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of  State 


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V 


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bulletin 


Jhe  Ofticial  Monthly  Recofd-^ql  IJiiited  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volume  88  /  Number  2139 


Oi.^^ 


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Hoy 


^    19RQ  I 


October  1988 


Secretary's  Trips: 

Latin  America/2 

East  Asia  and  the  Pacific/21 

Nicaragua/1,  82 
Economics/43,  46 
Human  Rights/54,  57 


Dpparimvnt  of  Staip 

bulletin 


Ml 


Volume  88  /  Number  2139  /  October  M 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public  Com- 
munication in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide 
the  public,  the  Congress,  and  govern- 
ment agencies  with  information  on  de- 
velopments in  U.S.  foreign  relations 
and  the  work  of  the  Department  of 
State  and  the  Foreign  Service.  The 
Bulletin's  contents  include  major 
addresses  and  news  conferences  of  the 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  State; 
statements  made  before  congressional 
committees  by  the  Secretary  and  other 
senior  State  Department  officials;  se- 
lected press  releases  issued  by  the 
White  House,  the  Department,  and  the 
U.S.  Mission  to  the  United  Nations; 
and  treaties  and  other  agreements  to 
which  the  United  States  is  or  may  be- 
come a  party.  Special  features,  articles, 
and  other  supportive  material  (such  as 
maps,  charts,  photographs,  and  graphs) 
are  published  frequently  to  provide  ad- 
ditional information  on  current  issues 
but  should  not  necessarily  be  inter- 
preted as  official  U.S.  policy 
statements. 


GEORGE  P.  SHULTZ 

Secretary  of  State 

CHARLES  REDMAN 

Assistant  Secretary 
for  Public  Affairs 

PAUL  E.  AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office  of  Public  Communication 

COLLEEN  LUTZ 

Chief,  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 

SHARON  R.  HAYNES 

Assistant  Editor 


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September  :50,  1989. 


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For  sale  by  the  Sui>erintendent  of  Docu- 
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CONTENTS 


fi9  President 

;     Aid  to  the  Nicaraguan  Demo- 
cratic Resistance 


^  Secretary 

;      Secretary  Shultz  Visits  Latin 
America  (Ricardo  Acevedo 
PeraUo.  Alfonso  Cabrera 
Hildago,  Carlos  Lopez 
j         Contreras,  Rodric/o  Madrigal 
9         Nieto,  Secretari/  SIndtz) 
I     Secretary's  Trip  to  East  Asia 
I         and  the  Pacific 


\ms  Control 

Nuclear  Testing  T^lks  Open 

Round  Three  (White  House 

Stateinent) 
U.S. -Soviet  Union  Conduct  First 

Phase  of  JVE  {White  House 

Statement) 
ABM  Treaty  Review  Session 

Opens  (White  House 

Statement) 


\  St  Asia 

I       Situation  in  Vietnam,  Cambodia, 
and  Laos  (David  F. 
Lambert  son) 


honomics 

Strategy  for  An  LDC  Debt 
Workout:  A  U.S.  Perspective 
(William  B.  Milam) 
I        U.S.  Export  Control  Policy:  Its 
Present  and  Future  Course 
(E.  Allan  Wendt) 


Europe 

49  Visit  of  Icelandic  Prime  Minister 

(Thorsteinn  Palsson,  President 
Reagan) 

50  27th  Anniversary  of  the  Berlin 

Wall  (President  Reagan) 
50        38th  Report  on  Cyprus  (Message 
to  the  Congress) 


General 

51  American  Foreign  Policy:  Oppor- 
tunities and  Challenges  (Colin 
L.  Powell) 


Human  Rights 

54        U.S.  Human  Rights  Policy:  An 
Overview  (Paula  Dohriansky) 

57        Helsinki  Human  Rights  Day, 
1988  (Proclamation) 

57  Captive  Nations  Week,  1988 

(Proclamation) 

International  Law 

58  Compensation  for  Iranian  Airbus 

Tragedy  (Abraham  D.  Sofaer) 


Middle  East 

60  Visit  of  Kuwaiti  Prime  Minister 

(President  Reagan,  Saad  al- 
Abdallah  al-Salim  Al  Sabah) 

61  Review  of  U.S.  Policy  in  the 

Middle  East  (Richard  W. 
Miuyh;/) 


Oceans 

64        Fisheries  Negotiations  and 

Ti-ade  Opportunities  (Edward 
E.  Wolfe) 


Science  &  Technology 

67        U.S.  Views  on  Waste  Exports 
(Frederick  M.  Bernthal) 


South  Asia 

69        Pakistan's  President  Zia,  U.S. 
Ambassador  Die  in  Plane 

Crash  (Secretarji  Shultz.  Johv 
C.  Whitehead) 


United  Nations 


70 


U.S.  Assessments  for  the  United 
Nations  (Dennis  C.  Goodman) 


Western  Hemisphere 

72        FY  1989  Assistance  Requests  for 
Latin  America  and  the  Carib- 
bean (Elliott  Abrams) 

82        Situation  in  Nicaragua  (White 
House  Statement) 


Treaties 

83        Current  Actions 

Press  Releases 

85  Department  of  State 

Publications 

86  Department  of  State 

86        CSCE  Semiannual  Report 
Released 

Index 


-^H^^i?^'M 


%   NOV!   W88    ■     1 


T\E  PRESIDENT 


^d  to  the  Nicaraguan  Democratic  Government 


Iesidents  radio  address, 

:.V  30,  1988' 

at  a  moment  of  hope  it  was  1  year 
when  Central  American  leaders 
eluded  their  meeting  in  Guatemala. 

Sandinista  government  of  Nic- 
gua,  a  communist  regime  fighting  a 
il  war  against  15,000  Nicaraguan 
sdom  fighters  opposed  to  their  op- 
ssion,  agreed  to  a  series  of  sweeping 
nocratic  reforms.  If  carried  out, 
se  reforms  would  have  ended  the 
ing  and  brought  peace  to  Nicaragua 
1  Central  America.  It  would  also 
'6  meant  that  Nicaragua  would  at 
t  join  the  family  of  free,  democratic 
ions. 

At  first,  there  were  a  few  hopeful 
ns.  To  much  media  fanfare,  the  op- 
ition  newspaper  in  Nicaragua,  La 
■nsa,  was  reopened.  Independent  ra- 
stations  were  allowed  to  broadcast 
lin.  A  few  political  prisoners  were 
eased,  and  jjolitical  groups  were  al- 
,'ed  more  latitude.  Most  important, 
ndinistas  finally  agreed  to  the  free- 
m  fighters'  request  for  direct  negotia- 
ns  for  a  peaceful,  democratic 
,tlenient. 

Now,  the  main  reason  the  San- 
listas  agreed  to  those  steps  a  year 
0  was  the  steady  progress  of  the 
jedom  fighters,  including  important 
ttlefield  victories  like  the  one  at  Los 
inas.  But  tragically,  at  the  very  mo- 
mt  when  continued  strength  and  de- 
rmination  by  the  United  States  might 
ve  meant  the  continued  success  of  the 
ace  plan,  the  United  States  House  of 
'presentatives  decided,  and  by  only  a 
ry  narrow  margin,  to  refuse  my  re- 
lest  for  further  effective  aid  to  the 
eedom  fighters.  This,  of  course,  re- 
oved  the  principal  prod — the  military 


victories  and  popular  success  of  the 
freedom  fighters— to  Sandinista  par- 
ticipation in  the  peace  plan  and  sent  an 
immediate  signal  of  American  weakness 
to  the  communists. 

This  failure  to  support  the  freedom 
fighters  has  had  costly  and  sad  conse- 
quences, just  how  costly  and  sad  we've 
seen  during  the  past  few  weeks.  Com- 
munist Sandinista  leader  Daniel  Ortega 
has  been  visiting  Castro  in  Cuba  and 
voicing  solidarity  with  the  tyrant  who 
has  brought  so  much  sadness  and  mis- 
ery to  that  country.  While  in  Nic- 
aragua, a  renewed  attack  on  political 
dissent  is  being  led  by  the  head  of  the 
secret  police,  Thomas  Borge,  a  dedi- 
cated communist  and  grim,  hardened 
repressor  of  human  rights  whose  office, 
according  to  our  Commission  on  Orga- 
nized Crime,  has  also  been  actively  en- 
gaged in  the  international  drug  trade. 
Acting  under  the  orders  of  the  commu- 
nist leaders  and  Borge's  supervision, 
Sandinista  police  and  goon  squads  have 
brutally  broken  up  a  peaceful  demon- 
stration by  3,000  Nicaraguans.  Opposi- 
tion leaders  were  jailed  or  beaten  and 
now  sentenced  to  prison.  Political,  re- 
ligious liberties  have  again  been  cur- 
tailed. The  communists  ordered  the 
Catholic  Archbishop  to  shut  down  the 
Catholic  radio  station.  And  for  almost 
2  weeks  the  independent  newspaper,  La 
Prensa,  was  refused  permission  to  pub- 
lish. And  the  American  ambassador 
was  expelled. 

And  yet,  while  the  cutoff  of  aid  to 
the  freedom  fighters  was  a  dreadful 
mistake,  getting  the  cause  of  peace  and 
freedom  back  on  track,  not  recrimina- 
tion, must  now  be  our  goal.  There  is  a 
chance  for  real  bipartisan  consensus  in 
support  of  renewed  contra  aid.  Indeed, 
one  of  its  strong  supporters  [Senator 
Lloyd  Bentsen]  has  recently  been 
named  to  be  the  vice  presidential  candi- 
date of  the  Democratic  Party.  Senator 
Bob  Dole  intends  soon  to  offer  legisla- 
tion to  renew  effective  assistance  to  the 


freedom  fighters.  The  final  details  are 
being  worked  out.  And  I  urge  the 
Members  of  the  Senate  to  support  the 
aid  package,  and  I  also  ask  the  House 
of  Representatives  to  move  speedily 
and  favorably  on  the  Senate  legislation. 
Meanwhile,  we  continue  to  pursue  ag- 
gressively our  diplomatic  efforts  with 
the  Central  American  democracies. 

So  much  is  at  stake.  A  few  years 
ago,  there  were  those  who  said  the 
cause  of  freedom  and  democracy  was 
lost  in  El  Salvador  Well,  perhaps  some 
of  you  remember  that  incredible  scene 
when  the  people  of  that  country  defied 
communist  threats  and  bullets  to  march 
to  the  polls  and  vote  for  democracy. 
The  American  aid  package  that  helped 
make  democracy  victorious  in  El  Sal- 
vador passed  by  only  two  votes  in  the 
House.  But  pass  it  did,  and  democracy 
did  come. 

A  few  weeks  ago,  both  Vice  Pres- 
dent  Bush  and  I  visited  the  bedside  of 
one  of  the  heroes  of  that  struggle,  Pres- 
ident Duarte  of  El  Salvador.  President 
Duarte  has  had  no  easy  life.  He  has 
been  continually  threatened  by  extrem- 
ists of  both  left  and  right.  His  daughter 
was  kidnaped  by  communist  guerrillas. 
And  now,  while  in  a  desperate  sti'uggle 
with  cancer,  he  continues  to  lead  his 
nation  on  the  high  road  to  democracy.  I 
cannot  tell  you  how  deeply  moved  Vice 
President  Bush  and  I  were  by  our  visit 
to  this  brave  and  remarkable  man  and 
how  determined  we  both  were  that  his 
dream  for  his  people  and  all  the  peoples 
of  Central  America  should  he  made  a 
reality:  the  dream  of  peace  and  freedom 
for  every  man,  woman,  and  child. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Aug.  8,  1988. 


epartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1988 


THE  SECRETARY 


Secretary  Shultz  Visits  Latin  America 


Secretary  Shultz  departed  Washington,  B.C., 

to  visit  Guatemala  (August  1,  1988), 
Argentina  (August  2-k),  Uruguay  (August  U), 

Brazil  (August  4-8),  Bolivia  (August  8-9), 

Costa  Rica  (August  9),  Honduras  (August  9), 

El  Salvador  (August  9),  Costa  Rica  (August  9-10) 

and  Ecuador  (August  10). 

He  returned  to  the  United  States  on  August  11. 

Following  are  the  texts  of  addresses, 

news  conferences,  and  remarks 

he  made  on  various  occasions 

during  the  trip. 


JOINT  NEWS  CONFERENCE, 
GUATEMALA  CITY, 
AUG.  1,  1988' 

Guatemalan  Foreign  Minister  Cabrera. 

We  are  reaching  the  conclusion  of  a 
very  promising  and  fruitful  meeting.  As 
you  know,  as  a  result  of  an  agreement 
among  the  four  Central  American  coun- 
tries, we  decided  to  meet  with  the  Sec- 
retary of  State  of  the  United  States, 
Mr.  George  Shultz,  in  Guatemala  City 
in  order  to  analyze  the  problems  of 
Central  America,  to  study  the  Es- 
quipulas  II  peace  process,  to  analyze 
the  problems  of  security  in  the  region, 
and  to  discuss  economic  and  social 
problems,  in  order  to  have  a  joint  dis- 
cussion and  in  order  to  move  in  the 
direction  of  defining  specific  solutions 
for  each  one  of  these  topics. 

We  recognize  the  United  States  is  a 
friend,  which  has  shown  its  concern  and 
its  political  determination  to  help  in  the 
Central  American  peace  process  and  to 
help  with  the  economic  and  social  devel- 
opment of  this  area  on  a  regional  basis, 
and  bilaterally  with  each  of  our  coun- 
tries. This  is  why  we  have  carried  out 
this  meeting.  Let  me  say  to  you  that 
we,  the  Central  American  foreign  min- 
isters, are  extremely  satisfied  with  re- 
sults we  have  obtained  and  which  you 
will  be  aware  of  after  we  read  the  joint 
communique,  which  will  happen  in  a 
matter  of  minutes. 


I  would  like  to  highlight  something 
I  think  is  very  important.  A  number  of 
speculations  have  circulated  with  re- 
gard to  this  meeting — about  the  e.xist- 
ence  of  a  so-called  Shultz  plan — about 
some  sort  of  a  declaration  of  war  and 
about  pressures  that  were  being  e.x- 
erted  on  governments,  specifically 
Guatemala  and  Costa  Rica.  Let  me  tell 
you  all  of  that  is  pure  speculation.  No 
pressure  was  exercised.  No  "Shultz 
plan"  has  been  presented,  and  we  have 
not  been  invited  to  sign  any  declaration 
of  war. 

From  the  time  we  [previously]  met 
in  Guatemala,  Guatemala  proposed  a 
process  to  this  meeting,  and  that  proc- 
ess entailed  the  establishment  of  tech- 
nical committees  to  draft  documents  to 
define  the  topics  that  were  to  be  dis- 
cussed together  at  this  meeting.  What 
happened  was  that  we  have  had  a  dis- 
cussion of  the  basic  document — which 
was  submitted  initially  by  Guatemala — 
and  it  was  then  enhanced,  and  a 
number  of  proposals  from  other  Central 
American  countries  were  received.  Un- 
doubtedly, this  led  to  speculation.  I 
want  to  take  advantage  of  this  occasion 
to  make  the  situation  very  clear  and  to 
say  there  was  none  of  what  was  de- 
scribed in  some  of  these  speculative 
statements. 

After  this  process  of  thinking  and 
reflecting,  the  technical  committees  of 
the  four  Central  American  countries 
and  the  United  States  worked  very. 


very  hard.  We  came  up  with  this  fin&.'| 
communique,  which  is,  in  fact,  the  be, 
ginning  of  a  process  of  reflection  that; 
will  lead  us  to  develop  certain  mecha-, 
nisms.  We,  the  Central  Americans, 
have  spoken  to  the  Secretary  of  State  j 
Mr.  Shultz  has  understood  us.  And  w. 
all  know  it  is  not  enough  to  have  a     . 
political  determination  conveyed  in  a 
document;  rather,  we  must  clearly  ar 
objectively  put  forth  mechanisms  so 
can  convert  the  aspirations  listed  in 
this  document  into  reality.  These  asp 
rations  are  those  of  peace,  progress, 
development  for  2.5  million  Central 
Americans.  I  will  now  turn  to  Ms. 
Claudia  Arenas,  Director  of  Public  R 
lations  of  the  Presidency,  to  be  kind 
enough  to  read  the  document. 

Ms.  Arenas.  [Translation  of  Spa 
ish  text]  The  Ministers  analyzed  the 
present  Central  American  situation  . 
discussed  the  peace  process  in  Centi 
America  and  measures  to  promote  d 
mocracy,  development,  peace,  and  s( 
curity  in  the  region. 

The  Ministers  confirmed  their  r 
spect  for  the  principles  of  peace,  de- 
mocracy, security,  social  justice,  and 
economic  development  expressed  in 
United  Nations  Charter  and  the  Ch. 
ter  of  the  Organization  of  American 
States  and  reiterated  the  importanc 
the  Esquipulas  II  agreement  and  th 
declaration  of  Alajuela  as  Central 
American  instruments  which  are  fu: 
mental  for  the  democratization,  se- 
curity, and  economic  and  social 
development  of  the  region. 

They  agreed  the  establishment 
genuine  democratic  governments 
throughout  the  region  is  essential  ii( 
order  to  achieve  peace.  Likewise,  tif 
agreed  on  their  vision  of  a  democra: 
truly  pluralistic,  prosperous,  just,  f 
ble,  and  secure  Central  America. 

They  reaffirmed  that  authentic 
mocracy  needs,  among  other  requir 
ments:  political  pluralism,  freedom 
association,  freedom  of  the  press,  ai 
impartial  judicial  system  that  guars, 
tees  due  process,  armed  forces  whe 
ever  they  exist  which  are  apolitical, 
honest  and  open  electoral  system,  ;  tl 
respect  for  human  rights  and  indivi  |i 
freedoms. 

These  basic  principles  and  func 
mental  freedoms  as  a  whole  create 
democratic,  representative  system 
which  the  will  of  the  people  is  ex- 
pressed periodically  through  free  ai 
honest  elections  that  permit  the  pe 
ful  and  orderly  transfer  of  power. 

They  declared  their  firm  deteri 
nation  to  consolidate  democratizatic 


THE  SECRETARY 


Irts  being  undertaken  in  the  region 
to  strengthen  the  bonds  of  coopera- 
and  solidarity  that  exist  between 

They  invited  the  international  com- 
nity  to  assist  them  in  their  efforts 
I  to  encourage  democratic  govern- 
nts.  They  considered  this  a  vital  ele- 
tit  that  must  be  taken  into  account 
the  international  community  in  its 
nomic  relations  with  the  region. 

The  Ministers  reiterated  their  in- 
tion  to  agree  upon  political  and  eco- 
nic  actions  to  promote  their  common 
ectives. 

At  the  conclusion  of  the  meeting, 

Foreign  Ministers  of  Costa  Rica,  El 
vador,  and  Honduras  and  the  Secre- 
■y  of  State  of  the  United  States  of 
lerica  thanked  the  people  and  the 
vernment  of  Guatemala  for  their  hos- 
ality  and  courtesies  which  contrib- 
d  toward  fully  achieving  the 
oected  objectives  of  peace  and  de- 
cracy  in  the  region. 

(Signed)  Rodrigo  Madrigal  Nieto, 
nister  of  Foreign  Relations  and  Wor- 
p  of  Costa  Rica;  Ricardo  Acevedo 
ralta,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of 
Salvador;  Carlos  Lopez  Contreras, 
cretary  of  Foreign  Relations  of  Hon- 
Tas;  George  R  Shultz,  Secretary  of 
ate  of  the  United  States  of  America; 
tfonso  Cabrera  Hidalgo,  Minister  of 
'reign  Relations  of  Guatemala. 

Q.  We  understand  from  declara- 
)ns  made  by  Honduras  yesterday 
at  Honduras  has  very  special  con- 
rns  regarding  the  peace  process  and 
'  at  it  wishes  to  make  those  very 
iblic.  The  concern  appears  to  be 
ost  of  all  that  Honduras  is  the 
luntry  which  right  now  has  some 
,00(1  contras  in  its  own  territory  and 
ong  the  border  with  Nicaragua, 
hat  kind  of  reassurances  can  the 
merican  Government  offer  Honduras 
garding  the  future  of  those  contrasl 

Secretary  Shultz.  As  far  as  the 
mtras  ai'e  concerned,  they  are  an 
iportant  element  e.xpressing  a  strong 
asire  for  freedom  and  democracy  in 
icaragua,  and  we  continue  to  support 
lem.  I  did  not  come  here,  basically,  to 
iscuss  that  subject,  and  we  did  not 
ave  very  much  discussion  of  it,  al- 
hough  I  certainly  hope  that  in  my 
ountry  we  will  have  a  vote  before  long 
hat  once  again  extends  the  funding  for 
he  cuntras.  I  think  it  is  very  important 
n  this  whole  process. 

But  our  focus  of  attention  here  was 
m  the  centrality  of  democracy  as  the 
vay  to  peace  in  the  region;  the  impor- 
ance  of  the  security  interests  of  all  of 


the  countries.  There  was  a  very  clear 
expression  in  our  discussions  of  how 
deleterious  it  is  for  the  Soviet  Union  to 
be  sending  such  huge  supplies  of  arms 
into  the  region.  Also  we  had  some  very 
fruitful  discussions — and  I  hope  quite 
prospective — about  the  problems  of  eco- 
nomic development  and  how  we  may 
organize  ourselves  to  pursue  that  more 
systematically. 

Q.  Is  Guatemala's  active  neu- 
trality policy  toward  Central  Ameican 
problems  going  to  be  maintained?  You 
said  a  while  ago  that  there  had  been 
speculation,  with  regard  to  the  state- 
ments by  a  member  of  Congress  here. 
Is  there  still  a  commitment  that  there 
not  be  militarization  of  Nicaragua  on 
the  part  of  the  United  States?  That  is 
not  contained  in  the  statement,  in  the 
communique? 

Foreign  Minister  Cabrera.  We 
have  indicated  that  we  participated  in 
all  meetings  in  order  to  make  whatever 
effort  is  necessary  to  find  peaceful  solu- 
tions to  the  Central  American  conflict, 
to  strengthen  economic  and  social 
development. 

Q.  What  happened  to  your  pres- 
sure on  the  Central  American  coun- 
tries, in  order  to  pressure  Nicaragua 
into  the  democratic  system? 

Secretary  Shultz.  What  pressures 
Nicaragua — and  I  hope  that  at  some 
point  they  will  feel  the  pressure,  al- 
though all  the  evidence  is  that  they  are 
going  backwards — but  what  pressures 
Nicaragua,  I  should  think,  is  first  and 
foremost  the  sad  state  of  affairs  inside 
Nicaragua  resulting  from  the  use  of 
central  authority,  of  bringing  every- 
thing under  government's  control.  That 
restricts  the  freedom  of  their  people; 
that  robs  them  of  the  incentive  to 
produce. 

This  has  resulted  in  a  drastic  de- 
cline in  the  standard  of  living  and  an 
inflation  that  is  totally  out  of  control. 
That  is  a  fundamental  pressure.  And 
with  the  steps  they  have  taken  to  close 
newspapers,  stop  opposition  rallies,  and 
things  of  that  kind,  they  basically  are 
turning  off  the  international  community 
all  over  the  world,  including  in  the 
United  States.  That  is  where  the  pres- 
sure comes  from.  And  I  might  say,  the 
fact  that  there  are  Nicaraguans  who 
are  willing  to  stand  up  for  the  freedom 
and  independence  of  their  country  is  a 
very  admirable  additional  point. 

Q.  What  role  will  human  rights 
play  in  the  future  awarding  of  mili- 


tary aid  to  the  burgeoning  democ- 
racies of  Central  America,  such  as 
Guatemala? 

Secretary  Shultz.  We  have  set  out 
here,  in  this  document,  a  short  and  elo- 
quent statement  of  the  importance  we 
all  attach  to  the  principles  of  democ- 
racy, of  genuine  democratic  govern- 
ment. It  has  set  out  all  of  these 
criteria,  and  we  take  them  very  seri- 
ously in  the  United  States.  I  believe 
they  are  taken  very  seriously  by  all  of 
the  governments  that  are  represented 
here  at  this  table.  The  United  States, 
thereby,  has  responded  to  the  needs  of 
these  governments,  and  we  are  trying 
to  be  helpful  to  them  in  security  as- 
sistance, in  economic  assistance,  and  in 
assistance  having  to  do  with  the  gen- 
eral operation  of  democratic  govern- 
ments and  the  rule  of  law.  What  we 
need  is  a  Central  America  that  has  all 
of  the  countries  here  following  these 
principles.  That  is  what  we  are  working 
for. 

Q.  You  have  said  that  there  was 
no  pressure  from  the  U.S.  Secretary 
of  State.  Nevertheless,  there  was  a 
communique  in  the  press  today  from 
the  Christian  Democratic  Party,  the 
administration  party,  and  you  are  the 
Secretary  General  of  that  party.  Are 
you  denying  what  your  own  party  has 
published  in  the  paper  today? 

Foreign  Minister  Cabrera.  I  would 
like  to  say  that  the  statement  that  I 
made  rejected  what  appears  to  be  an 
erroneous  statement.  There  have  been 
apocryphal  statements  that  have  been 
attributed  to  the  Christian  Democratic 
Party,  and  I  have  been  trying  to  ascer- 
tain whether  it  was,  in  fact,  my  party 
that  issued  that  statement.  I  have 
asked  the  National  Committee  of  the 
party  to  assess  the  situation  and  to  as- 
certain the  facts. 

Q.  Since  the  Central  American 
people  are  the  poorest  people  on  this 
planet,  what  proposal  have  you 
brought  with  you  to  the  Central 
American  governments  on  behalf  of 
the  U.S.  Government,  specifically  to 
get  them  out  of  their  state  of  misery, 
of  poverty,  as  a  guarantee  to  sustain 
peace  in  this  region? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  think  that  eco- 
nomic development  in  a  free  system  is 
the  way  out  of  the  poverty  that  is  seen 
in  this  region.  I  want  to  say  the  con- 
trast between  what  is  now  happening  in 
the  four  countries  represented  here  and 
what  takes  place  under  a  different  sys- 
tem among  basically  similar  people  in 
Nicaragua  is  eloquent  testimony  to 
what  is  the  right  approach.  And  the 


department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1988 


THE  SECRETARY 


right  approach  is  to  have  free  and  open 
systems  of  government,  free  and  open 
systems  of  economic  development. 

Of  course,  it  is  important  for  coun- 
tries that  can  do  so,  such  as  the  United 
States,  to  be  helpful  with  resources  and 
with  ideas,  and  we  try  to  do  that.  Be- 
yond that,  I  have  felt  at  the  meeting  we 
have  had  here  today,  we  progressed 
quite  a  bit.  We  had  a  really  good,  can- 
did, frank  exchange.  I  think  all  of  my 
fellow  ministers  here  would  agree  with 
me.  We  have  talked  about  the  impor- 
tance of  continuing  our  meetings  and 
having  a  systematic  way  of  constructing 
agendas  and  using  our  meetings  to 
make  something  happen  in  various 
areas,  including  economic  development. 

I  hope,  by  the  time  we  have  our 
next  meeting,  we  will  be  able  to  con- 
struct a  plan  of  action  that  will  include 
resources  from  the  United  States  but 
also  will  be  a  way  of  coordinating  what 
might  come  from  other  countries  and 
international  organizations  that  also 
have  an  interest  and  resources  to  bring 
to  bear — so  we  have  on  a  systematic 
basis  an  idea  of  how  to  go  about  this  in 
a  way  that  can  truly  be  fruitful.  I  think 
it  is  quite  possible  to  give  the  whole 
situation  a  lift.  But  I  say  that  with  full 
recognition  of  the  important  fact  that 
all  four  of  these  countries  now  have  real 
economic  growth.  They  all  have  their 
inflation  under  control.  Things  are  get- 
ting better.  There  is  a  long  way  to  go. 
We  all  have  our  problems,  but  things 
are  getting  better.  So  that  is  an  aspect 
of  this  meeting  that  I  found  very  con- 
structive and  important  for  the  future. 

Not  every  foreign  minister  had  a 
chance  to  give  a  view  at  this  meeting, 
and  it  seems  to  me  we  ought  to  hear 
from  them.  You  [Foreign  Minister 
Cabrera]  and  I  did  most  of  the  talking; 
I  think  we  did  all  of  it.  I  found  in  the 
meetings  the  other  three  had  a  lot  to 
say. 

Honduran  Foreign  Minister 
Lopez.  On  behalf  of  Honduras,  I  would 
simply  like  to  state  very  clearly  that  in 
no  way  has  the  Government  of  Hon- 
duras come  to  this  meeting  forced, 
pressured,  or  under  any  other  type  of 
obligation.  We  have  come  here  volun- 
tarily and  on  the  basis  of  an  agreement 
and  of  a  consensus  of  the  five  demo- 
cratic governments  represented  here. 

As  far  as  Honduras  is  concerned,  I 
can  say  to  you  very  categorically,  there 
is  no  basis,  no  foundation,  for  the  spec- 
ulation there  might  have  been  an  effort 
to  obtain  a  document  that  was  imposed 
by  any  one  country.  From  the  informa- 
tion I  have  been  able  to  obtain  from  the 


Honduran  delegation  that  took  part  in 
three  of  the  phases  of  the  negotiations, 
all  of  the  countries,  all  of  the  govern- 
ments, made  contributions  to  the  com- 
munique that  has  been  produced. 

I  would  also  like  to  add  that,  in  my 
view,  the  document  has  more  depth 
than  the  depth  it  had  yesterday.  It  has 
this  additional  depth  because  in  the 
course  of  this  morning's  meeting,  we 
had  very  deep  discussions,  which  in  my 
view  is  really  a  set  of  guidelines  of  the 
type  of  course  of  action  that  we  can 
follow — by  means  of  consultation  among 
the  five  governments  represented  here. 

Salvadoran  Foreign  Minister 
Acevedo.  El  Salvador  supports  the 
message  that  has  been  conveyed  by  my 
colleagues,  in  the  sense  that  we  are 
meeting  here  in  order  to  strengthen  the 
democratic  principles  that  inspire  our 
governments  in  their  work. 

We  are  here  to  initiate  a  new  phase 
in  the  diplomatic  relations  among  all  of 
our  countries.  We  are  searching  for 
strategies  and  solutions  that  will  favor 
and  support  the  economic  development 
of  our  countries.  We  are  searching  for  a 
closeness  based  on  democracy  and  so- 
cial justice.  We  are  strengthening  de- 
mocracy here — the  principles  of 
Esquipulas  II.  We  are  working  on  the 
basis  of  a  dialogue,  an  agreement.  And 
those  countries,  or  the  country  which 
unfortunately  has  not  joined  in  this 
meeting  of  the  minds,  the  country  that 
is  taking  measures  against  democracy, 
is  invited  to  participate — [once  it  has 
the]  credentials  of  democracy  and  free- 
dom— in  these  meetings  that  are  so 
important  for  the  consolidation  of 
peace,  based  on  liberty  and 
development. 

Costa  Riean  Foreign  Minister 
Madrigal.  Since  we  have  not  been 
asked  any  questions,  we  will  have  to 
figure  out  what  to  say,  since  you  did 
not  seem  to  be  interested  in  asking  us 
questions.  The  time  was  used  up  by  Mr. 
Shultz  and  Mr.  Cabrera.  They  were  the 
stars  of  the  show. 

In  any  case,  let  me  say  we  came 
here  with  a  very  constructive  spirit  to 
reaffirm  Esquipulas.  The  leadership  of 
Central  America  will  not  be  abandoned, 
will  not  be  given  up.  We  are  very  inter- 
ested in  having  the  Central  American 
countries  retain  their  leadership  in  this 
entire  effort  for  peace  and  for  democ- 
racy. We  are  fully  convinced  we  need  a 
democratic  basis,  a  common  democratic 
denominator,  so  we  can  make  progress 
in  the  field  of  peace;  so  we  can  develop 
economically;  so  we  can  develop  a  com- 
mon market;  so  we  can  interrelate  more 


and  more  culturally,  politically,  and  e 
nomically  within  Central  America.  V-, 
believe  this  is  fundamental  in  this  ne' 
world  of  today. 

Five  small  countries,  if  isolated, 
are  going  to  have  a  much  more  diffici 
task  than  if  we  were  united.  Therefoij 
for  those  who  felt  we  came  here  to    I 
bury  Esquipulas,  for  those  who  felt ' 
would  disregard  that  effort,  we  comtl 
here  to  tell  you,  together  and  united  i 
is  quite  the  opposite.  We  want  to       I 
strengthen  the  principles  that  inspiri| 
Esquipulas.  We  are  meeting  here  be  I 
cause  we  are  five  countries  which  arl 
very  closely  interconnected  demo-     i 
cratically,  and  that  is  important.  I  h; 
believed  for  a  while — and  I  have  ex- 
plained it  here,  and  I  have  obtained 
understandings  of  my  fellow  Central 
American  colleagues  and  from  Secre 
tary  Shultz — that  when  the  time  is 
right,  we  should  have  a  meeting  of  t 
five  Central  American  foreign  minis 
ters,  including  Nicaragua,  with  the 
Secretary  of  State.  Nicaragua  has  t( 
help  us  pave  the  road. 

A  country  like  Costa  Rica,  that 
totally  unarmed,  has  no  army  and  h 
not  had  one  for  40  years,  that  wants 
peaceful  and  negotiated  solution,  re 
quires,  needs,  a  Nicaragua  that  will 
move  toward  democracy  so  that  we 
become  the  best  interlocutors  for  n(| 
development,  for  a  new  stage  of  spi| 
itual  and  political  growth,  and  for  b« 
ter  economic  growth  as  well. 

We  believe  in  the  disarmament 
all  of  the  Central  American  countri| 
honestly.  We  believe  we  have  to  st 
looking  at  the  disproportionate  mil 
escalation  and  help  from  the  Soviet; 
Union  to  Nicaragua.  I  believe  Pres 
Arias  was  very  right  when  he  wrot 
General  Secretary  Gorbachev  some 
time  ago  telling  him  he  should  stop 
eliminate,  limit  sending  arms  to  Ni 
aragua.  If  that  were  to  happen,  we 
would  like  a  decrease  in  sending  wt 
ons  to  any  other  country  in  Centra 
America.  We  have  got  to  reduce  th 
We  are  small  countries,  and  we  mu 
devote  as  much  as  possible  of  our 
monies  to  education,  health,  and  ec 
nomic  development. 

What  is  important  at  this  meet 
is  there  has  been  no  one  who  has  ii 
posed  his  view.  It  would  be  inaccur  i 
to  say  there  was  an  imposition  of  v 
on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  o; 
the  part  of  any  other  country.  We  1 
had  a  dialogue,  we  have  cleared  up 
document,  and  we  have  reached  a  c 
sensus.  It  seems  to  us  this  is  an  im 
tant  consensus.  It  is  a  consensus  tl 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October    B 


THE  SECRETARY 


s  up  a  sense  of  hope  and  shows  the 
toward  new  understandings  in  sup- 
of  values  that  are  common  to  all  of 
Centi'al  American  countries. 
I  believe  we  must  defend  proudly, 
our  heads  high,  with  pride,  our 
locratic  principles.  I  am  personally 
ily  convinced  that  only  by  having 
ictive  democracies  in  Central  Amer- 
will  we  be  able  to  have  a  dialogue 
t  will  lead  us  to  peace.  We  are  not, 
eby,  trying  to  impose  a  system,  a 
cifie  model,  on  anyone.  We  want  to 
re  values  that  are  indispensable.  No 
!  can  imagine  Europe  would  have 
in  united  as  it  is  today.  No  one  could 
'e  envisioned  the  organizations  and 
titutions  that  feed  the  Common  Mar- 
,  in  Europe  had  it  not  been  for  the 
:t  all  of  the  governments  there  are 
mocratic.  We  want  to  do  the  same 
ng  in  Central  America.  We  want  to 
smulate  that  constructive  spirit  in 
s  )port  and  in  defense  of  man  himself, 
\  h  respect  for  man  himself.  That  is 
i  we  are  asking  for.  We  are  asking  for 
I  :hiiig  else. 

That  is  why  we  are  very  pleased  to 
I  ill  (luatemala.  The  extraordinary 
<l>it;ility  of  Guatemala  must  be 
Hiked.  We  want  to  thank  President 
rezii  and  Foreign  Minister  Cabrera 
■  theii-  many  courtesies  and  the  envi- 
inient  that  has  been  tendered  to  us 
we  can  address  you  with  so  much 
I  mkness  and  with  so  much  independ- 
I  ce,  as  we  are  now  doing.  If  we  plan 
I  have  future  meetings,  I  hope  we  can 
ve  them  with  the  five  foreign  minis- 
rs,  because  we  will  all  be  involved  in 
process  of  democratization  which  will 
sure  those  values  that  are  so  dear  to 
e  history,  the  culture,  and  the  civi- 
,ation  of  Central  America. 


UNCHEON  TOAST, 
UENOS  AIRES, 

UG.  2,  19882 

.r.  Minister  and  distinguished  ladies 
id  gentlemen;  distinguished  in  many 
ays  but  most  especially  by  the  par- 
cipation  in  the  vitality  of  the  demo- 
ratic  process  here  which  has  such  a 
trong  meaning  all  over  the  world,  as 
'ell  as  here. 

I  deeply  appreciate  your  kind  per- 
3nal  comments,  and  I  can  reciprocate 
lem.  I  remember  very  well  our  meet- 
ig  about  5  years  ago  when  we  dis- 
issed  important  topics,  and  we  found 
lat  we  could  do  so  in  a  frank  and  open 
ay.  We  wound  up  with  great  personal 
infidence,  and  that  has  helped  us 


through  these  5  years  to  make  our  con- 
tribution to  the  constructive  rela- 
tionship between  the  United  States  and 
Argentina. 

The  people  of  the  Argentine  Re- 
public have  overcome  great  difficulties 
in  returning  their  nation  to  the  demo- 
cratic fold,  where  it  so  rightfully  be- 
longs, and  in  establishing  a  social  peace 
based  on  consensus  and  mutual  respect. 
And  in  doing  so  successfully,  Argentina 
has  provided  an  e.xample  to  future  gen- 
erations of  its  citizens  and  to  the  world. 

For  those  who  have  followed  your 
history,  Argentina's  political  achieve- 
ments over  the  past  5  years  are  fully 
worthy  of  the  nation  which  gave  birth 
to  the  liberator,  San  Martin;  the  il- 
lustrious educator,  Sarmiento;  five  No- 
bel Prize  winners;  and  a  legion  of 
world-famed  celebrities  like  poet-novel- 
ist Borges  and  composer  Ginastera. 

While  separated  by  great  dis- 
tances, our  two  nations  are  inextricably 
linked  in  the  common  task  of  building 
democracy  and  achieving  freedom, 
prosperity,  and  social  justice.  Total- 
itarian societies  in  tyranny  don't  work. 
They  drain  people's  energies  and  re- 
sources; they  strip  away  freedom  and 
dignity.  Argentina  and  the  United 
States  must  continue  working  together 
to  achieve  stable,  free,  and  democratic 
governments  in  this  hemisphere. 

To  this  end,  we  must  solve  prob- 
lems. A  stable,  advancing  economy  is 
needed  to  generate  confidence  at  home 
and  abroad.  Nothing  consolidates  politi- 
cal freedom  as  much  as  economic  prog- 
ress and  well-being  which  needs,  in 
turn,  sound  macroeconomic  policies  and 
long-term  structural  reform.  It  is 
important  to  keep  open  the  channels  of 
international  finance  and  so  keep  alive 
prospects  for  sustained  growth. 

We  are  both  engaged  in  the  battle 
against  international  drug  trafficking 
and  the  use  of  drugs  in  our  societies. 
Drugs  threaten  the  very  basic  fabric  of 
both  our  nations.  A  long,  hard  struggle 
remains  ahead.  We  want  to  expand  still 
further  the  cooperation  between  our 
two  governments.  That  cooperation  can 
produce  results  as  was  shown  in  the 
seizure  of  a  huge  amount  of  cocaine  just 
last  month  by  your  federal  authorities. 
The  United  States  and  Argentina 
are  both  young  nations.  The  role  of  im- 
migrants in  shaping  our  societies  un- 
derscores the  fact  that  both  nations 
have  served  as  a  refuge  for  those  seek- 
ing freedom  and  a  better  life.  Our  coun- 
tries are  blessed  with  abundant  natural 
resources.  The  export  of  commodities 
and  raw  materials  has  played  a  key  role 
in  the  economic  development  of  both 
nations. 


The  people  of  the  United  States 
and  Argentina  both  aspire  to  raise 
their  children  in  a  climate  of  democracy 
where  peace,  justice,  and  equality  of 
opportunity  prevail.  These  similarities 
and  many  others  we  hold  in  common 
provide  us  with  a  great  potential  for 
deepening  and  expanding  our  relations. 
Let  us  commit  ourselves  to  this  goal. 

Let  us  raise  our  glasses  to  our 
friendship  and  to  the  freedom  that  we 
share  and  which  is  such  an  integral 
part  of  our  friendship,  and  to  you,  Mr. 
Foreign  Minister,  for  all  that  you  have 
done  and  are  doing  to  further  both  the 
friendship  and  the  freedom  that  we 
toast. 


NEWS  CONFERENCE, 
BUENOS  AIRES, 
AUG.  3,  1988' 

1  have  had  an  extraordinary  opportu- 
nity to  see  many  people  during  2  days 
here  in  Argentina,  and  I  want  to  ex- 
press my  warm  thanks  to  President 
Alfonsin  and  all  the  others  whom  I  saw 
for  the  generous  hospitality.  I  had  a 
chance  to  visit  with  the  President,  and 
I'll  visit  with  him  again  this  evening  at 
a  dinner.  Of  course,  my  host  has  been 
the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  but  I've 
also  seen  the  Minister  of  Finance,  the 
Minister  of  Interior,  the  Minister  of 
Economy,  and  the  Minister  of  Defense. 
I've  had  a  chance  to  have  a  wonderful 
lunch  out  on  the  pampas.  I've  visited 
with  a  group  of  other  citizens  who  came 
and  joined  me  for  breakfast,  and  I've 
had  a  chance  to  have  a  session  with 
each  of  the  three  candidates  for 
president. 

So  you  can  see  that  it's  been  a  busy 

2  days  but  an  extraordinarily  interest- 
ing time.  Out  of  this,  of  course,  I  have 
many  impressions,  but  the  outstanding 
one  is  how  strong  and  vital  is  the  proc- 
ess of  democracy  in  this  country.  Of 
course  that  is  som.ething  of  great  mo- 
ment and  acclaim  throughout  the 
world.  Argentina  has  once  again 
[taken]  its  rightful  place  in  world  coun- 
cils. And  to  get  a  sense  of  how  strongly 
people  feel  about  this  question  of  de- 
mocracy and  human  rights  and  the  rule 
of  law  here  has  been  very  heartening  to 
me. 

We  look  forward  to  continuing  the 
very  good  relationship  between  the 
United  States  and  Argentina  through 
the  balance  of  President  Alfonsin's 
presidency  and  with  the  presidency  of 
whoever  the  people  of  Argentina  decide 
to  put  there. 


lepartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1988 


THE  SECRETARY 


Q.   During  your  meeting  with 
President  Alfonsin,  we  have  the  infor- 
mation that  you  talked  about  the  ex- 
ternal debt.  What's  the  meaning  of 
the  United  States  about  this  problem? 
Can  America  support  the  last  proposi- 
tion of  our  President  in  the  first  days 
of  June,  in  the  America  Society  in 
New  York? 

A.  There  is  currently  a  set  of  prob- 
lems that  are  being  talked  about  inten- 
sively, and  my  government  is  giving 
strong  support  to  yours  in  this  process; 
there  will  be  an  outcome  announced,  I 
assume  sometime  very  soon.  I  don't 
want,  in  any  way,  to  try  to  get  ahead  of 
that  announcement,  so  I  won't  make 
any  particular  comment,  other  than  to 
say  that,  in  general,  we  have  tried  to 
be  as  supportive  as  we  possibly  can  of 
the  efforts  here  to  bring  about  eco- 
nomic reform  to  go  with  the  political 
reform  that  is  so  heartening.  The  eco- 
nomic reform  is  as  needed  as  the  politi- 
cal reform,  in  our  opinion. 

Q.  Why  didn't  you  include  Chile 
in  your  tour  to  Latin  America,  and  do 
you  think  that  there  are  enough  guar- 
antees for  the  next  plebiscite  which 
will  take  place  there? 

A.  I  haven't  included  Chile  like  I 
haven't  included  many  other  countries, 
because  I  haven't  had  the  time.  I  don't 
know  whether  you've  had  a  chance  to 
look  at  my  schedule,  but  in  the  space 
of  I  think,  around  10  days  including  a 
weekend,  I  will  go  to  10  countries,  so 
I'm  pretty  busy.  That's  the  reason. 

As  far  as  the  plebiscite  is  con- 
cerned, we  want  to  see — and  I  don't 
want  to  try  to  pass  judgment  on  it 
right  here — a  full  and  fair  political  ex- 
pression in  Chile. 

Q.  What  you  have  just  told  us 
about  an  announcement,  I  ask  you 
without  any  other  detail,  was  this  an- 
nouncement made  in  these  last 
months  of  the  Reagan  Administra- 
tion, or  at  least  just  was  it  for  the 
next  year's  Administration?  And 
which  is  the  balance  that  you  can 
make  of  this  relationship  of  the  Rea- 
gan Administration  with  the  Alfonsin 
Administration,  which  is  the  result  of 
the  earlier  evaluation  as  to  what  rela- 
tions of  both  Administrations? 

A.  Any  announcement  about  steps 
to  be  taken  are  steps  that  are  going  to 
be  taken  by  Argentina,  and  it  is  not  for 
the  United  States  to  make  any  such 
statements.  So  the  announcement  I  was 
referring  to,  when  it  takes  place,  and  I 
don't  know — it's  not  my  position  to 
know — but  at  some  point,  the  Govern- 
ment of  Argentina  will  make  a  state- 


ment about  the  situation.  What  I  said 
was  my  government  has  been  working 
with  the  Government  of  Argentina  in  a 
constructive  way  and  in  a  supportive 
way.  Of  course,  we  have  to  make  what 
statement  we  make  after  the  country 
whose  efforts  we're  supporting  says 
what  it  is  going  to  do. 

Now  as  far  as  the  continuity  is  con- 
cerned, I  think  it  is  interesting  to  take 
note  of  the  fact  that  both  the  United 
States  and  Argentina  are  right  now  in 
the  midst  of  election  campaigns.  In 
both  countries,  the  present  incumbent 
will  not  be  in  office  after  the  election  is 
over.  There  will  be  a  new  president, 
and  we  are  both  going  to  see  this  proc- 
ess, which  is  the  essence  of  democracy, 
of  a  peaceful  transition  of  power  from 
one  person  to  another  person  based  on 
the  results  of  an  open  and  free,  fair 
electoral  process. 

I  think  it's  something  to  point  to  as 
important,  and  it  is  also  important,  I 
think,  to  see  that  this  movement  to- 
ward freedom,  toward  the  rule  of  law, 
toward  democracy,  is  something  that  is 
taking  place  all  over  the  world  as  peo- 
ple see  that,  whether  in  political  life  or, 
I  might  say,  in  economic  life,  it's  the 
countries  that  manage  to  arrange  their 
politics  and  their  economics  on  an  open 
basis  that  prosper. 

Q.  Do  you  think  that  the  future 
U.S.  President  will  have  to  face  a 
complete  plan  to  foster  the  develop- 
ment of  developing  countries  to  in- 
crease their  growth  and  thus  be  able 
to  soften  or  mitigate  the  hardness  of 
the  way  in  which  the  peoples  are  liv- 
ing since  the  governments  want  to 
pay  the  foreign  debt? 

A.  There  is  a  plan,  so  to  speak, 
that  has  become  more  and  more  evident 
all  over  the  world,  and  it  doesn't  take 
the  United  States  to  dream  it  up,  al- 
though President  Reagan  has  talked 
about  it  continuously  in  his  presidency. 
But  it  has  come  more  and  more  to  be 
the  common  wisdom  that  if  you  want  to 
see  economic  development  in  a  country, 
then  what  needs  to  be  done  is  to 
lighten  up  the  regulatory  load  that  has 
grown  so  heavy  in  every  country,  to 
jjrivatize  economic  matters,  to  get  tax 
rates  down,  to  get  fiscal  policies  into 
reasonable  shape,  and  to  provide  in 
general  in  an  economy  the  openness 
and  the  incentives  and  the  respect  for 
private  activities  and  the  zest  and  en- 
ergy and  creativity  that  they  bring  as 
basically  the  engine  of  economic 
development. 

All  of  this  comes  not  out  of  some- 
body's ideology;  it  comes  out  of  peoples' 
observation.  If  you  look  and  see  around 


the  world  what  countries  have  pros- 
pered and  what  countries  have  not 
prospered,  whether  you'i-e  talking 
about  countries  that  are  in  an  advant 
stage  of  development  and  have  high  ) 
capita  income,  or  whether  you're  tall 
ing  about  countries  that  have  startet 
with  low  or  medium  per  capita  incorr 
and  have  advanced,  you  find  that  in  j 
cases — all  cases — the  ones  that  have 
really  advanced  are  the  ones  that  ha 
opened  themselves  up,  have  respects 
the  marketplace,  have  privatized 
things,  have  encouraged  creativity. 

Personally,  I  think  that  these  el 
ments  will  be  more  important,  if  any 
thing,  in  the  future  than  they  have 
been  in  the  past  because  of  the  natu 
of  the  world  economy  of  which  we  ar ' 
all  a  part.  Nobody  is  separate  from 
world  economy.  The  nature  of  that 
economy  is  changing,  and  it  is  based 
the  knowledge  and  information  age  . 
tributes  that  call  for  just  the  charac 
istics  that  I  have  named  off 

It  isn't  going  to  take  a  present 
new  U.S.  President  or  anybody's  ne 
president  to  find  the  answer.  The  ai 
swer  is  there  in  the  experience  that 
countries  all  around  the  world  have 
had. 

Q.  Taking  into  account  the  lap 
statements  made  in  England  on  tl 
part  of  the  Reagan  Administratiot 
members  and  even  by  personalitie 
from  the  English  Government  eva 
uating  the  Malvinas  war  situatiot 
and  taking  into  account  that  in  tl  . 
country  at  present  we  are  trying  t  ; 
military  people  who  intervened  in  (i 
Malvinas  war,  how  do  you  relate  t  il 
to  the  relations  of  the  United  Stal 
with  Latin  America  and  all  the  tl  Ij 
that  can  be  implied  in  this  proble  ' 

A.  It's  an  interesting  question, 
coming  from  Australia.  But  in  any 
case,  I  would  simply  say  that  my  d 
cussions  here  have  been  very  posit i 
throughout.  I  have  talked  with  lots  f 
different  people.  We  are  working  e  i- 
tively  to  help  support  the  forces  of  ?- 
mocracy  here.  We  are  encouraged 
see — and  I  had  a  very  good  talk  wi 
the  Minister  of  Defense — the  effort  o 
position  the  military  as  responsive  t 
civilian  rule  and  at  the  same  time  t 
see  a  good  and  honorable  and  stroi 
professional  role  for  the  military.  V 
are  encouraging  that  and  trying  to 
work  with  the  defense  establishme 
here  in  every  way  we  can  to  do  tha  S 
I  think  that  there  may  be  some 
wounds,  but  they  are  healing,  and 
that's  what  we  want  to  have  happe; 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  18) 


THE  SECRETARY 


Q.  Did  you  discuss  the  provisions 
S.  arms  to  Argentina,  or  are 
re  still  restrictions  on  providing 
IS  to  Argentina? 

A.  There  are  no  restrictions  on  the 
vision  of  arms  for  Argentina.  We 
e  discussions  between  the  Ministry 
)efense  and  our  own  Defense  De- 
tment.  I  was  able  to  carry  with  me 
)rmal  invitation — there  had  been  an 
)rmal  one — from  Secretary  of  De- 
36  Carlucci  to  the  Minister  of  De- 
se  here  to  have  a  formal  and  official 
t  to  Washington,  and  that  was  ac- 
ted, so  that  will  take  place  this  fall. 
There  are  certain  lines  of  equip- 
■iiit  where  questions  get  asked,  and  at 
nc  time  there  are  also  financial 
ms  on  how  much  money  there  is 
''■to  buy  things,  but  basically 
:.— I  don't  say  that  we  are  fully 
U)  have  a  normal  and  straight- 
w.wi]  relationship  across  the  board 
li  Ai'uentina. 

(J.  Specifically  as  to  U.S.  inten- 
t  ns  vis-a-vis  the  Argentine  situa- 
t  n.  can  you  say  there  is  a  loan  of 
I^haps  $500  million — in  that  neigh- 
i  rhood — under  discussion  now  in  the 
I  litod  States  to  Argentina 
1  audible]? 

A.  The  question  of  a  bridge  loan 
it  would  be  provided — not  neces- 
I  -ily  all  by  the  United  States,  but  we 
uld  lead  the  consortium  if  there  is  a 
isortium — is  one  of  the  things  being 
;cussfd.  Again  I  don't  want  to  make 
y  comment  on  this  matter  because 

ii  for  the  Government  of  Argentina  to 
ike  whatever  announcement  they 
oose  to  make.  Then  we  will  make  a 
;  nsequent  and  supporting  announce- 
j  mt.  It's  not  a  good  idea  to  try  to 
nounce  these  things  before  they  are 
nounced. 

Q.  You  met  with  Carlos  Menem, 
i  e  Peronist  candidate,  and  he  had 
I  Id  you  about  a  way  of  paying  up  the 
i  reign  debt.  I  would  like  to  know  if 
lU  agree  with  that  formula  of  the 
ironists  to  pay  the  foreign  debt.  I 
ould  like  to  ask  if  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ent  fears  the  victory  of  the  Peronist 
arty  in  Argentina. 

A.  I  met  with  all  three  candidates 
r  president,  and  I  told  them  all  basi- 
illy  the  same  thing:  namely,  that  first 
'all,  I  wanted  to  meet  with  all  three 
id  I  was  grateful  to  each  for  meeting 
ith  me  to  get  to  know  them  since  one 
f  them  presumably  will  be  the  presi- 
ent.  Second,  I  wanted  to  meet  with  all 
iree  to  underline  the  fact  that  what 
ne  United  States  supports  is  the  dem- 
cratic  process.  The  outcome  of  the 


process  is  for  the  people  of  Argentina 
to  decide.  We  don't  take  sides  in  some- 
body else's  electoral  process;  I  don't 
want  to  express  myself  about  any  pref- 
erences at  all.  It  is  for  the  people  of 
Argentina. 

As  far  as  the  debt  question  as  such 
is  concerned,  there  is  in  place  a  strat- 
egy that  goes  forward  on  an  interna- 
tional basis.  It's  known  as  the  case-by- 
case  approach  with  a  so-called  menu  of 
options,  and  I  think  that  over  time  this 
has  evolved — the  menu,  so  to  speak,  of 
options  has  increased  in  number.  New 
ways  of  coping  with  the  reality  that  is 
represented  by  the  debt  are  emerging. 
Banks  are  looking  at  their  own  posture. 
So  there's  a  great  deal  of  action  and 
intense  study  in  connection  with  that 
activity,  and  beyond  that  I  don't  want 
to  say. 

Q.  During  your  conversations 
with  President  Alfonsin,  have  you 
reached  any  agreement  and  coinci- 
dence aiming  at  achieving  a  solution 
to  the  debt  problem  which  is  of  so 
much  concern  to  us? 

A.  No,  we  didn't  try  to  reach  any 
particular  solution.  We  discussed  a  lit- 
tle bit  the  current  economic  issues  in 
Argentina  and  the  U.S.  posture  with 
respect  to  that.  I  discussed  those  issues 
at  some  length  with  the  Minister  of  Fi- 
nance and  with  President  Alfonsin,  in 
addition. 

I  had  what  I  thought  was  an  extra- 
ordinarily interesting,  stimulating  dis- 
cussion with  him  about  world 
developments,  including  developments 
in  South  America.  I  found  him  to  be  a 
person  of  a  very  creative  and  interest- 
ing set  of  instincts  and  mind  and  very 
well-informed.  We  had  a  discussion  that 
went  over  the  time  allotted,  and  I  am 
looking  forward  to  having  dinner  with 
him  and  continuing  it. 

Q.  Surely  among  the  subjects  you 
have  discussed  with  the  President, 
you  find  the  situation  in  Central 
America.  May  I  ask  in  this  regard:  I 
imagine  that  the  U.S.-Nicaraguan  re- 
lations are  not  the  best  at  this  mo- 
ment, if  you  take  into  account  the 
fact  that  the  ambassadors  were  ex- 
pelled. I  would  like  to  know  what  is 
going  to  happen  with  the  contra 
support,  especially  when  Reagan 
leaves  power,  and  which  are  the  pos- 
sibilities in  reaching  an  agreement 
according  to  events  in  Central  Amer- 
ica in  recent  days? 

A.  Yes,  we  did  discuss  the  issues 
of  Central  America  in  several  of  my 
meetings,  and  when  you  say  that  our 


relations  with  Nicaragua  are  not  the 
best,  I  can  see  you  have  learned  that 
masterpiece  of  understatement  is  a  way 
to  proceed. 

I  think  that  the  situation  in  Cen- 
tral America  will  continue  to  have  in- 
tense interest  from  the  United  States. 
The  profile  of  the  subject  has  been 
raised  in  my  country,  and  I  think  we 
see  more  clearly  since  the  Reagan 
years  and  the  emphasis  the  President 
has  put  on  our  neighborhood  and  what's 
going  on  in  it,  that  we  see  a  lot  more 
interest,  we  see  a  lot  more  resources 
and  attention  being  devoted  to  the 
problems  of  this  region. 

As  we  see  it,  there  has  been  a 
great  deal  of  positive  evolution  in  the 
area.  We  see  now  four,  instead  of  one, 
democratic  governments  with  four 
elected  presidents  with  the  rule  of  law 
increasing  in  its  strength.  In  each  of 
those  countries,  we  see  real  economic 
growth  now  taking  place,  and  we  see  in 
each  one  of  those  countries  little-to- 
very-moderate  inflation.  I  think  the 
highest  is  9%  a  year  and  the  lowest  is 
on  the  negligible  side,  so  they  have  that 
problem  under  control  and  we  believe 
are  in  a  position  to  move  forward. 

We  see  in  the  fifth  country  a  trag- 
edy, because  income  per  capita  has 
dropped  perhaps  to  about  half  of  what 
it  was  when  the  present  regime  came 
in,  and  we  see  inflation  at  levels  that 
are  hard  to  calculate.  Some  of  our  peo- 
ple say  it's  going  at  around  2,000  a  year 
and  the  Nicaraguan  Minister  of  Plan- 
ning the  other  day  said  it  w'as  at  24,000 
per  year.  It  really  doesn't  matter — 
when  you  get  to  that  level,  you  have 
moved  away  from  the  money  economy. 

So  the  Government  of  Nicaragua 
has  produced  a  failure,  except  that  they 
have  a  huge  amount  of  arms  from  the 
Soviet  Union  and  its  allies,  and  with 
those  arms  and  an  army  that  is  all  out 
of  proportion  as  far  as  Central  Ameri- 
can standards  are  concerned,  they  in- 
timidate their  neighbors.  They  are  a 
destabilizing  force,  and  people  are  very 
concerned  about  that  in  Central  Amer- 
ica, in  the  United  States,  and,  I  have 
found,  elsewhere  in  South  America  as 
well. 

The  issue  isn't  whether  that  is  a 
good  thing.  The  issue  comes  down  to, 
what  do  you  do  about  it?  Of  course,  I 
think  it  is  important  to  emphasize  the 
positive  aspects  of  democracy  and  the 
rule  of  law,  to  speak  against — and  we 
feel  we  speak  against — the  things  that 
are  going  on  there:  the  closing  of  news- 
papers, the  closing  down  of  radio  [sta- 
tions], the  breaking  up  of  opposition 
rallies,  the  murder  of  labor  leaders.  All 


)epartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1988 


THE  SECRETARY 


those  things  are  hardly  the  kind  of  soci- 
ety that  we  can  admire  or  have  any 
confidence  in,  and  we  don't  mind  saying- 
it.  In  fact,  we  think  it  is  incumbent,  a 
responsibility,  to  say  it  just  as  we  have 
been  critical  of  developments  in  other 
countries  when  they  were  of  such  a 
nature. 

We  think  that  it  is  important  to 
.support  those  in  such  a  country  who 
are  willing  to  fight  for  the  independ- 
ence and  freedom  of  their  own  country, 
and  we  do.  Just  where  the  diplomacy  of 
this  will  go  remains  to  be  seen,  but  the 
force  of  the  wave  of  freedom  in  this 
hemisphere  and  around  the  world  is  so 
great,  the  clear  arguments  in  favor  of 
more  openness — a  different  approach — 
are  so  obvious — obvious  even  to  the 
sponsors  of  the  Nicaraguan  regime — 
that  they  themselves  are  changing.  But 
somehow  or  other  I  think  we  and  our 
friends  are  on  the  right  side  of  this 
issue,  and  somehow  or  other  in  the  end 
we  are  going  to  prevail. 


ADDRESS  TO  BUSINESSMEN 

AND  BANKERS, 
MONTEVIDEO, 
AUG.  4,  1988< 

Now  is  a  good  time  and  this  is  the  right 
place  to  discuss  the  changes  that  are 
remaking  this  hemisphere — to  see 
where  we  have  come  and,  more  impor- 
tantly, to  envision  where  we  might  go. 

Now  is  a  good  time  because  we  are 
on  the  threshold  of  a  decade  that  can  be 
a  strong  finish  to  this  century  and  a 
springboard  into  the  ne.\t.  The  1980s 
have  been  a  decade  of  sweeping  change. 
Democracy  has  transformed  the  politi- 
cal map.  Economic  turmoil  is  bringing  a 
rebirth  of  free-market  thinking  and 
practice.  Together,  political  and  eco- 
nomic freedom  are  radically  transform- 
ing the  hemisphere. 

I  take  a  fundamentally  optimistic 
view  of  the  future,  even  though  I  am 
well  aware  that  economic  problems — 
debt,  poverty,  inflation,  capital  flight — 
abound  in  Latin  America  as  elsewhere 
in  the  world.  But  I  am  optimistic  be- 
cause I  am  convinced  these  problems 
are  soluble  with  the  right  mix  of  at- 
titudes and  policies. 

I  also  believe  that,  opened  to 
change  by  this  explosion  of  freedom, 
the  nations  of  the  Americas  have  won 
the  opportunity  to  hold  their  own  in  the 
powerful  current  of  another  revolu- 
tion— the  revolution  of  information 


technology.  Whether  the  Americas 
surge  ahead,  just  keep  up,  or  fall  be- 
hind will  depend  on  what  policies  you 
and  we  choose. 

This  is  the  right  place  to  think 
about  the  choices  ahead.  Uruguay  has 
restored  its  long  democratic  tradition. 
After  12  years  of  military  rule,  it  has 
returned  with  renewed  commitment  to 
the  ranks  of  democratic  nations.  Uru- 
guay is  also  demonstrating  the  power  of 
economic  freedom.  The  current  GATT 
[General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Ti'ade]  round  bears  the  name  of  this 
country:  what  is  happening  in  the 
Uruguay  Round  can  lay  the  ground- 
work for  a  world  economy  that  is  dy- 
namic because  it  is  free. 

The  following  apparently  unrelated 
facts  offer  glimpses  of  the  change  that 
is  happening  all  around  us. 

•  In  the  Indian  village  of  Ocobam- 
ba,  high  in  the  Andes,  a  homemade  sat- 
ellite dish  pulls  in  television  programs 
from  Buenos  Aires.  In  Guatemala  City, 
televiewers  watch  the  Cable  News  Net- 
work from  Atlanta,  Georgia. 

•  In  central  Brazil,  soybean  grow- 
ers receive  real-time  data  on  Chicago 
Board  trading  by  computer.  In  Sao 
Paulo,  automatic  tellers  dispense  cash 
to  bankcard  holders  around  the  clock. 

•  Businessmen  in  Rio  have  sold  a 
supermarket  to  Moscow.  Ti-inidad  is 
selling  nitrogen  fertilizer  to  India.  Ven- 
ezuela is  actually  mixing  oil  and  water 
in  a  new  substance  (called  "orimulsion") 
to  fuel  power  plants  in  Japan. 

•  In  Buenos  Aires  5  years  ago,  22 
women  organized  to  better  participate 
in  democracy  when  military  rule  ended. 
Today  their  organization  has  8,000 
members  working  in  civic  education 
throughout  the  country.  Sister  groups 
have  sprung  up  in  Brazil  and  here  in 
Uruguay. 

The  initiative  and  genius  of  free 
men  and  women  are  changing  the  way 
we  do  things.  They  are  making  this  the 
age  of  the  ballot  box,  free  market,  and 
computer  chij) — a  time  of  parallel  and 
converging  revolutions. 

Technological  Revolution 
and  the  Global  Economy 

Freedom  to  compete  brought  the  revo- 
lutions of  the  ballot  box  and  free  mar- 
ket. It  is  also  key  to  success  in  the  new 
global  economy. 

What  kind  of  global  economy  are 
we  talking  about?  The  oft-heard  gener- 
alities may  sound  glib,  but  they  are 
true.  It  is  an  environment  of  increasing 


interdependence  and  rapid,  accelerate 
change.  It  is  postindustrial,  in  that 
services  count  for  more  and  more  of  f ! 
worlds  business.  And  it  is  irreversibi' 
altered  by  the  information  age.  These  I 
are  sweeping  characterizations.  But  | 
they  are  timid  approximations  of  the  I 
forces  moving  the  world  we  live  in. 

The  very  material  substances  of  ti 
physical  world  are  being  transformed 
New  substances  are  being  created.  0 ' 
substances  are  finding  new  uses.  Spa-i 
is  measured  in  microns;  time  in  nano-l 
seconds.  Ideas  add  the  greatest  value 
new  products.  The  worth  of  a  chip  or  | 
floppy  disk  has  almost  nothing  to  do  , 
with  its  plastic  or  silicon  content  and  | 
everything  to  do  with  the  informatioi| 
etched  inside.  1 

Technology  has  linked  distant  mi^ 
kets,  lessened  dependence  on  natura 
raw  materials,  and  created  new  form 
of  economic  activity.  In  the  emergini 
global  economy,  abundant  natural  re- 
sources do  not  guarantee  prosperity. 
Distance  from  traditional  markets  di  , 
not  preclude  success.  In  agriculture 
alone,  today's  research  promises  chan  : 
that  will  dwarf  the  green  revolution. 
Uruguayan  statesmen  once  help 
inspire  the  League  of  Nations.  So  y( 
in  Uruguay  know  that  labels  like 
"small"  and  "out  of  the  way"  mean  li .' 
to  countries  that  grasp  the  bigger  p 
ture.  This  is  as  true  in  economics  as 
is  in  politics.  Today  Israeli  farmers  i  i 
microelectronic  agricultural  system.<  i 
supply  80%  of  the  cut  flowers  in  Eu 
rope;  they  compete  effectively  in 
avocado  markets  in  New  York.  Som' 
farmers  in  Guatemala  have  rejected 
dependence  on  traditional  crops  and 
(i-month  growing  season.  They  grow 
crops  year  round  with  yield  increas( 
between  20%  and  600%.  Thinking  b. 
yond  the  limits  of  convention,  these 
farmers  are  growing  "winter  crops"  i 
export — "snow  peas"  from  the  troi)i 
Already,  countries  in  this  hem- 
isphere produce  more  than  three- 
quarters  of  the  world's  soybeans.  Tl 
pi'otein-rich,  soil-enriching  plant  is    t 
just  a  food,  food  supplement,  and  li  - 
stock  feed.  It  is  an  industrial  com- 
modity that  can  be  used  to  make  an 
array  of  products — from  rubber  sub 
stitutes  to  artificial  petroleum.  Not 
moreover,  that  this  widespread  cult  a 
tion  of  soybeans  in  South  America  i 
due,  in  large  measure,  to  research  i  n 
on  this  continent — research  to  adaji 
plant  strains  to  conditions  where  b(  ii 
thev  could  not  flourish. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1B 


THE  SECRETARY 


'    What  counts  is  innovation, 
^jativity — freedom  and  capacity  to  see 
Ift'ond  what  is  to  what  can  be.  Coun- 
fies  must  decide  whether  they  will  be 
j(ong  the  innovators,  the  imitators,  or 
fjise  who  are  left  behind.  What  counts 
isound  policy. 

iidelines 

Siat  does  it  take  specifically  to  pros- 
•  in  the  new  global  economy?  Three 
ftors  are  essential. 

I!    First,  societies  must  be  open. 

Jiowledge  is  the  key  resource  in  the 
lerging  world  economy:  the  genera- 
tn  and  diffusion  of  ideas  is  its  hall- 
mrk.  Democratic  societies  have  the 
i^pect  for  free  thought,  free  expres- 
'  n.  and  free  association  to  enable 
■  ir  citizens  to  take  full  advantage  of 
; '  new  age  of  information.  An  open 
irty  does  not  impose  any  one  vision 
ail  ideal  order.  As  the  practice  of 
■eiluin  becomes  the  habit  of  freedom, 
Hiii'stions  assumptions,  challenges 
ecdiiceptions,  upsets  habits,  and 
'^es  risks.  Freedom  is  not  a  panacea 
t  a  process  that  liberates  people  to 
ajit,  to  change,  to  prosper. 

I'lilitically,  the  countries  of  Latin 
neiica  are  among  the  winners  in  the 
giiiiig  global  competition.  Nowhere  in 
e  wdrld  has  the  movement  to  democ- 
c\  l)t'en  more  dramatic.  When  Presi- 
nt  Keagan  spoke  to  the  students  and 
I  culty  of  Moscow  State  University  on 
(ay  31,  he  proudly  highlighted  a  fact 
lU  have  lived.  In  the  1970s,  only  a 
ird  of  the  people  of  Latin  America 
id  the  Caribbean  enjoyed  democratic 
)vernment.  Today,  over  90%  do. 

This  democratic  revolution  has 
een  the  work  of  many  individuals: 
oters  and  politicians,  men  and  women 
'the  right,  left,  and  center  who  share 
commitment  to  self-government.  It 
as  taken  leaders  like  Jose  Napoleon 
'uarte,  Eugenia  Charles,  Victor  Paz 
stenssoro,  Raul  Alfonsin — and  your 
resident,  Julio  Maria  Sanguinetti,  who 
eserves  recognition  as  a  statesman  of 
ontinental  rank. 

Closed  societies  shut  out  knowl- 
dge.  They  are  bound  to  fall  farther 
nd  farther  behind.  Countries  that  re- 
use to  perceive  this  and  to  act  upon  it 
hoose  second-class  status.  The  Soviet 
Jnion  and  China  are  just  beginning 
0  understand  that  without  openness,  it 
s  impossible  to  assimilate  new  ideas 
ind  information  with  which  our  age 
ibounds.  Without  openness,  it  is  impos- 
ible  to  have  the  flexibility,  initiative. 


Latin  America's  Trade  Surplus,  1983-87 


1983  1984  1985 

Source:  IMF  Direction  ot  Trade  1988  Statistics 


and  the  willingness  to  experiment. 
Only  open  societies  and  free  markets 
prosper  from  change. 

This  brings  me  to  a  second 
guideline:  We  must  rely  on  incentives, 
enterprise,  and  the  market.  Central 
planning  cannot  cope  with  the  pace  or 
magnitude  of  technological  change.  Re- 
sources must  respond  to  opportunity. 
Statist  models  do  not  work.  In  a  world 
of  rapid  shifts  in  comparative  advan- 
tage, governments  do  not  create 
wealth,  and  plans  cannot  coerce 
growth.  The  free  operation  of  the 
marketplace  of  goods  and  ideas  is  by 
far  the  most  efficient  arbiter  of 
decisions. 

A  rebirth  of  free-market  thinking 
and  practice  in  the  hemisphere  is  be- 
ginning to  follow  in  the  wake  of  the 
movement  to  democracy.  Brazil  and 
Mexico,  Latin  Americas  two  most 
powerful  economies,  have  both  declared 
economic  freedom  the  road  to  sustained 
growth.  Announcing  plans  to  liberalize 
trade.  President  Sarney  said:  "We 
intend  to  untie  our  economy  so  that  it 
may  enjoy  the  winds  of  freedom  that 
are  already  benefiting  other  sectors  of 
our  country."  Important  barriers  re- 
main, but  the  direction  is  clear. 

Over  the  last  5  yeai's,  Mexico  has 
lowered  tariffs  from  a  maximum  100% 
in  1986  to  20%  last  year.  At  the  same 


time,  exports  of  non-oil  goods  have  in- 
creased by  25%-30%  every  year  since 
1983.  Internal  reforms  have  been 
equally  ambitious. 

Political  and  economic  progress  has 
not  been  uniform.  It  has  not  followed 
any  timetable.  In  many  cases,  practice 
lags  behind  official  intentions.  In  oth- 
ers, policy  lags  behind  popular  prac- 
tice. In  Chile,  the  freedom  that  informs 
that  productive  marketplace  is  still  to 
transform  the  political  forum.  In  Ar- 
gentina, active  public  debate  is  contrib- 
uting to  a  search  for  more  open  and 
outward-looking  economic  policies. 

In  short,  the  openness  at  the  heart 
of  political  competition  can,  if  brought 
to  economic  competition,  help  countries 
survive  and  prosper  in  the  swift  cur- 
rents of  the  modern  global  economy. 

The  third  guideline  is:  We  must 
enhance  our  cooperation.  We  still  talk 
about  "the  world  order."  But  there  is 
nothing  static  about  global  politics  or 
economics.  Multilateral  organizations 
have  proliferated.  Their  agendas  over- 
lap. Decisionmakers  face  more  issues  of 
greater  complexity.  Global  politics  is 
changing  to  keep  pace  with  global  eco- 
nomic and  technological  change. 

Hemispheric  diplomacy  is  also 
changing.  The  OAS  [Organization  of 
American  States]  is  as  active  in  human 
rights  as  in  peacekeeping.  The  Con- 
tadora  group  is  now  the  Group  of 


)epartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1988 


THE  SECRETARY 


Eight.  Its  focus  is  now  culture  and  eco- 
nomics as  well  as  politics  and  security. 
There  is  no  guarantee  that  what  comes 
out  of  such  groups  will  lead  to  wider 
agreement.  But  cooperation  is  essen- 
tial. Consultation  is  essential.  These 
are  guidelines  for  our  generation  and 
the  next.  But  there  are  problems,  right 
here  and  now,  we  need  to  identify  and 
solve  if  we  are  to  keep  up  today.  Let 
me  note  some  issues  on  which  global, 
regional,  and  domestic  cooperation  is 
needed  right  now. 

International  Economic  Cooperation 

The  Uruguay  Round  is  at  the  center  of 
global  economic  cooperation.  In  Sep- 
tember 1986,  trade  ministers  from  more 
than  92  countries  gathered  at  Punta  del 
Este,  here  in  Uruguay,  to  launch  a  new 
round  of  global  trade  talks.  Inspired  by 
the  original  open-market,  free-trade 
goals  of  GATT,  the  current  round  has 
enormous  potential  to  lay  the  founda- 
tions for  what  President  Reagan  hopes 
we  can  call  the  "Roaring  Nineties." 

Progress  in  agricultui-e  is  long 
overdue.  Taking  hold  of  the  future  re- 
quires that  we  break  through  the  bar- 
riers of  traditional  thinking  and  ways  of 
doing  things.  The  OECD  [Organization 
for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Develop- 
ment] estimates  that  each  year  the 
world  spends  $150  billion  on  agriculture 
in  the  form  of  direct  government  pay- 
ments and  higher  costs  to  consumers. 
This  calculation  does  not  include  the 
damage  to  the  agricultural  sectors  of 
developing  countries  caused  by  excess 
products  dumped  on  world  markets. 
The  Uruguay  Round  is  a  chance  to  turn 
away  from  costly  subsidies  and  lost  op- 
portunities and  turn  toward  cultivating 
the  potential  of  our  planet. 

Although  tariffs  are  not  the  central 
focus  of  the  round,  they  are  an  impor- 
tant impediment  to  trade,  as  are  non- 
tariff  barriers,  which  have  themselves 
become  a  significant  problem  in  the 
world  trading  system. 

The  new  items  on  the  GATT 
agenda  include  issues  we  must  address 
if  the  full  promise  of  the  technological 
revolution  is  to  be  realized.  The  issues 
of  services,  intellectual  property,  and 
investment  are  important  globally  and 
especially  relevant  to  the  countries  of 
this  hemisphere. 

The  U.S.  Trade  Representative, 
Clayton  Yeutter,  puts  services  in  the 
top  echelon  of  our  concerns.  Service  in- 
dustries like  engineering,  data  proc- 
essing, insurance,  and  tourism  have 
been  a  growth  sector  in  the  United 
States.  They  are  responsible  for  62%  of 


the  U.S.  GNP  [gross  national  product] 
and  90%  of  the  job  creation  in  the  last 
4-5  years. 

Other  countries  are  having  similar 
experiences.  In  1987,  Jamaica,  for  the 
first  time  in  its  history,  welcomed  a 
million  tourists;  35%  of  its  foreign  ex- 
change is  from  tourism.  Services  count. 
Data  processing  jobs  in  the  Caribbean 
are  projected  to  jump  from  3,500  in 
mid-1987  to  20,000  in  1990.  Services 
count.  They  are  essential  inputs  to 
growth,  too.  Corporate  customers  in 
developing  countries  critically  need 
services  to  stay  competitive  in  world 
markets.  Too  often,  however,  many 
services  are  not  available,  owing  to 
protection. 

Intellectual  property  is  an  issue 
typical  of  the  world  we  are  entering. 
Ti'ade  has  come  increasingly  to  en- 
compass the  commercial  exchange  of 
ideas — embodied  in  print,  in  chemical 
formulas,  in  information  electronically 
encoded  and  stored.  When  ideas  be- 
come unique  items  in  trade,  difficult 
questions  arise.  For  example,  what 
does  it  mean  for  the  protection  of  prop- 
erty rights  when  property  becomes 
"intellectual" — when  information  stored 
in  the  memory  of  a  machine  can  be  pi- 
rated by  a  computer  bandit  and  repli- 
cated in  a  foreign  clone?  This  is  a 
critical  and  vexing  question  for  the 
Uruguay  Round. 

The  right  to  market  new  ideas,  to 
recover  the  investment  in  research,  and 
to  profit  from  innovation — all  require  an 
equitable,  enforceable,  and  transparent 
set  of  principles  relating  to  intellectual 
property.  The  world  trading  system — 
therefore,  GATT — has  to  recognize  the 
role  of  intellectual  property  in  an  open 
and  equitable  world  market. 

Investment  issues  and  trade  issues 
are  inseparable.  Restrictions  on  invest- 
ment flows  distort  trade  flows — and 
vice  versa.  If  the  next  decade  is  to 
make  up  for  the  lagging  economic 
growth  of  the  1980s,  renewed  inflows  of 
private,  direct  investment  will  be  re- 
quired. Venture-specific  equity  financ- 
ing, domestic  or  foreign,  is  a  basis  for 
growth.  The  funds  are  there.  So  is  the 
international  competition  for  capital. 
The  competitors  include  many  countries 
that  have  enjoyed,  for  some  time,  the 
edge  which  market-based  policy  gives. 
The  only  way  ever  invented  to  attract 
equity  capital  is  to  assure  an  attractive 
investment  climate.  And  that  means 
structural  reforms  to  free  up  markets, 
promote  trade,  and  encourage  private 
entrepreneurship.  Those  who  compete 
poorly  or  choose  not  to  compete  at  all 
face  slim  development  prospects. 


The  United  States,  I  am  proud 
to  say,  has  championed  the  cause  of 
economic  freedom  in  the  world.  U.S. 
policy  has  long  recognized  that  a  pro- 
growth  global  economy  must  be  free, 
open,  and  competitive.  U.S.  support! 
a  free  global  economy  order  is  as  old  . 
Franklin  Roosevelt's  call  for  reciproca 
free  trade  and  as  i-ecent  as  the  Uru- 
guay Round.  Bilaterally  and  multi-      | 
laterally,  we  have  stood  for  market-    i 
based  solutions  to  economic  problems 
and  called  for  market-led  economic      | 
growth  strategies.  | 

We  have  argued,  again  and  again 
the  disastrous  consequences  of  begga 
thy-neighbor  policies.  Protectionism  i 
a  lose-lose  situation  for  all  players.  It  1 
will  be  difficult,  no  doubt,  to  resist  pi 
tectionist  pressures.  Ultimately,  lead 
ership  is  required  to  sustain  support 
for  policies  that  make  the  best  sense 
in  the  long  run. 

Regional  Economic  Cooperation 

The  United  States  has  played,  and  w^ 
continue  to  play,  an  important  role  ii 
regional  economic  cooperation  and 
growth.  We  have  championed  free  tr. 
in  the  area,  resisted  the  calls  for  pro 
tection,  and  opened  our  market  to 
hemispheric  trade. 

Our  openness  to  products  from 
other  countries  in  the  hemisphere  iSi 
measured  by  our  balance  of  trade. 
From  the  onset  of  the  debt  crisis, 
United  States  has  imported  $43-$^ 
billion  of  goods  and  services  from 
region  per  year.  Latin  America  has 
had  a  trade  surplus  with  us  rangini 
tween  $13.3  billion  and  $20.9  billion. 
Our  deficit  supports  free  and  fair 
trade. 

The  United  States  advocates  re 
gional  economic  cooperation.  The  C; 
ibbean  Basin  Initiative  (CBI)  mater  1 
improved  the  lives  of  countless  peoj 
in  the  Caribbean.  President  BalagU(  c 
the  Dominican  Republic  called  the  (  I 
"the  most  constructive  initiative... e  r 
come  to  Latin  America,  [including]    e 
Good  Neighbor  Policy... and  the  Al- 
liance for  Progress." 

Ti-ade  agreements  among  BrazL 
Argentina,  and  Uruguay  strengthen 
cooperation  in  the  southern  cone. 
CARICOM's  [Caribbean  Community 
recent  decision  to  bring  down  trade 
barriers  among  states  in  the  easteri 
Caribbean  is  a  similar  move  in  the  i 
direction. 

These  are  all  promising  develof 
ments.  When  initiatives  are  sustain 
real  progress  shows  over  time.  I  an" 
just  back  from  Asia,  an  area  that  h. 


10 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1i 


THE  SECRETARY 


(,jilved  very  successful  regional  eco- 
rjnie  policy — based  on  an  outward- 
Ikiiiu  apiiroach.  An  approach  that  is 
h  dutward  looking  and  regional  can 
,a  powerful  springboard  for  global 
e momic  activity  and  engagement. 

nustic  Policies 

nii'siic  economic  policy  must  be  in 
ic  with  global  economic  reality. 
uiitries  unable  to  change  their  do- 

nstic  policy  will  be  the  victims  of 

cinge  in  the  global  economy. 

The  overall  picture  for  Latin  Amer- 

ii  and  the  Caribbean  is  not  bright. 

Foiiiimic  growth  at  2.6%  is  bai"ely 
A I   m-owth  in  population.  The  world 
iiM\  iiig  fast,  and  Latin  America  must 
•\c  faster  if  it  is  to  catch  up. 

I  ast  month  I  spoke  to  the  Asso- 
tmii  (if  South  East  Asian  Nations 
SIIAN)  in  Jakarta.  Those  countries 
M'  achieved  enormous  economic 

I  Ills.  They  have  been  successful  for 

I  o  I'casons. 

First,  their  political  systems  and 
■  iiKiiiiic  policies  open  their  societies 
il  promote  economic  growth. 

Second,  they  are  outward  looking. 
ey  lecognize  that  foreign  markets  of- 
■  tremendous  opportunities  for  sales, 
IS,  and,  above  all,  economic  and  tech- 
logical  development. 

Latin  America  cannot  be  satisfied 
I  th  the  steps  it  has  taken  in  these 
I  rections.  But  what  Asia  has  done, 
i  itin  America  can  do.  Consider  these 

ises. 

•  It  is  hard  to  imagine  an  economic 
;uation  worse  than  Bolivia's  in  1985. 
•ices  rose  by  24,000%,  a  modern 

jrld  record.  In  some  regions,  vendors 
aighed  money  instead  of  counting  it. 
.rikes  were  endemic.  Workers  missed 
1  average  100  workdays  in  1984.  Then 
le  new  government,  elected  in  1985, 
troduced  reforms  based  on  free- 
arket  principles.  Inflation  is  down  to 
1%  per  year.  After  years  of  stagnation, 
le  economy  is  again  showing  real 
rowth. 

•  After  a  decline  of  16%  in  real 
DP  [gross  domestic  product]  in 
:>82-84,  Uruguay  attained  a  remark- 
ble  6.3%  advance  in  real  growth  in 
386.  Since  then,  growth  has  been 
lower  but  steady. 

•  Even  with  the  combined  pres- 
ures  of  an  active  insurgency  and  drug 
rafficking,  Colombia  has  scored  real 
;ains  of  5%  or  more  in  economic  growth 
n  1986  and  1987;  it  should  repeat  that 
lerformance  this  vear. 


Annual  Change  in  Real  Per  Capita  GDP,  1980-87 

Percent 

7     — 


Africa 

Asia 

Latin 
America 


1980  1981  1982  1983 

Source:  IMF  World  Economic  Outlook  1987 


•  In  the  Caribbean,  the  Jamaican 
economy  has  grown  over  6%,  unemploy- 
ment has  declined  about  7%,  and  infla- 
tion has  been  reduced  from  12%  to  7%. 

It  took  a  new  way  of  thinking  to 
produce  these  results.  More  than  that, 
it  took  a  decision  to  implement  changes 
and  to  follow  through.  Common  to  these 
cases  is  resolute  implementation  of  out- 
ward-looking policies  aimed  at  trade 
and  e.xchange  liberalization,  deregula- 
tion, privatization,  and  market-based 
pricing.  Market-based  poUcies  make  the 
difference. 

The  new  president  of  the  Inter- 
American  Development  Bank,  Enrique 
Iglesias  of  Uruguay,  says:  "There  is  a 
new  pragmatism  in  the  air,  a  growing 
acceptance  of  the  need  to  reduce  the 
role  of  the  state,  expand  and  diversify 


e.xports,  and  make  profound  adjust- 
ments in  the  production  structures 
of  Latin  American  economies." 

Debt:  A  Problem  With 
Many  Ramifications 

Any  discussion  of  economic  develop- 
ments in  Latin  America  must  address 
the  political  and  economic  problems  as- 
sociated with  debt — and  those  problems 
are  very  real  and  very  difficult.  The 
hard  realities  must  all  be  faced.  They 
must  be  faced  by  everyone — creditors 
and  debtors  alike. 

The  most  basic  realities  are  these: 
the  only  solutions  available  will  take 
time  and  effort;  and  a  case-by-case 
approach  with  a  menu  of  options  has 
proven  to  be  the  only  workable  way  to 
bring  creditoi's  and  debtors  together. 

To  debtors,  I  would  say  that 
growth  remains  the  key  and  that,  today 
as  in  the  past,  growth  requii'es  invest- 


)epartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1988 


THE  SECRETARY 


ment.  The  more  savings  you  can  gener- 
ate in  your  own  country,  the  better.  But 
you  will  also  need  capital  flows  from 
abroad. 

A  country  can  test  itself  on  the 
progress  it  is  making.  Do  its  own  sav- 
ings stay  home  and  get  applied  to  its 
own  capital  needs?  Is  domestic  private 
capital  returning  from  abroad  or  is  it 
continuing  to  flee?  If  the  answers  are 
positive,  the  counti-y  will  find  itself  in 
good  standing  in  what  we  might  call 
the  court  of  the  allocation  of  world  sav- 
ings. If  the  answers  are  negative,  the 
country  should  take  a  hard  look  at  its 
own  decisions  about  economic  policy 
and  ask: 

•  "Has  the  process  of  economic  re- 
form been  as  thorough  and  comprehen- 
sive as  possible?" 

•  "Are  structural  and  regulatory 
rigidities  still  a  stubborn  reality?" 

•  "Are  incentives  to  work,  save, 
and  invest  adequate?" 

To  creditors,  I  would  repeat  that 
they,  too,  must  look  to  the  solution 
rather  than  to  the  size  of  the  problem. 
They  must  continue  to  work  with  debt- 
ors, and  they  must  learn  to  take  into 
account  what  amounts  to  a  marginal 
rate  of  taxation  on  political  and  eco- 
nomic reform  that  is  simply  too  high. 
Reform  is  difficult,  and  if  all  the  gains 
are  taken  away  by  debt  service,  then 
the  necessary  process  may  simply  not 
get  underway. 

The  Impetus  of  Freedom 

To  conclude,  it  should  surprise  no  one 
that  we  North  Americans  should  be- 
lieve that  freedom  is  the  power  that  can 
propel  this  half  of  the  globe  to  levels  of 
unprecedented  opportunity  and  growth. 
More  than  a  century  ago,  the  French- 
man De  Tocqueville  wrote  that: 

Democratic  liberty  is  far  from  accom- 
plishing all  its  projects  with  the  skill  of  an 
adroit  despotism....  [B]ut  in  the  end  it 
produces  more  than  any  absolute  govern- 
ment. Democracy  does  not  give  the  people 
the  most  skillful  government,  but  it  pro- 
duces what  the  ablest  governments  are  fre- 
quently unable  to  create:  namely,  an  all- 
pervading  and  restless  activity,  a  super- 
abundant force... an  energy  which  is  in- 
separable from  it  and  which  may,  however 
unfavorable  circumstances  may  be,  produce 
wonders. 

Today  all  of  us  in  the  Americas  can 
make  the  choices  that  will  produce  won- 
ders that  neither  De  Tocqueville  nor  we 
could  yet  imagine. 


NEWS  CONFERENCE, 
MONTEVIDEO. 
AUG.  4,  1988^ 

President  Sanguinetti  and  his  col- 
leagues, my  direct  host  Foreign  Minis- 
ter Barrios — ^just  now  I  had  a  good 
visit  with  the  Finance  Minister,  Mr. 
Zerbino.  All  have  been  most  cordial.  I 
want  to  e.xpress  my  appreciation  to 
them  and  others:  President  Pascale  of 
the  Central  Bank,  who  sponsored  the 
talk  that  I  gave,  for  their  cordiality  and 
even  more  than  that,  for  this  exhibition 
of  political  freedom  in  action  and  eco- 
nomic freedom  in  action. 

Political  and  economic  reform  and 
freedom  work.  What  has  been  happen- 
ing here  in  Uruguay  in  the  last 
3  years — I  i-emember  when  I  came  to 
the  inauguration  in  1985 — is  a  very 
good  example.  That  doesn't  mean  there 
aren't  problems;  there  are  problems 
everywhere.  But  what  we  see  are  prob- 
lems being  resolved.  It  was  a  marker,  I 
think,  that  at  the  very  interesting 
luncheon  that  President  Sanguinetti 
gave,  there  were  not  very  many  people 
present,  but  there  were  representatives 
of  all  of  the  political  parties,  including 
the  opposition  parties.  We  had  a  very 
stimulating  conversation.  I  want  to  ex- 
press my  gratitude  for  all  that. 

Q.  Specifically,  what  topics  did 
you  deal  with  with  President 
Sanguinetti? 

A.  We  shared  views  about  things 
going  on  in  this  region,  in  Central 
America,  Panama.  We  shared  views 
about  developments  in  the  Soviet 
Union,  the  relationship  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union. 
We  had  a  very  interesting  discussion, 
over  luncheon,  of  changes  taking  place 
in  the  world  economy,  the  global  econ- 
omy, and,  of  course,  we  discussed  the 
developments  in  political  and  economic 
freedoms  here  in  Uruguay  and  various 
bilateral  issues  having  to  do  with  trade 
and  support  programs. 

It  was  a  very  constructive  and  sys- 
tematic discussion,  and  I  was  very 
pleased  to  have  a  chance  to  meet  with 
him.  He  has  given  extraordinary  lead- 
ership, just  as  Uruguay  has  given,  in  a 
sense,  a  touchstone  on  a  world  basis  to 
the  problem  of  expanding  trade  and  its 
leadership  of  what  is  known  as  the 
"Uruguay  Round"  now  of  the  current 
GATT  negotiations. 

Q.  You  spoke  with  the  Minister 
of  Finance,  Mr.  Zerbino.  What  eco- 
nomic topics  did  you  deal  with?  .\nd  I 
would  like  to  know  before  the  end  of 


the  Reagan  Administration,  will  ther 
be  softer  treatment  for  the  foreign 
debt? 

A.  I  asked  the  minister  to  tell  me 
about  what  has  happened  in  Uruguay 
the  economic  field  during  the  .3  years  ( 
so  of  his  administration  and  the  result: 
of  that,  and  he  did  in  a  very  careful  ar 
interesting  way.  I  think,  basically,  the 
story  is  a  success  story — one  that  neei 
to  be  observed  carefully,  because  it  is 
story  of  opening  markets,  of  opening 
yourself  to  trade,  of  not  having  capita 
controls  and  exchange  controls,  and,  i 
general,  of  trying  to  free  up  the 
system. 

The  contrast  between  the  last 
3  yeai's  and  the  3  years  that  preceded 
startling.  Whereas  in  the  previous  pe- 
riod, there  was  a  decline  in  real  GNP, 
in  this  period  there  has  been  a  steadj 
increase;  whereas  in  the  previous  pe-  j 
riod,  there  was  a  rise  in  inflation,  in 
this  period  there  has  been  a  decline  i 
the  rate  of  inflation. 

In  the  talk  that  I  gave  earlier  th:i 
afternoon,  I  said  that  it  seemed  to  m 
test  that  any  country  could  apply  to 
itself  in  resolving  the  question  of 
whether  it  was  on  the  right  track  wa< 
this:  Are  the  savings  generated  in  yo 
country  staying  here  and  being  appli 
to  the  development  of  your  own  coun 
or  are  they  fleeing?  And  is  capital,  ii 
general,  fleeing  or  is  it  returning  to 
that  country? 

I  think  it  is  very  interesting  to  s 
that  in  the  case  of  Uruguay,  capital  i 
returning;  and  that  is  an  expression 
confidence  of  people  who  put  their  o' 
resources  on  the  line.  I  think  is  a  fu. 
damental  good  sign.  This  was  the  pr 
cipal  thing  that  we  talked  about.  We 
also  talked  about  such  things  as  che^t 
quotas  and  wool  textile  negotiations 
and  things  of  that  kind  a  little  bit  m 
particular,  and  which  I  was  glad  to  1  ii 
the  point  of  view  expressed  by  my 
friends  from  Uruguay. 

Q.  I  would  like  to  know  if  dur  g 
your  talks  with  the  President  and 
during  your  talks  with  the  Foreigr 
Minister,  did  you  talk  specifically 
about  Panama  and  the  relations  of 
Panama  with  the  United  States?  A  I, 
if  you  did,  were  you  able  to  find  a 
specific  solution  to  that  problem? 

A.  We  had  a  brief  reference  to   ir 
my  talks  with  the  President,  but  I  Id 
a  little  bit  more  time  on  the  subject , 
with  the  Foreign  Minister.  About  al 
can  say  on  the  subject  is  that  Urugi 
has  been  willing  to  be  constructive, 
the  extent  that  it  can,  in  a  quiet  wa 
Nevertheless,  at  this  point,  there's 
nothing  in  particular  to  report  on  tl( 
score. 


12 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1l8| 


THE  SECRETARY 


Q.  We  would  like  to  know  if  there 
any  differences  between  the  Gov- 
ments  of  Uruguay  and  the  United 
tes?  Are  there  any  differences,  and 
o.  what  are  they?  And  also,  we 
ild  like  to  know  if  the  U.S.  policy 
ard  Central  America  has  reached 
t  of  an  impasse  until  the  time 
en  U.S.  elections  are  held. 
A.  We  have  many  things  that  we 
c  about.  We  don't  necessarily  see 
m  all  eye-to-eye,  but  by-and-large.  I 
ik  I  could  characterize— and  I  be- 
•e  the  representatives  of  the  Govern- 
nt  of  Uruguay,  President  Sanguinetti 
I  others  who  say  our  relationships 
excellent.  We  talk  of  our  problems 
[i  direct  way  and  have  managed  to 
olve  them.We  have  a  constructive 
•hange  on  various  issues  dealing  with 
nblems  in  this  area.  I  don't  think 
ire  are  any  major  differences  or 
(blems. 

i    As  far  as  Central  America  is  con- 
■ned,  the  policies  of  the  United 
ites  are  strong  and  basically  suc- 
j.sful  and  will  be  ongoing.  Nev-  ^ 
jheless,  problems  remain.  What's 
xessful  is  that  we  now  see  in  Central 
lerica  four  countries  governed  by  ci- 
ian,  democratically  elected  presi- 
its,  instead  of  just  one.  We  see  all 
ir  of  those  democratic  countries  ex- 
riencing  real  growth  in  their  econo- 
«s,  seeing  inflation  very  much  under 
Vitrei— the  highest  rate  of  inflation 
Ing  9%  and  others  lower  than  that — 
jd  we  see  the  rule  of  law,  we  see  re- 
ject for  human  values  increasingly  a 
|rt  of  their  lives.  That's  the  successful 
«rt. 

The  part  that  troubles  us  and  trou- 
3s  lots  of  people  is  that  in  Nicaragua 
lat  we  see  is  a  failure,  a  human 
lure.  We  see  income  per  capita  now 
out  half  of  what  it  was  when  the 
^ndinistas  took  over.  We  see  inflation 
wild  that,  in  effect,  they  have,  for  all 
tents  and  purposes,  abandoned  the 
oney  economy.  We  see  them  breaking 
)  opposition  rallies,  dosing  news- 
ipers  and  radio  stations.  We  see  labor 
aders  murdered.  We  see,  in  general, 
1  atmosphere  of  repression  in  which 
iman  values  don't  seem  to  have  much 
I'  a  place.  That's  a  tragedy.  It's  a  trag- 
liy  for  the  people  of  Nicaragua.  We'd 
ke  to  see  that  changed  and  others 
■ould. 

We  support  those  who  would  like 
0  change  it.  It's  also  a  tragedy  in  a 
reader  sense  for  the  region,  because 
long  with  this  degradation  of  hfe  in 
liearagua  has  come  the  emergence  of 
military  capacity  way  beyond  any  other 


Central  American  country,  with  a  very 
heavy  amount  of  Soviet  support  in  the 
form  of  armaments.  That's  a  threat  in 
the  region,  and,  from  our  standpoint, 
it's  a  potential  threat  to  the  United 
States,  not  because  of  anything  Nic- 
aragua as  such  would  do,  but  because 
the  existence  of  Soviet  power  and  air 
fields  and  port  facilities  potentially  is  a 
problem,  as  far  as  the  United  States  is 
concerned. 

There  has  been  a  lot  going  for- 
ward, and  we'll  continue  working  on  the 
positive  aspects  of  what's  happened  in 
Central  America.  But,  nevertheless,^ 
there  is  a  problem,  a  cancer,  and  we'll 
have  to  try  to  do  everything  we  can  to 
stop  it  from  growing  and  try  to  put  it 
right. 

Q.  [Inaudible]  to  another  area  of 
the  world,  the  Middle  East.  Today 
.Jordan  announced  the  retiring  of  all 
Palestinian  government  and  munici- 
pal employees  in  the  occupied  territo- 
ries and  the  firing  of  nongovern- 
mental Palestinian  employees.  These 
are  people  who  work  in  health,  agri- 
culture, social  affairs,  and  education. 
I  know  in  the  past  you  said  that  King 
Hussein  still  continues  to  have  a  ma- 
jor role  to  play  in  the  process.  But 
are  you  concerned  about  the  services 
that  mav  be  denied  to  the  Palesti- 
nians in  the  occupied  territories,  and 
is  this  destabilizing  for  peace? 

A.  This  is  an  important  step,  and  it 
is  simply  the  implementation  of  the 
things  that  King  Hussein  announced  m 
his  speech  on  Sunday.  Ambassador 
Murphy  [Assistant  Secretary  for  Near 
Eastern  and  South  Asian  Affairs  Rich- 
ard W.  Murphy]  is  in  the  region  right 
now  and  will  be  consulting  with  people 
in  the  region,  including  in  Jordan. 
When  I  have  his  report,  I'll  be  able  to 
see  a  little  more  clearly  exactly  what 
the  implications  of  this  are. 

But,  obviously,  King  Hussein  is  ba- 
sically saying,  "I  have  been  declared  by 
the  Arab"  world  as  not  the  spokesman 
for  the  people  on  the  West  Bank  and 
Gaza  and  under  those  circumstances 
I'm  following  through  on  the  implica- 
tions of  that  statement."  I've  said  be- 
fore—and I  believe  it  is  clearly  the 
case— that  King  Hussein  must  be  an 
important  part  of  any  effective  peace 
process,  if  for  no  other  reason  than  the 
border  between  Israel  and  Jordan— it's 
the  longest  border  Israel  has  with  any 
Afsb  stst-G. 

It's  obvious  that  if  there  is  to  be 

peace  between  Israel  and  its  neighbors 

then  that  has  to  include  peace  between 


Israel  and  Jordan.  How  exactly  the  Pal- 
estinian issues  are  to  be  resolved,  what 
the  negotiating  structure  will  be,  is  a 
question  that  is  certainly  more  open 
now  and  more  difficult  now.  But  I  don't 
rule  out  that  in  some  way  King  Hussein 
will  be  involved— he  historically  has 
been.  I'll  be  better  able  to  answer  that 
question  after  I  hear  from  Ambassador 
Murphy. 

Q.  The  Government  of  Uruguay 
in  the  past  has  opposed  the  idea  of 
contras  receiving  military  aid.  Did 
they  change  their  position  in  light  of 
the  recent  events  in  Nicaragua? 

A.  I  haven't  been  going  around 
trying  to  persuade  people  to  support 
assistance  for  the  democratic  resist- 
ance. This  is  something  that's  being  de- 
bated in  the  United  States.  I  believe 
that  we  will  see  a  new  vote  on  that 
subject  in  the  Congress.  1  think,  the 
actions  of  the  Government  of  Nicaragua 
recently  have,  very  frankly,  embar- 
rassed "those  in  our  Congress  who  have 
supported  them  by  what  they've  done, 
and  so  a  somewhat  new  picture  has 
been  presented.  Basically  as  I  said  a 
few  moments  ago,  it's  fundamentally  a 
question  of  seeing  success — painfully 
hard-earned  success— on  the  part  of  the 
four  democratic  countries,  and  what  we 
see  in  Nicaragua  is  failure. 

NEWS  CONFERENCE, 

BRASILIA, 

AUG.  5,  1988« 

I've  had  a  very  good  day  of  discussions 
here  with  great  warmth  and  hospitality. 
We've  gone  through  quite  a  number  of 
issues.  I've  had  the  opportunity  for  a 
very  long  and  interesting  and  cordial 
meeting  with  President  Sarney  and 
luncheon  with  the  Foreign  Minister,  Mr. 
Sodre,  and  with  the  Finance  Minister, 
Mr.  Nobrega,  as  is  appropriate  in  visit- 
ing a  sister  democracy  with  a  structure 
of  government  similar  to  ours.  I  had  an 
opportunity  to  visit  the  President  of 
the  Supreme  Court.  Shortly  after  I 
leave  this  press  conference,  I  will  meet 
with  the  President  of  the  Constituent 
Assembly. 

Accumulating  all  these  talks  to- 
gether, we've  discussed  our  general 
view  of  the  world  economy  and  the  sup- 
port that  the  United  States  is  glad  to 
lend  to  Brazil's  economic  efforts.  Brazil 
is  a  long-time  friend  and  the  eighth 
largest  economy  in  the  free  world.  We 
talked  about  a  variety  of  trade  issues. 


^onartmont  of  State  Bulletin/October  1988 


13 


THE  SECRETARY 


We've  had  excellent  discussions  of  our 
cooperative  activities  and  views  about 
narcotics  trafficking,  and  we've  touched 
on  matters  of  common  concern  around 
the  world  from  Central  America,  south- 
ern Africa,  Iran-Iraq,  Middle  East, 
Cambodia. 

We've  had  a  very  stimulating  dis- 
cussion about  future  trends,  particu- 
larly with  President  Sarney,  who  has 
thought  a  great  deal  about  the  develop- 
ments that  are  in  store  for  us.  All  in 
all,  it's  been  a  very  interesting  and 
worthwhile  day  and  a  day  of  great 
friendliness  and  cordiality. 

Q.  After  a  long  day  of  conversa- 
tion with  President  Sarney,  with  the 
Minister  of  Finance,  and  with  the 
Minister  of  External  Affairs,  how 
would  you  describe  a  general  balance 
in  more  specific  terms,  particularly 
with  respect  to  the  question  of  trade 
retaliations? 

A.  In  general  we  shared  our  view 
that  the  relations  between  Brazil  and 
the  United  States  are  excellent.  We  do 
have  some  disputes,  most  particularly 
on  trade  issues.  We  discussed  them  and 
put  them  into  their  broad  perspective, 
and  we  will  hope  to  keep  working  at 
them  and  resolve  them.  We've  agreed 
that  we  should  try  to  do  that,  and  I 
believe  that  we  will  be  able  to  work 
successfully  on  them. 

Q.  Will  you  comment  on  the  fol- 
lowing? In  the  past,  in  the  area  of 
information,  when  the  newspapers 
published  the  possibility  of  retalia- 
tions in  that  area,  even  though  these 
retaliations  did  not  come  about,  this 
already  had  a  damaging  effect  on  the 
nation's  exports — perhaps  in  a  value 
even  greater  than  the  expected  re- 
taliations. Recent  events  have  come 
to  the  same  conclusion,  and  Brazilian 
exports  are  already  suffering  damage 
due  to  this.  Would  you  comment  on 
this? 

A.  I  don't  know  that  there's  any 
evidence  of  any  damage.  The  U.S.  mar- 
ket is  the  largest  foreign  market  for 
Brazilian  goods  and  services — I  think 
amounting  to  about  27%  of  the  total 
Brazilian  exports — and  that  continues. 
So  I  don't  think  there's  any  particular 
immediate  effect.  There  are,  of  course, 
broad  world  trends  underway,  and  we 
do  see  the  U.S.  firms  very  competitive 
these  days  all  over  the  world,  so  we 
have  an  export  boom  going  on  in  the 
United  States.  But,  nevertheless,  Bra- 
zil continues  to  find  us  its  largest  mar- 
ket, and  I  don't  see  any  reason  to 
believe  that  would  change. 


Q.  Some  South  Americans  believe 
the  United  States,  during  the  years  of 
the  Reagan  Administration,  has  ne- 
glected South  America  because  of  its 
focus  on  Central  America.  Certainly 
Central  America,  I'm  sure,  has  taken 
up  much  more  of  your  time  than 
South  America.  I  assume  this  is  be- 
cause of  security  considerations,  or  is 
my  assumption  wrong? 

A.  In  the  first  place,  we  have 
worked  a  lot  with  our  friends  in  South 
America.  In  fact,  we  happen  to  be  right 
here  in  Brasilia,  and  I  very  well  re- 
member coming  here  with  President 
Reagan  and  going  to  Sao  Paulo  on  that 
trip  and  to  other  countries  in  South 
America. 

One  of  the  preoccupations  in  these 
last  few  years  in  our  hemisphere  has 
been  the  debt  problem,  and  no  country 
has  worked  harder  with  the  countries 
of  this  region  than  the  United  States  in 
trying  to  keep  that  problem  in  hand. 
The  most  recent  evidence  for  that,  as 
was  remarked  to  me  in  most  of  our 
meetings  and  most  recently  by  the  Min- 
ister of  Finance,  is  the  bridge  loan  that 
the  United  States  provided  to  help  Bra- 
zil in  its  present  moment  of  economic 
reform.  So  we  have  worked  with  a 
great  deal  of  effort  on  that  issue. 

We've  also  worked  with  the  coun- 
tries of  South  America  on  the  problem 
of  narcotics  trafficking,  and  this  has 
been  a  very  good,  strong  cooperative 
effort.  There  have  been  many  ways  in 
which  we've  been  very  active  with  our 
friends  in  South  America. 

It  certainly  is  true  that  the  profile 
of  interest  and  concern  and  effort  on 
the  problems  of  Central  America  and 
the  Caribbean  has  been  higher  in  the 
Reagan  Administration  than  in  the 
past.  I  think  it's  fair  to  say,  perhaps,  a 
reasonable  criticism  of  the  United 
States  is  that  we  haven't  paid  enough 
attention  to  Central  America  in  the 
past,  and  that's  why  the  problems  have 
been  difficult  to  resolve. 

But  I  think  we  have  made  a  great 
deal  of  progress  in  that  regard,  and  I 
might  say  it's  not  as  though  the  coun- 
tries of  South  America  aren't  concerned 
about  developments  in  Central  Amer- 
ica; quite  to  the  contrary.  It  comes  up 
everywhere,  and  I've  had  good  discus- 
sions here  about  those  problems  as  in 
the  other  countries  that  I've  visited  so 
far. 

Q.  Did  you  bring  up  your  con- 
cerns, or  the  American  concerns, 
about  the  potential  sales  of  Brazilian 
arms  to  the  Middle  East,  particularly 
to  Libya?  And  secondly,  after  your 
talks  so  far  today,  do  you  share  the 


view  of  some  officials  in  your  Depart- 
ment that  Brazil  has  not  assumed  fu' 
responsibility  as  one  of  the  major  eco 
nomic  powers  in  the  world? 

A.  One  of  the  statements  that  was'| 
made  to  me  by  the  Brazilian  Foreign 
Minister  in  my  first  meeting  today  wasl 
the  desire  of  Brazil  to  be  a  full  partnei 
and  to  work  with  us  and  with  others  oil 
the  problems  that  we  share  around  the' 
world.  President  Sarney  developed  the' 
point  that  in  the  world  we  are  in  and  I 
increasingly  moving  into — the  informa-l 
tion  age — we  are  more  and  more  all  in  I 
volved  in  a  global  environment  so  that 
we  have  to  take  an  interest  in  these  i 
things.  I  found  those  statements  to  be 
very  positive  ones. 

As  far  as  the  arms  sales  question 
concerned,  we  did  talk  about  it,  and  ii 
particular  I  expressed  my  concerns- 
which  we  talk  about  with  our  friends  i 
over  the  world — about  three  types  of 
weapons  that  we  consider  to  be  partic 
larly  potentially  destabilizing.  One  is 
nuclear  weapons;  another  is  chemical 
weapons;  and  a  third  is  ballistic  mis- 
siles that  carry  or  can  carry  those  pai' 
ticular  weapons. 

I  talked  about  our  efforts  to  redi 
nuclear  arms  and  our  agreements  wit 
the  Soviet  Union,  our  efforts  in  non- 
proliferation,  our  efforts  to  negotiate 
ban  on  chemical  weapons — the  alarmi ' 
nature  of  that  field  and  how  they  hav^ 
been  used  in  the  Iran-Iraq  war.  The 
genie  is  sort  of  out  of  the  bottle,  and 
think  we  all  have  a  great  stake  in  stu 
ing  it  back  in  again,  if  we  can.  Then, 
course,  ballistic  missiles  are  a  partici 
lar  threat.  I'm  sure  that  we  will  con- 
tinue to  discuss  those  subjects 
constructively. 

Q.  We  would  like  for  you  to  coi 
ment  if  you  think  that  Brazil  now  1 5 
the  conditions  to  build  ballistic  mis 
siles  capable  of  carrying  weapons  a  I 
selling  them  to  the  Middle  East. 

A.  I  think  that  is  for  the  Brazili;  5 
to  comment  on.  Ballistic  missile  tech 
nology  is  something  that  we  see  in  v:  ■ 
ous  parts  of  the  world.  We  have  beei 
particularly  concerned  about  sales  in 
the  Middle  East  from  China,  and  I  d 
cussed  that  when  I  was  in  China,  at 
great  length.  I  don't  see  evidence  of 
any  direct  sales  by  Brazil. 

Q.  I  would  like  to  know  if  you 
had  the  opportunity  to  speak  to  Fr  i- 
dent  Sarney  or  to  the  Minister  of  t  ■ 
ternal  Relations  on  the  question  of 
Panama,  and  did  you  make  any  re- 
quests of  Brazil  in  this  regard? 

A.  We  didn't  make  any  particul; 
re(]uest  except  I  think  we  all  see,  pai 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1'  B 


THE  SECRETARY 


ifularly  in  the  context  of  our  concern 
'iout  drug  trafficking,  how  undesirable 
(is  to  have  somebody  in  an  important 
•fsition  in  an  important  country  who  is 
ijvolved  in  drug  trafficking.  But  we 
lidn't  go  into  the  Panama  subject  in 
(,,y  great  detail. 

Q.  Considering  the  declarations 
lade  by  the  Minister  of  External  Re- 
tions  with  respect  to  Nicaragua — 
/ying  that  he  was  in  agreement  with 
;iur  position  on  Nicaragua — would 
;iu  consider  the  position  of  Brazil  in 
le  international  forum  to  make  it 
e  principal  ally  of  the  United  States 
nong  the  eight  countries? 

\.  I  will  be  careful  not  to  try  to 
leak  for  Brazil  in  any  way,  but  I  do 
ink  that  what  we  are  seeing  is  an 
olation  of  Nicai'agua,  not  by  others 
U  liy  themselves,  by  their  behavior, 
,■  the  way  their  policies  are  affecting 
eir  own  people  with  their  standard  of 
.•iiig-  cut  in  half  with  inflation  running 
inipant,  with  so  much  of  their  effort 
noted  to  military  development.  With 
lese  huge  Soviet  armaments  and  with 
jiese  repressive  measures,  you  can 
ily  refer  to  it  as  a  police  state. 

What  is  happening  is  that  Nic- 
•auua  is  turning  everybody  off  because 
■  its  behavior.  And  we  can  only  hope 
1(1  t'X])ect  that  somehow  they  will  see 
le  light  of  day,  one  of  these  times.  I 
lust  say  that  I  welcomed  very  much 
ly  discussions  about  Central  America 
■ith  my  colleagues  here  in  Brazil. 

Q.  Brazilian  officials  said  that 
ou  spoke  with  Mr.  Sodre — referring 
a  his  speech  before  the  Organization 
f  American  States  (OAS)  in 
iuatemela  in  1986 — about  the  need 
ou  saw  for  Brazil  and  other  coun- 
ries  to  speak  plainly  about  Nic- 
iragua.  He,  apparently  encouraged 
ly  your  remarks,  did  that  this  after- 
loon  or  this  morning.  Can  you  tell  us 
f  you  either  asked  for  or  would  like 
o  see  any  particular  new  action  by 
Jrazil  on  the  issue  of  Nicaragua  to  go 
^ny  further  on  this? 

A.  What  I  did  wasn't  in  the  con- 
;ext  of  Nicaragua  particularly,  but  we 
vvere  talking  about  democracy  and  the 
importance  of  the  values  of  freedom  and 
the  rule  of  law  which  we  share.  He  was 
making  that  comment  and  I  said,  "I 
recall  when  we  met  at  the  OAS  and  you 
spoke  eloquently  about  this  and  force- 
fully and  people  paid  attention,"  and 
that  I  was  very  much  impressed  by  it. 
That  was  the  context. 


Q.  In  1979  a  military  movement — 
guerrilla  movement — overthrew  a  gov- 
ernment in  Central  America,  which 
had  a  hereditary  type  government — 
the  Somoza  regime — after  40  years  in 
power  and  practically  the  owner  of 
the  country  at  that  time.  You  just 
mentioned  that  the  United  States  is 
isolating  Nicaragua  and  providing 
support  to  a  military  movement 
within  the  country.  Do  you  not  think 
that  in  the  end  this  will  not  damage 
the  image  of  the  United  States  while 
also  damaging  Central  America  and 
South  America  as  a  whole? 

A.  What  I  said  was,  Nicaragua  is 
isolating  itself,  and  it's  doing  so  by  its 
behavior,  and  its  behavior  is  totally  out 
of  tune  with  what  is  happening  every- 
where else  in  this  hemisphere  and  peo- 
ple don't  like  it.  That  is  basically  what 
is  happening,  and  it  is  what  Nicaragua 
is  doing  to  its  people. 

As  far  as  the  revolution  is  con- 
cerned and  the  current  group  of  people, 
the  Nicaraguan  resistance  who  are 
fighting  for  their  freedom  and  independ- 
ence, if  you  look  at  people  in  that 
resistance  and  look  at  who  the  original 
revolutionaries  are,  you  will  find  that 
the  original  comwandcuites  included 
many  of  the  people  who  are  now  in  the 
resistance.  And  they  are  in  the  resist- 
ance because  they  found  that  the  people 
now  in  power,  the  communists — as  they 
have  said,  it's  their  phrase — "stole  the 
revolution,"  and  they  are  trying  to  get 
it  back. 

Q.  With  respect  to  the  question 
of  patents,  I  would  like  to  know  what 
would  be  the  minimum  position,  or 
the  minimum  Brazilian  proposal  that 
the  United  States  could  accept,  and 
when  would  the  technical  meetings 
begin  that  were  mentioned  in  your 
conversations  with  Minister  Sodre? 

A.  I  think  that  the  precise  negotia- 
tions that  people  undertake  are  for  the 
negotiators,  and  I  don't  want  to  try  to 
preempt  their  ground.  Let  me  put  this 
question  in  a  broader  context.  When 
President  Sarney  and  I  talked  about 
the  future  and  the  information  age,  the 
knowledge  age,  that  we  are  moving 
into,  what  I  think  is  implied  by  that  is 
that  knowledge  more  and  more  is  some- 
thing that  is  created.  It  is,  in  a  sense, 
like  a  good  in  international  trade,  and 
it  is  in  the  interest  of  the  world  to  en- 
courage the  production  of  knowledge  in 
various  fields. 

Pharmaceuticals  is  an  example  of 
this  problem,  but  it  is  just  one  exam- 
ple. If  we  want  to  encourage  this  pro- 
duction of  knowledge  from  which  we  all 


benefit,  then  we  need  to  join  in  recog- 
nition of  what  is  called  intellectual 
property  rights,  that  don't  last  forever 
but  do  give  the  creator  a  momentary 
advantage,  and  that  encourages  future 
creation. 

This  issue  is  not  simply  one  of  a 
particular  industry  or  particular  prod- 
uct. It's  a  generic  issue  that  is  of  tre- 
mendous and  sweeping  importance  in 
the  kind  of  world  we  are  moving  into, 
where  ideas  and  knowledge  and  infor- 
mation are  going  to  be  the  essence  of 
what  we  do,  what  we  produce,  the 
services  we  render,  and  the  things  that 
we  trade. 

What  we  are  talking  about  is  some- 
thing of  very  fundamental  and  basic  im- 
portance. I  think  increasingly  as  we 
work  at  it  and  we  discuss  it  with  our 
friends  here  in  Brazil  and  elsewhere,  it 
is  dawning  on  us  more  that  this  is  ex- 
actly the  case.  I  welcome  the  fact  that 
this  is  an  important  subject  in  the  Uru- 
guay Round  in  negotiations  in  GATT, 
and  it's  important  in  discussions  every- 
where I  go. 


ADDRESS  TO  BOLIVIANS 

AND  THE  PRESS, 
LA  PAZ, 
AUG.  8,  1988' 

Your  government  has  received  me  with 
great  cordiality,  grace,  and  dignity  de- 
spite the  incident  [bomb  explosion 
along  the  Secretary's  motorcade  route] 
this  morning.  I  am  deeply  grateful  to 
President  Paz  and  his  associates. 

In  recent  months,  I've  traveled  to 
the  Soviet  Union,  to  Western  Europe, 
to  the  Middle  East,  to  the  Far  East, 
and  now  to  Latin  America.  Everywhere 
there  is  a  sense  of  great  changes  under- 
way in  the  world.  Science  and  tech- 
nology are  transforming  the  materials 
we  use  and  the  work  we  do.  Today  we 
live  in  a  global  economy  in  which  inter- 
national manufacturing  processes  bring 
goods  and  raw  materials  from  around 
the  globe  to  the  market  of  choice.  An- 
other fact  is  the  global  financial  mar- 
ket— a  trillion  dollars  change  hands 
every  day,  according  to  some  estimates. 

We  don't  have  a  name  yet  to  cap- 
ture these  changes,  but  let  me  suggest 
one:  the  age  of  information.  For  what 
connects  all  of  these  new  developments 
is  knowledge,  its  discovery,  its  trans- 
mission, and  the  education  needed  to 
use  it.  Access  to  ideas  has  thus  become 
the  key  to  scientific  and  economic 
progress. 

Two  conclusions  can  be  drawn 
about  the  age  of  information. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1988 


15 


THE  SECRETARY 


First,  a  society  must  be  open  if  it 
hopes  to  take  advantage  of  new  oppor- 
tunities. Closed  societies,  isolated  econ- 
omies and  nations  will  not  be  able  to 
progress.  There  is  a  profound  political 
implication  here.  Democracy,  which  is 
justified  by  humane  values  that  go  be- 
yond economic  efficiency,  happens  to  be 
best  suited  to  the  new  age. 

Bolivia  has  clearly  understood  this, 
and  we  welcome  your  achievements  as  a 
democracy — not  the  easiest  path  but 
surely  the  best.  Freedom,  openness, 
individual  initiative,  and  individual 
responsibility — the  cornerstones  of  de- 
mocracy— are  also  the  building  blocks 
of  the  age  of  information. 

Second,  the  opportunities  and  the 
problems  presented  by  this  rapidly 
changing  world  often  transcend  national 
boundaries.  No  country  today  can  ex- 
pect to  prosper  apart  from  the  global 
economy.  Every  country  today,  includ- 
ing the  United  States,  needs  the  coop- 
eration of  allies  and  friends  to  deal  with 
mutual  dangers.  And  that  is  my  subject 
today:  how,  working  together,  we  can 
win  the  war  against  the  new  pirates  of 
the  20th  century,  the  narcotics  traf- 
fickers of  the  world,  who  threaten 
us  all. 

Bolivia  and  the  United  States  are 
two  of  the  many  allies  in  this  war.  As 
democracies,  we  understand  the  dan- 
gers of  failing  to  fight  such  a  ruthless 
and  pervasive  enemy.  And  as  the  larg- 
est single  market  for  illegal  drugs,  the 
United  States  has  a  special  responsibil- 
ity in  this  struggle — a  very  special 
responsibility. 

So  let  us  hold  a  council  of  war. 
What  are  we  doing  about  drugs,  as  in- 
dividual countries?  What  are  we  doing 
together?  And  what  more  can  we  do? 

U.S.  Efforts  To  Reduce  Consumption 

Many  here  and  elsewhere  continue  to 
ask:  "Is  the  United  States  really  doing 
enough  to  reduce  the  vast  American  de- 
mand for  drugs  at  the  heart  of  this 
trade?"  The  answer  is,  we  are  doing  a 
lot  but  not  enough — not  yet.  But  the 
answer  also  is  that  we  are  beginning  to 
do  what  needs  to  be  done — at  last. 

Americans  are  slow  to  anger,  but 
once  aroused,  we  know  how  to  take  ac- 
tion. Today  Americans  are  sickened  by 
the  sight  of  young  athletes,  who  should 
be  heroes,  throwing  their  lives  away 
through  drug  abuse;  by  children,  whose 
aspirations  are  perverted  to  a  life  of 
crime;  by  auto  and  train  accidents,  in- 
juring or  killing  the  innocent,  because 
of  drug  abuse;  by  evidence  of  drug  use 


by  those  entrusted  with  our  health,  our 
safety,  and  our  security;  by  the  interna- 
tional drug  cartels  that  make  the 
Capone  crowd  and  the  old  Mafia  look 
like  small-time  crooks. 

Americans  have  finally  begun  to 
say  "no"  to  drugs.  Drug-taking  is  now 
seen  increasingly  for  what  it  is:  death, 
not  life.  A  crucial  psychological  change 
has  taken  place,  especially  among  young 
Americans.  In  the  past  8  years,  we 
have  seen  dramatic  reductions  in  teen- 
age marijuana  abuse:  today  one  in  30 
students  report  using  marijuana  on  a 
daily  basis,  compared  to  one  in  nine  10 
years  ago.  Cocaine  use  among  young 
people  has  also  declined,  dropping  by 
one-third  last  year.  American  students 
are  saying  "no"  to  drugs  and  "yes"  to 
their  future. 

President  and  Mrs.  Reagan  have 
led  the  American  fight  against  drug 
abuse.  There  are  now  more  than  9,000 
groups  of  parents  working  in  commu- 
nities, sharing  information  and  tactics. 
Mrs.  Reagan's  ".Just  Say  No"  clubs  are 
influencing  a  new  generation  of  Ameri- 
can children.  Drug  education  and  pre- 
vention efforts  have  become  common  in 
our  schools,  from  kindergarten  on  up. 

Everybody  has  a  job  to  do — the 
churches,  the  workplaces,  the  govern- 
ment, coaches  and  athletes.  Every- 
where the  word  has  to  go  out:  "Don't 
take  drugs,  and  if  you  do,  we  are  going 
to  be  tough  as  nails."  It  is  not  a  matter 
of  choice,  and  it's  no  longer  a  careless 
attitude  of  "live  and  let  live."  No  cjuan- 
tity  of  drugs,  even  small  amounts  once 
considered  "personal  possession"  levels, 
will  be  tolerated — zero  tolerance.  Ve- 
hicles and  yachts  are  being  seized, 
offenders  are  being  fined,  and  our  en- 
forcement agencies  are  sending  a  loud 
message — no  one  is  above  the  law. 

We  are  saying  to  lawyers,  to  stock- 
brokers, to  doctors:  by  choosing  to  use 
drugs,  you  are  throwing  it  all  away — 
your  possessions,  your  standing  in  the 
community,  your  freedom.  Personal  re- 
sponsibility can  no  longer  be  denied. 

Our  law  enforcement  agencies  and 
courts  are  arresting  and  convicting 
more  drug  offenders  than  ever  before. 
Over  12,000  people  arrested  by  the 
U.S.  Drug  Enforcement  Administration 
were  convicted  of  drug  crimes  last  year, 
roughly  twice  the  number  in  1981.  In 
New  York  City  alone,  felony  drug  con- 
victions during  the  last  4  years  more 
than  tripled,  from  4,202  to  13,466. 

Over  the  last  10  years,  the  U.S. 
Coast  Guard  has  arrested  more  than 
8,500  drug  smugglers.  In  1983,  we 
formed  the  National  Narcotics  Border 


Interdiction  System,  led  by  Vice  Pres- 
ident Bush,  to  coordinate  Federal,  - 
State,  and  local  law  enforcement  effort, 
against  drug  smuggling  nationwide. 
Since  the  formation  of  the  border  inter- 
diction system,  annual  cocaine  seizures 
have  gone  up  twentyfold. 

The  Comprehensive  Crime  Control  I 
Act,  passed  in  1984,  helps  us  put  drug 
dealers  out  of  business  by  seizing  their  | 
assets.  Last  year,  over  $500  million  in  I 
drug-related  assets  were  seized  in  the 
United  States.  Since  1981,  we  have  tri-  | 
pled  the  antidrug  enforcement  budget,  i 
and  President  Reagan  has  asked  for  an! 
other  13%  increase.  That  would  give  th 
U.S.  Government  $3.9  billion  next  fiscii 
year  to  fight  the  drug  menace.  i 

Our  Congress  continues  its  crusad  \ 
to  eliminate  drugs  from  America.  The  | 
omnibus  drug  bill  now  being  considere  i 
reflects  the  recent,  important  changes  i 
we  have  seen  in  American  attitudes.     I 
Through  the  new  legislation,  Congress 
is  proposing  that  more  treatment  be     j 
made  available  to  users  who  seek  it  bi  i 
is  insisting  at  the  same  time  that  thosi 
who  refuse  to  be  treated  will  be  in 
trouble  with  the  law.  Proposals  have 
been  made  to  rescind  drivers  licenses 
young  people  who  are  discovered  usinj  ( 
drugs  and  to  withhold  Federal  priv-     j 
ileges,  such  as  student  loans. 

Strong  new  penalties  against  thos 
who  deal  in  illegal  drugs — the  peddler 
of  evil — are  being  developed.  Local  an 
Federal  law  enforcement  agencies  are 
being  given  increased  resources  and 
more  legal  tools  with  which  to  fight  a 
already  well-equipped  enemy.  Across 
the  board.  Congress  and  the  Executi^ 
are  proposing  a  number  of  measures  t 
augment  the  order  of  battle  at  home 
and  to  help  our  allies  abroad. 

Anyone  who  doubts  that  the  Am( 
ican  people  are  serious  about  eliminat 
ing  drug  abuse  ought  to  take  a  good 
look  at  any  opinion  poll,  any  news- 
paper, and  every  political  speech.  Dri 
abuse  is  the  number  one  election  issu 
And  the  drug  trade  is  the  number  oni 
enemy. 

So  that  is  the  news  from  the  nort 
We  are  mobilizing  fully  to  wage  this 
war  at  home;  to  cut  demand.  We  are 
going  to  win. 

Challenges  Facing  South  America 

Let  me  turn  now  to  the  situation  on 
this  continent — what  you  face,  what 
you  are  doing,  and  how  we  can  help. 
Physicians  and  scientists  tell  us 
that  drug  addiction  does  not  usually  i 
suit  from  massive  doses  but  from  sm; 


16 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  198 


THE  SECRETARY 


ounts.  The  addict  believes  that  he  or 

can  stop  "at  any  time."  Soon  it  is 
t!J)  late.  The  poison  attacks  the  brain 
Sill  the  body,  and  the  victim  soon  loses 
Ifalth,  will,  and  personality. 
«    Similar  things  can  happen  to  a 
Bjmtry.  The  cultivation  of  the  coca 
jj.nts  or  of  marijuana  for  illicit  pur- 
ines starts  small,  in  isolated  places, 
lople  say,  "It's  always  been  grown 
lire,  and  it  is  being  used  in  dangerous 
fys  elsewhere,  so  how  can  it  harm 
a'"  There  is  good  money  in  it,  and  the 
dig  dealers  like  to  behave  like  Robin 
Fods.  They  buy  allies. 

The  economy  of  narcotics  prospers, 
slI  soon  a  country's  political  institu- 
tns  are  undermined.  Its  constitution 
tcomes  a  scrap  of  paper,  while  the 
f  ardians  of  its  independence  are  cor- 
tpted — whether  they  be  soldiers  or  ci- 
tians.  And  everything  goes,  including 
.■  f-ri'spect  and  sovereignty. 

ritimately,  drugs  destroy  the  moral 
( jric  of  society.  That  is  why  drugs  and 
imocracy  are  permanent  enemies. 
'  'mocratic  thinkers  from  Thomas 
fftTsim  to  Victor  Paz  Estenssoro  have 
lulit  that  democracy  rests  upon  cer- 
in  ethical  foundations.  Ultimately, 
1  If-government  in  the  political  sense 
peiids  on  self-government  in  the  per- 
nal  and  moral  sense.  There  can  be  no 
miiriimises  here.  A  person  must  say 
(>"  to  drug  abuse  or  eventually  he  will 
y  "no"  to  life.  A  nation  must  say  "no" 
narcotics  or  eventually  it  will  say 
•  lO"  to  democracy. 

And  what  could  be  more  destruc- 
ve  to  a  nation  than  a  systematic  at- 
■ck  on  its  natural  resources?  Look  at 
jru.  Experts  agree  that — unless  coca 
iltivation  and  cocaine  processing  are 
opped  soon — the  Upper  Huallaga  Val- 
y  could  be  reduced  to  a  toxic  waste 
jmp.  Slash-and-burn  agriculture  is 
•oding  the  soil.  Hired  coca  farmers  are 
irelessly  using  chemicals  and  fertil- 
ers.  Processors  have  dumped  millions 
niters  of  kerosene,  sulfuric  acid, 
cetone,  and  toluene  into  the  valley's 
ivers  and  ground  water.  When  the  sun 
its  the  Huallaga  River  at  just  the 
ight  angle,  the  chemical  pollution — a 
ellow  color — can  be  seen  from  the  air. 
'hat's  the  color  of  a  dying  land. 

tecent  Developments 
n  Bolivia  and  Colombia 

50,  the  challenges  are  cleai-.  What  is 
)eing  done  in  the  region  about  it?  I  will 
omment  on  developments  in  several 
countries  but  concentrate  on  two  that 
re  very  different — Bolivia  and 
'olombia. 


Bolivia.  Here  in  Bolivia,  despite 
strong  opposition,  your  Congress  has 
passed  a  comprehensive  antinareotics 
law.  You  have  kept  your  national  pledge 
to  the  world  community  to  outlaw  all 
coca  cultivation  beyond  that  raised  in 
specific  areas,  in  certain  quantities,  for 
traditional  uses.  You  have  defined  the 
crimes  of  illicit  narcotics  production, 
processing,  and  trafficking  and  spec- 
ified the  penalties  for  breaking  the  law. 
You  have  voluntarily  eradicated  over 
2,000  hectares  of  coca  over  the  past 
year — fulfilling  the  letter  of  your  inter- 
national commitments.  You  have  cap- 
tured and  jailed  Roberto  Suarez,  a 
leader  among  the  international  drug 
criminals. 

All  of  this  has  been  difficult.  The 
pirates  and  warlords  of  the  drug  busi- 
ness have  fought  you  at  every  step, 
with  money,  intimidation,  and  violence. 
But  there  can  be  no  question  that 
Bolivia  has  made  the  right  choice.  We 
salute  you  for  that  choice. 


A  person  must  say  "no" 
to  drug  abuse  or  eventu- 
ally he  will  say  "no"  to 
life.  A  nation  must  say 
"no"  to  narcotics  or  even- 
tually it  will  say  "no"  to 
democracy. 


We  have  made  the  same  choice. 
This  morning's  explosion  brings  that 
home.  There  is  no  turning  back.  The 
traffickers  want  us  to  look  the  other 
way.  The  terrorists  want  us  to  run  and 
hide.  To  both  I  say:  "You  have  picked 
on  the  wrong  people.  The  democracies 
will  not  be  intimidated.  Bolivia  and  the 
United  States  will  stand  together.  We 
will  win  this  war." 

When  the  history  of  the  war  against 
narcotics  is  written,  Bolivia  will  rank 
high.  Millions  who  are  young,  still  more 
millions  not  yet  born  will  owe  you  a 
priceless  debt  of  gratitude. 

There  are  many  lessons  to  be 
learned  from  the  Bolivian  experience. 
Perhaps  the  most  important  is  that  a 
country's  own  strength  to  act  against 
the  drug  menace  can  be  multiplied 
many  times  more  through  international 
cooperation.  A  number  of  countries — 
including,  very  much,  the  United 
States  through  the  State  Department's 
International  Narcotics  Control  Pro- 
gram and  using  development  and  other 


economic  assistance  fund.s — have 
pledged  the  monies  necessary  to  sup- 
port the  unique  Bolivian  combination  of 
economic  incentive  and  law  enforce- 
ment. And  your  own  legislative  deci- 
sions have  mandated  that  the  "Bolivian 
way"  must  be  made  a  reality. 

The  U.S.  Congress  has  looked  at 
your  law  and  your  performance  with 
great  interest,  and  I  trust  that  your 
steady  commitment  will  convince  the 
members  of  our  legislative  body  of  your 
serious  intentions.  To  sum  up,  the  drug 
traffickers  are  in  trouble  in  Bolivia. 

Colombia.  In  Colombia,  the  coun- 
try is  under  siege.  Narcotics  traffickers 
and  guerrillas,  often  operating  together 
in  criminal  conspiracy,  threaten  Colom- 
bian democracy.  The  Medellin  cartel,  as 
evil  a  bunch  as  exists  anywhere,  has 
murdered  many  officials  and  citizens 
whose  sin  it  was  to  stand  up  for  the 
rule  of  law,  the  honor  of  Colombia,  de- 
mocracy, and  just  plain  human  decency. 
They  are  in  cahoots  with  other  evil- 
doers. The  FARC  [Revolutionary 
Armed  Forces  of  Colombia]  guerrillas 
protect  the  traffickers  in  some  areas 
and  produce  their  own  drugs  in  others. 
Then  there  is  the  M-19,  a  new  "Murder 
Incorporated,"  hired  by  the  drug  car- 
tels to  kill  those  who  oppose  them,  as 
we  saw  in  the  attack  on  the  Palace  of 
Justice  3  years  ago. 

The  Government  of  Colombia  is 
fighting  back.  The  Colombian  mili- 
tary— in  its  largest  and  most  successful 
operation  to  date  in  the  country's  drug 
interdiction  history — recently  seized 
over  3,000  kilos  of  cocaine,  a  cache 
of  sophisticated  weapons,  and  large 
amounts  of  the  chemicals  used  to  man- 
ufacture the  drug.  Air  force  and  army 
units  combined  to  force  down  two  traf- 
ficker planes  at  a  clandestine  airfield, 
where  the  cocaine  was  seized.  This  is 
only  the  latest  example.  To  date  in 
1988,  Colombian  military  and  law  en- 
forcement units  have  seized  15  tons  of 
cocaine  hydrochloride  (HCL)  or  equiv- 
alent; 680  cocaine  HCL  labs  have  been 
destroyed,  compared  to  183  for  the 
same  period  in  1987. 

We  in  the  United  States  cannot  and 
will  not  stand  aside  from  this  battle. 
We  are  going  to  help  give  Colombia  the 
tools  it  needs  to  win  this  war.  The  U.S. 
Congress  is  considering  passage  of  leg- 
islation to  permit  the  Export-Import 
Bank  to  guarantee  financing  of  loans  to 
governments  like  that  of  Colombia  for 
the  purchase  of  weapons  and  other  mili- 
tary equipment  to  use  in  the  war  on 
the  traffickers. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1988 


17 


THE  SECRETARY 


Progress  in  Other  Countries 

What  about  other  countries  in  the 
region?  After  a  rough  start,  we  are 
seeing  some  progress. 

Peru.  As  producer  of  half  the 
world's  coca  leaf,  Peru  has  long  been 
aware  of  the  dangers  posed  by  drug 
trafficking  to  its  democracy  and  its 
physical  environment.  President  Garcia 
began  his  presidency  determined  to 
stamp  out  this  vile  trade.  His  govern- 
ment has  now  pledged  a  program  of 
large-scale  eradication  of  coca,  includ- 
ing the  use  of  herbicides,  once  a  safe 
and  effective  product  is  identified 
and  fully  tested.  A  small  army  has 
been  mobilized  in  the  remote  Upper 
Huallaga  Valley  to  fight  the  traffickers. 
The  United  States  provides  financial 
and  logistical  aid,  but  it  is  the  Peruvian 
Gitardia  Civil  that  is  fighting  the  bat- 
tles and  taking  the  casualties  in  the 
.struggle  to  defend  Peru's  institutions. 
The  drug  merchants  and  terrorists  have 
joined  in  a  deadly  marriage  of  conve- 
nience whose  only  common  ground  is 
contem])t  for  democracy  and  humanity. 

Ecuador.  Ecuador  today  is  totally 
free  of  coca  cultivation  because  of  a 
determined  governmental  effort  sup- 
ported by  the  United  States  to  desti-oy 
the  crop.  But  trafficking  in  illicit  drugs 
and  precursor  chemicals  is  up  and  has 
contributed  to  a  substantial  rise  in  local 
drug  addiction. 

Other  Governments.  As  this  sug- 
gests, the  problem  is  changing  all  the 
time.  The  Venezuelan  Government  has 
had  to  move  against  increasing  traf- 
ficker use  of  its  territory.  Brazil's  vast 
border  regions  have  been  an  inviting 
lure  to  cultivation  for  trafficking.  Ar- 
gentina has  become  a  major  locus  of 
cocaine  movement  to  Europe  and  the 
United  States.  But  all  three  govern- 
ments are  now  alert  to  the  problem  and 
are  taking  action  against  the  traf- 
fickers. Last  month,  Argentine  au- 
thorities were  able  to  seize  1,200 
pounds  of  cocaine  and  disrupt  a  major 
drug  network. 

Unfortunately,  no  country  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere,  including  my 
own,  has  yet  been  able  to  control  ade- 
quately the  movement  of  coca,  or  paste, 
or  cocaine,  or  the  precursor  chemicals 
which  make  it  all  possible.  That's  a  sad 
but  accurate  conclusion.  We  are  all 
fighting  this  war,  and  we  have  made 
some  headway.  Yet  the  fact  is  that  de- 
spite the  money  spent,  the  laws  passed, 
and  the  lives  lost,  there  is  more  cocaine 
entering  the  United  States  and  Europe 
from  South  America  than  ever  before. 


We  have  failed  to  stop  the  enemy.  We 
are  responsible  because  the  demand  for 
drugs  still  exists,  and  you  are  responsi- 
ble because  the  drugs  are  still  being 
produced  and  shipped  northward. 

As  the  U.S.  National  Drug  Policy 
Board  recently  reported,  the  pool  of 
people  using  drugs  has  diminished,  but 
the  pool's  drug  consumption  has  risen. 
Clearly,  though  we  are  allies,  we  have 
not  helped  each  other  enough.  And 
that's  the  key  to  it — to  increase  our 
ability  to  act  and  our  will  to  act 
through  international  cooperation.  This 
is  an  international  problem,  and  we 
must  deal  with  it  on  an  international 
basis  if  we  want  to  succeed. 

Future  Efforts 

Where  do  we  go  from  here?  Let  me 
suggest  some  directions. 

First,  do  not  give  up  the  fight. 
That's  what  it  would  mean  if  we  legal- 
ized narcotics.  We  do  not  want  a  nation 
of  addicts.  Neither  do  you.  And  you 
don't  want  to  make  the  drug  syndicates 
even  more  powerful  in  your  countries. 

Second,  mobilize  more  of  our  re- 
sources, our  key  institutions:  the  mili- 
tary, as  in  Colombia;  the  legislators,  as 
in  Bolivia;  the  media  and  the  private 
sector,  as  in  the  United  States;  the 
schools,  the  churches,  the  workplaces, 
the  home. 

Third,  expand  international  cooper- 
ation among  the  nations  cursed  by  the 
drug  trade.  The  Toronto  economic  sum- 
mit in  June  called  for  more  cooperation 
against  "all  facets"  of  the  drug  trade, 
particularly  production,  trafficking,  and 
financing.  The  summit  also  supported 
the  adoption  of  a  UN  convention  on  il- 
licit trafficking.  This  convention  is  a 
Latin  American  initiative,  and  it  is 
Latin  American  leadership  that  has 
brought  rapid  progress  toward  its  com- 
pletion in  Vienna  in  November. 

Great  changes  have  already  been 
taking  place  in  this  hemisphere,  once 
known  for  its  nationalistic  border  dis- 
putes. Direct  law  enforcement  coopera- 
tion is  becoming  the  norm — as  among 
Ecuador,  Colombia,  and  Peru;  the  An- 
dean nations  together  in  their  regional 
antidrug  communications  network;  and 
the  specific  agreements  that  Brazil  has 
concluded  with  its  neighbors.  We  all 
recognize  the  fact  that  the  problem  is 
greater  than  any  individual  country,  in- 
cluding the  United  States. 

Six  weeks  ago  in  Washington,  a 
precedent-setting  meeting  of  the  lead- 
ers of  the  Andean  Parliament  and  of 


our  own  Congi-ess  produced  a  joint  dec- 
laration symbolic  of  this  sense  of  re- 
gional responsibility  and  commitment. 
The  declaration  recognized  "the  menac 
that  organized  narcotrafficking  repre- 
sents for  the  security  and  the  continua 

tion  of  democracy "  It  insisted  on  th. 

setting  of  specific  goals  for  the  com- 
plete elimination  of  both  consumption 
and  production  of  narcotics.  It  called 
for  concrete  measures  to  combat  drug 
money  laundering.  And  it  asked  for  th' 
development  of  "an  international  strat- 
egy and  inter-American  mechanisms  ol 
cooperation  in  the  fight  against  the  il- 
legal production,  traffic,  and  use  of 
drugs." 

Our  Congress — from  Chairman  [ol 
the  Select  Committee  on  Narcotics  j 
Abuse  and  Control]  Rangel  to  Con-  | 
gressman  Oilman  to  Senators  D'Amat(| 
Kerry,  Murkowski,  and  DeConcini,  allj 
of  whom  contributed  to  that  meeting  ( j 
legislative  leaders — championed  those  | 
goals.  [Bolivian]  Vice  President  Garrc 
was  there  with  his  Andean  colleagues 
and  can  take  pride  in  his  role  in  that 
effort.  And  we — the  State  Departmen 
Justice,  Ti'easury,  and  Defense — will  i 
our  part,  specifically: 

•  We  must  continue  to  refine  and 
expand  the  State  Department's  Interi 
tional  Narcotics  Control  Program,  no' 
contributing  some  $100  million  a  year 
worldwide  (almost  half  of  that  in  Soul 
America)  to  law  enforcement  and  oth 
antidrug  efforts. 

•  We  must  expand  our  military  a 
sistance  programs  to  those  countries 
where  the  direct  cooperation  of  the  d 
fense  establishment  with  civilian  age 
cies  is  essential  if  the  war  against  thi 
traffickers  and  their  allies  is  to  be  \v( 

•  We  must  revise  our  own  laws  a 
procedures  which  have  made  it  diffici 
to  provide  useful  assistance  to  foreigi 
military  or  police  forces.  That  means 
doing  something  about  security  as- 
sistance prohibitions  imposed  in  the 
1960s  out  of  fear  that  such  assistance 
might  strengthen  dictatorships.  How 
tragic  it  is  that  these  laws  now  hamji 
our  help  for  democracies  so  urgently 
in  need.  Limitations  on  what  kind  of 
credit  and  guarantees  our  Export- 
Import  Bank  can  provide  are  also  pa 
of  the  ])roblem.  We  hope  that  the  on  ■ 
bus  drug  bill  now  moving  through  th 
Congress  will  address  these  issues. 

•  We  must  continue  to  remembe 
that  coca  eradication  has  economic  r;  i 
ifications.  With  the  Europeans  and  i  i- 
ers,  we  should  continue  to  provide     ^ 
assistance  to  help  countries  make  th 
transition  to  a  legal  economy. 


18 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1!I8 


THE  SECRETARY 


f    Let  me  sum  it  up.  We  in  the 
Uiited  States  are  ready  to  help,  and  we 
I  need  to  help  each  other.  We  may  be 
king  at  the  turning  point  in  this  war: 
a  United  States  aroused  at  last  to 
courage  consumption,  reduce  de- 
ind,  punish  the  users  and  the  sup- 
ers; at  a  United  States  generous  and 
derstanding  of  its  allies  in  this  strug- 
i;  at  allies  who,  like  Bolivia,  aim  at 
;  total  elimination  of  the  illicit  crop 
»thin  a  reasonable  period  of  time;  at 
t?  determined  and  rapid  destruction  of 
t?  laboratories,  of  the  aircraft  and 
liding  fields;  at  the  arrest,  trial,  con- 
^;tion,  and  jailing  of  the  so-called 
hgpins;  at  the  seizure  of  the  traf- 
ikers'  assets;  at  the  new  hemisphere- 
nle  conviction  that  a  free  people,  in 
imocratic  consultation,  can  beat  its 
nst  powerful  enemies;  in  short,  at  the 
picniacy  of  law,  the  assertion  of  sov- 
fiuiUy,  and  the  safeguarding  of  our 
oi)les'  health  and  honor,  dignity,  and 
curity. 

The  war  against  narcotics  can 
d  must  be  won. 


EWS  CONFERENCE, 

;(;.  s,  1988S 

•esident  Paz  and  Foreign  Minister 
■adregal  and  all  of  their  associates 
jive  treated  me  with  great  cordiality, 

tid  I  am  deeply  appreciative.  They  and 
hers  expressed  indignation  at  the  in- 
dent this  morning  and  told  me  that  it 
no  way  represented  the  sentiments 
■  the  people  of  Bolivia.  I  told  them 
lat  I  interpreted  it  not  as  anything 
-■motely  anti-American,  but  rather  anti 
le  things  that  we  and  Bolivia  stand 
ir:  democracy,  decency,  the  rule  of  law. 
fe  will  not  be  intimidated,  as  the 
olivian  Government  will  not  be 
itimidated. 

Two  inescapable  conclusions 
merged  from  my  trip  to  South  Amer- 
;a  and  discussions  here  in  Bolivia. 
'irst,  human  dignity  and  freedom  can 
e  secured  only  through  a  constant 
ommitment  to  democracy  and  demo- 
ratic  values.  Second,  economic  growth 
nd  social  justice  can  only  be  secured 
hrough  a  constant  commitment  to  eco- 
lomic  openness  and  reform. 

Bolivia  has  made  both  of  these 
:ommitments.  Under  the  courageous 
eadership  of  President  Victor  Paz  Es- 
enssuro,  with  the  support  of  the  pact 
or  democracy,  Bolivians  have  made  a 
:ommitment  to  freedom  and  openness. 


Their  commitment  deserves  the  recog- 
nition and  backing  of  the  democratic 
community  throughout  the  world. 

As  I  noted  in  my  speech  earlier 
today,  Bolivia  is  also  committed  to  the 
war  against  narcotics  trafficking.  The 
program  to  eradicate  coca  and  the 
tough  new  law  on  controlled  substances 
make  clear  where  Bolivia  stands  on  this 
priority  issue.  The  capture  of  trafficker 
kingpin  Roberto  Suarez  is  a  sure  sign 
of  the  seriousness  and  skill  with  which 
Bolivia  is  enforcing  the  law.  The  United 
States  supports  and  will  continue  to 
support  Bolivia's  strenuous  efforts  in 
our  common  battle  against  drug  traf- 
ficking. Our  efforts  against  drug  traf- 
ficking reaffirm  and  protect  the 
political  and  economic  freedoms  that 
citizens  of  both  our  countries  cherish. 
Bolivia's  progress  in  all  these  areas 
over  the  last  3  years  is  truly 
impressive. 

Q.  You  came  in  a  crusade  against 
drugs  to  Bolivia,  and  I  want  to  ask 
you  if  your  government  has  knowl- 
edge that  the  increase  of  drug  traf- 
ficking is  affecting  the  congress  in 
Bolivia. 

A.  It  is  clear  enough  that  your  con- 
gress stepped  up  to  the  problem  in 
passing  the  most  recent  law,  and  I  ad- 
mire that  and  respect  that  effort  of 
theirs.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  law  is 
an  interesting  one  among  laws  around 
the  world  on  this  subject.  So  much  so 
that  I  know  we  are  studying  it,  and  our 
own  Congress  is  studying  it  to  see  if  in 
some  way  it  might  be  useful  for  us  as 
well.  I  certainly  applaud  the  action  of 
your  congress. 

Q.  I  would  like  to  know  the  rea- 
sons for  the  delay  of  your  government 
in  giving  the  funds  committed  for  the 
battle  against  drug  trafficking.  We 
know  that  only  11%  of  the  committed 
money  was  given  until  now,  so  isn't 
this  a  contradiction  of  the  facts  and 
what  you  say? 

A.  No,  the  money  is  there.  In 
order  for  it  to  get  disbursed,  there  are 
certain,  somewhat  stubborn,  admin- 
istrative issues  that  need  to  get 
straightened  out.  There  is  one  thing 
that  we  agreed  on  with  the  Government 
of  Bolivia  by  way  of  a  criterion  that 
both  we  and  the  Government  of  Bolivia 
think  doesn't  give  us  enough  flexibility. 
We  are  working  on  both  these  matters. 
We  feel  that  these  problems  are  very 
soluble  problems.  One  of  the  things 
that  I  think  comes  strongly  out  of  my 
meetings  is  a  determination  on  both 
sides  to  establish  exactly  what  these 
problems  are  and  then  work  through 
the  solutions.  We  intend  to  do  that. 


But  the  money  is  there,  and  it  will 
come.  We  want  to  see  that  those  re- 
sources flow  to  correct  the  problem.  It 
isn't  a  question,  so  to  speak,  of  the 
United  States  helping  Bolivia.  It  is  a 
question  of  a  problem  that  we  both 
have.  We  have  a  partnership  in  doing 
something  about  it.  We  have  to  put  into 
that  partnership  as  you  do,  and  we  will. 

Q.  I  want  to  ask  you  with  regards 
to  the  economic  problem.  I  under- 
stand you  had  a  meeting  in  the  after- 
noon with  the  economic  team,  as  well 
as  representatives  of  your  delegation. 
Therefore,  I  would  like  to  know  if  it 
is  true  that  the  United  States  will 
help  us  in  the  negotiations  with  the 
Club  of  Paris. 

A.  That  subject  was  discussed  and, 
I  think,  illuminated  in  a  creative  way.  I 
don't  want  to  hold  out  the  idea  that 
there  is  some  new  solution  there,  but 
certainly  it  is  something  that  needs  to 
be  worked  on,  and  we  are  prepared  to 
work  on  it. 

Let  me  say  that  our  discussions 
with  the  economic  team  covered  several 
interesting  issues.  Among  the  things 
that  I  carry  away  from  that  meeting 
and  also  the  meeting  that  President  Paz 
organized  with  many  members  of  his 
cabinet  present — all  of  whom  spoke  in 
one  way  or  another  about  particular 
problems — one  thing  that  I  carry  away 
is  the  great  competence  of  the  economic 
team  and  its  leadership,  the  Minister  of 
Planning,  and  the  others  and  of  the 
cabinet  generally. 

When  people  sense  that  Bolivia  is 
on  the  right  track,  that  your  programs 
are  succeeding,  and  that  the  people 
who  are  managing  things  have  compe- 
tence and  good  sense,  that  increases 
confidence  and  leads,  I  think,  to  addi- 
tional things  that  can  be  done. 

Q.  The  coca  leaf  has  been  culti- 
vated in  Bolivia  for  many  centuries. 
The  present  government  has  decided 
on  a  crop  substitution  and  now,  at  the 
suggestion  of  the  United  States,  it  is 
eradicating  the  crop.  Don't  you  think 
that  the  consumer  countries  have  also 
a  responsibility  as  well,  and  they 
should  make  more  efforts  to  combat 
drug  trafficking  instead  of  putting 
the  burden  on  the  poor  countries  like 
us  who  don't  have  the  economic 
means? 

A.  First  of  all,  as  far  as  Bolivia  is 
concerned,  it's  the  illicit  coca  produc- 
tion that  is  the  target.  In  your  law, 
which  I  noted  with  admiration  and  re- 
spect, that's  clear. 


ir\^^^u.^^  nnoo 


THE  SECRETARY 


Second,  I  tried  to  make  it  plain  in 
the  talk  that  I  just  gave — and  I  hope 
you  get  a  copy  of  it  and  take  a  look  at 
it — that  there  is  a  deep  responsibility 
for  this  problem  in  the  user  countries, 
the  consuming  countries,  the  United 
States,  because,  after  all,  it  is  this  big 
demand  for  drugs  that  creates  a  market 
that  people  then  come  to  supply. 

We  have  to  do  our  job  in  getting  at 
drug  use  and  helping  you  and  others 
get  at  the  illicit  production  and  traffick- 
ing and  money  laundering  and  so  on 
that  go  with  it.  We  have  tasks  to  do 
and  you  have  tasks  to  do;  it's  a  joint 
enterprise.  I  am  not  in  any  way  trying 
to  say  that  here  is  a  problem,  and  it  is 
a  problem  caused  just  by  the  people 
who  supply  drugs.  That's  part  of  it,  but 
also  part  of  it  is  things  that  we  need  to 
do  in  the  United  States.  I  tried  to  be 
very  clear  about  that. 

I  am  encouraged  in  the  United 
States  that  we  are  much  more  alert  to 
this  problem  and  working  on  it  much 
harder  I  have  been  working  on  this 
issue  in  the  United  States  for  a  long 
time.  When  I  was  Secretary  of  Labor, 
when  I  was  Director  of  the  [Office  of 
Management  and]  Budget,  and  Secre- 
tary of  Ti'easury  back  in  the  late  1960s 
and  early  1970s,  we  were  working  on 
the  problem  and  we  did  things.  But  I 
sense  now  a  much  more  thorough-going 
effort,  a  much  deeper  commitment.  In 
a  sense,  the  fact  that  it  is  a  big  political 
issue  in  the  United  States  is  a  good 
thing,  because  it  shows  the  people,  as 
they  assess  our  various  political  con- 
tests, are  placing  a  priority  on  doing 
something  about  this  problem,  and  I 
believe  that's  a  very  good  thing. 

Q.  In  your  conference  you  said 
that  this  morning's  attempt  was  prob- 
ably carried  out  by  drug  traffickers. 
What  was  the  basis  for  this  assertion? 

A.  What  I  said  was  that  those  who 
carried  it  out  were  the  enemies  of  de- 
cency and  democracy.  Whether  they  are 
traffickers,  terrorists  from  some  other 
school,  or  some  combination — and  we 
know  that  people  of  this  background 
have  not  hesitated  to  use  violence  and 
to  attack  the  governments  that  are  try- 
ing to  do  something  about  what  they 
are  doing. 

As  far  as  the  particulars  of  exactly 
who  is  responsible  for  this  incident,  I 
don't  have  any  information.  I  don't  put 
forward  an  accusation  against  any  par- 
ticular individual  or  group,  but  the  tac- 
tic of  using  violence  to  try  to  intimidate 


or  scare  off  government  officials  is  the 
kind  of  tactic  that  we  have  to  fight 
against.  I  think  it  is  important  to  note 
that  your  government  and  mine  were 
not  deterred,  not  intimidated.  We  car- 
ried through  our  schedule  as  we  had 
planned  it,  and  we  will  continue  to  fight 
this  war  on  that  basis. 

Q.  You  will  be  leaving  shortly 
now  for  Central  America.  We  are  at 
the  first  anniversary  of  the  Arias 
peace  plan,  as  it  was  called.  I  wonder 
what  are  your  thoughts  on  whether 
the  plan  has  accomplished  anything 
in  the  past  year,  its  promises,  its 
failures?  I  know  that  about  a  year 
ago,  people  in  the  Administration  felt 
that  there  were  faults  in  the  plan. 
How  do  you  feel  a  year  later? 

A.  1  think  the  Esquipulas  agree- 
ment had  a  great  deal  of  merit  to  it, 
and  it  did  have  e.xplicit  operational 
things  having  to  do  with  democracy.  I 
think  it  was  a  positive  development,  as 
have  been  some  of  the  other  agree- 
ments that  followed  it,  particularly  the 
meeting  in  San  Jose.  That  was  kind  of 
an  assessment,  and  people  were  quite 
candid  in  their  assessment. 

It  is  too  bad  that  we  can't  declare 
that  the  plan  has  succeeded  in  the 
sense  that  we  see  peace  in  Central 
America.  We  don't.  We  have  to  continue 
to  struggle  at  that  problem.  Certainly 
peace  is  the  objective.  I  think  Presi- 
dent Arias  has  made  a  great  contribu- 
tion, as  have  the  others  who  worked 
that  plan  out.  But  we  have  to  follow 
through,  and  we  have  to  help  them  fol- 
low through. 

The  situation  we  see,  broadly 
speaking,  in  Central  America  now,  as 
compared  with  earlier  years,  is  that 
whereas  there  was  once  one  democracy, 
there  are  now  four.  In  those  four  de- 
mocracies, there  is  now  economic 
growth  in  each  one,  varying  amounts, 
and  in  each  one  inflation  is  under  good 
control. 

In  the  other  country,  we  see  still  a 
government  that  feels  it  must  break  up 
opposition  rallies,  cancel  publication 
rights  of  newspapers,  broadcast  rights 
of  radio  stations,  and  various  other  acts 
of  repression  against  their  population. 

At  the  same  time,  in  economic 
terms,  the  incomes  per  capita  have 
fallen  in  half,  and  inflation  has  gone  to- 
tally out  of  control,  in  a  manner  that 
you  here  in  Bolivia  are  familiar  with 
from  your  past  terrible  experience 
which  you.  President  Paz,  and  you  all 
have  cured. 


There  is  a  big  problem  there  for 
the  people  of  Nicaragua  and  the  people 
of  the  region.  For  the  region,  of  course, 
it  is  particularly  troubling,  because 
Nicaragua — despite  the  fact  that  it  is  a 
complete  failure — has  a  very  big  army, 
heavily  equipped  with  Soviet  arms, 
and,  therefore,  it's  a  menace  to  its 
neighborhood.  There  is  still  a  big  prob- 
lem a  year  later.  Even  so,  it's  good  to 
keep  working  for  peace. 

I  will  be  going  back  to  Central 
America.  I  look  forward  to  meeting 
with  President  Arias  tomorrow  morn- 
ing and  President  Azcona  and  the  Act- 
ing President  of  El  Salvador,  as  I  met 
with  President  Cerezo  earlier  on  this 
trip. 

Q.  We  would  like  to  know  if  you 
are  going  to  help  us,  because  as  far  a 
what  we  received  in  aid,  it  is  not 
enough.  We  have  decreased  the  coca 
cultivation;  therefore,  are  we  going  t 
receive  additonal  aid? 

A.  We  want  to  help  ourselves — we 
want  to  help  by  stimulating  others  to 
pitch  in.  We  want  to  encourage  the 
ideas  that  will  work.  A  question  was 
asked  earlier  about  some  resources  th: 
have  been  appropriated,  but  haven't 
flowed  in  the  way  that  we  want.  We'll 
get  that  cleared  up.  That's  what  we 
want  to  do,  and  we  fully  recognize  the 
breadth  and  difficulty  of  the  problem. 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
AUG.  8,  19889 

Terrorist  tactics,  such  as  used  against! 
Secretary  Shultz  and  his  motorcade  intt 
Bolivia  today,  are  always  repugnant. 
Thankfully,  the  Secretary's  party  was 
not  injured,  but  the  fact  remains  that 
an  attack  on  U.S.  officials  cannot  be 
tolerated.  We  ask  the  Government  of 
Bolivia  to  bring  those  responsible  to 
justice. 


■Press  release  166  of  Aug.  3,  1988  (re 
marks  by  the  Central  American  foreign 
ministers  are  translations  from  Spanish).. 

-Made  at  a  luncheon  hosted  by  Argeij 
tine  Foreign  Minister  Dante  Caputo  (pre) 
release  168  of  Aug.  4). 

^Press  release  169  of  Aug.  5. 

<Press  release  171  of  Aug.  12. 

^Press  release  172  of  Aug.  5. 

sPress  release  178  of  Aug.  8. 

'Press  release  181  of  Aug.  12. 

"Press  release  185  of  Aug.  11. 

■'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Aug.  15.  ■ 


Deoartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  19 


THE  SECRETARY 


Secretary's  Trip  to  East  Asia 
and  the  Pacific 


Secretary  Shultz  departed  the  United  States 
July  5,  1988,  to  visit  Thailafid  (July  6-9) 

to  participate  in  the  annual 

Association  of  South  East  Asian  Nations 

(ASEAN)  postministerial  conference 

and  then  visited  Malaysia  (July  9), 

Indonesia  (July  9-11),  Philippines  (July  11-13), 

Hong  Ko7ig  (July  IS-U),  China  (July  IJ^-W), 

South  Korea  (July  16-18),  Japan  (July  18-20), 

and  the  Marshall  Islands  (July  20) 

to  meet  with  government  officials 

arid  private  sector  groups.  His  trip  concluded 

on  July  21  ivith  an  address 

at  the  East-West  Center  in  Honolulu. 

Following  are  various  statements,  addresses, 

and  toasts  made  during  his  trip. 


'ENING  STATEMENTS, 
"ASEAN  POSTMINISTERIAL 
CONFERENCE, 
\NGKOK, 

ILY  7  AND  8,  1988 

ly  7  Statement' 

le  high  regard  I  have  for  ASEAN  and 
r  our  chairman  [Foreign  Minister  of 
lailand  Siddhi  Savetsila]  is  no  secret 
anyone  here  today.  For  more  than 
!0  decades,  ASEAN  has  given  its 
embers  the  strength  to  stand  up  to 
lallenges  which  might  otherwise  have 
'erwhelmed  them.  The  agenda  before 
i  shows  that  ASEAN  has  by  no  means 
lived  all  the  issues  facing  it.  But, 
lanks  to  ASEAN,  Southeast  Asia  is  a 
lore  peaceful,  more  stable,  and  more 
rosperous  place  than  most  of  us  could 
ave  imagined  20  years  ago. 

Before  we  begin  our  discussions, 
would  like  to  say  a  few  words  about 
ome  of  the  key  issues  before  us.  The 
Jnited  States  remains  deeply  con- 
erned  about  the  suffering  of  the  Cam- 
lodian  people  and  the  continued  threat 
vhich  the  presence  of  over  100,000 
/ietnamese  troops  poses  to  Thai  se- 
'urity  and  regional  stability. 

We  steadfastly  support  ASEAN's 
ifforts  to  achieve  a  Cambodian  settle- 
nent.  We  applaud  the  skill  with  which 
VSEAN  has  marshaled  international 


opposition  to  Vietnam's  actions  in  that 
tortured  country.  Vietnam  recently 
announced  it  would  withdraw  50,000 
troops  from  Cambodia  by  year-end,  and 
it  apparently  will  participate  in  the  pro- 
posed talks  in  Indonesia,  which  Foreign 
Minister  Alatas  is  so  ably  organizing. 
The  Soviet  Union  has  also  asserted  its 
willingness  to  promote  a  political  solu- 
tion in  Cambodia.  These  signs  of  possi- 
ble progress  are  in  large  part  due  to 
ASEAN's  admirable  determination  not 
to  let  aggression  go  unanswered.  We 
need  to  remain  alert  for  opportunities 
to  move  toward  a  settlement,  but  stead- 
fast— and  wary — until  we  can  be  sure 
Vietnam  is  genuinely  committed  to  seri- 
ous negotiations  and  complete  troop 
withdrawal. 

To  achieve  the  kind  of  settlement 
we  want,  and  which  Cambodia  must 
have,  we  must  keep  up  our  strong  sup- 
port for  Prince  Sihanouk  and  the  non- 
communist  elements  of  the  coalition. 
They  represent  the  political  alternative 
to  the  Vietnamese  occupation  and  the 
Khmer  Rouge,  and  they  are  key  to  a 
Cambodian  settlement. 

We  must  also  keep  diplomatic  and 
economic  pressure  on  Hanoi.  ASEAN 
can  rely  on  America's  constancy  in  this 
regard.  We  do  not  pursue  these  policies 
out  of  malice  toward  Vietnam.  On  the 
contrary,  we  look  forward  to  the  time 
when  Vietnam  will  once  again  rejoin 


the  community  of  nations.  We  have 
stated  repeatedly  we  look  forward  to 
the  normalized  relations  with  Vietnam 
in  the  conte.xt  of  a  Cambodian  settle- 
ment. It  is  in  this  spirit  we  have  been 
attempting  to  resolve  the  POW/MIA 
[prisoner  of  war/missing  in  action]  issue 
which,  so  long  as  it  is  unresolved,  will 
divide  our  peoples.  Some  progress  has 
been  made,  but  we  believe  it  critically 
important  for  Vietnam  to  move  quickly 
on  this  issue  this  year.  The  American 
people  e.xpect  it,  and  it  is  clearly  in 
Vietnam's  own  national  interest.  At  the 
same  time,  Vietnam  must  realize  that 
our  commitment  to  a  free  and  independ- 
ent Cambodia  is  unswerving,  and  that 
we  will  stay  the  course  until  this  goal 
is  achieved. 

In  the  coming  months,  diplomatic 
activity  seems  likely  to  quicken,  and 
there  could  be  real  movement.  The 
Cambodian  conflict  cannot  go  on  indefi- 
nitely. It  is  to  no  one's  advantage  that 
it  continue.  We  now  need  to  e.xpand  our 
already  e.xtensive  consultations  on  this 
issue.  We  also  need  to  work  with  our 
Cambodian  allies  to  define  more  clearly 
the  outline  of  an  acceptable  settlement 
which  comprises  the  specifics  of  Viet- 
namese withdrawal,  sets  in  motion  a 
viable  process  of  national  reconciliation 
and  addresses  the  Khmer  Rouge  prob- 
lem. China  is  clearly  giving  serious 
thought  to  these  issues,  reflected  in  its 
statement  of  July  1,  and  we  will  con- 
tinue our  dialogue  with  Beijing  as  well. 
The  United  States  remains  unalterably 
opposed  to  the  Khmer  Rouge  ever  again 
taking  control  of  Cambodia,  and  we  be- 
lieve it  is  essential  that  any  settlement 
have  adequate  safeguards  to  prevent 
this.  By  addressing  this  problem  now, 
and  developing  effective  measures  to 
ensure  that  the  Khmer  Rouge  can 
never  come  back,  we  also  remove 
Hanoi's  main  pretext  for  remaining  in 
Cambodia. 

The  continuing  refugee  crisis  is,  of 
course,  also  at  the  top  of  our  agenda. 
The  dramatic  surge  in  boat  refugee  ar- 
rivals on  ASEAN  shores,  a  perception 
of  lessened  commitment  on  the  part  of 
resettlement  nations,  and  gi'owing  im- 
patience in  the  region,  have  placed  in 
jeopardy  the  decade-long  consensus 
that  has  sustained  a  generous  policy 
of  first  asylum  in  Southeast  Asia. 
The  United  States  remains  deeply  con- 
cerned about  the  plight  of  refugees  in 
this  region  and  the  vital  necessity  of 
maintaining  first  asylum.  We  want  to 
work  with  ASEAN  governments  and 
others  to  develop  a  comprehensive  and 
revitalized  approach  to  deal  with  Indo- 
chinese  refugees,  one  that  meets  to- 
day's circumstances.  Accomplishing  this 


leDartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1988 


21  _ 


THE  SECRETARY 


East  Asia 


I      I  ASEAN  members 


7715    8-88    STATE    (INR/GE) 


goal  will  require  our  collective  political 
will,  patience,  and  steadfastness  be- 
cause there  is  no  simple  or  quick 
solution. 

I  believe  you  are  all  familiar  with 
the  proposals  the  United  States  has  put 
forward  for  consideration  regarding  ref- 
ugees. Their  objective  would  be  to  dis- 
courage clandestine  departures  from 
Vietnam,  maintain  resettlement  offtake 
of  eligible  groups  in  order  to  keep  the 
total  first-asylum  population  at  tolera- 
ble levels,  press  Vietnam  to  broaden  ac- 
cess by  its  citizens  to  programs  for 
legal  and  orderly  departure,  and  per- 
sist in  the  search  for  other  options. 


including  an  acceptable  voluntary  re- 
patriation program.  We  think  these 
proposals  form  a  pragmatic  basis  on 
which  to  build  a  renewed  consensus  to 
handle  the  problem  of  increased  refugee 
outflows.  They  are  also,  of  course, 
aimed  at  bolstering  first  asylum  in  the 
region.  I  urge  that  the  first-asylum 
countries  and  our  partners  in  the  inter- 
national community  give  careful  atten- 
tion to  these  proposals  so  that  a  new 
and  viable  consensus  can  be  established 
and  humanitarian  interests  served. 

We  have  carefully  noted  the  foreign 
ministers  joint  statement  on  refugees, 
and  we  share  its  concerns  and  support 
its  proposals.  The  United  States  could 


support  an  international  conferenceMf, 
by  vii'tue  of  its  timing,  content,  and, 
especially,  commitment,  it  could  actu- 
ally achieve  a  constructive  result.  We 
would  envisage  the  formation  of  a  mul- 
tilateral working  group  in  Bangkok 
made  up  of  the  ASEAN  nations,  their 
dialogue  partners,  and  the  UNHCR 
I  UN  High  Commissioner  for  Refugees] 
to  discuss  a  compi'ehensive  refugee 
strategy  and  undertake  visits  to  vari- 
ous capitals  to  sound  out  the  views  of 
other  nations.  Such  a  working  group 
could  identify  and  refine  realistic  op- 
tions. In  addition,  it  could  craft  new 
approaches  that  could  be  implemented 
immediately  and  could  also  assess  the 
prospects  and  necessary  conditions  for 
a  successful  international  conference. 

In  the  meantime  let  me  emphasize 
once  again  our  message  to  the  first- 
asylum  countries:  you  do  not  stand 
alone.  While  we  attempt,  together,  to 
find  a  humane  means  to  dissuade  the 
citizens  of  Vietnam  from  undertaking 
the  terrible  dangers  of  clandestine  de- 
parture, the  United  States  will  con- 
tinue to  work  hard  to  improve  the 
orderly  departure  program.  We  will 
also  continue  to  share  the  financial  bu 
den  with  the  first-asylum  countries 
through  our  contributions  to  interna- 
tional refugee  organizations.  And,  we 
will  continue  to  offer  high  levels  of 
resettlement  opportunities  for  refu- 
gees who  arrive  in  the  first-asylum 
countries. 

We,  of  course,  are  mindful  that  th 
refugee  pi'oblems  of  this  region  are 
rooted  not  in  the  first-asylum  countri 
but  in  the  countries  from  which  refu- 
gees flee,  and  this  is  w-here  those 
problems  must  ultimately  be  solved. 
Concerted  diplomatic  efforts  are 
needed  to  convince  Hanoi,  in  particull 
to  adopt  the  kinds  of  political  and  ecO' 
nomic  policies  that  will  permit  their 
countrymen  to  live  productive  lives  aU 
home. 

The  commitment  of  the  United 
States  to  resolve  the  Indochinese  refi 
gee  problem  is  strong  today,  as  it  has 
been  in  the  past.  We  have  come  a  lonji 
way  and  have  many  extraordinary  ac- 
complishments to  be  proud  of.  Now  w 
solemnly  recommit  ourselves  to  stay 
the  course. 

I'd  like  to  turn  to  another  subjea 
of  immediate  concern  to  all  of  us:  int« 
national  trade.  Over  the  past  decade, 
rapid  changes  in  the  global  economy 
have  increased  the  need  to  strengthe 
and  expand  the  GATT  [General  Agre 
ment  on  Tariffs  and  Ti-ade]  rules  of 
trade.  GATT  has  focused  primarily  a 


Denartm(>nt  of  State  Bulletin/OctobeiUtS 


THE  SECRETARY 


jide  in  manufactured  goods,  while  ag- 
ifultural  trade  has  been  sheltered 
,|)ni  GATT  discipline.  In  addition,  a 
ijmber  of  "new  areas"  not  covered  by 
*|\.TT  have  become  far  more  important 
Si  international  economic  relations, 
'iiese  include  trade-related  aspects  of 
iltional  investment  policies,  intellec- 
Jial  property  rights  protection,  and 
fede  in  services.  At  the  same  time, 
'le  number  of  trading  countries  has 
{own  sharply  as  developing  economies, 
linu  e.\port-led  development  strat- 
1  it>,  have  increased  their  level  of  in- 
csti'ialization.  The  more  successful 
nong  the  newly  industrialized  econo- 
lies  now  need  to  take  on  a  greater 
arr  (if  responsibility  for  ensuring  the 
alth  of  the  international  economy, 
nfortunately,  throughout  the  world, 
action  to  these  and  other  changing 
•  onomic  circumstances  has  too  often 
jme  in  the  form  of  increasing  protec- 
nnism,  which  in  turn  threatens  to 
idermine  the  multilateral  trading  sys- 
m.  In  response  to  this  challenge, 
\TT  members,  at  U.S.  urging,  agreed 
Punta  del  Este  to  launch  the  most 
nbitious  round  of  trade  negotiations 
er,  aimed  at  revitalizing  and 
rcngthening  GATT. 

Thus  far,  general  results  have  been 
icouraging.  More  proposals  from  more 
untries  on  more  subjects  have  been 
it  foi'ward  in  this  round  than  in  any 
•evidus  round.  The  proposal  for  com- 
ete  reform  of  agricultural  trade  and 
le  abolition,  over  time,  of  costly  and 
ade-destroying  subsidies  is  supported 
i  /  the  United  States  and  the  Cairns 
I  "oup,  of  which  many  of  you  are  mem- 
ars.  There  are  also  concerns  about  our 
1  "fort  to  bring  the  new  areas  under 
ATT  discipline.  Since  the  Uruguay 
ound  is  scheduled  to  conclude  in  1990, 
16  mid-term  review  in  Montreal  in 
'ecember  1988  will  be  a  crucial  test 
?  progress  and  could  provide  an  im- 
ortant  political  impetus  to  GATT 
egotiations. 

A  successful  mid-term  review  will 
olster  confidence  in  the  future  of  the 
lultilateral  trade  regime  and  curb  pro- 
ectionist  pressures  on  governments.  In 
ome  areas,  such  as  GATT  dispute  set- 
lement  and  surveillance  over  members' 
iractices,  we  hope  to  reach  agreement 
ly  the  mid-term  review.  In  other  areas, 
1  broad  framework  agreement  on  some 
undamental  principles  should  be 
ichievable.  We  believe  this  will  send  an 
mportant  signal  that  GATT  members 
ire  seriously  committed  to  improve  the 
nultilateral  trading  system. 

We  appreciated  receiving,  prior 
0  the  Toronto  summit,  ASEAN's  views 


on  key  economic  issues,  conveyed  to  us 
by  the  Bruneian  Ambassador  to  Wash- 
ington. We,  of  course,  shared  many  of 
your  concerns,  and  I  think  it  fair  to  say 
that  the  summit  addressed  them  in 
helpful  ways:  it  gave  a  boost  to  the 
GATT  process;  it  singled  out  agricul- 
ture for  special  treatment;  it  stressed 
the  need  to  remove  obstacles  to  trade 
and  promote  open  markets;  it  affirmed 
a  market-oriented,  case-by-case  ap- 
proach to  debt,  with  particular  consid- 
eration to  the  poorest  of  the  poor 
debtor  countries;  and,  it  gave  special 
attention  in  Asia  to  the  Philippines. 


in  my  public  statement  at  the  opening 
session  yesterday. 

Rather  than  dwelling  on  these 
pressing  matters  now,  however,  I  want 
to  use  my  final  postministerial  confer- 
ence statement  to  explore  some  key 
new  trends  in  the  world,  and  the  im- 
pact I  believe  they  will  have  on  our 
fundamentally  sound  relationship. 

The  first  point  I  would  make  is 
that  major  changes  are  underway  in  the 
world — changes  in  virtually  every  area 
from  science  to  superpower  relations. 
For  all  of  us,  understanding  and  manag- 
ing change  will  be  crucial. 


.  .  .  thanks  to  ASEAN,  Southeast  Asia  is  a  more  peace- 
ful, more  stable,  and  more  prosperous  place  than  most 
of  us  could  have  imagined  20  years  ago. 


The  summit  leaders  also  reaffirmed 
our  strategy  in  dealing  with  East- West, 
Cambodia,  and  Middle  East  matters 
and  added  to  our  efforts  to  combat  ter- 
rorism and  broke  new  ground  and  work 
on  the  problems  associated  with  drugs. 

The  overall  outlook  at  Toronto,  I 
should  add,  was  upbeat;  the  economies 
of  the  industrialized  democracies  are 
doing  very  well,  and  this  has  good  im- 
plications for  you. 

So,  these  are  a  few  of  the  key 
issues  my  government  is  anxious  to 
tackle  over  the  next  3  days.  I  will  not 
take  up  any  more  of  our  limited  time. 
We  have  a  full  agenda  before  us,  and  I 
look  forward  to  hearing  what  my  col- 
leagues have  to  say. 

July  8  Statement^ 

We  Americans  often  speak  about  things 
"coming  full  circle;"  that  certainly  fits 
in  my  situation  today.  Several  of  you 
will  recall  that  I  first  met  with  you  at 
the  ASEAN  postministerial  conference 
here  in  Bangkok  5  years  ago.  Today,  I 
meet  with  you  at  a  postministerial  con- 
ference for  the  last  time. 

In  the  past,  I  have  used  this  open- 
ing statement  to  focus  on  the  regional 
issues  to  which  we  give  the  highest  pri- 
ority. This  year,  I  think  we  all  agree 
that  the  issues  of  greatest  interest  to 
all  of  us  are  Cambodia,  refugees,  and 
trade.  I  look  forward  to  reviewing 
these  questions  with  you  in  detail  dur- 
ing the  closed  session  to  follow.  Of 
course,  I  did  speak  about  each  of  these 


The  United  States  has  done  a  good 
job  over  the  years  in  adapting  to 
change,  which,  in  fact,  seems  to  be  a 
characteristic  of  our  society.  I  have 
been  impressed,  in  the  years  I  have 
been  coming  to  these  meetings  in  the 
various  member  countries,  by  the  ob- 
vious capacity  of  ASEAN  nations  to 
cope  with  change,  manage  it,  focus  it. 
Your  policies  have  been  pragmatic,  flex- 
ible, and  increasingly  market  oriented, 
and  the  results  speak  for  themselves. 

While  you  and  we  are  meeting  to- 
day's challenges,  we  must  also  prepare 
ourselves  for  tomorrow's.  The  world  is 
changing  in  ways  which  will  require  all 
of  us  to  discard  outdated  habits  of 
thought  and  keep  making  room  for  new 
possibilities.  Developments  in  science 
and  social  organization  are  altering  the 
world  profoundly — too  profoundly  for 
conventional  thinking  to  grasp.  History 
suggests  that  mankind  rarely  under- 
stands or  can  articulate  transforma- 
tional change  while  it  is  coming  about. 
As  language  catches  up  with  the  pace 
of  change,  new  definitions  and  descrip- 
tions are  coined  to  describe  it.  I  believe 
we  have  entered  such  a  period  of 
sweeping  change. 

The  very  material  substances 
which  surround  us  in  everyday  life  are 
being  transformed.  Physically,  syn- 
thetic materials  make  objects  lighter, 
stronger,  and  more  durable.  Fiberoptics 
are  transforming  efficiency  and  conven- 
ience of  international  communications. 
These  new  substances  are  changing  so- 
cieties and  economies  as  well,  because 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1988 


23 


THE  SECRETARY 


their  emergence  affects  supply  and  de- 
mand for  natural  raw  materials  and  en- 
tirely opens  up  new  areas  of  economic 
activity. 

The  same  scientific  progress  that 
has  altered  the  nature  of  these  basic 
materials  has  also  accelerated  the  speed 
of  human  transactions.  Time  is  meas- 
ured in  ever-smaller  units.  Success  in 
every  field  depends  increasingly  on  how 
quickly  ideas  can  be  transformed  into 
practical  reality.  The  ease  with  which 
information  now  flows  internationally 
has  already  created  a  global  financial 
market  that  operates  almost  instanta- 
neously on  an  "information  standard." 
Markets  are  no  longer  just  places,  but 
really  electronic  networks. 

Along  with  these  alterations  in 
substances  and  speed  have  come 
changes  in  magnitude.  Today's  scien- 
tific, economic,  and  political  trends 
have  global  consequences.  The  amount 
of  money  that  changes  hands  in  the 
global  financial  market  in  1  day,  for  in- 
stance, exceeds  $1  trillion — or  about 
the  same  as  the  entire  budget  of  the 
U.S.  Government  for  1  year.  Such  flows 
transcend  national  boundaries  and  can 
overwhelm  rigid  economic  policies. 

Similarly,  manufacturing  processes 
are  becoming  global  in  scale.  As  firms 
increasingly  source,  produce,  and  mar- 
ket on  a  worldwide  basis,  the  distinc- 
tion between  what  is  "foreign"  and 
what  is  "made-at-home"  blurs. 

The  thread  that  runs  through  all 
these  trends  is  knowledge:  its  discov- 
ery, its  rapid  transmission,  and  the  ed- 
ucation needed  to  use  it.  Access  to 
ideas,  no  matter  where  they  are  devel- 
oped, is  becoming  the  key  to  scientific 
and  economic  progress.  I  know  that 
many  of  your  governments'  leaders 
grasp  the  importance  of  this  point.  The 
over  46,000  ASEAN  students  in  Ameri- 
can colleges  and  universities  alone,  for 
example,  attest  to  this  fact.  This  and 
similar  investments  in  the  creation  of 
human  capital  show  remarkable  pre- 
science and  will  pay  high  dividends  as 
we  enter  this  new  era. 

By  contrast,  countries  which  can- 
not or  will  not  compete  in  the  global 
marketplace  of  goods,  services,  and 
ideas  will  find  themselves  falling  behind 
the  advanced  innovators  and  producers. 
Other  nations — single  commodity  coun- 
tries and  agricultural  and  industrial 
subsistence  economies — face  the  danger 
of  becoming  marginal  participants  in 
the  world  economy. 

As  I  review  the  remarkable  record 
of  ask; AN  over  the  past  21  years,  it  is 
evident  that  your  countries  have  in  dif- 
ferent ways — and  in  different  combina- 


tions—melded traditional  culture  and 
modernity  in  a  successful  adaptation  to 
the  requii-ements  of  the  coming  age. 
A  new  generation  of  leaders  will 
come  to  the  fore  in  ASEAN  in  the  dec- 
ade ahead.  It  will  be  better  educated 
and  maybe  more  worldly  than  its  prede- 
cessor was  in  the  beginning.  However, 
this  new  generation  will  not,  by  and 
large,  have  the  experience  of  World 
War  II  or  of  the  struggle  for  independ- 
ence. Nor  will  it  have  faced  and  over- 
come the  challenge  of  building  a 
cohesive  nation  and  viable  economy, 
while  simultaneously  overcoming  do- 
mestic communist  insurgencies.  But 
they  will  face  the  daunting  challenges 
of  the  new  era  I  have  described.  I 
would  like  to  suggest  three  clear  guide- 
lines for  a  new  generation  of  leaders, 
whether  of  ASEAN  or  of  the  United 
States. 

First,  societies  must  be  open  to 
this  new  age  of  knowledge  and  informa- 
tion. Resistance  to  ideas  and  insularity 
deaden  hope  of  progress  and  can 
threaten  to  leave  societies  drifting  in 
the  wake  of  sweeping  change.  You  will 
not  be  surprised  to  hear  me  say  that  I 
am  convinced  the  idea  of  democracy, 
which  depends  on  openness,  personal 
freedom,  individual  initiative,  and  inno- 
vation, remains  the  best  political  frame- 
work within  which  to  deal  with  the 
stress  and  the  opportunities  of  change. 

It  is  precisely  for  this  reason,  I 
think,  that  we  see  a  powerful  impulse 
to  adopt  institutions  and  values  around 
the  globe  that  are  consistent  with  open- 
ness and  freedom.  Just  a  few  years 
ago,  democratic  nations  were  thought 
to  be  a  dwindling  and  embattled  minor- 
ity. Today,  the  idea  of  democracy  is 
among  the  most  important  political 
forces  of  our  time.  It  takes  different 
forms  in  different  places,  shaped  always 
by  the  special  historical,  cultural,  and 
societal  forces  that  exist  in  any  given 
country.  But  it  is  a  strengthening  trend 
ai-ound  the  world. 

Second,  encourage  the  use  of  in- 
centives, enterprise,  and  decentraliza- 
tion in  economic  activity.  Overcentral- 
ized  planning  and  decisionmaking  sys- 
tems cannot  cope  with  the  multiplicity 
of  choices  any  government  or  society 
has  before  it.  And  when  a  central  plan- 
ner with  massive  power  makes  a  mis- 
take, it's  a  "beaut,"  which  is  hard  to 
rectify.  The  free  operation  of  the  mar- 
ketplace— for  goods  and  ideas — is  a  far 
more  efficient  arbiter  of  decisions. 

The  third  guideline  would  be  to 
seek  enhanced  cooperation.  The  global 
nature  of  changes  in  science,  in  eco- 
nomics, and  in  communications  must  be 


matched  by  greater  political  interac- 
tion. We  can  already  see  the  emergence 
of  new  coalitions — both  functional  and 
regional — of  like-minded  nations.  As 
you  in  ASEAN  have  demonstrated,  re- 
gional associations  of  nations  can  pro- 
vide an  indispensable  milieu  for 
political  economic  cooperation.  The 
combined  voice  of  the  several,  devel- 
oped through  a  process  of  consulta- 
tions, consensus  building,  and  mutual 
support,  can  have  a  much  greater  im- 
pact than  the  single  voices  of  individual 
members.  Moreover,  a  group  of  nations 
sharing  a  regional  locus  and  broad  po- 
litical outlook  can  more  effectively  deal 
with  the  impact  of  scientific  and  tech- 
nological advances  on  political,  eco- 
nomic, and  social  developments. 

These  are  really  the  reasons  I  re- 
gard attendance  at  these  postminis- 
terial  conferences  a  most  necessary 
event  on  my  calendar.  I  come  here  eaci 
year  because  of  my  admiration  for 
"aSEAN's  remarkable  achievements  an» 
in  recognition  of  the  substantial  inter- 
ests we  share.  I  regard  ASEAN  and  i1 
leaders  as  examples  of  those  who  are 
most  skillfully  positioning  themselves 
to  meet  the  challenges  ahead.  I  have 
confidence  that  you  and  those  who  fol- 
low you  will  continue  the  policies  of 
pragmatism,  openness,  and  cooperatioi 
which  have  served  the  ASEAN  nation* 
so  well  over  the  past  two  decades.  We 
in  the  United  States  look  forward  to  a 
continuing,  strong,  and  mutually  bene- 
ficial relationship. 

ADDRESS  BEFORE  THE 

ASSOCIATION  OF  INDONESIANll 

ECONOMISTS, 
JAKARTA, 
JULY  11,  1988' 

I  have  come  to  Southeast  Asia  many 
times  before,  and  I'm  planning  to  com 
back  again,  as  often  as  I  can.  But  I  an 
meeting  with  you  today  for  the  last 
time  as  Secretary  of  State.  This  is  noil 
my  "farewell  address,"  but  it  is  my 
"end-of-term"  report  to  you  on  the  cun 
rent  state  of  America,  Asia,  and  the 
global  economy. 

We  live  in  a  time  when,  for  many 
people,  the  words  "Pacific"  and  "futur 
are  nearly  synonymous.  That  is  becau 
we  can  characterize  as  successful  whai 
is  going  on  in  the  Pacific  world  that  y« 
and  we  share. 

Take  a  look  at  how  we're  doing  in; 
the  United  States:  since  1982,  the  U.& 
economy  has  created  16  million  new 
jobs.  U.S.  unemployment  is  now  dowi 
to  5.3%.  U.S.  growth  has  recently  av* 
aged  over  3%  in  real  terms,  and  infla- 
tion has  been  low  and  stable  at  less 


24 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1911 


THE  SECRETARY 


;>an  4Vc.  U.S.  production  of  manufac- 
Ires  exceeded  $800,000  million  in  198(5 
id  has  risen  steadily  every  year  since 
•82.  Productivity  in  manufacturing  has 
isen  more  than  4%  during  the  1980s. 

The  U.S.  current  balance  of  trade 
declining,  perhaps  more  rapidly  than 
eople  expected  or  are  prepared  for. 
he  U.S.  budget  deficit,  which  is  one  of 
le  smallest  in  proportion  to  GNP 
:Toss  national  product]  among  the 
E("I)  [Organization  for  Economic  Co- 
)iTation  and  Development]  countries, 
ift  reduction  targets  in  1987.  The  re- 
jctions  planned  for  this  year  and  next 
•e  nil  target.  OECD  forecasts  show 
eadv  reductions  of  our  deficit  in  pro- 
n-ti.in  to  GNP  to  2.4%  in  1988  and  a 
ro.iected  1.9%  in  1989. 

And  now,  look  at  ASEAN  [Associa- 
011  (if  South  East  Asian  Nations]:  with 
pnpulation  of  300  million  people,  the 
X  ASEAN  countries  have  achieved 
mil'  iif  the  world's  highest  growth 
It.  s  (luring  the  1960s  and  1970s.  In 
'NT.  they  averaged  5.4%.  The  forecast 
11-  UIS8  was  .5.7%'. 

ASEAN  trade  with  the  world  has 
uicased  steadily  and  is  now  in  moder- 
te  surplus.  ASEAN's  exports  rose 
:-i;in  .$71.4  billion  in  1985  to  $84.1  billion 
1  U),S7  and  are  forecast  to  reach  $95.2 
illion  this  year.  Meanwhile,  ASEAN's 
iiIHirts  rose  less  rapidly,  from  $69.8 
illiiin  in  1985  to  an  even  $80  billion  in 
Vxl:  in  1988,  imports  should  increase 
0  $90.9  billion.  As  a  result,  ASEAN's 
rade  surplus — $1.6  billion  in  1985 — rose 
0  $4.1  billion  in  1987  and  is  expected  to 
ncrease  slightly,  to  $4.3  billion,  this 
,  ^ear. 

I        Between  1980  and  1987,  ASEAN 
[trade  both  ways  with  the  United  States 
•ose  from  $22  billion  to  $27  billion — an 
ncrease  of  26.5%' — and  U.S.  investment 
;more  than  doubled  to  a  present  total  of 
labout  $10  billion. 

Success  in  an  Age 

of  Information  and  Change 

What  accounts  for  this  very  positive 
record?  Success  comes  from  political 
stability;  being  part  of  a  large  and  open 
market:  and  allowing  market  signals, 
incentives,  and  enterprise  to  operate. 
And  government  is  as  important  for 
what  it  does  not  do  as  for  what  it  does. 
This  is  "old  thinking,"  but  it  is  be- 
ing newly  discovered  all  over  the  world, 
to  the  great  benefit  of  all  who  discover 
it — even  if  they  call  it  "new  thinking." 
These  ideas  have  renewed  vitality  now 
and  for  the  future  because  of  the  emer- 
gence of  an  "information  age"  with  vast 
implications  for  finance,  production  of 


Pacific  Community  Forum 


Excerpt  from  question-and-answer  ses- 
sion following  the  Secretary's  address 
before  the  Association  of  Indonesian 
Economists  in  Jakarta  on  July  11." 

There  are  many  private  organizations 
and  some  official — perhaps,  particularly, 
the  Asian  Development  Bank— that  pro- 
mote discussion  and  take  certain  func- 
tions on  in  this  broad,  specific  area. 
Now  I  think  that  is  all  for  the  good. 

But  I  do  think  we  could  benefit  from 
some  sort  of  forum  that  is  governmental 
in  its  base  and  provides  for  a  systematic 
discussion  by  governments  of  key  is- 
sues from  which  we  could  benefit.  I  tried 
to  list  some  in  a  kind  of  example-like 
fashion.  Now  insofar  as  how  you  would 
put  that  together  and  who  should  be  in- 
cluded, and  so  on,  that's  obviously  a  dif- 
ficult question  because  the  Pacific  Basin 
is  so  huge.  You  have  a  lot  of  South 


American  countries  that  are  on  the  Pa- 
cific, got  a  lot  of  North  American  and 
Asian,  and  so  on.  Just  who  needs  to  be 
included  and  how  to  do  that  is  a  prob- 
lem, because  you  want  an  organization 
that  IS  effective. 

You  also  mentioned  the  importance 
of  having  a  concept  that  includes  having 
like-minded  countries  and  doesn't  ex- 
clude important  countries  that  perhaps 
might  become  like-minded.  I  agree  with 
that — that  also  illustrates  a  potential  is- 
sue, or  problem,  in  this  regard.  So  I 
don't  come  here  with  a  specific  sugges- 
tion all  packaged  up  and  ready  to  say, 
"here."  What  I  am  trying  to  do  is  encour- 
age the  pace  of  discussion  of  this  prob- 
lem, or  this  opportunity,  and  to  just 
underline  it,  move  it  along  and  identify 
some  of  the  things  that  could  be  of 
interest. 


goods  and  services,  international  trade 
and  investment,  and  political  and  stra- 
tegic relationships  among  nations. 

For  all  of  us,  understanding  and 
managing  change  has  become  crucial 
and  will  be  ever  more  so  in  the  future. 
The  United  States  is  doing  just  fine  in 
adapting  to  change — it  is  a  basic  char- 
acteristic of  our  society.  And  ASEAN 
nations  also  are  showing  themselves  to 
be  pragmatic,  flexible,  and  increasingly 
market  oriented. 

But  success  is  never  permanent.  To 
stay  successful  we  must  stay  alert,  ana- 
lyze swiftly,  and  act  decisively.  This  is 
because  the  world  is  being  altered,  and 
profoundly — too  profoundly  to  be  com- 
prehended by  traditional  thinking. 

The  very  material  substances 
which  surround  us  in  everyday  life  are 
being  transformed.  Synthetic  materials 
and  other  new  substances  are  changing 
societies  and  economies.  Their  emer- 
gence affects  supply  and  demand  for 
natural  raw  materials  and  opens  up  en- 
tirely new  areas  of  economic  activity. 

Scientific  progress  has  accelerated 
the  speed  of  human  transactions.  The 
ease  with  which  information  now  flows 
internationally  has  already  created  a 
global  electronic  financial  network  that 
operates  almost  instantaneously  on  an 
"information  standard." 

Along  with  these  revolutions  in 
speed  and  substance  have  come  explo- 
sions in  magnitudes.  The  amount  of 
money  that  moves  in  the  global  finan- 
cial market  in  one  day,  for  instance, 
exceeds  some  $1  trillion — or  about  the 
same  as  the  entire  annual  expenditures 


of  the  U.S.  Government.  Such  flows 
transcend  national  boundaries  and  can 
overwhelm  rigid  economic  policies. 

Manufacturing  processes  similarly 
are  becoming  global  in  nature.  As  firms 
increasingly  source,  produce,  and  mar- 
ket on  a  worldwide  basis,  the  distinc- 
tion between  what  is  foreign  and  what 
is  made  at  home  blurs.  Forty  percent  of 
U.S.  imports  come  from  movements  of 
goods  or  services  between  subsidiaries 
of  multinational  firms. 

The  thread  that  runs  through  all 
these  trends  is  knowledge.  Access  to 
ideas,  no  matter  where  they  are  devel- 
oped, is  the  key  to  progress.  Invest- 
ment in  human  capital  will  pay  high 
dividends  in  the  era  ahead. 

By  contrast,  countries  which  can- 
not or  will  not  compete  in  the  new 
global  marketplace  inexorably  will  fall 
behind.  Single  commodity  economies 
and  isolationist  economies  will  become 
marginal  participants  in  the  world 
economy. 

In  contrast,  our  countries  are 
adapting  fairly  successfully  to  the  re- 
quirements of  the  coming  age.  We  want 
this  to  continue.  A  new  generation  of 
leaders  will  come  to  the  fore  in  our 
countries  in  the  decade  ahead.  It  will 
not  have  experienced  the  great  strug- 
gles of  war  and  independence  or  the 
political  and  economic  tasks  of  nation 
building.  Few  will  have  been  tested  by 
the  bitter  battles  against  communism. 

For  this  they  can  be  counted  as  for- 
tunate— and  we  can  take  some  credit. 
Hard  experience  steeled  and  sharpened 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1988 


25 


THE  SECRETARY 


the  older  generation.  For  the  new  gen- 
eration coming  up,  I  suggest  three 
guidelines  useful  to  all  of  us. 

•  First,  societies  must  be  open  to 
this  new  age  of  knowledge  and  informa- 
tion. Resistance  to  ideas  will  leave  so- 
cieties drifting  in  the  wake  of  sweeping 
change.  Democracy,  which  depends  on 
openness,  personal  freedom,  individual 
initiatives,  and  innovation,  remains  the 
best  political  framework  for  facing  the 
stresses  and  opportunities  of  change. 

This  is  why  we  see  a  powerful  im- 
pulse around  the  globe  to  move  to  open- 
ness and  freedom.  Today  the  idea  of 
democracy — shaped  by  the  historical, 
cultural,  and  societal  forces  of  each 
country — is  the  most  important  political 
force  of  our  time.  Democracy  is  not  a 
panacea,  but  it  is  the  best  way  of  find- 
ing answers. 

•  Second,  we  must  rely  on  incen- 
tives, enterprise,  and  the  market.  Cen- 
trahzed  planning  and  decisionmaking 
systems  cannot  cope  with  the  multi- 
plicity of  choices  any  government  or  so- 
ciety has  before  it.  When  a  central 
planner  with  massive  power  makes  a 
mistake,  it's  a  "beaut."  The  free  opera- 
tion of  the  marketplace,  for  goods  and 
ideas,  is  by  far  the  most  efficient  ar- 
biter of  decisions. 

•  The  third  guideline  is:  enhance 
cooperation.  The  global  nature  of 
changes  in  science,  in  economics,  and 
in  communications  must  be  matched 
by  greater  political  interaction.  As 
ASEAN  has  demonstrated,  regional  as- 
sociations of  nations  can  promote  politi- 
cal and  economic  cooperation  without 
loss  of  individuality.  Consultation,  con- 
sensus building,  and  mutual  support 
can  have  much  greater  impact  than  the 
separate  voices  of  individual  members. 

Challenges  to  Future  Success 

These  are  guidelines  for  the  next  gen- 
eration. But  right  here  and  now  there 
are  problems  we  need  to  identify  and 
solve  if  we  are  to  e.xtend  our  winning 
ways  into  the  future.  Let  me  take  brief 
note  to  some  of  these  issues — interna- 
tional, regional,  and  domestic. 

International  Economic  Coopera- 
tion. One  of  the  most  significant  global 
developments  over  the  years  since 
World  War  II  is  the  extent  to  which 
free  market  nations  have  cooperated 
to  strengthen  growth  on  the  broad- 
est possible  basis.  These  hard-won 
achievements  must  be  cultivated  and 
reinforced. 


26 


The  Uruguay  Round  of  multilateral 
trade  negotiations  is  crucial  to  the  long- 
tei-m  health  of  the  world  trading  sys- 
tem. We  need  to  build  momentum  for 
reform  at  the  ministerial  mid-term  re- 
view in  Montreal  in  December.  Frame- 
works must  be  established  there  for 
negotiating  long-term,  market-oriented 
reforms  of  trade  in  agriculture,  includ- 
ing tropical  products,  and  institutional 
improvements  in  the  GATT  [General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade]  sys- 
tem. We  also  must  reach  agreements 
for  dealing  with  the  "new  issues"  of 
services,  intellectual  property  rights, 
and  trade-related  investment  measures 
such  as  export  performance  and  import 
substitution  requirements. 

All  GATT  members  have  a  stake  in 
the  success  of  the  new  round  and  the 
strengthening  of  an  open  world  trading 
system.  This  is  particularly  true  for  the 
East  Asian  economies — developed  and 
developing — which  have  benefited  so 
greatly  from  the  liberalization  of  world 
trade.  They  have  a  special  responsibil- 
ity in  Geneva  for  helping  less  developed 
countries  understand  the  importance  of 
open  trade  to  their  own  opportunities 
for  growth. 

Regional  Economic  Cooperation. 

Our  annual  meetings  in  Bangkok  last 
week  demonstrated  ASEAN's  recogni- 
tion of  the  importance  of  stronger  and 
more  far-reaching  ties  to  the  global 
economy.  In  the  ASEAN-U.S.  eco- 
nomic dialogue,  we  have  developed  to- 
gether an  ASEAN-U.S.  initiative — a 
joint  research  project  to  seek  oppor- 
tunities for  expanding  trade  and  invest- 
ment between  ASEAN  and  the  United 
States.  The  project  will  get  underway 
later  this  week  at  a  meeting  in 
Singapore. 

Looking  beyond  the  region  to  the 
dramatic  economic  dynamism  which 
now  links  both  sides  of  the  Pacific 
basin,  we  should  consider  measures  for 
cooperation  among  the  market-oriented 
economies  of  this  vast  area  of  the 
world. 

Any  initiative,  to  be  successful, 
must  be  outward-looking  and  inclusive. 
We  do  not  seek  to  create  a  closed  trad- 
ing bloc  in  the  Pacific.  That  would  be  to 
no  one's  benefit.  Rather,  we  should 
start  intergovernmental  exchanges  on 
the  structural  policies  needed  to  pro- 
mote more  integrated  processes  of  pro- 
duction and  distribution. 

I  suggest  focusing  initially  on: 

•  Ti-ansportation  policies  to  facili- 
tate a  flexible,  efficient  system  for  mov- 
ing goods  and  people  throughout  the 
region.  Development  of  transportation 


is  essential  for  maximum  economic^ 
growth,  not  just  for  importing  and  ex- 
porting but  for  division  of  labor,  spe- 
cialization, and  efficiency  within 
countries.  The  problems  here  differ 
from  those  in  the  continental  United 
States  or  Europe,  and  there  is  enough 
similarity  among  countries  here  for  di- 
alogue to  be  promising.  Similarly,  air 
transportation  in  this  region  can  be  im 
proved  greatly. 

•  Telecommunications;  dei'egulatio 
can  foster  rapid  innovation  to  meet  the 
needs  of  businesses  and  citizens.  Agaii 
however,  communications  in  this  area 
have  unique  characteristics  because  of 
distances,  water  separation  of  land 
areas,  and  other  factors. 

•  Education  to  make  productive  ir 
vestment  in  our  people — our  most 
important  economic  resource.  I  am  gl; 
and  proud  to  note  that  there  are  now 
almost  50,000  students  from  ASEAN 
countries  studying  in  U.S.  institutions 
of  higher  learning. 

•  National  resources  and  the  envi- 
ronment; decisions  made  in  this  decad 
will  have  far-reaching  and  long-lasting 
effects  on  the  totality  of  our  economic 
and  social  well-being. 

Other  issues  to  discuss  are  invest 
ment  policy,  deregulation,  tax  reform 
and  privatization.  Just  as  discussions 
the  economic  summits  of  the  seven  in 
dustrialized  nations  and  in  the  OECD 
have  helped  those  countries  both  to  C' 
operate  and  to  improve  their  individu 
domestic  policies,  so  also  can  coopera 
tion  among  the  Pacific  basin  count  rie 
strengthen  societies  and  economies. 

It  would  be  worth  your  while,  I 
venture  to  suggest,  to  form  some  kin 
of  Pacific  basin  forum  where  like- 
minded  countries  could  compare  expe 
ences,  discuss  ideas,  and  prepare  ans 
ses  on  subjects  that  are  of  interest  to 
most  countries  in  the  region.  Some- 
times discussion  and  joint  research 
might  lead  to  cooperative  action,  andl 
sometimes  they  might  simply  improvd 
policies  internal  to  different  economiw 
In  our  part  of  the  world,  the  annual 
economic  summits,  the  OECD,  and 
other  organizations  have  proved  usefl 
in  these  ways.  ' 

Domestic  Economic  Policies. 

International  cooperation  in  this  fash  i 
can  serve  all  our  interests,  but  it  car 
not  really  succeed  unless  domestic  ( 
icies  are  in  tune  with  reality.  Sound 
domestic  policies  serve  us  all.  Indont 
is  an  example. 

Faced  with  economic  downturn  t 
falling  oil  prices,  the  Government  of 
donesia — beginning  in  1983 — undertc 


THE  SECRETARY 


uctural  reforms  needed  for  future 
djwth.  The  government  has: 

Kept  its  spending  under  control; 
Maintained  currency  convert- 
lity  through  two  devaluations; 

•  Made  investment  more  attractive 
both  domestic  and  foreign  investors; 

•  Made  fundamental  tax  reforms: 

•  Encouraged  the  growth  of  capital 
irkets;  and 

Increased  security  for  intellectual 
operty  rights. 

It  was  not  easy.  It  will  not  be  easy, 
it  the  results  are  strengthening  the 
donesian  economy,  and  by  so  doing, 
ly  are  also  strengthening  political 
ability  at  a  time  of  rapid  change- — 
rien  we  need  it  most.  Many  of  you 
re  today  have  played  major  roles  in 
leparing  Indonesia's  way  to  a  brighter 
lonomic  future.  I  congratulate  you. 
i)ur  accomplishments  of  the  past  20 
ars,  and  especially  of  the  last  5 
lars,  should  give  you  confidence  as 
tu  tackle  the  challenges  that  lie 
ead. 

Elsewhere  in  Asia  are  other  exam- 
les  of  the  benefits  of  freeing  up  mar- 
ts, decentralizing  decisionmaking, 
d  liberating  the  energies  of  private 
itrepreneurs.  The  Philippines  has 
hieved  major  benefits  by  abolishing 
irtels  such  as  those  which  formerly 
introlled  trade  in  coconut  products 
id  wheat  flour.  South  Korea,  Taiwan, 
ong  Kong,  and  Singapore  have  be- 
')me  world-class  competitors  in  a  wide 
mge  of  products  through  economic 
rategies  emphasizing  vigorous  com- 
atition  for  export  markets. 

In  contrast.  North  Korea  and  the 
mdochinese  states  remain  in  the  strait- 
icket  of  centrally  dictated  economic 
jntrol.  Some  of  Vietnam's  new  leaders 
lay  be  recognizing  how  far  they  have 
illen  behind  their  neighbors.  I  sense  a 
rowing  awareness  in  Vietnam  of  the 
nportance  of  market  incentives  for 
enerating  improved  economic  perform- 
nce,  but  such  steps  will  be  of  little 
ffect  until  the  Vietnamese  leaders  fi- 
lally  decide  that  peace,  not  military  ex- 
lansion,  is  in  their  interest. 

The  greatest  experiment  is,  per- 
laps,  the  one  in  the  People's  Republic 
if  China.  During  the  past  decade, 
!Jhina  increasingly  has  turned  to  the 
narketplace  to  overcome  its  immense 
!Conomic  challenges.  Despite  occasional 
letbacks,  China  is  breaking  down  the 
•igidities  of  central  planning  and  rely- 
ng  on  individual  incentives.  These  re- 
orms  have  paid  impressive  dividends 
n  greater  productivity  and  improved 
iving  standards,  particularly  in 
igriculture. 


The  inescapable  conclusion  is  that 
many  Asian  economies  are  reaping 
great  rewards  by  opening  themselves 
up  to  the  international  flows  of  goods, 
capital,  and  information  which  are 
transforming  the  global  economy.  They 
have  been  aided  in  this  process  by 
sound  financial  management,  a  growing 
commitment  to  education,  and  a  strong 
base  of  scientific  and  technical  compe- 
tence. And  they  have  been  benefiting 
greatly  from  a  welcoming  and  extensive 
U.S.  market. 


than  ever,  and  it  is  the  leading  source 
of  new  jobs  in  our  expanding  economy. 
And  our  impressive  scientific  commu- 
nity is  developing  the  knowledge  and 
innovations  that  will  make  possible  fu- 
ture growth. 

A  few  statistics  will  illustrate  the 
point.  The  value  of  U.S.  manufactures 
in  1976  in  constant  dollars  was  about 
$600  billion.  By  1986,  this  figure  had 
increased  to  more  than  $800  billion. 
And  the  United  States  has  increased  its 
manufacturing  output  steadily  every 


1  he  U.S.  economy  has  been  on  a  path  of  steady  growth 
since  1982,  and  our  domestic  demand  for  both  con- 
sumer and  investment  goods  has  been  strong,  much  of 
it  satisfied  by  investment  from  abroad. 


The  Trade  Balance 

Let  me  conclude  by  mentioning  an  is- 
sue that  spans  all  the  main  categories  I 
have  covered  here:  domestic  policy,  in- 
ternational cooperation,  and  the  chal- 
lenge of  change.  I  refer  to  the  trade 
balance. 

When  the  economic  history  of  the 
1980s  is  written,  it  will  be  recognized 
that  the  growth  of  the  U.S.  trade 
deficit,  with  all  of  its  potentially 
troublesome  implications,  was  a  mutu- 
ally beneficial  development — enabling 
world  trade  to  expand  while  helping 
our  own  economic  growth  to  proceed 
without  inflation. 

The  U.S.  economy  has  been  on  a 
path  of  steady  growth  since  1982,  and 
our  domestic  demand  for  both  con- 
sumer and  investment  goods  has  been 
strong,  much  of  it  satisfied  by  invest- 
ment from  abroad.  Concurrently,  until 
1985,  the  U.S.  dollar  strengthened, 
while  high  savings  rates  in  Japan  and 
Germany,  combined  with  relatively  lim- 
ited investment  opportunities  in  those 
countries,  produced  strong  capital  flows 
into  our  inviting  economy. 

Our  trading  partners  enthusiasti- 
cally welcomed  the  investment  oppor- 
tunities and  the  markets  we  provided. 
U.S.  exports  were  flat,  while  imports 
skyrocketed.  As  a  result,  by  1987,  the 
United  States  had  a  foreign  trade  defi- 
cit of  $171  billion — the  world's  largest. 

Along  with  that  deficit,  the  United 
States  has  a  stronger  economy  than 
ever  before  in  its  history.  We  now  pro- 
duce more  manufactured  goods  than 
ever;  our  services  sector  is  stronger 


year  since  1982,  the  year  when  the 
present  economic  surge  began.  The  pe- 
riod 1982-87,  not  coincidentally,  was 
also  a  time  in  which  we  created  about 
16  million  new  jobs  in  the  United 
States. 

During  this  period  of  domestic 
growth,  exports  from  Asia — excluding 
Japan — to  the  United  States  more  than 
doubled,  showing  that  our  expansion 
was  not  at  the  expense  of  imports,  but, 
indeed,  that  it  was  fueled,  in  part,  by 
them. 

The  accessibility  of  the  U.S.  mar- 
ket to  the  exports  of  developing  coun- 
tries is  due  not  only  to  the  absence  of 
most  trade  barriers — and  to  a  general 
willingness  to  accept  competition  from 
foreign  suppliers — but  also  to  the  en- 
during ability  of  the  American  market 
to  absorb  new  or  more  favorably  priced 
goods. 

The  United  States  continues  to  be 
the  consumer  of  first  resort  for  the 
member  nations  of  ASEAN — our  sev- 
enth largest  trading  partner — and  for  a 
host  of  other  developing  countries  as 
well.  America  was  the  market  for  56% 
of  ASEAN's  combined  manufactured 
exports  in  1985,  while  Japan  took  12% 
and  the  European  Community  25%  of 
those  experts. 

But  all  of  us  know  that  the  deficit 
that  has  characterized  the  climate  of 
trading  relationships  has  started  to 
shift — perhaps  rapidly.  The  United 
States  now  has  an  export  boom  going, 
and  the  OECD  forecasts  significant  in- 
creases in  U.S.  exports,  especially  of 
manufactures.  By  1989  our  deficit  in 


Qepartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1988 


27 


THE  SECRETARY 


Communist  Insurgency  and  Security  Cooperation 


Excerpt  from  the  Secretary's  news  con- 
ference at  the  Hotel  Intercontinental  in 
Manila  on  July  12,  7988.5 

The  Armed  Forces  of  the  Philippines  are 
clearly  in  far  better  shape  than  they 
were  2  V2  years  ago.  There  is  a  far 
greater  degree  of  professionalism.  They 
are  better  equipped.  They  have  a 
greater  capacity  for  mobility,  for  commu- 
nication, and  the  morale  is,  I  am  told,  far 
better  There  is  a  clear  mission.  There  is 
a  sense  of  genuine  support  and  a  record 
of  increasing  success.  So,  my  impres- 
sion from  my  discussions  with  the  De- 
fense Minister  and  the  Chief  of  Staff  are 
quite  good.  They  are  confident  of  their 
ability  to  come  to  grips  with  the 
insurgency,  and  I'm,  of  course,  encour- 
aged to  hear  that. 

Obviously,  the  security  relationship 
that  the  United  States  has  with  the  Phil- 
ippines represents  a  kind  of  interplay 


between  the  ability  to  handle  different 
kinds  of  problems.  There  is  a  threat  in 
this  country  from  the  communist  insur- 
gency and,  obviously,  it  is  basically 
something  for  the  Philippine  Armed 
Forces  to  handle.  But  there  are  many 
ways  in  which  we  can  give  support  to 
that. 

At  the  same  time  there  is  a  large 
strategic  involvement  of  the  Philippines 
in  this  region;  and  given  the  global 
nature  of  things  that  go  on  in  this  kind  of 
world  we  live  in,  it  is  global  in  nature.  So 
there  are  some  things  that  we  can  do 
and  some  things  that  the  Philippine 
Armed  Forces  can  do,  and  there  is  a 
pattern  of  interaction  between  us  and 
that  IS  the  strategic  and  security  part- 
nership. We  have  been  working  on  it,  we 
talk  atjout  it,  and  I  am  certain  that  as 
the  question  of  the  review  of  bases 
works  itself  along,  there  will  be  consid- 
erations in  the  ways  in  which  the  Armed 
Forces  of  the  Philippines  will  benefit. 


manufactures  should  be  down  by  half. 
The  U.S.  market  is,  thus,  not  likely  to 
absorb  rapid  growth  in  export  of  man- 
ufactures to  the  extent  that  it  did  ear- 
lier in  this  decade. 

To  ensure  future  growth,  our  trad- 
ing partners  must  turn  also  to  other 
markets — or  to  domestic  expansion.  We 
have  encouraged  Germany  and  Japan  to 
make  structural  reforms  in  order  to 
maintain  growth  at  home,  expand  world 
trade,  and  prevent  a  global  recession. 
Japan  has  responded  effectively.  Today, 
Japan's  economy  is  growing  at  more 
than  4%  per  year,  and  its  trade  surplus 
with  the  world  is  decreasing  in  volume 
terms — more  recently,  even  in  dollar 
terms.  Germany,  on  the  other  hand, 
has  done  less  and,  as  a  consequence, 
the  performance  of  the  German  econ- 
omy is  sluggish. 

As  trade  imbalances  change,  we 
can  adjust  smoothly,  but  it  will  mean 
hard  work  because  we  face  three  seri- 
ous obstacles: 

•  First,  structural  rigidities  prop 
up  inefficient  industiies;  subsidize — 
that  is,  protect — exports;  restrict  the 
entry  of  foreign  investment;  and  gener- 
ally allocate  resources  by  bureaucratic 
fiat  rather  than  in  response  to  market 
conditions. 

In  the  United  States,  we  have  al- 
ready accomplished  a  great  deal: 
growth  of  the  government's  share  of  na- 
tional output  has  been  curbed.  Our 


28 


budget  deficit  has  been  significantly  re- 
duced. Inflation  has  been  brought  un- 
der control.  Our  tax  system  has  been 
reformed.  And  our  transportation,  com- 
munications, and  financial  markets  have 
been  significantly  deregulated. 

•  The  second  obstacle  is  that  ex- 
change rates  can  frustrate  the  adjust- 
ment of  economic  imbalances  if  manipu- 
lated by  governments  to  gain  short- 
term  commercial  advantage.  We  believe 
such  interference  reduces  the  welfare  of 
consumers  in  the  countries  concerned 
and  gives  comfort  to  protectionist  ele- 
ments elsewhere.  Instead,  governments 
should  enable  their  currency  exchange 
rates  to  reflect,  fully  and  promptly, 
market  factors  and  the  underlying 
health  of  their  economies. 

•  The  third  obstacle  to  adjustment 
is  trade  barriers,  including  tariffs  and 
nontariff  barriers  such  as  quotas,  re- 
strictions on  trade  and  services,  and 
discriminatory  standards.  These  bar- 
riers enrich  narrow  interest  groups  at 
the  expense  of  the  rest  of  society. 

I  regret  to  say  that  most  ASEAN 
countries  retain  relatively  high  tariffs, 
often  with  import  licensing  and  other 
nontariff  constraints.  Such  trade  bar- 
riers in  Asia  provide  a  rallying  point 
for  those  in  the  United  States  who  wish 
to  increase  protectionism  and,  from  an 
Asian  point  of  view,  also  reduce  com- 
petition and  consumer  choice  at  home. 
To  this  I  can  only  say  that  protection- 
ism is  arson  that  eventually  burns  down 
everyone's  house. 


Conclusion 

So  there  is  a  lot  to  do: 

•  Keep  steady  on  the  paths  that 
have  led  to  progress.  There  have  been 
great  achievements  that  must  not  be 
lost. 

•  Analyze  the  problems  that  arise 
with  each  new  day  and  move  boldly  to 
solve  them. 

•  Look  ahead  to  the  future,  its  op- 
portunities and  its  difficulties.  If  we 
face  the  future,  we  can  see  where  to 
go.  If  we  go  back  into  it,  we  will  be 
caught  unaware  and  stumble 
unnecessarily. 

History  tells  us  that  most  nations  i 
do  not  accept  change  readily.  The         | 
United  States  and  many  of  the  nations 
of  the  Pacific  have  found  that  facing  tl 
future  is  far  better  than  backing  into 
That's  what  I'm  talking  about  today. 
Americans  and  Asians  should  see  that 
open  markets,  domestic  policies  for 
growth,  and  international  cooperation 
that  supports  those  policies  are  the 
keys  to  the  future. 

Whenever  I  come  to  Jakarta,  I  ar 
greeted  by  the  music  of  the  gamelan. 
is  a  unique  and  wonderful  sound.  So, 
like  the  gamelan  players,  one  of  us  m 
play  the  kettle  drum,  another  the  cyr 
bals,  still  another  the  flute.  But  if  we 
each  develop  our  particular  talent  an< 
then  learn  to  orchestrate  our  efforts, 
we  can  make  great  music  together. 

That  is  our  task  for  today  and  fo 
the  new  century  ahead  of  us. 


ARRIVAL  STATEMENT 

(EXCERPT), 
MANILA, 
JULY  n,  1988 

The  United  States  rejoiced — there  is 
other  word  for  it — when  the  Philippir 
people  joined  together  2  years  ago  in 
one  of  the  most  dramatic  political  tra. 
formations  of  this  era.  The  restoratio 
of  democracy  to  the  Philippines  not 
only  met  our  hopes  for  your  own  dev 
opment,  it  set  an  example  for  politict 
transformations  elsewhere  in  this  re- 
gion. And  it  positioned  your  country 
especially  dramatic  progress  in 
economic  development  and  national 
reconciliation. 

The  United  States  has  given  hea 
felt  political  and  material  support  to 
your  new  government  since  the  Febr 
ary  revolution  because  we  believe  ths 
your  triumph  represented  a  victory  i 
democracy  to  flourish,  it  needs  conti 
ing  support  from  its  friends.  We  cou 


THE  SECRETARY 


(t  countenance  its  failure  here,  for  it 
4ulcl  be  a  loss  to  democratic  societies 
.«ery  where. 

My  visit  this  time  provides  an  op- 
'jrtunity  to  review  with  your  leaders 
*le  full  range  of  issues  which  are  cen- 
tal to  your  continuing  development  and 
II  the  evolution  of  U.S. -Philippine 
Illations. 

•  Economic  reform  and  vigorous 
jowth  are  critical  to  reinforcing  your 
I'litical  revolution,  and  I  want  to  re- 

.'w  nur  trading  and  investment  ties, 
i  well  as  prospects  for  the  multilateral 
;;1  initiative.  We  want  to  see  the  Phil- 
ipine  economy  put  on  the  track  of  self- 
:  staining  growth;  we  want  you  to  be- 
ime  full  participants  in  the  emerging 

obal  era  based  on  dramatic  develop- 

ents  in  the  fields  of  science,  informa- 

m.  and  technology. 

•  I  want  to  learn  more  about  recent 
■iiuress  in  dealing  with  the  communist 
suruency  and  of  your  current  efforts 

I'eform  and  modernize  the  Armed 
)i-e('s  of  the  Philippines. 

•  And,  of  course,  there  is  the 
■iiader  issue  of  U.S. -Philippine  se- 
ii-ii.\-  cooperation.  We  both  understand 
e  \  ital  necessity  of  like-minded  na- 
in,--  working  together  to  preserve  the 
■curity  and  stability  so  essential  for 
eeilom  and  economic  progress.  Our 
'feiise  relationship  enables  the  Philip- 
no  to  concentrate  resources  on  mat- 
ers of  internal  security  and  domestic 
rowth.  It  makes  a  major  contribution 

5  well  to  regional  stability. 

And  it  is  a  significant  part  of  the 
feh  of  security  ties  that  gives  political 
nd  economic  vitality  and  cohesiveness 
D  the  entire  free  world.  In  this  regard, 
will  be  reviewing  with  President 
iquino  and  Secretary  Manglapus  the 
tate  of  the  bases  review  and  prospects 
or  continuing  security  cooperation. 

So,  I  welcome  this  opportunity  to 
neet  again  with  your  leaders  and  work 
ooperatively  with  you  to  shape  the  fu- 
ure  of  U.S. -Philippine  relations  in 
vays  that  respond  to  your  deepest  aspi- 
■ations  and  benefit  both  our  people. 

3ANQUET  TOASTS  (EXCERPTS), 

BEIJING. 

lULY  14  AND  15,  1988 

July  14  Toast 


We  live  in  a  time  of  great  promise  for 
the  future;  a  time  of  great  change  and 
challenge.  International  relationships 


are  changing  dramatically  as  we  enter  a 
period  of  global  economic  transforma- 
tion. Former  adversaries  are  turning  to 
political  approaches  to  resolve  their  dif- 
ferences. Nations  long  divided  by  war 
and  revolution  are  seeking  to  bridge 
the  chasms  of  confrontation  through  di- 
alogue, trade,  and  human  contact.  And 
prospects  for  social  development  are  e.\- 
panding  dramatically  as  the  technolo- 
gies and  production  processes  of  the 
information  age  make  possible  new 
products,  new  services,  and  new  pat- 
terns of  interpersonal  relations.  In  this 
transformation,  openness  is  the  key: 
openness  to  ideas,  to  human  contact,  to 
trade,  and  to  new  approaches  to  resolv- 
ing old  problems. 


1  he  challenge  we  collec- 
tively face  is  to  keep  this 
global  trading  system  as 
open  as  possible. 


China  and  the  United  States  have 
been  pacesetters  in  this  process  of 
change.  Nearly  two  decades  ago,  our 
nations'  leaders  embarked  on  a  path  of 
normalization,  hoping  to  resolve  long- 
standing differences  through  dialogue 
and  the  search  for  common  interests. 
Upon  this  foundation  we  have,  in  the 
course  of  this  decade,  built  what  is  now 
a  stable  and  mature  relationship  that 
enriches  our  two  peoples  through  ever- 
expanding  trade,  student  and  scientific 
exchanges,  and  ongoing  contact  be- 
tween our  two  national  leaderships. 

The  success  of  our  experience  is 
now  reflected  in  the  parallel  efforts  of 
our  two  countries  to  reduce  tensions 
with  the  Soviet  Union.  While  serious 
obstacles  remain  for  both  of  us,  from  an 
American  perspective  we  have  begun  to 
make  some  progress  in  reversing  the 
arms  I'ace  and  moving  to  create  a  more 
stable  strategic  balance. 

The  recent  U.S. -Soviet  INF  [inter- 
mediate-range nuclear  forces]  agree- 
ment will  now  be  followed  by  a  broad 
range  of  arms  control  negotiations:  on  a 
50%  reduction  in  strategic  arms,  on 
conventional  arms  reduction  in  Europe, 
and  on  efforts  to  ban  chemical  weapons 
on  a  global  basis.  We  also  look  for  evi- 
dence that  the  Soviet  Union  will  make 
practical  contributions  to  removing 
sources  of  tension  and  resolving  long- 
standing conflicts  in  Asia.  In  this 


regard,  your  country  is  seeking  elim- 
ination of  the  remaining  obstacles  in 
the  way  of  Sino-Soviet  relations,  a  pros- 
pect that  can  be  welcomed  to  the  ex- 
tent that  it  strengthens  an  environment 
of  security  and  stability  for  all  the 
countries  of  Asia  as  they  try  to  focus 
their  energies  on  national  economic 
construction. 

China  and  the  United  States  have 
made  their  own  contributions  to  this 
more  promising  international  environ- 
ment. Even  as  we  have  moved  to  nego- 
tiate differences,  we  have  also  stood 
firm  in  the  face  of  aggression.  From 
Afghanistan  to  Indochina,  we  have  sup- 
ported peoples  determined  to  resist  the 
imposition  of  foreign  rule  and  fight  for 
national  independence.  The  Soviets  are 
now  withdrawing  from  Afghanistan. 
This  should  be  followed  by  a  complete 
withdrawal  of  Vietnamese  forces  from 
Cambodia  and  the  creation  of  a  national 
reconciliation  government  under  the 
leadership  of  Prince  Sihanouk.  All  na- 
tions concerned  with  the  future  of  Indo- 
china have  an  obligation  to  facilitate 
such  a  development. 

We  have  made  it  clear  that  we  wel- 
come development  on  both  sides  of  the 
Taiwan  Straits  that  contribute  to  a  re- 
laxation of  tensions  and  constructive 
interchange.  Such  developments  are 
consistent  with  our  longstanding  inter- 
est in  a  peaceful  resolution  of  the  Tai- 
wan question.  In  the  same  spirit,  we 
hope  that  the  recent  courageous  and 
farsighted  proposals  that  have  been 
made  for  creating  a  new  climate  on  the 
Korean  Peninsula  and  for  expanding 
North-South  contacts  wall  lead  to  posi- 
tive steps  toward  national  reconcilia- 
tion. The  leadership  in  Pyongyang  has 
both  the  responsibility  and  the  oppor- 
tunity to  help  make  the  upcoming 
Olympic  Games  in  Seoul  a  secure  and 
contributing  element  to  this  process  so 
much  desired  by  all  Koreans. 

For  all  that  is  promising  in  contem- 
porary international  trends,  we  also  see 
new  and  daunting  security  challenges. 
The  development  of  diverse  centers  of 
scientific  and  industrial  capacity  around 
the  world  is  leading  to  the  prolifera- 
tion— from  many  sources — of  high- 
technology  weaponry:  advanced  aircraft, 
missiles,  chemical  weapons.  As  we  see 
in  the  gulf  war,  less  developed  coun- 
tries fighting  age-old  battles  on  re- 
ligious, ethnic,  or  political  grounds  have 
ready  access  to  such  highly  destructive 
armaments.  And  it  is  ironic  that  just  as 
the  major  powers  are  making  progress 
in  getting  their  arms  competition  under 
some  control,  the  developing  world  is 
increasingly  burdened  by  this  flow  of 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1988 


29 


THE  SECRETARY 


advanced  weaponry.  The  international 
community  as  a  whole  must  find  ways 
to  staunch  this  arms  traffic. 

Finally,  let  me  note  China's  leading 
role  in  economic  reform  among  the  de- 
veloping, socialist  countries.  A  decade 
ago,  under  Chairman  Deng  Xiaoping's 
leadership,  China  began  a  series  of  far- 
reaching  reforms  that  have  dramatically 
raised  economic  productivity  and  posi- 
tioned the  country  to  participate  in  the 
increasingly  global  trading  system.  By 
opening  up  its  doors  to  commerce  with 
the  world,  by  decentralizing  manage- 
ment of  the  economy,  by  sending 
students  abroad,  China  has  gained  rec- 
ognition as  a  country  capable  of  world- 
class  economic  performance  as  we  move 
into  the  21st  century.  The  impact  of 
these  policies  is  already  evident  in 
China's  impressive  economic  growth  on 
the  average  of  nearly  10%  per  year  over 
the  past  decade— and  in  the  rapid  ex- 
pansion of  U.S. -China  trade. 

The  challenge  we  collectively  face 
is  to  keep  this  global  trading  system  as 
open  as  possible.  For  our  part,  we  will 
resist  protectionism  at  home,  but  we 
need  the  example  of  open  markets  in 
our  trading  partners  to  counter  those 
who  would  restrict  access  to  our  do- 
mestic market.  And  we  will  do  our  best 
to  keep  flows  of  advanced  technology 
abroad  as  unconstrained  as  possible,  as 
reflected  in  the  recent  COCOM  [Coor- 
dinating Committee  for  Multilateral  Se- 
curity Export  Controls]  decision  to 
further  liberalize  technology  transfers 
to  China. 

Let  me  make  an  observation  as  a 
reflection  from  my  time  as  Secretary  of 
State  since  1982:  our  relationship  keeps 
moving  forward  because  of  our  willing- 
ness to  find  common  ground  by  com- 
bining adherence  to  principle  with 
practical  efforts  to  resolve  issues  be- 
tween us.  This  is  the  hallmark  of  a 
truly  normal  and  productive  relation- 
ship— a  legacy  that  my  generation  of 
leaders  is  proud  to  leave  to  the 
next. 


.July  15  Toast 


On  the  economic  front,  we  are 
continuing  to  open  up  to  each  other. 
From  the  time  I  took  office  in  1982,  I 
have  watched  our  bilateral  trade  nearly 
double  from  $5.5  billion  to  $10.4  billion 
last  year.  And  in  the  same  period, 
pledged  U.S.  investment  in  China  has 
tripled,  from  $1  billion  to  over  $3  bil- 


lion. At  the  same  time,  China's  reforms 
promise  to  bring  you  into  the  circle  of 
GATT  signatories. 

And,  in  the  years  ahead,  as  China 
enters  GATT  with  its  tenets  of  fairness 
and  openness— as  you  provide  those 
with  whom  you  trade  an  opportunity 
for  reasonable  profits,  as  you  reduce 
nontariff  barriers,  as  you  respect  intel- 
lectual property  rights — then  China 
will  surely  attract  new  waves  of  foreign 
trade  and  investment. 

Finally,  in  the  realm  of  political  re- 
lations over  the  past  decade,  American 
leaders  have  been  privileged  to  work 
with  Chinese  leaders  who  are  willing  to 
engage  with  us  and  with  the  world 
community  in  order  to  resolve  the  is- 
sues of  the  present  and  create  better 
world  conditions  for  the  futui-e. 


ADDRESS  BEFORE  THE  KOREAN 

NEWSPAPER  EDITOR'S 

ASSOCIATION. 
SEOUL, 
JULY  18,  19886 

I  am  pleased  to  be  here  and  to  convey 
to  the  people  of  the  Republic  of  Korea 
warm  greetings  from  President  Reagan 
and  the  American  people.  The  dynamic 
economic  growth  that  you  are  sustain- 
ing, the  profound  political  changes  that 
have  taken  place  this  past  year,  the 
vigor  and  thoroughness  of  your  Olympic 
preparations  all  reflect  the  Korean  peo- 
ple's spirit  and  have  won  for  the  Re- 
public of  Korea  the  respect  of  the 
world.  And  no  achievement  is  more  im- 
pressive than  your  remarkable  efforts 
to  bring  democracy  to  your  country. 

Korea  was  once  called  the  "Hermit 
Kingdom."  Today,  the  Republic  of 
Korea  stands  at  the  forefront  of  a 
worldwide  trend  toward  democracy,  de- 
centralization, and  openness.  The 
Korean  people  have  been  pacesetters  in 
all  these  trends. 

We  live  in  a  time  of  profound  trans- 
formation of  the  international  order: 
national  economies  are  becoming  inte- 
grated into  a  global  trading  system, 
even  as  centralized  planning  gives  way 
to  economic  pluralism  and  the  play  of 
open  markets.  Like-minded  nations 
seek  new  ways  to  cooperate  on  chal- 
lenges such  as  terrorism  and  the  pro- 
liferation of  ballistic  missiles,  even  as 
allies  pursue  arms  control  with  adver- 
saries and  seek  new  approaches  to  old 
confrontations.  The  struggle  to  open  up 
the  political  process,  to  end  military  or 
one-party  rule,  to  give  people  freedom 
to  choose  leaders  and  influence  policies, 
is  an  integral  part  of  this  great  tide  of 
change. 


Democracy  and  Development: 
A  Global  TYend 

From  Spain  and  Portugal  a  decade  ago 
to  a  trend  that  now  encompasses  Latin 
America  from  Argentina  to  El  Sal- 
vador, from  the  Philippines  to  South 
Korea,  democratic  values  and  institu- 
tions are  growing  in  influence  and 
strength.  Democracy  has  no  one  form; 
its  institutional  development  in  any 
given  country  is  shaped  by  unique  fac- 
tors of  history,  culture,  and  circum- 
stance. But  its  common  denominator  is 
a  people's  demand  to  play  an  active  roU 
in  their  own  affairs. 

We  see  this  trend  to  democracy  in 
growing  public  pressures  for  human 
dignity,  personal  liberties,  and  broad 
participation  in  government.  We  see  it 
not  only  among  developing  nations 
friendly  to  the  industrial  West;  even 
highly  regimented  societies  like  the  So 
viet  Union  and  China  now  realize  that 
economic  advance  in  this  era  requires 
openness  to  information  and  ideas,  pul 
lie  expression  of  conflicting  views,  and 
economic  decentralization. 

Ample  evidence  suggests  a  close, 
reciprocal  relationship  between  eco- 
nomic jjrogress  and  political  openness 
in  the  modern  world.  Indeed,  they  are 
inseparable.  Political  and  economic 
systems  supportive  of  free  inquiry, 
entrepreneurial  risk-taking,  and  indi- 
vidual freedom  are  the  font  of 
creativity — the  cutting  edge  of  change 
in  the  ei-a  of  the  information  revolutio 
Economic  strength  and  political  mod- 
ernization mutually  support  each  othe 
Democracy — with  all  its  facets  of  per- 
sonal freedoms,  individual  initiative, 
and  the  right  of  choice— is  the  fullest 
expression  of  political  modernization. 

Nowhere  in  the  world  is  the  rela- 
tionship between  political  and  econom. 
development  clearer  than  in  East  Asii 
Some  Asian  countries  have  had  to  ove 
come  the  destruction  of  war  and  the 
legacies  of  colonialism  or  entrenched 
tradition.  Others  have  had  to  confront 
the  failure  of  Marxist  development  ex- 
periments. Yet,  in  this  region,  there 
have  been  economic  miracles,  and  the: 
are  now  being  matched, by  political  mi 
acles.  In  some  cases,  economic  develo; 
ment  provided  the  basis  for  political 
evolution.  In  the  case  of  Japan,  demo- 
cratic institutions — including  the  rule 
law,  constitutionalism,  and  elections- 
provided  the  conditions  for  economic 
growth. 

Many  East  Asian  countries  have 
benefited  from  postwar  Western  deve: 
opment  assistance,  access  to  Western 
markets.  Western  security  guarantee: 


30 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  19iJ 


THE  SECRETARY 


educational  opportunities  in  devel- 
d  countries.  The  United  States 
red  a  major  role  in  providing  many 
hese  benefits,  and  we  are  proud  to 
e  done  so.  These  benefits  have  con- 
uted  to  dramatic  economic  and  po- 
:al  advancement.  The  basic  sources 
he  success  of  Asian  countries,  how- 
r,  have  been  the  talent,  initiative, 
hard  work  of  their  people. 
In  Asia,  not  surprisingly,  economic 
sperity  has  been  accompanied  by 
nater  public  demand  for  personal 
T'dom  and  for  political  participation, 
^crnment  resistance  to  these  de- 
II i-  has  often  created  domestic  in- 
ula,\-  and  endangered  the  new 
'is|i.i-ity.  Many  traditional  govern- 
i:  Us  have  found  it  far  better  to  re- 
11  ilomestic  institutions,  to  exercise 
It  rship  in  the  process  of  change,  and 
ii\:i"  expression  of  public  aspirations 
I  )iis^h  ]ieaceful,  constructive 
■1  iiiicls. 

Although  demands  for  political  re- 
11  may  be  irresistible,  democratic 
-iisiiions,  once  underway,  are  often 
i  icult.  Societies  undergoing  such 
ii.<iti(ins  are  vulnerable  to  assault 
11  the  authoritarian  right  and  the  to- 
taiiaii  left.  History,  including  that  of 
I  nited  States,  tells  us  that  democ- 
■  \-  1.-;  not  a  sure  thing.  The  scope  and 
,  e  (if  political  development  are  deter- 
led  by  the  unique  history,  culture, 
I  geopolitical  realities  of  each  society 
t  chooses  a  democratic  path.  Just  as 
sparks  of  inspiration  for  reform 
st  originate  domestically,  so  must  a 
intry's  political  evolution  be  driven 
distinctive  domestic  forces  and  cir- 
nstances.  Every  case  is  different; 
:re  is  no  set  pattern  or  standard 
;come. 

The  democratic  process  cannot  be 
ificially  shaped  or  forced,  but  friends 
:1  allies  can — indeed,  should — support 
itical  reform.  Thus,  we  will  remain 
pged  with  democratically  oriented 
litical  forces  and  support  their  goals, 
r  position  is  clear:  we  stand  for 
aceful  institutional  and  procedural  re- 
•m  in  accordance  with  the  will  of  the 
ople.  Our  influence  with  friendly  gov- 
nments  is  a  precious  resource  which 
'  will  use  for  this  constructive  end. 
hile  we  will  never  seek  to  dictate 
ents,  decisions,  or  formulas,  we  will 
tempt  to  offer  ideas,  assistance,  and 
iderstanding  in  support  of  the  process 
change.  Our  support  will  be  all  the 
ore  steadfast  when  democracies  are 
reatened  by  hostile  external  forces. 
I  do  less  would  be  to  betray  our  own 
mmitment  to  democratic  values  and, 
essence,  to  turn  away  from  our 
tends  at  a  time  of  difficult  transition. 


The  progress  of  recent  democratic  revo- 
lutions in  Korea  and  the  Philippines 
demonstrates,  I  believe,  success  in 
maintaining  the  delicate  balance  be- 
tween domestic  pressures  for  reform 
and  friendly  assistance  from  abroad. 
Although  politically  developing 
Asian  nations  face  many  challenges, 
their  experiences  compare  very  favor- 
ably to  those  of  less  fortunate  neigh- 
bors. In  North  Korea,  Vietnam,  and 
Cambodia — where  political  oppression, 
economic  centralization,  and  oversized 
military  regimes  still  hold  sway — lead- 
ership is  paralyzed,  economies  stag- 
nate, and  the  people  are  demoralized 
and  unproductive. 


patriots  to  the  North.  This  commitment 
to  the  defense  of  their  freedom  is  dear, 
but  it  is  one  that  Koreans,  like  other 
free  peoples,  know  they  must  bear. 

Just  35  years  ago,  in  the  wake  of 
the  terrible  devastation  of  the  Korean 
war,  the  Republic  of  Korea  was  among 
the  most  impoverished  states  in  the 
world.  Now,  it  is  one  of  the  most  mod- 
ern, prosperous,  and  dynamic.  Korea, 
once  a  major  U.S.  aid  recipient,  is  now 
on  its  feet  and  stands  as  our  seventh 
largest  trading  partner.  Korea  has  even 
helped  create  a  new  word  in  the  lexicon 
of  development  economics:  it  is  a  prime 
example  of  a  newly  industrialized 
economy. 


Uemocracy — with  all  its  facets  of  personal  freedoms, 
individual  initiative,  and  the  right  of  choice— is  the 
fullest  expression  of  political  modernization. 


Democratization  in  Korea 

For  their  part,  the  people  of  the  Re- 
public of  Korea  have  made  very  clear 
their  determination  to  develop  a  demo- 
cratic political  system.  Through  their 
public  calls  for  democracy  and  enthusi- 
astic support  for  political  candidates, 
through  their  ratification  of  a  new  con- 
stitution, and  the  election  of  a  new 
president  and  National  Assembly, 
Koreans  have  given  the  world  a  dra- 
matic example  of  political  forces  at 
work. 

The  unfolding  drama  of  the  Korean 
people's  quest  for  a  more  pluralistic 
system  has  been  especially  heroic,  for 
it  has  has  taken  place  against  the 
ominous  backdrop  of  a  severe  military 
threat  from  the  North.  Deployed  just 
across  the  DMZ  [demilitarized  zone],  a 
scant  30  miles  from  here,  is  one  of  the 
largest  concentrations  of  armed  forces 
in  the  world.  Since  the  communist-initi- 
ated war  in  the  early  1950s,  North 
Korea  has  maintained  a  preponderant 
military  force  armed  with  sophisticated 
Soviet-supplied  weaponry  and  postured 
for  offensive  operations.  The  citizens  of 
the  South — despite  their  deeply  felt  de- 
sire for  peaceful  relations  with  their 
brethren  to  the  North,  and  for  eventual 
peaceful  reunification — have  had  to  arm 
themselves  against  a  clear  threat  of  re- 
newed war.  They  have  had  to  bear  this 
bitter  and  costly  burden  despite  their 
deep  feeling  of  kinship  with  their  com- 


The  same  human  energy,  resource- 
fulness, and  vision  has  driven  Korea's 
political  development.  Koreans  have  re- 
jected authoritarianism  and  are  devel- 
oping more  open  and  representative 
political  institutions,  including  a  free 
press.  These  transitions  have  not  been 
easy  in  Korea,  and  they  have  not  been 
easy  elsewhere.  Political  reform  is 
never  a  conflict-free  process. 

We  know,  in  our  own  case,  that  de- 
mocracy is  a  rough  and  tumble  process 
of  give-and-take,  debate,  and  compro- 
mise. It  can  only  work  if  citizens  are 
prepared  actively  to  engage  in  it  with  a 
high  degree  of  self-discipline,  restraint, 
and  civic  responsibility.  The  citizen's 
exercise  of  democratic  freedoms  is  not 
a  license  to  do  anything.  Nor  is  it  a 
sure-fire  method  of  always  getting  one's 
way.  But  it  is  a  process  that  keeps  the 
players  in  the  game.  It  is  openness,  the 
right  to  express  one's  view  and  to  de- 
mand official  responsiveness  to  a  peo- 
ple's needs  and  concerns.  And,  above 
all,  it  is  an  effective  means  by  which  a 
society  can  remain  stable  even  as  it  ad- 
justs in  an  orderly  manner  to  changing 
conditions. 

Thus,  even  in  the  midst  of  vigorous 
public  debate  and  societal  change,  dem- 
ocratic governments  can  remain  strong 
because  they  have  a  structure  of  con- 
sent behind  them — elections,  a  free 
press,  open  institutions.  By  the  same 
token,  representative  governments  have 
the  right — indeed,  the  duty — to  protect 
their  electorates  from  extremists  whose 


apartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1988 


31 


THE  SECRETARY 


aim  is  violent  disruption  of  the  demo- 
cratic processes  of  orderly  change. 

Events  of  the  past  year  in  Korea 
affirm  the  need  for  a  balance  between 
official  responsiveness  and  popular  re- 
straint. The  government  accepted  the 
will  of  the  people— often  vociferously 
enunciated— to  revise  the  constitution, 
which  was  endorsed  overwhelmingly  in 
a  popular  referendum.  Koreans  then 
geared  up  for  the  first  direct  presiden- 
tial election  in  16  years.  The  world 
watched  as  the  candidates  campaigned 
across  the  land,  in  print,  on  television, 
and  in  enormous  rallies.  The  campaign, 
a  free-wheeling,  wide-open  contest, 
marked  a  major  step  along  the  road  to 
democracy.  . 

Then,  almost  before  the  presiden- 
tial campaign  posters  came  down,  the 
banners  went  up  for  the  National  As- 
sembly election.  Koreans  surprised 
many  "observers  by  electing  more  as- 
sembly members  from  opposition  par- 
ties than  from  the  government  party. 
The  result  has  been  a  national  oppor- 
tunity for  everyone,  providing  Korean 
pohticians  from  differing  political,  eco- 
nomic, and  regional  backgrounds  the 
chance  to  work  together  in  establishing 
a  process  of  debate,  compromise,  and 
consensus-building. 

That  process  is  still  underway  and 
is  a  never-ending  one  in  any  democracy. 
From  what  the  Korean  people  them- 
selves are  saying,  many  tasks  lie  ahead: 
forging  new,  "productive  executive-legis- 
lative relations,  enhancing  local  auton- 
omy, and  strengthening  respect  for 
human  rights.  But  judging  from  how- 
far  you  have  come  this  past  year,  I  have 
no  doubt  that  outstanding  problems  will 
be  resolved  as  the  process  of  political 
institution-building  continues.  For  al- 
though views  and  approaches  may  dif- 
fer widely,  the  Korean  people  are  firmly 
committed  to  sustaining  the  proc- 
ess of  democratic  development.  From 
my  meeting  this  morning  with  party 
leaders  at  the  National  Assembly,  I 
learned  firsthand  of  the  commitments  of 
the  Korean  people  to  this  process. 

This  past  year's  progress  toward 
democratic  government  has  helped  to 
highlight,  along  with  this  country's  eco- 
nomic dynamism,  Korea's  growing  role 
on  the  world  stage.  The  Republic  of 
Korea  enjoys  an  ever  greater  stature 
because  it  "has  adapted  itself  so  effec- 
tively to  the  political  and  economic 
trends  of  the  future.  Increasingly,  other 
countries  turn  to  Korea  to  establish  or 
strengthen  diplomatic  ties,  to  engage  in 
trade,  to  conduct  cultural  exchanges. 
The  1988  Seoul  Olympic  Games,  only 
weeks  away,  provide  only  the  most  im- 
mediate example  of  this  trend. 


32 


North-South  Relations 


Regrettably,  we  cannot  address^  the  re- 
markable achievements  of  the  Korean 
people  without  also  noting  that  the  Re- 
public of  Korea  must  have  the  strength 
and  resolve  to  defend  itself  from  the 
still  acute  threat  of  armed  attack  from 
the  North.  Since  the  end  of  the  Korean 
war,  the  communist  regime  in  Pyong- 
yang has  done  more  than  merely  men- 
"ace  the  South.  The  records  of  their  use 
of  violence  spans  the  decades;  the  list 
of  victims  grows  tragically  longer.  Yet 
America's  resolve  to  help  our  Korean 
ally  deter  and,  if  necessary,  repel  ag- 
gression from  the  North  is  as  firm  now 
as  when  we  signed  our  mutual  defense 
treaty  in  1953.  The  military  forces  that 
the  U.S.  stations  here  through  agree- 
ment with  the  Korean  Government  rep- 
resent one  component  of  that  security 
guarantee.  They  will  remain  in  Korea 
as  long  as  the  people  and  Governments 
of  both  the  United  States  and  the  Re- 
public of  Korea  deem  them  necessary  to 
ensure  peace.  North  Korea  should  have 
no  doubt  that  even  as  we  will  support 
the  efforts  of  our  ally  in  the  South  to 
promote  dialogue  and  national  recon- 
ciliation, we  will  also  stand  firm  in  the 
face  of  violence  and  efforts  to 
intimidate. 

Koreans  everywhere  share  the  as- 
piration of  reunifying  their  country. 
The  United  States  has  long  supported 
the  peaceful  attainment  of  this  goal.  It 
is  important  for  us  all  to  remember 
that  there  was  a  time  when  Korean  and 
American  soldiers  died  side  by  side  in 
pursuit  of  this  aspiration.  It  is  now  up 
to  Koreans  in  the  North  and  South, 
however,  to  work  out  for  themselves 
how  they  will  achieve  unification  peace- 
fully. In"  our  view,  the  recent  proposals 
of  President  Roh  Tae-Woo  are  a  con- 
structive and  sincere  effort  to  breathe 
new  life  into  the  process  of  North- 
South  dialogue,  and  we  hope  the  North 
will  consider  them  carefully.  The  Olym- 
pic Games  provide  an  immediate  oppor- 
tunity for  contact  between  the  North 
and  South.  Even  at  this  late  date. 
North  Korea  can  still  choose  to  partici- 
pate in  the  Olympics. 

We  urge  North  Korean  leaders  to 
rethink  the  severe  restrictions  they  im- 
pose on  the  lives  of  their  citizens. 
North  Korean  leaders  should  recalcu- 
late the  costs  of  centralizing  decisions 
which  individuals  can  and  should  make 
for  themselves.  Many  nations,  including 
some  of  North  Korea's  closest  allies,  are 
recognizing  the  benefits  of  movement 
toward  greater  individual  Uberty.  In  its 
own  self-interest,  perhaps  North  Korea 
should  profit  from  the  experience  of 


others  to  improve  its  own  condition.  I 
note  in  this  respect  that  North  Korea 
has  recently  praised  Chinese  economic 
reforms. 


U.S.-Korean  Relations 

Whatever  course  the  leaders  in  the 
North  should  decide  to  take— and,  wit! 
you,  we  hope  it  is  a  positive  one— the 
"people  of  the  Republic  of  Korea  alread> 
have  chosen  to  join  a  growing  commu- 
nity of  democratic  nations  and  free 
market  economies.  By  joining  us,  you 
have  strengthened  a  web  of  global  mar 
kets  and  mutually  supportive  security  i 
ties  that  knit  the  free  world  together.  |li 
Korea's  economic  and  political  de-  Ixi 
velopment  has  occurred  very  quickly. 
One  feature  of  this  development  has 
been  the  emergence  of  diverse  and 
forcefully  articulated  views  on  many  i^ 
sues,  including  the  relationship  be- 
tween Korea  and  the  United  States. 
This  relationship  is  being  debated  and 
reexamined;  we  welcome  this  reex- 
amination. Certainly,  it  will  bring  out 
differences,  problems,  and  divergent  _ 
points  of  view.  In  doing  so,  however,  i)| 
will  illuminate  misunderstanding  and 
misperception.  It  will  force  us  to  ad- 
dress issues  squarely  and  honestly.  If 
we  understand  our  differences,  we  cai 
resolve  them.  Ultimately,  honest  and 
open  debate,  conducted  in  a  spirit  of 
friendship  and  respect,  will  strengthe 
the  relationship  between  our  two 
countries. 

Through  it  all,  neither  of  our  cou 
tries  should  forget  that  the  bilateral 
ties  that  we  have  formed  have,  in  tur 
reinforced  the  structure  of  peace  na- 
tionally, regionally,  and  internationall 
They  have  brought  each  of  us  greater 
benefits  than  either  of  us  could  have 
achieved  on  our  own.  They  are  ties  of 
mutuality,  of  reponsibility,  and  of  par 
nership.  "They  are  ties  of  individual 
strength  and"  shared  commitment.  Ar 
they  are  ties  indispensable  to  the  eff< 
five  pursuit  of  each  of  our  national 
interests. 

This  fundamental  understanding 
our  bilateral  ties  must  infuse,  in  part 
ular,  the  current  reassessment  of  our 
economic  relations.  As  Korea  prepan 
to  take  its  place  among  the  industri- 
alized democracies,  it  assumes  new 
obligations  to  its  economic  trading 
partners  and  to  the  international  trai 
ing  system— a  system  to  which  it  ow. 
so  much  for  its  own  economic  pros-_ 
perity.  In  response  to  these  obligatid 
and  commensurate  with  its  economic 
strength,  Korea  has  now  begun  to 
share  responsibility  for  economic  ad- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1« 


THE  SECRETARY 


tments.  both  domestic  and  interna- 
al,  that  will  lead  to  freer  trade. 
e  of  these  adjustments  will  be  diffi- 
t  in  the  short  term,  but  they  will 
tribute  to  a  healthier  world  economy 
i,  sooner  than  later,  to  the  benefit  of 
rea  itself. 

The  Korean  people  are  clearly  pre- 
ring  themselves  for  a  future  of  ever 
jater  political  stability,  individual 
ledom,  and  prosperity.  These  trends 
11  strengthen  relations  between  our 
lo  nations,  and  they  will  attract  in- 
C^ased  attention  and  respect  through- 
ct  the  world. 

I  leave  you  today  by  renewing 
;nii-iea's  resolute  pledge  to  the  Korean 

,o,,k.. 

•  The  United  States  will  stand  with 
;u  in  the  face  of  external  threats  to 
jur  security; 

•  We  support  you  in  your  search 
■  ways  to  reduce  tensions  and  pro- 
)tf  reconciliation  with  the  North;  and 

•  We  will  steadfastly  encourage  and 
sist  you  in  your  efforts  to  further 
oniimic  growth  and  democratic 
vfl(i])nient. 

Together  we  will  pursue  these  com- 
:>n  objectives  and  together  ensure  a 
ture  of  liberty,  of  prosperity,  and  of 
•ace  for  our  peoples. 


INNER  TOAST, 
3KY0, 

JLY  19,  1988 

r.  Foreign  Minister  [Sosuke  Uno],  you 
■ok  office  just  7  months  ago.  We  held 
ir  first  exchange  in  January  during 
le  visit  of  Prime  Minister  [Noboru] 
ikeshita  to  Washington  and,  since  that 
me,  have  communicated  often.  I  have 
ien  pleased  with  what  I  have  heard 
id  seen.  At  the  time  of  Prime  Minis- 
'.r  Takeshita's  visit  to  Washington,  he 
nd  the  President  established  a  very 
pecific  agenda  and  gave  you,  Mr.  Min- 
;ter,  and  me  firm  orders  to  roil  up  our 
leeves  and  get  to  work.  We  did,  and 
apan  and  the  United  States  can  be 
roud  of  recent  accomplishments  that 
/ould  not  have  been  possible  without 
he  active  cooperation  and  consultation 
etween  our  two  governments  and 
nthout  a  shared  sense  of  responsibility 
0  the  world  community. 

•  Japan  has  accelerated  its  reliance 
n  domestic  demand  expansion  to  pro- 
lote  economic  growth. 

•  Japan  has  taken  steps  to  assume 
lore  of  the  costs  for  the  support  of 
I.S.  forces  in  Japan. 


Anti-Americanism 


Excerpt  from  the  question-and-answer 
session  following  Secretary  Shultz's  ad- 
dress before  the  Korean  Newspaper 
Editors'  Association  on  July  18. 

I  don't  know  how  to  assess  the  anti- 
Americanism,  so  called,  that  I  hear 
about.  I  can  only  say  what  the  United 
States  is  doing  and  will  do.  We  support 
free  and  democratic  government.  We 
stand  with  people  who  are  willing  to  act 
to  defend  their  freedom  and  security.  We 
believe  in  open  markets.  We  have 
played  a  big  part  in  creating  the  open 
trading  system  from  which  we  and  the 
Korean  people  have  benefited  tremen- 
dously. So  we  want  to  keep  it  that  way 
and  open  it  further.  And  well  push  for 
those  things.  Sometimes  people  don't 
like  It  when  we  push  for  those  things. 
Yet,  sometimes  it  seems  to  us  that 
everybody  wants  the  U.S.  market  to  be 
open  and  that's  as  far  as  it  goes.  That's 
not  an  open  world  trading  system;  it's 
got  to  be  reciprocal. 

I  understand  there  is  a  lot  of  resent- 
ment and  anti-Americanism  connected 
with  our  efforts  to  open  your  markets  to 


tobacco,  for  example,  and  in  the  case  of 
beef.  .  .  .  Are  you  aware  that  you  sell 
more  tobacco  in  the  United  States  than 
we  sell  here?  Would  you  like  us  to  take 
action  to  stop  that?  There  is  a  perfectly 
satisfactory  agreement  that's  been  nego- 
tiated. Let  it  be  so.  And  if  my  saying  that 
causes  anti-Americanism,  so  be  it.  I'm 
going  to  stand  up  for  the  principles  I 
believe  in.  .  .  ,  You  can't  say,  I  want  the 
good  aspects,  but  if  something  happens 
I  don't  like,  I'll  reject  that.  That's  not  be- 
ing part  of  the  system.  So,  if  my  saying 
that  means  you  become  anti-American, 
so  be  it. 

But,  you  have  to  look  at  these  is- 
sues in  a  factual,  objective  way,  just  as 
we  try  to  do.  We  know  every  country  has 
forceful,  political,  special  interests.  We 
have  them.  Do  you  think  that  we  don't 
have  any  farmers  that  notice  when  they 
can't  penetrate  other  people's  markets? 
And  that  they  don't  raise  Cain?  Have 
you  ever  seen  the  tractors  on  the  streets 
of  Washington  protesting  closed  markets 
abroad?  So,  it's  got  to  work  both  ways  if 
It's  going  to  work. 


•  We  have  agreed  on  a  procedure 
for  facilitating  the  access  of  American 
corporations  to  public  works  projects  in 
Japan. 

•  Japan  has  agreed  to  remove 
quotas  on  the  import  of  beef  and  citrus 
products,  permitting  a  freer  trade  in 
these  commodities  to  the  benefit  of  Jap- 
anese consumers  and  our  producers. 

•  We  have  adopted  a  new  science 
and  technology  agreement  that  will 
provide  for  a  vastly  increased  inter- 
change of  ideas  between  our  two 
peoples. 

•  We  have  concluded  a  revised  nu- 
clear agreement  that  will  greatly  sta- 
bilize our  cooperation  in  this  area. 

•  Japan  has  moved  decisively  to 
strengthen  its  export  control  regime, 
thereby  contributing  to  the  security  of 
both  of  our  peoples. 

•  We  have  agreed  on  codevelop- 
ment  of  a  new  fighter  aircraft,  and 
Japan  has  increased  its  cash  contribu- 
tion to  the  maintenance  of  our  forces  in 
Japan. 

Our  cooperation  has  also  extended 
to  efforts  to  coordinate  international  fi- 
nancial and  development  strategy.  We 
have  been  in  close  contact  in  recent 


months  to  discuss  the  major  develop- 
ment assistance  programs  which  will  be 
required  to  support  the  Philippines  and 
Afghanistan.  Moreover,  we  have  begun 
regular  meetings  to  seek  methods  by 
which  the  world's  two  largest  economic 
powers  can  coordinate  efforts. 

In  our  discussions  during  my  visit, 
we  have  reaffirmed  that  the  close  rela- 
tionship between  our  two  nations  is 
unshakable.  We  have  a  common  com- 
mitment to  democratic  principles  and 
the  pursuit  of  excellence,  and  we  share 
a  respect  for  the  free  market  which  has 
afforded  our  peoples  an  unprecedented 
level  of  prosperity  and  economic 
vitality. 

I  am  confident  that  our  relations 
are  headed  in  the  right  direction.  We 
will  have  problems,  but  those  will  be 
problems  arising  out  of  the  dynamism 
of  our  societies.  They  will  at  times 
cause  frictions,  but  they  will  also  pro- 
vide opportunities  for  cooperation, 
whether  it  be  in  trade,  scientific  en- 
deavor, development  assistance,  or 
peacemaking.  It  is  time  now  to  plan  for 
the  future,  one  which  holds  great  prom- 
ise for  both  of  our  peoples,  for  our  so- 
cieties are  blessed  with  the  democratic 
values  and  enterprising  spirit  so  vital 
for  success  in  our  increasingly  inte- 
grated and  rapidly  changing  world. 


lepartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1988 


33 


THE  SECRETARY 


RFMARKS  \T  U.S. -MARSHALL 
"^SdS  COMMEMORATIVE 

CEREMONY, 
MAJURO, 
JULY  20,  1988 


Today,  at  this  place,  we  are  joined 
together  to  pause  and  to  remember. 
Join  me  in  looking  across  the  Majuro 
Lagoon  and  remembering  a  late  Janu- 
ary day  in  1944,  when  a  small  band  ot 
American  forces  came  ashore  here  to 
hberate  Majuro  Atoll  from  Imperial 
Japanese  forces.  Like  many  other  Pa- 
cific islands,  these  islands  were  re- 
moved from  the  hands  of  the  aggressor 
and  came  again  into  the  possession  of 
the  sovereign  Marshallese  people. 

The  conquest  of  Majuro  Atoll  by 
American  forces  was  bloodless,  but 
your  experience  in  the  surrounding  war 
was  not.  Just  200  miles  to  our  north- 
west, the  day  before  the  landing  here 
at  Majuro,  American  forces  from  the 
4th  Marine  and  the  7th  Infantry  Divi- 
sions, supported  by  U.S.  naval  and  air 
forces,  liberated  Kwajalein  Atoll  from 
an  entrenched  enemy.  That  day  saw 
some  of  the  most  brutal  hand-to-hand 
fighting  of  the  Pacific  campaign.  These 
Americans  fought  and  died  to  return  to 
you  what  has  always  been  yours— these 
islands,  these  waters,  this  country. 

Our  remembrance  today  of  those 
cataclysmic  events  is  not  complete 
without  paying  tribute  to  the  Mar- 
shallese people  who  aided  American 
forces  as  scouts  and  who  took  up  arms 
to  eradicate  occupiers  from  these 
islands. 

Forty-four  years  have  passed  since 
that  January  day.  For  42  of  those  years, 
until  October  21,  1986,  we  were  part- 
ners in  reconstructing  your  country  in 
setting  it  on  the  course  wanted  by  Mar- 
shallese and  for  Marshallese.  We  know 
the  Marshallese  people  made  major  sac- 
rifices in  securing  the  peace  in  our 
postwar  world.  Here  I  refer  to  the  U.S. 
nuclear  weapons  testing  program  that 
took  place  here  between  1946  and  1958. 
For  our  part,  we  participated  in  your 
enterprise  under  the  trusteeship  agree- 
ment with  the  United  Nations.  But  the 
task  was  harder  for  you— you  had  the 
challenge  of  building  a  nation. 

We  experienced  times  of  exhilara- 
tion and  progress  during  the  trust- 
eeship. We  participated  together  in 
designing  and  building  new  public  proj- 
ects so  that  the  economy  of  your  coun- 
try could  advance.  We  participated 
together  in  creating  and  sustaining  the 
political  conditions  that  resulted  in 
your  own  constitution  taking  effect  on 
May  1,  1979. 


We  also  participated  together  in 
creating  a  new  political  partnership 
that  allows  vour  country  and  mine  to 
associate  freely  as  friends  dedicated  to 
human  rights,  to  the  realization  of  hu- 
man potential,  and  to  the  strength  of 
our  common  vision  of  peace  in  the 
Pacific  and  the  world.  There  is  no 
precedent  for  our  free  association  rela- 
tionship. We  created  it  out  of  our  mu- 
tual respect  for  one  another  and  our 
desire  to  honor  the  bonds  first  formed 
so  many  years  ago.  And  we  did  the 
same  with  our  friends  and  neighbors  in 
the  Federated  States  of  Micronesia. 

In  October  of  1986,  when  the  Com- 
pact of  Free  Association  entered  into 
force,  you  became  a  free  people  in  a 
free  nation,  just  as  you  were  in  the 
distant  past.  And  in  the  short  20 
months  that  have  followed,  nations  and 
international  organizations  in  the  re- 
gion and  the  world  are  recognizing  and 
accepting  this  most  fundamental  of 
facts   The  years  of  waiting  are  over,  the 
transition  is  done,  the  life  of  this  nation 
is  now  unfettered  and  supported  only 
by  friends  of  your  own  making. 

As  I  cast  this  wreath  on  the  waters 
of  Majuro  Lagoon,  remember  with  me 
the  days  of  liberation,  of  exhilaration, 
of  work  and  suffering,  and  finally  of 
freedom  that  we  have  shared.  And  re- 
member the  price  paid  by  those  who 
made  this  possible.  Let  us  consecrate 
their  memory  even  as  we  rededicate 
ourselves,  as  free  peoples,  to  the  pur- 
pose they  had  in  moving  across  this 
lagoon  44  years  ago. 


ADDRESS  BEFORE  THE  PACIFIC 
AND  ASIAN  AFFAIRS  COUNCIL 
AND  THE  PACIFIC  FORUM, 

HONOLULU, 

JULY  21,  1988' 

I  conclude  my  travels  in  Asia  as  Secre- 
tary of  State  here  in  Hawaii— a  symbol, 
if  ever  there  was  one,  that  America  is  a 
nation  of  the  Pacific  and  a  nation  of  the 
future.  This  nine-stop  trip  covered 
Southeast,  East,  and  Northeast  Asia, 
as  well  as  Oceania.  1  am  more  im- 
pressed than  ever  with  Asia's  diversity, 
with  its  dynamism,  and  with  the  re- 
gion's potential.  And  I  am  more  con- 
vinced than  ever  of  how  critical 
America's  ties  to  Asia  will  be  for  our 
own  prosperity,  freedom,  and  security 
in  the  years  ahead.  But  if  we,  the  free 
nations  of  the  Asia-Pacific  region,  are 
to  continue  to  advance  in  the  next  cen- 
tury, we  all  must  learn  to  meet  the 
challenges  arising  from  the  very  suc- 
cesses that  we  have  achieved  together. 


A  Success  Story 

The  story  of  the  Asia-Pacific  region  in 
the  postwar  period  is  one  of  profound 
success— for  the  United  States  and  for 
the  other  countries  in  the  region  that 
have  cast  their  fate  with  us.  The  accom 
plishments  of  the  countries  of  East 
Asia  have  become  so  prominent  a  fea- 
ture of  the  global  landscape  that  it  is 
getting  hard  to  remember  the  time  in 
the  years  just  after  World  War  II  whei 
their  survival— let  alone  their  success- 1 
was  not  at  all  assured. 

The  Pacific  region— with  its  long    | 
history  of  national  rivalries  and  war- 
fare—has enjoyed  a  remarkable  period 
of  stability  and  economic  advance,  es])^ 
cially  in  the  past  two  decades.  In  the 
years  since  Worid  War  II,  long-time  a^ 
versaries  have  become  allies,  friends, 
and  trading  partners.  Once  poor  coun- 
tries have  become  prosperous.  Nation: 
once  divided  from  each  other  are  wort 
ing  together  pragmatically  to  realize    ^ 
shared  interests  and  concerns.  And  av 
thoritarian  political  orders  of  the  past 
have  given  way  to  the  give-and-take  u 
democratic  politics. 

Among  the  reasons  for  this  ex- 
tended period  of  reconciliation  and  coi 
structive  growth  is  the  fact  that  for 
more  than  40  years,  the  United  State 
has  pursued  farsighted  and  effective 
policies  toward  the  region,  as  it  has 
toward  the  world  as  a  whole. 

The  Fundamentals  of  U.S.  Policy 

What  are  those  policies  and  on  what 
precepts  are  they  based? 

Collective  Security.  Our  leaders 
the  postwar  years  rightly  sensed  tha> 
our  worid  had  become  a  place  where 
nation  could  protect  its  security  inter 
ests  in  isolation.  Therefore,  we  and 
other  nations  of  the  free  worid  joinec 
together  in  a  global  web  of  alliance  a 
security  ties,  to  which  each  of  us  has 
contributed  our  individual  strengths. 
This  structure  of  collective  security  1 
maintained  the  peace  in  the  face  of  fc 
decades  of  unremitting  challenges  fn 
the  communist  world. 

Regional  Conflict  Resolution.  J: 
today's  ever  more  integrated  world, 
age-old  conflicts  and  regional  confiag 
tions  pose  ever  greater  threats  to  th( 
global  community.  Therefore,  we  anc 
our  partners  have  sought  to  use  our 
collective  strength  to  ensure  that  vio 
lence  does  not  spread  and  to  further 
the  prospects  for  negotiated  settle- 
ments of  disputes. 

Open  Economies.  Despite  our 
strong  defenses,  we  know  that  it  is  i 


34 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1! 


THE  SECRETARY 


ble  for  any  country  to  ensure  its 
ity  through  mihtary  means  alone. 
lOmic  vitaUty  is  the  essential  foun- 
n  of  national  strength.  Thus,  we 
actively  promoted  economic  recov- 
,nd  development.  Moreover,  eco- 
ic  development  has  been  spurred 
n  open  and  competitive  global  trad- 
system.  Therefore,  the  United 
es  has  pursued  policies  designed  to 
ngthen  open  markets  and  facilitate 
flows  of  technology  and  capital  that 
accelerate  global  growth. 
Democratic  Values.  Development 
es  a  high  premium  on  creativity,  on 
inced  levels  of  education,  entre- 
leurship,  the  decentralization  of  re- 
isibility,  and  the  free  flow  of  ideas 
people — all  hallmarks  of  open  and 
ocratic  societies.  Therefore,  for 
lOns  of  political  commitment  as  well 
ractical  effect,  the  United  States 
encouraged  processes  of  democratic 
itution-building.  We  and  our  allies 
i  supported  those  around  the  world 
are  struggling  for  their  freedom 
mst  the  authoritarian  right  as  well 
Ihe  totalitarian  left. 

Collective  security,  regional  conflict 
olution,  open  markets,  and  demo- 
iic  values — for  four  decades,  these 
(cies  have  been  a  powerful  formula 
.national  development,  security,  and 

I.onal  stability  in  the  world  and  in 
Asia-Pacific  region.  And  it  is  no 
j  icidence  that  countries  that  have 
j  ed  with  the  United  States  in  the 
twar  coalition  of  free  nations  have 
ined  out  to  be  the  most  productive, 
I  most  stable,  and  the  greatest 
tributors  to  a  secure  global 
ironment. 

Today  the  communist  powers — first 
ina  and  now  the  Soviet  Union — seem 
nave  begun  to  realize  the  jjower  of 
se  policies.  We  encourage  them  to 
ognize  the  need  to  settle  draining 
1  dangerous  regional  conflicts,  to  end 
ifrontations  with  the  United  States 
1  its  allies,  to  decentralize  their 
momies,  and  open  up  to  the  world, 
d  they  are  giving  indications  of 
,ng  so. 

fping  With  Success 

,  the  trends  are  going  our  way — 
rard  peace,  toward  a  lessening  of 
isions,  toward  free  markets  and  dem- 
ratic  values.  The  United  States  has 
Iped  the  countries  of  the  Asia-Pacific 
le  the  wave  and  to  solve  the  problems 
sociated  with  economic  gi'owth  and 
litical  maturation.  Now,  we  and  our 
.rtners  are  facing  another  set  of  chal- 
iges  but  of  a  qualitatively  different 


kind — we  must  learn  to  cope  with  the 
problems  created  by  our  own  successes. 

As  we  have  seen,  America  helped 
powerfully  to  create  an  environment 
that  enabled  many  of  the  nations  of 
Asia  to  come  into  their  own.  As  a  re- 
sult, our  world  is  no  longer  dominated 
by  one  or  two  "superpowers."  There 
are  increasingly  numerous  national  cen- 
ters of  economic  strength  and  political 
power.  Peoples  once  accustomed  to 
American  preeminence  and  protection 
are  ever  more  determined  to  shape 
their  own  futures. 

From  the  Philippines  to  Korea, 
long-established  security  arrangements 
are  being  reassessed,  and  throughout 
the  region  domestic  economic  policies 
are  being  reviewed  in  the  context  of 
pressures  for  more  open  markets,  cur- 
rency revaluations,  and  the  new  re- 
quirements of  an  age  of  information- 
based  innovation  and  production.  Into 
the  bargain,  we  have  China's  reorienta- 
tion toward  economic  reform  and  more 
constructive  interchange  with  its  neigh- 
bors. And  we  see  a  new  Soviet  activism 
toward  the  Pacific. 

All  these  developments  present 
challenges.  We  and  our  partners  will  be 
equal  to  them  if  we  hold  fast  to  the 
primary  sources  of  our  achievements: 
the  cooperative  coalition  of  free  nations 
that  has  served  us  all  so  well. 

Asia  as  a  Policy  Model 

Let's  take  a  closer  look  at  how  the  ele- 
ments of  our  policy  have  shaped  U.S. 
relations  with  the  Asia-Pacific  region 
and  at  some  of  the  challenges  we  now 
face. 

Security.  First  comes  security:  the 
U.S. -Japan  alliance  remains  the  cor- 
nerstone of  our  policy  in  the  region, 
enhancing  the  security  of  our  friends 
and  allies  as  well.  While  maintaining  its 
fundamental  commitment  to  remain  a 
nonmilitary  power,  Japan  has  steadily 
improved  its  self-defense  capabilities 
in  recent  years  and  has  broadened  bi- 
lateral defense  cooperation  with  the 
United  States. 

In  the  Republic  of  Korea,  with 
American  help,  Korean  troops  have  held 
the  front  line  for  more  than  three  dec- 
ades against  a  formidable  northern  ad- 
versary. At  the  same  time,  the  stability 
that  the  U.S.  presence  has  lent  to  this 
strategic  peninsula  has  boosted  Korea's 
economic  and  political  development. 

In  the  Philippines,  another  area  of 
strategic  significance,  the  United 
States  has  helped  a  struggling  democ- 
racy beat  back  a  communist  insurgency 


and  promote  economic  growth.  And,  by 
supporting  an  imjjortant  U.S.  military 
presence,  the  Philippines — like  Korea — 
has  made  a  major  contribution  to  its 
own  and  to  regional  and  global  security. 

Thailand  has  been  an  ally  for  over 
30  years  and  today  remains  the  front- 
line state  resisting  Vietnamese  aggres- 
sion in  Cambodia.  In  turn,  America  has 
supported  Thailand  diplomatically,  mili- 
tarily, and  politically  against  security 
threats.  The  presence,  even  as  I  speak, 
of  U.S.  ground,  naval,  and  air  units  on 
bilateral  exercises  in  Thailand  dem- 
onstrates that  our  commitment  to 
Thailand's  security  remains  firm. 

Our  ally  Australia  has  devoted  the 
resources  necessary  to  modernizing  its 
military  forces  and — by  its  steadfast 
support  for  defense  cooperation 
through  our  joint  facilities — has  made 
important  contributions  to  effective 
deterrence. 

Just  as  the  United  States  and  our 
allies  benefit  from  the  strong  web  of 
security  ties  we  have  formed  in  the 
Asia-Pacific  region,  each  of  us  also 
draws  strength  from  the  constancy  and 
resolve  of  free  nations  elsewhere  in  the 
world.  The  successful  way  the  United 
States  and  our  allies  in  Europe  handled 
the  Soviet  SS-20  threat  demonstrated 
that  our  commitment  to  NATO  would 
not  be  at  the  expense  of  secui'ity  in 
Asia. 

At  every  step  in  the  negotiation  of 
the  INF  [Intermediate-Range  Nuclear 
Forces]  Ti-eaty  we  consulted  with  our 
friends  and  allies  in  this  part  of  the 
world  as  well  as  in  Europe.  Their  views 
were  reflected  in  our  positions  at  the 
table.  From  the  outset,  we  made  it 
plain  that  we  would  insist  on  the  elim- 
ination of  the  Soviet  missiles  in  this 
range  aimed  at  Asia  as  well  as  Europe. 
The  treaty  had  to  be  global  in  scope, 
just  as  the  structure  of  our  security 
ties  is  global  in  scope. 

The  clear  lesson  of  this  experience 
is  that  the  ties  among  the  world's  free 
nations  are  interdependent  and  indivisi- 
ble. For  four  decades,  our  collective 
strengths  have  reinforced  the  structure 
of  peace  nationally,  regionally,  and  in- 
ternationally. The  Asia-Pacific  region  is 
more  secure  and  stable  today  than  ever 
before.  Keeping  it  so  requires  commit- 
ment and  hard  work  on  the  part  of  all 
countries.  We  cannot  take  the  frame- 
work of  peace  we  have  built  together 
for  granted.  The  postwar  generation 
understood  this;  yet  today  complacency 
is  perhaps  the  greatest  thi'eat  we  face. 
Our  challenge  is  to  help  new  genera- 
tions see  the  fundamental  importance  of 
keeping  that  framework  strong  and 
suited  to  the  times. 


spartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1988 


35 


THE  SECRETARY 


Nuclear  Free  Zones 


The  following  remarks  were  made  dur- 
ing a  question-and-answer  session  fol- 
lowing ttie  address. 

I  don't  particularly  like  the  nuclear- 
free-zone  efforts,  and  the  reasons  are 
these: 

First,  we  live  in  a  world  where  there 
are  nuclear  weapons.  The  Soviets  and 
we  have  the  bulk  of  them.  As  long  as  the 
Soviets  have  them,  we  must  have  them. 
Our  ability  to  have  our  nuclear  weapons 
is  a  principal  source  of  deterrence 
against  aggression.  It's  a  principal  rea- 
son why  we  have  seen,  broadly  speak- 
ing, an  era  of  stability.  If  we  don't  have 
them  and  they  do  have  them,  it  would  be 
a  very  destabilizing  thing.  So  we  have  to 
remember  that,  first  of  all. 

Second,  we  have  to  remember,  as  I 
tried  to  bring  out  in  my  talk,  that  there  is 
a  very  real  sense  in  which  the  security 
of  the  free  nations  is  a  worldwide  web  of 
relationships.  The  fact  that  in  Iceland  we 
have  an  important  presence  in  military 
capability — as  Iceland  is  a  member  of 
NATO— helps  the  stability  of  the  Asian 
region,  just  as  it  goes  vice  versa.  You 
have  to  look  upon  these  things  as  a  col- 
lective matter. 

Therefore,  when  there  come  to  be 
proposals  that  would  have  the  effect,  if 
they  were  fully  implemented,  of  meaning 
that  U.S.  naval  presence  would  be  elimi- 
nated from  the  area.  I  think  it  would  be  a 
very  destabilizing  thing,  and  that's  what 
it  would  mean. 

We  have  nuclear  weapons  on  many 
of  our  vessels.  As  a  matter  of  policy  and 
of  intelligence,  we  do  not  confirm  or 
deny  their  presence  on  any  particular 
vessel.  There's  no  point  in  telling  poten- 
tial adversaries,  giving  them  unneces- 
sary intelligence.  So  that  is  a  firm 
policy;  it  is  a  worldwide  policy.  We  must 
pursue  it  in  every  part  of  the  world. 

So  when  New  Zealand,  a  friendly, 
democratic  country,  decided — I  think  in 


an  ill-considered  action — in  effect,  to 
ban  our  ships  from  using  their  port,  we 
had  to  say  to  New  Zealand,  "We  part  as 
friends,  but  we  part  "  And  they  have  left 
the  web  of  security  arrangements.  I 
don't  think  it  helps  any.  But  if  that 
spreads — if  that  disease  spreads  and 
the  Asia-Pacific  nations  try  to  leave  that 
web  of  security  arrangements,  then  I 
think  that's  a  bad  thing.  That  is  why  we 
think  that  the  way  to  go  about  it  is  the 
way  we  are  going  about  it. 

We  don't  like  the  possibility  of  a  nu- 
clear explosion  any  more  than  anybody 
else  does.  In  fact,  the  United  States  has 
more  nuclear  weapons  stationed  there,  on 
our  soil  and  operating  from  there  on  our 
soil,  than  anybody  else  does — except  the 
Soviet  Union — for  good  and  sufficient  rea- 
sons. So  we  think  the  way  to  deal  with  this 
matter  is  to  try  and  get  control  of  the  in- 
creasing numbers  of  nuclear  warheads  in 
the  world. 

That  IS  why  President  Reagan,  nght 
from  the  beginning,  said  that  treaties,  such 
as  the  early  SALT  [strategic  arms  limitation 
talks]  treaties  that  limited  the  rate  of  in- 
crease in  nuclear  weapons,  were  not  a 
good  idea.  A  much  better  idea  is  to  reduce 
them.  So  on  strategic  arms,  we  are  working 
to  get  them  cut  in  half,  and  we  have  made 
a  lot  of  headway  On  the  intermediate- 
range,  nuclear-armed  ballistic  missiles,  we 
sought  and  obtained  a  treaty  with  the  So- 
viet Union  that  would  eliminate  that  class  of 
weapon. 

So  the  way  to  do  it  is  to  bring  this 
down  in  a  way  that  maintains  stability  and 
parity — not,  in  effect,  to  have  a  form  of 
unilateral  disarmament  which  will  not  serve 
our  strategic  interests. 

We  have  been  understanding  of  the 
sort  of  motive  power  behind  this,  but  also 
we  have  said — understandable  though  it 
may  be — it's  not  a  good  idea  to  push  this 
idea  too  far,  too  fast,  for  the  reasons  I  have 
given. 


Some  of  our  allies  in  Asia  are  now 
reviewing  whether  the  components  of 
our  security  presence — port  and  air  fa- 
cilities and  naval  access — are  really  nec- 
essary to  their  security.  Some  wonder 
whether  it  might  not  be  better  to  go  it 
alone.  Their  reassessment  is  appropri- 
ate; it  is  the  essence  of  a  voluntary  al- 
liance of  free  nations.  But  they  should 
not  forget  that  our  collective  efforts 
have  kept  the  peace  for  40  years  and 
that  our  combined  strength  has  brought 
our  adversaries  to  the  bargaining  table, 


making  possible  the  stabilizing  reduc- 
tions in  armaments  that  we  all  seek. 

Likewise,  we  cannot  be  complacent 
in  the  face  of  new  challenges  to  regional 
and  global  security.  Terrorism  requires 
a  collective  response.  And  the  increas- 
ing proliferation  of  high-technology 
weaponry — aircraft,  missiles,  nuclear 
material,  and  chemical  weapons — into 
areas  of  regional  conflict  requires  re- 
straint or  collective  controls  on  the  part 
of  all  weapons-exporting  states,  as  well 
as  effort  to  resolve  the  sources  of  con- 
flict themselves. 


Resolution  of  Conflicts  and  Re- 
duction of  Tension.  The  success  of  oa 
collective  security  efforts  has  furthers 
prospects  for  reduction  of  tension  and 
negotiated  settlements  in  Asia  and, 
hence,  for  a  more  stable  world.  The 
United  States,  the  ASEAN  countries, 
and  other  interested  nations  have  lon^ 
pressed  for  the  withdrawal  of  Viet- 
namese troops  from  Cambodia  and  foi 
the  start  of  a  genuine  process  of  na- 
tional reconciliation  in  that  tortured 
country.  To  that  end,  we  have  sup- 
ported Prince  Sihanouk  as  the  genuinj 
leader  of  an  independent  Cambodian 
Government.  The  United  States  will 
continue  to  support  measures  which 
could  be  implemented  in  the  context 
of  a  settlement  that  rejects  a  return 
to  control  by  the  Khmer  Rouge. 

During  my  recent  meetings  with 
the  leaders  of  the  ASEAN  countries, 
China,  and  Japan,  we  reaffirmed  our 
shared  objective  of  an  independent 
Cambodia  free  of  both  Vietnamese 
troops  and  the  danger  of  Khmer  Rou 
control.  We  advanced  our  dialogue  or 
specific  ways  to  achieve  those  goals  i 
found  more  common  ground  than  eve 
before.  I  should  also  tell  you  that  oui 
efforts  have  not  been  limited  to  the 
Asian  region  alone.  The  Soviet  Unio 
as  Vietnam's  principal  supporter,  has 
clear  responsibility  to  help  bring  thi; 
tragic  conflict  to  an  end.  Therefore, 
have  had  increasingly  frequent  ex- 
changes with  the  Soviet  Foreign  Mir 
ter  [Eduard  Shevardnadze]  in  order 
encourage  a  constructive  stance  on 
their  part.  I  am  encouraged  by  the 
tone  and  content  of  these  contacts,  j 
the  Jakarta  informal  meeting  unfold; 
next  week,  I  hope  we  will  see  the  bi 
ginnings  of  a  process  that  will  lead  t 
the  end  of  Cambodia's  ti'agedy. 

When  I  addressed  the  ASEAN 
postministerial  conference  2  weeks  a 
I  stressed  the  need  to  keep  diploma'* 
and  economic  pressui'e  on  Hanoi.  Tb 
stance  does  not  arise  from  malice  or 
bitterness.  Rather,  the  United  State 
together  with  our  allies  and  friends 
in  Asia,  looks  forward  to  Vietnam's  : 
joining  the  community  of  nations.  T1 
United  States  will  unequivocally  we; 
come  normalized  i-elations  with  Viet 
nam  in  the  context  of  an  acceptable 
Cambodian  settlement  and  a  resolutl 
of  the  POW/MIA  issue  which,  if  leftl 
unsettled,  will  continue  to  divide  ou 
peoples.  While  we  are  somewhat  en 
couraged  by  recent  progress,  Hanoi 
must  understand  that  our  commitm 
to  a  free  and  independent  Cambodi: 
and  to  our  POWs/MIAs  is  unshakali 


36 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1B' 


THE  SECRETARY 


The  United  States  has  welcomed 
Republic  of  Korea's  increased  con- 
with  China  and  the  Soviet  Union; 
President  Roh's  recent  states- 
like  initiative  to  encourage  North 
■ea  to  reduce  its  isolation  has  our 
pect  and  support.  Pyongyang's  initial 
etion  has  been  to  brush  aside  Seoul's 
cere  offer  to  reduce  tensions  and 
imote  a  North-South  dialogue.  We 
)e  the  North  will  reconsider  its  posi- 

It  should  not  squander  this  im- 
•tant  opportunity.  Today's  positive  at- 
sphere  is  a  valuable  asset  for  na- 
lal  reconciliation,  and  time  is  not  on 
side  of  those  who  obstruct  dialogue, 
the  meanwhile,  we  remain  solidly  in 
)port  of  the  Republic  of  Korea's 
lurity. 

The  United  States  has  responded 
sitively  to  China's  steps  toward 
ater  and  more  constructive  inter- 
emge  with  its  neighbors.  We  have  re- 
ined firm  in  our  one-China  policy 
d  have  welcomed  developments  on 
th  sides  of  the  Taiwan  Straits  that 
itribute  to  a  rela.xation  of  tensions, 
nsistent  with  our  longstanding  inter- 
in  a  peaceful  resolution  of  the  T^i- 
n  question,  we  have  sought  to  foster 
environment  within  which  such  de- 
lopments  can  continue. 

We  have  urged  China  to  join  with 
in  an  international  effort  to  staunch 
3  alarming  traffic  in  ballistic  missiles 
strife-ridden  areas  of  the  world.  We 
;o  believe  that  elimination  of  the  re- 
aining  obstacles  in  the  way  of  Sino- 
iviet  relations  could  be  constructive  to 
e  e.xtent  that  this  strengthens  an  en- 
ronment  of  security  and  stability  for 
the  countries  of  Asia. 
By  the  same  token,  we  have  noted 
r.  Gorbachev's  heightened  interest  in 
sia  and  his  declared  willingness  to  im- 
■ove  relations  in  the  region.  Thus  far, 
hile  we  view  as  encouraging  the  res- 
ration  of  some  contacts  with  China, 
e  have  not  seen  any  significant  reduc- 
on  of  Soviet  forces  on  the  Sino-Soviet 
jrder.  The  Soviets  still  seek  to  under- 
it  America's  naval  presence  in  the 
sia-Pacific  region  through  one-sided 
roposals  for  naval  arms  restrictions, 
'loscow  still  underwrites  the  Viet- 
amese  occupation  of  Cambodia  and  op- 
rates  naval  and  air  forces  out  of  Cam 
lanh  Bay.  And  the  Soviets  continue  to 
nhance  arms  supplies  to  North  Korea 
t  a  time  when  Pyongyang  remains 
i.sia's  primary  exporter  of  subversion, 
ggression,  and  terrorism.  Finally, 
loscow  must  agree  to  discuss  Japan's 


Northern  Territories,  a  matter  that  re- 
mains a  fundamental  obstacle  to  nor- 
malized relations. 

The  United  States  repeatedly  has 
sent  the  message  to  Moscow  that  the 
greatest  contribution  the  Soviet  Union 
can  make  to  reducing  tensions  and 
building  confidence  in  Asia  would  be  to 
end  its  support  for  Vietnam's  occupa- 
tion of  Cambodia  and  to  encourage 
Pyongyang  to  respond  positively  to  con- 
structive proposals  such  as  those  put 
forward  by  President  Roh. 

Thus,  the  peaceful  resolution  of 
conflicts  and  the  reduction  of  tensions 
in  Asia  remains  a  high  priority  and 
a  continuing  concern  for  the  United 
States  and  our  partners  in  the  region. 
Each  situation  presents  a  different  set 
of  barriers  to  peace;  a  different  set  of 
problems  to  confront  and  resolve.  In 
each  instance,  we  are  searching  for  so- 
lutions that  will  advance  the  independ- 
ence, freedom,  and  security  of  the 
peoples  directly  affected.  Together  with 
our  allies,  we  will  insist  on  settlements 
that  involve  the  withdrawal  of  foreign 
troops,  a  cessation  of  hostilities,  and 
the  resolution  of  humanitarian  problems 
caused  by  the  conflicts. 

Open  Economies.  Asia's  economic 
dynamism  is  the  most  powerful  argu- 
ment for  decentralized,  market-based 
economic  gi'owth,  and  for  an  open  inter- 
national trading  system.  The  region's 
emergence  as  a  world-class  performer 
in  manufacturing,  trade,  and  finance 
could  not  have  occurred  without  an 
open  international  economy.  Japan  and 
the  newly  industrialized  economies  of 
the  region  have  demonstrated  how 
knowledge,  adaptabihty,  innovation, 
and  openness  can  achieve  high  growth 
rates  and  advanced  industrial  power  in 
a  world  of  globalized  sourcing,  produc- 
tion, and  manufacturing. 

Japan  is  now  the  world's  second 
largest  economy.  Korea,  Taiwan,  Sing- 
apore, and  Hong  Kong  have  enjoyed 
some  of  the  highest  growth  rates  any- 
where; last  year  their  real  GNP  [gross 
national  product]  growth  rates,  ex- 
pressed in  local  currency,  ranged  be- 
tween 8%  and  almost  14%.  By  the  turn 
of  the  century,  Thailand  and  Malaysia 
could  be  major  success  stories  as  well. 
And  the  Philippines  and  Indonesia  have 
economic  reforms  underway  which,  if 
sustained,  will  enable  them  to  cap- 
italize on  their  impressive  potential. 

Yet  Asian  nations  have  in  the  past 
relied  on  export-led  growth  fueled  by 


the  U.S.  deficit  and  our  vast  invest- 
ment market.  But  the  deficit  that  has 
characterized  the  climate  of  our  trading 
relationship  has  started  to  shift.  U.S. 
exports  have  begun  to  surge,  particu- 
larly manufacturers.  Our  market  is 
thus  not  likely  to  absorb  rapid  growth 
in  exports  of  Asia's  manufacturers  to 
the  extent  that  it  did  earlier  in  this 
decade. 

Thus,  another  challenge  of  success 
that  we  and  our  Asian  partners  must 
meet  is  adjustment  to  a  more  balanced 
trading  environment.  Unless  each  of  us 
pursues  domestic  and  international  pol- 
icies which  strengthen  the  role  of  the 
market  and  unleash  forces  that  promote 
growth,  all  of  us  will  face  great  strains 
in  the  years  ahead. 

That  is  why  the  United  States  has 
emphasized  structural  reform  and  do- 
mestic growth  in  all  our  international 
discussions,  including  on  my  recent 
travels  in  Asia.  Since  Asian  nations 
have  depended  on  export-led  growth 
and  the  American  market,  they  must 
plan  now  in  order  to  ease  the  adjust- 
ments they  will  have  to  make  as  our 
deficit  continues  to  decline. 

The  rewards  and  challenges  of  par- 
ticipating in  the  world  market  are  ap- 
parent to  all  in  Asia — including  China 
and  the  Soviet  Union. 

In  China,  Deng  Xiaoping's  far- 
reaching  economic  reforms  of  the  past 
10  years  have  dramatically  raised  pro- 
ductivity and  positioned  China  to  partic- 
ipate in  the  world  trading  system.  By 
opening  up  its  doors  to  international 
commerce,  China  has  gained  recogni- 
tion as  a  country  capable  of  world-class 
economic  performance.  The  impact  of 
these  policies  is  already  evident  in 
China's  impressive  rate  of  growth — on 
the  average  nearly  10%  per  year  over 
the  past  decade — and  in  the  rapid 
expansion  of  trade  with  the  United 
States. 

The  Soviet  Union  is  displaying  a 
growing  interest  in  sharing  in  Asia's 
economic  boom.  Its  access  to  the  region 
remains  constrained  by  its  political  and 
military  activities  and  by  its  own  eco- 
nomic limitations.  Vladivostok,  the  So- 
viet's one  major  port  on  the  Pacific, 
remains  a  city  closed  to  commerce  and 
foreign  travel.  The  Soviet  Union  will 
be  able  to  participate  in  the  economic 
dynamism  of  Asia  as  it  makes  the 
structural  adjustments  necessary  for 
successful  interaction  with  free  markets 
and  open  societies. 


}epartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1988 


37 


THE  SECRETARY 


Building  Democracy.  Nowhere  in 
the  world  is  the  relationship  between 
political  and  economic  development 
clearer  than  in  East  Asia.  The  region's 
economic  miracles  are  now  being 
matched  by  political  miracles.  It  was  in 
postwar  Japan  that  our  policy  of  en- 
couraging democracy  had  its  earliest 
and  most  spectacular  success  in  the  re- 
gion. Today's  worldwide  trend  toward 
democracy  has  had  its  most  recent 
breakthroughs  in  Korea  and  the  Philip- 
pines. We  have  welcomed  the  demo- 
cratic process  in  Thailand  and  are 
impressed  with  the  political  reforms 
now  advancing  in  Taiwan. 

But  the  advance  of  democracy  is 
not  guaranteed.  Societies  making  the 
transition  to  open  political  systems  are 
vulnerable  to  assault  from  the  au- 
thoritarian right  and  the  totalitarian 
left.  The  challenge  for  other  democ- 
racies of  the  world  is  to  remain  en- 
gaged with  all  democratically  oriented 
political  forces  and  support  their  goals. 
We  cannot  dictate  events,  but  we 
should  offer  ideas,  assistance,  and  un- 
derstanding in  order  to  support  the 
processes  of  democratic  change. 

So  these  trends  of  success  all  come 
together  in  Asia.  Security,  stability, 
prosperity,  freedom — they  are  all  inter- 
linked. Throughout  the  region  we  find 
countries  that,  in  distinctive  ways  and 
to  varying  degi-ees,  are  building  mod- 
ern, market-oriented  economies  in- 
creasingly integrated  into  a  global 
trading  system.  They  are  opening  up 
their  political  systems  to  popular  par- 
ticipation, seeking  to  heal  the  wounds 


U.S.  Leadership  Remains 
Essential  to  Asia's  Success 

American  leadership  remains  crucial  to 
continuing  success.  But  our  leadership 
must  be  of  a  different  cast  than  that  of 
the  postwar  period.  It  must  be  a  lead- 
ership suited  to  the  times. 

The  Asia-Pacific  region  remains  an 
area  of  high  strategic  importance  and 
competing  interest  among  powerful  na- 
tions. Since  the  Second  World  War,  the 
United  States  has  been  the  indispens- 
able stabilizing  influence  in  the  region. 
We  are — and  for  the  foreseeable  future 
will  remain — the  fundamental  guaran- 
tor of  the  balance  of  power  in  this  vital 
area  that  spans  fully  one-half  of  the 
globe. 

Our  active  engagement  in  the  re- 
gion ensures  that  countries  great  and 
small,  developed  and  developing  alike, 
can  continue  to  advance  economically 
and  politically  within  a  secure  environ- 
ment. U.S.  security  capabilities  remain 
second  to  none,  and  we  continue  to  pro- 
vide to  our  friends  and  allies  the  most 
flexible  and  diversified  military  support 
available  in  the  world. 

Our  economy  is  innovative;  it  is 
open;  and,  as  a  result,  it  is  expanding. 
Our  economic  strength  will  continue  to 
increase.  Our  trade  deficit  is  declining 
as  our  exports  continue  to  rise.  And  we 
are  becoming  more  productive  as  we 
eliminate  obstructions  to  domestic 
growth.  America  continues  to  be  the 
largest  source  of  investment  capital  and 
opportunity,  high  technology,  and  man- 
ufacturing capability  in  the  world,  and 


Asia's  economic  dynamism  is  the  most  powerful  argu- 
ment for  decentralized,  market-based  economic  growth 
and  for  an  open  international  trading  system. 


of  national  division  and  to  bridge  the 
chasm  of  military  confrontation  through 
dialogue  and  political  accommodation. 
The  countries  of  the  Asia-Pacific 
region  are  models  for  other  nations  to 
follow  into  the  future.  And  along  with 
the  United  States,  they  are  especially 
well  positioned  to  meet  the  challenges 
and  grasp  the  opportunities  of  the  com- 
ing century.  Let  me  explain  why. 


our  service  sector  is  poised  for  an  ever 
greater  role  in  Asian  markets. 

And,  last,  but  not  least,  America's 
deeply  held  democratic  values  remain 
our  greatest  asset.  They  are  a  universal 
beacon  to  people  of  all  countries  and 
backgrounds,  and  they  make  profound 
practical  sense  in  a  world  where  indi- 
vidual initiative,  ingenuity,  and  the  free 
flow  of  information  and  people  are  key 
to  progress. 


Our  strengths  and  our  vision  en- 
sui-e  that  the  United  States  will  r^nat 
a  leader  in  the  Asia-Pacific  region  in 
the  years  ahead,  just  as  it  was  in  the 
immediate  postwar  era.  In  the  next 
century,  America's  engagement  with 
Asia  must  intensify  because  and  not  d 
spite  the  fact  that  there  is  an  ever- 
growing number  of  capable  countries 
coming  onto  the  world  scene.  Our  en- 
gagement must  be  more  active  than 
ever  because  the  socialist  powers  are 
seeking  to  be  more  actively  involved  i) 
the  region  as  well. 

Today's  transformations  in  our  rel 
tionships  with  allies,  friends,  and  ad- 
versaries alike  are  leading  to  a  health 
reexamination  and  renewal  of  our  ties 
with  the  nations  of  the  region.  And,  I 
am  confident,  our  relations  with  our 
partners  will  be  the  stronger  for  it.  T 
national  interests  at  stake — our  own 
and  theirs — are  too  weighty  and  jeop 
dize;  the  alternatives  too  troublesome 
in  their  implications. 

Policy  Guidelines 
for  the  Years  Ahead 

As  we  all  engage  in  a  collective  reas- 
sessment of  the  relations  among  us,  ll 
me  suggest  some  guidelines  for  shap;! 
our  future  dealings. 

•  We  are  better  together  than 
apart;  we  can  do  much  more  collecti% 
than  separately.  One  nation's  strateg 
location  may  prove  advantageous  to 
basing  arrangements;  another  natior 
may  possess  a  strategic  capability;  s 
another's  thriving  economy  may  pen 
it  to  exert  influence  in  world  affairs 
order  to  achieve  shared  objectives.  \ 
must  maintain  our  collective  strength 
and  vigilance  in  matters  of  defense, 
even  as  we  seek  opportunities  for  na 
tional  reconciliation  and  the  reductio 
of  tensions  with  adversaries. 

•  We  must  seek  to  be  inclusive, 
exclusive,  in  our  dealings  with  each 
other.  The  national  or  regional  polici 
and  institutional  arrangements  we 
adopt  must  not  run  counter  to  globai 
trends  toward  integrated  markets  an 
collective  security.  Furthermore,  we 
should  welcome  the  participation  of 
those  socialist  countries  whose  doma 
tic  reforms  and  foreign  policies  enab 
them  to  meet  the  security  concerns 
economic  requirements  of  the  mark© 
oriented  democracies. 


38 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1!|C 

JL 


ARMS  CONTROL 


We  must  strive  for  ever  greater 
nness — openness  to  markets,  to  the 
I  of  people  and  ideas,  to  change  it- 

We  and  our  Asian  trading  partners 
i  the  common  challenge  of  keeping 

international  economy  open. 

•  And,  four,  we  must  support  dem- 
itic  reforms  as  they  develop  natu- 
y  in  each  country.  There  is  no  set 
tern  for  democracy  and  no  standard 
issured  outcome  to  processes  of  po- 
;al  reform.  But  there  is  the  common 
imitment  to  the  value  of  the  individ- 

even  as  the  citizen  makes  a  contri- 
ion  to  collective  efforts. 

Which  brings  me  back  to  the  begin- 
',.  The  freedoms,  the  prosperity,  and 

security  we  and  our  Asian  allies 

friends  have  come  to  enjoy  are  pos- 
e  only  because  of  the  relationships 
have  built  together.  Like  the  multi- 
ped roofs  of  a  pagoda,  each  country 
he  coalition  of  free  nations  adds 
support  to  a  worldwide  structure. 
en  one  part  of  the  edifice  is  weak- 
id,  the  entire  structure  is  weakened, 
en  each  element  carries  its  share  of 

load,  the  entire  structure  is  firm. 

Thus,  the  ties  America  has  formed 
h  the  other  free  nations  of  the  Asia- 
ific  region  are  ties  of  mutual  inter- 

of  shared  responsibility,  of  part- 
ship.  They  are  ties  of  individual 
ength  and  common  commitment. 
By  are  the  building  blocks  of  our  for- 
n  policy.  They  have  been  dramat- 
Uy  effective  for  more  than  40  years 
meeting  our  national  interests,  and 
ty  remain  the  most  effective  means 
meeting  the  future  challenges  of  our 
-ired  success. 


Nuclear  Testing  Talks  Open  Round  Three 


'Press  release  138  of  July  8,  1988. 
^Made  at  the  si.x-plus-one  session. 
;ss  release  140  of  July  12. 
•'Press  release  148  of  July  15. 
^Press  release  148A  of  July  19. 
■■■Press  release  153  of  July  21. 
"Press  release  154  of  July  27. 
'Press  release  160  of  July  27.  ■ 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
AUG.  29,  19881 

On  Monday,  August  29,  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  will  re- 
sume step-by-step  negotiations  on  nu- 
clear testing  with  the  opening  of  round 
three  of  the  nuclear  testing  talks  in 
Geneva.  The  first  priority  of  these  talks 
remains  an  agreement  on  effective  ver- 
ification measures  for  two  existing  but 
unratified  treaties,  the  Threshold  Test 
Ban  Treaty  (TTBT)  and  the  Peaceful 
Nuclear  Explosions  Ti-eaty  (PNET). 

We  are  making  good  progress  to- 
ward our  goals.  On  August  17,  the  first 
phase  of  the  joint  verification  experi- 
ment (JVE)  was  successfully  concluded, 
with  U.S.  and  Soviet  scientists,  techni- 
cians, and  observers  present  at  the 
U.S.  nuclear  test  site  in  Nevada.  There 


each  side  was  able  to  demonstrate  the 
use  of  its  on-site,  direct  hydrodynamic 
methods  to  measure  the  yield  of  a  U.S. 
nuclear  explosion.  In  mid-September, 
U.S.  scientists,  technicians,  and  ob- 
servers will  be  present  for  the  Soviet 
phase  of  the  JVE  at  the  Soviet  nuclear 
test  site  at  Semipalatinsk. 

We  will  continue  to  press  for  agree- 
ment on  effective  verification  measures 
so  that  these  two  treaties  can  be 
ratified.  As  we  return  to  Geneva,  we 
look  for  the  cooperation  of  the  Soviet 
Union  to  achieve  this  objective. 

The  U.S.  delegation  to  the  nuclear 
testing  talks  is  headed  by  Ambassador 
C.  Paul  Robinson. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Sept.  5,  1988. 


U.S.-Sovlet  Union  Conduct 
First  Phase  of  JVE 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
AUG.  17,  1988' 

Today,  at  the  U.S.  nuclear  test  site  in 
Nevada,  the  United  States  and  the  So- 
viet Union  will  conduct  the  first  phase 
of  the  joint  verification  experiment 
(JVE).  This  is  the  result  of  a  U.S.- 
Soviet agreement  which  provides  for 
one  underground  nuclear  explosion  ex- 
periment at  the  U.S.  test  site  and  for 
another  such  experiment  at  the  Soviet 
test  site  near  Semipalatinsk  in  Sep- 
tember. U.S.  and  Soviet  scientists, 
technicians,  and  observers  will  be  pres- 
ent at  each  other's  test  site  to  measure 
yields  of  the  explosions  and  to  discuss 
the  results  of  the  two  tests. 

During  the  December  1987  Wash- 
ington summit,  the  United  States  and 
Soviet  Union  agreed  to  design  and  con- 
duct the  JVE  to  facilitate  an  agreement 
on  effective  verification  measures  for 
the  Threshold  Test  Ban  Ti-eaty  (TTBT) 
of  1974  and  the  Peaceful  Nuclear  Explo- 
sions Ti-eaty  (PNET)  of  1976.  Such  an 
agreement  on  effective  verification  meas- 
ures would,  in  turn,  permit  these  two 
treaties  to  be  ratified — a  long-time  goal 
of  the  Administration.  The  JVE  will 
provide  the  opportunity  to  measure  the 


yield  of  nuclear  explosions  using  tech- 
niques proposed  by  each  side.  The 
United  States  has  proposed  CORRTEX 
[continuous  reflectrometry  for  radius 
vs.  time  experiment],  a  direct  hydro- 
dynamic  yield  measurement  system,  as 
the  most  accurate  technique  available 
for  verification  of  the  TTBT  and  PNET. 
Through  the  JVE,  the  United  States 
hopes  to  provide  the  Soviet  Union  with 
the  information  it  needs  to  accept  the 
routine  U.S.  use  of  CORRTEX  in  the 
verification  of  these  two  treaties. 

For  the  past  four  decades,  a  strong 
nuclear  deterrent  has  ensured  U.S.  se- 
curity and  helped  to  preserve  the  free- 
dom of  our  allies  and  friends.  As  long 
as  we  must  rely  on  nuclear  weapons, 
we  must  continue  to  test  to  ensure  the 
reliability,  effectiveness,  safety,  se- 
curity, and  survivability  of  our  nuclear 
arsenal.  Today's  JVE  is  a  further  posi- 
tive step  which  reflects  the  success  of 
the  Administration's  practical  and  meas- 
ured approach  to  nuclear  testing. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Pres- 
idential Documents  of  Aug.  22,  1988.  ■ 


lepartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1988 


39 


EAST  ASIA 


ABM  Treaty  Review  Session  Opens 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
AUG.  8,  1988' 

The  third  5-year  review  called  for  by 
the  Antiballistic  Missile  (ABM)  Ti-eaty 
will  be  held  in  Geneva  beginning  on  Au- 
gust 24.  The  U.S.  delegation,  headed 
by  Arms  Control  and  Disarmament 
Agency  (ACDA)  Director  William  F. 
Burns,  will  consist  of  the  U.S.  Commis- 
sioner to  the  Standing  Consultative 
Commission,  Ambassador  Richard 
Ellis;  the  U.S.  Ambassador  to  the  de- 
fense and  space  talks.  Ambassador 
Henry  Cooper;  and  senior  officials  from 
the  Departments  of  State  and  Defense, 
the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  and  their 
advisers. 

The  principal  U.S.  objective  for 
this  review  session  is  to  obtain  the  So- 
viet Union's  agreement  to  correct  its 


violations  of  the  ABM  Treaty  and  to 
satisfy  other  U.S.  concerns  regarding 
Soviet  noncompliance  with  its  obliga- 
tions under  the  treaty. 

The  Soviet  Union's  large,  phased- 
array  radar  at  Krasnoyarsk  is  a  signifi- 
cant violation  of  a  central  element  of 
the  ABM  Treaty.  The  Krasnoyarsk 
radar  will  be  one  of  the  key  topics  of 
the  upcoming  review.  In  preparation  for 
the  upcoming  review,  the  President  has 
issued  guidance  that  the  U.S.  delega- 
tion should  continue  to  make  it  clear 
that  the  existence  of  the  Krasnoyarsk 
radar  violation  calls  into  question  the 
viability  of  the  ABM  Treaty,  and, 
therefore,  it  should  be  dismantled  with- 
out further  delay  and  without  condi- 
tion. Unless  resolved,  the  Krasnoyarsk 
radar  violation  will  force  the  United 
States  to  consider  the  exercise  of  its 


rights  under  international  law  to  take 
appropriate  and  proportionate  re-  ~ 
spouses.  In  this  context,  the  United 
States  will  also  have  to  consider 
whether  to  declare  the  Krasnoyarsk 
radar  to  be  a  material  breach  of  the 
ABM  Ti-eaty. 

The  President  has  also  directed 
that  the  Department  of  Defense,  work 
ing  with  other  executive  branch  agen- 
cies and  the  Congress,  take  the  lead  irj 
developing  a  range  of  appi'opriate  and  i 
proportionate  responses  for  considera- 1 
tion  if  the  Soviet  Union  continues  to 
refuse  to  correct  the  Krasnoyarsk 
violation. 

After  hearing  what  the  Soviet 
Union  has  to  say  at  the  5-year  ABM 
Tr-eaty  review,  should  the  situation  re- 
main unresolved,  the  President  will 
consult  with  the  Congress  and  our  al- 
lies concerning  next  steps. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Aug.  15,  1988. 


Situation  in  Vietnam,  Cambodia, 
and  Laos 


by  David  F.  Lambertson 

Statement  before  the  Si(bco)n)nittee 
on  East  Afiicui  and  Pacific  Affairs  of 
the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Commit- 
tee on  August  2,  lOSS.  Mr.  Lambertson 
is  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for  East 
Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs.^ 

I  appreciate  the  opportunity  to  appear 
today  before  the  subcommittee  to  dis- 
cuss the  situation  in  Vietnam,  Cam- 
bodia, and  Laos  and  our  policies  toward 
those  countries. 


Vietnamese  Occupation  of  Cambodia 

The  United  States  has  joined  with  the 
vast  majority  of  the  nations  of  the 
world  in  condemning  Vietnam's  illegal 
occupation  of  Cambodia  and  has  called 
for  Hanoi  to  withdraw  its  forces  and  to 
negotiate  a  settlement  acceptable  to  all 
sides.  We  believe  that  only  through  a 
political  solution  can  the  suffering  of 
the  Cambodian  people  be  brought  to  an 
end  and  regional  stability  restored.  Our 
goal  is  a  free  and  independent  Cam- 
bodia which  is  not  a  threat  to  its  neigh- 
bors and  which  will  permit  the 
Cambodian  people  to  determine  their 


own  future  without  internal  or  external 
manipulation  or  intimidation. 

In  this  context,  the  United  States 
is  unalterably  opposed  to  the  Khmer 
Rouge,  whose  legacy  of  brutality  and 
depravity  is  unsurpassed.  We  are  com- 
mitted to  a  settlement  in  Cambodia 
that  contains  effective  safeguards  to  en- 
sure that  the  Khmer  Rouge  can  never 
again  take  control  in  Cambodia  and 
subject  the  Cambodian  people  once 
again  to  the  horrors  of  the  past. 

ASEAN  Concerns 

The  Vietnamese  invasion  of  Cambodia 
and  Vietnam's  continuing  occupation  of 
that  country  constitute  a  direct  threat 
to  the  security  of  Thailand,  a  long-time 
friend  and  treaty  ally  of  the  United 
States  and  to  regional  stability.  The  As- 
sociation of  South  East  Asian  Nations 
(ASEAN)  has  responded  to  this  danger 
with  vigor  and  effectiveness.  It  has 
marshaled  international  opposition  to 
Vietnam's  occupation  of  Cambodia  and 
has  fostered  the  growth  of  the  Cambo- 
dian noncommunist  resistance  into  a  vi- 
able military  and  political  force  in  the 
struggle  for  a  free  and  independent 
Cambodia. 


The  United  States  has  worked  en 
ergetically  with  ASEAN  in  seeking  ti 
resolve  the  Cambodian  conflict.  We 
have  consulted  closely  and  regularly 
with  ASEAN  governments,  most  re- 
cently during  Secretary  Shultz's  visit 
Bangkok  last  month,  and  have  provid 
strong  backing  to  ASEAN  efforts  to 
generate  and  maintain  international  c 
position  to  Vietnam's  occupation.  We 
have  also  made  this  issue  a  priority  ii 
our  discussions  with  the  Soviet  Unioi 
and  with  China,  including  during  the 
Secretary's  recent  visit  to  Beijing;  wi 
have  urged  both  these  major  powers 
use  their  influence  constructively. 
ASEAN  and  our  other  friends  in  the 
region  have  come  to  rely,  with  good 
reason,  on  the  consistency  and  stead- 
fastness of  our  policy  on  Cambodia. 

Recent  Diplomatic  Activity 

There  has  recently  been  considerable 
diplomatic  activity  surrounding  the 
Cambodian  conflict  and  some  signs  a/ 
progress.  The  Vietnamese  have  an- 
nounced that  they  will  withdraw  50,C 
troops  from  Cambodia  by  year  end  an 
that  their  remaining  units  would  be 
placed  under  the  command  of  the 
Phnom  Penh  regime.  Based  on  Hanot 
previous  manipulation  of  withdrawal 
dates  and  announcements,  we,  of 
course,  remain  skeptical.  In  particuli 
we  do  not  place  any  real  significance 
the  putative  decision  to  place  the  re- 
maining occupation  forces  under  Phn 


40 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October 


EAST  ASIA 


Pnh's  command.  Nevertheless,  if 
Fjnoi  follows  through  on  its  announce- 
t.iJint,  this  would  be  an  encouraging, 
«eit  only  partial,  step  toward  the  ob- 
j»(tive  we  seek — the  complete  with- 
dfiiwal  of  all  Vietnamese  troops  from 
(f.'mbodia. 

(    On  the  negotiating  front,  informal 
Biks  were  held  in  Indonesia  last  week 
\(|ich  brought  together  the  four  Cam- 
ilian  factions,  the  Vietnamese,  the 
ilonesians,  and  other  ASEAN  repre- 
Atatives.  The  Jakarta  informal  meet- 
I;  did  not  achieve  dramatic  break- 
||-oughs,  but  it  did  lend  additional  im- 
p:us  to  a  negotiating  process  that 
cild  lead  to  a  settlement  of  the  Cam- 
blia  conflict.  The  meeting  seemed  to 
C  )(luce  a  broad  consensus  on  two  fun- 
vi  !ital  points:  that  Vietnamese 
must,  indeed,  be  withdrawn  to- 
rn 1  that  the  Khmer  Rouge  must 
|iii\ented  from  regaining  control. 
'M   are  the  leitmotifs  of  our  own  pol- 
1  ,  and  we  will  continue  to  lend  our 
■ipoi't  to  efforts  to  achieve  a  settle- 
iiii  which  would  make  those  goals  a 
1  ility. 

ni'sjjite  these  encouraging  signs, 
I  'i-i'  are  fundamental  uncertainties. 
en  if  Hanoi  were  to  withdraw  50,000 
Idlers,  this  would  still  leave  a  sizable 
■ce  in  Cambodia — of  over  50,000 
)ops — whose  presence  would  preclude 
nuine  national  reconciliation.  More- 
er,  despite  Hanoi's  participation  in 
e  Jakarta  informal  meeting,  it  re- 
ains  questionable  whether  the  So- 
ilist  Republic  of  Vietnam  (S.R.V.),  in 
ct,  will  take  an  active  and  direct  role 
negotiations — e.g.,  by  talking  di- 
ctly  with  Prince  Sihanouk — and  is 
•epared  to  talk  seriously  about  how  to 
[id  the  conflict. 

.S.  Course  of  Action 

^e  believe,  therefore,  that  the  best 
mrse  for  the  United  States  is  to  main- 
lin  our  present  policies.  This  means 
lat  we  will  continue  to  support  Prince 
ihanouk  and  the  Cambodian  noncom- 
lunist  resistance  forces  in  their  valiant 
:ruggle  for  a  free  and  independent 
'ambodia.  These  forces  are  making  en- 
ouraging  progress  in  expanding  their 
resence  in  the  interior  of  Cambodia, 
nd  we  believe  that,  because  they  eon- 
titute  an  increasingly  viable  alter- 
ative to  both  the  Vietnamese  and  the 
lurderous  Khmer  Rouge,  they  can  and 
n\\  ])lay  a  key  role  in  a  settlement 
i^hich  serves  the  best  interests  of  the 
Jambodian  people. 


We  also  intend  to  continue  our  sup- 
port for  the  international  effort  to  iso- 
late Vietnam  economically  and 
diplomatically.  We  believe  that  this 
campaign  has,  over  the  years,  helped  to 
bring  home  to  Hanoi  the  cost  of  its  ag- 
gression in  Cambodia  and  that  the  re- 
cent, although  inconclusive,  signs  of 
change  in  Vietnam's  approach  attest  to 
its  effectiveness.  Thus,  we  must  con- 
tinue to  adhere  to  a  policy  which  can  be 
summarized  as  "no  trade,  no  aid,  and 
no  normal  relations"  with  Vietnam 
except  in  the  context  of  a  political 
settlement  and  an  end  of  Vietnam's  oc- 
cupation of  Cambodia. 

And  we  must  continue  to  work  for 
a  settlement  which  ensures  that  the 
withdrawal  of  Vietnamese  troops  will 
not  lead  to  the  return  to  power  of  the 
Khmer  Rouge.  Crafting  such  a  solution 
will  not  be  easy,  inasmuch  as  the 
Khmer  Rouge  remains  probably  the 
most  militarily  powerful  of  the  Cambo- 
dian factions. 

ASEAN  and  others,  particularly 
Prince  Sihanouk,  at  various  times  have 
put  forward  a  number  of  ideas  for  con- 
trolling the  Khmer  Rouge  which  war- 
rant serious  and  urgent  consideration. 
These  include  the  holding  of  interna- 
tionally supervised  elections — we  can- 
not imagine  that  the  Cambodian  people 
would  willingly  vote  for  the  return  of 
the  Khmer  Rouge — the  removal  of  Pol 
Pot  and  other  senior  Khmer  Rouge 
leaders  most  responsible  for  crimes 
against  the  Cambodian  people,  the  dis- 
armament of  all  the  factions  under 
some  form  of  international  monitoring, 
a  cutoff  of  arms  aid  from  the  outside, 
and  the  despatch  of  an  international 
peacekeeping  force.  We  believe  some 
combination  of  these  or  other  ap- 
proaches can  prove  effective. 

In  our  discussions  with  our 
ASEAN  partners,  the  Chinese,  and 
others,  we  have  stressed  the  absolute 
necessity  of  controlling  the  Khmer 
Rouge  and  the  need  to  move  now  to 
address  the  specific  ways  by  which  this 
could  be  done.  This  was  a  central 
theme  of  Secretary  Shultz's  recent  dis- 
cussions in  Bangkok  and  Beijing.  We 
have  noted  authoritative  statements  by 
China's  leaders  that  they  oppose  a 
Khmer  Rouge  return  to  power  in 
Phnom  Penh  and  are  gratified  by 
China's  recent  willingness,  as  reflected 
in  its  July  1  statement,  to  begin  to  ad- 
dress the  concrete  measures  that  will 
be  necessary  to  prevent  this  from 
happening. 

I  must  also  emphasize,  however, 
our  strong  belief  that  until  Hanoi  shows 


clearly — more  clearly  than  it  has  to 
date — that  it,  in  fact,  has  made  the  fun- 
damental decision  to  end  its  occupation 
of  Cambodia,  the  United  States  must 
continue  our  joint  efforts  with  ASEAN 
and  others  to  maintain  diplomatic  and 
economic  pressure  on  Vietnam. 

Question  of  Interests  Sections 

In  this  connection,  I  would  like  to  dis- 
cuss Senate  Concurrent  Resolution  109, 
which  calls  for  the  establishment  of  re- 
ciprocal interests  sections  in  Hanoi  and 
Washington.  As  I  understand  it,  the  ra- 
tionale for  the  establishment  of  such  of- 
fices would  be  to  improve  cooperation 
between  the  United  States  and  Vietnam 
on  humanitarian  issues,  facihtate  the 
search  for  a  resolution  of  the  Cambodia 
conflict,  and,  more  broadly,  to  heal  old 
wounds. 

While  we  recognize  the  construc- 
tive purposes  this  resolution  is  intended 
to  serve,  we  believe  it  represents  the 
wrong  approach  and  must  oppose  it. 

With  regard  to  the  Cambodian  con- 
flict, the  establishment  of  interests  sec- 
tions would  represent  a  fundamental 
change  in  our  policy  of  supporting  the 
diplomatic  isolation  of  Vietnam.  The 
opening  of  an  interests  section  staffed 
by  U.S.  personnel  would  represent,  in 
fact,  the  establishment  of  a  U.S.  diplo- 
matic presence  in  Vietnam.  This  would 
be  seen  as  a  major  political  victory  by 
Hanoi.  For  those  who  are  struggling 
against  the  Vietnamese  occupation  of 
Cambodia,  particularly  the  noncom- 
munist  resistance  led  by  Prince 
Sihanouk,  it  would  be  seen  as  a  deeply 
discouraging  signal  of  a  weakened 
American  commitment. 

Internationally,  it  would  represent 
a  major  breach  in  the  political  isolation 
of  Vietnam  stemming  from  its  occupa- 
tion of  Cambodia.  It  would,  in  short, 
severely  undermine  the  international 
effort  to  bring  about  a  settlement  in 
Cambodia.  To  make  such  a  move  now, 
at  a  time  when  this  effort  appears  to  be 
having  an  impact,  would  not  be  in  the 
interest  of  the  United  States  or  of  our 
friends  and  allies  in  the  region. 

ASEAN  in  particular  would  be 
deeply  troubled  were  we  to  take  this 
step.  ASEAN  leaders  have  expressed 
their  concern  and  strong  opposition  to 
the  establishment  of  interests  sections, 
which  they  correctly  assert  would 
damage  our  joint  effort  to  end  Viet- 
nam's occupation  of  Cambodia.  Prime 
Minister  Lee  of  Singapore  spoke  elo- 
quently along  these  lines  when  he  met 


)epartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1988 


41 


EAST  ASIA 


with  several  members  of  this  committee 
during  his  visit  to  Washington  last 
April.  Failure  on  our  part  to  stand  with 
ASEAN  on  this  vitally  important  issue 
could  affect  our  relations  with  ASEAN 
more  generally,  calling  into  question 
the  constancy  we  have  thus  far 
demonstrated. 

Despite  the  absence  of  diplomatic 
relations,  a  function  of  Vietnam's  con- 
tinuing occupation  of  Cambodia,  the 
United  States,  and  the  S.R.V.  cooper- 
ate on  several  urgent  humanitarian  is- 
sues of  mutual  concern,  including  the 
effort  to  achieve  the  fullest  possible  ac- 
counting of  Americans  missing  in  action 
in  Vietnam  (POW/MIA),  the  resettle- 
ment of  Amerasian  children  still  in 
Vietnam,  the  departure  of  Vietnamese 
through  the  orderly  departure  pro- 
gram, and  the  resettlement  of  released 
reeducation  center  detainees.  In  keep- 
ing with  commitments  undertaken  dur- 
ing Gen.  Vessey's  [John  W.  Vessey, 
special  presidential  envoy]  trip  to  Hanoi 
in  August  of  last  year,  we  have  facili- 
tated efforts  of  American  nongovern- 
mental organizations  to  address 
Vietnamese  humanitarian  concerns  in 
the  areas  of  prosthetics  and  child 
disabilities. 

Senate  Concurrent  Resolution  109 
contends  that  the  establishment  of  in- 
terests sections  in  Hanoi  and  Wash- 
ington would  facilitate  the  resolution  of 
these  issues  by  increasing  communica- 
tion and  cooperation  between  the 
United  States  and  Vietnam.  We 
disagree. 

There  is  no  dearth  of  communica- 
tion between  us  and  the  Vietnamese  on 
humanitarian  issues.  The  United  States 
has  more  contact  with  the  Vietnamese 
on  operational  and  policy  levels  than 
any  other  Western  nation,  including 
those  which  maintain  diplomatic  rela- 
tions. Since  1982  more  than  35  execu- 
tive branch  U.S.  delegations  have 
visited  Vietnam;  there  have  also  been 
numerous  high-level  discussions  else- 
where. For  e.xample,  Gen.  Vessey  met 
in  early  June  with  Vietnamese  Vice 
Premier  and  Foreign  Minister  Nguyen 
Co  Thach  in  New  York  to  discuss 
POW/MIAs  and  the  resettlement  of  re- 
education center  detainees  in  the 
United  States.  In  July  a  senior  Depart- 
ment official  traveled  to  Hanoi  and  Ho 
Chi  Minh  City  to  continue  the  detainee 
discussions  and  to  examine  the  orderly 
departure  program  and  Amerasian 
processing.  Just  last  week,  a  technical 
team  from  the  Central  Identification 
Laboratory  in  Hawaii  and  the  Joint  Ca- 
sualty Resolution  Center  concluded  the 


42 


latest  round  of  POW/MIA  technical 
talks  with  Vietnamese  experts  in 
Hanoi. 

Given  the  frequency  of  U.S. -S.R.V. 
discussions  at  all  levels,  and  the  con- 
tinuing dialogue  between  our  respective 
embassies  in  Bangkok,  we  do  not  be- 
lieve that  the  establishment  of  interests 
sections  would  significantly  improve 
either  communications  or  cooperation 
between  our  two  countries  on  human- 
itarian issues.  A  review  of  develop- 
ments over  the  past  year  bears  this 
out. 

•  As  a  result  of  Gen.  Vessey's  talks 
with  Foreign  Minister  Thach  in  New 
York  in  June,  we  have  secured  a  re- 
newed Vietnamese  commitment  to  coop- 
erate on  POW/MIAs.  Hanoi  has  agreed 
to  Gen.  Vessey's  proposal  for  joint,  on- 
the-ground  investigations,  surveys,  and 
crash-site  excavations.  Moreover,  since 
1985  the  repatriation  of  remains  of 
missing  Americans  is  higher  than  at 
any  time  since  the  end  of  the  war. 

•  We  have  achieved  agreement  in 
principle  to  the  processing  of  released 
reeducation  center  detainees  for  reset- 
tlement in  the  United  States.  Several 
important  issues  remain  to  be  resolved, 
but  we  are  encouraged  by  the  progress 
to  date.  It  is  possible  that  the  process- 
ing of  released  detainees  may  begin 
within  the  next  several  months. 

•  Both  the  orderly  departure  pro- 
gram and  Amerasian  program  are  in 
full  operation,  and  we  have  inter- 
viewed over  14,000  people  since  last 
September. 

Given  the  current  level  of  coopera- 
tion, we  do  not  believe  that  any  formal 
diplomatic  structures  are  required.  The 
progress  which  we  have  recently 
achieved  has  been  due  in  large  part  to 
our  having  managed,  successfully,  to 
deal  with  these  humanitarian  issues 
separately  from  the  political  questions 
which  divide  Vietnam  and  the  United 
States.  The  establishment  of  interests 
sections — regardless  of  legislative  lan- 
guage to  the  contrary — would  be  seen 
in  Hanoi  as  an  important  political  con- 
cession motivated  by  our  desire  to  re- 
solve these  humanitarian  issues.  In  this 
way,  a  relationship  between  political 
and  humanitarian  issues  would  have 
been  created,  and  any  future  progress 
on  our  humanitarian  agenda  would  be 
affected  by  the  state  of  our  political  re- 
lations. This  would  not  be  in  our 
interest. 

For  all  of  these  reasons,  the  Ad- 
ministration opposes  the  establishment 
of  reciprocal  interests  sections.  We  do 


not  believe  that  they  would  contribute 
either  to  improving  U.S. -S.R.V.  hu- 
manitarian cooperation  or  toward  faei' 
fating  a  settlement  in  Cambodia.  Quit 
the  contrary,  we  believe  that  interests 
sections  could  well  have  a  negative  im 
pact  on  both  sets  of  issues.  We,  there- 
fore, oppose  the  passage  of  Senate 
Concurrent  Resolution  109. 

Our  opposition  to  interests  sectioi 
should  not  be  seen  as  a  sign  that  the 
Administration  remains  implacably  ho 
tile  toward  Vietnam.  This  is  not  true. 
As  Secretary  Shultz  made  clear  in  his 
remarks  to  the  ASEAN  postministeri 
meeting  in  Bangkok  last  month,  we 
hold  no  malice  toward  Vietnam  as  a  n 
suit  of  the  war  in  Indochina.  In  fact, 
look  forward  to  the  time  when  we  will 
be  able  to  enter  into  normal  diplomat 
and  commercial  relations  with  Vietna 
and  have  made  it  clear  that  we  are  pi 
pared  to  establish  such  relations  in  th 
context  of  a  Cambodian  settlement 
which  provides  for  the  withdrawal  of 
Vietnamese  troops  from  Cambodia.  E 
at  the  same  time,  the  Vietnamese  lea 
ership  must  realize  that  our  commit- 
ment to  a  free  and  independent 
Cambodia  is  steadfast  and  that  we  w 
continue  with  our  current  policies  un 
that  conflict  is  satisfactorily  resolved 
Moreover,  we  have  and  will  continue 
make  it  clear  to  the  Vietnamese  that 
the  pace  and  scope  of  the  normalizat 
process  will  be  affected  by  Vietnam's 
ability  to  work  with  us  on  the 
POW/MIA  issue,  as  demanded  by  th 
American  people. 

Laos 

Before  closing,  I  would  like  to  revie\ 
briefly  our  policy  toward  Laos,  a  coi 
try  which  appears  to  have  begun  to 
change  the  isolationist  stance  it 
adopted  when  the  communists  came 
power.  The  Lao  People's  Democratic 
Republic  (L.RD.R.)  and  the  United 
States  have  maintained  diplomatic  n 
tions  at  the  charge  level  since  the 
L.RD.R.  came  into  existence  in  197! 
We  agreed  with  Laos  in  1982  to  seel- 
improved  bilateral  relations  through 
concrete  steps  to  be  taken  concurrei 
by  both  sides.  While  we  have  avoide 
establishing  any  direct  linkage  betw 
our  actions  and  those  of  the  Lao,  wt 
have  made  it  clear  that  for  the  Uniti 
States  progress  on  the  POW/MIA  is 
is  the  principal  standard  by  which 
progress  in  the  relationship  will  be 
measured. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1  18 


ECONOMICS 


Here  too,  we  are  encouraged  by  re- 
t  developments.  We  have  conducted 
ree  joint  excavations  of  suspected  air- 
ift  crash-sites  in  Laos,  most  recently 
May  of  this  year.  Although  that 
,est  effort  did  not  result  in  the  recov- 
y  of  any  remains,  Lao  cooperation 
,s  exemplary.  In  addition,  the  Lao 
ilaterally  turned  over  remains  earlier 
the  year,  the  first  time  this  had  been 
ne  since  1978.  We  believe  we  are 
)se  to  agreement  with  the  Lao  Gov- 
nment  on  dates  for  another  technical 
anning  meeting  to  prepare  for  further 
nt  excavation  activities. 

The  United  States,  over  the  years, 
IS  responded  to  Lao  humanitarian 
eds  in  a  variety  of  ways.  An  Ameri- 
n  nongovernmental  organization  plans 
construct  and  stock  a  prefabricated 
inic  in  the  vicinity  of  the  May  excava- 
an.  The  United  States  provided  rice  in 
84  and  1987  and  medicine  to  combat 
mgue  fever  in  1985. 

An  issue  of  growing  concern  in  our 
lationship  with  Laos  is  the  inci-easing 
Dw  of  narcotics  to  the  international 
arketplace  from  that  country.  The 
ao  Government  has  declared  its  op- 
)sition  to  illicit  narcotics  production 
id  trafficking  and  has  agreed  to  a  UN 
and  for  Drug  Abuse  Control 
JNFDAC)  pilot  project  to  control  nar- 
)ties  cultivation  and  production.  The 
nited  States  has  also  offered  bilateral 
;sistance  in  this  area.  We  intend  to 
aep  this  problem  high  on  our  agenda. 
In  general,  we  believe  that  our  re- 
itionship  with  Laos  is  slowly  but 
:eadily  improving  and  that  continued 
nprovement  would  serve  the  interests 
f  both  countries. 

outheast  Asia  Refugees 

inally,  I  would  like  to  comment  on  the 
ontinuing  refugee  crisis  in  Southeast 
isia. 

The  upsurge  in  boat  refugee  arriv- 
s  in  1988,  a  perception  of  lessened 
ommitment  on  the  part  of  resettle- 
nent  nations,  and  growing  impatience 
ti  the  region  have  eroded  the  interna- 
ional  consensus  which  has  sustained 
irst-asylum  in  Southeast  Asia  for  more 
han  a  decade. 

In  his  meeting  with  ASEAN  for- 
ign  ministers  last  month,  Secretary 
Shultz  assured  them  that  the  United 
States  wants  to  work  with  ASEAN 
governments  and  others  to  develop  a 
comprehensive  and  revitalized  ap- 
proach, one  that  deals  with  changing 
circumstances — and  that  preserves 
first-asylum.  We  have  put  forward  a 


number  of  specific  proposals — including 
a  screening  program  monitored  by  the 
LIN  High  Commissioner  for  Refugees 
(UNHCR),  the  resettlement  of  long- 
stayers,  the  humane  return  of  those  de- 
termined to  be  nonrefugees,  and  an  ex- 
panded orderly  departure  program — 
and  we  will  pursue  these  and  other  ini- 
tiatives as  a  matter  of  priority  in  the 
months  ahead.  Secretary  Shultz  empha- 
sized to  his  ASEAN  colleagues  that  we 
would  continue  to  stand  by  them,  for  as 
long  as  is  necessary. 

We  will  work  hard  to  improve  and 
expand  the  orderly  departure  program; 
we  will  continue  to  share  the  financial 
burden  with  the  first-asylum  countries 
through  our  contributions  to  interna- 
tional refugee  organizations;  we  will 
continue  to  offer  high  levels  of  resettle- 
ment opportunities;  and  we  will  con- 


tinue to  urge  other  resettlement  and 
donor  nations  to  participate  in  these 
efforts. 

The  Secretary  added  that  we  are, 
of  course,  mindful  that  the  refugee 
problem  of  Southeast  Asia  is  rooted  not 
in  the  first-asylum  countries  but  in  the 
countries  from  which  refugees  flee — 
and  this  is  where  these  problems  ulti- 
mately must  be  solved.  The  interna- 
tional community  must  continue  to 
attempt  to  convince  Hanoi,  in  particu- 
lar, to  adopt  the  kinds  of  political  and 
economic  policies  that  will  permit  its 
countrymen  to  live  productive  lives  at 
home. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee 
and  will  be  available  from  the  Superintend- 
ent of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Print- 
ing Office.  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Strategy  for  An  LDC  Debt  Workout: 
A  U.S.  Perspective 


by  William  B.  Milam 

Address  before  the  Western  Eco- 
nomic Association  International  in  Los 
Angeles  on  July  3,  1988.  Mr.  Mila)n  is 
Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for  Eco- 
nomic and  Business  Affairs. 

There  are  two  debt  problems,  and  they 
are  quite  different.  I  will  address,  first, 
the  debt  workout  for  the  middle-income 
developing  countries;  second,  I  will  dis- 
cuss the  debt  situation  of  the  very  poor 
countries,  most  of  which  are  in  Africa. 

How  the  State 
Department  Fits  In 

The  State  Department  has  two  distinct 
but  interdependent  roles  in  the  for- 
mulation and  implementation  of  debt 
policy  as  it  relates  to  both  the  middle- 
income  and  the  poorest  countries. 

First,  we  have  a  direct  role  as  the 
agency  which  leads  on  official  debt  re- 
scheduling negotiations.  (As  you  know, 
these  negotiations  take  place  in  the 
mysterious  Paris  Club.) 

Second,  we  participate  in  formula- 
tion of  debt  policy  and  try  to  ensure 
that  it  is  compatible  with — even  sup- 
portive of — our  foreign  policy  and  na- 
tional security  interests. 

If  I  may  speak  personally  for  a 
minute,  my  own  experience  and  role  in 
debt  policy  stems  directly  from  the 


State  Department's  various  roles.  I  am 
one  of  the  "old  warhorses"  of  the  debt 
issue,  having  been  involved  with  debt 
policy  and  rescheduling  since  1978.  My 
experience  began  in  those  halcyon  days 
when  lending  to  developing  countries 
soared  to  dizzingly  high  levels — fed  and 
motivated  by  oil-exporter  country  sur- 
pluses; the  belief  that  these,  and  high 
inflation,  would  continue — and  when 
only  a  few  (mainly  the  poor  countries) 
ran  into  trouble. 

But  that  experience  also  covers  the 
crisis  years;  I  was  present  at  the  U.S. 
Treasury  in  August  1982,  when  the  out- 
line of  the  present  debt  workout  strat- 
egy emerged  in  response  to  the  Mexican 
payments  crisis.  Also,  I  have  repre- 
sented the  United  States  at  the  Paris 
Club  in  two  different  jobs — for  a  while 
in  1983  and  in  my  present  position.  So 
you  won't  be  misled,  I'll  warn  you  in 
advance  that  I  believe  our  foreign  pol- 
icy interests  are  best  served  by  the 
present  flexible,  evolutionary  debt 
workout  strategy. 

The  Middle-Income 
Developing  Countries 

The  overriding  theme  of  that  first  Mex- 
ican package — the  overriding  theme  of 
the  debt  workout — has  been,  and  re- 
mains, cooperation  in  a  collective  effort 
to  solve  a  problem  in  ways  which  serve 
the  mutual  interests  of  all  the  partici- 
pants. The  mutuality  of  interests  is  key 


43 


ECONOMICS 


to  the  effectiveness  and  the  duration  of 
the  debt  workout  strategy.  The  debtors 
perceived  then,  and  most  still  perceive, 
that  it  is  not  in  their  interests,  long  or 
short  term,  to  stop  servicing  their 
debts  and,  therefore,  cut  off  their  ac- 
cess to  capital  markets.  The  industrial 
countries  perceived  then,  and  continue 
to  perceive,  that  their  interests  are 
best  served  by  cooperation  to  help  the 
debtor  countries  through  this  rough 
patch. 

First,  generalized  default  threat- 
ened the  viability  of  the  international 
financial  system. 

Second,  a  default  which  cuts  off 
these  countries  from  international  cap- 
ital markets  is  likely  to  lead  to  political 
instability  in  the  debtor  countries. 

That  mutuality  of  interests  also  ob- 
tains for  our  foreign  policy  interests. 
The  strategy  emphasizes  a  collective 
effort,  a  nonconfrontational  approach. 
It  preserves  a  case-by-case  approach, 
allowing  official  and  private  creditors 
the  fle.xibility  to  shape  agreements  to 
the  individual  needs  of  the  various  debt 
countries.  The  evolutionary  nature  of 
the  strategy  also  maintains  flexibility 
and  permits  the  strategy  to  change 
with  the  times.  Most  importantly,  this 
approach  has  preserved  some  access  to 
international  capital  markets  for  these 
debtor  countries,  albeit  mostly  involun- 
tary. It  is  the  only  strategy  that  holds 
open  the  hope  that  they  can  improve 
the  level  and  quality  of  that  access  over 
time. 

A  long  cutoff  in  such  access  would 
be  very  deleterious  for  our  foreign  pol- 
icy and  national  security  interests.  The 
middle-income  countries  need  foreign 
capital  to  meet  their  investment  needs, 
thus  to  grow  at  optimum  rates.  For  one 
set  of  these  countries — mainly  those  in 
Latin  America — the  ability  to  obtain 
foreign  capital  in  the  amounts  needed  is 
threatened  for  a  significant  period  of 
time.  Without  foreign  capital,  growth 
prospects  decline,  and  the  possibility  of 
political  instability  increases.  Programs 
to  liberalize  and  open  these  economies 
might  be  abandoned.  These  countries 
might  react  as  they  did  in  the  1930s  to 
the  drying  up  of  foreign  capital:  by 
turning  inward  and  toward  statism. 
Such  a  turn  would,  incidentally,  attenu- 
ate the  movement  toward  real  democ- 
racy which  has  been  growing  in  the 
past  decade. 


The  Design  of  the  Debt  Workout 

The  basic  framework  of  the  debt  work- 
out for  the  middle-income  countries  re- 
mains essentially  the  same  as  when  it 
began  in  1982.  There  are  two  major  and 
related  long-term  goals: 

First,  to  reduce  the  vulnerability  of 
the  international  banking  system;  and 

Second,  to  improve  the  debtor 
country  economic  and  financial  perfor- 
mance and  structure  to  promote  sus- 
tainable growth. 

Each  participant  in  the  debt  work- 
out has  had,  and  continues  to  have,  its 
own  role  and  set  of  responsibilities. 

•  The  debtor  countries,  of  course, 
must  change  their  economic  policies 
and  structures  to  make  their  economies 
more  efficient  so  they  can  regain  the 
capacity  to  service  debt. 

•  The  commercial  bank  creditors 
are  to  reschedule  and  provide  new- 
funding  if  countries  carry  out  their 
adjustment  programs. 

•  Creditor  governments  reschedule 
their  own  claims  on  debtors,  providing 
new  money  by  rescheduling  interest, 
by  continuing  their  e.xport  credit  pro- 
grams in  these  countries,  and — in  a  few 
cases — by  providing  other  financial  as- 
sistance. Creditor  governments  also 
provide  bridge  financing  in  cases  in 
which  that  is  necessary.  Finally,  cred- 
itor governments  put  in  the  necessary 
resources  and  bring  about  the  neces- 
sary policies  in  the  international  finan- 
cial institutions  to  ensure  that  these 
institutions  are  conducive  to  the 
process. 

In  1985,  Secretary  Baker  changed 
the  adjustment  emphasis  of  the  debt 
workout  from  macroeconomic  stabiliza- 
tion and  demand  restraint  to  structural 
adjustment  policies.  Such  structural  ad- 
justment policies  range  from  trade  and 
financial  liberalization  to  deregulation 
and  privatization  of  public  sector  en- 
terprises. Secretary  Baker  put  a  new 
thrust  into  the  debt  workout,  but  he 
did  not  change  its  basic  framework. 

The  strategy  has  evolved  in  other 
important  ways  while  retaining  its 
basic  structure.  Many  new  instruments 
to  reduce  exposure  have  been  created. 
More  innovations  are  likely  as  we 
proceed. 

And  much  progress  has  occurred. 
Progress  is  particularly  apparent  with 
regard  to  the  objective  of  reducing  the 
vulnerability  of  the  banking  system  on 
LDC  [less  developed  country]  loans. 
From  1982  to  the  end  of  1987,  the  nine 


U.S.  money  center  banks  reduced thei-' 
exposure  to  the  so-called  Baker  15 
[major  LDC  debtor  countries]  from 
212%  of  primary  capital  to  90'7f .  The 
decline  for  other  classes  of  banks  was 
even  larger,  on  average.  This  decHne  is 
more  rapid  than  we  would  have  pre- 
dicted in  1982;  it  results,  in  large  mea- 
sure, from  the  efforts  of  the  banks  to 
broaden  their  capital  base. 

There  has  been  less  visible  prog- 
ress toward  the  second  fundamental 
objective — structural  and  economic  pel 
icy  reform  in  the  debtor  countries. 
However,  there  is  much  more  progress 
than  is  generally  admitted.  Indicators 
of  debt  burdens  have  stabilized.  One 
striking  feature  is  the  reduction  in  the 
proportion  of  short-term  debt  to  total 
debt,  which  has  fallen  from  21%  in  198 
to  8%  in  1987,  largely  because  of  re- 
schedulings. The  lengthening  of  the 
maturity  structure  in  this  way  has  pre 
vided  most  debtors  with  a  more  man- 
ageable debt  service  payment  stream. 
Of  course,  another  very  prominent  fac 
tor  is  the  reduction  in  interest  costs 
from  the  worldwide  reduction  of  inter 
est  rates  since  1982.  The  Baker  15  coi 
tries  pay  26%  of  exports  as  interest 
now,  in  comparison  with  31%  in  1982 

There  are  many  examples  of  gres 
progress  in  the  attitudes  and  in  the  ii 
plementation  of  structural  adjustmen 
programs  in  the  major  debtor  coun 
tries.  Mexico  has  liberalized  its  trade 
regime  and  is  privatizing  its  state  en- 
terprises. Its  export  bases  are  so  div 
sified  that  now  non-oil  export  revenu 
exceed  oil  revenues.  Chile's  success, 
both  on  macro  adjustment  and  on  stri 
tural  adjustment,  is  well  known.  It  h 
adopted  the  most  successful  debt  eqi 
program,  which  has  reduced  its  debt 
about  23%..  Bolivia  has  perhaps  impli 
mented  the  best,  most  comprehensiv 
most  effective  macroeconomic  and 
structural  adjustment  program  of  an 
debtor  country.  Bolivia  has  also  worj' 
out  with  its  creditor  banks  an  inno- 
vative debt  reduction  scheme.  That 
scheme  was  an  important  advance  in 
the  debt  workout  strategy.  It  was  voj 
untary  and  worked  out  between  the 
debtor  and  its  creditors  within  the 
market  mechanism. 

The  United  States  has  supporte 
schemes  with  those  characteristics  t 
will  continue  to  do  so.  As  you  know. 
United  States  provided  zero  coupon 
bonds  to  collateralize  the  Mexican  d' 
securitization  scheme.  We  have  re- 
sponded in  other  ways. 


44 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1  lEs 


ECONOMICS 


1  •  We  have  fostered  the  growth  of 
ti^  so-called  menu  of  options  (such  as 
Ilxican  securitization,  exit  bonds,  and 
<^t/equity  swaps)  for  financing  among 
tU  commercial  banks. 
,!  •  We  have  tried  to  shape  the  inter- 
Ijional  financial  community  in  ways 
trich  would  be  conducive  to  voluntary 
tt)t  workouts;  for  example,  Ti-easury 
ftretary  Baker  proposed  a  new  exter- 
j  contingency  facility  for  the  IMF 
ternational  Monetary  Fund]  last 
ir,  and  that  has  now  been  put  into 


e  Eroding  Consensus 

e  consensus  which  sprang  from  that 
'ceived  mutuality  of  interest  in  1982 
5  suffered  much  wear  and  tear.  The 
Dtor  countries  are  finding  the  pain  of 
croeconomic  and  structural  adjust- 
nt  more  and  more  difficult  to  bear, 
e  creditor  banks  are  finding  the 
jvision  of  new  money  more  and  more 
jensive  and  risky.  The  creditor  gov- 
iments  are  more  and  more  threat- 
d  with  the  prospects  of  default 
massive  intervention,  which  would 
juire  large  expenditures  of  public 
iney. 

In  part,  at  least,  the  problem  in 
;  debtor  countries  is  political,  and 
s  always  gives  cause  for  foreign  pol- 
concerns.  There  are  fledgling  democ- 
."ies  involved  who  find  it  difficult,  if 
t  impossible,  simultaneously  to  build 
mocratic  institutions  and  to  cope 
th  the  structural  adjustment  prob- 
ns.  We  have  to  weigh  these  short- 
■m  dangers  against  the  longer  term 
nefits  to  our  foreign  policy  interests 
at  will  accrue  from  a  strategy  that 
omises  strengthened  access  to  capital 
irkets  over  time. 

But  frustration  and  wear  and  tear 
e  apparent  also  on  the  creditor  side, 
pai'ticular,  the  commercial  banks 
,ve  become  increasingly  frustrated  by 
e  almost  endless  negotiations  but, 
ore  particularly,  by  the  growing  re- 
ctance  of  the  smaller,  less  exposed 
mks  to  play  their  role  in  providing 
!W  financing.  This  so-called  free  rider 
•oblem  appears  to  be  getting  worse 
;  more  and  more  banks  increase  their 
Ian  loss  reserves. 

In  part,  the  consensus  is  breaking 
own  also  because  of  differing  regula- 
i)ry  and  tax  structures  in  various  coun- 
■ies,  giving  different  national  banks 
npetus  in  different  directions.  Even  in 
le  United  States,  the  middle-income 
ebt  workout  strategy  is  under  attack, 
'hese  attacks  are  driven  by  the  percep- 
ion  that  the  debt  strategy  is  designed 


to  save  U.S.  banks  at  the  expense  of 
other  sectors  of  the  U.S.  economy,  par- 
ticularly exporting  sectors  such  as  agri- 
culture. Calls  from  both  sides  of  the 
political  aisle  for  new  large  facihties 
to  relieve  the  debt  burden  of  these 
countries  continue  to  grow. 

There  are  powerful  arguments 
against  any  schemes  for  generalized 
debt  reduction  toward  a  general  policy 
using  government  monies  to  take  the 
banks  out  of  their  LDC  exposures 
and/or  to  place  the  banks'  risk  on  the 
taxpayers.  I  share  in  full  the  aversion 
to  ideas  that  would  throw  the  burden 
on  the  taxpayers.  Many  schemes  which 
would  do  so  have  been  put  forward. 
Some  are  said  to  be  costless.  However, 
none  of  them  would  be;  all  would  be 
very  costly. 

They  would  be  costly  also  to  our 
long-term  foreign  policy  interests.  They 
would  destroy  the  cooperative  approach 
on  debt,  based  on  mutual  interests,  and 
promote  confrontation  between  debtors 
and  creditors. 

The  implementation  of  such 
schemes  would  cut  access  to  capital 
markets  for  the  debtor  countries  for 
some  time.  Those  who  downplay  this 
don't  realize  that  after  the  Latin  Amer- 
ican nations  settled — often  at  deep  dis- 
counts and  interest  reductions — their 
defaults  of  the  1930s,  they  regained  ac- 
cess generally  onli/  after  about  15-20 
years.  I  underline  the  word  "only." 
Such  a  long  hiatus  from  adequate  levels 
of  foreign  capital  would  be  a  real  threat 
to  our  long-term  foi-eign  policy  and  na- 
tional security  interests. 

We  have  to  incorporate  into  our 
mindset  on  the  debt  situation  one  im- 
portant fact:  the  debt  workout  for 
middle-income  countries  is  a  long-term 
and  very  difficult  process.  There  will  be 
much  pain  involved,  both  in  creditor 
countries  and  in  debtor  countries,  and 
there  will  be  many  setbacks  along  the 
way.  I  think  that  must  be  clearly 
spelled  out  as  we  move  forward.  But 
the  strategy  as  we  have  it  framed  now 
is  fundamentally  sound  on  financial,  po- 
litical, and  foreign  policy  grounds.  It  is 
the  only  strategy  that  promises  a  full 
return  to  capital  markets  for  these 
debtor  countries  within  the  foreseeable 
future.  And,  in  my  view,  a  corollary  of 
that  is  that  this  is  the  only  strategy 
that  promises  the  kind  of  structural 
adjustment  and  macroeconomic  reform 
that  must  occur  if  these  nations  are  to 
grow,  prosper,  and  sustain  open,  demo- 
cratic political  systems. 


The  Poorer  Developing  Countries 

In  contrast  to  the  rocky  patch  and  the 
eroding  consensus  that  we  see  for  the 
debt  workout  in  the  middle-income 
countries,  there  seems  to  be  a  growing 
consensus  about  how  to  handle  debt  in 
the  poorer  countries  with  large  debt 
problems  and  good  adjustment  pro- 
grams. Now  when  we  say  "poorer  coun- 
tries," we  are  talking  primarily  about 
sub-Saharan  Africa.  We  are  talking 
about  countries  which  are  eligible  only 
for  very  concessional  World  Bank  loans, 
that  are  undertaking  good  adjustment 
progi'ams  in  which  heavy  debt  service 
complicates  the  adjustment  program. 

The  consensus  that  has  been  grow- 
ing basically  revolves  around  finding 
options  to  reduce  the  debt  service  bur- 
den on  these  countries  in  a  way  com- 
patible with  legal  and  budgetary  con- 
straints in  the  creditor  countries.  The 
Group  of  Seven  countries'  meeting  at 
the  Toronto  economic  summit  recently 
outlined  a  proposal  for  a  menu  of  op- 
tions for  the  rehef  of  debt  service  in 
these  countries.  This  range  of  options 
will  be  vetted  by  the  Paris  Club  with  a 
view  to  implementing  them  soon. 

Let  me  review  how  the  Paris  Club 
works,  then  describe  how  the  options 
will  work.  The  Paris  Club  is  an  infor- 
mal, but  official,  organization  which 
meets  almost  monthly  to  reschedule  the 
official  debts  of  countries  which  can  no 
longer  service  these  debts.  The  Paris 
Club  does  not  reschedule  the  stock  of 
debt  of  a  country.  It  reschedules  flows. 
It  takes  debt  service  due  this  broad  set 
of  creditors  over  a  certain  time  pe- 
riod— usually  the  length  of  an  IMF 
standby  program — and  agrees  that  part 
or  all  of  that  debt  service  can  be  paid 
starting  up  to  5  years  later  (in  the  case 
of  most  debtors),  or  up  to  10  years  later 
(in  the  case  of  the  poorest),  and  over  a 
5-  to  10-year  period. 

The  Paris  Club  has  traditionally  re- 
scheduled debts  at  an  interest  rate 
which  reflects  the  original  interest  rate 
paid  on  the  debt.  In  other  words,  AID 
[Agency  for  International  Development] 
loans  are  rescheduled  at  the  conces- 
sional rates  at  which  they  were  gi-anted, 
and  commercial-type  loans  are  re- 
scheduled at  the  commercial  rates  at 
which  they  were  originally  contracted. 
(Interest  on  rescheduled  debt  is  called 
moratorium  interest. )  In  the  Paris 
Club,  moratorium  interest  rates  are  bi- 
lateral matters  settled  in  bilateral  nego- 
tiations subsequent  to  the  Paris  Club 
agreement. 


lepartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1988 


45 


ECONOMICS 


The  Toronto  summit  proposal 
would  allow  creditor  countries  to  treat 
this  debt  significantly  differently,  with 
a  menu  of  three  options. 

The  first  option,  proposed  by 
France,  would  allow  creditors  to  reduce 
the  debt  service  due  over  the  period  by 
some  fraction,  then  to  pay  the  reduced 
amount  back  over  a  period  similar  to, 
or  only  slightly  longer  than,  the  tradi- 
tional Paris  Club  repayment  period  of 
10  years,  with  perhaps  a  grace  period 
equal  to  more  than  half  of  the  repay- 
ment period.  The  debtor  countries 
would  be  paying  interest  on  a  reduced 
amount  of  rescheduled  debt  service, 
thus  reducing  the  moratorium  interest 
due  during  the  grace  period;  in  addi- 
tion, of  course,  debtors  would  be  re- 
paying less  than  the  full  amount  of 
principal  and  interest  during  the  repay- 
ment period. 

The  second  option,  proposed  by 
the  British,  would  allow  creditors  to  re- 
schedule the  debt  due  over  a  similar 
period,  with  a  similar  grace  period,  but 
charge  a  reduced  interest  rate  on  that 
rescheduled  debt.  Thus,  debtors  would 
pay  a  reduced  moratorium  interest  I'ate 
over  this  period  but  would  repay  the 
full  amount  of  principal  and  of  re- 
scheduled interest  during  the  repay- 
ment period. 

The  third  option  is  for  those  coun- 
tries, such  as  the  United  States,  which 
are  unable — legally,  politically,  or  budg- 
etarily — to  implement  options  that  re- 
duce the  value  of  loans.  It  would  allow 
such  countries  to  reschedule  debts  over 
an  even  longer  period — perhaps  up  to 
25  years — but  would  allow  these  cred- 
itors to  collect  a  market  interest  rate 
on  the  debt  as  moratorium  interest. 
Again,  the  grace  period  would  be  over 
half  of  the  full  repayment  period.  The 
benefit  for  the  debtor  is  that  repayment 
of  principal  and  of  interest  is  put  off  for 
a  long  time. 

In  more  general  terms,  it  is  clear 
that  the  international  community  has 
reacted  quickly  and  aggressively  to 
meet  the  severe  problems  of  the  poor- 
est developing  countries.  One  signifi- 
cant problem  in  those  countries  has 
been  the  debt  of  the  International  Mon- 
etary Fund,  which  is  short  term  and 
carries  relatively  high  interest  rates. 
Over  the  past  3  years,  the  members  of 
the  Fund  have  acted  to  create,  first,  a 
structural  adjustment  facility  and,  now, 
an  enhanced  structural  adjustment  fa- 
cility which  is  providing  ciose  to  $9  bil- 
lion to  these  countries  in  conjunction 


46 


with  good  macroeconomic  and  struc- 
tural adjustment  programs  worked  out 
with  the  Fund  and  the  World  Bank.  In 
addition,  donor  countries  pledged  $6.4 
billion  of  financing  to  be  used  in  cooper- 
ation with  the  World  Bank  for  the  low- 
income  African  countries  with  severe 
debt  problems  who  are  undertaking  ad- 
justment programs.  Members  of  the 
World  Bank  recently  approved  a  $12.5- 
billion  IDA  [International  Development 
Association]  program,  half  of  which  is 
to  be  devoted  to  African  countries.  Fi- 
nally, many  bilateral  donors  have  in- 
creased their  assistance,  and  that 
includes  the  United  States,  which  re- 
cently received  additional  funds  from 
the  Congress  for  development  assist- 
ance to  Africa  and  also  has  received 
congressional  authority  for  greater  flex- 
ibility in  allocating  these  funds. 

We  are  convinced  that,  in  the 
poorest  countries,  debt  is  a  symptom 
of  major  structural  development  prob- 
lems, but  it  is  not  the  problem  itself 


We  have  concluded  that,  for  the  heavil- 
indebted  poor  countries,  the  potential 
level  of  resource  transfer  is,  in  the  ag- 
gregate, sufficient  to  provide  all  the  fi 
nancing  needed  over  the  next  few  yeai 
for  optimal  growth  rates  in  the  contex 
of  good  sound  adjustment  programs. 
Thus,  the  level  of  net  resource  trans- 
fer— including  debt  rescheduling — will 
remain  fairly  constant  at  an  increased 
level  if  these  countries  continue  to  im- 
plement good  adjustment  programs. 

The  outline  agreed  at  the  Toronto 
summit  will  assure  that  rescheduling 
continues  to  support  this  approach. 
Thus,  we  can  predict  with  relative  cor 
fidence  that  the  resources  necessary  : 
the  poorest  countries  are  there  and 
that  resource  transfer  levels  will  not 
fall  if  those  countries  undertake,  and 
continue  to  undertake,  internationally 
agreed  adjustment  programs  under  tl 
aegis  of  the  IMF  and  the  World  Bank 
Frankly  speaking,  the  ball  is  in  their 
court.  ■ 


U.S.  Export  Control  Policy: 
Its  Present  and  Future  Course 


by  E.  Allan  Wendt 

Address  before  the  annual  tneeting 
of  the  Atlantic  Council  of  the  United 
States  on  June  U,  1988.  Ambassador 
Wendt  is  Senior  Representative  for 
Strategic  Technology  Policy. 

It  is  a  pleasure  to  be  with  you  for  this 
timely  discussion  of  U.S.  export  control 
policy. 

As  we  consider  our  options  for  the 
future  in  this  important  area,  we  must 
keep  in  mind  the  extraordinary  change 
in  our  government's  approach  to  tech- 
nology transfer  issues  that  has  taken 
place  in  recent  years.  Throughout  the 
1960s  and  1970s,  there  was  limited  at- 
tention by  administrations  of  both  polit- 
ical parties  to  the  serious  threat  to  our 
security  posed  by  Warsaw  Pact  acquisi- 
tion of  strategic  Western  technology.  Of 
course,  we  had  a  national  export  con- 
trol system  in  place,  and  the  Coordinat- 
ing Committee  on  Multilateral  Export 
Controls  (COCOM)  routinely  carried 
out  its  work  in  Paris — but  all  was  not 
well.  The  attention  of  the  senior  politi- 
cal leadership  was  elsewhere,  and  our 
national  export  control  establishment 
suffered  from  a  lack  of  both  policy  guid- 
ance and  adequate  resources. 


As  a  result  of  these  problems, 
some  very  serious  mistakes  were  ma 
As  examples,  I  will  cite  three  sales  t 
the  Soviet  Union  made  in  the  1970s- 
three  of  them  legal  at  the  time  and  t 
three  approved  with  the  understand) 
that  the  items  would  be  put  only  to 
civilian  use. 

•  The  first  was  the  sale  of  $1.5  t 
lion  worth  of  U.S.  and  other  Wester 
technology  that  allow'ed  the  Soviets 
build  the  Kama  River  Ti-uck  Plant  ii 
the  early  1970s.  The  factory  produce 
lai'ge  numbers  of  military  trucks  tha 
were  used  in  the  Soviet  invasion  of 
Afghanistan  and  by  Soviet  military 
units  in  Eastern  Europe  opposite 
NATO  forces. 

•  The  second  unfortunate  sale  c- 
sisted  of  U.S.  precision  grinding  ma 
chines  for  the  production  of  small,  h 
precision  bearings  tbat  proved  usefu 
Soviet  missile  designers. 

•  The  third  sale  consisted  of  tw( 
large  floating  drydocks  that  were  so 
to  the  Soviet  Union  in  1978  and  dive' 
ted  shortly  thereafter  to  military  usi 
Such  drydocks  are  of  critical  impor- 
tance for  the  repair  of  ships  damagei 
in  warfare,  and  each  of  those  sold  ca 
carry  several  naval  vessels.  They  ha 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1  i^ 


ECONOMICS 


n  used  over  the  years  to  service 
,'i'-class  aircraft  carriers,  destroyers, 
I  submarines  carrying  ballistic 
^siles. 

i    I  think  it  should  be  clear,  even 
jm  these  three  examples,  that  the  ex- 
ft  control  systems  of  the  United 
^tes  and  its  COCOM  partners  were 
jurgent  need  of  major  reform. 

w  Priorities  in  U.S.  Policy 

winds  of  change  first  appeared  to- 
rd  the  end  of  the  last  decade.  The 
asion  of  Afghanistan,  coupled  with  a 
)wing  realization  that  acquisition  of 
/anced  Western  technology  was  en- 
icing  the  military  capacity  of  the  So- 
t  Union,  finally  began  to  turn  the 
uation  around.  Export  control  be- 
ne an  early— and  very  high — priority 
the  Reagan  Administration. 

The  extent  of  this  change  is  clear 
im  a  statement  early  in  the  Presi- 
nt's  first  term  by  then-Secretary  of 
fense  Caspar  Weinberger.  He  de- 
red  that  his  two  top  priorities  were 
idiness  of  U.S.  forces  and  the  pre- 
ntion  of  the  acquisition  of  advanced 
!hnology  by  the  Warsaw  Pact.  In  sub- 
:juent  months  and  years,  it  became 
•reasingly  clear  to  Western  publics 
d  parliaments  that  the  diversion  of 
!stern  strategic  technology  to  the 
irsaw  Pact  had  to  be  arrested.  The 
•hnology  leakage  was  directly  assist- 
l  Soviet  military  research  and  devel- 
ment,  reducing  our  technological 
ge  over  the  Soviets,  and,  as  a  result, 
■cing  increases  in  our  own  defense 
dgets  and  those  of  our  allies.  In 
ort,  it  was  impairing  our  mutual 
:urity. 

We  reacted  in  the  early  1980s  by 
■ning  major  policy-level  attention  to 
»COM  and  to  our  own  export  control 
5tem.  Policy-level  officials  began 
roting  much  time  and  effort  to 
engthening  the  COCOM  system, 
dating  the  lists  of  controlled  com- 
dities  and  technologies,  and  other- 
se  bringing  COCOM  out  of  the 
Idrums.  In  the  Department  of  De- 
ise,  the  professional  staff  dealing 
th  technology  security  policy  mush- 
jmed  from  a  handful  to  over  200. 
ere  were  also  important  increases  in 
5  Department  of  Commerce  and  in 
S.  Customs.  Within  the  Department 
State,  a  new  policy  office  was  created 
the  Bureau  of  Pohtico-Military  Af- 
rs  in  recognition  of  export  controls  as 
ta  national  security  issue.  The  staff  was 


strengthened  in  the  Bureau  of  Eco- 
nomic and  Business  Affairs.  Finally, 
the  position  I  occupy  was  created  in 
order  to  coordinate  strategic  technology 
policy  within  the  Department  of  State 
and  with  other  agencies. 

Our  efforts  have  been  directed  at 
ensuring  that  national  security  consid- 
erations are  adequately  taken  into  ac- 
count in  our  own  licensing  procedures, 
at  preventing  diversions  from  U.S. 
sources,  at  working  with  friendly 
governments  to  prevent  diversions  else- 
where, and  at  strengthening  the  struc- 
ture of  COCOM.  We  have  also  worked 
to  ensure  conditions  of  fairness  in 
COCOM  so  that  American  firms  are  not 
placed  at  a  competitive  disadvantage. 

We  have  had  both  successes  and 
failures.  There  is  no  question  that  the 
U.S.  export  control  system  is  vastly  su- 
perior to  what  it  was  in  1980.  The 
COCOM  system  is  far  more  effective. 
We  have  negotiated  technology  protec- 
tion arrangements  with  numerous  non- 
COCOM  countries  in  order  to  keep  the 
COCOM  effort  from  being  undermined 
by  technology  loss  from  or  through 
those  third  countries.  Talks  with  addi- 
tional third  countries  are  underway.  We 
have  certainly  frustrated  countless  So- 
viet acquisition  efforts  across  the 
world.  But  the  task  is  enormous,  and 
the  track  record  is  far  from  perfect. 

The  Toshiba/Kongsberg  Diversion 

The  most  glaring  failure  of  the  recent 
past  was  the  illegal  sale  by  the  Jap- 
anese firm,  Toshiba  Machine  Company, 
and  the  Norwegian  firm,  Kongsberg 
Ti-ading  Company,  of  multiaxis  milling 
machines  that  have  provided  a  Soviet 
naval  shipyard  with  the  means  to  mass- 
produce  quiet  submarine  propellers. 
The  result  was  real  damage  to  the  mu- 
tual security  of  all  Western  nations. 
The  Toshiba/Kongsberg  diversion  was  a 
shock— to  the  Administration,  to  the 
Congress,  and  to  the  American  people. 
But  it  was  also  a  stimulus  for  further 
improvements. 

The  Administration  reacted  by  im- 
mediately holding  urgent  bilateral  con- 
sultation's with  its  COCOM  partners,  in 
particular  the  Japanese  and  Norwegian 
Governments.  The  Department  of  State 
led  U.S.  delegations  to  Tokyo,  Oslo, 
and  other  COCOM  capitals  last  fall,  and 
we  and  the  Japanese  decided  henceforth 
to  hold  regular,  institutionalized  bilat- 
eral meetings  on  export  control  issues. 
-Japan  and  Norway  moved  quickly  to 
remedy  the  shortcomings  in  their  ex- 
port control  systems  that  had  contrib- 
uted to  the  illegal  sales. 


epartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1988 


In  addition,  at  the  request  of  the 
United  States,  a  senior  political  meet- 
ing of  all  COCOM  partners  was  held  in 
Versailles  in  .January  of  this  year  to  dis- 
cuss means  of  strengthening  the  multi- 
lateral export  control  system.  It  was 
a  unique  event — a  meeting  not  of 
COCOM  but,  rather,  about  COCOM.  It 
placed  a  senior  political  imprimatur  on 
COCOM  and  its  mission  and  repre- 
sented the  first  senior  political  commit- 
ment to  strengthened  enforcement. 
Heads  of  delegation  included  deputy 
foreign  ministers,  directors  general, 
and  other  senior  officials.  The  Deputy 
Secretary  of  State,  John  Whitehead, 
was  the  leader  of  the  U.S.  delegation. 

The  Campaign 

To  Revitalize  COCOM 

The  Versailles  meeting  was  the  begin- 
ning of  a  major  campaign  to  revitalize 
COCOM.  The  participating  govern- 
ments reaffirmed  their  commitment  to 
COCOM,  recognized  that  more  effective 
controls  are  necessary  to  protect  the 
Western  advantage  in  strategically  sen- 
sitive technology  essential  to  Western 
security,  and  called  for  improved  under- 
standing of  COCOM  by  the  business 
community.  The  participants  agreed  to 
rationalize  the  COCOM  control  lists, 
strengthen  cooperation  with  non- 
COCOM  countries  on  technology  trans- 
fer, harmonize  and  reinforce  national 
controls,  and  facilitate  the  flow  of  stra- 
tegically significant  goods  and  tech- 
nologies among  participating  countries. 

This  last  point  is  of  particular  im- 
portance, since  the  objective  of  the 
COCOM  partners  is  to  establish  a 
common  standard  level  of  effective 
protection  of  controlled  goods  and 
technologies  in  all  COCOM  countries 
with  a  view  to  the  eventual  elimination 
of  licensing  requirements  for  trade  in 
such  goods  and  technologies  among 
these  countries. 

The  achievement  of  such  a  license- 
free  strategic  trade  zone  will  be  one  of 
the  greatest  challenges  facing  us  in  the 
future. 

First  of  all,  the  common  standard 
level  of  effective  protection  must  be  de- 
fined in  concrete  terms  within  COCOM. 

Second,  the  weaker  national  ex- 
port control  systems  within  the 
COCOM  community  must  be  brought 
up  to  the  standards  of  the  strongest 
national  systems. 

Finally,  there  must  be  a  significant 
streamlining  of  the  COCOM  lists,  since 
continued  attempts  to  control  items  no 


47 


ECONOMICS 


longer  militarily  critical  can  only  under- 
mine COCOM's  credibility  with  the 
public  and  business  community  and 
complicate  the  enforcement  task. 

The  concept  of  streamlining  is 
simple:  one  achieves  a  consensus  on 
dropping  from  the  lists  items  that  no 
longer  meet  certain  strategic  criteria. 
Whether  a  particular  item  meets  the 
indicated  criteria,  however,  is  often  the 
subject  of  intense  debate,  and  there  are 
clearly  some  borderline  situations.  It 
can  be  a  difficult  task  to  reach  agree- 
ment on  the  removal  of  items  even 
among  the  agencies  of  any  one  govern- 
ment, including  our  own.  When  one 
considers  that  multiple  agencies  of  all 
16  COCOM  governments  are  involved  in 
this  decisionmaking,  one  can  under- 
stand the  difficulty  of  reaching  agree- 
ment on  precisely  what  items  should  be 
deleted  from  the  COCOM  lists.  It  is 
essential,  however,  that  the  COCOM 
nations  continue  to  work  for  consensus 
on  streamlining  and  that  the  streamlin- 
ing process  goes  forward  expeditiously. 
In  the  months  following  the  senior 
political  meeting  at  Versailles,  we  have 
moved  energetically  to  follow  up  on  its 
conclusions.  We  are  working  to  estab- 
lish a  common  standard  level  of  effec- 
tive protection.  We  are  continuing  a 
determined  but  careful  effort  to  prune 
and  update  the  COCOM  control  lists. 
We  are  working  to  enhance  our  cooper- 
ation with  non-COCOM  countries. 

New  Challenges  Ahead 

Over  the  next  few  years,  we  will  face 
the  task  not  only  of  revitalizing 
COCOM  itself  but  of  adjusting  COCOM 
to  a  wide  range  of  new  challenges. 

•  First,  there  is  the  mushrooming 
of  high-technology  industries  through- 
out the  world.  This  proliferation  in- 
creases the  complexity — but  also  the 
importance — of  cooperation  among 
COCOM  governments  and  cooperating 
governments  to  prevent  access  to  stra- 
tegic technologies  and  avoid  placing 
any  one  government  or  firm  at  a  com- 
petitive disadvantage. 

•  The  second  challenge  is  the  emer- 
gence of  the  civilian  sector  as  the  domi- 
nant market  for  leading-edge  technol- 
ogies. This  development  increases  the 
importance  of  the  dual-use  control  list 
and  greatly  expands  the  reach  of  export 
controls  to  the  civilian  exporter. 

•  A  third  challenge  stems  from  the 
growing  conviction  around  the  world 
that  high  technology  is  the  key  to 


future  economic  growth  and  competi- 
tiveness. No  country  or  firm  can  coun- 
tenance falling  behind  in  this  area,  and 
intense  competition  will  undoubtedly 
continue.  The  COCOM  governments 
must  ensure  that  this  competition  is 
fair  if  the  system  is  to  operate 
effectively. 

•  Finally,  and  by  no  means  least 
important,  all  of  these  challenges  must 
be  met  in  a  period  of  perestroika  and 
of  new  developments  in  East- West 
relations. 

A  more  stable  relationship  between 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
is  certainly  a  positive  development. 
Expansion  of  mutually  beneficial,  non- 
strategic  trade  is  desirable  and  is  be- 
ginning to  take  place.  I  would  like  to 
stress,  however,  that  nothing  has  hap- 
pened that  would  justify  a  more  liberal 
policy  on  exports  of  strategic  goods  and 
technology  to  the  Warsaw  Pact  coun- 
tries. Such  a  policy  would  help  to  mod- 
ernize the  Soviet  conventional  military 
machine  at  the  very  time  we  are  elim- 
inating a  whole  class  of  nuclear  weap- 
ons and  working  for  reductions  in  stra- 
tegic nuclear  forces.  Relaxing  our 
efforts  in  COCOM  in  the  face  of  the 
continued  Soviet  strengthening  of  offen- 
sive, conventional  arms  would  be  pro- 
foundly inimical  to  the  security  of  the 
West. " 

In  fact,  we  must  brace  ourselves  in 
the  years  ahead  for  a  probable  stepped- 
up  Soviet  technology  acquisition  pro- 
gram in  the  West  motivated  by: 

•  The  Soviets'  desire  to  strengthen 
their  conventional  forces  in  an  era  of 
nuclear  disarmament;  and 

•  New  opportunities  for  strategic 
technology  acquisition,  which  the  Sovi- 
ets expect  improved  East-West  rela- 
tions may  offer. 

It  will  be  of  the  utmost  impor- 
tance, therefore,  to  ensure  continuity  of 


our  strategic  technology  policy  into  th; 
next  U.S.  Administration— regardless 
of  the  outcome  of  the  elections  in 
November.  We  must  ensure  that  the 
pendulum  does  not  swing  back  toward 
complacency.  As  we  pursue  greater 
contacts,  greater  scientific  exchanges, 
and  greater  nonstrategic  trade  with  tl 
Soviet  bloc,  we  must,  at  the  same  tim 
protect  the  technology  that  underlies 
our  security.  We  must  continue  the  pr 
cess  of  revitalizing  COCOM,  adjusting 
it  to  the  changed  situation  of  the  1980 
and  1990s— that  is,  rapidly  increasing 
technological  sophistication  in  non- 
COCOM  countries,  the  lowering  of 
trade  barriers  in  the  West,  and  a  like 
increase  in  nonstrategic  trade  with  th 
Warsaw  Pact  countries. 

Maintaining  effective  strategic 
trade  controls  requires  a  sustained 
effort  on  the  part  of  the  United  Stati 
its  allies,  and  other  cooperating  na- 
tions. The  effort  does  not  come  easil; 
In  some  quarters,  it  is  politically  un- 
popular. The  need  for  certain  control 
is  not  always  clear.  Although  no  resf 
sible  person  would  contemplate  sellii 
a  sensitive  weapons  system  to  an  ad 
versary,  there  are  those  who  do  not 
readily  perceive  the  need  to  deny  th 
adversary  the  sophisticated  compute 
system  required  to  guide  that  same 
weapons  system — perhaps  because  t 
computer  could  also  be  used  for  civi 
purposes. 

The  fact  remains,  however,  that 
keeping  such  technology  out  of  the 
hands  of  those  who  might  use  it  agj 
us  contributes  to  the  maintenance  c 
our  technological  edge.  And  this  ad 
tage,  along  with  our  nuclear  deterr 
has  helped  avoid  global  conflict  for 
43  years.  We  and  our  allies  have  be 
fited  greatly  from  this  era  of  relati\ 
peace  and  stability.  We  must  ensun 
continued  vigilance  and  sacrifices  n 
essary  to  preserve  it.  ■ 


48 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October 


EJROPE 


^sit  of  Icelandic  Prime  Minister 


Pnine  Minister  Thorsteinn  Palsson 
^'ir  Rcpuhlic  of  Iceland  made  an  offi- 
II  Hiking  visit  to  Washington,  D.C., 
Ills!  9-13,  1988,  to  meet  with  Presi- 
I  li'  Ill/an  and  other  government 

h'niliiicing  are  remarks  made  by  the 
'  Kiili  lit  and  the  Prime  Minister  after 
I  r  iih'cting  on  August  10.^ 

"isidcnt  Reagan 

L'kiimed  Prime  Minister  Thorsteinn 
'i^sdii  to  the  ^Vhite  House  with  par- 
iilar  pleasure,  for  he's  the  first  Ice- 
ilic  I'rime  Minister  to  make  an 
t  'ial  working  visit  to  the  United 
Ucs.  The  Prime  Minister  and  I  had  a 
u  uodd  and  friendly  meeting  this 
riiiiit:.  and  we  continued  our  conver- 
:  on  over  lunch. 

As  you  are  well  aware,  ties  be- 
\  en  the  United  States  and  Iceland 
1  (let']!  and  long-hved.  In  fact,  they 
■•  lack  to  the  year  1000,  when  Leif 
^L-kson,  a  son  of  Iceland,  first  came 
I  hi'sc  shores.  I  distinctly  remember 
I  statue  of  "Leif  the  Lucky"  in  front 
I  celand's  largest  church  atop  Reyk- 
I  k's  tallest  hill.  It  was  a  gift  from 
American  people  to  Iceland  in  1930 
the  1,000th  anniversary  of  the 
ading  of  the  Icelandic  parliament, 
ir  parhament,  the  Althing,  is  the 
3st  in  the  world,  and  it  existed  long 
are  most  parliamentary  systems 
r  got  started.  That  statue  now 
nds  as  a  reminder  of  the  tradition- 
•  close  and  cooperative  ties  between 
two  democratic  nations.  It  also  re- 
ids  us  of  how  fortunate  it  is  that 
landers  were  and  remain  a  brave  and 
faring  people. 
On  the  occasion  of  the  Prime  Minis- 
s  visit  to  the  White  House  today,  I 
nt  again  to  express  my  personal 
nks  and  the  appreciation  of  the 
lerican  people  for  the  gracious  hospi- 
,ty  shown  by  the  Icelandic  people 
1  Government  in  hosting  my  meeting 
:h  General  Secretary  Gorbachev  in 
ober  of  1986.  I  have  nothing  but  ad- 
ration  for  the  efficiency  and  speed 
;h  which  your  entire  nation  success- 
ly  met  an  immense  challenge  on  such 
ort  notice.  I  was  told  while  there 
it  Icelanders  are  accustomed  to  re- 
onding  to  such  things  as  earthquakes 
d  volcanic  eruptions.  But  I'm  sure, 
wever,  they  had  never  previously  wit- 
sed  the  upheaval  of  a  U.S. -Soviet 
mmit,  complete  with  more  than  3,000 


journalists.  But  you  and  your  coun- 
trymen took  it  all  in  stride,  and  we're 
all  left  with  an  unforgettable  impres- 
sion of  your  warmth,  generosity,  and 
hospitality.  In  the  wake  of  the  Moscow 
summit,  I  must  note  that  the  talks  that 
the  General  Secretary  and  I  had  in 
Hofdi  House  were  an  important 
milestone  in  the  development  of  our 
current  dialogue  with  the  Soviet  Union, 
a  dialogue  made  possible  by  the  firm 
determination  and  unity  of  the  Western 
alliance  of  which  your  nation  was  a 
founding  member. 

NATO  has  more  than  stood  the 
test  of  time,  and  Iceland  was  there  at 
the  beginning.  NATO  is  an  alliance  of 
sovereign  equals  whose  members  have 
agreed  to  share  both  its  benefits  and 
responsibilities.  But  our  bilateral  and 
NATO  relationship  transcends  security 
considerations  and  rests  solidly  in 
shared  democratic  values,  history, 
trade,  and  a  tradition  upheld  by  your 
leadership,  Mr.  Prime  Minister.  It  is 
that  long  and  valued  relationship  I  am 
proud  to  acknowledge  today. 

And  welcome  again  to  you  and  to 
your  lovely  wife.  We  wish  you  the  very 
best  for  the  remainder  of  your  visit  to 
Washington  and  for  the  future. 

Prime  Minister  Palsson 

It  is,  indeed,  both  an  honor  and  a  dis- 
tinct pleasure  to  have  been  your  guest 
here  at  the  White  House  today.  My  in- 
vitation here  underscores  the  friendly 
relationship  and  close  cooperation  pre- 
vailing between  the  United  States  and 
Iceland.  At  our  meeting  today,  we  were 
able  to  review  many  issues  in  our  bilat- 
eral relationship,  as  well  as  some  of  the 
larger  issues  on  the  international  scene. 
Our  bilateral  relationship  is  excellent. 


It's  based  not  only  on  our  joint  mem- 
bership in  the  Atlantic  alliance  and  a 
mutually  beneficial  defense  agreement 
but  also  on  historical  ties  and  impor- 
tant cooperation  in  fields  as  diverse  as 
trade,  transportation,  education,  and 
scientific  research. 

We  have,  during  this  visit,  been 
able  to  explore  ways  of  further  solidify- 
ing and  strengthening  our  ties  in  some 
of  these  fields.  But  perhaps  most  im- 
portantly, our  friendship  is  based  on 
certain  shared  basic  values,  such  as  re- 
spect for  freedom,  human  dignity,  and 
the  democratic  process,  all  of  which  are 
fundamental  elements  of  open,  plu- 
ralistic societies.  These  shared  princi- 
ples transcend  differences  in  size  or 
population. 

For  most  of  its  1,100  years  of  re- 
corded history,  my  country  was  rela- 
tively isolated  from  the  currents  of 
world  events.  All  that  changed  during 
the  Second  World  War.  The  foundations 
for  the  security  relationship  between 
our  two  countries  were  laid  during  a 
crucial  phase  of  the  Battle  of  the  Atlan- 
tic. We  are  hopeful  that  we  may  jointly, 
with  our  partners  in  the  Western  al- 
liance, prevent  such  times  from  ever  oc- 
curring again. 

But  clearly,  a  lot  also  depends  on 
the  arms  control  efforts  of  your  govern- 
ment and  that  of  the  Soviet  Union,  as 
well  as  the  international  community  in 
general.  The  people  of  my  country  were 
encouraged  by  the  recently  concluded 
Intermediate-Range  Nuclear  Forces 
(INF)  Treaty.  And  we  are  proud  to 
have  been  able  to  contribute  in  a  small 
way  to  the  process  leading  up  to  that 
agreement  by  hosting  the  summit  be- 
tween yourself,  Mr.  President,  and  the 
Soviet  "leader  in  the  fall  of  1986.  We 
hope  that  progress  can  also  be  made 


.•partment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1988 


49 


EUROPE 


this  year  in  the  area  of  strategic  arms 
and  wish  you  and  your  negotiators  suc- 
cess in  those  talks. 

To  conclude,  allow  me  again  to  ex- 
press my  appreciation  for  your  hospi- 
tality and  the  fine  reception  we  have 
received  here  in  Washington.  Coming 
from  Iceland,  I  can  tell  a  warm  day. 
But  it's  not  the  climate  which  will  make 
this  visit  memorable  but  rather  the  hu- 
man warmth  we  have  encountered. 


38th  Report  on  Cyprus 


'Made  the  East  Room  of  the  White 
House  (te.xt  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Aug.  1.5,  1988). 


27th  Anniversary 
of  the  Berlin  Wall 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
AUG.  12,  19881 

August  13  marks  a  sad  anniversary;  the 
27th  anniversary  of  the  Berlin  Wall. 
That  wall  is  both  a  scar  across  the  city 
of  Berlin  and  a  symbol  of  the  division  of 
the  German  nation  and  of  Euroije.  As 
tentative  breezes  of  openness  begin  to 
stir  the  societies  in  the  East,  the  wall 
now  stands  in  stark  contrast  to  the  hu- 
man struggle  for  freedom  taking  place 
in  its  shadow.  There  is  no  more  dra- 
matic proof  of  communism's  failed 
dream  than  the  wall. 

Free  men  and  women  everywhere 
take  heart  from  the  courage  of  the  peo- 
ple of  Berlin.  Their  determination  to 
protect  their  outpost  of  freedom  re- 
mains undaunted  despite  repeated  chal- 
lenges over  the  years  from  those  who 
would  deny  their  liberty  and  who  fear 
their  e.xample.  Berliners  remain  com- 
mitted to  preserving  their  democratic 
way  of  life  and  to  removing  the  barriers 
dividing  the  German  nation.  The 
United  States  is  honored  to  stand 
firmly  with  the  British  and  French  to 
defend  the  freedom  and  promote  the 
well-being  of  Berlin.  These  unwavering 
commitments  continue  to  be  a  cor- 
nerstone of  American  policy  in  Europe. 

In  June  of  last  year,  I  stood  before 
the  Brandenburg  Gate  and  offered  an 
initiative  meant  to  bring  positive 
change  to  the  lives  of  Berliners:  im- 
proved air  access;  bringing  more  confer- 
ences to  the  entire  city;  staging 
international  sporting  events,  including 
the  Olympics;  and  promoting  youth  ex- 
changes between  the  two  parts  of 
Berlin.  Last  December  we,  together 


50 


MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
JULY  29,  1988' 

In  accordance  with  Public  Law  95-384,  I 
am  submitting  to  you  a  bimonthly  report 
on  progress  toward  a  negotiated  settlement 
of  the  Cyprus  question. 

In  recent  months,  the  U.N.  Secretary 
General  intensified  his  efforts  to  restart 
negotiations  between  the  parties  to  the 
dispute.  I  am  pleased  to  inform  you  that 
the  Seeretai\y  Genera!  announced  that  he 
has  received  agreement  in  principle  from 
both  Cypriot  President  George  Vassiliou 
and  Turkish  Cypriot  community  leader 
Rauf  Denktash  to  begin  talks.  Details, 
however,  remain  to  be  worked  out  regard- 
ing the  exact  timing,  basis,  and  nature  of 
the  discussions.  We  believe  that  this  is  an 
important  opportunity  and  have  noted  to 
all  interested  parties  that  it  should  not  be 
missed;  maximum  effort  should  be  made  to 
cooperate  with  the  Secretary  General.  I  of- 
fer my  best  wishes  to  both  leaders  as  they 
strive  for  a  lasting,  mutually  acceptable 
peace. 

As  publicly  announced  on  July  7,  Pres- 
ident Vassiliou  has  accepted  my  invitation 
for  a  private  visit  to  the  United  States  on 
August  1.  I  look  forward  to  meeting  with 
him  at  that  time  to  discuss  efforts  to  nego- 
tiate a  Cyprus  solution  and  the  continuing 
improvement  of  our  already  excellent  bilat- 
eral relations.  During  President  Vassiliou's 
recent  visit  to  New  York  for  the  U.N.  Spe- 
cial Session  on  Disarmament,  I  sent  a  mes- 
sage to  the  President  through  Special 
Cyprus  Coordinator  [M.  James]  Wilkinson 
who  had  a  lengthy  conversation  with  him. 
Under  Secretary  of  State  for  Coordinating 
Security  Assistance  Programs  [Edward  J.] 
Derwinski  also  met  with  President  Vas- 
siliou. Special  Cyprus  Coordinator  Wilkin- 
son also  recently  met  with  President 


Vassiliou  and  Turkish  Cypriot  leader 
Denktash  during  a  recent  trip  to  Cyprus  v 
discuss  continuing  efforts  toward  negotia- 
tions and  a  settlement. 

The  U.N.  Secretary  General  issued  hi 
semiannual  report,  dated  May  ,S1,  1988,  a 
copy  of  which  is  attached,  to  the  Security 
Council  on  the  U.N.  operation  in  Cyprus. 
The  Secretary  General  noted  that  his  re- 
port was  coming  out  at  "a  time  of  ten- 
sion...but  also  of  hope,"  referring  to 
concerns  about  serious  incidents  in  the 
buffer  zone  that  he  hoped  would  not  side- 
track efforts  to  resume  active  negotiation; 
toward  an  overall  settlement.  Among  otht 
subjects  in  the  report,  the  Secretary  Gen- 
eral reitei'ated  his  concern  about  the  accu 
mulated  deficit  in  the  UNFICYP  [UN 
Peacekeeping  Force  in  Cyprus]  special 
account. 

President  Kenan  Evren  of  Turkey  vis 
ited  the  United  States  in  late  June  and, 
during  the  course  of  his  stay,  responded  t 
questions  on  Cyprus.  President  Evren 
stated  that  Turkey's  main  interest  in 
Cyprus  remains  the  security  of  the  Turki  I 
Cypriot  community.  He  reaffirmed  past    » 
Turkish  statements  that  Turkish  troops 
would  be  withdrawn  from  Cyprus  in  thi 
context  of  a  settlement  that  adequately  a  ^. 
dresses  Turkish  Cypriot  concerns  and  in-  i 
terests.  I  view  the  timing  and  content  of  m 
this  message  as  very  positive  in  relation   , 
the  U.N.  Secretary  General's  effort  to  n  ! 
start  serious  intercommunal  negotiations  r 
in  Cyprus.  t 

Sincerely,  I 

Ronald  Reag 


'Identical  letters  addressed  to  Jim 
Wright,  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Repres 
tatives,  and  Claiborne  Pell,  chairman  of 
the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee 
(text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presid 
tial  Documents  of  Aug.  1,  1988).  ■ 


with  the  British  and  French,  proposed 
specific  ideas  to  the  Soviets  along  these 
lines.  We  are  still  awaiting  an  answer. 

As  we  recall  the  construction  of  the 
wall  on  this  day  in  1961,  the  people  of 
the  United  States  reaffirm  their  com- 
mitment to  Berlin  and  salute  the  brave 
people  who  live  there.  Americans  be- 
lieve that  with  imagination  and  will 


East  and  West  can  make  Berlin  a  s 
bol  of  a  new  era,  reflecting  the  true 
aspirations  of  the  human  spirit,  bef( 
another  anniversary  of  the  wall  is 
passed. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Aug.  15,  19i 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1 


ip 


.ENERAL 


imerican  Foreign  Policy: 
Opportunities  and  Challenges 


1/  (  oliii  L.  Powell 

Address  before  the  World  Affairs 
uiicil  in  Los  Angeles  on  July  19, 
i8.  Lt.  Gen.  Powell  is  Assistant  to 

President  for  National  Security 
fairs. 

le  Democratic  National  Convention  is 
11  underway  in  Atlanta  and  will  be 
lowed  next  month  by  the  Republican 
nvention.  With  these  two  uniquely 
nerican  events,  we  begin  the  quad- 
nnial  ritual  of  asking  the  American 
ople  to  decide  how — and  by  whom — 
sy  wish  to  be  led. 

This  ritual  requires  both  sides  to 
•ite  their  views  forcefully  and  to  high- 
ht  their  differences  so  the  people  can 
derstand  those  differences  and  make 
^ir  choice.  In  this  process,  American 
■eign  policy  will  be  hotly  debated, 
at's  good  because  rigorous  debate  is 
5ential  if  we  are  to  make  informed 
d  wise  choices. 

But  in  the  excitement  of  the  cam- 
ign  season  we  should  not  lose  sight  of 
3  fact  that,  in  recent  years,  there  has 
veloped,  once  again,  a  remarkable 
gree  of  domestic  consensus  on  the 
sic  principles  and  direction  of  Ameri- 
1  foreign  policy. 

ke  Restoration  of 
xmestic  Consensus 

■rtainly,  there  are  remaining  contro- 
rsies,  and  I've  struggled  through  a 
of  them — over  Central  America,  the 
ide  bill,  the  Strategic  Defense  Initia- 
'e,  the  defense  budget,  to  name  a 
•N.  But  in  a  real  sense,  something 
ry  important  and  very  positive  has 
ppened  in  this  country  in  recent 
ars:  we  now  find  ourselves  agreeing 
lere  there  was  once  deep,  often  bitter 
vision. 

For  example,  the  American  people 
3arly  do  not  want  to  see  a  repetition 
the  period  of  military  weakness  that 
3  went  through  in  the  wake  of  the 
etnam  war.  Today's  battles  over  the 
irticulars  of  the  defense  budget 
lould  not  obscure  the  basic  fact  that 
mericans  agree  on  the  need  for  a 
Tong  defense  and  are  wilHng  to  pay  a 
iasonable  price  for  it.  The  public  and 
16  Congress  have  also  shown  their 
ipport  for  the  use  of  our  military 
rength  when  and  where  our  vital  in- 
!rests  or  those  of  our  friends  and  allies 


are  threatened — such  as  in  Grenada,  the 
blow  struck  against  Libyan  terrorism, 
and  our  commitment  in  the  gulf.  Our 
people  understand  the  need  for  a 
strong,  engaged  America  actively  de- 
fending what  it  stands  for. 

There  is  agreement  that  our  mili- 
tary forces  must  be  strong  and  I'eady, 
not  only  so  that  they  will  be  effective 
should  we  have  to  commit  them  but 
also  to  keep  others  from  forcing  us  to 
use  them.  "Peace  through  strength"  is 
more  than  a  slogan.  It  is  a  fundamental 
reality.  It  is  strength  that  enables  us  to 
pursue  peaceful  relations  with  our 
adversaries. 

For  that  reason,  our  relations  with 
the  Soviet  Union  are  based  on  strength 
and  realism  and  on  a  willingness  to  re- 
solve problems  through  negotiation.  It 
is  no  accident  that  we  are  now  negotiat- 
ing with  them  on  the  most  comprehen- 
sive agenda  ever  and  that  today  our 
approach  to  the  Soviet  Union  has  broad 
and  deep  public  support. 

There  is  a  significant  moral  dimen- 
sion in  our  foreign  policy  as  well,  as 
there  must  be  in  a  democracy.  Human 
rights  has  to  be — and  is — an  important 
element  in  our  relations  toward  the  So- 
viet Union,  toward  South  Africa,  and 
toward  all  nations,  whether  in  Europe, 
Asia,  Africa,  or  Latin  America.  The 
transitions  to  democracy  throughout 
Latin  America,  in  the  Philippines,  and 
in  the  Republic  of  Korea  are  supported 
by  all  Americans.  "Human  rights"  is 
not  just  an  abstract  concept.  It  means 
the  ability  of  people  to  worship,  to 
speak,  to  write,  and  to  vote  as  they 
please;  freely  to  choose,  as  we  do,  how 
and  by  whom  they  will  be  governed. 

Related  to  this  commitment  is  our 
active  support  for  those  struggling 
against  tyranny — those  whom  we  call 
the  freedom  fighters.  Where  our  back- 
ing of  these  freedom  fighters  has  been 
strong,  consistent,  and  bipartisan — as 
in  Afghanistan,  Angola,  and  Cam- 
bodia— there  has  been  progress  toward 
diplomatic  solutions.  Central  America 
is  today  the  exception,  with  potentially 
calamitous  strategic  consequences,  pre- 
cisely because  we  have  been  divided. 
Nevertheless,  the  degree  of  bipartisan 
support  that  has  existed  for  these 
efforts  elsewhere  is  something  the  next 
President  can  build  upon. 

In  short,  the  American  people  have 
made  it  clear  they  want  their  country 


strong  and  engaged.  They  want  an  ef- 
fective foreign  policy  that  promotes 
with  energy  and  commitment  our  val- 
ues of  freedom,  democracy,  and  human 
rights. 

This  restoration  of  our  domestic 
consensus — of  our  military  and  moral 
strength — is  what  has  reestablished 
America's  strategic  position  in  the 
world.  It  is  a  bipartisan  accomplish- 
ment of  the  executive  branch,  the  Con- 
gress, and  the  American  people.  These 
achievements  could  not  have  been 
reached  any  other  way. 

Pursuing  U.S. 
Foreign  Policy  Goals 

With  this  backdrop,  I  want  to  review 
where  we  are  in  the  many  regions  of 
the  world  where  we  pursue  our  goals 
as  a  nation.  Too  much  of  the  time, 
whether  as  professionals  in  govern- 
ment, in  business,  in  academia,  or  as 
citizens,  we  are  forced  to  look  at  re- 
gions and  issues  one  at  a  time,  in  isola- 
tion. It  is  useful,  from  time  to  time,  to 
stop  examining  individual  trees  and 
step  back  to  survey  the  forest. 

As  he  looks  out  at  the  world, 
the  next  President,  whoever  he  is,  will 
find  America  in  a  strong  position  with 
many  basic  trends  in  our  favor.  He  will 
also,  of  course,  find  problems  and 
challenges. 

Europe.  Europe  continues  to  be  a 
crucial  arena  of  global  politics,  but  it 
has,  nevertheless,  enjoyed  more  than 
four  decades  of  peace — one  of  the  long- 
est such  periods  in  its  history,  certainly 
the  longest  in  this  century.  This  is  true 
primarily  because  the  North  Atlantic 
allies  have  maintained  a  secure  military 
balance,  deterring  the  Warsaw  Pact 
from  using  its  preponderence  of  con- 
ventional military  power.  Behind  that 
shield.  Western  Europe  has  enjoyed 
unprecedented  prosperity  and  freedom. 
The  American  commitment  to  Western 
Europe,  embodied  in  the  North  Atlan- 
tic Treaty,  will  remain  a  central  pillar 
of  American  policy  sustained  by  solid 
bipartisan  support. 

And  we  see  many  positive  histor- 
ical trends  in  Europe.  Among  them  is 
the  strong  movement  toward  greater 
West  European  integration,  which  the 
United  States  has  always  supported — 
for  example,  the  steps  toward  a  full 
internal  common  market  by  1992  and 
toward  greater  European  defense 
cooperation  within  the  framework  of 
the  NATO  alliance. 

The  unity  of  the  alliance  proved  it- 
self in  historic  fashion  in  1983,  when 


51 


GENERAL 


key  allied  countries  went  ahead  with 
deployment  of  U.S.  INF  [intermediate- 
range  nuclear  forces]  missiles  to  coun- 
ter the  Soviet  SS-20s,  and  they  did  so 
in  the  face  of  loud,  often  angry,  some- 
times violent  protests.  Allied  stead- 
fastness was  vindicated  when  it  proved 
to  be  the  key  to  successful  arms  con- 
trol— leading  directly  to  the  INF 
Treaty,  in  which  the  United  States  and 
the  Soviet  Union  agreed  to  eliminate  all 
of  their  intermediate-range  nuclear 
missiles,  a  process  now  underway. 

In  March,  I  accompanied  the  Presi- 
dent to  the  NATO  summit  meeting  in 
Brussels,  and  I  can  report  that  the 
Western  democracies  stand  united  as 
we  enter  a  new  era  of  opportunity  in 
East-West  relations.  We  will  certainly 
face  challenges,  whether  trade  issues 
between  the  United  States  and  a 
stronger  European  Community,  or  in- 
stability arising  from  long-suppressed 
aspirations  in  Eastern  Europe,  or  com- 
plex issues  in  arms  control  such  as  the 
continuing  imbalance  in  conventional 
forces. 

But  if  the  allies  maintain  the  same 
political  will  they  displayed  in  the  re- 
cent past,  we  will  surmount  these 
challenges.  The  Soviet  Union  is  reex- 
amining its  past  policies  because  of  per- 
sistent failures;  the  West  must  avoid 
lapsing  into  complacency  and  not  rest 
on  its  four  decades  of  success. 

East-West  Relations.  We  may  be 

at  a  moment  of  historic  opportunity  in 
East- West  relations.  The  revival  of 
Western  strength  and  cohesion — coin- 
ciding with  the  emergence  of  a  bold 
new  leadership  in  the  Soviet  Union — 
offers  hope  that  many  longstanding 
sources  of  tension  can  be  addressed. 

The  real  sources  of  tension,  of 
course,  are  political.  The  weapons  are 
but  the  symptoms  of  a  political  conflict, 
not  its  cause.  As  the  President  likes  to 
say,  we  don't  mistrust  each  other  be- 
cause we're  armed;  we're  armed  be- 
cause we  mistrust  each  other  In  the 
1970s,  efforts  at  arms  control  and  de- 
tente were  derailed  by  the  aggressive- 
ness and  opportunism  of  the  Soviet 
Union  and  its  clients  in  Angola,  Ethi- 
opia, South  Yemen,  Cambodia,  and 
Afghanistan  and  by  continuing  Soviet 
repression  at  home  and  in  Eastern 
Europe. 

Thus,  as  you  saw  at  the  Moscow 
summit,  both  in  his  public  speeches  and 
in  his  private  meetings  with  Soviet 
leaders.  President  Reagan  has  raised 
human  rights  and  Soviet  policies  in 


Third  World  regional  conflicts,  seeking 
improvements  in  these  areas,  in  parallel 
with  our  efforts  for  arms  reduction. 
And  there  has  been  progress — a  his- 
toric commitment  to  leave  Afghanistan 
and  important  diplomatic  movement  on 
problems  such  as  Angola  and  Cambodia. 

Today  we  see  extraordinary  fer- 
ment inside  the  Soviet  Union — a  greater 
tolerance  for  diversity  of  opinion,  re- 
ligious practice,  autonomous  economic 
activity,  and  cultural  experimentation, 
although  all  still  within  prescribed  lim- 
its. If  these  developments  bear  fruit, 
they  could  improve  the  lives  of  the  So- 
viet people  considerably  over  the  long 
term.  We  wish  the  Soviet  people  well  in 
this  endeavor.  After  just  celebrating 
the  200th  anniversary  of  our  own  Con- 
stitution, however,  we  should  be  mind- 
ful that  the  Soviet  system — even  if  the 
new  reforms  are  implemented — will  re- 
main a  one-party  dictatorship  that  per- 
mits no  organized  political  opposition 
and  that  lacks  the  separation  of  powers 
that,  in  our  democracy,  provide  the 
essential  structural  safeguards  of 
individual  liberty. 

East  Asia  and  the  Pacific. 

Turning  to  other  parts  of  the  globe. 
East  Asia  and  the  Pacific  is  a  region 
that  we  on  the  east  coast  tend  some- 
times to  underestimate  or  overlook. 
This  Administration — in  particular, 
[Secretary  of  State]  George  Shultz — 
doesn't;  he  goes  out  there  at  least  once 
a  year  and  is  there  now. 

The  sustained  prosperity  of  the 
Pacific  is  the  product  of  government 
policies  to  some  degree,  but  mainly 
because  those  policies  let  private  initia- 
tive flourish.  Noncommunist  Asia  is 
proof  of  the  power  of  economic  freedom 
and  a  model  of  economic  progress. 
Japan,  defeated  in  war,  turned  its  ener- 
gies to  learning  from  us.  Its  success  is 
there  for  all  to  see.  The  combined  econ- 
omies of  the  United  States  and  Japan 
now  account  for  almost  one-third  of  the 
world's  GNP  [gross  national  product]. 
And  while  we  sometimes  pay  a  price 
for  the  Japanese  miracle  we  ourselves 
spawned,  we  also  reap  the  benefits  of 
having  a  democratic,  free-enterprise 
nation — and  not  a  totalitarian,  commu- 
nist state — as  the  economic  and  politi- 
cal inspiration  for  the  rest  of  Asia. 

In  the  political  and  security  realm, 
too,  we  must  be  doing  something  right. 
With  Japan,  we  have  defined  a  division 
of  defense  roles  that  acknowledges 
Japan's  greater  economic  capability.  Un- 
like in  Europe,  our  security  rela- 
tionships in  East  Asia  are  diverse, 
recognizing  differing  threats  and  varied 


strengths  among  our  allies  and  friends 
But  these  security  ties  have  been  an 
anchor  of  regional  peace,  and  the 
American  role  remains  crucial. 

Certainly,  there  are  problems. 
Vietnam's  continuing  occupation  of 
Cambodia  is  a  running  sore,  but  we 
encourage  the  current  diplomatic 
efforts — such  as  next  week's  informal 
meetings  in  Jakarta — and  hope  there 
progress  toward  independence  and  sel 
determination  for  the  people  of  Cam- 
bodia. North  Korea  remains  a  real 
threat.  Together  with  the  forces  of  th 
Republic  of  Korea,  we  provide  a  se- 
curity shield  behind  which  our  ally  is 
making  positive  diplomatic  efforts  to 
reduce  tensions. 

The  Soviet  Union  has  put  improv 
ing  relations  with  China  at  the  top  of 
its  Asian  agenda.  A  lessening  of  ten- 
sions between  these  two  powerful 
neighbors  is  a  logical  course  for  both 
pursue;  we  can  have  no  objection,  so 
long  as  the  terms  of  that  relationship! 
do  not  harm  our  interests.  The  strati  | 
gic  realities  of  Soviet  power  remain.   I 
know  that  China's  foreign  policy  is  tr  | 
independent  and  that  China  needs  nc  - 
advice  on  its  strategic  interests.  It  h  I' 
for  example,  wisely  insisted  on  an  er 


to  the  Vietnamese  invasion  of  Cambc 
as  one  precondition  of  improved  rela- 
tions with  the  Soviet  Union. 

The  broader  strategic  picture  in 
East  Asia  and  the  Pacific  is  one  of 
continued  stability,  prosperity,  and 
opportunity. 

Latin  America.  Latin  America, 
the  last  decade,  has  witnessed  a  re- 
markable trend — a  trend  toward  der 
racy;  indeed,  a  democratic  revolutioi 
A  decade  ago,  barely  a  third  of  the 
people  of  Central  and  South  Americ 
enjoyed  democratic  self-government 
day,  more  than  90%  do.  This  trend  i 
tribute  to  the  courage  of  Latin  Ame 
can  peoples  in  taking  their  destiny  i 
their  own  hands.  It  is  a  tribute  to  tl 
power  of  the  idea  of  democracy,  whi 
our  country  has  always  championed, 
encouraged  and  supported  this  tren 
the  past  decade,  and  we  must  contir 
to  do  so. 

Democracy  is  not  a  panacea,  ho 
ever.  Acute  economic  problems  rem; 
and  that  is  where  we  must  place  the 
focus  of  our  efforts. 

•  The  scourge  of  drugs  has  long 
been  a  subject  of  concern  and  coope 
tion  between  us  and  our  Latin  neigl 
bors.  Enormous  new  strides  have  bi 
taken  in  cooperation  on  law  enforce- 
ment, but  more  must  be  done. 


52 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  ipi;; 


GENERAL 


•  Panama  continues  to  be  a  prob- 
1.  liut  we  will  continue  to  support 

hnpes  for  democracy  in  that  trou- 
il  itiuntry. 

•  Despite  improvements,  Central 
itiiia  remains  an  area  of  latent 

•  1-    The  democracies  neighboring 
aiamia  have  made  remarkable  prog- 
s,  liut  this  progress  is  in  jeopardy.  A 
^ulmista  victory  over  the  democratic 
i>iance  would  have  ominous  conse- 
■iii  ts  for  freedom  inside  Nicaragua 
111  fur  the  peace  and  security  of  all 
^i-aragua's  neighbors.  Unless  Con- 
r  ss  and  the  President — which  means, 
iiiitrly,  the  American  people — come 
luicement  on  a  program  of  effective 
i;  for  the  Nicaraguan  resistance  as  an 
uunct  to  our  diplomatic  strategy,  the 
i;t  President  will  probably  face  a  sit- 
1  ion  of  accelei'ating  deterioration,  as 
I  tho  local  democracies  will  come  un- 
1  ■  m-(  >wing  strains  as  Nicaragua  grows 
;  Diii^cr,  more  assertive,  and  more  ag- 
issi\e.  Last  week  you  all  saw  the  re- 
1  ion  of  the  Sandinista  regime  to 
( itiniate  political  protest.  Can  there 
:  any  further  doubt  about  the  total- 
1  :'ian  nature  of  the  ruling  junta  in 
^  nagua? 

Africa.  In  Africa,  the  United 
•  itf>  has  forged  excellent  political 
:  ations  across  the  broad  spectrum  of 
.  -lean  nations  from  Zaire  to  Mozam- 
[  ue.  Chad,  with  assistance  from 
I  anee  and  ourselves,  won  a  great  vic- 
t  y  by  driving  Libyan  forces  out  of  its 
I  ritory.  Helping  Africa  relieve  eco- 
nic  hardship  is  one  our  priorities,  as 
Tionstrated  in  the  Toronto  economic 
limit's  commitment  to  intensify  our 
orts  on  behalf  of  the  poorest  nations. 

More  than  a  year  ago,  the  Presi- 
nt  undertook  a  major  reform  of  our 
n  aid  policies  in  an  initiative  to  com- 
t  hunger  in  Africa.  The  Administra- 
n  has  provided  a  key  stimulant  for 
lat  can  truly  be  called  a  silent  revo- 
ion  currently  underway  in  African 
onomic  development.  Twenty-five 
rican  countries  are  in  the  process 
abandoning  Marxist  or  state- 
mmanded  economies  in  favor  of  free 
irkets  and  private  sector  initiative.  I 
n't  think  it  would  be  an  exaggeration 
say  that  Marxism  is  dead  in  Africa — 
lied  by  its  own  internal  contradictions 
.d  failures  over  25  years  of  practical 
perience. 

In  southern  Africa,  we  have  dis- 
nced  ourselves  sharply  from  South 
frican  apartheid,  which  the  President 
is  condemned  as  repugnant.  In  the 
plomacy  to  bring  independence  to 
amibia  and  an  end  to  civil  war  and 


outside  intervention  in  Angola,  we  have 
been  the  galvanizing  force.  Whether 
the  intensified  diplomatic  efforts  will 
succeed  this  year  is  impossible  to  tell. 
Nevertheless,  the  next  President  will 
inherit  an  American-sponsored  diplo- 
matic framework  which  offers  the 
best — indeed,  the  only — hope  for  prog- 
ress in  southern  Africa. 

The  Middle  East.  The  Middle  East 
is,  as  alw^ays,  a  region  of  turbulence. 
The  Arab-IsraeU  dispute,  the  Iran-Iraq 
war,  and  the  menace  of  state-sponsored 
terrorism  remain;  Americans  and  oth- 
ers are  still  cruelly  being  held  hostage. 
Yet  there  are  also  positive  trends.  Our 
efforts  to  promote  a  comprehensive 
Arab-Israeli  settlement  have  not 
achieved  their  objectives,  but  progress 
has  been  made  which  can  be  built  upon; 
the  voices  of  moderation  on  both  sides 
are  stronger  and  may  well  have  been 
made  so,  in  part,  by  our  efforts.  In  the 
gulf,  Iran  may  have  at  last  drawn  the 
rational  conclusions  from  the  evident 
futihty  of  its  war  policy.  Yesterday's  an- 
nouncement that  Iran  has  accepted  UN 
Resolution  598  is  hopefully  a  long- 
awaited  and  important  first  step  on  the 
road  to  bringing  an  end  to  the  tragic 
Iran-Iraq  war. 

Afghanistan,  if  the  Soviets  with- 
draw on  schedule,  is  headed  for  a  his- 
toric outcome:  aggression  has  been 
ended;  the  Kabul  regime's  days  are 
numbered;  the  resistance  is  stronger 
than  ever  and  gaining  control  over  more 
and  more  territory;  our  ally,  Pakistan, 
has  withstood  Soviet  pressures. 

The  Need  for 

Unity  and  Leadership 

All  Americans  can  be  proud  that  a 
stronger  and  reengaged  America  has 
made  the  world  more  secure.  We  can  be 
proud  that  our  ideals  of  political  and 
economic  freedom  are  being  redis- 
covered by  others  and  are  turning  out 
to  be,  once  again,  powerful  forces  in 
the  world. 

Many  of  these  successes  flow  from 
the  new  consensus  on  the  basic  princi- 
ples I  began  with.  But  recent  history 
also  teaches  that  when  we  are  divided 
over  tactics — as  in  Central  America — 
our  policy  suffers  grievously,  and  our 
national  interest  does,  too.  When  we 
are  united — as  we  have  been  in  support 
of  the  Afghan  freedom  fighters,  or  of  a 
solid  NATO,  or  a  new  basis  for  U.S.- 
Soviet relations,  or  of  a  vital  commit- 
ment in  the  gulf — we  can  achieve  a 
great  deal. 


Another  lesson,  I  would  argue,  is 
the  need  for  presidential  leadership. 
Our  postwar  history  is  a  history  of  cou- 
rageous Presidents — of  both  parties — 
making  many  courageous  decisions.  In 
the  aftermath  of  Iran-coiitm,  Congress 
may  be  tempted  to  try  to  limit  presi- 
dential power.  Divided,  shared,  and 
countervailing  powers  are  the  hallmarks 
of  our  system — by  design  of  the  Found- 
ing Fathers.  Weakening  the  presidency 
also  weakens  the  country.  This  Presi- 
dent— any  president — must  defend  his 
constitutional  authority  against  efforts, 
however  well  intentioned,  which  unbal- 
ance the  always  delicate  relationship 
between  the  executive  and  legislative 
branches. 

The  executive  branch,  of  course, 
has  an  obligation  to  keep  its  own  house 
in  order.  There  must  be  adherence  to 
law  and  to  the  Constitution  and  a  will- 
ingness to  consult  and  deal  openly  and 
respectfully  with  the  Congress,  taking 
legislative  leaders  into  its  confidence 
even  on  the  most  sensitive  matters. 
There  should  also  be  smooth  procedures 
for  coUegial  deliberation  and  orderly 
policymaking  within  the  executive 
branch.  I  believe  this  Administration, 
after  the  aberration  of  Iran-contra,  has 
reestablished  and  enjoys  such  a  co- 
herent and  cooperative  process  inter- 
nally. It  has  served  the  President  and 
the  country  well.  It  has  helped  our  re- 
lations with  the  Congress  and  added  to 
our  credibility  with  the  American  peo- 
ple and  other  nations. 

And  so,  as  we  go  into  the  fourth 
quarter  of  our  political  season,  we 
should  remember  that  next  January  20 
we  must  come  together  in  support  of 
our  new  President.  We  must  remember 
that  what  unites  us  is  more  important 
than  what  divides  us. 

And,  as  for  myself,  I  expect  to  go 
back  to  a  nice  quiet  foxhole  where  I  can 
serve  my  country  in  a  more  comfortable 
and,  perhaps,  less-exposed  position.  ■ 


ipartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1988 


53 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


U.S.  Human  Rights  Policy: 
An  Overview 


by  Paula  Dobriansky 

Address  before  the  American 
Council  of  Young  Political  Leaders  on 
June  3,  1988.  Ms.  Dohriauskji  is  Dep- 
uty Assistant  Secretary  for  Human 
Rights  and  Huiuaiiitariuii  Affairs. 

The  advancement  of  human  rights  and 
the  promotion  of  democracy  have  been 
a  key  tenet  of  the  Reagan  Administra- 
tion's foreign  policy.  We  define  human 
rights  as  the  respect  for  the  integrity  of 
the  individual  and  the  observance  of  po- 
litical/civil rights.  The  President  has 
stated  "that  human  rights  are  the  prop- 
erty of  every  man,  woman,  and  child  on 
this  planet  and  that  a  violation  of  hu- 
man rights  anywhere  is  the  business  of 
free  people  everywhere."  Our  policy 
is  a  measured  and  visible  approach  to 
the  preservation  of  human  rights  and 
fundamental  freedoms  which  seeks  to 
alleviate  the  repression,  pain,  and 
suffering  of  miUions  of  people  from 
fear  and  violence. 

Indeed,  one  of  the  primary  objec- 
tives of  U.S.  human  rights  policy  is 
highly  moral  in  nature — that  is,  to  im- 
prove the  quality  of  life  of  people  in 
other  countries.  This  policy  reflects  an 
underlying  American  optimism  about 
the  human  condition  and  an  innate 
sense  of  idealism  in  dealing  with  com- 
plex international  problems. 

Our  pursuit  of  these  human  rights 
causes  is  also  predicated  on  a  somber 
appraisal  of  U.S.  national  interests.  In 
our  view  a  government  that  seeks  to 
deny  its  people  fundamental  civil  and 
political  rights  is  usually  prone  to 
aggression  and  habitually  exhibits 
ruthless  and  unpredictable  behavior 
internationally. 

While,  in  the  long  term,  the  United 
States  is  desirous  of  fostering  a  better 
world  order,  our  present  human  rights 
policy  stems  from  a  pragmatic  and  real- 
istic assessment  of  the  existing  interna- 
tional system.  As  noted  by  Secretary 
Shultz,  "It  is  a  tough-minded  policy, 
which  faces  the  world  as  it  is,  not  as 
Americans  might  wish  or  imagine  it  to 
be.  At  the  same  time,  it  is  an  idealistic 
policy,  which  expresses  the  continuing 
commitment  of  the  United  States  to  the 
cause  of  liberty  and  the  alleviation  of 
suffering." 


Human  Rights  and  the 
American  Tradition 

While  human  rights  have  been  an  inte- 
gral component  of  the  Reagan  Admin- 
istration's foreign  policy,  American 
concern  about  human  rights  develop- 
ments in  other  countries  is  not  a  new 
phenomenon.  Indeed,  American  history 
and  political  ti-adition  clearly  evidence 
a  preoccupation  with  protecting  the 
rights  of  individuals  against  the  abuses 
of  state  power. 

Upon  reflection,  this  is  not  surpris- 
ing. The  United  States  was  born  of  a 
crucible  of  revolutionary  struggle.  Hav- 
ing witnessed  firsthand  the  ravages  of 
tyranny,  the  American  Founding  Fa- 
thers were  determined  to  create  a  soci- 
ety in  which  violations  of  individual 
rights  by  the  state  would  not  occur. 
Having  studied  such  philosophers  as 
Locke,  Montesquieu,  and  Rousseau,  the 
Founding  Fathers  also  felt  that  relying 
solely  on  the  goodness  of  man's  nature 
or  enlightened  policies  espoused  by  in- 
dividual rulers  was  foolhardy.  Accord- 
ingly, in  their  view,  the  only  way  to 
ensure  that  tyranny  would  not  arise 
again  was  to  create  a  full-fledged  de- 
mocracy with  a  system  of  "checks  and 
balances"  and  with  safeguards  to  pro- 
tect the  civil  and  political  rights  of 
citizens. 

Additionally,  one  important  aspect 
of  the  American  experience  was  an 
abiding  conviction  felt  by  our  Founding 
Fathers  and  their  successors  that  the 
lofty  ideals  of  freedom,  democracy,  and 
human  rights  were  not  just  for  Ameri- 
cans— that  in  this  area  Americans  had 
something  unique  to  offer  to  the  world. 
This  belief  in  the  universal  nature  of 
the  American  experience  arose  not  out 
of  arrogance  or  from  a  desire  to  impose 
our  views  on  the  rest  of  the  world. 
Rather,  it  reflected  a  conviction,  felt  by 
many  early  Americans,  that  as  a  young 
society,  far  removed  from  acute  power 
struggles  then  raging  in  Europe,  Amer- 
ica was  in  a  unique  position  to  offer 
moral  and  spiritual  leadership. 

The  belief  in  the  universal  nature 
of  the  American  experience  is  reflected 
in  key  documents  associated  with  early 
American  history.  For  example,  the 
Declaration  of  Independence,  known  by 
heart  by  all  Americans  and  numerous 
people  throughout  the  world,  adopted 
broad  language  which  states: 


We  hold  these  truths  to  be  self- 
evident,  that  all  men  are  created  equal, 
that  they  are  endowed  by  their  Creator 
with  certain  unalienable  Rights,  that 
among  these  are  Life,  Liberty  and  the  pu 
suit  of  Happiness. — That  to  secure  these 
rights,  Governments  are  instituted  amonf 
Men,  deriving  their  just  powers  fmni  the 
consent  of  the  governed, — That  whenever 
any  Form  of  Government  becomes  destru' 
tive  of  these  ends,  it  is  the  Right  of  the 
People  to  alter  or  to  abolish  it,  and  to  in- 
stitute new  Government,  laying  its  found: 
tion  on  such  principles  and  organizing  its 
power  in  such  form,  as  to  them  shall  seer 
most  likely  to  affect  their  Safety  and 
Happiness. 

The  concept  of  the  protection  of 
civil  and  political  rights  of  individuals 
also  permeates  numerous  State  consti 
tutions  and  the  Bill  of  Rights  of  the 
U.S.  Constitution.  These  documents  > 
fer  perhaps  one  of  the  most  vigorous 
and  spirited  defenses  of  the  concepts 
of  human  dignity,  democracy,  and 
freedom. 


Our  Multilateral  Agenda 

In  addition  to  serving  as  the  reposito 
of  rich  political  and  historical  human 
rights  tradition,  the  United  States  hi 
also  made  an  invaluable  contribution 
the  development  of  international  hun 
rights  law.  The  United  States  played 
key  role  in  the  establishment  of  the 
UN  system  and  the  drafting  of  the  I 
Charter.  In  fact,  one  of  the  earliest  i 
most  important  international  docu- 
ments dealing  with  human  rights  ma 
ters — the  Universal  Declaration  of 
Human  Rights,  adopted  by  the  Gem 
Assembly  on  December  10,  1948 — wt 
prepared  under  the  guidance  of  Elea 
Roosevelt,  then  the  U.S.  Represent- 
ative in  the  UN  Human  Rights  Com 
mission.  We  adhere  to  the  principles 
the  UN  Charter  and  the  Universal  I 
laration  of  Human  Rights  and  have  c 
tinned  to  play  a  constructive  role  in 
development  of  new  international  hu 
man  rights  documents  and  norms. 

Through  the  UN  Human  Rights 
Commission  (UNHRC),  we  have  sou 
to  bring  to  the  attention  of  the  inter 
national  community  violations  of  hun 
rights  and  fundamental  freedoms.  0 
the  years,  our  delegations  have  intn 
duced  resolutions  calling  upon  comn- 
sion  members  to  acknowledge  and  di 
with  human  rights  violators  and  hav 
made  strong  representations  on  the 
need  to  defend  and  uphold  human 
rights  everywhere.  Our  concern  has 
been  expressed  about  Nicaragua,  Sc 
Africa,  Vietnam,  Iran,  Chile,  the  So 
Union,  and  Ethiopia,  among  many 
others. 


54 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  ipi 

J. 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


In  addition  to  focusing  on  human 
hts  violations  within  specific  coun- 
s,  we  have  urged  consideration  of 
smatic  issues.  For  example,  in  1983, 
!  United  States,  along  with  the 
therlands  and  Ireland,  proposed  that 
!  UNHRC  focus  on  a  new  agenda 
m  entitled  "Implementation  of  the 
claration  of  Elimination  of  All  Forms 
Intolerance  and  of  Discrimination, 
sed  on  Religion  or  Belief."  Later,  in 
!6,  we  were  the  lead  sponsor  of  a 
iolution  creating  a  Special  Rappor- 
ir  on  Religious  Intolerance  with  the 
jcific  mandate  of  investigating  inci- 
its  of  religious  intolei'ance  globally, 
jorting  on  them  to  the  commission, 
d  suggesting  remedial  measures. 
We  have  also  striven  to  encourage 
observance  of  a  standard  of  fairness 
d  balance  in  the  commissions  treat- 
ent  of  human  rights — a  difficult  task 
best.  While  some  countries  have 
len  charged  with  violations  of  human 
|;hts  by  the  commission,  other  coun- 
t  es,  which  are  more  serious  offenders, 
Ive  not  even  been  considered.  For  ex- 
:  ijili'.  in  1987,  our  delegation  tabled  a 
1  solution  addressing  the  egregious  hu- 
!  Ill  i-ights  abuses  in  Cuba — a  resolu- 
■  11  \\  hich  was  ultimately  turned  down 
(iiic  vote.  Finally,  in  this  past  year's 
\'Hi;C,  though  no  resolution  on  Cuba 
IS  acted  on,  it  was  unanimously  deter- 
ned  that  a  six-member  UN  investiga- 
'e  team  would  visit  Cuba  to  assess 
man  rights  conditions. 

Another  multilateral  foi'um  in 
lich  we  have  advanced  the  cause  of 
iman  rights  has  been  the  CSCE  [Con- 
rence  on  Security  and  Cooperation  in 
arope].  The  United  States  was  instru- 
sntal  in  ensuring  the  inclusion  of  bas- 
■t  III  in  the  1975  Helsinki  accords, 
lis  section  of  the  accords  spelled  out 
range  of  human  rights  obligations 
sumed  by  the  signatories. 

Having  developed  these  new  inter- 
itional  legal  obligations,  the  United 
,ates  has  played  a  key  role  in  monitor- 
g  compliance  and  holding  violators 
•countable  for  their  actions.  Thus, 
liring  the  1977  Belgrade  CSCE  fol- 
wup  meeting  and  the  1980  Madrid 
leeting,  the  U.S.  delegation  not  only 
litiated  extensive  discussions  on  the 
attern  of  Soviet  noncompliance  with 
asket  III  provisions  but  also  proposed 
dditional  measures  and  steps  to  im- 
rove  the  human  rights  situation. 

>ur  Bilateral  Agenda 

legotiations  in  multilateral  and  inter- 
ational  forums  have  not  been  the  only 
leans  by  which  the  United  States  has 


striven  to  further  human  rights.  Hu- 
man rights  considerations  have  also 
played  a  major  role  in  shaping  U.S.  bi- 
lateral relations  with  numerous  coun- 
tries. Beginning  in  the  mid-1970s. 
Congress  amended  a  number  of  foreign 
policy-related  statutes — the  Foreign 
Assistance  Act,  the  Mutual  Assistance 
Act,  the  Ti-ade  Reform  Act  of  1974— to 
specify  that  human  rights  considera- 
tions play  an  integral  role  in  determin- 
ing how  U.S.  military  and  economic 
assistance  is  to  be  dispensed. 

Through  bilateral  channels  we  have 
raised  specific  human  rights  cases  and 
concerns.  This  type  of  "quiet  diplo- 
macy" has  often  been  key  to  the  resolu- 
tion of  various  problems.  However, 
when  such  diplomatic  overtures  failed, 
we  have  resorted  to  such  actions  as  the 
issuance  of  strong  public  statements  of 
condemnation  and  the  denial  of  eco- 
nomic or  military  assistance  and  licenses 
for  the  export  of  crime  control  equip- 
ment. These  punitive  approaches  have 
the  two-tiered  effect  of  visibly  singling 
out  countries  engaged  in  a  pattern  of 
human  rights  abuses  and  providing  in- 
ducements for  them  to  improve  their 
record. 


Myths  and  Realities 

Myth  #1:  "Economic  and  social 
rights"  constitute  human  rights. 

While  the  pursuit  of  human  rights  is  a 
generally  popular  undertaking,  consid- 
erable confusion  still  permeates  discus- 
sions of  this  subject.  Let's  consider  the 
very  definition  of  human  rights.  There 
have  been  efforts  to  obfuscate  tradi- 
tional civil  and  political  rights  with 
"economic  and  social  rights."  We  be- 
lieve that  traditional  political  rights 
provide  a  vital  foundation  for  any  dem- 
ocratic society.  As  noted  in  our  human 
rights  bureau's  annual  Country  Reports 
on  Human  Rights  Practices: 

. .  .the  right  of  self-government  is  a 
basic  political  right,  that  government  is  le- 
gitimate only  when  grounded  on  the  con- 
sent of  the  governed,  and  that  government 
thus  grounded  should  not  be  used  to  deny 
life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness. 
Individuals  in  a  society  have  the  inaliena- 
ble right  to  be  free  from  governmental  vio- 
lations of  the  integrity  of  the  person:  to 
enjoy  civil  liberties  such  as  freedom  of  ex- 
pression, assembly,  religion,  and  move- 
ment, without  discrimination  based  on 
race,  ancestry,  or  sex;  and  to  change  their 
government  by  peaceful  means. 

We  believe  that  under  present  con- 
ditions "economic  and  social  rights"  are 
really  more  in  the  nature  of  aspirations 
and  goals  than  "rights."  This  semantic 


distinction  is  highly  important.  It  does 
not  make  sense  to  claim  that  a  particu- 
lar level  of  economic  and  social  entitle- 
ments are  rights  if  most  governments 
are  not  able  to  provide  them.  In  con- 
trast, any  government  can  guarantee 
political  and  civil  rights  to  its  citizens. 
Obfuscating  a  goal  with  fundamental 
rights  promotes  not  only  conceptual 
confusion  but  often  is  used  to  justify 
actual  human  rights  violations.  Not  sur- 
prisingly, we  have  usually  found  that 
political  rights  are  often  denigrated  by 
repressive  governments  claiming  that, 
in  order  to  promote  "economic  and  so- 
cial rights,"  they  must  deny  their  cit- 
izens political  and  civil  rights. 

In  fact,  there  exists  a  symbiotic  re- 
lationship between  human  rights  and 
economic  development.  Experience 
demonstrates  that  it  is  individual  free- 
dom that  fosters  economic  and  social 
development;  it  is  repression  that  sti- 
fles it.  Those  who  try  to  justify  subor- 
dinating political  and  civil  rights  on  the 
grounds  that  they  are  concentrating  on 
economic  aspirations  invariably  deliver 
on  neither. 

Myth  #2:  Economic  deprivation 
is  a  valid  rationale  for  denial  of  civil/ 
political  rights.  This  does  not  mean 
that  we  seek  to  disparage  the  sincere 
desire  of  those  well-meaning  people 
who  genuinely  promote  improvecl  eco- 
nomic and  social  standards.  It  is  true 
that  poverty  and  deprivation  plague 
many  parts  of  the  world.  And,  even  in 
developed  Western  countries,  poverty 
still  has  not  been  eradicated.  'This  is  a 
very  real  problem  which  merits  a  sus- 
tained effort  to  resolve  it.  We  believe 
that  democracy  and  free  enterprise  of- 
fer the  best  solution  to  improving  the 
economic  well-being  of  people. 

Unfortunately,  this  point  seems  to 
be  often  overlooked  or  ignored  by  those 
who  seek  to  justify  their  own  egregious 
violations  of  political  and  civil  rights  by 
asserting  that,  after  all,  even  in  the 
United  States,  poverty  has  not  been 
fully  conquered,  and  a  number  of  Ameri- 
cans have  been  unable  to  secure  shelter 
or  stable  income.  This,  of  course,  is  a 
flawed  argument.  The  fact  that  eco- 
nomic deprivation  has  not  yet  been 
fully  eradicated  provides  absolutely  no 
justification  for  denying  people  their 
political  rights  or  torturing  one's  politi- 
cal opponents.  Sadly,  the  whole  subject 
has  become  so  heavily  laden  with  hy- 
pocrisy that  dictators  who  often  torture 
and  maim  their  subjects  see  fit  to  lec- 
ture the  United  States  on  human 
rights. 


epartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1988 


55 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


Myth  #3:  The  linkage  and 
application  of  human  rights  and 
U.S.  foreign  policy  is  inconsistent. 

Another  often  misunderstood  area  is 
the  proper  relationship  between  human 
rights  and  other  factors  shaping  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  The  critics  of  our  human 
rights  policy  often  highlight  a  U.S.  de- 
cision to  provide  military  or  economic 
aid  to  a  country  with  a  less  than  per- 
fect human  rights  record.  In  their  view 
this  indicates  that  the  United  States  is 
not  serious  about  seeking  to  promote 
human  rights.  This,  of  course,  is  a 
highly  simplistic  notion. 

Human  rights  is  an  important  but 
not  the  only  consideration  in  determin- 
ing the  course  of  U.S.  relations  with 
foreign  countries.  Other  factors  have  to 
be  taken  into  account.  This  view  is  not 
peculiar  to  this  Administration.  Indeed, 
an  identical  position  was  taken  by  the 
Carter  Administration.  Lincoln  Bloom- 
field,  a  Carter  Administration  NSC 
[National  Security  Council]  staff  mem- 
ber responsible  for  human  rights, 
stated: 

When  it  came  to  specifics,  whether  the 
aid  was  military  or  nonmilitary.  comple.x 
interests  had  to  be  balanced  in  reaching 
decisions  on  individual  eases.  Inescapably, 
there  were  numerous  cases  in  which  the 
Administration  was  e.xposed  to  the  charge 
of  inconsistency.  Human  rights  perform- 
ance became  a  dominant  factor  in  conven- 
tional arms  transfers  to  Latin  America;  but 
such  considerations  were  clearly  subordi- 
nate in  weighing  military  aid  to  Egypt, 
Israel,  North  Yemen,  and  Saudi  Arabia. 

An  identical  view  has  also  been 
advanced  by  former  Secretary  of  State 
Cyrus  Vance,  who,  in  justifying  his  de- 
cision not  to  cut  aid  to  such  U.S.  allies 
as  South  Korea,  Iran,  and  Zaire,  which 
had  been  found  to  commit  human  rights 
violations,  indicated  that  "in  each  case, 
we  must  balance  a  political  concern  for 
human  rights  against  economic  and  se- 
curity goals." 

Moreover,  even  as  far  as  human 
rights  themselves  are  concerned,  we 
have  been  acting  with  a  sense  of  real- 
ism. This  means  that,  while  we  have 
been  striving  to  improve  human  rights 
situations  in  various  countries,  we  usu- 
ally do  not  expect  immediate  results 
overnight.  In  our  view,  a  pattern  of  im- 
provement, however  modest,  deserves 
encouragement.  We  have  also  been  at- 
tentive to  the  circumstances  facing  each 
specific  country.  Clearly,  a  country 
plunged  in  the  turmoil  of  civil  war,  or 
which  has  been  battling  rightwing  or 
leftwing  terrorists  seeking  to  over- 
throw a  fledgling  demociacy,  cannot  be 
expected  to  improve  human  rights  as 


promptly  as  a  country  enjoying  political 
and  economic  tranquility. 

Our  sense  of  realism  has  also  re- 
sulted in  a  human  rights  stance  which 
seeks  to  weigh  carefully  the  conse- 
quences of  our  policies — for  example, 
whether  the  imposition  of  sanctions  in  a 
particular  situation  would  lead  to  an 
improvement  in  human  rights.  Failure 
to  consider  both  the  limits  of  our  influ- 
ence and  the  consequences  of  our  action 
can  result  in  a  human  rights  policy  rich 
in  moral  posturing  and  poor  in  positive, 
concrete  results.  Yet,  when  we  witness 
a  country  commiting  an  egregious  pat- 
tern of  human  rights  violations,  we 
must  respond  by  condemning  the  per- 
petrator, even  if  there  is  no  immediate 
prospect  for  success  in  sight.  Express- 
ing moral  outrage  contributes  to  public 
education  and  heightens  international 
cognizance  of  human  rights  problems. 

Myth  #4:  Quiet  diplomacy  is 
essentially  useless  in  improving  hu- 
man rights  conditions.  In  fostering 
human  rights  improvements,  it  has 
been  claimed  by  many  that  public  rep- 
resentations and  overt  pressure  is  the 
only  sound  approach  to  attaining  human 
rights  objectives.  Yet,  our  experience 
has  shown  that  both  approaches  have  to 
be  utilized,  with  specific  circumstances 
determining  the  extent  to  which  one  or 
the  other  is  used. 

Promotion  of  Human  Rights 

It  is  also  useful  to  broaden  our  con- 
ception of  how  human  rights  are  to  be 
promoted.  On  one  level  we  have  been 
seeking  to  eradicate  specific  human 
rights  problems.  Fundamentally,  how- 
ever, we  believe  that  the  best  way  to 
promote  human  rights  in  the  long  term 
is  to  spread  and  bolster  democracy 
throughout  the  world.  As  noted  in  our 
Coinitri/  Reports  on  Human  Rights 
Practices: 

It  is  in  our  national  interest  to  pro- 
mote democratic  processes  in  order  to  help 
build  a  world  environment  more  favorable 
to  respect  for  human  rights  and  hence, 
more  conducive  to  stability  and  peace.  We 
have  developed,  therefore,  a  dual  policy, 
reactive  in  the  sense  that  we  continue  to 
oppose  specific  human  rights  violations 
wherever  they  occur,  but  at  the  same  time 
active  in  working  over  the  long  term  to 
strengthen  democracy. 

With  regard  to  human  rights  pol- 
icy, this  Administration  can  boast  of  a 
significant  and  broad  record  of  accom- 
plishments. We  have  made  much  use  of 
the  National  Endowment  for  Democracy 
in  fostering  democratic  institutions  in 


other  countries.  Through  Section  116(e 
of  the  Foreign  Assistance  Act,  we  hav 
allocated  funds  for  programs  which  w', 
specifically  enhance  civil  and  political 
rights  abroad.  We  have  also  contributtj 
to  the  democratic  transformations  in  ; 
number  of  countries,  including  the  Phi  I 
ippines.  El  Salvador,  and  South  Korea 
These  achievements  have  made  an  em) 
mous  contribution  to  the  cause  of  hu- 
man rights. 

Human  Rights  Policy  Criteria  1 

What  about  the  practical  aspects  of 
human  rights?  Our  human  rights  poli( 
is  a  sustained  process,  shaped  by  a  i 
number  of  actors.  On  one  level,  of  i 
course,  it  is  the  American  people  repl 
sented  by  the  President  and  Congres  I 
who  ultimately  determine  the  content  I 
of  our  human  rights  policy.  More  spe'  1 
ically,  however,  it  is  the  human  rights! 
bureau  of  the  Department  of  State  I 
which  has  the  primary  responsibility  |i 
for  the  development  and  implementa-  f 
tion  of  U.S.  human  rights  policy.  Th(!| 
criteria,  or  rather,  broad  standards  v  [! 
use  in  assessing  any  country's  humar  i 
rights  performance  are  as  follows:      ^^ 

Integrity  of  the  individual — 

involving  political  killings,  disappear 
ances,  torture,  arbitrary  arrest/ 
detention; 

Civil  rights — meaning  freedom 
speech/press,  peaceful  assembly/ass( 
elation,  religion,  movement/travel,  r 
to  a  fair  public  trial  and  to  privacy, 
family,  home,  and  free  corresponden 
and 

Political  rights — meaning  the 
ability  to  change  one's  government 

Additionally,  in  evaluating  huma 
rights  conditions,  we  take  into  accoi 
such  factors  as  a  government's  attiti 
to  international  and  nongovernment; 
investigation  of  alleged  violations;  c 
dence  of  discrimination  based  on  rac 
sex,  religion,  language,  and  social  st 
tus;  and  conditions  of  labor  (the  rigl 
to  organize  and  bargain  collectively, 
acceptable  work  conditions — minimu 
wages,  occupational  safety  and  healt 
etc.).  The  bureau  draws  upon  inforn' 
tion  provided  to  it  by  human  rights 
ficers  posted  in  our  embassies  abroa 
We  analyze  this  information  and  pro 
duce  a  number  of  documents  and  re- 
ports for  the  benefit  of  the  executiv 
branch,  the  American  public,  and  C' 
gress.  The  single  most  important  re 
port  issued  by  the  bureau  of  human 
rights  is  its  annual  Country  Reports 
Human  Rights  Practices,  which  doc 
ments  human  rights  in  approximate! 
167  countries. 


56 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  iBi 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


We  also  draw  upon  reports  of  UN 
luiury/thematic  rapporteurs  (e.g.,  rap- 
mieurs  on  torture,  religious  intol- 
i-aiice,  Iran,  etc.),  domestic  and 
itci'iiational  nongovernmental  human 
luiits  groups,  as  well  as  the  Universal 
ifclaration  of  Human  Rights,  for  stand- 
I'ds,  information,  and  analysis  of  coun- 
■y  implementation/performance. 

We  have  come  a  long  way  in  our 
unian  rights  efforts.  It  can  be  said 


that  the  pursuit  of  human  rights  has 
become  an  institutionalized  and  funda- 
mental aspect  of  our  foreign  policy.  It  is 
also  an  issue  that  has  attracted  tremen- 
dous public  support  and  a  high  degree 
of  bipartisanship.  As  a  result,  our 
achievements  in  this  area  have  been 
truly  impressive.  We  are  committed  to 
continue  working  for  the  noble  goal 
of  the  promotion  of  human  rights 
worldwide.  ■ 


Helsinki  Human  Rights  Day,  1988 


KOCLAMATION  5843, 

rc;.  1, 19881 

hiiioen  years  ago,  33  European  states, 
it'  I'nited  States,  and  Canada  signed  the 
elsinki  Final  Act  of  the  Conference  on 
.^ciirity  and  Cooperation  in  Europe.  In  so 
)ing,  we  and  the  other  signatories  under- 
lok  a  sacred  commitment  to  the  principles 

■  freedom,  self-determination,  and  human 
L'luty.  The  Helsinki  Final  Act  acknowl- 
lecil  the  fundamental  interrelationship  of 
iiiian  rights,  economic  relations,  and  se- 
irity  considerations  in  the  overall  conduct 

■  affairs  within  and  among  states.  The  Fi- 
ll Alt  recognized  that  there  can  be  no 

ui'  international  security  without  respect 
r  basic  political  and  civil  rights;  that  eco- 
)inic  ties  can  contribute  to  security,  but 
ily  if  based  upon  open  relations  among 
Miples;  and  that  security  and  confidence 
III  also  be  improved  through  the  free  ex- 
uinu:e  of  information. 

That  historic  meeting  in  Helsinki  has 
lauiied  a  dynamic  process  that  we  in  the 
nited  States  regard  as  one  of  the  most 
11)1(11  tant  developments  in  East-West  rela- 
iiMs  in  the  post-World  War  II  period.  The 
ork  begun  at  Helsinki  to  eliminate  the 
arriers  that  divide  East  and  West  has 
een  carried  on  in  three  follow-up  meetings 
uring  the  intervening  years.  At  present 
'e  are  working  with  the  delegations  from 
11  the  signatory  states  in  Vienna  to  ad- 
ance  our  cherished  objectives  of  freedom, 
penness,  and  security. 

While  progress  has  occurred  in  reduc- 
ig  the  tensions  between  East  and  West, 
he  Soviet  Union  and  other  states  of  the 
;ast  have  not  fully  Uved  up  to  the  commit- 
lents  undertaken  at  Helsinki.  Respect  for 
uman  rights  in  these  countries  continues 
0  fall  far  short  of  the  standards  set  forth 
n  the  Final  Act,  as  well  as  in  the  docu- 
nent  issued  at  the  conclusion  of  the 
Madrid  review  conference  in  1983.  Free- 
lom  of  movement,  conscience,  and  religion 
,re  still  shackled  by  unreasonable  and  ar- 
)itrary  government  controls.  Individuals 
luch  as  Ukrainian  Helsinki  monitors  Ivan 
<andyba  and  Ivan  Sokulsky  and  Lithua- 
lian  CathoUc  priest  Sigitas  Tamkevicius, 
vhose  only  "crime"  was  to  monitor  the  So- 
/iet  Government's  compliance  with  the 


Helsinki  Final  Act  and  speak  out  in  behalf 
of  political  and  religious  freedom,  remain 
in  Soviet  labor  camps.  The  free  flow  of 
ideas  and  information  from  abroad  and 
within  Eastern  Europe  is  still  impeded. 

A  few  short  weeks  ago  I  stood  in 
Finlandia  Hall — the  historic  building  in 
which  the  Helsinki  Final  Act  was  signed.  I 
reiterated  the  commitment  of  the  American 
people  to  continue  to  work  to  bring  down 
the  barriers  that  have  so  cruelly  divided 
the  European  continent  for  4  decades. 
However,  it  bears  reminding  that  those 
barriers  were  erected  by  the  East,  and  so 
much  of  the  demolition  work  will  neces- 
sarily fall  to  those  states.  We  are  encour- 
aged by  recent  hopeful  pronouncements 
coming  from  the  Soviet  Union  and  its  al- 
lies; we  await  further  concrete  progress  in 
the  treatment  of  all  individuals  in  the  So- 
viet Union  and  Eastern  Europe  and  posi- 
tive steps  in  the  Vienna  meeting  to  give 
those  pronouncements  substance. 

It  is  appropriate  that  we  mark  this 
13th  anniversary  of  the  signing  of  the  Final 
Act  by  setting  aside  a  special  day  to  reflect 
upon  and  to  renew  our  dedication  to  the 
values  of  human  dignity  and  freedom  em- 
bodied in  that  farsighted  document.  On 
this  occasion,  we  call  upon  all  signatories 
of  the  Final  Act  to  honor  in  full  its  solemn 
principles.  Let  us  pledge  to  spare  no  effort 
in  striving  toward  this  goal. 

The  Congress,  by  Senate  Joint  Resolu- 
tion 338.  has  designated  August  1,  1988,  as 
"Helsinki  Human  Rights  Day"  and  has  au- 
thorized and  requested  the  President  to  is- 
sue a  proclamation  in  its  observance. 

Now,  Therefore,  I,  Ronald 
Reagan,  President  of  the  United  States  of 
America,  do  hereby  proclaim  August  1, 
1988,  as  Helsinki  Human  Rights  Day. 

In  Witness  Whereof,  I  have  here- 
unto set  my  hand  this  first  day  of  August, 
in  the  year  of  our  Lord  nineteen  hundred 
and  eighty-eight,  and  of  the  Independence 
of  the  United  States  of  America  the  two 
hundred  and  thirteenth. 

Ronald  Reagan 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Aug.  8,  1988. 


Captive  Nations 
Week,  1988 


PROCLAMATION  5840, 
JULY  13,  19881 

During  Captive  Nations  Week,  we  honor 
the  courage,  faith,  and  aspirations  of  the 
millions  of  people  the  world  over  who  suf- 
fer under  Soviet  domination.  They  desire, 
seek,  and  deserve,  as  the  common  heritage 
of  humanity,  the  liberty,  justice,  self-deter- 
mination, and  independence  we  Americans 
and  all  free  peoples  cherish.  The  citizens  of 
the  captive  nations  daily  hear  the  mighty 
call  of  freedom  and  answer  it  boldly,  send- 
ing an  echo  around  the  globe  to  remind 
totalitarians  and  all  mankind  that  their 
voices  cannot  be  quelled — because  they  are 
the  voices  of  the  human  spirit. 

Across  the  continents  and  seas,  the 
cry  for  freedom  rings  out  and  the  struggle 
for  its  blessings  continues,  in  the  republics 
of  the  Soviet  Union,  in  the  Baltic  States 
and  throughout  Eastern  Europe,  in  Cuba 
and  Nicaragua,  in  Ethiopia  and  Angola, 
and  in  Vietnam,  Laos,  and  Cambodia.  It 
also  continues  in  Afghanistan,  depite  ini- 
tial Soviet  withdrawal,  because  the  Na- 
jibuUah  regime  imposes  its  will  upon  the 
Afghan  people.  We  in  America,  who  have 
held  high  the  torch  of  liberty  for  two  cen- 
turies and  more,  pause  during  Captive  Na- 
tions Week  to  express  our  solidarity  with 
those  who  strive  at  great  personal  risk  and 
sacrifice  to  win  justice  for  their  nations. 
We  commemorate  as  well  the  many  free- 
dom fighters  and  individuals  such  as  Polish 
Father  Jerzy  Popieluszko  and  Ukrainian 
poet  Vasyl  Stus  who  have  given  their  lives 
in  the  imperishable  cause  of  liberty.  We 
cannot  and  will  not  shirk  our  duty  and  re- 
sponsibility to  insist  on  the  speediest  end 
to  subjugation,  persecution,  and  discrimi- 
nation in  the  captive  nations.  We  repeat 
our  call  for  all  governments  to  respect  and 
honor  the  letter  and  the  spirit  of  the 
United  Nations  Charter  and  the  Helsinki 
Accords. 

Last  year's  Captive  Nations  Week 
Proclamation  mentioned  four  people  in  the 
Soviet  Union  imprisoned  for  their  struggle 
for  national  rights.  Now,  1  year  later,  two 
of  them,  both  Helsinki  human  rights  moni- 
tors, remain  in  internal  exile — Viktoras 
Petkus,  a  Lithuanian,  and  Lev 
Lukyanenko,  a  Ukrainian.  Another, 
Helsinki  monitor  Mart  Niklus,  an  Esto- 
nian, is  still  in  a  labor  camp.  The  last, 
Gunars  Astra,  Latvia's  highly  respected 
national  rights  activist,  was  released  in 
poor  health  earlier  this  year  after  19  years 
in  Soviet  labor  camps.  He  died  several 
months  ago  at  56  years  of  age. 

America  is  keenly  aware  of,  and  will 
continue  to  encourage,  the  great  tide  of 
democratic  ideas  that  now  sweeps  the 
globe.  We  cannot  forget  decades  of  trag- 
edy, the  tens  of  millions  of  lives  lost,  or  the 
enormity  of  the  suffering  inflicted  on  the 


)epartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1988 


57 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW 


innocent.  We  applaud  the  courage  and  faith 
that  have  sustained  countless  people  and 
kept  alive  the  di-eam  of  freedom  against 
unthinkable  odds.  Despite  starvation,  tor- 
ture, and  murder,  the  indomitable  human 
spirit  will  outlast  all  oppression.  We  con- 
tinue to  stand  ready  to  cooperate  in  meet- 
ing the  just  aspirations  of  the  oppressed 
and  needy  of  the  world.  We  will  remain 
forever  steadfast  in  our  commitment  to 
speak  out  for  those  who  cannot,  to  seek 
justice  for  those  to  whom  it  is  denied,  and 
to  assist  freedom-seeking  peoples 
everywhere. 

The  Congress,  by  joint  resolution  ap- 
proved July  17,  1959  (73  Stat.  212),  has  au- 
thorized and  requested  the  President  to 
issue  a  proclamation  designating  the  third 
week  in  July  of  each  year  as  "Captive  Na- 
tions Week." 


Now,  Therefore,  I,  Ronald 
Reacan,  President  of  the  United  States  of 
America,  do  hereby  proclaim  the  week  be- 
ginning July  17,  1988,  as  Captive  Nations 
Week.  I  call  upon  the  people  of  the  United 
States  to  observe  this  week  with  appropri- 
ate programs,  ceremonies,  and  activities, 
and  I  urge  them  to  reaffirm  their  devotion 
to  the  aspirations  of  all  peoples  for  justice, 
self-determination,  and  liberty. 

In  Witness  Whereof,  I  have  here- 
unto set  my  hand  this  thirteenth  day  of 
July,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord  nineteen  hun- 
dred and  eighty-eight,  and  of  the  Inde- 
pendence of  the  United  States  of  America 
the  two  hundred  and  thirteenth. 

Ronald  Reagan 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  July  18,  1988. 


Compensation  for  Iranian  Airbus 
Tragedy 


by  Abraham  D.  Sofaer 

Statement  prepared  for  the  Defense 
Policy  Panel  of  the  House  Armed  Serv- 
ices Committee  on  August  i,  1988.  Mr. 
Sofaer  is  the  Legal  Adviser  of  the  De- 
partment of  State. ^ 

I  appreciate  this  opportunity  to  appear 
before  this  panel  to  discuss  the  Admin- 
istration's position  on  compensation  to 
the  families  of  those  who  were  killed  by 
the  destruction  of  Iran  Air  #655  on 
July  3,  1988. 

As  you  know,  this  tragic  accident 
occurred  in  the  Persian  Gulf  when  the 
U.S.S.  Vincennes,  exercising  justifiable 
defensive  action,  fired  upon  Iran  Air 
#655.  According  to  information  we  have 
received,  this  action  resulted  in  the 
deaths  of  290  individuals  from  seven 
nations. 

Prompted  by  the  humanitarian  tra- 
ditions of  our  nation,  and  prior  interna- 
tional practice,  the  President  decided 
on  July  11  that  the  United  States  would 
offer  compensation,  on  an  ex  gratia 
basis,  to  the  families  of  the  victims. 
The  White  House  announced  on  that 
date  that: 

The  President  has  reviewed  U.S.  pol- 
icy in  the  Persian  Gulf  where  our  military 
forces  are  protecting  vital  interests  of  the 
free  world.  He  has  expressed  his  complete 
satisfaction  with  the  policy  and  reiterated 
his  belief  that  the  actions  "of  the  U.S.S. 
Vincennes  on  July  3  in  the  case  of  the  Ira- 
nian airliner  were  justifiable  defensive  ac- 
tions. At  the  same  time,  he  remains 
personally  saddened  at  the  tragic  death  of 


58 


the  innocent  victims  of  this  accident  and 
has  already  expressed  his  deep  regret  to 
their  families. 

The  President's  decision  to  make  ex 
gratia,  compensation  has  set  in  motion  a 
process  by  which  the  United  States  will 
determine  how,  to  whom,  and  under 
what  conditions  compensation  is  to  be 
paid.  I  will  briefly  address  the  interna- 
tional legal  aspects  of  the  ex  gratia 
payments  we  intend  to  make,  including 
prior  precedents  for  ex  gratia 
payments,  and  what  the  process  will  be 
for  making  these  payments.  It  is  my 
understanding  that  the  Department  of 
Defense  is  prepared  to  discuss  in  gen- 
eral terms  its  current  authority  to 
make  ex  gratia  payments  and  the  funds 
available  to  do  so. 


Governing  International  Law 

Principles  of  international  law  that 
govern  potential  liability  for  injuries 
and  property  damage  arising  out  of  mil- 
itary operations  are  generally  well- 
established. 

First,  indemnification  is  not  re- 
quired for  injuries  or  damage  incidental 
to  the  lawful  use  of  armed  force. 

Second,  indemnification  is  required 
where  the  exercise  of  armed  force  is 
unlawful. 

Third,  states  may,  nevertheless, 
pay  compensation  ex  gratia  without  ac- 
knowledging, and  irrespective  of,  legal 
liability. 


Iran  Air  Incident 

In  the  case  of  the  Iran  Air  incident,  the 
damage  caused  in  firing  upon  #655  was 
incidental  to  the  lawful  use  of  force. 
The  Government  of  Iran  should  not 
have  allowed  gunboats  to  attack  our 
vessels  and  aircraft.  That  government 
also  should  not  have  allowed  a  pas- 
senger airline  to  fly  over  a  battle 
zone — especially  not  unless  it  was 
equipped  and  prepared  to  respond  to 
our  Navy's  repeated  warnings. 

The  commander  of  the  U.S.S. 
Vincennes  evidently  believed  that  his 
ship  was  under  imminent  threat  of  at- 
tack from  a  hostile  aircraft,  and  he  at- 
tempted repeatedly  to  identify  or 
contact  the  aircraft  before  taking  de- 
fensive action.  Therefore,  the  United 
States  does  not  accept  legal  responsibil 
ity  for  this  incident  and  is  not  paying 
"reparations,"  a  word  which  implies 
wrongdoing  and  is  often  associated  witl 
wartime  activities. 

Instead,  the  President  has  decided 
to  make  an  ex  gratia  payment  as  a  hu- 
manitarian gesture  to  the  families  of 
the  individuals  who  were  on  #655. 
Most  of  the  individuals  who  tragically 
and  innocently  perished  in  this  inciden' 
were  Iranians.  But  people  from  six 
other  countries  also  reportedly  died: 
India,  Italy,  Kuwait,  Pakistan,  the 
United  Arab  Emirates,  and  Yugoslavi; 
We  intend  to  make  no  payments  to  or 
through  the  Government  of  Iran  but, 
instead,  to  the  families  of  the  victims. 
We  may  work  directly,  however,  with 
the  governments  of  the  other  countrie; 
involved,  depending  on  the  need  for  ar 
propriety  of  such  contacts. 

Precedents  for  Payments 

An  ex  gratia  payment  of  this  type  is 
consistent  with  the  past  practice  of  tht 
United  States  and  of  other  nations, 
with  the  exception  of  the  Soviet  Unioi 

Currently  the  United  States  is  dis 
cussing  with  the  Government  of  India 
ex  gratia  payment  for  the  death  of  an 
Indian  fisherman  killed  by  gunfire  fro; 
the  U.S.S.  Carr  in  November  1987. 

In  1973  Israel  shot  down  a  Libyan 
Boeing  727  airliner  that  mistakenly 
flew  over  the  Israeli-occupied  Sinai, 
killing  106  passengers.  We  are  informs 
that  Israel  made  an  ex  gratia  payment 
to  Libya. 

During  the  1967  war,  Israeli  air 
craft  attacked  the  U.S.S.  Liberty,  kill 
ing  a  number  of  U.S.  servicemen  and 
causing  extensive  damage.  Israel  mair 
tained  that  the  attack  was  a  justifiabli 
accident  but,  nonetheless,  paid  the 
United  States  ex  gratia  compensation. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  19S 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW 


1 11  1954  the  People  s  Republic  of 
lima  (P.R.C.)  shot  down  a  U.K.-regis- 
■rt'tl  Cathay  Pacific  plane  in  the 
icinity  of  Hainan  Island,  which  was  en 
lUtc  iVom  Bangkok  to  Hong  Kong.  The 
i;.('.  apologized  and  indicated  that  its 
ildts  had  mistakenly  identified  the 
laiif  as  a  military  aircraft  from  Tai- 
an.  The  P.R.C.  paid  compensation  to 
le  I'nited  Kingdom  to  be  disbursed  to 
le  victims'  families.  Among  the  vic- 
ms  were  six  U.S.  nationals. 

In  1946  an  unarmed  U.S.  transport 
lane  en  route  from  Austria  to  Italy 
as  shot  down  by  Yugoslav  forces. 
ive  L'.S.  nationals  were  killed.  The 
(Acrnment  of  Yugoslavia  expressed  its 
•gict  but  rejected  any  responsibility 
1  pay  compensation.  Yugoslavia  did 
ate,  however,  that  it  wished  "to  ex- 
re>s  its  sympathy  toward  the  innocent 
iiiulies  of  the  perished  airmen"  and  to 
ay  lump  sums  to  each  of  the  five  clos- 
et families.  The  United  States  ac- 
■|iteil  this  payment. 

.\  somewhat  different  case  is  repre- 
iiteil  by  the  Iraqi  attack  on  the 
.S.S.  Stark  in  May  1987.  Iraq 
roniptly  agreed  to  pay  compensation, 
ml  Iraq  now  has  our  wrongful  death 
aims  under  active  consideration.  Al- 
Ktimh  we  do  not  regard  Iraq's  prom- 
ed  payments  as  ex  gratia,  Iraq's 
eeisien  to  pay  makes  unnecessary  a 
eterinination  of  liability,  leaving  only 
le  level  of  compensation  to  be 
stablished. 

\'ery  few  instances  exist  in  which  a 
ation  responsible  for  shooting  down  a 
ivilian  airliner  has  refused  to  pay  com- 
pensation. The  two  most  notorious  ex- 
•mples  both  involve  the  Soviet  Union. 

In  1978  the  Soviets  fired  upon  and 
jrced  the  crash  landing  of  a  Korean 
irline  707  airplane,  killing  two  pas- 
engers.  In  1983  a  Soviet  fighter  pilot 
hot  down  Korean  Air  Lines  #007,  kill- 
ig  269  passengers.  The  Soviets  have 
efused  to  accept  our  claims  for  the 
eaths  of  60  U.S.  nationals  on  that 
hght,  which  resulted  from  the  Soviets' 
ndefensible  action,  or  to  accept  the 
laims  of  other  governments. 

I  would  also  note  the  case  of  the 
.hooting  down  of  an  El  Al  civilian  air- 
iner  by  Bulgarian  planes  in  1955,  re- 
;ulting  in  the  deaths  of  the  crew  and 
)assengers,  including  nine  U.S.  na- 
tionals. The  United  States  immediately 
sought  prompt  and  adequate  compensa- 
-ion  for  what  we  deemed  an  unlawful 
ict.  Bulgaria  offered  an  inadequate 
imount  to  the  United  States,  which  we 
•efused.  Both  Israel  and  the  United 
States  brought  claims  against  Bulgaria 


before  the  International  Court  of  Jus- 
tice, but  the  United  States  withdrew 
its  claim  when  the  Court  decided  Bul- 
garia had  not  submitted  to  the  Court's 
jurisdiction  at  the  time  of  the  incident. 
Offering  compensation  is  especially 
appropriate  where  a  civilian  airliner  has 
been  shot  down.  The  1944  Convention 
on  International  Civil  Aviation  (the 
Chicago  convention),  to  which  both  the 
United  States  and  Iran  are  parties, 
constitutes  a  solemn  undertaking  to 
promote  the  safe  and  orderly  develop- 
ment of  international  civil  aviation.  In- 
deed, the  safety  of  international  civil 
aviation  is  of  the  highest  priority  to  the 
international  community.  When  that 
safety  is  impaired  and  innocent  lives 
are  lost,  nations  should  consider  taking 
appropriate  action  to  compensate  those 
who  suffer  as  a  result. 

Assessing  Compensation 

The  level  of  compensation  paid  on  an  ex 
gratia  basis  is  essentially  within  the 
discretion  of  the  state  offering  such 
payments.  Obviously  we  are  interested 
in  providing  significant  humanitarian 
relief  to  the  families  of  the  victims,  and 
we  will  be  guided  in  part  by  levels  of  ex 
gratia  payments  that  have  been  made 
in  the  past.  We  have  not  yet  deter- 
mined the  levels  or  range  which  we 
intend  to  recommend  to  the  President, 
and  I  cannot  speculate  even  roughly 
what  amounts  ultimately  will  be 
proposed. 

We  also  have  not  yet  decided  upon 
the  methodology  we  will  use  in  deter- 
mining what  constitutes  appropriate 
humanitarian  relief  Payments  could  be 
made  either  by  looking  at  the  particu- 
lar circumstances  of  the  victims  and 
their  families  or  by  setting  a  uniform 
amount  for  each  victim  or  family  mem- 
ber. Our  decision  on  methodology  will 
be  affected  somewhat  by  the  amount  of 
information  we  can  obtain  about  the 
victims  and  their  families.  If  we  find  we 
are  unable  to  determine  the  particular 
circumstances  of  certain  victims  or 
their  families  or  that  distinctions 
among  the  victims  are  inappropriate, 
we  may,  instead,  set  a  flat  amount  of 
compensation.  We  are  still  collecting 
data,  moreover,  on  past  incidents  which 
could  provide  more  guidance  with  re- 
spect to  international  practice  in  this 
area. 

Disbursing  the  Compensation 

We  will  also  have  to  decide  how  to  col- 
lect the  information  we  need  about  the 
families  of  the  victims  and  how  pay- 


ments will  be  made.  P''or  families  of 
Iranian  victims,  we  are  exploring  the 
possibility  of  using  third-party  inter- 
mediaries to  obtain  information  about 
the  families  and,  perhaps  eventually,  to 
distribute  the  payments  as  well. 

Each  person  receiving  an  ex  gratia 
payment  will  be  required  to  sign  a 
waiver  form  which  releases  the  U.S. 
Government  and  any  of  its  employees 
from  liability  arising  out  of  the  Iran  Air 
incident.  This  is  standard  practice  by 
the  U.S.  Government  whenever  it  set- 
tles a  claim  with,  or  makes  an  ex  gratia 
payment  to,  a  foreign  national.  The 
United  States  uses  as  a  model  a  waiver 
form  developed  by  the  United  Nations, 
modified  so  as  to  be  effective  as  a 
matter  of  law  in  the  country  of  the 
claimant. 

We  will  work  as  quickly  as  possible 
to  complete  the  compensation  process. 
We  will  need  a  considerable  amount  of 
time,  however,  to  determine  how  to  as- 
sess compensation  and  to  obtain  the  in- 
formation necessary  from  the  families 
or  their  governments. 

In  the  case  of  the  U.S.S.  Stark,  for 
example,  although  Iraq  agreed  to  pay 
compensation  in  May  1987,  we  were 
only  able  to  submit  our  detailed  claims 
for  wrongful  death  in  April  of  this  year. 
We  are  still  calculating  claims  for  non- 
fatal injuries  and  damage  to  the  ship. 
This  process,  in  other  words,  must  be 
done  carefully. 

We  understand  the  importance  of 
fulfilling  the  President's  intention  that 
compensation  be  paid — as  well  as  the 
human  interest  involved  in  making  the 
payments — as  promptly  as  possible.  We 
must,  however,  satisfy  all  professional 
and  legal  requirements  before  making 
any  payment,  including  obtaining  legis- 
lative authority  if  necessary  or 
desirable. 

In  conclusion,  the  President  has  es- 
tablished the  governing  policies  in  this 
matter  by  confirming  the  legal  pro- 
priety of  our  Navy  commander's  ac- 
tions, while  at  the  same  time  offering 
to  pay  compensation  ex  gratia  to  the 
families  of  the  victims.  We  intend  to 
implement  these  decisions  and  specifi- 
cally to  develop  an  appropriate  compen- 
sation package  for  the  President's 
approval  as  promptly  as  the  circum- 
stances permit. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee 
and  will  be  available  from  the  Superintend- 
ent of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Print- 
ing Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1988 


59 


MIDDLE  EAST 


Visit  of  Kuwaiti  Prime  IVIinister 


The  Crown  Prince  and  Prime  Min- 
ister Saad  al-Abdallak  al-Salim  Al 
Sabah  of  the  State  of  Kuwait  made  an 
official  working  visit  to  Washington, 
D.C.,  July  10-16.  1988,  to  meet  with 
President  Reagan  and  other  govern- 
ment officials. 

Following  are  remarks  made  by 
President  Reagan  and  the  Crown 
Prince  after  their  meeting  on  July  12.^ 

President  Reagan 

It's  been  an  honor  to  meet  with  you 
today  and  discuss  the  many  important 
issues  that  concern  our  two  countries.  I 
value  the  opportunity  to  exchange 
views  and  ideas  with  a  leader  of  your 
wisdom  and  experience. 

Our  two  great  countries  share  a 
long  history  of  friendship  and  coopera- 
tion. Never  have  our  relations  been 
stronger  than  they  are  today.  During 
the  past  year,  we've  worked  together 
successfully  to  help  defend  the  safe  pas- 
sage of  neutral  shipping  through  the 
vital  waters  of  the  gulf.  Together  we've 
taken  steps  to  preserve  the  crucial 
principle  of  free  navigation  that  we 
both  believe  in.  Your  support  for  our 
naval  forces  engaged  in  this  mission  has 
been  crucial  to  their  success. 

Kuwait  is  respected  throughout  the 
world  for  its  moderation,  skillful  diplo- 
macy, strong  and  principled  stance 
against  terrorism,  and  commitment  to 
seeking  negotiated  solutions  to  interna- 
tional disputes.  Despite  your  preference 
for  diplomacy,  you've  known  how  to 
stand  firm  against  intimidation  and  pre- 
vent the  Iran-Iraq  war  from  compro- 
mising your  independence.  All 


60 


Americans  salute  your  steadfastness 
and  resolve.  We've  been  glad  to  assist 
you,  including  coopei'ation  in  Kuwait's 
program  for  upgrading  its  defenses 
against  increasing  threats.  In  this  con- 
nection, I  strongly  support  your  re- 
quest for  F-18  aircraft  and 
accompanying  weapons  now  pending 
before  the  Congress. 

We've  also  been  pleased  to  join  you 
in  a  broad  international  campaign  to 
bring  Iran  and  Iraq  to  the  bargaining 
table.  The  horror  of  this  terrible,  tragic 
war  and  its  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
innocent  victims  seems  to  have  no  end. 
It's  a  continuing  threat  to  your  region 
and  an  object  of  revulsion  for  the  inter- 
national community.  The  time  has  come 
to  act.  Today,  in  our  talks,  we  have 
rededicated  ourselves  to  seeking  a 
prompt  negotiated  end  to  this  human 
catastrophe  based  upon  urgent  ac- 
ceptance and  full  implementation  of  UN 
Security  Council  Resolution  598. 

In  our  discussions  today,  we  also 
reaffirmed  the  urgent  need  for  a  just 
and  lasting  resolution  of  the  Palestinian 
problem.  'The  United  States  will  con- 
tinue to  work  actively  in  the  pursuit  of 
a  comprehensive  peace  that  would  real- 
ize the  legitimate  political  aspirations  of 
Palestinians  while  safeguarding  the  le- 
gitimate security  concerns  of  Israel. 
None  of  us  can  afford  diplomatic  stale- 
mate, from  which  only  extremists  on  all 
sides  will  benefit. 

The  peoples  of  Kuwait  and  the 
United  States  have  developed  common 
interests  and  lasting  ties.  The  bonds 
that  join  us  have  never  been  closer.  The 
social,  economic,  political,  and  security 


interests  we  share  have  never  been 
greater.  Our  meeting  today  has  sent  a 
powerful  signal  to  the  world  of  the 
value  the  United  States  places  on 
Kuwait's  friendship.  I  wish  you  well 
during  the  remainder  of  your  stay  in 
the  United  States,  and  I  sincerely  hope 
your  contacts  with  my  countrymen  will 
broaden  and  deepen  the  mutually  bene- 
ficial relationship  between  us. 

The  Crown  Prince 

It  gives  me  great  pleasure  to  express  to 
you  my  most  sincere  thanks  for  the 
gracious  invitation  which  you  have  ex- 
tended to  me  to  visit  your  great  coun- 
try, a  visit  during  which  I  had  the 
pleasure  of  meeting  and  discussing  with 
you  a  number  of  topics  of  mutual  con- 
cern to  both  our  friendly  nations.  The 
visit  has  also  provided  me  with  a  good 
opportunity  to  meet  with  officials  in 
your  Administration  and  the  Congress, 
as  well  as  the  friendly  American  peo- 
ple. While  expressing  my  warm  appre- 
ciation for  your  kind  words  about  my 
country,  Kuwait,  it  gives  me  great  pleas 
ure  to  convey  to  you  and  to  the  Ameri- 
can people  the  warmest  sentiments  of 
cordial  friendship  from  His  Highness, 
the  Amir;  the  Government;  and  people 
of  Kuwait. 

The  comprehensive,  farreaching, 
and  positive  nature  that  has  marked 
our  talks  today  reflects  the  advanced 
and  ever  developing  level  which  has 
been  achieved  in  our  mutual  rela- 
tionship. Our  talks  have  also  revealed 
identical  views  in  addressing  the  great 
potential  for  the  continued  developmen 
of  cooperation  and  friendship  between 
the  United  States  and  Kuwait.  This 
gives  us  yet  greater  confidence  in  the 
future  of  our  relationship.  Our  common 
and  solid  belief  in  spiritual  values,  hu- 
man principles,  and  norms  controlling 
relations  between  nations  and  peoples 
constitute,  in  our  opinion,  the  proper 
framework  for  the  development  of  our 
relations. 

We  in  Kuwait  have  high  admiratioi 
for  the  values  and  principles  upon 
which,  and  for  which,  your  gi-eat  coun 
try  was  founded;  and  we  also  appreciat 
the  remarkable  achievements  of  the 
American  people  in  various  fields  of  hu 
man  endeavor  and  progress.  Further- 
more, we  appreciate  the  effective  role 
of  the  United  States  as  a  superpower  i 
resolving  issues  of  world  peace  and  se- 
curity, as  well  as  its  keen  interest  in 
seeking  suitable  solutions  to  interna- 
tional problems. 

Regarding  our  region,  we  espe- 
cially value  all  that  the  United  States 


MIDDLE  EAST 


Review  of  U.S.  Policy 
in  the  IVIiddle  East 


I  diiiH'  and  is  doing  toward  bringing 
rnd  to  the  Iraq-Iran  war,  and  for 
3  uuafding  international  navigation  in 
1  Arabian  Gulf.  Your  support  has 

the  gratitude  of  the  Government 
I   people  of  Kuwait.  Your  stance  re- 
its  the  depth  of  the  ties  of  friendship 
«A'een  us. 

We  have  followed  with  great  inter- 
s  your  efforts  toward  peace  in  the 
I  die  East.  We  hope  that  such  efforts 
^  continue  and  will  lead  to  a  just  and 
i|  ing  peace.  And  as  the  Palestinian 

I  stion  is  the  core  of  the  conflict  in 

II  Middle  East,  we  are  confident  that 
l|  recognition  of  the  national  legiti- 
jie  rights  of  the  Palestinian  people 

i  the  necessity  of  their  participation, 
I  resented  by  the  Palestine  Liberation 
I  :anization,  in  any  future  efforts  to 
1  lin  this  noble  goal  are  essential  re- 
■ements  for  peace  in  this  region. 
And,  Mr.  President,  I  should  like 
I  'eemphasize  that  we  in  Kuwait 
nly  value  the  friendly  backing  of 
r  nation  in  our  firm  stand  against  all 
1  i  of  terrorism,  which  have  been  re- 
tedly  directed  at  our  country  and 
pie  in  the  last  few  years.  Such  sup- 
t  by  you  and  your  friendly  people 
strengthened  our  resolve  and  deter- 
lation  to  stand  firm  against  these 
Dcious  acts. 
I  would  hke  to  wish  your  great 
ntry  continued  progress  and  pros- 
•ity,  and  your  kind  person  and  es- 
med  family  the  best  of  health  and 
opiness. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
:sidential  Documents  of  July  18,  1988. 


by  Richard  W.  Murphy 

Statement  before  the  SubcommMtee 
on  Europe  and  the  Middle  East  of  the 
Hon  fie  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
■Jiitji  J7,  1988.  Ambassador  Mnrplii/  is 
Assistant  Secretary  for  Near  Eastern 
and  South  Asian  Affairs.^ 

I  am  pleased  to  come  before  you  once 
again  for  this  update.  We  have  signifi- 
cant new  regional  developments  to  dis- 
cuss— particularly  in  the  Persian  Gulf.  I 
believe  that  the  consistent  and  steady 
U.S.  policy  there  over  the  past  18 
months  has  begun  to  bear  fruit.  I  want 
to  also  bring  you  up  to  date  on  our 
efforts  toward  Ai'ab-Israeli  peace  and 
will  welcome  any  other  questions  of  in- 
terest to  you. 

Iran-Iraq  War 

Iran's  acceptance  of  [UN  Security 
Council]  Resolution  598  a  week  ago  rep- 
resents a  watershed  in  the  history  of 
the  gulf  war  With  the  personal  ap- 
proval of  AyatoUah  Khomeini,  Iran's 
willingness  to  seek  a  negotiated  end  to 
the  Iran-Iraq  war  is  the  authoritative 
signal  which  the  outside  world  has  been 
waiting  for  In  the  year  since  the  UN 
Security  Council  unanimously  adopted 
Resolution  598,  there  has  been  ex- 
tended debate  and  controversy  over  the 
question  of  Iran's  aims — which  really 
came  down  to  the  basic  question:  Was 
Iran  ready  for  peace?  There  have  been 
differences  of  opinion,  but  we  have  held 
that  Iran's  public,  explicit,  and  au- 
thoritative acceptance  of  Resolution  598 
was  required  to  demonstrate  a  real 
commitment  to  negotiation.  We  now 
have  that  confirmation. 

Because  of  the  special  interest 
which  this  subcommittee  has  shown 
toward  our  gulf  policy,  I  would  like 
briefly  to  step  back  and  review  the  rea- 
sons I  believe  Iran  has  finally  made  this 
dramatic — and  historic — move.  I  submit 
that  U.S.  steadfastness  and  toughness, 
in  combination  with  pressures  brought 
to  bear  on  Iran  by  many  countries, 
played  a  significant  role  in  creating  an 
environment  in  which  the  top  Iranian 
leadership  decided  to  opt  for  a  negoti- 
ated peace. 

It  is  safe  to  infer  from  Ayatollah 
Khomeini's  lengthy  statement,  as  well 


as  other  public  comments  by  senior  Ira- 
nians, that  Iran's  internal  deteriora- 
tion— military,  political,  and  economic — 
had  reached  such  a  state  that  they  as- 
sessed that  continued  pursuit  of  the 
war  would  place  the  Islamic  revolution 
at  risk.  They  presumably  still  hope  and 
intend  to  export  the  revolution — but  by 
nonmilitary  means.  The  impact  of  this 
Iranian  decision  will  have  a  ripple  ef- 
fect in  the  region — both  in  the  gulf  and 
in  Lebanon  as  well  as  other  areas  of  the 
world  where  postrevolutionary  Iran  has 
sought  to  spread  its  world  view.  We 
will  have  to  watch  and  assess  carefully 
what  comes  next,  but  there  seems  little 
doubt  the  Khomeini  statement  marks  a 
watershed. 

The  two-track  policy  we  have  been 
following  paid  dividends.  First,  there 
was  our  active  diplomatic  effort  aimed 
at  ending  the  war — launched  in  the  UN 
Security  Council  in  January  1987.  The 
first  phase  of  this  effort  culminated  in 
the  historic,  mandatory  Resolution  598 
of  July  20,  1987.  Secretary  of  State 
Shultz  represented  the  United  States  at 
the  meeting,  and  the  President  con- 
tacted heads  of  state  from  other  Se- 
curity Council  members  to  secure  their 
support.  Then  began  for  us  a  year-long 
phase  of  trying  to  get  Iran  to  accept 
Resolution  598  and  all  that  it  signified: 
an  end  to  the  war  and  negotiations 
which  addressed  the  basic  concerns  of 
both  belligerents. 

When  it  became  clear  that  Iran 
would  not  accept  Resolution  598,  we 
pressed  for  a  followup  resolution — to 
penalize  Iran  through  an  arms  embargo 
for  its  unwillingness  to  accept  and  im- 
plement Resolution  598.  The  Soviet 
Union  and  China,  however,  delayed  and 
would  not  agree  to  join  in  an  arms  em- 
bargo. Nonetheless,  our  campaign — 
maintained  through  our  own  arms  em- 
bargo. Operation  Staunch — encouraged 
other  governments  to  press  Iran  to  ne- 
gotiate and  kept  diplomatic  focus  on 
Iran's  unwillingness  to  negotiate.  And 
it  helped  the  Secretary  General's 
efforts  to  flesh  out  his  own  plans  for 
the  implementation  of  Resolution  598. 

On  a  second  track,  along  with  this 
sustained  diplomatic  effort,  the  Presi- 
dent put  our  navy  on  the  line  in  the 
gulf,  escorting  U.S. -flag  vessels.  This 
arrangement,  initially  controversial  to 
some  of  the  Congress  and  elements  of 
the  American  public,  gradually  won 
general  acceptance.  Our  leadership  and 


partment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1988 


61 


MIDDLE  EAST 


steadfastness  inspired  other  NATO  al- 
lies to  play  a  role  in  the  gulf,  to  the 
point  where  their  vessels  came  to  out- 
number our  own.  In  coordination  with 
five  European  allies  and  the  Gulf  Coop- 
eration Council  states,  we  stood  firm 
against  Iranian  provocations,  including 
minelaying  in  international  waters,  mis- 
sile and  gunboat  attacks — all  part  of  a 
more  generalized  effort  by  Iran  to 
intimidate  and  coerce  governments 
friendly  to  us. 

Following  both  tracks,  we  demon- 
strated that  the  United  States  was  a 
dependable  friend  and  ally.  We  suc- 
ceeded. Not  only  did  Iran  not  dare  to 
use  its  Silkworm  missiles  at  the  Strait 
of  Hormuz  and  scale  back  its  reported 
plans  for  laying  mines,  but  over  the 
past  4  months,  the  number  of  Iranian 
ship  attacks  fell  to  half  of  what  it  was 
in  the  first  3  months  of  the  year.  Our 
friends  and  allies  took  risks  along  with 
us,  and  we  can  say  today  that  the  risks 
have  paid  off. 

Next  Steps 

To  secure  implementation  of  Resolution 
598  is  a  comple.x  challenge.  Resolution 
598  establishes  a  solid  and  fair  basis  for 
a  negotiated  settlement.  It  is  not  an 
anti-Iranian  platform.  It  promises  to 
meet  Iranian  needs  as  long  as  Iran  is 
sincere  in  looking  for  a  negotiated  and 
comprehensive  end  to  the  war. 

Resolution  598  demands  a  cease- 
fire on  all  fronts — land,  sea,  and  air — 
and  a  withdrawal  of  forces  to  interna- 
tional borders.  It  also  calls  for  an  ex- 
change of  prisoners,  the  establishment 
of  an  impartial  body  to  investigate  re- 
sponsibility for  the  conflict,  and  efforts 
to  begin  the  task  of  reconstructing  and 
rehabilitating  the  economies  of  Iran  and 
Iraq.  Resolution  598  also  calls  for  nego- 
tiations between  Iraq  and  Iran  to 
"achieve  a  comprehensive,  just  and  hon- 
orable settlement,  acceptable  to  both 
sides,  of  all  outstanding  issues." 

Iran's  acceptance  last  week  of  Res- 
olution 598  does  not  appear  to  be  a 
tactical  decision  designed  to  buy  time 
but,  rather,  a  strategic  choice  to  end 
the  war.  Nevertheless,  the  war  is  not 
over.  Difficult  negotiations  lie  ahead. 
We  support  the  efforts  of  the  Secretary 
General  to  get  these  negotiations 
started  and  will  use  our  influence  to 
bring  about  a  comprehensive  peace. 
During  the  negotiations,  there  is  a 
provision  for  UN  observers  to  help 
maintain  the  cease-fire.  A  UN  survey 
team  has  already  been  sent  to  prepare 
for  such  an  observer  force.  We  strongly 
support  it  and  are  examining,  together 


62 


with  the  United  Nations  and  other  gov- 
ernments, means  of  financing  it. 

Resolution  598  must  be  imple- 
mented as  an  integral  whole.  We  do  not 
support  a  temporary  cease-fire.  We 
support  a  full  accounting  for  all  pris- 
oners of  war  on  both  sides  and  their 
voluntary  repatriation  as  soon  as  possi- 
ble. Iran's  decision  to  drop  its  demand 
that  Iraq  be  condemned  for  initiating 
the  conflict  as  a  precondition  for  imple- 
mentation of  the  resolution  is  deeply 
significant.  We  believe  the  impartial 
body  called  for  in  Resolution  598  should 
be  established  and  should  begin  to  in- 
quire into  responsibility  for  the  conflict 
in  a  balanced  and  deliberate  manner. 
Finally,  we  are  urging  Iraq  to  exercise 
military  restraint  so  that  this  opportun- 
ity is  not  lost. 

U.S.  Gulf  Role 

We  intend  to  stay  the  course  in  the 
gulf  We  have  always  said  that  the  size 
of  our  naval  deployment  in  the  gulf  is  a 
reflection  of  the  ongoing  threat  to  civil- 
ian shipping.  We  want  to  return  to  our 
traditional  presence  in  the  gulf  Until 
the  cease-fire  is  established  and  sus- 
tained, we  will  continue  to  escort  U.S.- 
flag  vessels,  and,  under  certain  circum- 
stances, we  will  assist  friendly,  neutral 
vessels  in  distress. 

The  same  vital  national  interests 
which  dictated  the  commitment  of  our 
large  naval  deployment  to  the  gulf  ar- 
gue that  our  disengagement  be  gradual 
and  directly  linked  to  a  reduction  in  the 
level  of  tension  and  anxiety.  I  want  to 
underscore,  however,  that  our  strategic 
interests  in  the  gulf  are  long  term  and 
require  active  engagement.  We  will 
maintain  a  naval  presence  in  the  gulf 
as  long  as  our  interests  require  it. 

Those  interests  also  dictate  that  we 
sustain  the  current  high  level  of  cooper- 
ation with  friendly  gulf  Arab  states, 
continue  to  improve  our  relations  with 
Iraq,  and,  over  time,  reestablish  a 
more  normal  relationship  with  Iran.  We 
can  pursue  all  these  efforts  simul- 
taneously, but  success  will  depend  on 
our  ability  to  meet  the  security  needs 
of  our  friends.  Insecurity  and  anxiety 
will  stay  at  high  levels  in  the  gulf  re- 
gion for  the  foreseeable  future. 

U.S.  Arms  Sales  to 

Gulf  States:  Kuwait  F-18s 

This  brings  me  to  a  subject  of  special 
interest  to  this  subcommittee.  Many  of 
you  heard  directly  the  views  of  a  senior 
gulf  Arab  leader,  the  Prime  Minister  of 
Kuwait,  2  weeks  ago  when  he  discussed 


the  war,  the  U.S. -Kuwait  relationship,, 
and  Kuwait's  desire  to  purchase  fighte. 
aircraft  from  the  United  States.  You 
have  before  you,  for  markup  and  refer- 
ral to  the  full  House  Foreign  Affairs 
Committee,  a  resolution  of  disapprova 
which  seeks  to  bar  the  sale  to  Kuwait 
of  nearly  .$1.9  billion  in  F-18  aircraft, 
associated  munitions,  and  services.  I 
wish  to  underscore  emphatically  the 
view  of  the  Reagan  Administration  th 
passage  of  this  resolution  would  unde; 
mine  our  national  interests  in  the  gul: 
region  over  the  long  term,  as  well  as 
have  an  immediate  negative  impact 
upon  relations  with  Kuwait. 

You  are  familiar  with  the  justific; 
tion  for  the  sale.  You  know  of  Kuwait 
role  in  the  face  of  Iranian  intimidatioii 
and  direct  attacks  over  the  past  sevei 
years.  You  know  of  the  political  and 
logistical  support  Kuwait  has  given  ti 
our  naval  deployment  in  the  gulf.  Yoi 
know  of  Kuwait's  admirably  strong  n 
ord  of  counterterrorism.  Y''ou  know  ol 
our  important  financial  relations  witl 
Kuwait  and  the  prospects  for  increas 
trade.  You  heard  the  Kuwaiti  Prime 
Minister's  direct  public  endorsement 
our  current  efforts  at  creating  the  nc 
gotiating  context  for  Arab-Israeli  pe 
talks.  This  is  consistent  with  Kuwait 
long  record  of  advocating  diplomacy 
and  moderation  to  resolve  disputes. 

The  only  new  element  for  your 
consideration  is  whether  the  Iranian 
acceptance  of  Resolution  598  elimina 
the  projected  threat  environment  fo 
which  Kuwaiti  defense  planners — ar 
the  United  States — must  be  prepare 

First,  even  if  Resolution  598  tal 
hold  permanently,  Kuwait  will  be  fa 
with  potential  threats.  These  are  wt 
known  and  based  on  familiar  history 
and  geography.  The  fact  is  that  Kuv 
has  very  valuable,  strategically  loca' 
territory  to  protect  and  has  larger, 
tentially  threatening  neighbors.  The 
Government  of  Kuwait  has  clearly  d 
onstrated  its  determination  to  prote 
its  territory,  particularly  over  the  Is 
18  months. 

Second,  if  we  are  able,  as  antic 
pated,  to  draw  down, our  naval  force 
the  Resolution  598  process  takes  ho 
it  will  be  even  more  important  for  n 
erate  states  to  be  their  own  first  liriJ 
of  defense.  Kuwait  has  indicated  th; 
it  fully  intends  to  take  up  that  resj- 
bility  and  wishes  to  do  so  with  help 
from  us.  This  attests  to  the  improvt 
political  relations  which  have  result 
from  the  close  cooperation  of  the  pa 
year  or  so,  particularlv  in  the  milit; 
■field. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1  I8 


MIDDLE  EAST 


Kuwait  wants  to  purchase  the  F-18 
kage  from  the  United  States  as  the 
Ileal  follow-on  to  its  obsolescent 
s.  It  wants  an  advanced  aircraft 
t  will  meet  its  needs  in  the  next 
itury.  We  are  the  first  choice  of  all 
tential  suppliers  of  the  new  aircraft 
iwait  will  order  this  year,  as  the 
ime  Minister  has  stated.  However,  let 
i  emphasize  an  awkward  but  ines- 
pable  reality:  When  we  cannot  or  will 
t  sell  needed  defensive  equipment  to 
r  friends,  their  requirements  do  not 
lappear.  And  we  do  not  have  a  mo- 
poly  on  sophisticated  weapons  sys- 
Tis.  Our  friends  will  seek  similar 
stems  elsewhere.  The  U.S.S.R., 
ance,  and  the  United  Kingdom  have 
■craft  and  missile  systems  as  ad- 
nced  as  the  F-18  and  Maverick, 
lich  they  are  already  selling  to  states 
the  area.  They  are  only  too  willing 
id  able  to  accommodate  would-be  pur- 
lasers.  So  our  unwillingness  to  pro- 
de  such  equipment  not  only  has  the 
lort-term  negative  impact  on  our  bi- 
eral  relations  which  we  have  experi- 
ced  with  several  countries  in  the 
gion  in  recent  years  but  it  under- 
nes  and  diminishes  our  influence  in 
•e  region  over  the  long  term.  It  also 
ipacts  negatively  on  our  own  domestic 
•onomy  in  contracts  forsworn  and  jobs 
rfeited. 

The  recently  announced  arms 
freement  between  Great  Britain  and 
liudia  Arabia  is  a  concrete  reminder 
iat  the  Arab  gulf  states  have  and  will 
■.ercise  alternatives  in  meeting  their 
,'fense  needs  if  their  first  choice,  the 
nited  States,  declares  itself  unavail- 
)le  to  them.  One  small  silver  lining  of 
ludia  Arabia's  shifting  supply  rela- 
anship  is  that  it  is  toward  a  close  U.S. 
ly — the  United  Kingdom.  The  United 
:ates  is  generally  supportive  of  the 
des  program  as  presented  to  us  by 
le  British  Government.  The  program 
Idresses  the  legitimate  defense  needs 
■  Saudia  Arabia.  We  have  informed  the 
ritish  Government  of  our  need  to  re- 
iew  each  sale  to  determine  whether 
lie  U.S.  components  can  be  included 
^hen  the  British  systems  are  sold  to 
ae  Saudis.  Of  course,  we  would  have 
referred  that  the  potential  $30-billion, 
)ng-term  security  and  political  rela- 
ionship  and  estimated  50,000  jobs  that 
/ere  lost  had  come  to  this  country. 

Such  unwillingness  on  our  part  also 
ndermines  our  credibility  in  the  re- 
lion — making  it  more  difficult,  not  less, 
0  deal  with  Iran  and  Iraq  in  the  new 
ircumstances  created  by  Iran's  accept- 
ince  of  Resolution  598. 


U.S. -Iran  Relations 

There  has  been  much  comment  and 
speculation  on  U.S. -Iran  relations  since 
the  U.S.S.  Vincenues  regrettably 
downed  Iran  Air  #655.  Our  position 
and  policy  on  relations  with  Iran 
have  been  public  and  consistent  and 
have  not  changed.  We  are  ready  for  di- 
rect talks  with  authoritative  official  Ira- 
nians designated  by  the  Ayatollah 
Khomeini's  regime  and  have  so  told  the 
Iranians — publicly  and  privately.  We 
have  welcomed  Iran's  categoric  accept- 
ance of  Resolution  598. 

The  U.S. -Iranian  relationship  is 
deeply  emotional  for  both  sides.  Iranian 
behavior  continues  to  fall  short  of  that 
required  of  a  responsible  state.  Iran's 
decision  to  accept  Resolution  598  is  an 
important  step.  But  if  Iran  wants  to  be 
treated  as  a  respected  member  of  the 
international  community,  it  must  end 
its  intimidation  of  its  gulf  neighbors, 
negotiate  a  just  and  lasting  settlement 
of  its  war  with  Iraq,  and  end  its  sup- 
port for  terrorism  and  hostage-taking, 
now,  immediately.  In  the  meantime,  our 
offer  to  talk  is  on  the  table. 


The  Peace  Process 

Unfortunately,  I  have  no  comparable 
breakthrough  or  dramatic  development 
to  report  on  the  Middle  East  peace 
process.  There  have  been  some  positive 
signs  for  the  future.  Our  initiative  re- 
ceived support  from  our  allies,  most  re- 
cently at  the  Toronto  summit.  The  Arab 
League  summit  in  Algiers  left  the  door 
open  for  movement  and,  after  three 
trips  by  Secretary  Shultz  to  the  region 
since  .lanuary,  the  parties  in  the  region 
continue  to  urge  us  to  pursue  our 
efforts. 

A  potentially  significant  develop- 
ment was  the  distribution  at  the  Al- 
giers summit  of  an  article  entitled 
"Prospects  of  a  Palestinian-Israeli  Set- 
tlement." It  was  distributed  unsigned, 
but  PLO  [Palestine  Liberation  Organi- 
zation] spokesman  Bassam  Abu  Sharif 
later  declared  himself  to  be  the  author. 
We  are  struck  by  its  constructive  tone 
and  the  positive  points  it  raises,  such 
as  its  emphasis  on  the  existence  of  Is- 
rael and  on  the  ultimate  goal  of  the 
Palestinians  being  to  attain  lasting 
peace  in  which  there  is  security  for  Is- 
raelis and  for  the  Palestinian  people. 
We  also  note  its  flat  assertion  that  the 
conflict  can  only  be  solved  by  direct 
talks.  The  paper  remains  silent,  how- 
ever, on  the  issue  of  terrorism  and 
simply  restates  the  PLO's  equivocal 
position  on  acceptance  of  UN  Security 
Council  Resolutions  242  and  338.  It  re- 


mains to  be  seen  whether  this  article  is 
authoritative  and  represents  the  posi- 
tion of  the  PLO.  Yasir  Arafat  has  de- 
clined to  support  the  article  officially. 
Salah  Khalaf  and  others  have  de- 
nounced it.  This  illustrates  one  of  the 
problems  with  the  PLO.  Nonetheless, 
should  events  prove  this  article  to  have 
marked  a  beginning  of  a  responsible, 
reliable,  authoritative,  and  realistic  ap- 
proach by  the  PLO  to  the  peace  proc- 
ess, then  it  would  be  welcomed. 

Soviet  positions  on  important  is- 
sues affecting  the  region — including 
ties  with  Israel,  emigration  levels  for 
Soviet  Jewry,  and  on  the  shape  of  an 
international  conference — seem  to  be 
evolving  in  a  postive  direction,  although 
the  Soviets  have  not  yet  revealed  to  us 
their  thinking  in  any  detail.  I  will  be 
meeting  with  my  Soviet  counterpart 
next  week  to  explore  their  latest  think- 
ing on  developments  in  the  region,  in- 
cluding the  peace  process. 

In  the  coming  months,  we  will  re- 
main actively  engaged  in  the  peace 
process.  We  must  do  no  less.  The 
status  quo  is  unacceptable  and  shows 
no  signs  of  improving,  either  in  terms 
of  the  arms  race  between  regional 
states  or  the  standoff  between  Israelis 
and  Palestinians.  Progress  toward  re- 
solving conflicts  in  Afghanistan  and  be- 
tween Iran  and  Iraq  demonstrates  that 
even  the  most  bitter  conflicts  can  be 
resolved. 

First  and  foremost,  we  will  en- 
deavor to  convince  the  parties  to  the 
conflict  that  their  present  policies  are  a 
dead-end  street.  Our  initiative  remains 
compelling.  It  constitutes  a  realistic 
and  constructive  framework  for  positive 
progress  by  addressing  the  key  princi- 
ples that  must  guide  the  search  for 
peace: 

•  Resolution  242,  which  embodies 
the  principle  of  land  for  peace; 

•  The  legitimate  rights,  including 
political  rights,  of  Palestinians;  and 

•  Security  for  all  states  in  the 
region. 

We  have  created  an  opportunity 
which  the  parties  must  seize  if  they 
want  to  resolve  the  conflict. 

Nothing  more  clearly  demonstrates 
the  need  for  a  realistic  reassessment  of 
positions  by  the  parties  than  the  situa- 
tion in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza,  which 
continues  to  exact  a  heavy  toll  on  both 
Palestinians  and  Israelis.  The  uprising, 
now  in  its  eighth  month,  shows  no  signs 
of  ending,  despite  the  human,  moral, 
and  material  costs.  Violent  confronta- 
tions continue.  The  number  of  deaths 
and  injuries  continues  to  mount.  We 


rtmant  r>f  Qtato  Riillptin/nntohpr  1988 


63 


OCEANS 


have  repeatedly  called  for  both  sides  to 
exercise  restraint  and  to  avoid  actions 
that  exacerbate  tensions.  We  acknowl- 
edge Israel's  legitimate  security  con- 
cerns and  the  need  for  the  preservation 
of  order.  At  the  same  time,  we  have 
raised  with  the  Government  of  Israel 
our  opposition  to  excessively  harsh 
practices  for  humanitarian  reasons  and 
also  because  they  are  counterproductive 
to  efforts  at  reconciliation. 

We  have  no  doubt  that  the  uprising 
in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  was  caused, 
in  large  part,  by  a  sense  that  the  peace 
process  had  stalled.  An  end  to  the  vio- 
lence can  best  be  achieved  through  the 
early  stages  of  negotiations  leading  to  a 
comprehensive  settlement  of  the  Arab- 
Israeli  dispute.  We  shall  continue  to  fol- 
low developments  in  the  West  Bank  and 
Gaza  closely  and  continue  our  active 
efforts  with  the  parties  to  bring  about 
movement  toward  peace. 

Lebanese  Elections 

Finally,  we  are  closely  following  the 
buildup  to  the  presidential  election  in 
Lebanon,  where  a  new  president  is 
scheduled  to  take  office  on  Septem- 
ber 23.  We  have  been  engaged  in  a  di- 
alogue with  the  Syrian  and  Lebanese 
Governments  to  promote  elections  and 
reforms.  The  Administration  strongly 
supports  a  timely  and  orderly  election 
so  that  an  orderly,  legitimate  transition 
can  occur.  We  are  not  supporting  any 
specific  candidate.  We  believe  the  new 
president,  whoever  he  is,  should  repre- 
sent all  Lebanese.  The  new  president 
should  also  build  on  the  efforts  that 
have  been  made  to  reform  the  Leba- 
nese constitution  and  promote  national 
reconciliation. 

Many  Lebanese  believe  the  election 
offers  the  last,  best  chance  to  end 
over  13  years  of  conflict.  The  elec- 
tion can  play  a  major  role  in  helping 
restore  Lebanon's  unity,  but  the  elec- 
tion alone  will  not  be  enough.  To  re- 
store Lebanon's  unity,  sovereignty,  and 
territorial  integrity,  Lebanon's  various 
militias  must  disband  and  all  foreign 
forces  must  withdraw.  This  said,  a  suc- 
cessful election  is  the  first  crucial  step 
to  restoring  stability  to  Lebanon. 


Fisheries  Negotiations 
and  Trade  Opportunities 


'The  complete  tran.script  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee 
and  will  be  available  from  the  Superintentl- 
ent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Print- 
mg  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


by  Edward  E.  Wolfe 

Address  at  the  Alaska  Center  for 
Internatumal  Business  at  the  Univer- 
sity of  Alaska  in  Anchorage  on  July 
20,  1988.  Mr  Wolfe  is  Deputy  Assistant 
Secretary  for  Oceans  and  International 
Environmental  and  Scientific  Affairs. 

The  North  Pacific  Ocean  has  long  been 
an  important  area  for  the  establishment 
of  international  commercial  ventures  in 
the  field  of  fisheries.  The  waters  of  the 
North  Pacific  contain  some  of  the  most 
productive  fishing  grounds  in  the  world 
and  have  been  a  major  area  of  interest 
for  both  U.S.  and  foreign  fishing  com- 
panies. The  fisheries  stocks  off  the 
extensive  coastline  of  Alaska  alone 
represent  a  multi-billion-dollar  resource 
which,  for  many  years,  has  attracted 
considerable  foreign  investment.  Over 
the  past  decade,  economically  beneficial 
ventures  in  fisheries  have  been  estab- 
lished with  such  countries  as  Japan,  the 
Soviet  Union,  Korea,  China,  and  Po- 
land, and  the  possibilities  for  continued 
commercial  cooperation  in  this  area  are 
great. 

As  U.S.  fisheries  negotiator,  one  of 
my  primary  goals,  consistent  with  U.S. 
international  fisheries  policy  in  the 
North  Pacific,  has  been  to  assist  in  the 
development  of  international  commer- 
cial opportunities  for  the  U.S.  fishing 
industry.  I  believe  this  objective  has 
been  achieved  through  bilateral  nego- 
tiations which  provide  for  the  creation 
of  new  economic  possibilities  for  the 
U.S.  fishing  industry.  These  oppor- 
tunities include  the  establishment  of 
joint  ventures  with  the  U.S.  industry 
in  U.S.  waters,  the  opening  of  foreign 
markets  for  U.S.  fisheries  products, 
and  access  to  fisheries  resources  in 
other  countries'  waters.  The  following 
is  a  review  of  U.S.  international  fish- 
eries policy  and  negotiations  of  com- 
mercial interest  to  the  U.S.  fishing 
industry  in  Alaska  and  the  Pacific 
Northwest. 

Access  to  U.S.  Fisheries  Resources 

One  of  the  main  goals  of  the  Magnuson 
Fishery  Conservation  and  Development 
Act  of  1976  was  to  promote  the  develop- 
ment of  U.S.  fisheries  in  the  U.S.  200- 
mile  zone.  Prior  to  the  act's  passage, 
the  vast  majority  of  the  groundfish  fish- 
eries in  what  was  to  become  the  U.S. 


exclusive  economic  zone  (EEZ)  off 
Alaska  were  conducted  by  fishermen 
from  Japan,  the  Soviet  Union,  and 
Korea,  as  well  as  other  countries.  Aftt 
1976,  the  primary  objective  of  U.S.  in- 
ternational fisheries  policy  in  the  Nort 
Pacific  was  to  use  the  immense  surplu: 
fisheries  off  Alaska,  an  approximately 
2  million  metric  ton  (MT)  resource  wit 
a  product  value  of  over  $2  billion,  to  tl 
benefit  of  the  developing  U.S.  fishing 
industry. 

In  the  first  few  years  following  th 
enactment  of  the  Magnuson  Fishery 
Conservation  and  Development  Act,  w 
concluded  governing  international  fish 
eries  agreements  with  nearly  20  forei; 
countries  conducting  fisheries  in  the 
U.S.  EEZ.  These  agreements  outline( 
the  terms  and  conditions  under  which 
foreign  countries  could  gain  access  to 
the  considerable  surplus  resources  in 
the  U.S.  EEZ  which  could  not  be  uti- 
lized by  the  U.S.  industry.  Under 
these  agreements,  allocations  of  surpl 
stocks  were  granted  to  those  countrie 
which  made  the  greatest  contribution 
to  the  development  of  the  U.S.  indust 
through  purchases  of  U.S.  harvested 
and  processed  fish  products,  reductio 
in  tariff  and  nontariff  barriers  to  U.S 
fisheries  exports,  transfers  of  fisherii 
technology,  and  other  factors. 

This  policy  for  the  allocation  of  s 
plus  fish  stocks  was  highly  successful 
providing  for  the  expansion  of  the  U. 
fishing  industry.  One  of  the  most  imp 
tant  developments  which  occurred  wj 
that  foreign  countries  were  encourag 
to  establish  so-called  over-the-side  jo 
ventures  with  the  U.S.  industry  in  e; 
change  for  consideration  for  allocatio 
of  surplus  resources.  In  these  joint  v  | 
tures,  U.S.  fishermen  harvest  fish  in 
our  U.S.  EEZ  and  sell  it  at  .sea  to  a 
foreign  processing  vessel.  All  fisherii 
joint  ventures  are  subject  to  the  tern 
and  conditions  of  a  governing  interna 
tional  fisheries  agreement,  and  each 
counti'y  conducting  such  ventures  in 
the  U.S.  EEZ  must  have  a  governing 
international  fisheries  agreement  in 
force  with  the  United  States.  From 
1980  to  1987,  these  joint  ventures  in- 
creased in  size  from  about  20,000  MI 
over  1.4  million  MT,  which  provided  £ 
estimated  $150  million  to  U.S.  fish- 
ermen last  year. 

During  this  time,  successful  join 
ventures  were  established  with  comp 


64 


Deoartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1^ 


,u. 


OCEANS 


es  from  Japan,  Korea,  the  Soviet 
nion,  and  Poland.  In  addition,  at  the 
iquest  of  segments  of  the  U.S.  fishing 
idustry,  from  1984  to  1985,  we  negoti- 
ed  and  signed  a  governing  interna- 
onal  fisheries  agreement  with  the 
eople's  Republic  of  China,  a  major  new 
eep-sea  fishing  nation.  This  pioneering 
ureement  was  one  of  the  first  commer- 
al  accords  between  the  United  States 
ml  China  and  led  to  the  establishment 
r  jdiiit  ventures  between  U.S.  and 
hmcse  fish  companies. 

The  joint  ventures  provided  much 
I'cded  employment  opportunities  for 
If  U.S.  harvesting  fleet,  which  had 
cell  seriously  affected  by  the  fall  in 
'..'>.  crab  stocks  in  the  early  1980s.  In 
(Iditiun,  they  completely  displaced  for- 
ign  directed  fishing  in  the  U.S.  EEZ 
ff  .\laska.  Whereas  we  provided  be- 
>vccn  1.3  and  1.8  million  MT  in  alloca- 
iins  to  foreign  countries  between  1977 
nd  1984,  it  is  e.xpected  that  there  will 
c  11(1  surplus  fish  available  for  alloca- 
:(iii  to  any  foreign  countries  off  Alaska 
11.-  \ear.  This  dramatic  change  in  the 
attcrn  of  foreign  fishing  in  U.S.  wa- 
r>  ciiuld  not  have  occurred  without 
■ic  development  of  the  joint  ventures. 

While  the  "over-the-side"  joint  ven- 
11  lis  continue  to  present  commercially 
aluable  opportunities  for  U.S.  compa- 
ies,  it  is  recognized  that  they  repre- 
ent  only  an  interim  phase  in  the 
levelopment  of  the  U.S.  fishing  indus- 
ry.  As  the  U.S.  fish  processing  sector 
levelops,  "over-the-side"  joint  ventures 
vill  be  phased  out  so  that  the  U.S. 
ndustry  can  benefit  from  both  the  har- 
'esting  and  processing  of  U.S.  fisheries 
■esources.  U.S.  processors,  both  in  on- 
.hore  plants  and  in  at-sea  factory 
rawlers,  will  continue  to  e.xpand  and 
vill  eventually  utilize  all  available  re- 
iources  in  the  U.S.  EEZ.  This  develop- 
nent  has  been  most  dramatic  in  the 
growth  of  the  U.S.  factory  trawler 
leet,  which  has  increased  from  a  hand- 
ful of  vessels  in  1984  to  over  30  ships 
this  year.  We  expect  that  within  several 
years  this  process  of  "Americanization" 
or  total  domestic  utilization  of  all  fish- 
eries in  the  U.S.  EEZ  will  be 
completed. 

Over  the  past  decade,  we  have  ac- 
tively promoted  the  development  of  the 
processing  sector  in  our  international 
fisheries  relations.  In  order  to  increase 
their  prospects  for  receiving  alloca- 
tions, foreign  countries  engaged  in  sev- 
eral equity  or  true  joint  ventures  in 
v/hich  they  invested  directly  in  the 
U.S.  fishing  industry.  Japan,  for  exam- 
ple, invested  over  $20  million  in  the  de- 
velopment of  two  fish  processing  plants 


in  Dutch  Harbor,  Alaska,  and  provided 
the  technology  for  producing  top-grade 
surimi,  an  Alaska  pollock  product  used 
in  traditional  Japanese  foods  as  well  as 
in  imitation  crab  and  shrimp  products. 
Korea,  Poland,  and  other  countries 
have  also  made  steps  toward  the  estab- 
lishment of  ecjuity  joint  ventures  with 
the  U.S.  fishing  industry.  I  have 
stressed  to  foreign  representatives  that 
these  types  of  joint  ventures  represent 
a  way  for  foreign  companies  to  continue 
their  mutually  beneficial  involvement  in 
the  development  of  U.S.  fisheries  even 
after  allocations  have  been  phased  out. 

Another  major  aspect  of  our  alloca- 
tions policy  has  been  the  promotion  of 
U.S  fisheries  exports  through  agree- 
ments for  the  removal  of  tariff  and  non- 
tariff  barriers  in  foreign  countries. 
Because  a  large  proportion  of  the  re- 
sources taken  in  the  U.S.  EEZ  are  ex- 
ported, this  policy  is  of  particular 
importance  for  the  development  of  the 
U.S.  fish  processing  sector.  Since  the 
early  1980s,  we  have  been  successful  in 
opening  markets  for  U.S.  fisheries 
products  in  several  major  fish-consum- 
ing nations. 

One  of  the  most  important  fisheries 
trade  agreements  for  Alaska  and  the 
Pacific  Northwest  was  last  year's  U.S.- 
Japanese accord  on  pollock  and  herring 
import  quotas.  Under  this  agreement, 
Japan  agreed  to  remove  nontariff  bar- 
riers to  exports  of  U.S.  pollock  and 
herring  products.  These  barriers  in- 
cluded an  import  licensing  system 
which  severely  impeded  imports  of 
processed  pollock  and  a  herring  mar- 
keting structure  which  provided  a  few 
Japanese  cooperatives  with  monopoly 
power  over  the  sale  of  herring  products 
in  Japan. 

As  a  result  of  the  March  1987 
agreement,  American  producers  now 
have  virtually  unrestricted  access  to 
Japanese  markets  for  processed  pol- 
lock— mostly  surimi — and  for  herring. 
The  Department  of  Commerce  esti- 
mates that  U.S,  surimi  exports  should 
now  rise  from  less  than  500  MT  in  1986 
to  about  100,000  MT  per  year  in  the 
early  1990s,  with  an  estimated  value  of 
between  $300  and  $400  million.  The 
Commerce  Department  also  believes 
that  the  agreement  will  result  in  more 
competitive  bidding  for  U.S.  herring 
products,  thus  resulting  in  higher 
prices  for  U.S.  exporters.  These  pos- 
sibilities for  increased  exports  will  be 
of  major  assistance  to  the  development 
of  the  U.S.  fishing  industry. 


Access  to  Other  Countries'  Waters 

Another  major  area  of  interest  for  the 
U.S.  industry  in  our  international  fish- 
eries relations  is  access  to  fisheries  re- 
sources in  other  countries'  waters. 
Although  the  U.S.  fishing  industry  has 
historically  concentrated  on  utilizing 
fish  stocks  within  the  U.S.  EEZ,  cer- 
tain sectors  of  the  industry  have  had  an 
interest  in  access  to  stocks  beyond  U.S. 
waters.  U.S.  tuna  fishermen  in  particu- 
lar have  sought  new  fishing  grounds 
throughout  the  world,  and  we  have  con- 
cluded a  number  of  bilateral  and  multi- 
lateral agreements  to  provide  for  U.S. 
access  to  tuna  in  the  EEZs  of  foreign 
countries.  Last  year,  after  several  years 
of  negotiation,  we  concluded  a  treaty 
with  15  South  Pacific  island  nations 
which  provides  for  U.S.  access  to  tuna 
stocks  in  some  10  million  square  miles 
of  the  South  Pacific  Ocean. 

In  the  North  Pacific,  the  U.S.  in- 
dustry has  been  involved  over  the  past 
decade  primarily  in  the  development  of 
fisheries  within'the  U.S.  EEZ.  Until 
very  recently,  the  U.S.  industry  was 
unable  to  utilize  the  majority  of  the 
available  resources  in  the  U.S.  EEZ. 
However,  now  that  U.S.  fishermen  are 
harvesting  almost  all  available  fisheries 
resources  in  U.S.  waters  off  Alaska, 
they  have  become  increasingly  inter- 
ested in  access  to  other  countries'  wa- 
ters in  the  North  Pacific. 

The  U.S.  industry  has  been  partic- 
ularly interested  in  access  to  fisheries 
resources  in  Soviet  waters,  which  are 
those  closest  to  the  fishing  grounds  off 
Alaska.  The  crab  sector  of  the  U.S.  in- 
dustry was  especially  supportive  of 
efforts  to  gain  access  to  the  substantial 
crab  resources  in  the  Soviet  economic 
zone.  In  September  1986,  the  North  Pa- 
cific Fisheries  Management  Council  en- 
dorsed an  Alaska  crab  coalition  petition 
calling  on  the  Department  of  State  to 
initiate  fisheries  access  negotiations 
with  the  Soviet  Union.  The  Alaska  con- 
gressional delegation  and  the  State  of 
Alaska  also  supported  this  initiative 
and  played  a  leadership  role  in  the  sub- 
sequent negotiations  with  the  Soviet 
Union. 

Following  consultations  with  U.S. 
industry  representatives  in  early  1987, 
we  held  two  rounds  of  talks  with  Soviet 
officials  in  August  1987  and  January 
1988.  These  talks  resulted  in  the  conclu- 
sion of  an  agreement  to  provide  the 
U.S.  industry  with  access  to  the  Soviet 
economic  zone  on  terms  not  more  re- 
strictive than  those  which  apply  to  So- 
viet access  to  the  U.S.  EEZ  under  the 


DeDartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1988 


65 


OCEANS 


terms  of  the  existing  U.S.-Soviet  gov- 
erning international  fisheries  agi'ee- 
ment.  This  interim  agreement  was 
signed  this  past  February  in  Moscow  by 
Secretary  Shultz  and  Soviet  Foreign 
Minister  Shevardnadze. 

As  part  of  the  interim  agreement, 
both  countries  also  agreed  to  immedi- 
ately begin  talks  on  a  comprehensive 
agreement  which  would  govern,  under 
one  single  framework,  all  aspects  of  the 
bilateral  fisheries  relationship.  I  led  a 
U.S.  delegation  for  talks  on  this  com- 
prehensive agreement  on  May  18-22  in 
Moscow,  where  an  agi-eement  in  princi- 
ple was  reached  on  a  draft  text.  This 
text  was  subsequently  signed  during 
the  Moscow  summit  by  Secretary 
Shultz  and  Soviet  Fisheries  Minister 
Kotlyar  on  May  31.  I  am  confident  that 
the  Congress  will  take  expeditious  ac- 
tion so  that  the  comprehensive  agree- 
ment can  take  effect  this  fall. 

When  the  comprehensive  fisheries 
agi-eement  enters  into  force,  it  will  re- 
place both  the  U.S.-Soviet  governing 
international  fisheries  agreement  and 
the  February  21  interim  access  agree- 
ment. It  will  govern,  under  similar 
terms,  access  by  fishermen  of  each 
country  to  the  other  country's  waters. 
The  5-year  agreement  provides  new  op- 
portunities for  fishermen  from  each 
country  to  engage  in  mutually  bene- 
ficial operations  in  the  other  country's 
waters  on  a  reciprocal  basis.  This  is  the 
only  reciprocal  fisheries  agreement  the 
United  States  has  concluded  with  any 
country  in  recent  years,  and  it  repre- 
sents a  possible  model  for  future  bilat- 
eral fisheries  agreements  with  other 
countries.  As  Secretary  Shultz  noted 
during  the  signing,  this  agreement  is 
also  indicative  of  the  improved  commer- 
cial relations  between  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union. 

It  is  our  expectation  that  as  a  re- 
sult of  the  comprehensive  fisheries 
agreement,  U.S.  companies  will  now  be 
able  to  enter  into  mutually  beneficial 
arrangements  with  their  counterparts 
in  the  U.S.S.R.  There  is  strong  inter- 
est in  the  Soviet  Union  for  improved 
commercial  contacts  with  the  United 
States.  Last  March  a  group  of  U.S. 
chief  executive  officers  from  major  U.S. 
corporations  accompanied  Commerce 
Secretary  Verity  to  Moscow  for  com- 
mercial discussions  with  their  Soviet 
counterparts.  In  addition,  new  Soviet 
joint  enterprise  laws,  enacted  last  year 
as  part  of  General  Secretary  Gor- 
bachev's perestroika  program,  now  al- 
low for  the  establishment  of  joint 
arrangements  between  Soviet  and 
Western  firms.  The  Soviets  are  clearly 


interested  in  commercial  arrangements 
which  could  provide  access  to  advanced 
marketing  and  business  skills,  hard  cur- 
rency, and  improved  technology. 

Accoi'ding  to  our  Embassy  in 
Moscow,  the  Soviet  Union  views  fish- 
eries as  one  of  the  fields  in  which  coop- 
erative joint  enterprises  with  the 
United  States  can  successfully  be  es- 
tablished in  the  near  future.  The  Sovi- 
ets apparently  have  a  strong  interest  in 
increasing  their  marketing  of  fish  prod- 
ucts domestically  and  internationally 
and  in  improving  their  fish  harvesting, 
processing,  and  aquaculture  techniques. 
In  the  field  of  North  Pacific  fisheries, 
the  Soviet  industry,  which  has  dealt  al- 
most exclusively  with  Japanese  firms  in 
recent  years,  also  desires  improved  con- 
tacts with  the  fishing  industries  of 
other  countries,  particularly  the  United 
States. 

In  order  to  facilitate  the  establish- 
ment of  commei'cial  ties  between  the 
U.S.  and  Soviet  fisheries  industries,  we 
arranged  for  a  meeting  of  U.S.  and  So- 
viet fishing  industry  representatives  in 
March  1988  in  Khabarovsk,  one  of  the 
major  cities  in  the  Soviet  Far  East.  The 
meeting  was  highly  successful,  and  the 
two  sides  reached  agreement  on  a  large 
number  of  areas  in  which  cooperative 
arrangements  between  the  two  indus- 
tries could  be  established.  These  in- 
clude the  joint  harvesting,  processing, 
and  marketing  of  crab,  cod,  halibut, 
and  other  species  from  the  Soviet  eco- 
nomic zone;  exchange  of  aquaculture 
technology;  and  U.S.  technical  coopera- 
tion in  sorting,  packaging,  and  market- 
ing products  for  Soviet  consumer 
markets.  The  Soviet  Union  recently  in- 
vited three  U.S.  companies  to  return  to 
Khabarovsk  for  commercial  negotiations 
on  possible  fisheries  ventures  in  the  So- 
viet exclusive  economic  zone. 


It  is  also  our  expectation  that  im- 
proved cooperation  in  fisheries  may 
lead  to  new  commercial  opportunities 
between  U.S.  and  Soviet  companies  in 
other  fields.  I  am  personally  aware 
from  6  years  of  experience  in  negotia- 
tions that  fisheries  agreements  often 
provide  contacts  for  improved  coopera- 
tion in  new  areas  beyond  fisheries.  The 
Marine  Resources  Company  is  one  ex- 
ample of  a  joint  U.S.-Soviet  company 
which  has  expanded  from  fisheries  into 
other  commercially  profitable  areas. 
Another  example  is  the  opening  of  the 
port  of  Provideniya,  which  is  of  com- 
mercial and  cultural  interest  to  the 
United  States.  The  opening  of  this 
important  port  under  the  terms  of  the 
U.S.-Soviet  comprehensive  agreement 
has  facilitated  other  types  of  U.S.  ac- 
cess to  Provideniya  such  as  the  recent 
"friendship"  flight  from  Nome,  Alaska. 

The  Soviet  fisheries  agreement, 
like  other  international  fisheries  nego- 
tiations, has  provided  new  commercial 
opportunities  for  U.S.  business  repre- 
sentatives. The  State  of  Alaska  is  in  a 
particularly  favorable  position  to  take  ) 
advantage  of  our  international  fisherie  j 
negotiations  because  of  its  proximity  t  g 
East  Asian  countries  and  the  major 
North  Pacific  fishing  grounds.  Alaskai 
companies  have  successfully  establish* 
commercial  fisheries  ventures  with 
firms  from  a  number  of  East  Asian 
countries,  and  the  May  31  U.S. -Soviets 
fisheries  agreement  should  provide  n« 
opportunities  for  commercial  ties  with 
the  Soviet  Far  East.  According  to  th( 
University  of  Alaska's  Institute  of  So- 
cial and  Economic  Research,  fisheries 
and  tourism  are  the  two  main  areas  fi 
economic  cooperation  between  Alaska 
and  the  Soviet  Far  East.  It  is  our  ex- 
pectation that  as  our  international  fis 
eries  relations  continue  to  evolve  in  tl 
North  Pacific  region,  additional  com- 
mercial opportunities  for  the  U.S.  in- 
dustry will  develop.  ■ 


ilf 


SCIENCE  &  TECHNOLOGY 


l.S.  Views  on  Waste  Exports 


I  rcderick  M.  Bernthal 

>''itement  before  the  Subcommittee 
I' ■rironment.  Energy,  and  Natural 
res  of  the  House  Government 
'•(ins  Committee  on  July  IJ,,  1988. 
rnthal  is  Assistant  Secretary  for 
•  and  International  Environ- 
il  and  Scioitific  Affairs.^ 

m  pleased  to  be  here  today  to  talk 
th  you  about  the  export  of  wastes 
im  the  United  States.  It  is  a  highly 
arged  subject  about  which  there  is  a 
od  deal  of  misinformation  and  conse- 
ent  confusion. 

I  will  begin  with  a  brief  overview 
what  we  know  about  actual  waste 
ports,  leaving  to  EPA  [Environ- 
mtal  Protection  Agency]  a  more  de- 
led description  of  the  situation.  I  will 
in  describe  the  impact  to  date  of  these 
ports  on  our  foreign  relations  and 
icuss  the  potential  for  adverse  effects 
the  future.  Finally,  I  will  suggest 
eas  whei-e  improvements  in  the  e.xist- 
g  legislative  and  regulatory  structure 
iiy  be  needed. 

aste  Exports:  Proposed  and  Actual 

t  me  comment  first  on  reports  of 

S.  exports  of  nuclear  wastes.  Re- 
ntly,  there  have  been  a  number  of 
ess  reports,  particularly  in  Africa, 
at  developed  countries  are  attempting 

dump  "nuclear  and  toxic"  wastes  in 
e  developing  world.  The  reports  have 
t  focused  on  the  United  States,  and, 

the  best  of  my  knowledge,  nuclear 
iste  is  not  being  exported  from  the 
nited  States  to  Africa  or  any  develop- 
g  country.  Having  made  this  clear,  let 
e  focus  the  rest  of  my  statement  on 
in-nuclear  wastes  regulated  as  haz- 
dous  under  Subtitle  C  of  the  Re- 
urce  Conservation  and  Recovery  Act 
ICRA)  and,  perhaps  even  more  impor- 
ntly,  wastes  considered  nonhazardous 
e.,  not  regulated  as  hazardous  under 
ibtitle  C  of  RCRA). 

Iiazardous  Wastes 

s  you  know,  we  have  perhaps  the 
orld's  most  advanced  system  for  man- 
ning hazardous  waste  exports.  Under 
CRA  rules  that  took  effect  in  1986, 
astes  defined  as  "hazardous"  cannot 
e  legally  exported  from  the  United 
tates  unless,  among  other  things,  the 


exporter  notifies  and  provides  sufficient 
information  to  EPA  of  its  intent  to  ex- 
port and  the  government  of  the  country 
to  which  the  export  is  destined  con- 
sents in  writing  to  accept  the  waste. 
Because  of  this  requirement,  we  believe 
we  have  a  fairly  good  idea  about  haz- 
ardous waste  exports. 

About  90%  of  all  our  hazardous 
waste  exports  go  to  a  few  facilities  in 
Canada,  well  known  to  the  Canadian 
Government.  In  fact,  hazardous  waste 
moves  in  both  directions  across  the 
U.S. -Canadian  border  to  qualified 
facilities  for  recycling  or  disposal.  To 
help  ensure  that  the  process  works 
smoothly,  we  have  entered  into  a  spe- 
cific bilateral  agreement  with  Canada 
to  control  these  international  ship- 
ments. This  agreement — and  waste 
movements  thereunder — has  been 
working  quite  well. 

Mexico,  the  United  Kingdom, 
and  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany  are  the  other  major  recipi- 
ents of  U.S.  wastes.  A  bilateral  agree- 
ment similar  to  our  agreement  with 
Canada  covers  waste  exports  with  Mex- 
ico. U.S.  and  Mexican  authorities  re- 
cently reviewed  the  functioning  of  the 
notice  and  consent  system  under  this 
agreement.  The  Mexican  authorities 
expressed  concern  about  wastes  that 
are  not  notified  because  they  are  not 
considered  hazardous  under  RCRA. 
This  is  a  point  I  will  come  back  to. 
There  also  have  been  a  number  of  ex- 
ports to  Western  Europe — notably  the 
United  Kingdom — where  the  wastes  are 
often  treated  for  the  recovery  of  pre- 
cious metals.  These  exports  to  Canada, 
Mexico,  and  Western  Europe — and,  oc- 
casionally, other  countries  such  as  Ja- 
pan— were  for  specifically  defined  and 
quite  limited  amounts  of  hazardous 
wastes. 

Recently,  however,  there  have  been 
four  notices  to  governments  of  West 
Africa  of  a  different  nature. 

•  In  December  1987,  at  EPA's  re- 
quest, the  State  Department  notified 
the  Government  of  Guinea  of  a  proposal 
to  export  up  to  1.9  million  tons  of  sol- 
vents, paints,  and  pesticide  wastes 
from  39  waste  streams. 

•  In  April  1988,  the  Department 
similarly  notified  the  Government  of 
Guinea-Bissau  of  a  proposal  to  export 
up  to  15  million  tons  of  hazardous 
wastes  (over  5  years)  in  virtually  every 
category  of  such  wastes. 


•  Again  in  April,  the  Department 
notified  the  Government  of  the  Congo 
of  a  proposal  to  export  up  to  568,000 
tons  of  solvents,  paints,  and  pesticide 
sludges  from  50  waste  streams. 

•  Finally,  in  June,  the  Department 
notified  the  Government  of  Benin  of  a 
proposal  to  export  up  to  10,000  metric 
tons  of  spent  solvents  from  39  waste 
streams. 

The  first  three  proposals  have  been 
rejected.  We  are  waiting  for  a  response 
to  the  fourth.  We  expect  it  will  be 
negative  because  the  Government  of 
Benin  is  generally  opposed  to  the  ex- 
port of  wastes  from  the  developed  to 
the  developing  world.  These  recent  no- 
tifications suggest  an  increase  in  the 
volume  of  hazardous  wastes  exports 
and  lend  added  importance  to  the  noti- 
fication and  consent  requirements  of 
RCRA. 

Nonhazardous  Wastes 

RCRA's  notification  requirements  do 
not  apply,  however,  to  wastes  not  de- 
fined as  hazardous  under  the  act.  Be- 
cause these  wastes  may  be  exported 
without  notifying  any  federal  authority, 
I  cannot  tell  you  how  much  is  exported 
from  the  United  States  or  where  it 
goes,  if  exported.  Several  attempts  to 
export  nonhazardous  (under  RCRA) 
wastes  from  the  United  States  have 
been  the  object  of  considerable  interna- 
tional attention  in  the  past  year.  A  gar- 
bage barge  from  New  York  is  but  one 
example.  Another  example  that  comes 
to  mind  has  to  do  with  incinerator  ash 
from  the  city  of  Philadelphia.  You  have 
heard  of  the  attempts  to  export  about 
30,000  tons  of  incinerator  ash  from  (but 
not  by)  the  city  of  Philadelphia  on  two 
ships — the  Khian  Sea  and  the  Bark. 

The  Khian  Sea,  owned  by  Amalga- 
mated Shipping  of  The  Bahamas,  was 
apparently  originally  destined  for  Pan- 
ama, where  arrangements  had  been 
made  to  sell  the  ash.  When  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Panama  learned  of  this 
shipment,  however,  it  objected  to  im- 
portation of  the  ash  into  the  country. 
The  Khian  Sea  then  attempted  to  un- 
load the  ash  in  Haiti,  appai'ently  with 
the  support  of  some  Haitian  officials. 
The  Government  of  Haiti  objected  after 
some  2,000  tons  had  been  unloaded, 
and  the  Khian  Sea  returned  to  Dela- 
ware Bay  to  try  and  arrange  for  dis- 
posal in  the  United  States.  The  Khian 
Sea,  still  loaded,  left  Delaware  Bay  for 
the  open  seas  on  May  22,  1988,  and  its 
whereabouts  is  currentlv  unknown. 


epartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1988 


67 


SCIENCE  &  TECHNOLOGY 


The  Bark,  owned  by  Bulk  Handling 
of  Norway,  transported  its  load  to  Kas- 
sa  Island,  just  off  the  coast  of  Guinea, 
where  it  was  quickly  unloaded.  The 
Government  of  Guinea  later  determined 
that  the  permits  under  which  the  ash 
had  been  imported  had  been  improperly 
issued  and  ordered  Klaveness,  a  Nor- 
wegian firm  involved  in  the  arrange- 
ment, to  remove  the  ash  from  Guinea. 
Klaveness  has  complied  and  is  return- 
ing the  material  to  the  United  States. 
This  incident  has  strained  relations 
between  the  Guinean  Government  and 
Norway.  Let  me  point  out  that,  while 
these  wastes  may  not  be  classified  as 
hazardous  under  RCRA,  their  manage- 
ment is  of  concern,  given  potential 
impacts  to  human  health  and  the  envi- 
ronment if  mishandled. 

Impact  on  U.S. 
Foreign  Relations 

While  the  export  of  wastes,  including 
hazardous  wastes,  has  not  yet  had  a 
serious  adverse  effect  on  our  bilateral 
relations,  the  perception  seems  to  be 
growing  that  the  developed  world — in- 
cluding the  United  States — is  dumping 
to.xic  trash  in  the  underdeveloped 
world.  The  effects  of  this  heightened 
perception  are  difficult  to  measure,  but 
they  are  not  favorable.  So  far,  the  con- 
cern in  Africa  over  the  unwanted  re- 
ceipt of  hazardous  wastes  has  focused 
more  on  Europe  than  on  the  United 
States.  U.S.  efforts  to  respond  to  oth- 
ens'  concerns  about  waste  exports  have 
been  appreciated. 

As  an  example,  a  few  weeks  ago, 
the  Government  of  Nigeria  discovered 
that  approximately  4,000  tons  of  toxic 
waste  had  been  sent  from  Italy  and 
dumped  at  Koko  Port  in  Bendel  State. 
The  Nigerian  Government  did  not  feel 
that  it  had  the  expertise  to  evaluate 
what  it  regarded  as  an  emergency  situ- 
ation and  formally  requested  assistance 
from  the  United  States.  Nigeria,  like 
much  of  the  world,  looks  to  us  for  ex- 
pertise and  leadership  on  environ- 
mental matters.  EPA  dispatched  a 
three-person  team  to  assess  the  medical 
and  technical  implications  of  the  dump. 
The  team  was  joined  by  two  doctors 
from  the  Center  for  Disease  Control 
and  by  experts  from  the  United  King- 
dom. The  situation  was  found  to  be 
dangerous,  although  there  was  no 
radioactive  material  as  originally 
feared,  and  a  report  has  been  made  to 
the  Nigerian  Government.  This  incident 
has  led  to  improvement  in  U.S.- 
Nigerian relations.  Nigerian-Italian  re- 
lations have  been  strained,  however. 


68 


even  though  the  Government  of  Italy 
was  not  involved  in  the  shipment  of  ma- 
terial to  Koko  Port. 

We  may  not  always  be  so  lucky. 

First,  many  countries,  particularly 
developing  countries,  do  not  make  the 
sometimes  sophisticated  distinction 
made  under  RCRA  between  hazardous 
and  nonhazardous  waste.  In  fact,  some 
newspapers  and  politicians  reject  this 
distinction. 

Second,  many  countries  will  hold 
the  U.S.  Government  responsible  for 
problems  created  by  private  U.S.  firms. 

Third,  the  United  States  will  be 
held  morally  responsible  for  any 
damage  caused  by  waste  (whether  it  is 
hazardous  or  not)  generated  by  U.S. 
companies  and  disposed  of  in  an  un- 
derdeveloped country,  regardless  of 
whether  or  not  the  government  of  the 
country  consented  to  receiving  the 
waste. 

And  finally,  the  volume  of  actual 
or  proposed  waste  exports  appears  to 
be  growing  as  disposal  costs  in  the 
United  States  continue  to  rise,  al- 
though this  trend  is  difficult  to  measure 
in  the  absence  of  a  historical  base.  Ob- 
viously, an  increase  in  the  volume  of 
exports  means  a  heightened  risk  of 
something  going  wrong. 

Possible  Improvements 
to  Existing  Requirements 

Given  these  considerations,  I  am  partic- 
ularly concerned  about  two  possible  sit- 
uations. First,  I  am  concerned  about 
the  possibility  of  exporting  hazardous 
waste  to  a  country  which  does  not  man- 
age it  safely  or  may  not  respond  effec- 
tively to  an  accident.  Prior  consent  of 
the  government  of  the  receiving  coun- 
try would  not  protect  us  from  receiving 
some  portion  of  the  blame  for  the  situa- 
tion. We  would  almost  certainly  be  ex- 
pected to  help  solve  the  problem, 
perhaps  at  a  substantial  cost. 

The  international  ramifications  of 
an  incident  and  effects  on  U.S.  foreign 
policy  interests  are  currently  difficult 
to  judge.  At  the  international  level,  the 
United  States  has  been  engaged  in  ne- 
gotiations in  both  the  Organization  for 
Economic  Cooperation  and  Develop- 
ment (OECD)  and  UN  Environment 
Program  (UNEP)  to  develop  agreed  in- 
ternational procedures  for  controlling 
transfrontier  movements  of  hazardous 
wastes.  The  OECD  exercise  is  due  to 
be  completed  in  December  of  this  year 
and  the  UNEP  negotiations  in  March 
1989.  Current  versions  of  the  agree- 
ments under  development  in  both  orga- 


nizations contain  export  notification  anr 
importing  country  consent  provisions 
patterned  after  existing  RCRA  re- 
quirements. The  United  States  has 
participated  very  actively  in  these 
negotiations  and  will  continue  these 
efforts  to  successfully  conclude  an  ef- 
fective global  convention.  Incidentally, 
our  success  in  managing  our  hazardous 
waste  exports  is  fully  recognized  in 
l)oth  conventions,  which  incorporate     i 
the  basic  principles  of  notification  i 

and  consent  on  which  our  system  is 
based. 

However,  the  UNEP  and  OECD 
draft  agreements  now  also  contain 
provisions  that  would  require  exportin 
countries  to  prohibit  hazardous  waste  ^ 
exports  if  there  is  reason  to  believe  thf 
wastes  in  question  will  not  be  manage  : 
in  an  environmentally  sound  manner, 
regardless  of  the  consent  of  the  goveri  ( 
ment  of  the  receiving  country.  Our  au  t 
thority  to  prohibit  hazardous  waste      I 
exports  to  countries  that  have  con-      r 
sented  to  their  receipt  appears  to  be    » 
limited  under  RCRA  to  parties  to  in-  r 
ternational  conventions  in  which  such  |i 
prohibition  is  included.  The  parties  tc  J: 
both  these  conventions  believe  export 
ing  countries  should  have  uniform  obi 
gations  with  respect  to  hazardous  wa: 
exports,  regardless  of  their  destinatic 
Legal  authority  to  ban  exports  to  noi 
contracting  parties  is  likely  to  be  nee 
essary  if  we  are  to  be  able  to  join  wil 
others  in  adhering  to  the  prospective 
UNEP  and  OECD  conventions. 

The  second  situation  I  am  con- 
cerned about  is  the  export  by  an  Am 
ican  firm  of  American  wastes,  not 
defined  as  hazardous  under  RCRA,  1 
also  determined  not  to  be  welcome  b 
the  government  of  the  receiving  coui 
try.  There  might  be  very  little  that  r 
government  could  do  to  respond  to  tl 
legitimate  concern  of  the  foreign  gov 
ernment.  In  the  highly  charged  polit 
atmosphere  that  could  easily  develop 
U.S.  interests  could  be  adversely  af- 
fected. In  our  view,  it  is  clearly  in  ti 
interest  of  the  United  States  to  avoic 
situations  in  which  our  government  ( 
not  quickly  and  effectively  respond  t 
the  objection  of  a  foreign  governmen 
to  the  disposition  by  an  American  fiii 
of  American  wastes  in  its  country.  T' 
probability  of  this  occurring  for  wasti 
defined  as  hazardous  under  RCRA  H 
been  greatly  reduced  by  the  act's  pr' 
notice  and  consent  requirements.  Si 
ilar  requirements  may  need  to  be  im 
posed  on  the  export  of  all  such  wast 
not  just  hazardous  wastes.  Govern- 
ment-to-government notification  on  ; 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  lBi 


SOUTH  ASIA 


lar  basis  can  avoid  misunderstand- 
s  and  fraud. 

An  interesting  and  straightforward 
(Siproach  to  dealing  effectively  and  con- 
Htently  with  waste  exports  would  be 
jjpply  to  ban  exports  of  waste,  except 
mere  we  have  a  bilateral  agreement 
Mth  the  receiving  country.  This  would 
jjsure  that  a  framework  exists  for  the 
Bnely  exchange  of  information  that 
jUst  underpin  responsible  decisionmak- 
jt.  Bilateral  agreements  now  in  place 
Ith  Canada  and  Mexico  could  serve  as 
ndels  for  future  agreements  with  oth- 
es.  They  ensure  that  the  appropriate 
jthorities  are  involved  in  decisionmak- 
U  yet  are  sufficiently  flexible  to  en- 
turage  an  efficient  use  of  resources 
itwfen  the  parties.  We  will  be  looking 
oscly  at  this  option. 

Ill  the  days  ahead,  both  EPA  and 
le  Department  of  State  will  also  evalu- 
;?  other  approaches  to  improved  man- 
;  ement  of  waste  exports.  Let  me 
:ivss,  however,  that  in  doing  so,  we 
11  keep  in  mind  that  the  receiving 
'UiiU'ies  must  bear  ultimate  responsi- 
lity  for  their  own  cost-benefit  deci- 
)ns.  We  should  not  create  a  system 
lat  makes  the  U.S.  Government  re- 
onsible  for  what  rightfully  is  a  sov- 
leign  decision  by  others.  We  should 
't,  for  example,  be  obliged  to  certify 
at  a  waste  will  be  disposed  of  in  an 
ivironmentally  sound  manner  in  an 
iporting  country,  though  authority  to 
■ohibit  an  export  if  we  know  it  cannot 
will  not  be  disposed  of  properly  may 
'.  appropriate.  We  can  ensure  that  the 
iporting  government  has  the  informa- 
m  it  needs  to  make  a  decision  as  to 
hether  environmentally  sound  dis- 
)sal  is  possible  and  desirable  in  a  spe- 
fic  case. 

In  conclusion,  I  believe  we  in  the 
mited  States  have  a  system  for  dealing 
ith  exports  of  hazardous  wastes  that 
in  work  and  has  been  working.  Recent 
'ents  appear  to  suggest  that  improve- 
ents  may  be  necessary,  however,  and 
believe  the  Administration,  working 
ith  the  Congress,  can  usefully  con- 
der  some  adjustments  to  ensure  that 
e  are  in  a  position  to  ward  off  prob- 
■ms  before  they  occur  rather  than  hav- 
ig  to  react — perhaps  at  considerable 
conomic  or  political  cost — after  some- 
ling  has  gone  wrong. 


Pakistan's  President  Zia, 

U.S.  Ambassador  Die  in  Plane  Crash 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
gs  will  be  published  by  the  committee 
id  will  be  available  from  the  Superintend- 
it  of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Print- 
g  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


President  Mohammad  Zia  ul-Haq, 
U.S.  Ambassador  to  Pakistan 
Arnold  L.  Raphel,  Brig.  Gen. 
Herbert  M.  Wassom  (head  of  the  Mili- 
tary Assistance  Advisory  Group  at  the 
U.S.  Embassy  in  Isla^nahad),  and  '27 
others  died  August  17,  1988,  when  Pres- 
ident Zia's  plane  exploded  minutes 
after  taking  off  in  eastern  Pakistan. 

Following  are  a  statement  by  Sec- 
retary Shultz  made  in  Islamabad 
where  he  represented  the  United  States 
at  President  Zia's  funeral,  his  remarks 
at  the  memorial  ceremony  for  Ambas- 
sador Raphel  at  Andrews  Air  Force 
Base,  and  Acting  Secretary  Whitehead's 
remarks  at  the  funeral  service  for  the 
Ambassador. 


SECRETARY  SHULTZ'S 

STATEMENT, 
ISLAMABAD, 
AUG.  20,  19881 

My  delegation  and  I  have  just  had  a 
very  good  meeting  with  Acting  Presi- 
dent Ghulam  Ishaq  Khan.  I  conveyed  to 
him,  on  behalf  of  the  Pi-esident  and  the 
American  people,  our  profound  sorrow 
over  the  tragic  death  of  President  Zia 
ul-Haq  and  those  who  died  with  him. 

President  Zia  was  a  strong  and 
principled  leader,  who  earned  the  admi- 
ration of  the  world.  He  was  a  steadfast 
defender  of  Pakistan's  territorial  integ- 
rity and  freedom,  who  yearned  for 
peace  in  this  troubled  region.  He  was  a 
tireless  promoter  of  regional  coopera- 
tion whose  promise  is  evident  in  the 
South  Asian  Regional  Cooperation 
Council.  He  was  a  magnanimous  bene- 
factor to  the  Afghans,  whose  quest  for 
independence  he  never  ceased  to 
champion. 

We  mourn  our  own  loss  as  well. 
Ambassador  Raphel  and  Brig.  Gen. 
Wassom  were  skillful  and  devoted 
Americans — public  servants  who 
worked  tirelessly  to  build  and 
strengthen  relations  between  our 
two  countries. 

This  tragic  incident  shocked 
Pakistan  and  the  world.  Pakistan's  lead- 
ers have  reacted  calmly  and  quickly  to 
preserve  the  continuity  of  constitutional 
government  and  to  reaffirm  that  elec- 
tions will  be  held  in  November.  We  ex- 
pressed the  admiration  of  all  Americans 
for  the  wise  manner  in  which  Pakistan's 
Government  has  responded  to  this 


trial  and  for  the  patience,  strength, 
steadiness,  and  determination  of  the 
Pakistani  people. 


SECRETARY  SHULTZ'S 

REMARKS, 
ANDREWS  AIR  FORCE  BASE, 
AUG.  21,  19882 

Mrs.  Raphel,  Mrs.  Wassom,  your  fami- 
lies and  friends;  last  Thursday  night, 
from  this  spot,  I  took  off  in  this  U.S. 
Air  Force  jet  for  Islamabad,  Pakistan. 
There,  yesterday,  I  stood  in  an  open 
field  next  to  a  mosque  to  extend  our 
country's  honor  to  a  fallen  friend.  Presi- 
dent Zia  ul-Haq  of  Pakistan. 

Today  I  stand  here  again,  as  a 
guardian  in  your  stead,  to  return  to  you 
beneath  our  Stars  and  Stripes  two  of 
our  best,  Arnold  Raphel  and  Herbert 
Wassom.  Arnie  and  Herb.  Over  there. 
Ambassador  and  General.  To  us  they 
will  always  be  Arnie  and  Herb. 

Why  were  they  over  there?  Why? 
They  were  over  there  because  of  big 
words:  liberty,  freedom,  justice,  se- 
curity, prosperity,  peace.  We  hear  these 
words  all  the  time;  maybe  sometimes 
we've  taken  them  for  granted.  I  can  tell 
you  that  most  people  around  the  world 
do  not  take  them  for  granted.  They 
lack  them;  they  want  them;  they'll  fight 
for  them,  as  the  Afghan  people,  with 
President  Zia  behind  them,  have  been 
fighting  and  winning. 

Arnie  and  Herb  went  halfway 
around  the  world  to  join  the  fight  for 
these  great  causes,  not  just  for  others 
but  for  America.  If  we  do  not  work  to 
shape  a  world  of  freedom,  peace,  pros- 
perity, and  justice,  then  here  at  home 
those  principles  will  be  endangered  and 
could  be  lost. 

So  yesterday,  halfway  around  the 
world  in  Pakistan,  I  saw  people  far  dif- 
ferent from  ourselves  moved  to  tears  by 
Amei'ica's — and  Arnie  and  Herb's — ded- 
ication to  these  causes. 

An  Ambassador.  A  General.  As  in- 
dividuals they  were  strong,  energetic, 
dedicated,  and  they  had  that  bright, 
light,  endless  American  optimism  and 
humor.  As  professionals  and  patriots, 
they  were  committed  to  the  inseparable 
principles  needed  for  success:  a  read- 
iness to  engage  with  others  diplo- 
matically to  reach  agreement  and  a 
readiness  to  employ  strength  in  the  in- 
terests of  a  safer  world.  We  must  keep 


epartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1988 


69 


UNITED  NATIONS 


our  effort  going  to  engage  the  world 
out  there. 

Here  they  are,  Arnie  and  Herb, 
your  sons.  The  world  is  a  better  place 
and  your  country  is  better  off  and  safer 
because  of  their  sacrifice.  In  far  off 
lands,  people  know  this.  I  want  you  to 
know  it,  too.  Be  proud  of  them.  Never 
lose  heart.  There  is  so  much  more  to 
do.  Be  proud  to  engage,  as  they  have, 
in  the  spirit  of  America. 


ACTING  SECRETARY 

WHITEHEAD'S  REMARKS, 
FT.  MYER.  VIRGINIA, 
AUG.  22,  1988-' 

In  the  State  Department  lobby,  just  in- 
side the  C  Street  entrance,  there  are 
two  large  plaques,  where  the  names  of 
ambassadors  and  others  who  have  died 
while  serving  their  country  are  in- 
scribed. It  is  a  grim  list,  but  a  proud 
list,  too;  a  list  of  those  who  defended 
peace  and  freedom  to  the  very  end. 
And  now  today  there  will  be  added  to 
that  list  the  name  of  Arnold  Raphel. 

Last  Friday  I  participated  in  the 
swearing-in  ceremony  of  .John  McCar- 
thy as  our  new  Ambassador  to 
Lebanon.  In  a  few  days,  he  will  depart 
for  service  in  that  troubled  land.  John 
was  Amies  deputy  in  Islamabad.  In  his 
brief  remarks  at  the  ceremony,  he  in- 
troduced his  wife  and  his  children  and 
then  he  said,  "During  the  past  week, 
we  have  lost  a  very  dear  member  of  our 
family."  For  a  brief  moment  I  didn't 
know  what  he  meant,  but  then,  of 
course,  I  quickly  realized  that  he  meant 
Arnie.  And  I  thought  how  much  of  a 
family  the  Foreign  Service  really  is,  in- 
cluding those  of  us  fortunate  enough  to 
serve  with  it  for  a  short  time:  loyal  to 
each  other,  proud  of  each  other's  accom- 
plishments, mutually  supportive,  eager 
to  see  its  standards  and  traditions 
maintained.  Arnie  was  one  of  the  lead- 
ers of  our  family,  highly  respected  and 
dearly  loved. 

On  the  seventh  floor  at  the  State 
Department,  Arnie  will  be  warmly  re- 
membered as  the  guy  who'd  show  up 
first  at  a  meeting,  rarely  waiting  to  be 
announced,  and  with  his  shirt  sleeves 
rolled  up.  He  was  always  out  ahead  of 
others,  eager  to  get  started,  quick  to 
catch  you  in  the  corridor.  He  relished 
wrestling  with  the  issues  and  was 
ready  with  the  paper  sometimes  even 
before  you  knew  you  needed  it. 

He  was  quick  to  identify  the 
trends,  anticipate  the  likely  outcome, 
and  work  the  problem.  In  short,  he  was 
a  senior  policymaker's  delight,  a  man  of 
incisive  thought  and  of  decisive  action. 


70 


Arnie  was  never  motivated  by  gar- 
nering personal  prestige  but  by  a  deep 
sense  of  public  purpose.  He  was  not  a 
man  to  be  awed  by  rank  or  power.  But 
he  did  hold  one  thing  in  unshakeable 
reverence — his  country.  And  although 
he  often  referred  to  the  ways  of  the 
Foreign  Service  with  a  winning  irrever- 
ence, there  was  no  more  fiercely  loyal  a 
supporter  of  the  Foreign  Service  than 
Arnie  Raphel.  He  loved  his  work  and 
his  country,  and  he  was  grateful  for  the 
opportunity  the  Department  offered 
him  to  serve  it. 

And  serve  it  he  did.  His  outstand- 
ing work  led  directly  to  the  achieve- 
ment of  the  Afghanistan  peace  accords. 
The  hostages  in  Iran  owe  their  freedom 
in  large  part  to  Arnie,  as  indeed  do  the 
hostages  from  hijacked  TWA  #847. 

Arnie  was  also  an  energetic  re- 
cruiter and  cultivator  of  new  talent.  He 
was  a  builder  of  bureaus,  a  mover  and 
shaker-upper  of  the  personnel  office. 
He  sought  out  the  very  best  people. 
Perhaps  his  most  lasting  achievement 
among  the  many  is  the  fact  that, 
thanks  to  him,  the  State  Department 
now  has  a  veritable  army  of  his  fine 
young  officers  just  as  eager  to  serve  as 
he  was.  He  was  a  great  advocate  for 
the  people  who  served  with  him  in 
Washington  and  overseas.  The  life  he 
knew  and  shared  with  these  dedicated 
men  and  women  was  no  tea  party.  His 
world  was  not  the  world  of  the  prover- 
bial crisp,  pin-striped  cocktail  party 
diplomat,  for  he  knew  the  haixlships 
and  the  dangers  our  people  endure  for 
service's  sake,  particularly  those  who 
are  abroad. 


In  closing,  let  me  share  a  smile 
with  you  from  Arnie.  His  colleagues  ii 
the  Bureau  of  Near  Eastern  and  Soutl 
Asian  Affairs  (NEA)  saved  a  postcard 
that  he  and  Nancy  sent  to  the  front 
office  staff  just  over  a  year  ago.  On  th 
front  is  a  picture  of  a  beautiful  lake  ir 
Pakistan.  Snow-covered  mountains 
plunge  into  the  lake's  azure  e.xpanse 
and  a  small  boat  floats  peacefully  in  tl 
center.  The  NEA  staff  saved  the  card 
all  this  time  because  the  wry  messagt 
written  on  the  back  is  "pure  Arnie." 

It  says:  "Here  is  a  picture  of  our 
embassy  gunboat  providing  escort  ser 
ices  on  a  vital  sea  route  in  the  region 
Notice  the  absence  of  enemy  assets — 
it's  tough  out  here  on  the  front  lines, 
but  someone  has  to  do  it!" 

It  is  a  tough  job  out  there.  And 
Arnie  did  it  and  so  did  Herb  Wassom 
and  superbly  well.  They  truly  served 
America's  front  lines,  although  the 
landscape  may  have  seemed  deceptiv 
beautiful  at  times. 

And  so.  we  join  Nancy  and  Step! 
anie,  Judy,  Tara,  and  Doug,  and  thei 
large  community  of  friends  around  tl 
world,  in  pride  as  well  as  in  sorrow. 
Arnie  and  Herb  will  be  always  with 
They  live  on  in  the  acts  of  service  an 
of  the  goodness  they  performed,  and 
the  hearts  of  all  of  us  in  their  extenc 
family  who  cherish  their  memories. 

"Blessed  are  the  peacemakers: 
they  should  be  called  the  children  of 
God." 


'Press  release  192  of  Aug.  22,  1988 
-Press  release  19:3  of  Aug.  2:3. 
^Press  release  194.  ■ 


U.S.  Assessments  for  the  United  Nations 


by  Dennis  C.  Goodman 

Statement  submitted  to  the  Senate 
Foreign  Relations  Committee  on  July 
29,  1988.  Mr.  Goodman  is  Acting  As- 
sistant Secretary  for  International  Or- 
ganization Affairs.^ 

It  is  a  pleasure  to  appear  before  you 
today  to  discuss  certain  aspects  of  UN 
funding.  Over  the  past  several  years, 
due  in  large  part  to  congressional  ini- 
tiative, there  has  been  some  real  prog- 
ress throughout  the  UN  system  to 
reform  both  UN  management  and  budg- 
et processes.  UN  reform  has  been  nec- 
essary; an  effective  consensus 
decisionmaking  process  on  budget  is- 


sues, such  as  we  are  now  seeking  t( 
implement,  can  lead  the  way  to  a  m 
balanced,  constructive,  and  effective 
United  Nations. 

As  you  know,  in  1986  the  Unite  F" 
States  played  a  key  role  in  the  effoi  it 
of  the  group  of  18  intergovernmentE  I 
experts  to  review  the  UN's  admin-   f' 
istrative  and  financial  functioning.  '  ic 
eventual  recommendations  were  un 
precedented  and  sweeping.  That  fal; 
the  UN  General  Assembly,  after  m 
ing  some  adjustments  to  the  recom 
dations,  adopted  significant  reform 
through  UN  General  Assembly  Re; 
tion  41/213. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October 


UNITED  NATIONS 


1  nditioning  U.S.  Payments 

'  St  \(>ar  Congress — based  on  legisla- 
.11  originating  in  this  committee — con- 
umicmI  U.S.  payments  to  the  assessed 
iIlicI  of  the  United  Nations  by  requir- 
;  ;i  |ii'esidential  determination  on  the 
it  us  of  three  specific  matters: 

•  Implementation  of  a  15%  reduc- 
II  111  II N  Secretariat  staff; 

•  Progress  in  reaching  a  50%  lim- 
; , '11  for  nationals  of  any  member 

I'conded  to  the  UN  Secretariat; 


implementation  of  a  consensus- 
budget  reform  procedure. 


( »ii  July  15,  the  President  indicated 
I  the  UN  Secretary  General  that  while 
■  1  nited  States  clearly  recognized  its 
ions  to  the  United  Nations,  fur- 
ogress  on  reform  was  necessary 
;  the  concerns  of  Congress,  con- 
-hared  by  the  Administration. 
.wthnugh  the  United  Nations  has 
rt  fully  imjjlemented  the  15%  I'educ- 
tn  111  Secretariat  staff,  progress  to- 
rd  this  goal  has  been  achieved,  and 
?  reductions  have  been  equitably  ap- 
ed as  called  for  in  Section  702  of  the 
reign  Relations  Authorization  Act. 

The  Secretariat  of  the  United  Na- 
ns is  staffed  primarily  by  permanent 
iployees.  In  1987,  68%  of  the  staff 
■re  on  permanent  contracts.  However, 
ist  Europeans  serve  primarily  (97%) 
fi.xed-term  contracts,  and  it  clearly 
IS  congressional  intent  to  seek  prog- 
5S  in  this  area.  This  past  May,  the 
viet  Government  informed  the  Secre- 
ry  General  that  a  decision  had  been 
ken  to  permit  Soviet  nationals  to  ac- 
pt  longer  terms  of  service  and,  in 
me  cases,  permanent  appointments, 
date,  however,  no  Soviets  are  on  per- 
anent  contracts. 

With  respect  to  the  consensus- 
sed  budget  decisionmaking  process, 
December  21,  1987,  the  General  As- 
mbly  voted  to  amend  the  UN  regula- 
ms  and  rules  governing  program 
anning  and  budgeting  to  incorporate 
e  new  budget  process.  A  major  test 
r  the  new  budget  process  will  occur 
this  September's  meeting  of  the 
ommittee  for  Program  and 
oordination. 

.S.  Support  for  UN  Efforts 

/e  remain  committed  to  continued  ac- 
ve  support  for  the  important  work  be- 
ig  done  by  the  United  Nations.  We 
trongly  support  the  Secretary  Gen- 
ral's  efforts  in  Afghanistan,  Iran-Iraq, 
"yprus,  Namibia-Angola,  the  Western 
Sahara,  Cambodia,  and  other  areas. 


Because  this  work  is  important,  we  are 
continuing  to  seek  effective  implemen- 
tation of  the  reforms  required  by  our 
law  so  that  we  may  restore  our  pay- 
ment levels. 

There  is  general  agreement  that 
the  United  States  should  pay  its  as- 
sessed obligations  to  international  orga- 
nizations. And  while  U.S.  budget 
constraints  prevent  us  from  doing  that 
in  FY  1988  and  1989,  there  is  general 
agreement  that  we  should  pay  the 
United  Nations  the  remaining  $44  mil- 
lion appropriated  for  the  United  Na- 
tions for  FY  1988  as  soon  as  we  can 
credibly  proceed  with  a  presidential  de- 
termination that  the  requirements  of 
our  laws  are  being  met.  We  take  with 
profound  seriousness  the  legislation  as 
passed  by  Congress  and  signed  into  law 
by  the  President. 

We  very  much  hope  that  further 
action  will  be  taken  by  the  United  Na- 
tions to  implement  the  necessary  re- 
forms to  allow  the  President  to  make  a 
determination  this  fall,  as  has  already 
occurred  in  the  case  of  five  UN  spe- 
cialized agencies. 

U.S.  Arrearages 

The  United  States  currently  owes  $467 
million  on  its  UN  regular  budget  as- 
sessment— $253  million  for  prior  years 
and  $214  million  for  the  current  year. 
The  prior  year  arrearage  would  be  re- 
duced by  .$44  million  if  the  legislative 
requirements  for  presidential  determi- 
nation and  report  to  Congress  regard- 
ing UN  reforms  were  to  be  met.  We 
have  requested  in  our  FY  1989  budget 
submission  $144  million  to  pay  our  cur- 
rent year  assessment  of  $214  million. 
Since  Congress  has  yet  to  approve  a 
final  appropriation  for  FY  1989,  we  do 
not  know  at  this  time  what  our  out- 
standing UN  balance  will  be  at  the  end 
of  the  current  year  Assuming  payment 
of  our  full  appropriation  for  FY  1988 
(which  includes  the  $44  million  subject 
to  presidential  determination)  and  pay- 
ment of  the  full  FY  1989  request  ($144 
million),  the  U.S.  arrearage  would  be 
approximately  $279  million  by  the  end 
of  calendar  year  1988. 

As  I  indicated  earlier,  the  United 
Nations  has  been  playing  a  useful  role 
in  resolving  disputes  in  a  number  of 
key  regions  of  the  world.  The  United 
Nations  will  need  to  seek  additional 
funding  if  it  proves  necessary  to  estab- 
lish peacekeeping  and  monitoring  forces 
in  Iran-Iraq,  Angola-Namibia,  and  pos- 
sibly Cambodia  and  the  Western  Sa- 
hara. A  UN  observer  foi'ce  is  already 
on  the  ground  in  Afghanistan,  and  a 


somewhat  larger  monitoring  force  for 
the  Iran-Iraq  conflict  now  appears  im- 
minent. Because  of  the  fluid  nature  of 
ongoing  negotiations,  no  cost  estimates 
or  funding  sources  have  been 
determined. 

Funding  Sources  for 
Peacekeeping  Operations 

I  would  like  to  say  something  about  the 
various  funding  sources  for  UN  peace- 
keeping operations,  as  well  as  the  U.S. 
contributions  to  them. 

The  UN  Disengagement  Observer 
Force  (UNDOF)  and  the  UN  Interim 
Force  in  Lebanon  (UNIFIL)  are  fi- 
nanced by  assessed  contributions 
through  a  special  UN  peacekeeping  ac- 
count. The  assessments  are  based  on  a 
special  "peace  and  security"  scale  which 
places  the  159  UN  member  states  in 
four  categories: 

•  The  five  permanent  members  of 
the  Security  Council  which  are  assessed 
at  a  higher  rate  than  their  regular  budg- 
et scale  (i.e.,  the  U.S.  assessment  rate 
for  UNDOF  and  UNIFIL  is  30.6%  as 
compared  to  its  regular  budget  assess- 
ment rate  of  25%); 

•  A  second  group  of  22  named,  eco- 
nomically developed  states  which  are 
assessed  at  their  regular  budget  rates; 

•  A  third  group  of  47  named,  least 
developed  states  which  are  assessed  at 
approximately  10%  of  their  regular 
scale;  and 

•  The  remaining  members  which 
are  assessed  at  approximately  20%  of 
their  regular  rates. 

There  are  two  other  assessed 
peacekeeping  activities — the  UN  Truce 
Supervision  Organization  (UNTSO)  and 
the  UN  Military  Observer  Group  in  In- 
dia and  Pakistan  (UNMOGIP),  which 
are  funded  through  assessed  contribu- 
tions as  part  of  the  UN  regular  budget. 
For  these  operations,  the  United  States 
is  assessed  25%.  UNTSO,  originally  es- 
tablished to  supervise  the  1948  Arab- 
Israeli  truce,  now  assists  UNDOF  and 
UNIFIL.  UNMOGIP  was  established 
to  supervise  the  1949  Kashmir  cease- 
fire. Observers  are  now  stationed  on 
both  sides  of  the  boundary  defined  by 
the  1972  Simla  agreement. 

The  UN  Peacekeeping  Force  in 
Cyprus  (UNFICYP)  is  funded  by  vol- 
untary contributions  through  a  special 
UN  peacekeeping  account.  In  the  case 
of  UNFICYP,  troop  contributing  coun- 
tries absorb  approximately  70%  of  the 
total  costs  with  the  balance  made  up 
from  voluntary  contributions  of  the  UN 
members. 


epartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1988 


71 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Additionally,  member  states  have 
provided  support  services  and/or  facili- 
ties to  the  overall  peace  effort  (i.e., 
transportation,  equipment,  supplies, 
etc.),  usually  for  start-up  purposes,  on 
a  voluntary  basis. 

U.S.  Funding  for  Peacekeeping 

U.S.  contributions  to  UNTSO  and 
UNMOGIP  are  included  in  the  U.S.  as- 
sessment for  the  UN  regular  budget, 
and  the  United  States  thus  pays  25%  of 
their  costs. 

The  United  States  made  a  volun- 
tary contribution  to  UNFICYP  of  $7.3 
million  in  FY  1988.  A  total  of  $29  mil- 
Hon  in  annual  UNFICYP  costs  is  paid 
on  a  voluntary  basis  by  UN  members 
(the  balance  of  the  $95  million  annual 
UNFICYP  costs  are  absorbed  by  troop 
contributing  countries).  U.S  funds  for 
its  UNFICYP  contributions  are  re- 
quested in  the  Agency  for  International 
Development  (AID)  budget  ("peace- 
keeping operations")  and,  when  ap- 
propriated, are  transferred  to  the 
Department  of  State  for  subsequent 
disbursement. 

The  United  States  currently  owes 
some  $70  million  on  its  assessed  contri- 
butions to  the  separate  UN  peacekeep- 
ing accounts  for  UNDOF  and  UNIFIL 
(over  .$64  million  to  UNIFIL  alone). 
With  payment  of  our  full  FY  1988  UN 
peacekeeping  appropriation,  the 
amount  owed  would  increase  to  some 
.$87  million  (over  $86  million  for 
UNIFIL).  For  FY  1989,  our  UN  peace- 
keeping request  of  $29  million  should 
fully  fund  our  requirements  for 
UNDOF  but  less  than  half  required  for 
UNIFIL,  leading  to  total  peacekeeping 
arrearages  of  approximately  $111.8 
million. 


FY  1989  Assistance  Requests 

for  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean 


'The  complete  tran.script  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee 
and  will  be  available  from  the  Superintend- 
ent of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Print- 
ing Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


hy  Elliott  Abrams 

Statement  prepared  for  delivery  be- 
fore the  Subcommittee  on  Foreign  Oper- 
ations of  the  House  Appropriations 
Committee  on  April  22,  1988.  Mr. 
Abrams  is  Assistant  Secretary  for 
In ter-A merican  Affairs . ' 

I  am  pleased  to  have  this  opportunity 
to  present  the  Administration's  re- 
quests for  bilateral  assistance  for  Latin 
America  and  the  Caribbean  for  FY  1989 
and  to  answer  your  questions.  A  seri- 
ous public  assessment  of  the  resources 
available  to  advance  U.S.  interests  in 
this  hemisphere  is  badly  needed. 

In  keeping  with  the  austere  budget 
agreement  for  FY  1989,  our  assistance 
requests  are  14%  below  last  year's  re- 
quest for  economic  assistance  and  27% 
below  last  year's  request  for  mihtary 
assistance. 

The  Administration  is  requesting 
$1,137  million  in  bilateral  economic  as- 
sistance. This  included  $.547.5  million  in 
economic  support  funds  (ESF),  $371.7 
million  in  development  assistance,  and 
$218.2  milhon  in  PL  480  commodity 
assistance. 

We  also  request  $197.1  million  in 
military  assistance.  This  included 
$185.5  million  for  the  military  as- 
sistance program  (MAP)  and  $11.6  mil- 
lion for  international  military  education 
and  training  (IMET).  To  avoid  adding 
to  the  already  high  debt  burden,  no 
foreign  military  sales  (FMS)  credits  are 
requested,  for  the  second  year  in  a  row. 

These  economic  and  military  as- 
sistance accounts,  about  which  I  have 
been  asked  to  testify  today,  make  up 
94%'  of  the  resources  available  bilater- 
ally to  advance  U.S.  interests  in  this 
hemisphere.  The  only  other  e.xplicitly 
bilateral  accounts  are  $32.2  million  for 
Peace  Corps  programs  and  $56.2  mil- 
lion for  antinarcotics  assistance. 


THE  POLICY  FRAMEWORK 

A  key  element  of  the  Administration's 
foreign  policy  is  the  recognition  that 
this  hemisphere — our  immediate  neigh- 
borhood— is  of  great  strategic  impor- 
tance; in  fact,  critical  to  our  national 
security.  We  cannot  deal  effectively 
with  challenges  to  our  interests  in 
other  parts  of  the  world  if  we  are  un- 
able to  cope  with  problems  closer  to 


home.  Historically,  our  ability  to  pro- 
ject power  in  the  world,  in  part,  has 
been  based  on  the  absence  of  threats 
closer  to  home. 

Unfortunately,  many  of  our  allies 
Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  do 
not  have  the  resources  to  provide  si- 
multaneously for  their  own  security  a 
the  basic  economic  needs  of  their  peo 
pie.  Because  we  know  they  must  do 
both  if  they  are  to  survive  and  prospe 
and  if  democracy  is  to  be  given  a 
chance  to  flourish,  we  must  help  to 
make  up  the  shortfall. 

In  the  past,  many  Latin  America 
seemed  to  view  democracy  as  just  an 
other  form  of  government  to  be  tried 
and  discarded  if  it  resulted  in  no  app 
ent  immediate  benefits.  The  current 
trend  of  democratization  has  been  ac- 
companied by  some  interesting  and 
promising  political  developments  thai 
have  helped  the  new  democracies  bre 
out  of  the  old  patterns. 

Many  Latin  Americans  now  belli 
that  open  societies  are  superior  to 
closed  ones  and  that  democratic  insti 
tions  are,  therefore,  worth  building  ; 
strengthening.  Accompanying  this  h; 
been  the  formation  of  an  informal  bu 
strong  mutual  support  network  amo 
democratic  leaders.  When,  for  e.xam 
Peru's  President  Alan  Garcia  and  Ai 
gentina's  President  Raul  Alfonsin  w( 
undergoing  periods  of  increased  civi 
military  tension,  there  were  strong 
public  expressions  and  private  effort 
support  of  them  from  other  democr; 
leaders. 

Respect  for  human  rights  has 
shown  improvement  in  all  the  non- 
Marxist  and  nondictatorial  states  of 
Latin  America.  The  marked  reducti' 
in  the  number  of  human  I'ights  abus 
in  recent  years  parallels  the  spread 
consolidation  of  democracy:  where  d 
ocratic  government  has  taken  root,  i 
human  rights  situation  has  changed 
dramatically  for  the  better. 

The  security  of  the  United  Stat' 
and  the  security  of  all  free  countries 
this  hemisphere  benefit  from  the 
region-wide  movement  toward  demo 
racy.  We  have  supported  this  trend  |t' 
only  because  it  is  in  accord  with  oui 
deepest  values  but  also  because  we    - 
lieve  it  is  in  our  interest.  There  has 
been  not  one  coup  against  a  demo- 
cratically elected  government  durin; 
the  more  than  7  years  of  the  Reaga; 
Administration.  And  Latin  America 


72 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October    B 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


n\\  me  political  maturity  is  demon- 
r;i!  \nii  that  we  can  enjoy  the  most 
nstiuctive  long-term  relationships 
th  iduntries  where  government  is 
1111. IimI  on  the  consent  of  the  governed. 

I  iir  these  reasons,  we  emphasize 
■nioiracy  in  our  political  relations 
iili  iiur  neighbors.  The  modest  as- 
<taiK'e  levels  we  have  requested  aim 
|iiii\ide  the  resources  needed  to  sup- 
;it  Diir  quest  for  sustained  democracy 
i  this  hemisphere.  A  reversal  of  the 
idwnient  to  democracy  anywhere  will 
!■  rejected  by  us  as  it  will  be  by  all  the 
'mocracies  in  the  region. 


HALLENGES  TO  U.S.  INTERESTS 

le  road  to  democracy  is  not  without 
)stacles;  many  challenges  lie  ahead, 
ur  neighbors  face  tremendous  politi- 
il,  economic,  and  social  problems, 
arcotraffickers  are  sometimes  better 
•med  and  equipped  than  governments; 
^bt  repayments  eat  away  funds  that 
ight  otherwise  be  used  for  develop- 
ent;  insurgencies  threaten  political 
ability;  and  social  institutions  are 
'erburdened. 

arcotics 

hat  drugs  are  a  threat  to  the  national 
■curity  of  the  United  States  and  our 
iighbors  should  be  obvious.  Drugs  kill 
id  corrupt.  The  power  of  the  interna- 
onal  drug  mafia — particularly  the  so- 
illed  Medellin  cartel — to  corrupt,  in- 
midate,  and  destabihze  key  U.S.  allies 
Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  is 
1  immediate  threat  to  U.S.  national 
;curity.  In  Panama  drug  power 
cached  into  the  very  core  of 
overnment. 

The  MedelUn  cartel — actually  a  col- 
!Ction  of  criminal  "families" — is  run  by 
)ur  men:  Carlos  Lehder  Rivas  (now  on 
rial  in  south  Florida  on  drug  traffick- 
ig  charges),  Jorge  Ochoa  Vasquez, 
'ablo  Escobar  Gaviria,  and  Gonzalo 
iodriguez  Gacha.  They  are  all  bil- 
lonaires,  and  both  Escobar  and  Ochoa 
pjjear  on  the  list  of  the  world's 
vealthiest  people,  published  by  Fortune 
ind  Forbes  magazines.  The  cartel  fami- 
ies  control  some  80%  of  the  estimated 
65,000  pounds  of  cocaine  consumed  in 
he  United  States  annually  from  South 
\merica.  They  earn  approximately  $8 
jillion  each  year  from  various  drug 
operations. 

The  corruption  born  of  the  drug 
rade  jeopardizes  our  security  by 
hreatening  the  survival  of  democratic 
institutions.  Corrupt  politicians  become 


Proposed  FY  1989  Assistance  to  Latin 
America  and  the  Caribbean 


Development 
Assistance 

26% 


ESF  38% 


Narcotics 

4% 
Peace 
Corps  2% 


PL-480  15% 


MAP  13% 
IMET  1% 


servants  of  the  drug  lords  rather  than 
of  the  people  they  are  supposed  to  rep- 
resent. Corrupt  military  officers  be- 
come loyal  to  the  commander  who  pays 
them  the  most  money,  rather  than  to 
the  constitution  they  have  pledged  to 
defend  and  protect.  In  addition,  the 
drug  lords,  in  some  cases,  have  been 
able  to  capture  the  allegiance  of  the 
local  poor  by  establishing  private  wel- 
fare systems  more  generous  than  any- 
thing the  government  can  offer. 

The  destructive  and  pernicious  in- 
fluence of  narcotics  traffickers  in  the 
fledgling  democracies  was  vividly  dem- 
onstrated recently  in  Honduras.  The 
demonstrations  which  climaxed  in  a  vio- 
lent attack  on  a  part  of  our  Embassy— 
an  action  highly  uncharacteristic  of 
Honduran  behavior  and  views — were 
largely  instigated  and  financed  by  the 
network  of  billionaire  drug  baron  Juan 
Ramon  Matta  Ballesteros,  who  recently 
was  returned  to  the  United  States  to 
face  criminal  charges  for  his  narcotics- 
smuggling  activities.  Matta's  efforts  in 
Honduras  to  buy  loyalty  from  high  offi- 
cials in  the  government  and  the  mili- 
tary threatened  the  future  political  and 
social  stability  of  the  nation.  We  are 
optimistic  that  a  serious  cancer  has 
been  removed  from  Honduras  and  that 
follow-on  treatment  of  the  cancer's  ill- 
effects  can  now  be  successful. 


The  narcotraffickers  undermine 
and  destabilize  democratic  government 
even  more  directly  by  means  of  violence 
and  intimidation.  In  Colombia  this  dan- 
ger has  reached  an  acute  stage.  On  Jan- 
uary 25,  hit-men  in  the  employ  of  cartel 
members  abducted  and  killed  Carlos 
Mauro  Hoyos,  Colombia's  Attorney 
General.  Hoyos  was  murdered  for  dis- 
missing two  judges  and  ordering  an  in- 
vestigation of  five  government  officials 
in  connection  with  the  release  from  a 
Bogota  prison  of  cartel  magnate  Jorge 
Ochoa.  Among  other  victims  of  traf- 
ficker violence  are  a  Minister  of  Jus- 
tice, Supreme  Court  judges,  prominent 
journaUsts,  and  scores  of  other  judges 
and  policemen.  Hoyos  was  the  22d  high- 
ranking  Colombian  official  assassinated 
by  drug  traffickers  in  the  past  3  years. 

The  grim  truth  is  that  authorities 
in  Colombia  and  in  the  other  demo- 
cratic countries  of  the  region  are  out- 
gunned by  the  drug  syndicates.  Most 
Colombian  police  carry  World  War  II 
vintage  weapons  that  are  no  match  for 
the  automatic  rifles  and  other  state-of- 
the-art  weaponry  available  to  the  co- 
caine traffickers.  The  drug  lords  run 
what  is,  in  effect,  a  parallel  government 
with  a  paramilitary  infrastructure,  air- 
craft, troops,  and  enormous  financial 
resources. 


73 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


In  Mexico,  too,  there  is  compelling 
evidence  of  the  connection  between 
arms  and  drugs.  In  late  January  and 
early  February  of  this  year,  huge  weap- 
ons caches  were  discovered  in  Mexico 
by  the  federal  police.  In  addition  to 
seizing  11  tons  of  marijuana  and  4,400 
pounds  of  cocaine,  Mexican  authori- 
ties captured  more  than  360  Soviet- 
designed  AK-47  assault  rifles,  more 
than  145,000  rounds  of  ammunition,  92 
bayonets,  6  metal  detectors,  and  3  in- 
frared rifle  scopes,  as  well  as  7  small 
airplanes  and  several  vehicles.  The 
Mexican  authorities  had  interdicted  the 
shipments  in  a  classic  drugs-for-arms 
trade.  The  drugs  were  destined  for  the 
United  States. 

There  are  some  positive  indications 
of  changing  attitudes  and  behavior  in 
drug-producing  and  consuming  coun- 
tries. More  Latin  American  govern- 
ments are  making  efforts  to  combat 
drug  trafficking.  Ecuador  has  eradi- 
cated all  coca  plantings  and  is  no  longer 
on  our  list  of  major  drug  producers. 
Venezuela  has  attempted  to  stop  traf- 
fickers from  gaining  a  foothold  by  uni- 
formly handing  out  very  tough 
sentences;  if  convicted,  traffickers  can 
face  a  15-year  sentence  with  no  chance 
for  parole.  Bolivia  is  encouraging  peas- 
ant farmers  to  destroy  their  coca  crops 
by  providing  a  payment  for  each  hec- 
tare in  coca  bushes  removed  from 
cultivation.  Peru  is  continuing  with 
its  eradication  effort  in  the  Upper 
Huallaga  Valley  despite  violent  attacks 
by  both  traffickers  and  guerrillas.  The 
Colombian  Government  has  instituted  a 
number  of  measures  designed  to  facili- 
tate the  capture  and  punishment  of 
those  involved  in  acts  of  violence — 
whether  terrorist  or  drug-related — 
against  the  government.  In  1987  Mexico 
increased  by  26%  its  eradication  of  mar- 
ijuana, and  seizures  of  all  drugs  also 
were  up  (cocaine  by  75%,  opium  deriva- 
tives by  12%,  and  marijuana  by  104%). 

Still,  as  governments  have  begun 
to  take  measures  against  traffickers, 
narcotics-related  violence  has  in- 
creased. Often  the  attacks  have  been 
directed  against  security  forces  operat- 
ing against  the  traffickers.  However, 
the  traffickers  also  have  been  known  to 
target  the  spouses  and  children  of  those 
involved  in  antinarcotics  activities. 

In  addition  to  narcotics,  there  are 
many  other  challenges  to  our  Latin  and 
Caribbean  neighbors  and  to  U.S.  inter- 
ests in  the  region. 

Violent  Insurgencies 

Several  nations  (Guatemala,  El  Sal- 
vador, Honduras,  Colombia,  Peru,  Ec- 


uador) now  have  active  or  incipient 
Marxist  insurgencies.  All  are  threats  to 
democratic  values.  Most  are  supported 
to  some  extent  by  the  Soviet  bloc, 
Cuba,  and  Nicaragua.  Insurgent  groups 
in  El  Salvador,  Guatemala,  and  Colom- 
bia have  received  particularly  extensive 
support  from  Cuba  and  Nicaragua: 
there  are  disquieting  signs  of  subver- 
sive activities  in  several  other  coun- 
tries. In  Chile,  for  example,  the  Manuel 
Rodriguez  Patriotic  Front — the  ter- 
rorist arm  of  the  Chilean  Communist 
Party — is  actively  involved  in  bomb- 
ings, shootings,  kidnappings,  and  as- 
sassination attempts.  Weapons  caches 
linked  to  the  group  indicate  external 
support  for  its  activities. 

Government-Condoned  Violence 

Politically  motivated  violence  other 
than  that  related  to  narcotics  traffick- 
ing or  insurgencies  remains  a  problem 
in  many  countries.  A  wave  of  violence 
caused  the  cancellation  of  Haiti's 
November  1987  balloting  (later  re- 
scheduled and  held  in  January).  In  Nic- 
aragua, Sandinista  "divine  mobs" 
{"tnrbas  diohias")  continue  to  harass 


demonstrators  and  peaceful  oppositic 
Opposition  groups  are  beaten  and  teat 
gassed  in  Panama. 

Economic  Challenges 

The  most  recent  data  indicate  that  re; 
gross  domestic  product  for  the  largest 
countries  in  Latin  America  and  the 
Caribbean  grew  by  3.7%  in  1986,  2M 
in  1987,  and  is  only  expected  to  grow 
by  about  2%^  in  1988.  Because  the  pop 
lation  continues  to  grow  at  around 
2.3%,  per  capita  income  levels  contim 
to  decline.  The  decline  primarily  has 
been  due  to  lower  world  prices  for  co! 
fee,  sugar,  and  other  basic  commoditi 
that  comprise  the  bulk  of  regional  ex- 
ports. The  demand  for  some  of  these 
exports  is  reviving  modestly.  Even  sc 
many  countries  are  continuing  to  run 
large  and  growing  trade  deficits  as  tl 
demand  for  imports  exceeds  their  abi 
ity  to  export  by  significant  margins. 
For  example,  in  the  first  6  months  of 
1987,  exports  declined  by  5%  and  im- 
ports rose  by  6%-  compared  to  the  sa 
period  in  1986.  Growing  balance-of- 
payments  deficits  result  in  shortages 
foreign  exchange  needed  to  pay  forei 


FY  1989  Assistance*  Request  to 
Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  Vs. 
Annual  IVIedellin  Cartel  Revenues 

$  Billlions 
10-r 


8-- 
6-- 
4- 

2- 

0 


$8  Billion 


$1,422  Million 


U.S.  Assistance  Cartel  (est.) 

'includes:  Development  assistance,  ESF,  PL-480,  IMET,  MAP, 
international  narcotics,  Peace  Corps. 


74 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1p 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


liL::iiions  and  to  buy  those  imports 
It  aiv  needed  as  inputs  to  products 
•  rxport. 

Another  factor  contributing  to  the 
■'wiliiwn  in  economic  activity  in  1987 
s  I  hf  inability  of  many  Latin  Ameri- 

I  and  Caribbean  countries  to  stabilize 

II  fconomies  largely  because  of  po- 
iiai  and  social  resistance  to  needed 

'    'ity.  For  example,  inflation  rates 
u'  to  be  a  serious  problem  in 
aountries.  Also  the  sharp  curtail- 
iii  iif  domestic  and  foreign  invest- 
iii  since  the  early  1980s  due  to 
uirtainty  and  lack  of  confidence  has 
distrained  growth.  The  huge  amounts 
ceapital  flowing  out  of  the  region  have 
:t  1m  en  counterbalanced  by  inflows 
I  Jill  the  commercial  banks,  interna- 
tnal  financial  institutions,  or  bilateral 
isistance. 

Fui-  most  of  the  major  debtor  coun- 
es,  high  interest-rate  burdens  from 
ior  year  borrowing  and  little  like- 
ood  of  improvement  in  current  ac- 
unts  balances  will  continue  to  limit 
owth  prospects  to  the  2-3'7f  range 
er  the  next  few  years.  Although  the 
gion's  current  account  deficit  dropped 
)m  $17.5  billion  in  1986  to  $13  billion 
1987,  this  deficit  is  projected  to  grow 
$13.8  billion  this  year,  largely  be- 
use  of  worsening  of  trade  balances. 
There  is  little  prospect  in  1988  of 
versing  net  financial  flows  out  of  the 
gion.  The  major  debtors  will  need 
piificant  new  lending  from  commer- 
il  creditors  in  order  to  service  their 
bt  and  finance  their  current  account 
ficits.  The  outlook  for  new  lending, 
wever,  is  bleak  due  to  the  natural 
willingness  of  foreign  commercial 
nks  to  lend  new  money  when  current 
bts  are  not  being  repaid  and  when 
e  banks  perceive  that  a  return  to 
editworthiness  for  the  region  in  gen- 
al  is  unlikely  in  the  short  to  medium 
rm.  Mexico's  plan  to  offer  bonds 
icked  by  U.S.  Treasury  notes  in  ex- 
ange  for  a  portion  of  its  debt  is  indic- 
ive  of  the  kind  of  innovative  measures 
at  are  needed  to  overcome  this  signif- 
ant  obstacle  to  i-enewed  growth. 

Economic  progress,  peace,  and  se- 
irity  are  at  risk  in  the  Caribbean 
asin.  Almost  without  exception,  the 
)untries  of  that  area  face  daunting 
lallenges.  Their  economies  are  for  the 
ost  part  small,  fragile,  and  extremely 
ulnerable  to  disruption.  Developments 

the  international  economic  system 
iriously  exacerbate  the  effects  of  in- 
rained  structural  rigidity.  The  current 
lowdown  in  the  world  economy  is  a 
ase  in  point.  Prices  for  the  primary 


commodities  that  are  the  principal  ex- 
ports of  these  countries — sugar,  coffee, 
and  bauxite — have  fallen  sharply  over 
the  past  decade.  In  the  same  period, 
most  of  the  region  also  has  been  strug- 
gling with  the  need  to  adjust  to  in- 
creases in  the  costs  of  essential 
imports,  particularly  petroleum.  Tour- 
ism, although  strong  in  1987,  cannot 
make  up  in  the  short  run  for  declines  in 
such  traditional  export  earners  as 
sugar.  Certain  economies  of  Central 
America — particularly  El  Salvador's — 
have  been  severely  damaged  by 
guerrilla-inflicted  destruction  as  well  as 
by  a  lack  of  investor  confidence  due  to 
political  and  social  instability  and  tur- 
moil. The  large  exodus  of  capital,  par- 
ticularly during  the  early  1980s,  has 
resulted  in  little  new  investment 
throughout  this  area,  except  in  Costa 
Rica. 

It  is  clear  that  our  friends  need 
help  to  overcome  their  economic  diffi- 
culties, to  defend  themselves,  and  to 
keep  alive  their  faith  in  freedom  and 
democracy.  With  foreign  assistance, 
they  have  a  chance  to  manage  their  own 
affairs  and  find  their  own  way  out  of 
their  present  troubles.  We  should  have 
no  higher  priority.  Neither  the  commu- 
nists nor  the  drug  dealers  are  inter- 
ested in  strengthening  the  security, 
political  systems,  or  economies  of  these 
countries.  It  is  to  us  that  our  neighbors 
look  for  cooperation  and  support.  It  is 
in  our  interest  that  we  respond. 


ASSISTANCE  TO  INDIVIDUAL 
COUNTRIES 

Security  assistance  helps  to  strengthen 
the  defenses  of  our  friends  in  the  inter- 
ests of  their  own  security  and  ours.  In 
addition,  U.S.  assistance  to  Latin 
America  and  Caribbean  countries  pro- 
duces direct  domestic  benefits  here  in 
the  United  States.  These  benefits  take 
the  form  of  employment,  export  sales, 
investment  opportunities,  and  access  to 
raw  materials  for  American  industry. 

The  ESF  advances  U.S.  economic 
interests  by  offering  grant  or  loan  eco- 
nomic assistance.  These  funds  are  used 
primarily  to  provide  quick-disbursing 
balance-of-payments  support  to  allow 
time  for  local  economic  and  financial  ad- 
justments to  take  effect. 

The  MAP  provides  grant  funds  for 
procurement  of  defense  articles  and 
services  to  help  strengthen  defense  ca- 
pabilities. Without  grant  aid,  many 
countries  in  this  hemisphere  would  have 
to  divert  scarce  domestic  resources 
from  economic  development  efforts  in 


order  to  purchase  military  training  and 
equipment. 

The  IMET  program  is  a  grant-aid, 
low-cost  instrument  that  gives  us  an  ex- 
tremely valuable  channel  of  communica- 
tion and  influence  with  foreign  military 
organizations.  Education  and  training 
for  the  professionalization  of  military  of- 
ficers have  long  been  considered  to  be 
the  most  cost-effective  form  of  security 
assistance. 

Development  assistance  is  project 
support  used  for  education  and  manage- 
ment training  and  some  small  business 
development.  It  also  funds  private  sec- 
tor and  agricultural  development  and 
health  and  nutrition  programs,  pri- 
marily to  increase  the  incomes  of  poor 
rural  families  to  meet  their  basic  needs. 

Food  for  Peace,  commonly  called 
PL  480,  provides  food  from  U.S.  De- 
partment of  Agriculture  stockpiles  to 
those  nations  that  are  too  poor  to  feed 
all  of  their  people  adequately.  The  food 
provided  alleviates  hunger  and  mal- 
nutrition and  improves  health.  One  of 
our  most  successful  programs,  it  also 
generates  local  currency  in  some  coun- 
tries that  is  recycled  to  fund  agri- 
cultural development,  infrastructure 
improvements,  rural  education,  and 
health  programs. 

During  the  past  few  years,  and 
particularly  in  FY  1988,  cuts  in  our 
budget  requests  and  extensive  ear- 
marking have  severely  limited  our  sup- 
port for  countries  outside  of  Central 
America. 

In  many  cases,  our  military  and 
economic  support  programs  outside 
Central  America  had  to  be  "zeroed 
out" — completely  eliminated — in  order 
to  accommodate  the  reductions  in  the 
total  foreign  assistance  levels  which, 
along  with  the  increased  earmarking, 
left  little  discretionary  ESF  and  MAP 
for  the  rest  of  this  hemisphere. 

Central  America 

Our  assistance  request  for  the  coun- 
tries of  Central  America  reflects  the 
high  priority  the  Administi-ation  at- 
taches to  U.S.  interests  in  that  trou- 
bled subregion.  The  basic  arguments 
and  proposals  for  aiding  Central  Amer- 
ica were  developed  in  1983-84  by  the 
National  Bipartisan  Commission  on 
Central  America  (the  Kissinger  com- 
mission). Its  bipartisan  focus  on  eco- 
nomic stabilization  and  political 
democratization  has  been  the  oi-ganiz- 
ing  principle  of  U.S.  policy  ever  since. 
Thanks  in  part  to  sustained  U.S. 
aid  levels  to  Central  America,  this  half- 


75 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


decade  has  seen  first  one  country  then 
another  make  a  remarkable  recovery 
from  near  disastrous  circumstances. 
Now  freely  elected  civilian  governments 
are  offering  their  people  the  chance  for 
a  better  future  in  El  Salvador,  Hon- 
duras, and  Guatemala.  Costa  Rica  con- 
tinues to  enjoy  freedom  and  the  rule  of 
law,  as  it  has  for  many  years.  The  com- 
munist Sandinistas  are  a  blatant  excep- 
tion to  the  new  democratic  trend. 

The  return  of  democratic  resistance 
leaders  to  Managua  for  negotiations  is  a 
sign  that  we  are  in  a  new,  intensely 
political  phase  of  the  struggle  there.  To 
increase  the  prospect  of  a  democratic 
outcome,  it  is  essential  that  the  door 
finally  opened  by  the  strength  and  per- 
severance of  the  resistance  is  not 
slammed  shut.  We  intend  to  cooperate 
with  the  freedom  fighters,  the  internal 
democratic  opposition  forces  inside  Nic- 
aragua, and  with  the  four  democracies 
in  order  to  further  the  prospects  for 
both  peace  and  freedom  in  Nicaragua. 

Throughout  Central  America,  it  is 
in  the  U.S.  interest  to  strengthen  dem- 
ocratic institutions  and  the  administra- 
tion of  justice  and  to  support  existing 
regional  institutions  to  foster  increased 
cooperation  among  the  Central  Ameri- 
can democracies.  As  we  support  and 
encourage  the  development  of  the  re- 
gion, we  should  assist  those  existing 
regional  institutions  that  contribute  to 
improving  the  economic  and  social  well- 
being  of  the  citizens  of  these  countries. 

The  regional  program  for  Central 
America  is  designed  to  complement  and 
to  supplement  U.S.  bilateral  assistance 
progi'ams.  It  complements  those  pro- 
grams by  promoting  on  a  regional  basis 
what  is  also  being  done  individually, 
with  the  objective  of  improving  regional 
cooperation.  It  supplements  the  bilat- 
eral programs  where  it  is  more  logical 
and  cost-effective  to  implement  projects 
on  a  regional  basis,  thus  avoiding  costly 
duplication.  This  regional  program  is 
managed  partly  from  an  office  based  in 
Guatemala  City  and  partly  by  the  U.S. 
Agency  for  International  Development 
in  Washington,  D.C. 

El  Salvador  is  one  of  our  closest 
allies  in  Central  America.  U.S.  policy 
interests  in  El  Salvador  are  to  advance 
the  cause  of  democracy;  improve  eco- 
nomic conditions;  promote  peaceful 
change;  prevent  hostile,  antidemocratic 
forces  from  gaining  a  strategic  foothold; 
and  prevent  the  Soviet  Union  from  in- 
creasing its  influence  through  its  sup- 
port for  the  Salvadoran  insurgents.  The 
Government  of  El  Salvador  is  critically 
dependent  on  U.S.  support  in  its 


76 


FY  1989  Assistance  Request 

$  Millions 

1000^  ■Economic 

YZA  Military 
□  Other 


Central 
America 


Caribbean 


South 
America 


other:  Includes  Peace  Corps  and  international  narcotics. 


efforts  to  consolidate  democratic  gov- 
ernment and  rebuild  its  economy  in 
the  face  of  guerrilla  sabotage  and 
destruction. 

U.S.  policy  promotes  the  consolida- 
tion of  constitutional  democracy  in  El 
Salvador  by  assisting  the  government 
to  defend  itself  against  a  determined 
Marxist  insurgency  supported  by  Nic- 
aragua, Cuba,  and  the  Soviet  bloc.  It 
addresses  the  socioeconomic  roots  of 
the  insurgency  and  its  historic  political 
bases  by  continuing  support  for  demo- 
cratic development,  judicial  reform,  re- 
spect for  human  rights,  and  responsive 
public  institutions.  It  also  helps  sta- 
bilize the  war-torn  national  economy 
and  stimulates  revitalization  and 
growth.  FY  1989  requests  are  for 
$292.5  million  of  economic  assistance 
and  $96. .5  million  of  military  assistance. 

Guatemala's  size,  proximity  to  the 
United  States,  large  population,  and  re- 
gionally important  economy  make  its 
stability  and  development  important  to 
the  interests  of  the  United  States.  Over 
the  past  20  years,  Guatemala  has  faced 
a  lingering  Cuban-supported  insur- 
gency that  fed  on  the  neglect  and  pov- 
erty of  the  nation's  Indians,  some  50% 
of  the  population.  A  succession  of  mili- 
tary governments  attempted  to  put 
down  the  festering  insurgency,  but  at 
great  cost  in  human  life  and  widespread 


human  rights  abuses.  The  violence 
to  a  cutoff  of  U.S.  military  assistanc 
1977. 

In  late  1985,  Guatemalans  freel? 
elected  a  new  civilian  government, 
ushering  in  an  era  of  new  expectati( 
for  growth  and  democracy.  The  new 
government,  led  by  Christian  Demo 
Vinicio  Cerezo,  faces  a  continued  bu 
weakened  Marxist  insurgency,  serio 
economic  pi'oblems  inherited  from  \ 
vious  regimes,  and  an  upsurge  in  cc 
mon  crime  fed  by  unemployment. 
Undermanned  and  poorly  trained  pi 
and  criminal  justice  forces  have  had 
trouble  controlling  the  increase  in 
crime.  The  government,  neverthele: 
has  made  steady  strides  in  ending  1 
man  rights  abuses,  promoting  econ( 
growth,  and  in  creating  the  conditic 
for  greater  citizen  participation  in  I 
government.  p 

U.S.  Government  assistance  prf*' 
vided  in  the  past  to  the  Guatemalai 
Armed  Forces  has  demonstrated  oi 
support  for  an  important  institutioi  ii 
Guatemala's  democratic  society.  Thi  as 
sistance  has  addressed  only  the  mo 
pressing  material  needs  of  the 
Guatemalan  Armed  Forces,  while  e 
hancing  professional  competence. 

The  primary  U.S.  objective  in 
Guatemala  is  the  promotion  of  a  de 
cratic  government  that  is  friendly  1 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  \% 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


s  country,  respectful  of  human 
hts,  capable  of  dealing  effectively 
;h  the  Marxist  insurgent  threat,  and 
iponsive  to  the  economic  and  social 
ds  of  its  people.  It  is  clearly  in  our 
erest  that  Guatemala  adopt  policies 
it  strengthen  democratic  institutions, 
)mote  real  economic  growth,  curb  re- 
jssive  practices,  and  thereby  elimi- 
ie  popular  support  for  e.xtremist 
utions.  Our  FY  1989  economic  as- 
tance  request  is  $137.1  million;  we 
o  are  requesting  $5.4  million  of  mili- 
•y  aid. 

Honduras  is  a  key  democratic  ally 
the  United  States.  Honduras'  fledg- 
g  democracy  faces  both  a  conven- 
nal  military  threat  and  subversion 
m  the  Sandinista  regime,  which  con- 
ues  its  unprecedented  military 
ildup.  As  the  poorest  democracy  in 
ntral  America,  Honduras  requii'es 
bstantial  assistance  if  it  is  to  make 
■ficult  but  necessary  economic  re- 
ms  in  support  of  economic  develop- 
nt  and  democracy. 

U.S.  security  assistance  to  Hon- 
ras  is  a  tangible  demonstration  of  our 
Timitment  to  this  key  ally's  defense 
d  development.  The  Azcona  Admin- 
ration  has  consistently  formulated 
d  implemented  economic  stabilization 
brm  programs  since  it  took  office  in 
luary  1986.  These  accomplishments 
3  particularly  noteworthy  when 
iwed  in  the  regional  context  of  in- 
ibility  and  declining  prices  for  pri- 
iry  exports  and  the  destabilizing 
'ect  of  quick  profits  provided  by  the 
egal  drug  trade. 

Our  military  assistance  program  is 
itical  to  modernizing  the  Honduran 
■med  Forces  in  order  to  enhance  sta- 
ity  and  to  meet  the  Sandinista 
reat.  The  assistance  also  conti'ibutes 
jnificantly  to  the  professionalization 
the  armed  forces  and  improved  re- 
ect  for  human  rights,  crucial  factors 
the  strengthening  of  Honduran  de- 
oeracy.  The  FY  1989  request  for  Hon- 
iras  is  $142.1  million  for  economic  aid 
id  $61.2  million  for  military  aid. 

Despite  its  long  democratic  tradi- 
)n  and  the  promise  of  the  Guatemala 
coi'd,  Costa  Rica  i-emains  vulnerable 
regional  tensions.  In  sharp  contrast 
heavily  militarized  Nicaragua,  its 
)rthern  neighbor,  Costa  Rica  main- 
.ins  no  standing  army.  The  civil  war  in 
icaragua  and  the  totalitarian  orienta- 
on  of  the  Sandinista  regime  have 
riven  150,000-250,000  Nicaraguans 
ito  exile  in  Costa  Rica.  This  massive 
iflux  of  refugees  strains  the  country's 
ublic  resources  and  social  infrastructure. 


The  Costa  Rican  economy  con- 
tinues its  slow  recovery  from  the  severe 
problems  of  1981-82.  When  coffee  prices 
fell  and  petroleum  costs  skyrocketed  in 
the  late  1970s,  Costa  Rica  postponed 
economic  adjustment  by  borrowing 
massively  from  abroad.  Falling  export 
revenues  forced  the  authorities  to  halt 
interest  payments  on  international 
loans.  Commercial  banks  I'efused  to 
provide  new  financing,  plunging  Costa 
Rica  into  economic  crisis.  The  collapse 
of  the  Central  American  Common  Mar- 
ket in  the  early  1980s  was  another  blow 
to  the  Costa  Rican  economy.  The  econ- 
omy contracted,  forcing  down  real  in- 
comes. U.S.  economic  aid  played  a  key 
role  in  helping  Costa  Rica  overcome 
these  serious  problems.  However,  the 
country  is  still  burdened  with  a  high 
level  of  per  capita  debt. 

U.S.  assistance  to  Costa  Rica 
seeks  to  promote  economic  growth  and 
the  strengthening  of  the  country's  dem- 
ocratic institutions.  Costa  Rica  provides 
convincing  evidence  that  social  and  eco- 
nomic progress  go  hand  in  hand  with 
democratic  values  in  Central  America. 
The  success  of  Costa  Rica  also  high- 
lights the  totalitarian  failure  of  the 
Sandinista  regime  in  Nicaragua.  The 
FY  1989  request  includes  $97  million 
for  economic  aid  and  $1.73  million  for 
military  assistance  ($1.5  million  for 
MAP  and  $230,000  for  IMET). 

What  we  face  in  Panama  is  a 
threat  to  democracy  and  a  threat  to  our 
ability  to  stop  the  international  drug 
traffickers.  We  will  not  shirk  our  re- 
sponsibility to  defend  ourselves  against 
these  threats.  The  earlier  Gen.  Noriega 
leaves,  the  better  Panama's  interests 
will  be  served.  We  will  continue  to 
fulfill  our  obligations  under  the  Panama 
Canal  Ti-eaties  and  cooperate  with 
President  Delvalle  and  his  government. 
And  we  are  prepai'ed  to  resume  our 
close  working  relationships  with  the 
Panama  Defense  Forces  once  civilian 
government  and  constitutional  democ- 
racy are  reestablished.  Once  Panama- 
nians achieve  these  goals,  we  will  work 
with  them  to  help  restore  Panama's  eco- 
nomic health.  For  this  reason  we  re- 
quest that  $445,000  be  budgeted  for 
IMET  for  FY  1989. 


The  Andean  Countries 

The  five  Andean  countries — Bolivia, 
Colombia,  Ecuador,  Peru,  and  Venezu- 
ela— all  have  democratically  elected 
governments.  To  varying  degrees,  all 
are  confronted  by  serious  economic 
problems,  sometimes  exacerbated  by 


terrorism  on  the  part  of  guerrillas  and 
drug  traffickers.  These  countries  re- 
quire our  support. 

The  government  of  President  Paz 
Estenssoro  in  Bolivia  is  committed  to  a 
campaign  to  eliminate  illicit  coca 
cultivation  completely  within  3  years. 
Close  cooperation  with  the  United 
States  has  continued  since  the  Govern- 
ment of  Bolivia  courageously  began  in- 
terdiction with  U.S.  logistical  and  troop 
support  during  Operation  Blast  Fur- 
nace in  1986.  This  unprecedented  opera- 
tion is  being  followed  by  a  comprehensive 
coca  eradication  program.  The  success 
of  both  interdiction  and  eradication  de- 
pends heavily  on  additional  U.S.  equip- 
ment, training,  and  development 
resources. 

Should  the  antinarcotics  program 
falter,  Bolivia's  fragile  democracy  might 
be  overcome  by  extremists  financed 
with  drug  profits  or  by  military  ele- 
ments afraid  that  the  government  could 
not  withstand  a  leftist  challenge. 
Bolivia's  severely  limited  defense  budg- 
et depends  on  MAP  ($5  million 
requested)  and  IMET  ($400,000  re- 
quested) funds  for  supplements  crucial 
to  improving  the  military's  antinarcotics 
capabilities  and  to  enhancing  military 
cooperation  with  the  national  narcotics 
police.  ESF  resources  also  are  critical, 
both  to  support  economic  reforms  na- 
tionwide and  development  projects  in 
areas  affected  by  loss  of  revenue  from 
coca  production.  Bolivia,  the  poorest 
country  in  South  America,  deserves  our 
help  and  uses  that  help  wisely.  The 
total  FY  1989  assistance  request  for 
Bolivia  is  $82.4  million. 

Colombia  is  one  of  the  oldest  de- 
mocracies in  the  region.  It  is  attempt- 
ing to  preserve  a  cease-fire  with  the 
Revolutionary  Armed  Forces  of  Colom- 
bia (FARC),  the  oldest,  largest,  and 
one  of  the  best-armed  of  the  insurgent 
groups.  At  the  same  time,  the  govern- 
ment is  contending  with  other  groups 
that  have  rejected  the  government's 
peace  initiative.  Colombian  terrorists, 
moreover,  are  actively  supporting  and 
cooperating  with  terrorist  groups  in 
other  countries  in  the  region. 

Although  a  leader  in  regional  drug 
eradication  and  inteixliction,  Colombia 
faces  serious  challenges  from  narcotics 
traffickers.  To  reverse  the  government's 
programs,  the  traffickers  often  ally 
themselves  with  terrorists.  The  judici- 
ary has  been  a  special  target  of  the 
drug  dealers  and  insurgents.  The  1985 
seizure  of  the  Palace  of  Justice,  the  as- 
sassination of  prominent  jurists  and 


lepartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1988 


77 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean: 

V- 

FY  1989  Foreign  Assistance 

Request 

1 

(millions 

US$) 

Economic 

Assistance 

Military 

Assistance 

ESF 

DA 

PL  480 

Total 

MAP 

FMS 

IMET 

Tota 

Central  America 

434.0 

209.2 

93.0 

736.2 

162.0 

0.0 

3.885 

165.8; 

Belize 

2.0 

7.4 

0.0 

9.4 

0.5 

0.0 

0.100 

0.6 

Costa  Rica 

70.0 

12.0 

15.0 

97.0 

1.5 

0.0 

0,230 

1.7 

El  Salvador 

185.0 

67.7 

39.8 

292.5 

95.0 

0.0 

1.500 

96.5 

Guatemala 

80.0 

34.0 

23.1 

137.1 

5.0 

0.0 

0.400 

5.4 

Honduras 

87.0 

40.0 

15.1 

142.1 

60.0 

0.0 

1.200 

61.2 

Panama 

0.0 

0.0 

00 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.455 

0.4 

Regional  Programs 

10.1 

48.1 

0.0 

58.1 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

Caribbean 

65.0 

83.3 

69.1 

217.4 

10.5 

0.0 

1.690 

12.1 

The  Bahamas 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.060 

O.C 

Dominican  Republic 

25.0 

20.3 

28.3 

73.6 

2.0 

0.0 

0.700 

2.7 

Eastern  Caribbean 

15.0 

20.2 

0.0 

35.2 

5.0 

00 

0.400 

5.^ 

Guyana 

0.0 

0.0 

4.0 

4.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.050 

O.C 

Haiti 

0.0 

25.2 

6.8 

32.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.055 

0.( 

Jamaica 

25.0 

17.6 

30.0 

72.6 

3.5 

0.0 

0.300 

3.f 

Suriname 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.050 

0.( 

Trinidad  &  Tobago 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.075 

0.( 

Caribbean  Basin  Initiative 

499.0 

292.5 

162.1 

953.6 

172.5 

0.0 

5.575 

178.1 

Andean 

36.0 

54.3 

56.1 

146.4 

13.0 

0.0 

2.685 

15. 

Bolivia 

25.0 

22.3 

29.7 

77.0 

5.0 

0.0 

0.400 

5. 

Colombia 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

5.0 

0.0 

0.950 

5. 

Ecuador 

9.0 

16.7 

0.5 

26.2 

3.0 

0.0 

0.650 

3. 

Peru 

2.0 

15.3 

25.9 

43.2 

0.0 

0.0 

0.560 

0. 

Venezuela 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.125 

0 

Other 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.775 

0 

Argentina 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.125 

0 

Brazil 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.125 

0 

Chile 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.050 

0 

Mexico 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.225 

0 

Paraguay 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.125 

0 

Uruguay 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.125 

0 

Latin  America  and 

Caribbean  Regional 

Programs 

12.5 

24.9 

0.0 

37.4 

NA 

NA 

NA 

N 

Panama  Canal 

Military  Schools 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

0.0 

0.0 

2.100 

2 

TOTAL: 

Latin  America 

and  the  Caribbean 

547.5 

371.7 

218.2 

1,137.4 

185.5 

0.0 

11.135 

196  1 

NA  =  not  applicable. 

1 

. 

78 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


al  officials  (including  the  Attorney 
eral  in  January),  and  the  judiciary's 
uctance  to  rule  on  extradition  and 
■cotics  cases  are  ample  evidence  of 

continuing  pressure.  We  are  re- 
jsting  $5.95  million  in  military  as- 
bance  for  FY  1989. 

Ecuador  is  a  friendly  democracy 
;h  a  generally  open,  market-based 
nomy.  Civil  and  political  rights  are 
ipected.  In  recent  years,  rapid  but 
svenly  distributed  economic  growth 
strained  Ecuador's  social  system, 
government  was  successful  in  its 
3-86  campaign  to  defeat  and  disman- 
the  violent  urban  terrorist  group, 
'aro  Lives,  which  had  clandestine  in- 
national  support.  At  the  same  time 
government  maintained  a  generally 
3d  human  rights  record.  Guerrillas 
i  narcotics  traffickers  based  in 
ighboring  Colombia  repeatedly  have 
acked  targets  in  Ecuador.  Although 
presidential  campaign  now  under- 
y  has  been  marked  with  less  partisan 
ilence  than  in  the  past,  sharply  rising 
lation,  increased  unemployment,  and 
^  polarization  fostered  by  political  e.x- 
'mists  could  contribute  to  a  resur- 
nce  of  terrorism  in  the  future. 

Ecuador's  economy  depends  heavily 
crude  oil  exports.  Both  the  govern- 
nt's  overall  budget  and  the  armed 
•ces'  budget  derive  more  than  half 
3ir  income  from  petroleum  exports, 
e  collapse  of  oil  prices  in  1986  halved 
pected  petroleum  revenues.  Oil  pro- 
ction  was  stopped  for  6  months  in 
S7  because  of  earthquake  damage  to 
e  trans-Ecuador  pipeline  system, 
lese  events  led  to  a  severe  financial 
isis  that  is  expected  to  affect  govern- 
?nt  accounts  and  the  military's  read- 
?ss  for  several  years. 

MAP  will  partially  fund  purchases 
vehicles,  arms,  and  equipment  for  a 
iformed  military  counterinsurgency 
oup,  which  would  be  used  to  combat 
ui-gents  and  control  the  northern 
nifi-  areas.  The  FY  1989  request  is 
r  $26.2  million  for  economic  aid  and 
.65  million  for  military  assistance. 

Our  fundamental  interest  is  to  sup- 
irt  democracy  in  Peru  while  helping 
,e  country  meet  the  challenges  of  ter- 
irism  and  entrenched  narcotics  traf- 
:king.  As  we  seek  to  improve  dialogue 
ith  Peru  on  the  management  of  its 
;onomic  and  debt  crises,  we  need  to 
'fer  development  assistance  and  en- 
mrage  structural  reforms  as  well.  We 
ISO  seek  to  counter  the  influence  of  the 
irgest  Soviet  presence  in  South  Amer- 
:a.  The  United  States  supports  Peru's 


antinarcotics  efforts,  cooperating 
through  interdiction  operations  and 
through  coca  eradication.  MAP,  ESF, 
and  development  assistance  are  impor- 
tant components  of  the  framework  of 
bilateral  cooperation.  The  request  for 
Peru  is  for  $25.9  million  for  PL  480, 
$15.3  million  for  development  as- 
sistance, and  $2  million  for  ESF,  with 
$560,000  for  IMET.  The  total  request  is 
for  $43.76  million. 

Southern  Cone 

In  the  countries  of  South  America's 
important  southern  cone,  we  are  seek- 
ing to  help  consolidate  democracy 
where  it  now  exists  in  Argentina  and 
Uruguay;  and  we  are  doing  what  we 
can  to  promote  the  transition  to  democ- 
racy in  Chile  and  Paraguay,  whose  peo- 
ples still  live  under  authoritarian 
governments. 

After  7  years  of  controversial  mili- 
tary rule  and  an  unsuccessful  war, 
Argentina  returned  to  civilian  rule  in 
1983.  The  civilian  democratic  govern- 
ment of  President  Raul  Alfonsin  is  con- 
fronting the  formidable  tasks  of 
restoring  national  unity  and  economic 
prosperity  in  the  wake  of  a  period  of 
military  rule  and  the  international  debt 
crisis.  One  significant  factor  in  main- 
taining a  thriving  democracy  in  Argen- 
tina is  continued  improvement  in  civil- 
military  relations  and  improved,  re- 
sponsible civilian  control.  The  United 
States  can  assist  by  encouraging  mili- 
tary professionalism,  stressing  civilian 
primacy  in  our  defense  and  security  re- 
lationships with  the  Argentine  military, 
assisting  in  military  modernization,  and 
maintaining  good  bilateral  relationships 
with  the  democratic  government.  Our 
request  is  for  $125,000  in  IMET. 

The  military  in  Paraguay  has  al- 
ways had  a  central  political  role  and  can 
be  expected  to  play  a  crucial  role  in 
future  political  developments.  By  ex- 
posing the  Paraguayan  Armed  Forces 
to  the  alternative  pattern  of  military 
norms  represented  by  U.S.  forces,  we 
hope  that  IMET  programs  will  encour- 
age Pai-aguay's  military  to  play  a  mod- 
erating role  and  will  enable  us  to 
challenge  them  to  do  better. 

The  proposed  IMET  program 
($125,000  requested)  for  Paraguay  will 
be  used  to  provide  technical  courses, 
professional  military  education,  man- 
agement training,  and  English- 
language  training. 


Uruguay's  economy  has  improved 
slightly  since  1984,  but  the  country  will 
continue  to  face  budgetary  constraints 
as  it  moves  to  address  serious  economic 
problems.  The  civilian  government  has 
reacted  responsibly  to  its  economic 
problems,  particularly  its  sizable  exter- 
nal debt.  U.S.  assistance  will  help  pre- 
serve the  military's  institutional 
integrity  and  professionalism  and  is 
strongly  and  repeatedly  sought  by  Uru- 
guay's civilian  democratic  political 
leaders. 

The  Uruguayan  military  seeks  to 
resume  its  traditional,  nonpolitical  role 
in  a  democratic  society  and  needs  as- 
sistance in  meeting  its  equipment  and 
training  needs.  After  years  of  neglect, 
military  hardware  is  in  such  poor  condi- 
tion that  continued  safe  operation  is 
threatened.  Ti'aining  opportunities  are 
limited.  Domestic  budgetary  pressures 
are  expected  to  be  intense,  as  the  mili- 
tary contends  with  other  elements  in 
the  domestic  budget  allocation  process. 
IMET  ($125,000  requested)  is  an  essen- 
tial element  in  carrying  out  U.S.  policy 
goals. 

Brazil  returned  to  civilian  rule  in 
1985  after  21  years  of  military  govern- 
ment. The  United  States  wishes  to  en- 
courage consolidation  of  democracy  by 
offering  military  training  through 
IMET.  Exposure  to  U.S.  military  pro- 
fessional education,  doctrine,  and  train- 
ing will  aid  the  professionalization  of 
the  Brazilian  military.  Overall,  the 
United  States  should  continue  to 
strengthen  its  bilateral  ties  to  Latin 
America's  largest  country,  where  the 
military  does  and  will  play  a  major  po- 
litical role.  The  request  is  for  $125,000 
in  IMET. 

Mexico 

A  secure,  friendly  Mexico  is  essential 
to  U.S.  national  interests.  Our  interde- 
pendent relationship  crosses  a  range  of 
issues  with  international  implications. 
Among  the  U.S.  objectives  in  Mexico 
are:  democratic  values  and  the  mainte- 
nance of  an  apolitical  military;  expand- 
ing U.S.  cooperation  with  military, 
political,  and  cultural  leaders;  strength- 
ening the  Mexican  military's  capability 
to  combat  drug  trafficking;  and  assist- 
ing in  the  development  of  a  professional 
military  able  to  guarantee  the  country's 
security.  The  IMET  program  ($225,000 
requested)  helps  to  improve  military-to- 
military  ties  as  well  as  professional- 
ization. 


Ilpartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1988 


79 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Caribbean 

Jamaica  is  important  to  the  United 
States  because  of  its  location  along  vital 
sealanes,  the  ability  of  its  government 
to  influence  opinion  in  the  English- 
speaking  Caribbean,  and  its  role  as  a 
major  source  of  bauxite.  The  United 
States  has  a  very  close  relationship 
with  the  present  Jamaican  Government. 

The  Jamaican  Defense  Force  (JDF), 
with  the  support  of  U.S.  military  as- 
sistance, is  capable  of  performing  its 
role  of  maintaining  internal  order  to 
protect  the  democratic  process  and  par- 
ticipating in  narcotics  interdiction  and 
eradication  efforts.  Our  military  as- 
sistance also  will  foster  a  continued 
close  relationship  between  the  JDF  and 
the  U.S.  military  and  will  promote  the 
JDF's  ability  and  willingness  to  partici- 
pate in  joint  operations. 

The  Jamaican  Government  con- 
tinues to  pursue  a  politically  risky  eco- 
nomic stabilization  program  that  since 
mid-1986  has  moved  the  country  toward 
self-sustaining  economic  growth.  By 
providing  modest  amounts  of  as- 
sistance, we  help  sustain  this  process 
and  demonstrate  to  other  countries  in 
the  region  that  the  United  States  is 
committed  to  economic  refoi'm.  The  Ja- 
maican example,  if  successful,  will  en- 
courage governments  to  undertake  the 
political  risks  necessary  to  implement 
long  overdue  economic  reforms.  The 
total  request  is  for  $76.4  million,  of 
which  $72.6  million  is  for  economic 
assistance. 

The  Dominican  Republic  is  the 
most  populous  democratic  island  state 
in  the  Caribbean  and  a  trusted  and  reli- 
able friend  of  the  United  States.  It  has 
cooperated  closely  with  the  United 
States,  particularly  on  narcotics  mat- 
ters and  on  key  issues  in  international 
fora.  The  goals  of  the  United  States  are 
to  promote  and  strengthen  democratic 
institutions  in  the  Dominican  Republic, 
to  support  private-sector  economic 
growth,  and  to  foster  increased  bilat- 
eral cooperation. 

The  Dominican  Republic  is  strate- 
gically located  amid  the  waterways  of 
the  Caribbean,  halfway  between  the 
United  States  and  South  America. 
Maintenance  of  democracy  and  a  stable 
economic  environment  there  are  key  to 
the  preservation  of  U.S.  interests.  U.S. 
goals  with  respect  to  the  military  are  to 
promote  professionalism  and  institu- 
tionalism  in  the  armed  forces  and  to 
assist  in  the  modernization  of  military 
equipment. 


80 


Arms  Transfers  to  Latin  America, 
1982-86,  By  Major  Supplier 


Czechoslovaki 
($405M)  2% 


Other 
($3,545M)  21  % 


France 
($790M)  5% 


Soviet  Union 
($8,120M)  47% 


Poland 
($135M)  1 

United  Sta 
($1,695M)  1 

United  Kingd 
($100M)  1°/ 

West  Germany 
($2,370M)  14% 


After  several  years  of  economic 
growth  and  stability,  the  Dominican 
economy  has  deteriorated  because  of  in- 
appropriate monetary,  fiscal,  and  ex- 
change rate  policies.  From  June  to 
November  1987,  unrealistic  exchange 
rates  caused  legally  converted  exchange 
receipts  to  fall  from  an  average  of  $6 
million  per  day  to  less  than  $250,000. 
Additional  economic  reform  is  required 
if  inflation,  which  now  exceeds  30%, 
and  mounting  external  debts,  equal  to 
about  75%  of  GDP,  are  to  be  controlled. 

Current  government  monetary  pol- 
icies also  have  adversely  affected  do- 
mestic stability.  Rising  food  and  basic 
commodity  prices  have  resulted  in  a  se- 
ries of  strikes  and  sporadic  civil  dis- 
turbances. The  government  is  striving 
simultaneously  to  increase  employment 
and  to  develop  economic  policy  reforms 
that  will  address  the  recognized  struc- 
tural weaknesses  in  the  economy.  With- 
out substantial  help,  however,  the 
chances  for  an  economic  turnaround  in 
the  medium  term  are  low.  The  FY  1989 
request  is  for  $76.3  million,  including 
$73.6  million  for  economic  assistance. 


The  seven  independent  eastern 
Caribbean  countries  (Antigua  and 
buda,  Barbados,  Dominica,  Grenad: 
St.  Christopher  and  Nevis,  St.  Luc 
and  St.  Vincent  and  the  Grenadines 
are  significant  to  the  United  States 
their  strategic  location,  commitmen 
democratic  institutions  and  private 
sector-led  economic  growth,  assista 
in  combatting  narcotics  trafficking, 
port  in  international  organizations, 
efforts  to  develop  an  effective  regie 
security  system. 

U.S.  security  assistance  aims  t 
enhance  the  viability  of  these  friem 
democratic  states  by  helping  them 
dress  their  economic  development 
needs  and  by  supporting  regional 
efforts  to  create  a  mechanism  for  n 
tual  self-protection.  Their  small, 
commodity-dependent  economies  n" 
them  extremely  vulnerable  to  the  ^ 
aries  of  world  markets,  especially  f 
traditional  exports.  Disparities  in  ( 
velopment,  as  demonstrated  by  pei 
capita  incomes  ranging  from  $1,000 
St.  Vincent  and  the  Grenadines  to 
$4,600  for  Barbados  have  strained 
islands'  economic,  social,  and  politi 
structures. 


■i 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  Bit! 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


The  eastern  Caribbean  needs 
ater  infrastructure  development  in 
ler  to  attract  new  private  investment 
d  take  full  advantage  of  Caribbean 
sin  Initiative  (CBI)  benefits.  The  is- 
ids  of  the  Organization  of  Eastern 
ribbean  States  (OECS)  are  moving 
establish  a  regional  office  in  the 
lited  States  to  attract  American 
restment.  High  unemployment,  par- 
ularly  among  youth,  increases  sus- 
ptibility  to  the  negative  influences  of 
rcotics  trafficking.  The  United  States 
working  closely  with  European  Com- 
inity  governments  to  combat  the  il- 
it  drug  trade  through  the  area. 

An  integral  part  of  U.S.  policy  is 
improve  search  and  rescue  and  re- 
ed capabilities  among  the  island  na- 
ms.  Our  MAP  ($5  million  requested) 
d  IMET  ($400,000  requested)  pro- 
ams,  in  conjunction  with  British  sup- 
rt,  also  train  local  security  forces  and 
ast  guards  to  deal  with  small-scale 
,'al  and  external  security  threats.  The 
lited  States  continues  to  work  closely 
th  eastern  Caribbean  governments  to 
velop  an  effective  indigenous  defense 
pability  through  the  regional  security 
stem.  The  total  request  is  for  $40.6 
Uion. 

The  Latin  America  and  Caribbean 
gional  program  supports  a  variety  of 
cial,  economic,  and  political  develop- 
3nt  needs  best  addressed  on  a  re- 
Dnal  basis.  In  addition,  several 
ejects  affect  some  countries — Mexico, 
•azil,  and  Colombia,  for  example — 
nere  there  are  no  bilateral  AID  pro- 
ams.  The  regional  program  focuses 
1  administration  of  justice  and  human 
,|hts,  education  and  training,  health, 
:riculture  and  agribusiness,  and 
■ivate-sector  support. 

Individual  projects  in  these  areas 
e  designed  to  reinforce  the  interde- 
mdent  U.S.  policy  objectives  of 
rengthening  democracy  and  improv- 
g  the  living  conditions  of  people 
.roughout  this  hemisphere. 


EW  DIRECTIONS 

he  Changing  Balance  in  the  Region 

started  this  presentation  noting  the 
nportance  of  this  hemisphere  to  our 
ational  well-being.  Yet  in  some  key 
reas,  the  United  States  no  longer 
lays  an  effective  role.  Recent  patterns 
f  foreign  arms  deliveries  to  Latin 
imerica  reveal  that  the  United  States, 


whose  policies  are  presumed  to  be  mili- 
tarily oriented  and  thus  are  the  source 
of  criticism  in  some  quarters,  has  for 
some  years  been  at  best  a  minor  player 
in  comparison  to  other  arms  suppliers. 
Ominously,  it  is  the  Soviet  bloc,  not 
Western  countries  like  West  Germany 
or  the  United  Kingdom,  that  has  made 
the  most  significant  gains.  How  many 
Americans  are  aware  that  the  Warsaw 
Pact  now  provides  more  military  sup- 
plies to  the  countries  in  our  hemisphere 
than  the  United  States  and  all  the 
countries  of  NATO  combined? 

The  Changing  Balance 
Among  Regions 

Central  America  has  received  as- 
sistance at  levels  close  to  those  recom- 
mended by  the  Kissinger  commission. 
These  levels  are  substantially  higher 
than  the  historic  average  for  that  area. 

South  America,  in  contrast,  re- 
ceives relatively  fewer  resources  than 
in  the  past.  South  America — which  in- 
cludes the  exploding  continental  nation 


of  Brazil,  the  agricultural  pampas  of 
Argentina,  and  the  Pacific  rim  lands  of 
the  Andes  as  well  as  the  Caribbean 
Basin  lands  of  Venezuela  and  Colom- 
bia— now  receives  less  than  one  quarter 
as  much  U.S.  aid  as  Africa.  The  rela- 
tive development  of  South  America  and 
the  absence  of  general  crises  justify 
this.  At  the  same  time,  we  have  to 
wonder  what  implications  this  has  for 
our  role  in  the  hemisphere. 

Democratic  Institution-Building 

Budgetary  constraints  have  helped  lead 
us  to  explore  new  ideas  for  practical 
and  concrete  steps  that  we  can  take  to 
demonstrate  support  for  our  democratic 
allies. 

Strengthening  the  administration 
of  justice  in  democracies  in  Latin 
America  and  the  Caribbean  remains  a 
long-term  goal.  The  Congress  recog- 
nized the  promise  of  projects  initiated 
to  date  by  extending  authority  for  the 
program  for  another  2  years.  The  Ad- 
ministration hopes  that  the  terminal 


FY  1989  Request  for  U.S.  Economic  & 
Military  Assistance  to  South  America  Vs. 
Other  Selected  Regions* 


Billions 


Egypt        Other 
&  Middle 

Israel         East 


Africa     East  Asia     South 
&  America 

Pacific 


includes:  Development  assistance,  ESF,  PL-480,  FMS,  MAP,  IMET, 
international  narcotics,  Peace  Corps. 


lepartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1988 


81 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


date  eventually  will  be  removed  since 
progress  in  the  strengthening  of  demo- 
cratic institutions  cannot  be  measured 
in  1-year  or  2-year  intervals.  The  Ad- 
ministration also  is  pleased  that  the 
Congress  approved  a  modest  clarifica- 
tion and  expansion  of  the  authority  for 
this  program  last  year  We  believe  this 
program  is  an  important  means  for  im- 
proving the  observance  of  political  and 
human  rights. 

The  continuing  resolution  adopted 
in  December  gave  us  important  new  au- 
thority for  cooperation  with  South 
America's  two  largest  democracies.  The 
continuing  resolution  explicitly  permits 
Brazil  and  Argentina  to  participate  in 
military  (IMET)  and  civilian  training 
activities  funded  under  the  Foreign  As- 
sistance Act  as  long  as  they  have  demo- 
cratically elected  governments.  This 
gives  us  a  vehicle  for  involving  these 
two  countries  in  ongoing  regional  train- 
ing efforts — such  as  the  administration 
of  justice  program  and  IMET. 

IMET-supported  training  is  an  ef- 
fective way  of  supporting  democracy, 
useful  for  building  long-term  rela- 
tionships that  strengthen  civilian- 
military  cooperation.  It  demonstrates 
our  support  for  the  consolidation  of  de- 
mocracy as  an  integrated  effort. 

The  penal  law  reform  underway  in 
Argentina,  or  perhaps  the  growth  of 
grassroots  organizations  in  Brazil  over 
the  last  few  years,  may  offer  interest- 
ing focal  points  for  regional  training 
efforts  aimed  at  enhancing  regional 
cooperation  in  the  strengthening  of 
democratic  institutions. 

We  are  working  within  the  inter- 
agency context  on  a  strategy  for  AID- 
funded  democratic  development  proj- 
ects in  the  region — including  leadership 
training,  strengthening  of  justice  and 
electoral  systems,  and  professionaliza- 
tion  of  legislative  staff. 

We  also  are  exploring  the  design  of 
a  program  that  could  become  the  first 
integrated  project  for  strengthening  de- 
mocracy in  South  America — "integra- 
ted" because  it  combines  administration 
of  justice  with  other  democratic  pro- 
gram elements,  including  support  for 
the  electoral  process  and  possibly  as- 
sistance to  the  legislature. 


The  War  on  Drugs 

We  cannot  overemphasize  that  the  war 
on  drugs  is  a  transnational  problem 
that  requires  an  unprecedented  level  of 
international  cooperation.  How  the 
United  States  deals  with  illegal  narcot- 
ics will  affect  our  government's  ability 
to  resolve  many  other  serious  issues 
that  confront  us  and  the  nations  of 
Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean. 

Only  the  widest  possible  coopera- 
tion among  the  governments  in  the 
hemisphere — cooperation  that  mobilizes 
all  the  resources  potentially  available  to 
us — will  enable  us  to  beat  the  narcotics 
traffickers  in  this  increasingly  dan- 
gerous high  stakes  conflict. 

National  economic  difficulties  and 
scarcity  of  resources  create  competing 
demands  on  limited  military  and  police 
forces  that  often  lack  appropriate 
equipment  and  training.  Even  without 
additional  complicating  factors,  such  as 
the  traffickers  and  the  corruption  and 


intimidation  their  power  permits,  thl 
means  that  our  friends  often  appear  ; 
effective  in  the  war  against  the  traf- 
fickers. This  in  turn  has  weakened  tl 
political  will  of  some  to  stay  in  the 
fight. 

But  this  is  not  a  fight  from  whicl 
we  can  walk  away.  We  must  understa 
the  problems  and  ask  ourselves  what 
we  can  do  to  keep  an  already  grave  a 
worsening  situation  from  deterioratirj 
still  further. 

The  democratic  ideal  is  universa 
its  practice  is  increasingly  the  stuff  c 
life  and  politics  throughout  Latin 
America.  Most  of  Latin  America's  de 
ocrats  know  they  can  count  on  U.S. 
support  now;  it  is  imperative  that  th 
be  able  to  count  on  our  support  in  tl 
future. 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
JULY  15,  1988' 

The  President  is  pleased  with  the  over- 
whelming, bipartisan  votes  of  the  Sen- 
ate and  the  House  of  Representatives 
condemning  the  outrageous  actions  of 
the  Sandinista  government  of  Nic- 
aragua. These  votes  send  the  message 
to  the  Sandinistas  that  the  United 
States  is  firmly  committed  to  the 
achievement  of  freedom  and  democracy 
in  Nicaragua. 

Just  this  week,  the  Sandinistas 
have  shut  down  the  two  media  outlets 
for  free  expression  in  Nicaragua,  the 
newspaper  La  Preiisa  and  Catholic  Ra- 
dio. And  they  have  brutally  suppressed 
a  peaceful  demonstration  for  human 
rights,  arrested  leaders  of  the  demo- 
cratic opposition,  and  expelled  the  U.S. 
Ambassador  and  much  of  his  staff. 

The  Sandinistas  continue  to  snuff 
out  any  hope  for  democratic  reform  in 
Nicaragua,  despite  the  solemn  promises 
to  establish  democracy  that  they  have 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hea 
ings  will  be  published  by  the  committei 
and  will  be  available  from  the  Superinti 
ent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Government _Pi 
ing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


Situation  in  Nicaragua 


made  and  broken  repeatedly  in  the 
ade  since  they  seized  power.  They  c 
tinue  to  oppress  the  Nicaraguan  pe( 
and  receive  substantial  Soviet  bloc 
tary  shipments.  The  Sandinistas'  co 
duct  makes  clear  that  they  will  not 
institute  democratic  reform  and  cea 
their  threats  to  the  security  of  Cen 
America  unless  effectively  pressure 
and  persuaded  to  do  so.  To  achieve 
mocracy  in  Nicaragua  and  security 
all  of  Central  America  clearly  requ: 
a  viable  and  effective  Nicaraguan  d 
ocratic  resistance. 

When  the  Congress  returns,  tl 
President  hopes  they  will  move  swi 
to  enact  legislation  currently  being 
mulated  in  the  Senate  for  further  a 
the  resistance. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  July  18,  19^ 


82 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  oi 


TREATIES 


Cirrent  Actions 


III  LATERAL 


It  ion  on  offenses  and  certain  other 
iiimitted  on  board  aircraft.  Done  at 
-rpt.  14.  1963.  Entered  into  force 
1%9.  TIAS  6768. 
'•n  deposited:  Cameroon,  Mar  24. 

'  Kpn  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful 
iinst  the  safety  of  civil  aviation. 
Montreal  Sept.  23,  1971.  Entered 
-  r  .Jan.  26,  1973.  TIAS  7570. 
ill  deposited:  Yemen  (Aden), 
',    19^SS.' 

•  \  relating  to  an  amendment  to  the 
inn  on  international  civil  aviation 
!'i91).  Done  at  Montreal  Sept.  30, 

It  ions  deposited:  Ecuador,  Apr.  22, 
S;  Niger,  Apr  8,  1988. 

■toeol  relating  to  an  amendment  to  the 

vention  on  international  civil  aviation 

AS  1.591).  Done  at  Montreal  Oct.  6, 

0.^ 

:ifications  deposited:  Guyana,  May  2, 

8:  Niger,  Apr.  8,  1988:  U.S.S.R., 

).  3,  1988. 

itocol  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful 
s  of  violence  at  airports  serving  interna- 
lal  civil  aviation,  supplementary  to  the 
vention  of  Sept.  23,  1971  (TIAS  7570). 
lie  at  Montreal  Feb.  24,  1988.-  [Senate] 
-aty  Doc.  100-19. 

natures:  France,  Mar  29,  1988,'  Greece, 
r.  18,  1988;  Ivory  Coast,  Mar.  21,  1988; 
rshall  Islands,  June  23,  1988; 
therlands,  Apr  13,  1988.-' 

mmodities — Common  Fund 

reenient  establishing  the  Common  Fund 
Commodities,  with  schedules.  Done  at 
neva  June  27,  1980.- 
tification  deposited:  Cuba,  July  21,  1988. 

nservation 

nvention  on  the  conservation  of  Ant- 
•tic  marine  living  resources,  with  anne.x. 
■ne  at  Canberra  May  20,  1980.  Entered 
,0  force  Apr.  7,  1982'.  TIAS  10240. 
cession  deposited:  Canada,  July  1,  1988. 

ntainers 

ternational  convention  for  safe  con- 
iners,  with  anne.xes,  as  amended.  Done 
Geneva  Dec.  2,  1972.  Entered  into  force 
pt.  6,  1977;  for  the  U.S.  Jan.  3,  1979. 
AS  9037,  10220. 
cession  deposited:  Greece,  June  28, 


istoms 

nvi-ntion  establishing  a  Customs  Cooper- 
ion  Council,  with  anne.x.  Done  at 

ussels  Dec.  15,  1950.  Entered  into  force 

ov.  4,  1952;  for  the  U.S.  Nov.  5,  1970. 

IAS  7063. 

ccession  deposited:  Gambia,  Oct.  14, 

'87. 


Environmental  Modification 

Convention  on  the  prohibition  of  military 
or  any  other  hostile  use  of  environmental 
modification  techniques,  with  annex.  Done 
at  Geneva  May  18,  1977.  Entered  into  force 
Oct.  5,  1978;  for  the  U.S.  Jan.  17,  1970. 
TIAS  9614. 

Accession  deposited:  Switzerland,  Aug.  5, 
1988. 

International  Court  of  Justice 

Declaration  recognizing  as  compulsory  ju- 
risdiction of  the  International  Court  of  Jus- 
tice under  Art.  36.  para.  2  of  the  statute  of 
the  Court.  59  Stat.  1055;  TS  993. 
Declaration  deposited  Cyprus,  Apr.  22, 
1988. ^ 

Judicial  Procedures — Child  Abduction 

Convention  on  the  civil  aspects  of  interna- 
tional child  abduction.  Done  at  The  Hague 
Oct.  25,  1980.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  1, 
1983;  for  the  U.S.  July  1,  1988.  [Senate] 
Treaty  Doe.  99-11. 

Ratification  deposited:  Austria,  July  14, 
1988.-' 

Marine  Pollution 

International  convention  relating  to  inter- 
vention on  the  high  seas  in  cases  of  oil 
pollution  casualties,  with  annex.  Done  at 
Brussels  Nov.  29,  1969.  Entered  into  force 
May  6,  1975.  TIAS  8068. 
Accession  deposited:  Qatar,  June  2,  1988. 

International  convention  on  civil  liability 

for  oil  pollution  damage.  Done  at  Brussels 

Nov.  29,  1969.  Entered  into  force  June  19, 

1975.5 

Accession  deposited:  Qatar,  June  2,  1988. 

International  convention  on  the  establish- 
ment of  an  international  fund  for  compen- 
sation for  oil  pollution  damage.  Done  at 
Brussels  Dec.  18,  1971.  Entered  into  force 
Oct.  16,  1978.5 
Accession  deposited:  Qatar,  June  2,  1988. 

Protocol  of  1978  relating  to  the  interna- 
tional convention  for  the  prevention  of  pol- 
lution from  ships,  1973.  Done  at  London 
Feb.  17,  1978.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  2, 
1983. 

Accessions  deposited:  Austria,  May  27, 
1988;  Burma,  May  4,  1988;^  Marshall  Is- 
lands, Apr.  26,  1988. 
Territorial  application:  Extended  by  the 
U.K.  to  Bermuda,  with  effect  from  June 
23,  1988.' 

Annex  V  to  the  international  convention 
for  the  prevention  of  pollution  from  ships, 
1973.  Done  at  London  Nov.  2,  1973.  Enters 
into  force  Dec.  31,  1988. 
Acceptances  deposited:  Austria,  May  27, 
1988,  Marshall  Islands,  Apr.  26,  1988; 
Netherlands,  Apr.  19,  1988. » 
Territorial  application:  Extended  by  the 
U.K.  to  the  Cayman  Islands  and  Bermuda, 
with  effect  from  June  23,  1988. 

Maritime  Matters 

International  convention  on  load  lines, 
1966.  Done  at  London  Apr  5,  1966.  En- 
tered into  force  July  21,  1968.  TIAS  6331, 
6629,  6720. 


Accession  deposited:  Marshall  Islands, 
Apr  2(i,  1988. 

Territorial  application:  Extended  by  the 
U.K.  to  the  Cayman  Islands,  with  effect 
from  June  23,  1988. 

Amendments  to  the  international  conven- 
tion on  load  lines,  1966  (TIAS  6331,  6629, 
6720).  Done  at  London  Nov.  17,  1983.- 
Acceptances  deposited:  Peru,  July  11,  1988; 
Syria,  July  13,  1988. 

International  convention  on  tonnage  meas- 
urement of  ships,  1969,  with  annexes.  Done 
at  London  June  23,  1969.  Entered  into 
force  July  18,  1982;  for  the  U.S.  Feb.   10, 
1983.  TIAS  10490. 
Accession  deposited:  Burma,  May  4,  1988. 

Convention  on  the  international  regulations 
for  preventing  collisions  at  sea,  1972,  as 
amended.  Done  at  London  Oct.  20,  1972. 
Entered  into  force  July  15,  1977.  TIAS 
8587,  10672. 

Accession  deposited:  Marshall  Islands, 
Apr.  26,  1988. 

International  convention  for  the  safety  of 
life  at  sea,  1974,  with  annex.  Done  at  Lon- 
don Nov.  1,  1974.  Entered  into  force 
May  25,  1980.  TIAS  9700. 

Protocol  of  1978  relating  to  the  interna- 
tional convention  for  the  safety  of  life  at 
sea  (TIAS  9700).  Done  at  London  Feb.  17. 
1978.  Entered  into  force  Mav  1,  1981.  TIAS 
10009. 

Accessions  deposited:  Austria,  May  27, 
1988. 

Territorial  application:  Extended  by  the 
U.K.  to  Bermuda,  with  effect  from 
June  23,  1988. 

International  convention  on  maritime 
search  and  rescue,  1979,  with  annex.  Done 
at  Hamburg  Apr.  27,  1979.  Entered  into 
force  June  22.  1985. 

Accessions  deposited:  Jamaica,  June  10, 
1988;  Peru,  July  4,  1988. 

Nuclear  Material — Physical  Protection 

Convention  on  the  physical  protection  of 
nuclear  material,  with  annexes.  Done  at 
Vienna  Oct.  26.  1979.  Entered  into  force 
Feb.  8,  1987. 
Accession  deposited:  Mexico,  Apr.  4,  1988. 

Phonograms 

Convention  for  the  protection  of  producers 
of  phonograms  against  unauthorized  du- 
plication of  their  phonograms.  Done  at 
Geneva  Oct.  29,  1971.  Entered  into  force 
Apr.  18,  1973;  for  the  U.S.  Mar.  10,  1974. 
TIAS  7808. 

Accession  deposited:  Trinidad  and  Tobago, 
June  27,  1988, 

Pollution 

Convention  for  the  protection  of  the  ozone 
layer,  with  annexes.  Done  at  Vienna 
Mar.  22,  1985.  Enters  into  force  Sept.  22, 
1988.  [Senate]  Treaty  Doc.  99-9. 
Accession  deposited:  Spain,  July  25,  1988. 

Montreal  protocol  on  substances  that  de- 
plete the  ozone  layer,  with  annex.  Done  at 
Montreal  Sept.  16,  1987.-  [Senate]  Treaty 
Doc.  100-10. 


ipartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1988 


83 


TREATIES 


Signatures:  Indonesia,  Spain,  .July  21, 

1988. 

Ratification  deposited:  Egypt,  Aug.  2, 

1988;  New  Zealand,  July  21,  1988. 

Property — Industrial 

Convention  revising  the  Paris  convention  of 
Mar.  20,  1883,  as  revised,  for  the  protec- 
tion of  industrial  property.  Done  at  Stock- 
holm Julv  14,  1967.  Entered  into  force 
Apr.  26,'l970;  for  the  U.S.  Sept.  5,  1970, 
e.xcept  for  Arts.  1-12  which  entered  into 
force  May  19,  1970;  for  the  U.S.  Aug.  25, 
1973.  TIAS  6923. 

Accessions  deposited:  Malaysia,  June  23, 
1988;  Trinidad  and  Tobago,  May  16,  1988. 

Property — Intellectual 

Convention  establishing  the  World  Intellec- 
tual Property  Organization.  Done  at  Stock- 
holm July  14,  1967.  Entered  into  force 
Apr.  26,"l970;  for  the  U.S.  Aug.  25,  1970. 
TIAS  6932. 

Accessions  deposited:  Swaziland,  May  18, 
1988;  Trinidad  and  Tobago,  May  16,  1988. 

Satellite  Communications  Systems 

International  COSPAS-SARSAT  [search 
and  rescue  satellite  system]  program 
agreement.  Done  at  Paris  July  1,  1988. ^ 
Signatures:  Canada,  France,  U.S.S.R., 
U.S.,  July  1,  1988. 

Sugar 

International  sugar  agreement,  1987,  with 

anne.xes.  Done  at  London  Sept.  11,  1987. 

Entered  into  force  provisionally  Mar.  24, 

1988. 

Ratification  deposited:  Finland,  Aug.  3, 

1988. 

Terrorism 

Convention  on  the  prevention  and  punish- 
ment of  crimes  against  internationally  pro- 
tected persons,  including  diplomatic 
agents.  Done  at  New  York  Dec.  14,  1973. 
Entered  into  force  Feb.  20,  1977.  TIAS 
8532. 
Accession  deposited:  China,  Aug.  5,  1987.' 

International  convention  against  the  taking 
of  hostages.  Done  at  New  York  Dec.  17, 
1979.  Entered  into  force  June  3,  1983;  for 
the  U.S.  Jan.  6,  1985. 

Accession  deposited:  Ecuador,  May  2,  1988; 
Oman,  July  22,  1988. 

Timber 

International  tropical  timber  agreement, 

1983,  with  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva 
Nov.   18,  1983.  Entered  into  force  provi- 
sionally Apr.  1,  1985;  for  the  U.S.  Apr.  26, 
1985. 

Ratification  deposited:  Greece,  July  26, 
1988. 

Torture 

Convention  against  torture  and  other 
cruel,  inhuman,  or  degrading  treatment  or 
punishment.  Done  at  New  York  Dec.  10, 

1984.  Entered  into  force  June  26,  1987.= 
[Senate!  Treaty  Doc.  100-20. 
Signature:  Nigeria,  July  28,  1988. 


84 


Ratification  deposited:  Turkey,  Aug.  2, 
1988. 

Trade 

United  Nations  convention  on  contracts  for 
the  international  sale  of  goods.  Done  at 
Vienna  Apr.  11,  1980.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  1,  1988.  [52  Fed.  Reg.  6262] 
Ratification  deposited:  Norway,  July  20, 
1988. 

Transportation — P'oodstuffs 

Agreement  on  the  international  carriage  of 
perishable  foodstuffs  and  on  the  special 
equipment  to  be  used  for  such  carriage 
(ATP),  with  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva 
Sept.  1,  1970.  Entered  into  force  Nov.  21, 
1976;  for  the  U.S.  Jan.  20,  1984.  1028 
UNTS  121. 

Accession  deposited:  Portugal,  Aug.  15, 
1988. 

Wheat 

Wheat  trade  convention,  1986.  Done  at 
London  Mar.  14,  1986.  Entered  into  force 
July  1,  1986;  definitively  for  the  U.S. 
Jan.  27,  1988.  [Senate]  Treaty  Doc.  100-1. 
Ratification  deposited:  Egypt,  July  12, 
1988. 


BILATERAL 

Bangladesh 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Apr.  17,  1987,  as  amended,  for  sales  of  ag- 
ricultural commodities.  Effected  by  e.x- 
change  of  letters  at  Dhaka  June  25,  1988. 
Entered  into  force  June  25,  1988. 

Benin 

International  express  mail  agreement,  with 
detailed  regulations.  Signed  at  Cotonou 
and  Washington  July  6  and  26,  1988.  En- 
tered into  force  Sept.  15,  1988. 

Brazil 

Swap  agreement  between  the  U.S.  Treas- 
ury and  the  Central  Bank  of  Brazil/Govern- 
ment of  Brazil,  with  memorandum  of 
understanding.  Signed  at  Washington  and 
Rio  de  Janeiro  July  15,  1988.  Entered  into 
force  July  15,  1988. 

Canada 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of 
Mar.  13,  1986,  concerning  an  experimental 
transborder  air  services  program.  Effected 
by  exchange  of  notes  at  Ottawa  June  22, 
1988.  Entered  into  force  June  22,  1988;  ef- 
fective Aug.  21,  1987. 

Costa  Rica 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Jan.  14,  1987,  for  the  sale  of  agricultural 
commodities.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  San  Jose  July  2  and  7,  1987.  En- 
tered into  force  July  7,  1987. 

Cyprus 

Agreement  concerning  reciprocal  exemp- 
tion from  income  tax  of  income  derived 


from  the  international  operation  of  ships 
and  aircraft.  Effected  by  exchange  of  no' 
at  Nicosia  June  21  and  July  8,  1988.  En- 
tered into  force  July  8,  1988;  with  respec 
to  taxable  vears  beginning  on  or  after 
Jan.   1,  1987. 

France 

Protocol  to  the  convention  of  July  28,  19( 
with  respect  to  taxes  on  income  and  pro 
erty,  as  amended  (TIAS  6518,  7270,  950( 
with  exchange  of  notes.  Signed  at  Paris 
June  16,  1988.  [Senate]  Treaty  Doe.  100- 
Transmitted  to  Senate  for  advice  and  co 
sent:  Aug.  1,  1988. 

Honduras 

Agreement  relating  to  and  amending  th 
agreement  of  Mar.  11,  1987,  for  sales  of 
agricultural  commodities.  Signed  at 
Tegucigalpa  Mar.  7,  1988.  Entered  into 
force  Mar.  7,  1988. 

Hong  Kong 

Agreement  amending  agreement  of  Auj 
1986,  as  amended,  relating  to  trade  in  c 
tain  textile  and  textile  products.  Effect 
by  exchange  of  letters  at  Washington 
July  15  and  20,  1988.  Entered  into  fore. 
July  20,  1988. 

Hungary 

Agreement  amending  agreement  of  Fel 
and  25,  1983  (TIAS  10666),  as  amended 
relating  to  trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and  n 
made  fiber  textiles  and  textile  product; 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Buda] 
June  23  and  Aug.  1,  1988.  Entered  into 
force  Aug.  1,  1988. 

Indonesia 

Convention  for  the  avoidance  of  double 
ation  and  the  prevention  of  fiscal  evasi 
with  respect  to  taxes  on  income,  with 
tocol  and  exchange  of  notes.  Signed  at 
arta  Julv  11,  1988.  [Senate]  Treaty  Dot 
100-22. 

Transmitted  to  the  Senate  for  advice  a 
consent:  Aug.  5,  1988. 

Agreement  on  maritime  search  and  re: 
Signed  at  Jakarta  July  5,  1988.  Entere 
into  force  July  5,  1988. 

Italy 

Memorandum  of  understanding  on  the 
change  of  officers  between  the  U.S.  ar 
the  Italian  Air  Forces.  Signed  at  Rom(  i 
Washington  May  30  and  Aug.  12,  1988.  f, 
tered  into  force  Aug.  12,  1988. 

Kenya 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  o 
Feb.  26,  1988,  for  sales  of  agricultural 
modifies.  Effected  by  exchange  of  left 
at  Nairobi  July  15  and  20,  1988.  Enter 
into  force  July  20,  1988. 

Korea 

Agreement  regarding  the  collection  ar 
exchange  of  data  on  fisheries  harvests 
the  international  waters  of  the  Bering 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Wash 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October 


a 


PRESS  RELEASES 


Apr.  25  and  July  l-I.  1988.  Entered 
ivf  July  14,  1988. 

iliourg 

insport  agreement,  with  annex. 
1  at  Lu.xembourg  Aug,  19,  1986. 
!  into  force:  Aug.  3,  1988. 


ment  concerning  rediversion  of  Rio 

'■  waters  allocated  to  Mexico  under 

'-(■ntion  of  1906  (TS  455).  Effected 

ange  of  notes  at  Mexico  .June  24 

■\.  10,  1987.  Entered  into  force 

.  1987. 

■  nt  extending  the  air  transport 
lit  of  Aug.  15,  1960,  as  amended 
■nded  (TIAS  4675,  7167),  and  the 
iient  of  Jan.  20,  1978,  as  extended, 
iting  to  reduced  air  fares  and  charter 
services  (TIAS  10115).  Effected  by  ex- 
nge  of  notes  at  Mexico  June  30,  1988. 
Lered  into  force  June  30,  1988. 

;herlands 

reement  amending  the  air  transport 
eement  of  Apr.  3,  1957,  as  amended 
AS  4782,  6797,  8998).  Effected  by  ex- 
nge  of  notes  at  Washington  Oct.  13  and 
.".  22,  1987.  Entered  into  force  provi- 
lally,  Dec.  23,  1987. 
ered  into  force  definitively:  Aug.  9, 


eement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
Jities.  Signed  at  Lima  June  28,  1988. 
ered  into  force  June  28,  1988. 

legal 

reement  regarding  the  consolidation  and 
cheduling  of  certain  debts  owed  to, 
iranteed  by,  or  insured  by  the  U.S.  Gov- 
ment  and  its  agencies,  with  annexes, 
ned  at  Dakar  June  10,  1988.  Entered 
3  force  July  28,  1988. 

reement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
dities,  with  memorandum  of  under- 
nding.  Signed  at  Dakar  Aug.  3,  1988. 
tered  into  force  Aug.  3,  1988. 

rra  Leone 

ernational  express  mail  agreement,  with 
ailed  regulations.  Signed  at  Freetown 
i  Washington  May  31  and  July  26,  1988. 
tered  into  force  Aug.  15,  1988. 

igapore 

reement  amending  the  agreement  of 

11  and  Mar.  24,  1988,  with  respect  to 
tual  exemption  from  taxation  of  air 
nspurt.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
Singapore  July  5  and  28,  1988.  Entered 
0  force  July  28,  1988. 


ernational  express  mail  agreement,  with 
tailed  regulations.  Signed  at  Mogadishu 
d  Washington  June  28  and  July  26,  1988. 
itered  into  force  Aug.  15,  1988. 


Sri  Lanka 

Grant  agreement  for  rehabilitation  as- 
sistance. Signed  at  Colombo  July  21,  1988. 
Entered  into  force  July  21,  1988". 

Switzerland 

Memorandum  of  understanding  for 
coproduction  of  the  M109A1B  self-propelled 
155  MM  Howitzer.  Signed  at  Washington 
July  18,  1988.  Entered  into  force  July  18, 
1988. 

Tunisia 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Mar.  16,  1988,  as  amended,  for  sales  of  ag- 
ricultural commodities.  Signed  at  Tunis 
July  28,  1988.  Entered  into  force  July  28, 


United  Kingdom 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of 
Sept.  18,  1986,  as  extended,  concerning  the 
Turks  and  Caicos  Islands  and  narcotics  ac- 
tivities. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Washington  July  20,  1988.  Entered  into 
force  July  20,  1988;  effective  July  21,  1988. 

Uruguay 

Agreement  amending  arrangement  of  Aug. 
24  and  Sept.  13,  1984,  for  a  visa  system 
relating  to  trade  in  certain  textile  prod- 
ucts. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Montevideo  Jan.' 19  and  July  11,  1988.  En- 
tered into  force  July  11,  1988. 

Venezuela 

Agreement  for  the  avoidance  of  double  tax- 
ation with  respect  to  shipping  and  air 
transport.  Signed  at  Caracas  Dee.  29, 
1987. 
Entered  into  force:  Aug.  10,  1988. 

Agreement  concerning  employment  of  de- 
pendents of  official  government  employees. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Caracas 
July  18  and  29,  1988.  Entered  into  force 
July  29,  1988,  except  with  respect  to  de- 
pendents of  employees  of  permanent  mis- 
sions to  international  organizations,  which 
shall  enter  into  force  upon  written  notice 
that  both  governments  have  adopted  meas- 
ures to  allow  the  issuance  of  necessary 
permits. 

Yugoslavia 

Swap  agreement  between  the  U.S.  Treas- 
ury and  the  Central  Bank  of  the  Federated 
Republic  of  Yugoslavia,  with  related  letter. 
Signed  at  Washington  and  Belgrade 
June  10,  1988.  Entered  into  force  June  10, 
1988. 


'With  reservation(s). 

-Not  in  force. 

■'With  declaration(s). 

<With  conditions. 

^Not  in  force  for  the  U.S. 

''Does  not  include  (optional)  Annexes 
III,  IV,  and  V. 

'Does  not  include  (optional)  Annex  IV. 

''For  the  Kingdom  in  Europe,  the 
Netherlands  Antilles  and  Aruba.  ■ 


Department  of  State 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Office  of  Press  Relations,  Department  of 
State,  Washington,  D.C.  20.520. 

No.  Dale  Subject 

164      8/1         Shultz:  interview  on  "Face 
the  Nation,"  July  31. 

*165  8/2  Shultz:  arrival  statement, 
Guatemala  City,  Aug.  1. 
166  8/3  Shultz,  Foreign  Ministers  of 
Guatemala,  Costa  Rica, 
Honduras,  El  Salvador: 
joint  news  conference, 
Guatemala  City,  Aug.  1. 

*167      8/3         Shultz:  interview  on 

NBC-TV's  "Today  Show," 
Buenos  Aires,  Aug.  3. 

168  8/4         Shultz:  luncheon  toast, 

Buenos  Aires,  Aug.  2. 

169  8/5         Shultz:  news  conference, 

Buenos  Aires,  Aug.  3 
*170      8/5        Shultz:  statement,  Argen- 
tine-North American  Cul- 
tural Institute,  Buenos 
Aii'es,  Aug.  3. 

171  8/12       Shultz:  address,  Mon- 

tevideo, Aug.  4. 

172  8/5         Shultz:  news  conference, 

Montevideo,  Aug.  4. 
*173      8/5         Program  for  the  official 
working  visit  to  Wash- 
ington, D.C,  of  Icelandic 
Prime  Minister  Palsson, 
Aug.  9-13. 

Jeffrey  Davidow  is  sworn  in 
as  Ambassador  to  Zambia 
(biographic  data). 

Whitehead:  interview  on 
Worldnet's  "Dialogue." 

Shultz:  interview  on  "TV 
Globo,"  Rio  de  Janeiro, 
Aug.  6. 

Shultz:  arrival  statement. 
La  Paz,  Aug.  8. 

Shultz:  news  conference, 
Brasilia,  Aug.  5. 

Shultz:  luncheon  toast.  La 
Paz,  Aug.  8. 

George  E.  Moose  is  sworn 
in  as  Ambassador  to  Sen- 
egal (biographic  data). 

Shultz:  address.  La  Paz, 
Bolivia,  Aug.  8. 

Foreign  Relations  of  the 
United  States,  1955-57, 
Vol.  XI,  United  Nations 
and  General  Interna- 
tional Matters,  released. 
*183      8/10       Shultz:  news  briefing, 

Tegucigalpa,  Aug.  9. 
*184      8/10      Shultz:  interview  on 

NBC-TV's  "Today  Show." 
185      8/11       Shultz:  news  briefing.  La 
Paz,  Aug.  8. 
*186      8/11       Shultz:  statement  and  ques- 
tion-and-answer  session, 
San  Salvador,  Aug.  9. 
■*187      8/11       Shultz:  news  briefing,  San 
Jose,  Aug.  9. 


85 


174 

8/5 

175 

8/5 

176 

8/8 

177 

8/9 

178 

8/8 

179 

8/9 

180 

8/9 

181 

8/12 

182 

8/11 

PUBLICATIONS 


*188      8/11       Shultz:  statement  following 
meeting  with  President- 
elect Borja,  Quito,  Aug. 
10. 

*189  Carl  Copeland  Cundiff 

sworn  in  as  Ambassador 
to  Niger,  Aug.  17  (biog- 
raphic data). 

[Unnumbered]  John  F.  Kordek  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  Botswana, 
Aug.  18  (biographic  data). 

*191      8/22       Shultz:  remarks  at  memorial 
ceremony  for  Ambassador 
Raphel  and  Brig.  Gen. 
Wassom,  U.S.  Embassy, 
Islamabad,  Aug.  20. 


192  8/22       Shultz:  statement  made  fol- 

lowing meeting  with  act- 
ing President  Ghulum 
Ishaq  Khan,  Islamabad, 
Aug.  20. 

193  8/23      Shultz:  remarks  at  the  me- 

morial ceremony  for  Am- 
bassador Raphel  and 
Brig.  Gen.  Wassom,  An- 
drews AFB,  Aug.  21. 

194  8/22       Whitehead:  remarks  at  fu- 

neral of  Ambassador  Ar- 
nold Raphel,  Ft.  Myer, 
Aug.  22. 


*Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 


Department  of  State 


Free  single  copies  of  the  following  Depart- 
ment of  State  publications  are  available 
from  the  Public  Information  Division,  Bu- 
reau of  Public  Affairs,  Department  of 
State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

Secretary  Shultz 

Winning  the  War  Against  Narcotics,  Boliv- 
ian citizens  and  members  of  the  press. 
La  Paz,  Aug.  8,  1988  (Current  Policy 
#1099). 

Facing  the  Future:  The  Americas  and  the 
Global  Economy,  businessmen  and  bank- 
ers at  the  Central  Bank.  Montevideo, 
Aug.  4,  1988  (Current  Policy  #1101). 

Arms  Control 

Nuclear  Testing  Limitations:  U.S.  Policy 
and  the  Joint  Verfication  Experiment, 
July  1988  (Public  Information  Series). 

East  Asia 

Review  of  U.S. -Vietnam  Issues,  Assistant 
Secretary  Sigur,  Subcommittee  on  Asian 
and  Pacific  Affairs,  House  Foreign  Af- 
fairs Committee,  July  28,  1988  (Current 
Policy  #1098). 

Amerasians  in  Vietnam  (GIST,  Aug.  1988). 

U.S. -Philippines  Military  Bases  Agree- 
ment (GIST,  Aug.  1988) 

U.S.  Policy  in  East  Asia  and  the  Pacific, 
Aug.  1988  (Selected  Documents  #30). 

Economics 

U.S.  E.xport  Control  Policy:  Its  Present 
and  I\iture  Course,  Ambassador  Wendt, 
Atlantic  Council  of  the  United  States, 
June  14,  1988  (Current  Policy  #1094). 

Strategy  for  an  LDC  Debt  Workout:  A 
U.S.  Perspective,  Deputy  Assistant  Sec- 
retary Milam,  Western  Economic  Asso- 
ciation International,  Los  Angeles,  July 
3,  1988  (Current  Policy  #1100). 

Generalized  System  of  Preferences  (GIST. 
Aug.  1988)." 


86 


Europe 

The  Moscow  Summit,  Aug.  1988  (Selected 
Documents  #28). 

General 

American  Foreign  Policy:  Opportunities 
and  Challenges,  Assistant  to  the  Presi- 
dent for  National  Security  Affairs 
Powell,  World  Affairs  Council,  Los 
Angeles,  July  19,  1988  (Current  Policy 
#1096). 

Human  Rights 

U.S.  Human  Rights  Policy:  An  Overview, 
Dejjuty  Assistant  Secretary  Dobriansky, 
American  Council  of  Young  Political 
Leaders,  June  3,  1988  (Current  Policy 
#1091). 

Implementation  of  the  Helsinki  Final  Act, 
October  1,  1987-April  1,  1988  (Special  Re- 
port #178). 

Middle  East 

Review  of  U.S.  Policy  in  the  Middle  East, 
Assistant  Secretary  Murphy,  Subcommit- 
tee on  Europe  and  the  Middle  East, 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee,  July 
27,  1988  (Current  Policy  #1097). 

Science  &  Technology 

U.S.  Views  on  Waste  Exports,  Assistant 
Secretary  Bernthal.  Subcommittee  on 
Environment,  Energy,  and  Natural  Re- 
sources, House  Government  Operations 
Committee,  July  14,  1988  (Current  Policy 
#1095). 

Western  Hemisphere 

Central  America:  U.S.  Policy  (GIST,  Aug. 

1988). 
Nicaragua:  Negotiating  Documents  of  the 

Sapoa  Truce,  July  1988  (Regional 

Brief).  ■ 


CSCE  Semiannual 
Report  Released 


On  behalf  of  the  President,  the  Actinj: 
Secretary  of  State  on  June  3,  1988, 
transmitted  the  24th  semiannual  repo 
on  the  implementation  of  the  Helsinki 
Final  Act  and  the  Madrid  concluding 
document  to  the  congressional  Comm 
sion  on  Security  and  Cooperation  in 
Europe. 

The  semiannual  report  covers  thf 
period  October  1,  1987,  to  April  1,  19^ 
and  provides  an  assessment  of  Soviet 
and  East  European  compliance  with 
commitments  they  undertook  in  adop 
ing  the  Helsinki  Final  Act  and  the 
Madrid  concluding  document.  Among 
the  issues  discussed  are  human  right 
and  humanitarian  concerns;  security 
and  confidence-building  measures;  ec 
nomic,  scientific,  and  technological  c 
operation;  emigration;  freedom  of 
information;  and  educational  and  cul- 
tural exchanges. 

The  report  acknowledges  that  th 
record  of  compliance  varied  among  E 
European  states  but  makes  evident  I 
overall  performance  by  the  Warsaw 
Pact  nations  in  the  area  of  human 
rights  and  human  contacts  remains  i 
violation  of  the  Conference  on  Secur 
and  Cooperation  in  Europe  (CSCE) 
commitments.  While  recognizing  th; 
some  positive  developments  have  tal 
place,  the  report  highlights  the  fact 
that  many  citizens  of  these  countrie 
including  those  who  serve  as  Helsin 
monitors,  continue  to  suffer  perseci 
for  attempting  to  exercise  their  bas 
human  rights  or  for  focusing  attenti 
on  violations  of  these  human  rights 
fundamental  freedoms. 

At  the  CSCE  followup  meeting 
rently  underway  in  Vienna,  the  Uni 
States  and  other  allied  delegations 
also  made  these  points,  recognizing 
provements  when  they  occur  and  vi 
orously  highlighting  continuing  Sov 
and  East  European  failures  where  t 
remain. 

This  report  is  an  important  ele 
ment  in  the  continuing  U.S.  effort 
assess  the  progress  and  shortcomin 
in  the  implementation  of  the  CSCE 
goals  of  protecting  human  rights, 
strengthening  security,  expanding  ( 
eration,  and  building  mutual 
confidence. 

Free  single  copies  of  this  48-p; 
report  are  available  from  the  Public 
formation  Division,  Bureau  of  Publ 
Affairs,  Department  of  State,  Wasl 
ington,  D.C.  20520.  Please  request 
Special  Report  #178.  ■ 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  11 


:dex 


:!:tober  1988 
illume  88,  No.  2139 


lica.  American  Foreign  Policy:  Oppor- 
■jnities  and  Challenges  (Powell) 51 

\lf\s  Control 

UM  Treaty  Review  Session  Opens  (White 

nii-c  statement)    40 

1(  :ir  Testing  Talks  Open  Round  Three 

.\  hue  House  statement) 39 

■.  S.iviet  Union  Conduct  First  Phase  of 
\'  1-:  (White  House  statement)   39 

\  ociation  of  South  East  Asian  Nations. 
ecri'tary's  Trip  to  East  Asia  and  the 

aeit'ic  (Shultz) 21 

iibddia.  Situation  in  Vietnam,  Cam- 

iidia,  and  Laos  (Lambertson)   40 

iia.  Secretary's  Trip  to  East  Asia  and 

ir  Pacific  (Shultz)    21 

isrcss 

iijii  iisation  for  Iranian  Airbus  Tragedy 

-ola.T)    58 

i;iN9  Assistance  Requests  for  Latin 
merica  and  the  Caribbean  (Abrams)   .  72 
'lew  of  U.S.  Policy  in  the  Middle  East 

Vlurphy) 61 

lation  in  Vietnam,  Cambodia,  and  Laos 

^ambertson)   40 

h  Report  on  Cyprus  (message  to  the 

ongress)    50 

;.  Assessments  for  the  United  Nations 

joodman) 70 

'i.  Views  on  Waste  Exports 

3ernthal) 67 

ijrus.  38th  Report  on  Cyprus  (message 

5  the  Congress)    50 

jartment  &  Foreign  Service.  Pakistan's 
resident  Zia,  LI.S.  Ambassador  Die  in 

lane  Crash  (Shultz,  Whitehead) 69 

.-eloping  Countries.  Strategy  for  An 
,DC  Debt  Workout:  A  U.S.  Perspective 

Milam)    43 

5t  Asia.  American  Foreign  Policy:  Op- 

ortunities  and  Challenges  (Powell)    .  .  51 

jnomics 

retary's  Trip  to  East  Asia  and  the  Pa- 

ific  (Shultz)   21 

ategy  for  An  LDC  Debt  Workout:  A 

I.S.  Perspective  (Milam)    43 

i.  E.xport  Control  Policy:  Its  Present 

nd  Future  Course  (Wendt) 46 

rope.  American  Foreign  Policy:  Oppor- 

unities  and  Challenges  (Powell) 51 

iheries.  Fisheries  Negotiations  and 

Vade  Opportunities  (Wolfe) 64 

reign  Assistance.  FY  1989  Assistance 
lequests  for  Latin  America  and  the 

!^aribbean  (Abrams)  72 

rmany.  27th  Anniversary  of  the  Berlin 

Vail  (Reagan) 50 

ng  Kong.  Secretary's  Trip  to  East  Asia 

md  the  Pacific  (Shultz)    21 

(man  Rights 

ptive  Nations  Week,  1988 

proclamation)    57 

•Isinki  Human  Rights  Day,  1988 

proclamation)    57 

S.  Human  Rights  Policy:  An  Overview 
JDobriansky)    54 


Iceland.  Visit  of  Icelandic  Prime  Minister 

(Palsson,  Reagan)   49 

Indonesia.  Secretary's  Trip  to  East  Asia 

and  the  Pacific  (Shultz)    21 

International  Law.  Compensation  for 

Iranian  Airbus  Tragedy  (Sofaer)   58 

Iran 

Compensation  for  Iranian  Airbus  Tragedy 

(Sofaer)    58 

Review  of  U.S.  Policy  in  the  Middle  East 

(Murphy) ." 61 

Iraq.  Review  of  U.S.  Policy  in  the  Middle 

East  (Murphy)  61 

Japan.  Secretary's  Trip  to  East  Asia  and 

the  Pacific  (Shultz)    21 

Korea.  Secretary's  Trip  to  East  Asia  and 

the  Pacific  (Shultz)    21 

Kuwait 

Review  of  U.S.  Policy  in  the  Middle  East 

(Murphy) 61 

Visit  of  Kuwaiti  Prime  Minister  (Reagan, 

Sabah)   60 

Laos.  Situation  in  Vietnam,  Cambodia,  and 

Laos  (Lambertson)   40 

Lebanon.  Review  of  U.S.  Policy  in  the 

Middle  East  (Murphy)    61 

Malaysia.  Secretary's  Trip  to  East  Asia 

and  the  Pacific  (Shultz)    21 

Marshall  Islands.  Secretary's  Trip  to  East 

Asia  and  the  Pacific  (Shultz) 21 

Middle  East 

American  Foreign  Policy:  Opportunities 

and  Challenges  (Powell)   51 

Secretary  Shultz  Visits  Latin  America 

(Acevedo,  Cabrera,  Lopez,  Madrigal, 

Shultz)  2 

Monetary  Affairs.  Strategy  for  An  LDC 

Debt  Workout:  A  U.S.  Perspective 

(Milam)    43 

Narcotics.  Secretary  Shultz  Visits  Latin 

America  (Acevedo,  Cabrera,  Lopez, 

Madrigal,  Shultz)    2 

Nicaragua 

Aid  to  the  Nicaraguan  Democratic  Resist- 
ance (Reagan) 1 

Situation  in  Nicaragua  (White  House 

statement) 82 

Oceans.  Fisheries  Negotiations  and  Trade 

Opportunities  (Wolfe) 64 

Pacific.  American  Foreign  Policy:  Oppor- 
tunities and  Challenges  (Powell) 51 

Pakistan.  Pakistan's  President  Zia,  U.S. 

Ambassador  Die  in  Plane  Crash  (Shultz, 

Whitehead) 69 

Philippines.  Secretary's  Trip  to  East  Asia 

and  the  Pacific  (Shultz)    21 

Presidential  Documents 

Aid  to  the  Nicaraguan  Democratic 

Resistance 1 

Captive  Nations  Week,  1988 

(proclamation)    57 

Helsinki  Human  Rights  Day,  1988 

(proclamation)    57 

38th  Report  on  Cyprus  (message  to  the 

Congress)    50 

27th  Anniversary  of  the  Berlin  Wall  ....  50 


Visit  of  Icelandic  Prime  Minister  (Palsson, 

Reagan)  49 

Visit  of  Kuwaiti  Prime  Minister  (Reagan, 
Sabah)   60 

Publications 

CSCE  Semiannual  Report  Released   86 

Department  of  State 86 

Refugees.  Situation  in  Vietnam,  Cam- 
bodia, and  Laos  (Lambertson)   40 

Science  &  Technology.  U.S.  Views  on 
Waste  Exports  (Bernthal)  67 

Security  Assistance.  FY  1989  Assistance 
Requests  for  Latin  America  and  the 
Caribbean  (Abrams) 72 

Thailand.  Secretary's  Trip  to  East  Asia 
and  the  Pacific  (Shultz)    21 

Trade 

Fisheries  Negotiations  and  Trade  Oppor- 
tunities (Wolfe)    64 

Secretary's  Trip  to  East  Asia  and  the 
Pacific"  (Shultz) 21 

U.S.  Export  Control  Policy:  Its  Present 
and  Future  Course  (Wendt) 46 

Treaties.  Current  Actions 83 

U.S.S.R. 

ABM  Treaty  Review  Session  Opens 
(White  House  statement) 40 

Nuclear  Testing  Talks  Open  Round  Three 
(White  House  statement) 39 

U.S. -Soviet  Union  Conduct  First  Phase  of 
JVE  (White  House  statement)   39 

United  Nations 

U.S.  Assessments  for  the  United  Nations 
(Goodman) 70 

U.S.  Human  Rights  Policy   An  Overview 
(Dobriansky)    54 

Vietnam.  Situation  in  Vietnam,  Cambodia, 
and  Laos  (Lambertson)    40 

Western  Hemisphere 

American  Foreign  Policy:  Opportunities 
and  Challenges  (Powell)   51 

FY  1989  Assistance  Requests  for  Latin 
America  and  the  Caribbean  (Abrams)   .  72 

Secretary  Shultz  Visits  Latin  America 
(Acevedo,  Cabrera,  Lopez,  Madrigal, 
Shultz) 2 

Name  Index 

Abrams,  Elliott  72 

Acevedo  Peralta,  Ricardo   2 

Bernthal,  Frederick  M 67 

Cabrera  Hildago,  Alfonso   2 

Dobriansky,  Paula 54 

Goodman,  Dennis  C    70 

Lambertson,  David  F 40 

Lopez  Contreras,  Carlos 2 

Madrigal  Nieto,  Rodrigo  2 

Milam,  William  B    43 

Murphy,  Richard  W    61 

Palsson,  Thorsteinn    49 

Powell,  Colin  L    51 

Reagan,  President 1,49,50,57,60 

Sabah,  Saad  al-Abdallah  al-Salim  Al    ...  60 

Shultz,  Secretary   2,21,69 

Sofaer,  Abraham  D 58 

Wendt,  E.  Allan    46 

Whitehead,  John  C   69 

Wolfe,  Edward  E 64 


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I^eparttnvn  t 
of  Si  flip 


1     ^* 


huUetMU 


e  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volume  88  /  Number  2140 


November  1988 


United  Nations/1 
The  Secretary/10 
Southwest  Africa/18 
Malaysia  and  Singapore/23 
Soviet  Foreign  IVIinister  Visit/28 


n^parintpni  oi  Siaip 

bulletin 


Volume  88  /  Number  2140  /  November  1J 


The  Department  ok  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public  Com- 
munication in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide 
the  public,  the  Congress,  and  govern- 
ment agencies  with  information  on  de- 
velopments in  U.S.  foreign  relations 
and  the  work  of  the  Department  of 
State  and  the  Foreign  Service.  The 
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preted as  official  U.S.  policy 
statements. 


GEORGE  P.  SHULTZ 

Secretary  of  State 

CHARLES  REDMAN 

Assistant  Secretary 
for  Public  Affairs 

PAUL  E.  AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office  of  Public  Communication 

COLLEEN  LUTZ 

Chief,  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 

SHARON  R.  HAYNES 

Assistant  Editor 


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CONTENTS 


FEATURE 

1         Prospects  for  A  New  Era  of  World  Peace  (President 
Reagan) 

5  U.S.  Releases  Funds  to  United  Nations  (White  House 

Statement) 

6  Security  Council  Permanent  Members  Meet  With 

Secretary  General  (Joint  Communique) 


he  President 

)        Foreign  Policy  Achievements 

he  Secretary 

)        The  Administration's  Approach 
to  Middle  East  Peacemaking 

!        Proposed  Refugee  Admissions 
for  FY  1989 
The  International  Legacy  of 
Dn  Martin  Luther  King,  Jn 

frica 

Southwest  Africa  Negotiations 
(Chester  A.  Crocker,  Joint 
State)iients,  White  House 
Statement) 

irms  Control 

ABM  Treaty  Review  Conference 

Ends  (U.S.  Statement) 
JVE  Carried  Out  in  Soviet 

Union  (White  House 

Statement) 
25th  "Hot  Line"  Anniversary 

(White  House  Statement) 

department 

1         Foreign  Language  Competence 
in  the  Foreign  Service 
(Ronald  I.  Spiers) 


East  Asia 


23 


24 
26 


Developments  in  Malaysia  and 

Singapore  (David  F. 

Lambertson) 
Malaysia — A  Profile 
Singapore — A  Profile 


Economics 

27 


Export  of  U.S.  Satellite  to  China 
for  Launch  (Department 
Statement) 


Europe 

28 


31 


Soviet  Foreign  Minister  Visits 

Washington  (Secretary  Shidtz, 

Joint  Statonent) 
20th  Anniversary  of  Warsaw 

Pact  Invasion  of  Czechoslovakia 

(President  Reagan) 


Human  Rights 

33  Human  Rights:  A  Western 
Cultural  Bias?  (Richard 
Schifter) 

International  Law 

36        The  War  Powers  Resolution 
(Aljraham  D.  Sofaer) 

Military  Affairs 

40        Military  Power  and  Diplomacy: 
The  Reagan  Legacy 
(Michael  H.  Armacost) 


Narcotics 

44        T^sk  Force  on  Narcotics  Meets 
in  Washington  (Chairman's 

Statement) 


Pacific 

46        Palau  Supreme  Court  Rules 
Compact  Not  Approved 
(Department  Statement) 


Refugees 

46        U.S.  Responds  to  Southern 
Africa  Refugee  Crisis 
(Jonathan  Moore) 


Western  Hemisphere 

48        Chilean  Plebiscite  (Department 
Statement) 


Treaties 

48        Current  Actions 

Press  Releases 

50        Department  of  State 

Publications 

50        Department  of  State 

Index 


K^1.A 


President  Reagan  at  the  United  Nations 


The  members  of  the  United  Nations  must  be  aligned  on  the  side  of 
justice  rather  than  injustice,  peace  rather  than  aggression,  human 
dignity  rather  than  subjugation. 


UN  General  Assembly 
September  26,  1983 


The  responsibility  of  this  Assembly — the  peaceful  resolution  of  disputes 
between  peoples  and  nations — can  be  discharged  successfully  only  if 
we  recognize  the  great  common  ground  upon  which  we  all  stand:  our 
fellowship  as  members  of  the  human  race,  our  oneness  as  inhabitants 
of  this  planet,  our  place  as  representatives  of  billions  of  our  country- 
men whose  fondest  hope  remains  the  end  of  war  and  to  the  repression 
of  the  human  spirit. 


UN  General  Assembly 
September  24,  1984 


For  over  40  years,  this  organization  has  provided  an  international 
forum  for  harmonizing  conflicting  national  interests  and  has  made  a 
significant  contribution  in  such  fields  as  peacekeeping,  humanitarian 
assistance,  and  eradicating  disease. 


UN  General  Assembly 
September  22,  1986 


The  Charter  has  a  concrete  practical  meaning  today  because  it  touches 
on  all  the  dimensions  of  human  aspiration  .  .  .  the  yearning  for  democ- 
racy and  freedom,  for  global  peace,  and  for  prosperity. 


UN  General  Assembly 
September  21,  1987 


FEATURE 
UN  General  Assembly 


Prospects  for 

A  New  Era 
of  World  Peace 

President  Reagan's  Address 

before  the  UN  General  Assembly 

on  September  26,  1988} 


Half  a  world  away  from  this  place  of 
peace,  the  firing,  the  killing,  the  blood- 
shed in  two  merciless  conflicts  have,  for 
the  first  time  in  recent  memory,  dimin- 
ished. After  adding  terrible  new  names 
to  the  roll  call  of  human  horror — names 
such  as  Halabjah,  Maydan  Shahr,  and 
Spin  Buldak — there  is,  today,  hope  of 
peace  in  the  Persian  Gulf  and 
Afghanistan. 

So,  too,  in  the  highlands  and 
coastal  cities  of  southern  Africa — places 
of  civil  war,  places  of  occupation  by  for- 
eign troops — talk  of  peace  is  heard, 
peace  for  the  tortured  nation  of  Angola. 
Sixty-five  hundred  miles  east,  in  the 
Southeast  Asian  country  of  Cambodia, 
there  is  hope  now  of  a  settlement — the 
removal  of  Vietnam's  occupying  forces. 
And,  finally,  in  this  hemisphere,  where 
only  12  years  ago  one-third  of  the  peo- 
ple of  Latin  America  lived  under  demo- 
cratic rule,  some  90%  do  so  today.  And, 
especially  in  Central  America,  nations 
such  as  El  Salvador,  once  threatened  by 
the  anarchy  of  the  death  squad  and  the 
specter  of  totalitarian  rule,  now  know 
the  hope  of  self-government  and  the 
prospect  of  economic  growth. 

And  another  change — a  change 
that,  if  it  endures,  may  go  down  as  one 
of  the  signal  accomplishments  of  our 
history;  a  change  that  is  a  cause  for 
shaking  of  the  head  in  wonder  is  also 
upon  us;  a  change  going  to  the  source 
of  postwar  tensions  and  to  the  once 
seemingly  impossible  dream  of  ending 
the  twin  threats  of  our  time:  totalitar- 
ianism and  thermonuclear  world  war. 


For  the  first  time,  the  differences  be- 
tween East  and  West — fundamental 
differences  over  important  moral 
questions  dealing  with  the  worth  of  the 
individual  and  whether  governments 
shall  control  people  or  people  control 
governments — for  the  first  time,  these 
differences  have  shown  signs  of  easing; 
easing  to  the  point  where  there  are  not 
just  troop  withdrawals  from  places  like 
Afghanistan  but  also  talk  in  the  East  of 
reform  and  greater  freedom  of  press,  of 
assembly,  and  of  religion.  Yes,  funda- 
mental differences  remain.  But,  should 
talk  of  reform  become  more  than  that — 
should  it  become  reality — there  is  the 
prospect  of  not  only  a  new  era  in 
Soviet-American  relations  but  a  new 
age  of  world  peace.  For  such  reform  can 
bring  peace,  history  teaches,  and  my 
country  has  always  believed  that  where 
the  rights  of  the  individual  and  the  peo- 
ple are  enshrined,  war  is  a  distant 
prospect,  for  it  is  not  people  who  make 
war — only  governments  do  that. 

A  Moment  of  Hope 

I  stand  at  this  podium,  then,  in  a  mo- 
ment of  hope — hope,  not  just  for  the 
peoples  of  the  United  States  or  the  So- 
viet Union  but  for  all  the  peoples  of  the 
world;  and  hope,  too,  for  the  dream  of 
peace  among  nations,  the  dream  that 
began  the  United  Nations. 

Precisely  because  of  these  changes, 
today  the  United  Nations  has  the  op- 
portunity to  live  and  breathe  and  work 
as  never  before.  Already,  you,  Mr 


)epartment  of  State  Bulletin/November  1988 


Secretary  General  [Javier  Perez  de 
Cuellar],  through  your  persistence,  pa- 
tience, and  unyielding  will,  have  shown, 
in  working  toward  peace  in  Afghanistan 
and  the  Persian  Gulf,  how  valuable  the 
United  Nations  can  be.  And  we  salute 
you  for  these  accomplishments. 

In  Geneva  at  this  very  hour,  there 
are  numerous  negotiations  underway — 
multilateral  negotiations  at  the  Confer- 
ence on  Disarmament  as  well  as  bilat- 
eral negotiations  on  a  range  of  issues 
between  the  Soviets  and  ourselves.  And 
these  negotiations,  some  of  them  under 
UN  auspices,  involve  a  broad  arms  con- 
trol agenda — strategic  offensive  weap- 
ons and  space,  nuclear  testing  and 
chemical  warfare — whose  urgency  we 
have  witnessed  anew  in  recent  days. 

And  the  negotiators  are  busy,  and 
over  the  last  few  years,  they've  been 
engaged  in  more  than  an  academic  ex- 
ercise. There  is  movement.  The  logjam 
is  broken.  Only  recently,  when  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
signed  the  INF  [intermediate-i'ange  nu- 
clear forces]  agreement,  an  entire  class 
of  U.S.  and  Soviet  nuclear  missiles  was 
eliminated  for  the  first  time  in  history. 
Progress  continues  on  negotiations  to 
reduce,  in  massive  number,  strategic 
weapons  with  effective  verification. 
And  talks  will  begin  soon  on  conven- 
tional reductions  in  Europe. 

Much  of  the  reason  for  all  of  this 
goes  back,  I  believe,  to  Geneva  itself, 
to  the  small  chateau  along  the  lake 
where  General  Secretary  of  the  Soviet 
Union  and  I  had  the  first  of  several 
fireside  chats — exchanges  characterized 
by  frankness,  but  friendliness,  too.  I 
said  at  the  first  meeting  in  Geneva  that 
this  was  a  unique  encounter  between 
two  people  who  had  the  power  to  start 
world  war  III  or  to  begin  a  new  age  of 
peace  among  nations.  And  I  also  said 
peace  conferences,  arms  negotiations, 
proposals  for  treaties  could  make  sense 
only  if  they  were  part  of  a  wider  con- 
text— a  context  that  sought  to  explore 
and  resolve  the  deeper,  underlying  dif- 
ferences between  us.  I  said  to  Mr.  Gor- 
bachev then,  as  I've  said  to  you  before, 
nations  do  not  mistrust  each  other  be- 
cause they're  armed;  they're  armed  be- 
cause they  mistrust  each  other. 


And  in  that  place,  by  that  peaceful 
lake  in  neutral  Switzerland,  Mr.  Gor- 
bachev and  I  did  begin  a  new  rela- 
tionship, based  not  just  on  engagement 
over  the  single  issue  of  arms  control 
but  on  a  broader  agenda  about  our 
deeper  differences — an  agenda  of  hu- 
man rights,  regional  conflicts,  and  bi- 
lateral exchanges  between  our  peoples. 
Even  on  the  arms  control  issue  itself, 
we  agreed  to  go  beyond  the  past — to 
seek  not  just  treaties  that  permit  build- 
ing weapons  to  higher  levels  but  revo- 
lutionary agreements  that  actually  re- 
duced, and  even  eliminated,  a  whole 
class  of  nuclear  weapons. 

What  was  begun  that  morning  in 
Geneva  has  shown  results:  in  the  INF 
Treaty;  in  my  recent  visit  to  Moscow;  in 
my  opportunity  to  meet  there  with  So- 
viet citizens  and  dissidents  and  speak 
of  human  rights  and  to  speak,  too,  in 
the  Lenin  Hills  of  Moscow  to  the  young 
people  of  the  Soviet  Union  about  the 
wonder  and  splendor  of  human  free- 
dom. The  results  of  that  morning  in 
Geneva  are  seen  in  peace  conferences 
now  underway  around  the  world  on  re- 
gional conflicts  and  in  the  work  of  the 
United  Nations  here  in  New  York  as 
well  as  in  Geneva. 

But  history  teaches  caution.  In- 
deed, that  very  building  in  Geneva 
where  important  negotiations  have 
taken  place — the  Geneva  accords  on 
Afghanistan,  the  Iran-Iraq  negotia- 
tions, for  example — we  see  it  today  as 
stone-like  testimony  to  a  failed  dream 
of  peace  in  another  time.  The  Palais  des 
Nations  was  the  headquarters  of  the 
League  of  Nations — an  institution  that 
was  to  symbolize  an  end  to  all  war.  And 
yet,  that  institution  and  its  noble  pur- 
pose ended  with  the  Second  World 
War — ended  because  the  chance  for 
peace  was  not  seized  in  the  1930s  by 
the  nations  of  the  world;  ended  because 
humanity  didn't  find  the  courage  to  iso- 
late the  aggressors,  to  reject  schemes 
of  government  that  serve  the  state,  not 
the  people. 

We  are  here  today,  determined  that 
no  such  fate  shall  befall  the  United 
Nations.  We  are  determined  that  the 
United  Nations  should  succeed  and 
serve  the  cause  of  peace  for  humankind. 


So  we  realize  that,  even  in  this 
time  of  hope,  the  chance  of  failure  is 
real.  But  this  knowledge  does  not  dis- 
courage us.  It  spurs  us  on,  for  the 
stakes  are  high.  Do  we  falter  and  fail 
now  and  bring  down  upon  ourselves  tl 
just  anger  of  future  generations?  Or  c 
we  continue  the  work  of  the  founders 
this  institution  and  see  to  it  that,  at 
last,  freedom  is  enshrined  and  human 
ity  knows  war  no  longer  and  that  this 
place,  this  floor,  shall  be  truly  "the 
world's  last  battlefield." 

The  Agenda  of  Peace 

We  are  determined  it  shall  be  so.  So 
turn  to  the  agenda  of  peace.  Let  us 
begin  by  addressing  a  concern  that  \^ 
much  on  my  mind  when  I  met  with  I\ 
Gorbachev  in  the  Kremlin  as  well  as 
the  minds  of  Soviet  citizens  that  I  m 
in  Moscow.  It  is  also  an  issue  that  I 
know  is  of  immediate  importance  to  1 
delegates  of  this  assembly  who,  this 
fall,  commemorate  the  40th  annivers 
of  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Hum 
Rights. 

That  declaration  says  plainly  wh 
those  who  seek  peace  can  forget  onl 
the  greatest  peril:  that  peace  rests  t 
one  foundation — observing  "the  in- 
alienable rights  of  all  members  of  th 
human  family."  In  a  century  where  1 
man  rights  have  been  denied  by  tot; 
itarian  governments  on  a  scale  neve 
before  seen  in  history,  with  so  man\ 
millions  deliberately  starved  or  elin 
nated  as  a  matter  of  state  policy — a 
history,  it  has  been  said,  of  blood,  s 
pidity,  and  barbed  wire — few  can  W' 
der  why  peace  has  proved  so  elusivi 

Now  let  us  understand.  If  we 
would  have  peace,  we  must  acknowl 
edge  the  elementary  rights  of  our  fi 
low  human  beings.  In  our  own  land 
and  in  other  lands,  if  we  would  hav( 
peace,  the  trampling  of  the  human 
spirit  must  cease.  Human  rights  is 
for  some,  some  of  the  time.  Human 
rights,  as  the  Universal  Declaratioi 
this  assembly,  adopted  in  1948,  pro- 
claims, is:  "for  all  people  and  all  na 
tions" — and  for  all  time. 

This  regard  for  human  rights  a 
the  foundation  of  peace  is  at  the  he 
of  the  United  Nations.  Those  who 
starve  in  Ethiopia,  those  who  die 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November 


)8I 


FEATURE 
UN  General  Assembly 


long  the  Kurds,  those  who  face  racial 
ustice  in  South  Africa,  those  who 
11  cannot  write  or  speak  freely  in  the 
viet  Union,  those  who  cannot  wor- 
p  in  the  Ukraine,  those  who  struggle 
life  and  freedom  on  boats  in  the 
uth  China  Sea,  those  who  cannot 
blish  or  assemble  in  Managua — all  of 
s  is  more  than  just  an  agenda  item 
your  calendar.  It  must  be  a  first 
ncern — an  issue  above  others.  For 
len  human  rights  concerns  are  not 
ramount  at  the  United  Nations — 
len  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Hu- 
m  Rights  is  not  honored  in  these 
lis  and  meeting  rooms — then  the  very 
dibility  of  this  organization  is  at 
ike,  the  very  purpose  of  its  existence 
question. 

That  is  why,  when  human  rights 
ogress  is  made,  the  United  Nations 
ows  stronger,  and  the  United  States 
glad  of  it.  Following  a  2-year  effort 
1  by  the  United  States,  for  example, 
e  UN  Human  Rights  Commission 
ok  a  major  step  toward  ending  the 
luble  standards  and  cynicism  that  had 
aracterized  too  much  of  its  past.  For 
■ars,  Cuba,  a  blatant  violator  of  its 
:izens'  human  rights,  has  escaped  UN  | 
nsure  or  even  scrutiny.  This  year,         1 
aba  has  responded  to  pressure  gener-    p 
ed  by  the  Human  Rights  Commission  ■?. 
I  accepting  an  investigation  into  its        'S 
iman  rights  abuses.  Fidel  Castro  has    ? 
ready  begun  to  free  some  political         ^ 
isoners,  improve  prison  conditions,       = 
id  tolerate  the  existence  of  a  small,       =^ 
dependent  national  human  rights  ;§ 

•oup.  - 

More  must  be  done.  The  United 
ations  must  be  relentless  and  unyield- 
g  in  seeking  change,  in  Cuba  and 
isewhere.  And  we  must  also  see  to  it 
lat  the  Universal  Declaration  itself 
nould  not  be  debased  with  episodes 
ke  the  "Zionism  is  racism"  resolution. 
Respect  for  human  rights  is  the  first 
nd  fundamental  mission  of  this  body, 
he  most  elementary  obligation  of  its 
lembers.  Indeed,  wherever  one  turns 
1  the  world  today,  there  is  new  aware- 
ess,  a  growing  passion  for  human 
ights:  the  people  of  the  world  grow 
nited;  new  groups,  new  coalitions 
orm — coalitions  that  monitor  govern- 
nent;  that  work  against  discrimination; 


Respect  for  human  rights  is  the 
first  and  fundamental  mission  of 
this  body,  the  most  elementary 
obligation  of  its  members. 


department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1988 


that  fight  religious  or  political  repres- 
sion, unlawful  imprisonment,  torture, 
or  execution.  As  those  I  spoke  to  at 
Spaso  House  said  to  me  last  June,  such 
movements  make  a  difference. 

Regional  Conflicts 

Turning  now  to  regional  conflicts,  we 
feel  again  the  uplift  of  hope.  In  the  gulf 
war  between  Iran  and  Iraq — one  of  the 
bloodiest  conflicts  since  World  War  II — 
we  have  a  cease-fire.  The  resolution 
and  the  firmness  of  the  allied  nations  in 
keeping  the  Persian  Gulf  open  to  inter- 
national shipping  not  only  upheld  the 
rule  of  law,  it  helped  prevent  further 
spread  of  the  conflict  and  laid  the  basis 
for  peace.  So,  too,  the  Security  Coun- 
cil's decisive  resolution  in  July  a  year 
ago  has  become  the  blueprint  for  a 
peaceful  gulf.  Let  this  war — a  war  in 
which  there  has  been  no  victor  or  van- 
quished, only  victims — let  this  war  end 
now.  Let  both  Iran  and  Iraq  cooperate 
with  the  Secretary  General  and  the  Se- 
curity Council  in  implementing  Resolu- 
tion 598.  Let  peace  come. 

Moving  on  to  a  second  region: 
When  I  first  addressed  the  UN  General 
Assembly  in  1983,  world  attention  was 
focused  on  the  brutal  invasion  and  il- 
legal occupation  of  Afghanistan.  After 
nearly  9  long  years  of  war,  the  courage 
and  determination  of  the  Afghan  people 
and  the  Afghan  freedom  fighters  have 
held  sway,  and  today  an  end  to  the  oc- 
cupation is  in  sight.  On  April  14,  the 
U.S.S.R.  signed  the  Geneva  accords, 
which  were  negotiated  under  UN  aus- 
pices by  Pakistan  and  the  Kabul  re- 
gime. We  encourage  the  Soviet  Union 
to  complete  its  troop  withdrawal  at  the 
earliest  possible  date  so  that  the 
Afghan  people  can  freely  determine 
their  future  without  further  outside 
interference. 

In  southern  Africa,  too,  years  of 
patient  diplomacy  and  support  for  those 
in  Angola  who  seek  self-determination 
are  having  their  effect.  We  look  for- 
ward to  an  accord  between  the  Govern- 
ments of  Angola,  Cuba,  and  South 
Africa  that  will  bring  about  a  complete 
withdrawal  of  all  foreign  troops — pri- 
marily Cuban— from  Angola.  We  look 
forward  as  well  to  full  implementation 


of  UN  Security  Council  Resolution  435 
and  our  longstanding  goal  of  independ- 
ence for  Namibia.  We  continue  to 
support  a  growing  consensus  among 
African  leaders  who  also  believe  there 
can  be  no  end  to  conflict  in  the  region 
until  there  is  national  reconciliation 
within  Angola. 

There  are  new  hopes  for  Cambodia, 
a  nation  whose  freedom  and  independ- 
ence we  seek  just  as  avidly  as  we 
sought  the  freedom  and  independence 
of  Afghanistan.  We  urge  the  rapid  re- 
moval of  all  Vietnamese  troops  and  a 
settlement  that  will  prevent  the  return 
of  the  Khmer  Rouge  to  power,  permit- 
ting, instead,  the  establishment  of  a 
genuinely  representative  government — 
a  government  that  will,  at  last,  respect 
fully  the  rights  of  the  people  of  Cam- 
bodia and  end  the  hideous  suffering 
they  have  so  bravely  and  needlessly 
borne. 

In  other  critical  areas,  we  applaud 
the  Secretary  General's  efforts  to  struc- 
ture a  referendum  on  the  Western  Sa- 
hara. And  in  the  Mediterranean,  direct 
talks  between  Greek  and  Turkish  Cyp- 
riot  communities  hold  much  promise  for 
accord  in  that  divided  island  nation. 
And  finally,  we  look  to  a  peaceful  solu- 
tion to  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict.  So, 
too,  the  unnatural  division  of  Europe 
remains  a  critical  obstacle  to  Soviet- 
American  relations. 

In  most  of  these  areas,  then,  we 
see  progress,  and,  again,  we're  glad  of 
it.  Only  a  few  years  ago,  all  of  these 
and  other  conflicts  were  burning  dan- 
gerously out  of  control.  Indeed,  the  in- 
vasion of  Afghanistan  and  the  apparent 
will  among  democratic  and  peace-loving 
nations  to  deter  such  events  seemed  to 
cause  a  climate  where  aggression  by 
nations  large  and  small  was  epidemic,  a 
climate  the  world  has  not  seen  since  the 
1930s.  Only  this  time,  larger  war  was 
avoided — avoided  because  the  free  and 
peaceful  nations  of  the  world  recovered 
their  strength  of  purpose  and  will.  And 
now  the  United  Nations  is  providing 
valuable  assistance  in  helping  this  epi- 
demic to  recede. 

And  because  we're  resolved  to  keep 
it  so,  I  would  be  remiss  in  my  duty  if  I 
did  not  now  take  note  here  of  the  one 
e.xception  to  progress  in  regional  con- 
flicts. I  refer  here  to  the  continuing 


deterioration  of  human  rights  in  Nic- 
aragua and  the  refusal  of  the  tiny  elite 
now  ruling  that  nation  to  honor  prom- 
ises of  democracy  made  to  their  own 
people  and  to  the  international  commu 
nity.  This  elite,  in  calling  itself  revolu- 
tionary, seeks  no  real  revolution;  the 
use  of  the  term  is  subterfuge,  decepti( 
for  hiding  the  oldest,  most  corrupt  vi( 
of  all — man's  age-old  will  to  power,  his 
lust  to  control  the  lives  and  steal  the 
freedom  of  others. 

And  that's  why,  as  President,  I  w 
continue  to  urge  the  Congress  and  th 
American  public  to  stand  behind  thos 
who  resist  this  attempt  to  impose  a  tt 
talitarian  regime  on  the  people  of  Nic- 
aragua; that  the  United  States  will 
continue  to  stand  with  those  who  are 
threatened  by  this  regime's  aggressio 
against  its  neighbors  in  Central 
America. 

Today  I  also  call  on  the  Soviet 
Union  to  show  in  Central  America  th 
same  spirit  of  constructive  realism  it 
has  shown  in  other  regional  conflicts 
to  assist  in  bringing  conflict  in  Centr 
America  to  a  close  by  halting  the  flo- 
of  billions  of  dollars  worth  of  arms  ai 
ammunition  to  the  Sandinista  regime 
regime  whose  goals  of  regional  dom- 
ination— while  ultimately  doomed — i 
continue  to  cause  great  suffering  to 
people  of  that  area  and  risk  to  Sovie 
American  relations,  unless  action  is 
taken  now. 


Arms  Control  Negotiations 

Moving  now  to  the  arms  reduction 
agenda,  I  have  mentioned  already  t 
importance  of  the  INF  Ti-eaty  and  t 
momentum  developed  in  the  START 
[strategic  arms  reduction  talks]  neg 
tiations.  The  draft  START  treaty  is 
lengthy  document,  filled  with  brack 
language  designating  sections  of  dih 
agreement  between  the  two  sides.  1 
through  this  summer  in  Geneva,  thi 
brackets  have  diminished;  there  is 
every  reason  to  believe  this  process 
continue.  I  can  tell  this  assembly  tl 
it  is  highly  doubtful  such  a  treaty  c 
be  accomplished  in  a  few  months,  b 
can  tell  you,  a  year  from  now  is  a  p 
sibility — more  than  a  possibility.  B\ 
we  have  no  deadline.  No  agreement 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November   8£ 


FEATURE 
UN  General  Assembly 


;ter  than  a  bad  agreement.  The 
ited  States  remains  hopeful,  and  we 
[nowledge  the  spirit  of  cooperation 
)wn  by  the  Soviet  Union  in  these  ne- 
iations.  We  also  look  for  that  spirit 
be  apphed  to  our  concerns  about 
npliance  with  existing  agreements. 

So,  too,  our  discussions  on  nuclear 
iting  and  defense  and  space  have 
en  useful.  But  let  me  here  stress  to 
s  General  Assembly  that  much  of  the 
)mentum  in  nuclear  arms  control  ne- 
tiations  is  due  to  technological  prog- 
58  itself,  especially  in  the  potential 
space-based  defensive  systems.  I 
lieve  that  the  U.S.  determination  to 
search  and  develop  and,  when  ready, 
ploy  such  defensive  systems — sys- 
ms  targeted  to  destroy  missiles,  not 
ople — accounts  for  a  large  share  of 
e  progress  made  in  recent  years  in 
■neva.  With  such  systems,  for  the 
st  time,  in  case  of  accidental  launch 
the  act  of  a  madman  somewhere,  ma- 
r  powers  will  not  be  faced  with  the 
igle  option  of  massive  retaliation  but 
11,  instead,  have  the  chance  of  a  saner 
oice — to  shield  against  an  attack  in- 
sad  of  avenging  it.  So,  too,  as  defen- 
je  systems  grow  in  effectiveness,  they 
duce  the  threat  and  the  value  of 
eater  and  greater  offensive  arsenals. 
nly  recently,  briefings  I  have  received 
the  Oval  Office  indicate  that  progress 
ward  such  systems  may  be  even  more 
pid  and  less  costly  than  we  had,  at 
-st,  thought.  Today  the  United  States 
affirms  its  commitment  to  its  Strate- 
c  Defense  Initiative  and  our  offer  to 
lare  the  benefits  of  strategic  defenses 
ith  others. 

And  yet,  even  as  diplomatic  and 
chnological  progress  holds  out  the 
ape  of  at  last  diminishing  the  awful 
cud  of  nuclear  terror  we've  lived  un- 
er  in  the  postwar  era,  even  at  this 
loment,  another  ominous  terror  is 
)0se  once  again  in  the  world;  a  terror 
e  thought  the  world  had  put  behind;  a 
rror  that  looms  at  us  now  from  the 
mg,  buried  past;  from  ghostly,  scar- 
ing trenches  and  the  haunting,  wan 
aces  of  millions  dead  in  one  of  the  most 
nhumane  conflicts  of  all  time:  poison 
;as,  chemical  warfare — the  terror  of  it; 
he  horror  of  it.  We  condemn  it. 


U.S.  Releases  Funds 
to  United  Nations 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
SEPT.  13,  19881 

The  President  announced  today  that  he 
has  signed  a  determination  releasing  to 
the  United  Nations  $44  million  withheld 
pending  reforms  in  the  UN  system. 
This  action  repi-esents  recognition  of 
the  renewed  effectiveness  of  the  United 
Nations  as  an  organization  serving  the 
cause  of  world  peace  and  stability. 

Reflecting  concerns  shared  by  the 
Administration  regarding  UN  admin- 
istrative and  budgetary  practices.  Con- 
gress established  requirements  for 
release  of  FY  1988  and  1989  funds  for 
U.S.  contributions  to  the  United  Na- 
tions. The  United  Nations  has  made 
progress  toward  a  consensus  budget 
process,  limitations  on  secondment  of 
staff  to  the  Secretariat,  and  Secretariat 
staff  reductions.  The  President  has  de- 
termined that  these  actions  fulfill  the 
legislative  requirements  for  release  of 
outstanding  FY  1988  funds.  The  Secre- 
tary of  State  has  been  directed  to  in- 
form Congress,  as  required  by  law.  The 
President  expects  that  similar  deter- 
minations will  be  possible  for  releasing 
FY  1989  funds  as  they  become 
available. 


The  use  of  chemical  weapons  in  the 
Iran-Iraq  war — beyond  its  tragic  human 
toll — jeopardizes  the  moral  and  legal 
strictures  that  have  held  these  weapons 
in  check  since  World  War  I.  Let  this 
tragedy  spark  reaffirmation  of  the  Ge- 
neva protocol  outlawing  the  use  of 
chemical  weapons.  I  call  upon  the  sig- 
natories to  that  protocol,  as  well  as 
other  concerned  states,  to  convene  a 
conference  to  consider  actions  that  we 
can  take  together  to  reverse  the  serious 
erosion  of  this  treaty.  And  we  urge  all 
nations  to  cooperate  in  negotiating  a 
verifiable,  truly  global  ban  on  chemical 
weapons  at  the  Conference  on  Disarma- 


In  addition  to  adopting  important 
organizational  reforms,  the  United  Na- 
tions is  also  undertaking  major  new 
peacekeeping  operations  in  Afghanistan 
and  the  Persian  Gulf,  and  prospects  for 
further  peacekeeping  exist  in  other 
critical  areas.  In  its  peacekeeping 
efforts,  the  United  Nations  is  directly 
serving  important,  long-term  objectives 
of  this  Administration  to  end  regional 
conflicts  and  advance  peace  and  free- 
dom around  the  world.  The  President's 
action  makes  it  clear  that  the  United 
States  is  prepared  to  meet  its  obliga- 
tions in  support  of  these  peacekeeping 
efforts.  As  an  indication  of  our  commit- 
ment to  an  effective  United  Nations, 
the  President  also  announced  his  inten- 
tion to  include  full  funding  to  meet  the 
U.S.  contribution  to  the  UN  system 
and  UN  peacekeeping  in  the  FY  1990 
budget,  which  he  will  submit  to  Con- 
gress in  January. 

In  announcing  these  decisions,  the 
President  called  on  the  United  Nations 
to  continue  progress  in  areas  where  re- 
form remains  incomplete.  The  Presi- 
dent reiterated  the  commitment  of  the 
United  States  to  assist  the  United  Na- 
tions in  its  reform  program  as  well  as 
in  its  new  peacekeeping  efforts. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Sept.  19,  1988. 


ment  in  Geneva.  It  is  incumbent  upon 
all  civilized  nations  to  ban,  once  and  for 
all — and  on  a  verifiable  and  global 
basis — the  use  of  chemical  and  gas 
warfare. 

Finally,  we  must  redouble  our 
efforts  to  stop  further  proliferation  of 
nuclear  weapons  in  the  world.  Like- 
wise, proliferation  in  other  high-tech- 
nology weapons  such  as  ballistic 
missiles  is  reaching  global  proportions, 
exacerbating  regional  rivalries  in  ways 
that  can  have  global  imphcations.  The 
number  of  potential  suppliers  is  grow- 
ing at  an  alarming  rate,  and  more  must 
be  done  to  halt  the  spread  of  these 


3epartment  of  State  Bulletin/November  1988 


weapons.  This  was  a  matter  of  discus- 
sion last  week  between  Secretary 
Shultz  and  [Soviet]  Foreign  Minister 
Shevardnadze.  Talks  between  American 
and  Soviet  experts  begin  on  this  today. 
And  we  hope  to  see  a  multilatei-al  effort 
to  avoid  having  areas  of  tension  like  the 
Middle  East  become  even  more  deadly 
battlegi-ounds  than  they  already  are. 

Progress  and  Reform 
in  the  United  Nations 

But  in  most  of  these  areas,  we  see  not 
only  progress  but  also  the  potential  for 
an  increasingly  vital  role  for  multi- 
lateral efforts  and  institutions  like  this 
United  Nations.  That  is  why,  now  more 
than  ever,  the  United  Nations  must 
continue  to  increase  its  effectiveness 
through  budget  and  program  reform. 
The  United  Nations  already  is  enacting 
sweeping  measures  affecting  personnel 
reductions,  budgeting  by  consensus, 
and  the  establishment  of  program  pri- 
orities. These  actions  are  e.xtremely 
important.  The  progress  on  reforms  has 
allowed  me  to  release  funds  withheld 
under  congressional  restrictions.  I  ex- 
pect the  reform  program  will  continue 
and  that  further  funds  will  be  released 
in  our  new  fiscal  year. 

And,  let  me  say  here,  we  congratu- 
late the  United  Nations  on  the  work  it 
has  done  in  three  areas  of  special 
concern. 

•  First,  our  struggle  against  the 
scourge  of  terrorism  and  state-spon- 
sored terrorism  must  continue.  And  we 
must  also  end  the  scourge  of  hostage- 
taking. 

•  Second,  the  work  of  the  World 
Health  Organization  in  coordinating 
and  advancing  research  on  AIDS  [ac- 
quired immune  deficiency  syndrome]  is 
vital.  All  international  efforts  in  this 
area  must  be  redoubled.  The  AIDS 
crisis  is  a  grave  one;  we  must  move  as 
one  to  meet  it. 

•  And  so,  too,  is  the  drug  crisis. 
We're  moving  now  toward  a  new  anti- 
drug-trafficking convention.  This  im- 
portant treaty  will  be  completed  in 
December.  I  am  confident  other  strong 
UN  drug  control  programs  will  also  fol- 
low. The  American  people  are  pro- 


Security  Council  Permanent  Members 
Meet  With  Secretary  General 


JOINT  COMMUNIQUE, 
SEPT.  28,  1988 

On  28  September  1988,  the  Ministers  of 
Foreign  Affairs  of  the  five  permanent 
members  of  the  Security  Council  had  a 
meeting  with  the  Secretary  General  of  the 
United  Nations,  H.E.  Mr.  Javier  Perez  de 
Cuellar.  Taking  part  in  the  meeting  were 
the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Peo- 
ple's Republic  of  China,  H.E.  Mr.  Qian 
Qichen;  the  State  Minister,  Minister  of  For- 
eign Affairs  of  France,  H.E.  Mr.  Roland 
Dumas:  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of 
the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics. 
H.E.  Mr.  Eduard  A.  Shevardnadze;  the 
Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  and  Com- 
monwealth Affairs  of  the  United  Kingdom 
of  Great  Britain  and  Northern  Ireland,  the 
Right  Honorable  Sir  Geoffrey  Howe;  and 
the  Secretary  of  State  of  the  United  States 
of  America,  H.E.  Mr.  George  Shultz. 

The  Ministers  and  the  Secretary  Gen- 
eral exchanged  views  on  a  wide  range  of 
major  international  issues.  They  placed 
particular  emphasis  on  efforts  to  resolve 
current  regional  conflicts  in  accordance 
with  the  principles  of  the  Charter  of  the 
United  Nations.  They  noted  with  satisfac- 
tion the  marked  improvement  in  interna- 
tional relations  at  the  global  level  and  the 
general  trend  towards  dialogue  and  peace- 
ful settlement  of  disputes  which  had  devel- 
oped since  their  previous  meeting  with  the 
Secretary  General  on  25  September  1987. 
They  welcomed  the  active  involvement  of 
the  United  Nations  in  this  process.  They 
also  stressed  their  continuing  confidence  in 
the  United  Nations,  which  they  believed 
had  an  increasingly  significant  role  to  play 
in  the  achievement  of  international  peace 
and  security.  The  Ministers  expressed 


foundly  concerned  and  deeply  angered. 
We  will  not  tolerate  the  drug  traf- 
fickers. We  mean  to  make  war  on  them, 
and  we  believe  this  is  one  war  the 
United  Nations  can  endorse  and  par- 
ticipate in. 

Yes,  the  United  Nations  is  a  better 
place  than  it  was  8  years  ago — and  so, 
too,  is  the  world.  But  the  real  issue  of 
reform  in  the  United  Nations  is  not 


their  determination  to  continue  to  work  1 
gether  to  enhance  these  positive 
developments. 

The  Ministers  welcomed  the  cease-fi 
between  Iran  and  Iraq  which  came  into 
effect  on  20  August  1988.  They  also  wel- 
comed the  start  of  direct  talks  between  t 
parties  under  the  auspices  of  the  Secret; 
General  in  order  to  secure  full  implemer 
tion  of  Security  Council  Resolution  598. 

The  Secretary  General  briefed  the 
Ministers  on  his  current  efforts  to  conso 
date  the  cease-fire  in  all  its  aspects  and 
bring  about  a  settlement  in  accordance 
with  the  resolution.  The  Ministers  reitei 
ated  their  complete  support  for  the  Seer 
tary  General's  endeavors  and  their 
determination  to  work  in  cooperation  wi 
him  to  ensure  that  the  resolution  be  full 
implemented  as  an  integral  whole.  They 
also  expressed  the  conviction  that  the  t 
parties  now  had  before  them  the  opport 
nity  to  reach  a  comprehensive,  just,  hoi 
able  and  durable  peace.  They  urged  the 
need  for  substantive  and  continuous  tal 
and,  in  this  respect,  they  welcomed  the 
decision  to  continue  the  talks  on  1  Octo 
They  called  on  both  sides  to  display  re- 
straint, flexibility  and  readiness  to  sea 
for  mutually  acceptable  solutions. 

The  Ministers  thanked  the  Secreta 
General  for  his  invitation  to  the  meetii 
which  they  considered  most  useful.  In 
of  the  primary  responsibility  of  the  Se- 
curity Council  under  the  Charter  for  tl 
maintenance  of  international  peace  and 
curity,  they  expressed  their  determina  ^ 
to  continue  to  work  together  for  the  pi 
vention  and  settlement  of  Internationa 
conflicts. ■ 


limited  just  to  fiscal  and  administrt 
improvements  but  also  to  a  higher 
of  reform — an  intellectual  and  phik 
sophical  reform,  a  reform  of  old  vie 
about  the  relationship  between  the 
vidual  and  the  state. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  33 


Closing  Reflections 

^nd  yet,  we  Americans  champion  free- 
iom  not  only  because  it's  practical  and 
Jeneficial  but  because  it  is  also  just, 
iiorally  right.  And  here,  I  hope  you'll 
Permit  me  to  note  that  I  have  ad- 
iressed  this  assemblage  more  than  any 


FEATURE 
UN  General  Assembly 


•eedom  and 

:onomic  Development 

'W  developments,  for  example,  have 
en  more  encouraging  to  the  United 
ates  than  the  special  session  this 
dy  held  on  Africa  IVz  years  ago — a 
ssion  in  which  the  United  Nations 
ined  as  one  in  a  call  for  free  market 
centives  and  a  lessening  of  state  con- 
ols  to  spur  economic  development.  - 

At  one  of  the  first  international  as-  f 
mblies  of  my  presidency,  in  Cancun,  ^ 
e.xico,  I  said  that  history  demon-  t 

rates  that,  time  and  again,  in  place  i 
ter  place,  economic  growth  and  hu-  I 
an  progress  make  their  greatest  f- 

rides  in  countries  that  encourage  eco-    | 
)mic  freedom;  that  individual  farmers,  == 
borers,  owners,  traders,  and  manag-     "^ 
s  are  the  heart  and  soul  of  develop-       - 
ent.  Ti-ust  them,  because  where 
ey're  allowed  to  create  and  build, 
here  they're  given  a  personal  stake  in 
ciding  economic  policies  and  benefit- 
g  from  their  success,  then  societies 
came  more  dynamic,  prosperous,  pro- 
•essive,  and  free.  We  believe  in  free- 
5m.  We  know  it  works. 

And  this  is  the  immutable  lesson  of 
16  poswar  era:  that  freedom  works; 
/en  more,  that  freedom  and  peace 
ork  together.  Every  year  that  passes, 
/ery where  in  the  world,  this  lesson  is 
iking  hold,  from  the  People's  Republic 
:'  China  to  Cameroon;  from  Bolivia  to 
otswana;  and,  yes,  in  the  citadel  of 
[arxism-Leninism  itself.  No,  my  coun- 
•y  did  not  invent  this  synergy  of  peace 
nd  freedom,  but,  believe  me,  we  im-       - 
ose  no  restrictions  on  the  free  export     = 
f  our  more  than  two  centuries  of  expe-  "^ 
ience  with  it.  Free  people  blessed  by     t 
conomic  opportunity  and  protected  by    i 
iws  that  respect  the  dignity  of  the  in-     I 
ividual  are  not  driven  toward  war  or       ^ 
he  domination  of  others.  Here,  then,  is  § 
he  way  to  world  peace.  ^ 


Bilateral  Meetings 


With  President  Robert  Mugabe  of  Zimbabwe. 


With  Deputy  Prime  Minister/Foreign  Minister  Esmat  Abdel  Meguid  of  Egypt 
and  Vice  Prime  Minister  Shimon  Peres  of  Israel. 


department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1988 


of  my  predecessors  and  that  this  will  be 
the  last  occasion  I  do  so.  So,  I  hope, 
too,  I  may  be  permitted  now  some  clos- 
ing reflections. 

The  world  is  currently  witnessing 
another  celebration  of  international 
cooperation;  at  the  Olympics,  we  see 
nations  joining  together  in  the  competi- 
tion of  sports,  and  we  see  young  peo- 
ple, who  know  precious  little  of  the 
resentments  of  their  elders,  coming  to- 
gether as  one. 

One  of  our  young  athletes,  from  a 
home  of  modest  means,  said  that  she 
drew  the  strength  for  her  achievement 
from  another  source  of  wealth.  "We 
were  rich  as  a  family,"  she  said,  about 
the  love  she  was  given  and  the  values 
she  was  taught. 

I  dare  to  hope  that,  in  the  senti- 
ment of  that  young  athlete,  we  see  a 
sign  of  the  rediscovery  of  old  and  tested 


Father,  passed  on  in  the  first  farewell 
address  made  to  the  American  people. 
It  is  a  truth  that  I  hope  now  you'll 
permit  me  to  mention  in  these  remarks 
of  farewell;  a  truth  embodied  in  our 
Declaration  of  Independence:  that  the 
case  for  inalienable  rights,  that  the  idea 
of  human  dignity,  that  the  notion  of 
conscience  above  compulsion,  can  be 
made  only  in  the  conte.xt  of  higher  law; 
only  in  the  conte.xt  of  what  one  of  the 
founders  of  this  organization.  Secretary 
General  Dag  Hammarskjold,  has  called 
"devotion  to  something  which  is  greater 
and  higher  than  we  are  ourselves." 

This  is  the  endless  cycle,  the  final 
truth  to  which  humankind  seems  al- 
ways to  return:  that  religion  and  moral- 
ity, that  faith  in  something  higher,  are 
prerequisites  for  freedom  and  that  jus- 
tice and  peace  within  ourselves  is  the 


...the  real  issue  of  reform  in  the 
United  Nations  is  not  limited  just 
to  fiscal  and  administrative 
improvements  but  also  to  a  higher 
sort  of  reform  ...a  reform  of  old 
views  about  the  relationship 
between  the  individual  and  the 
state. 


values,  values  such  as  family — the  first 
and  most  important  unit  of  society, 
where  all  values  and  learning  begin;  an 
institution  to  be  cherished  and  pro- 
tected. Values,  too,  such  as  work,  com- 
munity, freedom,  and  faith — for  it's 
here  we  find  the  deeper  rationale  for 
the  cause  of  human  rights  and  world 
peace. 

And  our  own  experience  on  this 
continent — the  American  e.xperience — 
though  brief,  has  had  one  unmistakable 
encounter,  an  insistence  on  the  preser- 
vation of  one  sacred  truth.  It  is  a  truth 
that  our  first  President,  our  Founding 


first  step  toward  justice  and  peace  in 
the  world  and  for  the  ages. 

Yes,  this  is  a  place  of  great  debate 
and  grave  discussions,  and  yet,  I  cannot 
help  but  note  here  that  one  of  our 
Founding  Fathers — the  most  worldly  of 
men,  an  internationalist — Benjamin 
Franklin,  interrupted  the  proceedings 
of  our  own  Constitutional  Convention  to 
make  much  the  same  point.  And  I  can- 
not help  but  think  this  morning  of  other 
beginnings.  Of  where  and  when  I  first 
read  those  words,  "and  they  shall  beat 
their  swords  into  plowshares"  and 
"your  young  men  shall  see  visions  and 


your  old  men  shall  dream  dreams."  Thi 
morning,  my  thoughts  go  to  her  who 
gave  me  many  things  in  life  but  whose 
most  important  gift  was  the  knowledge 
of  happiness  and  solace  to  be  gained  in 
prayer.  It's  the  greatest  help  I've  had  i 
my  presidency,  and  I  recall  here  Lin- 
coln's words  when  he  said  only  the  mo 
foolish  of  men  would  think  he  could  co 
front  the  duties  of  the  office  I  now  hoi 
without  turning  to  someone  stronger, 
power  above  all  others. 

I  think  then  of  her  and  others  lik( 
her  in  that  small  town  in  Illinois — gen 
tie  people  who  possessed  something 
that  those  who  hold  positions  of  powe 
sometimes  forget  to  prize.  No  one  of 
them  could  ever  have  imagined  the  be 
from  the  banks  of  the  Rock  River  woi 
come  to  this  moment  and  have  this  op 
portunity.  But  had  they  been  told  it 
would  happen,  I  think  they  would  ha 
been  a  bit  disappointed  if  I'd  not  spo 
ken  here  for  what  they  knew  so  well: 
that  when  we  grow  weary  of  the  wor 
and  its  troubles,  when  our  faith  in  h- 
manity  falters,  it  is  then  that  we  mu 
seek  comfort  and  refreshment  of  spii 
in  a  deeper  source  of  wisdom,  one 
greater  than  ourselves. 

And  so,  if  future  generations  do 
say  of  us  that,  in  our  time,  peace  cai 
closer,  that  we  did  bring  about  new- 
sons  of  truth  and  justice,  it  will  be 
cause  for  pride.  But  it  shall  be  a  cai 
of  greater  pride  still  if  it  is  also  said 
that  we  were  wise  enough  to  know  t 
deliberations  of  great  leaders  and  gi 
bodies  are  but  overture,  that  the  tn 
majestic  music — the  music  of  freedo 
of  justice  and  peace — is  the  music  vc 
in  forgetting  self  and  seeking  in  sile 
the  will  of  Him  who  made  us. 

Thank  you  for  your  hospitality  i 
the  years.  I  bid  you  now  farewell,  a 
God  bless  you. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Oct.  3,  1988; 
USUN  press  release  77.  ■ 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1Bi: 


HE  PRESIDENT 


foreign  Policy  Achievements 


President  Reagan's  radio  address 
'  ///(   nation  on  August  27,  1988} 

want  to  talk  to  you  today  about  some 
iMul  things  that  are  happening  around 
e  world,  a  move  toward  peace  that 
(iws  how  successful  this  nation's  com- 
iitinent  to  peace  through  strength  has 
Vvu. 

in  the  Persian  Gulf,  a  cease-fire 
IS  been  declared  in  one  of  this  era's 
list  horrible  conflicts,  the  Iran-Iraq 
ir.  In  Asia,  half  the  Soviet  Union's 
\asion  force  has  left  Afghanistan,  and 
e  rest  are  due  out  early  next  year.  In 
lutheast  Asia,  Vietnam  has  promised 
w  ithdraw  its  occupation  force  from 
ambodia.  In  southern  Africa,  we're 
■iikering  an  agreement  that  may  lead 
the  departure  of  all  Cuban  and  South 
frican  forces  from  Angola.  And  we 
'ein  to  have  a  more  constructive  rela- 
iinship  with  the  Soviet  Union  because 
the  Afghanistan  withdrawal,  human 
i;hts  improvements,  and  the  INF 
reaty  that  eliminates  an  entire  class  of 
.S.  and  Soviet  nuclear  missiles. 

Peace  is  gaining  ground,  but  the 
lins  haven't  just  come  in  the  last  few 
lOnths.  It's  taken  IV2  years  of  effort, 
^e  came  into  office  convinced  that  the 
ord  "peace"  is  just  an  empty  slogan 
nless  the  word  "strength"  follows  hard 
pon  it.  Peace  is  a  godly  thing,  but 
len  are  seldom  godly.  What  we've 
■arned  is  that  peace  is  hard  to  achieve 
nless  the  forces  of  good  have  the 
:rength  to  stand  firmly  for  it. 

Before  we  took  office  in  1981,  the 
lobe  was  reeling  from  an  e.xplosion  of 
iternational  turbulence.  Our  nation 
ad  neglected  its  defenses  for  years 
'hile  some  assured  us  that  a  passive 
Linerica  would  enjoy  a  peace  that  was 
lore,  not  less,  secure.  But  that's  not 
ow  things  turned  out.  Soon  we  saw 
Vietnam  invade  Cambodia  and  the  So- 
iet  Union  invade  Afghanistan.  Iraq 
nd  Iran  began  their  war  during  this 
leriod  as  well.  Over  and  over,  we 
Americans  saw  that  when  our  nation 
Ices  not  maintain  her  strength  peace 
lias  no  anchor  in  the  world. 


Our  resolve  was  tested  early  on. 
The  Soviet  Union  had  deployed  highly 
destabilizing  intermediate-range  mis- 
siles in  Europe  and  Asia,  a  threat  to 
peace.  With  our  NATO  allies,  we  went 
to  the  Soviets  with  a  proposal:  get  rid 
of  those  missiles,  we  said,  before  we 
match  them  with  missiles  of  our  own. 
And  the  Soviets  turned  us  down.  They 
were  daring  us  to  deliver,  and  we  did. 
Our  determination,  and  that  of  our  al- 
lies, to  see  our  missiles  installed  in  Eu- 
rope convinced  the  Soviet  Union  that 
the  days  of  unilateral  disarmament 
were  over.  And  once  the  Soviets 
learned  they  could  not  intimidate  us  or 
cajole  us  into  giving  them  the  advan- 
tage, they  came  to  the  bargaining 
table.  They  did  business  because  we 
proved  we  meant  business. 

We  also  meant  business  when  we 
said  we  would  not  sit  idly  by  as  noble 
and  brave  Afghan  freedom  fighters  re- 
sisted an  invasion  of  their  country.  Our 
aid  to  the  Afghan  resistance  has  been 
of  critical  importance  in  the  Soviet  deci- 
sion to  go  home.  Once  again,  they  did 
business  because  we  proved  we  meant 
business. 

In  Angola,  Jonas  Savimbi's  UNITA 
[National  Union  for  the  Total  Inde- 
pendence of  Angola]  has  been  fighting 
for  13  years  against  the  Mar.xist  regime 
and  its  Cuban  protectors.  In  1975, 
President  Gerald  Ford  wanted  to  help, 
but  some  in  Congress  felt  our  standing 
with  the  freedom  fighters  would  only 
prolong  hostilities.  A  law  was  passed 
that  made  aid  illegal,  and  the  war 
dragged  on.  The  Cubans  multiplied.  In 
1985  Congress  repealed  the  law  and  be- 
gan supporting  UNITA.  Now  the 
Cubans  are  talking  of  a  pullout.  They're 
doing  business  because  we  showed 
them  we  meant  business.  We've  proved 
that  we  can  stand  united  as  a  country 
that  means  business — business  for 
peace. 

Our  bipartisan  policy  in  the  Per- 
sian Gulf  has  been  to  stand  firm  against 
Iranian  aggression  and  for  the  principle 
of  free  navigation.  Now  the  Iran-Iraq 
war  is  coming  to  a  close.  Why?  One 
reason,  as  retired  Admirals  Elmo  Zum- 


walt  and  Worth  Bagley  put  it,  was  that 
the  allied  naval  operation  designed  to 
be  a  deterrent  worked. 

Contrast  these  successes  with  the 
tragic  situation  in  Nicaragua.  It's  been 
almost  2  years  since  Congress  has  ap- 
proved any  military  aid  to  the  brave 
freedom  fighters  there.  Here's  the  re- 
sults: the  Sandinistas  come  to  the  bar- 
gaining table  making  promises  to  bring 
democracy  and  end  the  war,  and  then 
they  violate  those  promises  with  im- 
punity. They  kick  out  our  ambassadors, 
oppress  their  people,  arrest  their  op- 
position, muzzle  the  media,  and  engage 
in  vicious  assaults  on  civilians  to  get 
them  to  stop  aiding  the  freedom  fight- 
ers. They  feel  free  to  do  all  this  be- 
cause they  do  not  believe  that  we  mean 
business. 

Our  policy  of  peace  through 
strength  has  been  vindicated  wherever 
it's  been  tried.  There  is  still  time  to 
turn  the  tide  in  Nicaragua.  We 
shouldn't  be  overly  optimistic,  for  free- 
dom still  faces  serious  challenges, 
whether  in  South  Asia  or  Eastern  Eu- 
rope. But  the  future  for  world  peace  is 
bright  if  we  Americans  continue  to 
stand  firm,  stand  tall,  and  stand  for 
freedom. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Sept.  5,  1988. 


department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1988 


THE  SECRETARY 


The  Administration's  Approach 
to  IVIiddle  East  Peacemaking 


Secretary  Shultz's  address  before 
the  Washington  Institute  for  Near  East 
Policy  ut  the  Wye  Plantation  in 
Queenstown,  Maryland,  on  September 
16,  198S.'^ 

Decision  time  is  approaching  in  the 
Middle  East.  In  Israel  and  Lebanon, 
within  the  Palestinian  community,  and 
in  the  gulf,  choices  will  be  made  that 
will  have  a  profound  impact  on  the  pol- 
itics of  the  region  and  on  the  chances  of 
settling  conflicts  peacefully.  These  deci- 
sions must  be  based  on  a  dispassionate 
and  cold  look  at  reality. 

For  nearly  9  months,  the  United 
States  has  highlighted  a  simple  but  far- 
reaching  reality  in  the  Arab-Israeli  con- 
flict: The  status  quo  between  Arabs  and 
Israelis  does  not  work.  It  is  not  viable. 
It  is  dangerous.  It  contains  the  seeds  of 
a  worsening  conflict  that  threatens  to 
inflict  even  greater  losses  on  all  sides  in 
the  future. 

The  Arab-Israeli  conflict  is  not 
static.  Today  potentially  far-reaching 
changes  are  taking  place.  But  the  fun- 
damental nature  of  the  conflict  and  the 
principles  for  resolving  it  have  not 
changed.  Indeed,  continuity  and  con- 
stancy appear  even  more  important  in 
the  process  of  resolving  this  conflict. 
The  challenge  facing  the  ne.xt  Admin- 
istration will  be  to  shape  change  by 
building  on  the  fundamental  constants. 
This  will  serve  U.S.  interests  and  en- 
hance the  prospects  for  peace. 

What  is  the  shape  of  the  Middle 
East  today? 

•  The  Palestinian  uprising  in  the 
West  Bank  and  Gaza  has  not  altered 
the  fundamental  nature  of  the  Arab- 
Israeli  conflict.  It's  a  reminder  that 
comprehensive  peace  requires  peace  be- 
tween Israelis  and  Palestinians.  And 
it's  a  reminder  that  the  status  quo 
serves  the  interests  of  no  party. 

•  Jordan's  disengagement  from  the 
West  Bank  hasn't  ended  Jordan's  in- 
volvement in  the  peace  process.  Jordan 
has  its  own  interests  to  pursue.  Jor- 
dan's border  with  Israel  is  the  longest 
of  any,  and  much  of  its  population  is 
related  by  family  ties  to  residents  of 
the  West  Bank  and  Gaza.  The  shaping 
of  Jordan's  role  in  negotiations  and  in  a 
settlement  are  among  the  key  issues 
that  need  to  be  assessed  by  all  parties. 


•  Israel's  upcoming  elections  only 
highlight  the  intense  and  continuing  de- 
bate within  that  country  about  peace. 
People  are  taking  a  hard  look  at  the 
prospects  for  peace,  and  they  are  ask- 
ing hard  questions:  Should  Israel  trade 
land  for  peace?  Will  continued  occupa- 
tion affect  the  democratic  and  Jewish 
nature  of  the  State  of  Israel?  What 
should  Israelis  do  about  Palestinian 
rights?  Are  other  Arabs  ready  to  ac- 
cept Israel  as  a  neighbor  and  make 
peace? 

•  The  options  before  the  Palestin- 
ians also  have  not  changed.  Palestin- 
ians are  grappling  with  tough  choices. 
Should  they  renounce  terrorism  and  vi- 
olence and  choose  a  political  course  to- 
ward peace?  How  should  they  move 
beyond  empty  slogans  toward  realistic 
and  responsible  positions  to  give  new 
life  to  the  peace  process? 

•  Elsewhere  in  the  region,  change 
and  constancy  are  key  words.  In 
Lebanon,  a  new  president  is  scheduled 
to  be  elected  amidst  hopes  that  this  will 
give  a  push  to  the  process  of  national 
reconciliation.  All  Lebanese  recognize 
the  dangers  that  would  result  from  a 
failure  to  elect  a  president  according  to 
the  constitution. 

•  Iran  and  Iraq  are  now  negotiat- 
ing under  UN  auspices  to  bring  an  end 
to  8  years  of  bloody  and  destructive 
war  in  the  gulf  The  results  of  these 
talks  will  have  a  profound  influence  on 
the  entire  region. 

•  Ballistic  missiles  and  chemical 
weapons  continue  to  proliferate.  The 
use  of  chemical  weapons  by  both  sides 
in  the  gulf  war  and  Iraq's  use  of  these 
weapons  against  the  Kurds  are  grim  re- 
minders of  the  dangers  these  weapons 
pose  to  the  conduct  of  international 
relations. 

•  In  Afghanistan,  Soviet  troops  are 
withdrawing.  The  people  of  Afghan- 
istan look  forward  to  the  end  of  Soviet 
intervention. 

Continuity  in  the 
Midst  of  Change 

So,  the  fact  of  change  is  less  important 
than  the  uses  made  of  change.  The 
Arab-Israeli  conflict  does  not  stand 
still.  But  there  are  enduring  realities 
that  point  to  a  mehod  for  resolving  the 
conflict. 


The  Arab-Israeli  conflict  is  not 
intractable.  Negotiations  can  bring 
about  peace.  No  matter  what  new  situ- 
ations or  difficulties  Arabs  and  Israelis 
face  as  they  approach  negotiations,  one 
thing  is  certain  once  they  get  there: 
They  will  confront  some  enduring  real- 
ities that  shape  the  rules  of  the  nego- 
tiations and  the  outlines  of  a  fair 
settlement  that  negotiations  can  be  ex- 
pected to  produce. 

What  are  the  principles  that  undei 
lie  a  comprehensive  settlement  of  the 
Arab-Israeli  conflict? 

The  existence,  security,  and  well- 
being  of  Israel  are  the  first  principles 
of  any  settlement.  Israel  has  the  right 
to  exist,  and  it  has  the  right  to  exist  ii 
security.  We  will  do  our  utmost  to  en- 
sure it. 

The  requirements  of  security  need 
to  be  understood  clearly.  These  includ 
military  hardware,  defensible  geo- 
graphic positions,  and  technological 
know-how.  The  United  States  has  coop 
erated  with  Israel  on  these  elements, 
and  that  cooperation  will  continue.  Bu 
these  are  not  the  only  critical  compo- 
nents of  Israel's  security. 

Real  security  results  from  resolv- 
ing political  differences  that  continue 
fuel  conflict.  The  location  of  borders  i: 
important,  but  more  important  is  wh£ 
crosses  those  borders:  ideas,  goods, 
people,  instead  of  armies  and  weapon.' 
Borders  need  to  be  secure  and  recog- 
nized, but  political  differences  betwee 
neighbors  also  need  to  be  resolved 
through  compromise. 

Palestinian  political  rights  must 
also  be  recognized  and  addressed.  Pal 
estinians  want  more  than  the  basic  ne 
cessities  of  life.  They  want,  and  they 
are  entitled  to,  political  participation 
and  influence  over  political  and  eco- 
nomic decisions  that  affect  their  lives. 
This  can  occur  if  opportunities  for 
peace  and  dialogue  are  seized. 

A  third  enduring  reality  is  that  tl* 
history,  security,  and  destiny  of  Is- 
raelis, Jordanians,  Palestinians,  and 
Egyptians  are  inextricably  bound  to- 
gether. Jordan  is  a  vibrant  and  hetera 
geneous  society  with  a  strong  national 
identity  of  its  own.  It  is  not  a  Palestii 
ian  state.  An  enduring  settlement  mv 
reflect  the  reality  that  strong,  open  r 
lations  will  need  to  exist  among  Israe 


10 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  19 1 

t 


THE  SECRETARY 


^Palestinian,  Jordanian,  and  Egyptian 
)eoples. 

A  critical  and  enduring  reality  is 
hat  negotiations  work.  Ten  years  ago, 
Sgypt  and  Israel  forged  a  treaty  of 
jeace  that  has  survived  enormous 
trains.  They  continue  to  demonstrate 
;hat  dialogue  and  negotiations  resolve 
lifferences  between  peoples  far  better 
;han  war  and  violence. 

Pranslating  Principles 

Into  a  Negotiated  Settlement 

(American  efforts  to  bring  about  nego- 
;iations  are  rooted  in  these  enduring 
Drinciples.  Our  approach  seeks  a  com- 
prehensive and  durable  settlement 
p-ounded  in  UN  Security  Council  Reso- 
utions  242  and  338.  It  calls  for  direct 
legotiations,  launched,  if  required, 
hrough  an  international  conference.  It 
■equires  acceptance  of  242  and  338  and 
'enunciation  of  violence  and  terrorism. 

As  regards  the  West  Bank  and 
jiaza,  our  approach  highlights  the  need 
"or  a  transitional  period  to  help  the  par- 
,ies  adjust  to  working  with  each  other 
,0  implement  an  agreement.  It  recog- 
lizes  the  relationship  in  time  and  sub- 
stance between  the  transitional  period 
md  the  final  status  agreement.  It 
iffirms  the  right  of  Palestinians  to  par- 
.icipate  actively  in  every  stage  of  nego- 
.iations.  And  it  reflects  the  strategic 
-eality  of  Jordanian-Palestinian 
nterdependence. 

This  has  been  the  American  ap- 
proach to  negotiations.  The  purposes  of 
.his  effort  have  been  clear. 

First,  the  objective  is  comprehen- 
iive  peace  between  Israel  and  all  its 
leighbors,  achieved  through  negotia- 
tions based  on  UN  Security  Council 
Resolutions  242  and  338.  This  will  re- 
quire the  exchange  of  territory  for 
Deace.  It  will  require  recognition  that 
sovereignty  cannot  be  defined  in  abso- 
ute  terms.  Today,  borders  are  porous. 
Dpenness  is  required  for  the  free  move- 
ment of  ideas,  people,  and  goods.  There 
will  need  to  be  a  border  demarcation 
but  not  a  wall  established  between 
peoples. 

The  territorial  issue  needs  to  be 
addressed  realistically.  Israel  will  never 
negotiate  from  or  return  to  the  lines  of 
partition  or  to  the  1967  borders.  But  it 
must  be  prepared  to  withdraw — as  Res- 
olution 242  says — "from  territories  oc- 
cupied in  the  recent  conflict."  Peace 
and  security  for  all  sides  are  at  stake. 
|i        Second,  peace  between  Israel  and 
its  neighbors  will  need  time  and  grow- 


ing mutual  good  will  to  succeed.  In  the 
case  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza,  this 
means  there  must  be  a  transitional  pe- 
riod. All  sides  need  to  deal  with  one 
another  gradually  in  the  light  of  an 
agreement  freely  negotiated.  All  need 
time  to  adjust  to  a  new  situation.  Pal- 
estinians need  to  achieve  rapid  control 
over  political  and  economic  decisions 
that  affect  their  lives.  Israelis  need 
time  to  adjust  to  a  new  situation — one 
in  which  Palestinians,  not  Israeli  mili- 
tary government  officials,  administer 
the  West  Bank  and  Gaza. 

The  concept  of  transition  is  vital 
and  far  reaching.  Many  of  its  elements 
have  already  been  worked  through  and 
accepted  by  Israel.  These  transitional 
arrangements  are  extensive  and  dra- 
matic. They  can  be  implemented 
quickly. 

Such  transitional  arrangements  will 
benefit  from  the  interplay  with  final 
status  negotiations.  Each  party  needs 
to  know  the  principles  that  will  define 
the  final  settlement.  As  those  princi- 
ples are  hammered  out  in  negotiations, 
they  will  enhance  the  transitional  ar- 
rangements themselves.  Each  element 
strengthens  the  other.  This  is  the  es- 
sence and  benefit  of  interlock  between 
transitional  arrangements  and  final 
status. 

Direct  negotiations  are  at  the  heart 
of  this  negotiating  process.  No  party 
should  be  expected  to  trust  its  vital 
national  security  interests  to  any  mech- 
anism except  direct  talks.  How  better 
to  engage  an  adversary,  take  his  mea- 
sure, assess  intentions,  and  probe  for 
openings  than  to  square  off  across  the 
table?  Direct  talks  work. 

In  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict,  an  in- 
ternational conference  may  also  be  nec- 
essary to  ease  the  entry  of  the  parties 
into  direct  negotiations.  This  confer- 
ence would  also  be  in  a  position,  at  the 
right  time,  to  deal  with  important  re- 
gionwide  issues  such  as  economic  devel- 
opment, joint  resource  sharing,  and 
humanitarian  concerns.  But  only  the 
right  kind  of  conference  should  take 
place — one  that  helps  launch  and  sup- 
port direct  negotiations  without  inter- 
fering in  them. 

Palestinian  participation  is  required 
at  every  stage  of  the  negotiations.  Pal- 
estinians have  a  vital  stake  in  the  out- 
come of  negotiations.  They  must  have  a 
say  in  the  negotiations  themselves,  and 
they  must  approve  the  outcome. 

Participation  involves  respon- 
sibilities, however.  There  are  no  free 
rides.  All  parties  must  demonstrate 


their  desire  to  make  peace.  They  must 
be  creative  and  reliable;  they  must  ad- 
here to  internationally  accepted  princi- 
ples and  norms.  For  Palestinians,  this 
means  acting  credibly  and  pursuing 
goals  that  are  achievable. 

No  participant  in  a  peace  process 
can  wave  the  flag  of  justice  in  one  hand 
and  brandish  the  weapons  of  terrorism 
in  the  other.  All  participants  must  re- 
nounce violence  and  terrorism.  Each 
must  agree  to  negotiate  on  the  ac- 
cepted international  basis  of  Security 
Council  Resolutions  242  and  338. 

There  are  also  no  free  rides  for 
outside  parties  that  want  to  play  a  role 
in  settling  the  conflict.  Both  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  consider  a 
settlement  of  the  conflict  to  be  in  their 
national  interest.  But  the  Soviets  will 
need  to  confront  some  difficult  choices. 

There  is  no  longer  any  excuse  for 
the  Soviets  to  avoid  such  important 
steps  as  resuming  full  diplomatic  rela- 
tions with  Israel;  nor  is  there  justifica- 
tion for  preventing  Jews  who  wish  to 
emigrate  from  doing  so.  The  sooner 
these  things  are  done,  the  better  for 
the  peace  process. 

Effective  Policies 

in  a  Period  of  Change 

The  challenge  of  Arab-Israeli  peace- 
making in  a  time  of  change  is  to  find 
the  right  mix  of  fundamental  realities 
and  creative  ideas.  The  question  is  how 
to  assess  some  of  these  ideas  at  this 
time. 

•  Peace  cannot  be  achieved  through 
the  creation  of  an  independent  Palestin- 
ian state  or  through  permanent  Israeli 
control  or  annexation  of  the  West  Bank 
and  Gaza.  At  the  same  time,  each  party 
is  free  to  bring  any  position  it  chooses 
to  the  negotiating  table.  Israelis  are 
free  to  argue  for  annexation;  Palestin- 
ians are  free  to  argue  for  independence. 
The  United  States  will  not  support 
either  of  these  positions  during 
negotiations. 

•  The  status  of  the  West  Bank  and 
Gaza  cannot  be  determined  by  uni- 
lateral acts  of  either  side  but  only 
through  a  process  of  negotiations.  A 
declaration  of  independent  Palestinian 
statehood  or  government-in-exile  would 
be  such  a  unilateral  act.  Palestinians 
need  to  decide  whether  to  remain  a 
part  of  the  problem  in  the  Middle  East 
or  become  a  part  of  the  solution.  His- 
tory need  not  repeat  itself  Practical, 
realistic  steps  by  Palestinians  are 
required. 


THE  SECRETARY 


•  An  attempt  by  Israel  to  transfer 
Palestinians  from  the  West  Bank  and 
Gaza  would  also  be  a  unilateral  act  to 
determine  the  status  of  those  territo- 
ries. The  United  States  would  oppose 
this  vigorously.  Such  a  policy  does  not 
provide  a  solution  to  the  problem,  nor 
does  it  bring  negotiations  any  closer. 

•  It  is  also  not  acceptable  to  shift 
the  focus  from  what  Palestinians  or  Is- 
raelis need  to  do  to  advance  the  peace 
process  to  what  the  United  States 
should  do.  This  applies  to  those  who 
urge  that  the  United  States  should  sup- 
port Palestinian  self-determination. 

The  United  States  cannot  accept 
"self-determination"  when  it  is  a  code- 
word for  an  independent  Palestinian 
state  or  for  unilateral  determination  of 
the  outcome  of  negotiations.  To  expect 
the  PLO  [Palestine  Liberation  Organi- 
zation] to  accept  Resolutions  242  and 
338  as  the  basis  for  negotiation  is  not 
to  ask  it  to  make  a  concession.  Those 
resolutions  lay  out  basic  principles 
which  the  international  community  has 
decided  must  be  reflected  in  a  peace 
settlement.  In  addition  to  these,  the 
legitimate  rights  of  the  Palestinian  peo- 
ple— including  political  rights — must 
also  be  addressed.  It  is  through  accept- 
ance of  these  principles,  not  through 
any  action  by  the  United  States,  that 
the  Palestinians  can  participate  fully  in 
determining  their  own  future. 

Conditioning  the 
Environment  for  Negotiations 

In  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict,  there  is  no 
objective  reality  and  no  immutable  set 
of  circumstances  that  cannot  be  shaped 
by  decisions  for  peace.  During  the  pe- 
riod ahead,  such  decisions  are  required. 
Israelis  and  Palestinians  themselves 
must  condition  the  environment  for  ne- 
gotiations. They  can  start  down  the 
road  to  accommodation  and  reconcilia- 
tion. Violence  has  distracted  people 
from  establishing  achievable  objectives. 
Political  debate  must  replace  violence. 

Concrete  actions  on  the  ground  are 
required.  Palestinians  must  renounce 
terrorism  and  violence.  They  must 
accept  the  right  of  Israel  to  exist  in 
peace  and  present  themselves  as  a 
viable  negotiating  partner.  They  cannot 
murder  or  threaten  other  Palestinians 
who  maintain  contact  with  Israeli 
authorities. 

For  its  part,  Israel  has  the  respon- 
sibility to  maintain  law  and  order  in  the 
West  Bank  and  Gaza.  But  Israel  must 
also  find  a  way  to  respond  to  expres 
sions  of  Palestinian  grievances.  It  can- 


12 


not  claim  there  is  no  one  to  talk  to, 
while  suppressing  political  expression 
and  arresting  or  deporting  those  who 
speak  out — even  those  who  speak  in 
moderate  terms. 

There  must  also  be  actions  on  the 
regional  level.  The  peace  treaty  be- 
tween Egypt  and  Israel  is  a  strategic 
anchor  of  the  entire  peace  process;  it 
must  constantly  be  enhanced.  Relations 
between  Israel  and  other  Arab  states 
must  start  down  the  road  to  normaliza- 
tion. Relations  between  people  don't 
need  to  await  the  formality  of  a  treaty. 
Israelis  and  Arabs  should  find  ways  to 
talk  to  each  other  now,  even  before 
treaty  relations  exist. 

The  conditions  under  which  refu- 
gees live  in  the  region  must  also  be 
addressed.  Poverty  is  no  ally  of  peace. 
The  continuing  existence  of  refugees 
does  not  make  the  case  for  Palestinian 
nationalism  stronger.  Palestinian  refu- 
gees can  live  in  better  conditions  even 
while  the  search  for  peace  continues. 
Arabs  and  Israelis,  together  with  the 
international  community,  must  shoulder 
this  responsibility. 

Finally,  there  must  be  a  change  of 
attitude  throughout  the  region.  The 


way  people  think  affects  the  way  they 
act.  Cynicism,  skepticism,  and  pessi- 
mism about  peace  must  be  shaken.  The 
conflict  must  be  seen  to  be  resolvable. 
Once  there  is  the  will  for  and  belief  in 
settlement,  the  benefits  of  peace  will 
be  seen  to  outweigh  the  real  but  tran- 
sitory risks  of  achieving  it. 

So  fundamental  realities  persist, 
even  in  the  midst  of  change.  The  goals 
of  the  peace  process  have  not  changed, 
nor  have  the  principles  of  negotiations. 

Indeed,  the  only  thing  that  needs 
to  change  is  the  willingness  of  people  ii 
the  Middle  East  to  move  the  peace 
process  forward.  Israehs,  Palestinians, 
Jordanians,  Syrians,  and  Lebanese  can 
make  peace  happen.  The  Egyptians  an 
more  than  ready  to  do  their  part.  So 
are  we.  And  so  are  others  around  the 
world.  The  opportunities  today  are 
greater  than  before,  and  so  are  the 
risks  of  doing  nothing.  To  make  peace, 
the  parties  must  exploit  the  new  oppoi 
tunities  created  by  the  current  fer- 
ment. And  thev  should  start  now. 


'Press  release  199  of  Sept.  19,  1988. 
Question-and-answer  session  not  printed 
here.  ■ 


Proposed  Refugee 
Admissions  for  FY  1989 


Secretary  Shultz's  statement  before 
the  Senate  Judiciary  Coynmittee  on 
September  13,  1988.^ 

I  am  pleased  to  be  here  this  morning 
once  more  to  present  the  President's 
proposal  for  refugee  admissions  for 
fiscal  year  (FY)  1989.  During  my  tenure 
as  Secretary,  I  have  taken  particular 
pride  in  testifying  before  this  commit- 
tee about  one  of  the  most  satisfying 
foreign  policy  endeavors  the  United 
States  undertakes — our  assistance  to 
refugees. 

It  is  customary  to  discuss  U.S.  aid 
to  refugees  in  the  context  of  the  hu- 
manitarian purposes  of  our  foreign  pol- 
icy. Indeed,  humanitarianism  is  the 
principal  motive  behind  our  programs 
on  refugee  issues.  Yet  it  is  worth  em- 
phasizing at  the  outset  of  these  re- 
marks that  we  have  benefited  greatly 
as  a  nation  by  opening  our  doors  to  the 
displaced  and  politically  oppressed.  We 
know  from  generations  of  experience 
that  every  wave  of  refugees  that  has 
come  to  our  shores  has  made  enormous 


contributions  to  all  sectors  of  our  soci- 
ety. Just  look  at  those  who  fled  from 
Nazi  Germany,  from  the  Soviet  Union, 
from  Indochina,  and  from  Cuba.  The 
contributions  to  this  nation  fi-om  the 
refugees  who  have  sought  sanctuary 
here  are  incalculable.  Thus,  U.S.  refu- 
gee policy  is  an  area  where  our  ideals, 
our  humanitarian  instincts,  and  our  in- 
terests coincide. 

I  would  like  to  review  with  you  to 
day  the  principles  which  have  shaped 
this  Administration's  refugee  assistanc 
and  admissions  policies  and  the  accom- 
plishments that  have  come  from  the 
programs  we  have  pursued.  I  want  the 
to  cover  briefly  the  major  refugee  is- 
sues we  face  today  and  also  summarize 
the  situation  which  prompted  the  emei 
gency  consultations  in  April  which  led 
us  to  increase  the  admissions  ceiling  f( 
Eastern  Europe  and  the  Soviet  Union. 
Finally,  I  will  present  the  President's 
proposal  for  refugee  admissions  in  fisc; 
year  1989. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  19{ 


THE  SECRETARY 


Let  me  also  draw  your  attention  to 
le  most  recent  World  Refugee  Report 
[ibmitted  by  the  Department  of  State. 
t  contains  substantial  information  on 
le  situation  of  refugees  around  the 
'orld.  In  addition,  you  will  find  the 
etailed  justification  for  the  President's 
reposals  in  the  document  Proposed 
efugee  Admissions  for  Fiscal  Year 
)89,  submitted  by  the  U.S.  Coordi- 
ator  for  Refugee  Affairs,  who  is  with 
16  here,  Mr.  Jonathan  Moore. 


lESOURCES 

efore  I  address  specific  refugee  is- 
jes,  I  want  to  say  a  word  about  re- 
Durces.  There  are  limited  resources 
railable  for  the  foreign  affairs  budget 

the  United  States.  At  the  same  time, 
lere  are  increased  refugee  needs,  both 
ir  assistance  and  admissions  overseas, 
inal  action  has  not  yet  been  taken  on 
le  FY  1989  foreign  assistance  appro- 
riations  for  the  refugee  progi-am.  The 
mference  on  that  bill  will  occur  next 
eek.  I  urge  the  conferees  to  remove 
le  earmarks  in  both  the  House  and 
enate  bills.  If  all  of  these  earmarks  at 
18  President's  requested  funding  level 

came  law,  over  half  of  the  migration 
id  refugee  assistance  appropriation 
ould  be  earmarked,  and  the  unmarked 
rograms — which  provide  lifesaving 
upport  to  refugees  in  camps  in  Africa, 
latin  America,  the  Near  East,  and 
(outheast  Asia — would  have  to  be  cut 
y  25%  across  the  board  to  absorb  the 
lerease  outside  the  request  level.  We 
eed  to  drop  the  earmarks  on  both  the 
jgular  and  the  emergency  refugee 
^counts. 


EFUGEE  ASSISTANCE  POLICY 

bout  two-thirds  of  refugee  funds  help 
rovide  the  most  basic  food,  shelter, 
ledical  care,  education  or  training,  and 
rotection  for  people  in  camps  who 
ave  fled  human  rights  abuses,  famine, 
ivil  war,  or  invasions.  Today  the  vast 
lajority  of  the  nearly  13  million  refu- 
ees  are  found  in  Asian  and  African 
ountries.  International  refugee  as- 
istance  bolsters  these  countries'  re- 
olve  to  continue  to  welcome  asylum- 
eekers.  The  United  States  has  a  long- 
tanding  tradition  of  providing  diplo- 
latic  leadership  and  substantial 
inancial  resources  to  ensure  protection 
nd  care  and  maintenance  programs  for 
efugees  in  camps  overseas. 


As  political  conditions  permit,  this 
assistance  enables  thousands  of  refu- 
gees to  return  to  their  countries  of  ori- 
gin. This  solution  requires  political 
conditions  which,  unfortunately,  are  not 
foreseeable  in  the  near  term  for  the 
majority  of  the  world's  refugees. 

U.S.  refugee  assistance  in  first- 
asylum  nations  is  made  more  efficient 
by  combining  it  with  the  resources  of 
other  nations  through  international  ref- 
ugee assistance  organizations.  We  con- 
centrate our  refugee  program  resources 
on  these  international  assistance  pro- 
grams, spending  about  twice  as  much 
on  the  99%  of  refugees  who  remain 
overseas  as  we  do  to  resettle  the  refu- 
gees admitted  each  year  to  the  United 
States. 


REFUGEE  ADMISSIONS  POLICY 

Our  refugee  admissions  policy  reflects 
the  oft-quoted  words  of  Emma  Lazarus 
on  the  Statue  of  Liberty.  To  the  "poor, 
huddled  masses  yearning  to  breathe 
free,"  we  want  to  offer  the  same  oppor- 
tunities for  a  new  home  in  a  new  land 
that  were  e.xtended  to  our  own  fore- 
fathers. The  Refugee  Act  of  1980  de- 
fines who  we  may  admit  as  refugees. 
Each  year  we  must  make  choices  con- 
cerning which  refugees  we  will  admit 
and  in  what  numbers.  These  decisions 
follow  naturally  from  our  refugee  ad- 
missions policy,  which  provides  reset- 
tlement when  repatriation  or  local 
resettlement  is  not  possible  or  first 
asylum  is  not  secure. 

There  are  four  significant  objec- 
tives of  our  admissions  policy. 

First,  each  year,  in  cooperation 
with  the  UNHCR  [UN  High  Commis- 
sioner for  Refugees],  refugees  who  face 
perilous  protection  problems  in  their 
countries  of  first  asylum  are  resettled 
quickly  and  quietly.  Released  political 
prisoners,  as  from  Cuba,  are  also  reset- 
tled. We  hope  soon  to  begin  resettling 
large  numbers  of  Vietnamese  reeduca- 
tion center  detainees  as  well. 

Second,  our  willingness  to  resettle 
refugees  encourages  other  nations  to 
maintain  responsible  pohcies  of  first 
asylum.  This  applies  not  only  in  South- 
east Asia  but  also  in  Western  Europe, 
which  has  a  long  tradition  of  offering 
asylum. 

Third,  we  have  a  special,  ongoing 
commitment  to  offer  resettlement  to 
refugees  overseas  who  have  family  in 
the  United  States  or  close  ties  here 
through  employment  or  education. 


Whenever  possible,  we  save  refugee  ad- 
missions numbers  by  channeling  family 
reunion  cases  through  regular  immigra- 
tion channels.  The  long  waiting  periods 
for  immigrant  visas  and  the  difficulties 
under  which  refugees  exist  overseas, 
however,  do  not  allow  for  easy  switch- 
ing of  refugees  onto  an  immigrant 
track. 

The  fourth  objective  of  our  admis- 
sions policy  is  to  deter  refugees  from 
jeopardizing  their  own  safety  by  ensur- 
ing an  orderly  flow  of  refugees  through 
special  negotiated  direct-departure  pro- 
grams. Such  programs  also  ensure  that 
persons  who  do  not  qualify  for  refugee 
admission  are  not  stranded  in  a  third 
country. 


REAGAN  ERA 
ACCOMPLISHMENTS 
IN  REFUGEE  AFFAIRS 

When  President  Reagan  took  office,  the 
refugee  act  was  not  yet  a  year  old.  The 
successful  implementation  of  this  legis- 
lation, which  weighs  the  individual's 
claim  to  persecution  more  heavily  than 
any  other  factor  in  refugee  determina- 
tions, is  H  significant  accomplishment  of 
the  Reagan  years  and,  I  might  say,  an 
accomplishment  that  proceeded  with 
very  strong  bipartisan  support.  It's 
been  a  very  fine  program  from  that, 
among  other,  points  of  view. 

Southeast  Asia 

Let  me  first  turn  to  Southeast  Asia. 
Worldwide,  our  overriding  priority  in 
the  1980s  has  been  assisting  and  reset- 
tling Indochinese  refugees.  We  began 
by  processing  refugees  on  beaches  as 
they  stepped  off  boats  or  swam  to  shore 
from  sinking  crafts.  Working  closely 
with  our  voluntary  agency  partners, 
since  FY  1981,  we  have  processed  and 
admitted  over  400,000  Indochinese  refu- 
gees—37,000  Highland  Lao,  60,000 
Lowland  Lao,  116,000  Cambodians,  and 
200,000  Vietnamese. 

We  recently  proposed  a  comprehen- 
sive package  of  measures  designed  to 
dissuade  people  fi'om  the  dangers  of 
clandestine  departure  while  preserving 
the  principle  of  first  asylum.  A  compre- 
hensive solution  depends,  in  part,  on  a 
concerted  effort  of  the  Southeast  Asian 
nations.  Hong  Kong,  and  the  resettle- 
ment nations  to  urge  the  Government 
of  Vietnam  to  expand  further  the  Or- 
derly Departure  Program  (ODP).  The 
effective  operation  of  legitimate,  na- 


ijtepartment  of  State  Bulletin/November  1988 


13 


THE  SECRETARY 


tional  screening  programs  monitored  by 
the  UNHCR  would  ensure  that  bona 
fide  refugees  are  recognized  and  given 
first  asylum.  Those  deemed  not  to  be 
refugees  should  be  cared  for  by  the  in- 
ternational community  until  they  can 
return  safely  to  their  homes.  Refugees 
should  have  the  opportunity  to  apply 
for  resettlement,  and  resettlement 
countries  must  continue  to  offer  hope 
for  a  new  life  to  these  victims  of  per- 
secution through  generous  resettlement 
programs.  The  United  States  has  by  far 
the  strongest  resettlement  commitment 
to  Indochinese  refugees.  We  have  main- 
tained that  steady  commitment  since 
1975  and  will  continue  to  do  so  in  the 
future. 

In  July,  I  met  with  the  foreign 
ministers  of  the  Southeast  Asian  na- 
tions during  the  ASEAN  [Association 
of  South  East  Asian  Nations]  minis- 
terial meetings  in  Bangkok.  We  dis- 
cussed the  elements  of  this  strategy 
and  agreed  that  our  common  search  for 
a  solution  to  the  region's  refugee  prob- 
lems would  be  advanced  if  we  formed  a 
working  group  composed  of  first-asylum 
and  resettlement  countries. 

Orderly  Departure  Program.  The 

Orderly  Departure  Program  gives  peo- 
ple the  hope  for  a  new  life  without 
their  having  to  resort  to  dangerous  and 
clandestine  departures.  Before  this 
committee  in  1984,  I  had  the  honor  to 
announce  President  Reagan's  human- 
itarian initiative  for  the  resettlement  in 
the  United  States  of  Amerasians  and 
the  reeducation  center  prisoners.  In 
1986,  we  reached  a  bilateral  agreement 
with  Vietnam  to  expedite  resettlement 
of  Amerasian  children. 

Since  1984,  progress  on  the  reset- 
tlement of  reeducation  center  detainees 
has  been  disappointingly  slow.  In  July 
1988,  we  had  very  encouraging  bilateral 
talks  in  Hanoi.  At  that  time,  both  sides 
committed  themselves  to  an  early  sec- 
ond meeting  in  Hanoi  in  order  to  begin 
processing  within  several  months.  It 
appeared  that  the  United  States  and 
Vietnam  had  successfully  separated 
their  political  differences  on  Cambodia 
from  what  has  become  our  shared  inter- 
est in  expanding  humanitarian  coopera- 
tion between  our  countries. 

For  reasons  not  satisfactorily  ex- 
plained, the  Vietnamese  decided  to 
take  exception  to  recent  Administration 
testimony  which  reaffirmed  longstand- 
ing U.S.  policy  on  the  conditions  for 
the  normalization  of  diplomatic  rela- 
tions with  Vietnam — that  is,  Vietnam's 
departure  from  Cambodia.  They  an- 
nounced a  "temporary  suspension"  of 
cooperation  with  us  on  the  POW/MIA 


[prisoner  of  war/missing  in  action]  issue 
and  on  the  resettlement  of  reeducation 
center  detainees.  We  were  pleased  that 
on  August  30  they  lifted  the  suspension 
on  POW/MIA  cooperation.  But  we  re- 
main deeply  disappointed  on  the  con- 
tinued suspension  of  progress  on  the 
resettlement  of  the  detainees. 

In  my  address  at  the  ASEAN 
postministerial  meeting  in  July,  I 
stated  that  the  United  States  holds  no 
hostile  feelings  toward  Vietnam  as  a  re- 
sult of  the  war  in  Indochina.  In  fact,  we 
look  forward  to  the  time  when  we  will 
be  able  to  enter  into  normal  diplomatic 
and  commercial  relations  with  Vietnam. 
Today  we  call  upon  Vietnam  to  help 
heal  one  of  the  most  painful  wounds 
remaining  from  the  war — by  responding 
favorably  to  the  wish  of  thousands  of 
reeducation  center  detainees  to  be  al- 
lowed to  be  reunited  with  their  families 
in  the  United  States  or  to  come  with 
their  families  to  our  country. 

We  recently  reaffirmed  our  read- 
iness to  have  our  delegation  return  to 
Hanoi  for  the  planned  second  meeting 
and,  we  hope,  complete  an  agreement. 
We  hope  Vietnam  will  lift  its  "tempor- 
ary" suspension  of  cooperation  with  us 
on  this  compelling  humanitarian  issue. 

Thai-Cambodian  Border.  In  the 

wake  of  the  fall  of  the  Pol  Pot  regime, 
hundreds  of  thousands  of  fearful  Cam- 
bodians fled  toward  Thailand  for  food 
and  medical  care.  Once  there,  hundreds 
died  from  exhaustion  due  to  severe  mal- 
nutrition or  disease.  American  officials 
and  private  citizens  provided  emer- 
gency care  to  help  these  people.  And 
the  United  States  has  continued  since 
then  to  provide  assistance  through  the 
UN  Border  Relief  Operation  (UNBRO). 
We  support  UNBRO  and  ICRC  [Inter- 
national Committee  of  the  Red  Cross] 
initiatives  across  the  board  to  improve 
protection  and  education  for  these 
300,000  Cambodians. 

Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean 

Mariel  Migration  Agreement.  A  major 
accomplishment  of  recent  years  is  the 
migration  agreement  of  1984  with  Cuba, 
which  finally  put  an  end  to  the  history 
of  the  1980  Mariel  boatlift  by  encom- 
passing a  return  of  excludable  Cubans 
to  Havana.  Under  the  resumed  migra- 
tion agreement,  we  expect  to  resettle 
approximately  3,000  Cuban  political 
prisoners  and  family  members  annually 
through  the  refugee  program  and  the 
Attorney  General's  parole  authority.  We 
will  continue  to  consider  for  admission 
all  of  the  political  prisoners  who  wish 
to  apply. 


Salvadoran  Refugee  Repatriation-  j 

During  the  past  year,  the  Central 
American  refugee  situation  has  been 
alleviated  somewhat  by  the  voluntary 
repatriation  of  more  than  6,700  Sal- 
vadoran refugees  from  camps  in  Hon- 
duras through  arrangements  monitorec 
by  the  UNHCR.  The  latest  group  re- 
turned to  El  Salvador  in  mid-August, 
and  there  are  indications  that  further 
repatriations  may  occur  in  the  future. 

Africa 

By  far  the  largest  refugee  emergencie 
involving  life  and  death  have  been  in 
Africa.  In  the  past  8  years,  the  Reaga 
Administration  has  taken  the  lead  in 
the  multilateral  responses  to  crises  in- 
volving millions  of  refugees  from  19  di 
ferent  African  nations. 

Ethiopia.  With  respect  to  Ethi- 
opia, currently  we  are  deeply  con- 
cerned by  the  refugee  problems  which 
threaten  war-torn  and  famine-stricken 
Ethiopia — for  many  years  a  country 
better  known  for  producing  refugees 
than  for  absorbing  them.  Over  300, 00( 
refugees  from  the  civil  war  in  souther 
Sudan  have  poured  into  Ethiopia.  In 
addition,  over  400,000  refugees  have 
fled  armed  conflict  between  governme 
forces  and  rebels  in  northern  Somalia 
We  are  working  with  the  UN  agencies 
and  other  donors  to  avoid  a  major  hu- 
manitarian disaster. 

Mozambique.  The  Department's 
report  on  the  situation  of  Mozambicar 
refugees  in  southern  Africa  underline 
the  need  to  pay  heed  to  refugee  popul 
tions  as  we  consider  our  policy  alter- 
natives in  any  region  of  the  world. 
Malawi  has  been  overwhelmed  by  ove: 
600,000  Mozambican  refugees,  but  thi 
people  of  Malawi  and  President  Band: 
have  reinforced  their  solid  humanitari 
reputation  by  accepting  the  presence 
this  enormous  burden. 

Near  East  and  South  Asia 

Afghanistan.  There  are  more  than  3 
million  Afghan  refugees  in  Pakistan— 
the  largest  refugee  population  in  the 
woHd.  Since  1979,  the  United  States 
has  provided  over  $600  million  in  refii 
gee  assistance,  including  over  $370  m 
lion  worth  of  food.  The  late  President 
Zia  ul-Haq  and  the  people  of  Pakistar 
have  offered  their  land  and  their  hosf 
tality  to  Afghan  refugees  for  nearly  a 
decade.  Now  these  refugees  appear  t 
have  the  possibility  to  return  to  their 
homes  in  the  near  future.  There  are 


14 


THE  SECRETARY 


btitacles  to  that  repatriation — includ- 
ig  the  critical  danger  of  land  mines 
trewn  throughout  Afghanistan  by  So- 
iet  military  forces — but  we  hope  that  a 
irge  number  of  the  Afghan  refugees 
'ill  be  able  to  return  home  in  the  com- 
ig  year 

Palestinian  Refugees.  The  oldest 
Dntinuing  refugee  population  involves 
le  Palestinian  refugees  in  the  Near 
last.  The  UN  Relief  and  Works 
gency  for  Palestine  Refugees  in  the 
Fear  East  (UNRWA)  continues  to  pro- 
ide  basic  educational,  medical,  and  re- 
ef services  to  Palestinian  refugees  in 
ebanon,  Syria,  Jordan,  the  West 
ank,  and  Gaza.  It  is  vital  that 
fNRWA  should  continue  providing 
jrvices,  especially  in  the  West  Bank 
nd  Gaza.  I  salute  the  dedicated  staff  of 
'NRWA  and,  especially,  Robert  Dillon, 
le  American  deputy  director  general 
■ho  is  leaving  that  organization  after  4 
ears  of  energetic  and  compassionate 


MERGENCY  CONSULTATIONS 
hJ  FY  1988 

hroughout  the  Reagan  Administration, 
nd  consistently  since  World  War  II, 
He  United  States  has  vigorously  cham- 
ioned  the  cause  of  freedom  of  emigra- 
lon  from  the  Soviet  Union.  In  the  past 
ear,  after  an  8-year  period  of  only  min- 
nal  and  unacceptable  emigration,  the 
loviet  Union  has  granted  exit  permits 
■)  tens  of  thousands  of  persons — pri- 
larily  Jews,  Armenians,  ethnic  Ger- 
lans,  and  some  Pentecostalists.  All 
:her  Soviet  citizens,  however,  have  vir- 
lally  no  opportunity  to  emigrate. 


We  applaud  the  emigration  policy 
reforms  in  the  Soviet  Union,  but  we 
urge  the  Soviet  Government  to  comply 
fully  with  the  emigration  provisions  of 
the  Helsinki  Final  Act.  International 
human  rights  standards  recognize  the 
right  to  emigrate  and  to  return  to  one's 
country  but  not  to  immigrate  into  any 
country  of  one's  choosing.  Standards 
and  limits  to  immigration  are  deter- 
mined by  national  decision  and  legisla- 
tion. The  United  States  has  responded 
generously,  but  we,  too,  have  limits  set 
by  the  immigration  and  refugee  laws 
relating  both  to  eligibility  criteria  and 
to  the  numbers  we  can  absorb. 

Two  fundamental  issues  have 
emerged  from  this  experience  with  So- 
viet resettlement. 

One  is  budgetary:  In  a  time  of  se- 
verely constrained  budgets,  how  do  we 
ensure  that  we  will  have  adequate  re- 
sources to  support  an  unexpected  out- 
flow of  emigrants  from  the  Soviet 
Union  without  damaging  other  critical 
foreign  policy  programs? 

The  second  is  legal:  Can  all  Soviet 
emigrants  be  admitted  under  the  refu- 
gee provisions  of  the  Immigration  and 
Nationality  Act?  With  the  commence- 
ment of  INS  [Immigration  and  Natu- 
ralization Service]  processing  in 
Moscow,  INS  has  confirmed  that  not  all 
potential  emigrants  meet  the  statutory 
definition  of  refugee  under  the  act.  We 
must,  therefore,  seek  alternate  immi- 
gration channels  for  those  who  do  not 
meet  the  statutory  definition  in  order 
to  offer  realistic  options  to  such 
persons. 

We  learned  this  year  that  there  are 
occasions  when  our  foreign  policy 
goals — encouragement  of  liberalized 


Proposed  U.S.  Refugee  Admissions  for  FY  1989 


Region 

ast  Asia 

First  Asylum 

Orderly  Departure  Program^ 
astern  Europe/Soviet  Union 
lear  East/South  Asia 
atin  America/Caribbean 
,frica 

ubtotal 

Inallocated  (Private  Sector) 
OTAL 


Proposed 
Ceilings' 

Minimum  Fully 
funded  Level 

28,000 

25,000 

24,500 

7,000 

3,500 

2,000 

22,000 

17,000 

21,000 

6,000 

3,000 

1,500 

90,000 

70,500 

4,000 

4,000 

94,000 

74,500 

Assuming  adequate  funding, 
ncluding  Amerasian  immigrants. 


emigration  policy,  for  one — dictate  a 
need  for  flexibility  in  order  to  admit 
groups  of  people  who  do  not  immed- 
iately or  neatly  fit  into  current 
immigrant  or  refugee  categories.  Un- 
fortunately, such  flexibility  is  not  cur- 
rently available  in  immigration  law.  We 
believe  that  greater  flexibility  is  an 
urgent  foreign  policy  and  humanitarian 
need,  which  we  would  like  to  address, 
together  with  Congress,  over  the  com- 
ing months.  One  possibility  would  be  a 
new  category  of  immigrant  visa.  This  is 
described  in  greater  detail  in  my  ex- 
tended testimony. 


PROPOSED  REFUGEE 
ADMISSIONS  FOR  FY  1989 

We  are  here  this  morning  to  address 
the  President's  proposed  ceilings  for 
refugee  admissions  for  FY  1989.  The 
Refugee  Act  of  1980,  which  established 
this  consultative  process,  states: 

.  .  .  the  President  shall  report  to  the 
Committees  on  the  Judiciary  of  the  House 
of  Representatives  and  of  the  Senate  re- 
garding the  foreseeable  number  of  refugees 
who  will  be  in  need  of  resettleinent  during 
the  fiscal  vear  and  the  anticipated  alloca- 
tion of  refugee  admissions  during  the  fiscal 
year 

Last  year,  during  both  the  regular 
and  the  emergency  consultations,  we 
set  refugee  admissions  numbers  that 
were  higher  than  the  funds  available  for 
the  admissions  program.  This  led  to 
confusion  and  disappointment  as  the 
year  went  on  and  the  money  ran  out.  I 
am,  therefore,  very  reluctant  to  begin 
the  fiscal  year  with  an  admissions  ceil- 
ing higher  than  that  for  which  funds 
will  be  available. 

Unfortunately,  we  do  not  yet  know 
what  funds  we  will  have  available  for 
FY  1989.  Neither  the  appropriations  for 
HHS  [Department  of  Health  and  Hu- 
man Services]  nor  for  the  State  Depart- 
ment has  been  enacted.  The  HHS  FY 
1989  appropriations  bill  provides  fund- 
ing to  support  up  to  90,000  refugee  and 
Amerasian  admissions  for  24  months. 

In  the  current  fiscal  year,  the  State 
Department  had  $338.45  million  avail- 
able for  refugee  programs  funded  out  of 
the  migration  and  refugee  assistance 
account,  including  refugee  admissions 
and  assistance  programs.  The  Presi- 
dent's budget  request  for  refugees  for 
FY  1989 — constrained  as  it  is  by 
Gramm-Rudman-HoUings  and  the  bi- 
partisan budget  agreement — is  $340 
million.  The  bill  adopted  by  the  House 
provides  $361.95  million  but  requires 
that  $23.5  million  be  transferred  to 


iepartment  of  State  Bulletin/November  1988 


15 


THE  SECRETARY 


HHS,  leaving  a  net  amount  of  $338.45 
million.  The  Senate  bill  provides  the 
same  $361.95  million.  The  Senate  bill 
does  not  require  a  transfer  to  HHS  but 
does  earmark  $140  million  for  refugee 
and  Amerasian  immigrant  admissions. 
The  conference  on  these  two  bills  is 
scheduled  to  begin  ne.xt  week. 

If  the  final  bill  provides  the  State 
Department  $338.45  million— the  same 
amount  as  last  year— we  will  have  new 
funds  to  admit  only  68,500  persons.  If 
the  final  bill  provides  $361.95  million, 
including  the  $140-million  earmark  for 
admissions,  we  will  have  new  funds  to 
admit  82,000  refugees  and  Amerasian 
immigrants.  That  is  the  Senate  version. 
In  addition,  we  estimate  that  carryover 
funds  from  the  FY  1988  dire  emergency 
supplemental  will  be  available  to  fund 
an  additional  2,000  refugee  admissions. 
Therefore,  the  potential  fully  funded 
admissions  level  is  between  70,500  and 
84,000,  depending  on  the  final  appropri- 
ation. With  regard  to  fully  funded  ad- 
missions, at  no  time  will  we  operate  at 
a  rate  higher  than  that  for  which  funds 
are  available  in  the  migration  and  refu- 
gee assistance  account. 

Establishing  the  ceiling  requires 
balancing  our  humanitarian  and  foreign 
policy  goals,  refugee  eligibility  require- 
ments, domestic  resettlement  capacity, 
and  estimated  costs.  For  FY  1989, 
therefore,  despite  my  misgivings  and 
my  desire  to  be  absolutely  clear  to  the 
Congress  and  not  to  mislead  anyone 
about  actual  admissions  levels,  we  are 
proposing  an  aggregate,  worldwide  ceil- 
ing for  refugee  and  Amerasian  immi- 
grant admissions  of  94,000.  It  is 
comprised  of  three  elements: 

•  Up  to  84,000  fully  funded  admis- 
sions— that's  on  the  assumption  we  get 
the  positive  numbers  that  I  outlined 
here; 

•  Up  to  6,000  which  would  be  par- 
tially funded  by  HHS,  as  they  are  ap- 
propriated up  to  90,000,  and  partially 
by  the  private  sector;  and 

•  Up  to  4,000  reserved  for  the  sep- 
arate, private  sector  program. 

The  6,000  partially  funded  numbers 
will  cover  a  group  of  persons,  some  of 
whom  would  be  eligible  for  HHS- 
funded  benefits  and  some  who  could  be 
admitted  without  any  Federal  funding 
whatsoever.  Therefore,  we  are  not 
seeking  additional  Federal  funds  to  fi- 
nance these  6,000  admissions.  In  addi- 
tion, we  propose  to  continue  the 
current  allocation  of  4,000  numbers  for 
the  fully  privately  funded  admissions 
initiative.  This  private  sector  initiative 


has  already  benefited  hundreds  of 
Cuban  refugees  in  fiscal  year  1988. 

Once  the  final  appropriations  for 
FY  1989  are  enacted,  we  will  advise 
Congress  of  our  operational  plan,  by  re- 
gion, that  is  consistent  with  the  actual 
funding  available.  If  the  final  appropri- 
ations level  for  the  Department  of  State 
budget  would  fund  70,500  admissions  in 
FY  1989,  then  we  will  commence  the 
year  at  an  operational  level  of  70,500.  If 
the  final  appropriations  for  FY  1989 
fully  funds  84,000  admissions  in  the  De- 
partment of  State  budget  and  90,000 
admissions  in  the  HHS  budget,  we 
would  commence  the  fiscal  year  with  an 
operational  plan  for  90,000.  This  plan 
would  include  the  partially  funded  cate- 
gory of  6,000  persons  who  would  re- 
ceive HHS  funding  only. 

Proposed  Regional  Ceilings 

The  proposed  regional  ceilings  for  the 
90,000  level  are  shown  on  p.  15.  Also 
included  is  a  possible  allocation  by  re- 
gion which  could  result  at  the  70,500 
level,  and  you  have  in  my  testimony 
two  columns.  I  won't  read  them  out, 
but  they  go  by  regions. 

A  thorough  explanation  and  justifi- 
cation for  each  of  the  proposed,  federal- 
ly funded  refugee  admissions  levels  by 
region  is  found  in  the  document  entitled 
Proposed  Refugee  Admissions  for  FY 
1989.  I  would  like  to  say  something 
about  the  importance  of  each  of  the  re- 
gional admissions  levels,  however. 

East  Asia:  First  Asylum.  The  level 
of  28,000  in  the  President's  request  re- 
sponds to  the  currently  high  number  of 
Vietnamese  boat  people  in  camps  (in- 
cluding new  arrivals  since  January  1988) 
and  puts  us  in  a  position  to  take  some 
additional  longstayers  (which  is  part  of 
the  new  comprehensive  strategy  for 
Southeast  Asia),  should  we  wish  to  do 
so.  In  a  period  when  first  asylum  has 
significantly  eroded,  this  level  is 
needed  to  encourage  the  ASEAN  coun- 
tries to  continue  humane  reception  and 
treatment  of  refugees. 

East  Asia:  Orderly  Departure 
Program.  The  proposed  level  of  25,000, 
which  includes  13,000  refugees  and 
12,000  Amerasian  immigrants,  exceeds 
the  FY  1988  admissions  ceiling  by 
16,500.  An  expanding  ODP  is  vital  as 
an  alternative  to  boat  departures  and  is 
a  vital  part  of  our  strategy  for  that 
region.  The  level  also  provides  for  sev- 
eral thousand  former  reeducation  camp 
detainees  and  their  accompanying  rela- 
tives, to  whom,  after  6  years  of  nego- 
tiations, we  hope  to  start  gaining 
access  in  the  coming  fiscal  year. 


Eastern  Europe  and  the  Soviet 
Union.  We  have  determined  that, 
within  the  overall  total  that  we  are  rec 
ommending  for  inclusion  in  the  refugee 
program,  a  total  of  24,500  be  allocated 
to  Eastern  Europe  and  the  Soviet 
Union.  We  recognize  that  the  number 
of  eligible  applicants  with  exit  permis- 
sion is  unpredictable  and  may  be 
higher,  but  under  the  relevant  circum- 
stances, we  consider  this  a  reasonable 
level. 

Near  East  and  South  Asia.  The 

suggested  level  of  7,000  will  allow  for  i 
continuation,  albeit  at  a  reduced  level 
from  FY  1988,  of  our  program  to  reset 
tie  mainly  Afghan,  Iranian,  and  Iraqi 
refugees,  including  a  large  number  of 
religious  minorities.  Conditions  are  be 
ginning  to  stabilize  in  Afghanistan, 
making  it  possible  for  many  Afghans  t 
return  to  their  homeland.  Although  th 
hope  for  an  end  to  the  8-year-long  Irai 
Iraq  conflict  may  lead  to  fewer  appli- 
cants, persecution  of  minorities  in  Irai 
continues,  including  the  Baha'is,  Chris 
tians,  and  Jews. 

Western  Hemisphere.  We  are  con 

mitted  to  admitting  3,000  former  polit 
cal  prisoners  from  Cuba  under  the 
Mariel  migration  agreement  and  have 
humanitarian  interest  in  providing  re- 
settlement to  certain  refugees  in  Cen- 
tral America  for  whom  repatriation  is 
not  an  option.  The  ceiling  also  provide 
for  the  resettlement  of  political  prison 
ers  in  Central  America. 

Africa.  The  level  of  2,000  admis- 
sions for  Africa  supports  our  priority 
for  Ethiopian  and  southern  African  n 
ugees,  for  whom  protection  in  their 
counti'ies  of  asylum  is  often  tenuous. 
The  fact  that  2,000  is,  admittedly,  a  r 
atively  low  figure  reflects  the  practic; 
reality  that  we  have  difficulty  arrangi 
for  efficient  movements  of  approved 
Ethiopians  from  the  Sudan.  With  an 
INS  officer  in  Nairobi  now,  we  expect 
that  our  access  to  cases  where  protec 
tion  is  a  problem  will  improve. 


CONCLUSION 

I  have  provided  a  brief  justification  oi 
the  levels  which  we  would  like  to  see 
established  as  the  refugee  admissions 
ceilings.  I  acknowledge  that,  at  pres- 
ent, we  cannot  predict  what  funding 
will  be  available  to  admit  these  refu- 
gees. As  the  stewards  of  our  refugee 
policy,  however,  the  Administration  is 
responsible  for  ensuring  that  our  higb 
est  humanitarian  and  foreign  policy  O' 
jectives  are  reflected  in  our  refugee 


16 


THE  SECRETARY 


•ourams.  Let  me  assure  you  that  we 
A'ill  endeavor  to  carry  out  that  respon- 
ubility  to  the  best  of  our  ability.  With 
he  bipartisan  support  of  Congress,  we 
\-i]\  continue  in  our  traditional  human- 
tarian  spirit  to  provide  for  the  needs  of 
•efugees  around  the  world. 


'Press  release  196.  The  complete  tran- 
script of  the  hearings  will  be  published  by 
the  committee  and  will  be  available  from 
the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office,  Washington, 
D.C.  20402.  ■ 


The  International  Legacy 
of  Dr.  Martin  Luther  King,  Jr. 


Secretary  Shidtz's  remarks  before 
the  Washington  diplomatic  community 
it  the  Department  of  State  on  Sep- 
ember  19.  lOSS} 

Normally,  on  an  occasion  like  this, 
hanking  you  for  coining,  recognizing 
A-hat  it  means  that  you're  here,  I  would 
alk  to  you  from  the  heart,  so  to  speak. 
But  I  felt  I  wanted  to  have  a  message 
hat  could  be  distributed,  and  to  do 
:hat  you  have  to  write  it  out  and  read  it 
)ut.  There's  no  other  way  in  this  day 
md  age,  I've  discovered.  So  I  have 
tvritten  something  out  here  that  I  want 
:o  read  to  you  and  hope  that  when  it's 
riistributed,  you  might  think  it  was 
vvorth  reading  over. 

You  and  I  are  here  today  because 
vve  care  about  the  legacy — the  interna- 
ional  legacy — of  the  Reverend  Martin 
Luther  King,  Jr.  In  my  role  as  Secre- 
tary of  State,  I'd  like  to  use  this  occa- 
don  to  pay  special  tribute  to  him,  a 
nan  who  symbolizes  the  values  and 
deals  that  are  central  to  the  conduct  of 
American  foreign  policy — values  I  have 
;ried  to  live  up  to  during  my  years  of 
Dublic  service. 

Martin  Luther  King,  Jr.,  led  us  to 
5ee  that  a  racially  divided  society  can 
oe  healed  rather  than  dismembered.  He 
ed  a  cause  whose  example  now  illumi- 
nates struggles  for  racial  justice  in  the 
most  downtrodden  corners  of  the 
Earth.  The  civil  rights  movement  in 
America  is  an  epic  struggle,  a  legend 
that  has  transformed  the  spirit  of  our 
ountry.  And  its  message  resonates 
around  the  world — a  message  Martin 
Luther  King,  Jr.,  summed  up  when  he 
declared  that  "every  man  is  heir  to  the 
legacy  of  worthiness." 

But  it  wasn't  just  Dr.  King's  mes- 
sage that  changed  the  way  Americans 
think  about  race  and  opportunity.  It 
was  the  way  he  taught.  It  was  the  way 
he  served  as  an  example  of  civility;  the 
way  he  resisted  counsels  of  rage  and 
despair.  He  was  a  man  of  faith  and  a 
man  of  dialogue.  He  knew  that  no  one 


has  a  monopoly  on  truth  and  virtue.  He 
wanted  people  of  good  will  to  sit  down 
together  and  resolve  their  differences. 
He  wanted  reason  and  brotherhood  to 
prevail.  His  abiding  patience,  under- 
standing, and  nonviolence  in  confront- 
ing the  tyranny  of  racism  and  prejudice 
showed  the  world  the  profound  differ- 
ence one  person  can  make. 

Today  men  and  women  everywhere 
are  laying  claim  to  Dr.  King's  legacy. 
Around  the  globe,  we  see  a  powerful 
impulse  toward  democratic  institutions 
and  values.  This  recent  phenomenon 
was  first  evident  in  Spain  and  Portugal 
a  decade  or  so  ago.  Now  in  Latin 
America,  this  drive  has  changed  the  po- 
litical complexion  of  an  entire  conti- 
nent, from  Argentina  to  El  Salvador.  In 
the  Philippines,  despite  serious  chal- 
lenges, we  see  how  tenaciously  people 
are  seeking  to  effect  a  transition  to  a 
new  democratic  way.  In  South  Korea, 
there  is  a  dramatic  struggle  to  create 
new  political  institutions,  and,  in  1987 
we  witnessed  the  peaceful  transition  of 
national  leadership  through  open  elec- 
tions. And  in  South  Africa,  the  struc- 
ture of  apartheid  is  under  siege  as 
never  before. 

In  each  of  these  nations — indeed, 
wherever  the  struggle  for  democracy 
and  human  rights  is  waged  today — the 
memory  of  Martin  Luther  King,  Jr.,  is 
revered,  for  he  taught  us  that  power 
does  not  come  from  the  barrel  of  a  gun 
but  from  firm  adherence  to  moral  prin- 
ciples. He  showed  the  world  that  con- 
flicts can  be  resolved  through  reason 
and  that  significant  change  can  come 
without  bloodshed. 

It  seems  to  me  that  Dr.  King's  life 
and  message  have  a  very  special  rele- 
vance for  those  of  us  in  the  diplomatic 
community,  for  what  is  diplomacy  if  not 
an  attempt  to  resolve  conflicts  through 
nonviolent  means?  In  today's  conflict- 
ridden  world,  the  pursuit  of  diplomatic 
solutions  calls  for  persistent  effort,  for 
dialogue,  and  a  recognition  of  the  need 


for  compromise — the  very  ideals  Martin 
Luther  King,  Jr.,  spoke  of  and  fought 
for  Most  importantly,  perhaps,  effec- 
tive diplomacy  today  needs  the  inspira- 
tion of  a  moral  vision — the  vision  of  a 
world  where  prosperity  is  com- 
monplace, conflict  an  aberration,  and 
democracy  and  human  dignity  a  way  of 
life.  No  American  has  articulated  that 
vision  more  forcefully  than  Martin 
Luther  King,  Jr. 

On  January  16,  people  all  over  the 
world  will  be  honoring  the  memory  of 
Martin  Luther  King,  Jr.  I  know  that 
some  of  you  here  today  have  joined 
with  us  in  the  past  in  celebrating  the 
annual  King  holiday  observance,  as 
Mrs.  King  noted.  On  behalf  of  all  of  my 
colleagues  here  at  State,  I'd  like  to 
thank  you  for  your  help  in  making  the 
King  holiday  a  truly  international 
event.  I  look  forward  to  your  coopera- 
tion once  again  in  January.  And  I'll  still 
be  in  office  on  January  16  to  look  it 
over.  [Laughter] 

As  an  American,  I  am  very  proud 
that  Martin  Luther  King,  Jr.,  has  come 
to  symbolize  mankind's  struggle  for 
peace  and  freedom,  and  I  am  proud 
that  the  United  States  has  supported 
this  struggle  around  the  world.  But  the 
battle  isn't  over  yet.  Here  in  the 
United  States,  the  forces  of  racism  and 
intolerance  are  persistent.  Despite  the 
progress  of  recent  decades,  the  demo- 
cratic promise  of  a  land  where  all  men 
can  live  as  brothers  remains  unfulfilled. 
Abroad  the  world's  new  democracies 
are  confronted  by  daunting  internal  and 
external  challenges.  Meanwhile  war, 
oppression,  and  poverty  continue  to 
darken  the  face  of  our  planet. 

So  my  final  message  to  all  of  you 
here  today  is  a  simple  one:  Don't  de- 
spair of  the  slow  pace  of  change;  hold 
fast  to  the  highest  standards  of  the  dip- 
lomatic profession.  And  continue  to 
draw  inspiration  for  the  values  and  per- 
sonal example  of  Dr.  King.  He  was  able 
to  help  guide  a  world  full  of  fear,  doubt, 
and  violence  toward  greater  compassion 
and  understanding.  Let  each  of  us 
strive  to  do  likewise.  At  home  and 
abroad,  let  us  not  flag  in  our  effort  to 
keep  faith  with  the  dreamer  and  the 
dream. 


'Press  release  200. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1988 


17 


AFRICA 


Southwest  Africa  Negotiations 


JOINT  STATEMENT, 

GENEVA, 

AUG.  8,  1988 

Delegations  of  the  People's  Republic  of 
Angola/the  Republic  of  Cuba,  the  Re- 
public of  South  Africa,  and  the  United 
States  of  America  met  August  2-5, 
1988,  in  Geneva,  Switzerland,  to  con- 
tinue their  efforts  to  find  a  peaceful 
solution  for  the  conflict  in  southwestern 
Africa. 

Building  on  progress  made  at  Lon- 
don, Cairo,  and  New  York,  the  negotia- 
tions in  Geneva  were  detailed,  positive, 
and  productive.  The  delegations  of  An- 
gola/Cuba and  South  Africa  agreed  on  a 
sequence  of  steps  necessary  to  prepare 
the  way  for  the  independence  of 
Namibia  in  accordance  with  UN  Se- 
curity Council  Resolution  435  and  to 
achieve  peace  in  southwestern  Africa. 

They  agreed  to  recommend  to  the 
Secretary  General  of  the  United  Na- 
tions the  date  of  November  1,  1988,  for 
the  beginning  of  implementation  of  UN 
Security  Council  Resolution  435.  The 
parties  approved,  ad  referendum  to 
their  respective  governments,  the  text 
of  a  tripartite  agreement  that  embod- 
ies, in  binding  treaty  form,  the  princi- 
ples negotiated  at  Governors  Island  in 
New  York  and  formally  approved  by 
the  governments  on  July  20,  1988. 

On  their  side,  Angola  and  Cuba  re- 
iterate their  decision  to  subscribe  to  a 
bilateral  accord  which  will  include  a 
timetable  acceptable  to  all  parties  for 
the  staged  and  total  withdrawal  of 
Cuban  troops  from  Angola.  The  parties 
have  undertaken  to  reach  agreement  on 
this  timetable  by  September  1,  1988. 

The  parties  approved  a  comprehen- 
sive series  of  practical  steps  that  will 
enhance  mutual  confidence,  reduce  the 
risk  of  military  confrontation,  and 
create  the  conditions  in  the  region  nec- 
essary to  conclude  the  negotiations. 
With  the  approval  of  these  measures,  a 
de  facto  cessation  of  hostilities  is  now  in 
effect.  The  full  effects  of  these  meas- 
ures will  become  apparent  in  the  weeks 
ahead. 

The  next  round  of  negotiations  at 
the  level  of  senior  officials  will  take 
place  during  the  week  of  August  22, 
with  the  exact  date  and  venue  to  be 
established. 

All  the  delegations  expressed  their 
appreciation  for  the  superb  facilities 
and  support  extended  by  the  Govern- 
ment of  Switzerland. 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
AUG.  8.  19881 

The  progress  made  in  Geneva  last  week 
is  a  step  toward  bringing  independence 
to  Namibia  and  ending  military  con- 
frontation in  southwestern  Africa.  We 
welcome  the  decisions  taken  by  the 
Governments  of  South  Africa,  Angola, 
and  Cuba  to  begin  military  disengage- 
ment and  to  formalize  a  cease-fire.  Also 
important  is  the  setting  of  target  dates 
to  begin  implementation  of  UN  Se- 
curity Council  Resolution  435  and 
agreement  on  withdrawal  of  Cuban  mil- 
itary forces  from  Angola.  It  is  imper- 
ative that  the  parties  involved  approach 
the  next  round  of  meetings  seriously 
and  constructively  in  order  to  resolve 
the  one  major  area  of  disagreement:  a 
mutually  acceptable  timetable  for  total 
Cuban  troop  withdrawal. 


ASSISTANT  SECRETARY 

CROCKER. 
GENEVA, 
AUG.  9,  19882 

Geneva,  as  we  see  it,  represents  the 
further  acceleration  of  the  pace  of  work 
in  this  negotiation,  as  well  as  a  clear 
commitment  by  the  parties — that  is  to 
say,  Angola/Cuba  and  South  Africa — to 
a  number  of  key  political  and  military 
steps  that  must  now  be  implemented. 

If  those  steps  are  implemented — 
and  we  have  heard  the  governments 
concerned  say  that  they  will  be — it 
could  mean  an  early  end  to  the  cross- 
border  war  that  has  been  going  on 
since  1975  in  this  part  of  Africa. 

The  steps  agreed  at  Geneva  include 
the  decision  to  recommend  to  the  UN 
Secretary  General  that  November  be 
looked  at  by  him  as  his  decision  to  set  a 
date  for  the  implementation  of  UN  Se- 
curity Council  Resolution  435.  This  rep- 
resents a  recommendation  from  the 
parties  to  the  UN  Secretary  General. 

Second,  the  parties  have  set  them- 
selves a  target  for  the  negotiation  of 
the  remaining  outstanding  issues 
which,  of  course,  include  the  need  for 
agreement  on  a  schedule  for  Cuban 
troop  withdrawal  from  Angola  in  con- 
junction with  the  implementation  of 
Resolution  435. 

Third,  the  parties  have  agreed  on 
the  text  of  a  trilateral  treaty  which  will 
translate  the  principles  agreed  in  New 
York  in  July  into  a  binding  interna- 
tional treaty  and  which,  of  course. 


would  incorporate,  by  reference,  the 
Cuban  troop  withdrawal  schedules  that 
would  be  agreed  between  now  and  the 
1st  of  September. 

Fourth,  Geneva  represents  agree- 
ment on  a  comprehensive  set  of  steps  t 
establish  a  disengagement  of  forces,  a 
de  facto  cessation  of  hostilities  and  ap- 
propriate mechanisms  to  assure  that 
the  commitments  agreed  in  Geneva  are 
carried  out. 

It  is  our  impression  that  the  cessa 
tion  of  hostilities  took  effect  yesterday 
that  the  South  African  Government  ha 
committed  itself  to  a  schedule  for  the 
withdrawal  of  its  remaining  forces  fror 
Angola.  There  are  additional  provision 
agreed  at  Geneva  that  concern  the  ac- 
tivities of  the  South  West  Africa  Peo- 
ple's Organization  (SWAPO)  and  of 
Cuban  forces  in  Angola  in  conjunction 
with  these  other  steps.  So  I  use  the 
word  a  "comprehensive"  set  of  steps. 
In  addition,  of  course,  there  was 
agreement  on  a  series  of  dates  for  the 
approval  and  publicly  registering  fur- 
ther progress  as  it  is  made  in  the  neg( 
tiation;  for  example,  agreement  on  an 
appropriate  timeframe  for  the  signing 
of  the  interlocking  series  of  agreement 
that  needs  to  be  reached  as  soon  as 
possible  after  agreement  is  reached  or 
Cuban  troop  withdrawal  timing. 

Another  point  that  was  registered 
at  Geneva  is  the  fact  that  there  were 
in-depth  side  discussions  between  us 
and  the  parties  on  the  necessity  for  a 
compromise  on  Cuban  withdrawal  tim 
ing,  and  these  side  discussions  lay  the 
groundwork  for  the  next  meeting  whi' 
is  scheduled  to  take  place  in  the  week 
of  August  22  at  a  time  and  place  that 
still  to  be  agreed.  Some  groundwork 
has  been  laid  there  for  what  is  clearl> 
going  to  be  a  very  important  round  of 
discussions  that  lies  ahead. 

Beyond  this,  I  cannot  go  into  the 
details  of  all  the  agreements  reached 
Geneva.  They  are  extensive.  The  par- 
ties have  agreed  that  those  commit- 
ments and  agreements  would  be  held 
their  respective  governments  at  this 
stage,  and  as  far  as  we  are  concerned 
they  will  be  so  held  by  us. 

What  now  remains  to  be  seen  is 
whether  the  political  will  exists  to 
bridge  the  gap  that  I  have  referred  tc 
so  that  these  ambitious  targets,  in  fac 
can  be  met  in  the  negotiation.  There 
real  work  ahead.  The  New  York  princ 
pies  have  been  substantially  put  into 
practice  in  the  sense  of  a  clear  packaj 
of  steps  and  agreements  being  reache 
at  Geneva.  The  path  to  a  settlement, 
a  sense,  has  been  cleared,  and  this 
places  focus  now  on  the  complex  equai 
tion  of  the  timing  relationship  betwee^ 


18 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  19{ 


ARMS  CONTROL 


Resolution  435  and  a  schedule  for 
ICuban  withdrawal,  and  how  that,  in 
jturn,  relates  to  the  unresolved  question 
f  bringing-  about  an  end  to  the  war 
nside  Angola  between  the  Angolan 
Government  and  its  National  Union  for 
the  Total  Independence  of  Angola 
[UNITA)  opposition. 

In  this  regard,  I  think  a  number  of 
joints  need  to  be  made  very  clear. 

F"irst,  there  will  have  to  be  a  com- 
promise on  Cuban  troop  withdrawal. 
No  one's  public  position  can  be  imposed 
on  anyone  else. 

Second,  it  appears  to  us  that  the 
sides  understand  that  point  and  under- 
stand it  very  clearly. 

Third,  the  fact  that  up  until  now 
the  internal  question  in  Angola  has  not 
yet  been  solved  and  the  fact  that  there 
needs  to  be  a  basis  for  dialogue  and 
reconciliation  inside  Angola.  This  unre- 
olved  question  can  hamper  and  post- 
pone a  settlement.  We  are  very 
conscious  of  that,  but  we  are  not  the 
only  ones  who  are  very  conscious  of  it. 

As  you  know  from  previous  brief- 
ings and  other  things  that  you  have 
seen,  this  is  a  very  delicate  matter.  It 
is  an  internal  matter  for  Angolans  of  all 
kinds  and  persuasions  to  discuss  among 
themselves.  It  is  not  formally  part  of 
the  agenda  being  discussed  in  these  tri- 
partite talks — that  is,  our  mediation  be- 
tween Angola/Cuba  and  South  Africa — 
and  yet  it  is  obviously  in  everyone's 
minds. 

In  our  view,  it  would  be  tragic  if 
this  moment  is  not  seized  to  bring 
peace  to  Angolans  themselves  as  well 
as  bring  peace  to  southwestern  Africa 
in  the  sense  of  ending  the  cross-border 
conflict. 

Our  government  has  no  ambition  or 
wish  to  impose  an  internal  settlement 
on  Angola,  nor  do  we  have  the  capacity 
to  do  so.  We  would  point  out  that 
UNITA  has  made  it  crystal  clear  that  it 
is  ready  to  flexibly  explore  the  basis  for 
a  solution  to  the  unresolved  political 
question  inside  Angola.  Until  such  a  so- 
lution is  found,  there  will  not  be,  ob- 
viously, a  cease-fire  as  between  the 
Angolan  parties;  that  is  to  say,  the  An- 
golan Government  and  UNITA.  And  so 
the  drain  on  the  economy  of  Angola 
continues,  and  that  overall  situation  in- 
side the  country  would  continue. 


JOINT  STATEMENT, 
BRAZZAVILLE, 

AUd.  2fi.  1988 

Delegations  of  the  People's  Republic  of 
Angola/Republic  of  Cuba  and  the  Re- 
public of  South  Africa,  with  the  media- 


tion of  the  Government  of  the  United 
States,  met  in  Brazzaville  August  24th 
to  26th  [1988]  to  continue  negotiations 
toward  a  peaceful  solution  of  the  con- 
flict in  southwestern  Afi-ica.  During 
this  round  of  the  negotiations,  the 
terms  of  a  calendar  for  the  redeploy- 
ment to  the  north  and  staged  and  total 
withdrawal  of  Cuban  troops — to  be 
agreed  between  the  Governments  of  the 
People's  Republic  of  Angola  and  the  Re- 
public of  Cuba — were  examined,  as  well 
as  other  issues  related  to  the  global 
settlement  of  the  conflict. 

The  discussions  at  Brazzaville  were 
serious,  detailed,  and  constructive. 
The  delegations  exchanged  views  and 
assessments  that  could  facilitate 
resolution  of  remaining  issues.  All 
participants  agreed  that  further  con- 
sultations with  their  respective  govern- 
ments were  required.  They,  therefore, 
agreed  to  meet  again  during  the  week 
of  September  5  in  Brazzaville. 

The  delegations  expressed  their  ap- 
preciation for  the  invitation  of  the  Peo- 
ple's Republic  of  the  Congo  and  for  the 
superb  facilities  and  support  extended 
by  the  Congolese  Government  during 
the  negotiations. 


JOINT  STATEMENT, 
BRAZZAVILLE. 
SEPT.  29,  1988 

Delegations  of  the  People's  Republic  of 
Angola/Republic  of  Cuba  and  the  Re- 
public of  South  Africa,  with  the  media- 
tion of  the  Government  of  the  United 
States,  met  in  Brazzaville  September 
26-29  to  continue  negotiations  toward  a 
peaceful  solution  of  the  conflict  in 
southwestern  Africa.  These  meetings 
were  a  resumption  of  the  round  of  nego- 
tiations in  Brazzaville  that  began 
August  24-26  and  continued  Septem- 
ber 7-9. 

The  delegations  expressed  their 
firm  intention  to  resolve  the  remaining 
issues  following  consultations  with  their 
governments.  In  this  connection,  they 
agreed  to  meet  again  at  a  date  to  be 
determined  in  Brazzaville.  They  con- 
firmed their  previous  recommendation 
to  the  Secretai-y  General  of  the  United 
Nations  that  1  November  1988  be  estab- 
lished as  the  date  for  implementation  of 
UN  Security  Council  Resolution  435. 

The  delegations  expressed  their  ap- 
pi'eciation  for  the  invitation  of  the  Peo- 
ple's Republic  of  the  Congo  and  their 
sincere  gratitude  to  the  Congolese  head 
of  state,  President  Denis  Sassou- 


Nguesso,  for  his  hospitality  and  for  his 
indispensable  contribution  to  the  search 
for  peace. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Aug.  15,  1988. 

-Made  at  the  opening  of  a  news  brief- 
ing; Chester  A.  Crocker  is  Assistant  Sec- 
retary for  African  Affairs  and  heads  the 
U.S.  delegation.  ■ 


ABM  Treaty  Review 
Conference  Ends 


U.S.  STATEMENT, 
AUG.  31,  1988 

The  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  conducted  the  third  review  of  the 
AntibalKstic  Missile  (ABM)  Ti-eaty  as 
required  at  5-year  intervals  by  the 
provisions  of  that  treaty.  The  review 
was  conducted  from  August  24,  1988,  to 
August  31,  1988.  The  U.S.  delegation 
was  led  by  William  F.  Burns,  Director 
of  the  Arms  Control  and  Disarmament 
Agency  (ACDA). 

During  the  review,  the  United 
States  emphasized  the  importance  of 
Soviet  violations  of  the  ABM  Ti-eaty, 
which  are  a  threat  to  the  viability  of 
the  treaty.  Throughout  the  review  con- 
ference, the  Soviet  Union  gave  no  indi- 
cation that  it  was  prepared  to  correct 
the  violations  without  linking  their 
agreement  to  do  so  to  unacceptable 
demands. 

Specifically  the  United  States  dis- 
cussed with  the  Soviets  its  serious 
concern  that  the  Soviet  Union's 
deployment  of  a  large  phased-array 
radar  near  Krasnoyarsk  constitutes  a 
significant  violation  of  a  central  ele- 
ment of  the  ABM  Ti-eaty.  Such  radars 
take  years  to  build  and  are  a  key  to 
providing  a  nationwide  defense — which 
is  prohibited  by  the  treaty.  The  treaty's 
restrictions  on  the  location,  orientation, 
and  functions  of  such  radars  are,  thus, 
essential  provisions  of  the  treaty. 
Hence  the  Krasnoyarsk  violation  is 
very  serious,  particularly  when  it  is 
recognized  that  the  radar  constitutes 
one  of  a  network  of  such  radars  that 
have  the  inherent  potential  for  attack 
assessment  in  support  of  ballistic  mis- 
sile defense. 

In  oi'der  for  the  Soviet  Union  to 
correct  this  violation,  the  Krasnoyarsk 
radar  must  be  dismantled.  The  United 
States  has  been  urging  the  Soviet 
Union  for  more  than  5  years,  both  in 
the  Standing  Consultative  Commission 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1988 


19 


ARMS  CONTROL 


established  by  the  treaty  and  in  other 
diplomatic  channels,  to  correct  this 
clear  violation  by  dismantling  the 
radar.  During  the  review,  the  United 
States  outlined  the  specific  Soviet  ac- 
tions necessary  to  correct  this  violation 
in  a  verifiable  manner.  The  United 
States  has  also  made  clear  that  the  con- 
tinuing e.xistence  of  the  Krasnoyarsk 
radar  makes  it  impossible  to  conclude 
any  future  arms  agreements  in  the 
strategic  arms  reduction  talks  (START) 
or  defense  and  space  areas.  The  United 
States  has  observed  a  slowdown  in  con- 
struction, but  this  slowdown,  or  even  a 
full  construction  freeze,  would  not  be 
sufficient  either  to  correct  the  treaty 
violation  or  to  meet  U.S.  concerns 
about  the  significant  impact  of  the 
violation. 

The  United  States  cannot  continue 
indefinitely  to  tolerate  this  clear  and 
serious  treaty  violation.  The  viola- 
tion must  be  corrected.  Until  the 
Krasnoyarsk  radar  is  dismantled,  it  will 
continue  to  raise  the  issue  of  material 
breach  and  proportionate  responses. 
Nothing  that  occurred  during  the  re- 
view conference  or  its  completion 
should  be  interpreted  as  derogating  in 
any  way  from  rights  the  United  States 
has  under  international  law  with  regard 
to  any  Soviet  violation  of  the  treaty. 
Since  the  Soviet  Union  was  not  pre- 
pared to  satisfy  U.S.  concerns  with 
respect  to  the  Krasnoyarsk  radar 
violation  at  the  review  conference,  the 
United  States  will  have  to  consider  de- 
claring this  continuing  violation  a  mate- 
rial breach  of  the  treaty.  In  this 
connection,  the  United  States  reserves 
all  its  rights,  consistent  with  interna- 
tional law,  to  take  appropriate  and  pro- 
portionate responses  in  the  future. 

During  the  ABM  Treaty  review, 
the  United  States  also  discussed  the 
violation  of  the  ABM  Treaty  involving 
the  illegally  deployed  radars  at  Gomel. 
The  United  States  also  reserves  its 
rights  to  respond  to  this  violation  in  an 
appropriate  and  proportionate  manner. 
The  United  States  also  discussed  with 
the  Soviet  Union  a  number  of  ABM- 
related  compliance  concerns,  the  total- 
ity of  which  suggests  that  the  Soviet 
Union  may  be  preparing  a  prohibited 
ABM  territorial  defense.  This  is  a  par- 
ticularly serious  concern.  As  the  Presi- 
dent has  noted,  such  a  development 
"would  have  profound  implications  for 
the  vital  East-West  balance.  A  uni- 
lateral Soviet  territorial  ABM  ca- 
pability acquired  in  violation  of  the 
ABM  Ti-eaty  could  erode  our  deterrent 
and  leave  doubts  about  its  capability." 


The  United  States  continues  to 
have  deep,  continuing  concerns  about 
the  implications  of  the  pattern  of  Soviet 
noncompliance  with  the  ABM  Treaty. 
As  President  Reagan  observed  in  De- 
cember 1987:  "No  violations  of  a  treaty 
can  be  considered  to  be  a  minor  matter, 
nor  can  there  be  confidence  in  agree- 
ments if  a  country  can  pick  and  choose 
which  provisions  of  an  agreement  it  will 
comply  with.... Correcting  their  vio- 
lations will  be  a  true  test  of  Soviet  will- 
ingness to  enter  a  more  constructive 
relationship  and  broaden  the  basis  for 
cooperation  between  our  two  countries 
on  security  matters." 

The  United  States  will  not  accept 
Soviet  violations  or  a  double  standard 
of  treaty  compliance  and  reserves  the 
right  to  take  appropriate  and  propor- 
tionate responses  in  the  future.  ■ 


JVE  Carried  Out 
in  Soviet  Union 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
SEPT.  14,  19881 

Today,  at  the  Soviet  nuclear  test  site  at 
Semipalatinsk,  the  United  States  and 
the  Soviet  Union  conducted  the  second 
and  concluding  phase  of  the  joint  ver- 
ification e.xperiment  (JVE).  As  in  the 
successful  first  phase  of  the  JVE  last 
month  at  the  U.S.  nuclear  test  site  in 
Nevada,  U.S.  and  Soviet  scientists, 
technicians,  and  observers  were  present 
to  measure  the  yield  of  the  explosion. 

We  believe  these  experiments  have 
demonstrated  the  effectiveness  and 
nonintrusiveness  of  CORRTEX  [contin- 
uous reflectrometry  for  radius  vs.  time 
experiment] — our  preferred  method — 
and  should  allow  the  Soviet  Union  to 
accept  its  routine  use. 

The  JVE  process  is  the  result  of  a 
U.S.  initiative  embodied  in  the  agree- 
ment reached  at  the  Moscow  summit, 
which  provided  for  one  underground 
nuclear  explosion  experiment  at  the 
U.S.  test  site  in  Nevada  and  another  at 
the  Soviet  test  site.  Following  today's 
phase  of  the  JVE,  U.S.  and  Soviet  ne- 
gotiators return  to  Geneva  to  continue 
the  current  round  of  negotiations  on 
nuclear  testing.  Our  objective  for  these 
negotiations  is  to  conclude  an  agree- 
ment on  effective  verification  measures 
for  the  unratified  Threshold  Test  Ban 
Treaty  (TTBT)  and  the  Peaceful  Nu- 
clear Explosions  Treaty  (PNET). 


Today's  JVE  at  Semipalatinsk 
moves  us  further  toward  achieving 
agreement  on  the  effective  verification 
protocols  which  are  essential  for  the 
two  treaties  and  reflects  the  success  of 
the  Administration's  practical  and 
measured  approach  to  nuclear  testing 
issues. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Sept.  19,  1988. 


25th  "Hot  Line" 
Anniversary 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
AUG.  30,  19881 

Today  marks  the  25th  anniversary  of 
the  operational  start  of  the  direct  com 
munications  link  or  "Hot  Line."  Since 
its  inception,  this  confidential  and  rapi 
communication  channel  has  proved  to 
be  an  invaluable  tool.  Although  used 
infrequently,  the  "Hot  Line"  has  per- 
mitted American  Presidents  to  commu 
nicate  with  Soviet  leaders  to  reduce 
the  risk  of  conflict  which  might  result 
from  accident,  miscalculation,  or 
misunderstanding. 

Recognizing  the  need  to  improve 
our  ability  to  communicate  with  the  Sc 
viet  leadership  in  emergency  situation: 
President  Reagan  proposed  in  1984  the 
the  "Hot  Line"  be  modernized  by 
adding  a  rapid  facsimile  capability  to 
the  existing  teletype  system.  This  moc 
ernization  was  completed  in  1986  with 
excellent  results,  and  the  United  Statt 
and  U.S.S.R.  have  continued  to  work 
together  effectively  to  maintain  the 
highest  reliability. 

In  1987  a  U.S.  initiative  resulted  i: 
the  establishment  of  the  Nuclear  Risk 
Reduction  Centers  (NRRC)  as  a  new 
government-to-government  channel 
(separate  from  the  "Hot  Line").  The 
modernized  "Hot  Line"  and  the 
NRRCs,  like  other  confidence-building 
measures  proposed  by  the  President 
since  1981,  reflect  his  continuing  commii 
ment  to  further  reduce  the  risk  of  war 
Such  measures  complement  our  efforts 
to  negotiate  deep,  equitable,  and  effec- 
tively verifiable  reductions  in  U.S.  and 
Soviet  nuclear  arsenals.  These  efforts 
will  contribute  significantly  to  interna- 
tional stability  and  will  strengthen  the 
foundation  for  peace. 


'Tpxt  from  Weekly  Conipilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Sept.  5,  198.S 


20 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1981 


DEPARTMENT 


Iporeign  Language  Competence 
In  the  Foreign  Service 


ly  Ronald  I.  Spiers 

Stafeuient  before  the  Senate 
hreigii  Relations  Committee  on  Sep- 
ember  21,  I'JSS.  Ambassador  Spiers  is 
'Jnder  Secretary  for  Management.^ 

(oil  have  asked  for  the  views  of  the 
Department  on  the  significance  of  for- 
'ign  language  competence  in  our  For- 
'ign  Service  and  on  where  we  stand  in 
ifforts  to  maintain  and  improve  the 
anguage  competence  of  our  diplomats 
)verseas.  Before  I  deal  with  those 
questions,  it  may  be  useful  to  set  forth 
;ome  facts  about  the  requirements  for 
anguage  competence  and  about  our 
'fforts  to  meet  those  requirements. 

Requirements  for 
ianguage  Competence 

The  United  States  has  diplomatic  rela- 
ions  with  128  countries  in  which  knowl- 
'dge  of  a  foreign  language  is  considered 
mportant  to  the  successful  conduct  of 
lur  foreign  relations.  At  our  missions 
n  these  countries,  there  are  over  2,000 
Department  of  State  positions  that  we 
designate  as  requiring  language  compe- 
ence  in  41  different  languages.  Most  of 
hose  2,000  positions  require  compe- 
ence  in  a  language  that  can  be  used  in 
several  countries:  French.  Spanish,  Por- 
uguese,  German,  or  Arabic.  We  also 
leed  significant  numbers  of  officers 
vho  can  speak  or  read  "one  country" 
anguages  of  countries  that  are  critical 
0  American  foreign  policy.  Russian, 
Jhinese,  Japanese,  and  Korean  are  ex- 
imples  of  this  category.  Our  remaining 
anguage  needs  make  up  less  than  one- 
ifth  of  our  total  position  requirements 
Dut  embrace  more  than  30  languages 
and  countries,  chiefly  in  Northern  and 
Eastern  Europe  and  East  and  South 
Asia. 

We  meet  this  need  principally  by 
raining  our  Foreign  Service  officers 
,'FSOs)  at  the  Foreign  Service  Insti- 
tute (FSI).  The  institute  offers  lan- 
guage training  in  all  of  the  languages 
for  which  we  have  language-designated 
positions  overseas  and  is  buttressed  in 
its  efforts  by  overseas  language  schools 
in  key  languages  such  as  Arabic,  Jap- 
anese, and  Chinese.  Its  services  are 
used  not  only  by  the  Department  of 
State  but  by  many  other  U.S.  Govern- 
ment agencies. 


Normally,  our  training  goal  is  for 
officers  to  reach  a  general  professional 
speaking  proficiency,  defined  as  "the 
ability  to  speak  the  language  with  suffi- 
cient structural  accuracy  and  vocabu- 
lary to  participate  effectively  in  most 
formal  and  informal  conversations  on 
practical,  social,  and  professional  top- 
ics." An  officer  who  has  attained  this 
general  professional  proficiency  is  said 
to  have  reached  level  three  in  the  five- 
level  scoring  system  used  by  the  For- 
eign Service  Institute  to  evaluate  lan- 
guage proficiency.  Most  of  our  lan- 
guage-designated positions  require 
level-three  proficiency  both  in  speaking 
and  reading  the  language,  this  being 
the  so-called  3/3  standard. 

Our  expectation  is  that  most  newly 
appointed  FSOs  will  need  training  to 
acquire  a  3/3  proficiency  in  any  foreign 
language.  While  many  of  our  candidates 
for  appointment  have  been  exposed  to 
foreign  languages  in  school  or  in  travel- 
ing, very  few  of  them  have  sufficient 
mastery  to  attain  the  3/3  level.  Accord- 
ingly, existing  language  proficiency 
does  not  play  a  central  role  in  selecting 
Foreign  Service  officers.  We  do  give 
bonus  points  in  our  ranking  process  to 
candidates  who  have  language  profi- 
ciency in  the  critical  hard  languages  of 
Russian,  Chinese,  Japanese,  and  Ara- 
bic, and  we  do  offer  higher  starting  sal- 
aries to  newly  appointed  officers  who 
have  a  tested  proficiency  in  a  foreign 
language. 

Nevertheless,  we  assume  that  new 
officers  will  need  language  training, 
and  it  is  customary  for  new  officers  to 
spend  time  in  FSI  language  training  en 
route  to  their  first  or  second  tour  over- 
seas. We  do  require  that  officers  dem- 
onstrate language  proficiency  that 
meets  FSI  standards  before  they  may 
be  granted  tenure  as  Foreign  Service 
officers. 

For  the  bulk  of  an  officer's  career 
after  tenure  is  granted,  language  com- 
petence or  the  need  for  further  lan- 
guage instruction  to  attain  that  compe- 
tence becomes  one  of  many  factors  con- 
sidered in  meeting  job  needs  overseas, 
as  well  as  in  career  planning  for  the 
officer.  We  try  to  blend  the  need  for 
language  competence  with  officers' 
overall  career  needs.  One  instance  of 
that  blending  is  the  recent  policy  deci- 
sion to  grant  additional  length  of  tenure 
at  the  middle  grades  to  officers  who 
take  long-term  training — typically  1  or 


2  years  in  length — in  certain  critical 
and  difficult  languages.  This  practice 
eliminates  the  possibility  that  officers 
who  take  long-term  language  training 
will  be  at  a  disadvantage  in  competing 
for  promotions  with  their  peers. 

Whether  by  training  or  through 
placement  of  an  already  competent  of- 
ficer, our  goal  is  always  to  have  each 
language-designated  position  filled  by 
an  officer  who  meets  the  desired  stand- 
ard. The  ideal  assignee,  however,  must 
also  have  experience  in  the  work  he  or 
she  will  do  at  post,  knowledge  of  the 
region  and  country,  and  expertise  to 
deal  with  the  key  bilateral  or  multi- 
lateral issues.  He  or  she  should  be  an 
effective  representative  of  the  United 
States  in  the  culture  that  prevails  in 
the  posted  country  and  be  a  comple- 
ment to  the  strengths  and  weaknesses 
of  the  rest  of  the  embassy  staff  Fur- 
ther, he  or  she  should  be  available  for 
posting  in  a  timeframe  that  dovetails 
with  the  departure  of  his  or  her  prede- 
cessor. Finally,  the  ideal  assignee 
should  not  be  needed  for  a  more  critical 
assignment  and  should  find  that  this  as- 
signment is  compatible  with  career  de- 
velopment and  family  needs.  This  list  of 
factors  is  suggestive  of  the  considera- 
tions that  sometimes  regrettably  lead 
to  the  assignment  of  officers  to  posts  in 
which  they  are  less  than  fully  compe- 
tent in  the  host  country  language.  The 
result  of  this  need  to  balance  off  many 
different  job  requirements  is  that  about 
three-quarters  of  the  occupants  of  our 
language-designated  positions  currently 
meet  the  full  competency  requirements 
of  their  positions,  while  one-quarter  do 
not. 

Meeting  Our  Language 
Competence  Requirements 

In  view  of  the  foregoing,  four  questions 
might  naturally  arise. 

First,  what  could  or  should  the  De- 
partment of  State  do  to  fill  a  higher 
proportion  of  our  language-designated 
positions  with  language-competent 
officers? 

Second,  has  the  Department  desig- 
nated the  appropriate  universe  of  posi- 
tions for  language  requirements? 

Third,  is  the  3/3  standard  ade- 
quate, or  should  officers  be  held  to  a 
higher  one? 

Finally,  one  could  ask  whether  the 
Department  should  be  extending  its 
language  training  efforts  to  cover  cler- 
ical and  technical  employees  and/or 
dependents  of  employees  at  post. 

Let  me  comment  briefly  on  each  of 

these  issues. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1988 


21 


DEPARTMENT 


Expanding  FSO  Language  Com- 
petence. As  to  filling  more  of  our  lan- 
guage-designated jobs  with  competent 
officers,  we  are  facing  what  is  essen- 
tially a  resources  question.  FSI  has  a 
very  good  track  record,  over  the  years, 
of  enabling  employees  to  reach  the  3/3 
level  in  a  language,  either  through  FSI 
training  alone  or  a  combination  of  FSI 
training  and  in-country  experience. 
We  hope  to  build  and  improve  on  that 
record  when  FSI's  anticipated  move  to 
new  quarters  at  Arlington  Hall  be- 
comes reality  and  enables  us  to  design 
more  efficient  instructional  facilities, 
including  those  integrating  new 
technologies. 

We  could,  perhaps,  approach  a 
100%  compliance  level  for  language- 
designated  positions  if  resources  were 
available  to  train  all  officers  at  FSI  and 
keep  them  there  until  they  were  at  the 
3/3  level.  But  to  do  so  would  mean  a 
major  increase  in  FSI  resources  to 
carry  the  e.xtra  training  load. 

Moreover,  it  would  mean  a  major 
permanent  addition  to  the  size  of  the 
FSO  corps  to  deal  with  the  fact  that 
we  would  permanently  have  a  larger 
number  of  people  in  training.  In  fiscal 
year  1988,  FSI  trained  about  870  State 
Department  employees  in  languages, 
typically  for  a  period  of  20  or  24  weeks. 
Thus,  about  400  workyears  of  employee 
time  were  spent  in  training — time  dur- 
ing which  those  employees  were  un- 
available to  fill  regular  positions.  That 
factor  might  easily  increase  by  50%,  or 
about  200  more  workyears,  if  we  sought 
to  meet  a  "100%  compliance"  goal, 
thereby  e.xacerbating  existing  staffing 
gaps  at  posts  overseas.  In  the  current 
resource  climate,  we  simply  cannot  ac- 
commodate such  an  increase  in  gaps  at 
post,  nor  could  we  expect  to  increase 
the  size  of  the  Foreign  Service  by  200 
persons  in  order  to  avoid  those  gaps. 

Determination  of  Language- 
Designated  Positions.  Turning  to  the 
question  of  which  jobs  carry  language 
designation,  our  current  procedures 
involve  the  posts  overseas,  the 
geographic  bureaus,  and  central 
management  in  assessing  language 
needs.  Typically,  the  post  will  originate 
a  request  to  designate  a  position  for 
language  competence,  or  to  change  an 
existing  designation,  and  that  request 
will  be  reviewed  in  Washington  by  the 
parent  bureau,  by  the  Bureau  of  Per- 
sonnel, and  by  FSI.  We  believe  that  the 
resulting  list  of  language-designated 
positions  is  a  generally  accurate  reflec- 
tion of  our  language  needs  overseas. 

It  could  be  argued,  of  course,  that 
we  should  err  on  the  side  of  requiring 


language  competence  and  that  a  larger 
universe  of  positions  should  carry  a  lan- 
guage requirement.  This  is  a  position 
for  which  there  are  powerful  argu- 
ments, not  least  of  which  is  that  all 
employees  are  apt  to  be  comfortable  in 
a  foreign  environment,  and  hence  more 
effective  on  their  jobs,  when  they  speak 
the  language  of  the  host  country.  There 
is  no  disputing  that  this  is  what  we 
found  in  Montevideo  and  Dakar  during 
the  model  language  post  program. 
Again,  I  can  only  say  that  the  costs  of 
expanding  our  language-designated 
position  base  would  be  prohibitive  in 
the  context  of  our  current  budget 
situation. 

Criterion  for  Language  Profi- 
ciency. The  third  question  about  our 
language  competence  program  is 
whether  the  general  professional,  or 
3/3,  proficiency  requirement  is  an  ap- 
propriate criterion.  Three  years  ago,  I 
asked  Ambassador  Monty  Stearns  to 
review  this  situation  for  me,  particu- 
larly as  regards  the  four  "hard"  lan- 
guages of  Russian,  Arabic,  Chinese, 
and  Japanese.  It  had  been  my  observa- 
tion that  the  3/3  level  was  woefully  in- 
adequate and  did  not  give  a  working 
knowledge  of  these  languages.  The 
Stearns  report  urged  adoption,  in  some 
cases,  of  advanced  professional,  or  4/4, 
proficiency  standards.  The  4/4  standard 
requires  substantially  greater  fluency 
and  accuracy  than  the  3/3  standard  and 
what  one  might  call  "cross-cultural 
comfort." 

We  have  begun  initiatives  to  train 
people  to  speak  and  read  at  higher  than 
the  standard  3/3  level.  We  feel  this  is 
possible  under  some,  but  not  all,  cir- 
cumstances. Our  Russian  language  pro- 
gram now  does  offer  advanced  training 
for  officers  who  already  have  a  good 
working  knowledge  of  the  language. 
Specially  tailored  Russian  courses,  like 
the  one  we  offered  last  spring  to  the 
staff  of  the  Nuclear  Risk  Reduction 
Center  or  the  recent  Russian  inter- 
preter training  for  Foreign  Service 
officers  that  we  sponsored  at  the 
Monterey  Institute  of  International 
Studies,  are  indicative  of  what  can  be 
continued  or  expanded  given  adequate 
resources. 

We  have  also  run  successful  experi- 
ments, as  opportunities  arise,  for  in- 
country  training  in  Chinese  at  Nanjing 
University,  and  for  Hungarian,  Pashto, 
Sinhala,  and  Spanish.  We  are  looking 
into  the  possibilities  for  onsite  training 
in  East  European  languages,  similar  to 
our  existing  overseas  language  schools. 
Most  language  specialists  agree,  how- 
ever, that  a  4/4  level  of  proficiency  in  a 
language  is  not  easily  attainable  in  a 


classroom  alone.  A  combination  of  for- 
mal study,  along  with  exposure  to  the 
culture  in  country  and  continual  prac- 
tice, is  required  to  achieve  and  main- 
tain advanced-level  skills  in  a  foreign 
language.  With  all  of  this  in  mind,  we 
will  continue  to  look  at  the  needs  of 
specific  jobs  to  see  whether,  in  a  partic 
ular  instance,  the  4/4  proficiency  stan- 
dard is  appropriate. 

Expanding  Training  Oppor- 
tunities. Finally,  I  want  to  address  the 
question  of  the  need  for  language  train- 
ing for  clerical  and  technical  employees 
and  for  spouses  and  dependents  of  all 
our  Foreign  Service  employees.  Many 
employees  in  these  categories  can  do 
their  jobs  better  when  they  are  skilled 
in  the  host  country  language.  All  of 
these  persons  undergo  the  stresses  anc 
strains  of  overseas  life  that  can  be 
dramatically  increased  by  lack  of 
language  fluency.  For  some  years,  we 
have  tried  to  widen  the  availability  of 
FSI  training  to  include  these  groups, 
as  space  and  time  would  permit.  There 
fore,  we  are  continuing  to  expand  FSI's 
Familiarization  And  Short  Term  (FAST 
Language  Courses.  These  intensive  6-J 
week  courses  are  intended  to  provide 
"survival"  language  skills  and  have 
been  enthusiastically  received  by  stu- 
dents. The  courses  ai-e  geared  for  peo- 
ple whose  assignments  do  not  formally 
require  language  competence,  but  they 
have  also  proven  effective  for  individu- 
als whose  schedules  do  not  permit 
longer  term  training.  We  now  offer 
FAST  courses  in  25  languages. 

We  still  have  a  long  way  to  go  in 
this  area.  Here,  too,  the  projected 
move  of  FSI  to  Arlington  Hall  can  givf 
us  more  flexibility  to  look  for  ways  of 
offering  at  least  a  bare  minimum  of  Ian 
guage  training  to  a  greater  number  of 
Foreign  Service  employees  and  family 
members. 

In  summary,  I  believe  that  the 
Department  of  State  and  the  Foreign 
Service  are  meeting  the  challenges  of 
conducting  bilateral  and  multilateral 
diplomacy  in  today's  polyglot  world. 
Improvement  is  certainly  possible,  par 
ticularly  if  additional  resources  were  h 
become  available.  For  now,  we  continue 
to  try  to  manage  what  we  have  as  effi- 
ciently and  effectively  as  possible. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee 
and  will  be  available  from  the  Superintend 
ent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Print 
ing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


22 


EAST  ASIA 


Developments  in  Malaysia  and 
Singapore 


bn  David  F.  Lamhertson 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Human  Rights  and  International 
Organizations  of  the  House  Foreign  Af- 
fairs Committee  on  September  22.  1988. 
Mr.  Lambertson  is  Deputy  Assistant 
Secretary  for  East  Asian  and  Pacific 
Affairs.^ 

Thank  you  for  this  opportunity  to  dis- 
cuss recent  developments  in  Malaysia 
and  Singapore.  I  would  like  to  begin 
with  some  remarks  on  Malaysia. 

Malaysia 

People  and  Government.  Malaysia  is  a 
multiracial  society  in  which  ethnic  Ma- 
ays  comprise  a  bare  majority  of  the 
jopulation.  Chinese  make  up  approxi- 
•nately  33%  of  the  population,  Indians 
0%,  and  there  are  several  smaller  mi- 
lority  groups. 

Since  independence  in  1957,  Malay- 
sia has  had  a  parliamentary  system  of 
Government  based  on  free  elections  con- 
ested  by  several  parties,  almost  all  of 
■vhich  are  racially  based.  The  ruling 
National  Front  (composed  of  three  ma- 
or  and  several  minor  parties  and  domi- 
lated  by  ethnic  Malays)  has  won  a  two- 
hirds  or  better  majority  in  the  federal 
)arliament  in  all  seven  general  elec- 
ions  since  1957,  but  opposition  parties 
ire  active  and  vocal  participants  in  the 
)olitical  system  and  occasionally  hold 
)Ower  at  the  state  level. 

Economy.  A  strong  free  market 
economy,  abundant  natural  resources, 
md  a  relatively  small  population  (17 
nillion)  have  helped  Malaysia  become 
)ne  of  the  most  prosperous  of  the  devel- 
)ping  countries. 

Shared  Interests.  The  United 
states  and  Malaysia  enjoy  very  good 
•elations  grounded  on  mutual  interests 
n  the  fields  of  trade  and  investment 
md  regional  stability.  We  cooperate 
smoothly  on  a  range  of  shared  con- 
cerns, including  defense,  the  fight 
igainst  narcotics,  the  continuing  refu- 
gee crisis  in  Southeast  Asia,  and  educa- 
tion. In  the  field  of  education,  for 
Jexample,  more  than  20,000  Malaysian 
'(students  are  now  enrolled  in  American 
'universities — the  second  largest  foreign 
student  population  in  the  United 
(States. 


Our  economic  ties  with  Malaysia 
are  solid.  The  United  States  is  Malay- 
sia's second  largest  trading  partner 
after  Japan.  We  take  one-sixth  of  Ma- 
laysia's exports  and  supply  nearly  one- 
fifth  of  its  imports.  For  1987  U.S.- 
Malaysia trade  reached  approximately 
$4.4  billion,  while  U.S.  direct  invest- 
ment in  Malaysia  is  estimated  at  $4 
billion.  More  than  20  major  U.S.  elec- 
tronics firms  have  established  factories 
in  Malaysia,  and  further  expansion  in 
this  and  other  industrial  areas  is  likely. 

To  facilitate  the  further  develop- 
ment of  economic  relations,  our  two 
countries  have  ongoing  discussions  in  a 
number  of  areas,  including  copyright 
and  bilateral  investment  agreements. 

Regional  Stability.  Beyond  eco- 
nomic cooperation,  Malaysia  and  the 
United  States  have  strong  mutual  inter- 
ests in  regional  security  and  stability. 
Strategically  located  on  the  Malacca 
Strait,  Malaysia's  continued  political 
stability  and  economic  development  are 
important  to  U.S.  interests  in  South- 
east Asia.  Confronted  with  the  Viet- 
namese occupation  of  Cambodia  and  a 
major  Soviet  base  at  Cam  Ranh  Bay, 
Malaysia  has  been  in  the  forefront  of 
the  Association  of  South  East  Asian 
Nations  (ASEAN)  strategy  to  bring 
about  a  withdrawal  of  Vietnamese 
forces  from  Cambodia  and  secure  a  ne- 
gotiated settlement  ensuring  genuine 
self-determination  for  the  Cambodian 
people.  Malaysia  and  its  ASEAN  part- 
ners have  done  an  effective  job  in  work- 
ing for  a  just  settlement  in  Cambodia, 
and  the  United  States  will  continue  to 
support  their  efforts. 

Malaysia's  geographic  location  has 
also  made  it  a  key  player  in  the  ongoing 
tragedy  of  Indochinese  refugees.  Since 
1975  Malaysia  has  generously  provided 
first  asylum  to  more  than  200,000  Viet- 
namese refugees.  At  present  there  are 
more  than  13,000  refugees  in  Malaysian 
refugee  camps,  and  it  is  significant  that 
many  of  those  granted  asylum  in  Malay- 
sia this  year  had  been  turned  away  by 
other  countries  in  the  region.  The 
United  States  deeply  appreciates  Ma- 
laysia's commitment  to  the  principle  of 
first  asylum,  and  we  look  forward  to 
continued  close  cooperation  on  this  hu- 
manitarian issue. 


While  the  United  States  and  Ma- 
laysia do  not  participate  in  a  formal 
security  alliance,  we  share  an  apprecia- 
tion of  the  threats  which  jeopardize  the 
area's  peace  and  freedom.  One  example 
of  our  rapport  in  this  area  is  Prime 
Minister  Mahathir's  public  support  for 
U.S.  military  facilities  in  the  Philip- 
pines. A  stable  parliamentary  democ- 
racy, Malaysia  is  nonaligned  but 
staunchly  anticommunist.  Still  emerg- 
ing from  its  tlrst  economic  recession 
since  independence,  Malaysia  has  ex- 
pressed its  appreciation  of  the  small  in- 
ternational military  education  and 
training  (IMET)  program  grant,  which 
represents  the  only  form  of  aid  it  now 
receives  from  the  United  States.  In  FY 
1988,  that  grant  totaled  $900,000. 

Internal  Security  Situation. 

Internal  security  in  Malaysia  has  been 
seriously  threatened  twice:  first,  by  a 
major  communist  insurrection  which 
began  in  1948  and  peaked  in  the  early 
1950s  and  which  still  smolders  in  a  few 
border  areas;  second,  by  inteiTommunal 
rioting  following  the  19(39  national  elec- 
tions, in  which  several  hundred  persons 
reportedly  died. 

In  addition,  since  1983  the  govern- 
ment ha.  explicitly  classified  the  coun- 
try's serious  drug  problem  as  a  threat 
to  national  security.  The  remnants  of 
the  communist  insurgency,  the  pos- 
sibility of  renewed  communal  conflict, 
and  widespread  drug  abuse  are  cited  by 
the  Government  of  Malaysia  as  justifi- 
cation for  laws  allowing,  in  conformity 
with  the  constitution,  preventive  deten- 
tion of  persons  suspected  of  subversive 
activity  or  of  other  activities,  including 
drug  crimes.  Other  laws  empower  the 
government  to  restrict  the  right  to  free 
expi'ession  and  association.  These  laws, 
though  seldom  used,  were  strengthened 
by  amendment  in  December  1987. 

Prime  Minister  Mahathir's  Admin- 
istration has  been  relatively  restrained 
in  its  use  of  Malaysia's  In*^2rnal  Se- 
curity Act  legislation  to  deal  with  polit- 
ical offenses.  By  mid-October  of  last 
year,  the  number  detained  under  the 
Internal  Security  Act  had  been  sharply 
reduced  to  at  most  27  from  about  500 
when  Mahathir  took  office  in  1981. 
However,  in  late  October  and  early 
November,  in  an  effort  it  said  was  nec- 
essary to  avoid  serious  racial  striie,  the 
government  detained  106  persons  under 
the  Internal  Security  Act.  Among  those 
detained  were  opposition  and  govern- 
ment politicians,  social  critics,  environ- 
mentalists, religious  activists,  and 
academics. 


itPepartment  of  State  Bulletin/November  1988 


23 


EAST  ASIA 


Shortly  after  the  arrests  began  on 
October  27,  our  Embassy  in  Kuala 
Lumpur  told  the  Malaysian  Government 
of  our  concern  over  the  detention  with- 
out trial  of  opposition  politicians  and 
social  activists  and  conveyed  to  the  gov- 
ernment our  hope  that  those  detained 
would  be  afforded  every  right  and  con- 
sideration under  Malaysian  law.  Secre- 
tary Shultz  raised  the  issue  of  Internal 
Security  Act  detentions  with  Prime 
Minister  Mahathir  during  their  July  9 
meeting  in  Kuala  Lumpur.  In  a  news 
conference  following  the  meeting.  Sec- 
retary Shultz  said  he  had  been  assured 
by  the  Prime  Minister  and  other  Malay- 
sian Government  officials  that  "those 
remaining  under  detention  would  be  af- 
forded full  statutory  and  constitutional 
rights  and  that  as  time  went  on  we 
would  see  them  dealt  with  properly.  So 
the  subject  was  discussed  in,  I  think, 
fundamentally  a  satisfactory  way."  Both 
before  and  after  the  Secretary's  meet- 
ing with  Prime  Minister  Mahathir, 
other  representatives  of  the  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment, including  Assistant  Secretary 
[for  East  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs] 
Gaston  Sigur,  Deputy  Assistant  Secre- 
tary [for  Human  Rights  and  Human- 
itarian Affairs  Robert  W.]  Farrand,  and 
myself,  have  reiterated  our  concerns  to 
the  Government  of  Malaysia. 

To  date  the  Government  of  Malay- 
sia has  released  85  of  the  106  persons 
detained  under  the  Internal  Security 
Act.  Orders  permitting  detention  for  up 
to  2  years  have  been  issued  for  the  re- 
maining 21  persons.  Under  the  Internal 
Security  Act,  the  government  is  not  re- 
quired to  bring  detainees  to  trial  How- 
ever, it  must  present  each  detainee 
with  the  grounds  for  detention  and  ap- 
point an  advisory  board  which  reviews 
each  case  every  6  months.  The  board 
has  no  power  to  order  release  of  a  de- 
tainee. We  have  welcomed  the  Malay- 
sian Government's  release  of  85 
detainees  and  urged  the  government  to 
release  the  remaining  detainees  as  ex- 
peditiously as  possible. 

At  the  time  of  the  Internal  Se- 
curity Act  arrests  last  year,  the  govern- 
ment suspended  three  newspapers  and 
banned  all  public  assemblies.  Shortly 
after  this  decision,  and  on  sevei-al  occa- 
sions since  that  time,  we  told  the  Ma- 
laysian Government  of  our  concern  over 
this  action.  Our  approaches  emphasized 
America's  longstanding  tradition  of  sup- 
port for  freedom  of  the  press  and  e.x- 
pressed  the  hope  that  the  newspapers 
which  had  their  publishing  licenses  re- 
voked would  be  permitted  to  resume 
publication  as  soon  as  possible.  Both 


Malaysia — A  Profile 


Geography 

Area:  329,749  sq.  km.  a27,316  sq.  mi.); 
slightly  larger  than  New  Mexico.  Cities: 
Capital — Kuala  Lumpur  (pop.  1  million). 
Other  cities — Penang,  Petaling  Jaya,  Ipoh, 
Malacca,  Johore  Bahru,  Kuching,  Kota 
Kinabalu. 


People 

Nationality:  Noun  and  adjective — Malay- 
sian(s).  Population  (1987  est.):  16.5  million. 
Annual  growth  rate  (1987):  2.6%.  Ethnic 
groups:  Malay  and  other  indigenous  60%, 
Chinese  31%,  Indian  9%.  Religions: 
Muslim,  Hindu,  Buddhist,  Taoist,  Chris- 
tian, traditional.  Languages:  Malay,  Chi- 
nese dialects,  English,  Tamil,  other  indi- 
genous. 

Government 

Type:  Federal  parliamentary  democracy  on 
the  Westminster  model  with  a  constitu- 
tional monarch.  Independence:  August  31, 
1957.  Constitution:  1957. 

Branches:  Executive — "Yang  di- 
Pertuan  Agong"  (head  of  state,  with  cere- 
monial duties),  prime  minister  (head  of 
government).  Cabinet.  Legislative — bi- 
cameral Parliament,  comprising  58-member 
Senate  (26  elected  by  the  13  state  assem- 
blies, 32  appointed  by  the  king)  and  177- 
member  House  of  Representatives  (elected 
from  single-member  constituencies). 
Judicial — Supreme  Court,  high  courts. 

Political  parties:  Barisan  Nasional 
(National  Front) — a  broad  coalition  com- 
prising the  United  Malays  National  Orga- 
nization (UMNO)  and  12  other  parties, 
most  of  which  are  ethnically  based;  Demo- 
cratic Action  Party  (DAP);  Parti  Se-Islam 
Malaysia  (PAS).  There  are  more  than  30 


registered  political  parties,  13  of  which  are 
represented  in  the  federal  parliament. 
Suffrage:  Universal  adult. 

Central  government  budget  (1988): 
$10.8  billion. 

Defense  (1987  est.):  4.2%  of  GNP 

Economy 

GNP  (1987):  .$28.4  billion.  Annual  real 
growth  rate  (1987  est.):  4.7%.  Per  capita 
growth  rate  (1987):  2.1%.  Avg.  inflation 
rate:  1986,  0.7%;  1985,  1.3%. 

Natural  resources:  Petroleum,  lique- 
fied natural  gas  (LNG),  tin,  minerals. 

Agriculture:  Products — palm  oil,  rub- 
ber, timber,  cocoa,  rice,  pepper,  pineapples. 

Industry:  Types — electronics,  elec- 
trical products,  rubber  products,  auto- 
mobile assembly,  textiles. 

Trade  (1987):  fi'xpor^s— $18.0  billion: 
electronic  components,  petroleum,  timber 
and  logs,  palm  oil,  natural  rubber,  LNG, 
electrical  products,  textiles.  Major  mar- 
kets—Japan 19.7%,  Singapore  18.4%,  US 
16.6%,  EEC  14.4%.  Imports— $12.1  billion: 
intermediate  goods,  machinery,  metal 
products,  food  products,  consumer  dura- 
bles, transport  equipment.  Major  sup- 
pliers—Japan 21.2%,  US  18.8%,  Singapore 
15.0%,  EEC  13.2%. 

Fiscal  year:  Calendar  year. 

Exchange  rate:  2.50  Malaysian  ringgi 
(M$)  =  US$1. 

US  aid  received  (1987):  $900,000— mill 
tary  program  grants;  $161,900 — narcotics 
suppression. 

Membership  in  International 
Organizations 

UN  and  some  of  its  specialized  and  related 
agencies,  including  the  World  Bank,  Interna- 
tional Monetary  Fund  (IMF),  General  Agree- 
ment on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT),  UNESCO 
International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  (IAEA) 
Association  of  South  East  Asian  Nations 
(ASEAN);  Asian  Development  Bank  (ADB); 
Five-Power  Defense  Arrangement;  Common- 
wealth; Nonaligned  Movement;  Organization 
of  the  Islamic  Conference  (OIC);  INTELSAT 


Taken  from  the  Background  Notes  of  Aug. 
1988,  published  by  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  Department  of  State.  Editor: 
.Juanita  Adams. ■ 


24 


EAST  ASIA 


the  suspensions  and  the  ban  on  assem- 
ily  were  lifted  earlier  this  year.  How- 
iver,  parliament  has  enacted  legislation 
larther  strengthening  the  government's 
ilready  substantial  control  over  the 
iress  and  public  assembly.  We  are  en- 
ouraged  that  the  publishing  licenses  of 
he  opposition  Democratic  Action  Party 
ind  Parti  Islam  have  been  renewed  and 
vould  note  also  that  the  official  publica- 
ions  of  these  opposition  parties  con- 
inue  to  freely  criticize  the  Government 
if  Malaysia.  We  are  also  pleased  that 
he  social  awareness  group,  Aliran,  has 
ontinued  to  publish  its  monthly  news- 
etter  In  addition,  the  important  Malay 
anguage  paper  Watmi,  which  was  a 
veekly  before  the  crackdown,  now  pub- 
ishes  three  issues  a  week  and  carries 
■.xtensive  coverage  of  dissident  activity, 
t  is  clear,  however,  that  the  inhibiting 
■ffect  of  the  government's  recent  ac- 
ions  on  the  climate  of  press  freedom  is 
ikely  to  continue  for  some  time  to 
ome. 

The  Department  has  also  been  fol- 
Dwing  closely  recent  controversial 
vents  in  Malaysia  involving  the  judici- 
ry,  the  Prime  Minister,  and  parlia- 
nent.  In  response  to  what  the  Prime 
Minister  viewed  as  unwarranted  inter- 
erence  by  the  judiciary,  the  parliament 
las  passed  legislation  limiting  the  I'ole 
'f  the  judiciary  in  reviewing  executive 
■cts.  Parliament  also  amended  the  con- 
titution  in  a  manner  which  appears  to 
imit  the  judiciary's  independent  au- 
hority.  In  turn  many  senior  judicial 
igures  reacted  critically  to  what  they 
■iewed  as  an  attack  on  their  independ- 
nce.  The  heightened  stress  between 
he  two  branches  of  government  ulti- 
(lately  led  to  the  removal  of  the  Lord 
'resident  of  Malaysia's  Supreme  Court, 
n  addition,  five  Supreme  Court  judges 
vere  later  suspended  and  are  awaiting 
he  decision  of  a  tribunal  appointed 
ly  the  King  to  examine  the  propriety 
if  the  actions  they  took  in  connec- 
ion  with  the  case  that  resulted  in  the 
■emoval  of  the  Lord  President. 

While  from  an  American  perspec- 
ive  we  find  these  trends  disquieting, 
ve  believe  it  would  be  premature  to 
iraw  conclusions  about  their  ultimate 
mpact  on  the  historically  independent 
Vlalaysian  judiciary.  We  will  continue  to 
Tionitor  these  events  closely  and  make 
)ur  views  known  to  the  Government  of 
Malaysia  as  appropriate. 


Singapore 

People  and  Geography.  I  would  like  to 
turn  now  to  the  subject  of  Singapore, 
a  city-state  of  2.6  million  people.  The 
majority  of  Singapore's  citizens  (75%) 
are  ethnic  Chinese.  Malays  (15%)  and 
Indians  (7%)  constitute  substantial 
minorities. 

Singapore's  location  at  the  southern 
tip  of  the  Malay  Peninsula  historically 
has  given  it  a  strategic  importance  far 
greater  than  its  small  population  and 
area  might  suggest.  Its  industrious 
people  and  sound  economic  manage- 
ment have  enabled  it  to  become  a  major 
manufacturing  and  service,  as  well  as  a 
trading,  center.  Singapore's  per  capita 
income  has  become  the  third  highest  in 
Asia  after  Japan  and  Brunei. 

Political  Situation.  At  independ- 
ence Singapore  adopted  a  Westminster- 
style  parliamentary  system  of  govern- 
ment with  political  authority  resting  in 
a  prime  minister  and  cabinet.  The  rul- 
ing political  party  (in  power  continu- 
ously since  1959)  is  the  People's  Action 
Party  (PAP)  headed  by  Prime  Minister 
Lee  Kuan  Yew. 

Singapore  has  regularly  held  par- 
liamentary elections  since  full  inde- 
pendence, and  separation  from 
Malaysia,  23  years  ago.  The  most  re- 
cent elections  took  place  on  Septem- 
ber 3.  Opposition  parties  fielded  candi- 
dates for  70  of  81  contested  seats.  Only 
one  opposition  candidate  won  election, 
but  several  lost  by  very  narrow  mar- 
gins. (Two  opposition  candidates  have 
indicated  their  intent  to  fill  special  un- 
elected  seats  reserved  for  the  opposi- 
tion in  parliament.)  The  ruling  PAP 
garnered  61.7%  of  the  vote,  a  statis- 
tically insignificant  decline  of  1.2  per- 
centage points  from  the  1984  election 
results.  'There  have  been  no  allegations 
of  fraud  either  in  polling  or  in  the 
counting  of  ballots.  One  opposition  fig- 
ure has  complained  that  the  PAP  takes 
advantage  of  its  incumbency  to  intimi- 
date would-be  opposition  figures  and  to 
stifle  alternative  viewpoints.  Never- 
theless, nearly  two  of  every  five  Sin- 
gapore voters  cast  ballots  against  the 
ruling  PAP,  despite  suggestions  during 
the  campaign  that  constituencies  which 
elected  opposition  candidates  might 
find  themselves  cut  off  from  important 
government  entitlements.  Singapore's 
current  economic  growth  rate  of  over 
10%  and  its  dramatic  recovery  from  its 
1985-86  recession  may  better  explain 
voter  support  for  PAP. 


The  government  maintains  active 
internal  security  and  military  forces  to 
counter  threats  to  the  nation's  security. 
The  authorities  maintain  that  the  Com- 
munist Party  of  Malaya  (CPM)  has  not 
abandoned  its  intent  to  overthrow  the 
government  by  force  and  that  the  need 
for  continuing  social  harmony  requires 
special  measures,  such  as  the  Internal 
Security  Act  and  restrictions  on  free 
speech  and  press.  The  government,  for 
instance,  forbids  oral  and  printed  state- 
ments which  it  believes  might  arouse 
tensions  among  the  various  races.  In- 
flammatory discussion  of  race,  religion, 
and  language  is  officially  forbidden. 

Regional  Interests.  The  United 
States  and  Singapore  have  close,  long- 
standing ties^ased  on  mutual  inter- 
ests. The  United  States  is  Singapore's 
top  investment  and  trading  partner.  As 
a  free-trading  nation,  Singapore  has 
also  been  a  vigorous  supporter  of 
efforts  to  reduce  trade  barriers  world- 
wide. Its  impressive  economic  growth 
has  made  it  a  model  for  other  develop- 
ing countries  whose  primary  natural  re- 
source is  their  people.  Singapore  is  a 
respected  and  articulate  voice  of  moder- 
ation in  multilateral  fora,  such  as  the 
United  Nations,  the  General  Agree- 
ment on  'Ririffs  and  Trade  (GATT),  and 
the  Nonaligned  Movement  (NAM). 

Singapore  is  a  staunch  supporter  of 
political  stability  and  economic  growth 
in  Southeast  Asia  and  of  a  strong 
ASEAN.  Singapore's  strategic  position 
and  well-developed  harbor,  airfields, 
and  maintenance  facilities  have  made  it 
a  useful  port-of-call  for  U.S.  military 
ships  and  aircraft.  Singapore's  Govern- 
ment views  Vietnam,  and  behind  Viet- 
nam the  Soviet  Union,  as  the  main 
threat  to  regional  stability.  The  Govern- 
ment of  Singapore  strongly  and  publicly 
supports  the  U.S.  military  presence  in 
Southeast  Asia,  including  our  facilities 
in  the  Phihppines,  and  is  a  leading  op- 
ponent of  Vietnam's  occupation  of 
Cambodia. 

We  maintain  a  modest  ($50,000  per 
annum)  IMET  program  which  contrib- 
utes to  increased  professionalism  and 
technical  capabilities  of  Singaporean 
Armed  Forces  members  and  to  the  sup- 
port of  U.S. -origin,  commercially  pur- 
chased equipment.  Foreign  military 
sales  (FMS)  programs  with  Singapore 
have  concentrated  on  procurement  of 
high-technology  weapons  systems,  such 
as  the  F-16  fighter  aircraft,  the  E-2C 
antisubmarine  warfare  aircraft,  and 
antiship  missiles,  such  as  the  Harpoon. 
The  modernization  of  ground  forces  has 
focused  on  I-Hawk  antiaircraft  missiles 
and  mortar-locating  radars. 


25 


EAST  ASIA 


Human  Rights  Issues.  Even 
though  the  United  States  and  Sin- 
gapore have  a  close  and  mutually  bene- 
ficial relationship,  highly  regarded  by 
both  our  governments,  we  do  not  al- 
ways see  eye-to-eye  on  every  issue.  Hu- 
man rights  issues  are  one  of  these  areas 
in  which  we  have  had  our  differences 
and  in  which  both  sides  have  expressed 
their  views  frankly,  befitting  the  can- 
dor and  openness  of  our  relationship. 

Under  the  Internal  Security  Act, 
the  Minister  of  Home  Affairs  may  order 
the  detention  of  persons  whom  the  Min- 
ister determines  pose  a  threat  to  na- 
tional security.  Most  recently  the 
government  used  this  power  twice  in 
1987  and  again  in  May  1988.  In  May  and 
.June  1987,  22  people  were  detained 
without  trial  for  what  the  government 
described  as  their  involvement  in  "a 
communist  conspiracy."  Most  of  those 
detained  last  year  were  released  after  a 
few  months,  although  they  were  forbid- 
den to  leave  Singapore  or  join  any  soci- 
ety or  organization  without  government 
permission.  At  the  end  of  the  year,  only 
the  alleged  leader  of  this  group  re- 
mained in  custody. 

In  the  second  instance  in  1987,  the 
government  ordered  the  detention  of 
four  Malay  Singaporeans  on  charges  of 
spreading  rumors  of  and  preparing  for 
race  I'iots  in  connection  with  the  anni- 
versary of  the  1969  ethnic  strife  in  Ma- 
laysia and  Singapore.  Detention  orders 
authorized  their  incarceration  for  up  to 
2  years. 

In  April  1988,  nine  of  those  who 
had  been  detained  in  May  and  June  the 
previous  year  signed  a  press  statement 
which  denied  any  involvement  in  a  con- 
spiracy and  claimed  that  some  de- 
tainees had  been  physically  abused 
while  in  custody.  Eight  were  rearrested 
(the  ninth  was  out  of  the  country), 
along  with  a  lawyer  who  served  as 
counsel  to  some  of  the  detainees  the 
previous  year.  Another  former  de- 
tainee, who  reportedly  helped  draft  but 
did  not  sign  the  press  statement,  was 
also  detained  in  May.  A  prominent  law- 
yer, who  had  represented  several  of  the 
detainees  in  1987  was  also  arrested  in 
this  period  for  his  alleged  dealings  with 
an  American  diplomat.  While  under  ar- 
rest, all  of  the  eight  signed  statutory 
declarations  which  modified  their 
April  18  statement.  Of  those  detained 
this  year,  six  former  detainees  remain 
in  detention;  two  of  the  lawyers  and 
three  others  have  been  released  with 
restrictions  on  their  movement  and 
activities. 


Singapore— A  Profile 


Geography 

Area:  620  sq.  km.  (239  sq.  mi.).  Cities: 
Capita/— Singapore  (country  is  a  city-state). 
Terrain:  Lowland.  Climate:  Tropical. 


South 
China  Sea      J 


People 

Nationality:  Noun  and  adjective— 
Singaporean(s).  Population  (1985):  2.6 
million.  Annual  growth  rate:  1.1%.  Ethnic 
groups:  Chinese  77%,  Malays  15%,  Indians 
6%,  others  2%.  Religions:  Buddhist,  Taoist. 
Muslim,  Hindu,  Christian.  Languages: 
English,  Mandarin  and  other  Chinese  dialects, 
Malay,  Tamil.  Education:  Years 
compulsory— none.  Attendance— 85%. 
Literacy— S5%.  Health:  Infant  mortality 
rate— 8.911.000.  Life  expectancy— d^  yrs. 
(male),  74  yrs.  (female).  Work  force  (1.2 
million):  Agriculture— 1%.  Industry  and 
commerce— 58%.  Services— S5%. 
Government— 6%. 


Government 

Type:  Parliamentary  democracy.  Constitu- 
tion: 1965.  Independence:  August  9,  1965. 

Branches:  Executive— president  (chief  of 
state,  4-yr.  term);  prime  minister  (head  of 
government).  Legislative— unicameral 
79-member  Parliament  (maximum  5-yr.  term). 
Judicial— High  Court,  Court  of  Appeal,  Court 
of  Criminal  Appeal. 

Political  parties:  People's  Action  Party 
(PAP),  various  opposition  parties.  Suffrage: 
Universal  and  compulsory. 


Central  government  budget  (1986):  $10 
billion. 

Defense  (1985):  6%  of  gross  domestic 
product. 

National  holiday:  August  9. 

Flag:  Two  equal  horizontal  sections,  red 
over  white,  with  a  white  crescent  and  five 
stars  in  the  upper  left  corner. 

Economy 

GDP  (1985):  $16.0  billion.  Annual  growth 
rate  (in  real  terms):  -1.8%.  Per  capita 
income:  $6,200.  Avg.  inflation  rate  (1985): 
0.5%. 

Natural  resources:  None. 

Agriculture  (0.9%  of  real  GNP): 
Products— hogs,  poultry,  orchids,  vegetables, 
fruits. 

Industry  (17%  of  real  GNP):  Types- 
petroleum  products,  electrical  and  electronic 
products,  shipbuilding  and  ship  repair,  food 
and  beverages,  textiles  and  garments. 

Trade  (1985,  excluding  Indonesian  trade, 
which  is  not  reported  by  Singaporean 
authorities):  Exports— $23  billion:  petroleum 
products,  electronics  equipment,  electrical 
and  nonelectrical  machinery,  telecommunica- 
tions apparatus,  garments.  Major  markets- 
US,  Malaysia,  Japan,  EC.  Imports— $26 
billion:  crude  oil,  machinery,  manufactured 
goods,  foodstuffs.  Major  suppliers:  US,  EC, 
Malaysia,  Japan. 

Official  exchange  rate  (avg.  1985): 
Singapore  $2.2002  =  US$1. 

Fiscal  year:  April  1-March  31. 

Membership  in  International 
Organizations 

UN  and  some  of  its  specialized  and  related 
agencies.  Commonwealth  of  Nations,  Associa 
tion  of  South  East  Asian  Nations  (ASEAN), 
Five-Power  Defense  Arrangement,  Asian 
Development  Bank  (ADB),  Colombo  Plan, 
INTELSAT,  Nonaligned  Movement,  Group  ol 
77. 


Taken  from  the  Background  Notes  of  Feb. 
1987,  published  by  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  Department  of  State.  Editor: 
Juanita  Adams. ■ 


26 


ECONOMICS 


Withdrawal  of  U.S.  Diplomat.  On 

May  6,  the  Government  of  Singapore 
sked  that  an  officer  of  the  U.S.  Em- 
bassy be  withdrawn  from  Singapore  on 
p-ounds  that  he  had  interfered  in  the 
lomestic  affairs  of  that  country  with 
;he  approval  of  two  unnamed  "senior 
jfficers"  of  the  Department  of  State. 
The  allegations,  based  on  these  officials' 
Tieetings  with  Singaporeans  outside  of 
overnment,  were  totally  without  foun- 
Jation.  We  firmly  rejected  them  and 
stated  that  all  activities  of  U.S.  Gov- 
rnment  officials  in  dealing  with  Sin- 
;apore  had  been  legitimate  and  in  full 
iccord  with  customai-y  diplomatic  prac- 
tice. Nevertheless,  we  withdrew  the 
U.S.  diplomat,  inasmuch  as  it  is  estab- 
lished in  international  law  and  practice 
:hat  a  government  may,  at  any  time  and 
without  having  to  explain  its  decision, 
^ive  notice  that  a  foreign  diplomat 
should  be  withdrawn.  On  May  10  we 
equested  that  Singapore  withdraw 
Tom  Washington  a  diplomat  of  similar 
'ank  and  responsibility.  We  also  e.x- 
oressed  regret  that  the  Government  of 
Singapore  did  not  attempt  to  resolve 
;his  matter  privately,  in  a  manner  be- 
Itting  relations  between  friendly 
!ountries. 

I  am  pleased  to  note  that  the  furor 
surrounding  this  incident  has  died 
iown.  Prime  Minister  Lee  in  a  speech 
lefore  parliament  on  June  10  said  that 
Decause  of  the  importance  of  the  bilat- 
eral relationship  to  both  Singapore  and 
;he  United  States,  it  was  time  to  put 
:his  incident  behind  us.  We  fully  share 
(lis  sentiment. 

Detentions  and  Restrictions.  We 

nave  consistently  made  known  to  the 
overnment  of  Singapore  our  opposi- 
Uon  to  prolonged  detention  without 
trial  and  our  firm  position  that  those 
till  detained  under  the  Internal  Se- 
curity Act  either  be  released  or  tried 
fairly  and  promptly.  Secretary  Shultz 
first  raised  this  issue  with  then-Foreign 
Minister  Dhanabalan  in  June  1987,  and 
it  has  been  a  regular  item  on  our  bilat- 
eral agenda  since. 

We  have  also  regularly  expressed 
concern  to  the  Government  of  Sin- 
gapore about  restrictions  placed  on  for- 
eign publications  and  their  journalists. 
In  1987  the  government  restricted  dis- 
tribution of  three  foreign  publications 
and  lifted  restrictions  imposed  on  a 
fourth.  Time,  in  1986.  In  February  the 
government  restricted  circulation  of  the 
Asian  Wall  Street  Journal  to  400  cop- 
ies. In  October  Asiaweek  circulation 


was  reduced  to  500  copies.  In  De- 
cember circulation  of  the  for  Eastern 
Economic  Review  was  also  cut  to  500. 
The  government  explains  these  restric- 
tions by  arguing  that  it  has  an  unre- 
stricted right  of  reply  to  foreign  media 
coverage  of  Singapore  and  by  alleging 
that  the  publications  "engage  in  the  do- 
mestic politics  of  Singapore."  Earlier 
this  year,  Singapore's  Parliament 
passed  legislation  which  allows  the  gov- 
ernment to  authorize  photocopying  and 
circulation  of  restricted  foreign  journals 
in  Singapore.  We  have  protested  the 
unauthorized  and  uncompensated  re- 
production of  restricted  journals  and 
pointed  out  that  this  action  appears  to 
violate  the  bilateral  copyi-ight  agree- 
ment between  us,  as  it  may  affect  the 
works  of  U.S.  citizens.  We  have  also 
consistently  emphasized,  in  public 
statements  and  in  private  meetings,  our 
fundamental  and  longstanding  commit- 
ment to  a  free  and  unfettered  press. 
During  the  recent  election  cam- 
paign, the  Government  of  Singapore  de- 
nied entry  to  one  foreign  journalist, 
expelled  another,  and  announced  that  in 
contrast  to  longstanding  practice,  jour- 
nalists would  have  to  seek  a  temporary 
work  permit  if  they  plan  to  do  any 
newsgathering  while  in  Singapore.  Our 
Embassy  has  sought  clarification  of  this 
policy. 


Conclusion 

To  conclude  the  United  States  regards 
Malaysia  and  Singapore  as  good 
friends,  and  we  fully  expect  that  the 
increasing  depth  and  complexity  of  our 
bilateral  relationships  will  produce  still 
closer  ties  between  us.  As  those  ties 
develop  further,  their  management  will 
require  greater  sensitivity,  increased 
effort  by  all  of  us,  and  an  appreciation 
of  the  fundamental  shared  interests  un- 
derlying our  relations.  This  is  nowhere 
more  evident  than  in  the  area  covered 
by  this  committee — human  rights. 

We  believe  Malaysians  and  Sin- 
gaporeans alike  share  many  of  our 
ideals.  Today,  the  idea  of  democracy  is 
among  the  most  important  political 
forces  of  our  time.  It  takes  different 
forms  in  different  places,  shaped  always 
by  the  special  historical,  cultural,  and 
societal  forces  that  exist  in  any  given 
country.  But  it  is  a  strengthening  trend 
around  the  world,  and  in  spite  of  some 
recent  disquieting  developments,  we 
are  optimistic  that  an  underlying  com- 
mitment to  fundamental  democratic  val- 
ues will  continue  in  Malaysia  and 
Singapore. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee 
and  will  be  available  from  the  Superintend- 
ent of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Print- 
ing Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Export  of  U.S.  Satellite  to  China  for  Launch 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
SEPT.  9,  19881 

The  State  Department  today  will  notify 
Congress  and  its  COCOM  [Coordinat- 
ing Committee  for  Multilateral  Export 
Controls]  allies  of  the  Administration's 
intent  to  approve,  subject  to  certain 
conditions,  a  pending  export  license  ap- 
plication for  the  use  of  Chinese  space 
launch  services.  The  license  application 
was  submitted  by  Hughes  Aircraft 
Company  for  the  launch  of  two  of  its 
satellites  which  have  been  ordered  by 
an  Australian  entity,  AUSSAT.  If  this 
application  receives  final  approval,  in- 
cluding from  Congress  and  COCOM,  it 
will  be  the  first  ever  approved  by  the 
U.S.  Government  for  shipment  of  a 
U.S. -made  satellite  to  a  non- Western 
destination. 


The  Administration  has  also  de- 
cided to  approve,  subject  to  conditions, 
a  license  for  the  launch  of  a  third  U.S.- 
made  satellite  on  a  Chinese  launch  vehi- 
cle. This  satellite,  known  as  AsiaSat, 
will  be  launched  on  behalf  of  a  Hong- 
Kong-based  consortium  with  Chinese 
and  British  ownership.  AsiaSat  was  for- 
merly known  as  Westar  6.  It  was  the 
satellite  salvaged  from  orbit  by  the 
space  shuttle  during  STS  51-A  in 
November  1984.  The  Congress  is  also 
being  informed  of  the  decision  to  ap- 
prove the  AsiaSat  license,  subject  to 
conditions,  even  though  the  export  in- 
volved is  for  less  than  the  .$50  million 
threshold  for  notification  specified  in 
the  Arms  Export  Control  Act.  COCOM 
approval  will  also  be  sought. 

The  projected  launch  dates  are  late 
1989  for  the  AsiaSat  satellite  and  1991 
and  1992  for  the  two  AUSSAT 
satellites. 


tiDepartment  of  State  Bulletin/November  1988 


27 


EUROPE 


As  conditions  for  licensing  the 
launches  of  the  AUSSAT  and  AsiaSat 
satellites  on  Chinese  expendable  launch 
vehicles,  the  United  States  and  the 
People's  Republic  of  China  will  establish 
a  government-to-government  regime 
to  safeguard  the  technology  from  pos- 
sible misuse  or  diversion  and  obtain  a 
government-to-government  commitment 
that  China  will  accept  adequate  re- 
sponsibility for  potential  liability  for 
damages  resulting  from  accident.  It  has 
also  been  decided  we  will  have  an 
agreement  to  prevent  possible  unfair 
Chinese  pricing  or  trade  practices  re- 
lating to  launch  competitions.  These 
agreements  will  be  concluded  before 
the  licenses  are  issued. 

As  a  matter  of  policy,  the  U.S. 
Government  will  continue  its  case-by- 
case  approach  to  decisions  on  future 
export  license  requests  for  satellites 
destined  for  launch  by  the  People's 
Republic  of  China.  The  positive  out- 
come in  these  cases  reflects  our  con- 
tinuing interest  in  e.xpanding  relations 
with  China  in  ways  which  are  mutually 
beneficial.  We  emphasize  that  this  deci- 
sion does  not  reflect  a  change  in  U.S. 
policy  opposing  use  of  Soviet  launch 
vehicles. 

In  reaching  this  decision,  the  Ad- 
ministration is  determined  to  protect 
legitimate  U.S.  national  security  inter- 
ests and  assure  the  ability  of  the  U.S. 
commercial  launch  industry  to  compete 
on  an  equal  footing  with  launches  from 
a  nonmarket  economy,  while  continuing 
to  promote  increased  U.S. -China  trade. 
In  addition,  the  Administration  re- 
affirms its  policy  of  promoting  and  en- 
couraging a  strong  U.S.  commercial 
launch  industry. 


Soviet  Foreign  Minister 
Visits  Washington 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by  De- 
partment spokesman  Charles  Redman.  ■ 


JOINT  STATEMENT, 
SEPT.  23,  1988 

Proceeding  from  the  agreed  goal  of  con- 
tinued development  of  the  U.S. -Soviet 
dialogue.  Secretary  of  State  George  P. 
Shultz  and  Foreign  Minister  Eduard  A. 
Shevardnadze  met  September  22-23, 
1988,  in  Washington  for  further  discus- 
sions on  the  full  range  of  arms  control 
and  disarmament,  human  rights  and 
humanitarian,  regional  and  bilateral  is- 
sues in  U.S. -Soviet  relations.  The  For- 
eign Minister  called  on  President 
Reagan  at  the  White  House,  where 
they  considered  the  state  of  relations. 
He  also  met  with  Vice  President  Bush. 

During  the  2  days  of  detailed  and 
frank  discussions,  the  sides  thoroughly 
reviewed  progress  in  implementing  the 
agreements  and  understandings 
reached  by  President  Reagan  and  Gen- 
eral Secretary  Gorbachev  at  the  Wash- 
ington and  Moscow  summits.  They 
noted  that,  although  important  differ- 
ences remain  on  certain  issues,  both 
sides  are  convinced  that  solutions  are 


possible.  The  record  of  achievement 
since  the  November  1985  summit  in 
Geneva  attests  to  this:  goals  that 
seemed  impossible  have  been  reached, 
and  other  important  goals  have  been 
brought  within  sight.  Continuity  of 
effort,  consistency  of  purpose,  and  coi 
mitment  to  a  process  of  candid  dialogi 
aimed  at  finding  practical  and  endurir 
solutions  to  problems  will  be  as  indis- 
pensable in  the  months  and  years  ahe: 
as  they  have  been  over  the  last  3  yeai' 
Toward  this  end.  Secretary  Shult; 
and  Foreign  Minister  Shevardnadze 
agreed  that  the  negotiators  and  e.xper 
of  the  two  sides  will  continue  to  seek 
progress  across  the  agenda  set  forth  1 
President  Reagan  and  General  Secre- 
tary Gorbachev  in  their  joint  state- 
ments from  the  Washington  and 
Moscow  summits.  These  statements 
comprise  a  detailed  and  concrete  pro- 
gram of  action  for  building  a  more  sta 
ble  and  sustainable  relationship 
between  the  United  States  and  the  So 
viet  Union  and  for  contributing,  with 
other  nations,  to  a  world  at  peace. 


28 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  19{ 


EUROPE 


The  Secretary  and  the  Foreign 
linister  noted  the  active  and  serious 
ffort  underway  to  resolve  outstanding 
5sues  in  the  Geneva  nuclear  and  space 
alks.  They  received  updated  joint  draft 
exts  of  a  treaty  on  the  reduction  and 
imitation  of  strategic  offensive  arms 
nd  its  associated  documents.  They 
relcomed  the  further  elaboration  since 
he  Moscow  summit  of  these  drafts, 
he  sides  discussed  a  range  of  issues 
ncluding  air-launched  cruise  missiles 
ALCMs)  and  the  problem  of  verifica- 
ion  of  mobile  intercontinental  ballistic 
lissiles  (ICBMs)  and  sea-launched 
ruise  missiles  (SLCMs).  Some  further 
rogress  was  achieved  in  the  first  two 
reas. 

The  Secretary  and  the  Foreign 
linister  also  reviewed  the  negotiations 
0  work  out  a  separate  agreement  con- 
erning  the  AntibaUistic  Missile  (ABM) 
Veaty,  in  accordance  with  the  joint 
tatements  issued  at  the  Washington 
nd  Moscow  summits.  They  noted  cer- 
iin  progress  achieved  in  the  prepara- 
on  of  an  associated  protocol  during 
ne  current  round  of  negotiations  in 
eneva.  They  instructed  their  nego- 
ators  to  intensify  their  efforts  in  pre- 
aring  the  joint  draft  texts  of  the 
parate  agreement  and  its  associated 
rotocol.  They  also  agreed  to  continue 
iscussions  concerning  space-based 
insors. 

The  Secretary  and  the  Foreign 
ilinister  instructed  the  delegations  in 
eneva  to  continue  intensive  work 
imed  at  the  ultimate  completion  of  the 
greements  being  negotiated  in  the  nu- 
ear  and  space  talks. 

The  sides  discussed  concerns  that 
oth  of  them  have  in  connection  with 
le  observance  of  the  ABM  Ti-eaty.  Dis- 
jssions  on  these  matters  will  be 
ontinued. 

The  Secretary  and  the  Foreign 
linister  noted  with  great  satisfaction 
lat  since  the  Moscow  summit,  both 
des  have  begun  the  process  of  elim- 
lating  intermediate-range  nuclear 
)rces  (INF)  missile  systems  in  ac- 
Drdance  with  the  INF  Treaty. 

The  Secretary  and  the  Foreign 
linister  welcomed  completion  of  the 
)int  verification  experiment  (JVE)  at 
le  nuclear  test  sites  of  the  United 
tates  and  the  U.S.S.R.,  which  demon- 
trated  an  unprecedented  degree  of  co- 
peration  and  openness  on  verification 
djf  nuclear  testing  limitations.  They  di- 
ected  negotiators  to  finish  the  new 
erification  protocol  for  the  Peaceful 
luclear  Explosions  Treaty  (PNET), 
'hich  is  nearly  complete,  and  the  new 


verification  protocol  to  the  Threshold 
Test  Ban  Treaty  (TTBT).  They  agreed 
to  work  for  the  earliest  submission  of 
these  documents  for  ratification  and  to 
continue  stage-by-stage  negotiations  to- 
ward the  objectives  specified  by  the 
leaders  at  the  Washington  and  Moscow 
summits. 

The  sides  reaffirmed  the  objective 
of  concluding,  as  soon  as  possible,  a 
global  convention  on  the  comprehensive 
prohibition  and  destruction  of  chemical 
weapons,  encompassing  all  chemical 
weapons-capable  states.  In  reviewing 
progress  toward  this  goal,  the  sides  ex- 
changed views  on  such  issues  as  labora- 
tory synthesis  of  super  toxic  chemicals 
for  medical  and  research  purposes, 
bilateral  data  exchanges,  and  other 
confidence-building  measures.  They 
agreed  that  the  10th  round  of  U.S.- 
Soviet bilateral  consultations  on  chem- 
ical weapons  will  take  place  in  Geneva 
from  November  29  to  December  15.  The 
sides  expressed  deep  concern  about  the 
recurrent  use  of  chemical  weapons,  in 
particular  against  civilian  populations. 
They  shared  the  view  that  the  expand- 
ing proliferation  and  use  of  chemical 
weapons  continue  to  impart  a  sense  of 
urgency  to  their  discussions  and  high- 
light the  absolute  necessity  of  negotiat- 
ing an  effective  and  verifiable  chemical 
weapons  ban.  They  reaffirmed  their 
support  for  the  role  of  the  UN  Secre- 
tary General  in  carrying  out  prompt  in- 
vestigations in  order  to  ascertain  the 
facts  of  such  use.  They  further  agreed 
that  U.S.  and  Soviet  experts  would 
meet  on  December  16,  1988,  for  a  new 
round  of  talks  on  measures  to  halt  the 
proliferation  of  chemical  weapons. 

The  sides  also  stated  their  serious 
concern  about  the  proliferation  of  bal- 
listic missile  technology  and  announced 
that,  pursuant  to  the  Moscow  summit 
joint  statement,  U.S.  and  Soviet  ex- 
perts will  meet  on  September  26  in 
Washington  to  discuss  this  growing 
problem. 

The  sides  held  a  thorough  discus- 
sion of  both  progress  to  date  and  con- 
tinuing problems  in  the  area  of  human 
rights  and  humanitarian  issues.  The 
Secretary  and  the  Foreign  Minister  un- 
derscored the  value  of  regular  bilateral 
discussions  on  these  issues  and  the 
need  further  to  develop  constructive 
dialogue. 

The  Secretary  and  the  Foreign 
Minister  expressed  the  special  impor- 
tance their  governments  attach  to 
achieving  promptly  a  balanced  conclu- 
sion to  the  Vienna  followup  meeting  of 


the  Conference  on  Security  and  Cooper- 
ation in  Europe  (CSCE)  and  called  on 
all  participating  states  to  work  inten- 
sively toward  this  end.  They  reaffirmed 
the  necessity  of  an  outcome  at  Vienna 
which  encompasses  significant  results 
in  all  of  the  principal  areas  of  the 
Helsinki  Final  Act  and  the  Madrid  con- 
cluding document  and  which  further 
strengthens  the  CSCE  process.  The 
Secretary  and  the  Foreign  Minister  also 
stressed  the  importance  of  the  ongoing 
effort  with  other  states  to  resolve  re- 
maining issues  on  a  mandate  in  order  to 
begin  as  soon  as  possible  a  new  nego- 
tiation with  the  objective  of  enhancing 
stability  and  security  in  the  whole  of 
Europe  at  lower  levels  of  armed  forces 
and  conventional  armaments. 

The  Secretai-y  and  the  Foreign 
Minister  considered  regional  issues,  in- 
cluding Afghanistan,  Cambodia,  Cen- 
tral America,  the  Iran-Iraq  war,  the 
Korean  Peninsula,  the  Middle  East,  and 
southern  Africa.  They  affirmed  the  im- 
portance of  the  Geneva  accords  on 
Afghanistan.  They  also  noted  encourag- 
ing trends  in  the  search  for  political 
solutions  to  several  long-running  re- 
gional conflicts;  in  some  cases,  existing 
negotiating  efforts  have  found  new 
vigor,  and  in  others  new  efforts  have 
emerged.  They  agreed  that  the  process 
of  a  settlement  in  southwestern  Africa 
is  currently  at  a  crucial  stage  and  noted 
the  importance  of  sustaining  the  mo- 
mentum toward  solutions  of  the  prob- 
lems of  Angola  and  early  independence 
for  Namibia  in  accordance  with  UN  Se- 
curity Council  Resolution  435. 

The  Secretary  and  the  Foreign 
Minister  welcomed  the  increasingly  ac- 
tive contribution  of  the  United  Nations 
to  regional  conflict  resolution,  espe- 
cially the  effort  to  achieve  a  durable 
settlement  of  the  Iran-Iraq  war.  They 
also  favored  further  efforts  aimed  at 
bringing  peace  to  Cambodia.  They 
agreed  that  U.S.  and  Soviet  experts 
would  continue  to  meet  as  appropriate 
to  support  the  search  for  peaceful  solu- 
tions to  regional  conflicts. 

The  two  sides  welcomed  the  con- 
tinued development  of  bilateral  coopera- 
tion and  interchange  as  set  forth  in  the 
Moscow  summit  joint  statement,  as 
well  as  further  development  of  contacts 
among  defense  and  military  officials. 
They  strongly  believe  that  expansion  of 
bilateral  ties  on  the  basis  of  mutual 
benefit  is  in  the  interests  of  both  sides. 
The  Secretary  and  the  Foreign  Minister 
exchanged  views  on  prospects  for  de- 
veloping trade  and  economic  relations 


jlepartment  of  State  Bulletin/November  1988 


29 


EUROPE 


and  reiterated  the  goals  set  forth  in 
this  field  in  the  Moscow  summit  joint 
statement. 


SECRETARY  SHULTZ'S 
NEWS  CONFERENCE, 
WHITE  HOUSE, 
SEPT.  23,  19881 

We've  just  finished  a  meeting  of  the 
President  with  [Foreign]  Minister  Shev- 
ardnadze and  at  that  meeting  reviewed 
the  various  items  on  our  foui'-part 
agenda.  I  think  both  on  the  part  of  the 
President  and  the  Foreign  Minister, 
there  was  an  emphasis  on  continuity, 
on  a  desire  to  keep  working  in  the  re- 
maining months  of  the  Administration 
to  accomplish  as  much  as  can  be 
accomplished. 

There  was,  to  me,  a  touching  end 
to  that  meeting,  as  the  Foreign  Minis- 
ter surprised  us  all.  He  had  a  little 
presentation  for  the  President.  He  gave 
him  this  very  substantial  looking 
medallion.  He  said  the  Soviet  Union 
had  minted  a  very  few  of  these  to  com- 
memorate the  INF  Treaty,  and  he  said 
he  regarded  the  President  as  its  author, 
and  this  was  the  first  of  the  medallions 
to  be  passed  out.  I  thought  it  was  an 
appropriate  person  to  give  it  to. 

For  the  last  couple  of  days,  we 
have  had  a  fairly  typical  ministerial 
meeting.  We  have  divided  into  working 
groups.  The  working  groups  have  met 
independently  on  quite  a  variety  of  sub- 
ject.s — the  ones  we  usually  do.  They 
have  given  us  an  extended  report  this 
afternoon,  and  let  me  kind  of  go 
through  the  subjects  as  we  have  gone 
through  them  and  just  briefly  give  you 
a  sense  of  the  content. 

As  usual,  in  my  meeting  with  the 
Foreign  Minister,  we  started  with  hu- 
man rights,  and  the  human  rights 
working  group  had  actually  been  going 
for  a  couple  of  days  before  the  minis- 
terial started.  We  continued  to  advocate 
what  you  might  call  a  zero  option  as  far 
as  this  variety  of  divided  spouses,  fam- 
ily reunification,  political  and  religious 
prisoners,  emigration  issues,  and  so  on. 
We  tried  to  get  that  deck  cleared.  We 
continue  to  see  some  cases  resolved. 
There  are  still  all  too  many  cases 
remaining. 

We  also  push,  and  we  have  as- 
surances or  statements  it's  likely  we'll 
see  draft  changes  in  key  pieces  of  legis- 
lation, such  as  their  criminal  code  and 
other  possible  decrees  that  will  move 
toward  the  institutionalization  of  some 
of  the  human  rights  changes  we  have 


30 


sought.  As  and  if  that  happens, 
those  will  certainly  be  a  welcome 
development. 

Obviously,  connected  with  the  hu- 
man rights  discussion  is  the  meeting  in 
Vienna,  the  CSCE  meeting.  And  here, 
of  course,  we  and  our  allies  insist  on  a 
balanced  outcome.  You'll  see  in  our 
joint  statement,  as  in  past  joint  state- 
ments, the  Soviets  agree  on  a  balanced 
outcome  in  Vienna — balance  meaning  a 
substantial  and  positive  treatment  of 
human  rights  issues  that  goes  beyond 
Helsinki  and  Madrid  and  an  appropriate 
mandate  for  the  start  of  conventional 
arms  talks. 

In  both  of  these  areas,  our  discus- 
sions lead  me  to  feel,  as  the  content 
feeds  into  the  discussions  next  week 
with  our  allies  in  New  York  and  feeds 
back  into  Vienna,  we  see  substantial 
enough  progress  to  make  it  quite  possi- 
ble we  will  be  able  to  bring  that  Vienna 
meeting  to  a  successful  balanced  out- 
come before  long.  I  certainly  hope  so, 
and  we  want  to,  and  from  all  indica- 
tions the  Soviets  also  would  like  to  see 
that  happen. 

In  the  area  of  arms  control,  [it's  a] 
somewhat  mixed  picture.  We  work 
away  at  the  strategic  arms  and  the 
ABM  and  defense  and  space  talks.  I 
can't  say  there  is  any  real  substantial 
progress  to  report.  We  have  perhaps 
the  possibility  of  some  progress  as  they 
take  on  board  ideas  that  were  put  for- 
ward here  in  the  air-launch  cruise  mis- 
sile area  and  in  the  difficult  areas  of 
verification,  if  there  are  to  be  any 
mobile  missiles.  So  it's  possible  we'll 
see  some  progress — further  progress  in 
those  two  key  areas,  and  maybe  a  con- 
tribution was  made  in  this  meeting. 
But  I  can't  report  any  really  substan- 
tial movement  in  those  fields. 

In  the  area  of  nuclear  testing,  of 
course,  we've  seen  a  huge  amount  of 
progress.  The  two  experiments  that 
were  planned  have  been  held;  they've 
been  successfully  held.  It  was  really 
two  rather  extraordinary  events,  and 
we  now  have  the  results  of  them.  We 
believe  the  Peaceful  Nuclear  Explosions 
Treaty  protocol  is  just  about  completed. 
There  is  one  rather  difficult  issue,  but  I 
think  it  is  resolvable,  and  then  we'll 
turn  to  the  TTBT.  We  aspire  to  have 
those  protocols  finished  so  the  treaties 
will  have  been  completed  and  the  Presi- 
dent will  be  in  a  position  to  send  them 
up  for  ratification  before  he  leaves  of- 
fice. At  least  that's  what  I  hope  will 
happen,  and  I  think  there  is  a  reason- 
able prospect,  judging  from  the  devel- 
opments here  and  the  reports  to  us  by 
the  two  key  negotiators  who  came  here 
to  work  with  us  during  the  ministerial. 


The  Krasnoyarsk  radar,  and  to  a 
lesser  extent  Gomel,  came  in  for  a 
great  deal  of  discussion.  We  feel  as  a 
result  of  the  discussion  that  as 
Krasnoyarsk  is  resolved,  if  it  is,  Gomel 
will  fall  into  place  satisfactorily. 
Krasnoyarsk  still  presents  real  difficul- 
ties. Wliether  or  not  it  is  resolvable  in 
the  context  of  rearranging  that  site  so 
it  is  useful  as  a  center  for  research  on 
space  matters,  as  General  Secretary 
Gorbachev  has  said — whether  it's  re- 
solvable in  that  context  or  not,  I  don't 
know.  But  in  any  case,  what  will  be 
necessary  is  removing  or  dealing  satis- 
factorily with  those  things  that  have 
been  constructed  at  Krasnoyarsk  that 
put  it  on  its  way  to  an  operating 
phased-array  radar  which  is  a  violatioi 
of  the  ABM" Treaty. 

Whether  we  can  get  there  or  not, 
remains  to  be  seen.  We  are  working  at 
language  that — if  we  got  our  way — 
would  be  satisfactory,  but  we  haven't 
got  our  way  as  yet,  and  I  don't  know 
whether  that  will  happen.  But  at  leas 
we  are  discussing  the  subject  in  a  pos 
five  manner. 

We  had  a  very  strong  working 
group  in  the  area  of  chemical  weapons 
and  I  think  people  are  increasingly  of 
the  view  this  is  a  subject — this  is  an 
area  of  weaponry  we  just  must  get  a 
hold  of  So  we  talked  bilaterally,  and  ' 
tried  to  use  the  impulse  from  that  to 
feed  into  the  Conference  on  Disarma- 
ment work  in  Geneva,  and  you  will  se 
this  is  treated  at  some  length  in  the 
joint  statement. 

I  was  glad  to  see  in  the  joint  stat 
ment — we  say  the  sides  express  deep 
concern  about  the  recurrent  use  of 
chemical  weapons,  in  particular  agair 
civilian  populations.  And  also  it's  stat 
here  we  affirm  our  support  for  the  ro 
of  the  UN  Secretary  General  in  carrj 
ing  out  prompt  investigations  in  orde 
to  ascertain  the  facts  of  such  use. 

As  you  know,  in  Geneva  what  we 
negotiating  for  is  the  prohibition  on  t 
production,  the  existence  of  chemical 
weapons.  Right  now  we  also  must  be 
terribly  concerned  about  their  use  in 
the  Iran-Iraq  war  and  by  Iraq  agains 
its  Kurdish  population.  So  we  had,  I 
think,  very  useful  further  discussions 
the  area  of  chemical  weapons. 

At  Moscow  at  the  summit  meetir 
the  General  Secretary  and  President 
agreed  on  the  importance  of  getting 
going,  discussing  control  of  ballistic 
missile  technology.  And  so  we  set  a 
meeting  for  next  Monday,  and  we'll 
have  the  first  detailed  discussion  of  t 
subject  with  the  Soviets.  We  welcom' 
that. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November 


19^^! 


As  always,  we  discussed  regional 
lonflicts.  And,  here,  I  think  our  discus- 
ions  over  the  years  have  become  in- 
reasingly  fruitful,  with  increasingly 
ealistic  content.  It  varied  from  one  of 
hesc  hot  spots  to  another,  just  how  we 
:vrc  able  to  talk  about  it  in  a  construc- 
i\f  way.  But  we  have  had  many  discus- 
idiis  about  Afghanistan  at  these 
linisterials.  We  had  another  today 
rthichl,  I  think,  will  prove  to  be  useful. 
The  cooperation  between  us  in  the 
ffort  to  resolve  matters  in  southern 
ifi-ica  has  been  good  and  that's  been 
ustained.  [Assistant  Secretary  for  Af- 
ieaii  Affairs]  Chet  Crocker  is  leaving 
;>ni.L;ht,  I  believe,  for  Brazzaville  and 
ill  make  another  effort  at  that.  This  is 
n  area  where  the  discussions  between 
s  have  been  clearly  fruitful. 

We  had  some  further  discussions 
11  the  problems  of  Cambodia.  I  had  a 
it  iif  talk  about  that  when  I  was  out  in 
ic  Tar  East  with  the  countries  of  the 
s,-<iieiation  of  South  East  Asian  Na- 
on,-.  (ASEAN),  with  the  Chinese.  The 
(i\  ii'ts  have  now  had  a  direct  conversa- 
oii  with  the  Chinese  on  the  subject. 
11  I  think  this  is  in  a  very  fluid  and, 
is.^ibly,  promising  situation,  and  we 
iiituuie  to  talk  about  it. 

We  had  some  discussion  of  the  gulf, 
mic  discussion  of  the  Middle  East; 
retty  good  examination  of  develop- 
n'lit.'^  in  Korea  and  prospects  in  the 
(ircan  Peninsula;  and  some  discussion 
the  Horn  of  Africa,  although  I 
ouldn't  say  they  took  us  anywhere  in 
articular,  and  the  same  about  Central 
merica. 

In  bilateral  matters,  we  recon- 
rmed  our  interest  in  concluding  a  new 
asic  sciences  research  agreement,  and 
e  tabled  some  new  thoughts  about 
lat  and  perhaps  it  will  be  possible  to 
ring  that  into  being.  Of  course,  we 
)mmented  on  the  favorable  progress 
1  e.xchanges  and  the  steady  growth  in 
iltural — people-to-people  contacts, 
id  right  now  there  is,  in  being,  the 
3ry  interesting  Chautauqua  conference 
I  Mr.  Shevardnadzes  hometown  of 
bilisi.  We  recorded  our  toasts  yester- 
ay,  in  part,  to  give  a  little  message  to 
lat  meeting  in  Tbilisi. 

We  discussed  civil  aviation,  mar- 
ime  issues,  and  also  our  continuing 
Dnsultations  which  are  gradually  get- 
ng  into  greater  and  greater  depth  on 
le  international  drug  problem. 

I  would  say,  if  you  are  looking  for 
Dme  words  to  capture  the  essence  of 
lese  meetings,  I  like  "pick-and-shovel 
'ork,"  I  guess.  That's  what  we  seem  to 
e  doing. 


I  asked  Read  Hanmer,  our  START 
[strategic  arms  reduction  talks]  nego- 
tiator, how  many  brackets  he's  removed 
in  that  treaty  in  the  last  3  or  4  months, 
and  he  said  about  150  bi-ackets  have 
been  taken  out.  There's  plenty  more 
there.  But  that's  pick-and-shovel  work, 
and  that's  what  we're  doing,  but  you 
have  to  do  it  if  you're  going  to  get 
anywhere. 

I  would  say  [there  was]  continuity, 
commitment  to  keep  this  process  mov- 
ing, a  consistency  in  our  efforts,  our 
posture,  and  determination  to  resolve 
these  problems  insofar  as  we  possibly 
can. 

Q.  On  this  meeting  on  ballistic 
missiles,  the  Soviets  accept  our  pa- 
rameters— that  is,  the  300  kilometers 
and  500  kilograms?  And  are  they  in- 
clined to  stop  the  export  of  that  size 
weapon? 

A.  This  is  what  we're  going  to 
start  discussing  with  them.  We  haven't 
had  discussions;  we  are  starting  that. 
Of  course,  we  have  a  regime  developed 
with  our  summit  seven  partners,  and 
we've  discussed  this  in  those  meetings. 
We've  discussed  the  idea  of  talking  with 


EUROPE 


the  Soviets  in  those  meetings,  and  now 
we're  going  to  start  talking  with  them. 
I  might  say,  I've  raised  this  with  the 
Chinese,  and  we  do  not  have  their 
agreement  as  yet  to  engage  in  this  kind 
of  discussion,  but  I  hope  that  may  come 
in  good  time. 

Q.  Will  that  meeting  in  New  York 
be  you  and  Shevardnadze  or  some- 
body else? 

A.  No,  this  will  be  between  Kar- 
pov  [Ambassador  Viktor  R  Karpov, 
Chief  of  the  Arms  Control  and  Disar- 
mament Directorate,  Soviet  Ministry  of 
Foreign  Affairs]  and  Holmes  [H.  Allen 
Holmes,  Assistant  Secretary  for 
Politico-Military  Affairs],  and  I  think 
it's  going  to  be  in  Washington. 

Q.  How  far  did  the  two  sides  get 
on  the  Soviet  proposal  to  extract  from 
the  December  statement  the  ceilings 
on  warheads,  on  U.S.  and  Soviet  stra- 
tegic missiles,  and  impose  those  re- 
straints, at  least,  as  a  temporary 
interim  measure? 

A.  It  was  discussed.  It's  being  ex- 
plored. People  have  described  this  as  an 
interim  agreement.  It  isn't.  There  is  no 


20th  Anniversary  of  Warsaw  Pact 
Invasion  of  Czechoslovakia 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
AUG.  20,  19881 

August  21,  1988,  marks  the  20th  anni- 
versary of  the  Soviet-led  Warsaw  Pact 
invasion  of  Czechoslovakia.  That  inva- 
sion put  a  brutal  end  to  the  so-called 
Prague  Spring,  during  which  the  people 
of  Czechoslovakia  sought  to  implement 
political  and  economic  reforms  which 
would  have  moved  their  country  away 
from  tyranny  and  closer  to  its  own 
democratic  traditions.  The  Soviet-led 
invasion  stopped  this  reform  process 
and  has  left  a  20-year  legacy  of  political 
repression  and  economic  stagnation. 

An  entire  generation  has  been  born 
and  raised  since  tanks  rolled  through 
the  streets  of  Prague,  crushing  the 
hopes  of  Czechoslovakia  to  determine 
its  own  destiny.  Brave  men  and  women 
within  the  country,  such  as  the  signato- 
ries of  Charter  77  [a  Czechoslovakian 
human  rights  initiative],  continue  to 
struggle  for  freedom  and  long  overdue 
reforms,  which  remain  the  fervent  hope 
of  Czechs  and  Slovaks.  We  take  the  oc- 
casion of  this  anniversary  to  salute 


these  people  and  to  express  firm  agree- 
ment with  their  conviction  that,  in  the 
end,  truth  will  prevail. 

We  also  take  this  occasion  to  note 
that  the  winds  of  change  now  sweeping 
across  the  Soviet  Union  and  parts  of 
Eastern  Europe  cannot  bring  funda- 
mental reconciliation  between  East  and 
West  until  historical  injustices,  such  as 
the  1968  invasion,  are  forthrightly  dealt 
with  and  corrected.  The  so-called 
Brezhnev  doctrine,  which  was  used  to 
justify  the  invasion,  should  be  openly 
renounced  by  Moscow.  Soviet  troops 
should  be  removed.  The  peoples  of 
Eastern  Europe  should  be  free  to 
choose  their  own  system  of  govern- 
ment. There  must  be  an  end  to  the 
cruel  and  artificial  division  of  Europe 
which  continues  to  split  that  continent 
from  the  Baltic  States  through  Ber- 
lin to  the  Balkans.  Only  true  self- 
determination  of  peoples  can  bring  gen- 
uine peace  and  stability  to  Europe  and 
to  the  East-West  relationship. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Aug.  29,  1988. 


,i{^epartment  of  State  Bulletin/November  1988 

fl 


31 


EUROPE 


such  interim  agreement  being  consid- 
ered at  all.  All  that's  being  considered 
is  the  possibility  of  some  other  things 
like  what  we  worked  out  in  Moscow  on 
the  ballistic  missile  launch  notification. 
We  have  thought  about  and  made  a  pro- 
posal about,  for  instance,  breaking  out 
a  little  agi-eement  about  encryption, 
and  they  have  made  the  proposal  you 
have  referred  to.  The  one  they  pro- 
posed is  a  lot  more  complex.  It  would 
entail — the  word  is  casually  used — "on- 
site  verification."  Those  are  a  few  little 
words,  but  once  you  start  to  do  it  and 
you  look  at  the  text  of  what's  already 
been  agreed  in  the  START  treaty,  you 
see  it's  an  immense  undertaking. 

At  any  rate,  it  has  been  proposed 
by  the  General  Secretary,  so  we  are 
considering  it. 

Q.  Would  encryption  have  to  go 
with  it?  And,  really,  I  have  no  sense 
of  how  far  along  the  idea  is.  You 
would  insist  on  protection  against 
them  asking  their  test  characteris- 
tics? You  would  want  an  encryption 
assurance  at  the  same  time?  But  how- 
far  is  that  process  along — getting 
those  two  things? 

A.  We  made  a  proposal  on  encryp- 
tion about  a  week  or  so  ago,  I  think. 
They  delivered  a  letter  here  last 
Wednesday — something  like  that — and 
so  we  have  been  looking  at  it,  thinking 
about  it.  We  have  raised  questions: 
What  do  you  mean  by  this,  what  do  you 
mean  by  that  kind  of  thing?  It's  in  that 
stage.  If  it  were  to  take  place,  it's  a 
modest  effort  to  try  to  break  out  some- 
thing that  might  be  useful. 

In  the  case  of  the  reentry  vehicle 
limits  you  referred  to,  I  think  the  more 
you  look  at  it,  the  more  it  does  seem  to 
be  a  fairly  good  sized  undertaking. 
When  you  talk  about  the  kind  of  on-site 
verification  you  would  want,  it's  a  big 
undertaking.  Maybe  too  big  for  this 
kind  of  thing. 

Q.  Could  you  be  more  specific 
about  what  the  human  rights  progress 
is,  what  they're  going  to  agree  to  that 
you  think  will  move  things  along,  but 
I  guess  will  also  move  the  conven- 
tional talks  along? 

A.  The  things  we  look  at — there 
are  two  aspects  of  it  in  Vienna.  One  is 
our  view  that  deeds  are  more  important 
than  words  here.  We've  got  a  lot  of 
good  words.  So  we  look  at  behavior  We 
look  at  immigration  figures.  We  look  at 
political  and  religious  prisoners.  We 
look  at  the  cases  of  divided  families  and 
so  on.  That  is  the  sort  of  thing  we  look 
at  in  terms  of  behavior  We  look  at 
jamming. 


32 


We've  seen  quite  a  bit  of  change  in 
Soviet  behavior  and  the  behavior  of 
other  Eastern  European  countries. 
Let's  remember,  we're  talking  about 
Europe.  We're  not  just  talking  about 
the  Soviet  Union.  So  we  look  at  those 
kinds  of  behavorial  indicators.  Then 
there  will  be  language  produced  in 
Vienna  about  human  rights. 

For  example,  we  wanted  to  be 
clearly  understood.  This  is  just  an  ex- 
ample but  those  who  organize  them- 
selves to  be  Helsinki  monitors,  it 
should  be  recognized  that's  an  accept- 
able and  understandable  thing  that  peo- 
ple will  want  to  do. 

Those  are  the  types  of  things  we 
look  for  On  the  one  hand,  behavorial 
change;  on  the  other  hand,  language. 
We're  working  these  things.  I  think 
this  situation  is  reasonably  promising, 
but  we  aren't  quite  there  yet. 

Q.  When  you  say,  "We  aren't 
quite  there  yet,"  what  is  your  expec- 
tation in  terms  of  moving  it  along 
and  making  progress  on  the  conven- 
tional side? 

A.  Our  basic  attitude  is  we  want  to 
have  an  outcome  that's  balanced  and  is 
a  good  outcome,  as  we  would  see  it  and 
our  allies  would  see  it.  It  isn't  just  us. 
There  are  35  countries  involved,  or  23 
in  the  case  of  the  arms  talk  mandate. 
We're  ready  to  stay  there  in  Vienna  as 
long  as  it  takes  to  get  the  job  done. 
We're  not  imposing  any  artificial  dead- 
Hne  on  ourselves.  But  we  and,  I  think, 
most  people  would  like  to  see  the 
Vienna  meeting  come  to  a  successful 
conclusion;  we'd  like  to  see  the  human 
rights  results  we're  looking  for;  and 
would  like  to  see  conventional  arms 
talks  get  going. 

As  we  see  these  discussions  here — 
I  might  say  [West  German  Foreign  Min- 
ister] Hans-Dietrich  Genscher  had 
some  rather  interesting  talks  when  he 
was  in  Moscow  in  early  August,  I  think 
it  was.  So  that  material  has  been 
useful. 

Putting  all  this  together  and  stir- 
ring the  pot — and  there  will  be  a  lot  of 
talk  next  week  in  New  York  as  well  as 
in  Vienna — we  think  the  situation  looks 
a  lot  more  promising.  But  I  don't  want 
to  try  to  put  a  date  on  it. 

Q.  You  won't  say  whether  it 
could  be  before  the  President  leaves 
office? 

A.  I  certainly  would  hope  it  would 
be,  but  I  don't  want  to  put  a  date  on  it. 
I  would  rather  just  say,  we're  ready  to 
stay  with  it  as  long  as  it  takes. 


Q.  You  summarized  some  of  youir 
sessions  of  the  meeting  by  saying 
there  is  not  substantial  progress,  par- 
ticularly in  arms  control.  If  you  had 
to  itemize,  out  of  the  past  couple  of 
days  of  meetings,  the  real  importance 
or  the  most  significant  accomplish- 
ments in  your  talks  with  Mr.  Shev- 
ardnadze, what  would  it  have  been? 

A.  I  think  the  basic  thing  is  there 
is  a  pattern  in  the  interaction  of  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
that  is  orderly,  systematic,  regular, 
that  has  an  understood  agenda  that  in- 
cludes what  were  formerly  practically 
impossible  to  talk  about,  and  by  this 
time,  we  are  just  doing  it  regularly, 
and  kind  of  pecking  away  at  all  of  thes 
subjects. 

I  think  that's  the  most  fundament; 
thing,  and  that's  a  big  change  from  th( 
way  it  was  3  years  ago  or  at  the  time 
the  President's  first  summit  meeting 
with  General  Secretary  Gorbachev. 

In  terms  of  the  specific  items,  I 
have  gone  through,  and  I  have  tried  t( 
in  the  scorecard,  rank  the  different 
areas — I  don't  want  to  try  to  do  it  all 
over  again — as  to  what,  where,  the 
most  promising  discussions  seem  to  b( 

Q.  President  Reagan  has  long  d" 
scribed  getting  a  big  cut  in  strategic 
arms  as  his  top  priority.  Is  he  disap- 
pointed, are  you  disappointed,  that 
this  now  is  clearly  not  going  to  be 
able  to  be  done  in  this  Administra- 
tion; and  why  do  you  think  it  was  n 
possible  to  achieve  it? 

A.  We'll  continue  to  work  for  it, 
but  you  are  right;  it  is  certainly  quite 
improbable.  I  never  rule  things  out,  1: 
it  is  certainly  quite  improbable. 

I  suppose  the  basic  reason  we 
haven't  got  there  is  that  it  is  very  difi 
cult.  And,  as  you  get  the  fundamenta 
parameters  agreed,  and  I  was  really 
very  encouraged  and  pleased  when  w. 
got  that,  but  it  was  over  a  year  ago 
that  you  could  say,  "There  is  the  shap 
of  a  strategic  arms  50%  cut.  It  is  righ 
there.  You  can  see  it." 

Once  you  have  got  that,  in  this  d; 
and  age  of  intense  interest  in  verifica 
tion,  pinning  things  down,  really  care 
fully,  which  we  must  do,  then  there  h 
this  immense  and  difficult  detail,  and 
is  just  a  bear  to  work  through. 

Then  we  have  issues  that  at  this 
point  at  least  we  don't  quite  see  how 
we  are  going  to  resolve  them;  and  in 
particular  the  area  of  sea-launched 
cruise  missiles,  nuclear  sea-launched 
cruise  missiles,  which  are — it  is  an 
important  topic.  We  agree  on  that,  ai 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November 


19^ 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


the  same  time,  how  do  you  verify 
hatever  you  might  agree  to  in  that 
rea?  We  certainly  haven't  seen  how  to 
B  it,  although  they  have  made  a  great 
lany  proposals. 

It's  hard  going,  but  we  have  made 
•ogress.  I  hope  we'll  continue  to  make 
ogress,  and  the  President's  aspiration 
id  mine  is  that  if  we  are  not  able  to 
mclude  something,  at  least  we  will 
irn  over  to  our  successors  a  very  good 
ickage  from  which  they  can  continue 
1  and  work,  and  they  don't  have  to 
,art  all  over  again. 

Q.  Could  you  tell  us  after  this 
eeting  now  whether  you  anticipate 
•  think  it  likely  that  the  President 
id  the  General  Secretary  will  meet 
fain  before  the  end  of  the  President's 
!rm? 

A.  There  is  no  plan  for  any  meet- 
g,  and  if  there  were  a  meeting,  there 
ould  have  to  be  a  good  reason,  and  I 
")n't  see  what  it  would  be  at  this  point. 

Q.  Other  than  the  Nobel  Prize,  of 
)urse? 

A.  There  is  no  plan,  and  I  don't 
link  there  is  any — there  is  nothing  I 
low  of  that  would  bring  that  about. 

Q.  You  say  you  are  optimistic 
jout  progress  and  dealing  with  the 
rasnoyarsk  problem. 

A.  No,  I  just  said  it  has  been  an 
sue  where  we  have  said,  "This  is  a 
olation,"  and  we  have  argued  back 
id  forth  like  that  with  the  Soviets. 
nd,  at  this  point,  we  are  on  a  track 
here  we  are  trying  to  work  some  lan- 
aage.  Maybe  it  won't  work.  So  that's  a 
:tle  bit  different.  But  I  wouldn't  use 
ords  like  that.  Did  I  say  I  was 
itimistic? 

Q.  You  never  indicated — the  Sovi- 
s  have  always  made  it  conditional 
pon  certain  demands  that  they  have 
ade  on  us,  and  many  people  have 
'en  the  whole  Krasnoyarsk  issue  as 
mply  a  pawn,  as  part  of  the  Soviet 
'forts  to  get  us  to  abandon  our  Stra- 
ngle Defense  Initiative  program. 

A.  No,  no,  no.  What  we  are  work- 
■g  on  now  doesn't  have  any  links  to 
ly  of  those  kinds  of  things.  It  is  an 
:'fort  to  wrestle  this  problem  to  the 
round  and  put  it  behind  us  on  a  differ- 
it  basis.  Maybe  it  will  succeed.  We 
re  going  to  try,  but  I  can't  answer  that 
?t. 

Q.  Did  Shevardnadze  indicate 
ny  concern  as  to  whether  all  of  these 
litiatives  and  on-going  things  will 
ontinue,  in  the  future,  since  you  are 
owing  out? 


A.  I  think  what  we  have  in  place  is 
something  that  works,  and  that  has,  on 
the  whole,  produced  a  lot  of  results.  If 
you  take  the  situation  today  and  com- 
pare it  with  the  situation  in  the  middle 
of  1985,  it's  practically  night  and  day. 
This  process  has  worked. 

There  are  plenty  of  problems  out 
there,  and  there  is  always  the  pos- 
sibility of  things,  something  going 
badly  awry,  but  I  would  imagine  any- 
body who  comes  along  here  will  want  to 
continue  to  do  things  that  work,  partic- 
ularly on  something  of  such  underlying 
importance  as  the  U.S. -Soviet  relation. 

As  far  as  I  can  see,  from  knowing 
the  Vice  President  very  well,  and  for 
that  matter  listening  to  the  discussion 
this  morning  at  breakfast,  and  from 
what  I  have  read  of  the  candidate  of  the 
other  party,  Mr.  Dukakis,  both  of  them 


would  like  to  see  this  relationship  con- 
tinue and  mature. 

Nobody  is  saying,  "Let's  walk  away 
from  this." 

Q.  Do  they  seem  worried  at  all 
about  the  future? 

A.  The  Soviets?  No,  they  are 
working.  They  want  to  see  it  continue, 
and  they  kind  of  assume  it  will.  But, 
anyway  they  will  find  some  new  people 
here,  and  they  will  have  to  get  to  know 
them. 

Q.  Will  progress  continue,  no 
matter  which  party  takes  over? 

A.  Well,  of  course,  I  think  it's 
much  more  likely  to  go  well  if  the  Re- 
publicans are  in. 


'Press  release  204. 


Human  Rights:  A  Western  Cultural  Bias? 


by  Richard  Schifter 

Address  before  the  European  Work- 
shop on  the  Universal  Declaration  of 
Human  Rights  sponsored  by  the  UN 
Center  for  Hiiman  Rights  in  Milan, 
Italy,  on  September  7,  1988.  Ambas- 
sador Schifter  is  Assistant  Secretary 
for  Human  Rights  and  Humanitarian 
Affairs. 

"That  to  secure  these  Rights,  Govern- 
ments are  instituted  among  Men,  deriv- 
ing their  just  Powers  from  the  Consent 
of  the  Governed,"  says  the  U.S.  Decla- 
ration of  Independence.  The  rights  re- 
ferred to  are  the  rights  to  life,  liberty, 
and  the  pursuit  of  happiness. 

The  Declaration  thus  rejected  the 
fundamental  notion,  which  had  per- 
sisted for  so  long  in  human  history,  of 
the  divine  right  of  kings,  which  held 
that  the  ruler  had  an  inherent  right  to 
exercise  power  and  that  the  subjects 
had  a  responsibility  to  obey.  It  turned 
that  relationship  around  by  defining  the 
right  of  the  citizen  as  the  principal  rea- 
son for  the  e.xistence  of  state  authority. 

The  writers  of  the  American  Decla- 
ration of  Independence  were,  in  1776, 
not  the  originators  of  this  idea.  The 
thoughts  which  were  incorporated  into 
the  Declaration  were  those  that  had 
been  discussed  and  written  about  for 
more  than  a  century — the  thoughts  of 
the  Enlightenment.  Thirteen  years 
later,  in  1789,  the  same  thoughts  were 


reflected  in  France's  Declaration  of  the 
Rights  of  Man  and  the  Citizen.  And, 
almost  simultaneously,  the  United 
States  followed  up  on  its  Declaration 
with  the  Bill  of  Rights. 

Anyone  who  compares  these  docu- 
ments of  the  late  18th  century  with  the 
Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights 
will  recognize  the  close  similarity.  What 
the  Universal  Declaration  has  clearly 
done  has  been  to  elevate  to  the  interna- 
tional scene  the  principles  of  govern- 
ment enunciated  by  the  writers  and 
thinkers  of  the  Enlightenment. 

Cultural  Experience  and 
Attitudes  Toward  Human  Rights 

Do  I,  by  making  these  observations, 
lend  support  to  the  criticism  of  the 
Universal  Declaration  that  it  is  culture 
bound,  that  it  narrowly  reflects  the  at- 
titude and  thinking  of  what  is  generally 
known  as  Western  civilization,  and  that 
it  is  really  not  applicable  to  societies 
which  have  different  cultural  roots?  In 
other  words,  have  I  given  support  to 
the  proposition  that  the  Universal 
Declaration  is  not  truly  universal? 

To  focus  on  the  issue  thus  posed, 
let  me  suggest  that  we  think  of  how 
some  British  observers  of  political  de- 
velopments in  France  might  have  re- 
sponded in  the  year  1789  to  the  news  of 
the  promulgation  of  the  Declaration  of 
the  Rights  of  Man  and  the  Citizen.  It 
would  have  been  slightly  more  than 


department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1988 


33 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


100  years  after  the  glorious  revolution, 
many  decades  after  the  development  of 
a  constitutional  monarchy  in  Britain 
had  begun.  Wouldn't  it  be  likely  that  a 
good  many  observers  in  London  would 
have  exclaimed:  "Rights  of  citizens  in 
France?  All  these  people  have  ever 
known  is  absolute  monarchy.  What  does 
the  average  Frenchman  understand 
about  the  rights  of  the  citizen?" 

Let  us  also  consider  the  American 
experience.  To  be  sure,  the  writers  of 
the  Declaration  of  Independence  and  of 
the  Bill  of  Rights  represented  a  bur- 
geoning new  country  in  which  govern- 
ment with  the  consent  of  the  governed 
and  respect  for  individual  rights  were 
recognized  concepts.  But  was  it  govern- 
ment by  consent  of  all  the  governed? 
And  were  the  rights  of  all  Individuals 
respected? 

The  answer  to  both  of  these  ques- 
tions was  "no."  The  most  egregious 
form  of  repression — chattel  slavery — 
was  practiced  in  many  of  the  states  that 
made  up  that  new  country,  which  had 
been  brought  into  being  by  the  Decla- 
ration of  Independence  of  1776.  Slavery 
was  an  institution  that  lasted  87  years 
after  the  country's  founders  had 
proudly  proclaimed  that  "all  men  are 
created  equal."  And  it  took  a  civil 
war — the  most  costly  war  in  American 
history — to  expunge  slavery  from 
American  life. 

The  point  I  want  to  make  is  that 
the  principles  set  forth  in  such  docu- 
ments as  the  American  Declaration  of 
Independence  or  the  French  Declara- 
tion of  the  Rights  of  Man  and  the  Cit- 
izen were  not  deeply  rooted  in  the 
practices  of  either  of  these  countries. 
They  were  statements  of  an  ideal  that 
had  sufficient  support  to  constitute  a 
national  aspiration  toward  whose  real- 
ization both  countries  and  others  simi- 
larly affected  by  that  ideal  pledged 
themselves  to  work. 

The  Influence  of 
Democratic  Principles 

The  concepts  incorporated  in  the  18th- 
century  documents  to  which  I  have  re- 
ferred were  not  entirely  novel.  The  the- 
ories of  government  on  which  they  were 
based  went  back  for  more  than  2,000 
years  to  the  writings  and  practices  in 
some  of  the  cities  of  ancient  Greece.  I 


am  obviously  making  the  point  that 
when  we  speak  of  the  philosophical  her- 
itage of  ancient  Greece,  we  are  really 
speaking  of  the  heritage  of  ancient 
Athens,  not  of  ancient  Sparta.  The 
writers  and  thinkers  of  the  Enlighten- 
ment had  received  some  of  their  re- 
markable inspiration  from  the  Athens 
of  two  millennia  earlier. 

It  could  be  said  that  this  tie  that 
binds  the  Enlightenment  to  ancient 
Athens  is  vivid  proof  of  the  fact  that  we 
are  dealing  with  a  culture-bound  phe- 
nomenon. But  is  it  really?  What  cul- 
tural ties  bound  the  ancient  Athenians 
to  the  barbarians  that  populated  the 
forests  of  northern  and  central  Europe 
in  the  days  of  Aristotle?  Why  should 
the  descendants  of  these  barbarians 
have  paid  gi'eater  attention  to  what 
they  had  learned  about  Greek  democ- 
racy than  they  did  to  other  teachings 
and  traditions  which  were  passed  down 
to  them?  Could  it  be  that  as  they  re- 
flected on  the  various  models  of  politi- 
cal organization,  they  concluded  that 
the  democratic  model  is  best  equipped 
to  fulfill  human  needs  and  aspirations? 
And  is  that  the  reason  why  it  took 
hold?  Could  it  be,  as  Winston  Churchill 
said,  that  democracy  is,  indeed,  the 
worst  form  of  government  except  for  all 
the  others?  These,  it  seems,  are  the 
questions  we  need  to  ponder  as  we  re- 
flect today  on  the  Universal  Declaration 
of  Human  Rights. 

In  this  talk,  I  have  bracketed,  un- 
der the  term  "human  rights,"  two  dis- 
tinct concepts: 

First,  that  of  government  by  con- 
sent of  the  governed;  and 

Second,  that  of  respect  for  the 
rights,  integrity,  and  dignity  of  the 
individual. 

It  is  conceivable  that  a  demo- 
cratically elected  government  deprives 
some  persons  of  their  individual  rights. 
It  is  equally  conceivable  that  a  dic- 
tatorial government,  not  freely  chosen 
by  the  people,  benevolently  respects 
most  individual  rights — except,  of 
course,  the  right  to  choose  one's  gov- 
ernment. What  can  be  said  on  this  sub- 
ject is  that  human  experience  has 
demonstrated  that  the  correlation 
between  democracy  and  respect  for 
individual  rights,  on  one  hand,  and  dic- 
tatorship and  disrespect  for  individual 
rights,  on  the  other  hand,  is  quite  high. 


We  can  accept  it  as  a  given  that  a  good 
way  of  assuring  that  governmental  in-      I 
stitutions  respect  the  rights  of  the  indi- 
vidual is  to  make  these  institutions 
accountable  to  the  people. 

Defining  the  Scope 
of  Human  Rights 

There  is  one  further  issue  that  deserves 
attention  in  this  context.  It  is  the  ques- 
tion of  the  relationship  between  what 
have  come  to  be  known  as  civil  and 
political  rights,  on  one  hand,  and  eco- 
nomic and  social  rights,  on  the  other 
hand.  Analysts  of  the  Universal  Decla- 
ration will  call  attention  to  the  fact 
that,  while  22  articles  do,  indeed,  spell 
out  a  set  of  civil  and  political  rights, 
five  others  list  a  series  of  what  are 
known  as  economic  and  social  rights. 

I  would  .iuggest  to  you  that  we 
have  witnessed,  over  the  decades,  a 
rather  sterile  debate  over  what  does  or 
does  not  constitute  a  "right."  We  can 
cut  through  that  debate  by  simply  af- 
fixing different  labels  to  the  subjects 
under  discussion.  We  can  speak,  when 
we  refer  to  the  set  of  issues  encom- 
passed by  the  term  "civil  and  political 
rights,"  to  limitations  on  government. 
"Economic  and  social  rights"  can,  on 
the  other  hand,  be  denominated  tasks 
of  government. 

A  significant  difference  between 
the  two  categories  is  that  the  first  can 
be  attained  with  relative  ease.  All  that 
is  required  by  the  government  in  order 
to  live  up  to  its  commitments  in  that 
area  is  not  to  do  something.  Performin. 
well  in  the  second  area  requires  skill, 
thought,  and  resources.  Making  prog- 
ress in  that  field  requires  decisions  as 
to  the  basic  approach  to  be  taken  to  th 
operation  of  one's  economy,  often  only 
after  overcoming  considerable  disagree 
ment  on  proper  analyses  and  remedies. 
For  the  performance  of  a  government  i 
the  social  and  economic  area  will  not 
ultimately  be  judged  by  the  promises  r 
made  but  by  what  is  delivered  on  thesf 
promises. 

The  broad  issue  posed  by  the  eco- 
nomic and  social  programs  of  govern- 
ment is  an  important  one — an  issue 
which  deserves  consideration,  analysis 
and  discussion.  It  deserves  such  discu; 
sion  in  its  appropriate  context — discus 
sion  by  experts  in  the  field,  discussion 
by  economists,  by  experts  on  public 
health,  on  housing,  on  agricultural  pro 


34 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


I 

'.lietion  and  distribution,  and  others, 
ut  these  are  discussions  different  from 
lose  that  focus  on  the  limitations  on 
i\i  riiment,  which  are  most  appropri- 
v\\  conducted  by  experts  on  govern- 
eiital  structure  and  the  law. 

he  Universality 
;'  Human  Feeling 

)  return  to  the  Declai'ation:  it  was 
;io|ited  prior  to  the  time  when  the 
ave  of  decolonization  crested.  It  was 
;lopted  when  the  bulk  of  the  votes  in 
le  United  Nations  was  cast  by  the 
'luntries  of  southern,  western,  and 
)rthern  Europe  and  the  Americas. 
nd  the  text  reflected,  as  I  have  al- 
ady  noted,  the  notions  of  government 
id  the  rights  of  the  individual  which 
1(1  begun  to  crystallize  in  Western 
nidpe  and  North  America  more  than 
10  years  earlier. 

llut  does  the  fact  that  persons  of 
rench  and  English  descent  were  in  the 
ad  in  articulating  the  concept  of  indi- 
dual  freedom — and  of  government  as 
e  servant  rather  than  the  master  of 
e  citizen — mean  that  they  were 
■eaking  only  for  Frenchmen  and  Eng- 
Khmen  and  their  descendants  in  North 
met'ica?  Could  it  be,  instead,  that 
ey  were  identifying  principles  of  gov- 
iinient  of  universal  applicability,  that 
ey  were  speaking  a  language  which 
ipealed  to  the  logic  and  innermost 
n^ings  of  all  men  and  women  of  what- 
er  cultural  stream?  I  have  already 
ited  that,  at  the  time  the  writers  and 
inkers  of  the  Enlightenment  put  pen 
pa])er,  the  experience  of  their  so- 
I'ties  with  the  concepts  these  writers 
I'le  groping  to  explain  ranged  from 
iiited  to  nonexistent.  I  submit  to  you 
at  what  the  thinkers  of  the  En- 
(htenment  did,  and  what  the  drafters 
the  Universal  Declaration  also  strove 
do,  was  to  present  a  set  of  ideals — of 
liversal  ideals  on  the  limits  of  govern- 
ental  authority,  of  goals  to  be  at- 
lined,  above  all,  to  guarantee  the 
[dividual  respect  for  his  human  dignity 
id  a  life  of  freedom  from  fear. 


There  are  those  who  contend  that 
adherence  to  the  principles  of  the  Uni- 
versal Declaration  may  be  one  of  the 
luxuries  which  rich,  industrial  societies 
can  enjoy  but  which  simply  won't  work 
in  countries  that  must  focus,  in  the 
first  instance,  on  the  essential  elements 
of  maintaining  a  standard  of  living  of 
minimum  adequacy.  "We  can't  worry 
about  freedom  of  the  press  when  people 
are  starving,"  is  the  comment  which 
can  so  often  be  heard. 

There  are  a  number  of  points  that 
can  be  made  in  response.  First  of  all, 
the  concepts  of  individual  freedom  of 
which  we  are  here  speaking  took  hold 
in  countries  such  as  my  own  at  a  time 
when  it  was  predominantly  agrarian, 
with  the  great  majority  of  the  popula- 
tion "poor"  by  today's  standards.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  these  concepts  estab- 
lished themselves  most  firmly  in  those 
regions  of  the  country  which  were  al- 
most exclusively  agrarian  and  almost 
exclusively  "poor." 

And  as  for  freedom  of  the  press 
and  the  need  for  food:  let  us  ponder 
whether  countries  in  which  people  go 
hungry  would  have  followed  the  disas- 
trous agricultural  policies  which 
sharply  reduced  food  production  if  they 
had  had  a  free  press — a  press  which 
most  certainly  would  have  criticized 
these  policies  and  pointed  out  the  inev- 
itable consequences  of  such  serious 
policy  errors. 

Let  us  now  take  a  look  at  some  of 
the  specific  provisions  of  the  Universal 
Declaration  and  ask  ourselves  whether 
they  are,  indeed,  the  particular  prop- 
erty of  a  single  civilization  or  should 
be  deemed  generally  applicable.  What 
should  we  think  of  the  principle  that 
everyone  "has  the  right  to  life,  liberty 
and  security  of  person?"  What  should 
we  think  of  the  prohibition  of  slavery, 


torture,  and  cruel,  inhuman,  and  de- 
grading treatment  or  punishment?  And 
what  about  the  notion  that  all  are  equal 
before  the  law  and  are  entitled,  without 
any  discrimination,  to  equal  protection 
of  the  law?  And  what  about  the  rule 
against  arbitrary  interference  with  a 
person's  privacy,  family,  home,  or  corre- 
spondence? And  what  about  the  right 
to  freedom  of  movement  within  one's 
country  and  across  international  bor- 
ders? And  what  about  freedom  of 
thought,  conscience,  and  religion  and 
freedom  of  expression?  And,  finally, 
what  about  the  right  to  choose  one's 
government  in  free  elections?  Is  it  not  a 
truly  detestable  form  of  racism  to  sug- 
gest that  these  should  be  the  goals  of 
Western  civihzation  only  and  of  no 
bearing  or  relevance  to  the  rest  of  the 
world? 

As  we  reflect  on  the  text  of  the 
Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights 
and  consider  its  worldwide  applicabil- 
ity, let  us  keep  in  mind  the  words  of 
Shylock  in  Shakespeare's  "The  Mer- 
chant of  Venice"  on  the  universahty  of 
human  feeling: 

Hath  not  a  Jew  eyes?  Hath  not  a  Jew 
hands,  organs,  dimensions,  senses,  af- 
fections, passions? — fed  with  the  same 
food,  hurt  with  the  same  weapons,  subject 
to  the  same  diseases,  healed  by  the  same 
means,  warmed  and  cooled  by  the  same 
winter  and  summer  as  a  Christian  is?  If 
you  prick  us,  do  we  not  bleed?  If  you  tickle 
us,  do  we  not  laugh?  If  you  poison  us,  do 
we  not  die? 

For  the  word  "Jew"  in  Shylock's 
immortal  plea,  we  can  substitute  any  of 
the  names  of  hundreds  of  ethnic,  re- 
ligious, or  national  groups  around  the 
world. 

Let  us,  therefore,  indeed  ponder 
what  all  of  us  as  members  of  the  human 
race  have  in  common,  how  we  can  best 
organize  ourselves  to  work  together  to 
solve  the  problems  that  our  commu- 
nities and  our  societies  fa:e,  and  how 
we  can  best  arrange  to  govern  our- 
selves. Let  us  keep  in  mind  that  when 
we  use  the  wheel,  when  we  calculate 
with  Arabic  numerals,  when  we  switch 
on  a  bulb  to  give  us  light,  when  we 
administer  penicillin  to  cure  the  sick, 
we  do  not  spend  time  asking  ourselves 
which  culture  produced  the  inventor  or 
discoverer.  The  same  should,  indeed,  be 
true  in  giving  worldwide  application  to 
the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human 
Rights.  ■ 


lepartment  of  State  Bulletin/November  1988 


35 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW 


The  War  Powers  Resolution 


by  Abraham  D.  Sofaer 

Statement  before  the  Senate  For- 
eign Relations  Committee  on  Sep- 
tember 15,  1988.  Mr.  Sofaer  is  the  Legal 
Adviser  of  the  Department  of  State. ^ 

I  am  honored  to  have  the  opportunity 
to  present  this  distinguished  committee 
with  views  of  the  executive  branch  con- 
cerning the  War  Powers  Resolution.  I 
am  also  prepared  to  offer  some  general 
comments  on  current  proposals  to 
amend  the  resolution. 

This  committee  is  intimately  famil- 
iar with  the  provisions  and  the  history 
of  the  resolution.  I  see  no  need  to  offer 
an  e.xtended  description  of  either.  Some 
general  observations  do  seem  in  order, 
however,  to  place  into  proper  context 
the  resolution's  key  provisions. 


GENERAL  OBSERVATIONS 

The  War  Powers  Resolution  has  been 
controversial  from  the  day  it  was 
adopted  over  President  Nixon's  veto. 
Since  1973,  executive  officials  and  many 
Members  of  Congress  have  criticized 
various  aspects  of  the  resolution  repeat- 
edly. Furthermore,  it  is  widely  re- 
garded— by  its  critics  and  its 
supporters  alike — as  ineffective.  Presi- 
dents dispute  its  constitutionality  in 
certain  fundamental  respects,  and  Con- 
gress has  failed  to  enforce  its  most 
questionable  provisions. 

The  intense  debate  generated  by 
the  War  Powers  Resolution  is  part  of 
our  beloved  system  of  government.  No 
sooner  had  George  Washington  become 
President  when  debates  commenced 
about  the  relative  powers  of  the  three 
branches  under  the  Constitution.  Presi- 
dent Washington's  declaration  of  U.S. 
neutrality  in  the  war  between  England 
and  France,  for  example,  spawned  a 
debate  on  the  relative  powers  of  the 
political  branches  over  foreign  policy 
and  war.  Legal  argument  has  been  a 
national  pastime,  particularly  over  the 
crucial  powers  of  war  and  foreign  af- 
fairs. We  must  expect  it  to  continue. 

Debate  about  the  War  Powers  Res- 
olution has  focused  on  particular  re- 
quirements of  the  resolution  rather 
than  on  the  principles  that  govern 
executive-congressional  relations,  which 
has  tended  to  divert  the  attention  of 
Congress  from  the  wisdom  and  effec- 
tiveness of  policies  to  the  legal  niceties 


of  this  subject.  It  has  led,  and  will  con- 
tinue to  lead,  to  unnecessary  and  unde- 
sirable legal  face-offs  between  Congress 
and  the  President  at  times  when  the 
nation  most  needs  to  formulate  and 
implement  policy  effectively  and  wisely. 
The  issues  this  committee  is  addressing 
are,  therefore,  of  the  greatest  impor- 
tance. The  crucial  question  in  any  war 
powers  situation  should  be  how  the  po- 
litical branches  can  best  cooperate  in 
the  nation's  interests,  not  which  branch 
is  right  or  wrong  on  particular  legal 
issues. 

This  Administration  recognizes  that 
Congress  has  a  critical  role  to  play  in 
the  determination  of  the  circumstances 
under  which  the  United  States  should 
commit  its  forces  to  actual  or  potential 
hostilities.  No  executive  policy  or  ac- 
tivity in  this  area  can  have  any  hope  of 
success  in  the  long  term  unless  Con- 
gress and  the  American  people  concur 
in  it  and  are  willing  to  support  its  e.x- 
ecution.  We  also  believe,  however,  that 
the  War  Powers  Resolution  has  not 
made  a  positive  contribution  to  execu- 
tive-congressional cooperation  in  this 
area  that  would  justify  the  controversy 
and  uncertainty  it  has  caused  and 
seems  certain  to  cause  in  the  future.  It 
incorporates  a  view  of  the  relative 
powers  of  the  political  branches  of  our 
government,  and  of  their  proper  roles, 
that  is  at  odds  with  the  Constitution's 
scheme  and  with  over  200  years  of  rela- 
tively consistent  experience. 

It  is,  moreover,  based  on  erroneous 
assumptions  about  the  power  of  both 
Congress  and  the  President.  It  under- 
estimates the  power  of  Congress  in  the 
sense  that  it  is  not  needed  to  make 
clear  that  Congress  has  substantial 
power  under  the  Constitution  in  mat- 
ters concerning  war.  And  the  resolution 
is  also  unnecessary  in  that  it  can  grant 
Congress  no  more  power  in  such  mat- 
ters than  the  Constitution  allows. 

The  notion  that  this  resolution  is 
necessary  to  curb  Presidents  who  claim 
unlimited  "inherent"  or  unilateral 
power  to  use  force  is  incorrect.  No 
President  has  been  able  for  long  to  ex- 
ercise exaggerated  claims  of  power  to 
act  in  the  face  of  legislative  constraints. 
As  Madison  stated  in  arguing  for  a  bal- 
ance among  the  branches:  "In  re- 
publican government  the  legislative 
authority  necessarily  predominates." 
Congress  has  powers  that  enable  it  to 
curb  any  executive  pretension,  includ- 
ing the  power  to  declare  war,  to  raise 


and  support  armies,  to  tax  and  spend, 
to  regulate  foreign  commerce,  and  to 
adopt  measures  necessary  and  proper 
to  implement  its  powers. 

President  Johnson  did  not  make 
war  in  Vietnam;  the  United  States 
made  war  there,  until  Congress  decidec 
to  end  its  support.  Indeed,  it  is  ironic 
that  the  Vietnam  war  was  the  pur- 
ported basis  for  the  War  Powers  Reso- 
lution when  Congress  was,  in  fact,  a 
full  player  in  that  war.  President  Nixor 
regarded  repeal  of  the  Gulf  of  Tonkin 
resolution  as  insufficient  to  prevent  hin 
from  continuing  the  war.  But  this  was 
in  the  context  of  Congress  continuing  t 
pay  for — and,  thereby,  to  authorize — 
his  actions.  Once  Congress  denied 
funds  for  certain  military  activities. 
President  Nixon  ultimately  complied. 
President  Ford  properly  regarded  as  a 
strategic  catastrophe  Congress'  insis- 
tence that  we  completely  abandon  Indc 
china  and  later  take  no  action  in  Ang 
to  offset  Soviet  and  Cuban  interventioi 
He  complied,  however,  as  did  Presi- 
dents Carter  and  Reagan  in  Angola, 
until  the  Clark  amendment  was 
repealed. 

The  resolution  is  intended  to  pre- 
vent the  President  from  acting  uni- 
laterally, beyond  a  limited  time  period 
even  when  Congress  has  not  ordered 
him  to  stop  and  even  though  the  Presi 
dent  is  acting  for  purposes  traditional 
regarded  as  appropriate.  This  con- 
stitutes, as  former  Legal  Adviser 
Monroe  Leigh  put  it,  a  procedure  by 
which  Congress  attempts  "to  restrain 
the  Executive  without  taking  responsi 
bility  for  the  exercise  of  that  restraint 
in  time  of  crisis." 

In  a  great  many  instances  over  th 
past  200  years,  Pi'esidents  have  used 
military  force  without  first  obtaining 
specific  and  explicit  legislative  autho- 
rization. In  our  system  of  government 
explicit  legislative  approval  for  partici 
lar  uses  of  force  has  never  been  neces 
sary,  and  the  War  Powers  Resolution 
cannot  and  should  not  be  permitted  tc 
make  it  necessary. 

Congress  and  the  American  peopl 
in  fact,  expect  that  the  President  will 
use  the  military  forces  placed  by  Con- 
gress at  his  disposal  for  long-recognizi 
purposes,  including  the  defense  of  the 
United  States,  its  bases,  its  forces,  ib 
citizens,  its  property,  its  fundamental 
interests,  and  its  allies.  This  is  true 
even  with  respect  to  the  most  serious 
forms  of  military  power — the  use  of  ni 
clear  weapons.  In  placing  such  weapoi 


36 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW 


ijthe  President's  disposal,  Congress 
is  recognized  that  the  President  must 
ive  the  authority  to  use  them  without 
jior  approval  in  order  to  deter  effec- 
tively an  enemy  attack. 

Conversely,  however,  Congress 
lUst  recognize  and  respect  the  role 
ich  the  President  plays  under  the 
S.  constitutional  scheme.  As  re- 
sitory  of  the  executive  power  of  the 
ited  States,  Commander  in  Chief  of 
|e  Armed  Forces,  and  the  officer  in 
arge  of  the  diplomatic  and  intel- 
;ence  resources  of  the  United  States, 
e  President  is  responsible  for  acting 
omptly  to  deal  with  threats  to  U.S. 
terests.  including  the  deployment  and 
e  of  U.S.  forces,  where  necessary,  in 
fense  of  the  national  security  of  the 
nited  States.  Congress  should  not,  as 
matter  of  sound  policy — and  cannot, 
a  matter  of  constitutional  law — im- 
se  statutory  restrictions  that  impede 
e  President's  ability  to  carry  out 
ese  responsibilities. 

It  is  against  these  basic  concepts 
at  the  adequacy  of  the  key  provisions 
the  War  Powers  Resolution  should  be 
dged.  If  the  resolution  is  repealed, 
lis  Administration  would  certainly 
ntinue  to  consult  and  involve  Con- 
less  in  decisions  involving  the  intro- 
ction  of  U.S.  forces  in  hostilities. 
id  if  some  future  Administration  at- 
mpted  to  behave  otherwise.  Congress 
uld  compel  it  to  mend  its  ways. 


•5SESSMENT  OF 
ECIFIC  PROVISIONS 

y  remaining  remarks  will  focus  on 
ose  features  of  the  resolution  that 
ive  led  Presidents  to  criticize  it.  I  will 
30  comment  on  proposals  to  amend 
e  resolution. 

;ction  2 

ction  2(c)  of  the  resolution  states  the 
ew  of  Congress  as  to  circumstances 
ider  which  the  President  may  intro- 
ace  U.S.  armed  forces  into  actual  or 
iminent  involvement  in  hostilities, 
le  list  of  circumstances  in  section  2(c) 
clearly  incomplete,  however.  As  my 
edecessors  as  Legal  Adviser  have  ad- 
sed  this  committee,  the  list  fails  to 
elude  several  types  of  situations  in 
hich  the  United  States  would  clearly 
ave  the  right  under  international  law 

use  force  and  in  which  Presidents 
ave  used  the  armed  forces  without 
lecific  statutory  authorization  on 
iny  occasions. 


Specifically,  section  2(c)  omits,  for 
example,  the  protection  or  rescue  from 
attack,  including  terrorist  attacks,  of 
U.S.  nationals  in  difficulty  abroad;  the 
protection  of  ships  and  aircraft  of  U.S. 
registry  from  unlawful  attack;  re- 
sponses to  attacks  on  allied  countries 
with  which  we  may  be  participating  in 
collective  military  security  arrange- 
ments or  activities,  even  where  such 
attacks  may  threaten  the  security  of 
the  United  States  or  its  armed  forces; 
and  responses  by  U.S.  forces  to  un- 
lawful attacks  on  friendly  vessels  or  air- 
craft in  their  vicinity. 

It  is  not  clear  whether  Congress 
really  intended  section  2(c)  as  an  ex- 
clusive enumeration  of  the  President's 
authority,  but,  in  any  event,  such  an 
enumeration  is  neither  possible  nor  de- 
sirable. Any  attempt  by  Congress  to 
define  the  constitutional  rights  of  the 
President  by  statute  is  bound  to  be  in- 
complete and  to  engender  controversy 
between  the  branches.  The  solution  to 
this  problem  is  to  delete  section  2(c) 
altogether,  as  proposed  by  Senators 
Byrd,  Nunn,  and  Warner.  The  only  way 
that  the  character  and  limits  of  such 
fundamental  constitutional  powers  can 
be  defined  and  understood  is  through 
the  actions  of  the  two  branches  in  cop- 
ing with  real  world  events  over  the 
years.  No  convenient  shortcut  exists. 

Section  3 

Section  3  of  the  resolution  requires  the 
President  to  consult  with  Congress  "in 
every  possible  instance"  before  intro- 
ducing U.S.  armed  forces  into  actual  or 
imminent  hostilities.  Over  the  years, 
both  before  and  after  the  resolution 
was  adopted,  the  executive  branch  has 
engaged  in  consultations  with  the  Con- 
gress in  a  variety  of  circumstances  in- 
volving the  possible  deployment  of  U.S. 
forces  abroad.  Consultations  have  taken 
place,  whether  or  not  called  for  by  the 
resolution.  Consultations  are  intended 
to  keep  Congress  informed,  to  deter- 
mine whether  Congress  approves  of  a 
particular  action  or  policy,  and,  in  the 
period  immediately  before  an  action,  to 
give  congressional  leaders  an  opportun- 
ity to  provide  the  President  with  their 
views.  Consultations  are  not  intended 
to  enable  Congress  to  review  or  ap- 
prove the  detailed  plans  of  a  military 
operation. 

The  resolution  requires  consulta- 
tion "in  every  possible  instance"  and 
thus  recognizes  that  consultation  may 
be  impossible  in  particular  cases.  No 
President  has  challenged  the  merits  of 
the  statutory  obligation  to  consult;  the 


'I 

tepartment  of  State  Bulletin/November  1988 


statute  leaves  to  the  President  the  dis- 
cretion to  decide  whether  consultation 
is  possible  and,  if  so,  to  determine  the 
form  and  substance  of  the  consultation 
according  to  the  circumstances  of  each 
case.  In  some  instances,  such  as  the 
introduction  of  U.S.  forces  into  Egypt 
to  participate  in  peacekeeping  opera- 
tions, detailed  consultations  were  held 
with  many  interested  Members  of  Con- 
gress well  in  advance  of  the  action  con- 
templated. In  other  instances,  consulta- 
tion was  limited  to  a  smaller  number  of 
members  and  was  less  extensive.  In  the 
case  of  the  Tehran  rescue  mission. 
President  Carter  concluded  that  prior 
consultation  was  not  possible  because  of 
extraordinary  operational  security 
needs. 

The  President's  flexibility  respect- 
ing the  number  of  persons  consulted 
and  the  manner  and  timing  of  consulta- 
tion must  be  preserved.  Any  require- 
ment for  a  schedule  of  regular  meetings 
(as  in  the  Byrd-Nunn-Warner  bill)  that 
does  not  preserve  this  element  of  flexi- 
bility would  impermissibly  interfere 
with  the  exercise  of  the  President's 
powers  under  Article  II  of  the  Con- 
stitution. Further,  the  Byrd-Nunn- 
Warner  bill  could  result  in  the  Presi- 
dent being  required  to  engage  in  prior 
consultation  with  18  members,  except 
in  "extraordinary  circumstances  affect- 
ing the  most  vital  security  interests  of 
the  United  States."  The  Administration 
regards  this  as  excessively  burdensome 
and  undesirable  in  many  cases,  even  if 
"vital  security  interests"  might  not  be 
affected. 

An  additional  constitutional  prob- 
lem arises  from  the  provisions  of  sec- 
tion 3(2)  of  the  Byrd-Nunn-Warner  bill 
regarding  the  proposed  permanent  con- 
sultative group.  Under  that  proposal, 
the  requirement  that  the  President  con- 
sult with  the  group  is  triggered  by  a 
majority  vote  of  that  group.  This  is  in- 
consistent with  the  Supreme  Court's 
decision  in  INS  v.  Chadha,  which  pre- 
cludes the  Congress  from  taking  ac- 
tions having  legal  effect  on  the 
executive  branch  except  by  approval  of 
both  Houses  and  presentment  to  the 
President  for  signature  or  veto. 

On  the  other  hand.  Secretary 
Shultz  has  long  indicated  his  support 
for  ways  of  encouraging  ongoing  con- 
sultations between  the  leaders  of  the 
executive  branch  and  Congress  on  na- 
tional security  issues  generally.  The 
procedure  proposed  in  the  Byrd-Nunn- 
Warner  bill,  however,  creates  an  un- 
wieldy cabinet-like  institution,  thereby 
eliminating  necessary  flexibility  on  the 
most  sensitive  and  vital  issues  before 
the  two  branches. 


37 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW 


Section  4 

Section  4  requires  that  the  President 
submit,  within  48  hours  after  the  intro- 
duction of  U.S.  forces,  a  written  report 
to  the  Congress  in  three  circumstances: 

•  Where  U.S.  forces  are  introduced 
into  actual  or  imminent  hostilities; 

•  Where  U.S.  forces  are  introduced 
into  foreign  territory,  waters,  or  air- 
space "while  equipped  for  combat," 
with  certain  exceptions;  and 

•  Where  such  forces  are  introduced 
in  numbers  which  "substantially  en- 
large" the  combat-equipped  U.S.  forces 
already  located  in  a  foreign  country. 

Presidents  have  uniformly  provided 
written  reports  to  the  Congress,  with 
respect  to  U.S.  deployments  abroad,  as 
a  means  of  keeping  the  Congress  in- 
formed while  reserving  the  executive 
branch's  position  on  the  applicability 
and  constitutionality  of  the  resolution. 
Indeed,  the  executive  branch  has  pro- 
vided information  to  the  Congress  in 
many  cases  where  no  relevant  statute 
applies. 

The  executive  branch's  administra- 
tion of  this  section  has  satisfied  any 
special  need  for  information  that  Con- 
gress may  have  in  this  area.  Section  4 
does  not  require  the  President  to  state 
the  particular  subsection  under  which 
reports  are  made,  and  no  President  has 
felt  compelled  to  do  so.  A  definitive 
judgment  at  the  outset  of  a  deployment 
as  to  whether  hostilities  will  result  is 
often  difficult  to  make.  Furthermore, 
this  practice  is  a  useful  way  for  the 
executive  to  avoid  unnecessary  con- 
stitutional confrontations  over  whether 
section  4(a)(1)  is  applicable  or 
whether — even  if  its  conditions  are 
met — it  can  properly  be  deemed  to 
trigger  an  automatic  termination 
under  section  5. 


Section  5 

Section  5  of  the  resolution  purports  to 
require  the  President  to  withdraw  U.S. 
forces  from  a  situation  of  actual  or  im- 
minent hostilities  in  two  circumstances: 

•  Where  60  days  have  elapsed  with- 
out specific  congressional  authorization 
for  the  continuation  of  their  use,  with 
some  specific  exceptions;  and 

•  Where  the  Congress  at  any  time 
enacts  a  concurrent  resolution  requir- 
ing such  withdrawal. 

The  60-day  provision  presents  seri- 
ous problems  under  our  constitutional 
scheme,  in  which  the  President  has  the 


constitutional  authority  and  responsibil- 
ity as  Commander  in  Chief  and  chief 
executive  officer  to  deploy  and  use  U.S. 
forces  in  a  variety  of  circum- 
stances— such  as  in  the  exercise  of  our 
inherent  right  of  self-defense,  including 
the  protection  of  American  citizens, 
forces,  and  vessels  from  attack.  The 
provision  is  particularly  troublesome 
because  it  would  require  the  with- 
drawal of  U.S.  forces  by  reason  of  the 
mere  inaction  of  Congress  within  an  ar- 
bitrary 60-day  period.  The  resolution  it- 
self appears  to  recognize  that  the 
President  has  independent  authority  to 
use  the  armed  forces  for  certain  pur- 
poses. On  what  basis  can  Congress 
seek  to  terminate  such  independent  au- 
thority by  the  mere  passage  of  time? 
In  addition  to  this  general,  con- 
stitutional objection,  this  provision  has 
several  harmful  effects. 

•  The  imposition  of  arbitrary  and 
inflexible  deadlines  interferes  with  the 
effective  and  successful  completion  of 
the  initiative  undertaken  by  the 
President. 

•  Such  limits  may  signal  a  divided 
nation,  giving  our  adversaries  a  basis 
for  hoping  that  the  President  may  be 
forced  to  desist,  or  at  least  feel  pres- 
sured to  do  so.  As  Senator  Tower  re- 
cently testified:  "The  important  thing  is 
that  we  be  perceived  as  being  able  to 
act  with  dispatch,  and  that  the  policy 
that  we  employ  will  not  be  picked  to 
pieces  through  congressional  debates  or 
nitpicking  congressional  action." 

•  Such  limits  could  increase  the 
risk  to  U.S.  forces  in  the  field,  who 
could  be  forced  to  withdraw  under  fire. 

•  Debates  over  the  time  deadline 
provide  an  undesirable  occasion  for  in- 
terbranch  or  partisan  rivalry,  poten- 
tially misleading  our  adversaries  into 
assuming  an  absence  of  national  re- 
solve, thus  escalating  the  military  and 
political  risks. 

•  The  automatic  nature  of  the  dead- 
line, if  obeyed,  would  result  in  the  ter- 
mination of  executive  protection  of  the 
national  interest  without  any  congres- 
sional action  taking  full  responsibility 
for  that  termination. 

•  The  deadline  also  reduces  the  ef- 
fectiveness of  the  potential  role  of 
Congress  by  placing  unnecessary  pres- 
sure on  Congress  to  act  where  the 
President  has  not  sought  specific  legis- 
lative approval  to  continue  an  action 
beyond  the  designated  time  limits. 

•  The  nation  has  successfully  de- 
fended its  interests  by  following  a  pat- 
tern of  government  in  which  Congress 
withholds  final  judgment  on  executive 
actions  until  their  outcome  becomes 


more  clear.  Once  again,  as  Senator 
Tower  said:  "Congress  is  not  structure! 
to  maintain  the  day-to-day  business  of  [ 
the  conduct  of  diplomacy.  Congress  is 
not  structured  to  devise  and  maintain  , 
long-term,  comprehensive,  reliable  for- 
eign policy." 

The  concurrent  resolution  aspect  ( 
section  5  is  clearly  unconstitutional  un 
der  INS  v.  Chadha.  In  that  case,  the 
Supreme  Court  held  that  Congress  ma 
not  regulate  matters  beyond  its  own  ir 
ternal  affairs,  other  than  through  legis 
lations  subject  to  the  veto.  To  the 
extent  Congress  can  impose  restrictioi 
relating  to  military  action,  it  can  only 
do  so  by  legislation  subject  to  a  presi- 
dential veto.  Because  the  War  Powers 
Resolution's  concurrent-resolution  pro 
cedure  violates  this  principle,  it  is  un- 
constitutional and  should  be  repealed. 
Moreover,  section  5(c)  contemplates 
congressional  action  that  may  intrude 
on  the  President's  authority  as  Com- 
mander in  Chief  and  chief  executive 
officer. 

Sections  5(b)  and  (c)  should  be 
stricken,  as  proposed  by  the  Byrd- 
Nunn- Warner  bill.  This  course  would 
consistent  with  the  Constitution  and 
with  U.S.  national  interests. 

Section  6 

Section  6  of  the  resolution  contains  pi 
cedures  for  the  expedited  considerati 
of  joint  resolutions  introduced  pursua 
to  section  5(b).  Since  we  favor  repeal 
section  5(b),  we  likewise  favor  repeal 
this  provision. 

The  Byrd-Nunn-Warner  bill  con- 
tains a  som.ewhat  different  set  of  exp' 
dited  procedures  from  those  set  forth 
the  War  Powers  Resolution  and  is  de- 
signed to  serve  somewhat  different  p 
poses.  Under  that  bill,  expedited 
procedures  would  apply,  in  either  of 
two  situations,  to  any  joint  resolutioi 
approved  by  a  majority  of  the  perma- 
nent consultative  group  authorizing  t 
President  to  continue  a  particular  de 
ployment  of  U.S.  forces  or  prohibitin 
him  from  doing  so.  The  two  situation 
are: 

•  Where  the  President  has  re- 
ported to  Congress  under  section 
4(a)(1);  or 

•  Where  a  majority  of  the  18-mei 
ber  permanent  consultative  group  fin 
that  he  should  have  done  so. 

The  Byrd-Nunn-Warner  bill  wou  | 
add  two  other  provisions  that  would 
create  undesirable  consequences  as  a\\, 
result  of  the  adoption  of  a  joint  resol' u 
tion  opposing  or  disapproving  execut  \ 


38 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  vM 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW 


ion.  One  provision  would  automati- 
y  prohibit  the  use  of  funds  for  any 
ivity  which  would  have  the  purpose 
jffect  of  violating  any  provision  of 
h  a  joint  resolution;  the  other  would 
e  standing  in  U.S.  District  Court  to 
Member  of  Congress  to  seek  de- 
•atory  and  injunctive  relief  on  the 
und  that  any  provision  of  such  a 
it  resolution  had  been  violated.  We 
lose  both  of  these  proposals  for  both 
stitutional  and  policy  reasons. 
Congress  has  broad  power  to  con- 
l  the  expenditure  of  funds.  Con- 
ss,  however,  may  not  use  its  funding 
rer  to  restrict  or  usurp  the  independ- 
constitutional  authority  of  another 
nch.  For  e.xample,  Congress  could 
require  the  Supreme  Court  to  de- 
i  a  case  in  a  particular  way  as  a 
dition  on  the  use  of  funds  by  the 
iciary.  By  the  same  token,  Congress 
Id  not  lawfully  deny  funds  for  the 
led  forces  to  compel  the  President 
:ease  exercising  functions  that  are 
fully  his  as  Commander  in  Chief, 
h  as  the  defense  of  U.S.  vessels 
■n  attack  on  the  high  seas  in  a  par- 
ilar  region.  Congress  would  also  ex- 
d  its  authority  by  ordering  the 
sident  to  conduct  a  particular  type 
ailitary  operation  in  a  specific  man- 
;  the  power  to  control  spending  can- 
properly  be  used  to  interfere  with 
President's  discretion  over  the  con- 
t  of  military  operations. 
We  believe  the  proposal  to  permit 
,  by  any  Member  of  Congress  would 
inconsistent  with  current  case  law 
a  grave  setback  for  the  system  of 
aration  of  powers  established  by  the 
ners  of  the  Constitution.  The 
eral  courts  have  prudently  decided 
t  they  will  not  exercise  jurisdiction 
r  suits  based  on  the  War  Powers 
solution.  The  courts  have  held  that 
h  suits  raise  nonjusticiable  political 
stions  which  should  be  resolved  by 
political  branches.  Congress  has  no 
;itutional  interest  in  having  the 
rts  pass  on  such  questions.  As  the 
rts  have  concluded,  judicial  supervi- 
1  is  inherently  unsuited  to  monitor- 
military  actions  outside  the  United 
tes  or  resolving  political  controversy 
r  the  propriety  of  such  actions.  Con- 
ss,  as  we  have  seen,  has  ample 
ver  concerning  the  President's  use  of 
itary  forces.  It  should  not  resort  to 
courts  to  perform  its  proper 
ction. 

Particularly  troublesome  is  the  con- 
it  that  any  single  Member  of  Con- 
:ss  would  have  the  right  to  sue.  This 
ivision  is  objectionable  both  from  a 
al  and  a  policy  perspective.  As  a 


legal  matter,  we  believe  the  congres- 
sional standing  provision  purports 
unconstitutionally  to  expand  the  juris- 
diction of  the  Federal  courts  to  litiga- 
tion not  presenting  an  Article  III  case 
or  controversy.  We  believe  that  mem- 
bership in  Congress,  without 
more,  is  insufficient  to  confer  standing 
under  Article  III  of  the  Constitution. 
The  amendment  purports  to  grant 
standing  to  Members  of  Congress 
merely  for  the  purpose  of  enforcing  a 
generalized  grievance  about  govern- 
mental conduct,  but  this  is  insufficient 
to  confer  standing  on  a  Member  of  Con- 
gress, just  as  it  is  for  a  member  of  the 
general  public. 

This  provision  fares  no  better  when 
viewed  from  a  policy  perspective.  For 
example,  under  the  Byrd-Nunn- Warner 
proposal.  Congress  might  enact  a  joint 
resolution  authorizing  continuation  of 
the  President's  use  of  the  armed  forces, 
subject  to  certain  conditions,  and  the 
Congress  as  a  whole  might  be  perfectly 
satisfied  with  the  President's  com- 
pliance with  the  resolution.  And  yet, 
one  or  more  dissatisfied  Members  of 
Congress  would  be  authorized  to  bring 
the  matter  into  the  courts  with  the  ob- 
jective of  obstructing  or  disrupting  the 
President  in  his  direction  of  U.S.  armed 
forces  in  a  situation  of  actual  or  poten- 
tial hostilities. 

The  Constitution  intended  that 
such  situations  be  resolved  by  the  Con- 
gress and  the  executive  branch  in  the 
exercise  of  their  respective  constitu- 
tional powers — ideally,  in  a  spirit  of  co- 
operation and  concern  for  the  national 
interest.  Whether  or  not  Congress  as  a 
whole  would  act  in  a  partisan  manner 
in  such  situations,  the  risks  of  partisan 
motivation  are  gi'eat,  indeed,  when  a 
single  member  is  authorized  to  sue. 

Section  8 

Section  8(a)  of  the  resolution  purports 
to  instruct  future  Congresses  on  the 
manner  in  which  they  may  choose  to 
authorize  the  introduction  of  U.S. 
armed  forces  into  actual  or  imminent 
hostilities.  Specifically,  it  states  that  no 
law  passed — or  treaty  ratified — can 
ever  authorize  such  action  unless  it  con- 
tains an  explicit  statutory  statement 
that  it  is  intended  to  constitute  specific 
authorization  within  the  meaning  of  the 
resolution. 

This  provision  appears  to  be  a  re- 
sponse to  the  fact  that  the  Tonkin  Gulf 
resolution,  contemporaneous  appropria- 
tion legislation,  and  the  SEATO  [South 
East  Asia  Treaty  Organization]  Treaty 


were  construed  by  courts  in  the  1970s 
to  authorize  conduct  of  the  Vietnam 
war.  In  our  view,  section  8(a)  ineffec- 
tively attempts  to  restrict  the  rights  of 
future  Congresses  to  authorize  deploy- 
ments in  any  way  they  choose. 

If  a  Congress  chooses  to  adopt  a 
statutory  provision  which  authorizes 
the  President  to  act  but  fails  to  men- 
tion the  resolution,  that  authorization 
is,  nonetheless,  valid  and  effective, 
whatever  the  Congress  may  have  said 
to  the  contrary  in  1973.  Indeed,  the 
passage  of  such  a  law  would  properly 
be  regarded  as  the  equivalent  of  an 
amendment  of  the  War  Powers  Resolu- 
tion, since  subsequent  statutes  are  con- 
trolling over  earlier  ones  that  contain 
inconsistent  provisions.  In  short,  if 
Congress  supports  an  executive  initia- 
tive to  the  extent  that  Congress  sup- 
ported the  President  in  Vietnam,  the 
initiative  would,  we  believe,  be  upheld 
in  court  as  lawful.  We,  therefore,  favor 
repeal  of  section  8(a)  to  remove  any 
misunderstanding  as  to  its  constitu- 
tional effect. 

CONCLUSION 

This  review  of  the  key  provisions  of  the 
War  Powers  Resolution  makes  clear 
that  the  Administration  has  constitu- 
tional and  policy  objections  to  various 
provisions  of  the  resolution  in  its  cur- 
rent form.  We  believe  it  should  be  re- 
pealed altogether.  We  particularly  urge 
repeal  of  sections  2(c),  5(b),  5(c),  and 
8(a).  The  Byrd-Nunn-Warner  bill  would 
properly  delete  three  of  these  sections 
but  contains  other  provisions  which  the 
Administration  could  not  accept. 

In  the  last  analysis,  we  cannot 
solve  the  problems  which  the  resolution 
seeks  to  remedy  merely  by  adopting 
new,  more  detailed  statutes  or  restating 
general  principles.  The  only  effective 
solution  for  these  problems  is  for  the 
two  political  branches  to  work  together 
in  pursuit  of  common  national  interests, 
to  communicate  more  effectively  with 
one  another  on  their  particular  con- 
cerns and  ideas,  and  to  utilize  their 
proper  powers  to  influence  events 
rather  than  attempting  to  modify  a  con- 
stitutional framework  that  has  served 
us  too  well  to  jeopardize. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee 
and  will  be  available  from  the  Superintend- 
ent of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Print- 
ing Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


39 


MILITARY  AFFAIRS 


Military  Power  and  Diplomacy: 
The  Reagan  Legacy 


by  Michael  H.  Armacost 

Address  before  the  Air  Force  Asso- 
ciation  Convention  on  September  19, 
1988.  Ambassador  Armacost  is  Under 
Secretary  for  Political  Affairs. 

I  am  pleased  to  have  this  opportunity 
to  share  with  you  some  thoughts  about 
the  relationship  between  military  power 
and  effective  diplomacy — and  some  of 
the  key  trends  we  see  emerging  in  in- 
ternational affairs  for  which  America's 
military  strength  will  be  essential  to 
the  conduct  of  our  foreign  policy. 

The  Air  Force  has  long  provided 
essential  elements  of  the  underlying 
military  strength  which  makes  possible 
an  effective  global  diplomacy  for  the 
United  States.  The  power,  flexibility, 
and  reach  of  our  air  forces  give  us  valu- 
able options  in  our  foreign  policy 
quiver  Over  the  skies  of  Europe,  at 
SAC  [Strategic  Air  Command]  air  and 
missile  bases  in  the  United  States,  and 
throughout  the  Pacific,  the  Air  Force 
makes  its  presence  felt. 

I  would  like  to  emphasize  four 
themes  this  afternoon: 

First,  there  is  the  essential  rela- 
tionship between  military  strength  and 
effective  diplomacy.  We  have  learned 
through  hard  experience  that  a  world  in 
which  disputes  are  settled  peacefully — 
a  world  of  law,  comity,  and  human 
rights — cannot  be  created  by  good  will 
and  idealism  alone.  Since  1945,  every 
President  has  recognized  that  to  main- 
tain the  peace,  we  must  preserve  our 
strength,  and,  more  than  that,  we  have 
to  be  willing  to  use  our  strength. 

Second,  the  Reagan  Administra- 
tion has  recognized  this  essential  truth 
and,  by  restoring  our  military  strength, 
has  enhanced  our  ability  to  employ 
forces  in  support  of  U.S.  interests 
abroad. 

Third,  the  results  of  this  policy 
have  generated  some  important  suc- 
cesses for  the  United  States  in  the  last 
few  years. 

Fourth,  this  fact,  when  considered 
in  light  of  a  number  of  global  trends 
favorable  to  U.S.  interests,  gives  us 
promising  prospects  for  the  future.  Yet, 
we  should  not  be  complacent.  As  we 
face  the  future,  we  need  to  pay  careful 
attention  to  new  challenges  posed  by  a 


changing  security  environment  as  well 
as  trends  that  bear  on  our  ability  to 
acquire  and  use  military  power 

Military  Strength 
and  Diplomacy 

From  the  earliest  years  of  our  country, 
America's  leaders  have  recognized  the 
relationship  between  an  effective  diplo- 
macy and  the  possession  of  adequate 
military  strength.  If  anyone  at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  19th  century  was  uncon- 
vinced, the  episodes  with  the  Barbary 
pirates  proved  the  point.  (I  apologize 
for  using  a  naval  example,  but  no  one 
was  clever  enough  to  have  put  together 
an  air  force  back  then.)  Although  the 
United  States  was  not  a  global  power  in 
the  early  1800s,  we  recognized  that  we 
had  interests  that  extended  far  beyond 
our  borders.  Ti'ade,  often  carried  over 
long  distances,  was  essential  to  our  na- 
tional strength — hence,  our  long-held 
adherence  to  the  principle  of  the  free- 
dom of  navigation  on  the  high  seas.  Our 
leaders  also  understood  that  such  a 
right  would  have  no  reality  if  we  were 
unprepared  to  take  risks  to  exercise  it. 
And  taking  risks  in  that  case  meant 
building  a  navy  and  engaging  the  great- 
est sea  power  of  the  age  in  combat  to 
assert  our  rights  under  law. 

This  is  not  to  imply  that  military 
power  is  the  only  component  of  effec- 
tive diplomacy.  Indeed,  most  diplomacy 
is  carried  out  without  the  explicit 
threat  of  force.  Skill,  intelligence,  pa- 
tience, and  the  right  policies  do  make  a 
difference.  And  a  strong  economy  is 
important.  Some  nations,  such  as 
Japan,  with  relatively  small  military 
forces  wield  considerable  diplomatic 
clout.  At  the  other  extreme  is  the  So- 
viet Union,  which,  lacking  effective 
economic  power  or  moral  standing,  has 
placed  excessive  reliance  in  its  diplo- 
macy on  military  force — as  some  of  its 
own  leaders  are  now  acknowledging. 

Yet,  military  power  is  usually  an 
implicit  element  in  negotiations.  As 
George  Kennan  used  to  say,  it  casts  its 
lengthy  shadow  on  the  bargaining 
table.  We  cannot  avoid  the  fact  that 
maintaining  the  military  balance  of 
power  is  crucial  to  diplomatic  success. 
In  the  decade  of  the  1970s,  we  lost 
sight  of  this  fact,  and  we  paid  the  price. 


When  President  Reagan  first  took 
office,  our  dialogue  with  the  Soviet 
Union  had  broken  down  under  the 
weight  of  a  massive  buildup  of  Soviet 
conventional  and  nuclear  power  Our   ■ 
strategic  forces  were  becoming  in- 
creasingly vulnerable  to  Soviet  "heav^ 
missiles,  threatening  strategic  stabilit 
In  Europe,  the  Soviets  were  deployin 
a  new  and  more  threatening  type  of 
INF  [intermediate-range  nuclear 
forces]  missile,  the  SS-20. 

This  buildup  occurred  against  a 
backdrop  of  what  Moscow  perceived  t 
be  a  new  "correlation  of  forces"  emer 
ing  from  Hanoi's  victory  in  Indochina 
and  the  apparent  decline  of  American 
power  and  will.  Moscow  was  embold- 
ened in  the  mid-1970s  to  exploit  turm 
in  several  different  regions  of  the 
world.  It  undertook  military  interven 
tions — either  directly  or  through  pro: 
ies — in  Angola,  Ethiopia,  Cambodia, 
and  Afghanistan. 

Other  aspects  of  our  foreign  rela 
tions  were  also  not  going  well.  The  e 
ergy  crisis  had  dramatized  the  diffus 
of  economic  power  and  the  vulnerabil 
of  the  postwar  economic  system.  Ter- 
rorists, often  supported  by  hostile 
states  in  the  Third  World,  put  them- 
selves on  the  global  agenda,  and  thei 
seeming  ability  to  strike  at  will  raise 
serious  questions  about  our  capacity 
respond  effectively  to  an  ambiguous 
and  elusive  security  challenge. 

The  Reagan  Buildup 

Accordingly,  the  Reagan  Administra 
tion  came  into  office  determined  to  r 
store  American  will  and  self-confidei 
and  embarked  on  a  long-term  effort 
restore  American  military  capabilitic 
In  pursuit  of  this  aim,  we  recognizee 
not  only  our  own  military  needs  but 
also  the  vital  role  that  our  allies  woi 
need  to  play  as  we  rebuilt  our  defen; 
The  broad  outlines  of  the  Reaga 
defense  agenda  are  familiar  to  you  a 
But  let  me  highlight  some  of  its  mos 
significant  aspects. 

First,  we  intensified  the  moderi 
zation  of  U.S.  strategic  forces  to  ent 
the  survivability  and  retaliatory  ca- 
pability of  all  legs  of  the  triad.  This 
included  enhanced  support  for  the  IV 
missile.  Trident  II  submarine,  D-5  r 


40 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  ll 


MILITARY  AFFAIRS 


iS,  and  improved  mechanisms  for 
nmand  and  control.  And  this  au- 
nce,  above  all,  is  familiar  with  our 
itinuing  emphasis  on  the  importance 
the  triad  of  air-breathing  strategic 
ces — the  B-1,  and  Stealth  bombers, 
]  our  cruise  missile  programs.  We 
ait  with  anticipation  the  imminent 
raling  of  the  B-2  bomber.  While 
engthening  our  nuclear  deterrent, 

President  has  also  launched  the 
•ategic  Defense  Initiative  in  order  to 
3lore  the  possibilities  offered  by  ad- 
iced  technology  for  defending  against 
luclear  missile  attack. 

To  meet  the  threat  posed  to  Eu- 
)e  and  Asia  by  Soviet  deployment  of 
I  SS-20  missile,  we  and  our  NATO 
es  undertook  the  deployment  in  Eu- 
)e  of  572  INF  missiles  in  accordance 
;h  NATO's  1979  dual-track  decision, 
e  deployment  of  INF  was  a  dramatic 
ance  success  story.  Allied  govern- 
nts  came  under  considerable  public 
;ssure  to  rescind  the  decision — we 
1  all  recall  the  hundreds  of  thousands 
protestors  who,  with  Soviet  encour- 
;ment,  marched  in  1982  and  1983  in 
ropean  capitals  against  the  NATO 
ssiles — but  the  governments  held 
Ti,  and  missile  deployments  began. 

Second,  despite  what  some  are 
N  saying,  we  have  also  beefed  up  our 
iventional  forces.  This  has  involved 
re  rapid  procurement  of  tanks  and 
■tical  aircraft,  increases  in  readiness 
i  sustainability,  and  substantial  im- 
wements  in  the  quality  of  training  of 
rsonnel.  It  has  also  entailed  an  ex- 
ision  of  our  navy — so  vital  in  project- 
;  American  power  in  support  of  our 
ropean  allies  and  to  ensure  the  se- 
ity  of  sealanes  of  communication. 

Improvements  have  also  been  made 
the  NATO  alliance's  conventional 
ce  posture,  though  more  needs  to  be 
lie.  In  December  1985,  NATO  de- 
ise  ministers  approved  the  Conven- 
nal  Defense  Improvement  Program, 
■omprehensive  plan  to  remedy  critical 
ficiencies  in  the  alliance's  conven- 
nal  defenses.  Under  this  and  other 
tiatives,  NATO  has  increased  am- 
mition  stockpiles  and  other  war  re- 
rves,  improved  facilities  for  receiving 
d  protecting  allied  aircraft  reinforc- 
?  Europe,  and  modernized  air  de- 
ises  and  maritime  capabilities. 

A  third  feature  of  the  Reagan 
enda  has  been  active  support  to  in- 
^enous  nationalist  movements  in 
'ghanistan,  Angola,  Nicaragua,  and 
imbodia.  Increasing  the  political  and 
onomic  costs  of  these  involvements  to 
e  Soviets  and  their  allies  has  given 


them  incentives  to  liquidate  such  ad- 
ventures and  disincentives  to  undertake 
similar  efforts  in  the  future.  Freedom 
for  others  means,  in  the  end,  greater 
peace  and  security  for  ourselves. 

A  fourth  aspect  of  the  Reagan  Ad- 
ministration's policy  of  realism  and 
strength  has  been  the  determination  to 
use  military  force,  when  necessary,  in 
support  of  our  interests  and  those  of 
our  friends  and  allies. 

•  When  the  Cuban-sponsored 
Marxist  government  of  Grenada  col- 
lapsed into  violence  in  1983,  we  re- 
sponded to  the  Governor  General's 
request  for  assistance.  In  concert 
with  the  Caribbean  democracies,  we 
mounted  a  military  operation  to  help 
restore  peace  and  security  on  Grenada. 

•  When  Kuwait  approached  us  to 
explore  ways  to  protect  Kuwaiti-owned 
shipping  from  Iranian  attack  in  the  Per- 
sian Gulf,  we  and  our  allies  responded 
by  increasing  our  naval  presence  to  en- 
sure freedom  of  navigation  in  a  region 
vital  to  Western  security. 

•  When  confronted  with  clear  evi- 
dence of  Qadhafi's  involvement  in  ter- 
rorist acts,  we  undertook  successful  air 
attacks  on  Tripoli  and  Banghazi  in 
April  1986. 

I  think  it  fair  to  say  that  the  de- 
signers of  the  FB-111  never  imagined 
that  this  strategic  aircraft  would  find 
service  in  operation  against  terrorist 
bases.  But  the  real  significance  of  the 
strike  against  Libya,  as  with  Grenada 
and  the  gulf,  is  that  we  gave  renewed 
credibility  to  our  will  to  engage  in  the 
measured  and  judicious  use  of  force  in 
pursuit  of  our  security  interests.  Such 
credibility  gives  greater  weight  to  our 
diplomacy  and  will  hopefully  reduce 
prospects  of  having  to  employ  force  in 
the  future. 

A  Revived  Diplomacy 

These  efforts  to  rebuild  and  modernize 
our  military  forces,  as  well  as  the  will- 
ingness to  apply  that  force  when  cir- 
cumstances demanded,  have  done  much 
to  change  the  international  environ- 
ment. [Commentator]  Charles 
Krauthammer  may  have  exaggerated 
when  he  recently  wrote  of  the  last  8 
years  that  "in  the  entire  postwar  era, 
there  has  never  been  a  period  of  such 
profound  international  tranquility."  But 
we  have  had  a  singularly  successful  dec- 
ade in  advancing  the  objectives  of  U.S. 
policy.  The  paralysis  of  the  post-Viet- 
nam years  has  dissipated;  our  friends 


and  allies  have  been  reassured;  and  our 
adversaries  have  had  to  reassess  funda- 
mentally their  expansionist  policies. 

One  of  the  areas  where  change  has 
been  the  most  pronounced  has  been 
U.S. -Soviet  relations.  Here  there  has 
been  progress  across  the  board,  but  the 
advances  have  been  particularly  re- 
markable in  arm.s  control — the  INF 
Ti'eaty — and  management  of  regional  is- 
sues— Soviet  agreement  to  withdraw 
from  Afghanistan. 

INF.  The  INF  Treaty  represents  a 
major  victory  for  the  Administration 
and  for  the  NATO  alliance.  When  Pres- 
ident Reagan  first  proposed  the  "zero 
option"  in  1981,  many  critics  derided  it 
as  empty  propaganda,  saying  the  Rus- 
sians would  never  accept  it.  But  in  the 
end,  after  returning  to  the  bargaining 
table  following  a  walkout  and  much  pa- 
tient negotiating,  the  Soviets  did  accept 
the  President's  offer.  They  agreed  to 
eliminate  entirely  two  classes  of  inter- 
mediate-range ballistic  missiles  as  well 
as  to  accept  unprecedented  procedures 
for  onsite  verification. 

A  number  of  thoughtful  Europeans 
and  Americans  have  expressed  concerns 
that  the  INF  agreement  could  lead  to 
the  denuclearization  of  Europe.  I  be- 
lieve these  fears  are  exaggerated.  Even 
after  all  INF  weapons  have  been  elimi- 
nated, NATO  will  still  have  more  than 
4,000  nuclear  warheads,  including  those 
on  INF  aircraft  and  U.S.  submarine- 
launched  ballistic  missiles.  While  the 
Soviets  will  continue  to  try  to  mobilize 
and  exploit  pacifist  sentiments  against 
Western  governments,  Gorbachev  has 
shown  no  inclination,  as  yet,  to  remove 
a  key  source  of  East- West  tension:  the 
basic  division  of  Europe  imposed  by  the 
Red  Army.  That  will  impose  real  con- 
straints on  European  willingness  to 
move  away  from  a  policy  of  mutual 
security. 

Regarding  the  negotiations  on  the 
longer  range  strategic  missiles,  we  have 
not  reached  agreement  with  the  Sovi- 
ets, but  major  progress  has  been  made 
toward  a  treaty  that  will  reduce  strate- 
gic arsenals  on  both  sides  by  50%.  We 
and  the  Soviets  have  agreed,  for  in- 
stance, on  the  subceilings  for  major 
strategic  systems,  including  a  subceil- 
ing  that  would  require  50%  cuts  in  the 
Soviet  force  of  heavy  MIRVed  [multiple 
independently-targetable  reentry  vehi- 
cle] ICBMs  [intercontinental  baUistic 
missiles] — the  SS-18s,  particularly  de- 
stabilizing systems  that  pose  a  first- 
strike  threat  to  our  retaliatory  forces. 


41 


MILITARY  AFFAIRS 


Many  factors  have  contributed  to 
the  achievement  of  an  INF  Treaty  and 
progress  on  START  [strategic  arms  re- 
ductions tall<s] — including  the  accession 
to  power  in  the  Soviet  Union  of  a  new 
leadership  concerned  by  the  country's 
internal  backwardness  and  stagnation 
and  overextended  foreign  policy — but 
one  key  factor  clearly  has  been  the 
U.S.  modernization  program.  Absent 
NATO  INF  missile  deployments  in  Eu- 
rope, Gorbachev  would  not  have  agreed 
to  destroy  all  of  those  SS-20s,  SS-12s, 
and  SS-23S. 

Afghanistan.  A  second  major 
achievement  of  the  Reagan  Administra- 
tion's foreign  policy  was  Soviet  agree- 
ment to  withdraw  from  Afghanistan. 
The  Soviet  invasion  of  Afghanistan  con- 
stituted the  first  massive  use  of  Soviet 
troops  outside  Eastern  Europe  since 
World  War  II.  It  not  only  destroyed  the 
independence  of  a  nonaligned  country, 
but  it  threatened  the  security  of  our 
ally,  Pakistan,  and  e.xtended  forward  by 
several  hundred  miles  the  Soviet  capac- 
ity to  project  military  power  toward  the 
Persian  Gulf.  For  all  of  these  reasons, 
the  complete  and  total  withdrawal  of 
troops  and  the  restoration  of  Afghan  na- 
tional independence  has  been  an  urgent 
goal  of  U.S.  policy. 

We  are  now  within  reach  of  achiev- 
ing that  objective.  On  April  14,  the 
U.S.S.R.  signed  the  Geneva  accords 
which  were  negotiated,  under  UN  aus- 
pices, by  Pakistan  and  the  Kabul  re- 
gime. The  United  States  associated 
itself  with  the  settlement  by  agreeing 
to  respect  the  undertakings  of  the  high 
contracting  parties. 

These  accords  provide  for  the  com- 
plete withdrawal  of  all  Soviet  troops 
from  Afghanistan  by  February  15,  1989. 
The  Soviets  were  also  required  to  with- 
draw 50%  of  those  troops  by  August  15. 
Our  intelligence  indicates  that  the 
Soviets  met  that  benchmark. 

A  number  of  factors  have  been  re- 
sponsible for  the  change  in  Soviet  pol- 
icy on  Afghanistan.  First  and  foremost, 
credit  must  go  to  the  Afghan  people 
themselves,  who  for  9  years  have 
waged  a  struggle  that  will  be  the  stuff 
of  legend.  The  Afghan  resistance  has 
enjoyed  the  stalwart  support  of 
Pakistan  and  the  backing  of  world  opin- 
ion. Since  the  1979  invasion,  we,  the 
Chinese,  the  West  Europeans,  the  Is- 
lamic world,  and  others  have  made 
clear  that  the  Soviet  occupation  im- 
posed a  heavy  cost  on  bilateral 
relations. 


Beyond  our  moral  and  diplomatic 
support  for  the  resistance,  we  have 
provided,  in  a  bipartisan  effort,  both 
humanitarian  and  military  assistance 
and  will  continue  to  do  so.  Prior  to  sig- 
nature of  the  Geneva  accords,  we  pro- 
posed a  moratorium  on  all  military 
supplies  to  parties  in  Afghanistan,  but 
the  Soviets  rejected  this  offer.  We, 
therefore,  made  clear — publicly  at  time 
of  signature  in  Geneva  as  well  as  pri- 
vately through  diplomatic  channels — 
that  we  intended  to  e.xercise  our  right 
to  provide  military  aid  to  the  resistance 
as  long  as  the  Soviet  Union  continued 
to  give  military  assistance  to  the  Kabul 
regime.  The  Soviets  have  continued 
their  aid  to  the  Kabul  government,  so 
we  have  continued  our  assistance  to  the 
mujaliidin. 

These  factors — the  indigenous 
strength  of  the  Afghan  insurgency,  the 
generous  support  provided  by  members 
of  the  international  community  includ- 
ing ourselves,  and  the  Soviets'  political 
isolation — have  not  led  to  the  outright 
military  defeat  of  Soviet  forces,  but 
they  have  imposed  substantial — and 
growing — military,  political,  and  eco- 
nomic costs  on  Moscow.  In  9  years  of 
war,  the  Soviets  have  suffered  about 
35,000  casualties,  with  13,000  killed. 
With  no  victory  in  sight,  a  palpable 
war-weariness  set  in  among  many  ele- 
ments of  the  Soviet  population.  Criti- 
cism of  the  war  has  grown  and,  in  the 
climate  of  glasiwst,  become  more  pub- 
lic. The  new  Soviet  leadership — free  of 
responsibility  for  earlier  decisions  and 
intent  upon  creating  an  international 
environment  conducive  to  the  concen- 
tration of  Soviet  resources  and  energies 
on  urgent  domestic  needs — has  clearly 
found  these  costs  unacceptable. 

Since  the  Geneva  accords  were  con- 
cluded, military  initiative  has  continued 
to  pass  to  the  mujaliidin.  As  Soviet 
forces  have  pulled  back  from  eastern, 
southern,  and  western  Afghanistan,  the 
Kabul  regime  has  lost  additional  ter- 
ritory— including  a  number  of  impor- 
tant towns  and  garrisons.  As  a  result, 
the  resistance  almost  completely  con- 
trols strategically  important  areas  such 
as  the  Panjsher  and  Konar  Valleys, 
which  have  been  bitterly  contested  for 
the  last  8  years.  Major  cities  such  as 
Jalalabad,  Ghazni,  Gardeyz,  and  Qan- 
dahar  are  cut  off  from  the  surrounding 
countryside  and  can  be  supplied  only 
with  great  difficulty. 

I  don't  wish  to  leave  the  impression 
that  the  Geneva  accords  have  solved  all 
the  problems  associated  with  a  long, 
brutal,  and  tragic  war.  Soviet  troop 


withdrawal  has  yet  to  be  completed. 
There  remains  the  formidable  problem 
of  providing  for  the  repatriation  and  n 
settlement  of  4-5  million  Afghan  refu- 
gees currently  residing  in  Iran  and 
Pakistan.  Finally,  the  shape  of  future 
Afghan  political  arrangements  is  un- 
clear. This  is  for  Afghans  to  decide.  I 
cannot  predict  what  form  Afghan  self- 
determination  will  take,  but  no  proces 
of  genuine  Afghan  self-determination 
can  succeed  unless  all  Soviet  troops  ar 
withdrawn.  That  is  why  the  Geneva  ac 
cords  are  so  important. 

More  Active 

Third  World  Diplomacy 

The  settlement  on  Afghanistan  has 
given  further  impetus  to  efforts  to  re- 
solve other  regional  conflicts.  Presider 
Reagan  outlined,  in  a  speech  to  the  U 
General  Assembly  in  1985,  a  process  f 
resolving  these  conflicts  that  involved 
first  and  foremost,  dialogue  and  nego- 
tiation among  the  warring  parties 
themselves  because  any  durable  solu- 
tion must  accommodate  the  interests  ( 
those  most  directly  concerned.  The 
form  of  these  negotiations  should  and 
does  vary,  but  often  a  multilateral 
forum  or  institution  like  the  United 
Nations  is  involved. 

The  United  States  has  played  a 
role  in  a  number  of  these  negotiations 
and  our  peace  efforts  have  begun  to  p 
off. 

•  We  were  pleased  by  the  recent 
breakthrough  to  a  cease-fire  in  the  w: 
between  Iran  and  Iraq.  The  Admin- 
istration worked  long  and  hard  to  get 
the  parties  to  agree  to  UN  Resolutioi 
.598.  The  parties'  sheer  exhaustion  aft 
8  years  of  armed  conflict  as  well  as  th 
personal  mediating  efforts  of  the  Sect 
tary  General  [Javier  Perez  de  Cuellar 
have  brought  the  parties  to  the  nego- 
tiating table.  But  part  of  the  success 
has  also  been  directly  related  to  our 
willingness  to  commit  air  and  naval 
units  to  the  gulf.  Our  presence  acted 
inhibit  Iranian  attacks  against  neutra 
shipping  as  well  as  intimidation  of  gul 
states. 

•  We  have  also  seen  forward  movi 
ment  in  southern  Africa  and  Cambod 
[Assistant  Secretary  for  African  Af- 
fairs] Chet  Crocker's  patient  diplo- 
macy— backed  up  by  our  support  for 
Jonas  Savimbi  and  his  UNITA  [Na- 
tional Union  for  the  Total  Independer 
of  Angola]  forces — may  be  on  the  verj 
of  achieving  an  agi'eement  that  will 
both  remove  Cuban  troops  from  Angc 
and  bring  freedom  and  independence 
Namibia. 


42 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1£ 


MILITARY  AFFAIRS 


In  Cambodia,  we — along  with 
ina,  the  ASEAN  [Association  of 
ith  East  Asian  Nations]  states,  and 
ers — have  pursued  a  policy  of  isolat- 

Vietnam  diplomatically  and  eco- 
nically  as  well  as  supporting  the 
icommunist  resistance  forces  in 

bodia.  There  is  some  evidence  that 
•  efforts  have  begun  to  bear  fruit. 
;  pace  of  the  diplomacy,  with  [Cam- 
lian  independence  leader]  Prince 
anouk  in  the  lead,  has  quickened  in 
ent  months.  The  key  to  a  solution 
1  remains,  however,  Vietnamese 
■eement  to  a  prompt  and  total  with- 
wal  from  Cambodia. 


ture  Trends 

can  take  some  satisfaction  in  these 
lievements.  As  we  look  to  the  future, 

can  also  build  on  the  record  of  this 
ministration.  Global  trends  are  mov- 

our  way. 

Freedom  and  democracy  are  on 

move  from  Argentina  to  El  Sai- 
lor, from  the  Philippines  to  South 
rea.  In  Latin  America,  for  instance, 
y  30%  of  the  people  were  living  un- 
•  democratic  governments  in  our  bi- 
tennial  year.  Today  that  percentage 

increased  to  90%. 

Freedom  and  initiative  are  in- 
asingly  recognized  as  the  source  of 
nomic  dynamism  and  prosperity, 
rket  economies  are  prospering;  com- 
nd  economies  are  seen  for  what  they 

-sluggish,  insensitive  bureaucracies 
t  stifle  growth.  Free  economic  sys- 
is  are  pi-opelling  the  Pacific  Basin 
'ard  unprecedented  prosperity.  Free 
rkets  are  making  inroads  into  China 
1  Eastern  Europe.  And  even  the  So- 
ts are  experimenting  with  ways  to 
;en  the  constraints  of  their  centrally 
nned  economy. 

A  second  major  trend  running  in 
r  favor  is  the  continued  and  grow- 
;  weight  of  our  allies,  especially 
rope  and  Japan,  in  the  world  econ- 

y.  Some  see  in  this  development  the 
;line  of  America.  It  is  true  that  our 
ight  in  the  world  economy  has  de- 
led in  relative — though  not  abso- 
i — terms,  and  it  is  also  true  that 
re  are  things  that  we  as  a  nation 
1st  do  to  make  ourselves  more 
npetitive. 

But  we  should  not  lose  sight  of  the 
t  that  the  economic  prosperity  of  our 
ies  is  the  result  of  a  policy  initiated 
d  sustained  by  the  United  States  it- 
f.  Over  the  last  40  years,  the  United 
ates  has  promoted  economic  pros- 


perity and  political  stability  in  Western 
Europe  and  Japan  and  maintained  close 
alliances  with  them.  The  current  situa- 
tion attests  to  how  successful  we  have 
been  in  achieving  that  central  goal. 

U.S.  leadership  will  remain  funda- 
mental to  the  maintenance  of  global 
stability.  Both  Europe  and  Japan  desire 
the  United  States  to  play  an  active  role 
in  the  world.  But  changing  circum- 
stances will  require  some  adjustments 
in  our  respective  roles. 

•  We  will  have  to  exercise  our  spe- 
cial responsibilities  in  an  increasingly 
subtle  and  cooperative  way.  This 
change  to  a  more  consensual  style  of 
leadership  has  already  been  occurring 
in  the  international  financial  realm,  and 
I  would  expect  that  the  role  of  key  Eu- 
ropean countries  in  NATO  decisionmak- 
ing will  continue  to  expand. 

•  For  their  part,  our  NATO  allies 
and  Japan  must  ensure  that  we  have 
the  same  access  to  their  markets  as 
they  have  to  ours.  They  should  also  ex- 
pect, in  coming  years,  to  bear  a  greater 
share  of  the  defense  and  security  bur- 
den. There  may  be  differences  over  sta- 
tistics, but  there  is  little  doubt  that  the 
U.S.  taxpayer  bears  a  greater  burden 
for  the  collective  defense  than  do  his 
counterparts  in  NATO  Europe  or 
Japan.  With  the  United  States  running 
a  massive  trade  deficit  with  both  those 
areas,  the  current  allocation  of  burdens 
is  not  politically  sustainable.  In  some 
cases,  our  allies  will  have  to  assume  a 
somewhat  greater  responsibility  for 
their  direct  defense;  in  other  cases, 
they  will  have  to  play  a  more  active  role 
in  nonmilitary  areas  such  as  interna- 
tional peacekeeping  operations,  re- 
gional development,  and  Third  World 
debt. 

The  current  base  negotiations  with 
the  Governments  of  Greece,  Spain,  and 
the  Philippines — where  we  deploy 
important  Air  Force  assets  of  interest 
to  this  audience — demonstrate  some  of 
the  problems  of  making  these  adjust- 
ments in  a  fair  and  dispassionate  man- 
ner. We  are  prepared  to  consider 
adjustments  in  the  force  structure  to 
reflect  changing  circumstances,  but  we 
are  deeply  concerned  when  our  allies 
appear  to  approach  these  negotiations 
on  the  supposition  that  our  military 
presence  benefits  the  United  States 
alone  or  that  the  only  thing  linking  us 
is  a  cash  nexus. 


We  and  they  should  be  clear  about 
the  function  of  those  bases.  Jeane 
Kirkpatrick  put  it  well  in  a  recent  edi- 
torial: the  United  States  does  not  seek 
empire  or  hegemony  in  either  Europe 
or  the  Pacific;  we  are  there  to  foster  a 
world  of  independent  self-governing  na- 
tions, and  we  recognize  the  power  of 
local  nationalism.  But  the  last  40  years 
have  shown  that  aspirations  for  national 
independence  can  best  be  realized  in  a 
system  of  collective  security.  If  our  al- 
lies no  longer  share  this  belief — or  have 
come  to  the  conclusion  that  these  bases 
are  dearer  to  our  security  than  to 
theirs — then  we  are  prepared  to  draw 
appropriate  conclusions. 

A  third  trend  giving  ground  for 
optimism  over  the  next  decade  is  de- 
velopments in  the  Soviet  Union  and 
Eastern  Europe.  It  is  likely  that,  for 
the  foreseeable  future,  this  entire  re- 
gion will  be  preoccupied  with  a  pro- 
tracted systemic  crisis  that  may 
produce  serious  political  unrest. 

•  Failure  in  the  U.S.S.R.  is  evident 
in  declining  economic  growth  rates — 5% 
growth  rates  in  the  1960s  had  fallen  to 
2%  by  the  1970s  and  0%  by  the  early 
1980s. 

•  It  is  evident  in  the  slow  pace  of 
Soviet  technological  development  and 
in  the  increase  in  consumer  dissatis- 
faction. 

•  It  is  evident  in  a  spiritual  malaise 
that  has  resulted  in  rampant  crime,  cor- 
ruption, and  alcoholism. 

Unless  these  trends  are  reversed, 
the  Soviet  Union  will  not  enter  the  21st 
century  as  a  great  power.  To  deal  with 
this  situation,  Gorbachev  has  proposed 
far-reaching  political  and  economic  re- 
forms. The  primary  implication  for  us 
of  these  changes  is  a  potentially  in- 
creased subordination  of  Soviet  national 
security  and  foreign  policy  to  Soviet  do- 
mestic imperatives.  If  the  Soviet  Union 
is  to  address  successfully  its  internal 
problems,  it  will  need  a  long  period  of 
relaxation  of  tensions  with  us  and  other 
major  powers. 

If  we  negotiate  with  persistence 
and  patience  and  maintain  our 
strength,  we  may  have  a  unique  oppor- 
tunity to  achieve  some  of  our  more  fun- 
damental goals  on  the  way  to  a  s^fer 
and  more  peaceful  world. 

In  human  rights,  we  will  want  to 
press  the  Soviets  to  institutionalize  not 
only  the  right  to  free  emigration  but 
basic  political  and  religious  freedoms 
as  well. 


ipartment  of  State  Bulletin/November  1988 


43 


NARCOTICS 


In  arms  control,  we  will  want  to 
continue  to  press  for  early  conclusion  of 
a  START  agreement.  In  the  emerging 
talks  on  conventional  arms,  we  may 
have  an  opportunity  to  reduce  the  level 
of  military  confrontation  in  Europe.  We 
should  test  Gorbachev's  professed  will- 
ingness to  make  assymmetrical  cuts 
and  to  restructure  Soviet  forces  to  a 
"defensive"  posture. 

On  regional  issues,  we  should  con- 
tinue to  test  the  Soviets'  willingness  to 
resolve  regional  conflicts  by  urging 
them  to  weigh  in  with  the  Cubans  and 
Angolans  to  remove  Cuban  troops  from 
Angola;  with  the  Vietnamese  to  set  a 
timetable  for  the  prompt  withdrawal  of 
their  troops  from  Cambodia;  with 
Qadhafi  to  cease  support  for  terrorism; 
and  with  clients  such  as  Syria  and  the 
PLO  [Palestine  Liberation  Organiza- 
tion] to  take  a  more  reasonable  posture 
on  the  Middle  East  peace  process.  We 
also  shall  continue  to  insist  on  the  ces- 
sation of  Soviet  arms  shipments  to 
Nicaragua. 

These  three  trends — the  spread  of 
democracy  and  the  market  economy, 
the  economic  prosperity  and  political 
stability  of  our  allies,  and  the  process 
of  change  underway  in  the  Soviet 
Union — augur  well  for  the  U.S.  se- 
curity. Alongside  the  signs  of  hope  and 
progress,  however,  there  are  a  number 
of  other  trends  that  remind  us  that 
there  is  little  reason  to  rest  on  our 
oars.  Two  trends  are  particularly 
onerous. 

•  The  first  is  the  diffusion  of  ad- 
vanced weapons  systems  in  volatile  re- 
gions of  the  Third  World.  We  see,  for 
instance,  the  proliferation  of  missile 
and  chemical  weapons  technology  into 
the  Middle  East.  The  Iran-Iraq  war 
was  marked  by  a  number  of  distasteful 
"firsts."  Until  this  conflict,  ballistic 
missiles  had  not  been  used  since  World 
War  II  against  civilians.  And  we  must 
go  all  the  way  back  to  the  First  World 
War  to  find  such  frequent  and  wide- 
spread use  of  chemical  weapons.  These 
are  very  disturbing  precedents  in  a 
world  where  the  proliferation  of  me- 
dium- to  high-technology  armaments  is 
increasingly  common. 

The  implication  for  U.S.  forces  of 
this  proliferation  of  weaponry  is  all  too 
clear.  Third  World  conflicts  are  becom- 
ing increasingly  dangerous.  Quick  re- 
sponse by  superior  forces  will  be 
essential  if  we  want  to  have  an  impact 
on  such  conflicts — either  to  deter  them 
or,  if  our  vital  interests  require  it,  to 


apply  effective  counterforce.  To  be 
credible  and  effective,  our  forces  will 
have  to  be  highly  mobile  and  capable  of 
operating  and  supporting  themselves  in 
distant  theaters. 

•  Finally,  a  second  trend  of  special 
concern — and  let  me  conclude  on  this 
note — concerns  the  budget.  I  need  re- 
mind no  one  in  this  room  about  the 
need  for  adequate  resources  to  do  the 
job.  Those  departments  with  special  re- 
sponsibilities for  our  national  security — 
State  and  Defense — have  been  hard  hit 
by  budgetary  stringencies.  In  many 
ways,  budgetary  trends  are  even  more 
troublesome  for  us  at  State  than  they 
are  for  Defense.  From  fiscal  year  (FY) 
1985  to  FY  1988,  State  sustained  a  re- 
duction of  almost  one-third  of  our  for- 
eign policy  budget  base — from  over  .$26 
billion  to  about  $18  billion. 

As  I  stated  earlier,  the  commit- 
ment of  our  allies  to  America's  se- 
curity— as  ours  to  their  own — is 
essential.  But  many  of  our  friends 
around  the  world  lack  the  ability  to 
support  their  own  national  defense  re- 
quirements as  well  as  provide  resources 
for  economic  development.  We  know 
they  must  do  both  if  they  are  to  survive 
and  prosper.  Consequently,  we  provide 
defense  and  economic  support.  We  also 
provide  security  assistance  to 
strengthen  the  defenses  of  friends  and 
allies  who  provide  us  with  access  to 
military  facilities  in  the  interest  of  mu- 
tual security.  Portugal,  Greece,  Turkey, 
and  the  Philippines  are  examples.  We 


must  maintain  these  commitments.  A?i 
our  allies  need  to  stand  firm  on  their  I 
responsibilities  in  pursuit  of  mutual  i 
security. 

Further  cuts  in  security  assistanc 
programs  can  only  place  at  risk  our 
ability  to  maintain  the  degree  of  pres- 
ence and  influence  that  we  need  in  vai 
ous  areas  of  the  globe.  Low  levels  of 
security  assistance  will  make  it  in- 
creasingly difficult  to  meet  our  global  I 
responsibilities.  Inadequate  capabiliti( 
can  only  erode  the  confidence  of  friem 
and  allies  while  tempting  adversaries 
fill  the  void. 

We  all  fully  understand  the  part 
each  of  us  must  play  in  trying  to  redu 
the  burden  imposed  by  the  Federal 
budget  deficit.  And  State  is  doing  its 
part.  But,  as  Secretary  Shultz  told  th 
Congress: 

We  must  not  allow  the  American  eag 
to  become  so  undernourished  or  so  encui 
bered  in  her  flight  that  she  looses  her  gr 
on  either  the  arrows  or  the  olive  branch. 
Neither  this  Administration  nor  the  nexi 
one  can  afford  to  let  that  happen.  Far  tc 
much  is  riding  on  her  wings. 

The  allusion  to  the  eagle  in  flight 
particuarly  apt  for  this  audience,  an  ; 
sociation  which  has  done  so  much  to 
ensure  the  vitality  of  American  air 
power.  For  your  assistance  in  further 
ing  the  ability  of  America's  diplomat! 
corps  to  implement  U.S.  foreign  poli( 
I  extend  my  heartfelt  thanks. 


Task  Force  on  Narcotics 
Meets  in  Washington 


CHAIRMAN'S  STATEMENT, 
SEPT.  8,  1988' 


Introduction 

Following  the  request  made  by  leaders 
at  the  Toronto  economic  summit,  repre- 
sentatives from  Canada,  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany,  Italy,  Japan,  the 
United  Kingdom,  and  the  United  States 
met  in  Washington  on  September  6-8, 
1988,  to  discuss  priorities  for  action  in 
the  fight  against  drug  abuse. 

The  representatives  noted  with 
grave  concern  the  terrible  toll  which 
the  drug  trade  is  taking  in  their  coun- 
tries, as  well  as  the  tragic  price  in  hu- 


man lives  that  is  being  paid  all  over  t 
world  as  a  result  of  illicit  drug  use, 
including  its  association  with  the  HF 
infection  in  a  number  of  countries,  ai 
the  wave  of  criminality  associated  wi 
it.  The  representatives  agreed  that  s 
cess  in  the  fight  against  illicit  drugs 
requires  the  widest  possible  interna- 
tional cooperation  in  demand  and  suj 
ply  reduction  efforts. 

Demand  Reduction 

The  representatives  recognized  that 
their  countries  account  for  a  large  pi 
portion  of  the  world  drug  market  am 
that  it  is,  therefore,  imperative  for 
them  to  act  to  reduce  their  demand 


44 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1! 


NARCOTICS 


:it  drugs.  The  representatives  be- 
red  that  the  long-term  commitment 
prevention,  identification,  interven- 
1,  treatment,  and  rehabilitation  is  as 
;essary  as  controlling  the  production 
]  the  supply  of  drugs.  The  repre- 
itatives  support  the  recommenda- 
is  contained  in  the  UN  comprehen- 
e  multidisciplinary  outline  of  future 
ivities  in  drug  abuse  control  as  an 
egral  part  of  an  effective  strategy  to 
uce  the  problems  associated  with  il- 
t  drug  use. 
Although  each  country  must  devise 
own  programs  and  legislation  to  en- 
irage  demand  reduction,  there  is 
pe  for  international  action  with  a 
w  to  achieving  the  following 
ectives: 

To  implement  specific  domestic 
asures  to  reduce  demand  and 

To  coordinate  and  share  results 
intidrug  research  and  technical 
'elopment  efforts,  using  existing 
chanisms. 

A  sound,  effective,  and  compre- 
isive  drug  strategy  must  include 
tnerships  among  governments, 
igovernmental  organizations,  and 
vate  citizens. 

The  countries  represented  are 
nly  committed  to  pursuing  their  de- 
iid  reduction  efforts  and  agree  that 
hout  a  long-term  demand  reduction 
itegy,  other  efforts  to  curb  the  in- 
V  of  drugs  will  be  doomed  to  failure. 
iy  stressed  that  demand  reduction  is 
integral  part  of  any  effective  drug 
trol  program. 

)ceeds  From  Illicit 
iffic  in  Drugs 

representatives  at  this  meeting 
ommended  initiatives  relating  to: 

Improving  cooperation  among  fi- 
icial  authorities  and  institutions  to 
•b  money  laundering  and  the  flow  of 
:it  drug  trafficking  proceeds  and 

The  adoption  of  measures  for  the 
ntification,  tracing,  freezing,  and 
ifiscation  of  proceeds  derived  from  il- 
t  drug  trafficking. 

Drug  traffickers  commonly  attempt 
launder  the  proceeds  of  their  crimes 
ough  banks  and  financial  institutions 
0  legitimate  activities.  The  integrity 
the  financial  system,  as  well  as  of 
ancial  markets,  is  thus  undermined, 
priving  traffickers  of  their  profits  is 
efficient  deterrent  means  against  il- 
it  trafficking.  Tracing  illegal  proceeds 
often  a  good  starting  point  for  trac- 


ing and  prosecuting  drug  traffickers. 
Effective  measures  such  as  those  con- 
templated in  the  UN  draft  convention 
against  illicit  traffic  in  narcotic  drugs 
and  psychotropic  substances  can  be 
taken  against  criminal  money  launder- 
ing without  impairing  legitimate 
business. 

The  representatives  welcomed  and 
endorsed  the  initiatives  being  taken  by 
the  financial  regulatory  authorities  (in- 
cluding the  Basle  Committee  on  Bank- 
ing Regulation  and  Supervisory 
Activities  and  bankers'  associations)  to 
encourage  cooperation,  vigilance,  and 
the  maintenance  of  high  ethical  stand- 
ards (among  other  things,  through 
codes  of  conduct  requiring  "know-your- 
customer"  policies)  among  the  banks 
and  the  financial  institutions  they 
supervise. 

Economic  Development  and 
Assistance 

The  representatives  confirmed  their 
view  that  development  assistance  and 
narcotics  enforcement  must  go  hand-in- 
hand  and  urged  that  donor  nations  and 
organizations  and  recipient  countries 
include  in  their  dialogues  their  mutual 
commitments  to  reducing  illicit  drug 
use,  trafficking,  production,  and  crop 
cultivation.  Economic  and  development 
assistance  can  provide  the  necessary 
social  and  economic  infrastructure 
needed  in  many  countries  to  parallel 
and/or  facilitate  their  enforcement 
efforts.  Donor  assistance  should  also  be 
used  for  demand  reduction  and  public 
awareness  programs. 

The  representatives  also  agreed 
that  narcotics  control  objectives  should 
be  mutually  deliberated  by  donor  and 
recipient  countries,  in  consultation  with 
international  organizations  where  multi- 
lateral aid  is  involved  with  the  ultimate 
goal  of  achieving  coordinated  narcotics- 
related  assistance  objectives  for  each 
major  source  region. 

Criminal  Justice  and  Law 
Enforcement 

In  the  criminal  justice  and  law  enforce- 
ment field,  the  representatives  identi- 
fied three  critical  areas  for  increased 
international  cooperation: 

•  Intelligence  sharing; 

•  Monitoring  of  precursor  chem- 
icals; and 

•  Provision  of  law  enforcement 
training  equipment. 


They  were  hopeful  that  the  UN 
draft  convention  will  enhance  interna- 
tional cooperation  in  all  three  areas. 
The  representatives  agreed  that  once 
the  UN  draft  convention  is  ratified,  it 
is  crucial  that  it  be  used  to  its  full 
potential. 

UN  Draft  Convention 

The  representatives  expressed  their 
strong  support  for  the  ongoing  work  on 
drafting  a  new  international  convention 
[against  illicit  traffic  in  narcotic  drugs 
and  psychotropic  substances]  which  will 
greatly  enhance  international  coopera- 
tion in  the  fight  against  drug  traffick- 
ing. They  look  forward  to  the  successful 
negotiation  of  this  convention  in  Vienna 
in  November-December  1988.  The  adop- 
tion of  such  an  international  convention 
will  represent  a  major  step  forward. 

The  representatives  are  confident 
that  all  countries  will  approach  the 
plenipotentiary  conference  in  a  spirit  of 
cooperation  so  this  crucial  step  is  suc- 
cessfully completed.  Their  countries 
pledge  to  promote  international  coopei-- 
ation  in  the  fight  against  drug  traffick- 
ing and  to  work  to  ensure  that  the 
convention  serves  as  a  powerful  instru- 
ment in  these  efforts. 


'The  chairman  of  this  meeting  of  the 
task  force  was  Ann  B.  Wrobleski,  As- 
sistant Secretary  for  International  Narcot- 
ics Matters.  ■ 


Ipartment  of  State  Bulletin/November  1988 


45 


PACIFIC 


REFUGEES 


Palau  Supreme  Court 

Rules  Compact  Not  Approved 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
AUG.  30,  19881 

On  August  29,  1988,  the  Appeals  Divi- 
sion of  the  Palau  Supreme  Court  ruled 
on  a  lawsuit  brought  last  March  before 
the  Trial  Division  of  the  Palau  Supreme 
Court  challenging  the  legality  of  the 
August  4,  1987,  constitutional  amend- 
ment referendum  in  Palau  that  led  to 
the  August  21,  1987,  approval  of  the 
Compact  of  Free  Association  by  the 
Palauan  people.  The  Appeals  Division, 
which  consists  of  three  judges  all  of 
whom  are  members  of  the  Palau  Su- 
preme Court,  ruled  that  the  compact 
approval  process  of  last  August  in  Palau 
was  valid  in  all  respects  except  that  the 
procedure  employed  by  the  Palau  Na- 
tional Congress  (the  Olbiil  Era  Kelu- 
lan)  to  call  the  amendment  referendum 
was  defective.  The  court  thus  concluded 
that  the  results  of  the  referendum,  in 
which  some  73%  of  the  Palauan  voters 
approved  the  constitutional  amend- 
ment, did  not  operate  to  amend  the 
constitution. 

Since  the  constitutional  amendment 
is  not  effective,  the  compact  plebiscite 
of  August  21,  1987,  in  which  the  people 
of  Palau  approved  the  compact  by  a 
73%  majority,  also  had  no  legal  effect. 
The  unamended  terms  of  the  Palau 
Constitution  had  been  earlier  inter- 
preted by  the  Palau  Supreme  Court  to 
require  a  75%  majority  to  approve  the 
compact.  Thus  the  ultimate  effect  of  the 
Palau  Supreme  Court's  ruling  of  Au- 
gust 29  is  that  Palau  has  not  yet  ap- 
proved the  Compact  of  Free  Association 
according  to  its  constitution. 

The  Government  of  Palau,  under 
President  Thomas  Remengesau,  re- 
mains committed  to  the  Compact  of 
Free  Association.  It  is  now  considering 
alternatives  to  put  the  question  of  com- 
pact approval  again  before  the  Palauan 
people.  The  following  is  the  text  of  a 
statement  from  the  office  of  President 
Remengesau  reacting  to  the  Palau  Su- 
preme Court  decision: 

"The  Office  of  the  President  of 
Palau: 

"The  Appellate  Division  of  the 
Palau  Supreme  Court  ruled  today,  Au- 
gust 29,  1988,  that  the  August  04,  1987, 
constitutional  amendment  referendum 
and  the  August  21,  1987,  referendum  on 
the  Compact  of  Free  Association  were 


null  and  void  because  the  Olbiil  Era 
Kelulau  (the  Palau  National  Congress) 
did  not  adopt  by  a  three-fourths  vote  of 
the  members  of  each  house  a  resolution 
approving  the  August  04,  1987,  place- 
ment on  the  ballot  of  the  constitutional 
amendment.  It  was  adopted  by  legisla- 
tion approved  by  simple  majority  of  the 
members  of  each  house. 

"The  Trial  Court  had  earlier  ruled 
that  there  was  no  inconsistency  be- 
tween the  Constitution  of  Palau  and  the 
Compact  of  Free  Association.  The  Ap- 
pellate Division,  however,  overturned 
that  ruling  and  stated  that  there,  in- 


deed, were  conflicts  between  the  two 
documents  and  that  the  constitution 
could  be  amended  at  any  time  to  re- 
solve those  inconsistencies.  Palau's  ne\ 
President,  Thomas  0.  Remengesau, 
intends  to  immediately  consult  with  tl 
leadership  of  the  Olbiil  Era  Kelulau, 
the  Council  of  Chiefs,  and  state  gover- 
nors to  determine  how  best  to  get  the 
compact  approved  legitimately  by  the 
Palau  people." 


'Made  available  to  news  eorrespondei 
by  Department  deputy  spokesman  Phylli 
Oakley.  ■ 


U.S.  Responds  to  Southern  Africa 
Refugee  Crisis 


by  Jonathan  Moore 

Address  before  the  Conference  on 
Southern  African  Refugees,  Returnees, 
and  Displaced  Persons  on  August  23, 
1988,  in  Oslo.  Ambassador  Moore  is 
U.S.  Coordinator  for  Refugee  Affairs. 

Opening  the  1979  Arusha  conference  on 
the  situation  of  refugees  in  Africa, 
[then-President  of  Tknzania]  Julius 
Nyerere  proclaimed: 

This  conference  is  about  people;  about 
the  prospects,  and  indeed  the  very  life  of 
people  who  are  now,  or  may  in  future  be, 
forced  to  flee  from  their  homelands  and 
seek  refuge  in  another  country  in  order  to 
escape  persecution,  or  death,  or  starva- 
tion. .  .  .  This  conference  has  to  face  up  to 
the  implications  of  our  common  humanity 
with  these  millions  of  souls.  They  are  vic- 
tims of  forces  beyond  their  control:  It  could 
happen  to  any  of  us.  The  manner  in  which 
they  now  unavoidably  look  to  us  for  succor 
may  be  the  way  we  ourselves  will  tomor- 
row be  looking  to  others. 

These  words  ring  true  today  as  we 
consider  the  plight  of  the  more  than  5 
million  refugees  and  displaced  persons 
of  southern  Africa.  Their  suffering  and 
the  dangerous  instability  of  the  south- 
ern African  region  demand  the  highest 
priority  attention  and  the  best  con- 
certed efforts  of  the  international  com- 
munity. The  U.S.  delegation  is,  there- 
fore, proud  to  associate  itself  with  this 
conference  and  its  goals:  The  solidarity 


of  the  spirit  and  the  rehabilitation  of 
the  society. 

It  is  singularly  fitting  that  our  cc 
sulfations  about  these  tragic  refugee 
problems  are  taking  place  in  Norway. 
The  contributions  of  the  Government 
and  people  of  Norway  on  behalf  of  rei 
gees  are  beacons  of  sacrifice,  dedica- 
tion, and  generosity.  Norwegians  lea( 
the  entire  world  in  their  contribution 
per  capita  and  as  a  percentage  of  GN 
[gross  national  product],  to  the  inter 
tional  organizations  which  protect  an 
assist  refugees. 

Norway's  legendary  native  son, 
Fridtjof  Nansen,  formulated  the  idea 
and  established  the  structures  of  int( 
national  refugee  assistance  as  the  fir 
commissioner  for  refugees.  The  mem 
ory  of  Nansen's  tireless  entreaties  to 
governments  and  individuals  to  assis 
refugees  earlier  in  this  century  still 
lives  everywhere.  The  United  Nation 
and  its  partners  work  to  help  desper 
people. 

To  the  Government  of  Norway,  tl 
Organization  of  African  Unity,  the 
United  Nations,  and  to  all  who  have 
worked  to  provide  this  forum  on  beh; 
of  the  helpless  victims  in  southern  A 
rica,  I  wish  to  express  our  heartfelt 
thanks. 


46 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  l!t6 

i 


REFUGEES 


e  Situation 
Southern  Africa 

is  indeed  an  indictment  of  our  age 
it  once  again  we  must  meet  to  try  to 
;over  the  lives  of  a  vast  group  of  refu- 
;s  and  displaced  persons.  We  have 
ne  together  because  of  our  shared 
icern  for  the  tragic  conditions  of  the 
ugees  in  southern  Africa.  We  are 
and  by  our  common  anguish  about 
>  suffering  and  deprivation  which  so 
ny  of  these  refugees  and  displaced 
-sons  have  endured;  and  all  of  us  feel 
ommon  revulsion  to  the  cruelties  per- 
orated against  innocent  people.  We 
n  in  common  purpose  to  save  the  ref- 
ees  and  to  aid  them  in  their  search 
productive  lives  with  dignity  and 
tice. 

The  causes  of  the  immense  suffer- 
:  in  southern  Africa  are  well  known, 
ustice,  poverty,  violence,  natural  di- 
.ters,  and  the  repressive,  intolerable 
icy  of  apartheid  in  South  Africa  have 
iwned  conditions  which  are  echoed  in 
■  tragedies  of  Indochina,  South  Asia, 
1  the  Horn.  In  such  a  world,  we 
jht  become  inured  to  a  seemingly 
iless  succession  of  transgi'essions, 
,  if  we  turned  our  backs  on  the  vul- 
•able  and  needy,  we  would  lose  the 
se  of  our  own  humanity. 

During  1987,  refugee  numbers  in- 
ased  dramatically  in  southern  Af- 
1.  I  traveled  to  the  region  in  March 
;hat  year  and  was  alarmed  by  the 
ge  groups  of  Mozambicans  who  were 
placed  in  Mozambique  or  dispersed 
refugees  in  Tanzania.  Malawi,  Zam- 
,  Zimbabwe,  Swaziland,  and  South 
•ica.  Subsequently,  as  these  flows 
itinued,  I  commissioned  a  study  in 
:er  to  learn  more  about  their  causes, 
ich  was  completed  earlier  this  year. 

What  emerged  from  the  interviews 
,h  Mozambican  refugees  and  dis- 
ced persons  was  a  consistently  hor- 
nng  account  of  the  most  appalling 
ttality.  Copies  of  the  report  are  avail- 
e  here  today.  I  commend  it  to  your 
ding.  The  cries  of  RENAMO's" 
ozambique  National  Resistance 
vement]  victims  implore  us  to  act. 

It  is  a  godsend  that  so  many 
zambicans  have  found  refuge  in  the 
ler  countries  of  southern  Africa.  We 
ute  this  extraordinary  hospitality, 
ich,  unfortunately,  is  not  matched  in 
areas  of  the  world.  Many  African 
ions  with  lower  per  capita  GNP, 
her  ratio  of  refugees  to  indigenous 
pulation,  and  less  foreign  assistance, 
rertheless,  preserve  first  aslyum 
ire  faithfully  than  other  nation  states 


which  are  better  off  in  all  categories. 
We  recognize  that  the  burden  grows 
heavier,  but  we  urge  Africans  and  their 
governments  to  continue  their  profound 
traditions  of  refuge  and  sharing.  We 
pledge  our  continued  strong  support  for 
these  efforts,  which  illuminate  man's 
capacity  for  spiritual  as  well  as  physical 
survival. 

As  a  nation  of  refugees  and  immi- 
grants, the  people  of  the  United  States 
are  profoundly  moved  by  the  ordeal  of 
those  forced  to  flee  their  homes.  Amer- 
icans have  consistently  reached  out  to 
share  the  burden  of  refugees,  retur- 
nees, and  displaced  persons  through 
the  UN  High  Commissioner  for  Refu- 
gees (UNHCR),  the  International  Com- 
mittee of  the  Red  Cross  (ICRC),  the 
World  Food  Program,  UNICEF  [UN 
Children's  Fund],  and  the  courageous 
private  voluntary  organizations. 

Since  1980,  the  United  States  has 
provided  over  $1  billion  in  development 
assistance  to  the  countries  of  southern 
Africa  to  help  ameliorate  the  poverty 
that  can  cause  conditions  of  refugee 
flows  and  displacement — including  $25 
million  per  year  in  legal  and  other  as- 
sistance to  the  victims  of  apartheid 
within  South  Africa.  Our  humanitarian 
assistance  to  refugees  in  southern  Af- 
rica has  amounted  to  another  $300  mil- 
lion since  1980.  I  am  most  pleased  to 
announce  today  an  immediate  further 
emergency  contribution  of  $10.5  million 
in  refugee-related  help.  Of  this  total, 
$5.5  million  will  be  in  response  to  the 
urgent  appeals  by  ICRC  for  its  African 
programs.  The  balance  of  $5  million  will 
be  contributed  to  UNHCR  for  Mozam- 
bican refugees  and  for  refugees  in  the 
Horn.  There  must  be  more  help  from 
us,  and  there  will  be,  because  these 
commitments  are  not  fleeting  but  lie 
deep  in  the  hearts  of  the  American 
people. 

Material  resources  alone  cannot 
help  anyone  if  the  available  assistance 
fails  to  reach  the  refugees.  Unfortuna- 
tely, there  are  situations  where  the  in- 
ternational organizations  are  hindered 
in  fulfilling  their  mandates  to  help  all 
refugees,  regardless  of  their  original 
nationalities  and  regardless  of  where 
they  are.  We  are  concerned  about  ex- 
cessively narrow  definitions  of  security 
that  deny  safety  and  help  to  innocent 
civilians  and  insist  on  categorizing  peo- 
ple as  either  supporters  or  enemies, 
and  we  are  troubled  about  politically 
motivated  efforts  to  prevent  interna- 
tional organizations  from  helping  some 
refugees  because  of  who  or  where  they 
are.  Neutrality,  which  is  so  fundamen- 
tal to  the  provision  of  international  hu- 


manitarian assistance,  is  in  jeopardy. 
Extremely  important  ideals,  which  nur- 
ture the  worldwide  mechanisms  by 
which  refugees  are  helped  and  pro- 
tected, may  be  crippled  and  compro- 
mised. Denying  humanitarian  assist- 
ance as  a  weapon  of  war  is  an 
unjustifiable  practice,  which  must  not 
be  used  by  any  party  to  conflict. 

The  conference  sponsors  have  re- 
minded us  that  this  is  not  the  first  time 
we  have  come  together  to  discuss  the 
plight  of  African  refugees  and  retur- 
nees and  the  social,  economic,  and  eco- 
logical burdens  that  they  pose  for  their 
host  countries.  In  1984,  at  the  second 
International  Conference  on  Assistance 
to  Refugees  in  Africa,  we  all  agreed 
that  integrating  refugee  relief  as- 
sistance with  development  aid  was  key 
to  finding  truly  lasting  solutions  in 
areas  of  high  refugee  impact.  Indeed,  it 
is  virtually  impossible  to  separate  the 
two  where  refugees  and  nationals  use 
the  same  systems  providing  health 
care,  education,  and  other  essential 
social  services.  In  this  connection,  the 
recent  meeting  of  the  World  Bank's 
consultative  group  on  Malawi  rightly 
focused  on  both  long-term  development 
issues  a'cl  the  immediate  impact  of  the 
600,000  Mozambican  refugees  on  the 
Malawian  economy. 

Since  every  country  in  southern 
Africa  shares  the  experience  of  having 
hosted  refugees,  it  may  be  that  new 
regional  approaches  to  refugees  and 
development  would  be  fruitful.  In  this 
regard,  we  would  welcome  SADCC 
[Southern  Africa  Development  Coordi- 
nation Conference]  playing  a  greater 
role  in  serving  as  a  coordinating  con- 
duit for  donor  assistance  that  links  ref- 
ugee aid  and  humanitarian  assistance  to 
the  displaced  with  long-term  develop- 
ment assistance. 

Is  there  any  reason  to  hope  that 
the  flows  of  refugees  in  southern  Africa 
might  soon  stop?  Can  we  hope  that 
those  who  are  presently  refugees  must 
soon  be  able  to  return  home?  The  an- 
swers to  these  questions,  of  course,  de- 
pend on  the  conditions  in  the  refugees' 
home  countries.  In  those  places  where 
violence,  persecution,  and  the  violation 
of  basic  rights  occur,  we  should  expect 
people  to  continue  to  see  their  hope  for 
survival  in  crossing  borders  to  escape 
such  actions.  And  it  is  essential  that 
the  natural  temptation  to  repatriate 
refugees  prematurely  be  resisted  until 
conditions  which  can  sustain  and  protect 
life  have  been  adequately  restored,  lest 
the  tragedy  be  compounded  and  the  cy- 
cle be  repeated. 


47 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


TREATIES 


It  is  incumbent  on  all  of  us,  as 
members  of  the  human  family,  not  only 
to  bring  to  bear  all  possible  effective 
resources  to  aid  the  victims  but  also  to 
address  the  problems  which  cause  refu- 
gees to  flee.  In  doing  so,  we  must  be 
prepared  to  see  the  competent  interna- 
tional and  regional  organizations  en- 
gage not  only  those  governments  and 
gi'oups  whose  actions  and  policies  we 
Hke.  It  will  be  imperative  for  channels 
to  be  open  precisely  to  those  who  cause 
the  conditions  which  drive  people  into 
exile. 

Hopeful  Signs 

I  am  encouraged  that  there  are  hopeful 
signs  amidst  the  evidence  of  distress. 
Even  as  we  meet,  another  round  of 
talks  among  the  Governments  of  An- 
gola, Cuba,  and  South  Africa  is  about 
to  begin,  with  the  mediation  of  the 
United  States.  The  cherished  vision  of 
independence  for  Namibia  may  soon  be- 
come reality.  Independence  in  Namibia 
will  create  other  challenges  as  to  how 
to  facilitate  repatriation,  reintegration, 
and  reconciliation.  These  are  challenges 
which  all  of  us  will  welcome. 

So  we  recognize  that  southern  Af- 
rica is  e.xperiencing  a  major  emergency, 


in  which  the  lives  of  millions  of  people 
are  in  grave  danger,  and  that  the  poten- 
tial e.xists  there  for  a  worse  crisis  in 
the  years  to  come.  The  United  States, 
in  concert  with  other  governments  and 
with  the  international  and  regional  or- 
ganizations, will  continue  to  support 
and  strengthen  a  wide  range  of  efforts 
to  help  southern  Africa  heal  that  emer- 
gency and  avoid  that  crisis. 

Exactly  25  years  ago  in  his  speech 
before  the  Lincoln  Memorial,  a  great 
and  sorely  missed  American  political 
leader,  Dr  Martin  Luther  King,  Jr ,  es- 
poused an  ideal  which  ultimately  an- 
swers the  tragedy  of  southern  Africa. 
That  ideal  is  that  there  is  no  peace 
without  justice.  He  said: 

Now  is  the  time  to  lift  our  nation  from 
the  quicksand  of  racial  injustice  to  the 
solid  rock  of  brotherhood.  .  .  .  Let  us  not 
seek  the  satisfy  our  thirst  for  freedom  by 
drinking  from  the  cup  of  bitterness  and 
hatred.  .  .  .  We  must  not  allow  our  creative 
protest  to  degenerate  into  physical  vio- 
lence. .  .  .  Many  of  our  white  brothers,  as 
evidenced  by  their  presence  here  today, 
have  come  to  realize  that  their  destiny  is 
tied  up  with  our  destiny.  .  .  . 

May  God  bless  us  all  with 
compassionate,  dynamic,  and  fruitful 
endeavor.  ■ 


Chilean  Plebiscite 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
AUG.  31,  1988= 

With  the  announcement  by  the  Govern- 
ment of  Chile  of  October  5th  as  the 
date  for  voting  in  the  plebiscite  and  the 
opening  of  the  formal  campaign  period 
yesterday,  the  Chilean  plebiscite  now 
enters  its  crucial  final  phase.  Unprece- 
dented numbers  of  Chileans  have  regis- 
tered to  vote,  and  we  congratulate 
those  who  worked  so  tirelessly  for  the 
broadest  possible  participation  in  the 
plebiscite. 

The  United  States  joins  with  oth- 
ers who  have  called  for  a  vote  in  which 
the  will  of  the  people  can  be  openly 
expressed  in  an  atmosphere  free  of  vio- 
lence and  intimidation.  Although  we  re- 
gret that  it  was  not  done  sooner,  we 
welcomed  the  Government  of  Chile's  de- 
cision on  August  24  to  lift  the  states  of 


exception.  This  action,  combined  with 
the  new  law  authorizing  free  television 
time  to  opposing  views,  improves  condi- 
tions for  a  fair  and  free  plebiscite. 

The  Government  of  Chile  and  espe- 
cially its  armed  forces  have  an  impor- 
tant responsibility  to  assure  its  citizens 
that  there  will  be  a  free  plebiscite  un- 
der peaceful  conditions.  We  have  con- 
sistently encouraged  the  Chilean 
Government  to  take  further  steps  to 
improve  the  balance  of  information 
available  to  voters  and  to  create  an  at- 
mosphere in  which  its  citizens  can  exer- 
cise their  freedom  of  choice  without 
fear  or  intimidation  so  that  Chile  may 
retake  its  rightful  place  in  the  commu- 
nity of  democratic  nations. 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by  De- 
partment deputy  spokesman  Phyllis 
Oaklev.  ■ 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Agriculture 

International  plant  protection  convention 

Done  at  Rome  Dec.  6,  195L  Entered  into 

force  Apr  3,  1952;  for  the  U.S.  Aug.  18, 

1972.  HAS  7465. 

Adherence  deposited:  Turkey,  .July  29, 

1988. 

Revised  text  of  the  international  plant  pi 
tection  convention.  (TIAS  7465)  Adopted 
Rome  Nov.  28,  1979.' 
Acceptances  deposited:  Ecuador,  July  22 
1988;  Turkey,  July  29,  1988. 

Customs 

Convention  establishing  a  Customs  Coop 
ation  Council,  with  annex.  Done  at 
Brussels  Dec.  15,  1950.  Entered  into  fore 
Nov.  4,  1952;  for  the  U.S.  Nov.  5,  1970. 
TIAS  7063. 
Accession  deposited:  Cuba,  July  11,  198 

Human  Rights 

International  convenant  on  economic,  so 

cial,  and  cultural  rights.  Done  at  New  Y 

Dec.  16,  1966.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  3, 

1976.-^ 

Accession  deposited:  Guatemala,  May  li 

1988. 

Judicial  Procedure 

Convention  on  the  law  applicable  to  tru 
and  on  their  recognition.  Done  at  The 
Hague  July  1,  1985.  Enters  into  force  o 
the  first  day  of  the  third  calendar  mont 
after  the  deposit  of  the  third  instrumer 
ratification,  acceptance,  or  approval. 
Signatures:  Italy,  Luxembourg, 
Netheriands,  July  1,  1985;  U.K.,  Jan.  V 
1986;  U.S.,  June  13,  1988. 


Marine  Pollution 

Protocol  of  1984  to  amend  the  internal i 
convention  on  civil  liability  for  oil  polli 
damage.  1969.  Done  at  London  May  25 
1984.'  ISenate]  Treaty  Doc.  99-12. 
Accession  deposited:  Australia,  June  2 
1988. 

Pollution 

Convention  for  the  protection  of  the  oz 
layer,  with  annexes.  Done  at  Vienna 
Mar  22,  1985.  Entered  into  force  Sept 
1988.  [Senate]  Treaty  Doc.  99-9. 
Accession  deposited:  Venezuela,  Sept. 
1988. 

Prisoner  Transfer 

Convention  on  the  transfer  of  sentenc* 

persons.  Done  at  Strasbourg  Mar.  21, 

Entered  into  force  July  1,  1985.  TIAS 

10,s24. 

Territorial  Extension:  Extended  by  th 

U.K.  to  the  British  Virgin  Islands. 

Sept.  9,  1988. 


48 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  Bti 


TREATIES 


d  Cross 

itn, ..]  additional  to  the  Geneva  conven- 
11^  oi  Aug.  12,  1949  (TIAS  3362,  3363. 
1).    '.  ;ri5),  and  relating  to  the  protection 
VI.  I  mis  of  international  armed  conflicts 
■i'Imi  III  I),  with  annexes.  Adopted  at 
111  \:i  lune  8,  1977.  Entered  into  force 
(•    T.  1978.2 

lis  deposited:  Democratic  People's 
of  Korea,  Mar.  9,  1988;  Qatar, 

1M.S8;  Liberia,  June  30,  1988. 

itocol  additional  to  the  Geneva  conven- 
is  of  Aug.  12,  1949  (TIAS  3362,  3363, 
4,  3365),  and  relating  to  the  protection 
iiictims  of  noninternational  armed  con- 
ts  (Protocol  II).  Adopted  at  Geneva 
le  8,  1977.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  7, 
8.2 
gession  deposited:  Liberia,  June  30, 


;ellite  Communications  System 
IMARSAT) 

lendments  to  the  convention  and  operat- 
agreement  on  the  International  Mar- 
ne  Satellite  Organization  (INMARSAT) 
Sept.  3,  1976  (TIAS  9605).  Adopted  at 
iidon  Oct.  16,  1985.' 
:eptances  deposited:  Spain,  July  27, 
8;  Greece,  July  29,  1988. 

ice  Station 

reement  on  cooperation  in  the  detailed 
ign,  development,  operation,  and  utili- 
ion  of  the  permanently  manned  civil 
,ce  station,  with  annex.  Done  at  Wash- 
ton  Sept.  29,  1988.1 
natures:  Belgium,  Canada,  Denmark, 
mce.  Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
ly,  Japan,  Netherlands,  Norway.  Spain, 
K.,  U.S.,  Sept.  29,  1988. 

rangement  concerning  application  of  the 
ice  station  intergovernmental  agreement 
iding  its  entry  into  force.  Done  at  Wash- 
ton  Sept.  29,  1988.  Entered  into  force 
3t.  29,  1988. 

■ties:  Belgium,  Canada,  Denmark, 
ance,  Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
ly,  Netherlands,  Norway,  Spain,  U.K., 


'ture 

nvention  against  torture  and  other 
lel.  inhuman,  or  degrading  treatment  or 
lishment.  Done  at  New  York  Dec.  10, 
14.  Entered  into  force  June  26,  1987. ^ 
tification  deposited:  Guyana,  May  19, 


Katies 

;nna  convention  on  the  law  of  treaties 

tween  states  and  international  organiza- 

ns  or  between  international  organiza- 

ns,  with  annex.  Done  at  Vienna  Mar.  21. 

*6.> 

cession  deposited:  Hungary,  Aug.  17. 


i8. 


BILATERAL 

Canada 

Agreement  amending  and  supplementing 
the  agreement  of  Mar.  9.  1959,  as  amended 
and  supplemented,  governing  tolls  on  the 
St.  Lawrence  Seaway  (TIAS  4192.  5117, 
5608,  6236,  7408,  9003,  9883,  10363),  with 
memorandum  of  agreement.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Washington  Apr.  21 
and  Aug.  10.  1988.  Entered  into  force 
Aug.  10.  1988. 

Memorandum  of  understanding  on  coopera- 
tion in  the  detailed  design,  development, 
operation,  and  utilization  of  the  perma- 
nently manned  civil  space  station.  Signed 
at  Washington  Sept.  29,  1988.  Enters  into 
force  upon  notification  by  each  party  that 
all  necessary  procedures  have  been 
completed. 

Congo 

International  express  mail  agreement,  with 
detailed  regulations.  Signed  at  Brazzaville 
and  Washington  July  15  and  Aug.  12,  1988. 
Entered  into  force  Sept.  15,  1988. 

Cote  d'lvoire 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  and 
rescheduling  of  certain  debts  owed  to. 
guaranteed  by,  or  insured  by  the  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment and  its  agencies,  with  annexes. 
Signed  at  Abidjan  July  14,  1988.  Entered 
into  force  Aug.  26,  1988. 

Czechoslovakia 

Program  of  cooperation  and  exchanges  in 
culture,  education,  science,  technology, 
and  other  fields  for  years  1988-90.  Signed 
at  Washington  Apr.  8.  1988.  Entered  into 
force  Apr.  16,  1988. 

Agreement  amending  agreement  of 
June  25,  July  3  and  22,  1986,  relating  to 
trade  in  certain  textile  products.  Effected 
by  exchange  of  notes  at  Prague  Dec.  21, 
1987,  Apr.  15  and  May  4,  1988.  Entered 
into  force  May  4.  1988. 

International  express  mail  agreement,  with 
detailed  regulations.  Signed  at  Prague  and 
Washington  July  25  and  Aug.  17,  1988.  En- 
tered into  force  Sept.  30,  1988. 

Dominican  Republic 

Agreement  concerning  the  status  of  U.S. 
Government  personnel  temporarily  present 
in  the  Dominican  Republic  in  connection 
with  their  official  duties.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Santo  Domingo  July  20 
and  Aug.  4,  1988.  Entered  into  force 
Aug.  4,  1988. 

Ecuador 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  and 
rescheduling  of  certain  debts  owed  to, 
guaranteed  by.  or  insured  by  the  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment and  its  agencies,  with  annexes. 
Signed  at  Quito  July  8,  1988.  Entered  into 
force  Aug.  22,  1988. 


European  Space  Agency  (ESA) 
Memorandum  of  understanding  on  coopera- 
tion in  the  detailed  design,  development, 
operation,  and  utilization  of  the  perma- 
nently manned  civil  space  station.  Signed 
at  Washington  Sept.  29,  1988.  Enters  into 
force  upon  notification  by  each  party  that 
all  necessary  procedures  have  been 
completed. 

German  Democratic  Republic 

Agreement  for  the  exchange  of  scholars 
from  both  countries  through  the  Fulbright 
Program  for  the  academic  years  1988-89 
and  1989-90.  Signed  at  Berlin  June  22, 
1988.  Entered  into  force  June  22,  1988, 

Indonesia 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
June  3.  1988,  for  the  sale  of  agricultural 
commodities.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Jakarta  July  28,  1988.  Entered 
into  force  July  28,  1988. 

Jamaica 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Nov.  9,  1987,  as  amended,  for  sale  of  agri- 
cultural commodities.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Kingston  Aug.  10,  1988. 
Entered  into  force  Aug.  10,  1988. 

Japan 

Agreement  concerning  .Japan's  financial 
contribution  for  U.S.  administrative  and 
related  expenses  for  the  Japanese  fiscal 
year  1988  pursuant  to  the  mutual  defense 
assistance  agreement  of  Mar.  8.  1954  (TIAS 
2957).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Tokyo  Aug.  23,  1988.  Entered  into  force 
Aug.  23.  1988. 

Mexico 

Minute  276  of  the  International  Boundary 
and  Water  Commission:  Conveyance,  treat- 
ment, and  disposal  of  sewage  at  the 
Nogales  international  sewage  treatment 
plant  under  Minute  227,  with  joint  report. 
Signed  at  Ciudad  Juarez  July  26,  1988.  En- 
tered into  force  Aug.  19,  1988. 

Agreement  modifying  the  agreement  of 
June  18,  1982  (TIAS  10534),  concerning 
land  mobile  service  in  the  bands  470-512 
MHz  and  806-890  HMz  along  the  common 
U.S. -Mexico  border.  Signed  at  Mexico 
Sept.  12,  1988.  Enters  into  force  upon  re- 
ceipt of  notification  from  Mexico  that  the 
formalities  required  by  its  national  legisla- 
tion have  been  completed. 

Pakistan 

Commodity  import  grant  agreement  for  ag- 
ricultural sector  support  program.  Signed 
at  Islamabad  Aug.  4,  1988.  Entered  into 
force  Aug.  4,  1988. 

Program  grant  agreement  for  sectoral  as- 
sistance component  of  the  agricultural  sec- 
tor support.  Signed  at  Islamabad  Aug.  4, 
1988.  Entered  into  force  Aug.  4,  1988. 


49 


PRESS  RELEASES 


PUBLICATIONS 


Papua  New  Guinea 

International  express  mail  agreement  with 
detailed  regulations.  Signed  at  Boroko  and 
Washington  Aug.  4  and  19,  1988.  Entered 
into  force  Sept.  30,  1988. 

Paraguay 

International  express  mail  agreement,  with 
detailed  regulations.  Signed  at  Asuncion 
and  Washington  July  13  and  Aug.  22,  1988. 
Entered  into  force  Sept.  30,  1988. 

Peru 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
June  28,  1988,  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities. Signed  at  Lima  Aug.  12,  1988. 
Entered  into  force  Aug.  12,  1988. 

Turkey 

Agreement  amending  the  air  transport 
agreement  of  Feb.  12,  1946  {TIAS  1538). 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Ankara 
Aug.  17,  1988.  Entered  into  force  Aug.  17, 
1988. 

U.S.S.R. 

Program  of  cooperation  and  exchanges  for 
1989-91,  with  annex.  Signed  at  Moscow 
May  31,  1988.  Entered  into  force  May  31, 
1988;  effective  Jan.  1,  1989. 


Department  of  State 


United  Kingdom 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of 
May  14,  1987,  concerning  Montserrat  and 
narcotics  activities.  Effected  by  exchange 
of  notes  at  Washington  Aug.  26,  1988.  En- 
tered into  force  Aug.  26,  1988. 

Venezuela 

Agreement  extending  the  agreements  of 
Jan.  11,  1980  (TIAS  10649),  for  scientific 
and  technological  cooperation:  Apr.  10, 
1980  (TIAS  106.52),  on  agricultural  coopera- 
tion; Aug.  11,  1980  (TIAS  10651),  for  scien- 
tific and  technological  cooperation  in 
health;  and  the  Feb.  5  and  7,  1980  (TIAS 
10650),  memorandum  of  understanding  on 
cooperation  in  earth  resources  and  geo- 
logical phenomena.  Effected  by  exchange 
of  notes  at  Caracas  July  19  and  21,  1988. 
Entered  into  force  July  21,  1988. 

Zaire 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Feb.  24,  1988,  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Kinshasa  Aug.  13,  1988.  Entered  into  force 
Aug.  13.  1988. 


'Not  in  force. 

-Not  in  force  for  the  U.S. 


Department  of  State 


Free  single  copies  of  the  following  Depai 
ment  of  State  publications  are  available 
from  the  Public  Information  Division,  Bu 
reau  of  Public  Affairs,  Department  of 
State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

President  Reagan 

Prospects  for  a  New  Era  of  World  Peace, 
UN  General  Assembly,  Sept.  26,  1988 
(Current  Policy  #1109). 

Secretary  Shultz 

Proposed  Refugee  Admissions  for  FY  19! 
Senate  Judiciary  Committee,  Sept.  13, 
1988  (Current  Policy  #1103). 

The  Administration's  Approach  to  Middh 
East  Peacemaking,  Washington  Institi 
for  Near  East  Policy,  Wye  Plantation, 
Queenstown,  Md.,  Sept.  16.  1988  (Cur- 
rent Policy  #1104). 

Arms  Control 

Nuclear  Risk  Reduction  Centers  (GIST, 
Sept.  1988). 

East  Asia 

Political  Dimensions  of  a  Changing  Asia 
Assistant  Secretary  Sigur,  U.S. -Asia 
stitute's  sixth  national  leadership  coni 
ence,  Sept.  15,  1988  (Current  Policy 
#1106). 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Office  of  Press  Relations,  Department  of 
State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 


No 


Subject 


H95      9/9         Shultz:  remarks,  question- 
and-answer  session  be- 
fore the  Board  of  Direc- 
tors, General  Federation 
of  Women's  Clubs. 

*196      9/13       Shultz:  statement  before 
the  Senate  Judiciary 
Committee. 

*197  9/15  Shultz:  remarks,  U.S. -Asia 
Institute  National  Lead- 
ership Conference. 

*198      9/16       Shultz:  remarks,  question- 
and-answer  session  be- 
fore the  Asia  Society's 
Washington  Center,  Sept. 
15. 

199  9/19       Shultz:  address,  question- 

and-answer  session  be- 
fore the  Washington  In- 
stitute for  Near  East 
Policy,  Wye  Plantation, 
Sept.  16. 

200  9/19       Shultz:  remarks  before  the 

Washington  Diplomatic 
Community. 
*201      9/21        Shultz:  remarks,  question- 
and-answer  session  be- 
fore the  Voice  of  America 
drug  workshop,  Sept.  20. 


50 


*202      9/22       Shultz:  acceptance  remarks 
upon  receiving  the  Air 
Force  Association's  W. 
Stuart  Symington  Award, 
Sept.  21. 

*203      9/22       Shultz:  luncheon  toast  in 
honor  of  Soviet  Foreign 
Minister  Shevardnadze. 
204      9/23       Shultz:  news  conference  fol- 
lowing meeting  with  So- 
viet Foreign  Minister 
Shevardnadze. 

*205      9/28       Shultz:  news  briefing.  New 
York,  Sept.  27. 

*206  9/28  Program  for  the  official 
working  visit  to  Wash- 
ington, D.C,  of  Presi- 
dent Mitterrand  of  the 
French  Republic,  Sept. 
29. 

*207      9/30       Shultz:  remarks  on  signing 
space  station  agree- 
ments, Sept.  29. 
208      9/30       Principal  Officers  of  the 

Department  of  State  and 
United  States  Chiefs  of 
Mission,  1778-1988, 
released. 

*209      9/30       Shultz:  news  conference, 
USUN. 


"Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 


Economics 

Economic  Summits  1981-88  (GIST,  Sept 
1988). 

International  Law 

The  War  Powers  Resolution,  Legal  Adv 
Sofaer,  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Con 
mittee,  Sept.  15,  1988  (Current  Polic\ 
#1107). 

Refugees 

U.S.  Response  to  Southern  African  Ret 
gee  Crisis,  Refugee  Coordinator  Moo 
Conference  on  Southern  African  Refi 
gees,  Returnees,  and  Displaced  Persi 
Oslo.  Aug.  23,  1988  (Current  Policy 
#1102). 

Indochinese  Refugees  (GIST,  Sept.  198) 

Western  Hemisphere 

U.S. -Cuban  Relations  (GIST,  Sept. 
1988).  ■ 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1 


NDEX 


^Jovember  1988 
k/olume  88,  No.  2140 


AI'Khanistan.  Military  Power  and  Diplo- 
macy: The  Reagan  Legacy 
(Armacost) 40 

\frica.  U.S.  Responds  to  Southern  Africa 
Itffugee  Crisis  (Moore) 4G 

American  Principles.  The  International 
I.ruacy  of  Dr.  Martin  Luther  King,  Jr. 
i.siuiltz) 17 

Vn^'ola.  Southwest  Africa  Negotiations 
iCnicker,  joint  statements.  White  House 
>lalement)    IcS 

Vrms  Control 

^BM  Treaty  Review  Conference  Ends 

(U.S.  statement) 19 

VE  Carried  Out  in  Soviet  Union  (White 
House  statement)    20 

»Iilitary  Power  and  Diplomacy:  The  Reagan 
Legacy  (Armacost)    40 

ioviet  Foreign  Minister  Visits  Washington 
(Shultz,  joint  statement)    28 

!;hile.  Chilean  Plebiscite  (Department 
statement) 48 

:hina.  Export  of  U.S.  Satellite  to  China 
for  Launch  (Department  statement)    .  27 

Communications.  2.5th  "Hot  Line"  Anni- 
versary (White  House  statement)  ....  20 
ongress 

)evelopments  in  Malaysia  and  Singapore 
Lambertson)    23 

'oreign  Language  Competence  in  the 

Foreign  Service  (Spiers) 21 

roposed  Refugee  Admissions  for  FY  1989 

'(Shultz) 12 

he  War  Powers  Resolution  (Sofaer)   ...  36 

Izechoslovakia.  20th  Anniversary  of  War- 
saw Pact  Invasion  of  Czechoslovakia 
(Reagan) 31 


Department  &  Foreign  Service.  Foreign 
Language  Competence  in  the  Foreign 
Service  (Spiers)    21 

Economics.  Export  of  U.S.  Satellite  to 
China  for  Launch  (Department  state- 
ment)      27 

Europe.  Military  Power  and  Diplomacy: 
The  Reagan  Legacy  (Armacost)   40 

Human  Rights 

Developments  in  Malaysia  and  Singapore 
(Lambertson)    23 

Human  Rights:  A  Western  Cultural  Bias? 
(Schifter)   33 

Military  Power  and  Diplomacy:  The  Reagan 
Legacy  (Armascost)    40 

International  Law.  The  War  Powers  Reso- 
lution (Sofaer) 36 

Malaysia 

Developments  in  Malaysia  and  Singapore 
( Lambertson)    23 

Malaysia— A  Profile 24 

Middle  East.  The  Administration's  Ap- 
proach to  Middle  East  Peacemaking 
(Shultz) 10 

Military  Affairs.  Military  Power  and 
Diplomacy:  The  Reagan  Legacy 
(Armacost) 40 

Namibia.  Southwest  Africa  Negotiations 
(Crocker,  joint  statements,  White  House 
statement)    18 

Narcotics.  Task  Force  on  Narcotics 
Meets  in  Washington  (chairman's 
statement)  44 

Palau.  Palau  Supreme  Court  Rules  Com- 
pact Not  Approved  (Department  state- 
ment)      46 

Presidential  Documents 

Foreign  Policy  Achievements  (Reagan)  .  .  9 

Prospects  for  A  New  Era  of  World  Peace 
(Reagan)  1 

20th  Anniversary  of  Warsaw  Pact  Invasion 
of  Czechoslovakia  (Reagan)    31 

Publications.  Department  of  State  ....  50 

Refugees 

Proposed  Refugee  Admissions  for  FY  1989 
(Shultz) 12 

U.S.  Responds  to  Southern  Africa  Refugee 
Crisis  (Moore) 46 


Science  &  Technology.  Export  of  U.S. 
Satellite  to  China  for  Launch  (Depart- 
ment statement) 27 

Singapore 

Developments  in  Malaysia  and  Singapore 
( Lambertson)    23 

Singapore — A  Profile    26 

Treaties 

ABM  Treaty  Review  Conference  Ends 
(U.S.  statement) 19 

Current  Actions 48 

U.S.S.R. 

ABM  Treaty  Review  Conference  Ends 
(U.S.  statement) 19 

Foreign  Policy  Achievements  (Reagan)  .  .  9 

.JVE  Carried'Out  in  Soviet  Union  (White 
House  statement) 20 

Soviet  Foreign  Minister  Visits  Washington 
(Shultz,  joint  statement)    28 

2.5th  "Hot  Line"  Anniversary  (White  House 
statement)   20 

United  Nations 

Prospects  for  A  New  Era  of  World  Peace 
(Reagan)  1 

Security  Council  Permanent  Members 
Meet  With  Secretary  General  (joint 
communique) 6 

U.S.  Release  Funds  to  United  Nations 
(White  House  statement)   5 

Name  Index 

Armacost,  Michael  H   40 

Crocker,  Chester  A 18 

Lambertson,  David  F   23 

Moore,  Jonathan 46 

Reagan,  President 1,  9,  31 

Schifter,  Richard   33 

Shultz,  Secretary    10,  12,  17,  28 

Sofaer,  Abraham  D    36 

Spiers,  Ronald  I  21 


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Depart  mvni 

le  Official  Monthly  F^ecord  of  'United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volume 


88 /Number  2141 


\    %■ 


ggjipl 


Universal   Declaration 
of  Human  Rights 


December  1988 


Philippine  Sea 


I  o 


Manili 


n 


manna,/ 

South  'i\' 

China  .t)tf|g"^'--»'" 

sea      / 


MAUYSlAy? 


U.S.-PhJIipplnes 

Bases 
Agreement 


Lebanon 


i0f»pariment  of  StnU* 

bulletin 


I  Number  2141  /  December  It 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public  Com- 
munication in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide 
the  public,  the  Congress,  and  govern- 
ment agencies  with  information  on  de- 
velopments in  U.S.  foreign  relations 
and  the  work  of  the  Department  of 
State  and  the  Foreign  Service.  The 
Bulletin's  contents  include  major 
addresses  and  news  conferences  of  the 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  State; 
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lected press  releases  issued  by  the 
White  House,  the  Department,  and  the 
U.S.  Mission  to  the  United  Nations; 
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are  published  frequently  to  provide  ad- 
ditional information  on  current  issues 
but  should  not  necessarily  be  inter- 
preted as  official  U.S.  policy 
statements. 


GEORGE  P.  SHULTZ 

Secretary  of  State 

CHARLES  REDMAN 

Assistant  Secretary 
for  Public  Affairs 

PAUL  E.  AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office  of  Public  Communication 

COLLEEN  LUTZ 

Chief,  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 

SHARON  R.  HAYNES 

Assistant  Editoi- 


The  Secretary  of  State  has  determined  that 
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For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
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CONTENTS 


mmifwpr"''"' 


'■N^^ijj^  It 


FEATURE 


1      40th  Anniversary  of  the  Universal 
of  Human  Rights 


ifie  Secretary 

1        The  Open  Society  and  Its 

Friends 
Key  to  the  Future:  Enlightened 

Engagement 
Promoting  Peace  and  Prosperity 

in  the  South  Asian  Region 
Efforts  for  Peace  in  Africa 


Canada 

2        U.S. -Canada  Sign  Free  Trade 

Agreement  (President  Reagan) 

Consular  Affairs 

2  Xonimmigrant  Visa  Waiver  Pilot 
Program  With  Japan  (Depart- 
ment Announcement) 

Eist  Asia 

2        U.S. -Philippines  Military  Bases 
Agreement  Review,  1988  (Raul 
Ma)iglapus,  President  Reagan, 
Secretary  Shultz,  Texts  of 
Agreement,  Agreed  Minutes, 
and  Letter  to  President 
Aquino) 

2  U.S.  Japan  Relations 

(William  Clark,  Jr.) 

3  Burdensharing  and  Japan 
(William  Clark,  Jr.) 

Situation  in  Cambodia 
(Charles  H.  Twining) 


Europe 


36 


37 


Visit  of  Hungarian  Premier 
(President  Reagan, 
Karohj  Grosz) 

39th  Report  on  Cyprus 
(Message  to  the  Congress) 


Food 

37 


World  Food  Day,  1988 
(Proclamation) 

General 

38        Diplomacy  in  an  Election  Year 
and  Beyond 

(Max  M.  Kampelman) 

IVIiddle  East 

41  Update  on  the  Situation  in  the 

Middle  East 
(Richard  W.  Murphy) 

42  T^ba  Arbitration  Award 

(Department  Statement) 

44  Iraq's  Use  of  Chemical  Weapons 

(Department  Statement) 

45  Lebanon:  At  the  Crossroads 

(Richard  W.  Murphy) 
48        Republic  of  Lebanon 


United  Nations 

53        Toward  the  21st  Century:  The 
Future  for  Multilateral  Diplo- 
macy (Richard  S.  Williamson) 

Western  Hemisphere 

57        National  Emergency  in  Panama 
(Message  to  the  Congress) 

57  Results  in  Chilean  Plebiscite 

(Department  Statement) 

Treaties 

58  Current  Actions 

Press  Releases 

60 
60 


Department  of  State 
USUN 


Publications 


62 


62 


Department  of  State 

Foreign  Relations  Volume 
Released 

Principal  Officers  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  and  United 
States  Chiefs  of  Mission, 
1778-1988  Released 

Background  Notes 


Index 


(onomics 

Overview  of  U.S.  Ti-ade  Policy 

(W.  Allen  Wallis) 
Economic  Summits  1981-88 


Eleanor  Koosevelt  was  a  member  of  the 
Ij.S.  deleKation  to  the  United  Nations 
from  1916  to  1952  and  a  special  adviser 
to  the  U.S.  delegation  to  the  General 
.Assembly  in  19(>1.  She  played  a  leading 
role  in  establishing  the  UN  Commission 
on  Human  Rights  and  served  a.s  I'.S. 
representative  from  1946-50. 

Mrs.  Koosevelt  was  chosen  as  the 
Comission's  first  chairman  by  acclama- 
tion and  headed  the  subcommittee  that 
prepared  preliminary  drafts  of  an  inter- 
national bill  of  human  rights.  On  De- 
cember 10,  1948,  she  cast  the  U.S.  vote 
for  the  I'niversal  Declaration  of  Human 
Rights.  After  its  adoption  the  Assembly 
gave  her  a  standing  ovation. 


In  1962,  President  John  Kennedy 
nominated  Mrs.  Roosevelt  for  the  Nobel 
Peace  Prize  for  her  work  in  connection 
with  the  declaration.  .After  her  death 
later  that  year,  the  General  Assembly 
paid  tribute  to  her  in  a  special  meeting 
during  which  delegates  from  around  the 
world  mourned  her  passing  and  ex- 
pressed gratitude  for  her  years  of  dedi- 
cated and  selfless  leadership  at  the 
United  Nations.  She  posthumously  wjis 
awarded  the  first  UN  Human  Rights 
prize. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/Decembe  I 


FEATURE 
Human  Rights 


0th  Anniversary  of  the 
niversal  Declaration  of 
uman  Rights 


e  Universal  Declaration 
ter  40  Years 

cember  10,  1988,  marks  the  40th  an- 
ersary  of  the  adoption  by  the  United 
tions  of  the  Universal  Declaration  of 
man  Rights.  The  declaration  repre- 
its  the  first  comprehensive,  global 
tement  on  basic  human  rights,  and  it 
braces  many  of  the  values  long  held 
Americans.  U.S.  foreign  policy  is 
;ed  on  the  concept  that  individual 
hts  must  be  respected  by  govern- 
nt — an  idea  that  the  Universal  Dec- 
ation  seeks  to  promote  worldwide. 

The  declaration  offers  a  common 
ndard  against  which  the  United 
ites  and  other  nations,  as  well  as  or- 
lizations  and  individuals,  can  mea- 
•e  treatment  of  citizens.  The  first 
i-agraph  refers  to  the  "equal  and  in- 
jnable  rights  of  all  members  of  the 
man  family."  The  grim  lessons  of 
irld  War  II  demonstrated  that  gov- 
iments  which  deny  basic  human 
hts  to  their  own  people  are  likely  to 
:■  aggression  to  deny  human  rights  to 
Dple  of  other  countries.  Reflecting 
s  belief,  the  declaration's  opening 
iguage  directs  itself  to  the  "disregard 
;1  eimtempt  for  human  rights"  that 
^ulted  in  "barbarous  acts  which  have 
traged  the  conscience  of  mankind." 
Tiilarly,  then-Secretary  of  State 
orge  Marshall,  in  urging  the  UN 
neral  Assembly  to  adopt  the  Univer- 
,  Declaration,  said  "systematic  and 
liberate  denials  of  basic  human  rights 
at  the  root  of  most  of  our  troubles." 

The  fundamental  rights  and  free- 
ms  found  in  the  Universal  Declara- 
)n,  in  effect,  proposes  limits  on  the 
wers  of  governments  to  compel  or 
ntrol  the  behavior  of  individual  cit- 
ans.  The  Universal  Declaration  also 
ts  social  and  economic  "rights,"  such 
the  right  to  an  education,  the  right 
work  at  an  occupation  of  one's  own 


choosing,  the  right  to  own  property, 
and  the  right  to  marry  a  person  of  one's 
choice.  While  recognizing  the  desir- 
ability of  these  norms,  the  United 
States  feels  they  are  dependent  on  and, 
indeed,  arise  from,  satisfaction  of  the 
basic  political,  civil,  and  human  rights 
of  a  truly  free  and  democratic  society. 

The  Universal  Declaration  contains 
many  of  the  civil  rights  guaranteed  in 
the  first  10  amendments  to  the  Ameri- 
can Constitution.  Its  philosophical 
starting  point  is  the  same  as  that 
adopted  by  America's  Founders  who 
stated,  as  their  first  principle,  that  "all 
men  are  created  equal."  The  Universal 
Declaration,  however,  also  includes 
rights  that  are  more  applicable  to  to- 
day's international  community — for  ex- 
ample, the  right  to  send  and  receive 
information  from  any  source  across  in- 
ternational borders  and  the  right  to 
leave  and  return  to  the  country  of  one's 
origin. 

The  premise  that  the  fundamental 
human  rights  described  in  the  Univer- 
sal Declaration  are  applicable  to  every- 
one on  earth  regardless  of  the  political 
or  economic  system  they  enjoy  is  an 
integral  part  of  the  UN  Charter.  The 
Charter  calls  for  "universal  respect  for, 
and  observance  of,  human  rights  and 
fundamental  freedoms  for  all  without 
distinction  as  to  race,  sex,  language  or 
religion." 

Early  American  Experience 

U.S.  experience  clearly  demonstrates 
that  peaceful  relations  and  a  dynamic 
economy  flourish  in  an  environment 
where  the  rights  of  the  individual  are 
respected.  An  important  principle  es- 
poused by  America's  Founders  was  the 
inescapable  connection  between  democ- 
racy, freedom,  and  human  rights.  In 
declaring  the  independence  of  the 


United  States,  they  stated  that  govern- 
ments "deriving  their  just  powers  from 
the  consent  of  the  governed"  are  in- 
stituted among  men  for  the  purpose  of 
securing  and  protecting  man's  inaliena- 
ble rights.  This  same  theme  is  as  clear 
in  U.S.  human  rights  policy  today  as  it 
was  then.  Current  U.S.  human  rights 
policy  centers  around  the  belief  that 
the  best  way  to  promote  human  rights 
in  the  long  term  is  to  encourage  democ- 
racy throughout  the  world.  As  noted  in 
the  State  Department's  Country  Re- 
ports on  Human  Rights  Practices  last 
year: 

It  is  in  our  national  interest  to  pro- 
mote democratic  processes  in  order  to  help 
build  a  world  environment  more  favorable 
to  respect  for  human  rights  and  hence, 
more  conducive  to  stability  and  peace.  We 
have  developed,  therefore,  a  dual  policy, 
reactive  in  the  sense  that  we  continue  to 
oppose  specific  human  rights  violations 
wherever  they  occur,  but  at  the  same  time 
active  in  woi-king  over  the  long  term  to 
strengthen  democracy. 

This  same  belief  is  echoed  in  the 
Universal  Declaration  of  Human 
Rights:  Article  22  stipulates  that 
"Everyone  has  the  right  to  take  part  in 
the  government  of  his  country,"  and 
that  "The  will  of  the  people  shall  be  the 
basis  of  the  authority  of 
government.  .  .  ." 

Another  important  aspect  of  the 
early  American  experience  was  the  con- 
viction that  the  ideals  of  freedom,  de- 
mocracy, and  human  rights  applied  not 
just  to  Americans — but  to  the  entire 
world.  This  belief  in  the  universal 
nature  of  the  American  experience  re- 
flected a  conviction  held  by  many  early 
Americans  that — as  a  young  society 
with  a  uniquely  democratic  political 
system  and  far  removed  from  European 
power  struggles — America  was  in  a 
position  to  offer  moral  and  spiritual 
leadership  to  the  world. 

The  belief  in  the  universal  nature 
of  the  American  experience  was  re- 
flected in  key  documents  associated 
with  early  American  history.  The  con- 
cept of  the  protection  of  natural  rights 
of  individuals  also  permeates  numerous 
State  constitutions  and  the  Bill  of 
Rights  of  the  U.S.  Constitution.  These 
documents  offer  perhaps  the  most  vig- 
orous and  spirited  defenses  of  the  con- 
cepts of  human  dignity,  democracy,  and 


1 

Bona 


freedom.  The  universality  of  these  doc- 
uments was  viewed  as  a  nearly  self- 
evident  proposition,  leading  Thomas 
Jefferson  to  state  in  a  1787  letter  to 
James  Madison  that  "a  Bill  of  Rights  is 
what  people  are  entitled  to  against 
every  government  on  earth." 

Multilateral  Efforts 

The  Universal  Declaration  of  Human 
Rights  provides  a  modern  version  of 
Jefferson's  "international  Bill  of 
Rights."  Throughout  the  40  years  since 
adopting  the  Universal  Declaration,  the 
United  States  has  led  the  effort  to  ex- 
pand the  observance  of  the  declaration's 
principles  throughout  the  world.  The 
U.S.  Government  participates  actively 
in  multilateral  efforts  such  as  the  Inter- 
American  Human  Rights  Commission  of 
the  Organization  of  American  States 
and  the  Conference  on  Security  and  Co- 
operation in  Europe,  which  has  i-e- 
affirmed  the  universality  of  these 
standards. 

But  it  is  through  the  United  Na- 
tions itself — in  the  Security  Council, 
the  General  Assembly  and  its  commit- 
tees, and  particularly  in  the  UN  Hu- 
man Rights  Commission  (UNHRC) — 
that  the  United  States  has  concentrated 
the  major  part  of  its  multilateral  efforts 
to  achieve  human  rights  improvement 
throughout  the  world. 

In  the  commission,  the  United 
States  has  initiated  or  supported  nu- 
merous "thematic"  issues.  For  example, 
in  1983,  the  United  States,  along  with 
the  Netherlands  and  Ireland,  proposed 
that  the  UNHRC  focus  on  a  new 
agenda  item  entitled  "Implementation 
of  the  Declaration  of  Elimination  of  All 
Forms  of  Intolerance  and  of  Discrimina- 
tion, Based  on  Religion  or  Belief." 
Later,  in  1986,  we  were  the  lead  spon- 
sor of  a  resolution  creating  a  "Special 
Rapporteur  on  Religious  Intolerance" 
with  the  specific  mandate  of  investigat- 
ing incidents  of  religious  intolerance 
globally,  reporting  on  them  to  the  com- 
mission, and  suggesting  remedial  mea- 
sures. Similarly,  the  United  States 
supported  the  appointment  of  Special 
Rapporteurs  to  investigate  other  prac- 
tices which  violate  human  rights,  such 
as  the  use  of  torture  or  cruel  or  un- 
usual punishment. 


In  addition  to  focusing  on  these 
"thematic"  human  rights  issues,  the 
U.S.  Government  also  has  pressed  hard 
to  ensure  that  international  bodies  such 
as  the  UN  Human  Rights  Commission 
and  the  UN  General  Assembly  address 
specific  human  rights  problems  in  indi- 
vidual countries.  Over  the  years,  U.S. 
delegations  to  these  organizations  have 
introduced  resolutions  calling  on  gov- 
ernments to  acknowledge  and  deal  with 
human  rights  violations  and  have 
strongly  represented  the  need  to  up- 
hold human  rights  everywhere. 

Among  the  major  breakthroughs  of 
the  last  8  years  is  the  1982  appointment 
of  a  Special  Rapporteur  on  Poland  and 
the  e.\tension  of  the  mandate  the  follow- 
ing year.  Resolutions  naming  similar 
Rapporteurs  for  Afghanistan  and  Iran 
also  marked  the  increased  willingness 
of  the  UN  Human  Rights  Commission 
to  tackle  politically  unpopular  and  diffi- 
cult problems.  Similar  efforts  also  were 
authorized  for  Guatemala,  Chile,  and  El 
Salvador,  among  others,  although  in 
Guatemala  sufficient  improvement  later 
was  achieved  to  allow  conversion  of  the 
Special  Rapporteur's  mandate  to  that  of 
an  adviser  on  human  rights-related 
matters.  Similar  progress  is  expected  in 
El  Salvador. 

The  United  States  also  deals  di- 
rectly with  the  governments  concerned. 
Efforts  to  encourage  fulfillment  of  the 
human  rights  standards  embodied  in 
the  Universal  Declaration  are  a  major 
part  of  the  work  of  U.S.  diplomats  in 
foreign  capitals.  Each  Embassy  has  at 
least  one  officer  primarily  responsible 
for  following  and  reporting  on  develop- 
ments in  this  area. 

In  comparing  a  government's  hu- 
man rights  performance  with  the  stand- 
ards set  by  the  Universal  Declaration, 
the  United  States  takes  into  account 
such  factors  as  a  government's  attitude 
toward  outside  investigation  of  alleged 
human  rights  violations  by  interna- 
tional and  nongovernmental  organiza- 
tions; evidence  of  discrimination  based 
on  race,  sex,  religion,  language,  and  so- 
cial status;  and  conditions  of  labor  (the 
right  to  organize  and  bargain  collec- 
tively, acceptable  work  conditions, 
etc.).  General  economic  and  political 
factors  also  weigh  heavily  in  the  equa- 
tion, but  the  Universal  Declaration  re- 
mains the  constant — the  standard 


against  which  this  overall  judgment  is 
cast. 

In  each  country  where  it  appears 
the  human  rights  standards  of  the  Un 
versal  Declai'ation  are  not  being  met, 
the  U.S.  Government  seeks  to  verify 
the  situation  independently  and  to  tal 
action  best  designed  to  achieve  some 
improvement.  Often  this  takes  the  fori 
of  diplomatic  exchanges  with  the  gov- 
ernment concerned,  sometimes  at  the 
very  highest  level.  Sometimes  we  en- 
gage in  more  formal  exchanges,  such 
through  bilateral  human  rights  confei 
ences.  Members  of  Congress  often  an 
active  participants  in  this  process.  Bi 
whether  or  not  improvement  seems 
possible,  the  United  States  will  make 
its  views  known  to  the  government  ci 
cerned,  publicly  or  privately,  whenev 
it  appears  that  the  Universal  Declare 
tion  is  not  being  upheld. 

Eliminating  Double  Standards 


Over  the  past  40  years,  the  Universa 
Declaration  of  Human  Rights  has  set 
clear  and  objective  standard  against 
which  the  international  community  c 
measure  the  human  rights  performa 
of  any  government.  But  there  is  still 
much  to  be  achieved,  both  with  resp 
to  the  situation  in  individual  countri 
as  well  as  in  regard  to  the  internatic 
situation  overall. 

For  example,  the  United  States 
strongly  believes  it  is  crucial  that  th 
standards  of  the  Universal  Declarati 
be  accepted  by,  and  applied  to,  all  I 
members  equally  and  fairly,  without 
gard  to  the  political  or  economic  sys 
they  espouse.  However,  many  natioi 
today  appear  to  subscribe  to  a  doub 
standard — harshly  criticizing  relativ 
minor  human  rights  infractions  in  s( 
countries,  particularly  those  of  the  ( 
veloped  Western  world,  while  ignori 
more  serious,  consistent  violations  c 
human  rights  by  self-styled  progres; 
regimes  or  developing  nations.  Ofte 
the  international  community  has  ter 
to  downplay  massive  abuses  of  the  I 
versal  Declaration's  human  rights  stt 
ards,  apparently  on  the  theory  that 
core  civil  liberties,  the  dignity  of  th 
individual,  and  respect  for  the  law 
should  somehow  be  less  important  tl 
for  example,  economic  development. 


DeDartment  of  State  Bulletin  December  ' 


FEATURE 
Human  Rights 


The  United  States  consistently 
ks  to  underscore  the  importance  of 
nhanded  apphcation  of  the  declara- 
I's  "common  standard"  for  all  man- 
d.  We  have  striven  especially  to 
iiinate  a  "double  standard"  in  the 
atment  of  human  rights  in  interna- 
nal  bodies,  and  especially  the  Human 
hts  Commission  itself — often  a  diffi- 
t  task.  For  example,  we  seek  to  per- 
de  UNHRC  to  afford  Chile  the  same 
atment  as  other  countries  whose 
es  are  under  consideration.  This 
.lid  be  consistent  with  the  "common 
ndard"  declared  for  the  international 
imunity's  treatment  of  human  rights 
blems  worldwide. 

While  some  countries  have  been 
rged  with  violations  of  human  rights 
the  commission,  other  countries, 
ich  are  more  serious  offenders,  have 

been  considered.  For  example,  in 
7,  the  U.S.  delegation  tabled  a  reso- 
on  addressing  the  egregious  human 
its  abuses  in  Cuba — a  resolution 
ch  was  ultimately  turned  down  by 

vote.  Although  the  UNHCR  did' 

act  on  the  U.S.  resolution  on  Cuba 
'988,  it  did  decide  to  send  a  six- 
Tiber  UN  investigating  team  to 
)a  to  assess  human  rights  conditions 
re  and  report  to  the  commission  at 
1989  session. 

Another  "double  standard"  also  is 
arent.  Despite  the  fact  that  drafting 

adoption  of  the  Universal  Declara- 
1  was  one  of  the  first  acts  under- 
I'U  by  the  newly  formed  United 

ions,  some  member  states  seem  to 

little  more  than  lip  service  to  its 
iciples.  In  general,  this  is  most  true 
hose  governments  which  claim  the 
lusive  right  to  judge  what  is  best  for 
ir  citizens,  rather  than  allowing  the 

ens  to  decide  for  themselves.  They 
k  to  impose  their  judgments — by  co- 
on, if  necessary — on  their  citizens, 
istitutional  guarantees  of  individual 
its  have  little  meaning  when  they 

qualified  by  broad,  vaguely  worded 
hibitions  which,  in  effect,  deny 
se  rights  whenever  the  government 
ides  to  do  so.  As  Justice  Oliver 
ndell  Holmes  noted,  such  "stand- 
s"  are  so  vague  as  to  be  "no  stand- 
s  at  all." 

Despite  these  problems  the  cause 
luman  rights  and  individual  freedom 


The  Genocide  Convention 


President  Reagan's  signature  on  legislation 
providing  legal  enforcement  under  U.S.  law 
for  the  provisions  of  the  Convention  on  the 
Prevention  and  Punishment  of  the  Crime  of 
Genocide  completes  more  than  four  dec- 
ades of  U.S.  consideration  of  the  diverse 
legal  implications  of  this  major  act. 

Following  the  Second  World  War,  the 
United  States  and  other  members  of  the 
new  United  Nations  were  determined  to 
prevent  a  repetition  of  Nazi  Germany's  de- 
liberate and  systematic  attempt  to  annihi- 
late the  Jewish  people.  On  December  11, 
1946,  the  UN  General  Assembly  unan- 
imously passed  a  resolution  declaring  gen- 
ocide to  be  a  crime  under  international  law. 
The  U.S.  delegation  to  the  United  Nations 
took  an  early,  active,  and  leading  role  in 
subsequent  UN  efforts  to  draft  a  legally 
binding  convention  outlawing  genocide  and 
worked  to  make  it  one  of  the  first  focuses 
of  UN  human  rights  action. 

On  December  9.  1948,  the  General  As- 
sembly unanimously  adopted  the  Conven- 
tion on  the  Prevention  and  Punishment  of 
the  Crime  of  Genocide.  The  convention 
proclaimed  genocide,  whether  committed  in 
time  of  peace  or  in  time  of  war,  to  be  a 
crime  under  international  law  that  the  con- 
tracting parties  were  to  pledge  to  prevent 
and  punish.  The  convention  defines  gen- 
ocide as  acts  intended  to  destroy  in  whole 
or  in  part,  a  national,  ethnical,  racial,  or 
religious  group.  This  includes: 

•  Killing  members  of  the  group; 

•  Causing  serious  bodily  or  mental 
harm  to  members  of  the  group; 

•  Deliberately  inflicting  on  the  group 
conditions  of  life  calculated  to  bring  about 
its  physical  destruction  in  whole  or  in  part; 

•  Imposing  measures  intended  to  pre- 
vent births  within  the  group;  and 

•  Forcibly  transferring  children  of  the 
group  to  another  group. 


has  advanced  in  the  past  40  years.  Be- 
cause of  the  Universal  Declaration — 
translated  now  into  some  70  lan- 
guages— the  oppressed  are  more  likely 
to  be  aware  of  their  rights  than  they 
might  have  been  40  years  ago.  Given 
this  universal  acceptance,  such  vio- 
lators can  no  longer  claim  that  criticism 
of  human  rights  violations  is  "interfer- 
ence in  their  internal  affairs."  And  this 


The  convention  provides  for  the  punish- 
ment, either  by  the  state  in  which  the  act 
was  committed  or  by  an  international  penal 
tribunal,  of  persons  committing  genocide, 
be  they  constitutionally  responsible  rulers, 
public  officials,  or  private  individuals. 
Ratifying  parties  agree  to  enact  the  neces- 
sary legislation  to  give  effect  to  the  conven- 
tion's provisions. 

On  December  11,  1948,  the  represent- 
atives of  20  nations,  including  the  United 
States,  signed  the  convention,  which  en- 
tered into  force  on  January  12.  1951,  Presi- 
dent Truman  transmitted  the  Genocide 
Convention  to  the  U,S.  Senate  for  its  ad- 
vice and  consent  to  ratification  on  June  16, 
1949,  but  no  action  was  taken.  Presidents 
Kennedy,  Johnson,  Nixon,  Ford,  and  Carter 
each  in  turn  urged  the  Senate  to  give  its 
consent  to  ratification  of  the  convention. 

On  September  5.  1984,  the  White 
House  announced  that  the  Reagan  Admin- 
istration had  completed  its  review  of  the 
Genocide  Convention  and  supported  its 
ratificaton.  The  following  day.  President 
Reagan  affirmed  that  his  Administration 
would  "vigorously  support,  consistent  with 
the  US.  Constitution,  the  ratification  of  the 
Genocide  Convention,"  and  intended  to  use 
the  convention  in  its  "efforts  to  expand  hu- 
man freedom  and  fight  human  rigtits 
abuses  around  the  world,"  Following  its 
own  careful  process  of  consideration,  on 
February  19,  1986,  the  U.S.  Senate  voted 
83  to  11  to  give  its  advice  and  consent  to 
ratification  of  the  convention.  Following 
adoption  by  Congress  in  October  1988  of 
the  Genocide  Convention  Implementation 
Act.  President  Reagan,  November  4,  1988, 
signed  into  law  the  implementing  legislation 
thereby  completing  the  U.S.  ratification 
process. 


broader  knowledge  and  acceptance 
means  that  human  rights  offenders  cur- 
rently are  less  likely  to  employ  tactics 
of  oppression,  due  to  severe  public 
criticism. 

As  the  Universal  Declaration  en- 
ters its  40th  year,  the  world  has  come  a 
long  way  in  the  effort  to  strengthen 
and  broaden  observance  of  universal 
human  rights  standards,  extending 


their  benefits  to  all  individuals.  Sup- 
port for  human  rights  has  become  a 
more  important  consideration  for  the 
foreign  and  domestic  policies  of  most 
nations  since  the  Universal  Declaration 
was  first  signed.  Freedom  has  spread 
more  broadly  as  former  colonies  obtain 
their  independence.  In  doing  so,  they, 
too,  adopted  the  standards  of  the  Uni- 
versal Declaration  and  began  the  proc- 
ess of  building  political  structures 
reflecting  those  principles.  More  re- 
cently, there  has  been  much  progress  in 
the  advancement  of  human  rights  and 
the  rule  of  law  in  the  Soviet  Union  and 
Eastern  Europe,  although  in  these 
countries,  as  in  others,  much  remains 
to  be  done  before  the  standards  of  the 
Universal  Declaration  are  fully  met. 

As  the  United  States  continues  to 
improve  the  human  rights  situation 
within  its  borders,  there  is  no  question 
that  the  pursuit  of  human  rights  re- 
mains an  institutionalized  and  funda- 
mental aspect  of  our  foreign  policy.  It  is 
an  issue  that  will  continue  to  attract 
tremendous  public  support  and  a  high 
degree  of  bipartisanship.  The  United 
States  is  committed  to  promoting  hu- 
man rights  worldwide,  based  on  the 
principles  upon  which  this  nation  was 
founded  and  as  set  forth  for  the  entire 
community  of  man  in  the  Universal 
Declaration  of  Human  Rights. 

The  Road  to  the 
Universal  Declaration 

The  United  States  and  other  Allied 
Powers  during  the  Second  World  War 
proclaimed  the  protection  of  human 
rights  as  one  of  their  most  important 
war  aims.  After  the  cessation  of  hostili- 
ties the  United  States,  drawing  on  its 
own  long  experience  in  advancing  the 
rights  of  its  citizens,  played  a  leading 
role  in  the  complex,  painstaking,  and 
meticulous  process  that  led  to  formula- 
tion of  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Hu- 
man Rights  and  its  adoption  by  the  UN 
General  Assemblv  on  December  10, 
1948. 


August  14,  1941.  President  Frank- 
lin D.  Roosevelt  and  British  Prime  Min- 
ister Winston  Churchill  signed  the 
Atlantic  Charter,  a  set  of  principles  to 
guide  the  Allies  in  their  struggle 
against  the  Axis  Powers.  The  charter 
affirmed  "the  right  of  all  peoples  to 
choose  the  form  of  government  under 
which  they  will  live,"  and  to  "live  out 
their  lives  in  freedom  from  fear  and 
want." 

January  1,  1942.  President  Frank- 
lin D.  Roosevelt,  British  Prime  Minis- 
ter Winston  Churchill,  and  representa- 
tives of  the  Soviet  Union  and  China 
signed  a  statement  at  a  White  House 
ceremony  pledging  their  governments' 
full  resources  to  the  successful  prosecu- 
tion of  the  war  against  the  Axis 
Powers.  The  four  leaders  affirmed  the 
conviction  of  their  governments  that 
"complete  victory  over  their  enemies 
[was]  essential  to  .  .  .  preserve  human 
rights  and  justice  in  their  own  lands  as 
well  as  in  other  lands."  The  statement, 
issued  as  a  "Declaration  by  the  United 
Nations,"  constituted  the  first  official 
use  of  the  term  "United  Nations." 
Nearly  two  dozen  other  governments 
subsequently  subscribed  to  the 
declaration. 

June  26,  1945.  Representatives  of 
50  nations  meeting  in  San  Francisco 
signed  the  Charter  of  the  United  Na- 
tions. The  UN  Charter  proclaimed  the 
promotion  and  preservation  of  human 
rights  as  one  of  the  primary  objectives 
of  the  United  Nations  and  mandated 
the  establishment  of  a  Commission  on 
Human  Rights  as  a  subsidiary  of  the 
UN  Economic  and  Social  Council.  The 
United  Nations  formally  came  into  exis- 
tence on  October  24,  1945,  following 
ratification  of  its  Charter  by  a  majority 
of  the  signatory  nations. 

February  15,  1946.  During  its  first 
session  in  London,  the  Economic  and 
Social  Council  established  a  preliminary 
Human  Rights  Commission  to  prepare 
a  report  that  would  delineate  the  func- 
tions and  scope  of  work  of  the  projected 
Commission  on  Human  Rights.  The 
council  selected  nine  members  who 
were  to  serve  on  the  preliminary  com- 
mission as  individuals  rather  than  gov- 
ernment representatives:  Eleanor  Roo- 
sevelt (United  States),  Rene  Cassin 
(France),  K.C.  Neogi  (India),  Paal  Borg 
(Norway),  Alexander  Borisov 


(U.S.S.R.),  Dusan  Brkish  (Yugoslavia 
Fernand  Dehousse  (Belgium),  Victor 
Haya  de  la  Torre  (Peru),  and  C.L.  Hsi 
(China). 

April  29-May  20,  1946.  The  prelii 
inary  Human  Rights  Commission  met 
at  Hunter  College  in  New  York  City  f 
its  first  and  only  session.  It  submittei 
proposals  to  the  Economic  and  Social 
Council  on  establishing  the  permanen 
Commission  on  Human  Rights  and  rei 
ommended  that  the  permanent  comm 
sion  draft  an  international  bill  of  hum 
rights  "as  soon  as  possible." 

June  21,  1946.  The  Economic  and 
Social  Council  selected  18  UN  membe 
states  to  serve  on  the  permanent  Con 
mission  on  Human  Rights:  Australia, 
Belgium,  Belorussian  S.S.R.,  Chile, 
China,  Egypt,  France,  India,  Iran, 
Lebanon,  Panama,  Philippines,  Ukrai 
nian  S.S.R.,  U.S.S.R.,  United  King- 
dom, United  States,  Uruguay,  and 
Yugoslavia.  (Initial  terms  varied  fron 
to  4  years;  subsequently,  members 
were  elected  for  3-year  terms.) 

December  11,  1946.  The  UN  Ger 
eral  Assembly  referred  a  draft  decla 
tion  on  fundamental  human  rights  ai 
freedoms,  submitted  by  Panama,  to 
Economic  and  Social  Council  for  refe 
ence  to  the  Commission  on  Human 
Rights.  This  was  the  first  of  a  numb 
of  draft  declai'ations,  conventions,  ai 
other  proposals  relating  to  human 
rights  submitted  by  individual  coun- 
tries. A  Division  of  Human  Rights  ii 
the  Secretariat  of  the  United  Nation 
began  gathering  materials  relevant  t 
the  work  of  the  Human  Rights  Comi 
sion.  The  division  also  undertook 
additional  research  and  prepared  do- 
mentation  for  the  use  of  the  Human 
Rights  Commission.  These  materialt 
corporated  the  work  of  scholars  and 
statesmen  worldwide  and  formed  an 
propriate  basis  for  the  commission's 
decisions. 

January  27-February  10,  1947. 
Commission  on  Human  Rights,  durii 
its  first  plenary  session  at  Lake  Sue 
cess.  New  York,  elected  Eleanor  Ro 
velt  as  chairman,  PC.  Chang  of  Chi 
as  vice  chairman,  and  Charles  Malik 
Lebanon  as  rapporteur.  The  central 
substantive  concern  of  the  commissi 
was  the  proposed  bill  of  human  righ 
During  the  first  months,  members  o 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  1 


FEATURE 
Human  Rights 


tie  cdmmission  frequently  debated  the 
ilosophical  basis  of  human  rights, 
lang  spoke  of  the  teachings  of  Con- 
jius,  while  Malik  cited  the  works  of 
Lomas  Aquinas. 

The  basic  differences  that  arose, 
wever,  concerned  the  relationship  of 
e  individual  to  the  state.  Points  of 
;w  ranged  from  the  unrestricted  as- 
tion  of  individual  freedom  to  the  su- 
emacy  of  the  collective  rights  of 
iety  as  a  whole.  The  ideological  de- 
te  did  not  completely  divide  along 
Timunist-noncommunist  lines.  Several 
jresentatives  of  democratic  govern- 
nts  urged  that  more  attention  be 
id  to  the  assertion  of  economic  and 
;ial  rights. 

As  a  result  of  this  discussion,  the 
Timission  selected  a  drafting  commit- 
,  composed  of  Roosevelt,  Chang,  and 
lik,  and  directed  it  to  consult  with 
amission  members  and  other  experts 
;i  prepare  a  preliminary  draft  inter- 
-ional  bill  of  human  rights.  The  draft- 
;  committee  was  to  consider  the 
lusion  of  a  range  of  civil  and  politi- 
,  as  well  as  economic  and  social 
hts.  These  included  certain  civil 
hts,  such  as  the  right  to  freedom  of 
igion,  opinion,  speech,  information, 
embly  and  association,  and  to  safe- 
irds  for  persons  accused  of  crime; 
■h  social  and  economic  rights  as  the 
ht  of  security,  the  right  to  employ- 
nt,  education,  food,  medical  care, 
1  the  right  to  property;  and  such  po- 
cal  rights  as  the  right  to  citizenship, 
right  of  citizens  to  participate  in 
government,  and  the  right  to  equal- 
without  distinction.  Members  of  the 
nmission  also  expressed  the  view 
,t  the  bill  should  take  into  account 
■  constitutions  of  member  states,  be 
eptable  to  all  UN  members,  and 
t  it  be  short,  and  simple  to 
lerstand. 

March  24,  1947.  In  response  to  ob- 
tions  by  the  Soviet  Union  that  the 
)posed  drafting  committee  was  too 
all  and  had  no  European  member, 
s.  Roosevelt  informed  the  UN  Eco- 
mic  and  Social  Council  that  she  was 
Jointing  a  larger  drafting  committee 
njiosed  of  eight  members  of  the  com- 
ssion:  the  United  States,  the  United 
igdom,  the  Soviet  Union,  France, 
banon,  China,  Australia,  and  Chile. 
March  28,  the  council  noted  with 


approval  Mrs.  Roosevelt's  decision  and 
asked  the  UN  Secretariat  to  prepare  a 
"documented  outline"  to  be  used  as  the 
basis  for  a  preliminary  draft  of  an  inter- 
national bill  of  rights  by  the  committee. 

June  9-25,  1947.  The  drafting  com- 
mittee held  its  first  session  at  Lake 
Success.  Its  discussions  were  based  on 
a  400-page  draft  "outline"  containing  48 
short  articles  with  annotations  to  con- 
stitutions of  member  states,  prepared 
by  John  Humphrey  of  Canada,  Director 
of  the  UN  Secretariat's  Division  of  Hu- 
man Rights.  The  committee  also  took 
into  consideration  a  draft  covenant  on 
human  rights  proposed  by  the  United 
Kingdom,  as  well  as  several  specific 
language  changes  to  the  draft  outline 
submitted  by  the  United  States. 

During  the  discussion,  U.S.  and 
other  representatives  of  democratic 
governments  emphasized  the  impor- 
tance of  political  and  civil  liberties  as 
embodied  in  the  U.S.  Bill  of  Rights  and 
the  French  Declaration  of  the  Rights  of 
Man  and  of  the  Citizen.  Represent- 
atives of  communist  countries  rejected 
these  "bourgeois"  thoughts  as  obsolete, 
insisted  that  social  principles  have  pri- 
ority, and  strongly  objected  to  the  in- 
clusion and  wording  of  such  rights  as 
freedoiTi  of  expression  and  of  the  press. 
Members  of  the  drafting  committee  also 
diverged  on  the  question  of  whether 
the  bill  of  rights  should  be  a  declaration 
approved  by  the  General  Assembly  that 
would  only  have  the  legal  force  of  a 
recommendation  or  a  multilateral  con- 
vention binding  in  international  law  on 
all  states  ratifying  it.  Consequently,  the 
drafting  committee  decided  to  prepare 
two  separate  documents — a  declaration 
or  manifesto  outlining  general  princi- 
ples and  providing  a  common  standard 
of  achievement  and  a  working  paper 
containing  suggestions  for  the  content 
of  one  or  more  conventions. 

Rene  Cassin,  who  would  receive 
the  Nobel  Peace  Prize  in  1968  for  his 
work  in  promoting  international  human 
rights,  was  then  chosen  to  prepare  a 
preliminary  draft  declaration  for  the 
committee  based  on  the  Secretariat 
outline.  After  Professor  Cassin's  initial 
draft  was  revised  by  a  temporary  work- 
ing group  (United  States,  United  King- 
dom, France,  and  Lebanon),  it  was 
considered  in  detail  by  the  full  drafting 


The  United  States  Recommends 
Adoption 

■'Systematic  and  deliberate  denials  of 
basic  human  rights  lie  at  the  root  of 
most  of  our  troubles  and  threaten  the 
work  of  the  United  Nations.  .  .  .    Govern- 
ments wtiich  systematically  disregard 
the  rights  of  their  own  people  are  not 
likely  to  respect  the  rights  of  other  na- 
tions and  other  people  and  are  likely  to 
seek  their  objectives  by  coercion  and 
force  in  the  international  field.  .  .  .  [Let] 
the  General  Assembly  approve  by  an 
overwhelming  majority  the  Declaration 
of  Human  Rights  as  a  standard  of  con- 
duct for  all;  and  let  us,  as  Members  of 
the  United  Nations,  conscious  of  our 
own  shortcomings  and  imperfections, 
join  our  effort  in  good  faith  to  live  up  to 
this  high  standard." 

Secretary  of  State  George  C.  f^/lar- 
shall  before  the  opening  session  of  the 
UN  General  Assembly  in  Paris,  Sep- 
tember 23.  1948. 


committee  before  submission  to  the  UN 
Human  Rights  Commission.  The  draft- 
ing committee  also  decided  to  present 
to  the  commission  suggestions  for  a 
convention  that  expanded  upon  articles 
from  the  U.K.  draft  convention. 

October  31,  1947.  The  U.S.  De- 
partment of  State  held  a  conference  at- 
tended by  representatives  of 
approximately  150  nongovernmental  or- 
ganizations to  discuss  a  U.S.  proposal 
for  a  declaration  of  human  rights.  The 
U.S.  proposal  had  been  developed  by 
an  interdepartmental  committee  that 
included  representatives  from  the  De- 
partments of  State,  Justice,  Labor,  and 
Interior,  and  the  Federal  Security 
Agency  (which  dealt  with  health,  edu- 
cation, and  social  and  economic  se- 
curity). The  U.S.  proposal  w-as  later 
revised  in  light  of  comments  made  at 
the  conference  and  submitted  by  Mrs. 
Roosevelt  to  the  second  session  of  the 
UN  Human  Rights  Commission  in  De- 
cember 1947. 

December  2-17,  1947.  The  second 
session  of  the  UN  Human  Rights  Com- 
mission, meeting  in  Geneva, 
Switzerland,  addressed  as  the  first 


partment  of  State  Bulletin/December  1988 


The  UN  Commission  on  Human  Rights 


The  UN  Commission  on  Human  Rights 
is  the  major  UN  body  to  promote  and 
protect  human  rights.  It  is  one  of  several 
specialized  commissions  mandated  by 
the  UN  Charter,  and  was  formally  estab- 
lished as  a  subsidiary  body  of  the  Eco- 
nomic and  Social  Council  (ECOSOC)  in 
June  1946.  The  commission  initially  was 
comprised  of  18  UN  member  states.  Its 
first  important  task  was  to  draft  the  inter- 
national bill  of  rights. 

Since  its  first  plenary  session  at 
Lake  Success,  New  York,  in  January 
1947.  the  Commission  on  Human  Rights 
has  evolved  into  a  body  composed  of  43 
states  elected  by  ECOSOC.  from  among 
interested  UN  members,  for  3-year 
terms.  The  commission  meets  once  a 
year  at  Geneva  for  6  weeks.  It  deals 
with  all  aspects  of  human  rights.  It 
provides  overall  policy  recommendations 
to  the  United  Nations,  studies  human 
rights  problems,  prepares  recommenda- 
tions for  action,  drafts  UN  instruments 
relating  to  human  rights,  and  monitors 
the  observance  of  human  rights. 

Each  year,  under  ECOSOC  resolu- 
tion 1503,  a  subcommission  of  experts 
meets  separately  to  consider,  in  strict 
confidence,  thousands  of  letters  from  in- 


order  of  business  the  question  of 
whether  priority  should  be  given  to  the 
preparation  of  a  declaration  of  human 
rights,  a  human  rights  covenant,  or 
measures  of  implementation.  The  com- 
mission decided  that  the  drafting  com- 
mittee should  pursue  all  three  areas,  to 
be  included  in  an  international  bill  of 
rights.  The  commission  also  revised  the 
working  papers  submitted  by  the  draft- 
ing committee  into  preliminary  drafts 
of  an  international  declaration  on  hu- 
man rights  and  an  international  cove- 
nant on  human  rights.  In  January  1948, 
the  commission  forwarded  these  "drafts 
to  UN  members  for  comment. 

May  3-21,  1948.  After  considering 
comments  received  from  13  UN  mem- 
ber states,  the  second  session  of  the 


dividuals  and  groups  protesting  alleged 
human  rights  violations.  The  subcom- 
mission also  reviews  responses  ob- 
tained from  the  governments  concerned. 
After  hearing  from  all  parties  and  re- 
viewing the  evidence,  the  subcommis- 
sion makes  recommendations  to  the 
commission.  It  may  recommend,  for  ex- 
ample, that  the  commission  authorize 
an  investigation  by  independent  experts, 
that  direct  discussions  with  the  govern- 
ment or  governments  involved  be  under- 
taken, that  the  case  be  put  on  the  public 
record,  or  that  the  matter  be  dropped. 
Together  with  these  contributions 
from  its  subcommission,  the  UN  Human 
Rights  Commission  also  gains  informa- 
tion from  public  sessions  at  which  gov- 
ernments, nongovernmental  organ- 
izations, and  individuals  may  present 
views  and  evidence  concerning  human 
rights.  The  commission  has  the  power 
to  adopt  resolutions  condemning  vio- 
lations of  human  rights,  or  to  recom- 
mend such  resolutions  for  adoption  by 
its  parent  body.  ECOSOC.  or  by  the  UN 
General  Assembly.  While  such  resolu- 
tions are  not  legally  binding  or  enforcea- 
ble, they  can  subject  violating  countries 
to  close  public  scrutmy  worldwide. 


drafting  committee,  meeting  at  Lake 
Success,  revised  the  international  dec- 
laration and  the  international  covenant 
and  submitted  the  new  drafts  to  the 
Commission  on  Human  Rights. 

May  24-June  18,  1948.  Returning 
to  Lake  Success,  the  third  session  of 
the  Commission  on  Human  Rights  re- 
vised the  draft  declaration  but  did  not 
have  time  to  consider  the  draft  cove- 
nant. Mrs.  Roosevelt  urged,  as  she  had 
throughout  the  entire  process,  that  pri- 
ority be  given  to  the  declaration  as  "the 
world  was  waiting  for  the  Commission 
on  Human  Rights  to  do  something." 
Progress  in  the  field  of  human  rights 
would  be  long  delayed,  she  argued,  if 
the  world  must  await  the  laborious  pro- 
cess of  negotiating  the  technical  lan- 
guage of  a  treaty  and  then  defer  its 


being  brought  into  force  until  individu. 
countries  had  completed  their  lengthy 
processes  of  ratification.  On  June  18,  1 
members  of  the  commission  voted  in 
favor  of  a  revised,  28-article  draft  inte 
national  declaration  on  human  rights. 
(There  were  no  negative  votes,  al- 
though the  Soviet  Union,  Belorussian 
S.S.R.,  Ukrainian  S.S.R.,  and 
Yugoslavia  abstained  and  the  Soviet 
representative  submitted  a  minority  n 
port  calling  the  draft  "weak  and  com- 
pletely unacceptable.")  The  commissio 
then  submitted  the  draft  declaration  t 
the  Economic  and  Social  Council  for 
approval. 

August  1948.  The  majority  view  ( 
the  Economic  and  Social  Council  was 
that  adoption  of  the  international  decl 
ration  on  human  rights  would  mark  a 
important  step  toward  affirming  hum; 
rights  and  that  this  step  should  be 
taken  without  waiting  for  agreement 
an  international  covenant.  On  August 
26,  the  council  decided  to  transmit  th 
draft  declaration  to  the  UN  General 
Assembly. 

September  24,  1948.  The  Genera 
Assembly  referred  the  draft  interna- 
tional declaration  on  human  rights  to 
Committee  III  (Social,  Humanitarian 
and  Cultural). 

September  30-l)ecember  7,  1948 
Committee  III  held  a  total  of  81  mee 
ings  on  the  International  Declaration  ; 
on  Human  Rights.  Charles  Malik  of 
Lebanon,  who  had  been  rapporteur  c 
the  Human  Rights  Commission  while 
the  declaration  was  being  drafted, 
served  as  chairman.  The  committee 
conducted  an  article-by-article  reviev 
of  the  text  of  the  draft  declaration,  d 
ing  which  168  formal  draft  resolution 
containing  amendments  to  its  variou; 
articles  were  submitted.  At  1:00  a.m. 
on  December  7,  after  voting  on  hun- 
dreds of  proposed  changes,  Committ 
III  adopted  the  revised  text  of  the  di 
laration  (now  called  the  Universal  D( 
laration  of  Human  Rights)  by  a  vote 
29  to  0  with  7  abstentions  (Belorussi. 
S.S.R.,  Canada,  Czechoslovakia,  Po- 
land, Ukrainian  S.S.R.,  U.S.S.R.,  a: 
Yugoslavia)  and  transmitted  it  to  th( 
General  Assembly.  On  December  7 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  1  pj. 


FEATURE 
Human  Rights 


mmittee  rejected  a  Soviet  draft  reso- 
:ion  requesting  the  General  Assembly 
postpone  final  adoption  of  the  Uni- 
rsal  Declaration  until  its  next 
ssion. 

December  9-10,  1948.  The  UN 
neral  Assembly,  meeting  at  the  Pal- 
de  Chaillot  in  Paris,  debated  and 
opted  the  Universal  Declaration  of 
mian  Rights.  Representatives  of  35 
tions  presented  their  views.  The  dec- 
ation  was  proclaimed  as  marking  a 
;toric  step  in  the  history  of  mankind, 
jrotest  by  humanity  against  oppres- 
n,  inspired  by  the  highest  ideals  and 
e.xpression  of  mankind's  most  noble 
nciples  and  aspirations.  Some  of 
)se  who  spoke  saw  it  as  a  step  to- 
rd  the  establishment  of  a  true  inter- 
tional  constitution,  a  landmark  of 
ernational  cooperation,  an  effective 
)tector  of  human  freedoms.  Others 
lised  the  document  but  stressed  the 
d  for  a  covenant  to  secure  com- 
ance.  Some  noted  that  the  document 
s  a  compromise,  not  perfect,  but  the 
ist  harmonious,  comprehensive,  and 
iversal  declaration  on  human  rights 
it  the  human  race  had  so  far  ach- 
ed. They  criticized  certain  provi- 
ns,  omissions,  and  lack  of  specificity 
language  but  supported  the  docu- 
■nt  as  a  whole.  A  few  withheld  their 
jport  for  a  variety  of  reasons,  includ- 
;  a  Soviet  protest  that  the  declaration 
ilated  national  sovereignty,  but  these 
:ions  chose  not  to  vote  against  it. 
The  General  Assembly  approved 
?  amendment  proposed  by  the  United 
igdom  and  rejected  a  Soviet  draft 
solution  proposing  that  final  adoption 
postponed  until  the  fourth  regular 
;sion  of  the  General  Assembly  in  the 
1  of  1949.  After  voting  article  by  arti- 
on  the  text,  the  General  Assembly 
Dpted  the  Universal  Declaration  of 
iman  Rights  (Resolution  217(A)(III)) 
4  minutes  to  midnight  on  December 
by  a  vote  of  48  to  0  with  8  absten- 
ns.  Those  voting  in  favor  were: 
ghanistan,  Argentina,  Australia, 
Igium,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Burma,  Can- 
J  a,  Chile,  China,  Colombia,  Costa 
If  ea,  Cuba,  Denmark,  the  Dominican 


Three  o(  tlu  declaration's  origfinal  authors  (with  advisers)  at  the  opening  of  a 
1949  I'N  (  <)mml^sl()n  tor  Human  Rights  session.  Seated  from  left  to  right:  Dr. 
Charles  Vlalik  (Lchanon),  Prof.  Rene  Cassin  (F"rance),  Miss  Marjorie  Whiteman 
(adviser),  Mrs.  Eleanor  Roosevelt  (United  States),  and  Mr.  .lames  Simsarian 
(adviser). 


Republic,  Ecuador,  Egypt,  El  Salvador, 
Ethiopia,  France,  Greece,  Guatemala, 
Haiti,  Iceland,  India,  Iran,  Iraq, 
Lebanon,  Liberia,  Luxembourg,  Mex- 
ico, Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  Nic- 
aragua, Norway,  Pakistan,  Panama, 
Paraguay,  Peru,  Philippines,  Siam 
(Thailand),  Sweden,  Syria,  Turkey, 
United  Kingdom,  United  States,  Uru- 
guay, Venezuela.  Those  abstaining 
were:  Belorussian  S.S.R.,  Czechoslo- 
vakia, Poland,  Saudi  Arabia,  Ukrainian 
S.S.R.,  Union  of  South  Africa, 
U.S.S.R.,  and  Yugoslavia. 


Continuing  Etforts 

To  Implement  the  Declaration 

Since  December  10,  1948,  the  UN  Gen- 
eral Assembly  has  adopted  well  over 
100  other  resolutions,  covenants,  con- 
ventions, and  protocols,  which  elabo- 
rate on  principles  contained  in  the 


declaration.  These  instruments  repre- 
sent an  ongoing  effort  to  advance  and 
implement  the  message  contained  in 
the  Universal  Declaration. 

Declarations,  which  are  adopted  by 
the  UN  General  Assembly,  constitute 
recommendations  to  UN  member 
states.  They  have  moral  weight  but  no 
legal  force.  The  United  States,  after 
careful  consideration,  has  voted  in  the 
General  Assembly  for  a  number  of  dec- 
larations on  many  subjects,  including 
religious,  sexual  and  racial  discrimina- 
tion; torture  and  other  cruel  treatment 
or  punishment;  and  the  rights  of  indi- 
viduals who  are  not  nationals  of  the 
country  in  which  they  live. 

Covenants,  conventions,  and  pro- 
tocols, which  constitute  legally  binding 
international  treaties  for  ratifying  par- 
ties, involve  a  much  more  complex 
process  before  entering  into  force.  Fol- 
lowing approval  of  the  text  by  the  Gen- 
eral Assembly,  individual  states  must 
initiate  their  own  frequently  lengthy 
ratification  processes.  Only  after  a 
specified  number  of  countries  have 
ratified  the  treaty,  does  the  covenant. 


ipartment  of  State  Bulletin/December  1988 


convention,  or  protocol  enter  into  force, 
and  then  only  for  those  countries  which 
ratified  it. 

The  United  States  has  ratified  sev- 
eral of  these  instruments:  the  Protocol 
Amending  the  Slavery  Convention 
Signed  at  Geneva  on  September  25, 
1926,  with  annex  (adopted  on  December 
7,  1953,  and  ratified  by  the  United 
States  on  March  7,  1956);  the  Supple- 
mentary Convention  on  the  Abolition  of 
Slavery,  the  Slave  Trade  and  Institu- 
tions and  Practices  Similar  to  Slavery 
(adopted  on  September  7,  1956,  and 
ratified  by  the  United  States  on  De- 
cember e'  1967);  the  Protocol  Relating 
to  the  Status  of  Refugees  (adopted  on 
December  16,  1966,  and  ratified  by  the 
United  States  on  October  4,  1968);  the 
Convention  on  the  Political  Rights  of 
Women  (adopted  on  December  20,  1952, 
and  ratified  by  the  United  States  on 
July  7,  1976);  and  the  Convention  on 
the  Prevention  and  Punishment  of  the 
Crime  of  Genocide  (see  box  on  p.  3). 

The  executive  branch  of  the  United 
States  has  signed  and  submitted  to  the 
Senate  for  its  advice  and  consent  to 
ratification  the  International  Covenant 
on  Civil  and  Political  Rights  and  the 
International  Covenant  on  Economic 
and  Social  Rights  (see  1966  Covenants); 
the  International  Convention  on  the 
Elimination  of  All  Forms  of  Racial  Dis- 
crimination (adopted  December  21, 
1965,  and  submitted  by  President  Car- 
ter to  the  Senate  on  February  23,  1978); 
the  Convention  on  the  Elimination  of 
All  Forms  of  Discrimination  Against 
Women  (adopted  December  18,  1979, 
and  submitted  by  President  Cai-ter  to 
the  Senate  on  November  12,  1980);  and 
the  Convention  Against  Torture  and 
other  Cruel,  Inhuman  or  Degrading 
Treatment  or  Punishment  (adopted  on 
December  10,  1984,  and  submitted  by 
President  Reagan  to  the  Senate  on  May 
23,  1988).  The  Senate  has  not  yet  acted 
on  these  instruments. 

Delay  in  the  process  of  ratifying 
treaties  associated  with  human  rights, 
however,  does  not  reflect  an  intention 
to  deny  Americans  their  rights.  The 
Constitution,  the  Bill  of  Rights,  and 
other  U.S.  laws  fully  protect  the  rights 
and  freedoms  that  Americans  enjoy. 


The  1966  Covenants 

The  adoption  of  the  Universal  Declara- 
tion on  December  10,  1948,  did  not  di- 
minish the  impetus  to  develop  legally 
binding  measures  to  secure  compliance 
with  the  principles  of  the  declaration. 
That  same  day,  the  UN  General  Assem- 
bly passed  a  resolution  requesting  the 
Economic  and  Social  Council  to  ask  the 
Commission  on  Human  Rights  to  con- 
tinue to  give  priority  to  preparation  of 
the  remaining  portions  of  the  projected 
international  bill  of  human  rights — an 
international  covenant,  which  would  be 
legally  binding  on  ratifying  states,  and 
measures  of  implementation. 

In  1952,  at  the  request  of  the  Eco- 
nomic and  Social  Council  and  the  Gen- 
eral Assembly,  the  commission  agi-eed 
to  divide  its  draft  covenant  into  two 
covenants — one  on  civil  and  political 
rights  and  the  other  on  economic,  so- 
cial, and  cultural  rights.  The  United 
States  had  been  a  strong  proponent  of 
two  separate  covenants  on  the  grounds 
that  the  term  "rights"  was  used  in  a 
different  sense  regarding  civil  and  po- 
litical rights  on  the  one  hand  and  eco- 
nomic, social,  and  cultural  rights  on  the 
other.  The  commission  subsequently 
produced  two  draft  covenants  as  well  as 
an  optional  protocol  to  the  covenant  on 
civil  and  political  rights. 

On  December  16,  1966,  19  years 
after  submission  of  the  first  prelimi- 
nary drafts  of  an  international  bill  of 
rights  to  the  Commission  on  Human 
Rights,  the  General  Assembly  adopted 
the  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and 
Political  Rights;  the  Optional  Protocol 
to  the  International  Covenant  on  Civil 
and  Political  Rights;  and  the  Interna- 
tional Covenant  on  Economic,  Social 
and  Cultural  Rights — three  instruments 
giving  legal  force  to  the  rights  pro- 
claimed in  the  Universal  Declaration  of 
Human  Rights.  Both  covenants  were 
adopted  unanimously,  while  the  Op- 
tional Protocol  to  the  Covenant  on  Civil 
and  Political  Rights  was  adopted  by  a 
vote  of  68  (United  States)  to  2,  with  38 
abstentions.  Together  with  the  Univer- 
sal Declaration,  these  three  instru- 
ments constitute  what  the  United 
Nations  calls  the  International  Bill  of 
Human  Rights. 


Following  the  vote,  U.S.  Represent 
ative  to  the  United  Nations  Patricia 
Harris  declared  that  the  United  States 
had  voted  for  the  three  instruments  be- 
cause it  believed  that  "the  United  Na- 
tions must  move  forward  in  the  field  of 
human  rights  if  it  is  to  fulfill  the  prom- 
ise of  the  Charter  to  promote  and  en- 
courage 'respect  for  human  rights  and 
for  fundamental  freedoms  for  all  with- 
out distinction  as  to  race,  sex,  lan- 
guage, or  religion.'"  Harris  noted  that 
this  affirmative  vote  did  not  express 
U.S.  "agreement  with  or  approval  of 
every  part  of  the  covenants." 

On  October  5,  1977,  President 
Jimmy  Carter  visited  the  United  Na- 
tions and  signed  the  International 
Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights 
and  the  International  Covenant  on  Ecc 
nomic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights  on 
behalf  of  the  United  States.  President 
Carter  transmitted  both  covenants  to 
the  Senate  for  ratification,  on  FebruarA 
23,  1978,  declaring  that  its  prompt  ad- 
vice and  consent  to  ratification  would 
"confirm  our  country's  traditional  com 
mitment  to  the  promotion  and  protec- 
tion of  human  rights  at  home  and 
abroad." 

The  President  also  told  the  Senat 
however,  that  although  "the  great  ma 
jority  of  the  substantive  provisions"  o 
the  covenants  were  "entirely  consis- 
tent" with  the  letter  and  spirit  of  U.S 
laws  and  the  Constitution,  he  had  rec 
ommended  reservations,  understand- 
ings, or  declarations  wherever  a 
provision  may  be  in  conflict  with  the 
U.S.  Constitution  or  laws.  These  are; 
included,  among  others,  rights  to  fret 
speech  and  property,  and  the  federal 
character  of  our  government.  The  Pre 
ident  also  recommended  that  the  Sen- 
ate issue  a  statement  of  understandin 
that  Articles  1  through  15  of  the  Intei 
national  Covenant  on  Economic,  Socit 
and  Cultural  Rights  describe  goals  to 
be  achieved  progressively  rather  than 
through  immediate  implementation. 
The  Senate  has  not  yet  given  its  con- 
sent to  ratification  of  the  covenants. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  19 


FEATURE 
Human  Rights 


The  Universal  Declaration:  A  Living  Document 


The  Universal  Declaration  of  Human 
Rights  urges  all  peoples  and  all  nations 
to  promote  respect  for  the  rights  it  pro- 
claims and  to  strive  for  their  universal 
and  effective  recognition  and  obser- 
vance. Immediately  after  adoption  of  the 
Universal  Declaration,  the  United  Na- 
tions began  to  develop  a  many-faceted 
program  for  informing  people  throughout 
the  world  that  they  were  entitled  to  cer- 
tain rights.  The  text  of  the  declaration 
i«as  translated  into  numerous  languages 
and  publicized  through  UN  publications, 
Dosters,  films,  speakers,  radio  and  tele- 
vision programs,  human  rights  exhibits, 
and  special  events.  By  the  end  of  1949, 
he  Universal  Declaration  was  available 
n  19  languages — including  the  5  official 
anguages  of  the  United  Nations.  It  is 
low  printed  and  circulated  in  more  than 
70  languages  and  copies  can  be  found 
n  almost  every  nation  on  earth,  A  mini- 
ature copy  of  the  declaration  also  is 
available  in  the  form  of  a  pocket-sized 
passport,"  showing  that  the  individual 
/vhose  name  it  bears  is  entitled  to  the 
ights  within. 

To  underscore  theimportance  that 
he  United  Nations  attached  to  this  doc- 
jment,  it  decided  that  the  declaration 


The  International  Covenant  on 
vil  and  Political  Rights  affirms  such 
jhts  as  the  inherent  right  to  life;  lib- 
ty  of  movement;  equality  before  the 
v;  presumption  of  innocence;  freedom 
thought,  conscience,  and  religion; 
»edom  of  expression;  the  right  of 
aceful  assembly;  freedom  of  associa- 
in;  and  the  right  to  take  part  in  the 
nduct  of  public  affairs  and  to  vote  in 
nuine,  free  elections.  The  covenant 
Clares  that  no  one  shall  be  subjected 
cruel,  inhuman,  or  degrading  punish- 
3nt,  torture,  or  arbitrary  arrest  or 
tention;  and  that  no  one  shall  be  held 
slavery  or  servitude.  It  prohibits  dis- 
imination  in  enjoyment  of  these  rights 
,  the  basis  of  race,  sex,  language,  re- 
;ion,  opinion,  and/or  national  or  social 
igin.  It  also  established  an  18-mem- 
■r  Human  Rights  Committee  to  cen- 
ter reports  submitted  by  ratifying 


would  be  the  only  other  document  along 
with  the  UN  Charter  to  be  deposited  in 
the  cornerstone  of  the  UN  Headquarters 
building  in  New  York  City.  Secretary 
General  Trygve  Lie  placed  these  docu- 
ments in  the  cornerstone  during  the 
dedication  ceremony  on  October  24, 
1949.  Also,  the  United  Nations,  under  a 
practice  established  by  the  General  As- 
sembly on  December  4,  1950,  observes 
Human  Rights  Day  each  year  on  De- 
cember 10,  a  special  day  for  disseminat- 
ing the  message  of  the  declaration  to 
the  peoples  of  the  world. 

UN  Secretary  General  Javier  Perez 
de  Cuellar  on  December  10,  1987,  initi- 
ated the  40th  anniversary  of  the  adop- 
tion of  the  Universal  Declaration  by 
reaffirming  the  UN  commitment  to  its 
principles.  The  United  Nations  an- 
nounced that  it  would  put  even  greater 
stress  on  carrying  the  message  of  the 
Universal  Declaration  to  every  part  of 
the  world  during  the  year-long  obser- 
vance of  its  40th  anniversary,  particu- 
larly through  expansion  of  UN 
information,  training,  and  advisory  pro- 
grams. UN  offices  organized  a  series  of 
commemorative  events  celebrating  the 
40th  anniversary  and  promoting  human 


states  on  measures  taken  to  implement 
its  provisions.  The  International  Cove- 
nant on  Civil  and  Political  Rights  en- 
tered into  force  on  March  23,  1976—3 
months  after  deposit  of  the  35th  instru- 
ment of  accession  with  the  UN  Secre- 
tary General. 

The  Optional  Protocol  of  the 
Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political 
Rights  recognizes  the  competence  of 
the  Human  Rights  Committee  to  inves- 
tigate complaints  against  states  ratify- 
ing the  protocol  by  individuals  claiming 
to  be  victims  of  violations  of  the  rights 
set  forth  by  the  covenant.  The  Optional 
Protocol  also  entered  into  force  on 
March  23,  1976 — 3  months  after  deposit 
of  the  10th  instrument  of  ratification 
with  the  UN  Secretary  General. 

The  International  Covenant  on 
Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights 

proclaims  such  rights  as  the  right  to 
self-determination,  enjoyment  of  just 


rights  to  be  held  throughout  the  year, 
such  as  speeches  by  the  Secretary 
General  and  other  top  UN  officials,  sem- 
inars, panel  discussions,  briefings, 
worksfiops,  public  meetings,  and  other 
special  programs — culminating  with  sol- 
emn ceremonies  during  a  special  com- 
memorative session  of  the  UN  General 
Assembly  on  December  8,  1988. 

The  United  States  is  commemorat- 
ing the  40th  anniversary  by  holding  a 
conference  on  human  rights  at  the  De- 
partment of  State  on  December  8,  1988, 
which  will  be  attended  by  represen- 
tatives of  human  rights  organizations 
and  other  individuals  active  in  this  area. 
President  Reagan's  annual  proclama- 
tion, announcing  U.S.  observance  of  Hu- 
man Rights  Day  on  December  10, 
repledges  U.S.  dedication  to  the  cause 
of  individual  freedom  and  human  rights. 

Clearly,  the  Universal  Declaration  of 
Human  Rights  continues  to  be  a  living 
document  and  the  UN  slogan  honoring 
its  40th  anniversary — "People  only  live 
full  lives  in  the  light  of  human  rights" — 
gains  more  adherents  every  day. 


and  favorable  conditions  of  work,  an  ad- 
equate standard  of  living,  the  highest 
attainable  standard  of  physical  and 
mental  health,  education,  participation 
in  cultural  life,  the  benefits  of  scientific 
progress,  and  the  right  to  form  trade 
unions.  The  covenant  prohibits  discrimi- 
nation in  enjoyment  of  these  rights 
based  on  race,  sex,  language,  religion, 
opinion,  and/or  national  or  social  origin. 
Ratifying  states  undertake  to  submit 
periodic  reports  to  the  Economic  and 
Social  Council  on  measures  adopted  and 
progress  made  toward  achieving  obser- 
vance of  the  rights  recognized  by  the 
covenant.  The  International  Covenant 
on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural 
Rights  entered  into  force  on  January  3, 
1976 — 3  months  after  deposit  of  the 
35th  instrument  of  ratification  with  the 
UN  Secretary  General. 


Appendix 


Universal  Declaration 
OF  Human  Rights 


Resolution  217{A)(III)  of 
the  General  Assembly, 
December  10,  1948 


Preamble 

Whereas  recognition  of  the  inherent  dignity 
and  of  the  equal  and  inalienable  rights  of 
all  members  of  the  human  family  is  the 
foundation  of  freedom,  justice  and  peace  in 
the  world. 

Whereas  disregard  and  contempt  for 
human  rights  have  resulted  in  barbarous 
acts  which  have  outraged  the  conscience  of 
mankind,  and  the  advent  of  a  world  in 
which  human  beings  shall  enjoy  freedom  of 
speech  and  belief  and  freedom  from  fear 
and  want  has  been  proclaimed  as  the  high- 
est aspii-ation  of  the  common  people, 

Whereas  it  is  essential,  if  man  is  not  to 
be  compelled  to  have  recourse,  as  a  last 
resort,  to  rebellion  against  tyranny  and  op- 
pression, that  human  rights  should  be  pro- 
tected by  the  rule  of  law, 

Whereas  it  is  essential  to  promote  the 
development  of  friendly  relations  between 
nations. 

Whereas  the  peoples  of  the  United  Na- 
tions have  in  the  Charter  reaffirmed  their 
faith  in  fundamental  human  rights,  in  the 
dignity  and  worth  of  the  human  person  and 
in  the  equal  rights  of  men  and  women  and 
have  determined  to  promote  social  prog- 
ress and  better  standards  of  life  in  larger 
freedom. 

Whereas  Member  States  have  pledged 
themselves  to  achieve,  in  co-operation  with 
the  United  Nations,  the  promotion  of  uni- 
versal respect  for  and  observance  of  human 
rights  and  fundamental  freedoms, 

Whereas  a  common  understanding  of 
these  rights  and  freedoms  is  of  the  great- 
est importance  for  the  full  realization  of 
this  pledge. 

Now,  therefore, 

The  General  Assembly, 

Proclaims  this  Universal  Declaration 
of  Human  Rights  as  a  common  standard  of 
achievement  for  all  peoples  and  all  nations. 


to  the  end  that  every  individual  and  every 
organ  of  society,  keeping  this  Declaration 
constantly  in  mind,  shall  strive  by  teaching 
and  education  to  promote  respect  for  these 
rights  and  freedoms  and  by  progressive 
measures,  national  and  international,  to  se- 
cure their  universal  and  effective  recogni- 
tion and  observance,  both  among  the 
peoples  of  Member  States  themselves  and 
among  the  peoples  of  territories  under 
their  jurisdiction. 

Article  1 

All  human  beings  are  born  free  and 
equal  in  dignity  and  rights.  They  are  en- 
dowed with  reason  and  conscience  and 
should  act  towards  one  another  in  a  spirit 
of  brotherhood. 


Article  2 

Everyone  is  entitled  to  all  the  rights 
and  freedoms  set  forth  in  this  Declaration, 
without  distinction  of  any  kind,  such  as 
race,  colour,  sex,  language,  religion,  politi- 
cal or  other  opinion,  national  or  social  ori- 
gin, property,  birth  or  other  status. 

Furthermore,  no  distinction  shall  be 
made  on  the  basis  of  the  political,  jurisdic- 
tional or  international  status  of  the  country 
or  territory  to  which  a  person  belongs, 
whether  it  be  independent,  trust,  non-self- 
governing  or  under  any  other  limitation  of 
sovereignty. 


Article  3 

Everyone  has  the  right  to  life,  liberty 
and  the  security  of  person. 


Article  4 

No  one  shall  be  held  in  slavery  or  serv- 
itude; slavery  and  the  slave  trade  shall  be 
prohibited  in  all  their  forms. 


Article  5 

No  one  shall  be  subjected  to  torture  or 
to  cruel,  inhuman  or  degrading  treatment 
or  punishment. 


Article  6 

Everyone  has  the  right  to  recognition 
everywhere  as  a  person  before  the  law. 


Article  7 

All  are  equal  before  the  law  and  are 
entitled  without  any  discrimination  to 
equal  protection  of  the  law.  All  are  entitl 
to  equal  protection  against  any  discrimir 
tion  in  violation  of  this  Declaration  and 
against  any  incitement  to  such 
discrimination. 


Article  8 

Everyone  has  the  right  to  an  effecti' 
remedy  by  the  competent  national  tri- 
bunals for  acts  violating  the  fundamenta 
rights  granted  him  by  the  constitution  o 
by  law. 


Article  9 

No  one  shall  be  subjected  to  arbitra 
arrest,  detention  or  exile. 


Article  10 

Everyone  is  entitled  in  full  equality 
a  fair  and  public  hearing  by  an  independ 
ent  and  impartial  tribunal,  in  the  deter 
mination  of  his  rights  and  obligations  an 
of  any  criminal  charge  against  him. 


10 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  If 


FEATURE 
Human  Rights 


Article  11 

1.  Everyone  charged  with  a  penal  of- 
ice  has  the  right  to  be  presumed  inno- 
it  until  proved  guilty  according  to  law  in 
lublic  trial  at  which  he  has  had  all  the 
arantees  necessary  for  his  defence. 

No  one  shall  be  held  guilty  of  any 
rial  offence  on  account  of  any  act  or 
ission  which  did  not  constitute  a  penal 
ence,  under  national  or  international 
■,  at  the  time  when  it  was  committed, 
r  shall  a  heavier  penalty  be  imposed 
m  the  one  that  was  applicable  at  the 
le  the  penal  offence  was  committed. 

Article  12 

No  one  shall  be  subjected  to  arbitrary 
erference  with  his  privacy,  family,  home 
correspondence,  nor  to  attacks  upon  his 
lour  and  reputation.  Everyone  has  the 
ht  to  the  protection  of  the  law  against 
h  interference  or  attacks. 


Article  13 

1.  Everyone  has  the  right  to  freedom 
-novement  and  residence  within  the  bor- 

of  each  state. 

2.  Everyone  has  the  right  to  leave  any 
mtry,  including  his  own,  and  to  return 
his  country. 


'^mMB- 


Article  14 

1.  Everyone  has  the  right  to  seek  and 
enjoy  in  other  countries  asylum  from 
•secution. 

2.  This  right  may  not  be  invoked  in  the 
le  of  prosecutions  genuinely  arising  from 
!i-political  crimes  or  from  acts  contrary 
the  purposes  and  principles  of  the 

dted  Nations. 


partment  of  State  Bulletin/December  1988 


Article  15 

1.  Everyone  has  the  right  to  a 
nationality. 

2.  No  one  shall  be  arbitrarily  deprived 
of  his  nationality  nor  denied  the  right  to 
change  his  nationality. 

Article  16 

1.  Men  and  women  of  full  age,  without 
any  limitation  due  to  race,  nationality  or 
religion,  have  the  right  to  marry  and  to 
found  a  family.  They  are  entitled  to  equal 
rights  as  to  marriage,  during  marriage  and 
at  its  dissolution. 

2.  Marriage  shall  be  entered  into  only 
with  the  free  and  full  consent  of  the 
intending  spouses. 

3.  The  family  is  the  natural  and  funda- 
mental group  unit  of  society  and  is  entitled 
to  protection  by  society  and  the  State. 

Article  17 

1.  Everyone  has  the  right  to  own  prop- 
erty alone  as  well  as  in  association  with 
others. 

2.  No  one  shall  be  arbitrarily  deprived 
of  his  property. 

Article  18 

Everyone  has  the  right  to  freedom  of 
thought,  conscience  and  religion;  this  right 
includes  freedom  to  change  his  religion  or 
belief,  and  freedom,  either  alone  or  in  com- 
munity with  others  and  in  public  or  pri- 
vate, to  manifest  his  religion  or  belief  in 
teaching,  practice,  worship  and 
observance. 

Article  19 

Everyone  has  the  right  to  freedom  of 
opinion  and  expression;  this  right  includes 
freedom  to  hold  opinions  without  inter- 
ference and  to  seek,  receive  and  impart 
information  and  ideas  through  any  media 
and  regardless  of  frontiers. 

Article  20 

1.  Everyone  has  the  right  to  freedom 
of  peaceful  assembly  and  association. 

2.  No  one  may  be  compelled  to  belong 
to  an  association. 


Article  21 

1.  Everyone  has  the  right  to  take  part 
in  the  Government  of  his  country,  directly 
or  through  freely  chosen  representatives. 

2.  Everyone  has  the  right  of  equal  ac- 
cess to  public  service  in  his  country. 

3.  The  will  of  the  people  shall  be  the 
basis  of  the  authority  of  government;  this 
will  shall  be  expressed  in  periodic  and  gen- 
uine elections  which  shall  be  by  universal 
and  equal  suffrage  and  shall  be  held  by 
secret  vote  or  by  equivalent  free  voting 
procedures. 


Article  22 

Everyone,  as  a  member  of  society,  has 
the  right  to  social  security  and  is  entitled 
to  realization,  through  national  effort  and 
international  co-operation  and  in  accord- 
ance with  the  organization  and  resources  of 
each  State,  of  the  economic,  social  and  cul- 
tural rights  indispensable  for  his  dignity 
and  the  free  development  of  his 
personality. 


(Ski'tchf.s  bv  S:illv  Bn 


Article  23 

1.  Everyone  has  the  right  to  work,  to 
free  choice  of  employment,  to  just  and 
favourable  conditions  of  work  and  to  pro- 
tection against  unemployment. 

2.  Everyone,  without  any  discrimina- 
tion, has  the  right  to  equal  pay  for  equal 
work. 

3.  Everyone  who  works  has  the  right 
to  just  and  favourable  remuneration  insur- 
ing for  himself  and  his  family  an  e.xistence 
worthy  of  human  dignity,  and  supple- 
mented, if  necessary,  by  other  means  of 
social  protection. 

4.  Everyone  has  the  right  to  form  and 
to  join  trade  unions  for  the  protection  of 
his  interests. 


Article  24 

Everyone  has  the  right  to  rest  and  lei- 
sure, including  reasonable  limitation  of 
working  hours  and  periodic  holidays  with 
pa.V. 


Article  25 

1.  Everyone  has  the  right  to  a  stand- 
ard of  living  adequate  for  the  health  and 
well-being  of  himself  and  of  his  family,  in- 
cluding food,  clothing,  housing  and  medical 
care  and  necessary  social  services,  and  the 
right  to  security  in  the  event  of  unemploy- 
ment, sickness,  disability,  widowhood,  old 
age  or  other  lack  of  livelihood  in  circum- 
stances beyond  his  control. 

2.  Motherhood  and  childhood  are  en- 
titled to  special  care  and  assistance.  All 
children,  whether  born  in  or  out  of 
wedlock,  shall  enjoy  the  same  social 
protection. 


Article  26 

1.  Everyone  has  the  right  to  educa- 
tion. Education  shall  be  free,  at  least  in  the 
elementary  and  fundamental  stages.  Ele- 
mentary education  shall  be  compulsory. 
Technical  and  professional  education  shall 
be  made  generally  available  and  higher  ed- 
ucation shall  be  equally  accessible  to  all  on 
the  basis  of  merit. 


2.  Education  shall  be  directed  to  the 
full  development  of  the  human  personality 
and  to  the  strengthening  of  respect  for  hu- 
man rights  and  fundamental  freedoms.  It 
shall  promote  understanding,  tolerance  and 
friendship  among  all  nations,  racial  or  re- 
ligious groups,  and  shall  further  the  ac- 
tivities of  the  United  Nations  for  the 
maintenance  of  peace. 

3.  Parents  have  a  prior  right  to  choose 
the  kind  of  education  that  shall  be  given  to 
their  children. 


Article  27 

1.  Everyone  has  the  right  freely  to 
participate  in  the  cultural  life  of  the  com- 
munity, to  enjoy  the  arts  and  to  share  in 
scientific  advancement  and  its  benefits. 

2.  Everyone  has  the  right  to  the  pro- 
tection of  the  moral  and  material  interests 
resulting  from  any  scientific,  literary  or 
artistic  production  of  which  he  is  the 
author. 


Article  28 

Everyone  is  entitled  to  a  social  and 
international  order  in  which  the  rights  and 
freedoms  set  forth  in  this  Declaration  can 
be  fully  realized. 


Sketch  by  Sally  Brennaii) 


Article  29 

1.  Everyone  has  duties  to  the  comm 
nity  in  which  alone  the  free  and  full  dev 
opment  of  his  personality  is  possible. 

2.  In  the  exercise  of  his  rights  and 
freedoms,  everyone  shall  be  subject  onl 
such  limitations  as  are  determined  by  If 
solely  for  the  purpose  of  securing  due  n 
ognition  and  respect  for  the  rights  and 
freedoms  of  others  and  of  meeting  the  j 
requirements  of  morality,  public  order  ; 
the  general  welfare  in  a  democratic  soc 

3.  These  rights  and  freedoms  may  i 
no  case  be  e.\ercised  contrary  to  the  pu 
poses  and  principles  of  the  United  Nati 


Article  30 

Nothing  in  this  Declaration  may  be 
terpreted  as  implying  for  any  State,  gr 
or  person  any  right  to  engage  in  any  ai 
tivity  or  to  perform  any  act  aimed  at  tl 
destruction  of  any  of  the  rights  and  fre 
doms  set  forth  herein. 

Hundred  and  eighty-third  plenary 
meeting.  10  December  191,8.  ■ 


12 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  ll8h 


■HE  SECRETARY 


The  Open  Society  and  Its  Friends 


Secretary  Shidtz's  address  before 
I  liter-American  Press  Associa- 
I  ( lAPA)  in  Salt  Lake  City  on 
vtolier  11,  1988.^ 

)ur  years  from  now,  we  will  mark  half 
millennium  since  the  discovery  of  the 
ew  World  by  Columbus.  Eight  years 
ter  that,  we  will  enter  a  new  century 
id  a  new  millennium. 

A  community  of  nations,  with  a 
mmunity  of  shared  interests  and 
,lues,  is  emerging  in  the  Western 
emisphere.  Almost  500  years  after 
:)lunibus,  the  New  World  turned  de- 
litively  to  democracy  and  openness, 
reedom  is  a  core  value.  Human  digni- 
and  social  justice  are  critical  objec- 
ves,  and  democracy  is  finally  being 
iderstood  for  what  it  is:  an  inspiring 
eal  that  is  also  the  best  way  to  get 
lings  done. 

The  democratic  revolutions  un- 
^rway  in  this  hemisphere  express  a 
lared  heritage.  From  the  start,  the 
)peal  of  freedom  from  the  miseries  of 
le  Old  World  created  a  mutually  rein- 
rcing  dynamic  among  the  peoples  of 
le  Americas.  The  demands  for  free- 
)m,  equality,  and  liberty  heard  at 
oncord  and  Valley  Forge  echoed 
uthward  to  Latin  America.  The  aspi- 
itions  and  ideals  of  Latin  American 
'volutionaries  echoed  in  the  north. 

There  have  been  many  problems 
ong  the  way;  but  as  we  prepare  to 
ose  the  20th  century,  we  are  a  hemi- 
ihere  that  is  organizing,  democrati- 
dly  and  freely,  to  meet  the  challenges 
'  the  world  around  us. 
akes  us  a  hemisphere  well  suited  to 
;al  with  the  new  world  that  is  coming 
the  21st  century. 

That  new  world  of  the  future  is 
ready  upon  us.  We  must  prepare 
irselves.  The  changes  brought  by 
formation  technology  cannot  be  put 
to  a  single  headline,  but  they  are  all 
'ound  us. 

•  High  in  the  Andes,  a  homemade 
itellite  dish  in  an  Indian  village  pulls 

television  programs  from  Argentina. 

•  In  Guatemala  City,  televiewers 
atch  the  Atlanta-based  Cable  News 
etwork  (CNN).  And  I  might  say, 
'hen  I  went  to  Beijing  earlier  this 

ear,  I  turned  on  the  TV,  and  there  was 
'NN.  I  went  to  Moscow,  I  turned  on 
le  TV,  and  there  was  CNN.  Talk 
bout  an  information  standard. 


•  In  central  Brazil,  soybean  grow- 
ers receive  real-time  data  on  Chicago 
Board  trading  by  computer. 

•  In  Barbados  and  the  Dominican 
Republic,  key-entry  operators  encode 
information  from  tons  of  library  cata- 
logs and  court  transcripts,  telephone 
directories  and  manufacturing  invento- 
ries flown  in  daily  by  jet  from  all  the 
world.  In  a  matter  of  hours,  the  same 
data  is  again  on  its  way — this  time  elec- 
tronically— to  data  banks  abroad. 

This  is  a  time  of  accelerating 
change  and  growing  interdependence 
among  nations.  The  very  material  sub- 
stances which  surround  us  in  everyday 
life  are  being  transformed.  New  sub- 
stances are  being  created.  Old  sub- 
stances are  finding  new  uses.  The  same 
scientific  progress  that  has  altered  the 
nature  of  basic  materials  has  acceler- 
ated the  speed  of  human  transactions. 
More  and  more,  ours  is  a  time  of  open 
skies  and  borderless  markets.  Increas- 
ingly, wealth  is  becoming  intangible; 
e.xchange,  instantaneous;  labor,  mental. 
Increasingly,  success  depends  on  the 
speed  with  which  ideas  are  put  into 
practice. 

That  is  why  knowledge,  informa- 
tion, and  ideas  are  the  hottest  items  in 
trade.  Service  industries  are  major 
sources  of  new  employment.  Knowl- 
edge-intensive industries  like  micro- 
electronics and  biotechnology  are  the 
fastest  growing.  Today's  research  in  ag- 
riculture, based  on  the  information  con- 
tained in  the  genetic  codes,  promises 
changes  that  will  dwarf  the  "green 
revolution." 

Impact  on  the  Press 

You  in  the  press  face  special  challenges 
in  this  information  age.  Technology  al- 
lows news  to  reach  more  people  in  less 
time.  Nonetheless,  some  governments 
still  try  to  choke  the  spread  of  new 
ideas.  They  exclude  and  expel  foreign 
journalists;  confiscate  film  and  equip- 
ment; jam  broadcasts;  turn  out  propa- 
ganda and  disinformation. 

Some  methods  are  brutally  direct: 
physical  assault  on  journalists,  shutting 
down  presses,  banning  broadcasts.  Oth- 
ers are  more  indirect:  licensing  require- 
ments, newsprint  controls,  suggestions 
that  journalists  report  "only  the  truth." 


In  democracies,  such  practices  are  un- 
acceptable. But  in  the  closed  societies 
of  this  hemisphere — and  there  are  get- 
ting to  be  fewer  and  fewer  of  them — 
these  are  not  isolated  instances. 

You  in  the  Inter-American  Press 
Association  have  defended  the  free  flow 
of  information  and  ideas.  You  have 
helped  to  resist  the  so-called  new  in- 
ternational information  order  I'm 
heartened  that  the  new  UNESCO  [UN 
Educational,  Scientific  and  Cultural  Or- 
ganization] Director  General  [Frederico 
Mayor]  has  called  for  "communications 
without  restrictions  between  all  na- 
tions." We  must  work  together  to  stop 
attempts  to  manage  the  news. 

Time  of  Decision 

During  my  recent  visits  to  Latin 
America,  one  of  the  most  persistent 
questions  raised  was  whether  Latin 
America  could  cope  with  the  informa- 
tion age  and  with  a  global  economy 
driven  by  technological  innovation. 

The  answer  to  these  questions  is 
clear:  Countries  decide  whether  they 
will  be  among  the  innovators,  the  im- 
itators, or  those  that  are  left  behind. 
This  decision  is  the  product  of  attitudes 
and  policies. 

Material  factors — such  as  re- 
sources, large  industrial  plants,  close 
markets — are  important  but  need  not 
be  deciding.  Look  at  Singapore.  Tech- 
nology links  distant  markets,  lessens 
dependence  on  natural  raw  materials, 
and  creates  new  forms  of  economic 
activity. 

Success  comes  to  those  ready  to 
seize  the  opportunities  that  come  with 
change.  In  the  middle  of  the  last  cen- 
tury, the  pampas  of  Argentina  were  the 
locus  of  an  economic  boom  that  lasted 
beyond  World  War  I.  The  driving  force 
was  biotechnology  and  transportation. 
Selective  breeding  developed  new  stocks 
of  cattle.  The  railroads  linked  suppliers 
with  markets.  Refrigeration  made  it 
thinkable  that  livestock  raised  in  one 
quarter  of  the  globe  could  feed  popula- 
tions across  an  ocean. 

The  natural  wealth  was  always 
there.  The  technology  became  available. 
What  made  the  difference  then?  Argen- 
tina got  in  the  loop  and  moved  to  the 
center  It  borrowed  technology  and 
equity  capital  from  others  and  had  the 
confidence  to  compete  effectively  in  the 
global  market. 

No  one  can  downplay  the  problems 
facing  Latin  America  today.  But  politi- 
cal and  economic  freedom,  openness, 
and  cooperation  provide  the  basis  for 


13 


THE  SECRETARY 


overcoming  them.  There  is  ah-eady 
movement  in  this  direction.  It  must 
continue. 

Guidelines  for  the  Future 

Three  factors  are  essential  to  prosper 
in  the  new  global  environment. 

First,  societies  must  be  open. 

Knowledge  is  the  key  resource  in  a 
changing  world.  Free  societies  ai-e  open 
to  knowledge  from  inside  and  out.  In- 
formation circulates  freely  and  widely. 
Everything  gets  tested  in  open  com- 
petition— products  in  the  marketplace; 
candidates  at  the  ballot  box;  ideas  in 
journals,  newspapers,  classrooms. 
Freedom  spawns  innovation  because  it 
questions  established  ways  of  doing 
things.  It  puts  new  ideas  to  the  test, 
too.  In  this  context,  the  role  of  a  free 
press  is  vital.  Democracies  cannot  func- 
tion without  a  free  press. 

In  any  decisionmaking  system, 
input  and  feedback  are  vital.  Econom- 
ic and  political  feedback  come  from 
free  markets,  free  elections,  and  free 
thought.  Without  opposition  parties, 
a  free  press,  opinion  polls,  or  labor 
unions,  governments  and  economies  op- 
erate in  a  vacuum.  Societies  become 
closed.  They  stagnate.  They  lose  not 
only  the  capacity  to  govern  justly  and 
produce  wealth  but  the  capacity  to  op- 
erate effectively  at  all. 

Isn't  it  ironic  that  coverage  of 
the  recent  Communist  Party  Congress 
in  Moscow  was  much  greater  in  the 
West  than  in  Cuba?  Why  is  that?  Both 
Havana  and  Moscow  recognize  the 
power  of  ideas.  While  Moscow  seems 
desperately  to  be  looking  for  new  ideas 
to  turn  its  economy  around,  Havana 
still  fears  ideas — even  the  controlled 
debates  approved  in  Moscow.  Castro  de- 
liberately keeps  Cuba  out  of  the  game. 
He  doesn't  want  discussion.  He  fears 
the  winds  of  freedom. 

A  second  guideline:  Incentives, 
enterprise,  and  the  market  are  key. 

Central  planning  cannot  cope  with  the 
pace  or  magnitude  of  change.  Statist 
models  don't  work.  Governments  do  not 
create  wealth.  Planners  cannot  force 
growth.  But  governments  can,  and  fre- 
quently do,  discourage  growth  by  re- 
treating from  the  challenges  of  change. 
The  free  operation  of  the  marketplace 
for  goods  and  ideas  is  by  far  the  most 
efficient  arbiter  of  decisions. 

Political  freedom  in  the  Americas 
has  gone  farther  than  economic  free- 
dom, but  a  rebirth  of  free-market 
thinking  and  practice  is  underway.  The 
president  of  the  Inter-American  Devel- 
opment Bank  has  detected  a  "new  prag- 


14 


matism  in  the  air" — a  reduced  role  for 
the  state,  expanded  exports,  and  eco- 
nomic reform. 

To  be  sure,  economic  performance 
for  the  region  as  a  whole  is  not  good. 
Economic  growth  at  2.6%  is  barely 
above  growth  in  population.  It  will  have 
to  be  much  better  if  the  Americas  are 
to  hold  their  own  in  the  emerging 
global  economy.  This  statistical  total, 
however,  averages  out  some  strong 
performances  and  some  instructive 
failures. 

Colombia,  Uruguay,  and  Jamaica 
have  all  done  much  better  than  aver- 
age. Bolivia,  the  least  developed  South 
American  economy,  has  made  a  dra- 
matic turnaround.  In  1985,  prices  in 
Bolivia  rose  by  24,000%,  if  you  can 
calculate  something  like  that.  All 
that  means  is  that  the  money  economy 
didn't  function.  Some  vendors  weighed 
money  instead  of  counting  it.  Strikes 
were  endemic.  Workers  missed  an  aver- 
age of  100  workdays  in  1984. 

Then  a  new  government,  elected  in 
1985,  introduced  reforms  based  on  free- 
market  principles.  Now  inflation  is 
down  to  12%  per  year.  After  years  of 
stagnation,  the  economy  again  is  show- 
ing real  growth. 

Common  to  these  cases  is  resolute 
implementation  of  outward-looking  pol- 
icies aimed  at  trade  and  exchange  libei'- 
alization,  deregulation,  privatization, 
and  market-based  pricing.  Market- 
based  policies  make  the  difference. 

The  third  guideline  is  enhanced 
cooperation.  Problems  and  oppor- 
tunities both  increasingly  span  the 
globe.  People  must  think  beyond  na- 
tional frontiers.  They  must  work 
together. 

Global  politics  have  not  kept  pace 
with  global  economic  and  technological 
change.  Multilateral  organizations  are 
only  now  beginning  to  reflect  the  new- 
realities  of  today's  interactive  world 
rather  than  a  sterile  North-South 
confrontation. 

Latin  America  is  prominent  on  this 
global  scene  and  has  helped  encourage 
a  necessary  change  and  reform.  A  Pe- 
ruvian serves  with  distinction  as  UN 
Secretary  General  [Javier  Perez  de 
Cuellar].  Brazil  has  joined  the  UN 
Security  Council.  An  Argentine  is  Pres- 
ident of  the  UN  General  Assembly 
[Dante  Caputo].  Uruguay  has  launched 
the  current  round  of  the  GATT  [Gen- 
eral Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Ti-ade]. 


But  we  all  agree  that  more  needs 
to  be  done,  especially  at  the  regional 
level.  Andean,  Caribbean,  and  souther 
cone  groupings  function  but  do  not 
flourish.  This  is  unfortunate.  The  exarr 
pie  of  ASEAN  [Association  of  South 
East  Asian  Nations]  demonstrates  whs 
can  be  achieved  through  a  process  of 
consensus  building,  consultation,  and 
mutual  support. 

Cooperation  is  essential.  Consulta- 
tion is  essential.  The  new  democratic 
sohdarity  will  demand  that  established  j 
groupings  like  the  OAS  [Organization  ■ 
American  States] — already  active  in 
newer  ai'eas  like  human  rights  as  well 
as  older  ones  like  peacekeeping — adap 
to  the  new  global  diplomacy  in  the  dec 
ade  and  centuiy  ahead.  Global  and 
regional  organizations  are  a  fact  of 
international  life.  We  must  work  withi 
them,  and  we  must  make  them  work. 

At  the  forefront  of  our  regional 
concerns  lie  three  major  challenges: 
drugs,  debt,  and  the  future  of  democ- 
racy in  the  Americas. 

The  War  on  Drugs 

The  consumption  of  illegal  drugs  has 
become  a  pervasive  evil,  poisoning  pu 
lie  and  private  life  throughout  our 
hemisphere.  A  vast  network  links 
growers  on  the  slopes  of  the  Andes 
with  users  on  the  city  streets  in  Nort 
America.  This  clandestine  network 
rivals  legitimate  commercial  network; 
in  its  scope,  but  the  resemblance  is  s 
perficial.  This  is  a  dirty  business  tha' 
undermines  law  and  democracy.  Both 
newsmen  and  lawmen  have  lost  their 
lives  in  efforts  to  expose  the  evil  and 
protect  us  from  it. 

The  problem  is  not  only  pervasiv 
it  is  changing  constantly.  Ti-affickers 
are  moving  operations  into  Venezueh 
and  Brazil.  Argentina  has  become  a 
transshipment  point  for  cocaine  goin; 
to  Europe  and  the  United  States.  Th 
shifting  locus  of  activity  makes  this  i 
truly  international  problem. 

The  solution,  of  course,  begins  a 
home.  I  said  it  in  Bolivia,  and  I  repe 
it  now:  As  the  largest  single  market  [ 
illegal  drugs,  the  United  States  has 
special  responsibility  in  this  struggle 
a  responsibility  fully  as  great  as  that 
the  producing  countries.  I  agree  witl 
your  freedom  of  the  press  committee 
where  you  said:  "It  is  a  duty  to  fight 
the  consumption  of  narcotics — prin- 
cipally in  the  United  States — that  su 
tains  the  drug  trade."  Your  committi 
is  absolutely  on  the  mark  in  identify 
that  as  a  central  problem. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  1f 


THE  SECRETARY 


Individuals  must  say  "no"  to  drugs, 
with  Nancy  Reagan's  Just  Say  No 
lubs.  Nations  must  act,  singly  and 
)gether.  International  cooperation  is 
sential.  Producers  and  consumers 
ust  stop  blaming  each  other  and  start 
orking  together  And  a  real  start  is 
eing  made.  Just  this  past  August,  for 
sample,  29  Latin  and  European  na- 
ons  teamed  up  to  crack  down  on  drug 
irtel  operations.  Drugs  were  seized, 
boratories  destroyed,  and  criminals 
rested.  Information  sharing  was  criti- 
il.  Joint  action  across  borders  was 
iken.  We  started  on  the  right  track 
)gether,  and  we  must  continue. 

he  Test  of  Debt 

econd,  let  me  talk  briefly  about  the 
!st  of  debt.  The  second  challenge  is 
ebt.  This  involves  both  economic  and 
olitical  dimensions. 

As  Latin  America  solidifies  the 
'ansition  to  democracy,  the  bills  are 
Dming  due  for  massive  borrowing  and 
lisguided  economic  policy  of  the  past — 
past  often  characterized  by  military 
jgimes.  With  debt  high  and  growth 
gging,  some  believe  that  debt  puts 
emocracy  to  a  severe  test. 

The  democracies  have  shown  re- 
liance, but  the  debt  burden  is  great, 
efore  the  end  of  1989,  9  of  the  12 
ighly  indebted  Latin  American  coun- 
ties will  hold  elections.  Governments 
ill  be  rated  on  their  economic  per- 
)rmance.  Creditors  and  debtors  are  in 
lis  together  Both  must  join  pragmat- 
•ally  in  reaching  solutions. 

For  debtors,  growth  remains  the 
ey,  and  growth  requires  investment, 
he  more  savings  that  can  be  generated 
t  home,  the  better.  But  capital  flows 
■om  abroad  are  also  required. 

A  country  can  test  itself  on  its  prog- 
ass.  Do  its  own  savings  stay  home  to 
leet  its  own  capital  needs?  Is  domestic 
rivate  capital  returning  from  abroad, 
r  does  it  continue  to  flee? 

If  the  answers  are  positive — if 
loney  is  coming  back,  if  it  stays  home, 
■  they  can  attract  new  foreign  capital- 
he  country  will  find  itself  in  good 
tanding  in  what  we  might  call  the 
ourt  of  the  allocation  of  world  savings, 
f  the  answers  are  negative,  the  coun- 
ry  should  take  a  hard  look  at  its  own 
ecisions  about  economic  policy  and 
sk: 

•  "Has  economic  reform  been  as 
:t<  horough  and  comprehensive  as 
lossible?" 


•  "Are  structural  and  regulai-ity 
rigidities  still  a  stubborn  reality?" 

•  "Are  incentives  to  work,  save, 
and  invest  adequate?" 

Too  often,  structural  reform  is 
equated  with  austerity  and  restrictions. 
Surely,  economic  reform  is  needed.  But 
economic  reform  is  about  growth.  It  is 
about  freeing  up  and  attracting  re- 
sources, seeking  and  opening  up  mar- 
kets, expanding  the  opportunities  for 
trade.  Surely,  it  means  adjustments.  It 
imposes  costs.  It  takes  time.  But  it 
does  work.  Wliere  it  has  been  carried 
out  integrally — not  piecemeal — it  has 
made  for  a  real  turnaround. 

For  creditors,  the  challenge  is  to 
look  to  solutions  rather  than  the  size  of 
the  problem.  They  must  continue  to 
work  with  debtors,  and  they  must  learn 
to  take  into  account  what  amounts  to  a 
marginal  rate  of  ta.xation  on  political 
and  economic  reform — a  rate  that  is 
simply  too  high.  This  is  an  old  idea  in 
economics,  and  I'm  sure  you've  all  writ- 
ten it  or  thought  about  it:  that  if  you 
put  a  very  high  rate  of  taxation,  a  mar- 
ginal rate  of  taxation,  on  the  extra  dol- 
lar earned,  you  discourage  effort.  If 
you  confiscate  any  extra  earnings,  you 
stop  effort.  We  know  that.  The  same 
thing  applies  to  countries.  Reform  is 
difficult,  and  if  all  the  gains  ai-e  taken 
away  by  debt  service,  then  the  neces- 
sary process  may  simply  not  get 
underway. 

The  United  States  has  worked  to 
arrange  bridge  loans  and  provided  eco- 
nomic support  funds  to  debtor  coun- 
tries to  help  them  manage  debt  and 
make  needed  policy  changes.  Argen- 
tina, the  Dominican  Republic,  and  Hon- 
duras are  important  examples.  The 
most  important  contribution  we  can 
make,  however,  is  to  keep  our  markets 
open.  From  the  onset  of  the  debt  crisis, 
the  United  States  has  imported  $43-$53 
billion  worth  of  goods  and  services  from 
the  region  each  year.  This  has  enabled 
our  neighbors  to  maintain  a  trade  sur- 
plus with  us  of  between  $13  and  $21 
billion  a  year.  In  short,  dealing  success- 
fully with  debt  requires  something  from 
each  of  us. 

The  Future  of  Democracy 

The  third  challenge  is  the  future  of  de- 
mocracy. The  democratic  transforma- 
tion in  Latin  America  has  been  the 
work  of  countless  numbers  of  free 
men  and  women — and  members  of  this 
group.  They  made  the  transition  hap- 
pen. People  are  voting  in  record  num- 
bers— 300  million  in  over  50  elections 


since  1980.  They  are  voting  for  a  wide 
range  of  political  leaders,  but  they  will 
not  easily  give  up  their  right  to  vote  for 
their  leaders  on  a  regular  and  predict- 
able basis. 

Last  week's  vote  in  Chile  makes 
the  point.  Voters  participated  in  record 
numbers  and  in  record  calm.  Competi- 
tion and  openness  have  brought  Chile 
extraordinary  economic  success;  now 
Chileans  have  affirmed  the  political  cor- 
ollary: the  right  to  choose  political  lead- 
ers in  an  equally  open  and  competitive 
fashion. 

Latin  America  is  no  longer  swing- 
ing between  democracy  and  military 
rule.  Governments  still  change.  But 
now  parties  alternate  power  within 
democracies  and  through  elections. 
Power  is  passing  from  one  elected  gov- 
ernment to  another.  In  Honduras,  it 
happened  for  the  first  time  ever  in 
1985.  The  presidential  inauguration  in 
Ecuador  last  August  marked  Ecuador's 
third  consecutive  transfer  of  power 
under  democracy.  That  was  the  impor- 
tance of  the  inauguration.  That's  why 
I  attended. 

The  message  of  democratic  Latin 
America  is  clear.  No  would-be  coup 
plotters  looking  to  overthrow  a  demo- 
cratic government  need  apply.  They  will 
be  resisted  at  home.  And  they  will  be 
resisted  by  the  United  States.  Be  they 
of  the  left  or  the  right,  civilian  or  mili- 
tary, there  will  be  no  winks,  nods,  or 
"green  lights"  for  any  who  are  looking 
to  oppose  democracy  or  reverse  its 
progress. 

When  rump  groups  of  military 
officers  challenged  elected  civilian 
governments  in  Argentina  and,  more 
recently,  in  Guatemala,  our  opposition 
was  timely,  clear,  and  vigorous.  In  case 
after  case — death  squads  in  El  Sal- 
vador, narcoterrorists  in  Colombia, 
thugs  in  Haiti,  corruption  in  Panama, 
censorship  in  Paraguay,  totalitarianism 
in  Nicaragua — we  have  made  known  our 
condemnation  and  given  our  support  to 
the  democratic  forces  under  attack. 
These  are  bipartisan  positions.  They 
follow  from  our  basic  commitment  to 
democracy. 

The  Renaissance  of  Freedom 

We  are  fortunate  to  live  in  a  period  of 
the  renaissance  of  freedom.  Openness  is 
in  the  ascendancy.  Closed  societies  are 
not  working.  The  results  of  freedom  are 
increasingly  compelling. 

Still,  Latin  America's  continued 
transition  to  democracy  cannot  be 


15 


THE  SECRETARY 


taken  for  granted.  Its  consolidation  and 
continued  health  will  require  a  new 
kind  of  diplomacy  from  countries  that 
have  made  the  transition — a  diplomacy 
of  democratic  solidarity;  a  diplomacy 
of  democratic  states  for  democracy. 

Solidarity  sustains  and  advances 
the  cause  of  democracy.  Solidarity 
means  mutual  support.  Sometimes  it 
means  going  out  on  a  limb  to  pressure 
nondemocratic  neighbors  to  open  up. 
The  Group  of  8^  demonstrated  this 
when  they  suspended  Panama  from  par- 
ticipation. The  democratic  states  of 
Central  America  demonstrate  this 
when  they  apply  diplomatic  pressure  on 
Nicaragua  to  keep  its  promises  of  a 
democratic  opening.  Working  for  de- 
mocracy is  one  of  the  best  ways  to  keep 
the  peace,  since  democratic  countries 
make  good  neighbors. 

The  friends  of  democracy  have  a 
legacy  of  progress  to  preserve  and  a 
record  of  achievement  to  build  on.  You 
in  lAPA  know  the  price  of  freedom. 
You  know  that  economic  and  social 
problems — debt,  poverty,  capital  flight, 
drugs — must  be  dealt  with.  You  know 
that  political  problems — repression, 
dictatorship,  censorship — must  be 
overcome. 

The  answers  are  not  easy,  but  in 
freedom  we  can  forge  answers  that 
work.  Freedom  has  proven  its  worth. 
Freedom  works.  Freedom  is  our  goal 
and  our  surest  means  to  a  brighter  fu- 
ture. Pulling  together,  the  friends  of 
democracy  can  make  democracy  a  last- 
ing, durable  achievement  for  everyone 
in  the  Americas. 


Key  to  the  Future: 
Enlightened  Engagement 


'Press  release  220  of  Oct.  13,  1988. 
^Argentina,  Brazil,  Colombia,  Mexico, 
Panama,  Peru,  Uruguay,  and  Venezuela.  ■ 


Secretary  Shultz's  address  before 
the  Financial  Executives  Institute  in 
San  Francisco  on  October  10.  1988. ^ 

This  is  a  time  of  watershed  events  and 
watershed  rearrangements  in  thinking. 
The  flow  is  toward  political  and  eco- 
nomic openness.  The  success  of  these 
ideas  since  World  War  II,  with  strong 
and  creative  leadership  from  the  United 
States,  has  rearranged  the  political  and 
economic  map  of  the  world.  And  an  in- 
formation age  is  here,  where  knowledge 
and  the  ability  to  create  and  use  it  is 
the  source  of  comparative  advantage 
and  general  progress.  These  develop- 
ments reinforce  the  powerful  thrust  of 
the  very  same  political  and  economic 
openness  that  has  brought  us  our  pres- 
ent good  fortune.  So  I  am  here  to  talk 
about  success — and  the  problems  of 
success. 

Over  the  course  of  our  history, 
America  has  seemed  to  swing  between 
involvement  and  isolation.  We  have  ea- 
gerly engaged  with  the  world,  or  we 
have  tried  to  look  inward.  You  know 
that  America  no  longer  has  that  option; 
nor  should  we  want  it.  Your  financial 
world  operates  on,  as  Walt  Wriston 
says,  "an  information  standard,"  and  it 
is  global  in  scope.  You  know  that  from 
your  own  e.xperience.  So  I  want  to  take 
these  few  minutes  together  to  tell  you 
what  is  on  my  sketch  pad  for  America; 
our  success;  the  reasons  why;  the  road 
ahead,  with  its  opportunities,  prob- 
lems, and  demands.  Make  no  mistake 
about  it:  We  are  part  of  the  global  de- 
velopments which  we  did  so  much  to 
create.  With  national  will  to  stay  en- 
gaged, to  join  in  active  and  enlightened 
leadership,  we  can  be  confident  of  a 
free  and  productive  future. 

Global  and  U.S. 
Achievements 

Just  look  back  a  few  decades  and  see 
what  has  recently  been  achieved. 

•  The  shadow  of  a  third  world  war 
has  faded;  for  the  first  time  ever,  nu- 
clear weapons  have  been  reduced. 

•  The  little  handful  of  embattled 
democracies  find  themselves  growing 
in  strength  and  number  and  viewed 
around  the  world  as  the  wave  of  the 
future. 


•  The  tide  of  Marxism — and,  with 
it,  communism  as  the  model  for  devel- 
opment— is  a  tide  that  is  going  out. 

•  And  national  economies — once 
thought  destined  to  be  buffeted  by 
chance,  disaster,  and  bitter  rivalry — are 
finding  new  ways  to  cooperate  and 
pi'osper  in  openness. 

In  this  environment,  anybody  who 
claims  America  is  in  decline  better  see 
a  doctor — or  maybe  it's  a  lawyer.  But 
anyway,  you'd  belong  on  some  other 
planet.  Let  me  spell  it  out. 

•  In  the  war-shattered  world  of 
1945,  the  United  States  accounted  for 
almost  50%  of  the  devastated  global 
output.  Today,  thanks  to  the  recovery 
of  our  European  and  Asian  allies,  the 
Summit  Seven  countries  now  account 
for  b57c  of  the  vastly  expanded  world 
GNP  [gross  national  product].  Since 
1950,  the  volume  of  world  output  has 
increased  fivefold  and  the  volume  of 
world  exports  ninefold.  There's  a  mv^- 
sage  there  in  that  relationship.  • 

•  The  United  States  is  in  the  midi 
of  the  longest  peacetime  economic  ex- 
pansion in  history — now  in  its  70th 
month.  Since  November  1982,  we 
have  created  almost  18  million  new 
jobs.  Roughly  two-thirds  of  our  new 
jobs  have  been  in  higher  paying,  highc 
skill  categories;  only  12%  in  the  lowes 
paid,  low-skill  occupations. 

•  From  1981  to  1987,  manufacturii 
productivity  increased  at  an  annual 
growth  rate  of  4.1% — that  is  nearly 
three  times  the  annual  productivity 
gain  between  1973  and  1981.  Manufac- 
turing production  is  up  28%  since  197S 

•  The  real  U.S.  trade  deficit — 
measured  in  constant  1982  dollars — ha 
fallen  39%  since  the  third  quarter  of 
1986,  from  an  annual  rate  of  .$151.8 
billion  to  $92.6  billion  in  the  second 
quarter  of  1988.  Real  exports  of  goods 
and  services  have  increased  by  a  17% 
annual  rate  during  this  period. 


Success  and  the 
Open  World  Economy 

The  visionary  men  who  shaped  our 
international  economic  policy  in  the 
1940s— Cordell  Hull,  George  Marshall 
William  Clayton,  and  others — recog- 
nized that  America  had  to  shape  a  ne 
and  open  global  economic  order.  Our 


b 


16 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  19fi 


THE  SECRETARY 


ktional  security  demanded  it.  The  in- 
Irwar  years  had  taught  us  the  bitter 
«son  that  our  own  vital  interests 
puld  not  be  served  in  a  compartmented 
1(1  chaotic  world.  And  so  we  rejected 
olationism  and  economic  nationalism, 
hicli  we  knew  would  bring  only  a  false 
■11-1'  of  security  and  stagnation.  In- 
f:ul,  in  the  spirit  of  the  Marshall  Plan 
111  r.retton  Woods,  we  chose  economic 
luaut-ment.  The  World  Bank,  IMF 
iiiiTiiational  Monetary  Fund],  and  the 
ATT  [General  Agreement  on  Tariffs 
1(1  Trade]  wei'e  born  of  that  engage- 
ifiii.  These  new  institutions  heljjed 
;talilish  a  postwar  environment  that 
'Stci-ed  global  recovery,  development, 
1(1  urowth.  Thus,  we  recognized  early 
1  that  the  most  effective  way  to  pro- 
iiic  our  own  economic  development  is 
\  \»  orking  with  others  to  promote 
uiis.  And  we  are  seeing  the  positive 
■.-^ults. 

N(3w  people  everywhere  can  see 
u(, cssful  application  of  this  Am.erican 
sion  in  country  after  country.  They, 
Ml,  have  embarked  on  the  path  to  suc- 
■.-s.  They,  too,  see  the  virtues  of  open- 
'ss  and  cooperation  and  recognize  the 
ipoi'tance  of  moving  in  concert.  Dem- 
■laiic  and  free  market  values  are  gain- 
u  strength  among  the  peoples  of 
aim  America;  in  the  Philippines, 
I'lra.  Thailand,  and  elsewhere  in  Asia; 
II !  ill  Africa.  Almost  everywhere  in 
ic  world,  there  are  movements  toward 
jenness,  decentralization,  deregula- 
on,  and  privatization.  More  and  more 
)untries  are  cooperating  to  ensure 
lat  they  reap  the  rewards  of  the  ex- 
anding  global  trading  system. 

The  world  economy  is  e.xpanding. 
omestic  economies  are  more  produc- 
ve.  Wealth  and  power  are  spread  more 
idely  among  nations.  The  success  of 
le  free  world's  open  market  system — 
I  contrast  to  the  failure  of  the  socialist 
3mmand  model — has  become  plain  to 
verybody.  A  new  consensus  is  emerg- 
ig  among  the  world's  nations.  Coun- 
•ies  as  different  as  Poland  and  Mauri- 
us  are  eager  to  participate  more  fully 
1  the  international  economic  system 
aat  America  has  been  so  instrumental 
1  establishing.  To  do  so,  of  course, 
Siey  must  be  willing  to  undertake  the 
ifficult  domestic  adjustments  that  will 
nable  them  to  reap  the  benefits  of  full 
articipation. 

The  big  communist  countries, 
^hina  and  the  Soviet  Union,  are  also 
iscovering  these  truths.  Listen  to  the 
sewest  member  of  the  Soviet  Politburo, 
Ir.  V.  A.  Medvedev,  speaking  last 


week  on  "The  Contemporary  Concept  of 
Socialism":  "It  is  well  known,"  he  said, 
"that  from  the  late  seventies,  negative 
trends  in  our  development  began 
emerging  with  increasing  clarity.  So- 
cialism found  that  it  had  lost  its  advan- 
tage over  capitalism," — some  would  say 
it  never  had  it — "in  terms  of  the  pace  of 
economic  development."  "The  essence," 
he  says,  "of  economic  reform  lies  in  the 
creation  and  an  intensification  of  eco- 
nomic incentives  for  the  growth  of  pro- 
duction and  its  qualitative  improvement 
on  the  basis  of  accelerated  scientific 
and  technical  progress." 

And  what  does  he  mention  as  an 
incentive?  Ownership — and  then  he 
says,  "In  our  conditions,  the  market  is 
an  irreplaceable  instrument  for  the 
flexible  economic  coordination  of  pro- 
duction with  the  growing  and  con- 
stantly changing  social  needs." 

I  have  to  keep  pinching  myself. 
This  is  a  communist  talking.  The  words 
he  says  are  important  words.  Actions 
will  be  difficult,  and  results  will  take  a 
while.  But  actions  and  results  start 
from  ideas  and  words,  whether  called 
"new  thinking";  perestroika  (restruc- 
turing); or  just  plain,  pragmatic  obser- 
vation of  what  works. 


Competition,  Change, 
and  the  Future 

What's  ahead?  A  competitive  and  high- 
stepping  world  is  already  upon  us.  The 
very  material  substances  which  sur- 
round us  in  everyday  life  are  being 
transformed.  New  substances  are  being 
created.  Old  substances  are  finding  new 
uses.  The  same  scientific  progress  that 
has  altered  the  nature  of  basic  mate- 
rials has  accelerated  the  speed  of  hu- 
man transactions.  More  and  more,  ours 
is  a  time  of  open  skies  and  borderless 
markets;  illustrations — ^just  little  ones: 

•  High  in  the  Andes,  a  homemade 
satellite  dish  in  an  Indian  village 

can  pull  in  international  television 
programs. 

•  In  central  Brazil,  soybean  grow- 
ers receive  real-time  data  on  Chicago 
Board  trading  by  computer 

•  Barbados  and  the  Dominican  Re- 
public are  gathering  information  from 
all  over  the  world,  programming  it,  and 
supplying  it  electronically  to  data  banks 
abroad. 

Increasingly,  wealth  is  becoming 
intangible;  exchange,  instantaneous;  la- 
boi',  mental.  Increasingly,  success  de- 
pends on  the  speed  with  which  ideas 
are  put  into  practice.  That  is  why 


knowledge,  information,  and  ideas  are 
the  hottest  items  in  trade  and  why 
"intellectual  property  rights"  are  such  a 
hot  issue.  Service  industries  are  major 
sources  of  exciting  and  productive  new 
jobs.  Knowledge-intensive  industries 
like  microelectronics  and  biotechnology 
are  the  fastest  growing.  Today's  re- 
search in  agriculture — based  on  unlock- 
ing secrets  contained  in  genetic  codes — 
promises  changes  that  will  dwarf  the 
green  revolution.  To  build  on  our  suc- 
cess and  to  stay  on  top  of  this  exciting 
world  ahead,  we  must  be  prepared,  and 
we  must  be  engaged. 

Key  Issues 

What  are  some  of  the  key  issues  to 
watch  as  indicators  of  our  ability  to 
deal  with  the  problems  and  oppor- 
tunities at  hand? 

First,  regional  economic  coopera- 
tion and  prosperity:  The  global  trends 
now  underway  are  leading  national  gov- 
ernments to  tackle  broader  issues  that 
cannot  be  managed  within  a  single  na- 
tion state  or  national  economy.  Re- 
gional initiatives  are  playing  an  ever 
more  important  role  in  promoting  freer 
trade,  closer  economic  cooperation,  and 
stronger  growth.  As  such  creative  ini- 
tiatives increase,  we  will  all  benefit. 

We  saw  this  new  reality  some  years 
ago.  That  is  why  I  and  others  sug- 
gested the  formation  of  a  Pacific  Basin 
Forum,  where  representatives  from 
like-minded  economies  could  compare 
experiences,  discuss  ideas,  and  prepare 
analyses  on  subjects  of  mutual  interest. 

We  are  also  nearing  completion  of 
years  of  work  that  can  make  a  giant 
step  toward  the  goals  of  open  trade  and 
enhanced  economic  opportunity  by  re- 
moving the  barriers  to  free  trade  and 
investment  between  Canada  and  the 
United  States.  Our  two  nations  ex- 
change more  goods  and  services — $166- 
billion  worth  last  year — than  any  two 
countries  in  the  world.  If  Canada's 
voters  agree,  the  elimination  of  tariffs 
and  most  other  barriers  to  trade  and 
investment  between  the  two  countries 
under  the  U.S. -Canada  Free  Ti-ade 
Agreement  will  increase  economic 
growth,  lower  prices,  expand  employ- 
ment, and  enhance  the  competitive- 
ness of  both  countries  in  the  world 
marketplace. 

Another  potentially  magnificent  ex- 
ample of  regional  cooperation  is  now 
underway.  The  acceleration  of  Euro- 
pean economic  integration,  as  embodied 
by  the  single-market  program,  clearly 


>epartment  of  State  Bulletin/December  1988 


17 


THE  SECRETARY 


is  a  seminal  step  in  the  postwar  eco- 
nomic and  political  development.  Euro- 
peans increasingly  see  the  benefits  of 
cooperative  engagement  and  the  prom- 
ise of  openness.  But  this  vision  will  be 
tested. 

•  There  is  a  stifling  regulatory 
overlay  on  much  of  Europe.  Will  it  be 
applied  on  what  might  be  called  a 
"worst  common  denominator"  basis?  Or 
will  policies  be  adopted  that  are  market 
oriented,  that  promote  growth  and  effi- 
cient use  of  resources? 

•  Protectionism  everywhere  must 
be  defeated.  It  would  be  a  tragic  irony 
for  a  group  of  nations  to  create  a  com- 
mon market  among  themselves  and 
then  to  erect  new  trade  barriers 
against  countries  outside  its  borders. 

•  Economic  and  political  change 
has  been  possible  because  strength  and 
common  purpose  have  deterred  war  and 
kept  the  peace.  European  integration 
must  strengthen,  not  undermine,  those 
commitments. 

European  integration  will  bring 
substantial  changes  in  the  vast  system 
of  ties  that  forms  the  existing  U.S.- 
European relationship.  The  impact  will 
be  felt  well  beyond  trade  and  invest- 
ment. If  we  all  manage  this  well,  the 
mutual  benefits  will  be  enormous. 

Second,  the  U.S.  deficits:  Before 

we  get  too  carried  away  advising  others 
what  to  do,  we  should  take  a  good  look 
in  the  mirror  and  at  our  budget  and 
trade  deficits.  In  order  to  ensure  con- 
tinued national  and  global  economic  e.x- 
pansion,  the  U.S.  budget  and  trade 
deficits  must  shrink — the  sooner,  the 
better. 

We  have  made  important  progress 
on  both  fronts.  We  need  to  continue  our 
strong  efforts,  and  we  need  to  succeed 
quickly.  Some  believe  that  we  can  bal- 
ance our  internal  and  external  books  by 
turning  inward  and  ignoring  our  inter- 
national interests  and  obligations.  They 
would  counsel  isolation  as  a  solution  to 
both  deficits.  But  that's  a  recipe  for 
economic  and  political  disaster,  not 
success. 

Our  budget  and  trade  deficits  are 
interrelated.  Our  Federal  excess  of 
spending  over  receipts  absorbs  savings 
that  could  otherwise  be  available  for  in- 
vestment in  the  private  sector.  Financ- 
ing from  abroad  has  enabled  us  to  fund 
our  deficit  while  continuing  to  expand 
our  investment  and,  therefore,  our 
economy. 

But  foreign  capital  flows — perfectly 
welcome  on  their  merits  and  a  sign  of 
our  strong  attraction  to  investors — do 


18 


build  up  foreign  claims  on  public  and 
l)rivate  assets  in  the  United  States.  As 
income  generated  from  those  foreign 
claims  exceeds  the  income  to  the 
United  States  from  American  capital 
abroad,  then  the  strain  on  our  current 
account  increases,  with  consequent 
pressure  to  attain  a  better  balance  of 
trade  or  even  run  a  surplus.  That  is 
why  we  need  to  press  ahead  in  reduc- 
ing our  budget  and  trade  deficits.  As 
we  do,  other  countries  will  need  to 
make  important  adjustments  of  their 
own.  Our  healthy  trading  partners  with 
export  surpluses  must  maintain  open 
and  growing  markets  at  home.  And  to 
service  their  debt,  the  heavily  indebted 
nations  must  seize  opportunities  to  in- 
crease exports  and  to  attract  new  for- 
eign capital. 

It  is  essential,  but  not  enough,  for 
nations  to  fight  off  protectionist  forces. 
The  stakes  for  the  economies  of  the 
United  States  and  our  trading  partners 
are  too  high.  We  must  all  go  on  the 
offensive  for  freer  trade.  This  is  the 
true  meaning  and  genuine  necessity  of 
the  Uruguay  Round  of  trade  talks  now 
well  underway. 

Never  forget:  The  wealth  and  size 
of  our  market  are  vital  to  many  coun- 
tries and  to  the  world  economy.  Ameri- 
can purchases  of  manufactured  goods 
from  developing  countries  nearly  dou- 
bled between  1982  and  1986— from  .$41 
billion  to  .$81  billion.  And  markets 
abroad  are  vital  to  our  own  economic 
health.  Our  strong  export  perform- 
ance— up  $96  billion  between  the  third 
quarter  of  1986  and  the  second  quarter 
of  1988 — has  contributed  mightily  to 
growth  at  home. 

As  we  meet  our  own  domestic  chal- 
lenges and  global  economic  integration 
intensifies,  we  see  new  opportunities 
for  productive  cooperation  and  engage- 
ment— bilaterally,  regionally,  and  inter- 
nationally. Wherevei-  I  go,  that  is  the 
appeal  I  hear — sometimes  publicly,  but 
always  privately;  often  from  govern- 
ments, but  invariably  from  their  cit- 
izens: "America,  stay  engaged." 

Third,  debt  and  development  in 
the  Third  World:  The  hard  realities  of 
the  Third  World  debt  situation  must  be 
faced.  As  thinking  about  this  process 
continues  to  unfold,  I  have  a  word  for 
debtors  and  a  word  for  creditors. 

•  To  the  debtors,  growth  remains 
the  key  and — today  as  in  the  past — 
growth  requires  investment.  A  country 
can  test  itself  on  the  progress  it  is  mak- 
ing in  encouraging  investment  by  look- 
ing at  savings.  Do  its  policies 


encourage  saving?  Do  its  own  savings 
stay  home  and  get  applied  to  its  own 
capital  needs?  Is  domestic  and  other 
private  capital  returning  from  abroad 
or  is  it  continuing  to  flee? 

If  the  answers  are  positive,  the 
country  will  find  itself  in  good  standing 
in  what  we  might  call  "the  court  of  the 
allocation  of  world  savings."  If  the  an- 
swers are  negative,  the  country  should 
take  a  hard  look  at  how  thorough  and 
market-based  its  own  process  of  eco- 
nomic reform  has  been. 

•  To  the  creditors,  time  has  given 
you  a  break.  Major  international  effort 
over  the  past  6  years  have  bought  time 
during  which  private  creditors  have  ha 
the  opportunity  to  put  their  own  house 
in  better  order.  But  harsh  realities 
remain. 

As  creditors  continue  to  work  witl 
debtors,  they  and  all  of  us  must  learn 
to  take  into  account  a  fundamental 
economic  idea:  High  marginal  rates  of 
taxation  discourage  effort,  and  confisc 
tory  rates  can  turn  effort  off  com- 
pletely. I'm  sure  everybody  in  this  roc 
has  preached  that  sermon.  Now,  turn 
around.  Reform  is  difficult.  If  all  the 
gains  from  reform  are  taken  by  debt 
service,  then  the  necessary  actions  m; 
simply  not  be  politically  sustainable. 
Rescheduling  packages  must  reflect 
this  reality  if  they  are  to  succeed. 

But  succeed  they  can.  Experience 
shows  that  economic  expansion  is  pos: 
ble  almost  anywhere  with  the  right 
kind  of  economic  policies.  Economic 
success  depends  less  on  market  size  o 
natural  resource  endowment  and  mon 
on  making  the  right  policy  choices. 
Technology  has  linked  distant  market 
lessened  dependence  on  natural  raw- 
materials,  and  created  new  products 
and  production  processes.  Global  eco- 
nomic integration  now  enables  coun- 
tries to  experience  explosions  of 
economic  activity — if  they  adopt  pol- 
icies which  encourage  innovation  and 
remove  barriers  between  the  individu 
and  the  marketplace. 

Regional  efforts  at  economic  coop 
eration — efforts  which  strengthen  the 
role  of  market  forces  in  the  economi?; 
of  the  debtor  nations — can  be  a  powei 
ful  springboard  for  global  economic 
activity  and  engagement.  That  is  v^'hy 
the  United  States  supports  CARICO": 
[Caribbean  Community  and  Common 
Market],  the  CBI  [Caribbean  Basin  I 
tiative],  and  the  recent  trade  agi-ee- 
ments  between  Brazil,  Argentina,  an( 
Uruguay — all  outward-looking  initia- 
tives which  remove  barriers  to  the 
growth  of  trade.  This  type  of  cooper- 


THE  SECRETARY 


tive  effort  between  nations  and  re- 
ional  groupings  can  help  resolve  the 
lost  difficult  political  and  economic 
oblems  associated  with  debt  and  de- 
elopment  in  the  Third  World. 

Fourth,  and  finally,  international 
conomic  institutions  are  due  for  a 

earching  and  square-one  examination. 
he  World  Bank,  the  International 
lonetary  Fund,  and  the  GATT  have 
layed  important  roles  in  the  postwar 
eriod  of  economic  development.  As  the 
cene  has  shifted,  so  have  their  ac- 
vities,  with  some  present  activities 
appening  almost  as  a  matter  of  cir- 
umstance  and  convenience. 

As  we  consider  the  next  decades, 
hese  roles  and  their  interrelationships 
hould  be  carefully  considered.  Ti-ade, 
1  vestment,  and  other  capital  flows  in- 
fract in  ways  that  the  founders  of 
hese  institutions  could  not  have  antici- 
ated  in  the  late  1940s.  Established  as 
idependent  organizations  with  sepa- 
ate  responsibilities,  they  now  face  a 
^orld  where  the  interaction  of  these 
lobal  flows  resembles  a  seamless  web. 

Questions  arise.  Should,  for  exam- 
le,  the  IMF  really  be  a  banker  of  last 
3sort  and  the  setter  of  conditions  for 
ccess  to  its  own  resources?  Should  it 
e  the  stalking  horse  for  the  reschedul- 
ig  and  debt-management  efforts  of  pri- 
ate  lenders?  Such  a  banker's  role  is 
far  cry  from  what  was  originally 
itended  for  the  IMF  and  for  which  it 
as  designed.  How,  as  national  econo- 
lies — including  those  of  the  Soviet 
tnion  and  China — take  steps  to  adjust 
new  realities,  should  they  relate  to 
le  international  economy?  Can  we  en- 
jre  the  continued  relevance  of  the 
ATT  by  covering  services  and  intellec- 
jal  property  rights  and  by  dealing  ef- 
ctively  with  the  runaway  problem  of 
jbsidies  to  agriculture.  So  these  in- 
titutions,  designed  to  provide  a  frame- 
ork  for  international  economic  trans- 
ctions,  must  be  tested  for  their  capac- 
y  to  respond  to  the  promising,  yet 
omplex,  world  of  the  next  century. 

tpenness  Remains  Our  Vision 

'he  American  philosophy  is  pragma- 
ism.  Pragmatism  dictates  that  problem 
olving  be  a  cooperative  process.  We 
.'ill  welcome  the  actions  and  ideas  of 
thers  on  the  world  stage — whether  de- 
eloi)ed  or  developing,  capitalist  or 
ommunist — if  they  are  geared  to  pro- 
loting  openness  and  world  economic 
Towth. 

There  is  a  lot  of  creative  thinking 
oing  on  out  there.  Japan  and  the  Eu- 
ropean Community  are  large,  vibrant, 


and  important  players,  and  we  want  to 
hear  their  ideas.  The  Soviet  Union  and 
China  have  launched  upon  processes  of 
political  rethinking  and  economic  re- 
structuring and,  by  doing  so,  seek  to 
pai-ticipate  more  fully  in  the  global 
economy. 

All  of  this  holds  promise  for  the 
United  States  if  we  approach  the  future 
with  confidence  and  vision.  After  all, 
our  willingness  to  innovate,  to  engage, 
and  to  cooperate  has  been  the  secret  of 
our  remarkable  progress.  It  is,  if  any- 
thing, even  more  needed  at  a  time 
when  others,  too,  have  economic  wealth 
and  capability. 

We  must  build  coalitions  of  common 
sense.  We  need  patience,  discipline, 
and  staying  power  We  need  openness 
and  the  swiftness  to  seize  the  oppor- 
tunities openness  creates. 

I  have  traveled  over  1  million  miles 
as  your  Secretary  of  State  and  received 
leaders  from  every  part  of  the  world  as 


they  visit  Washington.  During  the  past 
2  weeks,  I  met,  individually  or  in 
groups,  with  representatives  of  132 
countries.  The  atniosjihere  was,  by  gen- 
eral agreement,  the  best  in  many  dec- 
ades. The  sense  is  that  problems  are 
there  to  be  solved  rather  than  used  to 
berate  each  other  Presidents  Reagan 
and  Gorbachev  receive,  and  certainly 
deserve,  great  credit  and  praise. 

In  these  discussions,  people  can  be 
critical  or  apprehensive  but  also  con- 
structive and  even  creative.  There  is 
the  sense  that  something  different  and 
better  is  on  the  horizon.  And  the  basic 
message  to  us  is  always  the  same:  Stay 
engaged.  America's  ideas,  presence, 
and  influence  are  essential. 

Enlightened  engagement  will  take 
us  into  a  free,  rewarding,  and  produc- 
tive future.  That  is  the  opportunity  we 
face  and  the  responsibility  we  bear. 


'Press  release  219  of  Oct.  12, 


Promoting  Peace  and  Prosperity 
in  the  South  Asian  Region 


Secretary  Shultz's  address  before 
the  South  Asian  Association  for  Re- 
gional Cooperation  (SAARC)  in  New 
York  City  on  October  6,  1988.1 

To  use  a  phrase  that  a  predecessor  of 
mine  used  in  another  context,  I'm 
pleased  to  have  been  present  at  the 
creation  of  SAARC,  to  wish  it  well  as  it 
undertook  its  work  on  behalf  of  the  bil- 
lion people  of  South  Asia.  Since  its  in- 
ception, I  have  watched  SAARC  gi'ow 
and  demonstrate  to  the  world  that  co- 
operation is  a  matter  of  will  and  effort. 
More  importantly,  you  have  shown  that 
the  organization  can  flourish  despite 
unanticipated  changes  and  challenges  in 
your  region.  This  is  the  mark  of  any 
viable  organization,  but  it  is  by  no 
means  a  given  for  as  recently  launched 
a  body  as  SAARC. 

This  success  comes  in  the  midst  of 
a  difficult  year  Most  recently  you  and 
the  world  lost  a  great  statesman, 
[Pakistani]  President  Zia-ul-Haq,  in  a 
tragic  plane  crash.  Nepal,  India, 
Bangladesh,  and  the  Maldives  have  en- 
dured crippling  natural  disasters,  yet 
your  support,  sympathy,  and  under- 
standing for  one  another  following 
these  tragic  events  underscore  the  good 
will  and  cooperative  spirit  that  serve  as 
the  foundation  for  SAARC. 


In  spite  of  the  tragedies,  SAARC 
has  enjoyed  an  especially  productive 
year  since  we  last  met  here  in  New 
York.  You  have  served  your  main  objec- 
tive well — to  promote  regional 
cooperation. 

I  understand  that  SAARC  held  a 
large  number  of  meetings,  training  ses- 
sions, seminars,  conferences,  and  cul- 
tural events  this  year  over  a  wide 
spectrum,  including  agriculture,  rural 
development,  science  and  technology, 
telecommunications,  and 
transportation. 

Convention  on  Terrorism 

The  United  States  vigorously  applauds 
what  we  believe  to  be  your  most  impor- 
tant accomplishment  of  the  year:  put- 
ting into  force  the  SAARC  Regional 
Convention  on  the  Suppression  of  Ter- 
rorism. Last  year  I  wished  you  luck  in 
your  efforts  to  complete  the  convention. 
This  year  the  convention  is  not  only 
completed,  it  is  ratified  and  in  force.  As 
a  person  who  has  fought  terrorism 
throughout  my  tenure  as  Secretary  of 
State,  I  must  add  that  it  also  gives  me 
great  personal  satisfaction  to  see  the 
convention  is  now  a  reality. 


bepartment  of  State  Bulletin/December  1988 


19 


THE  SECRETARY 


Experience  has  shown  the  world 
that  it  is  such  mutual  efforts  which  en- 
able governments  to  prevail  over  ter- 
rorists. The  convention  has  particularly 
useful  features.  It  clearly  defines  ter- 
rorist acts  as  criminal.  It  can  also  be 
used  as  the  basis  for  an  extradition  re- 
quest between  states  which  do  not  have 
bilateral  extradition  treaties.  You  have 
thus  helped  remove  the  protection — 
however  unintended — that  terrorists 
enjoy  when  they  flee  to  countries  who 
for  legal  reasons  are  unable  to  return 
those  terrorists  to  the  scene  of  their 
crime.  The  consistent  application  of  the 
internationally  accepted  standard  of 
"extradite  or  prosecute"  is  one  of  the 
most  effective  instruments  in  the  hands 
of  responsible  governments  in  the  fight 
against  terrorism.  Most  importantly, 
the  convention  establishes  a  regime  of 
cooperative  measures  through  the  shar- 
ing of  expertise,  information,  and  intel- 
ligence aimed  at  preventing  terrorist 
acts  from  occurring. 

Narcotics 

I  am  especially  impressed  with 
SAARC's  efforts  to  stem  narcotics  traf- 
ficking and  abuse.  Those  of  you  who 
have  watched  the  American  scene  this 
year  have  no  doubt  noted  that  drug 
abuse  and  its  associated  evils  are  key 
issues  that  our  lawmakers  are  address- 
ing with  renewed  vigilance.  But  is 
there  any  nation  in  the  world  today 
that  is  not  touched  in  some  way — be  it 
through  abuse  among  its  own  popula- 
tion, trafficking  in  violation  of  its  bor- 
ders, or  growth  and  manufacture  within 
its  borders — by  the  horrible  effects  of 
the  drug  trade? 

The  massive  job  of  educating  our 
publics  to  the  dangers  of  narcotics, 
stemming  the  trade  which  delivers  il- 
legal substances  to  our  streets,  and 
protecting  our  citizens  from  the  associ- 
ated crime  and  violence  the  illegal  drug 
trade  inevitably  spawn  is  too  big  for 
any  one  nation  to  do  alone.  I  see  by 
your  actions  it  is  clear  that  SAARC 
understands  that. 

Nuclear  Proliferation 

The  danger  of  nuclear  proliferation 
presents  one  of  the  most  serious  re- 
gional security  threats  in  South  Asia. 
Fortunately,  both  India  and  Pakistan  al- 
ready appear  to  appreciate  this  danger 
and  have  exercised  restraint  in  their 
nuclear  activities. 

The  United  States  welcomes  such 
restraint  and  urges  both  countries  to 


20 


find  ways  to  remove  the  threat  of  nu- 
clear proliferation  in  South  Asia 
through  discussions  and  agreement.  We 
are  pleased  to  note  that  SAARC  has 
addressed  this  issue  and  hope  that  it 
will  continue  to  study  how  best  to  move 
ahead  on  resolving  this  difficult 
problem. 

The  past  year  by  many  accounts 
has  been  an  exciting  one  for  all  of  us — 
exciting,  I  must  add,  in  positive  ways. 
The  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  signed  the  INF  [Intermediate- 
range  Nuclear  Forces]  Ti'eaty,  thus  con- 
firming our  mutual  commitment  to 
arms  control  and  a  safer  world.  The 
United  States  has  also  made  progress 
on  the  other  items  of  our  four-point 
agenda  with  the  Soviets  in  the  areas  of 
human  rights,  bilateral  issues,  and  re- 
gional issues.  The  constructive  dialogue 
continues  even  now,  promoting  what  we 
hope  will  be  an  increasingly  productive 
working  i-elationship. 

Afghanistan 

We  are  pleased  to  see  that  the  Soviets 
have  met  their  target  of  withdrawing 
half  of  their  troops  from  Afghanistan 
by  August  15.  As  important  as  that  ac- 
complishment is,  we  must  persevere 
until  all  Soviet  forces  are  withdrawn, 
until  Afghans  again  enjoy  the  right  to 
genuine  self-determination,  and  until 
Afghanistan  is  on  the  road  to  recovery 
from  the  devastation  wreaked  by  the 
Soviet  invasion.  We  stand  ready  with 
the  nations  of  the  region  and  the  world 
to  contribute  to  the  safe  return  of  the 
millions  of  refugees  ci'eated  by  the  war 
and  to  help  promote  the  process  of  rec- 
onciliation, but  we  recognize  that  only 
Afghans  can  accomplish  this  much- 
needed  process. 


Peace  is  coming  to  other  strife-rid- 
den areas  as  well.  We  have  witnessed 
this  year  negotiated  settlements  com- 
pleted or  in  progress  in  the  Iran-Iraq 
war,  Angola,  and  Cambodia.  The  par- 
ties in  conflict  have  often  looked  to  the 
United  Nations  to  facilitate  those  nego- 
tiations, and  the  United  Nations  has 
contributed  admirably  to  this  vital 
function. 

Future  Challenges  for  SAARC 

SAARC  has  some  major  challenges 
ahead.  With  upcoming  elections  sched- 
uled in  several  of  your  member  states, 
you  face  a  year  of  intense  political  ac- 
tivity. The  Soviet  withdrawal  from 
Afghanistan  will  have  a  major  impact 
on  the  regional  equation.  SAARC's 
role,  as  a  forum  for  cooperation,  will  h 
of  vital  importance  at  such  a  time  of 
transition  and  uncertainty. 

On  behalf  of  my  government,  I 
wish  to  commend  SAARC  for  setting 
such  a  positive  example  of  cooperation 
and  to  wish  you  every  success  for  an- 
other year  of  progress. 

On  my  own  part,  I  wish  to  again 
express  my  great  pleasure  at  our  asso- 
ciation over  the  years,  and  for  the  op- 
portunity we  have  had  on  these 
occasions  to  engage  in  candid,  helpful 
dialogues.  I  will  miss  working  with  all 
of  you  in  my  official  capacity.  I  look 
forward,  however,  to  our  continued 
friendship  at  the  personal  level.  In  th( 
coming  years  you  can  be  assured  I  wil 
follow  closely  SAARC's  progress  in  pi 
moting  peace  and  prosperity  among  al 
its  members  and  for  the  region  as  a 
whole. 


'Press  release  215  of  Oct.  7,  1988. 


Efforts  for  Peace  in  Africa 


Secretary  Shulfz's  remarks  at  a  re- 
ception in  honor  of  the  Organization  of 
African  Unity  (OAU)  in  New  York  City 
on  October  k,  1988A 

African  nations  today  are  developing 
their  own  industries,  their  own  com- 
merce, and  their  own  agricultural  po- 
tential. But  also  essential  to  economic 
growth  is  a  just  and  peaceful  society.  I 
see,  today,  encouraging  signs  of  Af- 
ricans working  to  address  the  chal- 
lenges of  both  economic  and  political 


development  and  to  create  the  peacefi 
international  environment  in  which 
both  can  proceed.  Certainly,  the  strid 
taken  to  end  the  conflicts  in  Chad, 
Western  Sahara,  and  southwestern  A 
rica  are  important  manifestations  of  t 
effort  to  bring  peace  to  your  continen 
Sadly,  civil  wars  and  human  sufff 
ing  are  not  limited  to  the  noi'thern  ar 
southern  extremes  of  Africa.  Internal 
conflict  and  natural  disastei's  have  di.' 
rupted  and  frequently  ended  the  lives 
of  thousands  of  people  throughout 
Africa. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  19) 


THE  SECRETARY 


We  all — Africans  as  well  as  oth- 
-have  a  role  in  seeking  an  end  to 
Is  enormous  suffering  and  helping  to 
store  the  political  stability  and  eco- 
mic  infrastructure  essential  to  the 
ll-being  of  all  mankind.  Governments 
countries  afflicted  by  civil  conflict 
d  natural  disasters  are  called  to  ex- 
lordinary  efforts.  It  will  require  un- 
rstanding,  compromise,  good  will, 
d  compassion.  Solutions  will  not  just 
appen"  and  cannot  be  imposed,  either 
ernally  or  from  the  outside.  Each 
vernment  affected  must  accept  and 
;charge  its  rightful  responsibilities, 
e  United  States  will  do  its  part  to 
tend  its  assistance  and  good  offices  in 
appropriate  ways  to  reduce  suffering 
d  to  foster  the  peaceful  resolution  of 
iflict. 


solving  Regional  Conflicts 

are  encouraged  by  the  growing  role 
the  Organization  of  African  Unity  in 
'diating  and  resolving  conflicts.  One 
icific  instance  is  the  conflict  between 
ad  and  Libya.  We  support  the  OAU's 
ort  to  find  a  peaceful  solution.  Lib- 
1  aggression  against  Chad  and  occu- 
;ion  of  Chadian  territory  have 
anted  the  1964  OAU  decision  that  Af- 
an  nations  should  respect  the  bor- 
s  inherited  at  independence.  We 
pe  that  recent  developments  will 
)n  be  followed  by  a  peaceful  and  last- 
;  settlement  of  territorial  disputes 
it  is  acceptable  to  both  Chad  and 
jya. 

We  also  welcome  and  support  the 
:retary  General  of  the  United  Na- 
ns [Javier  Perez  de  Cuellar]  in  his 
orts  to  mediate  the  dispute  in  the 
•stern  Sahara.  With  the  concurrence 
the  Security  Council,  important 
ps  toward  a  resolution — including 
;  designation  of  the  Secretary  Gen- 
ii's special  representative — have  al- 
idy  been  taken.  We  hope  that  the 
jgress  attained  through  UN  and 
.U  efforts  will  permit  the  introduc- 
n  of  a  balanced  resolution  in  the  Gen- 
ii Assembly  this  year  supporting  the 
cretary  General. 

In  the  troubled  landscape  of  south- 
1  Africa,  there  are  also  signs  of  hope. 

stant  Secretary  for  African  Af- 
rsj  Chester  Crocker's  tireless  efforts 
•  peace  are  nearing  success.  South 
rica,  Angola,  and  Cuba  are  in  the 
al  stages  of  working  out  a  compre- 
nsive  settlement  of  the  conflicts  in 
igola  and  Namibia.  The  parties  are 
w  up  against  the  need  to  make  con- 
3te  decisions  on  a  timetable  for  the 


withdrawal  of  Cuban  troops  from  An- 
gola in  conjunction  with  the  imple- 
mentation of  UN  Security  Council 
Resolution  435  and  on  how  to  promote 
national  reconciliation  in  both  Namibia 
and  Angola.  If  they  have  the  courage 
and  statesmanship  to  make  those  deci- 
sions, this  will  bring  Africa's  last  colony 
to  independence,  remove  all  foreign 
forces  from  southwestern  Africa,  and 
give  Angola  the  first  peace  it  has 
known  since  its  independence.  The  Sec- 
retary General  of  the  United  Nations 
has  been  supportive  throughout  the  ne- 
gotiating process.  Once  negotiations  are 
complete,  the  United  Nations  will  put 
into  Namibia  a  joint  civilian/military 
group  to  facilitate  Namibia's  transition 
to  independence.  The  United  States 
will  fully  support  that  effort. 

Similarly,  we  applaud  the  efforts  of 
African  statesmen  to  broker  talks  be- 
tween the  MPLA  [Popular  Movement 
for  the  Liberation  of  Angola]  and 
UNITA  [National  Union  for  the  Total 
Independence  of  Angola]  and  to  medi- 
ate a  peace  in  which  there  would  be  no 
Angolan  losers — only  gainers.  Such  na- 
tional reconciliation  through  direct  di- 
alogue between  the  parties  is  the  only 
realistic  means  of  ending  the  tragic 
civil  war  which  has  raged  in  Angola  for 
more  than  13  years. 

We  are  also  encouraged  by  recent 
developments  among  South  Africa, 
Mozambique,  and  South  Africa's  other 
neighbors  and  strongly  support  the 
openings  for  peace  that  they  imply. 

Regrettably,  the  political  outlook 
inside  South  Africa  itself  is  not  very 
encouraging.  Despite  international 
pressure,  there  is  scant  evidence  of  the 
sort  of  dramatic,  profound  change  in 
that  country's  laws  and  political  and 
economic  society  that  is  necessary  if  vi- 
olence is  to  be  avoided.  The  determina- 
tion of  the  white  minority  to  retain  its 
monopoly  on  political  power  appears  to 
have  grown  apace  with  South  African 
isolation  from  the  outside  world.  Re- 
pression continues  and  has  intensified 
recently  to  include  actions  taken 
against  even  moderate  white  opponents 
of  apartheid. 

The  issue  for  the  United  States  is 
not  "where  do  we  stand?"  Six  American 
Presidents — three  from  each  of  our  ma- 
jor political  parties — have  made  crystal 
clear,  over  the  past  25  years,  where 
America  stands  on  apartheid.  The 
American  people  will  never  be  able  to 
have  a  cordial  relationship  with  a  gov- 
ernment or  people — any  government 
and  any  people — who  deprive  most  of 
their  citizenry  their  due  rights  on  the 
basis  of  race  or  religion  or  ethnic  or 
national  origin.  The  issue,  rather,  is 


what  can  we  do  to  help  bring  about 
change.  The  United  States  was  the  first 
of  South  Africa's  trading  partners  to 
embargo  the  sale  of  military  equipment 
to  that  country.  We  did  so  in  1963 — 14 
years  before  the  United  Nations,  with 
our  support,  imposed  one.  Over  the 
past  quarter-century,  the  American 
people  have  continued  to  lead  interna- 
tional efforts  to  demonstrate  abhor- 
rence for  apartheid  and  to  help  its 
victims  build  the  economic  and  political 
strength  they  will  need  to  end  it  and 
take  their  rightful  place  in  running 
their  country. 

We  have  repeatedly  called  on  the 
South  African  Government  to  end  the 
state  of  emergency,  release  detainees 
and  other  political  prisoners,  and  to 
begin  the  process  of  reconciliation  and 
dialogue  necessary  for  a  peaceful 
i-esolution  of  South  Africa's  political 
crisis.  We  remain  deeply  concerned 
that,  unless  the  accelerating  cycle  of 
violence — practiced  by  both  the  govern- 
ment and  its  opponents — is  stopped, 
South  Africa  will  continue  its  descent 
into  a  siege  mentality  and  garrison 
state  in  which  all  South  Africans  be- 
come losers. 

We  have,  however,  opposed  the  ex- 
pansion of  mandatory  sanctions  because 
we  believe  that  the  effect  of  such  sanc- 
tions is  to  deprive  us  of  leverage,  of 
influence,  and  of  the  ability  to  press  for 
change.  The  principal  victims  of  such 
sanctions  have  been  black  South  Af- 
rican businesses  and  workers  and  the 
principal  beneficiaries  have  been  those 
within  the  South  African  industrial  and 
financial  elite  who  have  picked  up,  at 
bargain  prices,  what  the  American  di- 
vesters  left  behind.  It  seems  to  me  that 
this  is  precisely  the  wrong  "signal"  for 
the  United  States  to  be  sending.  We 
believe  a  more  fruitful  approach  is  to 
help  the  victims  of  apartheid  build  their 
bargaining  power  thi'ough  assistance 
for  education,  economic  opportunities, 
and  community  development  for  black 
South  Africans. 

The  regions  of  Africa  I  have  men- 
tioned are  not  the  only  parts  of  your 
continent  troubled  by  tension  and  vio- 
lence. Efforts  to  resolve  the  conflicts 
peacefully  in  Sudan  and  the  Horn,  for 
example,  must  be  more  vigorously  pur- 
sued. The  recent  tragic  events  in  Bu- 
rundi remind  us  again  of  the  need  for 
people  to  strive  for  a  peaceful  recon- 
ciliation of  differences  within  their  own 
national  boundaries.  President  Buyoya 
has  declared  his  firm  intention  to  pur- 
sue national  reconciliation.  We  support 
African  efforts  to  help  Burundi  bind  up 
its  wounds  and  bring  its  people  back 


tppartment  of  State  Bulletin/December  1988 


21 


CANADA 


together.  This  would  seem  to  be  an  ap- 
propriate opportunity  for  the  OAU  it- 
self to  try  to  promote  a  lasting  and 
equitable  solution. 

Economic  Reform 
and  Assistance 

Finally,  no  discussion  of  Africa  is  com- 
plete without  reference  to  the  enor- 
mous economic  problems  facing  the 
continent.  The  United  States,  along 
with  the  others  in  the  international 
community,  has  been  responsive  to  Af- 
rica's special  needs.  Africa  has  been 
the  beneficiary  of  numerous  initiatives 
supported  by  President  Reagan's 
Administration: 

•  The  IMF's  [International  Mone- 
tary Fund]  Structural  Adjustment 
Facility  and  the  Enhanced  Structural 
Adjustment  Facility; 

•  The  allocation  of  45%-50%  of 
IDA-8  [International  Development  As- 
sociation's eighth  replenishment]  to 
Africa; 

•  The  World  Bank's  $6.4  billion  cofi- 
nancing  initiative  for  low-income,  debt- 
distressed  countries  which  have  under- 
taken economic  reform  programs; 

•  The  recent  tripling  of  the  African 
Development  Bank's  capital  and  the 
50%  increase  in  the  African  Develop- 
ment Fund's  fifth  replenishment;  and 

•  The  U.S.  Government's  active 
work  with  other  creditor  countries  to 
implement  the  Toronto  summit's  dec- 
laration on  the  debt  of  the  poorest 
countries. 

We  recognize  the  political  price 
that  must  be  paid  to  implement  a  suc- 
cessful economic  reform  program,  and 
we  applaud  those  countries  which  have 
summoned  the  courage  to  embark  upon 
the  difficult  and  sometimes  risky  road 
to  reform.  But  I  am  absolutely  con- 
vinced that  there  can  be  no  economic 
development — or  political  freedom — for 
those  not  willing  to  acknowledge  the 
need  for  economic  discipline.  We  urge 
those  countries  which  have  embarked 
on  economic  reform  programs  to  stay 
the  course  until  the  medicine  begins  to 
work,  and  I  hope  others  will  enroll  in 
the  same  sort  of  economic  program. 

To  assist  those  countries  in  dis- 
tress, the  United  States  has  made  some 
important  improvements  to  our  own 
system.  Among  these  is  the  creation  of 
the  Development  Fund  for  Africa.  This 
has  greatly  assisted  the  United  States 
to  respond  more  effectively  to  develop- 
ment needs  in  Africa.  Economic  reform 
is  particularly  important  today,  and  I 
hope  our  assistance  will  be  effective  in 
helping  to  reinforce  essential  efforts  be- 


22 


ing  undertaken  by  many  African  gov- 
ernments. Although  our  own  resources 
are  strained,  we  will  continue  to  try  to 
increase  amounts  available  to  Africa. 

A  Continent  of  Promise 

I  have  referred,  this  evening,  to  many 
of  Africa's  problems.  But  Africa  is  also 
a  continent  of  great  promise  and  is  en- 
dowed with  people  who  are  dedicated  to 
conquering  those  problems  and  fulfill- 
ing that  promise.  I  assure  you  that  the 
United  States  stands  ready  to  help 
them  do  so. 

In  closing,  I  would  like  to  acknowl- 
edge and  applaud  the  statesmanship 
and  leadership  of  the  most  recent 
Chairman  of  the  OAU,  President  Ken- 


neth Kaunda  of  Zambia,  and  to  OAU 
Secretary  General  Oumarou  and  his 
staff  The  contribution  to  African  na- 
tionalism and  African  pride  over  the 
years  by  President  Kaunda  cannot  be 
overstated.  He  is  one  of  the  great  lead 
ers  of  Africa  by  virtually  any  reason- 
able standard  or  definition.  And  we 
look  forward  to  working  with  your  new 
chairman.  President  Moussa  Ti-aore  of 
Mali,  whom  we  will  welcome  in  Wash- 
ington the  day  after  tomorrow. 

The  United  States  supports  the  0 
ganization  of  African  Unity  and  its 
principles,  and  I  ask  you  to  join  me  in 
saluting  the  OAU  and  your  chairman, 
President  Moussa  Ti'aore. 


'Press  release  212  of  Oct.  5,  1988. 


U.S.-Canada  Sign  Free  Trade  Agreement 


President  Reagan's  remarks  before 
signing  the  U.S.-Canada  Free  Dude 
Agreement  Implementation  Act  of  1988 
on  September  28,  1988.'^ 

This  is  a  moment  future  historians  will 
cite  as  a  landmark,  a  turning  point  in 
the  forward  march  of  trade,  commerce, 
and  even  civilization  itself  That's  a  dra- 
matic statement,  I  know,  but  I  think 
everyone  here  is  aware  of  the  historical 
importance  of  what  we  do  today.  Today, 
September  28,  1988,  I  am  signing  into 
law  the  United  States-Canada  Free 
Ti-ade  Agreement  Implementation  Act 
of  1988. 

This  agreement  brings  down  the 
tariff  walls  between  our  two  nations 
and,  in  so  doing,  creates  the  world's 
largest  free  trade  area.  Businesses  and 
consumers  in  both  our  countries  will 
have  unprecedented  freedom  to  choose 
among  a  staggering  array  of  goods  and 
services.  It'll  mean  lower  prices  for 
consumers,  jobs  galore  for  workers, 
and  new  markets  for  producers.  It'll 
stimulate  investment  in  both  econo- 
mies, which  will  mean  the  rapid  ad- 
vancement of  new  technologies.  It 
means  a  stronger  and  freer  market- 
place for  the  United  States  and 
Canada.  There'll  be  a  rich  flow  of  agri- 
culture and  energy  resources  from  one 
country  to  the  other  in  a  way  that  will 
profit  both.  We  also  deal  with  the  serv- 
ice sectors  of  our  economies,  providing 
for  the  first  time  an  explicit  assurance 


that  in  such  areas  as  accounting,  tour- 
ism, insurance,  and  engineering  our 
peoples  will  be  free  to  choose 
their  suppliers. 

The  U.S.-Canada  Free  Trade 
Agreement,  which  recognizes  the  sim- 
ilarities between  our  economies  and  o 
political  systems,  also  respects  our  di 
ferent  histories,  aspirations,  and  denf 
ties — the  reality  that  Canada  and  the 
United  States  are  two  distinct  varia- 
tions of  a  common  theme  of  freedom, 
democracy,  and  human  rights.  As  lea( 
ers  of  the  free  world,  Canada  and  the 
United  States  are  pointing  the  way  t( 
ward  the  future.  Canada's  visionary 
Prime  Minister,  Brian  Mulroney,  and 
able  Arnbassadoi',  Allan  Gotlieb,  und( 
stand  well  that  free  trade  is  an  idea 
whose  time  has  come.  One  of  the  sigi 
of  this  change  is  the  very  passage  of 
this  bill.  We  must  make  sure  the  free 
doms  we  enjoy  include  the  freedom  t( 
choose  at  home  and  the  freedom  to  b' 
chosen  abroad.  This  nation,  which  we 
born  to  nurture  human  freedoms,  mu 
take  the  lead  in  establishing  the  prin* 
pie  that  one  of  the  most  important  hi 
man  freedoms  is  free  exchange. 

That  principle  was  the  animating 
force  behind  the  sterling  work  of  Am 
bassador  Clayton  Yeutter  [U.S.  Ti-ad 
Representative]  and  former  Ti-easury 
Secretary  James  Baker.  The  coopera- 
tion among  them,  the  administration 
and  Members  of  Congress  on  both  si( 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  19- 


CONSULAR  AFFAIRS 


if  the  aisle  was  decisive.  The  congres- 
lional  leadership  promised  and  deliv- 
jred  prompt  action,  and  the  result  was 
iverwhelming  approval  by  both  Houses. 
They  deserve  the  Nation's  thanks  for  a 
ob  well  done. 

This  legislation  reflects  overwhelm- 
ng  support  for  the  elimination  of  bar- 
'iers  to  trade  between  the  United 
states  and  Canada.  It  reflects  the 
lound  economic  principles  of  free  trade 
hat  benefit  American  businesses  and 
vorkers.  The  bill  is  a  hallmark  of  free 
rade,  in  marked  contrast  to  the 
lamaging  protectionist  te.xtiles  bills 
hat  I  vetoed  earlier  today. 

What  the  United  States  and  Can- 
da  are  accomplishing  on  a  bilateral 
)asis  is  an  e.xample  of  what  we  can  and 
nust  achieve  multilaterally.  That  is  why 
ve  look  forward  to  continuing  the  mid- 
erm  review  of  the  Uruguay  Round 
legotiations  [multilateral  trade  negotia- 
ions]  in  Montreal  later  this  year.  This 
igreement  is  a  model  for  those  talks  to 
bllow.  Just  as  the  pessimists  were 
vrong  about  this  agreement,  so  will  the 
Dessimists  be  wrong  about  the  Uruguay 
;iound.  Today  we  not  only  commemo- 
■ate  this  legislation  as  the  happy  con- 
lusion  of  a  bilateral  pact  but  pledge 
)ur  commitment  to  the  successful  com- 
oletion  of  the  Uruguay  Round  by  1990. 
The  midterm  review  will  be  the  most 
important  trade  matter  in  the  last 
months  of  this  Administration,  and  I 
arge  our  trading  partners  to  be  ready 
0  do  business  in  December. 
Ne  sure  will  be. 

Let  the  5,000-mile  border  between 
Canada  and  the  United  States  stand 
IS  a  symbol  for  the  future.  No  soldier 
itands  guard  to  protect  it.  Barbed  wire 
loes  not  deface  it.  And  no  invisible  bar- 
ier  of  economic  suspicion  and  fear  will 
jxtend  it.  Let  it  forever  be  not  a  point 
)f  division  but  a  meeting  place  between 
Dur  great  and  true  friends.  This  bill  is 
;he  product  of  the  vision  of  the  Ameri- 
can and  Canadian  people  who  are 
eading  the  way  toward  a  new  era  of 
Teedom.  Now,  I  thank  you.  May  God 
bless  all  of  you.  And  I  shall  now  sign 
this  agreement. 


Nonimmigrant  Visa  Waiver 
Pilot  Program  With  Japan 


DEPARTMENT  ANNOUNCEMENT, 
OCT.  19,  1988  1 

Beginning  December  15,  1988,  Japan 
and  the  United  States  have  waived  the 
requirement  that  citizens  traveling  be- 
tween the  two  countries  for  purposes  of 
tourism  or  business  need  visas. 

The  Immigration  Reform  and  Con- 
trol Act  of  1986  provided  for  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  pilot  nonimmigrant  visa 
waiver  program  for  citizens  of  certain 
counti'ies  to  come  to  the  United  States 
for  short  visits  for  business  or  pleas- 
ure. Under  the  trial  program,  up  to 
eight  countries  may  be  selected  to  par- 
ticipate for  a  period  of  3  years.  The 
first  country  to  participate  in  the  visa 
waiver  program  was  the  United  King- 
dom. Since  July  1,  1988,  British  citizens 
who  met  certain  requirements  have 
been  permitted  to  enter  the  United 
States  for  short  stays  without  a  visa. 

In  the  case  of  Japan,  the  following 
requirements  must  be  met  for  Japanese 
citizens  to  travel  without  a  visa.  The 
traveler  must: 

•  Be  a  citizen  of  Japan  and  travel 
on  an  une.xpired  Japanese  passport; 

•  Ti-avel  to  the  United  States  (this 
includes  Alaska,  Hawaii,  Puerto  Rico, 
Guam,  the  U.S.  Virgin  Islands)  for 
business  or  pleasure  for  90  days  or  less; 

•  Arrive  aboard  a  carrier  that  has 
signed  an  agreement  with  the  U.S. 
Government  to  participate  in  the  waiver 
program; 

•  Hold  an  onward  or  return  ticket 
which  takes  the  traveler  outside  the 
United  States  and  the  contiguous  areas 
of  Canada,  Mexico,  and  the  adjacent  is- 
lands in  the  Caribbean;  and 

•  Hold  a  completed  and  signed  visa 
waiver  pilot  program  information  form 


(1-791)  and  waive  the  right  to  a  hearing 
of  exclusion  or  deportation.  (The  forms 
are  available  from  participating  air- 
lines, travel  agents,  and  from  the  U.S. 
Embassy  in  Tokyo  and  American  Con- 
sulates in  Japan.) 

U.S.  citizens  traveling  to  Japan  will 
benefit  from  visa-free  travel  under  sim- 
ilar circumstances  in  accordance  with 
Japanese  regulations.  U.S.  travelers 
should  consult  the  Embassy  of  Japan  or 
Japanese  Consulates  in  the  United 
States  for  specific  information. 

No  extension  of  stay  or  adjustment 
of  status  is  permitted. 

Certain  travelers  will  still  need  a 
visa.  Visas  are  required  if  the  traveler: 

•  Plans  to  work  or  study; 

•  Plans  to  stay  for  more  than  90 
days; 

•  Is  not  traveling  aboard  a  par- 
ticipating carrier;  or 

•  Might  otherwise  be  ineligible  for 
a  visa.  (Ti'avelers  who  have  previously 
been  denied  a  visa,  have  criminal  rec- 
ords, or  who  believe  they  may  be  inel- 
igible for  a  visa  should  contact  the  U.S. 
Embassy  or  nearest  consulate  prior  to 
traveling  to  forestall  the  possibility  of 
being  turned  back  upon  arrival  at  a 
port  of  entry. ) 

In  1987  there  were  2.1  million  Jap- 
anese travelers  to  the  United  States, 
and  travel  in  1988  is  up  another  17%. 
The  convenience  of  coming  to  the 
United  States  without  a  visa  will  result 
in  an  even  greater  number  of  Japanese 
visitors  in  the  future.  The  travel  indus- 
try and  airlines  are  welcoming  this 
development. 


'Made  available  to  news  correspondents 
by  Department  spokesman  Charles  Red- 
man. ■ 


'Made  in  the  Rose  Garden  at  the  White 
House  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents'of  Oct.  3,  1988).  ■ 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  1988 


23 


EAST  ASIA 


U.S.-Philippines  Military  Bases 
Agreement  Review,  1988 


Secretary  Shultz  and  Philippines 
Foreign  Affairs  Secretary  Raul  Mang- 
lapus  signed  a  U.S.-Philippines  mili- 
tary bases  agreement  on  October  17, 
1988.  Following  are  the  texts  of  the 
agreement,  two  agreed  minutes,  re- 
marks made  by  Secretaries  Shultz  and 
Manglapus,  and  the  text  of  President 
Reagan's  letter  to  President  Corazon 
Aquino. 


TEXT  OF  AGREEMENT, 
OCT.  17,  1988 

Memorandum  of  Agreement 

The  Exchange  of  Notes  between  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  Philippines  and  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  amending  the 
Military  Bases  Agreement,  dated  January 
7,  1979,  provides:  "in  every  fifth  anniver- 
sary year  from  the  date  of  this  modification 
and  until  the  termination  of  the  Military 
Bases  Agreement,  there  shall  be  begun 
and  completed  a  complete  and  thorough  re- 
view and  reassessment  of  the  agreement, 
including  its  objectives,  its  provisions,  its 
duration,  and  the  manner  of  implementa- 
tion, to  assure  that  the  agreement  con- 
tinues to  serve  the  mutual  interest  of  both 
parties."  The  first  such  review,  conducted 
in  Manila  from  April  11  to  June  1,  1983, 
resulted  in  the  signing  of  a  Memorandum 
of  Agreement  dated  June  1,  1983. 

The  second  scheduled  review  of  the 
Agreement  took  place  in  Manila  and  Wash- 
ington from  April  5,  1988,  to  October  17, 
1988,  with  discussions  between  represent- 
atives of  the  Government  of  the  Philippines 
and  the  Government  of  the  United 
States.  Pursuant  to  the  understandings 
reached  during  the  second  scheduled  re- 
view, the  Government  of  the  Philippines 
and  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
have  agreed  to  the  following: 

I.  Mutual  Security  Relationship 

1.  The  Government  of  the  Philippines  and 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  re- 
affirm the  importance  of  their  continuing 
mutual  security  relationship,  of  which  the 
military  base  arrangements  form  an  inte- 
gral part,  and  the  fundamental  principles 
on  which  this  relationship  is  based,  includ- 
ing in  particular  their  mutual  respect  for 
the  sovereign  equality  and  independence  of 
both  countries,  their  joint  commitment  to 
the  defense  and  stability  of  their  respec- 
tive territories  and  to  maintaining  the 
freedom  and  dignity  of  their  peoples,  and 
their  mutual  interest  in  strengthening  the 


24 


fabric  of  peace  in  the  Pacific  area  and  in 
maintaining  global  freedom  of  commerce 
and  trade. 

2.  The  Government  of  the  Philippines 
and  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
also  affirm  the  continuing  need  to  adjust 
their  current  security  relationship  in  light 
of  present  and  emerging  realities  in  the 
domestic,  regional  and  global  situation.  In 
the  context  of  the  foregoing  and  in  full  rec- 
ognition of  and  respect  for  each  other's  sov- 
ereignty and  consistent  with  their 
respective  national  interests,  both  govern- 
ments reaffirm  their  commitments  under 
the  1947  Military  Bases  Agreement  and 
Mutual  Defense  Treaty. 

3.  Recognizing  the  interrelationship  of 
economic,  social  and  security  concerns,  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  will  exert 
its  best  efforts  to  provide  mutually  agreed 
levels  of  financial  assistance  to  strengthen 
the  security,  as  well  as  to  help  support  the 
economic  and  social  development,  of  the 
Republic  of  the  Philippines. 


II.  Procurement  of  Philippine 
Products 

1.  The  Government  of  the  United  States 
reaffirms  its  obligations  under  the  1983 
Memorandum  of  Understanding  that  U.S. 
forces  shall  procure  goods  and  services  in 
the  Philippines  to  the  maximum  extent  fea- 
sible and  its  undertaking  in  1986,  at  the 
request  of  the  Government  of  the  Philip- 
pines, to  pursue  energetically  a  Buy  Phil- 
ippines Program  aimed  at  identifying, 
advising,  and  assisting  potential  Philippine 
suppliers  in  order  to  expand  the  range  of 
goods  and  services  which  can  be  procured 
in  the  Philippines.  As  part  of  that  pro- 
gram, the  United  States  has  waived,  and 
will  continue  to  waive  for  the  period  of  this 
Agreement,  the  requirements  of  the  Bal- 
ance of  Payments  Program  in  order  to  per- 
mit purchase  within  the  Philippines  of 
goods  and  materials  that  are  mined,  pro- 
duced, or  manufactured  in  the  Philippines 
by  and  for  the  use  of  U.S.  forces  in  the 
Philippines. 

2.  In  order  to  expand  further  the  po- 
tential markets  for  and  use  of  Philippine 
products  by  U.S.  military  forces,  the 
United  States  will  waive,  in  addition,  the 
Balance  of  Payments  Program  require- 
ments in  order  to  permit  purchase  of  Phil- 
ippine goods  and  materials  by  and  for  the 
use  of  U.S.  forces  in  the  foreign  areas  of 
responsibility  of  the  U.S.  Commander  in 
Chief,  Pacific  (USCINCPAC). 

3.  The  Executive  Branch  of  the  United 
States  Government  will  also  seek  legisla- 
tion which  would  permit  a  waiver  permit- 
ting purchase  of  Philippine  goods  and 
materials,  notwithstanding  the  restrictions 
of  the  Berrv  Amendment,  bv  and  for  the 


use  of  U.S.  forces  in  the  Philippines  and 
the  foreign  areas  of  responsibility  of  the 
U.S.  Commander  in  Chief,  Pacific 
(USCINCPAC). 


III.  Review  of  the  Base  Labor 
Agreement 

1.  Pursuant  to  an  exchange  of  notes  be- 
tween the  Government  of  the  Philippines 
and  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
completed  on  April  12,  1988,  represen- 
tatives of  the  two  countries  have  met  be- 
ginning on  July  12,  1988,  to  discuss 
possible  additional  revisions  to  or  altera- 
tions in  the  Base  Labor  Agreement  of  May 
27,  1968,  concerning  the  employment  of 
Philippine  nationals  by  the  U.S.  forces  in 
the  Philippines. 

2.  The  Government  of  the  Philippines 
and  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
are  committed  to  the  welfare  of  the  Philip- 
pine national  work  force  at  the  bases.  The 
proposed  talks  reflect  the  critical  contribu- 
tion made  by  the  Philippine  national  work 
force  to  the  effective  operation  of  the  U.S. 
Facilities  and  will  be  conducted  with  a 
view  to  ensuring  that  labor  relations  in- 
volving the  Philippine  national  work  force 
remain  harmonious,  productive  and  bene- 
ficial to  both  the  employer  and  the  work- 
ers. The  discussions  shall  be  conducted  on 
the  basis  of  the  principles  of  recognition 
and  respect  for  the  sovereignty  of  the  Re- 
public of  the  Philippines  and  equality  of 
treatment. 

3.  The  Government  of  the  Philippines 
suggests  the  following  issues  for  discus- 
sion: (1)  application  of  Philippine  labor 
laws;  (2)  preferential  employment  for  Fil- 
ipinos; (3)  uniform  or  comparative  employ- 
ment standards  on  wages  and  other  forms 
of  compensation;  (4)  security  of  employ- 
ment; (5)  severance  pay;  (6)  regulation  of 
contracting  out  of  services  and  activities; 
(7)  full  recognition  of  the  right  to  self-org; 
nization  and  collective  bargaining;  (8)  fair 
and  effective  dispute  settlement,  and  im- 
provement of  the  mechanics  and  i-ole  of  thi 
Joint  Committee;  (9)  fair  standards  for  cor 
tractors  and  concessionaires.  The  panels, 
however,  will  be  empowei-ed  to  approve 
their  own  agenda. 

IV.  Joint  Republic  of  the 
Philippines-United  States  Panel 
on  Philippines  Veterans'  Claims 

Recognizing  the  commiiment  of  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  Philippines  and  the  Gover- 
ment  of  the  United  States  to  the  rights  of 
the  veterans  who  fought  in  World  War  II, 
the  United  States  representatives  have 
communicated  to  the  highest  appropriate 
United  States  authority  the  concerns  of  th 
Government  of  the  Philippines  regarding 
the  request  to  reconvene  the  Veterans' 
Claims  Panel. 


EAST  ASIA 


'  Social  Issue 

Till'  Government  of  the  Philippines  and 
c   iHi\ernment  of  the  United  States  af- 
111  their  common  concern  over  the  global 
nl.l,.m  of  AIDS  [Acquired  Immune  Defi- 

Syndrome]  virus  infection  and  their 

II  interest  in  the  prevention  and  con- 

',  his  disease. 

The  Government  of  the  Philippines 

Government  of  the  United  States 

......  exchange  releasable  information  on 

e  incidence  of  AIDS  virus  infection. 

3.  The  Government  of  the  United 
ates  reaffirms  its  policy  that  U.S.  mili- 
ry  personnel  who  test  positive  for  the 
IDS  virus  will  not  be  assigned  outside 
e  United  States. 

4.  In  recognition  of  the  global  dimen- 
)ns  of  the  AIDS  problem,  both  Govern- 
;nts  agree  to  refer  this  issue  to  a 
ateral  committee  consisting  of  appropri- 

i  repi"esentatives  from  both  Governments 
ncerned  with  the  limitation  and  control 
this  disease,  in  order  to  establish  and 
velop  programs  and  identify  funding  in 
pport  of  AIDS  prevention,  education, 
sting,  detection,  and  control. 


[.  Nuclear  Weapons 

Notwithstanding  the  provisions  of  Arti- 
i  III  of  the  1947  Military  Bases  Agree- 
;nt,  as  amended,  the  storage  or 
stallation  of  nuclear  or  non-conventional 
lapons  or  their  components  in  Philippine 
rritory  shall  be  subject  to  the  agreement 
the  Government  of  the  Philippines. 

2.  For  purposes  of  paragraph  1,  tran- 
s,  overflights  or  visits  by  U.S.  aircraft 
ships  in  Philippine  territory  shall  not  be 
insidered  storage  or  installation.  These 
ansits,  overflights  or  visits  will  be  con- 
icted  in  accordance  with  existing  pro- 
idures,  which  may  be  changed  or 
odified,  as  necessary,  by  mutual  agree- 
ent  between  both  parties. 

II.  Ownership  and  Disposition 
"  Buildings,  Structures  and  Other 
roperty 

rticle  XVII  of  the  1947  Military  Bases 
greement  is  amended  to  read  as  follows: 

1.  It  is  mutually  agreed  that  the 
nited  States  shall  have  the  right  to  re- 
ove  or  dispose  of  any  or  all  removable 
iprovements,  equipment  or  facilities  lo- 
ted  at  or  on  any  base  and  paid  for  with 
nds  of  the  United  States.  No  e.xport  ta.\ 
lall  be  charged  on  any  property  so  re- 
oved  from  the  Philippines.  The  Govern- 
ent  of  the  Philippines  shall  have  the  first 
Jtion  to  acquire,  upon  mutually  agreed 

5,  such  removable  United  States  Gov- 
'nment  property  within  the  bases  as  the 
nited  States  Government  determines  to 
e  excess  property  available  for  dispostion 
the  Philippines. 


2.  Non-removable  buildings  and  struc- 
tures within  the  bases,  including  essential 
utility  systems  such  as  energy  and  water 
production  and  distribution  systems  and 
heating  and  air  conditioning  systems  that 
are  an  integral  part  of  such  buildings  and 
structures,  are  the  property  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  Philippines,  and  shall  be  so 
registered.  The  United  States  shall,  how- 
ever, have  the  right  of  full  use,  in  accord- 
ance with  this  Agreement,  of  such  non- 
removable buildings  and  structures  within 
the  United  States  Facilities  at  the  bases, 
including  the  right  to  repair,  alter  or,  when 
necessary  for  reasons  of  safety  or  new  con- 
struction, to  demolish  them.  There  shall  be 
no  obligation  on  the  part  of  the  United 
States  or  of  the  Philippines  to  rebuild  or 
repair  any  destruction  or  damage  inflicted 
from  any  cause  whatsoever  on  any  of  the 
non-removable  buildings  or  structures  used 
by  the  United  States  in  the  bases.  The 
United  States  is  not  obligated  to  turn  over 
the  bases  to  the  Philippines  at  the  expira- 
tion of  this  Agreement  or  the  earlier  relin- 
quishment of  any  bases  in  the  condition  in 
which  they  were  at  the  time  of  their  occu- 
pation, nor  is  the  Philippines  obliged  to 
make  any  compensation  to  the  United 
States  for  the  improvements  made  in  the 
bases  or  for  the  non-removable  buildings  or 
structures  left  thereon,  the  right  of  use  of 
which  shall  revert  to  the  Philippines  upon 
the  termination  of  this  Agreement  or  the 
earlier  relinquishment  by  the  United 
States  of  the  bases  where  the  buildings  or 
structures  have  been  built. 

3.  Upon  final  termination  of  the  use  by 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  of  the 
Facilities  or  earlier  relinquishment,  the 
United  States  and  the  Republic  of  the  Phil- 
ippines will  take  appropriate  measures  as 
they  shall  jointly  determine  to  ensure  a 
smooth  transition  with  respect  to  custody 
and  control  of  the  Facilities  and  in  order  to 
minimize  any  disruptive  effects  of  such 
termination. 


VIII.  Base  Security 

1.  The  Governments  of  the  Philippines  and 
the  United  States  take  note  of  the  need  to 
improve  the  security  of  the  bases  in  view  of 
increasing  intrusions  into  and  other  possi- 
ble threats  on  the  bases.  Accordingly,  both 
Governments  agree  that  the  Mutual  De- 
fense Board  (MDB)  shall  give  this  need 
priority  in  its  agenda  for  1988  and  conclude 
an  action  plan,  along  with  any  necessary 
related  agreements,  that  addresses  the  full 
range  of  security  concerns  regarding  phys- 
ical security  of  the  bases,  including  se- 
curity of  U.S.  personnel  off-base,  on  or 
before  the  end  of  1988.  This  tasking  shall 
not  affect  the  general  or  continuing  re- 
sponsibilities of  the  Joint  Committee  cre- 
ated under  the  1983  amendment  to  the  1947 
Military  Bases  Agreement  and  the  MDB 
shall  report  to  the  Joint  Committee  on  the 
conclusion  of  its  efforts. 


Subject  to  the  availability  of  funds,  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  is  pre- 
pared to  provide  up  to  $4  million  per  year 
for  FYs  1990  and  1991  for  the  sole  purpose 
of  assisting  the  Philippine  Base  Commands 
at  Subic  and  Clark  in  the  maintenance  of 
base  security.  Prioritization  of  projects  for 
improvements  of  base  security  will  be 
jointly  agreed  upon  by  the  Philippine  Base 
Commanders  and  U.S.  Facility  Command- 
ers and  submitted  to  the  MDB  for  approval. 

2.  The  Governments  of  the  Philippines 
and  the  United  States  take  note  of  the 
presence  of  squatters  on  base  and  Facility 
lands  and  of  the  need  to  relocate  them. 
Both  Governments  also  take  note  of  the 
joint  action  taken  by  the  Philippine  Base 
Commanders  and  U.S.  Facilities  Command- 
ers of  Clark  Air  Base  and  Subic  Naval 
Base  to  address  the  squatter  problem.  For 
its  part,  the  Philippine  Government  will 
take  steps  to  relocate  and  resettle  the 
squatters  and  prevent  further  squatting  on 
the  bases.  The  resettlement  program  will 
given  priority  to  those  whose  relocation  is 
necessary  to  improve  base  security  and 
protect  them  from  risks  arising  from  oper- 
ations at  the  bases  while  at  the  same  time 
improving  their  conditions.  For  this  pur- 
pose, the  Philippine  Government  will  carry 
out  a  resettlement  program,  which  will  in- 
clude a  livelihood  component,  for  squatters 
at  Clark  Air  Base  and  Subic  Naval  Base. 
For  its  part,  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment is  prepared  at  this  time  to  provide  up 
to  $5  million  to  fund  Philippine  Govern- 
ment approved  projects. 

The  recommendations  of  the  Base 
Commanders  and  U.S.  Facility  Command- 
ers will  be  taken  into  consideration  in  the 
formulation  of  the  resettlement  program. 
Priority  for  squatter  relocation  will  be 
jointly  agreed  by  the  Philippine  Base  Com- 
manders and  the  U.S.  Facility  Command- 
ers and  forwarded  for  appropriate 
consideration.  To  start  the  resettlement 
program,  a  resettlement  project  will  be 
undertaken  in  1988  for  squatters  at  Clark 
Air  Base. 

3.  The  Government  of  the  Philippines 
reaffirms  its  obligation  under  Article  V  of 
the  1979  Arrangements  Regarding  Delinea- 
tion of  United  States  Facilities  concerning 
access  to,  egress  from,  and  movement  be- 
tween U.S.  Facilities,  depicted  areas, 
other  base  areas  of  the  Philippine  military 
bases  which  are  made  available  for  use  by 
the  U.S.  forces  under  the  1947  Military 
Bases  Agreement,  and  the  Tabones  Train- 
ing Complex. 

4.  With  respect  to  the  problem  of  un- 
lawful entry  onto  the  bases  and  Facilities, 
the  Government  of  the  Philippines  will 
take  necessary  and  appropriate  steps  to 
achieve  strict  enforcement  of  existing  laws 
and  to  ensure  that  defendants  appear  for 
trial.  These  steps  shall  include  the  circula- 
tion to  the  authorities  concerned  of  rele- 
vant Philippine  law  or  rules  relating  to  the 
periods  for  which  defendants  may  be  de- 
tained, and,  for  defendants  who  post  bail 
and  thereafter  fail  to  appear,  the  vigorous 


lepartment  of  State  Bulletin/December  1988 


25 


EAST  ASIA 


pursuit  of  their  arrest  and  detention  pend- 
ing trial.  The  Philippine  Base  Commanders 
and  U.S.  Facilities  Commanders  will  also 
continue  to  work  to  improve  the  expedi- 
tious processing  of  apprehended  intruders. 

IX.  ESF  Budget  Support  Program 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  will 
develop  with  the  Government  of  the  Philip- 
pines a  program  of  budget  support  for  the 
Philippine  Government.  The  United  States 
will  propose  rapid  disbursement  of  a  sub- 
stantial portion  of  $248  million  in  ESF 
I  Economic  Support  Fund]  for  U.S.  fiscal 
years  1988  and  1989  and  a  substantial  por- 
tion of  the  fiscal  year  1990  ESF,  in  the 
anticipated  amount  of  .$160  million,  which 
may  be  appropriated  for  the  Philippines  to 
assure  continued  progress  in  implementa- 
tion of  agreed  on  Philippine  economic  and 
administrative  reforms.  These  cash  trans- 
fers would  enhance  significantly  the  finan- 
cial ability  of  the  Government  of  the 
Philippines  to  undertake  a  voluntary,  mar- 
ket-oriented debt  reduction  program  in 
1990,  or  earlier  if  desirable  and  feasible. 


X.  Further  Consultations 

The  Governments  of  the  Philippines  and  of 
the  United  States  note  that  other  impor- 
tant subjects,  including  questions  related 
to  criminal  jurisdiction  and  military  opera- 
tions, have  been  discussed  during  the 
course  of  the  review,  but  that  no  agree- 
ment has  been  reached.  The  Governments 
of  the  Philippines  and  of  the  United  States 
note,  however,  that  any  further  concerns  of 
both  Governments  regarding  the  imple- 
mentation and  operation  of  arrangements 
in  these  areas  can  be  further  explored  un- 
der existing  consultation  procedures. 


Entry  Into  Force 

This  Agreement  shall  enter  into  force  upon 
signature. 

In  Witness  Whereof,  the  under- 
signed, being  duly  authorized  by  their  re- 
spective Governments,  have  signed  this 
Agreement. 

Done  at  Washington,  in  duplicate,  the 
seventeenth  day  of  October,  1988. 

For  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  of  America 

George  P.  Shi'i.tz 

For  the  Government  of  the 
Republic  of  the  Philippines 

Raul  Manclapus 


AGREED  MINUTE 
OCT.  17,  1988 

The  Governments  of  the  Philippines  and 
the  United  States  note  their  understanding 
that  the  term  "non-conventional  weapons" 
refers  to  chemical  and  biological  weapons. 


26 


AGREED  MINUTE 
OCT.  17,  1988 

"Non-removable  buildings  and  structures" 
refers  to  buildings,  structures,  and  other 
improvements  permanently  affixed  to  the 
ground,  and  such  equipment  that  is  essen- 
tial to  the  habitability  and  general  use  of 
such  improvements  and  is  permanently  at- 
tached to  or  integrated  into  the  property. 
Examples  are  roads,  runways,  buildings 
with  basements,  permanently  installed 
plumbing,  heating,  and  cooling  systems  re- 
quired for  normal  habitation  purposes,  and 
generators  for  basic  electric  power  require- 
ments of  such  buildings.  Examples  of  re- 
moval property  are  demountable  structures 
(e.g.,  trailers,  Butler  buildings,  certain  an- 
tennas), communications  equipment,  navi- 
gational aids,  vehicles,  furniture,  portable 
air  conditioners,  aircraft,  weapons,  am- 
munition, office  equipment,  data  process- 
ing equipment,  special  heating  and  cooling 
equipment  not  related  to  habitability  of  a 
structure,  generators  for  special  power  re- 
quirements exceeding  habitability  and  gen- 
eral use  requirements,  and  other  types  of 
military  or  special  use  equipment. 


REMARKS, 

OCT.  17,  19881 


Secretary  Shultz 

This  signing  ceremony  marks  the  com- 
pletion of  quite  a  few  months  of  hard 
and  thoughtful  work — thoughtful  work 
about  the  security  interests  of  each  of 
our  two  countries,  and  thoughtful  work 
about  the  security  and  stability  of  the 
Asia-Pacific  region,  of  which  we  are 
both  a  vital  part. 

I  think,  as  has  been  the  case  in  the 
past,  that  the  relationship  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Philippines 
serves  those  interests.  This  agreement, 
which  builds  on  past  agreements  but 
develops  them  some  and  examines  them 
carefully,  is  a  worthy  continuation  of 
this  tradition. 

I'd  like  to  say  a  word  about  the 
Government  of  the  Philippines,  Presi- 
dent Cory  Aquino  and  Secretary  Mang- 
lapus,  with  whom  we've  worked  so 
closely  in  developing  this  agreement. 
It's  a  government  we  have  supported 
wholeheartedly,  and  we  are  just  thrilled 
at  the  return  to  democracy  in  the  Phil- 
ippines. Of  course,  we  know  that  a 
democratic  government  is  one  you 
struggle  with,  but  nevertheless  you 
struggle  with  a  like-minded  set  of 
people. 

We  take  great  pleasure  and  satis- 
faction in  the  developments  that  are 
taking  place  there,  and  want  to  see  the 
Philippines  succeed.  As  I've  said  on 


many  occasions,  I'm  buUish  on  the  Phil 
ippines,  and  this  is  a  continuation  of 
that  effort. 

Finally,  just  a  word  to  Secretary 
Manglapus,  who  has  been  here  for  a 
few  weeks  now.  We've  met  here  in 
Washington.  He's  met  with  people 
throughout  our  government,  including 
our  Congress.  He  has  been  around  in 
New  York.  We've  met  there,  and  we've 
met  here.  He's  delayed  his  return  to 
the  Philippines,  and  has  kept  after  this 
and  has  wrestled  this  problem  to  the 
ground. 

We're  very  grateful  to  you  for  tak- 
ing all  that  extra  trouble.  Anybody  cai 
start  a  job,  but  it  takes  a  special  some 
body  to  finish  the  job,  and  that's  what 
we've  done  here.  I  express  my  respect 
and  appreciation  to  you. 

Secretary  Manglapus 

The  .5-year  periodic  review  of  the  U.S. 
Philippine  Military  Bases  Agreement  i 
concluded  with  the  Memorandum  of 
Agreement  that  we  have  signed  this 
afternoon. 

The  review,  including  the  public 
discussions  that  accompanied  it,  has 
served  to  introduce  a  more  realistic 
and,  therefore  firmer,  footing  for  our 
mutual  relations. 

There  has  been  stressed  that  the 
U.S.  military  facilities  in  the  Philip- 
pines are  there  not  only  for  Philippine 
defense  but  also  for  the  securing  for 
the  United  States  and  East  Asian  anc 
Southeast  Asian  nations  of  vital  ar- 
teries that  extend  to  the  Persian  Gulf 
To  quote  the  article  written  jointly  bj 
Assistant  Secretaries  Gaston  Sigur  ai 
Richard  Armitage  only  2  weeks  ago, 
"Sea  lines  ai'e  to  America  what  railro 
lines  are"  to  land-based  powers. 

This  review  has  not  resolved  all  t 
issues  that  the  Philippines  would  like 
have  seen  resolved.  Differences  on 
criminal  jurisdiction  and  operational 
use  have  had  to  be  left  for  further 
discussion. 

But  other  important  questions  h; 
been  squarely  met.  Title  to  nonremo\ 
ble  buildings  and  structures,  includin 
essential  utility  systems,  will  now  be 
vested  in  the  Philippines. 

At  the  termination  of  the  facilitie 
the  Philippines  will  acquire  possessio 
of  these  properties  without  paying  co 
pensation.  The  provision  of  the  new 
Philippine  Constitution  on  nuclear 
weapons  is  being  implemented.  As  to 
the  compensation  package,  we  recog- 
nize the  efforts  by  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment to  meet  our  proposals  in  spite  c 
budget  constraints  by  employing  non 


EAST  ASIA 


judgetary  means  of  providing  the  Phil- 
ipines  with  economic  benefits. 

The  United  States  has  agreed  to 
tatutory  waivers  to  permit  additional 
riiiurement  of  Philippine  goods  in  the 
"IXCTAC  foreign  area  and  in  the  Phil- 
)piiu'  bases. 

The  United  States  has  also  agreed 
11  convert  unused  foreign  military  sales 
i-filits  to  grants  and  to  extend  guaran- 
(•f>  liy  U.S.  financial  institutions.  The 
'iiiti'd  States,  finally,  has  agreed  to 
hi'  rapid  disbursement  of  economic 
upport  funds.  This  action  will  enable 
lit'  Philippines  to  launch  its  own  mean- 
lufiil  debt-reduction  program.  This  is 
npi-ecedented  and  we  recognize  that 
Ppi-Dval  for  it  required  a  difficult  inter- 
al  process  within  the  U.S. 
iiiN'ernment. 

For  this  and  for  his  statesmanlike 
pen-mindedness  through  these  ar- 
luous  negotiations,  we  would  like  to 
ay  a  very  special  word  of  appreciation 
0  Secretary  George  Shultz.  We  would 
Iso  extend  this  word  to  the  State  De- 
lartment  officials  involved  in  this  en- 
leavor,  as  well  as  to  Ambassador 
Nicholas  Piatt  and  his  Manila  panel 
ith  whom  we  initiated  these  talks. 

The  talks  are  concluded.  We  hope 
hat  this  new  understanding  will  make 
nore  real  the  meaning  of  Philippine- 
Vmerican  friendship. 


'RESIDENT  REAGAN'S  LETTER 
O  PRESIDENT  AQUINO, 
)CT.  17,  1988 

was  pleased  to  learn  that  our  represen- 
atives  have  completed  the  second  five-year 
eview  of  the  Military  Bases  Agreement 

hich  is  called  for  in  the  1979  amendments. 
In  light  of  this  development,  I  wish  to 
tate  that  the  E.xecutive  Branch  of  the 

nited  States  Government  will,  during  the 

,vo  fiscal  years  beginning  on  October  1, 
9,'-;ii,  make  its  best  efforts  to  provide  $962 
ailliun  in  security  assistance,  development 
nd  commodity  assistance,  and  housing  in- 
vestment guarantees,  in  the  following 
mounts: 

Military  Assistance  Program  .  .  .$400  million 

i^conomic  Support  Fund o2U  million 

Development  Assistance 

and  Food  Aid 192  million 

4ousing  Investment 

Guarantees 50  million 

In  connection  with  an  implemented 
housing  Investment  Guarantee  program, 
,he  Government  of  the  Philippines  may  use 
he  dollars  borrowed  on  the  security  of  the 
Jnited  States  Government  guarantee  to 
mhance  its  foreign  e.xchange  position  or 
'or  other  purposes,  should  it  so  desire. 


The  United  States  Executive  Branch 
will  seek  Congressional  authorization  to 
forgive  repayment  of  the  $29.4  million  in 
e.xisting  unused  FMS  credits  for  the 
PhiUppines. 

The  Export-Import  Bank  of  the  United 
States  is  prepared  to  consider  loans,  guar- 
antees, and  insurance  aggregating  up  to 
$350  million  over  three  U.S.  fiscal  years, 
1989,  1990  and  1991,  for  the  purpose  of  as- 
sisting in  the  financing  of  United  States 
exports  to  the  Philippines. 

Such  financing  will  be  extended  on  a 
case-by-case  basis  at  the  discretion  of  the 
Board  of  Directors  of  the  Export-Import 
Bank;  shall  be  subject  to  all  applicable 
provisions  of  United  States  law,  including 
budget  commitment  authority;  and  shall  be 
in  the  form  of  loans,  guarantees,  or  insur- 
ance under  the  Bank's  regular  programs 
for  individual  transactions  or  projects  ap- 
proved by  the  Board.  The  Board  will  apply 
the  creditworthiness  criteria  and  financing 
terms  and  conditions  which  are  the  cus- 
tomary policies  and  practices  of  the  Bank. 
Loans  to  private  companies  in  the  Philip- 
pines may  require  a  guarantee  of  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  Philippines. 

The  Overseas  Private  Investment  Cor- 
poration will  continue  to  facilitate  United 
States  private  investment  in  the  Republic 
of  the  Philippines  and  to  that  end  expects 
to  issue  new  insurance  coverage  for  United 
States  private  investment  projects  in  the 
Philippines  in  the  range  of  $100  million  by 
September  30,  1991. 

In  addition,  by  September  30,  1991, 
the  Overseas  Private  Investment  Corpora- 
tidii  would  ])rovide  financial  guarantees  up 
til  $M  million  in  United  States  private  cap- 
ital, through  appropriate  mechanisms,  for 


use  in  financing  productive  projects  in  the 
private  sector  in  the  Republic  of  the  Philip- 
[lines.  Both  the  Overseas  Private  Invest- 
ment Corporation's  finance  guarantees  and 
insurance  coverage  will  be  subject  to  terms 
and  conditions  as  shall  be  agreed  upon  by 
the  Overseas  Private  Investment  Corpora- 
tion and  the  Government  of  the  PhiUp- 
pines, and  approved  by  the  Overseas 
Private  Investment  Corporation's  Board  of 
Directors. 

These  undertaking  are  subject  to  the 
limitations  of  applicable  United  States  leg- 
islation and  compliance  with  applicable 
legal  requirements,  and,  where  necessary, 
to  the  availability  of  the  appropriate 
funding. 

As  you  know,  under  our  constitutional 
system,  the  Congress  has  sole  authority  to 
appropriate  funds. 

In  closing,  let  me  affirm  once  again  the 
continuing  support  of  the  United  States  for 
your  efforts  to  strengthen  democracy  and 
economic  development  in  the  Republic  of 
the  Philippines.  I  am  pleased  to  note  that 
the  Military  Bases  Agreement  Review  con- 
firmed that  the  Agreement  continues  to 
meet  our  mutual  needs  and  interests.  I  be- 
lieve that  this  review  has  again  underlined 
the  close  and  historic  ties  linking  our  two 
countries,  and  will  contribute  further  to 
strengthening  the  peace  and  security  of 
the  Western  Pacific  region. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald  Re.ao.\n 


'Press  release  223.  Question-and-an- 
swer  session  not  printed  here.  ■ 


U.S.-Japan  Relations 


hi/  William  Clark,  Jr. 

Statement  before  the  Subcowmittee 
on  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs  of  the 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
October  IS,  1988.  Mr.  Clark  is  Deputy 
Assistant  Secretary  for  East  Asian  and 
Pacific  Affairs.^ 

I  am  pleased  to  have  the  opportunity  to 
appear  before  you  today  to  discuss  the 
United  States'  relations  with  Japan. 

For  much  of  the  past  8  years  our 
relations  with  Japan  have  been  marked 
by  bitter  trade  disputes  and  growing 
U.S.  trade  deficits.  Bilateral  trade  fric- 
tion was  fueled  by  criticism  that  Japan 
was  doing  little  to  contribute  to  our 
mutual  diplomatic  and  security  inter- 
ests. To  a  large  degree  this  perception 
of  the  state  of  our  bilateral  relations 


persists.  In  my  view,  it  lags  behind  re- 
ality. Let  me  explain  why. 

We  have  resolved,  or  are  on  the 
way  to  resolving,  many  of  the  trade 
conflicts  which  have  bedeviled  us  the 
past  8  years.  That  is  not  to  say  no 
problems  remain.  While  we  have  made 
much  progress  on  a  wide  range  of  is- 
sues such  as  beef  and  citrus  and  major 
projects,  new  trade  disputes  continue 
to  arise  and  some  old  ones  persist. 

But  overall  the  recent  develop- 
ments in  our  economic  relationship  with 
Japan  are  favorable.  Japan's  economic 
growth  is  strong  and  now  driven  by  do- 
mestic demand.  U.S.  exports  to  Japan 
are  up  significantly.  And  the  bilateral 
trade  deficit  has  begun  to  shrink 
slowly.  Ti-ade  issues  remain  significant, 
but  the  trends  are  in  the  right 
direction. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  1988 


27 


EAST  ASIA 


Moreover,  trade  issues  have  tended 
to  overshadow  a  great  deal  of  progress 
in  the  diplomatic  and  security  areas  in 
recent  years.  Defense  cooperation  and 
Japan's  host  nation  support  for  U.S. 
Forces  Japan  have  never  been  greater. 
Japanese  cooperation  with  the  United 
States  to  promote  global  peace  and  po- 
litical and  economic  stability  is  more 
active  and  extensive  than  ever,  ranging 
from  the  Philippines  and  Afghanistan 
to  the  Persian  Gulf  and  Angola/ 
Namibia.  In  short,  Japans  commitment 
to  play  a  larger  global  role  in  sustaining 
the  Western  economic  and  security 
structure  is  increasingly  tangible. 

Of  course,  this  is  no  time  for  either 
country  to  rest  on  its  laurels.  The 
world  has  not  stopped  to  applaud  our 
efforts.  We  must  continue  and  intensify 
our  global  cooperation  in  each  of  these 
areas.  At  the  same  time,  it  is  impor- 
tant to  recognize  what  Japan  is  doing 
now  to  promote  common  economic,  se- 
curity, and  political  interests. 

Economic  Cooperation 

Japan,  which  has  benefited  so  much 
from  the  open  international  trade  sys- 
tem, is  beginning  to  play  a  more  active 
role  now  in  sustaining  that  system. 
With  the  Maekawa  report  in  1986,  the 
Government  of  Japan  set  out  a  frame- 
work for  a  major  restructuring  of 
Japan's  economy  to  fulfill  more  effec- 
tively its  new  responsibilities  as  an  eco- 
nomic great  power  and  to  assume  its 
share  of  the  global  economic  burden. 
Progress  toward  that  goal,  including 
the  dramatic  increase  in  the  value  of 
the  yen  stemming  from  the  1985  Plaza 
agreement,  has  produced  some  im- 
pressive results  in  recent  months.  For 
example,  although  Japan  has  relied  in 
the  past  on  exports  to  generate  eco- 
nomic growth,  last  year  the  external 
sector  was  actually  a  drag  on  GDP 
[gross  domestic  product]  growth.  It 
was  instead  rapidly  expanding  domestic 
demand — up  5% — which  boosted  Jap- 
anese GDP  growth  to  4.2%  in  1987. 

Japanese  and  U.S.  global  trade  fig- 
ures suggest  that  both  countries  are 
headed  toward  a  healthier  balance  of 
trade.  Through  August  of  this  year  im- 
ports to  Japan  were  up  33%  in  dollar 
terms — compared  to  a  16%  increase  in 
exports — and  Japan's  monthly  trade 
surplus  with  the  world  has  been  declin- 
ing steadily.  Japan  is  importing  more 
manufactui-ed  good.'^ — the  share  of  man- 
ufactured goods  to  total  imports  has  in- 
creased from  31%  in  1985  to  48.1%  in 
recent  trade  figures. 


28 


Moreover,  the  Japan-U.S.  bilateral 
trade  imbalance  has  been  narrowing. 
For  the  first  7  months  of  this  year  our 
exports  to  Japan  have  been  up  over  40% 
in  dollar  terms  while  imports  are  al- 
most flat.  If  these  trends  continue  U.S. 
exports  to  Japan — our  most  important 
overseas  market — will  top  $35  billion 
this  year  and  our  bilateral  deficit  with 
Japan  should  drop  $8-$10  billion. 

Progress  on  significant  market  ac- 
cess issues  between  our  two  countries 
has  also  been  impressive.  Japan  ac- 
ceded to  the  GATT  [General  Agree- 
ment on  Tariffs  and  Ti'ade]  panel 
decision  on  the  "GATT  12"  agricultural 
products  in  February,  and  a  bilateral 
agreement  has  now  been  reached. 
Agreements  on  U.S.  access  to  public 
works  projects  and  beef  and  citrus  mar- 
ket opening  have  been  concluded. 

We  still  are  faced  with  important 
trade  problems.  In  the  high-tech  area, 
access  to  Japan's  market  for  U.S.  semi- 
conductors and  supercomputers  is  un- 
satisfactory. Japan's  right  to  take 
salmon  in  U.S.  waters,  provided  for  by 
treaty,  is  under  attack  in  the  courts  and 
the  Congress.  We  think  Japan's  re- 
search whaling  program  undermines  in- 
ternational conservation  efforts.  But 
our  recent  trade  successes  show  that 
even  issues  that  affect  powerful  interest 
groups  in  Japan  are  not  intractable. 

Japan  will  record  a  sizeable  trade 
and  current  account  surplus  again  this 
year,  and  strong  pressure  from  the 
United  States  and  other  trading  part- 
ners to  open  fully  its  markets  more 
quickly  will  continue.  The  point  is  not 
that  we  have  no  more  trade  problems, 
but  that  we  have  shown  we  can  resolve 
sensitive  issues  and  the  trends  are  mov- 
ing in  the  right  direction. 

Defense  Cooperation 

Japan  is  often  criticized  for  spending 
only  about  1%  of  its  GNP  [gross  na- 
tional product]  on  defense.  I  believe  it 
makes  more  sense  to  consider  what 
Japan  is  and  should  be  doing  in  the 
defense  area  than  to  focus  on  percent- 
ages of  GNP. 

In  fact,  Japan's  defense  budget  is 
already  the  world's  third  largest — about 
$40  billion  compared  to  the  Federal  Re- 
public of  Germany's  $31.7  billion, 
France's  $32.4  billion,  and  the  United 
Kingdom's  $35.7  billion — based  on  the 
NATO  calculation  (including  veterans' 
costs)  of  defense  expenditures.  More- 
over, Japan's  defense  expenditures  have 
been  growing  over  the  last  decade  at 
the  rate  of  5%  real  growth  per  year — 
substantiallv  better  than  the  United 


States  or  our  other  allies.  Japan  al- 
ready possesses  twice  as  many  destroy- 
ers as  we  have  in  the  7th  Fleet,  as 
many  fighter  aircraft  defending  its  ter- 
ritory as  we  have  in  the  continental 
United  States,  and  a  sizeable  ground 
force  now  reconfiguring  for  forward  de- 
fense. Their  ASW  [anti-submarine  war- 
fare] capabilities  are  good  and  growing, 
with  plans  to  obtain  nearly  100  P3-C 
aircraft  and  a  growing  conventionally 
powered  attack  submarine  force.  Coop- 
eration and  interoperability  with  U.S. 
forces  are  steadily  improving  through 
an  ambitious  schedule  of  joint  exei'- 
cises.  Japan's  forces  will  be  strength- 
ened with  acquisition  of  new  aircraft — 
notably  the  codeveloped  FSX  [a  new 
Japanese  fighter  aircraft  in  the  develop: 
ment  stage] — and  more  early  warning 
aircraft,  extremely  accurate  shore-to- 
ship  missiles  and  Aegis-equipped  navaU 
vessels.  Weaknesses  remain,  notably  ii< 
air  defense,  sustainability,  and  logis- 
tics, but  Japan's  leaders  are  working  tc 
remedy  these  in  their  future  programs 
We  expect  the  follow-on  plan  to  today's 
midterm  defense  plan,  which  concludes 
in  1991,  will  call  for  even  greater  im 
provements  in  air,  ground,  and  sealant 
defense. 

Our  current  agreement  on  defensf 
roles  and  missions  gives  the  United 
States  responsibility  for  nuclear  deter 
rence  and  offensive  operations  in  the 
region  w-hile  Japan  is  to  defend  its  ter 
ritory,  airspace,  and  selected  sealines 
communication  out  to  1,000  miles. 
There  are  compelling  reasons  for  mail 
taining  that  security  framework  and 
persuasive  ones  why  major  changes  ii 
it — for  example,  having  Japan  assume 
regional  defense  responsibilities — woi 
be  neither  politically  feasible  nor  in  oi 
own  interests. 

Most  of  our  60,000-man  force  in 
Japan  has  a  dual  mission.  They  are 
there  not  simply  to  defend  Japan  but 
maintain  peace  and  stability  elsewhei 
in  the  Far  East.  History,  reflected  re 
cently  in  the  reactions  of  some  Asian 
nations  to  Japan's  decision  to  drop  its 
1%  GNP  barrier  to  defense  expend- 
itures, makes  it  doubtful  that  the  re- 
gion is  prepared  for  Japan  to  play  a 
larger  security  role.  A  radical  change 
in  the  present  security  framework 
would  likely  lead  to  less,  not  more,  si 
bility,  and  to  higher,  not  lower,  costs 
the  United  States.  We  and  our  other 
Asian  friends,  and  most  Japanese  tht 
selves,  believe  that  regional  security 
and  stability  are  best  served  by  Japa 
maintaining  a  strictly  defensive  force 
closely  allied  with  U.S.  forces.  At  th 
same  time,  we — and,  we  believe. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  1£  ik 


EAST  ASIA 


Japan — are  committed  to  securing  a 
more  equitable  share  of  the  defense 
luiiden,  a  subject  of  continuous  di- 
alnijue  between  our  two  countries. 

lapan  contributes  some  $2.5  billion 
a  year  to  support  the  maintenance  of 
()i).(ii)0  U.S.  service  personnel  in  Japan, 
r  S.  forces,  I  repeat,  which  are  fulfill- 
iiiu  a  regional  security  role.  Japan's  con- 
tnliution  accounts  now  for  about  40%  of 
intal  costs.  Japan  has  committed  to  con- 
inhiite  an  additional  $100  million  a  year 
t'lir  the  next  2  years  toward  labor  costs 
(if  r.S.  forces  workers.  We  expect  and 
will  urge  Japan  to  include  an  even 
ureater  share  in  its  next  midterm  de- 
fense plan. 

Foreign  Aid  Cooperation 

We  rnnsult  closely  with  Japan  on  over- 
seas development  assistance  (ODA), 
seeking  complementary  ways  to  foster 
I'eaee  and  economic  and  political  sta- 
I'lliiy  in  areas  of  importance  to  the 
West.  In  addition  to  continuing  discus- 
Mi  ms  in  Washington  and  Tokyo,  and 
miniig  our  representatives  in  foreign 
.•a]iitals,  twice  yearly  the  United  States 
111(1  -Japan  hold  formal  consultations  on 
feieign  assistance  at  the  Under  Secre- 
ary/Deputy  Foreign  Minister  level. 

It  will  come  as  no  surprise  to  mem- 
bers of  the  committee  that,  on  a  dis- 
oursement  basis,  Japan,  whose  foreign 
aid  budget  was  second  to  the  United 
States  in  1987  at  $7.45  billion,  will  pass 
as  within  the  next  year  or  two  to  be- 
ome  the  world's  largest  donor  of  eco- 
nomic assistance. 

Japan's  traditional  geographical 
pattern  of  foreign  aid  has  been 
7_1_1_1":  70%  to  Asia;  10%  to  Africa; 
10%  to  Latin  America;  and  10%  to  the 
Middle  East.  Japan's  ODA  remains 
trongly  oriented  toward  the  Asian- 
Pacific  region.  There  are  obvious  his- 
torical and  political  reasons  for  this  ori- 
entation and,  after  all,  the  stable  and 
()r((sperous  environment  in  East  Asia 
since  1975  owes  much  to  Japanese  aid 
and  trade. 

Increasingly,  Japan  has  provided 
foreign  aid  to  countries  of  strategic  im- 
portance to  the  West.  Japan  has  sub- 
stantial development  assistance 
programs  in  countries  like  the  Philip- 
pines, Pakistan,  Egypt,  Jordan,  Oman, 
and  Turkey,  which  are  of  special  impor- 
tance to  us.  Japan  has  also  begun  in- 
creasing ODA  to  Mexico,  South  and 
Central  America,  the  Caribbean,  and 
sub-Saharan  Africa. 

Japan  has  also  begun  to  provide 
l„more  assistance  on  a  grant,  rather  than 
loan,  basis.  In  1987,  $1.15  billion  of 


Japan's  ODA  was  in  grant  form,  an  in- 
crease of  35%'  from  the  preceding  year. 
At  the  Toronto  summit,  Japanese 
Prime  Minister  Takeshita  outlined  a 
new  program  of  $50  billion  in  ODA  over 
the  next  5  years.  The  program  also  un- 
derlines Japan's  intention  to  increase 
the  grant  component  of  its  ODA,  ex- 
pand untying  of  loan  aid,  and  provide 
$1  billion  in  debt  relief  to  the  poorest 
developing  countries.  Japan's  imminent 
position  as  the  world's  largest  foreign 
aid  donor  is  good  news  for  those  of  us 
who  ai-e  interested  in  greater  contribu- 
tions from  our  allies  to  common  global 
interests.  But  we  should  also  under- 
stand that  burdensharing  means  influ- 
ence sharing. 

Political  Cooperation 
and  Complementarity 

Former  Prime  Minister  Nakasone 
marked  a  turning  point  in  Japan's  inter- 
national role  when  at  the  Williamsburg 
summit  in  1983,  he  made  clear  Japan's 
commitment  to  sharing  in  the  benefits 
and  burdens  of  Western  leadership.  To- 
day, there  is  hardly  an  area  of  the  globe 
or  a  global  issue  on  which  we  do  not 
consult  closely  and  frequently.  Japan  is 
now  defining  and  asserting  its  goals 
and  objectives  more  clearly.  Not  sur- 
prisingly, they  are  broadly  consonant 
with  those  of  other  industrial  democ- 
racies, including  the  United  States. 

There  are  a  number  of  areas  in 
which  Japan  has  acted  to  support  com- 
mon political  and  security  objectives.  In 
addition  to  having  played  a  major  role 
in  the  United  Nation's  reform  efforts, 
Japan  is  a  key  actor  in  international 
attempts  to  bring  peace  and  economic 
and  political  stability  to  a  number  of 
the  world's  trouble  spots.  For  example, 
Tokyo  has  offered  to  provide  financial 
support  for  reconstruction  following 
settlements  in  the  Iran-Iraq  war,  the 
Arab-Israeli  conflict,  and  Cambodia  as 
part  of  an  inducement  to  settlements. 
Japan  has  launched  a  new  program  for 
participation  in  international  peace- 
keeping, including  Afghanistan  and 
Angola/Namibia.  Japan  has  indicated  it 
will  be  a  major  donor  to  Afghan  relief 
effort  costs,  as  well  as  to  the  multi- 
lateral aid  initiative  now  under  consid- 
eration for  the  Philippines. 

The  trend  of  Japan's  relations  with 
U.S.  friends  and  allies  in  Asia  is  also 
favorable.  Second  only  to  U.S. -Japan 
relations,  Japan's  foreign  policy  places 
primary  importance  on  relations  with 
its  neighbors  in  East  Asia. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  1988 


Despite  the  history  of  the  Japanese 
colonial  period  and  a  contemporary 
trade  imbalance  in  Japan's  favor,  Japan's 
relations  with  South  Korea  have  im- 
proved markedly  in  recent  years.  An 
exchange  of  state  visits  in  1984  and  1985 
helped  to  ameliorate  longstanding  ten- 
sions. Prime  Minister  Takeshita's  two 
recent  trips  to  Seoul,  and  President 
Roh's  scheduled  November  visit  to 
-Japan,  signal  continuation  of  these  im- 
proved ties.  -Japan  and  South  Korea  are 
now  each  other's  second  largest  trading 
partners.  Japan  has  no  diplomatic  rela- 
tions with  North  Korea,  strongly  backs 
the  Republic  of  Korea  and  has  been 
very  supportive  of  efforts  to  relax  ten- 
sions on  the  Korean  peninsula. 

There  have  also  been  recent  im- 
provements in  -Japan's  ties  with  China. 
China  is  -Japan's  number  three  trading 
partner,  and  while  the  trade  balance  is 
in  -Japan's  favor  (exports  of  $10  billion; 
imports  of  $5.6  billion  in  1986),  China  is 
also  the  second  largest  recipient  of  Jap- 
anese foreign  assistance  (over  $550  mil- 
lion in  1987).  Prime  Minister  Takeshita's 
successful  visit  to  Beijing  in  August, 
and  a  reciprocal  visit  by  Chinese  Presi- 
dent Li  Peng  scheduled  for  next  spring, 
indicate  a  continuation  of  friendly  Sino- 
Japanese  ties. 

Japan  considers  Southeast  Asia  a 
region  of  critical  strategic  and  economic 
importance  and  has  firmly  supported 
the  ASEAN  [Association  of  South  East 
Asian  Nations]  countries.  Japan  and  the 
United  States  variously  share  number 
one  or  two  trading  partner  status  in 
Indonesia,  the  Philippines,  Thailand, 
Malaysia,  and  Singapore.  ASEAN  lead- 
ers have  called  for  increased  -Japanese 
investment  and  technology  transfer 
from  Japan,  and  Tokyo  has  responded 
by  increasing  aid  flows  and  cooperative 
technical  assistance  programs.  In  1987, 
Indonesia  became  Japan's  largest  aid 
recipient,  with  over  $700  million  in  for- 
eign assistance.  -Japan  has  also  been 
highly  supportive  of  the  Aquino  govern- 
ment, providing  the  Philippines  almost 
$820  million  in  aid  during  the  past  2 
years.  Prime  Minister  Takeshita's  first 
foreign  travel  was  to  Manila  for  the 
ASEAN  summit,  a  clear  sign  of  the 
importance  -Japan  places  on  its  ties  with 
this  regional  grouping. 

Not  surprisingly,  -Japan — like  the 
United  States — has  been  highly  sup- 
portive of  the  ASEAN  position  on 
Cambodia.  We  both  seek  a  complete 
withdrawal  of  the  Vietnamese  troops 
occupying  that  country  and  the  estab- 
lishment of  an  independent,  neutral 
Cambodia  not  dominated  bv  the  Khmer 


29 


EAST  ASIA 


Rouge.  The  Government  of  Japan  is 
supportive  of  the  ASEAN-led  sanctions 
on  commercial  transactions  with  Viet- 
nam that  would  contribute  to  economic 
development.  In  1986,  Vietnam  ranked 
78th  worldwide  as  a  recipient  of  Jap- 
anese exports,  with  a  0.1  percentage 
share.  Japanese  exports  to  Vietnam  de- 
clined in  1987  on  a  volume  basis.  On  the 
other  hand,  imports  from  Vietnam— 
largely  in  shrimp  and  crude  oil — in- 
creased 46%  in  yen  terms  in  1987. 

Friendly  countries  in  the  region 
have  accepted  a  substantial  defense- 
oriented  Japanese  military  buildup.  At 
the  same  time,  those  countries  would 
be  concerned  by  any  indication  that 
Japan  was  developing  offensive  ca- 
pabilities or  intended  to  play  a  regional 
security  role.  Japan's  immediate  neigh- 
bors and  the  ASEAN  countries  realize, 
however,  that  Japan's  defense  force  is 
designed  to  operate  jointly  with  U.S. 
forces  to  counter  the  increased  Soviet 
threat,  and  that  Japan's  defense  policy 


is  firmly  based  on  cooperation  with  our 
own  forces  under  the  U.S. -Japan  Mu- 
tual Security  Ti-eaty.  The  successful 
visit  this  year  of  Japan's  Defense 
Agency  Director  General  to  Singapore 
and  Indonesia — the  first  such  visit  in 
the  postwar  era — testifies  to  the  in- 
creasing recognition  among  Asian  coun- 
tries that  Japan's  defense  policy  poses 
no  military  threat  to  their  interests. 

Japan's  emerging  role  as  a  key 
player  in  international  finance  has 
important  and  very  positive  implica- 
tions for  the  economies  of  the  East 
Asia-Pacific  region.  Japanese  imports 
from  the  rest  of  Asia  have  grown  dra- 
matically in  recent  years.  In  1983 
Japan's  imports  from  Korea  totaled  $3.4 
billion;  last  year  they  were  $8.1  billion. 
During  the  same  period  Japan's  imports 
from  Taiwan  rose  from  $2.6  billion  to 
$7.1  billion.  Japan's  exports  to  the 
newly  industrialized  economies  also 
have  increased,  resulting  in  continued 
Japanese  surpluses  with  them.  But 
growth  of  imports  into  Japan  from 


these  economies  has  consistently  sur- 
passed the  trade  growth  in  the  opposite 
direction  in  recent  years.  The  increased 
trade  between  these  nations  represents 
an  important  part  of  the  dynamism  and 
vitality  of  the  region. 

Overall  Relations  and  Direction 

In  sum,  our  relations  with  Japan  are 
generally  excellent.  Perhaps  more 
important,  the  trends  for  our  coopera- 
tion across  the  board — economic,  de- 
fense, and  political — are  favorable.  This 
is  not  merely  a  fortuitous  development 
but  the  result  of  hard  work  on  both 
sides.  We  believe  this  cooperative  ap- 
proach has  paid  off  and  will  continue  to 
pursue  it,  with  the  goal  of  accelerating 
those  favorable  trends. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee 
and  will  be  available  from  the  Superintend- 
ent of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Print- 
ing Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Burdensharing  and  Japan 


by  William  Clark,  Jr. 

Statement  before  the  Defense  Bur- 
densharing Panel  of  the  House  Armed 
Services  Committee  on  September  27, 
1988.  Mr.  Clark  is  Deputy  Assistant 
Secretary  for  East  Asian  and  Pacific 
Affairs. i 

I  am  pleased  to  have  the  opportunity  to 
appear  before  you  and  to  comment  on 
that  portion  of  the  panel's  report  rele- 
vant to  Japan. 

I  would  like  to  preface  my  remarks 
by  noting  that  the  Department  of 
State,  like  the  Department  of  Defense, 
agrees  with  the  panel's  premise  that 
our  allies  should  share  the  risks,  roles, 
and  responsibilities  of  our  common  de- 
fense as  equitably  as  possible.  Based  on 
that  premise,  and  in  view  of  Japan's 
economic  success,  we  in  the  Bureau  of 
East  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs,  in  coop- 
eration with  our  colleagues  in  the  De- 
partment of  Defense,  began  over  10 
years  ago  to  work  toward  specific  bur- 
densharing efforts  in  the  areas  of  both 
defense  cooperation  and  host-nation 
support  for  U.S.  forces  based  in  Japan. 
We  believe  we  have  been  largely  suc- 
cessful. U.S. -Japan  defense  cooperation 
has  never  been  greater,  and  Japan's 


30 


host-nation  support — now  at  the  level  of 
$2.5  billion  annually — is  the  most  gen- 
erous in  the  world.  Moreover,  Japan 
will  likely  overtake  the  United  States 
in  the  coming  year  as  the  world's 
largest  donor  of  foreign  economic  as- 
sistance, an  area  the  panel  has  clearly 
identified  as  an  important  element  of 
burdensharing.  Our  policies  and  the 
panel's  report  are  in  agreement  that 
these  efforts  are  important,  and  Japan 
has  been  largely  responsive  to  them. 
Let  me  offer  a  few  comments  on 
the  panel's  six  interim  conclusions  and 
recommendations. 

Defense  and  Security-Related  Areas 

Items  #1  and  #2  note  the  need  for 
Japan  to  do  more  in  defense  and  other 
security-related  areas.  Neither  we  nor, 
I  believe,  the  Government  of  Japan 
would  have  difficulty  with  the  panel's 
assertion  that  Japan  should  strengthen 
its  defense  capabilities.  Indeed,  the 
panel's  position  is  a  statement  of  Jap- 
anese— and  U.S. — policy.  Japan's  mid- 
term defense  plan,  covering  the  period 
1986-90,  is  aimed  precisely  at  improv- 
ing Japan's  capabilities  to  carry  out  the 
defense  missions  which  the  report  has 
noted,  incorporating  new  and  expensive 
defense  systems  such  as  Aegis-capable 
destroyers. 


Regional  Cooperation 

Item  #3  recommends  that  the  United 
States  assist  Japan  in  fostering  greater 
political  unity  and  cooperation  among 
its  neighbors  and  encouraging  minis- 
terial conferences  and  parliamentary 
structures  like  the  Western  European 
Union. 

We  consult  closely  with  .Japan  on 
Asian  regional  issues,  as  we  do  on 
global  issues.  Japan  is  by  far  the 
largest  economic  assistance  donor  to 
Asian  countries,  where  it  seeks  to  fos- 
ter political  as  well  as  economic  sta- 
bility. Moreover,  the  Japanese  Diet  has 
an  active  exchange  program  with  the 
parliamentarians  of  the  region.  Still 
conditions  in  Asia  are  different,  and 
history  adds  to  the  difficulty  of  Japan 
playing  a  more  active  security  role. 

Host-Nation  Support 

Item  #4  concludes  that  Japan's  host- 
nation  support  for  U.S.  service  person 
nel  is  overstated  because  nonappropri- 
ated outlays,  such  as  the  land  value  of 
U.S.  bases  and  foregone  revenues,  are 
included.  Without  belaboring  this  poin 
let  me  suggest  that  the  political  and 
opportunity  costs  incurred  by  the  Gov- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  198 


EAST  ASIA 


■rnnH'iit  of  Japan  in  providing  bases  to 
.S.  forces  may  be  more  significant 
liaii  the  assigned  value  of  the  land.  In 
my  event,  Japan  continues  to  increase 
ts  contributions  to  host-nation  support. 
linuigh  plans,  for  example,  to  raise  the 
f\i'l  of  labor  cost-sharing  by  $100  mil- 
inn  a  year  through  1990. 

)ofcnse  Missions 

iiiii  #5  recommends  that  Japan  accel- 
■late  its  attainment  of  the  ability  to 
HTt'iirm  its  defense  missions.  We  agree 
hai  an  acceleration  is  desirable.  Item 
^.")  also  recommends  other  countries  in 
lu'  region  engage  in  discussions  about 
lu'ii-  regional  security.  If  this  recom- 
miidation  is  meant  to  include  Japan,  I 
viiuld  note  that  Japan's  constitution,  as 
iiti'i-jireted,  prohibits  collective  defense 
iii-aiigements.  Further,  history — not  to 
nt'iition  national  sovereignty  con- 
I'liis — inhibits  others  from  assigning 
ueh  a  role  to  Japan. 

)eveiopment  Assistance 

tcm  #6  recommends  that  Japan  in- 
icase  its  official  development  as- 
istaiice  substantially  and  target  more 
ntii'd  aid  to  countries  with  both  eco- 
oiiiic  and  strategic  importance  to 
apaii  and  the  United  States,  giving  as 
.xamples  Turkey  and  the  Philippines. 
Ve  agree;  so  does  Japan.  For  example, 
he  panel  reported  that  Japan  supplied 
\n-key  with  $71  million  in  aid  in  1986. 
n  1987  Japan  disbursed  $162.7  million 
n  aid  to  Turkey,  making  that  NATO 
lly  Japan's  ninth  largest  aid  recipient, 
'he  Philippines  is  Japan's  third  largest 
id  recipient  ($379  million  disbursed  in 
987),  and  we  expect  Japan  to  be  a  key 
larticipant  in  the  multilateral  aid  initia- 
ive  for  the  Philippines. 

'Out-of-Area"  Interests 

would  also  like  to  address  Japan's  con- 
ributions  in  what  the  panel  has  called 
out-of-area"  burdensharing:  the  re- 
•.ponsibility  of  nations  to  respond  to 
■rises  and  needs  in  regions  and  coun- 
ries  of  the  world  where  they  do  not 
lecessarily  participate  in  a  defense  al- 
iance  but  where  they  have  important 
nterests. 

The  panel  rightly  singled  out  the 

I  Persian  Gulf  as  one  such  area.  Prohib- 
ted  constitutionally  from  participating 

,|  Tiilitarily  in  overseas  operations,  Japan 
levertheless  made  other  commitments 
,0  security  in  that  region.  Specifically 


in  October  1986,  Japan  committed  $300 
million  in  foreign  economic  assistance 
to  Jordan  and  $200  million  to  Oman;  $10 
million  to  establish  a  precise  naviga- 
tional aid  system  in  the  gulf;  and  $10 
million  to  the  UN  Secretary  General's 
peacekeeping  efforts. 

That  is  one  example  of  Japan's  out- 
of-area  burdensharing  but  not  the  only. 
Less  well-known  is  Japan's  commitment 
to  fund  as  much  as  one-third  of  the 
Afghan  relief  effort  and  to  contribute 
significantly  to  peacekeeping  and  relief 
efforts  in  Angola  and  Namibia. 

Conclusion 

I  find  the  panel  report's  section  on 
Japan  to  be  very  constructive.  It  ad- 
dresses the  complexity  of  Japanese  bur- 
densharing, taking  into  account  the 
constitutional,  political,  and  diplomatic 
constraints  on  Japan's  defense  efforts 
and  makes  recommendations  wdthin 
that  context.  It  does  not,  for  example, 
recommend  vastly  increased  Japanese 
expenditures  on  defense  or  greatly  ex- 


panded defense  roles  and  missions, 
which  an  increase  of  defense  expend- 
itures of  such  magnitude  would  imply. 
The  panel  identifies  foreign  economic 
assistance  as  an  important  element  of 
burdensharing.  While  the  report's  em- 
phasis on  quantitative  factors — Japan's 
level  of  defense  spending — goes  further 
than  we  would  and  does  not  place 
enough  emphasis  on  the  importance  of 
our  presence  in  Japan  to  our  own  se- 
curity, the  recommendations  that  Japan 
should  improve  its  defense  capabilities, 
increase  its  host-nation  support  of  U.S. 
forces,  and  improve  the  quantity  and 
quality  of  its  foreign  economic  as- 
sistance are  goals  we  all  can  support. 
In  fact,  the  recommendations  of  the 
panel  in  great  part  coincide  with  pol- 
icies this  Administration  has  been 
pursuing. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee 
and  will  be  available  from  the  Superintend- 
ent of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Print- 
ing Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Situation  in  Cambodia 


by  Charles  H.  Twining 

Address  before  the  Second  Interna- 
tional Scholars  Conference  on  Cam- 
bodia on  September  29,  1988.  Mr. 
Ttrining  is  Director  of  the  Office  of  Viet- 
nam, Laos,  and  Cambodia  Affairs. 

I  appreciate  the  opportunity  to  appear 
today  before  this  conference  to  discuss 
the  situation  in  Cambodia  and  U.S.  pol- 
icy toward  that  very  unfortunate 
country. 

Vietnam's  illegal  occupation  i-e- 
mains  the  root  cause  of  the  conflict  in 
Cambodia  today,  and  the  expeditious 
withdrawal  of  all  of  the  estimated 
120,000  Vietnamese  troops  we  believe 
are  still  in  country  is  the  key  to  resolv- 
ing this  tragic  situation.  The  United 
States  has  joined  with  the  vast  major- 
ity of  the  nations  of  the  world  in  con- 
demning Vietnam's  occupation  and  has 
called  for  Hanoi  to  withdraw  its  forces 
and  to  negotiate  a  settlement  accept- 
able to  all  sides.  We  believe  that  only 
through  a  political  solution  can  the  suf- 
fering of  the  'Cambodian  people  be 
brought  to  an  end  and  regional  stability 
be  restored.  Our  goal  is  a  free  and  in- 
dependent Cambodia  that  is  not  a 
threat  to  its  neighbors. 


)epartment  of  State  Bulletin/December  1988 


A  settlement  must  permit  the 
Cambodian  people  to  determine  their 
own  futures  without  internal  or  exter- 
nal manipulation  or  intimidation.  In 
this  context,  the  United  States  is  un- 
alterably opposed  to  a  return  to  power 
of  the  Khmer  Rouge,  whose  legacy  of 
brutality  and  depravity  is  unsurpassed. 
We  are  committed  to  a  settlement  in 
Cambodia  that  contains  effective  safe- 
guards to  ensure  that  the  Khmer 
Rouge  can  never  again  take  control  in 
Cambodia  and  subject  the  Cambodian 
people  once  more  to  the  horrors  of  the 
past. 

Diplomatic  Efforts 

In  addition  to  its  impact  on  Cambodia 
and  its  people,  the  Vietnamese  invasion 
and  continuing  occupation  of  that  coun- 
try constitute  a  direct  threat  to  the  se- 
curity of  Thailand — a  long-time  friend 
and  treaty  ally  of  the  United  States — 
and  to  the  stability  of  the  entire  region. 
ASEAN  [Association  of  South  East 
Asian  Nations]  has  responded  to  this 
danger  with  vigor  and  effectiveness.  It 
has  marshaled  international  opposition 
to  Vietnam's  occupation  of  Cambodia 
and  has  fostered  the  growth  of  the 
Cambodian  noncommunist  resistance 


31 


EAST  ASIA 


into  a  viable  military  and  political  force 
in  the  struggle  for  a  free  and  independ- 
ent Cambodia. 

The  United  States  has  worked  en- 
ergetically with  ASEAN  in  seeking  to 
resolve  the  Cambodian  conflict.  We 
have  consulted  closely  and  regularly 
with  ASEAN  governments— for  in- 
stance, during  Secretary  Shultz's  visit 
to  Bangkok  in  July  for  the  ASEAN  for- 
eign ministers  meeting.  We  have  pro- 
vided strong  backing  to  ASEAN  efforts 
to  generate  and  maintain  international 
opposition  to  Vietnam's  occupation.  As 
we  have  done  every  year,  this  year 
again  at  the  UN  General  Assembly,  the 
United  States  will  unconditionally  sup- 
port the  ASEAN  resolution  on  "the  sit- 
uation in  Cambodia,"  and  we  are  urging 
our  friends  to  do  the  same. 

We  have  also  made  the  situation  in 
Cambodia  a  priority  in  our  discussions 
with  the  Soviet  Union  and  with  China, 
including  during  Secretary  Shultz's  visit 
to  Beijing  this  summer.  We  have  urged 
both  these  major  powers  to  use  their 
influence  constructively.  ASEAN  and 
our  other  friends  in  the  region  have 
come  to  rely,  with  good  reason,  on  the 
consistency  and  steadfastness  of  our 
policy  on  Cambodia. 

During  the  past  several  months, 
there  has  been  considerable  diplomatic 
activity  surrounding  the  Cambodian 
conflict,  and  some  signs  of  progress. 
The  Vietnamese  announced  in  May  that 
they  will  withdraw  .50,000  troops  from 
Cambodia  by  the  end  of  1988  and  that 
their  remaining  units  would  be  placed 
under  the  command  of  the  Phnom  Penh 
regime.  Based  on  Hanoi's  manipulation 
of  withdrawal  dates  and  announce- 
ments, we,  of  course,  remain  skeptical. 
In  particular,  we  do  not  place  any  real 
significance  on  the  putative  decision  to 
place  the  remaining  occupation  forces 
under  Phnom  Penh's  command.  Nev- 
ertheless, if  Hanoi  follows  through  on 
its  announcement,  this  would  be  an  en- 
couraging, albeit  only  partial,  step  to- 
ward the  objective  we  all  seek — the 
complete  withdrawal  of  all  Vietnamese 
troops  from  Cambodia. 

On  the  negotiating  front,  the  Jak- 
arta informal  meeting  at  the  end  of 
July  brought  together  the  four  Cambo- 
dian factions,  the  Vietnamese,  the  Lao, 
the  Indonesians,  and  other  ASEAN 
representatives.  The  meeting  did  not 
achieve  dramatic  breakthroughs,  but  it 
did  lend  additional  impetus  to  a  nego- 
tiating process  that  could  lead  to  a  set- 
tlement of  the  Cambodia  conflict. 
The  Jakarta  informal  meeting 
seemed  to  produce  a  broad  consensus 
on  two  fundamental  points: 


•  That  Vietnamese  forces  must,  in- 
deed, be  withdrawn  totally  from  Cam- 
bodia; and 

•  That  the  Khmer  Rouge  must  be 
prevented  from  regaining  control. 

These  are  the  basic  elements  of 
U.S.  policy,  and  we  will  continue  to 
lend  our  support  to  efforts  to  achieve  a 
settlement  which  could  make  these 
goals  a  reality. 

We  are  not  aware  that  there  were 
dramatic  breakthroughs  at  the  special 
talks  on  Cambodia  between  the  Soviet 
and  Chinese  vice  foreign  ministers, 
held  in  Beijing  at  the  end  of  August. 
However,  the  fact  that  these  two  major 
powers  met  to  discuss  seriously  the  sit- 
uation in  Cambodia  is  another  encoui'- 
aging  step  forward. 

The  Need  To 
Maintain  U.S.  Policy 

Despite  these  encouraging  signs,  there 
are  fundamental  uncertainties.  Even  if 
Hanoi  were  to  withdraw  50,000  sol- 
diers, this  would  still  leave  a  very  siz- 
able force  in  Cambodia — an  estimated 
70,000  troops — whose  presence  would 
preclude  genuine  national  reconcilia- 
tion. Moreover,  despite  Hanoi's  par- 
ticipation in  the  Jakarta  informal 
meeting,  it  remains  questionable 
whether  the  Vietnamese  will,  in  fact, 
take  an  active  and  direct  role  in  nego- 
tiations— for  e.xample,  by  talking  di- 
rectly with  [Cambodian  independence 
leader]  Prince  Sihanouk — and  whether 
Hanoi  is  prepared  to  talk  seriously 
about  how  to  end  the  conflict. 

We  believe,  therefore,  that  the  best 
course  for  the  United  States  is  to  main- 
tain our  present  policies.  This  means 
that  we  will  continue  to  support  Prince 
Sihanouk  and  the  Cambodian  noncom- 
munist  resistance  forces  in  their  valiant 
struggle  for  a  free  and  independent 
Cambodia.  These  forces  are  making  en- 
couraging progress  in  expanding  their 
presence  in  the  interior  of  Cambodia, 
and  we  believe  that,  because  they  con- 
stitute an  increasingly  viable  alter- 
native to  both  the  Vietnamese  and  the 
murderous  Khmer  Rouge,  they  can  and 
must  play  a  key  role  in  a  settlement, 
which  will  serve  the  best  interests  of 
the  Cambodian  people. 

We  also  intend  to  continue  our  sup- 
port for  the  international  effort  to  iso- 
late Vietnam  economically  and 
diplomatically.  We  believe  that  this 
campaign  has,  over  the  years,  helped  to 
bring  home  to  Hanoi  the  cost  of  its  ag- 
gression in  Cambodia  and  that  the  re- 
cent, although  inconclusive,  signs  of 


change  in  Vietnam's  approach  attest  to 
its  effectiveness.  It  is  our  strong  belief 
that  Hanoi  must  show  clearly — more 
clearly  than  it  has  to  date — that  it  has, 
in  fact,  made  the  fundamental  decision 
to  end  its  occupation  of  Cambodia  and 
that  it  must,  in  fact,  proceed  to  with- 
draw all  of  its  troops  from  that  country. 
Until  this  happens,  the  United  States 
must  continue  its  joint  efforts  with 
ASEAN  and  others  to  maintain  diplo- 
matic and  economic  pressure  on  Viet- 
nam. Thus,  we  must  continue  to  adhere 
to  a  policy  which  can  be  summarized  as 
"no  trade,  no  aid,  and  no  normal  rela- 
tions" with  Vietnam,  except  in  the  con- 
text of  a  political  settlement  and  the 
end  of  Vietnam's  occupation  of 
Cambodia. 

Working  Toward 
a  Settlement 

And  we  must  continue  to  work  for  a 
settlement  which  ensures  that  the  with- 
drawal of  Vietnamese  troops  will  not 
lead  to  the  return  to  power  of  the 
Khmer  Rouge.  Crafting  such  a  solution 
will  not  be  easy,  inasmuch  as  the 
Khmer  Rouge  remain  very  powerful 
militarily — a  fact  of  which  we  are  all 
aware. 

ASEAN  and  others— particularly 
Prince  Sihanouk — have,  at  various 
times,  put  forward  a  number  of  ideas 
for  controlling  the  Khmer  Rouge  which 
warrant  serious  and  urgent  considera- 
tion. These  include: 

•  The  holding  of  internationally  su- 
pervised elections — we  cannot  imagine 
that  the  Cambodian  people  would 
willingly  vote  for  the  return  of  the 
Khmer  Rouge; 

•  The  removal  of  Pol  Pot  and  othei 
senior  Khmer  Rouge  leaders  most  re- 
sponsible for  crimes  against  the  Cam- 
bodian people; 

•  The  disarming  of  all  the  factions 
under  some  form  of  monitoring; 

•  The  cutoff  of  arms  aid  from  the 
outside;  and 

•  The  dispatch  of  some  kind  of  in- 
ternational monitoring  and  peacekeep- 
ing force. 

We  believe  some  combination  of 
these  or  other  approaches  can  prove 
effective. 

In  our  discussions  with  our 
ASEAN  friends,  the  Chinese,  and  oth 
ers,  we  have  stressed  the  absolute  ne- 
cessity of  controlling  the  Khmer  Roug' 
and  the  need  to  move  now  to  address 
the  specific  ways  by  which  this  could 
clone.  This  was  a  central  theme  of  Sec 
retary  Shultz's  July  discussions  in 


0 


32 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  19&  \ 


ECONOMICS 


anpkok  and  Beijing.  We  have  noted 
utlidi-itative  statements  by  China's 
■adcrs  that  they  oppose  a  Khmer 
jiuue  return  to  power  in  Phnom  Penh, 
11(1  we  are  gratified  by  China's  recent 
illingness  to  begin  to  address  the  con- 
iric  measures  that  will  be  necessary 
1  pi'i'vent  this  from  happening. 

'lo  us,  the  situation  is  clear:  A  com- 
k'ti'  X'ietnamese  withdrawal  is  the  key 
I  liryinning  its  resolution.  Construct- 
in  a  settlement  which  will  include 
I'orkable  measures  to  prevent  a  return 
3  power  by  the  Khmer  Rouge  is  the 
ubsequent  challenge.  In  this  process, 
he  United  States  will  continue  to  sup- 
ort  Prince  Sihanouk  and  the  Cambo- 
ian  noncommunist  resistance  forces  in 
leir  efforts  to  work  toward  a  settle- 
lent.  We  view  Prince  Sihanouk  as  the 
idispensable  leader  of  any  future  coali- 
ion  government  in  Cambodia.  We  wel- 
ome  Prince  Sihanouk's  upcoming  visit 
3  Washington  next  month  and  look  for- 
ward to  his  calls  on  President  Reagan 
nd  Secretai'y  Shultz  as  opportunities 
D  discuss  the  situation  in  greater  detail. 

In  Paris  on  September  20,  Prince 
iihanouk  called  for  the  convening  of  an 
Uternational  conference  on  Cambodia, 
ife  will  be  following  this  initiative  with 
(iterest,  since  it  seems  logical  that,  at 
ome  point,  the  international  commu- 
ity  must  play  a  role  in  the  process  of 
nding  this  tragic  era  in  Cambodian 
istory.  An  international  presence  must 
■e  in  place  to  support  a  Cambodian  set- 
lement  in  order  both  to  verify  the 
"ietnamese  withdrawal  and  to  limit  the 
^hmer  Rouge  threat. 

While  there  is  an  important  role 
3r  the  international  community  to  play, 
n  acceptable  settlement  in  Cambodia 
lust,  first  and  foremost,  be  worked  out 
y  those  most  closely  involved.  We  look 
arward  to  signs  of  progress  toward  a 
'ambodia  solution,  which  may  emerge 
1  the  coming  months  from  a  number  of 
vents  and  meetings.  We  have  consider- 
ble  confidence  that  the  working  group 
stablished  by  the  Jakarta  informal 
leeting  in  July,  which  is  charged  with 
eporting  on  specific  settlement  plans 
ly  the  end  of  the  year,  will  have  some 
if  the  answers  that  the  world  is 
eeking. 

While  the  focus  of  this  Second  In- 
ernational  Scholars  Conference  on 
ambodia  is  the  Khmer  diaspora — that 
s  to  say,  the  Khmer  e.xperience 
broad — I  would  look  forward  to  a  third 
onference  focusing  on  the  i-eturn  of  the 
<hmer  to  their  country — a  free  and  in- 
lependent  Cambodia.  I  join  you  in  hop- 
ng  that  this  comes  to  pass  very 
}uickly.    B 


Overview  of  U.S.  Trade  Policy 


by  W.  Allen  Wallis 

Address  before  the  Washington 
Ti-ade  Conference  of  the  Executive 
Council  on  Foreign  Diplomats  on 
October  5,  1988.  Mr.  Wallis  is  Under 
Secretary  for  Economic  Affairs  and 
Agriculture. 

I  have  been  asked  to  give  an  overview 
of  trade  policy  as  we  see  it  in  Wash- 
ington, with  the  expectation  that  you 
will  fill  in  the  details  at  your  sessions 
tomorrow.  I  want  to  make  just  three 
basic  points:  1)  that  the  remarkable 
economic  success  of  the  U.S.  economy 
is  the  foundation  for  healthy  world 
trade,  2)  that  the  multilateral  trade  ne- 
gotiations are  going  well  as  we  prepare 
for  the  midterm  review,  and  3)  that  the 
U.S.  trade  bill  need  not  be  the  har- 
binger of  protectionism. 

U.S.  Economic  Strength 

First,  about  U.S.  economic  strength: 
We  are  in  the  final  months  of  an  Admin- 
istration that  has  fought  hard  and  suc- 
cessfully for  its  economic  principles, 
both  domestically  and  internationally. 
At  home,  we  have  reformed  the  taxes 
and  slashed  rates,  cut  interest  rates  in 
half,  subdued  inflation,  stimulated  pro- 
ductivity, and  cut  unemployment  in 
half  This  has  produced  good  results  for 
us  and  for  the  world  economy. 

Since  1982,  the  U.S.  economy  has 
created  17  million  new  jobs,  more  than 
the  EC  [European  Community]  and 
Japan  combined.  More  than  62%  of  the 
working-age  population  have  jobs,  the 
highest  rate  in  American  history.  Man- 
ufacturing productivity  has  been  rising 
more  than  4%  a  year  since  our  recovery 
began. 

Deregulation  and  other  policies 
have  provided  the  economy  with  the 
flexibility  and  incentives  to  adapt  to 
changes  in  the  international  economy. 
We  have  resisted  protectionism,  fought 
for  an  improved  GATT  [General  Agree- 
ment on  Tariffs  and  Ti'adeJ,  and  are 
turning  around  the  trade  deficit.  It's 
down,  and  exports  are  up  significantly. 
Since  the  third  quarter  of  1986,  U.S. 
merchandise  exports  have  grown  nearly 
40%  in  volume. 

In  the  past  3  years,  we  have  used  a 
wide  variety  of  innovative  tactics  to  re- 
move barriers  to  our  products,  benefit- 
ing third  country  as  well  as  U.S. 
producers  and  exporters  and  setting 


the  stage  for  a  more  open  trading  sys- 
tem worldwide;  several  examples: 

•  The  settlement  with  Japan  on 
beef  and  citrus  imports; 

•  Korea's  agreement  to  open  its 
market  to  foreign  insurance  firms; 

•  Changes  in  patent  and  copyright 
protection  in  Singapore; 

•  Compensation  from  the  EC  for 
markets  lost  when  the  EC  expanded  to 
12;  and 

•  Modifications  in  Brazil's  notorious 
informatics  policies. 

We  have  negotiated  free  trade 
agreements  with  Israel  and  Canada, 
and  we  have  a  framework  arrangement 
with  Mexico  which  has  resulted  in  in- 
tensified dialogue  on  trade  issues.  All 
our  bilateral  pacts  are  consistent  with 
the  GATT  and  may  be  useful  models  for 
dealing  with  issues  in  the  Uruguay 
Round. 

Where  GATT  mechanisms  are 
available,  we  have  used  them,  thereby 
contributing  new  vitality  to  that  in- 
stitution. In  a  number  of  instances, 
with  our  participation,  GATT  panels 
have  come  to  clear  conclusions  on  trade 
issues. 

What  will  the  future  hold?  The 
1990s  can  be  a  time  to  expand  the  disci- 
pline of  the  free  market  in  international 
trade  and  extend  the  benefits  of  effi- 
cient competition  to  the  entire  trading 
community.  To  achieve  a  freer  trading 
system,  however,  it  will  be  essential  for 
the  United  States  and  its  trading  part- 
ners to  take  an  assertive  stance  on 
open  markets.  It  is  heartening  to  see 
free  market-oriented  policies  adopted 
elsewhere,  in  East  Asia,  in  Africa,  in 
the  Middle  East,  and  in  this  hemi- 
sphere. Even  in  China  and  the  Soviet 
Union,  reforms  hold  the  potential  for 
more  efficient  and  adaptable  economies, 
perhaps  tied  more  closely  to  the  inter- 
national trading  system. 

Multilateral  Trade  Negotiations 

So  much  for  the  strength  of  the  U.S. 
economy.  I  will  turn  now  to  multilateral 
trade  negotiations.  The  ascendancy  of 
free  market  forces  bodes  well  for  the 
General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Ti-ade.  In  September  1986,  trade  min- 
isters from  92  countries  gathered 
at  Punta  del  Este,  Uruguay,  to 
launch  a  new  round  of  global  trade 
talks.  Pursuing  GATT's  original  goals  of 


33 


ECONOMICS 


open  markets  and  free  ti'ade,  the  cur- 
rent round  has  enormous  potential  for 
what  President  Reagan  hopes  we  can 
call  the  "Roaring  Nineties." 

We  have  an  opportunity  through 
the  Ui'uguay  Round  of  trade  negotia- 
tions to  strengthen  GATT  rules  for  the 
benefit  of  the  entire  trading  commu- 
nity. Success  of  the  Uruguay  Round  is 
essential  to  the  economic  prosperity  of 
the  world.  Without  a  renewed  GATT, 
international  trade  in  goods,  and  trade 
in  the  so-called  new  areas — such  as 
services,  investment,  and  intellectual 
property  rights — will  be  stifled  and 
eventually  stagnate.  This  must  not  be 
allowed  to  happen. 

The  outcome  of  the  midterm  review 
this  December  in  Montreal  will  influ- 
ence public  attitudes  on  the  viability  of 
the  GATT  system  and  the  virtues  of  a 
liberal  world  trading  regime. 

At  Montreal,  the  United  States 
will  work  for  a  framework  in  key  areas 
to  assist  the  ongoing  negotiations.  We 
believe  that  the  midterm  review  should 
develop  approaches  to  deal  with  several 
specific  areas  of  negotiations,  including: 

•  Improvements  in  market  access; 

•  Strengthening  GATT  rules  and 
decisionmaking;  and 

•  Disciplines  covering  basic  i-efornis 
in  agriculture — trading  policies  and 
practices  related  to  services,  intellec- 
tual property,  and  investment. 

In  some  areas — for  example,  dis- 
pute settlement  and  surveillance  over 
members'  practices — we  may  well  have 
agreements  at  the  midterm  review.  In 
most  areas,  however,  a  broad  frame- 
work agreement  on  fundamental  princi- 
ples will  be  an  appropriate  midpoint 
accomplishment. 

Pull  participation  in  the  GATT  by 
underdeveloped  countries  is  essential 
for  a  successful  outcome  of  this  nego- 
tiating round,  and  our  negotiators  have 
developed  some  proposals  of  special  in- 
terest to  them  as  well. 

We  know  that  some  areas  will  be 
harder  than  others.  Our  agriculture 
proposal  is  still  resisted  by  the  Euro- 
pean Community,  making  the  outcome 
uncertain.  Nevertheless,  momentum  is 
building.  We  are  well  ahead  of  the  pace 
of  earlier  rounds. 

1988  Trade  Act 

Finally,  I  will  touch  briefly  on  our  new- 
trade  bill,  known  officially  as  the  Omni- 
bus Trade  and  Competitiveness  Act  of 
1988.  P'ortunately,  the  act  as  passed  is 


34 


an  improvement  over  earlier,  more  pro- 
tectionist, versions.  While  generaliza- 
tions are  hard  to  make  about  such  a 
massive  bill,  it  is  generally  consistent 
with  traditional  U.S.  trade  policy.  It 
renews  the  U.S.  commitment  to  the 
multilateral  trading  system.  Contrary 
to  the  impressions  of  some,  particularly 
abroad,  the  bill  does  not  erect  new 
trade  barriers;  instead,  it  focuses  on 
opening  foreign  markets. 

To  be  sure,  a  number  of  objection- 
able provisions  remain  in  the  final  ver- 
sion. The  President  said  when  he 
signed  the  bill  that:  "There  are  some 
things  in  this  bill  I  don't  like."  How- 
ever, the  centerpiece  of  this  legislation 
provides  for  negotiating  authority  that 
will  facilitate  trade  agreements. 

That  authority,  often  called  the 
"fast  track"  for  trade  agreements,  does 
not  guarantee  that  the  Congress  will 
approve  and  implement  any  agreements 
that  the  President  may  negotiate,  but  it 
does  ensure  that  Congress  will  review- 
such  agreements  expeditiously  and 
without  amendments — two  critically 
important  provisions. 

The  impact  of  most  provisions  of 
the  trade  bill  will  depend  upon  how 
they  are  applied,  hence  upon  the  out- 
come of  the  election  next  month.  If  it  is 
prudently  applied,  the  act  can  open 
markets  and  liberalize  trade,  rather 
than  protect  inefficient  businesses  or 
close  American  markets. 

Conclusion 

As  we  survey  the  trade  policy  horizon, 
thei-efore,  we  can  take  heart.  The  con- 
tinuing health  and  vitality  of  the  U.S. 
economy  is  a  constant  reminder  and  ex- 
ample of  the  benefits  of  free  markets 
and  liberalization.  Internationally,  the 
multilateral  trade  negotiations  are  well 
underway,  with  a  major  deal-making 
conference  just  ahead.  And  here  in  the 
United  States,  we  have  survived  the 
bruising  processes  of  a  new  trade  bill 
without  too  much  permanent  damage. 
What  lies  ahead  in  trade  will  depend  on 
what  the  major  interested  parties,  in- 
cluding the  business  communities  in  the 
United  States  and  abroad,  see  as  in 
their  long-term  interests. 

The  best  insurance  against  the 
constant  specter  of  resurgent  pro- 
tectionism in  the  United  States,  in 
Europe,  and  elsewhere  would  be  the 
successful  conclusion  of  the  Uruguay 
Round  and  the  continued  liberalization 
of  trade  and  investment.  We  all  have  a 
stake  in  free  markets  to  maximize  eco- 
nomic growth  and  disseminate  its  bene- 
fits to  all  of  our  people.  ■ 


Economic  Summits 
1981-88 

Background 

The  Toronto  summit  of  June  19-21, 
1988,  was  the  14th  annual  economic 
summit  of  the  seven  Western  industri- 
alized nations.  Heads  of  government 
and  foreign  and  economic  ministers  at- 
tend and  the  Eui'opean  Community  also 
sends  representatives.  In  the  first  cycle 
of  seven  summits  (1975-81),  the  leaders 
grappled  with  crises  of  inflation  and  re- 
cession; in  the  second  cycle  (1982-88), 
the  focus  was  on  growth  and  coordina- 
tion. In  the  1980s,  all  the  summit  coun- 
tries moderated  inflation,  opened  up  to 
market  forces,  and  reduced  regulation. 
The  result  was  sustained  economic 
growth  with  low  inflation. 

Ottawa  1981 

President  Reagan  outlined  U.S.  policy 
to  promote  sustainable,  market-ori- 
ented, noninflationary  growth  by  reduc- 
ing government  spending,  changing  tax 
codes  to  promote  savings  and  invest- 
ment, and  targeting  stable  and  moder- 
ate money  growth.  He  also  called 
attention  to  the  need  to  reassess  East- 
West  economic  relations  and  to  the  po- 
tential for  erosion  of  Western  security 
resulting  from  excessive  dependence  on 
Soviet  energy  resources. 


Versailles  1982 

The  participants  accepted  joint  respon- 
sibility to  work  for  global  monetary  sta 
bility  and  emphasized  that  this  requirec 
convergent  policies  to  achieve  lower  in- 
flation and  renewed  growth.  They  com- 
mitted themselves  to  stronger  support 
for  the  International  Monetary  Fund 
(IMF)  surveillance  process.  They  also 
highlighted  the  need  for  consensus  on 
East-West  economic  relations. 


Williamsburg  1983 

Members  committed  themselves  to  im- 
plementing a  joint  strategy  for  manag- 
ing international  debt  problems  and 
further  strengthened  their  commitmen 
to  economic  cooperation  and  the  IMF 
surveillance  process.  They  agreed  to 
closer  consultation  on  exchange  markei 
issues  and  called  for  consultations  on  a 
new  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Ti-ade  (GATT)  trade  round.  They  issue 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  198  k 


ECONOMICS 


1  plan  for  arms  control  that  for  the  first 
iiiic  tied  Japan  firmly  to  the  'Western 
illiaiK-e  and  stressed  that  the  security 
)t'  our  countries  is  indivisible. 

I.ondon  1984 

riie  summit  strongly  endorsed  the  com- 
iiitment  to  sustainable  growth  and  pru- 
lent  monetary  policies  first  advocated 
It  Ottawa  by  President  Reagan.  Partic- 
ilar  emphasis  was  given  to  the  need  to 
educe  obstacles  to  job  creation.  Strong 
upport  was  expressed  for  the  World 
Bank's  special  action  program  for  Af- 
ica.  The  leaders  also  broadened  con- 
;ensus  on  East-West  economic  relations 
,nd  solved  the  Soviet  pipeline  dispute, 
)roduced  a  strong  declaration  on  inter- 
lational  terrorism  and  democratic  val- 
les,  supported  a  U.S.  proposal  for 
enewed  talks  on  nuclear  arms  control, 
md  called  for  an  Iran-Iraq  cease-fire. 

Sonn  1983 

The  summit  agreed  to  pursue  policies 
or  sustained  growth  and  higher  em- 
i)loyment;  each  country  indicated  spe- 
tific  priorities  for  its  own  national 
Dolicies.  The  leaders  gave  impetus  to 
ireparations  for  a  new  trade  round  and 
indertook  to  make  the  world  monetary 
ystem  more  stable  and  effective.  They 
lighlighted  structural  adjustment,  elab- 
orated on  international  debt  and  devel- 
ijiment  strategies  outlined  at  Williams- 
lurg  and  London,  and  welcomed  estab- 
i.'^hment  of  the  World  Bank's  special 
acility  for  Africa.  They  supported  U.S. 
iiisitions  in  arms  talks,  particularly  in 
he  intermediate-range  nuclear  forces 
u'UDtiations.  On  narcotics,  they  ap- 
iriivfd  the  convening  of  an  experts 
1-1  lup  to  make  program  and  policy 
ecommendations. 


Tokyo  1986 

Members  agreed  to  assess  the  consist- 
ency and  compatibility  of  their  eco- 
nomic policies  based  on  economic 
indicators  and  then  to  deal  with  the 
problems  in  a  coordinated  medium-term 
context.  To  do  this,  they  formed  the 
"Group  of  Seven"  finance  ministers. 
They  decided  to  launch  the  new  trade 
round  and  to  include  services,  intellec- 
tual property,  and  investment.  For  the 
first  time,  agriculture  was  on  the 
agenda  and  the  leaders  agreed  to  coop- 
ei'ate  in  redirecting  policies  of  sub- 
sidization and  protection.  They 
endorsed  the  case-by-case  approach  to 
debt  problems  outlined  by  the  United 
States  in  the  fall  of  1985,  as  well  as  an 
eighth  International  Development  Asso- 
ciation replenishment.  They  called  for 
an  international  convention  on  nuclear 
accidents  and  issued  a  strong  statement 
against  countries  that  sponsor  or  sup- 
port international  terrorism,  naming 
Libya  in  this  context.  They  stressed 
shared  democratic  values  and  a  common 
approach  to  the  Soviet  Union  and  East- 
ern Europe.  They  adopted  the  report  of 
the  narcotics  experts  group  and  urged 
its  implementation. 

Venice  1987 

The  summit  partners  outlined  strat- 
egies for  reducing  global  imbalances, 
emphasizing  the  need  for  an  appropri- 
ate pattern  of  growth  in  the  industrial 
countries  and  the  shared  responsibility 
of  the  newly  industrialized  economies  in 
preserving  free  world  trade.  They  en- 
dorsed structural  policies  to  promote 
employment  and  agreed  on  firm  pursuit 
of  the  GATT  trade  round  talks  begun  in 
Uruguay  with  the  objective  of  progres- 
sive, concerted  reduction  of  agricultural 
supports.  They  reconfirmed  their  debt 
strategy  for  middle-income  debtors  and 
endorsed  a  "menu"  approach  of  alter- 
native financing  techniques  in  debtor 


countries.  Creditors  of  the  poorest  de- 
veloping countries  were  urged  to  ease 
debt  burdens  through  favorable  re- 
scheduling terms.  The  leaders  put  for- 
ward a  comprehensive  approach  to 
arms  conti'ol,  made  a  strong  statement 
on  the  Iran-Iraq  war  and  the  Persian 
Gulf,  and  adopted  a  measure  to  provide 
sanctions  against  states  that  failed  to 
honor  their  "extradite  or  prosecute"  ob- 
ligation in  cases  of  civil  aviation 
sabotage. 

Toronto  1988 

At  an  informal  session,  the  other  part- 
ners agreed  with  President  Reagan 
that  flexibility  and  openness  were  vital 
if  growth  is  to  continue,  and  they  all 
emphasized  the  importance  of  educa- 
tion. In  plenary  sessions,  they  re- 
affirmed the  value  of  economic  policy 
coordination  and  directed  that  struc- 
tural reform  be  included  in  the  policy 
coordination  process.  They  stressed  the 
need  for  progress  in  the  GATT  midterm 
review  and  the  urgency  of  talks  on  agri- 
culture. On  debt,  the  leaders  welcomed 
steady  progress  with  middle-income 
debtors  but  endorsed  more  flexible  re- 
scheduling options  for  the  poorest. 
They  encouraged  ratification  of  the 
Montreal  pi'otocol  on  depletion  of  the 
ozone  layer  and  international  coopera- 
tion on  global  climate  change.  They  set 
forth  their  common  goals  and  approach 
to  East-West  relations.  They  supported 
new  steps  against  terrorism,  including 
a  policy  of  no  takeoffs  for  hijacked  air- 
craft once  they  have  landed.  They  en- 
dorsed the  formation  of  a  task  force  to 
make  recommendations  on  cooperation 
against  narcotics  trafficking  and  money 
laundering. 


Taken  from  the  GIST  series  of  September 
1988,  pubHshed  by  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  Department  of  State.  Editor; 
Harriet  Cullev.  ■ 


JDepartment  of  State  Bulletin/December  1988 


35 


EUROPE 


Visit  of  Hungarian  Premier 


with  the  best  wishes  of  the  people  of 
America. 


Premier  Karoly  Grosz  of  the  Hun- 
garian Peopfe'f:  Rrpiihllc  made  an  offi- 
cial working  nsit  t<i  Washnigton,  D.C., 
Juhj  26-28,  I'.is.s,  t,,  Hint  icitli  Presi- 
dent Reagan  and  other  government 
officials. 

Following  are  irniarks  made  by 
President  Reagan  and  Premier  Grosz 
after  their  meeting  uii  Jiilg  J/.' 

President  Reagan 

Your  visit  has  been  an  important  suc- 
cess. It  marks  a  historic  stage  in  U.S.- 
Hungarian relations  which  began  with 
the  return  of  the  Crown  of  St.  Stephen 
10  years  ago.  In  your  meetings  with 
U.S.  Government  leaders,  with  leaders 
of  both  parties,  and  with  business  rep- 
resentatives, journalists,  and  others, 
you've  exchanged  views  on  a  broad 
range  of  topics;  and  we've  been  im- 
pressed with  your  openness  to  new 
ideas.  We're  encouraged  by  your  recog- 
nition that  economic  reforms  cannot 
succeed  unless  they  are  accompanied  by 
political  reforms  as  well.  And  this 
lesson  has  been  demonstrated  many 
times  in  the  recent  history  of  Eastern 
and  central  Europe.  We  know  that 
Hungary  faces  difficult  economic  and 
political  choices.  The  decisions  that  you 


and  your  government  will  have  to  make 
and  implement  in  the  coming  months 
will  set  the  direction  of  Hungary's  de- 
velopment over  the  next  decade. 

We  Americans  regard  Hungarians 
as  a  people  of  great  talent,  a  people 
who  have  contributed  significantly  to 
America's  own  development.  We  know 
that  in  Hungary  itself  the  Hungarian 
people  can  better  their  society  and 
their  economy  if  the  greater  freedoms 
and  reforms  now  being  discussed  are 
steadfastly  implemented. 

From  our  talks,  I  believe  that 
you're  intent  on  providing  the  kind  of 
leadership  that  will  give  scope  to  the 
energy,  ingenuity,  and  vision  that  Hun- 
garians possess  in  such  abundance.  I 
hope  you'll  take  with  you  some  new 
ideas  about  America.  I  hope  you'll  re- 
member what  you've  seen  here  about 
the  strength  to  be  found  in  a  society 
that  is  free,  in  a  society  committed  to 
upholding  fundamental  human  rights 
and  open  to  diverse  opinion  and  talent. 

You  take  with  you  our  best  wishes 
for  success.  We  will  be  watching  devel- 
opments in  Hungary  closely  and  hope 
to  continue  working  together  for  the 
further  development  of  good  relations 
between  our  two  countries.  Know  that 
you  return  to  the  people  of  Hungary 


Premier  Grosz- 

I  thank  you  for  your  kind  words  honor- 
ing me  and  for  the  meaningful  discus- 
sions we  have  just  concluded.  I  wish  to 
express  my  thanks  for  the  invitation  of 
the  U.S.  Government  and  the  program 
which  has  provided  it  with  richness  in 
both  work  and  impressions.  I  had  great 
expectations  as  I  had  set  foot  on  U.S. 
soil  more  than  40  years  after  the  last 
Hungarian  Prime  Minister  in  office. 
Now,  as  I  approach  the  end  of  the  trip, 
I  can  tell  you  that  I  consider  it  to  be 
useful  and  successful  and  promising  for 
the  expansion  of  the  relations  between 
our  countries  and  our  nations. 

I  was  pleased  to  take  this  oppor- 
tunity offered  by  a  personal  meeting  to 
convey  the  high  regard  of  the  Hun- 
garian people  to  you,  Mr.  President,  for 
the  results  of  historical  proportions 
which  you  and  General  Secretai'y  Gor- 
bachev have  achieved  together  in  the 
area  of  disarmament.  The  improvement 
of  Soviet-American  relations  and  the  in- 
ternational climate  helps  the  small 
countries  in  these  areas.  The  Govern- 
ment of  the  Hungarian  People's  Re- 
public will  do  everything  in  its  power  t( 
become  part  of  the  effort  which  the  twc 
of  you  represent. 

Hungary  has  to  face  enormous 
tasks  today.  It  will  reorganize  its  econ- 
omy. This  can  only  be  done,  we  are 
aware,  if  the  citizens  will  enjoy  more 
rights,  more  freedoms.  Therefore,  we 
are  modernizing  our  political  system 
and  our  political  practice.  In  this  effort 
we  are  counting  on  all  our  partners — 
the  leaders,  the  statesmen,  in  fact,  the 
people  who  wish  us  well. 

I  was  very  pleased  to  have  had  the 
opportunity  to  meet  in  your  beautiful 
country  Americans  who  have  once  com 
from  Hungary.  It  was  so  pleasing  to 
see  the  close  contacts  and  feelings  to- 
ward Hungary  while  they  are  very 
useful  and  able  citizens  of  yours.  We 
will  continue  to  make  these  rela- 
tionships even  more  free,  even  more 
happy. 

i  wish  the  people  of  the  United 
States  much  success,  happiness,  and 
good  health  to  your  President;  and  I  a 
very  grateful  for  making  possible  the 
marvelous  experience  of  my  visit  in  th 
country.  I  am  confident  that  we  have  < 
become  richer  through  it. 


'Te.xt  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Aug.  1,  1988. 

-Premier  Grosz  spoke  in  Hungarian, 
and  his  remarks  were  translated  by  an  in 
terpreter.  ■ 


36 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  19l| 


FOOD 


}9th  Report  on  Cyprus 


IKSSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS. 

•CT.  ;5,  1988' 

I  :ico)rdaiiee  with  Public  Law  95-384,  I 
III  transmitting  to  you  this  bimonthly  re- 
ii '  nil  progress  toward  a  negotiated  set- 
.  im  nt  of  the  Cyprus  question. 

I  In  August  24,  1988.  Turkish  Cypriot 
miinutiity  leader  Denktash  and  Cypriot 
resident  Vassiliou  met  for  the  first  time, 
he  meetings  were  hosted  by  UN  Secre- 
iry  General  Perez  de  Cuellar  in  Geneva 
id,  as  noted  in  an  official  UN  statement, 
le  leaders  of  the  two  sides  had  an  oppor- 
inity  "to  become  acquainted  and  to  e.x- 
lange  views  on  the  Cyprus  problem." 

The  statement  also  noted  that  the  two 
aders  "e.xpressed  their  readiness  to  seek 
negotiated  solution  through  the  efforts  of 
le  Seci'etary  General.  They  acknowledged 
lat  this  would  require  a  determined  and 
istained  effort  by  both  sides,  as  well  as 
le  creation  of  an  atmosphere  of  mutual 
)nfidence.  They  recognized  the  need  to 
low  respect  for  each  other's  concerns  and 
1  discuss  with  good  will  how  these  con- 
!rns  could  be  met.  The  two  leaders  e.\- 
•essed  their  willingness  to  meet  without 
ly  preconditions  and  to  attempt  to 
•hieve  by  1  June  1989  a  negotiated 
■ttlement  of  all  aspects  of  the  Cyprus 
•oblem." 

As  agreed  at  Geneva,  talks  between 
le  two  sides  are  continuing  in  Nicosia, 
ith  further  meetings  held  September  1.5, 
i,  21,  and  continuing  into  the  week  of  Sep- 
•mber  26.  There  will  be  another  meeting 
late  October  with  the  Secretary  General 
New  York  to  review  progress. 

We  have  been  actively  encouraging  re- 
imption  of  a  meaningful  negotiating  proc- 
is.  Shortly  before  the  August  24th  talks, 
sent  a  message  to  the  Secretary  General 
)mmending  his  persistent  and  patient  en- 
dgement  over  many  years  in  the  effort  to 
isist  the  parties  to  achieve  peace.  I  also 
■ansmitted  oral  messages  to  both  leaders 
ith  my  best  wishes  for  their  attempt  to 
■ach  a  lasting,  mutually  acceptable  solu- 
on  of  the  Cyprus  problem.  As  I  noted  in 
le  letter  to  the  Secretary  General,  the 
nited  States  will  continue  to  support 
;rongly  the  effort  to  achieve  a  settlement 
'  this  tragic  conflict. 

On  August  1,  I  met  with  President 
assiliou  in  Washington  and  discussed  our 
lutual  hopes  for  resolution  of  the  Cyprus 
roblem  as  well  as  the  e.xcellent  state  of 
ur  bilateral  relations.  I  reiterated  my 
:rong  confidence  in  the  UN  Secretary 
"  eneral  and  was  pleased  to  hear  him  echo 
lat  thought  and  to  express  his  sensitivity 
J  the  needs  and  concerns  of  the  Turkish 
iypriot  community.  In  the  course  of  his 
isit,  he  also  met  with  the  Vice  President, 
He  Secretary  of  State,  the  Secretary  of 
'ommerce,  the  U.S.  Trade  Represent- 
tive,  and  other  high-ranking  officials,  pri- 
ate  individuals,  and  groups. 


We  have  continued  frequent  consulta- 
tions with  the  two  parties,  the  UN,  and 
other  interested  countries  and  individuals 
during  the  past  2  months.  In  August,  the 
UN  Secretary  General's  Special  Represent- 
ative for  Cyprus,  Oscar  Camilion,  visited 
Washington  and  met  with  Assistant  Secre- 
tary of  State  Ridgway,  Assistant  Secretary 
of  State  Williamson,  and  the  Special 
Cyprus  Coordinator.  Special  Cyprus  Coor- 
dinator Wilkinson  also  visited  Cyprus  in 
mid-July  and  met  with  the  leadei-s  of  both 
sides  and  numerous  other  interlocutors.  In 


World  Food  Day,  1988 


PROCLAMATION  5873, 
SEPT.  28,  19881 

On  World  Food  Day,  the  United  States 
joins  150  other  nations  in  reaffirming  our 
determination  to  end  world  hunger.  We 
Americans  are  a  generous  people,  and  we 
are  blessed  with  the  liberty  and  the  boun- 
tiful natural  resources  that  make  pros- 
perity and  opportunity  possible.  Through 
private  and  public  efforts,  we  gladly  share 
our  abundance  in  the  fight  against  hunger; 
we  have  done  so  more  generously  than  all 
other  countries  combined.  This  year,  we 
are  sending  about  $1.4  billion  in  food  com- 
modities abroad  to  help  the  hungry. 

Some  estimates  suggest  that  one-third 
of  the  people  of  the  developing  nations  lack 
enough  food  to  lead  active  working  lives. 
That  must  change.  Clearly,  more  needs  to 
be  done.  Permanent  progress  in  this  re- 
gard will  not  be  achieved,  however,  unless, 
along  with  remedial  assistance,  needy  na- 
tions receive  a  transfusion  of  incentive-  and 
market-based  ideas.  The  tide  of  freedom 
and  democracy  now  sweeping  the  globe  of- 
fers the  greatest  long-term  promise  for 
success  in  the  fight  against  hunger  and 
economic  stagnation. 

Finding  a  lasting  solution  to  world 
hunger  requires  agricultural  and  trade  pol- 
icies with  one  irreplaceable  ingredient: 
freedom.  Freedom  alone  can  build  eco- 
nomic progress,  cooperation,  and  stability 
for  nations  at  every  level  of  development. 
We  need  to  move  toward  a  time  when  gov- 
ernment intervention  no  longer  distorts  in- 
dividuals' production  and  trade  decisions. 
We  also  need  thriving  international  mar- 
kets to  which  all  farmers  have  broad 


all  of  these  meetings,  we  reiterated  our 
strong  commitment  to  assisting  in  the 
search  for  a  peaceful  settlement  to  the 
Cyprus  problem. 
Sincerely, 

Ronald  Reagan 


'Identical  letters  addressed  to  Jim 
Wright,  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Represent- 
atives, and  Claiborne  Pell,  chairman  of  the 
Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee,  (text 
from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents 'of  Oct.  10,  1988).  ■ 


That  is  something  for  all  of  us  to  re- 
member this  year  especially,  when  World 
Food  Day  focuses  on  rural  youth.  These 
young  people  often  migrate  to  the  cities. 
We  must  develop  policies  that  will  encour- 
age and  enable  them  to  remain  in  their 
agricultural  and  rural  communities  and  im- 
prove their  families'  food  productivity  and 
income.  Stabilization  of  developing  coun- 
tries' agricultural  base  accompanied  by 
structural  reforms  to  increase  farmers' 
earnings  are  crucial  steps  in  the  drive  to 
conquer  hunger  worldwide. 

This  October  16  marks  the  eighth  suc- 
cessive year  in  which  people  everywhere 
have  observed  World  Food  Day.  It  is  a  day 
on  which  all  Americans  can  resolve  once 
again  to  wage  and  win  the  battle  against 
world  hunger. 

In  recognition  of  the  desire  and  com- 
mitment of  the  American  people  to  end 
world  hunger,  the  Congress,  by  Senate 
Joint  Resolution  336,  has  designated  Oc- 
tober 16,  1988,  as  "World  Food  Day"  and 
authorized  and  requested  the  President  to 
issue  a  proclamation  in  observance  of  that 
day. 

Now,  Therefore,  I  Ronald  Reagan, 
President  of  the  United  States  of  America, 
do  hereby  proclaim  October  16,  1988,  as 
World  Food  Day.  I  call  upon  the  people  of 
the  United  States  to  observe  this  day  with 
appropriate  activities  to  find  and  imple- 
ment ways  in  which  our  Nation  can  better 
combat  world  hunger. 

In  Witness  Whereof,  I  have  here- 
unto set  my  hand  this  twenty-eighth  day  of 
September,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord  nine- 
teen hundred  and  eighty-eight,  and  of  the 
Independence  of  the  United  States  of 
America  the  two  hundred  and  thirteenth. 

Ronald  Reagan 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Oct.  3,  1988. 


37 


GENERAL 


Diplomacy  in  an  Election  Year  and  Beyond 


by  Max  M.  Kampelman 

Address  before  the  Georgetoivn 
University  School  of  Foreign  Service  on 
the  occasion  of  receiving  the  Jit  Trainer 
Award  on  October  7,  1988.  Ambassador 
Kampelman  is  Counselor  of  the  De- 
partmant  of  State. 

This  occasion,  in  this  forum,  before  this 
audience  of  students,  teachers,  and  pro- 
fessional practitioners  of  diplomacy,  is 
appropriate  for  some  personal  retro- 
spection and  analysis.  Within  a  few- 
short  months,  I  will  be  leaving  the 
State  Department  with  its  different  and 
exciting  challenges  that  have  enriched 
my  life.  In  this  election  year,  as  a  tradi- 
tional Democrat  serving  in  a  Repub- 
lican Administration,  I  see  the  need  to 
stand  back  and  evaluate  our  country's 
evolving  role  as  a  responsible  member 
of  an  international  community  in  a 
world  that  is  changing  so  fast  and  so 
dramatically  that  we  can  barely  see  its 
details,  let  alone  its  scope. 

The  pace  of  change  in  this  century 
is  greater  than  in  all  of  mankind's  pre- 
vious history  put  together.  And  newer 
scientific  and  technological  develop- 
ments on  the  horizon  will  probably 
make  all  previous  discoveries  dwarf  by 
comparison.  During  my  lifetime,  medi- 
cal knowledge  available  to  physicians 
has  increased  more  than  tenfold.  The 
average  lifespan  is  now  nearly  twice  as 
great  as  it  was  when  my  grandparents 
were  born.  The  average  world  standard 
of  living  has,  by  one  estimate,  quad- 
rupled in  the  past  century.  More  than 
80%  of  all  scientists  who  ever  lived  are 
alive  today.  New  computers,  new  mate- 
rials, new  biotechnological  processes 
are  altering  every  phase  of  our  lives, 
deaths,  even  reproduction.  World  com- 
munications are  now  instantaneous,  and 
transportation  is  not  far  behind. 

These  developments  are  stretching 
our  minds  to  the  outermost  dimensions 
of  our  capacity  to  understand  them. 
Moreover,  as  we  look  ahead,  we  must 
agree  that  we  have  only  the  minutest 
glimpse  of  what  our  universe  really  is. 
Indeed,  "Our  science  is  a  drop,  our 
ignorance  a  sea." 


The  Challenge  of  Peace 

Much  has  been  said,  and  much  more 
must  be  said,  about  the  significance  of 
those  awesome  changes.  But  today  I 
would  like  to  address  this  question  in 
the  context  of  "peace,"  understandably 
considered  to  be  the  ultimate  objective 
of  diplomacy.  It  is  a  goal  easy  enough 
to  state  but  difficult  to  attain  or  even 
define.  Men  and  women  seem  capable 
of  mobilizing  their  talents  to  unravel 
the  mysteries  of  their  physical  environ- 
ment. We  have  learned  to  fly  through 
space  like  birds  and  move  in  deep  wa- 
ters like  fish.  But  how  to  live  and  love 
on  this  small  planet  as  brothers  and 
sisters  still  eludes  us.  In  every  age, 
that  has  been  the  essence  of  the  chal- 
lenge. It  is  the  primary  challenge  fac- 
ing the  next  president — and  he  builds 
on  an  extraordinary  beginning  by  Pres- 
ident Reagan. 

We  are  brought  up  to  believe  that 
necessity  is  the  mother  of  invention. 
I  suggest  the  corollary  is  also  true: 
Invention  is  the  mother  of  necessity. 
Technology  and  communication  have 
made  the  world  smaller.  There  is  no 
escaping  the  fact  that  the  sound  of  a 
whisper  or  a  whimper  in  one  part  of 
the  world  can  immediately  be  heard  in 
all  parts  of  the  world.  And  yet,  the 
world  body  politic  is  not  keeping  pace 
with  those  realities.  What  we  have, 
instead,  been  observing  is  an  intense 
fractionalization,  as  large  numbers  of 
peoples  have  had  their  emotions  in- 
flamed by  nationality  and  religious  ap- 
peals. It  is  as  if  a  part  of  us  is  saying: 
"Not  so  fast.  We  are  not  ready.  Our 
religious  and  communal  culture  has  not 
prepared  us  for  this  new  world  we  are 
being  dragged  into.  We  resist  the  pres- 
sures by  holding  on  tight  to  the  famil- 
iar, the  traditional:  and  we  will  do  so 
with  a  determined  frenzy." 

But  the  inevitable  tomorrow  is  ap- 
pearing. There  are  new  sounds,  and 
among  those  most  clearly  and  loudly 
heard  are  the  sounds  of  freedom  and 
democracy.  The  striving  for  human  dig- 
nity is  universal  because  it  is  an  inte- 
gral part  of  our  human  character.  We 
see  it  in  Burma,  Pakistan,  Korea,  the 
Philippines,  South  Africa,  Chile,  Po- 
land. A  larger  part  of  the  world's  pop- 
ulation is,  today,  living  in  relative  free- 
dom than  ever  before  in  the  history  of 
the  world.  Even  in  Latin  America — a 


region  of  the  world  we  grew  up  believ- 
ing to  be  governed  by  military  dic- 
tatorships and  tyrannies — more  than 
90%  of  the  people  today  live,  though 
still  precariously,  in  democracies  or 
near  democracies. 

There  is,  alongside  the  cry  for 
freedom,  also  the  clamoring  sound  for 
peace.  Peace  is  the  indispensable  ingre 
dient  for  the  evolution  of  man  from  the 
species  Homo  sapiens  to  the  species 
"human  being."  But  what  does  it  mean 
There  is  the  peace  of  the  grave;  the 
peace  that  reigns  in  a  well-disciplined 
prison  or  gulag:  the  peace  that  may 
plant,  with  its  terms,  the  seeds  of  a 
future  war.  Certainly,  those  are  not 
what  our  dreamers  and  philosophers 
have  yearned  for. 

The  Moral  Dimension 
of  Foreign  Policy 

The  discussion  of  war  since  the  begin 
ning  of  time  has  been  surrounded  by 
ethical  considerations.  Theologians 
have  long  debated  the  "just  war."  Frc 
Thucydides  to  Tolstoy  to  Churchill,  it 
was  understood  that  w^ars  could  not 
just  be  fought  without  justification. 
Ancient  Greek  philosophers  and  earl, 
Christian  writers  accepted  war  as  a 
necessary  part  of  nature.  St.  August 
found  justification  for  war  in  interve 
ing  to  protect  the  innocent:  Thomas 
Aquinas,  in  punishing  wrongdoers:  f 
others,  simply  the  notion  of  defense. 
Modern-day  international  law,  reflec 
in  the  UN  Chartei-,  embraces  the  "ii 
herent  right  of  individual  or  collecti\ 
self-defense." 

Today,  as  it  must,  modern  tech- 
nology profoundly  enters  the  discoui 
Evenbefore  the  full  impact  of  nuclei 
weapons  could  be  felt,  Reinhold  Nie 
buhr  noted  that:  "We  have  come  inti 
the  tragic  position  of  developing  a  ft 
of  destruction  which,  if  used  by  our 
emies  against  us,  would  mean  our  p 
ical  annihilation;  and,  if  used  by  us 
against  our  enemies,  would  mean  oi 
moral  annihilation."  He  noted  "a  mc 
dilemma  for  which  there  is  no  clear 
moral  solution." 

Neither  the  diplomat  nor  the  P' 
cian  in  a  democracy  can  afford  to  ig 
the  moral  dimension  of  foreign  polic 
With  the  clearly  devastating  charac 


38 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  \%^ 


GENERAL 


modern  weapons — conventional  and 
iclear — no  democracy  can  effectively 
irsue  its  diplomacy,  where  the  avail- 
)ility  of  force  is  an  indispensable 
gradient,  unless  there  is  a  broad  con- 
:nsus  behind  that  policy.  Certainly  for 
e  United  States,  that  consensus  re- 
lires  a  moral  foundation. 

The  pacifist  meets — some  would 
,y  avoids — the  Niebuhr  moral  dilemma 
I  declaring  an  absolute  principle.  He 
eks  to  expunge  war  through  conscien- 
ous  objection,  active  opposition,  and 
?rsonal  testimony.  I  was  in  my  college 
?ars  when  I  began  reading  and  study- 
g  Gandhi,  Tolstoy,  Shridharani,  Tho- 
;au,  Richard  Gregg,  A.  J.  Muste,  and 
van  and  Norman  Thomas.  Pacifism 
id  a  strong  appeal.  "Wars  will  cease 
hen  men  refuse  to  fight,"  was  the  slo- 
\n.  "Someday  they'll  give  a  war  and 
)body  will  come,"  wrote  Carl 
mdburg. 

The  pacifist  principle  that  war  is  a 
■eater  evil  than  any  evil  it  would  seek 
)  correct  justifies  yielding  to  the  les- 
'r  evil  in  the  faith  that  history  or  a 
gher  moral  authority  will,  in  the  end, 
't  things  straight.  Regrettably,  this 
IS,  in  recent  years,  led  to  a  rationaliz- 
g  that  the  purported  enemy  is  not  so 
.'il  after  all;  thus,  the  sad  alliance  of 
any  pacifists  with  polit'cally  moti- 
ved cadres  who  told  us  that  Hitler 
as  only  reflecting  rightful  German 
nevances,  or  that  the  brutal  excesses 
'  Stalin  and  Mao  were  simply  capitalist 
<aggerations,  or  that  North  Vietnam 
as  seeking  to  unify  and  not  subjugate 
s  peninsula,  or  that  the  Sandinistas 
-e  idealistic  revolutionaries  rather 
lan  totalitarian  communists.  Clause- 
itz  reminds  us  that:  "The  aggressor  is 
ways  peaceloving.  He  would  like 
)  make  his  entry  into  our  country 
ndisturbed." 

This  change  is  sadly  and  dramat- 
ally  characterized  by  the  contrast  in 
Dmparing  a  Quaker  declaration  of 
i60 — "We  utterly  deny  all  outward 
ars...for  any  end,  or  under  any  pre- 
mse,  whatever;  this  is  our  testimony 
1  the  whole  world...."— with  the  1972 
fficial  statement  of  the  Quaker  Ameri- 
an  Friends  Service  Committee  urging 
support"  for  the  North  Vietnamese 
revolution."  [French]  President  Mitter- 
and  had  this  phenomenon  in  mind  with 

sardonic  comment  that  the  Soviet 
Inion  produces  weapons  while  the 
Vest  produces  pacifists. 

Other  pacifists  have  recognized  the 
igh  moral  duty  to  identify,  challenge, 
nd  attempt  to  defeat  evil.  In  heu  of 


war.  they  focus  on  the  power  of  love 
and  nonviolent  resistance  to  evil.  The 
human  being,  they  argue,  has  the  ca- 
pacity to  respond  more  to  the  human 
force  of  love  and  conscience  in  his  fel- 
low man  than  to  coercion  and  hate, 
which  perpetuate  conflict. 

Beyond  Pacifism 

Modern  technology  now  challenges  pac- 
ifist faith  by  depersonalizing  and  auto- 
mating the  process  of  war.  The  armed 
adversary  in  modern  war  never  sees  his 
victim,  who,  therefore,  cannot  reach  his 
adversary  to  project  the  power  of  his 
love.  The  human  dimension  disappears. 
The  Russian  proverb  goes:  "Make  your- 
self into  a  sheep,  and  you'll  meet  a  wolf 
nearby." 

Society  looks  beyond  pacifism  for 
the  peace  with  freedom  and  dignity  we 
all  seek.  Here,  those  who  have  been 
called  "the  moral  architects"  present 
their  case.  They  seek  to  build  a  moral 
framework  in  which  war  could  be  con- 
tained, restrained,  and,  perhaps,  even 
humanized.  They  accept  the  legitimacy 
of  force  and  its  presence  in  human  his- 
tory, but  within  a  moral  universe. 

Nonintervention  as  an  approach 
has  historically  had  its  advocates.  It 
was  John  Stuart  Mill,  however,  who 
pierced  the  balloon  of  simplicity  when 
he  wrote: 

The  doctrine  of  non-intervention,  to  be 
a  legitimate  principle  of  morality,  must  be 
accepted  by  all  governments.  The  despots 
must  consent  to  be  bound  by  it  as  well  as 
the  free  States.  Unless  they  do,  the  profes- 
sion of  it  by  free  countries  comes  but  to 
this  miserable  issue,  that  the  wrong  side 
may  help  the  wrong,  but  the  right  must 
not  help  the  right. 

The  modern  policy  of  deterrence  as 
an  approach  has  widespread  support.  A 
defensive  posture,  it  meets  a  primary 
requirement  of  "just  war."  Yet  deter- 
rence can  work  only  if  it  is  accompanied 
by  a  credible  threat  to  engage  in  war  in 
the  event  of  attack.  Thus,  it  deliber- 
ately skates  close  to  the  edge  of  nuclear 
catastrophe.  But  it  seems  to  be  work- 
ing. Deterrence  has  not  led  to  mass, 
indiscriminate  destruction.  Rather,  it 
has  achieved  stability.  Michael  Walzer, 
in  discussing  the  ethics  of  nuclear 
peace,  writes: 

Supreme  emergency  has  become  a  per- 
manent condition.  Deterrence  is  a  way  of 
coping  with  that  condition,  and  though  it  is 
a  bad  way,  there  may  well  be  no  other  that 
is  practical  in  a  world  of  sovereign  and  sus- 
picious states.  We  threaten  evil  in  order 
not  to  do  it,  and  the  doing  of  it  would  be  so 
terrible,  that  the  threat  seems  in  compari- 
son to  be  morally  defensible. 


Society  continues  to  look  for  other 
and,  perhaps,  better  alternatives  than 
war  to  assure  peace  with  liberty.  The 
Strategic  Defense  Initiative  (SDI)  in- 
creasingly presents  itself  as  an  alter- 
native that  must  here  be  addressed.  It 
is  defensive  in  intent.  With  our  SDI 
program,  we  are  exploring,  through  re- 
search, whether  we  can  strengthen  de- 
terrence through  an  increased  ability  to 
create  effective  defenses  and  thereby 
deny  and  deter  an  aggressor  from  his 
objectives.  Its  appeal  is  that  people  ask 
of  their  governments  that  they  be  pro- 
tected from  attack,  not  that  their  gov- 
ernment be  able  only  to  avenge  them 
after  the  attack.  The  possibility  is  a 
real  one  that  defensive  technologies — 
cost  effective  at  the  margin  and  prefer- 
ably non-nuclear — can  be  created. 

The  search,  furthermore,  is  not 
ours  alone.  The  Soviet  Union  has,  for 
many  years,  been  active  and  successful 
in  building  up  its  defensive  capabilities. 
This  includes,  as  Mr.  Gorbachev  has  ac- 
knowledged, proceeding  with  an  inten- 
sified program  of  research  on  their  own 
version  of  SDI.  We  must  seek  a  coor- 
dinated effort,  with  its  promise  for 
greater  stability  and  peace  through  mu- 
tual security.  The  new  reality  is  that 
there  can  be  no  true  security  for  any 
one  country  or  people  unless  there  is 
security  for  all.  We  must  learn  to  ac- 
cept in  each  of  our  countries  a  mutual 
responsibility  for  peoples  in  all  other 
countries. 

The  Soviet  Challenge 

In  the  meantime,  as  we  continue  to 
search  for  this  goal,  current  U.S.  policy 
is  to  reduce  risks  and  tensions  while 
maintaining  the  strategy  of  deterrence. 
We  have  achieved  and  are  negotiating 
toward  further  verifiable  and  stabilizing 
reductions  in  nuclear  arms.  We  are  pre- 
paring for  talks,  to  begin  later  this  year 
or  next  year,  to  reduce  conventional 
arms  and  deal  with  the  scourge  of 
chemical  weapons.  Simultaneously,  we 
are  engaged  in  a  process  to  build  real- 
istic, constructive,  and  more  cooper- 
ative relations  with  the  Soviet  Union. 

The  tensions  that  have  charac- 
terized our  relations  with  the  Soviet 
Union  are  real.  Our  problems  are  too 
profound  to  be  thought  of  as  being  re- 
solved by  quick  fixes,  supernegotiators, 
a  summit,  or  a  master  draftsman  capa- 
ble of  formulating  language  to  overcome 
differences.  The  leadership  of  the  So- 
viet Union  is  serious.  Its  diplomats  are 
well  trained.  Their  response  in  a  nego- 
tiation is  motivated  by  one  primary 


)epartment  of  State  Bulletin/December  1988 


39 


GENERAL 


consideration:  their  perceived  national 
self-interest. 

The  fundamental  challenge  to  the 
free  world  has  been  a  Soviet  principle 
that  everything  that  has  become  com- 
munist remains  forever  inviolate,  and 
everything  that  is  not  communist 
is  open  to  change  by  pressure,  sub- 
version, even  terror.  We,  therefore, 
observe  with  keen  interest  that  the  So- 
viets are  withdrawing  their  troops  from 
Afghanistan.  Its  leaders  now  say — and 
we  are  encouraged  to  hear — they  are 
modifying  their  old  faith  that  the 
"irreconcilability"  of  our  two  systems 
means  the  "inevitability"  of  war 

The  Soviet  economy  is  working 
poorly,  although  it  does  provide  a  fully 
functioning  military  machine.  Massive 
mihtary  power  has  provided  the  Soviets 
with  a  presence  that  reaches  all  parts 
of  the  world,  but  this  military  super- 
power cannot  hide  the  fact  that  its  eco- 
nomic and  social  weaknesses  are  deep. 
The  Soviets'  awesome  internal  police 
foi'ce  has  provided  continuity  to  its  sys- 
tem of  governance,  but  a  Russia  which 
during  czarist  days  exported  food 
cannot,  today,  feed  its  own  people.  Pro- 
ductivity is  low.  With  absenteeism,  cor- 
ruption, and  alcoholism,  internal  morale 
is  bad.  Contrary  to  trends  elsewhere  in 
the  world,  life  e.xpectancy  is  actually 
decreasing.  It  is  estimated  that  a 
worker  in  the  Soviet  Union  must  work 
more  than  seven  times  as  many  hours 
as  a  West  European  to  earn  enough 
money  to  buy  a  car 

The  new  leaders  of  the  Soviet 
Union  are  fully  aware  of  its  problems. 
No  police  can  keep  out  the  ideas  and 
developments  that  are  communicated 
by  satellite  to  all  parts  of  the  world, 
any  more  than  it  can,  by  fiat,  insulate 
the  Soviet  Union  from  the  wind  cur- 
rents that  circle  our  globe.  They  are 
also  aware  of  our  strengths,  reflecting 
the  vitality  of  our  values  and  the 
healthy  dynamism  of  our  system. 

Democracy  works  best.  A  closed, 
tightly  controlled  society,  tied  in  knots 
by  a  repressive  bui'eaucratic  system, 
cannot  compete  in  a  world  in  which  eco- 
nomic development  and  the  creative 
power  which  it  produces  is  all  impor- 
tant. Rapid  technological  change,  stim- 
ulated by  an  information  explosion  that 
knows  no  national  boundaries,  requires 
the  vitality  that  comes  from  freedom. 
There  is  an  inescapable  link  between 
human  hberty,  democracy,  and  eco- 
nomic well-being. 


We  hope  the  time  is  at  hand  when 
Soviet  authorities,  looking  at  the  en- 
ergy of  the  West,  comprehend  that  re- 
pressive societies  in  our  day  cannot 
achieve  economic  health,  inner  stability, 
or  true  security.  We  hope  Soviet  lead- 
ership today  realizes  that  its  historic 
aim  of  achieving  communism  through 
violence  has  no  place  in  this  nuclear 
age.  We  hope  Soviet  authorities  will 
join  us  in  making  the  commitment  that 
our  survival  as  a  civilization  depends  on 
the  mutual  realization  that  we  must  live 
under  rules  of  responsible  international 
behavior.  We  hope — and  there  are  en- 
couraging signs  to  bolster  that  hope. 
But  as  yet,  we,  regrettably,  cannot 
trust. 

But  even  as  we  cannot  yet  trust, 
we  have  a  responsibility  to  ourselves  to 
observe  developments  in  the  Soviet 
Union  carefully  and  to  do  so  with  open 
eyes  and  an  open  mind.  There  have 
been  significant  changes  within  the 
U.S.S.R.  President  Gorbachev  has 
shown  himself,  in  a  dramatic  way,  will- 
ing to  reconsider  past  views.  The  words 
gtasHo:it  and  peref:twika  have  been  re- 
peated so  extensively  that  the  ideas 
they  represent  may  well  take  on  a 
meaning  and  dynamism  of  their  own, 
which  could  become  internally 
irreversible. 

The  United  States  negotiates  with 
the  Soviet  Union  in  that  context.  We 
intensify  our  efforts,  through  our  nego- 
tiations, to  find  a  basis  for  understand- 
ing, stability,  and  peace  with  dignity. 
To  negotiate  is  risky.  It  is,  in  the  words 
of  Hubert  Humphrey,  something  like 
crossing  a  rapid  stream  by  walking  on 
slippery  rocks.  The  possibility  of  a  fall 
is  on  every  side,  but  it  is  the  only  way 
to  get  across. 

Toward  a  Genuine 
and  Desirable  Peace 

For  us,  peace  is  not  merely  the  absence 
of  war.  A  genuine  and  desirable  peace 
is,  to  paraphrase  Niebuhr,  built  only  on 
the  foundation  of  justice,  freedom,  and 
the  rule  of  law.  These  are  not  merely 


abstract  ideals.  These  are  real  livint;- 
values  that  have  guided  our  nation 
since  its  founding. 

All  of  us  and  our  societies  fall 
short  of  our  aspirations.  We  grow  by 
stretching  to  reach  them.  As  we  do 
so,  however,  let  us  be  reassured  by  the 
conviction  that  the  future  lies  with 
freedom  because  there  can  be  no  last- 
ing stability  in  societies  that  would 
deny  it.  Only  freedom  can  release 
the  constructive  energies  of  men  and 
women  to  work  toward  reaching  new 
heights.  A  human  being  has  the  capac- 
ity to  aspire,  to  achieve,  to  dream,  am 
to  do.  Our  task  is  to  stretch  ourselves 
to  come  closer  to  that  realization.  Witl 
its  realization,  we  not  only  find  the 
path  to  peace;  we  find  peace. 

The  major  obstacle  in  the  path 
toward  that  realization  is  within  our- 
selves as  we  note  De  Tocqueville's  19th 
century  observation  that:  "It  is  espe- 
cially in  the  conduct  of  their  foreign 
relations  that  democracies  appear  to 
be  decidedly  inferior  to  other  Govern- 
ments." We  must  achieve  the  firm,  un 
fying  sense  of  purpose,  steadiness,  an 
strength  that  is  indispensable  for  effe 
five  foreign  policy  decisionmaking.  W 
must  insist  that  our  political  communi 
resist  the  temptation  of  partisan  pol- 
itics and  institutional  rivalry  to  devek 
the  consensus  adequate  to  meet  our 
I'esponsibilities. 

Abraham  Lincoln,  in  his  day,  saic 
that:  "America  is  the  last  great  hope 
of  mankind."  It  still  is.  Our  political 
values  have  helped  us  build  the  most 
dynamic  and  open  society  in  recorded 
history,  a  source  of  inspiration  to  mo^ 
of  the  world.  It  is  a  promise  of  a  bett 
tomorrow  for  the  hundreds  of  million: 
of  people  who  have  not  known  the  gif 
of  human  freedom.  The  future  lies  wi 
liberty,  human  dignity,  and  democrac 
To  preserve  and  expand  these  values 
our  special  responsibility.  We  cannot 
cape  that  burden.  But,  more  than  a  b 
den  and  responsibility,  we  should  lool 
upon  it  as  an  exciting  opportunity. 


40 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  1 


. 


t 


IDDLE  EAST 


Jpdate  on  the  Situation 
n  the  IVIiddle  East 


/  liivliard  H.  Murphy 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
I  Europe  and  the  Middle  East  of  the 
iiiiisi-  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
rtnhcr  13.  1988.  Ambassador  Murphy 
Assistant  Secretary  for  Near  East- 
it  and  South  Asian  Affairs.^ 

am  happy  to  be  back  before  the  sub- 
immittee  after  a  relatively  short  ab- 
snce.  Although  only  a  brief  time  has 
apsed  since  my  last  appearance,  a 
amber  of  important  events  have  taken 
ace  in  the  Middle  East  which  are  of 
terest  to  this  subcommittee.  One  sig- 
ficant  event  in  the  last  several  weeks 
IS  been  the  failure  in  Lebanon  to  elect 
new  president.  The  August  20  cease- 
re  between  Iran  and  Iraq  and  the  be- 
nning  of  negotiations  in  Geneva  under 
le  auspices  of  Secretary  General  Perez 
•  Cuellar  are  important  milestones, 
ing  Hussein's  July  announcement  that 
>  would  end  administrative  and  legal 
?s  with  the  West  Bank  is  another 
iportant  development. 

In  addition  to  the  items  just  men- 
jned.  this  statement  will  address  the 
iddle  East  peace  process,  including 
le  question  of  Jordan's  role,  and  a 
imber  of  issues  which  were  of  particu- 
r  interest  to  the  subcommittee  during 
y  last  visit.  This  statement  will  con- 
ude  with  what  I  call  "future  chal- 
nges."  As  we  near  the  end  of  our 
atch.  this  Administration  will  not  flag 
its  efforts  to  seek  imaginative  and 
ting  solutions  to  the  very  difficult, 
ime  say  intractable,  problems  we  face 
that  critical  part  of  the  world. 


he  Situation  in  Lebanon 

would  like  to  begin  with  events  in 
ebanon,  starting  with  an  overview  of 
le  political  situation. 

Our  diplomatic  efforts  associated 
•ith  Lebanon's  presidential  election 
nd  constitutional  reform  began  about  a 
ear  ago,  when  then-President  Amine 
emayel  asked  us  to  help.  The  Syrians 
nd  Lebanese  Muslims  also  welcomed 
ur  involvement. 

The  United  States  worked  hard  on 
elping  the  Lebanese  reach  an  agree- 
lent  on  reform,  especially  from  Febru- 
ry  through  April  of  this  year  Our 
fforts  resulted  in  some  progress  in  two 


key  areas;  power  sharing  and  deconfes- 
sionalization.  But,  by  the  end  of  April, 
no  reform  text  on  which  all  sides  could 
agree  had  been  reached.  With  the  Sep- 
tember deadline  for  the  holding  of  pres- 
idential elections  rapidly  approaching, 
we  decided  to  postpone  our  reform 
efforts  until  after  the  election.  The 
Lebanese  and  Syrians  agreed  with  this 
approach. 

Progress  toward  an  election  stalled 
in  August,  however,  over  the  Syrian- 
backed  candidacy  of  former  President 
Suleiman  Franjieh,  who  was  vetoed  by 
a  significant  part  of  the  Lebanese 
Christian  community,  and  a  quorum  for 
the  vote  proved  impossible.  To  help 
break  this  impasse  and  to  promote  a 
timely,  orderly,  and  constitutional 
election,  I  went  out  to  Beirut  and 
Damascus  in  mid-September.  Both 
Lebanese  Christians  and  Lebanese 
Muslims  had  been  urging  such  a  trip; 
the  Syrians,  too,  had  made  it  clear  an 
American  envoy  would  be  welcome.  I 
traveled  on  the  clear  understanding 
that  no  Lebanese  faction  would  exercise 
a  veto  on  any  candidate  beyond  that 
which  had  been  cast  against  Franjieh. 

In  Damascus,  talks  with  the  Syr- 
ians on  a  common  U.S. -Syrian  approach 
to  holding  the  election  proved  difficult. 
Our  position  was  that  Lebanon  would 
be  well  on  the  road  to  formal  partition 
if  no  election  were  held.  Syria  asserted 
that  Lebanese  Muslims  now  insisted  on 
constitutional  reform  before  elections. 
After  considerable  discussion,  Syria 
consulted  with  its  Lebanese  friends  and 
agreed  not  to  insist  on  Franjieh's  can- 
didacy and  that  constitutional  reform 
could  follow  elections. 

We  discussed  the  qualifications  of 
many  mainstream  candidates  for  the 
presidency.  I  urged  that  Syria  agree  to 
my  taking  several  names  back  to 
Beirut,  noting  that  the  United  States 
could  work  with  any  one  of  the  many 
names  discussed.  However,  Syria  set  as 
a  condition  that  it  would  support  only 
one  alternative  candidate  to  Franjieh 
and  only  if  the  Lebanese  Christians 
first  agreed  to  go  along  with  this  candi- 
date. The  Lebanese  Christian  lead- 
ership reacted  negatively  to  this 
proposal,  perceiving  it  as  a  Syrian- 
American  diktat. 

On  September  23  the  Lebanese 
presidency  fell  vacant  when  Lebanon's 


Parliament  again  failed  to  convene  and 
elect  a  new  president  before  President 
Gemayel's  term  ended.  Despite  continu- 
ing efforts,  the  deputies  have  been  un- 
able to  agree  on  consensus  candidates 
for  the  election. 

So  far,  the  situation  on  the  ground 
remains  quiet.  The  two  cabinets  which 
have  resulted  from  the  failure  to  elect  a 
president  have  refrained  from  pushing 
their  claims  to  the  point  of  an  outright 
break.  The  United  States  does  not  want 
partition  in  Lebanon  and  will  do  noth- 
ing to  push  affairs  in  that  direction.  We 
continue  to  deal  with  all  parties  in 
Lebanon  on  an  equal  footing  as  we 
work  to  encourage  the  holding  of  an 
early  presidential  election  in  peace  and 
safety.  We  are  urging  all  parties  to 
work  together  to  ensure  that  such  an 
election  occurs  and  to  avoid  actions  that 
legitimize  the  de  facto  partition.  We  re- 
main committed  to  helping  restore 
Lebanon's  unity  and  territorial  integ- 
rity and  will  continue  to  exert  our 
efforts  toward  that  end. 


Iran-Iraq  War 
and  the  Cease-Fire 

Iran's  long-awaited  acceptance  of 
Security  Council  Resolution  598  in 
mid-July  set  the  stage  for  the  cease- 
fire which  ultimately  took  effect  on 
August  20. 

As  part  of  the  cease-fire  agree- 
ment, a  UN  observer  force,  called  the 
UN  Iran-Iraq  Military  Observer  Group, 
or  UNIIMOG  for  short,  was  estab- 
lished to  patrol  the  cease-fire  lines  and 
report  violations.  The  UN  force  is  in- 
ternational, composed  of  350  unarmed 
military  observers  from  24  different 
countries,  commanded  by  Yugoslavian 
Major  General  Slavko  Jovic.  Canada 
has  deployed  a  communications  support 
unit  of  approximately  500  additional 
men,  whom  we  airlifted  to  Iraq  and 
Turkey  (for  those  proceeding  onward  to 
Iran).  In  addition  to  providing  exten- 
sive airlift  support,  we  have  offered  to 
contribute  helicopters  and  aircraft  (but 
no  crews)  for  use  by  UNIIMOG  observ- 
ers. The  United  Nations  has  assessed 
the  United  States  $10.9  million  for  the 
period  between  August  9  and  Novem- 
ber 8.  This  is  our  share  of  the  initial  3- 
month  operations  cost  of  $35.7  million, 
based  on  the  UN  peacekeeping  assess- 
ment formula — under  which  the  United 
States  is  obligated  to  contribute  some 
30%  of  total  costs.  We  expect  that  the 
U.S.  assessment  will  be  offset  by  the 
value  of  goods  and  services  we  are 
providing.  As  is  customary,  neither  the 


41 


MIDDLE  EAST 


Taba  Arbitration  Award 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT. 
SEPT.  29,  1988' 

The  Taba  Arbitration  Ti-ibunal  in  Ge- 
neva has  handed  down  its  award  today. 
We  are  pleased  that  this  longstanding 
difference  between  Egypt  and  Israel 
has  been  amicably  resolved  in  a  proc- 
ess that  received  the  support  of  both 
governments.  The  success  of  the  ar- 
bitration process  shows  once  again  that 
negotiations  work,  and  that  Arab- 
Israeli  peace  can  work. 

We've  not  yet  seen  the  actual  text, 
but  understand  that  the  tribunal  de- 
cided in  favor  of  Egypt's  claimed  loca- 
tion for  the  disputed  boundary  pillar 
at  T^ba,  at  the  southern  end  of  the 
Egyptian-Israeli  border. 


The  United  States  participated  ac- 
tively in  the  negotiations  leading  up  to 
the  arbitration,  and  we  have  supported 
the  work  of  the  arbitration  tribunal 
since  its  inception.  It  is  now  up  to  the 
parties  to  implement  the  decision  fully, 
expeditiously,  and  in  good  faith,  as  they 
have  agreed  to  do,  and  as  the  peace 
treaty  requires.  We  urge  both  sides  to 
show  continuing  flexibility  and  accom- 
modation in  dealing  with  the  practical 
implementation  of  the  award  in  a  way 
that  will  facilitate  tourism,  enhance 
economic  cooperation,  and  preserve 
Taba's  potential  as  a  bridge  for  the 
growth  of  solid  bilateral  relations. 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by 
Department  deputy  spokesman  Phyllis 
Oaklev.  ■ 


United  States  nor  the  Soviet  Union  (or 
the  other  three  permanent  members  of 
the  UN  Security  Council)  was  asked  to 
contribute  troops  to  the  peacekeeping 
force. 

The  peace  negotiations  which  are 
underway  in  Geneva  and  New  York  un- 
der UN  auspices  have  been  predictably 
difficult,  with  both  sides  staking  out 
tough  initial  positions.  Let  me  take  a 
moment  to  review  the  issues  with  you. 
Formally,  the  negotiations  are  over  the 
terms  of  UN  Security  Council  Resolu- 
tion 598,  which  provide  a  comprehen- 
sive framework  for  a  just  and  durable 
settlement.  Iraq  argues  that  to  be  last- 
ing, a  cease-fire  should  provide  for 
freedom  of  navigation  in  the  gulf  and 
through  the  Strait  of  Hormuz  for  both 
sides.  Iran  counters  that  while  a  state 
of  belligerency  exists,  it  has  the  right 
under  international  law  to  visit  and 
search  shipping.  With  i-egard  to  the 
Shaft  al-Arab,  the  waterway  which  di- 
vides the  two  countries,  Iraq  seeks 
commitments  from  Iran  that  it  will  co- 
operate in  efforts  by  the  United  Na- 
tions to  clear  the  Shatt  for  use  by  both 
states.  Iran  seeks  Iraqi  agreement  to 
respect  the  1975  Algiers  agreement 
which  delimited  the  border  along  the 
main  downstream  channel  of  the  Shatt, 
the  thalweg.  Although  Iraq  has  as- 
serted its  historic  claim  to  sovereignty 
over  the  entire  Shatt  al-Arab  in  state- 
ments made  in  Baghdad,  it  has  not  as- 
serted that  claim  in  the  negotiations. 


42 


In  general,  our  policy  has  been  to 
provide  all  possible  support  to  the  Sec- 
retary General  and  his  special  repre- 
sentative, the  respected  Swedish 
diplomat  Ambassador  Jan  Eliasson, 
while  avoiding  being  drawn  into  the 
middle  of  the  details  of  negotiations  to 
which  the  United  States  is  not  a  party. 
The  permanent  members  of  the  Se- 
curity Council  have  recently  issued  a 
statement  reaffirming  their  full  supjjoi't 
for  the  UN  negotiations.  In  the  final 
analysis,  only  the  Iranian  and  Iraqi 
Governments  can  make  the  hard  politi- 
cal choices  which  must  be  made  if  the 
negotiations  are  to  make  progress.  The 
sooner  they  get  on  with  it,  in  our  view, 
the  better.  It  is  encouraging  that,  de- 
spite their  differences  on  the  issues, 
both  sides  appear  to  be  committed  to 
the  negotiating  process  and  neither 
seems  inclined  to  break  off  the  talks. 
With  flexibility  on  both  sides,  it  should 
be  possible  to  reach  a  package  agree- 
ment on  several  aspects  of  Resolution 
598  which  would  meet  the  basic  re- 
quirements of  both  Iraq  and  Iran. 

Nor  should  we  lose  sight  of  an  es- 
sential fact.  Negotiations,  however  pro- 
tracted and  difficult,  are  better  than 
fighting. 

Finally,  we  have  adjusted  in  some 
small  ways  our  military  operations  and 
force  posture  in  the  region.  The  U.S.S. 
Vincennes,  for  instance,  departed  for 
the  United  States  on  September  11.  We 
consulted  our  friends  and  allies  on  this 
move  and,  given  the  cease-fire,  there 


was  broad  understanding  for  it.  We 
have  changed  our  practice  from  escort 
ing  to  accompanying  U.S.  flag  vessels 
If  the  cease-fire  holds,  we  should  be 
able  gradually  to  reduce  our  operatior 
and  assets.  We  need  to  build  on  the 
considerable  success  we  have  had  in  tl 
gulf  by  consulting  carefully  with  all 
who  have  a  stake  in  regional  security 
and  freedom  of  navigation  in  this  vita! 
area. 

The  Peace  Process 

The  Middle  East  peace  process  is  wit 
nessing  significant  events.  The  an- 
nouncement by  King  Hussein  of  .Jordi 
that  he  would  end  administrative  and 
legal  ties  with  the  West  Bank  needs  t 
be  assessed  carefully. 

There  is  no  question  of  Jordan's 
continued  commitment  to  the  peace 
process.  At  the  same  time,  the  King 
has  challenged  other  parties,  primari 
the  FLO  [Palestine  Liberation  Organi 
zation]  but  Israel  as  well,  to  take  the 
difficult  decisions  i-equii'ed  for  peace. 
The  King  emphasized  an  important 
element  in  the  Middle  East  equation. 
Jordan  is  not  Palestine.  But  he  also  r 
affirmed  that  geography  and  history 
dictate  that  Jordan  will  play  an  impoi 
tant  part  as  the  peace  process  untold 

In  Israel,  there  is  significant  de- 
bate on  the  peace  process,  with  the 
election  campaign  now  in  full  swing, 
raelis  are  weighing  significant  issues 
related  to  the  role  of  Palestinians  in 
the  peace  process  and  the  centrality 
of  the  land-for-peace  concept  in  the 
negotiations. 

Our  objective  in  the  Middle  East 
remains  a  comprehensive  peace  throi 
a  process  of  direct  negotiations.  On 
September  1(3,  Secretary  Shultz  de- 
scribed the  Administration's  approacl 
to  Middle  East  peacemaking  in  an 
important  address  before  the  Wash- 
ington Institute  for  Near  East  Policy 

The  plan  we  put  forward  continu 
to  represent  assumptions  and  realitit 
about  the  peace  process  that  have  no 
changed.  There  is  a  need  to  structun 
negotiating  framework  based  on  a  re 
istic  view  of  the  situation.  Our  initial 
provides  that  framework  as  it  seeks  ■ 
dispel  certain  illusions  which  cannot 
reconciled  with  the  realities  of  the  si 
ation  in  the  region. 

Our  initiative  takes  these  realitit 
into  account — realities  which  will  not 
change — regardless  of  decisions  or  ac 
tions  taken  by  individual  parties.  Be- 
cause they  reflect  those  realities,  the 
fundamental  elements  of  our  initiativ 
remain  valid; 


IDDLE  EAST 


>  The  need  for  a  comprehensive 
lace; 

>  The  requirement  that  negotia- 
fcns  be  based  on  UN  Security  Council 

^solutions  242  and  8;W,  including  the 
inciple  of  the  exchange  of  territory 
r  peace; 

>  The  essentiality  of  security  for  all 
ates  in  the  region; 

•  The  importance  of  realizing  the 
B;itimate  rights — including  the  politi- 

rights — of  the  Palestinian  people; 
Id 

•  The  indispensability  of  an  initial 
;reement  on  transitional  arrange- 
ents,  tightly  linked  to  an  early  start 

negotiations  on  a  final  settlement. 

We  will  remain  active  and  engaged 
the  peace  process  over  the  balance  of 
e  year  and  into  the  next.  U.S.  Middle 
ast  policy  will  continue  to  reflect  the 
ndamental  continuity  and  bipar- 
ianship  of  our  approach.  Our  commit- 
ent  to  peace  and  to  the  process 
eded  to  achieve  peace  remains  solid. 

rms  Sales 

uring  my  last  testimony  to  the  sub- 
mmittee,  I  noted  a  strong  interest  in 
e  subject  of  arms  sales  to  the  region, 
particular  sales  to  the  Arab  gulf 
ates.  At  the  moment,  there  are  no 
les  pending.  Nonetheless,  I  think  it 
ould  be  useful  to  recap  the  Admin- 
:rations  thinking  on  arms  sales  to 
iendly  Arab  governments  in  the  gulf. 
It  is  illusory  to  believe  that  if  the 
nited  States  refuses  to  sell  weapons 
id  weapon  systems  to  the  gulf  states, 
e  level  of  hardware  in  the  region  will 
main  unchanged.  Illusions  in  this  case 
so  fail  the  test  of  reality. 

»  Do  Arab  governments  in  the  gulf 
ive  legitimate  defense  needs?  The  an- 
ver  is  clearly  yes.  Credible  defenses 
1  the  part  of  the  gulf  states  are  a  sine 
a  )w>i  for  a  stable  and  peaceful  Rer- 
an Gulf. 

•  Do  they  have  the  resources  to 
jrchase  the  arms  necessary  to  meet 
lose  legitimate  needs?  Again,  the  an- 
ver  is  yes. 

•  Will  they  refrain  from  purchasing 
the  United  States  is  not  willing  to 
ill?  The  answer  is  no,  as  the  Saudi- 
.K.  deal  has  revealed. 

•  Will  our  bilateral  relationships 
ith  the  gulf  states  suffer  if  we  are 
liable  to  help  them  with  their  legiti- 
ate  defense  needs?  The  answer  is  yes. 

•  Will  U.S.  influence  and  access  in 
le  region  dechne  in  some  proportion 

« )  lost  sales  of  arms?  The  answer  is 
8S,  especially  in  the  longer  term  as 


routine  relationships  develop  with  other 
suppliers  of  defense  equipment.  The 
value  of  this  relationship  for  our  own 
operations  in  the  area  was  clearly  dem- 
onstrated over  the  past  year. 

•  Do  sales  of  U.S.  arms  to  gulf 
states  pose  a  threat  to  Israel?  No. 
These  countries  are  not  a  threat  to  Is- 
rael. In  addition,  purchases  of  U.S. 
equipment  lower  the  likelihood  of  any 
use  of  advanced  systems  against  Israel. 

I  made  similar  arguments  during 
my  last  appearance  before  the  subcom- 
mittee. Since  then,  the  sale  of  F-18s  to 
Kuwait  has  been  approved,  and  the 
contracts  have  been  signed.  We  believe 
that  the  extensive  and  serious  consulta- 
tions between  the  Administration  and 
the  Congress  on  the  F-18s  have  re- 
sulted in  a  better  understanding  of  our 
mutual  concerns  and  that  the  final 
package  meets  Kuwaiti  defense  needs 
while  it  also  is  responsive  to  congres- 
sional views. 

I  also  recall  that  subcommittee 
members  expressed  an  interest  regard- 
ing transfer  of  aircraft  from  Saudi  Ara- 
bia to  Jordan  and  whether  the  United 
States  could  provide  the  minesweepers 
to  Saudi  Arabia  that  are  part  of  the 
deal  with  the  United  Kingdom. 

On  the  first  question,  we  do  not 
have  information  that  would  lead  us  to 
believe  that  part  of  the  recent  Saudi- 
U.K.  deal  involves  a  purchase  of  air- 
craft for  Jordan.  We  note  that  direct 
negotiations  between  Jordan  and  the 
United  Kingdom  for  Tornado  aircraft 
are  in  progress. 

On  the  second  question,  there  are 
two  firms  in  Wisconsin  which  currently 
build  minesweepers.  Both  build  wood 
laminate  ships,  and  our  Navy  has  ships 
on  order  from  both  these  companies. 
Under  a  previous  sale,  four  wooden 
ships  have  already  been  delivered  to 
the  Saudi  Navy.  In  addition,  there  is  a 
firm  in  Georgia  which  makes  fiberglass 
minesweepers. 

Ballistic  Missiles 

The  acquisition  of  long-range  ballistic 
missile  systems  by  a  number  of  coun- 
tries in  the  Middle  East  adds  a  new, 
and  potentially  very  dangerous,  ele- 
ment to  the  security  of  the  region.  Mis- 
siles provide  the  ability  to  strike 
suddenly  and  without  warning  at  tar- 
gets far  removed  from  the  attacker's 
own  territory.  As  a  result,  the  spread 
of  missiles  throughout  the  region 
threatens  to  create  serious  instability 
and  insecurity. 


The  heavy  use  of  ballistic  missiles 
against  civilian  targets  during  the  Iran- 
Iraq  war,  and  the  fact  that  missiles  can 
be  fitted  with  chemical  or  nuclear  war- 
heads adds  to  our  concern  about  the 
proliferation  of  these  weapons. 

The  momentum  toward  more  and 
more  missile  procurement  is  well  ad- 
vanced, and  it  will  be  very  difficult  to 
slow  it  down — let  alone  reverse  it.  We 
are  committed,  however,  to  a  compre- 
hensive effort.  To  that  end — because  of 
our  strong  concerns — the  United  States 
has  joined  with  its  six  economic  summit 
partners  to  establish  an  international 
missile  technology  control  regime  to 
limit  transfers  of  long-range  missiles 
and  related  technologies.  We  have  also 
raised  our  concerns  with  other  coun- 
tries, including  the  Soviet  Union  and 
the  People's  Republic  of  China.  We  also 
believe  it  is  in  the  interest  of  all  coun- 
tries in  a  volatile  region  like  the  Middle 
East  to  discourage  the  spread  of  bal- 
listic missiles.  Therefore,  we  urge  re- 
gional states  to  refrain  from  further 
acquisition  of  these  weapons.  We  are 
ready  to  consult  with  countries  inside 
and  outside  the  region  about  ways  to 
prevent  new  sources  of  instability  and 
insecurity  arising  from  the  spread  of 
long-range  missiles. 

Chemical  Warfare 

The  spread  of  chemical  warfare  ca- 
pabilities to  the  Middle  East  is  deeply 
disturbing.  The  use  of  chemical  weap- 
ons in  the  Iran-Iraq  war,  and  by  Iraq 
against  its  Kurdish  population,  have 
caught  not  just  American  but  world  at- 
tention. We  are  also  deeply  troubled  by 
the  efforts  of  other  countries  in  the  re- 
gion to  acquire  chemical  weapons 
capabilities. 

The  Administration  has  taken  a 
number  of  steps  to  respond  to  this 
growing  threat. 

•  In  his  address  to  the  UN  General 
Assembly  on  September  26,  President 
Reagan  called  for  the  convening  of  an 
international  conference  to  reinforce 
the  ban  on  use  of  chemical  weapons  es- 
tablished by  the  1925  Geneva  protocol. 
Preparations  are  now  being  made  to 
hold  such  a  conference,  which  France 
has  agreed  to  chair. 

•  Its  objective  will  be  to  reaffirm 
the  international  community's  commit- 
ment against  chemical  weapons  use  and 
to  prevent  any  further  erosion  of  bar- 
riers against  such  use. 

•  We  have  publicly  and  unam- 
biguously opposed  the  illegal  use  of 
chemical  weapons  in  the  gulf  war  and 


43 


MIDDLE  EAST 


by  Iraq  against  the  Kurds.  We  have 
worked  to  obtain  Security  Council  reso- 
lutions condemning  chemical  weapons 
usage  during  the  gulf  war. 

•  We  have  drawn  public  attention 
to  Libyan  efforts  to  acquire  a  capability 
to  produce  chemical  warfare  agents.  In 
view  of  reports  that  Libya  used  chem- 
ical weapons  against  Chad  as  well  as 
Libya's  general  irresponsibility,  we  have 
called  on  all  countries  to  refrain  from 
supplying  Libya  with  any  assistance  in 
developing  a  chemical  weapons 
capability. 

•  We  are  negotiating  with  the  Sovi- 
ets and  others  in  Geneva  on  a  verifiable 
worldwide  ban  on  chemical  weapons. 

•  We  have  strengthened  our  own 
export  control  regulations  and  obtained 
agreement  from  other  Western  coun- 
tries on  an  expanded  list  of  precursor 
chemicals  whose  export  will  be  care- 
fully controlled. 

•  Through  diplomatic  channels,  we 
are  actively  consulting  other  potential 
supplier  countries,  including  the  Soviet 
Union,  about  ways  to  prevent  the  fur- 
ther spread  of  chemical  weapons 
capabilities. 

Unfortunately,  the  spread  of  chem- 
ical weapons  is  very  difficult  to  control. 
The  technology  required  to  manufac- 
ture chemical  warfare  agents  is  within 
the  reach  of  many  countries.  The  neces- 
sai'y  equipment  closely  resembles  that 
used  for  legitimate  chemical  industries, 
and  can  be  acquired  piecemeal  from  a 
large  number  of  commercial  suppliers, 
often  without  any  knowledge  or  in- 
volvement by  the  exporting  country's 
government.  Nonetheless,  we  are  com- 
mitted to  continue  our  efforts  to  stem 
the  chemical  weapons  threat. 


The  Administration  has  taken  a 
number  of  actions  to  end  Iraqi  use  of 
chemical  weapons  and  to  reinforce  in- 
ternational bans  on  using  them.  We 
have  made  it  abundantly  clear  to  the 
Iraqis — as  has  also  the  Congress — that 
they  cannot  have  good  relations  with  us 
and  continue  to  use  chemical  weapons. 

On  September  17,  Iraq  reaffirmed 
its  adherence  to  international  law,  in- 
cluding the  192.5  Geneva  protocol  on 
chemical  weapons  as  well  as  other  in- 
ternational humanitarian  law.  We  wel- 
comed this  statement  as  a  positive  step 
and  asked  for  confirmation  that  Iraq 
means  by  this  to  renounce  the  use  of 
chemical  weapons  inside  Iraq  as  well  as 
against  foreign  enemies.  On  October  3, 
the  Iraqi  foreign  minister  confirmed 
this  directly  to  Secretary  Shultz. 

We  take  these  assurances  as  seri- 
ous undertakings.  So  far,  there  is  no 
evidence  they  have  broken  their  Sep- 
tember 17  undertakings.  There  are 
good  reasons  for  Iraq  to  forgo  further 
chemical  weapons  use.  They  have  come 
to  be  aligned  with  many  of  our  friends 
in  the  Middle  East:  Egypt,  Jordan, 
Saudi  Arabia,  and  Kuwait.  Their  path 
is  clear  and  will  bring  them  influence  in 
the  region  and  economic  power.  But  to 
follow  that  path  they  cannot  alienate 
those  who  uphold  international  stand- 
ards, including  the  United  States  and 
others.  We  are  firmly  committed  to 
ensuring  that  future  use  of  chemical 
weapons  is  foresworn  by  all — including 
Iraq. 

Then  why  do  we  continue  to  oppose 
the  legislation  before  Congress  to  im- 
pose economic  sanctions  on  Iraq? 
Because  sanctions  would  not  be  produc- 
tive. We  are  prepared  to  impose  sanc- 
tions on  Iraq  if  it  violates  its 
assurances,  and  we  will  do  so. 


Iraq's  Use  of  Chemical  Weapons 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
SEF'T.  8,  19881 

As  a  result  of  our  evaluation  of  the  situ- 
ation, the  U.S.  Government  is  con- 
vinced Iraq  has  used  chemical  weapons 
in  its  military  campaign  against  Kur- 
dish guerrillas.  We  don't  know  the  ex- 
tent to  which  chemical  weapons  have 
been  used,  but  any  use  in  this  context 
is  abhorrent  and  unjustifiable. 

We  condemn  this  use  of  chemical 
weapons  as  we  have  consistently  con- 
demned li-a(|'s  use  of  chemical  weajioiis 


in  the  conflict  with  Iran.  We  expressed 
our  strong  concern  to  the  Iraqi  Govern- 
ment which  is  well  aware  of  our  posi- 
tion that  use  of  chemical  weapons  is 
totally  unjustifiable  and  unacceptable. 
The  Secretary  will  be  raising  this 
issue  with  the  Iraqi  Minister  of  State, 
Mr.  Saddoun  Hammadi,  during  his 
meeting  with  Mr.  Hammadi  this 
afternoon. 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by 
Department  spokesman  Charles  Redman. 


Future  Challenges 

As  we  approach  a  change  in  Admin- 
istration, I  thought  it  would  be  api^ro- 
priate  to  share  some  thoughts  on  the 
future  of  our  relations  with  the  coun- 
tries of  the  Middle  East  and  the  Per- 
sian Gulf  Certainly,  the  issues  that 
have  challenged  the  Administration  and 
the  Congress  will  not  disappear  or 
change  dramatically  on  November  .s. 

Above  all  we  need  to  keep  before 
us  an  objective  and  dispassionate  view 
of  U.S.  interests  in  the  region.  These 
are  varied  and  complex,  but  we  can 
identify  certain  key  elements  as  touch- 
stones in  our  relationships  in  the 
region. 

The  major  challenges  facing  us 
from  today  through  the  beginning  of 
the  new  year  include  preserving  the 
cease-fire  and  the  momentum  of  nego- 
tiations between  Iran  and  Iraq.  The  ne 
gotiations  will  continue  to  have  ups  anc 
downs — moments  of  high  drama  and 
days  of  frustration — but  the  overall 
trend  is  good.  It  is  too  easy  to  forget 
that  even  a  few  months  ago  we  had  no 
firm  sense  that  Iran  and  Iraq  would  bf 
negotiating  with,  rather  than  fighting, 
each  other.  Above  all,  we  must  not  cut 
and  run.  Our  presence  in  the  gulf  was 
instrumental  in  bringing  the  parties  tc 
the  negotiating  table;  our  will  to  see  it 
through  will  help  to  ensure  that  nego- 
tiations not  falter  and  the  cease-fire 
collapse. 

We  need  to  provide  strong  suppor 
to  the  UN  peacekeeping  group  and  to 
the  efforts  of  the  Secretary  General  t( 
bring  the  Geneva  talks  to  a  fruitful  cc 
elusion.  This  will  require  an  expend- 
iture of  both  moral  and  financial 
resources,  which  I  believe  the  Ameri 
can  people  are  willing  to  bear  to  brinj 
a  lasting  peace  to  that  vital  part  of  th 
world. 

Another  difficult  challenge  is  pre- 
serving our  current  policy  in  the  gulf 
region.  Radical  changes  are  not  in 
order.  We  have  developed  a  policy 
framework  which  has  worked:  over  th 
near  term,  we  have  to  see  it  through. 
We  need  to  counsel  continuity  and 
steadiness  to  keep  our  allies  engaged 
our  shared  efforts  in  the  gulf  Reduc- 
tions in  our  naval  forces  in  the  gulf  ar 
possible,  as  I  noted  earlier,  but  we  wi 
continue  to  maintain  the  Middle  East 
force  inside  the  gulf  and  a  strong  prei 
ence  outside  as  well. 

In  the  context  of  a  stable  cease-fi 
between  Iran  and  Iraq,  and  the  on- 
going process  of  negotiations  to  imple 
ment  Resolution  598,  we  are  also  opei 
to  the  possibility  of  improvement  in 


Department  of  State  Bulletin  December  19J 


MIDDLE  EAST 


-Iran  relations.  We  have  made  it 
ir  that  the  United  States  would  be 
pared  to  conduct  direct  discussions 
h  authoritative  Iranian  officials, 
wever,  there  remain  barriers  to  sig- 
cant  improvement  in  relations — most 
)ortantly,  Iran's  continuing  support 
international  terrorism  and  its  rela- 
iship  with  the  hostage-holders  in 
janon.  While  it  is  up  to  the  Iranian 
dership  to  judge  Iran's  interests,  re- 
nsible  figures  in  Tehran  should  now 
lize  the  hostages  are  only  a  burden 
Iran — not  leverage  on  us  and  oth- 
.  They  should  all  be  released 
thwith. 

We  must  not  forget  the  importance 
promoting  closer  economic  and  com- 
rcial  ties  with  the  GCC  [Gulf  Coop- 
tion  Council]  states,  but  also  Iraq  as 
onstruction  there  moves  forward, 
r  ties  to  the  region  should  not  stress 
y  the  political  and  security  dimen- 
is  of  the  oil  trade.  We  have  other 
de  and  investment  ties  with  the  re- 
n  which  require  cultivation,  on  the 
't  of  both  the  private  and  govern- 
nt  sector,  in  order  to  bear  fruit  for 
lerican  economic  interests.  Our  Eu- 
ean  and  .Japanese  friends  are  moving 
:ad  faster  than  we  in  the  trade  fig- 
is;  we  need  to  catch  up. 

Perhaps  of  greatest  interest  to  this 
committee  is  the  challenge  of  restor- 

momentum  to  the  the  peace  proc- 
.  The  process  is  currently  on  hold, 

is  certainly  not  e.xhausted.  The  in- 
tment  of  time  and  effort  by  the  Sec- 
ary — with  three  visits  to  the  region 
i  year  alone — has  yielded  some  divi- 
ds,  but  we  have  much  more  work 
:lo. 

Above  all  we  need  to  create  an  en- 
onment  of  moderation  that  will  en- 
rage all  sides  to  move  closer  to  the 
collating  table.  The  human  costs  of 

intifada  have  been  great  for  both 
estinians  and  Israelis  and  under- 
re  the  need  for  a  political  settle- 
nt.  A  further  hardening  of  hearts  is 

last  thing  we  want  to  see  in  Israel 
1  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza.  Pal- 
inians  have  e.xperienced  great  eco- 
nic  losses,  the  destruction  of  crops 
1  houses,  the  loss  of  almost  an  entire 
lool  year,  and  a  general  disruption  of 
ly  life.  The  uprising  has  also  under- 
led  some  of  the  economic  strides  Is- 
1  has  made  in  the  past  several  years. 

Both  sides  need  to  make  accom- 
dations.  The  Palestinians  need  to  put 
ether  a  political  program  they  can 


bring  to  the  negotiating  table.  They 
must  realize  that  violence  diverts  them 
from  their  goals.  They  must  act  respon- 
sibly, putting  an  end  to  empty  postur- 
ing, slogans  of  rejection,  and  inflated 
dreams. 

Israel's  attempts  to  end  the 
intifada  have  not  been  effective;  often 
they  have  resulted  in  increases  in  the 
number  of  casualties  and  appear  to 
have  reinforced  the  belief  shared  by 
many  Palestinians  that  there  is  no  al- 
ternative to  resisting  the  occupation  in 
the  streets  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza. 
Israel  needs  to  develop  a  positive  pro- 
gram for  dealing  with  the  uprising.  An 
exclusive  reliance  on  force,  deporta- 
tions, and  detentions  is  not  the  answer. 


We  urge  Israel  to  seek  opportunities  to 
develop  an  environment  of  moderation 
in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza. 

This  concludes  my  summing  up  of 
the  situation  in  the  Middle  East.  The 
region  remains  fraught  with  dangers 
and  opportunities.  Our  diplomatic  ef- 
forts must  not  falter  or  lose  their  inten- 
sity. I  appreciate  your  keen  interest  in 
the  region  as  well  as  the  interest  of 
your  colleagues  on  the  subcommittee. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee 
and  will  be  available  from  the  Superintend- 
ent of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Print- 
ing Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Lebanon:  At  the  Crossroads 


by  Richard  W.  Murphy 

Address  before  the  American  Uni- 
versity of  Beirut  (AUB)  Alumni  Con- 
ference in  Orlando  on  October  29,  1988. 

Thank  you  for  your  invitation  to  be 
with  you  tonight.  I  can  think  of  no  bet- 
ter audience  with  whom  to  share  my 
thoughts  about  Lebanon.  Lebanon  has 
been  a  topic  rarely  out  of  the  news 
these  days  and  never  off  our  mind  in 
Washington. 

First,  a  word  about  our  relations 
with  your  university.  The  American 
University  of  Beirut  and  the  United 
States  have  had  a  long  and  productive 
relationship.  The  fact  remains  that  for 
many  years,  the  U.S.  Government  has 
helped  AUB  and  its  hospital  to  meet 
many  of  its  operating  costs.  Last  year, 
we  contributed  nearly  $9  million.  This 
year,  we  expect  to  provide  about  the 
same  amount.  The  United  States  does 
so  in  recognition  of  AUB's  vital  role  in 
Lebanon  and  the  Middle  East,  because 
AUB  is  an  American  institution  in  its 
secular  and  open  spirit.  We  recognize 
that  AUB  is  in  and  of  the  Middle  East. 
Its  role  and  responsibilities  are  bound 
up  in  the  lives  and  affairs  of  the  people 
of  that  region.  AUB  reflects  the  hopes, 
fears,  the  trends,  and  tensions  of 
Lebanon  and  the  Middle  East  and  the 
best  values  of  the  United  States  and 
the  West. 


Because  it  does,  we  believe  the 
AUB  family  of  men  and  women — 
whether  Muslim  or  Christian,  Lebanese 
or  non-Lebanese — is  an  important,  civi- 
lized voice  of  moderation  and  tolerance, 
not  only  in  Lebanon  but  throughout  the 
Middle'East  and  the  world.  The  United 
States  recognizes  and  applauds  the 
commitment  of  AUB  to  Lebanon  and 
the  region.  We  respect  the  many  associ- 
ated with  AUB  who  have  worked  to 
advance  peace  and  understanding  in  the 
Middle  East.  Some,  like  [the  President 
of  AUB]  Malcolm  Kerr,  have  paid  with 
their  lives.  Many  others,  Lebanese 
and  American,  have  been  taken  as 
hostages. 

It  is  in  recognition  of  such  com- 
mitment and  service  that  the  United 
States  has  long  supported  AUB.  It  is  in 
recognition  of  AUB's  important  role  in 
promoting  stability  in  Lebanon  and  the 
region  that  our  support  for  your  univer- 
sity will  continue. 

Lebanon  and  the 

Middle  East  Peace  Process 

Let  me  pursue  this  issue  of  regional 
stability  for  a  moment  because 
Lebanon's  specific  problems  cannot  be 
sepai-ated  from  the  Arab-Israeli  con- 
flict. The  United  States  has  long  played 
a  leading  role  in  trying  to  bring  the 
parties  to  that  conflict  to  the  negotiat- 
ing table.  Early  this  year.  Secretary 
Shultz  put  forth  an  initiative  which  we 
believe  meets  the  fundamental  needs  of 
all  parties.  The  objective  of  that  initia- 
tive— indeed,  of  all  of  our  peace  process 


partment  of  State  Bulletin  December  1988 


45 


MIDDLE  EAST 


activities — is  a  comprehensive  peace 
between  Israel  and  all  its  Arab  neigh- 
bors, including  Lebanon. 

We  see  Lebanon  as  a  player  in  the 
Middle  East  peace  process  to  the  ex- 
tent that  it  wishes  and  is  able  to  be. 
Should  there  be  an  international  confer- 
ence, we  see  Lebanon  participating 
in  it  to  the  e.xtent  that  it  wishes  and 
is  able  to  do  so.  The  fact  of  the 
matter,  however,  is  that  only  a  unified 
Lebanese  government  can  participate 
effectively  on  the  broader  regional 
stage;  a  partitioned  Lebanon  cannot 
realize  the  interests  of  the  Lebanese 
people. 

U.S.  Opposition  to  Partition 

We  are  hearing  that  in  some  Lebanese 
circles  partition  is  being  seriously  dis- 
cussed as  a  solution  to  the  seemingly 
intractable  problems  faced  by  the  coun- 
try. Let  me  say  straight  out  that  the 
United  States  is,  and  will  continue  to 
be,  adamantly  opposed  to  partition. 
Some  challenge  our  position,  saying  that 
the  Lebanon  problem  cannot  be  solved 
in  light  of  the  deep  antagonisms  that 
plague  that  society.  We  disagree.  As 
long  as  Lebanese  Muslim  and  Christian 
can  gather  together,  as  they  have  here 
tonight,  Lebanon's  problems  can  be 
solved.  As  long  as  the  forces  of  modera- 
tion remain  in  Lebanon,  there  is  hope. 
As  long  as  the  American  University  of 
Beirut,  its  faculty,  staff,  and  students, 
its  alumni  and  its  administration,  can 
continue  the  university's  traditions  of 
dialogue  and  tolerance,  the  integrity 
and  authority  of  Lebanon  can  be  re- 
stored and  the  Lebanese  once  again 
proud  to  be  its  citizens. 

Lebanon  itself  is  in  agony.  But  the 
U.S.  Government,  for  one,  and  your 
university,  for  another,  are  convinced 
Lebanon  can  and  should  be  saved  and 
its  political  structure  rebuilt.  Partition 
is  the  very  antithesis  of  the  supple 
unity  in  Lebanon  that  long  accommo- 
dated Lebanon's  religious  and  cultural 
diffei'ences. 

Partition  would  raise  a  number  of 
questions  about  the  future.  For  e.xam- 
ple,  it  would  endanger  the  stabilizing 
role  played  by  such  forces  as  the  UN 
Interim  Force  in  Lebanon,  whose  troop 
presence  for  the  past  dozen  years  has 
been  semiannually  renewed  at  the 
specific  request  of  the  Lebanese  Gov- 
ernment— a  government  whose  frag- 
mentation is  now  forcing  the  question: 
Who  speaks  for  Lebanon? 

A  Lebanon  which  stopped  short  of 
formal  partition  but  effectively  created 


46 


Maronite,  Shi'ite,  Sunni,  and  Druze 
cantons  would  not  be  a  country,  but,  at 
best,  an  unstable  collection  of  insecure 
and  mutually  antagonistic  entities.  The 
major  thi-eats  that  the  conflict  in 
Lebanon  now  pose  to  the  international 
community  would  not  be  solved. 
Lebanon  would  continue  to  be  a  base 
for  international  terrorism.  It  would 
continue  to  be  a  drug  trafficking  center. 
Its  problems  would  still  undermine 
regional  stability. 

U.S.  Support  for  Reform 
and  National  Reconciliation 

It  is  obvious  partition  cannot  be  the 
answer.  Reform  and  national  reconcilia- 
tion are.  But  how  to  agree  on  that 
reform?  How  to  achieve  national  recon- 
ciliation? The  fact  that  such  questions 
remain  unanswered  lies  behind 
Lebanon's  inability  to  elect  a  new  presi- 
dent. In  this  sense,  the  current  elec- 
toral impasse  is  the  symptom  of  a 
disease,  not  the  disease  itself  And,  as 
the  many  physicians  here  tonight  will 
appreciate,  you  can  only  treat  symp- 
toms effectively  if  you  accurately  diag- 
nose the  condition  that  is  causing  them. 
Constitutional  reform  that  addresses 
the  concerns  of  all  Lebanese  is  the  only 
long-run  cure. 

The  United  States  believes  the 
election  of  a  president  should  be  held  as 
soon  as  possible,  in  peace  and  in  safety. 
Lebanon  needs  a  president  who  is  com- 
mitted to  immediately  and  resolutely 
beginning  the  process  of  restoring  the 
unity  and  authority  of  the  central  gov- 
ernment— a  president  who  is  committed 
to  promoting  national  reconciliation  and 
reforming  the  constitution.  We  will  not 
hesitate  to  favor  those  who  work  for 
the  holding  of  elections  for  such  a  presi- 
dent. And  we  will  publicly  identify  and 
oppose  those  who  are  obstacles  to  the 
elections  and  reform. 

How  can  the  U.S.  Government  best 
help  the  elections?  The  best  way  is  to 
help  the  Lebanese  help  themselves.  We 
are,  for  example,  encouraging  Patriarch 
Sfeir's  [Maronite  Catholic  Patriarch  of 
Lebanon]  efforts  to  identify  at  least 
one  or  two  candidates  on  whom  the 
Lebanese — both  Christian  and  Mus- 
lim— can  agree.  Should  he  succeed  in 
gaining  a  Christian-Muslim  consensus 
on  candidates,  appropriate  steps  will 
need  to  be  taken  to  get  others  to  sup- 
port this  consensus. 

So  far,  the  impasse  continues.  Cre- 
ative approaches  are  critically  needed. 
We  urge  all  parties  to  reconsider  their 
positions  and  to  explore  the  means  and 


methods  for  clearing  the  way  to  the 
election  and  reform.  Common  ground 
on  the  election  and  on  reform  can  and 
must  be  developed  among  the  parties  t 
the  Lebanon  problem. 

Our  Embassy  in  Beirut  works  un- 
der formidable  handicaps  in  terms  of 
moving  around  the  city  and  keeping 
contact  with  the  many  opinion  leaders: 
But  we  have  confirmed  that  some  com- 
mon ground  already  exis*:s.  No  party 
admits  to  wanting  formal  partition,  al- 
though some  may  be  inclined  to  acct-p) 
it  as  a  second  or  third  choice.  In 
Beirut,  "partitionist"  is  still  the  label 
you  try  to  pin  on  your  adversary.  All 
senior  leaders  appear  to  prefer  that  a 
central  government  continue,  althougl 
they  differ  on  the  rights  and  respon- 
sibilities that  govei'nment  should 
exercise.  All  believe  in  the  need  to 
assure  the  freedom  and  safety  of  each' 
Lebanese  citizen  as  well  as  the  securi 
of  their  respective  communities.  The 
United  States  is  convinced  that,  from 
such  a  common  framework,  consensus 
can  be  reached  through  compromise  c 
the  details. 

The  United  States  also  recognize 
that  the  lack  of  security  and  stability 
Lebanon  threatens  the  interests  of  it: 
neighbors  and  undermines  the  comnK 
ground  that  does  exist.  We  are  cate- 
gorically opposed  to  Lebanon  being 
used  as  a  base  for  attacks  on  Israel  c 
Syria.  No  solution  to  the  Lebanon 
crisis  will  be  found  in  undermining  tl 
security  and  stability  of  its  neighbor.- 

Rather,  Lebanon's  interests  reqi; 
recognition  of  the  legitimate  interest 
of  its  neighbors.  As  far  as  Syria  is  C( 
cerned,  we  believe  Damascus  has  no 
tention  to  annex  any  part  of  Lebanoi 
in  fact,  we  believe  Syria  wishes  to  re 
duce  its  burdens  in  Lebanon  as  soon 
possible.  Despite  the  differences  be- 
tween our  two  governments  on  some 
other  issues,  as  far  as  the  immediati 
political  crises  is  concerned,  Syria  h, 
told  us  at  the  highest  level  that  it 
strongly  supports  a  presidential  ele( 
tion  in  Lebanon  followed  by  constitu 
tional  reform  and  national  reconcilia 
tion.  We  believe  the  nature  of  that 
reform  must  be  negotiated  among 
the  Lebanese. 

We  support  constitutional  refori 
as  the  best  way  to  restore  Lebanon' 
unity  and  territorial  integrity.  This 
be  unwelcome  to  those  who  resist  si 
ing  privileges  but  the  political  struc 
ture,  subjected  to  open  violence  sin< 
197.5,  cannot  be  simply  restored  to  i 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  t  IH 


IIDDLE  EAST 


shape,  if  stability  and  pros- 
are  to  be  regained.  Legitimate 
.  -    aiices  have  prolonged  the  civil  war. 
r-t   L;rievances  cannot  be  wished 
'  i\  those  who  may  dream  of  re- 
_:  the  good  old  days.  Reform  is 
!  a.itdry.  Accordingly,  the  United 
ites  will  continue  to  exert  every 
brt  to  help  ensure  positive  movement 
electing  a  president  who  is  clearly 
Timitted  to  reform  so  that  Lebanon's 
ity  and  territorial  integrity  can  be 
stored. 

I  have  already  addi-essed  the  im- 
rtance  we  attach  to  the  peaceful, 
istitutional  election  of  a  president 
nniitted  to  reform.  Let  me  briefly 
■iew  with  you  the  efforts  we  have 
ide. 

As  many  of  you  know,  our  diplo- 
itic  efforts  associated  with  constitu- 
nal  reform  began  about  a  year  ago, 
len  then-President  Amine  Gemayel 
<ed  us  to  help.  The  Syrians  and 
banese  Muslim  leadership  also  wel- 
ned  our  involvement.  We  worked 
rd  on  helping  the  Lebanese  reach  an 
reement  on  reform,  especially  from 
bruary  through  April  of  this  year.  It 
s  an  awkward,  thankless,  and  ulti- 
itely  unsuccessful  effort;  it  became 
J.S.  shuttle  between  Beirut  and 
mascus  rather  than  the  Lebanese 
?mselves  negotiating  directly  with 
?  another  Our  efforts  nonetheless 
suited  in  some  progress  in  two  key 
;as:  power-sharing  and  deconfes- 
nalization.  However,  by  the  end  of 
)ril,  no  reform  text  on  which  all 
les  could  agree  had  been  reached, 
th  the  September  deadline  for 
3  holding  of  a  presidential  election 
)idly  approaching,  all  parties 
reed  to  postpone  reform  efforts 
til  after  the  election. 

le  Need  for  Unity 

1  September  23,  after  two  attempts 
hold  elections,  Parliament  failed  to 
nvene  to  elect  a  new  president  before 
esident  Gemayel's  term  ended.  The 
'banese  presidency  fell  vacant.  Five 
;eks  later,  the  parliamentary  deputies 
ill  cannot  agree  either  on  the  site  for 
e  election  or  on  whom  they  should 
nsider  for  president. 

Lebanon  is  now  at  the  crossroads, 
oving  to  partition,  wittingly  or  unwit- 
igly,  or  moving  to  a  renewed  unity, 
vo  cabinets  are  competing  to  control 
e  institutions  of  government.  The  fis- 
ires  within  government  are  appearing 
the  top  ranks  of  the  civil  and  mili- 
ry  service.  This  creeping  partitioning 


of  government,  if  allowed  to  continue, 
will  accelerate  the  political  and  socio- 
economic fragmentation  of  Lebanon 
that  has  been  underway  since  1975. 

Our  policy  is  to  promote  actions 
which  will  unite  the  Lebanese.  We  will 
continue  to  work  both  with  Gen.  Awn 
[Commander  of  the  Lebanese  Armed 
Forces]  and  Dr.  Huss  [Acting  Prime 
Minister  under  President  Gemayel] 
toward  elections  and  reform.  We  are 
convinced  that  both  these  men  have 
the  good  of  Lebanon  at  heart  and 
will  resist  the  intense  pressures  for 
divisive  action. 

If  Lebanon  is  to  survive,  there  is 
much  work  to  do,  and  I  believe  we  all 
agree  that  time  is  running  out.  The 
Lebanese  themselves  have  not  always 
been  willing  or  able  to  assume  the  re- 
sponsibility they  must  for  Lebanon's 
fate.  Some  have  been  too  willing  to 
blame  others  for  their  national  calami- 
ties. They  have  been  too  quick  to  shrug 
off  responsibility  for  what  has  happened 
in  Lebanon  since  1975;  too  quick  to  say 
the  Lebanese  are  weak — powerless  to 
prevent  others  from  using  the  country 
as  the  staging  area  and  killing  field  for 
non-Lebanese  rivalries. 

These  Lebanese  are  both  right  and 
wrong  in  these  views.  They  are  right 
that  foreign  powers  have  been  quick  to 
exploit  conditions  in  a  broken  country 
to  further  their  own  national  goals.  The 
United  States  opposes  this  cynical  ex- 
ploitation of  Lebanon.  Our  opposition  is 
reflected  in  our  call  for  the  withdrawal 
of  all  foreign  forces  from  Lebanon.  It 
is  reflected  in  our  support  for  Security 
Council  Resolution  425  in  1978.  The 
U.S.  Government  will  continue  to 
oppose  the  occupation  of  Lebanon 
by  foreign  powers. 

So,  the  Lebanese  may  be  right 
about  the  negative  role  of  foreign 
powers  in  Lebanese  affairs,  but  they 
are  wrong  if  they  believe  they  can  do 
little  about  it.  The  Lebanese  can  deter- 
mine Lebanon's  future,  but  only  if  they 
demonstrate  courage  and  the  willing- 
ness to  compromise  in  order  to  reach 
consensus  among  themselves  on  the 
immediate  question  of  presidential 


candidates  and  the  farther  reaching 
problems  of  reform  and  reconciliation  as 
well. 

The  Lebanese  are  also  wrong  if 
they  believe  that  external  forces  will 
come  to  their  rescue  and  restore  their 
country  to  its  former  vitality.  Outsiders 
can  help.  The  Arab  and  international 
community  can  and  should  render  sig- 
nificant assistance  to  Lebanon.  And  we 
support  all  such  international  and  Arab 
efforts  to  assist  Lebanon  in  its  hour  of 
need.  But  such  external  forces  can  do 
nothing  if  the  Lebanese  themselves  are 
unwilling  to  accept  the  tasks  and  make 
the  difficult  choices  associated  with 
reconciliation. 

Only  through  compromise,  consen- 
sus, and  reconciliation  can  the  Leba- 
nese begin  their  long  march  toward 
national  unity  and  sovereignty.  True 
unity  must  be  based  on  a  common  rec- 
ognition of,  and  respect  for,  religious 
and  cultural  diversity.  Lasting  unity 
can  only  come  about  if  there  is  a  com- 
mon commitment  to  the  security  and 
equal  opportunity  of  all  citizens  and  to 
the  fi-eedom  of  all  citizens  to  worship 
God  in  their  own  way  as  long  as  that 
worship  does  not  infringe  upon  the 
right  of  any  other  citizens  to  do  the 
same.  These  are  the  principles  the  next 
president  of  Lebanon  must  espouse. 

Such  a  commitment  is  more 
than  just  a  theoretical  possibility  in 
Lebanon;  we  believe  the  Lebanese  are 
preeminently  capable  of  the  commit- 
ment. Lebanon,  after  all,  traditionally 
has  been  one  of  the  world's  greatest 
religious  refuges,  home  to  17  sects 
which  for  generations — indeed,  cen- 
turies— have  managed,  however  ten- 
uously at  times,  to  live  together.  Can 
the  events  of  just  13  years  obliterate 
the  orientation  produced  by  the  at- 
titudes and  practices  of  generations? 
I  think  not. 

But  time  is  short.  Each  day  that 
passes  without  progress  toward  an  elec- 
tion and  reform  is  a  day  that  draws 
violence  and  formal  partition  nearer. 
Let  the  effort  at  consensus,  compro- 
mise, and  reconciliation  begin  anew; 
let  it  begin  now.  ■ 


47 


MIDDLE  EAST 


Republic  of  Lebanon 


Geography 

Lebanon,  on  the  eastern  shore  of  the 
Mediterranean  Sea,  is  bounded  on  the 
north  and  east  by  Syria  and  on  the 
south  by  Israel.  Its  principal  topo- 
graphic features  are  a  narrow  coastal 
plain  behind  which  are  the  high 
Lebanon  Mountains,  the  fertile  Biqa' 
Valley,  and  the  Anti-Lebanon  Moun- 
tains extending  to  the  Syrian  border. 

The  Litani  River,  which  flows  into 
the  sea  north  of  Tyre,  is  Lebanon's 
main  river  and  the  only  river  in  the 
Arab  Near  East  that  does  not  cross  a 
national  boundary.  The  Hasbani  River, 
one  of  the  sources  of  the  Jordan  River, 
rises  within  Lebanon. 


People 

The  population  of  Lebanon  comprises 
Christians  and  Muslims.  No  official  cen- 
sus has  been  taken  since  1932,  reflect- 
ing the  political  sensitivity  in  Lebanon 
over  confessional  (religious)  balance. 
Although  there  are  no  official  figures,  it 
has  become  increasingly  clear  in  recent 
years  that  Muslims  outnumber  Chris- 
tians. A  1977  French  family  planning 
study,  for  e.xample,  put  the  ratio  at 
55%  Muslim  and  45%  Christian.  Claims 
since  the  early  1970s  by  Muslims  that 
they  are  in  the  majority  contributed  to 
tensions  preceding  the  1975-76  civil 
strife  and,  currently,  are  the  basis  of 
demands  for  a  more  powerful  Muslim 
voice  in  the  government. 

Many  Christian  sects  are  repre- 
sented in  Lebanon,  including  Mar- 
onites,  Greek  Orthodox,  Greek 
Catholic,  Armenians,  Catholic,  and 
Protestant.  The  Maronites,  who  are  af- 
filiated with  the  Roman  Catholic 
Church,  make  up  the  largest  Christian 
group.  Muslims  include  members  from 
the  Sunni  and  Shi'a  sects,  the  latter 
now  constituting  the  largest  religious 
community  in  Lebanon.  Adherents  to 
the  Druze  sect,  a  group  deriving  from 
Shi'ite  Islam  but  differing  greatly  from 
it,  constitute  another  significant  minor- 
ity. With  no  official  figures  available,  it 
is  estimated  that  600,000-900,000  per- 
sons fied  the  country  during  the 
1975-76  civil  strife.  Although  some  re- 
turned, continuing  instability  in  the 
late  1970s,  the  1982  Israeli  invasion, 
and  renewed  internal  conflict  in  1983-84 
sparked  further  waves  of  emigration, 
adding  to  uncertainty  over  population 
figures. 


Many  Lebanese  still  derive  their 
living  from  agriculture.  The  urban  pop- 
ulation, concentrated  mainly  in  Beirut 
and  Tripoli,  is  noted  for  its  commercial 
enterprise,  but  chronic  instability  in 
much  of  the  country  has  had  a  strong 
negative  impact  on  both  agriculture  and 
commerce.  Lebanon  has  a  higher  pro- 
portion of  skilled  labor  than  any  other 
Arab  country. 

History 

Lebanon  is  the  historical  home  of  the 
Phoenicians,  Semitic  traders  who  based 
a  maritime  culture  there  for  more  than 
2,000  years  (c.  2700-4.50  B.C.).  In  later 
centuries,  Lebanon's  mountains  were  a 
refuge  for  Christians,  and  the  Cru- 
saders established  several  strongholds 
there.  Following  the  collapse  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire  after  World  War  I, 
the  five  Ottoman  provinces  that  had 
comprised  present-day  Lebanon  were 
mandated  to  France  by  the  League  of 
Nations.  The  country  gained  independ- 
ence in  1943,  and  French  troops  were 
withdrawn  in  1946. 

Lebanon's  history  since  independ- 
ence can  be  defined  largely  in  terms  of 
its  presidents,  each  of  whom  has 
shaped  Lebanon  by  his  personal  brand 
of  politics:  Sheikh  Bishara  al-Khoury 
(1943-52),  Camille  Chamoun  (1952-58), 
Fuad  Shihab  (1958-64),  Charles  Helou 
(1964-70),  Suleiman  Franjiyah 
(1970-76),  Elias  Sarkis  (1976-1982),  and 
Amine  Gemayel  (1982-present). 

The  terms  of  the  first  two  presi- 
dents ended  in  political  turmoil.  In 
1958,  during  the  last  months  of  Presi- 
dent Chamoun's  term,  an  insurrection 
broke  out,  aggravated  intensely  by  ex- 
ternal factors.  In  July  1958,  in  response 
to  the  Lebanese  Government's  appeal, 
U.S.  forces  were  sent  in  to  help  and 
were  later  withdrawn  in  October  1958, 
after  the  inauguration  of  President 
Shihab  and  a  general  improvement  in 
the  internal  and  international  aspects  of 
the  situation. 

President  Franjiyah's  term  saw  the 
outbreak  of  full-scale  civil  conflict  in 
1975.  Prior  to  1975,  difficulties  had 
arisen  over  the  large  number  of  Pales- 
tinian refugees  in  Lebanon  and  the 
presence  of  Palestinian  fedayeen  (com- 
mandos). Frequent  clashes  involving 
Israeli  forces  and  the  fedai/ee)!  en- 
dangered civilians  in  south  Lebanon 
and  unsettled  the  country.  Following 
minor  skirmishes  in  the  late  1960s  and 


early  1970s,  serious  clashes  erupted  h& 
tween  the  fedai/een  and  Lebanese  Gov 
ernment  forces  in  May  1973. 

Coupled  with  the  Palestinian  prob- 
lem, Muslim  and  Christian  differences 
grew  more  intense,  with  occasional 
clashes  between  sectarian  private  mili- 
tias. The  Muslims  were  dissatisfied 
with  what  they  considered  to  be  an  in- 
equitable distribution  of  political  powe 
and  social  benefits.  In  April  1975,  a 
busload  of  Palestinians  was  ambushed 
by  gunmen  in  the  Christian  sector  of 
Beirut,  an  incident  widely  regarded  as 
the  spark  that  touched  off  the  civil 
strife.  Palestinian  /erfo.i/ee»  forces 
joined  the  predominantly  leftist-Musli: 
side  as  the  fighting  persisted,  and 
fighting  eventually  escalated  and 
spread  to  most  parts  of  the  country. 

Elias  Sarkis  was  elected  presiden 
in  1976.  In  October  of  that  year,  Arab 
summits  in  Riyadh  and  Cairo  set  fortl 
a  plan  to  end  the  war.  The  resulting 
Arab  Deterrent  Force  (ADF),  com- 
posed largely  of  Syrian  troops,  moved 
in  at  the  Lebanese  Government's  invii 
tion  to  separate  the  combatants,  and 
most  fighting  ended  soon  thereafter. 

In  mid-1978,  clashes  between  the 
ADF  and  the  Christian  militias 
erupted.  The  Arab  foreign  ministers, 
a  meeting  in  Bayt  ad-Din,  Lebanon, 
created  the  Arab  Follow-Up  Commit- 
tee, composed  of  Lebanon,  Syria,  Sai 
Arabia,  and  Kuwait,  to  end  fighting  1 
tween  the  Syrians  and  Christians. 
After  the  Saudi  ambassador  was 
wounded  in  December  1978,  the  com- 
mittee did  not  meet  again  formally  ui 
June  1981,  when  it  was  convened  to  b 
gin  addressing  issues  of  security  and 
national  reconciliation,  starting  with 
the  Zahlah  crisis.  (The  crisis  began  ii 
April  1981,  when  a  confrontation  aro;- 
between  Syrian  troops  and  a  Christ i; 
militia.)  The  situation  in  Zahlah  was 
solved  in  late  June  1981,  but  the  com 
mittee  was  unsuccessful  in  making 
progress  toward  a  broader  political  s 
tlement  and  has  been  inactive  since 
November  1981. 

Israeli-Palestinian  fighting  in  Jul 
1981  was  ended  by  a  cease-fire  arran; 
by  President  Reagan's  special  envoy, 
Philip  C.  Habib,  and  announced  on  J 
24,  1981.  The  cease-fire  was  respecter 
during  the  next  10  months,  but  a  stri 
of  incidents — an  assassination  attenif 
against  the  Israeli  ambassador  in  Lo 
don,  Israeli  retaliatory  air  strikes 
against  Palestinian  positions  in 
Lebanon,  and  responding  PLO  (Pal- 
estine Liberation  Organization)  rocki 
attacks  into  northern  Israel — led  to  I 


48 


MIDDLE  EAST 


ne  6,  1982,  Israeli  ground  attack  into 
ibanon.  Israeli  forces  moved  quickly 

ough  south  Lebanon,  reaching  and 
circling  west  Beirut  by  mid-June  and 
ginning  a  2V:;-month  siege  of  Palestin- 
1  and  Syrian  forces  in  the  city. 
roughout  this  period,  which  saw  sus- 
ned,  heavy  Israeli  air,  naval,  and  ar- 
lery  bombardments  of  west  Beirut, 
nbassador  Habib  worked  actively  to 
range  a  settlement.  In  August,  he 
IS  successful  in  bringing  about  an 
reement  for  the  evacuation  of  Syrian 
)ops  and  PLO  fighters  fi-om  Beirut. 
le  agreement  also  provided  for  the 
ployment  of  a  three-nation  multina- 
inal  force  (MNF)  during  the  period  of 
e  evacuation,  and  by  late  August. 
S.  Marines,  as  well  as  French  and 
ilian  units,  had  arrived  in  Beirut, 
llowing  the  conclusion  of  the  evacua- 
n,  these  units  departed.  The  Marines 
't  on  September  10. 

In  spite  of  the  invasion,  the 
banese  political  process  continued  to 
action,  and  Bashir  Gemayel  was 
icted  president  in  August,  succeeding 
ias  Sarkis.  On  September  14,  bow- 
er, only  9  days  before  he  was  to  as- 
me  the  presidency,  Bashir  Gemayel 
s  assassinated  when  a  bomb  e.\- 
)ded  while  he  was  addressing  a  meet- 
=;  in  east  Beirut.  Subsequently, 
•aeli  troops  entered  west  Beirut,  be- 
ining  September  15.  On  September 
-18,  Lebanese  militiamen  massacred 
ndreds  of  Palestinian  civilians  in  the 
bra  and  Shatila  refugee  camps  in 
■St  Beirut. 

Bashir  Gemayel's  brother,  Amine, 
IS  elected  president  by  a  unanimous 
te  of  Parliament  on  September  21.  He 
Dk  office  on  September  23,  beginning 
e  effort  to  restore  stability  and  eco- 
mic  prosperity  to  Lebanon  and  to 
n  the  withdrawal  of  all  foreign  forces. 

assist  in  this  undertaking,  MNF 
•ces  returned  to  Beirut  at  the  end  of 
ptember,  their  presence  serving  as  a 
mbol  of  support  for  the  government. 

February  1983,  a  small  British  con- 
igent  joined  the  U.S.,  French,  and 
alian  MNF  troops  in  Beirut.  Presi- 
nt  Gemayel  and  his  government 
aced  primary  emphasis  on  the  with- 
awal  of  Israeli,  Syrian,  and  Palestin- 
n  forces  from  Lebanon,  and  in  late 
82,  Lebanese-Israeli  negotiations 
mmenced  with  U.S.  participation.  On 
ay  17,  1983,  an  agreement  was  signed 
I  the  representatives  of  Lebanon,  Is- 
lel,  and  the  United  States  that  pro- 
ded  for  Israeli  withdrawal.  Syria, 
)wever,  in  spite  of  earlier  assurances, 
iclined  to  discuss  the  withdrawal  of  its 


Lebanon — A  Profile 


Geography 

.\rea:  l(l,4.'i2  sq.  km,  (4,015  .sq.  mi.);  about 
halt  the  M/c  nf  Xrw  .l(.rs<'v.  Cities:  Capital 

— Bi'ii'iii   M..,|,,   1,1  inillimii;  ()//,,(■  cities— 
Trii.Hili  iL'ln.iHMi'.  Shii.n  ,  im.iKKl),  Tyre 
{60,110111.  Zahhih  i:,:,.niMi,   IVi-rain:  karrow 
coastal  plain  hark.'d  \'\  I  he  Lchanon  Moun- 
tains, Ih.'  I'urtilr  I'.iqa'  \allcy,  ami  thp 
.\nti-l.,'lMn..ii  .M.iiirit,-.,in-,  w'hirh  rMr^inl  in 

tlU'  Syrian  Imrdcr.   / m/— ill',   iirhaii,  ■]■■.-■ 

ert,  111-  waste:  21' i   a.urk-ult  lira!;  li',    fnr- 
ested.  Climate:  Typically  .Mcilit.Trani'an, 
resembling  that  nf  suutlu'i  n  ( 'alilurnia. 
Temperatures  rarely-  cNreeil  :'.ii    ('  i.s.'i  1-"  i 
durini>-  the  sumnu'r,  Imt  huniKlity  i-  hiyh. 

People 

Nationality:  \<u,,i  and  ,_u!i,ilirr~ 
LebaniM-  (MllL^  and  |.il,  I,  Population  ll!i,s:; 
est.):  '!.'>  niillinii.  .\nnual  growth  rate 

(19,s:-!  ,.^11    iinl.;i]M\Mi,   Ethnic  groups:  .A.rah 
!i:-;',,  .\iiii.Tnan  li'.     Kcligions:  Christian 
(.Marnniti',  Urc-k  (Irtliudux.  Crn^k  Catho- 
lic, Kiiiiian  (,'athiilic,  Protestant).  Muslim 
(Sunni  ;ind  Shi'a).  and  Druze.  Language.s: 
Arabic  (olTiciali,  Fri'iich,  English,  Arme- 
nian. Education:  r^<i.:^  cmi/ piilsu]-!/ — ,"). 
Atl,:H,l,nn;-\-i:v,,  i:.!.  r.n„— 7.V,.  Health: 

blfa)il    ilu,ii,ll'lil   ri:t,—4S  1,01111  llitMIl,    Lilr 

e,rpcvtiiin',i—t^r>  yr.s.  Work  force:  ni.'iiMHlo 
in  IH.s,');  . 1,,,, ,„/;,.,,>— IT',  ,  I „,/ ,i:,f ni.  mm- 

men  ,  -7.".',  .  ';.w.  ,■,'.,-.  ///— 

8'i . 

Government 

Type:  parliamentary  republic. 
Independence:  l'.ii:i    Constitution:  May 

26,  192ii  laniendeill, 

Hran(4ics:  A'y- <■,(/,/■, —president  (chief 
of  state,  ,>le,i(M|  l.\   simple  majnrity  of  par- 
lianieiii   Imt  'i-\e:ir  termi,  (';iliiiiet  nf  .Minis- 
ters ia|i|Hiiiiteil  I.  I.I  i/is!(itir< — unicamei-al 
parliament  ilMi-niemher  National  .Assembly 
elected  for  )-year  tei-nis:  last  parliamen- 
tary elections  in  i;t72i,  J /nl :,-:,il — .secular 
and  religious  courts:  comlnnal  leii  nf  ilt- 
toman,  ci\il,  and  canen  law:  im  judicial  re- 
view of  letiishitiNi'  acts. 


.■Vdministratjvc  subdivisions:  (i 

provinces,  each  headed  by  a  governor: 
Beirut.  North  Lebanon.  South  Lebanon. 
Mount  Lebanon,  Biqa',  and  Jabal  Amal 
(roughly  the  southern  half  of  South 
Lebanon). 

Political  parties:  Organized  along  sec- 
tarian lines  around  individuals  whose  fol- 
lewers  are  niiitixati'il  by  religious,  clan, 
.iinl  eilinir  cen>iiler;itiens.  Suffrage:  Males 
'iier  -i\:  feiiKile,-  u\er  21  with  elementarv 
educ:.tiui,. 

Central  government  budget  ilMSs  pro- 
jected i:  ,s2iil!.:!  million. 

Defense  il!lS4  projected  -  .-■:;n  i;  million 
nr  1-")',  of  government  budgi  !     /a  !'•   / 
ii;is7)._,'?U(i.7  million,  or  ."i-l'.  ef  liudget. 

Flag:  Two  horizontal  red  hands  Imr- 
denng  a  lirnader  «  hite  liaiid  en  whicli  a 
cedar  tree  i>  celUereil, 

Economy 

(JDP:  No  reliable  current  figure  available: 
lii.s:; — ,■<:;  hillien.  .\nnual  growth  rate: 

X'aries  uitli  security  situatimi  but  thought 
to  be  negligible  ..ver  the  I',l71-Sl  period.  It 
has  preliiiblc  derlme.l  .-nice  miil-19S2,  Per 
capita  iiuonic:  .s:;i;ii  i  :i.~  ,-111111  iig  population 
of  2,5  niillium,  .\vg.  inflation  rate  (198(5 
est. );  7110',  , 

Natural  resources:  Limestone, 

-Vgriculture  Clo'r  of  GDP  in  1984): 
I'roil arts — citrus  fruits,  produce.  Lain! — 
1(1,^,011(1  hectares  under  cultivation. 

Industry  ild',  ef  (.iDPi:  y'.(//,r.s— cement 
productieii,  light  industry,  refining. 

Trade  lUisili;  /•;,,7"<,(s— ,S221,4  million 
(est,!,  Mnjnr  ;e, //■/,.  (,<—.\rab  states, 
/,„/„,,7,s— ,S:!tlll,r,  milliiill  (est.l.   ,l/o;.o-  ,v»/)- 
/)/,er,s  — Western   Ihirope,   CS, 

Official  c\cbantrc  rate  cSejitember 
19s7l:  27O-:;0(i  Lebanese  pmilids  =  US$1, 

Fiscal  year:  Calendar  year. 

Membership  in  International 
Organizations 

CN  :ind  si'ver:il  of  its  specialized  a.gencies, 

.■\r,di  l.e:inie,  Mrganization  of  the  Islamic 
(■(Milereoce  idlCi,  .Nonaligned  Movement, 
(iroup  of  77,  INTELSAT. 


troops,  effectively  stalemating  further 
progress.  Faced  with  continuing  Syrian 
opposition  to  the  Lebanon-Israel  agree- 
ment, the  Lebanese  Government  an- 
nounced on  March  5,  1984,  that  it  was 
canceling  its  unimplemented  agreement 
with  Israel. 

Although  the  general  security  situ- 
ation in  Beirut  remained  calm  through 
late  1982  and  the  first  half  of  1983,  a' 
move  by  Christian  militiamen  into  the 


Druze-controlled  Shuf  area  southeast  of 
Beirut  following  the  Israeli  invasion  led 
to  a  series  of  Druze-Christian  clashes  of 
escalating  intensity  beginning  in  Oc- 
tober 1982.  When  Israeli  forces  uni- 
laterally withdrew  from  the  Shuf  at  the 
beginning  of  September  1983.  a  full- 
scale  battle  erupted  with  the  Druze, 
backed  by  Syria,  pitted  against  the 
Christian  Lebanese  Forces  militia  as 


49 


MIDDLE  EAST 


Lebanon 

— ^— —  International  boundary 

Armistice  Line,  1949 

Province  boundary 

*  National  capital 

®  Province  capital 

Road 

- — Railroad 


Al  HamidiyahV 


' -y^"       1       Rumaysh, I 

Ga    ■]( 
jf  Nahariyya  v 

/  ISRAEL* 


As  Sanamavn  ^ 


As  Surah  as  Sughra 


50 


Department  of  State  Bulletin'December  19 


MIDDLE  EAST 


11  as  the  Lebanese  Army.  A  eease- 
■r  I  liat  followed  very  active  U.S.  and 
uuii  efforts  to  bring  the  fighting  to  an 
■  il  was  concluded  on  September  2(5 
it  the  Druze  in  control  of  most  of 
if  Casualties  were  estimated  to 
.:.  I  he  thousands. 

.Vs  it  became  clear  that  the  depar- 
llie  nf  the  U.S.  Marines  was  imminent, 
e  Gemayel  government  came  under 
creasing  pressure  from  Syria  and  its 
uslim  allies  to  abandon  the  May  17 
cord.  The  virtual  collapse  of  the 
banese  Army  in  February  1984,  fol- 
.ving  the  defection  of  many  of  its  Mus- 
n  and  Druze  units  to  opposition 
ilitias,  was  a  further  blow  to  the  gov- 
nment's  viability.  His  options  rapidly 
k'indling,  Gemayel  agreed  to  abrogate 
e  accord:  the  Marines  were  with- 
awn  in  March. 

Syria,  however,  proved  unable  to 
rn  matters  decisively  to  its  advan- 
ge.  Further  national  reconciliation 
Iks  at  Lausanne  (Switzerland)  under 
rian  auspices  failed.  A  new  "govern- 
2nt  of  national  unity"  under  Prime 
inister  Rashid  Karami  was  declared 
April  1984  but  made  no  significant 
ogress  toward  solving  Lebanon's  in- 
rnal  political  crisis  or  its  growing  eco- 
mic  difficulties. 

The  situation  was  e.xacerbated  by 
e  deterioration  of  internal  security, 
le  opening  I'ounds  of  the  savage 
amps  war"  in  May  1985 — a  war  that 
red  up  twice  more  in  1986 — pitted 
e  Palestinians  living  in  refugee  camps 
Beirut,  Tyre,  and  Sidon  against  the 
i'ite  Amal  militia,  which  was  con- 
rned  with  resurgent  Palestinian  mili- 
;\v  strength  in  Lebanon.  Eager  for  a 
lution  in  late  1985,  Syria  mediated  a 
■ipartite  accord"  on  political  reform 
long  the  leaders  of  various  Lebanese 
,'tions,  including  the  Lebanese  Forces 
iristian  militia. 

Syrian  hopes  were  dashed,  bow- 
er, when  the  accord  was  opposed  by 
■mayel,  and  the  leader  of  the 
■banese  Forces  was  overthrown  by  his 
rdline  anti-Syrian  rival,  Samir  Ja'ja', 
January  1986.  Syria  responded  by  in- 
iding  the  Muslim  government  minis- 
rs  to  cease  dealing  with  Gemayel  in 
y  capacity,  effectively  paralyzing  the 
vernment.  In  1987  the  Lebanese 
onomy  worsened,  and  the  pound  be- 
n  a  ])recipitous  slide.  On  June  1, 
ime  Minister  Karami  was  assassi- 
ted.  further  compounding  the  politi- 
1  paralysis.  Salim  al-Huss  was 
pointed  Acting  Prime  Minister. 


Government 

\  series  of  amendments  has  substan- 
tially altered  the  constitution  of  1926. 
Among  the  more  significant  is  Article 
95,  which  provides  that  the  confessional 
communities  of  Lebanon  shall  be  equi- 
tably represented  in  public  employment 
and  in  the  composition  of  the  cabinet 
but  that  such  a  measure  is  not  to  im- 
pair the  general  welfare  of  the  state. 
This  article  supplements  the  National 
Covenant  of  1943,  an  unwritten  agree- 
ment that  estabhshed  the  political  foun- 
dations of  modern  Lebanon.  The 
covenant  provides  that  public  offices 
shall  be  distributed  among  the  recog- 
nized religious  groups  and  that  the 
three  top  positions  in  the  governmental 
systems  shall  be  distributed  as  follows: 

•  The  president  is  to  be  a  Maronite 
Christian: 

•  The  prime  minister,  a  Sunni  Mus- 
lim, and 

•  The  president  of  the  National  As- 
sembly, a  Shi'a  Muslim. 

Constitutionally,  the  president  has 
a  strong  and  influential  position.  The 
president  appoints  the  Cabinet  of  Min- 
isters and  designates  one  of  them  to  be 
prime  minister.  The  president  also  has 
the  authority  to  promulgate  laws 
passed  by  the  National  Assembly,  to 
issue  supplementary  regulations  to  en- 
sure the  execution  of  laws,  to  negotiate 
and  ratify  treaties,  and  to  propose  new 
laws  to  the  assembly.  Presidential  elec- 
tions are  held  every  6  years,  most  re- 
cently in  1982. 

The  National  Assembly  was  elected 
in  1972  for  a  4-year  term.  Since  then, 
with  elections  rendered  impossible  by 
the  hostilities  in  Lebanon,  the  assembly 
has  been  extending  its  mandate.  There- 
fore, it  has  not  been  able  to  replace  the 
deputies  who  have  died  since  1972 — 8 
out  of  99. 

The  National  Assembly,  only  spo- 
radically active  since  1975,  is  elected  by 
adult  suffrage  based  on  a  system  of 
proportional  representation  for  the  con- 
fessional groups  of  the  country.  Most 
deputies  do  not  represent  political  par- 
ties as  they  are  known  in  the  West,  nor 
do  they  form  Western-style  groups  in 
the  assembly.  Political  blocs  are  usually 
based  on  confessional  and  local  inter- 
ests or  on  personal  allegiance  rather 
than  on  political  affinities.  The  assem- 
bly traditionally  has  played  a  significant 
role  in  financial  affairs,  since  it  has  the 
responsibility  for  levying  taxes  and 
passing  the  budget.  It  also  exercises 
political  control  over  the  cabinet 


through  formal  questioning  of  ministers 
on  policy  issues  and  by  requesting  a 
confidence  debate. 

Lebanon's  judicial  system  is  based 
on  the  Napoleonic  Code.  Juries  are  not 
used  in  trials.  The  Lebanese  court  sys- 
tem has  three  levels — Courts  of  First 
Instance,  Courts  of  Appeal,  and  the 
Court  of  Cassation.  There  also  is  a  sys- 
tem of  confessional  courts  having  juris- 
diction on  personal  status  matters 
within  their  own  communities. 

Principal  Government  Officials 

President — Amine  Gemayel 

Acting  Prime  Minister:  Minister  of  For- 
eign Affairs — Salim  Al-Huss 

Finance:  Housing  and  Cooperatives — 
Joseph  al-Hashem  (Acting) 

Labor  and  Social  Affairs:  Education 
and  Fine  Arts — Salim  al-Huss 

Defense:  Agriculture — Adil  Usayran 

Post,  Telephone,  and  Telegraph:  Public 
Health— Joseph  al-Hashem 

Information — Joseph  Skaff 

Justice:  Hydraulic  and  Electrical  Re- 
sources: and  Minister  of  State  for  the 
South  and  Reconstruction — Nabih 
Barri 

Public  Works  and  Ti-ansportation:  Tour- 
ism— Walid  Jumblatt 

Interior — Abdallah  Rassi 

Economy  and  Commei'ce:  Industry:  and 
Petroleum — Victor  Qassir 

Ambassador  to  the  United  States — 
Abdallah  Bouhabib 

Ambassador  to  the  Lhiited  Nations — 
Rashid  Fakhoury 

Lebanon  maintains  an  embassy  in 
the  United  States  at  2560  -  28th  Street, 
N.W.,  Washington,  D.C.  20008:  (202) 
939-6300.  There  also  are  consulates 
genei-al  in  Deti'oit,  Los  Angeles,  and 
New  York  City 

Political  Conditions 

In  addition  to  its  indigenous  political 
groupings,  Lebanon  contains  branches 
of  almost  all  other  political  parties  of 
the  Arab  world.  These  cover  the  politi- 
cal spectrum  from  far  left  to  far  right, 
from  totally  secular  to  wholly  religious. 
The  Arab  Christians  and  Muslims  gen- 
erally look  to  particular  political  parties 
and  leaders,  according  to  the  sect  to 
which  they  belong.  The  Palestinian  ref- 
ugees, numbering  about  400,000  and 
predominantly  Muslim,  constitute  an 
important  and  sensitive  minority. 

Unlike  the  huge  umbrella  organiza- 
tions found  in  the  United  States, 
Lebanese  political  parties  are  generally 


51 


MIDDLE  EAST 


Travel  Advisory 


The  Department  of  State  has  deter- 
mined that  the  situation  in  Lebanon  has 
become  so  dangerous  for  Americans 
that  no  U.S.  citizen  can  be  (.■uii>i(lered 
safe  from  terrorist  acts.  In  liuht  of  this 
determination,  the  Secretary  of  Stati' 
has  exercised  his  authority  to  mvalidate 
U.S.  passports  for  travel  to,  in,  and 
through  Lebanon.  Using  a  U.S.  pass- 
port for  travel  to  Lebanon  would  con- 
stitute a  violation  of  Section  1.544  of 
Title  IS,  U.S.  Code  and  may  be 
punishable  by  a  fine  and/or  prison 
term. 

E.xceptions  t(i  this  restriction  may 
be  granted  tn  professinnal  journalists 
and  to  others  for  comi)elling  human- 
itarian considerations,  or  if  travel  is  de- 
termined to  be  in  the  national  interest. 


Exceptions  will  be  scrutinized  carefully 
on  a  case-by-case  basis  in  light  of  the 
level  of  threat  to  the  prosiiective  trav- 
eler's safety.  Rt'i|uests  for  excejjtions 
should  be  fijrwarded  in  writing  to:  Mr 
Harry  L.  Coburn.  Deputy  ,-Vssistant 
Secretary  for  Passjicirt  Services,  U.S. 
Department  of  State,  Washington,  DC 
20520,  Attn.:  Office  of  Citizenship  Ap- 
peals and  Legal  .Assistance. 

The  request  tor  an  exception  must 
be  acconii)anie(l  1:)\'  substantiating  docu- 
mentation according  to  the  category 
under  which  an  exceiitioii  is  sought. 
Additional  information  may  lie  obtained 
by  calling  the  Office  of  Citizenship 
Appeals  and  Legal  .\ssistance  (Tel. 
202-326-6180). 


vehicles  for  powerful  leaders  whose  fol- 
lowers are  often  of  the  same  religious 
sect.  The  interplay  for  position  and 
power  among  these  leaders  and  groups 
produces  a  political  tapestry  of  extraor- 
dinary complexity  for  the  Western 
observer. 

In  the  past,  this  system  worked  to 
produce  a  viable  democracy.  Recent 
events,  however,  have  upset  the  delicate 
Muslim-Christian  balance  and  resulted 
in  a  tendency  for  Christians  and  Mus- 
lims to  group  themselves  for  safety  into 
distinct  zones.  All  factions  have  called 
for  a  reform  of  the  political  system. 
Some  Christians  favor  political  and  ad- 
ministrative decentralization  of  the  gov- 
ernment, with  separate  Muslim  and 
Christian  sectors  operating  in  a  con- 
federated framework.  Muslims,  for  the 
most  part,  prefer  reunification  but  with 
an  enhanced  share  of  power  for  them- 
selves commensurate  with  their  per- 
centage of  the  population.  The  reforms 
that  are  eventually  achieved  will  proba- 
bly define  Lebanon's  future  as  a 
democracy. 

Defense 

Since  the  197.5-76  fragmentation  of  the 
Lebanese  Armed  Forces  under  the 
strains  of  confessional  strife,  the 
United  States  has  supported  the  efforts 
of  the  Lebanese  Government  to  rebuild 
its  military.  This  support,  which  al- 
ready totaled  .$100  million  by  1982,  was 
substantially  increased  thereafter.  A 
U.S.  Office  of  Military  Cooperation  was 


established  in  Beirut  to  provide  on-the- 
ground  training  as  well  as  an  expanded 
military  supply  program. 

Internal  strife  in  early  1984  pro- 
duced fresh  confessional  splits  in  the 
Lebanese  Armed  Forces.  As  a  result, 
U.S.  military  assistance  was  appropri- 
ately reduced. 

Economy 

Before  the  outbreak  of  the  civil  war  in 
1975,  Lebanon  was  considered  the  fi- 
nancial and  commercial  capital  of  the 
Middle  East.  Because  of  its  location, 
Christian-Muslim  population,  and  mer- 
cantile heritage,  it  was  regarded  as  a 
bridge  between  the  West  and  the  Mid- 
dle East.  The  preeminence  of  Lebanon 
in  the  region's  commercial  services 
seemed  to  confirm  this  perception. 

The  civil  war  did  much  to  weaken 
this  traditional  Lebanese  commercial 
leadership.  In  the  intervening  years, 
the  war  has  inflicted  massive  damage 
on  Lebanon's  economic  infrastructure. 
Beirut,  the  Shuf,  and  southern 
Lebanon  have  been  particularly  hard 
hit.  Industry,  housing,  roads,  telecom- 
munications, and  water-supply  systems 
will  require  major  reconstruction  to  at- 
tain pre-civil  war  development  levels. 
According  to  one  estimate,  it  will  take 
a  10-year  investment  at  a  rate  of  $1.2 
billion  annually  to  reconstruct  the 
country. 

During  periods  of  relative  tran- 
quility in  1977,  1978,  and  1980,  the 
economy  grew  rapidly.  But  with  re- 
newed outbursts  of  fighting,  the  spurts 


of  economic  growth  stalled.  No  reliable 
statistics  on  growth  rates  since  the  out 
break  of  the  war  exist,  but  the  consen- 
sus is  that  the  economy  has  expanded 
only  marginally.  In  recent  years, 
growth  rates  may  even  have  been  nega- 
tive. There  continues  to  be  some  re- 
silience in  the  economy,  but  steady 
recovery  will  be  possible  only  if  a  dura- 
ble cease-fire  can  be  maintained. 

Industrial  production  has  been  se^ 
verely  reduced  as  a  result  of  destruc- 
tion of  most  industrial  areas,  especiallj 
Shuwayfat  on  the  southeast  edge  of 
Beirut.  Agriculture  also  has  suffered 
greatly,  especially  in  southern 
Lebanon.  The  service  sector,  particu- 
larly banking,  is  the  most  important 
sector  of  the  Lebanese  economy.  Al- 
though 9  years  of  strife  have  weakene( 
this  area,  the  banking  industry  has 
maintained  its  vitality  throughout  the 
difficult  years. 

Large  numbers  of  the  Lebanese 
professional  class  have  emigrated.  Th( 
remittances  they  supply  to  the  countr 
are  needed  to  assist  in  the  balance  ( 
payments,  but  their  services  would 
benefit  Lebanon  directly  if  the  securi 
situation  permitted  them  to  return. 

Despite  the  long  years  of  fighting 
the  country's  external  debt  position  it 
surprisingly  strong.  Lebanon  holds  9 
million  troy  ounces  of  gold  and  a  larg 
amount  of  foreign  exchange  reserves 
for  a  country  its  size  (more  than  $1.5 
billion  as  of  February  1984).  Thus  far 
Lebanese  financial  officials  have  man 
aged  to  keep  external  debt  to  a  mini- 
mum—an estimated  $273.2  million  in 
1983. 

F\)reiKn  Relations 

Lebanon's  foreign  policy  reflects  its 
geographic  location,  the  composition 
its  population,  and  its  reliance  on  coi 
merce  and  trade.  Lebanon  hopes  to  i 
gain  its  status  as  a  bridge  between  t 
West  and  the  Middle  East.  Its  basic 
goal  is  to  maintain  good  relations  wit 
many  countries.  Fundamentally  pro- 
West,  it  follows  a  more-or-less  neutr 
and  generally  cautious  line  in  its  rel; 
tions  with  communist  countries. 

Lebanon  seeks  to  maintain  the  I 
possible  relations  with  all  other  Aral 
states.  It  did  not  participate  in  the  1 
or  1973  Arab-Israeli  war  but  sides  w 
other  Arab  states  on  the  question  of 
Middle  East  peace  settlement. 

Although  there  has  been  no  con 
frontation  between  the  Israeli  and 
Lebanese  Armies  since  1948,  and 
Lebanon's  southern  border  with  Isr;; 
is  uncontested,  Israeli  forces  have  t\ 


UNITED  NATIONS 


ided  Lebanon  to  strike  at  Palestin- 
forces.  In  March  1978,  the  Israeli 
ny  moved  up  to  the  Litani  River. 

■  Security  Council  Resolution  425 
!  passed,  calling  for  Israeli  with- 
wal  and  the  creation  of  the  UN  In- 
im  Force  in  Lebanon  (UNIFIL), 
rged  with  maintaining  peace.  A  for- 

Lebanese  Army  officer,  Sa'd  Had- 
,  developed  a  "buffer  zone"  along 

border  with  Israel  after  the  Israelis 
hdrew.  In  June  1982,  Israeli  forces 
in  entered  Lebanon,  and  as  of 
i-ch  1988,  remained  in  the  south  in  a 
curity  zone"  patrolled  by  the  Israeli 
eiise  Forces,  and  self-styled  "Army 
iouth  Lebanon,"  commanded  by  a 
)anese.  Gen.  Lahd. 

i. -Lebanese  Relations 

■  United  States  seeks  to  maintain  its 
litionally  close  ties  with  Lebanon;  to 
J  preserve  its  independence,  sov- 
ignty,  national  unity,  and  territorial 
'grity;  and  to  promote  its  political 
oility  and  economic  development. 

■  United  States  believes  that  a 
ceful,  prosperous,  and  stable 
tanon  can  make  an  important  contri- 
ion  to  stability  and  peace  in  the 

die  East. 

The  United  States  supports  the 
grams  of  the  central  government  to 
.ore  security  and  unity  to  Lebanon 

to  rebuild  that  country's  national 
itutions.  The  U.S.  commitment  has 
lained  unchanged  in  the  face  of  such 
•orist  acts  as  the  bombings  of  the 
5.  Embassy  in  April  and  the  Marine 
•dquarters  in  October  1983. 

One  measure  of  U.S.  concern  and 
jlvement  has  been  an  e.xpanding 
gram  of  relief  and  rehabilitation  as- 
ance  which,  since  1975,  has  totaled 
•e  than  $200  million.  This  support 
ects  not  only  humanitarian  concerns 

historical  ties  but  the  importance 

United  States  attaches  to  the  resto- 
lon  of  a  sovereign,  independent,  uni- 
1  Lebanon.  Current  funding  is  used 
support  the  activities  of  U.S.  and 
Danese  private  voluntary  organiza- 
is  engaged  in  humanitarian  relief 
grams. 

The  United  States  also  has  helped 
■4ince  construction  of  the  American 
iversity  Hospital  in  Beirut  and  has 
isted  the  .Xmerican  University  of 
rut  by  financing  part  of  its  operat- 

budget  and  by  providing  schol- 
hips  to  some  of  its  students. 


Toward  the  21st  Century: 

The  Future  for  Multilateral  Diplomacy 


en  from  the  Background  Notes  of  Apr. 
^,  published  by  the  Bureau  of  Public 
li\pirs,  Department  of  State.  Editor: 
nita  Adams.  ■ 


bfi  Richard  S.  Williawson 

Addresfs  before  the  annual  confer- 
ence of  the  Department  of  Public 
I)ifnr))intin)i  for  NoiHjovrriuiicntal 
Orfiuiiizatiiiiis  (it  l'\  Hiadqiiartem  i)i 
Neir  York  Citi/  on  Scnieiiilicr  16,  198fi. 
Ambasfsador  WiUiavifson  is  Assistant 
Secretary  for  International  Organiza- 
tion Affairs. 

1  firmly  believe  that  as  we  look  toward 
the  1990s  and  on  toward  the  21st  cen- 
tury, multilateral  diplomacy  will  be  of 
growing  importance  to  the  United 
States  in  ])ursuing  its  national  interests 
and  for  other  nations  in  pursuing 
theirs. 

Profound  changes  are  underway  in 
the  world — changes  in  virtually  every 
subject  from  science  to  superpower  re- 
lations. As  a  result,  the  "member 
state"  itself  has  undergone  a  redefini- 
tion. That  is  because  the  issues  con- 
fronting us,  whether  they  be  political, 
economic,  or  scientific  in  nature,  tran- 
scend national  borders. 

A  number  of  factors  are  increasing 
national  interdependency.  Scientific, 
economic,  and  political  matters  are 
global  in  dimension  and  enormous  in 
extent.  They  are  outstripping  the  tradi- 
tional means  by  which  governments 
dealt  with  them.  The  speed  at  which 
information  flows — whereby,  in  an 
instant,  a  computer  in  New  York  can 
exchange  information  around  the  globe 
by  tying  in  with  another  computer — has 
already  created  a  global  marketplace. 
The  amount  of  money  that  changes 
hands  in  the  global  financial  market  in  1 
day  exceeds  .$1  trillion — more  than  the 
entire  annual  budget  of  the  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment. Such  flows  transcend  national 
boundaries  and  can  overwhelm  rigid 
economic  policies. 

Facing  every  nation  is  a  variety  of 
emerging  problems  of  great  urgency 
which  transcend  the  national  borders. 
We  can  see  this  today  in  a  number  of 
environmental  issues.  Emissions  from 
factories  in  one  nation  cause  trees  to 
die  and  lakes  to  be  polluted  in  another 
nation.  Floods  in  Bangladesh  are 
caused  by  deforestation  in  upriver 
countries.  Rain  forests  are  cleared  for 
development  in  one  region,  and  the  cli- 
mate is  changed  throughout  the  West- 
ern Hemisphere.  Chlorofluorocarbons 
are  released  in  several  countries,  and 
the  "greenhouse  effect"  in  the  earth's 
atmosphere  is  apparent. 


Actions  which  were  once  viewed  as 
strictly  national  or  domestic  are  now 
being  perceived  as  having  international 
rei)ercussions.  Nations  are  becoming 
more  aware  that  we  must  work  to- 
gether within  the  global  community  to 
better  understand  the  many  implica- 
tions which  our  individual  actions  will 
have  for  all  our  societies  in  the  decades 
ahead. 

I  befeve  that  multilateral  negotia- 
tions will  inevitably  become  more 
important  as  we  increase  our  awareness 
of  interdependency;  that  there  will 
be  a  growing  need  to  develop  and 
strengthen  multilateral  forums.  And 
this  will  mean  that  each  nation  must 
further  develop  its  skills  at  multilateral 
diplomacy.  To  do  this,  we  must  have  a 
recognition  of  our  past  experience  in 
multilateral  diplomacy,  face  multina- 
tional fora  with  realism  and  an  under- 
standing of  their  limits  and  oppor- 
tunities, and  have  a  commitment  to 
nurture  their  potential. 

The  Importance  of 
Political  Groupings 

The  global  nature  of  changes  in  science, 
in  economics,  and  in  technology  must 
be  matched  by  political  developments, 
particularly  the  strengthening  and 
closer  association  of  like-minded 
nations. 

With  the  increased  awareness  of 
national  interdependency,  the  impor- 
tance of  regional  country  and  functional 
groupings  has  been  heightened.  Re- 
gional, political,  and  religious  blocs  of 
nations — such  as  the  OAS  [Organization 
of  American  States],  the  Organization 
of  African  Unity,  the  South  Asian  Asso- 
ciation of  Regional  Cooperation,  the 
Nonaligned  Movement,  and  the 
[Organization  of  the]  Islamic  Confer- 
ence— now  provide  platforms  for  certain 
countries  to  exercise  influence  more  ef- 
fectively than  when  alone. 

Other  regional  organizations  are 
taking  on  growing  economic  and  politi- 
cal importance.  The  Pacific  Basin,  for 
example — a  region  of  phenomenal  eco- 
nomic growth — has  been  developing  a 
web  of  cooperative  realities.  ASEAN 
[Association  of  South  East  Asian  Na- 
tions] is  showing  the  way  to  regional 
cooperation  and  has  been  taking  on 
more  and  more  of  a  political  dimension 
beyond  its  initial  focus  on  economic 
affairs. 

These  developments  in  political  co- 
operation are  outgrowths  of  our  efforts 
and  aspirations  for  a  better  world.  The 


53 


UNITED  NATIONS 


United  States  led  the  way  after  World 
War  II  in  advocating  the  importance  of 
the  regional  approach  to  the  recovery  of 
a  devastated  Europe.  Today,  the  in- 
stitutions that  resulted  from  this  effort 
are  thriving:  regional  organizations 
such  as  the  NATO  alliance,  the  OECD 
[Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation 
and  Development],  the  European  Eco- 
nomic Community,  and  the  Western 
European  Union;  and  functional  organi- 
zations such  as  GATT  [General  Agree- 
ment on  Tariffs  and  Ti'ade],  IMF 
[International  Monetary  Fund],  the 
World  Bank,  and  regional  development 
banks,  as  well  as  the  effective  func- 
tional organizations  of  the  United 
Nations. 

Over  the  past  several  decades,  the 
United  States  has  come  to  an  increased 
recognition  that,  in  many  areas,  we  can 
be  more  effective  in  advancing  U.S.  ob- 
jectives if  we  pursue  these  objectives  in 
a  multilateral  context,  which  allows  us 
to  assert  values  that  ti-anscend  narrow 
political  interests.  The  United  States 
recognizes  that — in  order  to  meet  the 
challenges  facing  us  as  we  look  toward 
the  next  century — we  will  have  to  have 
recourse  to  a  variety  of  multilateral  foi'- 
ums,  of  which  the  United  Nations  is 
going  to  be  just  one.  The  Group  of  7, 
for  example,  is  a  vital  multilateral 
forum  today  for  the  United  States  and 
the  other  most  industrialized  Western 
nations.  Over  the  years  since  its  incep- 
tion, the  Group  of  7  has  broadened  its 
scope  beyond  just  economic  concerns. 
And  it  is  an  explicit  example  of  how 
nations  can  overcome  cultural  differ- 
ences or  past  difficulties  to  work  to- 
gether on  issues — whether  they  be 
economic,  political,  or  environmental — 
which  know  no  boundaries. 

Upgrading  Small-Power  Diplomacy 

Just  as  there  is  a  need  for  nations  to 
achieve  an  increased  awareness  of  inter- 
dependency,  as  well  as  a  realistic  un- 
derstanding of  the  limits  and  capabil- 
ities of  multinational  forums,  so,  too,  is 
there  a  need  to  recognize  that  political, 
technological,  and  economic  power  have 
been  dispersing  horizontally.  Ours  is  no 
longer  a  bipolar  world.  For  far  too  long, 
too  much  of  U.S.  efforts  and  attention 
have  focused  on  the  Soviet-U.S.  com- 
petition, the  so-called  East- West 
debate.  The  Soviet  Union  remains  our 
primary  adversary:  the  East- West  de- 
bate properly  is  the  dominant  diplo- 
matic concern  of  the  United  States  and 
bilateral  relations  a  major  means  of  ad- 
vancing our  foreign  policy  interests. 


Nevertheless,  just  as  bilateral  relations 
cannot  be  the  sole  means  of  diplomacy, 
the  East- West  debate  cannot  be  our 
only  concern. 

Developing  countries  can  have  a 
major  impact  on  U.S.  vital  interests — 
economic  prosperity,  war,  and  peace. 
As  sovereign  nations,  they  deserve  our 
respect.  We  must  understand  their  in- 
terests and  aspirations,  just  as  they 
should  try  to  understand  ours. 

The  scores  of  new  nations  that 
gained  independence  in  the  1960s  often 
were  relatively  poor  and  struggling  for 
an  identity.  They  lacked  the  ti'adition  of 
country-to-country  diplomacy.  They 
lacked  an  experienced  diplomatic  corps. 
And  they  lacked  the  resources  to  fund 
embassies  all  over  the  globe.  So  rather 
than  conduct  their  world  affairs  in  the 
capitals  of  scores  of  nations,  they  did  so 
through  their  preferred  diplomatic 
forum — the  United  Nations. 

If  we  properly  recognize  the  impor- 
tance of  these  new  nations  to  U.S.  vital 
interests  and  also  the  impoi'tance  these 
nations  place  on  the  United  Nations, 
then  we  should  actively  and  construc- 
tively engage  them  diplomatically 
within  the  UN  framework.  This  means 
working  with  them  on  issues  of  impor- 
tance to  them  while  we  work  on  our 
own  agenda,  constructively  negotiating 
on  resolutions  and  working  for  common 
ground. 

Again,  I  would  like  to  em))hasize 
that  broader  multilateral  solutions  must 
be  forged.  And  we  must  recognize  the 
United  Nations  as  an  arena  that  can 
contribute  constructively  to  finding 
these  solutions. 


The  Importance 

of  the  United  Nations 

When  the  United  States  emerged  on 
the  world  stage,  diplomacy  was  con- 
ducted country  to  country,  bilaterally. 
Suspicious  of  broader  multilateral 
entanglements,  the  United  States 
rejected  entry  into  the  League  of  Na- 
tions after  World  War  I. 

Following  World  War  II,  however, 
traditional  American  idealism  heartily 
embraced  the  work  in  San  Francisco  in 
1945  to  create  a  world  assembly.  The 
UN  Charter  embodies  the  ideals  and 
moral  goals  of  our  own  Constitution. 
Despite  frustrations  with  the  organiza- 
tion, the  United  States  has  remained 
firm  in  its  commitment  to  the  United 
Nations  as  an  important  forum  in  help- 
ing governments  take  collective  action 
for  addressing  global  problems  and 
challenges.  We  have  demonstrated  our 
commitment  by  consistently  supporting 
the  United  Nations  morally,  financially, 
and  politically. 


The  United  Nations  was  founded  td 
keep  the  peace,  to  promote  political 
self-determination,  to  foster  global 
prosperity,  and  to  strengthen  the  bond> 
of  civility  among  nations.  By  subjugat- 
ing the  individual  interests  of  member 
states  to  the  greater  good  of  the  world 
community,  the  United  Nations  was  to 
speak  with  the  voice  of  moral  authority 
its  greatest  power.  Over  the  past  40 
years,  however,  as  the  voice  of  the 
United  Nations  has  become  louder,  its 
moral  authority  has  been  weakened  by 
the  trends  toward  double  standards, 
loose  rhetoric,  bloc  voting,  and  petty 
jjoliticization. 

Much  progress  has  been  made  in 
addressing  these  problems,  but  there  i 
still  an  important  need  to  take  a  real- 
istic look  at  the  United  Nations  as  it 
actually  is.  What  are  its  limitations  an 
its  capabilities?  What  do  we  need  to  di 
in  seeking  broader  multilateral  solu- 
tions to  the  challenges  of  today  so  tha'< 
the  United  Nations  is  better  able  to 
fulfill  its  mandate  in  the  world  of 
tomorrow? 

I  have  tried  to  stress  here  impor- 
tant questions  not  confined  to  bilatera 
solutions.  There  are  important  issues 
that  transcend  national  borders  and 
must  be  considered  in  a  global  contex 
Two  such  issues — refugee  assistance 
and  human  rights — are  ones  for  whic! 
the  United  Nations  has  become  a  vit; 
forum  in  addressing  multinational  int 
ests  and  concerns. 

Refugee  Assistance.  Throughou 
history,  people  have  fled  injustice,  w 
drought,  and  famine.  More  than  100 
million  people  have  been  uprooted  frc 
their  homes  since  World  War  I,  mak- 
ing the  20th  century  what  has  been 
called  "the  century  of  refugees  and 
prisoners." 

Today  conflict  and  repression  on 
every  continent  have  forced  more  tht 
11  million  people  outside  their  nation 
borders  as  refugees.  And,  again,  no 
specific  national  situation  can  be  con: 
ered  in  isolation.  Following  the  invas 
of  Afghanistan,  millions  of  refugees 
poured  into  Pakistan.  Thousands  of 
Vietnamese  were  forced  to  find  their 
way  to  countries  throughout  Southet 
Asia  as  a  result  of  the  excesses  of  th 
government.  More  than  a  million 
Mozambicans  have  fled  into  neighboi 
nations  to  escape  w'ar  and  starvation 
their  homeland. 

We  must  not  forget  that  the  roo 
cause  of  mass  refugee  flows  is  the  df 
nial  of  fundamental  human  rights.  Tl 
care  of  refugees  is  an  international  c 
cern  and  the  responsibility  of  every 
country  and  each  individual,  with  ec 
table  burdenshai'ing. 


54 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  15 


UNITED  NATIONS 


While  the  initial  focus  of  refugee 
istance  is  on  short-term  material  as- 
;ance  for  basic  life-sustaining  needs, 
important  element  of  assistance 
)rts  is  the  search  for  more  lasting 
itions  to  refugee  problems.  Such  so- 
ons  include  the  fostering  of  volun- 
y  repatriation,  when  that  is 
)ropriate.  local  integration  in  the 
ntry  or  region  of  asylum,  and,  fi- 
ly,  resettlement  in  third  countries. 

Refugees  have  no  political  influ- 
;e.  If  the  international  community 
s  to  speak  for  them,  their  cause  will 
lost  in  darkness,  and  the  violation  of 
nan  rights  will  go  on  endlessly.  And 
3  in  the  United  Nations  that  the 
jrnational  community  can  rise  up 

speak  with  one  voice,  a  voice  of 
ral  and  political  authority.  We,  as 
mbers  of  the  international  commu- 
■.  have  been  tasked  to  share  the 
den  of  supporting  multilateral, 
iteral.  or  pi'ivate  efforts  to  achieve 
re  durable  refugee  solutions  wher- 
r  they  are  possible. 

Human  Rights.  Another  continuing 
.llenge  for  UN  member  states  as  we 
k  toward  the  21st  century  is  human 
hts.  The  protection  and  promotion  of 
ic  human  rights  and  fundamental 
edoms  are  among  the  principal  pur- 
.es  of  the  United  Nations  set  forth  in 
Charter  and  in  the  Universal  Decla- 
ion  of  Human  Rights. 

A  reason  for  the  primacy  of  human 
hts  in  the  United  Nations  is  that  its 
nders  recognized  from  the  bitter  ex- 
•ience  of  the  Second  World  War  that 
ise  governments  that  abuse  the 
hts  of  their  own  citizens  are  more 
dy  to  abuse  the  rights  of  citizens  of 
ler  countries.  Promotion  of  the  re- 
'ct  for  human  rights  is  thus  linked  to 
'  United  Nations'  basic  purpose  of 
iping  the  peace. 

As  we  prepare  to  commemorate  the 
h  anniversary  of  the  Universal  Dec- 
ation.  it  is  important  to  note  the  pro- 
'ss  that  has  been  made  in  seeking  to 
itore  these  vitally  important  norms 

standards,  as  well  as  the  signifi- 
it  role  which  the  United  Nations  con- 
ues  to  play  in  addressing  human 
:hts  abuses  around  the  world. 

The  United  States  uses  its  influ- 
ce  in  favor  of  human  rights  and  de- 
)cracy  bilaterally,  both  in  public  and 
private,  and  in  multilateral  forums 
ch  as  the  OAS,  the  UN  General  As- 
mbly,  and  the  UN  Commission  on 
iman  Rights.  We  see  the  United  Na- 
ns with  its  various  organs  as  the  pre- 
linent  global  organization  in  the  area 
human  rights.  The  need  to  address 
man  rights  violations  in  multilateral 
•urns  is  also  linked  to  the  efforts  to 
Ip  avoid  new  mass  flows  of  refugees. 


In  our  view,  no  state  may  hide  be- 
hind the  argument  of  national  sover- 
eignty in  the  area  of  human  rights. 
The  world  community  has  made  clear 
that  human  rights  are  matters  of  inter- 
national concern. 

As  in  the  case  of  all  manmade  in- 
stitutions, the  United  Nations  often 
carries  out  its  tasks  in  an  imperfect 
way.  But  the  United  Nations  can  and 
does  have  an  impact  with  respect  to 
protecting  human  rights.  It  is  like  a 
hoe — by  itself  useless,  but  in  the  hands 
of  the  gardener,  it  can  make  the  earth 
productive  and  help  it  yield  fruit.  Its 
principal  tool  is  its  ability  to  generate 
publicity  and  investigate  a  specific  situ- 
ation of  human  rights  abuses  or  pro- 
mote thematic  human  rights  issues. 

The  problems  I  mentioned  pre- 
viously regarding  the  double  standards, 
politicization,  and  bloc  voting  are  par- 
ticularly abhorrent  with  respect  to  the 
consideration  of  human  rights  within 
the  United  Nations.  The  message  that 
is  often  sent  is  that  countries  with  a 
powerful  friend  or  popularity  among 
the  voting  majority  in  the  United  Na- 
tions can  be  held  to  a  different  human 
rights  standard  than  others.  This  dou- 
ble standard  undermines  the  United 
Nations'  moral  authority — and  its 
legitimacy. 

Despite  these  serious  problems, 
however,  progress  has  been  made.  The 
achievement  of  consensus  earlier  this 
year  in  Geneva  on  concerns  about  hu- 
man rights  in  our  hemisphere  was  sig- 
nificant not  only  because  it  marked  a 
departui'e  from  the  United  Nations'  too 
frequent  double  standard  but  also  be- 
cause it  demonstrated  how.  in  this  age 
of  bloc  voting,  a  country  like  the 
United  States  can  strike  a  victory  for 
freedom  by  carefully  marshaling  the 
full  range  of  our  multilateral  resources 
to  forge  a  coalition.  And  this  initiative 
serves  as  another  example  of  the 
unique  capability  of  the  United  Nations 
to  make  an  important  contribution  to 
the  world  community. 

With  all  of  its  flaws,  the  United 
Nations  remains  the  only  body  of  its 
kind  in  the  world.  It  is  the  only  arena 
where  the  tortured  and  abused  of  the 
world  have  an  opportunity  to  lay  forth 
their  cases  and  stand  some  chance  of 
having  the  world  community  act  on 
their  behalf. 


The  Role  of  the  United  Nations 
in  Conflict  Resolution 

I  know  that  over  the  past  2  days  others 
have  addressed  this  conference  on  the 
topics  of  UN  peacekeeping  and  the  role 
of  the  United  Nations  in  conflict  resolu- 
tion. I  would,  however,  like  to  address 
these  issues  as  they  relate  to  the 


broader  topic  of  multilateral  goals  and 
efforts. 

Since  the  first  UN  peacekeeping 
effort  in  Palestine  in  1948.  jieacekeep- 
ing  operations  have  become  an  impor- 
tant technique  in  international  conflict 
management.  Today  we  face  a  unique 
and  exciting  opportunity  for  the  United 
Nations  in  the  peacekeeping  area.  To 
quote  the  remark  of  one  UN  observer: 
"Peace  seems  to  be  breaking  out  all 
over"  In  Afghanistan.  Iran-Iraq.  An- 
gola-Namibia. Cyprus,  Western  Sahara, 
and  Cambodia,  the  United  Nations  is 
moving  center  stage  in  helping  to  re- 
solve significant  regional  conflicts  that 
have  cost  many  lives  and,  in  some 
cases,  been  tinderboxes  with  the  poten- 
tial to  explode  into  major  power 
confrontations. 

At  a  time  of  such  major  UN  in- 
volvement in  making  positive  contribu- 
tions for  peacekeeping,  it  is  incumbent 
upon  us  to  study  the  reasons  events 
have  joined  to  create  this  opportunity, 
and  to  learn  the  lessons  of  history  and 
of  these  current  conflicts,  so  that  we 
may  better  understand  precisely  what 
the  United  Nations  is  able  to  contribute 
in  resolving  these  conflicts.  If  we  are 
unrealistic  in  our  expectations,  or  fail 
to  be  hard-headed  in  our  analysis  of  the 
apparent  recent  success  and  progress  of 
UN  peacekeeping,  we  will  endanger  fu- 
ture potential  for  the  United  Nations  as 
a  peacekeeping  tool. 

The  fact  of  the  matter  is  that  the 
United  Nations  cannot  and  should  not 
seek  to  impose  solutions  on  parties. 
Rather,  once  the  parties  have — through 
exhaustion,  their  own  cost-benefit  anal- 
ysis, or  other  reasons — reached  a  stage 
where  it  is  time  for  the  conflict  to  end, 
the  United  Nations  can  provide  an  in- 
valuable role  as  a  facilitator  to  this  pro- 
cess. Whether  by  bridging  a  gulf  of 
remaining  differences  or  merely  provid- 
ing a  graceful  exit,  and/or  providing  do- 
mestic justification  that  the  respective 
governments  can  use  with  their  own 
situation  at  home,  the  United  Nations 
has  a  role.  It  does  not  impose  peace. 
However,  it  can  act  as  a  midwife,  a 
helpful  facilitator,  a  promoter  of  peace. 
This  is  a  limited  role,  but  it  is  an  enor- 
mously important  role. 

It  is  as  a  result  of  UN  efforts  and 
this  Administi-ation's  policies  that  the 
major  players  have  agreed  to  come  to 
the  negotiation  table  in  a  number  of 
these  recent  conflicts. 

•  In  Afghanistan,  for  example,  it 
was  the  steadfast  support  of  Ronald 
Reagan  and  the  strong  bipartisan  sup- 
port in  the  U.S.  Congress  for  the 
mujahidin  that  raised  the  Soviet  costs 
of  the  brutal  occupation  of  that  country. 


apartment  of  State  Bulletin/December  1988 


55 


UNITED  NATIONS 


•  It  was  the  deployment  of  U.S. 
naval  forces  in  the  Per.sian  Gulf,  as  well 
as  the  diplomatic  isolation  of  Iran,  that 
led  Iran  to  accept  the  terms  of  Resolu- 
tion 598  and  agree  to  a  cease-fire. 

•  The  United  States  is  taking  the 
lead  in  trying  to  arrange  among  the 
parties  a  peaceful  solution  to  the  An- 
gola-Namibia conflict.  However,  As- 
sistant Secretary  [for  African  Affairs] 
Chet  Crocker,  the  mediator  in  these 
talks,  has  recognized  from  the  outset 
the  helpful  role  the  United  Nations  can 
play  in  implementing  the  arrangements 
the  parties  eventually  agree  on  con- 
cerning self-determination  in  Namibia 
and  the  end  of  civil  war  in  Angola. 

•  In  Cambodia,  we  anticipate  that 
the  United  Nations  will  have  to  be 
involved  in  bringing  about  true  self- 
determination  for  the  Cambodian 
people  following  withdrawal  of  the 
Vietnamese  occupation  forces. 

We  strongly  support  the  Secretary 
General's  [Javier  Perez  de  Cuellar]  role 
in  these  recent  peacekeeping  initia- 
tives, and  we  welcome  the  resurgence 
of  the  United  Nations  as  a  forum  for 
the  resolution  of  international  disputes. 

Pressure  for  new  peacekeeping  op- 
erations is  likely  to  continue  and  per- 
haps increase  in  the  years  leading  to 
the  next  century.  Additional  initiatives 
over  the  ne.xt  few  years  could  have  sev- 
eral important  consequences — political 
as  well  as  financial — for  our  efforts  in 
the  multilateral  arena.  We  must  ensure 
that  an  expanded  UN  peacekeeping 
role  is  not  manipulated  in  a  way  that 
would  undermine  the  constructive  and 
practical  contribution  the  United  Na- 
tions is  making  toward  world  peace. 

UN  Role  in  Global  Problem-Solving 

As  with  conflict  resolution,  the  UN 
system  is  uniquely  able  to  help  govern- 
ments take  collective  action,  when  gov- 
ernments have  a  unity  of  purpose  and 
political  will.  In  recent  years,  the  abil- 
ity of  the  United  Nations  and  its  spe- 
cialized agencies  to  respond  quickly  and 
effectively  to  global  problems  has  taken 
on  new  importance. 

At  the  International  Atomic  En- 
ergy Agency  (IAEA),  for  example, 
important  work  is  done  on  nuclear  non- 
proliferation,  assurance  of  supply,  and 
nuclear  safety.  The  IAEA  responded 
fully  and  constructively  to  the  nuclear 
accident  at  Chernobyl,  helping  to  ana- 
lyze the  causes  of  the  accident,  contain 
the  fallout,  and  draft  international  con- 
ventions to  deal  with  future  nuclear 
accidents. 

At  the  Secretary  General's  initia- 
tive, i;-!8  countries  met  last  year  and 
declared  the  elimination  of  drug  abuse 


and  illicit  trafficking  a  universal  pri- 
ority. We  are  now  mo\ing  toward  a 
strong  new  antidrug  trafficking  conven- 
tion. With  our  collective  commitment 
and  with  the  Secretary  General's  sup- 
port, this  imjjortant  law  enforcement 
treaty  will  be  completed  in  December 
1988,' and  stronger  UN  drug  control 
programs  will  follow  to  address  this 
serious  international  problem. 

Another  excellent  example  of 
global  problem-solving  can  be  found  in 
the  World  Health  Organization  (WHO). 
WHO  has  led  the  fight  to  eradicate 
smallpox,  developed  programs  target- 
ing the  health  of  children,  and  has  been 
aggressively  coordinating  the  global 
response  to  the  problems  of  AIDS 
[acquired  immune  deficiency  syndrome]. 

Finally,  we  should  also  note  the 
significant  problem-solving  undertaken 
by  other  UN  agencies  like  the  Interna- 
tional Maritime  Organization  and  the 
International  Civil  Aviation  Organiza- 
tion. These  have  both  been  in  the  van- 
guard of  the  global  fight  against 
international  terrorism. 

We  will  need  to  continue  our 
efforts  into  the  next  century  to 
strengthen  the  UN  specialized  agencies 
and  programs  so  that  organizations  like 
IAEA,  UNICEF  [UN  Children's  Fund], 
the  UN  Environment  Program,  and  the 
UN  Fund  for  Drug  Abuse  Control  can 
perform  their  essential  functions — func- 
tions which  no  one  country  can  perform 
alone. 

Conclusion 

At  this  time  of  global  challenge  and 
change,  our  efforts  in  the  multilateral 
arena  will  be  of  ever-increasing  impor- 
tance to  the  United  States  in  advancing 
our  interests  and  goals  and  to  other 
nations  in  advancing  theirs.  We  must 
vigorously  pursue  multilateral  diplo- 
macy to  constructively  address  issues  of 
concern  to  the  international  community 
and  work  to  build  broad-based 
coalitions. 

Among  the  foremost  arenas  for 
multilateral  diplomacy  is  the  United 
Nations.  The  UN  system  is  important 
to  the  world  community  and  to  the  in- 
terests of  its  individual  member  states. 
Debates  in  the  United  Nations  set  the 
international  agenda  for  much  of  the 
world.  These  debates  legitimize  and 
delegitimize  issues  on  the  world  stage 
and  focus  world  attention,  often  estab- 
lishing the  framework  for  progress. 

In  the  areas  of  peacekeeping,  hu- 
man rights,  and  the  vital  work  of  the 
specialized  agencies,  we  can  see  an  in- 
creasing number  of  opportunities  on  the 
horizon  for  effectively  utilizing  the  dip- 
lomatic benefits  of  the  United  Nations 
as  a  gathering  place  for  the  world. 


At  the  same  time,  we  must  con- 
tinue to  take  a  realistic  look  at  the 
United  Nations  as  we  approach  tin- 
next  century.  We  must  not  allow  the 
present  euphoria  felt  in  some  quarters 
to  blind  us  to  the  political  realities 
which  are  intertwined  within  the  mult 
lateral  arena. 

The  Reagan  Administration  and 
Congress  have  recognized  the  value  of 
the  United  Nations  to  advance  U.S. 
interests.  Under  the  leadership  of  Am 
bassador  Vernon  Walters  and  his  \n-ei 
cessor.  Ambassador  Jeane  Kirkpatrick 
this  Administration  has  provided  in- 
creased U.S.  vigor  and  leadership  in 
the  UN  system. 

We  share  with  other  member  stal 
a  deep  concern  about  the  financial  dif 
culties  now  facing  the  United  Nations 
There  should  be  no  doubt  that  the 
United  States  clearly  recognizes  its  o 
ligations  to  the  United  Nations,  and  i 
is  because  the  work  of  the  United  Na 
tions  is  so  important  that  we  care  ab( 
reform.  We  also  must  avail  ourselves 
all  means  of  influence  to  effect  reforn 
of  the  United  Nations  that  is  in  all 
members'  interest.  This  includes  mor 
leadership,  political  and  diplomatic  pi 
suasion,  and  financial  leverage. 

Much  has  been  achieved,  but  mu 
more  remains  to  be  done.  In  the  firs! 
place,  we  must  recognize  that  the 
United  Nations  simply  cannot  solve  ; 
the  world's  problems.  To  continue  bu 
ness  as  usual  by  piling  committee  on 
top  of  committee  to  deal  with  a  hand 
of  abstract  issues  is  not  only  pointle; 
but  counterproductive.  The  issue  of 
international  security,  for  example,  i 
important,  and  it  does  involve  many 
things,  but  security  can  be  maintain^ 
without  creating  a  whole  new  struct 
or  radically  revising  the  UN  Chartei 
As  member  nations,  we  must  sti 
to  see  that  the  United  Nations  focus 
its  resources  on  those  areas  where  e 
perience  has  demonstrated  that  it  ca 
make  a  difference — in  facilitating  rei 
peacekeeping  and  real  problem-solvi 
in  the  real  world. 

In  order  to  be  forward-looking 
about  the  United  Nations,  we  must 
able  to  take  a  long  look  back — back 
the  United  Nations  as  it  was  intendt 
to  be  by  its  founders.  The  future  of 
multilateral  diplomacy,  its  promises  : 
potential  problems,  can  be  glimpsed 
the  achievements  and  in  the  mistake 
the  past  and  in  the  faith  and  commit 
ment  of  today.  We  should  renew  that 
faith  and  understand  that  our  goals 
the  future  can  only  be  attained  by  tl 
steps  we  take  today.  ■ 


56 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  IS 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


l^^tional  Emergency  in  Panama 


■ss a(;e  to  the  congress. 

Ki;  II.  19881 

'11  April  8,  1988,  in  Executive  Order 
12635,  I  declared  a  national  emergency 
eal  with  the  threat  to  the  national  se- 
ty  and  foreign  policy  of  the  United 
:es  posed  by  the  policies  and  actions  of 
Noriega'Solis  regime  of  Panama  (53 
.  Reg.'  12134,  April  12,  1988).  In  that 
er,  1  ordered  the  immediate  blocking  of 
iroperty  and  interests  in  property  of 
Government  of  Panama  (including  the 
CO  Nacional  de  Panama  and  the  Caja  de 
irros)  then  or  thereafter  located  in  the 
ted  States  or  coming  within  the  posses- 
or  control  of  persons  located  w'ithin 
United  States.  I  also  prohibited  the 
ment  or  transfer  of  any  funds  or  other 
ncial  or  investment  assets  or  credits  to 
Noriega/Solis  regime  from  the  United 
Les  and  by  U.S.  persons  and  U.S.- 
troUed  Panamanian  entities  located  in 
territory  of  Panama.  All  transfers,  or 
ments  owed,  that  are  not  authorized  by 
s,  regulations,  or  licenses,  to  the  Gov- 
ment  of  Panama  are  required  to  be 
ie  into  a  blocked  account  of  the  Govern- 
it  of  Panama  at  the  Federal  Reserve 
k  of  New  York,  to  be  held  for  the  bene- 
if  the  Panamanian  people. 

2.  The  declaration  of  a  national  emer- 
cy  was  made  pursuant  to  the  authority 
.ed  in  me  as  President  by  the  Constitu- 

and  laws  of  the  United  States,  includ- 
the  International  Emergency  Economic 
■ers  Act  (50  U.S.C.  1701  et  seq.),  the 
ional  Emergencies  Act  (50  U.S.C.  1601 
eq.),  and  section  301  of  title  3  of  the 
ted  States  Code.  I  reported  the  decla- 
on  to  the  Congress  on  April  8,  1988, 
suant  to  section  1703(b)  of  the  Interna- 
al  Emergency  Economic  Powers  Act. 

present  report  is  submitted  pursuant 
.0  U.S.C.  1641(c)  and  1703(c). 

3.  The  Office  of  Foreign  Assets  Control 
he  Department  of  the  Treasury,  after 
sulfation  with  other  Federal  agencies, 
led  the  Panamanian  Transactions  Reg- 
ion, 31  C.F.  R.  Part  565,  to  implement 
he  lu'ohibitions  in  E.xecutive  Order  No. 
io  (.53  Fed.  Reg.  20566,  June  3,  1988). 

Panamanian  Transactions  Regulations 
tain  a  number  of  general  licenses,  au- 
rizing  payment  to  the  Noriega/Solis  re- 
le  of  utilities:  indirect  taxes:  fees  and 
es  paid  in  connection  with  basic  busi- 
s  activity:  fees  (other  than  income 
es)  directly  owed  by  individuals:  pay- 
nts  for  travel-related,  telecommunica- 
is,  and  mail  transactions:  fees  related  to 

purchase  and  sale  of  publications;  and 
•ments  of  obligations  of  the  Noriega- 
is  regime  to  persons  within  the  United 


Two  amendments  to  the  Panamanian 
Transactions  Regulations  have  been  issued 
to  date.  The  first,  effective  June  15,  1988, 
authorizes  payment  of  social  security  taxes 
to  the  Noriega/Solis  regime  by  U.S.  per- 
sons and  U.S. -controlled  Panamanian  en- 
tities (!33  Fed.  Reg.  23620,  June  23,  1988). 
This  amendment  permits  the  payment  of 
taxes  and  fees  for  health,  maternity,  and 
retirement  benefits  for  Panamanian  na- 
tionals employed  by  U.S.  companies  and 
U.S. -controlled  Panamanian  companies. 
The  second  amendment,  effective  August 
24,  1988,  authorizes  payment  to  the 
Noriega/Solis  regime  of  import  duties, 
other  import-related  expenses,  and  port 
fees  (.53  Fed.  Reg.  :32221,  August  24,  1988). 
This  amendment  facilitates  U.S.  exports  to 
Panama  by  permitting  U.S.  exporters  and 
U.S. -controlled  Panamanian  importers  to 
pay  expenses  related  to  importations. 

With  this  report,  I  am  enclosing  a  copy 
of  the  Treasury  Department's  Panamanian 
Transactions  Regulations,  as  amended  to 
date. 

4.  The  objective  of  Administration  pol- 
icy remains  support  for  a  return  to  civilian 
consitutional  rule  and  the  development  of 
an  apolitical  military  establishment  in  Pan- 
ama. In  furtherance  of  our  policy,  the  Ad- 
ministration has  imposed  economic 
sanctions  against  the  Noriega/Solis  regime. 
In  our  judgment,  the  root  cause  of  the  cur- 
rent crisis  is  the  fact  that  the  Panamanian 
people  have  lost  confidence  in  a  political 
system  widely  perceived  as  corrupt,  re- 
pressive, and  inept.  A  genuine  Panamanian 
resolution  of  the  political  crisis  is  neces- 
sary to  restore  confidence  in  the  Panama- 
nian economy,  a  precondition  to  the  return 


of  economic  stability  and  growth  in  Pan- 
ama. Accordingly,  our  efforts  have  been  di- 
rected at  supporting  Panamanian  efforts  to 
resolve  the  underlying  political  crisis  as 
rapidly  as  possible. 

5.  The  expense  incurred  by  the 
Federal  Government  in  the  6-month  period 
from  April  8  through  October  8,  1988,  that 
are  directly  attributable  to  the  exercise  of 
powers  and  authorities  conferred  by  the 
declaration  of  the  Panamanian  national 
emergency  are  estimated  at  .$701,000, 
most  of  which  represents  wage  and  salary 
costs  for  Federal  personnel.  Personnel 
costs  were  largely  centered  in  the  Depart- 
ment of  the  Treasury  (particularly  in  the 
Office  of  Foreign  Assets  Control,  the  Office 
of  the  Assistant  Secretary  for  Enforce- 
ment, the  Office  of  the  Assistant  Secretary 
for  International  Affairs,  and  the  Office  of 
the  General  Counsel),  the  Department  of 
State,  the  Federal  Reserve  Board,  the  Na- 
tional Security  Council  staff,  and  the  De- 
partment of  Defense. 

6.  The  policies  and  actions  of  the  Nor- 
iega/Solis regime  in  Panama  continue  to 
pose  an  unusual  and  extraordinary  threat 
to  the  national  security  and  foreign  policy 
of  the  United  States.  I  shall  continue  to 
exercise  the  powers  at  my  disposal  to  ap- 
ply economic  sanctions  against  Panama  as 
long  as  these  measures  are  appropriate  and 
will  continue  to  report  periodically  to  the 
Congress  on  significant  developments,  pur- 
suant to  50  U.S.C.  1703(c). 

Rox.M.i)  Rl;.\(;a.v 


'  Text  from  Weeklv  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Oct.  17,  1988.1 


Results  of  Chilean  Plebiscite 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT. 
OCT.  6,  1988' 

We  congratulate  the  people  of  Chile  for 
having  given  the  world  such  an  im- 
pressive demonstration  of  the  power  of 
the  ballot  bo.x.  They  turned  out  in  ex- 
ceptionally high  numbers  and  took  part 
in  an  exemplary  voting  process  which 
they  helped  administer.  We,  likewise, 
congratulate  the  Chilean  Government 
for  carrying  out  its  pledge  of  an  impar- 
tial and  orderly  plebiscite.  The  Chilean 
Armed  Forces  protected  the  polling 
places  and  guaranteed  order  in  an  ad- 
mirable fashion.  We  are  particularly 
pleased  that  the  large  number  of  inter- 
national observers  were  able  to  witness 


this  display  of  civic  responsibility  and 
cooperation.  We  hope  that  these 
qualities  will  continue  to  prevail  in  the 
months  to  come.  We  are  confident  that 
the  substantial  numbers  of  Chileans 
who  supported  each  side  in  the 
plebiscite  will  now  work  together  to 
build  a  new  national  consensus  for  the 
future.  The  United  States  joins  with 
others  in  the  international  community 
in  pledging  its  strong  support  for  the 
orderly  and  peaceful  evolution  of  the 
democratic  process  in  Chile. 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by  De- 
partment deputv  spokesman  Phyllis 
Oaklev.  ■ 


57 


TREATIES 


Current  Actions 


MILTILATEKAL 


Atomic  Energy 

Amendment  of  Article  VI.  A. 1  of  the  Stat- 
ute of  the  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency  of  Oct.  26,  1956,  a.s  amended  (TIAS 
3873.  5284.  7668).  Done  at  Vienna  Sept.  27, 
1984.'  ISenate]  Treaty  Doc.  99-7. 
Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 
Sept.  7.  1988. 

Instrument  of  ratification  signed  by  the 
President:  Sept.  15,  1988. 
Ratifications  deposited:  Iran,  Sept.  30, 
1988;  U.S.,  Sept.  16,  1988. 

Aviation 

Convention  on  international  civil  aviation. 
Done  at  Chicago  Dec.  7,  1944.  Entered  into 
force  Apr.  4,  1947.  TIAS  1591. 
Adherence  deposited:  Federated  States  of 
Micronesia,  Sept.  27,  1988. 

Commodities — Common  Fund 

Agreement  establishing  the  Common  Fund 
for  Commodities,  with  schedules.  Done  at 
Geneva  June  27,  1980.' 
Signature:  Mauritania,  Oct.  18,  1988. 

Fisheries 

Pacific  Island  regional  fisheries  treaty, 

with  annexes  and  agreed  statement.  Done 

at  Port  Moresby  Apr  2,  1987.  Entered  into 

force  June  15,  1988.  [Senate]  Treaty  Doc. 

100-5. 

Proclaimed  by  the  President:  Oct.  11,  1988. 

International  Court  of  Justice  Statute  of 

the  International  Court  of  Justice.  Signed 

at  San  Francisco  June  26,  1945.  Entered 

into  force  Oct.  24,  1945.  59  Stat.  1055;  TS 

993. 

Acceptance  deposited:  Nauru,  Jan.  29, 

1988. 

Declaration  recognizing  as  compulsory  ju- 
risdiction of  the  International  Court  of  Jus- 
tice under  Art.  36,  para.  2  of  the  statute  of 
the  Court.  59  Stat.  1055;  TS  993. 
Declaration  deposited:  Nauru,  Jan.  29, 
1988.- 

Judicial  Procedure 

Convention  on  the  law  applicable  to  trusts 
and  on  their  recognition.  Done  at  The 
Hague  July  1,  1985.' 
Signature:  Canada,  Oct.  11,  1988. 

Maritime  Matters 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful 
acts  against  the  safety  of  maritime  naviga- 
tion, with  protocol  for  the  suppression  of 
unlawful  acts  against  the  safety  of  fixed 
platforms  located  on  the  continental  shelf. 
Done  at  Rome  Mar.  10,  1988.' 
Signature:  Spain,  Sept.  28,  1988.-* 


Convention  on  the  international  regulations 

for  preventing  collisions  at  sea,  1972,  with 

regulations.  Done  at  London  Oct.  20,  1972. 

Entered  into  force  Julv  15.  1977.  TIAS 

8587. 

Accession  deposited:  Sevchelles.  Aug.  22, 

1988. 

International  convention  on  standards  of 
training,  certification,  and  watchkeeping 
for  seafarers,  1978.  Done  at  London  July  7, 
1978.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  28,  1984.-'' 
Accession  deposited:  Seychelles,  Aug.  22, 
1988. 

Narcotics 

Convention  on  psychotropic  substances. 
Done  at  Vienna  Feb.  21,  1971.  Entered  into 
force  Aug.  16,  1976;  for  the  U.S.  July  15. 
1980.  TIAS  9725. 

Accession  deposited:  Czechoslovakia,  Oct. 
13,  1988. 

Protocol  amending  the  single  convention  on 
narcotic  drugs  (TIAS  6298).  Done  at  Ge- 
neva Mar.  25,  1972.  Entered  into  force 
Aug.  8,  1975.  TIAS  8118. 
Accession  deposited:  German  Dem.  Rep., 
Oct.  4.  1988. 

Nuclear  .Accidents 

Convention  on  assistance  in  the  case  of  a 
nuclear  accident  or  radiological  emergency. 
Done  at  Vienna  Sept.  26,  1986.  Entered 
into  force  Feb.  26,  1987.  [Senate]  Treaty 
Doc.  100-4. 

Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 
Sept,  17,  1988.5 

Instrument  of  ratification  signed  by  the 
President:  Sept.  15,  1988. '• 
Entered  into  force  for  the  LT.S.:  Oct.  20, 
1988. 

Ratifications  deposited:  Australia,  Sept. 
22,  1987;'  Bulgaria,  Feb.  24,  1988;^  Belorus- 
sian  S.S.R.,  Jan.  26,  1987;''  China,  Sept.  10. 
1987;^  Czechoslovakia,  Aug.  4,  1988;»  Ger- 
man Dem.  Rep.,  Apr.  29,  1987;-  Guatemala, 
Aug.  8,  1988;  Hungary,  Mar.  10,  1987;'  In- 
dia, Jan.  28,  1988;=  Iraq,  July  21,  1988;'' 
Jordan,  Dec.  11,  1987;  Me.xico,  May  10, 
1988;  Mongolia,  June  11,  1987;»  Poland, 
Mar.  24,  1988;  South  Africa,  Aug.  10,  1987;'' 
Switzerland,  May  31,  1988;  Ukrainian 
S.S.R.,  Jan.  26,  1987;»  U.S..  Sept.  19, 
1988.-^ 

Accessions  deposited:  Bangladesh,  Jan.  7, 
1988;  New  Zealand,  Mar.  11,  1987;-'  United 
Arab  Emirates,  Oct.  2,  1987;'  Vietnam, 
Sept.  29.  1987;'  World  Health  Organization, 
Aug.  10,  1988.'^ 

Acceptance  deposited:  .Japan,  June  9, 
1987.5 

Definitive  signature:  Malaysia,  Sept.  1. 
1987.' 


Convention  on  early  notification  of  a  nu- 
clear accident.  Done  at  Vienna  Se]it    .'li, 
1986.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  27.  19m;. 
[Senate]  Treaty  Doc.  100-4. 
Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 
Sept.  7.  1988."' 

Instrument  of  ratification  signed  by  the 
President:  Sept.  15,  1988."' 
Entered  into  force  for  the  U.S.:  Oct.  20, 
1988. 

Ratifications  deposited;  Australia, 
Sept.  22,  1987;  Austria,  Feb.  18,  19nn;  Bi: 
garia,  Feb.  24,  1988;"  Belorussian  S  S.R., 
.Jan.  26,  1987;^  China,  Sept.  10.  1987: 
Egypt,  July  6,  1988;5  German  Dem,  l:.  p. 
Apr.  29,  1987;'  Guatemala,  Aug.  8.  n-^; 
Hungary,  Mar.  10,  1987;''  India.  .Jan    i'-. 
1988;-'  Iraq,  July  21,  1988;^  Jordan.  H.  r.  l 
1987;  Mexico,  May  10,  1988;  Mongolia, 
June  11,  1987;'  Poland,  Mar.  24,  198,^ 
Africa,  Aug.  10.  1987;5  Sweden.  Feb.  27, 
1987;  Switzerland,  Mav  31,  1988;  Ukiaini 
S.S.R.,  .Jan.  26.  1987;5  U.S.,  Sept.  in, 
1988.' 

Accessions  deposited:  Bangladesh,  Jan. 
1988;  New  Zealand,  Mar.  11,  1987;  Unitet 
Arab  Emirates,  Oct.  2,  1987;5  Vietnam, 
Sept.  29,  1987;'  World  Health  Organizati 
Aug.  10.  1988.5 
Approval  deposited:  Finland.  Dec.  11,  19 
Acceptance  ileposited:  .Japan,  June  9.  19:- 
Definitive  signature  :  Malaysia,  Se|)t,  1, 
1987.' 

Nuclear  Weapons — Nonproliferation 

Treaty  on  the  nonproliferation  of  nuclea 
weapons.  Done  at  Washington,  London, 
and  Moscow  Julv  1.  1968.  Entered  int.) 
force  Mar.  5,  1970.  TIAS  6839. 
Accession  deposited:  Saudi  Arabia,  ( irt 
1988. 

Pollution 

Convention  for  the  protection  of  the  ozt 
layer,  with  annexes.  Done  at  Vienna  M: 
22,  1985.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  22.  1 
[Senate]  Treaty  Doc.  99-9. 
Proclaimed  by  the  President:  Oct.  11.  1! 
Ratifications  deposited:  Belgium,  Oct. 
1988;  Denmark.  Sept.  29,  1988;  German 
Fed.  Rep.  of  Sept.  20,  1988;  Luxembou 
Oct.  17,  1988. 

Acceptance  deposited:  Netherlands,  Sei 
28,  1988. 

Approval  deposited:  European  Econom; 
Community.  Oct.  17,  1988. 
Accessions  deposited:  Equatorial  Guine 
Aug.  17.  1988;  Japan,  Sept.  30,  1988;  Po 
tugal,  Oct.  17.  1988. 

Montreal  protocol  on  substances  that  d 

plete  the  ozone  layer,  with  annex.  Done 

Montreal  Sept.  16,  1987.'  [Senate]  Trea 

Doc.  100-10. 

Ratifications  deposited:  Luxembourg. 

tugal.  Oct.  17.  1988. 

Acceptances  deposited:  Japan,  Sept.  3( 

1988;  Ukrainian  S.S.R.,  Sept.  20,  1988. 


58 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  1  „, 


TREATIES 


111  against  torture  and  other 
iinian.  or  degrading  treatment  or 
lit.  Done  at  New  York  Dec.  10. 
(■red  into  force  June  26,  1987.' 
■  ms  deposited:  Chile,  Sept.  30. 
lui,  Oct.  4.  1988:  Greece,  Oct.  (i. 
iisia.  Sept.  23,  1988.'^ 


nil  on  the  elimination  of  all  forms 
iiination  against  women.  Done  at 
i>    iwik  Dec.  18,  1979.  Entered  into  force 

t.  3.  1981.' 

lature:  Sierra  Leone.  Sept.  21,  1988. 


eement  on  cultural  cooperation.  Signed 

,lgiers  June  2,  1987. 

ered  into  force:  Oct.  3,  1988. 

igladesh 

eement  amending  the  agreement  of 

17,  1987,  as  amended,  for  sales  of  ag- 
Itural  commodities.  Effected  by  ex- 
ige  of  letters  at  Dhaka  Sept.  14,  1988. 
sred  into  force  Sept.  14,  1988. 

angement  for  the  e.xchange  of  technical 
"mation  and  cooperation  in  nuclear 
ty  matters,  with  appendices.  Signed  at 
hington  May  2,  1988.  Entered  into 
May  2,  1988. 

zil 

eement  relating  to  trade  in  cotton. 

and  manmade  fiber  textiles  and  tex- 
products,  with  annexes.  Effected  by 
lange  of  notes  at  Washington  Sept.  15 
19,  1988.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  19, 
;  effective  Apr.  1,  1988. 

ada 

eement  concerning  cooperation  in  flood 
rol,  with  construction  plan.  Effected 
■xchange  of  notes  at  Ottawa  and  Wash- 
on  Aug.  29  and  30,  1988.  Entered  into 
e  Aug.  30,  1988. 

tral  African  Republic 

rnational  express  mail  agreement,  with 
died  regulations.  Signed  at  Bangui  and 
hington  June  22  and  Sept.  21,  1988. 
ered  into  force  Nov.  1,  1988. 


eement  amending  the  agreement  of 

2.  1988.  as  amended,  concerning  trade 
sxtiles  and  textile  products.  Effected 
exchange  of  letters  at  Washington 
;.  2(i  and  Sept.  7.  1988.  Entered  into 
e  Se])t.  7,  1988. 

ninican  Republic 

•eement  on  Caribbean  Basin  Radar  Net- 
k.  Signed  at  Santo  Domingo  Aug.  30, 
■!.  Entered  into  force  Aug.' 30,  1988. 


El  Salvador 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities. Signed  at  San  Salvador  Mav  22. 
1987. 
Entered  into  force:  Sept.  9,  1988. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
May  22,  1987,  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
San  Salvador  Sept.  29,  1987. 
Entered  into  force:  Sept.  9,  1988. 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities. Signed  at  San  Salvador  Mar.  10. 
1988. 
Entered  into  force:  Sept.  11.  1988. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Mar.  10,  1988,  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
San  Salvador  July  20,  1988. 
Entered  into  force:  Sept.  11,  1988. 

Germany,  Federal  Republic  of 

Memorandum  of  understanding  concerning 
German  support  of  the  joint  U.S.  services 
program  for  testing  and  evaluation  of  the 
IFP'N  system,  with  annexes.  Signed  at 
Bonn  and  Washington  July  14  and  Aug.  3, 
1988.  Entered  into  force  Aug.  3,  1988. 

Honduras 

Project  agreement  for  economic  stabiliza- 
tion and  recovery  program  II.  Signed  at 
Tegucigalpa  Aug.  20,  1988.  Entered  into 
force  Aug.  20,  1988. 

India 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Feb.  6,  1987,  as  amended,  relating  to  trade 
in  textiles  and  textile  products.  Effected 
by  exchange  of  notes  at  New  Delhi  May  24, 
June  23,  Aug.  26,  and  Sept.  12,  1988.  En- 
tered into  force  Sept.  12,  1988. 

Israel 

Arrangement  for  the  exchange  of  technical 
information  and  cooperation  in  nuclear 
safety  matters,  with  addenda.  Signed  at 
Rockville  Julv  11.  1988.  Entered  into  force 
July  11,  1988. 

Italy 

Technical  arrangement  concerning  the  in- 
stallation and  maintenance  of  a  U.S.  inter- 
face with  the  Italian  MRCS-403  radar  at 
Capo  Frasca,  Sardinia.  Signed  at  Rome 
and  Ramstein  AB  Aug.  1  and  23,  1988.  En- 
tered into  force  Aug.  23,  1988. 

Jamaica 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Nov.  9,  1987,  as  amended,  for  sales  of  agri- 
cultural commodities.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Kingston  Sept.  8  and  27. 
1988.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  27,  1988. 

Korea 

Agreement  amending  the  air  transport 
agreement  of  Apr.  24,  19.57,  as  amended 
(f  IAS  3807,  7083,  9427).  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Seoul  Sept.  15,  1988. 
Entered  into  force  Sept.  15,  1988. 


Morocco 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Mar.  25,  1988,  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities. Effected  by  exchange  of  letters 
at  Rabat  Aug.  31  and  Sept.  2.  1988.  En- 
tered into  force  Sept.  2,  1988. 

Netherlands 

Agreement  relating  to  the  agreement  of 
Aug.  14,  1987  on  the  resolution  of  practical 
problems  with  respect  to  deep  seabed  min- 
ing areas.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
The  Hague  Aug.  14.  1987. 
Entered  into  force:  Oct.  19,  1988. 

Pakistan 

Project  grant  agreement  for  child  survival. 
Signed  at  Islamabad  Aug.  29,  1988.  En- 
tered into  force  Aug.  29.  1988. 

Philippines 

Project  grant  agreement  for  the  rural  elec- 
trification project.  Signed  at  Manila  Sept. 
28.  1988.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  28.  1988. 

Poland 

Air  transport  agreement,  with  schedule 
and  annex.  Signed  at  Warsaw  Feb.  1,  1988. 
Entered  into  force:  Oct.  11,  1988;  effective 
Jan.  1,  1988. 

Senegal 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of 
Dec.  15.  1982,  and  Jan.  31,  1983  (TIAS 
10811),  providing  for  an  emergency  landing 
site  in  Senegal  for  the  space  shuttle.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  notes  at  Dakar  Feb. 
2  and  Sept.  3,  1988.  Entered  into  force 
Sept.  3,  1988;  effective  Jan.  1.  1988. 

Sierra  Leone 

Agreement  relating  to  the  agreement  of 
June  10,  1987,  as  amended,  for  the  sales  of 
agricultural  commodities.  Signed  at  Free- 
town Sept.  27,  1988.  Entered  into  force 
Sept.  27,  1988. 

Tunisia 

Agreement  relating  to  the  agreement  of 
Mar.  16,  1988,  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities. Signed  at  Tunis  Sept.  17.  1988. 
Entered  into  force  Sept.  17,  1988. 

United  Kingdom 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of 
Mar.  11,  1987,  as  extended,  concerning  An- 
guilla  and  narcotics  activities.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Washington  Sept.  23, 
1988;  effective  Sept.  27,  1988. 


'Not  in  force. 
-With  condition! s). 
'Subject  to  ratification. 
'Not  in  force  for  the  U.S. 
"'With  declaration(s).  ■ 


59 


PRESS  RELEASES 


Department  of  State 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Office  of  Press  Relations,  Department  of 
State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

No.  Date  Subject 

*210     10/.5       Shultz;  dinner  remarks, 

Gulf  Cooperation  Council, 
Oct.  3. 

*211      10/4        Shultz:  luncheon  toast.  New 

York  City. 
212     10/.5       Shultz:  remarks.  Organiza- 
tion of  African  Unity, 
New  York  City,  Oct.  4. 

*213     10/4        Program  for  the  state  visit 
to  the  United  States  of 
President  Traore  of  the 
Republic  of  Mali, 
Oct.   5-9. 

*214      10/7        Shultz:  acceptance  remarks 
for  Liberty  Award  from 
Hebrew  Immigrant  Aid 
Society,  New  York  City, 
Oct.  5. 
215     10/7        Shultz:  remarks,  South 

Asian  Association  for  Re- 
gional Cooperation,  New 
York  City,  Oct.  6. 

*216     10/7       Shultz:  news  conference, 
USUN,  New  York  City, 
Oct.  6. 

*217     10/6       Whitehead:  luncheon  toast 
in  honor  of  Mali  President 
Traore. 

*218     10/7        Shultz:  acceptance  remarks 
for  honorary  doctorate  of 
philosophy  from  Tel  Aviv 
University,  New  York 
City,  Oct."  6. 

219  10/12      Shultz:  address,  question- 

and-answer  session,  Fi- 
nancial Executives  In- 
stitute, San  Francisco, 
Oct.  10. 

220  10/18      Shultz:  address,  question- 

and-answer  session,  In- 
ter-American Press  Asso- 
ciation, Salt  Lake  City, 
Oct.  11. 

*221      10/17     William  H.  Twaddel  sworn 
in  as  Ambassador  to  the 
Islamic  Republic  of 
Mauritania,  Sept.  14  (bi- 
ographic data). 

*222  10/17  Robert  L.  Pugh  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  Chad, 
Sept.  9  (biographic  data). 
223  10/17  Shultz.  Manglapus:  remarks, 
(|uestion-and-answer  ses- 
sion following  signing  cer- 
emony of  U.S. -Philippines 
military  bases  agreement. 

*224      10/18      Program'for  the  official 
working  visit  to  Wash- 
ington, D.C,  of  South 
Korean  President  Roh. 
Oct.  20. 


*225     10/20 


*226     10/24 


Shultz:  remarks,  question- 
and-answer  session,  Na- 
tional Conference  for 
Nongovernmental  Organi- 
zations, Oct.  19. 

William  Graham  Walker  is 
sworn  in  as  Ambassador 
to  El  Salvador,  Aug.  19 
(biographic  data). 

Thomas  E.  McNamara  is 
sworn  in  as  Ambassador 
to  Colombia,  Sept.  6  (bi- 
ographic data). 


USUN 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Public  Affairs  Office,  U.S.  Mission  to  the 
United  Nations,  799  United  Nations  Plaza, 
New  York,  N.Y.  10017. 


No.  Dale  Subject 

*31      4/15       Okun:  occupied  territories. 

Security  Council. 
*32      4/15       Note  to  correspondents:  U.S. 
to  sign  torture  convention. 
*33      4/18       Whitehead  signs  UN  Con- 
vention Against  Torture 
for  U.S. 
*34      4/18       DiMartino:  children, 
UNICEF  Executive 
Board. 
*35      4/20       Buczacki:  Guam,  Subcommit- 
tee on  Small  Territories, 
Special  Committee, 
Apr.  21. 
*36      4/25       Okun:  Tunisia,  Security 

Council. 
*37      5/3         Bunton:  American  Samoa, 
Subcommittee  on  Small 
Territories,  Special 
Committee. 
*38      5/5        Wrobleski:  narcotics, 

ECOSOC,  May  4. 
*39      5/5        Walters:  human  rights  in 
Cuba,  44th  UN  Commis- 
sion on  Human  Rights, 
Mar.  8. 
*40      5/5         Reagan:  women,  32d  Com- 
mission on  the  Status  of 
Women,  Vienna,  Mar.  16. 
41      5/9        Walters:  chemical  weapons, 

Security  Council. 
*42      5/10       Noe:  Virgin  Islands,  Subcom- 
mittee on  Small  Territo- 
ries, Special  Committee, 
May  9. 
*43      5/10       Byrne:  Palau,  Trusteeship 
Council. 
44      5/10      Walters:  Lebanon.  Security 

Council. 
*45      5/11       Reagan:  women,  ECOSOC. 
*46      5/12       Korn:  Central  America,  Spe- 
cial Session  of  General 
Assembly. 
*47      5/13       Byrne:  host  country  rela- 
tions. General  Assembly. 


*228     10/24      Robert  S.  Gelbard  is  swofli;  ! 
in  as  Ambassador  to 
Bolivia,  Sept.  16  (bio- 
graphic data). 
229     10/31      Shultz:  address,  question- 
and-answer  session.  Com- 
monwealth Club  of  Cal- 
ifornia, San  Francisco, 
Oct.  28. 

*Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin.  ■ 


*48      5/16       Reagan:  Palestinian  women. 

ECOSOC,  May  13. 
*49      5'16       Byrne:  social  development, 
ECOSOC. 
50      5/19       Williamson:  Ethiopia. 

ECOSOC. 
*51      5/20       Byrne:  human  rights. 

ECOSOC. 
*52      5/23       Byrne:  petitions,  Trusti-esh 

Council. 
*53      5/27       Byrne:  Palau,  Trusteeship 
Council. 
54      5/31       U.S.  statement.  Third  Spe- 
cial Session  of  the  Gener 
Assemblv  Devoted  to  Dis 
armament  (SSOD  IIIi.  M- 
31^June  25. 
*55      6/2         Friedersdorf:  Iran.  SSOD 

III,  June  1. 
*56      6/7         Friedersdorf:  Panama.  SS( 

III. 
*57      6/6         Bailey:  Cuba,  SSOD  III, 

June  3. 
*58      6/10      Granger:  Nicaragua,  SSOI 
III. 
59      6/13       Shultz:  disarmament,  S>( 

III. 
*60      6/14       Williamson:  Afghanistan. 
Donors  Meeting  for  Hu- 
manitarian and  Econiimi 
Assistance  Programs  Re 
lating  to  Afghanistan. 
*61      6/15       Lowell:  outer  space, 

COPUOS. 
*62      6/20       Smith:  outer  space, 

COPUOS. 

*63      6/22       Rashkow:  outer  space,  Le; 
Subcommittee,  COPUOl 
*64      6/27       Friedersdorf:  closing  state 
ment,  SSOD  III,  June  2 
*65      7/8         Berstein:  information,  Coi 
mittee  on  Information. 
66      7/11       Note  to  correspondents: 
Fitzvvater  statement  on 
Iranian  airliner. 
*67      7/20       Walters:  Iran  Air  incident 
Security  Council. 
(58      7/13       Note  to  correspondents: 

southern  Africa. 
69      7/14       Bush:  Iran  Air  incident, 

curity  Council. 
*70      7/18      Thayer:  Indian  Ocean.  Ad 
Hoc  Committee  on  tht 
Indian  Ocean. 

*Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin.  ■ 


60 


^ 


BLICATIONS 


ipartment  of  State 

single  copies  of  the  following  Depart- 
"I'  State  publications  are  available 
Public  Information  Division,  Bu- 
I'ublic  Affairs,  Department  of 
..  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

Secretary 

irts  for  Peace  in  Africa,  Organization  of 
frican  Unity.  New  York  City,  Oct.  4, 
■8<s  (Current  Policy  #1111). 

to  the  Riture:  Enlightened  Engage- 
ent,  Financial  Executives  Institute, 
in  Francisco,  Oct.  10.  1988  (Current 
jlicy  #1114). 

Open  Society  and  Its  Friends,  Inter- 
merican  Press  Association,  Salt  Lake 
ity,  Oct.  11,  1988  (Current  Policy  #1116). 

IS  Control 

t-West  Relations  and  Arms  Reductions, 

mbassador  Rowny,  Polish  Institute  of 

iternational  Affairs,  Warsaw,  Sept.  2, 

188  (Current  Policy  #1112). 

mical  Weapons:  U.S.  Policy  (GIST,  Oct. 

i88). 

artment  &  Foreign  Service 

sign  Language  Competence  in  the  For- 
gn  Service  (Public  Information  Series, 
3pt.  21,  1988). 

t  Asia 

Situation  in  Cambodia,  Office  Director 
harles  H.  Twining,  Second  Interna- 
lonal  Scholars  Conference  on  Cambodia, 
ept.  29,  1988  (Current  Policy  #1113). 

momics 

rview  of  U.S.  Trade  Policy,  Under  Sec- 
'tary  Wallis,  Trade  Conference  of  the 
-xecutive  Council  on  Foreign  Diplomats, 
^ct.  5,  1988  (Current  Policy  #1118). 

iieral 

llomacy  in  an  Election  Year  and  Beyond, 
mbassador  Kampelman,  Georgetown 
niversity  School  of  Foreign  Service, 
ct.  7,  1988  (Current  Policy  #1115). 
;T  Index  (GIST,  Oct.  1988). 

man  Rights 

nan  Rights;  A  Western  Cultural  Bias?, 
distant  Secretary  Schifter.  European 
/orkshop  on  the  Universal  Declaration 
f  Human  Rights  sponsored  by  the  UN 
enter  for  Human  Rights,  Milan, 
ept.  7,  1988  (Current  Policy  #1105). 

jdle  East 

date  on  the  Situation  in  the  IVliddle 
;ast.  Assistant  Secretary  IVIurphy,  Sub- 
ommittee  on  Europe  and  the  IVliddle 
;ast.  House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee, 
)ct.  13,  1988  (Current  Policy  #1117). 

litary  Affairs 

itary  Power  and  Diplomacy:  The  Reagan 
jegacy.  Under  Secretary  Armacost,  Air 
^oree  Association  Convention,  Sept.  19, 
988  (Current  Policy  #1108). 


Narcotics 

The  International  Drug  Problem  and  U.S. 
Foreign  Policy  (Public  Information  Se- 
ries, Sept.  1988). 

United  Nations 

Toward  the  21st  Century:  The  Future  for 
Multilateral  Diplomacy,  Assistant  Secre- 
tary Williamson,  Annual  Conference  of 


the  Department  of  Public  Information  for 
Nongovernmental  Organizations,  UN 
Headquarters,  New  York  City,  Sept.  1(5, 
1988  (Current  Policy  #1110). 

Western  Hemisphere 

FY  1989  Assistance  Requests  for  Latin 
America  and  the  Caribbean  (Bulletin  Re- 
print, Apr.  22,  1988).  ■ 


Foreign  Relations  Volume  Released 


The  Department  of  State  on  August  11, 
1988,  released  Foreign  Relations  of  the 
United  States,  1955-1957,  Volume 'XI, 
United  Nations  and  General  Interna- 
tional Matters.  This  volume  covers  the 
United  Nations,  Law  of  the  Sea,  Ant- 
arctica, outer  space,  and  the  Interna- 
tional Geophysical  Year. 

In  the  m"id-1950s,  the  United  Na- 
tions entered  its  second  decade  and 
found  itself  in  the  midst  of  those  grow- 
ing pains  that  were  to  transform  the 
international  organization  in  the  years 
to  come.  The  member  nations  began 
their  sparring  over  reforming  the  oper- 
ations of  the  organization  as  originally 
defined  in  the  Charter.  The  vanquished 
nations  of  World  War  II,  the  cluster  of 
Soviet  satellite  states,  and  the  emerg- 
ing Third  World  countries  began  their 
efforts  to  be  included  in  an  expanded 
UN  membership.  The  Soviet  bloc 
sought  to  widen  its  role  in  the  Security 
Council.  Furthermore,  the  recurrent  in- 
ternational crisis  of  the  mid-1950s  per- 
suaded UN  members  of  the  need  for 
permanent  peacekeeping  devices  be- 
yond the  voters  in  the  various  UN 
bodies. 

The  documents  in  this  volume  also 
provide  an  indication  of  some  of  the 
radically  altered  international  political 
context  caused  by  profound  scientific 


and  technological  changes  in  the 
mid-1950s.  In  particular,  the  competi- 
tion for  offshore  resources  provoked 
reconsideration  of  the  long-established 
international  legal  concepts  of  maritime 
jurisdiction.  The  search  for  increased 
knowledge  of  Antarctica  and  conflicting 
ideas  with  respect  to  jurisdiction  over 
that  continent  caused  concern.  The 
launching  of  Sputnik  I  by  the  Soviet 
Union  in  1957  set  in  motion  the  race  for 
space. 

This  volume  is  the  most  recent  in 
the  Department  of  State's  official  diplo- 
matic documentary  series  begun  in 
1861.  Foreign  Relations,  1955-1957,  Vol- 
ume XI,  comprises  787  pages  of  govern- 
mental records,  most  of  which  were 
previously  classified.  The  volume  was 
prepared  in  the  Office  of  the  Historian, 
Bureau  of  Public  Affairs,  Department 
of  State.  This  authoritative  official  rec- 
ord is  based  on  the  files  of  the  White 
House,  the  Department  of  State,  and 
other  government  agencies. 

Copies  of  Volume  XI  (Department 
of  State  Publication  No.  9640,  GPO 
Stock  No.  044-000-02197-8)  may 
be  purchased  for  $24.00  (domestic 
postpaid)  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  Checks 
or  money  orders  should  be  made 
payable  to  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents. 


Press  release  182  of  Aug.  11,  1988. 


61 


PUBLICATIONS 


Principal  Officers  of  the  Department  of  State 

and  United  States  Cliiefs  of  /W/ss/on,  1778-1988  Released 


The  Department  of  State,  on  Sep- 
tember 30,  1988,  released  the  pub- 
Hcation  Principal  Officers  of  the 
Department  of  State  and  United  States 
Chiefs  of  Mission,  1778-1988.  It  is  a 
revised  edition  of  a  standard  reference 
work  first  published  in  1973  under  the 
title  United  States  Chiefs  of  Mission. 
and  last  updated  under  the  current  title 
in  1986. 

The  publication  presents  the  au- 
thoritative record  of  the  tenure  of  prin- 
cipal Department  of  State  officials 


throughout  the  nation's  history.  The  rec- 
ord includes  the  state  of  residence,  ca- 
reer status,  and  dates  of  appointment, 
or  entry  on  duty,  and  of  termination  of 
appointment.  An  index  of  all  persons 
listed  in  the  main  text  contains  full 
name,  dates  of  birth  and  death,  and  a 
chronological  list  of  each  position  men- 
tioned in  the  text.  The  edition  covers 
appointments  through  August  26,  1988. 

Part  I,  Principal  Officers  of  the  De- 
partment of  State,  provides  information 
on  officers  commissioned  bv  the  Presi- 


Background  Notes 


This  series  provides  brief,  factual  summa- 
ries of  the  people,  history,  government, 
economy,  and  foreign  relations  of  about 
170  countries  (excluding  the  United  States) 
and  of  selected  international  organiza- 
tions. Recent  revisions  are: 

Burundi  (July  1988) 

Chad  (Sept.  1988) 

Chile  (Sept.  1988) 

Gabon  (.lulv  1988) 

Ireland  (Sept.  1988) 

Malaysia  (Aug.  1988) 

Mauritius  (Aug.  1988) 

Sao  Tome  and  Principe  (July  1988) 

Senegal  (.July  1988) 

Zaire  (Aug.  1988) 

Zambia  (Aug.  1988) 


A  free  copy  of  the  index  only  may  be 
obtained  from  the  Public  Information  Di- 
vision, Bureau  of  Pulilic  Affiiii's,  Depart- 
ment of  State,  Washington.  D.C.  2(i520. 

For  about  60  Backgron „,l  X,,!,:.  a 
year,  a  subscription  is  available  IViiin  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment Printing  Office,  Washington. 
D.C.  20402,  for  $14.00  (domestic)  and 
$17.50  (foreign).  Check  or  money  order, 
made  payable  to  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  must  accompany  order.  ■ 


dent,  Chiefs  of  Bureaus  who  were  des- 
ignated by  the  Secretary  of  State  and 
who  hold  rank  equivalent  to  an  As- 
sistant Secretary  of  State.  All  individu- 
als conferred  with  the  personal  rank  of 
career  ambassador  are  included  in  a 
separate  list  that  ends  this  section. 

Part  II,  United  States  Chiefs  of 
Mission,  includes  all  United  States  Am- 
bassadors, Ministers  (including  those 
commissioned  as  sole  ministers  by  the 
Continental  Congress),  Ministers  Resi- 
dent, charge  d'affaires,  charge  d'af- 
faires pro  tempore,  and  diplomatic 
agents.  It  also  includes  those  commis- 
sioners who  were  accredited  to  foreign 
governments  and  served  as  heads  of 
American  legations. 

The  revised  edition  oi  Priiicijial 
Officers  of  the  Department  of  State 
and  United  States  Chiefs  of  Missicn. 
1778-1988  was  prepared  in  the  Office  ol 
the  Historian,  Bureau  of  Public  Affairs 
Department  of  State.  Copies  of  this 
book,  which  contains  160  pages  of  data 
are  available  in  soft  cover  (Departmen' 
of  State  Publication  No.  9649;  GPO 
Stock  No.  004-000-02232-0  and 
may  be  purchased  for  $8.50  from  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office,  Wash- 
ington, D.C.  20402.  Checks  or  money 
orders  should  be  made  payable  to  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents. 


Press  release  208. 


62 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  19 


)EX 


«:ember  1988 
3ume  88,  No.  2141 


-Ian.  Promoting  Peace  and 
1  itv  in  the  South  Asian  Region 

tultz)  .' 19 

a.  Efforts  for  Peace  in  Africa 

ultz)    20 

■ican  Principles.  The  Open  Society 

1  Its  Friends  (Shultz)   13 

iation  of  South  East  Asian  Nations. 

uation  in  Cambodia  (Twining) 31 

liodia.  Situation  in  Cambodia 

i-ining)    31 

da.  U.S.-Canada  Sign  Free  Trade 

reement  (Reagan) 22 

.  Results  in  Chilean  Plebiscite 

apartment  statement) 57 

ress 

ensharing  and  Japan  (Clark) 30 

nal  Emergency  in  Panama  (message 

he  Congress) 57 

Report  on  Cyprus  (message  to  the 

igress) 37 

Japan  Relations  (Clark)    27 

.te  on  the  Situation  in  the  Middle  East 

nrphy)    41 

ular  Affairs.  Nonimmigrant  Visa 
iver  Pilot  Program  With  Japan 

partment  announcement) 23 

as.  39th  Report  on  Cyprus  (message 

he  Congress) 37 

lomics 

omic  Summits  1981-88   34 

,0  the  Future:  Enlightened 

gagement  (Shultz) 16 

view  of  U.S.  Trade  Policy  (Wallis)  .  33 
Cjt.  Taba  Arbitration  Award 

i'liartment  statement) 42 

t.  World  Food  Day.  1988 

1  iihimation) 37 

I  an  Rights.  40th  Anniversary  of 
1   1  iiiversal  Declaration  of  Human 

i  hi-  1 

I   ar  >.  Visit  of  Hungarian  Premier 

(  u-z.  Reagan)    36 

i    rpdate  on  the  Situation  in  the 

W  Idli-  East  (Murphy) 41 


Iraq 

Iraq's  Use  of  Chemical  Weapons 
(Department  statement) 44 

Update  on  the  Situation  in  the  Middle  East 
(Murphy)    41 

Israel 

Taba  Arbitration  Award  (Department 

statement)   42 

Update  on  the  Situation  in  the  Middle  East 
(Murphy)    41 

Japan 

Burdensharing  and  .Japan  (Clark) 30 

Nonimmigrant  Visa  Waiver  Pilot  Program 
With  Japan  (Department 
announcement)   23 

U.S. -.Japan  Relations  (Clark)    27 

Kuwait.  Update  on  the  Situation  in  the 
Middle  East  (Murphy) 41 

Lebanon 

Lebanon:  At  the  Crossroads  (Murphy)   .  45 

Republic  of  Lebanon  48 

Update  on  the  Situation  in  the  Middle  East 
(Murphy)    41 

.Middle  East.  Update  on  the  Situation  in 
the  Middle  East  (Murphy)    41 

Military  Affairs.  U.S. -Philippines  Military 
Bases  Agreement  Review.  1988 
(Manglapus,  Reagan,  Shultz,  te.xts  of 
agreement,  agreed  minutes,  and  letter  to 
President  Aquino)    24 

Narcotics.  Promoting  Peace  and 
Prosperity  in  the  South  Asian  Region 
(Shultz)  .' 19 

Nuclear  Policy.  Promoting  Peace  and 
Prosperity  in  the  South  Asian  Region 
(Shultz)  .' 19 

Panama.  National  Emergency  in  Panama 
(message  to  the  Congress) 57 

Philippines.  U.S. -Philippines  Military 
Bases  Agreement  Review,  1988 
(Manglapus,  Reagan,  Shultz,  te.xts  of 
agreement,  agreed  minutes,  and  letter  to 
President  Aquino)    24 

Presidential  Documents 

National  Emergency  in  Panama  (message 
to  the  Congress) 57 

39th  Report  on  Cyprus  (message  to  the 
Congress) 37 

U.S.-Canada  Sign  Free  Trade  Agreement 
(Reagan)    22 

U.S. -Philippines  Military  Bases 
Agreement  Review,  1988  (Manglapus, 
Reagan,  Shultz,  te.xts  of  agreement, 
agreed  minutes,  and  letter  to  President 
Aquino)    24 


Visit  of  Hungarian  Premier  (Grosz, 

Reagan)    .' 36 

World  Food  Day,  1988  (proclamation)  ...  37 
Publications 

Hackgi-ound  Notes 62 

Department  of  State    61 

Fiircigii  Rcliitiotifi  Volume  Released  ....  61 
I'riiH-ipal  Officcfs  of  the  Department  of 

State  and  United  States  Chiefs  of 

Mission.  1778-1988  Released 62 

Saudi  Arabia.  Update  on  the  Situation  in 

the  Middle  East  (Murphy)    41 

Science  &.  TechnoloK.v.  Diplomacy  in  an 

Election  Year  and  Beyond 

( Kampelman) 38 

South  Asia.  Promoting  Peace  and 

Prosperity  in  the  South  Asian  Region 

(Shultz)  .' 19 

Terrorism.  Promoting  Peace  and 

Prosperity  in  the  South  Asian  Region 

(Shultz)  .' 19 

Trade 

Overview  of  U.S.  Trade  Policy  (Wallis)  .  33 

U.S.-Canada  Sign  Free  Trade  Agreement 

(Reagan) 22 

Treaties.  Current  Actions  58 

U.S.S.R.  Diplomacy  in  an  Election  Year 

and  Beyond  (Kampelman) 38 

United  Nations 

40th  Anniversary  of  the  Universal 

Declaration  of  Human  Rights 1 

Toward  the  21st  Century:  The  Future  for 

Multilateral  Diplomacy  (Williamson)   .  53 
Vietnam.  Situation  in  Cambodia 

(Twining)    31 

Western  Hemisphere.  The  Open  Society 

and  Its  Friends  (Shultz)   13 

Name  Index 

Clark,  William,  Jr    27, .30 

Grosz,  Karoly  36 

Kampelman,  Max  M    38 

Manglapus,  Raul    24 

Murphv,  Richard  W   41,45 

Reagan.  President   22,24,36,37,57 

Shuitz,  Secretary    13,16,19,20,24 

Twining,  Charles  H   31 

Wallis.  W.  Allen  33 

Williamson,  Richard  S    53 


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buUetm 

e  Official  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy   /  Vol.  88  /    Nos.  2130-2141 

Index  1988 


■  31 


errorism 


'^*^^;St<&^^^ 


Nicaragua 


INF  Treaty 


Moscow  Summit 


Human  Rights 


Canada 


Afghanistan 


Dpparimpni  of  State 

bulletin 


Vol.88/  Nos.  2130-2141 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public  Com- 
munication in  the  Bureau  of  Public  Af- 
fairs, is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide 
the  public,  the  Congress,  and  govern- 
ment agencies  with  information  on  de- 
velopments in  U.S.  foreign  relations 
and  the  work  of  the  Department  of 
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Bulletin's  contents  include  major  ad- 
dresses and  news  conferences  of  the 
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senior  State  Department  officials;  se- 
lected press  releases  issued  by  the 
White  House,  the  Department,  and  the 
U.S.  Mission  to  the  United  Nations; 
and  treaties  and  other  agreements  to 
which  the  United  States  is  or  may  be- 
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are  published  frequently  to  provide  ad- 
ditional information  on  current  issues 
but  should  not  necessarily  be  inter- 
preted as  official  U.S.  policy 
statements. 


GEORGE  P.  SHULTZ 

Secretary  of  State 

CHARLES  REDMAN 

Assistant  Secretary 
for  Public  Affairs 

PAUL  E.  AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office  of  Public  Communication 

NORMAN  HOWARD 
COLLEEN LUTZ 

Chiefs,  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 

SHARON  R.HAYNES 

Assistant  Editor 


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INDEX:  Volume  88,  Numbers  2130-2141 


irams.  Elliott,  May  70,  Aug.  88,  Oct.  72 
evedo  Peralta,  Ricardo,  Oct.  4 
ghani.stan: 
rugs,  narcotic,  production,  trafficking, 
control  efforts:  Karp,  Mar.  19; 
Wrobleski,  June  51 
Economy  (Karp),  Mar.  14,  16 
Khalis,  Moulavi  Mohammed  Yunis  (bio- 
graphical data),  Mar.  8 
50viet  occupation  and  withdrawal:  Arma- 
cost,  Sept.  18,  Nov.  42;  NAC,  May  6; 
Okun,  Jan.  .54;  Reagan,  Mar.  25,  80, 
Nov.  4;  Shultz,  Dec.  20;  Whitehead, 
Sept.  37 
Afghan  resistance  activity  (Karp),  Mar. 

2 
Afghanistan  settlement  agreement: 
June  69;  Reagan,  Shultz,  June  54, 
55;  te.xt,  June  56 
Human  rights  (Karp),  Mar.  19 
International  concerns  (Karp),  Mar.  22 
Kabul  regime  and  national  reconcilia- 
tion policy  (Karp),  Mar.  1,  11,  19 
Military  activity  (Karp),  Mar.  2,  9,  11 
Refugees:  Karp^  Mar.  21;  Shultz, 
Nov.  14;  Williamson,  Sept.  57 
Regional  concerns  (Karp),  Mar.  21 
Social  developments  (Karp),  Mar.  17 
Soviet  morale  at  home  (Karp),  Mar.  11 
U.S.  visit  of  resistance  leaders  (Rea- 
gan), Jan.  43 
Withdrawal  negotiations  (Karp),  Mar.  1, 
11 
Terrorism  (Bremer),  June  62 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Mav  82,  Julv 

76 

UN  involvement:  Karp,  Mar.  1,  20,  23; 
Okun,  Jan.  54;  Walters,  May  68;  Wil- 
liamson, Sept.  58,  62 
General  Assembly  Resolution  42/15,  Jan. 
55 
U.S.  aid,  FY  89,  request,  (Murphv),  June 

41 
U.S.  humanitarian  assistance  (Karp), 

Mar.  24 

U.S.  policy:  Armacost,  Sept.  55;  (Karp), 
Mar.  24;  Reagan,  July  2;  Shultz,  May. 
13 
Zahir  Shah,  Mohammed  (biographical 

data),  Mar.  9 
ghanistan  Da.v,  1988,  proclamation  (Rea- 
gan), June  60 
rica  (see  also  Refugees  and  names  of  in- 
dividual ronntries): 
Development  Fund  for  Africa,  FY  89, 
budget  request  (Woods),  July  57 
Economic  policies  (Wallis),  Aug.  73 
Regional  conflicts  and  peace  efforts 

(Shultz),  Dec.  20 
Southern:  Armacost,  Sept.  22;  Moore, 

Nov.  46 

Southwest  (Shultz),  Apr.  46,  Dec.  21 
Negotiations  on  regional  settlement 
(joint  statements),  Sept.  3,  Nov.  18, 
19 
Principles  for  a  Peaceful  Settlement 
(text),  Sept.  5 


Africa  (Cont'd) 

U.S.  position  (Crocker,  White  House), 
Nov.  18 
Sub-Sahara  (Milam),  Oct.  45 
U.S.  national  security  strategy  (Reagan), 

Apr.  25 
U.S.  policy  (Powell),  Oct.  .53 
Agency  for  International  Development 

(AID)  (see  also  Foreign  aid,  U.S.),  FY 
89,  budget  request  (Woods),  July  54 
Agriculture  (see  also  Wheat): 
Agency  for  International  Development 
(AID),  FY  89,  budget  request 
(Woods),  July  57 
Agricultural  commodities,  sales  of,  bilat- 
eral agreements:  Bangladesh,  Aug. 
92,  Oct.  84,  Dec.  59;  Bolivia,  Sept.  84; 
Costa  Rica,  May  83,  Oct.  84;  Domini- 
can Republic,  Apr.  88,  Aug.  92; 
Egypt,  July  77;  El  Salvador,  Aug.  92, 
Dec.  .59;  Guatemala,  Feb.  92;  Guyana, 
Mar.  85;  Honduras,  Oct.  84;  Indo- 
nesia, Sept.  84,  Nov.  49;  Jamaica,  Feb. 
92,  Mar.  85,  Aug.  93,  Sept.  85,  Dec. 
59;  Kenya,  May  84,  Oct.  84;  Liberia, 
Jan.  62;  Madagascar,  Apr.  88;  Feder- 
ated States  of  Micronesia,  Aug.  93, 
Dec.  59;  Pakistan,  June  69;  Peru,  Oct. 
85,  Nov.  50;  Philippines,  July  77,  Aug. 
93;  Senegal,  Oct.  85;  Sierra  Leone, 
Sept.  85,  Dec.  59;  Sri  Lanka,  Mar.  85, 
Aug.  93,  Sept.  85;  Sudan,  Jan.  63,  May 
84,  July  77;  Tunisia,  July  77,  Aug.  93. 
Oct.  85,  Dec.  59;  Uganda,  Sept.  85; 
Yemen  Arab  Republic,  June  69;  Zaire, 
June  69,  Nov.  50;  Zambia,  Aug.  93 
Agricultural  commodities  and  equipment, 
bilateral  agreement  with  Pakistan, 
.Jan.  62 
Agricultural  sector  support  program 
(ASSP),  bilateral  agreement  with 
Pakistan,  .Jan.  62,  Nov.  49 
Agricultural  technology  transformation 
project,  bilateral  agreement  with 
Peru,  Apr.  88 
Agricultural  trade  policy  reform  (Wallis), 

Jan.  30 
Agriculture  and  rural  sector  support, 
program  grant,  bilateral  agreement 
with  Indonesia,  Jan.  62 
International  Fund  for  Agricultural  De- 
velopment (IFAD),  agreement  (1976), 
Trinidad  and  Tobago,  June  68 
International  plant  protection,  convention 
(1951),  Turkey,  Nov.  48 
Revised  text  (1979):  Ecuador,  Turkey, 
Nov.  48 
Irrigation  management  systems,  bilateral 
agreement  with  Egypt,  Sept.  84 
AIDS  (acquired  immune  deficiency  syn- 
drome). See  under  Health  and  Medical 
research 
Albania,  treaties,  agreements,  etc..  May  82, 
July  76,  77 


Algeria,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  92, 

July  76,  Dec.  59 
American  Foreign  Policy:  Cnrrent  Docn- 
tiients,  1982,  Supplement,  microfiche 
publication,  released  Feb.  94 
American  Foreign  Policy:  Current  Docu- 
ments, 198S,  Supplement,  microfiche 
publication,  released  July  81 
American  Foreign  Policy:  Current  Docu- 
ments, 1986,  released,  Feb.  94 
American  ideals  (Reagan),  Aug.  15,  Nov.  8 
Angola: 
Negotiations  on  regional  settlement  in 
southwestern  Africa  (joint  state- 
ments), Sept.  3,  Nov.  18,  19 
Cuba,  involvement  (Williamson),  Sept. 

73 
Principles  for  a  Peaceful  Settlement, 

text,  Sept.  5 
U.S.  position  (Crocker,  White  House), 
Nov.  18 
Antarctica  (see  also  Conservation): 
Antarctic  Treaty  (1959),  Canada,  July  76 
Principles  and  objectives,  recommenda- 
tions re  furtherance  (1985):  Japan, 
Uruguay,  Apr.  87 
Principles  and  objectives,  recommenda- 
tions re  furtherance  (1988):  U.K., 
U.S.,  Apr.  87 
Antigua  and  Barbuda,  treaties,  agreements, 

etc.,  Jan.  61,  May  82 
ANZUS  (Australia,  New  Zealand,  U.S.)  se- 
curity agreement:  Reagan,  Apr.  25; 
Shultz,  Apr.  46 
Arab-Israeli  conflict  (see  al.w  Middle  East): 
Occupied  territories: 
Deportations  of  Palestinians  (Okun, 

Walters),  Mar.  82 
Economic,  social,  political  situation 

(Murphy),  Mar.  71 
U.S.  aid,  FY  89,  request  (Murphy),  June 

42 
U.S.  policy:  Okun,  Mar.  81;  Reagan, 

May  9,  10 
West  Bank/Gaza  uprisings  (Shultz),  June 
11 
Palestinian  issues:  Murphv,  June  45; 

Shultz,  May  .56,  57,  Nov.  15 
Peace  process:  Murphy,  June  37,  45,  Sept. 
44,  Oct.  63,  Dec.  42;  Shultz,  Apr.  46, 
May  57 
Egyptian  participation  (Shultz),  June  12 
Jordanian  participation  (Shultz),  June  9, 

15,  Sept.  1 
Lebanon  (Shultz),  June  16 
Palestine  Liberation  Organization 

(PLO):  Shultz,  June  3,  5,  10,  Nov.  1 
Taba  arbitration  settlement,  Dec.  42 
UN  Resolution  242  (Shultz),  June  2 
U.S.  role  (Shultz),  June  7 
Visits  by  Secretary  Shultz: 
Egypt  (Shultz)  Sept.  47,  49 
Israel  (Shultz),  June  1,  9,  Sept.  48 
Jordan  (Shultz),  June  7,  15,  Sept.  48 
Saudi  Arabia  (Shultz),  June  13 


apartment  of  State  Bulletin/Index  1988 


Arab-Israeli  conflict  (Cont'd) 
U.N.  actions  and  U.S.  concerns  (Walters), 

May  67 
U.S.  foreign  policy  agenda  (Shultz),  July  9 
Arbitration,  recognition  and  enforcement  of 
foreign  arbital  awards,  convention 
(19.58):  Bahrain,  June  68;  Cameroon, 
May  81;  Costa  Rica.  Jan.  61;  Peru,  Sept. 
83' 
Archival  information  and  materials  on  the 
Nazi  occupation  of  Poland,  the  Holo- 
caust, and  related  subjects,  memo  of 
agreement  with  Poland,  Jan.  6:S 
Arctic  cooperation,  bilateral  agreement 

with  Canada,  Mar.  84 
Argentina: 
Debt  resolution  (Shultz),  Oct.  6 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar  84,  Apr. 
88,  May  81,  82,  July  76,  77,  Aug.  92, 
Sept.  83 
U.S.  aid,  FY  89,  request  (Abrams),  Oct. 

79 
Visit  of  Secretary  Shultz  (Shultz),  Oct.  5 
Armacost,  Michael  H..  Aug.  69,  88,  Sept.  9, 

18,  55,  Nov.  40 
Armaments,  U.S.  (see  also  Defense  and  na- 
tional security); 
Arms  sales,  proposed; 
Bahrain;  Murphy,  Mar  75;  White 

House,  Man  76 
Japan  (Sigur),  Sept.  13 
Kuwait  (Murphy),  Oct.  62 
Saudi  Arabia  (White  House),  Jan.  41 
Coproduction  of  M109A1B  self-propelled 
155  MM  Howitzer,  bilateral  agree- 
ment, with  Switzerland,  Oct.  85 
International  Traffic  in  Arms  Regulations 
(Department),  June  46 
Arms  control  and  disarmament  {see  also 
Europe:  Confidence-  and  Security- 
Building  Measures  and  Disarmament 
Conference  (CDE);  Europe:  Mutual  and 
balanced  force  reduction  talks;  and  So- 
viet Union;  U.S.  arms  control  negotia- 
tions): NAC  Mav  5;  NATO,  Feb.  85; 
Nitze,  Feb.  81 
Arms  reduction  efforts  (Reagan),  Feb.  19, 

Apr.  12,  Nov.  4 
Certain  conventional  weapons  with  e.xces- 
sively  injurious  or  indiscriminate  ef- 
fects, convention  (1980)  with  protocols 
I,  II,  and  III,  France,  May  83 
Conference  on  Disarmament,  Vienna,  re- 
convenes (Reagan),  Apr.  57 
Conventional  weapons;  NAC,  May  2; 

Nitze,  Feb.  83 
Inspections  relating  to  the  Intermediate- 
range  nuclear  forces  treaty  (INF), 
agreement;  Belgium,  Federal  Repub- 
lic of  Germany,  Italv,  Netherlands, 
U.K.,  U.S.,  Feb.  9l" 
Progress  and  global  challenges  (Shultz), 

Aug.  84 
Summit,  Washington,  D.C.  (U.S. -Soviet 

joint  statement),  Feb.  13 
UN  General  Assembly  third  special  ses- 
sion devoted  to  disarmament  (U.S.), 
Aug.  84 
U.S.  accomplishments  (Williamson),  Sept. 
65 


Arms  control  and  disarmanent  (Cont'd) 
U.S.  arms  control  initiatives,  Jan.  23,  May 
26,  July  16 
Aruba,  preinspection  in  respect  of,  bilateral 

agreement  with  Netherlands,  Apr.  88 
Asia  (see  also  Pacific  Ocean  region  and 
names  of  individual  countries): 
East  Asia;  Armacost,  Sept.  9;  Shultz,  May 
14,  Oct.  38 
Democratization  (Shultz),  Oct.  30 
Economic  development  (Wallis),  June  23, 

Aug.  73 
U.S.  aid,  FY  89,  request  (Sigur),  July 

33 
U.S.  national  security  strategy  (Rea- 
gan), Apr  24 
U.S.  policy;  Powell,  Oct.  .52,  Shultz, 
Oct.  34,  38 
South  Asia; 
South  Asian  Association  for  Regional 
Cooperation  (SAARC);  Shultz,  Dec. 
19 
U.S.  national  security  strategy  (Rea- 
gan), Apr.  22 
Association  of  South  East  Asian  Nations 
(ASEAN):  Reagan,  Apr  24,  Shultz, 
Oct.  21,  25 
Indonesia,  economic  development  (Sigur). 

Mar.  59 
Ministerial  dialogue,  Washington,  Feb. 
1988:  joint  statement,  Apr.  .54;  Shultz, 
Apr.  .52;  Yeo  Cheow  Tong,  Apr  53 
Australia; 
Ministerial  meeting,  Washington,  joint 

communique,  Sept.  51 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  61,  Feb. 
91,  Mar.  83,  84,  May  82,  83,  July  76, 
Nov.  48,  Dec.  58 
U.S.  visit  of  Prime  Minister  Hawke; 
Hawke,  Sept.  51;  Reagan,  Sept.  .50 
Austria,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  92, 

Mar  84,  July  76,  Aug.  92,  Oct.  83 
Aviation: 
Access  of  airlines  to  La  Guardia  Airport 
for  transborder  services,  bilateral 
agreement  with  Canada  (1985),  U.S. 
(termination),  May  83 
Air  services,  memo  of  understanding  with 

Greece,  Aug.  92 
Air  services  agreement  between  St. 

Christopher  and  Nevis  and  U.S.,  June 
69 
Air  transport,  bilateral  agreements;  Aus- 
tralia, Mar  84;  Republic  of  Korea, 
Dec.  59;  Lu.xembourg,  Oct.  85;  Mex- 
ico, Mar  85,  Oct.  85;  Netherlands, 
Apr.  88,  Oct.  85;  Philippines,  June  69; 
Poland,  May  84,  Dec.  59;  Soviet 
Union,  Feb.  93;  Spain,  Jan.  63;  Tur- 
key. Nov.  50;  Venezuela,  Aug.  93; 
Yugoslavia,  Mar.  86 
Air  transport  between  U.S.  and  Aruba, 
bilateral  agreement  with  Nether- 
lands, Jan.  62 
Aviation  security;  McManaway,  May  65; 
Shultz,  Apr  37 
Bilateral  agreement  with  Kuwait,  May 
84,  Sept.  85 
Civil  aviation; 
Bilateral  agreements;  Saudi  Arabia, 
Feb.  92;  Soviet  Union  (Shultz),  Feb. 
10 
International  negotiations  (Shane),  June 

27 
Intra-European  air  services  (Shane), 
June  29 


Cicil  aviation  (Cont'd) 

Security,  bilateral  agreement  with 

Zambia,  Aug.  93 
Technical  assistance  and  service  to  the 
Directorate  General  of  Civil  Avia- 
tion of  Oman,  bilateral  agreement 
with  Oman,  May  84 
Experimental  trans-border  air  services 
program,  bilateral  agreement  with 
Canada,  Oct.  84 
International  air  services  transit  agree- 
ment (1944);  Canada  (termination), 
Jan.  61;  Federated  States  of  Micro- 
nesia, Dec.  58;  Vanuatu,  Mar  84 
International  civil  aviation,  convention 
(1944): 
Protocol  on  authentic  quadrilingual  te? 
(1968):  Australia,  Feb.  91;  Marshal 
Islands,  June  68;  San  Marino,  Aug 
92 
Protocol  (1977);  Ecuador,  Niger,  Oct.  8:. 
Protocol  (1980);  Guyana,  Niger,  Soviet 
Union,  Oct.  83 
Nonscheduled  air  services,  bilateral 

agreement  with  Yugoslavia,  Mar.  86 
Offenses  and  certain  other  acts  commit- 
ted on  board  aircraft,  convention 
(1963):  Byelorussian  S.S.R.,  Aug.  92 
Cameroon,  Oct.  83;  Maldives,  May  8 
Soviet  Union,  Aug.  92;  Ukrainian 
S.S.R.,  June68 
Reduced  air  fares  and  charter  air  serv- 
ices, bilateral  agreement  with  Mex 
ico.  Mar  85,  Oct.  85 
Suppression  of  unlawful  acts  against  thi 
safety  of  civil  aviation,  convention 
(1971);  Antigua  and  Barbados,  .Jan. 
Maldives,  Apr  87;  Rwanda,  .Jan.  61 
Yemen  (Aden),  Oct.  83 
Suppression  of  unlawful  acts  of  violence 
airports  serving  international  civil 
aviation,  convention  (1971): 
Protocol  (1988);  Argentina,  Brazil.  Bi 
garia,  Byelorussian  S.S.R.,  Can; 
da,  Chile,  China,  Costa  Rica, 
Czechoslovakia,  Denmark,  Egyp 
Ethiopia,  May  81;  France,  Oct.  8; 
German  Democratic  Republic.  Fi 
eral  Republic  of  Germany,  Ghan; 
May  81;  Greece,  Oct.  83;  Hungar 
Iceland,  Indonesia,  Israel,  Italy, 
May  81;  Ivory  Coast,  Oct.  83;  Jai 
ca,  Korea,  Kuwait,  Lebanon,  Lil 
ria,  Malawi.  Malaysia,  May  81: 
Marshall  Islands,'Oct.  83;"Mexic 
May  81;  Netherlands,  Oct.  83; 
Niger,  Norway,  Pakistan,  Peru, 
land,  Portugal,  Romania,  Saudi 
Arabia,  Senegal,  Soviet  Union, 
Sweden,  Switzerland,  Turkey, 
Ukrainian  S.S.R.,  United  Arab 
Emirates,  May  81;  U.S.,  July  76 
May  81;  Venezuela,  Yugoslavia, 
Zaire,  May  81 
Suppression  of  unlawful  seizure  of  air- 
craft, convention,  1970:  Antigua  ai 
Barbados,  Jan.  61;  Cameroon,  Jum 
Maldives,  Apr  87;  Rwanda,  Jan.  6 
Yemen  (Aden),  July  76 


r 


Department  of  State  Bulletin'Index  '  ^ 


B 


hamas: 

Drus's.  narcotic,  production,  trafficking, 

control  efforts  (Wrobleski).  June  49 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Mav  S3,  June 

68,  Aug.  92,  Sept.  83,  84 
hrain: 
Arms  sales:  Murphy,  Mar.  75;  White 

House,  Mar.  76 
Recognition  and  enforcement  of  foreign 
arbitral  awards,  convention  (1958), 
June  68 
laguer  Ricardo,  Joaquin,  June  65 
ilance-of-payments  support  program,  bi- 
lateral agreement  with  El  Salvador, 
Sept.  84 
Itic  Freedom  Day,  1988,  proclamation 

(Reagan),  Sept.  24 
ngladesh,  treaties,  agreements,  etc., 

'Aug.  92,  Oct.  84,  Dec.  58,  .59 
irbados,  treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Apr. 

87,  June  68 
Igium,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb. 
78,  91,  Mar.  84,  May  83,  June  68,  July 
76,  Nov.  49,  Dec.  58,  59 
lize: 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  trafficking, 

control  efforts  (Wrobleski),  June  47 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.;  Apr.  88,  May 

82,  July  76 
nin,  international  express  mail,  bilateral 

agreement,  Oct.  84 
rlin  Wall.  27th  Anniversary  (Reagan), 

Oct.  .50 
rnthal,  Frederick  M.,  Oct.  67 
livia; 

Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  trafficking, 
control  efforts:  Shultz,  Oct.  17; 
Wrobleski,  June  47 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  92,  July 

76,  Sept.  83,  84 
U.S.  aid,  FY  89,  request  (Abrams),  Oct. 

77 
Visit  of  Secretary  Shultz,  Oct.  15 
■azil: 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  trafficking, 

control  efforts  (Wrobleski),  June  5U 
Trade  sanctions  against  (Reagan,  White 

House),  Jan.  60 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  62,  May 
81,  82,  July  76,  Aug.  92,  Sept.  84,  Oct. 
84,  Dec.  59 
lU.S.  aid,  FY  89,  request  (Abrams),  Oct. 

79 
Visit  of  Secretary  Shultz,  Oct.  13 
•emer,  L.  Paul,  III,  Jan.  44,  47,  May  61, 

June  61,  July  62,  65 
•own,  William  A.,  May  37 
■unei: 
Narcotic  drugs,  single  convention  (1961), 

protocol  (1972),  Feb.  91 
U.S.  aid,  FY  89,  request  (Sigur),  July  37 
ulgaria: 

Human  rights  (Whitehead),  May  55 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  May  81,  83, 
July  76,  Aug.  92,  Dec.  58 
j^urkina  Faso,  treaties,  agreements,  etc., 
Feb.  91,  92 
urma: 

Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  trafficking, 
control  efforts  (Wrobleski),  June  50 


,  lepartment  of  State  Bulletin/Index  1988 


Burma  (Cont'd) 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States. 
I952-195J,.  VulnDie  XII.  Part  2,  Bur- 
ma, Indonesia.  Philippines,  Thai- 
land, released,  Jan.  64 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Apr.  87,  Sept. 

83,  Oct.  83 
U.S.  aid,  FY  89,  request  (Sigur),  July  37 
Bush,  George,  remarks: 
Iranian  Airbus  tragedy,  Sept.  42 
Moscow  summit,  Aug.  40 
Byelorussian  S.S.R.,  treaties,  agreements, 
etc.,  Apr.  87,  May  81,  July  76,  Aug.  92, 
Dec.  58 


Cabrera  Hidalgo,  Alfonso,  Oct.  2,  3 
Cambodia  (Toronto  economic  summit),  Aug. 
49 
POW/MIAs  (Lambertson),  Sept.  15 
U.S.  aid,  FY  89,  request  (Sigur),  July  37 
U.S.  policy:  Armacost,  Sept.  21;  Lam- 
bertson, Oct.  40;  Shultz,  Apr.  46; 
Twining,  Dec.  31 
Cameroon,  treaties,  agreements,  etc..  May 

81,  83,  June  68,  July  76,  Oct.  83 
Canada; 
Economic  development  (Group  of  7  state- 
ment and  annex),  Mar.  67 
Nuclear-powered  submarines,  acquisition 

(Department),  July  61 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  61,  62, 
Feb.  92,  Mar.  83,  Apr.  87,  88,  May  81, 
82,  83,  July  76,  Aug.  92,  Sept.  83,  84, 
Oct.  83,  84,  Nov.  49,  Dec.  59 
U.S.  relations  (GIST),  July  23 
U.S.  trade  and  trade  relations:  Reagan, 
Jan.  2,  Mar.  57.  Dec.  22;  White  House, 
Mar.  57;  Whitehead,  Jan.  34 
U.S. -Canada  free  trade  agreement, 
summary,  July  24 
U.S.  visit  of  Prime  Minister  Mulroney: 
Mulroney,  July  22;  Reagan,  July  21 
Cape  Verde,  training  relating  to  defense  ar- 
ticles under  IMET  program,  Mar.  84 
Captive  Nations  Week,  1988,  proclamation 

(Reagan),  Oct.  57 
Caribbean  region.  See  under  Latin  America 
Carlucci,  Frank,  July  61 
Cavaco  Silva,  Anibal,  May  47 
Central  African  Republic,  international  ex- 
press mail,  bilateral  agreement,  Dec. 
59 
Central  America.  See  under  Latin  America 
Change  and  international  stability:  Shultz. 

Jan.  3.  Apr.  38;  Solomon,  May  34 
Chemical  weapons  (CW):  Nitze,  Feb.  83; 
Shultz,  Aug.  86;  U.S.-Soviet  joint 
statement,  Aug.  28 
Convention  proposed  (U.S.-Soviet  joint 

statement),  Feb.  15 
Middle  East:  Murphy,  Dec.  43;  UN,  Wal- 
ters, July  69 
Soviet  delegation  tours  U.S.  chemical  mu- 
nitions destruction  facility  (Depart- 
ment), Jan.  22 


Chemical  weapons  (Cont'd) 
U.S.  arms  control  initiatives,  Jan.  27,  May 
28,  July  20 
Chile  (Whitney),  Feb.  89 
Democratic  progress  (Department),  Mar. 

83,  Nov.  48,  Dec.  57 
Human  rights  (Department),  Sept.  82 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar.  84,  May 
81,  July  76,  Aug.  92,  Dec.  59 
China: 
Afghanistan,  refugee  aid  (Karp),  Mar.  21 
Economic  reforms:  Armacost,  Aug.  70; 

Wallis,  June  25 
Missile  sales  to  Iran  (Murphy),  Mar.  76 
Taiwan:  Wallis,  June  24;  White  House, 

Apr.  65 
Trade  issues  (Reagan),  Sept.  17 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Mar.  84,  May 
81,  83,  July  76,  77,  Aug.  92,  Oct.  84, 
Dec.  58,  59 
U.S.  relations:  Armacost,  Aug.  69,  71; 

Shultz,  Oct.  29 
Visit  of  Secretary  Shultz,  Oct.  29 
Clark,  William,  Jr.,  Apr.  58,  May  65,  Dec. 

27,30 
Colombia: 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  trafficking, 
control  efforts:  Shultz,  Oct.  17; 
Wrobleski,  June  47,  48 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  62,  Mar. 

84,  June  68,  July  76 
U.S.  aid,  FY  89,  request  (Abrams),  Oct. 
77 
Commodities  {see  also  Trade  and  name  of 
commodity): 
Commodity  import  grant  agreement  for 
agricultural  sector  support  program, 
Pakistan,  Nov.  49 
Commodity  imports,  bilateral  agreement 

with  Egypt,  Apr.  88 
Common  Fund  for,  with  schedules,  agree- 
ment (1980):  Cuba,  Oct.  83;  Congo, 
Jan.  61;  Honduras,  Aug.  92;  Maldives, 
Aug.  92,  Sept.  83;  Mauritania,  Nov. 
84;  Soviet  Union,  Feb.  91;  Swaziland, 
Feb.  91,  Sept.  83 
Comoros,  establishment  of  Peace  Corps  pro- 
gram, bilateral  agreement.  Mar.  85 
Congo,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  .Jan.  61, 

May  82,  Sept.  84,  Nov.  49 
Congress,  U.S.: 
Bipartisan  cooperation  and  national  secu- 
rity strategy  (Reagan),  Apr.  30 
Executive-congressional  relations  (Rea- 
gan), Jan.  2 
Legislation: 
Foreign  relations  authorization  act,  FY 

1988  and  1989  (Reagan),  Mar.  70 
Nicaragua,  humanitarian  aid  to  resist- 
ance (Woods),  Aug.  77 
Legislation,  proposed: 
Anti-Apartheid  Act,  1986,  amendments 

(Whitehead),  Aug.  58 
Foreign  affairs  budget,  FY'  89: 
Foreign  operations,  overview  (Shultz), 
May  12 
East  Asia  and  the  Pacific  (Sigur), 

July  33 
Economic  assistance  programs 

(Woods),  July  54 
Latin  America  and  Caribbean 

(Abrams),  Oct.  72 
Middle  East  and  North  Africa 
(Murphy),  June  40 


Congress,  U.S.  (Cont'd) 

Security  assistance  (Whitehead), 

Sept.  53 
Foreign  policy  admini-stration 

(Shultz),  July  8 
International  organizations  and  pro- 
grams (Williamson),  July  71 
Narcotics,  certification  of  source  coun- 
tries (Wrobleski),  June  47 
Nicaragua,  contra  aid  (Reagan),  Apr.  33 
Omnibus  trade  bill  (Whitehead),  Jan.  34 
Refugee  admissions,  1989,  proposed 

(Shultz),  Nov.  12 
Terrorism,  counter  measures  funding 
(Bremer),  Jan.  46 
Antiterrorism  assi-stance  program 
(Bremer),  June  61 
Senate  advice  and  consent: 
Intermediate-range  nuclear  forces 

(INF)  treaty:  Glitman,  Mar  43:  Ka- 
mpelman.  Mar.  41;  Shultz,  Mar.  31, 
May  18,  July  6 
Labor,  implementation  of  international 

standards,  Sept.  83 
Merchant  ships,  minimum  standards, 

Sept.  83 
Montreal  protocol  to  Vienna  convention 
on  protection  of  the  ozone  layer. 
May  82 
Nuclear  accidents,  assistance  on,  con- 
vention (1986),  Dec.  ,58 
Nuclear  accidents,  early  notification, 

convention  (1986),  Dec.  58 
Prevention  of  pollution  from  ships,  in- 
ternational convention  (1973),  Anne.x 
V,  .Jan.  61 
Taxation,  double,  avoidance  of,  supple- 
mentary treaty  with  Belgium,  May 
83 
Taxation,  double,  avoidance  of,  with 
protocol,  bilateral  agreement  with 
Indonesia,  Oct.  84 
Taxes  on  income  and  property,  protocol, 
bilateral  agreement  with  France, 
Oct.  84 
Conservation  (see  also  Fish  and  Fisheries): 
Antarctic  marine  living  resources,  con- 
vention (1980),  Canada,  Oct.  83 
Antarctic  seals,  conservation,  convention 
(1972),  Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
Feb.  92 
Endangered  species  of  w'ild  fauna  and  flo- 
ra, international  trade  in,  convention 
(1973),  amendment  (1979),  U.S.,  Feb. 
91 
Wetlands  of  international  importance,  es- 
pecially as  waterfowl  habitat  (1971), 
protocol  (1982),  U.S.,  Feb.  91 
Consular  relations  (U.S. -Soviet  joint  state- 
ment), Feb.  16 
Vienna  convention  on  (1967):  Dominica, 
Feb.  91;  Guinea,  Sept.  83;  Saudi 
Arabia,  Sept.  83;  Western  Samoa, 
Jan.  61 
Containers,  safe,  international  convention 
(1972)  as  amended:  Greece,  Oct.  83; 
Peru,  Yugoslavia,  May  82 
Coordinating  Committee  for  Multilateral 
Export  Controls  (COCOM):  Shultz, 
Apr.  46;  Wendt,  Mar  63,  64,  Oct.  46; 
Whitehead,  July  42 
Costa  Rica  (Madrigal),  Oct.  4 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  61.  62, 
Mar.  85,  May  81,  82,  83,  June  68,  July 
76.  Aug.  92,  Oct.  84 


Cos^a  Rica  (Cont'd) 
U.S.  aid,  FY  89,  request  (Abrams),  Oct. 

77 
Visit  of  Secretary  Shultz,  Sept.  80 
Cote  d'l voire,  treaties,  agreements,  etc., 
Jan.  61,  Man  83,  84,  Apr,  87,  May  82. 
Oct.  83,  Nov.  49 
Criminal  matters.  See  Judicial  matters 
Crocker,  Chester  A..  Aug.  62,  Sept.  3 
Cuba: 
Angola,  involvement  in:  Crocker,  Nov.  18; 
Delegations'  statements,  Sept.  3,  Nov. 
18.  19;  Department.  Sept.  3;  Skoug. 
Sept.  73;  White  House,  Nov.  18 
Principles  for  a  peaceful  settlement  in 
southwestern  Africa,  Sept.  5 
Cuban  Independence  Day  (Reagan),  Aug. 

91 
Economic,  social,  political  situation 

(Skoug),  Sept.  75 
Human  rights,  UN  involvement  (Wil- 
liamson), Sept.  62 
Migration  agreement  with  U.S.  (Skoug), 

May  76,  Sept.  72 
Soviet-Cuban  militarization  in  Nicaragua 

(Reagan),  Apr  33 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar.  85,  May 

82,  July  76,  Aug.  92,  Oct.  83,  Nov.  48 
U.S.  relations  (Skoug),  Sept.  72 

Cultural  relations: 
Cultural  cooperation,  bilateral  agreement 

with  Algeria,  Dec.  59 
Culture,  education,  science  and  technolo- 
gy, cooperation  and  exchanges,  bilat- 
eral agreements:  Czechoslovakia,  Nov. 
49;  Hungary,  Feb.  92 
Fulbright  program,  exchange  of  schol- 
ars, bilateral  agreement  with  Ger- 
man Democratic  Republic.  Nov.  49 
General  exchanges  agreement  with  So- 
viet Union.  Aug.  44 
High  school  exchange  proposal,  bilateral 
agreement  with  Soviet  Union,  Aug. 
45 
People-to-people  exchanges  (U.S.- 
Soviet joint  statement),  Feb.  15 
U.S. -German  Youth  Exchange  Council 
(Reagan),  May  46 
Customs  Cooperative  Council,  convention 
(1950):  Cuba,  Nov.  48;  Gambia,  Oct.  83 
Mutual  customs  service  assistance,  bilat- 
eral agreements:  Finland,  Mar.  85; 
Sweden,  Sept.  85 
Cyprus: 
Reports  to  Congress  (Reagan),  Feb.  86, 
Apr.  69,  June  32,  Aug.  76.  Oct.  .50, 
Dec.  37 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  July  76,  Sept. 

83,  84,  Oct,  83,  84 
Czechoslovakia: 

Human  rights:  Reagan,  Nov.  31;  White- 
head, May  55 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Apr.  87.  May 
81,  July  76,  Sept.  84,  Nov.  49,  Dec.  58 


D 


Debt  management: 
Debt  consolidation  and  rescheduling,  bi- 
lateral agreements:  Ecuador,  Nov.  49; 
Egypt,  Apr  88;  Gabon,  July  77;  Ivory 
Coast,  Nov.  49;  Jamaica,  Mar.  85;  Mo- 


Debt  management  (Cont'd) 

rocco,  June  69;  Niger,  May  84;  I'lnlii 
pines,  Aug.  93;  Senegal,  Oct.  ^.'i:  Sie 
ra  Leone,  Jan.  63;  Somalia,  Ma\  s|; 
Uganda.  Apr  89;  Zaire,  June  il!i 

Middle-income  developing  countric-    Mi 
lam).  Oct.  43 

Program  for  sustained  grow-th  (Bal.<  r 
plan):  Shultz,  Jan.  15;  Whitnev.  I  .h 
89 

Sub-Sahara  Africa  (Milam),  Oct.  45 

Third  World  debt  (Shultz),  Dec.  18 

Toronto  economic  summit  proposal  (Mi- 
lam), Oct.  46  , 
Defense  and  national  security  (see  also  Aa 
maments,  U.S.;  Security  assistance,  < 
U.S.):  Reagan.  Feb.  19  " 

Arms  procurement  procedures  (Wallis), 
Jan.  31.  32 

British  Indian  Ocean  Territory  Islandsi 
availabliity  of  for  defense  purposes 
bilateral  agreement  with  U.K. 
(amended).  Jan.  (i3 

Defense  cooperation,  bilateral  agreeme 
with  Spain,  Mar.  69 

Defense  Department  budget  cuts  (Rea- 
gan), May  U 

Defense  facilities  in  the  Bahamas,  bilal 
eral  agreement,  Sept.  84 

Defense  procurement,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Sweden.  Feb.  92 

Defense-related  technologies,  transfer 
bilateral  agreement  with  Japan,  M 


Direct  communications  link,  memo  of  i 
derstanding  with  Soviet  L'nion.  S( 
85 

Low-intensity  conflict  (Reagan),  Apr  1 

Military  assistance  funding  (Shultz),  J 
15  ' 

Mutual  cooperation  in  research  and  de 
opment,  scientist  and  engineer  ex 
change,  procurement  and  logistic 
support  of  defense  equipment,  me 
of  understanding  with  Israel,  Mar 

Mutual  defense  assistance,  Japan's  fin: 
cial  contributions,  bilateral  agree 
ment  with  Japan,  Nov.  49 

Mutual  logistic  support,  bilateral  agri 
ments:  France,  Jan.  62;  Israel,  Se 
84;  Korea,  Aug.  93 

National  security  strategy  (Reagan), 
Apr.  1 

NATO  anti-air  warfare  system  (NA.V 
memo  of  understanding:  Canada, 
eral  Republic  of  Germany,  Nethei- 
lands,  Spain,  U.K.,  U.S.',  May  82 

NATO  insensitive  munitions  informal 
center,  pilot,  memo  of  understand 
France,  Netherlands,  Norway,  U 
Sept.  83 

Nuclear-pow'ered  submarines,  Canadi 
acquisition  (Department),  July  lil 

Security  of  military  information,  bila 
agreement  with  United  Arab  Em 
ates,  Feb.  93 

Sembach  Air  Base.  Germany,  allied  t 
cal  operations  center,  bilateral  ag  Ir 
ment  with  Supreme  Headquarter 
Allied  Powers  Europe  (SHAPE), 
85 

Strategic  Defense  Initiative  (SDI):  Ri 
gan.  Mar  26,  June  22,  Aug.  33; 
Rowny,  May  24 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/Index 


k 


ifense  and  national  security  (Cont'd) 
Technological  innovation  (Wallis),  Jan.  30 
U.S.  armed  forces  in  Japan,  treaty  of  mu- 
tual cooperation  and  security,  May  84 
U.S.  defense  policy  (Reagan),  Apr.  11 
U.S.  foreign  assistance  programs  (Rea- 
gan), Apr.  28 
U.S.  intelligence  policy  (Reagan),  Apr.  18 
U.S. -Japan  defense  cooperation  (Clark), 

Dec.  30 
U.S. -Philippines  military  bases  agree- 
ment review,  1988:  Manglapus,  Dec. 
2(5;  Reagan,  Dec.  27;  Shultz,  Dec.  26 
Te.xt,  Dec.  24 
U.S. -Soviet  arms  control  talks,  chronol- 
ogy. May  29 
Western  Hemisphere  security  strategy 

(Reagan),  Apr.  19 
;  la  Madrid,  Miguel,  May  6 
;  Mita,  Ciriaco,  Aug.  47,  Sept.  29 
?lors,  Jacques,  Aug.  47 
moeracy  and  democratic  progress  {see 
also  names  of  individual  countries): 
Acevedo,  Oct.  4;  Lambertson,  Mar.  61; 
Powell,  Oct.  51;  Reagan,  Feb.  19,  Apr. 
32,  Aug.  17;  Shultz,  Jan.  5,  18,  Oct.  12, 
19,  30,  Dec.  15;  Whitehead,  June  34; 
Whitney,  Feb.  87 
snmark: 
Nuclear-free  zone  policy  (Department), 

June  31 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  62,  Feb. 

91,  Mar.  85.  89,  May  81,  July  7(5,  Aug. 

92,  Nov.  49,  Dec.  58 
eveloping  countries; 

Debt  problems;  Milan,  Oct.  43;  Shultz, 
Dec.  18;  Toronto  economic  summit, 
Aug.  51 
Less  developed  countries  (LDCs);  Milam, 
Oct.  43;  Woods,  July  55 
U.S.  aid,  FY  89,  request  (Woods),  July 
54 
Newly  industrialized  economies  (NICs): 
Toronto  economic  summit,  Aug  51; 
Wallis,  June  24,  Aug.  72;  White 
House,  Apr.  65;  Whitehead,  July  40 
igesi  of  United  States  Practice  in  Interna- 
tional Law,  1980,  released,  July  80 
iplomacy;  Armacost,  Nov.  40;  Gorbachev, 

Feb.  10;  Kampelman,  Dec.  38 
Diplomatic  relations,  Vienna  convention 
(1961);  Albania,  May  82;  Dominica, 
Feb.  91;  Western  Samoa,  Jan.  61 
Diplomatic  security  (Shultz),  July  12 
U.S.  diplomatic  policy  (Reagan),  Apr.  8 
obriansky,  Paula,  Oct.  54 
ominica,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb. 

91,  July  76,  77,  Sept.  83,  84 
ominican  Republic: 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Apr.  88,  May 
82,  83,  June  68,  July  76,  Aug.  92,  Nov. 
49,  Dec.  59 
U.S.  aid,  FY  89,  request  (Abrams),  Oct. 

80 
U.S.  visit  of  President  Balaguer;  Bal- 

aguer,  June  65;  Reagan,  June  64 
louble  taxation.  See  underTaxes 
I  irugs,  narcotic  (see  also  names  of  individu- 
al countries):  Shultz,  Dec.  14;  Toronto 
economic  summit,  Aug.  49 
Afghanistan,  opium  production  and  traffic 

(Karp)  Mar.  19 
Certification  of  narcotics  source  countries 
(Wrobleski),  June  47 


Drugs,  narcotic  (Cont'd) 
Drug  trafficking  offenses,  investigation 
and  seizure,  bilateral  agreement  with 
U.K.,  Apr.  89 
International  trafficking  control  pro- 
grams: Shultz,  May  17;  Wrobleski, 
June  48 
Latin  America,  control  efforts:  Abrams, 

Oct.  77,  79;  Shultz,  Oct.  17 
Me.xico,  cooperative  arrangements  to  curb 
illegal  traffic  in  narcotics,  bilateral 
agreement.  May  84 
Psychotropic  substances,  convention 
"  (1971):  Brunei,  Feb.  91; 
Czechoslovakia,  Dec.  .58;  Uganda, 
Sept.  83;  United  Arab  Emirates,  Mav 
82 
Single  convention  on  (1961): 
Protocol  (1972);  Brunei,  Feb.  91;  German 
Democratic  Republic,  Dec.  58;  Hun- 
gary, Jan.  61;  Somalia,  Uganda, 
Aug.  92;  L'nited  Arab  Emirates, 
May  82 
South  Asian  region,  control  efforts: 
Brown,  May  40;  Shultz,  Dec.  20 
Task  Force  on  narcotics,  multinational, 

statement,  Nov.  44 
U.K.,  bilateral  agreements  re:  Anguilla, 
Dec.  59;  Cayman  Islands,  Feb.  93, 
Aug.  93;  Monserrat,  Nov.  50;  Turks 
and  Caicos  Islands,  Mar.  85,  Oct.  85 
U.S.  control  efforts  (Shultz),  Oct.  16 
Duarte,  Jose  Napoleon,  Jan.  58 


E 


East-West  relations:  NAC,  May  5:  Powell, 
Oct.  52;  Shultz,  Jan.  6,  May  12,  July  8; 
Toronto  economic  summit,  Aug.  47; 
Whitehead,  Sept.  33 
Economy,  domestic:  Group  of  7  statement 
and"  anne.x.  Mar.  68;  Wallis,  Aug.  73 
Federal  budget  deficit  (Shultz),  Dec.  18 
Structural  adjustment  (Wallis),  July  44 
Economy,  world  (see  also  Debt  manage- 
ment): Shultz,  May  14,  Oct.  8;  Wallis, 
Aug.  72 
ASEAN-U.S.  trade:  joint  statement,  Apr. 

55;  Shultz,  Oct.  26 
Balance-of-payments  support  program,  bi- 
lateral agreement  with  El  Salvador, 
May  83 
Economic  summits: 
1981-88  (GIST),  Dec.  34 
Summary  (Whitehead),  July  39 
Group  of  7  finance  ministers  and  central 
bank  governors,  trade  and  monetary 
policies  meeting,  June  26 
Information  revolution  (Shultz),  Oct.  8,  23, 

25 
International  economic  institutions 

(Shultz),  Dec.  19 
Multilateral  investment  guarantee  agen- 
cy, convention  (1985),  U.S.,  June  68 
Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation 
and  Development  (OECD)  meeting: 
Ridgway,  July  52;  Whitehead.  July  42 


Economy,  ivorld  (Cont'd) 

Pacific  Basin  development:  Solomon,  May 
33;  Wallis,  June  23 

Policy  coordination  efforts:  Group  of  7 
statement  and  anne.x.  Mar.  66;  Toron- 
to economic  summit,  Aug.  50 

Structural  adjustment:  Toronto  economic 
summit,  Aug.  52;  Wallis,  July  46 

SWAP  agreement  between  U.S.  Treasury 
and  Central  Bank  of  the  Argentine 
Republic/Government  of  the  Argen- 
tine Republic,  July  77 

SWAP  agreement  between  U.S.  Treasury 
and  Central  Bank  of  Brazil/ 
Government  of  Brazil,  memo  of  under- 
standing, Oct.  84 

SWAP  agreement  between  U.S.  Treasury 
and  Central  Bank  of  Republic  of 
Yugolavia,  bilateral  agreement,  Oct. 
85 

SWAP  agreement  between  U.S.  Treasury 
and  Central  Bank  of  Ecuador,  bilat- 
eral agreement.  Mar.  85 

Toronto  economic  summit  (Reagan,  White 
House),  Aug.  53 
Economic  declaration,  Aug.  49 
Statements  on;  Cambodia,  Aug.  49; 
East-West  relations,  Aug.  47;  Mid- 
dle East,  narcotics.  South  Africa, 
Aug.  49;  terrorism,  Aug.  48 

Trade  and  global  monetary  policies 
(Group  of  7),  June  26 

U.S.  and  world  economy:  Shultz,  June  18, 
Oct.  26,  Dec.  16;  Wallis,  Aug.  72; 
Whitehead,  July  39 

U.S.  foreign  economic  policy,  1981-1987: 
July  47;  Reagan,  Apr.  9 
Ecuador: 

Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  trafficking, 
control  efforts:  Shultz,  Oct.  18; 
Wrobleski,  June  50 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar.  85,  May 

82,  June  68,  July  76,  Aug.  92,  Sept. 

83,  Oct.  83,  84,  Nov.  48.  49 

U.S.  aid.  FY  89.  request  (Abrams),  Oct. 

79 
Education; 
Agency  for  International  Development 

(AID),  FY  89,  budget  request 

(Woods),  July  58 
Bilateral  agreement  with  Egypt,  Sept.  84 
East  Asian  students  in  U.S.  (Wallis),  June 

26 
Egypt,  Arab  Republic  of: 
Background  notes,  Apr.  74 
Profile,  Apr.  75 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  92,  Apr. 

88,  May  81,  June  68,  July  76,  77,  Sept. 

84,  Oct.  83,  84,  Dec.  .58 

U.S.  aid,  FY  89,  request  (Murphy),  June 

42 
U.S.  visit  of  President  Mubarek: 

Mubarek,  Apr.  73;  Reagan,  Apr.  72 
Visit  of  Secretary  Shultz,  Sept.  47,  49 
El  Salvador: 
Democratic  progress;  Acevedo,  Oct.  4; 

Reagan,  Apr.  32 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Apr.  88,  May 

82,  83,  June  68,  July  77,  Aug.  92, 

Sept.  84,  Dec.  59 
U.S.  aid,  FY  89,  request  (Abrams),  Oct. 

76 
U.S.  visit  of  President  Duarte:  Duarte. 

Jan.  59;  Reagan,  Jan.  58 
Visit  of  Secretary  Shultz,  Sept.  78 


Employment  of  dependents  of  official  gov- 
ernment employees,  bilateral  agree- 
ments: France,  June  68;  Grenada,  Jan. 
62;  Peru,  June  69;  Venezuela,  Oct.  85 

E 11  crff  V  • 
E.xchange  of  energy-related  information, 
memo  of  understanding;  France,  Aug. 
92;  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  Jan. 
62 
Japan,  cooperative  ventures  with  (Walhs), 

Jan.  37 
Magnetic  fusion  energy,  memo  ot  under- 
standing with  Canada,  Jan.  62 
Research  and  development,  bilateral 
agreement  with  Venezuela,  May  84 
Environmental  modification,  prohibition  of 
military  or  other  hostile  use  of.  conven- 
tion {19'77):  Guatemala,  May  82; 
Switzerland,  Oct.  83 
Environmental  problems  and  control  [see 
also  Oil  pollution);  Toronto  economic 
summit,  Aug.  52;  U.S. -Soviet  joint 
statement,  Feb.  16 
Flood  control  cooperation,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Canada,  Dec.  .59 
Hazardous  waste  disposal  (Bernthal),  Oct. 

67 
Intervention  on  the  high  seas  m  cases  of 
pollution  by  substances  other  than  oil, 
protocol  (1973),  Switzerland,  Apr.  87 
Long-range  transboundary  air  pollution, 
convention  (1979),  protocol  (1984); 
France,  Jan.  61;  Greece,  Sept.  83; 
U.S.,  Yugoslavia,  Jan.  61 
Marine  environment  of  the  wider  Carib- 
bean region,  convention  (1983);  U.S., 
June  68,  July  76 
Nogales  sewage  treatment  plant,  treat- 
ment and  disposal  of  sewage,  bilateral 
agreement  with  Mexico,  Nov.  49 
Ozone  layer,  protection,  convention  (1985); 
Belgium,  Denmark,  Dec.  58;  Egypt, 
July  76;  Equatorial  Guinea,  European 
Economic  Community,  Dec.  58; 
France,  Feb.  91;  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany,  Dec.  58;  Hungary,  July  76; 
.Japan,  Luxembourg,  Dec.  .58;  Mal- 
dives, July  76;  Netherlands,  Portugal, 
Dec.  58;  Spain,  Oct.  83;  Uganda, 
U.S.,  Aug.  92;  Venezuela,  Nov.  48 
Ozone  laver,  protection,  convention  (1985); 
Montreal  protocol  (1987);  Reagan,  June 
30 
Current  actions;  Argentina,  Sept.  83; 
Australia,  Aug.  92;  Byelorussian 
S.S.R.,  Apr.  87,  June  68;  Canada, 
Sept.  83;  Chile,  Aug.  92;  Egypt, 
Oct.  83;  Greece,  Apr.  87;  Indo- 
nesia, Oct.  83;  Israel,  June  68;  Ja 
pan,  Dec.  .58;  Luxembourg,  June 
68,  Dec.  58;  Maldives,  Sept.  83; 
Mexico,  Morocco,  June  68;  New 
Zealand,  Oct.  83;  Norway,  Aug. 
92;  Soviet  Union,  Apr  87; 
Sweden,  Sept.  83;  Ukrainian 
S.S.R.,  Apr.  87,  Dec.  .58;  U.S., 
May  82,  June  68 
Prevention  of  marine  pollution  by  dump- 
ing of  wastes  and  other  matter,  con- 
vention (1972),  Ivory  Coast,  Apr.  87 
Amendments  (1975),  Switzerland,  Apr. 


Etivirv)nne)ital  prohlons  and  control 
(Cont'd) 
Prevention  of  pollution  from  ships,  inter- 
national convention  (1973):  Australia, 
Ivory  Coast.  Jan.  61 
Annex'V;  pollution  by  garbage  (1973): 
Austria,  Marshall  Islands,  Nether- 
lands, U.K.  (e.xtension  to  Cayman 
Islands  and  Bermuda),  Oct.  83; 
U.S.,  Jan.  61,  Feb.  91,  Mar.  83,  Apr 
87 
Protocol  (1978):  Antigua  and  Barbados, 
May  82;  Austria,  Oct.  83;  Brazil, 
May  82;  Burma,  Marshall  Islands, 
Oct.  83;  Portugal,  Mar  84;  Switzer- 
land, May  82;  U.K.  (extension  to 
Bermuda),  Oct.  83  (Cayman  Is- 
lands), Sept.  83 
Waste  exports  (Bernthal),  Oct.  67 
Equatorial  Guinea,  treaties,  agreements, 

etc.,  Jan.  62,  Dec.  58 
Ethiopia  (Shultz),  July  10 
Civil  war  and  famine  relief;  Crocker, 
Gladson,  Aug.  62;  Williamson,  Aug. 
62,  66 
UN  efforts  (Williamson),  Aug.  65,  Sept. 
63 
Soviet  interest  in  (Reagan),  July  2 
Suppression  of  unlawful  acts  of  violence  at 
airports  serving  international  civil 
aviation,  convention  (1971),  protocol 
(1988),  May  81 
Europe  (see  also  East-West  relations  and 
names  of  individual  countries): 
Conference  on  Security  and  Cooperation 
in  Europe  (CSCE);  Reagan,  Aug.  2; 
U.S. -Soviet  joint  statement,  Aug.  28 
Helsinki  Final  Act  (Reagan),  Mar.  54, 

Aug.  2,  5,  7,  Oct.  .57 
24th  semiannual  report,  released,  Oct. 
86 
Confidence-  and  Security-Building  Meas- 
ures and  Disarmament  Conference 
(CDE),  Stockholm  (Shultz),  Aug.  85 
U.S.  arms  control  initiatives,  Jan.  27, 
May  30,  July  20 
Eastern: 
U.S.  human  rights  policy  (Whitehead), 

May  56 
U.S.  national  security  strategy  (Rea- 
gan), Apr.  20 
U.S.  relations  (Whitehead),  Apr.  66 
Mutual  and  balanced  force  reductions 
(NAC),  May  2,  4,  5 
U.S.  arms  control  initiatives,  Jan.  27; 
May  30,  July  21 
Protectionism  and  trade  barriers  (Wallis), 

Jan.  29 
U.S.  relations  (Ridgway),  July  50 
Western  Europe  and  NATO,  U.S.  national 
security  strategy  (Reagan),  Apr.  21 
European  Atomic  Energy  Community 

(EURATOM),  radioactive  waste  man- 
agement, cooperative  program  agree- 
ment. May  83 
European  Economic  Community; 

Intra-European  air  services  (Shane),  June 

29 
Meat  imports  from  U.S.  (White  House), 

Mar  68 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  91,  92, 

June  68,  Dee.  56 
U.S.  relations  and  trade  issues  (White 
House),  Jan.  38 
European  Space  Agency  (ESA),  Nov.  49 


European  Telecommunications  Satellite  ( M- 
ganization  (EUTELSAT),  Mar.  84 

Evren,  Kenan,  Sept.  31 

Expositions,  international,  convention 

(1972),  El  Salvador  (denunciation),  June 
68 

Extradition,  supplementary  treaties:  Cana- 
da, Mar.  84;  Spain,  June  69;  U.K.,  Apr. 
89 


Fiji  (Reagan),  Apr.  25 
International  sugar  agreement  (1987),  rat- 
ification. May  82 
U.S.  aid,  FY  89,  request  (Sigur),  July  37 
Finland; 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  92,  Mar. 
85,  May  82,  June  68,  July  76,  Oct.  84, 
Dec.  58 
U.S.  relations  (Reagan),  Aug.  2 
U.S.  visit  of  Prime  Minister  Holkeri,  July 

51 
Visit  of  President  Reagan,  July  2 
Fish  and  fisheries; 
Data  on  fisheries  harvest  in  the  Bering 
Sea,  bilateral  agreement  with  Korea, 
Oct.  84 
Fisheries  off  the  coast  of  the  U.S.,  bilat- 
eral agreements;  German  Democratic 
Republic,  Aug.  92,  Sept.  84;  Japan, 
Jan.  62.  Apr.  88;  Korea,  Feb.  92;  Sovi 
et  Union,  Feb.  93 
Mutual  fisheries  relations,  bilateral 
agreement  with  Soviet  Union,  Aus- 
42,  93 
North  Pacific  Ocean,  commercial  oppor- 
tunities (Wolfe),  Oct.  64 
North  Pacific  Ocean,  high  seas  fisheries, 
international  convention  (1952); 
Amended  annex  (1986);  Canada,  Japan, 

U.S.,  Mar.  83 
Enforcement,  memorandum  of  under- 
standing (1986):  Canada,  Japan, 
U.S.,  Mar  83 
Salomid  research,  memo  of  understant 
ing  (1986):  Canada,  Japan,  U.S., 
Mar.  83 
Pacific  Islands  regional  fisheries  treaty 
(1987):  Reagan,  Apr.  25;  Sigur,  July  : 
Current  actions;  Federated  States  of 
Micronesia,  Jan.  61;  Kiribati,  Niue 
Palau,  June  68;  Solomon  Islands, 
.Jan.  61;  U.S.,  Jan.  61,  Mar.  83,  Au;, 
92,  Dec.  58 
U.S.  access  to  fisheries  in  U.S.S.R.  eco- 
nomic zone,  bilateral  agreement  wit 
Soviet  Union,  May  84 
U.S.-Soviet  meeting  (joint  statement), 

Apr  68 
Whaling  convention,  international,  and 
schedule  of  whaling  regulations 
(1946);  Belize  (withdrawal),  Apr.  88; 
Philippines  (withdrawal),  Feb.  92 
Food  and  Agriculture  Organization  (Wil- 
liamson), Apr  82,  83 
Foreign  affairs,  U.S.  (see  also  Diplomacy 
and  Foreign  aid,  U.S.): 
Foreign  policy  administration,  FY  89 
budget,  request  (Shultz),  July  8 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/Index  1£ 


ei(/)i  affairs.  U.S.  (Cont'd) 
iternational  organizations  and  programs, 
FY  89  budget,  request  (Williamson). 
July  71 
eign  aid,  U.S.  (see  o/.so  Humanitarian 

aid  and  Security  assistance,  U.S.): 
last  Asia  and  the  Pacific,  FY  89  budget. 

request  (Sigur).  .July  33 
Economic  assistance.  FY  89  budget,  re- 
quest (Woods).  July  54 
Economic  stabilization  and  recovery  pro- 
gram II.  bilateral  agreement  with 
Honduras,  Dec.  59 
Iconomic  support,  bilateral  agreement 

with  Guatemala.  Sept.  84 
breign  affairs.  FY  88  budget:  Shultz. 

Apr.  47:  Spiers,  July  28 
breign  operations,  FY  89  budget,  re- 
quest (Shultz),  May  12 
,atin  America  and  the  Caribbean,  FY  89 
budget,  request  (Abrams),  Oct.  72,  78 
(chart) 
liddle  East  and  North  Africa,  FY  89 

budget,  reque.st  (Murphy),  June  40 
eign  policy,  U.S.:  Whitehead.  June  33: 

Powell.  Oct.  51:  Reagan.  Feb.  20.  Nov.  9 
.gencv  for  International  Development 

(AID):  Woods,  July  .54 
tgenda  1988  (Shultz),  Apr.  43 
iDierican  Foreign  Policy:  Current  Docu- 
iiients,  19SJ.  Supplement,  microfiche 
publication,  released,  Feb.  94 
[iiierican  Foreign  Policji:  Current  Docu- 
ment,'!. lOS.i.  Supplcmoit,  microfiche 
publication,  released.  July  81 
bnerican  Foreign  Policy:  Current  Docu- 
ments. 19S6,  released,  Feb.  94 
)iplomacy:  Armacost.  Nov.  40;  Kampel- 

man,  Dec.  38;  Reagan,  Apr.  8 
^oreign  relations  authorization  act.  FY  88 

and  89  (Reagan),  Mar.  70 
dilitarv  assistance  programs  (Shultz), 

May  14 
'rinciples,  obiectives,  purposes  (Shultz), 

May  12 
eign  Relations  of  the  United  States. 
195J-19.5i.  Volume  XII,  Part  2,  Burma. 
Indonesia,  Philippines,  Thailand,  re- 
leased. .Jan.  64 
eign  Relations  of  the  United  States, 
19:'>-'>-19oT,  Volume  XI,  United  Nations 
and  General  International  Matters,  re- 
leased. Dec.  61 
■eign  Relations  of  the  United  States,  Sup- 
plement, Memoranda  of  Conversation 
of  the  Secretary  of  State,  191,7-1952,  mi- 
crofiche publication,  released,  July  79 
ance: 

Economic  development  (Group  of  7  state- 
ment and  anne.x).  Mar.  67 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Jan.  61,  62. 
Feb.  91,  93,  May  82,  83,  June  68,  July 
76,  Aug.  92,  Sept.  83,  84,  Oct.  83.  84, 
Nov.  49 

eedom:  Reagan,  Feb.  20.  Mar.  25.  Apr.  35. 
Aug.  4.  17.  39,  Nov.  7;  Whitehead,  Sept. 
33:  Williamson,  July  68 
mseth.  Robert,  May  58 


G 

ibon,  consolidation  and  rescheduling  of 
certain  debts,  bilateral  agreement, 
Julv  77 


Gambia,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  May  83. 

July  76,  Oct.  83 
Gandhi,  Rajiv,  Jan.  41,  42 
Geneva  conventions  on  treatment  of  armed 
forces,  civilian  persons,  and  prisoners 
of  war  (1949): 
Protocol  I  (1977),  re  protection  of  victims 
of  international  armed  conflicts; 
Burkina  Faso,  Guatemala,  Feb.  91; 
Guyana,  May  82;  Democratic  People's 
Republic  of  Korea,  Liberia,  Nov.  49; 
New  Zealand,  May  82;  Qatar,  Nov.  49; 
Saudi  Arabia.  Feb.  91 
Protocol  II  (1977):  re  protection  of  victims 
of  noninternational  armed  conflict: 
Burkina  Faso,  Guatemala,  Feb.  91; 
Guyana.  May  82;  Liberia,  Nov.  49; 
New  Zealand.  May  82 
German  Democratic  Republic,  treaties, 
agreements,  etc.,  May  81,  82,  July  76, 
Aug.  92,  Sept.  84.  Nov.  49,  Dec.  58 
Germany,  Federal  Republic  of: 
Economic  development  (Group  of  7  state- 
ment and  anne.x).  Mar.  67 
IFFN  system,  testing  and  evaluation,  sup- 
port of  joint  U.S.  services  program, 
bilateral  agreement,  Dec.  59 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  62.  Feb. 
78,  91,  92,  Apr.  87,  88,  May  81,  82, 
July  76,  Sept.  83,  Nov.  49,  Dec.  58 
U.S.  visit  of  Chancellor  Kohl:  Kohl,  May 
45,  46;  Reagan,  May  44,  46 
Ghana,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  61. 

May  81 
Gladson,  Charles,  Aug.  62 
Glitman,  Maynard  W.,  Mar.  43 
Goodman,  Dennis  C,  Oct.  70 
Gorbachev,  Mikhail  S.: 
Soviet  Union: 
INF  treaty,  Feb.  4,  9 
Perestroika,  Feb.  6,  7 
Summit,  Moscow,  Aug.  8,  12,  22,  35 
U.S.  relations,  Feb.  7 
U.S.  visit:  Reagan.  Feb.  1;  Gorbachev, 

Feb.  2;  White  House,  Feb.  12 
World  peace,  Feb.  9 
Goria,  Giovanni,  Mar.  68,  69 
Greece: 
Greek  Independence  Day,  1988,  proclama- 
tion (Reagan),  June  31 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Feb.  92.  Apr. 
87,  July  76,  Aug.  92,  93,  Sept.  83.  Oct. 
83,  84,  Nov.  49,  Dec.  59 
Grenada,  treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Jan. 

62,  Feb.  91.  June  68 
Grosz,  Karoly,  Dec.  36 
Guatemala: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  91,  92, 
May  81,  83,  June  68,  Sept.  84,  Nov.  48, 
Dec.  .58 
U.S.  aid.  FY  89.  request  (Abrams),  Oct. 

76 
Visits  of  Secretary  Shultz,  Sept.  76.  Oct. 
2 
Guinea,  treaties,  agreements,  etc..  May  83, 

July  76,  Sept.  83 
Guinea-Bissau,  establishment  of  Peace 
Corps  program,  bilateral  agreement, 
Apr.  88 
Guyana,  treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar.  85, 
May  82,  July  76,  Oct.  83,  Nov.  49 


H 


Haiti  (Shultz),  Jan.  7,  8 
Democratic  progress  (Department),  Mar. 
83 
Hawke.  Robert  J. L.,  Sept.  50 
Health  and  medical  research: 
Agency  for  International  Development 
(A"iD),  FY  89,  budget  request 
(Woods),  July  57,  58 
AIDS  (acquired  immune  deficiency  syn- 
drome): Department,  Jan.  58;  Koop, 
Jan.  56 
U.N.  General  Assembly  resolution.  Jan. 
57 
Border  sanitation  problem,  bilateral 
agreement  with  Mexico.  Feb.  92 
Cooperation,  bilateral  agreement  with 
Mexico,  May  84 
Helsinki  Human  Rights  Day,  1988,  proclama- 
tion (Reagan),  Oct.  57 
Herzog,  Chaim,  Mar.  72,  73 
Honduras:  Lopez,  Oct.  4;  Shultz.  May  21, 
Oct.  3 
Sandinista  offensive  against  Nicaraguan 

contras  (Shultz),  May  75 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  62,  May 

82,  Aug.  92,  Oct.  84,  Dec.  59 
U.S.  aid,  FY  89,  request  (Abrams),  Oct. 

77 
Visit  of  Secretary  Shultz,  Sept.  79,  80 
Hong  Kong: 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  trafficking, 

control  efforts  (Wrobleski),  June  50 
Economic  development  (Wallis),  June  24 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  61,  May 

84,  Oct.  84 
U.S.  trade  relations  (White  House).  Apr. 
65 
Human  rights  (see  also  Europe:  Conference 
on  Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe 
(CSCE):  Dobrianskv,  Oct.  54;  Reagan, 
July  3,  4.  Aug.  10,  11,  35,  Nov.  3;  Schif- 
ter,  Apr.  70,  Nov,  33;  U.S.-Soviet  joint 
statement,  Aug.  29:  Whitehead,  Sept. 
35 
Afghanistan  (Karp).  Mar.  19 
American  convention  on  (1969),  Suriname, 

Mar.  83 
Child  survival,  bilateral  project  grant 
agreement  with  Pakistan,  Dec.  59 
Chile  (Department),  Sept.  82 
Convention  against  torture  and  other 
cruel,  inhuman  or  degrading  treat- 
ment or  punishment  (1984):  Af- 
ghanistan, Algeria,  Argentina, 
Austria,  Belgium,  Belize,  Bolivia, 
Brazil,  Bulgaria,  Byelorussian  S.S.R., 
Cameroon,  Canada,  July  76:  Chile, 
China,  July  76,  Dec.  59;  Colombia, 
Costa  Rica,  Cuba,  Cyprus,  July  76; 
Czechoslovakia.  July  76.  Sept.  84; 
Denmark,  Dominica,  Dominican  Re- 
public, Ecuador,  Finland,  France, 
Gambia,  German  Democratic  Repub- 
lic, Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
July  76;  Greece,  July  76,  Dec.  59; 
Guinea.  July  76;  Guyana,  July  76, 
Nov.  49;  Hungary,  Iceland,  Indonesia, 
Israel,  Italy,  Liechtenstein,  Lux- 


Convention  against  torture  and  other  cruel, 
inhuman  or  degrading  treatment  or 
punishment  (198!,)  (Cont'd) 
embourg,  Mexico,  Netherlands. 
Nicaragua,  July  76;  Nigeria,  Oct.  84; 
Norway,  Panama,  July  76;  Peru,  July 

76,  Sept.  84;  Philippines,  Portugal, 
Senegal,  Sierra  Leone,  Soviet  Union, 
Spain,  Sudan,  Sweden,  Switzerland, 
Togo,  July  76;  Tunisa,  July  76,  Dec. 
59;  Turkey.  July  76,  Oct.  84;  Uganda, 
Ukrainian  S.S.R.,  U.K.,  Uruguay, 
July  76;  U.S.,  July  76,  Aug.  79;  Ven- 
ezuela, July  76 

Text,  Aug.  79 
Eastern  Europe  (Whitehead),  May  .54 
Economic,  social  and  cultural  rights,  in- 
ternational covenant  (1966),  Gua- 
temala, Nov.  48 
Racial  discrimination,  elimination  of,  con- 
vention (1965),  Congo,  Sept.  84 
Soviet  Union  (Reagan),  July  3,  4 
UN  agenda  (Williamson),  Dec.  55 
Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights 
(1948): 
Chronology,  Dec.  4 
40th  anniversary,  Dec.  1 
1966  covenants,  Dec.  8 
Text,  Dec.  10 
Vietnamese  political  prisoners,  Funseth, 
May  58,  60 
Humanitarian  aid:  Shultz,  May  16;  Woods, 

Aug.  77 
Hungary: 
Trade  issues  (Reagan),  Sept.  17 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  61.  Feb. 
92.  Mar.  84.  May  81,  82,  84,  July  76, 

77,  Aug.  92,  Sept.  84,  Oct.  84,  Dec.  58 
U.S.  visit  of  Premier  Grosz:  Grosz,  Rea- 
gan, Dec.  36 


I 


Iceland: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  May  81.  July 

76 
U.S.  visit  of  Prime  Minister  Palsson 

(Palsson,  Reagan),  Oct.  49 
India: 
Afghanistan,  political  solution  (Karp). 

Mar.  22 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  trafficking, 

control  efforts  (Wrobleski),  June  50 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Mav  82,  Sept. 

84,  Dec.  58,  59 
U.S.  visit  of  Prime  Minister  Gandhi:  Gan- 
dhi. .Jan.  42;  Reagan,  Jan.  41 
Indonesia: 
Economic,  social,  political  situation 

(Sigur),  Mar.  58 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  U.S.,  1952-195J,, 

Vol  XII,  part  2,  Burma,  Indonesia, 

Philippines,  Thailand,  released,  Jan. 

64 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  61,  62, 

May  81,  July  76,  Sept.  84,  Oct.  83,  84, 

Nov.  49 
U.S.  aid,  FY  89,  reque.st  (Sigur),  July  35 
U.S.  relations  (Sigur),  Mar.  60 
Visit  of  Secretary  Shultz,  Oct.  24 
Industrial  property: 
Nice  agreement  re  registration  of  marks 

(19.57,  as  revised  1977),  Soviet  Union, 

P>b.  91 


Industrial  property  (Cont'd) 
Paris  convention  for  protection  of  indus- 
trial property  (1967),  Malaysia,  Trini- 
dad and  Tobago,  Oct.  84 
Protection  of  producers  of  phonograms 
against  unauthorized  duplication,  con- 
vention (1971),  Trinidad  and  Tobago, 
Oct.  83 
Insurance,  access  of  U.S.  firms  to  Korea's 
insurance  market,  bilateral  agreement 
with  Korea,  Jan.  62 
Intellectual  property: 
Intellectual  property  rights,  record  of  un- 
derstanding with  Korea,  .Jan.  62 
Thailand  (Brown),  May  41 
World  Intellectual  Property  Organization 
(WIPO),  convention  (1967):  Swaziland, 
Trinidad  and  Tobago,  Oct.  84 
Interdependence  of  modern  world:  Shultz, 
Oct.  8,  25,  Nov.  13,  16,  Dec.  13;  Wallis, 
July  43,  Aug.  72;  Whitehead,  July  39 
Intermediate-range  nuclear  forces  (INF) 
treaty.  See  Soviet  Union:  INF  treaty, 
and  Treaties,  agreements,  etc.:  INF 
treaty 
International  Atomic  Energy  Agency 

(IAEA)  (Williamson),  Apr.  8,  July  72 
International  Boundary  and  Water  Commis- 
sion, minutes  273,'  274,  Feb.  92 
International  Civil  Aviation  Organization 
(ICAO)  (Williamson),  Apr.  82,  83 
Investigation  into  U.S.S.  VincennesI 
Iranian  airbus  tragedy,  Sept.  39 
International  Court  of  Justice,  Oct.  83,  Dec. 

58 
International  Fund  for  Agricultural  Devel- 
opment (IFAD)  (Williamson),  July  73 
International  Hydrographic  Organization 
(IHO),  convention  (1967),  with  annexes, 
Oman,  Feb.  91 
International  Labor  Organization  (ILO) 

(Williamson),  April  81,  82 
International  Maritime  Organization  (IMO) 

(Williamson),  Apr.  82,  83,  Sept.  83 
International  narcotics  control  strategy  re- 
port (INCSR),  summary  (Wrobleski), 
June  47 
International  organizations,  U.S.  funding 

for  (Williamson),  Apr.  84 
International  traffic  in  arms  regulations 

(ITAR)  (Department),  June  46 
Investment  guarantees,  bilateral  agreement 

with  Micronesia,  Aug.  93 
Investment  of  private  capital  abroad: 
Investment  incentive,  bilateral  agreement 
with  U.K.  (on  behalf  of  Anguilla), 
Feb.  93 
Multilateral  Investment  Guarantee  Agen- 
cy (MIGA),  convention  (1985),  U.S., 
June  68 
Iran: 
Afghanistan,  position  on  (Karp),  Mar.  21 
Arms  sales  and  Operation  Staunch  (Mur- 
phy), Mar.  76 
International  Atomic  Energy  Agency, 
amendment,  ratification,  Dec.  58 
International  terrorism  (Bremer).  Jan.  46. 
50,  June  52,  Sept.  61 
Chronology,  Jan.  .53 
U.S.  relations  (Murphy),  Mar.  76,  Oct.  63 
Iran  arms  and  contra  aid  controversy  (Rea- 
gan). May  10 
Iran-Iraq  war  (see  also  Persian  Gulf):  Rea- 
gan. .Jan.  2;  Whitehead,  Sept.  36 
Chemical  weapons  (UN,  Walters),  July  69 


Iran-Iraq  war  (Cont'd) 
UN  actions  and  U.S.  concerns:  Murphy, 

Oct.  61;  Walters,  May  67;  Williamson, 

Sept.  62 
Security  Council  Resolution  598:  Mur- 
phy, Mar.  74;  Shultz,  Apr.  46 
U.S.  policy  (Murphy),  Oct.  61,  Dec.  41 
Iraq  (see  also  Iran-Iraq  war): 
Chemical  weapons  use  (Department),  Dec. 

44 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  62,  Dec. 

58 
Ireland,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  92, 

May  83,  June  69 
Israel  (see  also  Arab-Israeli  conflict): 
Bilateral  U.S. -Israeli  consultative  groups 

on  military,  security  assistance  and 

economic  development  (White  House), 

June  39 
Deportation  of  Palestinians  from  occupied 

territories  (U.N.),  Mar.  82 
Political,  security,  and  economic  coopera- 
tion, memo  of  agreement,  July  77 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  62,  Mar. 

84,  85,  May  81,  82,  84,  July  76,  77, 

Aug.  92,  Sept.  84,  Dec.  59 
U.S.  aid,  FY  89,  request  (Murphy),  June 

42 
U.S.  visit  of  Defense  Minister  Rabin 

(White  House).  Sept.  49 
U.S.  visit  of  Foreign  Minister  Peres: 

Shultz.  July  60;  White  House,  Aug.  83 
U.S.  visit  of  President  Herzog  (Herzog, 

Reagan),  Mar.  72 
U.S.  visit  of  Prime  Minister  Shamir 

(Reagan,  Shamir).  June  39 
Visits  of  Secretary  Shultz,  May  56,  June  1, 

9.  Sept.  48 
Italy: 
Economic  development  (Group  of  7  state- 
ment, annex).  Mar.  67 
Profile.  Sept.  30 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Jan.  62,  Feb. 

78,  91,  92.  Mar.  84.  May  81,  June  69, 

July  76,  Aug.  92,  Oct.  84,  Nov.  48,  49, 

Dec.  59 
U.S.  visit  of  Prime  Minister  De  Mita  (De 

Mita,  Reagan),  Sept.  29 
U.S.  visit  of  Prime  Minister  Goria:  Goria, 

Mar.  69;  Reagan.  Mar.  68 
Ivory  Coast.  See  Cote  d'lvoire 


Jamaica: 

Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  trafficking, 

control  efforts  (Wrobleski),  June  50 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  92,  Mar. 

85,  May  81,  84,  Aug.  93,  Sept.  85,  Oct 

83,  Dec.  59 
U.S.  aid,  FY  89,  request  (Abrams),  Oct. 

80 
Japan  (Reagan),  Apr.  24 

Aegis  weapons  system  sale,  proposed 

(Sigur),  May"31,  Sept.  13 
Economic  aid  to  developing  countries: 

Clark,  Apr.  60;  GIST,  Apr.  65 
Economic  development  (Group  of  7  state- 
ment, annex).  Mar.  67 
Economic  relations  with  U.S.:  Clark,  Ap; 

.58;  Shultz,  Oct.  33;  Sigur,  Mav  32; 

Wallis,  Jan.  35,  43,  June  24,  July  43 


1.^ 


Department  of  State  Bulletin  Index  19l| 


'cofiomic  relations  with  U.S.  (Cont'd) 
Trade  issues  (Reairan),  Jan.  29 

I     Beef  and  citrus  quotas,  Sept.  l(j 
P-3  aircraft,  acquisition  and  production, 

bilateral  agreements,  July  77 
'onimmigrant  visa  waiver  pilot  program 

Department),  Dec.  23 
il  supply  and  Persian  Gulf  initiatives 

(Wallis),  Jan.  36 
rofile,  Apr.  63 
trategic  technology  export  issues 

(Sigur),  May  31 
reaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  62,  Feb. 
92,  Mar.  83,  85,  Apr.  87,  88,  June  68, 
Aug.  92,  93,  Sept  8.5,  Nov.  49,  Dec.  58 
U.S.  armed  forces  in  Japan,  treaty  of 
mutual  cooperation  and  support, 
May  84,  Sept.  85 
.S. -Japan  agreement  on  cooperation  in 
research  and  development  in  science 
and  technology  (White  House),  Aug. 
55 
S. -Japan  energy  cooperation  (Wallis), 

Jan.  35,  36 
S. -Japan  mutual  security  treaty 

(Sigur),  May  31 
S. -Japan  nuclear  cooperation  agree- 
ment (Reagan),  Jan.  28 
S. -.Japanese  defense  cooperation 

(Clark),  Dec.  30 
S.  relations:  Clark,  Dec.  27;  GIST,  Apr. 

64 
S.  visit  of  Prime  Minister  Takeshita: 
joint  statement,  Apr  63;  Reagan, 
Apr.  61;  Takeshita,  Apr.  62 
Ian: 
rab-Israeli  peace  process  (Shultz),  June 

9 
reaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Aug.  92,  Dec. 

58 
'.S.  aid,  FY  89,  request  (Murphv),  June 

42 
isits  of  Secretary  Shultz,  June  7,  15, 

Sept.  48 
icial  matters: 

hild  abduction,  international,  civil  as- 
pects, convention  (1980):  Austria,  Oct. 
83:  Canada  (extension  to  Northwest 
Territories),  May  82;  U.S.,  July  76 
riminal  matters,  mutual  assistance,  bi- 
lateral agreement  with  Switzerland, 
Jan.  63 
Hgi'tit  of  United  States  Praetiee  in  hiter- 
natiiiiial  Lan:  I'isn,  released.  July  80 
nternational  Court  of  Justice  (ICJ),  com- 
pulsory jurisdiction,  declaration:  Cy- 
prus, Oct.  83;  Nauru,  Dee.  58 
nternational  Court  of  Justice  (ICJ),  stat- 
ute, Nauru,  Dec.  58 
aw  applicable  to  trusts  and  on  their  rec- 
ognition, convention  (1985):  Canada, 
Dec.  58;  Italy,  Luxembourg,  Nether- 
lands, U.K.,'U.S.,  Nov.  48 
etters  rogatory,  inter-American  conven- 
tion (1975),  additional  protocol  (1979), 
Guatemala,  May  82 
Jutual  assistance  in  criminal  matters,  bi- 
lateral agreements:  Bahamas,  June 
68;  Italy,  Feb.  92;  Thailand,  July  77 
Jutual  assistance  on  procedures  in  law 
enforcement  matters,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Nigeria,  Jan.  62 


Judicial  matters  (Cont'd) 

Mutual  legal  assistance  cooperation,  bilat- 
eral agreement  with  Mexico,  Feb.  92; 
U.S.  Apr.  88 
Mutual  legal  assistance  in  criminal  mat- 
ters, bilateral  agreements:  Belgium, 
Mar.  84,  June  68:  Canada,  Apr.  88 
Transfer  of  sentenced  prisoners,  conven- 
tion (1983):  Denmark  (extension  to 
Faroe  Islands),  Greece,  Apr.  87;  Hong 
Kong,  Luxembourg,  Jan.  Gl;  Switzer- 
land, Apr.  87,  U.K.  (extension  to  Brit- 
ish Virgin  Islands),  Nov.  48 
Jute  and  jute  products,  international  agree- 
ment (1982):  European  Economic  Com- 
munity, Feb.  91;  Portugal,  July  76 


K 


Kampelman,  Max  M.,  Mar.  41,  .50,  Sept.  6, 

Dec.  38 
Karp,  Craig,  Mar.  1 
Kaunda,  Kenneth  D.,  Jan.  19,  20 
Kenya,  treaties,  agreements,  etc..  May  84, 

Oct.  84 
King,  Dr.  Martin  Luther,  Jr.  (Shultz),  Nov. 

17 
Kiribati,  Pacific  Islands  regional  fisheries 

treaty  (1987),  June  68 
Kohl,  Helmut,  May  45,  46,  Aug.  47 
Koop,  C.  Everett,  Jan.  56 
Korea,  Democratic  People's  Republic  of: 
Geneva  conventions,  protocol,  relating  to 
the  protection  of  victims  of  interna- 
tional armed  conflicts,  Nov.  49 
Terrorism  (Bremer),  June  62,  Sept.  61 
Korea,  Republic  of  (Reagan),  Apr.  24 
Democracy  and  democratic  progi-ess: 

Shultz,  Oct.  30;  Sigur,  July  32 
Economic  development  (Wallis),  June  24 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  62,  Feb. 
92,  Mar.  85,  Apr.  87,  May  81,  82,  84, 
Aug.  93,  Sept.  85,  Dec.  59 
U.S.  aid,  FY  89,  request  (Sigur),  July  36 
U.S.  trade  relations  (White  House),  Apr. 

65 
Visit  of  Secretary  Shultz,  Oct.  30 
Kuwait: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  May  81,  84, 

July  76,  Sept.  85 
U.S.  arms  sales  (Murphy),  Oct.  62 
U.S.  visit  of  Crown  Prince  and  Prime 
Minister  Saad  (Reagan,  Saad),  Oct.  60 


Labor: 
International  labor  standards,  convention 

(1976),  U.S.,  Sept.  83 
Minimum  standards  in  merchant  ships, 
convention  (1976),  U.S.,  Sept.  83 
Lambertson,  David  F.,  Mar.  61,  Sept.  15 
Laos: 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  trafficking, 

control  efforts  (Wrobleski),  June  48 
POW/MIAs  (Lambertson),  Sept.  16 
Refugees.  .See  Refugees:  Southeast  Asian 
U.S.  policy  (Lambertson),  Oct.  42 
Latin  America  (see  also  names  of  individual 
countries): 
Caribbean  region  (Shultz),  .Jan.  15 


Latin  America  (Cont'd) 

Caribbean  Basin  Initiative  (Whitney), 

June  65 
U.S.  aid,  FY  89,  request  (Abrams), 
Oct.  80 
Central  America: 
Arias  peace  plan  (Shultz),  Oct.  20 
Economics  and  democratic  reform 

(Shultz),  Sept.  76,  Oct.  3 
Guatemala  City  accords  (Shultz),  Jan.  16 
Regional  issues  (Joint  Foreign  Ministers 

news  conference),  Oct.  2 
Summit  meeting,  San  Jose  (White 

House),  Apr.  86 
U.S.  aid,  FY  89,  request  (Department), 

Sept.  79 
U.S.  policy:  Powell,  Oct.  53;  Shultz,  May 
13,  .July  10,  Sept.  3,  Oct.  3 
Debt  management:  Shultz,  Oct.  11,  Dec. 

15;  Whitney,  Feb.  89 
Democratic  progress  (Shultz),  Jan.  18, 

Dec.  15 
Economic  development:  Shultz,  .Jan.  15, 
Oct.  10;  Whitney,  Feb.  87;  Williamson, 
July  68 
Newly  industrialized  economies  (Wal- 
lis), Aug.  73 
Refugees  (Shultz),  Nov.  14,  16 
U.S.  economic  assistance  (Shultz),  Jan.  15 
U.S.  policy  and  relations  (Schultz),  Apr.  44 
Western  Hemisphere  and  U.S.  national 
security  strategy  (Reagan),  Apr.  19 
Lebanon:  Murphy,  Oct.  64,  Dec.  41 
American  hostages  in  (Reagan),  May  9,  12 
Background  Notes,  Dec.  48 
Democratic  progress  (Murphy),  Dec.  46 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  trafficking, 

control  efforts  (Wrobleski),  June  49 
Profile,  Dec.  49 

Suppression  of  unlawful  acts  of  violence  at 
airports  serving  international  civil 
aviation,  convention,  protocol  (1988), 
May  81 
Terrorism  and  hostage-taking  (Bremer), 

June  62 
UN  Security  Council  Resolution  (Walters), 

July  73 
U.S.  aid,  FY  89,  request  (Murphy),  June 

42 
U.S.  passport  restrictions  (Department), 

Apr.  79,  Dee.  52 
U.S.  policy  (Murphy),  Dec.  46 
U.S.  visit  of  Patriarch  Sfeir  (White 
House),  Sept.  46 
Lesotho,  protocol  of  provisional  application 
of  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs 
and  Trade,  Apr.  87 
Liberia,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  .Jan.  62, 

May  81,  84,  Aug.  92,  Nov.  49 
Libya,  terrorism:  Bremer,  Jan.  45,  June  62; 

Department,  Jan.  48;  Shultz,  Apr.  37 
Liechtenstein,  convention  against  torture 
and  other  cruel,  inhuman  or  degrading 
treatment  or  punishment,  July  76 
Lithuanian  Independence  Day,  1988,  procla- 
mation (Reagan)  May  46 
Lopez  Contreras,  Carlos,  Oct.  4 
Luxembourg,  treaties,  agreements,  etc., 
Jan.  61,  Feb.  92,  July  76,  Oct.  85,  Nov. 
48,  Dec.  58 


M 

Macao,  trade  in  textiles  and  textile  prod- 
ucts, bilateral  agreement,  Apr.  88 
Madagascar,  treaties,  agreements,  etc., 

Apr.  88,  Aug.  93 
Madrigal  Nieto,  Rodrigo,  Oct.  4 
Malawi,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  91, 

Mav  81,  82,  Aug.  92,  Sept.  85 
Malaysia:  Lambertson,  Nov.  2-3;  Sigur,  July 
:36 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  trafficking, 

control  efforts  (Wrobleski),  June  .30 
Profile,  Nov.  24 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  92,  May 
81,  .July  77,  Oct.  84,  Dec.  .58 
Maldives,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Apr. 
87,  May  81,  84,  July  76,  77,  Aug.  92, 
Sept.  83 
Manglapus,  Raul,  Dec.  26 
Marine  pollution.  See  Environmental  prob- 
lems and  control  and  Oil  |)ollution 
Maritime  matters: 
Antiterrorism  and  maritime  security  (De- 
partment), May  62 
Facilitation  of  international  maritime 
traffic,  convention  (1965),  Ecuador, 
Sept.  83 
High  seas,  convention  (1958),  Cyprus, 

Sept.  83 
International  Maritime  Organization 
(IMO),  convention  (1948),  Solomon  Is- 
lands, Sept.  83 
Load  lines,  international  convention 
(1966):  Marshall  Islands,  Oct.  83; 
U.K.  (extension  to  Cayman  Islands), 
Oct.  83 
Amendments  (1971),  Burma,  Apr.  87 
Amendments  (1975),  Switzerland,  Apr. 

87 
Amendments  (1979)  (1983),  Switzerland, 

May  82 
Amendments  (1983):  Peru,  Syria,  Oct. 
83 
Maritime  boundary,  bilateral  agreement 

with  Cuba,  Mar.  85 
Maritime  search  and  rescue: 
Bilateral  agreements:  Indonesia,  Oct. 

84;  Soviet  Union,  Aug.  42,  93 
International  convention  (1979):  Ecu- 
ador, Sept.  83:  Ivory  Coast,  Mar.  84; 
Jamaica,  Peru,  Oct.  83;  Poland,  So- 
viet Union,  July  76;  Uruguay,  Apr. 
87 
Prevention  of  collisions  at  .sea,  interna- 
tional convention  (1972):  Antigua  and 
Barbados,  May  82;  Burma,  Apr.  87; 
Ivory  Coa.st,  Mar.  84;  Marshall  Is- 
lands, Oct.  83;  Seychelles,  Nov.  58 
Protection  and  development  of  the  marine 
environment  of  the  wider  Caribbean 
region,  convention  (1983):  Panama, 
U.S.,  Feb.  91 
Safety  of  life  at  sea,  international  conven- 
tion (1974):  Ivory  Coast,  Mar.  84; 
Mauritius,  May  82 
Protocol  (1978):  Austria,  Oct.  83;  Bur- 
ma, Apr.  87;  Ivorv  Coast,  Mar.  84; 
Marshall  Islands,  Seychelles,  U.K. 
(extension  to  Bermuda,  Cayman  Is- 
lands), Sept.  83 


10 


Maritime  matters  (Cont'd) 

Standards  of  training,  certification,  and 
watchkeeping  for  seafarers  (1978):  Bo- 
livia, Burma,  Sept.  83;  Canada,  Apr. 
87;  Ecuador,  Sept.  83;  Italy,  Ivory 
Coast,  Mar.  84;  Seychelles.  Dec.  58; 
Singapore,  Sept.  83;  Switzerland, 
Apr.  87;  Venezuela,  Mar.  84 

Suppression  of  unlawful  acts  against  the 
safety  of  maritime  navigation,  con- 
vention with  protocol  (1988):  Argen- 
tina, Austria,  Bahamas,  Brazil, 
Bulgaria,  Canada,  Chile,  Costa  Rica, 
Ecuador,  France,  Greece,  Hungary, 
Israel,  Italy,  Jordan,  Liberia,  Moroc- 
co, Norway,  Philippines,  Aug.  92; 
Spain,  Dec.  58;  Sweden,  Switzerland, 
Turkey,  U.S.,  Aug.  92 

Tonnage  measurement  on  ships,  interna- 
tional convention  (1969):  Burma,  Oct. 
83;  Ivory  Coast,  Mar.  84;  U.K.  (exten- 
sion to  Cayman  Islands),  Sept.  83 
Marshall  Islands: 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  June  69,  Sept. 

83,  Oct.  83 

Visit  of  Secretary  Shultz,  Oct.  34 
Mauritius,  treaties,  agreements,  etc..  May 

82,  84 
McCormack,  Richard  T.,  Sept.  69 
McManaway,  Clayton  C,  May  64 
Mexico: 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  trafficking, 

control  efforts  (Wrobleski),  June  49 
Profile,  May  7 

Rediversion  of  Rio  Grande  waters  allo- 
cated to  Mexico,  bilateral  agreement, 
Oct.  85 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  62,  Feb. 
92,  Mar.  84,  85,  Apr.  88,  May  81,  83, 

84,  July  76,  77,  Sept.  85,  Oct.  83,  84, 
Nov.  49,  Dec.  58 

U.S.  aid,  FY  89,  request  (Abrams),  Oct. 

79 
Visit  of  President  Reagan:  De  la  Madrid, 
Reagan,  May  6;  White  House,  May  7 
Michaud,  Michael  A.G.,  Mar.  79 
Micronesia,  Federated  States  of,  treaties, 
agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  61,  Aug.  93, 
Dec.  58 
Middle  East  {see  also  Arab-Israeli  conflict 
and  names  of  indiridnal  conntries): 
Powell,  Oct.  53;  Shultz,  May  13,  May  23; 
Toronto  economic  summit,  Aug.  49 
Arms  sales  to  Persian  Gulf  states  (Mur- 
phy), Oct.  62,  Dec.  43 
Ballistic  missiles  (Murphy),  Dec.  43 
Chemical  warfare  (Murphy),  Dec.  43 
Palestine  Liberation  Organization  (PLO) 

(Reagan),  Mar.  70,  May  10 
Peace  process  (Shultz),  Nov.  10 
U.N.  actions  and  U.S.  concerns  (Walters), 

May  67 
U.S.  aid,  FY  89,  request  (Murphy),  June 

41 
U.S.  national  security  strategy  (Reagan), 
Apr.  22 
Migration,  constitution  of  the  inter- 
governmental committee  for  migration 
(19.53),  amendments  (1987),  U.S..  Apr. 
87 
Milam,  William  B.,  Oct.  43 
Military  personnel: 
Exchange  of  officers  between  the  U.S. 
Marine  Corps  and  Argentine  Marine 


Military  personnel  (Cont'd) 

Corps,  memo  of  understanding,  Apr.  88 
Exchange  of  officers  between  the  U.S. 
and  Italian  Air  Forces,  memo  of  un- 
derstanding, Oct.  84 
Personnel  exchange  program  between  the 
U.S.  Navy  and  Canadian  forces,  bilat- 
eral agreement,  Sept.  84 
Military  power  and  diplomacy  (Armacost). 

Nov.  40 
Mitterrand,  Francois,  Aug.  47 
Mongolia,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Se]it. 

84,  Dec.  58 
Moore,  .Jonathan,  Mar.  77,  Nov.  46 
Morocco: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  June  ()9,  Aug. 

92,  93,  Dec.  59 
U.S.  aid,  FY  89,  request  (Murphy),  June 
43 
Mubarek,  Hosni  Mohammed,  Apr.  72 
Mulronev,  Brian,  July  22,  Aug.  47 
Murphy," Richard  W.,  Mar.  71,  74,  June  37, 
40,  43,  Sept.  44,  Oct.  61 


N 


Namibia  (Department),  Sept.  3 
Nauru,  International  Court  of  Justice,  com- 
pulsory jurisdiction,  statute.  Dee.  58 
Nepal,  international  telecommunications 

convention,  ratification,  July  76 
Netherlands,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.. 
Jan.  61,  62,  Feb.  78,  91,  Mar.  85,  Apr 
88,  May  82,  July  76,  Aug.  92,  Sept.  83, 
Oct.  83,  85,  Nov.  48,  49,  Dec.  58,  59 
New  Zealand,  treaties,  agreements,  etc., 

May  92,  Aug.  92,  Oct.  83,  Dec.  58 
Nicaragua:  Reagan,  Apr.  32;  Shultz,  May  22, 
Oct.  7 
Contra  aid:  Reagan,  Apr.  33,  May  9,  11, 
July  3,  Aug.  78,  Oct.  1,  Nov.  4;  Shultz, 
Apr.  48;  White  House,  Apr.  85,  86 
Democratic  progress  (Shultz),  Apr.  44, 

Oct.  3 
Expulsion  of  diplomats:  Department, 

Sept.  69;  McCormack,  Sept.  69 
Guatemala  City  accords:  Reagan,  Jan.  1; 

Shultz.  Jan.  16,  17,  Apr.  48 
Humanitarian  aid  (Woods),  Aug.  77 
Peace  negotiations  (White  House),  Sept. 

71 
Sandinista  offensive  and  cease-fire  talks: 
Department.  May  73;  Shultz,  May  14, 
74;  White  House,  May  74,  Oct.  82 
Sandinista  military  buildup  (Reagan), 

Apr.  33 
U.S.  troops  sent  to  Honduras  (Shultz, 
White  House),  May  74 
Soviet-Cuban  militarization  (Reagan), 

Apr.  33 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  July  76,  Aug 
92 
Niger,  treaties,  agreements,  etc..  May  81, 

84,  Oct.  83 
Nigeria,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  6i 

May  82,  Oct.  84 
Nitze,  PaulH.,  Feb.  81 
Niue,  Pacific  Islands  regional  fisheries  ire 

ty.  June  68 
North  Africa,  U.S.  aid,  FY  89,  request 
(Muri)hy),  June  43 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/Index  19i 


th  Atlantic  Council  (NAC),  heads  of 
state  meeting: 
russels  (Mar.  2-3,  1988):  declaration, 
May  4:  Reagan,  May  1.  4;  statement  on 
conventional  arms  control,  May  2 
th  Atlantic  Council,  ministerial 
meeting: 
ladrid  (June  9-10,  1988),  final  communi- 
ques. Aug.  76 
•th  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization 
(NATO):  Kohl,  May  45;  Reagan,  May  44; 
Ridgway,  July  50 
onventional  defense  improvement  initia- 
tive: NATO,  Feb.  87;  Rowny,  Jan.  21 
onventional  stability  talks,  U.S.  arms 

control  initiatives,  July  20 
)efense  ministers  meeting,  Brussels 

(Dec.  1-2),  final  communique,  Feb.  85 
)enmark  nuclear-free  zone  policy  (De- 
partment), June  31 
^igh-le^'el  task  force  on  conventional  arms 
control  (U.S.  arms  control  initiatives), 
Jan.  27 

nitial  voice  switched  network  (IVSN)  and 
U.S.  automatic  voice  network 
(AUTOVON),  memo  of  understanding, 
Jan.  62 

ntermediate-range  nuclear  forces  (INF) 
treaty:  Glitman,  Mar  44;  Kempelman, 
Mar  42;  Shultz,  Jan.  14,  Mar  32,  May 
18 
Dual  track  policy  (Shultz),  Mar.  33 
Nuclear  planning  group  statement,  Jan. 
38,  July  53 
legional  security  (Reagan),  Apr  21 
ummit  meeting.  See  North  Atlantic 

Council,  heads  of  state  meeting 
Varsaw  Pact  conventional  stability  talks, 
U.S.  arms  control  initiatives.  May  30 
iTO  Maintenance  and  Supply  Agency, 
consolidated  procurement  of  munitions, 
bilateral  agreement,  Sept.  85 
rway,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Mar  84, 
May  81,  84,  June  68,  July  76,  Aug.  92, 
Sept.  83,  Oct.  84,  Nov.  49 
clear  accidents: 

Assistance,  convention  (1986):  Australia, 
Bangladesh,  Bulgaria,  Byelorussian 
S.S.R.,  China,  Czechoslovakia,  Ger- 
man Democratic  Republic,  Gua- 
temala, Hungary,  India,  Iraq,  Japan, 
Jordan,  Malaysia,  Me.xico,  Mongolia, 
New  Zealand,  Poland,  South  Africa, 
Switzerland,  Ukrainian  S.S.R.,  Unit- 
ed Arab  Emirates,  U.S.,  Vietnam, 
World  Health  Organization,  Dec.  58 
Early  notification,  convention  (1986):  Aus- 
tralia, Austria,  Bangladesh,  Bulgaria, 
Byelorussian  S.S.R.,  China,  Egypt, 
Finland,  German  Democratic  Repub- 
lic, Guatemala,  Hungary,  India,  Iraq, 
Japan,  Jordan,  Malaysia,  Mongolia, 
New  Zealand,  Poland,  South  Africa, 
Sweden,  Switzerland,  Ukrainian 
S.S.R.,  United  Arab  Emirates,  U.S., 
Vietnam,  World  Health  Organization, 
Dec.  58 
uclear  energy; 

Civilian  nuclear  reactor  safety,  bilateral 
agreement  with  Soviet  Union,  June 
69 
EURATOM,  cooperation  with:  Reagan, 
June  51;  U.S. -Soviet  joint  statement, 
Feb.  16 


Nuclear  energy  (Cont'd) 

International  Atomic  Energy  Agenev 
(IAEA),  statute  (19,56),  amended" 
(1984):  Iran,  U.S.,  Dec.  58 

Liquid  metal-cooled  fast  breeder  reactors, 
bilateral  agreements:  Federal  Repub- 
lic of  Germany,  Apr.  88;  U.K.,  Apr  89 

Management  of  radioactive  wastes,  bilat- 
eral agreement  with  EURATOM, 
May  83 

Nuclear  reactor  safety  research,  bilateral 
agreement  with  Me.xico,  .Jan.  62 

Nuclear  safety  matters,  exchange  of  tech- 
nical information,  bilateral  agreement 
with  Israel,  Dec.  58 

Peaceful  uses  of  nuclear  energy,  coopera- 
tion, bilateral  agreements:  Japan, 
Jan.  62,  Aug.  93;  Soviet  Union,  Aug. 
42,  93 

Physical  protection  of  nuclear  material, 
convention  (1979),  Mexico,  Oct.  83 

Radioactive  waste  management,  bilateral 
agreements:  Canada,  Apr  88;  France, 
Aug.  92 

Reprocessing  of  special  nuclear  material 
of  U.S.  origin,  bilateral  agreement 
with  Japan,  Mar  85 

Safety  matters,  e.xchange  of  technical  in- 
formation and  cooperation,  bilateral 
agreement  with  Belgium,  Dec.  59 

U.S. -Japan  nuclear  coopei-ation  agree- 
ment (Reagan),  Jan.  27 

USNRC  severe  accident,  source  term,  and 
containment  research  program,  bilat- 
eral agi-eement  with  Italy,  Jan.  62 
Nuclear  nonproliferation  (Shultz),  Dec.  20 

Treaty  (19()8):  Saudi  Arabia,  Dec.  58; 
Spain,  Jan.  61 
20th  anniversary  (White  House),  Sept.  8 

U.S.  arms  control  initiatives.  May  28, 
July  18 

U.S. -Soviet  joint  statement,  Feb.  14,  Aug. 
28 
Nuclear  testing: 

Joint  verification  experiment  (JVE),  Aug. 
93: 
Agreement  (U.S. -Soviet  Union  joint 
statement)  Feb.  11,  Aug.  27 
Text,  Aug.  67 
Testing,  1st  and  2nd  phases  (White 
House),  Oct.  39,  Nov.  2 

Limited  test  ban  treaty  (1963),  Pakistan, 
June  68 

Nuclear  testing  talks:  Reagan,  U.S.,  Jan. 
23;  White  House,  Apr.  50,  Sept.  7, 
Oct.  39 
U.S.  arms  control  initiatives,  Jan.  26 

Test  site  inspections,  U.S.  and  Soviet:  De- 
partment, Mar  40;  joint  statement, 
Apr.  57 

Threshold  test  ban  treaty  and  peaceful 
nuclear  explosions  treaty:  Depart- 
ment, .Jan.  26;  Reagan,  U.S.,  Jan.  23; 
U.S.  arms  control  initiatives.  May  28; 
U.S. -Soviet  joint  statement,  Feb.  14, 
Aug.  27;  White  House,  Apr.  50 

U.S.  arms  control  initiatives,  July  18 
Nuclear  weapons: 

Multiple  launch  rocket  system,  memo  of 
understanding  with  Turkey,  Jan.  63 


Nuclear  weapons  (Cont'd) 

Nuclear-free  zones  (Shultz),  Oct.  36 
Pi-olifcration,  threat  of  (Shultz),  Aug.  87 


o 


Oceans  (see  also  Maritime  matters  and  Sci- 
ence and  technology):  World  ocean  stud- 
ies cooperation,  bilateral  agreement 
with  Soviet  Union,  Mar.  85;  Shultz, 
Feb.  10 
Oil  pollution: 
Civil  liability  for  oil  pollution  damage,  in- 
ternational convention  (1969):  Austra- 
lia, Nov.  48;  Qatar,  Oct.  83; 
Seychelles,  Sept.  83;  Switzerland, 
Apr.  87 
International  fund  for  compensation  for 
damage,  convention  (1971):  Ivory 
Coast,  Mar  83;  Seychelles,  Sept.  83; 
Qatar,  Oct.  83 
Intervention  on  the  high  seas  in  cases  of, 
international  convention  (1969):  Ivory 
Coast,  May  82;  Qatar,  Oct.  83; 
Switzerland,  Apr  87 
Oil  spills  in  the  wider  Caribbean  region, 
protocol  (1983):  Colombia,  July  76; 
Grenada,  Panama,  Feb.  91 
Prevention  of  pollution  of  the  sea  by  oil, 
international  convention  (19.54):  Aus- 
tralia (denunciation).  Mar.  83;  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany  (denunciation), 
Sept.  83 
Okun,  Herbert  S.,  Jan.  54,  Mar.  81,  82,  Sept. 

42 
Oman: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  91,  May 

83,  84,  Oct.  84 
U.S.  aid,  FY  89,  request  (Murphy),  June 
42 
Organization  of  American  States  (OAS): 
Shultz,  .Jan.  15;  Williamson,  July  73 
Organization  of  the  Islamic  Conference 
(Karp),  Mar  22 


Pacific  Ocean  region:  Armacost,  Sept.  9; 
Shultz,  Oct.  34 

Economic  development:  Sigur,  Mar  58; 
Wallis,  June  23 

Economic,  social,  political  situation  (Sol- 
omon), May  33 

Pacific  Basin  and  U.S.  trade  issues  (Wal- 
lis), June  23 

Pacific  Community  Forum  (Shultz),  Oct. 
25 

Pacific  Islands  regional  fisheries  treaty; 
Reagan,  Apr  25;  Sigur,  July  38 

Peace  and  prosperity  in  South  Asia 
(Shultz),  Dec.  19" 

South  Pacific  oceanographic  research,  FY 
89,  budget  request,  July  38 

South  Pacific  regional  development  pro- 
gram (Sigur),  July  38 

U.S.  national  security  strategy  (Reagan), 
Apr.  24 
Pakistan: 

Afghanistan,  involvement  in  (Karp),  Mar. 
21 

Afghanistan  settlement  agreement,  signa- 
ture, June  59 


11 


Pakistan  (Cont'd) 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  trafficking, 

control  efforts  (Wrobleski),  June  50 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  62,  May 

81,  82,  June  68,  Sept.  84,  Nov.  49, 
Dec.  59 

U.S.  aid,  FY  89,  request  (Murpliy),  June 

41 
U.S.  aid  cutoff  waived  (White  House), 

Apr.  80 
Zia  ul-Haq,  death:  Shultz,  Oct.  69;  White- 
head, Oct.  7 
Palau  {Department),  Nov.  46 
Pacific  Islands  regional  fisheries  treaty, 
June  68 
Palsson,  Thorsteinn,  Oct.  49 
Pan  American  Day  and  Week,  1988,  procla- 
mation (Reagan),  July  75 
Panama:  Shultz,  May  13;  Whitehead,  June  33 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  trafficking, 
control  efforts:  Reagan,  May  11; 
Wrobleski,  June  .50 
Noriega  political  crisis:  Abrams,  May  70; 
Reagan,  May  71;  Shultz,  May  21,  71, 
July  15,  Aug.  57,  88;  White  House, 
May  69 
Panama  Canal  commission,  alimony  and 
child  support  obligations  of  employ- 
ees, bilateral  agreement.  May  84 
Transfer  of  U.S.  funds:  Reagan,  Dec.  57; 

White  House,  July  75 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  91,  Mar. 

84,  May  82,  July  76,  Aug.  93 
U.S.  aid,  FY  89,  request  (Abrams),  Oct. 

77 
U.S.  relations  (Department),  Apr  85; 
White  House,  July  75 
Panama  Canal  neutrality  treaty  (1977):  Bar- 
bados, Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
Apr.  87 
Papua  New  Guinea: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  92,  May 

82,  Nov.  50 

U.S.  aid,  FY  89,  request  (Sigur),  July  38 
Paraguay: 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  trafficking, 

control  efforts  (Wrobleski),  June  49 
International  express  mail,  bilateral 

agreement,  Nov.  50 
U.S.  aid,  FY  89,  request  (Abrams),  Oct. 
79 
Patents,  international  recognition  of  deposit 
of  micro-organisms  for  patent  pro- 
cedure, Budapest  treaty.  Republic  of 
Korea,  Apr.  87 
Peace  Corps,  program  establishment,  bilat- 
eral agreements:  Comoros,  Mar.  85; 
Equatorial  Guinea,  .Jan.  62;  Guinea- 
Bissau,  Apr.  88 
Persian  Gulf  (.sec  also  Iran-Iraq  war):  Rea- 
gan, .Jan.  1,  2;  Shultz,  July  10 
Freedom  of  navigation:  Carlucci,  July  61; 

Murphy,  Oct.  62 
Iranian  mining  of  international  waters: 
Reagan,  June  .36;  Walters,  June  35; 
White  House,  June  35 
Soviet  position  (Murphy),  Mar  75 
UN  role  (Murphy),  Mar.  74 
U.S.  attack  on  Iranian  military  platforms; 
Reagan,  June  36;  White  House,  June 
35 
U.S.  policy:  Murphy,  Mar.  74,  June  43; 
Shultz.  Mav  14  ' 


Persian  Gulf  (Cont'd) 
U.S.S.  Sainuel  B.  Roberts,  mine  attack 

on:  Reagan,  June  36;  Walters,  June  35 
U.S.S.  Vincennes  and  Iranian  airbus  trag- 
edy: Bush,  Sept.  42;  Okun,  Sept.  38; 

Reagan,  Sept.  38;  Sofaer,  Oct.  58; 

Williamson,  Sept.  39 
Peru; 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  trafficking, 

control  efforts:  Shultz,  Oct.  18; 

Wrobleski,  June  50 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar.  84,  Apr 

88,  May  81,  82,  June  69,  July  76,  Sept. 

83,  Oct.  83,  85,  Nov.  50 

U.S.  aid,  FY  89,  request  (Abrams),  Oct. 
79 
Philippines:  Reagan,  Apr.  25;  Shultz,  Aug. 
58,  Oct.  28 
Democratic  institutions  (Lambertson), 

Man  61 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  U.S.,  19o2-195J,, 
Vol.  XII,  part  2,  Burma,  Indonesia, 
Philippines,  Thailand,  released,  Jan. 
64 
Insurgency  problems:  Lambertson,  Mar 

62;  Shultz,  Oct.  28 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  92,  May 
82,  84,  June  69,  July  76,  77,  Aug.  92, 
93,  Dee,  59 
U.S.  aid:  Lambertson,  Mar  62;  Reagan, 

Jan.  1;  Sigur,  July  .34 
LT.S. -Philippines  military  bases  agree- 
ment review  (1988):  signature  (Man- 
glapus,  Shultz).  Dec.  26;  te.xt,  Dec.  24 
Visit  of  Secretary  Shultz,  Oct.  28 
Poland: 
Human  rights  (Whitehead),  May  54 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  63,  Mar. 
85,  May  81,  84,  July  76,  Sept.  83,  84, 
85,  Dec.  58,  59 
Pollution.  See  Environmental  problems  and 
control;  Maritime  matters;  and  Oil 
pollution 
Portugal: 
Background  Notes,  May  48 
Profile,  May  51 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  92,  Mar 

84,  May  81,  June  69,  July  76,  Oct.  84, 
Dec.  58 

U.S.  visit  of  Prime  Minister  Cavaco  Silva 
(Reagan,  Cavaco  Silva),  May  47 
Postal  matters: 

INTELPOST  field  trial,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Papua  New  Guinea,  92 

INTELPOST  service,  memo  of  under- 
standing, Israel,  Jan.  62 

International  express  mail  agreement: 
Benin,  Oct.  84;  Brazil,  Aug.  92; 
Burkina  Faso,  Feb.  92;  Central  Afri- 
can Republic,  Dec.  59;  Congo, 
Czechoslovakia,  Nov.  49;  Guinea,  May 
83;  Madagascar,  Aug.  93;  Malawi, 
Sept.  85;  Morocco,  Aug.  93;  Papua 
New  Guinea,  Paraguay,  Nov.  49; 
Rwanda,  Apr.  88;  Sierra  Leone, 
Somalia,  Oct.  85;  Soviet  Union, 
Swaziland,  June  69;  Tanzania,  Apr  88; 
Trinidad  and  Tobago,  Aug.  93;  Zam- 
bia, Aug.  84;  Zimbabwe,  May  85 

Money  orders  and  postal  travelers'  checks, 
agreement  with  final  protocol  (1984): 
Chile,  Mar.  84;  Cyprus,  Sept.  84; 
France,  July  76;  Hungary,  Nor- 
way, Mar  84;  Poland,  Rwanda,  Sept. 
84;  St.  Christopher-Nevis,  Mar.  84; 


Po.ftal  matters  (Cont'd)  ; 

San  Marino,  July  76;  Sri  Lanka,  Mar  84, 
Parcel  post  bilateral  agreement  (1958)  ' 

with  Japan,  U.S.  (terminated),  Ajir 
88 
Postal  parcel  agreement  with  final  proto-     t 
col  and  detailed  regulations  (1984):         j 
Albania,  Australia,  July  76;  Bahamas,    | 
Sept.  83;  Chile,  Mar  84;  Cyprus,  Do- 
minica, Sept.  83;  France,  July  76; 
Hungary,  Mar.  84;  Israel,  Nicaragua, 
July  76;  Norway,  Mar.  84;  Poland, 
Rwanda,  Sept.  83;  St.  Christopher- 
Nevis,  Mar.  84;  San  Marino,  July  76; 
Saudi  Arabia,  Sept.  83;  Sri  Lanka, 
Mar  84 
Postal  money  order  agreement,  bilateral 

agreement  with  Mexico,  Sept.  85 
Universal  Postal  Union  (UPU)  constitu- 
tion (1964),  Rwanda,  Sept.  83 
Second  additional  protocol  (1974): 
Nicaragua,  July  76;  St. 
Christopher-Nevis,  Mar  84 
Third  additional  protocol  (1984):  Alba- 
nia, Australia,  July  76;  Bahamas, 
Sept.  83;  Chile,  Cyprus,  Dominica, 
Sept.  83;  Mar  84;"France,  July  76; 
Hungary,  Mar.  84;  Israel, 
Nicaragua,  July  76;  Norway,  Mar 
84;  Poland,  Rwanda,  Sept.  83;  St. 
Christopher-Nevis,  Mar.  84;  San 
Marino,  July  76;  Saudi  Arabia, 
Sept.  83;  Sri  Lanka,  Mar  84 
Powell,  Colin  L.,  Oct.  51 
Preinspection,  bilateral  agreement  with 

Ireland,  June  69 
Presidential  authority  (Reagan),  Jan.  2 

war  powers  resolution  (Sofaer),  Nov.  36 
Press  Releases: 
State  Department:  Jan.  63,  Feb.  93,  Mar. 
86,  Apr  89,  May  85,  June  69,  July  78, 
Aug.  94,  Sept.  85,  Oct.  86,  Nov.  ,50, 
Dec.  60 
USUN;  July  78,  Dec.  60 
Principal  Officers  of  the  Department  of 
State  and  United  States  Chiefs  of  Mis- 
sion, 1778-198S,  released,  Dec.  62 
Proclamations  by  the  President: 
Afghanistan  Day,  1988  (5T78),  June  60 
Baltic  Freedom  Day,  1988  (58S1\  Sept.  24 
Captive  Nations  Week,  1988  (5S!,0),  Oct.  57 
Greek  Independence  Day,  1988  (.57*0),  June 

31 
Helsinki  Human  Rights  Day,  1988  (.3A'4J), 

Oct.  57 
Lithuanian  Independence  Day,  1988  (5772). 

May  46 
Pan  American  Day  and  Week,  1988  (579S), 

July  75 
World  Food  Day,  1988  (587S),  Dec.  37 
World  Trade  Week,  1988  (58U),  July  41 
Publications: 
CSCE,  23rd  semiannual  report,  released, 

Apr  90 
CSCE,  24th  semiannual  report,  released, 

Oct.  86 
State  Department:  Jan.  64,  Feb.  93,  Mar, 
86,  Apr  89,  Mav  85,  June  70,  July  79, 
Aug.  94,  Sept.  86,  Oct.  86,  Nov.  50, 
Dec.  61 
American  Foreign  Polici/:  Current  Doc 
iiment.'i.  lOSJ,  Supplement,  micro- 
fiche publication,  released,  ¥eh.  94 


12 


Department  of  State  Bulletin  Index  198    i;. 


xcatio)is 

ate  Depariment  (Cont'd) 

American  Foreign  Policy:  Current  Doc- 
uments. WSJ  Supplement,  micro- 
fiche publication,  released,  July  81 

American  Foreign  Policy:  Current  Doc- 
uments, 1!)S6  Supplement,  re- 
leased, Feb.  94 

Background  Notes:  Jan.  65,  Mar  86, 
June  70,  Sept.  86,  Dec.  62 

Digest  of  United  States  Practice  in  In- 
ternational Law,  released,  July  80 

Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States, 
Supplement,  Memoranda  of  Con- 
versation of  the  Secretary  of  State 
19J,7-1952,  microfiche  publication, 
released,  July  79 

Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States, 
1955-1957,  Volume  XI,  United  Na- 
tions and  General  International 
Matters,  released,  Dec.  61 

Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States, 
1952-1951,,  Volume  XII,  Part  2,  Bur- 
ma. Indonesia,  Philippines,  Thai- 
land, released,  Jan.  64 

Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States, 
19Gl-196.i,  Volume  I,  Vietnam.  19IH, 
released,  Apr.  90 

Principal  Officers  of  the  Department  of 
State  and  United  States  Chiefs  of 
Mission,  1TT8-1988,  released,  Dec. 
62 

SUN:  Jan.  63,  Mar.  86 


Q 

ar,  treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar  84, 
Oct.  8.3,  Nov.  49 


R 

lar,  Italian  MRCS-40:3  radar,  U.S.  inter- 
face, installation  and  maintenance,  bi- 
lateral agreement  with  Italy,  Dec.  59 
igan,  Ronald  {see  also  Proclamations  by 

the  President): 
Lddresses,  remarks,  and  statements: 
Afghanistan: 
Geneva  agreements  on  Soviet  with- 
drawal, June  54,  .55 
Meeting  with  resistance  leaders,  Jan. 

43 
Soviet  occupation,  Jan.  43,  Mar  25, 
80,  July  2,  Nov.  4 
American  ideals,  Aug.  15,  Nov.  8 
Arab-Israeli  conflict,  peace  process, 

May  9,  10 
Arms  control  and  disarmament,  Feb. 

19,  Apr  12,  57,  Nov.  4 
Association  of  South  East  Asian  Nations 

(ASEAN),  Apr  24 
Berlin  Wall,  27th  anniversary,  Oct.  50 
Brazil,  trade  sanctions,  Jan.  60 
Canada,  free  trade  negotiations,  Jan.  2, 

Mar  57,  Dec.  22 
China,  trade,  Sept.  17 
Cuban  independence  day,  Aug.  91 
Czechoslovakia,  20th  anniversary  of 

Warsaw  Pact  invasion,  Nov.  31 
Defense  and  national  security,  Feb.  19, 

20,  May  U 

Strategic  Defense  Initiative,  Mar  26, 
June  22,  Aug.  33 


Reagan,  Ronald 

Addresses,  remarks  and  stat€))icnts 
(ConVd) 
Democracy  and  democratic  principles, 

Feb.  19,  Apr  32,  Aug.  17 
Disarmament  conference,  Vienna,  re- 
convenes, Apr  51 
Economic  summits,  Aug.  53 
Economy,  world,  Apr  9 
El  Salvador,  democratic  progress,  Apr. 

32 
Environmental  problems,  Montreal  pro- 
tocol on  ozone  layer,  June  30 
Ethiopia,  famine,  July  2 
EURATOM,  cooperation,  June  51 
Fiji,  political  problems,  Apr  25 
Finland,  year  of  friendship  with  U.S., 

Aug.  "2 
Foreign  policy,  Feb.  20,  Nov.  9 
Foreign  relations  authorization  act  sign- 
ing. Mar.  70 
Freedom,  Feb.  20,  Mar  25,  Apr  35, 

Aug.  4,  17,  39,  Nov.  7 
Germany,  cultural  relations,  May  46 
Helsinki  Final  Act,  Mar  54,  Aug.  2,  5, 

7,  Oct.  .57 
Human  rights,  July  3,  4,  Aug.  10,  11,  35, 

Nov.  3 
Hungary,  trade  issues,  Sept.  17 
Iran  arms  and  contra  aid  controversy. 

May  10 
Iraqi  pipeline,  Jan.  10 
Japan,  trade  issues,  Jan.  29,  Apr  24 
Korea,  regional  stability,  Apr.  24 
Latin  America,  Apr  19,  May  9 
Lebanon,  American  hostages  in.  May  9, 

12 
Mexico,  U.S.  relations.  May  8 
Nicaragua,  Jan.  1,  Mar  25,  Apr  32,  May 
8 
Contra  aid,  Apr.  33,  May  9,  11,  July  3, 
Aug.  78,  Oct.  1,  Nov.  4 
North  Atlantic  Council,  May  1,  4 
North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization 

(NATO),  May  44  " 
Northern  Ireland,  reconciliation,  June 

32 
Palestine  Liberation  Organization 

(PLO),  Mar  70,  May  10 
Panama,  May  11,  71 
Persian  Gulf,  Jan.  1,  2,  June  36 
Philippines,  Jan.  1,  July  34  (quoted) 
Presidency,  view  of,  Jan.  2,  Feb.  19, 

Mar  70,  Aug.  33 
South  Africa,  oppression.  May  10 
Soviet  Union: 
Dissidents,  Aug.  11,  33 
Human  rights,  July  3,  4,  Aug.  10,  11, 

35 
Intermediate-range  nuclear  forces 

(INF)  negotiations,  Jan.  2,  Feb.  3 
Intermediate-range  nuclear  forces 
(INF)  treaty,  Feb.  4,  18,  19,  Mar 
25,  Aug.  6,  25,  68 
Nuclear  and  space  arms  talks  (NST), 

Mar  50,  Sept.  7 
Nuclear  testing  negotiations,  Jan.  23 
Strategic  arms  reduction  talks 

(START),  Feb.  20,  Mar  25,  Aug. 
32,  35,  Sept.  7 
Summit,  Moscow,  July  5,  Aug.  1,  9, 

13,  21,  36,  38,  40 
Summit,  Washington,  D.C.,  Feb.  1,  4, 
6,  16,  18 


Reagan,  Ronald 
Addresses,  remarks,  and  statements 
(Cont'd) 

Trade  relations.  May  10 
U.S.  arms  control  negotiations,  Nov.  4 
U.S.  relations,  Jan.  2,  Feb.  7,  July  L 
Aug.  32,  Nov.  2 
State  of  the  Union,  Mar  25 
Thailand,  U.S.  support,  Apr  25 
Trade,  free,  Jan.  2,  60,  Mar  25,  Dec.  20 
United  Kingdom,  U.S.  relations,  Aug. 

37 
United  Nations,  Nov.  1,  6 
Vietnam,  U.S.  relations,  Apr.  25 
War  Powers  Act,  Jan.  2 
World  Affairs  Council,  July  1 
World  peace,  Feb.  2,  5,  Apr  35,  Nov.  1 
Addresses  to  the  nation,  Feb.  18,  Apr  32, 

Oct.  1 
Correspondence  and  messages,  U.S.- 
Philippines military  bases  agree- 
ment, Dec.  27 
Meetings  with  heads  of  state  and  officials 
of,  remarks  and  joint  communiques: 
Canada,  July  21;  Dominican  Republic, 
June  64;  Egypt,  Apr  72;  El  Sal- 
vador, Jan.  58;  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany,  May  44,  46;  Hungary, 
Dec.  36;  Iceland,  Oct.  49;  India, 
Jan.  41;  Israel,  Mar  72,  June  39, 
Aug.  83;  Italy,  Mar.  69,  Sept.  29;  Ja- 
pan, Apr  61;  Kuwait,  Oct.  60;  Por- 
tugal, May  47;  Soviet  Union,  Feb.  1; 
Turkey,  Sept.  31;  Zambia,  .Jan.  19 
Messages  and  reports  to  Congress: 
Convention  against  torture  and  other 
cruel,  inhuman  or  degrading  treat- 
ment or  punishment,  Aug.  79 
Cyprus,  reports  on,  Feb.  86,  Apr.  69, 
June  32,  Aug.  76,  Oct.  50,  Dec.  37 
International  economic  policy,  Apr.  9 
National  power,  Apr.  6 
National  security  strategy,  Apr  1 
Africa,  Apr  25 

Congressional  role  and  bipartisan  co- 
operation, Apr  30 
East  Asia  and  the  Pacific,  Apr.  24 
Foreign  assistance  programs,  Apr.  28 
Low  intensity  conflict,  Apr  27 
Middle  East  and  South  Asia,  Apr.  22 
Objectives,  Apr  4 
Soviet  Union  and  Eastern  Europe, 

Apr  20 
U.S.  defense  policy,  Apr.  11 
U.S.  diplomatic  policy,  Apr  8 
U.S.  intelligence  policy,  Apr  18 
U.S.  space  policy,  Apr  18 
Western  Europe  and  NATO,  Apr  21 
Western  Hemisphere,  Apr.  19 
Nuclear  cooperation  with  EURATOM, 

June  51 
Panama,  national  emergency,  Dec.  57 
Persian  Gulf,  U.S.  attack  on  Iranian 

military  platforms,  June  36 
Science  and  technology,  international 

activities,  June  53 
Soviet  noncompliance  with  arms  control 

agreements.  Mar.  51,  55 
Trade  with  Hungary  and  China,  Sept. 

17 
U.S. -Japan  nuclear  cooperation  agree- 
ment, Jan.  28 
U.S.S.  Vincennes  and  Iranian  airbus 
tragedy,  Sept.  38 
News  conferences,  Jan.  1,  May  9,  Aug.  31 


13 


Reagan.  Ronald  (Cont'd) 
Toronto  economic  summit,  participation, 

Aug.  47 
Vi.sit.s  to; 
Finland,  Aug.  2 
Mexico,  iVIay  6 
Soviet  Union,  Aug.  1,  9,  21 
United  Kingdom,  Aug.  36 
Refugees: 
Afghan:  Moore,  Mar.  78;  Shultz,  Nov,  14; 

Williamson,  Sept.  58 
African:  Moore,  Mar.  78,  Nov.  40;  Shultz, 

Nov.  14,  16 
Latin  American  and  Caribbean  (Shultz), 

Nov.  14,  16 
Palestinian  (Shultz),  Nov.  1.5 
Southeast  Asian:  Brown,  May  37;  Funseth, 
Mav  58;  Lambertson,  Oct.  43;  Moore, 
Mar.  78;  Shultz,  Oct.  21,  Nov.  13,  16 
UN  assistance  (Williamson),  Dec.  54 
U.S.  admissions,  FY  89,  proposed 

(Shultz),  Nov.  12,  15 
Vietnamese  political  prisoners  (Fun.seth), 

May  .58,  60 
Worldwide,  and  U.S.  foreign  policy 
(Moore).  Mar.  77,  79 
Refugees,  status  of,  protocol  (1967),  Malawi, 

Feb.  91 
Rehabilitation  assistance,  grant  agreement 

with  Sri  Lanka,  Oct.  85 
Renunciation  of  war  as  an  instrument  of  na- 
tional policy,  treaty  (1928),  Dominica, 
Sept.  84 
Ridgway,  Rozanne  L.,  .July  50,  Sept.  23 
Romania: 
Human  rights  (Whitehead),  May  55 
Most-favored-nation  status  (Department), 

May  43 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  May  81,  .June 
69,  Sept.  85 
Rownv,  Edward  L.,  .Jan.  20,  May  24,  Sept. 

26 
Rubber,  international  natural  rubber  agree- 
ment (1987):  Belgium,  Feb.  91;  China. 
Mar.  84;  Denmark,  European  Economic 
Community  (EEC),  Feb.  91;  Finland, 
June  68;  France,  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany,  Greece,  Feb.  91;  Indonesia, 
Jan.  61;  Ireland,  Italy,  Feb.  91;  .Japan, 
Feb.  91,  Aug.  92;  Luxembourg,  Feb.  91; 
Netherlands,  Jan.  61;  Norway,  June  68; 
Portugal,  Spain,  Feb.  91;  Sweden,  June 
68;  Thailand,  Mar.  84;  U.K.,  Feb.  91 
Rwanda,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  61, 
Apr.  88,  Sept.  83,  84 


Saad  al-Abdallah  al-Salim  Al  Sabah,  Oct.  60 
St.  Christopher  and  Nevis,  treaties,  agree- 
ments, etc..  Mar.  84,  June  69 
St.  Lawrence  Seaway,  tolls,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Canada,  May  83,  Nov.  49 
San  Marino,  treaties,  agreements,  etc., 

July  76,  Aug.  92 
Satellites: 
China,  space  launch  services  (Depart- 
ment), Nov.  27 
INMARSAT,  convention  and  operating 
agreement  (1976):  Colombia,  Israel, 


Satellites  (ConVd) 

Mar.  84;  Nigeria,  May  82;  Panama, 
Peru,  Qatar,  Mar.  84' 
Amendments  (1985):  Australia,  Bulgar- 
ia, Byelorussian  S.S.R.,  Canada, 
China,  Denmark,  Finland,  July  76; 
Greece,  Nov.  49;  Kuwait,  Nether- 
lands, Norway,  Philippines,  Poland, 
Portugal,  Saudi  Arabia,  July  76; 
Spain,  Nov.  49;  Soviet  Union,  Sri 
Lanka,  Sweden,  Ukrainian  S.S.R., 
U.K..  U.S.,  July  76 

INTELSTAT,  agreement  and  operating 
agreement,  Swaziland,  July  76 

International  COSPAS-SARSAT  pro- 
gram: Canada,  France,  Soviet  Union, 
U.S.,  Oct.  84 
Saudi  Arabia: 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  91,  92, 
May  81,  July  76,  Sept.  76,  83,  Dec.  58 

U.S.  arms  sales  proposed  (White  House), 
Jan.  41 

Visit  of  Secretary  Shultz,  June  13 
Schifter,  Richard,  Jan.  39,  Apr.  70,  Nov.  ;33 
Science  and  technology: 

Advanced  materials  and  standards,  collab- 
oration on,  memo  of  understanding: 
Canada,  European  Communities, 
France,  Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
Italy,  Japan,  U.K.,  U.S.,  Feb.  92 

Agricultural  science  and  technology,  bilat- 
eral agreements:  France,  May  83; 
Philippines,  May  84 

Agriculture,  health,  earth  resources,  and 
geologic  phenomena,  cooperation,  bi- 
lateral agreement  with  Venezuela, 
Nov.  .50 

Basic  sciences,  cooperation,  bilateral 

agreements:  Czechoslovakia,  Sept.  84, 
Poland,  Sept.  85 

Commercial,  economic,  and  technical  co- 
operation, bilateral  agreement  with 
Iraq,  Jan.  62 

Continental  crust,  scientific  drilling,  bi- 
lateral agreement  with  Federal  Re- 
public of  Germany,  Sept.  84 

Cooperation  and  development,  bilateral 
agreements:  Egypt,  June  68;  Italy, 
June  69;  .Japan,  Apr.  88,  Aug.  55;  Ko- 
rea, Feb.  92,  Mar.  84,  Aug.  93 

Cooperative  research  activities  (U.S.- 
Soviet joint  statement),  Aug.  30 

Coordinating  Committee  on  Multilateral 
Export  Controls  (COCOM):  Shultz, 
Apr.  46;  Wendt,  Mar.  63,  64,  Oct.  46 

Danish-American  fund  for  exchange  of 
technology,  bilateral  agreements,  Jan. 
62,  Mar.  85,  Aug.  92 

Deep  seabed  mining  areas,  bilateral 

agreement  with  Netherlands,  Dec.  59 

Defense-related  technologies,  transfer  of, 
bilateral  agreement  with -Japan,  Mar. 
85 

Earth  sciences,  cooperation,  bilateral 
agreements:  Hungary,  United  Arab 
Emirates,  May  84 

Geologic  sciences,  cooperation,  bilateral 
agreement  with  Norway,  May  84 

Global  telemetered  seismograph  network, 
scientific  and  technical  cooperation, 
bilateral  agreement  with  Argentina, 
May  83 

Information  technology  (Shultz),  Dec.  13 

International  activities  (Reagan),  June  53 


.Joint  Loran-C  and  Chayka  radio  naviga- 
tion systems,  bilateral  agreement 
with  Soviet  Union,  Aug.  44,  93 
Mapping,  charting,  and  geodesy,  bilateral 

agreement  with  Honduras,  Jan.  62 
Meteorological  observation  program,  bi- 
lateral agreement  with  Mexico,  Julv 
77 
Natural  gas  hydrates  research  and  devel- 
opment, bilateral  agreement  with 
Canada,  Apr.  85 
Rural  electrification  project,  bilateral 

agreement  with  Philippines,  Dec.  59 
Seismic  data  acquisition  system,  bilateral 
agreement  with  South  Africa,  Apr.  ss 
Strategic  technology  export  controls 

(Wendt),  Mar.  6.3,  64 
Teehnologv  transfer  issues  (Wendt),  Oct. 

46 
World  climate  program  (Smith),  June  52 
World  oceans  agreement  between  U.S. 
and  U.S.S.R.  (Shultz),  Feb.  10 
Seabeds: 
Deep  seabed  matters,  provisional  under- 
standing with  Netherlands,  Aug.  92 
Deep  seabed  mining  areas,  bilateral 

agreement  with  Netherlands,  Dec.  59 
Seabed  disarmament  treaty  (1971),  Brazil, 
July  76 
Security  assistance,  U.S.  (see  also  Defense 
and  national  security): 
Appropriations  request,  FY  89:  Shultz, 
May  15;  Whitehead,  Sept.  53 
East  Asia  and  the  Pacific  (Sigur),  Julv 

33 
Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean 

(Abrams),  Oct.  72 
Middle  Ea.st  and  North  Africa  (Mur- 
phy). June  40 
Bilateral  U.S. -Israeli  consultative  groups. 

White  House,  June  39 
Defense  technological  and  industrial  coop- 
eration, bilateral  agreement  with  Ko- 
rea, Sept.  85 
International  military  education  and 
training  program  (IMET),  bilateral 
agreements:  Cape  Verde,  Mar.  84; 
Mexico,  Feb.  92,  Mar.  85 
Patent  rights  and  technical  information 
for  purposes  of  defense,  bilateral 
agreement  with  Japan,  Sept.  85 
Senegal,  treaties,  agreements,  etc..  May  81, 

June  69,  July  76,  Oct.  85,  Dec.  59 
Seychelles,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Sept. 

83,  Dec.  58 
Shamir,  Yitzhak,  June  39 
Shane,  Jeffrev  N.,  June  27 
Shevardnadze,  Eduard  A.,  Feb.  10,  11 

Visit  to  U.S.  (joint  statement).  May  42 
Shultz,  George  P.: 
Addresses,  remarks,  and  statements: 
Afghanistan.  May  13,  Dec.  20 
Geneva  agreements  on  Soviet  with- 
drawal, June  54,  55 
Africa,  July  10,  Dec.  20 
Anti-Americanism,  Oct.  33 
Arab-Israeli  conflict  (for  details  see 
."^rab-Israeli  conflict): 
Palestinian  issues.  May  56,  57,  June 

11,  Sept.  1,  Nov.  1.5 
Peace  process,  June  2,  4,  7,  9,  15,  July 
9,  Sept.  47,  48,  49 
Argentina,  Oct.  5 


Department  of  State  Bulletin  Index  198E 


dtz,  George  P.  (Cont'd) 
ddresses,  rernarkx.  and  statcDiciifs 

(Cont'd) 
Arms  control  and  disarmament.  Aug. 

84 
Arms  proliferation,  Sept.  3 
Asia.  East.  May  14.  July  10 
Asia.  South,  peace  and  prosperity.  Dec. 

19 
Asia.  Southeast.  Oct.  21.  Oct.  26 
Asia-Pacific  region.  U.S.  policy,  Oct.  34 
Association  of  South  East  Asian  Nations 

(ASEAN).  Apr.  .52,  ,54,  Oct.  21.  25, 

27 
Bolivia,  drug  trafficking,  Oct.  19 
Brazil.  Oct.  13 
Cambodia,  political  settlement.  Apr.  46, 

Oct.  21 
Caribbean  Basin,  economic  assistance, 

Jan.  15 
Central  America,  May  13,  July  10,  Aug. 

56,  Sept.  3 
Arias  peace  plan.  Oct.  20 
Economics  and  democratic  reforms. 

Sept.  76,  Oct.  3 
Guatemala  City  accords.  Jan.  16 
U.S.  aid.  Oct.  3 
Change  and  international  stability,  Jan. 

3.  Apr.  38 
Chemical  weapons.  Aug.  86 
China,  world  trade,  Oct.  30 
Colombia,  narcotic  drugs,  Oct.  17 
Costa  Rica,  Sept.  80,  81 
Defense  and  national  security.  Strategic 

Defense  Initiative,  Aug.  57 
Democracy,  Jan.  5 
Developing  nations,  debt  problems,  Dec. 

18 
Diplomatic  security,  July  12 
Drugs,  narcotic,  problems  and  control 

efforts.  May  17,  Oct.  16,  Dec.  14,  20 
East-West  relations,  Jan.  6,  May  12,  July 

8,  Aug.  85 
Economy,  domestic,  deficits,  Dec.  18 
Economy,  world.  May  14,  June  18,  Oct. 

26,  Dec.  16,  19 
El  Salvador,  democratic  progress.  Sept. 

78 
Ethiopia,  July  10 
Foreign  affairs  budget,  FY  88,  Apr.  47, 

May  14,  16 
Foreign  affairs  budget  request,  FY  89, 

May  12 
Foreign  policy,  Apr.  43,  July  8 
Haiti,  Jan.  7.  8 

Honduras.  May  21,  Sept.  79,  80,  Oct.  3 
Humanitarian  aid,  May  16 
Interdependence  of  modern  world,  Oct. 

8.  25,  Nov.  13,  16,  Dec.  13 
Iran,  Jan.  12.  Apr.  37,  Sept.  1 
Iran-Iraq  war,  Apr.  46 
Israel,  U.S.  visit  of  Foreign  Minister 

Peres,  July  60 
Japan,  trade  relations,  Oct.  33 
King.  Dr.  Martin  Luther.  Jr..  Nov.  17 
Korea,  Apr.  38.  Oct.  30 
Kuwait,  arms  sales,  Sept.  2 
Latin  America  (/or  details  see  Latin 

America): 
U.S.  policy,  Jan.  15,  Oct.  2,  Dec.  13 
Visits  to,  Sept.  76,  82,  Oct.  2 
Libya,  terrorism,  Apr.  37 
Marshall  Islands,  visit  to,  Oct.  34 
Middle  East,  May  13,  May  23,  Nov.  10 
Military  procurement.  Aug.  56 


Shiiltz,  George  P.  (Cont'd) 
Addresses,  remarks,  and  stat('))ie>its 
(Cont'd) 
Nicaragua,  May  14,  22,  74.  Oct.  7 
co)itra  aid.  Apr.  48 
Democratic  progress,  Apr.  44,  Oct.  3 
Guatemala  City  accords,  Jan.  16,  17 
Peace  process,  Sept.  77 
North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization 
(NATO),  consultations  on  INF  nego- 
tiations, Jan.  13 
Nuclear-free  zones.  Oct.  36 
Nuclear  nonproliferation,  Aug.  87.  Dec. 

20 
Organization  of  American  States  (OAS), 

Jan.  15 
Pacific  Community  Forum,  Oct.  25 
Pakistan,  Zia  funeral,  Oct.  69 
Panama.  May  13,  21,  71,  July  15,  Aug, 

57,  88 
Persian  Gulf,  May  14,  July  10 
Peru,  narcotics,  Oct.  18 
Philippines,  Aug.  58,  Oct.  28,  Dec.  26 
Refugees.  Oct.  21,  Nov.  12 
Regional  cooperation,  Jan.  6 
South  Africa,  Mar.  30,  May  14,  July  10, 

Dec.  21 
South  Asian  Association  for  Regional 

Cooperation  (SAARC),  Dec.  19 
Soviet  Union  (for  details  see  Soviet 
LInion): 
ABM  treaty.  Aug.  57,  Nov.  30 
Intermediate-range  nuclear  forces 
(INF)  treaty,  Jan.  9,  13,  14,  Feb. 
8,10 
Background,  Mar.  31 
NATO  and  national  securitv.  May. 

18.  July  6 
Verification  issues,  July  7 
Strategic  arms  reduction  talks 

(START),  .Jan.  9,  12,  Mar.  40,  Apr. 
50,  Aug.  19,  Nov.  32 
Summit,  Moscow,  July  14 
Summit,  Washington.  .Jan.  10 
U.S.  relations,  Jan.  7,  Feb,  8.  10.  Apr. 
38,  July  9 
Strategic  export  controls,  Apr.  46 
Technological  revolution  and  global 
economy,  Oct.  8,  23,  25,  Dec.  13 
Terrorism  and  counterterrorism.  Apr. 

35,  May  17,  Aug.  56 
Thailand,  Apr.  47 

Trade,  free,  Jan.  5,  June  21,  Oct.  10,  23 
Uruguay,  democratic  progress,  Oct.  12 
Attack  on.  in  Bolivia,  Oct.  20 
News  conferences  and  press  briefings, 
Jan.,  9,  13,  June  4,  7,  15,  Aug.  88,  Oct. 
2.  5,  12,  Nov.  30 
TV  interviews,  Jan.  7,  Apr.  48,  May  21, 

June  2,  9,  July  14,  Aug.  19,  56,  Sept.  1 
Visits  to: 
East  Asia  and  Pacific,  Oct.  21 
Latin  America  (Shultz),  Sept.  76,  82, 

Oct.  2 
Middle  East  (Shultz),  May  56,  June  1 
Saudi  Arabia  (Shultz),  June  13 
Soviet  Union  (Shultz),  May  42,  Aug.  19 
Sierra  Leone,  treaties,  agreements,  etc., 
Jan.  63,  July  76,  Sept.  85,  Oct.  85,  Dec. 
59 
Sigur.  Gaston  J..  Jr.,  Mar.  58,  May  31.  July 

32 
Singapore:  Lambertson,  Nov.  25;  White 
House,  Apr.  65 


Singapore  (Cont'd) 

Economic  development  (Wallis),  June  24 
Profile,  Nov.  26 

Trade  issues:  ASEAN-U.S.  joint  state- 
ment, Apr.  55;  Yeo,  Apr.  53 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  June  69,  Sept. 

83,  Oct.  85 
U.S.  aid,  FY  89,  request  (Sigur),  July  37 
Skoug,  Kenneth  N.,  Jr.,  May  76,  Sept.  73 
Smith,  Richard  J.,  June  52 
Social  security,  bilateral  agreements: 

France,  July  77;  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany,  Apr.  88;  Netherlands,  Mar. 
85;  Portugal,  June  69;  Spain,  Apr.  88; 
Switzerland,  Aug.  93 
Sofaer,  Abraham,  Oct.  58.  Nov.  36 
Solomon.  Richard  H.,  May  33 
Solomon  Islands: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  61,  Sept. 

83 
U.S.  aid,  FY  89,  request  (Sigur),  July  38 
Somalia,  treaties,  agreements,  etc..  May  84, 

Aug,  92,  Oct.  85 
South  Africa  (Toronto  economic  summit), 
Aug.  49 
Angola,  involvement  in:  Crocker,  joint 

statement.  White  House,  Nov.  18.  19 
Apartheid:  Freeman.  Mar.  26;  Reagan. 
Mar.  26  (quoted).  May  10 
U.S.  Anti-Apartheid  Act  of  1986 
(Whitehead),  Aug.  58 
Economy,  sanctions  and  disinvestment: 
Freeman,  Mar.  28;  Whitehead.  Aug. 
58 
Prohibition  of  foreign  funds  (Department), 

May  23 
Release  of  political  prisoners  (Depart- 
ment), .Jan.  20 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Apr.  88,  May 

82,  Dec.  58 
U.S.  policy  and  objectives:  Freeman.  Mar. 
29;  Shultz,  Mar.  30  (quoted).  May  14, 
July  10,  Dec.  21;  Whitehead.  Aug.  62 
South  Asian  Association  for  Regional  Coop- 
eration (SAARC)  (Shultz),  Dec.  19 
Soviet  Union  (see  also  Afghanistan:  Soviet 
occupation  and  withdrawal): 
ABM  treaty:  Nitze,  Feb.  83;  Shultz,  Aug. 
57,  Nov.  30;  U.S.-Soviet  joint  state- 
ment Feb.  14 
Soviet  noncompliance:  Reagan,  Mar.  52, 

55;  Shultz,  Mar.  39 
Third  5-year  review  session  (White 

House),  Oct.  40,  Nov.  19 
U.S.  arms  control  initiatives.  May  27, 
July  17 
Afghanistan  settlement  agreement,  June 

56,69 
Arms  control  agreements:  Shultz,  Apr.  44; 

U.S.-Soviet  joint  statement,  Feb.  13 
Ballistic  missile  launch  notifications 
(U.S.-Soviet  joint  statement),  Aug. 
27,  Aug.  93 
Chemical,  biological,  and  toxin  weapons 
program,  noncom.pliance  (Reagan), 
Mar.  53,  56 
Chemical  weapons  convention  proposed 

(U.S.-Soviet  joint  statement),  Feb.  15 
De)nokratizatsii/a  (Schifter),  Jan.  40 
Environmental  issues  (U.S.-Soviet  joint 

statment),  Feb.  16 
Glasnost:  Schifter,  Jan.  39;  Whitehead, 

Sept.  33 
"Hot  Line,"  25th  anniversary  (White 
House),  Nov.  20 


15 


Soviet  Union  (Cont'd) 
Human  rights:  Reagan,  July  3,  4,  Aug.  10, 

11,  35;  Shultz,  Nov.  32;  U.S.-Soviet 
joint  statement,  Feb.  15 

Intermediate-range  nuclear  forces  (INF) 
negotiations:  Department,  Jan.  24; 
Reagan,  Jan.  2;  Rowny,  Jan.  20 
Background:  Kampelman,  Mar.  41; 

Shultz,  Mar.  31,  34,  Apr.  45 
"Double  global  zero,"  (Department), 

Jan.  26 
NATO  role:  Glitman,  Mar.  44;  Kempel- 

man,  Mar.  42;  Shultz,  Mar.  32 
Verification  issues:  Glitman,  Mar.  46; 
Reagan,  Feb.  3;  Rowny,  Jan.  22; 
Shultz,  Jan.  8,  11,  14 
Intermediate-range  nuclear  forces  (INF) 
treaty  (see  also  Treaties,  agreements, 
etc.:  INF  treaty):  Armacost,  Nov.  41; 
Department  (GIST),  Feb.  84;  Nitze, 
Feb.  81;  Reagan,  Feb.  4,  18,  19,  Mar. 
25,  Aug.  6,  25;  Shevardnadze,  Feb.  10; 
Shultz,  Jan.  9,  13,  14,  Feb.  8,  10,  Mar. 
31;  U.S.-Soviet  joint  statement,  Feb. 

12,  13,  Aug.  27 

Compliance  issues  (Shultz),  Mar.  38 
Entry  into  force,  Aug.  68 
Exchange  of  treaty  documents:  Gor- 
bachev, Aug.  23;  Reagan,  Aug.  25 
Inspections,  multilateral  agreement, 

U.S.,  Aug.  92 
Inspections  on  the  territory  of  the 
Czechoslovak  S.S.R.,  bilateral 
agreement  with  Czechoslovakia, 
Sept.  84 
Inspections  on  the  territory  of  the  Ger- 
man Democratic  Republic,  bilateral 
agreement  with  German  Demo- 
cratic Republic,  Sept.  84 
NATO  support:  NATO,  Jan.  38,  July  53; 

Shultz,  Jan.  14,  Mar.  32,  May  18 
Ratification:  Glitman,  Mar.  43;  Kampel- 
man, Mar.  41;  Reagan.  Aug.  6 
Signature:  Gorbachev,  Feb.  4,  5;  Rea- 
gan, Feb.  3 
Text,  Feb.  22 

Transmitted  to  Senate,  Apr.  89 
U.S.  arms  control  initiatives.  May  26, 

July  16 
Verification  procedures:  Glitman.  Mar. 
48;  Shultz,  Mar.  37,  July  7 
Noncompliance  with  arms  control  agree- 
ments (Reagan),  Mar.  51,  55 
Nuclear  and  space  talks:  joint  statement, 
Aug.  26;  Kampelman,  Mar.  50,  Sept. 
6;  Reagan,  Mar.  50,  Sept.  7;  White 
House,  Mar.  45 
Nuclear  energy,  peaceful  uses  (U.S.- 
Soviet joint  statement),  Feb.  16 
Nuclear  nonproliferation  (U.S.  arms  con- 
trol initiatives),  Jan.  26 
Treaty  (1968)  (U.S.-Soviet  joint  state- 
ment), Feb.  14 
Nuclear  risk  reduction  centers  (U.S.- 
Soviet joint  statements),  Feb.  15, 
Aug.  28 
U.S.  arms  control  initiatives,  Jan.  26, 
May  28,  July  18 
Nuclear  testing,  joint  verification  experi- 
ment, agreement:  Aug.  93;  U.S.- 
Soviet joint  .statement,  Feb.  11,  Aug. 
27;  White  House,  Oct.  39,  Nov.  20 
Text,  Aug.  67 


16 


Soviet  Union  (Cont'd) 

Nuclear  testing  talks:  Reagan,  U.S.,  Jan. 
23;  U.S.  arms  control  initiatives,  Jan. 
26;  White  House,  Apr.  50,  Sept.  7, 
Oct.  39 

Perestroika  (Gorbachev),  Feb.  6,  7 

Regional  issues:  Armacost,  Sept.  18;  U.S.- 
Soviet joint  statements,  Feb.  15,  Aug. 
29 

Soviet  delegation  tours  U.S.  chemical  mu- 
nitions destruction  facility  (Depart- 
ment), Jan.  22 

Strategic  arms  reduction  talks  (START): 
Department.  Jan.  24;  Kempelman, 
Mar.  .50,  Sept.  6;  Nitze,  Feb.  82; 
Shultz,  Jan.  9,  12,  Mar.  40,  Apr.  50, 
Aug.  19;  Reagan,  Feb.  20,  Mar.  25, 
Aug.  32,  35,  Sept.  7;  U.S.-Soviet  joint 
statement,  Feb.  13;  Whitehead,  Sept. 
34 
Soviet  linkage  to  SDI  (Rowny),  Jan.  21 
U.S.  arms  control  initiatives,  May  27, 
July  17 

Summit,  Moscow:  Gorbachev,  Aug.  8,  12, 
22,  35;  Reagan,  July  5,  Aug.  1,  9,  13, 
21,  36,  38,  40;  Shultz,  July  14;  U.S.- 
Soviet joint  statement,  Aug.  25 

Summit,  Washington,  D.C.:  Gorbachev, 
Feb.  2,  4,  5,  7,  9,  17;  Reagan,  Feb.  1, 
4,  6,  16,  18;  Shultz,  Feb.  8,  10;  U.S.- 
Soviet joint  statement,  Feb.  12 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.  (see  also 
names  of  treaties  under  Soviet 
Union),  Feb.  91,  92,  93,  Mar.  85,  Apr. 
87,  89,  May  81,  82,  84,  June  69,  July 
76,  Aug.  92,  Sept.  85,  Oct.  83,  84, 
Nov.  50 

U.S.  arms  control  negotiations  (see  also 
Chemical  weapons  and  ABM  treaty, 
INF  treaty  and  START  under  Soviet 
Union):  Reagan,  Nov.  4;  Shultz,  Nov. 
32 
Chronology,  Jan.  25,  July  19 

U.S.  national  security  strategy  (Reagan), 
Apr.  20 

U.S.  relations:  Gorbachev,  Feb.  7;  Nitze, 
Feb.  84;  Reagan,  Jan.  2,  Feb.  7,  July 
1,  Aug.  32,  Nov.  2;  Ridgway,  Sept.  23; 
Rowny,  Sept.  26;  Shultz,  Jan.  7,  Feb. 
8,  10,  Apr.  38;  U.S.-Soviet  joint  state- 
ment, Feb.  15 
Goals  and  objectives  (Shultz),  Apr.  41 
Program  of  cooperation  and  exchanges, 

bilateral  agreement,  Nov.  50 
U.S.  arms  control  talks,  chronology, 
May  29 

U.S.-Soviet  meeting  on  fisheries  issues 
(joint  statement),  Apr.  68 

U.S.  visit  of  Foreign  Minister  Shev- 
ardnadze (joint  statement),  May  42, 
Nov.  28 

Visit  of  President  Reagan:  Gorbachev, 
Aug.  8;  Reagan,  Aug.  1,  9,  21 

Visits  of  Secretary  Shultz:  joint  state- 
ment, May  42;  Shultz,  Aug.  19 
Space: 

Exploration  and  use  of  outer  space  (1967), 
Afghanistan,  May  82 

Exploration  and  use  of  outer  space  for 
peaceful  purposes,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Soviet  Union,  Aug.  43,  92 

International  cooperation  (Michaud),  Mar. 
79 

International  liability  for  damage  caused 
by  space  objects  (1972),  European 


Space  (Cont'd) 

Telecommunications  Satellite  Organi- 
zation (EUTELSAT),  Mar.  84 
Space  shuttle  emergency  landing  site,  bi- 
lateral agreements:  Gambia,  May  s:^; 
Senegal,  Dec.  59 
Space  station,  permanently  manned,  cm. it- 
eration in  design,  development,  opir;i- 
tion  and  utilization:  Belgium,  Canada, 
Denmark,  European  Space  Agency 
(ESA),  France,  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany,  Italy,  Japan,  Netherlands, 
Norway,"  Spaiii,  U.K..  U.S.,  Nov.  49 
Space  station  intergovernmental  agree- 
ment: Belgium,  Canada,  Denmark, 
France,  Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
Italy,  Netherlands,  Norway,  Spain, 
U.K.,  U.S.,  Nov.  49 
Space  vehicle  tracking  and  communicatidii 
facility,  bilateral  agreement  with 
Senegal,  June  69 
U.S.  civil  space  program  (Michaud),  Mai'. 

79 
U.S.  policy  (Reagan),  Apr.  18 
Spain,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  61, 
63,  Feb.  92,  Mar.  69,  85,  Apr.  88,  Mav 
82,  June  69,  July  76,  Oct.  83,  Nov.  49 
Spiers,  Ronald  I.,  July  28,  Nov.  21 
Sri  Lanka,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Mai-. 

84,  85,  May  84,  July  76,  Aug.  93,  Sept. 

85,  Oct.  85 
State  Department: 

Budgetary  concerns  (Spiers),  July  28 

Foreign  language  competence  (Spiers), 
Nov.  21 

Foreign  operations  budget,  FY  89,  re- 
quest (Shultz),  May  12 

Foreifin  Rvlaliinis  ,,ftlr  Un ilal  States, 
Sniipli'iiiiiit.  M,  ,}n,r,ni,l,i  ,,/  Cmiver- 
siitian  lit  til,'  Sn-retarij  (ij  Stiilr.  191,7- 
1952,  microfiche  publication,  released 
July  79 

Foreign  Service  management  (Spiers), 
July  29 
Sudan,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  63, 

May  84,  July  76,  77 
Sugar: 

Caribbean  Basin  trade  quotas  (Whitnev), 
June  67 

International  sugar  agreement  (1987):  Ar 
gentina.  May  82;  Barbados,  June  68; 
Belize,  May  82;  Brazil,  Sept.  84;  Cana 
da,  Congo,  Costa  Rica,  May  82;  Cuba 
May  82,  Aug.  92;  Dominican  Republic 
Ecuador,  El  Salvador,  May  82;  Euro- 
pean Economic  Community,  June  68; 
Finland,  May  82,  Oct.  84;  German 
Democratic  Republic,  May  82;  Gua- 
temala, June  68;  Honduras,  Hungary 
India,  May  82;  Japan,  June  68;  Korea, 
May  82;  Malawi,  May  82,  Aug.  92; 
Guatemala,  Nicaragua,  May  82;  Nor- 
way, June  68;  Pakistan,  May  82,  Sept 
84;  Panama,  Papua  New  Guinea, 
Peru,  Philippines,  Soviet  Union,  Ma^ 
82;  Swaziland,  June  68,  Aug.  92;  Tha 
land.  June  68,  Sept.  84;  Togo,  June  6i 
U.S.,  May  82;  Uruguay,  Sept.  84;  Zin 
babwe,  June  68 
Summit  meetings.  See  Soviet  Union:  Sum- 
mit, Moscow,  and  Summit,  Washing- 
ton, D.C. 
Supreme  Headquarters  Allied  Powers  Eu- 
rope (SHAPE),  support  of  the  allied 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/Index  198 


iprerne  Headquarters  Allied  Poivers  Eu- 
rope (Cont'd) 

tactical  operations  center  at  Sembach 
Air  Base,  Germany,  Mar.  85 

iriname,  American  convention  on  human 
rights  (1969),  Mar.  83 

iraziland,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  June 
68,  69,  July  76,  Aug.  92,  Sept.  83,  Oct. 
84 

reden,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  92, 
Mar.  85,  Mav  81,  82,  June  68,  July  76, 
77,  Aug.  92,  Sept.  83,  85,  Dec.  58 

ifitzerland,  treaties,  agreements,  etc., 
Jan.  63,  Feb.  91,  92,  Apr.  87,  May  81,  82, 
July  76,  Aug.  92,  93,  Oct.  83,  85,  Dec. 
58  " 

rian  Arab  Republic: 

Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  trafficking, 
control  efforts  (Wrobleski),  June  51 

State-supported  terrorism  (Bremer),  Jan. 
45,  June  62 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  July  76,  Oct. 
83 


keshita,  Norubu,  Apr.  62,  Aug.  47 
inzania,  international  express  mail,  bilat- 
eral agreement,  Apr.  88 
i.xes: 

Double  taxation: 
Avoidance  of,  and  prevention  of  fiscal 
evasion  with  respect  to  taxes  on  in- 
come, bilateral  agreements:  Bel- 
gium, Mar.  84,  May  83;  Indonesia, 
Sept.  84,  Oct.  84 
Mutual  exemption  from  the  taxation  of 
income  of  air  transport,  bilateral 
agreement  with  Singapore,  June  69, 
Oct.  85 
Relief  from,  on  earnings  derived  from 
operation  of  ships  and  aircraft,  bi- 
lateral agreements:  Argentina, 
Mar.  84;  Belgium,  June  68;  Bolivia, 
Feb.  92;  Colombia,  Jan.  62;  Cyprus, 
Oct.  84;  Finland,  Aug.  92;  Greece, 
Aug.  93;  Liberia,  May  84;  Vene- 
zuela, Mar.  85,  Oct.  85 
Relief  from,  on  income  derived  from  op- 
eration of  aircraft,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  El  Salvador,  Apr.  88 
Relief  from,  on  income  on  shipping  prof- 
its, bilateral  agreements:  China 
(termination),  July  77;  Panana, 
Aug.  93 
Exchange  of  information  with  respect  to 
taxes,  bilateral  agreement  with  Do- 
minica, July  77 
Income  and  property,  convention  (1967), 
protocol,  bilateral  agreement  with 
France,  Sept.  84,  Oct.  84 
elecommunications: 

Caribbean  Basin  radar  network,  bilateral 
agreement  with  Dominican  Republic, 
Dec.  59 
International  telecommunications  conven- 
tion (1982):  Bahamas,  Guinea,  May  83; 
Nepal,  July  76;  Nicaragua,  Aug.  92; 
Tonga,  May  83;  Vanuatu,  Aug.  92 
Land  mobile  service  along  the  common 
U.S. -Mexican  border,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Mexico,  Nov.  49 
Landsat  system,  bilateral  agreement  with 
Brazil,  Jan.  62 


Telecomrnun ications  (Cont'd) 
NATO  initial  voice  switched  network 
(IVSN)  and  the  U.S.  automatic  voice 
network  (AUTOVON),  interconnection 
memo  of  understanding  with  NATO, 
Jan.  62 
Radio  relay  station  in  Israel,  bilateral 

agreement.  May  84 
Radio  relay  station  of  USIA  (Voice  of 
America),  bilateral  agreement  with 
Grenada,  June  68 
Terrorism  and  counterterrorism;  Bremer, 
May  61;  Shultz,  Aug.  56;  Toronto  eco- 
nomic summit,  Aug.  48 
Afghanistan  (Bremer),  June  62 
Aviation  security:  Bremer,  Sept.  61; 

Shultz,  Apr."  37 
High  technology  (Bremer),  July  65 
Historical  perspective  (Bremer),  Jan.  47 
International  convention  against  taking  of 
hostages  (1979):  Bulgaria,  Cameroon, 
May  83;  Czechoslovakia,  Apr.  87;  Ec- 
uador, Oct.  84;  German  Democratic 
Republic,  July  76;  Ghana,  Jan.  61; 
Oman,  Oct.  84 
Iran:  Bremer,  Jan.  46,  50,  Sept.  61;  Shultz, 
Apr.  37 
Chronology,  Jan.  52 
Korea,  Democratic  People's  Republic  of: 
Bremer,  Sept.  61;  Clark,  May  65; 
McManaway,  May  64;  Shultz,  Apr.  38 
Libya:  Bremer,  Jan.  45;  Department,  Jan. 

'  48;  Shultz,  Apr.  37 
Maritime  security  treaty  (Department), 

May  62 
Prevention  and  punishment  of  crimes 

against  internationally  protected  per- 
sons, including  diplomatic  agents, 
convention  (1973):  China,  Oct.  84; 
Oman,  May  83;  Syrian  Arab  Republic, 
July  76 
Shultz,  attack  on,  in  Bolivia  (White 

House),  Oct.  20 
State-supported  (Bremer),  Jan.  45 
Syria  (Bremer),  Jan.  45,  48 
U.S.  antiterrorism  assistance  program 

(Bremer),  June  61 
U.S.  counterterrorism  policy:  Bremer, 
Jan.  44,  47,  May  63,  June  63,  July  62, 
65,  Sept.  59;  Shultz,  Apr.  35 
Appropriations:  Department,  Sept.  60; 

Shultz,  May  17 
Proposed  legislation  (Bremer),  Jan.  46 
Western  counterterrorist  strategy 
(Bremer),  Jan.  48 
Textiles: 
Cotton,  wool,  and  man-made  fiber  textiles 
and  textile  products,  trade  in,  bilat- 
eral agreements:  Brazil,  Dec.  59;  Do- 
minican Republic,  June  68,  Aug.  92; 
Hungary,  Sept.  84,  Oct.  84; 
Mauritius,  May  84;  Mexico,  Jan.  62, 
May  84 
Cotton  and  manmade  fiber  te.xtiles  and 
textile  products,  trade  in,  bilateral 
agreement  with  Costa  Rica,  Mar.  85 
Cotton  sateen  fabrics,  trade  in,  bilateral 

agreement  with  Colombia,  June  68 
Cotton  textiles,  trade  in,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Romania,  June  69 


Textiles  (Cont'd) 
International  trade  in  textiles,  1986  proto- 
col extending  1973  arrangement:  Aus- 
tria, Feb.  92;  Costa  Rica,  June  68; 
Dominican  Republic,  Guatemala,  May 
83;  Switzerland,  Feb.  92 
Trade  in  (certain)  textiles  and  textile 
products,  bilateral  agreements:  Chi- 
na, May  83,  Aug.  92,  Dec.  59; 
Czechoslovakia,  Nov.  49;  Dominican 
Republic,  Apr.  88;  Egypt,  June  68; 
Hong  Kong,  May  84,  Oct.  84;  India, 
Jan.  62,  Sept.  84,  Dec.  59;  Jamaica, 
May  84,  Aug.  93;  Macao,  Apr.  88;  Ma- 
laysia, Feb.  92,  July  77;  Soviet  Union, 
Mar.  85;  Sri  Lanka,  May,  84;  Turkey, 
Mar.  85;  Uruguay,  May  84 
Visa  system  relating  to  trade  in  certain 
textile  products,  bilateral  agreement 
with  Uruguay,  Oct.  85 
Wool  and  cotton  textiles  and  textile  prod- 
ucts, trade  in,  bilateral  agreement 
with  Uruguay,  Jan.  63 
Wool  and  manmade  fiber  textiles  and  tex- 
tile products,  trade  in,  bilateral 
agreements:  Hungary,  July  77;  Ro- 
mania, June  69 
Thailand:  Reagan,  Apr.  25;  Shultz,  Apr.  47 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  trafficking, 

control  efforts  (Wrobleski)  June  50 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  U.S..  19.52~195i, 
Vol.  XII,  part  2,  Banna,  Indonesia, 
Philippiyies,  Thailand,  released,  Jan. 
64 
Indochinese  refugees  (Brown),  May  37 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Mar.  84,  June 

68,  July  77,  Sept.  84 
U.S.  aid,  FY  89,  request  (Sigur),  July  35 
U.S.  relations  (Brown),  May  40 
Visit  of  Secretary  Shultz,  Oct.  21 
Thatcher,  Margaret,  Aug.  47 
Timber,  international  tropical  timber  agree- 
ment (1983):  Australia,  May  83;  Ecua- 
dor, June  68;  Greece,  Oct.  84 
Togo,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  June  68, 

July  76 
Tonga,  international  telecommunications 
convention,  May  83 
U.S.  aid,  FY  89,  requested  (Sigur),  July 
38 
Trade: 
ASEAN-U.S.  dialogue,  Washington  (joint 

statement),  Apr.  54 
Contracts  for  international  sale  of  goods, 
UN  convention  (1980):  Australia,  May 
83;  Austria,  Mar.  84;  Finland,  Feb.  92; 
Mexico,  Mar.  84;  Norway,  Oct.  84; 
Sweden,  Feb.  92;  U.S.,  Apr.  87 
Coordinating  Committee  on  Multilateral 
Export  Controls  (COCOM)  policy 
(Wendt),  Mar.  63,  64,  Oct.  46 
General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade 
(GATT):  Shultz,  Oct.  23;  Whitehead, 
July  4 
Article  VI  (antidumping  code),  agree- 
ment (1979):  Mexico,  May  83;  New 
Zealand,  Aug.  92 
Article  VII  (customs  valuation  code), 
agreement  (1979):  Mexico,  May  83; 
Zimbabwe,  Feb.  93 
GATT  Interim  Commission,  tax  reim- 
bursement agreement,  Sept.  84 
Provisional  application  of  (1947),  Le- 
sotho, Apr.  87 


17 


Trade  (Cont'd) 

Uruguay  Round:  Shultz,  Oct.  10;  Toron- 
to economic  summit,  Aug.  50;  Wal- 
lis,  Jan.  30 

Protectionism  and  trade  barriers  (Wallis), 
Jan.  29 

Technical  barriers  to  trade  (standards 
code),  agreement  (1979):  Greece,  Feb. 
92;  Mexico,  May  83 

U.S.-U.S.S.R.  joint  commercial  commis- 
sion (U.S. -Soviet  joint  statement), 
Feb.  16 

World  Bank  development  report  (Whit- 
ney), Feb.  90 

World  Trade  Week,  1988,  proclamation 
(Reagan),  July  41 
Trade,  U.S.: 

Association  of  South  East  Asian  Nations 
(Shultz),  Oct.  25,  27 

Balance  of  trade:  Shultz,  Oct.  27;  Wallis, 
Jan,  30 

Brazil:  Reagan,  Jan.  60;  White  House, 
Jan.  61,  Sept.  17 

Canada: 
U.S. -Canada  free  trade  agreement: 
Mar.  84;  Reagan,  Mar.  57,  Dec.  22; 
Whitehead,  Jan.  34 
Summary,  July  24 
White  House  fact  sheet,  Mar.  57 

Caribbean  Basin  Initiative  (Whitney), 
June  65 

China  (Reagan),  Sept.  17 

Computer  software  (Reagan),  Jan.  60 

E.xport  control  policy  (Wendt),  Mar.  63, 
64,  Oct.  46 

Generalized  system  of  preference  (GSP): 
White  House,  Apr  65;  Whitney,  Feb. 
90;  Yeo,  Apr.  53 

Government  procurement,  protocol  (U.S.), 
Apr.  88 

Hungary  (Reagan),  Sept.  17 

International  traffic  in  arms  regulations 
(ITAR),  June46 

Japan: 

Beef  and  citrus  quotas,  Sept.  16 
Cooperative  agreements  (Wallis),  Jan. 
35,  37 

Latin  America  (Whitney),  Feb.  90 

Meat  product  sales  to  European  Commu- 
nity (White  House),  Jan.  38,  Mar.  69 

Mexico,  consultations  regarding  trade  and 
investment  relations,  bilateral  agree- 
ment, Feb.  92 

Omnibus  trade  bill  (Whitehead),  Jan.  34 

Pacific  Basin  (Wallis),  June  23 

Romania,  suspension  of  most-favored- 
nation  status,  bilateral  agreement, 
Sept.  85 

Soviet  Union  (Reagan),  May  10 

Steel,  specialty,  limitation  of  imports,  bi- 
lateral agreement:  Poland,  Spain, 
Sweden,  Mar.  85 

Steel  products,  and  liberalization  for  cer- 
tain other  products,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Mexico,  July  77 

Steel  products,  imports  into  U.S.,  bilat- 
eral agreement  with  Canada,  Mar  84 

Strategic  technology  export  controls 
(Wendt),  Mar.  63,  64 

Thailand  (Brown),  May  41 

U.S. -Japan  semiconductor  agreement 
(Reagan),  Jan.  29 


Trade,  U.S.  (Cont'd) 
U.S.  policy:  Wallis,  Dec.  33;  Whitehead, 

Jan.  33 
Wool  sweaters,  bilateral  agreement  with 
Maldives,  May  84 
Transportation: 
Foodstuffs,  international  carriage  of  per- 
ishable, and  equipment  used,  agree- 
ment (1970):  Hungary,  Feb.  92; 
Ireland,  May  83;  Portugal,  Oct.  84 
Rural  roads  maintenance  system,  project 
loan,  bilateral  agreement  with  Indo- 
nesia, Jan.  62 
Transportation  science  and  technology,  bi- 
lateral agreement  with  Soviet  Union, 
Aug.  42,  93 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  61,  Feb.  78, 
91,  92,  Mar.  83,  Apr.  87,  88,  May  81,  82, 
83,  June  68,  July  76,  Aug.  92,  Sept,  83, 
Oct.  84,  Nov.  48,  Dec.  58 
Intermediate-range  nuclear  forces  (INF) 
treaty  {see  also  under  Soviet  Union); 
Basing  agreement,  multilateral,  with 

European  allies,  Feb.  78 
Corrigendum,  Feb.  23 
Data  base,  establishment  of,  memo  of 

understanding,  Feb.  31 
Elimination  of  the  missile  systems  sub- 
ject to  the  treaty,  pi'otocol  on  pro- 
cedures, Feb.  64 
Entered  in  force,  Aug.  93;  Reagan, 

Aug.  68 
Inspections,  multilateral  agreement 

with  European  allies,  Feb.  78 
Inspections  related  to  the  treaty,  proto- 
col on,  Feb.  70 
Text,  Feb.  22 
Joint  verification  experiment  (JVE),  bilat- 
eral agreement  with  Soviet  Union, 
Aug.  67,  93 
Shorter-range  missiles.  See  Intermediate- 
range  Nuclear  Forces  Treaty  (INF), 
supra. 
Vienna  convention  on  law  of  treaties 

(1969),  Mongolia,  Sept.  86 
Vienna  convention  on  law  of  treaties  be- 
tween states  and  international  organi- 
zations or  between  international 
organizations  (1986):  Bulgaria,  May 
83;  Hungary,  Nov.  49;  Mexico,  May  83; 
Sweden,  July  77 
Trinidad  and  Tobago,  treaties,  agreements, 

etc.,  June  68,  Aug.  93,  Oct.  83,  84 
Tunisia,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  July  76, 
77,  Aug.  93,  Oct.  85,  Dec.  59 
U.S.  aid,  FY  89,  request  (Murphy),  June 
43 
Turkey: 
Profile,  Sept.  32 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  63,  Mar 
85,  May  81,  July  76,  Aug.  92,  Oct.  84, 
Nov.  48,  50 
U.S.  visit  of  President  Evren  (Evren, 
Reagan),  Sept.  3 
Twining,  Charles  H.,  Dec.  31 


u 


Uganda,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Apr  89, 
July  76,  Aug.  92,  Sept.  83,  85 

Ukrainian  S.S.R.,  treaties,  agreements, 
etc.,  Apr.  87,  May  81,  June  68,  July  76, 
Dec.  58 


Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics 

(U.S.S.R.).  See  Soviet  Union 
United  Arab  Emirates,  treaties,  agree- 
ments, etc.,  Feb.  93,  May  81,  82,  84, 
Dec.  58 
United  Kingdom: 
Economic  development  (Group  of  7  state- 
ment, annex).  Mar.  67 
Northern  Ireland  (Reagan),  June  32 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  63,  Feb. 
78,  91,  92.  93.  Mar  85,  Apr  87,  89, 
May  82,  July  76,  Aug.  93,  Sept.  83, 
Oct.  83,  85,  Nov.  48,  49,  50,  Dec.  .59 
Visit  of  President  Reagan,  Aug.  36 
United  Nations  (Reagan),  Nov.  1,  6 
Actions  taken,  1988  (Williamson),  Sept.  62 
Administrative  and  budgetary  reform 

(Walters),  May  68 
Arms  control  and  disarmament  (William- 
son), Sept.  66 
Convention  against  torture  and  other 
cruel,  inhuman  or  degrading  treat- 
ment or  punishment,  Aug.  79 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States, 
1955-1957,  Volume  XI,  United  Na- 
tions and  General  International  Mat- 
ters, released,  Dec.  61 
General  Assembly: 
42nd  session,  developments  (Walters), 

May  68 
Resolution  42/8  on  AIDS,  Jan.  57 
Resolution  42/15  on  Afghanistan,  Jan.  55 
Third  special  session  devoted  to  disar- 
mament (U.S.),  Aug.  84 
Global  conflict  resolution  and  problem 

solving  (Williamson)  Dec.  55 
Human  rights:  Karp,  Mar  20;  Williamson 

Dec.  55 
Privileges  and  immunities,  convention 
(1946):  Dominica,  Feb.  92;  Vietnam, 
Sept.  84 
Refugee  assistance:  Brown,  May  37;  Wil- 
liamson, Dec.  54 
Secretary  General  meets  with  foreign 

ministers,  joint  communique,  Nov.  6 
Security  Council: 
Activities  (Williamson),  Sept.  63 
Resolution  598,  Iran-Iraq  war;  Depart- 
ment, Sept.  83;  Murphy,  Mar  74, 
Oct.  61 
Resolutions  607,  608,  Palestinian  depoi 

tation  (Okun,  Walters),  Mar  82 
Resolution  612,  July  69 
Resolution  on  Lebanon  (Walters),  July 

73 
Resolution  on  West  Bank/Gaza  (Okun), 
Mar  81 
Specialized  agencies  activities  (William- 
son), Sept.  63 
Technical  agencies  and  U.S.  funding 

(Williamson),  Apr  81 
U.S.  assessments:  Goodman,  Oct.  70; 

White  House,  Nov.  5 
U.S.  contributions  to  development,  hu-    | 
manitarian  and  scientific  assistance 
programs  (Williamson),  July  71 
U.S.  foreign  policy  priorities  (Walters), 

May  67 
U.S.  relations  and  objectives  (William- 
son), Sept.  67 
United  Nations  Children's  Fund  (UNICEF 
FY  89,  U.S.  funding  proposed  (Will- 
iamson), July  72 


18 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/Index  19B 


led  Nations  Development  Program 
(UNDP),  FY  89,  U.S.  funding  proposed 
(Williamson),  July  72 
ed  Nations  Environment  Program 
(UNEP).  FY  89,  U.S.  funding  proposed 
(Williamson),  July  72 
ed  Nations  Industrial  Development  Or- 
ganization (UNIDO):  Williamson,  Apr. 
82,83 
nstitution  (1979):  Albania,  Costa  Rica, 

Jan.  62;  El  Salvador,  Maldives,  July  77 
Government  personnel  in  the  Domini- 
can Republic,  bilateral  agreement, 
Nov.  49 

ruay:  (Shultz),  Oct.  12 
eaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  63,  Apr. 

87,  May  84,  July  76,  Sept.  84 
S.  aid,  FY  89,  request  (Abrams),  Oct. 

79 
sit  of  Secretary  Shultz,  Oct.  8 


latu,  treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar. 

83,  Aug.  92 

•zuela,  treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar. 

84,  85,  Mav  81,  85,  July  76,  Aug.  93, 
Oct.  85,  Nov.  48,  50 

nam  (Reagan),  Api-.  25 

)W/MIAs;  Lambertson,  Sept  15,  Oct.  42; 

U.S. -Laos  joint  statement,  Jan.  28 
•fugees:  Brown,  May  37;  Funseth,  May 

58 
eaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Sept.  84,  Dec. 

58 
S.  policy  (Lambertson),  Oct.  40 
s,  nonimmigrant  waiver  pilot  program 
with  Japan  (Department),  Dec.  23 
e  of  America  (VOA),  establishment  of  a 
radio  relay  station  of  the  U.S.  Informa- 
tion Agency,  bilateral  agreement  with 
Grenada,  Jan.  62 


w 

Wallis,  W.  Allen,  Jan.  29,  35,  June  23,  Julv 

43,  Dec.  30 
Walters,  Vernon  A.,  Mar.  82,  May  67,  July 

69 
War  Powers  Act:  Reagan,  Jan.  2;  Sofaer, 

Nov.  36 
Warsaw  Pact  (NAG),  May  2 
Water,  canal  cities  water  and  waste  water, 
bilateral  agreement  with  Egvpt,  Feb. 
92 
Water  quality: 
Great  Lakes  water  quality,  bilateral 
agreement  (amended)  with  Canada, 
Jan.  62 
Improvement  of  quality  of  waters  of  the 
New  River  at  Calexico,  California — 
Me.xicali,  Baja  California,  bilateral 
agreement  with  Mexico,  Feb.  92 
Wendt,  E.  Allen,  Mar.  63,  64,  Oct.  46 
Western  Samoa,  Vienna  conventions  on  con- 
sular relations,  diplomatic  relations, 
Jan.  61 
Wheat: 

Food  aid  convention  (1986),  Federal  Repub- 
lic of  Germany,  May  83 
Food  aid  convention  (1987),  U.S.,  Apr.  88 
Wheat  trade  convention  (1986):  Algeria, 
Feb.  92;  Egypt,  Oct.  84;  U.S.,  Apr.  88 
Whitehead,  John  C.,  Jan.  33,  Apr.  66,  May 
54,  June  33,  July  39,  Aug.  58,  Sept.  33, 
36,  53,  Oct.  70 
Whitnev,  Peter  D.,  Feb.  87,  June  65 
Williamson,  Richard  S.,  Apr.  81,  July  68,  71, 
Aug.  62,  65,  66,  Sept.  39,  57,  62,  65,  67, 
Dec.  53 
Wolfe,  Edward  E.,  Oct.  64 
Women,  convention  for  elimination  of  dis- 
crimination against  (1979):  Sierre 
Leone,  Dec.  59 
Woods,  Alan,  July  54,  Aug.  77 
World  Bank  (Whitney),  Feb.  89 
World  Food  Day,  1988,  proclamation  (Rea- 
gan), Dec.  37 
World  Health  Organization  (WHO)  (William- 
son), Apr.  81,  82;  Dec.  58 
Nuclear  accidents,  convention  on  assist- 
ance in  case  of  emergency,  Dec.  58 
World  Meteorological  Organization  (WMO) 

(Williamson),  Apr.  82,  83,  July  73 
World  peace  (Reagan),  Nov.  1 
Wrobleski,  Ann  B.,  June  47 


Yemen,  Democratic  Republic  of,  treaties, 

agreements,  etc.,  June  69,  July  76,  Oct. 

83 
Yemen  Arab  Republic,  sales  of  agricultural 

commodities,  bilateral  agreement,  June 

69 
U.S.  aid,  FY  89,  request  (Murphy),  June 
42 
Yeo  Cheow  Tong,  Apr.  53 
Yugoslavia,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan. 

61,  Mar,  86,  May  81,  82,  Oct.  85 


Zaire,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  May  81, 

June  69,  Aug.  93,  94 
Zambia,  U.S.  visit  of  President  Kaunda: 

Kaunda,  Jan.  20:  Reagan,  Jan.  19 
Zia  ul-Haq,  Mohammad,  death,  Oct.  69 
Zimbabwe,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb. 

93,  May  85,  June  68  ■ 


19 


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