prob- 
lems that are being talked about inten- 
sively, and my government is giving 
strong support to yours in this process; 
there will be an outcome announced, I 
assume sometime very soon. I don't 
want, in any way, to try to get ahead of 
that announcement, so I won't make 
any particular comment, other than to 
say that, in general, we have tried to 
be as supportive as we possibly can of 
the efforts here to bring about eco- 
nomic reform to go with the political 
reform that is so heartening. The eco- 
nomic reform is as needed as the politi- 
cal reform, in our opinion. 

Q. Why didn't you include Chile 
in your tour to Latin America, and do 
you think that there are enough guar- 
antees for the next plebiscite which 
will take place there? 

A. I haven't included Chile like I 
haven't included many other countries, 
because I haven't had the time. I don't 
know whether you've had a chance to 
look at my schedule, but in the space 
of I think, around 10 days including a 
weekend, I will go to 10 countries, so 
I'm pretty busy. That's the reason. 

As far as the plebiscite is con- 
cerned, we want to see — and I don't 
want to try to pass judgment on it 
right here — a full and fair political ex- 
pression in Chile. 

Q. What you have just told us 
about an announcement, I ask you 
without any other detail, was this an- 
nouncement made in these last 
months of the Reagan Administra- 
tion, or at least just was it for the 
next year's Administration? And 
which is the balance that you can 
make of this relationship of the Rea- 
gan Administration with the Alfonsin 
Administration, which is the result of 
the earlier evaluation as to what rela- 
tions of both Administrations? 

A. Any announcement about steps 
to be taken are steps that are going to 
be taken by Argentina, and it is not for 
the United States to make any such 
statements. So the announcement I was 
referring to, when it takes place, and I 
don't know — it's not my position to 
know — but at some point, the Govern- 
ment of Argentina will make a state- 



ment about the situation. What I said 
was my government has been working 
with the Government of Argentina in a 
constructive way and in a supportive 
way. Of course, we have to make what 
statement we make after the country 
whose efforts we're supporting says 
what it is going to do. 

Now as far as the continuity is con- 
cerned, I think it is interesting to take 
note of the fact that both the United 
States and Argentina are right now in 
the midst of election campaigns. In 
both countries, the present incumbent 
will not be in office after the election is 
over. There will be a new president, 
and we are both going to see this proc- 
ess, which is the essence of democracy, 
of a peaceful transition of power from 
one person to another person based on 
the results of an open and free, fair 
electoral process. 

I think it's something to point to as 
important, and it is also important, I 
think, to see that this movement to- 
ward freedom, toward the rule of law, 
toward democracy, is something that is 
taking place all over the world as peo- 
ple see that, whether in political life or, 
I might say, in economic life, it's the 
countries that manage to arrange their 
politics and their economics on an open 
basis that prosper. 

Q. Do you think that the future 
U.S. President will have to face a 
complete plan to foster the develop- 
ment of developing countries to in- 
crease their growth and thus be able 
to soften or mitigate the hardness of 
the way in which the peoples are liv- 
ing since the governments want to 
pay the foreign debt? 

A. There is a plan, so to speak, 
that has become more and more evident 
all over the world, and it doesn't take 
the United States to dream it up, al- 
though President Reagan has talked 
about it continuously in his presidency. 
But it has come more and more to be 
the common wisdom that if you want to 
see economic development in a country, 
then what needs to be done is to 
lighten up the regulatory load that has 
grown so heavy in every country, to 
jjrivatize economic matters, to get tax 
rates down, to get fiscal policies into 
reasonable shape, and to provide in 
general in an economy the openness 
and the incentives and the respect for 
private activities and the zest and en- 
ergy and creativity that they bring as 
basically the engine of economic 
development. 

All of this comes not out of some- 
body's ideology; it comes out of peoples' 
observation. If you look and see around 



the world what countries have pros- 
pered and what countries have not 
prospered, whether you'i-e talking 
about countries that are in an advant 
stage of development and have high ) 
capita income, or whether you're tall 
ing about countries that have startet 
with low or medium per capita incorr 
and have advanced, you find that in j 
cases — all cases — the ones that have 
really advanced are the ones that ha 
opened themselves up, have respects 
the marketplace, have privatized 
things, have encouraged creativity. 

Personally, I think that these el 
ments will be more important, if any 
thing, in the future than they have 
been in the past because of the natu 
of the world economy of which we ar ' 
all a part. Nobody is separate from 
world economy. The nature of that 
economy is changing, and it is based 
the knowledge and information age . 
tributes that call for just the charac 
istics that I have named off 

It isn't going to take a present 
new U.S. President or anybody's ne 
president to find the answer. The ai 
swer is there in the experience that 
countries all around the world have 
had. 

Q. Taking into account the lap 
statements made in England on tl 
part of the Reagan Administratiot 
members and even by personalitie 
from the English Government eva 
uating the Malvinas war situatiot 
and taking into account that in tl . 
country at present we are trying t ; 
military people who intervened in (i 
Malvinas war, how do you relate t il 
to the relations of the United Stal 
with Latin America and all the tl Ij 
that can be implied in this proble ' 

A. It's an interesting question, 
coming from Australia. But in any 
case, I would simply say that my d 
cussions here have been very posit i 
throughout. I have talked with lots f 
different people. We are working e i- 
tively to help support the forces of ?- 
mocracy here. We are encouraged 
see — and I had a very good talk wi 
the Minister of Defense — the effort o 
position the military as responsive t 
civilian rule and at the same time t 
see a good and honorable and stroi 
professional role for the military. V 
are encouraging that and trying to 
work with the defense establishme 
here in every way we can to do tha S 
I think that there may be some 
wounds, but they are healing, and 
that's what we want to have happe; 



Department of State Bulletin/October 18) 



THE SECRETARY 



Q. Did you discuss the provisions 
S. arms to Argentina, or are 
re still restrictions on providing 
IS to Argentina? 

A. There are no restrictions on the 
vision of arms for Argentina. We 
e discussions between the Ministry 
)efense and our own Defense De- 
tment. I was able to carry with me 
)rmal invitation — there had been an 
)rmal one — from Secretary of De- 
36 Carlucci to the Minister of De- 
se here to have a formal and official 
t to Washington, and that was ac- 
ted, so that will take place this fall. 
There are certain lines of equip- 
■iiit where questions get asked, and at 
nc time there are also financial 
ms on how much money there is 
''■to buy things, but basically 
:.— I don't say that we are fully 
U) have a normal and straight- 
w.wi] relationship across the board 
li Ai'uentina. 

(J. Specifically as to U.S. inten- 
t ns vis-a-vis the Argentine situa- 
t n. can you say there is a loan of 
I^haps $500 million — in that neigh- 
i rhood — under discussion now in the 
I litod States to Argentina 
1 audible]? 

A. The question of a bridge loan 
it would be provided — not neces- 
I -ily all by the United States, but we 
uld lead the consortium if there is a 
isortium — is one of the things being 
;cussfd. Again I don't want to make 
y comment on this matter because 

ii for the Government of Argentina to 
ike whatever announcement they 
oose to make. Then we will make a 
; nsequent and supporting announce- 
j mt. It's not a good idea to try to 
nounce these things before they are 
nounced. 

Q. You met with Carlos Menem, 
i e Peronist candidate, and he had 
I Id you about a way of paying up the 
i reign debt. I would like to know if 
lU agree with that formula of the 
ironists to pay the foreign debt. I 
ould like to ask if the U.S. Govern- 
ent fears the victory of the Peronist 
arty in Argentina. 

A. I met with all three candidates 
r president, and I told them all basi- 
illy the same thing: namely, that first 
'all, I wanted to meet with all three 
id I was grateful to each for meeting 
ith me to get to know them since one 
f them presumably will be the presi- 
ent. Second, I wanted to meet with all 
iree to underline the fact that what 
ne United States supports is the dem- 
cratic process. The outcome of the 



process is for the people of Argentina 
to decide. We don't take sides in some- 
body else's electoral process; I don't 
want to express myself about any pref- 
erences at all. It is for the people of 
Argentina. 

As far as the debt question as such 
is concerned, there is in place a strat- 
egy that goes forward on an interna- 
tional basis. It's known as the case-by- 
case approach with a so-called menu of 
options, and I think that over time this 
has evolved — the menu, so to speak, of 
options has increased in number. New 
ways of coping with the reality that is 
represented by the debt are emerging. 
Banks are looking at their own posture. 
So there's a great deal of action and 
intense study in connection with that 
activity, and beyond that I don't want 
to say. 

Q. During your conversations 
with President Alfonsin, have you 
reached any agreement and coinci- 
dence aiming at achieving a solution 
to the debt problem which is of so 
much concern to us? 

A. No, we didn't try to reach any 
particular solution. We discussed a lit- 
tle bit the current economic issues in 
Argentina and the U.S. posture with 
respect to that. I discussed those issues 
at some length with the Minister of Fi- 
nance and with President Alfonsin, in 
addition. 

I had what I thought was an extra- 
ordinarily interesting, stimulating dis- 
cussion with him about world 
developments, including developments 
in South America. I found him to be a 
person of a very creative and interest- 
ing set of instincts and mind and very 
well-informed. We had a discussion that 
went over the time allotted, and I am 
looking forward to having dinner with 
him and continuing it. 

Q. Surely among the subjects you 
have discussed with the President, 
you find the situation in Central 
America. May I ask in this regard: I 
imagine that the U.S.-Nicaraguan re- 
lations are not the best at this mo- 
ment, if you take into account the 
fact that the ambassadors were ex- 
pelled. I would like to know what is 
going to happen with the contra 
support, especially when Reagan 
leaves power, and which are the pos- 
sibilities in reaching an agreement 
according to events in Central Amer- 
ica in recent days? 

A. Yes, we did discuss the issues 
of Central America in several of my 
meetings, and when you say that our 



relations with Nicaragua are not the 
best, I can see you have learned that 
masterpiece of understatement is a way 
to proceed. 

I think that the situation in Cen- 
tral America will continue to have in- 
tense interest from the United States. 
The profile of the subject has been 
raised in my country, and I think we 
see more clearly since the Reagan 
years and the emphasis the President 
has put on our neighborhood and what's 
going on in it, that we see a lot more 
interest, we see a lot more resources 
and attention being devoted to the 
problems of this region. 

As we see it, there has been a 
great deal of positive evolution in the 
area. We see now four, instead of one, 
democratic governments with four 
elected presidents with the rule of law 
increasing in its strength. In each of 
those countries, we see real economic 
growth now taking place, and we see in 
each one of those countries little-to- 
very-moderate inflation. I think the 
highest is 9% a year and the lowest is 
on the negligible side, so they have that 
problem under control and we believe 
are in a position to move forward. 

We see in the fifth country a trag- 
edy, because income per capita has 
dropped perhaps to about half of what 
it was when the present regime came 
in, and we see inflation at levels that 
are hard to calculate. Some of our peo- 
ple say it's going at around 2,000 a year 
and the Nicaraguan Minister of Plan- 
ning the other day said it w'as at 24,000 
per year. It really doesn't matter — 
when you get to that level, you have 
moved away from the money economy. 

So the Government of Nicaragua 
has produced a failure, except that they 
have a huge amount of arms from the 
Soviet Union and its allies, and with 
those arms and an army that is all out 
of proportion as far as Central Ameri- 
can standards are concerned, they in- 
timidate their neighbors. They are a 
destabilizing force, and people are very 
concerned about that in Central Amer- 
ica, in the United States, and, I have 
found, elsewhere in South America as 
well. 

The issue isn't whether that is a 
good thing. The issue comes down to, 
what do you do about it? Of course, I 
think it is important to emphasize the 
positive aspects of democracy and the 
rule of law, to speak against — and we 
feel we speak against — the things that 
are going on there: the closing of news- 
papers, the closing down of radio [sta- 
tions], the breaking up of opposition 
rallies, the murder of labor leaders. All 



)epartment of State Bulletin/October 1988 



THE SECRETARY 



those things are hardly the kind of soci- 
ety that we can admire or have any 
confidence in, and we don't mind saying- 
it. In fact, we think it is incumbent, a 
responsibility, to say it just as we have 
been critical of developments in other 
countries when they were of such a 
nature. 

We think that it is important to 
.support those in such a country who 
are willing to fight for the independ- 
ence and freedom of their own country, 
and we do. Just where the diplomacy of 
this will go remains to be seen, but the 
force of the wave of freedom in this 
hemisphere and around the world is so 
great, the clear arguments in favor of 
more openness — a different approach — 
are so obvious — obvious even to the 
sponsors of the Nicaraguan regime — 
that they themselves are changing. But 
somehow or other I think we and our 
friends are on the right side of this 
issue, and somehow or other in the end 
we are going to prevail. 



ADDRESS TO BUSINESSMEN 

AND BANKERS, 
MONTEVIDEO, 
AUG. 4, 1988< 

Now is a good time and this is the right 
place to discuss the changes that are 
remaking this hemisphere — to see 
where we have come and, more impor- 
tantly, to envision where we might go. 

Now is a good time because we are 
on the threshold of a decade that can be 
a strong finish to this century and a 
springboard into the ne.\t. The 1980s 
have been a decade of sweeping change. 
Democracy has transformed the politi- 
cal map. Economic turmoil is bringing a 
rebirth of free-market thinking and 
practice. Together, political and eco- 
nomic freedom are radically transform- 
ing the hemisphere. 

I take a fundamentally optimistic 
view of the future, even though I am 
well aware that economic problems — 
debt, poverty, inflation, capital flight — 
abound in Latin America as elsewhere 
in the world. But I am optimistic be- 
cause I am convinced these problems 
are soluble with the right mix of at- 
titudes and policies. 

I also believe that, opened to 
change by this explosion of freedom, 
the nations of the Americas have won 
the opportunity to hold their own in the 
powerful current of another revolu- 
tion — the revolution of information 



technology. Whether the Americas 
surge ahead, just keep up, or fall be- 
hind will depend on what policies you 
and we choose. 

This is the right place to think 
about the choices ahead. Uruguay has 
restored its long democratic tradition. 
After 12 years of military rule, it has 
returned with renewed commitment to 
the ranks of democratic nations. Uru- 
guay is also demonstrating the power of 
economic freedom. The current GATT 
[General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Ti'ade] round bears the name of this 
country: what is happening in the 
Uruguay Round can lay the ground- 
work for a world economy that is dy- 
namic because it is free. 

The following apparently unrelated 
facts offer glimpses of the change that 
is happening all around us. 

• In the Indian village of Ocobam- 
ba, high in the Andes, a homemade sat- 
ellite dish pulls in television programs 
from Buenos Aires. In Guatemala City, 
televiewers watch the Cable News Net- 
work from Atlanta, Georgia. 

• In central Brazil, soybean grow- 
ers receive real-time data on Chicago 
Board trading by computer. In Sao 
Paulo, automatic tellers dispense cash 
to bankcard holders around the clock. 

• Businessmen in Rio have sold a 
supermarket to Moscow. Ti-inidad is 
selling nitrogen fertilizer to India. Ven- 
ezuela is actually mixing oil and water 
in a new substance (called "orimulsion") 
to fuel power plants in Japan. 

• In Buenos Aires 5 years ago, 22 
women organized to better participate 
in democracy when military rule ended. 
Today their organization has 8,000 
members working in civic education 
throughout the country. Sister groups 
have sprung up in Brazil and here in 
Uruguay. 

The initiative and genius of free 
men and women are changing the way 
we do things. They are making this the 
age of the ballot box, free market, and 
computer chij) — a time of parallel and 
converging revolutions. 

Technological Revolution 
and the Global Economy 

Freedom to compete brought the revo- 
lutions of the ballot box and free mar- 
ket. It is also key to success in the new 
global economy. 

What kind of global economy are 
we talking about? The oft-heard gener- 
alities may sound glib, but they are 
true. It is an environment of increasing 



interdependence and rapid, accelerate 
change. It is postindustrial, in that 
services count for more and more of f ! 
worlds business. And it is irreversibi' 
altered by the information age. These I 
are sweeping characterizations. But | 
they are timid approximations of the I 
forces moving the world we live in. 

The very material substances of ti 
physical world are being transformed 
New substances are being created. ' 
substances are finding new uses. Spa-i 
is measured in microns; time in nano-l 
seconds. Ideas add the greatest value 
new products. The worth of a chip or | 
floppy disk has almost nothing to do , 
with its plastic or silicon content and | 
everything to do with the informatioi| 
etched inside. 1 

Technology has linked distant mi^ 
kets, lessened dependence on natura 
raw materials, and created new form 
of economic activity. In the emergini 
global economy, abundant natural re- 
sources do not guarantee prosperity. 
Distance from traditional markets di , 
not preclude success. In agriculture 
alone, today's research promises chan : 
that will dwarf the green revolution. 
Uruguayan statesmen once help 
inspire the League of Nations. So y( 
in Uruguay know that labels like 
"small" and "out of the way" mean li .' 
to countries that grasp the bigger p 
ture. This is as true in economics as 
is in politics. Today Israeli farmers i i 
microelectronic agricultural system.< i 
supply 80% of the cut flowers in Eu 
rope; they compete effectively in 
avocado markets in New York. Som' 
farmers in Guatemala have rejected 
dependence on traditional crops and 
(i-month growing season. They grow 
crops year round with yield increas( 
between 20% and 600%. Thinking b. 
yond the limits of convention, these 
farmers are growing "winter crops" i 
export — "snow peas" from the troi)i 
Already, countries in this hem- 
isphere produce more than three- 
quarters of the world's soybeans. Tl 
pi'otein-rich, soil-enriching plant is t 
just a food, food supplement, and li - 
stock feed. It is an industrial com- 
modity that can be used to make an 
array of products — from rubber sub 
stitutes to artificial petroleum. Not 
moreover, that this widespread cult a 
tion of soybeans in South America i 
due, in large measure, to research i n 
on this continent — research to adaji 
plant strains to conditions where b( ii 
thev could not flourish. 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1B 



THE SECRETARY 



' What counts is innovation, 
^jativity — freedom and capacity to see 
Ift'ond what is to what can be. Coun- 
fies must decide whether they will be 
j(ong the innovators, the imitators, or 
fjise who are left behind. What counts 
isound policy. 

iidelines 

Siat does it take specifically to pros- 
• in the new global economy? Three 
ftors are essential. 

I! First, societies must be open. 

Jiowledge is the key resource in the 
lerging world economy: the genera- 
tn and diffusion of ideas is its hall- 
mrk. Democratic societies have the 
i^pect for free thought, free expres- 
' n. and free association to enable 
■ ir citizens to take full advantage of 
; ' new age of information. An open 
irty does not impose any one vision 
ail ideal order. As the practice of 
■eiluin becomes the habit of freedom, 
Hiii'stions assumptions, challenges 
ecdiiceptions, upsets habits, and 
'^es risks. Freedom is not a panacea 
t a process that liberates people to 
ajit, to change, to prosper. 

I'lilitically, the countries of Latin 
neiica are among the winners in the 
giiiiig global competition. Nowhere in 
e wdrld has the movement to democ- 
c\ l)t'en more dramatic. When Presi- 
nt Keagan spoke to the students and 
I culty of Moscow State University on 
(ay 31, he proudly highlighted a fact 
lU have lived. In the 1970s, only a 
ird of the people of Latin America 
id the Caribbean enjoyed democratic 
)vernment. Today, over 90% do. 

This democratic revolution has 
een the work of many individuals: 
oters and politicians, men and women 
'the right, left, and center who share 
commitment to self-government. It 
as taken leaders like Jose Napoleon 
'uarte, Eugenia Charles, Victor Paz 
stenssoro, Raul Alfonsin — and your 
resident, Julio Maria Sanguinetti, who 
eserves recognition as a statesman of 
ontinental rank. 

Closed societies shut out knowl- 
dge. They are bound to fall farther 
nd farther behind. Countries that re- 
use to perceive this and to act upon it 
hoose second-class status. The Soviet 
Jnion and China are just beginning 
understand that without openness, it 
s impossible to assimilate new ideas 
ind information with which our age 
ibounds. Without openness, it is impos- 
ible to have the flexibility, initiative. 



Latin America's Trade Surplus, 1983-87 




1983 1984 1985 

Source: IMF Direction ot Trade 1988 Statistics 



and the willingness to experiment. 
Only open societies and free markets 
prosper from change. 

This brings me to a second 
guideline: We must rely on incentives, 
enterprise, and the market. Central 
planning cannot cope with the pace or 
magnitude of technological change. Re- 
sources must respond to opportunity. 
Statist models do not work. In a world 
of rapid shifts in comparative advan- 
tage, governments do not create 
wealth, and plans cannot coerce 
growth. The free operation of the 
marketplace of goods and ideas is by 
far the most efficient arbiter of 
decisions. 

A rebirth of free-market thinking 
and practice in the hemisphere is be- 
ginning to follow in the wake of the 
movement to democracy. Brazil and 
Mexico, Latin Americas two most 
powerful economies, have both declared 
economic freedom the road to sustained 
growth. Announcing plans to liberalize 
trade. President Sarney said: "We 
intend to untie our economy so that it 
may enjoy the winds of freedom that 
are already benefiting other sectors of 
our country." Important barriers re- 
main, but the direction is clear. 

Over the last 5 yeai's, Mexico has 
lowered tariffs from a maximum 100% 
in 1986 to 20% last year. At the same 



time, exports of non-oil goods have in- 
creased by 25%-30% every year since 
1983. Internal reforms have been 
equally ambitious. 

Political and economic progress has 
not been uniform. It has not followed 
any timetable. In many cases, practice 
lags behind official intentions. In oth- 
ers, policy lags behind popular prac- 
tice. In Chile, the freedom that informs 
that productive marketplace is still to 
transform the political forum. In Ar- 
gentina, active public debate is contrib- 
uting to a search for more open and 
outward-looking economic policies. 

In short, the openness at the heart 
of political competition can, if brought 
to economic competition, help countries 
survive and prosper in the swift cur- 
rents of the modern global economy. 

The third guideline is: We must 
enhance our cooperation. We still talk 
about "the world order." But there is 
nothing static about global politics or 
economics. Multilateral organizations 
have proliferated. Their agendas over- 
lap. Decisionmakers face more issues of 
greater complexity. Global politics is 
changing to keep pace with global eco- 
nomic and technological change. 

Hemispheric diplomacy is also 
changing. The OAS [Organization of 
American States] is as active in human 
rights as in peacekeeping. The Con- 
tadora group is now the Group of 



)epartment of State Bulletin/October 1988 



THE SECRETARY 



Eight. Its focus is now culture and eco- 
nomics as well as politics and security. 
There is no guarantee that what comes 
out of such groups will lead to wider 
agreement. But cooperation is essen- 
tial. Consultation is essential. These 
are guidelines for our generation and 
the next. But there are problems, right 
here and now, we need to identify and 
solve if we are to keep up today. Let 
me note some issues on which global, 
regional, and domestic cooperation is 
needed right now. 

International Economic Cooperation 

The Uruguay Round is at the center of 
global economic cooperation. In Sep- 
tember 1986, trade ministers from more 
than 92 countries gathered at Punta del 
Este, here in Uruguay, to launch a new 
round of global trade talks. Inspired by 
the original open-market, free-trade 
goals of GATT, the current round has 
enormous potential to lay the founda- 
tions for what President Reagan hopes 
we can call the "Roaring Nineties." 

Progress in agricultui-e is long 
overdue. Taking hold of the future re- 
quires that we break through the bar- 
riers of traditional thinking and ways of 
doing things. The OECD [Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment] estimates that each year the 
world spends $150 billion on agriculture 
in the form of direct government pay- 
ments and higher costs to consumers. 
This calculation does not include the 
damage to the agricultural sectors of 
developing countries caused by excess 
products dumped on world markets. 
The Uruguay Round is a chance to turn 
away from costly subsidies and lost op- 
portunities and turn toward cultivating 
the potential of our planet. 

Although tariffs are not the central 
focus of the round, they are an impor- 
tant impediment to trade, as are non- 
tariff barriers, which have themselves 
become a significant problem in the 
world trading system. 

The new items on the GATT 
agenda include issues we must address 
if the full promise of the technological 
revolution is to be realized. The issues 
of services, intellectual property, and 
investment are important globally and 
especially relevant to the countries of 
this hemisphere. 

The U.S. Trade Representative, 
Clayton Yeutter, puts services in the 
top echelon of our concerns. Service in- 
dustries like engineering, data proc- 
essing, insurance, and tourism have 
been a growth sector in the United 
States. They are responsible for 62% of 



the U.S. GNP [gross national product] 
and 90% of the job creation in the last 
4-5 years. 

Other countries are having similar 
experiences. In 1987, Jamaica, for the 
first time in its history, welcomed a 
million tourists; 35% of its foreign ex- 
change is from tourism. Services count. 
Data processing jobs in the Caribbean 
are projected to jump from 3,500 in 
mid-1987 to 20,000 in 1990. Services 
count. They are essential inputs to 
growth, too. Corporate customers in 
developing countries critically need 
services to stay competitive in world 
markets. Too often, however, many 
services are not available, owing to 
protection. 

Intellectual property is an issue 
typical of the world we are entering. 
Ti'ade has come increasingly to en- 
compass the commercial exchange of 
ideas — embodied in print, in chemical 
formulas, in information electronically 
encoded and stored. When ideas be- 
come unique items in trade, difficult 
questions arise. For example, what 
does it mean for the protection of prop- 
erty rights when property becomes 
"intellectual" — when information stored 
in the memory of a machine can be pi- 
rated by a computer bandit and repli- 
cated in a foreign clone? This is a 
critical and vexing question for the 
Uruguay Round. 

The right to market new ideas, to 
recover the investment in research, and 
to profit from innovation — all require an 
equitable, enforceable, and transparent 
set of principles relating to intellectual 
property. The world trading system — 
therefore, GATT — has to recognize the 
role of intellectual property in an open 
and equitable world market. 

Investment issues and trade issues 
are inseparable. Restrictions on invest- 
ment flows distort trade flows — and 
vice versa. If the next decade is to 
make up for the lagging economic 
growth of the 1980s, renewed inflows of 
private, direct investment will be re- 
quired. Venture-specific equity financ- 
ing, domestic or foreign, is a basis for 
growth. The funds are there. So is the 
international competition for capital. 
The competitors include many countries 
that have enjoyed, for some time, the 
edge which market-based policy gives. 
The only way ever invented to attract 
equity capital is to assure an attractive 
investment climate. And that means 
structural reforms to free up markets, 
promote trade, and encourage private 
entrepreneurship. Those who compete 
poorly or choose not to compete at all 
face slim development prospects. 



The United States, I am proud 
to say, has championed the cause of 
economic freedom in the world. U.S. 
policy has long recognized that a pro- 
growth global economy must be free, 
open, and competitive. U.S. support! 
a free global economy order is as old . 
Franklin Roosevelt's call for reciproca 
free trade and as i-ecent as the Uru- 
guay Round. Bilaterally and multi- | 
laterally, we have stood for market- i 
based solutions to economic problems 
and called for market-led economic | 
growth strategies. | 

We have argued, again and again 
the disastrous consequences of begga 
thy-neighbor policies. Protectionism i 
a lose-lose situation for all players. It 1 
will be difficult, no doubt, to resist pi 
tectionist pressures. Ultimately, lead 
ership is required to sustain support 
for policies that make the best sense 
in the long run. 

Regional Economic Cooperation 

The United States has played, and w^ 
continue to play, an important role ii 
regional economic cooperation and 
growth. We have championed free tr. 
in the area, resisted the calls for pro 
tection, and opened our market to 
hemispheric trade. 

Our openness to products from 
other countries in the hemisphere iSi 
measured by our balance of trade. 
From the onset of the debt crisis, 
United States has imported $43-$^ 
billion of goods and services from 
region per year. Latin America has 
had a trade surplus with us rangini 
tween $13.3 billion and $20.9 billion. 
Our deficit supports free and fair 
trade. 

The United States advocates re 
gional economic cooperation. The C; 
ibbean Basin Initiative (CBI) mater 1 
improved the lives of countless peoj 
in the Caribbean. President BalagU( c 
the Dominican Republic called the ( I 
"the most constructive initiative... e r 
come to Latin America, [including] e 
Good Neighbor Policy... and the Al- 
liance for Progress." 

Ti-ade agreements among BrazL 
Argentina, and Uruguay strengthen 
cooperation in the southern cone. 
CARICOM's [Caribbean Community 
recent decision to bring down trade 
barriers among states in the easteri 
Caribbean is a similar move in the i 
direction. 

These are all promising develof 
ments. When initiatives are sustain 
real progress shows over time. I an" 
just back from Asia, an area that h. 



10 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1i 



THE SECRETARY 



(,jilved very successful regional eco- 
rjnie policy — based on an outward- 
Ikiiiu apiiroach. An approach that is 
h dutward looking and regional can 
,a powerful springboard for global 
e momic activity and engagement. 

nustic Policies 

nii'siic economic policy must be in 
ic with global economic reality. 
uiitries unable to change their do- 

nstic policy will be the victims of 

cinge in the global economy. 

The overall picture for Latin Amer- 

ii and the Caribbean is not bright. 

Foiiiimic growth at 2.6% is bai"ely 
A I m-owth in population. The world 
iiM\ iiig fast, and Latin America must 
•\c faster if it is to catch up. 

I ast month I spoke to the Asso- 
tmii (if South East Asian Nations 
SIIAN) in Jakarta. Those countries 
M' achieved enormous economic 

I Ills. They have been successful for 

I o I'casons. 

First, their political systems and 
■ iiKiiiiic policies open their societies 
il promote economic growth. 

Second, they are outward looking. 
ey lecognize that foreign markets of- 
■ tremendous opportunities for sales, 
IS, and, above all, economic and tech- 
logical development. 

Latin America cannot be satisfied 
I th the steps it has taken in these 
I rections. But what Asia has done, 
i itin America can do. Consider these 

ises. 

• It is hard to imagine an economic 
;uation worse than Bolivia's in 1985. 
•ices rose by 24,000%, a modern 

jrld record. In some regions, vendors 
aighed money instead of counting it. 
.rikes were endemic. Workers missed 
1 average 100 workdays in 1984. Then 
le new government, elected in 1985, 
troduced reforms based on free- 
arket principles. Inflation is down to 
1% per year. After years of stagnation, 
le economy is again showing real 
rowth. 

• After a decline of 16% in real 
DP [gross domestic product] in 
:>82-84, Uruguay attained a remark- 
ble 6.3% advance in real growth in 
386. Since then, growth has been 
lower but steady. 

• Even with the combined pres- 
ures of an active insurgency and drug 
rafficking, Colombia has scored real 
;ains of 5% or more in economic growth 
n 1986 and 1987; it should repeat that 
lerformance this vear. 



Annual Change in Real Per Capita GDP, 1980-87 

Percent 

7 — 



Africa 

Asia 

Latin 
America 




1980 1981 1982 1983 

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook 1987 



• In the Caribbean, the Jamaican 
economy has grown over 6%, unemploy- 
ment has declined about 7%, and infla- 
tion has been reduced from 12% to 7%. 

It took a new way of thinking to 
produce these results. More than that, 
it took a decision to implement changes 
and to follow through. Common to these 
cases is resolute implementation of out- 
ward-looking policies aimed at trade 
and e.xchange liberalization, deregula- 
tion, privatization, and market-based 
pricing. Market-based poUcies make the 
difference. 

The new president of the Inter- 
American Development Bank, Enrique 
Iglesias of Uruguay, says: "There is a 
new pragmatism in the air, a growing 
acceptance of the need to reduce the 
role of the state, expand and diversify 



e.xports, and make profound adjust- 
ments in the production structures 
of Latin American economies." 

Debt: A Problem With 
Many Ramifications 

Any discussion of economic develop- 
ments in Latin America must address 
the political and economic problems as- 
sociated with debt — and those problems 
are very real and very difficult. The 
hard realities must all be faced. They 
must be faced by everyone — creditors 
and debtors alike. 

The most basic realities are these: 
the only solutions available will take 
time and effort; and a case-by-case 
approach with a menu of options has 
proven to be the only workable way to 
bring creditoi's and debtors together. 

To debtors, I would say that 
growth remains the key and that, today 
as in the past, growth requii'es invest- 



)epartment of State Bulletin/October 1988 



THE SECRETARY 



ment. The more savings you can gener- 
ate in your own country, the better. But 
you will also need capital flows from 
abroad. 

A country can test itself on the 
progress it is making. Do its own sav- 
ings stay home and get applied to its 
own capital needs? Is domestic private 
capital returning from abroad or is it 
continuing to flee? If the answers are 
positive, the counti-y will find itself in 
good standing in what we might call 
the court of the allocation of world sav- 
ings. If the answers are negative, the 
country should take a hard look at its 
own decisions about economic policy 
and ask: 

• "Has the process of economic re- 
form been as thorough and comprehen- 
sive as possible?" 

• "Are structural and regulatory 
rigidities still a stubborn reality?" 

• "Are incentives to work, save, 
and invest adequate?" 

To creditors, I would repeat that 
they, too, must look to the solution 
rather than to the size of the problem. 
They must continue to work with debt- 
ors, and they must learn to take into 
account what amounts to a marginal 
rate of taxation on political and eco- 
nomic reform that is simply too high. 
Reform is difficult, and if all the gains 
are taken away by debt service, then 
the necessary process may simply not 
get underway. 

The Impetus of Freedom 

To conclude, it should surprise no one 
that we North Americans should be- 
lieve that freedom is the power that can 
propel this half of the globe to levels of 
unprecedented opportunity and growth. 
More than a century ago, the French- 
man De Tocqueville wrote that: 

Democratic liberty is far from accom- 
plishing all its projects with the skill of an 
adroit despotism.... [B]ut in the end it 
produces more than any absolute govern- 
ment. Democracy does not give the people 
the most skillful government, but it pro- 
duces what the ablest governments are fre- 
quently unable to create: namely, an all- 
pervading and restless activity, a super- 
abundant force... an energy which is in- 
separable from it and which may, however 
unfavorable circumstances may be, produce 
wonders. 

Today all of us in the Americas can 
make the choices that will produce won- 
ders that neither De Tocqueville nor we 
could yet imagine. 



NEWS CONFERENCE, 
MONTEVIDEO. 
AUG. 4, 1988^ 

President Sanguinetti and his col- 
leagues, my direct host Foreign Minis- 
ter Barrios — ^just now I had a good 
visit with the Finance Minister, Mr. 
Zerbino. All have been most cordial. I 
want to e.xpress my appreciation to 
them and others: President Pascale of 
the Central Bank, who sponsored the 
talk that I gave, for their cordiality and 
even more than that, for this exhibition 
of political freedom in action and eco- 
nomic freedom in action. 

Political and economic reform and 
freedom work. What has been happen- 
ing here in Uruguay in the last 
3 years — I i-emember when I came to 
the inauguration in 1985 — is a very 
good example. That doesn't mean there 
aren't problems; there are problems 
everywhere. But what we see are prob- 
lems being resolved. It was a marker, I 
think, that at the very interesting 
luncheon that President Sanguinetti 
gave, there were not very many people 
present, but there were representatives 
of all of the political parties, including 
the opposition parties. We had a very 
stimulating conversation. I want to ex- 
press my gratitude for all that. 

Q. Specifically, what topics did 
you deal with with President 
Sanguinetti? 

A. We shared views about things 
going on in this region, in Central 
America, Panama. We shared views 
about developments in the Soviet 
Union, the relationship between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. 
We had a very interesting discussion, 
over luncheon, of changes taking place 
in the world economy, the global econ- 
omy, and, of course, we discussed the 
developments in political and economic 
freedoms here in Uruguay and various 
bilateral issues having to do with trade 
and support programs. 

It was a very constructive and sys- 
tematic discussion, and I was very 
pleased to have a chance to meet with 
him. He has given extraordinary lead- 
ership, just as Uruguay has given, in a 
sense, a touchstone on a world basis to 
the problem of expanding trade and its 
leadership of what is known as the 
"Uruguay Round" now of the current 
GATT negotiations. 

Q. You spoke with the Minister 
of Finance, Mr. Zerbino. What eco- 
nomic topics did you deal with? .\nd I 
would like to know before the end of 



the Reagan Administration, will ther 
be softer treatment for the foreign 
debt? 

A. I asked the minister to tell me 
about what has happened in Uruguay 
the economic field during the .3 years ( 
so of his administration and the result: 
of that, and he did in a very careful ar 
interesting way. I think, basically, the 
story is a success story — one that neei 
to be observed carefully, because it is 
story of opening markets, of opening 
yourself to trade, of not having capita 
controls and exchange controls, and, i 
general, of trying to free up the 
system. 

The contrast between the last 
3 yeai's and the 3 years that preceded 
startling. Whereas in the previous pe- 
riod, there was a decline in real GNP, 
in this period there has been a steadj 
increase; whereas in the previous pe- j 
riod, there was a rise in inflation, in 
this period there has been a decline i 
the rate of inflation. 

In the talk that I gave earlier th:i 
afternoon, I said that it seemed to m 
test that any country could apply to 
itself in resolving the question of 
whether it was on the right track wa< 
this: Are the savings generated in yo 
country staying here and being appli 
to the development of your own coun 
or are they fleeing? And is capital, ii 
general, fleeing or is it returning to 
that country? 

I think it is very interesting to s 
that in the case of Uruguay, capital i 
returning; and that is an expression 
confidence of people who put their o' 
resources on the line. I think is a fu. 
damental good sign. This was the pr 
cipal thing that we talked about. We 
also talked about such things as che^t 
quotas and wool textile negotiations 
and things of that kind a little bit m 
particular, and which I was glad to 1 ii 
the point of view expressed by my 
friends from Uruguay. 

Q. I would like to know if dur g 
your talks with the President and 
during your talks with the Foreigr 
Minister, did you talk specifically 
about Panama and the relations of 
Panama with the United States? A I, 
if you did, were you able to find a 
specific solution to that problem? 

A. We had a brief reference to ir 
my talks with the President, but I Id 
a little bit more time on the subject , 
with the Foreign Minister. About al 
can say on the subject is that Urugi 
has been willing to be constructive, 
the extent that it can, in a quiet wa 
Nevertheless, at this point, there's 
nothing in particular to report on tl( 
score. 



12 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1l8| 



THE SECRETARY 



Q. We would like to know if there 
any differences between the Gov- 
ments of Uruguay and the United 
tes? Are there any differences, and 
o. what are they? And also, we 
ild like to know if the U.S. policy 
ard Central America has reached 
t of an impasse until the time 
en U.S. elections are held. 
A. We have many things that we 
c about. We don't necessarily see 
m all eye-to-eye, but by-and-large. I 
ik I could characterize— and I be- 
•e the representatives of the Govern- 
nt of Uruguay, President Sanguinetti 
I others who say our relationships 
excellent. We talk of our problems 
[i direct way and have managed to 
olve them.We have a constructive 
•hange on various issues dealing with 
nblems in this area. I don't think 
ire are any major differences or 
(blems. 

i As far as Central America is con- 
■ned, the policies of the United 
ites are strong and basically suc- 
j.sful and will be ongoing. Nev- ^ 
jheless, problems remain. What's 
xessful is that we now see in Central 
lerica four countries governed by ci- 
ian, democratically elected presi- 
its, instead of just one. We see all 
ir of those democratic countries ex- 
riencing real growth in their econo- 
«s, seeing inflation very much under 
Vitrei— the highest rate of inflation 
Ing 9% and others lower than that — 
jd we see the rule of law, we see re- 
ject for human values increasingly a 
|rt of their lives. That's the successful 
«rt. 

The part that troubles us and trou- 
3s lots of people is that in Nicaragua 
lat we see is a failure, a human 
lure. We see income per capita now 
out half of what it was when the 
^ndinistas took over. We see inflation 
wild that, in effect, they have, for all 
tents and purposes, abandoned the 
oney economy. We see them breaking 
) opposition rallies, dosing news- 
ipers and radio stations. We see labor 
aders murdered. We see, in general, 
1 atmosphere of repression in which 
iman values don't seem to have much 
I' a place. That's a tragedy. It's a trag- 
liy for the people of Nicaragua. We'd 
ke to see that changed and others 
■ould. 

We support those who would like 
change it. It's also a tragedy in a 
reader sense for the region, because 
long with this degradation of hfe in 
liearagua has come the emergence of 
military capacity way beyond any other 



Central American country, with a very 
heavy amount of Soviet support in the 
form of armaments. That's a threat in 
the region, and, from our standpoint, 
it's a potential threat to the United 
States, not because of anything Nic- 
aragua as such would do, but because 
the existence of Soviet power and air 
fields and port facilities potentially is a 
problem, as far as the United States is 
concerned. 

There has been a lot going for- 
ward, and we'll continue working on the 
positive aspects of what's happened in 
Central America. But, nevertheless,^ 
there is a problem, a cancer, and we'll 
have to try to do everything we can to 
stop it from growing and try to put it 
right. 

Q. [Inaudible] to another area of 
the world, the Middle East. Today 
.Jordan announced the retiring of all 
Palestinian government and munici- 
pal employees in the occupied territo- 
ries and the firing of nongovern- 
mental Palestinian employees. These 
are people who work in health, agri- 
culture, social affairs, and education. 
I know in the past you said that King 
Hussein still continues to have a ma- 
jor role to play in the process. But 
are you concerned about the services 
that mav be denied to the Palesti- 
nians in the occupied territories, and 
is this destabilizing for peace? 

A. This is an important step, and it 
is simply the implementation of the 
things that King Hussein announced m 
his speech on Sunday. Ambassador 
Murphy [Assistant Secretary for Near 
Eastern and South Asian Affairs Rich- 
ard W. Murphy] is in the region right 
now and will be consulting with people 
in the region, including in Jordan. 
When I have his report, I'll be able to 
see a little more clearly exactly what 
the implications of this are. 

But, obviously, King Hussein is ba- 
sically saying, "I have been declared by 
the Arab" world as not the spokesman 
for the people on the West Bank and 
Gaza and under those circumstances 
I'm following through on the implica- 
tions of that statement." I've said be- 
fore—and I believe it is clearly the 
case— that King Hussein must be an 
important part of any effective peace 
process, if for no other reason than the 
border between Israel and Jordan— it's 
the longest border Israel has with any 
Afsb stst-G. 

It's obvious that if there is to be 

peace between Israel and its neighbors 

then that has to include peace between 



Israel and Jordan. How exactly the Pal- 
estinian issues are to be resolved, what 
the negotiating structure will be, is a 
question that is certainly more open 
now and more difficult now. But I don't 
rule out that in some way King Hussein 
will be involved— he historically has 
been. I'll be better able to answer that 
question after I hear from Ambassador 
Murphy. 

Q. The Government of Uruguay 
in the past has opposed the idea of 
contras receiving military aid. Did 
they change their position in light of 
the recent events in Nicaragua? 

A. I haven't been going around 
trying to persuade people to support 
assistance for the democratic resist- 
ance. This is something that's being de- 
bated in the United States. I believe 
that we will see a new vote on that 
subject in the Congress. 1 think, the 
actions of the Government of Nicaragua 
recently have, very frankly, embar- 
rassed "those in our Congress who have 
supported them by what they've done, 
and so a somewhat new picture has 
been presented. Basically as I said a 
few moments ago, it's fundamentally a 
question of seeing success — painfully 
hard-earned success— on the part of the 
four democratic countries, and what we 
see in Nicaragua is failure. 

NEWS CONFERENCE, 

BRASILIA, 

AUG. 5, 1988« 

I've had a very good day of discussions 
here with great warmth and hospitality. 
We've gone through quite a number of 
issues. I've had the opportunity for a 
very long and interesting and cordial 
meeting with President Sarney and 
luncheon with the Foreign Minister, Mr. 
Sodre, and with the Finance Minister, 
Mr. Nobrega, as is appropriate in visit- 
ing a sister democracy with a structure 
of government similar to ours. I had an 
opportunity to visit the President of 
the Supreme Court. Shortly after I 
leave this press conference, I will meet 
with the President of the Constituent 
Assembly. 

Accumulating all these talks to- 
gether, we've discussed our general 
view of the world economy and the sup- 
port that the United States is glad to 
lend to Brazil's economic efforts. Brazil 
is a long-time friend and the eighth 
largest economy in the free world. We 
talked about a variety of trade issues. 



^onartmont of State Bulletin/October 1988 



13 



THE SECRETARY 



We've had excellent discussions of our 
cooperative activities and views about 
narcotics trafficking, and we've touched 
on matters of common concern around 
the world from Central America, south- 
ern Africa, Iran-Iraq, Middle East, 
Cambodia. 

We've had a very stimulating dis- 
cussion about future trends, particu- 
larly with President Sarney, who has 
thought a great deal about the develop- 
ments that are in store for us. All in 
all, it's been a very interesting and 
worthwhile day and a day of great 
friendliness and cordiality. 

Q. After a long day of conversa- 
tion with President Sarney, with the 
Minister of Finance, and with the 
Minister of External Affairs, how 
would you describe a general balance 
in more specific terms, particularly 
with respect to the question of trade 
retaliations? 

A. In general we shared our view 
that the relations between Brazil and 
the United States are excellent. We do 
have some disputes, most particularly 
on trade issues. We discussed them and 
put them into their broad perspective, 
and we will hope to keep working at 
them and resolve them. We've agreed 
that we should try to do that, and I 
believe that we will be able to work 
successfully on them. 

Q. Will you comment on the fol- 
lowing? In the past, in the area of 
information, when the newspapers 
published the possibility of retalia- 
tions in that area, even though these 
retaliations did not come about, this 
already had a damaging effect on the 
nation's exports — perhaps in a value 
even greater than the expected re- 
taliations. Recent events have come 
to the same conclusion, and Brazilian 
exports are already suffering damage 
due to this. Would you comment on 
this? 

A. I don't know that there's any 
evidence of any damage. The U.S. mar- 
ket is the largest foreign market for 
Brazilian goods and services — I think 
amounting to about 27% of the total 
Brazilian exports — and that continues. 
So I don't think there's any particular 
immediate effect. There are, of course, 
broad world trends underway, and we 
do see the U.S. firms very competitive 
these days all over the world, so we 
have an export boom going on in the 
United States. But, nevertheless, Bra- 
zil continues to find us its largest mar- 
ket, and I don't see any reason to 
believe that would change. 



Q. Some South Americans believe 
the United States, during the years of 
the Reagan Administration, has ne- 
glected South America because of its 
focus on Central America. Certainly 
Central America, I'm sure, has taken 
up much more of your time than 
South America. I assume this is be- 
cause of security considerations, or is 
my assumption wrong? 

A. In the first place, we have 
worked a lot with our friends in South 
America. In fact, we happen to be right 
here in Brasilia, and I very well re- 
member coming here with President 
Reagan and going to Sao Paulo on that 
trip and to other countries in South 
America. 

One of the preoccupations in these 
last few years in our hemisphere has 
been the debt problem, and no country 
has worked harder with the countries 
of this region than the United States in 
trying to keep that problem in hand. 
The most recent evidence for that, as 
was remarked to me in most of our 
meetings and most recently by the Min- 
ister of Finance, is the bridge loan that 
the United States provided to help Bra- 
zil in its present moment of economic 
reform. So we have worked with a 
great deal of effort on that issue. 

We've also worked with the coun- 
tries of South America on the problem 
of narcotics trafficking, and this has 
been a very good, strong cooperative 
effort. There have been many ways in 
which we've been very active with our 
friends in South America. 

It certainly is true that the profile 
of interest and concern and effort on 
the problems of Central America and 
the Caribbean has been higher in the 
Reagan Administration than in the 
past. I think it's fair to say, perhaps, a 
reasonable criticism of the United 
States is that we haven't paid enough 
attention to Central America in the 
past, and that's why the problems have 
been difficult to resolve. 

But I think we have made a great 
deal of progress in that regard, and I 
might say it's not as though the coun- 
tries of South America aren't concerned 
about developments in Central Amer- 
ica; quite to the contrary. It comes up 
everywhere, and I've had good discus- 
sions here about those problems as in 
the other countries that I've visited so 
far. 

Q. Did you bring up your con- 
cerns, or the American concerns, 
about the potential sales of Brazilian 
arms to the Middle East, particularly 
to Libya? And secondly, after your 
talks so far today, do you share the 



view of some officials in your Depart- 
ment that Brazil has not assumed fu' 
responsibility as one of the major eco 
nomic powers in the world? 

A. One of the statements that was'| 
made to me by the Brazilian Foreign 
Minister in my first meeting today wasl 
the desire of Brazil to be a full partnei 
and to work with us and with others oil 
the problems that we share around the' 
world. President Sarney developed the' 
point that in the world we are in and I 
increasingly moving into — the informa-l 
tion age — we are more and more all in I 
volved in a global environment so that 
we have to take an interest in these i 
things. I found those statements to be 
very positive ones. 

As far as the arms sales question 
concerned, we did talk about it, and ii 
particular I expressed my concerns- 
which we talk about with our friends i 
over the world — about three types of 
weapons that we consider to be partic 
larly potentially destabilizing. One is 
nuclear weapons; another is chemical 
weapons; and a third is ballistic mis- 
siles that carry or can carry those pai' 
ticular weapons. 

I talked about our efforts to redi 
nuclear arms and our agreements wit 
the Soviet Union, our efforts in non- 
proliferation, our efforts to negotiate 
ban on chemical weapons — the alarmi ' 
nature of that field and how they hav^ 
been used in the Iran-Iraq war. The 
genie is sort of out of the bottle, and 
think we all have a great stake in stu 
ing it back in again, if we can. Then, 
course, ballistic missiles are a partici 
lar threat. I'm sure that we will con- 
tinue to discuss those subjects 
constructively. 

Q. We would like for you to coi 
ment if you think that Brazil now 1 5 
the conditions to build ballistic mis 
siles capable of carrying weapons a I 
selling them to the Middle East. 

A. I think that is for the Brazili; 5 
to comment on. Ballistic missile tech 
nology is something that we see in v: ■ 
ous parts of the world. We have beei 
particularly concerned about sales in 
the Middle East from China, and I d 
cussed that when I was in China, at 
great length. I don't see evidence of 
any direct sales by Brazil. 

Q. I would like to know if you 
had the opportunity to speak to Fr i- 
dent Sarney or to the Minister of t ■ 
ternal Relations on the question of 
Panama, and did you make any re- 
quests of Brazil in this regard? 

A. We didn't make any particul; 
re(]uest except I think we all see, pai 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1' B 



THE SECRETARY 



ifularly in the context of our concern 
'iout drug trafficking, how undesirable 
(is to have somebody in an important 
•fsition in an important country who is 
ijvolved in drug trafficking. But we 
lidn't go into the Panama subject in 
(,,y great detail. 

Q. Considering the declarations 
lade by the Minister of External Re- 
tions with respect to Nicaragua — 
/ying that he was in agreement with 
;iur position on Nicaragua — would 
;iu consider the position of Brazil in 
le international forum to make it 
e principal ally of the United States 
nong the eight countries? 

\. I will be careful not to try to 
leak for Brazil in any way, but I do 
ink that what we are seeing is an 
olation of Nicai'agua, not by others 
U liy themselves, by their behavior, 
,■ the way their policies are affecting 
eir own people with their standard of 
.•iiig- cut in half with inflation running 
inipant, with so much of their effort 
noted to military development. With 
lese huge Soviet armaments and with 
jiese repressive measures, you can 
ily refer to it as a police state. 

What is happening is that Nic- 
•auua is turning everybody off because 
■ its behavior. And we can only hope 
1(1 t'X])ect that somehow they will see 
le light of day, one of these times. I 
lust say that I welcomed very much 
ly discussions about Central America 
■ith my colleagues here in Brazil. 

Q. Brazilian officials said that 
ou spoke with Mr. Sodre — referring 
a his speech before the Organization 
f American States (OAS) in 
iuatemela in 1986 — about the need 
ou saw for Brazil and other coun- 
ries to speak plainly about Nic- 
iragua. He, apparently encouraged 
ly your remarks, did that this after- 
loon or this morning. Can you tell us 
f you either asked for or would like 
o see any particular new action by 
Jrazil on the issue of Nicaragua to go 
^ny further on this? 

A. What I did wasn't in the con- 
;ext of Nicaragua particularly, but we 
vvere talking about democracy and the 
importance of the values of freedom and 
the rule of law which we share. He was 
making that comment and I said, "I 
recall when we met at the OAS and you 
spoke eloquently about this and force- 
fully and people paid attention," and 
that I was very much impressed by it. 
That was the context. 



Q. In 1979 a military movement — 
guerrilla movement — overthrew a gov- 
ernment in Central America, which 
had a hereditary type government — 
the Somoza regime — after 40 years in 
power and practically the owner of 
the country at that time. You just 
mentioned that the United States is 
isolating Nicaragua and providing 
support to a military movement 
within the country. Do you not think 
that in the end this will not damage 
the image of the United States while 
also damaging Central America and 
South America as a whole? 

A. What I said was, Nicaragua is 
isolating itself, and it's doing so by its 
behavior, and its behavior is totally out 
of tune with what is happening every- 
where else in this hemisphere and peo- 
ple don't like it. That is basically what 
is happening, and it is what Nicaragua 
is doing to its people. 

As far as the revolution is con- 
cerned and the current group of people, 
the Nicaraguan resistance who are 
fighting for their freedom and independ- 
ence, if you look at people in that 
resistance and look at who the original 
revolutionaries are, you will find that 
the original comwandcuites included 
many of the people who are now in the 
resistance. And they are in the resist- 
ance because they found that the people 
now in power, the communists — as they 
have said, it's their phrase — "stole the 
revolution," and they are trying to get 
it back. 

Q. With respect to the question 
of patents, I would like to know what 
would be the minimum position, or 
the minimum Brazilian proposal that 
the United States could accept, and 
when would the technical meetings 
begin that were mentioned in your 
conversations with Minister Sodre? 

A. I think that the precise negotia- 
tions that people undertake are for the 
negotiators, and I don't want to try to 
preempt their ground. Let me put this 
question in a broader context. When 
President Sarney and I talked about 
the future and the information age, the 
knowledge age, that we are moving 
into, what I think is implied by that is 
that knowledge more and more is some- 
thing that is created. It is, in a sense, 
like a good in international trade, and 
it is in the interest of the world to en- 
courage the production of knowledge in 
various fields. 

Pharmaceuticals is an example of 
this problem, but it is just one exam- 
ple. If we want to encourage this pro- 
duction of knowledge from which we all 



benefit, then we need to join in recog- 
nition of what is called intellectual 
property rights, that don't last forever 
but do give the creator a momentary 
advantage, and that encourages future 
creation. 

This issue is not simply one of a 
particular industry or particular prod- 
uct. It's a generic issue that is of tre- 
mendous and sweeping importance in 
the kind of world we are moving into, 
where ideas and knowledge and infor- 
mation are going to be the essence of 
what we do, what we produce, the 
services we render, and the things that 
we trade. 

What we are talking about is some- 
thing of very fundamental and basic im- 
portance. I think increasingly as we 
work at it and we discuss it with our 
friends here in Brazil and elsewhere, it 
is dawning on us more that this is ex- 
actly the case. I welcome the fact that 
this is an important subject in the Uru- 
guay Round in negotiations in GATT, 
and it's important in discussions every- 
where I go. 



ADDRESS TO BOLIVIANS 

AND THE PRESS, 
LA PAZ, 
AUG. 8, 1988' 

Your government has received me with 
great cordiality, grace, and dignity de- 
spite the incident [bomb explosion 
along the Secretary's motorcade route] 
this morning. I am deeply grateful to 
President Paz and his associates. 

In recent months, I've traveled to 
the Soviet Union, to Western Europe, 
to the Middle East, to the Far East, 
and now to Latin America. Everywhere 
there is a sense of great changes under- 
way in the world. Science and tech- 
nology are transforming the materials 
we use and the work we do. Today we 
live in a global economy in which inter- 
national manufacturing processes bring 
goods and raw materials from around 
the globe to the market of choice. An- 
other fact is the global financial mar- 
ket — a trillion dollars change hands 
every day, according to some estimates. 

We don't have a name yet to cap- 
ture these changes, but let me suggest 
one: the age of information. For what 
connects all of these new developments 
is knowledge, its discovery, its trans- 
mission, and the education needed to 
use it. Access to ideas has thus become 
the key to scientific and economic 
progress. 

Two conclusions can be drawn 
about the age of information. 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1988 



15 



THE SECRETARY 



First, a society must be open if it 
hopes to take advantage of new oppor- 
tunities. Closed societies, isolated econ- 
omies and nations will not be able to 
progress. There is a profound political 
implication here. Democracy, which is 
justified by humane values that go be- 
yond economic efficiency, happens to be 
best suited to the new age. 

Bolivia has clearly understood this, 
and we welcome your achievements as a 
democracy — not the easiest path but 
surely the best. Freedom, openness, 
individual initiative, and individual 
responsibility — the cornerstones of de- 
mocracy — are also the building blocks 
of the age of information. 

Second, the opportunities and the 
problems presented by this rapidly 
changing world often transcend national 
boundaries. No country today can ex- 
pect to prosper apart from the global 
economy. Every country today, includ- 
ing the United States, needs the coop- 
eration of allies and friends to deal with 
mutual dangers. And that is my subject 
today: how, working together, we can 
win the war against the new pirates of 
the 20th century, the narcotics traf- 
fickers of the world, who threaten 
us all. 

Bolivia and the United States are 
two of the many allies in this war. As 
democracies, we understand the dan- 
gers of failing to fight such a ruthless 
and pervasive enemy. And as the larg- 
est single market for illegal drugs, the 
United States has a special responsibil- 
ity in this struggle — a very special 
responsibility. 

So let us hold a council of war. 
What are we doing about drugs, as in- 
dividual countries? What are we doing 
together? And what more can we do? 

U.S. Efforts To Reduce Consumption 

Many here and elsewhere continue to 
ask: "Is the United States really doing 
enough to reduce the vast American de- 
mand for drugs at the heart of this 
trade?" The answer is, we are doing a 
lot but not enough — not yet. But the 
answer also is that we are beginning to 
do what needs to be done — at last. 

Americans are slow to anger, but 
once aroused, we know how to take ac- 
tion. Today Americans are sickened by 
the sight of young athletes, who should 
be heroes, throwing their lives away 
through drug abuse; by children, whose 
aspirations are perverted to a life of 
crime; by auto and train accidents, in- 
juring or killing the innocent, because 
of drug abuse; by evidence of drug use 



by those entrusted with our health, our 
safety, and our security; by the interna- 
tional drug cartels that make the 
Capone crowd and the old Mafia look 
like small-time crooks. 

Americans have finally begun to 
say "no" to drugs. Drug-taking is now 
seen increasingly for what it is: death, 
not life. A crucial psychological change 
has taken place, especially among young 
Americans. In the past 8 years, we 
have seen dramatic reductions in teen- 
age marijuana abuse: today one in 30 
students report using marijuana on a 
daily basis, compared to one in nine 10 
years ago. Cocaine use among young 
people has also declined, dropping by 
one-third last year. American students 
are saying "no" to drugs and "yes" to 
their future. 

President and Mrs. Reagan have 
led the American fight against drug 
abuse. There are now more than 9,000 
groups of parents working in commu- 
nities, sharing information and tactics. 
Mrs. Reagan's ".Just Say No" clubs are 
influencing a new generation of Ameri- 
can children. Drug education and pre- 
vention efforts have become common in 
our schools, from kindergarten on up. 

Everybody has a job to do — the 
churches, the workplaces, the govern- 
ment, coaches and athletes. Every- 
where the word has to go out: "Don't 
take drugs, and if you do, we are going 
to be tough as nails." It is not a matter 
of choice, and it's no longer a careless 
attitude of "live and let live." No cjuan- 
tity of drugs, even small amounts once 
considered "personal possession" levels, 
will be tolerated — zero tolerance. Ve- 
hicles and yachts are being seized, 
offenders are being fined, and our en- 
forcement agencies are sending a loud 
message — no one is above the law. 

We are saying to lawyers, to stock- 
brokers, to doctors: by choosing to use 
drugs, you are throwing it all away — 
your possessions, your standing in the 
community, your freedom. Personal re- 
sponsibility can no longer be denied. 

Our law enforcement agencies and 
courts are arresting and convicting 
more drug offenders than ever before. 
Over 12,000 people arrested by the 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration 
were convicted of drug crimes last year, 
roughly twice the number in 1981. In 
New York City alone, felony drug con- 
victions during the last 4 years more 
than tripled, from 4,202 to 13,466. 

Over the last 10 years, the U.S. 
Coast Guard has arrested more than 
8,500 drug smugglers. In 1983, we 
formed the National Narcotics Border 



Interdiction System, led by Vice Pres- 
ident Bush, to coordinate Federal, - 
State, and local law enforcement effort, 
against drug smuggling nationwide. 
Since the formation of the border inter- 
diction system, annual cocaine seizures 
have gone up twentyfold. 

The Comprehensive Crime Control I 
Act, passed in 1984, helps us put drug 
dealers out of business by seizing their | 
assets. Last year, over $500 million in I 
drug-related assets were seized in the 
United States. Since 1981, we have tri- | 
pled the antidrug enforcement budget, i 
and President Reagan has asked for an! 
other 13% increase. That would give th 
U.S. Government $3.9 billion next fiscii 
year to fight the drug menace. i 

Our Congress continues its crusad \ 
to eliminate drugs from America. The | 
omnibus drug bill now being considere i 
reflects the recent, important changes i 
we have seen in American attitudes. I 
Through the new legislation, Congress 
is proposing that more treatment be j 
made available to users who seek it bi i 
is insisting at the same time that thosi 
who refuse to be treated will be in 
trouble with the law. Proposals have 
been made to rescind drivers licenses 
young people who are discovered usinj ( 
drugs and to withhold Federal priv- j 
ileges, such as student loans. 

Strong new penalties against thos 
who deal in illegal drugs — the peddler 
of evil — are being developed. Local an 
Federal law enforcement agencies are 
being given increased resources and 
more legal tools with which to fight a 
already well-equipped enemy. Across 
the board. Congress and the Executi^ 
are proposing a number of measures t 
augment the order of battle at home 
and to help our allies abroad. 

Anyone who doubts that the Am( 
ican people are serious about eliminat 
ing drug abuse ought to take a good 
look at any opinion poll, any news- 
paper, and every political speech. Dri 
abuse is the number one election issu 
And the drug trade is the number oni 
enemy. 

So that is the news from the nort 
We are mobilizing fully to wage this 
war at home; to cut demand. We are 
going to win. 

Challenges Facing South America 

Let me turn now to the situation on 
this continent — what you face, what 
you are doing, and how we can help. 
Physicians and scientists tell us 
that drug addiction does not usually i 
suit from massive doses but from sm; 



16 



Department of State Bulletin/October 198 



THE SECRETARY 



ounts. The addict believes that he or 

can stop "at any time." Soon it is 
t!J) late. The poison attacks the brain 
Sill the body, and the victim soon loses 
Ifalth, will, and personality. 
« Similar things can happen to a 
Bjmtry. The cultivation of the coca 
jj.nts or of marijuana for illicit pur- 
ines starts small, in isolated places, 
lople say, "It's always been grown 
lire, and it is being used in dangerous 
fys elsewhere, so how can it harm 
a'" There is good money in it, and the 
dig dealers like to behave like Robin 
Fods. They buy allies. 

The economy of narcotics prospers, 
slI soon a country's political institu- 
tns are undermined. Its constitution 
tcomes a scrap of paper, while the 
f ardians of its independence are cor- 
tpted — whether they be soldiers or ci- 
tians. And everything goes, including 
.■ f-ri'spect and sovereignty. 

ritimately, drugs destroy the moral 
( jric of society. That is why drugs and 
imocracy are permanent enemies. 
' 'mocratic thinkers from Thomas 
fftTsim to Victor Paz Estenssoro have 
lulit that democracy rests upon cer- 
in ethical foundations. Ultimately, 
1 If-government in the political sense 
peiids on self-government in the per- 
nal and moral sense. There can be no 
miiriimises here. A person must say 
(>" to drug abuse or eventually he will 
y "no" to life. A nation must say "no" 
narcotics or eventually it will say 
• lO" to democracy. 

And what could be more destruc- 
ve to a nation than a systematic at- 
■ck on its natural resources? Look at 
jru. Experts agree that — unless coca 
iltivation and cocaine processing are 
opped soon — the Upper Huallaga Val- 
y could be reduced to a toxic waste 
jmp. Slash-and-burn agriculture is 
•oding the soil. Hired coca farmers are 
irelessly using chemicals and fertil- 
ers. Processors have dumped millions 
niters of kerosene, sulfuric acid, 
cetone, and toluene into the valley's 
ivers and ground water. When the sun 
its the Huallaga River at just the 
ight angle, the chemical pollution — a 
ellow color — can be seen from the air. 
'hat's the color of a dying land. 

tecent Developments 
n Bolivia and Colombia 

50, the challenges are cleai-. What is 
)eing done in the region about it? I will 
omment on developments in several 
countries but concentrate on two that 
re very different — Bolivia and 
'olombia. 



Bolivia. Here in Bolivia, despite 
strong opposition, your Congress has 
passed a comprehensive antinareotics 
law. You have kept your national pledge 
to the world community to outlaw all 
coca cultivation beyond that raised in 
specific areas, in certain quantities, for 
traditional uses. You have defined the 
crimes of illicit narcotics production, 
processing, and trafficking and spec- 
ified the penalties for breaking the law. 
You have voluntarily eradicated over 
2,000 hectares of coca over the past 
year — fulfilling the letter of your inter- 
national commitments. You have cap- 
tured and jailed Roberto Suarez, a 
leader among the international drug 
criminals. 

All of this has been difficult. The 
pirates and warlords of the drug busi- 
ness have fought you at every step, 
with money, intimidation, and violence. 
But there can be no question that 
Bolivia has made the right choice. We 
salute you for that choice. 



A person must say "no" 
to drug abuse or eventu- 
ally he will say "no" to 
life. A nation must say 
"no" to narcotics or even- 
tually it will say "no" to 
democracy. 



We have made the same choice. 
This morning's explosion brings that 
home. There is no turning back. The 
traffickers want us to look the other 
way. The terrorists want us to run and 
hide. To both I say: "You have picked 
on the wrong people. The democracies 
will not be intimidated. Bolivia and the 
United States will stand together. We 
will win this war." 

When the history of the war against 
narcotics is written, Bolivia will rank 
high. Millions who are young, still more 
millions not yet born will owe you a 
priceless debt of gratitude. 

There are many lessons to be 
learned from the Bolivian experience. 
Perhaps the most important is that a 
country's own strength to act against 
the drug menace can be multiplied 
many times more through international 
cooperation. A number of countries — 
including, very much, the United 
States through the State Department's 
International Narcotics Control Pro- 
gram and using development and other 



economic assistance fund.s — have 
pledged the monies necessary to sup- 
port the unique Bolivian combination of 
economic incentive and law enforce- 
ment. And your own legislative deci- 
sions have mandated that the "Bolivian 
way" must be made a reality. 

The U.S. Congress has looked at 
your law and your performance with 
great interest, and I trust that your 
steady commitment will convince the 
members of our legislative body of your 
serious intentions. To sum up, the drug 
traffickers are in trouble in Bolivia. 

Colombia. In Colombia, the coun- 
try is under siege. Narcotics traffickers 
and guerrillas, often operating together 
in criminal conspiracy, threaten Colom- 
bian democracy. The Medellin cartel, as 
evil a bunch as exists anywhere, has 
murdered many officials and citizens 
whose sin it was to stand up for the 
rule of law, the honor of Colombia, de- 
mocracy, and just plain human decency. 
They are in cahoots with other evil- 
doers. The FARC [Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia] guerrillas 
protect the traffickers in some areas 
and produce their own drugs in others. 
Then there is the M-19, a new "Murder 
Incorporated," hired by the drug car- 
tels to kill those who oppose them, as 
we saw in the attack on the Palace of 
Justice 3 years ago. 

The Government of Colombia is 
fighting back. The Colombian mili- 
tary — in its largest and most successful 
operation to date in the country's drug 
interdiction history — recently seized 
over 3,000 kilos of cocaine, a cache 
of sophisticated weapons, and large 
amounts of the chemicals used to man- 
ufacture the drug. Air force and army 
units combined to force down two traf- 
ficker planes at a clandestine airfield, 
where the cocaine was seized. This is 
only the latest example. To date in 
1988, Colombian military and law en- 
forcement units have seized 15 tons of 
cocaine hydrochloride (HCL) or equiv- 
alent; 680 cocaine HCL labs have been 
destroyed, compared to 183 for the 
same period in 1987. 

We in the United States cannot and 
will not stand aside from this battle. 
We are going to help give Colombia the 
tools it needs to win this war. The U.S. 
Congress is considering passage of leg- 
islation to permit the Export-Import 
Bank to guarantee financing of loans to 
governments like that of Colombia for 
the purchase of weapons and other mili- 
tary equipment to use in the war on 
the traffickers. 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1988 



17 



THE SECRETARY 



Progress in Other Countries 

What about other countries in the 
region? After a rough start, we are 
seeing some progress. 

Peru. As producer of half the 
world's coca leaf, Peru has long been 
aware of the dangers posed by drug 
trafficking to its democracy and its 
physical environment. President Garcia 
began his presidency determined to 
stamp out this vile trade. His govern- 
ment has now pledged a program of 
large-scale eradication of coca, includ- 
ing the use of herbicides, once a safe 
and effective product is identified 
and fully tested. A small army has 
been mobilized in the remote Upper 
Huallaga Valley to fight the traffickers. 
The United States provides financial 
and logistical aid, but it is the Peruvian 
Gitardia Civil that is fighting the bat- 
tles and taking the casualties in the 
.struggle to defend Peru's institutions. 
The drug merchants and terrorists have 
joined in a deadly marriage of conve- 
nience whose only common ground is 
contem])t for democracy and humanity. 

Ecuador. Ecuador today is totally 
free of coca cultivation because of a 
determined governmental effort sup- 
ported by the United States to desti-oy 
the crop. But trafficking in illicit drugs 
and precursor chemicals is up and has 
contributed to a substantial rise in local 
drug addiction. 

Other Governments. As this sug- 
gests, the problem is changing all the 
time. The Venezuelan Government has 
had to move against increasing traf- 
ficker use of its territory. Brazil's vast 
border regions have been an inviting 
lure to cultivation for trafficking. Ar- 
gentina has become a major locus of 
cocaine movement to Europe and the 
United States. But all three govern- 
ments are now alert to the problem and 
are taking action against the traf- 
fickers. Last month, Argentine au- 
thorities were able to seize 1,200 
pounds of cocaine and disrupt a major 
drug network. 

Unfortunately, no country in the 
Western Hemisphere, including my 
own, has yet been able to control ade- 
quately the movement of coca, or paste, 
or cocaine, or the precursor chemicals 
which make it all possible. That's a sad 
but accurate conclusion. We are all 
fighting this war, and we have made 
some headway. Yet the fact is that de- 
spite the money spent, the laws passed, 
and the lives lost, there is more cocaine 
entering the United States and Europe 
from South America than ever before. 



We have failed to stop the enemy. We 
are responsible because the demand for 
drugs still exists, and you are responsi- 
ble because the drugs are still being 
produced and shipped northward. 

As the U.S. National Drug Policy 
Board recently reported, the pool of 
people using drugs has diminished, but 
the pool's drug consumption has risen. 
Clearly, though we are allies, we have 
not helped each other enough. And 
that's the key to it — to increase our 
ability to act and our will to act 
through international cooperation. This 
is an international problem, and we 
must deal with it on an international 
basis if we want to succeed. 

Future Efforts 

Where do we go from here? Let me 
suggest some directions. 

First, do not give up the fight. 
That's what it would mean if we legal- 
ized narcotics. We do not want a nation 
of addicts. Neither do you. And you 
don't want to make the drug syndicates 
even more powerful in your countries. 

Second, mobilize more of our re- 
sources, our key institutions: the mili- 
tary, as in Colombia; the legislators, as 
in Bolivia; the media and the private 
sector, as in the United States; the 
schools, the churches, the workplaces, 
the home. 

Third, expand international cooper- 
ation among the nations cursed by the 
drug trade. The Toronto economic sum- 
mit in June called for more cooperation 
against "all facets" of the drug trade, 
particularly production, trafficking, and 
financing. The summit also supported 
the adoption of a UN convention on il- 
licit trafficking. This convention is a 
Latin American initiative, and it is 
Latin American leadership that has 
brought rapid progress toward its com- 
pletion in Vienna in November. 

Great changes have already been 
taking place in this hemisphere, once 
known for its nationalistic border dis- 
putes. Direct law enforcement coopera- 
tion is becoming the norm — as among 
Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru; the An- 
dean nations together in their regional 
antidrug communications network; and 
the specific agreements that Brazil has 
concluded with its neighbors. We all 
recognize the fact that the problem is 
greater than any individual country, in- 
cluding the United States. 

Six weeks ago in Washington, a 
precedent-setting meeting of the lead- 
ers of the Andean Parliament and of 



our own Congi-ess produced a joint dec- 
laration symbolic of this sense of re- 
gional responsibility and commitment. 
The declaration recognized "the menac 
that organized narcotrafficking repre- 
sents for the security and the continua 

tion of democracy " It insisted on th. 

setting of specific goals for the com- 
plete elimination of both consumption 
and production of narcotics. It called 
for concrete measures to combat drug 
money laundering. And it asked for th' 
development of "an international strat- 
egy and inter-American mechanisms ol 
cooperation in the fight against the il- 
legal production, traffic, and use of 
drugs." 

Our Congress — from Chairman [ol 
the Select Committee on Narcotics j 
Abuse and Control] Rangel to Con- | 
gressman Oilman to Senators D'Amat(| 
Kerry, Murkowski, and DeConcini, allj 
of whom contributed to that meeting ( j 
legislative leaders — championed those | 
goals. [Bolivian] Vice President Garrc 
was there with his Andean colleagues 
and can take pride in his role in that 
effort. And we — the State Departmen 
Justice, Ti'easury, and Defense — will i 
our part, specifically: 

• We must continue to refine and 
expand the State Department's Interi 
tional Narcotics Control Program, no' 
contributing some $100 million a year 
worldwide (almost half of that in Soul 
America) to law enforcement and oth 
antidrug efforts. 

• We must expand our military a 
sistance programs to those countries 
where the direct cooperation of the d 
fense establishment with civilian age 
cies is essential if the war against thi 
traffickers and their allies is to be \v( 

• We must revise our own laws a 
procedures which have made it diffici 
to provide useful assistance to foreigi 
military or police forces. That means 
doing something about security as- 
sistance prohibitions imposed in the 
1960s out of fear that such assistance 
might strengthen dictatorships. How 
tragic it is that these laws now hamji 
our help for democracies so urgently 
in need. Limitations on what kind of 
credit and guarantees our Export- 
Import Bank can provide are also pa 
of the ])roblem. We hope that the on ■ 
bus drug bill now moving through th 
Congress will address these issues. 

• We must continue to remembe 
that coca eradication has economic r; i 
ifications. With the Europeans and i i- 
ers, we should continue to provide ^ 
assistance to help countries make th 
transition to a legal economy. 



18 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1!I8 



THE SECRETARY 



f Let me sum it up. We in the 
Uiited States are ready to help, and we 
I need to help each other. We may be 
king at the turning point in this war: 
a United States aroused at last to 
courage consumption, reduce de- 
ind, punish the users and the sup- 
ers; at a United States generous and 
derstanding of its allies in this strug- 
i; at allies who, like Bolivia, aim at 
; total elimination of the illicit crop 
»thin a reasonable period of time; at 
t? determined and rapid destruction of 
t? laboratories, of the aircraft and 
liding fields; at the arrest, trial, con- 
^;tion, and jailing of the so-called 
hgpins; at the seizure of the traf- 
ikers' assets; at the new hemisphere- 
nle conviction that a free people, in 
imocratic consultation, can beat its 
nst powerful enemies; in short, at the 
picniacy of law, the assertion of sov- 
fiuiUy, and the safeguarding of our 
oi)les' health and honor, dignity, and 
curity. 

The war against narcotics can 
d must be won. 



EWS CONFERENCE, 

;(;. s, 1988S 

•esident Paz and Foreign Minister 
■adregal and all of their associates 
jive treated me with great cordiality, 

tid I am deeply appreciative. They and 
hers expressed indignation at the in- 
dent this morning and told me that it 
no way represented the sentiments 
■ the people of Bolivia. I told them 
lat I interpreted it not as anything 
-■motely anti-American, but rather anti 
le things that we and Bolivia stand 
ir: democracy, decency, the rule of law. 
fe will not be intimidated, as the 
olivian Government will not be 
itimidated. 

Two inescapable conclusions 
merged from my trip to South Amer- 
;a and discussions here in Bolivia. 
'irst, human dignity and freedom can 
e secured only through a constant 
ommitment to democracy and demo- 
ratic values. Second, economic growth 
nd social justice can only be secured 
hrough a constant commitment to eco- 
lomic openness and reform. 

Bolivia has made both of these 
:ommitments. Under the courageous 
eadership of President Victor Paz Es- 
enssuro, with the support of the pact 
or democracy, Bolivians have made a 
:ommitment to freedom and openness. 



Their commitment deserves the recog- 
nition and backing of the democratic 
community throughout the world. 

As I noted in my speech earlier 
today, Bolivia is also committed to the 
war against narcotics trafficking. The 
program to eradicate coca and the 
tough new law on controlled substances 
make clear where Bolivia stands on this 
priority issue. The capture of trafficker 
kingpin Roberto Suarez is a sure sign 
of the seriousness and skill with which 
Bolivia is enforcing the law. The United 
States supports and will continue to 
support Bolivia's strenuous efforts in 
our common battle against drug traf- 
ficking. Our efforts against drug traf- 
ficking reaffirm and protect the 
political and economic freedoms that 
citizens of both our countries cherish. 
Bolivia's progress in all these areas 
over the last 3 years is truly 
impressive. 

Q. You came in a crusade against 
drugs to Bolivia, and I want to ask 
you if your government has knowl- 
edge that the increase of drug traf- 
ficking is affecting the congress in 
Bolivia. 

A. It is clear enough that your con- 
gress stepped up to the problem in 
passing the most recent law, and I ad- 
mire that and respect that effort of 
theirs. As a matter of fact, the law is 
an interesting one among laws around 
the world on this subject. So much so 
that I know we are studying it, and our 
own Congress is studying it to see if in 
some way it might be useful for us as 
well. I certainly applaud the action of 
your congress. 

Q. I would like to know the rea- 
sons for the delay of your government 
in giving the funds committed for the 
battle against drug trafficking. We 
know that only 11% of the committed 
money was given until now, so isn't 
this a contradiction of the facts and 
what you say? 

A. No, the money is there. In 
order for it to get disbursed, there are 
certain, somewhat stubborn, admin- 
istrative issues that need to get 
straightened out. There is one thing 
that we agreed on with the Government 
of Bolivia by way of a criterion that 
both we and the Government of Bolivia 
think doesn't give us enough flexibility. 
We are working on both these matters. 
We feel that these problems are very 
soluble problems. One of the things 
that I think comes strongly out of my 
meetings is a determination on both 
sides to establish exactly what these 
problems are and then work through 
the solutions. We intend to do that. 



But the money is there, and it will 
come. We want to see that those re- 
sources flow to correct the problem. It 
isn't a question, so to speak, of the 
United States helping Bolivia. It is a 
question of a problem that we both 
have. We have a partnership in doing 
something about it. We have to put into 
that partnership as you do, and we will. 

Q. I want to ask you with regards 
to the economic problem. I under- 
stand you had a meeting in the after- 
noon with the economic team, as well 
as representatives of your delegation. 
Therefore, I would like to know if it 
is true that the United States will 
help us in the negotiations with the 
Club of Paris. 

A. That subject was discussed and, 
I think, illuminated in a creative way. I 
don't want to hold out the idea that 
there is some new solution there, but 
certainly it is something that needs to 
be worked on, and we are prepared to 
work on it. 

Let me say that our discussions 
with the economic team covered several 
interesting issues. Among the things 
that I carry away from that meeting 
and also the meeting that President Paz 
organized with many members of his 
cabinet present — all of whom spoke in 
one way or another about particular 
problems — one thing that I carry away 
is the great competence of the economic 
team and its leadership, the Minister of 
Planning, and the others and of the 
cabinet generally. 

When people sense that Bolivia is 
on the right track, that your programs 
are succeeding, and that the people 
who are managing things have compe- 
tence and good sense, that increases 
confidence and leads, I think, to addi- 
tional things that can be done. 

Q. The coca leaf has been culti- 
vated in Bolivia for many centuries. 
The present government has decided 
on a crop substitution and now, at the 
suggestion of the United States, it is 
eradicating the crop. Don't you think 
that the consumer countries have also 
a responsibility as well, and they 
should make more efforts to combat 
drug trafficking instead of putting 
the burden on the poor countries like 
us who don't have the economic 
means? 

A. First of all, as far as Bolivia is 
concerned, it's the illicit coca produc- 
tion that is the target. In your law, 
which I noted with admiration and re- 
spect, that's clear. 



ir\^^^u.^^ nnoo 



THE SECRETARY 



Second, I tried to make it plain in 
the talk that I just gave — and I hope 
you get a copy of it and take a look at 
it — that there is a deep responsibility 
for this problem in the user countries, 
the consuming countries, the United 
States, because, after all, it is this big 
demand for drugs that creates a market 
that people then come to supply. 

We have to do our job in getting at 
drug use and helping you and others 
get at the illicit production and traffick- 
ing and money laundering and so on 
that go with it. We have tasks to do 
and you have tasks to do; it's a joint 
enterprise. I am not in any way trying 
to say that here is a problem, and it is 
a problem caused just by the people 
who supply drugs. That's part of it, but 
also part of it is things that we need to 
do in the United States. I tried to be 
very clear about that. 

I am encouraged in the United 
States that we are much more alert to 
this problem and working on it much 
harder I have been working on this 
issue in the United States for a long 
time. When I was Secretary of Labor, 
when I was Director of the [Office of 
Management and] Budget, and Secre- 
tary of Ti'easury back in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, we were working on 
the problem and we did things. But I 
sense now a much more thorough-going 
effort, a much deeper commitment. In 
a sense, the fact that it is a big political 
issue in the United States is a good 
thing, because it shows the people, as 
they assess our various political con- 
tests, are placing a priority on doing 
something about this problem, and I 
believe that's a very good thing. 

Q. In your conference you said 
that this morning's attempt was prob- 
ably carried out by drug traffickers. 
What was the basis for this assertion? 

A. What I said was that those who 
carried it out were the enemies of de- 
cency and democracy. Whether they are 
traffickers, terrorists from some other 
school, or some combination — and we 
know that people of this background 
have not hesitated to use violence and 
to attack the governments that are try- 
ing to do something about what they 
are doing. 

As far as the particulars of exactly 
who is responsible for this incident, I 
don't have any information. I don't put 
forward an accusation against any par- 
ticular individual or group, but the tac- 
tic of using violence to try to intimidate 



or scare off government officials is the 
kind of tactic that we have to fight 
against. I think it is important to note 
that your government and mine were 
not deterred, not intimidated. We car- 
ried through our schedule as we had 
planned it, and we will continue to fight 
this war on that basis. 

Q. You will be leaving shortly 
now for Central America. We are at 
the first anniversary of the Arias 
peace plan, as it was called. I wonder 
what are your thoughts on whether 
the plan has accomplished anything 
in the past year, its promises, its 
failures? I know that about a year 
ago, people in the Administration felt 
that there were faults in the plan. 
How do you feel a year later? 

A. 1 think the Esquipulas agree- 
ment had a great deal of merit to it, 
and it did have e.xplicit operational 
things having to do with democracy. I 
think it was a positive development, as 
have been some of the other agree- 
ments that followed it, particularly the 
meeting in San Jose. That was kind of 
an assessment, and people were quite 
candid in their assessment. 

It is too bad that we can't declare 
that the plan has succeeded in the 
sense that we see peace in Central 
America. We don't. We have to continue 
to struggle at that problem. Certainly 
peace is the objective. I think Presi- 
dent Arias has made a great contribu- 
tion, as have the others who worked 
that plan out. But we have to follow 
through, and we have to help them fol- 
low through. 

The situation we see, broadly 
speaking, in Central America now, as 
compared with earlier years, is that 
whereas there was once one democracy, 
there are now four. In those four de- 
mocracies, there is now economic 
growth in each one, varying amounts, 
and in each one inflation is under good 
control. 

In the other country, we see still a 
government that feels it must break up 
opposition rallies, cancel publication 
rights of newspapers, broadcast rights 
of radio stations, and various other acts 
of repression against their population. 

At the same time, in economic 
terms, the incomes per capita have 
fallen in half, and inflation has gone to- 
tally out of control, in a manner that 
you here in Bolivia are familiar with 
from your past terrible experience 
which you. President Paz, and you all 
have cured. 



There is a big problem there for 
the people of Nicaragua and the people 
of the region. For the region, of course, 
it is particularly troubling, because 
Nicaragua — despite the fact that it is a 
complete failure — has a very big army, 
heavily equipped with Soviet arms, 
and, therefore, it's a menace to its 
neighborhood. There is still a big prob- 
lem a year later. Even so, it's good to 
keep working for peace. 

I will be going back to Central 
America. I look forward to meeting 
with President Arias tomorrow morn- 
ing and President Azcona and the Act- 
ing President of El Salvador, as I met 
with President Cerezo earlier on this 
trip. 

Q. We would like to know if you 
are going to help us, because as far a 
what we received in aid, it is not 
enough. We have decreased the coca 
cultivation; therefore, are we going t 
receive additonal aid? 

A. We want to help ourselves — we 
want to help by stimulating others to 
pitch in. We want to encourage the 
ideas that will work. A question was 
asked earlier about some resources th: 
have been appropriated, but haven't 
flowed in the way that we want. We'll 
get that cleared up. That's what we 
want to do, and we fully recognize the 
breadth and difficulty of the problem. 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
AUG. 8, 19889 

Terrorist tactics, such as used against! 
Secretary Shultz and his motorcade intt 
Bolivia today, are always repugnant. 
Thankfully, the Secretary's party was 
not injured, but the fact remains that 
an attack on U.S. officials cannot be 
tolerated. We ask the Government of 
Bolivia to bring those responsible to 
justice. 



■Press release 166 of Aug. 3, 1988 (re 
marks by the Central American foreign 
ministers are translations from Spanish).. 

-Made at a luncheon hosted by Argeij 
tine Foreign Minister Dante Caputo (pre) 
release 168 of Aug. 4). 

^Press release 169 of Aug. 5. 

<Press release 171 of Aug. 12. 

^Press release 172 of Aug. 5. 

sPress release 178 of Aug. 8. 

'Press release 181 of Aug. 12. 

"Press release 185 of Aug. 11. 

■'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 15. ■ 



Deoartment of State Bulletin/October 19 



THE SECRETARY 



Secretary's Trip to East Asia 
and the Pacific 



Secretary Shultz departed the United States 
July 5, 1988, to visit Thailafid (July 6-9) 

to participate in the annual 

Association of South East Asian Nations 

(ASEAN) postministerial conference 

and then visited Malaysia (July 9), 

Indonesia (July 9-11), Philippines (July 11-13), 

Hong Ko7ig (July IS-U), China (July IJ^-W), 

South Korea (July 16-18), Japan (July 18-20), 

and the Marshall Islands (July 20) 

to meet with government officials 

arid private sector groups. His trip concluded 

on July 21 ivith an address 

at the East-West Center in Honolulu. 

Following are various statements, addresses, 

and toasts made during his trip. 



'ENING STATEMENTS, 
"ASEAN POSTMINISTERIAL 
CONFERENCE, 
\NGKOK, 

ILY 7 AND 8, 1988 

ly 7 Statement' 

le high regard I have for ASEAN and 
r our chairman [Foreign Minister of 
lailand Siddhi Savetsila] is no secret 
anyone here today. For more than 
!0 decades, ASEAN has given its 
embers the strength to stand up to 
lallenges which might otherwise have 
'erwhelmed them. The agenda before 
i shows that ASEAN has by no means 
lived all the issues facing it. But, 
lanks to ASEAN, Southeast Asia is a 
lore peaceful, more stable, and more 
rosperous place than most of us could 
ave imagined 20 years ago. 

Before we begin our discussions, 
would like to say a few words about 
ome of the key issues before us. The 
Jnited States remains deeply con- 
erned about the suffering of the Cam- 
lodian people and the continued threat 
vhich the presence of over 100,000 
/ietnamese troops poses to Thai se- 
'urity and regional stability. 

We steadfastly support ASEAN's 
ifforts to achieve a Cambodian settle- 
nent. We applaud the skill with which 
VSEAN has marshaled international 



opposition to Vietnam's actions in that 
tortured country. Vietnam recently 
announced it would withdraw 50,000 
troops from Cambodia by year-end, and 
it apparently will participate in the pro- 
posed talks in Indonesia, which Foreign 
Minister Alatas is so ably organizing. 
The Soviet Union has also asserted its 
willingness to promote a political solu- 
tion in Cambodia. These signs of possi- 
ble progress are in large part due to 
ASEAN's admirable determination not 
to let aggression go unanswered. We 
need to remain alert for opportunities 
to move toward a settlement, but stead- 
fast — and wary — until we can be sure 
Vietnam is genuinely committed to seri- 
ous negotiations and complete troop 
withdrawal. 

To achieve the kind of settlement 
we want, and which Cambodia must 
have, we must keep up our strong sup- 
port for Prince Sihanouk and the non- 
communist elements of the coalition. 
They represent the political alternative 
to the Vietnamese occupation and the 
Khmer Rouge, and they are key to a 
Cambodian settlement. 

We must also keep diplomatic and 
economic pressure on Hanoi. ASEAN 
can rely on America's constancy in this 
regard. We do not pursue these policies 
out of malice toward Vietnam. On the 
contrary, we look forward to the time 
when Vietnam will once again rejoin 



the community of nations. We have 
stated repeatedly we look forward to 
the normalized relations with Vietnam 
in the conte.xt of a Cambodian settle- 
ment. It is in this spirit we have been 
attempting to resolve the POW/MIA 
[prisoner of war/missing in action] issue 
which, so long as it is unresolved, will 
divide our peoples. Some progress has 
been made, but we believe it critically 
important for Vietnam to move quickly 
on this issue this year. The American 
people e.xpect it, and it is clearly in 
Vietnam's own national interest. At the 
same time, Vietnam must realize that 
our commitment to a free and independ- 
ent Cambodia is unswerving, and that 
we will stay the course until this goal 
is achieved. 

In the coming months, diplomatic 
activity seems likely to quicken, and 
there could be real movement. The 
Cambodian conflict cannot go on indefi- 
nitely. It is to no one's advantage that 
it continue. We now need to e.xpand our 
already e.xtensive consultations on this 
issue. We also need to work with our 
Cambodian allies to define more clearly 
the outline of an acceptable settlement 
which comprises the specifics of Viet- 
namese withdrawal, sets in motion a 
viable process of national reconciliation 
and addresses the Khmer Rouge prob- 
lem. China is clearly giving serious 
thought to these issues, reflected in its 
statement of July 1, and we will con- 
tinue our dialogue with Beijing as well. 
The United States remains unalterably 
opposed to the Khmer Rouge ever again 
taking control of Cambodia, and we be- 
lieve it is essential that any settlement 
have adequate safeguards to prevent 
this. By addressing this problem now, 
and developing effective measures to 
ensure that the Khmer Rouge can 
never come back, we also remove 
Hanoi's main pretext for remaining in 
Cambodia. 

The continuing refugee crisis is, of 
course, also at the top of our agenda. 
The dramatic surge in boat refugee ar- 
rivals on ASEAN shores, a perception 
of lessened commitment on the part of 
resettlement nations, and gi'owing im- 
patience in the region, have placed in 
jeopardy the decade-long consensus 
that has sustained a generous policy 
of first asylum in Southeast Asia. 
The United States remains deeply con- 
cerned about the plight of refugees in 
this region and the vital necessity of 
maintaining first asylum. We want to 
work with ASEAN governments and 
others to develop a comprehensive and 
revitalized approach to deal with Indo- 
chinese refugees, one that meets to- 
day's circumstances. Accomplishing this 



leDartment of State Bulletin/October 1988 



21 _ 



THE SECRETARY 



East Asia 



I I ASEAN members 








7715 8-88 STATE (INR/GE) 



goal will require our collective political 
will, patience, and steadfastness be- 
cause there is no simple or quick 
solution. 

I believe you are all familiar with 
the proposals the United States has put 
forward for consideration regarding ref- 
ugees. Their objective would be to dis- 
courage clandestine departures from 
Vietnam, maintain resettlement offtake 
of eligible groups in order to keep the 
total first-asylum population at tolera- 
ble levels, press Vietnam to broaden ac- 
cess by its citizens to programs for 
legal and orderly departure, and per- 
sist in the search for other options. 



including an acceptable voluntary re- 
patriation program. We think these 
proposals form a pragmatic basis on 
which to build a renewed consensus to 
handle the problem of increased refugee 
outflows. They are also, of course, 
aimed at bolstering first asylum in the 
region. I urge that the first-asylum 
countries and our partners in the inter- 
national community give careful atten- 
tion to these proposals so that a new 
and viable consensus can be established 
and humanitarian interests served. 

We have carefully noted the foreign 
ministers joint statement on refugees, 
and we share its concerns and support 
its proposals. The United States could 



support an international conferenceMf, 
by vii'tue of its timing, content, and, 
especially, commitment, it could actu- 
ally achieve a constructive result. We 
would envisage the formation of a mul- 
tilateral working group in Bangkok 
made up of the ASEAN nations, their 
dialogue partners, and the UNHCR 
I UN High Commissioner for Refugees] 
to discuss a compi'ehensive refugee 
strategy and undertake visits to vari- 
ous capitals to sound out the views of 
other nations. Such a working group 
could identify and refine realistic op- 
tions. In addition, it could craft new 
approaches that could be implemented 
immediately and could also assess the 
prospects and necessary conditions for 
a successful international conference. 

In the meantime let me emphasize 
once again our message to the first- 
asylum countries: you do not stand 
alone. While we attempt, together, to 
find a humane means to dissuade the 
citizens of Vietnam from undertaking 
the terrible dangers of clandestine de- 
parture, the United States will con- 
tinue to work hard to improve the 
orderly departure program. We will 
also continue to share the financial bu 
den with the first-asylum countries 
through our contributions to interna- 
tional refugee organizations. And, we 
will continue to offer high levels of 
resettlement opportunities for refu- 
gees who arrive in the first-asylum 
countries. 

We, of course, are mindful that th 
refugee pi'oblems of this region are 
rooted not in the first-asylum countri 
but in the countries from which refu- 
gees flee, and this is w-here those 
problems must ultimately be solved. 
Concerted diplomatic efforts are 
needed to convince Hanoi, in particull 
to adopt the kinds of political and ecO' 
nomic policies that will permit their 
countrymen to live productive lives aU 
home. 

The commitment of the United 
States to resolve the Indochinese refi 
gee problem is strong today, as it has 
been in the past. We have come a lonji 
way and have many extraordinary ac- 
complishments to be proud of. Now w 
solemnly recommit ourselves to stay 
the course. 

I'd like to turn to another subjea 
of immediate concern to all of us: int« 
national trade. Over the past decade, 
rapid changes in the global economy 
have increased the need to strengthe 
and expand the GATT [General Agre 
ment on Tariffs and Ti-ade] rules of 
trade. GATT has focused primarily a 



Denartm(>nt of State Bulletin/OctobeiUtS 



THE SECRETARY 



jide in manufactured goods, while ag- 
ifultural trade has been sheltered 
,|)ni GATT discipline. In addition, a 
ijmber of "new areas" not covered by 
*|\.TT have become far more important 
Si international economic relations, 
'iiese include trade-related aspects of 
iltional investment policies, intellec- 
Jial property rights protection, and 
fede in services. At the same time, 
'le number of trading countries has 
{own sharply as developing economies, 
linu e.\port-led development strat- 
1 it>, have increased their level of in- 
csti'ialization. The more successful 
nong the newly industrialized econo- 
lies now need to take on a greater 
arr (if responsibility for ensuring the 
alth of the international economy, 
nfortunately, throughout the world, 
action to these and other changing 
• onomic circumstances has too often 
jme in the form of increasing protec- 
nnism, which in turn threatens to 
idermine the multilateral trading sys- 
m. In response to this challenge, 
\TT members, at U.S. urging, agreed 
Punta del Este to launch the most 
nbitious round of trade negotiations 
er, aimed at revitalizing and 
rcngthening GATT. 

Thus far, general results have been 
icouraging. More proposals from more 
untries on more subjects have been 
it foi'ward in this round than in any 
•evidus round. The proposal for com- 
ete reform of agricultural trade and 
le abolition, over time, of costly and 
ade-destroying subsidies is supported 
i / the United States and the Cairns 
I "oup, of which many of you are mem- 
ars. There are also concerns about our 
1 "fort to bring the new areas under 
ATT discipline. Since the Uruguay 
ound is scheduled to conclude in 1990, 
16 mid-term review in Montreal in 
'ecember 1988 will be a crucial test 
? progress and could provide an im- 
ortant political impetus to GATT 
egotiations. 

A successful mid-term review will 
olster confidence in the future of the 
lultilateral trade regime and curb pro- 
ectionist pressures on governments. In 
ome areas, such as GATT dispute set- 
lement and surveillance over members' 
iractices, we hope to reach agreement 
ly the mid-term review. In other areas, 
1 broad framework agreement on some 
undamental principles should be 
ichievable. We believe this will send an 
mportant signal that GATT members 
ire seriously committed to improve the 
nultilateral trading system. 

We appreciated receiving, prior 
the Toronto summit, ASEAN's views 



on key economic issues, conveyed to us 
by the Bruneian Ambassador to Wash- 
ington. We, of course, shared many of 
your concerns, and I think it fair to say 
that the summit addressed them in 
helpful ways: it gave a boost to the 
GATT process; it singled out agricul- 
ture for special treatment; it stressed 
the need to remove obstacles to trade 
and promote open markets; it affirmed 
a market-oriented, case-by-case ap- 
proach to debt, with particular consid- 
eration to the poorest of the poor 
debtor countries; and, it gave special 
attention in Asia to the Philippines. 



in my public statement at the opening 
session yesterday. 

Rather than dwelling on these 
pressing matters now, however, I want 
to use my final postministerial confer- 
ence statement to explore some key 
new trends in the world, and the im- 
pact I believe they will have on our 
fundamentally sound relationship. 

The first point I would make is 
that major changes are underway in the 
world — changes in virtually every area 
from science to superpower relations. 
For all of us, understanding and manag- 
ing change will be crucial. 



. . . thanks to ASEAN, Southeast Asia is a more peace- 
ful, more stable, and more prosperous place than most 
of us could have imagined 20 years ago. 



The summit leaders also reaffirmed 
our strategy in dealing with East- West, 
Cambodia, and Middle East matters 
and added to our efforts to combat ter- 
rorism and broke new ground and work 
on the problems associated with drugs. 

The overall outlook at Toronto, I 
should add, was upbeat; the economies 
of the industrialized democracies are 
doing very well, and this has good im- 
plications for you. 

So, these are a few of the key 
issues my government is anxious to 
tackle over the next 3 days. I will not 
take up any more of our limited time. 
We have a full agenda before us, and I 
look forward to hearing what my col- 
leagues have to say. 

July 8 Statement^ 

We Americans often speak about things 
"coming full circle;" that certainly fits 
in my situation today. Several of you 
will recall that I first met with you at 
the ASEAN postministerial conference 
here in Bangkok 5 years ago. Today, I 
meet with you at a postministerial con- 
ference for the last time. 

In the past, I have used this open- 
ing statement to focus on the regional 
issues to which we give the highest pri- 
ority. This year, I think we all agree 
that the issues of greatest interest to 
all of us are Cambodia, refugees, and 
trade. I look forward to reviewing 
these questions with you in detail dur- 
ing the closed session to follow. Of 
course, I did speak about each of these 



The United States has done a good 
job over the years in adapting to 
change, which, in fact, seems to be a 
characteristic of our society. I have 
been impressed, in the years I have 
been coming to these meetings in the 
various member countries, by the ob- 
vious capacity of ASEAN nations to 
cope with change, manage it, focus it. 
Your policies have been pragmatic, flex- 
ible, and increasingly market oriented, 
and the results speak for themselves. 

While you and we are meeting to- 
day's challenges, we must also prepare 
ourselves for tomorrow's. The world is 
changing in ways which will require all 
of us to discard outdated habits of 
thought and keep making room for new 
possibilities. Developments in science 
and social organization are altering the 
world profoundly — too profoundly for 
conventional thinking to grasp. History 
suggests that mankind rarely under- 
stands or can articulate transforma- 
tional change while it is coming about. 
As language catches up with the pace 
of change, new definitions and descrip- 
tions are coined to describe it. I believe 
we have entered such a period of 
sweeping change. 

The very material substances 
which surround us in everyday life are 
being transformed. Physically, syn- 
thetic materials make objects lighter, 
stronger, and more durable. Fiberoptics 
are transforming efficiency and conven- 
ience of international communications. 
These new substances are changing so- 
cieties and economies as well, because 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1988 



23 



THE SECRETARY 



their emergence affects supply and de- 
mand for natural raw materials and en- 
tirely opens up new areas of economic 
activity. 

The same scientific progress that 
has altered the nature of these basic 
materials has also accelerated the speed 
of human transactions. Time is meas- 
ured in ever-smaller units. Success in 
every field depends increasingly on how 
quickly ideas can be transformed into 
practical reality. The ease with which 
information now flows internationally 
has already created a global financial 
market that operates almost instanta- 
neously on an "information standard." 
Markets are no longer just places, but 
really electronic networks. 

Along with these alterations in 
substances and speed have come 
changes in magnitude. Today's scien- 
tific, economic, and political trends 
have global consequences. The amount 
of money that changes hands in the 
global financial market in 1 day, for in- 
stance, exceeds $1 trillion — or about 
the same as the entire budget of the 
U.S. Government for 1 year. Such flows 
transcend national boundaries and can 
overwhelm rigid economic policies. 

Similarly, manufacturing processes 
are becoming global in scale. As firms 
increasingly source, produce, and mar- 
ket on a worldwide basis, the distinc- 
tion between what is "foreign" and 
what is "made-at-home" blurs. 

The thread that runs through all 
these trends is knowledge: its discov- 
ery, its rapid transmission, and the ed- 
ucation needed to use it. Access to 
ideas, no matter where they are devel- 
oped, is becoming the key to scientific 
and economic progress. I know that 
many of your governments' leaders 
grasp the importance of this point. The 
over 46,000 ASEAN students in Ameri- 
can colleges and universities alone, for 
example, attest to this fact. This and 
similar investments in the creation of 
human capital show remarkable pre- 
science and will pay high dividends as 
we enter this new era. 

By contrast, countries which can- 
not or will not compete in the global 
marketplace of goods, services, and 
ideas will find themselves falling behind 
the advanced innovators and producers. 
Other nations — single commodity coun- 
tries and agricultural and industrial 
subsistence economies — face the danger 
of becoming marginal participants in 
the world economy. 

As I review the remarkable record 
of ask; AN over the past 21 years, it is 
evident that your countries have in dif- 
ferent ways — and in different combina- 



tions—melded traditional culture and 
modernity in a successful adaptation to 
the requii-ements of the coming age. 
A new generation of leaders will 
come to the fore in ASEAN in the dec- 
ade ahead. It will be better educated 
and maybe more worldly than its prede- 
cessor was in the beginning. However, 
this new generation will not, by and 
large, have the experience of World 
War II or of the struggle for independ- 
ence. Nor will it have faced and over- 
come the challenge of building a 
cohesive nation and viable economy, 
while simultaneously overcoming do- 
mestic communist insurgencies. But 
they will face the daunting challenges 
of the new era I have described. I 
would like to suggest three clear guide- 
lines for a new generation of leaders, 
whether of ASEAN or of the United 
States. 

First, societies must be open to 
this new age of knowledge and informa- 
tion. Resistance to ideas and insularity 
deaden hope of progress and can 
threaten to leave societies drifting in 
the wake of sweeping change. You will 
not be surprised to hear me say that I 
am convinced the idea of democracy, 
which depends on openness, personal 
freedom, individual initiative, and inno- 
vation, remains the best political frame- 
work within which to deal with the 
stress and the opportunities of change. 

It is precisely for this reason, I 
think, that we see a powerful impulse 
to adopt institutions and values around 
the globe that are consistent with open- 
ness and freedom. Just a few years 
ago, democratic nations were thought 
to be a dwindling and embattled minor- 
ity. Today, the idea of democracy is 
among the most important political 
forces of our time. It takes different 
forms in different places, shaped always 
by the special historical, cultural, and 
societal forces that exist in any given 
country. But it is a strengthening trend 
ai-ound the world. 

Second, encourage the use of in- 
centives, enterprise, and decentraliza- 
tion in economic activity. Overcentral- 
ized planning and decisionmaking sys- 
tems cannot cope with the multiplicity 
of choices any government or society 
has before it. And when a central plan- 
ner with massive power makes a mis- 
take, it's a "beaut," which is hard to 
rectify. The free operation of the mar- 
ketplace — for goods and ideas — is a far 
more efficient arbiter of decisions. 

The third guideline would be to 
seek enhanced cooperation. The global 
nature of changes in science, in eco- 
nomics, and in communications must be 



matched by greater political interac- 
tion. We can already see the emergence 
of new coalitions — both functional and 
regional — of like-minded nations. As 
you in ASEAN have demonstrated, re- 
gional associations of nations can pro- 
vide an indispensable milieu for 
political economic cooperation. The 
combined voice of the several, devel- 
oped through a process of consulta- 
tions, consensus building, and mutual 
support, can have a much greater im- 
pact than the single voices of individual 
members. Moreover, a group of nations 
sharing a regional locus and broad po- 
litical outlook can more effectively deal 
with the impact of scientific and tech- 
nological advances on political, eco- 
nomic, and social developments. 

These are really the reasons I re- 
gard attendance at these postminis- 
terial conferences a most necessary 
event on my calendar. I come here eaci 
year because of my admiration for 
"aSEAN's remarkable achievements an» 
in recognition of the substantial inter- 
ests we share. I regard ASEAN and i1 
leaders as examples of those who are 
most skillfully positioning themselves 
to meet the challenges ahead. I have 
confidence that you and those who fol- 
low you will continue the policies of 
pragmatism, openness, and cooperatioi 
which have served the ASEAN nation* 
so well over the past two decades. We 
in the United States look forward to a 
continuing, strong, and mutually bene- 
ficial relationship. 

ADDRESS BEFORE THE 

ASSOCIATION OF INDONESIANll 

ECONOMISTS, 
JAKARTA, 
JULY 11, 1988' 

I have come to Southeast Asia many 
times before, and I'm planning to com 
back again, as often as I can. But I an 
meeting with you today for the last 
time as Secretary of State. This is noil 
my "farewell address," but it is my 
"end-of-term" report to you on the cun 
rent state of America, Asia, and the 
global economy. 

We live in a time when, for many 
people, the words "Pacific" and "futur 
are nearly synonymous. That is becau 
we can characterize as successful whai 
is going on in the Pacific world that y« 
and we share. 

Take a look at how we're doing in; 
the United States: since 1982, the U.& 
economy has created 16 million new 
jobs. U.S. unemployment is now dowi 
to 5.3%. U.S. growth has recently av* 
aged over 3% in real terms, and infla- 
tion has been low and stable at less 



24 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1911 



THE SECRETARY 



;>an 4Vc. U.S. production of manufac- 
Ires exceeded $800,000 million in 198(5 
id has risen steadily every year since 
•82. Productivity in manufacturing has 
isen more than 4% during the 1980s. 

The U.S. current balance of trade 
declining, perhaps more rapidly than 
eople expected or are prepared for. 
he U.S. budget deficit, which is one of 
le smallest in proportion to GNP 
:Toss national product] among the 
E("I) [Organization for Economic Co- 
)iTation and Development] countries, 
ift reduction targets in 1987. The re- 
jctions planned for this year and next 
•e nil target. OECD forecasts show 
eadv reductions of our deficit in pro- 
n-ti.in to GNP to 2.4% in 1988 and a 
ro.iected 1.9% in 1989. 

And now, look at ASEAN [Associa- 
011 (if South East Asian Nations]: with 
pnpulation of 300 million people, the 
X ASEAN countries have achieved 
mil' iif the world's highest growth 
It. s (luring the 1960s and 1970s. In 
'NT. they averaged 5.4%. The forecast 
11- UIS8 was .5.7%'. 

ASEAN trade with the world has 
uicased steadily and is now in moder- 
te surplus. ASEAN's exports rose 
:-i;in .$71.4 billion in 1985 to $84.1 billion 
1 U),S7 and are forecast to reach $95.2 
illion this year. Meanwhile, ASEAN's 
iiIHirts rose less rapidly, from $69.8 
illiiin in 1985 to an even $80 billion in 
Vxl: in 1988, imports should increase 
$90.9 billion. As a result, ASEAN's 
rade surplus — $1.6 billion in 1985 — rose 
$4.1 billion in 1987 and is expected to 
ncrease slightly, to $4.3 billion, this 
, ^ear. 

I Between 1980 and 1987, ASEAN 
[trade both ways with the United States 
•ose from $22 billion to $27 billion — an 
ncrease of 26.5%' — and U.S. investment 
;more than doubled to a present total of 
labout $10 billion. 

Success in an Age 

of Information and Change 

What accounts for this very positive 
record? Success comes from political 
stability; being part of a large and open 
market: and allowing market signals, 
incentives, and enterprise to operate. 
And government is as important for 
what it does not do as for what it does. 
This is "old thinking," but it is be- 
ing newly discovered all over the world, 
to the great benefit of all who discover 
it — even if they call it "new thinking." 
These ideas have renewed vitality now 
and for the future because of the emer- 
gence of an "information age" with vast 
implications for finance, production of 



Pacific Community Forum 



Excerpt from question-and-answer ses- 
sion following the Secretary's address 
before the Association of Indonesian 
Economists in Jakarta on July 11." 

There are many private organizations 
and some official — perhaps, particularly, 
the Asian Development Bank— that pro- 
mote discussion and take certain func- 
tions on in this broad, specific area. 
Now I think that is all for the good. 

But I do think we could benefit from 
some sort of forum that is governmental 
in its base and provides for a systematic 
discussion by governments of key is- 
sues from which we could benefit. I tried 
to list some in a kind of example-like 
fashion. Now insofar as how you would 
put that together and who should be in- 
cluded, and so on, that's obviously a dif- 
ficult question because the Pacific Basin 
is so huge. You have a lot of South 



American countries that are on the Pa- 
cific, got a lot of North American and 
Asian, and so on. Just who needs to be 
included and how to do that is a prob- 
lem, because you want an organization 
that IS effective. 

You also mentioned the importance 
of having a concept that includes having 
like-minded countries and doesn't ex- 
clude important countries that perhaps 
might become like-minded. I agree with 
that — that also illustrates a potential is- 
sue, or problem, in this regard. So I 
don't come here with a specific sugges- 
tion all packaged up and ready to say, 
"here." What I am trying to do is encour- 
age the pace of discussion of this prob- 
lem, or this opportunity, and to just 
underline it, move it along and identify 
some of the things that could be of 
interest. 



goods and services, international trade 
and investment, and political and stra- 
tegic relationships among nations. 

For all of us, understanding and 
managing change has become crucial 
and will be ever more so in the future. 
The United States is doing just fine in 
adapting to change — it is a basic char- 
acteristic of our society. And ASEAN 
nations also are showing themselves to 
be pragmatic, flexible, and increasingly 
market oriented. 

But success is never permanent. To 
stay successful we must stay alert, ana- 
lyze swiftly, and act decisively. This is 
because the world is being altered, and 
profoundly — too profoundly to be com- 
prehended by traditional thinking. 

The very material substances 
which surround us in everyday life are 
being transformed. Synthetic materials 
and other new substances are changing 
societies and economies. Their emer- 
gence affects supply and demand for 
natural raw materials and opens up en- 
tirely new areas of economic activity. 

Scientific progress has accelerated 
the speed of human transactions. The 
ease with which information now flows 
internationally has already created a 
global electronic financial network that 
operates almost instantaneously on an 
"information standard." 

Along with these revolutions in 
speed and substance have come explo- 
sions in magnitudes. The amount of 
money that moves in the global finan- 
cial market in one day, for instance, 
exceeds some $1 trillion — or about the 
same as the entire annual expenditures 



of the U.S. Government. Such flows 
transcend national boundaries and can 
overwhelm rigid economic policies. 

Manufacturing processes similarly 
are becoming global in nature. As firms 
increasingly source, produce, and mar- 
ket on a worldwide basis, the distinc- 
tion between what is foreign and what 
is made at home blurs. Forty percent of 
U.S. imports come from movements of 
goods or services between subsidiaries 
of multinational firms. 

The thread that runs through all 
these trends is knowledge. Access to 
ideas, no matter where they are devel- 
oped, is the key to progress. Invest- 
ment in human capital will pay high 
dividends in the era ahead. 

By contrast, countries which can- 
not or will not compete in the new 
global marketplace inexorably will fall 
behind. Single commodity economies 
and isolationist economies will become 
marginal participants in the world 
economy. 

In contrast, our countries are 
adapting fairly successfully to the re- 
quirements of the coming age. We want 
this to continue. A new generation of 
leaders will come to the fore in our 
countries in the decade ahead. It will 
not have experienced the great strug- 
gles of war and independence or the 
political and economic tasks of nation 
building. Few will have been tested by 
the bitter battles against communism. 

For this they can be counted as for- 
tunate — and we can take some credit. 
Hard experience steeled and sharpened 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1988 



25 



THE SECRETARY 



the older generation. For the new gen- 
eration coming up, I suggest three 
guidelines useful to all of us. 

• First, societies must be open to 
this new age of knowledge and informa- 
tion. Resistance to ideas will leave so- 
cieties drifting in the wake of sweeping 
change. Democracy, which depends on 
openness, personal freedom, individual 
initiatives, and innovation, remains the 
best political framework for facing the 
stresses and opportunities of change. 

This is why we see a powerful im- 
pulse around the globe to move to open- 
ness and freedom. Today the idea of 
democracy — shaped by the historical, 
cultural, and societal forces of each 
country — is the most important political 
force of our time. Democracy is not a 
panacea, but it is the best way of find- 
ing answers. 

• Second, we must rely on incen- 
tives, enterprise, and the market. Cen- 
trahzed planning and decisionmaking 
systems cannot cope with the multi- 
plicity of choices any government or so- 
ciety has before it. When a central 
planner with massive power makes a 
mistake, it's a "beaut." The free opera- 
tion of the marketplace, for goods and 
ideas, is by far the most efficient ar- 
biter of decisions. 

• The third guideline is: enhance 
cooperation. The global nature of 
changes in science, in economics, and 
in communications must be matched 
by greater political interaction. As 
ASEAN has demonstrated, regional as- 
sociations of nations can promote politi- 
cal and economic cooperation without 
loss of individuality. Consultation, con- 
sensus building, and mutual support 
can have much greater impact than the 
separate voices of individual members. 

Challenges to Future Success 

These are guidelines for the next gen- 
eration. But right here and now there 
are problems we need to identify and 
solve if we are to e.xtend our winning 
ways into the future. Let me take brief 
note to some of these issues — interna- 
tional, regional, and domestic. 

International Economic Coopera- 
tion. One of the most significant global 
developments over the years since 
World War II is the extent to which 
free market nations have cooperated 
to strengthen growth on the broad- 
est possible basis. These hard-won 
achievements must be cultivated and 
reinforced. 



26 



The Uruguay Round of multilateral 
trade negotiations is crucial to the long- 
tei-m health of the world trading sys- 
tem. We need to build momentum for 
reform at the ministerial mid-term re- 
view in Montreal in December. Frame- 
works must be established there for 
negotiating long-term, market-oriented 
reforms of trade in agriculture, includ- 
ing tropical products, and institutional 
improvements in the GATT [General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] sys- 
tem. We also must reach agreements 
for dealing with the "new issues" of 
services, intellectual property rights, 
and trade-related investment measures 
such as export performance and import 
substitution requirements. 

All GATT members have a stake in 
the success of the new round and the 
strengthening of an open world trading 
system. This is particularly true for the 
East Asian economies — developed and 
developing — which have benefited so 
greatly from the liberalization of world 
trade. They have a special responsibil- 
ity in Geneva for helping less developed 
countries understand the importance of 
open trade to their own opportunities 
for growth. 

Regional Economic Cooperation. 

Our annual meetings in Bangkok last 
week demonstrated ASEAN's recogni- 
tion of the importance of stronger and 
more far-reaching ties to the global 
economy. In the ASEAN-U.S. eco- 
nomic dialogue, we have developed to- 
gether an ASEAN-U.S. initiative — a 
joint research project to seek oppor- 
tunities for expanding trade and invest- 
ment between ASEAN and the United 
States. The project will get underway 
later this week at a meeting in 
Singapore. 

Looking beyond the region to the 
dramatic economic dynamism which 
now links both sides of the Pacific 
basin, we should consider measures for 
cooperation among the market-oriented 
economies of this vast area of the 
world. 

Any initiative, to be successful, 
must be outward-looking and inclusive. 
We do not seek to create a closed trad- 
ing bloc in the Pacific. That would be to 
no one's benefit. Rather, we should 
start intergovernmental exchanges on 
the structural policies needed to pro- 
mote more integrated processes of pro- 
duction and distribution. 

I suggest focusing initially on: 

• Ti-ansportation policies to facili- 
tate a flexible, efficient system for mov- 
ing goods and people throughout the 
region. Development of transportation 



is essential for maximum economic^ 
growth, not just for importing and ex- 
porting but for division of labor, spe- 
cialization, and efficiency within 
countries. The problems here differ 
from those in the continental United 
States or Europe, and there is enough 
similarity among countries here for di- 
alogue to be promising. Similarly, air 
transportation in this region can be im 
proved greatly. 

• Telecommunications; dei'egulatio 
can foster rapid innovation to meet the 
needs of businesses and citizens. Agaii 
however, communications in this area 
have unique characteristics because of 
distances, water separation of land 
areas, and other factors. 

• Education to make productive ir 
vestment in our people — our most 
important economic resource. I am gl; 
and proud to note that there are now 
almost 50,000 students from ASEAN 
countries studying in U.S. institutions 
of higher learning. 

• National resources and the envi- 
ronment; decisions made in this decad 
will have far-reaching and long-lasting 
effects on the totality of our economic 
and social well-being. 

Other issues to discuss are invest 
ment policy, deregulation, tax reform 
and privatization. Just as discussions 
the economic summits of the seven in 
dustrialized nations and in the OECD 
have helped those countries both to C' 
operate and to improve their individu 
domestic policies, so also can coopera 
tion among the Pacific basin count rie 
strengthen societies and economies. 

It would be worth your while, I 
venture to suggest, to form some kin 
of Pacific basin forum where like- 
minded countries could compare expe 
ences, discuss ideas, and prepare ans 
ses on subjects that are of interest to 
most countries in the region. Some- 
times discussion and joint research 
might lead to cooperative action, andl 
sometimes they might simply improvd 
policies internal to different economiw 
In our part of the world, the annual 
economic summits, the OECD, and 
other organizations have proved usefl 
in these ways. ' 

Domestic Economic Policies. 

International cooperation in this fash i 
can serve all our interests, but it car 
not really succeed unless domestic ( 
icies are in tune with reality. Sound 
domestic policies serve us all. Indont 
is an example. 

Faced with economic downturn t 
falling oil prices, the Government of 
donesia — beginning in 1983 — undertc 



THE SECRETARY 



uctural reforms needed for future 
djwth. The government has: 

Kept its spending under control; 
Maintained currency convert- 
lity through two devaluations; 

• Made investment more attractive 
both domestic and foreign investors; 

• Made fundamental tax reforms: 

• Encouraged the growth of capital 
irkets; and 

Increased security for intellectual 
operty rights. 

It was not easy. It will not be easy, 
it the results are strengthening the 
donesian economy, and by so doing, 
ly are also strengthening political 
ability at a time of rapid change- — 
rien we need it most. Many of you 
re today have played major roles in 
leparing Indonesia's way to a brighter 
lonomic future. I congratulate you. 
i)ur accomplishments of the past 20 
ars, and especially of the last 5 
lars, should give you confidence as 
tu tackle the challenges that lie 
ead. 

Elsewhere in Asia are other exam- 
les of the benefits of freeing up mar- 
ts, decentralizing decisionmaking, 
d liberating the energies of private 
itrepreneurs. The Philippines has 
hieved major benefits by abolishing 
irtels such as those which formerly 
introlled trade in coconut products 
id wheat flour. South Korea, Taiwan, 
ong Kong, and Singapore have be- 
')me world-class competitors in a wide 
mge of products through economic 
rategies emphasizing vigorous com- 
atition for export markets. 

In contrast. North Korea and the 
mdochinese states remain in the strait- 
icket of centrally dictated economic 
jntrol. Some of Vietnam's new leaders 
lay be recognizing how far they have 
illen behind their neighbors. I sense a 
rowing awareness in Vietnam of the 
nportance of market incentives for 
enerating improved economic perform- 
nce, but such steps will be of little 
ffect until the Vietnamese leaders fi- 
lally decide that peace, not military ex- 
lansion, is in their interest. 

The greatest experiment is, per- 
laps, the one in the People's Republic 
if China. During the past decade, 
!Jhina increasingly has turned to the 
narketplace to overcome its immense 
!Conomic challenges. Despite occasional 
letbacks, China is breaking down the 
•igidities of central planning and rely- 
ng on individual incentives. These re- 
orms have paid impressive dividends 
n greater productivity and improved 
iving standards, particularly in 
igriculture. 



The inescapable conclusion is that 
many Asian economies are reaping 
great rewards by opening themselves 
up to the international flows of goods, 
capital, and information which are 
transforming the global economy. They 
have been aided in this process by 
sound financial management, a growing 
commitment to education, and a strong 
base of scientific and technical compe- 
tence. And they have been benefiting 
greatly from a welcoming and extensive 
U.S. market. 



than ever, and it is the leading source 
of new jobs in our expanding economy. 
And our impressive scientific commu- 
nity is developing the knowledge and 
innovations that will make possible fu- 
ture growth. 

A few statistics will illustrate the 
point. The value of U.S. manufactures 
in 1976 in constant dollars was about 
$600 billion. By 1986, this figure had 
increased to more than $800 billion. 
And the United States has increased its 
manufacturing output steadily every 



1 he U.S. economy has been on a path of steady growth 
since 1982, and our domestic demand for both con- 
sumer and investment goods has been strong, much of 
it satisfied by investment from abroad. 



The Trade Balance 

Let me conclude by mentioning an is- 
sue that spans all the main categories I 
have covered here: domestic policy, in- 
ternational cooperation, and the chal- 
lenge of change. I refer to the trade 
balance. 

When the economic history of the 
1980s is written, it will be recognized 
that the growth of the U.S. trade 
deficit, with all of its potentially 
troublesome implications, was a mutu- 
ally beneficial development — enabling 
world trade to expand while helping 
our own economic growth to proceed 
without inflation. 

The U.S. economy has been on a 
path of steady growth since 1982, and 
our domestic demand for both con- 
sumer and investment goods has been 
strong, much of it satisfied by invest- 
ment from abroad. Concurrently, until 
1985, the U.S. dollar strengthened, 
while high savings rates in Japan and 
Germany, combined with relatively lim- 
ited investment opportunities in those 
countries, produced strong capital flows 
into our inviting economy. 

Our trading partners enthusiasti- 
cally welcomed the investment oppor- 
tunities and the markets we provided. 
U.S. exports were flat, while imports 
skyrocketed. As a result, by 1987, the 
United States had a foreign trade defi- 
cit of $171 billion — the world's largest. 

Along with that deficit, the United 
States has a stronger economy than 
ever before in its history. We now pro- 
duce more manufactured goods than 
ever; our services sector is stronger 



year since 1982, the year when the 
present economic surge began. The pe- 
riod 1982-87, not coincidentally, was 
also a time in which we created about 
16 million new jobs in the United 
States. 

During this period of domestic 
growth, exports from Asia — excluding 
Japan — to the United States more than 
doubled, showing that our expansion 
was not at the expense of imports, but, 
indeed, that it was fueled, in part, by 
them. 

The accessibility of the U.S. mar- 
ket to the exports of developing coun- 
tries is due not only to the absence of 
most trade barriers — and to a general 
willingness to accept competition from 
foreign suppliers — but also to the en- 
during ability of the American market 
to absorb new or more favorably priced 
goods. 

The United States continues to be 
the consumer of first resort for the 
member nations of ASEAN — our sev- 
enth largest trading partner — and for a 
host of other developing countries as 
well. America was the market for 56% 
of ASEAN's combined manufactured 
exports in 1985, while Japan took 12% 
and the European Community 25% of 
those experts. 

But all of us know that the deficit 
that has characterized the climate of 
trading relationships has started to 
shift — perhaps rapidly. The United 
States now has an export boom going, 
and the OECD forecasts significant in- 
creases in U.S. exports, especially of 
manufactures. By 1989 our deficit in 



Qepartment of State Bulletin/October 1988 



27 



THE SECRETARY 



Communist Insurgency and Security Cooperation 



Excerpt from the Secretary's news con- 
ference at the Hotel Intercontinental in 
Manila on July 12, 7988.5 

The Armed Forces of the Philippines are 
clearly in far better shape than they 
were 2 V2 years ago. There is a far 
greater degree of professionalism. They 
are better equipped. They have a 
greater capacity for mobility, for commu- 
nication, and the morale is, I am told, far 
better There is a clear mission. There is 
a sense of genuine support and a record 
of increasing success. So, my impres- 
sion from my discussions with the De- 
fense Minister and the Chief of Staff are 
quite good. They are confident of their 
ability to come to grips with the 
insurgency, and I'm, of course, encour- 
aged to hear that. 

Obviously, the security relationship 
that the United States has with the Phil- 
ippines represents a kind of interplay 



between the ability to handle different 
kinds of problems. There is a threat in 
this country from the communist insur- 
gency and, obviously, it is basically 
something for the Philippine Armed 
Forces to handle. But there are many 
ways in which we can give support to 
that. 

At the same time there is a large 
strategic involvement of the Philippines 
in this region; and given the global 
nature of things that go on in this kind of 
world we live in, it is global in nature. So 
there are some things that we can do 
and some things that the Philippine 
Armed Forces can do, and there is a 
pattern of interaction between us and 
that IS the strategic and security part- 
nership. We have been working on it, we 
talk atjout it, and I am certain that as 
the question of the review of bases 
works itself along, there will be consid- 
erations in the ways in which the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines will benefit. 



manufactures should be down by half. 
The U.S. market is, thus, not likely to 
absorb rapid growth in export of man- 
ufactures to the extent that it did ear- 
lier in this decade. 

To ensure future growth, our trad- 
ing partners must turn also to other 
markets — or to domestic expansion. We 
have encouraged Germany and Japan to 
make structural reforms in order to 
maintain growth at home, expand world 
trade, and prevent a global recession. 
Japan has responded effectively. Today, 
Japan's economy is growing at more 
than 4% per year, and its trade surplus 
with the world is decreasing in volume 
terms — more recently, even in dollar 
terms. Germany, on the other hand, 
has done less and, as a consequence, 
the performance of the German econ- 
omy is sluggish. 

As trade imbalances change, we 
can adjust smoothly, but it will mean 
hard work because we face three seri- 
ous obstacles: 

• First, structural rigidities prop 
up inefficient industiies; subsidize — 
that is, protect — exports; restrict the 
entry of foreign investment; and gener- 
ally allocate resources by bureaucratic 
fiat rather than in response to market 
conditions. 

In the United States, we have al- 
ready accomplished a great deal: 
growth of the government's share of na- 
tional output has been curbed. Our 



28 



budget deficit has been significantly re- 
duced. Inflation has been brought un- 
der control. Our tax system has been 
reformed. And our transportation, com- 
munications, and financial markets have 
been significantly deregulated. 

• The second obstacle is that ex- 
change rates can frustrate the adjust- 
ment of economic imbalances if manipu- 
lated by governments to gain short- 
term commercial advantage. We believe 
such interference reduces the welfare of 
consumers in the countries concerned 
and gives comfort to protectionist ele- 
ments elsewhere. Instead, governments 
should enable their currency exchange 
rates to reflect, fully and promptly, 
market factors and the underlying 
health of their economies. 

• The third obstacle to adjustment 
is trade barriers, including tariffs and 
nontariff barriers such as quotas, re- 
strictions on trade and services, and 
discriminatory standards. These bar- 
riers enrich narrow interest groups at 
the expense of the rest of society. 

I regret to say that most ASEAN 
countries retain relatively high tariffs, 
often with import licensing and other 
nontariff constraints. Such trade bar- 
riers in Asia provide a rallying point 
for those in the United States who wish 
to increase protectionism and, from an 
Asian point of view, also reduce com- 
petition and consumer choice at home. 
To this I can only say that protection- 
ism is arson that eventually burns down 
everyone's house. 



Conclusion 

So there is a lot to do: 

• Keep steady on the paths that 
have led to progress. There have been 
great achievements that must not be 
lost. 

• Analyze the problems that arise 
with each new day and move boldly to 
solve them. 

• Look ahead to the future, its op- 
portunities and its difficulties. If we 
face the future, we can see where to 
go. If we go back into it, we will be 
caught unaware and stumble 
unnecessarily. 

History tells us that most nations i 
do not accept change readily. The | 
United States and many of the nations 
of the Pacific have found that facing tl 
future is far better than backing into 
That's what I'm talking about today. 
Americans and Asians should see that 
open markets, domestic policies for 
growth, and international cooperation 
that supports those policies are the 
keys to the future. 

Whenever I come to Jakarta, I ar 
greeted by the music of the gamelan. 
is a unique and wonderful sound. So, 
like the gamelan players, one of us m 
play the kettle drum, another the cyr 
bals, still another the flute. But if we 
each develop our particular talent an< 
then learn to orchestrate our efforts, 
we can make great music together. 

That is our task for today and fo 
the new century ahead of us. 



ARRIVAL STATEMENT 

(EXCERPT), 
MANILA, 
JULY n, 1988 

The United States rejoiced — there is 
other word for it — when the Philippir 
people joined together 2 years ago in 
one of the most dramatic political tra. 
formations of this era. The restoratio 
of democracy to the Philippines not 
only met our hopes for your own dev 
opment, it set an example for politict 
transformations elsewhere in this re- 
gion. And it positioned your country 
especially dramatic progress in 
economic development and national 
reconciliation. 

The United States has given hea 
felt political and material support to 
your new government since the Febr 
ary revolution because we believe ths 
your triumph represented a victory i 
democracy to flourish, it needs conti 
ing support from its friends. We cou 



THE SECRETARY 



(t countenance its failure here, for it 
4ulcl be a loss to democratic societies 
.«ery where. 

My visit this time provides an op- 
'jrtunity to review with your leaders 
*le full range of issues which are cen- 
tal to your continuing development and 
II the evolution of U.S. -Philippine 
Illations. 

• Economic reform and vigorous 
jowth are critical to reinforcing your 
I'litical revolution, and I want to re- 

.'w nur trading and investment ties, 
i well as prospects for the multilateral 
;;1 initiative. We want to see the Phil- 
ipine economy put on the track of self- 
: staining growth; we want you to be- 
ime full participants in the emerging 

obal era based on dramatic develop- 

ents in the fields of science, informa- 

m. and technology. 

• I want to learn more about recent 
■iiuress in dealing with the communist 
suruency and of your current efforts 

I'eform and modernize the Armed 
)i-e('s of the Philippines. 

• And, of course, there is the 
■iiader issue of U.S. -Philippine se- 
ii-ii.\- cooperation. We both understand 
e \ ital necessity of like-minded na- 
in,-- working together to preserve the 
■curity and stability so essential for 
eeilom and economic progress. Our 
'feiise relationship enables the Philip- 
no to concentrate resources on mat- 
ers of internal security and domestic 
rowth. It makes a major contribution 

5 well to regional stability. 

And it is a significant part of the 
feh of security ties that gives political 
nd economic vitality and cohesiveness 
D the entire free world. In this regard, 
will be reviewing with President 
iquino and Secretary Manglapus the 
tate of the bases review and prospects 
or continuing security cooperation. 

So, I welcome this opportunity to 
neet again with your leaders and work 
ooperatively with you to shape the fu- 
ure of U.S. -Philippine relations in 
vays that respond to your deepest aspi- 
■ations and benefit both our people. 

3ANQUET TOASTS (EXCERPTS), 

BEIJING. 

lULY 14 AND 15, 1988 

July 14 Toast 



We live in a time of great promise for 
the future; a time of great change and 
challenge. International relationships 



are changing dramatically as we enter a 
period of global economic transforma- 
tion. Former adversaries are turning to 
political approaches to resolve their dif- 
ferences. Nations long divided by war 
and revolution are seeking to bridge 
the chasms of confrontation through di- 
alogue, trade, and human contact. And 
prospects for social development are e.\- 
panding dramatically as the technolo- 
gies and production processes of the 
information age make possible new 
products, new services, and new pat- 
terns of interpersonal relations. In this 
transformation, openness is the key: 
openness to ideas, to human contact, to 
trade, and to new approaches to resolv- 
ing old problems. 



1 he challenge we collec- 
tively face is to keep this 
global trading system as 
open as possible. 



China and the United States have 
been pacesetters in this process of 
change. Nearly two decades ago, our 
nations' leaders embarked on a path of 
normalization, hoping to resolve long- 
standing differences through dialogue 
and the search for common interests. 
Upon this foundation we have, in the 
course of this decade, built what is now 
a stable and mature relationship that 
enriches our two peoples through ever- 
expanding trade, student and scientific 
exchanges, and ongoing contact be- 
tween our two national leaderships. 

The success of our experience is 
now reflected in the parallel efforts of 
our two countries to reduce tensions 
with the Soviet Union. While serious 
obstacles remain for both of us, from an 
American perspective we have begun to 
make some progress in reversing the 
arms I'ace and moving to create a more 
stable strategic balance. 

The recent U.S. -Soviet INF [inter- 
mediate-range nuclear forces] agree- 
ment will now be followed by a broad 
range of arms control negotiations: on a 
50% reduction in strategic arms, on 
conventional arms reduction in Europe, 
and on efforts to ban chemical weapons 
on a global basis. We also look for evi- 
dence that the Soviet Union will make 
practical contributions to removing 
sources of tension and resolving long- 
standing conflicts in Asia. In this 



regard, your country is seeking elim- 
ination of the remaining obstacles in 
the way of Sino-Soviet relations, a pros- 
pect that can be welcomed to the ex- 
tent that it strengthens an environment 
of security and stability for all the 
countries of Asia as they try to focus 
their energies on national economic 
construction. 

China and the United States have 
made their own contributions to this 
more promising international environ- 
ment. Even as we have moved to nego- 
tiate differences, we have also stood 
firm in the face of aggression. From 
Afghanistan to Indochina, we have sup- 
ported peoples determined to resist the 
imposition of foreign rule and fight for 
national independence. The Soviets are 
now withdrawing from Afghanistan. 
This should be followed by a complete 
withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from 
Cambodia and the creation of a national 
reconciliation government under the 
leadership of Prince Sihanouk. All na- 
tions concerned with the future of Indo- 
china have an obligation to facilitate 
such a development. 

We have made it clear that we wel- 
come development on both sides of the 
Taiwan Straits that contribute to a re- 
laxation of tensions and constructive 
interchange. Such developments are 
consistent with our longstanding inter- 
est in a peaceful resolution of the Tai- 
wan question. In the same spirit, we 
hope that the recent courageous and 
farsighted proposals that have been 
made for creating a new climate on the 
Korean Peninsula and for expanding 
North-South contacts wall lead to posi- 
tive steps toward national reconcilia- 
tion. The leadership in Pyongyang has 
both the responsibility and the oppor- 
tunity to help make the upcoming 
Olympic Games in Seoul a secure and 
contributing element to this process so 
much desired by all Koreans. 

For all that is promising in contem- 
porary international trends, we also see 
new and daunting security challenges. 
The development of diverse centers of 
scientific and industrial capacity around 
the world is leading to the prolifera- 
tion — from many sources — of high- 
technology weaponry: advanced aircraft, 
missiles, chemical weapons. As we see 
in the gulf war, less developed coun- 
tries fighting age-old battles on re- 
ligious, ethnic, or political grounds have 
ready access to such highly destructive 
armaments. And it is ironic that just as 
the major powers are making progress 
in getting their arms competition under 
some control, the developing world is 
increasingly burdened by this flow of 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1988 



29 



THE SECRETARY 



advanced weaponry. The international 
community as a whole must find ways 
to staunch this arms traffic. 

Finally, let me note China's leading 
role in economic reform among the de- 
veloping, socialist countries. A decade 
ago, under Chairman Deng Xiaoping's 
leadership, China began a series of far- 
reaching reforms that have dramatically 
raised economic productivity and posi- 
tioned the country to participate in the 
increasingly global trading system. By 
opening up its doors to commerce with 
the world, by decentralizing manage- 
ment of the economy, by sending 
students abroad, China has gained rec- 
ognition as a country capable of world- 
class economic performance as we move 
into the 21st century. The impact of 
these policies is already evident in 
China's impressive economic growth on 
the average of nearly 10% per year over 
the past decade— and in the rapid ex- 
pansion of U.S. -China trade. 

The challenge we collectively face 
is to keep this global trading system as 
open as possible. For our part, we will 
resist protectionism at home, but we 
need the example of open markets in 
our trading partners to counter those 
who would restrict access to our do- 
mestic market. And we will do our best 
to keep flows of advanced technology 
abroad as unconstrained as possible, as 
reflected in the recent COCOM [Coor- 
dinating Committee for Multilateral Se- 
curity Export Controls] decision to 
further liberalize technology transfers 
to China. 

Let me make an observation as a 
reflection from my time as Secretary of 
State since 1982: our relationship keeps 
moving forward because of our willing- 
ness to find common ground by com- 
bining adherence to principle with 
practical efforts to resolve issues be- 
tween us. This is the hallmark of a 
truly normal and productive relation- 
ship — a legacy that my generation of 
leaders is proud to leave to the 
next. 



.July 15 Toast 



On the economic front, we are 
continuing to open up to each other. 
From the time I took office in 1982, I 
have watched our bilateral trade nearly 
double from $5.5 billion to $10.4 billion 
last year. And in the same period, 
pledged U.S. investment in China has 
tripled, from $1 billion to over $3 bil- 



lion. At the same time, China's reforms 
promise to bring you into the circle of 
GATT signatories. 

And, in the years ahead, as China 
enters GATT with its tenets of fairness 
and openness— as you provide those 
with whom you trade an opportunity 
for reasonable profits, as you reduce 
nontariff barriers, as you respect intel- 
lectual property rights — then China 
will surely attract new waves of foreign 
trade and investment. 

Finally, in the realm of political re- 
lations over the past decade, American 
leaders have been privileged to work 
with Chinese leaders who are willing to 
engage with us and with the world 
community in order to resolve the is- 
sues of the present and create better 
world conditions for the futui-e. 



ADDRESS BEFORE THE KOREAN 

NEWSPAPER EDITOR'S 

ASSOCIATION. 
SEOUL, 
JULY 18, 19886 

I am pleased to be here and to convey 
to the people of the Republic of Korea 
warm greetings from President Reagan 
and the American people. The dynamic 
economic growth that you are sustain- 
ing, the profound political changes that 
have taken place this past year, the 
vigor and thoroughness of your Olympic 
preparations all reflect the Korean peo- 
ple's spirit and have won for the Re- 
public of Korea the respect of the 
world. And no achievement is more im- 
pressive than your remarkable efforts 
to bring democracy to your country. 

Korea was once called the "Hermit 
Kingdom." Today, the Republic of 
Korea stands at the forefront of a 
worldwide trend toward democracy, de- 
centralization, and openness. The 
Korean people have been pacesetters in 
all these trends. 

We live in a time of profound trans- 
formation of the international order: 
national economies are becoming inte- 
grated into a global trading system, 
even as centralized planning gives way 
to economic pluralism and the play of 
open markets. Like-minded nations 
seek new ways to cooperate on chal- 
lenges such as terrorism and the pro- 
liferation of ballistic missiles, even as 
allies pursue arms control with adver- 
saries and seek new approaches to old 
confrontations. The struggle to open up 
the political process, to end military or 
one-party rule, to give people freedom 
to choose leaders and influence policies, 
is an integral part of this great tide of 
change. 



Democracy and Development: 
A Global TYend 

From Spain and Portugal a decade ago 
to a trend that now encompasses Latin 
America from Argentina to El Sal- 
vador, from the Philippines to South 
Korea, democratic values and institu- 
tions are growing in influence and 
strength. Democracy has no one form; 
its institutional development in any 
given country is shaped by unique fac- 
tors of history, culture, and circum- 
stance. But its common denominator is 
a people's demand to play an active roU 
in their own affairs. 

We see this trend to democracy in 
growing public pressures for human 
dignity, personal liberties, and broad 
participation in government. We see it 
not only among developing nations 
friendly to the industrial West; even 
highly regimented societies like the So 
viet Union and China now realize that 
economic advance in this era requires 
openness to information and ideas, pul 
lie expression of conflicting views, and 
economic decentralization. 

Ample evidence suggests a close, 
reciprocal relationship between eco- 
nomic jjrogress and political openness 
in the modern world. Indeed, they are 
inseparable. Political and economic 
systems supportive of free inquiry, 
entrepreneurial risk-taking, and indi- 
vidual freedom are the font of 
creativity — the cutting edge of change 
in the ei-a of the information revolutio 
Economic strength and political mod- 
ernization mutually support each othe 
Democracy — with all its facets of per- 
sonal freedoms, individual initiative, 
and the right of choice— is the fullest 
expression of political modernization. 

Nowhere in the world is the rela- 
tionship between political and econom. 
development clearer than in East Asii 
Some Asian countries have had to ove 
come the destruction of war and the 
legacies of colonialism or entrenched 
tradition. Others have had to confront 
the failure of Marxist development ex- 
periments. Yet, in this region, there 
have been economic miracles, and the: 
are now being matched, by political mi 
acles. In some cases, economic develo; 
ment provided the basis for political 
evolution. In the case of Japan, demo- 
cratic institutions — including the rule 
law, constitutionalism, and elections- 
provided the conditions for economic 
growth. 

Many East Asian countries have 
benefited from postwar Western deve: 
opment assistance, access to Western 
markets. Western security guarantee: 



30 



Department of State Bulletin/October 19iJ 



THE SECRETARY 



educational opportunities in devel- 
d countries. The United States 
red a major role in providing many 
hese benefits, and we are proud to 
e done so. These benefits have con- 
uted to dramatic economic and po- 
:al advancement. The basic sources 
he success of Asian countries, how- 
r, have been the talent, initiative, 
hard work of their people. 
In Asia, not surprisingly, economic 
sperity has been accompanied by 
nater public demand for personal 
T'dom and for political participation, 
^crnment resistance to these de- 
II i- has often created domestic in- 
ula, \- and endangered the new 
'is|i.i-ity. Many traditional govern- 
i: Us have found it far better to re- 
11 ilomestic institutions, to exercise 
It rship in the process of change, and 
ii\:i" expression of public aspirations 
I )iis^h ]ieaceful, constructive 
■1 iiiicls. 

Although demands for political re- 
11 may be irresistible, democratic 
-iisiiions, once underway, are often 
i icult. Societies undergoing such 
ii.<iti(ins are vulnerable to assault 
11 the authoritarian right and the to- 
taiiaii left. History, including that of 
I nited States, tells us that democ- 
■ \- 1.-; not a sure thing. The scope and 
, e (if political development are deter- 
led by the unique history, culture, 
I geopolitical realities of each society 
t chooses a democratic path. Just as 
sparks of inspiration for reform 
st originate domestically, so must a 
intry's political evolution be driven 
distinctive domestic forces and cir- 
nstances. Every case is different; 
:re is no set pattern or standard 
;come. 

The democratic process cannot be 
ificially shaped or forced, but friends 
:1 allies can — indeed, should — support 
itical reform. Thus, we will remain 
pged with democratically oriented 
litical forces and support their goals, 
r position is clear: we stand for 
aceful institutional and procedural re- 
•m in accordance with the will of the 
ople. Our influence with friendly gov- 
nments is a precious resource which 
' will use for this constructive end. 
hile we will never seek to dictate 
ents, decisions, or formulas, we will 
tempt to offer ideas, assistance, and 
iderstanding in support of the process 
change. Our support will be all the 
ore steadfast when democracies are 
reatened by hostile external forces. 
I do less would be to betray our own 
mmitment to democratic values and, 
essence, to turn away from our 
tends at a time of difficult transition. 



The progress of recent democratic revo- 
lutions in Korea and the Philippines 
demonstrates, I believe, success in 
maintaining the delicate balance be- 
tween domestic pressures for reform 
and friendly assistance from abroad. 
Although politically developing 
Asian nations face many challenges, 
their experiences compare very favor- 
ably to those of less fortunate neigh- 
bors. In North Korea, Vietnam, and 
Cambodia — where political oppression, 
economic centralization, and oversized 
military regimes still hold sway — lead- 
ership is paralyzed, economies stag- 
nate, and the people are demoralized 
and unproductive. 



patriots to the North. This commitment 
to the defense of their freedom is dear, 
but it is one that Koreans, like other 
free peoples, know they must bear. 

Just 35 years ago, in the wake of 
the terrible devastation of the Korean 
war, the Republic of Korea was among 
the most impoverished states in the 
world. Now, it is one of the most mod- 
ern, prosperous, and dynamic. Korea, 
once a major U.S. aid recipient, is now 
on its feet and stands as our seventh 
largest trading partner. Korea has even 
helped create a new word in the lexicon 
of development economics: it is a prime 
example of a newly industrialized 
economy. 



Uemocracy — with all its facets of personal freedoms, 
individual initiative, and the right of choice— is the 
fullest expression of political modernization. 



Democratization in Korea 

For their part, the people of the Re- 
public of Korea have made very clear 
their determination to develop a demo- 
cratic political system. Through their 
public calls for democracy and enthusi- 
astic support for political candidates, 
through their ratification of a new con- 
stitution, and the election of a new 
president and National Assembly, 
Koreans have given the world a dra- 
matic example of political forces at 
work. 

The unfolding drama of the Korean 
people's quest for a more pluralistic 
system has been especially heroic, for 
it has has taken place against the 
ominous backdrop of a severe military 
threat from the North. Deployed just 
across the DMZ [demilitarized zone], a 
scant 30 miles from here, is one of the 
largest concentrations of armed forces 
in the world. Since the communist-initi- 
ated war in the early 1950s, North 
Korea has maintained a preponderant 
military force armed with sophisticated 
Soviet-supplied weaponry and postured 
for offensive operations. The citizens of 
the South — despite their deeply felt de- 
sire for peaceful relations with their 
brethren to the North, and for eventual 
peaceful reunification — have had to arm 
themselves against a clear threat of re- 
newed war. They have had to bear this 
bitter and costly burden despite their 
deep feeling of kinship with their com- 



The same human energy, resource- 
fulness, and vision has driven Korea's 
political development. Koreans have re- 
jected authoritarianism and are devel- 
oping more open and representative 
political institutions, including a free 
press. These transitions have not been 
easy in Korea, and they have not been 
easy elsewhere. Political reform is 
never a conflict-free process. 

We know, in our own case, that de- 
mocracy is a rough and tumble process 
of give-and-take, debate, and compro- 
mise. It can only work if citizens are 
prepared actively to engage in it with a 
high degree of self-discipline, restraint, 
and civic responsibility. The citizen's 
exercise of democratic freedoms is not 
a license to do anything. Nor is it a 
sure-fire method of always getting one's 
way. But it is a process that keeps the 
players in the game. It is openness, the 
right to express one's view and to de- 
mand official responsiveness to a peo- 
ple's needs and concerns. And, above 
all, it is an effective means by which a 
society can remain stable even as it ad- 
justs in an orderly manner to changing 
conditions. 

Thus, even in the midst of vigorous 
public debate and societal change, dem- 
ocratic governments can remain strong 
because they have a structure of con- 
sent behind them — elections, a free 
press, open institutions. By the same 
token, representative governments have 
the right — indeed, the duty — to protect 
their electorates from extremists whose 



apartment of State Bulletin/October 1988 



31 



THE SECRETARY 



aim is violent disruption of the demo- 
cratic processes of orderly change. 

Events of the past year in Korea 
affirm the need for a balance between 
official responsiveness and popular re- 
straint. The government accepted the 
will of the people— often vociferously 
enunciated— to revise the constitution, 
which was endorsed overwhelmingly in 
a popular referendum. Koreans then 
geared up for the first direct presiden- 
tial election in 16 years. The world 
watched as the candidates campaigned 
across the land, in print, on television, 
and in enormous rallies. The campaign, 
a free-wheeling, wide-open contest, 
marked a major step along the road to 
democracy. . 

Then, almost before the presiden- 
tial campaign posters came down, the 
banners went up for the National As- 
sembly election. Koreans surprised 
many "observers by electing more as- 
sembly members from opposition par- 
ties than from the government party. 
The result has been a national oppor- 
tunity for everyone, providing Korean 
pohticians from differing political, eco- 
nomic, and regional backgrounds the 
chance to work together in establishing 
a process of debate, compromise, and 
consensus-building. 

That process is still underway and 
is a never-ending one in any democracy. 
From what the Korean people them- 
selves are saying, many tasks lie ahead: 
forging new, "productive executive-legis- 
lative relations, enhancing local auton- 
omy, and strengthening respect for 
human rights. But judging from how- 
far you have come this past year, I have 
no doubt that outstanding problems will 
be resolved as the process of political 
institution-building continues. For al- 
though views and approaches may dif- 
fer widely, the Korean people are firmly 
committed to sustaining the proc- 
ess of democratic development. From 
my meeting this morning with party 
leaders at the National Assembly, I 
learned firsthand of the commitments of 
the Korean people to this process. 

This past year's progress toward 
democratic government has helped to 
highlight, along with this country's eco- 
nomic dynamism, Korea's growing role 
on the world stage. The Republic of 
Korea enjoys an ever greater stature 
because it "has adapted itself so effec- 
tively to the political and economic 
trends of the future. Increasingly, other 
countries turn to Korea to establish or 
strengthen diplomatic ties, to engage in 
trade, to conduct cultural exchanges. 
The 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, only 
weeks away, provide only the most im- 
mediate example of this trend. 



32 



North-South Relations 



Regrettably, we cannot address^ the re- 
markable achievements of the Korean 
people without also noting that the Re- 
public of Korea must have the strength 
and resolve to defend itself from the 
still acute threat of armed attack from 
the North. Since the end of the Korean 
war, the communist regime in Pyong- 
yang has done more than merely men- 
"ace the South. The records of their use 
of violence spans the decades; the list 
of victims grows tragically longer. Yet 
America's resolve to help our Korean 
ally deter and, if necessary, repel ag- 
gression from the North is as firm now 
as when we signed our mutual defense 
treaty in 1953. The military forces that 
the U.S. stations here through agree- 
ment with the Korean Government rep- 
resent one component of that security 
guarantee. They will remain in Korea 
as long as the people and Governments 
of both the United States and the Re- 
public of Korea deem them necessary to 
ensure peace. North Korea should have 
no doubt that even as we will support 
the efforts of our ally in the South to 
promote dialogue and national recon- 
ciliation, we will also stand firm in the 
face of violence and efforts to 
intimidate. 

Koreans everywhere share the as- 
piration of reunifying their country. 
The United States has long supported 
the peaceful attainment of this goal. It 
is important for us all to remember 
that there was a time when Korean and 
American soldiers died side by side in 
pursuit of this aspiration. It is now up 
to Koreans in the North and South, 
however, to work out for themselves 
how they will achieve unification peace- 
fully. In" our view, the recent proposals 
of President Roh Tae-Woo are a con- 
structive and sincere effort to breathe 
new life into the process of North- 
South dialogue, and we hope the North 
will consider them carefully. The Olym- 
pic Games provide an immediate oppor- 
tunity for contact between the North 
and South. Even at this late date. 
North Korea can still choose to partici- 
pate in the Olympics. 

We urge North Korean leaders to 
rethink the severe restrictions they im- 
pose on the lives of their citizens. 
North Korean leaders should recalcu- 
late the costs of centralizing decisions 
which individuals can and should make 
for themselves. Many nations, including 
some of North Korea's closest allies, are 
recognizing the benefits of movement 
toward greater individual Uberty. In its 
own self-interest, perhaps North Korea 
should profit from the experience of 



others to improve its own condition. I 
note in this respect that North Korea 
has recently praised Chinese economic 
reforms. 



U.S.-Korean Relations 

Whatever course the leaders in the 
North should decide to take— and, wit! 
you, we hope it is a positive one— the 
"people of the Republic of Korea alread> 
have chosen to join a growing commu- 
nity of democratic nations and free 
market economies. By joining us, you 
have strengthened a web of global mar 
kets and mutually supportive security i 
ties that knit the free world together. |li 
Korea's economic and political de- Ixi 
velopment has occurred very quickly. 
One feature of this development has 
been the emergence of diverse and 
forcefully articulated views on many i^ 
sues, including the relationship be- 
tween Korea and the United States. 
This relationship is being debated and 
reexamined; we welcome this reex- 
amination. Certainly, it will bring out 
differences, problems, and divergent _ 
points of view. In doing so, however, i)| 
will illuminate misunderstanding and 
misperception. It will force us to ad- 
dress issues squarely and honestly. If 
we understand our differences, we cai 
resolve them. Ultimately, honest and 
open debate, conducted in a spirit of 
friendship and respect, will strengthe 
the relationship between our two 
countries. 

Through it all, neither of our cou 
tries should forget that the bilateral 
ties that we have formed have, in tur 
reinforced the structure of peace na- 
tionally, regionally, and internationall 
They have brought each of us greater 
benefits than either of us could have 
achieved on our own. They are ties of 
mutuality, of reponsibility, and of par 
nership. "They are ties of individual 
strength and" shared commitment. Ar 
they are ties indispensable to the eff< 
five pursuit of each of our national 
interests. 

This fundamental understanding 
our bilateral ties must infuse, in part 
ular, the current reassessment of our 
economic relations. As Korea prepan 
to take its place among the industri- 
alized democracies, it assumes new 
obligations to its economic trading 
partners and to the international trai 
ing system— a system to which it ow. 
so much for its own economic pros-_ 
perity. In response to these obligatid 
and commensurate with its economic 
strength, Korea has now begun to 
share responsibility for economic ad- 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1« 



THE SECRETARY 



tments. both domestic and interna- 
al, that will lead to freer trade. 
e of these adjustments will be diffi- 
t in the short term, but they will 
tribute to a healthier world economy 
i, sooner than later, to the benefit of 
rea itself. 

The Korean people are clearly pre- 
ring themselves for a future of ever 
jater political stability, individual 
ledom, and prosperity. These trends 
11 strengthen relations between our 
lo nations, and they will attract in- 
C^ased attention and respect through- 
ct the world. 

I leave you today by renewing 
;nii-iea's resolute pledge to the Korean 

,o,,k.. 

• The United States will stand with 
;u in the face of external threats to 
jur security; 

• We support you in your search 
■ ways to reduce tensions and pro- 
)tf reconciliation with the North; and 

• We will steadfastly encourage and 
sist you in your efforts to further 
oniimic growth and democratic 
vfl(i])nient. 

Together we will pursue these com- 
:>n objectives and together ensure a 
ture of liberty, of prosperity, and of 
•ace for our peoples. 



INNER TOAST, 
3KY0, 

JLY 19, 1988 

r. Foreign Minister [Sosuke Uno], you 
■ok office just 7 months ago. We held 
ir first exchange in January during 
le visit of Prime Minister [Noboru] 
ikeshita to Washington and, since that 
me, have communicated often. I have 
ien pleased with what I have heard 
id seen. At the time of Prime Minis- 
'.r Takeshita's visit to Washington, he 
nd the President established a very 
pecific agenda and gave you, Mr. Min- 
;ter, and me firm orders to roil up our 
leeves and get to work. We did, and 
apan and the United States can be 
roud of recent accomplishments that 
/ould not have been possible without 
he active cooperation and consultation 
etween our two governments and 
nthout a shared sense of responsibility 
the world community. 

• Japan has accelerated its reliance 
n domestic demand expansion to pro- 
lote economic growth. 

• Japan has taken steps to assume 
lore of the costs for the support of 
I.S. forces in Japan. 



Anti-Americanism 



Excerpt from the question-and-answer 
session following Secretary Shultz's ad- 
dress before the Korean Newspaper 
Editors' Association on July 18. 

I don't know how to assess the anti- 
Americanism, so called, that I hear 
about. I can only say what the United 
States is doing and will do. We support 
free and democratic government. We 
stand with people who are willing to act 
to defend their freedom and security. We 
believe in open markets. We have 
played a big part in creating the open 
trading system from which we and the 
Korean people have benefited tremen- 
dously. So we want to keep it that way 
and open it further. And well push for 
those things. Sometimes people don't 
like It when we push for those things. 
Yet, sometimes it seems to us that 
everybody wants the U.S. market to be 
open and that's as far as it goes. That's 
not an open world trading system; it's 
got to be reciprocal. 

I understand there is a lot of resent- 
ment and anti-Americanism connected 
with our efforts to open your markets to 



tobacco, for example, and in the case of 
beef. . . . Are you aware that you sell 
more tobacco in the United States than 
we sell here? Would you like us to take 
action to stop that? There is a perfectly 
satisfactory agreement that's been nego- 
tiated. Let it be so. And if my saying that 
causes anti-Americanism, so be it. I'm 
going to stand up for the principles I 
believe in. . . , You can't say, I want the 
good aspects, but if something happens 
I don't like, I'll reject that. That's not be- 
ing part of the system. So, if my saying 
that means you become anti-American, 
so be it. 

But, you have to look at these is- 
sues in a factual, objective way, just as 
we try to do. We know every country has 
forceful, political, special interests. We 
have them. Do you think that we don't 
have any farmers that notice when they 
can't penetrate other people's markets? 
And that they don't raise Cain? Have 
you ever seen the tractors on the streets 
of Washington protesting closed markets 
abroad? So, it's got to work both ways if 
It's going to work. 



• We have agreed on a procedure 
for facilitating the access of American 
corporations to public works projects in 
Japan. 

• Japan has agreed to remove 
quotas on the import of beef and citrus 
products, permitting a freer trade in 
these commodities to the benefit of Jap- 
anese consumers and our producers. 

• We have adopted a new science 
and technology agreement that will 
provide for a vastly increased inter- 
change of ideas between our two 
peoples. 

• We have concluded a revised nu- 
clear agreement that will greatly sta- 
bilize our cooperation in this area. 

• Japan has moved decisively to 
strengthen its export control regime, 
thereby contributing to the security of 
both of our peoples. 

• We have agreed on codevelop- 
ment of a new fighter aircraft, and 
Japan has increased its cash contribu- 
tion to the maintenance of our forces in 
Japan. 

Our cooperation has also extended 
to efforts to coordinate international fi- 
nancial and development strategy. We 
have been in close contact in recent 



months to discuss the major develop- 
ment assistance programs which will be 
required to support the Philippines and 
Afghanistan. Moreover, we have begun 
regular meetings to seek methods by 
which the world's two largest economic 
powers can coordinate efforts. 

In our discussions during my visit, 
we have reaffirmed that the close rela- 
tionship between our two nations is 
unshakable. We have a common com- 
mitment to democratic principles and 
the pursuit of excellence, and we share 
a respect for the free market which has 
afforded our peoples an unprecedented 
level of prosperity and economic 
vitality. 

I am confident that our relations 
are headed in the right direction. We 
will have problems, but those will be 
problems arising out of the dynamism 
of our societies. They will at times 
cause frictions, but they will also pro- 
vide opportunities for cooperation, 
whether it be in trade, scientific en- 
deavor, development assistance, or 
peacemaking. It is time now to plan for 
the future, one which holds great prom- 
ise for both of our peoples, for our so- 
cieties are blessed with the democratic 
values and enterprising spirit so vital 
for success in our increasingly inte- 
grated and rapidly changing world. 



lepartment of State Bulletin/October 1988 



33 



THE SECRETARY 



RFMARKS \T U.S. -MARSHALL 
"^SdS COMMEMORATIVE 

CEREMONY, 
MAJURO, 
JULY 20, 1988 



Today, at this place, we are joined 
together to pause and to remember. 
Join me in looking across the Majuro 
Lagoon and remembering a late Janu- 
ary day in 1944, when a small band ot 
American forces came ashore here to 
hberate Majuro Atoll from Imperial 
Japanese forces. Like many other Pa- 
cific islands, these islands were re- 
moved from the hands of the aggressor 
and came again into the possession of 
the sovereign Marshallese people. 

The conquest of Majuro Atoll by 
American forces was bloodless, but 
your experience in the surrounding war 
was not. Just 200 miles to our north- 
west, the day before the landing here 
at Majuro, American forces from the 
4th Marine and the 7th Infantry Divi- 
sions, supported by U.S. naval and air 
forces, liberated Kwajalein Atoll from 
an entrenched enemy. That day saw 
some of the most brutal hand-to-hand 
fighting of the Pacific campaign. These 
Americans fought and died to return to 
you what has always been yours— these 
islands, these waters, this country. 

Our remembrance today of those 
cataclysmic events is not complete 
without paying tribute to the Mar- 
shallese people who aided American 
forces as scouts and who took up arms 
to eradicate occupiers from these 
islands. 

Forty-four years have passed since 
that January day. For 42 of those years, 
until October 21, 1986, we were part- 
ners in reconstructing your country in 
setting it on the course wanted by Mar- 
shallese and for Marshallese. We know 
the Marshallese people made major sac- 
rifices in securing the peace in our 
postwar world. Here I refer to the U.S. 
nuclear weapons testing program that 
took place here between 1946 and 1958. 
For our part, we participated in your 
enterprise under the trusteeship agree- 
ment with the United Nations. But the 
task was harder for you— you had the 
challenge of building a nation. 

We experienced times of exhilara- 
tion and progress during the trust- 
eeship. We participated together in 
designing and building new public proj- 
ects so that the economy of your coun- 
try could advance. We participated 
together in creating and sustaining the 
political conditions that resulted in 
your own constitution taking effect on 
May 1, 1979. 



We also participated together in 
creating a new political partnership 
that allows vour country and mine to 
associate freely as friends dedicated to 
human rights, to the realization of hu- 
man potential, and to the strength of 
our common vision of peace in the 
Pacific and the world. There is no 
precedent for our free association rela- 
tionship. We created it out of our mu- 
tual respect for one another and our 
desire to honor the bonds first formed 
so many years ago. And we did the 
same with our friends and neighbors in 
the Federated States of Micronesia. 

In October of 1986, when the Com- 
pact of Free Association entered into 
force, you became a free people in a 
free nation, just as you were in the 
distant past. And in the short 20 
months that have followed, nations and 
international organizations in the re- 
gion and the world are recognizing and 
accepting this most fundamental of 
facts The years of waiting are over, the 
transition is done, the life of this nation 
is now unfettered and supported only 
by friends of your own making. 

As I cast this wreath on the waters 
of Majuro Lagoon, remember with me 
the days of liberation, of exhilaration, 
of work and suffering, and finally of 
freedom that we have shared. And re- 
member the price paid by those who 
made this possible. Let us consecrate 
their memory even as we rededicate 
ourselves, as free peoples, to the pur- 
pose they had in moving across this 
lagoon 44 years ago. 



ADDRESS BEFORE THE PACIFIC 
AND ASIAN AFFAIRS COUNCIL 
AND THE PACIFIC FORUM, 

HONOLULU, 

JULY 21, 1988' 

I conclude my travels in Asia as Secre- 
tary of State here in Hawaii— a symbol, 
if ever there was one, that America is a 
nation of the Pacific and a nation of the 
future. This nine-stop trip covered 
Southeast, East, and Northeast Asia, 
as well as Oceania. 1 am more im- 
pressed than ever with Asia's diversity, 
with its dynamism, and with the re- 
gion's potential. And I am more con- 
vinced than ever of how critical 
America's ties to Asia will be for our 
own prosperity, freedom, and security 
in the years ahead. But if we, the free 
nations of the Asia-Pacific region, are 
to continue to advance in the next cen- 
tury, we all must learn to meet the 
challenges arising from the very suc- 
cesses that we have achieved together. 



A Success Story 

The story of the Asia-Pacific region in 
the postwar period is one of profound 
success— for the United States and for 
the other countries in the region that 
have cast their fate with us. The accom 
plishments of the countries of East 
Asia have become so prominent a fea- 
ture of the global landscape that it is 
getting hard to remember the time in 
the years just after World War II whei 
their survival— let alone their success- 1 
was not at all assured. 

The Pacific region— with its long | 
history of national rivalries and war- 
fare—has enjoyed a remarkable period 
of stability and economic advance, es])^ 
cially in the past two decades. In the 
years since Worid War II, long-time a^ 
versaries have become allies, friends, 
and trading partners. Once poor coun- 
tries have become prosperous. Nation: 
once divided from each other are wort 
ing together pragmatically to realize ^ 
shared interests and concerns. And av 
thoritarian political orders of the past 
have given way to the give-and-take u 
democratic politics. 

Among the reasons for this ex- 
tended period of reconciliation and coi 
structive growth is the fact that for 
more than 40 years, the United State 
has pursued farsighted and effective 
policies toward the region, as it has 
toward the world as a whole. 

The Fundamentals of U.S. Policy 

What are those policies and on what 
precepts are they based? 

Collective Security. Our leaders 
the postwar years rightly sensed tha> 
our worid had become a place where 
nation could protect its security inter 
ests in isolation. Therefore, we and 
other nations of the free worid joinec 
together in a global web of alliance a 
security ties, to which each of us has 
contributed our individual strengths. 
This structure of collective security 1 
maintained the peace in the face of fc 
decades of unremitting challenges fn 
the communist world. 

Regional Conflict Resolution. J: 
today's ever more integrated world, 
age-old conflicts and regional confiag 
tions pose ever greater threats to th( 
global community. Therefore, we anc 
our partners have sought to use our 
collective strength to ensure that vio 
lence does not spread and to further 
the prospects for negotiated settle- 
ments of disputes. 

Open Economies. Despite our 
strong defenses, we know that it is i 



34 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1! 



THE SECRETARY 



ble for any country to ensure its 
ity through mihtary means alone. 
lOmic vitaUty is the essential foun- 
n of national strength. Thus, we 
actively promoted economic recov- 
,nd development. Moreover, eco- 
ic development has been spurred 
n open and competitive global trad- 
system. Therefore, the United 
es has pursued policies designed to 
ngthen open markets and facilitate 
flows of technology and capital that 
accelerate global growth. 
Democratic Values. Development 
es a high premium on creativity, on 
inced levels of education, entre- 
leurship, the decentralization of re- 
isibility, and the free flow of ideas 
people — all hallmarks of open and 
ocratic societies. Therefore, for 
lOns of political commitment as well 
ractical effect, the United States 
encouraged processes of democratic 
itution-building. We and our allies 
i supported those around the world 
are struggling for their freedom 
mst the authoritarian right as well 
Ihe totalitarian left. 

Collective security, regional conflict 
olution, open markets, and demo- 
iic values — for four decades, these 
(cies have been a powerful formula 
.national development, security, and 

I.onal stability in the world and in 
Asia-Pacific region. And it is no 
j icidence that countries that have 
j ed with the United States in the 
twar coalition of free nations have 
ined out to be the most productive, 
I most stable, and the greatest 
tributors to a secure global 
ironment. 

Today the communist powers — first 
ina and now the Soviet Union — seem 
nave begun to realize the jjower of 
se policies. We encourage them to 
ognize the need to settle draining 
1 dangerous regional conflicts, to end 
ifrontations with the United States 
1 its allies, to decentralize their 
momies, and open up to the world, 
d they are giving indications of 
,ng so. 

fping With Success 

, the trends are going our way — 
rard peace, toward a lessening of 
isions, toward free markets and dem- 
ratic values. The United States has 
Iped the countries of the Asia-Pacific 
le the wave and to solve the problems 
sociated with economic gi'owth and 
litical maturation. Now, we and our 
.rtners are facing another set of chal- 
iges but of a qualitatively different 



kind — we must learn to cope with the 
problems created by our own successes. 

As we have seen, America helped 
powerfully to create an environment 
that enabled many of the nations of 
Asia to come into their own. As a re- 
sult, our world is no longer dominated 
by one or two "superpowers." There 
are increasingly numerous national cen- 
ters of economic strength and political 
power. Peoples once accustomed to 
American preeminence and protection 
are ever more determined to shape 
their own futures. 

From the Philippines to Korea, 
long-established security arrangements 
are being reassessed, and throughout 
the region domestic economic policies 
are being reviewed in the context of 
pressures for more open markets, cur- 
rency revaluations, and the new re- 
quirements of an age of information- 
based innovation and production. Into 
the bargain, we have China's reorienta- 
tion toward economic reform and more 
constructive interchange with its neigh- 
bors. And we see a new Soviet activism 
toward the Pacific. 

All these developments present 
challenges. We and our partners will be 
equal to them if we hold fast to the 
primary sources of our achievements: 
the cooperative coalition of free nations 
that has served us all so well. 

Asia as a Policy Model 

Let's take a closer look at how the ele- 
ments of our policy have shaped U.S. 
relations with the Asia-Pacific region 
and at some of the challenges we now 
face. 

Security. First comes security: the 
U.S. -Japan alliance remains the cor- 
nerstone of our policy in the region, 
enhancing the security of our friends 
and allies as well. While maintaining its 
fundamental commitment to remain a 
nonmilitary power, Japan has steadily 
improved its self-defense capabilities 
in recent years and has broadened bi- 
lateral defense cooperation with the 
United States. 

In the Republic of Korea, with 
American help, Korean troops have held 
the front line for more than three dec- 
ades against a formidable northern ad- 
versary. At the same time, the stability 
that the U.S. presence has lent to this 
strategic peninsula has boosted Korea's 
economic and political development. 

In the Philippines, another area of 
strategic significance, the United 
States has helped a struggling democ- 
racy beat back a communist insurgency 



and promote economic growth. And, by 
supporting an imjjortant U.S. military 
presence, the Philippines — like Korea — 
has made a major contribution to its 
own and to regional and global security. 

Thailand has been an ally for over 
30 years and today remains the front- 
line state resisting Vietnamese aggres- 
sion in Cambodia. In turn, America has 
supported Thailand diplomatically, mili- 
tarily, and politically against security 
threats. The presence, even as I speak, 
of U.S. ground, naval, and air units on 
bilateral exercises in Thailand dem- 
onstrates that our commitment to 
Thailand's security remains firm. 

Our ally Australia has devoted the 
resources necessary to modernizing its 
military forces and — by its steadfast 
support for defense cooperation 
through our joint facilities — has made 
important contributions to effective 
deterrence. 

Just as the United States and our 
allies benefit from the strong web of 
security ties we have formed in the 
Asia-Pacific region, each of us also 
draws strength from the constancy and 
resolve of free nations elsewhere in the 
world. The successful way the United 
States and our allies in Europe handled 
the Soviet SS-20 threat demonstrated 
that our commitment to NATO would 
not be at the expense of secui'ity in 
Asia. 

At every step in the negotiation of 
the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Forces] Ti-eaty we consulted with our 
friends and allies in this part of the 
world as well as in Europe. Their views 
were reflected in our positions at the 
table. From the outset, we made it 
plain that we would insist on the elim- 
ination of the Soviet missiles in this 
range aimed at Asia as well as Europe. 
The treaty had to be global in scope, 
just as the structure of our security 
ties is global in scope. 

The clear lesson of this experience 
is that the ties among the world's free 
nations are interdependent and indivisi- 
ble. For four decades, our collective 
strengths have reinforced the structure 
of peace nationally, regionally, and in- 
ternationally. The Asia-Pacific region is 
more secure and stable today than ever 
before. Keeping it so requires commit- 
ment and hard work on the part of all 
countries. We cannot take the frame- 
work of peace we have built together 
for granted. The postwar generation 
understood this; yet today complacency 
is perhaps the greatest thi'eat we face. 
Our challenge is to help new genera- 
tions see the fundamental importance of 
keeping that framework strong and 
suited to the times. 



spartment of State Bulletin/October 1988 



35 



THE SECRETARY 



Nuclear Free Zones 



The following remarks were made dur- 
ing a question-and-answer session fol- 
lowing ttie address. 

I don't particularly like the nuclear- 
free-zone efforts, and the reasons are 
these: 

First, we live in a world where there 
are nuclear weapons. The Soviets and 
we have the bulk of them. As long as the 
Soviets have them, we must have them. 
Our ability to have our nuclear weapons 
is a principal source of deterrence 
against aggression. It's a principal rea- 
son why we have seen, broadly speak- 
ing, an era of stability. If we don't have 
them and they do have them, it would be 
a very destabilizing thing. So we have to 
remember that, first of all. 

Second, we have to remember, as I 
tried to bring out in my talk, that there is 
a very real sense in which the security 
of the free nations is a worldwide web of 
relationships. The fact that in Iceland we 
have an important presence in military 
capability — as Iceland is a member of 
NATO— helps the stability of the Asian 
region, just as it goes vice versa. You 
have to look upon these things as a col- 
lective matter. 

Therefore, when there come to be 
proposals that would have the effect, if 
they were fully implemented, of meaning 
that U.S. naval presence would be elimi- 
nated from the area. I think it would be a 
very destabilizing thing, and that's what 
it would mean. 

We have nuclear weapons on many 
of our vessels. As a matter of policy and 
of intelligence, we do not confirm or 
deny their presence on any particular 
vessel. There's no point in telling poten- 
tial adversaries, giving them unneces- 
sary intelligence. So that is a firm 
policy; it is a worldwide policy. We must 
pursue it in every part of the world. 

So when New Zealand, a friendly, 
democratic country, decided — I think in 



an ill-considered action — in effect, to 
ban our ships from using their port, we 
had to say to New Zealand, "We part as 
friends, but we part " And they have left 
the web of security arrangements. I 
don't think it helps any. But if that 
spreads — if that disease spreads and 
the Asia-Pacific nations try to leave that 
web of security arrangements, then I 
think that's a bad thing. That is why we 
think that the way to go about it is the 
way we are going about it. 

We don't like the possibility of a nu- 
clear explosion any more than anybody 
else does. In fact, the United States has 
more nuclear weapons stationed there, on 
our soil and operating from there on our 
soil, than anybody else does — except the 
Soviet Union — for good and sufficient rea- 
sons. So we think the way to deal with this 
matter is to try and get control of the in- 
creasing numbers of nuclear warheads in 
the world. 

That IS why President Reagan, nght 
from the beginning, said that treaties, such 
as the early SALT [strategic arms limitation 
talks] treaties that limited the rate of in- 
crease in nuclear weapons, were not a 
good idea. A much better idea is to reduce 
them. So on strategic arms, we are working 
to get them cut in half, and we have made 
a lot of headway On the intermediate- 
range, nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, we 
sought and obtained a treaty with the So- 
viet Union that would eliminate that class of 
weapon. 

So the way to do it is to bring this 
down in a way that maintains stability and 
parity — not, in effect, to have a form of 
unilateral disarmament which will not serve 
our strategic interests. 

We have been understanding of the 
sort of motive power behind this, but also 
we have said — understandable though it 
may be — it's not a good idea to push this 
idea too far, too fast, for the reasons I have 
given. 



Some of our allies in Asia are now 
reviewing whether the components of 
our security presence — port and air fa- 
cilities and naval access — are really nec- 
essary to their security. Some wonder 
whether it might not be better to go it 
alone. Their reassessment is appropri- 
ate; it is the essence of a voluntary al- 
liance of free nations. But they should 
not forget that our collective efforts 
have kept the peace for 40 years and 
that our combined strength has brought 
our adversaries to the bargaining table, 



making possible the stabilizing reduc- 
tions in armaments that we all seek. 

Likewise, we cannot be complacent 
in the face of new challenges to regional 
and global security. Terrorism requires 
a collective response. And the increas- 
ing proliferation of high-technology 
weaponry — aircraft, missiles, nuclear 
material, and chemical weapons — into 
areas of regional conflict requires re- 
straint or collective controls on the part 
of all weapons-exporting states, as well 
as effort to resolve the sources of con- 
flict themselves. 



Resolution of Conflicts and Re- 
duction of Tension. The success of oa 
collective security efforts has furthers 
prospects for reduction of tension and 
negotiated settlements in Asia and, 
hence, for a more stable world. The 
United States, the ASEAN countries, 
and other interested nations have lon^ 
pressed for the withdrawal of Viet- 
namese troops from Cambodia and foi 
the start of a genuine process of na- 
tional reconciliation in that tortured 
country. To that end, we have sup- 
ported Prince Sihanouk as the genuinj 
leader of an independent Cambodian 
Government. The United States will 
continue to support measures which 
could be implemented in the context 
of a settlement that rejects a return 
to control by the Khmer Rouge. 

During my recent meetings with 
the leaders of the ASEAN countries, 
China, and Japan, we reaffirmed our 
shared objective of an independent 
Cambodia free of both Vietnamese 
troops and the danger of Khmer Rou 
control. We advanced our dialogue or 
specific ways to achieve those goals i 
found more common ground than eve 
before. I should also tell you that oui 
efforts have not been limited to the 
Asian region alone. The Soviet Unio 
as Vietnam's principal supporter, has 
clear responsibility to help bring thi; 
tragic conflict to an end. Therefore, 
have had increasingly frequent ex- 
changes with the Soviet Foreign Mir 
ter [Eduard Shevardnadze] in order 
encourage a constructive stance on 
their part. I am encouraged by the 
tone and content of these contacts, j 
the Jakarta informal meeting unfold; 
next week, I hope we will see the bi 
ginnings of a process that will lead t 
the end of Cambodia's ti'agedy. 

When I addressed the ASEAN 
postministerial conference 2 weeks a 
I stressed the need to keep diploma'* 
and economic pressui'e on Hanoi. Tb 
stance does not arise from malice or 
bitterness. Rather, the United State 
together with our allies and friends 
in Asia, looks forward to Vietnam's : 
joining the community of nations. T1 
United States will unequivocally we; 
come normalized i-elations with Viet 
nam in the context of an acceptable 
Cambodian settlement and a resolutl 
of the POW/MIA issue which, if leftl 
unsettled, will continue to divide ou 
peoples. While we are somewhat en 
couraged by recent progress, Hanoi 
must understand that our commitm 
to a free and independent Cambodi: 
and to our POWs/MIAs is unshakali 



36 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1B' 



THE SECRETARY 



The United States has welcomed 
Republic of Korea's increased con- 
with China and the Soviet Union; 
President Roh's recent states- 
like initiative to encourage North 
■ea to reduce its isolation has our 
pect and support. Pyongyang's initial 
etion has been to brush aside Seoul's 
cere offer to reduce tensions and 
imote a North-South dialogue. We 
)e the North will reconsider its posi- 

It should not squander this im- 
•tant opportunity. Today's positive at- 
sphere is a valuable asset for na- 
lal reconciliation, and time is not on 
side of those who obstruct dialogue, 
the meanwhile, we remain solidly in 
)port of the Republic of Korea's 
lurity. 

The United States has responded 
sitively to China's steps toward 
ater and more constructive inter- 
emge with its neighbors. We have re- 
ined firm in our one-China policy 
d have welcomed developments on 
th sides of the Taiwan Straits that 
itribute to a rela.xation of tensions, 
nsistent with our longstanding inter- 
in a peaceful resolution of the T^i- 
n question, we have sought to foster 
environment within which such de- 
lopments can continue. 

We have urged China to join with 
in an international effort to staunch 
3 alarming traffic in ballistic missiles 
strife-ridden areas of the world. We 
;o believe that elimination of the re- 
aining obstacles in the way of Sino- 
iviet relations could be constructive to 
e e.xtent that this strengthens an en- 
ronment of security and stability for 
the countries of Asia. 
By the same token, we have noted 
r. Gorbachev's heightened interest in 
sia and his declared willingness to im- 
■ove relations in the region. Thus far, 
hile we view as encouraging the res- 
ration of some contacts with China, 
e have not seen any significant reduc- 
on of Soviet forces on the Sino-Soviet 
jrder. The Soviets still seek to under- 
it America's naval presence in the 
sia-Pacific region through one-sided 
roposals for naval arms restrictions, 
'loscow still underwrites the Viet- 
amese occupation of Cambodia and op- 
rates naval and air forces out of Cam 
lanh Bay. And the Soviets continue to 
nhance arms supplies to North Korea 
t a time when Pyongyang remains 
i.sia's primary exporter of subversion, 
ggression, and terrorism. Finally, 
loscow must agree to discuss Japan's 



Northern Territories, a matter that re- 
mains a fundamental obstacle to nor- 
malized relations. 

The United States repeatedly has 
sent the message to Moscow that the 
greatest contribution the Soviet Union 
can make to reducing tensions and 
building confidence in Asia would be to 
end its support for Vietnam's occupa- 
tion of Cambodia and to encourage 
Pyongyang to respond positively to con- 
structive proposals such as those put 
forward by President Roh. 

Thus, the peaceful resolution of 
conflicts and the reduction of tensions 
in Asia remains a high priority and 
a continuing concern for the United 
States and our partners in the region. 
Each situation presents a different set 
of barriers to peace; a different set of 
problems to confront and resolve. In 
each instance, we are searching for so- 
lutions that will advance the independ- 
ence, freedom, and security of the 
peoples directly affected. Together with 
our allies, we will insist on settlements 
that involve the withdrawal of foreign 
troops, a cessation of hostilities, and 
the resolution of humanitarian problems 
caused by the conflicts. 

Open Economies. Asia's economic 
dynamism is the most powerful argu- 
ment for decentralized, market-based 
economic gi'owth, and for an open inter- 
national trading system. The region's 
emergence as a world-class performer 
in manufacturing, trade, and finance 
could not have occurred without an 
open international economy. Japan and 
the newly industrialized economies of 
the region have demonstrated how 
knowledge, adaptabihty, innovation, 
and openness can achieve high growth 
rates and advanced industrial power in 
a world of globalized sourcing, produc- 
tion, and manufacturing. 

Japan is now the world's second 
largest economy. Korea, Taiwan, Sing- 
apore, and Hong Kong have enjoyed 
some of the highest growth rates any- 
where; last year their real GNP [gross 
national product] growth rates, ex- 
pressed in local currency, ranged be- 
tween 8% and almost 14%. By the turn 
of the century, Thailand and Malaysia 
could be major success stories as well. 
And the Philippines and Indonesia have 
economic reforms underway which, if 
sustained, will enable them to cap- 
italize on their impressive potential. 

Yet Asian nations have in the past 
relied on export-led growth fueled by 



the U.S. deficit and our vast invest- 
ment market. But the deficit that has 
characterized the climate of our trading 
relationship has started to shift. U.S. 
exports have begun to surge, particu- 
larly manufacturers. Our market is 
thus not likely to absorb rapid growth 
in exports of Asia's manufacturers to 
the extent that it did earlier in this 
decade. 

Thus, another challenge of success 
that we and our Asian partners must 
meet is adjustment to a more balanced 
trading environment. Unless each of us 
pursues domestic and international pol- 
icies which strengthen the role of the 
market and unleash forces that promote 
growth, all of us will face great strains 
in the years ahead. 

That is why the United States has 
emphasized structural reform and do- 
mestic growth in all our international 
discussions, including on my recent 
travels in Asia. Since Asian nations 
have depended on export-led growth 
and the American market, they must 
plan now in order to ease the adjust- 
ments they will have to make as our 
deficit continues to decline. 

The rewards and challenges of par- 
ticipating in the world market are ap- 
parent to all in Asia — including China 
and the Soviet Union. 

In China, Deng Xiaoping's far- 
reaching economic reforms of the past 
10 years have dramatically raised pro- 
ductivity and positioned China to partic- 
ipate in the world trading system. By 
opening up its doors to international 
commerce, China has gained recogni- 
tion as a country capable of world-class 
economic performance. The impact of 
these policies is already evident in 
China's impressive rate of growth — on 
the average nearly 10% per year over 
the past decade — and in the rapid 
expansion of trade with the United 
States. 

The Soviet Union is displaying a 
growing interest in sharing in Asia's 
economic boom. Its access to the region 
remains constrained by its political and 
military activities and by its own eco- 
nomic limitations. Vladivostok, the So- 
viet's one major port on the Pacific, 
remains a city closed to commerce and 
foreign travel. The Soviet Union will 
be able to participate in the economic 
dynamism of Asia as it makes the 
structural adjustments necessary for 
successful interaction with free markets 
and open societies. 



}epartment of State Bulletin/October 1988 



37 



THE SECRETARY 



Building Democracy. Nowhere in 
the world is the relationship between 
political and economic development 
clearer than in East Asia. The region's 
economic miracles are now being 
matched by political miracles. It was in 
postwar Japan that our policy of en- 
couraging democracy had its earliest 
and most spectacular success in the re- 
gion. Today's worldwide trend toward 
democracy has had its most recent 
breakthroughs in Korea and the Philip- 
pines. We have welcomed the demo- 
cratic process in Thailand and are 
impressed with the political reforms 
now advancing in Taiwan. 

But the advance of democracy is 
not guaranteed. Societies making the 
transition to open political systems are 
vulnerable to assault from the au- 
thoritarian right and the totalitarian 
left. The challenge for other democ- 
racies of the world is to remain en- 
gaged with all democratically oriented 
political forces and support their goals. 
We cannot dictate events, but we 
should offer ideas, assistance, and un- 
derstanding in order to support the 
processes of democratic change. 

So these trends of success all come 
together in Asia. Security, stability, 
prosperity, freedom — they are all inter- 
linked. Throughout the region we find 
countries that, in distinctive ways and 
to varying degi-ees, are building mod- 
ern, market-oriented economies in- 
creasingly integrated into a global 
trading system. They are opening up 
their political systems to popular par- 
ticipation, seeking to heal the wounds 



U.S. Leadership Remains 
Essential to Asia's Success 

American leadership remains crucial to 
continuing success. But our leadership 
must be of a different cast than that of 
the postwar period. It must be a lead- 
ership suited to the times. 

The Asia-Pacific region remains an 
area of high strategic importance and 
competing interest among powerful na- 
tions. Since the Second World War, the 
United States has been the indispens- 
able stabilizing influence in the region. 
We are — and for the foreseeable future 
will remain — the fundamental guaran- 
tor of the balance of power in this vital 
area that spans fully one-half of the 
globe. 

Our active engagement in the re- 
gion ensures that countries great and 
small, developed and developing alike, 
can continue to advance economically 
and politically within a secure environ- 
ment. U.S. security capabilities remain 
second to none, and we continue to pro- 
vide to our friends and allies the most 
flexible and diversified military support 
available in the world. 

Our economy is innovative; it is 
open; and, as a result, it is expanding. 
Our economic strength will continue to 
increase. Our trade deficit is declining 
as our exports continue to rise. And we 
are becoming more productive as we 
eliminate obstructions to domestic 
growth. America continues to be the 
largest source of investment capital and 
opportunity, high technology, and man- 
ufacturing capability in the world, and 



Asia's economic dynamism is the most powerful argu- 
ment for decentralized, market-based economic growth 
and for an open international trading system. 



of national division and to bridge the 
chasm of military confrontation through 
dialogue and political accommodation. 
The countries of the Asia-Pacific 
region are models for other nations to 
follow into the future. And along with 
the United States, they are especially 
well positioned to meet the challenges 
and grasp the opportunities of the com- 
ing century. Let me explain why. 



our service sector is poised for an ever 
greater role in Asian markets. 

And, last, but not least, America's 
deeply held democratic values remain 
our greatest asset. They are a universal 
beacon to people of all countries and 
backgrounds, and they make profound 
practical sense in a world where indi- 
vidual initiative, ingenuity, and the free 
flow of information and people are key 
to progress. 



Our strengths and our vision en- 
sui-e that the United States will r^nat 
a leader in the Asia-Pacific region in 
the years ahead, just as it was in the 
immediate postwar era. In the next 
century, America's engagement with 
Asia must intensify because and not d 
spite the fact that there is an ever- 
growing number of capable countries 
coming onto the world scene. Our en- 
gagement must be more active than 
ever because the socialist powers are 
seeking to be more actively involved i) 
the region as well. 

Today's transformations in our rel 
tionships with allies, friends, and ad- 
versaries alike are leading to a health 
reexamination and renewal of our ties 
with the nations of the region. And, I 
am confident, our relations with our 
partners will be the stronger for it. T 
national interests at stake — our own 
and theirs — are too weighty and jeop 
dize; the alternatives too troublesome 
in their implications. 

Policy Guidelines 
for the Years Ahead 

As we all engage in a collective reas- 
sessment of the relations among us, ll 
me suggest some guidelines for shap;! 
our future dealings. 

• We are better together than 
apart; we can do much more collecti% 
than separately. One nation's strateg 
location may prove advantageous to 
basing arrangements; another natior 
may possess a strategic capability; s 
another's thriving economy may pen 
it to exert influence in world affairs 
order to achieve shared objectives. \ 
must maintain our collective strength 
and vigilance in matters of defense, 
even as we seek opportunities for na 
tional reconciliation and the reductio 
of tensions with adversaries. 

• We must seek to be inclusive, 
exclusive, in our dealings with each 
other. The national or regional polici 
and institutional arrangements we 
adopt must not run counter to globai 
trends toward integrated markets an 
collective security. Furthermore, we 
should welcome the participation of 
those socialist countries whose doma 
tic reforms and foreign policies enab 
them to meet the security concerns 
economic requirements of the mark© 
oriented democracies. 



38 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1!|C 

JL 



ARMS CONTROL 



We must strive for ever greater 
nness — openness to markets, to the 
I of people and ideas, to change it- 

We and our Asian trading partners 
i the common challenge of keeping 

international economy open. 

• And, four, we must support dem- 
itic reforms as they develop natu- 
y in each country. There is no set 
tern for democracy and no standard 
issured outcome to processes of po- 
;al reform. But there is the common 
imitment to the value of the individ- 

even as the citizen makes a contri- 
ion to collective efforts. 

Which brings me back to the begin- 
',. The freedoms, the prosperity, and 

security we and our Asian allies 

friends have come to enjoy are pos- 
e only because of the relationships 
have built together. Like the multi- 
ped roofs of a pagoda, each country 
he coalition of free nations adds 
support to a worldwide structure. 
en one part of the edifice is weak- 
id, the entire structure is weakened, 
en each element carries its share of 

load, the entire structure is firm. 

Thus, the ties America has formed 
h the other free nations of the Asia- 
ific region are ties of mutual inter- 

of shared responsibility, of part- 
ship. They are ties of individual 
ength and common commitment. 
By are the building blocks of our for- 
n policy. They have been dramat- 
Uy effective for more than 40 years 
meeting our national interests, and 
ty remain the most effective means 
meeting the future challenges of our 
-ired success. 



Nuclear Testing Talks Open Round Three 



'Press release 138 of July 8, 1988. 
^Made at the si.x-plus-one session. 
;ss release 140 of July 12. 
•'Press release 148 of July 15. 
^Press release 148A of July 19. 
■■■Press release 153 of July 21. 
"Press release 154 of July 27. 
'Press release 160 of July 27. ■ 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
AUG. 29, 19881 

On Monday, August 29, the United 
States and the Soviet Union will re- 
sume step-by-step negotiations on nu- 
clear testing with the opening of round 
three of the nuclear testing talks in 
Geneva. The first priority of these talks 
remains an agreement on effective ver- 
ification measures for two existing but 
unratified treaties, the Threshold Test 
Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful 
Nuclear Explosions Ti-eaty (PNET). 

We are making good progress to- 
ward our goals. On August 17, the first 
phase of the joint verification experi- 
ment (JVE) was successfully concluded, 
with U.S. and Soviet scientists, techni- 
cians, and observers present at the 
U.S. nuclear test site in Nevada. There 



each side was able to demonstrate the 
use of its on-site, direct hydrodynamic 
methods to measure the yield of a U.S. 
nuclear explosion. In mid-September, 
U.S. scientists, technicians, and ob- 
servers will be present for the Soviet 
phase of the JVE at the Soviet nuclear 
test site at Semipalatinsk. 

We will continue to press for agree- 
ment on effective verification measures 
so that these two treaties can be 
ratified. As we return to Geneva, we 
look for the cooperation of the Soviet 
Union to achieve this objective. 

The U.S. delegation to the nuclear 
testing talks is headed by Ambassador 
C. Paul Robinson. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Sept. 5, 1988. 



U.S.-Sovlet Union Conduct 
First Phase of JVE 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
AUG. 17, 1988' 

Today, at the U.S. nuclear test site in 
Nevada, the United States and the So- 
viet Union will conduct the first phase 
of the joint verification experiment 
(JVE). This is the result of a U.S.- 
Soviet agreement which provides for 
one underground nuclear explosion ex- 
periment at the U.S. test site and for 
another such experiment at the Soviet 
test site near Semipalatinsk in Sep- 
tember. U.S. and Soviet scientists, 
technicians, and observers will be pres- 
ent at each other's test site to measure 
yields of the explosions and to discuss 
the results of the two tests. 

During the December 1987 Wash- 
ington summit, the United States and 
Soviet Union agreed to design and con- 
duct the JVE to facilitate an agreement 
on effective verification measures for 
the Threshold Test Ban Ti-eaty (TTBT) 
of 1974 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explo- 
sions Ti-eaty (PNET) of 1976. Such an 
agreement on effective verification meas- 
ures would, in turn, permit these two 
treaties to be ratified — a long-time goal 
of the Administration. The JVE will 
provide the opportunity to measure the 



yield of nuclear explosions using tech- 
niques proposed by each side. The 
United States has proposed CORRTEX 
[continuous reflectrometry for radius 
vs. time experiment], a direct hydro- 
dynamic yield measurement system, as 
the most accurate technique available 
for verification of the TTBT and PNET. 
Through the JVE, the United States 
hopes to provide the Soviet Union with 
the information it needs to accept the 
routine U.S. use of CORRTEX in the 
verification of these two treaties. 

For the past four decades, a strong 
nuclear deterrent has ensured U.S. se- 
curity and helped to preserve the free- 
dom of our allies and friends. As long 
as we must rely on nuclear weapons, 
we must continue to test to ensure the 
reliability, effectiveness, safety, se- 
curity, and survivability of our nuclear 
arsenal. Today's JVE is a further posi- 
tive step which reflects the success of 
the Administration's practical and meas- 
ured approach to nuclear testing. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of Pres- 
idential Documents of Aug. 22, 1988. ■ 



lepartment of State Bulletin/October 1988 



39 



EAST ASIA 



ABM Treaty Review Session Opens 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
AUG. 8, 1988' 

The third 5-year review called for by 
the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Ti-eaty 
will be held in Geneva beginning on Au- 
gust 24. The U.S. delegation, headed 
by Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency (ACDA) Director William F. 
Burns, will consist of the U.S. Commis- 
sioner to the Standing Consultative 
Commission, Ambassador Richard 
Ellis; the U.S. Ambassador to the de- 
fense and space talks. Ambassador 
Henry Cooper; and senior officials from 
the Departments of State and Defense, 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and their 
advisers. 

The principal U.S. objective for 
this review session is to obtain the So- 
viet Union's agreement to correct its 



violations of the ABM Treaty and to 
satisfy other U.S. concerns regarding 
Soviet noncompliance with its obliga- 
tions under the treaty. 

The Soviet Union's large, phased- 
array radar at Krasnoyarsk is a signifi- 
cant violation of a central element of 
the ABM Treaty. The Krasnoyarsk 
radar will be one of the key topics of 
the upcoming review. In preparation for 
the upcoming review, the President has 
issued guidance that the U.S. delega- 
tion should continue to make it clear 
that the existence of the Krasnoyarsk 
radar violation calls into question the 
viability of the ABM Treaty, and, 
therefore, it should be dismantled with- 
out further delay and without condi- 
tion. Unless resolved, the Krasnoyarsk 
radar violation will force the United 
States to consider the exercise of its 



rights under international law to take 
appropriate and proportionate re- ~ 
spouses. In this context, the United 
States will also have to consider 
whether to declare the Krasnoyarsk 
radar to be a material breach of the 
ABM Ti-eaty. 

The President has also directed 
that the Department of Defense, work 
ing with other executive branch agen- 
cies and the Congress, take the lead irj 
developing a range of appi'opriate and i 
proportionate responses for considera- 1 
tion if the Soviet Union continues to 
refuse to correct the Krasnoyarsk 
violation. 

After hearing what the Soviet 
Union has to say at the 5-year ABM 
Tr-eaty review, should the situation re- 
main unresolved, the President will 
consult with the Congress and our al- 
lies concerning next steps. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 15, 1988. 



Situation in Vietnam, Cambodia, 
and Laos 



by David F. Lambertson 

Statement before the Si(bco)n)nittee 
on East Afiicui and Pacific Affairs of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Commit- 
tee on August 2, lOSS. Mr. Lambertson 
is Deputy Assistant Secretary for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs.^ 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear 
today before the subcommittee to dis- 
cuss the situation in Vietnam, Cam- 
bodia, and Laos and our policies toward 
those countries. 



Vietnamese Occupation of Cambodia 

The United States has joined with the 
vast majority of the nations of the 
world in condemning Vietnam's illegal 
occupation of Cambodia and has called 
for Hanoi to withdraw its forces and to 
negotiate a settlement acceptable to all 
sides. We believe that only through a 
political solution can the suffering of 
the Cambodian people be brought to an 
end and regional stability restored. Our 
goal is a free and independent Cam- 
bodia which is not a threat to its neigh- 
bors and which will permit the 
Cambodian people to determine their 



own future without internal or external 
manipulation or intimidation. 

In this context, the United States 
is unalterably opposed to the Khmer 
Rouge, whose legacy of brutality and 
depravity is unsurpassed. We are com- 
mitted to a settlement in Cambodia 
that contains effective safeguards to en- 
sure that the Khmer Rouge can never 
again take control in Cambodia and 
subject the Cambodian people once 
again to the horrors of the past. 

ASEAN Concerns 

The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia 
and Vietnam's continuing occupation of 
that country constitute a direct threat 
to the security of Thailand, a long-time 
friend and treaty ally of the United 
States and to regional stability. The As- 
sociation of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) has responded to this danger 
with vigor and effectiveness. It has 
marshaled international opposition to 
Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia and 
has fostered the growth of the Cambo- 
dian noncommunist resistance into a vi- 
able military and political force in the 
struggle for a free and independent 
Cambodia. 



The United States has worked en 
ergetically with ASEAN in seeking ti 
resolve the Cambodian conflict. We 
have consulted closely and regularly 
with ASEAN governments, most re- 
cently during Secretary Shultz's visit 
Bangkok last month, and have provid 
strong backing to ASEAN efforts to 
generate and maintain international c 
position to Vietnam's occupation. We 
have also made this issue a priority ii 
our discussions with the Soviet Unioi 
and with China, including during the 
Secretary's recent visit to Beijing; wi 
have urged both these major powers 
use their influence constructively. 
ASEAN and our other friends in the 
region have come to rely, with good 
reason, on the consistency and stead- 
fastness of our policy on Cambodia. 

Recent Diplomatic Activity 

There has recently been considerable 
diplomatic activity surrounding the 
Cambodian conflict and some signs a/ 
progress. The Vietnamese have an- 
nounced that they will withdraw 50,C 
troops from Cambodia by year end an 
that their remaining units would be 
placed under the command of the 
Phnom Penh regime. Based on Hanot 
previous manipulation of withdrawal 
dates and announcements, we, of 
course, remain skeptical. In particuli 
we do not place any real significance 
the putative decision to place the re- 
maining occupation forces under Phn 



40 



Department of State Bulletin/October 



EAST ASIA 



Pnh's command. Nevertheless, if 
Fjnoi follows through on its announce- 
t.iJint, this would be an encouraging, 
«eit only partial, step toward the ob- 
j»(tive we seek — the complete with- 
dfiiwal of all Vietnamese troops from 
(f.'mbodia. 

( On the negotiating front, informal 
Biks were held in Indonesia last week 
\(|ich brought together the four Cam- 
ilian factions, the Vietnamese, the 
ilonesians, and other ASEAN repre- 
Atatives. The Jakarta informal meet- 
I; did not achieve dramatic break- 
||-oughs, but it did lend additional im- 
p:us to a negotiating process that 
cild lead to a settlement of the Cam- 
blia conflict. The meeting seemed to 
C )(luce a broad consensus on two fun- 
vi !ital points: that Vietnamese 
must, indeed, be withdrawn to- 
rn 1 that the Khmer Rouge must 
|iii\ented from regaining control. 
'M are the leitmotifs of our own pol- 
1 , and we will continue to lend our 
■ipoi't to efforts to achieve a settle- 
iiii which would make those goals a 
1 ility. 

ni'sjjite these encouraging signs, 
I 'i-i' are fundamental uncertainties. 
en if Hanoi were to withdraw 50,000 
Idlers, this would still leave a sizable 
■ce in Cambodia — of over 50,000 
)ops — whose presence would preclude 
nuine national reconciliation. More- 
er, despite Hanoi's participation in 
e Jakarta informal meeting, it re- 
ains questionable whether the So- 
ilist Republic of Vietnam (S.R.V.), in 
ct, will take an active and direct role 
negotiations — e.g., by talking di- 
ctly with Prince Sihanouk — and is 
•epared to talk seriously about how to 
[id the conflict. 

.S. Course of Action 

^e believe, therefore, that the best 
mrse for the United States is to main- 
lin our present policies. This means 
lat we will continue to support Prince 
ihanouk and the Cambodian noncom- 
lunist resistance forces in their valiant 
:ruggle for a free and independent 
'ambodia. These forces are making en- 
ouraging progress in expanding their 
resence in the interior of Cambodia, 
nd we believe that, because they eon- 
titute an increasingly viable alter- 
ative to both the Vietnamese and the 
lurderous Khmer Rouge, they can and 
n\\ ])lay a key role in a settlement 
i^hich serves the best interests of the 
Jambodian people. 



We also intend to continue our sup- 
port for the international effort to iso- 
late Vietnam economically and 
diplomatically. We believe that this 
campaign has, over the years, helped to 
bring home to Hanoi the cost of its ag- 
gression in Cambodia and that the re- 
cent, although inconclusive, signs of 
change in Vietnam's approach attest to 
its effectiveness. Thus, we must con- 
tinue to adhere to a policy which can be 
summarized as "no trade, no aid, and 
no normal relations" with Vietnam 
except in the context of a political 
settlement and an end of Vietnam's oc- 
cupation of Cambodia. 

And we must continue to work for 
a settlement which ensures that the 
withdrawal of Vietnamese troops will 
not lead to the return to power of the 
Khmer Rouge. Crafting such a solution 
will not be easy, inasmuch as the 
Khmer Rouge remains probably the 
most militarily powerful of the Cambo- 
dian factions. 

ASEAN and others, particularly 
Prince Sihanouk, at various times have 
put forward a number of ideas for con- 
trolling the Khmer Rouge which war- 
rant serious and urgent consideration. 
These include the holding of interna- 
tionally supervised elections — we can- 
not imagine that the Cambodian people 
would willingly vote for the return of 
the Khmer Rouge — the removal of Pol 
Pot and other senior Khmer Rouge 
leaders most responsible for crimes 
against the Cambodian people, the dis- 
armament of all the factions under 
some form of international monitoring, 
a cutoff of arms aid from the outside, 
and the despatch of an international 
peacekeeping force. We believe some 
combination of these or other ap- 
proaches can prove effective. 

In our discussions with our 
ASEAN partners, the Chinese, and 
others, we have stressed the absolute 
necessity of controlling the Khmer 
Rouge and the need to move now to 
address the specific ways by which this 
could be done. This was a central 
theme of Secretary Shultz's recent dis- 
cussions in Bangkok and Beijing. We 
have noted authoritative statements by 
China's leaders that they oppose a 
Khmer Rouge return to power in 
Phnom Penh and are gratified by 
China's recent willingness, as reflected 
in its July 1 statement, to begin to ad- 
dress the concrete measures that will 
be necessary to prevent this from 
happening. 

I must also emphasize, however, 
our strong belief that until Hanoi shows 



clearly — more clearly than it has to 
date — that it, in fact, has made the fun- 
damental decision to end its occupation 
of Cambodia, the United States must 
continue our joint efforts with ASEAN 
and others to maintain diplomatic and 
economic pressure on Vietnam. 

Question of Interests Sections 

In this connection, I would like to dis- 
cuss Senate Concurrent Resolution 109, 
which calls for the establishment of re- 
ciprocal interests sections in Hanoi and 
Washington. As I understand it, the ra- 
tionale for the establishment of such of- 
fices would be to improve cooperation 
between the United States and Vietnam 
on humanitarian issues, facihtate the 
search for a resolution of the Cambodia 
conflict, and, more broadly, to heal old 
wounds. 

While we recognize the construc- 
tive purposes this resolution is intended 
to serve, we believe it represents the 
wrong approach and must oppose it. 

With regard to the Cambodian con- 
flict, the establishment of interests sec- 
tions would represent a fundamental 
change in our policy of supporting the 
diplomatic isolation of Vietnam. The 
opening of an interests section staffed 
by U.S. personnel would represent, in 
fact, the establishment of a U.S. diplo- 
matic presence in Vietnam. This would 
be seen as a major political victory by 
Hanoi. For those who are struggling 
against the Vietnamese occupation of 
Cambodia, particularly the noncom- 
munist resistance led by Prince 
Sihanouk, it would be seen as a deeply 
discouraging signal of a weakened 
American commitment. 

Internationally, it would represent 
a major breach in the political isolation 
of Vietnam stemming from its occupa- 
tion of Cambodia. It would, in short, 
severely undermine the international 
effort to bring about a settlement in 
Cambodia. To make such a move now, 
at a time when this effort appears to be 
having an impact, would not be in the 
interest of the United States or of our 
friends and allies in the region. 

ASEAN in particular would be 
deeply troubled were we to take this 
step. ASEAN leaders have expressed 
their concern and strong opposition to 
the establishment of interests sections, 
which they correctly assert would 
damage our joint effort to end Viet- 
nam's occupation of Cambodia. Prime 
Minister Lee of Singapore spoke elo- 
quently along these lines when he met 



)epartment of State Bulletin/October 1988 



41 



EAST ASIA 



with several members of this committee 
during his visit to Washington last 
April. Failure on our part to stand with 
ASEAN on this vitally important issue 
could affect our relations with ASEAN 
more generally, calling into question 
the constancy we have thus far 
demonstrated. 

Despite the absence of diplomatic 
relations, a function of Vietnam's con- 
tinuing occupation of Cambodia, the 
United States, and the S.R.V. cooper- 
ate on several urgent humanitarian is- 
sues of mutual concern, including the 
effort to achieve the fullest possible ac- 
counting of Americans missing in action 
in Vietnam (POW/MIA), the resettle- 
ment of Amerasian children still in 
Vietnam, the departure of Vietnamese 
through the orderly departure pro- 
gram, and the resettlement of released 
reeducation center detainees. In keep- 
ing with commitments undertaken dur- 
ing Gen. Vessey's [John W. Vessey, 
special presidential envoy] trip to Hanoi 
in August of last year, we have facili- 
tated efforts of American nongovern- 
mental organizations to address 
Vietnamese humanitarian concerns in 
the areas of prosthetics and child 
disabilities. 

Senate Concurrent Resolution 109 
contends that the establishment of in- 
terests sections in Hanoi and Wash- 
ington would facilitate the resolution of 
these issues by increasing communica- 
tion and cooperation between the 
United States and Vietnam. We 
disagree. 

There is no dearth of communica- 
tion between us and the Vietnamese on 
humanitarian issues. The United States 
has more contact with the Vietnamese 
on operational and policy levels than 
any other Western nation, including 
those which maintain diplomatic rela- 
tions. Since 1982 more than 35 execu- 
tive branch U.S. delegations have 
visited Vietnam; there have also been 
numerous high-level discussions else- 
where. For e.xample, Gen. Vessey met 
in early June with Vietnamese Vice 
Premier and Foreign Minister Nguyen 
Co Thach in New York to discuss 
POW/MIAs and the resettlement of re- 
education center detainees in the 
United States. In July a senior Depart- 
ment official traveled to Hanoi and Ho 
Chi Minh City to continue the detainee 
discussions and to examine the orderly 
departure program and Amerasian 
processing. Just last week, a technical 
team from the Central Identification 
Laboratory in Hawaii and the Joint Ca- 
sualty Resolution Center concluded the 



42 



latest round of POW/MIA technical 
talks with Vietnamese experts in 
Hanoi. 

Given the frequency of U.S. -S.R.V. 
discussions at all levels, and the con- 
tinuing dialogue between our respective 
embassies in Bangkok, we do not be- 
lieve that the establishment of interests 
sections would significantly improve 
either communications or cooperation 
between our two countries on human- 
itarian issues. A review of develop- 
ments over the past year bears this 
out. 

• As a result of Gen. Vessey's talks 
with Foreign Minister Thach in New 
York in June, we have secured a re- 
newed Vietnamese commitment to coop- 
erate on POW/MIAs. Hanoi has agreed 
to Gen. Vessey's proposal for joint, on- 
the-ground investigations, surveys, and 
crash-site excavations. Moreover, since 
1985 the repatriation of remains of 
missing Americans is higher than at 
any time since the end of the war. 

• We have achieved agreement in 
principle to the processing of released 
reeducation center detainees for reset- 
tlement in the United States. Several 
important issues remain to be resolved, 
but we are encouraged by the progress 
to date. It is possible that the process- 
ing of released detainees may begin 
within the next several months. 

• Both the orderly departure pro- 
gram and Amerasian program are in 
full operation, and we have inter- 
viewed over 14,000 people since last 
September. 

Given the current level of coopera- 
tion, we do not believe that any formal 
diplomatic structures are required. The 
progress which we have recently 
achieved has been due in large part to 
our having managed, successfully, to 
deal with these humanitarian issues 
separately from the political questions 
which divide Vietnam and the United 
States. The establishment of interests 
sections — regardless of legislative lan- 
guage to the contrary — would be seen 
in Hanoi as an important political con- 
cession motivated by our desire to re- 
solve these humanitarian issues. In this 
way, a relationship between political 
and humanitarian issues would have 
been created, and any future progress 
on our humanitarian agenda would be 
affected by the state of our political re- 
lations. This would not be in our 
interest. 

For all of these reasons, the Ad- 
ministration opposes the establishment 
of reciprocal interests sections. We do 



not believe that they would contribute 
either to improving U.S. -S.R.V. hu- 
manitarian cooperation or toward faei' 
fating a settlement in Cambodia. Quit 
the contrary, we believe that interests 
sections could well have a negative im 
pact on both sets of issues. We, there- 
fore, oppose the passage of Senate 
Concurrent Resolution 109. 

Our opposition to interests sectioi 
should not be seen as a sign that the 
Administration remains implacably ho 
tile toward Vietnam. This is not true. 
As Secretary Shultz made clear in his 
remarks to the ASEAN postministeri 
meeting in Bangkok last month, we 
hold no malice toward Vietnam as a n 
suit of the war in Indochina. In fact, 
look forward to the time when we will 
be able to enter into normal diplomat 
and commercial relations with Vietna 
and have made it clear that we are pi 
pared to establish such relations in th 
context of a Cambodian settlement 
which provides for the withdrawal of 
Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. E 
at the same time, the Vietnamese lea 
ership must realize that our commit- 
ment to a free and independent 
Cambodia is steadfast and that we w 
continue with our current policies un 
that conflict is satisfactorily resolved 
Moreover, we have and will continue 
make it clear to the Vietnamese that 
the pace and scope of the normalizat 
process will be affected by Vietnam's 
ability to work with us on the 
POW/MIA issue, as demanded by th 
American people. 

Laos 

Before closing, I would like to revie\ 
briefly our policy toward Laos, a coi 
try which appears to have begun to 
change the isolationist stance it 
adopted when the communists came 
power. The Lao People's Democratic 
Republic (L.RD.R.) and the United 
States have maintained diplomatic n 
tions at the charge level since the 
L.RD.R. came into existence in 197! 
We agreed with Laos in 1982 to seel- 
improved bilateral relations through 
concrete steps to be taken concurrei 
by both sides. While we have avoide 
establishing any direct linkage betw 
our actions and those of the Lao, wt 
have made it clear that for the Uniti 
States progress on the POW/MIA is 
is the principal standard by which 
progress in the relationship will be 
measured. 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1 18 



ECONOMICS 



Here too, we are encouraged by re- 
t developments. We have conducted 
ree joint excavations of suspected air- 
ift crash-sites in Laos, most recently 
May of this year. Although that 
,est effort did not result in the recov- 
y of any remains, Lao cooperation 
,s exemplary. In addition, the Lao 
ilaterally turned over remains earlier 
the year, the first time this had been 
ne since 1978. We believe we are 
)se to agreement with the Lao Gov- 
nment on dates for another technical 
anning meeting to prepare for further 
nt excavation activities. 

The United States, over the years, 
IS responded to Lao humanitarian 
eds in a variety of ways. An Ameri- 
n nongovernmental organization plans 
construct and stock a prefabricated 
inic in the vicinity of the May excava- 
an. The United States provided rice in 
84 and 1987 and medicine to combat 
mgue fever in 1985. 

An issue of growing concern in our 
lationship with Laos is the inci-easing 
Dw of narcotics to the international 
arketplace from that country. The 
ao Government has declared its op- 
)sition to illicit narcotics production 
id trafficking and has agreed to a UN 
and for Drug Abuse Control 
JNFDAC) pilot project to control nar- 
)ties cultivation and production. The 
nited States has also offered bilateral 
;sistance in this area. We intend to 
aep this problem high on our agenda. 
In general, we believe that our re- 
itionship with Laos is slowly but 
:eadily improving and that continued 
nprovement would serve the interests 
f both countries. 

outheast Asia Refugees 

inally, I would like to comment on the 
ontinuing refugee crisis in Southeast 
isia. 

The upsurge in boat refugee arriv- 
s in 1988, a perception of lessened 
ommitment on the part of resettle- 
nent nations, and growing impatience 
ti the region have eroded the interna- 
ional consensus which has sustained 
irst-asylum in Southeast Asia for more 
han a decade. 

In his meeting with ASEAN for- 
ign ministers last month, Secretary 
Shultz assured them that the United 
States wants to work with ASEAN 
governments and others to develop a 
comprehensive and revitalized ap- 
proach, one that deals with changing 
circumstances — and that preserves 
first-asylum. We have put forward a 



number of specific proposals — including 
a screening program monitored by the 
LIN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), the resettlement of long- 
stayers, the humane return of those de- 
termined to be nonrefugees, and an ex- 
panded orderly departure program — 
and we will pursue these and other ini- 
tiatives as a matter of priority in the 
months ahead. Secretary Shultz empha- 
sized to his ASEAN colleagues that we 
would continue to stand by them, for as 
long as is necessary. 

We will work hard to improve and 
expand the orderly departure program; 
we will continue to share the financial 
burden with the first-asylum countries 
through our contributions to interna- 
tional refugee organizations; we will 
continue to offer high levels of resettle- 
ment opportunities; and we will con- 



tinue to urge other resettlement and 
donor nations to participate in these 
efforts. 

The Secretary added that we are, 
of course, mindful that the refugee 
problem of Southeast Asia is rooted not 
in the first-asylum countries but in the 
countries from which refugees flee — 
and this is where these problems ulti- 
mately must be solved. The interna- 
tional community must continue to 
attempt to convince Hanoi, in particu- 
lar, to adopt the kinds of political and 
economic policies that will permit its 
countrymen to live productive lives at 
home. 



'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee 
and will be available from the Superintend- 
ent of Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office. Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Strategy for An LDC Debt Workout: 
A U.S. Perspective 



by William B. Milam 

Address before the Western Eco- 
nomic Association International in Los 
Angeles on July 3, 1988. Mr. Mila)n is 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Eco- 
nomic and Business Affairs. 

There are two debt problems, and they 
are quite different. I will address, first, 
the debt workout for the middle-income 
developing countries; second, I will dis- 
cuss the debt situation of the very poor 
countries, most of which are in Africa. 

How the State 
Department Fits In 

The State Department has two distinct 
but interdependent roles in the for- 
mulation and implementation of debt 
policy as it relates to both the middle- 
income and the poorest countries. 

First, we have a direct role as the 
agency which leads on official debt re- 
scheduling negotiations. (As you know, 
these negotiations take place in the 
mysterious Paris Club.) 

Second, we participate in formula- 
tion of debt policy and try to ensure 
that it is compatible with — even sup- 
portive of — our foreign policy and na- 
tional security interests. 

If I may speak personally for a 
minute, my own experience and role in 
debt policy stems directly from the 



State Department's various roles. I am 
one of the "old warhorses" of the debt 
issue, having been involved with debt 
policy and rescheduling since 1978. My 
experience began in those halcyon days 
when lending to developing countries 
soared to dizzingly high levels — fed and 
motivated by oil-exporter country sur- 
pluses; the belief that these, and high 
inflation, would continue — and when 
only a few (mainly the poor countries) 
ran into trouble. 

But that experience also covers the 
crisis years; I was present at the U.S. 
Treasury in August 1982, when the out- 
line of the present debt workout strat- 
egy emerged in response to the Mexican 
payments crisis. Also, I have repre- 
sented the United States at the Paris 
Club in two different jobs — for a while 
in 1983 and in my present position. So 
you won't be misled, I'll warn you in 
advance that I believe our foreign pol- 
icy interests are best served by the 
present flexible, evolutionary debt 
workout strategy. 

The Middle-Income 
Developing Countries 

The overriding theme of that first Mex- 
ican package — the overriding theme of 
the debt workout — has been, and re- 
mains, cooperation in a collective effort 
to solve a problem in ways which serve 
the mutual interests of all the partici- 
pants. The mutuality of interests is key 



43 



ECONOMICS 



to the effectiveness and the duration of 
the debt workout strategy. The debtors 
perceived then, and most still perceive, 
that it is not in their interests, long or 
short term, to stop servicing their 
debts and, therefore, cut off their ac- 
cess to capital markets. The industrial 
countries perceived then, and continue 
to perceive, that their interests are 
best served by cooperation to help the 
debtor countries through this rough 
patch. 

First, generalized default threat- 
ened the viability of the international 
financial system. 

Second, a default which cuts off 
these countries from international cap- 
ital markets is likely to lead to political 
instability in the debtor countries. 

That mutuality of interests also ob- 
tains for our foreign policy interests. 
The strategy emphasizes a collective 
effort, a nonconfrontational approach. 
It preserves a case-by-case approach, 
allowing official and private creditors 
the fle.xibility to shape agreements to 
the individual needs of the various debt 
countries. The evolutionary nature of 
the strategy also maintains flexibility 
and permits the strategy to change 
with the times. Most importantly, this 
approach has preserved some access to 
international capital markets for these 
debtor countries, albeit mostly involun- 
tary. It is the only strategy that holds 
open the hope that they can improve 
the level and quality of that access over 
time. 

A long cutoff in such access would 
be very deleterious for our foreign pol- 
icy and national security interests. The 
middle-income countries need foreign 
capital to meet their investment needs, 
thus to grow at optimum rates. For one 
set of these countries — mainly those in 
Latin America — the ability to obtain 
foreign capital in the amounts needed is 
threatened for a significant period of 
time. Without foreign capital, growth 
prospects decline, and the possibility of 
political instability increases. Programs 
to liberalize and open these economies 
might be abandoned. These countries 
might react as they did in the 1930s to 
the drying up of foreign capital: by 
turning inward and toward statism. 
Such a turn would, incidentally, attenu- 
ate the movement toward real democ- 
racy which has been growing in the 
past decade. 



The Design of the Debt Workout 

The basic framework of the debt work- 
out for the middle-income countries re- 
mains essentially the same as when it 
began in 1982. There are two major and 
related long-term goals: 

First, to reduce the vulnerability of 
the international banking system; and 

Second, to improve the debtor 
country economic and financial perfor- 
mance and structure to promote sus- 
tainable growth. 

Each participant in the debt work- 
out has had, and continues to have, its 
own role and set of responsibilities. 

• The debtor countries, of course, 
must change their economic policies 
and structures to make their economies 
more efficient so they can regain the 
capacity to service debt. 

• The commercial bank creditors 
are to reschedule and provide new- 
funding if countries carry out their 
adjustment programs. 

• Creditor governments reschedule 
their own claims on debtors, providing 
new money by rescheduling interest, 
by continuing their e.xport credit pro- 
grams in these countries, and — in a few 
cases — by providing other financial as- 
sistance. Creditor governments also 
provide bridge financing in cases in 
which that is necessary. Finally, cred- 
itor governments put in the necessary 
resources and bring about the neces- 
sary policies in the international finan- 
cial institutions to ensure that these 
institutions are conducive to the 
process. 

In 1985, Secretary Baker changed 
the adjustment emphasis of the debt 
workout from macroeconomic stabiliza- 
tion and demand restraint to structural 
adjustment policies. Such structural ad- 
justment policies range from trade and 
financial liberalization to deregulation 
and privatization of public sector en- 
terprises. Secretary Baker put a new 
thrust into the debt workout, but he 
did not change its basic framework. 

The strategy has evolved in other 
important ways while retaining its 
basic structure. Many new instruments 
to reduce exposure have been created. 
More innovations are likely as we 
proceed. 

And much progress has occurred. 
Progress is particularly apparent with 
regard to the objective of reducing the 
vulnerability of the banking system on 
LDC [less developed country] loans. 
From 1982 to the end of 1987, the nine 



U.S. money center banks reduced thei-' 
exposure to the so-called Baker 15 
[major LDC debtor countries] from 
212% of primary capital to 90'7f . The 
decline for other classes of banks was 
even larger, on average. This decHne is 
more rapid than we would have pre- 
dicted in 1982; it results, in large mea- 
sure, from the efforts of the banks to 
broaden their capital base. 

There has been less visible prog- 
ress toward the second fundamental 
objective — structural and economic pel 
icy reform in the debtor countries. 
However, there is much more progress 
than is generally admitted. Indicators 
of debt burdens have stabilized. One 
striking feature is the reduction in the 
proportion of short-term debt to total 
debt, which has fallen from 21% in 198 
to 8% in 1987, largely because of re- 
schedulings. The lengthening of the 
maturity structure in this way has pre 
vided most debtors with a more man- 
ageable debt service payment stream. 
Of course, another very prominent fac 
tor is the reduction in interest costs 
from the worldwide reduction of inter 
est rates since 1982. The Baker 15 coi 
tries pay 26% of exports as interest 
now, in comparison with 31% in 1982 

There are many examples of gres 
progress in the attitudes and in the ii 
plementation of structural adjustmen 
programs in the major debtor coun 
tries. Mexico has liberalized its trade 
regime and is privatizing its state en- 
terprises. Its export bases are so div 
sified that now non-oil export revenu 
exceed oil revenues. Chile's success, 
both on macro adjustment and on stri 
tural adjustment, is well known. It h 
adopted the most successful debt eqi 
program, which has reduced its debt 
about 23%.. Bolivia has perhaps impli 
mented the best, most comprehensiv 
most effective macroeconomic and 
structural adjustment program of an 
debtor country. Bolivia has also worj' 
out with its creditor banks an inno- 
vative debt reduction scheme. That 
scheme was an important advance in 
the debt workout strategy. It was voj 
untary and worked out between the 
debtor and its creditors within the 
market mechanism. 

The United States has supporte 
schemes with those characteristics t 
will continue to do so. As you know. 
United States provided zero coupon 
bonds to collateralize the Mexican d' 
securitization scheme. We have re- 
sponded in other ways. 



44 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1 lEs 



ECONOMICS 



1 • We have fostered the growth of 
ti^ so-called menu of options (such as 
Ilxican securitization, exit bonds, and 
<^t/equity swaps) for financing among 
tU commercial banks. 
,! • We have tried to shape the inter- 
Ijional financial community in ways 
trich would be conducive to voluntary 
tt)t workouts; for example, Ti-easury 
ftretary Baker proposed a new exter- 
j contingency facility for the IMF 
ternational Monetary Fund] last 
ir, and that has now been put into 



e Eroding Consensus 

e consensus which sprang from that 
'ceived mutuality of interest in 1982 
5 suffered much wear and tear. The 
Dtor countries are finding the pain of 
croeconomic and structural adjust- 
nt more and more difficult to bear, 
e creditor banks are finding the 
jvision of new money more and more 
jensive and risky. The creditor gov- 
iments are more and more threat- 
d with the prospects of default 
massive intervention, which would 
juire large expenditures of public 
iney. 

In part, at least, the problem in 
; debtor countries is political, and 
s always gives cause for foreign pol- 
concerns. There are fledgling democ- 
."ies involved who find it difficult, if 
t impossible, simultaneously to build 
mocratic institutions and to cope 
th the structural adjustment prob- 
ns. We have to weigh these short- 
■m dangers against the longer term 
nefits to our foreign policy interests 
at will accrue from a strategy that 
omises strengthened access to capital 
irkets over time. 

But frustration and wear and tear 
e apparent also on the creditor side, 
pai'ticular, the commercial banks 
,ve become increasingly frustrated by 
e almost endless negotiations but, 
ore particularly, by the growing re- 
ctance of the smaller, less exposed 
mks to play their role in providing 
!W financing. This so-called free rider 
•oblem appears to be getting worse 
; more and more banks increase their 
Ian loss reserves. 

In part, the consensus is breaking 
own also because of differing regula- 
i)ry and tax structures in various coun- 
■ies, giving different national banks 
npetus in different directions. Even in 
le United States, the middle-income 
ebt workout strategy is under attack, 
'hese attacks are driven by the percep- 
ion that the debt strategy is designed 



to save U.S. banks at the expense of 
other sectors of the U.S. economy, par- 
ticularly exporting sectors such as agri- 
culture. Calls from both sides of the 
political aisle for new large facihties 
to relieve the debt burden of these 
countries continue to grow. 

There are powerful arguments 
against any schemes for generalized 
debt reduction toward a general policy 
using government monies to take the 
banks out of their LDC exposures 
and/or to place the banks' risk on the 
taxpayers. I share in full the aversion 
to ideas that would throw the burden 
on the taxpayers. Many schemes which 
would do so have been put forward. 
Some are said to be costless. However, 
none of them would be; all would be 
very costly. 

They would be costly also to our 
long-term foreign policy interests. They 
would destroy the cooperative approach 
on debt, based on mutual interests, and 
promote confrontation between debtors 
and creditors. 

The implementation of such 
schemes would cut access to capital 
markets for the debtor countries for 
some time. Those who downplay this 
don't realize that after the Latin Amer- 
ican nations settled — often at deep dis- 
counts and interest reductions — their 
defaults of the 1930s, they regained ac- 
cess generally onli/ after about 15-20 
years. I underline the word "only." 
Such a long hiatus from adequate levels 
of foreign capital would be a real threat 
to our long-term foi-eign policy and na- 
tional security interests. 

We have to incorporate into our 
mindset on the debt situation one im- 
portant fact: the debt workout for 
middle-income countries is a long-term 
and very difficult process. There will be 
much pain involved, both in creditor 
countries and in debtor countries, and 
there will be many setbacks along the 
way. I think that must be clearly 
spelled out as we move forward. But 
the strategy as we have it framed now 
is fundamentally sound on financial, po- 
litical, and foreign policy grounds. It is 
the only strategy that promises a full 
return to capital markets for these 
debtor countries within the foreseeable 
future. And, in my view, a corollary of 
that is that this is the only strategy 
that promises the kind of structural 
adjustment and macroeconomic reform 
that must occur if these nations are to 
grow, prosper, and sustain open, demo- 
cratic political systems. 



The Poorer Developing Countries 

In contrast to the rocky patch and the 
eroding consensus that we see for the 
debt workout in the middle-income 
countries, there seems to be a growing 
consensus about how to handle debt in 
the poorer countries with large debt 
problems and good adjustment pro- 
grams. Now when we say "poorer coun- 
tries," we are talking primarily about 
sub-Saharan Africa. We are talking 
about countries which are eligible only 
for very concessional World Bank loans, 
that are undertaking good adjustment 
progi'ams in which heavy debt service 
complicates the adjustment program. 

The consensus that has been grow- 
ing basically revolves around finding 
options to reduce the debt service bur- 
den on these countries in a way com- 
patible with legal and budgetary con- 
straints in the creditor countries. The 
Group of Seven countries' meeting at 
the Toronto economic summit recently 
outlined a proposal for a menu of op- 
tions for the rehef of debt service in 
these countries. This range of options 
will be vetted by the Paris Club with a 
view to implementing them soon. 

Let me review how the Paris Club 
works, then describe how the options 
will work. The Paris Club is an infor- 
mal, but official, organization which 
meets almost monthly to reschedule the 
official debts of countries which can no 
longer service these debts. The Paris 
Club does not reschedule the stock of 
debt of a country. It reschedules flows. 
It takes debt service due this broad set 
of creditors over a certain time pe- 
riod — usually the length of an IMF 
standby program — and agrees that part 
or all of that debt service can be paid 
starting up to 5 years later (in the case 
of most debtors), or up to 10 years later 
(in the case of the poorest), and over a 
5- to 10-year period. 

The Paris Club has traditionally re- 
scheduled debts at an interest rate 
which reflects the original interest rate 
paid on the debt. In other words, AID 
[Agency for International Development] 
loans are rescheduled at the conces- 
sional rates at which they were gi-anted, 
and commercial-type loans are re- 
scheduled at the commercial rates at 
which they were originally contracted. 
(Interest on rescheduled debt is called 
moratorium interest. ) In the Paris 
Club, moratorium interest rates are bi- 
lateral matters settled in bilateral nego- 
tiations subsequent to the Paris Club 
agreement. 



lepartment of State Bulletin/October 1988 



45 



ECONOMICS 



The Toronto summit proposal 
would allow creditor countries to treat 
this debt significantly differently, with 
a menu of three options. 

The first option, proposed by 
France, would allow creditors to reduce 
the debt service due over the period by 
some fraction, then to pay the reduced 
amount back over a period similar to, 
or only slightly longer than, the tradi- 
tional Paris Club repayment period of 
10 years, with perhaps a grace period 
equal to more than half of the repay- 
ment period. The debtor countries 
would be paying interest on a reduced 
amount of rescheduled debt service, 
thus reducing the moratorium interest 
due during the grace period; in addi- 
tion, of course, debtors would be re- 
paying less than the full amount of 
principal and interest during the repay- 
ment period. 

The second option, proposed by 
the British, would allow creditors to re- 
schedule the debt due over a similar 
period, with a similar grace period, but 
charge a reduced interest rate on that 
rescheduled debt. Thus, debtors would 
pay a reduced moratorium interest I'ate 
over this period but would repay the 
full amount of principal and of re- 
scheduled interest during the repay- 
ment period. 

The third option is for those coun- 
tries, such as the United States, which 
are unable — legally, politically, or budg- 
etarily — to implement options that re- 
duce the value of loans. It would allow 
such countries to reschedule debts over 
an even longer period — perhaps up to 
25 years — but would allow these cred- 
itors to collect a market interest rate 
on the debt as moratorium interest. 
Again, the grace period would be over 
half of the full repayment period. The 
benefit for the debtor is that repayment 
of principal and of interest is put off for 
a long time. 

In more general terms, it is clear 
that the international community has 
reacted quickly and aggressively to 
meet the severe problems of the poor- 
est developing countries. One signifi- 
cant problem in those countries has 
been the debt of the International Mon- 
etary Fund, which is short term and 
carries relatively high interest rates. 
Over the past 3 years, the members of 
the Fund have acted to create, first, a 
structural adjustment facility and, now, 
an enhanced structural adjustment fa- 
cility which is providing ciose to $9 bil- 
lion to these countries in conjunction 



46 



with good macroeconomic and struc- 
tural adjustment programs worked out 
with the Fund and the World Bank. In 
addition, donor countries pledged $6.4 
billion of financing to be used in cooper- 
ation with the World Bank for the low- 
income African countries with severe 
debt problems who are undertaking ad- 
justment programs. Members of the 
World Bank recently approved a $12.5- 
billion IDA [International Development 
Association] program, half of which is 
to be devoted to African countries. Fi- 
nally, many bilateral donors have in- 
creased their assistance, and that 
includes the United States, which re- 
cently received additional funds from 
the Congress for development assist- 
ance to Africa and also has received 
congressional authority for greater flex- 
ibility in allocating these funds. 

We are convinced that, in the 
poorest countries, debt is a symptom 
of major structural development prob- 
lems, but it is not the problem itself 



We have concluded that, for the heavil- 
indebted poor countries, the potential 
level of resource transfer is, in the ag- 
gregate, sufficient to provide all the fi 
nancing needed over the next few yeai 
for optimal growth rates in the contex 
of good sound adjustment programs. 
Thus, the level of net resource trans- 
fer — including debt rescheduling — will 
remain fairly constant at an increased 
level if these countries continue to im- 
plement good adjustment programs. 

The outline agreed at the Toronto 
summit will assure that rescheduling 
continues to support this approach. 
Thus, we can predict with relative cor 
fidence that the resources necessary : 
the poorest countries are there and 
that resource transfer levels will not 
fall if those countries undertake, and 
continue to undertake, internationally 
agreed adjustment programs under tl 
aegis of the IMF and the World Bank 
Frankly speaking, the ball is in their 
court. ■ 



U.S. Export Control Policy: 
Its Present and Future Course 



by E. Allan Wendt 

Address before the annual tneeting 
of the Atlantic Council of the United 
States on June U, 1988. Ambassador 
Wendt is Senior Representative for 
Strategic Technology Policy. 

It is a pleasure to be with you for this 
timely discussion of U.S. export control 
policy. 

As we consider our options for the 
future in this important area, we must 
keep in mind the extraordinary change 
in our government's approach to tech- 
nology transfer issues that has taken 
place in recent years. Throughout the 
1960s and 1970s, there was limited at- 
tention by administrations of both polit- 
ical parties to the serious threat to our 
security posed by Warsaw Pact acquisi- 
tion of strategic Western technology. Of 
course, we had a national export con- 
trol system in place, and the Coordinat- 
ing Committee on Multilateral Export 
Controls (COCOM) routinely carried 
out its work in Paris — but all was not 
well. The attention of the senior politi- 
cal leadership was elsewhere, and our 
national export control establishment 
suffered from a lack of both policy guid- 
ance and adequate resources. 



As a result of these problems, 
some very serious mistakes were ma 
As examples, I will cite three sales t 
the Soviet Union made in the 1970s- 
three of them legal at the time and t 
three approved with the understand) 
that the items would be put only to 
civilian use. 

• The first was the sale of $1.5 t 
lion worth of U.S. and other Wester 
technology that allow'ed the Soviets 
build the Kama River Ti-uck Plant ii 
the early 1970s. The factory produce 
lai'ge numbers of military trucks tha 
were used in the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan and by Soviet military 
units in Eastern Europe opposite 
NATO forces. 

• The second unfortunate sale c- 
sisted of U.S. precision grinding ma 
chines for the production of small, h 
precision bearings tbat proved usefu 
Soviet missile designers. 

• The third sale consisted of tw( 
large floating drydocks that were so 
to the Soviet Union in 1978 and dive' 
ted shortly thereafter to military usi 
Such drydocks are of critical impor- 
tance for the repair of ships damagei 
in warfare, and each of those sold ca 
carry several naval vessels. They ha 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1 i^ 



ECONOMICS 



n used over the years to service 
,'i'-class aircraft carriers, destroyers, 
I submarines carrying ballistic 
^siles. 

i I think it should be clear, even 
jm these three examples, that the ex- 
ft control systems of the United 
^tes and its COCOM partners were 
jurgent need of major reform. 

w Priorities in U.S. Policy 

winds of change first appeared to- 
rd the end of the last decade. The 
asion of Afghanistan, coupled with a 
)wing realization that acquisition of 
/anced Western technology was en- 
icing the military capacity of the So- 
t Union, finally began to turn the 
uation around. Export control be- 
ne an early— and very high — priority 
the Reagan Administration. 

The extent of this change is clear 
im a statement early in the Presi- 
nt's first term by then-Secretary of 
fense Caspar Weinberger. He de- 
red that his two top priorities were 
idiness of U.S. forces and the pre- 
ntion of the acquisition of advanced 
!hnology by the Warsaw Pact. In sub- 
:juent months and years, it became 
•reasingly clear to Western publics 
d parliaments that the diversion of 
!stern strategic technology to the 
irsaw Pact had to be arrested. The 
•hnology leakage was directly assist- 
l Soviet military research and devel- 
ment, reducing our technological 
ge over the Soviets, and, as a result, 
■cing increases in our own defense 
dgets and those of our allies. In 
ort, it was impairing our mutual 
:urity. 

We reacted in the early 1980s by 
■ning major policy-level attention to 
»COM and to our own export control 
5tem. Policy-level officials began 
roting much time and effort to 
engthening the COCOM system, 
dating the lists of controlled com- 
dities and technologies, and other- 
se bringing COCOM out of the 
Idrums. In the Department of De- 
ise, the professional staff dealing 
th technology security policy mush- 
jmed from a handful to over 200. 
ere were also important increases in 
5 Department of Commerce and in 
S. Customs. Within the Department 
State, a new policy office was created 
the Bureau of Pohtico-Military Af- 
rs in recognition of export controls as 
ta national security issue. The staff was 



strengthened in the Bureau of Eco- 
nomic and Business Affairs. Finally, 
the position I occupy was created in 
order to coordinate strategic technology 
policy within the Department of State 
and with other agencies. 

Our efforts have been directed at 
ensuring that national security consid- 
erations are adequately taken into ac- 
count in our own licensing procedures, 
at preventing diversions from U.S. 
sources, at working with friendly 
governments to prevent diversions else- 
where, and at strengthening the struc- 
ture of COCOM. We have also worked 
to ensure conditions of fairness in 
COCOM so that American firms are not 
placed at a competitive disadvantage. 

We have had both successes and 
failures. There is no question that the 
U.S. export control system is vastly su- 
perior to what it was in 1980. The 
COCOM system is far more effective. 
We have negotiated technology protec- 
tion arrangements with numerous non- 
COCOM countries in order to keep the 
COCOM effort from being undermined 
by technology loss from or through 
those third countries. Talks with addi- 
tional third countries are underway. We 
have certainly frustrated countless So- 
viet acquisition efforts across the 
world. But the task is enormous, and 
the track record is far from perfect. 

The Toshiba/Kongsberg Diversion 

The most glaring failure of the recent 
past was the illegal sale by the Jap- 
anese firm, Toshiba Machine Company, 
and the Norwegian firm, Kongsberg 
Ti-ading Company, of multiaxis milling 
machines that have provided a Soviet 
naval shipyard with the means to mass- 
produce quiet submarine propellers. 
The result was real damage to the mu- 
tual security of all Western nations. 
The Toshiba/Kongsberg diversion was a 
shock— to the Administration, to the 
Congress, and to the American people. 
But it was also a stimulus for further 
improvements. 

The Administration reacted by im- 
mediately holding urgent bilateral con- 
sultation's with its COCOM partners, in 
particular the Japanese and Norwegian 
Governments. The Department of State 
led U.S. delegations to Tokyo, Oslo, 
and other COCOM capitals last fall, and 
we and the Japanese decided henceforth 
to hold regular, institutionalized bilat- 
eral meetings on export control issues. 
-Japan and Norway moved quickly to 
remedy the shortcomings in their ex- 
port control systems that had contrib- 
uted to the illegal sales. 



epartment of State Bulletin/October 1988 



In addition, at the request of the 
United States, a senior political meet- 
ing of all COCOM partners was held in 
Versailles in .January of this year to dis- 
cuss means of strengthening the multi- 
lateral export control system. It was 
a unique event — a meeting not of 
COCOM but, rather, about COCOM. It 
placed a senior political imprimatur on 
COCOM and its mission and repre- 
sented the first senior political commit- 
ment to strengthened enforcement. 
Heads of delegation included deputy 
foreign ministers, directors general, 
and other senior officials. The Deputy 
Secretary of State, John Whitehead, 
was the leader of the U.S. delegation. 

The Campaign 

To Revitalize COCOM 

The Versailles meeting was the begin- 
ning of a major campaign to revitalize 
COCOM. The participating govern- 
ments reaffirmed their commitment to 
COCOM, recognized that more effective 
controls are necessary to protect the 
Western advantage in strategically sen- 
sitive technology essential to Western 
security, and called for improved under- 
standing of COCOM by the business 
community. The participants agreed to 
rationalize the COCOM control lists, 
strengthen cooperation with non- 
COCOM countries on technology trans- 
fer, harmonize and reinforce national 
controls, and facilitate the flow of stra- 
tegically significant goods and tech- 
nologies among participating countries. 

This last point is of particular im- 
portance, since the objective of the 
COCOM partners is to establish a 
common standard level of effective 
protection of controlled goods and 
technologies in all COCOM countries 
with a view to the eventual elimination 
of licensing requirements for trade in 
such goods and technologies among 
these countries. 

The achievement of such a license- 
free strategic trade zone will be one of 
the greatest challenges facing us in the 
future. 

First of all, the common standard 
level of effective protection must be de- 
fined in concrete terms within COCOM. 

Second, the weaker national ex- 
port control systems within the 
COCOM community must be brought 
up to the standards of the strongest 
national systems. 

Finally, there must be a significant 
streamlining of the COCOM lists, since 
continued attempts to control items no 



47 



ECONOMICS 



longer militarily critical can only under- 
mine COCOM's credibility with the 
public and business community and 
complicate the enforcement task. 

The concept of streamlining is 
simple: one achieves a consensus on 
dropping from the lists items that no 
longer meet certain strategic criteria. 
Whether a particular item meets the 
indicated criteria, however, is often the 
subject of intense debate, and there are 
clearly some borderline situations. It 
can be a difficult task to reach agree- 
ment on the removal of items even 
among the agencies of any one govern- 
ment, including our own. When one 
considers that multiple agencies of all 
16 COCOM governments are involved in 
this decisionmaking, one can under- 
stand the difficulty of reaching agree- 
ment on precisely what items should be 
deleted from the COCOM lists. It is 
essential, however, that the COCOM 
nations continue to work for consensus 
on streamlining and that the streamlin- 
ing process goes forward expeditiously. 
In the months following the senior 
political meeting at Versailles, we have 
moved energetically to follow up on its 
conclusions. We are working to estab- 
lish a common standard level of effec- 
tive protection. We are continuing a 
determined but careful effort to prune 
and update the COCOM control lists. 
We are working to enhance our cooper- 
ation with non-COCOM countries. 

New Challenges Ahead 

Over the next few years, we will face 
the task not only of revitalizing 
COCOM itself but of adjusting COCOM 
to a wide range of new challenges. 

• First, there is the mushrooming 
of high-technology industries through- 
out the world. This proliferation in- 
creases the complexity — but also the 
importance — of cooperation among 
COCOM governments and cooperating 
governments to prevent access to stra- 
tegic technologies and avoid placing 
any one government or firm at a com- 
petitive disadvantage. 

• The second challenge is the emer- 
gence of the civilian sector as the domi- 
nant market for leading-edge technol- 
ogies. This development increases the 
importance of the dual-use control list 
and greatly expands the reach of export 
controls to the civilian exporter. 

• A third challenge stems from the 
growing conviction around the world 
that high technology is the key to 



future economic growth and competi- 
tiveness. No country or firm can coun- 
tenance falling behind in this area, and 
intense competition will undoubtedly 
continue. The COCOM governments 
must ensure that this competition is 
fair if the system is to operate 
effectively. 

• Finally, and by no means least 
important, all of these challenges must 
be met in a period of perestroika and 
of new developments in East- West 
relations. 

A more stable relationship between 
the United States and the Soviet Union 
is certainly a positive development. 
Expansion of mutually beneficial, non- 
strategic trade is desirable and is be- 
ginning to take place. I would like to 
stress, however, that nothing has hap- 
pened that would justify a more liberal 
policy on exports of strategic goods and 
technology to the Warsaw Pact coun- 
tries. Such a policy would help to mod- 
ernize the Soviet conventional military 
machine at the very time we are elim- 
inating a whole class of nuclear weap- 
ons and working for reductions in stra- 
tegic nuclear forces. Relaxing our 
efforts in COCOM in the face of the 
continued Soviet strengthening of offen- 
sive, conventional arms would be pro- 
foundly inimical to the security of the 
West. " 

In fact, we must brace ourselves in 
the years ahead for a probable stepped- 
up Soviet technology acquisition pro- 
gram in the West motivated by: 

• The Soviets' desire to strengthen 
their conventional forces in an era of 
nuclear disarmament; and 

• New opportunities for strategic 
technology acquisition, which the Sovi- 
ets expect improved East-West rela- 
tions may offer. 

It will be of the utmost impor- 
tance, therefore, to ensure continuity of 



our strategic technology policy into th; 
next U.S. Administration— regardless 
of the outcome of the elections in 
November. We must ensure that the 
pendulum does not swing back toward 
complacency. As we pursue greater 
contacts, greater scientific exchanges, 
and greater nonstrategic trade with tl 
Soviet bloc, we must, at the same tim 
protect the technology that underlies 
our security. We must continue the pr 
cess of revitalizing COCOM, adjusting 
it to the changed situation of the 1980 
and 1990s— that is, rapidly increasing 
technological sophistication in non- 
COCOM countries, the lowering of 
trade barriers in the West, and a like 
increase in nonstrategic trade with th 
Warsaw Pact countries. 

Maintaining effective strategic 
trade controls requires a sustained 
effort on the part of the United Stati 
its allies, and other cooperating na- 
tions. The effort does not come easil; 
In some quarters, it is politically un- 
popular. The need for certain control 
is not always clear. Although no resf 
sible person would contemplate sellii 
a sensitive weapons system to an ad 
versary, there are those who do not 
readily perceive the need to deny th 
adversary the sophisticated compute 
system required to guide that same 
weapons system — perhaps because t 
computer could also be used for civi 
purposes. 

The fact remains, however, that 
keeping such technology out of the 
hands of those who might use it agj 
us contributes to the maintenance c 
our technological edge. And this ad 
tage, along with our nuclear deterr 
has helped avoid global conflict for 
43 years. We and our allies have be 
fited greatly from this era of relati\ 
peace and stability. We must ensun 
continued vigilance and sacrifices n 
essary to preserve it. ■ 



48 



Department of State Bulletin/October 



EJROPE 



^sit of Icelandic Prime Minister 



Pnine Minister Thorsteinn Palsson 
^'ir Rcpuhlic of Iceland made an offi- 
II Hiking visit to Washington, D.C., 
Ills! 9-13, 1988, to meet with Presi- 
I li' Ill/an and other government 

h'niliiicing are remarks made by the 
' Kiili lit and the Prime Minister after 
I r iih'cting on August 10.^ 

"isidcnt Reagan 

L'kiimed Prime Minister Thorsteinn 
'i^sdii to the ^Vhite House with par- 
iilar pleasure, for he's the first Ice- 
ilic I'rime Minister to make an 
t 'ial working visit to the United 
Ucs. The Prime Minister and I had a 
u uodd and friendly meeting this 
riiiiit:. and we continued our conver- 
: on over lunch. 

As you are well aware, ties be- 
\ en the United States and Iceland 
1 (let']! and long-hved. In fact, they 
■• lack to the year 1000, when Leif 
^L-kson, a son of Iceland, first came 
I hi'sc shores. I distinctly remember 
I statue of "Leif the Lucky" in front 
I celand's largest church atop Reyk- 
I k's tallest hill. It was a gift from 
American people to Iceland in 1930 
the 1,000th anniversary of the 
ading of the Icelandic parliament, 
ir parhament, the Althing, is the 
3st in the world, and it existed long 
are most parliamentary systems 
r got started. That statue now 
nds as a reminder of the tradition- 
• close and cooperative ties between 
two democratic nations. It also re- 
ids us of how fortunate it is that 
landers were and remain a brave and 
faring people. 
On the occasion of the Prime Minis- 
s visit to the White House today, I 
nt again to express my personal 
nks and the appreciation of the 
lerican people for the gracious hospi- 
,ty shown by the Icelandic people 
1 Government in hosting my meeting 
:h General Secretary Gorbachev in 
ober of 1986. I have nothing but ad- 
ration for the efficiency and speed 
;h which your entire nation success- 
ly met an immense challenge on such 
ort notice. I was told while there 
it Icelanders are accustomed to re- 
onding to such things as earthquakes 
d volcanic eruptions. But I'm sure, 
wever, they had never previously wit- 
sed the upheaval of a U.S. -Soviet 
mmit, complete with more than 3,000 




journalists. But you and your coun- 
trymen took it all in stride, and we're 
all left with an unforgettable impres- 
sion of your warmth, generosity, and 
hospitality. In the wake of the Moscow 
summit, I must note that the talks that 
the General Secretary and I had in 
Hofdi House were an important 
milestone in the development of our 
current dialogue with the Soviet Union, 
a dialogue made possible by the firm 
determination and unity of the Western 
alliance of which your nation was a 
founding member. 

NATO has more than stood the 
test of time, and Iceland was there at 
the beginning. NATO is an alliance of 
sovereign equals whose members have 
agreed to share both its benefits and 
responsibilities. But our bilateral and 
NATO relationship transcends security 
considerations and rests solidly in 
shared democratic values, history, 
trade, and a tradition upheld by your 
leadership, Mr. Prime Minister. It is 
that long and valued relationship I am 
proud to acknowledge today. 

And welcome again to you and to 
your lovely wife. We wish you the very 
best for the remainder of your visit to 
Washington and for the future. 

Prime Minister Palsson 

It is, indeed, both an honor and a dis- 
tinct pleasure to have been your guest 
here at the White House today. My in- 
vitation here underscores the friendly 
relationship and close cooperation pre- 
vailing between the United States and 
Iceland. At our meeting today, we were 
able to review many issues in our bilat- 
eral relationship, as well as some of the 
larger issues on the international scene. 
Our bilateral relationship is excellent. 




It's based not only on our joint mem- 
bership in the Atlantic alliance and a 
mutually beneficial defense agreement 
but also on historical ties and impor- 
tant cooperation in fields as diverse as 
trade, transportation, education, and 
scientific research. 

We have, during this visit, been 
able to explore ways of further solidify- 
ing and strengthening our ties in some 
of these fields. But perhaps most im- 
portantly, our friendship is based on 
certain shared basic values, such as re- 
spect for freedom, human dignity, and 
the democratic process, all of which are 
fundamental elements of open, plu- 
ralistic societies. These shared princi- 
ples transcend differences in size or 
population. 

For most of its 1,100 years of re- 
corded history, my country was rela- 
tively isolated from the currents of 
world events. All that changed during 
the Second World War. The foundations 
for the security relationship between 
our two countries were laid during a 
crucial phase of the Battle of the Atlan- 
tic. We are hopeful that we may jointly, 
with our partners in the Western al- 
liance, prevent such times from ever oc- 
curring again. 

But clearly, a lot also depends on 
the arms control efforts of your govern- 
ment and that of the Soviet Union, as 
well as the international community in 
general. The people of my country were 
encouraged by the recently concluded 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
(INF) Treaty. And we are proud to 
have been able to contribute in a small 
way to the process leading up to that 
agreement by hosting the summit be- 
tween yourself, Mr. President, and the 
Soviet "leader in the fall of 1986. We 
hope that progress can also be made 



.•partment of State Bulletin/October 1988 



49 



EUROPE 



this year in the area of strategic arms 
and wish you and your negotiators suc- 
cess in those talks. 

To conclude, allow me again to ex- 
press my appreciation for your hospi- 
tality and the fine reception we have 
received here in Washington. Coming 
from Iceland, I can tell a warm day. 
But it's not the climate which will make 
this visit memorable but rather the hu- 
man warmth we have encountered. 



38th Report on Cyprus 



'Made the East Room of the White 
House (te.xt from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 1.5, 1988). 



27th Anniversary 
of the Berlin Wall 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
AUG. 12, 19881 

August 13 marks a sad anniversary; the 
27th anniversary of the Berlin Wall. 
That wall is both a scar across the city 
of Berlin and a symbol of the division of 
the German nation and of Euroije. As 
tentative breezes of openness begin to 
stir the societies in the East, the wall 
now stands in stark contrast to the hu- 
man struggle for freedom taking place 
in its shadow. There is no more dra- 
matic proof of communism's failed 
dream than the wall. 

Free men and women everywhere 
take heart from the courage of the peo- 
ple of Berlin. Their determination to 
protect their outpost of freedom re- 
mains undaunted despite repeated chal- 
lenges over the years from those who 
would deny their liberty and who fear 
their e.xample. Berliners remain com- 
mitted to preserving their democratic 
way of life and to removing the barriers 
dividing the German nation. The 
United States is honored to stand 
firmly with the British and French to 
defend the freedom and promote the 
well-being of Berlin. These unwavering 
commitments continue to be a cor- 
nerstone of American policy in Europe. 

In June of last year, I stood before 
the Brandenburg Gate and offered an 
initiative meant to bring positive 
change to the lives of Berliners: im- 
proved air access; bringing more confer- 
ences to the entire city; staging 
international sporting events, including 
the Olympics; and promoting youth ex- 
changes between the two parts of 
Berlin. Last December we, together 



50 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
JULY 29, 1988' 

In accordance with Public Law 95-384, I 
am submitting to you a bimonthly report 
on progress toward a negotiated settlement 
of the Cyprus question. 

In recent months, the U.N. Secretary 
General intensified his efforts to restart 
negotiations between the parties to the 
dispute. I am pleased to inform you that 
the Seeretai\y Genera! announced that he 
has received agreement in principle from 
both Cypriot President George Vassiliou 
and Turkish Cypriot community leader 
Rauf Denktash to begin talks. Details, 
however, remain to be worked out regard- 
ing the exact timing, basis, and nature of 
the discussions. We believe that this is an 
important opportunity and have noted to 
all interested parties that it should not be 
missed; maximum effort should be made to 
cooperate with the Secretary General. I of- 
fer my best wishes to both leaders as they 
strive for a lasting, mutually acceptable 
peace. 

As publicly announced on July 7, Pres- 
ident Vassiliou has accepted my invitation 
for a private visit to the United States on 
August 1. I look forward to meeting with 
him at that time to discuss efforts to nego- 
tiate a Cyprus solution and the continuing 
improvement of our already excellent bilat- 
eral relations. During President Vassiliou's 
recent visit to New York for the U.N. Spe- 
cial Session on Disarmament, I sent a mes- 
sage to the President through Special 
Cyprus Coordinator [M. James] Wilkinson 
who had a lengthy conversation with him. 
Under Secretary of State for Coordinating 
Security Assistance Programs [Edward J.] 
Derwinski also met with President Vas- 
siliou. Special Cyprus Coordinator Wilkin- 
son also recently met with President 



Vassiliou and Turkish Cypriot leader 
Denktash during a recent trip to Cyprus v 
discuss continuing efforts toward negotia- 
tions and a settlement. 

The U.N. Secretary General issued hi 
semiannual report, dated May ,S1, 1988, a 
copy of which is attached, to the Security 
Council on the U.N. operation in Cyprus. 
The Secretary General noted that his re- 
port was coming out at "a time of ten- 
sion. ..but also of hope," referring to 
concerns about serious incidents in the 
buffer zone that he hoped would not side- 
track efforts to resume active negotiation; 
toward an overall settlement. Among otht 
subjects in the report, the Secretary Gen- 
eral reitei'ated his concern about the accu 
mulated deficit in the UNFICYP [UN 
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus] special 
account. 

President Kenan Evren of Turkey vis 
ited the United States in late June and, 
during the course of his stay, responded t 
questions on Cyprus. President Evren 
stated that Turkey's main interest in 
Cyprus remains the security of the Turki I 
Cypriot community. He reaffirmed past » 
Turkish statements that Turkish troops 
would be withdrawn from Cyprus in thi 
context of a settlement that adequately a ^. 
dresses Turkish Cypriot concerns and in- i 
terests. I view the timing and content of m 
this message as very positive in relation , 
the U.N. Secretary General's effort to n ! 
start serious intercommunal negotiations r 
in Cyprus. t 

Sincerely, I 

Ronald Reag 



'Identical letters addressed to Jim 
Wright, Speaker of the House of Repres 
tatives, and Claiborne Pell, chairman of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
(text from Weekly Compilation of Presid 
tial Documents of Aug. 1, 1988). ■ 



with the British and French, proposed 
specific ideas to the Soviets along these 
lines. We are still awaiting an answer. 

As we recall the construction of the 
wall on this day in 1961, the people of 
the United States reaffirm their com- 
mitment to Berlin and salute the brave 
people who live there. Americans be- 
lieve that with imagination and will 



East and West can make Berlin a s 
bol of a new era, reflecting the true 
aspirations of the human spirit, bef( 
another anniversary of the wall is 
passed. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 15, 19i 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1 



ip 



.ENERAL 



imerican Foreign Policy: 
Opportunities and Challenges 



1/ ( oliii L. Powell 

Address before the World Affairs 
uiicil in Los Angeles on July 19, 
i8. Lt. Gen. Powell is Assistant to 

President for National Security 
fairs. 

le Democratic National Convention is 
11 underway in Atlanta and will be 
lowed next month by the Republican 
nvention. With these two uniquely 
nerican events, we begin the quad- 
nnial ritual of asking the American 
ople to decide how — and by whom — 
sy wish to be led. 

This ritual requires both sides to 
•ite their views forcefully and to high- 
ht their differences so the people can 
derstand those differences and make 
^ir choice. In this process, American 
■eign policy will be hotly debated, 
at's good because rigorous debate is 
5ential if we are to make informed 
d wise choices. 

But in the excitement of the cam- 
ign season we should not lose sight of 
3 fact that, in recent years, there has 
veloped, once again, a remarkable 
gree of domestic consensus on the 
sic principles and direction of Ameri- 
1 foreign policy. 

ke Restoration of 
xmestic Consensus 

■rtainly, there are remaining contro- 
rsies, and I've struggled through a 
of them — over Central America, the 
ide bill, the Strategic Defense Initia- 
'e, the defense budget, to name a 
•N. But in a real sense, something 
ry important and very positive has 
ppened in this country in recent 
ars: we now find ourselves agreeing 
lere there was once deep, often bitter 
vision. 

For example, the American people 
3arly do not want to see a repetition 
the period of military weakness that 
3 went through in the wake of the 
etnam war. Today's battles over the 
irticulars of the defense budget 
lould not obscure the basic fact that 
mericans agree on the need for a 
Tong defense and are wilHng to pay a 
iasonable price for it. The public and 
16 Congress have also shown their 
ipport for the use of our military 
rength when and where our vital in- 
!rests or those of our friends and allies 



are threatened — such as in Grenada, the 
blow struck against Libyan terrorism, 
and our commitment in the gulf. Our 
people understand the need for a 
strong, engaged America actively de- 
fending what it stands for. 

There is agreement that our mili- 
tary forces must be strong and I'eady, 
not only so that they will be effective 
should we have to commit them but 
also to keep others from forcing us to 
use them. "Peace through strength" is 
more than a slogan. It is a fundamental 
reality. It is strength that enables us to 
pursue peaceful relations with our 
adversaries. 

For that reason, our relations with 
the Soviet Union are based on strength 
and realism and on a willingness to re- 
solve problems through negotiation. It 
is no accident that we are now negotiat- 
ing with them on the most comprehen- 
sive agenda ever and that today our 
approach to the Soviet Union has broad 
and deep public support. 

There is a significant moral dimen- 
sion in our foreign policy as well, as 
there must be in a democracy. Human 
rights has to be — and is — an important 
element in our relations toward the So- 
viet Union, toward South Africa, and 
toward all nations, whether in Europe, 
Asia, Africa, or Latin America. The 
transitions to democracy throughout 
Latin America, in the Philippines, and 
in the Republic of Korea are supported 
by all Americans. "Human rights" is 
not just an abstract concept. It means 
the ability of people to worship, to 
speak, to write, and to vote as they 
please; freely to choose, as we do, how 
and by whom they will be governed. 

Related to this commitment is our 
active support for those struggling 
against tyranny — those whom we call 
the freedom fighters. Where our back- 
ing of these freedom fighters has been 
strong, consistent, and bipartisan — as 
in Afghanistan, Angola, and Cam- 
bodia — there has been progress toward 
diplomatic solutions. Central America 
is today the exception, with potentially 
calamitous strategic consequences, pre- 
cisely because we have been divided. 
Nevertheless, the degree of bipartisan 
support that has existed for these 
efforts elsewhere is something the next 
President can build upon. 

In short, the American people have 
made it clear they want their country 



strong and engaged. They want an ef- 
fective foreign policy that promotes 
with energy and commitment our val- 
ues of freedom, democracy, and human 
rights. 

This restoration of our domestic 
consensus — of our military and moral 
strength — is what has reestablished 
America's strategic position in the 
world. It is a bipartisan accomplish- 
ment of the executive branch, the Con- 
gress, and the American people. These 
achievements could not have been 
reached any other way. 

Pursuing U.S. 
Foreign Policy Goals 

With this backdrop, I want to review 
where we are in the many regions of 
the world where we pursue our goals 
as a nation. Too much of the time, 
whether as professionals in govern- 
ment, in business, in academia, or as 
citizens, we are forced to look at re- 
gions and issues one at a time, in isola- 
tion. It is useful, from time to time, to 
stop examining individual trees and 
step back to survey the forest. 

As he looks out at the world, 
the next President, whoever he is, will 
find America in a strong position with 
many basic trends in our favor. He will 
also, of course, find problems and 
challenges. 

Europe. Europe continues to be a 
crucial arena of global politics, but it 
has, nevertheless, enjoyed more than 
four decades of peace — one of the long- 
est such periods in its history, certainly 
the longest in this century. This is true 
primarily because the North Atlantic 
allies have maintained a secure military 
balance, deterring the Warsaw Pact 
from using its preponderence of con- 
ventional military power. Behind that 
shield. Western Europe has enjoyed 
unprecedented prosperity and freedom. 
The American commitment to Western 
Europe, embodied in the North Atlan- 
tic Treaty, will remain a central pillar 
of American policy sustained by solid 
bipartisan support. 

And we see many positive histor- 
ical trends in Europe. Among them is 
the strong movement toward greater 
West European integration, which the 
United States has always supported — 
for example, the steps toward a full 
internal common market by 1992 and 
toward greater European defense 
cooperation within the framework of 
the NATO alliance. 

The unity of the alliance proved it- 
self in historic fashion in 1983, when 



51 



GENERAL 



key allied countries went ahead with 
deployment of U.S. INF [intermediate- 
range nuclear forces] missiles to coun- 
ter the Soviet SS-20s, and they did so 
in the face of loud, often angry, some- 
times violent protests. Allied stead- 
fastness was vindicated when it proved 
to be the key to successful arms con- 
trol — leading directly to the INF 
Treaty, in which the United States and 
the Soviet Union agreed to eliminate all 
of their intermediate-range nuclear 
missiles, a process now underway. 

In March, I accompanied the Presi- 
dent to the NATO summit meeting in 
Brussels, and I can report that the 
Western democracies stand united as 
we enter a new era of opportunity in 
East-West relations. We will certainly 
face challenges, whether trade issues 
between the United States and a 
stronger European Community, or in- 
stability arising from long-suppressed 
aspirations in Eastern Europe, or com- 
plex issues in arms control such as the 
continuing imbalance in conventional 
forces. 

But if the allies maintain the same 
political will they displayed in the re- 
cent past, we will surmount these 
challenges. The Soviet Union is reex- 
amining its past policies because of per- 
sistent failures; the West must avoid 
lapsing into complacency and not rest 
on its four decades of success. 

East-West Relations. We may be 

at a moment of historic opportunity in 
East- West relations. The revival of 
Western strength and cohesion — coin- 
ciding with the emergence of a bold 
new leadership in the Soviet Union — 
offers hope that many longstanding 
sources of tension can be addressed. 

The real sources of tension, of 
course, are political. The weapons are 
but the symptoms of a political conflict, 
not its cause. As the President likes to 
say, we don't mistrust each other be- 
cause we're armed; we're armed be- 
cause we mistrust each other In the 
1970s, efforts at arms control and de- 
tente were derailed by the aggressive- 
ness and opportunism of the Soviet 
Union and its clients in Angola, Ethi- 
opia, South Yemen, Cambodia, and 
Afghanistan and by continuing Soviet 
repression at home and in Eastern 
Europe. 

Thus, as you saw at the Moscow 
summit, both in his public speeches and 
in his private meetings with Soviet 
leaders. President Reagan has raised 
human rights and Soviet policies in 



Third World regional conflicts, seeking 
improvements in these areas, in parallel 
with our efforts for arms reduction. 
And there has been progress — a his- 
toric commitment to leave Afghanistan 
and important diplomatic movement on 
problems such as Angola and Cambodia. 

Today we see extraordinary fer- 
ment inside the Soviet Union — a greater 
tolerance for diversity of opinion, re- 
ligious practice, autonomous economic 
activity, and cultural experimentation, 
although all still within prescribed lim- 
its. If these developments bear fruit, 
they could improve the lives of the So- 
viet people considerably over the long 
term. We wish the Soviet people well in 
this endeavor. After just celebrating 
the 200th anniversary of our own Con- 
stitution, however, we should be mind- 
ful that the Soviet system — even if the 
new reforms are implemented — will re- 
main a one-party dictatorship that per- 
mits no organized political opposition 
and that lacks the separation of powers 
that, in our democracy, provide the 
essential structural safeguards of 
individual liberty. 

East Asia and the Pacific. 

Turning to other parts of the globe. 
East Asia and the Pacific is a region 
that we on the east coast tend some- 
times to underestimate or overlook. 
This Administration — in particular, 
[Secretary of State] George Shultz — 
doesn't; he goes out there at least once 
a year and is there now. 

The sustained prosperity of the 
Pacific is the product of government 
policies to some degree, but mainly 
because those policies let private initia- 
tive flourish. Noncommunist Asia is 
proof of the power of economic freedom 
and a model of economic progress. 
Japan, defeated in war, turned its ener- 
gies to learning from us. Its success is 
there for all to see. The combined econ- 
omies of the United States and Japan 
now account for almost one-third of the 
world's GNP [gross national product]. 
And while we sometimes pay a price 
for the Japanese miracle we ourselves 
spawned, we also reap the benefits of 
having a democratic, free-enterprise 
nation — and not a totalitarian, commu- 
nist state — as the economic and politi- 
cal inspiration for the rest of Asia. 

In the political and security realm, 
too, we must be doing something right. 
With Japan, we have defined a division 
of defense roles that acknowledges 
Japan's greater economic capability. Un- 
like in Europe, our security rela- 
tionships in East Asia are diverse, 
recognizing differing threats and varied 



strengths among our allies and friends 
But these security ties have been an 
anchor of regional peace, and the 
American role remains crucial. 

Certainly, there are problems. 
Vietnam's continuing occupation of 
Cambodia is a running sore, but we 
encourage the current diplomatic 
efforts — such as next week's informal 
meetings in Jakarta — and hope there 
progress toward independence and sel 
determination for the people of Cam- 
bodia. North Korea remains a real 
threat. Together with the forces of th 
Republic of Korea, we provide a se- 
curity shield behind which our ally is 
making positive diplomatic efforts to 
reduce tensions. 

The Soviet Union has put improv 
ing relations with China at the top of 
its Asian agenda. A lessening of ten- 
sions between these two powerful 
neighbors is a logical course for both 
pursue; we can have no objection, so 
long as the terms of that relationship! 
do not harm our interests. The strati | 
gic realities of Soviet power remain. I 
know that China's foreign policy is tr | 
independent and that China needs nc - 
advice on its strategic interests. It h I' 
for example, wisely insisted on an er 



to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambc 
as one precondition of improved rela- 
tions with the Soviet Union. 

The broader strategic picture in 
East Asia and the Pacific is one of 
continued stability, prosperity, and 
opportunity. 

Latin America. Latin America, 
the last decade, has witnessed a re- 
markable trend — a trend toward der 
racy; indeed, a democratic revolutioi 
A decade ago, barely a third of the 
people of Central and South Americ 
enjoyed democratic self-government 
day, more than 90% do. This trend i 
tribute to the courage of Latin Ame 
can peoples in taking their destiny i 
their own hands. It is a tribute to tl 
power of the idea of democracy, whi 
our country has always championed, 
encouraged and supported this tren 
the past decade, and we must contir 
to do so. 

Democracy is not a panacea, ho 
ever. Acute economic problems rem; 
and that is where we must place the 
focus of our efforts. 

• The scourge of drugs has long 
been a subject of concern and coope 
tion between us and our Latin neigl 
bors. Enormous new strides have bi 
taken in cooperation on law enforce- 
ment, but more must be done. 



52 



Department of State Bulletin/October ipi;; 



GENERAL 



• Panama continues to be a prob- 
1. liut we will continue to support 

hnpes for democracy in that trou- 
il itiuntry. 

• Despite improvements, Central 
itiiia remains an area of latent 

• 1- The democracies neighboring 
aiamia have made remarkable prog- 
s, liut this progress is in jeopardy. A 
^ulmista victory over the democratic 
i>iance would have ominous conse- 
■iii ts for freedom inside Nicaragua 
111 fur the peace and security of all 
^i-aragua's neighbors. Unless Con- 
r ss and the President — which means, 
iiiitrly, the American people — come 
luicement on a program of effective 
i; for the Nicaraguan resistance as an 
uunct to our diplomatic strategy, the 
i;t President will probably face a sit- 
1 ion of accelei'ating deterioration, as 
I tho local democracies will come un- 
1 ■ m-( >wing strains as Nicaragua grows 
; Diii^cr, more assertive, and more ag- 
issi\e. Last week you all saw the re- 
1 ion of the Sandinista regime to 
( itiniate political protest. Can there 
: any further doubt about the total- 
1 :'ian nature of the ruling junta in 
^ nagua? 

Africa. In Africa, the United 
• itf> has forged excellent political 
: ations across the broad spectrum of 
. -lean nations from Zaire to Mozam- 
[ ue. Chad, with assistance from 
I anee and ourselves, won a great vic- 
t y by driving Libyan forces out of its 
I ritory. Helping Africa relieve eco- 
nic hardship is one our priorities, as 
Tionstrated in the Toronto economic 
limit's commitment to intensify our 
orts on behalf of the poorest nations. 

More than a year ago, the Presi- 
nt undertook a major reform of our 
n aid policies in an initiative to com- 
t hunger in Africa. The Administra- 
n has provided a key stimulant for 
lat can truly be called a silent revo- 
ion currently underway in African 
onomic development. Twenty-five 
rican countries are in the process 
abandoning Marxist or state- 
mmanded economies in favor of free 
irkets and private sector initiative. I 
n't think it would be an exaggeration 
say that Marxism is dead in Africa — 
lied by its own internal contradictions 
.d failures over 25 years of practical 
perience. 

In southern Africa, we have dis- 
nced ourselves sharply from South 
frican apartheid, which the President 
is condemned as repugnant. In the 
plomacy to bring independence to 
amibia and an end to civil war and 



outside intervention in Angola, we have 
been the galvanizing force. Whether 
the intensified diplomatic efforts will 
succeed this year is impossible to tell. 
Nevertheless, the next President will 
inherit an American-sponsored diplo- 
matic framework which offers the 
best — indeed, the only — hope for prog- 
ress in southern Africa. 

The Middle East. The Middle East 
is, as alw^ays, a region of turbulence. 
The Arab-IsraeU dispute, the Iran-Iraq 
war, and the menace of state-sponsored 
terrorism remain; Americans and oth- 
ers are still cruelly being held hostage. 
Yet there are also positive trends. Our 
efforts to promote a comprehensive 
Arab-Israeli settlement have not 
achieved their objectives, but progress 
has been made which can be built upon; 
the voices of moderation on both sides 
are stronger and may well have been 
made so, in part, by our efforts. In the 
gulf, Iran may have at last drawn the 
rational conclusions from the evident 
futihty of its war policy. Yesterday's an- 
nouncement that Iran has accepted UN 
Resolution 598 is hopefully a long- 
awaited and important first step on the 
road to bringing an end to the tragic 
Iran-Iraq war. 

Afghanistan, if the Soviets with- 
draw on schedule, is headed for a his- 
toric outcome: aggression has been 
ended; the Kabul regime's days are 
numbered; the resistance is stronger 
than ever and gaining control over more 
and more territory; our ally, Pakistan, 
has withstood Soviet pressures. 

The Need for 

Unity and Leadership 

All Americans can be proud that a 
stronger and reengaged America has 
made the world more secure. We can be 
proud that our ideals of political and 
economic freedom are being redis- 
covered by others and are turning out 
to be, once again, powerful forces in 
the world. 

Many of these successes flow from 
the new consensus on the basic princi- 
ples I began with. But recent history 
also teaches that when we are divided 
over tactics — as in Central America — 
our policy suffers grievously, and our 
national interest does, too. When we 
are united — as we have been in support 
of the Afghan freedom fighters, or of a 
solid NATO, or a new basis for U.S.- 
Soviet relations, or of a vital commit- 
ment in the gulf — we can achieve a 
great deal. 



Another lesson, I would argue, is 
the need for presidential leadership. 
Our postwar history is a history of cou- 
rageous Presidents — of both parties — 
making many courageous decisions. In 
the aftermath of Iran-coiitm, Congress 
may be tempted to try to limit presi- 
dential power. Divided, shared, and 
countervailing powers are the hallmarks 
of our system — by design of the Found- 
ing Fathers. Weakening the presidency 
also weakens the country. This Presi- 
dent — any president — must defend his 
constitutional authority against efforts, 
however well intentioned, which unbal- 
ance the always delicate relationship 
between the executive and legislative 
branches. 

The executive branch, of course, 
has an obligation to keep its own house 
in order. There must be adherence to 
law and to the Constitution and a will- 
ingness to consult and deal openly and 
respectfully with the Congress, taking 
legislative leaders into its confidence 
even on the most sensitive matters. 
There should also be smooth procedures 
for coUegial deliberation and orderly 
policymaking within the executive 
branch. I believe this Administration, 
after the aberration of Iran-contra, has 
reestablished and enjoys such a co- 
herent and cooperative process inter- 
nally. It has served the President and 
the country well. It has helped our re- 
lations with the Congress and added to 
our credibility with the American peo- 
ple and other nations. 

And so, as we go into the fourth 
quarter of our political season, we 
should remember that next January 20 
we must come together in support of 
our new President. We must remember 
that what unites us is more important 
than what divides us. 

And, as for myself, I expect to go 
back to a nice quiet foxhole where I can 
serve my country in a more comfortable 
and, perhaps, less-exposed position. ■ 



ipartment of State Bulletin/October 1988 



53 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



U.S. Human Rights Policy: 
An Overview 



by Paula Dobriansky 

Address before the American 
Council of Young Political Leaders on 
June 3, 1988. Ms. Dohriauskji is Dep- 
uty Assistant Secretary for Human 
Rights and Huiuaiiitariuii Affairs. 

The advancement of human rights and 
the promotion of democracy have been 
a key tenet of the Reagan Administra- 
tion's foreign policy. We define human 
rights as the respect for the integrity of 
the individual and the observance of po- 
litical/civil rights. The President has 
stated "that human rights are the prop- 
erty of every man, woman, and child on 
this planet and that a violation of hu- 
man rights anywhere is the business of 
free people everywhere." Our policy 
is a measured and visible approach to 
the preservation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms which seeks to 
alleviate the repression, pain, and 
suffering of miUions of people from 
fear and violence. 

Indeed, one of the primary objec- 
tives of U.S. human rights policy is 
highly moral in nature — that is, to im- 
prove the quality of life of people in 
other countries. This policy reflects an 
underlying American optimism about 
the human condition and an innate 
sense of idealism in dealing with com- 
plex international problems. 

Our pursuit of these human rights 
causes is also predicated on a somber 
appraisal of U.S. national interests. In 
our view a government that seeks to 
deny its people fundamental civil and 
political rights is usually prone to 
aggression and habitually exhibits 
ruthless and unpredictable behavior 
internationally. 

While, in the long term, the United 
States is desirous of fostering a better 
world order, our present human rights 
policy stems from a pragmatic and real- 
istic assessment of the existing interna- 
tional system. As noted by Secretary 
Shultz, "It is a tough-minded policy, 
which faces the world as it is, not as 
Americans might wish or imagine it to 
be. At the same time, it is an idealistic 
policy, which expresses the continuing 
commitment of the United States to the 
cause of liberty and the alleviation of 
suffering." 



Human Rights and the 
American Tradition 

While human rights have been an inte- 
gral component of the Reagan Admin- 
istration's foreign policy, American 
concern about human rights develop- 
ments in other countries is not a new 
phenomenon. Indeed, American history 
and political ti-adition clearly evidence 
a preoccupation with protecting the 
rights of individuals against the abuses 
of state power. 

Upon reflection, this is not surpris- 
ing. The United States was born of a 
crucible of revolutionary struggle. Hav- 
ing witnessed firsthand the ravages of 
tyranny, the American Founding Fa- 
thers were determined to create a soci- 
ety in which violations of individual 
rights by the state would not occur. 
Having studied such philosophers as 
Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau, the 
Founding Fathers also felt that relying 
solely on the goodness of man's nature 
or enlightened policies espoused by in- 
dividual rulers was foolhardy. Accord- 
ingly, in their view, the only way to 
ensure that tyranny would not arise 
again was to create a full-fledged de- 
mocracy with a system of "checks and 
balances" and with safeguards to pro- 
tect the civil and political rights of 
citizens. 

Additionally, one important aspect 
of the American experience was an 
abiding conviction felt by our Founding 
Fathers and their successors that the 
lofty ideals of freedom, democracy, and 
human rights were not just for Ameri- 
cans — that in this area Americans had 
something unique to offer to the world. 
This belief in the universal nature of 
the American experience arose not out 
of arrogance or from a desire to impose 
our views on the rest of the world. 
Rather, it reflected a conviction, felt by 
many early Americans, that as a young 
society, far removed from acute power 
struggles then raging in Europe, Amer- 
ica was in a unique position to offer 
moral and spiritual leadership. 

The belief in the universal nature 
of the American experience is reflected 
in key documents associated with early 
American history. For example, the 
Declaration of Independence, known by 
heart by all Americans and numerous 
people throughout the world, adopted 
broad language which states: 



We hold these truths to be self- 
evident, that all men are created equal, 
that they are endowed by their Creator 
with certain unalienable Rights, that 
among these are Life, Liberty and the pu 
suit of Happiness. — That to secure these 
rights, Governments are instituted amonf 
Men, deriving their just powers fmni the 
consent of the governed, — That whenever 
any Form of Government becomes destru' 
tive of these ends, it is the Right of the 
People to alter or to abolish it, and to in- 
stitute new Government, laying its found: 
tion on such principles and organizing its 
power in such form, as to them shall seer 
most likely to affect their Safety and 
Happiness. 

The concept of the protection of 
civil and political rights of individuals 
also permeates numerous State consti 
tutions and the Bill of Rights of the 
U.S. Constitution. These documents > 
fer perhaps one of the most vigorous 
and spirited defenses of the concepts 
of human dignity, democracy, and 
freedom. 



Our Multilateral Agenda 

In addition to serving as the reposito 
of rich political and historical human 
rights tradition, the United States hi 
also made an invaluable contribution 
the development of international hun 
rights law. The United States played 
key role in the establishment of the 
UN system and the drafting of the I 
Charter. In fact, one of the earliest i 
most important international docu- 
ments dealing with human rights ma 
ters — the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, adopted by the Gem 
Assembly on December 10, 1948 — wt 
prepared under the guidance of Elea 
Roosevelt, then the U.S. Represent- 
ative in the UN Human Rights Com 
mission. We adhere to the principles 
the UN Charter and the Universal I 
laration of Human Rights and have c 
tinned to play a constructive role in 
development of new international hu 
man rights documents and norms. 

Through the UN Human Rights 
Commission (UNHRC), we have sou 
to bring to the attention of the inter 
national community violations of hun 
rights and fundamental freedoms. 
the years, our delegations have intn 
duced resolutions calling upon comn- 
sion members to acknowledge and di 
with human rights violators and hav 
made strong representations on the 
need to defend and uphold human 
rights everywhere. Our concern has 
been expressed about Nicaragua, Sc 
Africa, Vietnam, Iran, Chile, the So 
Union, and Ethiopia, among many 
others. 



54 



Department of State Bulletin/October ipi 

J. 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



In addition to focusing on human 
hts violations within specific coun- 
s, we have urged consideration of 
smatic issues. For example, in 1983, 
! United States, along with the 
therlands and Ireland, proposed that 
! UNHRC focus on a new agenda 
m entitled "Implementation of the 
claration of Elimination of All Forms 
Intolerance and of Discrimination, 
sed on Religion or Belief." Later, in 
!6, we were the lead sponsor of a 
iolution creating a Special Rappor- 
ir on Religious Intolerance with the 
jcific mandate of investigating inci- 
its of religious intolei'ance globally, 
jorting on them to the commission, 
d suggesting remedial measures. 
We have also striven to encourage 
observance of a standard of fairness 
d balance in the commissions treat- 
ent of human rights — a difficult task 
best. While some countries have 
len charged with violations of human 
|;hts by the commission, other coun- 
t es, which are more serious offenders, 
Ive not even been considered. For ex- 
: ijili'. in 1987, our delegation tabled a 
1 solution addressing the egregious hu- 
! Ill i-ights abuses in Cuba — a resolu- 
■ 11 \\ hich was ultimately turned down 
(iiic vote. Finally, in this past year's 
\'Hi;C, though no resolution on Cuba 
IS acted on, it was unanimously deter- 
ned that a six-member UN investiga- 
'e team would visit Cuba to assess 
man rights conditions. 

Another multilateral foi'um in 
lich we have advanced the cause of 
iman rights has been the CSCE [Con- 
rence on Security and Cooperation in 
arope]. The United States was instru- 
sntal in ensuring the inclusion of bas- 
■t III in the 1975 Helsinki accords, 
lis section of the accords spelled out 
range of human rights obligations 
sumed by the signatories. 

Having developed these new inter- 
itional legal obligations, the United 
,ates has played a key role in monitor- 
g compliance and holding violators 
•countable for their actions. Thus, 
liring the 1977 Belgrade CSCE fol- 
wup meeting and the 1980 Madrid 
leeting, the U.S. delegation not only 
litiated extensive discussions on the 
attern of Soviet noncompliance with 
asket III provisions but also proposed 
dditional measures and steps to im- 
rove the human rights situation. 

>ur Bilateral Agenda 

legotiations in multilateral and inter- 
ational forums have not been the only 
leans by which the United States has 



striven to further human rights. Hu- 
man rights considerations have also 
played a major role in shaping U.S. bi- 
lateral relations with numerous coun- 
tries. Beginning in the mid-1970s. 
Congress amended a number of foreign 
policy-related statutes — the Foreign 
Assistance Act, the Mutual Assistance 
Act, the Ti-ade Reform Act of 1974— to 
specify that human rights considera- 
tions play an integral role in determin- 
ing how U.S. military and economic 
assistance is to be dispensed. 

Through bilateral channels we have 
raised specific human rights cases and 
concerns. This type of "quiet diplo- 
macy" has often been key to the resolu- 
tion of various problems. However, 
when such diplomatic overtures failed, 
we have resorted to such actions as the 
issuance of strong public statements of 
condemnation and the denial of eco- 
nomic or military assistance and licenses 
for the export of crime control equip- 
ment. These punitive approaches have 
the two-tiered effect of visibly singling 
out countries engaged in a pattern of 
human rights abuses and providing in- 
ducements for them to improve their 
record. 



Myths and Realities 

Myth #1: "Economic and social 
rights" constitute human rights. 

While the pursuit of human rights is a 
generally popular undertaking, consid- 
erable confusion still permeates discus- 
sions of this subject. Let's consider the 
very definition of human rights. There 
have been efforts to obfuscate tradi- 
tional civil and political rights with 
"economic and social rights." We be- 
lieve that traditional political rights 
provide a vital foundation for any dem- 
ocratic society. As noted in our human 
rights bureau's annual Country Reports 
on Human Rights Practices: 

. . .the right of self-government is a 
basic political right, that government is le- 
gitimate only when grounded on the con- 
sent of the governed, and that government 
thus grounded should not be used to deny 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. 
Individuals in a society have the inaliena- 
ble right to be free from governmental vio- 
lations of the integrity of the person: to 
enjoy civil liberties such as freedom of ex- 
pression, assembly, religion, and move- 
ment, without discrimination based on 
race, ancestry, or sex; and to change their 
government by peaceful means. 

We believe that under present con- 
ditions "economic and social rights" are 
really more in the nature of aspirations 
and goals than "rights." This semantic 



distinction is highly important. It does 
not make sense to claim that a particu- 
lar level of economic and social entitle- 
ments are rights if most governments 
are not able to provide them. In con- 
trast, any government can guarantee 
political and civil rights to its citizens. 
Obfuscating a goal with fundamental 
rights promotes not only conceptual 
confusion but often is used to justify 
actual human rights violations. Not sur- 
prisingly, we have usually found that 
political rights are often denigrated by 
repressive governments claiming that, 
in order to promote "economic and so- 
cial rights," they must deny their cit- 
izens political and civil rights. 

In fact, there exists a symbiotic re- 
lationship between human rights and 
economic development. Experience 
demonstrates that it is individual free- 
dom that fosters economic and social 
development; it is repression that sti- 
fles it. Those who try to justify subor- 
dinating political and civil rights on the 
grounds that they are concentrating on 
economic aspirations invariably deliver 
on neither. 

Myth #2: Economic deprivation 
is a valid rationale for denial of civil/ 
political rights. This does not mean 
that we seek to disparage the sincere 
desire of those well-meaning people 
who genuinely promote improvecl eco- 
nomic and social standards. It is true 
that poverty and deprivation plague 
many parts of the world. And, even in 
developed Western countries, poverty 
still has not been eradicated. 'This is a 
very real problem which merits a sus- 
tained effort to resolve it. We believe 
that democracy and free enterprise of- 
fer the best solution to improving the 
economic well-being of people. 

Unfortunately, this point seems to 
be often overlooked or ignored by those 
who seek to justify their own egregious 
violations of political and civil rights by 
asserting that, after all, even in the 
United States, poverty has not been 
fully conquered, and a number of Ameri- 
cans have been unable to secure shelter 
or stable income. This, of course, is a 
flawed argument. The fact that eco- 
nomic deprivation has not yet been 
fully eradicated provides absolutely no 
justification for denying people their 
political rights or torturing one's politi- 
cal opponents. Sadly, the whole subject 
has become so heavily laden with hy- 
pocrisy that dictators who often torture 
and maim their subjects see fit to lec- 
ture the United States on human 
rights. 



epartment of State Bulletin/October 1988 



55 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



Myth #3: The linkage and 
application of human rights and 
U.S. foreign policy is inconsistent. 

Another often misunderstood area is 
the proper relationship between human 
rights and other factors shaping U.S. 
foreign policy. The critics of our human 
rights policy often highlight a U.S. de- 
cision to provide military or economic 
aid to a country with a less than per- 
fect human rights record. In their view 
this indicates that the United States is 
not serious about seeking to promote 
human rights. This, of course, is a 
highly simplistic notion. 

Human rights is an important but 
not the only consideration in determin- 
ing the course of U.S. relations with 
foreign countries. Other factors have to 
be taken into account. This view is not 
peculiar to this Administration. Indeed, 
an identical position was taken by the 
Carter Administration. Lincoln Bloom- 
field, a Carter Administration NSC 
[National Security Council] staff mem- 
ber responsible for human rights, 
stated: 

When it came to specifics, whether the 
aid was military or nonmilitary. comple.x 
interests had to be balanced in reaching 
decisions on individual eases. Inescapably, 
there were numerous cases in which the 
Administration was e.xposed to the charge 
of inconsistency. Human rights perform- 
ance became a dominant factor in conven- 
tional arms transfers to Latin America; but 
such considerations were clearly subordi- 
nate in weighing military aid to Egypt, 
Israel, North Yemen, and Saudi Arabia. 

An identical view has also been 
advanced by former Secretary of State 
Cyrus Vance, who, in justifying his de- 
cision not to cut aid to such U.S. allies 
as South Korea, Iran, and Zaire, which 
had been found to commit human rights 
violations, indicated that "in each case, 
we must balance a political concern for 
human rights against economic and se- 
curity goals." 

Moreover, even as far as human 
rights themselves are concerned, we 
have been acting with a sense of real- 
ism. This means that, while we have 
been striving to improve human rights 
situations in various countries, we usu- 
ally do not expect immediate results 
overnight. In our view, a pattern of im- 
provement, however modest, deserves 
encouragement. We have also been at- 
tentive to the circumstances facing each 
specific country. Clearly, a country 
plunged in the turmoil of civil war, or 
which has been battling rightwing or 
leftwing terrorists seeking to over- 
throw a fledgling demociacy, cannot be 
expected to improve human rights as 



promptly as a country enjoying political 
and economic tranquility. 

Our sense of realism has also re- 
sulted in a human rights stance which 
seeks to weigh carefully the conse- 
quences of our policies — for example, 
whether the imposition of sanctions in a 
particular situation would lead to an 
improvement in human rights. Failure 
to consider both the limits of our influ- 
ence and the consequences of our action 
can result in a human rights policy rich 
in moral posturing and poor in positive, 
concrete results. Yet, when we witness 
a country commiting an egregious pat- 
tern of human rights violations, we 
must respond by condemning the per- 
petrator, even if there is no immediate 
prospect for success in sight. Express- 
ing moral outrage contributes to public 
education and heightens international 
cognizance of human rights problems. 

Myth #4: Quiet diplomacy is 
essentially useless in improving hu- 
man rights conditions. In fostering 
human rights improvements, it has 
been claimed by many that public rep- 
resentations and overt pressure is the 
only sound approach to attaining human 
rights objectives. Yet, our experience 
has shown that both approaches have to 
be utilized, with specific circumstances 
determining the extent to which one or 
the other is used. 

Promotion of Human Rights 

It is also useful to broaden our con- 
ception of how human rights are to be 
promoted. On one level we have been 
seeking to eradicate specific human 
rights problems. Fundamentally, how- 
ever, we believe that the best way to 
promote human rights in the long term 
is to spread and bolster democracy 
throughout the world. As noted in our 
Coinitri/ Reports on Human Rights 
Practices: 

It is in our national interest to pro- 
mote democratic processes in order to help 
build a world environment more favorable 
to respect for human rights and hence, 
more conducive to stability and peace. We 
have developed, therefore, a dual policy, 
reactive in the sense that we continue to 
oppose specific human rights violations 
wherever they occur, but at the same time 
active in working over the long term to 
strengthen democracy. 

With regard to human rights pol- 
icy, this Administration can boast of a 
significant and broad record of accom- 
plishments. We have made much use of 
the National Endowment for Democracy 
in fostering democratic institutions in 



other countries. Through Section 116(e 
of the Foreign Assistance Act, we hav 
allocated funds for programs which w', 
specifically enhance civil and political 
rights abroad. We have also contributtj 
to the democratic transformations in ; 
number of countries, including the Phi I 
ippines. El Salvador, and South Korea 
These achievements have made an em) 
mous contribution to the cause of hu- 
man rights. 

Human Rights Policy Criteria 1 

What about the practical aspects of 
human rights? Our human rights poli( 
is a sustained process, shaped by a i 
number of actors. On one level, of i 
course, it is the American people repl 
sented by the President and Congres I 
who ultimately determine the content I 
of our human rights policy. More spe' 1 
ically, however, it is the human rights! 
bureau of the Department of State I 
which has the primary responsibility |i 
for the development and implementa- f 
tion of U.S. human rights policy. Th(!| 
criteria, or rather, broad standards v [! 
use in assessing any country's humar i 
rights performance are as follows: ^^ 

Integrity of the individual — 

involving political killings, disappear 
ances, torture, arbitrary arrest/ 
detention; 

Civil rights — meaning freedom 
speech/press, peaceful assembly/ass( 
elation, religion, movement/travel, r 
to a fair public trial and to privacy, 
family, home, and free corresponden 
and 

Political rights — meaning the 
ability to change one's government 

Additionally, in evaluating huma 
rights conditions, we take into accoi 
such factors as a government's attiti 
to international and nongovernment; 
investigation of alleged violations; c 
dence of discrimination based on rac 
sex, religion, language, and social st 
tus; and conditions of labor (the rigl 
to organize and bargain collectively, 
acceptable work conditions — minimu 
wages, occupational safety and healt 
etc.). The bureau draws upon inforn' 
tion provided to it by human rights 
ficers posted in our embassies abroa 
We analyze this information and pro 
duce a number of documents and re- 
ports for the benefit of the executiv 
branch, the American public, and C' 
gress. The single most important re 
port issued by the bureau of human 
rights is its annual Country Reports 
Human Rights Practices, which doc 
ments human rights in approximate! 
167 countries. 



56 



Department of State Bulletin/October iBi 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



We also draw upon reports of UN 
luiury/thematic rapporteurs (e.g., rap- 
mieurs on torture, religious intol- 
i-aiice, Iran, etc.), domestic and 
itci'iiational nongovernmental human 
luiits groups, as well as the Universal 
ifclaration of Human Rights, for stand- 
I'ds, information, and analysis of coun- 
■y implementation/performance. 

We have come a long way in our 
unian rights efforts. It can be said 



that the pursuit of human rights has 
become an institutionalized and funda- 
mental aspect of our foreign policy. It is 
also an issue that has attracted tremen- 
dous public support and a high degree 
of bipartisanship. As a result, our 
achievements in this area have been 
truly impressive. We are committed to 
continue working for the noble goal 
of the promotion of human rights 
worldwide. ■ 



Helsinki Human Rights Day, 1988 



KOCLAMATION 5843, 

rc;. 1, 19881 

hiiioen years ago, 33 European states, 
it' I'nited States, and Canada signed the 
elsinki Final Act of the Conference on 
.^ciirity and Cooperation in Europe. In so 
)ing, we and the other signatories under- 
lok a sacred commitment to the principles 

■ freedom, self-determination, and human 
L'luty. The Helsinki Final Act acknowl- 
lecil the fundamental interrelationship of 
iiiian rights, economic relations, and se- 
irity considerations in the overall conduct 

■ affairs within and among states. The Fi- 
ll Alt recognized that there can be no 

ui' international security without respect 
r basic political and civil rights; that eco- 
)inic ties can contribute to security, but 
ily if based upon open relations among 
Miples; and that security and confidence 
III also be improved through the free ex- 
uinu:e of information. 

That historic meeting in Helsinki has 
lauiied a dynamic process that we in the 
nited States regard as one of the most 
11)1(11 tant developments in East-West rela- 
iiMs in the post-World War II period. The 
ork begun at Helsinki to eliminate the 
arriers that divide East and West has 
een carried on in three follow-up meetings 
uring the intervening years. At present 
'e are working with the delegations from 
11 the signatory states in Vienna to ad- 
ance our cherished objectives of freedom, 
penness, and security. 

While progress has occurred in reduc- 
ig the tensions between East and West, 
he Soviet Union and other states of the 
;ast have not fully Uved up to the commit- 
lents undertaken at Helsinki. Respect for 
uman rights in these countries continues 
fall far short of the standards set forth 
n the Final Act, as well as in the docu- 
nent issued at the conclusion of the 
Madrid review conference in 1983. Free- 
lom of movement, conscience, and religion 
,re still shackled by unreasonable and ar- 
)itrary government controls. Individuals 
luch as Ukrainian Helsinki monitors Ivan 
<andyba and Ivan Sokulsky and Lithua- 
lian CathoUc priest Sigitas Tamkevicius, 
vhose only "crime" was to monitor the So- 
/iet Government's compliance with the 



Helsinki Final Act and speak out in behalf 
of political and religious freedom, remain 
in Soviet labor camps. The free flow of 
ideas and information from abroad and 
within Eastern Europe is still impeded. 

A few short weeks ago I stood in 
Finlandia Hall — the historic building in 
which the Helsinki Final Act was signed. I 
reiterated the commitment of the American 
people to continue to work to bring down 
the barriers that have so cruelly divided 
the European continent for 4 decades. 
However, it bears reminding that those 
barriers were erected by the East, and so 
much of the demolition work will neces- 
sarily fall to those states. We are encour- 
aged by recent hopeful pronouncements 
coming from the Soviet Union and its al- 
lies; we await further concrete progress in 
the treatment of all individuals in the So- 
viet Union and Eastern Europe and posi- 
tive steps in the Vienna meeting to give 
those pronouncements substance. 

It is appropriate that we mark this 
13th anniversary of the signing of the Final 
Act by setting aside a special day to reflect 
upon and to renew our dedication to the 
values of human dignity and freedom em- 
bodied in that farsighted document. On 
this occasion, we call upon all signatories 
of the Final Act to honor in full its solemn 
principles. Let us pledge to spare no effort 
in striving toward this goal. 

The Congress, by Senate Joint Resolu- 
tion 338. has designated August 1, 1988, as 
"Helsinki Human Rights Day" and has au- 
thorized and requested the President to is- 
sue a proclamation in its observance. 

Now, Therefore, I, Ronald 
Reagan, President of the United States of 
America, do hereby proclaim August 1, 
1988, as Helsinki Human Rights Day. 

In Witness Whereof, I have here- 
unto set my hand this first day of August, 
in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred 
and eighty-eight, and of the Independence 
of the United States of America the two 
hundred and thirteenth. 

Ronald Reagan 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 8, 1988. 



Captive Nations 
Week, 1988 



PROCLAMATION 5840, 
JULY 13, 19881 

During Captive Nations Week, we honor 
the courage, faith, and aspirations of the 
millions of people the world over who suf- 
fer under Soviet domination. They desire, 
seek, and deserve, as the common heritage 
of humanity, the liberty, justice, self-deter- 
mination, and independence we Americans 
and all free peoples cherish. The citizens of 
the captive nations daily hear the mighty 
call of freedom and answer it boldly, send- 
ing an echo around the globe to remind 
totalitarians and all mankind that their 
voices cannot be quelled — because they are 
the voices of the human spirit. 

Across the continents and seas, the 
cry for freedom rings out and the struggle 
for its blessings continues, in the republics 
of the Soviet Union, in the Baltic States 
and throughout Eastern Europe, in Cuba 
and Nicaragua, in Ethiopia and Angola, 
and in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. It 
also continues in Afghanistan, depite ini- 
tial Soviet withdrawal, because the Na- 
jibuUah regime imposes its will upon the 
Afghan people. We in America, who have 
held high the torch of liberty for two cen- 
turies and more, pause during Captive Na- 
tions Week to express our solidarity with 
those who strive at great personal risk and 
sacrifice to win justice for their nations. 
We commemorate as well the many free- 
dom fighters and individuals such as Polish 
Father Jerzy Popieluszko and Ukrainian 
poet Vasyl Stus who have given their lives 
in the imperishable cause of liberty. We 
cannot and will not shirk our duty and re- 
sponsibility to insist on the speediest end 
to subjugation, persecution, and discrimi- 
nation in the captive nations. We repeat 
our call for all governments to respect and 
honor the letter and the spirit of the 
United Nations Charter and the Helsinki 
Accords. 

Last year's Captive Nations Week 
Proclamation mentioned four people in the 
Soviet Union imprisoned for their struggle 
for national rights. Now, 1 year later, two 
of them, both Helsinki human rights moni- 
tors, remain in internal exile — Viktoras 
Petkus, a Lithuanian, and Lev 
Lukyanenko, a Ukrainian. Another, 
Helsinki monitor Mart Niklus, an Esto- 
nian, is still in a labor camp. The last, 
Gunars Astra, Latvia's highly respected 
national rights activist, was released in 
poor health earlier this year after 19 years 
in Soviet labor camps. He died several 
months ago at 56 years of age. 

America is keenly aware of, and will 
continue to encourage, the great tide of 
democratic ideas that now sweeps the 
globe. We cannot forget decades of trag- 
edy, the tens of millions of lives lost, or the 
enormity of the suffering inflicted on the 



)epartment of State Bulletin/October 1988 



57 



INTERNATIONAL LAW 



innocent. We applaud the courage and faith 
that have sustained countless people and 
kept alive the di-eam of freedom against 
unthinkable odds. Despite starvation, tor- 
ture, and murder, the indomitable human 
spirit will outlast all oppression. We con- 
tinue to stand ready to cooperate in meet- 
ing the just aspirations of the oppressed 
and needy of the world. We will remain 
forever steadfast in our commitment to 
speak out for those who cannot, to seek 
justice for those to whom it is denied, and 
to assist freedom-seeking peoples 
everywhere. 

The Congress, by joint resolution ap- 
proved July 17, 1959 (73 Stat. 212), has au- 
thorized and requested the President to 
issue a proclamation designating the third 
week in July of each year as "Captive Na- 
tions Week." 



Now, Therefore, I, Ronald 
Reacan, President of the United States of 
America, do hereby proclaim the week be- 
ginning July 17, 1988, as Captive Nations 
Week. I call upon the people of the United 
States to observe this week with appropri- 
ate programs, ceremonies, and activities, 
and I urge them to reaffirm their devotion 
to the aspirations of all peoples for justice, 
self-determination, and liberty. 

In Witness Whereof, I have here- 
unto set my hand this thirteenth day of 
July, in the year of our Lord nineteen hun- 
dred and eighty-eight, and of the Inde- 
pendence of the United States of America 
the two hundred and thirteenth. 

Ronald Reagan 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of July 18, 1988. 



Compensation for Iranian Airbus 
Tragedy 



by Abraham D. Sofaer 

Statement prepared for the Defense 
Policy Panel of the House Armed Serv- 
ices Committee on August i, 1988. Mr. 
Sofaer is the Legal Adviser of the De- 
partment of State. ^ 

I appreciate this opportunity to appear 
before this panel to discuss the Admin- 
istration's position on compensation to 
the families of those who were killed by 
the destruction of Iran Air #655 on 
July 3, 1988. 

As you know, this tragic accident 
occurred in the Persian Gulf when the 
U.S.S. Vincennes, exercising justifiable 
defensive action, fired upon Iran Air 
#655. According to information we have 
received, this action resulted in the 
deaths of 290 individuals from seven 
nations. 

Prompted by the humanitarian tra- 
ditions of our nation, and prior interna- 
tional practice, the President decided 
on July 11 that the United States would 
offer compensation, on an ex gratia 
basis, to the families of the victims. 
The White House announced on that 
date that: 

The President has reviewed U.S. pol- 
icy in the Persian Gulf where our military 
forces are protecting vital interests of the 
free world. He has expressed his complete 
satisfaction with the policy and reiterated 
his belief that the actions "of the U.S.S. 
Vincennes on July 3 in the case of the Ira- 
nian airliner were justifiable defensive ac- 
tions. At the same time, he remains 
personally saddened at the tragic death of 



58 



the innocent victims of this accident and 
has already expressed his deep regret to 
their families. 

The President's decision to make ex 
gratia, compensation has set in motion a 
process by which the United States will 
determine how, to whom, and under 
what conditions compensation is to be 
paid. I will briefly address the interna- 
tional legal aspects of the ex gratia 
payments we intend to make, including 
prior precedents for ex gratia 
payments, and what the process will be 
for making these payments. It is my 
understanding that the Department of 
Defense is prepared to discuss in gen- 
eral terms its current authority to 
make ex gratia payments and the funds 
available to do so. 



Governing International Law 

Principles of international law that 
govern potential liability for injuries 
and property damage arising out of mil- 
itary operations are generally well- 
established. 

First, indemnification is not re- 
quired for injuries or damage incidental 
to the lawful use of armed force. 

Second, indemnification is required 
where the exercise of armed force is 
unlawful. 

Third, states may, nevertheless, 
pay compensation ex gratia without ac- 
knowledging, and irrespective of, legal 
liability. 



Iran Air Incident 

In the case of the Iran Air incident, the 
damage caused in firing upon #655 was 
incidental to the lawful use of force. 
The Government of Iran should not 
have allowed gunboats to attack our 
vessels and aircraft. That government 
also should not have allowed a pas- 
senger airline to fly over a battle 
zone — especially not unless it was 
equipped and prepared to respond to 
our Navy's repeated warnings. 

The commander of the U.S.S. 
Vincennes evidently believed that his 
ship was under imminent threat of at- 
tack from a hostile aircraft, and he at- 
tempted repeatedly to identify or 
contact the aircraft before taking de- 
fensive action. Therefore, the United 
States does not accept legal responsibil 
ity for this incident and is not paying 
"reparations," a word which implies 
wrongdoing and is often associated witl 
wartime activities. 

Instead, the President has decided 
to make an ex gratia payment as a hu- 
manitarian gesture to the families of 
the individuals who were on #655. 
Most of the individuals who tragically 
and innocently perished in this inciden' 
were Iranians. But people from six 
other countries also reportedly died: 
India, Italy, Kuwait, Pakistan, the 
United Arab Emirates, and Yugoslavi; 
We intend to make no payments to or 
through the Government of Iran but, 
instead, to the families of the victims. 
We may work directly, however, with 
the governments of the other countrie; 
involved, depending on the need for ar 
propriety of such contacts. 

Precedents for Payments 

An ex gratia payment of this type is 
consistent with the past practice of tht 
United States and of other nations, 
with the exception of the Soviet Unioi 

Currently the United States is dis 
cussing with the Government of India 
ex gratia payment for the death of an 
Indian fisherman killed by gunfire fro; 
the U.S.S. Carr in November 1987. 

In 1973 Israel shot down a Libyan 
Boeing 727 airliner that mistakenly 
flew over the Israeli-occupied Sinai, 
killing 106 passengers. We are informs 
that Israel made an ex gratia payment 
to Libya. 

During the 1967 war, Israeli air 
craft attacked the U.S.S. Liberty, kill 
ing a number of U.S. servicemen and 
causing extensive damage. Israel mair 
tained that the attack was a justifiabli 
accident but, nonetheless, paid the 
United States ex gratia compensation. 



Department of State Bulletin/October 19S 



INTERNATIONAL LAW 



1 11 1954 the People s Republic of 
lima (P.R.C.) shot down a U.K.-regis- 
■rt'tl Cathay Pacific plane in the 
icinity of Hainan Island, which was en 
lUtc iVom Bangkok to Hong Kong. The 
i;.('. apologized and indicated that its 
ildts had mistakenly identified the 
laiif as a military aircraft from Tai- 
an. The P.R.C. paid compensation to 
le I'nited Kingdom to be disbursed to 
le victims' families. Among the vic- 
ms were six U.S. nationals. 

In 1946 an unarmed U.S. transport 
lane en route from Austria to Italy 
as shot down by Yugoslav forces. 
ive L'.S. nationals were killed. The 
(Acrnment of Yugoslavia expressed its 
•gict but rejected any responsibility 
1 pay compensation. Yugoslavia did 
ate, however, that it wished "to ex- 
re>s its sympathy toward the innocent 
iiiulies of the perished airmen" and to 
ay lump sums to each of the five clos- 
et families. The United States ac- 
■|iteil this payment. 

.\ somewhat different case is repre- 
iiteil by the Iraqi attack on the 
.S.S. Stark in May 1987. Iraq 
roniptly agreed to pay compensation, 
ml Iraq now has our wrongful death 
aims under active consideration. Al- 
Ktimh we do not regard Iraq's prom- 
ed payments as ex gratia, Iraq's 
eeisien to pay makes unnecessary a 
eterinination of liability, leaving only 
le level of compensation to be 
stablished. 

\'ery few instances exist in which a 
ation responsible for shooting down a 
ivilian airliner has refused to pay com- 
pensation. The two most notorious ex- 
•mples both involve the Soviet Union. 

In 1978 the Soviets fired upon and 
jrced the crash landing of a Korean 
irline 707 airplane, killing two pas- 
engers. In 1983 a Soviet fighter pilot 
hot down Korean Air Lines #007, kill- 
ig 269 passengers. The Soviets have 
efused to accept our claims for the 
eaths of 60 U.S. nationals on that 
hght, which resulted from the Soviets' 
ndefensible action, or to accept the 
laims of other governments. 

I would also note the case of the 
.hooting down of an El Al civilian air- 
iner by Bulgarian planes in 1955, re- 
;ulting in the deaths of the crew and 
)assengers, including nine U.S. na- 
tionals. The United States immediately 
sought prompt and adequate compensa- 
-ion for what we deemed an unlawful 
ict. Bulgaria offered an inadequate 
imount to the United States, which we 
•efused. Both Israel and the United 
States brought claims against Bulgaria 



before the International Court of Jus- 
tice, but the United States withdrew 
its claim when the Court decided Bul- 
garia had not submitted to the Court's 
jurisdiction at the time of the incident. 
Offering compensation is especially 
appropriate where a civilian airliner has 
been shot down. The 1944 Convention 
on International Civil Aviation (the 
Chicago convention), to which both the 
United States and Iran are parties, 
constitutes a solemn undertaking to 
promote the safe and orderly develop- 
ment of international civil aviation. In- 
deed, the safety of international civil 
aviation is of the highest priority to the 
international community. When that 
safety is impaired and innocent lives 
are lost, nations should consider taking 
appropriate action to compensate those 
who suffer as a result. 

Assessing Compensation 

The level of compensation paid on an ex 
gratia basis is essentially within the 
discretion of the state offering such 
payments. Obviously we are interested 
in providing significant humanitarian 
relief to the families of the victims, and 
we will be guided in part by levels of ex 
gratia payments that have been made 
in the past. We have not yet deter- 
mined the levels or range which we 
intend to recommend to the President, 
and I cannot speculate even roughly 
what amounts ultimately will be 
proposed. 

We also have not yet decided upon 
the methodology we will use in deter- 
mining what constitutes appropriate 
humanitarian relief Payments could be 
made either by looking at the particu- 
lar circumstances of the victims and 
their families or by setting a uniform 
amount for each victim or family mem- 
ber. Our decision on methodology will 
be affected somewhat by the amount of 
information we can obtain about the 
victims and their families. If we find we 
are unable to determine the particular 
circumstances of certain victims or 
their families or that distinctions 
among the victims are inappropriate, 
we may, instead, set a flat amount of 
compensation. We are still collecting 
data, moreover, on past incidents which 
could provide more guidance with re- 
spect to international practice in this 
area. 

Disbursing the Compensation 

We will also have to decide how to col- 
lect the information we need about the 
families of the victims and how pay- 



ments will be made. P''or families of 
Iranian victims, we are exploring the 
possibility of using third-party inter- 
mediaries to obtain information about 
the families and, perhaps eventually, to 
distribute the payments as well. 

Each person receiving an ex gratia 
payment will be required to sign a 
waiver form which releases the U.S. 
Government and any of its employees 
from liability arising out of the Iran Air 
incident. This is standard practice by 
the U.S. Government whenever it set- 
tles a claim with, or makes an ex gratia 
payment to, a foreign national. The 
United States uses as a model a waiver 
form developed by the United Nations, 
modified so as to be effective as a 
matter of law in the country of the 
claimant. 

We will work as quickly as possible 
to complete the compensation process. 
We will need a considerable amount of 
time, however, to determine how to as- 
sess compensation and to obtain the in- 
formation necessary from the families 
or their governments. 

In the case of the U.S.S. Stark, for 
example, although Iraq agreed to pay 
compensation in May 1987, we were 
only able to submit our detailed claims 
for wrongful death in April of this year. 
We are still calculating claims for non- 
fatal injuries and damage to the ship. 
This process, in other words, must be 
done carefully. 

We understand the importance of 
fulfilling the President's intention that 
compensation be paid — as well as the 
human interest involved in making the 
payments — as promptly as possible. We 
must, however, satisfy all professional 
and legal requirements before making 
any payment, including obtaining legis- 
lative authority if necessary or 
desirable. 

In conclusion, the President has es- 
tablished the governing policies in this 
matter by confirming the legal pro- 
priety of our Navy commander's ac- 
tions, while at the same time offering 
to pay compensation ex gratia to the 
families of the victims. We intend to 
implement these decisions and specifi- 
cally to develop an appropriate compen- 
sation package for the President's 
approval as promptly as the circum- 
stances permit. 



'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee 
and will be available from the Superintend- 
ent of Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



department of State Bulletin/October 1988 



59 



MIDDLE EAST 



Visit of Kuwaiti Prime IVIinister 




The Crown Prince and Prime Min- 
ister Saad al-Abdallak al-Salim Al 
Sabah of the State of Kuwait made an 
official working visit to Washington, 
D.C., July 10-16. 1988, to meet with 
President Reagan and other govern- 
ment officials. 

Following are remarks made by 
President Reagan and the Crown 
Prince after their meeting on July 12.^ 

President Reagan 

It's been an honor to meet with you 
today and discuss the many important 
issues that concern our two countries. I 
value the opportunity to exchange 
views and ideas with a leader of your 
wisdom and experience. 

Our two great countries share a 
long history of friendship and coopera- 
tion. Never have our relations been 
stronger than they are today. During 
the past year, we've worked together 
successfully to help defend the safe pas- 
sage of neutral shipping through the 
vital waters of the gulf. Together we've 
taken steps to preserve the crucial 
principle of free navigation that we 
both believe in. Your support for our 
naval forces engaged in this mission has 
been crucial to their success. 

Kuwait is respected throughout the 
world for its moderation, skillful diplo- 
macy, strong and principled stance 
against terrorism, and commitment to 
seeking negotiated solutions to interna- 
tional disputes. Despite your preference 
for diplomacy, you've known how to 
stand firm against intimidation and pre- 
vent the Iran-Iraq war from compro- 
mising your independence. All 



60 




Americans salute your steadfastness 
and resolve. We've been glad to assist 
you, including coopei'ation in Kuwait's 
program for upgrading its defenses 
against increasing threats. In this con- 
nection, I strongly support your re- 
quest for F-18 aircraft and 
accompanying weapons now pending 
before the Congress. 

We've also been pleased to join you 
in a broad international campaign to 
bring Iran and Iraq to the bargaining 
table. The horror of this terrible, tragic 
war and its hundreds of thousands of 
innocent victims seems to have no end. 
It's a continuing threat to your region 
and an object of revulsion for the inter- 
national community. The time has come 
to act. Today, in our talks, we have 
rededicated ourselves to seeking a 
prompt negotiated end to this human 
catastrophe based upon urgent ac- 
ceptance and full implementation of UN 
Security Council Resolution 598. 

In our discussions today, we also 
reaffirmed the urgent need for a just 
and lasting resolution of the Palestinian 
problem. 'The United States will con- 
tinue to work actively in the pursuit of 
a comprehensive peace that would real- 
ize the legitimate political aspirations of 
Palestinians while safeguarding the le- 
gitimate security concerns of Israel. 
None of us can afford diplomatic stale- 
mate, from which only extremists on all 
sides will benefit. 

The peoples of Kuwait and the 
United States have developed common 
interests and lasting ties. The bonds 
that join us have never been closer. The 
social, economic, political, and security 



interests we share have never been 
greater. Our meeting today has sent a 
powerful signal to the world of the 
value the United States places on 
Kuwait's friendship. I wish you well 
during the remainder of your stay in 
the United States, and I sincerely hope 
your contacts with my countrymen will 
broaden and deepen the mutually bene- 
ficial relationship between us. 

The Crown Prince 

It gives me great pleasure to express to 
you my most sincere thanks for the 
gracious invitation which you have ex- 
tended to me to visit your great coun- 
try, a visit during which I had the 
pleasure of meeting and discussing with 
you a number of topics of mutual con- 
cern to both our friendly nations. The 
visit has also provided me with a good 
opportunity to meet with officials in 
your Administration and the Congress, 
as well as the friendly American peo- 
ple. While expressing my warm appre- 
ciation for your kind words about my 
country, Kuwait, it gives me great pleas 
ure to convey to you and to the Ameri- 
can people the warmest sentiments of 
cordial friendship from His Highness, 
the Amir; the Government; and people 
of Kuwait. 

The comprehensive, farreaching, 
and positive nature that has marked 
our talks today reflects the advanced 
and ever developing level which has 
been achieved in our mutual rela- 
tionship. Our talks have also revealed 
identical views in addressing the great 
potential for the continued developmen 
of cooperation and friendship between 
the United States and Kuwait. This 
gives us yet greater confidence in the 
future of our relationship. Our common 
and solid belief in spiritual values, hu- 
man principles, and norms controlling 
relations between nations and peoples 
constitute, in our opinion, the proper 
framework for the development of our 
relations. 

We in Kuwait have high admiratioi 
for the values and principles upon 
which, and for which, your gi-eat coun 
try was founded; and we also appreciat 
the remarkable achievements of the 
American people in various fields of hu 
man endeavor and progress. Further- 
more, we appreciate the effective role 
of the United States as a superpower i 
resolving issues of world peace and se- 
curity, as well as its keen interest in 
seeking suitable solutions to interna- 
tional problems. 

Regarding our region, we espe- 
cially value all that the United States 



MIDDLE EAST 




Review of U.S. Policy 
in the IVIiddle East 



I diiiH' and is doing toward bringing 
rnd to the Iraq-Iran war, and for 
3 uuafding international navigation in 
1 Arabian Gulf. Your support has 

the gratitude of the Government 
I people of Kuwait. Your stance re- 
its the depth of the ties of friendship 
«A'een us. 

We have followed with great inter- 
s your efforts toward peace in the 
I die East. We hope that such efforts 
^ continue and will lead to a just and 
i| ing peace. And as the Palestinian 

I stion is the core of the conflict in 

II Middle East, we are confident that 
l| recognition of the national legiti- 
jie rights of the Palestinian people 

i the necessity of their participation, 
I resented by the Palestine Liberation 
I :anization, in any future efforts to 
1 lin this noble goal are essential re- 
■ements for peace in this region. 
And, Mr. President, I should like 
I 'eemphasize that we in Kuwait 
nly value the friendly backing of 
r nation in our firm stand against all 
1 i of terrorism, which have been re- 
tedly directed at our country and 
pie in the last few years. Such sup- 
t by you and your friendly people 
strengthened our resolve and deter- 
lation to stand firm against these 
Dcious acts. 
I would hke to wish your great 
ntry continued progress and pros- 
•ity, and your kind person and es- 
med family the best of health and 
opiness. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
:sidential Documents of July 18, 1988. 



by Richard W. Murphy 

Statement before the SubcommMtee 
on Europe and the Middle East of the 
Hon fie Foreign Affairs Committee on 
■Jiitji J7, 1988. Ambassador Mnrplii/ is 
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern 
and South Asian Affairs.^ 

I am pleased to come before you once 
again for this update. We have signifi- 
cant new regional developments to dis- 
cuss — particularly in the Persian Gulf. I 
believe that the consistent and steady 
U.S. policy there over the past 18 
months has begun to bear fruit. I want 
to also bring you up to date on our 
efforts toward Ai'ab-Israeli peace and 
will welcome any other questions of in- 
terest to you. 

Iran-Iraq War 

Iran's acceptance of [UN Security 
Council] Resolution 598 a week ago rep- 
resents a watershed in the history of 
the gulf war With the personal ap- 
proval of AyatoUah Khomeini, Iran's 
willingness to seek a negotiated end to 
the Iran-Iraq war is the authoritative 
signal which the outside world has been 
waiting for In the year since the UN 
Security Council unanimously adopted 
Resolution 598, there has been ex- 
tended debate and controversy over the 
question of Iran's aims — which really 
came down to the basic question: Was 
Iran ready for peace? There have been 
differences of opinion, but we have held 
that Iran's public, explicit, and au- 
thoritative acceptance of Resolution 598 
was required to demonstrate a real 
commitment to negotiation. We now 
have that confirmation. 

Because of the special interest 
which this subcommittee has shown 
toward our gulf policy, I would like 
briefly to step back and review the rea- 
sons I believe Iran has finally made this 
dramatic — and historic — move. I submit 
that U.S. steadfastness and toughness, 
in combination with pressures brought 
to bear on Iran by many countries, 
played a significant role in creating an 
environment in which the top Iranian 
leadership decided to opt for a negoti- 
ated peace. 

It is safe to infer from Ayatollah 
Khomeini's lengthy statement, as well 



as other public comments by senior Ira- 
nians, that Iran's internal deteriora- 
tion — military, political, and economic — 
had reached such a state that they as- 
sessed that continued pursuit of the 
war would place the Islamic revolution 
at risk. They presumably still hope and 
intend to export the revolution — but by 
nonmilitary means. The impact of this 
Iranian decision will have a ripple ef- 
fect in the region — both in the gulf and 
in Lebanon as well as other areas of the 
world where postrevolutionary Iran has 
sought to spread its world view. We 
will have to watch and assess carefully 
what comes next, but there seems little 
doubt the Khomeini statement marks a 
watershed. 

The two-track policy we have been 
following paid dividends. First, there 
was our active diplomatic effort aimed 
at ending the war — launched in the UN 
Security Council in January 1987. The 
first phase of this effort culminated in 
the historic, mandatory Resolution 598 
of July 20, 1987. Secretary of State 
Shultz represented the United States at 
the meeting, and the President con- 
tacted heads of state from other Se- 
curity Council members to secure their 
support. Then began for us a year-long 
phase of trying to get Iran to accept 
Resolution 598 and all that it signified: 
an end to the war and negotiations 
which addressed the basic concerns of 
both belligerents. 

When it became clear that Iran 
would not accept Resolution 598, we 
pressed for a followup resolution — to 
penalize Iran through an arms embargo 
for its unwillingness to accept and im- 
plement Resolution 598. The Soviet 
Union and China, however, delayed and 
would not agree to join in an arms em- 
bargo. Nonetheless, our campaign — 
maintained through our own arms em- 
bargo. Operation Staunch — encouraged 
other governments to press Iran to ne- 
gotiate and kept diplomatic focus on 
Iran's unwillingness to negotiate. And 
it helped the Secretary General's 
efforts to flesh out his own plans for 
the implementation of Resolution 598. 

On a second track, along with this 
sustained diplomatic effort, the Presi- 
dent put our navy on the line in the 
gulf, escorting U.S. -flag vessels. This 
arrangement, initially controversial to 
some of the Congress and elements of 
the American public, gradually won 
general acceptance. Our leadership and 



partment of State Bulletin/October 1988 



61 



MIDDLE EAST 



steadfastness inspired other NATO al- 
lies to play a role in the gulf, to the 
point where their vessels came to out- 
number our own. In coordination with 
five European allies and the Gulf Coop- 
eration Council states, we stood firm 
against Iranian provocations, including 
minelaying in international waters, mis- 
sile and gunboat attacks — all part of a 
more generalized effort by Iran to 
intimidate and coerce governments 
friendly to us. 

Following both tracks, we demon- 
strated that the United States was a 
dependable friend and ally. We suc- 
ceeded. Not only did Iran not dare to 
use its Silkworm missiles at the Strait 
of Hormuz and scale back its reported 
plans for laying mines, but over the 
past 4 months, the number of Iranian 
ship attacks fell to half of what it was 
in the first 3 months of the year. Our 
friends and allies took risks along with 
us, and we can say today that the risks 
have paid off. 

Next Steps 

To secure implementation of Resolution 
598 is a comple.x challenge. Resolution 
598 establishes a solid and fair basis for 
a negotiated settlement. It is not an 
anti-Iranian platform. It promises to 
meet Iranian needs as long as Iran is 
sincere in looking for a negotiated and 
comprehensive end to the war. 

Resolution 598 demands a cease- 
fire on all fronts — land, sea, and air — 
and a withdrawal of forces to interna- 
tional borders. It also calls for an ex- 
change of prisoners, the establishment 
of an impartial body to investigate re- 
sponsibility for the conflict, and efforts 
to begin the task of reconstructing and 
rehabilitating the economies of Iran and 
Iraq. Resolution 598 also calls for nego- 
tiations between Iraq and Iran to 
"achieve a comprehensive, just and hon- 
orable settlement, acceptable to both 
sides, of all outstanding issues." 

Iran's acceptance last week of Res- 
olution 598 does not appear to be a 
tactical decision designed to buy time 
but, rather, a strategic choice to end 
the war. Nevertheless, the war is not 
over. Difficult negotiations lie ahead. 
We support the efforts of the Secretary 
General to get these negotiations 
started and will use our influence to 
bring about a comprehensive peace. 
During the negotiations, there is a 
provision for UN observers to help 
maintain the cease-fire. A UN survey 
team has already been sent to prepare 
for such an observer force. We strongly 
support it and are examining, together 



62 



with the United Nations and other gov- 
ernments, means of financing it. 

Resolution 598 must be imple- 
mented as an integral whole. We do not 
support a temporary cease-fire. We 
support a full accounting for all pris- 
oners of war on both sides and their 
voluntary repatriation as soon as possi- 
ble. Iran's decision to drop its demand 
that Iraq be condemned for initiating 
the conflict as a precondition for imple- 
mentation of the resolution is deeply 
significant. We believe the impartial 
body called for in Resolution 598 should 
be established and should begin to in- 
quire into responsibility for the conflict 
in a balanced and deliberate manner. 
Finally, we are urging Iraq to exercise 
military restraint so that this opportun- 
ity is not lost. 

U.S. Gulf Role 

We intend to stay the course in the 
gulf We have always said that the size 
of our naval deployment in the gulf is a 
reflection of the ongoing threat to civil- 
ian shipping. We want to return to our 
traditional presence in the gulf Until 
the cease-fire is established and sus- 
tained, we will continue to escort U.S.- 
flag vessels, and, under certain circum- 
stances, we will assist friendly, neutral 
vessels in distress. 

The same vital national interests 
which dictated the commitment of our 
large naval deployment to the gulf ar- 
gue that our disengagement be gradual 
and directly linked to a reduction in the 
level of tension and anxiety. I want to 
underscore, however, that our strategic 
interests in the gulf are long term and 
require active engagement. We will 
maintain a naval presence in the gulf 
as long as our interests require it. 

Those interests also dictate that we 
sustain the current high level of cooper- 
ation with friendly gulf Arab states, 
continue to improve our relations with 
Iraq, and, over time, reestablish a 
more normal relationship with Iran. We 
can pursue all these efforts simul- 
taneously, but success will depend on 
our ability to meet the security needs 
of our friends. Insecurity and anxiety 
will stay at high levels in the gulf re- 
gion for the foreseeable future. 

U.S. Arms Sales to 

Gulf States: Kuwait F-18s 

This brings me to a subject of special 
interest to this subcommittee. Many of 
you heard directly the views of a senior 
gulf Arab leader, the Prime Minister of 
Kuwait, 2 weeks ago when he discussed 



the war, the U.S. -Kuwait relationship,, 
and Kuwait's desire to purchase fighte. 
aircraft from the United States. You 
have before you, for markup and refer- 
ral to the full House Foreign Affairs 
Committee, a resolution of disapprova 
which seeks to bar the sale to Kuwait 
of nearly .$1.9 billion in F-18 aircraft, 
associated munitions, and services. I 
wish to underscore emphatically the 
view of the Reagan Administration th 
passage of this resolution would unde; 
mine our national interests in the gul: 
region over the long term, as well as 
have an immediate negative impact 
upon relations with Kuwait. 

You are familiar with the justific; 
tion for the sale. You know of Kuwait 
role in the face of Iranian intimidatioii 
and direct attacks over the past sevei 
years. You know of the political and 
logistical support Kuwait has given ti 
our naval deployment in the gulf. Yoi 
know of Kuwait's admirably strong n 
ord of counterterrorism. Y''ou know ol 
our important financial relations witl 
Kuwait and the prospects for increas 
trade. You heard the Kuwaiti Prime 
Minister's direct public endorsement 
our current efforts at creating the nc 
gotiating context for Arab-Israeli pe 
talks. This is consistent with Kuwait 
long record of advocating diplomacy 
and moderation to resolve disputes. 

The only new element for your 
consideration is whether the Iranian 
acceptance of Resolution 598 elimina 
the projected threat environment fo 
which Kuwaiti defense planners — ar 
the United States — must be prepare 

First, even if Resolution 598 tal 
hold permanently, Kuwait will be fa 
with potential threats. These are wt 
known and based on familiar history 
and geography. The fact is that Kuv 
has very valuable, strategically loca' 
territory to protect and has larger, 
tentially threatening neighbors. The 
Government of Kuwait has clearly d 
onstrated its determination to prote 
its territory, particularly over the Is 
18 months. 

Second, if we are able, as antic 
pated, to draw down, our naval force 
the Resolution 598 process takes ho 
it will be even more important for n 
erate states to be their own first liriJ 
of defense. Kuwait has indicated th; 
it fully intends to take up that resj- 
bility and wishes to do so with help 
from us. This attests to the improvt 
political relations which have result 
from the close cooperation of the pa 
year or so, particularlv in the milit; 
■field. 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1 I8 



MIDDLE EAST 



Kuwait wants to purchase the F-18 
kage from the United States as the 
Ileal follow-on to its obsolescent 
s. It wants an advanced aircraft 
t will meet its needs in the next 
itury. We are the first choice of all 
tential suppliers of the new aircraft 
iwait will order this year, as the 
ime Minister has stated. However, let 
i emphasize an awkward but ines- 
pable reality: When we cannot or will 
t sell needed defensive equipment to 
r friends, their requirements do not 
lappear. And we do not have a mo- 
poly on sophisticated weapons sys- 
Tis. Our friends will seek similar 
stems elsewhere. The U.S.S.R., 
ance, and the United Kingdom have 
■craft and missile systems as ad- 
nced as the F-18 and Maverick, 
lich they are already selling to states 
the area. They are only too willing 
id able to accommodate would-be pur- 
lasers. So our unwillingness to pro- 
de such equipment not only has the 
lort-term negative impact on our bi- 
eral relations which we have experi- 
ced with several countries in the 
gion in recent years but it under- 
nes and diminishes our influence in 
•e region over the long term. It also 
ipacts negatively on our own domestic 
•onomy in contracts forsworn and jobs 
rfeited. 

The recently announced arms 
freement between Great Britain and 
liudia Arabia is a concrete reminder 
iat the Arab gulf states have and will 
■.ercise alternatives in meeting their 
,'fense needs if their first choice, the 
nited States, declares itself unavail- 
)le to them. One small silver lining of 
ludia Arabia's shifting supply rela- 
anship is that it is toward a close U.S. 
ly — the United Kingdom. The United 
:ates is generally supportive of the 
des program as presented to us by 
le British Government. The program 
Idresses the legitimate defense needs 
■ Saudia Arabia. We have informed the 
ritish Government of our need to re- 
iew each sale to determine whether 
lie U.S. components can be included 
^hen the British systems are sold to 
ae Saudis. Of course, we would have 
referred that the potential $30-billion, 
)ng-term security and political rela- 
ionship and estimated 50,000 jobs that 
/ere lost had come to this country. 

Such unwillingness on our part also 
ndermines our credibility in the re- 
lion — making it more difficult, not less, 
deal with Iran and Iraq in the new 
ircumstances created by Iran's accept- 
ince of Resolution 598. 



U.S. -Iran Relations 

There has been much comment and 
speculation on U.S. -Iran relations since 
the U.S.S. Vincenues regrettably 
downed Iran Air #655. Our position 
and policy on relations with Iran 
have been public and consistent and 
have not changed. We are ready for di- 
rect talks with authoritative official Ira- 
nians designated by the Ayatollah 
Khomeini's regime and have so told the 
Iranians — publicly and privately. We 
have welcomed Iran's categoric accept- 
ance of Resolution 598. 

The U.S. -Iranian relationship is 
deeply emotional for both sides. Iranian 
behavior continues to fall short of that 
required of a responsible state. Iran's 
decision to accept Resolution 598 is an 
important step. But if Iran wants to be 
treated as a respected member of the 
international community, it must end 
its intimidation of its gulf neighbors, 
negotiate a just and lasting settlement 
of its war with Iraq, and end its sup- 
port for terrorism and hostage-taking, 
now, immediately. In the meantime, our 
offer to talk is on the table. 



The Peace Process 

Unfortunately, I have no comparable 
breakthrough or dramatic development 
to report on the Middle East peace 
process. There have been some positive 
signs for the future. Our initiative re- 
ceived support from our allies, most re- 
cently at the Toronto summit. The Arab 
League summit in Algiers left the door 
open for movement and, after three 
trips by Secretary Shultz to the region 
since .lanuary, the parties in the region 
continue to urge us to pursue our 
efforts. 

A potentially significant develop- 
ment was the distribution at the Al- 
giers summit of an article entitled 
"Prospects of a Palestinian-Israeli Set- 
tlement." It was distributed unsigned, 
but PLO [Palestine Liberation Organi- 
zation] spokesman Bassam Abu Sharif 
later declared himself to be the author. 
We are struck by its constructive tone 
and the positive points it raises, such 
as its emphasis on the existence of Is- 
rael and on the ultimate goal of the 
Palestinians being to attain lasting 
peace in which there is security for Is- 
raelis and for the Palestinian people. 
We also note its flat assertion that the 
conflict can only be solved by direct 
talks. The paper remains silent, how- 
ever, on the issue of terrorism and 
simply restates the PLO's equivocal 
position on acceptance of UN Security 
Council Resolutions 242 and 338. It re- 



mains to be seen whether this article is 
authoritative and represents the posi- 
tion of the PLO. Yasir Arafat has de- 
clined to support the article officially. 
Salah Khalaf and others have de- 
nounced it. This illustrates one of the 
problems with the PLO. Nonetheless, 
should events prove this article to have 
marked a beginning of a responsible, 
reliable, authoritative, and realistic ap- 
proach by the PLO to the peace proc- 
ess, then it would be welcomed. 

Soviet positions on important is- 
sues affecting the region — including 
ties with Israel, emigration levels for 
Soviet Jewry, and on the shape of an 
international conference — seem to be 
evolving in a postive direction, although 
the Soviets have not yet revealed to us 
their thinking in any detail. I will be 
meeting with my Soviet counterpart 
next week to explore their latest think- 
ing on developments in the region, in- 
cluding the peace process. 

In the coming months, we will re- 
main actively engaged in the peace 
process. We must do no less. The 
status quo is unacceptable and shows 
no signs of improving, either in terms 
of the arms race between regional 
states or the standoff between Israelis 
and Palestinians. Progress toward re- 
solving conflicts in Afghanistan and be- 
tween Iran and Iraq demonstrates that 
even the most bitter conflicts can be 
resolved. 

First and foremost, we will en- 
deavor to convince the parties to the 
conflict that their present policies are a 
dead-end street. Our initiative remains 
compelling. It constitutes a realistic 
and constructive framework for positive 
progress by addressing the key princi- 
ples that must guide the search for 
peace: 

• Resolution 242, which embodies 
the principle of land for peace; 

• The legitimate rights, including 
political rights, of Palestinians; and 

• Security for all states in the 
region. 

We have created an opportunity 
which the parties must seize if they 
want to resolve the conflict. 

Nothing more clearly demonstrates 
the need for a realistic reassessment of 
positions by the parties than the situa- 
tion in the West Bank and Gaza, which 
continues to exact a heavy toll on both 
Palestinians and Israelis. The uprising, 
now in its eighth month, shows no signs 
of ending, despite the human, moral, 
and material costs. Violent confronta- 
tions continue. The number of deaths 
and injuries continues to mount. We 



rtmant r>f Qtato Riillptin/nntohpr 1988 



63 



OCEANS 



have repeatedly called for both sides to 
exercise restraint and to avoid actions 
that exacerbate tensions. We acknowl- 
edge Israel's legitimate security con- 
cerns and the need for the preservation 
of order. At the same time, we have 
raised with the Government of Israel 
our opposition to excessively harsh 
practices for humanitarian reasons and 
also because they are counterproductive 
to efforts at reconciliation. 

We have no doubt that the uprising 
in the West Bank and Gaza was caused, 
in large part, by a sense that the peace 
process had stalled. An end to the vio- 
lence can best be achieved through the 
early stages of negotiations leading to a 
comprehensive settlement of the Arab- 
Israeli dispute. We shall continue to fol- 
low developments in the West Bank and 
Gaza closely and continue our active 
efforts with the parties to bring about 
movement toward peace. 

Lebanese Elections 

Finally, we are closely following the 
buildup to the presidential election in 
Lebanon, where a new president is 
scheduled to take office on Septem- 
ber 23. We have been engaged in a di- 
alogue with the Syrian and Lebanese 
Governments to promote elections and 
reforms. The Administration strongly 
supports a timely and orderly election 
so that an orderly, legitimate transition 
can occur. We are not supporting any 
specific candidate. We believe the new 
president, whoever he is, should repre- 
sent all Lebanese. The new president 
should also build on the efforts that 
have been made to reform the Leba- 
nese constitution and promote national 
reconciliation. 

Many Lebanese believe the election 
offers the last, best chance to end 
over 13 years of conflict. The elec- 
tion can play a major role in helping 
restore Lebanon's unity, but the elec- 
tion alone will not be enough. To re- 
store Lebanon's unity, sovereignty, and 
territorial integrity, Lebanon's various 
militias must disband and all foreign 
forces must withdraw. This said, a suc- 
cessful election is the first crucial step 
to restoring stability to Lebanon. 



Fisheries Negotiations 
and Trade Opportunities 



'The complete tran.script of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee 
and will be available from the Superintentl- 
ent of Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
mg Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



by Edward E. Wolfe 

Address at the Alaska Center for 
Internatumal Business at the Univer- 
sity of Alaska in Anchorage on July 
20, 1988. Mr Wolfe is Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Oceans and International 
Environmental and Scientific Affairs. 

The North Pacific Ocean has long been 
an important area for the establishment 
of international commercial ventures in 
the field of fisheries. The waters of the 
North Pacific contain some of the most 
productive fishing grounds in the world 
and have been a major area of interest 
for both U.S. and foreign fishing com- 
panies. The fisheries stocks off the 
extensive coastline of Alaska alone 
represent a multi-billion-dollar resource 
which, for many years, has attracted 
considerable foreign investment. Over 
the past decade, economically beneficial 
ventures in fisheries have been estab- 
lished with such countries as Japan, the 
Soviet Union, Korea, China, and Po- 
land, and the possibilities for continued 
commercial cooperation in this area are 
great. 

As U.S. fisheries negotiator, one of 
my primary goals, consistent with U.S. 
international fisheries policy in the 
North Pacific, has been to assist in the 
development of international commer- 
cial opportunities for the U.S. fishing 
industry. I believe this objective has 
been achieved through bilateral nego- 
tiations which provide for the creation 
of new economic possibilities for the 
U.S. fishing industry. These oppor- 
tunities include the establishment of 
joint ventures with the U.S. industry 
in U.S. waters, the opening of foreign 
markets for U.S. fisheries products, 
and access to fisheries resources in 
other countries' waters. The following 
is a review of U.S. international fish- 
eries policy and negotiations of com- 
mercial interest to the U.S. fishing 
industry in Alaska and the Pacific 
Northwest. 

Access to U.S. Fisheries Resources 

One of the main goals of the Magnuson 
Fishery Conservation and Development 
Act of 1976 was to promote the develop- 
ment of U.S. fisheries in the U.S. 200- 
mile zone. Prior to the act's passage, 
the vast majority of the groundfish fish- 
eries in what was to become the U.S. 



exclusive economic zone (EEZ) off 
Alaska were conducted by fishermen 
from Japan, the Soviet Union, and 
Korea, as well as other countries. Aftt 
1976, the primary objective of U.S. in- 
ternational fisheries policy in the Nort 
Pacific was to use the immense surplu: 
fisheries off Alaska, an approximately 
2 million metric ton (MT) resource wit 
a product value of over $2 billion, to tl 
benefit of the developing U.S. fishing 
industry. 

In the first few years following th 
enactment of the Magnuson Fishery 
Conservation and Development Act, w 
concluded governing international fish 
eries agreements with nearly 20 forei; 
countries conducting fisheries in the 
U.S. EEZ. These agreements outline( 
the terms and conditions under which 
foreign countries could gain access to 
the considerable surplus resources in 
the U.S. EEZ which could not be uti- 
lized by the U.S. industry. Under 
these agreements, allocations of surpl 
stocks were granted to those countrie 
which made the greatest contribution 
to the development of the U.S. indust 
through purchases of U.S. harvested 
and processed fish products, reductio 
in tariff and nontariff barriers to U.S 
fisheries exports, transfers of fisherii 
technology, and other factors. 

This policy for the allocation of s 
plus fish stocks was highly successful 
providing for the expansion of the U. 
fishing industry. One of the most imp 
tant developments which occurred wj 
that foreign countries were encourag 
to establish so-called over-the-side jo 
ventures with the U.S. industry in e; 
change for consideration for allocatio 
of surplus resources. In these joint v | 
tures, U.S. fishermen harvest fish in 
our U.S. EEZ and sell it at .sea to a 
foreign processing vessel. All fisherii 
joint ventures are subject to the tern 
and conditions of a governing interna 
tional fisheries agreement, and each 
counti'y conducting such ventures in 
the U.S. EEZ must have a governing 
international fisheries agreement in 
force with the United States. From 
1980 to 1987, these joint ventures in- 
creased in size from about 20,000 MI 
over 1.4 million MT, which provided £ 
estimated $150 million to U.S. fish- 
ermen last year. 

During this time, successful join 
ventures were established with comp 



64 



Deoartment of State Bulletin/October 1^ 



,u. 



OCEANS 



es from Japan, Korea, the Soviet 
nion, and Poland. In addition, at the 
iquest of segments of the U.S. fishing 
idustry, from 1984 to 1985, we negoti- 
ed and signed a governing interna- 
onal fisheries agreement with the 
eople's Republic of China, a major new 
eep-sea fishing nation. This pioneering 
ureement was one of the first commer- 
al accords between the United States 
ml China and led to the establishment 
r jdiiit ventures between U.S. and 
hmcse fish companies. 

The joint ventures provided much 
I'cded employment opportunities for 
If U.S. harvesting fleet, which had 
cell seriously affected by the fall in 
'..'>. crab stocks in the early 1980s. In 
(Iditiun, they completely displaced for- 
ign directed fishing in the U.S. EEZ 
ff .\laska. Whereas we provided be- 
>vccn 1.3 and 1.8 million MT in alloca- 
iins to foreign countries between 1977 
nd 1984, it is e.xpected that there will 
c 11(1 surplus fish available for alloca- 
:(iii to any foreign countries off Alaska 
11.- \ear. This dramatic change in the 
attcrn of foreign fishing in U.S. wa- 
r> ciiuld not have occurred without 
■ic development of the joint ventures. 

While the "over-the-side" joint ven- 
11 lis continue to present commercially 
aluable opportunities for U.S. compa- 
ies, it is recognized that they repre- 
ent only an interim phase in the 
levelopment of the U.S. fishing indus- 
ry. As the U.S. fish processing sector 
levelops, "over-the-side" joint ventures 
vill be phased out so that the U.S. 
ndustry can benefit from both the har- 
'esting and processing of U.S. fisheries 
■esources. U.S. processors, both in on- 
.hore plants and in at-sea factory 
rawlers, will continue to e.xpand and 
vill eventually utilize all available re- 
iources in the U.S. EEZ. This develop- 
nent has been most dramatic in the 
growth of the U.S. factory trawler 
leet, which has increased from a hand- 
ful of vessels in 1984 to over 30 ships 
this year. We expect that within several 
years this process of "Americanization" 
or total domestic utilization of all fish- 
eries in the U.S. EEZ will be 
completed. 

Over the past decade, we have ac- 
tively promoted the development of the 
processing sector in our international 
fisheries relations. In order to increase 
their prospects for receiving alloca- 
tions, foreign countries engaged in sev- 
eral equity or true joint ventures in 
v/hich they invested directly in the 
U.S. fishing industry. Japan, for exam- 
ple, invested over $20 million in the de- 
velopment of two fish processing plants 



in Dutch Harbor, Alaska, and provided 
the technology for producing top-grade 
surimi, an Alaska pollock product used 
in traditional Japanese foods as well as 
in imitation crab and shrimp products. 
Korea, Poland, and other countries 
have also made steps toward the estab- 
lishment of ecjuity joint ventures with 
the U.S. fishing industry. I have 
stressed to foreign representatives that 
these types of joint ventures represent 
a way for foreign companies to continue 
their mutually beneficial involvement in 
the development of U.S. fisheries even 
after allocations have been phased out. 

Another major aspect of our alloca- 
tions policy has been the promotion of 
U.S fisheries exports through agree- 
ments for the removal of tariff and non- 
tariff barriers in foreign countries. 
Because a large proportion of the re- 
sources taken in the U.S. EEZ are ex- 
ported, this policy is of particular 
importance for the development of the 
U.S. fish processing sector. Since the 
early 1980s, we have been successful in 
opening markets for U.S. fisheries 
products in several major fish-consum- 
ing nations. 

One of the most important fisheries 
trade agreements for Alaska and the 
Pacific Northwest was last year's U.S.- 
Japanese accord on pollock and herring 
import quotas. Under this agreement, 
Japan agreed to remove nontariff bar- 
riers to exports of U.S. pollock and 
herring products. These barriers in- 
cluded an import licensing system 
which severely impeded imports of 
processed pollock and a herring mar- 
keting structure which provided a few 
Japanese cooperatives with monopoly 
power over the sale of herring products 
in Japan. 

As a result of the March 1987 
agreement, American producers now 
have virtually unrestricted access to 
Japanese markets for processed pol- 
lock — mostly surimi — and for herring. 
The Department of Commerce esti- 
mates that U.S, surimi exports should 
now rise from less than 500 MT in 1986 
to about 100,000 MT per year in the 
early 1990s, with an estimated value of 
between $300 and $400 million. The 
Commerce Department also believes 
that the agreement will result in more 
competitive bidding for U.S. herring 
products, thus resulting in higher 
prices for U.S. exporters. These pos- 
sibilities for increased exports will be 
of major assistance to the development 
of the U.S. fishing industry. 



Access to Other Countries' Waters 

Another major area of interest for the 
U.S. industry in our international fish- 
eries relations is access to fisheries re- 
sources in other countries' waters. 
Although the U.S. fishing industry has 
historically concentrated on utilizing 
fish stocks within the U.S. EEZ, cer- 
tain sectors of the industry have had an 
interest in access to stocks beyond U.S. 
waters. U.S. tuna fishermen in particu- 
lar have sought new fishing grounds 
throughout the world, and we have con- 
cluded a number of bilateral and multi- 
lateral agreements to provide for U.S. 
access to tuna in the EEZs of foreign 
countries. Last year, after several years 
of negotiation, we concluded a treaty 
with 15 South Pacific island nations 
which provides for U.S. access to tuna 
stocks in some 10 million square miles 
of the South Pacific Ocean. 

In the North Pacific, the U.S. in- 
dustry has been involved over the past 
decade primarily in the development of 
fisheries within'the U.S. EEZ. Until 
very recently, the U.S. industry was 
unable to utilize the majority of the 
available resources in the U.S. EEZ. 
However, now that U.S. fishermen are 
harvesting almost all available fisheries 
resources in U.S. waters off Alaska, 
they have become increasingly inter- 
ested in access to other countries' wa- 
ters in the North Pacific. 

The U.S. industry has been partic- 
ularly interested in access to fisheries 
resources in Soviet waters, which are 
those closest to the fishing grounds off 
Alaska. The crab sector of the U.S. in- 
dustry was especially supportive of 
efforts to gain access to the substantial 
crab resources in the Soviet economic 
zone. In September 1986, the North Pa- 
cific Fisheries Management Council en- 
dorsed an Alaska crab coalition petition 
calling on the Department of State to 
initiate fisheries access negotiations 
with the Soviet Union. The Alaska con- 
gressional delegation and the State of 
Alaska also supported this initiative 
and played a leadership role in the sub- 
sequent negotiations with the Soviet 
Union. 

Following consultations with U.S. 
industry representatives in early 1987, 
we held two rounds of talks with Soviet 
officials in August 1987 and January 
1988. These talks resulted in the conclu- 
sion of an agreement to provide the 
U.S. industry with access to the Soviet 
economic zone on terms not more re- 
strictive than those which apply to So- 
viet access to the U.S. EEZ under the 



DeDartment of State Bulletin/October 1988 



65 



OCEANS 



terms of the existing U.S.-Soviet gov- 
erning international fisheries agi'ee- 
ment. This interim agreement was 
signed this past February in Moscow by 
Secretary Shultz and Soviet Foreign 
Minister Shevardnadze. 

As part of the interim agreement, 
both countries also agreed to immedi- 
ately begin talks on a comprehensive 
agreement which would govern, under 
one single framework, all aspects of the 
bilateral fisheries relationship. I led a 
U.S. delegation for talks on this com- 
prehensive agreement on May 18-22 in 
Moscow, where an agi-eement in princi- 
ple was reached on a draft text. This 
text was subsequently signed during 
the Moscow summit by Secretary 
Shultz and Soviet Fisheries Minister 
Kotlyar on May 31. I am confident that 
the Congress will take expeditious ac- 
tion so that the comprehensive agree- 
ment can take effect this fall. 

When the comprehensive fisheries 
agi-eement enters into force, it will re- 
place both the U.S.-Soviet governing 
international fisheries agreement and 
the February 21 interim access agree- 
ment. It will govern, under similar 
terms, access by fishermen of each 
country to the other country's waters. 
The 5-year agreement provides new op- 
portunities for fishermen from each 
country to engage in mutually bene- 
ficial operations in the other country's 
waters on a reciprocal basis. This is the 
only reciprocal fisheries agreement the 
United States has concluded with any 
country in recent years, and it repre- 
sents a possible model for future bilat- 
eral fisheries agreements with other 
countries. As Secretary Shultz noted 
during the signing, this agreement is 
also indicative of the improved commer- 
cial relations between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. 

It is our expectation that as a re- 
sult of the comprehensive fisheries 
agreement, U.S. companies will now be 
able to enter into mutually beneficial 
arrangements with their counterparts 
in the U.S.S.R. There is strong inter- 
est in the Soviet Union for improved 
commercial contacts with the United 
States. Last March a group of U.S. 
chief executive officers from major U.S. 
corporations accompanied Commerce 
Secretary Verity to Moscow for com- 
mercial discussions with their Soviet 
counterparts. In addition, new Soviet 
joint enterprise laws, enacted last year 
as part of General Secretary Gor- 
bachev's perestroika program, now al- 
low for the establishment of joint 
arrangements between Soviet and 
Western firms. The Soviets are clearly 



interested in commercial arrangements 
which could provide access to advanced 
marketing and business skills, hard cur- 
rency, and improved technology. 

Accoi'ding to our Embassy in 
Moscow, the Soviet Union views fish- 
eries as one of the fields in which coop- 
erative joint enterprises with the 
United States can successfully be es- 
tablished in the near future. The Sovi- 
ets apparently have a strong interest in 
increasing their marketing of fish prod- 
ucts domestically and internationally 
and in improving their fish harvesting, 
processing, and aquaculture techniques. 
In the field of North Pacific fisheries, 
the Soviet industry, which has dealt al- 
most exclusively with Japanese firms in 
recent years, also desires improved con- 
tacts with the fishing industries of 
other countries, particularly the United 
States. 

In order to facilitate the establish- 
ment of commei'cial ties between the 
U.S. and Soviet fisheries industries, we 
arranged for a meeting of U.S. and So- 
viet fishing industry representatives in 
March 1988 in Khabarovsk, one of the 
major cities in the Soviet Far East. The 
meeting was highly successful, and the 
two sides reached agreement on a large 
number of areas in which cooperative 
arrangements between the two indus- 
tries could be established. These in- 
clude the joint harvesting, processing, 
and marketing of crab, cod, halibut, 
and other species from the Soviet eco- 
nomic zone; exchange of aquaculture 
technology; and U.S. technical coopera- 
tion in sorting, packaging, and market- 
ing products for Soviet consumer 
markets. The Soviet Union recently in- 
vited three U.S. companies to return to 
Khabarovsk for commercial negotiations 
on possible fisheries ventures in the So- 
viet exclusive economic zone. 



It is also our expectation that im- 
proved cooperation in fisheries may 
lead to new commercial opportunities 
between U.S. and Soviet companies in 
other fields. I am personally aware 
from 6 years of experience in negotia- 
tions that fisheries agreements often 
provide contacts for improved coopera- 
tion in new areas beyond fisheries. The 
Marine Resources Company is one ex- 
ample of a joint U.S.-Soviet company 
which has expanded from fisheries into 
other commercially profitable areas. 
Another example is the opening of the 
port of Provideniya, which is of com- 
mercial and cultural interest to the 
United States. The opening of this 
important port under the terms of the 
U.S.-Soviet comprehensive agreement 
has facilitated other types of U.S. ac- 
cess to Provideniya such as the recent 
"friendship" flight from Nome, Alaska. 

The Soviet fisheries agreement, 
like other international fisheries nego- 
tiations, has provided new commercial 
opportunities for U.S. business repre- 
sentatives. The State of Alaska is in a 
particularly favorable position to take ) 
advantage of our international fisherie j 
negotiations because of its proximity t g 
East Asian countries and the major 
North Pacific fishing grounds. Alaskai 
companies have successfully establish* 
commercial fisheries ventures with 
firms from a number of East Asian 
countries, and the May 31 U.S. -Soviets 
fisheries agreement should provide n« 
opportunities for commercial ties with 
the Soviet Far East. According to th( 
University of Alaska's Institute of So- 
cial and Economic Research, fisheries 
and tourism are the two main areas fi 
economic cooperation between Alaska 
and the Soviet Far East. It is our ex- 
pectation that as our international fis 
eries relations continue to evolve in tl 
North Pacific region, additional com- 
mercial opportunities for the U.S. in- 
dustry will develop. ■ 



ilf 



SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 



l.S. Views on Waste Exports 



I rcderick M. Bernthal 

>''itement before the Subcommittee 
I' ■rironment. Energy, and Natural 
res of the House Government 
'•(ins Committee on July IJ,, 1988. 
rnthal is Assistant Secretary for 
• and International Environ- 
il and Scioitific Affairs.^ 

m pleased to be here today to talk 
th you about the export of wastes 
im the United States. It is a highly 
arged subject about which there is a 
od deal of misinformation and conse- 
ent confusion. 

I will begin with a brief overview 
what we know about actual waste 
ports, leaving to EPA [Environ- 
mtal Protection Agency] a more de- 
led description of the situation. I will 
in describe the impact to date of these 
ports on our foreign relations and 
icuss the potential for adverse effects 
the future. Finally, I will suggest 
eas whei-e improvements in the e.xist- 
g legislative and regulatory structure 
iiy be needed. 

aste Exports: Proposed and Actual 

t me comment first on reports of 

S. exports of nuclear wastes. Re- 
ntly, there have been a number of 
ess reports, particularly in Africa, 
at developed countries are attempting 

dump "nuclear and toxic" wastes in 
e developing world. The reports have 
t focused on the United States, and, 

the best of my knowledge, nuclear 
iste is not being exported from the 
nited States to Africa or any develop- 
g country. Having made this clear, let 
e focus the rest of my statement on 
in-nuclear wastes regulated as haz- 
dous under Subtitle C of the Re- 
urce Conservation and Recovery Act 
ICRA) and, perhaps even more impor- 
ntly, wastes considered nonhazardous 
e., not regulated as hazardous under 
ibtitle C of RCRA). 

Iiazardous Wastes 

s you know, we have perhaps the 
orld's most advanced system for man- 
ning hazardous waste exports. Under 
CRA rules that took effect in 1986, 
astes defined as "hazardous" cannot 
e legally exported from the United 
tates unless, among other things, the 



exporter notifies and provides sufficient 
information to EPA of its intent to ex- 
port and the government of the country 
to which the export is destined con- 
sents in writing to accept the waste. 
Because of this requirement, we believe 
we have a fairly good idea about haz- 
ardous waste exports. 

About 90% of all our hazardous 
waste exports go to a few facilities in 
Canada, well known to the Canadian 
Government. In fact, hazardous waste 
moves in both directions across the 
U.S. -Canadian border to qualified 
facilities for recycling or disposal. To 
help ensure that the process works 
smoothly, we have entered into a spe- 
cific bilateral agreement with Canada 
to control these international ship- 
ments. This agreement — and waste 
movements thereunder — has been 
working quite well. 

Mexico, the United Kingdom, 
and the Federal Republic of 
Germany are the other major recipi- 
ents of U.S. wastes. A bilateral agree- 
ment similar to our agreement with 
Canada covers waste exports with Mex- 
ico. U.S. and Mexican authorities re- 
cently reviewed the functioning of the 
notice and consent system under this 
agreement. The Mexican authorities 
expressed concern about wastes that 
are not notified because they are not 
considered hazardous under RCRA. 
This is a point I will come back to. 
There also have been a number of ex- 
ports to Western Europe — notably the 
United Kingdom — where the wastes are 
often treated for the recovery of pre- 
cious metals. These exports to Canada, 
Mexico, and Western Europe — and, oc- 
casionally, other countries such as Ja- 
pan — were for specifically defined and 
quite limited amounts of hazardous 
wastes. 

Recently, however, there have been 
four notices to governments of West 
Africa of a different nature. 

• In December 1987, at EPA's re- 
quest, the State Department notified 
the Government of Guinea of a proposal 
to export up to 1.9 million tons of sol- 
vents, paints, and pesticide wastes 
from 39 waste streams. 

• In April 1988, the Department 
similarly notified the Government of 
Guinea-Bissau of a proposal to export 
up to 15 million tons of hazardous 
wastes (over 5 years) in virtually every 
category of such wastes. 



• Again in April, the Department 
notified the Government of the Congo 
of a proposal to export up to 568,000 
tons of solvents, paints, and pesticide 
sludges from 50 waste streams. 

• Finally, in June, the Department 
notified the Government of Benin of a 
proposal to export up to 10,000 metric 
tons of spent solvents from 39 waste 
streams. 

The first three proposals have been 
rejected. We are waiting for a response 
to the fourth. We expect it will be 
negative because the Government of 
Benin is generally opposed to the ex- 
port of wastes from the developed to 
the developing world. These recent no- 
tifications suggest an increase in the 
volume of hazardous wastes exports 
and lend added importance to the noti- 
fication and consent requirements of 
RCRA. 

Nonhazardous Wastes 

RCRA's notification requirements do 
not apply, however, to wastes not de- 
fined as hazardous under the act. Be- 
cause these wastes may be exported 
without notifying any federal authority, 
I cannot tell you how much is exported 
from the United States or where it 
goes, if exported. Several attempts to 
export nonhazardous (under RCRA) 
wastes from the United States have 
been the object of considerable interna- 
tional attention in the past year. A gar- 
bage barge from New York is but one 
example. Another example that comes 
to mind has to do with incinerator ash 
from the city of Philadelphia. You have 
heard of the attempts to export about 
30,000 tons of incinerator ash from (but 
not by) the city of Philadelphia on two 
ships — the Khian Sea and the Bark. 

The Khian Sea, owned by Amalga- 
mated Shipping of The Bahamas, was 
apparently originally destined for Pan- 
ama, where arrangements had been 
made to sell the ash. When the Gov- 
ernment of Panama learned of this 
shipment, however, it objected to im- 
portation of the ash into the country. 
The Khian Sea then attempted to un- 
load the ash in Haiti, appai'ently with 
the support of some Haitian officials. 
The Government of Haiti objected after 
some 2,000 tons had been unloaded, 
and the Khian Sea returned to Dela- 
ware Bay to try and arrange for dis- 
posal in the United States. The Khian 
Sea, still loaded, left Delaware Bay for 
the open seas on May 22, 1988, and its 
whereabouts is currentlv unknown. 



epartment of State Bulletin/October 1988 



67 



SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 



The Bark, owned by Bulk Handling 
of Norway, transported its load to Kas- 
sa Island, just off the coast of Guinea, 
where it was quickly unloaded. The 
Government of Guinea later determined 
that the permits under which the ash 
had been imported had been improperly 
issued and ordered Klaveness, a Nor- 
wegian firm involved in the arrange- 
ment, to remove the ash from Guinea. 
Klaveness has complied and is return- 
ing the material to the United States. 
This incident has strained relations 
between the Guinean Government and 
Norway. Let me point out that, while 
these wastes may not be classified as 
hazardous under RCRA, their manage- 
ment is of concern, given potential 
impacts to human health and the envi- 
ronment if mishandled. 

Impact on U.S. 
Foreign Relations 

While the export of wastes, including 
hazardous wastes, has not yet had a 
serious adverse effect on our bilateral 
relations, the perception seems to be 
growing that the developed world — in- 
cluding the United States — is dumping 
to.xic trash in the underdeveloped 
world. The effects of this heightened 
perception are difficult to measure, but 
they are not favorable. So far, the con- 
cern in Africa over the unwanted re- 
ceipt of hazardous wastes has focused 
more on Europe than on the United 
States. U.S. efforts to respond to oth- 
ens' concerns about waste exports have 
been appreciated. 

As an example, a few weeks ago, 
the Government of Nigeria discovered 
that approximately 4,000 tons of toxic 
waste had been sent from Italy and 
dumped at Koko Port in Bendel State. 
The Nigerian Government did not feel 
that it had the expertise to evaluate 
what it regarded as an emergency situ- 
ation and formally requested assistance 
from the United States. Nigeria, like 
much of the world, looks to us for ex- 
pertise and leadership on environ- 
mental matters. EPA dispatched a 
three-person team to assess the medical 
and technical implications of the dump. 
The team was joined by two doctors 
from the Center for Disease Control 
and by experts from the United King- 
dom. The situation was found to be 
dangerous, although there was no 
radioactive material as originally 
feared, and a report has been made to 
the Nigerian Government. This incident 
has led to improvement in U.S.- 
Nigerian relations. Nigerian-Italian re- 
lations have been strained, however. 



68 



even though the Government of Italy 
was not involved in the shipment of ma- 
terial to Koko Port. 

We may not always be so lucky. 

First, many countries, particularly 
developing countries, do not make the 
sometimes sophisticated distinction 
made under RCRA between hazardous 
and nonhazardous waste. In fact, some 
newspapers and politicians reject this 
distinction. 

Second, many countries will hold 
the U.S. Government responsible for 
problems created by private U.S. firms. 

Third, the United States will be 
held morally responsible for any 
damage caused by waste (whether it is 
hazardous or not) generated by U.S. 
companies and disposed of in an un- 
derdeveloped country, regardless of 
whether or not the government of the 
country consented to receiving the 
waste. 

And finally, the volume of actual 
or proposed waste exports appears to 
be growing as disposal costs in the 
United States continue to rise, al- 
though this trend is difficult to measure 
in the absence of a historical base. Ob- 
viously, an increase in the volume of 
exports means a heightened risk of 
something going wrong. 

Possible Improvements 
to Existing Requirements 

Given these considerations, I am partic- 
ularly concerned about two possible sit- 
uations. First, I am concerned about 
the possibility of exporting hazardous 
waste to a country which does not man- 
age it safely or may not respond effec- 
tively to an accident. Prior consent of 
the government of the receiving coun- 
try would not protect us from receiving 
some portion of the blame for the situa- 
tion. We would almost certainly be ex- 
pected to help solve the problem, 
perhaps at a substantial cost. 

The international ramifications of 
an incident and effects on U.S. foreign 
policy interests are currently difficult 
to judge. At the international level, the 
United States has been engaged in ne- 
gotiations in both the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment (OECD) and UN Environment 
Program (UNEP) to develop agreed in- 
ternational procedures for controlling 
transfrontier movements of hazardous 
wastes. The OECD exercise is due to 
be completed in December of this year 
and the UNEP negotiations in March 
1989. Current versions of the agree- 
ments under development in both orga- 



nizations contain export notification anr 
importing country consent provisions 
patterned after existing RCRA re- 
quirements. The United States has 
participated very actively in these 
negotiations and will continue these 
efforts to successfully conclude an ef- 
fective global convention. Incidentally, 
our success in managing our hazardous 
waste exports is fully recognized in 
l)oth conventions, which incorporate i 
the basic principles of notification i 

and consent on which our system is 
based. 

However, the UNEP and OECD 
draft agreements now also contain 
provisions that would require exportin 
countries to prohibit hazardous waste ^ 
exports if there is reason to believe thf 
wastes in question will not be manage : 
in an environmentally sound manner, 
regardless of the consent of the goveri ( 
ment of the receiving country. Our au t 
thority to prohibit hazardous waste I 
exports to countries that have con- r 
sented to their receipt appears to be » 
limited under RCRA to parties to in- r 
ternational conventions in which such |i 
prohibition is included. The parties tc J: 
both these conventions believe export 
ing countries should have uniform obi 
gations with respect to hazardous wa: 
exports, regardless of their destinatic 
Legal authority to ban exports to noi 
contracting parties is likely to be nee 
essary if we are to be able to join wil 
others in adhering to the prospective 
UNEP and OECD conventions. 

The second situation I am con- 
cerned about is the export by an Am 
ican firm of American wastes, not 
defined as hazardous under RCRA, 1 
also determined not to be welcome b 
the government of the receiving coui 
try. There might be very little that r 
government could do to respond to tl 
legitimate concern of the foreign gov 
ernment. In the highly charged polit 
atmosphere that could easily develop 
U.S. interests could be adversely af- 
fected. In our view, it is clearly in ti 
interest of the United States to avoic 
situations in which our government ( 
not quickly and effectively respond t 
the objection of a foreign governmen 
to the disposition by an American fiii 
of American wastes in its country. T' 
probability of this occurring for wasti 
defined as hazardous under RCRA H 
been greatly reduced by the act's pr' 
notice and consent requirements. Si 
ilar requirements may need to be im 
posed on the export of all such wast 
not just hazardous wastes. Govern- 
ment-to-government notification on ; 



Department of State Bulletin/October lBi 



SOUTH ASIA 



lar basis can avoid misunderstand- 
s and fraud. 

An interesting and straightforward 
(Siproach to dealing effectively and con- 
Htently with waste exports would be 
jjpply to ban exports of waste, except 
mere we have a bilateral agreement 
Mth the receiving country. This would 
jjsure that a framework exists for the 
Bnely exchange of information that 
jUst underpin responsible decisionmak- 
jt. Bilateral agreements now in place 
Ith Canada and Mexico could serve as 
ndels for future agreements with oth- 
es. They ensure that the appropriate 
jthorities are involved in decisionmak- 
U yet are sufficiently flexible to en- 
turage an efficient use of resources 
itwfen the parties. We will be looking 
oscly at this option. 

Ill the days ahead, both EPA and 
le Department of State will also evalu- 
;? other approaches to improved man- 
; ement of waste exports. Let me 
:ivss, however, that in doing so, we 
11 keep in mind that the receiving 
'UiiU'ies must bear ultimate responsi- 
lity for their own cost-benefit deci- 
)ns. We should not create a system 
lat makes the U.S. Government re- 
onsible for what rightfully is a sov- 
leign decision by others. We should 
't, for example, be obliged to certify 
at a waste will be disposed of in an 
ivironmentally sound manner in an 
iporting country, though authority to 
■ohibit an export if we know it cannot 
will not be disposed of properly may 
'. appropriate. We can ensure that the 
iporting government has the informa- 
m it needs to make a decision as to 
hether environmentally sound dis- 
)sal is possible and desirable in a spe- 
fic case. 

In conclusion, I believe we in the 
mited States have a system for dealing 
ith exports of hazardous wastes that 
in work and has been working. Recent 
'ents appear to suggest that improve- 
ents may be necessary, however, and 
believe the Administration, working 
ith the Congress, can usefully con- 
der some adjustments to ensure that 
e are in a position to ward off prob- 
■ms before they occur rather than hav- 
ig to react — perhaps at considerable 
conomic or political cost — after some- 
ling has gone wrong. 



Pakistan's President Zia, 

U.S. Ambassador Die in Plane Crash 



'The complete transcript of the hear- 
gs will be published by the committee 
id will be available from the Superintend- 
it of Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
g Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, 
U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan 
Arnold L. Raphel, Brig. Gen. 
Herbert M. Wassom (head of the Mili- 
tary Assistance Advisory Group at the 
U.S. Embassy in Isla^nahad), and '27 
others died August 17, 1988, when Pres- 
ident Zia's plane exploded minutes 
after taking off in eastern Pakistan. 

Following are a statement by Sec- 
retary Shultz made in Islamabad 
where he represented the United States 
at President Zia's funeral, his remarks 
at the memorial ceremony for Ambas- 
sador Raphel at Andrews Air Force 
Base, and Acting Secretary Whitehead's 
remarks at the funeral service for the 
Ambassador. 



SECRETARY SHULTZ'S 

STATEMENT, 
ISLAMABAD, 
AUG. 20, 19881 

My delegation and I have just had a 
very good meeting with Acting Presi- 
dent Ghulam Ishaq Khan. I conveyed to 
him, on behalf of the Pi-esident and the 
American people, our profound sorrow 
over the tragic death of President Zia 
ul-Haq and those who died with him. 

President Zia was a strong and 
principled leader, who earned the admi- 
ration of the world. He was a steadfast 
defender of Pakistan's territorial integ- 
rity and freedom, who yearned for 
peace in this troubled region. He was a 
tireless promoter of regional coopera- 
tion whose promise is evident in the 
South Asian Regional Cooperation 
Council. He was a magnanimous bene- 
factor to the Afghans, whose quest for 
independence he never ceased to 
champion. 

We mourn our own loss as well. 
Ambassador Raphel and Brig. Gen. 
Wassom were skillful and devoted 
Americans — public servants who 
worked tirelessly to build and 
strengthen relations between our 
two countries. 

This tragic incident shocked 
Pakistan and the world. Pakistan's lead- 
ers have reacted calmly and quickly to 
preserve the continuity of constitutional 
government and to reaffirm that elec- 
tions will be held in November. We ex- 
pressed the admiration of all Americans 
for the wise manner in which Pakistan's 
Government has responded to this 



trial and for the patience, strength, 
steadiness, and determination of the 
Pakistani people. 



SECRETARY SHULTZ'S 

REMARKS, 
ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE, 
AUG. 21, 19882 

Mrs. Raphel, Mrs. Wassom, your fami- 
lies and friends; last Thursday night, 
from this spot, I took off in this U.S. 
Air Force jet for Islamabad, Pakistan. 
There, yesterday, I stood in an open 
field next to a mosque to extend our 
country's honor to a fallen friend. Presi- 
dent Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan. 

Today I stand here again, as a 
guardian in your stead, to return to you 
beneath our Stars and Stripes two of 
our best, Arnold Raphel and Herbert 
Wassom. Arnie and Herb. Over there. 
Ambassador and General. To us they 
will always be Arnie and Herb. 

Why were they over there? Why? 
They were over there because of big 
words: liberty, freedom, justice, se- 
curity, prosperity, peace. We hear these 
words all the time; maybe sometimes 
we've taken them for granted. I can tell 
you that most people around the world 
do not take them for granted. They 
lack them; they want them; they'll fight 
for them, as the Afghan people, with 
President Zia behind them, have been 
fighting and winning. 

Arnie and Herb went halfway 
around the world to join the fight for 
these great causes, not just for others 
but for America. If we do not work to 
shape a world of freedom, peace, pros- 
perity, and justice, then here at home 
those principles will be endangered and 
could be lost. 

So yesterday, halfway around the 
world in Pakistan, I saw people far dif- 
ferent from ourselves moved to tears by 
Amei'ica's — and Arnie and Herb's — ded- 
ication to these causes. 

An Ambassador. A General. As in- 
dividuals they were strong, energetic, 
dedicated, and they had that bright, 
light, endless American optimism and 
humor. As professionals and patriots, 
they were committed to the inseparable 
principles needed for success: a read- 
iness to engage with others diplo- 
matically to reach agreement and a 
readiness to employ strength in the in- 
terests of a safer world. We must keep 



epartment of State Bulletin/October 1988 



69 



UNITED NATIONS 



our effort going to engage the world 
out there. 

Here they are, Arnie and Herb, 
your sons. The world is a better place 
and your country is better off and safer 
because of their sacrifice. In far off 
lands, people know this. I want you to 
know it, too. Be proud of them. Never 
lose heart. There is so much more to 
do. Be proud to engage, as they have, 
in the spirit of America. 



ACTING SECRETARY 

WHITEHEAD'S REMARKS, 
FT. MYER. VIRGINIA, 
AUG. 22, 1988-' 

In the State Department lobby, just in- 
side the C Street entrance, there are 
two large plaques, where the names of 
ambassadors and others who have died 
while serving their country are in- 
scribed. It is a grim list, but a proud 
list, too; a list of those who defended 
peace and freedom to the very end. 
And now today there will be added to 
that list the name of Arnold Raphel. 

Last Friday I participated in the 
swearing-in ceremony of .John McCar- 
thy as our new Ambassador to 
Lebanon. In a few days, he will depart 
for service in that troubled land. John 
was Amies deputy in Islamabad. In his 
brief remarks at the ceremony, he in- 
troduced his wife and his children and 
then he said, "During the past week, 
we have lost a very dear member of our 
family." For a brief moment I didn't 
know what he meant, but then, of 
course, I quickly realized that he meant 
Arnie. And I thought how much of a 
family the Foreign Service really is, in- 
cluding those of us fortunate enough to 
serve with it for a short time: loyal to 
each other, proud of each other's accom- 
plishments, mutually supportive, eager 
to see its standards and traditions 
maintained. Arnie was one of the lead- 
ers of our family, highly respected and 
dearly loved. 

On the seventh floor at the State 
Department, Arnie will be warmly re- 
membered as the guy who'd show up 
first at a meeting, rarely waiting to be 
announced, and with his shirt sleeves 
rolled up. He was always out ahead of 
others, eager to get started, quick to 
catch you in the corridor. He relished 
wrestling with the issues and was 
ready with the paper sometimes even 
before you knew you needed it. 

He was quick to identify the 
trends, anticipate the likely outcome, 
and work the problem. In short, he was 
a senior policymaker's delight, a man of 
incisive thought and of decisive action. 



70 



Arnie was never motivated by gar- 
nering personal prestige but by a deep 
sense of public purpose. He was not a 
man to be awed by rank or power. But 
he did hold one thing in unshakeable 
reverence — his country. And although 
he often referred to the ways of the 
Foreign Service with a winning irrever- 
ence, there was no more fiercely loyal a 
supporter of the Foreign Service than 
Arnie Raphel. He loved his work and 
his country, and he was grateful for the 
opportunity the Department offered 
him to serve it. 

And serve it he did. His outstand- 
ing work led directly to the achieve- 
ment of the Afghanistan peace accords. 
The hostages in Iran owe their freedom 
in large part to Arnie, as indeed do the 
hostages from hijacked TWA #847. 

Arnie was also an energetic re- 
cruiter and cultivator of new talent. He 
was a builder of bureaus, a mover and 
shaker-upper of the personnel office. 
He sought out the very best people. 
Perhaps his most lasting achievement 
among the many is the fact that, 
thanks to him, the State Department 
now has a veritable army of his fine 
young officers just as eager to serve as 
he was. He was a great advocate for 
the people who served with him in 
Washington and overseas. The life he 
knew and shared with these dedicated 
men and women was no tea party. His 
world was not the world of the prover- 
bial crisp, pin-striped cocktail party 
diplomat, for he knew the haixlships 
and the dangers our people endure for 
service's sake, particularly those who 
are abroad. 



In closing, let me share a smile 
with you from Arnie. His colleagues ii 
the Bureau of Near Eastern and Soutl 
Asian Affairs (NEA) saved a postcard 
that he and Nancy sent to the front 
office staff just over a year ago. On th 
front is a picture of a beautiful lake ir 
Pakistan. Snow-covered mountains 
plunge into the lake's azure e.xpanse 
and a small boat floats peacefully in tl 
center. The NEA staff saved the card 
all this time because the wry messagt 
written on the back is "pure Arnie." 

It says: "Here is a picture of our 
embassy gunboat providing escort ser 
ices on a vital sea route in the region 
Notice the absence of enemy assets — 
it's tough out here on the front lines, 
but someone has to do it!" 

It is a tough job out there. And 
Arnie did it and so did Herb Wassom 
and superbly well. They truly served 
America's front lines, although the 
landscape may have seemed deceptiv 
beautiful at times. 

And so. we join Nancy and Step! 
anie, Judy, Tara, and Doug, and thei 
large community of friends around tl 
world, in pride as well as in sorrow. 
Arnie and Herb will be always with 
They live on in the acts of service an 
of the goodness they performed, and 
the hearts of all of us in their extenc 
family who cherish their memories. 

"Blessed are the peacemakers: 
they should be called the children of 
God." 



'Press release 192 of Aug. 22, 1988 
-Press release 19:3 of Aug. 2:3. 
^Press release 194. ■ 



U.S. Assessments for the United Nations 



by Dennis C. Goodman 

Statement submitted to the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee on July 
29, 1988. Mr. Goodman is Acting As- 
sistant Secretary for International Or- 
ganization Affairs.^ 

It is a pleasure to appear before you 
today to discuss certain aspects of UN 
funding. Over the past several years, 
due in large part to congressional ini- 
tiative, there has been some real prog- 
ress throughout the UN system to 
reform both UN management and budg- 
et processes. UN reform has been nec- 
essary; an effective consensus 
decisionmaking process on budget is- 



sues, such as we are now seeking t( 
implement, can lead the way to a m 
balanced, constructive, and effective 
United Nations. 

As you know, in 1986 the Unite F" 
States played a key role in the effoi it 
of the group of 18 intergovernmentE I 
experts to review the UN's admin- f' 
istrative and financial functioning. ' ic 
eventual recommendations were un 
precedented and sweeping. That fal; 
the UN General Assembly, after m 
ing some adjustments to the recom 
dations, adopted significant reform 
through UN General Assembly Re; 
tion 41/213. 



Department of State Bulletin/October 



UNITED NATIONS 



1 nditioning U.S. Payments 

' St \(>ar Congress — based on legisla- 
.11 originating in this committee — con- 
umicmI U.S. payments to the assessed 
iIlicI of the United Nations by requir- 
; ;i |ii'esidential determination on the 
it us of three specific matters: 

• Implementation of a 15% reduc- 
II 111 II N Secretariat staff; 

• Progress in reaching a 50% lim- 
; , '11 for nationals of any member 

I'conded to the UN Secretariat; 



implementation of a consensus- 
budget reform procedure. 



( »ii July 15, the President indicated 
I the UN Secretary General that while 
■ 1 nited States clearly recognized its 
ions to the United Nations, fur- 
ogress on reform was necessary 
; the concerns of Congress, con- 
-hared by the Administration. 
.wthnugh the United Nations has 
rt fully imjjlemented the 15% I'educ- 
tn 111 Secretariat staff, progress to- 
rd this goal has been achieved, and 
? reductions have been equitably ap- 
ed as called for in Section 702 of the 
reign Relations Authorization Act. 

The Secretariat of the United Na- 
ns is staffed primarily by permanent 
iployees. In 1987, 68% of the staff 
■re on permanent contracts. However, 
ist Europeans serve primarily (97%) 
fi.xed-term contracts, and it clearly 
IS congressional intent to seek prog- 
5S in this area. This past May, the 
viet Government informed the Secre- 
ry General that a decision had been 
ken to permit Soviet nationals to ac- 
pt longer terms of service and, in 
me cases, permanent appointments, 
date, however, no Soviets are on per- 
anent contracts. 

With respect to the consensus- 
sed budget decisionmaking process, 
December 21, 1987, the General As- 
mbly voted to amend the UN regula- 
ms and rules governing program 
anning and budgeting to incorporate 
e new budget process. A major test 
r the new budget process will occur 
this September's meeting of the 
ommittee for Program and 
oordination. 

.S. Support for UN Efforts 

/e remain committed to continued ac- 
ve support for the important work be- 
ig done by the United Nations. We 
trongly support the Secretary Gen- 
ral's efforts in Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq, 
"yprus, Namibia-Angola, the Western 
Sahara, Cambodia, and other areas. 



Because this work is important, we are 
continuing to seek effective implemen- 
tation of the reforms required by our 
law so that we may restore our pay- 
ment levels. 

There is general agreement that 
the United States should pay its as- 
sessed obligations to international orga- 
nizations. And while U.S. budget 
constraints prevent us from doing that 
in FY 1988 and 1989, there is general 
agreement that we should pay the 
United Nations the remaining $44 mil- 
lion appropriated for the United Na- 
tions for FY 1988 as soon as we can 
credibly proceed with a presidential de- 
termination that the requirements of 
our laws are being met. We take with 
profound seriousness the legislation as 
passed by Congress and signed into law 
by the President. 

We very much hope that further 
action will be taken by the United Na- 
tions to implement the necessary re- 
forms to allow the President to make a 
determination this fall, as has already 
occurred in the case of five UN spe- 
cialized agencies. 

U.S. Arrearages 

The United States currently owes $467 
million on its UN regular budget as- 
sessment — $253 million for prior years 
and $214 million for the current year. 
The prior year arrearage would be re- 
duced by .$44 million if the legislative 
requirements for presidential determi- 
nation and report to Congress regard- 
ing UN reforms were to be met. We 
have requested in our FY 1989 budget 
submission $144 million to pay our cur- 
rent year assessment of $214 million. 
Since Congress has yet to approve a 
final appropriation for FY 1989, we do 
not know at this time what our out- 
standing UN balance will be at the end 
of the current year Assuming payment 
of our full appropriation for FY 1988 
(which includes the $44 million subject 
to presidential determination) and pay- 
ment of the full FY 1989 request ($144 
million), the U.S. arrearage would be 
approximately $279 million by the end 
of calendar year 1988. 

As I indicated earlier, the United 
Nations has been playing a useful role 
in resolving disputes in a number of 
key regions of the world. The United 
Nations will need to seek additional 
funding if it proves necessary to estab- 
lish peacekeeping and monitoring forces 
in Iran-Iraq, Angola-Namibia, and pos- 
sibly Cambodia and the Western Sa- 
hara. A UN observer foi'ce is already 
on the ground in Afghanistan, and a 



somewhat larger monitoring force for 
the Iran-Iraq conflict now appears im- 
minent. Because of the fluid nature of 
ongoing negotiations, no cost estimates 
or funding sources have been 
determined. 

Funding Sources for 
Peacekeeping Operations 

I would like to say something about the 
various funding sources for UN peace- 
keeping operations, as well as the U.S. 
contributions to them. 

The UN Disengagement Observer 
Force (UNDOF) and the UN Interim 
Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) are fi- 
nanced by assessed contributions 
through a special UN peacekeeping ac- 
count. The assessments are based on a 
special "peace and security" scale which 
places the 159 UN member states in 
four categories: 

• The five permanent members of 
the Security Council which are assessed 
at a higher rate than their regular budg- 
et scale (i.e., the U.S. assessment rate 
for UNDOF and UNIFIL is 30.6% as 
compared to its regular budget assess- 
ment rate of 25%); 

• A second group of 22 named, eco- 
nomically developed states which are 
assessed at their regular budget rates; 

• A third group of 47 named, least 
developed states which are assessed at 
approximately 10% of their regular 
scale; and 

• The remaining members which 
are assessed at approximately 20% of 
their regular rates. 

There are two other assessed 
peacekeeping activities — the UN Truce 
Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and 
the UN Military Observer Group in In- 
dia and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), which 
are funded through assessed contribu- 
tions as part of the UN regular budget. 
For these operations, the United States 
is assessed 25%. UNTSO, originally es- 
tablished to supervise the 1948 Arab- 
Israeli truce, now assists UNDOF and 
UNIFIL. UNMOGIP was established 
to supervise the 1949 Kashmir cease- 
fire. Observers are now stationed on 
both sides of the boundary defined by 
the 1972 Simla agreement. 

The UN Peacekeeping Force in 
Cyprus (UNFICYP) is funded by vol- 
untary contributions through a special 
UN peacekeeping account. In the case 
of UNFICYP, troop contributing coun- 
tries absorb approximately 70% of the 
total costs with the balance made up 
from voluntary contributions of the UN 
members. 



epartment of State Bulletin/October 1988 



71 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Additionally, member states have 
provided support services and/or facili- 
ties to the overall peace effort (i.e., 
transportation, equipment, supplies, 
etc.), usually for start-up purposes, on 
a voluntary basis. 

U.S. Funding for Peacekeeping 

U.S. contributions to UNTSO and 
UNMOGIP are included in the U.S. as- 
sessment for the UN regular budget, 
and the United States thus pays 25% of 
their costs. 

The United States made a volun- 
tary contribution to UNFICYP of $7.3 
million in FY 1988. A total of $29 mil- 
Hon in annual UNFICYP costs is paid 
on a voluntary basis by UN members 
(the balance of the $95 million annual 
UNFICYP costs are absorbed by troop 
contributing countries). U.S funds for 
its UNFICYP contributions are re- 
quested in the Agency for International 
Development (AID) budget ("peace- 
keeping operations") and, when ap- 
propriated, are transferred to the 
Department of State for subsequent 
disbursement. 

The United States currently owes 
some $70 million on its assessed contri- 
butions to the separate UN peacekeep- 
ing accounts for UNDOF and UNIFIL 
(over .$64 million to UNIFIL alone). 
With payment of our full FY 1988 UN 
peacekeeping appropriation, the 
amount owed would increase to some 
.$87 million (over $86 million for 
UNIFIL). For FY 1989, our UN peace- 
keeping request of $29 million should 
fully fund our requirements for 
UNDOF but less than half required for 
UNIFIL, leading to total peacekeeping 
arrearages of approximately $111.8 
million. 



FY 1989 Assistance Requests 

for Latin America and the Caribbean 



'The complete tran.script of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee 
and will be available from the Superintend- 
ent of Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



hy Elliott Abrams 

Statement prepared for delivery be- 
fore the Subcommittee on Foreign Oper- 
ations of the House Appropriations 
Committee on April 22, 1988. Mr. 
Abrams is Assistant Secretary for 
In ter-A merican Affairs . ' 

I am pleased to have this opportunity 
to present the Administration's re- 
quests for bilateral assistance for Latin 
America and the Caribbean for FY 1989 
and to answer your questions. A seri- 
ous public assessment of the resources 
available to advance U.S. interests in 
this hemisphere is badly needed. 

In keeping with the austere budget 
agreement for FY 1989, our assistance 
requests are 14% below last year's re- 
quest for economic assistance and 27% 
below last year's request for mihtary 
assistance. 

The Administration is requesting 
$1,137 million in bilateral economic as- 
sistance. This included $.547.5 million in 
economic support funds (ESF), $371.7 
million in development assistance, and 
$218.2 milhon in PL 480 commodity 
assistance. 

We also request $197.1 million in 
military assistance. This included 
$185.5 million for the military as- 
sistance program (MAP) and $11.6 mil- 
lion for international military education 
and training (IMET). To avoid adding 
to the already high debt burden, no 
foreign military sales (FMS) credits are 
requested, for the second year in a row. 

These economic and military as- 
sistance accounts, about which I have 
been asked to testify today, make up 
94%' of the resources available bilater- 
ally to advance U.S. interests in this 
hemisphere. The only other e.xplicitly 
bilateral accounts are $32.2 million for 
Peace Corps programs and $56.2 mil- 
lion for antinarcotics assistance. 



THE POLICY FRAMEWORK 

A key element of the Administration's 
foreign policy is the recognition that 
this hemisphere — our immediate neigh- 
borhood — is of great strategic impor- 
tance; in fact, critical to our national 
security. We cannot deal effectively 
with challenges to our interests in 
other parts of the world if we are un- 
able to cope with problems closer to 



home. Historically, our ability to pro- 
ject power in the world, in part, has 
been based on the absence of threats 
closer to home. 

Unfortunately, many of our allies 
Latin America and the Caribbean do 
not have the resources to provide si- 
multaneously for their own security a 
the basic economic needs of their peo 
pie. Because we know they must do 
both if they are to survive and prospe 
and if democracy is to be given a 
chance to flourish, we must help to 
make up the shortfall. 

In the past, many Latin America 
seemed to view democracy as just an 
other form of government to be tried 
and discarded if it resulted in no app 
ent immediate benefits. The current 
trend of democratization has been ac- 
companied by some interesting and 
promising political developments thai 
have helped the new democracies bre 
out of the old patterns. 

Many Latin Americans now belli 
that open societies are superior to 
closed ones and that democratic insti 
tions are, therefore, worth building ; 
strengthening. Accompanying this h; 
been the formation of an informal bu 
strong mutual support network amo 
democratic leaders. When, for e.xam 
Peru's President Alan Garcia and Ai 
gentina's President Raul Alfonsin w( 
undergoing periods of increased civi 
military tension, there were strong 
public expressions and private effort 
support of them from other democr; 
leaders. 

Respect for human rights has 
shown improvement in all the non- 
Marxist and nondictatorial states of 
Latin America. The marked reducti' 
in the number of human I'ights abus 
in recent years parallels the spread 
consolidation of democracy: where d 
ocratic government has taken root, i 
human rights situation has changed 
dramatically for the better. 

The security of the United Stat' 
and the security of all free countries 
this hemisphere benefit from the 
region-wide movement toward demo 
racy. We have supported this trend |t' 
only because it is in accord with oui 
deepest values but also because we - 
lieve it is in our interest. There has 
been not one coup against a demo- 
cratically elected government durin; 
the more than 7 years of the Reaga; 
Administration. And Latin America 



72 



Department of State Bulletin/October B 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



n\\ me political maturity is demon- 
r;i! \nii that we can enjoy the most 
nstiuctive long-term relationships 
th iduntries where government is 
1111. IimI on the consent of the governed. 

I iir these reasons, we emphasize 
■nioiracy in our political relations 
iili iiur neighbors. The modest as- 
<taiK'e levels we have requested aim 
|iiii\ide the resources needed to sup- 
;it Diir quest for sustained democracy 
i this hemisphere. A reversal of the 
idwnient to democracy anywhere will 
!■ rejected by us as it will be by all the 
'mocracies in the region. 



HALLENGES TO U.S. INTERESTS 

le road to democracy is not without 
)stacles; many challenges lie ahead, 
ur neighbors face tremendous politi- 
il, economic, and social problems, 
arcotraffickers are sometimes better 
•med and equipped than governments; 
^bt repayments eat away funds that 
ight otherwise be used for develop- 
ent; insurgencies threaten political 
ability; and social institutions are 
'erburdened. 

arcotics 

hat drugs are a threat to the national 
■curity of the United States and our 
iighbors should be obvious. Drugs kill 
id corrupt. The power of the interna- 
onal drug mafia — particularly the so- 
illed Medellin cartel — to corrupt, in- 
midate, and destabihze key U.S. allies 
Latin America and the Caribbean is 
1 immediate threat to U.S. national 
;curity. In Panama drug power 
cached into the very core of 
overnment. 

The MedelUn cartel — actually a col- 
!Ction of criminal "families" — is run by 
)ur men: Carlos Lehder Rivas (now on 
rial in south Florida on drug traffick- 
ig charges), Jorge Ochoa Vasquez, 
'ablo Escobar Gaviria, and Gonzalo 
iodriguez Gacha. They are all bil- 
lonaires, and both Escobar and Ochoa 
pjjear on the list of the world's 
vealthiest people, published by Fortune 
ind Forbes magazines. The cartel fami- 
ies control some 80% of the estimated 
65,000 pounds of cocaine consumed in 
he United States annually from South 
\merica. They earn approximately $8 
jillion each year from various drug 
operations. 

The corruption born of the drug 
rade jeopardizes our security by 
hreatening the survival of democratic 
institutions. Corrupt politicians become 



Proposed FY 1989 Assistance to Latin 
America and the Caribbean 



Development 
Assistance 

26% 



ESF 38% 




Narcotics 

4% 
Peace 
Corps 2% 



PL-480 15% 



MAP 13% 
IMET 1% 



servants of the drug lords rather than 
of the people they are supposed to rep- 
resent. Corrupt military officers be- 
come loyal to the commander who pays 
them the most money, rather than to 
the constitution they have pledged to 
defend and protect. In addition, the 
drug lords, in some cases, have been 
able to capture the allegiance of the 
local poor by establishing private wel- 
fare systems more generous than any- 
thing the government can offer. 

The destructive and pernicious in- 
fluence of narcotics traffickers in the 
fledgling democracies was vividly dem- 
onstrated recently in Honduras. The 
demonstrations which climaxed in a vio- 
lent attack on a part of our Embassy— 
an action highly uncharacteristic of 
Honduran behavior and views — were 
largely instigated and financed by the 
network of billionaire drug baron Juan 
Ramon Matta Ballesteros, who recently 
was returned to the United States to 
face criminal charges for his narcotics- 
smuggling activities. Matta's efforts in 
Honduras to buy loyalty from high offi- 
cials in the government and the mili- 
tary threatened the future political and 
social stability of the nation. We are 
optimistic that a serious cancer has 
been removed from Honduras and that 
follow-on treatment of the cancer's ill- 
effects can now be successful. 



The narcotraffickers undermine 
and destabilize democratic government 
even more directly by means of violence 
and intimidation. In Colombia this dan- 
ger has reached an acute stage. On Jan- 
uary 25, hit-men in the employ of cartel 
members abducted and killed Carlos 
Mauro Hoyos, Colombia's Attorney 
General. Hoyos was murdered for dis- 
missing two judges and ordering an in- 
vestigation of five government officials 
in connection with the release from a 
Bogota prison of cartel magnate Jorge 
Ochoa. Among other victims of traf- 
ficker violence are a Minister of Jus- 
tice, Supreme Court judges, prominent 
journaUsts, and scores of other judges 
and policemen. Hoyos was the 22d high- 
ranking Colombian official assassinated 
by drug traffickers in the past 3 years. 

The grim truth is that authorities 
in Colombia and in the other demo- 
cratic countries of the region are out- 
gunned by the drug syndicates. Most 
Colombian police carry World War II 
vintage weapons that are no match for 
the automatic rifles and other state-of- 
the-art weaponry available to the co- 
caine traffickers. The drug lords run 
what is, in effect, a parallel government 
with a paramilitary infrastructure, air- 
craft, troops, and enormous financial 
resources. 



73 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



In Mexico, too, there is compelling 
evidence of the connection between 
arms and drugs. In late January and 
early February of this year, huge weap- 
ons caches were discovered in Mexico 
by the federal police. In addition to 
seizing 11 tons of marijuana and 4,400 
pounds of cocaine, Mexican authori- 
ties captured more than 360 Soviet- 
designed AK-47 assault rifles, more 
than 145,000 rounds of ammunition, 92 
bayonets, 6 metal detectors, and 3 in- 
frared rifle scopes, as well as 7 small 
airplanes and several vehicles. The 
Mexican authorities had interdicted the 
shipments in a classic drugs-for-arms 
trade. The drugs were destined for the 
United States. 

There are some positive indications 
of changing attitudes and behavior in 
drug-producing and consuming coun- 
tries. More Latin American govern- 
ments are making efforts to combat 
drug trafficking. Ecuador has eradi- 
cated all coca plantings and is no longer 
on our list of major drug producers. 
Venezuela has attempted to stop traf- 
fickers from gaining a foothold by uni- 
formly handing out very tough 
sentences; if convicted, traffickers can 
face a 15-year sentence with no chance 
for parole. Bolivia is encouraging peas- 
ant farmers to destroy their coca crops 
by providing a payment for each hec- 
tare in coca bushes removed from 
cultivation. Peru is continuing with 
its eradication effort in the Upper 
Huallaga Valley despite violent attacks 
by both traffickers and guerrillas. The 
Colombian Government has instituted a 
number of measures designed to facili- 
tate the capture and punishment of 
those involved in acts of violence — 
whether terrorist or drug-related — 
against the government. In 1987 Mexico 
increased by 26% its eradication of mar- 
ijuana, and seizures of all drugs also 
were up (cocaine by 75%, opium deriva- 
tives by 12%, and marijuana by 104%). 

Still, as governments have begun 
to take measures against traffickers, 
narcotics-related violence has in- 
creased. Often the attacks have been 
directed against security forces operat- 
ing against the traffickers. However, 
the traffickers also have been known to 
target the spouses and children of those 
involved in antinarcotics activities. 

In addition to narcotics, there are 
many other challenges to our Latin and 
Caribbean neighbors and to U.S. inter- 
ests in the region. 

Violent Insurgencies 

Several nations (Guatemala, El Sal- 
vador, Honduras, Colombia, Peru, Ec- 



uador) now have active or incipient 
Marxist insurgencies. All are threats to 
democratic values. Most are supported 
to some extent by the Soviet bloc, 
Cuba, and Nicaragua. Insurgent groups 
in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Colom- 
bia have received particularly extensive 
support from Cuba and Nicaragua: 
there are disquieting signs of subver- 
sive activities in several other coun- 
tries. In Chile, for example, the Manuel 
Rodriguez Patriotic Front — the ter- 
rorist arm of the Chilean Communist 
Party — is actively involved in bomb- 
ings, shootings, kidnappings, and as- 
sassination attempts. Weapons caches 
linked to the group indicate external 
support for its activities. 

Government-Condoned Violence 

Politically motivated violence other 
than that related to narcotics traffick- 
ing or insurgencies remains a problem 
in many countries. A wave of violence 
caused the cancellation of Haiti's 
November 1987 balloting (later re- 
scheduled and held in January). In Nic- 
aragua, Sandinista "divine mobs" 
{"tnrbas diohias") continue to harass 



demonstrators and peaceful oppositic 
Opposition groups are beaten and teat 
gassed in Panama. 

Economic Challenges 

The most recent data indicate that re; 
gross domestic product for the largest 
countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean grew by 3.7% in 1986, 2M 
in 1987, and is only expected to grow 
by about 2%^ in 1988. Because the pop 
lation continues to grow at around 
2.3%, per capita income levels contim 
to decline. The decline primarily has 
been due to lower world prices for co! 
fee, sugar, and other basic commoditi 
that comprise the bulk of regional ex- 
ports. The demand for some of these 
exports is reviving modestly. Even sc 
many countries are continuing to run 
large and growing trade deficits as tl 
demand for imports exceeds their abi 
ity to export by significant margins. 
For example, in the first 6 months of 
1987, exports declined by 5% and im- 
ports rose by 6%- compared to the sa 
period in 1986. Growing balance-of- 
payments deficits result in shortages 
foreign exchange needed to pay forei 



FY 1989 Assistance* Request to 
Latin America and the Caribbean Vs. 
Annual IVIedellin Cartel Revenues 

$ Billlions 
10-r 



8-- 
6-- 
4- 

2- 





$8 Billion 



$1,422 Million 




U.S. Assistance Cartel (est.) 

'includes: Development assistance, ESF, PL-480, IMET, MAP, 
international narcotics, Peace Corps. 



74 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1p 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



liL::iiions and to buy those imports 
It aiv needed as inputs to products 
• rxport. 

Another factor contributing to the 
■'wiliiwn in economic activity in 1987 
s I hf inability of many Latin Ameri- 

I and Caribbean countries to stabilize 

II fconomies largely because of po- 
iiai and social resistance to needed 

' 'ity. For example, inflation rates 
u' to be a serious problem in 
aountries. Also the sharp curtail- 
iii iif domestic and foreign invest- 
iii since the early 1980s due to 
uirtainty and lack of confidence has 
distrained growth. The huge amounts 
ceapital flowing out of the region have 
:t 1m en counterbalanced by inflows 
I Jill the commercial banks, interna- 
tnal financial institutions, or bilateral 
isistance. 

Fui- most of the major debtor coun- 
es, high interest-rate burdens from 
ior year borrowing and little like- 
ood of improvement in current ac- 
unts balances will continue to limit 
owth prospects to the 2-3'7f range 
er the next few years. Although the 
gion's current account deficit dropped 
)m $17.5 billion in 1986 to $13 billion 
1987, this deficit is projected to grow 
$13.8 billion this year, largely be- 
use of worsening of trade balances. 
There is little prospect in 1988 of 
versing net financial flows out of the 
gion. The major debtors will need 
piificant new lending from commer- 
il creditors in order to service their 
bt and finance their current account 
ficits. The outlook for new lending, 
wever, is bleak due to the natural 
willingness of foreign commercial 
nks to lend new money when current 
bts are not being repaid and when 
e banks perceive that a return to 
editworthiness for the region in gen- 
al is unlikely in the short to medium 
rm. Mexico's plan to offer bonds 
icked by U.S. Treasury notes in ex- 
ange for a portion of its debt is indic- 
ive of the kind of innovative measures 
at are needed to overcome this signif- 
ant obstacle to i-enewed growth. 

Economic progress, peace, and se- 
irity are at risk in the Caribbean 
asin. Almost without exception, the 
)untries of that area face daunting 
lallenges. Their economies are for the 
ost part small, fragile, and extremely 
ulnerable to disruption. Developments 

the international economic system 
iriously exacerbate the effects of in- 
rained structural rigidity. The current 
lowdown in the world economy is a 
ase in point. Prices for the primary 



commodities that are the principal ex- 
ports of these countries — sugar, coffee, 
and bauxite — have fallen sharply over 
the past decade. In the same period, 
most of the region also has been strug- 
gling with the need to adjust to in- 
creases in the costs of essential 
imports, particularly petroleum. Tour- 
ism, although strong in 1987, cannot 
make up in the short run for declines in 
such traditional export earners as 
sugar. Certain economies of Central 
America — particularly El Salvador's — 
have been severely damaged by 
guerrilla-inflicted destruction as well as 
by a lack of investor confidence due to 
political and social instability and tur- 
moil. The large exodus of capital, par- 
ticularly during the early 1980s, has 
resulted in little new investment 
throughout this area, except in Costa 
Rica. 

It is clear that our friends need 
help to overcome their economic diffi- 
culties, to defend themselves, and to 
keep alive their faith in freedom and 
democracy. With foreign assistance, 
they have a chance to manage their own 
affairs and find their own way out of 
their present troubles. We should have 
no higher priority. Neither the commu- 
nists nor the drug dealers are inter- 
ested in strengthening the security, 
political systems, or economies of these 
countries. It is to us that our neighbors 
look for cooperation and support. It is 
in our interest that we respond. 



ASSISTANCE TO INDIVIDUAL 
COUNTRIES 

Security assistance helps to strengthen 
the defenses of our friends in the inter- 
ests of their own security and ours. In 
addition, U.S. assistance to Latin 
America and Caribbean countries pro- 
duces direct domestic benefits here in 
the United States. These benefits take 
the form of employment, export sales, 
investment opportunities, and access to 
raw materials for American industry. 

The ESF advances U.S. economic 
interests by offering grant or loan eco- 
nomic assistance. These funds are used 
primarily to provide quick-disbursing 
balance-of-payments support to allow 
time for local economic and financial ad- 
justments to take effect. 

The MAP provides grant funds for 
procurement of defense articles and 
services to help strengthen defense ca- 
pabilities. Without grant aid, many 
countries in this hemisphere would have 
to divert scarce domestic resources 
from economic development efforts in 



order to purchase military training and 
equipment. 

The IMET program is a grant-aid, 
low-cost instrument that gives us an ex- 
tremely valuable channel of communica- 
tion and influence with foreign military 
organizations. Education and training 
for the professionalization of military of- 
ficers have long been considered to be 
the most cost-effective form of security 
assistance. 

Development assistance is project 
support used for education and manage- 
ment training and some small business 
development. It also funds private sec- 
tor and agricultural development and 
health and nutrition programs, pri- 
marily to increase the incomes of poor 
rural families to meet their basic needs. 

Food for Peace, commonly called 
PL 480, provides food from U.S. De- 
partment of Agriculture stockpiles to 
those nations that are too poor to feed 
all of their people adequately. The food 
provided alleviates hunger and mal- 
nutrition and improves health. One of 
our most successful programs, it also 
generates local currency in some coun- 
tries that is recycled to fund agri- 
cultural development, infrastructure 
improvements, rural education, and 
health programs. 

During the past few years, and 
particularly in FY 1988, cuts in our 
budget requests and extensive ear- 
marking have severely limited our sup- 
port for countries outside of Central 
America. 

In many cases, our military and 
economic support programs outside 
Central America had to be "zeroed 
out" — completely eliminated — in order 
to accommodate the reductions in the 
total foreign assistance levels which, 
along with the increased earmarking, 
left little discretionary ESF and MAP 
for the rest of this hemisphere. 

Central America 

Our assistance request for the coun- 
tries of Central America reflects the 
high priority the Administi-ation at- 
taches to U.S. interests in that trou- 
bled subregion. The basic arguments 
and proposals for aiding Central Amer- 
ica were developed in 1983-84 by the 
National Bipartisan Commission on 
Central America (the Kissinger com- 
mission). Its bipartisan focus on eco- 
nomic stabilization and political 
democratization has been the oi-ganiz- 
ing principle of U.S. policy ever since. 
Thanks in part to sustained U.S. 
aid levels to Central America, this half- 



75 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



decade has seen first one country then 
another make a remarkable recovery 
from near disastrous circumstances. 
Now freely elected civilian governments 
are offering their people the chance for 
a better future in El Salvador, Hon- 
duras, and Guatemala. Costa Rica con- 
tinues to enjoy freedom and the rule of 
law, as it has for many years. The com- 
munist Sandinistas are a blatant excep- 
tion to the new democratic trend. 

The return of democratic resistance 
leaders to Managua for negotiations is a 
sign that we are in a new, intensely 
political phase of the struggle there. To 
increase the prospect of a democratic 
outcome, it is essential that the door 
finally opened by the strength and per- 
severance of the resistance is not 
slammed shut. We intend to cooperate 
with the freedom fighters, the internal 
democratic opposition forces inside Nic- 
aragua, and with the four democracies 
in order to further the prospects for 
both peace and freedom in Nicaragua. 

Throughout Central America, it is 
in the U.S. interest to strengthen dem- 
ocratic institutions and the administra- 
tion of justice and to support existing 
regional institutions to foster increased 
cooperation among the Central Ameri- 
can democracies. As we support and 
encourage the development of the re- 
gion, we should assist those existing 
regional institutions that contribute to 
improving the economic and social well- 
being of the citizens of these countries. 

The regional program for Central 
America is designed to complement and 
to supplement U.S. bilateral assistance 
progi'ams. It complements those pro- 
grams by promoting on a regional basis 
what is also being done individually, 
with the objective of improving regional 
cooperation. It supplements the bilat- 
eral programs where it is more logical 
and cost-effective to implement projects 
on a regional basis, thus avoiding costly 
duplication. This regional program is 
managed partly from an office based in 
Guatemala City and partly by the U.S. 
Agency for International Development 
in Washington, D.C. 

El Salvador is one of our closest 
allies in Central America. U.S. policy 
interests in El Salvador are to advance 
the cause of democracy; improve eco- 
nomic conditions; promote peaceful 
change; prevent hostile, antidemocratic 
forces from gaining a strategic foothold; 
and prevent the Soviet Union from in- 
creasing its influence through its sup- 
port for the Salvadoran insurgents. The 
Government of El Salvador is critically 
dependent on U.S. support in its 



76 



FY 1989 Assistance Request 

$ Millions 

1000^ ■Economic 

YZA Military 
□ Other 




Central 
America 



Caribbean 



South 
America 



other: Includes Peace Corps and international narcotics. 



efforts to consolidate democratic gov- 
ernment and rebuild its economy in 
the face of guerrilla sabotage and 
destruction. 

U.S. policy promotes the consolida- 
tion of constitutional democracy in El 
Salvador by assisting the government 
to defend itself against a determined 
Marxist insurgency supported by Nic- 
aragua, Cuba, and the Soviet bloc. It 
addresses the socioeconomic roots of 
the insurgency and its historic political 
bases by continuing support for demo- 
cratic development, judicial reform, re- 
spect for human rights, and responsive 
public institutions. It also helps sta- 
bilize the war-torn national economy 
and stimulates revitalization and 
growth. FY 1989 requests are for 
$292.5 million of economic assistance 
and $96. .5 million of military assistance. 

Guatemala's size, proximity to the 
United States, large population, and re- 
gionally important economy make its 
stability and development important to 
the interests of the United States. Over 
the past 20 years, Guatemala has faced 
a lingering Cuban-supported insur- 
gency that fed on the neglect and pov- 
erty of the nation's Indians, some 50% 
of the population. A succession of mili- 
tary governments attempted to put 
down the festering insurgency, but at 
great cost in human life and widespread 



human rights abuses. The violence 
to a cutoff of U.S. military assistanc 
1977. 

In late 1985, Guatemalans freel? 
elected a new civilian government, 
ushering in an era of new expectati( 
for growth and democracy. The new 
government, led by Christian Demo 
Vinicio Cerezo, faces a continued bu 
weakened Marxist insurgency, serio 
economic pi'oblems inherited from \ 
vious regimes, and an upsurge in cc 
mon crime fed by unemployment. 
Undermanned and poorly trained pi 
and criminal justice forces have had 
trouble controlling the increase in 
crime. The government, neverthele: 
has made steady strides in ending 1 
man rights abuses, promoting econ( 
growth, and in creating the conditic 
for greater citizen participation in I 
government. p 

U.S. Government assistance prf*' 
vided in the past to the Guatemalai 
Armed Forces has demonstrated oi 
support for an important institutioi ii 
Guatemala's democratic society. Thi as 
sistance has addressed only the mo 
pressing material needs of the 
Guatemalan Armed Forces, while e 
hancing professional competence. 

The primary U.S. objective in 
Guatemala is the promotion of a de 
cratic government that is friendly 1 



Department of State Bulletin/October \% 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



s country, respectful of human 
hts, capable of dealing effectively 
;h the Marxist insurgent threat, and 
iponsive to the economic and social 
ds of its people. It is clearly in our 
erest that Guatemala adopt policies 
it strengthen democratic institutions, 
)mote real economic growth, curb re- 
jssive practices, and thereby elimi- 
ie popular support for e.xtremist 
utions. Our FY 1989 economic as- 
tance request is $137.1 million; we 
o are requesting $5.4 million of mili- 
•y aid. 

Honduras is a key democratic ally 
the United States. Honduras' fledg- 
g democracy faces both a conven- 
nal military threat and subversion 
m the Sandinista regime, which con- 
ues its unprecedented military 
ildup. As the poorest democracy in 
ntral America, Honduras requii'es 
bstantial assistance if it is to make 
■ficult but necessary economic re- 
ms in support of economic develop- 
nt and democracy. 

U.S. security assistance to Hon- 
ras is a tangible demonstration of our 
Timitment to this key ally's defense 
d development. The Azcona Admin- 
ration has consistently formulated 
d implemented economic stabilization 
brm programs since it took office in 
luary 1986. These accomplishments 
3 particularly noteworthy when 
iwed in the regional context of in- 
ibility and declining prices for pri- 
iry exports and the destabilizing 
'ect of quick profits provided by the 
egal drug trade. 

Our military assistance program is 
itical to modernizing the Honduran 
■med Forces in order to enhance sta- 
ity and to meet the Sandinista 
reat. The assistance also conti'ibutes 
jnificantly to the professionalization 
the armed forces and improved re- 
ect for human rights, crucial factors 
the strengthening of Honduran de- 
oeracy. The FY 1989 request for Hon- 
iras is $142.1 million for economic aid 
id $61.2 million for military aid. 

Despite its long democratic tradi- 
)n and the promise of the Guatemala 
coi'd, Costa Rica i-emains vulnerable 
regional tensions. In sharp contrast 
heavily militarized Nicaragua, its 
)rthern neighbor, Costa Rica main- 
.ins no standing army. The civil war in 
icaragua and the totalitarian orienta- 
on of the Sandinista regime have 
riven 150,000-250,000 Nicaraguans 
ito exile in Costa Rica. This massive 
iflux of refugees strains the country's 
ublic resources and social infrastructure. 



The Costa Rican economy con- 
tinues its slow recovery from the severe 
problems of 1981-82. When coffee prices 
fell and petroleum costs skyrocketed in 
the late 1970s, Costa Rica postponed 
economic adjustment by borrowing 
massively from abroad. Falling export 
revenues forced the authorities to halt 
interest payments on international 
loans. Commercial banks I'efused to 
provide new financing, plunging Costa 
Rica into economic crisis. The collapse 
of the Central American Common Mar- 
ket in the early 1980s was another blow 
to the Costa Rican economy. The econ- 
omy contracted, forcing down real in- 
comes. U.S. economic aid played a key 
role in helping Costa Rica overcome 
these serious problems. However, the 
country is still burdened with a high 
level of per capita debt. 

U.S. assistance to Costa Rica 
seeks to promote economic growth and 
the strengthening of the country's dem- 
ocratic institutions. Costa Rica provides 
convincing evidence that social and eco- 
nomic progress go hand in hand with 
democratic values in Central America. 
The success of Costa Rica also high- 
lights the totalitarian failure of the 
Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. The 
FY 1989 request includes $97 million 
for economic aid and $1.73 million for 
military assistance ($1.5 million for 
MAP and $230,000 for IMET). 

What we face in Panama is a 
threat to democracy and a threat to our 
ability to stop the international drug 
traffickers. We will not shirk our re- 
sponsibility to defend ourselves against 
these threats. The earlier Gen. Noriega 
leaves, the better Panama's interests 
will be served. We will continue to 
fulfill our obligations under the Panama 
Canal Ti-eaties and cooperate with 
President Delvalle and his government. 
And we are prepai'ed to resume our 
close working relationships with the 
Panama Defense Forces once civilian 
government and constitutional democ- 
racy are reestablished. Once Panama- 
nians achieve these goals, we will work 
with them to help restore Panama's eco- 
nomic health. For this reason we re- 
quest that $445,000 be budgeted for 
IMET for FY 1989. 



The Andean Countries 

The five Andean countries — Bolivia, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezu- 
ela — all have democratically elected 
governments. To varying degrees, all 
are confronted by serious economic 
problems, sometimes exacerbated by 



terrorism on the part of guerrillas and 
drug traffickers. These countries re- 
quire our support. 

The government of President Paz 
Estenssoro in Bolivia is committed to a 
campaign to eliminate illicit coca 
cultivation completely within 3 years. 
Close cooperation with the United 
States has continued since the Govern- 
ment of Bolivia courageously began in- 
terdiction with U.S. logistical and troop 
support during Operation Blast Fur- 
nace in 1986. This unprecedented opera- 
tion is being followed by a comprehensive 
coca eradication program. The success 
of both interdiction and eradication de- 
pends heavily on additional U.S. equip- 
ment, training, and development 
resources. 

Should the antinarcotics program 
falter, Bolivia's fragile democracy might 
be overcome by extremists financed 
with drug profits or by military ele- 
ments afraid that the government could 
not withstand a leftist challenge. 
Bolivia's severely limited defense budg- 
et depends on MAP ($5 million 
requested) and IMET ($400,000 re- 
quested) funds for supplements crucial 
to improving the military's antinarcotics 
capabilities and to enhancing military 
cooperation with the national narcotics 
police. ESF resources also are critical, 
both to support economic reforms na- 
tionwide and development projects in 
areas affected by loss of revenue from 
coca production. Bolivia, the poorest 
country in South America, deserves our 
help and uses that help wisely. The 
total FY 1989 assistance request for 
Bolivia is $82.4 million. 

Colombia is one of the oldest de- 
mocracies in the region. It is attempt- 
ing to preserve a cease-fire with the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colom- 
bia (FARC), the oldest, largest, and 
one of the best-armed of the insurgent 
groups. At the same time, the govern- 
ment is contending with other groups 
that have rejected the government's 
peace initiative. Colombian terrorists, 
moreover, are actively supporting and 
cooperating with terrorist groups in 
other countries in the region. 

Although a leader in regional drug 
eradication and inteixliction, Colombia 
faces serious challenges from narcotics 
traffickers. To reverse the government's 
programs, the traffickers often ally 
themselves with terrorists. The judici- 
ary has been a special target of the 
drug dealers and insurgents. The 1985 
seizure of the Palace of Justice, the as- 
sassination of prominent jurists and 



lepartment of State Bulletin/October 1988 



77 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 







Latin America and the Caribbean: 






V- 






FY 1989 Foreign Assistance 


Request 






1 








(millions 


US$) 












Economic 


Assistance 






Military 


Assistance 






ESF 


DA 


PL 480 


Total 


MAP 


FMS 


IMET 


Tota 


Central America 


434.0 


209.2 


93.0 


736.2 


162.0 


0.0 


3.885 


165.8; 


Belize 


2.0 


7.4 


0.0 


9.4 


0.5 


0.0 


0.100 


0.6 


Costa Rica 


70.0 


12.0 


15.0 


97.0 


1.5 


0.0 


0,230 


1.7 


El Salvador 


185.0 


67.7 


39.8 


292.5 


95.0 


0.0 


1.500 


96.5 


Guatemala 


80.0 


34.0 


23.1 


137.1 


5.0 


0.0 


0.400 


5.4 


Honduras 


87.0 


40.0 


15.1 


142.1 


60.0 


0.0 


1.200 


61.2 


Panama 


0.0 


0.0 


00 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.455 


0.4 


Regional Programs 


10.1 


48.1 


0.0 


58.1 


NA 


NA 


NA 


NA 


Caribbean 


65.0 


83.3 


69.1 


217.4 


10.5 


0.0 


1.690 


12.1 


The Bahamas 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.060 


O.C 


Dominican Republic 


25.0 


20.3 


28.3 


73.6 


2.0 


0.0 


0.700 


2.7 


Eastern Caribbean 


15.0 


20.2 


0.0 


35.2 


5.0 


00 


0.400 


5.^ 


Guyana 


0.0 


0.0 


4.0 


4.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.050 


O.C 


Haiti 


0.0 


25.2 


6.8 


32.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.055 


0.( 


Jamaica 


25.0 


17.6 


30.0 


72.6 


3.5 


0.0 


0.300 


3.f 


Suriname 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.050 


0.( 


Trinidad & Tobago 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.075 


0.( 


Caribbean Basin Initiative 


499.0 


292.5 


162.1 


953.6 


172.5 


0.0 


5.575 


178.1 


Andean 


36.0 


54.3 


56.1 


146.4 


13.0 


0.0 


2.685 


15. 


Bolivia 


25.0 


22.3 


29.7 


77.0 


5.0 


0.0 


0.400 


5. 


Colombia 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


5.0 


0.0 


0.950 


5. 


Ecuador 


9.0 


16.7 


0.5 


26.2 


3.0 


0.0 


0.650 


3. 


Peru 


2.0 


15.3 


25.9 


43.2 


0.0 


0.0 


0.560 


0. 


Venezuela 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.125 





Other 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.775 





Argentina 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.125 





Brazil 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.125 





Chile 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.050 





Mexico 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.225 





Paraguay 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.125 





Uruguay 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.0 


0.125 





Latin America and 


















Caribbean Regional 


















Programs 


12.5 


24.9 


0.0 


37.4 


NA 


NA 


NA 


N 


Panama Canal 


















Military Schools 


NA 


NA 


NA 


NA 


0.0 


0.0 


2.100 


2 


TOTAL: 


















Latin America 


















and the Caribbean 


547.5 


371.7 


218.2 


1,137.4 


185.5 


0.0 


11.135 


196 1 


NA = not applicable. 
















1 
















. 





78 



Department of State Bulletin/October 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



al officials (including the Attorney 
eral in January), and the judiciary's 
uctance to rule on extradition and 
■cotics cases are ample evidence of 

continuing pressure. We are re- 
jsting $5.95 million in military as- 
bance for FY 1989. 

Ecuador is a friendly democracy 
;h a generally open, market-based 
nomy. Civil and political rights are 
ipected. In recent years, rapid but 
svenly distributed economic growth 
strained Ecuador's social system, 
government was successful in its 
3-86 campaign to defeat and disman- 
the violent urban terrorist group, 
'aro Lives, which had clandestine in- 
national support. At the same time 
government maintained a generally 
3d human rights record. Guerrillas 
i narcotics traffickers based in 
ighboring Colombia repeatedly have 
acked targets in Ecuador. Although 
presidential campaign now under- 
y has been marked with less partisan 
ilence than in the past, sharply rising 
lation, increased unemployment, and 
^ polarization fostered by political e.x- 
'mists could contribute to a resur- 
nce of terrorism in the future. 

Ecuador's economy depends heavily 
crude oil exports. Both the govern- 
nt's overall budget and the armed 
•ces' budget derive more than half 
3ir income from petroleum exports, 
e collapse of oil prices in 1986 halved 
pected petroleum revenues. Oil pro- 
ction was stopped for 6 months in 
S7 because of earthquake damage to 
e trans-Ecuador pipeline system, 
lese events led to a severe financial 
isis that is expected to affect govern- 
?nt accounts and the military's read- 
?ss for several years. 

MAP will partially fund purchases 
vehicles, arms, and equipment for a 
iformed military counterinsurgency 
oup, which would be used to combat 
ui-gents and control the northern 
nifi- areas. The FY 1989 request is 
r $26.2 million for economic aid and 
.65 million for military assistance. 

Our fundamental interest is to sup- 
irt democracy in Peru while helping 
,e country meet the challenges of ter- 
irism and entrenched narcotics traf- 
:king. As we seek to improve dialogue 
ith Peru on the management of its 
;onomic and debt crises, we need to 
'fer development assistance and en- 
mrage structural reforms as well. We 
ISO seek to counter the influence of the 
irgest Soviet presence in South Amer- 
:a. The United States supports Peru's 



antinarcotics efforts, cooperating 
through interdiction operations and 
through coca eradication. MAP, ESF, 
and development assistance are impor- 
tant components of the framework of 
bilateral cooperation. The request for 
Peru is for $25.9 million for PL 480, 
$15.3 million for development as- 
sistance, and $2 million for ESF, with 
$560,000 for IMET. The total request is 
for $43.76 million. 

Southern Cone 

In the countries of South America's 
important southern cone, we are seek- 
ing to help consolidate democracy 
where it now exists in Argentina and 
Uruguay; and we are doing what we 
can to promote the transition to democ- 
racy in Chile and Paraguay, whose peo- 
ples still live under authoritarian 
governments. 

After 7 years of controversial mili- 
tary rule and an unsuccessful war, 
Argentina returned to civilian rule in 
1983. The civilian democratic govern- 
ment of President Raul Alfonsin is con- 
fronting the formidable tasks of 
restoring national unity and economic 
prosperity in the wake of a period of 
military rule and the international debt 
crisis. One significant factor in main- 
taining a thriving democracy in Argen- 
tina is continued improvement in civil- 
military relations and improved, re- 
sponsible civilian control. The United 
States can assist by encouraging mili- 
tary professionalism, stressing civilian 
primacy in our defense and security re- 
lationships with the Argentine military, 
assisting in military modernization, and 
maintaining good bilateral relationships 
with the democratic government. Our 
request is for $125,000 in IMET. 

The military in Paraguay has al- 
ways had a central political role and can 
be expected to play a crucial role in 
future political developments. By ex- 
posing the Paraguayan Armed Forces 
to the alternative pattern of military 
norms represented by U.S. forces, we 
hope that IMET programs will encour- 
age Pai-aguay's military to play a mod- 
erating role and will enable us to 
challenge them to do better. 

The proposed IMET program 
($125,000 requested) for Paraguay will 
be used to provide technical courses, 
professional military education, man- 
agement training, and English- 
language training. 



Uruguay's economy has improved 
slightly since 1984, but the country will 
continue to face budgetary constraints 
as it moves to address serious economic 
problems. The civilian government has 
reacted responsibly to its economic 
problems, particularly its sizable exter- 
nal debt. U.S. assistance will help pre- 
serve the military's institutional 
integrity and professionalism and is 
strongly and repeatedly sought by Uru- 
guay's civilian democratic political 
leaders. 

The Uruguayan military seeks to 
resume its traditional, nonpolitical role 
in a democratic society and needs as- 
sistance in meeting its equipment and 
training needs. After years of neglect, 
military hardware is in such poor condi- 
tion that continued safe operation is 
threatened. Ti'aining opportunities are 
limited. Domestic budgetary pressures 
are expected to be intense, as the mili- 
tary contends with other elements in 
the domestic budget allocation process. 
IMET ($125,000 requested) is an essen- 
tial element in carrying out U.S. policy 
goals. 

Brazil returned to civilian rule in 
1985 after 21 years of military govern- 
ment. The United States wishes to en- 
courage consolidation of democracy by 
offering military training through 
IMET. Exposure to U.S. military pro- 
fessional education, doctrine, and train- 
ing will aid the professionalization of 
the Brazilian military. Overall, the 
United States should continue to 
strengthen its bilateral ties to Latin 
America's largest country, where the 
military does and will play a major po- 
litical role. The request is for $125,000 
in IMET. 

Mexico 

A secure, friendly Mexico is essential 
to U.S. national interests. Our interde- 
pendent relationship crosses a range of 
issues with international implications. 
Among the U.S. objectives in Mexico 
are: democratic values and the mainte- 
nance of an apolitical military; expand- 
ing U.S. cooperation with military, 
political, and cultural leaders; strength- 
ening the Mexican military's capability 
to combat drug trafficking; and assist- 
ing in the development of a professional 
military able to guarantee the country's 
security. The IMET program ($225,000 
requested) helps to improve military-to- 
military ties as well as professional- 
ization. 



Ilpartment of State Bulletin/October 1988 



79 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Caribbean 

Jamaica is important to the United 
States because of its location along vital 
sealanes, the ability of its government 
to influence opinion in the English- 
speaking Caribbean, and its role as a 
major source of bauxite. The United 
States has a very close relationship 
with the present Jamaican Government. 

The Jamaican Defense Force (JDF), 
with the support of U.S. military as- 
sistance, is capable of performing its 
role of maintaining internal order to 
protect the democratic process and par- 
ticipating in narcotics interdiction and 
eradication efforts. Our military as- 
sistance also will foster a continued 
close relationship between the JDF and 
the U.S. military and will promote the 
JDF's ability and willingness to partici- 
pate in joint operations. 

The Jamaican Government con- 
tinues to pursue a politically risky eco- 
nomic stabilization program that since 
mid-1986 has moved the country toward 
self-sustaining economic growth. By 
providing modest amounts of as- 
sistance, we help sustain this process 
and demonstrate to other countries in 
the region that the United States is 
committed to economic refoi'm. The Ja- 
maican example, if successful, will en- 
courage governments to undertake the 
political risks necessary to implement 
long overdue economic reforms. The 
total request is for $76.4 million, of 
which $72.6 million is for economic 
assistance. 

The Dominican Republic is the 
most populous democratic island state 
in the Caribbean and a trusted and reli- 
able friend of the United States. It has 
cooperated closely with the United 
States, particularly on narcotics mat- 
ters and on key issues in international 
fora. The goals of the United States are 
to promote and strengthen democratic 
institutions in the Dominican Republic, 
to support private-sector economic 
growth, and to foster increased bilat- 
eral cooperation. 

The Dominican Republic is strate- 
gically located amid the waterways of 
the Caribbean, halfway between the 
United States and South America. 
Maintenance of democracy and a stable 
economic environment there are key to 
the preservation of U.S. interests. U.S. 
goals with respect to the military are to 
promote professionalism and institu- 
tionalism in the armed forces and to 
assist in the modernization of military 
equipment. 



80 



Arms Transfers to Latin America, 
1982-86, By Major Supplier 



Czechoslovaki 
($405M) 2% 



Other 
($3,545M) 21 % 




France 
($790M) 5% 



Soviet Union 
($8,120M) 47% 



Poland 
($135M) 1 

United Sta 
($1,695M) 1 

United Kingd 
($100M) 1°/ 

West Germany 
($2,370M) 14% 



After several years of economic 
growth and stability, the Dominican 
economy has deteriorated because of in- 
appropriate monetary, fiscal, and ex- 
change rate policies. From June to 
November 1987, unrealistic exchange 
rates caused legally converted exchange 
receipts to fall from an average of $6 
million per day to less than $250,000. 
Additional economic reform is required 
if inflation, which now exceeds 30%, 
and mounting external debts, equal to 
about 75% of GDP, are to be controlled. 

Current government monetary pol- 
icies also have adversely affected do- 
mestic stability. Rising food and basic 
commodity prices have resulted in a se- 
ries of strikes and sporadic civil dis- 
turbances. The government is striving 
simultaneously to increase employment 
and to develop economic policy reforms 
that will address the recognized struc- 
tural weaknesses in the economy. With- 
out substantial help, however, the 
chances for an economic turnaround in 
the medium term are low. The FY 1989 
request is for $76.3 million, including 
$73.6 million for economic assistance. 



The seven independent eastern 
Caribbean countries (Antigua and 
buda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenad: 
St. Christopher and Nevis, St. Luc 
and St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
are significant to the United States 
their strategic location, commitmen 
democratic institutions and private 
sector-led economic growth, assista 
in combatting narcotics trafficking, 
port in international organizations, 
efforts to develop an effective regie 
security system. 

U.S. security assistance aims t 
enhance the viability of these friem 
democratic states by helping them 
dress their economic development 
needs and by supporting regional 
efforts to create a mechanism for n 
tual self-protection. Their small, 
commodity-dependent economies n" 
them extremely vulnerable to the ^ 
aries of world markets, especially f 
traditional exports. Disparities in ( 
velopment, as demonstrated by pei 
capita incomes ranging from $1,000 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines to 
$4,600 for Barbados have strained 
islands' economic, social, and politi 
structures. 



■i 



Department of State Bulletin/October Bit! 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



The eastern Caribbean needs 
ater infrastructure development in 
ler to attract new private investment 
d take full advantage of Caribbean 
sin Initiative (CBI) benefits. The is- 
ids of the Organization of Eastern 
ribbean States (OECS) are moving 
establish a regional office in the 
lited States to attract American 
restment. High unemployment, par- 
ularly among youth, increases sus- 
ptibility to the negative influences of 
rcotics trafficking. The United States 
working closely with European Com- 
inity governments to combat the il- 
it drug trade through the area. 

An integral part of U.S. policy is 
improve search and rescue and re- 
ed capabilities among the island na- 
ms. Our MAP ($5 million requested) 
d IMET ($400,000 requested) pro- 
ams, in conjunction with British sup- 
rt, also train local security forces and 
ast guards to deal with small-scale 
,'al and external security threats. The 
lited States continues to work closely 
th eastern Caribbean governments to 
velop an effective indigenous defense 
pability through the regional security 
stem. The total request is for $40.6 
Uion. 

The Latin America and Caribbean 
gional program supports a variety of 
cial, economic, and political develop- 
3nt needs best addressed on a re- 
Dnal basis. In addition, several 
ejects affect some countries — Mexico, 
•azil, and Colombia, for example — 
nere there are no bilateral AID pro- 
ams. The regional program focuses 
1 administration of justice and human 
,|hts, education and training, health, 
:riculture and agribusiness, and 
■ivate-sector support. 

Individual projects in these areas 
e designed to reinforce the interde- 
mdent U.S. policy objectives of 
rengthening democracy and improv- 
g the living conditions of people 
.roughout this hemisphere. 



EW DIRECTIONS 

he Changing Balance in the Region 

started this presentation noting the 
nportance of this hemisphere to our 
ational well-being. Yet in some key 
reas, the United States no longer 
lays an effective role. Recent patterns 
f foreign arms deliveries to Latin 
imerica reveal that the United States, 



whose policies are presumed to be mili- 
tarily oriented and thus are the source 
of criticism in some quarters, has for 
some years been at best a minor player 
in comparison to other arms suppliers. 
Ominously, it is the Soviet bloc, not 
Western countries like West Germany 
or the United Kingdom, that has made 
the most significant gains. How many 
Americans are aware that the Warsaw 
Pact now provides more military sup- 
plies to the countries in our hemisphere 
than the United States and all the 
countries of NATO combined? 

The Changing Balance 
Among Regions 

Central America has received as- 
sistance at levels close to those recom- 
mended by the Kissinger commission. 
These levels are substantially higher 
than the historic average for that area. 

South America, in contrast, re- 
ceives relatively fewer resources than 
in the past. South America — which in- 
cludes the exploding continental nation 



of Brazil, the agricultural pampas of 
Argentina, and the Pacific rim lands of 
the Andes as well as the Caribbean 
Basin lands of Venezuela and Colom- 
bia — now receives less than one quarter 
as much U.S. aid as Africa. The rela- 
tive development of South America and 
the absence of general crises justify 
this. At the same time, we have to 
wonder what implications this has for 
our role in the hemisphere. 

Democratic Institution-Building 

Budgetary constraints have helped lead 
us to explore new ideas for practical 
and concrete steps that we can take to 
demonstrate support for our democratic 
allies. 

Strengthening the administration 
of justice in democracies in Latin 
America and the Caribbean remains a 
long-term goal. The Congress recog- 
nized the promise of projects initiated 
to date by extending authority for the 
program for another 2 years. The Ad- 
ministration hopes that the terminal 



FY 1989 Request for U.S. Economic & 
Military Assistance to South America Vs. 
Other Selected Regions* 



Billions 




Egypt Other 
& Middle 

Israel East 



Africa East Asia South 
& America 

Pacific 



includes: Development assistance, ESF, PL-480, FMS, MAP, IMET, 
international narcotics, Peace Corps. 



lepartment of State Bulletin/October 1988 



81 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



date eventually will be removed since 
progress in the strengthening of demo- 
cratic institutions cannot be measured 
in 1-year or 2-year intervals. The Ad- 
ministration also is pleased that the 
Congress approved a modest clarifica- 
tion and expansion of the authority for 
this program last year We believe this 
program is an important means for im- 
proving the observance of political and 
human rights. 

The continuing resolution adopted 
in December gave us important new au- 
thority for cooperation with South 
America's two largest democracies. The 
continuing resolution explicitly permits 
Brazil and Argentina to participate in 
military (IMET) and civilian training 
activities funded under the Foreign As- 
sistance Act as long as they have demo- 
cratically elected governments. This 
gives us a vehicle for involving these 
two countries in ongoing regional train- 
ing efforts — such as the administration 
of justice program and IMET. 

IMET-supported training is an ef- 
fective way of supporting democracy, 
useful for building long-term rela- 
tionships that strengthen civilian- 
military cooperation. It demonstrates 
our support for the consolidation of de- 
mocracy as an integrated effort. 

The penal law reform underway in 
Argentina, or perhaps the growth of 
grassroots organizations in Brazil over 
the last few years, may offer interest- 
ing focal points for regional training 
efforts aimed at enhancing regional 
cooperation in the strengthening of 
democratic institutions. 

We are working within the inter- 
agency context on a strategy for AID- 
funded democratic development proj- 
ects in the region — including leadership 
training, strengthening of justice and 
electoral systems, and professionaliza- 
tion of legislative staff. 

We also are exploring the design of 
a program that could become the first 
integrated project for strengthening de- 
mocracy in South America — "integra- 
ted" because it combines administration 
of justice with other democratic pro- 
gram elements, including support for 
the electoral process and possibly as- 
sistance to the legislature. 



The War on Drugs 

We cannot overemphasize that the war 
on drugs is a transnational problem 
that requires an unprecedented level of 
international cooperation. How the 
United States deals with illegal narcot- 
ics will affect our government's ability 
to resolve many other serious issues 
that confront us and the nations of 
Latin America and the Caribbean. 

Only the widest possible coopera- 
tion among the governments in the 
hemisphere — cooperation that mobilizes 
all the resources potentially available to 
us — will enable us to beat the narcotics 
traffickers in this increasingly dan- 
gerous high stakes conflict. 

National economic difficulties and 
scarcity of resources create competing 
demands on limited military and police 
forces that often lack appropriate 
equipment and training. Even without 
additional complicating factors, such as 
the traffickers and the corruption and 



intimidation their power permits, thl 
means that our friends often appear ; 
effective in the war against the traf- 
fickers. This in turn has weakened tl 
political will of some to stay in the 
fight. 

But this is not a fight from whicl 
we can walk away. We must understa 
the problems and ask ourselves what 
we can do to keep an already grave a 
worsening situation from deterioratirj 
still further. 

The democratic ideal is universa 
its practice is increasingly the stuff c 
life and politics throughout Latin 
America. Most of Latin America's de 
ocrats know they can count on U.S. 
support now; it is imperative that th 
be able to count on our support in tl 
future. 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
JULY 15, 1988' 

The President is pleased with the over- 
whelming, bipartisan votes of the Sen- 
ate and the House of Representatives 
condemning the outrageous actions of 
the Sandinista government of Nic- 
aragua. These votes send the message 
to the Sandinistas that the United 
States is firmly committed to the 
achievement of freedom and democracy 
in Nicaragua. 

Just this week, the Sandinistas 
have shut down the two media outlets 
for free expression in Nicaragua, the 
newspaper La Preiisa and Catholic Ra- 
dio. And they have brutally suppressed 
a peaceful demonstration for human 
rights, arrested leaders of the demo- 
cratic opposition, and expelled the U.S. 
Ambassador and much of his staff. 

The Sandinistas continue to snuff 
out any hope for democratic reform in 
Nicaragua, despite the solemn promises 
to establish democracy that they have 



'The complete transcript of the hea 
ings will be published by the committei 
and will be available from the Superinti 
ent of Documents, U.S. Government _Pi 
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



Situation in Nicaragua 



made and broken repeatedly in the 
ade since they seized power. They c 
tinue to oppress the Nicaraguan pe( 
and receive substantial Soviet bloc 
tary shipments. The Sandinistas' co 
duct makes clear that they will not 
institute democratic reform and cea 
their threats to the security of Cen 
America unless effectively pressure 
and persuaded to do so. To achieve 
mocracy in Nicaragua and security 
all of Central America clearly requ: 
a viable and effective Nicaraguan d 
ocratic resistance. 

When the Congress returns, tl 
President hopes they will move swi 
to enact legislation currently being 
mulated in the Senate for further a 
the resistance. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of July 18, 19^ 



82 



Department of State Bulletin/October oi 



TREATIES 



Cirrent Actions 



III LATERAL 



It ion on offenses and certain other 
iiimitted on board aircraft. Done at 
-rpt. 14. 1963. Entered into force 
1%9. TIAS 6768. 
'• n deposited : Cameroon, Mar 24. 

' Kpn for the suppression of unlawful 
iinst the safety of civil aviation. 
Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered 
- r .Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570. 
il l deposited : Yemen (Aden), 
', 19^SS.' 

• \ relating to an amendment to the 
inn on international civil aviation 
!'i91). Done at Montreal Sept. 30, 

It ions deposited : Ecuador, Apr. 22, 
S; Niger, Apr 8, 1988. 

■toeol relating to an amendment to the 

vention on international civil aviation 

AS 1.591). Done at Montreal Oct. 6, 

0.^ 

:ifications deposited : Guyana, May 2, 

8: Niger, Apr. 8, 1988: U.S.S.R., 

). 3, 1988. 

itocol for the suppression of unlawful 
s of violence at airports serving interna- 
lal civil aviation, supplementary to the 
vention of Sept. 23, 1971 (TIAS 7570). 
lie at Montreal Feb. 24, 1988.- [Senate] 
-aty Doc. 100-19. 

natures : France, Mar 29, 1988,' Greece, 
r. 18, 1988; Ivory Coast, Mar. 21, 1988; 
rshall Islands, June 23, 1988; 
therlands, Apr 13, 1988.-' 

mmodities — Common Fund 

reenient establishing the Common Fund 
Commodities, with schedules. Done at 
neva June 27, 1980.- 
tification deposited : Cuba, July 21, 1988. 

nservation 

nvention on the conservation of Ant- 
•tic marine living resources, with anne.x. 
■ne at Canberra May 20, 1980. Entered 
,0 force Apr. 7, 1982'. TIAS 10240. 
cession deposited : Canada, July 1, 1988. 

ntainers 

ternational convention for safe con- 
iners, with anne.xes, as amended. Done 
Geneva Dec. 2, 1972. Entered into force 
pt. 6, 1977; for the U.S. Jan. 3, 1979. 
AS 9037, 10220. 
cession deposited : Greece, June 28, 



istoms 

nvi-ntion establishing a Customs Cooper- 
ion Council, with anne.x. Done at 

ussels Dec. 15, 1950. Entered into force 

ov. 4, 1952; for the U.S. Nov. 5, 1970. 

IAS 7063. 

ccession deposited : Gambia, Oct. 14, 

'87. 



Environmental Modification 

Convention on the prohibition of military 
or any other hostile use of environmental 
modification techniques, with annex. Done 
at Geneva May 18, 1977. Entered into force 
Oct. 5, 1978; for the U.S. Jan. 17, 1970. 
TIAS 9614. 

Accession deposited : Switzerland, Aug. 5, 
1988. 

International Court of Justice 

Declaration recognizing as compulsory ju- 
risdiction of the International Court of Jus- 
tice under Art. 36. para. 2 of the statute of 
the Court. 59 Stat. 1055; TS 993. 
Declaration deposited Cyprus, Apr. 22, 
1988. ^ 

Judicial Procedures — Child Abduction 

Convention on the civil aspects of interna- 
tional child abduction. Done at The Hague 
Oct. 25, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 1, 
1983; for the U.S. July 1, 1988. [Senate] 
Treaty Doe. 99-11. 

Ratification deposited : Austria, July 14, 
1988.-' 

Marine Pollution 

International convention relating to inter- 
vention on the high seas in cases of oil 
pollution casualties, with annex. Done at 
Brussels Nov. 29, 1969. Entered into force 
May 6, 1975. TIAS 8068. 
Accession deposited : Qatar, June 2, 1988. 

International convention on civil liability 

for oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels 

Nov. 29, 1969. Entered into force June 19, 

1975.5 

Accession deposited : Qatar, June 2, 1988. 

International convention on the establish- 
ment of an international fund for compen- 
sation for oil pollution damage. Done at 
Brussels Dec. 18, 1971. Entered into force 
Oct. 16, 1978.5 
Accession deposited : Qatar, June 2, 1988. 

Protocol of 1978 relating to the interna- 
tional convention for the prevention of pol- 
lution from ships, 1973. Done at London 
Feb. 17, 1978. Entered into force Oct. 2, 
1983. 

Accessions deposited : Austria, May 27, 
1988; Burma, May 4, 1988;^ Marshall Is- 
lands, Apr. 26, 1988. 
Territorial application : Extended by the 
U.K. to Bermuda, with effect from June 
23, 1988.' 

Annex V to the international convention 
for the prevention of pollution from ships, 
1973. Done at London Nov. 2, 1973. Enters 
into force Dec. 31, 1988. 
Acceptances deposited : Austria, May 27, 
1988, Marshall Islands, Apr. 26, 1988; 
Netherlands, Apr. 19, 1988. » 
Territorial application : Extended by the 
U.K. to the Cayman Islands and Bermuda, 
with effect from June 23, 1988. 

Maritime Matters 

International convention on load lines, 
1966. Done at London Apr 5, 1966. En- 
tered into force July 21, 1968. TIAS 6331, 
6629, 6720. 



Accession deposited : Marshall Islands, 
Apr 2(i, 1988. 

Territorial application : Extended by the 
U.K. to the Cayman Islands, with effect 
from June 23, 1988. 

Amendments to the international conven- 
tion on load lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331, 6629, 
6720). Done at London Nov. 17, 1983.- 
Acceptances deposited : Peru, July 11, 1988; 
Syria, July 13, 1988. 

International convention on tonnage meas- 
urement of ships, 1969, with annexes. Done 
at London June 23, 1969. Entered into 
force July 18, 1982; for the U.S. Feb. 10, 
1983. TIAS 10490. 
Accession deposited : Burma, May 4, 1988. 

Convention on the international regulations 
for preventing collisions at sea, 1972, as 
amended. Done at London Oct. 20, 1972. 
Entered into force July 15, 1977. TIAS 
8587, 10672. 

Accession deposited : Marshall Islands, 
Apr. 26, 1988. 

International convention for the safety of 
life at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at Lon- 
don Nov. 1, 1974. Entered into force 
May 25, 1980. TIAS 9700. 

Protocol of 1978 relating to the interna- 
tional convention for the safety of life at 
sea (TIAS 9700). Done at London Feb. 17. 
1978. Entered into force Mav 1, 1981. TIAS 
10009. 

Accessions deposited : Austria, May 27, 
1988. 

Territorial application : Extended by the 
U.K. to Bermuda, with effect from 
June 23, 1988. 

International convention on maritime 
search and rescue, 1979, with annex. Done 
at Hamburg Apr. 27, 1979. Entered into 
force June 22. 1985. 

Accessions deposited : Jamaica, June 10, 
1988; Peru, July 4, 1988. 

Nuclear Material — Physical Protection 

Convention on the physical protection of 
nuclear material, with annexes. Done at 
Vienna Oct. 26. 1979. Entered into force 
Feb. 8, 1987. 
Accession deposited : Mexico, Apr. 4, 1988. 

Phonograms 

Convention for the protection of producers 
of phonograms against unauthorized du- 
plication of their phonograms. Done at 
Geneva Oct. 29, 1971. Entered into force 
Apr. 18, 1973; for the U.S. Mar. 10, 1974. 
TIAS 7808. 

Accession deposited : Trinidad and Tobago, 
June 27, 1988, 

Pollution 

Convention for the protection of the ozone 
layer, with annexes. Done at Vienna 
Mar. 22, 1985. Enters into force Sept. 22, 
1988. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 99-9. 
Accession deposited : Spain, July 25, 1988. 

Montreal protocol on substances that de- 
plete the ozone layer, with annex. Done at 
Montreal Sept. 16, 1987.- [Senate] Treaty 
Doc. 100-10. 



ipartment of State Bulletin/October 1988 



83 



TREATIES 



Signatures : Indonesia, Spain, .July 21, 

1988. 

Ratification deposited : Egypt, Aug. 2, 

1988; New Zealand, July 21, 1988. 

Property — Industrial 

Convention revising the Paris convention of 
Mar. 20, 1883, as revised, for the protec- 
tion of industrial property. Done at Stock- 
holm Julv 14, 1967. Entered into force 
Apr. 26,'l970; for the U.S. Sept. 5, 1970, 
e.xcept for Arts. 1-12 which entered into 
force May 19, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 
1973. TIAS 6923. 

Accessions deposited : Malaysia, June 23, 
1988; Trinidad and Tobago, May 16, 1988. 

Property — Intellectual 

Convention establishing the World Intellec- 
tual Property Organization. Done at Stock- 
holm July 14, 1967. Entered into force 
Apr. 26,"l970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1970. 
TIAS 6932. 

Accessions deposited : Swaziland, May 18, 
1988; Trinidad and Tobago, May 16, 1988. 

Satellite Communications Systems 

International COSPAS-SARSAT [search 
and rescue satellite system] program 
agreement. Done at Paris July 1, 1988. ^ 
Signatures : Canada, France, U.S.S.R., 
U.S., July 1, 1988. 

Sugar 

International sugar agreement, 1987, with 

anne.xes. Done at London Sept. 11, 1987. 

Entered into force provisionally Mar. 24, 

1988. 

Ratification deposited : Finland, Aug. 3, 

1988. 

Terrorism 

Convention on the prevention and punish- 
ment of crimes against internationally pro- 
tected persons, including diplomatic 
agents. Done at New York Dec. 14, 1973. 
Entered into force Feb. 20, 1977. TIAS 
8532. 
Accession deposited : China, Aug. 5, 1987.' 

International convention against the taking 
of hostages. Done at New York Dec. 17, 
1979. Entered into force June 3, 1983; for 
the U.S. Jan. 6, 1985. 

Accession deposited : Ecuador, May 2, 1988; 
Oman, July 22, 1988. 

Timber 

International tropical timber agreement, 

1983, with annexes. Done at Geneva 
Nov. 18, 1983. Entered into force provi- 
sionally Apr. 1, 1985; for the U.S. Apr. 26, 
1985. 

Ratification deposited : Greece, July 26, 
1988. 

Torture 

Convention against torture and other 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment. Done at New York Dec. 10, 

1984. Entered into force June 26, 1987.= 
[Senate! Treaty Doc. 100-20. 
Signature : Nigeria, July 28, 1988. 



84 



Ratification deposited : Turkey, Aug. 2, 
1988. 

Trade 

United Nations convention on contracts for 
the international sale of goods. Done at 
Vienna Apr. 11, 1980. Entered into force 
Jan. 1, 1988. [52 Fed. Reg. 6262] 
Ratification deposited : Norway, July 20, 
1988. 

Transportation — P'oodstuffs 

Agreement on the international carriage of 
perishable foodstuffs and on the special 
equipment to be used for such carriage 
(ATP), with annexes. Done at Geneva 
Sept. 1, 1970. Entered into force Nov. 21, 
1976; for the U.S. Jan. 20, 1984. 1028 
UNTS 121. 

Accession deposited : Portugal, Aug. 15, 
1988. 

Wheat 

Wheat trade convention, 1986. Done at 
London Mar. 14, 1986. Entered into force 
July 1, 1986; definitively for the U.S. 
Jan. 27, 1988. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-1. 
Ratification deposited : Egypt, July 12, 
1988. 



BILATERAL 

Bangladesh 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Apr. 17, 1987, as amended, for sales of ag- 
ricultural commodities. Effected by e.x- 
change of letters at Dhaka June 25, 1988. 
Entered into force June 25, 1988. 

Benin 

International express mail agreement, with 
detailed regulations. Signed at Cotonou 
and Washington July 6 and 26, 1988. En- 
tered into force Sept. 15, 1988. 

Brazil 

Swap agreement between the U.S. Treas- 
ury and the Central Bank of Brazil/Govern- 
ment of Brazil, with memorandum of 
understanding. Signed at Washington and 
Rio de Janeiro July 15, 1988. Entered into 
force July 15, 1988. 

Canada 

Agreement extending the agreement of 
Mar. 13, 1986, concerning an experimental 
transborder air services program. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Ottawa June 22, 
1988. Entered into force June 22, 1988; ef- 
fective Aug. 21, 1987. 

Costa Rica 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Jan. 14, 1987, for the sale of agricultural 
commodities. Effected by exchange of 
notes at San Jose July 2 and 7, 1987. En- 
tered into force July 7, 1987. 

Cyprus 

Agreement concerning reciprocal exemp- 
tion from income tax of income derived 



from the international operation of ships 
and aircraft. Effected by exchange of no' 
at Nicosia June 21 and July 8, 1988. En- 
tered into force July 8, 1988; with respec 
to taxable vears beginning on or after 
Jan. 1, 1987. 

France 

Protocol to the convention of July 28, 19( 
with respect to taxes on income and pro 
erty, as amended (TIAS 6518, 7270, 950( 
with exchange of notes. Signed at Paris 
June 16, 1988. [Senate] Treaty Doe. 100- 
Transmitted to Senate for advice and co 
sent : Aug. 1, 1988. 

Honduras 

Agreement relating to and amending th 
agreement of Mar. 11, 1987, for sales of 
agricultural commodities. Signed at 
Tegucigalpa Mar. 7, 1988. Entered into 
force Mar. 7, 1988. 

Hong Kong 

Agreement amending agreement of Auj 
1986, as amended, relating to trade in c 
tain textile and textile products. Effect 
by exchange of letters at Washington 
July 15 and 20, 1988. Entered into fore. 
July 20, 1988. 

Hungary 

Agreement amending agreement of Fel 
and 25, 1983 (TIAS 10666), as amended 
relating to trade in cotton, wool, and n 
made fiber textiles and textile product; 
Effected by exchange of notes at Buda] 
June 23 and Aug. 1, 1988. Entered into 
force Aug. 1, 1988. 

Indonesia 

Convention for the avoidance of double 
ation and the prevention of fiscal evasi 
with respect to taxes on income, with 
tocol and exchange of notes. Signed at 
arta Julv 11, 1988. [Senate] Treaty Dot 
100-22. 

Transmitted to the Senate for advice a 
consent : Aug. 5, 1988. 

Agreement on maritime search and re: 
Signed at Jakarta July 5, 1988. Entere 
into force July 5, 1988. 

Italy 

Memorandum of understanding on the 
change of officers between the U.S. ar 
the Italian Air Forces. Signed at Rom( i 
Washington May 30 and Aug. 12, 1988. f, 
tered into force Aug. 12, 1988. 

Kenya 

Agreement amending the agreement o 
Feb. 26, 1988, for sales of agricultural 
modifies. Effected by exchange of left 
at Nairobi July 15 and 20, 1988. Enter 
into force July 20, 1988. 

Korea 

Agreement regarding the collection ar 
exchange of data on fisheries harvests 
the international waters of the Bering 
Effected by exchange of notes at Wash 



Department of State Bulletin/October 



a 



PRESS RELEASES 



Apr. 25 and July l-I. 1988. Entered 
ivf July 14, 1988. 

iliourg 

insport agreement, with annex. 
1 at Lu.xembourg Aug, 19, 1986. 
! into force : Aug. 3, 1988. 



ment concerning rediversion of Rio 

'■ waters allocated to Mexico under 

'-(■ntion of 1906 (TS 455). Effected 

ange of notes at Mexico .June 24 

■\. 10, 1987. Entered into force 

. 1987. 

■ nt extending the air transport 
lit of Aug. 15, 1960, as amended 
■nded (TIAS 4675, 7167), and the 
iient of Jan. 20, 1978, as extended, 
iting to reduced air fares and charter 
services (TIAS 10115). Effected by ex- 
nge of notes at Mexico June 30, 1988. 
Lered into force June 30, 1988. 

;herlands 

reement amending the air transport 
eement of Apr. 3, 1957, as amended 
AS 4782, 6797, 8998). Effected by ex- 
nge of notes at Washington Oct. 13 and 
.". 22, 1987. Entered into force provi- 
lally, Dec. 23, 1987. 
ered into force definitively : Aug. 9, 



eement for sales of agricultural com- 
Jities. Signed at Lima June 28, 1988. 
ered into force June 28, 1988. 

legal 

reement regarding the consolidation and 
cheduling of certain debts owed to, 
iranteed by, or insured by the U.S. Gov- 
ment and its agencies, with annexes, 
ned at Dakar June 10, 1988. Entered 
3 force July 28, 1988. 

reement for sales of agricultural com- 
dities, with memorandum of under- 
nding. Signed at Dakar Aug. 3, 1988. 
tered into force Aug. 3, 1988. 

rra Leone 

ernational express mail agreement, with 
ailed regulations. Signed at Freetown 
i Washington May 31 and July 26, 1988. 
tered into force Aug. 15, 1988. 

igapore 

reement amending the agreement of 

11 and Mar. 24, 1988, with respect to 
tual exemption from taxation of air 
nspurt. Effected by exchange of notes 
Singapore July 5 and 28, 1988. Entered 
force July 28, 1988. 



ernational express mail agreement, with 
tailed regulations. Signed at Mogadishu 
d Washington June 28 and July 26, 1988. 
itered into force Aug. 15, 1988. 



Sri Lanka 

Grant agreement for rehabilitation as- 
sistance. Signed at Colombo July 21, 1988. 
Entered into force July 21, 1988". 

Switzerland 

Memorandum of understanding for 
coproduction of the M109A1B self-propelled 
155 MM Howitzer. Signed at Washington 
July 18, 1988. Entered into force July 18, 
1988. 

Tunisia 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Mar. 16, 1988, as amended, for sales of ag- 
ricultural commodities. Signed at Tunis 
July 28, 1988. Entered into force July 28, 



United Kingdom 

Agreement extending the agreement of 
Sept. 18, 1986, as extended, concerning the 
Turks and Caicos Islands and narcotics ac- 
tivities. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington July 20, 1988. Entered into 
force July 20, 1988; effective July 21, 1988. 

Uruguay 

Agreement amending arrangement of Aug. 
24 and Sept. 13, 1984, for a visa system 
relating to trade in certain textile prod- 
ucts. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Montevideo Jan.' 19 and July 11, 1988. En- 
tered into force July 11, 1988. 

Venezuela 

Agreement for the avoidance of double tax- 
ation with respect to shipping and air 
transport. Signed at Caracas Dee. 29, 
1987. 
Entered into force : Aug. 10, 1988. 

Agreement concerning employment of de- 
pendents of official government employees. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Caracas 
July 18 and 29, 1988. Entered into force 
July 29, 1988, except with respect to de- 
pendents of employees of permanent mis- 
sions to international organizations, which 
shall enter into force upon written notice 
that both governments have adopted meas- 
ures to allow the issuance of necessary 
permits. 

Yugoslavia 

Swap agreement between the U.S. Treas- 
ury and the Central Bank of the Federated 
Republic of Yugoslavia, with related letter. 
Signed at Washington and Belgrade 
June 10, 1988. Entered into force June 10, 
1988. 



'With reservation(s). 

-Not in force. 

■'With declaration(s). 

<With conditions. 

^Not in force for the U.S. 

''Does not include (optional) Annexes 
III, IV, and V. 

'Does not include (optional) Annex IV. 

''For the Kingdom in Europe, the 
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. ■ 



Department of State 



Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20.520. 

No. Dale Subject 

164 8/1 Shultz: interview on "Face 
the Nation," July 31. 

*165 8/2 Shultz: arrival statement, 
Guatemala City, Aug. 1. 
166 8/3 Shultz, Foreign Ministers of 
Guatemala, Costa Rica, 
Honduras, El Salvador: 
joint news conference, 
Guatemala City, Aug. 1. 

*167 8/3 Shultz: interview on 

NBC-TV's "Today Show," 
Buenos Aires, Aug. 3. 

168 8/4 Shultz: luncheon toast, 

Buenos Aires, Aug. 2. 

169 8/5 Shultz: news conference, 

Buenos Aires, Aug. 3 
*170 8/5 Shultz: statement, Argen- 
tine-North American Cul- 
tural Institute, Buenos 
Aii'es, Aug. 3. 

171 8/12 Shultz: address, Mon- 

tevideo, Aug. 4. 

172 8/5 Shultz: news conference, 

Montevideo, Aug. 4. 
*173 8/5 Program for the official 
working visit to Wash- 
ington, D.C, of Icelandic 
Prime Minister Palsson, 
Aug. 9-13. 

Jeffrey Davidow is sworn in 
as Ambassador to Zambia 
(biographic data). 

Whitehead: interview on 
Worldnet's "Dialogue." 

Shultz: interview on "TV 
Globo," Rio de Janeiro, 
Aug. 6. 

Shultz: arrival statement. 
La Paz, Aug. 8. 

Shultz: news conference, 
Brasilia, Aug. 5. 

Shultz: luncheon toast. La 
Paz, Aug. 8. 

George E. Moose is sworn 
in as Ambassador to Sen- 
egal (biographic data). 

Shultz: address. La Paz, 
Bolivia, Aug. 8. 

Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1955-57, 
Vol. XI, United Nations 
and General Interna- 
tional Matters, released. 
*183 8/10 Shultz: news briefing, 

Tegucigalpa, Aug. 9. 
*184 8/10 Shultz: interview on 

NBC-TV's "Today Show." 
185 8/11 Shultz: news briefing. La 
Paz, Aug. 8. 
*186 8/11 Shultz: statement and ques- 
tion-and-answer session, 
San Salvador, Aug. 9. 
■*187 8/11 Shultz: news briefing, San 
Jose, Aug. 9. 



85 



174 


8/5 


175 


8/5 


176 


8/8 


177 


8/9 


178 


8/8 


179 


8/9 


180 


8/9 


181 


8/12 


182 


8/11 



PUBLICATIONS 



*188 8/11 Shultz: statement following 
meeting with President- 
elect Borja, Quito, Aug. 
10. 

*189 Carl Copeland Cundiff 

sworn in as Ambassador 
to Niger, Aug. 17 (biog- 
raphic data). 

[Unnumbered] John F. Kordek sworn in as 
Ambassador to Botswana, 
Aug. 18 (biographic data). 

*191 8/22 Shultz: remarks at memorial 
ceremony for Ambassador 
Raphel and Brig. Gen. 
Wassom, U.S. Embassy, 
Islamabad, Aug. 20. 



192 8/22 Shultz: statement made fol- 

lowing meeting with act- 
ing President Ghulum 
Ishaq Khan, Islamabad, 
Aug. 20. 

193 8/23 Shultz: remarks at the me- 

morial ceremony for Am- 
bassador Raphel and 
Brig. Gen. Wassom, An- 
drews AFB, Aug. 21. 

194 8/22 Whitehead: remarks at fu- 

neral of Ambassador Ar- 
nold Raphel, Ft. Myer, 
Aug. 22. 



*Not printed in the Bulletin. 



Department of State 



Free single copies of the following Depart- 
ment of State publications are available 
from the Public Information Division, Bu- 
reau of Public Affairs, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Secretary Shultz 

Winning the War Against Narcotics, Boliv- 
ian citizens and members of the press. 
La Paz, Aug. 8, 1988 (Current Policy 
#1099). 

Facing the Future: The Americas and the 
Global Economy, businessmen and bank- 
ers at the Central Bank. Montevideo, 
Aug. 4, 1988 (Current Policy #1101). 

Arms Control 

Nuclear Testing Limitations: U.S. Policy 
and the Joint Verfication Experiment, 
July 1988 (Public Information Series). 

East Asia 

Review of U.S. -Vietnam Issues, Assistant 
Secretary Sigur, Subcommittee on Asian 
and Pacific Affairs, House Foreign Af- 
fairs Committee, July 28, 1988 (Current 
Policy #1098). 

Amerasians in Vietnam (GIST, Aug. 1988). 

U.S. -Philippines Military Bases Agree- 
ment (GIST, Aug. 1988) 

U.S. Policy in East Asia and the Pacific, 
Aug. 1988 (Selected Documents #30). 

Economics 

U.S. E.xport Control Policy: Its Present 
and I\iture Course, Ambassador Wendt, 
Atlantic Council of the United States, 
June 14, 1988 (Current Policy #1094). 

Strategy for an LDC Debt Workout: A 
U.S. Perspective, Deputy Assistant Sec- 
retary Milam, Western Economic Asso- 
ciation International, Los Angeles, July 
3, 1988 (Current Policy #1100). 

Generalized System of Preferences (GIST. 
Aug. 1988)." 



86 



Europe 

The Moscow Summit, Aug. 1988 (Selected 
Documents #28). 

General 

American Foreign Policy: Opportunities 
and Challenges, Assistant to the Presi- 
dent for National Security Affairs 
Powell, World Affairs Council, Los 
Angeles, July 19, 1988 (Current Policy 
#1096). 

Human Rights 

U.S. Human Rights Policy: An Overview, 
Dejjuty Assistant Secretary Dobriansky, 
American Council of Young Political 
Leaders, June 3, 1988 (Current Policy 
#1091). 

Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, 
October 1, 1987-April 1, 1988 (Special Re- 
port #178). 

Middle East 

Review of U.S. Policy in the Middle East, 
Assistant Secretary Murphy, Subcommit- 
tee on Europe and the Middle East, 
House Foreign Affairs Committee, July 
27, 1988 (Current Policy #1097). 

Science & Technology 

U.S. Views on Waste Exports, Assistant 
Secretary Bernthal. Subcommittee on 
Environment, Energy, and Natural Re- 
sources, House Government Operations 
Committee, July 14, 1988 (Current Policy 
#1095). 

Western Hemisphere 

Central America: U.S. Policy (GIST, Aug. 

1988). 
Nicaragua: Negotiating Documents of the 

Sapoa Truce, July 1988 (Regional 

Brief). ■ 



CSCE Semiannual 
Report Released 



On behalf of the President, the Actinj: 
Secretary of State on June 3, 1988, 
transmitted the 24th semiannual repo 
on the implementation of the Helsinki 
Final Act and the Madrid concluding 
document to the congressional Comm 
sion on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe. 

The semiannual report covers thf 
period October 1, 1987, to April 1, 19^ 
and provides an assessment of Soviet 
and East European compliance with 
commitments they undertook in adop 
ing the Helsinki Final Act and the 
Madrid concluding document. Among 
the issues discussed are human right 
and humanitarian concerns; security 
and confidence-building measures; ec 
nomic, scientific, and technological c 
operation; emigration; freedom of 
information; and educational and cul- 
tural exchanges. 

The report acknowledges that th 
record of compliance varied among E 
European states but makes evident I 
overall performance by the Warsaw 
Pact nations in the area of human 
rights and human contacts remains i 
violation of the Conference on Secur 
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 
commitments. While recognizing th; 
some positive developments have tal 
place, the report highlights the fact 
that many citizens of these countrie 
including those who serve as Helsin 
monitors, continue to suffer perseci 
for attempting to exercise their bas 
human rights or for focusing attenti 
on violations of these human rights 
fundamental freedoms. 

At the CSCE followup meeting 
rently underway in Vienna, the Uni 
States and other allied delegations 
also made these points, recognizing 
provements when they occur and vi 
orously highlighting continuing Sov 
and East European failures where t 
remain. 

This report is an important ele 
ment in the continuing U.S. effort 
assess the progress and shortcomin 
in the implementation of the CSCE 
goals of protecting human rights, 
strengthening security, expanding ( 
eration, and building mutual 
confidence. 

Free single copies of this 48-p; 
report are available from the Public 
formation Division, Bureau of Publ 
Affairs, Department of State, Wasl 
ington, D.C. 20520. Please request 
Special Report #178. ■ 



Department of State Bulletin/October 11 



:dex 



:!:tober 1988 
illume 88, No. 2139 



lica. American Foreign Policy: Oppor- 
■jnities and Challenges (Powell) 51 

\lf\s Control 

UM Treaty Review Session Opens (White 

nii-c statement) 40 

1( :ir Testing Talks Open Round Three 

.\ hue House statement) 39 

■. S.iviet Union Conduct First Phase of 
\' 1-: (White House statement) 39 

\ ociation of South East Asian Nations. 
ecri'tary's Trip to East Asia and the 

aeit'ic (Shultz) 21 

iibddia. Situation in Vietnam, Cam- 

iidia, and Laos (Lambertson) 40 

iia. Secretary's Trip to East Asia and 

ir Pacific (Shultz) 21 

isrcss 

iijii iisation for Iranian Airbus Tragedy 

-ola.T) 58 

i;iN9 Assistance Requests for Latin 
merica and the Caribbean (Abrams) . 72 
'lew of U.S. Policy in the Middle East 

Vlurphy) 61 

lation in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos 

^ambertson) 40 

h Report on Cyprus (message to the 

ongress) 50 

;. Assessments for the United Nations 

joodman) 70 

'i. Views on Waste Exports 

3ernthal) 67 

ijrus. 38th Report on Cyprus (message 

5 the Congress) 50 

jartment & Foreign Service. Pakistan's 
resident Zia, LI.S. Ambassador Die in 

lane Crash (Shultz, Whitehead) 69 

.-eloping Countries. Strategy for An 
,DC Debt Workout: A U.S. Perspective 

Milam) 43 

5t Asia. American Foreign Policy: Op- 

ortunities and Challenges (Powell) . . 51 

jnomics 

retary's Trip to East Asia and the Pa- 

ific (Shultz) 21 

ategy for An LDC Debt Workout: A 

I.S. Perspective (Milam) 43 

i. E.xport Control Policy: Its Present 

nd Future Course (Wendt) 46 

rope. American Foreign Policy: Oppor- 

unities and Challenges (Powell) 51 

iheries. Fisheries Negotiations and 

Vade Opportunities (Wolfe) 64 

reign Assistance. FY 1989 Assistance 
lequests for Latin America and the 

!^aribbean (Abrams) 72 

rmany. 27th Anniversary of the Berlin 

Vail (Reagan) 50 

ng Kong. Secretary's Trip to East Asia 

md the Pacific (Shultz) 21 

(man Rights 

ptive Nations Week, 1988 

proclamation) 57 

•Isinki Human Rights Day, 1988 

proclamation) 57 

S. Human Rights Policy: An Overview 
JDobriansky) 54 



Iceland. Visit of Icelandic Prime Minister 

(Palsson, Reagan) 49 

Indonesia. Secretary's Trip to East Asia 

and the Pacific (Shultz) 21 

International Law. Compensation for 

Iranian Airbus Tragedy (Sofaer) 58 

Iran 

Compensation for Iranian Airbus Tragedy 

(Sofaer) 58 

Review of U.S. Policy in the Middle East 

(Murphy) ." 61 

Iraq. Review of U.S. Policy in the Middle 

East (Murphy) 61 

Japan. Secretary's Trip to East Asia and 

the Pacific (Shultz) 21 

Korea. Secretary's Trip to East Asia and 

the Pacific (Shultz) 21 

Kuwait 

Review of U.S. Policy in the Middle East 

(Murphy) 61 

Visit of Kuwaiti Prime Minister (Reagan, 

Sabah) 60 

Laos. Situation in Vietnam, Cambodia, and 

Laos (Lambertson) 40 

Lebanon. Review of U.S. Policy in the 

Middle East (Murphy) 61 

Malaysia. Secretary's Trip to East Asia 

and the Pacific (Shultz) 21 

Marshall Islands. Secretary's Trip to East 

Asia and the Pacific (Shultz) 21 

Middle East 

American Foreign Policy: Opportunities 

and Challenges (Powell) 51 

Secretary Shultz Visits Latin America 

(Acevedo, Cabrera, Lopez, Madrigal, 

Shultz) 2 

Monetary Affairs. Strategy for An LDC 

Debt Workout: A U.S. Perspective 

(Milam) 43 

Narcotics. Secretary Shultz Visits Latin 

America (Acevedo, Cabrera, Lopez, 

Madrigal, Shultz) 2 

Nicaragua 

Aid to the Nicaraguan Democratic Resist- 
ance (Reagan) 1 

Situation in Nicaragua (White House 

statement) 82 

Oceans. Fisheries Negotiations and Trade 

Opportunities (Wolfe) 64 

Pacific. American Foreign Policy: Oppor- 
tunities and Challenges (Powell) 51 

Pakistan. Pakistan's President Zia, U.S. 

Ambassador Die in Plane Crash (Shultz, 

Whitehead) 69 

Philippines. Secretary's Trip to East Asia 

and the Pacific (Shultz) 21 

Presidential Documents 

Aid to the Nicaraguan Democratic 

Resistance 1 

Captive Nations Week, 1988 

(proclamation) 57 

Helsinki Human Rights Day, 1988 

(proclamation) 57 

38th Report on Cyprus (message to the 

Congress) 50 

27th Anniversary of the Berlin Wall .... 50 



Visit of Icelandic Prime Minister (Palsson, 

Reagan) 49 

Visit of Kuwaiti Prime Minister (Reagan, 
Sabah) 60 

Publications 

CSCE Semiannual Report Released 86 

Department of State 86 

Refugees. Situation in Vietnam, Cam- 
bodia, and Laos (Lambertson) 40 

Science & Technology. U.S. Views on 
Waste Exports (Bernthal) 67 

Security Assistance. FY 1989 Assistance 
Requests for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (Abrams) 72 

Thailand. Secretary's Trip to East Asia 
and the Pacific (Shultz) 21 

Trade 

Fisheries Negotiations and Trade Oppor- 
tunities (Wolfe) 64 

Secretary's Trip to East Asia and the 
Pacific" (Shultz) 21 

U.S. Export Control Policy: Its Present 
and Future Course (Wendt) 46 

Treaties. Current Actions 83 

U.S.S.R. 

ABM Treaty Review Session Opens 
(White House statement) 40 

Nuclear Testing Talks Open Round Three 
(White House statement) 39 

U.S. -Soviet Union Conduct First Phase of 
JVE (White House statement) 39 

United Nations 

U.S. Assessments for the United Nations 
(Goodman) 70 

U.S. Human Rights Policy An Overview 
(Dobriansky) 54 

Vietnam. Situation in Vietnam, Cambodia, 
and Laos (Lambertson) 40 

Western Hemisphere 

American Foreign Policy: Opportunities 
and Challenges (Powell) 51 

FY 1989 Assistance Requests for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (Abrams) . 72 

Secretary Shultz Visits Latin America 
(Acevedo, Cabrera, Lopez, Madrigal, 
Shultz) 2 

Name Index 

Abrams, Elliott 72 

Acevedo Peralta, Ricardo 2 

Bernthal, Frederick M 67 

Cabrera Hildago, Alfonso 2 

Dobriansky, Paula 54 

Goodman, Dennis C 70 

Lambertson, David F 40 

Lopez Contreras, Carlos 2 

Madrigal Nieto, Rodrigo 2 

Milam, William B 43 

Murphy, Richard W 61 

Palsson, Thorsteinn 49 

Powell, Colin L 51 

Reagan, President 1,49,50,57,60 

Sabah, Saad al-Abdallah al-Salim Al ... 60 

Shultz, Secretary 2,21,69 

Sofaer, Abraham D 58 

Wendt, E. Allan 46 

Whitehead, John C 69 

Wolfe, Edward E 64 



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e Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 88 / Number 2140 



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n^parintpni oi Siaip 

bulletin 



Volume 88 / Number 2140 / November 1J 



The Department ok State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public Com- 
munication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and govern- 
ment agencies with information on de- 
velopments in U.S. foreign relations 
and the work of the Department of 
State and the Foreign Service. The 
Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
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and other supportive material (such as 
maps, charts, photographs, and graphs) 
are published frequently to provide ad- 
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but should not necessarily be inter- 
preted as official U.S. policy 
statements. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

CHARLES REDMAN 

Assistant Secretary 
for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

COLLEEN LUTZ 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

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Assistant Editor 



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CONTENTS 



FEATURE 

1 Prospects for A New Era of World Peace (President 
Reagan) 

5 U.S. Releases Funds to United Nations (White House 

Statement) 

6 Security Council Permanent Members Meet With 

Secretary General (Joint Communique) 



he President 

) Foreign Policy Achievements 

he Secretary 

) The Administration's Approach 
to Middle East Peacemaking 

! Proposed Refugee Admissions 
for FY 1989 
The International Legacy of 
Dn Martin Luther King, Jn 

frica 

Southwest Africa Negotiations 
(Chester A. Crocker, Joint 
State)iients, White House 
Statement) 

irms Control 

ABM Treaty Review Conference 

Ends (U.S. Statement) 
JVE Carried Out in Soviet 

Union (White House 

Statement) 
25th "Hot Line" Anniversary 

(White House Statement) 

department 

1 Foreign Language Competence 
in the Foreign Service 
(Ronald I. Spiers) 



East Asia 



23 



24 
26 



Developments in Malaysia and 

Singapore (David F. 

Lambertson) 
Malaysia — A Profile 
Singapore — A Profile 



Economics 

27 



Export of U.S. Satellite to China 
for Launch (Department 
Statement) 



Europe 

28 



31 



Soviet Foreign Minister Visits 

Washington (Secretary Shidtz, 

Joint Statonent) 
20th Anniversary of Warsaw 

Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia 

(President Reagan) 



Human Rights 

33 Human Rights: A Western 
Cultural Bias? (Richard 
Schifter) 

International Law 

36 The War Powers Resolution 
(Aljraham D. Sofaer) 

Military Affairs 

40 Military Power and Diplomacy: 
The Reagan Legacy 
(Michael H. Armacost) 



Narcotics 

44 T^sk Force on Narcotics Meets 
in Washington (Chairman's 

Statement) 



Pacific 

46 Palau Supreme Court Rules 
Compact Not Approved 
(Department Statement) 



Refugees 

46 U.S. Responds to Southern 
Africa Refugee Crisis 
(Jonathan Moore) 



Western Hemisphere 

48 Chilean Plebiscite (Department 
Statement) 



Treaties 

48 Current Actions 

Press Releases 

50 Department of State 

Publications 

50 Department of State 

Index 







K^1.A 






President Reagan at the United Nations 



The members of the United Nations must be aligned on the side of 
justice rather than injustice, peace rather than aggression, human 
dignity rather than subjugation. 



UN General Assembly 
September 26, 1983 



The responsibility of this Assembly — the peaceful resolution of disputes 
between peoples and nations — can be discharged successfully only if 
we recognize the great common ground upon which we all stand: our 
fellowship as members of the human race, our oneness as inhabitants 
of this planet, our place as representatives of billions of our country- 
men whose fondest hope remains the end of war and to the repression 
of the human spirit. 



UN General Assembly 
September 24, 1984 



For over 40 years, this organization has provided an international 
forum for harmonizing conflicting national interests and has made a 
significant contribution in such fields as peacekeeping, humanitarian 
assistance, and eradicating disease. 



UN General Assembly 
September 22, 1986 



The Charter has a concrete practical meaning today because it touches 
on all the dimensions of human aspiration . . . the yearning for democ- 
racy and freedom, for global peace, and for prosperity. 



UN General Assembly 
September 21, 1987 




FEATURE 
UN General Assembly 



Prospects for 

A New Era 
of World Peace 

President Reagan's Address 

before the UN General Assembly 

on September 26, 1988} 



Half a world away from this place of 
peace, the firing, the killing, the blood- 
shed in two merciless conflicts have, for 
the first time in recent memory, dimin- 
ished. After adding terrible new names 
to the roll call of human horror — names 
such as Halabjah, Maydan Shahr, and 
Spin Buldak — there is, today, hope of 
peace in the Persian Gulf and 
Afghanistan. 

So, too, in the highlands and 
coastal cities of southern Africa — places 
of civil war, places of occupation by for- 
eign troops — talk of peace is heard, 
peace for the tortured nation of Angola. 
Sixty-five hundred miles east, in the 
Southeast Asian country of Cambodia, 
there is hope now of a settlement — the 
removal of Vietnam's occupying forces. 
And, finally, in this hemisphere, where 
only 12 years ago one-third of the peo- 
ple of Latin America lived under demo- 
cratic rule, some 90% do so today. And, 
especially in Central America, nations 
such as El Salvador, once threatened by 
the anarchy of the death squad and the 
specter of totalitarian rule, now know 
the hope of self-government and the 
prospect of economic growth. 

And another change — a change 
that, if it endures, may go down as one 
of the signal accomplishments of our 
history; a change that is a cause for 
shaking of the head in wonder is also 
upon us; a change going to the source 
of postwar tensions and to the once 
seemingly impossible dream of ending 
the twin threats of our time: totalitar- 
ianism and thermonuclear world war. 



For the first time, the differences be- 
tween East and West — fundamental 
differences over important moral 
questions dealing with the worth of the 
individual and whether governments 
shall control people or people control 
governments — for the first time, these 
differences have shown signs of easing; 
easing to the point where there are not 
just troop withdrawals from places like 
Afghanistan but also talk in the East of 
reform and greater freedom of press, of 
assembly, and of religion. Yes, funda- 
mental differences remain. But, should 
talk of reform become more than that — 
should it become reality — there is the 
prospect of not only a new era in 
Soviet-American relations but a new 
age of world peace. For such reform can 
bring peace, history teaches, and my 
country has always believed that where 
the rights of the individual and the peo- 
ple are enshrined, war is a distant 
prospect, for it is not people who make 
war — only governments do that. 

A Moment of Hope 

I stand at this podium, then, in a mo- 
ment of hope — hope, not just for the 
peoples of the United States or the So- 
viet Union but for all the peoples of the 
world; and hope, too, for the dream of 
peace among nations, the dream that 
began the United Nations. 

Precisely because of these changes, 
today the United Nations has the op- 
portunity to live and breathe and work 
as never before. Already, you, Mr 



)epartment of State Bulletin/November 1988 



Secretary General [Javier Perez de 
Cuellar], through your persistence, pa- 
tience, and unyielding will, have shown, 
in working toward peace in Afghanistan 
and the Persian Gulf, how valuable the 
United Nations can be. And we salute 
you for these accomplishments. 

In Geneva at this very hour, there 
are numerous negotiations underway — 
multilateral negotiations at the Confer- 
ence on Disarmament as well as bilat- 
eral negotiations on a range of issues 
between the Soviets and ourselves. And 
these negotiations, some of them under 
UN auspices, involve a broad arms con- 
trol agenda — strategic offensive weap- 
ons and space, nuclear testing and 
chemical warfare — whose urgency we 
have witnessed anew in recent days. 

And the negotiators are busy, and 
over the last few years, they've been 
engaged in more than an academic ex- 
ercise. There is movement. The logjam 
is broken. Only recently, when the 
United States and the Soviet Union 
signed the INF [intermediate-i'ange nu- 
clear forces] agreement, an entire class 
of U.S. and Soviet nuclear missiles was 
eliminated for the first time in history. 
Progress continues on negotiations to 
reduce, in massive number, strategic 
weapons with effective verification. 
And talks will begin soon on conven- 
tional reductions in Europe. 

Much of the reason for all of this 
goes back, I believe, to Geneva itself, 
to the small chateau along the lake 
where General Secretary of the Soviet 
Union and I had the first of several 
fireside chats — exchanges characterized 
by frankness, but friendliness, too. I 
said at the first meeting in Geneva that 
this was a unique encounter between 
two people who had the power to start 
world war III or to begin a new age of 
peace among nations. And I also said 
peace conferences, arms negotiations, 
proposals for treaties could make sense 
only if they were part of a wider con- 
text — a context that sought to explore 
and resolve the deeper, underlying dif- 
ferences between us. I said to Mr. Gor- 
bachev then, as I've said to you before, 
nations do not mistrust each other be- 
cause they're armed; they're armed be- 
cause they mistrust each other. 



And in that place, by that peaceful 
lake in neutral Switzerland, Mr. Gor- 
bachev and I did begin a new rela- 
tionship, based not just on engagement 
over the single issue of arms control 
but on a broader agenda about our 
deeper differences — an agenda of hu- 
man rights, regional conflicts, and bi- 
lateral exchanges between our peoples. 
Even on the arms control issue itself, 
we agreed to go beyond the past — to 
seek not just treaties that permit build- 
ing weapons to higher levels but revo- 
lutionary agreements that actually re- 
duced, and even eliminated, a whole 
class of nuclear weapons. 

What was begun that morning in 
Geneva has shown results: in the INF 
Treaty; in my recent visit to Moscow; in 
my opportunity to meet there with So- 
viet citizens and dissidents and speak 
of human rights and to speak, too, in 
the Lenin Hills of Moscow to the young 
people of the Soviet Union about the 
wonder and splendor of human free- 
dom. The results of that morning in 
Geneva are seen in peace conferences 
now underway around the world on re- 
gional conflicts and in the work of the 
United Nations here in New York as 
well as in Geneva. 

But history teaches caution. In- 
deed, that very building in Geneva 
where important negotiations have 
taken place — the Geneva accords on 
Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq negotia- 
tions, for example — we see it today as 
stone-like testimony to a failed dream 
of peace in another time. The Palais des 
Nations was the headquarters of the 
League of Nations — an institution that 
was to symbolize an end to all war. And 
yet, that institution and its noble pur- 
pose ended with the Second World 
War — ended because the chance for 
peace was not seized in the 1930s by 
the nations of the world; ended because 
humanity didn't find the courage to iso- 
late the aggressors, to reject schemes 
of government that serve the state, not 
the people. 

We are here today, determined that 
no such fate shall befall the United 
Nations. We are determined that the 
United Nations should succeed and 
serve the cause of peace for humankind. 



So we realize that, even in this 
time of hope, the chance of failure is 
real. But this knowledge does not dis- 
courage us. It spurs us on, for the 
stakes are high. Do we falter and fail 
now and bring down upon ourselves tl 
just anger of future generations? Or c 
we continue the work of the founders 
this institution and see to it that, at 
last, freedom is enshrined and human 
ity knows war no longer and that this 
place, this floor, shall be truly "the 
world's last battlefield." 

The Agenda of Peace 

We are determined it shall be so. So 
turn to the agenda of peace. Let us 
begin by addressing a concern that \^ 
much on my mind when I met with I\ 
Gorbachev in the Kremlin as well as 
the minds of Soviet citizens that I m 
in Moscow. It is also an issue that I 
know is of immediate importance to 1 
delegates of this assembly who, this 
fall, commemorate the 40th annivers 
of the Universal Declaration of Hum 
Rights. 

That declaration says plainly wh 
those who seek peace can forget onl 
the greatest peril: that peace rests t 
one foundation — observing "the in- 
alienable rights of all members of th 
human family." In a century where 1 
man rights have been denied by tot; 
itarian governments on a scale neve 
before seen in history, with so man\ 
millions deliberately starved or elin 
nated as a matter of state policy — a 
history, it has been said, of blood, s 
pidity, and barbed wire — few can W' 
der why peace has proved so elusivi 

Now let us understand. If we 
would have peace, we must acknowl 
edge the elementary rights of our fi 
low human beings. In our own land 
and in other lands, if we would hav( 
peace, the trampling of the human 
spirit must cease. Human rights is 
for some, some of the time. Human 
rights, as the Universal Declaratioi 
this assembly, adopted in 1948, pro- 
claims, is: "for all people and all na 
tions" — and for all time. 

This regard for human rights a 
the foundation of peace is at the he 
of the United Nations. Those who 
starve in Ethiopia, those who die 



Department of State Bulletin/November 



)8I 



FEATURE 
UN General Assembly 



long the Kurds, those who face racial 
ustice in South Africa, those who 
11 cannot write or speak freely in the 
viet Union, those who cannot wor- 
p in the Ukraine, those who struggle 
life and freedom on boats in the 
uth China Sea, those who cannot 
blish or assemble in Managua — all of 
s is more than just an agenda item 
your calendar. It must be a first 
ncern — an issue above others. For 
len human rights concerns are not 
ramount at the United Nations — 
len the Universal Declaration of Hu- 
m Rights is not honored in these 
lis and meeting rooms — then the very 
dibility of this organization is at 
ike, the very purpose of its existence 
question. 

That is why, when human rights 
ogress is made, the United Nations 
ows stronger, and the United States 
glad of it. Following a 2-year effort 
1 by the United States, for example, 
e UN Human Rights Commission 
ok a major step toward ending the 
luble standards and cynicism that had 
aracterized too much of its past. For 
■ars, Cuba, a blatant violator of its 
:izens' human rights, has escaped UN | 
nsure or even scrutiny. This year, 1 
aba has responded to pressure gener- p 
ed by the Human Rights Commission ■?. 
I accepting an investigation into its 'S 
iman rights abuses. Fidel Castro has ? 
ready begun to free some political ^ 
isoners, improve prison conditions, = 
id tolerate the existence of a small, =^ 
dependent national human rights ;§ 

•oup. - 

More must be done. The United 
ations must be relentless and unyield- 
g in seeking change, in Cuba and 
isewhere. And we must also see to it 
lat the Universal Declaration itself 
nould not be debased with episodes 
ke the "Zionism is racism" resolution. 
Respect for human rights is the first 
nd fundamental mission of this body, 
he most elementary obligation of its 
lembers. Indeed, wherever one turns 
1 the world today, there is new aware- 
ess, a growing passion for human 
ights: the people of the world grow 
nited; new groups, new coalitions 
orm — coalitions that monitor govern- 
nent; that work against discrimination; 





Respect for human rights is the 
first and fundamental mission of 
this body, the most elementary 
obligation of its members. 



department of State Bulletin/November 1988 



that fight religious or political repres- 
sion, unlawful imprisonment, torture, 
or execution. As those I spoke to at 
Spaso House said to me last June, such 
movements make a difference. 

Regional Conflicts 

Turning now to regional conflicts, we 
feel again the uplift of hope. In the gulf 
war between Iran and Iraq — one of the 
bloodiest conflicts since World War II — 
we have a cease-fire. The resolution 
and the firmness of the allied nations in 
keeping the Persian Gulf open to inter- 
national shipping not only upheld the 
rule of law, it helped prevent further 
spread of the conflict and laid the basis 
for peace. So, too, the Security Coun- 
cil's decisive resolution in July a year 
ago has become the blueprint for a 
peaceful gulf. Let this war — a war in 
which there has been no victor or van- 
quished, only victims — let this war end 
now. Let both Iran and Iraq cooperate 
with the Secretary General and the Se- 
curity Council in implementing Resolu- 
tion 598. Let peace come. 

Moving on to a second region: 
When I first addressed the UN General 
Assembly in 1983, world attention was 
focused on the brutal invasion and il- 
legal occupation of Afghanistan. After 
nearly 9 long years of war, the courage 
and determination of the Afghan people 
and the Afghan freedom fighters have 
held sway, and today an end to the oc- 
cupation is in sight. On April 14, the 
U.S.S.R. signed the Geneva accords, 
which were negotiated under UN aus- 
pices by Pakistan and the Kabul re- 
gime. We encourage the Soviet Union 
to complete its troop withdrawal at the 
earliest possible date so that the 
Afghan people can freely determine 
their future without further outside 
interference. 

In southern Africa, too, years of 
patient diplomacy and support for those 
in Angola who seek self-determination 
are having their effect. We look for- 
ward to an accord between the Govern- 
ments of Angola, Cuba, and South 
Africa that will bring about a complete 
withdrawal of all foreign troops — pri- 
marily Cuban— from Angola. We look 
forward as well to full implementation 



of UN Security Council Resolution 435 
and our longstanding goal of independ- 
ence for Namibia. We continue to 
support a growing consensus among 
African leaders who also believe there 
can be no end to conflict in the region 
until there is national reconciliation 
within Angola. 

There are new hopes for Cambodia, 
a nation whose freedom and independ- 
ence we seek just as avidly as we 
sought the freedom and independence 
of Afghanistan. We urge the rapid re- 
moval of all Vietnamese troops and a 
settlement that will prevent the return 
of the Khmer Rouge to power, permit- 
ting, instead, the establishment of a 
genuinely representative government — 
a government that will, at last, respect 
fully the rights of the people of Cam- 
bodia and end the hideous suffering 
they have so bravely and needlessly 
borne. 

In other critical areas, we applaud 
the Secretary General's efforts to struc- 
ture a referendum on the Western Sa- 
hara. And in the Mediterranean, direct 
talks between Greek and Turkish Cyp- 
riot communities hold much promise for 
accord in that divided island nation. 
And finally, we look to a peaceful solu- 
tion to the Arab-Israeli conflict. So, 
too, the unnatural division of Europe 
remains a critical obstacle to Soviet- 
American relations. 

In most of these areas, then, we 
see progress, and, again, we're glad of 
it. Only a few years ago, all of these 
and other conflicts were burning dan- 
gerously out of control. Indeed, the in- 
vasion of Afghanistan and the apparent 
will among democratic and peace-loving 
nations to deter such events seemed to 
cause a climate where aggression by 
nations large and small was epidemic, a 
climate the world has not seen since the 
1930s. Only this time, larger war was 
avoided — avoided because the free and 
peaceful nations of the world recovered 
their strength of purpose and will. And 
now the United Nations is providing 
valuable assistance in helping this epi- 
demic to recede. 

And because we're resolved to keep 
it so, I would be remiss in my duty if I 
did not now take note here of the one 
e.xception to progress in regional con- 
flicts. I refer here to the continuing 



deterioration of human rights in Nic- 
aragua and the refusal of the tiny elite 
now ruling that nation to honor prom- 
ises of democracy made to their own 
people and to the international commu 
nity. This elite, in calling itself revolu- 
tionary, seeks no real revolution; the 
use of the term is subterfuge, decepti( 
for hiding the oldest, most corrupt vi( 
of all — man's age-old will to power, his 
lust to control the lives and steal the 
freedom of others. 

And that's why, as President, I w 
continue to urge the Congress and th 
American public to stand behind thos 
who resist this attempt to impose a tt 
talitarian regime on the people of Nic- 
aragua; that the United States will 
continue to stand with those who are 
threatened by this regime's aggressio 
against its neighbors in Central 
America. 

Today I also call on the Soviet 
Union to show in Central America th 
same spirit of constructive realism it 
has shown in other regional conflicts 
to assist in bringing conflict in Centr 
America to a close by halting the flo- 
of billions of dollars worth of arms ai 
ammunition to the Sandinista regime 
regime whose goals of regional dom- 
ination — while ultimately doomed — i 
continue to cause great suffering to 
people of that area and risk to Sovie 
American relations, unless action is 
taken now. 



Arms Control Negotiations 

Moving now to the arms reduction 
agenda, I have mentioned already t 
importance of the INF Ti-eaty and t 
momentum developed in the START 
[strategic arms reduction talks] neg 
tiations. The draft START treaty is 
lengthy document, filled with brack 
language designating sections of dih 
agreement between the two sides. 1 
through this summer in Geneva, thi 
brackets have diminished; there is 
every reason to believe this process 
continue. I can tell this assembly tl 
it is highly doubtful such a treaty c 
be accomplished in a few months, b 
can tell you, a year from now is a p 
sibility — more than a possibility. B\ 
we have no deadline. No agreement 



Department of State Bulletin/November 8£ 



FEATURE 
UN General Assembly 



;ter than a bad agreement. The 
ited States remains hopeful, and we 
[nowledge the spirit of cooperation 
)wn by the Soviet Union in these ne- 
iations. We also look for that spirit 
be apphed to our concerns about 
npliance with existing agreements. 

So, too, our discussions on nuclear 
iting and defense and space have 
en useful. But let me here stress to 
s General Assembly that much of the 
)mentum in nuclear arms control ne- 
tiations is due to technological prog- 
58 itself, especially in the potential 
space-based defensive systems. I 
lieve that the U.S. determination to 
search and develop and, when ready, 
ploy such defensive systems — sys- 
ms targeted to destroy missiles, not 
ople — accounts for a large share of 
e progress made in recent years in 
■neva. With such systems, for the 
st time, in case of accidental launch 
the act of a madman somewhere, ma- 
r powers will not be faced with the 
igle option of massive retaliation but 
11, instead, have the chance of a saner 
oice — to shield against an attack in- 
sad of avenging it. So, too, as defen- 
je systems grow in effectiveness, they 
duce the threat and the value of 
eater and greater offensive arsenals. 
nly recently, briefings I have received 
the Oval Office indicate that progress 
ward such systems may be even more 
pid and less costly than we had, at 
-st, thought. Today the United States 
affirms its commitment to its Strate- 
c Defense Initiative and our offer to 
lare the benefits of strategic defenses 
ith others. 

And yet, even as diplomatic and 
chnological progress holds out the 
ape of at last diminishing the awful 
cud of nuclear terror we've lived un- 
er in the postwar era, even at this 
loment, another ominous terror is 
)0se once again in the world; a terror 
e thought the world had put behind; a 
rror that looms at us now from the 
mg, buried past; from ghostly, scar- 
ing trenches and the haunting, wan 
aces of millions dead in one of the most 
nhumane conflicts of all time: poison 
;as, chemical warfare — the terror of it; 
he horror of it. We condemn it. 



U.S. Releases Funds 
to United Nations 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 13, 19881 

The President announced today that he 
has signed a determination releasing to 
the United Nations $44 million withheld 
pending reforms in the UN system. 
This action repi-esents recognition of 
the renewed effectiveness of the United 
Nations as an organization serving the 
cause of world peace and stability. 

Reflecting concerns shared by the 
Administration regarding UN admin- 
istrative and budgetary practices. Con- 
gress established requirements for 
release of FY 1988 and 1989 funds for 
U.S. contributions to the United Na- 
tions. The United Nations has made 
progress toward a consensus budget 
process, limitations on secondment of 
staff to the Secretariat, and Secretariat 
staff reductions. The President has de- 
termined that these actions fulfill the 
legislative requirements for release of 
outstanding FY 1988 funds. The Secre- 
tary of State has been directed to in- 
form Congress, as required by law. The 
President expects that similar deter- 
minations will be possible for releasing 
FY 1989 funds as they become 
available. 



The use of chemical weapons in the 
Iran-Iraq war — beyond its tragic human 
toll — jeopardizes the moral and legal 
strictures that have held these weapons 
in check since World War I. Let this 
tragedy spark reaffirmation of the Ge- 
neva protocol outlawing the use of 
chemical weapons. I call upon the sig- 
natories to that protocol, as well as 
other concerned states, to convene a 
conference to consider actions that we 
can take together to reverse the serious 
erosion of this treaty. And we urge all 
nations to cooperate in negotiating a 
verifiable, truly global ban on chemical 
weapons at the Conference on Disarma- 



In addition to adopting important 
organizational reforms, the United Na- 
tions is also undertaking major new 
peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan 
and the Persian Gulf, and prospects for 
further peacekeeping exist in other 
critical areas. In its peacekeeping 
efforts, the United Nations is directly 
serving important, long-term objectives 
of this Administration to end regional 
conflicts and advance peace and free- 
dom around the world. The President's 
action makes it clear that the United 
States is prepared to meet its obliga- 
tions in support of these peacekeeping 
efforts. As an indication of our commit- 
ment to an effective United Nations, 
the President also announced his inten- 
tion to include full funding to meet the 
U.S. contribution to the UN system 
and UN peacekeeping in the FY 1990 
budget, which he will submit to Con- 
gress in January. 

In announcing these decisions, the 
President called on the United Nations 
to continue progress in areas where re- 
form remains incomplete. The Presi- 
dent reiterated the commitment of the 
United States to assist the United Na- 
tions in its reform program as well as 
in its new peacekeeping efforts. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Sept. 19, 1988. 



ment in Geneva. It is incumbent upon 
all civilized nations to ban, once and for 
all — and on a verifiable and global 
basis — the use of chemical and gas 
warfare. 

Finally, we must redouble our 
efforts to stop further proliferation of 
nuclear weapons in the world. Like- 
wise, proliferation in other high-tech- 
nology weapons such as ballistic 
missiles is reaching global proportions, 
exacerbating regional rivalries in ways 
that can have global imphcations. The 
number of potential suppliers is grow- 
ing at an alarming rate, and more must 
be done to halt the spread of these 



3epartment of State Bulletin/November 1988 



weapons. This was a matter of discus- 
sion last week between Secretary 
Shultz and [Soviet] Foreign Minister 
Shevardnadze. Talks between American 
and Soviet experts begin on this today. 
And we hope to see a multilatei-al effort 
to avoid having areas of tension like the 
Middle East become even more deadly 
battlegi-ounds than they already are. 

Progress and Reform 
in the United Nations 

But in most of these areas, we see not 
only progress but also the potential for 
an increasingly vital role for multi- 
lateral efforts and institutions like this 
United Nations. That is why, now more 
than ever, the United Nations must 
continue to increase its effectiveness 
through budget and program reform. 
The United Nations already is enacting 
sweeping measures affecting personnel 
reductions, budgeting by consensus, 
and the establishment of program pri- 
orities. These actions are e.xtremely 
important. The progress on reforms has 
allowed me to release funds withheld 
under congressional restrictions. I ex- 
pect the reform program will continue 
and that further funds will be released 
in our new fiscal year. 

And, let me say here, we congratu- 
late the United Nations on the work it 
has done in three areas of special 
concern. 

• First, our struggle against the 
scourge of terrorism and state-spon- 
sored terrorism must continue. And we 
must also end the scourge of hostage- 
taking. 

• Second, the work of the World 
Health Organization in coordinating 
and advancing research on AIDS [ac- 
quired immune deficiency syndrome] is 
vital. All international efforts in this 
area must be redoubled. The AIDS 
crisis is a grave one; we must move as 
one to meet it. 

• And so, too, is the drug crisis. 
We're moving now toward a new anti- 
drug-trafficking convention. This im- 
portant treaty will be completed in 
December. I am confident other strong 
UN drug control programs will also fol- 
low. The American people are pro- 



Security Council Permanent Members 
Meet With Secretary General 



JOINT COMMUNIQUE, 
SEPT. 28, 1988 

On 28 September 1988, the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs of the five permanent 
members of the Security Council had a 
meeting with the Secretary General of the 
United Nations, H.E. Mr. Javier Perez de 
Cuellar. Taking part in the meeting were 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Peo- 
ple's Republic of China, H.E. Mr. Qian 
Qichen; the State Minister, Minister of For- 
eign Affairs of France, H.E. Mr. Roland 
Dumas: the Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 
H.E. Mr. Eduard A. Shevardnadze; the 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Com- 
monwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the 
Right Honorable Sir Geoffrey Howe; and 
the Secretary of State of the United States 
of America, H.E. Mr. George Shultz. 

The Ministers and the Secretary Gen- 
eral exchanged views on a wide range of 
major international issues. They placed 
particular emphasis on efforts to resolve 
current regional conflicts in accordance 
with the principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations. They noted with satisfac- 
tion the marked improvement in interna- 
tional relations at the global level and the 
general trend towards dialogue and peace- 
ful settlement of disputes which had devel- 
oped since their previous meeting with the 
Secretary General on 25 September 1987. 
They welcomed the active involvement of 
the United Nations in this process. They 
also stressed their continuing confidence in 
the United Nations, which they believed 
had an increasingly significant role to play 
in the achievement of international peace 
and security. The Ministers expressed 



foundly concerned and deeply angered. 
We will not tolerate the drug traf- 
fickers. We mean to make war on them, 
and we believe this is one war the 
United Nations can endorse and par- 
ticipate in. 

Yes, the United Nations is a better 
place than it was 8 years ago — and so, 
too, is the world. But the real issue of 
reform in the United Nations is not 



their determination to continue to work 1 
gether to enhance these positive 
developments. 

The Ministers welcomed the cease-fi 
between Iran and Iraq which came into 
effect on 20 August 1988. They also wel- 
comed the start of direct talks between t 
parties under the auspices of the Secret; 
General in order to secure full implemer 
tion of Security Council Resolution 598. 

The Secretary General briefed the 
Ministers on his current efforts to conso 
date the cease-fire in all its aspects and 
bring about a settlement in accordance 
with the resolution. The Ministers reitei 
ated their complete support for the Seer 
tary General's endeavors and their 
determination to work in cooperation wi 
him to ensure that the resolution be full 
implemented as an integral whole. They 
also expressed the conviction that the t 
parties now had before them the opport 
nity to reach a comprehensive, just, hoi 
able and durable peace. They urged the 
need for substantive and continuous tal 
and, in this respect, they welcomed the 
decision to continue the talks on 1 Octo 
They called on both sides to display re- 
straint, flexibility and readiness to sea 
for mutually acceptable solutions. 

The Ministers thanked the Secreta 
General for his invitation to the meetii 
which they considered most useful. In 
of the primary responsibility of the Se- 
curity Council under the Charter for tl 
maintenance of international peace and 
curity, they expressed their determina ^ 
to continue to work together for the pi 
vention and settlement of Internationa 
conflicts. ■ 



limited just to fiscal and administrt 
improvements but also to a higher 
of reform — an intellectual and phik 
sophical reform, a reform of old vie 
about the relationship between the 
vidual and the state. 



Department of State Bulletin/November 33 



Closing Reflections 

^nd yet, we Americans champion free- 
iom not only because it's practical and 
Jeneficial but because it is also just, 
iiorally right. And here, I hope you'll 
Permit me to note that I have ad- 
iressed this assemblage more than any 



FEATURE 
UN General Assembly 



•eedom and 

:onomic Development 

'W developments, for example, have 
en more encouraging to the United 
ates than the special session this 
dy held on Africa IVz years ago — a 
ssion in which the United Nations 
ined as one in a call for free market 
centives and a lessening of state con- 
ols to spur economic development. - 

At one of the first international as- f 
mblies of my presidency, in Cancun, ^ 
e.xico, I said that history demon- t 

rates that, time and again, in place i 
ter place, economic growth and hu- I 
an progress make their greatest f- 

rides in countries that encourage eco- | 
)mic freedom; that individual farmers, == 
borers, owners, traders, and manag- "^ 
s are the heart and soul of develop- - 
ent. Ti-ust them, because where 
ey're allowed to create and build, 
here they're given a personal stake in 
ciding economic policies and benefit- 
g from their success, then societies 
came more dynamic, prosperous, pro- 
•essive, and free. We believe in free- 
5m. We know it works. 

And this is the immutable lesson of 
16 poswar era: that freedom works; 
/en more, that freedom and peace 
ork together. Every year that passes, 
/ery where in the world, this lesson is 
iking hold, from the People's Republic 
:' China to Cameroon; from Bolivia to 
otswana; and, yes, in the citadel of 
[arxism-Leninism itself. No, my coun- 
•y did not invent this synergy of peace 
nd freedom, but, believe me, we im- - 
ose no restrictions on the free export = 
f our more than two centuries of expe- "^ 
ience with it. Free people blessed by t 
conomic opportunity and protected by i 
iws that respect the dignity of the in- I 
ividual are not driven toward war or ^ 
he domination of others. Here, then, is § 
he way to world peace. ^ 



Bilateral Meetings 




With President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe. 




With Deputy Prime Minister/Foreign Minister Esmat Abdel Meguid of Egypt 
and Vice Prime Minister Shimon Peres of Israel. 



department of State Bulletin/November 1988 



of my predecessors and that this will be 
the last occasion I do so. So, I hope, 
too, I may be permitted now some clos- 
ing reflections. 

The world is currently witnessing 
another celebration of international 
cooperation; at the Olympics, we see 
nations joining together in the competi- 
tion of sports, and we see young peo- 
ple, who know precious little of the 
resentments of their elders, coming to- 
gether as one. 

One of our young athletes, from a 
home of modest means, said that she 
drew the strength for her achievement 
from another source of wealth. "We 
were rich as a family," she said, about 
the love she was given and the values 
she was taught. 

I dare to hope that, in the senti- 
ment of that young athlete, we see a 
sign of the rediscovery of old and tested 



Father, passed on in the first farewell 
address made to the American people. 
It is a truth that I hope now you'll 
permit me to mention in these remarks 
of farewell; a truth embodied in our 
Declaration of Independence: that the 
case for inalienable rights, that the idea 
of human dignity, that the notion of 
conscience above compulsion, can be 
made only in the conte.xt of higher law; 
only in the conte.xt of what one of the 
founders of this organization. Secretary 
General Dag Hammarskjold, has called 
"devotion to something which is greater 
and higher than we are ourselves." 

This is the endless cycle, the final 
truth to which humankind seems al- 
ways to return: that religion and moral- 
ity, that faith in something higher, are 
prerequisites for freedom and that jus- 
tice and peace within ourselves is the 



...the real issue of reform in the 
United Nations is not limited just 
to fiscal and administrative 
improvements but also to a higher 
sort of reform ...a reform of old 
views about the relationship 
between the individual and the 
state. 



values, values such as family — the first 
and most important unit of society, 
where all values and learning begin; an 
institution to be cherished and pro- 
tected. Values, too, such as work, com- 
munity, freedom, and faith — for it's 
here we find the deeper rationale for 
the cause of human rights and world 
peace. 

And our own experience on this 
continent — the American e.xperience — 
though brief, has had one unmistakable 
encounter, an insistence on the preser- 
vation of one sacred truth. It is a truth 
that our first President, our Founding 



first step toward justice and peace in 
the world and for the ages. 

Yes, this is a place of great debate 
and grave discussions, and yet, I cannot 
help but note here that one of our 
Founding Fathers — the most worldly of 
men, an internationalist — Benjamin 
Franklin, interrupted the proceedings 
of our own Constitutional Convention to 
make much the same point. And I can- 
not help but think this morning of other 
beginnings. Of where and when I first 
read those words, "and they shall beat 
their swords into plowshares" and 
"your young men shall see visions and 



your old men shall dream dreams." Thi 
morning, my thoughts go to her who 
gave me many things in life but whose 
most important gift was the knowledge 
of happiness and solace to be gained in 
prayer. It's the greatest help I've had i 
my presidency, and I recall here Lin- 
coln's words when he said only the mo 
foolish of men would think he could co 
front the duties of the office I now hoi 
without turning to someone stronger, 
power above all others. 

I think then of her and others lik( 
her in that small town in Illinois — gen 
tie people who possessed something 
that those who hold positions of powe 
sometimes forget to prize. No one of 
them could ever have imagined the be 
from the banks of the Rock River woi 
come to this moment and have this op 
portunity. But had they been told it 
would happen, I think they would ha 
been a bit disappointed if I'd not spo 
ken here for what they knew so well: 
that when we grow weary of the wor 
and its troubles, when our faith in h- 
manity falters, it is then that we mu 
seek comfort and refreshment of spii 
in a deeper source of wisdom, one 
greater than ourselves. 

And so, if future generations do 
say of us that, in our time, peace cai 
closer, that we did bring about new- 
sons of truth and justice, it will be 
cause for pride. But it shall be a cai 
of greater pride still if it is also said 
that we were wise enough to know t 
deliberations of great leaders and gi 
bodies are but overture, that the tn 
majestic music — the music of freedo 
of justice and peace — is the music vc 
in forgetting self and seeking in sile 
the will of Him who made us. 

Thank you for your hospitality i 
the years. I bid you now farewell, a 
God bless you. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Oct. 3, 1988; 
USUN press release 77. ■ 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1Bi: 



HE PRESIDENT 



foreign Policy Achievements 



President Reagan's radio address 
' ///( nation on August 27, 1988} 

want to talk to you today about some 
iMul things that are happening around 
e world, a move toward peace that 
(iws how successful this nation's com- 
iitinent to peace through strength has 
Vvu. 

in the Persian Gulf, a cease-fire 
IS been declared in one of this era's 
list horrible conflicts, the Iran-Iraq 
ir. In Asia, half the Soviet Union's 
\asion force has left Afghanistan, and 
e rest are due out early next year. In 
lutheast Asia, Vietnam has promised 
w ithdraw its occupation force from 
ambodia. In southern Africa, we're 
■iikering an agreement that may lead 
the departure of all Cuban and South 
frican forces from Angola. And we 
'ein to have a more constructive rela- 
iinship with the Soviet Union because 
the Afghanistan withdrawal, human 
i;hts improvements, and the INF 
reaty that eliminates an entire class of 
.S. and Soviet nuclear missiles. 

Peace is gaining ground, but the 
lins haven't just come in the last few 
lOnths. It's taken IV2 years of effort, 
^e came into office convinced that the 
ord "peace" is just an empty slogan 
nless the word "strength" follows hard 
pon it. Peace is a godly thing, but 
len are seldom godly. What we've 
■arned is that peace is hard to achieve 
nless the forces of good have the 
:rength to stand firmly for it. 

Before we took office in 1981, the 
lobe was reeling from an e.xplosion of 
iternational turbulence. Our nation 
ad neglected its defenses for years 
'hile some assured us that a passive 
Linerica would enjoy a peace that was 
lore, not less, secure. But that's not 
ow things turned out. Soon we saw 
Vietnam invade Cambodia and the So- 
iet Union invade Afghanistan. Iraq 
nd Iran began their war during this 
leriod as well. Over and over, we 
Americans saw that when our nation 
Ices not maintain her strength peace 
lias no anchor in the world. 



Our resolve was tested early on. 
The Soviet Union had deployed highly 
destabilizing intermediate-range mis- 
siles in Europe and Asia, a threat to 
peace. With our NATO allies, we went 
to the Soviets with a proposal: get rid 
of those missiles, we said, before we 
match them with missiles of our own. 
And the Soviets turned us down. They 
were daring us to deliver, and we did. 
Our determination, and that of our al- 
lies, to see our missiles installed in Eu- 
rope convinced the Soviet Union that 
the days of unilateral disarmament 
were over. And once the Soviets 
learned they could not intimidate us or 
cajole us into giving them the advan- 
tage, they came to the bargaining 
table. They did business because we 
proved we meant business. 

We also meant business when we 
said we would not sit idly by as noble 
and brave Afghan freedom fighters re- 
sisted an invasion of their country. Our 
aid to the Afghan resistance has been 
of critical importance in the Soviet deci- 
sion to go home. Once again, they did 
business because we proved we meant 
business. 

In Angola, Jonas Savimbi's UNITA 
[National Union for the Total Inde- 
pendence of Angola] has been fighting 
for 13 years against the Mar.xist regime 
and its Cuban protectors. In 1975, 
President Gerald Ford wanted to help, 
but some in Congress felt our standing 
with the freedom fighters would only 
prolong hostilities. A law was passed 
that made aid illegal, and the war 
dragged on. The Cubans multiplied. In 
1985 Congress repealed the law and be- 
gan supporting UNITA. Now the 
Cubans are talking of a pullout. They're 
doing business because we showed 
them we meant business. We've proved 
that we can stand united as a country 
that means business — business for 
peace. 

Our bipartisan policy in the Per- 
sian Gulf has been to stand firm against 
Iranian aggression and for the principle 
of free navigation. Now the Iran-Iraq 
war is coming to a close. Why? One 
reason, as retired Admirals Elmo Zum- 



walt and Worth Bagley put it, was that 
the allied naval operation designed to 
be a deterrent worked. 

Contrast these successes with the 
tragic situation in Nicaragua. It's been 
almost 2 years since Congress has ap- 
proved any military aid to the brave 
freedom fighters there. Here's the re- 
sults: the Sandinistas come to the bar- 
gaining table making promises to bring 
democracy and end the war, and then 
they violate those promises with im- 
punity. They kick out our ambassadors, 
oppress their people, arrest their op- 
position, muzzle the media, and engage 
in vicious assaults on civilians to get 
them to stop aiding the freedom fight- 
ers. They feel free to do all this be- 
cause they do not believe that we mean 
business. 

Our policy of peace through 
strength has been vindicated wherever 
it's been tried. There is still time to 
turn the tide in Nicaragua. We 
shouldn't be overly optimistic, for free- 
dom still faces serious challenges, 
whether in South Asia or Eastern Eu- 
rope. But the future for world peace is 
bright if we Americans continue to 
stand firm, stand tall, and stand for 
freedom. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Sept. 5, 1988. 



department of State Bulletin/November 1988 



THE SECRETARY 



The Administration's Approach 
to IVIiddle East Peacemaking 



Secretary Shultz's address before 
the Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy ut the Wye Plantation in 
Queenstown, Maryland, on September 
16, 198S.'^ 

Decision time is approaching in the 
Middle East. In Israel and Lebanon, 
within the Palestinian community, and 
in the gulf, choices will be made that 
will have a profound impact on the pol- 
itics of the region and on the chances of 
settling conflicts peacefully. These deci- 
sions must be based on a dispassionate 
and cold look at reality. 

For nearly 9 months, the United 
States has highlighted a simple but far- 
reaching reality in the Arab-Israeli con- 
flict: The status quo between Arabs and 
Israelis does not work. It is not viable. 
It is dangerous. It contains the seeds of 
a worsening conflict that threatens to 
inflict even greater losses on all sides in 
the future. 

The Arab-Israeli conflict is not 
static. Today potentially far-reaching 
changes are taking place. But the fun- 
damental nature of the conflict and the 
principles for resolving it have not 
changed. Indeed, continuity and con- 
stancy appear even more important in 
the process of resolving this conflict. 
The challenge facing the ne.xt Admin- 
istration will be to shape change by 
building on the fundamental constants. 
This will serve U.S. interests and en- 
hance the prospects for peace. 

What is the shape of the Middle 
East today? 

• The Palestinian uprising in the 
West Bank and Gaza has not altered 
the fundamental nature of the Arab- 
Israeli conflict. It's a reminder that 
comprehensive peace requires peace be- 
tween Israelis and Palestinians. And 
it's a reminder that the status quo 
serves the interests of no party. 

• Jordan's disengagement from the 
West Bank hasn't ended Jordan's in- 
volvement in the peace process. Jordan 
has its own interests to pursue. Jor- 
dan's border with Israel is the longest 
of any, and much of its population is 
related by family ties to residents of 
the West Bank and Gaza. The shaping 
of Jordan's role in negotiations and in a 
settlement are among the key issues 
that need to be assessed by all parties. 



• Israel's upcoming elections only 
highlight the intense and continuing de- 
bate within that country about peace. 
People are taking a hard look at the 
prospects for peace, and they are ask- 
ing hard questions: Should Israel trade 
land for peace? Will continued occupa- 
tion affect the democratic and Jewish 
nature of the State of Israel? What 
should Israelis do about Palestinian 
rights? Are other Arabs ready to ac- 
cept Israel as a neighbor and make 
peace? 

• The options before the Palestin- 
ians also have not changed. Palestin- 
ians are grappling with tough choices. 
Should they renounce terrorism and vi- 
olence and choose a political course to- 
ward peace? How should they move 
beyond empty slogans toward realistic 
and responsible positions to give new 
life to the peace process? 

• Elsewhere in the region, change 
and constancy are key words. In 
Lebanon, a new president is scheduled 
to be elected amidst hopes that this will 
give a push to the process of national 
reconciliation. All Lebanese recognize 
the dangers that would result from a 
failure to elect a president according to 
the constitution. 

• Iran and Iraq are now negotiat- 
ing under UN auspices to bring an end 
to 8 years of bloody and destructive 
war in the gulf The results of these 
talks will have a profound influence on 
the entire region. 

• Ballistic missiles and chemical 
weapons continue to proliferate. The 
use of chemical weapons by both sides 
in the gulf war and Iraq's use of these 
weapons against the Kurds are grim re- 
minders of the dangers these weapons 
pose to the conduct of international 
relations. 

• In Afghanistan, Soviet troops are 
withdrawing. The people of Afghan- 
istan look forward to the end of Soviet 
intervention. 

Continuity in the 
Midst of Change 

So, the fact of change is less important 
than the uses made of change. The 
Arab-Israeli conflict does not stand 
still. But there are enduring realities 
that point to a mehod for resolving the 
conflict. 



The Arab-Israeli conflict is not 
intractable. Negotiations can bring 
about peace. No matter what new situ- 
ations or difficulties Arabs and Israelis 
face as they approach negotiations, one 
thing is certain once they get there: 
They will confront some enduring real- 
ities that shape the rules of the nego- 
tiations and the outlines of a fair 
settlement that negotiations can be ex- 
pected to produce. 

What are the principles that undei 
lie a comprehensive settlement of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict? 

The existence, security, and well- 
being of Israel are the first principles 
of any settlement. Israel has the right 
to exist, and it has the right to exist ii 
security. We will do our utmost to en- 
sure it. 

The requirements of security need 
to be understood clearly. These includ 
military hardware, defensible geo- 
graphic positions, and technological 
know-how. The United States has coop 
erated with Israel on these elements, 
and that cooperation will continue. Bu 
these are not the only critical compo- 
nents of Israel's security. 

Real security results from resolv- 
ing political differences that continue 
fuel conflict. The location of borders i: 
important, but more important is wh£ 
crosses those borders: ideas, goods, 
people, instead of armies and weapon.' 
Borders need to be secure and recog- 
nized, but political differences betwee 
neighbors also need to be resolved 
through compromise. 

Palestinian political rights must 
also be recognized and addressed. Pal 
estinians want more than the basic ne 
cessities of life. They want, and they 
are entitled to, political participation 
and influence over political and eco- 
nomic decisions that affect their lives. 
This can occur if opportunities for 
peace and dialogue are seized. 

A third enduring reality is that tl* 
history, security, and destiny of Is- 
raelis, Jordanians, Palestinians, and 
Egyptians are inextricably bound to- 
gether. Jordan is a vibrant and hetera 
geneous society with a strong national 
identity of its own. It is not a Palestii 
ian state. An enduring settlement mv 
reflect the reality that strong, open r 
lations will need to exist among Israe 



10 



Department of State Bulletin/November 19 1 

t 



THE SECRETARY 



^Palestinian, Jordanian, and Egyptian 
)eoples. 

A critical and enduring reality is 
hat negotiations work. Ten years ago, 
Sgypt and Israel forged a treaty of 
jeace that has survived enormous 
trains. They continue to demonstrate 
;hat dialogue and negotiations resolve 
lifferences between peoples far better 
;han war and violence. 

Pranslating Principles 

Into a Negotiated Settlement 

(American efforts to bring about nego- 
;iations are rooted in these enduring 
Drinciples. Our approach seeks a com- 
prehensive and durable settlement 
p-ounded in UN Security Council Reso- 
utions 242 and 338. It calls for direct 
legotiations, launched, if required, 
hrough an international conference. It 
■equires acceptance of 242 and 338 and 
'enunciation of violence and terrorism. 

As regards the West Bank and 
jiaza, our approach highlights the need 
"or a transitional period to help the par- 
,ies adjust to working with each other 
,0 implement an agreement. It recog- 
lizes the relationship in time and sub- 
stance between the transitional period 
md the final status agreement. It 
iffirms the right of Palestinians to par- 
.icipate actively in every stage of nego- 
.iations. And it reflects the strategic 
-eality of Jordanian-Palestinian 
nterdependence. 

This has been the American ap- 
proach to negotiations. The purposes of 
.his effort have been clear. 

First, the objective is comprehen- 
iive peace between Israel and all its 
leighbors, achieved through negotia- 
tions based on UN Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338. This will re- 
quire the exchange of territory for 
Deace. It will require recognition that 
sovereignty cannot be defined in abso- 
ute terms. Today, borders are porous. 
Dpenness is required for the free move- 
ment of ideas, people, and goods. There 
will need to be a border demarcation 
but not a wall established between 
peoples. 

The territorial issue needs to be 
addressed realistically. Israel will never 
negotiate from or return to the lines of 
partition or to the 1967 borders. But it 
must be prepared to withdraw — as Res- 
olution 242 says — "from territories oc- 
cupied in the recent conflict." Peace 
and security for all sides are at stake. 
|i Second, peace between Israel and 
its neighbors will need time and grow- 



ing mutual good will to succeed. In the 
case of the West Bank and Gaza, this 
means there must be a transitional pe- 
riod. All sides need to deal with one 
another gradually in the light of an 
agreement freely negotiated. All need 
time to adjust to a new situation. Pal- 
estinians need to achieve rapid control 
over political and economic decisions 
that affect their lives. Israelis need 
time to adjust to a new situation — one 
in which Palestinians, not Israeli mili- 
tary government officials, administer 
the West Bank and Gaza. 

The concept of transition is vital 
and far reaching. Many of its elements 
have already been worked through and 
accepted by Israel. These transitional 
arrangements are extensive and dra- 
matic. They can be implemented 
quickly. 

Such transitional arrangements will 
benefit from the interplay with final 
status negotiations. Each party needs 
to know the principles that will define 
the final settlement. As those princi- 
ples are hammered out in negotiations, 
they will enhance the transitional ar- 
rangements themselves. Each element 
strengthens the other. This is the es- 
sence and benefit of interlock between 
transitional arrangements and final 
status. 

Direct negotiations are at the heart 
of this negotiating process. No party 
should be expected to trust its vital 
national security interests to any mech- 
anism except direct talks. How better 
to engage an adversary, take his mea- 
sure, assess intentions, and probe for 
openings than to square off across the 
table? Direct talks work. 

In the Arab-Israeli conflict, an in- 
ternational conference may also be nec- 
essary to ease the entry of the parties 
into direct negotiations. This confer- 
ence would also be in a position, at the 
right time, to deal with important re- 
gionwide issues such as economic devel- 
opment, joint resource sharing, and 
humanitarian concerns. But only the 
right kind of conference should take 
place — one that helps launch and sup- 
port direct negotiations without inter- 
fering in them. 

Palestinian participation is required 
at every stage of the negotiations. Pal- 
estinians have a vital stake in the out- 
come of negotiations. They must have a 
say in the negotiations themselves, and 
they must approve the outcome. 

Participation involves respon- 
sibilities, however. There are no free 
rides. All parties must demonstrate 



their desire to make peace. They must 
be creative and reliable; they must ad- 
here to internationally accepted princi- 
ples and norms. For Palestinians, this 
means acting credibly and pursuing 
goals that are achievable. 

No participant in a peace process 
can wave the flag of justice in one hand 
and brandish the weapons of terrorism 
in the other. All participants must re- 
nounce violence and terrorism. Each 
must agree to negotiate on the ac- 
cepted international basis of Security 
Council Resolutions 242 and 338. 

There are also no free rides for 
outside parties that want to play a role 
in settling the conflict. Both the United 
States and the Soviet Union consider a 
settlement of the conflict to be in their 
national interest. But the Soviets will 
need to confront some difficult choices. 

There is no longer any excuse for 
the Soviets to avoid such important 
steps as resuming full diplomatic rela- 
tions with Israel; nor is there justifica- 
tion for preventing Jews who wish to 
emigrate from doing so. The sooner 
these things are done, the better for 
the peace process. 

Effective Policies 

in a Period of Change 

The challenge of Arab-Israeli peace- 
making in a time of change is to find 
the right mix of fundamental realities 
and creative ideas. The question is how 
to assess some of these ideas at this 
time. 

• Peace cannot be achieved through 
the creation of an independent Palestin- 
ian state or through permanent Israeli 
control or annexation of the West Bank 
and Gaza. At the same time, each party 
is free to bring any position it chooses 
to the negotiating table. Israelis are 
free to argue for annexation; Palestin- 
ians are free to argue for independence. 
The United States will not support 
either of these positions during 
negotiations. 

• The status of the West Bank and 
Gaza cannot be determined by uni- 
lateral acts of either side but only 
through a process of negotiations. A 
declaration of independent Palestinian 
statehood or government-in-exile would 
be such a unilateral act. Palestinians 
need to decide whether to remain a 
part of the problem in the Middle East 
or become a part of the solution. His- 
tory need not repeat itself Practical, 
realistic steps by Palestinians are 
required. 



THE SECRETARY 



• An attempt by Israel to transfer 
Palestinians from the West Bank and 
Gaza would also be a unilateral act to 
determine the status of those territo- 
ries. The United States would oppose 
this vigorously. Such a policy does not 
provide a solution to the problem, nor 
does it bring negotiations any closer. 

• It is also not acceptable to shift 
the focus from what Palestinians or Is- 
raelis need to do to advance the peace 
process to what the United States 
should do. This applies to those who 
urge that the United States should sup- 
port Palestinian self-determination. 

The United States cannot accept 
"self-determination" when it is a code- 
word for an independent Palestinian 
state or for unilateral determination of 
the outcome of negotiations. To expect 
the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organi- 
zation] to accept Resolutions 242 and 
338 as the basis for negotiation is not 
to ask it to make a concession. Those 
resolutions lay out basic principles 
which the international community has 
decided must be reflected in a peace 
settlement. In addition to these, the 
legitimate rights of the Palestinian peo- 
ple — including political rights — must 
also be addressed. It is through accept- 
ance of these principles, not through 
any action by the United States, that 
the Palestinians can participate fully in 
determining their own future. 

Conditioning the 
Environment for Negotiations 

In the Arab-Israeli conflict, there is no 
objective reality and no immutable set 
of circumstances that cannot be shaped 
by decisions for peace. During the pe- 
riod ahead, such decisions are required. 
Israelis and Palestinians themselves 
must condition the environment for ne- 
gotiations. They can start down the 
road to accommodation and reconcilia- 
tion. Violence has distracted people 
from establishing achievable objectives. 
Political debate must replace violence. 

Concrete actions on the ground are 
required. Palestinians must renounce 
terrorism and violence. They must 
accept the right of Israel to exist in 
peace and present themselves as a 
viable negotiating partner. They cannot 
murder or threaten other Palestinians 
who maintain contact with Israeli 
authorities. 

For its part, Israel has the respon- 
sibility to maintain law and order in the 
West Bank and Gaza. But Israel must 
also find a way to respond to expres 
sions of Palestinian grievances. It can- 



12 



not claim there is no one to talk to, 
while suppressing political expression 
and arresting or deporting those who 
speak out — even those who speak in 
moderate terms. 

There must also be actions on the 
regional level. The peace treaty be- 
tween Egypt and Israel is a strategic 
anchor of the entire peace process; it 
must constantly be enhanced. Relations 
between Israel and other Arab states 
must start down the road to normaliza- 
tion. Relations between people don't 
need to await the formality of a treaty. 
Israelis and Arabs should find ways to 
talk to each other now, even before 
treaty relations exist. 

The conditions under which refu- 
gees live in the region must also be 
addressed. Poverty is no ally of peace. 
The continuing existence of refugees 
does not make the case for Palestinian 
nationalism stronger. Palestinian refu- 
gees can live in better conditions even 
while the search for peace continues. 
Arabs and Israelis, together with the 
international community, must shoulder 
this responsibility. 

Finally, there must be a change of 
attitude throughout the region. The 



way people think affects the way they 
act. Cynicism, skepticism, and pessi- 
mism about peace must be shaken. The 
conflict must be seen to be resolvable. 
Once there is the will for and belief in 
settlement, the benefits of peace will 
be seen to outweigh the real but tran- 
sitory risks of achieving it. 

So fundamental realities persist, 
even in the midst of change. The goals 
of the peace process have not changed, 
nor have the principles of negotiations. 

Indeed, the only thing that needs 
to change is the willingness of people ii 
the Middle East to move the peace 
process forward. Israehs, Palestinians, 
Jordanians, Syrians, and Lebanese can 
make peace happen. The Egyptians an 
more than ready to do their part. So 
are we. And so are others around the 
world. The opportunities today are 
greater than before, and so are the 
risks of doing nothing. To make peace, 
the parties must exploit the new oppoi 
tunities created by the current fer- 
ment. And thev should start now. 



'Press release 199 of Sept. 19, 1988. 
Question-and-answer session not printed 
here. ■ 



Proposed Refugee 
Admissions for FY 1989 



Secretary Shultz's statement before 
the Senate Judiciary Coynmittee on 
September 13, 1988.^ 

I am pleased to be here this morning 
once more to present the President's 
proposal for refugee admissions for 
fiscal year (FY) 1989. During my tenure 
as Secretary, I have taken particular 
pride in testifying before this commit- 
tee about one of the most satisfying 
foreign policy endeavors the United 
States undertakes — our assistance to 
refugees. 

It is customary to discuss U.S. aid 
to refugees in the context of the hu- 
manitarian purposes of our foreign pol- 
icy. Indeed, humanitarianism is the 
principal motive behind our programs 
on refugee issues. Yet it is worth em- 
phasizing at the outset of these re- 
marks that we have benefited greatly 
as a nation by opening our doors to the 
displaced and politically oppressed. We 
know from generations of experience 
that every wave of refugees that has 
come to our shores has made enormous 



contributions to all sectors of our soci- 
ety. Just look at those who fled from 
Nazi Germany, from the Soviet Union, 
from Indochina, and from Cuba. The 
contributions to this nation fi-om the 
refugees who have sought sanctuary 
here are incalculable. Thus, U.S. refu- 
gee policy is an area where our ideals, 
our humanitarian instincts, and our in- 
terests coincide. 

I would like to review with you to 
day the principles which have shaped 
this Administration's refugee assistanc 
and admissions policies and the accom- 
plishments that have come from the 
programs we have pursued. I want the 
to cover briefly the major refugee is- 
sues we face today and also summarize 
the situation which prompted the emei 
gency consultations in April which led 
us to increase the admissions ceiling f( 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 
Finally, I will present the President's 
proposal for refugee admissions in fisc; 
year 1989. 



Department of State Bulletin/November 19{ 



THE SECRETARY 



Let me also draw your attention to 
le most recent World Refugee Report 
[ibmitted by the Department of State. 
t contains substantial information on 
le situation of refugees around the 
'orld. In addition, you will find the 
etailed justification for the President's 
reposals in the document Proposed 
efugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 
)89, submitted by the U.S. Coordi- 
ator for Refugee Affairs, who is with 
16 here, Mr. Jonathan Moore. 



lESOURCES 

efore I address specific refugee is- 
jes, I want to say a word about re- 
Durces. There are limited resources 
railable for the foreign affairs budget 

the United States. At the same time, 
lere are increased refugee needs, both 
ir assistance and admissions overseas, 
inal action has not yet been taken on 
le FY 1989 foreign assistance appro- 
riations for the refugee progi-am. The 
mference on that bill will occur next 
eek. I urge the conferees to remove 
le earmarks in both the House and 
enate bills. If all of these earmarks at 
18 President's requested funding level 

came law, over half of the migration 
id refugee assistance appropriation 
ould be earmarked, and the unmarked 
rograms — which provide lifesaving 
upport to refugees in camps in Africa, 
latin America, the Near East, and 
(outheast Asia — would have to be cut 
y 25% across the board to absorb the 
lerease outside the request level. We 
eed to drop the earmarks on both the 
jgular and the emergency refugee 
^counts. 



EFUGEE ASSISTANCE POLICY 

bout two-thirds of refugee funds help 
rovide the most basic food, shelter, 
ledical care, education or training, and 
rotection for people in camps who 
ave fled human rights abuses, famine, 
ivil war, or invasions. Today the vast 
lajority of the nearly 13 million refu- 
ees are found in Asian and African 
ountries. International refugee as- 
istance bolsters these countries' re- 
olve to continue to welcome asylum- 
eekers. The United States has a long- 
tanding tradition of providing diplo- 
latic leadership and substantial 
inancial resources to ensure protection 
nd care and maintenance programs for 
efugees in camps overseas. 



As political conditions permit, this 
assistance enables thousands of refu- 
gees to return to their countries of ori- 
gin. This solution requires political 
conditions which, unfortunately, are not 
foreseeable in the near term for the 
majority of the world's refugees. 

U.S. refugee assistance in first- 
asylum nations is made more efficient 
by combining it with the resources of 
other nations through international ref- 
ugee assistance organizations. We con- 
centrate our refugee program resources 
on these international assistance pro- 
grams, spending about twice as much 
on the 99% of refugees who remain 
overseas as we do to resettle the refu- 
gees admitted each year to the United 
States. 



REFUGEE ADMISSIONS POLICY 

Our refugee admissions policy reflects 
the oft-quoted words of Emma Lazarus 
on the Statue of Liberty. To the "poor, 
huddled masses yearning to breathe 
free," we want to offer the same oppor- 
tunities for a new home in a new land 
that were e.xtended to our own fore- 
fathers. The Refugee Act of 1980 de- 
fines who we may admit as refugees. 
Each year we must make choices con- 
cerning which refugees we will admit 
and in what numbers. These decisions 
follow naturally from our refugee ad- 
missions policy, which provides reset- 
tlement when repatriation or local 
resettlement is not possible or first 
asylum is not secure. 

There are four significant objec- 
tives of our admissions policy. 

First, each year, in cooperation 
with the UNHCR [UN High Commis- 
sioner for Refugees], refugees who face 
perilous protection problems in their 
countries of first asylum are resettled 
quickly and quietly. Released political 
prisoners, as from Cuba, are also reset- 
tled. We hope soon to begin resettling 
large numbers of Vietnamese reeduca- 
tion center detainees as well. 

Second, our willingness to resettle 
refugees encourages other nations to 
maintain responsible pohcies of first 
asylum. This applies not only in South- 
east Asia but also in Western Europe, 
which has a long tradition of offering 
asylum. 

Third, we have a special, ongoing 
commitment to offer resettlement to 
refugees overseas who have family in 
the United States or close ties here 
through employment or education. 



Whenever possible, we save refugee ad- 
missions numbers by channeling family 
reunion cases through regular immigra- 
tion channels. The long waiting periods 
for immigrant visas and the difficulties 
under which refugees exist overseas, 
however, do not allow for easy switch- 
ing of refugees onto an immigrant 
track. 

The fourth objective of our admis- 
sions policy is to deter refugees from 
jeopardizing their own safety by ensur- 
ing an orderly flow of refugees through 
special negotiated direct-departure pro- 
grams. Such programs also ensure that 
persons who do not qualify for refugee 
admission are not stranded in a third 
country. 



REAGAN ERA 
ACCOMPLISHMENTS 
IN REFUGEE AFFAIRS 

When President Reagan took office, the 
refugee act was not yet a year old. The 
successful implementation of this legis- 
lation, which weighs the individual's 
claim to persecution more heavily than 
any other factor in refugee determina- 
tions, is H significant accomplishment of 
the Reagan years and, I might say, an 
accomplishment that proceeded with 
very strong bipartisan support. It's 
been a very fine program from that, 
among other, points of view. 

Southeast Asia 

Let me first turn to Southeast Asia. 
Worldwide, our overriding priority in 
the 1980s has been assisting and reset- 
tling Indochinese refugees. We began 
by processing refugees on beaches as 
they stepped off boats or swam to shore 
from sinking crafts. Working closely 
with our voluntary agency partners, 
since FY 1981, we have processed and 
admitted over 400,000 Indochinese refu- 
gees— 37,000 Highland Lao, 60,000 
Lowland Lao, 116,000 Cambodians, and 
200,000 Vietnamese. 

We recently proposed a comprehen- 
sive package of measures designed to 
dissuade people fi'om the dangers of 
clandestine departure while preserving 
the principle of first asylum. A compre- 
hensive solution depends, in part, on a 
concerted effort of the Southeast Asian 
nations. Hong Kong, and the resettle- 
ment nations to urge the Government 
of Vietnam to expand further the Or- 
derly Departure Program (ODP). The 
effective operation of legitimate, na- 



ijtepartment of State Bulletin/November 1988 



13 



THE SECRETARY 



tional screening programs monitored by 
the UNHCR would ensure that bona 
fide refugees are recognized and given 
first asylum. Those deemed not to be 
refugees should be cared for by the in- 
ternational community until they can 
return safely to their homes. Refugees 
should have the opportunity to apply 
for resettlement, and resettlement 
countries must continue to offer hope 
for a new life to these victims of per- 
secution through generous resettlement 
programs. The United States has by far 
the strongest resettlement commitment 
to Indochinese refugees. We have main- 
tained that steady commitment since 
1975 and will continue to do so in the 
future. 

In July, I met with the foreign 
ministers of the Southeast Asian na- 
tions during the ASEAN [Association 
of South East Asian Nations] minis- 
terial meetings in Bangkok. We dis- 
cussed the elements of this strategy 
and agreed that our common search for 
a solution to the region's refugee prob- 
lems would be advanced if we formed a 
working group composed of first-asylum 
and resettlement countries. 

Orderly Departure Program. The 

Orderly Departure Program gives peo- 
ple the hope for a new life without 
their having to resort to dangerous and 
clandestine departures. Before this 
committee in 1984, I had the honor to 
announce President Reagan's human- 
itarian initiative for the resettlement in 
the United States of Amerasians and 
the reeducation center prisoners. In 
1986, we reached a bilateral agreement 
with Vietnam to expedite resettlement 
of Amerasian children. 

Since 1984, progress on the reset- 
tlement of reeducation center detainees 
has been disappointingly slow. In July 
1988, we had very encouraging bilateral 
talks in Hanoi. At that time, both sides 
committed themselves to an early sec- 
ond meeting in Hanoi in order to begin 
processing within several months. It 
appeared that the United States and 
Vietnam had successfully separated 
their political differences on Cambodia 
from what has become our shared inter- 
est in expanding humanitarian coopera- 
tion between our countries. 

For reasons not satisfactorily ex- 
plained, the Vietnamese decided to 
take exception to recent Administration 
testimony which reaffirmed longstand- 
ing U.S. policy on the conditions for 
the normalization of diplomatic rela- 
tions with Vietnam — that is, Vietnam's 
departure from Cambodia. They an- 
nounced a "temporary suspension" of 
cooperation with us on the POW/MIA 



[prisoner of war/missing in action] issue 
and on the resettlement of reeducation 
center detainees. We were pleased that 
on August 30 they lifted the suspension 
on POW/MIA cooperation. But we re- 
main deeply disappointed on the con- 
tinued suspension of progress on the 
resettlement of the detainees. 

In my address at the ASEAN 
postministerial meeting in July, I 
stated that the United States holds no 
hostile feelings toward Vietnam as a re- 
sult of the war in Indochina. In fact, we 
look forward to the time when we will 
be able to enter into normal diplomatic 
and commercial relations with Vietnam. 
Today we call upon Vietnam to help 
heal one of the most painful wounds 
remaining from the war — by responding 
favorably to the wish of thousands of 
reeducation center detainees to be al- 
lowed to be reunited with their families 
in the United States or to come with 
their families to our country. 

We recently reaffirmed our read- 
iness to have our delegation return to 
Hanoi for the planned second meeting 
and, we hope, complete an agreement. 
We hope Vietnam will lift its "tempor- 
ary" suspension of cooperation with us 
on this compelling humanitarian issue. 

Thai-Cambodian Border. In the 

wake of the fall of the Pol Pot regime, 
hundreds of thousands of fearful Cam- 
bodians fled toward Thailand for food 
and medical care. Once there, hundreds 
died from exhaustion due to severe mal- 
nutrition or disease. American officials 
and private citizens provided emer- 
gency care to help these people. And 
the United States has continued since 
then to provide assistance through the 
UN Border Relief Operation (UNBRO). 
We support UNBRO and ICRC [Inter- 
national Committee of the Red Cross] 
initiatives across the board to improve 
protection and education for these 
300,000 Cambodians. 

Latin America and the Caribbean 

Mariel Migration Agreement. A major 
accomplishment of recent years is the 
migration agreement of 1984 with Cuba, 
which finally put an end to the history 
of the 1980 Mariel boatlift by encom- 
passing a return of excludable Cubans 
to Havana. Under the resumed migra- 
tion agreement, we expect to resettle 
approximately 3,000 Cuban political 
prisoners and family members annually 
through the refugee program and the 
Attorney General's parole authority. We 
will continue to consider for admission 
all of the political prisoners who wish 
to apply. 



Salvadoran Refugee Repatriation- j 

During the past year, the Central 
American refugee situation has been 
alleviated somewhat by the voluntary 
repatriation of more than 6,700 Sal- 
vadoran refugees from camps in Hon- 
duras through arrangements monitorec 
by the UNHCR. The latest group re- 
turned to El Salvador in mid-August, 
and there are indications that further 
repatriations may occur in the future. 

Africa 

By far the largest refugee emergencie 
involving life and death have been in 
Africa. In the past 8 years, the Reaga 
Administration has taken the lead in 
the multilateral responses to crises in- 
volving millions of refugees from 19 di 
ferent African nations. 

Ethiopia. With respect to Ethi- 
opia, currently we are deeply con- 
cerned by the refugee problems which 
threaten war-torn and famine-stricken 
Ethiopia — for many years a country 
better known for producing refugees 
than for absorbing them. Over 300, 00( 
refugees from the civil war in souther 
Sudan have poured into Ethiopia. In 
addition, over 400,000 refugees have 
fled armed conflict between governme 
forces and rebels in northern Somalia 
We are working with the UN agencies 
and other donors to avoid a major hu- 
manitarian disaster. 

Mozambique. The Department's 
report on the situation of Mozambicar 
refugees in southern Africa underline 
the need to pay heed to refugee popul 
tions as we consider our policy alter- 
natives in any region of the world. 
Malawi has been overwhelmed by ove: 
600,000 Mozambican refugees, but thi 
people of Malawi and President Band: 
have reinforced their solid humanitari 
reputation by accepting the presence 
this enormous burden. 

Near East and South Asia 

Afghanistan. There are more than 3 
million Afghan refugees in Pakistan— 
the largest refugee population in the 
woHd. Since 1979, the United States 
has provided over $600 million in refii 
gee assistance, including over $370 m 
lion worth of food. The late President 
Zia ul-Haq and the people of Pakistar 
have offered their land and their hosf 
tality to Afghan refugees for nearly a 
decade. Now these refugees appear t 
have the possibility to return to their 
homes in the near future. There are 



14 



THE SECRETARY 



btitacles to that repatriation — includ- 
ig the critical danger of land mines 
trewn throughout Afghanistan by So- 
iet military forces — but we hope that a 
irge number of the Afghan refugees 
'ill be able to return home in the com- 
ig year 

Palestinian Refugees. The oldest 
Dntinuing refugee population involves 
le Palestinian refugees in the Near 
last. The UN Relief and Works 
gency for Palestine Refugees in the 
Fear East (UNRWA) continues to pro- 
ide basic educational, medical, and re- 
ef services to Palestinian refugees in 
ebanon, Syria, Jordan, the West 
ank, and Gaza. It is vital that 
fNRWA should continue providing 
jrvices, especially in the West Bank 
nd Gaza. I salute the dedicated staff of 
'NRWA and, especially, Robert Dillon, 
le American deputy director general 
■ho is leaving that organization after 4 
ears of energetic and compassionate 



MERGENCY CONSULTATIONS 
hJ FY 1988 

hroughout the Reagan Administration, 
nd consistently since World War II, 
He United States has vigorously cham- 
ioned the cause of freedom of emigra- 
lon from the Soviet Union. In the past 
ear, after an 8-year period of only min- 
nal and unacceptable emigration, the 
loviet Union has granted exit permits 
■) tens of thousands of persons — pri- 
larily Jews, Armenians, ethnic Ger- 
lans, and some Pentecostalists. All 
:her Soviet citizens, however, have vir- 
lally no opportunity to emigrate. 



We applaud the emigration policy 
reforms in the Soviet Union, but we 
urge the Soviet Government to comply 
fully with the emigration provisions of 
the Helsinki Final Act. International 
human rights standards recognize the 
right to emigrate and to return to one's 
country but not to immigrate into any 
country of one's choosing. Standards 
and limits to immigration are deter- 
mined by national decision and legisla- 
tion. The United States has responded 
generously, but we, too, have limits set 
by the immigration and refugee laws 
relating both to eligibility criteria and 
to the numbers we can absorb. 

Two fundamental issues have 
emerged from this experience with So- 
viet resettlement. 

One is budgetary: In a time of se- 
verely constrained budgets, how do we 
ensure that we will have adequate re- 
sources to support an unexpected out- 
flow of emigrants from the Soviet 
Union without damaging other critical 
foreign policy programs? 

The second is legal: Can all Soviet 
emigrants be admitted under the refu- 
gee provisions of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act? With the commence- 
ment of INS [Immigration and Natu- 
ralization Service] processing in 
Moscow, INS has confirmed that not all 
potential emigrants meet the statutory 
definition of refugee under the act. We 
must, therefore, seek alternate immi- 
gration channels for those who do not 
meet the statutory definition in order 
to offer realistic options to such 
persons. 

We learned this year that there are 
occasions when our foreign policy 
goals — encouragement of liberalized 



Proposed U.S. Refugee Admissions for FY 1989 



Region 

ast Asia 

First Asylum 

Orderly Departure Program^ 
astern Europe/Soviet Union 
lear East/South Asia 
atin America/Caribbean 
,frica 

ubtotal 

Inallocated (Private Sector) 
OTAL 



Proposed 
Ceilings' 


Minimum Fully 
funded Level 


28,000 

25,000 

24,500 

7,000 

3,500 

2,000 


22,000 

17,000 

21,000 

6,000 

3,000 

1,500 


90,000 


70,500 


4,000 


4,000 


94,000 


74,500 



Assuming adequate funding, 
ncluding Amerasian immigrants. 



emigration policy, for one — dictate a 
need for flexibility in order to admit 
groups of people who do not immed- 
iately or neatly fit into current 
immigrant or refugee categories. Un- 
fortunately, such flexibility is not cur- 
rently available in immigration law. We 
believe that greater flexibility is an 
urgent foreign policy and humanitarian 
need, which we would like to address, 
together with Congress, over the com- 
ing months. One possibility would be a 
new category of immigrant visa. This is 
described in greater detail in my ex- 
tended testimony. 



PROPOSED REFUGEE 
ADMISSIONS FOR FY 1989 

We are here this morning to address 
the President's proposed ceilings for 
refugee admissions for FY 1989. The 
Refugee Act of 1980, which established 
this consultative process, states: 

. . . the President shall report to the 
Committees on the Judiciary of the House 
of Representatives and of the Senate re- 
garding the foreseeable number of refugees 
who will be in need of resettleinent during 
the fiscal vear and the anticipated alloca- 
tion of refugee admissions during the fiscal 
year 

Last year, during both the regular 
and the emergency consultations, we 
set refugee admissions numbers that 
were higher than the funds available for 
the admissions program. This led to 
confusion and disappointment as the 
year went on and the money ran out. I 
am, therefore, very reluctant to begin 
the fiscal year with an admissions ceil- 
ing higher than that for which funds 
will be available. 

Unfortunately, we do not yet know 
what funds we will have available for 
FY 1989. Neither the appropriations for 
HHS [Department of Health and Hu- 
man Services] nor for the State Depart- 
ment has been enacted. The HHS FY 
1989 appropriations bill provides fund- 
ing to support up to 90,000 refugee and 
Amerasian admissions for 24 months. 

In the current fiscal year, the State 
Department had $338.45 million avail- 
able for refugee programs funded out of 
the migration and refugee assistance 
account, including refugee admissions 
and assistance programs. The Presi- 
dent's budget request for refugees for 
FY 1989 — constrained as it is by 
Gramm-Rudman-HoUings and the bi- 
partisan budget agreement — is $340 
million. The bill adopted by the House 
provides $361.95 million but requires 
that $23.5 million be transferred to 



iepartment of State Bulletin/November 1988 



15 



THE SECRETARY 



HHS, leaving a net amount of $338.45 
million. The Senate bill provides the 
same $361.95 million. The Senate bill 
does not require a transfer to HHS but 
does earmark $140 million for refugee 
and Amerasian immigrant admissions. 
The conference on these two bills is 
scheduled to begin ne.xt week. 

If the final bill provides the State 
Department $338.45 million— the same 
amount as last year— we will have new 
funds to admit only 68,500 persons. If 
the final bill provides $361.95 million, 
including the $140-million earmark for 
admissions, we will have new funds to 
admit 82,000 refugees and Amerasian 
immigrants. That is the Senate version. 
In addition, we estimate that carryover 
funds from the FY 1988 dire emergency 
supplemental will be available to fund 
an additional 2,000 refugee admissions. 
Therefore, the potential fully funded 
admissions level is between 70,500 and 
84,000, depending on the final appropri- 
ation. With regard to fully funded ad- 
missions, at no time will we operate at 
a rate higher than that for which funds 
are available in the migration and refu- 
gee assistance account. 

Establishing the ceiling requires 
balancing our humanitarian and foreign 
policy goals, refugee eligibility require- 
ments, domestic resettlement capacity, 
and estimated costs. For FY 1989, 
therefore, despite my misgivings and 
my desire to be absolutely clear to the 
Congress and not to mislead anyone 
about actual admissions levels, we are 
proposing an aggregate, worldwide ceil- 
ing for refugee and Amerasian immi- 
grant admissions of 94,000. It is 
comprised of three elements: 

• Up to 84,000 fully funded admis- 
sions — that's on the assumption we get 
the positive numbers that I outlined 
here; 

• Up to 6,000 which would be par- 
tially funded by HHS, as they are ap- 
propriated up to 90,000, and partially 
by the private sector; and 

• Up to 4,000 reserved for the sep- 
arate, private sector program. 

The 6,000 partially funded numbers 
will cover a group of persons, some of 
whom would be eligible for HHS- 
funded benefits and some who could be 
admitted without any Federal funding 
whatsoever. Therefore, we are not 
seeking additional Federal funds to fi- 
nance these 6,000 admissions. In addi- 
tion, we propose to continue the 
current allocation of 4,000 numbers for 
the fully privately funded admissions 
initiative. This private sector initiative 



has already benefited hundreds of 
Cuban refugees in fiscal year 1988. 

Once the final appropriations for 
FY 1989 are enacted, we will advise 
Congress of our operational plan, by re- 
gion, that is consistent with the actual 
funding available. If the final appropri- 
ations level for the Department of State 
budget would fund 70,500 admissions in 
FY 1989, then we will commence the 
year at an operational level of 70,500. If 
the final appropriations for FY 1989 
fully funds 84,000 admissions in the De- 
partment of State budget and 90,000 
admissions in the HHS budget, we 
would commence the fiscal year with an 
operational plan for 90,000. This plan 
would include the partially funded cate- 
gory of 6,000 persons who would re- 
ceive HHS funding only. 

Proposed Regional Ceilings 

The proposed regional ceilings for the 
90,000 level are shown on p. 15. Also 
included is a possible allocation by re- 
gion which could result at the 70,500 
level, and you have in my testimony 
two columns. I won't read them out, 
but they go by regions. 

A thorough explanation and justifi- 
cation for each of the proposed, federal- 
ly funded refugee admissions levels by 
region is found in the document entitled 
Proposed Refugee Admissions for FY 
1989. I would like to say something 
about the importance of each of the re- 
gional admissions levels, however. 

East Asia: First Asylum. The level 
of 28,000 in the President's request re- 
sponds to the currently high number of 
Vietnamese boat people in camps (in- 
cluding new arrivals since January 1988) 
and puts us in a position to take some 
additional longstayers (which is part of 
the new comprehensive strategy for 
Southeast Asia), should we wish to do 
so. In a period when first asylum has 
significantly eroded, this level is 
needed to encourage the ASEAN coun- 
tries to continue humane reception and 
treatment of refugees. 

East Asia: Orderly Departure 
Program. The proposed level of 25,000, 
which includes 13,000 refugees and 
12,000 Amerasian immigrants, exceeds 
the FY 1988 admissions ceiling by 
16,500. An expanding ODP is vital as 
an alternative to boat departures and is 
a vital part of our strategy for that 
region. The level also provides for sev- 
eral thousand former reeducation camp 
detainees and their accompanying rela- 
tives, to whom, after 6 years of nego- 
tiations, we hope to start gaining 
access in the coming fiscal year. 



Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union. We have determined that, 
within the overall total that we are rec 
ommending for inclusion in the refugee 
program, a total of 24,500 be allocated 
to Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union. We recognize that the number 
of eligible applicants with exit permis- 
sion is unpredictable and may be 
higher, but under the relevant circum- 
stances, we consider this a reasonable 
level. 

Near East and South Asia. The 

suggested level of 7,000 will allow for i 
continuation, albeit at a reduced level 
from FY 1988, of our program to reset 
tie mainly Afghan, Iranian, and Iraqi 
refugees, including a large number of 
religious minorities. Conditions are be 
ginning to stabilize in Afghanistan, 
making it possible for many Afghans t 
return to their homeland. Although th 
hope for an end to the 8-year-long Irai 
Iraq conflict may lead to fewer appli- 
cants, persecution of minorities in Irai 
continues, including the Baha'is, Chris 
tians, and Jews. 

Western Hemisphere. We are con 

mitted to admitting 3,000 former polit 
cal prisoners from Cuba under the 
Mariel migration agreement and have 
humanitarian interest in providing re- 
settlement to certain refugees in Cen- 
tral America for whom repatriation is 
not an option. The ceiling also provide 
for the resettlement of political prison 
ers in Central America. 

Africa. The level of 2,000 admis- 
sions for Africa supports our priority 
for Ethiopian and southern African n 
ugees, for whom protection in their 
counti'ies of asylum is often tenuous. 
The fact that 2,000 is, admittedly, a r 
atively low figure reflects the practic; 
reality that we have difficulty arrangi 
for efficient movements of approved 
Ethiopians from the Sudan. With an 
INS officer in Nairobi now, we expect 
that our access to cases where protec 
tion is a problem will improve. 



CONCLUSION 

I have provided a brief justification oi 
the levels which we would like to see 
established as the refugee admissions 
ceilings. I acknowledge that, at pres- 
ent, we cannot predict what funding 
will be available to admit these refu- 
gees. As the stewards of our refugee 
policy, however, the Administration is 
responsible for ensuring that our higb 
est humanitarian and foreign policy O' 
jectives are reflected in our refugee 



16 



THE SECRETARY 



•ourams. Let me assure you that we 
A'ill endeavor to carry out that respon- 
ubility to the best of our ability. With 
he bipartisan support of Congress, we 
\-i]\ continue in our traditional human- 
tarian spirit to provide for the needs of 
•efugees around the world. 



'Press release 196. The complete tran- 
script of the hearings will be published by 
the committee and will be available from 
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C. 20402. ■ 



The International Legacy 
of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 



Secretary Shidtz's remarks before 
the Washington diplomatic community 
it the Department of State on Sep- 
ember 19. lOSS} 

Normally, on an occasion like this, 
hanking you for coining, recognizing 
A-hat it means that you're here, I would 
alk to you from the heart, so to speak. 
But I felt I wanted to have a message 
hat could be distributed, and to do 
:hat you have to write it out and read it 
)ut. There's no other way in this day 
md age, I've discovered. So I have 
tvritten something out here that I want 
:o read to you and hope that when it's 
riistributed, you might think it was 
vvorth reading over. 

You and I are here today because 
vve care about the legacy — the interna- 
ional legacy — of the Reverend Martin 
Luther King, Jr. In my role as Secre- 
tary of State, I'd like to use this occa- 
don to pay special tribute to him, a 
nan who symbolizes the values and 
deals that are central to the conduct of 
American foreign policy — values I have 
;ried to live up to during my years of 
Dublic service. 

Martin Luther King, Jr., led us to 
5ee that a racially divided society can 
oe healed rather than dismembered. He 
ed a cause whose example now illumi- 
nates struggles for racial justice in the 
most downtrodden corners of the 
Earth. The civil rights movement in 
America is an epic struggle, a legend 
that has transformed the spirit of our 
ountry. And its message resonates 
around the world — a message Martin 
Luther King, Jr., summed up when he 
declared that "every man is heir to the 
legacy of worthiness." 

But it wasn't just Dr. King's mes- 
sage that changed the way Americans 
think about race and opportunity. It 
was the way he taught. It was the way 
he served as an example of civility; the 
way he resisted counsels of rage and 
despair. He was a man of faith and a 
man of dialogue. He knew that no one 



has a monopoly on truth and virtue. He 
wanted people of good will to sit down 
together and resolve their differences. 
He wanted reason and brotherhood to 
prevail. His abiding patience, under- 
standing, and nonviolence in confront- 
ing the tyranny of racism and prejudice 
showed the world the profound differ- 
ence one person can make. 

Today men and women everywhere 
are laying claim to Dr. King's legacy. 
Around the globe, we see a powerful 
impulse toward democratic institutions 
and values. This recent phenomenon 
was first evident in Spain and Portugal 
a decade or so ago. Now in Latin 
America, this drive has changed the po- 
litical complexion of an entire conti- 
nent, from Argentina to El Salvador. In 
the Philippines, despite serious chal- 
lenges, we see how tenaciously people 
are seeking to effect a transition to a 
new democratic way. In South Korea, 
there is a dramatic struggle to create 
new political institutions, and, in 1987 
we witnessed the peaceful transition of 
national leadership through open elec- 
tions. And in South Africa, the struc- 
ture of apartheid is under siege as 
never before. 

In each of these nations — indeed, 
wherever the struggle for democracy 
and human rights is waged today — the 
memory of Martin Luther King, Jr., is 
revered, for he taught us that power 
does not come from the barrel of a gun 
but from firm adherence to moral prin- 
ciples. He showed the world that con- 
flicts can be resolved through reason 
and that significant change can come 
without bloodshed. 

It seems to me that Dr. King's life 
and message have a very special rele- 
vance for those of us in the diplomatic 
community, for what is diplomacy if not 
an attempt to resolve conflicts through 
nonviolent means? In today's conflict- 
ridden world, the pursuit of diplomatic 
solutions calls for persistent effort, for 
dialogue, and a recognition of the need 



for compromise — the very ideals Martin 
Luther King, Jr., spoke of and fought 
for Most importantly, perhaps, effec- 
tive diplomacy today needs the inspira- 
tion of a moral vision — the vision of a 
world where prosperity is com- 
monplace, conflict an aberration, and 
democracy and human dignity a way of 
life. No American has articulated that 
vision more forcefully than Martin 
Luther King, Jr. 

On January 16, people all over the 
world will be honoring the memory of 
Martin Luther King, Jr. I know that 
some of you here today have joined 
with us in the past in celebrating the 
annual King holiday observance, as 
Mrs. King noted. On behalf of all of my 
colleagues here at State, I'd like to 
thank you for your help in making the 
King holiday a truly international 
event. I look forward to your coopera- 
tion once again in January. And I'll still 
be in office on January 16 to look it 
over. [Laughter] 

As an American, I am very proud 
that Martin Luther King, Jr., has come 
to symbolize mankind's struggle for 
peace and freedom, and I am proud 
that the United States has supported 
this struggle around the world. But the 
battle isn't over yet. Here in the 
United States, the forces of racism and 
intolerance are persistent. Despite the 
progress of recent decades, the demo- 
cratic promise of a land where all men 
can live as brothers remains unfulfilled. 
Abroad the world's new democracies 
are confronted by daunting internal and 
external challenges. Meanwhile war, 
oppression, and poverty continue to 
darken the face of our planet. 

So my final message to all of you 
here today is a simple one: Don't de- 
spair of the slow pace of change; hold 
fast to the highest standards of the dip- 
lomatic profession. And continue to 
draw inspiration for the values and per- 
sonal example of Dr. King. He was able 
to help guide a world full of fear, doubt, 
and violence toward greater compassion 
and understanding. Let each of us 
strive to do likewise. At home and 
abroad, let us not flag in our effort to 
keep faith with the dreamer and the 
dream. 



'Press release 200. 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1988 



17 



AFRICA 



Southwest Africa Negotiations 



JOINT STATEMENT, 

GENEVA, 

AUG. 8, 1988 

Delegations of the People's Republic of 
Angola/the Republic of Cuba, the Re- 
public of South Africa, and the United 
States of America met August 2-5, 
1988, in Geneva, Switzerland, to con- 
tinue their efforts to find a peaceful 
solution for the conflict in southwestern 
Africa. 

Building on progress made at Lon- 
don, Cairo, and New York, the negotia- 
tions in Geneva were detailed, positive, 
and productive. The delegations of An- 
gola/Cuba and South Africa agreed on a 
sequence of steps necessary to prepare 
the way for the independence of 
Namibia in accordance with UN Se- 
curity Council Resolution 435 and to 
achieve peace in southwestern Africa. 

They agreed to recommend to the 
Secretary General of the United Na- 
tions the date of November 1, 1988, for 
the beginning of implementation of UN 
Security Council Resolution 435. The 
parties approved, ad referendum to 
their respective governments, the text 
of a tripartite agreement that embod- 
ies, in binding treaty form, the princi- 
ples negotiated at Governors Island in 
New York and formally approved by 
the governments on July 20, 1988. 

On their side, Angola and Cuba re- 
iterate their decision to subscribe to a 
bilateral accord which will include a 
timetable acceptable to all parties for 
the staged and total withdrawal of 
Cuban troops from Angola. The parties 
have undertaken to reach agreement on 
this timetable by September 1, 1988. 

The parties approved a comprehen- 
sive series of practical steps that will 
enhance mutual confidence, reduce the 
risk of military confrontation, and 
create the conditions in the region nec- 
essary to conclude the negotiations. 
With the approval of these measures, a 
de facto cessation of hostilities is now in 
effect. The full effects of these meas- 
ures will become apparent in the weeks 
ahead. 

The next round of negotiations at 
the level of senior officials will take 
place during the week of August 22, 
with the exact date and venue to be 
established. 

All the delegations expressed their 
appreciation for the superb facilities 
and support extended by the Govern- 
ment of Switzerland. 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
AUG. 8. 19881 

The progress made in Geneva last week 
is a step toward bringing independence 
to Namibia and ending military con- 
frontation in southwestern Africa. We 
welcome the decisions taken by the 
Governments of South Africa, Angola, 
and Cuba to begin military disengage- 
ment and to formalize a cease-fire. Also 
important is the setting of target dates 
to begin implementation of UN Se- 
curity Council Resolution 435 and 
agreement on withdrawal of Cuban mil- 
itary forces from Angola. It is imper- 
ative that the parties involved approach 
the next round of meetings seriously 
and constructively in order to resolve 
the one major area of disagreement: a 
mutually acceptable timetable for total 
Cuban troop withdrawal. 



ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

CROCKER. 
GENEVA, 
AUG. 9, 19882 

Geneva, as we see it, represents the 
further acceleration of the pace of work 
in this negotiation, as well as a clear 
commitment by the parties — that is to 
say, Angola/Cuba and South Africa — to 
a number of key political and military 
steps that must now be implemented. 

If those steps are implemented — 
and we have heard the governments 
concerned say that they will be — it 
could mean an early end to the cross- 
border war that has been going on 
since 1975 in this part of Africa. 

The steps agreed at Geneva include 
the decision to recommend to the UN 
Secretary General that November be 
looked at by him as his decision to set a 
date for the implementation of UN Se- 
curity Council Resolution 435. This rep- 
resents a recommendation from the 
parties to the UN Secretary General. 

Second, the parties have set them- 
selves a target for the negotiation of 
the remaining outstanding issues 
which, of course, include the need for 
agreement on a schedule for Cuban 
troop withdrawal from Angola in con- 
junction with the implementation of 
Resolution 435. 

Third, the parties have agreed on 
the text of a trilateral treaty which will 
translate the principles agreed in New 
York in July into a binding interna- 
tional treaty and which, of course. 



would incorporate, by reference, the 
Cuban troop withdrawal schedules that 
would be agreed between now and the 
1st of September. 

Fourth, Geneva represents agree- 
ment on a comprehensive set of steps t 
establish a disengagement of forces, a 
de facto cessation of hostilities and ap- 
propriate mechanisms to assure that 
the commitments agreed in Geneva are 
carried out. 

It is our impression that the cessa 
tion of hostilities took effect yesterday 
that the South African Government ha 
committed itself to a schedule for the 
withdrawal of its remaining forces fror 
Angola. There are additional provision 
agreed at Geneva that concern the ac- 
tivities of the South West Africa Peo- 
ple's Organization (SWAPO) and of 
Cuban forces in Angola in conjunction 
with these other steps. So I use the 
word a "comprehensive" set of steps. 
In addition, of course, there was 
agreement on a series of dates for the 
approval and publicly registering fur- 
ther progress as it is made in the neg( 
tiation; for example, agreement on an 
appropriate timeframe for the signing 
of the interlocking series of agreement 
that needs to be reached as soon as 
possible after agreement is reached or 
Cuban troop withdrawal timing. 

Another point that was registered 
at Geneva is the fact that there were 
in-depth side discussions between us 
and the parties on the necessity for a 
compromise on Cuban withdrawal tim 
ing, and these side discussions lay the 
groundwork for the next meeting whi' 
is scheduled to take place in the week 
of August 22 at a time and place that 
still to be agreed. Some groundwork 
has been laid there for what is clearl> 
going to be a very important round of 
discussions that lies ahead. 

Beyond this, I cannot go into the 
details of all the agreements reached 
Geneva. They are extensive. The par- 
ties have agreed that those commit- 
ments and agreements would be held 
their respective governments at this 
stage, and as far as we are concerned 
they will be so held by us. 

What now remains to be seen is 
whether the political will exists to 
bridge the gap that I have referred tc 
so that these ambitious targets, in fac 
can be met in the negotiation. There 
real work ahead. The New York princ 
pies have been substantially put into 
practice in the sense of a clear packaj 
of steps and agreements being reache 
at Geneva. The path to a settlement, 
a sense, has been cleared, and this 
places focus now on the complex equai 
tion of the timing relationship betwee^ 



18 



Department of State Bulletin/November 19{ 



ARMS CONTROL 



Resolution 435 and a schedule for 
ICuban withdrawal, and how that, in 
jturn, relates to the unresolved question 
f bringing- about an end to the war 
nside Angola between the Angolan 
Government and its National Union for 
the Total Independence of Angola 
[UNITA) opposition. 

In this regard, I think a number of 
joints need to be made very clear. 

F"irst, there will have to be a com- 
promise on Cuban troop withdrawal. 
No one's public position can be imposed 
on anyone else. 

Second, it appears to us that the 
sides understand that point and under- 
stand it very clearly. 

Third, the fact that up until now 
the internal question in Angola has not 
yet been solved and the fact that there 
needs to be a basis for dialogue and 
reconciliation inside Angola. This unre- 
olved question can hamper and post- 
pone a settlement. We are very 
conscious of that, but we are not the 
only ones who are very conscious of it. 

As you know from previous brief- 
ings and other things that you have 
seen, this is a very delicate matter. It 
is an internal matter for Angolans of all 
kinds and persuasions to discuss among 
themselves. It is not formally part of 
the agenda being discussed in these tri- 
partite talks — that is, our mediation be- 
tween Angola/Cuba and South Africa — 
and yet it is obviously in everyone's 
minds. 

In our view, it would be tragic if 
this moment is not seized to bring 
peace to Angolans themselves as well 
as bring peace to southwestern Africa 
in the sense of ending the cross-border 
conflict. 

Our government has no ambition or 
wish to impose an internal settlement 
on Angola, nor do we have the capacity 
to do so. We would point out that 
UNITA has made it crystal clear that it 
is ready to flexibly explore the basis for 
a solution to the unresolved political 
question inside Angola. Until such a so- 
lution is found, there will not be, ob- 
viously, a cease-fire as between the 
Angolan parties; that is to say, the An- 
golan Government and UNITA. And so 
the drain on the economy of Angola 
continues, and that overall situation in- 
side the country would continue. 



JOINT STATEMENT, 
BRAZZAVILLE, 

AUd. 2fi. 1988 

Delegations of the People's Republic of 
Angola/Republic of Cuba and the Re- 
public of South Africa, with the media- 



tion of the Government of the United 
States, met in Brazzaville August 24th 
to 26th [1988] to continue negotiations 
toward a peaceful solution of the con- 
flict in southwestern Afi-ica. During 
this round of the negotiations, the 
terms of a calendar for the redeploy- 
ment to the north and staged and total 
withdrawal of Cuban troops — to be 
agreed between the Governments of the 
People's Republic of Angola and the Re- 
public of Cuba — were examined, as well 
as other issues related to the global 
settlement of the conflict. 

The discussions at Brazzaville were 
serious, detailed, and constructive. 
The delegations exchanged views and 
assessments that could facilitate 
resolution of remaining issues. All 
participants agreed that further con- 
sultations with their respective govern- 
ments were required. They, therefore, 
agreed to meet again during the week 
of September 5 in Brazzaville. 

The delegations expressed their ap- 
preciation for the invitation of the Peo- 
ple's Republic of the Congo and for the 
superb facilities and support extended 
by the Congolese Government during 
the negotiations. 



JOINT STATEMENT, 
BRAZZAVILLE. 
SEPT. 29, 1988 

Delegations of the People's Republic of 
Angola/Republic of Cuba and the Re- 
public of South Africa, with the media- 
tion of the Government of the United 
States, met in Brazzaville September 
26-29 to continue negotiations toward a 
peaceful solution of the conflict in 
southwestern Africa. These meetings 
were a resumption of the round of nego- 
tiations in Brazzaville that began 
August 24-26 and continued Septem- 
ber 7-9. 

The delegations expressed their 
firm intention to resolve the remaining 
issues following consultations with their 
governments. In this connection, they 
agreed to meet again at a date to be 
determined in Brazzaville. They con- 
firmed their previous recommendation 
to the Secretai-y General of the United 
Nations that 1 November 1988 be estab- 
lished as the date for implementation of 
UN Security Council Resolution 435. 

The delegations expressed their ap- 
pi'eciation for the invitation of the Peo- 
ple's Republic of the Congo and their 
sincere gratitude to the Congolese head 
of state, President Denis Sassou- 



Nguesso, for his hospitality and for his 
indispensable contribution to the search 
for peace. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 15, 1988. 

-Made at the opening of a news brief- 
ing; Chester A. Crocker is Assistant Sec- 
retary for African Affairs and heads the 
U.S. delegation. ■ 



ABM Treaty Review 
Conference Ends 



U.S. STATEMENT, 
AUG. 31, 1988 

The United States and the Soviet 
Union conducted the third review of the 
AntibalKstic Missile (ABM) Ti-eaty as 
required at 5-year intervals by the 
provisions of that treaty. The review 
was conducted from August 24, 1988, to 
August 31, 1988. The U.S. delegation 
was led by William F. Burns, Director 
of the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency (ACDA). 

During the review, the United 
States emphasized the importance of 
Soviet violations of the ABM Ti-eaty, 
which are a threat to the viability of 
the treaty. Throughout the review con- 
ference, the Soviet Union gave no indi- 
cation that it was prepared to correct 
the violations without linking their 
agreement to do so to unacceptable 
demands. 

Specifically the United States dis- 
cussed with the Soviets its serious 
concern that the Soviet Union's 
deployment of a large phased-array 
radar near Krasnoyarsk constitutes a 
significant violation of a central ele- 
ment of the ABM Ti-eaty. Such radars 
take years to build and are a key to 
providing a nationwide defense — which 
is prohibited by the treaty. The treaty's 
restrictions on the location, orientation, 
and functions of such radars are, thus, 
essential provisions of the treaty. 
Hence the Krasnoyarsk violation is 
very serious, particularly when it is 
recognized that the radar constitutes 
one of a network of such radars that 
have the inherent potential for attack 
assessment in support of ballistic mis- 
sile defense. 

In oi'der for the Soviet Union to 
correct this violation, the Krasnoyarsk 
radar must be dismantled. The United 
States has been urging the Soviet 
Union for more than 5 years, both in 
the Standing Consultative Commission 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1988 



19 



ARMS CONTROL 



established by the treaty and in other 
diplomatic channels, to correct this 
clear violation by dismantling the 
radar. During the review, the United 
States outlined the specific Soviet ac- 
tions necessary to correct this violation 
in a verifiable manner. The United 
States has also made clear that the con- 
tinuing e.xistence of the Krasnoyarsk 
radar makes it impossible to conclude 
any future arms agreements in the 
strategic arms reduction talks (START) 
or defense and space areas. The United 
States has observed a slowdown in con- 
struction, but this slowdown, or even a 
full construction freeze, would not be 
sufficient either to correct the treaty 
violation or to meet U.S. concerns 
about the significant impact of the 
violation. 

The United States cannot continue 
indefinitely to tolerate this clear and 
serious treaty violation. The viola- 
tion must be corrected. Until the 
Krasnoyarsk radar is dismantled, it will 
continue to raise the issue of material 
breach and proportionate responses. 
Nothing that occurred during the re- 
view conference or its completion 
should be interpreted as derogating in 
any way from rights the United States 
has under international law with regard 
to any Soviet violation of the treaty. 
Since the Soviet Union was not pre- 
pared to satisfy U.S. concerns with 
respect to the Krasnoyarsk radar 
violation at the review conference, the 
United States will have to consider de- 
claring this continuing violation a mate- 
rial breach of the treaty. In this 
connection, the United States reserves 
all its rights, consistent with interna- 
tional law, to take appropriate and pro- 
portionate responses in the future. 

During the ABM Treaty review, 
the United States also discussed the 
violation of the ABM Treaty involving 
the illegally deployed radars at Gomel. 
The United States also reserves its 
rights to respond to this violation in an 
appropriate and proportionate manner. 
The United States also discussed with 
the Soviet Union a number of ABM- 
related compliance concerns, the total- 
ity of which suggests that the Soviet 
Union may be preparing a prohibited 
ABM territorial defense. This is a par- 
ticularly serious concern. As the Presi- 
dent has noted, such a development 
"would have profound implications for 
the vital East-West balance. A uni- 
lateral Soviet territorial ABM ca- 
pability acquired in violation of the 
ABM Ti-eaty could erode our deterrent 
and leave doubts about its capability." 



The United States continues to 
have deep, continuing concerns about 
the implications of the pattern of Soviet 
noncompliance with the ABM Treaty. 
As President Reagan observed in De- 
cember 1987: "No violations of a treaty 
can be considered to be a minor matter, 
nor can there be confidence in agree- 
ments if a country can pick and choose 
which provisions of an agreement it will 
comply with.... Correcting their vio- 
lations will be a true test of Soviet will- 
ingness to enter a more constructive 
relationship and broaden the basis for 
cooperation between our two countries 
on security matters." 

The United States will not accept 
Soviet violations or a double standard 
of treaty compliance and reserves the 
right to take appropriate and propor- 
tionate responses in the future. ■ 



JVE Carried Out 
in Soviet Union 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 14, 19881 

Today, at the Soviet nuclear test site at 
Semipalatinsk, the United States and 
the Soviet Union conducted the second 
and concluding phase of the joint ver- 
ification e.xperiment (JVE). As in the 
successful first phase of the JVE last 
month at the U.S. nuclear test site in 
Nevada, U.S. and Soviet scientists, 
technicians, and observers were present 
to measure the yield of the explosion. 

We believe these experiments have 
demonstrated the effectiveness and 
nonintrusiveness of CORRTEX [contin- 
uous reflectrometry for radius vs. time 
experiment] — our preferred method — 
and should allow the Soviet Union to 
accept its routine use. 

The JVE process is the result of a 
U.S. initiative embodied in the agree- 
ment reached at the Moscow summit, 
which provided for one underground 
nuclear explosion experiment at the 
U.S. test site in Nevada and another at 
the Soviet test site. Following today's 
phase of the JVE, U.S. and Soviet ne- 
gotiators return to Geneva to continue 
the current round of negotiations on 
nuclear testing. Our objective for these 
negotiations is to conclude an agree- 
ment on effective verification measures 
for the unratified Threshold Test Ban 
Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nu- 
clear Explosions Treaty (PNET). 



Today's JVE at Semipalatinsk 
moves us further toward achieving 
agreement on the effective verification 
protocols which are essential for the 
two treaties and reflects the success of 
the Administration's practical and 
measured approach to nuclear testing 
issues. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Sept. 19, 1988. 



25th "Hot Line" 
Anniversary 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
AUG. 30, 19881 

Today marks the 25th anniversary of 
the operational start of the direct com 
munications link or "Hot Line." Since 
its inception, this confidential and rapi 
communication channel has proved to 
be an invaluable tool. Although used 
infrequently, the "Hot Line" has per- 
mitted American Presidents to commu 
nicate with Soviet leaders to reduce 
the risk of conflict which might result 
from accident, miscalculation, or 
misunderstanding. 

Recognizing the need to improve 
our ability to communicate with the Sc 
viet leadership in emergency situation: 
President Reagan proposed in 1984 the 
the "Hot Line" be modernized by 
adding a rapid facsimile capability to 
the existing teletype system. This moc 
ernization was completed in 1986 with 
excellent results, and the United Statt 
and U.S.S.R. have continued to work 
together effectively to maintain the 
highest reliability. 

In 1987 a U.S. initiative resulted i: 
the establishment of the Nuclear Risk 
Reduction Centers (NRRC) as a new 
government-to-government channel 
(separate from the "Hot Line"). The 
modernized "Hot Line" and the 
NRRCs, like other confidence-building 
measures proposed by the President 
since 1981, reflect his continuing commii 
ment to further reduce the risk of war 
Such measures complement our efforts 
to negotiate deep, equitable, and effec- 
tively verifiable reductions in U.S. and 
Soviet nuclear arsenals. These efforts 
will contribute significantly to interna- 
tional stability and will strengthen the 
foundation for peace. 



'Tpxt from Weekly Conipilation of 
Presidential Documents of Sept. 5, 198.S 



20 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1981 



DEPARTMENT 



Iporeign Language Competence 
In the Foreign Service 



ly Ronald I. Spiers 

Stafeuient before the Senate 
hreigii Relations Committee on Sep- 
ember 21, I'JSS. Ambassador Spiers is 
'Jnder Secretary for Management.^ 

(oil have asked for the views of the 
Department on the significance of for- 
'ign language competence in our For- 
'ign Service and on where we stand in 
ifforts to maintain and improve the 
anguage competence of our diplomats 
)verseas. Before I deal with those 
questions, it may be useful to set forth 
;ome facts about the requirements for 
anguage competence and about our 
'fforts to meet those requirements. 

Requirements for 
ianguage Competence 

The United States has diplomatic rela- 
ions with 128 countries in which knowl- 
'dge of a foreign language is considered 
mportant to the successful conduct of 
lur foreign relations. At our missions 
n these countries, there are over 2,000 
Department of State positions that we 
designate as requiring language compe- 
ence in 41 different languages. Most of 
hose 2,000 positions require compe- 
ence in a language that can be used in 
several countries: French. Spanish, Por- 
uguese, German, or Arabic. We also 
leed significant numbers of officers 
vho can speak or read "one country" 
anguages of countries that are critical 
American foreign policy. Russian, 
Jhinese, Japanese, and Korean are ex- 
imples of this category. Our remaining 
anguage needs make up less than one- 
ifth of our total position requirements 
Dut embrace more than 30 languages 
and countries, chiefly in Northern and 
Eastern Europe and East and South 
Asia. 

We meet this need principally by 
raining our Foreign Service officers 
,'FSOs) at the Foreign Service Insti- 
tute (FSI). The institute offers lan- 
guage training in all of the languages 
for which we have language-designated 
positions overseas and is buttressed in 
its efforts by overseas language schools 
in key languages such as Arabic, Jap- 
anese, and Chinese. Its services are 
used not only by the Department of 
State but by many other U.S. Govern- 
ment agencies. 



Normally, our training goal is for 
officers to reach a general professional 
speaking proficiency, defined as "the 
ability to speak the language with suffi- 
cient structural accuracy and vocabu- 
lary to participate effectively in most 
formal and informal conversations on 
practical, social, and professional top- 
ics." An officer who has attained this 
general professional proficiency is said 
to have reached level three in the five- 
level scoring system used by the For- 
eign Service Institute to evaluate lan- 
guage proficiency. Most of our lan- 
guage-designated positions require 
level-three proficiency both in speaking 
and reading the language, this being 
the so-called 3/3 standard. 

Our expectation is that most newly 
appointed FSOs will need training to 
acquire a 3/3 proficiency in any foreign 
language. While many of our candidates 
for appointment have been exposed to 
foreign languages in school or in travel- 
ing, very few of them have sufficient 
mastery to attain the 3/3 level. Accord- 
ingly, existing language proficiency 
does not play a central role in selecting 
Foreign Service officers. We do give 
bonus points in our ranking process to 
candidates who have language profi- 
ciency in the critical hard languages of 
Russian, Chinese, Japanese, and Ara- 
bic, and we do offer higher starting sal- 
aries to newly appointed officers who 
have a tested proficiency in a foreign 
language. 

Nevertheless, we assume that new 
officers will need language training, 
and it is customary for new officers to 
spend time in FSI language training en 
route to their first or second tour over- 
seas. We do require that officers dem- 
onstrate language proficiency that 
meets FSI standards before they may 
be granted tenure as Foreign Service 
officers. 

For the bulk of an officer's career 
after tenure is granted, language com- 
petence or the need for further lan- 
guage instruction to attain that compe- 
tence becomes one of many factors con- 
sidered in meeting job needs overseas, 
as well as in career planning for the 
officer. We try to blend the need for 
language competence with officers' 
overall career needs. One instance of 
that blending is the recent policy deci- 
sion to grant additional length of tenure 
at the middle grades to officers who 
take long-term training — typically 1 or 



2 years in length — in certain critical 
and difficult languages. This practice 
eliminates the possibility that officers 
who take long-term language training 
will be at a disadvantage in competing 
for promotions with their peers. 

Whether by training or through 
placement of an already competent of- 
ficer, our goal is always to have each 
language-designated position filled by 
an officer who meets the desired stand- 
ard. The ideal assignee, however, must 
also have experience in the work he or 
she will do at post, knowledge of the 
region and country, and expertise to 
deal with the key bilateral or multi- 
lateral issues. He or she should be an 
effective representative of the United 
States in the culture that prevails in 
the posted country and be a comple- 
ment to the strengths and weaknesses 
of the rest of the embassy staff Fur- 
ther, he or she should be available for 
posting in a timeframe that dovetails 
with the departure of his or her prede- 
cessor. Finally, the ideal assignee 
should not be needed for a more critical 
assignment and should find that this as- 
signment is compatible with career de- 
velopment and family needs. This list of 
factors is suggestive of the considera- 
tions that sometimes regrettably lead 
to the assignment of officers to posts in 
which they are less than fully compe- 
tent in the host country language. The 
result of this need to balance off many 
different job requirements is that about 
three-quarters of the occupants of our 
language-designated positions currently 
meet the full competency requirements 
of their positions, while one-quarter do 
not. 

Meeting Our Language 
Competence Requirements 

In view of the foregoing, four questions 
might naturally arise. 

First, what could or should the De- 
partment of State do to fill a higher 
proportion of our language-designated 
positions with language-competent 
officers? 

Second, has the Department desig- 
nated the appropriate universe of posi- 
tions for language requirements? 

Third, is the 3/3 standard ade- 
quate, or should officers be held to a 
higher one? 

Finally, one could ask whether the 
Department should be extending its 
language training efforts to cover cler- 
ical and technical employees and/or 
dependents of employees at post. 

Let me comment briefly on each of 

these issues. 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1988 



21 



DEPARTMENT 



Expanding FSO Language Com- 
petence. As to filling more of our lan- 
guage-designated jobs with competent 
officers, we are facing what is essen- 
tially a resources question. FSI has a 
very good track record, over the years, 
of enabling employees to reach the 3/3 
level in a language, either through FSI 
training alone or a combination of FSI 
training and in-country experience. 
We hope to build and improve on that 
record when FSI's anticipated move to 
new quarters at Arlington Hall be- 
comes reality and enables us to design 
more efficient instructional facilities, 
including those integrating new 
technologies. 

We could, perhaps, approach a 
100% compliance level for language- 
designated positions if resources were 
available to train all officers at FSI and 
keep them there until they were at the 
3/3 level. But to do so would mean a 
major increase in FSI resources to 
carry the e.xtra training load. 

Moreover, it would mean a major 
permanent addition to the size of the 
FSO corps to deal with the fact that 
we would permanently have a larger 
number of people in training. In fiscal 
year 1988, FSI trained about 870 State 
Department employees in languages, 
typically for a period of 20 or 24 weeks. 
Thus, about 400 workyears of employee 
time were spent in training — time dur- 
ing which those employees were un- 
available to fill regular positions. That 
factor might easily increase by 50%, or 
about 200 more workyears, if we sought 
to meet a "100% compliance" goal, 
thereby e.xacerbating existing staffing 
gaps at posts overseas. In the current 
resource climate, we simply cannot ac- 
commodate such an increase in gaps at 
post, nor could we expect to increase 
the size of the Foreign Service by 200 
persons in order to avoid those gaps. 

Determination of Language- 
Designated Positions. Turning to the 
question of which jobs carry language 
designation, our current procedures 
involve the posts overseas, the 
geographic bureaus, and central 
management in assessing language 
needs. Typically, the post will originate 
a request to designate a position for 
language competence, or to change an 
existing designation, and that request 
will be reviewed in Washington by the 
parent bureau, by the Bureau of Per- 
sonnel, and by FSI. We believe that the 
resulting list of language-designated 
positions is a generally accurate reflec- 
tion of our language needs overseas. 

It could be argued, of course, that 
we should err on the side of requiring 



language competence and that a larger 
universe of positions should carry a lan- 
guage requirement. This is a position 
for which there are powerful argu- 
ments, not least of which is that all 
employees are apt to be comfortable in 
a foreign environment, and hence more 
effective on their jobs, when they speak 
the language of the host country. There 
is no disputing that this is what we 
found in Montevideo and Dakar during 
the model language post program. 
Again, I can only say that the costs of 
expanding our language-designated 
position base would be prohibitive in 
the context of our current budget 
situation. 

Criterion for Language Profi- 
ciency. The third question about our 
language competence program is 
whether the general professional, or 
3/3, proficiency requirement is an ap- 
propriate criterion. Three years ago, I 
asked Ambassador Monty Stearns to 
review this situation for me, particu- 
larly as regards the four "hard" lan- 
guages of Russian, Arabic, Chinese, 
and Japanese. It had been my observa- 
tion that the 3/3 level was woefully in- 
adequate and did not give a working 
knowledge of these languages. The 
Stearns report urged adoption, in some 
cases, of advanced professional, or 4/4, 
proficiency standards. The 4/4 standard 
requires substantially greater fluency 
and accuracy than the 3/3 standard and 
what one might call "cross-cultural 
comfort." 

We have begun initiatives to train 
people to speak and read at higher than 
the standard 3/3 level. We feel this is 
possible under some, but not all, cir- 
cumstances. Our Russian language pro- 
gram now does offer advanced training 
for officers who already have a good 
working knowledge of the language. 
Specially tailored Russian courses, like 
the one we offered last spring to the 
staff of the Nuclear Risk Reduction 
Center or the recent Russian inter- 
preter training for Foreign Service 
officers that we sponsored at the 
Monterey Institute of International 
Studies, are indicative of what can be 
continued or expanded given adequate 
resources. 

We have also run successful experi- 
ments, as opportunities arise, for in- 
country training in Chinese at Nanjing 
University, and for Hungarian, Pashto, 
Sinhala, and Spanish. We are looking 
into the possibilities for onsite training 
in East European languages, similar to 
our existing overseas language schools. 
Most language specialists agree, how- 
ever, that a 4/4 level of proficiency in a 
language is not easily attainable in a 



classroom alone. A combination of for- 
mal study, along with exposure to the 
culture in country and continual prac- 
tice, is required to achieve and main- 
tain advanced-level skills in a foreign 
language. With all of this in mind, we 
will continue to look at the needs of 
specific jobs to see whether, in a partic 
ular instance, the 4/4 proficiency stan- 
dard is appropriate. 

Expanding Training Oppor- 
tunities. Finally, I want to address the 
question of the need for language train- 
ing for clerical and technical employees 
and for spouses and dependents of all 
our Foreign Service employees. Many 
employees in these categories can do 
their jobs better when they are skilled 
in the host country language. All of 
these persons undergo the stresses anc 
strains of overseas life that can be 
dramatically increased by lack of 
language fluency. For some years, we 
have tried to widen the availability of 
FSI training to include these groups, 
as space and time would permit. There 
fore, we are continuing to expand FSI's 
Familiarization And Short Term (FAST 
Language Courses. These intensive 6-J 
week courses are intended to provide 
"survival" language skills and have 
been enthusiastically received by stu- 
dents. The courses ai-e geared for peo- 
ple whose assignments do not formally 
require language competence, but they 
have also proven effective for individu- 
als whose schedules do not permit 
longer term training. We now offer 
FAST courses in 25 languages. 

We still have a long way to go in 
this area. Here, too, the projected 
move of FSI to Arlington Hall can givf 
us more flexibility to look for ways of 
offering at least a bare minimum of Ian 
guage training to a greater number of 
Foreign Service employees and family 
members. 

In summary, I believe that the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service are meeting the challenges of 
conducting bilateral and multilateral 
diplomacy in today's polyglot world. 
Improvement is certainly possible, par 
ticularly if additional resources were h 
become available. For now, we continue 
to try to manage what we have as effi- 
ciently and effectively as possible. 



'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee 
and will be available from the Superintend 
ent of Documents, U.S. Government Print 
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



22 



EAST ASIA 



Developments in Malaysia and 
Singapore 



bn David F. Lamhertson 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Human Rights and International 
Organizations of the House Foreign Af- 
fairs Committee on September 22. 1988. 
Mr. Lambertson is Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs.^ 

Thank you for this opportunity to dis- 
cuss recent developments in Malaysia 
and Singapore. I would like to begin 
with some remarks on Malaysia. 

Malaysia 

People and Government. Malaysia is a 
multiracial society in which ethnic Ma- 
ays comprise a bare majority of the 
jopulation. Chinese make up approxi- 
•nately 33% of the population, Indians 
0%, and there are several smaller mi- 
lority groups. 

Since independence in 1957, Malay- 
sia has had a parliamentary system of 
Government based on free elections con- 
ested by several parties, almost all of 
■vhich are racially based. The ruling 
National Front (composed of three ma- 
or and several minor parties and domi- 
lated by ethnic Malays) has won a two- 
hirds or better majority in the federal 
)arliament in all seven general elec- 
ions since 1957, but opposition parties 
ire active and vocal participants in the 
)olitical system and occasionally hold 
)Ower at the state level. 

Economy. A strong free market 
economy, abundant natural resources, 
md a relatively small population (17 
nillion) have helped Malaysia become 
)ne of the most prosperous of the devel- 
)ping countries. 

Shared Interests. The United 
states and Malaysia enjoy very good 
•elations grounded on mutual interests 
n the fields of trade and investment 
md regional stability. We cooperate 
smoothly on a range of shared con- 
cerns, including defense, the fight 
igainst narcotics, the continuing refu- 
gee crisis in Southeast Asia, and educa- 
tion. In the field of education, for 
Jexample, more than 20,000 Malaysian 
'(students are now enrolled in American 
'universities — the second largest foreign 
student population in the United 
(States. 



Our economic ties with Malaysia 
are solid. The United States is Malay- 
sia's second largest trading partner 
after Japan. We take one-sixth of Ma- 
laysia's exports and supply nearly one- 
fifth of its imports. For 1987 U.S.- 
Malaysia trade reached approximately 
$4.4 billion, while U.S. direct invest- 
ment in Malaysia is estimated at $4 
billion. More than 20 major U.S. elec- 
tronics firms have established factories 
in Malaysia, and further expansion in 
this and other industrial areas is likely. 

To facilitate the further develop- 
ment of economic relations, our two 
countries have ongoing discussions in a 
number of areas, including copyright 
and bilateral investment agreements. 

Regional Stability. Beyond eco- 
nomic cooperation, Malaysia and the 
United States have strong mutual inter- 
ests in regional security and stability. 
Strategically located on the Malacca 
Strait, Malaysia's continued political 
stability and economic development are 
important to U.S. interests in South- 
east Asia. Confronted with the Viet- 
namese occupation of Cambodia and a 
major Soviet base at Cam Ranh Bay, 
Malaysia has been in the forefront of 
the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) strategy to bring 
about a withdrawal of Vietnamese 
forces from Cambodia and secure a ne- 
gotiated settlement ensuring genuine 
self-determination for the Cambodian 
people. Malaysia and its ASEAN part- 
ners have done an effective job in work- 
ing for a just settlement in Cambodia, 
and the United States will continue to 
support their efforts. 

Malaysia's geographic location has 
also made it a key player in the ongoing 
tragedy of Indochinese refugees. Since 
1975 Malaysia has generously provided 
first asylum to more than 200,000 Viet- 
namese refugees. At present there are 
more than 13,000 refugees in Malaysian 
refugee camps, and it is significant that 
many of those granted asylum in Malay- 
sia this year had been turned away by 
other countries in the region. The 
United States deeply appreciates Ma- 
laysia's commitment to the principle of 
first asylum, and we look forward to 
continued close cooperation on this hu- 
manitarian issue. 



While the United States and Ma- 
laysia do not participate in a formal 
security alliance, we share an apprecia- 
tion of the threats which jeopardize the 
area's peace and freedom. One example 
of our rapport in this area is Prime 
Minister Mahathir's public support for 
U.S. military facilities in the Philip- 
pines. A stable parliamentary democ- 
racy, Malaysia is nonaligned but 
staunchly anticommunist. Still emerg- 
ing from its tlrst economic recession 
since independence, Malaysia has ex- 
pressed its appreciation of the small in- 
ternational military education and 
training (IMET) program grant, which 
represents the only form of aid it now 
receives from the United States. In FY 
1988, that grant totaled $900,000. 

Internal Security Situation. 

Internal security in Malaysia has been 
seriously threatened twice: first, by a 
major communist insurrection which 
began in 1948 and peaked in the early 
1950s and which still smolders in a few 
border areas; second, by inteiTommunal 
rioting following the 19(39 national elec- 
tions, in which several hundred persons 
reportedly died. 

In addition, since 1983 the govern- 
ment ha. explicitly classified the coun- 
try's serious drug problem as a threat 
to national security. The remnants of 
the communist insurgency, the pos- 
sibility of renewed communal conflict, 
and widespread drug abuse are cited by 
the Government of Malaysia as justifi- 
cation for laws allowing, in conformity 
with the constitution, preventive deten- 
tion of persons suspected of subversive 
activity or of other activities, including 
drug crimes. Other laws empower the 
government to restrict the right to free 
expi'ession and association. These laws, 
though seldom used, were strengthened 
by amendment in December 1987. 

Prime Minister Mahathir's Admin- 
istration has been relatively restrained 
in its use of Malaysia's In*^2rnal Se- 
curity Act legislation to deal with polit- 
ical offenses. By mid-October of last 
year, the number detained under the 
Internal Security Act had been sharply 
reduced to at most 27 from about 500 
when Mahathir took office in 1981. 
However, in late October and early 
November, in an effort it said was nec- 
essary to avoid serious racial striie, the 
government detained 106 persons under 
the Internal Security Act. Among those 
detained were opposition and govern- 
ment politicians, social critics, environ- 
mentalists, religious activists, and 
academics. 



itPepartment of State Bulletin/November 1988 



23 



EAST ASIA 



Shortly after the arrests began on 
October 27, our Embassy in Kuala 
Lumpur told the Malaysian Government 
of our concern over the detention with- 
out trial of opposition politicians and 
social activists and conveyed to the gov- 
ernment our hope that those detained 
would be afforded every right and con- 
sideration under Malaysian law. Secre- 
tary Shultz raised the issue of Internal 
Security Act detentions with Prime 
Minister Mahathir during their July 9 
meeting in Kuala Lumpur. In a news 
conference following the meeting. Sec- 
retary Shultz said he had been assured 
by the Prime Minister and other Malay- 
sian Government officials that "those 
remaining under detention would be af- 
forded full statutory and constitutional 
rights and that as time went on we 
would see them dealt with properly. So 
the subject was discussed in, I think, 
fundamentally a satisfactory way." Both 
before and after the Secretary's meet- 
ing with Prime Minister Mahathir, 
other representatives of the U.S. Gov- 
ernment, including Assistant Secretary 
[for East Asian and Pacific Affairs] 
Gaston Sigur, Deputy Assistant Secre- 
tary [for Human Rights and Human- 
itarian Affairs Robert W.] Farrand, and 
myself, have reiterated our concerns to 
the Government of Malaysia. 

To date the Government of Malay- 
sia has released 85 of the 106 persons 
detained under the Internal Security 
Act. Orders permitting detention for up 
to 2 years have been issued for the re- 
maining 21 persons. Under the Internal 
Security Act, the government is not re- 
quired to bring detainees to trial How- 
ever, it must present each detainee 
with the grounds for detention and ap- 
point an advisory board which reviews 
each case every 6 months. The board 
has no power to order release of a de- 
tainee. We have welcomed the Malay- 
sian Government's release of 85 
detainees and urged the government to 
release the remaining detainees as ex- 
peditiously as possible. 

At the time of the Internal Se- 
curity Act arrests last year, the govern- 
ment suspended three newspapers and 
banned all public assemblies. Shortly 
after this decision, and on sevei-al occa- 
sions since that time, we told the Ma- 
laysian Government of our concern over 
this action. Our approaches emphasized 
America's longstanding tradition of sup- 
port for freedom of the press and e.x- 
pressed the hope that the newspapers 
which had their publishing licenses re- 
voked would be permitted to resume 
publication as soon as possible. Both 



Malaysia — A Profile 



Geography 

Area: 329,749 sq. km. a27,316 sq. mi.); 
slightly larger than New Mexico. Cities: 
Capital — Kuala Lumpur (pop. 1 million). 
Other cities — Penang, Petaling Jaya, Ipoh, 
Malacca, Johore Bahru, Kuching, Kota 
Kinabalu. 




People 

Nationality: Noun and adjective — Malay- 
sian(s). Population (1987 est.): 16.5 million. 
Annual growth rate (1987): 2.6%. Ethnic 
groups: Malay and other indigenous 60%, 
Chinese 31%, Indian 9%. Religions: 
Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Taoist, Chris- 
tian, traditional. Languages: Malay, Chi- 
nese dialects, English, Tamil, other indi- 
genous. 

Government 

Type: Federal parliamentary democracy on 
the Westminster model with a constitu- 
tional monarch. Independence: August 31, 
1957. Constitution: 1957. 

Branches: Executive — "Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong" (head of state, with cere- 
monial duties), prime minister (head of 
government). Cabinet. Legislative — bi- 
cameral Parliament, comprising 58-member 
Senate (26 elected by the 13 state assem- 
blies, 32 appointed by the king) and 177- 
member House of Representatives (elected 
from single-member constituencies). 
Judicial — Supreme Court, high courts. 

Political parties: Barisan Nasional 
(National Front) — a broad coalition com- 
prising the United Malays National Orga- 
nization (UMNO) and 12 other parties, 
most of which are ethnically based; Demo- 
cratic Action Party (DAP); Parti Se-Islam 
Malaysia (PAS). There are more than 30 



registered political parties, 13 of which are 
represented in the federal parliament. 
Suffrage: Universal adult. 

Central government budget (1988): 
$10.8 billion. 

Defense (1987 est.): 4.2% of GNP 

Economy 

GNP (1987): .$28.4 billion. Annual real 
growth rate (1987 est.): 4.7%. Per capita 
growth rate (1987): 2.1%. Avg. inflation 
rate: 1986, 0.7%; 1985, 1.3%. 

Natural resources: Petroleum, lique- 
fied natural gas (LNG), tin, minerals. 

Agriculture: Products — palm oil, rub- 
ber, timber, cocoa, rice, pepper, pineapples. 

Industry: Types — electronics, elec- 
trical products, rubber products, auto- 
mobile assembly, textiles. 

Trade (1987): fi'xpor^s— $18.0 billion: 
electronic components, petroleum, timber 
and logs, palm oil, natural rubber, LNG, 
electrical products, textiles. Major mar- 
kets—Japan 19.7%, Singapore 18.4%, US 
16.6%, EEC 14.4%. Imports— $12.1 billion: 
intermediate goods, machinery, metal 
products, food products, consumer dura- 
bles, transport equipment. Major sup- 
pliers—Japan 21.2%, US 18.8%, Singapore 
15.0%, EEC 13.2%. 

Fiscal year: Calendar year. 

Exchange rate: 2.50 Malaysian ringgi 
(M$) = US$1. 

US aid received (1987): $900,000— mill 
tary program grants; $161,900 — narcotics 
suppression. 

Membership in International 
Organizations 

UN and some of its specialized and related 
agencies, including the World Bank, Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), UNESCO 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN); Asian Development Bank (ADB); 
Five-Power Defense Arrangement; Common- 
wealth; Nonaligned Movement; Organization 
of the Islamic Conference (OIC); INTELSAT 



Taken from the Background Notes of Aug. 
1988, published by the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, Department of State. Editor: 
.Juanita Adams. ■ 



24 



EAST ASIA 



the suspensions and the ban on assem- 
ily were lifted earlier this year. How- 
iver, parliament has enacted legislation 
larther strengthening the government's 
ilready substantial control over the 
iress and public assembly. We are en- 
ouraged that the publishing licenses of 
he opposition Democratic Action Party 
ind Parti Islam have been renewed and 
vould note also that the official publica- 
ions of these opposition parties con- 
inue to freely criticize the Government 
if Malaysia. We are also pleased that 
he social awareness group, Aliran, has 
ontinued to publish its monthly news- 
etter In addition, the important Malay 
anguage paper Watmi, which was a 
veekly before the crackdown, now pub- 
ishes three issues a week and carries 
■.xtensive coverage of dissident activity, 
t is clear, however, that the inhibiting 
■ffect of the government's recent ac- 
ions on the climate of press freedom is 
ikely to continue for some time to 
ome. 

The Department has also been fol- 
Dwing closely recent controversial 
vents in Malaysia involving the judici- 
ry, the Prime Minister, and parlia- 
nent. In response to what the Prime 
Minister viewed as unwarranted inter- 
erence by the judiciary, the parliament 
las passed legislation limiting the I'ole 
'f the judiciary in reviewing executive 
■cts. Parliament also amended the con- 
titution in a manner which appears to 
imit the judiciary's independent au- 
hority. In turn many senior judicial 
igures reacted critically to what they 
■iewed as an attack on their independ- 
nce. The heightened stress between 
he two branches of government ulti- 
(lately led to the removal of the Lord 
'resident of Malaysia's Supreme Court, 
n addition, five Supreme Court judges 
vere later suspended and are awaiting 
he decision of a tribunal appointed 
ly the King to examine the propriety 
if the actions they took in connec- 
ion with the case that resulted in the 
■emoval of the Lord President. 

While from an American perspec- 
ive we find these trends disquieting, 
ve believe it would be premature to 
iraw conclusions about their ultimate 
mpact on the historically independent 
Vlalaysian judiciary. We will continue to 
Tionitor these events closely and make 
)ur views known to the Government of 
Malaysia as appropriate. 



Singapore 

People and Geography. I would like to 
turn now to the subject of Singapore, 
a city-state of 2.6 million people. The 
majority of Singapore's citizens (75%) 
are ethnic Chinese. Malays (15%) and 
Indians (7%) constitute substantial 
minorities. 

Singapore's location at the southern 
tip of the Malay Peninsula historically 
has given it a strategic importance far 
greater than its small population and 
area might suggest. Its industrious 
people and sound economic manage- 
ment have enabled it to become a major 
manufacturing and service, as well as a 
trading, center. Singapore's per capita 
income has become the third highest in 
Asia after Japan and Brunei. 

Political Situation. At independ- 
ence Singapore adopted a Westminster- 
style parliamentary system of govern- 
ment with political authority resting in 
a prime minister and cabinet. The rul- 
ing political party (in power continu- 
ously since 1959) is the People's Action 
Party (PAP) headed by Prime Minister 
Lee Kuan Yew. 

Singapore has regularly held par- 
liamentary elections since full inde- 
pendence, and separation from 
Malaysia, 23 years ago. The most re- 
cent elections took place on Septem- 
ber 3. Opposition parties fielded candi- 
dates for 70 of 81 contested seats. Only 
one opposition candidate won election, 
but several lost by very narrow mar- 
gins. (Two opposition candidates have 
indicated their intent to fill special un- 
elected seats reserved for the opposi- 
tion in parliament.) The ruling PAP 
garnered 61.7% of the vote, a statis- 
tically insignificant decline of 1.2 per- 
centage points from the 1984 election 
results. 'There have been no allegations 
of fraud either in polling or in the 
counting of ballots. One opposition fig- 
ure has complained that the PAP takes 
advantage of its incumbency to intimi- 
date would-be opposition figures and to 
stifle alternative viewpoints. Never- 
theless, nearly two of every five Sin- 
gapore voters cast ballots against the 
ruling PAP, despite suggestions during 
the campaign that constituencies which 
elected opposition candidates might 
find themselves cut off from important 
government entitlements. Singapore's 
current economic growth rate of over 
10% and its dramatic recovery from its 
1985-86 recession may better explain 
voter support for PAP. 



The government maintains active 
internal security and military forces to 
counter threats to the nation's security. 
The authorities maintain that the Com- 
munist Party of Malaya (CPM) has not 
abandoned its intent to overthrow the 
government by force and that the need 
for continuing social harmony requires 
special measures, such as the Internal 
Security Act and restrictions on free 
speech and press. The government, for 
instance, forbids oral and printed state- 
ments which it believes might arouse 
tensions among the various races. In- 
flammatory discussion of race, religion, 
and language is officially forbidden. 

Regional Interests. The United 
States and Singapore have close, long- 
standing ties^ased on mutual inter- 
ests. The United States is Singapore's 
top investment and trading partner. As 
a free-trading nation, Singapore has 
also been a vigorous supporter of 
efforts to reduce trade barriers world- 
wide. Its impressive economic growth 
has made it a model for other develop- 
ing countries whose primary natural re- 
source is their people. Singapore is a 
respected and articulate voice of moder- 
ation in multilateral fora, such as the 
United Nations, the General Agree- 
ment on 'Ririffs and Trade (GATT), and 
the Nonaligned Movement (NAM). 

Singapore is a staunch supporter of 
political stability and economic growth 
in Southeast Asia and of a strong 
ASEAN. Singapore's strategic position 
and well-developed harbor, airfields, 
and maintenance facilities have made it 
a useful port-of-call for U.S. military 
ships and aircraft. Singapore's Govern- 
ment views Vietnam, and behind Viet- 
nam the Soviet Union, as the main 
threat to regional stability. The Govern- 
ment of Singapore strongly and publicly 
supports the U.S. military presence in 
Southeast Asia, including our facilities 
in the Phihppines, and is a leading op- 
ponent of Vietnam's occupation of 
Cambodia. 

We maintain a modest ($50,000 per 
annum) IMET program which contrib- 
utes to increased professionalism and 
technical capabilities of Singaporean 
Armed Forces members and to the sup- 
port of U.S. -origin, commercially pur- 
chased equipment. Foreign military 
sales (FMS) programs with Singapore 
have concentrated on procurement of 
high-technology weapons systems, such 
as the F-16 fighter aircraft, the E-2C 
antisubmarine warfare aircraft, and 
antiship missiles, such as the Harpoon. 
The modernization of ground forces has 
focused on I-Hawk antiaircraft missiles 
and mortar-locating radars. 



25 



EAST ASIA 



Human Rights Issues. Even 
though the United States and Sin- 
gapore have a close and mutually bene- 
ficial relationship, highly regarded by 
both our governments, we do not al- 
ways see eye-to-eye on every issue. Hu- 
man rights issues are one of these areas 
in which we have had our differences 
and in which both sides have expressed 
their views frankly, befitting the can- 
dor and openness of our relationship. 

Under the Internal Security Act, 
the Minister of Home Affairs may order 
the detention of persons whom the Min- 
ister determines pose a threat to na- 
tional security. Most recently the 
government used this power twice in 
1987 and again in May 1988. In May and 
.June 1987, 22 people were detained 
without trial for what the government 
described as their involvement in "a 
communist conspiracy." Most of those 
detained last year were released after a 
few months, although they were forbid- 
den to leave Singapore or join any soci- 
ety or organization without government 
permission. At the end of the year, only 
the alleged leader of this group re- 
mained in custody. 

In the second instance in 1987, the 
government ordered the detention of 
four Malay Singaporeans on charges of 
spreading rumors of and preparing for 
race I'iots in connection with the anni- 
versary of the 1969 ethnic strife in Ma- 
laysia and Singapore. Detention orders 
authorized their incarceration for up to 
2 years. 

In April 1988, nine of those who 
had been detained in May and June the 
previous year signed a press statement 
which denied any involvement in a con- 
spiracy and claimed that some de- 
tainees had been physically abused 
while in custody. Eight were rearrested 
(the ninth was out of the country), 
along with a lawyer who served as 
counsel to some of the detainees the 
previous year. Another former de- 
tainee, who reportedly helped draft but 
did not sign the press statement, was 
also detained in May. A prominent law- 
yer, who had represented several of the 
detainees in 1987 was also arrested in 
this period for his alleged dealings with 
an American diplomat. While under ar- 
rest, all of the eight signed statutory 
declarations which modified their 
April 18 statement. Of those detained 
this year, six former detainees remain 
in detention; two of the lawyers and 
three others have been released with 
restrictions on their movement and 
activities. 



Singapore— A Profile 



Geography 

Area: 620 sq. km. (239 sq. mi.). Cities: 
Capita/— Singapore (country is a city-state). 
Terrain: Lowland. Climate: Tropical. 



South 
China Sea J 




People 

Nationality: Noun and adjective— 
Singaporean(s). Population (1985): 2.6 
million. Annual growth rate: 1.1%. Ethnic 
groups: Chinese 77%, Malays 15%, Indians 
6%, others 2%. Religions: Buddhist, Taoist. 
Muslim, Hindu, Christian. Languages: 
English, Mandarin and other Chinese dialects, 
Malay, Tamil. Education: Years 
compulsory— none. Attendance— 85%. 
Literacy— S5%. Health: Infant mortality 
rate— 8.911.000. Life expectancy— d^ yrs. 
(male), 74 yrs. (female). Work force (1.2 
million): Agriculture— 1%. Industry and 
commerce— 58%. Services— S5%. 
Government— 6%. 



Government 

Type: Parliamentary democracy. Constitu- 
tion: 1965. Independence: August 9, 1965. 

Branches: Executive— president (chief of 
state, 4-yr. term); prime minister (head of 
government). Legislative— unicameral 
79-member Parliament (maximum 5-yr. term). 
Judicial— High Court, Court of Appeal, Court 
of Criminal Appeal. 

Political parties: People's Action Party 
(PAP), various opposition parties. Suffrage: 
Universal and compulsory. 



Central government budget (1986): $10 
billion. 

Defense (1985): 6% of gross domestic 
product. 

National holiday: August 9. 

Flag: Two equal horizontal sections, red 
over white, with a white crescent and five 
stars in the upper left corner. 

Economy 

GDP (1985): $16.0 billion. Annual growth 
rate (in real terms): -1.8%. Per capita 
income: $6,200. Avg. inflation rate (1985): 
0.5%. 

Natural resources: None. 

Agriculture (0.9% of real GNP): 
Products— hogs, poultry, orchids, vegetables, 
fruits. 

Industry (17% of real GNP): Types- 
petroleum products, electrical and electronic 
products, shipbuilding and ship repair, food 
and beverages, textiles and garments. 

Trade (1985, excluding Indonesian trade, 
which is not reported by Singaporean 
authorities): Exports— $23 billion: petroleum 
products, electronics equipment, electrical 
and nonelectrical machinery, telecommunica- 
tions apparatus, garments. Major markets- 
US, Malaysia, Japan, EC. Imports— $26 
billion: crude oil, machinery, manufactured 
goods, foodstuffs. Major suppliers: US, EC, 
Malaysia, Japan. 

Official exchange rate (avg. 1985): 
Singapore $2.2002 = US$1. 

Fiscal year: April 1-March 31. 

Membership in International 
Organizations 

UN and some of its specialized and related 
agencies. Commonwealth of Nations, Associa 
tion of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
Five-Power Defense Arrangement, Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), Colombo Plan, 
INTELSAT, Nonaligned Movement, Group ol 
77. 



Taken from the Background Notes of Feb. 
1987, published by the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, Department of State. Editor: 
Juanita Adams. ■ 



26 



ECONOMICS 



Withdrawal of U.S. Diplomat. On 

May 6, the Government of Singapore 
sked that an officer of the U.S. Em- 
bassy be withdrawn from Singapore on 
p-ounds that he had interfered in the 
lomestic affairs of that country with 
;he approval of two unnamed "senior 
jfficers" of the Department of State. 
The allegations, based on these officials' 
Tieetings with Singaporeans outside of 
overnment, were totally without foun- 
Jation. We firmly rejected them and 
stated that all activities of U.S. Gov- 
rnment officials in dealing with Sin- 
;apore had been legitimate and in full 
iccord with customai-y diplomatic prac- 
tice. Nevertheless, we withdrew the 
U.S. diplomat, inasmuch as it is estab- 
lished in international law and practice 
:hat a government may, at any time and 
without having to explain its decision, 
^ive notice that a foreign diplomat 
should be withdrawn. On May 10 we 
equested that Singapore withdraw 
Tom Washington a diplomat of similar 
'ank and responsibility. We also e.x- 
oressed regret that the Government of 
Singapore did not attempt to resolve 
;his matter privately, in a manner be- 
Itting relations between friendly 
!ountries. 

I am pleased to note that the furor 
surrounding this incident has died 
iown. Prime Minister Lee in a speech 
lefore parliament on June 10 said that 
Decause of the importance of the bilat- 
eral relationship to both Singapore and 
;he United States, it was time to put 
:his incident behind us. We fully share 
(lis sentiment. 

Detentions and Restrictions. We 

nave consistently made known to the 
overnment of Singapore our opposi- 
Uon to prolonged detention without 
trial and our firm position that those 
till detained under the Internal Se- 
curity Act either be released or tried 
fairly and promptly. Secretary Shultz 
first raised this issue with then-Foreign 
Minister Dhanabalan in June 1987, and 
it has been a regular item on our bilat- 
eral agenda since. 

We have also regularly expressed 
concern to the Government of Sin- 
gapore about restrictions placed on for- 
eign publications and their journalists. 
In 1987 the government restricted dis- 
tribution of three foreign publications 
and lifted restrictions imposed on a 
fourth. Time, in 1986. In February the 
government restricted circulation of the 
Asian Wall Street Journal to 400 cop- 
ies. In October Asiaweek circulation 



was reduced to 500 copies. In De- 
cember circulation of the for Eastern 
Economic Review was also cut to 500. 
The government explains these restric- 
tions by arguing that it has an unre- 
stricted right of reply to foreign media 
coverage of Singapore and by alleging 
that the publications "engage in the do- 
mestic politics of Singapore." Earlier 
this year, Singapore's Parliament 
passed legislation which allows the gov- 
ernment to authorize photocopying and 
circulation of restricted foreign journals 
in Singapore. We have protested the 
unauthorized and uncompensated re- 
production of restricted journals and 
pointed out that this action appears to 
violate the bilateral copyi-ight agree- 
ment between us, as it may affect the 
works of U.S. citizens. We have also 
consistently emphasized, in public 
statements and in private meetings, our 
fundamental and longstanding commit- 
ment to a free and unfettered press. 
During the recent election cam- 
paign, the Government of Singapore de- 
nied entry to one foreign journalist, 
expelled another, and announced that in 
contrast to longstanding practice, jour- 
nalists would have to seek a temporary 
work permit if they plan to do any 
newsgathering while in Singapore. Our 
Embassy has sought clarification of this 
policy. 



Conclusion 

To conclude the United States regards 
Malaysia and Singapore as good 
friends, and we fully expect that the 
increasing depth and complexity of our 
bilateral relationships will produce still 
closer ties between us. As those ties 
develop further, their management will 
require greater sensitivity, increased 
effort by all of us, and an appreciation 
of the fundamental shared interests un- 
derlying our relations. This is nowhere 
more evident than in the area covered 
by this committee — human rights. 

We believe Malaysians and Sin- 
gaporeans alike share many of our 
ideals. Today, the idea of democracy is 
among the most important political 
forces of our time. It takes different 
forms in different places, shaped always 
by the special historical, cultural, and 
societal forces that exist in any given 
country. But it is a strengthening trend 
around the world, and in spite of some 
recent disquieting developments, we 
are optimistic that an underlying com- 
mitment to fundamental democratic val- 
ues will continue in Malaysia and 
Singapore. 



'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee 
and will be available from the Superintend- 
ent of Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Export of U.S. Satellite to China for Launch 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 9, 19881 

The State Department today will notify 
Congress and its COCOM [Coordinat- 
ing Committee for Multilateral Export 
Controls] allies of the Administration's 
intent to approve, subject to certain 
conditions, a pending export license ap- 
plication for the use of Chinese space 
launch services. The license application 
was submitted by Hughes Aircraft 
Company for the launch of two of its 
satellites which have been ordered by 
an Australian entity, AUSSAT. If this 
application receives final approval, in- 
cluding from Congress and COCOM, it 
will be the first ever approved by the 
U.S. Government for shipment of a 
U.S. -made satellite to a non- Western 
destination. 



The Administration has also de- 
cided to approve, subject to conditions, 
a license for the launch of a third U.S.- 
made satellite on a Chinese launch vehi- 
cle. This satellite, known as AsiaSat, 
will be launched on behalf of a Hong- 
Kong-based consortium with Chinese 
and British ownership. AsiaSat was for- 
merly known as Westar 6. It was the 
satellite salvaged from orbit by the 
space shuttle during STS 51-A in 
November 1984. The Congress is also 
being informed of the decision to ap- 
prove the AsiaSat license, subject to 
conditions, even though the export in- 
volved is for less than the .$50 million 
threshold for notification specified in 
the Arms Export Control Act. COCOM 
approval will also be sought. 

The projected launch dates are late 
1989 for the AsiaSat satellite and 1991 
and 1992 for the two AUSSAT 
satellites. 



tiDepartment of State Bulletin/November 1988 



27 



EUROPE 



As conditions for licensing the 
launches of the AUSSAT and AsiaSat 
satellites on Chinese expendable launch 
vehicles, the United States and the 
People's Republic of China will establish 
a government-to-government regime 
to safeguard the technology from pos- 
sible misuse or diversion and obtain a 
government-to-government commitment 
that China will accept adequate re- 
sponsibility for potential liability for 
damages resulting from accident. It has 
also been decided we will have an 
agreement to prevent possible unfair 
Chinese pricing or trade practices re- 
lating to launch competitions. These 
agreements will be concluded before 
the licenses are issued. 

As a matter of policy, the U.S. 
Government will continue its case-by- 
case approach to decisions on future 
export license requests for satellites 
destined for launch by the People's 
Republic of China. The positive out- 
come in these cases reflects our con- 
tinuing interest in e.xpanding relations 
with China in ways which are mutually 
beneficial. We emphasize that this deci- 
sion does not reflect a change in U.S. 
policy opposing use of Soviet launch 
vehicles. 

In reaching this decision, the Ad- 
ministration is determined to protect 
legitimate U.S. national security inter- 
ests and assure the ability of the U.S. 
commercial launch industry to compete 
on an equal footing with launches from 
a nonmarket economy, while continuing 
to promote increased U.S. -China trade. 
In addition, the Administration re- 
affirms its policy of promoting and en- 
couraging a strong U.S. commercial 
launch industry. 



Soviet Foreign Minister 
Visits Washington 



'Read to news correspondents by De- 
partment spokesman Charles Redman. ■ 




JOINT STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 23, 1988 

Proceeding from the agreed goal of con- 
tinued development of the U.S. -Soviet 
dialogue. Secretary of State George P. 
Shultz and Foreign Minister Eduard A. 
Shevardnadze met September 22-23, 
1988, in Washington for further discus- 
sions on the full range of arms control 
and disarmament, human rights and 
humanitarian, regional and bilateral is- 
sues in U.S. -Soviet relations. The For- 
eign Minister called on President 
Reagan at the White House, where 
they considered the state of relations. 
He also met with Vice President Bush. 

During the 2 days of detailed and 
frank discussions, the sides thoroughly 
reviewed progress in implementing the 
agreements and understandings 
reached by President Reagan and Gen- 
eral Secretary Gorbachev at the Wash- 
ington and Moscow summits. They 
noted that, although important differ- 
ences remain on certain issues, both 
sides are convinced that solutions are 



possible. The record of achievement 
since the November 1985 summit in 
Geneva attests to this: goals that 
seemed impossible have been reached, 
and other important goals have been 
brought within sight. Continuity of 
effort, consistency of purpose, and coi 
mitment to a process of candid dialogi 
aimed at finding practical and endurir 
solutions to problems will be as indis- 
pensable in the months and years ahe: 
as they have been over the last 3 yeai' 
Toward this end. Secretary Shult; 
and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze 
agreed that the negotiators and e.xper 
of the two sides will continue to seek 
progress across the agenda set forth 1 
President Reagan and General Secre- 
tary Gorbachev in their joint state- 
ments from the Washington and 
Moscow summits. These statements 
comprise a detailed and concrete pro- 
gram of action for building a more sta 
ble and sustainable relationship 
between the United States and the So 
viet Union and for contributing, with 
other nations, to a world at peace. 



28 



Department of State Bulletin/November 19{ 



EUROPE 



The Secretary and the Foreign 
linister noted the active and serious 
ffort underway to resolve outstanding 
5sues in the Geneva nuclear and space 
alks. They received updated joint draft 
exts of a treaty on the reduction and 
imitation of strategic offensive arms 
nd its associated documents. They 
relcomed the further elaboration since 
he Moscow summit of these drafts, 
he sides discussed a range of issues 
ncluding air-launched cruise missiles 
ALCMs) and the problem of verifica- 
ion of mobile intercontinental ballistic 
lissiles (ICBMs) and sea-launched 
ruise missiles (SLCMs). Some further 
rogress was achieved in the first two 
reas. 

The Secretary and the Foreign 
linister also reviewed the negotiations 
work out a separate agreement con- 
erning the AntibaUistic Missile (ABM) 
Veaty, in accordance with the joint 
tatements issued at the Washington 
nd Moscow summits. They noted cer- 
iin progress achieved in the prepara- 
on of an associated protocol during 
ne current round of negotiations in 
eneva. They instructed their nego- 
ators to intensify their efforts in pre- 
aring the joint draft texts of the 
parate agreement and its associated 
rotocol. They also agreed to continue 
iscussions concerning space-based 
insors. 

The Secretary and the Foreign 
ilinister instructed the delegations in 
eneva to continue intensive work 
imed at the ultimate completion of the 
greements being negotiated in the nu- 
ear and space talks. 

The sides discussed concerns that 
oth of them have in connection with 
le observance of the ABM Ti-eaty. Dis- 
jssions on these matters will be 
ontinued. 

The Secretary and the Foreign 
linister noted with great satisfaction 
lat since the Moscow summit, both 
des have begun the process of elim- 
lating intermediate-range nuclear 
)rces (INF) missile systems in ac- 
Drdance with the INF Treaty. 

The Secretary and the Foreign 
linister welcomed completion of the 
)int verification experiment (JVE) at 
le nuclear test sites of the United 
tates and the U.S.S.R., which demon- 
trated an unprecedented degree of co- 
peration and openness on verification 
djf nuclear testing limitations. They di- 
ected negotiators to finish the new 
erification protocol for the Peaceful 
luclear Explosions Treaty (PNET), 
'hich is nearly complete, and the new 



verification protocol to the Threshold 
Test Ban Treaty (TTBT). They agreed 
to work for the earliest submission of 
these documents for ratification and to 
continue stage-by-stage negotiations to- 
ward the objectives specified by the 
leaders at the Washington and Moscow 
summits. 

The sides reaffirmed the objective 
of concluding, as soon as possible, a 
global convention on the comprehensive 
prohibition and destruction of chemical 
weapons, encompassing all chemical 
weapons-capable states. In reviewing 
progress toward this goal, the sides ex- 
changed views on such issues as labora- 
tory synthesis of super toxic chemicals 
for medical and research purposes, 
bilateral data exchanges, and other 
confidence-building measures. They 
agreed that the 10th round of U.S.- 
Soviet bilateral consultations on chem- 
ical weapons will take place in Geneva 
from November 29 to December 15. The 
sides expressed deep concern about the 
recurrent use of chemical weapons, in 
particular against civilian populations. 
They shared the view that the expand- 
ing proliferation and use of chemical 
weapons continue to impart a sense of 
urgency to their discussions and high- 
light the absolute necessity of negotiat- 
ing an effective and verifiable chemical 
weapons ban. They reaffirmed their 
support for the role of the UN Secre- 
tary General in carrying out prompt in- 
vestigations in order to ascertain the 
facts of such use. They further agreed 
that U.S. and Soviet experts would 
meet on December 16, 1988, for a new 
round of talks on measures to halt the 
proliferation of chemical weapons. 

The sides also stated their serious 
concern about the proliferation of bal- 
listic missile technology and announced 
that, pursuant to the Moscow summit 
joint statement, U.S. and Soviet ex- 
perts will meet on September 26 in 
Washington to discuss this growing 
problem. 

The sides held a thorough discus- 
sion of both progress to date and con- 
tinuing problems in the area of human 
rights and humanitarian issues. The 
Secretary and the Foreign Minister un- 
derscored the value of regular bilateral 
discussions on these issues and the 
need further to develop constructive 
dialogue. 

The Secretary and the Foreign 
Minister expressed the special impor- 
tance their governments attach to 
achieving promptly a balanced conclu- 
sion to the Vienna followup meeting of 



the Conference on Security and Cooper- 
ation in Europe (CSCE) and called on 
all participating states to work inten- 
sively toward this end. They reaffirmed 
the necessity of an outcome at Vienna 
which encompasses significant results 
in all of the principal areas of the 
Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid con- 
cluding document and which further 
strengthens the CSCE process. The 
Secretary and the Foreign Minister also 
stressed the importance of the ongoing 
effort with other states to resolve re- 
maining issues on a mandate in order to 
begin as soon as possible a new nego- 
tiation with the objective of enhancing 
stability and security in the whole of 
Europe at lower levels of armed forces 
and conventional armaments. 

The Secretai-y and the Foreign 
Minister considered regional issues, in- 
cluding Afghanistan, Cambodia, Cen- 
tral America, the Iran-Iraq war, the 
Korean Peninsula, the Middle East, and 
southern Africa. They affirmed the im- 
portance of the Geneva accords on 
Afghanistan. They also noted encourag- 
ing trends in the search for political 
solutions to several long-running re- 
gional conflicts; in some cases, existing 
negotiating efforts have found new 
vigor, and in others new efforts have 
emerged. They agreed that the process 
of a settlement in southwestern Africa 
is currently at a crucial stage and noted 
the importance of sustaining the mo- 
mentum toward solutions of the prob- 
lems of Angola and early independence 
for Namibia in accordance with UN Se- 
curity Council Resolution 435. 

The Secretary and the Foreign 
Minister welcomed the increasingly ac- 
tive contribution of the United Nations 
to regional conflict resolution, espe- 
cially the effort to achieve a durable 
settlement of the Iran-Iraq war. They 
also favored further efforts aimed at 
bringing peace to Cambodia. They 
agreed that U.S. and Soviet experts 
would continue to meet as appropriate 
to support the search for peaceful solu- 
tions to regional conflicts. 

The two sides welcomed the con- 
tinued development of bilateral coopera- 
tion and interchange as set forth in the 
Moscow summit joint statement, as 
well as further development of contacts 
among defense and military officials. 
They strongly believe that expansion of 
bilateral ties on the basis of mutual 
benefit is in the interests of both sides. 
The Secretary and the Foreign Minister 
exchanged views on prospects for de- 
veloping trade and economic relations 



jlepartment of State Bulletin/November 1988 



29 



EUROPE 



and reiterated the goals set forth in 
this field in the Moscow summit joint 
statement. 



SECRETARY SHULTZ'S 
NEWS CONFERENCE, 
WHITE HOUSE, 
SEPT. 23, 19881 

We've just finished a meeting of the 
President with [Foreign] Minister Shev- 
ardnadze and at that meeting reviewed 
the various items on our foui'-part 
agenda. I think both on the part of the 
President and the Foreign Minister, 
there was an emphasis on continuity, 
on a desire to keep working in the re- 
maining months of the Administration 
to accomplish as much as can be 
accomplished. 

There was, to me, a touching end 
to that meeting, as the Foreign Minis- 
ter surprised us all. He had a little 
presentation for the President. He gave 
him this very substantial looking 
medallion. He said the Soviet Union 
had minted a very few of these to com- 
memorate the INF Treaty, and he said 
he regarded the President as its author, 
and this was the first of the medallions 
to be passed out. I thought it was an 
appropriate person to give it to. 

For the last couple of days, we 
have had a fairly typical ministerial 
meeting. We have divided into working 
groups. The working groups have met 
independently on quite a variety of sub- 
ject.s — the ones we usually do. They 
have given us an extended report this 
afternoon, and let me kind of go 
through the subjects as we have gone 
through them and just briefly give you 
a sense of the content. 

As usual, in my meeting with the 
Foreign Minister, we started with hu- 
man rights, and the human rights 
working group had actually been going 
for a couple of days before the minis- 
terial started. We continued to advocate 
what you might call a zero option as far 
as this variety of divided spouses, fam- 
ily reunification, political and religious 
prisoners, emigration issues, and so on. 
We tried to get that deck cleared. We 
continue to see some cases resolved. 
There are still all too many cases 
remaining. 

We also push, and we have as- 
surances or statements it's likely we'll 
see draft changes in key pieces of legis- 
lation, such as their criminal code and 
other possible decrees that will move 
toward the institutionalization of some 
of the human rights changes we have 



30 



sought. As and if that happens, 
those will certainly be a welcome 
development. 

Obviously, connected with the hu- 
man rights discussion is the meeting in 
Vienna, the CSCE meeting. And here, 
of course, we and our allies insist on a 
balanced outcome. You'll see in our 
joint statement, as in past joint state- 
ments, the Soviets agree on a balanced 
outcome in Vienna — balance meaning a 
substantial and positive treatment of 
human rights issues that goes beyond 
Helsinki and Madrid and an appropriate 
mandate for the start of conventional 
arms talks. 

In both of these areas, our discus- 
sions lead me to feel, as the content 
feeds into the discussions next week 
with our allies in New York and feeds 
back into Vienna, we see substantial 
enough progress to make it quite possi- 
ble we will be able to bring that Vienna 
meeting to a successful balanced out- 
come before long. I certainly hope so, 
and we want to, and from all indica- 
tions the Soviets also would like to see 
that happen. 

In the area of arms control, [it's a] 
somewhat mixed picture. We work 
away at the strategic arms and the 
ABM and defense and space talks. I 
can't say there is any real substantial 
progress to report. We have perhaps 
the possibility of some progress as they 
take on board ideas that were put for- 
ward here in the air-launch cruise mis- 
sile area and in the difficult areas of 
verification, if there are to be any 
mobile missiles. So it's possible we'll 
see some progress — further progress in 
those two key areas, and maybe a con- 
tribution was made in this meeting. 
But I can't report any really substan- 
tial movement in those fields. 

In the area of nuclear testing, of 
course, we've seen a huge amount of 
progress. The two experiments that 
were planned have been held; they've 
been successfully held. It was really 
two rather extraordinary events, and 
we now have the results of them. We 
believe the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions 
Treaty protocol is just about completed. 
There is one rather difficult issue, but I 
think it is resolvable, and then we'll 
turn to the TTBT. We aspire to have 
those protocols finished so the treaties 
will have been completed and the Presi- 
dent will be in a position to send them 
up for ratification before he leaves of- 
fice. At least that's what I hope will 
happen, and I think there is a reason- 
able prospect, judging from the devel- 
opments here and the reports to us by 
the two key negotiators who came here 
to work with us during the ministerial. 



The Krasnoyarsk radar, and to a 
lesser extent Gomel, came in for a 
great deal of discussion. We feel as a 
result of the discussion that as 
Krasnoyarsk is resolved, if it is, Gomel 
will fall into place satisfactorily. 
Krasnoyarsk still presents real difficul- 
ties. Wliether or not it is resolvable in 
the context of rearranging that site so 
it is useful as a center for research on 
space matters, as General Secretary 
Gorbachev has said — whether it's re- 
solvable in that context or not, I don't 
know. But in any case, what will be 
necessary is removing or dealing satis- 
factorily with those things that have 
been constructed at Krasnoyarsk that 
put it on its way to an operating 
phased-array radar which is a violatioi 
of the ABM" Treaty. 

Whether we can get there or not, 
remains to be seen. We are working at 
language that — if we got our way — 
would be satisfactory, but we haven't 
got our way as yet, and I don't know 
whether that will happen. But at leas 
we are discussing the subject in a pos 
five manner. 

We had a very strong working 
group in the area of chemical weapons 
and I think people are increasingly of 
the view this is a subject — this is an 
area of weaponry we just must get a 
hold of So we talked bilaterally, and ' 
tried to use the impulse from that to 
feed into the Conference on Disarma- 
ment work in Geneva, and you will se 
this is treated at some length in the 
joint statement. 

I was glad to see in the joint stat 
ment — we say the sides express deep 
concern about the recurrent use of 
chemical weapons, in particular agair 
civilian populations. And also it's stat 
here we affirm our support for the ro 
of the UN Secretary General in carrj 
ing out prompt investigations in orde 
to ascertain the facts of such use. 

As you know, in Geneva what we 
negotiating for is the prohibition on t 
production, the existence of chemical 
weapons. Right now we also must be 
terribly concerned about their use in 
the Iran-Iraq war and by Iraq agains 
its Kurdish population. So we had, I 
think, very useful further discussions 
the area of chemical weapons. 

At Moscow at the summit meetir 
the General Secretary and President 
agreed on the importance of getting 
going, discussing control of ballistic 
missile technology. And so we set a 
meeting for next Monday, and we'll 
have the first detailed discussion of t 
subject with the Soviets. We welcom' 
that. 



Department of State Bulletin/November 



19^^! 



As always, we discussed regional 
lonflicts. And, here, I think our discus- 
ions over the years have become in- 
reasingly fruitful, with increasingly 
ealistic content. It varied from one of 
hesc hot spots to another, just how we 
:vrc able to talk about it in a construc- 
i\f way. But we have had many discus- 
idiis about Afghanistan at these 
linisterials. We had another today 
rthichl, I think, will prove to be useful. 
The cooperation between us in the 
ffort to resolve matters in southern 
ifi-ica has been good and that's been 
ustained. [Assistant Secretary for Af- 
ieaii Affairs] Chet Crocker is leaving 
;>ni.L;ht, I believe, for Brazzaville and 
ill make another effort at that. This is 
n area where the discussions between 
s have been clearly fruitful. 

We had some further discussions 
11 the problems of Cambodia. I had a 
it iif talk about that when I was out in 
ic Tar East with the countries of the 
s,-<iieiation of South East Asian Na- 
on,-. (ASEAN), with the Chinese. The 
(i\ ii'ts have now had a direct conversa- 
oii with the Chinese on the subject. 
11 I think this is in a very fluid and, 
is.^ibly, promising situation, and we 
iiituuie to talk about it. 

We had some discussion of the gulf, 
mic discussion of the Middle East; 
retty good examination of develop- 
n'lit.'^ in Korea and prospects in the 
(ircan Peninsula; and some discussion 
the Horn of Africa, although I 
ouldn't say they took us anywhere in 
articular, and the same about Central 
merica. 

In bilateral matters, we recon- 
rmed our interest in concluding a new 
asic sciences research agreement, and 
e tabled some new thoughts about 
lat and perhaps it will be possible to 
ring that into being. Of course, we 
)mmented on the favorable progress 
1 e.xchanges and the steady growth in 
iltural — people-to-people contacts, 
id right now there is, in being, the 
3ry interesting Chautauqua conference 
I Mr. Shevardnadzes hometown of 
bilisi. We recorded our toasts yester- 
ay, in part, to give a little message to 
lat meeting in Tbilisi. 

We discussed civil aviation, mar- 
ime issues, and also our continuing 
Dnsultations which are gradually get- 
ng into greater and greater depth on 
le international drug problem. 

I would say, if you are looking for 
Dme words to capture the essence of 
lese meetings, I like "pick-and-shovel 
'ork," I guess. That's what we seem to 
e doing. 



I asked Read Hanmer, our START 
[strategic arms reduction talks] nego- 
tiator, how many brackets he's removed 
in that treaty in the last 3 or 4 months, 
and he said about 150 bi-ackets have 
been taken out. There's plenty more 
there. But that's pick-and-shovel work, 
and that's what we're doing, but you 
have to do it if you're going to get 
anywhere. 

I would say [there was] continuity, 
commitment to keep this process mov- 
ing, a consistency in our efforts, our 
posture, and determination to resolve 
these problems insofar as we possibly 
can. 

Q. On this meeting on ballistic 
missiles, the Soviets accept our pa- 
rameters — that is, the 300 kilometers 
and 500 kilograms? And are they in- 
clined to stop the export of that size 
weapon? 

A. This is what we're going to 
start discussing with them. We haven't 
had discussions; we are starting that. 
Of course, we have a regime developed 
with our summit seven partners, and 
we've discussed this in those meetings. 
We've discussed the idea of talking with 



EUROPE 



the Soviets in those meetings, and now 
we're going to start talking with them. 
I might say, I've raised this with the 
Chinese, and we do not have their 
agreement as yet to engage in this kind 
of discussion, but I hope that may come 
in good time. 

Q. Will that meeting in New York 
be you and Shevardnadze or some- 
body else? 

A. No, this will be between Kar- 
pov [Ambassador Viktor R Karpov, 
Chief of the Arms Control and Disar- 
mament Directorate, Soviet Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs] and Holmes [H. Allen 
Holmes, Assistant Secretary for 
Politico-Military Affairs], and I think 
it's going to be in Washington. 

Q. How far did the two sides get 
on the Soviet proposal to extract from 
the December statement the ceilings 
on warheads, on U.S. and Soviet stra- 
tegic missiles, and impose those re- 
straints, at least, as a temporary 
interim measure? 

A. It was discussed. It's being ex- 
plored. People have described this as an 
interim agreement. It isn't. There is no 



20th Anniversary of Warsaw Pact 
Invasion of Czechoslovakia 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
AUG. 20, 19881 

August 21, 1988, marks the 20th anni- 
versary of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact 
invasion of Czechoslovakia. That inva- 
sion put a brutal end to the so-called 
Prague Spring, during which the people 
of Czechoslovakia sought to implement 
political and economic reforms which 
would have moved their country away 
from tyranny and closer to its own 
democratic traditions. The Soviet-led 
invasion stopped this reform process 
and has left a 20-year legacy of political 
repression and economic stagnation. 

An entire generation has been born 
and raised since tanks rolled through 
the streets of Prague, crushing the 
hopes of Czechoslovakia to determine 
its own destiny. Brave men and women 
within the country, such as the signato- 
ries of Charter 77 [a Czechoslovakian 
human rights initiative], continue to 
struggle for freedom and long overdue 
reforms, which remain the fervent hope 
of Czechs and Slovaks. We take the oc- 
casion of this anniversary to salute 



these people and to express firm agree- 
ment with their conviction that, in the 
end, truth will prevail. 

We also take this occasion to note 
that the winds of change now sweeping 
across the Soviet Union and parts of 
Eastern Europe cannot bring funda- 
mental reconciliation between East and 
West until historical injustices, such as 
the 1968 invasion, are forthrightly dealt 
with and corrected. The so-called 
Brezhnev doctrine, which was used to 
justify the invasion, should be openly 
renounced by Moscow. Soviet troops 
should be removed. The peoples of 
Eastern Europe should be free to 
choose their own system of govern- 
ment. There must be an end to the 
cruel and artificial division of Europe 
which continues to split that continent 
from the Baltic States through Ber- 
lin to the Balkans. Only true self- 
determination of peoples can bring gen- 
uine peace and stability to Europe and 
to the East-West relationship. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 29, 1988. 



,i{^epartment of State Bulletin/November 1988 

fl 



31 



EUROPE 



such interim agreement being consid- 
ered at all. All that's being considered 
is the possibility of some other things 
like what we worked out in Moscow on 
the ballistic missile launch notification. 
We have thought about and made a pro- 
posal about, for instance, breaking out 
a little agi-eement about encryption, 
and they have made the proposal you 
have referred to. The one they pro- 
posed is a lot more complex. It would 
entail — the word is casually used — "on- 
site verification." Those are a few little 
words, but once you start to do it and 
you look at the text of what's already 
been agreed in the START treaty, you 
see it's an immense undertaking. 

At any rate, it has been proposed 
by the General Secretary, so we are 
considering it. 

Q. Would encryption have to go 
with it? And, really, I have no sense 
of how far along the idea is. You 
would insist on protection against 
them asking their test characteris- 
tics? You would want an encryption 
assurance at the same time? But how- 
far is that process along — getting 
those two things? 

A. We made a proposal on encryp- 
tion about a week or so ago, I think. 
They delivered a letter here last 
Wednesday — something like that — and 
so we have been looking at it, thinking 
about it. We have raised questions: 
What do you mean by this, what do you 
mean by that kind of thing? It's in that 
stage. If it were to take place, it's a 
modest effort to try to break out some- 
thing that might be useful. 

In the case of the reentry vehicle 
limits you referred to, I think the more 
you look at it, the more it does seem to 
be a fairly good sized undertaking. 
When you talk about the kind of on-site 
verification you would want, it's a big 
undertaking. Maybe too big for this 
kind of thing. 

Q. Could you be more specific 
about what the human rights progress 
is, what they're going to agree to that 
you think will move things along, but 
I guess will also move the conven- 
tional talks along? 

A. The things we look at — there 
are two aspects of it in Vienna. One is 
our view that deeds are more important 
than words here. We've got a lot of 
good words. So we look at behavior We 
look at immigration figures. We look at 
political and religious prisoners. We 
look at the cases of divided families and 
so on. That is the sort of thing we look 
at in terms of behavior We look at 
jamming. 



32 



We've seen quite a bit of change in 
Soviet behavior and the behavior of 
other Eastern European countries. 
Let's remember, we're talking about 
Europe. We're not just talking about 
the Soviet Union. So we look at those 
kinds of behavorial indicators. Then 
there will be language produced in 
Vienna about human rights. 

For example, we wanted to be 
clearly understood. This is just an ex- 
ample but those who organize them- 
selves to be Helsinki monitors, it 
should be recognized that's an accept- 
able and understandable thing that peo- 
ple will want to do. 

Those are the types of things we 
look for On the one hand, behavorial 
change; on the other hand, language. 
We're working these things. I think 
this situation is reasonably promising, 
but we aren't quite there yet. 

Q. When you say, "We aren't 
quite there yet," what is your expec- 
tation in terms of moving it along 
and making progress on the conven- 
tional side? 

A. Our basic attitude is we want to 
have an outcome that's balanced and is 
a good outcome, as we would see it and 
our allies would see it. It isn't just us. 
There are 35 countries involved, or 23 
in the case of the arms talk mandate. 
We're ready to stay there in Vienna as 
long as it takes to get the job done. 
We're not imposing any artificial dead- 
Hne on ourselves. But we and, I think, 
most people would like to see the 
Vienna meeting come to a successful 
conclusion; we'd like to see the human 
rights results we're looking for; and 
would like to see conventional arms 
talks get going. 

As we see these discussions here — 
I might say [West German Foreign Min- 
ister] Hans-Dietrich Genscher had 
some rather interesting talks when he 
was in Moscow in early August, I think 
it was. So that material has been 
useful. 

Putting all this together and stir- 
ring the pot — and there will be a lot of 
talk next week in New York as well as 
in Vienna — we think the situation looks 
a lot more promising. But I don't want 
to try to put a date on it. 

Q. You won't say whether it 
could be before the President leaves 
office? 

A. I certainly would hope it would 
be, but I don't want to put a date on it. 
I would rather just say, we're ready to 
stay with it as long as it takes. 



Q. You summarized some of youir 
sessions of the meeting by saying 
there is not substantial progress, par- 
ticularly in arms control. If you had 
to itemize, out of the past couple of 
days of meetings, the real importance 
or the most significant accomplish- 
ments in your talks with Mr. Shev- 
ardnadze, what would it have been? 

A. I think the basic thing is there 
is a pattern in the interaction of the 
United States and the Soviet Union 
that is orderly, systematic, regular, 
that has an understood agenda that in- 
cludes what were formerly practically 
impossible to talk about, and by this 
time, we are just doing it regularly, 
and kind of pecking away at all of thes 
subjects. 

I think that's the most fundament; 
thing, and that's a big change from th( 
way it was 3 years ago or at the time 
the President's first summit meeting 
with General Secretary Gorbachev. 

In terms of the specific items, I 
have gone through, and I have tried t( 
in the scorecard, rank the different 
areas — I don't want to try to do it all 
over again — as to what, where, the 
most promising discussions seem to b( 

Q. President Reagan has long d" 
scribed getting a big cut in strategic 
arms as his top priority. Is he disap- 
pointed, are you disappointed, that 
this now is clearly not going to be 
able to be done in this Administra- 
tion; and why do you think it was n 
possible to achieve it? 

A. We'll continue to work for it, 
but you are right; it is certainly quite 
improbable. I never rule things out, 1: 
it is certainly quite improbable. 

I suppose the basic reason we 
haven't got there is that it is very difi 
cult. And, as you get the fundamenta 
parameters agreed, and I was really 
very encouraged and pleased when w. 
got that, but it was over a year ago 
that you could say, "There is the shap 
of a strategic arms 50% cut. It is righ 
there. You can see it." 

Once you have got that, in this d; 
and age of intense interest in verifica 
tion, pinning things down, really care 
fully, which we must do, then there h 
this immense and difficult detail, and 
is just a bear to work through. 

Then we have issues that at this 
point at least we don't quite see how 
we are going to resolve them; and in 
particular the area of sea-launched 
cruise missiles, nuclear sea-launched 
cruise missiles, which are — it is an 
important topic. We agree on that, ai 



Department of State Bulletin/November 



19^ 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



the same time, how do you verify 
hatever you might agree to in that 
rea? We certainly haven't seen how to 
B it, although they have made a great 
lany proposals. 

It's hard going, but we have made 
•ogress. I hope we'll continue to make 
ogress, and the President's aspiration 
id mine is that if we are not able to 
mclude something, at least we will 
irn over to our successors a very good 
ickage from which they can continue 
1 and work, and they don't have to 
,art all over again. 

Q. Could you tell us after this 
eeting now whether you anticipate 
• think it likely that the President 
id the General Secretary will meet 
fain before the end of the President's 
!rm? 

A. There is no plan for any meet- 
g, and if there were a meeting, there 
ould have to be a good reason, and I 
")n't see what it would be at this point. 

Q. Other than the Nobel Prize, of 
)urse? 

A. There is no plan, and I don't 
link there is any — there is nothing I 
low of that would bring that about. 

Q. You say you are optimistic 
jout progress and dealing with the 
rasnoyarsk problem. 

A. No, I just said it has been an 
sue where we have said, "This is a 
olation," and we have argued back 
id forth like that with the Soviets. 
nd, at this point, we are on a track 
here we are trying to work some lan- 
aage. Maybe it won't work. So that's a 
:tle bit different. But I wouldn't use 
ords like that. Did I say I was 
itimistic? 

Q. You never indicated — the Sovi- 
s have always made it conditional 
pon certain demands that they have 
ade on us, and many people have 
'en the whole Krasnoyarsk issue as 
mply a pawn, as part of the Soviet 
'forts to get us to abandon our Stra- 
ngle Defense Initiative program. 

A. No, no, no. What we are work- 
■g on now doesn't have any links to 
ly of those kinds of things. It is an 
:'fort to wrestle this problem to the 
round and put it behind us on a differ- 
it basis. Maybe it will succeed. We 
re going to try, but I can't answer that 
?t. 

Q. Did Shevardnadze indicate 
ny concern as to whether all of these 
litiatives and on-going things will 
ontinue, in the future, since you are 
owing out? 



A. I think what we have in place is 
something that works, and that has, on 
the whole, produced a lot of results. If 
you take the situation today and com- 
pare it with the situation in the middle 
of 1985, it's practically night and day. 
This process has worked. 

There are plenty of problems out 
there, and there is always the pos- 
sibility of things, something going 
badly awry, but I would imagine any- 
body who comes along here will want to 
continue to do things that work, partic- 
ularly on something of such underlying 
importance as the U.S. -Soviet relation. 

As far as I can see, from knowing 
the Vice President very well, and for 
that matter listening to the discussion 
this morning at breakfast, and from 
what I have read of the candidate of the 
other party, Mr. Dukakis, both of them 



would like to see this relationship con- 
tinue and mature. 

Nobody is saying, "Let's walk away 
from this." 

Q. Do they seem worried at all 
about the future? 

A. The Soviets? No, they are 
working. They want to see it continue, 
and they kind of assume it will. But, 
anyway they will find some new people 
here, and they will have to get to know 
them. 

Q. Will progress continue, no 
matter which party takes over? 

A. Well, of course, I think it's 
much more likely to go well if the Re- 
publicans are in. 



'Press release 204. 



Human Rights: A Western Cultural Bias? 



by Richard Schifter 

Address before the European Work- 
shop on the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights sponsored by the UN 
Center for Hiiman Rights in Milan, 
Italy, on September 7, 1988. Ambas- 
sador Schifter is Assistant Secretary 
for Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Affairs. 

"That to secure these Rights, Govern- 
ments are instituted among Men, deriv- 
ing their just Powers from the Consent 
of the Governed," says the U.S. Decla- 
ration of Independence. The rights re- 
ferred to are the rights to life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness. 

The Declaration thus rejected the 
fundamental notion, which had per- 
sisted for so long in human history, of 
the divine right of kings, which held 
that the ruler had an inherent right to 
exercise power and that the subjects 
had a responsibility to obey. It turned 
that relationship around by defining the 
right of the citizen as the principal rea- 
son for the e.xistence of state authority. 

The writers of the American Decla- 
ration of Independence were, in 1776, 
not the originators of this idea. The 
thoughts which were incorporated into 
the Declaration were those that had 
been discussed and written about for 
more than a century — the thoughts of 
the Enlightenment. Thirteen years 
later, in 1789, the same thoughts were 



reflected in France's Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and the Citizen. And, 
almost simultaneously, the United 
States followed up on its Declaration 
with the Bill of Rights. 

Anyone who compares these docu- 
ments of the late 18th century with the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
will recognize the close similarity. What 
the Universal Declaration has clearly 
done has been to elevate to the interna- 
tional scene the principles of govern- 
ment enunciated by the writers and 
thinkers of the Enlightenment. 

Cultural Experience and 
Attitudes Toward Human Rights 

Do I, by making these observations, 
lend support to the criticism of the 
Universal Declaration that it is culture 
bound, that it narrowly reflects the at- 
titude and thinking of what is generally 
known as Western civilization, and that 
it is really not applicable to societies 
which have different cultural roots? In 
other words, have I given support to 
the proposition that the Universal 
Declaration is not truly universal? 

To focus on the issue thus posed, 
let me suggest that we think of how 
some British observers of political de- 
velopments in France might have re- 
sponded in the year 1789 to the news of 
the promulgation of the Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and the Citizen. It 
would have been slightly more than 



department of State Bulletin/November 1988 



33 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



100 years after the glorious revolution, 
many decades after the development of 
a constitutional monarchy in Britain 
had begun. Wouldn't it be likely that a 
good many observers in London would 
have exclaimed: "Rights of citizens in 
France? All these people have ever 
known is absolute monarchy. What does 
the average Frenchman understand 
about the rights of the citizen?" 

Let us also consider the American 
experience. To be sure, the writers of 
the Declaration of Independence and of 
the Bill of Rights represented a bur- 
geoning new country in which govern- 
ment with the consent of the governed 
and respect for individual rights were 
recognized concepts. But was it govern- 
ment by consent of all the governed? 
And were the rights of all Individuals 
respected? 

The answer to both of these ques- 
tions was "no." The most egregious 
form of repression — chattel slavery — 
was practiced in many of the states that 
made up that new country, which had 
been brought into being by the Decla- 
ration of Independence of 1776. Slavery 
was an institution that lasted 87 years 
after the country's founders had 
proudly proclaimed that "all men are 
created equal." And it took a civil 
war — the most costly war in American 
history — to expunge slavery from 
American life. 

The point I want to make is that 
the principles set forth in such docu- 
ments as the American Declaration of 
Independence or the French Declara- 
tion of the Rights of Man and the Cit- 
izen were not deeply rooted in the 
practices of either of these countries. 
They were statements of an ideal that 
had sufficient support to constitute a 
national aspiration toward whose real- 
ization both countries and others simi- 
larly affected by that ideal pledged 
themselves to work. 

The Influence of 
Democratic Principles 

The concepts incorporated in the 18th- 
century documents to which I have re- 
ferred were not entirely novel. The the- 
ories of government on which they were 
based went back for more than 2,000 
years to the writings and practices in 
some of the cities of ancient Greece. I 



am obviously making the point that 
when we speak of the philosophical her- 
itage of ancient Greece, we are really 
speaking of the heritage of ancient 
Athens, not of ancient Sparta. The 
writers and thinkers of the Enlighten- 
ment had received some of their re- 
markable inspiration from the Athens 
of two millennia earlier. 

It could be said that this tie that 
binds the Enlightenment to ancient 
Athens is vivid proof of the fact that we 
are dealing with a culture-bound phe- 
nomenon. But is it really? What cul- 
tural ties bound the ancient Athenians 
to the barbarians that populated the 
forests of northern and central Europe 
in the days of Aristotle? Why should 
the descendants of these barbarians 
have paid gi'eater attention to what 
they had learned about Greek democ- 
racy than they did to other teachings 
and traditions which were passed down 
to them? Could it be that as they re- 
flected on the various models of politi- 
cal organization, they concluded that 
the democratic model is best equipped 
to fulfill human needs and aspirations? 
And is that the reason why it took 
hold? Could it be, as Winston Churchill 
said, that democracy is, indeed, the 
worst form of government except for all 
the others? These, it seems, are the 
questions we need to ponder as we re- 
flect today on the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. 

In this talk, I have bracketed, un- 
der the term "human rights," two dis- 
tinct concepts: 

First, that of government by con- 
sent of the governed; and 

Second, that of respect for the 
rights, integrity, and dignity of the 
individual. 

It is conceivable that a demo- 
cratically elected government deprives 
some persons of their individual rights. 
It is equally conceivable that a dic- 
tatorial government, not freely chosen 
by the people, benevolently respects 
most individual rights — except, of 
course, the right to choose one's gov- 
ernment. What can be said on this sub- 
ject is that human experience has 
demonstrated that the correlation 
between democracy and respect for 
individual rights, on one hand, and dic- 
tatorship and disrespect for individual 
rights, on the other hand, is quite high. 



We can accept it as a given that a good 
way of assuring that governmental in- I 
stitutions respect the rights of the indi- 
vidual is to make these institutions 
accountable to the people. 

Defining the Scope 
of Human Rights 

There is one further issue that deserves 
attention in this context. It is the ques- 
tion of the relationship between what 
have come to be known as civil and 
political rights, on one hand, and eco- 
nomic and social rights, on the other 
hand. Analysts of the Universal Decla- 
ration will call attention to the fact 
that, while 22 articles do, indeed, spell 
out a set of civil and political rights, 
five others list a series of what are 
known as economic and social rights. 

I would .iuggest to you that we 
have witnessed, over the decades, a 
rather sterile debate over what does or 
does not constitute a "right." We can 
cut through that debate by simply af- 
fixing different labels to the subjects 
under discussion. We can speak, when 
we refer to the set of issues encom- 
passed by the term "civil and political 
rights," to limitations on government. 
"Economic and social rights" can, on 
the other hand, be denominated tasks 
of government. 

A significant difference between 
the two categories is that the first can 
be attained with relative ease. All that 
is required by the government in order 
to live up to its commitments in that 
area is not to do something. Performin. 
well in the second area requires skill, 
thought, and resources. Making prog- 
ress in that field requires decisions as 
to the basic approach to be taken to th 
operation of one's economy, often only 
after overcoming considerable disagree 
ment on proper analyses and remedies. 
For the performance of a government i 
the social and economic area will not 
ultimately be judged by the promises r 
made but by what is delivered on thesf 
promises. 

The broad issue posed by the eco- 
nomic and social programs of govern- 
ment is an important one — an issue 
which deserves consideration, analysis 
and discussion. It deserves such discu; 
sion in its appropriate context — discus 
sion by experts in the field, discussion 
by economists, by experts on public 
health, on housing, on agricultural pro 



34 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



I 

'.lietion and distribution, and others, 
ut these are discussions different from 
lose that focus on the limitations on 
i\i riiment, which are most appropri- 
v\\ conducted by experts on govern- 
eiital structure and the law. 

he Universality 
;' Human Feeling 

) return to the Declai'ation: it was 
;io|ited prior to the time when the 
ave of decolonization crested. It was 
;lopted when the bulk of the votes in 
le United Nations was cast by the 
'luntries of southern, western, and 
)rthern Europe and the Americas. 
nd the text reflected, as I have al- 
ady noted, the notions of government 
id the rights of the individual which 
1(1 begun to crystallize in Western 
nidpe and North America more than 
10 years earlier. 

llut does the fact that persons of 
rench and English descent were in the 
ad in articulating the concept of indi- 
dual freedom — and of government as 
e servant rather than the master of 
e citizen — mean that they were 
■eaking only for Frenchmen and Eng- 
Khmen and their descendants in North 
met'ica? Could it be, instead, that 
ey were identifying principles of gov- 
iinient of universal applicability, that 
ey were speaking a language which 
ipealed to the logic and innermost 
n^ings of all men and women of what- 
er cultural stream? I have already 
ited that, at the time the writers and 
inkers of the Enlightenment put pen 
pa])er, the experience of their so- 
I'ties with the concepts these writers 
I'le groping to explain ranged from 
iiited to nonexistent. I submit to you 
at what the thinkers of the En- 
(htenment did, and what the drafters 
the Universal Declaration also strove 
do, was to present a set of ideals — of 
liversal ideals on the limits of govern- 
ental authority, of goals to be at- 
lined, above all, to guarantee the 
[dividual respect for his human dignity 
id a life of freedom from fear. 



There are those who contend that 
adherence to the principles of the Uni- 
versal Declaration may be one of the 
luxuries which rich, industrial societies 
can enjoy but which simply won't work 
in countries that must focus, in the 
first instance, on the essential elements 
of maintaining a standard of living of 
minimum adequacy. "We can't worry 
about freedom of the press when people 
are starving," is the comment which 
can so often be heard. 

There are a number of points that 
can be made in response. First of all, 
the concepts of individual freedom of 
which we are here speaking took hold 
in countries such as my own at a time 
when it was predominantly agrarian, 
with the great majority of the popula- 
tion "poor" by today's standards. As a 
matter of fact, these concepts estab- 
lished themselves most firmly in those 
regions of the country which were al- 
most exclusively agrarian and almost 
exclusively "poor." 

And as for freedom of the press 
and the need for food: let us ponder 
whether countries in which people go 
hungry would have followed the disas- 
trous agricultural policies which 
sharply reduced food production if they 
had had a free press — a press which 
most certainly would have criticized 
these policies and pointed out the inev- 
itable consequences of such serious 
policy errors. 

Let us now take a look at some of 
the specific provisions of the Universal 
Declaration and ask ourselves whether 
they are, indeed, the particular prop- 
erty of a single civilization or should 
be deemed generally applicable. What 
should we think of the principle that 
everyone "has the right to life, liberty 
and security of person?" What should 
we think of the prohibition of slavery, 



torture, and cruel, inhuman, and de- 
grading treatment or punishment? And 
what about the notion that all are equal 
before the law and are entitled, without 
any discrimination, to equal protection 
of the law? And what about the rule 
against arbitrary interference with a 
person's privacy, family, home, or corre- 
spondence? And what about the right 
to freedom of movement within one's 
country and across international bor- 
ders? And what about freedom of 
thought, conscience, and religion and 
freedom of expression? And, finally, 
what about the right to choose one's 
government in free elections? Is it not a 
truly detestable form of racism to sug- 
gest that these should be the goals of 
Western civihzation only and of no 
bearing or relevance to the rest of the 
world? 

As we reflect on the text of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and consider its worldwide applicabil- 
ity, let us keep in mind the words of 
Shylock in Shakespeare's "The Mer- 
chant of Venice" on the universahty of 
human feeling: 

Hath not a Jew eyes? Hath not a Jew 
hands, organs, dimensions, senses, af- 
fections, passions? — fed with the same 
food, hurt with the same weapons, subject 
to the same diseases, healed by the same 
means, warmed and cooled by the same 
winter and summer as a Christian is? If 
you prick us, do we not bleed? If you tickle 
us, do we not laugh? If you poison us, do 
we not die? 

For the word "Jew" in Shylock's 
immortal plea, we can substitute any of 
the names of hundreds of ethnic, re- 
ligious, or national groups around the 
world. 

Let us, therefore, indeed ponder 
what all of us as members of the human 
race have in common, how we can best 
organize ourselves to work together to 
solve the problems that our commu- 
nities and our societies fa:e, and how 
we can best arrange to govern our- 
selves. Let us keep in mind that when 
we use the wheel, when we calculate 
with Arabic numerals, when we switch 
on a bulb to give us light, when we 
administer penicillin to cure the sick, 
we do not spend time asking ourselves 
which culture produced the inventor or 
discoverer. The same should, indeed, be 
true in giving worldwide application to 
the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. ■ 



lepartment of State Bulletin/November 1988 



35 



INTERNATIONAL LAW 



The War Powers Resolution 



by Abraham D. Sofaer 

Statement before the Senate For- 
eign Relations Committee on Sep- 
tember 15, 1988. Mr. Sofaer is the Legal 
Adviser of the Department of State. ^ 

I am honored to have the opportunity 
to present this distinguished committee 
with views of the executive branch con- 
cerning the War Powers Resolution. I 
am also prepared to offer some general 
comments on current proposals to 
amend the resolution. 

This committee is intimately famil- 
iar with the provisions and the history 
of the resolution. I see no need to offer 
an e.xtended description of either. Some 
general observations do seem in order, 
however, to place into proper context 
the resolution's key provisions. 



GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 

The War Powers Resolution has been 
controversial from the day it was 
adopted over President Nixon's veto. 
Since 1973, executive officials and many 
Members of Congress have criticized 
various aspects of the resolution repeat- 
edly. Furthermore, it is widely re- 
garded — by its critics and its 
supporters alike — as ineffective. Presi- 
dents dispute its constitutionality in 
certain fundamental respects, and Con- 
gress has failed to enforce its most 
questionable provisions. 

The intense debate generated by 
the War Powers Resolution is part of 
our beloved system of government. No 
sooner had George Washington become 
President when debates commenced 
about the relative powers of the three 
branches under the Constitution. Presi- 
dent Washington's declaration of U.S. 
neutrality in the war between England 
and France, for example, spawned a 
debate on the relative powers of the 
political branches over foreign policy 
and war. Legal argument has been a 
national pastime, particularly over the 
crucial powers of war and foreign af- 
fairs. We must expect it to continue. 

Debate about the War Powers Res- 
olution has focused on particular re- 
quirements of the resolution rather 
than on the principles that govern 
executive-congressional relations, which 
has tended to divert the attention of 
Congress from the wisdom and effec- 
tiveness of policies to the legal niceties 



of this subject. It has led, and will con- 
tinue to lead, to unnecessary and unde- 
sirable legal face-offs between Congress 
and the President at times when the 
nation most needs to formulate and 
implement policy effectively and wisely. 
The issues this committee is addressing 
are, therefore, of the greatest impor- 
tance. The crucial question in any war 
powers situation should be how the po- 
litical branches can best cooperate in 
the nation's interests, not which branch 
is right or wrong on particular legal 
issues. 

This Administration recognizes that 
Congress has a critical role to play in 
the determination of the circumstances 
under which the United States should 
commit its forces to actual or potential 
hostilities. No executive policy or ac- 
tivity in this area can have any hope of 
success in the long term unless Con- 
gress and the American people concur 
in it and are willing to support its e.x- 
ecution. We also believe, however, that 
the War Powers Resolution has not 
made a positive contribution to execu- 
tive-congressional cooperation in this 
area that would justify the controversy 
and uncertainty it has caused and 
seems certain to cause in the future. It 
incorporates a view of the relative 
powers of the political branches of our 
government, and of their proper roles, 
that is at odds with the Constitution's 
scheme and with over 200 years of rela- 
tively consistent experience. 

It is, moreover, based on erroneous 
assumptions about the power of both 
Congress and the President. It under- 
estimates the power of Congress in the 
sense that it is not needed to make 
clear that Congress has substantial 
power under the Constitution in mat- 
ters concerning war. And the resolution 
is also unnecessary in that it can grant 
Congress no more power in such mat- 
ters than the Constitution allows. 

The notion that this resolution is 
necessary to curb Presidents who claim 
unlimited "inherent" or unilateral 
power to use force is incorrect. No 
President has been able for long to ex- 
ercise exaggerated claims of power to 
act in the face of legislative constraints. 
As Madison stated in arguing for a bal- 
ance among the branches: "In re- 
publican government the legislative 
authority necessarily predominates." 
Congress has powers that enable it to 
curb any executive pretension, includ- 
ing the power to declare war, to raise 



and support armies, to tax and spend, 
to regulate foreign commerce, and to 
adopt measures necessary and proper 
to implement its powers. 

President Johnson did not make 
war in Vietnam; the United States 
made war there, until Congress decidec 
to end its support. Indeed, it is ironic 
that the Vietnam war was the pur- 
ported basis for the War Powers Reso- 
lution when Congress was, in fact, a 
full player in that war. President Nixor 
regarded repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin 
resolution as insufficient to prevent hin 
from continuing the war. But this was 
in the context of Congress continuing t 
pay for — and, thereby, to authorize — 
his actions. Once Congress denied 
funds for certain military activities. 
President Nixon ultimately complied. 
President Ford properly regarded as a 
strategic catastrophe Congress' insis- 
tence that we completely abandon Indc 
china and later take no action in Ang 
to offset Soviet and Cuban interventioi 
He complied, however, as did Presi- 
dents Carter and Reagan in Angola, 
until the Clark amendment was 
repealed. 

The resolution is intended to pre- 
vent the President from acting uni- 
laterally, beyond a limited time period 
even when Congress has not ordered 
him to stop and even though the Presi 
dent is acting for purposes traditional 
regarded as appropriate. This con- 
stitutes, as former Legal Adviser 
Monroe Leigh put it, a procedure by 
which Congress attempts "to restrain 
the Executive without taking responsi 
bility for the exercise of that restraint 
in time of crisis." 

In a great many instances over th 
past 200 years, Pi'esidents have used 
military force without first obtaining 
specific and explicit legislative autho- 
rization. In our system of government 
explicit legislative approval for partici 
lar uses of force has never been neces 
sary, and the War Powers Resolution 
cannot and should not be permitted tc 
make it necessary. 

Congress and the American peopl 
in fact, expect that the President will 
use the military forces placed by Con- 
gress at his disposal for long-recognizi 
purposes, including the defense of the 
United States, its bases, its forces, ib 
citizens, its property, its fundamental 
interests, and its allies. This is true 
even with respect to the most serious 
forms of military power — the use of ni 
clear weapons. In placing such weapoi 



36 



INTERNATIONAL LAW 



ijthe President's disposal, Congress 
is recognized that the President must 
ive the authority to use them without 
jior approval in order to deter effec- 
tively an enemy attack. 

Conversely, however, Congress 
lUst recognize and respect the role 
ich the President plays under the 
S. constitutional scheme. As re- 
sitory of the executive power of the 
ited States, Commander in Chief of 
|e Armed Forces, and the officer in 
arge of the diplomatic and intel- 
;ence resources of the United States, 
e President is responsible for acting 
omptly to deal with threats to U.S. 
terests. including the deployment and 
e of U.S. forces, where necessary, in 
fense of the national security of the 
nited States. Congress should not, as 
matter of sound policy — and cannot, 
a matter of constitutional law — im- 
se statutory restrictions that impede 
e President's ability to carry out 
ese responsibilities. 

It is against these basic concepts 
at the adequacy of the key provisions 
the War Powers Resolution should be 
dged. If the resolution is repealed, 
lis Administration would certainly 
ntinue to consult and involve Con- 
less in decisions involving the intro- 
ction of U.S. forces in hostilities. 
id if some future Administration at- 
mpted to behave otherwise. Congress 
uld compel it to mend its ways. 



•5SESSMENT OF 
ECIFIC PROVISIONS 

y remaining remarks will focus on 
ose features of the resolution that 
ive led Presidents to criticize it. I will 
30 comment on proposals to amend 
e resolution. 

;ction 2 

ction 2(c) of the resolution states the 
ew of Congress as to circumstances 
ider which the President may intro- 
ace U.S. armed forces into actual or 
iminent involvement in hostilities, 
le list of circumstances in section 2(c) 
clearly incomplete, however. As my 
edecessors as Legal Adviser have ad- 
sed this committee, the list fails to 
elude several types of situations in 
hich the United States would clearly 
ave the right under international law 

use force and in which Presidents 
ave used the armed forces without 
lecific statutory authorization on 
iny occasions. 



Specifically, section 2(c) omits, for 
example, the protection or rescue from 
attack, including terrorist attacks, of 
U.S. nationals in difficulty abroad; the 
protection of ships and aircraft of U.S. 
registry from unlawful attack; re- 
sponses to attacks on allied countries 
with which we may be participating in 
collective military security arrange- 
ments or activities, even where such 
attacks may threaten the security of 
the United States or its armed forces; 
and responses by U.S. forces to un- 
lawful attacks on friendly vessels or air- 
craft in their vicinity. 

It is not clear whether Congress 
really intended section 2(c) as an ex- 
clusive enumeration of the President's 
authority, but, in any event, such an 
enumeration is neither possible nor de- 
sirable. Any attempt by Congress to 
define the constitutional rights of the 
President by statute is bound to be in- 
complete and to engender controversy 
between the branches. The solution to 
this problem is to delete section 2(c) 
altogether, as proposed by Senators 
Byrd, Nunn, and Warner. The only way 
that the character and limits of such 
fundamental constitutional powers can 
be defined and understood is through 
the actions of the two branches in cop- 
ing with real world events over the 
years. No convenient shortcut exists. 

Section 3 

Section 3 of the resolution requires the 
President to consult with Congress "in 
every possible instance" before intro- 
ducing U.S. armed forces into actual or 
imminent hostilities. Over the years, 
both before and after the resolution 
was adopted, the executive branch has 
engaged in consultations with the Con- 
gress in a variety of circumstances in- 
volving the possible deployment of U.S. 
forces abroad. Consultations have taken 
place, whether or not called for by the 
resolution. Consultations are intended 
to keep Congress informed, to deter- 
mine whether Congress approves of a 
particular action or policy, and, in the 
period immediately before an action, to 
give congressional leaders an opportun- 
ity to provide the President with their 
views. Consultations are not intended 
to enable Congress to review or ap- 
prove the detailed plans of a military 
operation. 

The resolution requires consulta- 
tion "in every possible instance" and 
thus recognizes that consultation may 
be impossible in particular cases. No 
President has challenged the merits of 
the statutory obligation to consult; the 



'I 

tepartment of State Bulletin/November 1988 



statute leaves to the President the dis- 
cretion to decide whether consultation 
is possible and, if so, to determine the 
form and substance of the consultation 
according to the circumstances of each 
case. In some instances, such as the 
introduction of U.S. forces into Egypt 
to participate in peacekeeping opera- 
tions, detailed consultations were held 
with many interested Members of Con- 
gress well in advance of the action con- 
templated. In other instances, consulta- 
tion was limited to a smaller number of 
members and was less extensive. In the 
case of the Tehran rescue mission. 
President Carter concluded that prior 
consultation was not possible because of 
extraordinary operational security 
needs. 

The President's flexibility respect- 
ing the number of persons consulted 
and the manner and timing of consulta- 
tion must be preserved. Any require- 
ment for a schedule of regular meetings 
(as in the Byrd-Nunn-Warner bill) that 
does not preserve this element of flexi- 
bility would impermissibly interfere 
with the exercise of the President's 
powers under Article II of the Con- 
stitution. Further, the Byrd-Nunn- 
Warner bill could result in the Presi- 
dent being required to engage in prior 
consultation with 18 members, except 
in "extraordinary circumstances affect- 
ing the most vital security interests of 
the United States." The Administration 
regards this as excessively burdensome 
and undesirable in many cases, even if 
"vital security interests" might not be 
affected. 

An additional constitutional prob- 
lem arises from the provisions of sec- 
tion 3(2) of the Byrd-Nunn-Warner bill 
regarding the proposed permanent con- 
sultative group. Under that proposal, 
the requirement that the President con- 
sult with the group is triggered by a 
majority vote of that group. This is in- 
consistent with the Supreme Court's 
decision in INS v. Chadha, which pre- 
cludes the Congress from taking ac- 
tions having legal effect on the 
executive branch except by approval of 
both Houses and presentment to the 
President for signature or veto. 

On the other hand. Secretary 
Shultz has long indicated his support 
for ways of encouraging ongoing con- 
sultations between the leaders of the 
executive branch and Congress on na- 
tional security issues generally. The 
procedure proposed in the Byrd-Nunn- 
Warner bill, however, creates an un- 
wieldy cabinet-like institution, thereby 
eliminating necessary flexibility on the 
most sensitive and vital issues before 
the two branches. 



37 



INTERNATIONAL LAW 



Section 4 

Section 4 requires that the President 
submit, within 48 hours after the intro- 
duction of U.S. forces, a written report 
to the Congress in three circumstances: 

• Where U.S. forces are introduced 
into actual or imminent hostilities; 

• Where U.S. forces are introduced 
into foreign territory, waters, or air- 
space "while equipped for combat," 
with certain exceptions; and 

• Where such forces are introduced 
in numbers which "substantially en- 
large" the combat-equipped U.S. forces 
already located in a foreign country. 

Presidents have uniformly provided 
written reports to the Congress, with 
respect to U.S. deployments abroad, as 
a means of keeping the Congress in- 
formed while reserving the executive 
branch's position on the applicability 
and constitutionality of the resolution. 
Indeed, the executive branch has pro- 
vided information to the Congress in 
many cases where no relevant statute 
applies. 

The executive branch's administra- 
tion of this section has satisfied any 
special need for information that Con- 
gress may have in this area. Section 4 
does not require the President to state 
the particular subsection under which 
reports are made, and no President has 
felt compelled to do so. A definitive 
judgment at the outset of a deployment 
as to whether hostilities will result is 
often difficult to make. Furthermore, 
this practice is a useful way for the 
executive to avoid unnecessary con- 
stitutional confrontations over whether 
section 4(a)(1) is applicable or 
whether — even if its conditions are 
met — it can properly be deemed to 
trigger an automatic termination 
under section 5. 



Section 5 

Section 5 of the resolution purports to 
require the President to withdraw U.S. 
forces from a situation of actual or im- 
minent hostilities in two circumstances: 

• Where 60 days have elapsed with- 
out specific congressional authorization 
for the continuation of their use, with 
some specific exceptions; and 

• Where the Congress at any time 
enacts a concurrent resolution requir- 
ing such withdrawal. 

The 60-day provision presents seri- 
ous problems under our constitutional 
scheme, in which the President has the 



constitutional authority and responsibil- 
ity as Commander in Chief and chief 
executive officer to deploy and use U.S. 
forces in a variety of circum- 
stances — such as in the exercise of our 
inherent right of self-defense, including 
the protection of American citizens, 
forces, and vessels from attack. The 
provision is particularly troublesome 
because it would require the with- 
drawal of U.S. forces by reason of the 
mere inaction of Congress within an ar- 
bitrary 60-day period. The resolution it- 
self appears to recognize that the 
President has independent authority to 
use the armed forces for certain pur- 
poses. On what basis can Congress 
seek to terminate such independent au- 
thority by the mere passage of time? 
In addition to this general, con- 
stitutional objection, this provision has 
several harmful effects. 

• The imposition of arbitrary and 
inflexible deadlines interferes with the 
effective and successful completion of 
the initiative undertaken by the 
President. 

• Such limits may signal a divided 
nation, giving our adversaries a basis 
for hoping that the President may be 
forced to desist, or at least feel pres- 
sured to do so. As Senator Tower re- 
cently testified: "The important thing is 
that we be perceived as being able to 
act with dispatch, and that the policy 
that we employ will not be picked to 
pieces through congressional debates or 
nitpicking congressional action." 

• Such limits could increase the 
risk to U.S. forces in the field, who 
could be forced to withdraw under fire. 

• Debates over the time deadline 
provide an undesirable occasion for in- 
terbranch or partisan rivalry, poten- 
tially misleading our adversaries into 
assuming an absence of national re- 
solve, thus escalating the military and 
political risks. 

• The automatic nature of the dead- 
line, if obeyed, would result in the ter- 
mination of executive protection of the 
national interest without any congres- 
sional action taking full responsibility 
for that termination. 

• The deadline also reduces the ef- 
fectiveness of the potential role of 
Congress by placing unnecessary pres- 
sure on Congress to act where the 
President has not sought specific legis- 
lative approval to continue an action 
beyond the designated time limits. 

• The nation has successfully de- 
fended its interests by following a pat- 
tern of government in which Congress 
withholds final judgment on executive 
actions until their outcome becomes 



more clear. Once again, as Senator 
Tower said: "Congress is not structure! 
to maintain the day-to-day business of [ 
the conduct of diplomacy. Congress is 
not structured to devise and maintain , 
long-term, comprehensive, reliable for- 
eign policy." 

The concurrent resolution aspect ( 
section 5 is clearly unconstitutional un 
der INS v. Chadha. In that case, the 
Supreme Court held that Congress ma 
not regulate matters beyond its own ir 
ternal affairs, other than through legis 
lations subject to the veto. To the 
extent Congress can impose restrictioi 
relating to military action, it can only 
do so by legislation subject to a presi- 
dential veto. Because the War Powers 
Resolution's concurrent-resolution pro 
cedure violates this principle, it is un- 
constitutional and should be repealed. 
Moreover, section 5(c) contemplates 
congressional action that may intrude 
on the President's authority as Com- 
mander in Chief and chief executive 
officer. 

Sections 5(b) and (c) should be 
stricken, as proposed by the Byrd- 
Nunn- Warner bill. This course would 
consistent with the Constitution and 
with U.S. national interests. 

Section 6 

Section 6 of the resolution contains pi 
cedures for the expedited considerati 
of joint resolutions introduced pursua 
to section 5(b). Since we favor repeal 
section 5(b), we likewise favor repeal 
this provision. 

The Byrd-Nunn-Warner bill con- 
tains a som.ewhat different set of exp' 
dited procedures from those set forth 
the War Powers Resolution and is de- 
signed to serve somewhat different p 
poses. Under that bill, expedited 
procedures would apply, in either of 
two situations, to any joint resolutioi 
approved by a majority of the perma- 
nent consultative group authorizing t 
President to continue a particular de 
ployment of U.S. forces or prohibitin 
him from doing so. The two situation 
are: 

• Where the President has re- 
ported to Congress under section 
4(a)(1); or 

• Where a majority of the 18-mei 
ber permanent consultative group fin 
that he should have done so. 

The Byrd-Nunn-Warner bill wou | 
add two other provisions that would 
create undesirable consequences as a\\, 
result of the adoption of a joint resol' u 
tion opposing or disapproving execut \ 



38 



Department of State Bulletin/November vM 



INTERNATIONAL LAW 



ion. One provision would automati- 
y prohibit the use of funds for any 
ivity which would have the purpose 
jffect of violating any provision of 
h a joint resolution; the other would 
e standing in U.S. District Court to 
Member of Congress to seek de- 
•atory and injunctive relief on the 
und that any provision of such a 
it resolution had been violated. We 
lose both of these proposals for both 
stitutional and policy reasons. 
Congress has broad power to con- 
l the expenditure of funds. Con- 
ss, however, may not use its funding 
rer to restrict or usurp the independ- 
constitutional authority of another 
nch. For e.xample, Congress could 
require the Supreme Court to de- 
i a case in a particular way as a 
dition on the use of funds by the 
iciary. By the same token, Congress 
Id not lawfully deny funds for the 
led forces to compel the President 
:ease exercising functions that are 
fully his as Commander in Chief, 
h as the defense of U.S. vessels 
■n attack on the high seas in a par- 
ilar region. Congress would also ex- 
d its authority by ordering the 
sident to conduct a particular type 
ailitary operation in a specific man- 
; the power to control spending can- 
properly be used to interfere with 
President's discretion over the con- 
t of military operations. 
We believe the proposal to permit 
, by any Member of Congress would 
inconsistent with current case law 
a grave setback for the system of 
aration of powers established by the 
ners of the Constitution. The 
eral courts have prudently decided 
t they will not exercise jurisdiction 
r suits based on the War Powers 
solution. The courts have held that 
h suits raise nonjusticiable political 
stions which should be resolved by 
political branches. Congress has no 
;itutional interest in having the 
rts pass on such questions. As the 
rts have concluded, judicial supervi- 
1 is inherently unsuited to monitor- 
military actions outside the United 
tes or resolving political controversy 
r the propriety of such actions. Con- 
ss, as we have seen, has ample 
ver concerning the President's use of 
itary forces. It should not resort to 
courts to perform its proper 
ction. 

Particularly troublesome is the con- 
it that any single Member of Con- 
:ss would have the right to sue. This 
ivision is objectionable both from a 
al and a policy perspective. As a 



legal matter, we believe the congres- 
sional standing provision purports 
unconstitutionally to expand the juris- 
diction of the Federal courts to litiga- 
tion not presenting an Article III case 
or controversy. We believe that mem- 
bership in Congress, without 
more, is insufficient to confer standing 
under Article III of the Constitution. 
The amendment purports to grant 
standing to Members of Congress 
merely for the purpose of enforcing a 
generalized grievance about govern- 
mental conduct, but this is insufficient 
to confer standing on a Member of Con- 
gress, just as it is for a member of the 
general public. 

This provision fares no better when 
viewed from a policy perspective. For 
example, under the Byrd-Nunn- Warner 
proposal. Congress might enact a joint 
resolution authorizing continuation of 
the President's use of the armed forces, 
subject to certain conditions, and the 
Congress as a whole might be perfectly 
satisfied with the President's com- 
pliance with the resolution. And yet, 
one or more dissatisfied Members of 
Congress would be authorized to bring 
the matter into the courts with the ob- 
jective of obstructing or disrupting the 
President in his direction of U.S. armed 
forces in a situation of actual or poten- 
tial hostilities. 

The Constitution intended that 
such situations be resolved by the Con- 
gress and the executive branch in the 
exercise of their respective constitu- 
tional powers — ideally, in a spirit of co- 
operation and concern for the national 
interest. Whether or not Congress as a 
whole would act in a partisan manner 
in such situations, the risks of partisan 
motivation are gi'eat, indeed, when a 
single member is authorized to sue. 

Section 8 

Section 8(a) of the resolution purports 
to instruct future Congresses on the 
manner in which they may choose to 
authorize the introduction of U.S. 
armed forces into actual or imminent 
hostilities. Specifically, it states that no 
law passed — or treaty ratified — can 
ever authorize such action unless it con- 
tains an explicit statutory statement 
that it is intended to constitute specific 
authorization within the meaning of the 
resolution. 

This provision appears to be a re- 
sponse to the fact that the Tonkin Gulf 
resolution, contemporaneous appropria- 
tion legislation, and the SEATO [South 
East Asia Treaty Organization] Treaty 



were construed by courts in the 1970s 
to authorize conduct of the Vietnam 
war. In our view, section 8(a) ineffec- 
tively attempts to restrict the rights of 
future Congresses to authorize deploy- 
ments in any way they choose. 

If a Congress chooses to adopt a 
statutory provision which authorizes 
the President to act but fails to men- 
tion the resolution, that authorization 
is, nonetheless, valid and effective, 
whatever the Congress may have said 
to the contrary in 1973. Indeed, the 
passage of such a law would properly 
be regarded as the equivalent of an 
amendment of the War Powers Resolu- 
tion, since subsequent statutes are con- 
trolling over earlier ones that contain 
inconsistent provisions. In short, if 
Congress supports an executive initia- 
tive to the extent that Congress sup- 
ported the President in Vietnam, the 
initiative would, we believe, be upheld 
in court as lawful. We, therefore, favor 
repeal of section 8(a) to remove any 
misunderstanding as to its constitu- 
tional effect. 

CONCLUSION 

This review of the key provisions of the 
War Powers Resolution makes clear 
that the Administration has constitu- 
tional and policy objections to various 
provisions of the resolution in its cur- 
rent form. We believe it should be re- 
pealed altogether. We particularly urge 
repeal of sections 2(c), 5(b), 5(c), and 
8(a). The Byrd-Nunn-Warner bill would 
properly delete three of these sections 
but contains other provisions which the 
Administration could not accept. 

In the last analysis, we cannot 
solve the problems which the resolution 
seeks to remedy merely by adopting 
new, more detailed statutes or restating 
general principles. The only effective 
solution for these problems is for the 
two political branches to work together 
in pursuit of common national interests, 
to communicate more effectively with 
one another on their particular con- 
cerns and ideas, and to utilize their 
proper powers to influence events 
rather than attempting to modify a con- 
stitutional framework that has served 
us too well to jeopardize. 



'The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee 
and will be available from the Superintend- 
ent of Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



39 



MILITARY AFFAIRS 



Military Power and Diplomacy: 
The Reagan Legacy 



by Michael H. Armacost 

Address before the Air Force Asso- 
ciation Convention on September 19, 
1988. Ambassador Armacost is Under 
Secretary for Political Affairs. 

I am pleased to have this opportunity 
to share with you some thoughts about 
the relationship between military power 
and effective diplomacy — and some of 
the key trends we see emerging in in- 
ternational affairs for which America's 
military strength will be essential to 
the conduct of our foreign policy. 

The Air Force has long provided 
essential elements of the underlying 
military strength which makes possible 
an effective global diplomacy for the 
United States. The power, flexibility, 
and reach of our air forces give us valu- 
able options in our foreign policy 
quiver Over the skies of Europe, at 
SAC [Strategic Air Command] air and 
missile bases in the United States, and 
throughout the Pacific, the Air Force 
makes its presence felt. 

I would like to emphasize four 
themes this afternoon: 

First, there is the essential rela- 
tionship between military strength and 
effective diplomacy. We have learned 
through hard experience that a world in 
which disputes are settled peacefully — 
a world of law, comity, and human 
rights — cannot be created by good will 
and idealism alone. Since 1945, every 
President has recognized that to main- 
tain the peace, we must preserve our 
strength, and, more than that, we have 
to be willing to use our strength. 

Second, the Reagan Administra- 
tion has recognized this essential truth 
and, by restoring our military strength, 
has enhanced our ability to employ 
forces in support of U.S. interests 
abroad. 

Third, the results of this policy 
have generated some important suc- 
cesses for the United States in the last 
few years. 

Fourth, this fact, when considered 
in light of a number of global trends 
favorable to U.S. interests, gives us 
promising prospects for the future. Yet, 
we should not be complacent. As we 
face the future, we need to pay careful 
attention to new challenges posed by a 



changing security environment as well 
as trends that bear on our ability to 
acquire and use military power 

Military Strength 
and Diplomacy 

From the earliest years of our country, 
America's leaders have recognized the 
relationship between an effective diplo- 
macy and the possession of adequate 
military strength. If anyone at the be- 
ginning of the 19th century was uncon- 
vinced, the episodes with the Barbary 
pirates proved the point. (I apologize 
for using a naval example, but no one 
was clever enough to have put together 
an air force back then.) Although the 
United States was not a global power in 
the early 1800s, we recognized that we 
had interests that extended far beyond 
our borders. Ti'ade, often carried over 
long distances, was essential to our na- 
tional strength — hence, our long-held 
adherence to the principle of the free- 
dom of navigation on the high seas. Our 
leaders also understood that such a 
right would have no reality if we were 
unprepared to take risks to exercise it. 
And taking risks in that case meant 
building a navy and engaging the great- 
est sea power of the age in combat to 
assert our rights under law. 

This is not to imply that military 
power is the only component of effec- 
tive diplomacy. Indeed, most diplomacy 
is carried out without the explicit 
threat of force. Skill, intelligence, pa- 
tience, and the right policies do make a 
difference. And a strong economy is 
important. Some nations, such as 
Japan, with relatively small military 
forces wield considerable diplomatic 
clout. At the other extreme is the So- 
viet Union, which, lacking effective 
economic power or moral standing, has 
placed excessive reliance in its diplo- 
macy on military force — as some of its 
own leaders are now acknowledging. 

Yet, military power is usually an 
implicit element in negotiations. As 
George Kennan used to say, it casts its 
lengthy shadow on the bargaining 
table. We cannot avoid the fact that 
maintaining the military balance of 
power is crucial to diplomatic success. 
In the decade of the 1970s, we lost 
sight of this fact, and we paid the price. 



When President Reagan first took 
office, our dialogue with the Soviet 
Union had broken down under the 
weight of a massive buildup of Soviet 
conventional and nuclear power Our ■ 
strategic forces were becoming in- 
creasingly vulnerable to Soviet "heav^ 
missiles, threatening strategic stabilit 
In Europe, the Soviets were deployin 
a new and more threatening type of 
INF [intermediate-range nuclear 
forces] missile, the SS-20. 

This buildup occurred against a 
backdrop of what Moscow perceived t 
be a new "correlation of forces" emer 
ing from Hanoi's victory in Indochina 
and the apparent decline of American 
power and will. Moscow was embold- 
ened in the mid-1970s to exploit turm 
in several different regions of the 
world. It undertook military interven 
tions — either directly or through pro: 
ies — in Angola, Ethiopia, Cambodia, 
and Afghanistan. 

Other aspects of our foreign rela 
tions were also not going well. The e 
ergy crisis had dramatized the diffus 
of economic power and the vulnerabil 
of the postwar economic system. Ter- 
rorists, often supported by hostile 
states in the Third World, put them- 
selves on the global agenda, and thei 
seeming ability to strike at will raise 
serious questions about our capacity 
respond effectively to an ambiguous 
and elusive security challenge. 

The Reagan Buildup 

Accordingly, the Reagan Administra 
tion came into office determined to r 
store American will and self-confidei 
and embarked on a long-term effort 
restore American military capabilitic 
In pursuit of this aim, we recognizee 
not only our own military needs but 
also the vital role that our allies woi 
need to play as we rebuilt our defen; 
The broad outlines of the Reaga 
defense agenda are familiar to you a 
But let me highlight some of its mos 
significant aspects. 

First, we intensified the moderi 
zation of U.S. strategic forces to ent 
the survivability and retaliatory ca- 
pability of all legs of the triad. This 
included enhanced support for the IV 
missile. Trident II submarine, D-5 r 



40 



Department of State Bulletin/November ll 



MILITARY AFFAIRS 



iS, and improved mechanisms for 
nmand and control. And this au- 
nce, above all, is familiar with our 
itinuing emphasis on the importance 
the triad of air-breathing strategic 
ces — the B-1, and Stealth bombers, 
] our cruise missile programs. We 
ait with anticipation the imminent 
raling of the B-2 bomber. While 
engthening our nuclear deterrent, 

President has also launched the 
•ategic Defense Initiative in order to 
3lore the possibilities offered by ad- 
iced technology for defending against 
luclear missile attack. 

To meet the threat posed to Eu- 
)e and Asia by Soviet deployment of 
I SS-20 missile, we and our NATO 
es undertook the deployment in Eu- 
)e of 572 INF missiles in accordance 
;h NATO's 1979 dual-track decision, 
e deployment of INF was a dramatic 
ance success story. Allied govern- 
nts came under considerable public 
;ssure to rescind the decision — we 
1 all recall the hundreds of thousands 
protestors who, with Soviet encour- 
;ment, marched in 1982 and 1983 in 
ropean capitals against the NATO 
ssiles — but the governments held 
Ti, and missile deployments began. 

Second, despite what some are 
N saying, we have also beefed up our 
iventional forces. This has involved 
re rapid procurement of tanks and 
■tical aircraft, increases in readiness 
i sustainability, and substantial im- 
wements in the quality of training of 
rsonnel. It has also entailed an ex- 
ision of our navy — so vital in project- 
; American power in support of our 
ropean allies and to ensure the se- 
ity of sealanes of communication. 

Improvements have also been made 
the NATO alliance's conventional 
ce posture, though more needs to be 
lie. In December 1985, NATO de- 
ise ministers approved the Conven- 
nal Defense Improvement Program, 
■omprehensive plan to remedy critical 
ficiencies in the alliance's conven- 
nal defenses. Under this and other 
tiatives, NATO has increased am- 
mition stockpiles and other war re- 
rves, improved facilities for receiving 
d protecting allied aircraft reinforc- 
? Europe, and modernized air de- 
ises and maritime capabilities. 

A third feature of the Reagan 
enda has been active support to in- 
^enous nationalist movements in 
'ghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, and 
imbodia. Increasing the political and 
onomic costs of these involvements to 
e Soviets and their allies has given 



them incentives to liquidate such ad- 
ventures and disincentives to undertake 
similar efforts in the future. Freedom 
for others means, in the end, greater 
peace and security for ourselves. 

A fourth aspect of the Reagan Ad- 
ministration's policy of realism and 
strength has been the determination to 
use military force, when necessary, in 
support of our interests and those of 
our friends and allies. 

• When the Cuban-sponsored 
Marxist government of Grenada col- 
lapsed into violence in 1983, we re- 
sponded to the Governor General's 
request for assistance. In concert 
with the Caribbean democracies, we 
mounted a military operation to help 
restore peace and security on Grenada. 

• When Kuwait approached us to 
explore ways to protect Kuwaiti-owned 
shipping from Iranian attack in the Per- 
sian Gulf, we and our allies responded 
by increasing our naval presence to en- 
sure freedom of navigation in a region 
vital to Western security. 

• When confronted with clear evi- 
dence of Qadhafi's involvement in ter- 
rorist acts, we undertook successful air 
attacks on Tripoli and Banghazi in 
April 1986. 

I think it fair to say that the de- 
signers of the FB-111 never imagined 
that this strategic aircraft would find 
service in operation against terrorist 
bases. But the real significance of the 
strike against Libya, as with Grenada 
and the gulf, is that we gave renewed 
credibility to our will to engage in the 
measured and judicious use of force in 
pursuit of our security interests. Such 
credibility gives greater weight to our 
diplomacy and will hopefully reduce 
prospects of having to employ force in 
the future. 

A Revived Diplomacy 

These efforts to rebuild and modernize 
our military forces, as well as the will- 
ingness to apply that force when cir- 
cumstances demanded, have done much 
to change the international environ- 
ment. [Commentator] Charles 
Krauthammer may have exaggerated 
when he recently wrote of the last 8 
years that "in the entire postwar era, 
there has never been a period of such 
profound international tranquility." But 
we have had a singularly successful dec- 
ade in advancing the objectives of U.S. 
policy. The paralysis of the post-Viet- 
nam years has dissipated; our friends 



and allies have been reassured; and our 
adversaries have had to reassess funda- 
mentally their expansionist policies. 

One of the areas where change has 
been the most pronounced has been 
U.S. -Soviet relations. Here there has 
been progress across the board, but the 
advances have been particularly re- 
markable in arm.s control — the INF 
Ti'eaty — and management of regional is- 
sues — Soviet agreement to withdraw 
from Afghanistan. 

INF. The INF Treaty represents a 
major victory for the Administration 
and for the NATO alliance. When Pres- 
ident Reagan first proposed the "zero 
option" in 1981, many critics derided it 
as empty propaganda, saying the Rus- 
sians would never accept it. But in the 
end, after returning to the bargaining 
table following a walkout and much pa- 
tient negotiating, the Soviets did accept 
the President's offer. They agreed to 
eliminate entirely two classes of inter- 
mediate-range ballistic missiles as well 
as to accept unprecedented procedures 
for onsite verification. 

A number of thoughtful Europeans 
and Americans have expressed concerns 
that the INF agreement could lead to 
the denuclearization of Europe. I be- 
lieve these fears are exaggerated. Even 
after all INF weapons have been elimi- 
nated, NATO will still have more than 
4,000 nuclear warheads, including those 
on INF aircraft and U.S. submarine- 
launched ballistic missiles. While the 
Soviets will continue to try to mobilize 
and exploit pacifist sentiments against 
Western governments, Gorbachev has 
shown no inclination, as yet, to remove 
a key source of East- West tension: the 
basic division of Europe imposed by the 
Red Army. That will impose real con- 
straints on European willingness to 
move away from a policy of mutual 
security. 

Regarding the negotiations on the 
longer range strategic missiles, we have 
not reached agreement with the Sovi- 
ets, but major progress has been made 
toward a treaty that will reduce strate- 
gic arsenals on both sides by 50%. We 
and the Soviets have agreed, for in- 
stance, on the subceilings for major 
strategic systems, including a subceil- 
ing that would require 50% cuts in the 
Soviet force of heavy MIRVed [multiple 
independently-targetable reentry vehi- 
cle] ICBMs [intercontinental baUistic 
missiles] — the SS-18s, particularly de- 
stabilizing systems that pose a first- 
strike threat to our retaliatory forces. 



41 



MILITARY AFFAIRS 



Many factors have contributed to 
the achievement of an INF Treaty and 
progress on START [strategic arms re- 
ductions tall<s] — including the accession 
to power in the Soviet Union of a new 
leadership concerned by the country's 
internal backwardness and stagnation 
and overextended foreign policy — but 
one key factor clearly has been the 
U.S. modernization program. Absent 
NATO INF missile deployments in Eu- 
rope, Gorbachev would not have agreed 
to destroy all of those SS-20s, SS-12s, 
and SS-23S. 

Afghanistan. A second major 
achievement of the Reagan Administra- 
tion's foreign policy was Soviet agree- 
ment to withdraw from Afghanistan. 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan con- 
stituted the first massive use of Soviet 
troops outside Eastern Europe since 
World War II. It not only destroyed the 
independence of a nonaligned country, 
but it threatened the security of our 
ally, Pakistan, and e.xtended forward by 
several hundred miles the Soviet capac- 
ity to project military power toward the 
Persian Gulf. For all of these reasons, 
the complete and total withdrawal of 
troops and the restoration of Afghan na- 
tional independence has been an urgent 
goal of U.S. policy. 

We are now within reach of achiev- 
ing that objective. On April 14, the 
U.S.S.R. signed the Geneva accords 
which were negotiated, under UN aus- 
pices, by Pakistan and the Kabul re- 
gime. The United States associated 
itself with the settlement by agreeing 
to respect the undertakings of the high 
contracting parties. 

These accords provide for the com- 
plete withdrawal of all Soviet troops 
from Afghanistan by February 15, 1989. 
The Soviets were also required to with- 
draw 50% of those troops by August 15. 
Our intelligence indicates that the 
Soviets met that benchmark. 

A number of factors have been re- 
sponsible for the change in Soviet pol- 
icy on Afghanistan. First and foremost, 
credit must go to the Afghan people 
themselves, who for 9 years have 
waged a struggle that will be the stuff 
of legend. The Afghan resistance has 
enjoyed the stalwart support of 
Pakistan and the backing of world opin- 
ion. Since the 1979 invasion, we, the 
Chinese, the West Europeans, the Is- 
lamic world, and others have made 
clear that the Soviet occupation im- 
posed a heavy cost on bilateral 
relations. 



Beyond our moral and diplomatic 
support for the resistance, we have 
provided, in a bipartisan effort, both 
humanitarian and military assistance 
and will continue to do so. Prior to sig- 
nature of the Geneva accords, we pro- 
posed a moratorium on all military 
supplies to parties in Afghanistan, but 
the Soviets rejected this offer. We, 
therefore, made clear — publicly at time 
of signature in Geneva as well as pri- 
vately through diplomatic channels — 
that we intended to e.xercise our right 
to provide military aid to the resistance 
as long as the Soviet Union continued 
to give military assistance to the Kabul 
regime. The Soviets have continued 
their aid to the Kabul government, so 
we have continued our assistance to the 
mujaliidin. 

These factors — the indigenous 
strength of the Afghan insurgency, the 
generous support provided by members 
of the international community includ- 
ing ourselves, and the Soviets' political 
isolation — have not led to the outright 
military defeat of Soviet forces, but 
they have imposed substantial — and 
growing — military, political, and eco- 
nomic costs on Moscow. In 9 years of 
war, the Soviets have suffered about 
35,000 casualties, with 13,000 killed. 
With no victory in sight, a palpable 
war-weariness set in among many ele- 
ments of the Soviet population. Criti- 
cism of the war has grown and, in the 
climate of glasiwst, become more pub- 
lic. The new Soviet leadership — free of 
responsibility for earlier decisions and 
intent upon creating an international 
environment conducive to the concen- 
tration of Soviet resources and energies 
on urgent domestic needs — has clearly 
found these costs unacceptable. 

Since the Geneva accords were con- 
cluded, military initiative has continued 
to pass to the mujaliidin. As Soviet 
forces have pulled back from eastern, 
southern, and western Afghanistan, the 
Kabul regime has lost additional ter- 
ritory — including a number of impor- 
tant towns and garrisons. As a result, 
the resistance almost completely con- 
trols strategically important areas such 
as the Panjsher and Konar Valleys, 
which have been bitterly contested for 
the last 8 years. Major cities such as 
Jalalabad, Ghazni, Gardeyz, and Qan- 
dahar are cut off from the surrounding 
countryside and can be supplied only 
with great difficulty. 

I don't wish to leave the impression 
that the Geneva accords have solved all 
the problems associated with a long, 
brutal, and tragic war. Soviet troop 



withdrawal has yet to be completed. 
There remains the formidable problem 
of providing for the repatriation and n 
settlement of 4-5 million Afghan refu- 
gees currently residing in Iran and 
Pakistan. Finally, the shape of future 
Afghan political arrangements is un- 
clear. This is for Afghans to decide. I 
cannot predict what form Afghan self- 
determination will take, but no proces 
of genuine Afghan self-determination 
can succeed unless all Soviet troops ar 
withdrawn. That is why the Geneva ac 
cords are so important. 

More Active 

Third World Diplomacy 

The settlement on Afghanistan has 
given further impetus to efforts to re- 
solve other regional conflicts. Presider 
Reagan outlined, in a speech to the U 
General Assembly in 1985, a process f 
resolving these conflicts that involved 
first and foremost, dialogue and nego- 
tiation among the warring parties 
themselves because any durable solu- 
tion must accommodate the interests ( 
those most directly concerned. The 
form of these negotiations should and 
does vary, but often a multilateral 
forum or institution like the United 
Nations is involved. 

The United States has played a 
role in a number of these negotiations 
and our peace efforts have begun to p 
off. 

• We were pleased by the recent 
breakthrough to a cease-fire in the w: 
between Iran and Iraq. The Admin- 
istration worked long and hard to get 
the parties to agree to UN Resolutioi 
.598. The parties' sheer exhaustion aft 
8 years of armed conflict as well as th 
personal mediating efforts of the Sect 
tary General [Javier Perez de Cuellar 
have brought the parties to the nego- 
tiating table. But part of the success 
has also been directly related to our 
willingness to commit air and naval 
units to the gulf. Our presence acted 
inhibit Iranian attacks against neutra 
shipping as well as intimidation of gul 
states. 

• We have also seen forward movi 
ment in southern Africa and Cambod 
[Assistant Secretary for African Af- 
fairs] Chet Crocker's patient diplo- 
macy — backed up by our support for 
Jonas Savimbi and his UNITA [Na- 
tional Union for the Total Independer 
of Angola] forces — may be on the verj 
of achieving an agi'eement that will 
both remove Cuban troops from Angc 
and bring freedom and independence 
Namibia. 



42 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1£ 



MILITARY AFFAIRS 



In Cambodia, we — along with 
ina, the ASEAN [Association of 
ith East Asian Nations] states, and 
ers — have pursued a policy of isolat- 

Vietnam diplomatically and eco- 
nically as well as supporting the 
icommunist resistance forces in 

bodia. There is some evidence that 
• efforts have begun to bear fruit. 
; pace of the diplomacy, with [Cam- 
lian independence leader] Prince 
anouk in the lead, has quickened in 
ent months. The key to a solution 
1 remains, however, Vietnamese 
■eement to a prompt and total with- 
wal from Cambodia. 



ture Trends 

can take some satisfaction in these 
lievements. As we look to the future, 

can also build on the record of this 
ministration. Global trends are mov- 

our way. 

Freedom and democracy are on 

move from Argentina to El Sai- 
lor, from the Philippines to South 
rea. In Latin America, for instance, 
y 30% of the people were living un- 
• democratic governments in our bi- 
tennial year. Today that percentage 

increased to 90%. 

Freedom and initiative are in- 
asingly recognized as the source of 
nomic dynamism and prosperity, 
rket economies are prospering; com- 
nd economies are seen for what they 

-sluggish, insensitive bureaucracies 
t stifle growth. Free economic sys- 
is are pi-opelling the Pacific Basin 
'ard unprecedented prosperity. Free 
rkets are making inroads into China 
1 Eastern Europe. And even the So- 
ts are experimenting with ways to 
;en the constraints of their centrally 
nned economy. 

A second major trend running in 
r favor is the continued and grow- 
; weight of our allies, especially 
rope and Japan, in the world econ- 

y. Some see in this development the 
;line of America. It is true that our 
ight in the world economy has de- 
led in relative — though not abso- 
i — terms, and it is also true that 
re are things that we as a nation 
1st do to make ourselves more 
npetitive. 

But we should not lose sight of the 
t that the economic prosperity of our 
ies is the result of a policy initiated 
d sustained by the United States it- 
f. Over the last 40 years, the United 
ates has promoted economic pros- 



perity and political stability in Western 
Europe and Japan and maintained close 
alliances with them. The current situa- 
tion attests to how successful we have 
been in achieving that central goal. 

U.S. leadership will remain funda- 
mental to the maintenance of global 
stability. Both Europe and Japan desire 
the United States to play an active role 
in the world. But changing circum- 
stances will require some adjustments 
in our respective roles. 

• We will have to exercise our spe- 
cial responsibilities in an increasingly 
subtle and cooperative way. This 
change to a more consensual style of 
leadership has already been occurring 
in the international financial realm, and 
I would expect that the role of key Eu- 
ropean countries in NATO decisionmak- 
ing will continue to expand. 

• For their part, our NATO allies 
and Japan must ensure that we have 
the same access to their markets as 
they have to ours. They should also ex- 
pect, in coming years, to bear a greater 
share of the defense and security bur- 
den. There may be differences over sta- 
tistics, but there is little doubt that the 
U.S. taxpayer bears a greater burden 
for the collective defense than do his 
counterparts in NATO Europe or 
Japan. With the United States running 
a massive trade deficit with both those 
areas, the current allocation of burdens 
is not politically sustainable. In some 
cases, our allies will have to assume a 
somewhat greater responsibility for 
their direct defense; in other cases, 
they will have to play a more active role 
in nonmilitary areas such as interna- 
tional peacekeeping operations, re- 
gional development, and Third World 
debt. 

The current base negotiations with 
the Governments of Greece, Spain, and 
the Philippines — where we deploy 
important Air Force assets of interest 
to this audience — demonstrate some of 
the problems of making these adjust- 
ments in a fair and dispassionate man- 
ner. We are prepared to consider 
adjustments in the force structure to 
reflect changing circumstances, but we 
are deeply concerned when our allies 
appear to approach these negotiations 
on the supposition that our military 
presence benefits the United States 
alone or that the only thing linking us 
is a cash nexus. 



We and they should be clear about 
the function of those bases. Jeane 
Kirkpatrick put it well in a recent edi- 
torial: the United States does not seek 
empire or hegemony in either Europe 
or the Pacific; we are there to foster a 
world of independent self-governing na- 
tions, and we recognize the power of 
local nationalism. But the last 40 years 
have shown that aspirations for national 
independence can best be realized in a 
system of collective security. If our al- 
lies no longer share this belief — or have 
come to the conclusion that these bases 
are dearer to our security than to 
theirs — then we are prepared to draw 
appropriate conclusions. 

A third trend giving ground for 
optimism over the next decade is de- 
velopments in the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe. It is likely that, for 
the foreseeable future, this entire re- 
gion will be preoccupied with a pro- 
tracted systemic crisis that may 
produce serious political unrest. 

• Failure in the U.S.S.R. is evident 
in declining economic growth rates — 5% 
growth rates in the 1960s had fallen to 
2% by the 1970s and 0% by the early 
1980s. 

• It is evident in the slow pace of 
Soviet technological development and 
in the increase in consumer dissatis- 
faction. 

• It is evident in a spiritual malaise 
that has resulted in rampant crime, cor- 
ruption, and alcoholism. 

Unless these trends are reversed, 
the Soviet Union will not enter the 21st 
century as a great power. To deal with 
this situation, Gorbachev has proposed 
far-reaching political and economic re- 
forms. The primary implication for us 
of these changes is a potentially in- 
creased subordination of Soviet national 
security and foreign policy to Soviet do- 
mestic imperatives. If the Soviet Union 
is to address successfully its internal 
problems, it will need a long period of 
relaxation of tensions with us and other 
major powers. 

If we negotiate with persistence 
and patience and maintain our 
strength, we may have a unique oppor- 
tunity to achieve some of our more fun- 
damental goals on the way to a s^fer 
and more peaceful world. 

In human rights, we will want to 
press the Soviets to institutionalize not 
only the right to free emigration but 
basic political and religious freedoms 
as well. 



ipartment of State Bulletin/November 1988 



43 



NARCOTICS 



In arms control, we will want to 
continue to press for early conclusion of 
a START agreement. In the emerging 
talks on conventional arms, we may 
have an opportunity to reduce the level 
of military confrontation in Europe. We 
should test Gorbachev's professed will- 
ingness to make assymmetrical cuts 
and to restructure Soviet forces to a 
"defensive" posture. 

On regional issues, we should con- 
tinue to test the Soviets' willingness to 
resolve regional conflicts by urging 
them to weigh in with the Cubans and 
Angolans to remove Cuban troops from 
Angola; with the Vietnamese to set a 
timetable for the prompt withdrawal of 
their troops from Cambodia; with 
Qadhafi to cease support for terrorism; 
and with clients such as Syria and the 
PLO [Palestine Liberation Organiza- 
tion] to take a more reasonable posture 
on the Middle East peace process. We 
also shall continue to insist on the ces- 
sation of Soviet arms shipments to 
Nicaragua. 

These three trends — the spread of 
democracy and the market economy, 
the economic prosperity and political 
stability of our allies, and the process 
of change underway in the Soviet 
Union — augur well for the U.S. se- 
curity. Alongside the signs of hope and 
progress, however, there are a number 
of other trends that remind us that 
there is little reason to rest on our 
oars. Two trends are particularly 
onerous. 

• The first is the diffusion of ad- 
vanced weapons systems in volatile re- 
gions of the Third World. We see, for 
instance, the proliferation of missile 
and chemical weapons technology into 
the Middle East. The Iran-Iraq war 
was marked by a number of distasteful 
"firsts." Until this conflict, ballistic 
missiles had not been used since World 
War II against civilians. And we must 
go all the way back to the First World 
War to find such frequent and wide- 
spread use of chemical weapons. These 
are very disturbing precedents in a 
world where the proliferation of me- 
dium- to high-technology armaments is 
increasingly common. 

The implication for U.S. forces of 
this proliferation of weaponry is all too 
clear. Third World conflicts are becom- 
ing increasingly dangerous. Quick re- 
sponse by superior forces will be 
essential if we want to have an impact 
on such conflicts — either to deter them 
or, if our vital interests require it, to 



apply effective counterforce. To be 
credible and effective, our forces will 
have to be highly mobile and capable of 
operating and supporting themselves in 
distant theaters. 

• Finally, a second trend of special 
concern — and let me conclude on this 
note — concerns the budget. I need re- 
mind no one in this room about the 
need for adequate resources to do the 
job. Those departments with special re- 
sponsibilities for our national security — 
State and Defense — have been hard hit 
by budgetary stringencies. In many 
ways, budgetary trends are even more 
troublesome for us at State than they 
are for Defense. From fiscal year (FY) 
1985 to FY 1988, State sustained a re- 
duction of almost one-third of our for- 
eign policy budget base — from over .$26 
billion to about $18 billion. 

As I stated earlier, the commit- 
ment of our allies to America's se- 
curity — as ours to their own — is 
essential. But many of our friends 
around the world lack the ability to 
support their own national defense re- 
quirements as well as provide resources 
for economic development. We know 
they must do both if they are to survive 
and prosper. Consequently, we provide 
defense and economic support. We also 
provide security assistance to 
strengthen the defenses of friends and 
allies who provide us with access to 
military facilities in the interest of mu- 
tual security. Portugal, Greece, Turkey, 
and the Philippines are examples. We 



must maintain these commitments. A?i 
our allies need to stand firm on their I 
responsibilities in pursuit of mutual i 
security. 

Further cuts in security assistanc 
programs can only place at risk our 
ability to maintain the degree of pres- 
ence and influence that we need in vai 
ous areas of the globe. Low levels of 
security assistance will make it in- 
creasingly difficult to meet our global I 
responsibilities. Inadequate capabiliti( 
can only erode the confidence of friem 
and allies while tempting adversaries 
fill the void. 

We all fully understand the part 
each of us must play in trying to redu 
the burden imposed by the Federal 
budget deficit. And State is doing its 
part. But, as Secretary Shultz told th 
Congress: 

We must not allow the American eag 
to become so undernourished or so encui 
bered in her flight that she looses her gr 
on either the arrows or the olive branch. 
Neither this Administration nor the nexi 
one can afford to let that happen. Far tc 
much is riding on her wings. 

The allusion to the eagle in flight 
particuarly apt for this audience, an ; 
sociation which has done so much to 
ensure the vitality of American air 
power. For your assistance in further 
ing the ability of America's diplomat! 
corps to implement U.S. foreign poli( 
I extend my heartfelt thanks. 



Task Force on Narcotics 
Meets in Washington 



CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 8, 1988' 



Introduction 

Following the request made by leaders 
at the Toronto economic summit, repre- 
sentatives from Canada, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States 
met in Washington on September 6-8, 
1988, to discuss priorities for action in 
the fight against drug abuse. 

The representatives noted with 
grave concern the terrible toll which 
the drug trade is taking in their coun- 
tries, as well as the tragic price in hu- 



man lives that is being paid all over t 
world as a result of illicit drug use, 
including its association with the HF 
infection in a number of countries, ai 
the wave of criminality associated wi 
it. The representatives agreed that s 
cess in the fight against illicit drugs 
requires the widest possible interna- 
tional cooperation in demand and suj 
ply reduction efforts. 

Demand Reduction 

The representatives recognized that 
their countries account for a large pi 
portion of the world drug market am 
that it is, therefore, imperative for 
them to act to reduce their demand 



44 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1! 



NARCOTICS 



:it drugs. The representatives be- 
red that the long-term commitment 
prevention, identification, interven- 
1, treatment, and rehabilitation is as 
;essary as controlling the production 
] the supply of drugs. The repre- 
itatives support the recommenda- 
is contained in the UN comprehen- 
e multidisciplinary outline of future 
ivities in drug abuse control as an 
egral part of an effective strategy to 
uce the problems associated with il- 
t drug use. 
Although each country must devise 
own programs and legislation to en- 
irage demand reduction, there is 
pe for international action with a 
w to achieving the following 
ectives: 

To implement specific domestic 
asures to reduce demand and 

To coordinate and share results 
intidrug research and technical 
'elopment efforts, using existing 
chanisms. 

A sound, effective, and compre- 
isive drug strategy must include 
tnerships among governments, 
igovernmental organizations, and 
vate citizens. 

The countries represented are 
nly committed to pursuing their de- 
iid reduction efforts and agree that 
hout a long-term demand reduction 
itegy, other efforts to curb the in- 
V of drugs will be doomed to failure. 
iy stressed that demand reduction is 
integral part of any effective drug 
trol program. 

)ceeds From Illicit 
iffic in Drugs 

representatives at this meeting 
ommended initiatives relating to: 

Improving cooperation among fi- 
icial authorities and institutions to 
•b money laundering and the flow of 
:it drug trafficking proceeds and 

The adoption of measures for the 
ntification, tracing, freezing, and 
ifiscation of proceeds derived from il- 
t drug trafficking. 

Drug traffickers commonly attempt 
launder the proceeds of their crimes 
ough banks and financial institutions 
legitimate activities. The integrity 
the financial system, as well as of 
ancial markets, is thus undermined, 
priving traffickers of their profits is 
efficient deterrent means against il- 
it trafficking. Tracing illegal proceeds 
often a good starting point for trac- 



ing and prosecuting drug traffickers. 
Effective measures such as those con- 
templated in the UN draft convention 
against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs 
and psychotropic substances can be 
taken against criminal money launder- 
ing without impairing legitimate 
business. 

The representatives welcomed and 
endorsed the initiatives being taken by 
the financial regulatory authorities (in- 
cluding the Basle Committee on Bank- 
ing Regulation and Supervisory 
Activities and bankers' associations) to 
encourage cooperation, vigilance, and 
the maintenance of high ethical stand- 
ards (among other things, through 
codes of conduct requiring "know-your- 
customer" policies) among the banks 
and the financial institutions they 
supervise. 

Economic Development and 
Assistance 

The representatives confirmed their 
view that development assistance and 
narcotics enforcement must go hand-in- 
hand and urged that donor nations and 
organizations and recipient countries 
include in their dialogues their mutual 
commitments to reducing illicit drug 
use, trafficking, production, and crop 
cultivation. Economic and development 
assistance can provide the necessary 
social and economic infrastructure 
needed in many countries to parallel 
and/or facilitate their enforcement 
efforts. Donor assistance should also be 
used for demand reduction and public 
awareness programs. 

The representatives also agreed 
that narcotics control objectives should 
be mutually deliberated by donor and 
recipient countries, in consultation with 
international organizations where multi- 
lateral aid is involved with the ultimate 
goal of achieving coordinated narcotics- 
related assistance objectives for each 
major source region. 

Criminal Justice and Law 
Enforcement 

In the criminal justice and law enforce- 
ment field, the representatives identi- 
fied three critical areas for increased 
international cooperation: 

• Intelligence sharing; 

• Monitoring of precursor chem- 
icals; and 

• Provision of law enforcement 
training equipment. 



They were hopeful that the UN 
draft convention will enhance interna- 
tional cooperation in all three areas. 
The representatives agreed that once 
the UN draft convention is ratified, it 
is crucial that it be used to its full 
potential. 

UN Draft Convention 

The representatives expressed their 
strong support for the ongoing work on 
drafting a new international convention 
[against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs 
and psychotropic substances] which will 
greatly enhance international coopera- 
tion in the fight against drug traffick- 
ing. They look forward to the successful 
negotiation of this convention in Vienna 
in November-December 1988. The adop- 
tion of such an international convention 
will represent a major step forward. 

The representatives are confident 
that all countries will approach the 
plenipotentiary conference in a spirit of 
cooperation so this crucial step is suc- 
cessfully completed. Their countries 
pledge to promote international coopei-- 
ation in the fight against drug traffick- 
ing and to work to ensure that the 
convention serves as a powerful instru- 
ment in these efforts. 



'The chairman of this meeting of the 
task force was Ann B. Wrobleski, As- 
sistant Secretary for International Narcot- 
ics Matters. ■ 



Ipartment of State Bulletin/November 1988 



45 



PACIFIC 



REFUGEES 



Palau Supreme Court 

Rules Compact Not Approved 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
AUG. 30, 19881 

On August 29, 1988, the Appeals Divi- 
sion of the Palau Supreme Court ruled 
on a lawsuit brought last March before 
the Trial Division of the Palau Supreme 
Court challenging the legality of the 
August 4, 1987, constitutional amend- 
ment referendum in Palau that led to 
the August 21, 1987, approval of the 
Compact of Free Association by the 
Palauan people. The Appeals Division, 
which consists of three judges all of 
whom are members of the Palau Su- 
preme Court, ruled that the compact 
approval process of last August in Palau 
was valid in all respects except that the 
procedure employed by the Palau Na- 
tional Congress (the Olbiil Era Kelu- 
lan) to call the amendment referendum 
was defective. The court thus concluded 
that the results of the referendum, in 
which some 73% of the Palauan voters 
approved the constitutional amend- 
ment, did not operate to amend the 
constitution. 

Since the constitutional amendment 
is not effective, the compact plebiscite 
of August 21, 1987, in which the people 
of Palau approved the compact by a 
73% majority, also had no legal effect. 
The unamended terms of the Palau 
Constitution had been earlier inter- 
preted by the Palau Supreme Court to 
require a 75% majority to approve the 
compact. Thus the ultimate effect of the 
Palau Supreme Court's ruling of Au- 
gust 29 is that Palau has not yet ap- 
proved the Compact of Free Association 
according to its constitution. 

The Government of Palau, under 
President Thomas Remengesau, re- 
mains committed to the Compact of 
Free Association. It is now considering 
alternatives to put the question of com- 
pact approval again before the Palauan 
people. The following is the text of a 
statement from the office of President 
Remengesau reacting to the Palau Su- 
preme Court decision: 

"The Office of the President of 
Palau: 

"The Appellate Division of the 
Palau Supreme Court ruled today, Au- 
gust 29, 1988, that the August 04, 1987, 
constitutional amendment referendum 
and the August 21, 1987, referendum on 
the Compact of Free Association were 



null and void because the Olbiil Era 
Kelulau (the Palau National Congress) 
did not adopt by a three-fourths vote of 
the members of each house a resolution 
approving the August 04, 1987, place- 
ment on the ballot of the constitutional 
amendment. It was adopted by legisla- 
tion approved by simple majority of the 
members of each house. 

"The Trial Court had earlier ruled 
that there was no inconsistency be- 
tween the Constitution of Palau and the 
Compact of Free Association. The Ap- 
pellate Division, however, overturned 
that ruling and stated that there, in- 



deed, were conflicts between the two 
documents and that the constitution 
could be amended at any time to re- 
solve those inconsistencies. Palau's ne\ 
President, Thomas 0. Remengesau, 
intends to immediately consult with tl 
leadership of the Olbiil Era Kelulau, 
the Council of Chiefs, and state gover- 
nors to determine how best to get the 
compact approved legitimately by the 
Palau people." 



'Made available to news eorrespondei 
by Department deputy spokesman Phylli 
Oakley. ■ 



U.S. Responds to Southern Africa 
Refugee Crisis 



by Jonathan Moore 

Address before the Conference on 
Southern African Refugees, Returnees, 
and Displaced Persons on August 23, 
1988, in Oslo. Ambassador Moore is 
U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs. 

Opening the 1979 Arusha conference on 
the situation of refugees in Africa, 
[then-President of Tknzania] Julius 
Nyerere proclaimed: 

This conference is about people; about 
the prospects, and indeed the very life of 
people who are now, or may in future be, 
forced to flee from their homelands and 
seek refuge in another country in order to 
escape persecution, or death, or starva- 
tion. . . . This conference has to face up to 
the implications of our common humanity 
with these millions of souls. They are vic- 
tims of forces beyond their control: It could 
happen to any of us. The manner in which 
they now unavoidably look to us for succor 
may be the way we ourselves will tomor- 
row be looking to others. 

These words ring true today as we 
consider the plight of the more than 5 
million refugees and displaced persons 
of southern Africa. Their suffering and 
the dangerous instability of the south- 
ern African region demand the highest 
priority attention and the best con- 
certed efforts of the international com- 
munity. The U.S. delegation is, there- 
fore, proud to associate itself with this 
conference and its goals: The solidarity 



of the spirit and the rehabilitation of 
the society. 

It is singularly fitting that our cc 
sulfations about these tragic refugee 
problems are taking place in Norway. 
The contributions of the Government 
and people of Norway on behalf of rei 
gees are beacons of sacrifice, dedica- 
tion, and generosity. Norwegians lea( 
the entire world in their contribution 
per capita and as a percentage of GN 
[gross national product], to the inter 
tional organizations which protect an 
assist refugees. 

Norway's legendary native son, 
Fridtjof Nansen, formulated the idea 
and established the structures of int( 
national refugee assistance as the fir 
commissioner for refugees. The mem 
ory of Nansen's tireless entreaties to 
governments and individuals to assis 
refugees earlier in this century still 
lives everywhere. The United Nation 
and its partners work to help desper 
people. 

To the Government of Norway, tl 
Organization of African Unity, the 
United Nations, and to all who have 
worked to provide this forum on beh; 
of the helpless victims in southern A 
rica, I wish to express our heartfelt 
thanks. 



46 



Department of State Bulletin/November l!t6 

i 



REFUGEES 



e Situation 
Southern Africa 

is indeed an indictment of our age 
it once again we must meet to try to 
;over the lives of a vast group of refu- 
;s and displaced persons. We have 
ne together because of our shared 
icern for the tragic conditions of the 
ugees in southern Africa. We are 
and by our common anguish about 
> suffering and deprivation which so 
ny of these refugees and displaced 
-sons have endured; and all of us feel 
ommon revulsion to the cruelties per- 
orated against innocent people. We 
n in common purpose to save the ref- 
ees and to aid them in their search 
productive lives with dignity and 
tice. 

The causes of the immense suffer- 
: in southern Africa are well known, 
ustice, poverty, violence, natural di- 
.ters, and the repressive, intolerable 
icy of apartheid in South Africa have 
iwned conditions which are echoed in 
■ tragedies of Indochina, South Asia, 
1 the Horn. In such a world, we 
jht become inured to a seemingly 
iless succession of transgi'essions, 
, if we turned our backs on the vul- 
•able and needy, we would lose the 
se of our own humanity. 

During 1987, refugee numbers in- 
ased dramatically in southern Af- 
1. I traveled to the region in March 
;hat year and was alarmed by the 
ge groups of Mozambicans who were 
placed in Mozambique or dispersed 
refugees in Tanzania. Malawi, Zam- 
, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, and South 
•ica. Subsequently, as these flows 
itinued, I commissioned a study in 
:er to learn more about their causes, 
ich was completed earlier this year. 

What emerged from the interviews 
,h Mozambican refugees and dis- 
ced persons was a consistently hor- 
nng account of the most appalling 
ttality. Copies of the report are avail- 
e here today. I commend it to your 
ding. The cries of RENAMO's" 
ozambique National Resistance 
vement] victims implore us to act. 

It is a godsend that so many 
zambicans have found refuge in the 
ler countries of southern Africa. We 
ute this extraordinary hospitality, 
ich, unfortunately, is not matched in 
areas of the world. Many African 
ions with lower per capita GNP, 
her ratio of refugees to indigenous 
pulation, and less foreign assistance, 
rertheless, preserve first aslyum 
ire faithfully than other nation states 



which are better off in all categories. 
We recognize that the burden grows 
heavier, but we urge Africans and their 
governments to continue their profound 
traditions of refuge and sharing. We 
pledge our continued strong support for 
these efforts, which illuminate man's 
capacity for spiritual as well as physical 
survival. 

As a nation of refugees and immi- 
grants, the people of the United States 
are profoundly moved by the ordeal of 
those forced to flee their homes. Amer- 
icans have consistently reached out to 
share the burden of refugees, retur- 
nees, and displaced persons through 
the UN High Commissioner for Refu- 
gees (UNHCR), the International Com- 
mittee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the 
World Food Program, UNICEF [UN 
Children's Fund], and the courageous 
private voluntary organizations. 

Since 1980, the United States has 
provided over $1 billion in development 
assistance to the countries of southern 
Africa to help ameliorate the poverty 
that can cause conditions of refugee 
flows and displacement — including $25 
million per year in legal and other as- 
sistance to the victims of apartheid 
within South Africa. Our humanitarian 
assistance to refugees in southern Af- 
rica has amounted to another $300 mil- 
lion since 1980. I am most pleased to 
announce today an immediate further 
emergency contribution of $10.5 million 
in refugee-related help. Of this total, 
$5.5 million will be in response to the 
urgent appeals by ICRC for its African 
programs. The balance of $5 million will 
be contributed to UNHCR for Mozam- 
bican refugees and for refugees in the 
Horn. There must be more help from 
us, and there will be, because these 
commitments are not fleeting but lie 
deep in the hearts of the American 
people. 

Material resources alone cannot 
help anyone if the available assistance 
fails to reach the refugees. Unfortuna- 
tely, there are situations where the in- 
ternational organizations are hindered 
in fulfilling their mandates to help all 
refugees, regardless of their original 
nationalities and regardless of where 
they are. We are concerned about ex- 
cessively narrow definitions of security 
that deny safety and help to innocent 
civilians and insist on categorizing peo- 
ple as either supporters or enemies, 
and we are troubled about politically 
motivated efforts to prevent interna- 
tional organizations from helping some 
refugees because of who or where they 
are. Neutrality, which is so fundamen- 
tal to the provision of international hu- 



manitarian assistance, is in jeopardy. 
Extremely important ideals, which nur- 
ture the worldwide mechanisms by 
which refugees are helped and pro- 
tected, may be crippled and compro- 
mised. Denying humanitarian assist- 
ance as a weapon of war is an 
unjustifiable practice, which must not 
be used by any party to conflict. 

The conference sponsors have re- 
minded us that this is not the first time 
we have come together to discuss the 
plight of African refugees and retur- 
nees and the social, economic, and eco- 
logical burdens that they pose for their 
host countries. In 1984, at the second 
International Conference on Assistance 
to Refugees in Africa, we all agreed 
that integrating refugee relief as- 
sistance with development aid was key 
to finding truly lasting solutions in 
areas of high refugee impact. Indeed, it 
is virtually impossible to separate the 
two where refugees and nationals use 
the same systems providing health 
care, education, and other essential 
social services. In this connection, the 
recent meeting of the World Bank's 
consultative group on Malawi rightly 
focused on both long-term development 
issues a'cl the immediate impact of the 
600,000 Mozambican refugees on the 
Malawian economy. 

Since every country in southern 
Africa shares the experience of having 
hosted refugees, it may be that new 
regional approaches to refugees and 
development would be fruitful. In this 
regard, we would welcome SADCC 
[Southern Africa Development Coordi- 
nation Conference] playing a greater 
role in serving as a coordinating con- 
duit for donor assistance that links ref- 
ugee aid and humanitarian assistance to 
the displaced with long-term develop- 
ment assistance. 

Is there any reason to hope that 
the flows of refugees in southern Africa 
might soon stop? Can we hope that 
those who are presently refugees must 
soon be able to return home? The an- 
swers to these questions, of course, de- 
pend on the conditions in the refugees' 
home countries. In those places where 
violence, persecution, and the violation 
of basic rights occur, we should expect 
people to continue to see their hope for 
survival in crossing borders to escape 
such actions. And it is essential that 
the natural temptation to repatriate 
refugees prematurely be resisted until 
conditions which can sustain and protect 
life have been adequately restored, lest 
the tragedy be compounded and the cy- 
cle be repeated. 



47 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



TREATIES 



It is incumbent on all of us, as 
members of the human family, not only 
to bring to bear all possible effective 
resources to aid the victims but also to 
address the problems which cause refu- 
gees to flee. In doing so, we must be 
prepared to see the competent interna- 
tional and regional organizations en- 
gage not only those governments and 
gi'oups whose actions and policies we 
Hke. It will be imperative for channels 
to be open precisely to those who cause 
the conditions which drive people into 
exile. 

Hopeful Signs 

I am encouraged that there are hopeful 
signs amidst the evidence of distress. 
Even as we meet, another round of 
talks among the Governments of An- 
gola, Cuba, and South Africa is about 
to begin, with the mediation of the 
United States. The cherished vision of 
independence for Namibia may soon be- 
come reality. Independence in Namibia 
will create other challenges as to how 
to facilitate repatriation, reintegration, 
and reconciliation. These are challenges 
which all of us will welcome. 

So we recognize that southern Af- 
rica is e.xperiencing a major emergency, 



in which the lives of millions of people 
are in grave danger, and that the poten- 
tial e.xists there for a worse crisis in 
the years to come. The United States, 
in concert with other governments and 
with the international and regional or- 
ganizations, will continue to support 
and strengthen a wide range of efforts 
to help southern Africa heal that emer- 
gency and avoid that crisis. 

Exactly 25 years ago in his speech 
before the Lincoln Memorial, a great 
and sorely missed American political 
leader, Dr Martin Luther King, Jr , es- 
poused an ideal which ultimately an- 
swers the tragedy of southern Africa. 
That ideal is that there is no peace 
without justice. He said: 

Now is the time to lift our nation from 
the quicksand of racial injustice to the 
solid rock of brotherhood. . . . Let us not 
seek the satisfy our thirst for freedom by 
drinking from the cup of bitterness and 
hatred. . . . We must not allow our creative 
protest to degenerate into physical vio- 
lence. . . . Many of our white brothers, as 
evidenced by their presence here today, 
have come to realize that their destiny is 
tied up with our destiny. . . . 

May God bless us all with 
compassionate, dynamic, and fruitful 
endeavor. ■ 



Chilean Plebiscite 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
AUG. 31, 1988= 

With the announcement by the Govern- 
ment of Chile of October 5th as the 
date for voting in the plebiscite and the 
opening of the formal campaign period 
yesterday, the Chilean plebiscite now 
enters its crucial final phase. Unprece- 
dented numbers of Chileans have regis- 
tered to vote, and we congratulate 
those who worked so tirelessly for the 
broadest possible participation in the 
plebiscite. 

The United States joins with oth- 
ers who have called for a vote in which 
the will of the people can be openly 
expressed in an atmosphere free of vio- 
lence and intimidation. Although we re- 
gret that it was not done sooner, we 
welcomed the Government of Chile's de- 
cision on August 24 to lift the states of 



exception. This action, combined with 
the new law authorizing free television 
time to opposing views, improves condi- 
tions for a fair and free plebiscite. 

The Government of Chile and espe- 
cially its armed forces have an impor- 
tant responsibility to assure its citizens 
that there will be a free plebiscite un- 
der peaceful conditions. We have con- 
sistently encouraged the Chilean 
Government to take further steps to 
improve the balance of information 
available to voters and to create an at- 
mosphere in which its citizens can exer- 
cise their freedom of choice without 
fear or intimidation so that Chile may 
retake its rightful place in the commu- 
nity of democratic nations. 



'Read to news correspondents by De- 
partment deputy spokesman Phyllis 
Oaklev. ■ 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Agriculture 

International plant protection convention 

Done at Rome Dec. 6, 195L Entered into 

force Apr 3, 1952; for the U.S. Aug. 18, 

1972. HAS 7465. 

Adherence deposited: Turkey, .July 29, 

1988. 

Revised text of the international plant pi 
tection convention. (TIAS 7465) Adopted 
Rome Nov. 28, 1979.' 
Acceptances deposited: Ecuador, July 22 
1988; Turkey, July 29, 1988. 

Customs 

Convention establishing a Customs Coop 
ation Council, with annex. Done at 
Brussels Dec. 15, 1950. Entered into fore 
Nov. 4, 1952; for the U.S. Nov. 5, 1970. 
TIAS 7063. 
Accession deposited: Cuba, July 11, 198 

Human Rights 

International convenant on economic, so 

cial, and cultural rights. Done at New Y 

Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3, 

1976.-^ 

Accession deposited: Guatemala, May li 

1988. 

Judicial Procedure 

Convention on the law applicable to tru 
and on their recognition. Done at The 
Hague July 1, 1985. Enters into force o 
the first day of the third calendar mont 
after the deposit of the third instrumer 
ratification, acceptance, or approval. 
Signatures: Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netheriands, July 1, 1985; U.K., Jan. V 
1986; U.S., June 13, 1988. 



Marine Pollution 

Protocol of 1984 to amend the internal i 
convention on civil liability for oil polli 
damage. 1969. Done at London May 25 
1984.' ISenate] Treaty Doc. 99-12. 
Accession deposited: Australia, June 2 
1988. 

Pollution 

Convention for the protection of the oz 
layer, with annexes. Done at Vienna 
Mar 22, 1985. Entered into force Sept 
1988. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 99-9. 
Accession deposited: Venezuela, Sept. 
1988. 

Prisoner Transfer 

Convention on the transfer of sentenc* 

persons. Done at Strasbourg Mar. 21, 

Entered into force July 1, 1985. TIAS 

10,s24. 

Territorial Extension: Extended by th 

U.K. to the British Virgin Islands. 

Sept. 9, 1988. 



48 



Department of State Bulletin/November Bti 



TREATIES 



d Cross 

itn, ..] additional to the Geneva conven- 
11^ oi Aug. 12, 1949 (TIAS 3362, 3363. 
1). '. ;ri5), and relating to the protection 
VI. I mis of international armed conflicts 
■i'Imi III I), with annexes. Adopted at 
111 \:i lune 8, 1977. Entered into force 
(• T. 1978.2 

lis deposited: Democratic People's 
of Korea, Mar. 9, 1988; Qatar, 

1M.S8; Liberia, June 30, 1988. 

itocol additional to the Geneva conven- 
is of Aug. 12, 1949 (TIAS 3362, 3363, 
4, 3365), and relating to the protection 
iiictims of noninternational armed con- 
ts (Protocol II). Adopted at Geneva 
le 8, 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 
8.2 
gession deposited: Liberia, June 30, 



;ellite Communications System 
IMARSAT) 

lendments to the convention and operat- 
agreement on the International Mar- 
ne Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) 
Sept. 3, 1976 (TIAS 9605). Adopted at 
iidon Oct. 16, 1985.' 
:eptances deposited: Spain, July 27, 
8; Greece, July 29, 1988. 

ice Station 

reement on cooperation in the detailed 
ign, development, operation, and utili- 
ion of the permanently manned civil 
,ce station, with annex. Done at Wash- 
ton Sept. 29, 1988.1 
natures: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
mce. Federal Republic of Germany, 
ly, Japan, Netherlands, Norway. Spain, 
K., U.S., Sept. 29, 1988. 

rangement concerning application of the 
ice station intergovernmental agreement 
iding its entry into force. Done at Wash- 
ton Sept. 29, 1988. Entered into force 
3t. 29, 1988. 

■ties: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
ance, Federal Republic of Germany, 
ly, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, U.K., 



'ture 

nvention against torture and other 
lel. inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
lishment. Done at New York Dec. 10, 
14. Entered into force June 26, 1987. ^ 
tification deposited: Guyana, May 19, 



Katies 

;nna convention on the law of treaties 

tween states and international organiza- 

ns or between international organiza- 

ns, with annex. Done at Vienna Mar. 21. 

*6.> 

cession deposited: Hungary, Aug. 17. 



i8. 



BILATERAL 

Canada 

Agreement amending and supplementing 
the agreement of Mar. 9. 1959, as amended 
and supplemented, governing tolls on the 
St. Lawrence Seaway (TIAS 4192. 5117, 
5608, 6236, 7408, 9003, 9883, 10363), with 
memorandum of agreement. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Washington Apr. 21 
and Aug. 10. 1988. Entered into force 
Aug. 10. 1988. 

Memorandum of understanding on coopera- 
tion in the detailed design, development, 
operation, and utilization of the perma- 
nently manned civil space station. Signed 
at Washington Sept. 29, 1988. Enters into 
force upon notification by each party that 
all necessary procedures have been 
completed. 

Congo 

International express mail agreement, with 
detailed regulations. Signed at Brazzaville 
and Washington July 15 and Aug. 12, 1988. 
Entered into force Sept. 15, 1988. 

Cote d'lvoire 

Agreement regarding the consolidation and 
rescheduling of certain debts owed to. 
guaranteed by, or insured by the U.S. Gov- 
ernment and its agencies, with annexes. 
Signed at Abidjan July 14, 1988. Entered 
into force Aug. 26, 1988. 

Czechoslovakia 

Program of cooperation and exchanges in 
culture, education, science, technology, 
and other fields for years 1988-90. Signed 
at Washington Apr. 8. 1988. Entered into 
force Apr. 16, 1988. 

Agreement amending agreement of 
June 25, July 3 and 22, 1986, relating to 
trade in certain textile products. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Prague Dec. 21, 
1987, Apr. 15 and May 4, 1988. Entered 
into force May 4. 1988. 

International express mail agreement, with 
detailed regulations. Signed at Prague and 
Washington July 25 and Aug. 17, 1988. En- 
tered into force Sept. 30, 1988. 

Dominican Republic 

Agreement concerning the status of U.S. 
Government personnel temporarily present 
in the Dominican Republic in connection 
with their official duties. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Santo Domingo July 20 
and Aug. 4, 1988. Entered into force 
Aug. 4, 1988. 

Ecuador 

Agreement regarding the consolidation and 
rescheduling of certain debts owed to, 
guaranteed by. or insured by the U.S. Gov- 
ernment and its agencies, with annexes. 
Signed at Quito July 8, 1988. Entered into 
force Aug. 22, 1988. 



European Space Agency (ESA) 
Memorandum of understanding on coopera- 
tion in the detailed design, development, 
operation, and utilization of the perma- 
nently manned civil space station. Signed 
at Washington Sept. 29, 1988. Enters into 
force upon notification by each party that 
all necessary procedures have been 
completed. 

German Democratic Republic 

Agreement for the exchange of scholars 
from both countries through the Fulbright 
Program for the academic years 1988-89 
and 1989-90. Signed at Berlin June 22, 
1988. Entered into force June 22, 1988, 

Indonesia 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
June 3. 1988, for the sale of agricultural 
commodities. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Jakarta July 28, 1988. Entered 
into force July 28, 1988. 

Jamaica 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Nov. 9, 1987, as amended, for sale of agri- 
cultural commodities. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Kingston Aug. 10, 1988. 
Entered into force Aug. 10, 1988. 

Japan 

Agreement concerning .Japan's financial 
contribution for U.S. administrative and 
related expenses for the Japanese fiscal 
year 1988 pursuant to the mutual defense 
assistance agreement of Mar. 8. 1954 (TIAS 
2957). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Tokyo Aug. 23, 1988. Entered into force 
Aug. 23. 1988. 

Mexico 

Minute 276 of the International Boundary 
and Water Commission: Conveyance, treat- 
ment, and disposal of sewage at the 
Nogales international sewage treatment 
plant under Minute 227, with joint report. 
Signed at Ciudad Juarez July 26, 1988. En- 
tered into force Aug. 19, 1988. 

Agreement modifying the agreement of 
June 18, 1982 (TIAS 10534), concerning 
land mobile service in the bands 470-512 
MHz and 806-890 HMz along the common 
U.S. -Mexico border. Signed at Mexico 
Sept. 12, 1988. Enters into force upon re- 
ceipt of notification from Mexico that the 
formalities required by its national legisla- 
tion have been completed. 

Pakistan 

Commodity import grant agreement for ag- 
ricultural sector support program. Signed 
at Islamabad Aug. 4, 1988. Entered into 
force Aug. 4, 1988. 

Program grant agreement for sectoral as- 
sistance component of the agricultural sec- 
tor support. Signed at Islamabad Aug. 4, 
1988. Entered into force Aug. 4, 1988. 



49 



PRESS RELEASES 



PUBLICATIONS 



Papua New Guinea 

International express mail agreement with 
detailed regulations. Signed at Boroko and 
Washington Aug. 4 and 19, 1988. Entered 
into force Sept. 30, 1988. 

Paraguay 

International express mail agreement, with 
detailed regulations. Signed at Asuncion 
and Washington July 13 and Aug. 22, 1988. 
Entered into force Sept. 30, 1988. 

Peru 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
June 28, 1988, for sales of agricultural com- 
modities. Signed at Lima Aug. 12, 1988. 
Entered into force Aug. 12, 1988. 

Turkey 

Agreement amending the air transport 
agreement of Feb. 12, 1946 {TIAS 1538). 
Effected by exchange of notes at Ankara 
Aug. 17, 1988. Entered into force Aug. 17, 
1988. 

U.S.S.R. 

Program of cooperation and exchanges for 
1989-91, with annex. Signed at Moscow 
May 31, 1988. Entered into force May 31, 
1988; effective Jan. 1, 1989. 



Department of State 



United Kingdom 

Agreement extending the agreement of 
May 14, 1987, concerning Montserrat and 
narcotics activities. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Washington Aug. 26, 1988. En- 
tered into force Aug. 26, 1988. 

Venezuela 

Agreement extending the agreements of 
Jan. 11, 1980 (TIAS 10649), for scientific 
and technological cooperation: Apr. 10, 
1980 (TIAS 106.52), on agricultural coopera- 
tion; Aug. 11, 1980 (TIAS 10651), for scien- 
tific and technological cooperation in 
health; and the Feb. 5 and 7, 1980 (TIAS 
10650), memorandum of understanding on 
cooperation in earth resources and geo- 
logical phenomena. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Caracas July 19 and 21, 1988. 
Entered into force July 21, 1988. 

Zaire 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Feb. 24, 1988, for sales of agricultural com- 
modities. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Kinshasa Aug. 13, 1988. Entered into force 
Aug. 13. 1988. 



'Not in force. 

-Not in force for the U.S. 



Department of State 



Free single copies of the following Depai 
ment of State publications are available 
from the Public Information Division, Bu 
reau of Public Affairs, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

President Reagan 

Prospects for a New Era of World Peace, 
UN General Assembly, Sept. 26, 1988 
(Current Policy #1109). 

Secretary Shultz 

Proposed Refugee Admissions for FY 19! 
Senate Judiciary Committee, Sept. 13, 
1988 (Current Policy #1103). 

The Administration's Approach to Middh 
East Peacemaking, Washington Institi 
for Near East Policy, Wye Plantation, 
Queenstown, Md., Sept. 16. 1988 (Cur- 
rent Policy #1104). 

Arms Control 

Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (GIST, 
Sept. 1988). 

East Asia 

Political Dimensions of a Changing Asia 
Assistant Secretary Sigur, U.S. -Asia 
stitute's sixth national leadership coni 
ence, Sept. 15, 1988 (Current Policy 
#1106). 



Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 



No 



Subject 



H95 9/9 Shultz: remarks, question- 
and-answer session be- 
fore the Board of Direc- 
tors, General Federation 
of Women's Clubs. 

*196 9/13 Shultz: statement before 
the Senate Judiciary 
Committee. 

*197 9/15 Shultz: remarks, U.S. -Asia 
Institute National Lead- 
ership Conference. 

*198 9/16 Shultz: remarks, question- 
and-answer session be- 
fore the Asia Society's 
Washington Center, Sept. 
15. 

199 9/19 Shultz: address, question- 

and-answer session be- 
fore the Washington In- 
stitute for Near East 
Policy, Wye Plantation, 
Sept. 16. 

200 9/19 Shultz: remarks before the 

Washington Diplomatic 
Community. 
*201 9/21 Shultz: remarks, question- 
and-answer session be- 
fore the Voice of America 
drug workshop, Sept. 20. 



50 



*202 9/22 Shultz: acceptance remarks 
upon receiving the Air 
Force Association's W. 
Stuart Symington Award, 
Sept. 21. 

*203 9/22 Shultz: luncheon toast in 
honor of Soviet Foreign 
Minister Shevardnadze. 
204 9/23 Shultz: news conference fol- 
lowing meeting with So- 
viet Foreign Minister 
Shevardnadze. 

*205 9/28 Shultz: news briefing. New 
York, Sept. 27. 

*206 9/28 Program for the official 
working visit to Wash- 
ington, D.C, of Presi- 
dent Mitterrand of the 
French Republic, Sept. 
29. 

*207 9/30 Shultz: remarks on signing 
space station agree- 
ments, Sept. 29. 
208 9/30 Principal Officers of the 

Department of State and 
United States Chiefs of 
Mission, 1778-1988, 
released. 

*209 9/30 Shultz: news conference, 
USUN. 



"Not printed in the Bulletin. 



Economics 

Economic Summits 1981-88 (GIST, Sept 
1988). 

International Law 

The War Powers Resolution, Legal Adv 
Sofaer, Senate Foreign Relations Con 
mittee, Sept. 15, 1988 (Current Polic\ 
#1107). 

Refugees 

U.S. Response to Southern African Ret 
gee Crisis, Refugee Coordinator Moo 
Conference on Southern African Refi 
gees, Returnees, and Displaced Persi 
Oslo. Aug. 23, 1988 (Current Policy 
#1102). 

Indochinese Refugees (GIST, Sept. 198) 

Western Hemisphere 

U.S. -Cuban Relations (GIST, Sept. 
1988). ■ 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1 



NDEX 



^Jovember 1988 
k/olume 88, No. 2140 



AI'Khanistan. Military Power and Diplo- 
macy: The Reagan Legacy 
(Armacost) 40 

\frica. U.S. Responds to Southern Africa 
Itffugee Crisis (Moore) 4G 

American Principles. The International 
I.ruacy of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 
i.siuiltz) 17 

Vn^'ola. Southwest Africa Negotiations 
iCnicker, joint statements. White House 
>lalement) IcS 

Vrms Control 

^BM Treaty Review Conference Ends 

(U.S. statement) 19 

VE Carried Out in Soviet Union (White 
House statement) 20 

»Iilitary Power and Diplomacy: The Reagan 
Legacy (Armacost) 40 

ioviet Foreign Minister Visits Washington 
(Shultz, joint statement) 28 

!;hile. Chilean Plebiscite (Department 
statement) 48 

:hina. Export of U.S. Satellite to China 
for Launch (Department statement) . 27 

Communications. 2.5th "Hot Line" Anni- 
versary (White House statement) .... 20 
ongress 

)evelopments in Malaysia and Singapore 
Lambertson) 23 

'oreign Language Competence in the 

Foreign Service (Spiers) 21 

roposed Refugee Admissions for FY 1989 

'(Shultz) 12 

he War Powers Resolution (Sofaer) ... 36 

Izechoslovakia. 20th Anniversary of War- 
saw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia 
(Reagan) 31 



Department & Foreign Service. Foreign 
Language Competence in the Foreign 
Service (Spiers) 21 

Economics. Export of U.S. Satellite to 
China for Launch (Department state- 
ment) 27 

Europe. Military Power and Diplomacy: 
The Reagan Legacy (Armacost) 40 

Human Rights 

Developments in Malaysia and Singapore 
(Lambertson) 23 

Human Rights: A Western Cultural Bias? 
(Schifter) 33 

Military Power and Diplomacy: The Reagan 
Legacy (Armascost) 40 

International Law. The War Powers Reso- 
lution (Sofaer) 36 

Malaysia 

Developments in Malaysia and Singapore 
( Lambertson) 23 

Malaysia— A Profile 24 

Middle East. The Administration's Ap- 
proach to Middle East Peacemaking 
(Shultz) 10 

Military Affairs. Military Power and 
Diplomacy: The Reagan Legacy 
(Armacost) 40 

Namibia. Southwest Africa Negotiations 
(Crocker, joint statements, White House 
statement) 18 

Narcotics. Task Force on Narcotics 
Meets in Washington (chairman's 
statement) 44 

Palau. Palau Supreme Court Rules Com- 
pact Not Approved (Department state- 
ment) 46 

Presidential Documents 

Foreign Policy Achievements (Reagan) . . 9 

Prospects for A New Era of World Peace 
(Reagan) 1 

20th Anniversary of Warsaw Pact Invasion 
of Czechoslovakia (Reagan) 31 

Publications. Department of State .... 50 

Refugees 

Proposed Refugee Admissions for FY 1989 
(Shultz) 12 

U.S. Responds to Southern Africa Refugee 
Crisis (Moore) 46 



Science & Technology. Export of U.S. 
Satellite to China for Launch (Depart- 
ment statement) 27 

Singapore 

Developments in Malaysia and Singapore 
( Lambertson) 23 

Singapore — A Profile 26 

Treaties 

ABM Treaty Review Conference Ends 
(U.S. statement) 19 

Current Actions 48 

U.S.S.R. 

ABM Treaty Review Conference Ends 
(U.S. statement) 19 

Foreign Policy Achievements (Reagan) . . 9 

.JVE Carried'Out in Soviet Union (White 
House statement) 20 

Soviet Foreign Minister Visits Washington 
(Shultz, joint statement) 28 

2.5th "Hot Line" Anniversary (White House 
statement) 20 

United Nations 

Prospects for A New Era of World Peace 
(Reagan) 1 

Security Council Permanent Members 
Meet With Secretary General (joint 
communique) 6 

U.S. Release Funds to United Nations 
(White House statement) 5 

Name Index 

Armacost, Michael H 40 

Crocker, Chester A 18 

Lambertson, David F 23 

Moore, Jonathan 46 

Reagan, President 1, 9, 31 

Schifter, Richard 33 

Shultz, Secretary 10, 12, 17, 28 

Sofaer, Abraham D 36 

Spiers, Ronald I 21 



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Depart mvni 

le Official Monthly F^ecord of 'United States Foreign Policy / Volume 




88 /Number 2141 






\ %■ 



ggjipl 




Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights 



December 1988 



Philippine Sea 



I o 



Manili 



n 



manna,/ 

South 'i\' 

China .t)tf|g"^'--»'" 

sea / 



MAUYSlAy? 



U.S.-PhJIipplnes 

Bases 
Agreement 




Lebanon 



i0f»pariment of StnU* 

bulletin 



I Number 2141 / December It 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public Com- 
munication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and govern- 
ment agencies with information on de- 
velopments in U.S. foreign relations 
and the work of the Department of 
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addresses and news conferences of the 
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are published frequently to provide ad- 
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but should not necessarily be inter- 
preted as official U.S. policy 
statements. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

CHARLES REDMAN 

Assistant Secretary 
for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

COLLEEN LUTZ 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

SHARON R. HAYNES 

Assistant Editoi- 



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CONTENTS 



mmifwpr"''"' 



'■N^^ijj^ It 



FEATURE 



1 40th Anniversary of the Universal 
of Human Rights 






ifie Secretary 

1 The Open Society and Its 

Friends 
Key to the Future: Enlightened 

Engagement 
Promoting Peace and Prosperity 

in the South Asian Region 
Efforts for Peace in Africa 



Canada 

2 U.S. -Canada Sign Free Trade 

Agreement (President Reagan) 

Consular Affairs 

2 Xonimmigrant Visa Waiver Pilot 
Program With Japan (Depart- 
ment Announcement) 

Eist Asia 

2 U.S. -Philippines Military Bases 
Agreement Review, 1988 (Raul 
Ma)iglapus, President Reagan, 
Secretary Shultz, Texts of 
Agreement, Agreed Minutes, 
and Letter to President 
Aquino) 

2 U.S. Japan Relations 

(William Clark, Jr.) 

3 Burdensharing and Japan 
(William Clark, Jr.) 

Situation in Cambodia 
(Charles H. Twining) 



Europe 



36 



37 



Visit of Hungarian Premier 
(President Reagan, 
Karohj Grosz) 

39th Report on Cyprus 
(Message to the Congress) 



Food 

37 



World Food Day, 1988 
(Proclamation) 

General 

38 Diplomacy in an Election Year 
and Beyond 

(Max M. Kampelman) 

IVIiddle East 

41 Update on the Situation in the 

Middle East 
(Richard W. Murphy) 

42 T^ba Arbitration Award 

(Department Statement) 

44 Iraq's Use of Chemical Weapons 

(Department Statement) 

45 Lebanon: At the Crossroads 

(Richard W. Murphy) 
48 Republic of Lebanon 



United Nations 

53 Toward the 21st Century: The 
Future for Multilateral Diplo- 
macy (Richard S. Williamson) 

Western Hemisphere 

57 National Emergency in Panama 
(Message to the Congress) 

57 Results in Chilean Plebiscite 

(Department Statement) 

Treaties 

58 Current Actions 

Press Releases 

60 
60 



Department of State 
USUN 



Publications 



62 



62 



Department of State 

Foreign Relations Volume 
Released 

Principal Officers of the Depart- 
ment of State and United 
States Chiefs of Mission, 
1778-1988 Released 

Background Notes 



Index 



(onomics 

Overview of U.S. Ti-ade Policy 

(W. Allen Wallis) 
Economic Summits 1981-88 




Eleanor Koosevelt was a member of the 
Ij.S. deleKation to the United Nations 
from 1916 to 1952 and a special adviser 
to the U.S. delegation to the General 
.Assembly in 19(>1. She played a leading 
role in establishing the UN Commission 
on Human Rights and served a.s I'.S. 
representative from 1946-50. 

Mrs. Koosevelt was chosen as the 
Comission's first chairman by acclama- 
tion and headed the subcommittee that 
prepared preliminary drafts of an inter- 
national bill of human rights. On De- 
cember 10, 1948, she cast the U.S. vote 
for the I'niversal Declaration of Human 
Rights. After its adoption the Assembly 
gave her a standing ovation. 



In 1962, President John Kennedy 
nominated Mrs. Roosevelt for the Nobel 
Peace Prize for her work in connection 
with the declaration. .After her death 
later that year, the General Assembly 
paid tribute to her in a special meeting 
during which delegates from around the 
world mourned her passing and ex- 
pressed gratitude for her years of dedi- 
cated and selfless leadership at the 
United Nations. She posthumously wjis 
awarded the first UN Human Rights 
prize. 



Department of State Bulletin/Decembe I 



FEATURE 
Human Rights 



0th Anniversary of the 
niversal Declaration of 
uman Rights 



e Universal Declaration 
ter 40 Years 

cember 10, 1988, marks the 40th an- 
ersary of the adoption by the United 
tions of the Universal Declaration of 
man Rights. The declaration repre- 
its the first comprehensive, global 
tement on basic human rights, and it 
braces many of the values long held 
Americans. U.S. foreign policy is 
;ed on the concept that individual 
hts must be respected by govern- 
nt — an idea that the Universal Dec- 
ation seeks to promote worldwide. 

The declaration offers a common 
ndard against which the United 
ites and other nations, as well as or- 
lizations and individuals, can mea- 
•e treatment of citizens. The first 
i-agraph refers to the "equal and in- 
jnable rights of all members of the 
man family." The grim lessons of 
irld War II demonstrated that gov- 
iments which deny basic human 
hts to their own people are likely to 
:■ aggression to deny human rights to 
Dple of other countries. Reflecting 
s belief, the declaration's opening 
iguage directs itself to the "disregard 
;1 eimtempt for human rights" that 
^ulted in "barbarous acts which have 
traged the conscience of mankind." 
Tiilarly, then-Secretary of State 
orge Marshall, in urging the UN 
neral Assembly to adopt the Univer- 
, Declaration, said "systematic and 
liberate denials of basic human rights 
at the root of most of our troubles." 

The fundamental rights and free- 
ms found in the Universal Declara- 
)n, in effect, proposes limits on the 
wers of governments to compel or 
ntrol the behavior of individual cit- 
ans. The Universal Declaration also 
ts social and economic "rights," such 
the right to an education, the right 
work at an occupation of one's own 



choosing, the right to own property, 
and the right to marry a person of one's 
choice. While recognizing the desir- 
ability of these norms, the United 
States feels they are dependent on and, 
indeed, arise from, satisfaction of the 
basic political, civil, and human rights 
of a truly free and democratic society. 

The Universal Declaration contains 
many of the civil rights guaranteed in 
the first 10 amendments to the Ameri- 
can Constitution. Its philosophical 
starting point is the same as that 
adopted by America's Founders who 
stated, as their first principle, that "all 
men are created equal." The Universal 
Declaration, however, also includes 
rights that are more applicable to to- 
day's international community — for ex- 
ample, the right to send and receive 
information from any source across in- 
ternational borders and the right to 
leave and return to the country of one's 
origin. 

The premise that the fundamental 
human rights described in the Univer- 
sal Declaration are applicable to every- 
one on earth regardless of the political 
or economic system they enjoy is an 
integral part of the UN Charter. The 
Charter calls for "universal respect for, 
and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language or 
religion." 

Early American Experience 

U.S. experience clearly demonstrates 
that peaceful relations and a dynamic 
economy flourish in an environment 
where the rights of the individual are 
respected. An important principle es- 
poused by America's Founders was the 
inescapable connection between democ- 
racy, freedom, and human rights. In 
declaring the independence of the 



United States, they stated that govern- 
ments "deriving their just powers from 
the consent of the governed" are in- 
stituted among men for the purpose of 
securing and protecting man's inaliena- 
ble rights. This same theme is as clear 
in U.S. human rights policy today as it 
was then. Current U.S. human rights 
policy centers around the belief that 
the best way to promote human rights 
in the long term is to encourage democ- 
racy throughout the world. As noted in 
the State Department's Country Re- 
ports on Human Rights Practices last 
year: 

It is in our national interest to pro- 
mote democratic processes in order to help 
build a world environment more favorable 
to respect for human rights and hence, 
more conducive to stability and peace. We 
have developed, therefore, a dual policy, 
reactive in the sense that we continue to 
oppose specific human rights violations 
wherever they occur, but at the same time 
active in woi-king over the long term to 
strengthen democracy. 

This same belief is echoed in the 
Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights: Article 22 stipulates that 
"Everyone has the right to take part in 
the government of his country," and 
that "The will of the people shall be the 
basis of the authority of 
government. . . ." 

Another important aspect of the 
early American experience was the con- 
viction that the ideals of freedom, de- 
mocracy, and human rights applied not 
just to Americans — but to the entire 
world. This belief in the universal 
nature of the American experience re- 
flected a conviction held by many early 
Americans that — as a young society 
with a uniquely democratic political 
system and far removed from European 
power struggles — America was in a 
position to offer moral and spiritual 
leadership to the world. 

The belief in the universal nature 
of the American experience was re- 
flected in key documents associated 
with early American history. The con- 
cept of the protection of natural rights 
of individuals also permeates numerous 
State constitutions and the Bill of 
Rights of the U.S. Constitution. These 
documents offer perhaps the most vig- 
orous and spirited defenses of the con- 
cepts of human dignity, democracy, and 



1 

Bona 



freedom. The universality of these doc- 
uments was viewed as a nearly self- 
evident proposition, leading Thomas 
Jefferson to state in a 1787 letter to 
James Madison that "a Bill of Rights is 
what people are entitled to against 
every government on earth." 

Multilateral Efforts 

The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights provides a modern version of 
Jefferson's "international Bill of 
Rights." Throughout the 40 years since 
adopting the Universal Declaration, the 
United States has led the effort to ex- 
pand the observance of the declaration's 
principles throughout the world. The 
U.S. Government participates actively 
in multilateral efforts such as the Inter- 
American Human Rights Commission of 
the Organization of American States 
and the Conference on Security and Co- 
operation in Europe, which has i-e- 
affirmed the universality of these 
standards. 

But it is through the United Na- 
tions itself — in the Security Council, 
the General Assembly and its commit- 
tees, and particularly in the UN Hu- 
man Rights Commission (UNHRC) — 
that the United States has concentrated 
the major part of its multilateral efforts 
to achieve human rights improvement 
throughout the world. 

In the commission, the United 
States has initiated or supported nu- 
merous "thematic" issues. For example, 
in 1983, the United States, along with 
the Netherlands and Ireland, proposed 
that the UNHRC focus on a new 
agenda item entitled "Implementation 
of the Declaration of Elimination of All 
Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimina- 
tion, Based on Religion or Belief." 
Later, in 1986, we were the lead spon- 
sor of a resolution creating a "Special 
Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance" 
with the specific mandate of investigat- 
ing incidents of religious intolerance 
globally, reporting on them to the com- 
mission, and suggesting remedial mea- 
sures. Similarly, the United States 
supported the appointment of Special 
Rapporteurs to investigate other prac- 
tices which violate human rights, such 
as the use of torture or cruel or un- 
usual punishment. 



In addition to focusing on these 
"thematic" human rights issues, the 
U.S. Government also has pressed hard 
to ensure that international bodies such 
as the UN Human Rights Commission 
and the UN General Assembly address 
specific human rights problems in indi- 
vidual countries. Over the years, U.S. 
delegations to these organizations have 
introduced resolutions calling on gov- 
ernments to acknowledge and deal with 
human rights violations and have 
strongly represented the need to up- 
hold human rights everywhere. 

Among the major breakthroughs of 
the last 8 years is the 1982 appointment 
of a Special Rapporteur on Poland and 
the e.\tension of the mandate the follow- 
ing year. Resolutions naming similar 
Rapporteurs for Afghanistan and Iran 
also marked the increased willingness 
of the UN Human Rights Commission 
to tackle politically unpopular and diffi- 
cult problems. Similar efforts also were 
authorized for Guatemala, Chile, and El 
Salvador, among others, although in 
Guatemala sufficient improvement later 
was achieved to allow conversion of the 
Special Rapporteur's mandate to that of 
an adviser on human rights-related 
matters. Similar progress is expected in 
El Salvador. 

The United States also deals di- 
rectly with the governments concerned. 
Efforts to encourage fulfillment of the 
human rights standards embodied in 
the Universal Declaration are a major 
part of the work of U.S. diplomats in 
foreign capitals. Each Embassy has at 
least one officer primarily responsible 
for following and reporting on develop- 
ments in this area. 

In comparing a government's hu- 
man rights performance with the stand- 
ards set by the Universal Declaration, 
the United States takes into account 
such factors as a government's attitude 
toward outside investigation of alleged 
human rights violations by interna- 
tional and nongovernmental organiza- 
tions; evidence of discrimination based 
on race, sex, religion, language, and so- 
cial status; and conditions of labor (the 
right to organize and bargain collec- 
tively, acceptable work conditions, 
etc.). General economic and political 
factors also weigh heavily in the equa- 
tion, but the Universal Declaration re- 
mains the constant — the standard 



against which this overall judgment is 
cast. 

In each country where it appears 
the human rights standards of the Un 
versal Declai'ation are not being met, 
the U.S. Government seeks to verify 
the situation independently and to tal 
action best designed to achieve some 
improvement. Often this takes the fori 
of diplomatic exchanges with the gov- 
ernment concerned, sometimes at the 
very highest level. Sometimes we en- 
gage in more formal exchanges, such 
through bilateral human rights confei 
ences. Members of Congress often an 
active participants in this process. Bi 
whether or not improvement seems 
possible, the United States will make 
its views known to the government ci 
cerned, publicly or privately, whenev 
it appears that the Universal Declare 
tion is not being upheld. 

Eliminating Double Standards 



Over the past 40 years, the Universa 
Declaration of Human Rights has set 
clear and objective standard against 
which the international community c 
measure the human rights performa 
of any government. But there is still 
much to be achieved, both with resp 
to the situation in individual countri 
as well as in regard to the internatic 
situation overall. 

For example, the United States 
strongly believes it is crucial that th 
standards of the Universal Declarati 
be accepted by, and applied to, all I 
members equally and fairly, without 
gard to the political or economic sys 
they espouse. However, many natioi 
today appear to subscribe to a doub 
standard — harshly criticizing relativ 
minor human rights infractions in s( 
countries, particularly those of the ( 
veloped Western world, while ignori 
more serious, consistent violations c 
human rights by self-styled progres; 
regimes or developing nations. Ofte 
the international community has ter 
to downplay massive abuses of the I 
versal Declaration's human rights stt 
ards, apparently on the theory that 
core civil liberties, the dignity of th 
individual, and respect for the law 
should somehow be less important tl 
for example, economic development. 



DeDartment of State Bulletin December ' 



FEATURE 
Human Rights 



The United States consistently 
ks to underscore the importance of 
nhanded apphcation of the declara- 
I's "common standard" for all man- 
d. We have striven especially to 
iiinate a "double standard" in the 
atment of human rights in interna- 
nal bodies, and especially the Human 
hts Commission itself — often a diffi- 
t task. For example, we seek to per- 
de UNHRC to afford Chile the same 
atment as other countries whose 
es are under consideration. This 
.lid be consistent with the "common 
ndard" declared for the international 
imunity's treatment of human rights 
blems worldwide. 

While some countries have been 
rged with violations of human rights 
the commission, other countries, 
ich are more serious offenders, have 

been considered. For example, in 
7, the U.S. delegation tabled a reso- 
on addressing the egregious human 
its abuses in Cuba — a resolution 
ch was ultimately turned down by 

vote. Although the UNHCR did' 

act on the U.S. resolution on Cuba 
'988, it did decide to send a six- 
Tiber UN investigating team to 
)a to assess human rights conditions 
re and report to the commission at 
1989 session. 

Another "double standard" also is 
arent. Despite the fact that drafting 

adoption of the Universal Declara- 
1 was one of the first acts under- 
I'U by the newly formed United 

ions, some member states seem to 

little more than lip service to its 
iciples. In general, this is most true 
hose governments which claim the 
lusive right to judge what is best for 
ir citizens, rather than allowing the 

ens to decide for themselves. They 
k to impose their judgments — by co- 
on, if necessary — on their citizens, 
istitutional guarantees of individual 
its have little meaning when they 

qualified by broad, vaguely worded 
hibitions which, in effect, deny 
se rights whenever the government 
ides to do so. As Justice Oliver 
ndell Holmes noted, such "stand- 
s" are so vague as to be "no stand- 
s at all." 

Despite these problems the cause 
luman rights and individual freedom 



The Genocide Convention 



President Reagan's signature on legislation 
providing legal enforcement under U.S. law 
for the provisions of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide completes more than four dec- 
ades of U.S. consideration of the diverse 
legal implications of this major act. 

Following the Second World War, the 
United States and other members of the 
new United Nations were determined to 
prevent a repetition of Nazi Germany's de- 
liberate and systematic attempt to annihi- 
late the Jewish people. On December 11, 
1946, the UN General Assembly unan- 
imously passed a resolution declaring gen- 
ocide to be a crime under international law. 
The U.S. delegation to the United Nations 
took an early, active, and leading role in 
subsequent UN efforts to draft a legally 
binding convention outlawing genocide and 
worked to make it one of the first focuses 
of UN human rights action. 

On December 9. 1948, the General As- 
sembly unanimously adopted the Conven- 
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide. The convention 
proclaimed genocide, whether committed in 
time of peace or in time of war, to be a 
crime under international law that the con- 
tracting parties were to pledge to prevent 
and punish. The convention defines gen- 
ocide as acts intended to destroy in whole 
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or 
religious group. This includes: 

• Killing members of the group; 

• Causing serious bodily or mental 
harm to members of the group; 

• Deliberately inflicting on the group 
conditions of life calculated to bring about 
its physical destruction in whole or in part; 

• Imposing measures intended to pre- 
vent births within the group; and 

• Forcibly transferring children of the 
group to another group. 



has advanced in the past 40 years. Be- 
cause of the Universal Declaration — 
translated now into some 70 lan- 
guages — the oppressed are more likely 
to be aware of their rights than they 
might have been 40 years ago. Given 
this universal acceptance, such vio- 
lators can no longer claim that criticism 
of human rights violations is "interfer- 
ence in their internal affairs." And this 



The convention provides for the punish- 
ment, either by the state in which the act 
was committed or by an international penal 
tribunal, of persons committing genocide, 
be they constitutionally responsible rulers, 
public officials, or private individuals. 
Ratifying parties agree to enact the neces- 
sary legislation to give effect to the conven- 
tion's provisions. 

On December 11, 1948, the represent- 
atives of 20 nations, including the United 
States, signed the convention, which en- 
tered into force on January 12. 1951, Presi- 
dent Truman transmitted the Genocide 
Convention to the U,S. Senate for its ad- 
vice and consent to ratification on June 16, 
1949, but no action was taken. Presidents 
Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter 
each in turn urged the Senate to give its 
consent to ratification of the convention. 

On September 5. 1984, the White 
House announced that the Reagan Admin- 
istration had completed its review of the 
Genocide Convention and supported its 
ratificaton. The following day. President 
Reagan affirmed that his Administration 
would "vigorously support, consistent with 
the US. Constitution, the ratification of the 
Genocide Convention," and intended to use 
the convention in its "efforts to expand hu- 
man freedom and fight human rigtits 
abuses around the world," Following its 
own careful process of consideration, on 
February 19, 1986, the U.S. Senate voted 
83 to 11 to give its advice and consent to 
ratification of the convention. Following 
adoption by Congress in October 1988 of 
the Genocide Convention Implementation 
Act. President Reagan, November 4, 1988, 
signed into law the implementing legislation 
thereby completing the U.S. ratification 
process. 



broader knowledge and acceptance 
means that human rights offenders cur- 
rently are less likely to employ tactics 
of oppression, due to severe public 
criticism. 

As the Universal Declaration en- 
ters its 40th year, the world has come a 
long way in the effort to strengthen 
and broaden observance of universal 
human rights standards, extending 



their benefits to all individuals. Sup- 
port for human rights has become a 
more important consideration for the 
foreign and domestic policies of most 
nations since the Universal Declaration 
was first signed. Freedom has spread 
more broadly as former colonies obtain 
their independence. In doing so, they, 
too, adopted the standards of the Uni- 
versal Declaration and began the proc- 
ess of building political structures 
reflecting those principles. More re- 
cently, there has been much progress in 
the advancement of human rights and 
the rule of law in the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe, although in these 
countries, as in others, much remains 
to be done before the standards of the 
Universal Declaration are fully met. 

As the United States continues to 
improve the human rights situation 
within its borders, there is no question 
that the pursuit of human rights re- 
mains an institutionalized and funda- 
mental aspect of our foreign policy. It is 
an issue that will continue to attract 
tremendous public support and a high 
degree of bipartisanship. The United 
States is committed to promoting hu- 
man rights worldwide, based on the 
principles upon which this nation was 
founded and as set forth for the entire 
community of man in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. 

The Road to the 
Universal Declaration 

The United States and other Allied 
Powers during the Second World War 
proclaimed the protection of human 
rights as one of their most important 
war aims. After the cessation of hostili- 
ties the United States, drawing on its 
own long experience in advancing the 
rights of its citizens, played a leading 
role in the complex, painstaking, and 
meticulous process that led to formula- 
tion of the Universal Declaration of Hu- 
man Rights and its adoption by the UN 
General Assemblv on December 10, 
1948. 



August 14, 1941. President Frank- 
lin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Min- 
ister Winston Churchill signed the 
Atlantic Charter, a set of principles to 
guide the Allies in their struggle 
against the Axis Powers. The charter 
affirmed "the right of all peoples to 
choose the form of government under 
which they will live," and to "live out 
their lives in freedom from fear and 
want." 

January 1, 1942. President Frank- 
lin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minis- 
ter Winston Churchill, and representa- 
tives of the Soviet Union and China 
signed a statement at a White House 
ceremony pledging their governments' 
full resources to the successful prosecu- 
tion of the war against the Axis 
Powers. The four leaders affirmed the 
conviction of their governments that 
"complete victory over their enemies 
[was] essential to . . . preserve human 
rights and justice in their own lands as 
well as in other lands." The statement, 
issued as a "Declaration by the United 
Nations," constituted the first official 
use of the term "United Nations." 
Nearly two dozen other governments 
subsequently subscribed to the 
declaration. 

June 26, 1945. Representatives of 
50 nations meeting in San Francisco 
signed the Charter of the United Na- 
tions. The UN Charter proclaimed the 
promotion and preservation of human 
rights as one of the primary objectives 
of the United Nations and mandated 
the establishment of a Commission on 
Human Rights as a subsidiary of the 
UN Economic and Social Council. The 
United Nations formally came into exis- 
tence on October 24, 1945, following 
ratification of its Charter by a majority 
of the signatory nations. 

February 15, 1946. During its first 
session in London, the Economic and 
Social Council established a preliminary 
Human Rights Commission to prepare 
a report that would delineate the func- 
tions and scope of work of the projected 
Commission on Human Rights. The 
council selected nine members who 
were to serve on the preliminary com- 
mission as individuals rather than gov- 
ernment representatives: Eleanor Roo- 
sevelt (United States), Rene Cassin 
(France), K.C. Neogi (India), Paal Borg 
(Norway), Alexander Borisov 



(U.S.S.R.), Dusan Brkish (Yugoslavia 
Fernand Dehousse (Belgium), Victor 
Haya de la Torre (Peru), and C.L. Hsi 
(China). 

April 29-May 20, 1946. The prelii 
inary Human Rights Commission met 
at Hunter College in New York City f 
its first and only session. It submittei 
proposals to the Economic and Social 
Council on establishing the permanen 
Commission on Human Rights and rei 
ommended that the permanent comm 
sion draft an international bill of hum 
rights "as soon as possible." 

June 21, 1946. The Economic and 
Social Council selected 18 UN membe 
states to serve on the permanent Con 
mission on Human Rights: Australia, 
Belgium, Belorussian S.S.R., Chile, 
China, Egypt, France, India, Iran, 
Lebanon, Panama, Philippines, Ukrai 
nian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., United King- 
dom, United States, Uruguay, and 
Yugoslavia. (Initial terms varied fron 
to 4 years; subsequently, members 
were elected for 3-year terms.) 

December 11, 1946. The UN Ger 
eral Assembly referred a draft decla 
tion on fundamental human rights ai 
freedoms, submitted by Panama, to 
Economic and Social Council for refe 
ence to the Commission on Human 
Rights. This was the first of a numb 
of draft declai'ations, conventions, ai 
other proposals relating to human 
rights submitted by individual coun- 
tries. A Division of Human Rights ii 
the Secretariat of the United Nation 
began gathering materials relevant t 
the work of the Human Rights Comi 
sion. The division also undertook 
additional research and prepared do- 
mentation for the use of the Human 
Rights Commission. These materialt 
corporated the work of scholars and 
statesmen worldwide and formed an 
propriate basis for the commission's 
decisions. 

January 27-February 10, 1947. 
Commission on Human Rights, durii 
its first plenary session at Lake Sue 
cess. New York, elected Eleanor Ro 
velt as chairman, PC. Chang of Chi 
as vice chairman, and Charles Malik 
Lebanon as rapporteur. The central 
substantive concern of the commissi 
was the proposed bill of human righ 
During the first months, members o 



Department of State Bulletin/December 1 



FEATURE 
Human Rights 



tie cdmmission frequently debated the 
ilosophical basis of human rights, 
lang spoke of the teachings of Con- 
jius, while Malik cited the works of 
Lomas Aquinas. 

The basic differences that arose, 
wever, concerned the relationship of 
e individual to the state. Points of 
;w ranged from the unrestricted as- 
tion of individual freedom to the su- 
emacy of the collective rights of 
iety as a whole. The ideological de- 
te did not completely divide along 
Timunist-noncommunist lines. Several 
jresentatives of democratic govern- 
nts urged that more attention be 
id to the assertion of economic and 
;ial rights. 

As a result of this discussion, the 
Timission selected a drafting commit- 
, composed of Roosevelt, Chang, and 
lik, and directed it to consult with 
amission members and other experts 
;i prepare a preliminary draft inter- 
-ional bill of human rights. The draft- 
; committee was to consider the 
lusion of a range of civil and politi- 
, as well as economic and social 
hts. These included certain civil 
hts, such as the right to freedom of 
igion, opinion, speech, information, 
embly and association, and to safe- 
irds for persons accused of crime; 
■h social and economic rights as the 
ht of security, the right to employ- 
nt, education, food, medical care, 
1 the right to property; and such po- 
cal rights as the right to citizenship, 
right of citizens to participate in 
government, and the right to equal- 
without distinction. Members of the 
nmission also expressed the view 
,t the bill should take into account 
■ constitutions of member states, be 
eptable to all UN members, and 
t it be short, and simple to 
lerstand. 

March 24, 1947. In response to ob- 
tions by the Soviet Union that the 
)posed drafting committee was too 
all and had no European member, 
s. Roosevelt informed the UN Eco- 
mic and Social Council that she was 
Jointing a larger drafting committee 
njiosed of eight members of the com- 
ssion: the United States, the United 
igdom, the Soviet Union, France, 
banon, China, Australia, and Chile. 
March 28, the council noted with 



approval Mrs. Roosevelt's decision and 
asked the UN Secretariat to prepare a 
"documented outline" to be used as the 
basis for a preliminary draft of an inter- 
national bill of rights by the committee. 

June 9-25, 1947. The drafting com- 
mittee held its first session at Lake 
Success. Its discussions were based on 
a 400-page draft "outline" containing 48 
short articles with annotations to con- 
stitutions of member states, prepared 
by John Humphrey of Canada, Director 
of the UN Secretariat's Division of Hu- 
man Rights. The committee also took 
into consideration a draft covenant on 
human rights proposed by the United 
Kingdom, as well as several specific 
language changes to the draft outline 
submitted by the United States. 

During the discussion, U.S. and 
other representatives of democratic 
governments emphasized the impor- 
tance of political and civil liberties as 
embodied in the U.S. Bill of Rights and 
the French Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and of the Citizen. Represent- 
atives of communist countries rejected 
these "bourgeois" thoughts as obsolete, 
insisted that social principles have pri- 
ority, and strongly objected to the in- 
clusion and wording of such rights as 
freedoiTi of expression and of the press. 
Members of the drafting committee also 
diverged on the question of whether 
the bill of rights should be a declaration 
approved by the General Assembly that 
would only have the legal force of a 
recommendation or a multilateral con- 
vention binding in international law on 
all states ratifying it. Consequently, the 
drafting committee decided to prepare 
two separate documents — a declaration 
or manifesto outlining general princi- 
ples and providing a common standard 
of achievement and a working paper 
containing suggestions for the content 
of one or more conventions. 

Rene Cassin, who would receive 
the Nobel Peace Prize in 1968 for his 
work in promoting international human 
rights, was then chosen to prepare a 
preliminary draft declaration for the 
committee based on the Secretariat 
outline. After Professor Cassin's initial 
draft was revised by a temporary work- 
ing group (United States, United King- 
dom, France, and Lebanon), it was 
considered in detail by the full drafting 



The United States Recommends 
Adoption 

■'Systematic and deliberate denials of 
basic human rights lie at the root of 
most of our troubles and threaten the 
work of the United Nations. . . . Govern- 
ments wtiich systematically disregard 
the rights of their own people are not 
likely to respect the rights of other na- 
tions and other people and are likely to 
seek their objectives by coercion and 
force in the international field. . . . [Let] 
the General Assembly approve by an 
overwhelming majority the Declaration 
of Human Rights as a standard of con- 
duct for all; and let us, as Members of 
the United Nations, conscious of our 
own shortcomings and imperfections, 
join our effort in good faith to live up to 
this high standard." 

Secretary of State George C. f^/lar- 
shall before the opening session of the 
UN General Assembly in Paris, Sep- 
tember 23. 1948. 



committee before submission to the UN 
Human Rights Commission. The draft- 
ing committee also decided to present 
to the commission suggestions for a 
convention that expanded upon articles 
from the U.K. draft convention. 

October 31, 1947. The U.S. De- 
partment of State held a conference at- 
tended by representatives of 
approximately 150 nongovernmental or- 
ganizations to discuss a U.S. proposal 
for a declaration of human rights. The 
U.S. proposal had been developed by 
an interdepartmental committee that 
included representatives from the De- 
partments of State, Justice, Labor, and 
Interior, and the Federal Security 
Agency (which dealt with health, edu- 
cation, and social and economic se- 
curity). The U.S. proposal w-as later 
revised in light of comments made at 
the conference and submitted by Mrs. 
Roosevelt to the second session of the 
UN Human Rights Commission in De- 
cember 1947. 

December 2-17, 1947. The second 
session of the UN Human Rights Com- 
mission, meeting in Geneva, 
Switzerland, addressed as the first 



partment of State Bulletin/December 1988 



The UN Commission on Human Rights 



The UN Commission on Human Rights 
is the major UN body to promote and 
protect human rights. It is one of several 
specialized commissions mandated by 
the UN Charter, and was formally estab- 
lished as a subsidiary body of the Eco- 
nomic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 
June 1946. The commission initially was 
comprised of 18 UN member states. Its 
first important task was to draft the inter- 
national bill of rights. 

Since its first plenary session at 
Lake Success, New York, in January 
1947. the Commission on Human Rights 
has evolved into a body composed of 43 
states elected by ECOSOC. from among 
interested UN members, for 3-year 
terms. The commission meets once a 
year at Geneva for 6 weeks. It deals 
with all aspects of human rights. It 
provides overall policy recommendations 
to the United Nations, studies human 
rights problems, prepares recommenda- 
tions for action, drafts UN instruments 
relating to human rights, and monitors 
the observance of human rights. 

Each year, under ECOSOC resolu- 
tion 1503, a subcommission of experts 
meets separately to consider, in strict 
confidence, thousands of letters from in- 



order of business the question of 
whether priority should be given to the 
preparation of a declaration of human 
rights, a human rights covenant, or 
measures of implementation. The com- 
mission decided that the drafting com- 
mittee should pursue all three areas, to 
be included in an international bill of 
rights. The commission also revised the 
working papers submitted by the draft- 
ing committee into preliminary drafts 
of an international declaration on hu- 
man rights and an international cove- 
nant on human rights. In January 1948, 
the commission forwarded these "drafts 
to UN members for comment. 

May 3-21, 1948. After considering 
comments received from 13 UN mem- 
ber states, the second session of the 



dividuals and groups protesting alleged 
human rights violations. The subcom- 
mission also reviews responses ob- 
tained from the governments concerned. 
After hearing from all parties and re- 
viewing the evidence, the subcommis- 
sion makes recommendations to the 
commission. It may recommend, for ex- 
ample, that the commission authorize 
an investigation by independent experts, 
that direct discussions with the govern- 
ment or governments involved be under- 
taken, that the case be put on the public 
record, or that the matter be dropped. 
Together with these contributions 
from its subcommission, the UN Human 
Rights Commission also gains informa- 
tion from public sessions at which gov- 
ernments, nongovernmental organ- 
izations, and individuals may present 
views and evidence concerning human 
rights. The commission has the power 
to adopt resolutions condemning vio- 
lations of human rights, or to recom- 
mend such resolutions for adoption by 
its parent body. ECOSOC. or by the UN 
General Assembly. While such resolu- 
tions are not legally binding or enforcea- 
ble, they can subject violating countries 
to close public scrutmy worldwide. 



drafting committee, meeting at Lake 
Success, revised the international dec- 
laration and the international covenant 
and submitted the new drafts to the 
Commission on Human Rights. 

May 24-June 18, 1948. Returning 
to Lake Success, the third session of 
the Commission on Human Rights re- 
vised the draft declaration but did not 
have time to consider the draft cove- 
nant. Mrs. Roosevelt urged, as she had 
throughout the entire process, that pri- 
ority be given to the declaration as "the 
world was waiting for the Commission 
on Human Rights to do something." 
Progress in the field of human rights 
would be long delayed, she argued, if 
the world must await the laborious pro- 
cess of negotiating the technical lan- 
guage of a treaty and then defer its 



being brought into force until individu. 
countries had completed their lengthy 
processes of ratification. On June 18, 1 
members of the commission voted in 
favor of a revised, 28-article draft inte 
national declaration on human rights. 
(There were no negative votes, al- 
though the Soviet Union, Belorussian 
S.S.R., Ukrainian S.S.R., and 
Yugoslavia abstained and the Soviet 
representative submitted a minority n 
port calling the draft "weak and com- 
pletely unacceptable.") The commissio 
then submitted the draft declaration t 
the Economic and Social Council for 
approval. 

August 1948. The majority view ( 
the Economic and Social Council was 
that adoption of the international decl 
ration on human rights would mark a 
important step toward affirming hum; 
rights and that this step should be 
taken without waiting for agreement 
an international covenant. On August 
26, the council decided to transmit th 
draft declaration to the UN General 
Assembly. 

September 24, 1948. The Genera 
Assembly referred the draft interna- 
tional declaration on human rights to 
Committee III (Social, Humanitarian 
and Cultural). 

September 30-l)ecember 7, 1948 
Committee III held a total of 81 mee 
ings on the International Declaration ; 
on Human Rights. Charles Malik of 
Lebanon, who had been rapporteur c 
the Human Rights Commission while 
the declaration was being drafted, 
served as chairman. The committee 
conducted an article-by-article reviev 
of the text of the draft declaration, d 
ing which 168 formal draft resolution 
containing amendments to its variou; 
articles were submitted. At 1:00 a.m. 
on December 7, after voting on hun- 
dreds of proposed changes, Committ 
III adopted the revised text of the di 
laration (now called the Universal D( 
laration of Human Rights) by a vote 
29 to with 7 abstentions (Belorussi. 
S.S.R., Canada, Czechoslovakia, Po- 
land, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., a: 
Yugoslavia) and transmitted it to th( 
General Assembly. On December 7 



Department of State Bulletin/December 1 pj. 



FEATURE 
Human Rights 



mmittee rejected a Soviet draft reso- 
:ion requesting the General Assembly 
postpone final adoption of the Uni- 
rsal Declaration until its next 
ssion. 

December 9-10, 1948. The UN 
neral Assembly, meeting at the Pal- 
de Chaillot in Paris, debated and 
opted the Universal Declaration of 
mian Rights. Representatives of 35 
tions presented their views. The dec- 
ation was proclaimed as marking a 
;toric step in the history of mankind, 
jrotest by humanity against oppres- 
n, inspired by the highest ideals and 
e.xpression of mankind's most noble 
nciples and aspirations. Some of 
)se who spoke saw it as a step to- 
rd the establishment of a true inter- 
tional constitution, a landmark of 
ernational cooperation, an effective 
)tector of human freedoms. Others 
lised the document but stressed the 
d for a covenant to secure com- 
ance. Some noted that the document 
s a compromise, not perfect, but the 
ist harmonious, comprehensive, and 
iversal declaration on human rights 
it the human race had so far ach- 
ed. They criticized certain provi- 
ns, omissions, and lack of specificity 
language but supported the docu- 
■nt as a whole. A few withheld their 
jport for a variety of reasons, includ- 
; a Soviet protest that the declaration 
ilated national sovereignty, but these 
:ions chose not to vote against it. 
The General Assembly approved 
? amendment proposed by the United 
igdom and rejected a Soviet draft 
solution proposing that final adoption 
postponed until the fourth regular 
;sion of the General Assembly in the 
1 of 1949. After voting article by arti- 
on the text, the General Assembly 
Dpted the Universal Declaration of 
iman Rights (Resolution 217(A)(III)) 
4 minutes to midnight on December 
by a vote of 48 to with 8 absten- 
ns. Those voting in favor were: 
ghanistan, Argentina, Australia, 
Igium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Can- 
J a, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa 
If ea, Cuba, Denmark, the Dominican 




Three o( tlu declaration's origfinal authors (with advisers) at the opening of a 
1949 I'N ( <)mml^sl()n tor Human Rights session. Seated from left to right: Dr. 
Charles Vlalik (Lchanon), Prof. Rene Cassin (F"rance), Miss Marjorie Whiteman 
(adviser), Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt (United States), and Mr. .lames Simsarian 
(adviser). 



Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, 
Haiti, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, 
Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mex- 
ico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nic- 
aragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Siam 
(Thailand), Sweden, Syria, Turkey, 
United Kingdom, United States, Uru- 
guay, Venezuela. Those abstaining 
were: Belorussian S.S.R., Czechoslo- 
vakia, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Ukrainian 
S.S.R., Union of South Africa, 
U.S.S.R., and Yugoslavia. 



Continuing Etforts 

To Implement the Declaration 

Since December 10, 1948, the UN Gen- 
eral Assembly has adopted well over 
100 other resolutions, covenants, con- 
ventions, and protocols, which elabo- 
rate on principles contained in the 



declaration. These instruments repre- 
sent an ongoing effort to advance and 
implement the message contained in 
the Universal Declaration. 

Declarations, which are adopted by 
the UN General Assembly, constitute 
recommendations to UN member 
states. They have moral weight but no 
legal force. The United States, after 
careful consideration, has voted in the 
General Assembly for a number of dec- 
larations on many subjects, including 
religious, sexual and racial discrimina- 
tion; torture and other cruel treatment 
or punishment; and the rights of indi- 
viduals who are not nationals of the 
country in which they live. 

Covenants, conventions, and pro- 
tocols, which constitute legally binding 
international treaties for ratifying par- 
ties, involve a much more complex 
process before entering into force. Fol- 
lowing approval of the text by the Gen- 
eral Assembly, individual states must 
initiate their own frequently lengthy 
ratification processes. Only after a 
specified number of countries have 
ratified the treaty, does the covenant. 



ipartment of State Bulletin/December 1988 



convention, or protocol enter into force, 
and then only for those countries which 
ratified it. 

The United States has ratified sev- 
eral of these instruments: the Protocol 
Amending the Slavery Convention 
Signed at Geneva on September 25, 
1926, with annex (adopted on December 
7, 1953, and ratified by the United 
States on March 7, 1956); the Supple- 
mentary Convention on the Abolition of 
Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institu- 
tions and Practices Similar to Slavery 
(adopted on September 7, 1956, and 
ratified by the United States on De- 
cember e' 1967); the Protocol Relating 
to the Status of Refugees (adopted on 
December 16, 1966, and ratified by the 
United States on October 4, 1968); the 
Convention on the Political Rights of 
Women (adopted on December 20, 1952, 
and ratified by the United States on 
July 7, 1976); and the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (see box on p. 3). 

The executive branch of the United 
States has signed and submitted to the 
Senate for its advice and consent to 
ratification the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic 
and Social Rights (see 1966 Covenants); 
the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis- 
crimination (adopted December 21, 
1965, and submitted by President Car- 
ter to the Senate on February 23, 1978); 
the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (adopted December 18, 1979, 
and submitted by President Cai-ter to 
the Senate on November 12, 1980); and 
the Convention Against Torture and 
other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (adopted on 
December 10, 1984, and submitted by 
President Reagan to the Senate on May 
23, 1988). The Senate has not yet acted 
on these instruments. 

Delay in the process of ratifying 
treaties associated with human rights, 
however, does not reflect an intention 
to deny Americans their rights. The 
Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and 
other U.S. laws fully protect the rights 
and freedoms that Americans enjoy. 



The 1966 Covenants 

The adoption of the Universal Declara- 
tion on December 10, 1948, did not di- 
minish the impetus to develop legally 
binding measures to secure compliance 
with the principles of the declaration. 
That same day, the UN General Assem- 
bly passed a resolution requesting the 
Economic and Social Council to ask the 
Commission on Human Rights to con- 
tinue to give priority to preparation of 
the remaining portions of the projected 
international bill of human rights — an 
international covenant, which would be 
legally binding on ratifying states, and 
measures of implementation. 

In 1952, at the request of the Eco- 
nomic and Social Council and the Gen- 
eral Assembly, the commission agi-eed 
to divide its draft covenant into two 
covenants — one on civil and political 
rights and the other on economic, so- 
cial, and cultural rights. The United 
States had been a strong proponent of 
two separate covenants on the grounds 
that the term "rights" was used in a 
different sense regarding civil and po- 
litical rights on the one hand and eco- 
nomic, social, and cultural rights on the 
other. The commission subsequently 
produced two draft covenants as well as 
an optional protocol to the covenant on 
civil and political rights. 

On December 16, 1966, 19 years 
after submission of the first prelimi- 
nary drafts of an international bill of 
rights to the Commission on Human 
Rights, the General Assembly adopted 
the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights; the Optional Protocol 
to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights; and the Interna- 
tional Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights — three instruments 
giving legal force to the rights pro- 
claimed in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. Both covenants were 
adopted unanimously, while the Op- 
tional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights was adopted by a 
vote of 68 (United States) to 2, with 38 
abstentions. Together with the Univer- 
sal Declaration, these three instru- 
ments constitute what the United 
Nations calls the International Bill of 
Human Rights. 



Following the vote, U.S. Represent 
ative to the United Nations Patricia 
Harris declared that the United States 
had voted for the three instruments be- 
cause it believed that "the United Na- 
tions must move forward in the field of 
human rights if it is to fulfill the prom- 
ise of the Charter to promote and en- 
courage 'respect for human rights and 
for fundamental freedoms for all with- 
out distinction as to race, sex, lan- 
guage, or religion.'" Harris noted that 
this affirmative vote did not express 
U.S. "agreement with or approval of 
every part of the covenants." 

On October 5, 1977, President 
Jimmy Carter visited the United Na- 
tions and signed the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and the International Covenant on Ecc 
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights on 
behalf of the United States. President 
Carter transmitted both covenants to 
the Senate for ratification, on FebruarA 
23, 1978, declaring that its prompt ad- 
vice and consent to ratification would 
"confirm our country's traditional com 
mitment to the promotion and protec- 
tion of human rights at home and 
abroad." 

The President also told the Senat 
however, that although "the great ma 
jority of the substantive provisions" o 
the covenants were "entirely consis- 
tent" with the letter and spirit of U.S 
laws and the Constitution, he had rec 
ommended reservations, understand- 
ings, or declarations wherever a 
provision may be in conflict with the 
U.S. Constitution or laws. These are; 
included, among others, rights to fret 
speech and property, and the federal 
character of our government. The Pre 
ident also recommended that the Sen- 
ate issue a statement of understandin 
that Articles 1 through 15 of the Intei 
national Covenant on Economic, Socit 
and Cultural Rights describe goals to 
be achieved progressively rather than 
through immediate implementation. 
The Senate has not yet given its con- 
sent to ratification of the covenants. 



Department of State Bulletin/December 19 



FEATURE 
Human Rights 



The Universal Declaration: A Living Document 



The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights urges all peoples and all nations 
to promote respect for the rights it pro- 
claims and to strive for their universal 
and effective recognition and obser- 
vance. Immediately after adoption of the 
Universal Declaration, the United Na- 
tions began to develop a many-faceted 
program for informing people throughout 
the world that they were entitled to cer- 
tain rights. The text of the declaration 
i«as translated into numerous languages 
and publicized through UN publications, 
Dosters, films, speakers, radio and tele- 
vision programs, human rights exhibits, 
and special events. By the end of 1949, 
he Universal Declaration was available 
n 19 languages — including the 5 official 
anguages of the United Nations. It is 
low printed and circulated in more than 
70 languages and copies can be found 
n almost every nation on earth, A mini- 
ature copy of the declaration also is 
available in the form of a pocket-sized 
passport," showing that the individual 
/vhose name it bears is entitled to the 
ights within. 

To underscore theimportance that 
he United Nations attached to this doc- 
jment, it decided that the declaration 



The International Covenant on 
vil and Political Rights affirms such 
jhts as the inherent right to life; lib- 
ty of movement; equality before the 
v; presumption of innocence; freedom 
thought, conscience, and religion; 
»edom of expression; the right of 
aceful assembly; freedom of associa- 
in; and the right to take part in the 
nduct of public affairs and to vote in 
nuine, free elections. The covenant 
Clares that no one shall be subjected 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading punish- 
3nt, torture, or arbitrary arrest or 
tention; and that no one shall be held 
slavery or servitude. It prohibits dis- 
imination in enjoyment of these rights 
, the basis of race, sex, language, re- 
;ion, opinion, and/or national or social 
igin. It also established an 18-mem- 
■r Human Rights Committee to cen- 
ter reports submitted by ratifying 



would be the only other document along 
with the UN Charter to be deposited in 
the cornerstone of the UN Headquarters 
building in New York City. Secretary 
General Trygve Lie placed these docu- 
ments in the cornerstone during the 
dedication ceremony on October 24, 
1949. Also, the United Nations, under a 
practice established by the General As- 
sembly on December 4, 1950, observes 
Human Rights Day each year on De- 
cember 10, a special day for disseminat- 
ing the message of the declaration to 
the peoples of the world. 

UN Secretary General Javier Perez 
de Cuellar on December 10, 1987, initi- 
ated the 40th anniversary of the adop- 
tion of the Universal Declaration by 
reaffirming the UN commitment to its 
principles. The United Nations an- 
nounced that it would put even greater 
stress on carrying the message of the 
Universal Declaration to every part of 
the world during the year-long obser- 
vance of its 40th anniversary, particu- 
larly through expansion of UN 
information, training, and advisory pro- 
grams. UN offices organized a series of 
commemorative events celebrating the 
40th anniversary and promoting human 



states on measures taken to implement 
its provisions. The International Cove- 
nant on Civil and Political Rights en- 
tered into force on March 23, 1976—3 
months after deposit of the 35th instru- 
ment of accession with the UN Secre- 
tary General. 

The Optional Protocol of the 
Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights recognizes the competence of 
the Human Rights Committee to inves- 
tigate complaints against states ratify- 
ing the protocol by individuals claiming 
to be victims of violations of the rights 
set forth by the covenant. The Optional 
Protocol also entered into force on 
March 23, 1976 — 3 months after deposit 
of the 10th instrument of ratification 
with the UN Secretary General. 

The International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 

proclaims such rights as the right to 
self-determination, enjoyment of just 



rights to be held throughout the year, 
such as speeches by the Secretary 
General and other top UN officials, sem- 
inars, panel discussions, briefings, 
worksfiops, public meetings, and other 
special programs — culminating with sol- 
emn ceremonies during a special com- 
memorative session of the UN General 
Assembly on December 8, 1988. 

The United States is commemorat- 
ing the 40th anniversary by holding a 
conference on human rights at the De- 
partment of State on December 8, 1988, 
which will be attended by represen- 
tatives of human rights organizations 
and other individuals active in this area. 
President Reagan's annual proclama- 
tion, announcing U.S. observance of Hu- 
man Rights Day on December 10, 
repledges U.S. dedication to the cause 
of individual freedom and human rights. 

Clearly, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights continues to be a living 
document and the UN slogan honoring 
its 40th anniversary — "People only live 
full lives in the light of human rights" — 
gains more adherents every day. 



and favorable conditions of work, an ad- 
equate standard of living, the highest 
attainable standard of physical and 
mental health, education, participation 
in cultural life, the benefits of scientific 
progress, and the right to form trade 
unions. The covenant prohibits discrimi- 
nation in enjoyment of these rights 
based on race, sex, language, religion, 
opinion, and/or national or social origin. 
Ratifying states undertake to submit 
periodic reports to the Economic and 
Social Council on measures adopted and 
progress made toward achieving obser- 
vance of the rights recognized by the 
covenant. The International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights entered into force on January 3, 
1976 — 3 months after deposit of the 
35th instrument of ratification with the 
UN Secretary General. 



Appendix 



Universal Declaration 
OF Human Rights 



Resolution 217{A)(III) of 
the General Assembly, 
December 10, 1948 



Preamble 

Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity 
and of the equal and inalienable rights of 
all members of the human family is the 
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in 
the world. 

Whereas disregard and contempt for 
human rights have resulted in barbarous 
acts which have outraged the conscience of 
mankind, and the advent of a world in 
which human beings shall enjoy freedom of 
speech and belief and freedom from fear 
and want has been proclaimed as the high- 
est aspii-ation of the common people, 

Whereas it is essential, if man is not to 
be compelled to have recourse, as a last 
resort, to rebellion against tyranny and op- 
pression, that human rights should be pro- 
tected by the rule of law, 

Whereas it is essential to promote the 
development of friendly relations between 
nations. 

Whereas the peoples of the United Na- 
tions have in the Charter reaffirmed their 
faith in fundamental human rights, in the 
dignity and worth of the human person and 
in the equal rights of men and women and 
have determined to promote social prog- 
ress and better standards of life in larger 
freedom. 

Whereas Member States have pledged 
themselves to achieve, in co-operation with 
the United Nations, the promotion of uni- 
versal respect for and observance of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, 

Whereas a common understanding of 
these rights and freedoms is of the great- 
est importance for the full realization of 
this pledge. 

Now, therefore, 

The General Assembly, 

Proclaims this Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights as a common standard of 
achievement for all peoples and all nations. 



to the end that every individual and every 
organ of society, keeping this Declaration 
constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching 
and education to promote respect for these 
rights and freedoms and by progressive 
measures, national and international, to se- 
cure their universal and effective recogni- 
tion and observance, both among the 
peoples of Member States themselves and 
among the peoples of territories under 
their jurisdiction. 

Article 1 

All human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights. They are en- 
dowed with reason and conscience and 
should act towards one another in a spirit 
of brotherhood. 



Article 2 

Everyone is entitled to all the rights 
and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, 
without distinction of any kind, such as 
race, colour, sex, language, religion, politi- 
cal or other opinion, national or social ori- 
gin, property, birth or other status. 

Furthermore, no distinction shall be 
made on the basis of the political, jurisdic- 
tional or international status of the country 
or territory to which a person belongs, 
whether it be independent, trust, non-self- 
governing or under any other limitation of 
sovereignty. 



Article 3 

Everyone has the right to life, liberty 
and the security of person. 



Article 4 

No one shall be held in slavery or serv- 
itude; slavery and the slave trade shall be 
prohibited in all their forms. 



Article 5 

No one shall be subjected to torture or 
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment. 



Article 6 

Everyone has the right to recognition 
everywhere as a person before the law. 




Article 7 

All are equal before the law and are 
entitled without any discrimination to 
equal protection of the law. All are entitl 
to equal protection against any discrimir 
tion in violation of this Declaration and 
against any incitement to such 
discrimination. 



Article 8 

Everyone has the right to an effecti' 
remedy by the competent national tri- 
bunals for acts violating the fundamenta 
rights granted him by the constitution o 
by law. 



Article 9 

No one shall be subjected to arbitra 
arrest, detention or exile. 



Article 10 

Everyone is entitled in full equality 
a fair and public hearing by an independ 
ent and impartial tribunal, in the deter 
mination of his rights and obligations an 
of any criminal charge against him. 



10 



Department of State Bulletin/December If 



FEATURE 
Human Rights 



Article 11 

1. Everyone charged with a penal of- 
ice has the right to be presumed inno- 
it until proved guilty according to law in 
lublic trial at which he has had all the 
arantees necessary for his defence. 

No one shall be held guilty of any 
rial offence on account of any act or 
ission which did not constitute a penal 
ence, under national or international 
■, at the time when it was committed, 
r shall a heavier penalty be imposed 
m the one that was applicable at the 
le the penal offence was committed. 

Article 12 

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary 
erference with his privacy, family, home 
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his 
lour and reputation. Everyone has the 
ht to the protection of the law against 
h interference or attacks. 



Article 13 

1. Everyone has the right to freedom 
-novement and residence within the bor- 

of each state. 

2. Everyone has the right to leave any 
mtry, including his own, and to return 
his country. 



'^mMB- 




Article 14 

1. Everyone has the right to seek and 
enjoy in other countries asylum from 
•secution. 

2. This right may not be invoked in the 
le of prosecutions genuinely arising from 
!i-political crimes or from acts contrary 
the purposes and principles of the 

dted Nations. 



partment of State Bulletin/December 1988 



Article 15 

1. Everyone has the right to a 
nationality. 

2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived 
of his nationality nor denied the right to 
change his nationality. 

Article 16 

1. Men and women of full age, without 
any limitation due to race, nationality or 
religion, have the right to marry and to 
found a family. They are entitled to equal 
rights as to marriage, during marriage and 
at its dissolution. 

2. Marriage shall be entered into only 
with the free and full consent of the 
intending spouses. 

3. The family is the natural and funda- 
mental group unit of society and is entitled 
to protection by society and the State. 

Article 17 

1. Everyone has the right to own prop- 
erty alone as well as in association with 
others. 

2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived 
of his property. 

Article 18 

Everyone has the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or 
belief, and freedom, either alone or in com- 
munity with others and in public or pri- 
vate, to manifest his religion or belief in 
teaching, practice, worship and 
observance. 

Article 19 

Everyone has the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression; this right includes 
freedom to hold opinions without inter- 
ference and to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas through any media 
and regardless of frontiers. 

Article 20 

1. Everyone has the right to freedom 
of peaceful assembly and association. 

2. No one may be compelled to belong 
to an association. 




Article 21 

1. Everyone has the right to take part 
in the Government of his country, directly 
or through freely chosen representatives. 

2. Everyone has the right of equal ac- 
cess to public service in his country. 

3. The will of the people shall be the 
basis of the authority of government; this 
will shall be expressed in periodic and gen- 
uine elections which shall be by universal 
and equal suffrage and shall be held by 
secret vote or by equivalent free voting 
procedures. 



Article 22 

Everyone, as a member of society, has 
the right to social security and is entitled 
to realization, through national effort and 
international co-operation and in accord- 
ance with the organization and resources of 
each State, of the economic, social and cul- 
tural rights indispensable for his dignity 
and the free development of his 
personality. 



(Ski'tchf.s bv S:illv Bn 




Article 23 

1. Everyone has the right to work, to 
free choice of employment, to just and 
favourable conditions of work and to pro- 
tection against unemployment. 

2. Everyone, without any discrimina- 
tion, has the right to equal pay for equal 
work. 

3. Everyone who works has the right 
to just and favourable remuneration insur- 
ing for himself and his family an e.xistence 
worthy of human dignity, and supple- 
mented, if necessary, by other means of 
social protection. 

4. Everyone has the right to form and 
to join trade unions for the protection of 
his interests. 



Article 24 

Everyone has the right to rest and lei- 
sure, including reasonable limitation of 
working hours and periodic holidays with 
pa.V. 



Article 25 

1. Everyone has the right to a stand- 
ard of living adequate for the health and 
well-being of himself and of his family, in- 
cluding food, clothing, housing and medical 
care and necessary social services, and the 
right to security in the event of unemploy- 
ment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old 
age or other lack of livelihood in circum- 
stances beyond his control. 

2. Motherhood and childhood are en- 
titled to special care and assistance. All 
children, whether born in or out of 
wedlock, shall enjoy the same social 
protection. 



Article 26 

1. Everyone has the right to educa- 
tion. Education shall be free, at least in the 
elementary and fundamental stages. Ele- 
mentary education shall be compulsory. 
Technical and professional education shall 
be made generally available and higher ed- 
ucation shall be equally accessible to all on 
the basis of merit. 




2. Education shall be directed to the 
full development of the human personality 
and to the strengthening of respect for hu- 
man rights and fundamental freedoms. It 
shall promote understanding, tolerance and 
friendship among all nations, racial or re- 
ligious groups, and shall further the ac- 
tivities of the United Nations for the 
maintenance of peace. 

3. Parents have a prior right to choose 
the kind of education that shall be given to 
their children. 



Article 27 

1. Everyone has the right freely to 
participate in the cultural life of the com- 
munity, to enjoy the arts and to share in 
scientific advancement and its benefits. 

2. Everyone has the right to the pro- 
tection of the moral and material interests 
resulting from any scientific, literary or 
artistic production of which he is the 
author. 



Article 28 

Everyone is entitled to a social and 
international order in which the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Declaration can 
be fully realized. 



Sketch by Sally Brennaii) 



Article 29 

1. Everyone has duties to the comm 
nity in which alone the free and full dev 
opment of his personality is possible. 

2. In the exercise of his rights and 
freedoms, everyone shall be subject onl 
such limitations as are determined by If 
solely for the purpose of securing due n 
ognition and respect for the rights and 
freedoms of others and of meeting the j 
requirements of morality, public order ; 
the general welfare in a democratic soc 

3. These rights and freedoms may i 
no case be e.\ercised contrary to the pu 
poses and principles of the United Nati 



Article 30 

Nothing in this Declaration may be 
terpreted as implying for any State, gr 
or person any right to engage in any ai 
tivity or to perform any act aimed at tl 
destruction of any of the rights and fre 
doms set forth herein. 

Hundred and eighty-third plenary 
meeting. 10 December 191,8. ■ 



12 



Department of State Bulletin/December ll8h 



■HE SECRETARY 



The Open Society and Its Friends 



Secretary Shidtz's address before 
I liter-American Press Associa- 
I ( lAPA) in Salt Lake City on 
vtolier 11, 1988.^ 

)ur years from now, we will mark half 
millennium since the discovery of the 
ew World by Columbus. Eight years 
ter that, we will enter a new century 
id a new millennium. 

A community of nations, with a 
mmunity of shared interests and 
,lues, is emerging in the Western 
emisphere. Almost 500 years after 
:)lunibus, the New World turned de- 
litively to democracy and openness, 
reedom is a core value. Human digni- 
and social justice are critical objec- 
ves, and democracy is finally being 
iderstood for what it is: an inspiring 
eal that is also the best way to get 
lings done. 

The democratic revolutions un- 
^rway in this hemisphere express a 
lared heritage. From the start, the 
)peal of freedom from the miseries of 
le Old World created a mutually rein- 
rcing dynamic among the peoples of 
le Americas. The demands for free- 
)m, equality, and liberty heard at 
oncord and Valley Forge echoed 
uthward to Latin America. The aspi- 
itions and ideals of Latin American 
'volutionaries echoed in the north. 

There have been many problems 
ong the way; but as we prepare to 
ose the 20th century, we are a hemi- 
ihere that is organizing, democrati- 
dly and freely, to meet the challenges 
' the world around us. 
akes us a hemisphere well suited to 
;al with the new world that is coming 
the 21st century. 

That new world of the future is 
ready upon us. We must prepare 
irselves. The changes brought by 
formation technology cannot be put 
to a single headline, but they are all 
'ound us. 

• High in the Andes, a homemade 
itellite dish in an Indian village pulls 

television programs from Argentina. 

• In Guatemala City, televiewers 
atch the Atlanta-based Cable News 
etwork (CNN). And I might say, 
'hen I went to Beijing earlier this 

ear, I turned on the TV, and there was 
'NN. I went to Moscow, I turned on 
le TV, and there was CNN. Talk 
bout an information standard. 



• In central Brazil, soybean grow- 
ers receive real-time data on Chicago 
Board trading by computer. 

• In Barbados and the Dominican 
Republic, key-entry operators encode 
information from tons of library cata- 
logs and court transcripts, telephone 
directories and manufacturing invento- 
ries flown in daily by jet from all the 
world. In a matter of hours, the same 
data is again on its way — this time elec- 
tronically — to data banks abroad. 

This is a time of accelerating 
change and growing interdependence 
among nations. The very material sub- 
stances which surround us in everyday 
life are being transformed. New sub- 
stances are being created. Old sub- 
stances are finding new uses. The same 
scientific progress that has altered the 
nature of basic materials has acceler- 
ated the speed of human transactions. 
More and more, ours is a time of open 
skies and borderless markets. Increas- 
ingly, wealth is becoming intangible; 
e.xchange, instantaneous; labor, mental. 
Increasingly, success depends on the 
speed with which ideas are put into 
practice. 

That is why knowledge, informa- 
tion, and ideas are the hottest items in 
trade. Service industries are major 
sources of new employment. Knowl- 
edge-intensive industries like micro- 
electronics and biotechnology are the 
fastest growing. Today's research in ag- 
riculture, based on the information con- 
tained in the genetic codes, promises 
changes that will dwarf the "green 
revolution." 

Impact on the Press 

You in the press face special challenges 
in this information age. Technology al- 
lows news to reach more people in less 
time. Nonetheless, some governments 
still try to choke the spread of new 
ideas. They exclude and expel foreign 
journalists; confiscate film and equip- 
ment; jam broadcasts; turn out propa- 
ganda and disinformation. 

Some methods are brutally direct: 
physical assault on journalists, shutting 
down presses, banning broadcasts. Oth- 
ers are more indirect: licensing require- 
ments, newsprint controls, suggestions 
that journalists report "only the truth." 



In democracies, such practices are un- 
acceptable. But in the closed societies 
of this hemisphere — and there are get- 
ting to be fewer and fewer of them — 
these are not isolated instances. 

You in the Inter-American Press 
Association have defended the free flow 
of information and ideas. You have 
helped to resist the so-called new in- 
ternational information order I'm 
heartened that the new UNESCO [UN 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Or- 
ganization] Director General [Frederico 
Mayor] has called for "communications 
without restrictions between all na- 
tions." We must work together to stop 
attempts to manage the news. 

Time of Decision 

During my recent visits to Latin 
America, one of the most persistent 
questions raised was whether Latin 
America could cope with the informa- 
tion age and with a global economy 
driven by technological innovation. 

The answer to these questions is 
clear: Countries decide whether they 
will be among the innovators, the im- 
itators, or those that are left behind. 
This decision is the product of attitudes 
and policies. 

Material factors — such as re- 
sources, large industrial plants, close 
markets — are important but need not 
be deciding. Look at Singapore. Tech- 
nology links distant markets, lessens 
dependence on natural raw materials, 
and creates new forms of economic 
activity. 

Success comes to those ready to 
seize the opportunities that come with 
change. In the middle of the last cen- 
tury, the pampas of Argentina were the 
locus of an economic boom that lasted 
beyond World War I. The driving force 
was biotechnology and transportation. 
Selective breeding developed new stocks 
of cattle. The railroads linked suppliers 
with markets. Refrigeration made it 
thinkable that livestock raised in one 
quarter of the globe could feed popula- 
tions across an ocean. 

The natural wealth was always 
there. The technology became available. 
What made the difference then? Argen- 
tina got in the loop and moved to the 
center It borrowed technology and 
equity capital from others and had the 
confidence to compete effectively in the 
global market. 

No one can downplay the problems 
facing Latin America today. But politi- 
cal and economic freedom, openness, 
and cooperation provide the basis for 



13 



THE SECRETARY 



overcoming them. There is ah-eady 
movement in this direction. It must 
continue. 

Guidelines for the Future 

Three factors are essential to prosper 
in the new global environment. 

First, societies must be open. 

Knowledge is the key resource in a 
changing world. Free societies ai-e open 
to knowledge from inside and out. In- 
formation circulates freely and widely. 
Everything gets tested in open com- 
petition — products in the marketplace; 
candidates at the ballot box; ideas in 
journals, newspapers, classrooms. 
Freedom spawns innovation because it 
questions established ways of doing 
things. It puts new ideas to the test, 
too. In this context, the role of a free 
press is vital. Democracies cannot func- 
tion without a free press. 

In any decisionmaking system, 
input and feedback are vital. Econom- 
ic and political feedback come from 
free markets, free elections, and free 
thought. Without opposition parties, 
a free press, opinion polls, or labor 
unions, governments and economies op- 
erate in a vacuum. Societies become 
closed. They stagnate. They lose not 
only the capacity to govern justly and 
produce wealth but the capacity to op- 
erate effectively at all. 

Isn't it ironic that coverage of 
the recent Communist Party Congress 
in Moscow was much greater in the 
West than in Cuba? Why is that? Both 
Havana and Moscow recognize the 
power of ideas. While Moscow seems 
desperately to be looking for new ideas 
to turn its economy around, Havana 
still fears ideas — even the controlled 
debates approved in Moscow. Castro de- 
liberately keeps Cuba out of the game. 
He doesn't want discussion. He fears 
the winds of freedom. 

A second guideline: Incentives, 
enterprise, and the market are key. 

Central planning cannot cope with the 
pace or magnitude of change. Statist 
models don't work. Governments do not 
create wealth. Planners cannot force 
growth. But governments can, and fre- 
quently do, discourage growth by re- 
treating from the challenges of change. 
The free operation of the marketplace 
for goods and ideas is by far the most 
efficient arbiter of decisions. 

Political freedom in the Americas 
has gone farther than economic free- 
dom, but a rebirth of free-market 
thinking and practice is underway. The 
president of the Inter-American Devel- 
opment Bank has detected a "new prag- 



14 



matism in the air" — a reduced role for 
the state, expanded exports, and eco- 
nomic reform. 

To be sure, economic performance 
for the region as a whole is not good. 
Economic growth at 2.6% is barely 
above growth in population. It will have 
to be much better if the Americas are 
to hold their own in the emerging 
global economy. This statistical total, 
however, averages out some strong 
performances and some instructive 
failures. 

Colombia, Uruguay, and Jamaica 
have all done much better than aver- 
age. Bolivia, the least developed South 
American economy, has made a dra- 
matic turnaround. In 1985, prices in 
Bolivia rose by 24,000%, if you can 
calculate something like that. All 
that means is that the money economy 
didn't function. Some vendors weighed 
money instead of counting it. Strikes 
were endemic. Workers missed an aver- 
age of 100 workdays in 1984. 

Then a new government, elected in 
1985, introduced reforms based on free- 
market principles. Now inflation is 
down to 12% per year. After years of 
stagnation, the economy again is show- 
ing real growth. 

Common to these cases is resolute 
implementation of outward-looking pol- 
icies aimed at trade and exchange libei'- 
alization, deregulation, privatization, 
and market-based pricing. Market- 
based policies make the difference. 

The third guideline is enhanced 
cooperation. Problems and oppor- 
tunities both increasingly span the 
globe. People must think beyond na- 
tional frontiers. They must work 
together. 

Global politics have not kept pace 
with global economic and technological 
change. Multilateral organizations are 
only now beginning to reflect the new- 
realities of today's interactive world 
rather than a sterile North-South 
confrontation. 

Latin America is prominent on this 
global scene and has helped encourage 
a necessary change and reform. A Pe- 
ruvian serves with distinction as UN 
Secretary General [Javier Perez de 
Cuellar]. Brazil has joined the UN 
Security Council. An Argentine is Pres- 
ident of the UN General Assembly 
[Dante Caputo]. Uruguay has launched 
the current round of the GATT [Gen- 
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Ti-ade]. 



But we all agree that more needs 
to be done, especially at the regional 
level. Andean, Caribbean, and souther 
cone groupings function but do not 
flourish. This is unfortunate. The exarr 
pie of ASEAN [Association of South 
East Asian Nations] demonstrates whs 
can be achieved through a process of 
consensus building, consultation, and 
mutual support. 

Cooperation is essential. Consulta- 
tion is essential. The new democratic 
sohdarity will demand that established j 
groupings like the OAS [Organization ■ 
American States] — already active in 
newer ai'eas like human rights as well 
as older ones like peacekeeping — adap 
to the new global diplomacy in the dec 
ade and centuiy ahead. Global and 
regional organizations are a fact of 
international life. We must work withi 
them, and we must make them work. 

At the forefront of our regional 
concerns lie three major challenges: 
drugs, debt, and the future of democ- 
racy in the Americas. 

The War on Drugs 

The consumption of illegal drugs has 
become a pervasive evil, poisoning pu 
lie and private life throughout our 
hemisphere. A vast network links 
growers on the slopes of the Andes 
with users on the city streets in Nort 
America. This clandestine network 
rivals legitimate commercial network; 
in its scope, but the resemblance is s 
perficial. This is a dirty business tha' 
undermines law and democracy. Both 
newsmen and lawmen have lost their 
lives in efforts to expose the evil and 
protect us from it. 

The problem is not only pervasiv 
it is changing constantly. Ti-affickers 
are moving operations into Venezueh 
and Brazil. Argentina has become a 
transshipment point for cocaine goin; 
to Europe and the United States. Th 
shifting locus of activity makes this i 
truly international problem. 

The solution, of course, begins a 
home. I said it in Bolivia, and I repe 
it now: As the largest single market [ 
illegal drugs, the United States has 
special responsibility in this struggle 
a responsibility fully as great as that 
the producing countries. I agree witl 
your freedom of the press committee 
where you said: "It is a duty to fight 
the consumption of narcotics — prin- 
cipally in the United States — that su 
tains the drug trade." Your committi 
is absolutely on the mark in identify 
that as a central problem. 



Department of State Bulletin/December 1f 



THE SECRETARY 



Individuals must say "no" to drugs, 
with Nancy Reagan's Just Say No 
lubs. Nations must act, singly and 
)gether. International cooperation is 
sential. Producers and consumers 
ust stop blaming each other and start 
orking together And a real start is 
eing made. Just this past August, for 
sample, 29 Latin and European na- 
ons teamed up to crack down on drug 
irtel operations. Drugs were seized, 
boratories destroyed, and criminals 
rested. Information sharing was criti- 
il. Joint action across borders was 
iken. We started on the right track 
)gether, and we must continue. 

he Test of Debt 

econd, let me talk briefly about the 
!st of debt. The second challenge is 
ebt. This involves both economic and 
olitical dimensions. 

As Latin America solidifies the 
'ansition to democracy, the bills are 
Dming due for massive borrowing and 
lisguided economic policy of the past — 
past often characterized by military 
jgimes. With debt high and growth 
gging, some believe that debt puts 
emocracy to a severe test. 

The democracies have shown re- 
liance, but the debt burden is great, 
efore the end of 1989, 9 of the 12 
ighly indebted Latin American coun- 
ties will hold elections. Governments 
ill be rated on their economic per- 
)rmance. Creditors and debtors are in 
lis together Both must join pragmat- 
•ally in reaching solutions. 

For debtors, growth remains the 
ey, and growth requires investment, 
he more savings that can be generated 
t home, the better. But capital flows 
■om abroad are also required. 

A country can test itself on its prog- 
ass. Do its own savings stay home to 
leet its own capital needs? Is domestic 
rivate capital returning from abroad, 
r does it continue to flee? 

If the answers are positive — if 
loney is coming back, if it stays home, 
■ they can attract new foreign capital- 
he country will find itself in good 
tanding in what we might call the 
ourt of the allocation of world savings, 
f the answers are negative, the coun- 
ry should take a hard look at its own 
ecisions about economic policy and 
sk: 

• "Has economic reform been as 
:t< horough and comprehensive as 
lossible?" 



• "Are structural and regulai-ity 
rigidities still a stubborn reality?" 

• "Are incentives to work, save, 
and invest adequate?" 

Too often, structural reform is 
equated with austerity and restrictions. 
Surely, economic reform is needed. But 
economic reform is about growth. It is 
about freeing up and attracting re- 
sources, seeking and opening up mar- 
kets, expanding the opportunities for 
trade. Surely, it means adjustments. It 
imposes costs. It takes time. But it 
does work. Wliere it has been carried 
out integrally — not piecemeal — it has 
made for a real turnaround. 

For creditors, the challenge is to 
look to solutions rather than the size of 
the problem. They must continue to 
work with debtors, and they must learn 
to take into account what amounts to a 
marginal rate of ta.xation on political 
and economic reform — a rate that is 
simply too high. This is an old idea in 
economics, and I'm sure you've all writ- 
ten it or thought about it: that if you 
put a very high rate of taxation, a mar- 
ginal rate of taxation, on the extra dol- 
lar earned, you discourage effort. If 
you confiscate any extra earnings, you 
stop effort. We know that. The same 
thing applies to countries. Reform is 
difficult, and if all the gains ai-e taken 
away by debt service, then the neces- 
sary process may simply not get 
underway. 

The United States has worked to 
arrange bridge loans and provided eco- 
nomic support funds to debtor coun- 
tries to help them manage debt and 
make needed policy changes. Argen- 
tina, the Dominican Republic, and Hon- 
duras are important examples. The 
most important contribution we can 
make, however, is to keep our markets 
open. From the onset of the debt crisis, 
the United States has imported $43-$53 
billion worth of goods and services from 
the region each year. This has enabled 
our neighbors to maintain a trade sur- 
plus with us of between $13 and $21 
billion a year. In short, dealing success- 
fully with debt requires something from 
each of us. 

The Future of Democracy 

The third challenge is the future of de- 
mocracy. The democratic transforma- 
tion in Latin America has been the 
work of countless numbers of free 
men and women — and members of this 
group. They made the transition hap- 
pen. People are voting in record num- 
bers — 300 million in over 50 elections 



since 1980. They are voting for a wide 
range of political leaders, but they will 
not easily give up their right to vote for 
their leaders on a regular and predict- 
able basis. 

Last week's vote in Chile makes 
the point. Voters participated in record 
numbers and in record calm. Competi- 
tion and openness have brought Chile 
extraordinary economic success; now 
Chileans have affirmed the political cor- 
ollary: the right to choose political lead- 
ers in an equally open and competitive 
fashion. 

Latin America is no longer swing- 
ing between democracy and military 
rule. Governments still change. But 
now parties alternate power within 
democracies and through elections. 
Power is passing from one elected gov- 
ernment to another. In Honduras, it 
happened for the first time ever in 
1985. The presidential inauguration in 
Ecuador last August marked Ecuador's 
third consecutive transfer of power 
under democracy. That was the impor- 
tance of the inauguration. That's why 
I attended. 

The message of democratic Latin 
America is clear. No would-be coup 
plotters looking to overthrow a demo- 
cratic government need apply. They will 
be resisted at home. And they will be 
resisted by the United States. Be they 
of the left or the right, civilian or mili- 
tary, there will be no winks, nods, or 
"green lights" for any who are looking 
to oppose democracy or reverse its 
progress. 

When rump groups of military 
officers challenged elected civilian 
governments in Argentina and, more 
recently, in Guatemala, our opposition 
was timely, clear, and vigorous. In case 
after case — death squads in El Sal- 
vador, narcoterrorists in Colombia, 
thugs in Haiti, corruption in Panama, 
censorship in Paraguay, totalitarianism 
in Nicaragua — we have made known our 
condemnation and given our support to 
the democratic forces under attack. 
These are bipartisan positions. They 
follow from our basic commitment to 
democracy. 

The Renaissance of Freedom 

We are fortunate to live in a period of 
the renaissance of freedom. Openness is 
in the ascendancy. Closed societies are 
not working. The results of freedom are 
increasingly compelling. 

Still, Latin America's continued 
transition to democracy cannot be 



15 



THE SECRETARY 



taken for granted. Its consolidation and 
continued health will require a new 
kind of diplomacy from countries that 
have made the transition — a diplomacy 
of democratic solidarity; a diplomacy 
of democratic states for democracy. 

Solidarity sustains and advances 
the cause of democracy. Solidarity 
means mutual support. Sometimes it 
means going out on a limb to pressure 
nondemocratic neighbors to open up. 
The Group of 8^ demonstrated this 
when they suspended Panama from par- 
ticipation. The democratic states of 
Central America demonstrate this 
when they apply diplomatic pressure on 
Nicaragua to keep its promises of a 
democratic opening. Working for de- 
mocracy is one of the best ways to keep 
the peace, since democratic countries 
make good neighbors. 

The friends of democracy have a 
legacy of progress to preserve and a 
record of achievement to build on. You 
in lAPA know the price of freedom. 
You know that economic and social 
problems — debt, poverty, capital flight, 
drugs — must be dealt with. You know 
that political problems — repression, 
dictatorship, censorship — must be 
overcome. 

The answers are not easy, but in 
freedom we can forge answers that 
work. Freedom has proven its worth. 
Freedom works. Freedom is our goal 
and our surest means to a brighter fu- 
ture. Pulling together, the friends of 
democracy can make democracy a last- 
ing, durable achievement for everyone 
in the Americas. 



Key to the Future: 
Enlightened Engagement 



'Press release 220 of Oct. 13, 1988. 
^Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, 
Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. ■ 



Secretary Shultz's address before 
the Financial Executives Institute in 
San Francisco on October 10. 1988. ^ 

This is a time of watershed events and 
watershed rearrangements in thinking. 
The flow is toward political and eco- 
nomic openness. The success of these 
ideas since World War II, with strong 
and creative leadership from the United 
States, has rearranged the political and 
economic map of the world. And an in- 
formation age is here, where knowledge 
and the ability to create and use it is 
the source of comparative advantage 
and general progress. These develop- 
ments reinforce the powerful thrust of 
the very same political and economic 
openness that has brought us our pres- 
ent good fortune. So I am here to talk 
about success — and the problems of 
success. 

Over the course of our history, 
America has seemed to swing between 
involvement and isolation. We have ea- 
gerly engaged with the world, or we 
have tried to look inward. You know 
that America no longer has that option; 
nor should we want it. Your financial 
world operates on, as Walt Wriston 
says, "an information standard," and it 
is global in scope. You know that from 
your own e.xperience. So I want to take 
these few minutes together to tell you 
what is on my sketch pad for America; 
our success; the reasons why; the road 
ahead, with its opportunities, prob- 
lems, and demands. Make no mistake 
about it: We are part of the global de- 
velopments which we did so much to 
create. With national will to stay en- 
gaged, to join in active and enlightened 
leadership, we can be confident of a 
free and productive future. 

Global and U.S. 
Achievements 

Just look back a few decades and see 
what has recently been achieved. 

• The shadow of a third world war 
has faded; for the first time ever, nu- 
clear weapons have been reduced. 

• The little handful of embattled 
democracies find themselves growing 
in strength and number and viewed 
around the world as the wave of the 
future. 



• The tide of Marxism — and, with 
it, communism as the model for devel- 
opment — is a tide that is going out. 

• And national economies — once 
thought destined to be buffeted by 
chance, disaster, and bitter rivalry — are 
finding new ways to cooperate and 
pi'osper in openness. 

In this environment, anybody who 
claims America is in decline better see 
a doctor — or maybe it's a lawyer. But 
anyway, you'd belong on some other 
planet. Let me spell it out. 

• In the war-shattered world of 
1945, the United States accounted for 
almost 50% of the devastated global 
output. Today, thanks to the recovery 
of our European and Asian allies, the 
Summit Seven countries now account 
for b57c of the vastly expanded world 
GNP [gross national product]. Since 
1950, the volume of world output has 
increased fivefold and the volume of 
world exports ninefold. There's a mv^- 
sage there in that relationship. • 

• The United States is in the midi 
of the longest peacetime economic ex- 
pansion in history — now in its 70th 
month. Since November 1982, we 
have created almost 18 million new 
jobs. Roughly two-thirds of our new 
jobs have been in higher paying, highc 
skill categories; only 12% in the lowes 
paid, low-skill occupations. 

• From 1981 to 1987, manufacturii 
productivity increased at an annual 
growth rate of 4.1% — that is nearly 
three times the annual productivity 
gain between 1973 and 1981. Manufac- 
turing production is up 28% since 197S 

• The real U.S. trade deficit — 
measured in constant 1982 dollars — ha 
fallen 39% since the third quarter of 
1986, from an annual rate of .$151.8 
billion to $92.6 billion in the second 
quarter of 1988. Real exports of goods 
and services have increased by a 17% 
annual rate during this period. 



Success and the 
Open World Economy 

The visionary men who shaped our 
international economic policy in the 
1940s— Cordell Hull, George Marshall 
William Clayton, and others — recog- 
nized that America had to shape a ne 
and open global economic order. Our 



b 



16 



Department of State Bulletin/December 19fi 



THE SECRETARY 



ktional security demanded it. The in- 
Irwar years had taught us the bitter 
«son that our own vital interests 
puld not be served in a compartmented 
1(1 chaotic world. And so we rejected 
olationism and economic nationalism, 
hicli we knew would bring only a false 
■11-1' of security and stagnation. In- 
f:ul, in the spirit of the Marshall Plan 
111 r.retton Woods, we chose economic 
luaut-ment. The World Bank, IMF 
iiiiTiiational Monetary Fund], and the 
ATT [General Agreement on Tariffs 
1(1 Trade] wei'e born of that engage- 
ifiii. These new institutions heljjed 
;talilish a postwar environment that 
'Stci-ed global recovery, development, 
1(1 urowth. Thus, we recognized early 
1 that the most effective way to pro- 
iiic our own economic development is 
\ \» orking with others to promote 
uiis. And we are seeing the positive 
■.-^ults. 

N(3w people everywhere can see 
u(, cssful application of this Am.erican 
sion in country after country. They, 
Ml, have embarked on the path to suc- 
■.-s. They, too, see the virtues of open- 
'ss and cooperation and recognize the 
ipoi'tance of moving in concert. Dem- 
■laiic and free market values are gain- 
u strength among the peoples of 
aim America; in the Philippines, 
I'lra. Thailand, and elsewhere in Asia; 
II ! ill Africa. Almost everywhere in 
ic world, there are movements toward 
jenness, decentralization, deregula- 
on, and privatization. More and more 
)untries are cooperating to ensure 
lat they reap the rewards of the ex- 
anding global trading system. 

The world economy is e.xpanding. 
omestic economies are more produc- 
ve. Wealth and power are spread more 
idely among nations. The success of 
le free world's open market system — 
I contrast to the failure of the socialist 
3mmand model — has become plain to 
verybody. A new consensus is emerg- 
ig among the world's nations. Coun- 
•ies as different as Poland and Mauri- 
us are eager to participate more fully 
1 the international economic system 
aat America has been so instrumental 
1 establishing. To do so, of course, 
Siey must be willing to undertake the 
ifficult domestic adjustments that will 
nable them to reap the benefits of full 
articipation. 

The big communist countries, 
^hina and the Soviet Union, are also 
iscovering these truths. Listen to the 
sewest member of the Soviet Politburo, 
Ir. V. A. Medvedev, speaking last 



week on "The Contemporary Concept of 
Socialism": "It is well known," he said, 
"that from the late seventies, negative 
trends in our development began 
emerging with increasing clarity. So- 
cialism found that it had lost its advan- 
tage over capitalism," — some would say 
it never had it — "in terms of the pace of 
economic development." "The essence," 
he says, "of economic reform lies in the 
creation and an intensification of eco- 
nomic incentives for the growth of pro- 
duction and its qualitative improvement 
on the basis of accelerated scientific 
and technical progress." 

And what does he mention as an 
incentive? Ownership — and then he 
says, "In our conditions, the market is 
an irreplaceable instrument for the 
flexible economic coordination of pro- 
duction with the growing and con- 
stantly changing social needs." 

I have to keep pinching myself. 
This is a communist talking. The words 
he says are important words. Actions 
will be difficult, and results will take a 
while. But actions and results start 
from ideas and words, whether called 
"new thinking"; perestroika (restruc- 
turing); or just plain, pragmatic obser- 
vation of what works. 



Competition, Change, 
and the Future 

What's ahead? A competitive and high- 
stepping world is already upon us. The 
very material substances which sur- 
round us in everyday life are being 
transformed. New substances are being 
created. Old substances are finding new 
uses. The same scientific progress that 
has altered the nature of basic mate- 
rials has accelerated the speed of hu- 
man transactions. More and more, ours 
is a time of open skies and borderless 
markets; illustrations — ^just little ones: 

• High in the Andes, a homemade 
satellite dish in an Indian village 

can pull in international television 
programs. 

• In central Brazil, soybean grow- 
ers receive real-time data on Chicago 
Board trading by computer 

• Barbados and the Dominican Re- 
public are gathering information from 
all over the world, programming it, and 
supplying it electronically to data banks 
abroad. 

Increasingly, wealth is becoming 
intangible; exchange, instantaneous; la- 
boi', mental. Increasingly, success de- 
pends on the speed with which ideas 
are put into practice. That is why 



knowledge, information, and ideas are 
the hottest items in trade and why 
"intellectual property rights" are such a 
hot issue. Service industries are major 
sources of exciting and productive new 
jobs. Knowledge-intensive industries 
like microelectronics and biotechnology 
are the fastest growing. Today's re- 
search in agriculture — based on unlock- 
ing secrets contained in genetic codes — 
promises changes that will dwarf the 
green revolution. To build on our suc- 
cess and to stay on top of this exciting 
world ahead, we must be prepared, and 
we must be engaged. 

Key Issues 

What are some of the key issues to 
watch as indicators of our ability to 
deal with the problems and oppor- 
tunities at hand? 

First, regional economic coopera- 
tion and prosperity: The global trends 
now underway are leading national gov- 
ernments to tackle broader issues that 
cannot be managed within a single na- 
tion state or national economy. Re- 
gional initiatives are playing an ever 
more important role in promoting freer 
trade, closer economic cooperation, and 
stronger growth. As such creative ini- 
tiatives increase, we will all benefit. 

We saw this new reality some years 
ago. That is why I and others sug- 
gested the formation of a Pacific Basin 
Forum, where representatives from 
like-minded economies could compare 
experiences, discuss ideas, and prepare 
analyses on subjects of mutual interest. 

We are also nearing completion of 
years of work that can make a giant 
step toward the goals of open trade and 
enhanced economic opportunity by re- 
moving the barriers to free trade and 
investment between Canada and the 
United States. Our two nations ex- 
change more goods and services — $166- 
billion worth last year — than any two 
countries in the world. If Canada's 
voters agree, the elimination of tariffs 
and most other barriers to trade and 
investment between the two countries 
under the U.S. -Canada Free Ti-ade 
Agreement will increase economic 
growth, lower prices, expand employ- 
ment, and enhance the competitive- 
ness of both countries in the world 
marketplace. 

Another potentially magnificent ex- 
ample of regional cooperation is now 
underway. The acceleration of Euro- 
pean economic integration, as embodied 
by the single-market program, clearly 



>epartment of State Bulletin/December 1988 



17 



THE SECRETARY 



is a seminal step in the postwar eco- 
nomic and political development. Euro- 
peans increasingly see the benefits of 
cooperative engagement and the prom- 
ise of openness. But this vision will be 
tested. 

• There is a stifling regulatory 
overlay on much of Europe. Will it be 
applied on what might be called a 
"worst common denominator" basis? Or 
will policies be adopted that are market 
oriented, that promote growth and effi- 
cient use of resources? 

• Protectionism everywhere must 
be defeated. It would be a tragic irony 
for a group of nations to create a com- 
mon market among themselves and 
then to erect new trade barriers 
against countries outside its borders. 

• Economic and political change 
has been possible because strength and 
common purpose have deterred war and 
kept the peace. European integration 
must strengthen, not undermine, those 
commitments. 

European integration will bring 
substantial changes in the vast system 
of ties that forms the existing U.S.- 
European relationship. The impact will 
be felt well beyond trade and invest- 
ment. If we all manage this well, the 
mutual benefits will be enormous. 

Second, the U.S. deficits: Before 

we get too carried away advising others 
what to do, we should take a good look 
in the mirror and at our budget and 
trade deficits. In order to ensure con- 
tinued national and global economic e.x- 
pansion, the U.S. budget and trade 
deficits must shrink — the sooner, the 
better. 

We have made important progress 
on both fronts. We need to continue our 
strong efforts, and we need to succeed 
quickly. Some believe that we can bal- 
ance our internal and external books by 
turning inward and ignoring our inter- 
national interests and obligations. They 
would counsel isolation as a solution to 
both deficits. But that's a recipe for 
economic and political disaster, not 
success. 

Our budget and trade deficits are 
interrelated. Our Federal excess of 
spending over receipts absorbs savings 
that could otherwise be available for in- 
vestment in the private sector. Financ- 
ing from abroad has enabled us to fund 
our deficit while continuing to expand 
our investment and, therefore, our 
economy. 

But foreign capital flows — perfectly 
welcome on their merits and a sign of 
our strong attraction to investors — do 



18 



build up foreign claims on public and 
l)rivate assets in the United States. As 
income generated from those foreign 
claims exceeds the income to the 
United States from American capital 
abroad, then the strain on our current 
account increases, with consequent 
pressure to attain a better balance of 
trade or even run a surplus. That is 
why we need to press ahead in reduc- 
ing our budget and trade deficits. As 
we do, other countries will need to 
make important adjustments of their 
own. Our healthy trading partners with 
export surpluses must maintain open 
and growing markets at home. And to 
service their debt, the heavily indebted 
nations must seize opportunities to in- 
crease exports and to attract new for- 
eign capital. 

It is essential, but not enough, for 
nations to fight off protectionist forces. 
The stakes for the economies of the 
United States and our trading partners 
are too high. We must all go on the 
offensive for freer trade. This is the 
true meaning and genuine necessity of 
the Uruguay Round of trade talks now 
well underway. 

Never forget: The wealth and size 
of our market are vital to many coun- 
tries and to the world economy. Ameri- 
can purchases of manufactured goods 
from developing countries nearly dou- 
bled between 1982 and 1986— from .$41 
billion to .$81 billion. And markets 
abroad are vital to our own economic 
health. Our strong export perform- 
ance — up $96 billion between the third 
quarter of 1986 and the second quarter 
of 1988 — has contributed mightily to 
growth at home. 

As we meet our own domestic chal- 
lenges and global economic integration 
intensifies, we see new opportunities 
for productive cooperation and engage- 
ment — bilaterally, regionally, and inter- 
nationally. Wherevei- I go, that is the 
appeal I hear — sometimes publicly, but 
always privately; often from govern- 
ments, but invariably from their cit- 
izens: "America, stay engaged." 

Third, debt and development in 
the Third World: The hard realities of 
the Third World debt situation must be 
faced. As thinking about this process 
continues to unfold, I have a word for 
debtors and a word for creditors. 

• To the debtors, growth remains 
the key and — today as in the past — 
growth requires investment. A country 
can test itself on the progress it is mak- 
ing in encouraging investment by look- 
ing at savings. Do its policies 



encourage saving? Do its own savings 
stay home and get applied to its own 
capital needs? Is domestic and other 
private capital returning from abroad 
or is it continuing to flee? 

If the answers are positive, the 
country will find itself in good standing 
in what we might call "the court of the 
allocation of world savings." If the an- 
swers are negative, the country should 
take a hard look at how thorough and 
market-based its own process of eco- 
nomic reform has been. 

• To the creditors, time has given 
you a break. Major international effort 
over the past 6 years have bought time 
during which private creditors have ha 
the opportunity to put their own house 
in better order. But harsh realities 
remain. 

As creditors continue to work witl 
debtors, they and all of us must learn 
to take into account a fundamental 
economic idea: High marginal rates of 
taxation discourage effort, and confisc 
tory rates can turn effort off com- 
pletely. I'm sure everybody in this roc 
has preached that sermon. Now, turn 
around. Reform is difficult. If all the 
gains from reform are taken by debt 
service, then the necessary actions m; 
simply not be politically sustainable. 
Rescheduling packages must reflect 
this reality if they are to succeed. 

But succeed they can. Experience 
shows that economic expansion is pos: 
ble almost anywhere with the right 
kind of economic policies. Economic 
success depends less on market size o 
natural resource endowment and mon 
on making the right policy choices. 
Technology has linked distant market 
lessened dependence on natural raw- 
materials, and created new products 
and production processes. Global eco- 
nomic integration now enables coun- 
tries to experience explosions of 
economic activity — if they adopt pol- 
icies which encourage innovation and 
remove barriers between the individu 
and the marketplace. 

Regional efforts at economic coop 
eration — efforts which strengthen the 
role of market forces in the economi?; 
of the debtor nations — can be a powei 
ful springboard for global economic 
activity and engagement. That is v^'hy 
the United States supports CARICO": 
[Caribbean Community and Common 
Market], the CBI [Caribbean Basin I 
tiative], and the recent trade agi-ee- 
ments between Brazil, Argentina, an( 
Uruguay — all outward-looking initia- 
tives which remove barriers to the 
growth of trade. This type of cooper- 



THE SECRETARY 



tive effort between nations and re- 
ional groupings can help resolve the 
lost difficult political and economic 
oblems associated with debt and de- 
elopment in the Third World. 

Fourth, and finally, international 
conomic institutions are due for a 

earching and square-one examination. 
he World Bank, the International 
lonetary Fund, and the GATT have 
layed important roles in the postwar 
eriod of economic development. As the 
cene has shifted, so have their ac- 
vities, with some present activities 
appening almost as a matter of cir- 
umstance and convenience. 

As we consider the next decades, 
hese roles and their interrelationships 
hould be carefully considered. Ti-ade, 
1 vestment, and other capital flows in- 
fract in ways that the founders of 
hese institutions could not have antici- 
ated in the late 1940s. Established as 
idependent organizations with sepa- 
ate responsibilities, they now face a 
^orld where the interaction of these 
lobal flows resembles a seamless web. 

Questions arise. Should, for exam- 
le, the IMF really be a banker of last 
3sort and the setter of conditions for 
ccess to its own resources? Should it 
e the stalking horse for the reschedul- 
ig and debt-management efforts of pri- 
ate lenders? Such a banker's role is 
far cry from what was originally 
itended for the IMF and for which it 
as designed. How, as national econo- 
lies — including those of the Soviet 
tnion and China — take steps to adjust 
new realities, should they relate to 
le international economy? Can we en- 
jre the continued relevance of the 
ATT by covering services and intellec- 
jal property rights and by dealing ef- 
ctively with the runaway problem of 
jbsidies to agriculture. So these in- 
titutions, designed to provide a frame- 
ork for international economic trans- 
ctions, must be tested for their capac- 
y to respond to the promising, yet 
omplex, world of the next century. 

tpenness Remains Our Vision 

'he American philosophy is pragma- 
ism. Pragmatism dictates that problem 
olving be a cooperative process. We 
.'ill welcome the actions and ideas of 
thers on the world stage — whether de- 
eloi)ed or developing, capitalist or 
ommunist — if they are geared to pro- 
loting openness and world economic 
Towth. 

There is a lot of creative thinking 
oing on out there. Japan and the Eu- 
ropean Community are large, vibrant, 



and important players, and we want to 
hear their ideas. The Soviet Union and 
China have launched upon processes of 
political rethinking and economic re- 
structuring and, by doing so, seek to 
pai-ticipate more fully in the global 
economy. 

All of this holds promise for the 
United States if we approach the future 
with confidence and vision. After all, 
our willingness to innovate, to engage, 
and to cooperate has been the secret of 
our remarkable progress. It is, if any- 
thing, even more needed at a time 
when others, too, have economic wealth 
and capability. 

We must build coalitions of common 
sense. We need patience, discipline, 
and staying power We need openness 
and the swiftness to seize the oppor- 
tunities openness creates. 

I have traveled over 1 million miles 
as your Secretary of State and received 
leaders from every part of the world as 



they visit Washington. During the past 
2 weeks, I met, individually or in 
groups, with representatives of 132 
countries. The atniosjihere was, by gen- 
eral agreement, the best in many dec- 
ades. The sense is that problems are 
there to be solved rather than used to 
berate each other Presidents Reagan 
and Gorbachev receive, and certainly 
deserve, great credit and praise. 

In these discussions, people can be 
critical or apprehensive but also con- 
structive and even creative. There is 
the sense that something different and 
better is on the horizon. And the basic 
message to us is always the same: Stay 
engaged. America's ideas, presence, 
and influence are essential. 

Enlightened engagement will take 
us into a free, rewarding, and produc- 
tive future. That is the opportunity we 
face and the responsibility we bear. 



'Press release 219 of Oct. 12, 



Promoting Peace and Prosperity 
in the South Asian Region 



Secretary Shultz's address before 
the South Asian Association for Re- 
gional Cooperation (SAARC) in New 
York City on October 6, 1988.1 

To use a phrase that a predecessor of 
mine used in another context, I'm 
pleased to have been present at the 
creation of SAARC, to wish it well as it 
undertook its work on behalf of the bil- 
lion people of South Asia. Since its in- 
ception, I have watched SAARC gi'ow 
and demonstrate to the world that co- 
operation is a matter of will and effort. 
More importantly, you have shown that 
the organization can flourish despite 
unanticipated changes and challenges in 
your region. This is the mark of any 
viable organization, but it is by no 
means a given for as recently launched 
a body as SAARC. 

This success comes in the midst of 
a difficult year Most recently you and 
the world lost a great statesman, 
[Pakistani] President Zia-ul-Haq, in a 
tragic plane crash. Nepal, India, 
Bangladesh, and the Maldives have en- 
dured crippling natural disasters, yet 
your support, sympathy, and under- 
standing for one another following 
these tragic events underscore the good 
will and cooperative spirit that serve as 
the foundation for SAARC. 



In spite of the tragedies, SAARC 
has enjoyed an especially productive 
year since we last met here in New 
York. You have served your main objec- 
tive well — to promote regional 
cooperation. 

I understand that SAARC held a 
large number of meetings, training ses- 
sions, seminars, conferences, and cul- 
tural events this year over a wide 
spectrum, including agriculture, rural 
development, science and technology, 
telecommunications, and 
transportation. 

Convention on Terrorism 

The United States vigorously applauds 
what we believe to be your most impor- 
tant accomplishment of the year: put- 
ting into force the SAARC Regional 
Convention on the Suppression of Ter- 
rorism. Last year I wished you luck in 
your efforts to complete the convention. 
This year the convention is not only 
completed, it is ratified and in force. As 
a person who has fought terrorism 
throughout my tenure as Secretary of 
State, I must add that it also gives me 
great personal satisfaction to see the 
convention is now a reality. 



bepartment of State Bulletin/December 1988 



19 



THE SECRETARY 



Experience has shown the world 
that it is such mutual efforts which en- 
able governments to prevail over ter- 
rorists. The convention has particularly 
useful features. It clearly defines ter- 
rorist acts as criminal. It can also be 
used as the basis for an extradition re- 
quest between states which do not have 
bilateral extradition treaties. You have 
thus helped remove the protection — 
however unintended — that terrorists 
enjoy when they flee to countries who 
for legal reasons are unable to return 
those terrorists to the scene of their 
crime. The consistent application of the 
internationally accepted standard of 
"extradite or prosecute" is one of the 
most effective instruments in the hands 
of responsible governments in the fight 
against terrorism. Most importantly, 
the convention establishes a regime of 
cooperative measures through the shar- 
ing of expertise, information, and intel- 
ligence aimed at preventing terrorist 
acts from occurring. 

Narcotics 

I am especially impressed with 
SAARC's efforts to stem narcotics traf- 
ficking and abuse. Those of you who 
have watched the American scene this 
year have no doubt noted that drug 
abuse and its associated evils are key 
issues that our lawmakers are address- 
ing with renewed vigilance. But is 
there any nation in the world today 
that is not touched in some way — be it 
through abuse among its own popula- 
tion, trafficking in violation of its bor- 
ders, or growth and manufacture within 
its borders — by the horrible effects of 
the drug trade? 

The massive job of educating our 
publics to the dangers of narcotics, 
stemming the trade which delivers il- 
legal substances to our streets, and 
protecting our citizens from the associ- 
ated crime and violence the illegal drug 
trade inevitably spawn is too big for 
any one nation to do alone. I see by 
your actions it is clear that SAARC 
understands that. 

Nuclear Proliferation 

The danger of nuclear proliferation 
presents one of the most serious re- 
gional security threats in South Asia. 
Fortunately, both India and Pakistan al- 
ready appear to appreciate this danger 
and have exercised restraint in their 
nuclear activities. 

The United States welcomes such 
restraint and urges both countries to 



20 



find ways to remove the threat of nu- 
clear proliferation in South Asia 
through discussions and agreement. We 
are pleased to note that SAARC has 
addressed this issue and hope that it 
will continue to study how best to move 
ahead on resolving this difficult 
problem. 

The past year by many accounts 
has been an exciting one for all of us — 
exciting, I must add, in positive ways. 
The United States and the Soviet 
Union signed the INF [Intermediate- 
range Nuclear Forces] Ti'eaty, thus con- 
firming our mutual commitment to 
arms control and a safer world. The 
United States has also made progress 
on the other items of our four-point 
agenda with the Soviets in the areas of 
human rights, bilateral issues, and re- 
gional issues. The constructive dialogue 
continues even now, promoting what we 
hope will be an increasingly productive 
working i-elationship. 

Afghanistan 

We are pleased to see that the Soviets 
have met their target of withdrawing 
half of their troops from Afghanistan 
by August 15. As important as that ac- 
complishment is, we must persevere 
until all Soviet forces are withdrawn, 
until Afghans again enjoy the right to 
genuine self-determination, and until 
Afghanistan is on the road to recovery 
from the devastation wreaked by the 
Soviet invasion. We stand ready with 
the nations of the region and the world 
to contribute to the safe return of the 
millions of refugees ci'eated by the war 
and to help promote the process of rec- 
onciliation, but we recognize that only 
Afghans can accomplish this much- 
needed process. 



Peace is coming to other strife-rid- 
den areas as well. We have witnessed 
this year negotiated settlements com- 
pleted or in progress in the Iran-Iraq 
war, Angola, and Cambodia. The par- 
ties in conflict have often looked to the 
United Nations to facilitate those nego- 
tiations, and the United Nations has 
contributed admirably to this vital 
function. 

Future Challenges for SAARC 

SAARC has some major challenges 
ahead. With upcoming elections sched- 
uled in several of your member states, 
you face a year of intense political ac- 
tivity. The Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan will have a major impact 
on the regional equation. SAARC's 
role, as a forum for cooperation, will h 
of vital importance at such a time of 
transition and uncertainty. 

On behalf of my government, I 
wish to commend SAARC for setting 
such a positive example of cooperation 
and to wish you every success for an- 
other year of progress. 

On my own part, I wish to again 
express my great pleasure at our asso- 
ciation over the years, and for the op- 
portunity we have had on these 
occasions to engage in candid, helpful 
dialogues. I will miss working with all 
of you in my official capacity. I look 
forward, however, to our continued 
friendship at the personal level. In th( 
coming years you can be assured I wil 
follow closely SAARC's progress in pi 
moting peace and prosperity among al 
its members and for the region as a 
whole. 



'Press release 215 of Oct. 7, 1988. 



Efforts for Peace in Africa 



Secretary Shulfz's remarks at a re- 
ception in honor of the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) in New York City 
on October k, 1988A 

African nations today are developing 
their own industries, their own com- 
merce, and their own agricultural po- 
tential. But also essential to economic 
growth is a just and peaceful society. I 
see, today, encouraging signs of Af- 
ricans working to address the chal- 
lenges of both economic and political 



development and to create the peacefi 
international environment in which 
both can proceed. Certainly, the strid 
taken to end the conflicts in Chad, 
Western Sahara, and southwestern A 
rica are important manifestations of t 
effort to bring peace to your continen 
Sadly, civil wars and human sufff 
ing are not limited to the noi'thern ar 
southern extremes of Africa. Internal 
conflict and natural disastei's have di.' 
rupted and frequently ended the lives 
of thousands of people throughout 
Africa. 



Department of State Bulletin/December 19) 



THE SECRETARY 



We all — Africans as well as oth- 
-have a role in seeking an end to 
Is enormous suffering and helping to 
store the political stability and eco- 
mic infrastructure essential to the 
ll-being of all mankind. Governments 
countries afflicted by civil conflict 
d natural disasters are called to ex- 
lordinary efforts. It will require un- 
rstanding, compromise, good will, 
d compassion. Solutions will not just 
appen" and cannot be imposed, either 
ernally or from the outside. Each 
vernment affected must accept and 
;charge its rightful responsibilities, 
e United States will do its part to 
tend its assistance and good offices in 
appropriate ways to reduce suffering 
d to foster the peaceful resolution of 
iflict. 



solving Regional Conflicts 

are encouraged by the growing role 
the Organization of African Unity in 
'diating and resolving conflicts. One 
icific instance is the conflict between 
ad and Libya. We support the OAU's 
ort to find a peaceful solution. Lib- 
1 aggression against Chad and occu- 
;ion of Chadian territory have 
anted the 1964 OAU decision that Af- 
an nations should respect the bor- 
s inherited at independence. We 
pe that recent developments will 
)n be followed by a peaceful and last- 
; settlement of territorial disputes 
it is acceptable to both Chad and 
jya. 

We also welcome and support the 
:retary General of the United Na- 
ns [Javier Perez de Cuellar] in his 
orts to mediate the dispute in the 
•stern Sahara. With the concurrence 
the Security Council, important 
ps toward a resolution — including 
; designation of the Secretary Gen- 
ii's special representative — have al- 
idy been taken. We hope that the 
jgress attained through UN and 
.U efforts will permit the introduc- 
n of a balanced resolution in the Gen- 
ii Assembly this year supporting the 
cretary General. 

In the troubled landscape of south- 
1 Africa, there are also signs of hope. 

stant Secretary for African Af- 
rsj Chester Crocker's tireless efforts 
• peace are nearing success. South 
rica, Angola, and Cuba are in the 
al stages of working out a compre- 
nsive settlement of the conflicts in 
igola and Namibia. The parties are 
w up against the need to make con- 
3te decisions on a timetable for the 



withdrawal of Cuban troops from An- 
gola in conjunction with the imple- 
mentation of UN Security Council 
Resolution 435 and on how to promote 
national reconciliation in both Namibia 
and Angola. If they have the courage 
and statesmanship to make those deci- 
sions, this will bring Africa's last colony 
to independence, remove all foreign 
forces from southwestern Africa, and 
give Angola the first peace it has 
known since its independence. The Sec- 
retary General of the United Nations 
has been supportive throughout the ne- 
gotiating process. Once negotiations are 
complete, the United Nations will put 
into Namibia a joint civilian/military 
group to facilitate Namibia's transition 
to independence. The United States 
will fully support that effort. 

Similarly, we applaud the efforts of 
African statesmen to broker talks be- 
tween the MPLA [Popular Movement 
for the Liberation of Angola] and 
UNITA [National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola] and to medi- 
ate a peace in which there would be no 
Angolan losers — only gainers. Such na- 
tional reconciliation through direct di- 
alogue between the parties is the only 
realistic means of ending the tragic 
civil war which has raged in Angola for 
more than 13 years. 

We are also encouraged by recent 
developments among South Africa, 
Mozambique, and South Africa's other 
neighbors and strongly support the 
openings for peace that they imply. 

Regrettably, the political outlook 
inside South Africa itself is not very 
encouraging. Despite international 
pressure, there is scant evidence of the 
sort of dramatic, profound change in 
that country's laws and political and 
economic society that is necessary if vi- 
olence is to be avoided. The determina- 
tion of the white minority to retain its 
monopoly on political power appears to 
have grown apace with South African 
isolation from the outside world. Re- 
pression continues and has intensified 
recently to include actions taken 
against even moderate white opponents 
of apartheid. 

The issue for the United States is 
not "where do we stand?" Six American 
Presidents — three from each of our ma- 
jor political parties — have made crystal 
clear, over the past 25 years, where 
America stands on apartheid. The 
American people will never be able to 
have a cordial relationship with a gov- 
ernment or people — any government 
and any people — who deprive most of 
their citizenry their due rights on the 
basis of race or religion or ethnic or 
national origin. The issue, rather, is 



what can we do to help bring about 
change. The United States was the first 
of South Africa's trading partners to 
embargo the sale of military equipment 
to that country. We did so in 1963 — 14 
years before the United Nations, with 
our support, imposed one. Over the 
past quarter-century, the American 
people have continued to lead interna- 
tional efforts to demonstrate abhor- 
rence for apartheid and to help its 
victims build the economic and political 
strength they will need to end it and 
take their rightful place in running 
their country. 

We have repeatedly called on the 
South African Government to end the 
state of emergency, release detainees 
and other political prisoners, and to 
begin the process of reconciliation and 
dialogue necessary for a peaceful 
i-esolution of South Africa's political 
crisis. We remain deeply concerned 
that, unless the accelerating cycle of 
violence — practiced by both the govern- 
ment and its opponents — is stopped, 
South Africa will continue its descent 
into a siege mentality and garrison 
state in which all South Africans be- 
come losers. 

We have, however, opposed the ex- 
pansion of mandatory sanctions because 
we believe that the effect of such sanc- 
tions is to deprive us of leverage, of 
influence, and of the ability to press for 
change. The principal victims of such 
sanctions have been black South Af- 
rican businesses and workers and the 
principal beneficiaries have been those 
within the South African industrial and 
financial elite who have picked up, at 
bargain prices, what the American di- 
vesters left behind. It seems to me that 
this is precisely the wrong "signal" for 
the United States to be sending. We 
believe a more fruitful approach is to 
help the victims of apartheid build their 
bargaining power thi'ough assistance 
for education, economic opportunities, 
and community development for black 
South Africans. 

The regions of Africa I have men- 
tioned are not the only parts of your 
continent troubled by tension and vio- 
lence. Efforts to resolve the conflicts 
peacefully in Sudan and the Horn, for 
example, must be more vigorously pur- 
sued. The recent tragic events in Bu- 
rundi remind us again of the need for 
people to strive for a peaceful recon- 
ciliation of differences within their own 
national boundaries. President Buyoya 
has declared his firm intention to pur- 
sue national reconciliation. We support 
African efforts to help Burundi bind up 
its wounds and bring its people back