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Full text of "Department of State bulletin"

MMepartnten t 

3: 



V of state -m-^ J ^ 

le Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 89 / Number 2151 




October 1989 



Dpparimvnt of Siaip 

bulletin 



Volume 89 / Number 2151 / October 1989 



The Department ok State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Pubhc Com- 
munication in the Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and govern- 
ment agencies with information on de- 
velopments in U.S. foreign relations 
and the work of the Department of 
State and the Foreign Service. The 
Bulletln's contents include major ad- 
dresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretai\v of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Seci-etary and other 
senior State Department officials; se- 
lected press releases issued by the 
White House, the Department, and the 
U.S. Mission to the United Nations; 
and treaties and other agreements to 
which the United States is or may be- 
come a party. Special features, articles, 
and other supportive material (such as 
maps, charts, photographs, and graphs) 
are published frequently to provide ad- 
ditional information on current issues 
but should not necessarily be inter- 
preted as official U.S. policy 
statements. 



JAMES A. BAKER, III 

Secretary of State 

MARGARET DeB. TUTWILER 

Assistant Secretary 
for Public Affairs 



Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

COLLEEN LUTZ 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 



The Secretary of State has determined that 
the publication of this periodical is necessary 
in the transaction of the public business re- 
quired by law of this Department. Use of 
funds for printing this periodical has been 
approved by the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget through Septem- 
ber .30, 1990. 



DeI'AKT.ME.N'T clF StATK Bl'l.I.KTIN (ISSN 

0041-7(310) is published monthly (plus an- 
nual index) by the Department of State. 
2201 C Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 
20.520. Second-class postage paid at Wash- 1 
ington, D.C, and additional mailing of- 
fices. POSTMASTER: Send address 
changes to Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20402. 



NOTE: Most of the contents of this publi- 
cation are in the public domain and not 
copyrighted. Those items may be re- 
printed: citation of the Department of 
Statf; Bulletin as the source will be ap- 
preciated. Permission to reproduce all 
copyrighted material (including pho- 
tographs) must be obtained from the origi- 
nal source. The Bulletin is inde.xed 
online by Magazine Index (Dialog file 47; 
BRS file MAGS), in the Readers' Guide to 
Periodical Literature and the online ver- 
sion of Readers' Guide (WILSONLINE file 
RDG), and in the PAIS (Public Affairs In- 
formation Service, Inc.) Bulletin. Articles 



are abstracted by Readers' Guide Ab- 
stracts (WILSONLINE file RGA). The 
Bulletin also participates in Mead Data 
Central's full-text onhne services, LEXIS 
and NEXIS. 



For sale by the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 



CONTENTS 



ie President 



News Conference of August 15 
(Excerpt^i) 



^rica 



Visit of Zaire's President 
(Pyeside)it Bush, Mobutu 
Sese Seko) 

Zaire — A Profile 



/ms Control 

I Status of the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Talks (Richard R. 

1 Burt) 

i Status of the Defense and Space 
Talks (Henry F. Cooper) 

2 Foreign Policy Implications of 

Biological Weapons (H. Allen 
d Hohnes) 



hst Asia 



International Conference on 
Cambodia Held in Paris 
(Secretart/ Baker, Statement) 

U.S. Response to Changes in 
China (Ricliard L. Williams) 

U.S. Relations With Korea 

FSX Coproduction Prohibition 
Disapproved by President 
(Letter to the Senate) 



E:onomics 

3 Aviation's Role in Shaping 
Today's World (Eugene J. 
McAllister) 

3 Steel Trade Liberalization 

Program (President Bush) 



Eivironment 



U.S. Ratifies Treaty to Reduce 
Smog Pollutant (White House 
Statement) 

World Environment Day 
(President Bush) 



Ejrope 



The Challenge of the European 
Landscape of the 1990s 
(Lawrence S. Eagleburger) 

Food Aid to Poland (President 
Bush) 

Polish Parliament Approves 
New Prime Minister 
(President Bush) 

Secretary, Soviet Foreign 
Minister Meet in Paris 




FEATURE 



1 U.S. -Canada Free Trade Agreement 
7 Canada 



40 



41 



Anniversary of Warsaw Pact 
Invasion of Czechoslovakia 
(Department Statement) 

Anniversary of the Berlin Wall 
(President Bush) 



Human Rights 

41 Human Rights Situation in Cuba 

(Richard Schifter) 

42 Helsinki Human Rights Day, 

nm (Proclamation) 

43 Ethnic Turks in Bulgaria 

(NATO and Department 
Statements) 



IVIiddle East 

44 U.S. Diplomacv in the Middle 
East (.John H. Kelly) 



Narcotics 

46 Cuba and Narcotics Trafficking 

(Melvyn Leritsky) 

47 Emergency Package for 
Colombia's Drug Fight 
(Presidoit Bush) 

49 Global Narcotics Cooperation 

and Presidential Certification 
(Ann B. Wrobleski) 



Pacific 



60 



61 
62 



Visit of Australian Prime 
Minister (President Bush, 
Robert J. L. Hawke) 

Australia — A Profile 

U.S. Establishes Diplomatic 
Relations With Marshall 
Islands and Micronesia 
(President Bush) 



South Asia 

63 Visit of Pakistan's Prime 

Minister (Mohtra ma Benzair 
Bhutto, President Bush) 

65 Proposal to Sell F-16s to 

Pakistan (Tercsita Schaffer) 



Terrorism 

66 Amei'ican Hostages in the 
Middle East (President 
Bush, Mohammad bin 
Mubarak al -Khalifa, 
White House Statements) 

68 Commission on Aviation Securi- 
ty and Terrorism Formed 
(White House Stateinent) 



United Nations 

69 Indochinese Refugee 

Conference Held in Geneva 
(Lawrence S. Eagleburger, 
Te.rts of Declaration and 
Plan of Action) 

73 Security Council Adopts Resolu- 

tion on Central American 
Peace (Herbert S. Okun, Te.ft 
of Resolution) 

74 The Concept of the "Unitary 

UN" (John R. Bolton) 



Western Hemisphere 

76 U.S.-Me.\ico Binational Com- 

mission Meets in Mexico City 
(Secretary Baker, Fernando 
Solana Morales, Joint 
Communique) 

77 U.S. Travel Advisory for 

Colombia (Department 
Statement) 



Treaties 



84 



Current Actions 



Index 



FEATURE-Canada 



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Department of State Bulletin/October 1S 



FEATURE-Canada 



U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement 



esident Bush began his trip to Ot- 
va, Canada, in February 1989, by 
waiting of the U.S.-Canada Free 
ade Agreement (FTA) — a historic 
abord representing the culmination of 
Eorts covering more than 100 years — 
uich went into effect on January 1, 
H9. The FTA is a bilateral agreement 
-iuiied primarily to eliminate trade 
1 1 riiTs and open new avenues of trade 
ttween the United States and Cana- 
:. It strengthens an already e.xtensive 
tjding relationship and enhances eco- 
rmic opportunity on both sides of our 
[mnion border 

The U.S. -Canadian trade relation- 
rip is the strongest in the world today. 
!ich year the United States and Cana- 
; exchange more goods and services 
tan any two countries in the world, 
Uh bilateral merchandise trade of 
imit .$154 billion in 1988, quadruple 
t.' 11174 level. Clearly, the elimination 
[tariffs and most other barriers to 
tide between the two countries under 
t^ FTA can only serve to further our 
Onomic progress. 

While the FTA does not eliminate 
I trade problems between the United 
'ates and Canada, it does provide a 
cnsultative framework in which these 
i.ues can be managed before they cre- 
£? serious economic and political fric- 
tins. Industries in both the United 
'ates and Canada can expect ongoing 
s'uctural readjustment in adapting 
t changing market conditions in the 
lars ahead. However, the FTA will fa- 
(itate those changes and lead the two 
itions into a new century with the 
nst productive and extensive trading 
ilationship in the world. 



KSIC FTA PRECEPTS 

'le FTA is an agreement designed 
'th several key points in mind. Specif- 
iilly, these objectives are to: 

• Eliminate tariffs and substan- 
tilly reduce other barriers to trade in 
,iods and services between the two 
'untries; 



• Promote fair competition; 

• Liberalize trade in several areas, 
including agriculture, autos, energy, 
and government procurement; 

• Establish rules on investment 
and financial services; 

• Establish effective administra- 
tive procedures and resolve disputes; 
and 

• Lay the foundation for further 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation. 

Although these objectives address 
a great many issues, the agreement is 
not intended to circumvent previously 
existing arrangements on trade and 
other bilateral relations. On the con- 
trary, the FTA serves to further en- 
hance our relationship. The FTA also is 
fully consistent with U.S. and Cana- 
dian obligations under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). It does not lessen commit- 
ments to achieve multilateral trade lib- 
eralization. Rather it establishes useful 
precedents for the ongoing Uruguay 
Round of GATT negotiations. 

The GATT has served trading na- 
tions well for more than 40 years. How- 
ever, this global system traditionally 
has been restricted to trade in goods. 
There is a missing link — services and 
investment, which have become in- 
creasingly important international eco- 
nomic activities in which the United 
States and Canada have a very strong 
relationship. Therefore, the two coun- 
tries are working together in the Uru- 
guay Round to expand GATT coverage 
to include trade-related investment and 
service activities. The implementation 
of the FTA has provided needed impe- 
tus to these negotiations. 

Enactment of the FTA was not 
easy. Many years of negotiations were 
involved in hammering out the agree- 
ment. In the United States, the Senate 
approved it on September 21, 1988. In 
Canada, the FTA became the center- 
piece of a bitter federal election cam- 
paign which tested the commitment of 
Prime Minister Mulroney's government 
to the FTA. The result was an endorse- 
ment of the FTA by the Canadian 
people, passage by the Canadian Par- 
liament on December 30, 1988, and the 
agreement's entry into force on Janu- 
ary 1, 1989. 



SUMMARY OF KEY PROVISIONS 

The agreement contains provisions cov- 
ering virtually every trade sector. The 
following is a synopsis of these 
provisions. 

General Provisions on Product Trade 

Tariffs. Eliminates all tariffs on U.S. 
and Canadian goods by 1998. Some tar- 
iffs were removed on -January 1, 1989, 
while the others will be phased out 
in 5 or 10 years. 

Rules of Origin. Rules of origin 
define goods eligible for FTA treat- 
ment and prevent "free riding" by third 
countries. Goods produced only in the 
United States or Canada qualify for 
FTA treatment. Goods containing 
imported components qualify if suffi- 
ciently transformed to result in a spe- 
cified change in tariff classification. In 
some cases, there is an additional re- 
quirement that 50% of the cost of man- 
ufacturing be in the United States or 
Canada. 

Customs. Ends customs user fees 
for goods and most duty drawback pro- 
grams (under which importers receive 
a duty rebate on exports) by 1994 for bi- 
lateral trade; ends duty waivers linked 
to performance requirements by 1998 
(except for the auto pact). 

Quotas. Eliminates import and ex- 
port quotas unless consistent with the 
GATT or explicitly grandfathered (al- 
lowed to remain in place) by the FTA. 

National Treatment. Reaffirms 
GATT principles preventing discrimi- 
nation against imported goods. 

Standards. Prohibits use of prod- 
uct standards as a trade barrier and 
provides for national treatment of test- 
ing labs and certification bodies. 

Emergency Action. Allows tempo- 
rary import restrictions to protect do- 
mestic industries harmed by increased 
imports from the other country in lim- 
ited circumstances. 



epartment of State Bulletin/October 1989 



FEATURE-Canada 



Government Procurement. Ex- 
pands the size of Federal Govei-nment 
procurement markets open to compe- 
titive bidding by suppliers from the 
other country by reducing the mini- 
mum purchases covered to $25,000. 

Agriculture and Industry 

-Ajrriculture. Eliminates all tariffs and 
export subsidies in bilateral trade and 
limits or eliminates bilateral quantita- 
tive restrictions on some agricultural 
products, including meat. Eliminates 
Canadian import licenses for wheat, 
oats, and barley when U.S. crop price 
supports are equal to or less than those 
in Canada. Increases imports allowed 
under Canadian poultry and egg import 
quotas. For 20 years, allows tariffs on 
fruits and vegetables to be reimposed 
on a temporary basis during abnor- 
mally low price periods. 

Energy. Prohibits most import and 
export restrictions on energy goods, 
including minimum export prices. Re- 
quires any export quotas designed to 
enforce either short supply or conserva- 
tion measures to ensure continuation of 
the historical proportionate share of 
resources. Provides for Alaskan oil ex- 
ports of up to 50,000 barrels per day to 
Canada under certain conditions. 

Autos. Replaces eligibility rule for 
duty-free auto pact imports into the 
United States with a tougher F^TA rule 
of origin. (Most auto trade already is 
duty free under the 1965 U.S. -Canada 
auto pact.) FTA continues the auto pact 
and programs allowing pact-qualified 
companies to import duly free into 
Canada but does not allow new firms to 
qualify for pact membership. Permits 
U.S. auto and parts exports that meet 
the FTA rule to enter Canada at FTA 
tariff rates, which will be reduced to 
zero by 1998. Ends, by 1996, Canadian 
programs not covered by the auto 
pact — production-based duty remission 
programs (under which producers pay 
less duty for automotive imports into 
Canada for meeting Canadian produc- 
tion requirements) and export-based 
programs by 1998 (those based on ex- 
ports to the United States were ended 
on January 1, 1989). 

Wine and Distilled Spirits. Re- 
moves the most disci'iminatoi'y pricing 
and listing practices against wine or 
spirits imported from the othei- coun- 
try. Prohibits new restrictions on beer. 



U.S. Exports 
to Canada: 
$71 Billion 



Manulactured Goods 
(14%) 




Agricultural Goods 

& Crude Materials 

(6%) 



Softwood Lumber. Preserves the 
1986 memorandum of understanding 
with Canada on lumber pricing prac- 
tices of Canadian provinces. 

Cultural Industries. Exempts 
industries such as publishing, broad- 
casting, and films. However, if this 
exemption results in practices that re- 
strain trade (otherwise inconsistent 
with the FTA), the injured party may 
take measures of equivalent commer- 
cial effect without resort to dispute 
settlement. 

Services and Temporary 
Business Travel 

Services. Commits governments not to 
discriminate against covered service 
providers of the other country when 
making future laws or regulations 
(transportation services are excluded). 

Business Travel. Facilitates cross- 
border travel for business visitors — 
investors, traders, professionals, or 
executives transferred within the 
company. 



Investment and Financial Services 

Investment. Provides that future lav 
and regulations must accord national ; 
treatment for establishment, acquisi- 
tion, sale, conduct, and operation of 
business (exempts transportation). E 
isting measures that deny national 
treatment remain in place. Commits 
Canada to end review of indirect acq 
sitions by U.S. companies and raises 
the threshold for review of direct ac- 
quisitions in most sectors to C$15(l m 
lion (constant 1992 Canadian dollars). 
Bans imposition of key performance i 
quirements (i.e., local content, expon 
import substitution, and local sourcir 
requirements) imposed on foreign in- 
vestments. Guarantees free transfer' 
of capital and current payments. Guai 
antees investors will be compensateo 
in accordance with international law 
cases of expropriation. 

Financial Services. Exempts U. 
bank subsidiaries from the ceiling on 
the share of Canadian domestic banki 
ing assets that can be held by foreigr 
banks. Ends Canada's foreign owner- 
ship restriction on U.S. purchases ofl 
shares in federally regulated financii 
institutions. Assumes that reviews o> 
U.S firms' applications for entry into 
Canadian financial markets will be o< 
the same basis as Canadian firms' apl 
plications. Permits banks in the Uniti 
States to underwrite and deal in debt 
securities fully backed by the Govern 
ment of Canada or Canadian politicall 
subdivisions. Establishes a formal coi 
sultative mechanism for financial sen 
ices, separate from the general dispui 
settlement procedures, to resolve pr( 
lems and oversee further financial m; 
ket liberalization. 



Resolving Disputes 

General Dispute Settlement (except 
for cultural industries — publishing, 
broadcasting, film, etc. — financial 
services, countervailing duty, and an 
dumping cases). Establishes a binatio 
al commission to resolve disagreemer 
and allows for arbitration if the partit 
desire. 

Dispute Settlement for Counter- 
vailing Duty and .Antidumping Case 

Countries will continue to apply exist 
ing national laws, but court review of 
administrative agency determination 
in either country is replaced by a bi- 
national jjanel. The panel applies the 
same standard and scope of review 
as would the relevant court. 



Department of State Bulletin/October 191 



FEATURE-Canada 



'UTTING THE FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENT INTO ACTION 

[he concept of free trade underlies the 
PTA, which encompasses a wide array 
f issues and products. The two govern- 
lents have established the Canada- 
J.S. Trade Commission to ensure 
roper implementation and to oversee 
urther elaboration of the agreement, 
'he FTA calls for the commission to 
leet at least once annually. At the 
irst commission meeting, on March 13, 
989, it decided to meet twice a year, at 
>ast for the early period of implemen- 
tation. The commission is responsible 
n- the establishment of working 
roups to monitor implementation of 
he various chapters of the agreement 
nd to undertake negotiations to ex- 
jand the agreement's coverage in those 
teas. The working groups report di- 
leetly to the commission, which is the 
lighest decisionmaking body under the 
greement. 

The following five working groups 
ere set up at the first commission 
leeting: 

Accelerated Elimination of Tar- 
'fs. To consider requests for acceler- 
;ed elimination of tariffs on particular 
'■oducts and make recommendations to 
le commission. 

The FTA provides for tariffs not 
ready eliminated to be phased out 
/er o or 10 years; either 5 annual re- 
ictions of 20% or 10 annual reductions 
'10'7(. The agreement also provides 
r accelerated elimination of these 
iriff rates if approved by both 
jvernments. 

The process currently works as 
Hows. Unless otherwise specified, 
•quests for accelerated tariff elimina- 
on are due by .January 1 of each year, 
'both governments agree, the new 
'hedule will become effective the fol- 
wing January 1. A petitioner for 
I'celerated tariff elimination must 
•ovide the following information: 

• Requester's name, organization, 
Idress, contact individual, telephone 
imber, and date of request; 

• Product on which accelerated 
ity elimination is requested and 
ihether the request pertains to the 
I.S. or Canadian import duty, or both; 

• U.S. and/or Canadian harmo- 
zed system subheading numbers at 
le eight-digit level along with the 
•oduct description of the subheadings; 



U.S. Imports 

From Canada: 

$83 Billion 



Agricultufal Goods 
(4%) 




[her Goods 
(5%) 



• Current staging of the tariff 
elimination for each product or tariff 
subheading; 

• Requested accelerated date of the 
tariff elimination and reasons for re- 
questing accelerated tariff elimination; 

• Requester's e.xports to and/or im- 
ports from Canada for each product in 
the most recent 3-year period for which 
data are available; 

• Requester's projected e.xports 
and/or imports for the product if tariff 
elimination is accelerated as requested; 
and 

• Names and addresses of known 
U.S. manufacturers of the products in 
question. 

Petitions should be forwarded with 
10 copies to the Office of North Ameri- 
can Affairs, Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative, Room 501, 600 17th 
Street, NW, Washington D.C. 20.506. 

Agricultural Issues. To monitor 
implementation of Chapter 7 (agricul- 
ture) and to oversee further coopera- 
tion and negotiations to expand 
coverage. 

The agricultural working group is 
cochaired by the Under Secretary for 



International Affairs and Commodity 
Programs of the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture and by the Senior Assist- 
ant Deputy Minister (United States) 
and Coordinator of the Free Trade 
Agreement of Canada or their 
representatives. 

To conduct detailed work, eight 
subworking groups were established 
and will report to the main agri- 
cultural working group; 

• Animal health; 

• Plant health, seeds, and 
fertilizers; 

• Meat and poultry inspection; 

• Dairy, fruit, vegetable, and egg 
inspection; 

• Veterinary drugs and feeds; 

• Food, beverage and color addi- 
tives, and unavoidable contaminants; 

• Pesticides; and 

• Packaging and labeling of agri- 
cultural, food, beverage, and certain 
related goods for human consumption. 

Chapter 19 (Subsidies). To develop 
more effective rules and disciplines 
concerning the use of government sub- 
sidies and to develop a substitute sys- 
tem of rules for dealing with unfair 
pricing and government subsidization. 

Customs-Related Issues. To re- 
solve procedural problems involved in 
customs administration. 

Rules of Origin. To consider, as 
appropriate, changes in the rules for 
FTA tariff eligibifity. 

In addition, the FTA commission 
established an Auto Select Panel, a 
committee of private-sector experts 
from both countries, to assess the state 
of the North American auto industry 
and to propose public policy measures 
and private initiatives to improve its 
competitiveness in domestic and for- 
eign markets. 

The U.S. Congress has asked the 
panel by .June 30, 1989, to formulate 
proposals and recommendations re- 
garding an increase in the North 
American content rule to 60*^. 
Congress also has asked the panel to 
report by June 30, 1990, on trade- 
distorting policies and practices main- 
tained by either party that affect bi- 
lateral trade in automotive goods and 
the rationale for maintaining such 
policies and practices. 



,epartment of State Bulletin/October 1989 



FEATURE-Canada 



QUESTIONS ABOUT THE FTA 

The following are frequently asked 
questions about how the FTA operates 
and how it might affect various sectors 
of the U.S. economy. 

General 

Q. Does the United States have a free 
trade agreement with countries other 
than Canada? 

A. The United States has a less 
comprehensive free trade agreement 
with Israel. 

Q. What other free trade agree- 
ments is the Administration 
planning? 

A. The Administration has no plan 
at this time to negotiate other free trade 
agreements. In order to do so, it would 
need to seek special authority from the 
Congress. 

Q. Why did the United States 
agree to eliminate its duties over the 
10 years on such sensitive products as 
textiles and apparel, lead, zinc, and 
certain fish products, etc., when 
these industries have been in econom- 
ic distress? 

A. Both countries agreed to elimi- 
nate duties on all products, including 
sensitive ones. Canada also must elimi- 
nate duties on sensitive products. The 
total elimination of tariffs between the 
United States and Canada is the only 
way to achieve the widest trade liberal- 
ization possible in goods and services. 
However, recognizing the sensitivity of 
certain industrial sectors in both coun- 
tries, the FTA provides for a lO-year 
phase-out period for duty elimination. 
The industry can take advantage of this 
full timeframe, or if the producers feel 
that the adjustment is already in place, 
they may seek accelerated tariff 
reduction. 

Q. What does the United States 
gain from the FTA's services 
provision? 

A. The United States gains thi'ee 
important benefits because the FTA: 

• Ensures that the U.S. -Canadian 
market, already substantially open in 
services trade, will become more open 
through the prospective establishment 
of national treatment; 

• Establishes a mechanism to re- 
solve trade disputes for scores of serv- 
ice sectors and creates a forum for 
bringing other sectors into the FTA; 
and 



• Provides a useful precedent for 
ongoing negotiations in the Uruguay 
multilateral trade round. 

Q. Has the FTA eliminated all 
of the trade disputes which our two 
countries face? 

A. No. Many issues remain unre- 
solved, and several disputes — including 
fish, alcoholic beverages, wool, plywood, 
the superfund (a tax imposed on oil im- 
ports to clean up toxic waste sites in the 
United States), and customs-users fees — 
remain as points of contention. However, 
almost all our difficulties are more work- 
able under the terms of the FTA than 
without it. 

Q. Does the FTA achieve every- 
thing the United States wanted from 
the negotiations? 

A. The overall agreement is some- 
thing of which both countries can be 
proud. However, neither side obtained all 
it wanted. We are continuing negotia- 
tions through the joint trade commission 
with a view to improving the FTA wher- 
ever possible. For example, subsidies, 
dumping, investment, energy, services, 
intellectual property, government pro- 
curement, agriculture, technical regu- 
lations, product standards, and the 
automotive rule of origin are issues 
that we wish to pursue. 

Q. Why doesn't the FTA elimi- 
nate Canadian subsidies? 

A. The agreement requires both 
countries to eliminate export subsidies 
to each other. However, both the United 
States and Canada can continue to have 



U.S.-Canada Free Trade 
Agreement Chronology 



18.54 Reciprocity Agreement (termi- 
nated by the United States in 1866). 

1874 Reciprocity Agreement (defeated 
by U.S. Senate). 

1911 Free Trade Agreement (defeated 
by Canadian electorate). 

1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (multilateral agreement, in- 
cluding United States and Canada). 

1948 Free Trade Agreement (suspended 
by Prime Minister King). 

19(i.S Auto Agreement (free trade in au- 
tomobiles and spare parts). 

1988 Free Trade Agreement signed. 

1989 Free Trade Agreement entered 
into force. 

1998 All tariffs eliminated under Free 
Trade Agreement. 



domestic or production subsidies. This issi- 
will be addressed over a .')-7-year period ir 
bilateral negotiations. Our joint aim is to c 
velop agreed discipline on government sub 
sidles that will ensure fair trade within th 
FTA. 



Agriculture 

Q. Does the FTA impair Congress' 
ability to change domestic support- 
programs? 

A. The agreement does not affect 
the ability of either country to change 
domestic support programs for agri- 
cultural products. Of course, the pro- 
grams would need to be consistent wit; 
the other provisions of the agreement i 
garding such matters as import duties^ 
and export subsidies. 

Q. Has the United States given-i 
up protection from unfair import 
competition under Section 22 of then 
Agricultural Adjustment Act and 
corresponding GATT protection? 

A. Both countries reserve the rig; 
to impose or reimpose import restric- 
tions on a particular grain (specificalh 
wheat, oats, barley, I'ye, corn, triticale 
and sorghum) if imports increase signi. 
cantly as a result of a substantial chan 
in either country's support programs f 
that grain. The United States may use 
Section 22 when there is a significant : 
crease in imports resulting from a sub 
stantial change in the price support 
programs of either country and provide 
the conditions of Section 22 are other- 
wise met. Past trade patterns are not 
likely to be affected by the elimination 
the small U.S. duties on grain from C; 
ada. It is not expected that U.S. impoi 
of Canadian grain will increase signifif 
cantly as a result of the removal of trai 
restrictions by the FTA. 

Q. How does the FTA affect 
trade in grain? 

A. Canada has agreed to eliminal 
import licenses for U.S. wheat, barley, 
oats, and their products when U.S. < In 
ernment support for the particular gr; 
is equal to or less than that of Canada. 
That has happened in the case of oats, 
and Canada is now eliminating the pri 
vious licensing system on that grain. 
Each country calculates its own suppoi™ 
level in accordance with the formula s< 
out in the agreement; there also is a 
mechanism to resolve any disagreeme 
over calculations. The elimination of ir 
port licenses will provide improved mi 
tual access to respective markets for 
both grains and processed products 
containing grains. 



Department of State Bulletin/October 19 



FEATURE-Canada 



\uto Trade 

[j. Why didn't the United States rene- 
(otiate the 19(i5 auto pact to remove 
ts inequities, such as Canadian per- 
"ormance requirements (local con- 
ent, etc.) and multilateral sourcing 
ncentives? 

A. Automotive trade was one of the 
nost difficult issues in the FTA negotia- 
ions. The auto pact, under which most 
uto trade has been conducted for over 
:0 years, essentially provides for duty- 
ree trade in automotive goods between 
Canada and the United States if certain 
ules of origin are met. In addition, 
Canada has duty remission (waiver) 
irograms based on meeting certain 
ierformance requirements. The FTA 
paves the auto pact in place but freezes 
Eligibility for duty-free entry into Cana- 
|a to those existing firms appearing in 
in F'TA annex. FYirthermore, Canada 
las agreed to restrict benefits, such as 
luty remission programs based on pro- 
luetiiin in Canada for nonpact members, 
a limited number of firms. These pro- 
rams will terminate by 1996. Programs 
tfhich tie benefits to exports to the Unit- 
d States ended on January 1, 1989. 

Q. Why doesn't the FTA require 
60% direct cost of processing rule 
or autos to increase the benefits to 
S. industry and labor? 

A. U.S. negotiators explored the 
■ossibility of moving to a 60% North 
imerican rule. The Canadian Govern- 
lent, however, was concerned that this 
.'ould be too restrictive for new foreign 
utomotive subsidiaries that recently 
ave invested in Canadian operations. 
'he FTA did, however, toughen the auto 
act's 50% rule of origin for entry into 
he United States by basing it on manu- 
icturing costs instead of value added, 
s had been the case. Profits and costs, 
uch as advertising and administrative 
verhead, will no longer count toward 
he 50%. 

Q. What will the Auto Select 
'anel actually do? 

A. Article 1004 of the FTA states 
hat the panel is to assess the state of 
he North American automotive indus- 
ry and propose public measures and 
■rivate initiatives to improve its compet- 
;ivt'ness in domestic and foreign mar- 
ets. The panel consists of 15 members 
rniii each country, with the responsibili- 
y (if i-eporting to the joint Canada-U.S. 
'rade (IJommission. 



Cultural Industries 

Q. Why aren't cultural industries in- 
cluded in the FTA? 

A. Canada insisted that most pro- 
visions of the FTA could not apply to 
"cultural" industries. These cultural 
industries include the publication, sale, 
distribution, or exhibition of books, mag- 
azines, and newspapers; film and video 
recordings; audio or video music record- 
ings; and radio, television, and cable 
dissemination. 

The FTA does provide for the elim- 
ination of tariffs on videos, records, 
and printed matei'ial and copyright pro- 
tection for the retransmission of com- 
mercial broadcasts. Furthermore, the 
United States retains the right to re- 
balance concessions with measures of 
equivalent commercial effect if Canada 
uses the cultural exception in a manner 
detrimental to our commercial interests. 
The United States also has the right 
to invoke the cultural exception, and 
Canada has the right to take counter- 
measures if we do so. The agreement 
does not require invocation of its dispute 
settlement provisions in order for either 
party to take such countermeasures. 

Q. Doesn't the cultural exception 
adversely affect U.S. firms? 

A. No. The FTA improves Canadian 
treatment of U.S. commercial interests 
in the cultural area. It provides for tariff 
elimination (e.g., on videos, records, 
printed material), improved provisions 
for sale of cultural industries, and 
cop.vTight protection for broadcast re- 
transmissions. In addition, the FTA al- 
lows the United States to take measures 
of equivalent commercial effect in the 
event that Canada enacts additional re- 
strictions which impair U.S. access to 
the Canadian market and which would 
violate the agreement if there were no 
cultural exception. This right should 
serve as a disincentive to the use of the 
cultural exception for measures that, al- 
though nominally cultural, have signifi- 
cant commercial effects. 

Q. How is border broadcasting 
affected by the FTA? 

A. Canada does not grant income 
tax deductions for advertising on U.S. 
stations, and this issue is not addressed 
by the FTA. However, it remedies the 
problem of unauthorized and uncompen- 
sated retransmission by Canadian cable 
systems of copyi'ighted television pro- 
grams. By January 1, 1990, Canada will 
need to provide a right of remuneration 



(royalty) to the copyright holder for the 
simultaneous and unaltered retransmis- 
sion of copyrighted programming. In ad- 
dition, the FTA generally prohibits the 
nonsimultaneous or altered retransmis- 
sion of copyrighted programming except 
with permission of the copyright holder. 

Energy 

Q. How does the FTA improve our en- 
ergy security? 

A. The FTA provides the United 
States with more secure access to Cana- 
dian energy supplies to meet our long- 
term energy needs which is important to 
reduce our dependence on OPEC. The 
Canadians have agreed that, even in the 
event of a supply disruption, they will 
continue to provide the United States 
with its historically proportionate share 
of their energy supplies. Rirthermore, 
the Canadians have agreed that they will 
not discriminate against U.S. consumers 
in the pricing of their energy resources, 
ensuring that U.S. consumers will not 
be cut off suddenly in the event of short- 
ages. We have the same commitments to 
Canada. 

Q. What barriers to energy trade 
are removed by the FTA? 

A. There are virtually no barriers 
today in our bilateral energy trade. 
However, in order to preserve gains we 



Further Information 



U.S. Department of State 

Office of Canadian Affairs (202) (347-1097 
Office of International Trade (202) 647-2320 

U.S. Trade Representative 

Office of Canadian Affairs (202) 395-5663 
Office of Public Affairs (202) 395-3230 

U.S. Department of Commerce 

Office of Canadian Affairs (202) 377-3101 
Office of Public Affairs (202) 377-3808 

U.S. Department of Agriculture 

Inter-American Branch (202) 382-1338 

U.S. Department of the Treasury 

Canada desk (202) 566-2747 

U.S. Department of Labor 

Office of International 
Economic Affairs (202) 523-6203 



Canadian Free Trade 
Hotline 



1-800-267-6626 



)epartment of State Bulletin/October 1989 



FEATURE-Canada 



have made, both sides agreed to pro- 
hibit i-e.strictions on imports or exports 
in terms of supply, price, or taxes. Nei- 
ther country may impose any taxes, 
duties, or charges on imported or ex- 
ported goods unless such charges also 
are imposed in equal amount on the 
same products for domestic use. 

Neither country may discriminate 
against suppliers or consumers in the 
other country, relative to its own do- 
mestic suppliers or consumers, in the 
pricing of energy supplies. For exam- 
jjle, under current Canadian regula- 
tions, exporters of Canadian electricity 
may not charge a price for that electric- 
ity which is significantly less than the 
least cost energy alternative available 
to their U.S. customers. Canadian reg- 
ulations, in the past, have required 
that the minimum price for oil and gas 
exports be higher than the prevailing 
price to Canadian consumers. These 
practices have been eliminated under 
the FTA. 

Q. What impact does the FTA 
have on U.S. oil and gas producers? 

A. The agreement is not expected 
to have any immediate direct effect on 
U.S. oil and gas producers, large or 
small. The FTA should not change the 
level of Canadian exports of oil or gas, 
since the Canadians are not currently 
restraining export levels or discriminat- 
ing against U.S. consumers in the pric- 
ing of their exports. The United States, 
in turn, is not I'estricting imports. On 
the other hand, the FTA's rules against 
arbitrary or discriminatory government 
interference in energy trade over the 
longer term should help energy pro- 
ducers and consumers alike. 

F^inancial Services 

Q. How does the agreement affect 
U.S. commercial banks? 

A. The FTA removes previous lim- 
its on growth, capital, and market share 
in Canada. Specifically, U.S. banks are 
now exempt from the ceiling on the 
share of Canadian domestic banking as- 
sets that can be held by foreign banks, 
as well as the individual capital limits 
used to implement the ceiling. 



Q. How does the FTA affect U.S. 
insurance companies? 

A. U.S. insurance companies now 
have the same rights as Canadian insur- 
ance companies to diversify in the feder- 
ally regulated financial sector. They can 
either establish or acquire a closely held 
bank or an insurance or trust company. 
As a result of Ontario provincial re- 
forms, they also are able to acquire Ca- 
nadian securities firms. (Ontario is the 
center of Canada's securities industry.) 

Q. How are securities firms 
affected? 

A. As a result of the FTA, U.S. 
securities firms are granted access to 
Canada and, for the first time, are able 
to diversify their activities in Canada by 
affiliating with insurance companies, 
trust and loan companies, or closely held 
commercial banks. Through a financial 
holding company, they can enter these 
new areas of business either as new com- 
panies or by acquiring an existing firm. 

Prior to this agreement, U.S. secu- 
rities firms established in Canada were 
not primary distributors of Canadian 
Government paper or money market 
funds. The FTA assures that their appli- 
cations to engage in these activities will 
be considered on an equal basis with 
Canadian firms. 

Q. Is the FTA consistent with the 
principles of the Glass-Steagall Act? 

A. The FTA is fully consistent with 
the Glass-Steagall Act but broadens its 
application to allow Canadian (and other) 
banks in the United States to under- 
write and deal in debt obligations fully 
backed by the Canadian Government and 
its political subdivisions (the vast major- 
ity of current business of Canadian secu- 
rities firms). This conforms with the 
existing ability of banks in the United 
States to underwrite and deal in securi- 
ties of the U.S. Government and its po- 
litical subdivisions, now permitted under 
the act. In addition, any future Glass- 
Steagall liberalization would automat- 
ically apply to Canadian, as well as to 
U.S., financial institutions. 



Dispute Settlement and Remedies 

Q. If the FT.\ does not resolve all 
conflicts between the United States 
and Canada, what does it do about 
them? 

A. Most importantly, the FTA em- 
phasizes dispute avoidance. However, if 
disputes do occur, the settlement mech- 
anism, modeled after the GATT, is im- 
proved to assure more rapid and effec- 
tive settlement. There are four basic 
steps involved: 

• Notification and consultation; 

• Referral to a five-person panel, 
if needed; 

• A panel finding and recommen- 
dation; and 

• Dispute resolution or retaliation- 

If there is no resolution in 30 days» 
after the panel finding, a party may 
retaliate. This process applies to all 
disputes except antidumping and 
countervailing duty cases, as well 
as financial services, which have their 
own dispute settlement processes. 

Q. Does the FTA change U.S. an 
tidumping and countervailing duty 
laws? 

A. No. The FTA preserves the 
rights of U.S. companies to obtain reli& 
from injurious dumping and governmert 
subsidies under such laws. It has creats 
a procedure under which binational par 
els, substituting for national courts, 
review determinations in U.S. or Canan 
dian cases on products of the other 
country. 

Q. Is it constitutional to have 
a binational panel instead of U.S. 
courts review antidumping and couri 
tervailing duty determinations? 

A. There is no constitutional right 
to have a federal court hear an appeal o 
administrative decisions in such cases. 
The Congress has the power to prescril 
or limit the jurisdiction of federal 
courts; indeed, it was only in 1980 that i 
the Congress, by statute, provided for 
the range of appeals to Federal courts 
that are now available. Moreover, there' 
is no constitutional right to import or t( 
be subject to a particular tariff. Conse- 
quently, eliminating judicial review of 
determinations in cases against Cana- 
dian products does not raise due proces 
problems. ■ 



Department of State Bulletin/October 19J 



FEATURE-Canada 



Canada 



EOGRAPHY 

anada is more than 9.9 million squai'e 
ilometers (8.97 million sq. mi.) in area 
nd is the second largest country in the 
orld. Canada shares an 8,892-kilometer 
i,335-mi. ) border with the United 
tates, unfortified for more than a cen- 
iry. There are five major geographic 
jgions. 

• The Appalachian region encom- 
asses the Atlantic Provinces and part 
'southeastei'n Quebec and consists of 
mnded hills and rolling plains. 

• The St. Lawrence lowlands consist 
■fertile, low-lying plains bordering the 
reat Lakes and St. Lawrence River in 
)uthern Quebec and Ontario. 

• The Canadian Shield is an area of 
re-Cambrian rock extending from La- 
rador to the Arctic islaiids and covering 
lost of eastern and central Canada. The 
jrthern area of the Shield is a moss- 
)vered, treeless i)lain with permanently 
ozen subsoil. The Shield is thickly for- 
feted in the south. 

I • The interior plains extend from the 
|.S. border to the Arctic Ocean. In the 
'•uth, they are unforested and form the 
■eadbasket of Canada. North of the 
•airies, the plains are forested and con- 
in large deposits of oil, gas, and 
rtash. 

• The Cordilleran region is a strip of 
ountainous terrain about 800 kilome- 
■rs (.500 mi.) wide that includes most of 
ritish Columbia, the Yukon, and part 

western Alberta. 

The climate varies greatly, from 
■ctic to mild, but Canada may be de- 
ribed generally as having moderate 
mimers and long, cold winters. 



EOPLE 

f Canada's 2(5.1 million people, 80*^ live 
ithin 160 kilometers (100 mi.) of the 

S. border, and half of the population 
ves in the southeastern part of the 
luntry near the Great Lakes and the 
:. Lawrence River Yet, Canadians and 

S. citizens are not as similar as casual 
iscrvers freijuently assume. The Cana- 
an character and outlook have beei> 
'Visvd from a distinctive historical and 
icial background. 



iew of Roger's Pass on Mount Abbot. 




department of State Bulletin/October 1989 



FEATURE-Canada 




An Indian artist, member of the Hazelton band, paints designs on a wooden box. 



Canada's more than (i million French- 
s])eaking citizens are primarily descen- 
dants of colonists who settled the coun- 
try three centuries ago. The English- 
speaking community has been built up 
mostly by immigration from the United 
Kingdom. The largest influ.x from the 
United States occurred during the 
American Revolution when thousands of 
"Empire Loyalist.s" fled to Canada. 

Canadians of neither British nor 
French origin are generally of German, 
Ukrainian. Scandinavian, Italian, Dutch, 
Polish, indigencjus Indian, or Eskimo 
(Inuit) origin. 

Cultural Achievements 

Canadian culture has been shaped by 
four major influences: Canada's multi- 
cultural hei-itage; English/French bilin- 
gualism; sustained government funding 
for artistic and literary pursuits; and 
the abundance and availability of Ameri- 
can cultural i)roduction. Canadians view 
their country not as a melting pot but 
rather as a cultural mosaic. Inuit. Indian 
nations. Francophones, Anglophones, 
and immigrant groups have all sought to 
maintain their unic|ue cultural identities. 
Such efforts have been encouraged by 
e.xtensive government funding of the 
arts. After the Second World War, the 
government established the Canada 



Council to fund the arts, which has be- 
come the major patron of all forms of 
creative endeavor in Canada. Govern- 
ment support, as well as strict regula- 
tions mandating a specified amount of 
Canadian content in the media, has pro- 
duced an artistic atmosphere that en- 
courages creativity over mai-ketability. 
This atmosphere pervades all areas tii' 
art and culture, from television and 
films to literature and publishing. 

Canada has a colorful literary tradi- 
tion. Margaret Lawrence, Margaret At- 
wood. Robertson Davies, and Mordechai 
Richlei- i-ank among the most influential 
Anglo])hone authors. Leading Franco- 
phone authors include Gabrielle Roy and 
Jacc|ues Ferron. In visual arts, Cana- 
dians are most jjroud of a school of paint- 
ers known as "The Group of Seven." This 
school, whose exclusive subject was Ca- 
nadian landscape, is credited with a 
strictly Canadian style of painting, a 
"pictoral nationalism." With the support 
of the National Film Board, Canadian 
filmmakers such as Harry Rasky and 
Bill Mason are world leaders in produc- 
ing documentaries. Canada also has a 
number of world-class dance troupes, 
orchestras, and repertory theaters. 
Numerous well-known musicians claim 
Canada as their home, including Joni 
Mitchell, Anne Murray, Paul Anka, 
Gordon Lightfoot, Bryan Adams, and 
Corev Hart. 



HISTOKV 

Canada's early hi.story was dominated b 
rivalry between ^' ranee and Britain. In 
1 197, .John Cabot reached Newfoundland 
and claimed for Britain a large portion 
of the Atlantic seaboard. Cabot was fol- 
lowed by the French e.xplorer Jacques 
Cartier, who landed on the Gaspe Penini 
sula in 1.534 and claimed it for P' ranee. 

While the British settled along the 
coast, the French pushed rapidly into th 
interior, and for more than a century 
Canada was a French colony. The foun- 
der and settler of French Canada was 
Samuel de Champlain, who founded 
Quebec City in 1608 and established a 
number of other settlements along the 
Bay of F\mdy and the shores of the St. 
Lawrence River Ex|)lorers, traders, 
and missionaries, including Marquette, 
Joliet, and La Salle, extended French 
influence in "New France." 

Following the early years of settle- 
ment, French and English pioneers en- 
gaged in the highly competitive fur 
trade. Canada's political shape began tc 
emerge from the Battle of the Plains of 
Abraham at Quebec, where the British 
defeated the French in 17.59 and took 
over the French colonies in North Aniei 
ica. The memory of that event still has ; 
strong emotional appeal for French- 
Canadians. Although New France came 
under British control, it was permitted 
to retain its religion and civil code. To- 
day, by means of the Meech Lake Const' 
tutional Accord (subject to provincial 
ratification), Canada continues its quest 
to develop a constitutional formula that 
will .satisfy the aspirations of French- 
speaking Quebec. 

During the American Revolution, 
French and British colonists in Canadai 
i-ebuffed the overtures of American leat 
ei-s and chose British rule over indepent 
ence in association with the Ihiited 
States. A U.S. raid on Quebec was un- 
successful. In the War of 1812, U.S.- 
British rivalry in North America again 
resulted in the invasion of Canada. 

Several events accelerated the unio 
of the British colonies in Canada into a 
new nation. 

First, the political uprisings of 
1S87 in both English Ujjper Canada and 
French Lower Canada led to the creatio 
of local governments and to greater citi 
zen particijjation in government. 

Second, at the end of the American 
Civil War, it was feared that the I'nited 
States might turn against British Nort 
America. 



nooartmont nf Citato Riillptin/Drtnhpr 198 



FEATURE-Canada 



Finally, the e.\i)aiisi()n of the Anieri- 
111 West and the sUiwer settlement of 
le Canadian West encouraged the de- 
■iopnieiit of a Canadian transcontinen- 
,1 railroad and the perception among 
istern Canadian political leaders that a 
anadian federation from the Atlantic to 
le Pacific had to be achieved if western 
anada was to avoifl absorption by the 
nited States. 

The British North America Act of 
■1(37 created the new nation of Canada, 
)mprising four provinces — Ontario, 
uebec, New Brunswick, and Nova 
:'otia. It provided for a federal union 
id for a parliamentary system of gov- 
•niuent. Six other provinces eventually 
itered the confederation; the last was 
ewfoundland in 1949. 



OVERNMENT 

anada is a constitutional monarchy 
ith a bilingual federal system, a parlia- 
entary form of government, and strong 
^mocratic traditions. Although in 1982 
anada consolidated its written consti- 
tion, many of the country's legal and 
irliamentary practices are based on 
iwritten custom, as is the case in 
le United Kingdom. On the other hand, 
je federal structure — uniting the 10 
•ovinces in a federal government — 
sembles the U.S. federal .system. The 
nstitution provides for a federal gov- 
nment to which are reserved specific 
iwers, such as those relating to de- 
nse, trade and commerce, banking and 
irrency, criminal law, postal services, 
id certain taxes, as well as all powers 
it expressly granted to the provinces, 
ne provinces have authority to admin- 
iter and legislate on such matters as ed- 
■ation, jjroperty laws, health, and local 
■fairs generally. The 1982 Charter of 
ights guarantees basic rights in many 
eas. 

Queen Elizabeth II, as Queen of 
anada. .serves as a symbol of the na- 
3n's unity. She appoints the governor 
meral on the advice of the prime minis- 
r of Canada, usually for a -S-year term. 

Canada's parliament consists of an 
ipointive Senate and an elective House 
Commons. In practice, legislative 
iwer rests with the Commons (295 
embers). Senate members are appoint- 
I by the governor general on the advice 
the prime mini.ster. Commons mem- 
Ts are elected at least every .5 years 
it also at any time that the prime min- 
ter advises the governor general to dis- 
Ive the House. 



Canada — A Profile 



Geography 

.\rea: 9.97 million sq. km. (3.8 million sq. 
mi.); second largest country in the world. Cit- 
ies: C(/pi7a/— Ottawa (pop. 83:^000). Other 
cities — Toronto (3.-5 milli(in), Montreal (2.9 
million), Vancouver (1.4 million). Terrain: 
Varied. Climate: Temperate to arctic. 

People 

Nationality: S'dhh and adjective — 
Canadian(s). Population (1988): 26.1 million. 
.Annual growth rate (1987-88); l.29c. Ethnic 
groups: British 'Irt^c , French 24*^, European 
W/( , indigenous Indian and Eskimo l.¥/e, 
mixed background 28'^f. Religions: Roman 
Catholic 47''/f , United Church 16'7f , Anglican 
10'^. Languages: English, French. Literacy — 
9.9'/; of population aged 15 and over have at 
least a ninth grade education. Health: Infant 
inortalilii ra^c— 7.3/1,000 (U.S. = 11.2/1,000). 
Lite e.rpectancji — 73 yrs. males, 80 yrs. fe- 
males. Work force (13.3 million, 1988); 
Agricnitiire — 0.4 million. Mannfacturing — 
2.1 million. Trade — 2.2 million. Communiti/i 
tiiisiness/personal service — 4.1 million. Public 
adininixlratinn — 0.8 million. 

Government 

Type: Confederatiim with parliamentary de- 
mocracy. Independence: .luly 1. 18(37. Consti- 
tution: Amended British North America Act 
|)atriated to Canada in 1982, charter of rights, 
and unwritten custom. 

Branches: Execntive — Queen Elizabeth 
II (chief of state, represented by a governor 
general), prime minister (head of govern- 
ment), cabinet. Legislative — bicameral parlia- 
ment (l()4-member Senate, 295-member House 
of (.'onimons). Jndicial — Supreme Court. 

Political parties: Progressive Conserv- 
ative. Liberal, New Democratic. Reform, 
Social Credit. 

Suffrage: Universal over 18. 



Government budget (FY 1984-8.5); 
Expenditures — C.$125.5 billion. Revennes — 
C$97.5 billion. Dp/Vc/7— C$28.0 billion. 

Defense: 27^ ofGNP. 

Subdivisions: 10 provinces. 2 territories. 

Flag: A red maple leaf on a white back- 
ground flanked by vertical red bands. 

Economy 

GDP (1988); .$48(i.3 billion. Annual real GDP 
growth rate: 4.5^^^. Per capita GDP (1988); 
$18,707. 

Natural resources: Metals and minerals, 
fish, forests, wildlife. 

.Agriculture: Products — wheat, livestock 
and meat, feedgrains. oilseeds, dairy prod- 
ucts, tobacco, fruits, vegetables. 

Industry: Ti/pes — motor vehicles and 
parts, fish and forest products, petroleum 
and natural gas, processed and unprocessed 
minerals. 

Trade (1988); Exports— $m.i billion: mo- 
tor vehicles and parts, lumber, woodpulp and 
newsprint, crude and fabricated metals, natu- 
ral gas, crude petroleum, wheat. Partners — 
U.S. 74'*, EC 18'7r. .Japan 5'7r. Imports— 
.$103.6 billion; motor vehicles and parts, indus- 
trial machinery, crude petroleum, chemicals, 
agricultural machinery. Partners — U.S. 69%, 
EC 8^;;,. Japan (W. 

Official exchange rate (floating, average 
closing rate for 1988); C$l= U.S. C81.24. 

Fiscal year: April 1-March 31. 

Development assistance (FY 1987-88); 
$2billi(jnijr0.4'; ofCDP. 

Membership in 
International Organizations 

UN, North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO). North Atlantic Fisheries Organiza- 
tion, Organization for Economic 
Coo[ierati<in and Development (OECD), 
Commonwealth, La Francophonie, Agency for 
Cultural and Technical Cooperation, Interna- 
tional Energy Agency (lEA), INTELSAT. 



The cabinet is led by the prime min- 
ister, who is the leader of the political 
party in power The cabinet remains in 
office as long as it retains majority sup- 
port in the Commons on major issues. 

Criminal law, a federal prerogative, 
is uniform throughout the nation and is 
based largely on British law. Civil law is 
based on the common law of England, ex- 
cept in Quebec, which has retained its 



own civil code patterned after that of 
France. .Justice is administered by fed- 
eral, provincial, and municipal courts. 

Government in the jjrovinces is pat- 
terned much along the lines of the cen- 
tral government. Each province is 
governed by a premier and a single, elect- 
ed legislative chamber. A lieutenant- 
governor, appointed by the governor 
general, represents the crown in each 
province. 



teoartment of State Bulletin/October 1989 



FEATURE-Canada 



Principal Government Officials 

Chief of Statt^Queen Elizabeth II 
Governor General — Madame Jeanne 

Sauve 
Prime Minister — Brian Mulroney 
Secretary of State for External 

Affairs — ,Joe Clark 

Ambassador to the United States — 

Derek Burney 
Ambassador to the United Nations — 

Yves Fortier 

Canada maintains an embassy in 
the United States at 501 Pennsylvania 
Avenue, NW., Washingrton, D.C. 20001 
(tel. 202-(382-1740). 




CaiHidicui coiiKulatefi 
in the United States 
Atlanta, Georgia 
Boston, 

Massachusetts 
Buffalo, New York 
Chicago, Illinois 
Cleveland, Ohio 
Dallas. Texas 
Detroit, Michigan 
Los Angeles, 

California 
Minneapolis, 

Minnesota 
New York, 

New York 
San Francisco, 

California 
Seattle, Washington 



(404) 577-6810 
(617) 262-3760 

(716) 852-1247 
(312) 427-1031 
(216) 771-0150 
(214) 992-9806 
(313) 567-2340 
(213) 687-7432 

(612) 333-1641 

(212) 586-2400 

(415) 981-2670 

(206) 443-1777 



Changing of the guard ceremony in front of 
Parliament, Ottawa. 



POLITICAL CONDITIONS 

The three national parties in Canada are 
the Progressive Conservatives, the Lib- 
erals, and the New Democratic Party 
(NDP), a Social Democratic party formed 
in 1961. Since 1921, either the Liberal or 
the Conservative Party has controlled 
the Canadian Government. Both are 
broadbased parties of the center that at- 
tempt to win support from all groups 
and regions of the country. In federal 
elections, the Liberals had relied in the 
past on strong support from Quebec. 
However, in the 1984 and 1988 federal 
elections, the Progressive Conservatives 
took the large majority of seats in that 
province. The Conservatives tradi- 
tionally have been strong in the western 
provinces. Heavily populated Ontario 
shifts between the two parties and often 
plays a decisive role in elections. 

The Progressive Conservative Party 
won 169 seats in the House of Commons 
in the November 21, 1988 election and 
again formed a majority government 
with representation from every region in 
the nation. The Liberal Party, the official 
opposition, won 83 seats; the NDP, 43. 

Quebec's status remains a serious 
political issue in Canada. In 1980, the 
Parti Quebecois sought, through a refer- 
endum, a mandate from the people of 
Quebec to negotiate a new status, 
"sovereignty-association," involving 
political independence with continued 
economic association with the rest of 
Canada. Sixty percent of Quebec voters 
rejected the proposal. 



In 1982, Queen Elizabeth ceremo- 
nially turned over full responsibility foi 
Canada's constitution, the amended Brii 
ish North America Act of 1867, to the j' 
Canadian Parliament. Patriation of the u 
constitution was made possible when tb 
federal government and nine provinces 
agreed on a Charter of Rights and an 
amending formula. Only Quebec did not 
concur. However, Quebec's current Lib- 
eral government has strongly endorsed 
the 1987 Meech Lake Constitutional Ac- 
cord that would bring the province into 
Canada's federal constitutional frame- 
work while recognizing Quebec as a "dii 
tinct society." The accord must still be 
ratified by two provinces (Manitoba an 
New Brunswick) by June 1990 before it 
takes effect. 

Federal-provincial relations are a 
central feature of Canadian politics. 
Quebec wishes to preserve and strengt 
en its distinct nature. Western pro- 
vinces desire more control over their 
abundant natural resources, especially 
energy reserves. Industrialized centra 
Canada is concerned with other aspect 
of economic development, while the At- 
lantic provinces have resisted federal 
claims to fishing and mineral rights off 
their shores. Canadians have responde 
to these differing regional needs by 
strengthening both their confederation' 
and the fundamental democratic princi 
pies essential to a balanced federal- 
provincial political system. 



ECONOMY 

Canada ranks seventh in the world in 
gross domestic product and is one of th 
world's largest producers of a wide vari 
ety of minerals. The mineral industry 
has been a major factor in Canada's eco 
nomic development. Canada's lakes havi 
more than 50V( of the world's fresh wa- 
ter, and 759'( of Canada's power needs a 
met by hydroelectric energy. 

The year 1988 marked the .sixth an 
.secutive year that Canada held its |)iisi- 
tion as one of the strongest economies i 
the t)rganization for Economic Coopeni 
tion and Development. Fueled by strmii 
investment in plant and equipment, (a; 
ada's economy grew by 5*/^ . This perforr 
ance not only surpassed 1987's growth 
rate of 4.5'/^ but was the highest rate 
since 1984. The spectacular growth of 
Canadian manufacturing, particularly 
since the 1950s, has transfoi-med the na 
tion from a rural, agricultural society 
into one primai'ily industrial and urbar 



n<sr>ortmortt r>f Qtata Rl ■llotm/notnKor 1Qfl 



FEATURE-Canada 



ndustry is now the leading- segment of 
he nation's economy, employing one- 
hii'il of the woi'k force. 



iKriiulture, Forestry, and Fisheries 

agriculture's contribution to the Cana- 
ian economy is very similar to that of 
he United States, averaging less than 
% of gross national product and employ- 
lent in the late 1980s. Agricultural ex- 
orts are less than 10*^* of all trade; led 
y wheat and barley to thii'd markets 
nd by pork and hoi-ticultui'al products 
D the United States. The United States 
i Canada's leading mai'ket. taking near- 
: one-third of all food exi)()rts. domi- 
ated by pork and horticultural products, 
lonversely, Canada is the United States' 
econd largest market, primarily impor- 
ing fresh fruits and vegetables and live- 
tock products. 

Forest covers 49"^^^, or 4.5 million 
quare kilometers (1.7 million sq. mi.) of 
'anada's total land area. Poorest product 
xports, including pulp and paper, repre- 
ent about W7( of Canada's total export 
rade with nearly two-thirds going to 
he United States. Canada is the world's 
'ading jjroducer of newsprint, account- 
ig for 4(K'( of global output. The United 
tates imports nearly 759; of Canada's 
Dtal newsprint production. 

Commercial fisheries provide an an- 
ual catch of about 1.4 million metric 
ons (1.54 million tons), and some 709( of 
he catch is exported. 

Minerals 

'anada ranks first in the world in min- 
ral exports and third in mineral pro- 
uction, after the United States and the 
ioviet Union. It is the world's largest 
uroducer of zinc, potash, uranium, and 
lickel; the second largest producer of as- 
lestos, silver, titanium, gypsum, and 
ulfur; and a leading producer of molyb- 
..enuni, aluminum, cobalt, gold, lead, 
opper, iron, and platinum. Mineral 
eposits are located in all regions. 

Canada is a major producer of hy- 
roelectricity, oil, and gas and, unlike 
lost of its industrial partners, is a net 
xporter of energy (i)rimarily gas and 
lectricity). Canada's exports and im- 
lorts of oil currently are in approximate 
lalance. Nevertheless, crude petroleum 
s the largest single component of Cana- 
da's minerals output. In 1988, Canadian 
|il reserves were about 6.8 billion bar- 
els, including arctic reserves. Canada 



produces annually more than 5(XJ million 
barrels of oil and about 8.5 trillion cubic 
feet of natural gas annually. The United 
States imports about 69f of its natural 
gas requirements from Canada. 

Foreign Trade 

In total volume of trade, Canada ranks 
seventh in the world, after the United 
States, the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, France, the United Kingdom, 
Japan, and Italy. 

The value of U.S. -Canadian mer- 
chandise trade for 1988 was over $157 
billion, more than between any other 
two countries in the world. Also in 1988 
about 2b^''r of all U.S. merchandise ex- 
ports went to Canada, and Canada 
supplied about 22Vf of total U.S. 
mei'chandise imjjorts. 

Almost one-third of U.S. -Canadian 
ti-ade occurs under the terms of the 
U.S. -Canada Automotive Agreement 
(Auto Pact), which provides for free 
trade between the two nations in cars, 
trucks, and auto parts. Under the 1965 
agreement, two-way trade in automotive 
products rose from $715 million in 1964 
to $23 billion by 1978. In 1980-81, the 
two-way trade declined to about $18 bil- 
lion, but it rose to $51.5 billion in 1988. 

Foreign Investment 

The investment relationship between the 
United States and Canada is extremely 
close. The United States is the largest 
foreign investor in Canada. In late 1988, 
the stock of U.S. direct investment in 
Canada was estimated at over $66 billion, 
or about SO^f of total foreign direct in- 
vestment in Canada. Similarly, Canada's 
investment exposure in the United 
States currently is quite substantial. At 
the end of 1988, the stock of Canadian 
direct investment in the United States 
stood at $35 billion (includes investments 
from Canadian holding companies lo- 
cated in the Netherlands), or 20'7f of total 
foreign direct investment in the United 
States. 

U.S. investment in Canada primar- 
ily is in the mining and smelting in- 
dustries, petroleum, chemicals, the 
manufacturing of machinery and trans- 
portation equipment, and finance. Cana- 
dian investment in the United States is 
concentrated in petroleum, real estate, 
manufacturing, and trade. 



FOREIGN RELATIONS 

In Canada's early days as a nation, its 
foreign affairs were conducted by the 
United Kingdom. By 1909, the Canadian 
drive for autonomy led to the creation of 
a Department of External Affairs. After 
World War I, Canadian representatives 
signed the Treaty of Versailles and be- 
gan to conduct a truly independent for- 
eign policy. 

World War II gave considerable im- 
petus to Canadian participation in world 
affairs. Canada took an active role in the 
creation of the United Nations, which it 
has strongly supported. It has contrib- 
uted troops to UN forces in Korea, 
the Middle East, the Congo, Yemen, 
Namibia, and Cyprus. In addition to its 
peacekeeping activities, Canada has as- 
sumed a prominent role in the United 
Nations in disarmamant discussions, en- 



Canada's Provinces 
and Territories 

Atlantic Provinces: Newfoundland, Prince 
Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Bruns- 
wick. ,4i-ra— .541,18()sq. km. (208,146 sq. 
mi.). Population (1988)— 2.3 million. Ethnic 
groups — predominantly British, French. 
hidnslrii — fishing, agriculture, mining, 
manufacturing. 

Quebec: Area— l,35(i, 790 sq. km. (.523,857 
sq. mi.). Population (1988)— 6.7 million. 
Etiinic groups — predominantly F'reneh, 
British, other European groups. Industri/ — 
agriculture, mining, manufacturing, hydro- 
electric power. 

Ontario: Area— 891,190 sq. km. (345,420 sq. 
mi.). Population (1988)- 9.5 million. Ethnic 
groups — British. French, other European 
groups. Indnstrg — manufacturing, agricul- 
ture, mining. 

Prairie provinces: Manitoba, Saskatche- 
wan, Alberta. Area — 1.77 million sq. km. 
((WO, 757 sq. mi.). Population (1988)^.5 mil- 
lion. Ethnic groups — British, other Euro- 
pean groups. Industrg — agriculture, cattle, 
petroleum and natural gas, mining, 
manufacturing. 

British Columbia: Area — 934,125 sq. km. 
(3,59,279 .sq. mi.). Population (1988)— 3 
million. Ethnic groups — British, other 
European, Chinese, indigenous Indian. 
Industrg — forestry, manufacturing, fish- 
ing, mining, agriculture. 

Territories: Northwest Territory and 
Yukon Territory. Area — 3.79 million sq. km. 
(1.45 million sq. mi). Population (1988) — 
72,300. Ethnic groups — British, indigenous 
Indian, Inuit. Industry — mining. 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1989 



11 



FEATURE-Canada 



vironmental activities, law of the sea ne- 
gotiations, human rights issues, North- 
South issues, and world food problems. 
Canada also continues to be a strong 
supporter of the nuclear Non- 
Proliferation Treaty and its goals. 

A member of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) since its in- 
ception, Canada shares responsibility, 
with the United States and other allies, 
for the North Atlantic Treaty area. Due 
to its membership in NATO, Canada is 
an active participant in discussions stem- 
ming from the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe. 

Two other international organiza- 
tions of special interest to Canada are 
the Commonwealth — an association of 
former British colonies that share sim- 
ilarities of language, customs, and 
institutions — and La Francophonie — an 
association of French-speaking countries 
that include France and former French 
colonies. Since about 24'%- of all 
Canadians regard French as their 
mother tongue, Canada has sought to 
broaden and strengthen ties with La 
Francophonie. 

Canadian economic assistance to de- 
veloping countries totals more than $2 
billion annually. The official channel for 
government overseas aid programs is the 
Canadian International Development 
Agency. Canada also contributes sub- 
stantially to international and regional 
development organizations and is a major 
supplier of food aid. 



U.S.-CANADL\N RELATIONS 

Canada views its relationship with the 
United States as crucial to a wide range 
of Canadian interests. The bilateral rela- 
tionship is varied and complex. Although 
differences inevitably occur occasionally, 
the basic characteristics of Canadian- 
U.S. relations are close friendship and 
cooperation in a wide range of fields. 

The two countries cooperate closely 
in resolving transboundary environment- 
al issues, an area of increasing impoi-- 
tance in the bilateral relationship. A 
principal instrument of this cooperation 
is the InternationalJoint Commission 
(I.JC). Established in 1909, the IJC is a 
unique approach to international envi- 
ronmental cooperation. The Great Lakes 
Water Quality Agreements of 1972 and 
197M, aimed at jjreserving and enhancing 
the water quality of the Great Lakes, are 
historic e.xamples of joint cooperation in 



controlling transboundary water pollu- 
tion. The United States and Canada fre- 
quently consult on possible approaches to 
dealing with the difficult ])roblem of 
transboundary air pollution. 

The United States and Canada also 
recently have resolved several major is- 
sues involving fisheries. By common 
agreement, the two countries submitted 
a Gulf of Maine boundary dispute to the 
ICJ in 1981; both accepted the Court's 
October 12, 1984 ruling. On January 28, 
198.5, the United States and Canada 
signed the Pacific Salmon Treaty, the 
culmination of years of difficult negotia- 
tions aimed at rebuilding the Pacific 
salmon resource. 

U.S. -Canadian economic relations 
provide a number of examples of cooper- 
ative efforts, such as the Auto Pact, 
which created a largely integrated two- 
country market for automobiles, and de- 
fense economic arrangements, which di- 
minish obstacles to trade and technology 
exchange and encourage a balance of 
trade in defense related areas. 

Investment and trade issues are a 
constant feature of U.S. -Canadian rela- 
tions. This is to be expected, given the 
enormous flows of capital between the 
countries and the fact that each is the 
other's most important market. 

The U.S. -Canada trading relation- 
ship has been further enhanced by the 
bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
that became effective on .January 1, 1989. 
Over a 10-year period, the FTA will re- 
move all tariffs and virtually all import 
and export restrictions; resolve many 
longstanding bilateral irritants; and lib- 
eralize rules in several areas including 
agriculture, services, energy, financial 
•services, investment, and government 
procurement. 

Energy and transportation issues 
also need constant attention, some of 
which have caused differences in the 
past, but, in most cases, they have been 
successfully resolved or managed. 



DEFENSE 

U.S. defense arrangements with Canada 
are more extensive and intimate than 
with any other country. The Permanent 
Joint Board on Defense, established in 
1940, provides policy-level consultation 
on bilateral defense matters. The United 
States and Canada share NATO mutual 
security commitments. As the only other 



non-European ally, Canada contributes 
forces to NATO commands in Europe 
and the North Atlantic. In addition, 
U.S. and Canadian military forces sincf 
1958 have cooperated on continental air' 
defense within the framework of the 
North American Aeros])ace Defense 
Command, an integrated bilateral mili- 
tary command exercising operational 
control over U.S. and Canadian air de- 
fen.se forces and also providing early 
warning information on possible air ana 
missile attack on North America. Canai 
da and the United States work closely 
in defense research and production. 



Principal U.S. Officials 

Ambassador — Edward N. Ney 
Deputy Chief of Mission — Dwight N. 

Mason 
Minister-Counselor for Political 

Affairs — Stephen Buck 
Minister-Counselor for Economic 

Affairs — Lawrence P. Taylor 
Minister-Counselor for Public Affairs — 

James P. Thurber 
Minister-Counselor for Commercial 

Affairs — George Mu. 

The LLS. Embassy in Canada is lo-^ 
cated at 100 Wellington Street, Ottawa^. 
(tel. 6i;^238-.5335). There are U.S. con-^ 
sulates general in the following Cana- 
dian cities: Calgary, Alberta (tel. 403- 
266-8962); Halifa.x", Nova Scotia (tel. 
902-429-2480); Montreal, Quebec 
(tel. .514-281-1886); Quebec City, Quebeo 
(tel. 41bM392-2095); Toronto, Ontario 
(tel. 416-595-1700); and Vancouver, 
British Columbia (tel. 604-685-4311). 



Taken from the Bnckgroiind Notes of Junei 
1989, published by the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, Department of State. Editor: 
Juanita Adams. ■ 



12 



Department of State Bulletin/October 198 



fHE PRESIDENT 



NJew Conference of August 15 (Excerpts) 



President Biisli held a news con- 
rn lice in the Briefing Room at the 
Vliitc House on Angnst 15, 1989.^ 

J. Your spokesman said yesterday 
Ihat significant progress had been 

tiade in pursuing the issues of the 
ostages. We're told that you've been 
m the phone to foreign leaders, that 
here's been a flurry of diplomatic 
■ontacts, but can you say today that 
ve're any closer to seeing the hos- 
ages released than we were, say, 
ibout 3 weeks ago when the Israeli 
seizure of Sheik [Abdul KarimI Obeid 
iMuslim cleric and Hezbollah leader] 
set into motion this chain of devel- 
opments that seems to have raised 
expectations or hopes of a break- 
hrough"? 

A. I can't say that today, but we're 
idiii.u to keep on trying. But I cannot 
;i\f you a definitive assessment of that. 
just don't know. There are a lot of lines 
ml there, a lot of initiatives have been 
akcn. As I said earlier, the cooperation 
hat we've received — some that we've so- 
iciled and some unsolicited — from lead- 
rs ai'ound the world has just been 
iiaiiiiificent. But I can't give you that 
Kisitive assessment at this point. 

Q. In the absence of an exchange 
)f prisoners, have you considered the 
•xtradition of Sheik Obeid to this 
■ountry to face criminal charges? 

\. No, we have no criminal indict- 
nent against Sheik Obeid. 

Q. Is that any kind of legal 
>ption? 

A. We wouldn't move against some- 
)ody without the legal process going 
'orward. 

Q. W^hat does it mean when you 
joinfedly remind Iran that goodwill 
oegets goodwill'.' The United States 
.vants the return of the .\merican 
nostages in Lebanon. If that oc- 
curred, what would the United States 
io in return for Iran'/ 

A. Too hypothetical to answer, but I 
i\<iul(l simply repeat that we're looking 
(ii- signs of change, certainly when it 
•limes to holding of hostages. We all 
\iiiiw that we've had some major differ- 
■iiri-s with Iran and the question of state 
-liiiiisorship of terrorism: that's a given. 
N'l i\\ we see a new leader coming in, and 



we hear different signals coming out of 
Iran — some in the old mode and then 
some that offer more hope. And so I will 
just leave it stand that a clear and good 
signal would be the release of American 
hostages, and there are many ways that 
countries are estranged can get back to- 
gethei', from diplomatic relations or a 
wide array of other things. So I just 
hope that the positive signs prevail 
there, because there are some. And they 
are encouraging. 

We don't have to be hostile with Iran 
for the rest of our lives. We've had a 
good relationship with them in the past. 
They are of strategic importance. They 
would be welcome back into the family of 
law-abiding, non-terrorist-sponsoring 
nations. But I just would repeat that I'd 
like to see that kind of change go for- 
ward, positive change. 

Q. As you formulate your drug 
plans, Bill Bennett comes up with his 
proposals to you, how do you feel 
about the possibility of penalizing 
Latin American countries which fail 
to cooperate with us in stemming the 
flow^ of drugs from Latin America? 

A. I wouldn't be opposed to that, 
provided they were able to cooperate 
with us. I mean, you take a country like 
Colombia, and I am convinced that Pres- 
ident Barco wants to cooperate. But his 
country has been ripped asunder by the 
drug cartels. And you've had Supreme 
Court justices slain, you've had people 
hunted down in Eastern Eui'ope from 
Colombia and killed, and so I think there 
has to be some measuring of intention 
before you paint with an exti-aordinarily 
broad brush and say. Hey, drugs are 
coming in from your country, and there- 
fore we're going to cut you off. 

And so I would hope that we'd have 
much more enlightened diplomacy or en- 
lightened foreign policy than to isolate 
every country, even though that country 
was trying to do something about drugs 
at the source. 

Q. But are there some countries 
out there which are not cooperating, 
and which you're actually thinking 
about penalizing economically? 

A. No proposal has come to me now, 
but there's been some, as you know; 
there's been a lot of suggestions on Cap- 
itol Hill about this. But I feel a certain 
responsibility to look at the problems 
that are facing some of these countries 



with limited armed forces of their own, 
with very complicated insurgencies in 
their countries, and to formulate a for- 
eign policy that takes these things into 
consideration. 

Q. Back to Sheik Obeid for a mo- 
ment. In light of his reported role in 
the kidnaping of Col. Higgins, would 
it not be the appropriate step for the 
United States to convene a grand jury 
and to pursue a possible criminal in- 
dictment against him, and then for 
the Administration to go forward 
with an effort to extradite him to 
this country? 

A. If the justice system goes for- 
ward and there is an indictment against 
him, I would be remiss if I didn't try to 
see him brought to trial. 

Q. Can't you take the lead in that 
and encourage the Justice Depart- 
ment to proceed — 

A. I put it just exactly the way I 
want to put it. [Laughter] 

Q. Can you explain why you have 
not retaliated for the murder of 
Col. Higgins? 

A. If I could find some action — 
diplomatic, military, private sector, pub- 
lic sector — that I thought would help get 
the hostages out or guard against future 
hostage taking, I would take such action. 
Military action — I'd like to know what 
action we took was not going to victim- 
ize a lot of innocent people. And I'd like 
to be sure of all the facts before taking 
action on the Higgins case. I wish I 
could tell you we had all the facts, and 
we don't. 

When you look at the action that the 
United States can take, I don't want to 
be responsible for the loss of innocent 
life. I also would have to weigh, if we 
considered military action, the lives of 
the Americans that were being asked to 
carry out that action. So it's just not 
clear yet. But if I could find a way to 
take those hostages, get them and bring 
them out, and that requii'ed using the 
military force of the United States, 
make no mistake about it: I would do it 
in an instant. 

Q. May I ask what you're doing 
to increase the intelligence that 
would let you do something like that? 
Have you ordered the CIA [Central 
Intelligence Agency] to try to get 
assets in Lebanon? 



pep 



department of State Bulletin/October 1989 



13 



THE PRESIDENT 



A. The problem there is, it takes a 
long time. I do think that the period that 
we went through quite a few years ago 
has resulted in less human intelligence 
than is necessary to come to grips with 
something as murky as hostage holding. 
I'd like to do more, and the various agen- 
cies know of my interest in this, but I 
don't want to hold out the wrong kind of 
hope that you can say let's get more 
agents, more intelligence of the human 
source and that that happens overnight. 
It just doesn't work that way. 

Q. On September 1st, there will 
be an inauguration of the candidate 
that Noriega supported, effectively 
institutionalizing what the United 
States considers a stolen election. 
What is the United States going to do 
now? Are we going to be limited to 
these kinds of skirmishes that we saw 
last week, these arrests of one side or 
the other, or is there something else? 

A. I don't know for sure what we're 
going to do. Part of our understanding of 
the OAS [Organization of American 
States] agreement was that Noriega 
would be out. I'm not holding my breath 
on his voluntary departure, but — and I 
have told Mr. Endara, who was duly elect- 
ed by the people of Panama, the other 
day that we will continue to support 
what the people of Panama voted foi\ But 
it's still rather murky as to what will 
happen beyond September 1st. There are 
some hints that possibly there will be a 
transfer. Let me just simply say this: I 
would reiterate that our argument is not 
with the Panamanian Defense Forces: it 
is with Mr. Noriega himself. And that if 
he were to go out, and that you had the 
will of the people recognized, we would 
instantly have better relations with Pan- 
ama. It would be good for our country, 
and certainly it would improve life for 
the Panamanians. 

Q. I know there's talk about 
using military assistance to provide 
to Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia to 
help cut down on drug trafficking. 
Can you tell me if you would consider 
deploying U.S. troops in these coun- 
tries to help in that effort? 

A. I have said previously, way back 
in the campaign, that I would give seri- 
ous consideration to an invitation from 
countries to help them. And I'll tell 
you what I found at this G-7 [Group of 
Seven] meeting. It was a very interest- 



ing — from several of the European lead- 
ers, the feeling that maybe we ought to 
have some kind of international effort to 
help countries in this regard, going after 
jjeople where — in a country, at the invi- 
tation of a government of a country, peo- 
ple that have been out of the reach of 
the law enforcement of the local — of the 
country itself, of the government. 

We have no specifics on that at this 
point, but generally speaking, we have 
used military assets, as you know. We've 
used helicopters, for example, in I be- 
lieve it was Bolivia and perhaps Peru. 
And we're interested in all of this. But 
I don't think you can inflict force on a 
country, and I wouldn't want to be a part 
ofthat'atall. 

Q. You talked about some con- 
flicting signals coming out of Iran as 
a result of your diplomatic efforts. 

A. I'm not sure it's a result of it, but 
there are conflicting signals coming out 
of Iran. 

Q. Perhaps coincident with your 
diplomatic efforts. Ud like to ask. do 
you believe that President [.\li Akbar 
Hashemi] Rafsanjani is firmly in 
charge in Iran and how long are you 
prepared to give this diplomatic proc- 
ess before trving some other means or 
effort? 

A. Please elaborate. What do you 
mean "before trying some other means"? 
I'm not sure — 

Q. There are those who believe 
that there should be stronger mili- 
tary messages sent. 

A, I don't know the answer to your 
first part of it, and I don't know any e.\- 
pert in this government who does. I had 
a meeting with various agency e.xperts 
on Iran, and I think the jury is still out 
as to what has happened internally there 
in Iran. I think all our experts feel that 
there are some hopeful signs, and I 
would cite some of the comments by Mr. 
Rafsanjani. Then you've seen some coun- 
tersigns, one as recently as yesterday, by 
Mr. Khamenei [Ayatollah Ali Khamenei]. 
There are others — their Interior Minis- 
ter, who seems to be very hard over. 

So, I think we don't know yet. We 
don't know how it is sorting out. But 
again, I would go back to the earlier an- 
swer, that that's fine. That can move for- 
ward. But if I find some other channel or 
action that would get our hostages out of 
there, I wouldn't wait on sorting out the 
internal affairs of Iran. 



Q. .lust how long are you pre- 
pared to wait, and would you consider 
stepping up military pressure in this '; 
process? And to what extent do you 
hold Iran responsible for the safety o 
these hostages? 

A. Again, we're trying to sort 
out — there certainly — I think that if 
Iran decided they wanted those hostages 
to come out of there, there would be a 
good likelihood that that would happen, 
perhaps not with certainty but a good -- 
likelihood. 

As you know, the position of the 
U.S. Government has been that Iran am 
a couple of other states have been in- 
volved in the state sponsorship of terror 
ism. I don't think it's a question of how . 
long; it's a question of not — in my view, 
it's a question of exploring every avenue' 
to get these people back and recognizinji 
that at some point we have to stand up 
for our interests, even if it means mili- 
tary. And yet I'm not threatening mili- 
tary action because I've told you some o: 
the constraints on authorizing military 
action. 

Q. What is the United States do- 
ing, if anything, to try and stop the 
destruction of Beirut that is under- 
way? Is it a fear that if the Syrians 
succeed in driving the Christians out 
that will seriously set back any prog- 
ress that's been made on settling the 
West Bank and Gaza problems? 

A. The answer to your last questioi 
is yes, and the answer to the first is, 
joining others in calling for a cease-fire 
and the withdrawal of all foreign forces; 
support for the Arab League mission, 
which regrettably has hit an impasse 
right now, but encouraging those three 
countries involved to reenergize that inr 
tiative; joining where we can — I had a 
long talk with the Secretary General 
[Javier Perez de Cuellar] to see what rol* 
the United Nations can play, and indeed- 
I might take the opportunity to thank 
him for his timely dispatch of his emis- 
sary to the Middle East, although that 
wasn't a mission about Lebanon. It had 
to do with Col. Higgins. I was deeply ap 
preciative of his taking that action. 

We're in a vei'y complicated situa- 
tion in Lebanon where I'm not sure any 
outside power can do other than exhort 
people in the country to have this cease- 
fire and to withdraw foreign forces, and' 
then to take a look at whatever constitu- 
tional change is necessary so you have a 
representation there that all factions in 
Lebanon can feel comfortable with. It's i 
long process, and in the meantime, I am 



14 



AFRICA 



iterally heartbroken. I've bored some 
if .\<m with this, but I've been to 
A'l)anon when I was in business and I 
eiall it as the peaceful oasis in a then- 
roubled Middle East, and I saw Chris- 
iaiis living peacefully with the Mus- 
ims. And someday again, I'd like to 
ihink that Lebanon can be restored to 
'hat— 

Q. There are reports that the 
Jnited States does not want to pres- 
;ure Syria to back off because we 
\eed their help to get the hostages 
)ut. 

A. That's wrong. I've never heard 
uch a report. But if there's such a re- 
)ort you've heard, it is wrong. 

Q. In an interview last week, I 
»elieve with Hearst Newspapers, you 
leemed to say that you would be wili- 
ng to kidnap Gen. Noriega to bring 
lim to justice. Is that your policy, 
ind would that be an appropriate 
hing for the U.S. Government to do? 

A. We have an indictment out 
igaiiist Gen. Noriega for drug traffick- 
n.y. I'm told that it's a good indictment, 
hat it's an in-depth indictment. I'm not 
a,\'iiig what I would or wouldn't do, but 
hi'i'e was a case where a man named 
uscf — I believe — Yunis was appre- 
lended and brought to justice. I have 
in obligation to try to bring people 
o justice. 

Q. Are there any constraints on 
ivhat means you use, even though 
here's a legal indictment, or are 
here limits on what would be ap- 
)ropriate in enforcing such an 
ndictment"? 

A. There are always limits. There 
u-e always limits in matters of this 
lature. And the limits, as far as I'm 
•oncerned, are the lives, first, of Ameri- 
■ans, and clearly innocent life. You've 
^ot to consider those things when you go 
ibout whatever it is, hostages or trying 
:o bring Mr. Noriega to justice. 

Q. There has been some talk of 
sending the Green Berets to South 
America. Do you think that the DEA 
Drug Enforcement Administration] 
IS inept to do this job, and why? 

A. To do the job of helping at the 
source? You'd have to look at it country- 
ly-eountry, and then I could tell you a 
it lie more about what the problem is. 
>nnie of the countries are faced with 
iiiirmously well-organized and financed 
insurgencies, some of them are faced 



with the most highly financed cartels, 
and so you'd have to look individually. 
DEA isn't big enough or strong enough 
to solve the problems in these various 
South American countries. They can 
help a lot, and in some areas they have 
been very, very helpful. But I don't 
think that the DEA alone can solve the 



problems of the cartels in Colombia, 
for example. 

Q. Are your considering sending 
the Green Berets to South America? 

A. No, I'm not considering that. 



' Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 21, 1989. 



Visit of Zaire's President 




President Mobutu Sese Seko of the 
Republic of Zaire made an official 
working visit to Washington, D.C., 
June 28-SO, 1989, to meet with Presi- 
dent Bush and other government 
officials. 

Following are remarks made by 
the two Presidents after their meeting 
0)1 June 29.'^ 

President Bush 

Zaire is among America's oldest 
friends, and its President — President 
Mobutu — one of our most valued 
friends — entire continent of Africa. 
I was honored to invite President 
Mobutu to be the first African head of 
state to come to the United States for 
an official visit during my presidency. 



I first met President Mobutu when 
I was Ambassador to the United Na- 
tions. In that capacity, I first visited 
Zaire in 1972; and, always, I have been 
impressed by his insight and his vision. 

In our talks, the President and I 
have had the opportunity to review and 
renew the excellent bilateral relation- 
ship between our countries. We have 
noted, to our mutual pleasure, that 
those ties continue to be beneficial 
and productive. 

One of Africa's most experienced 
statesmen. President Mobutu has 
worked with six Presidents. Together 
they — and we — have sought to bring to 
Zaire, and to all of Africa, real econom- 
ic and social progress and to pursue 
Africa's true independence, security, 
stability as the basis for that 
development. 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1989 



15 



AFRICA 



Over the years, President Mobutu 
has helped international councils from 
the United Nations to the OAU [Orga- 
nization of African Unity] to the non- 
aligned movement address these issues 
sensibly, and very effectively, I might 
add. Invariably he has personally 
worked to bring about the peaceful res- 
olution of conflicts. Just last week, he 
brought together, for the first time, in 
the presence of 18 African chiefs of 
state, the leadership of Angola's war- 
ring factions, setting the stage for na- 
tional reconciliation in that country. 
Thanks to President Mobutu, we are 
nearer the goal long sought, yet long 
elusive — peace and opportunity in 
southwestern Africa. 

We discussed that goal in our talks 
here, and the President and I also e.\- 
amined other important aspects of 
regional conflicts, especially the 
southern third of the African Conti- 
nent. There we share goals of a rapid, 
peaceful end to apartheid; the full im- 
plementation of Security Council Reso- 
lution 4.3.5 leading to the independence 
of Namibia; and the total withdrawal 
of Cuban troops from Angola. Zaire's 
stake in these results is as enormous as 
its influence. My advisers and I found 
President Mobutu's analyses valuable, 
and we support him as he strives to 
peacefully resolve problems. 

In addition to foreign affairs and 
regional matters, much of our discus- 
sion focused on Zaire's efforts to 
strengthen its economy. I want to note 
that Zaire recently took the construc- 
tive step of signing an economic policy 
reform agreement with the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund. Because we be- 
lieve that strict adherence to its terms 
can produce a healthy economy for 
Zaire, we intend to support that effort. 

During the President's visit, we 
also exchanged the instruments of rat- 
ification of a bilateral investment trea- 
ty. We hope that this treaty will 
encourage greater American invest- 
ment in Zaire leading, in turn, to 
greater economic development. 

In conclusion, we thank President 
Mobutu for coming to the United 
States at this critical time. We thank 
him for his leadership in central 
Africa, and we look forward to contin- 
ued cooperation between our countries. 
The strong ties of friendship between 
Zaire and the United States endure 
and prosper. We are proud and very, 
very pleased to have you with us today. 



Zaire — A Profile 



Geography 



.\rea: 2.3.5 million sq. km. (90.5,063 sq, 
mi. ): about the size of the US east of the 
Missis.sippi. Cities: Capital — Kinshasa 
(pop. about 3 million). Regional capitals — 
Kananga. Lubumbashi, Mbuji-Mayi, 
Bukavu. Mbandaka. Kisangani, Bandundu, 
Matarii. Terrain: Varies from tropical rain 
forests to mountainous terraces, plateau, 
savannas, dense grasslands, and moun- 
tains. Climate: Equatorial; hot and humid 
in much of the north and west, cooler and 
drier in the south central area and the 
east. 



ir 


/ AFRIMK R£HIBLK\ \ 


H 


TiOKor^ 1 ( 


\ 


{^ ( ZAIRE 6>**'»"\ 
KjLJ '"'""^ Tbwuwi \ 




^^"^"^"^ Kinshasa \ 
^ A ^_. k TAWANIA 


Atlantic 


( 1 i~>\ 


Ocean 


/ ANEOtA r-Jv3 /( 
/ ZAMB1A,-A_\ 




r'-S.,.,..,.,.,. ^ Sw-* X ^ ^ ^- 



People 

Nationality: Smin and adjective — 
Zairian(s). Population: (mid-1987 est.): 32 
million. Urban 3()'i-407f; under age 1.5, 
4591. Annual growth rate: 3.1%. Density: 
Ranges from 266/sq. mi. in Kinshasa, 
through 37/sq. mi. in Bas Zaire, to 8/sq. 
mi. in Haut Zaire and Shaba. Ethnic 
groups: Bantu tribes HO^c; as many as 250 
African tribal groups in all. Religions: 
Roman Catholic TM'/, . Protestant 20%, 
Muslim 10%, Kimbanguist 10%, other syn- 
cretic sects and traditional religions 10%. 
Languages: (major) French, Lingala, 
Swahili and Kingwana (a variant), Kikongo, 
Tshiluba. 

(lovernment 

Type: Republic with strong presidential 
authority, one party. Independence: 
June 30, 1960. Constitution: 
June 24, 1967 (amended 1974, revised 1978). 

Branches: The Popular Movement of 
the Revolution (MPR) is the sole legal po- 
litical institution. Its component organs in- 
clude a Secretary General, a Central 



Committee, a Political Bureau, a Party 
Congress (meeting every o years), an Ex- 
ecutive Council (Council of Ministers), a 
unicameral Legislative Council, and a Judt 
cial Council. The elected president of the 
party automatically becomes president of 
Zaire. 

Economy 

GDP (1985, current prices at the official 
exchange rate): $4.8 billion. .Annual 
growth rate (1985): 2.5%. Per capita GDP- 
(current 1985): .$170. 

Natural resources: Copper, pe- 
troleum, cobalt, industrial and gem dia- 
monds, gold, zinc, manganese, tin, 
columbium-tantalum, rare earth metals, 
coal, wolfamite, uranium, cadmium, silver; 
139; of world's hydroelectric potential. 

.\griculture: Products — cash crops: 
coffee, palm oil, palm kernel oil cake, quir 
quina, rubber, tea, cotton, cocoa; food 
crops: manioc, bananas plantains, corn, 
rice, legumes, ground nuts, vegetables, 
fruits, sugar. Land — 50% arable; 2% culti' 
vated or pasture. 

Industry: Types — processed and un- 
processed minerals; consumer products, inl 
eluding textiles, footwear, cigarettes; 
processed foods and beverages; cement, j, 

Trade: Exports— $1. So billion (1986 
f o.b.): copper, coffee, petroleum, diamonds 
cobalt, gold, wood. Partners — Belgium, 
Luxembourg, US, France, FRG. Imports-' 
$1.55 billion (1985 e.i.f ): petroleum prod- 
ucts, foods, textiles, heavy equipment. 
Partners — Belgium, Luxembourg, France 
FRG, US. 

Membership in International 
Organizations 

UN and most of its specialized and related 
agencies. Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) and affiliated specialized agencies, 
Intergovernmental Council of Copper Ex- 
porting Countries (CIPEC), .African Devel 
opment Bank (AFDB), International Coffel 
Organization (ICO), International Tin 
Council (ITC). Great Lakes States Eco- 
nomic Community (CEPGL), INTELSAT 
Nonaligned Movement, Group of 77, Eco- 
nomic Community of Central African 
States (CEEAC)' 



Taken from the Background Notes of Au- 
gust 1988, published by the Bureau of Publi 
Affairs, Department of State. Editor: 
Juanita Adams. ■ 



16 



Department of State Bulletin/October 198!' 



ARMS CONTROL 



•resident Mobutu- 

t is an honor to state in turn that 
he friendship between Zaire and the 
Jnited States is today 29 years old. I 
•n iiarticularly pleased to have been 
niioi-ed by the invitation extended by 
'resident Bush to come on an official 
,'orking visit early on in his term of of- 
ice. This has made it possible for us to 
old talks marked by warmth and 
riendship. This occasion also gave us 
he possibility of assessing bilateral co- 
jperation between our two countries 
Ind of identifying new goals to pursue 
iiui'ther. 

Thus we spoke of disarmament, de- 
i-nte, the Third World debt, and, more 
pecifically, the African debt. We also 
ipoke of the situation in southern 
Vfrica. In this connection, I informed 
•resident Bush of the results obtained 
DJlowing the summit held in Gbadolite 
11 .lune 22d, which lay the groundwork 
111- national reconciliation in Angola. I 
a\(' asked President Bush to support 
his process so as to restore once and 
or all peace in this country which 
jhares a 2,600-kilometer border with 
he Republic of Zaire. 

1 wish to express my satisfaction 
;itli the attention and the understand- 
■lu shown by President Bush in ad- 
ressing these problems. I also 
.elcome the fact that President Bush, 
ecause of his long political and diplo- 
latic experience, takes a special in- 
erest in African issues, in which, 
iicidentally, he is thoroughly well- 
rounded. 

Regarding my country, Zaire, I 
poke to President Bush about the new 
greement that I have just signed with 
he International Monetary Fund and 
he World Bank on a 3-year structural 
adjustment program. President Bush 
jias renewed the support of his govern- 
jnent to the Executive Council of Zaire 
n its effort to implement this program, 
n support of this. President Bush has 
ommitted his Administration to pro- 
noting and encouraging American in- 
•estment in the Republic of Zaire. This 
's the reason for which we proceeded to 
exchange instruments of ratification of 
ihe bilateral investment treaty be- 
(ween the United States and the Re- 
public of Zaire. Furthermore the 
{^resident reaffirmed U.S. support for 
''he program for stability and security 
n the Republic of Zaire. 

Finally I informed the President of 
he arrangements and measures of pro- 
ection which have been set up in Zaire 
or some years now. These arrange- 
nents have made it possible for the UN 



Commission on Human Rights to with- 
draw Zaire from the list of those coun- 
tries which it monitors for human 
rights. Since then Zaire can be ranked 
among those countries which observe 
the rule of law, not to be confused or 
mistaken with any incidental mishaps 
that are attributable to an administra- 
tion or to individuals. 

The UN Commission on Human 
Rights and the Republic of Zaire invite 
all governments and organizations con- 
cerned with human rights to support 
by all means possible the efforts de- 
ployed by the Zairian Department of 



Human Rights and Freedoms of the 
Citizen for the defense and the pro- 
tection of human rights in Zaire. 

In concluding we would like to 
thank President Bush and his advisers 
for the invitation that he extended to 
us to be the first African head of state 
to come on an official working visit 
since Mr. Bush has come to the White 
House. 



1 Made at the South Portico of the White 
House (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of July 3, 1989). 

- President Mobutu spoke in French, 
and his remarks were translated by an 
interpreters 



Status of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks 



by Richard R. Burt 

Statement made at the Confer- 
ence on Disarmament in Geneva on 
Ai(gust S, 1989. Ambassador Burt is 
head of ihe U.S. delegation to the nu- 
clear and space arms talks and chief 
negotiator at the strategic arms re- 
duction talks (START). 

I would like to say how pleased I am to 
be here today to review with the mem- 
bers and nonmember participants of 
the Conference on Disarmament the 
latest developments regarding our 
bilateral nuclear and space talks. 

Update on the Negotiations 

Round 11 of the strategic arms reduc- 
tion talks (START) between the United 
States and Soviet Union has been a 
useful and constructive endeavor. The 
United States approached this round as 
a reconnaissance and sought to clarify 
the policy positions of both parties and 
to reaffirm the central structure of the 
joint draft treaty. In fact we feel we 
have accomplished more than that in 
many areas, including the very impor- 
tant area of providing for effective 
verification. 

I have conducted a thorough review 
of key treaty provisions and outstand- 
ing issues with my Soviet counterpart 
[Ambassador Yu. Nazarkin]. He is an 
experienced negotiator and leads a pro- 
fessional team, characterized by well- 
grounded expertise. I believe we have 
established a solid, working relation- 
ship, despite the fact that he has de- 
cisively demonstrated during this 



round that he is a far more accom- 
plished tennis player than I. 

There has also been a good give- 
and-take at the working group level re- 
lated to the treaty and protocols which 
together comprise the START joint 
draft text. The two sides have held 
worthwhile discussions and debates of 
various alternatives. Together we have 
improved the text and cleared brackets 
and narrowed our differences in small 
but significant ways. 

The process has been businesslike, 
nonpolemical, and oriented to sub- 
stance not rhetoric. Useful exchanges 
have taken place in all areas. While 
some significant differences continue 
to separate the United States and the 
Soviet Union in these negotiations, I 
believe the sides more clearly under- 
stand and better appreciate the ra- 
tionale underpinning each other's nego- 
tiating posture. I thus believe that my 
Soviet colleague and I have been able 
to lay the groundwork for what I hope 
will be a productive discussion on 
START between Secretary of State 
Baker and Foreign Minister Shevard- 
nadze next month in the United States. 

Before I address some of the issues 
which were the focus of my discussions 
with Ambassador Nazarkin, I would 
like to comment on the overriding prin- 
ciples which guided the U.S. negotiat- 
ing team in round 11 and which will be 
of equal importance in future rounds. 

Guidance for Negotiating 

The United States returned to the Ge- 
neva talks with President Bush's firm 
pledge that "we will work vigorously to 
achieve fair and far-reaching agree- 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1989 



17 



ARMS CONTROL 



ments that strengthen peace. Nothing 
has higher priority." 

In its early days, the Bush Ad- 
ministration conducted a comprehen- 
sive review of American security and 
arms control policies. As a result of 
this review, the President concluded 
that the primary objective for strategic 
arms control is to achieve verifiable 
agreements that reduce the risk of war. 

The risk of nuclear war can be 
reduced by creating a more stable nu- 
clear balance, in which deterrence is 
strengthened and a condition of crisis 
stability prevails. Such a condition e.x- 
ists when each side is dissuaded from a 
first-strike because the costs and risks 
associated with such an attack clearly 
outweigh any conceivable benefit. 
Therefore, an essential ingredient to 
maintaining crisis stability is having 
survivable, retaliatory forces. In this 
sense, it is important to remember 
that arms control can only complement, 
not replace, unilateral measures that 
must be taken to maintain effective 
deterrence. 

Deep reductions in strategic forces 
can enhance stability if they are prop- 
erly applied. Provisions that could pro- 
duce greater stability are those that 
would: 

• Reduce force vulnerability, since, 
as I have just said, survivable forces 
reduce the incentives to strike first; 

• Enhance transparency, since sta- 
bility is enhanced by greater openness 
about the size and nature of each other's 
strategic forces and activities; and 

• Foster predictability, since sta- 
bility is enhanced by reducing uncer- 
tainties about the future evolution of 
the forces of both sides. 

The START negotiations to date 
have ])roduced a lengthy joint draft 
treaty text that reflects the areas of 
agreement and disagreement. At the 
beginning of this round, we I'eaffirmed 
the U.S. intent to proceed on the basis 
of the existing joint draft text. In par- 
ticular, we reaffirmed our continued 
acceptance of the structure of limits 
and sublimits that have already been 
agreed: that is, 1,600 strategic offen- 
sive delivery systems; 6,000 account- 
able warheads; 4,900 warheads on 
intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs) and sea-launched ballistic mis- 
siles (SLBMs); 1,540 warheads on 154 
heavy ballistic missiles; and a reduc- 
tion of approximately 50'/( in Soviet 
ballistic missile thi-ow-weight. While 
we reaffirm our support of the basic 



agreed numerical limits and other 
U.S. positions in the joint draft text, 
we have reserved the right to suggest 
new ideas and other changes that we 
believe would contribute to force sur- 
vivability and stability. 

To ensure that improvements in 
force survivability remain valid over 
the long term, they must be balanced 
with the requirement that the size and 
nature of current and evolving strate- 
gic forces be transparent and predict- 
able and that agreements be effectively 
verifiable. Mobile ICBMs provide a 
case in point: the same aspect of 
mobile ICBMs that make them more 
survivable — the fact that they move — 
clearly also complicates effective 
verification. 

The U.S. position on banning mo- 
bile ICBMs remains unchanged for now. 
Our decision on mobile missiles de- 
pends in part, of course, on support in 
the U.S. Congress for the President's 
ICBM modernization program. None- 
theless we have indicated to the Soviet 
side that we are willing to reconsider 
our position on seeking a ban, in light 
of the hundred-plus mobile ICBMs that 
the Soviets have deployed over the past 
several years, if the sides can agree 
upon a regime that would allow the ef- 
fective verification of numerical limits 
on mobile ICBM systems. Although 
much remains to be done, round 11 has 
produced significant clarifications of 
the requirements and restraints to be 
placed on both road and rail mobile 
systems. 

Verification and Stability Initiative 

As part of our overall negotiating ef- 
fort, and a prominent example of the 
new ideas the United States brought to 
round 11, the United States has pro- 
posed that the U.S. and Soviet sides 
make a special effort to agree on, and 
begin implementing as soon as possi- 
ble, certain verification and stability 
measures drawn from proposals previ- 
ously advanced by both sides. I do not 
need to underscore to the Conference 
on Disarmament the central role veri- 
fication plays in modern arms control 
agreements. Our verification and sta- 
bility initiative is a recognition of 
that centrality. 

Specifically at the direction of the 
President, we proposed to the Soviets 
that the START negotiators focus now 
on the following verification/stability 
measures, which would be reflected in 
the ultimate START treaty: 



(1) Immediate, reciprocal estab- 
lishment of perimeter and portal con- 
tinuous monitoring of certain ballistic 
missile production facilities in the 
United States and the Soviet Union to 
improve our confidence in the accuracy'4 
of declared mobile ballistic missile 
inventories; 

(2) Prompt, reciprocal exchange of' 
selected data on each country's nuclear 
forces to help us design appropriate in-P 
spection procedures to assist verifica- 
tion of the START treaty; 

(3) Cessation of ballistic missile te^ 
lemetry encryption and data denial of 
certain ICBM and SLBM launches, so 
that each country has a better under- 
standing of new developments in the 
forces of the other; 

(4) Reciprocal practice inspections 
to demonstrate procedures for verify- 
ing that the number of reentry vehiclei 
on specific existing ballistic missiles 
does not exceed the number that the 
United States and Soviet Union have 
agreed to attribute to that type of misi 
sile. A mutual demonstration could helji 
the negotiators to develop sound in- 
spection provisions for these unprece- 
dented intrusive inspections; and 

(5) Reciprocal demonstration of 
technologies for unique identifiers on 
ballistic missiles, a process often re- 
ferred to as "tagging," in order to facij 
itate technical exchanges on promising 
approaches. 

In addition the United States be- 
lieves that both countries can benefit 
by agreeing to two additional measure' 
that, while they have not been previ- 
ously discussed in our negotiations and 
would not themselves be part of the 
START treaty, would enhance strate- 
gic stability as separately agreed 
measures. 

• Following the Soviet Union's sug- 
gestion to Secretary Baker, we are pre 
pared to address the problem of SLBM 
with short times of flight, which wouk 
include what some refer to as de- 
pressed trajectory flights. 

• We also suggest the two countrie; 
implement a proposal, discussed in a 
previous exchange of letters, in which 
the United States and the Soviet Unioi 
would notify each other of one major 
strategic exercise each year. 

The President's verification and 
stability initiative complements the 
work done to date in Geneva. This ini- 
tiative is designed to expedite, not 
delay, the START negotiations— the 
START treaty will contain unprece- 



18 



Department of State Bulletin/October 198! 



ARMS CONTROL 



.lented verification provisions. It is im- 
)ortant to understand early on what 
he ])roblems are, so that the negotia- 
idiis are not prolonged by unresolved 
t'ehnical verification issues. Early im- 
jlementation of these measures will 
lelp the two countries to gain experi- 
mce in verification procedures so we 
■an draft realistic provisions in Geneva. 

The United States does not intend 
he U.S. initiative to be a take-it-or- 
eave-it package. While we would like 
;o reach agreement on every measure, 
ve are prepared to address only those 
,hat the Soviets are ready to discuss, 
^rther the United States intends that 
;ach measure be fully reciprocal and, 
therefore, apply equally to both 
■ountries. 

To date we have held exploratory 
iliscussions with the Soviet side which 
Save allowed us to describe the veri- 
ication and stability initiative in 
greater detail. We expect the U.S. 
.erification and stability initiative to 
agure prominently in the September 
ninisterial between Secretary Baker 
ind Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. 

J. S. -Soviet Differences 

have had detailed discussions with 
ny Soviet counterpart on prominent 
ireas where the sides differ — an ICBM 
varhead sublimit, heavy ICBMs, air- 
aunched cruise missiles (ALCMs)/ 
leavy bombers, submarine-launched 
•ruise missiles (SLCMs), and the link- 
ige of START to the Antiballistic Mis- 
sile (ABM) Treaty. These discussions 
ia\e been candid and substantive rath- 
•r than stale, rhetorical recitations of 
'a mi liar themes. 

The United States continues to be- 
lieve that agreement should be reached 
3n a sublimit of between 3,000 and 
3,300 warheads on deployed ICBMs. 
Both countries would benefit from the 
added predictability such a limit would 
provide since ICBM systems will re- 
main uniquely suited for use in a 
preemptive attack and, thus, more 
destabilizing than other types of stra- 
tegic offensive arms. 

Heavy ballistic missiles are partic- 
ularly destabilizing. Therefore, the 
United States continues to maintain its 
position that the START treaty should 
ban the production, flight-testing, or 



deployment of new or modernized types 
of heavy ICBMs, as well as the produc- 
tion or deployment of additional heavy 
ICBMs of existing types. Both coun- 
tries should also undertake not to con- 
duct flights of existing types of heavy 
ICBMs and not to produce, flight-test, 
or deploy heavy SLBMs. The U.S. posi- 
tion on heavy missiles would effectively 
provide for equality by resulting even- 
tually in the phasing out of the Soviet 
SS-18 force, the single most destabiliz- 
ing weapons system in the world today. 

Regarding bomber weapons, the 
United States has reaffirmed our past 
positions on ALCM counting, range, 
and distinguishability. Thus we contin- 
ue'to propose that ALCMs be counted 
under an attribution rule that would 
credit each heavy bomber equipped for 
ALCMs with an agreed number of war- 
heads against the 6,000 limit, regard- 
less of the number actually carried. 
The United States also continues to 
maintain the position that only air-to- 
surface cruise missiles which are nu- 
clear armed and capable of a range over 
1,500 kilometers should be subject to 
START limits. 

The U.S. position on SLCMs re- 
mains sound. Conventional SLCMs are 
not an element of the U.S. -Soviet stra- 
tegic nuclear balance and, therefore, 
should not be part of this agreement. 
After considerable review, the United 
States has concluded that the Soviet 
proposals for SLCM verification would 
not provide for effective verification. 
Available technologies allegedly suit- 
able for detecting nuclear SLCM war- 
heads remotely and distinguishing 
them from other nuclear sources cannot 
do either reliably. The recent Soviet 
demonstration in the Black Sea has not 
altered this conclusion. Consequently 
circumvention of provisions based on 
these technologies would be easy. Even 
if the technologies could detect and dis- 
tinguish nuclear SLCMs reliably, how- 
ever, it still appears highly doubtful 
that a regime of effective verification 
could be designed. The United States 
still knows of no way to verify effec- 
tively limits on the production and stor- 
age of SLCMs, arguably the core of the 
SLCM verification problem. 

Consequently the United States 
envisions a nonbinding declaration of 
plans for nuclear-armed SLCMs by 
both countries. Because nuclear 
SLCMs are neither suitable for nor vul- 



nerable to a first-strike, the LInited 
States believes that its proposal pro- 
vides both countries with the most 
practical means to build confidence 
that nuclear SLCMs will not circum- 
vent START limits. 

START and Other Negotiations 

Let me conclude by addressing the re- 
lationship between START and other 
negotiations. 

Some have recently questioned 
whether conclusion of a START treaty 
is a lower priority for the Bush Ad- 
ministration than conclusion of a con- 
ventional force in Europe (CFE) treaty 
or whether we want to delay START 
pending progress in CFE. Let me say 
that neither is true. Both the START 
and CFE negotiations are high, but in- 
dependent, priorities for the Bush Ad- 
ministration. Although he has 
expressed his hope that a CFE agree- 
ment can be finalized in 6-12 months, 
the President has not linked progress 
in START to progress in CFE. 

Because stabilizing reductions are 
in the interest of both countries, com- 
pletion of a START agreement should 
not await resolution of thorny defense 
and space issues. Since 1972 when the 
Antiballistic Missile Treaty entered 
into force, the magnitude and power of 
the nuclear threat has grown several 
fold. Yet a key premise of that treaty 
was that strategic offensive arms re- 
ductions would soon follow. Thus the 
Soviet LInion should join with us in con- 
cluding a START treaty, when it is 
ready, without any preconditions. A 
separate defense and space treaty, a 
subject that Ambassador Cooper will 
address in more detail in a moment, 
should likewise be negotiated on its 
own merits and at its own pace. 

The conclusions of our strategic re- 
view and the history of negotiations on 
these issues have convinced the United 
States that the task ahead is large. 
Much has been accomplished already, 
yet a great deal of work lies ahead. I 
believe that through serious, construc- 
tive negotiations, we will be able to 
make significant progress. The United 
States is committed to building on our 
achievements thus far to reach agree- 
ments that fulfill our objectives of re- 
ducing the risk of war, moving beyond 
containment, and enhancing global se- 
curity and stability. ■ 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1989 



19 



ARMS CONTROL 



Status of the Defense and Space Talks 



by Henry F. Cooper 

Statement made at the Conference 
oil Disarmament in Geneva on Au- 
gust .i, 1989. Ambassador Cooper is 
chief negotiator at the defense and 
space talks (DST). 

I am pleased to appear before the 
Conference on Disarmament to discuss 
the status of the defense and space 
talks. Let me begin with some back- 
ground material. 

U.S. Objectives 

Since our talks began in March 198.5, 
the United States has sought to facili- 
tate a possible future cooperative 
transition to a stabilizing balance of 
offensive and defensive forces, should 
effective defenses against strategic bal- 
listic missiles prove feasible. President 
Bush has directed us to preserve U.S. 
options to develop and deploy advanced 
defenses when they are ready. We be- 
lieve that stability and the security of 
all nations can be enhanced by such de- 
fenses, especially if they are introduced 
at a measured pace and in a coopera- 
tive way. 



Advancing Technology 
and the ABM Treaty ' 

There is clearly a growing likelihood of 
effective, non-nuclear defenses against 
ballistic missiles. Great advances in 
data processing, sensors, microelec- 
tronics, materials, propulsion, and di- 
rected energy have opened a window to 
a potentially new and safer era. Over 
the past 6 years, the creative talents of 
our scientists and engineers have ex- 
tended these advances. Now- innovative 
non-nuclear defensive concepts are 
emerging from laboratories and will 
undergo testing. If our hopes are real- 
ized, the nuclear-or-chemically-armed 
ballistic missile — by far the most dan- 
gerous instrument of war to use the 
medium of space — will no longer be an 
"absolute weapon." 

Our Soviet colleagues and others 
suggest there should be great concern 
regarding these developments. I want 
to address their arguments head-on. 

In effect, various spokesmen sug- 
gest that publics should believe that 
responsible leaders ought not use tech- 



nological advances to defend against 
ballistic missiles. In other words, ad- 
vancing technology should be used only 
to enhance the effectiveness of the 
threat posed by offensive ballistic 
missiles — even if it were technically 
possible to defend against and devalue 
that threat and thereby make deter- 
rence more stable. Of course, Soviet 
spokesmen do not make their argu- 
ments in these terms. Rather they di- 
vert attention to misleading disjuites 
about the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) 
Treaty. 

For example, the Soviets inac- 
curately charge that our Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI) program, 
because of its openly declared purpose, 
violates the ABM Treaty. They, of 
course, know better — and have known 
better since the ABM Treaty was 
signed in 1972. Marshal Grechko, then 
the Soviet Defense Minister, told the 
Supreme Soviet during its ratification 
process that the ABM Treaty "imposes 
no limitations on the performance of 
research and experimental work aimed 
at resolving the problem of defending 
the country against nuclear missile 
attack." 

So we and the Soviets both under- 
stand that there are no limitations on 
ABM research and experimental work 
to determine if effective defenses are 
feasible. And the Soviets, themselves, 
are very interested in strategic de- 
fenses and are conducting their own re- 
lated research and experimental work. 
In November 1987, General Secretary 
Gorbachev, on American television in 
answer to a direct question about So- 
viet activities in this field, said that 
"practically, the Soviet Union is doing 
all that the United States is doing." 
Although he also said that the Soviet 
Union would not build or dejjloy its 
SDI, it is capabilities rather than de- 
clared intentions that count. 

In fact the Soviets are already do- 
ing far more than the United States on 
strategic defenses. The magnitude of 
their civil and air defenses is unequaled 
anywhere else in the world. They also 
have the world's only deployed ABM 
system, which they are modernizing — 
as is their right under the ABM Treaty. 
And certain of their activities clearly 
go beyond the limits of the ABM Trea- 
ty. So Soviet actions make clear they 
do not oppose all defenses, only U.S. 
defenses. 



Beyond their attack on SDI, the So- J 
viets argue that the ABM Treaty spe- 
cified, for all time, the only possible ; 
stable strategic regime: one which se- 
verely limits the deployment of strate- 
gic ballistic missile defenses. They 
cannot explain why effective defenses 
against the most threatening offen- 
sive weapon — the strategic ballistic "^ 
missile — would be destabilizing, 
whereas their defenses in other areas, 
such as air defenses, are stabilizing. 
Furthermore it is simply not true that 
the ABM Treaty politically estab- 
lished, for all time, a particular strate- 
gic regime. To the contrary, the ABM 
Treaty explicitly acknowledged that thf 
future strategic situation could change. 
Accordingly, its provisions provide for 
discussions and amendment. 

The ABM Treaty also provides an 
explicit mechanism that makes clear 
that neither side can veto the other's 
decision to withdraw for its own stated 
reasons of supreme interest and deploy 
defenses beyond its terms. The United 
States made clear in 1972 that such 
a reason might be failure to achieve 
agreement, within 5 years, to signifi- 
cantly limit strategic offensive arms. 
Such an agreement was not achieved. 
Now, 17 years later, the Soviets are 
seeking to apply reverse linkage to this > 
fundamental premise of the ABM Trea- 
ty. They say there must be strict com- 
pliance with the ABM Treaty or there 
cannot be a START treaty. Meanwhile 
since 1972, Soviet strategic offensive 
nuclear weapons have quadrupled, and 
ours have doubled. So even the signifi- 
cant reductions anticipated in the 
START treaty will leave more strategic 
weapons than existed in 1972. It is long 
past time to conclude a START treaty, 
as promised in 1972, without further 
restrictions on strategic defenses. 

A Predictable Future 

At the same time, we do understand the 
Soviet interest in assuring predict- 
t 

experimental work proceeds and as re- 
ductions in strategic offensive arms 
take place. We, too, wish to assure 
predictability — not only now and in the 
near future but also into the more dis- 
tant future when advancing technolo- 
gies may enable effective defenses to 
play an increased role in the strategic 
forces of both sides. Therein lies a ba- 



i^. 



20 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1989 



ARMS CONTROL 



sis for agreement on a defense and 
space treaty. And although key differ- 
ences remain and the pace has been 
slower than we would wish, there has 
been some progress toward such an 
agreement. 

Specific U.S. proposals have indi- 
icated how such predictability might be 
'assured. In part, at [British] Prime 
Minister Thatcher's suggestion, we be- 
jgan in 1986 proposing "predictability 
Imeasures." Then in early 1988, the 
.United States formally proposed a pre- 
jdictability measures protocol to a de- 
fense and space treaty. While there is 
inot yet agreement on the specific pur- 
!pose for the protocol, both sides are 
Iconstructively drafting a joint draft 
text. Notably both sides agree that, 
lunder this protocol, they would use the 
iNuclear Risk Reduction Centers to 
exchange data each year on their ac- 
tivities regarding the development, 
itesting, deployment, modernization, 
and replacement of strategic ballistic 
missile defenses. The United States 
also wishes to exchange data on re- 
search activities conducted prior to 
the commencement of the formal devel- 
opment stage. 

In working on this protocol, the 
sides have also agreed to have experts 
meet and, on the basis of the data ex- 
changed each year, plan subsequent ac- 
tivities that could include visits to each 
other's test ranges to observe certain 
tests where the inviting party deter- 
mines the agenda. Again the United 
States would go further and include in 
the exchange visits to laboratories not 
necessarily at test ranges, the observa- 
tion of tests not necessarily at test 
ranges, and activities not necessarily 
observable by national technical means. 
The United States believes these meas- 
ures are practical only if they are car- 
ried out on a voluntary, reciprocal, and 
comparable basis. 

Predictability, Not 
Verification, Measures 

While accepting the idea of such 
confidence-building measures, the So- 
viets also emphasize developing new 
verification measures, including on- 
site inspections unacceptable to the 
United States. Of course, the United 
States supports cooperative means of 
verification when they can be effective 
without compromising U.S. and allied 
security interests, when they are nec- 
essary and tailored to the circum- 
stances, and when they are appropriate 



to the systems being negotiated. But in 
this instance, verification of the ABM 
Treaty, as signed in 1972, is provided 
by national technical means. While the 
U.S. -proposed predictability measures 
would provide more transparency into 
activities of the sides and thereby 
enhance some verification goals, they 
are primarily confidence-building 
measures. 

In any case, the significant prog- 
ress on this protocol has not received 
much public attention. Rather the em- 
phasis has been on Soviet threats that 
there can be no START treaty without 
an agreement not to withdraw from 
the ABM Treaty for a specified period 
of time. 

U.S. Conditions for 

a Nonwithdrawal Period 

The fact is that since 1986, the United 
States has made clear that it would 
agree to conclude a separate treaty of 
unlimited duration, including such a 
nonwithdrawal period — but not as pay- 
ment for a START treaty that should 
be concluded on its own merits. Rather 
the United States is prepared to meet 
the Soviet demand for a nonwithdrawal 
period provided the Soviet Union 
meets three U.S. conditions. First, 
after the nonwithdrawal period, the 
United States will be free to deploy 
defenses without further reference to 
the ABM Treaty, after giving 6 months' 
notice. Second, withdrawal and ter- 
mination rights under international 
law, other than those associated with 
deployment per se, will be retained. 
Third, there must be no disputes dur- 
ing the nonwithdrawal period about re- 
search, development, and testing — 
including in space. In this regard, I 
would reiterate that the United States 
is conducting, and will continue con- 
ducting, the SDI program in compli- 
ance with all international agreements, 
including the ABM Treaty. 

Two of these three U.S. conditions 
were dealt with in the December 10, 
1987, Washington summit joint state- 
ment, an important benchmark in our 
negotiations, which directed us in Ge- 
neva to work out an agreement with the 
same legal status as the ABM and 
START treaties. 

First, it was agreed in Washington 
that: "Intensive discussions of strategic 
stability shall begin not later than 3 
years before the end of the specified 
[nonwithdrawal] period, after which, in 
the event the sides have not agreed oth- 
erwise, each side will be free to decide 



its course of action." Thus was ac- 
knowledged a new regime after the 
nonwithdrawal period in which either 
side could decide to deploy ballistic 
missile defenses without further refer- 
ence to the ABM Treaty. The U.S. posi- 
tion is that, unless and until a party 
exercises this "right to deploy," the 
ABM Treaty restrictions w'ill remain 
in force. 

Second, it was also agreed that the 
sides would ". . . observe the ABM 
Treaty, as signed in 1972, while con- 
ducting their research, development, 
and testing as required, which are per- 
mitted by the ABM Treaty. . . ." Gen- 
eral Secretary Gorbachev accepted this 
U.S. language which, over the pre- 
ceding 18 months, the Soviets had re- 
jected in Geneva because they said they 
understood the United States meant it 
to mean that space-based ABM systems 
based on other physical principles and 
their components could be tested in 
space. The Soviets here in Geneva have 
sought to discount these Washington 
summit understandings. 

In the first case, they have sought 
to terminate the defense and space 
treaty at the end of the nonwithdrawal 
period, nullifying the agreed new re- 
gime after the nonwithdrawal period. 
The U.S. -proposed defense and space 
treaty is of unlimited duration and pre- 
serves the agreed "right to deploy" 
along with appropriate notification 
procedures. 

In the second case, the Soviets 
have argued that they did not agree to 
the "broad interpretation" of the ABM 
Treaty, even though the Geneva nego- 
tiating record clearly shows they under- 
stood that the United States meant the 
"broad interpretation" by the language 
the General Secretary accepted at the 
Washington summit. 

U.S. Initiatives on Activities 
During Nonwithdrawal Period 

Consequently the United States has 
made clear that concluding a defense 
and space treaty is contingent upon 
clarifying this language from the 
Washington summit joint statement to 
assure an unambiguous mutual under- 
standing of the permitted testing ac- 
tivities. To accomplish this, and to 
move the discussion beyond disputes 
about ABM Treaty interpretation, 
the United States has taken three 
initiatives. 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1989 



21 



ARMS CONTROL 



First, we proposed the predict- 
ability measures I cited above. 

Second, talking into account un- 
solvable verification problems and the 
importance of developing new, stabiliz- 
ing space-based sensors, the United 
States proposed that the sides agree 
not to object, on the basis of the ABM 
Treaty, to the development, testing, or 
deployment of each other's space-based 
sensors. 

Third, taking into account Soviet- 
stated concerns about deployment of 
ABM systems in space, or the prepara- 
tion of a base for such deployment, we 
provided last October a space-testing 
assurance. In that assurance, the 
United States pledged that it will test 
only from a limited number of desig- 
nated ABM test satellites components 
of space-based ABM systems based on 
other physical principles and capable of 
substituting for ABM interceptor mis- 
siles to counter ballistic missiles or 
their elements in flight trajectory. The 
number of U.S. -designated ABM test 
satellites in orbit simultaneously will 
not e.xceed a number well short of that 
associated with any realistic deployed 
capability. In conjunction with this as- 
surance, we proposed notification pro- 
cedures relating to testing activities of 
ABM test satellites. 

While the Soviets do not yet accept 
them, we are satisfied that these U.S. 
initiatives build on solid technical and 
political foundations and deal fairly 
with the concerns of both sides. They 
will provide predictability to both sides 
concerning all strategic ballistic mis- 
sile defense activities. They assure 
that there will be no deployment of ad- 
vanced defenses beyond the terms of 
the ABM Treaty for a specified period 
of time, and even then assure that 
there will have been extensive prior 
discussions of strategic stability in the 
U.S. -Soviet strategic relationship. 

But these U.S. initiatives are also 
designed to achieve a safer, more se- 
cure, and more stable future regime 
in which the security of both sides, 
and the whole world, is based upon an 
ever increasing role for effective non- 
nuclear defenses against the most 
threatening weapon of modern technol- 
ogy — the offensive ballistic missile — 
whether armed with nuclear, conven- 
tional, or chemical warheads. This fu- 
ture seems entirely consistent with 
recent Soviet statements that the 
U.S.S.R. is altering its overall mili- 
tary strategy to be defensive in nature. 
And this future is entirely consistent 



with the well-known Soviet interest in 
defenses, generally speaking. Thus we 
will be patient and wait for a positive 
Soviet response. 

Status of the Negotiations 

In this regard, I want to observe that 
we are concluding a useful round in our 
negotiations. The U.S. side has empha- 
sized the continuity of the U.S. position 
on defense and space and provided 
some new material relatecl to the proto- 
col. Although the Soviets have provided 
no new material and have refused to in- 
corporate both sides" positions in a joint 
draft text of the defense and space 
treaty, they have worked constructively 
on the protocol joint draft text. 

There also seemed to be a modest 
shift in this round toward more discus- 
sions of the offense-defense relation- 
ship, based upon a mutual recognition 
that there is no absolute weapon — 
offensive or defensive. Where such a 
discussion will lead, in view of the ad- 
vancing technical possibilities, is un- 
clear, but it would seem most unlikely 
to conclude that effective defense, 



should they prove feasible, should not 
be deployed. The United States be- 
lieves it makes sense to develop effec- 
tive defenses if advancing technology 
makes this feasible and to deploy them 
when they are ready — preferably at a 
measured pace and in a cooperative 
way. 

Before I close, let me take note of 
the work of the Outer Space Committee 
here at the Conference on Disarma- 
ment. As you can tell from my descrip- 
tion of the defense and space talks, 
work in this area is exceptionally com- 
plicated. Building understanding in 
this area is not an easy process, and I 
congratulate the Outer Space Commit- 
tee for its work in developing greater 
understanding on this subject. While a 
fundamental framework must be first 
established on a bilateral level, the 
United States remains interested in 
and willing to continue examining is- 
sues associated with space arms control 
at the Conference on Disarmament. 
But the United States has not yet iden- 
tified any practical outer space arms 
control measures that can be dealt with 
in an multilateral environment. ■ 



Foreign Policy Implications 
of Biological Weapons 



by H. Allen Holmes 

Statement before the Senate Judi- 
ciary Committee on July 26, 1989. 
Ambassador Holmes is Assista)it 
Secretary for Politico-Military 
Affair sJ 

I am pleased to appear before you 
today to discuss the foreign policy 
implications of biological weapons 
proliferation. I welcome the interest 
demonstrated by the committee in this 
problem at this time. A disturbing and 
dangerous trend has emerged in the re- 
cent past in the increasing efforts by 
states to acquire biological weapons. 
The technology to produce them is 
improving apace, and the agents 
themselves are becoming ever more 
threatening. 

I should like to state from the out- 
set that the United States is adamantly 
opposed to the development, pi'oduc- 
tion, stockpiling, or use of biological 
weapons. We have renounced any bio- 
logical weapon capability of our own, 
have destroyed our stockpile, and are 



committed to doing all we can to eli- 
minate these weapons from the world's 
arsenals. 

In this respect, we find useful the 
efforts of the Congress to formulate 
domestic criminal legislation against 
those who would develop or produce bi- 
ological weapons or assist foreign na- 
tions to acquire them. We are presently 
studying the language of the draft leg- 
islation, S. 993, to determine where we 
can contribute to the drafting process. 
I would defer to my distinguished col- 
league from the Department of Justice 
for specific comments on the substance 
of the draft legislation. 

We feel that passage of such legis- 
lation at this time would give a clear 
signal to the world that the United 
States is serious about controlling the 
proliferation of biological weajjons. It 
would signal to terrorists that we are 
deadly serious about keeping such 
weapons out of their hands. The legisla- 
tion is timely and important, and we 
are grateful to the Congress for bring- 
ing it forward. 



22 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1989 



ARMS CONTROL 



Now I would like to give you some 
background on the development of U.S. 
policy on biological weapons and on the 
present state of play in this area. I will 
then describe how we are working to 
achieve oui- goal of eliminating these 
weapons. 

Background 

There are two international agree- 
ments relating to biological and toxin 
weapons, both of which have proven in- 
adequate to prevent their proliferation. 
The 192.5 Geneva protocol prohibits the 
first use in war of chemical and bio- 
logical weapons but not their devel- 
opment, production, possession, or 
transfer. The 1972 Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Pro- 
duction and Stockpiling of Bacteriolog- 
ical (Biological) and Toxin Weapons, 
commonly known as the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention prohibits 
the development, production, stockpil- 
ing, acquisition, retention, and trans- 
fer of biological and toxin weapons. 

The United States itself uncondi- 
tionally renounced all aspects of bio- 
logical warfare in 1969, and President 
Nixon ordered the Department of De- 
fense to destroy existing stocks of bio- 
logical agents and weapons. In 1970 the 
U.S. unilateral ban was extended also 
to cover toxins, that is, poisonous 
chemicals which occur in nature as a 
product of living organisms. All re- 
search in the area of biological warfare 
has since been confined to the devel- 
opment of strictly defined defensive 
measures, for example, development 
of vaccines. 

Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention 

The United States followed up these 
unilateral actions by leading the fight 
for an international ban, the 1972 Bio- 
logical and Toxin Weapons Convention. 
Article I of the convention, confirmed 
by the treaty's negotiating record, pro- 
hibits the development, production, 
stockpiling, and retention of all biolog- 
ical agents "that have no justification 
for prophylactic, protective or other 
peaceful purposes." Thus research for 
protective and prophylactic defenses 
against biological weapons continued 
to be permissible. 

The Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention was approved by the U.S. 
Senate on December 16, 1974, and en- 
tered into force on March 26, 1975. All 
U.S. military stocks of biological and 



toxin agents, w^eapons, equipment, or 
means of delivery prohibited by the 
convention had already been destroyed 
unilaterally, pursuant to President 
Nixon's instructions. Facilities in the 
United States which had been built and 
used for biological or toxin weapons 
purposes were converted to other uses. 
For example, some of the military facil- 
ities at Ft. Detrick, Maryland, and 
Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas, previ- 
ously used for biological weapons ac- 
tivities, are now the property of the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services and are used by the National 
Cancer Institute and the National Cen- 
ter for Toxicological Research. 

After the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention was completed, 
many thought that the security prob- 
lem posed by biological and toxin weap- 
ons had been solved. However, this 
clearly is not the case. Despite the lim- 
itations of the convention, which has no 
verification provisions, we have identi- 
fied a number of compliance problems. 
In previous years and again in 1988, 
President Reagan reported to the Con- 
gress that the Soviet Union had contin- 
ued to maintain an offensive biological 
warfare program and accompanying ca- 
pability and that the Soviet Union had 
been involved in the production, trans- 
fer, and use of mycotoxins for hostile 
purposes in Laos, Cambodia, and Af- 
ghanistan, in violation of the 1972 Bio- 
logical and Toxin Weapons Convention. 
Furthermore we have yet to receive a 
satisfactory official explanation of the 
unprecedented outbreak of anthrax at 
Sverdlovsk in the Soviet Union in 1979. 

Two review conferences for the 
convention have been held, in 1980 and 
1986, with the next scheduled for 1991. 
At the two review conferences, the 
United States confirmed that it is in 
full compliance with the convention. 
At the second review conference, the 
United States expressed its concern 
that the Soviet Union, Laos, and 
Vietnam had violated the convention. 
Several other states party to the 
convention also expressed concern 
about compliance. These concerns are 
reflected in the final declaration of the 
1986 review conference, w^hich notes 
statements that compliance with Arti- 
cles I, II, and III of the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention was "sub- 
ject to grave doubt" and that efforts to 
resolve the concerns expressed had not 
been successful. Since then our con- 
cerns have intensified as evidence 
mounts of biological weapons prolifera- 
tion, especially in areas of particular 
concern to us. 



U.S. Implementation 
of the Convention 

Article IV of the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention provides that each 
state "shall, in accordance with its con- 
stitutional processes, take any neces- 
sary measures to prohibit and prevent 
development, production, stockpiling, 
acquisition or retention of the agents, 
toxins, weapons, equipment and means 
of delivery specified in Article I of the 
Convention, within the territory of 
such State, under its jurisdiction or un- 
der its control anywhere." As you know, 
several statutes exist that already reg- 
ulate these noxious weapons, such as 
the Toxic Substances Control Act and 
the Arms Export Control Act. These 
laws prohibit both the manufacturing 
and transfer of biological toxins. 

We recognize, however, that addi- 
tional domestic criminal legislation ad- 
dressing biological materials may be 
useful in further implementing the con- 
vention. We believe that the draft bills 
now under consideration by the Con- 
gress are a useful starting point for 
such legislation, and we and other 
agencies are prepared to work with the 
committee as the legislation develops. 

Technological Advances 

In addition the rapid advance of tech- 
nology in the biological field has led to 
another set of problems for the conven- 
tion. In many ways, recent progress in 
biological technology increases the 
ease of concealment of illicit manufac- 
turing plants, particularly for biolog- 
ically derived chemicals such as toxins. 
Verification of the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention, always a difficult 
task, has been significantly compli- 
cated by the new technology. The ease 
and rapidity of genetic manipulation, 
the ready availability of a variety of 
production equipment, and the prolif- 
eration of safety and environmental 
equipment and health procedures to 
numerous laboratories and production 
facilities throughout the world are 
signs of the growing role of biotechnol- 
ogy in the world's economy. They also 
make it easier for nations and others 
to produce the lethal agents banned 
by the convention. 

As advances are made in the field 
of biotechnology, the potential for using 
this technology for biological and toxin 
weapons increases commensurately. 
Not only has the time from basic re- 
search to mass production of lethal 
weapons decreased, but the ability to 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1989 



23 



ARMS CONTROL 



create agents and toxins with more op- 
timal weapons potential has increased. 
Simply put the potential for undetected 
breakout from ti-eaty constraints has 
increased significantly. 

Biological Weapons Proliferation 

When the convention was negotiated, 
only the United States acknowledged 
having biological weapons. In contrast 
to the openness we have practiced re- 
garding our military programs, the 
Soviets, to date, have never officially 
acknowledged having a biological weap- 
ons program and, in fact, only admit- 
ted in 1987 having a chemical weapons 
program. 

Today a number of countries are 
estimated to be working to achieve a bi- 
ological weapons capability. Our infor- 
mation on which states are involved in 
biological weapons programs is based 
on e.xtremely sensitive intelligence 
sources and methods and I would defer 
to the intelligence community to pro- 
vide you a fuller description of these 
programs in closed session. 

We are especially concerned about 
the spread of biological weapons in un- 
stable areas and about the prospects of 
biological and toxin weapons falling 
into the hands of terrorists, or into the 
arsenals of those states which actively 
support terrorist organizations. To 
date we have no evidence that any 
known terrorist organization has the 
capability to employ such weapons, nor 
that states supporting terrorism have 
supplied such weapons. However, we 
cannot dismiss these possibilities. If 
the proliferation of biological weapons 
continues, it may be only a matter of 
time before terrorists do acquire and 
use these weapons. 

U.S. Biological Defense 
Research Program 

The unilateral U.S. renunciation of 
biological weapons in 1969 was ac- 
companied by the recognition that 
maintaining a strong program to pro- 
vide for defense against biological 
weapons is essential for national secu- 
rity. That requirement is reflected in 
Article I of the convention which per- 
mits production of biological agents 
and toxins in quantities required to de- 
velop protective measures. In today's 
circumstances, with the concerns about 
compliance, proliferation, and rapid ad- 
vances in biotechnology, the require- 
ment for defensive measures is even 
greater than in 1969. 



The Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention clearly permits research 
and development for protection against 
biological and toxin weapons. The U.S. 
biological defense research program is 
in full compliance with the provisions 
of the convention. It is also open to pub- 
lic scrutiny. No other country even 
comes close in its openness. 

Eliminating Biological Weapons 

Vigorous action is needed to deal with 
the problems that I have just outlined. 
These problems are tough ones that 
will not be resolved easily or quickly. 
But we are determined to deal with 
them. 

What do we need to do? We need to 
persuade states that are not parties to 
the convention, particularly states in 
the Middle East, to renounce biological 
and toxin weapons. We have expressed 
our desire to have consultations with 
the Soviets under Article V of the con- 
vention, and this continues to be our 
position. We also need to explore pos- 
sible means for strengthening the in- 
ternational norms against biological 
weapons. 

In addition to ensuring that states 
fulfill their commitments not to pos- 
sess biological or toxin weapons, we 
must persuade additional states to 
make that important commitment. 
Currently more than 110 states have re- 
nounced biological and toxin weapons 
by becoming parties to the Biological 
and Toxin Weapons Convention. Unfor- 
tunately, while most states in the Mid- 
dle East have signed or acceded to the 
convention, only about half have rat- 
ified it and deposited their instruments 
of ratification, the legal steps neces- 
sary to become full parties to the con- 
vention. A number of these states have 
said that they will not take these ac- 
tions until their neighbors do so. We 
have recently renewed our efforts to 
bring all states in the Middle East into 
the convention. We will persist in this 
attempt to break the vicious circle. 

We are also carefully considering 
whether export controls could help re- 
inforce our efforts to prevent the acqui- 
sition of biological and toxin weapons 
by other countries. However, the tech- 
nical problems are daunting, over- 
shadowing even those associated with 
chemical weapons control. We are ex- 
amining whether an export control 
regime analogous to that of the 20 
countries belonging to the Australian 
group for controlling the export of 
chemical weapons precursors would be 



useful, but our preliminary impression 
is that the problem of identifying bio- 
logical weapons precursors and produc- 
tion equipment is so difficult that such 
a regime is not practical. We will be 
discussing this with key allies who are 
equally concerned about the prolifera- 
tion of biological weapons. 

We are also considering new and 
innovative approaches to making the in- 
ternational arms control regime for bi- 
ological weapons more effective. We 
need to strengthen international reac-' 
tion to deal effectively with proven vio- 1 
lations of the ban on use embodied in 
the 1925 Geneva protocol, to include in- 
ternational sanctions. We need addi- 
tional confidence-building measures to 
create greater openness about biolog- 
ical activities, such as that practiced 
by the United States with respect to 
our defensive research program. 

The United States has joined with 
others at the second review conference 
in calling for an annual exchange of 
information on each party's research 
activities using the U.S. policies on 
program openness as the standard. In 
this different countries work for ex- 
tended periods in each other's laborato- 
ries. By creating greater openness in 
these areas, we hope that the norm 
against biological weapons created by 
the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention can be strengthened. 

Conclusion 

We must continue to strive to prevent 
biological weapons proliferation by re- 
inforcing the moral, legal, and political i 
constraints against biological weapons ■ 
and, where feasible, seek to prevent 
states from obtaining sensitive mate- 
rials and technology for biological 
weapons purposes. This will be a par- 
ticularly difficult task and, quite 
frankly, we do not have the answers yet 
on how to achieve this. We know we 
cannot do it alone. Our efforts to con- 
strain biological weapons proliferation 
will require a sustained multilateral 
ap))roach, involving both U.S. leader- 
ship and coopei'ation with friends and 
allies. The draft legislation presently 
under consideration could demonstrate 
once again our concern and leadership 
in this area. 



' The complete transcript uf the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 204U2.H 



24 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1989 



EAST ASIA 



International Conference 
on Cambodia Held in Paris 



Following are a statement pre- 
pared for delivery by Secretary Baker 
pefure the opening of the hiternatioiial 
Conference on Canibodia in Paris on 
J Illy 30. 1989, and the text of the state- 
ment issued at the conclusion of the 
conference on August 30. 



SECRETARY'S STATEMENT, 
JULY 30, 1989' 

On behalf of President Bush and the 
lAmerican people, I want to express our 
jdeep appreciation to President Mitter- 
jrand. He took the initiative to organize 
'this conference. And he understands 
ithe great issues at stake in our 
deliberations. 

President Soeharto of Indonesia, 
Foreign Minister Alatas, his prede- 
cessor Dr. Mochtar, and their ASEAN 
[Association of South East Asian Na- 
tions] colleagues also merit our grati- 
tude. They have held aloft the vision of 
a peaceful and prosperous Southeast 
I Asia despite all obstacles. They have 
truly worked long and hard to bring us 
to this moment. Any actions we take 
here should be complementary to 
ASEAN's longstanding efforts. 

I also wish to salute UN Secretary 
General Perez de Cuellar, a true man 
of peace, for his continuing efforts to 
reconcile regional conflicts. 

We are meeting here, today, be- 
cause a decade and a half of violence 
and Vietnamese aggression have taken 
a terrible toll on the people of Cam- 
bodia. The twin tragedies of Khmer 
Rouge annihilation and Vietnamese oc- 
cupation have left more than 1 million 
Cambodians dead. To the lives lost 
must be added the wounds inflicted 
on the society and the culture of the 
Khmer people and the instability that 
has continued to plague the region. 
: The weight of the terror visited on the 
, Cambodian people is too great for us to 
measure and too heavy for any people 
to bear. 

The occupation should end. The vi- 
olence should end. The suffering should 
end. We know the path to Cambodian 
internal reconciliation is likely to be 
long and arduous. But, today, we take 
the first steps. While moving forward, 
\Vf must be mindful of the potential pit- 
falls that lie ahead. 




The United States joined 18 other nation.s and the four groups representing Cambodian 
factions at an international conference in Paris July 30-August 30, 1989. 



Now Cambodia and, indeed, the 
entire international community face a 
tragic dilemma. Perhaps the folklore of 
Cambodia tells the dilemma best when 
it speaks of the day when the Khmer 
people will be forced to choose between 
being eaten by a tiger or devoured by 
a crocodile. This conference has been 
convened in the belief that Cambodia 
can avoid the tragedy of such a choice. 
There is an alternative to the teeth of 
the Khmer Rouge or the jaws of foreign 
military domination. And that alterna- 
tive can be found in a comprehensive 
settlement that gives the people of 
Cambodia both security and the chance 
to choose their own government, a set- 
tlement bound together by external 
and internal agreements. 

Working toward that settlement 
is the purpose of this conference. 
We must find the political path that can 
lead Cambodia away from its war-torn 
past toward a constructive future. We 
can clear the way through international 
action and national reconciliation, both 
linked carefully together And while 
this path will be difficult, I believe that 
a comprehensive settlement offers the 
best route to a better future. 

The International Environment 

Let me speak first to the international 
environment. Over the past several 
years, we have seen a dramatic easing 
of global tensions. There is a growing 
disposition to resolve regional conflicts 
through negotiation. And there is a 
growing appreciation that a lasting 
resolution of conflict depends on the 
expression of the people's will. 



Our meeting, today, draws inspira- 
tion from this new direction in world 
affairs. But the signs of international 
conciliation need another signal, this 
time provided not by the international 
community but by the Cambodian peo- 
ple or, to be more precise, their lead- 
ers. It is clear to the United States, 
and it should be clear to all of us here, 
that any actions we might take to help 
Cambodia must be based on the will of 
the Cambodian parties themselves to 
move forward. A lasting peace will re- 
quire self-determination by the people 
of Cambodia. International conciliation 
cannot become a substitute for national 
reconciliation. 

That is why we believe a settle- 
ment that has any prospect of success 
must be comprehensive in its nature. 
Anything less would be a prescription 
for continued war. Today's war against 
foreign occupation would become to- 
morrow's civil war splintering further 
an already fragile land. 

A comprehensive solution has been 
the steadfast position of the United 
States, ASEAN, and our allies and 
friends throughout the decade-long 
search for peace in Cambodia. Our col- 
lective resolve in support of this posi- 
tion has helped pave the way for this 
meeting, especially our unrelenting 
opposition to Vietnamese aggression 
and occupation. 

Healing the wounds and divisions 
of Cambodia is a task that demands the 
highest quality of leadership. Cambodia 
has such a leader. Prince Sihanouk per- 
sonifies the Khmer nation and its quest 
for unity and national reconciliation. 
That is why the process of national rec- 
onciliation through the formation of an 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1989 



25 



EAST ASIA 



interim coalition government must be 
under Prince Sihanouk's leadership. It 
must reflect real power sharing, and 
it must provide executive authority 
to the Prince and the noncommunist 
resistance. 

The United States strongly be- 
lieves that the Khmer Rouge should 
play no role in Cambodia's future. We 
are prepared, however, to support 
Prince Sihanouk should he deem it nec- 
essary to accept the inclusion of all 
Khmer factions in an interim coalition 
or an interim authority. The strength 
of our support for any Cambodian Gov- 
ernment, however, will directly and in- 
versely depend on the extent of Khmer 
Rouge participation, if any, in that gov- 
ernment. There must be safeguards 
that Pol Pot and other Khmer Rouge 
leaders responsible for mass murders 
will never dominate Cambodia again. 

We also cannot accept a continua- 
tion of the present regime in Phnom 
Penh, which was established through 
Vietnamese aggression. We recognize, 
however, that elements of that regime 
are likely to be included in any transi- 
tional coalition. 

I urge that all members of the con- 
ference work to foster the necessary 
acts of reconciliation under Prince 
Sihanouk's leadership. 

UN Role as an International 
Control Mechanism 

An effective international control 
mechanism under the auspices of the 
United Nations can play a crucial role 
in the peace process. It can facilitate a 
peaceful transfer from Vietnamese oc- 
cupation to free elections, linking both 
external and internal aspects of a com- 
prehensive settlement. Such a mecha- 
nism would serve three essential 
purposes. 

First, it would assure internation- 
al verification of a total withdrawal of 
all Vietnamese troops and advisers. 

Second, the mechanism would im- 
prove the prospects of stability during 
the transition period, through peace- 
keeping activities such as monitoring a 
cease-fire and checking the disposition 
of the forces of the various Cambodian 
factions. It would also oversee the ces- 
sation of foreign military assistance 
to the four factions. 

Third, the international control 
mechanism would have a vital role to 
jilay in the process of political transi- 
tion. It would monitor a national census 
and supervise the repatriation of refu- 



gees. Most importantly, it would super- 
vise, monitor, and verify free and fair 
elections. The United States stands 
ready to recognize the victor in such 
elections, regardless of the outcome. 
Ultimately, those elections are the key 
to an independent, neutral, and peace- 
ful Cambodia. 

We believe that only the United 
Nations has the experience, resources, 
and credibility to shoulder the massive 
responsibility of such a complex set of 
undertakings. 

I must also emphasize once more 
that there is an integral link between 
the internal and external aspects of the 
settlement process. Without internal 
reconciliation, we would lack the basis 
upon which to establish the interna- 
tional control mechanism that I have 
described. Indeed, that mechanism 
could not function without a recognized 
interim government. 

Vietnamese Withdrawal 

To facilitate this critical process of na- 
tional reconciliation, it is essential that 
Vietnam play a responsible role today 
and in the future. It must live up to its 
pledge to withdraw not later than Sep- 
tember 30 and must not return again. 
But after more than a decade of occu- 
pation, Hanoi's political and moral 
obligations will not be met simply by 
withdrawing its forces from Cambodia 
and leaving behind either chaos or a re- 
gime imposed by force. 

I think there is little disagreement 
among us that our collective respon- 
sibilities to regional security — and to 
the Cambodian people — do not end with 
a Vietnamese withdrawal. That with- 
drawal came about because we were 
faithful to our principles: we opposed 
the Vietnamese aggression, and we re- 
fused to accept it as permanent. Now 
that the Vietnamese occupation is end- 
ing at last, we must work together to 
hel]) establish an independent, neutral, 
and stable Cambodia. 

What we do here in this confer- 
ence — or what we fail to do — will go far 
to determine whether such a just and 
durable peace emerges in Cambodia or 
whether Cambodia's future will resem- 
ble the tragedy of its recent past. 

The purpose of this conference is 
not to prolong that tragedy but rather 
to find the path to a very different fu- 
ture. We will find that path, I believe, 
through a comprehensive settlement. 
And while the recent past holds little 
hope, we have arrived at a point where 



the imperatives of international concil- 
iation intersect with the necessity for 
national reconciliation. 

U.S. Position 

Let me sum up our position. The Unit- 
ed States is committed to a fair and 
just political process. We support a 
comprehensive settlement including nol 
only a total and verified Vietnamese 
withdrawal but also an internal accord 
and an international control mecha- 
nism. We will respect the results of 
properly prepared and monitored 
free and fair elections. 

All of the nations' partici])ation in 
this conference can hasten the day 
when the killing fields of Cambodia can 
become the fertile fields of a peaceful 
and prosperous people. The monument.- 
at Angkor Wat are a tribute to the 
Khmer spirit of long ago. Now is the 
time to raise a new monument to that 
spirit. We must lay the foundations for 
a new and lasting tranquility in Cam- 
bodia and throughout Southeast Asia. 



CONFERENCE STATEMENT, 
AUG. 30, 1989 

At the invitation of the Government of 
France and under the cochairmanship 
of His Excellency AH Alatas, Foreign 
Minister of Indonesia, the Internationa 
Conference on Cambodia met in Paris 
from July 30 to August 30, 1989. Partic- 
ipating in the conference were the I 
representatives of Australia, Brunei I 
Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, Chi- 
na, France, India, Indonesia, Japan, ■ 
the Lao People's Democratic Republic, I 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
the United States of America, Viet- 
nam, and Zimbabw'e in its capacity as 
current chairman of the Nonaligned 
Movement. Cambodia was represented 
by the four Cambodian parties [Nation- 
al United Front for an Independent, 
Peaceful, Neutral, and Cooperative 
Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), led by 
Prince Sihanouk: the Khmer People's 
National Liberation Front (KPNLF); 
Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer 
Rouge): and the State of Cambodia]. 
The Secretary General of the United 
Nations and his representatives also 
participated in the conference. 

The conference, mindful of the pre- 
vious efforts made at the Jakarta in- 
formal meetings and elsewhere. 



26 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1989 



EAST ASIA 



achieved progress in elaborating a wide 
variety of elements necessary for the 
reaching of a comprehensive settlement 
to the tragic conflict in Cambodia. The 
conference noted, however, that it is not 
yet ])ossibIe to achieve a comprehensive 
settlement. It was, therefore, decided 
to suspend the conference. 

The conference urges all parties 
concerned to intensify their efforts to 
achieve a comprehensive settlement. 
To facilitate these efforts, the copresi- 
dents of the conference shall lend their 
good offices as required to participat- 
ing parties and countries who can fa- 
cilitate a comprehensive settlement, 
including the reconvening of the com- 
mittees as appropriate. 



The copresidents will begin con- 
sultations within 6 months with the 
participants in the conference with a 
view to reconvening the conference. 

The French Government expressed 
its readiness to make the appropriate 
arrangements to reconvene the confer- 
ence in due time in Paris. 

The Indonesian copresident and all 
the participants expressed their sin- 
cere appreciation and deep gratitude to 
the Government and people of France 
for hosting this important conference 
and the excellent arrangements made, 
as well as for their generous hospitality 
extended to all delegations. 



1 Press release 146 of Aug. 3, 1989. 



U.S. Response to Changes in China 



by Richard L. Williams 

Statements before the Subcommit- 
tees on Hinnan Rights and Interna- 
tional Organizations, on Asian and 
Pacific Affairs, and on International 
Economic Policy and Trade of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
July IS, 1989, and the Subcommittee on 
Immigration, Refugees, and Interna- 
tional Law of the House Judiciary 
Committee on July ^0. Mr. Williams is 
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
East Asian a)id Pacific Affairs.'^ 



JULY 13, 1989 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear 
before you this afternoon to continue 
the important dialogue with the Con- 
gress on how we as a nation can best 
respond to changes that have occurred 
in China since early June. 

We meet today in the shadow of the 
brutal events in and around Tiananmen 
Square on the night of June 3-4, and 
the events and arrests that have oc- 
curred since then. No one who has fol- 
lowed those events has not been moved 
by them and had their judgments of 
China affected by them. I would like to 
address the policy implications for the 
United States of these developments 
and the steps which we have taken in 
response to them. Before doing so, let 
me provide a brief description of the 
fundamental elements of our relation- 
ship as it has evolved over the last 
two decades. 



Elements of U.S. -Chinese Relations 

Improvement in relations with the Peo- 
ple's Republic of China (P.R.C.) has 
been a central objective of five succes- 
sive Administrations. Since 1971 the re- 
lationship between the United States 
and China has progressed and pros- 
pered beyond anyone's expectations. 
There have been a number of elements 
that have been central to the develop- 
ment of our relations. 

Strategic. We have both recog- 
nized that we are not each others' ad- 
versary, that we share important 
common security interests globally, 
and in Asia, and that our cooperation is 
crucial to peace and stability in East 
Asia. We have worked together to bring 
an end to the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan, Vietnamese occupation 
of Cambodia, and to further stability 
in the Korean Peninsula. China's op- 
position to stationing Soviet missiles 
in Asia buttressed the Reagan Ad- 
ministration's position and helped 
achieve agreement on an INF 
[Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] 
Treaty which removed intermediate- 
range missiles from both Asia and 
Europe. The P.R.C. 's commitment to 
a fundamental policy of peaceful re- 
unification with Taiwan, along with 
highly positive developments in Taiwan 
and growing unofficial interactions be- 
tween the two, has led to a significant 
decrease of tension in the Taiwan 
Strait. Even on issues where our ap- 
proaches have differed at times, the 
strong framework of relations we have 



built up — and the dialogue we have 
achieved — have served to bring P.R.C. 
positions much closer to our own and to 
make China a more constructive mem- 
ber of the world community in our 
view. 

Economic/Commercial. The Chi- 
nese Government's decision in the late 
1970s to open the economy to the West 
and implement meaningful market- 
oriented reforms has greatly expanded 
the opportunities for trade and invest- 
ment with the United States. Bilateral 
trade increased from about $1 billion in 
1978 to over $14 billion last year. China 
is now our 13th largest trading partner 
worldwide and our fifth largest in Asia. 
In 1988 major U.S. exports were grain 
(.$699 million), industrial raw materials 
($596 million), fertilizers {.$379 million), 
and industrial and office equipment 
($905 million). After Hong Kong/Macau, 
the United States is the largest inves- 
tor in China, with about $3 billion in 
assets. 

People-to-People. Since China 
opened its doors to reform and the out- 
side world in 1978, over 40,000 Chinese 
students have come to the United 
States to study. Hundreds of scientific 
and technological delegations go back 
and forth under the auspices of our sci- 
ence and technology accord, the largest 
accord we have with any country in the 
world. American professors, journal- 
ists, and artists have lectured and per- 
formed in China under our cultural 
accord. Hundreds of thousands of 
American tourists visit China each 
year. 

This web of relations, which I have 
sketched only briefly, has served im- 
portant U.S. national interests. More- 
over, it has helped to transform the 
political, social, and economic land- 
scape of China. It is an essential ele- 
ment of the achievements of the 10 
years of reform which provide the back- 
drop against which we should view the 
recent tragic events in China. Without 
this web of relations, in my view China 
would not have changed as dramatically 
as it has, nor would it have played as 
constructive a role in East Asian and 
global politics as it has. 

When Chinese troops moved into 
Tiananmen Square 6 weeks ago and 
brutally suppressed the demonstration 
for greater political freedoms and hu- 
man rights, the Administration reacted 
immediately with a firm, measured, 
and carefully thought out program. 
This policy was designed to achieve 
several purposes: 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1989 



27 



EAST ASIA 



• To place us on record, clearly 
and without equivocation, in sujjport 
of those who have advocated a more 
open society in China; 

• To allow us to respond speedily to 
events in the P. R.C.; and 

• To enhance and further the long- 
term strategic and foreign policy inter- 
ests of the United States. 

Policy Adjustments 

The Administration's policy since 
June 5 has been to combine our strate- 
gic, economic, and human rights con- 
cerns into a coherent package. It is a 
policy which supports a more open Chi- 
nese society, recognizes the long-term 
value of the U.S. -China relationship, 
and strives to keep our vital interests 
intact during this difficult period. The 
elements of the President's package are 
these. 

• We have suspended all 
government-to-government sales and 
commercial e.xports of weapons. The 
suspension includes export, manu- 
facturing, and technical assistance 
licenses. 

• We have suspended high-level 
U.S. and Chinese exchanges. Earlier 
we had suspended military exchanges. 
Several important previously scheduled 
exchanges were affected, including 

a meeting of the Joint Commission 
on Commerce and Trade in which 
Secretary [of Commerce Robert A.] 
Mosbacher was to have participated. 

• We are sympathetically review- 
ing requests of Chinese nationals in the 
United States to extend their stay 
here. All P.R.C. nationals who were in 
the United States as of June 6, 1989, 
and who are unwilling to return to 
China will be allowed to stay here 
until June 5, 1990. 

• We and our friends and allies 
have agreed to defer consideration of 
new loans to China by the multilateral 
development banks. 

In its totality, the Administration's 
policy adjusts our working relationship 
with China — taking into account the 
events of June ?>—l and since — and en- 
sures that our basic intei'ests ai'e well 
served. It is a policy that in our view 
promises to advance our objectives. 

First, as the President said on 
June .5, it provides us with a program 
for stimulating rather than stifling 
progress toward open and representa- 
tive systems in changing communist 
societies. It has sent a message, as 
Secretary Baker told the Senate For- 
eign Relations Committee on June 20, 



that concrete steps toward political and 
economic reform are necessary if Chi- 
na is serious about cooperating with 
the international community and 
achieving modernization. 

Second, the policy has allowed us 
to avoid measures which might advers- 
ely affect the economic well-being over 
the long term of both the Chinese and 
American people. Mandatory economic 
sanctions, unlike the measures target- 
ing military and high-level exchanges 
as proposed by the President, would 
damage our long-term economic posi- 
tion in China. As importantly, however, 
we should not lose sight of the fact that 
our commercial relationship provides 
us with a way of encoui'aging construc- 
tive change in China and influencing 
those elements of society most open to 
reform. 

Third, the policy has been sup- 
ported by and coordinated with 
America's friends and allies. This 
cooperation, for example, was critical 
for getting agreement within the World 
Bank and Asian Development Bank to 
postpone consideration of new loans to 
China. Attempts to force acceptance of 
broad economic sanctions on China — to 
which our allies are not sympathetic — 
could break the effective consensus 
that we have achieved thus far. 

Fourth, the policy has been over- 
whelmingly supported by the American 
people. Public opinion polls, editorials, 
and op-ed pieces in every section of the 
country show that the American people 
favor the measured approach taken by 
the President. They favor the way he 
has been attentive to the subtle inter- 
play of human rights, economic devel- 
opment, and geopolitical and strategic 
interests in formulating our present 
policy. 

The situation in China remains 
unsettled and, in some respects, un- 
predictable. No one can say with any 
degree of certainty where China will 
be a few months or a year from now. We 
and the allies are taking a careful ap- 
proach, avoiding precipitous reactions 
which might have unintended conse- 
quences and foreclose our options. We 
continue to monitor events very closely. 
It is important that our policy reflect 
the needs of the situation as it evolves. 

Maintaining a Flexible Policy 

The Administration and the Congress 
share similar concerns about China and 
U.S. -China relations. In almost all re- 
spects, we have the same objectives. 
But we do have a difference of o|)inion 



as to whether further legislation is 
necessary at the present time. The 
Administration believes that it is not. 
Legislation such as that adopted by the 
House, which limits severely the Presi- 
dent's ability to respond quickly in a 
rapidly changing situation, would only 
take us down the road toward economic 
sanctions, and the latter have generally 
proven ineffective, easy to circumvent, 
and costly to the economic interests of 
those countries which have imposed 
them. 

This is a difficult time for all of 
us who have followed China over the 
years. We have been greatly disap- 
pointed by recent events, which show 
that the road to reform in China will be 
a harder one than many Americans had 
hoped. Nonetheless, as the President 
noted in his recent trip to Poland, the 
movement toward political democracy 
and economic liberalization will be dif- 
ficult to stop in the long run. Change 
has its own irresistible momentum. The 
changes can be sometimes inspiring, as 
the President found in Warsaw, and 
setbacks can be agonizing as they have 
been in China during the past month. 
But ultimately the governments — 
whether they be in Poland, China, or 
elsewhere in the world — need the sup- 
port of those they serve in order to 
create lasting economic prosperity 
and maintain social order. China, too, 
will learn this lesson. 

"China's rendezvous with free- 
dom," as Secretary Baker said in his 
presentation at the Asia Society on 
June 26, "like its rendezvous with the 
advancing nations of the Pacific, cannot 
be long delayed. We w-ill be there to 
help when day follows night." To do less 
would be a disservice to those who gave 
their lives in and around Tiananmen 
Square on June 3 and June 4 and a dis- 
service to those working for change 
today. The President needs as much 
flexibility as possible to respond to 
changed circumstances. We have that 
flexibility now. We — in the Administra- 
tion and the Congress — should work 
together to maintain it. 



JULY 20, 1989 

I appreciate the opportunity to ap])ear 
before you today to consider the options 
for P.R.C. nationals now in the United 
States, especially those who are F [stu- 
dents of academic or language training] 
and J [exchange visitor] visa holders. 



28 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1989 



EAST ASIA 



Chinese Students in the United States 

Since China opened its doors to reform 
and the outside world in 1978, over 
40,000 Chinese students have come to 
the United States to study. After dec- 
ades of isolation, the decision of the 
P.R.C. in 1978-79 to allow students to 
go abroad, particularly to the United 
States, to study in large numbers rep- 
resented a landmark in the history of 
relations between our two countries. 
Chinese students have made important 
contributions to U.S. academic and re- 
search institutions, and those students 
who have returned to China have made 
important contributions to their home- 
land. They have been, and will continue 
to be, an important engine generating 
change, development, and moderniza- 
tion in China. 

My colleagues from INS [Immigra- 
tion and Naturalization Service] and 
USIA [United States Information 
Agency] are better able than I to dis- 
cuss the situation facing these Chinese 
students in the United States today, in 
the w^ake of the tragic events in China 
last month. I would like to use this oc- 
casion to describe the situation in Chi- 
na, particularly as it pertains to the 
conditions to which Chinese students 
currently in the United States would 
be returning to in the P.R.C. I will 
comment briefly on three aspects of the 
situation: the treatment of students 
now in China, the treatment of other 
participants in the demonstrations, and 
the P.R.C. Government's official posi- 
tion regarding treatment of students 
returning to China from abroad. 

The students now in China who 
were active in the demonstrations have 
been warned by the P.R.C. Government 
to report to the Public Security Bureau 
on their own initiative. There is an im- 
plicit threat that if they do not report 
to the Public Security Bureau on their 
own, they will be pursued and pun- 
ished. Those who have done so volun- 
tarily have been asked to describe in 
detail their activities during the dem- 
onstrations. In the cases with which we 
are familiar, those who have reported 
themselves to the Public Security Bu- 
reau have not been detained. It is too 
early to predict what use the P.R.C. 
Government will make of information 
provided by these students and others, 
and to what degree it could affect their 
future. Understandably, in a country 
where one's personal file — including 
comments on one's political views — 
follows one throughout one's life, these 
activities give grounds for considerable 
unease. 



The P.R.C. Government has pub- 
lished a list of 21 student and dissident 
leaders it is attempting to arrest for 
the part they played in the demonstra- 
tions. Of these, at least six, probably 
more, have been arrested. Several oth- 
ers have departed China and are now 
in other countries. Of those arrested, 
as far as we know, none have yet been 
officially charged or tried. 

Reports in the P.R.C. and Western 
press of those arrested in China follow- 
ing the demonstrations range from 
2,500 to 10,000. At the outset, the 
P.R.C. publicized many of the arrests, 
apparently with the intent of sending 
an object lesson to would-be dissent- 
ers. Since the initial wave of arrests 
there has been little official publicity 
of arrests. However, we have reason 
to believe that arrests continue. 
Precise numbers are unknown. 

The Chinese have announced 12 ex- 
ecutions of people connected with the 
demonstrations — three in Shanghai for 
burning a train, seven in Beijing for 
burning trucks and assaulting soldiers, 
and two in Chengdu for burning vehi- 
cles. The execution of 17 others in Jinan 
on June 22 was for crimes which the 
P.R.C. Government asserts were not 
related to the demonstrations. None of 
those executed to date have been stu- 
dents, to the best of our knowledge. 

Chinese leaders have said that 
students who return from abroad will 
not be subject to persecution or arrest. 
They have said that the party and gov- 
ernment will not blame students 
studying abroad who took part in dem- 
onstrations or who said, as they put it, 
some radical words as they were far 
away from the motherland, influenced 
by Western mass media, and did not 
know the truth. The Chinese leader- 
ship has said that it hopes the students 
will study hard, and they will be 
welcomed back to work in China upon 
graduation. 

The Administration hopes that the 
Chinese Government's actions toward 
returning students prove to be consis- 
tent with its stated intentions. How- 
ever, in our view the actions of the 
P.R.C. Government since June 3 pro- 
vide ample reason for the fears and 
anxieties of Chinese students in the 
United States about conditions in their 
home country. It will take positive 
P.R.C. actions over a period of some 
time to allay the concerns justifiably 
voiced by Chinese students in the 
United States. 



A Measured U.S. Response 

When Chinese troops moved into 
Tiananmen Scjuare 7 weeks ago and 
brutally suppressed the protesters seek- 
ing greater political freedoms, the 
Administration reacted immediately 
with a firm, measured, and carefully 
thought out program. Members of this 
committee are familiar with the ele- 
ments of the Administration's response, 
which has included suspension of all 
weapons sales to the P.R.C. suspension 
of high-level military and other ex- 
changes, and in concert with our 
friends' and allies' deferral of loans by 
multilateral banks to the P.R.C. In ad- 
dition to these measures, an essential 
element of the Administration's re- 
sponse, articulated in the President's 
statement on June 5, was the decision 
to review sympathetically the requests 
of Chinese nationals in the United 
States to extend their stay here. The 
Attorney General [Richard Thorn- 
burgh] issued a directive June 6 im- 
plementing the President's decision, 
which my colleague from INS is best 
able to discuss with members of the 
committee. 

In response to the Attorney Gen- 
eral's directive of June 6, the Immi- 
gration and Naturalization Service 
initiated programs to assist the Chi- 
nese F and J visa holders now in the 
United States. The INS has developed 
several options currently available to 
these individuals. The situation facing 
Chinese students upon their return to 
China, as I have said, is uncertain, 
and, consistent with the Administra- 
tion's policy, several options have been 
made available to them permitting 
them to stay in the United States and 
work until at least June 5, 1990. As we 
continue to monitor events very closely, 
we may find that the current options 
available to F and J visa holders re- 
quire modification. It is important that 
our policy reflect the needs of the situ- 
ation as it evolves. 

The situation in China remains 
unsettled and, in some respects, un- 
predictable. No one can say with any 
degree of certainty where China will 
be a few months or a year from now. We 
and the allies are taking a careful ap- 
proach, avoiding precipitous reactions 
which might have unintended conse- 
quences and foreclose our options. 

Though what I have said suggests 
that caution and a wait-and-see ap- 
proach are necessary, we at the State 
Department strongly believe that Chi- 
nese students in the United States 
should not be forced into a premature 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1989 



29 



EAST ASIA 



return to their homeland. We know 
that many Chinese students in the 
United States want nothing more than 
to return home, to use their knowledge 
and skills acquired here, and find a re- 
spected place in their country's devel- 
opment. That is our goal as well. We 
understand the Congress" interest in 
assuring the welfai'e of these students 
in the United States until the justifia- 



ble grounds for their anxiety and fear 
are removed, and we look forward to 
discussing solutions to the problems 
thev face. 



' The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee aiul 
will be available from tlie Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



U.S. Relations With Korea 



In just under four decades, the Repub- 
lic of Korea has emerged from the dev- 
astation of a civil war into a modern 
democratic nation and an inspiration 
for developing nations throughout the 
world. The modern U.S. -Korean rela- 
tionship dates from the end of World 
War II, when American troops helped 
to liberate southern Korea from Japa- 
nese colonial rule. In the early 1950s, 
U.S. forces, acting under UN auspices, 
helped South Korea repel an invasion 
from North Korea. Our mutual securi- 
ty interests, embodied in the 1954 Mu- 
tual Defense Treaty, are based on our 
joint commitment to the stability of the 
Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. 
As a tangible expression of this com- 
mitment, 40,000 U.S. troops currently 
are stationed in South Korea. 

U.S. -South Korean defense ar- 
rangements are the key element in this 
nation's strategic posture in Northeast 
Asia. In recent years, however, grow- 
ing anti-Americanism has strained our 
traditional friendship. The continued 
presence of U.S. troops on Korean soil 
has become a point of contention, and 
changes in our economic relations are 
redefining the nature of our overall 
relationship. 

U.S. policy toward the Republic of 
Korea rests on three interdependent 
components: security, democracy, and 
economic partnership. A stable Korean 
economy promotes greater security, 
which, in turn, enhances economic 
growth. Steps toward democracy pro- 
mote both security and economic 
progress. 

Strategic, Military, 
and Security Concerns 

The United States has compelling po- 
litical and strategic interests on the 
Korean Peninsula, where the interests 
of four major powers — the United 
States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and 
China — converge. South Korea's securi- 



ty is critical to regional and global 
peace and stability. 

The Republic of Korea remains 
wary of its well-armed neighbor. North 
Korea, which seeks the reunification of 
the Korean Peninsula on its own terms. 
The military balance continues to favor 
the North, which maintains numerical 
advantages in nearly every measure of 
combat power. Extensively reorganized 
since the early 1980s, North Korea's 
Armed Forces total more than 1 million 
(as compared to South Korea's 630,000) 
with a ground force strength of about 
930,000. Efforts to modernize South 
Korea's Armed Forces to narrow this 
military lead are essential to the main- 
tenance of an effective deterrent and 
the preservation of peace and stability. 

In light of the continuing threat 
from the North, with which a state of 
war still technically exists, safeguard- 
ing the security of South Korea re- 
mains a paramount U.S. objective. The 
United States is the primary guaran- 
tor of the 1953 armistice between the 
two nations. At the request of the Gov- 
ernment of South Korea, under the 
terms of the Mutual Defense Treaty, 
the United States continues to contrib- 
ute to the defense of the Republic of Ko- 
rea. A binational military command 
structure, under the joint political di- 
rection of both governments, deters 
North Korean aggression and would be 
called on to repel any future North Ko- 
rean incursion. This binational defense 
arrangement has provided a military 
shield behind which South Korea has 
prospered economically and begun 
democratic modernization. 

The overwhelming majority of Ko- 
reans remain committed to close U.S.- 
South Korean security ties, including 
the stationing of U.S. forces, despite 
increased questioning of the need for a 
continued U.S. troop presence by a vo- 
ciferous minority in South Korea. Our 
two governments periodically review 



the strength and composition of U.S. 
forces in Korea and are currently dis- 
cus'sing sharing the costs associated 
with their stationing there. U.S. forces 
will remain in South Korea as long as 
there is a threat from North Korea and 
the South Korean Government and peo- 
ple wish them to remain. 

Democratization 

The democratization of South Korean 
political institutions is also a major fac- 
tor in U.S. -Korean relations. The Re- 
public of Korea inherited a political 
tradition that followed thousands of 
years of imperial rule and the authori- 
tarian values of Confucianism. In the 
absence of an open political process, 
neither democratic institutions nor the 
belief in compromise and mutual trust, 
which are the foundation for democra- 
cy, developed. As a result, politics 
based on the strength of individual per- 
sonalities and concentration of political 
power in the hands of the ruling party 
became the hallmark of Korean 
politics. 

Recently, a dramatic transforma- 
tion has occurred as democratic values 
and a consensus on the need for more 
progress toward democratization 
emerge. In the past 2 years, ratifica- 
tion of a new constitution, elections to 
the National Assembly, and a presiden- 
tial election marked great strides in 
Korea's political evolution. For the first 
time, the ruling goverimient party fail- 
ed to win a majority in the assembly, 
which now has become an important fo- 
rum for the public airing of past and fu- 
ture policies. The election of President 
Roh Tae Woo was the outcome of a free- 
wheeling, open campaign marking a 
major step toward democracy. 

Bowing to the will of the Korean 
people. President Roh and leaders of 
the opposition have publicly affirmed 
their willingness to cooperate to make 
democracy succeed. They have pledged 
to work together to ensure that the mo- 
mentum toward democracy will be 
maintained. Encouraged by these de- 
velopments, the Korean people hope 
that this trend will continue. 

The human rights situation in 
South Korea also has improved 
measurably. Several hundred political 
prisoners have been released, sen- 
tences commuted, and the civil rights 
of political dissidents restored. There 
is a more vital and free press in the 
country. President Roh has pledged to 
curb the power of the police and securi- 
ty agencies to ensure that civil rights 
are respected. 



30 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1989 



EAST ASIA 



The United States has extended its 
uiKiualified support to South Korea's 
steps toward greater democracy. At the 
same time, we have attempted to im- 
press upon the Korean leadership that 
governmental authority must rest on a 
foundation of respect for individual 
rights and fundamental human liber- 
ties. While pressing for further im- 
provements in human rights, we have 
welcomed recent constitutional and leg- 
islative reforms which are helping to 
create a more solid democratic political 
framework. 

Economic Success Story 

The most rapidly developing area in 
U.S. -Korean relations is economics and 
trade. It is in this area that new prob- 
lems are likely to arise. 

The Republic of Korea has made 
remarkable economic progress in the 
past 30 years, becoming one of the most 
advanced economies in the Third 
World. Since 1961 Korea's spectacular 
economic growth has averaged over SVr 
annuallv, reaching more than 12% per 
year in'l986-87. Its GNP in 1987 was 
$118 billion, third highest in East Asia 
(after Japan and China), and per capita 
GNP was more than $2,800 (compared 
with $100 in 1963). South Korea now is 
in a select category of countries — the 
so-called newly industrialized econ- 
omies. It has moved from labor- 
intensive, light industry into the manu- 
facture and export of more sophisti- 
cated high-technology products, such 
as electronics, microchips, and 
automobiles. 

The Korean people have worked 
long and hard to achieve this success. 
They have one of the highest rates of 
personal savings in the world. Highly 
industrious, they have demanded and 
received more educational and on-the- 
job training, producing increasing 
numbers of scientists, engineers, and 
other skilled workers. The govern- 
ment's economic policies, an important 
factor in this success story, have in- 
cluded currency reform, stronger fi- 
nancial institutions, and flexible 
economic planning. Although govern- 
ment guidance of the economy is still 
significant, market forces are play- 
ing an increasing role. Korean 
chaebols — very large and highly di- 
versified conglomerates — compete 
fiercely. 

Successive Korean administrations 
also have focused on export-led growth 
and the benefits it brings in the form of 
increased competitiveness and foreign 
exchange earnings. In 1987 South Ko- 



South Korean Initiative 
Promotes Dialogue with the North 



On July 7, 1988, South Korean President 
Roh Tae Woo announced an initiative to pro- 
mote dialogue and contacts with the Demo- 
cratic People's Republic of Korea — North 
Korea. He urged it to open up trade and oth- 
er contacts and suggested that South Ko- 
rea's friends and allies also should pursue 
contacts with the North. 

In January 1989, North Korean Presi- 
dent Kim II Sung rejected an offer by Presi- 
dent Roh to come to North Korea and hold 
talks. President Kim had insisted upon pre- 
conditions, such as suspension of U.S. -South 
Korean military exercises, that were unac- 
ceptable to the South. The focus since has 
shifted to the possibility of talks on the 
prime ministerial level. The two national 
Olympic committees have met to consider 
forming a joint team for the 1990 Asian 
Games in Beijing. The resumption of Red 
Cross discussions on family reunification 



and youth exchanges has been undertaken. 
Informal trade relations between the two 
nations also are starting to develop. 

To support President Roh's initiative, on 
October 31, 1988, the United States an- 
nounced several measures to facilitate U.S.- 
North Korean private exchanges and hu- 
manitarian exports and allow substantive 
diplomatic contacts. However, the United 
States has not removed North Korea from 
the list of countries supporting terrorism or 
lifted the commercial trade embargo. Be- 
cause the U.S. Government believes that 
fundamental decisions on the future of the 
Korean Peninsula must be made by the Ko- 
rean people, it refuses separate negotiations 
with North Korea and supports direct, 
government-to-government talks between 
North and South Korean authorities to pro- 
mote greater understanding and reduce 
tensions. 



rean exports, which are very diver- 
sified, totaled $47.3 billion, "or 40% of 
GNP. Large trade surpluses in the 
1980s have enabled Korea to build up its 
foreign exchange reserves and to re- 
duce its external debt to less than $25 
billion. 

U.S. -Korean Economic Relations 

The United States has been an impor- 
tant catalyst in South Korea's economic 
progress. U.S. foreign assistance pro- 
grams to Korea were important in the 
1960s and 1970s. U.S. purchases of Ko- 
rean goods have become significant in 
the 19"80s. The United States is Korea's 
number one trade partner, taking 38% 
of Korean exports in 1987. Korea is now 
the seventh-largest trade partner of the 
United States and the fourth-largest 
market for U.S. agricultural products. 
The United States also is its leading 
source of foreign investment and tech- 
nology. The bilateral economic relation- 
ship, however, is characterized by large 
trade imbalances: Korea's surplus with 
the United States was $10.4 billion in 
1988. 

The United States wants to 
achieve a more balanced and equitable 
trade relationship with the Republic of 
Korea. The U.S. Government believes 



that South Korea should do more to 
open its markets to American goods 
and services. Korea's trade in certain 
agricultural products (e.g., beef) and 
some service sectors, such as advertis- 
ing and banking, have been especially 
protected. Greater access to imports 
would raise the living standards of Ko- 
rean consumers, reduce inflationary 
pressures, and increase economic effi- 
ciency. Some South Koreans, believing 
that domestic workers, farmers, and 
companies would be hurt by substan- 
tially higher American imports, resent 
U.S. pressure to open up Korean mar- 
kets. Progress is being made, however, 
in reducing Korea's tariff and nontariff 
barriers to trade. The won. South Ko- 
rea's currency, has been appreciating 
against the U.S. dollar since 1988, mak- 
ing Korean exports more expensive and 
less competitive. Consequently, the bi- 
lateral trade imbalance appears to be 
lessening in 1989. 

The United States also hopes that 
Korea will play a growing role in the 
liberalization of world trade. Interna- 
tional protectionism would stop the en- 
gine of Korea's economic development. 
South Korea should participate fully in 
the ongoing Uruguay Round of multi- 
lateral trade negotiations to reduce 
barriers to the international flow of 
goods and services. ■ 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1989 



31 



EAST ASIA 



FSX Coproduction Prohibition 
Disapproved by President 



PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO THE 
SENATE, JULY 31. 1989' 

I am returning without my approval S.J. 
Res. 113, a joint resolution that would pro- 
hibit the e.xport of certain technology, de- 
fense articles, and defense services in 
connection with the codevelopment and 
coproduction of the FS-X aircraft with Ja- 
pan. The resolution is neither necessary to 
protect the interest of the United States, 
n<jr consistent with long-standing require- 
ments of the Arms E.xport Control Act. 
Further, the resolution contains binding 
provisions that unconstitutionally infringe 
on the powers of the E.xecutive. 

I am committed to the protection of 
U.S. security, economic, and technological 
interests. Shortly after assuming this Of- 
fice, I directed that a review of the FS-X 
program be undertaken to reassess its im- 
pact on the United States. This evaluation 
included active participation by the Depart- 
ments of State, Defense, and Commerce, 
and the Office of the U.S. Trade Represen- 
tative, among other agencies. Following the 
review, we reopened discussions with the 
Japanese and clarifications were made 
to ensure that valid U.S. concerns and 
requirements were met in such areas as 
U.S. workshare and technology flowback. 

With agreement reached on these clari- 
fications, I decided that we should proceed 
with the joint development of the FS-X air- 
craft. I determined that the program is in 
the strategic and commercial interests of 
the United States and will contribute to our 
security and that of a major ally. The ability 
of Japan to carry its share of the defense 
burden will be enhanced as a result of the 
program, at no cost to the American ta.x- 
payer. Moreover, the program will produce 
substantial work for the U.S. aerospace in- 
dustry without jeopardizing our commit- 
ment to the continued excellence of that 
industry. The U.S. economy will gain some 
$2.5 billion and 22,700 man years of employ- 
ment over the course of the codevelopment 
and coproduction phases. 

I remain fully convinced that proceed- 
ing with the program is in the best interests 
of the United States and that the additional 
conditions prescribed in this resolution are 
unnecessary. Such conditions include an un- 
[irecedented absolute prohibition on sales or 



retransfers of the FS-X weapon system or 
any of its major subcomponents codeveloped 
or coproduced with the United States. This 
prohibition is inconsistent with the current 
agreement with .Japan and goes beyond the 
current requirements of the Arms Export 
Control Act, which permit such sales or re- 
transfers, but only if the written approval 
of the United States Government is first 
obtained. This requirement of prior con- 
sent completely protects U.S. security and 
other interests. 

This resolution also conflicts with the 
President's proper authority under the Con- 
stitution. The Constitution vests Executive 
power in the President. Executive power in- 
cludes the exclusive authority to conduct ne- 
gotiations on behalf of the United States 
with foreign governments. S.J. Res. 113 vio- 
lates this fundamental constitutional princi- 
ple by purporting — in binding legislative 
language — to direct the United States and 
Japan to conduct negotiations if coproduc- 
tion of the FS-X is sought, and by purport- 
ing to define in advance both the form and 
substance of any resulting agreement. In 
the conduct of negotiations with foreign gov- 
ernments, it is imperative that the United 
States speak with one voice. The Constitu- 
tion provides that that one voice is the Pres- 
ident's. While of course the Congress has 
authority under the Constitution to regulate 
commerce with foreign nations, it may not 
use that authority to intrude into areas en- 
trusted by the Constitution exclusively to 
the Executive. And while I am eager to co- 
operate with Congress in shaping a sound 
foreign policy for our Nation, and will con- 
sult with Members of Congress at every 
opportunity — indeed, the ultimate shape of 
the agreement with Japan reflects healthy 
cooperation between our two branches — I 
cannot accept binding provisions like those 
in S.J. Res. 113 that would tie my hands in 
the exercise of constitutional responsibilities. 

The Constitution's vesting of executive 
power in the President requires that the 
President exercise supervisory authority 
and control over the internal deliberations 
of the Executive branch. The resolution in- 
trudes on this constitutional principle by 
purporting to direct a particular Executive 
department to solicit and consider comments 
or recommendations from another depart- 
ment and to make certain recommendations 



to the President. The resolution also pur- 
ports to require the President to consider 
these recommendations. Such provisions in- 
terfere with Executive branch management 
and infringe on the President's authority 
with respect to deliberations incident to 
the exercise of Executive power 

The reporting requirement imposed by - 
this resolution would inject the General Ac- 
counting Office, a legislative entity, into the 
execution of the FS-X program in a highly 
intrusive manner. It would require the GAO, 
for example, to track within the Japanese 
aerospace industry all applications of tech- 
nology involved in the development of the 
FS-X, including technology developed solely 
by Japan. Such a role, tantamount to intel- 
ligence gathering, is inappropriate for a 
legislative entity, and poses the clear and 
significant risk of legislative entanglement 
in functions assigned under our Constitution 
to the Executive branch. 

The FS-X program is the first major 
military codevelopment program between 
the United States and Japan. The FS-X 
will bolster .Japan's self-defense capability, 
strengthen our overall alliance with .Japan, 
and allow Japan to assume a larger share of 
the common defense burden. The impor- 
tance of these achievements cannot be over- 
stated, particularly given the fact that our 
relationship with .Japan is a foundation for 
our political and strategic relations through- 
out the Pacific. 

To reopen discussions now for additional 
and needless changes can only damage the 
prospects for a successful agreement. If this 
occurs, substantial injury to the U.S. -Japan 
security relationship is likely and the con- 
siderable strategic and commercial benefits 
to the United States will be lost. The com- 
promising of U.S. interests is simply not 
acceptable. 

Finally, acceptance of this resolution 
would constitute a setback in our objective 
of achieving a close working relationship and 
mutual respect between our two branches 
through the minimization of legislative mi- 
cromanagement of both foreign affairs and 
Executive branch internal deliberations. 

For all the reasons stated above, I am 
compelled to disapprove S.J. Res. 113. 

George Bush 



' Text from Weekly Compilation of Pres- 
idential Documents of Aug. 7, 19iS9. ■ 



32 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1989 



ECONOMICS 



Aviation's Role in Shaping Today's World 



by Eugene J. McAllister 

Address before the International 
Anation Club on June 20, 1989. Mr. 
McAllister is Assistant Secretary for 
Ei-ononiic and Business Affairs. 

I am delighted to be here with the 
members and guests of the Internation- 
al Aviation Club. I have great respect 
for this organization, bringing togeth- 
er representatives of one of the most 
competitive and fastest growing indus- 
tries in the world. 

I would like to talk to you today 
from the perspective of a policy- 
maker — a policymaker from the State 
Department. We at the State Depart- 
ment feel first hand the tremendous 
ferment as the world shrinks and our 
national economies become a global 
economy. In the past month or two, we 
have witnessed incredible events in 
China, which commentators attribute 
to the communications revolution. I 
don't disagree about the importance of 
communications in drawing our world 
closer and making it more difficult for 
a nation to remain isolated — indeed, it 
is difficult to overestimate the signifi- 
cance of modern communication. But I 
would add another factor: that of trans- 
portation. The tremendous changes 
that have occurred in aviation have 
affected the world in which we live and 
affected it positively — tourism, busi- 
ness travel, and even the transporta- 
tion of products have all played their 
part in shaping today's world. 

I would like to spend a few minutes 
talking about three themes. 

• What has been accomplished in 
aviation, and what has aviation 
accomplished? 

• Where are we today with regard 
to aviation policy? What are the U.S. 
Government's priorities? 

• What does the future of aviation 
policy, and the aviation business, look 
like? And how can we in government 
and you in the industry cooperate to 
assure that the United States remains 
at the leading edge? 

Accomplishments in U.S. Aviation 

The changes in the aviation industry 
over the last 10 years have been truly 
remarkable — remarkable in what has 
been accomplished, and remarkable 



that we take it all for granted. Step- 
ping back, progress can be seen in 
a number of areas: the growth in 
aviation — both domestic and interna- 
tional, technological advancements, 
and rapid development of related in- 
dustries. Let me offer some concrete 
e.xamples. 

Growth in Aviation. While avia- 
tion has continually expanded since its 
inception, the changes over the last 
decade, since deregulation began, 
have been astounding, particularly in 
international aviation. 

• The number of international pas- 
sengers carried by U.S. airlines dou- 
bled from 16 million to 32 million in the 
last decade. 

• The importance of the interna- 
tional market has been recognized by a 
number of carriers that had previously 
served only domestic routes. New in- 
ternational service has been instituted 
by American, Delta, Continental, 
United, Federal Express, and other 
airlines. We applaud this trend and 
fully expect it to continue. 

• U.S. carriers control 52% of the 
international market, up 5% in the last 
2 years. This impressive growth can be 
attributed in part to an aggressive ne- 
gotiating stance of recent years, where 
we have actively sought new routes and 
rights for additional carriers in the in- 
ternational market. 

• International service by U.S. car- 
riers is growing 25 times faster than 
domestic service. 

In sum, the growth potential for 
international service by U.S. carriers 
is unlimited. But government and in- 
dustry must work together to make 
that growth continue at this impressive 
rate. 

Effect on the Economy. This 
growth in the aviation industry has had 
a profound impact on the U.S. economy. 
It has sparked rapid growth in other 
sectors of the economy and has even re- 
sulted in the restructuring of some 
sectors. 

For each Wc increase in interna- 
tional and domestic air travel in the 
United States, $600 million is added to 
the economy, hundreds of new jobs are 
created in airlines, and tens of thou- 
sands of new jobs are created in travel- 
related industries and in other parts of 
the economy. 



Technological Advancement and 
Development of Related Industries. 

Behind many of the changes in aviation 
has been the expanded use of computer 
technology. The application of computer 
technology coupled with the growth of 
international aviation has sparked re- 
markable changes in our lives. These 
technological advances have even led, 
in some cases, to the development of 
entirely new industries. 

• The computer reservation sys- 
tem, which did not exist 15 years ago, is 
now a primary marketing tool for air- 
lines. Not only are the majority of air 
travel reservations made and tickets is- 
sued through computer reservation sys- 
tems, but train, hotel, and rental car 
reservations can also be arranged — a 
full service travel planner for the busy 
traveler. 

• Improved cargo handling — which 
is faster, more efficient, and results in 
fewer losses — is now routine, thanks to 
expanded use of computer technology. 

• The development of small package 
delivery services and door-to-door 
service has created thousands of jobs 
and revolutionized the way business is 
conducted. Again, computer technology 
has made this new service possible. 

• The linkage between trucking 
and aviation has revolutionized the 
movement of freight. 

• One of the most impressive areas 
of growth has been in tourism, which 
accounts for 7% of the gross national 
product. In 1987, foreign tourists ac- 
counted for .$10 billion in income to the 
airlines and $42 billion to other travel- 
related industries. U.S. and foreign 
tourists spent nearly $300 billion on 
travel-related expenditures in the 
United States in 1987: 43 States and 
the District of Columbia earned more 
than $1 billion from tourism in that 
year. 

But the greatest effect of this ex- 
pansion is on the lives of people. The 
world has gotten smaller. People have 
more opportunities to travel to other 
countrie.s — to get to know different na- 
tionalities and cultures. This leads to 
greater understanding between nations 
and strengthens an appreciation for 
that system of government which best 
promotes the aspirations of people — 
democracy. 

Look at the explosive growth in the 
number of foreign students studying in 
the United States: in the school vear 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1989 



33 



ECONOMICS 



1977-78, there were 235,000 foreign stu- 
dents here. By the 1987-88 school year, 
that number had shot up to 356,000, a 
jump of 51'7c. With deregulation, air 
fares have actually declined 42'7( in real 
terms in the last 10 years, making this 
travel even easier and more accessible 
to more students. Of course, all of 
those students are picking up ideas and 
values and spreading them to their own 
countries. 

Japanese tourism to the United 
States is growing an unbelievable 2b% 
annually. In the past 10 years, tourist 
visas issued by American embassies 
and consulates around the world have 
nearly doubled, and e.xchange visitor 
visas have increased by VS59(. 

The common factor in all of these 
is access — aviation provides greater 
access to people, resources, oppor- 
tunities, and leads, ultimately, to 
more e.xchanges of information and 
more rapid development. 

What is Our Current Agenda? 

This takes me to my second point — 
where are we today with regard to avi- 
ation policy — what are our priorities? 
We in the government are operating 
on the following four principles or 
priorities. 

• Growth and expansion are our 
watchwords. Markets should be as open 
as possible. 

• Aviation is different from the tra- 
ditional international service industry. 
The markets are closed; market open- 
ings must be specifically negotiated, 
one by one, on a bilateral basis. Our ne- 
gotiators will continue to ensure that 
we obtain economically equivalent 
rights abroad before granting new 
rights to foreign carriers. 

• Aviation is becoming increasingly 
more complicated than routes and 
rights. We must look at security and li- 
ability issues and their implications for 
the passenger and the industry. 

• Innovation is the key to the avia- 
tion industry. By minimizing restric- 
tions and maximizing opportunities, 
the aviation industry will continue to 
thrive and expand. It is our job in 
government to facilitate, not impede, 
innovation. 

More specifically, our agenda can 
be broken down into three categories: 
bilateral negotiations, security and 
safety, and doing-business issues, in- 
cluding computer reservation systems 
and user charges. 



Bilateral Negotiations. Over the 

past year, the government has con- 
ducted 42 sets of negotiations with 23 
countries, pushing them toward more 
liberal aviation regimes. I am proud 
to be able to report that we have had 
many successes. 

• Our new air agreement with 
Mexico has expanded air service to 
many cities in both countries by new 
carriers. Combined with a dramatic 
change in aviation policy in favor of the 
economic benefits tourism can bring, 
passenger and cargo service has grown 
significantly. 

• In Brazil, we reached a new 
agreement that provides for a signifi- 
cant expansion of passenger, cargo, and 
charter service; instituted a liberal 
pricing regime; and resolved conver- 
sion and remittance problems. 

• We negotiated a new agreement 
with Austria, the first in over 10 years, 
that provides for new intermediate 
points and service by three carriers. 

• We have new or expanded agree- 
ments with Australia, the Philippines, 
and Yugoslavia that give us new mar- 
ket access and provide for growth in 
the market. 

• We are near resolution of doing- 
business problems with Switzerland 
and have solved two longstanding 
doing-business problems with Korea. 

During the coming year, we will 
look closely at Japan, Canada, and 
Europe to seek more liberal air rela- 
tionships and opportunities. 

We do not believe Japan sees avia- 
tion from as broad a perspective as 
it should. The proposal the Japanese 
made, in May, does not contain enough 
opportunities to satisfy market de- 
mand or command the broad support of 
U.S. interests. We have offered to meet 
again in July and are preparing a new 
proposal that should provide the basis 
for mutually acceptable expansion. Key 
U.S. objectives are: more service to .Ja- 
pan by more carriers from more U.S. 
cities and more services to new Japa- 
nese cities, more cargo rights, and 
more charter rights. In the longer 
term, price competition is the key 
to creating more U.S. opportunities 
in Asia. 

There is a greater gap between 
consumer demand and supply in the 
U.S. -Canadian market than in any oth- 
er bilateral market. The growing eco- 
nomic and political ties between the 
United States and Canada make prog- 
ress all the more important. The recent 
expansion of our aviation relationship 
with Mexico is strong evidence that an 



open relationship can be beneficial to 
both partners, even when their airlines 
differ in size. Despite Canadian con- 
cern about competition with large U.S. 
airlines, we believe broad liberalization 
will benefit both countries. 

Europe is a top priority. We value 
highly our air relationships with 
Europe — the United States and the 
European Community are each other's 
largest bilateral trading partners. One- 
third of U.S. arrivals and departures 
by air are traveling to or arriving from 
Europe. We are pleased that services 
are increasing with France and Ger- 
many and hope to see agreement soon 
on new service to Manchester, En- 
gland, and to Italy. We are urging the 
Scandinavian countries to focus on 
growth rather than restraint of a 
healthy market. The United States 
looks forward to, first and foremost, 
the preservation of our rights in Eu- 
rope under current bilateral agree- 
ments. In addition, we seek continued 
growth and expansion and freer pric- 
ing, a more liberal aviation regime in 
Europe — one which can foster new op- 
portunities for European and Ameri- 
can carriers — and a continued dialogue 
with the community on how best to 
achieve the open, competitive market 
we want on both sides of the Atlantic 
within the context of a single-market 
Europe. 

Security, Safety, and Facilita- 
tion. Earlier, I spoke about the contri- 
bution that aviation makes to opening 
up the world. But there is also a shadow 
on international travel — a shadow cre- 
ated by the threat of terrorist actions. 

Let me state up front: Air travel is 
still the safest mode of travel on earth. 
But there is the potential for terrorist- 
created accidents. The U.S. Govern- 
ment must and will put the safety of 
passengers first, to ensure that pas- 
sengers are offered the highest quality, 
safest service available. We are work- 
ing hard to ensure that the pursuit of 
safety does not unfairly burden U.S. 
carriers. These are issues which cut 
across national boundaries, and we are 
seeking multilateral solutions. We are 
working closely with the International 
Civil Aviation Organization to fight ter- 
rorism through the introduction of new 
security measures at international 
airports and cooperation in counter- 
terrorism efforts. 

We also are making significant 
progress in our bilateral efforts and 
have reached agreement with 49 coun- 
tries on the texts of security articles. 
Plans are proceeding for the deploy- 



34 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1989 



ECONOMICS 



meiit of new detection equipment at 
airports and for tlie assignment of addi- 
tional security specialists overseas. 
This is not an easy task ahead. These 
AW difficult issues that sometimes 
-.-aise sensitive questions. We recognize 
:hat additional burdens are imposed on 
the industry, and we want to work with 
v'ou to minimize those burdens. We re- 
alize that we may not always agree on 
these issues, but in the long run, if we 
all work together, we will achieve the 
best results. 

The tragedy of the bombing of Pan 
Am Flight 103 has had broad policy im- 
jjlications in several areas. In addition 
io the increased focus on aviation secu- 
rity, it has brought to public attention 
the fact that the United States has not 
yet ratified Montreal protocols 3 and 4 
til the Warsaw convention. This is a pri- 
ority of the State Department for this 
llegislative session. We must ensure 
that families and victims of aviation ac- 
cidents or terrorist acts will no longer 
have to endure additional suffering on 
!top of the trauma of injury or death 
lof a loved one in order to be justly 
icompensated. 

Doing-Business Issues. The third 
part of our immediate agenda is the 
resolution of the basic problems of do- 
ing business in other countries. We will 
continue to aggressively pursue resolu- 
tion of these issues that plague carriers 
in many parts of the world. In some 
eases, these are so egregious that they 
minimize the value of any route rights 
that have been negotiated. 

Market access for computer reser- 
vation systems is a key issue. We will 
not tolerate discriminatory displays, 
denial of ticketing authority for U.S. 
systems in foreign countries, or other 
restrictions that unfairly inhibit a car- 
rier's ability to use this sophisticated 
tool. 

Let me finally note that the De- 
partment is in the midst of arbitrating 
user charges imposed at Heathrow Air- 
port. We believe these charges violate 
our bilateral agreement with the 
■United Kingdom and a memorandum of 
understanding signed between the two 
governments in 1983. This is the larg- 
est aviation arbitration in history and 
the first arbitration with the United 
^Kingdom in many decades. It has re- 
: quired a major commitment of staff and 
funds, but I believe it demonstrates 
our wholehearted commitment to your 
industry. 



Steel Trade 
Liberalization Program 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
JULY 25, 19891 

Today I am establishing a steel trade 
liberalization program that will extend 
for 2'/2 years the voluntary restraint 
arrangements that limit steel imports 
into the United States. I am taking 
this step to permit the negotiation of 
an international consensus to remove 
unfair trade practices and to provide 
more time for the industry to adjust 
and modernize. The steel trade liberal- 
ization program is designed to restore 
free-market forces to, and end govern- 
ment interference in, global trade in 
steel. I am directing U.S. Trade Rep- 
resentative Carla A. Hills to oversee 
implementation of this program. 

Ambassador Hills will negotiate a 
2'/j-year transitional e.xtension of the 
restraints that currently limit steel 
imports from voluntary restraint ar- 
rangements countries to 18.4% of the 
U.S. market. The extension will cover 
all major product categories. During 
this transition to an open market, the 
ceiling on imports from voluntary re- 
straint arrangements countries will be 
increased at an annual rate of one per- 
centage point. To support our efforts to 
achieve an international consensus, this 
increase will be allocated to countries 
that undertake and abide by disciplines 
to address trade-distorting practices. 

I am also directing Ambassador 
Hills to seek to negotiate, through the 
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations and complementary bilat- 
eral agreements, an international con- 
sensus to provide effective disciplines 
over government aid and intervention 
in the steel sector and to lower barriers 
to global trade in steel. The interna- 
tional consensus will contain three 
elements: 

• Strong disciplines over trade- 
distorting government subsidies; 

• Lowering of trade barriers so 
as to ensure market access; and 

• Enforcement measures to deal 
with violations of consensus obligations. 



In extending the voluntary re- 
straint arrangements for a transitional 
period, I am mindful of the need to im- 
prove the availability of steel in the 
United States and to promote price 
competition. Accordingly, to ensure 
that adequate supplies of competitively 
priced steel are available on a timely 
basis, the Department of Commerce 
will expedite and streamline the exist- 
ing short-supply mechanism. 

Since 1984 the U.S. steel industry 
has made considerable progress toward 
improving its competitiveness and 
modernizing its production facilities. 
It has reduced capacity, cut costs, and 
modernized its equipment and technol- 
ogy. I urge the industry to continue its 
modernization and worker retraining 
programs and will support legislation 
to that effect. The U.S. International 
Trade Commission will be asked to 
monitor and report regularly on devel- 
opments in the carbon and specialty 
steel industries, including investment, 
wages, and executive compensation. 

Consistent with this Administra- 
tion's commitment to free and open 
trade, the voluntary restraint arrange- 
ments will end on March 31, 1992. 
Thereafter U.S. steel producers, like 
other American industries, will contin- 
ue to rely on domestic trade laws as an 
ultimate assurance against the effects 
of foreign unfair trade practices. The 
Department of Commerce will continue 
rigorously to endorse the laws against 
injurious dumping and subsidization. 

For decades governments have sup- 
ported their steel producers through 
subsidies and import restrictions. Steel 
trade and the international trading sys- 
tem as a whole have suffered. This self- 
defeating rivalry must end. I urge our 
trading partners to w'ork with us to 
restore free and fair trade to world 
markets. 



' Te.xt from Weekly Compilation of Pres- 
idential Documents of July 31, 1989. ■ 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1989 



35 



ENVIRONMENT 



Challenges for the Future 

The priorities just outlined are more 
than enough to keep U.S. Government 
negotiators busy. But there is one other 
critical assignment: thinking about the 
future. 

What will it take to be as success- 
ful over the next 10-25 years as we 
were over the last 10 years? Where will 
we be at the turn of the century — or 
more importantly, where do we want to 
be at the turn of the century? There 
are a host of issues. 

• In Europe, we will be facing an 
aviation industry shaped by 1992 and 
constrained by limited airspace. What 
does this mean for U.S. aviation? What 
will the European aviation industry 
look like? Perhaps there will be consol- 
idation through mergers, even with 
U.S. carriers. We are seeing this trend 
in the manufacturing sector already 
and with some airlines as well. What 
are the implications for airline planners? 

• In Asia, Japan is the gateway, yet 
.Japan approaches aviation with a phi- 
losophy far different from our own. 
How do we convince the .Japanese that 
a more e.xpansive approach to aviation 
will advance Japanese interests, as 
well as U.S. interests, and improve 
.Japan's economic relationship with the 
United States and its other economic 
partners? 



• Are we reaching the limits of bi- 
lateral agreements and the bilateral 
negotiating system? In many countries, 
we have all the cities and routes we 
want. The foreign carriers in some 
countries want access to more of our 
vast market, but we have nothing to 
ask for in return. In other countries, 
we want additional carriers and service 
to different cities, but foreign carriers 
fear the competition. 

• How can we address the interests 
of the American cities and additional 
U.S. carriers, which are now recogniz- 
ing the value of direct international 
traffic and are seeking expanded routes? 
Should we explore the possibility of a 
multilateral approach to negotiating for 
the future? 

These are difficult questions — 
questions of tremendous commercial 
magnitude — and we in the government 
don't claim to know the answers. But 
we do know two things: first, the U.S. 
aviation industry is highly competitive 
and should be extremely successful in 
the future, if given the opportunity — 
we in the government will approach 
these issues I have just raised from 
that perspective; second, that success 
will depend on cooperation between 
government and all interested parties. 
We need your advice and counsel. The 
future is in our hands. Let us make the 
most of it. ■ 



U.S. Ratifies Treaty to 
Reduce Smog Pollutant 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
.JULY 14, 1989' 

Yesterday the United States formally 
accepted the nitrogen oxides (NOx) 
protocol to the Convention on Long- 
Range Transboundary Air Pollution by 
depositing its instrument of acceptance 
with the Secretary General of the Unit- 
ed Nations. This protocol is fully con- 
sistent with the goals set out by the 
President in his proposals for the Clean 
Air Act. 

The Convention on Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution was 
adojjted in 1979 under the auspices of 
the UN Economic Commission for Eu- 
rope (ECE). The ECE includes the 
United States, Canada, and the coun- 
tries of Western and Eastern Europe, 
including the Soviet Union. 



The NOx protocol was signed last 
November by 2b ECE nations, includ- 
ing the United States. The United 
States is the third country to formally 
accept the agreement. When ratified 
by 16 nations, the protocol will require 
most participating countries to freeze 
NOx emissions or their transboundary 
flows at 1987 levels by the beginning of 
1995. 

The protocol allows nations such as 
the United States, which had already 
begun a NOx reduction jn-ogram before 
the negotiations began, to use a differ- 
ent base year if they choose. The Unit- 
ed States indicated at the time of 
signing that it would use 1978 as its 
base year. NOx emissions in the United 
States were 21.1 million metric tons in 
1978. 



' Text from Weeklv Compilation of Pres- 
idential Documents of .July 24, 191S9.B 



World Environment 
Day 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
JUNE 5, 1989' 



i: 



Over the last several years, people all 
over the world have become more and 
more concerned about the global envi- 
ronment, the warming of the world's 
climate, the depletion of the ozone lay- 
er, the loss of plant and animal species 
our mounting waste disposal problemsi 
and the pollution of the oceans. These 
are enormous challenges which cannot 
and should not be minimized. 

But at the same time, on this anni- 
versary of World Environment Day, I 
am optimistic about the future. Here i 
the United States, we have made re- 
markable progress in cleaning up our 
air and water. We have shown what we 
can do when the will is there and we 
work together. I believe that the world' 
community of nations can, and, indeed 
must make that same kind of progress 
on a global scale. We may speak differ- 
ent languages and worship God in dif- 
ferent ways, but we all share the same) 
Earth. If we can probe the depths of 
space and engineer the genetic build- 
ing blocks of life, we can surely protec 
the quality of our environment. We jusi 
need the will to do it. 

I would like to take this occasion t 
announce that the United States in- 
tends to ban the importation of ele- 
phant ivory from all countries. We do 
this out of mounting concern for the 
rapid decline of the wild elephant, one 
of nature's most majestic creatures. If 
their populations continue to diminish 
at current rates, the wild elephant will 
soon be lost from this Earth. We urge 
the nations of the world to join us in 
this ban. We further urge the countrie 
responsible for the elephant to practice 
sound stewardship of these precious 
creatures so they will not be lost to fu- 
ture generations. 



' Te.xt from Weekly Compilation of Pres 
idential Documents of June 12, 1989. ■ 



36 



Department of State Bulletin/October 198! 



EUROPE 



The Challenge of the European Landscape 
in the 1990s 



Iby Lawrence S. Eagleburger 

Statement l)efore the SulKommittee 
nil European Affairs of the Senate 
Fiireign Relations Committee on 
June 22, 1989. Ambassador Eagle- 
hiirger is Depnti/ Secretary of State. ^ 

The topic of your hearing, Mr. Chair- 
man [Joseph R. Biden, Jr.J, and your 
invitation to thinPt aloud, highlights a 
very key issue. As I said at my con- 
firmation hearings before this commit- 
tt'c, if we cannot successfully manage 
the West-West relationship, we cannot 
cflfctively manage the East-West is- 
sues and, ultimately, the North-South 
lilies as well. In the hearing today, I 
think we must recognize that these are 
largely speculative inquiries, likely 
t(i raise more questions than answers. 
Nc\ertheless, I believe it is important 
til take a hard look at the long-term 
policy and strategic interests of the 
United States in its relationship with 
Western Europe. 

Changes are underway across the 
European Continent. There is a re- 
newed commitment to free and open 
markets as the engines of prosperity — 
tilt' great American e.\pansion of the 
liisds, based on cutting red tape and 
inishackling business, is the model for 
the European Community's (EC) 1992 
program. In its own way. Eastern 
F.ui'ope is drawing from Western 
examples and experiences to rekindle 
economic growth. The e.xplosion of in- 
formation, through satellite transmis- 
sions, television, and computers, is 
prying open Eastern societies that pre- 
viously were buffered from new ideas. 
The demand to have a say in one's own 
destiny through enfranchisement and 
political pluralism is a major new force 
in Eastei'n Europe and elsewhere. 

These changes herald the begin- 
ning of a more comple.x equation of eco- 
nomic and political balances of power, 
and we welcome them — the forces re- 
shaping the European Continent are 
ones that we unleashed in our country 
200 years ago, with which we are famil- 
iar, and in which lie our strength. 

The next 10 years in our relation- 
ship with Europe will be a transitional 
period in which the patterns of the 
postwar era undergo significant adjust- 
ment in the face of change in the East 



and the political and economic growth 
of Western Europe itself. U.S. rela- 
tions with Europe will become more 
complicated as Europeans formulate 
their own responses to Soviet initia- 
tives, seek a more coherent political 
and economic identity, and generally 
adopt more assertive postures in deal- 
ing with the United States. As a result, 
we must keep very much in mind our 
basic objectives — maintenance of a 
close and cooperative, as well as se- 
cure, transatlantic partnership and 
pursuit of a less divided Europe built 
on Western values and around a West 
European identity. 

The Economic Partnership 

The most exciting development in West- 
ern Europe is the single market pro- 
gram. The first phase of an integrated 
Europe, as envisioned by Winston 
Churchill, Jean Monnet, and Konrad 
Adenauer 40 years ago, is finally Hear- 
ing completion. In less than 4 years, 
the European Community aims to elim- 
inate barriers to commerce and border 
controls among its 12 nations. The large 
unitary market would rival ours in 
wealth and surpass us in population — 
"consumers" in a businessman's eyes. 
While important features of a true sin- 
gle market will be absent in 1993, such 
as a single currency, sufficient prog- 
ress has already been made so as to as- 
sure the long-run completion of the 
market. 

The U.S. Government's ])olicy to- 
ward the single market is clear: We 
support the goal but want to ensure 
that our interests are not discrimi- 
nated against in the process. The rein- 
vigoration of the European economy is 
emphatically in our interest — as the 
President remarked, "a strong, united 
Europe means a strong America." 
While we are looking to improve the 
channels of communication between the 
EC Commission and us on trade and in- 
vestment questions, we are cautiously 
optimistic that the net result in Europe 
of 1992 will be a more vibrant, deregu- 
lated, wealthy, and open market. 

More broadly, however, we must 
give our all to making the GATT [Gen- 
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] 
Uruguay Round a success. In terms of 



our relationship with Western Eui'ope, 
an improved and more credible system 
could help resolve trade disputes — 
ever-present in a trading relationship 
surpassing $160 billion per annum — 
before they drive wedges in an other- 
wise fruitful relationship. By the same 
token, of course, we have to be pre- 
pared to live with the results; we 
should take steps to comply with the 
GATT findings against us on superfund 
and customs' users fees. 

Let this also be a heads-up to 
American business, however: The Eu- 
rope of the 1990s will be a more aggres- 
sive competitor. Regardless of whether 
protectionist policies are adopted in 
the EC (and, generally, we are confi- 
dent such policies will not be), competi- 
tion will make European firms leaner 
and stronger, offering direct challenges 
to American competitiveness in high 
technology and other areas. We will 
work to keep the playing field level, 
but American business has to get on 
and play. 

Beyond the trade relationship we 
should be working with our European 
and Japanese allies on multifaceted 
global problems. Third World debt and 
the precious cargo of democracy it 
threatens to overturn, the environ- 
ment, and the scourge of narcotics are 
expensive and complex problems too 
great for our nation to manage alone. 

Foreign Policy Coordination 

As hoped for by the Community's foun- 
ders, economic integration is encourag- 
ing deeper political and security 
cooperation. The EC negotiated and 
signed the Montreal protocol on ozone 
as a unit; European defense ministers 
have worked together to produce an ac- 
tion plan on military purchases; nation- 
al governments are improving 
coordination against terrorists and 
criminals; and the European political 
cooperation mechanism is becoming 
more active in developing some aspects 
of foreign policy for the Twelve. 
Through the European political cooper- 
ation mechanism, for instance, the 
Twelve concerted their actions in with- 
drawing ambassadors from Iran and 
endorsed sending a European team to 
the Middle East to engage leaders on 
the peace process. 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1989 



37 



EUROPE 



Given our shared values, the Euro- 
peans come out on our side of most im- 
portant issues. It is, therefore, in the 
U.S. interest to worls together, bilat- 
erally and collectively, on pressing 
transnational problems, as well as to 
work for a Western approach to situa- 
tions in South Africa, Cambodia, Iran, 
and elsewhere. Of course, as the Euro- 
pean Community grows more cohesive, 
we can e.xpect them to press their ideas 
more forcefully. On some areas, like 
the Middle East and Central America, 
we may have different perspectives. 
When we do, we will have to work to 
ensure that our concerns are not 
pushed aside. 

While few EC officials openly seek 
direct EC involvement in defense mat- 
ters (the 1986 Single European Act 
notes that NATO's primacy in security 
matters should not be impinged), the 
Community's interpretation of "eco- 
nomic and political aspects" of security 
will likely lead the EC to discuss some 
areas traditionally reserved to NATO. 
CSCE [Conference on Security and Co- 
operation in Europe], for instance, is 
an e.xample of an area where there is 
some overlap; defense procurement is 
another. While we seek an e.xpanded 
and deeper dialogue with the Commu- 
nity on foreign policy questions, we 
continue to see NATO as the appropri- 
ate forum for discussions affecting our 
security interests. 

The Security Alliance 

Cooperation on military and security 
issues among West European members 
of NATO has been improving for some 
time. Our European partners are dis- 
cussing military and security issues 
more e.xtensively in multilateral Euro- 
pean forums, particularly the Western 
European Union (WEU), the Euro- 
group, and, to some degree, the Euro- 
pean Community. Bilateral 
arrangements between European 
NATO members are also on the in- 
crease. For example, France and West 
Germany are jointly developing a new 
combat helicopter and are in the proc- 
ess of forming a joint brigade. 

Our calls for greater allied com- 
mitment to the common defense, 
coupled with changing West European 
perspectives on their roles and respon- 
sibility in that defense, have revived 
efforts to strengthen the "European 
pillar" of the alliance. These coopera- 
tive and consultative measures among 
Europeans seem likely to foster a 



Food Aid to Poland 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
AUG. 1. 19891 

I am pleased to announce today that 
the United States will provide addi- 
tional support for the Polish people and 
the democratization process. We are 
prepared to provide Poland with up to 
.$.50 million in food aid in FY 1990. It 
will include, but go far beyond, the 
8,000 metric tons of surplus commodi- 
ties to be provided in FY 1990 in accord- 
ance with the American Aid to Poland 
Act. We intend to provide to Poland 
supplies of sorghum, corn, and butter, 
subject to the availability of those com- 
modities. We anticipate that all this aid 
will be on a grant basis. The commodi- 
ties would be sold in Poland, with the 
proceeds being used to fund agricul- 
tural development activities there. 



Last month in Paris at the econom 
ic summit and at an August 1 meeting 
in Brussels of 24 concerned countries 
chaired by the EC [European Com- 
munities] Commission, the industrial 
democracies e.xpressed concern over 
Poland's urgent need for food aid. Food 
shortages are a heavy burden on the 
people of Poland and could undermine 
the historic political and economic re- 
forms Poland is undertaking. The U.S. 
food aid program — the commodities 
themselves and the projects funded 
through their sale — should be of real 
benefit to the Polish people. It will as- 
sist in alleviating the impact of market 
price reforms and support continued 
efforts toward economic and political 
liberalization. 



' Text IVoni Weekly Compilatidii nf 
Presidential Documents of Aug. 7, i;i>s;i.| 



Polish Parliament Approves 
New Prime Minister 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
AUG. 24, 19891 

I want to congratulate Mr. [TadeuszJ 
Mazowiecki on his election as Prime 
Minister of Poland and assure him of 
our strong support as he seeks to lead 
his country toward economic recovery 
and democratic change. I also salute 
President Jaruzelski for his political 
wisdom in endorsing a government re- 
flecting the genuine will of the Polish 
people and Solidarity, under the leader- 
ship of Lech Walesa, for its construc- 
tive role in helping bring about a new 
beginning in Poland. 

Since the roundtable agreement of 
last A]oril, Poland has pursued a path 
of democratic change. The election in 
June, the convening of Poland's new 
parliament, and its election of Gen. 
Jaruzelski as President and now the 
election of Mr. Mazowiecki as Prime 
Minister are further di-amatic signs of 



this historic process. These develop- 
ments hold promise not only for a 
peaceful democratic transition in 
Poland but also for a bi'oader process 
of European reconciliation toward a 
Europe whole and free. 

At Hamti'amck, Michigan [A]3i-il 
17], just after the signing of the round- 
table agreement between the Polish 
Government and Solidarity, I pledged 
U.S. support for Poland's economic and 
political reforms. We reiterated that 
support during visits to Warsaw and 
Gdansk last month and announced 
measures we are taking to assist. I 
want the Polish people and their new 
government to know that they will have 
our continued support as they meet the 
serious economic and political chal- 
lenges before them. 



' Text from Weekly Compilation of l'ix\<- 
idential Documents of Aug. 28, 19cS9.B a 



greater West European role in 
defense and security matters within 
NATO. 

While we expect to see a more as- 
sertive, coherent West European voice 



within the alliance over the next de- 
cade, it is important to note that these 
efforts are not aimed at replacing 
NATO or U.S. leadership in NATO. To 
an important extent, intra-Eurojjean 



38 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1989 



EUROPE 



security cooperation is about keeping 
hi' United States in Eui-ope, not out. 
■'ill- example, the WEU's "European se- 
■urity platform" recognizes the indi- 
.isibility of the transatlantic security 
lartnership. And leaders in both North 
\inerica and Western Europe under- 
-tand that the Atlantic alliance is 
lased on something more than a com- 
nitment to the common defense — it is „j_ 
aased on political, social, and economic ^p 
.alues which our societies share. 

Vt'xt Steps in European Integration 

The question being asked in Europe 
iliciut a common market is no longer 
'w hen?" but. "what next?" More pre- 
isi'ly, the EC must decide in the next 
U'tade whether to enlarge its member- 
ship and whether to extend the man- 
date of Community institutions into po- 
litical and macroeconomic issues. 

The sharp debate between mem- 
Imis of the European Community over 
powers and institutions for the EC 
Ss an old one, given new relevance by 
fhe 1992 ])rogram. The outcome is 
imcertain — it is not simply the United 
jKingdom against continental Europe. 
'It is a very open ciuestion, for instance, 
whether fiscal and monetary policies of 
•he 12 government.s could ever be close 
■iiiiugh to allow meaningful Commu- 
iiily macroeconomic policymaking, and 
Liiiifying tax or immigration policies is 
nil easier. 

Furthei' enlargement of the Com- 
munity could also alter its economic, 
foreign, or security policy agenda. Ap- 
iplications for membership have been 
made or considered by countries 
ranging from Turkey to Austria to 
Norway — the complexion of the Com- 
munity could be substantially changed 
in ways not easy to predict. The Com- 
munity has decided to put off any deci- 
sion on enlargement until after 1992. 
While we have an interest in the de- 
bate, it is, ultimately, a matter for 
Europeans to decide. 

Some argue the growing clout of 
Europe warrants a reassessment of the 
U.S. role in Europe. We could not dis- 
agree more strongly. Regai'dless of how 
big the EC gets, or what issues Euro- 
pean governments devolve to common 
(li'cisionmaking, the need for a strong 
American voice in Western affairs will 
nut be diminished. The EC is and will 
remain a group of separate and sov- 
ereign states deeply attached to the 
tiansatlantic community, each of which 
values and counts on the United States 
to help craft the Western agenda. 
\\'hile we expect Europe to shoulder 



Secretary, Soviet Foreign Minister 
IVIeet in Paris 



^" M^ 




Secretary Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze were surrounded by news 
correspondents after their meeting on July 29, 1989, in Paris. During the 'J-hour session, 
they discussed the bilateral relationship and regional issues, including Afghanistan, 
Central America, the Middle East, and the situation concerning the Turkish minority 
in Bulgaria. 



more of the burden for the West's de- 
fense, and while Europe will be more 
forceful in asserting its own needs and 
ideas, the President will remain the 
preeminent spokesman for the free 
world in the decade ahead. 

Managing Change in Eastern Europe 

New economic realities are encourag- 
ing change in Eastern Europe, too. 
Faced with economies falling further 
and further behind, some East Euro- 
pean leaders have become more flexible 
and pragmatic and are addressing po- 
litical as well as economic reforms. As 
the President has declared, the United 
States is moving beyond a policy of 
containment of the U.S.S.R. and the 
countries of the East. The ferment in 
Eastern Europe risks instability but 
presents great opportunities. While 
the evolution in Eastern Europe and 
the U.S.S.R. is influenced primarily by 
internal forces, the West can encourage 
political and economic reforms. It is 



here that I see a real benefit to West- 
ern Europe and the United States 
focusing our energies and working 
together. 

As I have said, successful Western 
political and economic models have in- 
spired many of the changes occurring 
in the East. A stronger Western Eu- 
rope will encourage those trends — 
closer economic integration of the EC 
can be a magnet guiding East Euro- 
pean economic development, as Presi- 
dent Bush recently told the graduates 
of Boston University. The EC is taking 
steps to remove market barriers 
against imports from Eastern Europe 
and working out arrangements based 
on market principles to facilitate West- 
ern investment and exports eastward. 
At the same time, the EC is conscious 
of using improved economic relations as 
a carrot to encourage reform, as dem- 
onstrated recently when it broke off 
talks with Romania over human rights. 
We should encourage this trend. It is 
the promise of being closer to the EC 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1989 



39 



EUROPE 



economic dynamo that is encouraging 
some of the more progressive groups 
and individuals in Hungary, Poland, 
and Yugoslavia to seek bolder reform. 



Anniversary of Warsaw Pact Invasion 
of Czechoslovakia 



NATO— Viability 

Public opinion polls in Western Europe 
provide solid evidence of continued 
strong public support for NATO and 
the U.S. defense commitment. At the 
same time. West Europeans are taking 
a more benign view of Soviet foreign 
policy, influenced by the hope and pos- 
sibility that Gorbachev's reforms may 
lead to reduced East-West tensions. We 
hope this, in fact, occurs. But in the 
meantime we must guard against any 
premature erosion of the public consen- 
sus around long-term alliance defense 
positions and hardnosed, realistic arms 
control policies. This will not always be 
an easy task. 

NATO has been a resounding suc- 
cess over the last 40 years in carrying 
out its mission of deterring Soviet 
aggression. The need for strong and 
credible defense will remain for the 
foreseeable future. But changing cir- 
cumstances may be altering the context 
within which the alliance operated. 
This does not mean NATO is becoming 
less relevant — on the contrary, the At- 
lantic alliance has its best and most im- 
portant years before it, providing a 
forum for managing the East-West rela- 
tionship, and for taking common actions 
on the environment, science, and other 
transnational issues confronting us. 

But we should be clear that our 
goal of a Europe made whole, resulting 
from real independence for the nations 
of Eastern Europe and revolving 
around a strong Western Europe, could 
change the artificial division of the con- 
tinent. Moreover, the President's initia- 
tives, if acted on in good faith by the 
Soviets, i-aise un])recedented potential 
for change in the East-West military 
equation. Coupled with the growing 
centers of economic power in Asia and 
Europe, the European Continent, and 
the world as a whole, is moving toward 
a more multipolar structure. 

A word about the Soviet perspec- 
tive on these developments. Gorbachev 
has promoted, as you know, the idea of 
a "common European house" — he has 
made clear this does not include a West 
European identity. In Bonn, Gorbachev 
spoke negatively about 1992; the Sovi- 
ets have in other ways sought to make 
clear their opposition to the strength- 
ening of European institutions. The 
absence of a strong West European 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
AUG. 21, 1989' 

Twenty-one years ago today, Warsaw 
Pact forces under Soviet leadership in- 
vaded Czechoslovakia and crushed the 
efforts of the people of Czechoslovakia 
and their leadership to move toward 
political reform and greater freedom. 

During the "Prague Spring" of 
1968, Czechoslovakia embarked upon a 
program of political, economic, and so- 
cial reforms that offered great promise 
for a better and freer life for all the 
nation's citizens. The "action program" 
of 1968 established the precedent of a 
ruling party seizing the political initia- 
tive and embarking on a reform pro- 
gram while tolerating and encouraging 
growing social pluralism. 

During that Prague Spring, the 
government under [Alexander] Dub- 
cek's leadership enjoyed genuine popu- 
lar support, and its policies began to 
regenerate legitimacy for the party as 
a political institution. A generation 
later, reforms underway elsewhere in 



Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union 
draw much of their inspiration from the 
failed attempts at the Prague Spring. 

A new generation, too young to 
have first-hand memories of 1968, has 
since grown to adulthood in Czecho- - 
Slovakia. Neither this generation nor 
the rest of us should dismiss those days 
as remote history. The hopes of that 
Prague Spring and the events of that 
tragic August remain relevant to all 
those who live in freedom or hope to 
do so. 

On this important and sad anniver- 
sary, with positive signs of change 
in Hungary, Poland, and the Soviet 
Union, it is our hope that the people 
and Government of Czechoslovakia will 
recall the events of 1968 and, together 
with their neighbors, will display a 
greater tolerance for freedom of ex- 
pression and assembly in accordance 
with their Helsinki [Final Act] 
commitments. 



' Read to news correspondents by 
Department deputy spokesman Richard A. 
Boucher. ■ 



identity in the Soviet vision of a "com- 
mon European home" is, frankly, one of 
the reasons we do not agree with it. We 
think a strong and dynamic Western 
Europe is an essential element in the 
future of Europe: within the trans- 
atlantic community, it maintains 
essential balance in Europe, and it pro- 
vides the light to guide Eastern Eu- 
rope along the path of Western values. 

The Hearts and Minds 
of Europe and U.S. Policy 

The trend toward European integra- 
tion is powerful and accelerating. Our 
policy choice is not whether to encour- 
age or discourage this evolution but to 
ensure that European integration rein- 
forces U.S. and broad Western inter- 
ests in open economies, democratic 
governments, and global stability. 

Our byword with Europe, over 
the next decade, must be cooperation. 
Some Europeans, especially those who 
want to build Europe without Ameri- 
can involvement, argue that American 
commitment to joint projects or consul- 



tations on crucial issues is uncertain or 
unreliable; they criticize what they see 
as America's "go-it-alone" tendencies. 
There are instances when American 
policy would have been strengthened 
by better coordination — on the other 
hand, leadership sometimes requires 
"going it alone." 

Our own economic and jiolitical po- 
sition in the world, still eminent but no 
longer dominant, does not so easily per- 
mit the luxury of unilateralism. Global 
developments — Third World debt, envi- 
ronmental degradation, transforma- 
tions underway in communist 
countrie.s — require better and deeper 
cooperative efforts among all indus- 
trialized democracies. The world is 
]ioised, with great chances for positive 
gains balanced against the ])otential for 
deterioration — seldom has a time seemedi 
so ripe for Western leadership. Our 
goal must be to work together to seek 
global solutions to global problems. 



' The complete tran.-;cript of the hear- 
ings will lie |.)ublished by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



40 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1989 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



Anniversary of 
the Berlin Wall 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
}AUG. 12, 1989> 

Twenty-eight years ago, a barrier of 
jSteel and stone was erected in the 
iheart of Berlin. It stands there still — 
now more than ever a relic of a bygone 
era and a failed philosophy. 

The barbed wire that severed a 
great city also proclaimed in stark, in- 
human terms the unnatural division of 
^Europe. Beyond its tragic human cost 
over the years, rending families and 
friends, the Berlin Wall has affronted 
the free world with an alien vision of 
closed societies where basic freedoms 
ai-c denied. 

The courageous people of West 
Berlin tend the precious fire of free- 
dom as an e.xample for us all. The city 
prospers and benefits from their inno- 
ivative spirit and from expanding inter- 
inational ties. Its cultural diversity, 
economic vigor, and political pluralism 
are the fruits of boundless imagination 
at work in a democratic community. 
The United States is proud to have con- 
tributed to Berlin's freedom and vital- 
ity. We remain firm in our commitment 
to assure the city's security and well- 
lieiiig. In a year which marks the 40th 
anniversary of the airlift, such his- 
toric bonds between Americans and 
Berliners carry special meaning. 

The United States is also commit- 
ted to improving the lives of Berliners 
and to bringing closer the day when the 
i/ity is again united. Together with our 
British and French allies, we have put 
forward an initiative to make such 
progress a reality. We want Berlin to 
enjoy greater access to the world 
through expanded air links, to be a 
center of international meetings and 
sports events, and to foster more hu- 
man contacts which lead to better un- 
dei'standing. As I said in Mainz on May 
. ol, we want Berlin to be a place of coop- 
! eration, not a point of confrontation. 
We have asked the Soviet Union, as 
part of its four-power responsibilities 
foi- Berlin, to join us in achieving these 
goals. We still await what we hope will 
lie a positive response. 



We observe this sad anniversary 
with renewed determination to over- 
come the division of Berlin and of Eu- 
rope. On behalf of the people of the 
United States, I reaffirm this nation's 
commitment to Berlin's freedom and 
prosperity. The tide of history has 
turned, and we look to a future Europe 



whole and free. As we now mark the 
day the wall was built, so shall we inev- 
itably celebrate a day when it no longer 
divides Berlin, the German people, and 
the nations of Europe. 



' Text from Weekly Compilation of Pres- 
idential Documents of Aug. 21, 1989. ■ 



Human Rights Situation in Cuba 



by Richard Schifter 

Statement before the Subcommit- 
tees on Human Rights and Interna- 
tional Organizations, on Western 
Hemisphere Affairs, and on Interna- 
tional Economic Policy and Trade of 
the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
on August 2, 1989. Ambassador Schif- 
ter is Assistant Secretary for Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.' 

As Fidel Castro is not the garden- 
variety human rights violator but oc- 
cupies a unique position among the 
world's — or for that matter history's — 
tyrants, the Cuban human rights situa- 
tion deserves special attention. About 
40 years ago, George Orwell described 
his nightmarish vision of the total- 
itarian state in his novel 1984. As is 
clear from a reading of Orwell's nonfic- 
tional account in Homage to Catalonia, 
the theme of 19Slt was derived from 
Orwell's encounter with Stalinism and 
Stalinists in the course of the Spanish 
Civil War. 

Though many dictators have striven 
to rule as did Big Brother in George 
Orwell's 19Si, that objective was so 
clearly in conflict with the basic human 
quest for freedom that only few can be 
said to have come close to achieving 
that goal. 

As we look at today's world, two 
dictators stand out, because they do, 
indeed, approach the totalitarian 
model described by Orwell — the world's 
longest-serving tyrants, Kim II Sung of 
North Korea and Fidel Castro of Cuba. 
Both of these men appear to have rec- 
ognized their kinship. They are mem- 
bers of a mutual admiration society. 
Last year, when North Korea decided 
to boycott the Olympic Games in Seoul, 
most communist countries, neverthe- 
less, attended, but Castro, as a token of 
his friendship for Kim II Sung, joined 
the boycott. 

To institute a totalitarian system 
following the North Korean or Cuban 
model, the dictator must have a single- 



minded devotion to his goal, an ex- 
traordinary gift for demagoguery, 
complete intolerance for the slightest 
form of dissent, and a readiness to re- 
sort to the severest forms of brutality 
to obtain his goals. In his 30 years in 
office, Fidel Castro has shown that he 
possesses all of these qualities. 

In the course of the last few years, 
during which world attention was final- 
ly focused on Cuban human rights con- 
ditions, Castro has ostentatiously 
released some political prisoners, has 
with a great deal of fanfare improved 
some prison conditions, has allowed 
some dissidents to leave the country, 
and has tolerated a few muted voices of 
dissent. None of these moves have had 
even the slightest impact on the total- 
itarian character of the Castro regime. 
As it is, most of those minor changes of 
last year were canceled out this year. 

In some of his actions, Castro re- 
sembles a medieval potentate. He re- 
ceives foreign visitors w^ho plead the 
cause of one or more of his prisoners. 
Magnanimously the great leader then 
unlocks his dungeon and lets the for- 
eign guest take the prisoner with him. 
But that throwback to another age is 
combined with the unique characteris- 
tics of 20th century totalitarianism. 
The essence of the Cuban dictatorship 
is its reliance on brainwashing and the 
total penetration of society by a secret 
police apparatus. 

Indoctrination and Vigilance Groups 

Indoctrination is accomplished through 
careful, fine-tuned utilization of all the 
country's educational institutions from 
preschool programs through university 
and by similar utilization of all the 
country's modes of public expression: 
newspapers, magazines, books, and 
electronic media. I have used the term 
"utilization" rather than "control" to 
underline the fact that the regime is 
not merely satisfied with censoring 
school programs and publications but 
enlists them in its total effort to pro- 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1989 



41 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



gram the thinking of the Cuban people. 

This effort at brainwashing is 
backed up by a coniiirehensive and 
amazingly efficient system of domestic 
spying, record-keeping, and distribu- 
tion of rewards and punishment. Cuba's 
secret police is a large organization, 
using extensive resources, and en- 
hances its effectiveness through the 
work of neighborhood vigilance groups 
known as 'Committees for the Defense 
of the Revolution.' Not only are active 
dissenters severely punished, but edu- 
cation, careers, income, and housing 
are distributed on the basis of the rec- 
ords of political conformity maintained 
by the secret police. 

We may wonder why Castro has 
been more successful than were those 
who undertook similar efforts, such as 
Hitler, Stalin, and Mao. The answer is 
that his country is smaller, he has been 
in power longer, and, importantly, he 
has had the availability of resources 
beyond those generated by his own 
economy. Also while the cult of person- 
ality characterizes them all, Castro's 
ability at demagoguery is rivaled only 
by that of Hitler. For a long time, he 
has also exuded a great deal of charis- 
ma, although the growth of his paunch 
and jowl may have begun to detract 
from his personal appeal. 

What has stood in the way of total 
success for Castro's totalitarian system 
has been the proximity of the United 
States, news of the outside world which 
reaches Cuba through Radio Marti and 
through the numerous U.S. relatives of 
Cuban citizens, and the utter failure 
of the Cuban economy. 

The Apologists' Line 

Apologists for the Castro dictatorship 
have, over the years, pointed to its suc- 
cess in the fields of health and educa- 
tion and the egalitarian character of 
Cuban society. As to the claims of im- 
provements in Cuban public health over 
the past 30 years, many are based on 
apparently doctored and falsified offi- 
cial statistics. Even so, the question 
that can appropriately be asked is 
whethei' such improvement as has oc- 
curred has been any greater than those 
in other, similarly situated countries. 
It has not been. 

As to education, we need to ask 
ourselves whether we prefer a literate, 
governmentally programmed robot to 
an illiterate free spirit. A good many 
of us, if forced to choose, would prefer 
the latter. 

And as for the alleged egalitarian 
character of Cuban societv, it mav be 



42 



Helsinki Human Rights Day, 1989 



PROCLAMATION 6005, 
AUG. 1, 1989' 

Fourteen years ago, the United States and 
Canada joined 33 Eurojjean countries in 
signing the Helsinki Final Act of the Con- 
ference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe. That action not only marked the 
culmination of the remarkable 2-year meet- 
ing of the Conference on Security and Coop- 
eration in Europe (CSCE), but also signaled 
a milestone in European post-war history. 

The Helsinki accords recognized the in- 
herent relationship between respect for hu- 
man rights and fundamental freedoms and 
the attainment of genuine peace and securi- 
ty. Following years of diligent effort, the 
Western nations won in these accords the 
stated commitment of the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe to one of the most far- 
reaching sets of human rights standards 
ever enunciated by governments. By signing 
the Helsinki Final Act, all participating 
States agreed to respect freedom of 
thought, freedom of conscience, as well as 
freedom of religion and belief. Signatories 
also agreed to facilitate the free movement 
of people, ideas, and information between 
nations. The work begun at Helsinki to elim- 
inate the barriers that divide East and West 
and to advance our goals of freedom, open- 
ness, and security has continued throughout 
three follow-up meetings. 

The ongoing CSCE process represents 
an invaluable avenue to work for change. 
As recent developments in some nations of 
Eastern Europe suggest, the Western coun- 
tries' insistence upon full implementation of 
the human rights and humanitarian provi- 
sions of the Helsinki accords is contributing 
to fulfillment of my Administration's goal 
of 'a Europe whole and free.' The United 
States welcomes recent improvements in 
human rights practices in Poland, Hungary, 
and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, we 
look for further reforms in these countries 
as well as institutionalization of the 
reforms already introduced. 

Despite some positive signs of change in 
the U.S.S.R. and some countries in Eastern 
Europe, we are still far from achieving uni- 
versal compliance with the Helsinki accords. 
The governments of Romania, Bulgaria, 



Czechoslovakia, and East Germany continue 
to systematically deny the fundamental 
rights of their citizens. Religious oppres- 
sion, persecution of ethnic minorities, and 
restrictions on freedom of information and 
travel in these countries violate the letter 
and spirit of the Helsinki accords and im- 
pede the CSCE process. The United States^ 
will continue to condemn such human rights 
violations and call upon these countries to 
meet their commitments under the Helsinki 
Final Act. 

Respect for individual liberty and fun- 
damental human rights is not only the duty 
of legitimate government, but also the key 
to economic prosperity and lasting peace 
among nations. The United States thus re- 
mains firmly committed to securing full 
implementation of the human rights and 
humanitarian provisions of the Helsinki 
Final Act. 

In recognition of the importance this 
Nation places on human rights and our con- 
tinuing commitment to the CSCE process, 
the Congress, by Senate Joint Resolution 
1.50, has designated August 1, 1989, as 
'Helsinki Human Rights Day' and has autho- 
rized and requested the President to 
issue a proclamation in its observance. 

Now, There FORK, I, George Bi'sh, Pres- 
ident of the United States of America, do 
hereby proclaim August 1, 1989, as Helsinki 
Human Rights Day and reaffirm U.S. dedi- 
cation to the principles of human dignity and 
freedom enshrined in the Helsinki Final 
Act. As we Americans observe this day with 
appropriate programs, ceremonies, and ac- 
tivities, let us call upon all signatories of thei 
Final Act to fulfill their obligation to re- 
spect the fundamental rights and dignity of 
all their citizens. 

I\ Witness Whereof, I have hereunto 
set my hand this first day of August, in the 
year of our Lord nineteen hundred and 
eighty-nine, and of the Independence of the 
United States of America the two hundred 
and fourteenth. 

George Bush 



' Text from Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents of Aug. 7, 1989. ■ 



true that the benefits allowed the Cu- 
ban )io)iu'nklatiira are somewhat less 
than those accorded until recently to 
their East European colleagues, but 
the fact is that Cuba's ruling class is ac- 
corded privileges and benefits which 
are simply not available to the mass 
of ordinary citizens, 

A few comments should be added 
about the recent trial of Gen. Ochoa. 



We are not privy to the real facts in the » 
case. But the trial bore an uncanny re- 
semblance to tliat of one of Stalin's vic- 
tims, Marshal Tukhachevsky, who had 
been Assistant Chief of Staff of the Red 
Army and was tried for espionage and 
treason, convicted and executed in 
1937. A few years ago, a Soviet official 
said to me: 'You know, of course, that 
all the evidence in the Tukhachevskv 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1989 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



case was forged." I told him that this 
news hardly came as a surprise. 

UN Human Rights 
Commission Report 

In September 1988, a working group 
established by the UN Human Rights 
Commission visited Cuba and thereaf- 
ter submitted a comprehensive report 
on its observations. The Government of 
Cuba then assured the commission of 
its willingness to cooperate with the 
Secretary General of the United Na- 
tions in maintaining direct contacts on 
the issues and cjuestions contained in 
the report. Accordingly, in March of 
this year, the commission adopted a de- 
cision which took note of this assurance 
and indicated that the Secretary Gen- 
eral would take up these contacts in 
an appropriate manner. 

As far as we know, the Government 
of Cuba has, to this day, failed to follow 
through on its commitment. Indeed, 
since that time, the human rights situa- 
tion in Cuba has, as I noted earlier, de- 
teriorated markedly. Dozens of human 
rights activists have been subjected to 
punitive actions, from harassment and 
beatings to detentions and imprison- 
ment. Some were arrested after — and 
no doubt because of — their testimony 
to, or attempt to give testimony to, the 
UN working group. We believe that the 
United Nations and the international 
human rights community has a moral 
obligation to help those brave souls who 
testified before the UN working group 
and thus stood up for the cause of hu- 
man rights in their country. We con- 
sider it incumbent on the Secretary 
General to take up this issue as he was 
mandated to do. 

Failure of Subsidized Economy 

The spirit of freedom and human rights 
is on the rise throughout the world. 
What has been dubbed as the system 
of "command economy," which is fre- 
quently a euphemism for what is really 
a "command society," has clearly failed. 
The Cuban command economy is an e.\- 
ample of such failure. Even the present 
level of the Cuban economy, low as it is, 
is maintained largely by Soviet sub- 
sidies. Increasingly, questions are be- 
ing asked in the Soviet Union as to 
whether the Soviet citizenry, as it tries 
to rid itself of the legacy of the past, 
should be taxed to support a system in 
Cuba which has been pronounced a self- 
defeating failure in the Soviet Union. 
The questions for the future are wheth- 
er an increasingly assertive Soviet 
citizenry will be able to call a halt to 



this subsidization and what the conse- 
quences of that would be for Castro's 
dictatorship. 

Throughout Cuba a new generation 
is growing up, a generation which sees 
the contrast between the promise and 
the reality, between what they hear in 
school and read in the official media 
and the news which reaches them from 
the outside world. It is a generation 



which is tired of the long-winded 
speeches of its graying leader, who 
after 30 years still holds out the hope of 
a better tomorrow. They recognize that 
if that better tomorrow comes, it will 
not be under the rule of Fidel Castro. 



' The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Ethnic Turks in Bulgaria 



NATO STATEMENT, 
AUG. 9, 1989 > 

In their declaration published after the 
summit meeting in May, our heads of 
state and government deplored the fact 
that the governments of certain East 
European countries continue all too 
frequently to violate human rights and 
basic freedoms. They also stated that a 
continuing denial of basic freedoms 
cannot but have a negative effect on 
cooperation with those countries. 

There, unfortunately, exists a 
grave situation in Bulgaria. Policies of 
forced assimilation and repression 
against Bulgarian citizens of Turkish 
origin have continued for nearly 5 
years in contravention of the Confer- 
ence on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE) documents. The situa- 
tion has now assumed a new dimension, 
with the expulsion and subsequent 
mass emigration of ethnic Turks, re- 
sulting from the deliberate deprivation 
of their basic human rights. The num- 
ber of emigrants has now exceeded 
250,000. Thousands of new divided fam- 
ilies are being created. 

The harsh treatment of citizens 
of Turkish origin in Bulgaria is a fla- 
grant violation of human rights. The al- 
lies continue to keep this matter under 
careful review. 

The allies call for the strict observ- 
ance of the fundamental rights of all 
Bulgarian citizens of Turkish origin, in 
line with the obligations of the Bulgar- 
ian Government under relevant interna- 
tional agreements, and for a mutually 
acceptable solution to facilitate the 
smooth and orderly emigration of eth- 
nic Turks wishing to go to Turkey with 
their rights being fully protected. 

The allies call upon the Bulgarian 
Government to respond positively to in- 
ternational appeals to meet its respon- 
sibilities under the CSCE documents. 



Greece has reserved its position on 
the above statement. Greece stands in 
an unequivocal manner for the respect 
of human rights and fundamental free- 
doms but believes that their application 
must be universal. Moreover Greece re- 
served its position as to the accurate le- 
gal terminology pertaining to Muslim 
minorities, as stipulated in interna- 
tional treaties. 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
AUG. 10, 1989- 

I would like to draw your attention to 
a special statement released yesterday 
by NATO Secretary Genei-al Woerner, 
which strongly criticizes the Bulgarian 
Government for its policy of forced as- 
similation and repression of its ethnic 
Turkish minority. 

You are all aware of this tragic sit- 
uation. At latest count, over 250,000 
Turks have fled Bulgaria for Turkey as 
a result of this policy, which is a fla- 
grant violation of human rights obliga- 
tions accepted by Bulgaria. 

The United States feels very 
strongly that the Government of Bul- 
garia must meet its human rights 
obligations, cease the religious and so- 
cial persecution of its ethnic Turkish 
minority, and provide an orderly 
departure — with dignity and personal 
property — for those who wish to leave 
Bulgaria. 

Together with our NATO allies, 
the United States will continue to seek 
every opportunity to express its con- 
cern over the entire Bulgarian human 
rights situation — involving not only the 
problems of the ethnic Turkish popula- 
tion but of individual Bulgarian human 
rights activists as well. 



' Made on behalf of the NATO members 
by Secretary General Manfred Woerner. 

- Read to news correspondents by 
Department spokesman Margaret DeB. 
TutwilerB 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1989 



43 



MIDDLE EAST 



U.S. Diplomacy in the IVIiddle East 



by John H. Kclli/ 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
oil Europe and the Middle Eafit of the 
Hoiifse Foreign Affairs Committee on 
Jtdij U, 19S9. Ambassador Kelli/ is 
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern 
and South Asian Affairs.' 

I am ]jleased to appear before the 
subcommittee today to discuss recent 
developments in the Middle East. I 
welcome the opportunity to begin what 
I hope will be a series of regular 
consultations on the region. Today, I 
will focus on the Arab-Israeli peace 
process, Iran and the Persian Gulf, and 
Lebanon. 

Arab-Israeli Peace Process 

A longstanding interest of the United 
States in the Middle East is to assist in 
efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli con- 
flict through direct negotiations based 
on UN Security Council Resolutions 
242 and 338. This approach is based on 
key principles, including that of the ex- 
change of territory for peace. For a 
settlement to be achieved and to be du- 
rable, Israel must enjoy security with 
defensible borders. A settlement must 
provide security and recognition for all 
states in the region, as well as provid- 
ing for the legitimate political rights of 
the Palestinian people. 

Principles alone, however, will not 
guarantee a settlement. We are em- 
barked on a pragmatic approach, de- 
signed to end the current tragic cycle 
of confrontation and to get Israelis and 
Palestinians engaged in a practical 
process. An authoritative dialogue be- 
tween Israelis and Palestinians from 
the West Bank and Gaza could enable 
the parties to break down walls of mis- 
trust, alter their risk assessments, and 
focus on ways to negotiate. Such a dia- 
logue would also help to structure elec- 
tions in ordei- to launch a political 
process involving negotiations on inter- 
im arrangements and final status of the 
occupied territories. Progress on those 
fundamental issues would permit reso- 
lution of other differences that now sep- 
arate Israel and other Arab states. 
Two factoi's now guide oui' thinking. 



First, we see real ojiportunities re- 
sulting from changed thinking in the 
region. Israelis and Palestinians have 
begun to acknowledge the need to en- 
gage one another directly. Israel has 
l)ut forward a constructive initiative, 
which for the first time addi'esses Pal- 
estinians as Israel's key negotiating 
partner. The PLO [Palestine Liberation 
Organization] has finally accepted UN 
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 
338 and Israel's right to exist. Egypt 
has gained readmission to the Arab 
League without compromising its 
peace with Israel. These events illus- 
trate changes in thinking on all sides 
that are positive and worth pursuing. 

Second, however, the parties con- 
tinue to face significant obstacles that 
have blocked progress to peacemaking 
in the past. Gaps between positions on 
substantive issues are broad. Mutual 
suspicions between the parties have 
been heightened by violence, and lead- 
ers on both sides face divisions within 
their own communities. Under these 
circumstances, a high visibility initia- 
tive by an outside party cannot suc- 
ceed. Similarly, premature focus on 
mechanisms like an international con- 
ference will only distract the parties 
from the difficult decisions they must 
make to establish a la.sting peace. 

It is within this context that we 
support the Government of Israel's 
peace initiative. The Israeli elections 
projjosal is a serious effort that we en- 
dorse wholeheartedly. It holds great 
promise and is worth building upon. 
We should not allow ourselves to be dis- 
tracted by positions that do not ad- 
vance the peace process. The May 14 
proposal adopted by the Government of 
Israel is a serious effort to engage the 
Palestinians directly in a political 
process. It acknowledges that the Pal- 
estinians have political rights and aspi- 
rations that must be satisfied. The 
initiative deserves a serious and posi- 
tive response from the Palestinians and 
the Arab states. 

Many questions still need to be ad- 
dressed about how we get to elections, 
the elections themselves, and the 
relationship between elections and 
negotiations. These can and should be 
discussed in an Israeli-Palestinian dia- 



logue, designed to pave the way for 
elections and negotiations. Beginning a 
Palestinian-Israeli dialogue is the first i 
priority. 

Let me say a word here about the 
U.S. dialogue with the PLO. Our dia- 
logue with the PLO is not an end in 
itself. It is a means to advance a practi- 
cal and workable peace process. In bot-h 
formal and informal meetings, we 
press the PLO to give practical mean- 
ing to its commitments of last Decem- 
ber: its renunciation of terrorism and 
its recognition of the existence of Isra- 
el. We also are trying to moderate PLQi 
positions on the peace process and cre- 
ate conditions under w'hich the Israeli 
Government initiative can work. We arei 
not trying to mediate between the PLQl 
and Israel. We are seeking to deter- 
mine whether the PLO is ready to act 
responsibly in the peace process. 

I have no major breakthroughs to 
report, but rather the continued efforts 
of our diplomacy to move all sides to- 
ward negotiations. This is slow and 
painstaking work. It has many oppo- 
nents in the region, who seek to per- 
petuate the conflict rather than resolve 
it. It is, nonetheless, the way to pro- 
ceed in a process designed to promote 
our national interests and to protect 
the interests of our friends, both 
Israeli and Arab. There is a long way toi 
go. I remain hopeful that we can build 
on what has been done and elicit a posi- 
tive Arab and Palestinian response, so 
that elections can be held and negotia- 
tions can be launched. 

Iran 

Elsewhere in the Middle East, Iran 
continues to command attention be- 
cause of its size, location, and influ- 
ence. It is too early to assess the 
impact of Khomeini's passing on Iran's 
internal politics. The leadershij) moved 
quickly in an outward display of unity 
to close ranks around Khomeini's suc- 
cessor. President Khamenei, but Kho- 
meini's death leaves the future course 
of Iran unclear. 

It is too early to tell whether Iran 
will move in a more positive direction. 
By that I mean whether Iran will end 
its supjjort for international terrorism 



44 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1989 i 



MIDDLE EAST 



and adhere to the accepted norms of in- 
ternational behavior, and whether Iran 
will use its influence with those holding 
(lur hostages in Lebanon to help gain 
their safe, immediate, and uncondition- 
jal release. We hope so, but obviously 
jhave no assurance it will. The burden 
iof proof clearly is on Iran to show it is 
prepared to behave responsibly. Ac- 
jtions are required, not words. 
I We are following developments in 
Iran closely. We continue to believe it is 
in our and Iran's interests to resume 
normal relations. President Bush has 
i-eiterated this position, but up to now 
we have had no meaningful reply from 
ITehran. 

Let me restate for the record our 
policy: We are ready to talk to author- 
ized Iranian Government representa- 
tives without preconditions. However, 
:any substantial improvement in rela- 
tions will require an end to Iranian 
support for terrorism and Iranian help 
in freeing our hostages. 

The Persian Gulf 

The cease-fire in the Persian Gulf has 
been in effect now for close to 1 year. 
Although Iran and Iraq have not signed 
a peace treaty to end hostilities, we are 
pleased that the cease-fire continues to 
hold. We continue to support UN ef- 
forts to encourage the two former bel- 
liuerents to negotiate seriously and to 
conclude a lasting settlement. 

Since I have restated for the record 
our policy ris-a-ris Iran, let me do the 
same for our policy toward the rest of 
the gulf. The United States recognizes 
that the Persian Gulf is an area of vital 
strategic importance. President Bush 
and this Administration are committed 
to defend our vital interests in the 
larea: the free passage of oil through 
Jthe Strait of Hormuz and the security 
|of friendly regional states. This com- 
.mitnient is as firm as the commitments 
of the Reagan and Carter Administra- 
tions. The Bush Administration is sim- 
ilarly determined to defend the 
principle of freedom of navigation in 
the Persian Gulf and elsewhere. 

If I may offer a personal observa- 
tion, as one who was not directly in- 
volved in the formulation of our gulf 
policy, I think the reason our policy has 
;succeeded over the years is that there 
!has been a bipartisan consensus that 
the policy meet our vital national 
interests. 



The security of our interests in the 
gulf rests on security cooperation with 
the member nations of the Gulf Cooper- 
ation Council, including arms sales. 
During our escort and other deterrent 
operations, we learned daily the impor- 
tance of "interoperability" of military 
equipment. In a variety of ways, we 
found that common equipment, similar 
training, and like-minded planning 
greatly enhanced the cooperation and 
ultimate success of our efforts. 

Among the states with which we 
enjoy this cooperation is Saudi Arabia. 
We will be pleased to welcome King 
Fahd on a state visit to the United 
States July 26-30 [postponed by the 
Saudi Government]. We intend to re- 
view these issues with him when he 
visits. 
Lebanon 

Moving on to Lebanon, let me begin by 
saying that the situation in Beirut re- 
mains e.xtremely volatile. Both sides 
accepted, in principle, an Arab League 
call for a cease-fire. However, sea and 
land blockades continue. A crossing 
was opened in Beirut last week, but the 
sea blockade remains unresolved over 
the issue of arms shipments. These 
blockades have caused severe shortages 
of fuel and food, particularly in the 
Christian enclave of east Beirut. 

The cease-fire remains unfulfilled. 
Shelling continues on a daily basis. The 
United States strongly urges an end to 
the involvement of foreign forces and 
restraint in the shipment of arms from 
foreign sources. 

On June 14, the President met with 
Prince Sa'ud al-Faisal, Foreign Minis- 
ter of Saudi Arabia, to discuss the ef- 
forts of the Arab League to resolve the 
Lebanon crisis. The President wel- 
comed the collective efforts of the lead- 
ers of Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and 
Algeria. He expressed our support for 
their mandate to pursue, urgently, a 
political process in Lebanon that leads 
to elections, reforms, and a new nation- 
al consensus. 

The United States intends to do all 
it can to promote a political solution 
that will bring Lebanon's turmoil to an 
end. We believe a political dialogue 
among the Lebanese is essential for 
Lebanon to regain its stability and se- 
curity. Such a dialogue is a necessary 
step toward resolution of Lebanon's suf- 
fering, which has gone on far too long. 



All parties to the conflict should show 
restraint and flexibility at this crucial 
point. All concerned should promote a 
political process that is devoid of 
threats and coercion and that leads to 
national reconciliation and reform. The 
goal of all friends of Lebanon must be a 
reunited and sovereign country — free 
of foreign forces and armed militias — 
in which the Lebanese people live in 
harmony. 

Ballistic Missiles 

and Chemical Weapons 

One further issue of serious concern to 
us in the Middle East and South Asia is 
the spread of ballistic missiles and 
chemical weapons. These weapons raise 
the threat of violence to a new order of 
magnitude in a region in which strong 
conventional military forces already 
exist and the potential for conflict is 
high. 

Ballistic missiles with ranges of up 
to 2,500 kilometers (1,552 miles) are 
now entering the inventories of several 
states in the region. The presence of 
these weapons may encourage potential 
adversaries to launch preemptive at- 
tacks or to acquire similar weapons as 
a deterrent. This prospect becomes 
even more troubling when linked to the 
proliferation of chemical warfare 
agents. The need for concerted and en- 
ergetic action has been dramatically il- 
lustrated by the use of chemical 
weapons by both parties in the Iran- 
Iraq war, by Iraq's use of chemical 
weapons against elements of its own 
population, and by Libya's attempts to 
acquire full-scale chemical weapons 
production capability. The Administra- 
tion is at the forefront of such action, 
encouraging the coordination of export 
controls through the informal missile 
technology control regime, and pursu- 
ing efforts to contain chemical weapons 
proliferation. 



' The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1989 



45 



NARCOTICS 



Cuba and Narcotics Trafficking 



by Mi'h'yn Levitsky 

Statement before the SiibcuiiiDiittee 
oil Terrorism, Narcotics, and Interna- 
tional Communications of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee on 
■Juhj 20, 1989. Ambassador Levitsky is 
Assistant Secretary for International 
Narcotics Matters.^ 

Before getting into the main body of 
my testimony, let me summarize our 
policy with regard to Cuba and drug 
smuggling. 

First, we approach our dealings 
with Cuba on the drug issue with pru- 
dence and a great deal of skepticism 
based on past performance. 

Second, our counternarcotics ef- 
forts are pursued on all fronts. Our 
])urpose is to enlist the cooperation of 
all countries in working against the 
cultivation, production, trafficking, 
and usage of illegal drugs. 

Third, we believe Cuba, like all 
other countries, should be expected to 
halt the flow of narcotics. This is re- 
flected in UN membership and in gen- 
eral international principle. 

Fourth, our concern about narcot- 
ics smuggling through Cuba — and there 
is no doulDt that Cuba is a transit point 
in the illegal drug flow — stands on its 
own. It does not affect other areas of 
the relationship. As the President said 
on May 22 and June 28 of this year, our 
basic relationship with Cuba will not 
change until Cuba ceases systematic 
violation of human rights, its military 
and other support for violent anti- 
democratic groups, and its relationship 
with the Soviet tjnion which is harmful 
to our interests. 

Finally, Cuba has had ample op- 
portunity to cooperate in stemming the 
flow of drugs to the United States. Our 
policy will be to put Cuba to the test 
and to see if the Cuban Government's 
actions match its words. Again, we will 
do so with prudence and with our eyes 
open. We are not naive about Cuba. 

This Administration is thoroughly 
committed to the war on drug traffick- 
ing, which causes our people untold 
grief and costs billions each year. A 
wide range of Federal agencies are en- 
gaged in combatting this scourge, in- 
cluding law enforcement agencies such 
as the Drug Enforcement Administra- 
tion, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. 



Customs Service, and State and local 
police forces. The Department of State 
is deeply involved in this effort, work- 
ing with these agencies and foreign 
governments to stem the flow of nar- 
cotics into the United States. 

The consumption of cocaine and 
other coca derivatives, such as "crack," 
has increased dramatically in this 
country. Most of the cocaine consumed 
in the United States is produced in the 
Andean countries of South America 
and much is shipped by boat or plane 
across the Caribbean to destinations in 
Florida and along our east and gulf 
coasts. We have made a major commit- 
ment to interdicting this traffic. 

As you can see from looking at a 
map, it stands amidst some of the pri- 
mary illicit drug routes into the United 
States, and its territory has been used 
by traffickers as a transshipment 
point. Although it is difficult to gauge 
the amount of trafficking that takes 
place in Cuba, we note a marked in- 
crease in reported drug trafficking 
incidents in Cuban territory during 
the first half of 1989. 

The Cuban Government has re- 
fused to cooperate with its neighbors in 
the international effort to stop the flow 
of drugs. For years Fidel Castro has 
denied involvement by any Cuban of- 
ficials in the drug trade since the 
revolution. 

The United States cooperates on 
narcotics interdiction with many gov- 
ernments and attempts to involve all 
nations in this global struggle. The So- 
viet Union, for instance, recently en- 
tered into a cooperative relationship 
with us to fight drugs. Despite our se- 
rious reservations about Cuban inten- 
tions, we are taking a fresh look at 
areas in which the Government of Cuba 
could tangibly demonstrate the serious- 
ness of its claimed willingness to coop- 
erate against drug trafficking. We will 
judge Cuba by its actions, not by its 
words. I would like to turn to some of 
the issues that have been raised in the 
wake of recent developments. 

Summary of Recent Events 

In an unprecedented move June 1(5, the 
official Cuban press accused Gen. Ar- 
naldo Ochoa and other officers of nar- 
cotics trafficking. This is the first time 
the Government of Cuba has admitted 
official Cuban involvement in the di-ug 



trade. The official press stated that 
agreements were concluded between 
Cuban officers and Colombian drug 
traffickers and that joint drug smug- 
gling operations were carried out, 
including airdrops, drug plane refuel- 
ings, and drug plane offloadings, in 
Cuban territory over the past 2 years. 

In total 14 officials were arrested. 
The list was headed by Ochoa, an Inte- 
rior Ministry general and Interior Min- 
istry Col. Antonio de la Guardia. The 
accused were brought before a military 
court, which sentenced Ochoa and 
three others to death July 7, although 
drug trafficking is not a capital offense 
in Cuba. They were executed July 13. 

During the trial, Fidel Castro re- 
newed his previous calls for dialogue 
with the United States on how to coop- 
erate to prevent the use of Cuban air- 
space and territory by traffickers 
delivering drugs to the U.S. market. 
Castro also claimed, inaccurately, that 
the United States had known about Cu- 
ban officials' drug trafficking activities* 
but had not shared the information 
with the Cuban Government. 

Trial and Execution " 

of Drug Traffickers 

Only Fidel Castro can definitively an- 
swer the question as to why Ochoa was 
sacked. We have no information linking 
Ochoa to drug trafficking, although we 
cannot rule out that possibility. We be- 
lieve it unlikely that Castro could have 
been unaware of high-level official Cu- 
ban involvement in narcotics traffick- 
ing. Ochoa may have been sacked and 
executed for other reasons. We must 
await further informed analysis to de- 
termine what motivated Castro to act 
against these individuals at this time. 
We have reports linking some of 
the 14 accused officers to drug smug- 
gling operations. Cuban disclosures 
confirm links between De la Guardia 
and other Interior Ministry officials 
and Reinaldo Ruiz, a drug smuggler 
who pleaded guilty to trafficking in a 
U.S. court in March 1989. We also have 
reports detailing drug smuggling oper- 
ations similiar in location and type 
to those described by official Cuban 
sources during the drug scandal. Agair 
it is hard to believe that the Castro re- 
gime was unaware of such allegedly ex- 
tensive involvement of its most senior 
officials and agencies, and it is unclear 



46 



Department of State Bulletin/October 19891 



NARCOTICS 



what motivated the sudden "revela- 
tions" and i)unishment of these alleged 
activities. 

The case against Ochoa, De la 
Guardia, and the others was a carefully 
choreographed show trial from begin- 
ning to end. When the first newspaper 
editorial appeared and charged drug 
itrafficking, the end result was obvious: 
The accused would be found guilty. The 
only real question throughout the pro- 
ceedings was whether the accused 
would be e.xecuted. It is also an indica- 
tion of the fairness of the trial that one 
of the officers who sat in judgment of 
I Ochoa is himself a fugitive from U.S. 
'justice, under indictment for drug 
Itrafficking. 

Castro's Motivation 

There are few available facts to support 
sijeculation that Ochoa was a political 
threat to Castro and that the house- 
ilfaning of the Interior IWinistry shows 
that the Cuban Government is in trou- 
ble. Castro deftly managed the show 
trial and apjiears to have been in firm 
command throughout the incident. At 
the same time, it does not seem cred- 
ible that the e.xecution of Ochoa and 
others was motivated only by a sudden 
"discovery" of drug involvement on 
their part. 

The defendants at the trial pre- 
dictably absolved Fidel and Raul 
Casti'o of any foreknowledge or cul- 
pability in their drug dealings. We seri- 
ously doubt that drug trafficking by 
high-level Ministry of Interior officials 
as described in the trial could have 
gone on for 2 years, as claimed in the 
trial proceedings, without the knowl- 
edge and possibly approval of the Cas- 
tro brothers. We find it hard to believe 
that the Castros were unaware of any 
deals of this magnitude only days be- 
fore they were made public. After all, 
our concerns on this issue were a mat- 
ter of public record, reiterated most re- 
cently in our March 1 international 
narcotics control strategy report. 

U.S. Knowledge and Interests 

We have had reports of drug trafficking 
in Cuba and of Cuban official.'^' involve- 
ment with narcotics smuggling since 
the eai'ly 1980s and have raised this 
matter on numerous occasions before 
the Congress and elsewhere. For e.xam- 
plt-', as early as March 12, 1982, Thomas 
Eiiders, then Assistant Secretary for 
Inter-American Affairs, stated before 
the Subcommittee on Security and Ter- 



Emergency Package 
for Colombia's Drug Fight 



PRESIDENTS STATEMENT. 
AUG. 25, 19891 

At the request of President Barco and 
in order to support the Government of 
Colombia in its battle against narcotics 
traffickers, I have today decided to 
authorize a .$6.5 million emergency anti- 
drug support package for the Colom- 
bian police and military. The package 
will include equipment for police and 
military personnel, with initial ship- 
ments to arrive as early as next week. 
In addition, it will include aircraft and 
helicopters to improve the mobility of 
Colombian forces engaged in the anti- 
drug effort. The package was developed 
over the last few days during which 
there was close consultation between 
President Barco and myself and among 
our key advisers. 

No U.S. troops have been re- 
quested by the Colombian Government. 
We will provide only materiel support 
and training. The United States has 
complete confidence in the capability of 
the Colombian police and military to 
deal with this situation. 

The support package will be made 
available under the provisions of the 
1986 Foreign Assistance Act which 
enables the President to direct the 
Department of Defense to provide 
military equipment and services to 
a foreign country in the event of an 
emergency. 



In addition to this emergency 
assistance and the funds being pro- 
vided under the Justice Department's 
judicial protection program, I will au- 
thorize an expanded police and mili- 
tary assistance program for FY 1990 
which will provide an increased level 
of support for the Colombian Govern- 
ment's ongoing antidrug efforts. 

The recent wave of assassinations 
and threats by the drug cartel against 
all Colombians who cooperate and Pres- 
ident Barco's antidrug crackdown 
makes it clear that it is time for the 
United States and other countries of 
the world to stand with President Bar- 
co during his coui'ageous challenge to 
these insidious forces that thi'eaten the 
very fabric of Colombian society. 

We intend to work closely with the 
Colombian Government to bring to jus- 
tice those responsible for the scourge of 
drug trafficking and will continue in 
our efforts to assist the Colombian ef- 
fort to provide protection for judges 
and other Colombian officials who are 
on the front line of the war against 
drugs. The Departments of State and 
.Justice are working closely with their 
Colombian counterparts on extradition 
matters. 



' Text from Weekly Compilation of Pres- 
idential Documents of Aug. 28, 1989. ■ 



rorism of the Senate Judiciary Commit- 
tee that "for the first time, we now also 
have detailed and reliable information 
linking Cuba to trafficking in narcotics 
as well as arms." Obviously, we are 
unable to share intelligence informa- 
tion with the Cubans without putting 
sources and methods at risk, but our 
conclusions are available. 

Four high-level Cuban officials 
were indicted in Miami in 1982 for 
involvement in drug trafficking. Infor- 
mation from those indictments was a 
matter of public record and was pro- 
vided to the Cuban Government, but so 
far the Cubans have not investigated 
the allegations, nor have they caused 
the officials in question to come to the 
United States to stand trial. Rather 
they have simply denounced our indict- 



ments as politically motivated without 
any pretense of even looking into the 
merits of the charges. Other non-Cuban 
defendants in this case were convicted. 
Cuba also figures prominently as a co- 
caine transshipment point in Federal 
indictments handed down in February 
1988 and April 1989. Reinaldo and 
Ruben Ruiz, the top defendants in the 
1988 case, pleaded guilty. Also in 1988, 
a former Panamanian intelligence aide 
to Gen. Noriega testified publicly be- 
fore the Senate that Fidel Castro me- 
diated a drug-related dispute between 
Noriega and key Colombian traffickers. 
It is clear that recent developments 
in Cuba have raised many questions. 
We do not yet have all of the answers. 
Only time will tell whether the sudden 
professed Cuban commitment to the 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1989 



47 



NARCOTICS 



war on drugs is genuine, or whether 
this is just another issue they want to 
play politics w'ith. Some evidence sug- 
gests that Cuba simultaneously facili- 
tates the flow of drugs in selected 
cases while prosecuting other cases 
to conviction. 

The indicators of high-level Cuban 
involvement in drug trafficking, includ- 
ing those that predate recent events, 
cause us to question seriously the po- 
tential for working with a government 
that could use the information we pro- 
vide against us. The history of coop- 
eration with Cuba is not reassuring. 
In the cases of both the 1973 hijacking 
agreement and the 1984 migration 
agreement, Cuba has abrogated its 
commitments when it suited its 
interests. 

E.xchanges with Cuban officials on 
drug issues have occurred in the course 
of our normal contacts, even before the 
current drug scandal. Despite Fidel 
Castro's claim that Cuba was ready to 
cooperate with the United States on 
drugs to a visiting U.S. Congressman 
late last year, when asked for clarifica- 
tion, Cuban officials subsequently stat- 
ed that they had no specific proposals 
on the subject in mind. They did not 
encourage further exchanges on this 
issue. While we do not make public de- 
tails of our private conversations with 
other governments, I can tell you that 
we have asked the Government of Cuba 
for the results of its investigation into 
drug smuggling by Cuban officials so 
that w'e can review them and take ap- 
propriate action on activities that may 
involve violations of U.S. law. 

Despite our longstanding concerns, 
the high priority the United States at- 
taches to drug interdiction and Cuba's 
geographic pro.ximity and strategic lo- 
cation have caused us to consider non- 
political avenues to stimulate serious 



enforcement action on the part of Cuba 
that would serve our interests. We are 
closely monitoring Cuban interdiction 
efforts to see if Cuban actions match 
Cuban officials' claims that their gov- 
ernment is, indeed, serious about com- 
batting narcotics trafficking. 

Cuban Actions 

The Cubans can take a number of posi- 
tive steps right away to demonstrate 
their sincerity. We are making this 
clear to them directly. 

• They can undertake serious, uni- 
lateral interdiction efforts against drug 
traffickers, which, after all, are in 
their own best interests. Their rec- 
ord of selective enforcement is not 
satisfactory. 

• They can respond quickly to re- 
ports of airdrops or other suspicious ac- 
tivities in their territory. Their record 
is not satisfactory. 

• They can take action regarding 
the persons charged in the U.S. indict- 
ments. To date, they have done nothing 
but protest the indictments. 

• They can share with us the re- 
sults of their investigations of Ochoa 
and others. To date they have not re- 
plied to our suggestion that they do so. 

• They should stop propping up 
an indicted drug dealer in Panama — 
Noriega. 

Enforcement against narcotics 
traffickers is a subject that requires 
action, not dialogue. Existing channels 
of communication are fully adequate to 
the task if Cuba has the will to move 
vigorously against traffickers. 

One final note of caution. Castro 
has stonewalled us and the rest of the 
world in this issue for many years. We 
must not — in our haste to further the 
war on drugs — rush into a situation 
which might give his government polit- 
ical and other benefits without corre- 
sponding advantage for ourselves in 
the struggle against narcotics traffick- 
ing. We must not allow Castro to clean 
up his image without cleaning up his 
act. 



Make no mistake. We are not naive i 
about Cuba. Thirty years of dealing 
with Cuban intransigence and decep- 
tion have taught us a number of lessons.' 
While we are willing to look at even the 
toughest problems with an open mind 
to see if an arrangement could be 
worked out that would benefit the 
United States and its people, we don't 
intend to be pushed prematurely into 
decisions that could work against our 
interests. We are committed to routing 
out high-level drug traffickers and ex- 
posing government complicity in drug 
trafficking. 

We still do not like what we see 
of the Cuban reality in drugs, human 
rights, support for antidemocratic 
groups, and so on. Nor do we believe 
that Cuba should be rewarded if its 
sudden interest in drugs proves to be 
genuine. By cracking down on drug 
trafficking, Cuba would finally be liv- 
ing up to its international obligation. 
When it comes to fighting drugs, vir- 
tue is its own reward. After all, events i 
have proven that Cuba, in spite of its 
protestations to the contrary, is no 
more immune to the scourge of narcot- 
ics than the rest of the world. 

In addition, the burden is on Cas- 
tro to prove Cuba is ready to make a 
contribution to the war on drugs. For 
many years Cuba has stonewalled us 
and the rest of the world on drugs. The 
United States has nothing to prove. 

As President Bush said in a June 2f 
interview published in The Miami Her- 
ald, Castro's apparent antidrug effort 
will not move the United States to seek 
improved relations with Cuba, as long 
as our serious concerns about Cuban 
behavior internally and externally re- 
main unresolved. The burden of proof 
lies with Fidel Castro. 



' The complete tran.script of the hear- 
ine-s will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents. U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20520.B 



48 



NARCOTICS 



Global Narcotics Cooperation 
and Presidential Certification 



/)// .{nil B. Wrobleski 

Statement before the Suljconniuttee 
on Terroi-isni, Narcotics, and Interna- 
tional Communications of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee on April 
5, 1989. Miss Wrobleski is Assistant 
Secretary for International Narcotics 
Matters.^ 

The Bureau of International Narcotics 
Matters will provide testimony today, 
in behalf of the Department of State, 
concerning the determinations on nar- 
cotics cooperation, which President 
Bush certified to Congress on March 1 
and on the International Narcotics 
Control Strategy Report (INCSR), 
which provides the basis for those 
decisions. 



SUMMARY OF 
RECOMMENDATIONS 

President Bush certified The Bahamas, 
Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecua- 
dor, Hong Kong, India, Jamaica, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, and Thai- 
land. The President gave a national in- 
terest certification to Lebanon and 
denied certification to Burma, Laos, 
Panama, Syria, Iran, and Afghanistan. 

But the Administration did much 
more than simply certify cooperating 
countries. President Bush, in effect, 
gave four ratings: certification, cer- 
tification with explanations, national 
interest certification, and denial of 
certification. The President provided 
special statements explaining the certi- 
fications of The Bahamas, Bolivia, Co- 
lombia, Mexico, Paraguay, and Peru. 
Secretary Baker, in a special letter to 
Congress [March 1, 1989], said that he 
and Pi-esident Bush "are both deeply 
troubled by the state of affairs upon 
which he based his certification deci- 
sions. Despite the hard work and dedi- 
cation of many public servants and 
private citizens, both here and abroad, 
the international war on narcotics is 
clearly not being won. In fact, in some 
areas we appear to be slipping 
backwards." 

"Nonetheless," the Secretary con- 
tinued, "we present you these certifica- 



tions in good faith in the hope that we 
can work together against the drug 
menace. For six countries, there are 
statements that explain the certifica- 
tion while acknowledging that each 
of the six can and must do more in the 
future to end the drug trade." 

With respect to denial of certifica- 
tion, let me note that aid is not a factor 
in Syria, Iran, and Laos or with the 
Government of Afghanistan; aid had 
been previously suspended to Burma 
and Panama. Laos is reportedly seek- 
ing a loan through the Asian Develop- 
ment Bank, which will have to be 
opposed. We do have a continuing in- 
terest in POW/MI A [prisoner of war/ 
missing in action] investigations with 
Laos, which was the basis for the pre- 
vious national interest certification. 
However, we felt that the information 
we had concerning official involvement 
was compelling, given the require- 
ments under Section 2013(b). Trade 
sanctions are discretionary to the 
President, and no recommendations are 
made affirmative or negative on trade 
sanctions for the six countries denied 
certification. 



1988 IN SUMMARY 

Our annual report was submitted to 
Congress on March 1 and, for the bene- 
fit of this hearing record and for those 
in the audience who have not read the 
INCSR, my testimony presents the 
major findings in the report. 

Several critical milestones were 
met during 1988. Peru eradicated .5,130 
hectares of coca — possibly offsetting 
for the first time any expansion of 
Peru's coca crop which has been in- 
creasing by an estimated 10% a year. 
Bolivia exceeded its coca eradication 
targets ahead of schedule and passed 
landmark legislation which outlaws 
coca cultivation in most of that country. 
Colombia seized 23 metric tons of co- 
caine, while The Bahamas seized 10 
tons of cocaine. The year 1988 pre- 
sented some opportunities for 
progress: 



• The election of new governments 
in Mexico and Pakistan: 

• Evidence of greater international 
willingness to assist nations facing 
problems with drug production and 
trafficking; and 

• The growing awareness among 
developing nations now faced with drug 
abuse epidemics that inaction can no 
longer be tolerated. 

We have seen a new willingness by 
nations to work together at the United 
Nations, at the economic summit, and 
on regional initiatives, actions which 
will have consequences for narcotics 
control in South America. Nations rec- 
ognize that they cannot confront the 
l)roblem alone, that one nation's prog- 
ress has generally resulted in a shift in 
production and traffic to more vulner- 
able, less vigilant nations. 

However, there were disappoint- 
ments in 1988: the continuing expansion 
of the Andes coca crop, particularly in 
Bolivia, and the slow progress of An- 
dean governments in agreeing upon 
strategies which include wide-scale her- 
bicidal eradication. Central to a viable 
cocaine control strategy is destruction 
of a good percentage of South America's 
coca crop, an objective which cannot be 
achieved through manual eradication. 
In 1988 farmers in Peru, Bolivia, Co- 
lombia, and Ecuador cultivated 193,136 
hectares of coca; manual eradication 
destroyed 6,896 hectares, or nearly 4% 
of the coca acreage in these countries. 

U.S. policymakers were con- 
fronted once again in 1988 by the 
reality that political and economic in- 
stability in drug-producing areas can 
subordinate drug control agendas to 
other pressing concerns. Narcotics pro- 
duction and trafficking often go hand- 
in-hand with enormous social and polit- 
ical problems. 

Expansion of the world's opium 
crop, especially in politically inacces- 
sible areas threatens to increase U.S. 
heroin supplies. There is concern 
among some domestic drug abuse ex- 
perts that heroin popularity will rise 
partly as a result of the highly pub- 
licized negative consequences of crack 
and of increased production in South- 
east and Southwest Asia. 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1989 



49 



NARCOTICS 



On the positive side, marijuana 
production continues to decline in tra- 
ditional K'l'owing areas in Colombia, Ja- 
maica, and Belize, although Colombia 
experienced an increase in new areas. 
Ironically, reduction in international 
marijuana supplies puts the United 
Slates in the indefensible position of 
being a major supjilier to the domestic 
and international market. 



(;()AL: COCAINE 

Over (iO''/( of the Bureau of Internation- 
al Narcotics Matters overseas narcotics 
control budget is dedicated to cocaine 
control with the objective of reducing 
cocaine imports by 50'/^ by 199:]. This 
year's brightest news comes from Peru, 
where against tremendous odds, 4 
months of concentrated manual erad- 
ication resulted in the destruction of 
5,180 hectares, eliminating a potential 
10 metric tons of cocaine from the in- 
tei-national market and possibly stabi- 
lizing coca e.xjiansion in Peru foi- the 
first time. However, the exjumsion of 
tile Andean coca crop in Bolivia and 
Colombia and modest gains in eradica- 
tion make 1988 a year of mixed results. 
Despite some encouraging efforts on 
the part of the Bolivian Government, 
coca cultivation in that country ex- 
panded during this |)ast year, from an 
estimated :'.9,2.5(S hectares in 1987 to 
48,500 hectares after eradication: this 
represents an increase in hectarage of 
more than 209^ in 1 year. Coca cultiva- 
tion also increased slightly in Colombia 
fi-om 25,000 hectares to approximately 
27,280 hectares. 

The success of our cocaine control 
strategy overseas depends on several 
U.S. (Jovernment agencies working to- 
gether. The strategy incorporates 
eradication, enforcement, training, 
public diplomacy, and development 
assistance. The Bureau of Internation- 
al Narcotics Matters airwing, manda- 
ted by Congress, is fully operational in 
South America sujjporting coca and 
marijuana control opei'ations. During 
FY 1989, the airwing inventory will 
have 54 aii'craft, including a mix of he- 
licopters, utility aircraft, fixed-wing 
s|)ray planes, and three C-128 trans- 
ports. In conjunction with host country 
officials, the Bureau of International 
Narcotics Matters and DEA (Drug En- 
forcement Administration] utilize the 
aircraft for aerial eradication of drug 
crops, transporting eradication work- 
ers and U.S. and host country law en- 
forcement i)ersonnel, training foreign 
pilots in spray technicjues, and trans- 
porting e(|uipment. 



The Drug Enforcement Adminis- 
tration works with law enforcement of- 
ficials in South and Central America in 
an advisory capacity; 'Operation Snow- 
cap,' a multicountry, multifaceted co- 
caine control operation, is central to 
our cocaine strategy. Snowcap ad- 
di'esses several as|)ects of the cocaine 
processing and trafficking cycle, in- 
cluding chemical control and lab and 
airstrip destruction. Most Snowcap ac- 
tivity is currently taking place in Boli- 
via and Peru. Since its inception in 
1987, this cooperative operation has re- 
sulted in the destruction of 194 cocaine 
hydrochloride labs, 15,500 arrests, and 
the seizure of over 48,000 kilograms of 
cocaine. 

Other U.S. Government agencies 
have also taken an active role in train- 
ing and advising Andean law enforce- 
ment organizations in support of co- 
caine control operations. The Border 
Patrol has trained UMOPAR | Bolivian 
rural police] units in Bolivia; the De- 
partment of Defense has trained law 
enforcement personnel in Bolivia, Ecua- 
dor, and Colombia and has ])rovided 
opei'ational supjjort to drug enforce- 
ment agency personnel engaged in 
cocaine control programs. 

While there are indications that 
certain segments of the U.S. market 
for cocaine may have stabilized, our 
major cities are faced with a crack epi- 
demic which has bred violence, murder, 
and despair. Latin American cities are 
also facing unprecedented levels of 
drug addiction with the introduction 
of baauco, a highly addictive byproduct 
of cocaine which has characteristics 
similar to crack. 

U.S. seizures of cocaine were up 
during 1988; Federal law enforcement 
agencies report that in the fii'st 10 
months of 1988, about 70,000 kilograms 
of cocaine were seized. This rejii-esenls 
an increase of 18.5 metric tons in sei- 
zures for the entire previous year. 

Prospects for Success 
in South America 

Latin American governments have 
been unable to significantly reduce the 
Andean coca crop oi' to eliminate co- 
caine trafficking. The enormous profits 
generated by the cocaine trade have en- 
abled the traffickers to intimidate rep- 
resentatives of government institutions 
and to purchase arms and influence. 
Violence, drug-related corruption, and 
intimidation impede Andean govern- 
ments' efforts to mount effective anti- 
narcotics campaigns. Some evidence 



exists to indicate that Shining Path 
guerrillas in Peru actively attempt 
to sabotage coca eradication efforts in 
the Upper Huallaga Valley. There is a 
proven relationship between narcotics 
traffickers and the FARC [Revolution- 
ary Armed ?\)rces of Colombia] guer- 
rilla movement in Colombia. 

Des))ite some country-by-country 
improvements, no real progress was 
made in a regional approach to cocaine 
control. The cocaine 'big picture' re- 
mains discouraging and suggests that 
the current direction of Latin Ameri- 
can cocaine control efforts may need to 
be reassessed. In the coming weeks, 
we will address the cocaine issue in de- 
tail as we respond to the request in PL 
100-(590 that we assess the feasibility ol 
creating an integrated regional sti'at- 
egy and as we work with the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy on the 
new U.S. national strategy. 

The Herbicide Issue 

While enforcement operations have I'e- 
sulted in significant seizures, coca 
eradication in the field holds the most 
promise for reducing worldwide cocains 
supplies. The most hotly debated and 
most misunderstood issue in 1988 drug 
control efforts was the possible use of 
herbicides against the Andean coca 
crop. Debate on the environmental ef- 
fects of herbicides was often su])ei'fi- 
cial, taking no account of the already 
devastating environmental conse- 
quences of clear cutting forests and 
mountain areas or the damage caused 
by narcotics refining and processing 
chemicals. 

Peru has repeatedly stated its com- 
mitment to testing safe, effective her- 
bicides for use against coca and, during 
1988, completed the fii'st phase of its 
testing program, applying six hei'bi- 
cides manually to several plots of coca 
totaling under 3 acres. On March 17, 
Peru completed the critical aerial 
test of two herbicides, across 16 test 
plots, and, in the coming weeks, soil, 
air, and water samjjles will be analyzed 
for effects. 

Herbicide testing is carried out by 
the L'.S. Government and host coun- 
tries using the same strict criteria 
which are mandated domestically but 
not internationally. Herbicides are a])- 
plied carefully to ensure that unin- 
tended destruction of other crops does 
not occur. Where possible, ])ellets are 
used to minimize the possibility of drift. 



50 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1989 



NARCOTICS 



Critics of herbicide testing fail to 
lU' several important issues which 
ay help put Peru's coca eradication 
■(igi-am into perspective. 

, First, in the Upper Huallaga Val- 
j|v, coca cultivation is illegal. A large 
'''rcentage of the peasants cultivating 
:ii crop are not traditional coca farm- 
rs; they have recently occupied the 
nd for the sole purpose of growing 
iica for the illegal market. Eighty pei'- 
int of the farmers grow nothing but 
i)ca; the remaining 209;^ cultivate some 
'od crops to supplement supplies 
jansported from other regions. The 
ipper Huallaga Valley has never been 
traditional agricultural area nor 
ill it revert to one after coca is 
iminated. 

; Second, coca farmers and cocaine 
affickers have devastated the valley 
jith irresponsible use of chemicals and 
'ith the careless destruction of the foi-- 
;t. Peruvian environmentalists are 
•eply concerned about the silence of 
ie world environmental community 
)out the continuing destruction of nat- 
•al resources due to coca cultivation 
ul see the use of herbicides to destroy 
'Ut illegal crop as an acceptable 
adeoff. 

Third, the increasing presence 
the Sendero Luminoso in coca- 
•oducing areas poses a grave threat to 
f stability of the Lima government. 

Herbicidal destruction of the coca 
op is not the answer to all coca- 
'lated problems. A number of impor- 
nt questions still need answers con- 
•rniiig development, alternative 
lui-ces of income for peasants, and the 
•oiKimic future of Andean countries, 
owever, the use of herbicides can pro- 
ide these governments with an effec- 
ve tool to eliminate part of the coca 
■op, encourage farmers to seek legal 
velihoods, and demonstrate govern- 
lent commitment to narcotics control. 

he IDEC Initiative 

luring the summer of 1988, 30 nations, 
iicluding several European govern- 
ments, participated in a month-long 
Dcaine enforcement operation under 
le auspices of the International Drug 
inforcement Conference (IDEC). At 
•DEC's April meeting in Guatemala 
'ity, members agreed to participate in 
cdiiperative, coordinated, multina- 
onai law enforcement operation dur- 
lu; .\ugust to enhance their abilities to 
L'ize cocaine and cash, track fugitives, 
nd crack down on money laundering. 



The United States participated in the 
IDEC operation, committing National 
Guard units in four states to work side 
by side with the U.S. Customs Service 
inspecting cargo. 



GOAL: HEROIN 

During 1988, there was no reduction in 
worldwide supplies of opium and her- 
oin. In every opium-jiroducing nation 
e-xcept Thailand, opium production ap- 
pears to have remained at 1987 levels 
or increased. Heroin conversion and 
trafficking remain serious problems 
in Southeast and Southwest Asia and 
Me.xico; increased heroin supplies have 
also alarmed U.S. drug experts who 
believe that the United States may be 
poised on the brink of another heroin 
epidemic. Compounding U.S. Govern- 
ment frustration at increasing world- 
wide opium supplies is the fact that 
90% of the world's opium production 
takes place in areas to which the 
United States has limited or no access, 
such as Iran, Afghanistan, Lebanon, 
Laos, and Burma. Federal law enforce- 
ment officials report that 1988 heroin 
seizures are up over last year's totals. 

Southeast Asia 

The civil turmoil in Burma has re- 
sulted in the suspension of the Socialist 
Republic of the Union of Burma's annu- 
al aerial opium eradication program. 
Between January and March 1988, Bur- 
ma reported eliminating over 16,000 
hectares of opium. At year's end, it is 
estimated that Burmese production 
of opium is up in absolute terms, and 
there is no immediate prospect that the 
aerial eradication campaign will be re- 
sumed in time to be effective against 
the 1989 crop. Indeed, the disturbances 
will most likely result in unchecked 
opium production in Burma. 

There has also been no reduction in 
opium production in Laos, and there 
continue to be reports of extensive in- 
volvement of military and civilian gov- 
ernment officials in the narcotics trade, 
suggesting that such activity remains a 
matter of de facto government policy. 

Our continuous dialogue on this 
subject with the Lao, our certification 
program, and pressures from others in 
the international community underlie 
the recent Lao decisions to begin to ad- 
dress the narcotics situation. In the 
summer of 1988, the Lao Government 
raided two refineries in Oudomsai Prov- 
ince and later tried 48 traffickers 



netted in the raid; among those con- 
victed was the governor of the prov- 
ince, a central committee member. A 
high-level delegation of U.S. Govern- 
ment officials traveled to Vientiane in 
early 1989 to discuss a number of is- 
sues, including narcotics control. Lao 
Government officials assured the U.S. 
representatives that the Lao had begun 
to address its opium problem, as evi- 
denced by the Lao agreement that 
the UN Fimd for Drug Abuse Control 
(UNFDAC) could establish a $5.8 mil- 
lion rural integrated pilot program in 
an opium growing region in northern 
Vientiane Province. "This project is 
scheduled to get underway before July. 
For the first time, Lao officials accept- 
ed, in principle, previous offers of bilat- 
eral U.S. narcotics control assistance. 

Thailand was successful in ensur- 
ing that opium production did not in- 
crease during 1988. It is possible that 
no further reductions will be made 
in coming years in the estimated 28 
metric tons of opium produced in Thai- 
land, given the demand for opium 
among the indigenous hill tribe addict 
population. 

Heroin trafficking remains a seri- 
ous problem in Southeast Asia, partic- 
ularly in Thailand where an excellent 
system of roads provides traffickers 
good access to international markets. 
There is evidence that heroin is traf- 
ficked through Vietnam, notably 
through the port of Da Nang. During 
1988, heroin seizures in Thailand dou- 
bled over the previous year's totals, and 
10 heroin refineries were immobilized. 

Southwest Asia 

Opium production and heroin traffick- 
ing ai'e deeply entrenched in the South- 
west Asian nations of Iran, Afghani- 
stan, and Pakistan. There is no indica- 
tion that the Southwest Asian opium 
situation will improve in the foreseeable 
future. Political turmoil and limited 
U.S. access in both Iran and Af- 
ghanistan will complicate any future 
opium control efforts, while the un- 
stable Afghan political outlook will 
undoubtedly contribute further to 
Southwest Asia's opium and heroin 
problem. Pakistan's new government 
has publicly stated its commitment to 
opium control and has agreed to make 
use of aerial spraying to reduce the 
1989 poppy crop. 

There is little reliable information 
emerging from Afghanistan on the 
amount of opium poppy cultivated or 



>epartment of State Bulletin/October 1989 



51 



NARCOTICS 



the amount of heroin trafficked; it is 
widely believed, however, that both ac- 
tivities increased during 1988. There 
are no signs that either the Soviets 
or the Kabul regime have been able to 
make any progress in curbing produc- 
tion and trafficking. Estimates put the 
amount of opium production during 
1988 at between 700-800 metric tons. 

There is also sketchy information 
out of Iran concerning the amount of 
o])ium poppy cultivation taking place. 
It is believed, however, that Iran does 
not produce enough opium to supply its 
estimated 1 million addicts and must 
turn to Afghanistan and Pakistan for 
heroin. Opium production is estimated 
at between 200-400 metric tons per 
year, similar to 1987 levels. Heroin traf- 
ficking through Iran to Turkey is a 
trend that concerns U.S. and Turkish 
Government drug enforcement officials; 
Turkish enforcement efforts have re- 
sulted in the relocation of some Kur- 
dish heroin refining activities from 
eastern Turkey to Iran. There is some 
indication that the Government of Iran 
is troubled by drug trafficking and ad- 
diction; enforcement operations and the 
execution of drug traffickers are two 
manifestations of Iran's desire to curb 
drug trafficking. 

Last year's estimate of Pakistan's 
opium crop {reported at between 135- 
160 metric tons) was further revised to 
a range of 190-220 metric tons based on 
a new appreciation of yields. Opium cul- 
tivation in 1988 did not increase appre- 
ciably, but the Government of Pakistan 
has not been able to bring production 
down to 1985 lows. The newly elected 
Bhutto government has stated its com- 
mitment to reducing opium cultivation 
and heroin trafficking, and the Prime 
Minister has urged the creation of a 
new cabinet-level drug control entity 
under her direct auspices. Alarmed by 
the estimates of 1 million Pakistani 
drug addicts, the government has 
pledged to redouble its eradication and 
enforcement efforts and has indicated 
to the United States its willingness to 
eradicate opium poppy by aerial means 
during the 1989 season. 

In late 1988, the Government of 
Pakistan signed the Tribal Areas De- 
velopment Agreement which will result 
in a major U.S. -sponsored development 
project in the Bajaur and Mohmand 
tribal areas. The agreement specifies 
that an opium ban will be gradually im- 
plemented in these remote areas over 
the ne.xt 5 years, increasing the possi- 
bility that opium cultivation can be re- 



duced through concerted government 
actions. The Government of Pakistan 
did arrest a major heroin trafficker 
this year, but trafficking organizations 
have not felt real pressure to cease 
smuggling. 

Mexico 

Mexico expanded the scope of opium 
and marijuana eradication programs, 
while taking steps to improve opera- 
tional efficiency. Cocaine seizures rose 
sharply. Still, Mexico remained the 
largest single country source for her- 
oin, the second largest source for mari- 
juana, and a leading transit point for 
cocaine. Newly elected President Car- 
los Salinas de Gortari has made anti- 
narcotics programs a national priority 
for his new government, and the Attor- 
ney General's budget for 1989 will ex- 
ceed $26 million, up from .$19.5 million 
in 1987. A strong, positive tone for bi- 
lateral relations was set in an early 
meeting between then President-elect 
Bush and Mr. Salinas, and the U.S. 
Government, anticipating continued 
improvements in the program, is pre- 
pared to cooperate with Salinas on 
these enhancements. However, U.S. of- 
ficials are concerned about the inhib- 
iting effects of corruption throughout 
the program. 

Other Opium Producers 
and Heroin Traffickers 

During the past few years, opium pro- 
duction has increased in countries such 
as Guatemala and Lebanon which are 
not traditional cultivators of opium. 
Heroin production and trafficking in 
the Middle East flourish in chaotic 
wartime conditions, and there is much 
evidence that heroin profits are being 
used to purchase arms. Until order is 
restored in Lebanon, gains in opium 
control are highly unlikely. 



GOAL: MARIJUANA 

The worldwide marijuana picture in 
1988 was mixed, with some nations 
making significant gains against mari- 
juana cultivation and others unable to 
reduce their supplies. In countries 
where repeated aerial marijuana erad- 
ication campaigns have been launched, 
such as Belize, cultivation and replant- 
ing have been significantly reduced. 
Colombia has been successful in 
eradicating marijuana cultivated in 



traditional areas through a series of 
aerial eradication campaigns. Howeve 
marijuana farmers have begun cultiv 
tion in nontraditional areas of Coloml 
including the Cauca and San Lucas 
Mountains; an estimated range of 
5,927-9,625 metric tons were produce 
by Colombia in 1988. 

The United States remains the 
third largest marijuana producer for 
our domestic market. During 1988, lai 
enforcement personnel located and de 
stroyed 38,531 small, difficult to local 
plantations and seized 1,240 indoor 
greenhouses. Net production is esti- 
mated at 3,000-3,500 metric tons for 
1988. 



GOAL: TRAFFICKING NETWORK 

Major international drug traffickers 
continue to wield power in Latin Amt 
ica, demonstrating their ability to rui 
large organizations with untold wealt 
a ready supply of arms, and growing 
access to the world's media. While 
many of the world's most powerful dr* 
traffickers remain at large, three not 
rious cocaine traffickers are behind 
bars today. Carlos Lehder was con- 
victed and sentenced to life in prison' 
after being extradited from Colombia 
Ramon Matta Ballesteros, captured iJ 
Honduras, is serving time on a sepa- 
rate offense and is awaiting trial on 
drug trafficking charges, and Bolivial 
drug kingpin, Roberto Suarez, was an 
rested by Bolivian authorities and is 
presently in prison. 

Last year was a banner year for 
initiating what we hope will be several 
classic investigations of the financial 
networks and wealth management syi 
tems of drug traffickers. The value of 
targeting the financial flows of drug 
traffickers has achieved a new promi- 
nence in U.S. enforcement operations 
and has become central to U.S. drug 
control policy. The pursuit of proceed 
is enhanced by marked increases in ir 
ternational sensitivity to this issue, > 
spurred in part by the attention giver' 
to money laundering issues at the Uni 
ed Nations and the economic summit ( 
industrialized nations as well as our e 
forcement initiatives. International ac 
tion to stop money laundering is also 
unquestionably driven by awareness o 
the crippling effects of narcotics traf- 
ficking and corruption — and a desire 
to avoid the stigma borne by countries 
which have become money laundering 
centers. 



52 



Department of State Bulletin/October 19C 



NARCOTICS 



A number of international investi- 
gitions led to major arrests and the 
sizure of millions of dollars in drug- 
riated assets. One of the most success- 
t. money laundering investigations, 
Ojled "C-Chase" by U.S. Customs and 
oner enforcement agencies, led Brit- 
ia, French, and U.S. authorities to 
Slit down an international network op- 
eating on three continents: the Bank 
oCredit and Commerce International 
v.s indicted. 



OAL: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 

Iternational public opinion is one of 
t? most crucial elements of a success- 
fl narcotics control program; the U.S. 
(ivernment, understanding this, is 
\)rking with a number of foreign gov- 
(nments to raise public awareness 
iout the global drug problem and en- 
It support for concerted, internation- 
i action against all facets of the illicit 
coig trade. 

I The U.S. Information Agency 
(iSIA), the Department of State, and 
te Agency for International Develop- 
i!nt (AID) contributed to the U.S. 
(ivernment's public awareness ac- 
tities during 1988. In addition to the 
faring of information, the U.S. Gov- 
enment also provided technical assist- 
i ce to a number of countries in the 
tea of drug education and demand 
ijduction. 

I The Agency for International De- 
ilopment has also become increasingly 
ivolved in narcotics awareness pro- 
S ams and anticipates that 10 countries 
uy receive assistance in this area 
ixt year. AID obligated almost $5 mil- 
Im for drug awareness programs in 
88 to fund training, technical assist- 
iice, information dissemination, and 
le of the media. 



tOAL: INTERNATIONAL 
OOPERATION 

eveloped nations are becoming in- 
easingly involved in the international 
ircotics issue as the threats of drug 
'iafficking and abuse take their toll on 
jost societies. Through diplomatic and 
"fogram initiatives, the United States 
1 working with other governments to 
■isure that narcotics is elevated on the 
ternational agenda. 

The annual certification process 
the centerpiece of U.S. diplomatic 
forts to encourage international co- 



operation in narcotics control. Over 
$1 billion in U.S. foreign assistance 
is at stake in these determinations. 

The finalization of the UN traf- 
ficking convention was one of several 
positive developments in the area of in- 
ternational cooperation. In meetings of 
the economic summit of industrialized 
nations (the United States, Canada, 
France, the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, Italy, Japan, and the United 
Kingdom), cooperation on controlling 
international narcotics production, 
trafficking, and abuse were discussed 
in detail. At the May meetings in 
Toronto, the governments agreed to 
convene an experts group later in the 
year; the United States hosted this ex- 
perts meeting in September at which 
representatives from six nations 
(France declined to attend) made rec- 
ommendations on how to achieve en- 
hanced cooperation in controlling 
financial flows, strengthening law 
enforcement initiatives, reducing 
the demand for drugs, and supporting 
development projects. 

The United States and U.S.S.R. 
signed a bilateral agreement in Janu- 
ary 1989 which will lead to closer coop- 
eration between our two nations in 
narcotics investigations. The agree- 
ment, signed by Secretary Shultz 
and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, 
provides a mechanism for exchange 
of information on drug traffickers, 
shipments, and the source of seized 
narcotics. At his confirmation hearings 
in January, Secretary Baker outlined 
U.S. interest in expanding the estab- 
lished four-part agenda for U.S. -Soviet 
dialogue (human rights, arms control, 
regional conflicts, and bilateral rela- 
tions) to include a fifth agenda item of 
global issues, such as narcotics, the en- 
vironment, and terrorism. The Soviet 
Government agreed to this expansion 
(which will make narcotics a regular 
topic of discussion between U.S. and 
Soviet leaders) during Secretary Bak- 
er's introductory meeting with Foreign 
Minister Shevardnadze in Vienna on 
March 7. 

The personal diplomacy of U.S. 
Government officials such as the Secre- 
tary of State and the Attorney General, 
who both traveled to Latin America dur- 
ing 1988, reinforced the priority that 
the Administration places on the nar- 
cotics issue as a major foreign policy 
concern. 

International organizations such as 
the United Nations, the Organization of 
American States (OAS), the Andean 
parliament, the Association of South 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the 



Colombo Plan were active on the drug 
front in 1988. Last year was the second 
year of operations of the OAS Inter- 
American Drug Abuse Control Com- 
mission (CICAD). The CICAD's mem- 
bership expanded from 11 members to 
20, demonstrating the growing interest 
among OAS members in the drug issue. 
During the last year, the commission 
launched regional projects using school 
systems for prevention and strengthen- 
ing law enforcement mechanisms in the 
fight against drug abuse and traffick- 
ing. CICAD also undertook to develop 
stricter regional controls on precursor 
chemicals. Plans for 1989 include a 
meeting of ministers from the 31 OAS 
member states to reassess priorities 
for action. 



THE ROAD AHEAD: 
THE 1989-90 AGENDA 

During the next year, the Bureau of In- 
ternational Narcotics Matters intends 
to support program goals around the 
world in the following ways. 

Latin America and the Caribbean 

Bolivia, as President Bush noted in his 
statement, must do more to halt the 
spread of coca cultivation. We think Bo- 
livia can gain control of coca expansion 
by ensuring that the new antinarcotics 
law is upheld and by vigorously admin- 
istering the involuntary eradication 
program. Bolivia must also intensify 
interdiction activities to further dis- 
rupt cocaine processing and encourage 
farmers to seek other livelihoods as a 
result of shrinking coca markets. Fund- 
ing in FY 1990 will be used for both in- 
terdiction and eradication; special 
emphasis will be placed on infrastruc- 
ture support to field units. 

Colombia's judicial system has suf- 
fered significant violence at the hands 
of major trafficking organizations; that 
nation must address problems in its 
system and take necessary steps which 
will enable them to bring traffickers to 
justice. The continuing expansion of 
Colombia's coca crop is troubling and 
needs to be checked, preferably with an 
aerial eradication campaign. New mari- 
juana plantations must be destroyed, 
again through aerial means. President 
Bush noted all of these concerns in 
his certification statement, which con- 
tained this summarv assessment: 



department of State Bulletin/October 1989 



53 



NARCOTICS 



Few countries, if any, have contributed 
more of their national resources or lost so 
many lives in the effort to curb narcotics 
trafficking. We continue to stand in admi- 
ration of Colombia's determination. Yet. 
we are sensitive as well to how much more 
needs to be done, directly and bilaterally. 
As much as has been done, Colombia must 
do more, not just to eradicate crops, but 
to overcome corruption and intimidation. 
Colombia fights a two-front war against 
the traffickers and insurgents, too often 
in league with one another We will continue 
to assist in meeting that challenge. 

In FY 1990, program funds will 
be used to support antinarcotics police 
enforcement efforts throughout the 
country to destroy cocaine processing 
laboratories, to interdict cocaine, and 
build upon the e.xisting aerial campaign 
to eliminate cannabis entirely. Funds 
will also be used to support aerial erad- 
ication of coca should that occur. 

Paraguay remains a significant 
drug transit point and is probably used 
as a money laundering center. Follow- 
ing last year's decision to provide Para- 
guay with a limited 'national interest' 
certification, a stronger commitment 
was made in 1988 by Gen. Stroessner, 
which resulted in several significant 
seizures and arrests and the passage of 
a tough new narcotics law. As President 
Bush said, 'We are taking a wait-and- 
see attitude on all aspects of the rela- 
tionship with new President Andres 
Rodriguez.' We have called upon the 
new Paraguayan Government to take 
the kinds of actions that will curb traf- 
ficking in cocaine and other drugs, and 
President Rodriguez has promised to 
'wage a firm and intransigent struggle 
against drug trafficking.' Paraguay is 
cooperating currently on aerial mari- 
juana eradication, which is an encour- 
aging step which we hope will lead to 
other concrete actions to stem the pro- 
duction and flow of drugs. 

Peru needs to e.xpand eradication 
through use of herbicides where appro- 
priate in its anticoca campaign. Over 
the coming months, we will press the 
agenda advanced by President Bush: 

The manual eradication effort in 19S.S 
was an e.xtraordinary improvement over the 
meager results of the previous year, but 
there is need for an even stronger crop con- 
trol effort in 1989, including completion of 
the aerial tests; enforcement in the Upper 
Huallaga Valley has had limited effect as a 
restraint on production or trafficking, and 
corruption is a problem. There is a need I'oi' 
a strong commitment from the Peruvian 
military against the combined, violent 
forces of traffickers and insurgents. 



By working closely with the inter- 
national environmental community, 
Peru can gain significant support for 
actions which will ameliorate trafficker 
damage to the environment. Peruvian 
enforcement operations should also be 
intensified to interrupt cocaine proc- 
essing in the field. FY 1990 funds will 
sup])ort eradication and interdiction; 
security for field workers will remain a 
high priority, necessitating greater 
protection from the Peruvian 
Government. 

Our Latin American regional fund- 
ing will be dedicated to the contain- 
ment of cocaine and marijuana 
production and trafficking in the re- 
gion. By supporting eradication cam- 
paigns in Belize. Venezuela, and other 
marijuana production countries world- 
wide, cannabis su])plies will be re- 
duced. Brazil's continuing efforts to 
eliminate coca and marijuana produc- 
tion and cocaine trafficking will be sup- 
ported. We will also look carefully at 
opium production in Guatemala during 
the next year and will support eradica- 
tion there. In countries such as Para- 
guay, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, 
Haiti, Honduras, and the Dominican 
Republic, the Bureau of International 
Narcotics Matters will seek ways to 
support enforcement operations, up- 
grade the enforcement capabilities of 
police, and support regional enforce- 
ment activities. 

Mexico must expand and intensify 
its poppy and cannabis eradication pro- 
grams, using aerial surveys to compare 
pre- and posteradication totals to veri- 
fy the destruction of crops. An im- 
proved Operation Vanguard should be 
resumed next year. We will continue 
working with the Government of Mex- 
ico on the issue of corruption. Mexico 
is callable of improving its eradication 
campaign and could achieve the same 
successful results as they did in the 
1970s; improvements must be made by 
increasing aircraft utilization rates 
and alleviating current pilot shortages. 
Cocaine interdiction efforts could also 
be improved. Increased funding is re- 
quested in the FY 1990 budget to cover 
costs of maintenance support for the 
Mexican eradication fleet and aerial 
survey efforts. 

Jamaica has kept down marijuana 
production and should continue to do so 
through repeated eradication cam- 
paigns. The U.S. Government looks 
forward to working with the govern- 
ment of newly elected Prime Minister 
Michael Manley, building on recent 
progress in eradication and enforce- 
ment. Trafficking networks must be 
dismantled and traffickers brought to 



justice. Jamaica also needs to launch 
comprehensive drug prevention pro- 
gram aimed at jjreventing an increas 
in cocaine abuse. Aerial eradication i 
priority for FY 1990. and funds will 1 
used to provide aircraft support for 
eradication and interdiction, maxi- 
mizing the efficiency of Jamaica's 
programs. 

The Bahamas should seek ways t 
undertake more indeijendent interdit 
tion activities and complement curre 
U.S. -supported operations. OPBAT 
[Operation Bahamas and Turks and 
Caicos] is working well — the 10 metr 
tons of cocaine and 18 metric tons of 
marijuana were seized in 1988, contii 
ing the strong record of this bilateral 
program — and the Bahamian experi- 
ence can be valuable to other Carib- 
bean countries plagued by drug 
trafficking. Drug-related corruption 
continues to be a major concern. FY 
1990 funds will continue in support o 
enforcement operations. 

Asia and Africa 

We will continue to work with Asian 
governments, where possible, to chee 
opium expansion and drug abuse. Ce 
tral to our program is the use of her- 
bicides to destroy narcotic crops, anc 
Asian governments will be urged to 
employ them in eradication campaigr 

Continued discussions with Laos 
most recently in January 19.S9. have 
identified areas of potential bilateral 
cooperation. Bilateral programs in 
training and narcotics crop control a 
currently in the planning stages. 

Farther reductions in Thailand's 
opium crop will be supported as welll 
eradication of their marijuana suppli 
with FY 1990 funding; funds will alsc 
be used for interdiction programs to 
eliminate heroin trafficking. 

Funds have temporarily been sue 
pended to Burma; we will continue to 
watch that political situation closely, 
waiting for an opportunity to revital 
the opium eradication campaign. If ai 
when assistance flows, FY 1990 fund; 
will be provided to continue operatioi 
aimed against opium producers and 
heroin traffickers, supporting ongoii 
programs to maintain and repair ro- 
tary and fixed-wing aircraft previoui 
supplied to the Burma Air Force. 

Pakistan's opium crop must be re 
duced significantly, and we are urgin 
that government to make use of aeria 
application of herbicides to do so. Pak 
Stan's new leaders must enforce the 
opium ban and must redouble efforts 



54 



Department of State Bulletin/October 19 



NARCOTICS 



mantle heroin trafficking networks: 
troy laboratories: and arrest, try, 
1 convict major traffickers. FY 1990 
ding will support the extension of 
[istan's ban on opium poppy cul- 
ition to the Bajaur and Mohmand 
ions by introducing improved agri- 
tural crops and by providing alter- 
ive sources of income through an 
egrated rural development plan 
ich includes roads, schools, wells, 
1 rural electrification. Funds have 
D been included in the FY 1990 bud- 
, for Afghanistan in the event that 
late 1990 the political situation 
!;ht permit negotiation of bilateral 
p control efforts. 

We will continue to support small- 
le enforcement ]3rograms in Turkey 
1 in African countries in an effort to 
luce heroin supplies coming to the 
ited States. 

)bal Support 

erregional Aviation Support. Dur- 

1989, interregional aviation support 

I become increasingly important as 
;in American governments intensify 
dication and enforcement opera- 
is. Airwing assets will be used in 
iombia and other countries to eradi- 
e marijuana and in Guatemala for 
um and marijuana eradication. In 
•u, aircraft will continue to trans- 

•t eradication workers and equip- 
nt and will be used in enforcement 
irations. In Bolivia, assets will con- 
ue to be used in interdiction ac- 
ities. In FY 1990, the program will 
)port the overall maintenance, hang- 
ng, and operational costs for 54 
partment-owned aircraft used in 
•iai and manual eradication, interdic- 
n operations, and survey and logis- 
il support activities. The principal 
us will continue to be in the source 
Mntries of Peru, Bolivia, and Col- 
Dibia, as well as smaller efforts in 
Inaiea, Guatemala, and Belize, in 
ahrdance with our airwing strategy. 

Interregional Training and De- 
i*ind Reduction. During 1989, our 
fids will be used to train foreign offi- 
cls in a variety of law enforcement 
t-hniques. Two foreign journalist 
\^rkshops, sponsored by Voice of 
Aierica, are scheduled, and our money 
i being used to fund the startup of 
'^l.A's International Narcotics Infor- 
ritiiiii Network which will provide 
1 S. iMTibassies with direct informa- 

II links to Washington to facilitate 
t ■ sharing of public information on 



drug abuse, trends, policies, and U.S. 
and international antidrug efforts. 
Public awareness training courses are 
also scheduled for host country preven- 
tion e.xperts. During FY 1990," the De- 
partment will provide expanded U.S. 
Drug Enforcement Administration and 
U.S. Customs Service training for ap- 
proximately 2,200 foreign officials from 
55-60 countries. This training will in- 
clude 50 in-country programs, 14 pro- 
grams conducted in the United States, 
and 30 executive observation programs. 
Increased emphasis will be placed on 
other State-sponsored programs, e.g., 
maritime interdiction training and 
narcotic-detector dog training. 

Our public diplomacy and demand 
reduction program contributes to in- 
ternational narcotics control by mo- 
bilizing support for narcotics control 
policies and programs in key producing 
and transiting countries. 

International Organizations. 

In 1989, the Department of State will 
support ongoing activities of the UN 
Fund for Drug Abuse Control, the OAS, 
ASEAN, and the Colombo Plan. The 
FY 1990 budget will provide expanded 
funding for the UN drug control agen- 
cies, including the UN Fund for Drug 
Abuse Control, the Colombo Plan's 
efforts for regional narcotics control 
activities, and other drug programs 
undertaken under the auspices of other 
international organizations such as the 
Organization of American States and 
the Pan American Health Organization. 

Program Development and Sup- 
port. Finally the FY 1989-90 budget 
provides funds for technical and ad- 
ministrative support for the overall in- 
ternational narcotics program which is 
not otherwise tied to bilateral projects 
or specific interregional activities. 
This budget provides funding for 
Washington-based personnel costs, pro- 
gram development and evaluation, spe- 
cial studies, and administrative costs of 
the bureau. 



Summary 

Many lessons about the overall effec- 
tiveness of our international narcotics 
control programs were learned during 
1988. More than ever we understand 
that persistence and flexibility are 
crucial to the long-term success of erad- 
ication and interdiction programs. 
Eradication success will not be meas- 
ured in a single growing season or even 
two; the true measure of effectiveness 
in eradication is the unwillingness of 



farmers to replant once their crops 
have been destroyed. Interdiction suc- 
cess is not only a function of the num- 
ber of seizures reported or laboratories 
hit but also a function of the institu- 
tional capabilities of host countries to 
attack all links in the drug chain. 

One of the most important tasks 
ahead is to gain control of the cocaine 
situation through an integrated pro- 
gram of demand reduction at home, 
eradication, and interdiction. We are at 
a crossroads in our cocaine strategy: 
while waiting for Andean governments 
to launch wide-scale coca eradication 
programs, the United States has had 
the opportunity to participate in en- 
forcement o])erations which require 
paramilitary expertise, not tradi- 
tionally resident in drug enforcement 
organizations. Questions abound: 
Should the United States continue 
to commit resources and personnel to 
operations in the Andean jungles? 
Are the right agencies being tasked 
to carry out these missions? 

Whatever decisions are made with- 
in the next year, one fact remains clear: 
We will have only limited success in 
battling cocaine until we forge a com- 
prehensive, multifaceted strategy 
which recognizes that cocaine is not 
simply a law enforcement issue but is 
also a complex foreign policy and eco- 
nomic mattei', requiring a long-term 
approach. 

Our international strategy, re- 
ported in detail in last year's report, 
calls for us to explore the possibility of 
creating a "superfund" to provide eco- 
nomic incentives to nations cooperating 
with the United States in narcotics 
control. We stated that such a fund 
could contain as much as $300 million 
to be granted to cooperative govern- 
ments in an effort to bolster their legit- 
imate economies and thus compete 
against the influence of billions of nar- 
codollars. While such a fund may be 
considered expensive at a time of lim- 
ited resources, it is a small amount 
compared to the huge profits generated 
by the international drug trade. We 
also need to explore ways to use Third 
World debt as a lever in gaining cooper- 
ation on drug control issues. 

The antidrug legislation of 1988 
suggests several actions in the area of 
international narcotics control includ- 
ing exploration of a multilateral strike 
force, convening a Western hemi- 
spheric summit on drugs, and the 
creation of an international cocaine 
strategy. The Department will review 
these recommendations during the 
coming year. 



Cspartment of State Bulletin/October 1989 



55 



NARCOTICS 



COUNTRY AND REGIONAL 
SUMMARIES: 1988 

Southwest Asia 

AfKhanistan, denied certification last 
yeai; produced 700-800 metric tons of 
opium in this past year and remains a 
principal but politically inaccessible 
source of opium/hei'oin for European 
and U.S. drug markets. Given the cur- 
rent instability in the wake of the Sovi- 
et withdrawal, there are no forecasts 
as to the time and circumstances under 
which a government in Kabul will at- 
tempt to suppress cultivation and refin- 
ing. The situation is complicated by the 
resettlement of Afghan refugees who 
may turn to opium as a cash crop, in- 
creasing the likelihood that production 
may increase. 

India, the world's major producer 
of licit opium for processing into phar- 
maceuticals, is of increasing concern 
to U.S. officials as a transit route for 
Pakistani and Burmese heroin and for 
precursor chemicals used in manufac- 
turing heroin. In the last 2 years, con- 
cern has grown over diversion from 
licit production. India continues to re- 
duce licit production in response to a 
declining market for opium gum. Di- 
version is estimated at 60-120 metric 
tons, primarily for domestic consump- 
tion. India has long had a sophisticated 
money laundering system which is but 
one element in a thriving underground 
economy. To counter narcotics money 
laundering, India has adopted new as- 
set forfeiture legislation. 

Iran was denied certification last 
year on grounds of noncooperation. 
U.S. officials estimate opium produc- 
tion at 200-400 metric tons. While this 
amount would not satisfy Iran's domes- 
tic addict population, opium and heroin 
are flowing across Iran from Pakistan 
and Afghanistan and e.xported through 
Turkey and other routes to Western 
markets. 

Nepal is an increasingly used tran- 
sit point for heroin produced in Paki- 
stan and the Golden Triangle, some of 
it routed through India and conveyed 
onward by Indian traffickers. There is 
concern that traffic could increase in 
1989 with the opening of a new inter- 
national terminal at the Kathmandu 
airport. While there is no conclusive 
evidence of money laundering, there 
is a thriving market in gold, part of 
which is believed related to narcotics 
smuggling. 



Pakistan opium production re- 
mained high in 1988 (20.5 metric tons), 
reflecting political instability in grow- 
ing areas and the continued e.xpansion 
of the country's domestic addict popu- 
lation. Spurred by awareness of this 
problem, which may now include 1 mil- 
lion heroin addicts. Prime Minister 
Bhutto has publicly committed her gov- 
ernment to a strong antinarcotics pro- 
gram, including strict enforcement of 
the poppy ban in all areas. Law en- 
forcement agencies maintained high 
seizure and arrest rates but have not 
pursued major traffickers. One major 
dealer is awaiting trial in Lahore and 
another may be extradited to the 
United States. Money laundering is 
not a major factor. 

Syria is a transit point for illicit 
narcotics as well as a heroin refining 
center. Its military e.xerts significant 
influence over Lebanon's Bekaa Valley, 
allegedly profiting from widespread 
drug production and trafficking in that 
area. For these reasons, the United 
States twice denied certification to 
Syria. However, after a break of more 
than 2 years, limited discussions have 
begun on possible narcotics cooperation 
and assistance to Syria on demand 
reduction/prevention. 

South America 

Argentina is of increasing concern as a 
refining and transit center for cocaine 
destined for U.S. and European drug- 
markets and as a source of precursor 
chemicals. U.S. officials are encour- 
aged by a much improved enforcement 
effort in 1988 (seizures and arrests dou- 
bled) but worry about the increasing 
importation of Bolivian paste and the 
e.xpansion of a network of domestic co- 
caine laboratories. The country has a 
high potential for money laundering. 

Bolivia conducted its first signifi- 
cant eradication campaign in 1987-88, 
exceeding the initial target of 1,800 
hectares, but a 20% surge in cultivation 
spurred by higher leaf prices dwarfed 
the impact of the voluntary eradica- 
tion program. Bolivia passed a much- 
strengthened narcotics law and adopted 
implementing regulations, and its now- 
experienced crop control organization 
has set a target of 5,000 hectares for 
this year's program, which includes in- 
voluntary destruction of seedbeds. The 
enforcement picture brightened: major 
trafficker Roberto Suarez was jailed; 
the Bureau of International Narcotics 
Matters' airwing supported a DEA- 
assisted interdiction effort that sharp- 
ly increased seizures of cocaine and 



paste and the number of base and co-' J 
caine labs destroyed. Bolivia is not a. 
major factor in international money 
laundering. 

Brazil is vital in the cocaine tra^ 
as a transit country for Andean traf- 
fickers, as a producer of precursor 
chemicals, and as an emerging coca < 
tivator. Police conducted two major 
eradication campaigns in 1988 and de 
molished eight cocaine labs and seize 
more than a ton of cocaine. Police als 
destroyed 5,240 metric tons of can- 
nabis. These high levels of enforcemj. 
activity, maintained despite budget 
constraints, will be enhanced by $5 
million in equipment from UNFDAC 
Brazil is not a major factor in interm 
tional money laundering. 

Colombia deployed its military 
more extensively in an intensified ef 
fort to suppress cocaine refining, an 
the results were impressive: over 23 
metric tons of cocaine seized, more 
than 800 labs destroyed including 29' 
major complexes, and about 600,000 
gallons of precursor chemicals seizeo 
Colombia has destroyed more than 9i> 
of cannabis growing in traditional 
northern areas, but traffickers have 
planted extensively in the San Lucas 
Mountains and south in Cauca. Mari' 
juana tonnage increased in 1988 desf 
an aggressive eradication campaign. 
Coca cultivation increased above the 
1987 level; eradication of 230 hectare- 
was conducted manually. Despite poi 
efforts to harass the Medellin cartel 
and other trafficking groups, large 
amounts of cocaine continued to flow 
to the United States; almost 20 metr 
tons were seized by U.S. Customs. 
Overall enforcement remains hamjie 
by a judicial system that has been in 
timidated by violence. Drug profits 
flow into and out of Colombia, but m( 
ey laundering per se is not a major 
activity. 

Ecuador has fallen below the st. 
utory standard as a coca jiroducing 
source country but is a transit point 
an estimated 30-.50 metric tons of cO' 
caine enroute to the United States ai 
also a transit country for large quan-i 
titles of precursor chemicals. Coca le 
production has dropped to 400 metric 
tons a year thanks to a vigorous erad 
ication program. New laws are beingi 
proposed to curb trafficking in precu 
sor chemicals; police confiscated l,60i 
drums of chemicals which could have 
been used in the production of 16 
metric tons of cocaine. While coopers 
tion with U.S. enforcement authoritii 



56 



Dpnartmpnt nf Statp Riillptin/Ortnher 1?! 



NARCOTICS 



I'nains good, judicial corruption and 
i efficiency are considered program 
i pi'diments. Some money laundering 
(•urs but is considered minor. 

I'arajjuay. U.S. officials are wait- 
in' to see what measures Gen. 
lidriguez, the military leader who in 
ibruary 1989 overthrew former Presi- 
ont Stroessner, takes against drugs. 
Ixlriguez, in the past, has been the 
sbject of numerous allegations of 
i?gal activity — including drug 
tifficking which he strongly denies. 
j'U'v years of indifference to narcotics 
cntrol, Paraguay, in 1988, took several 
5>nificant steps to improve its perfor- 
rince: it signed two narcotics agree- 
pnts with the United States, includ- 
ii one providing for aerial spraying of 
nrijuana, it adopted tough new legis- 
1 inn on narcotics, and it permitted 
'.iA to open an office in Paraguay. 
'Ihile Paraguayan Government author- 
ies made several significant seizures 
((drugs in 1988, an important measure 
(the new government's commitment 
vll be its performance in antinarcotics 
ijitters. 

! Peru conducted a vigorous manual 
(Indication program in 1988 which 
(stroyed 5,130 hectares of coca in 
■ iKinths and, for the first time in any 
iuiean country, eliminated more coca 
tin was planted. In addition, 184,000 
iuare meters of coca seedbeds were 
(Stroyed. In 1987, only 355 hectares of 
(ca and 8,000 square meters of seed- 
Ids were eradicated. Fifteen times as 
liny hectares of coca and 23 times as 
uny seedbeds were destroyed in 1988 
tan in 1987. Peru also continued to 
t>t herbicides which could be used 
aially against coca. Peru remains the 
h-gest cultivator of coca, at more than 
'5,630 gross hectares, but is primarily 
oupplier of paste for Colombian co- 
line refiners. Enforcement in the Up- 
i'r Huallaga Valley, the major growing 
line, remains quite hazardous. The 
:nited States increased its support for 
"terdiction and enforcement efforts, 
^panding the Bureau of International 
;arcotics Matters' airwing contingent 
i Peru to nine helicopters, while also 
,;panding the force of DEA agents who 
•■sist the enforcement effort. 

Venezuela is an important point 
r the transit of precursor chemicals 
id cocaine. Marijuana is cultivated 
ung the border with Colombia, appar- 
jitly by Colombian traffickers; as 
uch as 3,000 inetric tons of cannabis 
ay be grown in Venezuela and export- 
1 via Colombia. 



Central America and the Caribbean 

The Bahamas continues to be a major 
transit country for cocaine and mari- 
juana entering the United States and is 
an important money laundering center. 
Cooperation with U.S. enforcement 
agencies in 1988 is considered good, 
with numerous joint undercover as 
well as regular operations, including 
OPBAT, underway. U.S. assisted oper- 
ations resulted in the seizure of more 
than 10 metric tons of cocaine and more 
than 13 metric tons of marijuana. Fol- 
lowing the arrest of several important 
traffickers, the Bahamas imposed new 
and more stringent sentencing; it is 
also more actively investigating cor- 
ruption, which continues to be a factor 
affecting operational effectiveness. The 
Bahamas signed an agreement in accor- 
dance with the Chiles amendment on 
February 17, 1989. 

Belize is no longer a major source 
country for cannabis, now producing 
only 120 metric tons a year thanks to a 
successful U.S. -assisted aerial eradica- 
tion program. However, it is becoming 
an increasingly important transit coun- 
try for cocaine from South America 
and marijuana from Guatemala. Law 
enforcement resources are limited, but 
enforcement capabilities are improv- 
ing. Money laundering is not a factor. 

Costa Rica is increasingly impor- 
tant as a cocaine transit country, with 
estimates that 6-12 metric tons of co- 
caine are being transported through its 
territory by air and sea. Authorities 
remain vigilant to the possibility of 
labs being established; but no new labs 
were found in the last 2 years. Can- 
nabis cultivation appears to be less e.\- 
tensive than previously estimated, and 
the e.xport trade is a minor enterprise. 
Costa Rica is not a major money laun- 
dering center, although a highly pub- 
licized money laundering trial has 
focused attention on the issue. 

Cuba sits amidst some of the pri- 
mary drug routes into the United 
States, and aircraft and seacraft are 
reportedly eluding U.S. agents by en- 
tering Cuban territorial waters or air- 
space. In the past, U.S. officials have 
accused Cuban officials of involvement, 
and indictments were returned against 
four ranking officials in 1982. Cuban 
authorities have publicly expressed an 
interest in antidrug cooperation with 
the United States but have not elabo- 
rated on what kind of cooperation they 
envision. 



The Dominican Republic has be- 
come an ideal staging ai-ea and refuel- 
ing stop for traffickers smuggling 
cocaine into the United States. Some 
marijuana is also transshipped by traf- 
fickers, who are attracted by the is- 
land's 63 airstrips. The government 
ranks the drug problem as a major pri- 
ority and, in 1988, passed tough new 
antidrug legislation which imposes 
mandatory sentences. The very effec- 
tive Joint Information Coordination 
Center — vital to the monitoring of 
drug traffic through that part of the 
Caribbean — can serve as a model for 
other countries. Money laundering is 
not a problem. 

Guatemala increased in impor- 
tance to the U.S. drug situation as ma- 
jor amounts of opium and marijuana 
were produced during the past year. 
U.S. officials estimate that as much as 
150 kilograms of heroin are smuggled 
into the United States, probably under 
control of Mexican traffickers. Gua- 
temala is also important to the cocaine 
trade, serving as a transit point for 
narcotics headed for Florida, Louisi- 
ana, and Texas and for precursor chem- 
icals destined for South America. 
Guatemala has conducted effective 
eradication efforts and cooperates with 
U.S. officials on a chemical-tracking 
program and interdiction efforts. Mon- 
ey laundering is not a major factor. 

Haiti improved its drug interdic- 
tion efforts in 1988 despite two coups 
and four governments. The Avril gov- 
ernment improved the climate for 
cooperation. Seizures increased sub- 
stantially in 1988, thanks in part to a 
new Center for Information and Coor- 
dination at Port au Prince airport, but 
the volume of trafficking remains be- 
yond the capability of the narcotics po- 
lice. U.S. enforcement agencies are 
concerned that the uncertain situation 
in Haiti and lack of strong control by 
the central government has led to the 
increasing use of Haitian waters and 
Haitian-registered vessels for the 
transshipment of cocaine. Although cor- 
ruption remains a problem, the Avril 
government did remove from service a 
number of military officers suspected of 
involvement. There is little information 
on money laundering activity. 

Honduras is a transshipment point 
for Colombian cocaine. The key event of 
1988 was the arrest and expulsion of 
Matta Ballesteros, a major Honduran 
trafficker with Colombian connections; 
he is now imprisoned in the United 
States. Honduras signed a bilateral an- 
tinarcotics agreement with the United 



epartment of State Bulletin/October 1989 



57 



NARCOTICS 



States last November, accenting the co- 
operation evident in the opening of a 
permanent DEA office last May and in 
cooperation on seizures and investiga- 
tions. While there have not been the 
dramatic seizures that occurred in 
1987, U.S. and Honduran authorities 
collaborated on a seizure of 453 kilo- 
grams last August. There was also co- 
operation on operations at sea with the 
U.S. Coast Guard. 

Jamaica has reduced marijuana 
production dramatically, from a high of 
1,755 metric tons in 1986 to 405 metric 
tons in 1988. The island is also a transit 
point for cocaine; traffickers are now 
paying for services in kind, increasing 
the amount of cocaine available for Ja- 
maican consumption. Money laundering 
does not appear to be a major problem, 
with most drug proceeds being laun- 
dered elsewhere. Cooperation with 
U.S. authorities remains quite good on 
the vigorous eradication campaign as 
well as interdiction and investigations. 
Seizures dropped below 1987 levels, but 
a number of improvements, including 
new procedures and e.xpanded training, 
are in place for 1989 to enhance the en- 
forcement effort. Heavy fines have 
been levied by U.S. Customs on air- 
lines and shipping firms whose vessels 
have been used to smuggle narcotics 
out of Jamaica. 

Mexico e.xpanded the scope of 
opium and marijuana eradication pro- 
grams, while taking steps to improve 
operational efficiency. Cocaine seizures 
rose sharply. Still, Me.xico remained 
the largest single country source for 
heroin, the second largest source for 
marijuana, and a leading transit point 
for cocaine. Newly elected President 
Carlos Salinas de Gortari has made an- 
tinarcotics programs a national priori- 
ty for his new government, and the 
Attorney General's budget for 1989 will 
exceed .$2() million — up from .$19.5 mil- 
lion in 1987. A strong, positive tone for 
bilateral relations was set in an early 
meeting between then President-elect 
Bush and Mr. Salinas, and the U.S. 
Government, anticipating continued 
improvements in the program, is pre- 
pared to cooperate with Salinas on 
these enhancements. However, U.S. of- 
ficials are concerned about the inhib- 
iting effects of corruption throughout 
the program. U.S. enforcement agen- 
cies continue to monitor instances of 
drug-related corruption within Mexico. 

Nicaragua continues to be men- 
tioned by informants and traffickers as 
a cocaine transit point. In 1986, there 



were accusations that top government 
officials were engaged in trafficking. 
Nicaragua is now cooperating with 
Costa Rica on drug matters but not 
with U.S. enforcement agencies. 

Panama was denied certification 
in 1988 following the indictments of 
Gen. Noriega by two U.S. grand juries 
on charges of narcotics trafficking. De- 
spite being fired by the lawful Presi- 
dent of Panama in 1988, Noriega 
illegally remains in control of the Pana- 
manian Defense Forces. Panama con- 
tinues to be a principal money 
laundering center for the South Ameri- 
can cocaine trade and a transit site for 
cocaine and precursor chemical ship- 
ments. Noriega's defiance of President 
Delvalle and continued control of Pan- 
ama's police forces prevents President 
Delvalle from effectively implementing 
his policy of full cooperation with the 
United States. While some minimal co- 
operation continues between Noriega 
and DEA on a limited number of en- 
forcement matters, cooperation on 
money laundering has bogged down 
since Noreiga's indictment. President 
Delvalle's government continues to al- 
low boarding of Panamanian flag ves- 
sels by U.S. narcotics officials. U.S. 
prohibition on aid to the Noriega-Solis 
regime continues. 

Europe and the Middle East 

Bulgaria is a vital transit country for 
heroin smuggled along the Balkan truck 
route from Southwest Asia and the 
Middle East. Although known traf- 
fickers were previously operating 
openly in Sofia, as a consequence of 
pressure from the U.S. Government 
and other European states, the Bulgar- 
ians have restricted these activities. 
There has also been some improvement 
in Bulgarian cooperation with U.S. 
law enforcement agencies. A recent in- 
vestigation involving laundering 
large amounts of drug money through 
Switzerland revealed the involvement 
of Bulgarian nationals. There is no 
restriction on the amount of foreign 
exchange that can be brought into 
Bulgaria by foreign nationals if these 
monies are properly documented. 

Cyprus is central to the drug trade 
in the Middle East and especially from 
Lebanon. Traffickers use Cyprus as a 
site for brokering deals and also for 
exchanges of cash and narcotics. The 
banking system is not involved in the 
money exchanges. Cooperation with 
U.S. agencies is considered good. 



Egypt is an important consumer 
opium, heroin, and hashish — support 
ing production in Asia and the Middle 
East — and is increasingly important 
a transit point for drugs intended for 
European and U.S. markets. Heroin 
moves from both Southwest and Sout 
east Asia, as well as Lebanon and Syi 
which are also the principal suppliers^ 
of hashish. Egyptian police seized 4 
metric tons of opium and 300 kilogran 
of heroin in a Suez Canal operation in 
1988, among the largest seizures even 
made outside of an opium source coun 
try. Some money laundering occurs 
but most profits flow abroad. 

Greece is an important transit 
point due to its location at the comme* 
cial crossroads between Europe and 
the Middle East. Its long coastline an 
sparsely populated islands and exten 
sive merchant marine facilities contr 
ute to its role in the international dru 
trade. Heroin transits Greece en rout 
Europe and the United States. Police 
increased their effectiveness in 1988, 
particularly in interdicting drugs at 
the Athens airport. 

Lebanon, which was given a na- 
tional interest certification in 1988, 
continues to be a major narcotics proi 
ducing and trafficking country, suppll 
ing heroin to Europe and the United 
States as well as hashish to the Midd 
East and Western countries. The as- 
sessment of Lebanon takes into accou 
the limited control of the central gov 
ernment: Syria controls an estimated 
65*^ of the country, including the stra 
tegic Bekaa Valley where crops are cv 
tivated and processed and trafficking 
originates. 

Turkey. Traffickers take advan 
tage of this land bridge between Asia 
producers and European/LI.S. consun 
ers to smuggle heroin and hashish. 
Some heroin is also refined in Turkey 
There are reports of increased heroin 
morphine smuggling across the Irani! 
frontier into Turkey. Authorities dran 
matically increased seizures in 1988 
and successfully targeted several 
smuggling operations. Turkey produc 
concentrate of poppy straw and contii 
ues to be very effective in preventingi 
diversion from its licit program. 

Southeast Asia 

Burma's political turmoil has ground 
ed its large-scale aerial eradication 
program until an effective governmen 
is seated in Rangoon. Traffickers cap' 
italized on diminished enforcement ef 
forts to smuggle large quantities of 



58 



Department of State Bulletin/October 191 



NARCOTICS 



pium and heroin with little intei*- 
Tence. The prospect for 1989 is grim: 
.'ith highly favorable climatic condi- 
nns and the suspension of programs 
1 ik'stroy crops or seize shipments of 
rugs or precursor chemicals from Chi- 
la, Thailand, and India, traffickers 
ia.\' harvest and move as much as 1,400 
u'tric tons of opium to heroin refiners 
1 Sijutheast Asia. Money laundering is 
(it a factor. 

The People's Republic of China 
oes not produce significant amounts of 
licit narcotics, but U.S. officials are 
ici'easingly concerned about the trans- 
hipment of Golden Triangle heroin 
hrough southern China to Hong Kong 
;nd traffic in precursor chemicals into 
he triangle. The Chinese Government 
5^ responsive to these developments, 
■iiiiically resulting from its own "open- 
ess policy" and is particularly con- 
iiiicd about indications of reestab- 
slied triad influence in southern Chi- 
a. A new law controlling precursor 
ln'inicals was enacted in December 
Ii.^.s as part of a reinvigorated enforce- 
lent effort. China sent police officials 
!o the United States to give evidence in 
he "Goldfish" heroin case. 

Hong Kong is both the financial 
11(1 money laundering center of the Far 
last narcotics trade and an important 
I'ansit center for Golden Triangle her- 
in destined for Australia, Canada, the 
'nited States, and Europe. Hong Kong 
olice — who made record heroin sei- 
zures and arrested a number of key 
raffickers in 1988 — believe that as 
luch as half the heroin seized came 
verland through China. A high degree 
f cooperation e.xists with U.S. offi- 
ials. Hong Kong is moving forward 
nth legislation enabling the courts to 
|race, freeze, and seize proceeds of 
Irug trafficking and is considering a 
J.S. proposed mutual legal assistance 
i.ui'eement. 

Indonesia is a transit site for her- 
liin, opium, hashish, and precursor 
fhemicals. Heroin is exported to Aus- 
tralia, New Zealand, and Western 
Surope; the amounts reaching U.S. 
narkets are not considered significant. 
:^ew interest focuses on Bali; Western 
Europeans are heavily involved in the 
ncreasing traffic from this major re- 
port area, which is augmented by the 
aigh number of international flights. 
VIoney laundering is not a factor. 

Laos is the only country to date for 
vhich the extensive involvement of mil- 
tary and government officials led to 
iccusations that the government is fa- 
•ilitating narcotics trafficking during 



the corruption review required by Sec- 
tion 2013, PL 99-570. The Lao Govern- 
ment has made repeated efforts in the 
past year to convince U.S. officials of 
its intention to curb illicit narcotics 
production and trafficking. However, 
U.S. officials believe that opium pro- 
duction continues to expand and could 
be approaching the 300-metric-ton 
mark and that heroin refining contin- 
ues. Laos is exporting heroin and mari- 
juana through Thailand, Vietnam, and 
China. The government has welcomed 
U.S. consultations on narcotics and 
a UN narcotics-related crop substitu- 
tion program. 

Malaysia is an important heroin 
conversion and transit center, export- 
ing primarily to Europe and Australia. 
Plagued by drug abuse among its own 
population and concerned by the dom- 
inance of criminal elements in the 
trade, Malaysia considers drug traffick- 
ing a national security problem and has 
the death penalty for traffickers. A 
strong domestic enforcement program, 
which drove heroin seizures up by 
TOOVf , seems to have reduced drug 
availability in 1988, and a new property 
forfeiture act provides a vital new 
weapon. But the expected bounty of 
opium coming from the Golden Trian- 
gle in 1989 will put the country's forces 
to a test. 

The Philippines exports locally 
grown and Thai marijuana and is also a 
transit point for Golden Triangle heroin 
and South American cocaine smuggled 
into Guam, Australia, Europe, and the 
United States. Foreigners are still 
principals in the trade, but Filipino 
groups have also emerged. Filipino po- 
lice conducted more than 1,000 narcot- 
ics raids in 1988 and made important 
seizures and arrests, but the enforce- 
ment effort, which the U.S. assists, is 
hampered by budget and structural 
restraints. 

Singapore, which is a transship- 
ment point for Southeast Asian heroin 
and has high potential for money laun- 
dering, cooperates with U.S. officials 
in monitoring and intercepting inter- 
national drug traffic. Singapore offi- 
cials are especially worried about do- 
mestic drug use. 

Thailand has reduced opium culti- 
vation to about 28 metric tons but re- 
mains significant as a refiner of heroin 
and conduit for opium/heroin from oth- 
er sources in the Golden Triangle. High 
quality Thai marijuana is exported to 
the United States and other markets, 
and there is also an active trade in pre- 
cursor chemicals. The Royal Thai Gov- 



ernment counters these efforts with a 
vigorous enforcement program that 
doubled heroin seizures in 1988 while 
also seizing increased amounts of 
opium, morphine, and marijuana. Thai- 
land is also an important money flow 
country. 

Africa 

Cote d'lvoire continues to suppress 
marijuana cultivation, which is not a 
factor on the international market, 
while trying to cope with a continued 
flow of heroin, cocaine, and marijuana 
transiting Abidjan en route to Europe 
and sometimes the United States. 

Kenya is of increasing importance 
as a transit point for Southwest Asian 
heroin en route to West Africa, Eu- 
rope, and the United States. Local con- 
sumption of heroin is increasing. Small 
amounts of marijuana are cultivated 
and consumed locally. New antidrug 
legislation should be adopted in 1989. 
U.S. officials concentrate on raising 
awareness of these problems with Ken- 
yan officials and have provided some 
commodity support as well as training 
and technical assistance. 

Morocco is a source of cannabis 
and hashish, primarily for European 
and African markets, and also a transit 
point for heroin and cocaine. Cannabis 
cultivation is increasing as is domestic 
consumption. The effect on the U.S. 
market is considered insignificant. A 
UN-funded crop substitution project 
should begin in 1989. 

Nigeria is a major heroin transit 
country, a principal link between 
Southwest Asian producers and con- 
sumer markets in Europe and the 
United States. Cocaine from South 
America is also smuggled through 
Nigeria en route to Europe. Improved 
enforcement at Lagos airport has 
caused some diversion of heroin to oth- 
er West African cities then back to 
Nigeria through land routes. U.S. offi- 
cials provide training and technical 
assistance. 

Senegal is primarily concerned 
with an expanding domestic drug prob- 
lem, but some trafficking in narcotics 
is occurring, which has prompted in- 
creased police action. 



' The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402.B 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1989 



59 



PACIFIC 



Visit of Australian Prime Minister 




Prime Minister Robert J.L. Hairke 
of the Commonwealth of Australia 
made an official visit to Washington. 
D.C., June 2it-27. 1989. to meet with 
President Bush and other government 
officials. 

Following are remarks the Presi- 
dent and the Prime Minister made at 
the welcoming ceremony on June 27.^ 

President Bush 

Barbara and I are very pleased to wel- 
come you as old friends to the United 
States and to the White House. We had 
the opportunity to enjoy Australia's 
renowned hospitality in 1982 during 
Australian-American Friendship Week. 
Barbara and I are just delighted to try 
to return that marvelous hospitality. 
There is another reason why it is 
so fitting for Australia's Prime Minis- 
ter to be among the fii'st official 
guests. Our nations share a similar 
heritage: a pioneer heritage in the tam- 
ing of two vast continents, a heritage of 
democratic ideas, and a heritage of 
common sacrifice in war and common 
efforts in peace. In our last visit, Bar- 
bara and I joined your countrymen in 
the commemoration of one of the most 
costly battles of the Second World 
War — the Battle of the Coral Sea — a 



poignant reminder of how much Ameri- 
cans and Australians have sacrificed 
four times in this century in the de- 
fense of freedom. 

This is not just an alliance between 
two great powers; it is an intimate 
partnership between two peoples. Your 
visit reaffirms the vigor of this part- 
nership, the enduring strength of our 
alliance. 

The giant strides that we have 
made recently toward many of our com- 
mon goals — major progress in arms re- 
ductions; major progress in resolving 
conflicts in Afghanistan, Angola, and 
Cambodia — all were made possible by 
the resolve of the West. Our countries 
prize peace but recognize that peace 
comes only through Western strength 
and vigilance. We must maintain our 
alliances and stand by our friends if we 
are to fulfill the promise of a new era 
of lessened tension and confrontation. 
And that is why the United States is so 
grateful for Australian leadership in 
our common defense. 

America also admires Australia's 
bold leadership in foreign policy, both 
close to home and far from your shores. 
From the South Pacific to Africa, Aus- 
tralia is a force for economic growth 
and a beacon of democracy. We value 
your contribution, your good judgment, 
and your advice. 



We have much to discuss at an im- 
portant moment in history. Events in 
China call for close consultation amonj 
the free nations. The United States aii 
Australia have a longstanding traditic 
of such consultation on important is- 
sues. I am interested in hearing your 
assessments of recent world events. 

There are many pressing interna^ 
tional issues. Your leadership in orga- 
nizing global efforts to cope with the 
threat of chemical weapons is one posi 
tion that is greatly admired by Ameri' 
cans. The United States supports 
Australia's efforts, and you may be as- 
sured of our commitment to the early 
achievement of an effectively verifiabi 
treaty banning these weapons. Today 
we shall discuss world events — arms 
control, trade, Pacific regional coopen 
tion, economic cooperation, other 
subjects. 

You have a busy schedule in your 
very brief time with us. But we hope t 
. make your visit to Washington as 
pleasant and as memorable as ours wa 
to your great country. 

Prime Minister Hawke 

It is an immense pleasure for me, in 
these 3 days in Washington, to renew 
our long friendship. And it is a specia 
pleasure and privilege to join with yo 
as the elected chief of the greatest de 
mocracy in reaffirming the deep, abic 
ing friendship of our two countries. Ii 
you the Western world has an experi- 
enced and forward-looking leader, and 
in you Australia has a valued and long 
standing friend. 

Today, as you have said, I look for 
ward with you to continuing the e.\- 
change of views on all the issues 
affecting our countries in the spirit ofi 
friendship and of frankness which has- 
always characterized our association 
and which befits the relationship and, 
if I may say, the partnership between 
Australia and the United States. As 
you say, we are meeting at a time of 
historic and far-reaching change acros 
the world. There now exists unpar- 
alleled new opportunities, challenges, 
and, may I say, responsibilities for 
leadership and positive achievement oi_ 
crucial issues of peace and security, 
East-West relations, economic prog- 
ress, world trade, and the protection o 
the world environment. 

You have already demonstrated 
your determination to give leadershipj 
Your constructive approach to East- 
West relations is demonstrated by you: 
creative and bold proposal for the re- 



60 



Department of State Bulletin/October 19a 



PACIFIC 



i.ction of conventional weapons in Eu- 
)^e. In this and other arms control en- 
( avors aimed at reducing nuclear 
limaments and, as you importantly 
iiphasize, banning chemical weapons, 
u know that you can count consist- 
tly on the support of Australia. 

In this new and challenging era, 
te constancy, the depth, and the vital- 
i,' of the alliance between Australia 
ad the United States will remain cru- 
ally important to the national inter- 
ns of both our countries. But it has a 
i(der regional and, indeed, global sig- 
ificance. Under ANZUS [Australia, 
few Zealand, United States security 
leaty], the joint Australia-U.S. de- 
Inse facilities in Australia are signifi- 
(nt elements in maintaining the peace 
ad in supporting the effectiveness of 
;tms control and disarmament agree- 
ents. Over recent years, our coopera- 
m and consultations at the highest 
vels have been stronger, broader, and 
ore productive than at any other time 
ince ANZUS was formed. 
! But as we both agree, our alliance 
pes far beyond our defense alliance. It 
ocompasses dynamic economic links 
iid broad and deep human and cultural 
i.sociations. But above all, it is based 
'1 the firmest of foundations: our 
: ared commitment to democracy and 
individual liberty within the rule of 
vv. 

It is precisely because of the depth 
id the maturity of our relationship 
lat the differences of views that do ex- 
t between us can be faced openly and 
:)nestly as, for example, on some trade 
atters, particularly aspects of agri- 
dtural policy. I am quite confident 
lat today we will be able to focus on 
ays to minimize, if not entirely re- 
vive, such differences. I look forward 
> exploring with you means of cooper- 
ing in the current Uruguay Round of 
ultilateral trade negotiations to 
?hieve some progress toward the goal 
lat we both want — an international 
I'ading system based on free and fair 
pmpetition. 

I know that we both understand 
lat moving in the opposite directions 
jward a world of separate and compet- 
ig trade blocs would be economically 
isastrous and quite possibly strategi- 
jlly destabilizing. That is one of the 
easons, I might add, why earlier this 
tear I suggested the development of 
jioser regional economic cooperation in 
ie Asia-Pacific region. Implementa- 
on of my proposal could, I believe, im- 



Australia — A Profile 



Geography 

Area: 7.7 million sq. km. (2.966 million sq. 
mi.); about the size of the continental 
United States. Cities: (1987 est.) Capital- 
Canberra (pop. 286,000). Other cities— Syd- 
ney (3.5 million), Melbourne (3.0 million), 
Brisbane (1.2 million), Perth (1.1 million). 
Terrain: Varied, but generally low lying. 
Climate: Relatively dry, ranging from tem- 
perate in the south to semitropical in the 
north. 



PAPUA 
NEW GUINEA 




/m/iatt Ocean 



People 

Nationality: Noun ami adjective — Aus- 
tralian(s). Population (1988 est.): 16. .5 mil- 
lion. Annual growth rate: 1.5%. Ethnic 
groups: European 93%, Asian 5%, aborig- 
inal 1%. Religions: Anglican 26%, Roman 
Catholic 26%. Languages: English, aborig- 
inal. Education: Years compulsory — to 
age 15 in all states except Tasmania, where 
it is 16. Literacy— 100%. Health: Infant 
mortality rate — 8.8/1,000. Life expec- 
tancy — males 73 yrs., females 79 yrs. 
Work force (end-1987, 7.9 million): 
Agriculture — 6%. Mining, manufacturing , 
and utilities — 26%. Services — 63%. Public 
administration and Defense — 5%. 

Government 

Type: Democratic, federal-state system 
recognizing British monarch as sovereign. 
Constitution: July 9, 1900. Independence 
(federation): January 1, 1901. 

Branches: Executive — prime minister 
and cabinet responsible to Parliament. 
Legislative — bicameral Parliament (76- 
member Senate, 148-member House of 
Representatives). Judicial — independent 
judiciary. 

Administrative subdivisions: Six 
states and two territories. 



Political parties: Liberal, National, 
Australian Labor, Australian Democrats. 
Suffrage: Universal and compulsory over 
18. 

Central government budget 
(FY 1988-89): $65.1 billion. 

Defense (FY 1988-89): 2.7% of GDP or 
9.3% of government budget. 

Economy 

GDP (1988): $220.96 billion. Per capita in- 
come: $14,458. Inflation rate: 7.3%. 

Natural resources: Bauxite, coal, iron 
ore, copper, tin, silver, uranium, nickel, 
tungsten, mineral sands, lead, zinc, dia- 
monds, natural gas, oil. 

Agriculture (1985-86, 4% of GDP): 
Products — livestock, wheat, wool, sugar. 
Arable land—^%. 

Industry (1985-86, 36% of GDP): 
Types — mining, manufacturing, and 
transportation. 

Trade (1988): Exports— $30.7 billion: 
coal, wool, wheat, meat, iron ore and con- 
centrates, alumina, aluminum, petroleum 
oils, nonmonetary gold. Major markets — 
Japan. US ($3.3 billion in CY 1987), UK, 
Korea, PRC, Hong Kong, Taiwan, West 
Germany. Imports — $30.6 billion: transpor- 
tation equipment, capital goods, industrial 
supplies, petroleum products. Major sup- 
pliers— \JS ($5.5 billion in CY 1987), Japan, 
West Germany, UK, Taiwan, New Zealand, 
Italy, Korea. 

Official exchange rate: The Aus- 
tralian dollar floats freely. The November 
1988 rate was approximately US$0.85 = 
Australian $1. 

Fiscal year: July l^une 30. 

Membership in 
International Organizations 

UN and most of its specialized and related 
agencies, including the UN Education, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) and the Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO); Organization of Eco- 
nomic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD): Asian Development Bank (ADB); 
Economic and Social Council for Asia and 
the Pacific (ESCAP); Australia-New 
Zealand-US security treaty (ANZUS); 
Commonwealth; Colombo Plan; Interna- 
tional Energy Agency (lEA); the Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative Group; and many 
others. 



Taken from the Background Notes of March 
1989, published by the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, Department of State. Editor: 
Juanita Adams. ■ 



)epartment of State Bulletin/October 1989 



61 



PACIFIC 



pi'ove significantly the chances for suc- 
cess in the Uruguay Round, as well as 
acting as a catalyst for further growth 
in our dynamic region. I am very keen 
to exchange views with you on this pro- 
posal. And may I say that I, indeed, 
welcome Secretary Baker's support last 
night [in an address before the Asia So- 
ciety] for a new mechanism for multi- 
lateral cooperation among the nations 
of tlie region as an idea whose time has 
come. I am delighted that the United 
States supports my call for a minis- 
terial meeting this year as a first step 
if, as I hope and e.xpect, there is con- 
sensus in the region. 

I make this final point. The A.meri- 
can presence has been a prime factor in 
creating and in maintaining the condi- 
tions for stability and prosperity in the 



Asia-Pacific region. Americas continu- 
ing involvement in our region remains 
a key to its future progress. As you 
say, we have before us an imposing dia- 
logue that we have to deal with. 

What gives this visit and our dis- 
cussions their real substance, however, 
and what will make them so mutually 
beneficial is the sense of common i)ur- 
pose that we bring to these matters 
based on our common national and in- 
ternational interests and on our com- 
mon commitment to peace and to 
freedom. 



1 Made at the South Portico of the White 
House where Prime Minister Hawke was ac- 
corded a formal welcome with full military 
honors (te.xt from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of July 3, 1989).H 



U.S. Establishes Diplomatic Relations 
with Marshall Islands and Micronesia 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
JULY 26, 19891 

I take great pleasure in signing into 
law H.R. 2214 [Public Law No. lUl-62], 
which approves diplomatic relations 
agreements with the Republic of the 
Marshall Islands and the Federated 
States of Micronesia. Since 1986 these 
countries have been our partners in 
free association. Our ties to them go 
back to the last World War when Amer- 
ican forces liberated their islands in 
some of the bloodiest fighting of the Pa- 
cific campaign. We administered the is- 
lands as part of a UN trusteeship until 
late 198(5. 

Under the agreements now ap- 
proved, our current representative of- 
fices in Majuro, the Marshall Islands, 
and in Kolonia, Micronesia, will become 
fuU-gledged embassies with resident 
American Ambassadors. The same wel- 
come transformation will occur here in 
Washington, and our diplomatic com- 
munity will be enlarged by the addition 



of ambassadors from the Marshall Is- 
lands and Micronesia. This change will 
portray accurately the nature of our re- 
lationship with these countries under 
the Compact of Free Association, the 
treaty linking our nations in a special 
partnership. 

I would like to recognize the con- 
tributions of all those who labored 
to negotiate and conclude these two 
agreements. The one person who de- 
serves special mention is Representa- 
tive Bob Lagomarsino of California, 
who introduced this bill into the House 
and who has been a tireless supporter 
of the American position in the Pacific. 
I will also pay tribute to Their Excel- 
lencies Wilfred Kendall of the Marshall 
Islands and Jesse Marehalau of Micro- 
nesia. With the entry into force of the 
agreements, let me be the first to ad- 
dress them as Ambassador Kendall 
and Ambassador Marehalau. 



' Text from Weekly Compilation of Pres- 
idential Documents of July 31, 1989. ■ 



62 



Department of State Bulletin/October 19i 



;OUTH ASIA 



^isit of Pakistan's Prime Minister 



Prime Minister Mohtrama Benazir 
I iitlu of the Islamic Republic of 
t^kistan made an official risit to the 
hitcd States June 5-10. 19S9. to meet 
nil: President Bush and other 
qr( rnment officials. 

Following are remarks made by 
(, President and the Prime Minister 
an- their meeting on June 6.' 

lesident Bush 

Iwas a special pleasure for Barbara 
ad me to welcome Prime Minister 
iutto to the White House this morn- 
i J. In fact, our relationship goes back 
t|1971, when she attended Harvard 
n\ came with her dad to the United 
htions. I have often remarked that 
Yx father's 1971 appeal was literally 

S of the most moving speeches that I 
r heard at the United Nations. More 
rbently, we met in Tokyo last Febru- 
ay, where, I believe, we were the most 
riwly elected heads of government. 
' Pakistan and the United States 
l"\e enjoyed a long history of good re- 
lions, friends since the time that 
Ikistan became an independent na- 
tn. I welcome this opportunity to re- 
a'irm those ties and to reassure the 
lime Minister of our continued com- 
rtment to assist in Pakistan's security 
ad its economic and cultural 
cvelopment. 

The Prime Minister knows our 
c.mtry well, and she has many friends 
h'e. I congratulated her on Pakistan's 
htoric return to democracy last year, 
alevelopment of which the people of 
Ijkistan can be truly proud. We dis- 
cssed how important it is for all ele- 
I'nts of Pakistan society to ensure 
tat democracy isn't just an abstract 
ciicept but that it works. 

The Prime Minister and I reviewed 
te situation in Afghanistan. For the 
ht decade, the United States and 
Ikistan cooperated in supporting the 
i'ghan resistance in its fight against 
f'eign occupation. Pakistan deserves 
J eat credit and admiration for its ex- 
t.inrdinary humanitarian efforts in 
.-ppiirt of the millions of Afghan refu- 
■ ('> (luring this ]3eriod. The effeetive- 
.-> iif our mutual policy was proven 
■1 February, when the last Soviet 
' "ips withdrew from Afghanistan. We 
rt'ed, however, that the job is not 
ne. The mujahidin continues, and 
eir struggle for self-determination 




i^ 



partment of State Bulletin/October 1989 



63 



SOUTH ASIA 



goes on, a goal that both the United 
States and Pakistan continue to sup- 
port. Prime Minister Bhutto and I dis- 
cussed ways to encourage a political 
solution in Afghanistan that will lead 
to a nonaligned, representative govern- 
ment, willing to live in peace with its 
neighbors, to replace the illegitimate 
regime in Kabul. The United States 
and Pakistan will continue to explore 
any serious avenue toward this end. 

The Prime Minister and I also re- 
viewed our efforts to enhance stability 
in South Asia, an important objective 
of both governments. I expressed our 
strong support for Pakistan's efforts, 
and India's as well, to improve relations 
and stressed the critical importance of 
avoiding a regional nuclear arms race 
in the subcontinent. She assured me 
that Pakistan's nuclear program is com- 
mitted to peaceful purposes. I under- 
lined my Administration's commitment 
to discourage proliferation of nuclear 
and chemical weapons, ballistic mis- 
siles, in the South Asia region and 
around the world. 

We also shared our concern about 
the scourge of drug production and 
trafficking. Not much detail yet on 
that, but we're going to go into that one 
in much more detail later on. It's a mat- 
ter of grave concern on the United 
States. I applauded her tough stance on 
eradicating the opium cultivation and 
expressed our appreciation for the ex- 
tradition of alleged drug trafficker 
Saleem. To effectively combat this 
menace, we've got to undertake a vigor- 
ous enforcement campaign, offering 
U.S. assistance wherever possible. 

Let me say that as far as I'm con- 
cerned, these discussions have been 
productive. Let me note too that that 
ceremony outside today, the first since 
I've been President, was a wonderful 
way to welcome the Prime Minister. We 
just walked by the Rose Garden, which 
also is a lovely setting, and as the 
Prime Minister has observed, roses 
have a very special meaning in her life. 
When she was younger, her father 
would bring back roses every time he 
traveled abroad, and in time, her fami- 
ly's gardens became filled with vari- 
eties of color. During her own 
detention, she struggled bravely to 
keep the gardens alive, for as she has 
written, "I could not bear to watch the 
flowers wither, especially my father's 
roses." Madam Prime Minister, you've 
described your time among the roses 
and the cool shade of the gardens as 
"the happiest hours of my life." Now as 
a gesture of friendship between our 



64 



people and to continue your father's 
tradition, it is my privilege to present 
you with this American rosebush. May 
it and you prosper in the years to come. 

Prime Minister Bhutto 

I'm very grateful to President Bush for 
the kind invitation to pay an official 
visit to the United States, and I'd like 
to thank the President for his consid- 
eration in giving me one of the rose- 
bushes from the White House. It shall 
always remind me of this very use- 
ful, productive, and helpful visit — 
supportive visit — of mine to the United 
States. 

My presence here underlies the 
great importance that Pakistan at- 
taches to our relations with your 
country. This is not only because 
geopolitical realities require a close re- 
lationship but, more importantly, be- 
cause of the ideals and the objectives 
that we share. As you know, this is not 
my first visit to Washington or, indeed, 
to the United States. I have pleasant 
memories of my student days at Rad- 
cliffe, past visits to Washington, one of 
the great citadels of democracy. But it 
is a special privilege and honor to be 
here as the democratically elected lead- 
er of a country which has traditionally 
enjoyed close, friendly ties with your 
country. 

Over the last 10 years, Pakistan 
has been in the forefront of two great 
struggles. We have actively supported 
the cause of the Afghan people and 
their brave fight against foreign mili- 
tary intervention, and at the same 
time, at home in Pakistan, we've strug- 
gled against military dictatorship to 
establish a system based upon demo- 
cratic^ values and the respect for 
human rights. In both these epic 
struggles, we received from the United 
States unwavering support and mate- 
rial as well as moral encouragement. It 
has, therefore, been a special pleasure 
and privilege to come to Washington 
and to thank President Bush and the 
Government and the people of the 
United States for their friendship 
and their generosity. 

The President and I have had wide- 
ranging discussions on a number of is- 
sues, and I am convinced that this ex- 
change will be of immense benefit to 
the bilateral relations that exist be- 
tween us and also to the cause of world 
peace. President Bush has just re- 
turned to Washington from a spec- 
tacularly successful visit to Europe 
and where he has launched a series of 



initiatives which could open an entire 
new era in international relations, wi: 
the exciting prospect of a genuine am 
durable peace. Pakistan, which is siti 
ated in one of the more sensitive geO' 
political regions of the world, will 
contribute toward these objectives ai 
efforts. 

While the withdrawal of Soviet 
forces has brought a welcome change 
Afghanistan, the continued fighting 
and prolonged presence of over 3V2 m. 
lion Afghan refugees pose serious 
threats to the peace and stability oft 
region. The President and I have re- 
viewed the situation in the light of thi 
prevailing circumstances, and we are 
in complete accord, both in terms of 
our analyses as well as the future po! 
cies that need to be evolved. Pakistan 
remains committed to a political solu 
tion of the Afghan problem, whereby 
the brave people of Afghanistan will 
have the right to freely choose their 
own government without interferenc 
from outside. Pakistan's commitment 
peace and democracy are fundament; 

In thanking President Bush for t 
valuable support that the United Stai 
has rendered to us in the pursuit of 
these objectives, I have assured him 
our continuing efforts toward main- 
taining peace in the South Asian reg 
and of our determination to strength 
the process of nuclear nonproliferatic 
by seeking accords, both bilateral ani 
international, within the regional 
context. 

The President and I discussed 
measures to increase our cooperatioi 
in the fight against drugs. We have ai 
ready achieved some success in this c 
rection in Pakistan, but much remain 
to be done. 

In conclusion I would once more 
wish to thank President Bush for the 
generous hospitality, for the warmth 
and the friendship with which we ha\ 
been received. I go home greatly en- 
couraged by our constructive and fru 
ful discussions. I look forward to the 
ojjportunity of reciprocating in Paki- 
stan some of the warmth, kindness, a 
hospitality that my husband and I ha' 
been privileged to receive from the 
President and Mrs. Bush in 
Washington. 



• Made in the East Room of the White 
House (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of June 12, 1989).l 



Department of State Bulletin/October 



,. 



SOUTH ASIA 



'roposal to Sell F-16s to Pakistan 



I Teresita Schaffer 

Statement before the Subconunit- 
,( N mi Asian and Paeific Affairs and 
,1 Arms Control, Internationa! Secu- 

tii. and ScieJice of the House Foreign 
ffdirs Committee on August 2, 1989. 
. rs. Schaffer is Deputy Assistant Sec- 

tarii for Near Eastern and South 
Mini Affairs.^ 

jam pleased to have this opportunity 
l discuss with you the Administra- 
iii's plans to sell 60 F-16 A/B fighter 
roraft to Pakistan. This is a partic- 
arly memorable event for me, being 
y first opportunity to meet with you 
iRi' my appointment as Deputy Assist- 
,it Secretary. Assistant Secretary [for 
lear Eastern and South Asian Affairs 
>hn H.] Kelly regrets that he is unable 
) testify himself. He has spent the 
I St 2 days in Stockholm in bilateral 
scussions on Afghanistan with Soviet 
qjerts and is, unfortunately, still on 
le road. 

It has been almost 5 months since 
'presentatives of the State and De- 
nse Departments have testified 
'fore the Asia and Pacific Affairs 
ibcommittee on the Administration's 
reign assistance requests for Paki- 
an and India, including the possi- 
lity of selling additional F-16s to 
akistan. At that time, we indicated 
lat we had not reached a firm decision 
[\ how to respond to the Pakistan Gov- 
;-nment's reciuest for additional F-16s 
;id intended to consider carefully the 
'hole range of relevant factors. The 
lost important of these factors was the 
npact of selling or not selling on 
iakistan's security and development, 
n Pakistan's improving relations with 
ndia, on the risks of conventional and 
uclear arms proliferation in the re- 
ion, on the new democratic govern- 
lent in Pakistan, and on U.S. relations 
'ith Pakistan. 

'akistan's Need for Modernization 

'akistan is surrounded by nations with 
,irge military forces — Iran, Afghan- 
;tan, the Soviet Union, China, 
!nd India. The ongoing conflict in 
ifghanistan, the massive influx of 
'lodern weapons into Afghanistan from 
he Soviet Union, and repeated attacks 
n Pakistani soil by the Kabul regime 
ontinue to pose a very real threat to 



Pakistan's security. The current U.S. 
security assistance program to Paki- 
stan aims to help it maintain a credible 
deterrent to possible aggressors by 
sea, land, and air, but these funds are 
limited. The current Pakistan Govern- 
ment, like its predecessor, has made 
the modernization of its fighter force a 
top defense priority and is prepared to 
do this out of its own funds. 

After her ascension to the prime 
ministership in early December 1988, 
Benazir Bhutto called for a thorough 
review of Pakistan's military procure- 
ment plans. At the end of January, she 
informed our Ambassador in Islamabad 
that she had decided that Pakistan 
needs more F-16s. She subsequently re- 
viewed the situation again, carefully, 
from the standpoints of regional rela- 
tions and affordability. She reaffirmed 
her earlier decision and communicated 
it to the Administration in writing be- 
fore her visit here in June. 

We have discussed this decision in 
detail with a number of Pakistan au- 
thorities. They explain that important 
elements of Pakistan's Air Force, such 
as the Chinese variants of the MiG-19 
obtained in the 1960s, are old and 
increasingly outmoded. Many of its 
fighter aircraft will be retired in the 
next few years. Unless these aircraft 
are replaced with modern versions, the 
present military equation in South Asia 
will shift increasingly to Pakistan's dis- 
advantage, with potentially destabi- 
lizing consequences. The Pakistan 
Government has examined various re- 
placement possibilities, including high- 
technology models from other Western 
countries, and has decided that the 
U.S.-built F-16 A/B, which is present 
already in its air force, makes the best 
sense in terms both of performance and 
economics. 

The Bhutto government, although 
deciding to pursue the F-16 purchase, 
has taken steps to increase the develop- 
mental thrust of overall government ex- 
penditures. The great bulk of the $1.5 
billion cost of the F-16 package will be 
covered by funds already earmarked 
for an aircraft that Pakistan had in- 
tended to coproduce some years ago. In 
the new government's budget for 1989- 
90, defense is allotted a small nominal 
increase, which represents a substan- 
tial decrease in real terms. In contrast, 
spending on education is up 68% and 
health 26%. A people's development 



structure has been erected and allo- 
cated $143 million the first year to 
ensure that development monies are 
spread widely at the grass roots. 

Indian Government's Concerns 

The Government of India has expressed 
its concern about our intention to sell 
more F-16s to Pakistan. We have con- 
sidered India's views very carefully but 
feel that a sale of 60 F-16 A/Bs will not 
contribute to an escalation of military 
technology on the subcontinent, change 
the military balance, or destabilize the 
region. On the contrary, we believe 
that a more confident Pakistan, with a 
reasonable defensive capability, will be 
better able to negotiate the kind of fair 
and lasting agreements with India 
which will reduce the chances of war 
between them. I would note that the 
Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers 
have continued their efforts to improve 
relations since the Administration for- 
mally notified Congress of this sale. 

We believe also that our own good 
relations with India are sustained by 
a growing range of mutual interests. 
Growing ties in trade and high technol- 
ogy occupy an increasingly important 
place in our bilateral dialogue. We do 
not consider our relations with India 
and Pakistan to be a zero-sum game. I 
believe that the Government of India 
understands this position and would 
agree that Indo-U.S. relations should 
not be defined predominantly in terms 
of our relations with Pakistan, the So- 
viet Union, or any other country. 

We have heard concerns expressed 
that the sale of F-16s to Pakistan could 
increase the dangers of nuclear prolif- 
eration on the subcontinent. We believe 
the opposite is true. None of the F-16s 
Pakistan already owns or is about to 
purchase is configured for nuclear de- 
livery. Pakistan, moreover, will be obli- 
gated contractually not to modify its 
new acquisitions without the approval 
of the United States. More impor- 
tantly, a Pakistan with a credible 
conventional deterrent will be less 
motivated to pursue a nuclear weapons 
capability. 

Strengthening Democratic 
Government 

The establishment of democracy in 
Pakistan after more than a decade of 
military rule is, we believe, one of 



j)epartment of State Bulletin/October 1989 



65 



TERRORISM 



the most imijortant events in modern 
Pakistani and South Asian history. The 
United States should do all it can to 
support and strengthen these demo- 
cratic institutions and their civilian 
leadership. Our willingness to cooper- 
ate with the new government's efforts 
to modernize its fighter force will con- 
tribute to Pakistan's sense of security 
and assure the Pakistani public that 
the country's defense needs can be met 
effectively by a civilian democratic 
government. 

In May the State Department con- 
sulted informally with a number of 
members and staff in both the House 
and Senate. Our conclusion from those 
consultations was that there is broad- 
based support in Congress for the sale 
of this major weapons system as one in- 
dication of U.S. support for the new 
democratic government of Pakistan. 

In early June, Prime Minister 
Bhutto visited Washington. In her ad- 
dress before a joint meeting of Con- 
gress and in discussions with high-level 
Administration officials, she spoke 
of a new partnership with the United 
States based on shared democratic and 
developmental values and on a growing 
range of common interests. She reas- 
serted Pakistan's commitment to 
working with the United States in 
supporting the Afghan resistance, as- 
sisting the millions of Afghan refugees, 
suppressing the illicit drug trade, and 
preventing nuclear proliferation. She 
stated that U.S. military assistance to 
Pakistan has contributed to peace and 
stability in South Asia. She also reaf- 
firmed the importance she attaches to 
the purchase of more F-16s. 

On June 8, informal notification of 
the proposed F-16 sale was sent to the 
Congress. This was followed on July 11 
with formal notification. On July 27-28, 
the U.S. -Pakistan consultative group 
met in Washington to review our secu- 
rity assistance relationship, as we do at 
regular intervals. During these discus- 
sions, the two sets of experts discussed 
the specifics of Pakistan Government 
funding and various delivery schedules 
for the aircraft in the 1990s. Although 
our foreign military sales organization 
will administer the proposed sale, we 
were assured that the Government of 
Pakistan has budgeted to meet the full 
cost of the aircraft from its own 
resources. 



In sum the evidence we have e.xam- 
ined since we testified before you in 
March persuades us that it is strongly 
in the interests of the United States 
that we sell more F-16s to Pakistan. 
Not to sell the needed aircraft would 
not only jeopardize the close coopera- 
tion we have developed with Pakistan 



over the past decade but would show ai| 
unfortunate lack of support for 
Pakistan's fledgling democracy. 



' The complete transcript of the hear 
ings will be published by the committee an 
will be available from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.B 



American Hostages in the Middle East 



Lt. Col. William R. Higgins, 
USMC, chief of the UN peacekeeping 
force in southern Lebanon, was 
kidnapped on February 17. 1988. and 
allegedly hanged by pro-Iranian 
terrorists on July .11. 1989.^ 



PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, 
JULY 31, 19892 

Before I make my remarks, I want to 
comment on a very disturbing report 
that we have just heard. There are un- 
confirmed reports that Col. Higgins 
has, indeed, been executed. I had 
planned to go on out to Nevada for 
another appearance today and then 
to go to Oklahoma tonight. But this 
matter is of such concern to me and to 
all of you and to the American people 
that I think it's appropriate that I go 
back to Washington. 

Whether the report is true or not, 
I know I speak for all here when I try 
to express to the American people the 
sense of outrage that we all feel about 
this kind of brutality, this uncalled-for 
terrorism. This was a young American 
colonel serving in an international 
force, and it is incumbent on all of 
us to try to rectify this situation, if 
at all possible. 

I have no more to share with you 
on this. We have not been able to con- 
firm this horrible report, but I will go 
back to Washington and convene our 
top national security people and, first, 
establish to the best of our ability if the 
report is true and then figure out what 
might conceivably be done. I'm sorry to 
bring to this meeting a message of that 
natui-e — the bad news — but I felt you 
would want to know about it. 






PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, 
JULY 31, 1989 ' 

Let me just, on behalf of the Americai 
people, express the outrage that we 
feel at the brutal nvirder of Col. Hig- 
gins. At this juncture, I don't have 
what I would call a final confirmation. 
On the way home from Chicago, I was 
on the phone to the Secretary Generall 
[of the United Nations Javier Perez da 
Cuellar]. He, at that moment — which 
was about an hour ago — was still hop- 
ing that Higgins had not been mur- 
dered. I called Col. Higgins' wife and 
talked to her — wonderful stoic individi 
ual who is going through sheer hell. I 
will convene a meeting here in the 
White House about 5:30 p.m. to get ai 
update on the intelligence and to mee' 
with my top advisers on this whole 
matter. 

There is no way I can properly ex 
press the outrage that I feel. Somehov 
there has got to be a return to decenc 
and honor, even in matters of this 
nature. 

I will have nothing more to say 
about this until I have had this meeti 
and been with some — I may say some- 
thing more today but probably not. AI 
this juncture, we want to get all the 
information and be sure we're dealing 
from the facts, not from — regret- 
tably — heresay. It is a most troubling 
and disturbing matter that has shocki 
the American people right to the core 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
JULY 31, 1989 

The President met at .5:30 this after- 
noon in the Cabinet Room with senior 
advisers concerning the hostage situ- 
ation in Lebanon. The President re- 
ceived a briefing on the status of our 
knowledge of the situation. This was 
primarily an informational meeting at^ 
which all aspects of the case involving 



66 



TERRORISM 



1 I. Higgins and the other hostages 
\ i-i' discussed. Deputy Secretary [of 
itr Lawrence S.] Eagleburger dis- 
j -..^ed the UN resolution today which 
I idemned hostage-taking. 

.\ttending the meeting were the 
h'sident, the Vice President, Secre- 
ti'v [of Defense] Cheney, Adm. Crowe 
[hairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff], 
Iri)uty Secretary Eagleburger, Attor- 
ry General Thornburgh, CIA Director 
\Bbster, National Security Council ad- 
\^ei- Scowcroft, Bob Gates [Deputy 
i;sistant to the President for National 
Ircuritv Affairs], and Gov. Sununu 
[hief of Staff to the President]. 



UESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 

JLV 31. 1989^ 

'ir grave concern over the taking and 
1 Iding of American citizens as hos- 
tges has been made clear on numerous 
licasions in the past. 

Oil Friday [July 28 during a news 
ditrrence], I said that the taking of 
ay hostage was not helpful to the Mid- 
(? East peace process. The brutal and 
I iLiic events of today have underscored 
ic \alidity of that statement. That 
isiiion, and our firm opposition to ne- 
1 tinting with hostage-takers, was fur- 
li-r reinforced in my discussions this 
lening within the Administration and 
i consultations with the congressional 
iidership. 

Tonight I wish to go beyond that 
;atcnient with an urgent call to all — 
:1 parties who hold hostages in the 
jiddle East — to release them forth- 
ith, as a humanitarian gesture, to 
'gin to reverse the cycle of violence 
that region. 



HITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 

I'G. 1, 1989 

|he President called His Holiness Pope 
ihn Paul II this afternoon to urge the 
oly Father's intercession to have the 
pdy of Col. Higgins returned as a hu- 
lanitarian gesture, although we still 
ive no direct confirmation of his death. 

The President and the Holy Father 
sn discussed the situation in Lebanon, 
K' I'scalation of the fighting, the shell- 
ig, and the difficulty of the Arab 
t-ague's peace efforts. 

The call was described as warm, 
■iendly, and cooperative. It lasted 
ipproximately 12 minutes. 



QUESTION-AND-ANSWER 

SESSION, 
AUG. 2. 1989^ 

Q. Are you going to discuss the hos- 
tage crisis? Do you think that there 
are any other hostages in danger? 

President Bush. We're co 
nsidering that that might well be the 
case, given statements that we've seen. 
And yes, indeed, we have started to 
discuss it, and I'm not going to put 
words in his mouth, but he expressed 
his concern. You're free to say some- 
thing if you want to: you're our guest. 

Foreign Minister Khalifa. I would 
like to express our condemnation for 
such a terrorist act which we think is 
not aimed against the United States 
but against all humans everywhere. 
This man. Col. Higgins. is an interna- 
tional figure; he represented the L'nit- 
ed Nations. He is an American citizen 
but he is a world citizen. The attack on 
him is really against us all. We think, 
worldwide, not only condemnation but 
action should be taken to stop such 
acts. 

Q. What action are you going to 
take or are you considering taking? 

President Bush. You can just rest 
assured that we're going about our 
business in a, I'd say, prudent way and 
not — with a heavy heart, obviously, be- 
cause of the feeling that the [Foreign] 
Minister expressed on behalf of the 
whole world, but the feeling that I feel 
just so personally about what happened 
to Col. Higgins. But I would just leave 
it at that: please assume we are think- 
ing prudently about this matter in ev- 
ery way possible. 

We have exercised every diplomatic 
channel that I can think of — some per- 
sonal, some through our Secretary of 
State and our national security adviser 
[Brent Scowcroft]. We've been in 
touch — I have personally — with many 
world leaders, and our State Depart- 
ment has fleshed this out, so we're 
leaving no stone unturned. But regret- 
tably, as you know, we're dealing with 
less than a full deck when it comes to 
information. It is very hard when 
you're dealing with this kind of coward- 
ice and this kind of dastardly act to get 
all the information that you need to 
make a decision. 



Q. Do you feel you've received as- 
surances from any of the other coun- 
tries that you've contacted that they 
will be able to help in the situation? 
Is there anything you can tell us to- 
day that you feel — have some new 
confidence at all? 

President Bush. I feel that every- 
body I have talked to, and including my 
distinguished guests here, would do ev- 
erything they can to try to help. Yet 
they face the same problems that we 
face when it comes to information and 
trying to find out exactly what hap- 
pened. We are not dealing with all the 
facts. But I've had assurance after as- 
surance from world leaders that they 
want to help. I'm sure you know, I was 
very recently on the phone with [Brit- 
ish Prime Minister] Margaret Thatcher 
and many others — several others — 
today and quite a few yesterday, and so 
it transcends religion, it transcends 
alliances. 

It gets in, as the [Foreign] Minis- 
ter said, to a matter that concerns the 
entire civilized world. So we will keep 
on trying. In the meantime, we've got 
to go about our business, and I'm doing 
that. But I don't want anyone in this 
country or around the world to think 
that it is anything of other than tre- 
mendous concern. But we must pru- 
dently move on with the business of our 
country. 

Q. Would it help if the Israelis 
release Sheik Obeid? 

President Bush. I have made clear 
the position of the United States that 
I think — or, at least of everyone held 
against their will, would be a good 
thing. 

Q. How about ship movements? 
Are you planning any kind of military 
action? 

President Bush. We're prudently 
planning. 

Q. Like what? 

President Bush. Like that's all I've 
got to say about it. [Laughter] 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
AUG. 3. 1989 

We have seen a statement this after- 
noon declaring a "freeze" of the sen- 
tence issued earlier against hostage 
Joseph Cicippio [acting comptroller at 



lepartment of State Bulletin/October 1989 



67 



TERRORISM 



the American Univei-sity of Beirut, 
who was abducted from the campus on 
September 12, 1986]. We regard this as 
an encouraging and hopeful develop- 
ment. But it still does not answer our 
continuing concern for release of all 
hostages. We urge that all parties in 
the region use whatever influence they 
have to end the tragedy of hostage- 
taking and to release those remaining 
in captivity. And we express our appre- 
ciation to all those who have been thus 
far trying to help. 



QUESTION-AND-ANSWER 

SESSION (EXCERPT), 
AUG. 4, 1989'' 

Q. What do you make of Rafsanjani's 
[President and Speaker of the Parlia- 
ment of Iran] offer to help resolve the 
hostage crisis? 

A. We have engaged in an extraor- 
dinarily broad exercise of diplomacy 
here in the last couple of days, and let 
me say, I am pleased about that. I don't 
know what it means fully, but I think the 
world is familiar with our policy. But 
there will be nothing that will be done 
ever that will create a new incentive for 
taking somebody else hostage. 

I feel the burden of going to every 
end possible to try to find — get the re- 
turn of these Americans to their loved 
ones and find out the truth about Col. 
Higgins. 

Q. What do you think was the 
motivating factor for the freeze on 
the execution? And where do you go 
from here? 

A. I like to think that a broad- 
spread appeal to nations in every corner 
of the globe had something to do with it. 
And many — 

Q. You don't know? 

A. I don't know for sure. And the 
response that I have had on my personal 
calls and that the Secretary [of State] 
has had on his has been heartwarming. 
It's come from all sectors. I've been 
very, very encouraged by that. Where 
we go from here, though, we'll just keep 
on trying. 

Q. What has Iran's role been in 
this? And do you see an opening in 
the structure here to allow you to 
work for the release of the hostages? 

A. I just answered I was certainly 
pleased that that brutal murder that had 
been threatened was set aside. I don't 



Commission on Aviation Security 
and Terrorism Formed 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
AUG. 4, 1989> 

The President has announced [by Exec- 
utive Order 12686] his intention to form 
a Commission on Aviation Security and 
Terrorism to review and evaluate poli- 
cy options in connection with aviation 
security, with particular emphasis on 
the destruction, on December 21, 1988, 
of PanAm #103. He has complimented 
the efforts of Majority Leader Mitchell 
and Republican leader Dole, and their 
staffs, on their work with families of 
the victims and with the Administra- 
tion in the creation of this commission. 

The commission's terms of refer- 
ence call for a comprehensive study and 
appraisal of practices and policy op- 
tions with respect to preventing terror- 
ist acts involving aviation security, an 
evaluation of the adequacy of existing 
procedures for aviation security, in- 
cluding compliance and enforcement, 
and consideration of options for han- 
dling terrorist threats. In addition, the 
commission will make recommenda- 



tions regarding policies and laws conn 
cerning the families of victims of ter-i 
rorist acts. Ongoing, intensive 
investigations into all aspects of the 6 
struction of PanAm #103 will not be 
affected by the commission's work. ^ 
Rather the commission will focus on 
the need for additional measures to 
improve aviation security. 

The Commission on Aviation Sect 
rity and Terrorism will be independ- 
ent, have access to all information it 
needs to perform its functions, and rp 
port to the President within 6 months 
of its formation. In the event the com- 
mission's report contains classified p( 
tions, a report for public distribution 
shall also be prepared. The commissi^ 
will have seven members. Four mem- 
bers will represent both parties in th«l 
Senate and the House of Representa- 
tives and will be appointed in consult! 
tion with congressional leadership. 



' Text from Weekly Compilation of Prt 
idential Documents of Aug. 8, 1989. ■ 



know the total role of any individual 
country in that area in all of this, but 
when you see a statement that offers 
hope for the return of our hostages, 
I want to explore it to the fullest. 

Q. Have you made a decision to 
take military action if another 
American hostage is killed? 

A. If I had made such a decision, I 
expect this would be the last place I'd be 
talking about it. 

Q. Surely you must see this as a 
golden opportunity now — you have 
the momentum, you have a diplomatic 
flurry going on in Damascus, Inter- 
national Red Cross, apparently. Is 
there a new impetus? 

A. I'm encouraged but I don't want 
to get the hopes of the hostages' loved 
ones up once again to have those hopes 
dashed. This is a brutal process, whei-e 
you see people paraded before cameras 
and their families get their hopes up. 
My heart is still with Mrs. Higgins. We 
can't tell her with any definition other 
husband's fate. I have made appeal after 
appeal for the return of Col. Higgins' re- 
mains, if, indeed, he has been killed. 



You deal with what you ha\'e out 
there, and what is foremost on my min< 
are the families and the hostages themn 
selves. I don't want to raise hopes be- 
yond fulfillment, but there's reason to . 
be somewhat encouraged. I think of thC 
brutality of the process: a man con- 
demned to die at 11:00 and then it's 
moved to 3:00 in the afternoon. Put you) 
self in the position of these families: 
think of the hurt that just that 4 hours 
of experience causes somebody. I would 
just appeal to the civilized world or any, 
country anywhere in the world to lay 
aside this holding of people against thei 
will — hostages — and do what is right an 
decent and honorable in terms of the 
release of those hostages that are still 
held, and a full accounting in the case 
of Col. Higgins, a distinguished officer! 
who was wearing the uniform of the 
United Nations. 

As the Foreign Minister of Bahraiii 
said in this office yesterday or the day 
before, this is the business of the whole 
world. Sitting at this desk, it is — you as 
what I feel about it; I feel for the fami- 
lies and for those who are held. 



Department of State Bulletin/October 19( 



UNITED NATIONS 



Q. This hostage, Mr. Cicippio, 
ws amons those who stayed on in 
pirut after the United States had 
w'rned him to get out — had warned 
a'Americans to get out or stay at 
tfir own risk. What kind of a claim 
sbuld such a person have on the dip- 
Imatic resources of this country 
wen they act against the wishes of 
ti? government? 

A. We have put people in that — in 
tl; past, people in that part of the world 
olnotice. But that doesn't fulfill my 
o'ligation as President if a person is held 
aiinst his will, in the case of Mr. Cicip- 
p:. That doesn't mean we w'ash our 
hiids of it. He's an American, and he is 
eiitled to the concern of the President 
E'l every one of these Senators and ev- 
erbody in our Administration. He's got 
ajreat big wonderful family up there 
t^t are eating their hearts out in Nor- 
ritown, Pennsylvania, and we're very 
ri^ch concerned about. Pve not talked to 
Pr. Cicipi)io. The State Department has 
ben in daily contact with them — daily. 



VHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 

.J'G. 7, 1989 

le Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(i8I) today released the results of foren- 
a e.xaminations of the videotape pur- 
p'-ted to be of Lt. Col. Higgins. ' Mrs. 
Iggins was informed of the results by 
t» Commandant of the Marine Corps, 
(n. Al Gray. President Bush called 
I's. Higgins at about 2 p.m. to offer his 
spport and encouragement. The Presi- 
cnt said the U.S. Government will con- 
tme to do all it can to obtain a full 
Ejounting of what happened to her 
Isband. 



Indochinese Refugees Conference 
Held in Geneva 



' Text.s from Weekly Compilations of 
lesideiitial Documents of Aug. 7 & 14, 1989. 

- Made at a meeting of the National Gov- 
uiors' Asso. in Chicago. 

■ Made on the South Lawn of the White 
liust' upon his return from Chicago. 

' In this statement, the President refers 
t the .July 28 kidnapping of Sheik Abdul Kar- 
ii Obeid, senior cleric in southern Lebanon 
;th the Iranian-supported Hizballah, and 
tro aides from the cleric's home in Jibchit 
1 Israeli commandos. 

"■ Made in the Oval Office following dis- 
^ssions with Foreign Minister Mohammad 
In Mubarak al-Khalifa of Bahrain. 

'' Made in tlie Oval Office. 

' ."^fter e.xamining a videotape released 
the pro-Iranian group, FBI forensic e.x- 
rts and pathologists concluded that, al- 
iiugh a positive identification could not be 
ade, the person depicted in the videotape 
robably was Lt. Col. Higgins and that he 
as "within a reasonable degree of medical 
■i-tainty" dead.H 



The International Conference on 
Indochinese Refugees ivas held in 
Geneva on June IS-U, 19S9. Following 
are a statement by Deputy Secretary of 
State Lawrence S. Eaglebnrger, head of 
the U.S. delegation, and the texts of the 
draft declaration and comprehensive 
plan of action which were adopted by 
consensus. 



DEPUTY SECRETARY 

EAGLEBURGER'S 

STATEMENT, 
JUNE 18. 1989 

"Let us do something meaningful — 
something profound — to stem this mis- 
ery. We face a world problem. Let us 
fashion a world solution. History will 
not forgive us if we fail. History will 
not forget us if we succeed." It is with 
these words that then Vice President 
Mondale, the head of the U.S. delega- 
tion to the 1979 Geneva meeting on 
refugees and displaced persons, chal- 
lenged his fellow delegates to develop a 
multilateral response to the human 
tragedy of Indochina's refugees. 

The international effort that re- 
sulted from that meeting was unpre- 
cedented. Since 1975, over 1.5 million 
Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians 
have been resettled in third countries; 
900,000 of them in the United States 
alone. And yet, as shown by our pres- 
ence here today, our work is not fin- 
ished. Much has been accomplished; 
much more remains to be done. The 
1979 program, important though it 
was, did not become the truly viable al- 
ternative to clandestine departure so 
hopefully envisaged a decade ago. The 
simple fact is that thousands upon thou- 
sands of Vietnamese — unable to obtain 
e.xit permits from the Vietnamese 
authorities — have fled their homeland. 
Until Vietnam reforms its system, the 
exodus of Vietnamese will continue. 

Our task today is to deal as hu- 
manely and effectively as we can with 
this inescapable reality, building upon 
the many accomplishments that have 
been realized since the 1979 conference. 
We must, first of all, unequivocally re- 
affirm the practice of first asylum, 
thereby safeguarding the protection 
and humane treatment of all those who 
seek asylum. We must address the very 
real and legitimate concerns of those 



nations which have so generously shel- 
tered asylum seekers. We must ensure 
that the means for direct and orderly 
departures are available as alterna- 
tives to hazardous escape. We must 
provide for the dignified and safe re- 
turn to their country of origin of those 
people who freely choose to return. Fi- 
nally, we must continue our refugee re- 
settlement programs. 

These principles have the strong 
bipartisan support of the LI.S. Con- 
gress and the American people. 

The comprehensive plan of action 
w-e are asked to adopt at this confer- 
ence will — if approved — move us a long- 
way toward the accomplishment of 
these worthwhile goals. Those who 
labored so long and so hard on 
the comprehensive plan are to be 
congratulated. They have fashioned a 
practical course of action in a terribly 
complex area, balancing the often con- 
flicting interests of states with the hu- 
man needs of the asylum seekers. The 
balance that has been struck is deli- 
cate; we should not seek to alter it. 

The world looks to Vietnam to pro- 
vide full opportunity for resettlement 
to those who have been detained in re- 
education camps. Nothing the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam could do in this 
area would be more favorably received 
by the United States and the interna- 
tional community. In 1984, President 
Reagan affirmed the commitment of 
the American people to welcome with 
open arms prisoners and their families 
from reeducation camps. Today, I reaf- 
firm that commitment on behalf of 
President Bush. And I call upon Viet- 
nam to resume negotiations with the 
United States, looking toward the day 
when this large group of excluded per- 
sons will be allowed to emigrate. Only 
then will the orderly departure pro- 
gram become a true alternative to 
clandestine departure. 

The United States commits itself 
to accelerate and expand orderly depar- 
tures from Vietnam. We will assign ad- 
ditional personnel to the program so 
that our interviews in Vietnam can be 
more than doubled to 3,500 per month. 
We applaud those other resettlement 
nations which have made similar 
commitments to expand their own 
programs for direct departure from 
Vietnam. 



epartment of State Bulletin/October 1989 



69 



UNITED NATIONS 



The United States welcomes Viet- 
nam's commitment to accept, with 
UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees] supervision and protection, 
those of its citizens who wish to re- 
patriate voluntarily. Clearly, voluntary 
repatriation is both appropriate and 
feasible. But such returns must be 
truly voluntai'y and not the result of in- 
tolerable conditions of detention. Fur- 
thermore, it must be accomplished 
under safe conditions and with assur- 
ance that treatment thereafter will be 
humane. 

The plan imposes heavy respon- 
sibilities upon the United States: we 
will carry them out fully and gener- 
ously. Since 1979, we have contributed 
more than $0.5 billion to the care and 
support of refugees from Vietnam, 
Cambodia, and Laos. Beyond this, of 
course, are the billions of dollars in re- 
settlement costs which we have borne 
as well. We will continue to give gener- 
ously to the UNHCR and other appro- 
priate organizations for the protection 
and well-being of jjersons in first asy- 
lum. We will continue the historic ef- 
fort of the American people to resettle 
buna fide refugees. And we will contin- 
ue to defend the human rights of indi- 
viduals who seek asylum, whether or 
not they are found to be refugees. To 
Vietnam we say: 

• Accept responsibility for the well- 
being and human rights of your citi- 
zens: initiate the reforms — economic, 
social, and political — that will encour- 
age your people to remain in their cit- 
ies and villages: 

• Make orderly departure ])i'o- 
grams truly viable by agreeing to an 
initial target of at least 6,000 orderly 
departures per month; and 

• Demonstrate your genuine com- 
mitment to the comprehensive plan by 
granting all those eligible for orderly 
departure the right to emigrate freely. 

Voluntary repatriation, orderly de- 
parture, and other UNHCR programs 
called for in the comprehensive plan 
must be allowed a reasonable time to 
work. The United States accepts as a 
general principle that asylum seekers 
who are found not to be refugees are 
ultimately the responsibility of their 
country of origin. For more than a de- 
cade, conditions in Vietnam have re- 
pelled large segments of its population. 
So long as these conditions continue — 
unless and until dramatic imjirove- 
ments occur in that country's economic, 
social, and political life — the United 
States will remain unalterably opposed 
to the forced repatriation of Viet- 



namese asylum-seekers. We will not 
consider forced repatriation as falling 
within the rubric of "acceptable under 
international practices." 

At the same time, however, those 
who flee clandestinely and cannot es- 
tablish a well-founded fear of persecu- 
tion must understand that such flight 
no longer leads to resettlement. Such 
persons will face an indefinite stay in a 
holding camp until conditions in their 
homeland moderate. It is important for 
those thinking of fleeing the former 
North Vietnam to realize that most 
will fail to qualify as refugees and will, 
therefore, not be eligible for resettle- 
ment. 

The comprehensive plan calls upon 
the countries of first asylum to reaf- 
firm the basic humanitarian practice 
of temporary refuge for all asylum 
seekers — a practice which has been up- 
held with great forbearance and sacri- 
fice by those countries for more than a 
decade. New screening procedures and 
the I'eluctance of most asylum seekers 
to repatriate voluntarily are likely to 
result in a continued if temporary 
growth in refugee populations in first 
asylum countries. 'We note, in this re- 
spect, the reference in the comprehen- 
sive action plan to the possibility of a 
regional holding center under the aus- 
pices of the UNHCR. We stand ready 
to explore this possibility in the steer- 
ing committee. 

As part of the new regime envis- 
aged by the comprehensive plan, coun- 
tries of first asylum would commit to: 

• Treating all asylum seekers in a 
humane manner: 

• Granting the UNHCR immediate 
access to all new arrivals: and 

• Working in a close collaboration 
with the UNHCR on screening mecha- 
nisms for determining refugee status. 

The United States recognizes that 
these new responsibilities will create 
additional logistical and administrative 
requirements and awaits the UN's ap- 
peal for funds to support this effort. 
We will contribute our fair share. 

The United States will also assist 
in alleviating the burden that long- 
staying refugees pose for the countries 
of first-asylum. As of mid-March 1989, 
first asylum countries supported 
52,000 Vietnamese who had arrived 
before the cut-off dates. The United 
States is committed to resettling 
22,000 persons from this population 
over the ne.\t 3 years. 

Similarly, the United States will 
assist in the resettlement of those new 



arrivals determined to be refugees, 
anticipate accepting up to 50'^'f of thisi 
refugee population for resettlement'Jl 
the United States. 

In Laos, although we have been 
greatly encouraged by improved proa 
pects for voluntary repatriation, the 
comjirehensive plan also recognizes 
that for many Lao refugees, third- 
country resettlement remains more at 
propriate. We have already welcomed 
over 200,000 Lao to the United Stater 
and will continue to process Lao refu 
gees for resettlement. 

Finally, a word on the respon- 
sibilities undertaken by the donor ano 
resettlement counti'ies under the com 
prehensive plan of action. We all mus 
remain steadfast in our common com- 
mitment to provide funding and re- 
settlement and to stand together as 
partners in finding an effective solu- 
tion to this continuing tragedy. 

The United States pays tribute U 
the UN High Commissioner and his 
dedicated staff for their unflagging 
forts over the past year to protect thi 
rights of those seeking asylum, whili 
the same time addressing the conceri 
of those countries most burdened by 
asylum seekers. In the months aheac 
the international community will loo' 
to the UNHCR to continue its firm 
leadership in the implementation of 1 
comprehensive plan. 

All of us — countries of origin, 
countries of first asylum, and countr 
of resettlement — have a historic oppo 
tunity. By adopting here and now thi 
humanitarian and practical plan of ai 
tion, we will have embraced the begi 
ning of a solution to one of the most 
ai)pallingly difficult human problems 
our times. 

The plan is not a perfect docume: 
but it is a major step forward. Nor is 
a static concept: some of its elements 
must evolve over time. The steering 
committee to be established to monil 
the plan's progress will assure flex- 
ibility, while at the same time — 
because it will act through consensus- 
guaranteeing the suppoi't of all states 
party to the plan. The United States 
supports this monitoring effort and 
will actively particijiate in this and th 
subsequent regular reviews. 

We understand and appreciate th; 
the process embodied in the plan of 
action before us is painful, costly, and 
often slow. But, however great our bui 
den as we undertake this plan, it jiale 
in comparison with the burden borne 
by the refugees we seek to help. Surel 
we cannot ask less of ourselves than 
ask of them. 



70 



UNITED NATIONS 



UAFT DECLARATION 
LND COMPREHENSIVE 
'LAN OF ACTION. 

IXE 14, 1989 

LOECLARATION 

ri' Gdi'cniHients of the States represented 
'] 111- International Conference on Indo- 
i iH-.-u Refugees, held at Geneva from 13 to 
l.|une 1989, 

Having reviewed the problems of Indo- 
-!■ asylum-seekers in the South-East 
legion, 

.\i'li))(; that, since 1975, over 2 milllion 
p ,s(ins have left their countries of origin in 
Iilo-China and that the flow of asylum- 
sikers still continued, 

Aivare that the movement of asylum- 
si ki-rs across frontiers in the South-East 
Aan region remains a subject of intense 
h'luinitarian concern to the international 
cfimunity, 
I Recalliufi United Nations General As- 
spbly resolution 34.55 (XXX) and the first 
feting on Refugees and Displaced Persons 
i!>iiuth-East Asia convened at Geneva in 
J y UI79 under the auspices of the United 
Mions to address the problem. 

Recalling fitrthev the 1951 Convention 
rating to the Status of Refugees and its 
17 Protocol, and related instruments, 

\'iiti)ig with satisfaction that, as a re- 
s t uf combined efforts on the part of Gov- 
e;iments and international organizations 
C'cerned, a durable solution has been found 
fi ovei- 1.6 million Indo-Chinese, 

Preoccupied however by the burden im- 
1 <-'\. particularly on the neighbouring 
e imies and territories, as a result of the 
citmuation of the outflow and the presence 
oarge numbers of asylum-seekers still in 
e 111 IS, 

Alarmed by indications that the current 
a'angements designed to find solutions for 
a'lum-seekers and resolve problem stem- 
nng fi-om the outflow may no longer be re- 
sjinsive to the size, tenacity and comple.xity 
o:hi' problems in the region. 

Recognizing that the resolution of the 
fiiblem of asylum-seekers in the region 
cidd contribute positively to a climate of 
lace, harmony and good neighbourliness, 

Satisfied that the international commu- 

I y. and in particular the countries directly 
i iilved, have responded positively to the 

I I li'i- a new international conference made 
I till- States members of the Association of 
^uth-East Asian Nations and endorsed by 

I:' Executive Committee of the Programme 
(;the United Nations High Commissioner 
f|' Refugees at its thirty-ninth session and 
1 thf General Assembly of the United Na- 
^n^ at its forty-third session, 

Xntiiig the progress achieved towards a 
iUiHin of this issue by the various bilateral 
'\ multilateral meetings held between the 
1 riles concerned prior to the International 
iiilei-ence on Indo-Chinese Refugees, 

Xiiting that the issues arising from the 
fsence of Khmer refugees and displaced 
FMins are being discussed, among the par- 



ties directly involved, within a different 
framework and as such have not been includ- 
ed in the deliberations of the Conference, 

Noting leith satisfaction the positive re- 
sults of the Preparatory Meeting for the 
Conference, held in Kuala Lumpur from 7 to 
9 March 1989, 

Realizing that the complex problem at 
hand necessitates the co-operation and un- 
derstanding of all concerned and that a com- 
prehensive set of mutually re-enforcing 
humanitarian undertakings, which must be 
carried out in its totality rather than selec- 
tively, is the only realistic approach towards 
achieving a durable solution to the problem. 

Acknowledging that such a solution 
must be developed in the context of national 
laws and regulations as w'ell as of interna- 
tional standards. 

Have solemnly resolved to adopt the at- 
tached Comprehensive Plan of Action. 



II. COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF 
ACTION 



A. Clandestine Departures 

1. Extreme human suffering and hardship, 
often resulting in loss of lives, have accom- 
panied organized clandestine departures. It 
is therefore imperative that humane meas- 
ures be implemented to deter such depar- 
tures, which should include the following: 

(a) Continuation of official measures di- 
rected against those organizing clandestine 
departures, including clear guidelines on 
these measures from the central govern- 
ment to the provincial and local authorities. 

(b) Mass media activities at both local 
and international level, focussing on; 

(i) The dangers and hardship involved 
in clandestine departures; 

(ii) The institution of a status- 
determination mechanism under which 
those determined not to be refugees shall 
have no opportunity for resettlement; 

(iii) Absence of any advantage, real or 
perceived, particularly in relation to third- 
country resettlement, of clandestine and un- 
safe departures; 

(iv) Encouragement of the use of the 
regular departure and other migration 
programmes; 

(V) Discouragement of activities lead- 
ing to clandestine departures. 

(c) In the spirit of mutual co-operation, 
the countries concerned shall consult regu- 
larly to ensure effective implementation and 
co-ordination of the above measures. 



B. Regular Departure Programmes 

2. In order to offer a preferable alternative 
to clandestine departures, emigration from 
Viet-Nam through regular departure proc- 
edures and migration programmes, such as 
the current Orderly Departure Programme, 
should be fully encouraged and promoted. 



3. Emigration through regular depar- 
ture procedures and migration programmes 
should be accelerated and expanded with a 
view to making such programmes the pri- 
mary and eventually the sole modes of 
departure. 

4. In order to achieve this goal, the fol- 
lowing measures Will be undertaken: 

(a) There will be a continuous and wide- 
ly publicized media camjjaign to increase 
awareness of regular departure procedures 
and migration programmes for departure 
from Viet-Nam. 

(b) All persons eligible under regular 
third-country migration programmes, Am- 
erasians and former re-education centre de- 
tainees will have full access to regular 
departure procedures and migration pro- 
grammes. The problem of former re- 
education centre detainees will be further 
discussed separately by the parties 
concerned. 

(c) Exit permits and other resettlement 
requirements will be facilitated for all per- 
sons eligible under regular departure proc- 
edures and migration programmes. 

(d) Viet-Nam will fully co-operate with 
the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and the Intergovern- 
mental Committee for Migration (ICM) in 
expediting and improving processing, in- 
cluding medical processing, for departures 
under regular departure procedures and mi- 
gration programmes and will ensure that 
medical records of those departing comply 
with standards acceptable to receiving 
countries, 

(e) Viet-Nam, UNHCR, ICM and reset- 
tlement countries will co-operate to ensure 
that air transportation and logistics are suf- 
ficient to move expeditiously all those ac- 
cepted under regular departure procedures 
and migration programmes. 

(f) If necessary, countries in South-East 
Asia through which people emigrating under 
regular departure procedures and migra- 
tion programmes must transit will, with ex- 
ternal financial support as appropriate, 
expand transit facilities and expedite exit 
and entry procedures in order to help facili- 
tate increased departures under such 
programmes. 



C. Reception of New Arrivals 

5. All those seeking asylum will be given the 
opportunity to do so through the implemen- 
tation of the following measures: 

(a) Temporary refuge will be given to 
all asylum-seekers, who will be treated 
identically regardless of their mode of arriv- 
al until the status-determination process is 
completed. 

(b) UNHCR will be given full and early 
access to new arrivals and will retain ac- 
cess, following the determination of their 
status. 

(c) New arrivals will be transferred, as 
soon as possible, to a temporary asylum cen- 
tre where they would be provided assistance 
and full access to the refugee status- 
determination process. 



tepartment of State Bulletin/October 1989 



71 



UNITED NATIONS 






I). Refugee Status 

6. The early establishment of a consistent 
region-wide refugee status-determination 
process is required and will take place in ac- 
cordance with national legislation and inter- 
nationally accepted practice. It will make 
specific provision, inter alia, for the 
following: 

(a) Within a prescribed period, the sta- 
tus of the asylum-seeker will be determined 
by a qualified and competent national au- 
thority or body, in accordance with estab- 
lished refugee criteria and procedures. 
UNHCR will participate in the process in 
an observer and advisory capacity. In the 
course of that period, UNHCR shall advise 
in writing each individual of the nature of 
the procedure, of the implications for re- 
jected cases and of the right to appeal the 
first-level determination. 

(b) The criteria will be those recognized 
in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status 
of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, bearing in 
mind, to the extent appropriate, the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
other relevant international instruments 
concerning refugees, and will be applied in 
a humanitarian spirit taking into account 
the specific situation of the asylum-seekers 
concerned and the need to respect the fami- 
ly unit. A uniform questionnaire developed 
in consultation with UNHCR will be the ba- 
sis for interviews and shall reflect the ele- 
ments of such criteria. 

(c) The Handbook on Procedures and 
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status is- 
sued by UNHCR will serve as an authorita- 
tive and interpretative guide in developing 
and applying the criteria. 

(d) The procedures to be followed will 
be in accordance with those endorsed by the 
E.xecutive Committee of the Programme of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees in this area. Such procedures will 
include, letter alia: 

(i) The provision of information to the 
asylum-seekers about the procedures, the 
criteria and the presentation of their cases; 

(ii) Prompt advice of the decision in 
writing within a prescribed period; 

(iii) A right of appeal against negative 
decisions and proper appeals procedures for 
this purpose, based upon the e.xisting laws 
and procedures of the individual place of 
asylum, with the asylum-seeker entitled to 
advice, if required, to be provided under 
UNHCR auspices. 

7. UNHCR will institute, in co- 
operation with the Governments concerned, 
a comprehensive regional training pro- 
gramme for officials involved in the deter- 
mination process with a view to ensuring 
the proper and consistent functioning of the 
procedures and application of the criteria, 
taking full advantage of the experience 
gained in Hong Kong. 



E. Resettlement 

8. Continued resettlement of Vietnamese 
refugees benefiting from temporary refuge 
in South-East Asia is a vital component of 
the Comprehensive Plan of Action. 

/. Long-Stayers Resettlement Programme 

9. The Long-Stayers Resettlement Pro- 
gramme includes all individuals who arrived 
in temporary asylum camps prior to the ap- 
propriate cut-off date and would contain the 
following elements: 

(a) A call to the international commu- 
nity to respond to the need for resettlement, 
in particular through the participation by an 
expanded number of countries, beyond those 
few currently active in refugee resettle- 
ment. The expanded number of countries 
could include, among others, the following: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Den- 
mark, Germany, Federal Republic of, Fin- 
land, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Unit- 
ed Kingdom and United States of America. 

(b) A multi-year commitment to resettle 
all the Vietnamese who have arrived in tem- 
porary asylum camps prior to an agreed 
date, except those persons already found not 
to be refugees under established status- 
determination procedure and those who ex- 
press the wish to return to Viet-Nam. Refu- 
gees will be advised that they do not have 
the option of refusing offers of resettlement, 
as this would exclude them from further re- 
settlement consideration. 

2. Resettlement Programme 
for Newly-Determined Refugees 

10. The Resettlement Programme for 
Newly-Determined Refugees will accommo- 
date all those who arrive after the introduc- 
tion of status determination procedures and 
are determined to be refugees. Within a 
designated period after their transfer to the 
resettlement area, those determined to be 
refugees shall receive an orientation brief- 
ing from a UNHCR representative that ex- 
plains the third-country resettlement 
programme, the length of time current ar- 
rivals may be expected to spend in camp 
awaiting resettlement, and the necessity of 
adhering to the rules and regulations of the 
camp. 

U. Wherever possible, a pledge shall be 
sought from the resettlement countries to 
place all those determined to be refugees, 
except those expressing the wish to return 
to Viet-Nam. within a prescribed period. It 
shall be the responsibility of UNHCR, with 
the full support of all the resettlement coun- 
tries and countries of asylum, to co-ordinate 
efforts to ensure that departures are effect- 
ed within that time. 



F. Repatriation/Plan of Repatriation 

12. Persons determined not to be refugees 
should return to their country of origin in 
accordance with international practices re- 



flecting the responsibilities of States to- 
wards their own citizens. In the first in- 
stance, every effort will be made to 
encourage the voluntary return of such 
persons. 

13. In order to allow this process tod 
velop momentum, the following measure." 
will be implemented: 

(a) Widely publicized assurances b) 
the country of origin that returnees willl 
allow'ed to return in conditions of safety 
dignity and will not be subject to 
persecution. 

(b) The procedure for readmission 
will be such that the applicants would be^ 
readmitted within the shortest possible 
time. 

(c) Returns will be administered ii 
aecoi'dance with the above principles by 
UNHCR and ICM, and internationally 
funded reintegration assistance will be 
channelled through UNHCR, according! 
the terms of the Memorandum of Under- 
standing signed with Viet-Nam on 13 De-i 
eember 1988. 

14. If, after the passage of reasonabli 
time, it becomes clear that voluntary re- 
patriation is not making sufficient progre 
towards the desired objective, alternativ 
recognized as being acceptable under int' 
national practices would be examined. Ai 
gional holding centre under the auspices 
UNHCR may be considered as an interir 
measure for housing persons determinetf" 
not to be refugees pending their eventual 
turn to the country of origin. 

15. Persons determined not to be re{\ 
gees shall be provided humane care and 
assistance by L'NHCR and international! 
agencies pending their return to the coun 
try of origin. Such assistance would inclK 
educational and orientation programmes! 
signed to encourage return and reduce r^ 
integration problems. 

G. Laotian Asylum-Seekers 

16. In dealing with Laotian asylum-seeke| 
future measures are to be worked out 
through intensified trilateral negotiation| 
tween UNHCR, the Lao People's Democii 
Republic and Thailand, with the active si] 
port and co-operation of all parties con- 
cerned. These measures should be aimed 

(a) Maintaining safe arrival and aq 
cess to the Lao screening process; 

(b) Accelerating and simplifying th 
process for both the return of the screena 
out and voluntary repatriation to the Lao 
People's Democratic Republic under safe,! 
mane and UNHCR-monitored conditions.^ 

17. Together with other durable solu-^ 
tions, third-country resettlement continq 
to play an important role with regard tol 
present camp populations of the Laotians.J 



72 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1S 



UNITED NATIONS 



1 Implementation and Review 
locedures 

Implementation of the Comprehensive 
i HI of Action is a dynamic process that will 
1 aiire continued co-ordination and possible 
;:iptation to respond to changing situa- 
t ns. In order to ensure effective implemen- 
t ion of the Plan, the following mechanisms 
fid! be established: 

(a) UNHCR, with the financial sup- 
jrt of the donor community, will be in 
•carge of continuing liaison and co- 
(lination with concerned Governments and 
1 rruiivernmental as well as non- 
sMinmental organizations to implement 

I,' Comprehensive Plan of Action. 

(b) A Steering Committee based in 
Suth-East Asia will be established. It will 
(jisist of representatives of all Govern- 



ments making specific commitments under 
the Comprehensive Plan of Action. The 
Steering Committee will meet periodically 
under the chairmanship of UNHCR to dis- 
cuss implementation of the Comprehensive 
Plan of Action. The Steering Committee 
may establish sub-committees as necessary 
to deal with specific aspects of the imple- 
mentation of the Plan, particularly with re- 
gard to status determination, return and 
resettleliient. 

(c) A regular review arrangement 
will be devised by UNHCR, preferably in 
conjunction with the annual E.xecutive Com- 
mittee session, to assess progress in imple- 
mentation of the Comprehensive Plan of 
Action and consider additional measures to 
improve the Plan's effectiveness in meeting 
its objectives. ■ 



lecurity Council Adopts Resolution 
m Central American Peace 



Following are the text of the UN 
ciiritfi Council resolution adopted 
Id in»!OHsl)/ on July 27. 1989, and 
statement made in the Security 
iiiiicil after the vote by U.S. Acting 
iiiianent Representative to the 
lilted Nations Herbert S. Okun. 



N SECURITY COUNCIL 
, RESOLUTION 637 

''( Si'ciirity CoiDicil. 

Recatliiiq its resolutions 530 (1983) of 
I .May 1983 and 562 (1985) of 10 May 1985 
id fJeneral Assembly resolutions 38/10 of 
November 1983, 39/4 of 20 October 1984, 
:;7 of 18 November 1986, 42/1 of 7 October 
'.^7 and 43/24 of 15 November 1988, as well 
- the initiative that the Secretary-General 
thf United Nations undertook on 18 No- 
■niher 1986 together with the Secretary- 
eneral of the Organization of American 
tates, 

('iiHri)iced that the peoples of Central 
nierica wish to achieve a peaceful settle- 
|ient to their conflicts without outside inter- 
'■rence, including support for irregular 
ircfs, with respect for the principles of 
.•If-determination and non-intervention 
jhile ensuring full respect for human 
Sghts, 

Taking note of the report of the 
I'lretary-General of 26 June 1989 submitted 
I pursuance of Security Council resolutions 
:;n 1 1983) and 562 (1985) (S/20699), 

Recognizing the important contribution 
1' the Contadora Group and its Support 
iriiup in favour of peace in Central 
unei'ica, 



Welcoming the agreement signed at 
Guatemala City on 7 August 1987 by the 
Presidents of the Republics of Costa Rica, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua as the manifestation of the w'ill of 
the peoples of Central America to achieve 
peace, democratization, reconciliation, de- 
velopment and justice, in accordance with 
their decision to meet the historical chal- 
lenge of forgoing a peaceful destiny for 
the region, 

Welconuiiy the subsequent Joint Decla- 
rations issued by the Central American 
Presidents on 16 January 1988 in Costa Rica 
and on 14 February 1989 in El Salvador, 

Aicare of the importance which the Cen- 
tral American Presidents attach to the role 
of international verification as an essential 
component for the implementation of the 
above-mentioned instruments, including, in 
particular, their commitments relating to 
regional security, especially non-use of ter- 
ritory to support destabilization of neigh- 
bouring countries and democratization, 
especially free and fair elections, as well as 
to the voluntary demobilization, repatriation 
or relocation of irregular forces, as agreed 
in the Tesoro Beach Agreement of 14 Feb- 
ruary 1989, 

Airare o/.s-o that the commitments en- 
shrined in the Guatemala Agreement form 
a harmonious and indivisible whole, 

Noting icith appreciation the efforts un- 
dertaken to date by the Secretary-General 
in support of the Central American peace 
process, including his assistance in the es- 
tablishment of appropriate mechanisms to 
verify compliance with the provisions of the 
Guatemala Agreement and of the Joint Dec- 
laration adopted by the Central American 
Presidents at their meeting held in El Sal- 
vador on 14 February 1989, and particularly 



the Secretary-General's agreement with 
Nicaragua to deploy a United Nations elec- 
tions observer mission in that country, 

1. Coiniiiends the desire for peace e.\- 
pressed by the Central American Presidents 
in signing on 7 August 1987 at Guatemala 
City the agreement on "Procedures for the 
establishment of a firm and lasting peace in 
Central America" and in the Joint Declara- 
tions subsequently signed in pursuance of it; 

2. Expresses its finnest support for 
the Guatemala Agreement and the Joint 
Declarations; 

3. Calls upon the Presidents to continue 
their efforts to achieve a firm and lasting 
peace in Central America through the faith- 
ful implementation of the commitments en- 
tered into in the Guatemala Agreement and 
in the expressions of good will contained in 
the Joint Declaration of 14 February 1989; 

4. Appeals to all States, in particular to 
those which have links with the region and 
interests in it, to back the political will of 
the Central American countries to comply 
with the provisions of the Guatemala Agree- 
ment and of the Joint Declaration, partic- 
ularly that regional and extra-regional 
Governments which either openly or covertly 
supply aid to irregular forces or insurrec- 
tional movements in the area immediately 
halt such aid, with the exception of the hu- 
manitarian aid that contributes to the goals 
of the Tesoro Beach Agreement of 14 Feb- 
ruary 1989; 

5. Lends its full support to the 
Secretary-General to continue his mission of 
good offices in consultation with the Securi- 
ty Council in support of the Central Ameri- 
can Governments in their effort to achieve 
the goals set forth in the Guatemala 
Agreement; 

6. Requests the Secretary-General to 
report to the Security Council regularly 
on the implementation of the present 
resolution. 



AMBASSADOR OKUN'S 
STATEMENT' 

The United States is pleased to have 
joined in the adoption of this resolution 
supporting the Central American 
search for democracy and peace. We 
believe this resolution reflects and sup- 
ports three very important elements in 
the Central American peace process. 
These are: 

One, the centrality of the fulfill- 
ment of the prineiple,s and provisions of 
the Esquipulas and Tesoro accords to 
the achievement of peace and democra- 
cy in Central America; 

Two, the crucial need for a free 
and fair election and election process in 
Nicaragua to unlock regional movement 
toward peace, democracy, and develop- 
ment; and 



pepartment of State Bulletin/October 1989 



73 



UNITED NATIONS 



Three, states which are still sup- 
plying lethal assistance to insurgent 
forces in the region — namely Nicara- 
guan and Cuban support for the Fara- 
bundo Marti National Liberation Front 
(FMLN) — must cease this supply and 
declare publicly that they renounce such 
practices and support solely the use of 
political means and national reconcilia- 
tion as provided for in Esquipulas. 

The United States looks forward to 
the reports of the Secretary General 
regarding the efforts and findings of 
the UN election observer mission in 
Nicaragua. We believe that this mis- 
sion can strengthen the prospects for a 
free and fair electoral process in 
Nicaragua. 

Although the United States has ob- 
served that, to date, the Government of 
Nicaragua has declined to open the po- 
litical process in accord with the letter 
and spirit of its Esquipulas and Tesoro 
commitments, we ai^jilaud its decision to 
hold elections in February 1990, and we 
declare again our intentions to respect 
the results of those elections if they are 
carried out in a free and fair manner. 

We urge the Government of Nicar- 
agua to begin a positive dialogue with 
the op])osition to set the terms of a free 
election. We note that the political op- 
position has pledged that it will par- 
ticipate in the elections despite its 
dissatisfaction with the present rules. 
Current practices of intimidation, 
therefore, are wholly counterproduc- 
tive to the fulfillment of democratic 
principles and commitments. 

Further we call upon the Govern- 
ments of Nicaragua and Cuba to cease 
their 9-year supply of weapons, ammu- 
nition, safehaven, and other lethal 
assistance to the FMLN insurgents in 
El Salvador. This support for irregular 
forces in El Salvador has cost the lives 
of many Salvadoran citizens and frus- 
trated their desires for peace, democ- 
racy, and development and continues to 
undermine the Central American peace 
accords. Consistent with the spirit and 
letter of this resolution and the Es- 
quipulas and Tesoro accords, we call on 
all countries to assist the Central 
American governments in ensuring full 
respect for human rights while they 
seek a peaceful settlement. 

My government commends the ef- 
forts of the Secretary General to fur- 
ther the progress toward the peace the 
Central American governments have 
committed themselves to achieve. The 
United States was, therefore, pleased 
to support this resolution. 



The Concept of the Unitary UN' 



by John R. Bolton 

Address before the Genem group 
consuUatire-level meeting in Geneva 
on June 29, 1989. Mr. Bolton is Assist- 
ant Secretary for International Orga- 
nization Affairs. 

It is a special pleasure for me to partic- 
ipate in this my first meeting of the 
Geneva group consultative level. This 
forum, especially through the 1980s, 
has provided an important and useful 
opportunity for exchanging views and 
coming to conclusions on budgetary, 
financial, and administrative issues 
affecting the organizations of the UN 
system. I look forward to working with 
all of you in continuing our efforts to 
assure that the significant resources, 
we as a group invest in the UN system, 
are put to good use. 

Together, the members of the Ge- 
neva group represent over 70% of the 
contributions to the assessed budgets 
of the UN system. Were we to add our 
voluntary contributions to the e.xtra- 
budgetary activities of the UN agen- 
cies, and to the operational programs 
such as UNDP [UN Development Pro- 
gram], UNICEF [UN Children's Fund], 
UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees], and the WFP [World Food 
Program], the percentage would be at 
least as high. It is incumbent on mem- 
bers of the Geneva group to fulfill our 
res]H)nsibilities to our taxpayers and to 
other members of the organizations by 
continuing to provide the leadership 
required for adapting the UN system 
to its growing responsibilities. With 
your indulgence, I will take a few mo- 
ments at the opening of the meeting 
to discuss with you our concept of 
the 'unitary United Nations.' 

In the course of formulating the 
Bush Administration's diplomacy to- 
ward the UN system, it struck me that 
we should have a policy that treated the 
United Nations comprehensively. (Let 
me say at the outset that this analysis 
does not in any way implicate the IMF 
[International Monetary Fund], IBRD 



[International Bank for Reconstruct! 
and Development], oi' GATT [General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade].) It 
stead of a series of unrelated policies 
toward each UN component, I felt th 
we needed to address the UN systenj 
much the same way as the U.S. State 
Department's regional bureaus interi 
with the governments in their respeo 
five regions. Just as an action taken 
toward one specific country affects 
overall regional relationships, by an& 
ogy, so, too, do the actions of individi 
UN agencies affect the operation oft 
entire system. For example, the ham 
dling of UNDP support costs, which. 
will discuss, has a direct bearing on: 
the assessed budgets of the specializi, 
agencies. 

The unitary United Nations con 
cept provides us with a basis to deal 
herently with the UN system on boti 
budgetary and policy grounds. We h 
all noted the proliferation of commit 
tees, councils, conferences, and meel 
ings, all of which cover essentially i\ 
same issues. Numerous governing b( 
ies (however denominated) all spend 
precious time and fiscal resources di 
cussing precisely the same issues, of 
in several different cities. Moreover, 
most all components of the UN syste 
have expanded their programs beyon 
their originally intended missions an 
are now duplicating each other's worl 
Moreover, there is always the risk of 
creating even more new organization 
with substantial budgetary claims, 
when existing agencies could handle 
emerging jiroblems. 

Following the unitary United Ns 
tions concept would provide us with \ 
principled rule of decision to prune t 
thicket of LIN governing bodies. It 
would also permit us to redefine the 
proper limits of each UN comjionentl 
responsibilities and help avoid both e 
pire building and turf fighting. By 
adhering to the original intent underl 
ing the creation of each UN componer 
we should achieve not only budgetary 
savings but also create a greater sens 
of political responsibility among meni 
ber governments and secretariats. 



USUN pre.ss release ' 



74 



UNITED NATIONS 



Under a unitary United Nations 
i ipt, even if some elements of the 
,-\stem were to take on new respon- 
;! lities, we are not suggesting that 
;1, Geneva group abandon its policy 
of,ero real growth. Indeed, the pos- 
^i'lity of added responsibilities in- 
■lases the need for maintaining tight 
oilgetary discipline. In fact, I view 
tl] unitary United Nations concept as 
a)gical ne.xt step beyond the policy 
oi;ero real growth, which is now only 
aplied component by component. But 
ir'mplementing a policy of zero real 
gi)wth, we must recognize that there 
^^|1 be instances where some agencies 
rrjst grow to respond to new and 
eierging developments. Otherwise 
th' will stagnate, and initiatives will 
bltaken by other organizations which 
d^not have the expertise or qualifica- 
tns to do so in the most effective way 
p^sible. Any such growth, however, 
rist be offset by reductions in other 
o^anizations so as to maintain zero 
rjil growth throughout the UN sys- 
t|n. Difficult choices must be made not 
oly by the secretariats but by us, the 
nniber governments; ultimately, the 
brden of identifying and enforcing 
p orities rests with us. As we have 
S'u, it is not easy to achieve cutbacks 
i^agency functions, but if we want to 
Ei'engthen the UN system, it is incum- 
bnt upon us to take a hard look at the 
Mrious components in order to ration- 
aze and harmonize their operations. 
' My reference to the concept of the 
uitary United Nations should not be 
rsinterpreted. I am not now suggest- 
ii a change in the mandate of the 
(■neva group. I well understand that 
te Geneva group does not address the 
vnole of the UN system and that its 
landate e.xplicitly is limited to concern 
i\' administrative, budgetary, and fi- 
I'ncial issues related to the basic infra- 
iructure of the UN system, i.e., the 
igular assessed budgets of the spe- 
alized agencies and the IAEA [In- 
trnational Atomic Energy Agency], 
jowever, we must recognize that this 
ifrastructure influences, and is influ- 
•iced by, a much larger whole. We be- 
've more attention must be given to 



this larger whole in order to be effec- 
tive in addressing our concerns about 
the basic infrastructure. 

Let me also make clear that my use 
of the concept of the unitary United 
Nations does not mean that I am ad- 
vocating central control in the UN sys- 
tem. I fully recognize that many of our 
substantive interests in the UN agen- 
cies are fostered and protected by the 
pluralism of the UN system. I am fa- 
miliar with the longstanding efforts of 
some to do away with this pluralism in 
order to allow the whole of the UN sys- 
tem to be tightly orchestrated by a po- 
liticized majority in the UN General 
Assembly. It is because of the plural- 
ism of the UN system, and our interest 
in maintaining this pluralism, that I 
urge the concept of the unitary United 
Nations. The lack of effective central 
control in the UN system increases the 
need for us, the member governments, 
to guide our participation in the differ- 
ent UN agencies with an eye on the 
overall system. 

One example of the concept of the 
unitary United Nations at work is in 
deciding upon the appropriate role of 
the UNDP for the 1990s. We believe 
that the UNDP should play a more 
vigorous coordinating role. Over the 
years, UNDP has been weakened con- 
siderably, since agencies are taking it 
upon themselves to do what is properly 
in UNDP's realm. Indeed, if the Geneva 
group is to be effective in assuring the 
best use of resources by the United Na- 
tions' technical agencies, it will be 
essential that we assure a clearer divi- 
sion of labor between the UNDP and 
the technical agencies. Further, there 
needs to be improved communication 
among the major donors on the 
relationships between bilateral and 
multilateral assistance programs. The 
current state of play, all too often, 
means that resources are wasted or 
that we work at cross purposes in the 
management of a unitary UN system. 

This is important because we rec- 
ognize the great and growing need for 
the work of the UN system. In addition 
to the recent major increase in UN 
peacekeeping activities, still more can 
be expected. More directly related to 



our work at this meeting are the signif- 
icant transnational problems increas- 
ingly being addressed. Certainly, the 
UN system has the potential to help 
deal with issues such as drug control, 
terrorism, refugees, AIDS [acquired 
immune deficiency syndrome], human 
rights, and the host of environmental 
problems. 

Based on the reforms initiated in 
the United Nations and in the major 
specialized agencies, and on the impor- 
tant UN peacekeeping activities re- 
cently undertaken. President Reagan 
decided last year to seek restoration of 
U.S. financial support to the United 
Nations and its affiliated agencies. He 
included in the fiscal year (FY) 1990 
budget essentially full funding for U.S. 
assessed contributions to the organiza- 
tions of the UN system. As indicated in 
our paper. President Reagan also in- 
cluded in the FY 1990 budget the first 
step in a multiyear plan for payment of 
outstanding U.S. arrearages. This 
commitment to restore U.S. financial 
support for the UN system has been 
strongly endorsed by President Bush. 
Final approval of the budget requests 
by Congress remains uncertain, but we 
are hopeful for support of President 
Bush's program on Capitol Hill. 

In conclusion, I want to stress that 
the United States looks forward to 
important opportunities in the UN 
system for dealing with critical world 
problems. The renewed confidence in 
the UN system must be further 
strengthened and maintained; we must 
guard against allowing the expected 
return of financial stability to result in 
renewal of wasteful practices. This will 
require continued vigor by the Geneva 
group in insisting on value for money. 
However, building on what we have 
achieved in recent years, we must go a 
step further in identifying and enforc- 
ing priorities for the UN system as a 
whole in order to be sure that our 
financial resources are being well 
used. I urge that — within our own 
governments — we all place more em- 
phasis on what I have called the uni- 
tary United Nations. ■ 



'enartmpnt nf Rtatp Riillptin/October 1989 



75 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



U.S.-Mexico Binational Commission 
IVIeets in IVIexico City 



The U.S.-Mexico Binational Com- 
mission held its seventh meeting in 
Me.rico City on August 6-7, 1989. 

Following are the prepared state- 
iiteiif Secretary Baker made for the 
opening session of the meeting; a joint 
news conference by Secretary Baker, 
Attorney General Richard Thorn- 
burgh, and Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) Administrator William 
K. Re illy and Secretary of Foreign Re- 
lations Fernando Solaria Morales, At- 
torney General Enrique Alvarez Del 
Castillo, Secretary of Finance and 
Public Credit Pedro Aspe Armella, 
Secretary of Commerce and Industrial 
Decelopment Jaime Jose Serra Puche, 
and Secretary of Tourism Carlos Hank 
Gonzalez; and the text of the joint 
communique. 



SECRETARY'S STATEMENT, 
AUG. 7, 1989' 

We have gathered today in the Plaza of 
the Three Cultures — Aztec, Spanish, 
Mexican. This was the site of the great 
ancient marketplace of Tlatelolco. Here 
stands a Spanish church built by the 
conquistadores using stones from the 
Aztec temple. And here we stand in the 
heart of modern Me.xico City — a true 
amalgam of all that has gone before. 

On this very ground, Old and New 
Worlds were fated to meet. As a conse- 
quence, both worlds faced the challenge 
of change — a future profoundly differ- 
ent than either could have anticipated. 

And today, our delegations meet in 
this historic place at a time of sweeping 
change throughout the Americas and 
the world. But unlike our Old and New 
World ancestors, we have a clearer 
sense of where the world is headed. We 
also have the opportunity to shape our 
destinies. 

The strategic, economic, political, 
and environmental aspects of national 
security and global well-being are, 
today, indivisible. Democratic ideas 
and i)rocesses are gaining momentum 
around the world. Capital, finance, and 
trade flow across borders instantane- 
ously, forming a global marketplace. 
Experience teaches us that democracy 
and development go hand in hand. 



Cooperation and Challenge 

Pollution, narcotics trafficking, and 
terrorism respect no borders. They 
truly are transnational, global con- 
cerns. The issues that invigorate U.S.- 
Mexico relations today are a reflection 
of these world trends. On any given 
day, our relationship is a dynamic mix 
of cooperation and challenge; growing 
strategic, commercial, financial, and 
demographic interdependence; and 
vivid cultural exchange. 

In fact, if I wanted to paint a pic- 
ture of our relations in the changing 
world I have just described, I would en- 
vision a great and vivid mural — a mu- 
ral in the artistic style of Rivera or 
Orozco. One with bright and contrast- 
ing colors, filled with scenes from fam- 
ily life and the swirling crowds of the 
marketplace. A composition rich in cul- 
tural allusion, historical allegory, and 
the drama of politics. Uniting these 
varied images into a conceptual whole 
would be the democratic values and vi- 
sion of a better world that draw our two 
peoples together. 

U.S. -Mexican relations are a sub- 
ject of such breadth, complexity, and 
vibrancy that they cannot be confined 
within a conventional frame of diplo- 
matic reference. Thousands upon thou- 
sands of lines of communication and 
contact have developed naturally across 
our common border. By the year 2000, 
if current trends continue, Mexico will 
be home to the world's largest Spanish 
speaking population, and the United 
States will be home to the next largest. 
Today, we work toward joining these 
homes in a prosperous partnership — 
one that will unite our governments, 
our peoples, and our economies as nev- 
er before. 

Mexico is the United States' thii'd 
largest export market and our second 
most important source of strategic raw 
materials. At the same time, our gov- 
ernments share common interests in 
protecting and promoting security, 
prosperity, and democracy in our two 
countries, in our hemisphere, and 
throughout the changing world. 

We are here today because both 
our governments understand that we 
must face the challenge of change to- 
gether. We both recognize that as the 



new century ajjproaches, we have thei 
opportunity to forge a partnership foi 
the future — a future that holds manyi 
challenges and much promise for botl 
our peoples. 

Some defined the old U.S.-MexiC) 
relationship as "managing irritants.' 
We are committed to a new relation- 
ship: "creating common opportunities 
From now on, we will define the U.S.» 
Mexican relationship not by the narra 
differences which divide us but by th( 
growing agenda of common opportun; 
ties that unite us as never before. Th' 
binational commission can play a pivot 
al role in turning opportunities into 
realities. 

In preparation for this meeting, 
the U.S. delegation carried out an ex! 
tensive review of our relations. We 
know that Mexico's delegation has got 
through a similar process. Reflecting 
the high priority given our relationsh 
by our two Presidents, several of us 
have already met with you and your 
colleagues over the past months. 

Indeed, our constructive and on- 
going dialogue began last November, 
when President-elect Salinas and 
President-elect Bush met in Houston 
As a Houstonian, I was proud to take 
part, as were several of those around 
this table today. President Bush said 
then, and has rejieated many times 
since, what he and I believe: The Uni| 
ed States has no more impin'tant rela( 
tionship than that with its neighbor a: 
friend, the Republic of Mexico. These 
are not mere words — they represent 
the solemn commitment of the United 
States. On both sides of the border, w 
now refer with pride to the "spirit of 
Houston." That spirit moves us to ac- 
tion today. 

Our delegation looks forward to 
what we know will be a productive ano 
mutually beneficial discussion on a va^ 
riety of topics. Progress has been ma« 
on many issues, but much remains to i 
be done. 

The Drug Problem 

Let me begin with an issue that seri 
ously threatens both our countries: 
drugs. We have long since stopped 
pointing fingers of blame, ai-guing 
whether drugs are a problem of demar 
or supply. Instead, our governments 
are working to reduce the supply of thi 



76 



Department of State Bulletin/October 191 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



on pushed on our citizens — on our 

children — by vicious traffickers. 

h of us are making vigorous efforts 
^ree our city streets and our youth 
fim the prison of drug addiction. 

Mexico's success, over the last 6 
ninths, in capturing and prosecuting 
dug traffickers has seized the world's 
afention. Moreover, to its credit, your 
giTernment has made clear that it 
wilts to tear the roots of the opium 
popy and marijuana plant from its soil. 

My government, in turn, knows all 
t( well that (50% of the world's illegal 
dig supply is consumed in the United 
Sites. This is senseless demand that 
mst be cut, through the efforts of all 
Aiericans. Zero tolerance is more than 
aolicy — it's an attitude we must foster. 

i»krengthened Debt Strategy 

( a matter of great concern to 
iy-.\ico — its foreign debt — the United 
Sites took early leadership with the 
aiiouncement of a strengthened debt 
sategy. Now, thanks to the efforts of 
Scretary [of the Treasury Nicholas F.] 
^ady, Secretary [of Finance and Pub- 
lii Credit Pedro] Aspe, and others on 
b.h sides, an agreement has been 
riched. A real reduction in Mexico's 
dDt burden will be achieved. 

Mexico's bold, far-sighted economic 
p'-icies and its negotiating team have 
die outstanding woi'k to convince the 
p vate banks and international lending 
i'.titutions that Mexico is worthy of 
edit and trust. We believe that Mex- 
ii- has earned that faith and confi- 
Cnee. Mexico can once again set an 
eaniple which other nations can follow. 

lade and Investment 

lit efforts in debt do not stand in iso- 
Uon from other economic topics. Now 
y. can focus even greater attention on 
tose topics vital for our common 
fowth. Our two-way trade in 1988 to- 
tied more than $44 billion. We need to 
a-engthen our trade and investment 
'■iS in order to build a future of growth 
^d prosperity for all citizens of North 
.merica, whether they live north of the 
';o Grande or south of the Rio Bravo. 
We admire and respect the many 
:isitive economic changes introduced 
■ the Salinas Administration — tariffs 
leralized, investment restrictions 
tt'd, freer markets, more private 
isiness, an increased opportunity for 
te people of Mexico — whatever their 
'^atus or station in life — to determine 
'leir own economic future. We believe, 
'> we know vou do as well, that the un- 




Secretary Baker and Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations Fernando Solana Morales. 



U.S. Travel Advisory 
for Colombia 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
AUG. 25. 1989> 

President Barco of Colombia has imple- 
mented a major effort to control drug 
trafficking in that country. Extradition 
of drug traffickers under indictment in 
other nations is a major element of this 
program. On August 24, drug traf- 
fickers launched a violent campaign in an 
attempt to force President Barco to res- 
cind his newly established extradition 
policy. 

The United States is confident that 
this campaign of intimidation will fail. 
However, in light of the violent retalia- 
tion bv drug traffickers, Americans 



traveling to Colombia could expose them- 
selves to extraordinary personal danger. 
The Department of State strongly urges 
Americans to avoid visiting Medellin, 
the headquarters of the drug traffickers 
"cartel." 

Americans who must travel to Col- 
ombia should refer to the travel warning 
of June 2, 1989, by calling (202) 647-5225. 
After arriving in Colombia, U.S. citizens 
are urged to register with the U.S. Em- 
bassv or the nearest consulate. 



' Read to news correspondents by De- 
partment deputy spokesman Richard A. 
Boucher. ■ 



lepartment of State Bulletin/October 1989 



77 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



leashing of economic liberty can create 
constructive forces and creative ener- 
gies that extend well beyond that 
reached by the heavy hand of govern- 
ment directives. We also know that the 
success to be reached is one to be 
earned by Mexicans. 

But we wish to help where we can. 
So I am pleased our two governments 
will work with our business commu- 
nities to create the jobs, the new enter- 
prises, the hope. 

There is no doubt that difficult eco- 
nomic and business challenges still face 
both our countries. And we recognize 
those challenges will sometimes re- 
quire politically sensitive choices on 
both sides of the border But I also rec- 
ognize our governments can transform 
the challenges into achievements if we 
work together. We will do so. 

For our part, the United States is 
ready to accelerate trade and invest- 
ment talks with Mexico under the aus- 
pices of the U.S. -Mexico Framework 
Understanding and the Uruguay 
Round of the GATT [General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade]. By work- 
ing closely together in these forums, 
and by our talks here today, we can 
chart a new course in U.S. -Mexican re- 
lations that builds on the debt agree- 
ment. We can stimulate commerce be- 
tween our nations. We can engage our 
private sectors in developing new op- 
portunities for growth. We can improve 
the international trading rules embod- 
ied in the GATT. 

Cultural Relations 

Cultural relations between our two 
countries have never been better. In 
our discussions today, we will want to 
look at ways in which our governments 
can work together to strengthen those 
relations even further. Let us move to 
bring our peoples together — students, 
teachers, government officials, and 
journalists — for our nations have so 
much to gain from each othei' in learn- 
ing, understanding, and friendship. 

A Common Vision 

The opportunities are clearly there. 
Now we need to get to work. I am con- 
fident that, today, we will build the 
framework for a successful state visit 
by President Salinas to Washington in 
October. Every day our citizens are 
making it clear that they exjiect their 
goverimients not merely to plan, but to 
act; not merely to discuss, but to do. 



We are here to roll up our sleeves 
and start building a world where legiti- 
mate commerce flows freely and illegal 
drugs do not. For prosperity and jobs 
and expanding futures on both sides of 
our border are a common good. 

We are here to work together to 
clean the air, purify the water, and pro- 
tect our other natural resources, for 
these are the birthright of both our 
peoples. 

We are here to work together to 
improve the climate of understanding 
between our citizens. We want the lives 
of our children to be enriched by expo- 
sure to the distinctive languages, cul- 
tures, and histories of our two proud 
nations. 

And finally, we seek to deepen our 
partnership of democratic values — 
values upon which both our nations 
were founded, and which unite our two 
peoples in a common vision of the future. 

We pledge to you our government's 
commitment to work with Mexico to 
make this common vision an enduring 
reality. 



JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE, 
AUG. 7, 1989- 

Secretary Solana. The impression held 
by us in the Mexican delegation is that 
the broadness of the agenda on which 
we worked today, the level and depth at 
which the various topics were treated, 
is really without precedent in our bina- 
tional meetings. In fact, we thought 
over, negotiated, discussed, exchanged 
points of view, and found points of 
agreement on an agenda of eleven 
points in seven different meetings. In 
all the meetings of the morning and the 
afternoon, there was an atmosphere of 
mutual respect, of cordiality, and of in- 
telligent analyses of the problems and 
opportunities we have as neighbors 
and of willingness to obtain concrete 
results. It was a frank dialogue 
in which no points were ignored. 

As you have just seen, six impor- 
tant documents wei-e signed. But many 
topics were touched upon above and be- 
yond the documents signed. The joint 
communique, which is being distrib- 
uted, expands upon the information in 
this regard. Certain new themes 
caught the attention, in a positive way, 
of the Mexican delegation. I will give 
you only a couple of examples. 

With regard to drug trafficking, 
the sense of responsibility with which 
the American delegation is already 



treating the problem of drug consum 
tion, I think this is something which; 
allows us to be much more optimistici 
with regard to the joint accomplish- 
ments which we can achieve in the fij 
against drug trafficking. We have to 
face it in its different aspects of pro- 
duction and trafficking, but consump 
tion is equally fundamental. 

Another example is the exchange 
diplomatic notes on immigration mat 
ters. This will allow us a significant 
improvement in the protection of Me 
cans who live on the other side of the 
border Of course, this will work bot! 
ways. But it was very important for 
Mexico to have a somewhat broader 
framework, and some improvements 
were made in this regard. 

Great advances were made in thi) 
preparation for the trip President Ci 
los Salinas de Gortari will make to 
Washington, which as you know will 
take place starting October 3, as hafi 
been announced. We think that the 
agenda which we have begun to 
prepare — some matters were dealt 
with today, others were left for that 
occasion — will make this trip especii 
important. 

Perhaps best of all is that for all 
the matters taken up, permanent fom 
for discussion and negotiation have 
been established. I believe that this 
meeting confirms the political will o; 
the part of both governments to recof 
nize problems and opportunities in ai 
mature and calm manner. Two coun- 
tries as different as the United Stab 
and Mexico, living so closely togethe 
have problems and opportunities. 
I believe it behooves us to analyze thi 
problems with respect, mutual trust, 
and in a spirit of cooperation. And wi 
need to define these opportunities toi 
jointly and equitably make the best o 
them. This is a very general outline c 
the Mexican delegation's view of this 
seventh binational meeting between 
our two countries. 

Secretary Baker. Let me say or 

behalf of our delegation that we thini 
that this was a very productive and a 
highly successful meeting. I'd like to 
thank the numerous officials on both i 
sides who put in a lot of hard work to 
make this possible. I think it is fairti 
say that we have today carried forwa; 
the "spirit of Houston" which was es- 
tablished by President-elect Bush am 
Salinas when they first met in Noven 
ber in Houston. 

It seems to me our two President 
saw a special opportunity. They were 



78 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



1 iii'wly elected presidents of two 

1 1 1 nations — two great nations whose 

ITS are bound together with full 
,■ iiTt for one another. President Bush 
laisaid that there is no country with 
viith the United States has relations 
h. is any more important to the 
Jited States than Mexico. 

I think that the sheer breadth of 
lUidiscussions today is testimony to 
hivery close and intei'dependent 
laire of this relationship. Now, of 
.■orse, as we said in the closing ple- 
lajv, we cannot stop here. I would hope 
hf this meeting would serve as a 
)uding-block in a new structure 
jfven closer cooperation between 
.hjUnited States and Mexico across 
hlfuU range of the issues that make 
1] )ur agenda. 

j As you have just aptly pointed out, 
,nnext step will be when President 
iiinas visits President Bush in Wash- 
n|;on on October 3. I know how much 
fijsident Bush is looking forward to 
H; visit. 

1 would like to single out, if I 
:c:ld, for special mention the pro- 
jiwth economic policies that the Sa- 
i|(S Administration is implementing 
v!h great foresight and with great 
;crage. We think these are very im- 
)(tant: we think that these make pos- 
;i (■ the kind of dialogue we had today 
ii whole range of areas — trade, in- 
/(tment, debt, and so forth. 

As the Secretary has told you and 
Mv'ou have just witnessed, we have 
died some agreements as well, some 
((■eements that touch on various 
Dents of this relationship. One of these 
rolved a bridge-crossing between 
Mxico and Texas over the Rio Grande. 
\d in a way, I think that bridge is 
ijnbolic of the linked future that Mex- 
cand the United States are destined 
;(share. I think that today it is fair to 
ir that we made i)rogress towai'd as- 
ii'ing that that future is a prosperous 
i\ bright one for our people. 

We have just come from a very 
jicious lunch hosted by President 
'Unas. So let me close, if I might, 
I'.h special thanks to him, with special 
:inks to you, Mr. Secretary, and with 
secial thanks to the other members of 
WW ilelegation who made our visit so 
i'rm and so productive. Thank you. 

(J. It has been pointed out that 
'■I' main problem is drug consump- 
Im. .Mr. Baker recognized that 
i ' ( of all the world's drugs are con- 
nu'd in the United States. Our 
luntry has had a serious problem: 
irtification. 



What measures will be taken by the 
Government of Mexico to do some- 
thing about that policy, and what 
steps could the U.S. Government take 
to do away with the policy of drug 
certification? 

Attorney General Alvarez. Of 
course I believe that the relations 
between Mexico and the United States 
in the area of drug trafficking have 
changed significantly this year under 
the Administration of President Sa- 
linas. Of course there is no question 
as to who is to blame, consumer or 
producer. The relationship has funda- 
mentally changed; it has been trans- 
formed into one of coordination and 
collaboration. 

Consequently, we are all united in 
the struggle against this modern phe- 
nomenon of criminal activity, which is 
truly exceptional in its economic power, 
in the way in which it damages public 
health and the security of the state, 
and with which we are all involved in- 
ternationally. The fact that a country, 
within its sovereign powers, could pass 
a law — with which we may or may not 
agree — a law consistent with its sys- 
tem, to take for itself the right to certi- 
fy other countries, is debatable. But for 
us, this phenomenon is irrelevant be- 
cause we do, out of conviction and will 
continue to do, whatever is necessary 
to combat the plague of drug addiction. 
Fortunately, Mexico has a very small 
number of addicts, but it must aid those 
who have more. And, above all, it must 
also eliminate the production of those 
types of drugs which are present in our 
country. I believe this must be our view 
of our future problems. 

Q. As you know, the Presidents of 
the Central American republics have 
said today that they have reached 
agreement on a plan to demobilize the 
contras. Is this, in your view, the end 
of the contras and will the United 
States help carry out that demobiliza- 
tion plan, or will the United States 
place obstacles in its way? 

Secretary Baker. F'irst let me say 
that we have not seen the agreements 
that have been reached at Tela, so I am 
not able to comment on the specifics of 
the demobilization plan per se. Let me, 
though, say that the United States and 
the Central American democracies 
have, for a long time, been seeking a di- 
rect dialogue between the Government 
of Nicaragua and the internal opposi- 
tion. We have been asking that that 
takes place. We think it is important to 



the peace process that that occurs, and 
the Government of Nicaragua has been 
resisting these calls up until very re- 
cent days. 

We are pleased now to see that 
there finally is going to be a dialogue 
between the internal opposition and 
the Government of Nicaragua. Certain 
promises have now been made about 
preparations for the holding of elections 
in February of 1990. It is quite impor- 
tant that those promises be followed by 
action, that the words be followed by 
action. So we are very pleased with 
the steps that the Government of 
Nicaragua has taken to establish a dia- 
logue with the opposition and to move 
toward procedures that might permit a 
free and fair election. 

I am not able to comment with 
specificity as yet upon the details of the 
demobilization plan since I haven't seen 
it. But let me say this: It is a promise 
of Esquipulas that any demobilization 
or repatriation would be, first of all, 
into safe and democratic conditions, 
and second of all, would be voluntary. 
And I do not think for one minute that 
the Central American democracies 
would do anything to change the terms 
of the Esquipulas accord which they 
themselves have put forth. 

Q. There was some talk of an 
agreement on extradition of money 
launderers from Mexico, and there 
was apparently no accord on that 
signed. I would like to know why and 
and also why no accords were signed 
on drugs or immigration at all. 

Attorney General Thornburgh. 
With regard to extradition matters, 
there is in effect an extradition agree- 
ment between the Governments of the 
United States and of Mexico, and it has 
been utilized to the advantage of both 
parties in the past from time to time. 
The extradition of money launderers, 
like that of an offender within either 
country, is subject to that treaty and 
remains so following our discussion 
today. 

One of the important agreements 
reached between the Attorney General 
of Mexico and myself today was to form 
a study group, a working group of pros- 
ecutors within our respective depart- 
ments, well versed in the technicalities 
of extradition to ensure that this treaty 
and this process are utilized to the mu- 
tual advantage of both our countries. 
Therefore, beyond the reaffirming of 
the existence of the treaty and the com- 
mitment to form this working group. 



apartment of State Bulletin/October 1989 



79 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



~i 



Q. We would like to ask, what 
has been Mexico's response with ri 
sard to the U.S. proposal to set upi 
niethanisms to control money laut 
dering, such as banking laws? The 
has also been some talk that the U 
ed States is going to suggest the p« 
sibility that it be allowed to enter 
Mexican territory to control drug 
trafficking planes. Was this issue 
cussed, and was there any answer 
the part of Mexico on this matter?! 

Secretary Solana. Regarding 
second point, it was not discussed a<| 
this meeting because Mexico's posit 
has been made very clear in that it W 
not accept such a suggestion. Mexic ; 
carrying out its greatest efforts, ai 
will continue to do so, in the fight 
against drug trafficking. But Mexic 
feels that each country should be re 
sponsible for such a struggle within 
its own territory. 

With regard to the problem of i i 
ey laundering, and what was discus i 
perhaps Secretary Aspe would care 
comment on this. 

Secretary Aspe. The U.S. Tre; 
ury and Mexico's Finance Ministry 
have established a working group tl 
has been working on the specific iss 
of exchanging information. As you 
know, in Mexico the only illegal acti ; 
relating to money laundering is tax 
evasion. But there is no specific cat( 
gory for crimes of this type — as the 
Attorney General can explain later. 
Therefore, during this last 2 month 
we have been working on the first st 
of exchanging information. It is goii 
to take some time to go through the 
details, and afterward the executive 
branches of both nations must agree i 
terms, and the Senates should ratify 
them. This is my comment regardin 
the section dealing with informatior 

Attorney General Alvarez del 
Castillo. I would simply like to mak I 
the following clear. It is true that on I 
of the ways to trace funds from moni 
laundering is through tax laws. But 
is also possible to prosecute someont 
for illegal or inexplicable enrichmen 
These problems are subject to invest 
gation in concrete cases. This would 
be my comment. 

Q. I have a question about the ■ 
juana "ditch" that was controversi 
several months ago. My question is 
the U.S. Government plans to go fo 
ward with the ditch and, if not, wh 
alternative there is because I unde 
stand that the ditch initially re- 
sponded to environmental concern: 



there was no need for any additional ac- 
tion to bring money launderers or any 
other offenders in either country with- 
in the reach of the cui-rent law. 

Attorney General .\lvarez del 
Castillo. What we discussed was, in 
a nutshell, what Attorney General 
Thornburgh has said: a review of the 
treaty with, I believe, both parties' in- 
tention of making it faster and more 
efficient when jjrosecuting infractions 
of all types, while protecting the basic 
freedoms of citizens of the United 
States as well as of Mexico. 

Q. Up until a few months ago. 
Central America was considered the 
main source of tension and conflict in 
the relations between Mexico and the 
United States. Now we see that the 
topic isn't even mentioned in the 
agenda directly. 

I would like to know whether 
sources of real conflict have been set 
aside in this binational meeting. 
There was, of course, great optimism, 
and I would like to know if there were 
disagreements on some topics. 

Secretary Baker. Let me simply 
say that the Foreign Secretary and I 
discussed a range of political issues in 
a bilateral meeting that we had in his 
home the night that I arrived — issues 
involving a number of regions and 
areas of the world, not just Central 
America. We discussed Central Ameri- 
ca as well. I will let the Foreign Secre- 
tary speak for himself, but I think 
there is more of a congruence of views 
between the United States and Mexico 
with respect to the policy approach 
that the United States is now following 
regarding Central America than there 
was before. 

I am sorry to disappoint you, but I 
really don't believe that the divergen- 
cies and the differences of opinion that 
you seem to welcome and are seeking 
are really there anymore on that sub- 
ject, although I will let the Foreign 
Secretary speak for himself. 

Secretary Solana. Of course, it 
was a binational meeting in which we 
emphasized binational issues. With re- 
gard to regional issues or political 
problems in other areas of the world, 
we talked and exchanged viewpoints 
and information. It is true that we are 
not in complete agreement in all our 
views, in particular in some cases hav- 
ing to do with Central America. How- 
ever, we agreed that it was useful to 
exchange our points of view, as we have 
been doing for several months. I believe 



we have been doing this in an atmos- 
phere of the most complete respect 
with regard to our agreements and 
differences. It is useful to know the 
arguments that each country has 
with regard to issues of this nature. 

Q. On the other side of the border 
from Coahuila, a proposed nuclear 
simulation/explosion has been a ques- 
tion of concern, particularly among 
environmentalists. What agreements 
were reached regarding this issue in 
the conference today? 

Secretary Solana. This has been a 
matter of considerable commentary. Al- 
though it was not a specific item in to- 
day's agenda, it has been commented 
on. Mexico has explained its position 
on this matter, and we are working on 
it through the appropriate diplomatic 
channels. We have received a very cor- 
dial and interested reply from the U.S. 
Government. I reiterate that we are 
working on this matter to ensure that 
any experiment of this nature will not 
affect Mexico's natural resources, in 
this case underground waters, and 
much less the health of persons any- 
where on the border. 

Secretary Baker. Let me just add 
to that; this is not a nuclear explosion. 
We are of the view that there will be no 
collateral damage. But we have made 
no final decision to go forward, and 
Mexican concerns are very important 
to us. As the Foreign Secretary has 
just indicated, we will be taking those 
into account. We will be working this 
through diplomatic channels, and we 
will be proceeding only in close 
consultation. 

Q. This is the 100th anniversary 
of the International Boundary and 
Water Commission, and one of the 
agreements signed today recognizes 
this fact. However, the boundaries 
and water treaty signed by Secretary 
of State Cyrus Vance and Foreign Sec- 
retary Santiago Reol during the 
Lopez Portillo Administration has 
yet to be ratified by the U,S. Senate. I 
would like to know, what is the status 
of this treaty? 

Secretary Baker. What has hap- 
pended to the treaty and its ratification 
is that we haven't been able to secure 
ratification from the Senate yet — we 
are continuing to work on that — ^just as 
we have not yet received ratification of 
the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, 
which we in the executive branch of our 
government think is very important. 
We will continue to work on Senate 
ratification on both of those treaties. 



r 

itf 



80 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



o;*lexico before it became an im- 
rrkration issue. 

Secretary Baker. It is my under- 
sliifling with respect to tliat particu- 
lamatter — and let me simply say that 
Fill not the expert on it and I am not 
,11' that we have anybody up here at 
J table who is — but it is my under- 
siding that it is on hold, and we are 
^tl looking at the situation and review- 
1 the prospect of the construction of 
tl.t ditch and again closely consulting 
wjh the Mexican Government. I am 
ni in a position to tell you here today 
wether or not we will go forwai'd with 
itir not. But we have put it on hold. 
Secretary Solana. I would only 
that we have, indeed, been consult- 
through dijilomatic channels and 
tljt our concerns have been taken into 
ciisideration. This project would be 
cried out in U.S. territory, thus it 
i;k decision of the U.S. Government. 
Plwever, the concerns put forth by 
t? Mexican Government have been 
htened to. 

(J. I want to ask you about the 
areement on immigration; perhaps 
Vi could have more details about this 
areement. It seems that the U.S. del- 
eation was particularly interested in 
ru-hing an agreement to control the 
i migration of third-country nation- 
al through the U.S. -Mexican border. 
\is something achieved on this 
i ue? 

Secretary Solana. The matter was 
d^cussed, but the exchange of infor- 
ntion was discussed more than were 
dntrol issues. Migration from third 
(juntries to Mexico or through Mexico, 
f vice versa, is a regional concern, and 
\' think that the exchange of informa- 
t)n leading to concrete measures is 
leful so long as peoples' rights are al- 
Mvs protected, especially when they 
;e in Mexican territory. Therefore, we 
lought it was beneficial to establish a 
foup that would set up formal mecha- 
Isms to exchange information that 
■Duld help us to analyze this problem, 
f'cause we do not understand it well — 
; least as far as specific figures are 
incerned. We have a general idea, but 
is a problem that is happening right 
iw: and we want more systematic and 
mplete information. We think that 
ith this exchange of information, we 
m make progress on this issue. 

, Q. What is the nature of the 
kreement? 



Secretary Solana. We have ex- 
changed notes to begin this informa- 
tion exchange. There are more details 
in the joint communique. 

Q. I wonder if Mr. Reilly could 
tell us what the effects of ammonium 
nitrate are on subsoil conditions, be- 
cause that apparently is what the det- 
onation outside of Del Rio is supposed 
to be. Secondly, I would like to ask 
whether we can interpret this draw- 
ing together between Mexico and 
the United States as something that 
might extend further south with time 
and eventually manifest itself in an 
expression of similar respect for Cen- 
tral American nations and leaders 
that have beneficial side effects for 
the American taxpayers by sparing 
the expenses of repeated long- 
distance phone calls placed by Presi- 
dent Bush to leaders taking part in 
summit meetings such as Tela, Hon- 
duras, apparently in efforts to influ- 
ence their decisions. 

Secretary Baker. I think it's a 
statement. I'll answer the first ques- 
tion because it was a question, but I'll 
refei- it to Mr. Reilly. who is the envi- 
ronmental expert. 

Administrator Reilly. We are obli- 
gated by applicable law in the United 
States to assess very carefully the en- 
vironmental impact of any activity that 
is likely to have a significant impact on 
the environment. Whether this contem- 
plated simulation is such an activity re- 
mains to be seen, and there is a lot 
more to be determined about it. But if 
it is, in fact, a lot would have to be done 
to make sure that it is not going to have 
adverse consequences for the environ- 
ment before it is permitted to go 
ahead. We consider that we are obli- 
gated under agreements with Mexico to 
consult very closely and to inform the 
Mexican Government about any such ef- 
fects. This is within the area covered 
by our agreements, and we fully intend 
to comply with those agreements. 

Q. Three major issues have not 
yet been addressed. One is the elim- 
ination of protectionist barriers by 
the United States; two, the new in- 
vestment flows toward Mexico; and 
three, new tourism flows toward our 
country. 

Secretary Serra. On trade, which 
is your first question, there was a very 
productive session with [U.S. Trade 
Representative] Ambassador Carla 
Hills in which a number of issues were 



addressed. Discussion of issues that fall 
within the macroagreement, which 
governs the trade relations between 
Mexico and the United States, had a 
short-term focus on issues dealing with 
the steel industry, intellectual proper- 
ty, and textiles. We reached significant 
agreements in these three areas and 
made sure that there will be specific 
proposals for the summit between 
Presidents Salinas and Bush. 

With regard to the long term, with- 
in that same understanding we reached 
with Ambassador Hills, we agreed that 
we have to make an effort to give an 
additional push to that agreement — a 
framework agreement that at present 
is a forum for consultations — to see if 
we can turn it into an agreement for 
action that will permit us to eliminate 
barriers and promote access to 
markets. 

Regai'ding investment, we also had 
a very productive meeting with Secre- 
tary of Commerce Robert Mosbacher in 
relation to the new foreign investment 
regulations in Mexico — very detailed 
report on the characteristics but also 
an agreement to carry out promotional 
events among investors in a joint forum 
between our two governments. 

Secretary Hank Gonzalez. With 
regard to strengthening the flow of 
tourism, we spoke with Secretary Mos- 
bacher in an extremely cordial climate, 
and with a spirit of cooperation and 
good will, about a strengthened flow of 
tourists between our two countries, 
about promoting together — the U.S. 
and Mexico — a strengthening of the 
flows from other continents toward the 
United States and Mexico, and about 
fostering joint U.S. and Mexican in- 
vestments in infrastructure and con- 
struction of tourist facilities. 

Q. I want to ask Mr. Baker if the 
U.S. Government will support the de- 
mobilization agreements that the 
Central American presidents may 
have reached in Tela, Honduras, or if 
such support would be subject to any 
progress attained in the commit- 
ments that President Ortega may 
have with the Nicaraguan opposition. 

Secretary Baker. I have already 
said that I haven't seen the details of 
the agreement that was reached. It is 
my understanding that an agreement 
was reached in Tela just an hour or so 
ago, and I haven't seen the details of 
that agreement. 



department of State Bulletin/October 1989 



81 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Let me say, the only conditions 
that I think the United States would 
put on in such agreement are the very 
conditions that the Central American 
democracies themselves put on this 
issue in the Esquipulas peace agree- 
ment: that is, that any repatriation 
must be voluntary, and it must be a 
repatriation into safe and democratic 
conditions. So there must be safe and 
democratic conditions by the very 
terms of Esquipulas itself, which seems 
to me to argue quite strongly that 
there should be performance of the 
promises by the Government of Nicara- 
gua if there is to be repatriation. That's 
not commenting on the specifics of the 
plan because I haven't seen the plan. 
But I am quite sure that we would want 
to see it carry through the commitment 
of the Esquipulas peace accord, which 
the four Central American democracies 
themselves subscribed to. 



JOINT COMMUNIQUE, 
AUG. 7, 1989 

Responding to the desire of the two Govern- 
ments to hold periodic meetings to examine 
at the ministerial level the state of relations 
between our countries, the Seventh Meeting 
of the United States-Me.xico Binational 
Commission was held in Mexico City on 
August 6-7, 1989. 

Within this framework, it was proposed 
to negotiate new agreements and to consider 
appropriate actions with a view to overcom- 
ing current problems and strengthening re- 
lations in all areas. 

The meeting was particularly impor- 
tant because of the advances achieved in 
preparing the agenda which will be dis- 
cussed during the meeting of the Presidents 
of Mexico and of the United States in Wash- 
ington this October. 

The meeting was characterized by a cli- 
mate of cordiality and frankness which pre- 
vailed in the negotiations and in the joint 
evaluation of problems. All que.stions were 
examined in an exhaustive and careful man- 
ner, and numerous and important under- 
standings were achieved. 

In order to systematize the work, both 
delegations agreed to divide it into the fol- 
lowing topics: bilateral relations; border 
cooperation: environment: migration; legal 
affairs and antinarcotics cooperation; fi- 
nancial cooperation; trade and investment; 
promotion of commerce, investment and 
tourism; and cultural affairs. 

Bilateral and International Relations 

Both governments reiterated their intention 
to strenthen even more the relations be- 
tween Mexico and the United States, in 
strict observance of the indnciples which 



should govern international relations, es- 
l)ecially those which make possible a har- 
monious relation between neighboring 
countries. Among others, these principles 
include support for democracy and self- 
determination, respect for nonintervention, 
sovereign equality of states, good faith and 
international cooperation on a fair and equi- 
table basis. 

They confirmed their intention to give 
impetus to the dialogue in the search for so- 
lutions to current or anticipated problems; 
they recognized that the complexity of the 
relations requires a permanent dialogue 
taking into account, on the one hand, the na- 
tional identity and historical characteristics 
of each country and, on the other, the need 
to cooperate in the search for acceptable 
solutions to common problems. 

Both delegations took note with special 
satisfaction of the simultaneous initiation 
of the Administrations of Presidents Bush 
and Salinas; this circumstance led to the 
meeting in Houston in November, 1988 as 
Presidents-Elect. Within the spirit of cor- 
diality of the Houston meeting, a commit- 
ment was undertaken whose deepening and 
continuity will be evident during the meet- 
ing of both Chiefs of State which will be held 
in the United States next October 

The heads of delegation held a wide- 
ranging discussion on international affairs. 
They discussed and shared their respective 
views on arms control, East-West relations. 
Central America and other subjects of mu- 
tual concern to Mexico and to the United 
States. 

In analyzing the hemispheric situation, 
they indicated the importance of overcoming 
the conflicts in Central America, based 
on the Esquipulas II and El Salvador 
agreements. 

In evaluating the current state of bilat- 
eral relations, both sides agreed in charac- 
terizing them as very satisfactory. However, 
the need for careful follow-up was empha- 
sized to prevent situations from developing 
which in the past have led to frictions. The 
Binational Commission mechanism facili- 
tates this task. 



Border Cooperation 

Both delegations expressed their satisfac- 
tion with the manner in which the border 
ports of entry program is developing. They 
recognized the important advance deriving 
from the exchange of notes formalizing the 
agreement to construct and operate a bridge 
at Zaragoza, Chihuahua-Ysleta, Texas which 
occurred during the meeting. 

The sides expressed the political will to 
authorize, as soon as possible, border ports 
of entry at both Dolores, Texas-Colombia, 
Nuevo Leon, and Los Indies, Texas-Lucio 
Blanco, Taniaulipas. Both sides also looked 
forward to authorization, in the near future, 
of additional ports of entry, including: 



Matamoros, Tamaulipas/Brownsville, 

Tex. Ill; 
Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas/Laredo, 

Tex. Ill; 
Piedras Negras, Coahuila/Eagle Pass, 

Tex. II; 
Diaz Ordaz, Tamaulipas/Los Ebanos, Tex 

They took note with particular prid^ 

the first centenary of the Mexico-United 
States International Boundary and Watf 
Commission; they confirmed the acti' .- i 
which this institution has had throujjii'K, 
existence in the solution of numerous boi. 
problems and, therefore, the need foriM 
continue functioning to enhance relation! 
between both countries. 

The delegations took note with satia- 
tion of the creation of an Office of Bordei 
Affairs in the Secretariat of Foreign Rel 
tions, and of the intention of the Departr 
of State to create a similar office. 

The sides praised the work which thu 
border governors are undertaking with r 
gard to the economic development of thei' 
respective regions and their contributiot 
to improvement of border relations throi 
their annual meetings. 

The delegations discussed the questi 
of the appropriate Federal role in the ma 
of cooperation at the local level, and deci' 
that this would be examined carefully by 
the two Governments. 



Environment 

Affirming the priority which Mexico and 
United States assign to sanitation in bor 
cities, the sides exchanged diplomatic no 
for the purpose of formalizing, by means 
an International Boundary and Water Cc 
mission Minute dated August, 1989, the 
commitment of both countries to carry o 
program of cooperation and to share pro^ 
costs equally for cleaning the Rio Grande 
the vicinity of Laredo-Nuevo Laredo. 

With respect to the San Diego-Tijuari 
area, the sides indicated that both count 
view favorably a proposal for the construi 
tion of an international sewage treatment 
plant on the United States side of the bo: 
der They agreed to accelerate the analys 
of the pending financial and technical qut 
tions with a view to reaching a final deci:« 
which could be announced at the October ' 
Presidential summit. 

Positive discussions were initiated to 
examine the operation of .\nnex III of the 
Border Environment Agreement. Both p: 
ties agreed to review the legal aspects of 
the said Annex. 

Both sides agreed to begin negotiatii 
a new Annex V to the Border Agreement 
with regard to cooperating in monitoring 
air pollution in border urban areas. 

The two sides agreed that they share 
the political will to reach a cooperative 
agreement addressing the range of envir< 
mental issues facing Mexico City, and tha 
this agreement should be concluded by th 



82 



Department of State Bulletin/October 1S1 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



f the two Presidents meet in October. 
1 > aureement would involve SEDUE. 
liF. the State of Mexico and EPA, and will 
l;i>ly be concluded as a Memorandum of Un- 
djstanding (MOU), although the details of 
tiform will be left to the negotiations that 
wiexpect to begin later this month. 

Mexico indicated it will support on a 
tilely basis the designation of the Gulf of 
KkIco as a "Special Area" within the 
fiiniework of the International Convention 
fdthe Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(lARPOL). with the participation of appro- 
pate coastal states. 

I Both governments agreed to cooperate 
olglobal climate issues and expressed their 
iiention to work together in the Inter- 
gfernmental Panel on Climate Change, and 
oier international fora, to complete prepa- 
rJions for commencing negotiations on a 
fimework convention on climate change. 



Jgration 

.' intive to the inherent complexity of the 
t me of migration, the deliberations and 
d;isions were characterized by a spirit of 
ndual understanding. 

i Both delegations decided to continue ex- 
clnging information regarding the applica- 
tji of the Immigration Reform and Control 
A (Simpson-Rodino) of 1986 as well as the 
plgrams which could eventually be devel- 
oHl to facilitate documented worker flows. 
The parties expressed their satisfaction 
« h the exchange of diplomatic notes which 
eiances a framework for addressing the 
P'blenis of protection of nationals and mi- 
gUion. Additional procedures were estab- 
liied which, among other things, address 
t' following matters: (a) the dissemination 
Oinformation on the Mexican legal frame- 
wrk concerning migratory workers and the 
Siengthening of cooperation on specific la- 
b- matters of interest to both governments; 
(Ithe maintenance and sharing of informa- 
t II about accidents to Mexicans; (c) the 
dcussion of existing conditions in both 
cnitries concerning the arrest, detention 
a:l imprisonment of aliens; (d) the estab- 
I'timent of a system of consultations and ex- 
cmge of information on acts of violence or 
aase of authority against the nationals of 
e>h country; and (e) the encouragement of 
C)peration in the struggle against the traf- 
f king of humans and false documentation, 
t! migration of undocumented third- 
cintry nationals and the exchange of timely 
i:orniation on criminal immigration 
a.ivities. 

The sides expressed their concern about 
t- increase in undocumented migration 
f>m Latin American and other continents 
I ng Mexico in order to transit to the 
'lited States as well as about criminal 
piups which traffic in human beings and 

sify migratory documents. They recom- 
inded exploring possible forms of coopera- 
' n to repatriate nationals from other 
1 mtries and created working group "C" for 

■ analvsis and treatment of this theme. 



Legal Affairs and 
Anti-Narcotics Cooperation 

The sides took into account the different ju- 
dicial systems and the consequences that law 
enforcement can have in the neighboring 
country. They also considered the fact that 
certain acts, especially criminal ones, have 
impact beyond the border. Conscious of the 
need for respect due to each country's sover- 
eignty, the sides considered important legal 
questions with a view to cooperating in the 
fight against criminal actions having inter- 
national effects. 

In this context, both delegations agreed: 

1. To exchange information about our re- 
spective legal systems as well as relevant 
judicial processes, efforts to stop the traffic 
in arms and contraband of stolen vehicles 
and aircraft and the handling of corruption 
cases in both countries; 

2. To create a working group to ex- 
change information about money laundering 
and coordinate efforts concerning the sei- 
zure of assets; 

3. To analyze the possibility of ensuring 
more effective application of the current ex- 
tradition treaty; 

4. To support the continuation of joint 
programs for the education and training of 
police personnel of both countries; 

.5. The sides considered that the produc- 
tion, trafficking and consumption of narcot- 
ics represent a threat to humanity. They 
agreed that their common efforts against il- 
legal narcotics play an important role in the 
international struggle to rid the world of 
this evil. They resolved to increase their 
collaboration with a view toward making 
greater progress to stem the flow of 
narcotics; 

6. With this purpose in mind, the sides 
decided to create and decided on the compo- 
sition of a working group whose mandate 
will include the exchange of information 
about eradication programs in both coun- 
tries, verification of such eradication, in- 
cluding the application of new technologies 
to achieve the same, and about the advances 
which have been achieved in the control or 
reduction of demand. 



Financial Cooperation 

The two Governments reviewed the prog- 
ress on the implementation of the agreement 
on debt and debt service reduction reached 
in late July with Mexico's creditor commer- 
cial banks. Mexico and the United States 
agreed that this arrangement will provide 
lasting support for the Government of Mex- 
ico as it endeavors to restore sustained non- 
inflationary economic growth. Mexico and 
the United States also discussed efforts cur- 
rently underway to mobilize external sup- 
port from official sources for the financing 
arrangement. 

Mexico and the United States reviewed 
the substantial progress in implementing 
structural changes in the Mexican economic 
system. The Government of Mexico has 
made significant progress in opening and 



deregulating its economy to foster efficiency 
and improved growth and employment pros- 
pects. The two delegations reviewed the in- 
ternational support that exists regarding 
Mexico's commitment to modernize its econ- 
omy. The U.S. side indicated strong support 
for Mexico's efforts in achieving this 
objective. 

The U.S. delegation confirmed to Mex- 
ico an offer of $1,225 billion guarantee by 
the Commodity Credit Corporation to fi- 
nance the import of U.S. agricultural prod- 
ucts during the U.S. fiscal year beginning 
October 1, 1989. Both delegations agreed 
that the financing requirements for Mexico's 
agricultural imports will continue to be 
carefully reviewed. The two delegations re- 
iterated their commitment to confront the 
problem of narcotics. Particular emphasis 
was given to the question of money launder- 
ing, to border affairs and the possibility of 
development of human resources. A working 
group was established to promote coopera- 
tion between both countries on these topics. 
This group will also work to improve cus- 
toms cooperation to facilitate and monitor 
trade flows. 



Trade and Investment 

They reviewed the advances of the working 
groups under the Framework Trade and In- 
vestment Agreement. After being informed 
about the recent meetings, both delegations 
agreed to proceed at a more rapid pace in 
the corresponding activities. At the same 
time, the results achieved were analyzed to 
facilitate the processes of trade and invest- 
ment. The plan of action agreed to regard- 
ing trucking was analyzed and accepted; 
there was mutual agreement to put it into 
effect immediately. 

After a detailed report by both delega- 
tions, an understanding was achieved to ac- 
celerate in the short term the negotiations 
on tariff and non-tariff measures within the 
framework of the Uruguay Round; to place 
talks on steel and intellectual property 
rights on a fast track with a view toward 
achieving progress by the time of the Octo- 
ber Presidential summit; and to hold other 
talks on textiles. 

It was decided to initiate, at the time of 
the fall Presidential summit, longer term, 
comprehensive talks on market access and 
trade and investment facilitation in specific 
areas and/or sectors. 

The governments agreed to continue an- 
alyzing diverse matters related to subsidies, 
countervailing duties and anti-dumping 
rules. The Commerce Department today is- 
sued a notice of its intent to revoke counter- 
vailing duties on the first often outstanding 
countervailing duty cases. The governments 
also agreed to discuss further the related 
benefits to Mexico under the Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP) and the prob- 
lem of reciprocal access to each other's 
markets. The United States Government 
announced today its acceptance for review 



Ippartment of State Bulletin/October 1989 



83 



TREATIES 



of 43 petitions filed by the Government of 
Mexico, with an estimated export value of 
$500 million, in the context of the 1989 
GSP Annual Review. 



Promotion of Commerce, 
Investment and Tourism 

Regardin.e foreign investment, the Mexican 
delegation made a presentation w-ith regard 
to policy as well as of the recent modifica- 
tion of the Foreign Investment Law Regula- 
tions. It was agreed that the governments 
will establish a promotion mechanism and 
will formulate a plan of action to take ad- 
vantage of the opportunities which will be 
generated in both countries for commerce 
and investment. Attention was given to the 
opportunities in the tourism sector. They 
considered possibilities of investments re- 
lated to the privatization of public enter- 
prises, of telecommunications and of the 
expansion of infrastructure. 

The two sides will examine further the 
promising business climate emerging in 
Mexico. It is hoped that plans can be pur- 
sued to organize a high-level group of U.S. 
business executives to travel to Mexico this 
fall for the purpose of promoting mutual 
commercial and investment opportunities. 

They carefully analyzed investment op- 
portunities in Mexico's tourism sector fol- 
lowing a brief presentation by the Mexican 
delegation. At the same time, the possibility 
was mentioned that, in the future, the use of 
the debt-swap mechanism will be permitted 
in the Mexican privatization program of pub- 
lic enterprises and in infrastructure proj- 
ects in accordance with the guidelines and 
amounts as determined by the Secretariat 
of the Treasury and Public Credit. 

They underscored the interest of both 
governments to sign, as soon as possible, a 
convention to facilitate tourist activit.v, set- 
ting as a date certain for such an agreement 
the visit of President Carlos Salinas de Gor- 
tari to Washington next October. 

Cultural Affairs 

Taking into account the importance of bet- 
ter mutual understanding between the peo- 
ples of Mexico and the United States and of 
the responsibilities of the governments to 
promote such improved perception, the sides 
exchanged points of view and agreed to give 
a new impulse to cultural cooperation, espe- 
cially in the respective border areas, where 
our peoples need better understanding and 
mutual respect. Accordingly, they accepted 
the following commitments in cultural 
affairs: 

To hold in Mexico in June 1990 the VII 
meeting of the Cultural Cooperation Com- 
mission and at that meeting the two govern- 
ments will agree on their 1990-93 workplan; 
to promote visits of officials, official spokes- 
men, journalists and communications media 
specialists and the creation of data banks or 
clearing houses for public and private ex- 
changes; to restructure the Lincoln-Juarez 



lecture series to he carried out annually in 
F"ebruary and March in the United States 
and Mexico respectively; to recognize the 
importance of the border area and to pro- 
mote ties between universities and libraries 
of the area. 

The U.S. side offered to consider estab- 
lishing a Fulbright scholarship program for 
border area residents; both sides agreed to 
strengthen current scholarship programs 
and to continue supporting programs to pro- 
mote the study of the English and Spanish 
languages and literature in their respective 
countries. 

The two governments will continue 
their support for measures to safeguard the 
national heritage of both countries. The 
U.S. Government will try to identify ways 
to support the project to restore the "histor- 
ic center" of Mexico Cit.y. Both governments 
will support the organization of major ex- 
hibits in both countries as well as promote 
participation of performing groups and fes- 
tivals, particularly film festivals, in both 
countries. 



1 Press release 149 of Aug. 8, 1989. 

2 Press release 150 of Aug. 9.H 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Aviation 

Protocol for the suppression of unlawful acts 
of violence at airports serving international 
civil aviation, supplementary to the conven- 
tion of Sept. 23, 1971 (TIAS 7570). Done at 
Montreal Feb. 24, 1988. Entered into force 
Aug. 6, 1989.1 [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-19. 
Ratification deposited : Mauritius, Aug. 17, 
1989. 

Collusions 

Convention on the international regulations 

for preventing collisions at sea, 1972. Done 

at London Oct. 20, 1972. Entered into force 

July 15, 1977. TIAS 8587. 

Accession deposited : Mauritius, May 21), 

1989. 

Copyright 

Berne convention for the protection of liter- 
ary and artistic works of Sept. 9, 1886, as 
revised at Paris July 24, 1971, and amended 
in 1979. Entered into force for the U.S. 
Mar. 1, 1989. [Senate | Treaty Doc. 99-27. 
Accession deposited : Lesotho, June 27, 1989. - 

Gas 

Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war 
of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases 
an<l of bacteriological methods of warfare. 
Done at Geneva June 17, 1925. Entered into 
force Feb. 8, 1928; for the U.S. Apr. 10, 1975. 
TIAS 8061. 



Accessions deposited : Bangladesh,-* Equa-i 

torial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Laos. May;j| 

1989. 

Notification of succession deposited : 

Grenada, May 20, 1989. 

Judicial I'rocedure 

Convention on the taking of evidence abro( 
in civil or commercial matters. Done at Til 
Hague Mar. 18, 1970. Entered into force 
Oct. 7, 1972. TIAS 7444. 
Accession deposited : Mexico, July 27, 
1989. -• ■' 

Marine Pollution 

International convention on civil liability 
oil ijollution damage. Done at Brussels Nc 
29, 1969. Entered into force June 19, 1975. 
Accession deposited : St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Apr. 19, 1989. 

Protocol of 1984 to amend the Internationa 
convention on civil liability for oil pollutia 
damage, 1969. Done at London May 25, 1981 
[Senate] Treaty Doc. 99-12. 
Accession deposited : St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Apr. 19, 1989. 

Protocol of 1978 relating to the internatio 
convention for the prevention of pollution 
from ships, 1973. Done at London Feb. 17, 
1978. Entered into force Oct. 2, 1983. 
Accession deposited : Vanuatu, Apr. 13, 198!» 

Maritime Matters 

International convention on standards of 
training, certification and watchkeeping 
seafarers, 1978. Done at London July 7, 
1978. Entered into force Apr. 28, 1984. ' 
Accessions deposited : Cameroon, June 6, 
1989; Marshall Islands. Apr. 25, 1989. 

International convention on maritime sea| 
and rescue, 1979, with annex. Done at Ha 
burg Apr. 27, 1979. Entered into force 
June 22, 1985. 
Accessions deposited : Italy, June 2, 1989;, 
Trinidad and Tobago, May 4, 1989. ^ 

Convention for the suppression of unlaw^fi 
acts against the safety of maritime navig; 
tion, with protocol for the suppression of i 
lawful acts against the safety of fixed | 
platforms located on the Continental Shel . 
Done at Rome Mar. 10, igSS,-" [Senate] Tre. 
ty Doc. 101-1. 

Accession deposited : German Democratic ; 
Republic, Apr. 14, 1989. ■'• 

Pollution 

Convention for the protection of the ozone 
laver, with annexes. Done at Vienna Mar. . 
1985. Entered into force Sept. 22, 1988. [S ,• 
ate] Treaty Doc. 99-9. 
Accessions deposited : Ghana, July 24, 198 
Thailand, June 30, 1989. 

Montreal protocol on substances that de- 
plete the ozone la.ver, with annex. Done at 
Montreal Sept. 16, 1987. Entered into fori 
Jan. 1, 1989. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-10. 
Ratifications deposited : Burkina Faso, 
Julv 20, 1989; Thailand, June 30, 1989. 



84 



Department of State Bulletin/October 191 



I 



TREATIES 



r)tocol to the 1979 convention on long- 
rige transboundary air pollution (TIAS 
li41) concerning the control of emissions of 
r.'-rogen oxides or their transboundary 
f'kes. with annex. Done at Sofia Oct. 31, 
lis. J 

/ pnival deposited : France, July 20, 1989. 
Aeptance deposited : U.S.S.R., June 21, 

Pstal 

Oistitution of the Universal Postal Union, 
wh final protocol. Done at Vienna, July 10, 
l:|4; entered into force Jan. 1, 1966. TIAS 
hU. Additional protocol done at Tokyo 
4'. 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 
Ifl. TIAS 7150. Second additional protocol 
djie at Lausanne July .5, 1974. Entered into 
ftjceJan. 1, 1976. TIAS 8231. 
Aession deposited : Western Samoa, 
J,y 13, 1989. 

Tird additional protocol to the constitution 

o.:he Universal Postal Union of July 10, 1964 

CAS 5881), general regulations with an- 

r<, and the universal postal convention 

vih final protocol and detailed regulations. 

line at Hamburg July 27, 1984. Entered 

iJo force .Jan. 1, 1986; for the U.S. June 6, 

1^6. 

fjtifications deposited : Niger, Nov. 25, 

188; Togo, Jan. 25, 1989; Yugoslavia, 

ijc. 22, 1988. 

i^ cession deposited : Western Samoa, 

Jy 13, 1989. •'■ 

R ney orders and postal travellers' checks 
a-eement, with detailed regulations with 
f al protocol. Done at Hamburg July 27, 
14. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1986; for the 
IS., June 6, 1986. 

I,-;tal parcels agreement with final protocol 
al detailed regulations. Done at Hamburg 
J v 27, 1984. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1986; 
f 'the U.S. June 6, 1986. 
I tifications deposited : Niger, Nov. 25. 
H8; Togo, Jan. 25, 1989; Yugoslavia, 
Ic. 22, 1988. 

^ cession deposited : Western Samoa, 
J)yl3, 1989. 
1 

loperty — Industrial 

(invention revising the Paris convention of 
Iir. 20, 1883, as revised, for the protection 
industrial property. Done at Stockholm 
Jly 14, 1967. Entered into force Apr. 26, 
P; for the U.S. Sept. 5, 1970, except for 
Jits. 1-12 which entered into force Mav 19, 
170: for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1973. TIAS 6923, 

. cession deposited : Lesotho. June 27, 1989. ~ 

itellite Communications Systems 

(Invention on the International Maritime 
^tellite Organization (INMARSAT), with 
.■(nex. Done at London Sept. 3, 1976. En- 
ured into force July 16, 1979. TIAS 9605. 
^cession deposited : Switzerland, May 17, 
S9. 



Operating agreement on the International 
Maritime Satellite Organization 
(INMARSAT), with annex. Done at 
London Sept. 3, 1976. Entered into force 
July 16, 1979. TIAS 9605. 
Signature : Switzerland, May 17, 1989. 

Amendments to the convention and operat- 
ing agreement on the International Mar- 
itime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) 
of Sept. 3. 1976 (TIAS 9605). Adopted at 
London Oct. 16, 1985. 
Acceptances deposited : Belgium, June 15, 
1989; Egypt. June 7, 1989 (op. agt.). 
Entered into force : Oct. 13, 1989, 

Slavery 

Supplementary convention on the abolition 
of slavery, the slave trade, and institutions 
and practices similar to slavery. Done at 
Geneva Sept. 7, 1956. Entered into force 
Apr. 30, 1957; for the U.S. Dec. 6, 1967. 
TIAS 6418. 
Accession deposited ; Libya, May 16, 1989. 

Tonnage 

International convention on tonnage meas- 
urement of ships, 1969, with annexes. Done 
at London June 23, 1969. Entered into force 
Julv 18, 1982; for the U.S. Feb. 10, 1983. 
TIAS 10490. 

Accession deposited : Marshall Islands, 
Apr. 25, 1989. 

Trade 

Agreement on trade in civil aircraft. Done 
at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force 
,Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9620. 
Ratification deposited : Egypt, July 5, 1989. 

Agreement on implementation of Article 
VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade [customs valuation code]. Done at 
Geneva Apr. 12. 1979. Entered into force 
Jan. 1. 1981. TIAS 10402. 

Protocol to the agreement on implementa- 
tion of Article VII of the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva 
Dec. 1. 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1981. 
TIAS 10402. 

Acceptance deposited : Cyprus, May 24, 
1989. 



BILATERAL 

Argentina 

Agreement relating to the reciprocal accept- 
ance of airworthiness certifications. Effect- 
ed by exchange of notes at Buenos Aires 
June 22, 1989. Entered into force June 22, 
1989. 

Bangladesh 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Apr. 17, 1987, as amended, for sales of agri- 
cultural commodities. Effected by exchange 
of letters at Dhaka May 31, 1989. Entered 
into force May 31. 1989. 



Agreement amending the agreement of 
Apr. 17, 1987, as amended, for sales of agri- 
cultural commodities. Effected by exchange 
of letters at Dhaka July 24, 1989. Entered 
into force July 24, 1989. 

Bolivia 

Swap agreement between the U.S. Treas- 
ury and the Central Bank of Bolivia/ 
Government of Bolivia, with related letters. 
Signed at La Paz and Washington July 11, 
1989. Entered into force July 11, 1989. 

China 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Feb. 2, 1988, as amended, concerning trade 
in textiles and textile products. Effected by 
exchange of letters at Beijing Nov. 7. 1988, 
and .Jan. 24, 1989. Entered into force Jan. 24, 
1989; effective Jan. 1, 1989. 

Cote d'lvoire 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities. Signed at Abidjan June 21, 1989. 
Entered into force June 21. 1989. 

Dominican Republic 

Agreement amending the administrative ar- 
rangement of Dec. 18, 1986, for visa and cer- 
tification procedures relating to trade in 
textile products. Effected by exchange of 
letters at Santo Domingo Sept. 8, 1988, and 
Mar. 27, 1989. Entered into force Mar. 27, 
1989; effective Jan. 1, 1989. 

Agreement for the exchange of information 
with respect to taxes. Signed at Santo Do- 
mingo Aug. 7, 1989. Enters into force upon 
an exchange of notes confirming that both 
sides have met all constitutional and stat- 
utory requirements to effectuate this 
agreement. 

Postal money order agreement. Signed at 
Washington July 24, 1989. Entered into 
force Sept. 18, 1989. 

Egypt 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Mar. 20, 1989, for sales of agricultural com- 
modities. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Cairo July 26, 1989. Entered into force July 
26, 1989. " 

European Atomic Energy Community 
(EURATOM) 

Agreement extending the agreement of Jan. 
28, 1982 (TIAS 10338), in the field of nuclear 
material safeguards research and develop- 
ment. Signed at Washington and Brussels 
June 11 and 27, 1989. 
Entered into force June 27, 1989. 

European Economic Community (EEC) 
Agreement amending and extending the 
agreement of Oct. 1, 1984, concerning fish- 
eries off the coasts of the United States. 
Effected bv exchange of notes at Brussels 
Sept. 15, 1988, and Feb. 27, 1989. 
Entered into force : Aug. 4, 1989, effective 
from July 1, 1989. 



lepartment of State Bulletin/October 1989 



85 



TREATIES 



France 

Agreement amending and extending the 
memorandum of understanding of July 8 and 
23, 1982 (TIAS 10422). as extended, covering 
cooperation in the field of geological sci- 
ences. Signed at Washington .July 17. 1989. 
Entered into force Julv 17, 1989; effective 
July 23, 1988. 

Guatemala 

Project grant agreement for basic education 
strengthening, with annexes. Signed at 
Guatemala Julv 7. 1989. Entered into force 
July 7, 1989, 

Guyana 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Feb. 22, 1989, for sales of agricultural com- 
modities. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Georgetown July 31, 1989. Entered into 
force July 31, 1989. 

Honduras 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Feb. 9, 1989, for sales of agricultural com- 
modities. Signed at Tegucigalpa July 24, 
1989. Entered into force July 24, 1989. 

Hong Kong 

Agreement for the reciprocal exemption 
with respect to taxes on income from the in- 
ternational operation of ships. Effected by 
an exchange of notes at Hong Kong Aug. 1. 
1989. Entered into force Aug. 1, 1989. with 
respect to taxable vears on or after Jan. 1, 
1987. 

Hungary 

Agreement on the development and facilita- 
tion of tourism. Signed at Budapest July 12, 
1989. Enters into force on the date each par- 
ty has informed the other of completion of 
necessary legal requirements for entry 
into force. 

Iceland 

Agreement amending and extending the 
agreement of Sept. 21, 1984, concerning 
fisheries off the coasts of the United States. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Reykjavik 
Nov. 23, 1988, and Jan. 17, 1989. 
Entered into force : July 25, 1989, effective 
July 1, 1989, 

Korea 

Memorandum of understanding on royalty 
fees for U.S. origin defense articles. Signed 
at Washington Julv 18, 1989. Entered into 
force July 18, 1989.' 

Marshall Islands 

Supplementary agreement regarding the 
military use and operating rights of the 
■ Government of the United States and the 
Marshall Islands, with annex and agreed 
minute. Signed at Majuro June 12, 1989. 
Entered into force July 1, 1989. 



Mexico 

Agreement on maritime search and rescue. 
Signed at Mexico City Aug. 7, 1989, Enters 
into force on the date both parties communi- 
cate in writing through the diplomatic chan- 
nel that they have satisfied their necessary 
domestic legal requirements. 

Agreement for relief from double taxation 
on earnings from operation of ships and air- 
craft. Effected by exchange of notes at Mex- 
ico City Aug. 7, 1989. Entered into force 
Aug. 7', 1989. 

Norway 

Memorandum of understanding concerning a 
cooperative project on investigation of the 
ocean using radar, with annexes. Signed at 
Oslo and Arlington June 19 and July 18, 
1989. Entered into force July 18, 1989. 

Pakistan 

Agreement for the reciprocal exemption 
with respect to taxes on income from the in- 
ternational operation of ships. Effected by 
an exchange of notes at Islamabad, July 2(i 
and 27, 1989. Entered into force July 27, 
1989, with respect to taxable years begin- 
ning on or after Jan. 1, 1987, 

Philippines 

Grant agreement for the support for devel- 
opment program. Signed at Manila Aug. 1, 
1989. Entered into force Aug. 1, 1989. 

Romania 

Agreement amending the agreement of Nov. 
7 and 16, 1984. as amended, relating to trade 
in wool and manmade fiber textiles and tex- 
tile products. Effected by exchange of let- 
ters at Bucharest Dec. 28, 1988, and May 27, 
1989. Entered into force May 27, 1989. 

Sierra Leone 

Postal money order agreement. Signed 
at Freetown and Washington Mar. 29 and 
Julv 18, 1989. Entered into force Sept. 18, 
1989. 

Sudan 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
June 8, 1989, for sales of agricultural com- 
modities. Effected by exchange of diplo- 
matic note and letter at Khartoum July 28, 
1989. Entered into force July 28, 1989. 

Turkey 

Agreement amending the visa arrangement 
of Jan. 10, 1987, as amended, concerning tex- 
tiles and textile articles. Effected by ex- 
change of letters at Ankara June 29 and 
July 17, 1989. Entered into force July 17, 
1989. 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Oct. 19 and Nov. l(i, 1988, concerning trade 
in cotton and manmade fiber textiles and 
textile products. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Ankara June 30 and July 2(i, 1989. 
Entered into force July 26, 1989,' 



U.S.S.R. 

Agreement on maritime search and rescu 
with exchange of letters. Signed at Mosco 
May 31, 1988. 
Entered into force : July 3, 1989. 

Agreement concerning cooperation in cor 
batting pollution in the Bering and Chuki 
Seas in emergency situations. Signed at 
Moscow May 11, 1989. 
Entered into force : Aug. 17. 1989. 

Agreement extending the agreement of 
June 28, 1974 (TIAS 7898), on cooperation 
the field of housing and other constructio 
Effected by exchange of notes at Moscow 
May 2(j and Julv 11, 1989. Entered into foi 
July 11, 1989. 

Agreement extending the agreement of 
June 19. 1973, as amended and extended, 
(TIAS 7651). on cooperation in studies of' 
world's oceans. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Moscow June 9 and July 11, 1989. 
Entered into force July 11, 1989'. 

Agreement extending the agreement of 
June 21, 1973, as amended and extended 
(TIAS 7655, 10757), on scientific and tech; 
cal cooperation in the field of peaceful usi 
of atomic energy. Effected by exchange 
notes at Moscow June 20 and July 7. 1989. 
Entered into force Julv 7, 1989; effective 
June 20, 1989. 

United Kingdom 

Agreement extending the agreement of 
Sept. 18, 1986, as extended, concerning 
Turks and Caicos Islands and narcotics a 
tivities. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington July 20, 1989. Entered into 
force July 20. 1989; effective July 21, 
1989. 

Agreement (on behalf of the Isle of Man) 
for the reciprocal exemption with respect 
taxes on income from the international o| 
ations of ships. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Washington Aug. 1 and 15, 1989. , 
tered into force Aug. 15, 1989, with respe' 
to taxable vears beginning on or after 
Jan. 1, 1987. 



> Not in force for the U.S. | 

- With declaration(s). | 

■* With reservation(s). j, 

■■ Not in force. 

'■ Does not accept optional annexes II 
IV, and V. ■ 



86 



Department of State Bulletin/October 19i 



'JDEX 



(ctober1989 
olume 89, No. 2151 



i ms Control 

CE Talks End Round Two (Ledogar) ... 75 
Preign Policy Implications of Biological 

Aeapons (Holmes) 22 

Mtus of the Defense and Space Talks 

Cuoper) 20 

£jtu.s of the Strategic Arms Reduction 

Talks (Burt) 17 

jSstralia 

/stralia— A Profile 61 

tit of Australian Prime Minister (Bush, 
[awke) 60 

itiiation 

Nation's Role in Shaping Today's World 

McAllister) ". 33 

Cmmission on Aviation Security and Ter- 

forism Formed (White House 

statement) 68 

Mgaria. Ethnic Turks in Bulgaria (NATO 

ind Department statements) 43 

(mbodia. International Conference on 

[■ambodia Held in Paris (Baker, 

.statement) 25 

(inada 

(jnada 7 

IS. -Canada Free Trade Agreement 1 

C|ina. U.S. Response to Changes in China 

iWilliams) 27 

Clumbia 

Jiergency Package for Colombia's Drug 

Mght (Bush) 47 

I -5. Travel Advisory for Columbia 

Department statement) 77 

Cngress 

%i Challenge of the European Landscape 

If the 1990s (Eagleburger) 37 

Cba and Narcotics Trafficking 

Levitsky) 46 

Fj-eign Policy Implications of Biological 

Veapons (Holmes) 22 

rX Coproduction Prohibition Disapproved 

j)y President (letter to the Senate) .... 32 
Gbal Narcotics Cooperation and Presiden- 

ial Certification (Wrobleski) 49 

I- man Rights Situation in Cuba 

Schifter) 41 

Fjposal to Sell F-16s to Pakistan 

Schaffer) 65 

IS. Diplomacy in the Middle East 

Kelly) ....'. 44 

IS. Response to Changes in China 

Williams) 27 

Cba 

Cba and Narcotics Trafficking 

;Levitsky) 46 

Fman Rights Situation in Cuba 

Schifter) 41 

Cechoslovakia. Anniversary of Warsaw 

[*act Invasion of Czechoslovakia (Depart- 

iient statement) 40 

Fvironment 

13. Ratifies Treaty to Reduce Smog Pollu- 

,ant (White House statement) 36 

virld Environment Day (Bush) 36 

I rope. The Challenge of the European 

landscape of the 1990s (Eagleburger) . . 37 
frmany. Anniversary of the Berlin Wall 

Bush) 41 



Human Rights 

Ethnic Turks in Bulgaria (NATO and De- 
partment statements) 43 

Helsinki Human Rights Day, 1989 
(proclamation) 42 

Human Rights Situation in Cuba 
(Schifter) 41 

Japan. FSX Coproduction Prohibition Dis- 
approved by President (letter to the 
Senate) 32 

Korea. U.S. Relations With Korea 30 

Marshall Islands. U.S. Establishes Diplo- 
matic Relations With Marshall Islands 
and Micronesia (Bush) 62 

Mexico. U.S.-Me.xico Binational Commis- 
sion Meets in Mexico City (Baker, Solana, 
joint communique) 76 

Micronesia. U.S. Establishes Diplomatic 
Relations With Marshall Islands and 
Micronesia (Bush) 62 

Middle East 

American Hostages in the Middle East 
(Bush, Khalifa, White House 
statements) 66 

President's News Conference of August 15 
(e.xcerpts) 13 

U.S. Diplomacy in the Middle East 
(Kelly) ....". 44 

Narcotics 

Cuba and Narcotics Trafficking 
(Levitsky) 46 

Emergency Package for Colombia's Drug 
Fight (Bush) 47 

Global Narcotics Cooperation and Presiden- 
tial Certification (Wrobleski) 49 

President's News Conference of August 15 
(excerpts) 13 

Nicaragua. Security Council Adopts Reso- 
lution on Central American Peace (Okun, 
text of resolution) 73 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

The Challenge of the European Landscape 
of the 1990s (Eagleburger) 37 

Ethnic Turks in Bulgaria (NATO and 
Department statements) 43 

Pakistan 

Proposal to Sell F-16s to Pakistan 
(Schaffer) 65 

Visit of Pakistan's Prime Minister 
(Bhutto, Bush) 63 

Panama. President's News Conference of 
August 15 (excerpts) 13 

Poland 

Food Aid to Poland (Bush) 38 

Polish Parliament Approves New Prime 
Minister (Bush) 38 

Presidential Documents 

Anniversary of the Berlin Wall 41 

Emergency Package for Colombia's Drug 
Fight..". 47 

Food Aid to Poland 38 

FSX Coproduction Prohibition Disapproved 
by President (letter to the Senate) 32 

Helsinki Human Rights Day, 1989 
(proclamation) 42 

Polish Parliament Approves New Prime 
Minister 38 

President's News Conference of August 15 
(excerpts) 13 

Steel Trade Liberalization Program 35 

U.S. Establishes Diplomatic Relations 
With Marshall Islands and Micronesia . . 62 



Visit of Australian Prime Minister 
(Bush, Hawke) 60 

Visit of Pakistan's Prime Minister 
(Bhutto. Bush) 63 

Visit of Zaire's President (Bush, Mobutu) 15 

World Environment Day 36 

Refugees. Indochinese Refugees Conference 
Held in Geneva (Eagleburger, texts of dec- 
laration and plan of action) 69 

Terrorism 

American Hostages in the Middle East 
(Bush, Khalifa, White House 
statements) 66 

Commission on Aviation Security and Ter- 
rorism Formed (White House 
statement) 68 

President's News Conference of August 15 
(excerpts) 13 

Trade 

Steel Trade Liberalization Program 
(Bush) 35 

U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement 1 

Treaties 

Current Actions 84 

U.S. Ratifies Treaty to Reduce Smog Pollu- 
tant (White House statement) 36 

U.S.S.R. 

Secretary, Soviet Foreign Minister Meet in 
Paris ." 39 

Status of the Defense and Space Talks 
(Cooper) 20 

Status of the Strategic Arms Reduction 
Talks (Burt) 17 

United Nations 

The Concept of the "Unitary UN" 
(Bolton) 74 

Indochinese Refugees Conference Held in 
Geneva (Eagleburger, texts of declaration 
and plan of action) 69 

Security Council Adopts Resolution on 
Central American Peace (Okun, text of 
resolution ) 73 

Warsaw Pact. Anniversary of Warsaw Pact 
Invasion of Czechoslovakia (Department 
statement ) 40 

Zaire 

Visit of Zaire's President (Bush, Mobutu) 15 

Zaire — A Profile 16 



Name Index 

Baker, Secretary 25,76 

Bhutto, Mohtrama Benazir 63 

Bolton, -John R 74 

Burt, Richard R 17 

Bush, President 13,15,32,35,36,38, 

41,42,47,60,62,63,66 

Cooper, Henry F 20 

Eagleburger, Lawrence S 37,69 

Hawke, Robert J L 60 

Holmes, H. Allen 22 

Kelly, .John H 44 

Khalifa, Mohammad bin Mubarak al- .... 66 

Levitsky, Melvyn 46 

McAllister, Eugene J 33 

Mobutu Sese Seko 15 

Okun, Herbert S 73 

Schaffer, Teresita 65 

Schifter, Richard 41 

Solana Morales, Fernando 76 

Williams, Richard L 27 

Wrobleski, Ann B 49 



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^ Departni4»nt 

ouUetEn 


'he Official Monthly Record of United States Foreian Policy / Volume 89 / Number 2152 


.3:89/2152 

eartment of State BuUeti... Noyombor 1989 
I 










i 


GOVER;iM£i;rDCGu^ic;;TSD;r'; :'m \ 


ii\ 




The Wyoming Ministerial 




Df»partnt4»ni of Siatp 

bulletin 



Volume 89 / Number 2152 / November 1989 



The Department uf State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public Com- 
munication in the Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. It.s purpose is to provide 
the public, the Conj^ress, and govern- 
ment agencies with information on de- 
velopments in U.S. foreign relations 
and the work of the Department of 
State and the Foreign Service. The 
Bulletins contents include major ad- 
dresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; se- 
lected press releases issued by the 
White House, the Department, and the 
U.S. Mission to the United Nations; 
and treaties and other agreements to 
which the United States is or may be- 
come a party. Special features, articles, 
and other supportive material (such as 
maps, charts, photographs, and graphs) 
are published frequently to provide ad- 
ditional information on current issues 
but should not necessarily be inter- 
preted as official U.S. policy 
statements. 



JAMES A. BAKER, III 

Secretary of State 

MARGARET DeB. TUTWILER 

Assistant Secretary 
for Public Affairs 

ANTHONY A. DAS 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

MARILYN J. BREMNER 

Assistant Editor 



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the publication of this periodical is necessary 
in the transaction of the public business re- 
quired by law of this Department. Use of 
funds for printing this periodical has been 
approved by the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget through Septem- 
ber 30, 1990. 



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I 



CONTENTS 




he President 

Outlines of a New World of 
Freedom 



he Secretary 

I News Briefings in New York 
3 News Conference of Septem- 
,1 ber 19 



frica 

) Independence Process in 

Namibia (Herman J. Cohen) 
I South African Elections 
j (Department Statement) 

rms Control 

i Conference Against Chemical 

Weapons (Richard A. Clarke) 

i CFE and CSBM Talks Open 
Round Three (White House 
Statement) 

ast Asia 



J 



Cambodia and Vietnam: 
Trapped in an Eddy of His- 
tory? (Richard H. Solomon) 

Visit of Japanese Prime Minis- 
ter (President Bush, Toshiki 
Kaifu) 



FEATURE 

1 The Wyoming Ministerial 

(Secretary Baker, Eduard A. Shevardnadze, 
Texts of Joint Statements and Agreements) 



Economics 



53 



55 



Uruguay Round and U.S. Trade 
Policy: A Foundation for the 
Future (Carla A. Hills) 

Trade-Related Aspects of Intel- 
lectual Property Rights 
(Carla A. Hills) 



Europe 

59 



60 



60 



U.S. Recalls Ambassador to 
Bulgaria (Department 
Statemeyit) 

Polish Parliament Approves 
New Government (Depart- 
ment Statement) 

Additional Food and Commodity 
Assistance to Poland 
(President Bush) 



International Law 

60 Update on U.S. -Iran Claims 

Settlement (State Department 
Fact Sheet) 



Middle East 



61 



62 



Recent Events in the Middle 
East (John H. Kelly) 

U.S. Diplomats Evacuated 
From Beirut (Department 
Statement) 



Refugees 

63 U.S., Vietnam Agree on Em- 
igration of Detainees (Joint 
Statement) 



Terrorism 

64 The Japanese Red Army 

(Fact Sheet) 



United Nations 

66 Security Council Permanent 
Members Discuss Interna- 
tional Issues (Joint State- 
ment) 

Western Hemisphere 

67 
69 
69 
75 
78 



The OAS and the Panama Crisis 

(Laivrence S. Eagleburger, 

Declaration) 
U.S. Severs Diplomatic Contact 

With Noriega Regime 

(President Bush) 
Economic Measures Against 

Panama (Department 

Statement) 
Cuba: A Threat to Peace and 

Security in Our Hemisphere 

(Michael G. Kozak) 
Colombia Drug Dealers' 

Campaign of Intimidation 

(Department Statement) 



Treaties 

79 Current Actions 

Press Releases 

80 Department of State 

Publications 

81 Department of State 

82 Background Notes 



Index 




c 




^ I 



Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze with the Grand Tetons in the 
background. 



(Department of State photos by Robert Kaiser) 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1£3 




The Wyoming Ministerial 



Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A. 
levardnadze met with President 
ish at the White House on Septem- 
r21, 1989, and then accompanied 
cretary Baker to Jackson Hole, 
yoming, for a ministerial session 
■ptember 22-23. 

Following are remarks made by 
cretary Baker and Foreign Minister 
tevardnadze on various occasions 
{ring the visit, the texts of the joint 
itements, and the texts of the 
reements they signed. 



3cretary's 
News Conference, 
ie White House, 
3pt. 21, 1989^ 

'e just come from, as you know, the 
■esident's meeting with [Foreign] 
inister Shevardnadze. I have a brief 
iitement that I'd like to give you and 
len I'll be glad to take your questions. 

The discussion in the meeting 
l:used on five topics; 

First, a summit; 

Second, recent internal events in 
Ie Soviet Union; 

Third, regional conflicts around 
Ie world; 

Fourth, human rights; and 

Fifth, the letter on arms control 
'lich [Foreign] Minister Shevardnadze 
ilivered from President Gorbachev to 
I'esident Bush. 

With respect to a summit, let me 
'nply say that there was a full discus- 
■)n of a summit. As I think perhaps 
(e [Foreign] Minister told you out on 
e driveway, we hope to have a general 
neframe for a summit which we could 
inounce during the time that we're in 
yoming. 



President Gorbachev's letter is a 
reply to a letter that President Bush 
sent him 3 months ago. In President 
Bush's letter, he communicated his de- 
sire to make progress on our full arms 
control agenda. His letter also covered 
the key principles that President Bush 
thought should guide us in pursuing 
strategic arms control. The President 
wrote of the need to reduce the risk of 
war through enhancing strategic stabil- 
ity, especially by working "in these ne- 
gotiations to remove any incentive to 
attack first." In line with this, the 
President also wrote, "We must work to 
ensure that the forces that remain af- 
ter an agreement are survivable." 

In response the Gorbachev letter 
covers the range of arms control issues. 
It is a detailed and technical reply. Our 
experts are studying its contents seri- 
ously, and we e.xpect to be discussing 
that letter in some detail in Wyoming. 

Let me make a couple of general 
points, if I might, about the implica- 
tions of the letter and then I'll be glad 
to respond to your questions. 

President Gorbachev shares Presi- 
dent Bush's concern with increasing 
strategic stability and ensuring surviv- 
ability. He also agrees with President 
Bush's emphasis on improved verifica- 
tion measures. And in Wyoming, we 
hope to make substantial progress on 
the verification and stability measures 
which we propose for START [strategic 
arms reduction talks] in June. 

President Gorbachev also agrees 
with President Bush that we must move 
forward to ban chemical weapons from 
the face of the Earth. In this regard, 
the memorandum of understanding, 
which we hope to conclude in Wyoming 
on exchanges of chemical weapons data, 
represents a serious step forward. 

In closing, let me simply say that I 
think the letter generally represents a 
positive response to President Bush's 
letter. We believe that while the nego- 



tiations are complex and many difficult 
issues still have to be resolved, we're 
very hopeful that real progress will 
continue to be made on the full range 
of our arms control agenda. 

Q. [Foreign Minister] Shevard- 
nadze said that the Americans pre- 
sented some new and interesting 
ideas. Can you help us and tell us 
what they were? 

A. I think I alluded to some of those 
in my press conference a day or so ago 
at the State Department. We have, of 
course, mentioned before the President's 
"open skies" proposal. We have talked 
about the possibility of reaching a 
memorandum of understanding on chem- 
ical weapons. We have talked about the 
possibility of progress on the nuclear 
testing talks which would permit us to 
move forward with the Threshold Test 
Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear 
Explosions Treaty — perhaps get those in 
shape some time next year to send to the 
Senate. These are two treaties that 
we've been abiding by for 15 years and 
that we haven't been able to get in shape 
to send to the Senate. These are some of 
the things, I think, that perhaps he was 
talking about. 

Q. I think he was talking about 
START; it seemed that he was. Did 
you present a new proposal on START 
outside of the banning of the mobiles? 

A. Nothing that I didn't refer to in 
my press conference of a day or so ago. 

Q. What is your timeframe for a 
summit? I mean, you must have some 
ideas as well as — 

A. We do, and we hope we'll be able 
to give you that timeframe in Wyoming. 
I'm not prepared to give it to you here 
today. 

Q. Would it be this year? 

A. I'm not prepared to give it to you 
here today. 



Apartment of State Bulletin/November 1989 




Q. Can you give us a further 
briefing on what was said on these in- 
ternal events in the Soviet Union — 
what position the United States took, 
and what you sought in today's 
meeting? 

A. The President made it very clear 
that we have a deep interest in what's 
going on in the Soviet Union. He re- 
stated our commitment to the success 
of perestroika, our desire to see per- 
estroika succeed. He indicated that he 
thought that the Soviet Union had pro- 
ceeded very responsibly and in a very 
measured way with respect to changes 
that are taking place, not just in the So- 
viet Union but in Eastern Europe as 
well. He e.xpressed our desire to see 
that type of an approach continue. 

There was a full discussion by both 
President Bush and the Foreign Minister 
of the economic situation in the Soviet 
Union. We will be discussing that in a 
great deal more detail tonight, as a 
matter of fact, on the airplane as we 
fly to Wyoming. 

Q. Baltic states come up? 

A. As such, they did not, no. 
Specifically, they did not come up. 

Q. Was there any discussion ei- 
ther from the President or you or 
Shevardnadze as to how the United 
States might help Gorbachev succeed 
with perestroika! 

A. This meeting was about an hour 
long in the Cabinet Room, and then 
there was a smaller meeting that went 
on for maybe another 30 minutes or so. 
During the course of that time, we didn't 
get into that level of detail, but I e.xpect 
to get into that level of detail with the 
Foreign Minister during the course of 
this ministerial, as I did during the last 
ministerial. And I think perhaps we'll be 
able to give you a more complete fill on 
what they think we can do to help, and 
what we think we can do to help. 

There are a number of things I can 
tell you now: a stable international en- 
vironment is one thing; assistance with 
respect to their economic problems is 
another, and I don't mean — and there 
was a statement generally to the effect 



in this meeting that they didn't look for 
an economic assistance package but 
technical advice with respect to their 
economy, how can they move after 70 
years to more of an open economy and 
more of a free-market system. 

I mean, those kinds of discussions 
took place today. We will go into a lot 
more detail in part tonight, as a matter 
of fact, as we fly to Wyoming. 

Q. On this question of what it is 
that changed Mr. Shevardnadze's po- 
sition, he said he hadn't really com- 
plained about the President moving 
too slowly but that he did have con- 
cerns about the Geneva talks — and in 
his words, "Now I see certain inter- 
esting suggestions which mean criti- 
cism helped." 

Obviously, he's taken you to task 
on something, and you've answered 
his concern. Can you give us some 
idea of what this was? 

A. I don't know that I would totally 
agree with that characterization. What 
we have here is the Soviets respond- 
ing to a June 20th letter from the 
President — responding on the 21st of 
September. We still are awaiting a com- 
plete response to the President's conven- 
tional forces initiative. So I don't believe 
it's a case of our doing all the responding. 

Q. There must be something that 
has turned his view around. 

A. I don't know. 

Q. He's not saying it's because he 
brought you a letter. It's something 
you did that makes him feel better. 

A. I don't know. Maybe he will en- 
lighten us on what it is that we've done 
that's made him so happy. But I would 
refer you to him. I can't answer that 
question. 

Q. Outside [Foreign] Minister 
Shevardnadze mentioned a whole list 
of arms control topics that are in this 
letter. He mentioned particularly 
strategic offensive nuclear missiles 
and the ABM lAntiballistic Missile] 
Treaty issue. Have you evaluated 
what [General] Secretary Gorbachev 
has said in this letter, and can you 
give us your sense of how much move- 
ment there really is in this letter on 
arms control issues? 



A. The letter is very detailed. It i 
also very technical. And it does cover 1 
full range of arms control issues, all th 
way from chemical and "open skies" an 
START and nuclear testing and convei 
tional. It's a fairly long letter. 

With respect to the subject that y 
mention, I think it's going to require a 
bit more analysis, but we will be discu 
ing that in detail with them in Wyo- 
ming. Let me simply say that the lette 
in some instances, restates long-held S 
viet positions. In some instances, it pi 
new twists on those positions. 

Q. Did the President bring up t 
foot-dragging charge and express h 
objections to that charge? 

A. No, he did not. 

Q. This week [President] Bush 
was saying he's in no rush for a sum 
mit. What happened for you all sud< 
denly to decide that the time was 
right to set a date for — or a general 
timeframe — for a summit? Did She> 
ardnadze's visit — 

A. I don't think the two statemen ' 
are inconsistent. We've been talking. ^ 
had a discussion with respect to a sum 
mit when I last met [Foreign] Ministe: 
Shevardnadze in Paris at the Cambodi 
conference. The question of a summit 
comes up in our meetings. I don't thin 
it's inconsistent for the President to sa 
he's in no rush and for me to tell you I 
hope to be able to give you a general 
timeframe when we get to Wyoming. 

Q. Where will it be? The Unitei 
States? 

A. That hadn't been decided, but 

believe it's our turn. That bridge hasn' 
been crossed. First, let's decide when 
we're going to have it. But I think it's 
our turn. 

Q. Did the President and the Fc 
eign Minister discuss the possibilit) 
of additional U.S. aid to Poland and 
Hungary, and what the Soviet atti- 
tude would be toward that? i 

A. No, that was not discussed spei 
cifically, although I believe there is a 
general understanding and approval b} 



Department of State Bulletin/November 19' 




Wyoming Ministerial 




esident Bush, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, and Secretary Baker at the White 

)use. 



e Soviets of the manner in which we 
\e approached the dynamic changes 
at are taking place in Eastern 
arope. 

Q. Were you suggesting that 
ere was nothing dramatically new 
1 arms control in the Gorbachev — 

A. No, I'm not suggesting that at 
I. I'm just simply saying that it is a 
iig letter. It is detailed. It is technical, 
covers the full range of arms control 
sues. In some instances, there are re- 
ated positions. In some, however, there 
e new twists, and we'll just have to — 
? just got it. So we'll have to get into 
e details a little bit later on. 

Q. Can you say whether there 
as an exchange on Nicaragua and, if 

.A. There was, indeed, an exchange 
1 Nicaragua. As I mentioned in my 
leiiing statement, the President and 
le I Foreign] Minister talked about I'e- 
iiiial conflicts. They talked specifically 
iijut regional conflicts in Afghanistan 
id in Nicaragua. 



Q. What about the Middle 
East now? 

A. The Middle East was mentioned, 
but we didn't have time to get into that 
in detail. I hope to do that with the 
[Foreign] Minister. 

Q. On the question of internal 
problems, was there any suggestion 
by the President or by you of what 
might occur if there is a crackdown of 
any sort in either the Baltics or the 
Ukraine or Baku? 

A. No, there was no discussion in 
this meeting of that subject. I would an- 
ticipate that there would be a discussion 
in Wyoming on that. 

Q. Were you given any assur- 
ances on Nicaragua? 

A. We were given certain represen- 
tations with respect to weaponry that 
was not being shipped into Nicaragua by 
the Soviet Union, and we made the point 
that, notwithstanding that, shipments 
from the Soviet bloc, taken as a whole, 
have not diminished; that this repre- 



sented a problem to us, and we will be 
discussing that in quite some more de- 
tail in Wyoming as well. 

Q. You at least had enough chance 
to see this lengthy letter from Gor- 
bachev to be able to distinguish be- 
tween longstanding positions and new 
twists that are in it. Can you tell us 
what some of these new twists may 
be, and does the ABM Treaty — their 
position on the ABM Treaty — fall in 
the category of longstanding position 
or the category of new twists? 

A. I think that's going to depend on 
a bit more analysis. In some respects, 
there's some ambiguity in the letter, and 
in the space of a 1-hour meeting, we did 
not have time to get into that level of de- 
tail. We will do so. I'm not in a position 
to tell you that right now. 

Q. Are you talking about weap- 
ons that are being shipped, not from 
the Soviet Union then but from Cuba 
into Nicaragua and that you asked 
the Soviets to give us specific assur- 
ance that they will see to it that the 
Cubans stop those shipments? 

A. The answer to both questions 
is yes. 

Q. Did they say they would? 

A. They demur a bit on that, and 
they take the position that they can't to- 
tally control what happens with respect 
to Cuba. 

Q. Do you believe that? 

A. We have some difficulty with 
that. [Laughter] 

Q. If you're agreeing to move in 
concept toward a summit — toward 
setting a date — why? What would be 
the business, the goals, of the next 
summit? 

A. I think it's important that the 
leaders of the Soviet IJnion and the 
United States get together periodically. 
It will have been some time, if we're 
looking at something into next year — 
and I'm not saying that that's the 
timeframe we're going to give you in 
Wyoming — but I think it's important 
that they get together from time to time 
and talk about the full range of the prob- 
lems between these two countries. 



jepartment of State Bulletin/November 1989 




We have a very broad agenda. It's 
broader, quite frankly, than simply 
arms control. A lot of this meeting was 
spent on regional conflicts, and I think 
the President feels that he could pro- 
ductively spend time talking about 
these issues face to face with the leader 
of the Soviet Union. 

Q. Would it be solely to exchange 
ideas or to do business? 

A. Let's first decide when, if, and 
where we're going to have one, and then 
we'll talk about what it will accomplish. 

Q. Was Yeltsin's [Boris Yeltsin, a 
member of the Soviet Union's Con- 
gress of People's Deputies] visit men- 
tioned or even discussed at all? 

A. It was indirectly alluded to. 

Q. By whom? 

A. I think it was alluded to by the 
other side. 

Q. What was said? 

A. There are some things that I'm 
not going to repeat out of that meeting. 
[Laughter] 

Q. These new twists you talk 
about, can you say whether these 
would represent concessions of some 
sort by the Soviets, or are they simply 
just a new way of restating — 

A. I think some of them could be 
characterized that way, but I don't mean 
to brand all of them that way. Let me 
again say that this is a very serious let- 
ter. It's received by us in a serious man- 
ner It will require a lot of detailed 
analysis, because it is a very detailed 
and technical letter. 

Q. Can you say which area was 
the most — 

A. I really don't — I would hate to 
make that, because it could be that there 
would be a different area that would be 
more promising. 

Q. After today's meeting and af- 
ter looking at Gorbachev's letter, 
could you characterize where you 
think U.S. -Soviet relations stand 
right now, and where you think 
they're headed? 



A. I think there has been, in the re- 
cent past, a general improvement in the 
relationship between the United States 
and Soviet Union. I know we are fully 
engaged across a broadened agenda. The 
agenda has been broadened, as I said the 
other day, at the suggestion of the Unit- 
ed States. We're talking to the Soviet 
Union now about things that we never 
dreamed not long ago that we would be 
talking to them about — counterter- 
rorism, drugs, the environment, these 
transnational problems. 

We are into a great deal more depth 
with them, I think, on these regional is- 
sues than we used to be. I think the rela- 
tionship is moving forward positively. 
Sure we have some problems between 
us, and this was pointed out by both the 
President and the [Foreign] Minister 
during the course of this discussion. 

Q. Both you and the President 
have said recently that you'd like to 
see perestroika succeed. Your Deputy 
[Secretary of State Lawrence S. 
Eagleburger] recently said it's not 
necessary for Gorbachev to succeed, 
or at least he indicated that. Does the 
Administration differentiate between 
the two? Can perestroika succeed 
without Gorbachev? 

A. That's a hypothetical that I don't 
choose to answer. Let me simply put it 
to you this way. It is the position of 
the President, the position of the Ad- 
ministration, that we want perestroika 
to succeed, and we'd like to see the Gen- 
eral Secretary succeed as well, because 
we think, frankly, that his success is 
very important in whether or not per- 
estroika succeeds. 



Arrival Statements, 
Jackson Hole, 
Sept. 21, 1989^ 

Secretary Baker. I want to tell you 
how delighted I am to be here in this 
wonderful country. This area has long 
attracted me, and as many of you know, 
I have decided to put down a few roots 
in a ranch not too far away. The Grand 
Teton National Park and the town of 



Jackson Hole are living tributes, I 
think, to the foresight of Americans, 
who saw in this natural beauty an en 
during value that should be preserve 

Now we are about to intrude on 
this protected habitat with the diplo- 
matic concerns of the United States 
and the Soviet Union. Yet we may be 
able to say that we who gather here a ) 
have our eyes on the future. We want ) 
preserve and to strengthen the impr( 
ing international environment. We 
want to leave as a legacy for our chil- 
dren and our children's children a spi t 
of openness between our two countri 
May I say, Mr. Minister, that like Pa' i 
Jackson, who pioneered here so loii,t;- 
ago, we hope to clear new paths and 4 
plore new territory in the search for 
better relations. 

And now, ladies and gentlemen, [ 
please accept our thanks for this ver 
warm welcome, and we look forward 
an enjoyable and productive time her 
Thank you all, very much. 

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze 

First of all, I would like to thank the 
Secretary of State whose kind invita 
tion is making it possible for us to ho 
these negotiations in such unusual coi 
ditions. We are grateful to the authoi 
ties of the State of Wyoming for theii 
hospitality and to the many members 
of the press for the great interest tha 
they are showing toward our meeting 

Today a good beginning has been 
given to our work. We had a meeting 
with President George Bush, to whor 
we have conveyed the letter from Mik 
hail Gorbachev dealing with importai 
problems of arms control and arms re 
duction. I think that I will e.xpress th 
common view if I say that, today, we 
see the emergence of fairly good pros 
pects for moving forward in that ver> 
important area and in other areas of 
the Soviet-American relationship. 

I also think that today we see son 
good prerequisites for bringing our r 
lationship to a qualitatively new level, 
and I hope that the coming days will 
move us closer to that goal. We need 
fresh ideas, and, hopefully, the fresh 
mountain air of Wyoming will help 
them to emerge and to develop. We 
need specific deeds for the benefit of 
both sides, and as I understand from 



Department of State Bulletin/November 191 




Wyoming Ministerial 



r conversation with the President and 
%m my talk with the Secretary of 
ate aboard the plane, the American 
ie believes that too. I hope that by 
;b time our negotiations end, we will 
:i able to report to you some important 
gotiations, and we will be able to re- 
rt to you some important agree- 
!nts, because were it to turn out that 
have gone this far just to talk, that 
uld be just unforgivable, and, there- 
\e, we are looking forward to results. 
j Thank you for your welcome, 
iank you for the warm reception. 



acretary's Statement, 
enary Session, 
ickson Hole, 
jpt. 22, 1989^ 

t me begin by welcoming you and 
Ijr party here to Wyoming. Obvi- 
lily it's somewhat unusual to hold a 
jnisterial in a place like this, but 

s, I think, is in keeping with our 
'icussions in Moscow about moving 
|; site of the ministerials outside of 
ir nation's capitals. 

I hope you can see this morning 
ly I happen to love this area and this 
:ting, and I think it's one of the most 
autiful and majestic parts of the 
nerican West, and I wanted you and 
ur party to have an opportunity to 
b that. 

I also think that there is something 
mbolic about a meeting in this kind 
'unusual place. I really believe that 
lations between the United States 
;d the Soviet Union are entering a 
[w phase. I believe, and I think most 
iiuld agree, that there is a new open- 
ss and candor in our relationship, 
d I think, hopefully, we'll be able 

take some steps that are unprece- 
nted. So it shouldn't be unusual for 

to take the unprecedented step of 
eeting in a place like this. 



Joint Statement, 
Sept. 23, 1989 

Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, 
and Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shev- 
ardnadze met September 22-23 [1989] in 
Jackson Hole, Wyoming, for discus- 
sions on the entire spectrum of U.S.- 
Soviet relations, in the course of the 
Foreign Minister's official visit to the 
United States. 

The Foreign Minister also had a 
discussion with President Bush on Sep- 
tember 21 at the White House, where 
he delivered a letter from Chairman 
Gorbachev which contained new ideas 
and proposals on security questions. 
They had a wide-ranging e.xchange of 
views on the overall direction and 
prospects for development of the 
U.S. -Soviet relationship. 

The two sides attach great signifi- 
cance to contacts between U.S. and So- 
viet leaders in the development of the 
U.S. -Soviet dialogue at this important 
and promising point in U.S. -Soviet re- 
lations. Based on earlier understand- 
ings between President Bush and 
Chairman Gorbachev, the sides agreed 
that the next U.S. -Soviet summit 
meeting will take place in the United 
States in late spring-early summer 
1990. 

Both sides agree that their com- 
mon goal is to build a more stable, con- 
structive, and sustainable relationship, 
one in which openness and cooperation 
increasingly replace mistrust and com- 
petition. While significant differences 
remain on certain issues, the Secre- 
tary and the Foreign Minister believe 
that — with continuing efforts and 
shared commitment to a candid dia- 
logue aimed at finding practical and 
concrete solutions — it will be possible 
to further and broaden the progress 
that has been made in recent years in 
U.S. -Soviet relations. 

Toward this end, the discussions in 
Jackson Hole were productive and seri- 
ous. They were complemented by the 
efforts of experts' working groups on 
all parts of the five-part agenda, both 
in Wyoming and preceding the minis- 
terial in Washington. The Secretary 



and the Foreign Minister reached spe- 
cific agreements in several areas and 
defined new directions for work in 
other areas. 

I. The Secretary and the Foreign 
Minister held a thorough and produc- 
tive review on the range of arms con- 
trol and disarmament issues. They 
noted with satisfaction that, since their 
May meeting in Moscow, the nuclear 
and space talks, nuclear testing talks, 
and bilateral consultations on chemical 
weapons have resumed. 

The Secretary and the Foreign 
Minister had a detailed discussion of 
nuclear and space issues, including the 
ideas contained in the letters ex- 
changed by President Bush and Chair- 
man Gorbachev. 

Regarding ABM [antiballistic mis- 
siles] and space, the Soviet side in- 
troduced a new approach aimed at 
resolving this significant issue. Both 
sides agree that the Soviet approach 
opens the way to achieving and imple- 
menting a START [strategic arms re- 
duction talks] treaty without reaching 
a defense and space agreement. The 
sides agreed to drop the approach of a 
nonwithdrawal commitment while con- 
tinuing to discuss ways to ensure pre- 
dictability in the development of the 
U.S. -Soviet strategic relationship un- 
der conditions of strategic stability to 
reduce the risk of nuclear war. The 
U.S. side said it would consider care- 
fully the other aspects of the overall 
Soviet approach. Both sides agreed 
that their negotiators would consider 
these issues in Geneva. They also 
agreed that the negotiators would dis- 
cuss the U.S. invitation for Soviet 
Government experts to visit two U.S. 
facilities involved in strategic defense 
research. 

The Soviet side stated that, guided 
by its longstanding goal of strengthen- 
ing the ABM Treaty regime, it had de- 
cided to completely dismantle the 
Krasnoyarsk radar station. The U.S. 
side expressed satisfaction with this 
announcement. 



apartment of State Bulletin/November 1989 




At the same time, the Soviet side 
stressed again the necessity of remov- 
ing its concerns about the U.S. radar 
stations in Greenland and Great Brit- 
ain. The U.S. side promised to consider 
these concerns, in consultation with its 
allies. 

In the interest of promoting prog- 
ress in the negotiations, the Secretary 
announced that the U.S. side was with- 
drawing its proposal to ban mobile 
ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic mis- 
siles] in START, contingent on the 
funding by the U.S. Congress of U.S. 
mobile ICBMs. The Soviet side ex- 
pressed satisfaction with this announce- 
ment, and the two sides agreed on the 
need further to develop provisions for 
effective verification for limits on mo- 
bile ICBMs. In this connection, they 
also reached agreement on additional 
elements of common ground regarding 
the verification of mobile ICBMs, 
building on the elements agreed at the 
Moscow summit and subsequent work 
in Geneva. 

Both sides noted the need to re- 
solve the ALCM [air-launched cruise 
missile] and SLCM [sea-launched 
cruise missile] issues. On ALCMs, the 
Soviet side put forward a new idea con- 
cerning its approach on how to deal 
with ALCMs and heavy bombers. 

On SLCMs, the Soviet side offered 
new approaches for dealing with this 
difficult problem. The Soviet side 
raised the possibility of dealing with 
SLCMs in a broader naval arms con- 
text. As for the nuclear and space 
talks, the Soviet side appealed to the 
American side to concentrate on veri- 
fication and said that in the context of a 
verification system for SLCMs, these 
weapons could be limited outside of the 
text of a START treaty on the basis of 
reciprocal obligations. While reiterat- 
ing its willingness to study the Soviet 
ideas, the U.S. side, for its part, em- 
phasized its doubts about the feasibility 
of a workable verification system for 
SLCMs and noted its longstanding 
view that there are serious problems 
involved in any discussion of the limita- 
tion of naval arms. 




Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and his advisers 



The Soviet side responded pos- 
itively to President Bush's June initia- 
tive on verification and stability 
measures. In this regard, the Secre- 
tary and the Foreign Minister had a 
thorough exchange on the details of the 
initiative and signed an agreement en- 
couraging the development of such 
measures and outlining principles for 
implementing them. They also com- 
pleted an agreement on the advance 
notification of major strategic exer- 
cises. The sides examined the other 
verification and stability measures 
and agreed to explore these further 
in Geneva. 

The sides also agreed that, for pur- 
poses of the 1,600 START limit, ballis- 
tic missiles will be defined in terms of 
missiles and their associated launchers, 
thus resolving a longstanding issue. 

New instructions will be issued to 
negotiators to take account of the ex- 
changes on these and other START 
issues. 

The Secretary and the Foreign 
Minister reaffirmed the objective of 
early conclusion of a comprehensive, 
verifiable, and truly global ban on 
chemical weapons. To intensify efforts 
toward this goal, and to enhance open- 
ness and confidence between the two 
countries, they signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding on a bilateral veri- 
fication experiment and data exchange. 



The MOU provides for an exchange o 
data on U.S. and Soviet chemical we:i 
ons stockpiles and for visits and insp ■ 
tions of chemical weapons sites. 

The sides adopted a special joint 
statement on chemical weapons in 
which they stressed the need to con- 
clude a chemical weapons ban and un 
derscored their concern about the 
problem posed by the proliferation of 
chemical weapons. 

The Secretary and the Foreign 
Minister examined the status of the i 
clear testing negotiations. They note 
that the verification protocol for the 
1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Tn- 
ty has been agreed, ad referendum, 1 
their negotiators and reached agree- 
ment to incorporate hydrodynamic ai 
seismic monitoring, as well as on-site 
inspection, into the verification protc 
col for the 1974 Threshold Test Ban 
Treaty, as well as the levels above 
which these measurements would oc- 
cur. In order to obtain a statistically 
significant number of data points to i 
prove the national technical means of 
each side, each side will guarantee th 
other side the right to make on-site h; 
drodynamic yield measurements of at 
least two tests per year during the 
first 5 years following ratification of 
this treaty. After 5 years, each side 
shall guarantee one such hydrodynan' 
measurement a year thereafter unles 
otherwise agreed by the two sides. 



Department of State Bulletin/November 19' 




Wyoming Ministerial 




Tetary Baker and his advisers. 



ese agreements provide a framework 
conclusion of the verification proto- 
s, completing a process that began 
years ago. They instructed their del- 
itions to continue intensive work to 
■olve all remaining issues so that 
•se two documents can be submitted 
ratification as quickly as possible. 

The Secretary and the Foreign 
nister noted with approval the work 
ng done in the negotiations on con- 
itional forces in Europe and called 
I rapid conclusion of an agreement. 
; The Secretary and the Foreign 
nister agreed in principle to the 
|)en skies" concept proposed by Presi- 
'it Bush in May, which could make a 
luine contribution to openness and 
iifidence-building. They noted their 
'llingness to attend an international 
iference on the subject. 

The sides noted the importance of 
int efforts by the United States and 
K Soviet Union to prevent the prolif- 
iition of missiles and missile technol- 
y and agreed to activate bilateral 
isultations on this pressing problem. 

II. The Secretary and the Foreign 
nister had a thorough and frank ex- 
inge on regional issues. The sides re- 
irmed their belief that active U.S. 
d Soviet support for political solu- 
ns that are comprehensive and based 
broad national reconciliation could 
ilitate the peaceful resolution of I'e- 
mal conflicts around the world. They 



noted that the two sides continue to 
differ on some specific aspects of the 
question of arms supplies and their 
effect on the possibility of political 
settlements. 

They noted that a cycle of regional 
experts' discussions had been held on 
Central America, Afghanistan, Africa, 
the Middle East, and East Asia, South- 
east Asia, and the Pacific. Both sides 
found these discussions useful for un- 
derstanding one another's views and 
agreed to continue experts' meetings 
in the future. 

The sides expressed their support 
for efforts by the Central American 
countries to establish a lasting peace 
in that region on the basis of the Es- 
quipulas treaty and subsequent agree- 
ments, which include a commitment not 
to permit the use of their territory to 
support those seeking to destabilize 
other Central American countries. 
While noting their differences on cer- 
tain questions, including the level of 
arms flows to the region, they called on 
all interested parties to support this 
process actively by respecting in full 
the letter and spirit of the accords 
signed by the leaders of the five Cen- 
tral American countries. They also 
called upon all states outside the region 
to respect the request by the Central 
American countries to end all military 
assistance to irregular or insurgent 
forces. 



The two sides agreed on the need 
for a political settlement in Afghani- 
stan on the basis of national reconcilia- 
tion, one that ensures the peaceful, 
independent, and nonaligned status of 
Afghanistan. While their approaches 
differ over how to translate these prin- 
ciples into reality, they, nevertheless, 
agreed that a transition period is re- 
quired, as well as an appropriate 
mechanism to establish a broad-based 
government. The sides reaffirmed 
their commitment to the Geneva ac- 
cords on Afghanistan. 

The sides reaffirmed their support 
for an active Middle East peace proc- 
ess. Among other issues, they also ex- 
changed views on the place in that 
process of an Israeli-Palestinian dia- 
logue leading to a comprehensive set- 
tlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
in which all relevant parties will 
participate. 

The Secretary and the Foreign 
Minister expressed in a separate joint 
statement their strong support for the 
Arab League Tripartite Committee 
plan on Lebanon to bring about a cease- 
fire, a lifting of the blockade, and a 
dialogue among the Lebanese parties 
aimed at achieving a political settle- 
ment. They condemned the taking of 
hostages and called for the immediate 
release of all hostages. 

The Secretary and the Foreign 
Minister advocated a comprehensive 
political settlement in Cambodia and a 
continuation of the negotiation process 
toward this end. At this stage, they 
feel it is most important to take efforts 
to avert intensification of the civil war 
and the return of the Pol Pot regime to 
power. The sides declared their readi- 
ness to announce, together with other 
states, a moratorium on military 
assistance to all Cambodian factions as 
part of a comprehensive settlement. 

The Secretary and the Foreign 
Minister agreed on the need to imple- 
ment fully and on schedule the UN plan 
for the granting of independence to 
Namibia, including the holding of free 
and fair elections. They expressed their 
support for the national reconciliation 



partment of State Bulletin/November 1989 




process in Angola and for efforts to 
secure peace and stability in Mozam- 
bique. The sides also advocated a 
peaceful, political solution to the inter- 
nal conflicts in Ethiopia and supported 
the negotiation process underway be- 
tween the Ethiopian Government and 
the Eritrean People's Liberation Front. 

III. Within the framework of the 
ongoing U.S. -Soviet dialogue on human 
rights and humanitarian affairs, the 
Secretary and the Foreign Minister 
held a constructive discussion of a 
broad range of human rights and hu- 
manitarian issues, including the role of 
international accords and generally ac- 
cepted standards in the field of human 
rights and of the Helsinki Final Act 
and other CSCE [Conference on Securi- 
ty and Cooperation in Europe] agree- 
ments. Specific reference was made to 
policies and cases of exit and entry, 
freedom of conscience, criminal prac- 
tices concerning which questions had 
been raised and on which information 
will be e.xchanged. The Secretary and 
the Foreign Minister agreed to work to 
move forward on a range of programs 
that will promote a better understand- 
ing of each other's institutions, legisla- 
tion, and practices which affect human 
rights and humanitarian issues. 

IV. The Secretary and the Foreign 
Minister discussed a range of questions 
related to the other two parts of the 
agenda, bilateral and transnational is- 
sues. They signed two agreements: The 
Agreement Between the Government of 
the United States of America and the 
Government of the Union of Soviet So- 
cialist Republics Concerning Mutual 
Visits Between Inhabitants of the Ber- 
ing Straits Region and the Agreement 
Between the Government of the United 
States of America and the Government 
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub- 
lics Concerning the Bering Straits Re- 
gional Commission. 

A U.S.-U.S.S.R. joint statement 
was also signed on a uniform inter- 
pretation of rules of international law 
governing innocent passage through 
territorial waters, which removes a po- 
tential source of friction in the relation- 



ship between the two countries. They 
endorsed a working paper containing 
proposals for e.xtending the jurisdiction 
of the International Court of Justice. In 
furtherance of this, the sides have 
agreed to approach the three other per- 
manent members of the United Nations 
Security Council with a proposal to dis- 
cuss this question. 

U.S. and Soviet experts together 
elaborated an approach for resolution of 
the Northern Pacific maritime bound- 
ary issue. The Secretary and the For- 
eign Minister directed the experts to 
meet again soon to complete their work 
on this basis. 

The two sides agreed to start talks 
regarding the possible expansion of air 
routes between the two countries. 

In connection with the virtually 
completed agreement on cooperation in 
the field of peaceful uses of atomic en- 
ergy, it was decided to accelerate com- 
pletion of proposals aimed at drawing 
up a new agreement on cooperation in 
the field of non-nuclear energy. 

The sides reached agreement in 
principle that U.S. and Soviet cultural 
and information centers would be 
opened in Moscow and Washington, 
respectively. 

The Secretary and the Foreign 
Minister approved a bilateral work 
program. 

The sides also discussed matters 
connected with implementation of the 
U.S. -Soviet Memorandum of Under- 
standing signed in January 1989 re- 
garding cooperation in combating the 
flow of illegal narcotics. They ex- 
pressed readiness to consider new 
ideas for bilateral and international 
cooperation in this field. They agreed 
that experts from both sides would 
meet in Moscow before the end of 1989 
to discuss concrete proposals. 

The two sides conducted an exten- 
sive discussion on the problem of com- 
bating international terrorism and 
agreed in principle that experts would 
meet again in early 1990. 

The two sides underscored the de- 
sirability of intensifying contacts be- 
tween high-level elected and appointed 
officials in a variety of areas. 

They devoted special attention to 
continued and new cooperation on a 
range of bilateral and international en- 



vironmental problems, including glob 

and climate change, as well as the 
problem of various sources of pollutioi 

The two sides confirmed their in- 
tent to conclude an agreement on coo) 
eration on study of the world oceans b 
the end of this year and to continue 
their work of preparing an agreemen 
on cooperation in the field of housing 
and other types of construction. 

The two sides agreed to consult 
and cooperate with the goal of increai 
ing the effectiveness of the UN. 

The Secretary and the Foreign 
Minister agreed on the necessity of 
continuing the search for new sphere 
of joint action directed at qualitative 
movement on bilateral and transnatio 
al issues in U.S. -Soviet relations. 

A detailed discussion took place, 
including with the participation of ex.' 
perts, on a range of economic ques- 
tions. It was agreed that these useful 
discussions will be continued. 

Both sides confirmed the utility 
conducting regular meetings at the 
ministerial level for considering and 
solving major problems of U.S.-Sovie 
cooperation. 



Joint Statement 

on Chemical Weapons, 
Sept. 23, 1989 

During their September 22-23 meetil 
in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, Secretary 
of State James A. Baker, III and For- 
eign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnad; 
reaffirmed the commitment of the 
United States and the U.S.S.R. to pu 
sue aggressively the prohibition of 
chemical weapons and the destructioi 
of all stockpiles of such weapons on th 
basis of a comprehensive, effectively 
verifiable, and truly global ban. Both 
sides consider the early conclusion an 
entry into force of a convention to thi 
effect to be one of the highest priorit. 
for the international community. The} 
believe that with the active and con- 
structive participation of all states, it 
will be possible to resolve expeditious 
the remaining issues and to conclude 
the convention at the earliest date am 



Department of State Bulletin/November 19< 




Wyoming Ministerial 



11 upon all parties to the negotiations 
join them in achieving this objective. 
! The two sides also believe that 
reater openness between them and 
bong others could contribute to the 
rospects for reaching an early agree- 
lent on an effective ban on chemical 
eapons. As a concrete expression of 
le commitment of their two countries 
ward this end, the Secretary of State 
\d the Foreign Minister signed a 
emorandum of Understanding re- 
Srding a bilateral verification experi- 
ent and data exchange. The steps 
;i'ied upon in the Memorandum are 
itended to facilitate the process of ne- 
)tiation, signature, and ratification of 
comprehensive, effectively verifiable, 
id truly global convention on the pro- 
bition and destruction of chemical 
eapons. 

The verification experiment and 
it a exchange will be conducted in two 
lases. Phase I involves the exchange 
general data on the sides' chemical 
ea])(ins capabilities and a series of vis- 
> t(i relevant military and civil facili- 
^s on their respective territories. In 
nase II, the sides will exchange de- 
iled data and permit on-site inspec- 
ons to verify the accuracy of the 
formation exchanged. 
I The sides also agreed to undertake 
Icooperative effort with respect to the 
astruction of chemical weapons. They 
jjreed to reciprocal visits to monitor 
3st ruction operations of the other side 
id to the exchange of information on 
ast, current, and planned destruction 
"tivities and procedures. 

The sides noted their agreement on 
ime procedures for conducting chal- 
■nge inspections and on the provisions 
overning the order of destruction of 
lemical weapons and of chemical 
eapons production facilities. These 
Ko approaches will be introduced into 
le multilateral negotiations in Geneva 
1 an effort to contribute to those nego- 
atinns. They also stressed the need to 
jncentrate in the near future on re- 
living remaining verification-related 
•sufs. The two sides intend to pursue 
itensively their bilateral discussions 
n a chemical weapons ban with the 
lew to help achieve further progress 
1 the multilateral negotiations. 



The Secretary of State and the 
Foreign Minister expressed their grave 
concern about the growing danger posed 
to international peace and security by 
the risk of the illegal use of chemical 
weapons as long as such weapons exist 
and are spread. They reaffirmed the 
importance of and their commitment to 
the final declaration of the Paris con- 
ference on the prohibition of chemical 
weapons held earlier this year as well 
as their commitment to the 1925 Geneva 
protocol. The two sides emphasized the 
obligation of all states not to use chemi- 
cal weapons in violation of international 
law and urged that prompt and effec- 
tive measures be taken by the interna- 
tional community if that obligation is 
violated. In this regard, they under- 
scored their support for the UN Secre- 
tary General in investigating reports of 
violations of the Geneva protocol or oth- 
er relevant rules of customary interna- 
tional law. 

The sides welcomed Australia's 
convening of a Government-Industry 
Conference Against Chemical Weapons, 
which has just concluded in Canberra. 
They noted that this conference pro- 
vided an important opportunity for se- 
rious discussion between government 
and industry representatives from 
around the world. The sides expressed 
satisfaction with the extensive and pro- 
ductive work accomplished at the con- 
ference and the positive results 
reflected in the chairman's final 
summary statement. 

Finally the sides expressed the 
view that a truly global, comprehen- 
sive, and effectively verifiable ban on 
chemical weapons is the best means to 
address the threat posed by the spread 
of chemical weapons on a durable long- 
term basis. In the meantime, the sides 
emphasized their readiness to attempt 
to prevent the proliferation of chemical 
weapons. They intend to continue con- 
sultations on this issue. 




Joint Statement 
on Lebanon, 
Sept. 23, 1989 

While expressing their deep concern 
over the absence of peace and a settle- 
ment in Lebanon, the United States 
and the Soviet Union reaffirm their ur- 
gent appeal to take all necessary meas- 
ures to bring to an end the sufferings 
of the Lebanese people and urge a con- 
tinued search for a political solution of 
the Lebanese crisis. They reaffirm the 
assumption that there is no military so- 
lution to the problems of that country. 
A constructive dialogue between 
Lebanese, who themselves must reach 
lasting agreements on peaceful ar- 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1989 




rangements in Lebanon on the basis of 
a balance of interests, is the only ration- 
al path toward national reconciliation. 

The United States and the Soviet 
Union welcome the resumption of the 
peacemaking mission of the Tripartite 
Committee of the Arab League on 
Lebanon in accordance with the man- 
date entrusted to it by the Casablanca 
Arab summmit and the committee's ef- 
forts aimed at a cease-fire, the lifting 
of blockades, and initiation of the proc- 
ess of political settlement. They call 
upon all the parties involved in 
Lebanese affairs to respond positively 
to these efforts and to do their utmost 
to support the Tripartite Committee's 
action to complete its work success- 
fully. They also note the importance of 
extending strong international support 
for the activities of the Tripartite Com- 
mittee and, for their own part, intend 
to proceed further in this direction. 
Both sides reaffirm their resolute posi- 
tion in favor of preserving the sover- 
eignty, territorial integrity, and 
independence of the Lebanese state. 

The United States and the Soviet 
Union condemn any acts of taking hos- 
tages and demand that they be set free 
no matter where or by whom they are 
held captive. 



Secretary's 

News Conference, 
Jackson Hole, 
Sept. 23, 19895 

I really would like to first thank the 
people of Wyoming for letting us share 
this majestic location for a few days. 

The openness of this setting, I 
think, epitomizes the new nature of our 
talks with the Soviet Union. I believe 
the U.S. -Soviet relationship is entering 
a fresh phase. We have, in my view, 
moved from confrontation to dialogue 
and now to cooperation — ^joint action 
on common problems, across a broad 
range of topics on our five-part agenda. 



This has been a productive minis- 
terial. In fact, [Foreign] Minister Shev- 
ardnadze told me today that in his view 
this ministerial was unique from the 
standpoint both of context and content. 

Our flight to Wyoming, when we 
discussed the challenges of the nation- 
alities problem and perestroika, set a 
tone of openness for our subsequent 
meetings. We followed with U.S. pro- 
posals for "open skies" and open lands, 
a human rights work program to sup- 
port the development of a more open 
Soviet society, our initiative for great- 
er environmental cooperation including 
exchanges, and a new discussion of the 
economic changes taking place within 
the Soviet Union. 

We also took a series of steps 
across the full arms control agenda to 
overcome old misconceptions and build 
trust. In fact, [Foreign] Minister Shev- 
ardnadze also told me that he thought 
we made more progress across the full 
range of arms control issues than in 
any prior ministerial which he had 
attended. 

We have translated this new spirit 
of openness into some concrete achieve- 
ments, too. 

First, the Soviets said they have 
dropped their linkage between com- 
pleting and implementing agreement 
on START and achieving a defense and 
space accord. I made clear that the 
President remains committed to the 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and 
offered the Soviets the opportunity to 
visit SDI research facilities. 

Second, the Soviets agreed to dis- 
mantle their radar at Krasnoyarsk 
without preconditions. 

Third, we broke a 15-year deadlock 
by agreeing on the full verification re- 
gime for the nuclear testing treaties. 
This provides a detailed framework for 
the possible completion of these trea- 
ties next year. 

Fourth, we signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding on chemical weapons 
data exchange and verification tests, a 
good, realistic step toward addressing 
the larger task of completing an effec- 
tively verifiable ban on chemical 
weapons. 



1 



I 



Fifth, our willingness to lift the 
ban on mobile ICBMs, contingent on 
congressional approval of funding for 
the U.S. mobile ICBM programs, mad 
it possible. I think, for us to move 
ahead on developing verification meas 
ures for mobile missiles. 

Sixth, based on President Bush's 
June proposals, we signed an umbrelh 
agreement on START verification anc 
stability measures, as well as a sepa- 
rate agreement on notification of stra 
tegic forces exercises. 

Seventh, the Soviets agreed to 
President Bush's proposal to explore 
the details of an "open skies" regime 
at an international conference. 

Eighth, we explored new ideas 
about resolving a number of regional 
conflicts. In particular, I believe we 
share a view on the importance of fre^ 
and fair elections in Nicaragua and or 
stopping support for subversion in El 
Salvador. We also both support effort; 
to promote a Palestinian-Israeli dia- 
logue. And we condemn hostage-takin 
while supporting the immediate re- 
lease of the hostages held in Lebanon. 

Ninth, we followed up on the en- 
couraging efforts by the Soviets to pe 
mit refuseniks and others to emigrate 
freely. We've also developed a new hu- 
man rights work program placing in- 
creased emphasis on exchanges that 
could promote the institutions that 
should protect human rights in the 
Soviet Union. 

All in all, we got a lot of work don 
We want to keep on going and we shall 

In that connection, as you know b; 
now, President Bush and President 
Gorbachev have agreed to hold a sum- 
mit meeting in the late spring or earl^ 
summer of next year. [Foreign] Minis- 
ter Shevardnadze and I will, of course 
be meeting in advance to try and mak' 
that summit as productive as possible. 

Before I close, I want to make one' 
final announcement. President Bush 
intends to offer a new initiative at the 
United Nations on Monday that will 
move the world closer to a ban on chem 
ical weapons. The President believes 
that U.S. leadership is necessary to 
turn good intentions into a historic 
achievement. 



10 



Department of State Bulletin/November igSU 




Wyoming Ministerial 



Q. You just again said that the 
oviets removed the linkage between 
fie defense and space taliis and the 
TART talks. But in what Mr. Shev- 
rdnadze just got through saying, he 
lid, effectively, that they retain the 
ight to withdraw from the START 
'eaty if they perceive that the ABM 
jreaty has been violated. So they 
ontinue to say, you've got your 
hoice; you can have a START treaty 
r you can have the SDI. You can't 
ave them both. 

A. That's not it. I'm sorry. They're 
iyiiig that we can sign and implement a 
TART treaty, whether or not we have 
)ncluded a treaty on defense and space. 

There is a provision, as you may 
now, in the START treaty as it is that 
ould permit withdrawal upon a national 
iiterest determination within 6 months. 
;ither side could do that. So I'm sorry, 
it I don't think that interpretation is 
■curate. 

Q. We were told about the new 
eas, new suggestions, made by 
hairman Gorbachev in his letter to 
resident Bush. What is the attitude 
'the American Administration to 
lose ideas? 

And my second question is, is the 
merican side ready to discuss cut- 
ng arms not only on land, in air, in 
)ace, but also on sea? 

A. Let me take the second part of 
lat question first. We have some major 
roblems with naval arms control. We 
•e situated in a far different position 
lan the Soviet Union. We are sur- 
)unded on two sides by major oceans. 
k have been a sea-going power for all of 
ar existence. We use our navy to com- 
iiunicate and maintain our lines of com- 
lunication and supply with our allies. 

There's a significantly different 
ihysical situation as far as the United 
tates and the Soviet Union are con- 
^rned when it comes to naval arms 
jntrol. 

With respect to the initial part of 
>ur question, I think that my opening 
atement makes it clear that we re- 
."ived many of the suggestions and ideas 
1 President Gorbachev's letter very pos- 
ively. We think that some of those made 
possible for us to move forward with 
jncrete achievements at this minis- 
,irial. At the same time, we think we 



advanced some ideas and broke some 
ground and took some political deci- 
sions — hard decisions — that were neces- 
sary to move forward in other areas. I'm 
thinking particularly of the nuclear test- 
ing talks where for 15 years we have 
been deadlocked. 

Q. With the interpretation you're 
putting on the Soviet announcement 
about SDI and its connection to a 
START treaty, you might draw the 
conclusion that a START treaty is 
closer to being signed or more likely 
to be signed sooner or would become 
more easily negotiated. What is your 
view of how difficult the issues re- 
main and how soon a START agree- 
ment might be signed? 

A. Let me say that I think there are 
some difficult issues that still remain. 
We have the issues of ALCMs and SLCMs 
to deal with. 

I think I've said, though, that we 
believe that this proposal is positive. I 
think I said that it should — if I didn't 
say, I want to say — it should enable us to 
finish and implement a START treaty 
without first requiring an agreement on 
defense and space, which has, here- 
tofore, we think at least, been the posi- 
tion of the Soviet Union. So I think it is 
a positive development. 

Now, you want me to put a time- 
frame on it. I'm not able to do that now 
e.xcept to say that, obviously, we will be 
working — both sides, in good faith — 
to move the process forward as expe- 
ditiously as possible. 

Q. The Soviets are saying, how- 
ever, that they want at least talks to 
begin on what kinds of tests could be 
conducted in space that would be per- 
missible under the ABM Treaty and 
which ones wouldn't. One, do you feel 
that's a precondition for the Soviets? 
And, two, is the United States will- 
ing to, at least, enter into those 
discussions? 

A. I don't see it as a precondition. I 
don't believe it was presented as a pre- 
condition. It is our interpretation that it 
was not so presented. 

This is a pi'oposal that was made 
and considered in 1987. We had some 
problems with it at that time. We have 
agreed to look at all of the elements of 
this overall proposal and take it back to 



Washington, review it, and give them a 
detailed response at the negotiations in 
Geneva which are going to resume on 
the 28th of September. The response 
won't come then, but it will come as 
soon thereafter as we can. 

This is a procedure, though, that 
we had problems with in 1987, and it has 
not significantly changed from what it 
was then. 

Q. Mr. Shevardnadze suggested 
that SLCMs not necessarily should be 
included in the text of the START 
agreement. What is your reaction to 
that? Would it help to sign the START 
agreement? 

And, secondly, what is your reac- 
tion to suggestions that next year, 
sometime in the late summer and 
fall, there should be a meeting of the 
heads of state of Europe, the United 
States, and Canada to sign possibly 
the conventional arms treaty? 

A. With respect to the question on 
SLCMs, moving SLCMs out of a START 
treaty would be, I think, a step in the di- 
rection of making progress on a START 
treaty, because SLCMs are an extraordi- 
narily difficult problem because of the 
verification difficulties. So we would be 
interested in hearing more about ideas 
that the Soviet Union might have to 
handle the question of SLCMs outside 
ofa START agreement. 

With respect to a heads of state 
meeting on CFE, I told the [Foreign] 
Minister that that was something that 
obviously since they had suggested it, 
the United States would give considera- 
tion to, but that's not a decision for us to 
make. That is a NATO decision just as it 
is a Warsaw Pact decision; that we would 
look at that but that it might be a bit 
premature now to lock into a date until 
we see how much progress is made on 
CFE. 

As you know, NATO tabled its full 
proposal just last Thursday, and we are 
hoping for and looking for a response 
from the Warsaw Pact to a very detailed 
proposal which has been put on the 
table. 



department of State Bulletin/November 1989 



11 




Q. Following the Washington 
summit in 1987, there was the thought 
about proceeding with a START trea- 
ty without having a complete agree- 
ment between the two countries about 
what was allowed or not allowed un- 
der the ABM Treaty. At that time, 
some people, including especially the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, felt it would be 
very dangerous and a bad idea to go 
ahead with a START treaty without 
having complete understanding of 
what could be done on space. Do you 
see some of that concern in this cur- 
rent situation, as it is building up 
with the present Soviet proposal? 
And how do you feel about that? 

A. I think it's important that we 
make it clear that our views with re- 
spect to the Strategic Defense Initiative 
have not changed. We strongly support 
that. That was made abundantly clear in 
our dialogue here at this ministerial. 

I think, as I've already indicated, 
there are elements of this proposal that 
will have to be carefully analyzed and 
weighed in Washington, D.C. 

In terms of whether or not this 
could open up the prospect of moving 
forward a START agreement, I think 
you have to say that it might because it 
has been seen to be — assuming that it is 
an unconditional dropping of the linkage, 
as we interpret it — I think you would 
have to say that it offers the prospect of 
moving that forward. 

We will be talking about the kinds of 
issues that you've just raised when we 
get back to Washington. 

Q. You've now spent many hours 
talking to Eduard Shevardnadze 
about the problems that Mr. Gor- 
bachev faces — about the economy, the 
nationalities issue. After those kinds 
of conversations, do you have differ- 
ent views that you may now carry 
back to the I'resident about things 
that the United States might be able 
to do to weigh-in and help the Soviets 
in some way or another? Has it al- 
tered your views as to what we might 
or should or could do? 



A. We talked for maybe ;3-4 hours 
on the airplane flying from Washington 
to Wyoming about the just-completed 
plenum, about the approach to the na- 
tionalities problem, about the manner in 
which the relationship between the cen- 
tral government and the republics in the 
Soviet Union will be addressed. 

It seems to be that there is progress 
in a reasonable and rational way with 
respect to that problem. I got the sense 
that it was being addressed, as it should 
be, seriously and substantively and that 
there is a desire on the part of the cen- 
tral government to provide more politi- 
cal and economic autonomy to those 
republics; that that is already provided 
for by the Constitution of the Soviet 
Union but that that has not been fol- 
lowed in practice over the course of 
past years. 

We also talked at length about the 
economy and about some of the problems 
of the economy; about the ruble over- 
hang, about how that probably has to 
be addressed before you move to the 
more fundamental questions of estab- 
lishing a price system and getting to 
convertibility. 

But I think it was important that we 
began this e.xchange on these economic 
issues. I hope the Soviet side felt the 
same way. I believe they did, and we 
intend to continue that. 

Q. So what is your view now of 
whether or not the United States 
ought to do more, or something, in 
the way of directly helping with the 
economy — no change? 

A. We've not been requested — and 
the Soviet side made it quite clear, they 
are not coming to the United States for 
grants, assistance, loans, or that sort of 
thing. I think there is an interest in 
learning from our experience. There is 
an interest in taking steps to open up 
that economy and move it toward a more 
open system, and perhaps there are 
some things that we could contribute 
there. 

So I really believe the approach 
that's being taken is the right one, and 
that's what I will tell the President. 



Q. What happened to the joint 
press conference? 

A. That was, as I said out there 
when we were signing the agreement -. 
simply a busted signal. We anticipated 
that there would be an interest in a joii 
appearance. But we failed to give the 
proper amount of notice. I don't want ti 
blame it on the other side. I wall take a 
equal amount of responsibility for it, ar 
maybe this is a better way to proceed. 

Q. In Washington, you told us 
you had some difficulty when Mr. 
Shevardnadze said there were some 
limits upon what the Soviet Union 
could do to restrain the flow of 
Soviet-bloc arms to Nicaragua. Has 
the last couple of days changed that 
difficulty you're having at all? 

A. We've talked in some detail 
about that. First of all, let me say that 
we are not challenging the statement u 
the Soviet Union that they, themsehes 
have ceased shipping weapons to 
Nicaragua. I don't believe anyone 
in the U.S. Government ever did chal- 
lenge that. 

Our problem has to do wdth an in- 
crease in Soviet-bloc weapons and mili^ 
tary equipment going into Central 
America, going into Nicaragua, quite 
frankly, and from Nicaragua to the 
FMLN in El Salvador. Most of that is 
coming from Cuba. We would simply lit 
to see the Soviet Union do as much as 
it possibly could with Cuba to stop 
that flow. 



Q. Are they doing as much as 
they could? 

A. You're asking me to be judgmer 
tal. What I would like to tell you is that 
they've indicated to us that they suppor 
democracy in Nicaragua. They support 
the concept of free and fair elections in 
Nicaragua. They are committed to usiii 
their influence to do what they can to 
stop the flow of weapons to the insurge: 
cy in El Salvador. 

Q. If I could ask you to reflect 
for just a moment on what's trans- 






12 



Department of State Bulletin/November 198 




Wyoming Ministerial 




the conclusion of the Wyoming ministerial, Secretary Baker held a news conference. 



red here. You've had this extraordi- 
iry 2 or 3 days of movement, facil- 
ated by the Soviets moving their 
jsitions on a large number of arms 
)ntrol issues and at the same time 
>u've had these very frank economic 
iscussions with them. Is there any 
'lationship between the two? Is one 
riving the other? 

A. No. I don't think there is any — I 
in't say there's no relationship between 
le two, but one is not driving the other 

And may I say, we've had the move- 
lent, yes, in part because of some 
langes in Soviet positions but also, 
I may say so, in part because of some 
langes in U.S. positions. 

Again I would refer you to the nu- 
ear testing talks and I would refer you, 
s well, to the President's speech at the 
nited Nations on Monday. 



Q. Also on the economy, you said 
that Mr. Shevardnadze had raised a 
lot of questions and wasn't looking 
for specific grants of things, but 
could you give us your assessment at 
this point of just how far, what kind 
of strategy — economic strategy — Mr. 
Gorbachev has, and just how far does 
he intend to go economically to adopt 
a market economy? 

A. I think they want to move in that 
direction. I think that they have conclud- 
ed that it is in their interest to do so. I 
think they recognize the difficulties in- 
volved in getting there, particularly the 
difficulties in establishing a price sys- 
tem. And you have to do that, really, be- 
fore you can address in a comprehensive 
way the question of convertibility. And 
you have to have both of those before you 
get to a market system. 



Before you do price system and 
convertibility, though, there are some 
other problems that have to be taken 
care of, in our opinion. 

One is the ruble overhang. One is 
the whole idea of incentive and compe- 
tition that has to be somehow put into 
that system. And a third is the require- 
ment for some sort of a safety net, if 
you are going to move to a price system 
after 60 or 70 years, whatever it is, of 
having a totally different approach. It 
is very difficult to do it cold turkey and 
do it overnight. 

Q. Was anything agreed here, 
this weekend, on CFE to make that 
mid-1990s target deadline for a 
completed treaty more possible? 

A. Of course, this is not the forum 
for negotiating CFE. CFE should be ne- 
gotiated in Vienna because it is a multi- 
lateral negotiation. We don't have the 
power to negotiate here. 

There were some suggestions made 
on the Soviet side with respect to air- 
craft that we think don't go far enough 
but that we will analyze and that we will 
refer to our negotiators in Vienna. This 
is one of the most difficult problems we 
have in the conventional forces talks — 
the definition of aircraft. We think air- 
craft should be defined on the basis of 
what they are capable of doing, not what 
a particular country has given them as 
an organizational responsibility. The fact 
that an aircraft that flies and shoots is 
given a defensive role by the military 
authorities of a country doesn't mean it 
ought not to be counted as an offensive 
aircraft, in our view. 

That's the main difference separat- 
ing us. So we didn't come here to nego- 
tiate CFE. That was the only proposal 
affecting CFE that came from either 
side. 

Q. With regard to your more 
open society, in Yellowstone National 
Park this week, they offered the op- 
portunity for students from the So- 
viet Union to come and learn more 
about the environment. Do you see 
more of that kind of exchange and 
perhaps more of an encouragement 
toward that kind of exchange between 
the two countries? 



epartment of State Bulletin/November 1989 



13 




A. I certainly do, and we proposed 
that as one of our environmental 
initiatives — that there be greater envi- 
ronmental exchanges, not just students 
but people across a wide spectrum 
of society who are interested in the 
environment — legislators, environmen- 
talists, and others — and we think there 
ought to be a greater exchange. 

And let me say on that score that I 
believe the [Foreign] Minister shares my 
view that it is healthy that we are now 
engaged with the Soviet Union on these 
transnational problems. I know a lot of 
people thought this was not a partic- 
ularly significant idea last May when we 
surfaced it in Moscow, but we are talking 
about many global problems that are 
very, very important to both countries, 
and the environment is one of them. 
There is genuine interest on both sides 
in all aspects of environment. 

Q. What kind of progress did you 
make on human rights in the discus- 
sions? Did the Soviets present any 
new evidence that they were really 
any closer to passing the freedom of 
emigration law than they were sever- 
al months ago? And finally, will there 
be a continued linkage between trade 
and human rights? 

A. Will there continue to be a link- 
age between trade and human rights? Of 
course, there is a legal linkage as far as 
we are concerned now. We have made it 
very clear that we are prepared to move 
to eliminate that linkage the minute the 
Soviet Union institutionalizes its more 
liberal emigration policy. 

There has been very good progress 
in the Soviet Union regarding freer em- 
igration. We talked about that. We 
talked about those remaining cases that 
we think deserve consideration as we 
usually do in these ministerials. We pre- 
sented a list of names that we request 
they specifically look into. I think you 
have to say they have made good prog- 
ress on questions of emigration. 

I can't tell you when the Supreme 
Soviet will institutionalize that prog- 
ress, but when they do, we'll be pre- 
pared to move on Jackson-Vanik and 
Stevenson. 



14 



Q. Do you expect the results of 
this meeting should silence some of 
your critics, like Senator Mitchell, 
who has accused the Administration 
of moving too slowly? And, secondly, 
when you get back to Washington, do 
you expect to take these results and 
use them to push Congress a little 
harder on strategic issues in the 
budget? 

A. We've been trying to encourage 
Congress to move on those strategic is- 
sues. We have made it clear that they are 
very important to the process of negotia- 
tion. We have also asked that they move 
our initiatives with respect to Poland 
and Hungary, OPIC [Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation] and GSP [gen- 
eralized system of preferences] benefits, 
which are still hung up. So I think that 
we would like to see action, frankly, in 
both of those areas. 

Q. Mr. Shevardnadze said that he 
expected you to dismantle the radar 
stations in England and in Greenland 
in response to his dismantling of 
Krasnoyarsk. That's just the opposite 
of the impression you gave when you 
addressed us. 

A. I would be very surprised to 
hear that he said that he expected us to 
dismantle — 

Q. Of course, it was interpreted. 

A. Yes. If he did, he told you some- 
thing he didn't tell me. 

Q. What does he expect? There is 
this impression this is the Soviet's 
thought. 

A. As I understand it, he said that 
he wants us to consider the possibility of 
Soviet observers going to look at those 
radars to see if there is any violation or 
to see if they think, after inspection, 
that there might be any violation. 

As I may have mentioned to you, 
these are not ABM radars. They existed 
prior to the completion of the ABM Trea- 
ty and their modernization is totally le- 
gal under the treaty. 

I did tell him that we would consider 
his suggestion, or we would take his con- 
cern into account. We have an estab- 
lished process, as you know — I think it is 
the CSCE process — by which both sides 
attempt to alleviate concerns such as 
this. We'll be taking a look at that, be- 
cause we think it is important in main- 



I 



taining a relationship here of trust and; 
confidence that when they have some- 
thing they want us to look into, we lool< 
into it. Just like we ask them to look in 
things from time to time. 

Let me say one final thing. These 
radars are located on the territory of k 
our allies, and again, anything we do, M 
we will have to do in close consultation 
with those allies. I do not believe — and 
do not believe he said that this was a 
precondition to his — 

Q. At your press conference be- 
fore this meeting, you indicated you 
will be informing Mr. Shevardnadze 
on the health of the plans to aid froi 
the United States to both Poland am 
Hungary. I was wondering whether 
the question on the changes in Polai 
and Hungary came up at all in the 
meeting. 

A. We talked about Eastern Euro 
and the approach of the United States 
the problems of Eastern Europe yestei 
day on the flight in. That was one of th 
topics that we discussed in some detail 

Q. When will you two be meetir 
again? Neither of you have said that 

A. We haven't decided what the e\ 
act date would be. We will want to con- 
sider when we do that in light of the no' 
definitive summit timeframe. 

Q. As far as the summit is con- 
cerned, did you talk at all about hav 
ing a summit away from Washingtoi 
or perhaps including stops like this 
one during the summit? 

A. No, we haven't talked about th£ 

Q. What was the idea behind sa; 
ing that next spring and summer, or 
summer, would be the time that you | 
should have a summit? What went h> 
hind that calculation? i 

A. That was the time that the two 
heads of state saw as the most conven- 
ient time for both of them. That was thij 
time that it was determined would give 
us an opportunity — at least to give us 
adequate time to prepare for a summit, 
and we do believe that a summit should 
be thoroughly prepared. 

If we had moved it up before late 
spring, we don't think — and we think tl 
Soviets share this view — there would 
have been adequate time for preparatio 



I 



Department of State Bulletin/November 19f 




Wyoming Ministerial 



Q. In connection with the events 
f Eastern Europe, the German ques- 
t3n is often mentioned more in the 
.merican media than apparently the 
(erman media. Did you discuss any 
iipects of that question with [For- 
(gn] Minister Shevardnadze? 
j A. We talked about the problems 
iEast German migration, and we dis- 
(issed what I think you referred to 
nen you say the German question. I 
')uld like to leave those discussions, 
:r the time being, confidential. 

Q. Could we ask you to be philo- 
phical for a minute? All of your 
aff certainly have been very posi- 
ve about what has been accom- 
'ished here. You have been very 
jtsitive. You come away from this 
(eeting with an enlarged sense of 
tiat is possible in this relationship, 
I do you see it going on as a steady 
lit linear progression forward? 
"here does this weekend leave you 
:S-a-vis your own thoughts about the 
1 viet Union and what is possible? 

A. I think a steady progression on- 
ird is not a bad way to characterize the 
ly I see it. I think we made good prog- 
;ss here. I'll tell you that, and I think it 
Hs due to efforts on both sides. 

Can there be setbacks? Yes. Could 
' move even a bit better than just 
iBady progress? I suppose that's possi- 
h. But I think that those who want to 
le an improvement in the U.S. -Soviet 
:lationship across the full range of 
' r agenda should take heart from this 
anisterial. 



ecretary's Interview 
on "Face the Nation," 
ept. 24, 1989'' 

' Outside of an announcement on the 
immit, being spring or early sum- 
er, the big news out of your meeting 
. Wyoming, as I read it, was this So- 
■et offer to delink the whole ques- 
on of "star wars," or SDI from the 
TART treaty. And I want to 



know if you consider that a major vic- 
tory for the Bush Administration, or 
do you think that the Soviets have 
concluded that SDI ain't never going 
to fly and it's not worth all the trou- 
ble, and so why not just sort of make 
it a secondary issue? 

A. I think it shows the merit in 
sticking to your negotiating position 
when you believe you're right. Of course, 
we're not home yet by a long shot in 
these negotiations, either in START or 
in defense and space. Nevertheless, I 
think this is a positive development and 
would mean that we could have a START 
treaty negotiated and implemented with- 
out having a defense and space treaty. 

Q. Does that mean we could have 
a START treaty very soon — let's 
say even in conjunction or at the 
same time that you wrap up the 
conventional? Would that be your 
goal? 

A. I don't think we would state it 
that way, because there is a certain 
timeframe with respect to the goal of a 
conventional forces agreement. There 
are still a lot of problems in the START 
negotiations. We have to figure out how 
to deal with air-launched cruise missiles. 
We've got to figure out how to deal with 
submarine-launched cruise missiles. 
So I don't think you can put a specific 
timeframe on it. But clearly this was a 
major stumbling block, and this will 
make it easier to move forward. 

Q. I want to ask you more about 
that, but first let's stay on the ABM 
or "star wars" question. Does this 
mean that we've lost the chance to 
use "star wars" as a bargaining chip? 
And I say that that is important, be- 
cause Congress has really begun to 
cut that budget back so much, and it's 
even in our laws that you can't do the 
testing; Congress has passed laws to 
prevent it. Have they removed it as a 
way for you to use it to get more con- 
cessions from them? And doesn't that 
hurt us in the end? 

A. You know we really never saw it 
as a bargaining chip. I mean, it is a con- 
cept that we think is important, that is 
in the national security interest of the 
United States, and we are still every bit 
as committed to the Strategic Defense 
Initiative as we were before. 



Q. Yes, but with these laws, how 
can you go forward with it? Congress 
says you can't. 

A. Of course, if the Congress de- 
cides to say you can't move forward, then 
we will be constrained from moving for- 
ward, and — 

Q. But they've done that. 

A. Yes, and they are making a 
heavy run at the budget on SDI, much 
against the wishes of the Bush Ad- 
ministration. We don't like that, and we 
are continuing to oppose that. The final 
bill is not out yet, so let's see where we 
come out before we prejudge it. I mean, 
I don't think you should assume that 
what's in the legislation from one house 
is going to be the ultimate result. 

Q. Can we assume you're going to 
accept this proposal from the Soviets 
to delink these two? Can I read that 
in what you've said so far? 

A. There are other elements of this 
proposal. And as I said today, we will 
have to take those back to Washington 
and look at those and analyze those, and 
we will be responding in detail to the 
Soviets through our negotiator after 
the defense and space talks reopen in 
Geneva on the 28th of September. 

As far as the narrow question of 
delinkage — unconditional delinkage — as 
I've said, I think that is a positive devel- 
opment and should enable us to move for- 
ward perhaps more expeditiously with 
the START treaty. 

Q. Why do you say "perhaps"? 
Why don't you just say, "This is great. 
Now we can really get in there."? 

A. Because they're still — 

Q. Part of the criticism is that 
you really don't want to have START. 
You know that's been around. People 
say that all the time. 

A. You know, there's a lot of criti- 
cism from time — there was a lot of criti- 
cism in advance of this ministerial that I 
hope will be absolutely gone now because 
we have made some really fundamental 
progress, not just in START, not just be- 
cause the Soviets have delinked START 
from defense and space. But we've made 
it across the full range of arms control. 



epartment of State Bulletin/November 1989 



15 




the arms control agenda. We have bro- 
ken a 15-year deadlock in the nuclear 
testing talks. That is a major and very 
significant achievement. 

Q. But we've been complying 
with that anyway — 

A. We have a chemical weapons — 
we've been complying with it, but we've 
never been able to reach agreement. 
And what I think you see here is an ex- 
ercise of political will by the leadership 
on both sides — the Soviet Union and the 
United States — to move us forward 
across the broad range of our arms con- 
trol agenda. So I really think you need 
to look at chemical, you need to look at 
nuclear testing. Yes, you need to look at 
START and other elements, in START 
and defense and space other than just 
this question of delinkage. 

The President's verification and sta- 
bility initiative that he submitted to the 
Soviet Union, they have come back and 
said, yes, we like this idea, we'll work 
with you on it, let's see if we can't make 
it work. So we have an umbrella agree- 
ment here with respect to that. 

We've signed an agreement on pre- 
notification of strategic air exercises, 
something that would have been unheard 
of just a few short years ago. We're 
really moving in a whole lot of areas, 
and I don't think that the criticism, 
if I can say so — and of course I'm a bit 
biased — is warranted. 

Q. The criticism that you've 
gone slowly? 
A. Yes. 

Q. But the other half of that is 
that you, for some reason, say there 
are all sorts of speculations about 
what your reasons are, that you don't 
want to move that quickly on START. 
I'd love to hear from you that you are 
now ready to roll — are you ready to 
roll your sleeves up and really go in 
there and push for an early — you 
know, Reagan had it half done. 

A. Yes, we want a START agree- 
ment. We've said that from the begin- 
ning of this Administration. But we 
don't want a bad one. We've said that 
from the beginning of this Administra- 
tion. We want a START agreement, but 




The Bakers and the Shevardnadzes shared a quiet dinner at a local restaurant in Jack- 
son, Wyoming. 



we don't want one that we can't get rat- 
ified. So we're proceeding in the man- 
ner that we think is best to get a good 
agreement and to get one that we think 
we can get ratified. That, after all, is 
the end gain. 

We really made progress, it seems 
to me here, when you look at what 
we've done on mobile missiles, the 
dropping of our mobile ban, the veri- 
fication and stability initiatives. We 
solved the question of a unitive count. 
We have in the defense and space talks 
the Krasnoyarsk radar being dis- 
mantled by the Soviet Union, and we 
have this question of delinkage. These 
are major accomplishments in the 
START and defense and space area 
flowing out of this ministerial. 

Q. Does the Administration still 
have as its goal the reduction of 50% 
of these missiles on both sides? Is it 
the heart of this treaty? 



A. What had been negotiated in thi 
Reagan Administration is still on the ta 
ble. The joint draft text is basically as i1 
existed in the Reagan Administration. 

Q. And you're not going to tam- 
per with that? 

A. No, there's not going to be any 
tampering with that. 

Q. Here we have the same strate- 
gic lineup — two new missiles, two 
new bombers, everything that we 
wanted when our relationship with 
the Soviets was so tense. They blew 
up the KAL plane. Everybody agrees 
that the threat from the Soviet Unior 
is greatly diminished. The relation- 
ship is clearly, from what you're say- 
ing, much, much warmer. 

Why don't we start unilaterally, 
for our own country's budget prob- 
lems — for whatever other reasons — 



16 



Department of State Bulletin/November 198! 




Wyoming Ministerial 



tart cutting back on some of the 
^ings that we had at the worst point 
1 the relationship? 

A. The military threat has not di- 
linished if you look at it just in terms of 
lilitary to military. The Soviet Union 
;ill has a distinct advantage in strategic 
uclear. We've been debating in this 
Duntry the question of strategic mod- 
rnization for 15 or 16 years. We still 
on't have a resolution of it. 

Mobile missiles are a good example, 
[obile missiles are stabilizing types of 
uclear weapons. The Soviets have mo- 
iles, and they have them deployed. We 
ave them on the drawing board and still 
on't have congressional approval to even 
love forward. I think it would be really 
uite naive for the United States to talk 
bout unilateral reductions of its strate- 
ic nuclear arsenal. 

Q. But you're asking for new 
capons, and we need money to fight 
rugs, we need money — 

A. Oh, yes, but we have seen major 
'ductions in the defense budget over 
le course of the past 2 or 3 years. 

Q. But not on the strategic 
capons. 

A. Yes, we have. Oh, yes we have. 

Q. We have an MX and a Midget- 
lan, a B-2, and another bomber. The 
lajor components for the big build- 
p are still in place. 

A. But we have seen reductions in 
le defense budget, significant reduc- 
ons over the course of the past few 
jars. I really think it would be a terri- 
le mistake for the United States to talk 
1 terms of stepping out here and sug- 
ssting unilateral reductions in its 
rategic arsenal. 

Let me just say one final thing on 
pis. Our policy of flexible response and 
•)rward defense and our nuclear deter- 
;nt strategy have kept the peace for 
ver 40 years. It would be a mistake for 
< tn abandon that now or to turn away 
•om that now. On the other hand, we 
lould make every effort to reduce nu- 
^ear weapons and to negotiate good 
^reements to accomplish that but not 
ad agreements. 



We went out in a hurry in the late 
1970s to negotiate the SALT agreement 
[Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty], an 
agreement that we couldn't get ratified. 
That was a terrible mistake and we did 
it because there was this frantic rush to 
get an agreement. We think we're doing 
this just right. So far, at least, I think — 
I hope — the facts bear us out. 

Q. But is it true that you are not 
saying that we are now ready, for in- 
stance, to set a timetable for START 
as you did for the conventional? You 
said, let's finish it by "X" time. You 
are not willing to say that on START? 

A. No, I don't think we should set 
artificial deadlines when we're talking 
about strategic arms negotiations. I 
think that's a bad policy. I think it's a lit- 
tle bit different in the area of conven- 
tional forces. I really do. But let me say 
this: We are now going to have a summit. 

Q. Where, by the way? 

A. We don't know where, and we 
don't know exactly when. We know it's 
going to be late spring or early summer 
of next year, and that's definite. 

Q. In the United States? 

A. I believe it's our turn. Yes, I 
believe — I thought you meant where in 
the United States. But I believe it's — 

Q. I do mean where. The Presi- 
dent suggested Washington, when he 
spoke to reporters in Maine. 

A. Did he? 

Q. Yes. 

A. Good. 

Q. Does that sound right to you? 

A. That sounds right, if the Presi- 
dent suggested it. Sounds like an excel- 
lent idea! 

Q. Let me ask you about the dis- 
cussions and the whole subject of 
Eastern Europe. Would it be our poli- 
cy to support the Baltic states in 
tiieir urge for independence, even se- 
cession, from the Soviet Union? 

A. I don't know that I would put it 
that way. Let me explain to you what our 
policy is with respect to the Baltic 
states. 

As you probably know, for over 40 
years, the United States has not recog- 
nized the incorporation of the Baltic 



states into the Soviet Union. We hope 
that whatever happens with respect to 
the desire on the part of people in the 
Baltic states for more autonomy and 
more self-determination and more free- 
dom happens peacefully. That is our 
view. 

Should there be self- 
determination? Should there be free- 
dom? Should there be more autonomy? 
Yes, we think there should be — 

Q. Should there be independence? 

A. — but it should not take place in 
the context of major instability, blood- 
shed, and that sort of thing. That's our 
policy with respect to the Baltic states. 

Q. There have been a lot of re- 
ports that the Administration, the 
foreign policy side, has concluded 
that Mr. Gorbachev is going to have to 
crack down. Is that a conclusion that 
we've reached? 

A. No, it's not a conclusion; it's not a 
conclusion at all. In my conversations 
with [Foreign] Minister Shevardnadze on 
the airplane flying out here to Wyoming, 
he specifically rejected the use of force 
as not being a feasible alternative. And 
he says that is a view that is shared by 
the Soviet leadership. I think that's 
significant. 

Q. What do you say to all the 
critics — and there are a lot on this 
point — that you're much more con- 
cerned with stability and not making 
mistakes and all these questions 
about being careful than you are 
about speaking to the longings and 
urgings behind the Iron Curtain for 
more freedom, for independence, for 
democracy, all of the things we've 
always wanted? 

A. I think the Administration does 
speak to the longings and urging of 
people around the world for freedom. 

I've spoken to it, as a matter of fact, 
with respect to the Baltic states. But I 
think there's a way to speak to that with- 
out, at the same time, inciting rebellion 
and without, at the same time, creating 
instability which could have a significant 
adverse result, in terms of our relation- 



'epartment of State Bulletin/November 1989 



17 




ship with the countries of Eastern 
Europe and, for that matter, our rela- 
tionship with the Soviet Union. 

We see that relationship with the 
Soviet Union now moving away from 
competition, more to dialogue and to 
cooperation. There are still some areas 
where there's too much competition. 
There is now quite a bit of dialogue and 
more and more we're finding areas of 
cooperation, areas in which the Soviet 
Union and the United States can move 
to their mutual advantage. 

So I think the balance that we have 
struck on these issues is exactly the 
right balance. 

Q. Let me ask you a final ques- 
tion, and that relates to Mr. Gor- 
bachev himself and his chances of 
success. At the White House, you 
said — I think for the first time — that 
the United States does have an inter- 
est in seeing him personally succeed. 
Have you, in your own mind, decided 
in what ways we can help him beyond 
what has been said in the past? 

A. Last week we ticked off a num- 
ber of things that we can do. One is to 
work to maintain a stable international 
environment. That is accomplished, if I 
may say so, by making the kind of prog- 
ress across the full range of our arms 
control agenda that we made here in 
Wyoming over the last couple of days. 

We can help economically — with 
their economic problem — not by grants 
and loans and aid but by giving them 
technical advice with respect to how you 
can best move to a free market economy. 

We can help by not fomenting rebel- 
lion in areas within the Soviet Union or 
Eastern Europe, quite frankly, that are 
having some major difficulties. 

Yes, we should speak to the hopes 
and aspirations of people all around 
the world for freedom because our 
democracy — our national soul — has been 
built on that. But we've got to be careful 
that in doing so, we don't foment rebel- 
lion and instability. 

Q. But nothing of what you said 
is new. What is? Nothing came out of 
these talks. I know you and Mr. Shev- 
ardnadze talked about their problems. 



A. It seems to me we just started 
talking to the Soviets about economics. 
In fact, this ministerial was the first 
time we really engaged with them in de- 
tail about the specifics of their economic 
problems, and time doesn't permit me to 
go into all of that here with you now. But 
we got a very detailed discussion. We've 
engaged with them for 2 days, again, 
across the full range of arms control — 
chemical, conventional, nuclear. So I 
would not accept the categorization that 
"nothing is new." These are broad gener- 
al areas where we think we can cooper- 
ate with the Soviet Union to the mutual 
advantage of the Soviet Union and the 
United States. 



Texts of Agreements 



MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 

BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF 

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

AND THE GOVERNMENT OF 

THE UNION OF SOVIET 

SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 

REGARDING A BILATERAL 

VERIFICATION EXPERIMENT AND 

DATA EXCHANGE RELATED 

TO PROHIBITION 

OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS 

The Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, 

Determined to facilitate the process of 
negotiation, signature and ratification of a 
comprehensive, effectively verifiable and 
truly global convention on the prohibition 
and destruction of chemical weapons, 

Convinced that increased openness 
about their chemical weapons capabilities is 
essential for building the confidence neces- 
sary for early completion of the convention, 

Desiring also to gain e.xperience in the 
procedures and measures for verification of 
the convention, 

Have agreed as follows: 



Q. You really seem up. You say 
things have improved. You say the at- 
mosphere has improved. How would 
you describe the state of U.S. -Soviet 
relations right now? I know you hate 
the word detente, but we're clearly — 

A. Yes. I wouldn't want to put a 
buzz word on it. Let me say that I think 
we are making steady progress. I think 
I said to you that we are moving more 
and more away from competition. A lot 
of the relationship now could be em- 
braced under the heading "dialogue," 
and we're moving more and more into 
cooperation. It is a process of change. 
There's a great deal of change going on 
in the Soviet Union, and there's a great 
deal of change going on in our relation- 
ship in the Soviet Union. 



I. General Provisions 

1. As set forth below, the two sides shall con< 
duct a bilateral verification experiment and I 
data exchange related to the prohibition of 
chemical weapons. 

2. The bilateral verification experiment! 
and data exchange shall be conducted in twoi 
phases. In Phase I, the two sides shall ex- 
change general data on their chemical weap- 
ons capabilities and carry out a series of 
visits to relevant facilities. In Phase II, the 
two sides shall exchange detailed data and 
perform on-site inspections to verify the ac- 
curacy of those data. 

3. The bilateral verification experiment 
and data exchange is intended to facilitate 
the process of negotiation, signature and 
ratification of a comprehensive, effectively 
verifiable and truly global convention on the 
prohibition and destruction of chemical 
weapons by: 

(1) enabling each side to gain confidence 
in the data on chemical weapons capabilities 
that will be provided under the provisions of 
the convention; 

(2) enabling each side to gain confidence 
in the inspection procedures that will be 
used to verify compliance with the conven- 
tion; and 

(3) facilitating the elaboration of the 
provisions of the convention. 



18 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1989 ' 




Wyoming Ministerial 



4. Terms used in this Memorandum 
shall have the same meaning as in the draft 
convention text under negotiation by the 
Conference on Disarmament. The draft con- 
vention text that is current as of the date of 
the exchange of date data shall be used. 

5. Data shall be current as of the date of 
Ithe exchange, and shall encompass all sites 
;and facilities specified below, wherever they 
jare located. 

! 6. Each side shall take appropriate 
steps to protect the confidentiality of the 
data it receives. Each side undertakes not to 
divulge this data without the explicit con- 
sent of the side that provided the data. 

II. Phase I 

In Phase I, each side shall provide the fol- 
'lowing data pertaining to its chemical weap- 
ons capabilities: 

1. the aggregate quantity of its chemical 
weapons in agent tons; 

2. the specific types of chemicals it pos- 
sesses that are defined as chemical weap- 
ons, indicating the common name of each 
chemical; 

3. the percentage of each of its declared 
chemicals that is stored in munitions and de- 
vices, and the percentage that is stored in 
storage containers; 

4. the precise location of each of its 
chemical weapons storage facilities; 

5. for each of its declared chemical 
weapons storage facilities: 

• the common name of each chemical de- 
fined as a chemical weapon that is stored 
there; 

• the percentage of the precise aggre- 
gate quantity of its chemical weapons that is 
stored there; and 

• the specific types of munitions and de- 
vices that are stored there; 

6. the precise location of each of its 
chemical weapons production facilities, indi- 
cating the common name of each chemical 
that has been or is being produced at each 
facility; and 

7. the precise location of each of its facil- 
ities for destruction of chemical weapons, in- 
cluding those currently existing, under 
construction or planned. 

In Phase I, each side shall permit the 
other side to visit some of its chemical weap- 
;Ons storage and production facilities, the ex- 
; act number of which will be agreed upon as 
^ soon as possible. In addition, each side shall 
! permit the other side to visit two industrial 
chemical production facilities. Each side will 
' select the facilities to be visited by the other 
side. 



III. Phase II 

In Phase II, each side shall provide the fol- 
lowing data pertaining to its chemical weap- 
ons capabilities: 

1. the chemical name of each chemical it 
possesses that is defined as a chemical 
weapon; 

2. the detailed inventory, including the 
quantity, of the chemical weapons at each of 
its chemical weapons storage facilities; 

3. its preliminary general plans for de- 
struction of chemical weapons under the con- 
vention, including the characteristics of the 
facilities it expects to use and the time 
schedules it expects to follow; 

4. the capacity of each of its chemical 
weapons production facilities; 

5. preliminary genera! plans for closing 
and destroying each of its chemical weapons 
production facilities under the convention, 
including the methods it expects to use and 
the time schedules it expects to follow; 

6. the precise location and capacity of its 
planned single small-scale facility allowed 
under the convention for the production, for 
non-prohibited purposes under strict safe- 
guards, of a limited quantity of chemicals 
that pose a high risk, i.e.. Schedule 1 
chemicals; 

7. the precise location, nature and gen- 
eral scope of activities of any facility or es- 
tablishment designed, constructed or used 
since 1 January 1946 for development of 
chemical weapons, inter alia, laboratories 
and test evaluation sites. 



IV. Timing 

1. Except as specified below, Phase I data 
shall be exchanged not later than 31 Decem- 
ber 1989. Visits shall begin not later than 
30 June 1990, provided that the sides have 
agreed, with appropriate lead time, on the 
number of visits, as well as on the programs 
and other detailed arrangements for the vis- 
its, and assuming that the sides have agreed 
by 31 December 1989 on the type of facility 
to be visited by each side in its first visit 
to the other side. 

2. In Phase I each side may withhold 
temporarily, for reasons of security, data on 
the locations of storage facilities that to- 
gether contain a total quantity of chemical 
weapons that is not more than two percent 
of the precise quantity of its chemical weap- 
ons. In addition, the other data pertaining 
to these locations, as specified in Section II, 
paragraph 5, shall be grouped under the 
heading "other storage locations" without 
reference to specific locations. Precise data 
pertaining to these locations shall be ex- 
changed later in Phase I on a subsequent 
date to be agreed. 



3. Phase II data shall be e.xchanged on 
an agreed date not less than four months 
prior to the initialing of the text of the con- 
vention. At that time, both sides shall 
formally and jointly acknowledge the 
possibility of initialing the convention with- 
in four months. 

V. Verification 

1. Each side shall use its own national means 
to evaluate Phase I data and Phase II data. 

2. During Phase I, the sides shall hold 
consultations to discuss the information that 
has been presented and visits that have 
been exchanged. The sides will cooperate in 
clarifying ambiguous situations. 

3. During Phase II, each side shall have 
the opportunity to verify Phase I and Phase 
II data by means of on-site inspections. The 
purpose of these inspections shall be to veri- 
fy the accuracy of the data that has been ex- 
changed and to gain confidence that the 
signature and ratification of the convention 
will take place on the basis of up-to-date and 
verified data on the chemical weapons capa- 
bilities of the sides. 

4. Prior to the initialing of the conven- 
tion, each side shall have the opportunity to 
select and inspect at its discretion up to five 
facilities from the list of chemical weapons 
storage facilities and chemical weapons pro- 
duction facilities declared by the other side. 
During Phase I, the sides will consider 
whether each side may inspect not less than 
half of the declared facilities of the other 
side if their number is more than 10. Should 
either side as of the date of the Phase II ex- 
change possess a single small-scale facility 
for production of Schedule 1 chemicals, it 
shall be subject to an additional inspection. 

Each side shall also have the oppor- 
tunity to carry out up to five challenge 
inspections, as specified below. All inspec- 
tions shall be carried out within the agreed 
four months from the date of the declaration 
pertaining to Phase II, referred to in Sec- 
tion IV. 

5. While the signed convention is being 
considered by their respective legislative 
bodies, each side shall have the opportunity 
to request from the other side, and to obtain 
from it, updated data. Each side shall have 
the opportunity to conduct up to five chal- 
lenge inspections, as specified below. Dur- 
ing this process, the two sides will consult 
with their respective legislative bodies, as 
appropriate, in accordance with their consti- 
tutional requirements. 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1989 



19 




For each side, these inspections shall be 
carried out within a four-month period, be- 
ginning with the date that it conducts its 
first inspection. The sides shall consult and 
agree on the dates when the first inspection 
will be conducted by each side. The dates 
shall be chosen to ensure that the inspec- 
tions shall be conducted by both sides at 
appro.ximately the same time. Once the 
inspections begin, the sides may, by mutual 
consent, extend the four-month periods for 
an additional specified time. 

6. Inspections of declared facilities, as 
well as challenge inspections, shall be con- 
ducted in accordance with the correspond- 
ing provisions of the draft convention, 
taking into account that these inspections 
are being carried out on a bilateral basis 
and do not involve the bodies that will be es- 
tablished under the convention. If neces- 
sary, the two sides shall supplement the 
provisions of the draft convention by 
mutually-agreed procedures. 

7. Challenge inspections may be made at 
any location or facility of the other side, as 
provided for in the draft convention text, ex- 
cept that, for the purposes of this Memoran- 
dum and without creating a precedent, 
challenge inspections at facilities not on the 
territory of the sides may be made only at 
military facilities of a side in a limited num- 
ber of countries; the sides will agree later 
on these specific countries. 

8. Challenge inspections conducted pur- 
suant to this Memorandum shall be con- 
ducted in a manner consistent with the 
domestic law of the side being inspected and 
shall be based on a recognition by both sides 
of the need to resolve concerns and build 
confidence. 

9. To clarify questions related to the 
data provided during Phase I and Phase II, 
the two sides shall employ normal diplomatic 
channels, specifically-designated represen- 
tatives or such other means as may be 
agreed upon. 

VI. Format 

1. Unless otherwise provided in this 
Memorandum, the agreed data shall be pro- 
vided according to the specifications con- 
tained in the draft convention text for the 
declarations that are to be made not later 
than 30 days after the convention enters into 
force. 

2. Precise locations shall be specified by 
means of site diagrams of facilities. Each di- 
agram shall clearly indicate the boundaries 
of the facility, all structures of the facility 



and significant geographical relief features 
in the vicinity of the facility. If the facility is 
located within a larger complex, the dia- 
gram shall clearly specify the exact location 
within the complex. On each diagram, the 
geographic coordinates of the center of the 
facility shall be specified to the nearest 
second. 



VII. Entry into Force 

This Memorandum of Understanding shall 
enter into force upon signature. 

In Witness Whereof the undersigned, 
being duly authorized by their respective 
Governments, have signed this Memoran- 
dum of Understanding. 

Done at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, in du- 
plicate, this 23rd day of September, 1989, in 
the English and Russian languages, both 
texts being equally authentic. 

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 

James A. Baker, III 

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST 
REPUBLICS: 

E.A. Shevardnadze 



AGREEMENT BETWEEN 

THE GOVERNMENT OF 

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

AND THE GOVERNMENT OF 

THE UNION OF SOVIET 

SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 

ON RECIPROCAL ADVANCE 

NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR 

STRATEGIC EXERCISES 

The Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter re- 
ferred to as the Parties, 

Affirming their desire to reduce and ul- 
timately eliminate the risk of outbreak of 
nuclear war, in particular as a result of mis- 
interpretation, miscalculation or accident. 

Believing that a nuclear war cannot be 
won and must never be fought. 

Recognizing the necessity to promote 
the increase of mutual trust and the 
strengthening of strategic stability. 

Acknowledging the importance of ex- 
changing advance notification of major stra- 
tegic exercises on the basis of reciprocity, 



Reaffirming their obligations under thi 
Agreement between the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear 
Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 
1987, 

Have agreed as follows: 

Article I 

On the basis of reciprocity, each Party shall 
notify the other Party no less than 14 days i 
advance about the beginning of one major 
strategic forces exercise which includes the 
participation of heavy bomber aircraft to be 
held during each calendar year. 

Article II 

1. Each Party shall provide to the other Pan 
ty the notifications required by Article I 
through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Cen- 
ters established by the Agreement betweer 
the United States of America and the Unioi 
of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Estab- 
lishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Center 
of September 15, 1987. 

2. The notifications required by Articlt 
I shall be provided no less than 14 days pric 
to the date in Coordinated Universal Time 
(UTC) during which the relevant exercise 
will commence. 



Article III 

The Parties shall undertake to hold consul- 
tations, as mutually agreed, to consider 
questions relating to implementation of the 
provisions of this Agreement, as well as to 
discuss possible amendments thereto aimed 
at furthering the implementation of the ob- 
jectives of this Agreement. Amendments 
shall enter into force in accordance with 
procedures to be agreed upon. 



Article IV 

This Agreement shall not affect the ob- 
ligations of either Party under other 
agreements. 



Article V 

1. This Agreement shall be of unlimited 
duration. 

2. This Agreement may be terminated 
by either Party upon 12 months written no- 
tice to the other Party. 



20 



Department of State Bulletin/November 198! 



J 




Wyoming Ministerial 




The Foreign Minister and the Secretary signed several bilateral agreements while in 
Wyoming. 



Article VI 

This Agreement shall enter into force on 
January 1, 1990, and notifications pursuant 
to this Agreement shall commence with the 
calendar year 1990. 

In Witness Whereof the undersigned, 
being duly authorized by their respective 
Governments, have signed this Agreement. 

Done at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, in du- 
plicate, this 23rd day of September, 1989, in 
the English and Russian languages, each 
text being equally authentic. 

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 

James A. Baker, III 

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF 
THE UNION OF SOVIET 
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS: 

E.A. Shevardnadze 



AGREEMENT BETWEEN 

THE GOVERNMENT OF 

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

AND THE GOVERNMENT OF 

THE UNION OF SOVIET 

SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 

ON PRINCIPLES OF 

IMPLEMENTING 

TRIAL VERIFICATION 

AND STABILITY MEASURES 

THAT WOULD BE CARRIED OUT 

PENDING THE CONCLUSION 

OF THE U.S.-SOVIET TREATY 

ON THE REDUCTION 

AND LIMITATION OF 

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS 

The Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter 
referred to as the Parties, 



Proceeding from their mutual interest 
in using every opportunity to strengthen in- 
ternational security and reduce the risk of 
war. 

Seeking to provide, through stability 
and predictability in the military sphere, a 
solid foundation for concluding the Treaty on 
the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic 
Offensive Arms and with a view to expedit- 
ing agreement on effective verification pro- 
cedures for this Treaty, 

Desiring to achieve maximum confi- 
dence that the measures being negotiated at 
the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to 
verify compliance with the obligations as- 
sumed under this Treaty will be both practi- 
cal and sufficient for effective verification, 

Have agreed as follows: 

1. In the framework of the Geneva Nu- 
clear and Space Talks, the Parties agree to 
develop verification and stability measures 
to be implemented pending the conclusion of 
the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation 
of Strategic Offensive Arms. 

The purpose of the above measures is to 
conduct pilot trials with the aim of subse- 
quently refining, during negotiations, the 
verification procedures to be included in the 
Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of 
Strategic Offensive Arms, as well as en- 
hancing confidence in order to facilitate 
early finalization of the Treaty text for 
signature. 

2. Trial verification and stability meas- 
ures shall involve agreed kinds of strategic 
offensive arms to be covered by the Treaty 
being drawn up and agreed facilities for 
such arms. 

3. These measures shall be selected 
with a view to e.xamining, refining and try- 
ing out agreed on-site inspection and contin- 
uous monitoring procedures from among 
those proposed by the Parties for considera- 
tion and inclusion in the Treaty being drawn 
up. 

4. Trial verification and stability meas- 
ures shall be worked out on the basis of reci- 
procity and in light of the procedures 
agreed upon in the draft Treaty on Reduc- 
tion and Limitation of Strategic Offensive 
Arms as applied to some designated loca- 
tions, facilities and arms of both Parties. 

5. These measures shall be agreed upon 
concurrently with continuing efforts to 
work out the draft Treaty on the Reduction 
and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms 
and must not slow down this work in any 
way whatsoever. 

The implementation of these measures 
must not be a precondition for finalizing and 
concluding the Treaty on the Reduction and 
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1989 



21 




6. Trial verification and stability meas- 
ures shall be implemented as they are 
agreed upon, within the time periods estab- 
lished by the Parties. 

7. Each specific measure may be formal- 
ized either through agreements concluded 
by the Parties or through other means as 
appropriate. 

8. This agreement shall enter into force 
upon signature. 

In Witness Whereof, the undersigned, 
being duly authorized by their respective 
Governments, have signed this Agreement. 

Done at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, in du- 
plicate, this 23rd day of September, 1989, in 
the English and Russian languages, each 
te.xt being equally authentic. 

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 

James A. Baker, III 

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF 
THE UNION OF SOVIET 
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS: 

E.A. Shevardnadze 



AGREEMENT BETWEEN 

THE GOVERNMENT OF 

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

AND THE GOVERNMENT OF 

THE UNION OF SOVIET 

SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 

CONCERNING THE 

BERING STRAITS 

REGIONAL COMMISSION 

The Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics; 

Desiring to promote cooperation in the 
Bering Straits Region; and 

Desiring to provide a mechanism for re- 
solving minor disputes at the local level; 

Having agreed to create the Bering 
Straits Regional Commission (hereinafter 
Commission) for the settlement of local 
minor incidents which shall be established 
and function as follows: 

Article I 

1. The Commission shall be composed of 
three U.S. and three Soviet members. The 
Government of the United States of America 



and the Government of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics shall each appoint three 
Commissioners, and each designate one of 
them as the Chief Commissioner. 

2. The Commissioners shall cooperate 
in performing the duties arising from this 
Agreement and shall maintain direct work- 
ing contacts with a view to resolving expe- 
ditiously matters which arise within their 
jurisdiction under this Agreement. 

Article 2 

1. The official seats and districts of opera- 
tion of the Chief Commissioners shall be as 
follows: 

On the part of the United States of 
America, the Chief Commissioner shall have 
a permanent seat in Gambell and Nome. The 
district of operation shall be the Nome and 
Kobuk census areas of Alaska. 

On the part of the Union of Soviet So- 
cialist Republics, the Chief Commissioner 
shall have a permanent seat in Provideniya 
and Anadyr. The district of operation shall 
be the lultinskiy Rayon, Providenskiy Rayon 
and Chukotsky Rayon, as well as the eastern 
part of the Anadyrskiy Rayon, bounded on 
the south by the Anadyr River and on the 
west by Tanyurer River, including Anadyr 
(Chukotsky Autonomous Okrug). 

2. Each Party shall communicate the 
names of the Commissioners to the other 
Party through diplomatic channels. 

Articles 

1. The Commission shall: 

A. Investigate and, where appropriate, 
resolve all local minor incidents including: 

(1) The unintentional entry by individ- 
uals into the territory of the other Party 
without the permission of that Party or 
other legal basis; 

(2) In cases not covered by the Agree- 
ment between the United States of America 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
on Mutual Fisheries Relations, the return of 
fishing equipment, including crab pots, in 
the territory of the other Party as a result 
of natural causes; 

(3) As appropriate, the return of 
property which, in connection with an inci- 
dent, is found in the territory of the other 
Party. 

B. Assist in arranging emergency serv- 
ices for citizens of one Party visiting in the 
other Party's national territory. 

Such emergency services may include: 

(1) checking and verifying the welfare 
and whereabouts of individuals who are de- 
tained, arrested, lost, or ill; 



(2) assisting in the transmission of 
funds for the repatriation of destitute 
individuals; 

(3) assisting in matters arising from 
the death of an individual; and 

(4) assisting in arranging medical 
treatment for individuals who take ill. 

C. Cooperate to prevent incidents of a 
local character from arising. 

D. In furtherance of the Maritime 
Search and Rescue Agreement between the 
United States of America and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, cooperate in the 
search for persons, vessels, and property 
which are lost in the territory of each of the 
Parties. 

2. The Commission shall refer any inci- 
dent where there is a dispute over the loca- 
tion of the maritime boundary for resolutior 
through diplomatic channels. 

Article 4 

1. Persons who have been detained for unin- 
tentionally crossing into the territory of thi 
other Party without the permission of the 
Party or other lawful basis, shall be re- 
turned as soon as possible to the Commis- 
sioners or appointed representative of the 
Party from whose territory they have 
crossed. 

2. Vessels, means of conveyance, floats, 
hunting and fishing gear and other articles 
in the possession of the detained persons 
shall be returned at the same time such per 
son is returned. 

3. The Commission shall decide on the 
procedure and designated meeting points 
for the return of persons and property re- 
ferred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 5 of this 
article. 

4. The Commissioners shall not refuse 
to accept the persons returned. 

5. Questions concerning the return of 
persons who have intentionally crossed into 
the territory of the other Party without the 
permission of that Party or other lawful ba- 
sis, which cannot be handled directly by the 
Commission shall be dealt with through dip- 
lomatic channels. 

( 
Article 5 

I. Chief Commissioners may, at their discre- 
tion, refer any matter of particular impor- 
tance for settlement through diplomatic 
channels. 

2. All incidents of particular gravity, 
such as homicide, serious bodily harm or un- 
authorized overflight, shall in every case be 
referred for settlement through diplomatic 
channels. 



I 



22 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1989| 




Wyoming Ministerial 




llembers of the media between events in Jackson Hole. 



3. Incidents wliichi cannot be settled by 
^reement of the Commission sliall be set- 
ed through diplomatic channels. In such 
ises, the Commission shall make the neces- 
iry inquiries into the incident and register 
lie results in a joint record. 

4. The Commission shall undertake ac- 
vities in settlement of local incidents and 
?cord them in the record. 

5. When incidents are referred for set- 
ement through diplomatic channels, Com- 
lissioners shall, at the direction of their 
overnments, cooperate in providing rele- 
int information. 

irticle 6 

ommissioners shall provide information to 
isitors concerning procedures available for 
le settlement of claims. Commissioners 
lall not be held liable, and shall not be in- 
olved in, the settlement of matters relating 
) claims for compensation for damages. 



rticle 7 

ach Party will fund its own expenses for 
ctivities pertinent to this Agreement. 



Article 8 

1. Periodic meetings will be scheduled by 
the Commissioners. Additional meetings 
may take place at the request of a Commis- 
sioner. The agenda of a meeting shall be set- 
tled by means of preliminary discussions or 
by correspondence. Items not on the agenda 
may be dealt with by mutual consent. 

2. The Commission shall keep a record 
of each meeting which shall briefly indicate 
the proceedings of the meeting and actions 
taken at the meeting. The record shall be in 
the English and Russian languages, with 
each te,\t considered as equally authentic. 

3. Location of meetings shall alternate 
between the United States of America and 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 

4. Commissioners may enter into the 
territory of the other Party for the purpose 
of attending Commission meetings by giv- 
ing appropriate notification to the other Par- 
ty's Chief Commissioner. The documents 
authorizing such visits are: 

For the U.S.S.R. Commissioners, a So- 
viet passport or identification document and 
written authorization issued by the chief of 
the U.S.S.R. Border Troops; 

For the U.S. Commissioners, a U.S. 
passport and written authorization of the 
U.S. Department of State. 



Article 9 

Commissioners shall inform each other as 
soon as possible of actions taken in accord- 
ance with the decisions adopted at a 
meeting. 

Article 10 

1. The Commission shall decide on the 
procedure for the exchange of official 
correspondence. 

2. Official correspondence shall be ac- 
cepted at any time of day or night, including 
holidays or other non-working days. 

3. Communications and logistics capa- 
bilities of agencies of the Parties, including 
the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S.S.R. Bor- 
der Troops, may be utilized in furtherance 
of this Agreement. 

4. For the purpose of implementing this 
Agreement, the Chief Commissioner may 
bring to the meetings an assistant and an 
interpreter, who shall be enlisted to enter 
the territory of the other Party with at least 
ten days prior notification to the other Par- 
ty's Chief Commissioner. The documents au- 
thorizing the visit by an assistant and an 
interpreter shall be a passport or identifica- 
tion document and written authorization is- 
sued by the Chief Commissioners 
identifying the person as an assistant or in- 
terpreter. Such persons shall depart with 
the Commissioner. 

5. The crew of the aircraft or vessel 
transporting the Commissioners to a meet- 
ing may disembark the aircraft or vessel 
and remain in the place designated by the 
Chief Commissioner of the Party hosting the 
meeting until the meeting is concluded. The 
crew shall depart with the aircraft or vessel 
transporting the Commissioners. The docu- 
ments authorizing crew disembarkation 
shall be a passport or identification docu- 
ment and written authorization issued by 
their Chief Commissioner identifying the 
person as a crew member. 

Article 11 

1. Nothing in this Agreement shall preju- 
dice the ongoing maritime boundary nego- 
tiations between the two Parties or any 
agreements or understandings resulting 
from those discussions. 

2. Nothing in this Agreement shall 
derogate in any way from the rights and ob- 
ligations provided for in other agreements 
between the Parties. 



•epartment of State Bulletin/November 1989 



23 




Article 12 

1. This agreement shall enter into force on 
the date the Parties exchange diplomatic 
notes notifying each other that necessary 
internal procedures have been completed. 

2. This Agreement shall remain in force 
unless terminated by either Party upon six 
months' advance notice to the other Party of 
its intention to terminate this Agreement. 

3. This Agreement may be amended by 
written agreement between the Parties. 

In Witness Whereof the undersigned, 
being duly authorized by their respective 
Governments, have signed this Agreement. 

Done at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, in du- 
plicate, this 23rd day of September 1989. 

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 

James A. Baker, III 

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF 
THE UNION OF SOVIET 
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS: 

E.A. Shevardnadze 



AGREEMENT BETWEEN 

THE GOVERNMENT OF 

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

AND THE GOVERNMENT OF 

THE UNION OF SOVIET 

SOCIALIST REPUBLICS CONCERNING 

MUTUAL VISITS 

BY INHABITANTS OF 

THE BERING STRAITS REGION 

The Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the Union 
of the Soviet Socialist Republics (the 
"Parties"); 

Recognizing that native inhabitants live 
on both sides of the U.S. -Soviet border; 

Noting that these inhabitants have 
relatives on both sides of the U.S. -Soviet 
border; and 

Striving to promote contacts between 
the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. inhabitants of the 
Bering Straits Region; 

Have agreed as follows: 



Article 1 

For the purposes of this Agreement: 

1. "U.S. inhabitants" shall mean U.S. 
citizens who are permanent residents of the 
designated U.S. area. 

2. "U.S.S.R. inhabitants" shall mean 
U.S.S.R. citizens who are permanent resi- 
dents of the designated U.S.S.R. area. 

3. "Designated U.S. area" shall mean 
the Nome and Kobuk census areas of Alaska. 

4. "Designated U.S.S.R. area" shall 
mean the lultinskiy Rayon, Providenskiy 
Rayon and Chukotsky Rayon, as well as the 
eastern part of the Anadyrskiy Rayon, 
bounded on the south by the Anadyr River 
and on the west by the Tanyurer River, in- 
cluding the city of Anadyr (Chukotsky Au- 
tonomous Okrug). 

5. "Relatives" shall mean blood rela- 
tives, fellow clan or tribe members or native 
inhabitants who share a linguistic or cultur- 
al heritage with native inhabitants of the 
other territory. 

6. "Designated U.S. authorities" shall 
mean designated representatives of the U.S. 
Secretary of State. 

7. "Designated U.S.S.R. authorities" 
shall mean the internal affairs authorities of 
the Magadan Oblispolkom and the depart- 
ments of the internal affairs of city and Ray- 
on Ispolkoms of the Magadan Oblast. 

8. "Chief Commissioner" is as defined in 
the 1989 Agreement between the Govern- 
ment of the United States of America and 
the Government of the Union of Soviet So- 
cialist Republics Concerning the Bering 
Straits Regional Commission. 



Article 2 

1. Upon invitation of relatives, U.S. and 
U.S.S.R. inhabitants may travel to the des- 
ignated areas in accordance with the pro- 
cedures established by this Agreement. 

2. U.S. inhabitants desiring to visit rel- 
atives residing in the designated U.S.S.R. 
area shall notify the U.S.S.R. Chief Com- 
missioner, through the U.S. Chief Commis- 
sioner or through a Soviet relative who has 
extended them a written invitation to visit, 
a minimum of ten days in advance of the vis- 
it. They shall provide their names and pass- 
port numbers, their dates and places of 
birth, the names and addresses of the rela- 
tives who have extended them an invitation 
to visit, the date of their intended visit, 
their method of travel and the intended 
checkpoint of entry. 

3. Upon notification of the U.S.S.R. 
Chief Commissioner, U.S. inhabitants may 
enter and exit the designated U.S.S.R. area, 
including passage through U.S.S.R. terri- 



torial waters, using a U.S. passport and an 
insert to the passport stating that they are 
inhabitants of the designated U.S. area. 

4. U.S.S.R. inhabitants desiring to visit 
relatives residing in the designated U.S. 
area shall notify the U.S. Chief Commis- 
sioner, through the U.S.S.R. Chief Commis- 
sioner or through a U.S. relative who has 
extended them a written invitation to visit, 
a minimum of ten days in advance of the vis- 
it. They shall provide their names and pass- 
port numbers, their dates and places of 
birth, the name and address of the relatives 
who have extended them an invitation to 
visit, the date of their intended visit, their 
method of travel and the intended check- 
point of entry. 

5. Upon notification of the U.S. Chief 
Commissioner, U.S.S.R. inhabitants may 
enter and exit the designated U.S. areas, in 
eluding passage through U.S. terrritorial 
w-aters, using a Soviet passport and an in- 
sert to the passport stating that they are in 
habitants of the designated U.S.S.R. area. 

6. Unmarried children under the age of 
sixteen may travel only when accompanying 
their parents or other adults. An insert stat 
ing that such children are inhabitants of the 
designated U.S. or U.S.S.R. areas shall be 
placed in the passport of the parent or ac- 
companying adult. 

7. The Chief Commissioners shall deter 
mine the air and sea routes permitted for 
travel. 



Article 3 

1. The insert referred to in article 2 of this 
Agreement shall be issued by the desig- 
nated authorities of the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics in their respective territories. 
2. The Chief Commissioners shall ex- 
change sample inserts, and shall notify each 
other of any modifications to the insert thir-- 
ty days in advance of the issuance of such 
modified inserts. The insert text shall be in 
English and Russian and a photograph shall 
be attached. 



Article 4 

Duration of stay for U.S. and Ll.S.S.R. in 
habitants in the designated area of the othei 
Party shall not exceed ninety days. 

Article 5 

L Border crossings by the U.S.S.R. and 
U.S. inhabitants into the designated areas 
shall be made through the following 
checkpoints: 



24 



Department of State Bulletin/November 198f 




Wyoming Ministerial 



In the designated U.S. area, the check- 
boints for crossing the border shall be Nome 
md Gambell, Alaska. 

In the designated U.S.S.R. area, the 
•heckpoints for crossing the border shall be 
Provideniya, Anadyr, Lavrantiya and Uelen 
Chukotsky Autonomous Okrug). 

2. U.S. and U.S.S.R. inhabitants may 
enter only at the checkpoint provided in the 
prior notification to the Chief Commis- 
doners. 

3. Procedures for operation of each 
checkpoint will be established by agree- 
nient in writing signed by the Chief 
"ommissioners. 



I 



rticle 6 

1. U.S. and U.S.S.R. inhabitants crossing 
nto the designated areas pursuant to this 
Agreement shall be subject to border and 
customs control. 

2. Customs control at the checkpoints 
ihall be carried out in accordance with the 
aws of the Parties and bilateral agreements 
n force. 

3. U.S. and U.S.S.R. inhabitants may 
)riiig in with them items for personal use or 
'ur gifts. These items cannot be sold in the 
■ountry of visit. 

4. Procedures for taking items, includ- 
ng currency and financial documents, in 
jnd out of the country shall be subject to the 
,aws of the Parties and bilateral agreements 
:n force. 



Article 7 

1. In the event that the passport or the in- 
serts to the passport of a U.S. or U.S.S.R. 
inhabitant is lost or becomes unusable dur- 
ing a visit in the territory of the other Par- 
ty, such person shall notify the designated 
authorities of the country of visit. 

2. After consultation with the desig- 
nated authorities of the other country, the 
designated authorities of the country of visit 
shall issue a document to facilitate return 
travel. 



Articles 

1. U.S. and U.S.S.R. inhabitants while vis- 
liting in the territory of the other Party pur- 
[suant to this Agreement are subject to the 
llaws of the latter. 

; 2. Persons acting contrary to the provi- 
ilsions of this Agreement or laws of the coun- 
try of visit may be denied permission to 
enter the country or to stay further in its 
territory. 



3. In those cases referred to in para- 
graph 2, the designated authorities of the 
country of the visit shall notify such person 
of the grounds for such decision. 

Article 9 

In exceptional circumstances, such as epi- 
demics and natural disasters, a Party may 
temporarily restrict or suspend entry into 
its territory, by notifying the other Party 
through diplomatic channels. Such Party 
shall give notice of the lifting of the restric- 
tions as soon as possible. 

Article 10 

Questions relating to application or inter- 
pretation of this Agreement shall be re- 
solved through diplomatic channels. 

Article 11 

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on 
the date the Parties e.xchange diplomatic 
notes notifying each other that the neces- 
sary internal procedures have been 
completed. 

2. This Agreement shall remain in force 
unless terminated by either Party upon six 
months' advance written notice to the other 
Party of its intention to terminate this 
Agreement. 

3. This Agreement may be amended by 
written agreement between the Parties. 

In Witness Whereof the undersigned, 
being duly authorized by their respective 
Governments, have signed this Agreement. 

Done at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, in du- 
plicate, in the English and Russian lan- 
guages, each text being equally authentic, 
this 23rd day of September 1989. 

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 

James A. Baker, III 

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF 
THE UNION OF SOVIET 
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS: 

E.A. Shevardnadze 



JOINT STATEMENT BY 

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

AND THE UNION OF SOVIET 

SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 

Since 1986, representatives of the United 
States of America and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics have been conducting 
friendly and constructive discussions of 
certain international legal aspects of tradi- 
tional uses of the oceans, in particular, 
navigation. 

The Governments are guided by the 
provisions of the 1982 United Nations Con- 
vention on the Law of the Sea, which, with 
respect to traditional uses of the oceans, 
generally constitute international law and 
practice and balance fairly the interests of 
all States. They recognize the need to en- 
courage all States to harmonize their inter- 
nal laws, regulations and practices with 
those provisions. 

The Governments consider it useful to 
issue the attached Uniform Interpretation 
of the Rules of International Law Governing 
Innocent Passage. Both Governments have 
agreed to take the necessary steps to con- 
form their internal laws, regulations and 
practices with this understanding of the 
rules. 

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA: 

James A. Baker, III 

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET 
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS: 

E.A. Shevardnadze 

Jackson Hole, Wyoming 
September 23, 1989 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1989 



25 




UNIFORM INTERPRETATION OF 
RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
GOVERNING INNOCENT PASSAGE 

1. The relevant rules of international law 
governing innocent passage of ships in the 
territorial sea are stated in the 1982 United 
National Convention on Law of the Sea (Con- 
vention of 1982), particularly in Part II, 
Section 3. 

2. All ships, including warships, regard- 
less of cargo, armament or means of propul- 
sion, enjoy the right of innocent passage 
through the territorial sea in accordance 
with international law, for which neither pri- 
or notification nor authorization is required. 

3. Article 19 of the Convention of 1982 
sets out in paragraph 2 an exhaustive list of 
activities that would render passage not in- 
nocent. A ship passing through the terri- 
torial sea that does not engage in any of 
those activities is in innocent passage. 

4. A coastal State which questions 
whether the particular passage of a ship 
through its territorial sea is innocent shall 
inform the ship of the reason why it ques- 
tions the innocence of the passage, and pro- 
vide the ship an opportunity to clarify 

its intentions or correct its conduct in a 
reasonably short period of time. 

5. Ships e.xercising the right of innocent 
passage shall comply with all laws and regu- 
lations of the coastal State adopted in con- 
formity with relevant rules of international 
law as reflected in Articles 21, 22, 23 and 2.5 
of the Convention of 1982. These include the 
laws and regulations requiring ships exer- 
cising the right of innocent passage through 
its territorial sea to use such sea lanes and 









J 


hk4 


iu> 




*^9^H^^^^E| 


■ 


m^ 


4:4 < 


*^ 


noK 







■ni 



traffic separation schemes as it may pre- 
scribe where needed to protect safety of 
navigation. In areas where no such sea lanes 
or traffic separation schemes have been pre- 
scribed, ships nevertheless enjoy the right 
of innocent passage. 

6. Such laws and regulations of the 
coastal State may not have the practical ef- 
fect of denying or impairing the exercise of 
the right of innocent passage as set forth in 
Article 24 of the Convention of 1982. 

7. If a warship engages in conduct 
which violates such law or regulations or 
renders its passage not innocent and does 
not take corrective action upon request, the 
coastal State may require it to leave the ter- 
ritorial sea, as set forth in Article 30 of the 
Convention of 1982. In such case the warship 
shall do so immediately. 



8. Without prejudice to the exercise of 
rights of coastal and flag States, all differ- 
ences which may arise regarding a particu- 
lar case of passage of ships through the 
territorial sea shall be settled through dip- 
lomatic channels or other agreed means. 



' Press release 168. 

~ Press release 169 of Sept. 22, 1989. 

•' Foreign Minister Shevardnadze spoke 
in Russian, and his remarks were translated 
by an interpreter 

•• Press release 170. 

■' Press release 171 of Sept. 26. 

•^ Taped on Sept. 23 in Jackson Hole for 
broadcast the following day (press release 
172ofSept. 26). ■ 



26 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1989 



THE PRESIDENT 



Outlines of a New World of Freedom 



President Bush addressed the Ji.Ji.th session 
of the UN General Assembly on September 25, 1989. ^ 




(White House photo by Susan Biddle) 



I am honored to speak to you today as 
you open the 44th session of the General 
Assembly. 

I would like to congratulate Joseph 
Garba of Nigeria, a distinguished dip- 
lomat, on his election as president of 
this session of the General Assembly, 
and I wish him success in his presidency. 

I feel a great personal pleasure on 
this occasion, for this is a homecoming 
for Barbara and me. The memories of 
my time here in 1971 and 1972 are still 
with me today — the human moments, 
the humorous moments that are part of 
even the highest undertaking. 

With your permission, let me 
share one story from one of the many 
sessions of the Security Council. I was 
the Permanent Representative of the 
United States. I was 45 minutes late 
getting to the meeting, and all 45 min- 
utes were filled by the first speaker to 
take the floor. When I walked in and 
took my seat, the speaker paused and 
said with great courtesy: "I welcome 
the Permanent Representative of the 
United States and now, for his benefit, 
I will start my speech all over again — 
from the beginning." That's a true sto- 
ry. At that moment, difference of alli- 
ance, ideology didn't matter. The 
universal groan that went up around 
that table, from every member present, 
and then the laughter that followed, 
united us all. 

Today, I would like to begin 
by recognizing — again, a personal 
privilege — the current permanent rep- 
resentatives with whom I served — 
Ambassador Dugersuren, Roberto 
Martinez-Ordones, Blaise Rabetafika, 
Permanent Observer John Dube. 

It's wonderful to look around and 
see so many familiar faces — foreign 
ministers, members of the Secretariat, 
delegates. And, of course, Mr. Secre- 
tary General — you were then the per- 
manent representative for your country 
when we served together. Under Secre- 
tary Abby Farah — you were a perma- 
nent representative back then, too. 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1989 



27 



THE PRESIDENT 



of history. They failed to see the love 
of freedom that was written in the 
human heart. 

Two hundred years ago today, 
the United States — our Congress — 
proposed the Bill of Rights — fundamen- 
tal freedoms belonging to every indi- 
vidual; rights no government can deny. 
Those same rights have been recog- 
nized in this congress of nations — in 
the words of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, "a common standard 
of achievement for all peoples and all 
nations." 

From where we stand — on the 
threshold of this new world of free- 
dom — the trend is clear enough. If, for 
those who write the history of our 
times, the 20th century is remembered 
as the century of the state, the 21st 
century must be an era of emancipa- 
tion — the age of the individual. 

Make no mistake: Nothing can 
stand in the way of freedom's march. 
There will come a day when freedom isi 
seen the world over to be a universal 
birthright — of every man and woman, 
of every race and walk of life. Even un- 
der the worst circumstances, at the 
darkest of times, freedom has always 
remained alive — a distant dream, per- 
haps, but always alive. 

Today, that dream is no longer dis- 
tant. For the first time — for millions 
around the world — a new world of free- 
dom is within reach. Today is freedom's"^ 
moment. 

You see, the possibility now exists 
for the creation of a true community of 
nations — built on shared interests and 
ideals. A true community — a world 
where free governments and free mar- 
kets meet the rising desire of the peo- 
ple to control their own destiny, to live 
in dignity, and to e.xercise freely their 
fundamental human rights. It is time 
we worked together to deliver that des- 
tiny into the hands of men and women 
everywhere. 

Our challenge is to strengthen the 
foundations of freedom, encourage its 
advance, and face our most urgent 
challenges — the global challenges of the 
21st century — economic health, environ- 
mental well-being, and the great ques- 
tions of war and peace. 

Economic Growth 

First, global economic growth. During 
this decade, a number of developing na- 
tions have moved into the ranks of the 



Ambassador Aguilar was then here and 
is now back. And off we go. It's an hon- 
or to be back with you in this historic 
hall, and I apologize if I have forgotten 
any of you old enough to have served in 
1971 and 1972. 

The United Nations was estab- 
lished 44 years ago upon the ashes of 
war — and amidst great hopes. The 
United Nations can do great things. 
No, the United Nations is not perfect. 
It's not a panacea for world problems. 
But it is a vital forum where the na- 
tions of the world seek to replace con- 
flict with consensus, and it must 
remain a forum for peace. 

The United Nations is moving clos- 
er to that ideal. And it has the support 
of the United States of America. In re- 
cent years — certainly since my time 
here — the war of words that has often 
echoed in this chamber is giving way to 



For today, there's an idea at work 
around the globe — an idea of undeniable 
force; that idea is freedom. 

Freedom's advance is evident ev- 
erywhere. In central Europe, in 
Hungary — where state and society are 
now in the midst of a movement toward 
political pluralism and a free market 
economy, where the barrier that once 
enforced an unnatural division between 
Hungary and its neighbors to the West 
has been torn down — torn down — 
replaced by a new hope for the future, 
a new hope in freedom. 

We see freedom at work in Poland — 
where, in deference to the will of the 
people, the Communist Party has relin- 
quished its monopoly on power and, in- 
deed, in the Soviet Union — where the 
world hears the voices of people no 
longer afraid to speak out or to assert 
the right to rule themselves. 



In recent years... the war of words that has often echoed in 
this chamber is giving way to a new mood. We've seen a 
welcome shift— from polemics to peacekeeping. 



a new mood. We've seen a welcome 
shift — from polemics to peacekeeping. 

UN peacekeeping forces are on 
duty right now — and over the years, 
more than 700 peacekeepers have given 
their lives in service to the United Na- 
tions. Today, I want to remember one of 
those soldiers of peace — an American, 
on a mission of peace under the UN 
flag — on a mission really for all the 
world. A man of unquestioned bravery, 
unswerving dedication to the UN ideal — 
Lt. Col. William Richard Higgins. 

I call on the General Assembly to 
condemn the murder of this solider of 
peace — and call of those responsible to 
have the decency to return his remains 
to his family. Let us all right now — 
right here — rededicate ourselves and 
our nations to the cause that Colonel 
Higgins served so selflessly. 

Freedom's Advancement 
Throughout the World 

The founders of this historic institution 
believed that it was here that the na- 
tions of the woi'ld might come to agree 
that law — not force — shall govern. The 
United Nations can play a fundamental 
role in the central issue of our time. 



But freedom's march is not con- 
fined to a single continent or to the de- 
veloped world alone. We see the rise of 
freedom in Latin America, where, one 
by one, dictatorships are giving way to 
democracy. We see it on the Continent 
of Africa — where more and more na- 
tions see, in the system of free enter- 
prise, salvation for economies crippled 
by excessive state control. East and 
West, North and South, on every conti- 
nent, we can see the outlines of a new 
world of freedom. 

Of course, freedom's work remains 
unfinished. The trend we see is not yet 
universal. Some regimes still stand 
against the tide. Some rulers still deny 
the right of the people to govern them- 
selves. But now, the power of prejudice 
and despotism is challenged. Never be- 
fore have these regimes stood so iso- 
lated and alone — so out of step with 
the steady advance of freedom. 

Today we are witnessing an ideo- 
logical collapse — the demise of the to- 
talitarian idea of the omniscient, all- 
powerful state. There are many rea- 
sons for this collapse. But in the end, 
one fact alone explains what we see to- 
day: Advocates of the totalitarian idea 
saw its triumph written in the laws 



28 



Department of State Bulletin/November 198S 



THE PRESIDENT 



world's most advanced economies — all 
of them, each and every one, powered 
by the engine of free enterprise. 

In the decade ahead, others can 
join their ranks. But for many nations, 
barriers stand in the way. In the case of 
some countries, these are obstacles of 
their own making — unneeded restric- 
tions and regulations that act as dead 
weights on their own economies and ob- 
stacles to foreign trade. 

But other barriers to growth exist, 
and those, too, require effective action. 
Too many developing countries struggle 
today under a burden of debt that 
makes growth all but impossible. The 
nations of the world deserve better op- 
portunity to achieve a measure of con- 
trol over their own economic fate and 
build better lives for their own people. 

The approach the United States 
has put forward — the Brady plan — will 
help these nations reduce that debt 
and, at the same time, encourage the 
free market reforms that will fuel 
growth. In just 2 days, I will be speak- 
ing to the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank. And I'll dis- 
cuss there, in more detail, the steps 
that our nations can take in dealing 
with the debt problem. But I can say 
now, the new world of freedom is not a 
world where a few nations live in com- 
fort while others live in want. 

The power of commerce is a force 
for progress. Open markets are the key 
to continued growth in the developing 
world. Today the United States buys 
over one-half of the manufactured ex- 
ports that all developing nations com- 
bined sell to the industrialized world. 
It's time for the other advanced econ- 
omies to follow suit — to create ex- 
panded opportunities for trade. 

I believe we'll learn in the century 
ahead that many nations of the world 
have barely begun to tap their true po- 
tential for development. The free mar- 
ket and its fruits are not the special 
preserve of a few. They are a harvest 
that everyone can share. 

Environmental Issues 

Beyond the challenge of global growth 
lies another issue of global magnitude — 
the environment. No line drawn on a 
map can stop the advance of pollution. 
Threats to our environment have be- 
come international problems. We must 
develop an international approach to 
urgent environmental issues — one that 
seeks common solutions to common 
problems. 




The President with UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar. 



The United Nations is already at 
work — on the question of global warm- 
ing, in the effort to prevent oil spills 
and other disasters from fouling our 
seas and the air we breathe. 

And I will tell you now, the United 
States will do its part. We have com- 
mitted ourselves to the worldwide 
phaseout of all cholorofluorocarbons by 
the year 2000. We've proposed amend- 
ing our own Clean Air Act to ensure 
clean air for our citizens within a single 
generation. We've banned the import of 
ivory to protect the elephant and rhi- 
noceros from the human predators who 
exterminate them for profit. And we've 
begun to explore ways to work with 
other nations — with the major indus- 
trialized democracies and in Poland and 
Hungary — to make common cause for 
the sake of our environment. The envi- 
ronment belongs to all of us. In this 
new world of freedom, the world's citi- 
zens must enjoy this common trust for 
generations to come. 

U.S. Chemical Weapons Initiative 

Global economic growth and the stew- 
ardship of our planet both are critical 
issues. But as always, questions of war 
and peace must be paramount to the 
United Nations. 



We must move forward to limit — 
and eliminate — weapons of mass de- 
struction. Five years ago, at the UN 
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, 
I presented a U.S. draft treaty outlaw- 
ing chemical weapons. Since then prog- 
ress has been made, but time is 
running out. The threat is growing. 
More than 20 nations now possess 
chemical weapons or the capability to 
produce them. These horrible weapons 
are now- finding their w^ay into regional 
conflicts. This is simply unacceptable. 

For the sake of mankind, we must 
halt and reverse this threat. Today I 
want to announce steps that the United 
States is ready to take — steps to rid 
the world of these truly terrible 
weapons — toward a treaty that will 
ban — eliminate — all chemical weapons 
from the Earth 10 years from the day it 
is signed. This initiative contains three 
major elements. 

First, in the first 8 years of a 
chemical weapons treaty, the United 
States is ready to destroy nearly 
all — 98% — of our chemical weapons 
stockpile, provided the Soviet Union 
joins the ban. And I think they will. 

Second, we are ready to destroy 
all of our chemical weapons — 100%, 
every one — within 10 years, once all 
nations capable of building chemical 
weapons sign that total ban treaty. 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1989 



29 



THE PRESIDENT 



i 



And third, the United States is 
ready to begin now. We will eliminate 
more than 80% of our stockpile, even as 
we work to complete a treaty, if the So- 
viet Union joins us in cutting chemical 
weapons to an equal level, and we agree 
on the conditions, including inspec- 
tions, under which stockpiles are 
destroyed. 

We know that monitoring a total 
ban on chemical weapons will be a 
challenge. But the knowledge we've 
gained from our recent arms control 
experience — and our accelerating re- 
search in this area — makes me believe 
that we can achieve the level of veri- 
fication that gives us confidence to go 
forward with the ban. 

The world has lived too long in the 
shadow of chemical warfare. So let us 
act together — beginning today — to rid 
the Earth of this scourge. 

Conventional Arms Reductions 

We are serious about achieving conven- 
tional arms reductions as well. And 
that's why we tabled new proposals just 
last Thursday at the conventional [arm- 
ed] forces in Europe negotiations in 
Vienna — proposals that demonstrate 
our commitment to act rapidly to ease 
military tensions in Europe and move 
the nations of that continent one step 
closer to their common destiny — a 
Europe whole and free. 

The United States is convinced 
that open and innovative measures can 
move disarmament forward and ease 
international tensions. That's the idea 
behind the "open skies" proposal about 
which the Soviets have now expressed a 
positive attitude. It's the idea behind 
the "open lands" proposal — permitting, 
for the first time ever, free travel for 
all Soviet and American diplomats 
throughout each other's countries. 
Openness is the enemy of mistrust, and 
every step toward a more open world is 
a step toward the new world we seek. 

Wyoming Talks 

Let me make this comment on our 
meetings with the distinguished For- 
eign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. 
Shevardnadze, over the past few days. 
[Secretary Baker met with Foreign 
Minister Shevardnadze in Jackson 
Hole, Wyoming, on September 22-23.] 
I am very pleased by the progress 
made. The Soviet Union removed a 
number of obstacles to progress on con- 



ventional and strategic arms reduc- 
tions. We reached agreements in prin- 
ciple on issues from verification to 
nuclear testing. And, of course, we 
agreed to a summit in the spring or 
early summer of 1990. I look forward to 
meeting Mr. Gorbachev there. 

Each of these achievements is im- 
portant in its own right, but they are 
more important still as signs of a new 
attitude that prevails between the 
United States and the U.S.S.R. Seri- 
ous differences remain — we know 
that — but the willingness to deal con- 
structively and candidly with those dif- 
ferences is news that we and, indeed, 
the world must welcome. 

Regional Conflicts 

We have not entered into an era of per- 
petual peace. The threats to peace that 
nations face may today be changing, but 



The environment belongs to 
all of us. In this new world of 
freedom, the world's citizens 
must enjoy this common 
trust for generations to come. 



they've not vanished. In fact, in a num- 
ber of regions around the world, a dan- 
gerous combination is now emerging — 
regimes armed with old and unappeas- 
able animosities and modern weapons 
of mass destruction. This development 
will raise the stakes whenever war 
breaks out. Regional conflict may well 
threaten world peace as never before. 

The challenge of preserving peace 
is a personal one for all of you right 
here in this hall. Mr. Secretary Gener- 
al, with great respect, you have made 
it your own. The United Nations can be 
a mediator — a forum where parties in 
conflict come in search of peaceful 
solutions. 

For the sake of peace, the United 
Nations must redouble its support for 
the peace efforts now underway in re- 
gions of conflict all over the world. Let 
me assure you, the United States is de- 
termined to take an active role in set- 
tling regional conflicts. Sometimes our 
role in regional disputes is and will be 
highly public. And sometimes, like 
many of you, we work quietly behind 
the scenes. But always, we are working 
for positive change and lasting peace. 



Threats of Narcotics and Terrorism 

Our world faces other, less conventiona 
threats — no less dangerous to interna- 
tional peace and stability. Illegal drugs 
are a menace to social order and a 
source of human misery wherever they 
gain a foothold. The nations which suf- 
fer this scourge must join forces in the 
fight. And we are. Let me salute the 
commitment and extraordinary cour- ■ 
age of one country in particular — | 

Colombia — where we are working with 
the people and their president, Virgilic 
Barco, to put the drug cartels out of 
business and bring the drug lords to 
justice. 

Finally, we must join forces to 
combat the threat of terrorism. Every 
nation — and the United Nations — mus' 
send the outlaws of the world a clear 
message: Hostage-taking and the ter- 
ror of random violence are methods 
that cannot win the world's approval. 
Terrorism of any kind is repugnant to 
all values that a civilized world holds ii 
common. Make no mistake, terrorism 
is a means that no end — no matter how 
just that end — can sanctify. 

Democracy and Peace 

Whatever the challenge, freedom 
greatly raises the chances of our suc- 
cess. Freedom's moment is a time for 
hope for all of the world. Because 
freedom — once set in motion — takes 
on a momentum of its own. 

As I said the day I assumed the 
presidency of our country: "We don't 
have to talk late into the night about 
which form of government is better." 
We know that free government — de- 
mocracy — is best. I believe that is the 
hard-won truth of our time — the un- 
assailable fact that still stands at the 
end of a century of great struggle, of 
human suffering. 

This is true not because all our dif 
ferences must give way to democra- 
cy, but because democracy makes room 
for all our differences. In democracy, 
diversity finds its common home. 

At the very heart of the democrat!* 
ideal is respect — for freedom of belief, 
freedom of thought and action in all its 
diversity, for human rights. The world 
has experienced enough of the ideolog- 
ies that have promised to remake man 
in some new and better image. We've 
seen the colossal tragedies and dashed 
hopes. We know now that freedom and 
democracy hold the answers. What mer 
and nations want is the freedom to live 
by their own lights and a chance to 
prosper in peace. 



30 



Department of State Bulletin/November igSf 



THE SECRETARY 



JN Role as a Peacemaker 

hen I began today, I spoke to you 
'about peacekeeping. I want to speak 
:o you now about peacemaking. We 
nust bring peace to the people who 
bave never l<nown its blessings. 

There's a painting that hangs on 
.he wall of my office in the White 
House, and it pictures President 
^Vbraham Lincoln and his generals 
meeting near the end of a war that 
l-emains the bloodiest in the history of 
JTiy country. Outside, at that moment, a 
battle rages — in this picture. And yet 
A'hat we see in the distance is a 
rainbow — a symbol of hope, of the pass- 
ng of the storm. That painting is 
sailed "The Peacemakers." For me, it is 
a constant reminder that our 
struggle — the struggle for peace — is a 
struggle blessed by hope. 

I do remember sitting in this hall. 
I remember the mutual respect among 
dl of us proudly serving as representa- 
ives. Yes, I remember the almost end- 
ess speeches — and I don't want this to 
De one of them — the Security Council 
sessions; the receptions, those long re- 
■eiving lines; the formal meetings of 
his assembly; and the informal dis- 
ussions in the Delegates' Lounge 
)ver here. 

And I remember something more, 
lomething beyond the frantic pace and 
ometimes frustrating experiences of 
iaily life here — the heartbeat of the 
Jnited Nations — the quiet conviction 
hat we could make the world more 
)eaceful, more free. 

What we sought then — all of us — 
low lies within our reach. I ask each of 
,'ou here in this hall: Can we not bring 
i unity of purpose to the United Na- 
ions? Can we not make this new world 
)f freedom the common destiny we 
>eek'? I believe we can. I know we must. 

My solemn wish today is that 
lere — among the United Nations — that 
spirit will take hold and that all men 
ind all nations will make freedom's 
noment their own. 

Thank you. God bless you, and 
nay God bless the work of the United 
Nations. 



Secretary's News Briefings 
in New York 



' Te.xt from Weekly Compilation of Pres- 
.dential Documents of Oct. 2, 1989.B 




Secretary Baker held news brief- 
ings in New York City on September 
25,28, and 29, 1989. 



SEPT. 25, 19891 

The President will meet with [Colom- 
bian] President Barco later this week 
in Washington. I don't have the exact 
date or time for you, but I'm sure Mar- 
lin [Fitzwater, White House spokes- 
man] will have it a little bit later. 

The President, following his speech 
this morning, hosted a lunch for the 
NATO Foreign Ministers and the For- 
eign Ministers of Australia, Japan, and 
Korea. The discussion at lunch centered 
around the U.S. -Soviet relationship, 
specifically the meeting the President 
had with Foreign Minister Shevard- 
nadze in Washington and the 2-day min- 
isterial that we had out in Wyoming. 

He then had a bilateral with Presi- 
dent Sarney, during the course of 
which they discussed the environment, 
the Brazilian economy, Panama, and 
democracy and the transition in Brazil. 
He then had a bilateral with [Israeli 
Vice Prime Minister] Shimon Peres, 
and the major topics covered during 



the course of that bilateral were the 
Israeli economy, the peace process, 
and Soviet Jewish refugees. 

Q. On Mr. Peres, could you give 
us — because he — after all, he isn't the 
Prime Minister, he's a deputy and he 
really doesn't represent the govern- 
ment's point of view. Can you give us 
some notion of where you and the 
President are heading on this? You 
had hoped to have a three-way 
meeting — apparently you won't — with 
the Egyptians. What is ahead in the 
next couple of weeks? 

A. I think there is still a very good 
chance that we will have a three-way 
meeting at the foreign minister level. I 
can't tell you exactly when that meeting 
will be held, but I would suspect that 
within the course of the next week, we'll 
be able to arrange that meeting. It's 
been a problem with scheduling. I think 
we will have that meeting. 

We continue to be committed to the 
Israeli elections proposal. We continue 
to view the Egyptian 10 points as an ac- 
ceptance, in effect, by Egypt of Israel's 
elections proposal. We continue to be 



[Department of State Bulletin/November 1989 



31 



THE SECRETARY 






committed to trying to promote direct 
discussions between Israelis and Pal- 
estinians, and we continue to see this 
as a potential way of getting there. 
The President will have a brief 
meeting this evening with [Israeli] For- 
eign Minister Arens, and I will have a 
more extensive meeting with him dur- 
ing the course of my stay up here this 
coming week, and I don't know what 
exact date that is. 

Q. That may make academic be- 
yond this meeting what I was going to 
ask you, but let me try anyhow. Did 
he get any hint, or did the two of you 
get any hint, from Peres that the oth- 
er part of the Israeli Government is 
about to come aboard? The Egyptian 
idea. 

A. I think the way I would charac- 
terize that is that the proposal has not 
been rejected by, as you put it, the other 
part of the Israeli Government; that it's 
a matter for continued discussion and 
consideration. 

Q. In the talk with the Brazilian 
President, Panama came up. What's 
left to say about Panama? 

A. Simply that President Sarney 
was talking about the commitment of 
Brazil to democracy and, picking up on 
the President's speech, was talking as 
well about the movement toward democ- 
racy in Latin America. He was talking 
about how, in Brazil's case, they are en- 
tering a transition period; they will be 
conducting an election in November. The 
two Presidents agreed that the situation 
in Panama was regrettable when you 
consider that democracy there was being 
subverted and perverted by Gen. 
Noriega. 

Q. Even after the unhappy expe- 
rience that you have had with the 
OAS lOrganization of American 
States], are you still willing to 
try a multilateral approach toward 
Panama? 

A. We think it's very important to 
continue to note that 20 out of 22 Latin 
American nations have basically said 
that Gen. Noriega is the problem, and 
they have expressed profound regret at 
the fact that the will of the Panamanian 
people is being thwarted. We think it's 
important that they continue to main- 
tain that position, and we have every 
reason to believe that they will. 

Q. Was there any suggestion at 
that meeting, though, that the Latin 
Americans are prepared to go any 
further than that in terms of pres- 
suring Panama? 



32 



A. Many of these countries, as you 
know, have recalled their ambassadors, 
and there was a general discussion about 
the continuation of that as far as Latin 
American nations were concerned. 

Q. From your discussions with 
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze over 
the last weekend, to what extent do 
you think the Soviets will take up the 
President's offer on this chemical 
weapons idea that he proposed today? 

A. I can't respond for them and 
don't want to suggest in any way here to- 
day that I can. Let me simply say to you 
that we told them this was coming — in 
Wyoming — and we have notified them in 
detail in writing in Moscow. We'll, I am 
sure, see a response from them in due 
course. I can't predict when that will be. 

Q. But you did discuss chemical 
weapons at great length with Foreign 
Minister Shevardnadze. Presumably 
you also discussed at great length 
methods for destruction and verifica- 
tion and so on. What is your opinion 
of the way the Soviets are approach- 
ing this question of a bilateral ar- 
rangement to reduce separate from 
the multilateral problem? 

A. I read that, really, as repeating 
the question I was just asked here by 
Don. I don't want to prejudge or predict 
what their response will be until we see 
it. 

Q. President Gorbachev, in his 
letter, suggested a NATO-Warsaw 
Pact summit of some sort to consum- 
mate the conventional arms deal. Did 
this come up in the President's report 
to the NATO allies today? Did they 
discuss this outlook, and is it possible 
such a large summit will happen? 

A. It came up in the sense that we 
reported it to the NATO Foreign 
Ministers — and the Secretary General of 
NATO, by the way, attended this lunch. 
We reported it simply as a fact, and we 
told the foreign ministers that our re- 
sponse to [Foreign] Minister Shevard- 
nadze in Wyoming had been — this is a 
matter for alliance consideration; the 
United States cannot unilaterally make 
that determination, and we will take the 
request and consult with our allies and 
get back to you. We are now in the proc- 
ess of consulting with our allies on that 
suggestion, and once we finish, we'll 
have a position and we'll get back to the 
Soviet Union. 



Q. On chemical weapons, it seemsij 
the real problem has not been the So- 
viet Union but countries like Libya, 
Iran, and Iraq. What about the Presi 
dent's proposal makes it more likely 
that these countries will give up theiii 
chemical weapons? 

A. Because this proposal really at- 
tacks the proliferation problem by mak- 
ing it impossible for these countries to 
argue that major countries have them 
and are just dragging their feet in cheni' 
ical weapons negotiations — Why should^ 
we not develop them? You've got them. 
The point here is that, assuming the So- 
viet Union joins in, we will be taking 
affirmative and accelerated steps to getl 
rid of them. So I think it does focus on 
the proliferation problem. It also bringsi 
a bit more into public focus the problems 
of proliferation, and it shows what at 
least one major power is willing to do to 
try and deal with the problem. 

Q. Isn't one of their complaints, 
though, that the big powers have nu- 
clear weapons, they don't need chem- 
ical weapons, whereas these little 
countries, it's a cheaper and easier 
way for them to protect themselves? 

A. The Third World's atomic bomb 
argument, yes. That is an argument 
that is heard more and more frequently 
as the proliferation problem is discussec 
but I think it is logical for the countries 
that have those weapons to say, look, yoi 
shouldn't develop them, they're abhor- 
rent, and we're going to get rid of ours. 
The nuclear question is an entirely dif- 
ferent question. We get that in nuclear 
nonprol iteration discussions as well. Tha 
point, I think, there is — at least as far a 
the United States is concerned — we've 
had them for over 40 years, and we've 
never used them. At one point we were 
the only nation in the world that did havi 
them. 

Q. What do you do about a coun 
try like Iraq which not only has 
used them but has acknowledged that 
they've used them, and has, further- 
more, said that they have absolutely 
no intention of getting rid of them? 

A. If we get to the point where we 
are destroying and the Soviet Union is 
destroying and other chemical-capable 
countries are joining with us to promote 
an absolute ban, I think you bring the 
force of public opinion to bear worldwide 
on any country that says that they're 
going to keep them and they're going to 
use them. 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1981 




THE SECRETARY 



Secretary's Bilateral Meetings 



Foreign Minister Tserenpilyn Gombosuren 
(Mongolia). 




Foreign Minister Jaromir Johanes 
(Czechoslovakia). 




His Royal Highness Prince Mohamed 
Bolkiah (Brunei). 



Foreign Minister Alois Mock (Austria). 





Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan 
(Pakistan). 



Foreign Minister Hernan Felipe Errazuriz 
(Chile). 



Foreign Minister Nguz a Karl-I-Bond 

(Zaire). 



(Department of State photos by Robert Kaiser) 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1989 



33 



THE SECRETARY 



Q. Is it just the force of public 
opinion, or will the United States use 
its own diplomatic and economic 
leverage with a country like Iraq? 

A. Certainly you would do every- 
thing you could to bring them on board 
just like you would any other country 
that was developing them or keeping 
them and flaunting the idea of joining 
a worldwide ban. 

Q. To what extent is Mr. Bush's 
offer of today predicated on the 
amount of chemical weapons Con- 
gress was demanding that the Ad- 
ministration take apart anyway? Is it 
a sizable part of what you had to take 
apart to begin with? 

A. I don't think I would say a 
sizable — yes, there were some that we 
were going to be getting rid of, but by 
reaching a prompt agreement with the 
Soviets, we're going to be able to carry 
out the destruction of our unitary stocks 
well before any congressional mandate. 

The congressional mandate with re- 
spect to unitary runs until 1997, so that's 
number one. Second, it seems to me that 
there's a virtue in having the Soviets 
agree to this, not only for the effect that 
it has on our relations but also because of 
the effect that it will have on the inter- 
national community — gets to the ques- 
tion there, back there — about other 
states. If you get the Soviet Union and 
the United States moving together, 
you've got a heck of a lot better chance, 
in my view, of getting to a chemical ban. 

And third, if our binary program 
were to be carried out to the full e.xtent 
of what is now planned — and I'm not 
going to tell you what that is because it's 
classified — and there were no initiatives 
like this, our chemical stocks would be 
vastly greater than the interim 20% lev- 
el that the President's initiative talks 
about. 

To say that we're making a silk 
purse out of a sow's ear doesn't wash. 
We're not. 

Q. The French are talking about 
building their stocks of chemical 
weapons and, I think, along with the 
United States and U.S.S.R., have one 
of the largest inventories. Was there 
any consideration of bringing them in 
on this initiative that the President 
proposed this morning? 

A. I think that there's an excellent 
chance that we and the French will be 
seeing eye-to-eye in this whole area and 
that we do see eye-to-eye in this whole 
area. 



Q. On the question of sanctions, 
how tough is the United States will- 
ing to be with nations that would not 
sign on? 

A. I think that this will move this 
process forward significantly, and I 
think that we would be willing to be 
pretty tough. 

Q. Economic sanctions? 

A. I don't want to stand up here to- 
day and say we're going to do this whole 
wide range of things because we're just 
now advancing the initiative. You know 
how strongly the President feels about 
chemical weapons. He tabled a treaty, 
he's now taking this step. He feels ex- 
traordinarily strongly about it, and I 
would think that if we get to that point 
and could bring some of the allies along, 
certainly we would consider economic 
sanctions. They don't work, though, un- 
less you get everybody joining in. 

Q. You seem to be suggesting that 
this might be the first major test of 
whether the Soviet Union is willing 
to join the United States in sort of 
bringing stability to that part of the 
world which most depends upon 
chemical weapons — the Third World — 
where regional conflicts and other 
problems are taking place. Would that 
be a fair assessment? 

A. I don't know whether it would be 
fair to say it's the first test. We've, as 
you know — 

Q. I said a major test. I don't 
know of another one. 

A. We have been engaged with them 
full-time with respect to regional con- 
flicts. There are some instances in which 
they've taken some positive positions; 
some in which they've not taken such 
positive positions. I think it would be a 
pretty good example of a test — I don't 
know whether it's the first one. 

Q. Aside from the Soviets, what 
was the general feedback on this pro- 
posal at the United Nations and the 
President's speech? 

A. The feedback on the President's 
speech at lunch was very, very positive. 
Many of the foreign ministers there were 
congratulating the President on his 
speech. And I think that the feedback on 
the initiative was basically positive, al- 
though there's a lot in that initiative and 
it is not uncomplicated, and I think ev- 
erybody wanted to see exactly how it 
would work. 

Many have .said recently that the 
United States has been dragging its feet 
in the chemical weapons negotiations. We 
don't believe we have, but this ought to 
put that to re.st once and for all. 



Q. Did the President, who you 
said feels extraordinarily strongly 
about this issue, raise it with anyone 
he met with on a one-on-one basis 
today? 

A. He only met with President Sar- 
ney and with Shimon Peres, both of 
whom were very congratulatory of his 
speech. 

Q. If I'm not mistaken, he has 
several bilaterals today throughout 
the afternoon. 

A. He has only met with two. I sat 
in those two meetings. I can't tell you 
what is going to happen in future meet- 
ings. I will be in one of those, but I will 
not be in two because I'm here. 

Q. Can you give us a sense of 
timing on when the idea for this pro- 
posal came about and how fast it 
proceeded — the chemical weapons 
proposal? 

A. Maybe 3 or 4 weeks ago. So it 
proceeded reasonably fast. 

Q. Do you think it would be a 
good idea or do you think that it 
might come about that you would 
meet again this week with Foreign 
Minister Shevardnadze here in New 
York, perhaps to discuss this issue or 
other things by way of followup? 

A. I'm rather certain I will talk to 
him. Whether it's face-to-face or on the 
telephone with interpreters, I can't tell 
you, but the way we left it in Wyoming 
was that we would meet if there was a 
reason to do so; w'e will be talking to 
each other during the course of the week. 

Q. Was there any discussion at | 
the NATO ministers' meeting about 
Poland and Hungary and about trying 
to step up the pace of the Paris Club 
rescheduling or perhaps go farther 
than that? 

A. There was a discussion at the 
meeting about developments in Eastern 
Europe from the standpoint of my dis- 
cussions with the [Foreign] Minister in 
Wyoming; how did the Soviet Union see 
this, what were the parameters, what 
was the situation, and that sort of thing. 
But there was not a discussion that re- 
volved around the initiative which came 
out of the economic summit which is 
being administered by the European 
Community. 



34 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1989 



THE SECRETARY 



SEPT. 28, 19892 

Let me say that I've just finished meet- 
ing with Foreign Minister Meguid 
[Egypt] and Foreign Minister Arens 
'Israel]. There was so much interest in 
this meeting that I thought I'd come 
flown here and give you the readout on 
it myself. 

We met one-on-one-on-one. We met 
for an hour and a half. We had a good 
discussion, I think, on ways to move 
forward in the peace process. The 
three of us agreed to stay in close 
touch, and I believe that there may be 
some potential for progress — and I 
want to emphasize the "may." 

It's important to note that the 
Israeli cabinet is going to be meeting 
next week and will be considering the 
istatus of their elections initiative as it 
has developed since it was announced 
last May. 

For our part, we intend to remain 
active and committed to helping the 
parties move toward dialogue, elec- 
tions, and negotiations. 

Q. What gives rise to this hope 
of yours that there may be progress? 
What changed today? 

A. It's not a new hope; it didn't 
spring just from this meeting. I have 
said for a long time that I thought the 
Israeli elections initiative offered some 
prospect for moving forward. I think 
that the response that we've seen from 
the Egyptians is positive when you con- 
sider that the Egyptians readily concede 
that their so-called 10-points proposal 
constitutes an acceptance of the concept 
of elections as advanced by Israel. And 
it's not in any sense a competing proposal. 

Q. Did you agree on the list of 
the Palestinians, which it was re- 
ported, that [Egyptian President] 
Mubarak was bringing them in? 

A. No, and we didn't review any 
such list. This is one of the major ques- 
tions of modalities with respect to how 
you get to a dialogue — who will repre- 
sent the Palestinians — and that issue has 
not as yet been determined. 

Let me say one more time, the 
Israeli cabinet will be meeting ne.xt 
week to consider this, and we will really 
not know until after that meeting has 
been concluded whether there really are 
prospects for progress or not. 

Q. Did you get more positive — 
Q. [Inaudible] the Egyptians 

negotiating for the Palestinians or 

what? 



A. Did what? Do I anticipate — that's 
not what we did today. We didn't get into 
that kind of level of detail. What we 
were meeting on was the general concept 
of the Israeli elections proposal, and how 
we could take practical, pragmatic steps 
to make that work — how could we move 
toward getting Israelis and Palestinians 
at the same table to talk about the mo- 
dalities for elections. 

Q. It sounds as though you 
reached some kind of — something 
that moved the process forward in 
asking those questions among the 
three of you. 

A. I think the fact that we were 
meeting — the three of us were meet- 
ing — is, to some extent, progress. Again 
I want to say that the Israeli cabinet will 
be meeting next week, and much rests 
on that decision and that determination. 

Q. Did you ask or encourage the 
Israeli Government to go to Cairo and 
have talks with the Palestinians un- 
der Egyptian auspices? 

A. I don't want to get into the ex- 
quisite detail of everything I said in this 
meeting or, for that matter, what any- 
body else said. What I did encourage 
was that we — the three of us — continue 
to look for ways in which we can move 
this process forward; what practical 
steps can we take to move the process 
forward. 

And when I say "the process," I'm 
talking now again about the Israeli elec- 
tions proposal. I want to say one more 
time that the suggestion that the Egyp- 
tian Government has made is simply the 
position that the Palestinians would take 
to the table to start talking about elec- 
tions. It is not in any sense a competing 
proposal to the Israeli proposal. 

Q. There's a distinction, too, in 
that the Palestinians would come to 
the table — not exactly the Palestin- 
ians the Israelis would like to have 
come to the table. That's an issue. 

A. That will be an issue. That will 
be a bridge that will have to be crossed 
in future discussions, absolutely. The 
question of who represents the Palestin- 
ians in the territories is a major issue 
that will have to be — 

Q. Is your hope — the hope you've 
expressed — is it based on possibly the 
hope that Israel will see the Egyptian 
proposal as a helpful facilitator, or 
is your hope based possibly on some 
blending now between the Egyptian 
proposal — 

A. No. It is not the latter. 



Q. — and the Israeli proposal? 

A. It is not the latter, because they 
are not competing proposals, and what 
we are trying to make clear — and I think 
the Egyptians quite readily concede — 
they, too, are trying to move the process 
forward. They are not trying to, in any 
way, impede it by putting a competing 
proposal on the table. 

This so-called Egyptian 10 points 
would simply be the position the Palestin- 
ians woulcl embrace at the beginning of a 
dialogue with Israel on the modalities 
for elections. 

Q. The Soviets have offered to 
hold talks of their own in Moscow 
with all the parties concerned. How 
do you react to that? Mr. Shev- 
ardnadze made that comment after 
his meeting with Mr. Arens. 

A. Yes. I don't react particularly 
positively to that, frankly, because this 
process is extraordinarily difficult to 
get started. There have been many, 
many suggestions through the years of 
an international conference, the meet- 
ings of the permanent five [members of 
the UN Security Council], a meeting of 
the superpowers to kick this off 

What we really ought to concentrate 
on now is not any of these other ideas but 
the proposal that Israel itself had ad- 
vanced for a dialogue with Palestinians. 
Let's get the parties talking together at 
the same table. Without that, you're not 
going to make any progress. That is a 
very difficult first step. It is a very 
important first step, and that's what 
we ought to concentrate on. 

Q. The Israeli cabinet previously 
has been evenly split on whether the 
Egyptian 10 points is what you say it 
is or is a competing proposal. Did you 
get any indication from [Foreign] 
Minister Arens that there might be a 
change in that deadlock at the meet- 
ing next week? 

A. I don't want to get into questions 
that involve internal Israeli politics. But 
what is clear from our discussions today 
is that the United States does not see it 
as a competing proposal, and Egypt is 
conceding quite readily that it is not a 
competing proposal but simply a means 
of trying to assist to get the parties to 
the table. 

Q. Did you get a more positive re- 
action from Mr. Arens than we had 
been led to believe he would give? Is 
that part of the source of your hope? 

A. I don't know what you've been 
led to believe, so I can't judge that. 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1989 



35 



THE SECRETARY 



Q. We thought that he would re- 
ject the 10 points out of hand. Did you 
get a more positive response from him 
than that? 

A. I want to make it very clear, he 
did not accept or reject. He was not in a 
position to do so, because the Israeli 
Government will be meeting next week. 
So he was quite careful to reserve on 
that. 

I do believe there is some clearer ex- 
position or explanation of what at least 
the United States and Egypt see this 
proposal as being. I mean, I think there 
was a lot of misunderstanding out there. 
A lot of people felt that this was a com- 
peting proposal with the Israeli elections 
proposal, and it is not that at all. 

Q. I'm a little confused by some- 
thing — a couple of things you said to- 
day. You said several times the Israeli 
cabinet has to meet and make a deci- 
sion of some sort. At the same time, 
you've said the decision on who comes 
to talk with the Israelis is something 
to deal with down the road. 

A. That's correct. 

Q. That's a decision you have to 
face later on. What is it you expect to 
occur? You keep talking about getting 
the two sides together, but, if you 
wait down the road to decide on who's 
going to come to get together — 

A. There is a debate in Israel now 
with respect to whether to continue to 
pursue this process at all, as I under- 
stand. And it is that, in part, that the Is- 
raeli cabinet will be debating on — or will 
be considering early next week. 

Q. In effect, you're first trying to 
get direct negotiations between Likud 
and Labor, and then you're going to 
get— 

A. No. We're not involved in that. 
We're not involved in that. 

Q. You said that Arens would not 
accept or reject the Egyptian pro- 
posal as a way of facilitating getting 
to the table. Would it be fair to say 
that he now understands that he 
would like the Israeli cabinet to ac- 
cept and move forward from there? 

A. Let me put it to you this way: 
The United States would very much like 
the Israeli cabinet to move forward on 
Israel's initiative, announced in May, to 
come to an agreement with respect to 
Palestinians regarding elections. That's 
the way we see this. 

Now, the other items — matters that 
they have to debate internally in Israel 
early next week — are not something 



we're going to opine on or state an opin- 
ion with respect to or a preference. 
That's a matter of internal Israeli politics. 

Q. Will you be disappointed if Is- 
rael does not go with this next week? 
What effect will that have on U.S.- 
Israeli relations? 

A. It's not going to be something 

that's going to affect the fundamental 
U.S. -Israeli relationship. Let me simply 
say to you, we're in this thing in order 
to try and find a way to move toward 
peace, and we don't start out taking that 
position. 

I think that's the purpose and goal 
of the Shamir elections proposal as well. 

Q. You expressed optimism, and 
I'm just wondering, have you received 
any kind of indication — 

A. I don't know how much optimism 
I expressed. What I said was there 
"may" be — we "may" see — some possi- 
bility of progress, and I emphasized the 
"may," because we may not. And I want 
everybody to understand that. This is a 
road that many have tried to travel down 
for a long, long time, and there are many 
bumps and many land mines in the road, 
and who knows? All I'm trying to do is 
give you a sense of where we are today, 
and what took place in this meeting, 
because I know there's a great deal of 
interest. 

Q. If I could complete my ques- 
tion; just for the fact that there may 
be some progress, I'm just wondering, 
have you received any kind of indica- 
tion that the cabinet may be willing 
to— 

A. No. And let me simply say that 
Moshe Arens was quite frank in saying, 
"Now, you know this is something we 
have to consider next week, and I cannot 
speak to some of these questions." But I 
do think that we have identified what 
some of the major questions are that 
have to be answered — 

Q. And what are they? 

A. That's something I don't want to 
get into right here. We identified those 
among ourselves. Some of them have 
been referred to — who sits at the table, 
what is the shape of the table, who rep- 
resents the Palestinians — questions like 
that. The modalities of the dialogue re- 
specting elections will have to be — 

Q. You keep saying that the cab- 
inet is going to meet; we were led to 
understand that it was going to be 
inner cabinet. 

A. It may be the inner cabinet. I 
don't mean to suggest it won't be the 
inner cabinet. We didn't get into that. 



I 



That's not something we really got into 
in detail. It may just be the inner 
cabinet. 

Q. Mr. Peres got the impression 
yesterday in Washington that — and 
he said that he had been told by the 
Administration that the .American 
Administration is not going to let 
this momentum die. Is that true? 

A. The American Administration 
doesn't have it solely within its control 
as to whether or not the momentum dies 
and I wouldn't overemphasize the mo- 
mentum. I said there "may" be some pos- 
sibility for progress. There may not. 

Q. When you say that it is a 
Palestinian position at the outset 
brought to the table, is this what the 
Egyptian said that these 10 points 
would be accepted by the Palestinians 
at the outset, and was there any dis- 
cussion of the 10 points as to whether 
they were a package deal or some 
were acceptable to the Israelis, some 
were not? 

A. No. Now, you see, that's where 
there's a lot of misunderstanding. It's not 
a question of whether they are accept- ■ 
able to the Israelis or not; it is not a I 
competing proposal. The Israelis would 
bring to the table their original proposal 
with respect to elections and the transi- 
tional period, and their policy with re- 
spect to permanent status. 

The Palestinians, on the other hand, 
would start with these 10 points as their 
opening position for the discussion on 
modalities of the election and the transi- 
tional period, and they, too, would be 
free to raise their bottom-line concerns 
when the discussion turned to perma- 
nent status. 



SEPT. 29, 19893 

I don't know whether some of you who 
have been with us all week are as tired 
as I am, but I think it's been a pretty 
good 8 days, notwithstanding that. I've 
had 46 meetings with foreign officials 
over the past 5 days, including 35 bilat- 
erals. To sum it up, I think that the 
progress we made in Wyoming, partic- 
ularly on arms control, helped set a 
positive spirit that is encouraging to 
all members of the United Nations. 

For a while it's undoubtedly true 
that international relations no longer 
has to move in the shadow of a bipolar 
world. It's also true, I think, that the 
U.S. -Soviet relationship remains very 
important to the entire international 
community. 



36 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1989 



THE SECRETARY 



This week, of course, also saw the 
President's proposal on chemical weap- 
ons which offers a new and realistic 
program for moving in a practical way 
toward a global ban on chemical weap- 
, ons. It also presented us with an oppor- 
tunity to address further the process of 
change in Eastern Europe. I believe 
that the nations of the West are work- 
ing collectively to encourage these 
changes with real support and also 
with a real recognition that the success 
of these reforms must depend in the 
end upon the peoples of Poland and 
Hungary themselves. We can help, and 
we should help, and we will help, but 
I they must act. 

It is our hope, of course, that oth- 
ers in Eastern Europe will not be long 
to follow. That's one of the reasons that 
I met with the Czechoslovakian Foreign 
j Minister. 

I I've also had the chance this week 
1 to discuss some other important re- 
: gional problems and opportunities in 
both bilateral and multilateral meet- 
ings. It's been a productive week, and 
we look forward to building on our ef- 
forts here in the days and weeks ahead. 

Q. Could you expand somewhat 
on your earlier comments about the 
bilateral with the Chinese Foreign 
Minister and assess whether you 
see any change in China since the 
crackdown in June — any lessening 
of repression? 

A. I think there's a desire on the 
part of the Chinese Government to do 
what they can, as I indicated, to pre- 
serve a relationship that is very impor- 
tant to both countries from a geopolitical 
and geostrategic standpoint. I think 
we've made it very clear in the action 
which the President has taken and in the 
two meetings that I've had with the For- 
eign Minister that we have some prob- 
lems with the approach toward human 
rights that was e.xemplified, of course, 
by what happened in Tiananmen Square. 

I took this occasion to reiterate 
that. There's a clear difference of opinion 
between the two countries with respect 
to e.xactly what happened and what the 
appropriate approach should be, but we 
will continue to make our views known 
in this respect. 

You ask me to judge the state of re- 
pression in the People's Republic of Chi- 
na, and I cannot really quantify that for 
you except to say that we have been told 
that people who were simply expressing 
peaceful dissent will not be punished. 
People who were destroying property 
and violating laws — against that type of 
behavioi- — will be punished. That is the 
position of the Chinese Government. 



Q. There are indications today 
that the United States is prepared to 
and wants to sell approximately 300 
main battle tanks to the Saudis. Can 
you say anything about the appro- 
priateness of the reported effort by 
the United States to get the Israelis 
not to gin up a lobbying effort against 
us on the Hill so that this plan might 
go forward? Is that an appropriate 
thing for the United States to do — 
to take that action? 

A. First of all, you would want me 
to, I think, confirm that that action was 
taken, and I am not going to confirm it 
nor deny it for you. Let me simply say 
that we have a longstanding security re- 
lationship with Saudi Arabia. It's in our 
interests, and it's in the interests, we 
think, of peace that moderately oriented 
Arab governments feel secure and capa- 
ble of dealing with threats from radicals. 

We don't contemplate sales like this 
to any Arab government without first 
taking into account the question of Isra- 
el's security. We are committed, as you 
know, to maintaining a qualitative edge 
for Israel, and that commitment is sim- 
ply not going to change. 

Q. Since you are on the Middle 
East, you met today with the Foreign 
Minister of Syria. Can you tell us any- 
thing positive about Lebanon, and 
any commitment that the Syrians 
will ever withdraw from Lebanon? 

A. The Syrians did not challenge us 
when we said that we think ultimately 
there must be a withdrawal of all foreign 
forces from Lebanon. In fact, I got the 
distinct impression from the discussion 
that they clearly agree with that. 

The [Foreign] Minister did say that 
they support the [Arab League] Tripar- 
tite Committee's approach, and we, of 
course, have expressed our support for 
that approach. 

Q. What about the peace process? 
Did he support it, or [is] Syria re- 
jecting it? Was that condition about 
Mubarak's 10 points — did you discuss 
that with Syria? 

A. Do they support the Tripartite 
Committee's approach in Lebanon? 

Q. No, no. About the 10 points of 
Mubarak; are they still against it? 

A. The position of Syria is that they 
should be involved in any negotiations 
regarding the peace process in the Mid- 
dle East, and I explained to them that it 
is not the policy of the United States 
that they should not be involved. Of ne- 
cessity, they will have to be involved 
where we are dealing with questions 
involving the Golan Heights. 



However, the problem confronting 
us is to find a way to get Palestinians 
and Israelis talking to each other, and it 
may be that we can do that without the 
active involvement of the Government of 
Syria. That's the point I made to them. 

Q. Did they buy the argument 
that they should not be involved in 
any way in negotiations that do not 
involve issues of the Golan Heights? 

A. They didn't — that's not really the 
way it was put. The way it was put was 
that it's not our policy to take a — of gen- 
eral exclusion of Syria from peace proc- 
ess discussions. And, clearly, they must 
be involved where we're talking about 
the Golan Heights. 

Q. On the Middle East, today you 
and the other four representatives — 
the five permanent members — signed 
a statement, and in it, it says the 
ministers — including you — "the Min- 
isters reaffirm their support for an 
active peace process in which all rele- 
vant parties would participate." Is 
that a code word for an international 
conference, including the five perma- 
nent members? 

A. No. Are you talking about the 
communique that came out of the lunch- 
eon that the Secretary General gave for 
the five permanent members? It's not a 
code word in our view. You'd have to ask 
others about their interpretation, but as 
far as the United States is concerned, 
that is not a code word for 
an international conference. 

Q. What do you mean by "all 
relevant parties" then? 

A. What we mean right now are the 
parties that are necessary to begin the 
process of dialogue and negotiation. 

Q. Who are? 

A. Right now that's Palestinians and 
Israelis. It may be that in order to get 
there, we may need to see the involve- 
ment of the United States. We may need 
to see the involvement of Egypt. It 
seems to me that, again, the name of the 
game is to get Israelis talking to Palestin- 
ians; and whatever is required in that 
regard is what needs to be done, and 
that would include the question of who 
should be in attendance at any initial 
session of that sort. 

Q. Now that you've seen Poland's 
reform plan, could that be the basis, 
or do you think it should be the basis, 
for more aid from the United States, 
that's not through the IMF [Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund], but in addi- 
tion to? 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1989 



37 



THE SECRETARY 



A. I think it could be, and that is a 
matter that is going to be considered by 
the Administration next week. I think 
it's important to note that the stabiliza- 
tion proposal that they have submitted is 
consistent with the general principles 
that the President outlined in announc- 
ing his initial package of aid before the 
government moved from a communist 
government to a democratic form of 
government. 

We had a discussion last night at the 
dinner of the summit seven about the im- 
portance of that stabilization proposal. 
As you may know, the Gl-24 has met, and 
there have been pledges made to Poland 
and Hungary in the amount of — well, I 
don't want to put an amount on it, be- 
cause I'm not sure of the e.\act amount — 
but a substantial, three-figure, millions 
of dollars. 

The question is, will those commit- 
ments be made as a part of the stabiliza- 
tion proposal, or will they be made 
separately? That's still a question that 
has to be decided. 

Q. Would you comment on the 
Afghan Foreign Minister's proposal 
that the United States send an envoy 
to Kabul and also the proposal he 
made for a settlement in Afghanistan? 

A. For a settlement. I'm not sure 
that I am aware of the full details of 
what he said about a settlement in 
Afghanistan. Let me simply say that the 
United States would like to see a politi- 
cal settlement in Afghanistan. The one 
bar to that right now is the issue of 
transfer — not sharing but transfer — of 
power fi-om Najibullah to a government 
that is acceptable to all Afghan parties. 

That is the one thing, in our view, 
that stands between us and a political 
settlement in Afghanistan. The United 
States, when it evacuated its Embassy in 
Kabul for security reasons, made it very 
clear that that was not a permanent 
evacuation, and we will return when we 
think that the situation warrants it. 

Q. What did you demand or re- 
quire for the Chilean Government 
about Le teller's case? 

A. We require a solution of that 
case. That's been a longstanding demand 
of the U.S. Government with respect to 
our relationship with Chile. 

Q. President Mubarak will be 
going Monday to meet with President 
Bush in Washington. How far do you 
expect some kind of progress can be 
achieved and what have you done so 
far with the Egyptians and the 
Israelis? 



A. I would hope that there will be 
some progress, but, as I indicated to you 
in a brief press conference yesterday, the 
real question is what action the Govern- 
ment of Israel takes when their cabinet 
meets early next week. 

I think that President Mubarak and 
President Bush both want to see the 
Shamir elections proposal advanced. I'll 
say one more time that the Egyptian 10 
points is not a competing proposal. It is 
simply a method of trying to get imple- 
mentation of the Shamir proposal and 
simply a way to afford Palestinians to 
meet with Israelis. It would be an open- 
ing position or position that would be 
adopted by Palestinians when they sit 
down with Israelis to talk about elections. 

Q. What would be the position of 
the United States if, when the Israeli 
cabinet meets next week, they do not 
take favorable action or any action on 
the proposal? 

A. We'd have to go back to the 
drawing board, wouldn't we? 

Q. It appears that you're trying 
to send them a message in advance. 

A. No. We want to see progress to- 
ward peace. We think that the Shamir 
proposal represented an excellent oppor- 
tunity to get there, and we just hope 
that the Israeli Government will be as 
firmly committed to that proposal as it 
has been in the past and will decide to 
move forward toward peace. 

Q. You met with Mexico's Foreign 
Secretary and talked about the agen- 
da of the next week's visit by Presi- 
dent Salinas. How do you assess the 
relationship between Mexico and the 
United States? 

A. Better than it's been in quite 
a few years, and I think that view is 
shared by the Presidents of both 
countries — better than it's been, if I 
might say so, during the 9 years that 
I have been a member of the U.S. 
Government. 

Q. The Swedish Foreign Minister 
said that continued U.S. aid to the 
mujahidin is [inaudible]. What is 
your comment on that, and what 
should the United States do now, and 
what will it do now to get a political 
settlement in Afghanistan? I mean, it 
has been a stalemate for months now. 

A. Let me comment on human- 
itarian assistance which the United 
States is sending to the mujahidin. We 
don't think that's a bar to a settlement in 
Afghanistan. 

Insofar as what we're willing to do 
toward arriving at a settlement, we are 



willing to exercise our diplomacy, as we 
do every time we get together with the 
Soviets and others, as we have done on a 
number of occasions just today. We had a 
full discussion of that as well at the Sec- 
retary General's lunch for the permanent 
five. 

Q. A lot has been said about Po- 
land as well as about Hungary. 
Could you elaborate what real aid — 
American aid — you have mentioned 
would be for Hungary, and could you 
sum up your meetings with the Hun- 
garian Foreign Minister? 

A. Yes. I'll be glad to. I included 
Poland and Hungary in my opening 
statement when I talked about spending 
some time this week further addressing 
the changes in Eastern Europe; and the 
changes in Hungary we see as every bit 
as important as the changes in Poland. 
It's not a case of weighing one against 
the other. 

Poland is making a bit more prog- 
ress on the political side in its reform. 
That may still be coming in Hungary. 
Hungary, on the other hand, has been 
making a bit more progress than Poland' 
on the economic side. 

We had a full discussion of these is- 
sues when the Hungarian Foreign Minis- 
ter met with me — a discussion of how we 
can assist them in the reform effort. We 
talked about the courageous decision 
that the Hungarian Government had to 
make with respect to refugees from the ■ 
German Democratic Republic seeking toi 
go to the Federal Republic of Germany, 
and a whole host of other issues. 

Q. If I may go back to the Middle 
East. When you said that you are 
waiting for the decision from the Is- 
raeli Government, what do you expect 
to follow — that they will negotiate 
only on elections in the territories, or 
is it any way linked with the compre- 
hensive settlement? 

A. I think we have to take the peace 
process in the Middle East a step at a 
time, and I think we have to crawl before 
we walk, and walk before we run. The 
name of the game right now, it seems to 
me, is to, for the first time, get Israelis 
and Palestinians talking to each other 

Initially, of course, they should talk 
about elections and the modalities for 
such elections. Ultimately, those discus- 
sions should evolve into discussions of 
transitional arrangements and discus- 
sions respecting permanent status. 



3 
J 
( 

J 



> Press release 174 of Sept. 26. 1989. 
- Press release 176 of Sept. 29. 
^ Press release 179. ■ 



38 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1983. 



THE SECRETARY 



News Conference of September 19 



Secretary Baker held a news 
conference at the Departinent of State 
on September 19, 1989.^ 

I thought I would join you today to 
share a few perspectives on the upcom- 
ing ministerial [with Soviet Foreign 
Minister Shevardnadze in Jackson 
Hole, Wyoming], so I have a short 
statement that I'd like to give you, 
and then I'd be pleased to take your 
questions. 

These discussions are taking place 
against a backdrop of significant major 
changes in the Soviet Union. We recog- 
nize progress, but we are also alert to 
the severe challenges and pressures 
which the Soviets face. 

There are no simple or quick fixes 
to these. No one from the outside can 
solve these problems for them. Having 
learned the lessons of what General 
Secretary Gorbachev calls the "era of 
stagnation," the Soviets know that it's 
up to them to make the fundamental 
structural reforms that are necessary. 
The General Secretary has called it a 
revolution, and we would agree with 
that characterization. 

So the question is: What can and 
what should we do? The answer, I 
think, to that is that we should find 
points of mutual advantage, gains that 
help them but that also at the same 
time serve our interests. This approach 
requires, of course, some creativity on 
the part of both of us. 

I think that this ministerial will 
reflect that strategy. We are now fully 
engaged across an increasingly broad- 
ened agenda — broadened, if I may say 
so, at our suggestion in earlier meet- 
ings between us. So let me mention 
some of the things that we are doing 
that we think are to the mutual advan- 
tage of both the United States and the 
Soviet Union. 

First, I think it's fair to say that 
the Soviets can best concentrate on 
internal reform if the e.xternal inter- 
national environment is stable and 
positive. That's one reason why we've 
urged them to join us in trying to set- 
tle regional conflicts. It could also save 
the Soviets billions of dollars that we 
still see spent in a disappointing pat- 
tern of support for those who fuel 
conflict — in Central America, Cam- 
bodia, Afghanistan, Cuba, Ethiopia, 
and elsewhere. 



Second, arms control could offer 
the Soviets some real economic savings 
if they respond positively to our con- 
ventional forces initiative. I would sug- 
gest that it's their turn to move, and we 
hope that they will. I think we stand to 
make progress across a broad front of 
other arms control issues at this forth- 
coming ministerial. 

We will be offering proposals de- 
signed to break the 15-year nuclear 
testing logjam, which could free up to 
two testing treaties for ratification 
next year. 

In the area of chemical weapons, 
we have, I think, a reasonable shot 
at an agreement to exchange data on 
chemical stocks which I think is a first 
practical step toward achieving real 
controls and eventually a total ban. 

In START [strategic arms reduc- 
tion talks], we look forward to a posi- 
tive Soviet response to our verification 
and stabilization initiatives. Agree- 
ment on this topic now, of course, would 
help with ratification later, as the Pres- 
ident indicated when these initiatives 
were announced. I also expect START 
to be a major subject in the arms con- 
trol letter that [Foreign] Minister 
Shevardnadze has said he would bring. 
And while we had hoped to see this let- 
ter in advance of the ministerial so that 
we could work on the subjects it raises 
this week, we will and do appreciate 
movement whenever we get it. 

However, to start the ball rolling 
this week, I am announcing today that 
we will lift our ban on mobile ICBMs 
[intercontinental ballistic missiles] in 
START, contingent upon congressional 
funding of our mobile ICBMs. We will 
be instructing our START negotiators 
in Geneva to work out the appropriate 
details of limits to be applied to 
mobile ICBMs and effective verifi- 
cation measures. 

A third way that I think we can 
make a constructive contribution to 
perestroika is to assist the possible cat- 
alytic reform processes in Poland and 
Hungary. And this week, I'll be speak- 
ing with [Foreign] Minister Shevard- 
nadze about our intentions to play a 
positive role in helping those two na- 
tions help themselves. 

Finally, I believe our efforts to in- 
stitutionalize the human rights agenda 
with the Soviets to expand our joint ef- 
forts on transnational problems such as 
the environment can support glasnost 
through fostering a pluralistic society 



in the Soviet Union. I will be giving 
the [Foreign] Minister a list of possible 
environmental initiatives, and I hope 
that we can reach an agreement on a 
human rights statement, on the rule 
of law, and other topics. 

We seek to encourage a spirit of 
openness between the Soviet Union 
and the United States, and that's a 
spirit that we hope to find in Wyoming. 

Q. Could you give us some details 
on what you have in mind specifically 
on mobile missiles? 

A. We want to make it clear that if 
the Congress funds the strategic mod- 
ernization program that the President 
has asked for, we will lift the ban which 
currently is in place in the START nego- 
tiations on mobile missiles. 

Q. In other words, you would per- 
mit the Soviets to keep the SS-25s? 

A. No, we will lift the ban, but, as 
I indicated, we will instruct our negotia- 
tors in Geneva to begin discussions upon 
the appropriate limits and effective veri- 
fication measures with respect to mobile 
missiles. So those two things will still 
have to be negotiated out within the con- 
text of the START discussions. 

Q. Will the chemical weapons 
agreement that seems to be in sight 
include inspection of American chem- 
ical weapons on West German soil, or 
are the Germans objecting, and are 
you going to finesse that issue? 

A. I'd rather wait to see if we can 
close this out, because there are still a 
few issues. I said I think we have a fair 
shot at this, and that's exactly where we 
are today. You had put your finger on 
one of the last issues to be resolved. But 
this would involve a two-stage exchange 
of information on locations and quan- 
tities of U.S. and Soviet stocks, as well 
as a regime of inspections to confirm the 
data. 

Q. Is a second stage to tie in 
the inspection regime to a 40-nation 
agreement, or do you hope to have an 
agreement that will stand on its own 
bilaterally, possibly being a model for 
others but one that can be carried out 
by these two countries? 

A. We would, of course, prefer ulti- 
mately to find ourselves in the position 
of moving multilaterally in this area. 
If we can't do that, then, of course, 
we will move to the extent that we 
can bilaterally. 

Q. The United States, if it lifts 
its own distaste for mobile missiles 
unilaterally, as you appear to be an- 
nouncing you're willing to do, would 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1989 



39 



THE SECRETARY 



you expect the Soviets perhaps to do 
the same thing with their insistence 
on controlling submarine-launched 
cruise missiles (SLCMs)? Would that 
be something that you'd expect of a 
reciprocal — 

A. I can't forecast what might be 
included in the proposal that we presume 
we will see on Thursday. So I really 
would prefer not to just speculate here 
with you. I just don't know what could 
be in it. 

As you know, we have major differ- 
ences with the Soviet Union on the ques- 
tion of SLCMs. I don't anticipate a lot 
of progress on that issue at this minis- 
terial. This has been a very, very thorny, 
difficult problem throughout the entire 
history of the START negotiations. 

Q. But if the Soviets did with 
SLCMs what you appear to be doing 
with mobiles, you wouldn't have to 
face that issue, either at this minis- 
terial or — 

A. I can't guess with you about 
what they might or might not do. 

Q. Would you talk to us a little 
more about what you're thinking of 
vis-a-vis Poland and Hungary? Are 
you anticipating a greater level of 
U.S. support that takes into account 
that Solidarity is now running the 
government instead of the 
communists? 

A. I think it's fair to say that when 
the President went to Poland and Hun- 
gary, we were talking about how we 
might assist a communist government in 
the process of reform. Now we are talk- 
ing about assistance to a democratic gov- 
ernment seeking to survive, and, 
therefore, we should take a harder look 
at the problem and at the issue. We are 
doing that. 

You saw just the other day where 
the President announced an additional 
$50 million in food aid to Poland. We 
don't want to make the same mistakes 
that the industrialized democracies made 
in the 1970s when we funneled a lot of 
loans into Poland and a lot of grants into 
Poland without insisting upon the appro- 
priate economic reforms. 

There are a lot of things that the 
Poles need to do to help themselves. We 
need to assist in that in every way pos- 
sible. We need to try and move, for in- 
stance, a Paris Club rescheduling in ad- 
vance of any requirement for an Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) agreement. 
We need to push to make certain that 
the cooperative effort that was agreed to 
at the economic summit goes forward ex- 
peditiously. As we are presently doing, I 
think, with Secretary [of Commerce] 
Mosbacher on a trip over there, we need 



to concentrate on the Enterprise Foun- 
dation and fund so that we can create a 
private sector in these countries. This is 
very, very important. 

Q. But are you anticipating a 
greater level of U.S. aid than the 
President announced, other than the 
food? 

A. We've already bumped it by 
$50 million. What I think we need to do 
is take a look at requirements and take 
a look at what we can do, because the 
point you make is a very good one. We 
are now dealing with a democratic gov- 
ernment seeking to survive, rather than 
a communist government seeking to re- 
form itself. I think it's appropriate that 
we look particularly hard at our bottom 
line and do everything that we possibly 
can. 

But we shouldn't make the mistake 
of thinking that it's just U.S. aid in the 
form of grants and loans that's going to 
cure the problem, because it didn't cure 
it in the 1970s, and it's not going to cure 
it now. It's going to take some fundamen- 
tal economic reform in both of those 
countries. 

Q. Since the Soviets seem anx- 
ious to move ahead on START, is the 
United States willing to move without 
regard to progress in the conventional 
arms talks, to move on a separate 
track toward a START agreement? 

A. I don't think we've ever condi- 
tioned START and CFE [conventional 
armed forces in Europe], one on the oth- 
er. We have a fairly far-reaching and am- 
bitious proposal out there on the table as 
far as conventional is concerned, as you 
know. And, as I indicated in my state- 
ment, we would hope that the Soviets 
would pick up that offer. This would en- 
able them to save a significant amount of 
pioney and, as you know, some of their 
problems are economic in nature. 

Q. But there's a widespread per- 
ception that because of the problems 
in the Administration about what the 
position should be in the START talks 
relevant to the sea-launched cruise 
missiles and particularly the ABM 
[Antiballistic Missile] Treaty that it 
would be easier to move forward on 
conventional. The Soviets, on the oth- 
er hand, seem to want to push very 
hard on START. Are you willing to 
make that push? 

A. As I mentioned in my statement, 
we're going to be moving across the full 
range of our arms control agenda. We're 
going to be moving in START; we're 
going to be moving in conventional; 
we're going to be moving in chemical; 
and we're going to be moving in nuclear 
testing, we hope — in all of these areas. 



Will we conclude a treaty in Wyo- 
ming? The answer to that is obviously 
no. That's not the purpose or the func- 
tion of these meetings. They are to con- 
tinue to move the process forward, and 
I think if you judge us at the end of the 
day — hopefully next Sunday — that you 
will agree that we've moved the process 
forward substantially across the full 
range of our arms control agenda. 

Are there still some major issues in 
START? You bet there are, and they're 
going to be very difficult to resolve, but- 
we're going to keep at it. 

Q. The Senate Majority Leader 
accused the Administration of ti- 
midity in the face of unprecedented 
changes in the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe, and the Speaker of 
the Hungarian Parliament expressed 
unhappiness with the "wait-and-see" 
attitude on the part of the Admini- 
stration. What's your reaction to 
those charges? 

A. I don't think that we can appro- 
priately be accused of having a "wait- 
and-see" attitude. Frankly, I think that 
the statement, coming as it did on the 
eve of the ministerial, was unfortunate 
in its timing. I also think it ignores our 
approach as I've laid it out here to you in 
the opening statement that I just made. 

We have clearly recognized the his- 
toric changes that are taking place, not 
only in the Soviet Union but in Eastern 
Europe as well. That's why we are fully 
engaged, not just on the full range of our 
arms control agenda but on the broad- 
ened agenda as well — environmental 
problems, drug problems, terrorism 
problems, a whole range of issues that 
we never used to discuss, even with the 
Soviets. 

That's why we're focusing greater 
efforts on regional conflicts. That's why 
we're offering technical economic advice 
on what it's going to take to accomplish 
the kind of reform that's necessary in 
Poland and Hungary and, for that mat- 
ter, in the Soviet Union. 

Frankly, we could move forward a 
lot faster and with more effect, it seems 
to me, if the Congress would act expe- 
ditiously on the President's request for 
GSP and OPIC [generalized system of 
preferences and Overseas Private In- 
vestment Corporation] benefits for 
Poland and Hungary. 

So I think we have to be careful not 
to become frantic and rush out here to 
negotiate a treaty on strategic arms, or 
anything else for that matter, that would 
be nonratifiable. You know, the United 
States did that recently; we did it, I 



40 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1989 ' 



THE SECRETARY 



think, in the late 1970s timeframe, and 
^t turned out to be a mistake. I don't 
;hink we ought to do it again. 

Q. Your statement seems to be 
implied criticism of the previous Ad- 
ministration, of which you were a 
3art, inasmuch as they negotiated 
START to the point at which it is 
now. I mean, is that the way we 
should take this? 

A. No. I don't intend to be criticiz- 
ing the prior Administration of which I 
was a part. [Laughter] I think what's 
happened is they've taken it a long way 
clown the track. There are about two or 
three really fundamental, very tough, 
difficult issues in START that that Ad- 
ministration was not able to resolve, and 
that so far we have not been able to re- 
solve. But we need to keep negotiating 
on those, and that's the full thrust and 
import of my statement. 

Q. How much do you feel your 
hands are tied because of the legisla- 
tive slowness up on Capitol Hill, par- 
ticularly with regard to the mobile 
missile issue and the B-2 issue and 
the "star wars" issue? Has that made 
it difficult for the Administration to 
even field a coherent arms control 
strategy going into this ministerial? 

A. I do think it is fair for us to say 
Ihat we have been debating in this coun- 
try the question of strategic moderniza- 
tion for almost 15 or 16 years. It is very 
difficult to negotiate a strategic arms 
treaty until you know for sure what your 
strategic modernization program and 
policy are going to be. 

So that relates to the question 
you've just addressed on mobiles and to 
some extent, I suppose, in a related way 
on SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] and 
ABM. On the question of ALCMs [air- 
launched cruise missiles], which is yet 
another issue that's unresolved in the 
START discussions, it's pretty hard to 
know what limits or what kind of trade 
you should make on ALCMs until you 
know whether or not you're going to have 
a penetrating bomber such as the B-2. 

So we do need to move together — 
the legislative and executive branches — 
if we're going to ultimately reach a stra- 
tegic arms agreement. 

But I want to say in concluding that 
answer that I hope you will look at the 
progress that is going to be made across 
the full range of the arms control nego- 
tiations and not just look only at that 
one negotiation. 

Q. You seemed to have condi- 
tioned additional aid for Poland on 
their carrying out reforms. But some 



people have said that this government 
is not going to be able to succeed with 
a reform program without massive 
additional aid from the West. Could 
you address that? 

A. I'm not just saying they've got to 
reform and then we'll help them. The 
President has made it quite clear that 
we want to help the process of reform, 
and we've made that quite clear as well. 
We want to get OPIC coverage for them 
so that we can encourage U.S. invest- 
ment in Poland and Hungary. 

We want to give them GSP benefits 
so that they get the benefit of that in 
their trading relationship. We want to 
continue to be liberal and generous in 
our food aid and assistance. We want to 
continue to press for a liberal Paris Club 
rescheduling for Poland in advance of an 
IMF agreement, and not all countries 
are quite so forward-looking, if I may 
say so. We want to see the implementa- 
tion of our Enterprise Foundation, $125 
million proposal. 

I think it's fair to say that we need 
to assist them, and we need to help them 
over the rough spot. Whether they suc- 
ceed or not is going to depend on their 
willingness to effect some very funda- 
mental and substantial economic re- 
forms. They've got to find a way to move 
to a free market economy. 

Q. Are you going to make Soviet 
bloc aid to Nicaragua a priority issue 
during the talks? 

A. We have before and we will 
again, and we're a little disappointed in 
what's going on down there. So we'll 
make that known. 

Q. Are the Soviets contributing 
directly to the build-up of the San- 
dinista arsenal? 

A. To the buildup of the arsenal, I 
would have to say yes, if you ask me the 
question that way. Most of it is coming in 
indirectly but it's materiel and weaponry 
that we think they could have a signifi- 
cant influence on reducing if they so 
chose. 

Let me say one more time, as I did 
in my statement: They are spending bil- 
lions of dollars in regional conflict situa- 
tions that we think could be put to 
better use to assist the process of per- 
estroika. That's what I mean about as- 
sisting them where it's to our mutual 
advantage to do so. It's just one example. 

Q. When this ministerial meet- 
ing was scheduled, it was agreed that 
one of the topics that would be dis- 
cussed would be the question of a fu- 
ture summit meeting between 
President Bush and President Gor- 



bachev. Now statements from the 
White House seem to suggest that it's 
too early to talk about a summit 
meeting. Could you clarify your will- 
ingness, or the Administration's will- 
ingness or unwillingness, to consider 
a summit meeting schedule at this 
time? And what kind of criteria are 
you going to use — the President going 
to use — to determine whether you 
want to proceed with one? 

A. What I will say for you is that it 
is anticipated and intended that we have 
a full discussion of the possibility of a 
summit. That will take place, as we indi- 
cated it would, when we broke up, I 
think, following our meeting in Paris. 
We will have a discussion of when it 
would be appropriate for the General 
Secretary and the President to get to- 
gether. Beyond that, I really don't want 
to go — 

Q. Is there some feeling that this 
is too early to have a summit? 

A. I don't want to go beyond what 
I've just said. We will have a full discus- 
sion of that. 

Q. You said the Administration is 
not taking a "wait-and-see" attitude 
toward change in Eastern Europe and 
in the Soviet Union. Can you explain, 
in that context, why it has not yet 
acted on most-favored-nation (MEN) 
for the Soviets, and also why you feel 
the need to talk to Mr. Shevardnadze 
before taking additional steps in Po- 
land and Hungary? 

A. I don't feel the need to talk to 
him before taking additional steps. What 
I said in my statement was that I would 
be telling him what our approach to Po- 
land and Hungary is. I don't feel a need 
to talk to him before doing that. 

With respect to MEN, I think we've 
made it very clear that this is one way in 
which we could significantly assist the 
process of perestwika. We made it clear 
months ago that the only thing that was 
a bar to our moving on MFN was that 
they institutionalize the freer emigration 
policies which they have pretty consist- 
ently been following over the course of 
the past year or so. We're still waiting 
for that institutionalization. 

There's a good case of, it seems to 
me, helping others help themselves. If 
they'd simply pass the law, we would be 
in. a position to provide MFN. 

Q. But the parliament, as you 
know, has a lot of things on its agen- 
da, and some of the Soviet officials 
are now saying that they don't expect 
it to happen right away. Yet the prac- 
tice is there. Why doesn't the Ad- 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1989 



41 



THE SECRETARY 



ministration do some kind of selec- 
tive lifting or things that are within 
its purview or its legal — 

A. Because I think we took a forth- 
coming and far-reaching position on it. 
We made it very clear months ago that 
we were prepared to do this. I think that 
there is substantial consensus within the 
United States for that approach, partic- 
ularly when it rests only on their enact- 
ing legislation. I don't think we ought to 
change our position. 

Q. Despite what you said a mo- 
ment ago about not wanting to rush 
out and sign agreements, do you have 
any concern, given Mr. Gorbachev's 
domestic problems, that there may be 
a limited period of time during which 
you can make agreements with this 
regime in the Soviet Union? 

A. You know we want perestroika to 
succeed. You know we believe it's up to 
the Soviet people whether or not it will 
succeed and what happens to their 
leadership. 

Let me remind you that we hope — 
hope — to be able to tell you on Saturday 
night or Sunday that we've got signifi- 
cant movement on conventional forces 
because we hope they're going to come 
back and give us an answer on our pro- 
posal. We hope to be able to tell you 
we're going to have good progress on nu- 
clear testing, good progress on chemical 
weapons, and some progress on START. 

I think that's responsive to the con- 
cern that is suggested by your question. 
It's one reason that we believe in being 
fully engaged across a broad agenda in 
the U.S. -Soviet dialogue. 

Q. Just in regard to what you 
said, do you anticipate your remarks 
will have some impact back in Mos- 
cow now with a meeting going on 
there, to give a little assurance to 
your willingness to work with 
Gorbachev? 

A. I hadn't anticipated that in 
scheduling this. That's not the reason 
I'm down here. 

Q. With regard to most-favored- 
nation status, there's some debate 
over whether or not that would really 
improve trade that much between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. 
And for those who do argue that the 
biggest problems that the Soviets face 
internally pertain to the continued 
stagnation economically there, is 
there anything that the United States 
can do, practically, or that could be 
done at this meeting perhaps? 

A. Yes, and we hope to do that. We 
suggested at the last meeting that we 



42 



have an informal dialogue on the subject 
of economics generally and how per- 
estroika works and how we might assist 
them through technical advice, or other- 
wise, in doing what they need to do to 
move more toward an open market-type 
economy. 

They've got, as you know, some ex- 
traordinarily difficult problems involv- 
ing the convertibility of their currency 
and involving a price system. These are 
things that have to be at some time 
addressed. 

Q. Is that going to be discussed, 
then, this weekend? 

A. Informally, we will be discussing 

those, yes. 

Q. [Foreign] Minister Shev- 
ardnadze will be coming to the minis- 
terial from a nationalities plenum. 
What is our position on the Baltic 
states? Do we support the independ- 
ence of the Baltic states, or would we 
like— 

A. As you know, it's been the posi- 
tion of the United States for some time 
that we do not recognize the incorpora- 
tion of the Baltic states into the Soviet 
Union. That continues to be our posi- 
tion. We would hope that whatever takes 
place with respect to that would take 
place in a peaceful manner. 

We do not seek to foster, nor would 
we profit from, instability in the Soviet 
Union. We'd like to see a peaceful move 
toward independence for the Baltic 
states. 

Q. In the spirit of your concern 
about solving regional conflicts, what 
do you think of [Egyptian] President 
Mubarak's lO-point plan to move the 
peace process in the Middle East for- 
ward? And how do you assess the 
U.S.-PLO [Palestine Liberation Or- 
ganization] dialogue at the present 
time? 

A. Let me answer the first one and 
then you ask me the second one later, be- 
cause I'm going to give you a longer an- 
swer to the first one than you might 
have anticipated. 

First of all, let me say that we 
strongly support the Government of Isra- 
el's elections initiative. We would like 
to — and we have been working toward, 
ever since I've been in this office — find a 
way to bring about a dialogue between 
Israelis and Palestinians because we 
don't think there will ever be peace in 
the Middle East except through direct 
negotiations. 

We see Egypt's 10 points not as an 
alternative to the Israeli Government's 
proposal; on the contrary, we think they 



represent Egypt's acceptance of the 
Israeli proposal and Egypt's views on 
how to get to elections and make it 
work — how to get to a dialogue. 

We are encouraged by the recent 
diplomatic activity that has taken place 
in this regard, and we intend to remain 
actively involved and engaged with the 
parties. 

I have been in touch with both For- 
eign Ministers — the Foreign Minister of 
Egypt and the Foreign Minister of 
Israel — and I would hope that we will, 
the three of us, be able to meet when 
we're all three in New York at the UN 
General Assembly next week to further' 
discuss ways in which we might imple- 
ment the Israeli elections proposal. 

Q. Could you explain more fully 
the rationale or the reasoning behino 
your announcement here on mobile 
missiles? There are some arms con- 
trol supporters — I think Senator 
Nunn and [Representative] Les 
Aspin — who have argued that we 
should maintain a ban on mobile mis 
siles that carry multiple warheads bfi 
cause they maintain a breakout 
threat for a START treaty while al- 
lowing single-warhead mobile mis- 
siles. I gather you're not drawing tha 
sort of distinction. You would allow 
both types. 

A. I'm not getting into the questioi 
of MIRVing or de-MIRVing or any of 
that right now. If you ask me "rationale, 
I think, frankly, there has been some 
confusion out there about exactly where 
the United States was when we have a 
ban on mobile missiles in a START nega 
tiation with the Soviet Union and yet we 
send a request to the Congress for au- 
thority to build and deploy mobile mis- 
siles. I just wanted to make that very, 
very clear. 

Some have faulted us for maintain' 
ing the ban. Others think that, well, you 
ought to maintain the ban until you get 
congressional — what we've done here, I 
think, is to accentuate the positive and 
that's the purpose of the announcement. 

Q. Senator Mitchell's criticisms 
yesterday went beyond specifics re- 
garding Poland or Hungary or the So' 
viet Union. In general, I think he wai 
making the assessment that the Ad- 
ministration lacked vision and lead- 
ership and didn't have an over- 
arching policy to deal with these rev- 
olutionary changes. He even went so 
far as to say there was some 
nostalgia — there appeared to be nos- 
talgia for the cold war era. Can you 



AFRICA 



address the question more generally 
than just the specifics of what you do 
want to do in each of those countries? 

A. I thought I addressed it gener- 
ally in the first answer I gave you, be- 
cause I told you what we are doing. I 
think that the criticism fails to take that 
into account. So I disagree with the crit- 
icism. [Note handed to the Secretary] I 
have another announcement for you. I'm 
sorry, where did I leave you? 

Q. You said you reject the criti- 
cism. I'd say it was an unusually 
harsh assessment of overall Ad- 
ministration policy, and I'm asking 
you to address that. 

A. Let me address it this way by 
saying that when the President of the 
United States is rocking along with a 
10% approval rating on his handling of 
foreign policy and I were the leader of 
the opposition party, I might have some- 
thing similar to say. [Laugher] 

Q. Back to the question for a mo- 
ment of the instability in the Soviet 
Union, there seems to have been an 
upsurge in that since your last minis- 
terial meetings. How do those factors 
enter into your thinking on the pace 
of U.S. cooperation with the Soviet 
Union? Do Mr. Gorbachev's internal 
problems — the difficulty he has in 
getting his economic program off the 
ground — put limits on really what 
you can achieve? 

A. I don't think it enters in in the 
way in which your question would imply 
because we have, from the very begin- 
ning, felt that it was important to coop- 
erate where it was in our interest as 
well as theirs to assist perestroika to 
succeed. We've made that very clear, and 
we have felt a certain — all along — 
dynamic in this thing to do that without 
any undue delay. That's exactly what our 
position is now, and that's why we're 
moving across this full range of our 
agenda. 

If you're asking me, does it make us 
frantic because of what's happened over 
the course of the past 3 months, the an- 
swer is no, and it shouldn't and it's not in 
our interest for it — 

Q. I meant my question to ac- 
tually be the opposite. Does it tend to 
make you more cautious and more 
prudent? 

A. I would hope, and again as we 
said early on in this Administration, 
that we've been approaching this rela- 
tionship with the proper degree of pru- 
dence. We talked a lot about the 
importance of doing that. Why? Because 



we can have no assurance with respect 
to what the final result will be. So we 
shouldn't go out, as someone said, and do 
something dumb. 

Q. Senator Don Riegle is sending 
you a letter asking you to raise the 
Baltic question in Wyoming. 

A. We will be discussing that. 
That's an item that we would expect to 
discuss, the situation in the Baltics. 

Q. Will you spend much or any 
time discussing the South African sit- 
uation with the Foreign Minister? 
And do you have any private indica- 
tions that the new South African Gov- 
ernment will make the reforms that 
you seek in the near future? 

A. We hope they will. They haven't 
been in very long. As you know, when we 
congratulated that government on its 
election and caught a little flack for do- 
ing so, we made it very clear that that 
congratulation was tempered with a de- 



sire on our part to see them move expe- 
ditiously in a whole host of areas having 
to do with the abolition of apartheid. I 
hope that we will see that. 

We will be discussing the situation 
generally in southern Africa. I'm not 
sure we will get into detailed discus- 
sions about the De Klerk government. 

Let me say also that I can now in- 
form you that allied representatives 
meeting in Brussels today have reached 
agreement on tabling concrete proposals 
on verification information, exchange, 
and stabilizing measures in the CFE ne- 
gotiations in Vienna — they will table 
these [on Thursday, September 21] — 
together with the proposals that were ta- 
bled on July 13. This fully implements 
the decisions that were made at the May 
NATO summit as a result of the Presi- 
dent's conventional forces initiative. 



1 Press release 167. 



Independence Process in Namibia 



by Herman J. Cohen 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee on July 20, 1989. Ambassa- 
dor Cohen is Assistant Secretary for 
African Affairs. ' 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss 
the independence process in Namibia. 
This is particularly timely, since I have 
just returned from Africa and a stop in 
Windhoek, where I had an opportunity 
to view the process firsthand. In the 
brief time I was there, I met with par- 
ties representative of Namibia's entire 
political spectrum: the Administrator 
General, the UN Secretary General's 
special representative, and senior offi- 
cials both of the South West Africa Peo- 
ple's Organization (SWAPO) and its 
principal opponent in the electoral cam- 
paign, the Democratic Turnhalle Alli- 
ance (DTA), as well as observers from a 
variety of foreign governments. 

The United States has long taken 
the leading role in negotiations aimed 
at achieving Namibian independence. 
We are proud of our role in reaching 
agreement on UN Security Council 
Resolution 435. And we are equally 
proud of our mediating role in the ne- 
gotiations that led to the New York 



accords which opened the way to 
implementing that resolution. Today 
we stand ready to assist the Secretary 
General, his special representative, and 
the UN Transition Assistance Group 
(UNTAG) as they discharge their 
responsibilities. 

Situation Since Implementation of 
Security Council Resolution 435 

Nearly 4 months into the implementa- 
tion of Security Council Resolution 435, 
the transition to Namibia's independ- 
ence is firmly in place. Despite some 
delays, primarily caused by SWAPO's 
surprise incursion on April 1 and the 
resulting administrative glitches, all 
parties remain committed to keeping 
the independence process on track 
and ensuring that elections for the 
constituent assembly are held in 
November 1989. 

The Secretary General's special 
representative, Martti Ahtisaari, and 
the Administrator General, Louis 
Pienaar, have worked together to 
achieve the repeal of discriminatory 
legislation, the promulgation of a blan- 
ket amnesty for all returnees, a peace- 
ful repatriation of refugees, and the 
successful start of nationwide voter 
registration. 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1989 



43 



AFRICA 



I would note that the South Afri- 
can Government has also kept its side 
of the bargain. Once the problems aris- 
ing from the April 1 incursion were 
solved, the withdrawal and demobili- 
zation of the South African Defense 
Forces and the South-West Africa Ter- 
ritorial Force has proceeded according 
to schedule. As required by the UN 
plan, the remaining South African 
forces, which may not exceed 1,500, are 
now restricted to bases at Grootfontein 
and Oshivelo and monitored by UNTAG 
military units. 

Return of Exiles 

and Voter Registration 

The return of exiled Namibians repre- 
sents another significant milestone on 
the road to independence. Although de- 
layed by 4 weeks, the arrival of the 
first planeload of returnees at Wind- 
hoek airport on June 12 testified to the 
fact that transition to independence 
was irreversible. Over 20,000 refugees 
have been repatriated to be full partici- 
pants in this historic process. 

On July 3, the registration of vo- 
ters began. Having already registered 
over a third of the estimated elector- 
ate, representatives from the Ad- 
ministrator General's office and 
UNTAG are working side-by-side to 
sign up all Namibians who qualify to 
vote in the upcoming elections. 

Obstacles to Overcome 

Of course, there are still some obsta- 
cles to overcome. 

• The problem of intimidation in 
the north remains. 

• Reports of the continued pres- 
ence of armed SWAPO fighters in 
Angola prevents a complete sense 

of security inside Namibia. 

• Final election legislation, while 
under active consideration, has not yet 
been promulgated. 

• Questions concerning SWAPO 
detainees are not fully resolved, while 
political prisoners remain in South 
African custody. 

• UNTAG and the Administrator 
General's office continue to discuss 
whether additional legislation should 
be repealed because of its discrimina- 
tory nature. 

In our judgment, these issues, 
though not serious, do not constitute an 
insurmountable threat to the independ- 
ence process. 



Let me add a few words, however, 
about the issue of intimidation. We 
raised the matter one more time with 
the South African delegation at the 
joint commission meeting in Luanda 
June 7-8. There have been some posi- 
tive moves, including: 

• Removal of heavy armaments 
from police vehicles; 

• Removal of the large, mine- 
resistant casspirs [large armored vehi- 
cles] from populated areas; 

• Reduction of the numbers of 
casspirs in use; 

• Donation of 40 casspirs to 
UNTAG so it can accompany South 
West African police patrols; and 

• Appointment of a commission to 
review complaints. 

However, the South Africans have 
yet to remove ex-Koevoet counterin- 
surgency troops in the police force 
from the north. We will continue to 
support the UN Secretary General's 
special representative as he works on 
this problem. 

SWAPO Detainees 

Let me now turn to the issue of 
SWAPO detainees. At the Luanda joint 



commission meeting, the head of the 
Angolan delegation. Gen. Ndalu, re- 
ported he found 151 detainees in 
SWAPO camps, of which 99 had gone to 
Namibia and 52 had chosen to remain 
in Angola or be repatriated as refu- 
gees. However, 2 weeks ago, some of 
the SWAPO detainees who did return 
to Namibia reported graphically to the 
press on their imprisonment and tor- 
ture. A senior SWAPO official publicly 
apologized to the returnees and said 
that his organization would deal with " 
anyone involved in torture. 

I continue to be concerned with 
reports that not all the detainees pre- 
viously held by SWAPO have been re- 
leased. We urge a full accounting from 
SWAPO. We also urge that the South 
Africans release all political prisoners 
and detainees they still hold. 

In sum I am encouraged by what I 
saw in Windhoek. Resolution 435 is be- 
ing implemented fully and correctly, 
and we remain confident that free and 
fair elections will occur on schedule. 



1 The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee anc 
will be available from the Superintendent o: 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



South African Elections 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 7, 19891 

We congratulate Acting President 
[F.W.] De Klerk on his party's victory 
at the polls and for leading his party to 
win its mandate for real change in 
South Africa. Apartheid must end. The 
elections themselves once more under- 
score the systematic denial of political 
rights to the majority population in 
South Africa. 

The international community is 
carefully watching what the new South 
African Government will do to begin 
the process of change. Promises of re- 
form must be followed by concrete, spe- 
cific action. We are committed to 
working with all parties to bring the 
South African Government and black 
South Africans together in a substan- 
tial effort to end apartheid. We, there- 
fore, are prepared to work with the 
new government toward this end. 

The most important first step in 
the process of change is dialogue be- 



tween South Africans. To begin this dil 
alogue, we believe that the following 
steps will be necessary: 

• Release all political prisoners, 
including Nelson Mandela and Walter 
Sisulu, and the return of political exiles 

• Lift the state of emergency and 
associated restrictions on political ac- 
tivity and freedom of association for 
the black opposition; 

• Unban all political organizations, 
including the African National Con- 
gress (ANC); and 

• End violence from all sources. 

We urge the new South African 
Government to move as quickly as pos 
sible to create the conditions for dia- 
logue to begin. We hope all parties will 
take advantage of this opportunity to 
pursue negotiations on a peaceful proc- 
ess of constitutional change leading to 
nonracial democratic government. 



' Read to news correspondents by 
Department spokesman Margaret DeB. 
Tutwiler.B 



44 



Department of State Bulletin/November 198{ 



^RMS CONTROL 



Conference Against Chemical Weapons 



The International Government- 
'ndustry Conference Against Chemical 
Weapons was held in Canberra Septem- 
in- 18-22, 1989. Following is a state- 
iiiiit by Richard A. Clarke, head of the 
I'.S. delegation and Assistant Secre- 
nrii for Politico-Military Affairs, on 
■September 19. 

'If I am remembered for anything, it 
ivould be this, a complete and total ban 
m chemical weapons." Those are the 
>vnrds of George Bush. 

President Bush is committed to a 
verifiable and total ban on chemical 
vveapons. The U.S. Government is so 
committed. On behalf of President 
Bush, I want to extend my thanks to 
!;he Government of Australia for host- 
ng this unique and essential confer- 
ence against chemical weapons. 

It is interesting that the very title 
s a conference against chemical weap- 
ons; not on chemical weapons or about 
;:hemical weapons but against — for we 
all here are pledged to the total elim- 
I nation of chemical weapons. This is a 
ianique conference — a unique confer- 
mce because it brings together, in a 
'ormal setting for the first time, those 
governments that could make chemical 
veapons and could also eliminate them, 
n the same setting with those indus- 
ries that could make chemical weapons 
)r could help us in the process of elim- 
nating them. It is an essential confer- 
■iice because we cannot go ahead to 
mplement a ban without the coopera- 
;ion of industry. 

Role of Governments 

Let me begin by talking about the role 
of governments. Those nations that 
have chemical weapons bear a special 
'responsibility to conclude the conven- 
tion as rapidly as possible. Those na- 
tions which do not have chemical 
weapons also have a responsibility and 
that is not to acquire them; not to make 
the problem any worse. 

Both classes of nations have a mor- 
al responsibility to prevent the diver- 
sion of dual-use chemicals through 
igovernmental export controls and end- 
user confirmation. That is the best way 
to stop proliferation until we have a 
convention in force. Until that time, 
stopping proliferation of chemical 
weapons is a national responsibility. It 



would be a mistake for us to adopt any 
international regime as an interim to 
deal with proliferation. That would 
only divert us from the important task 
of completing the convention. While it 
is a national responsibility, nations can 
and should — and I am pleased to say 
many nations are — cooperate in their 
efforts to control the spread of chemical 
weapons. 

The threat of proliferation is a 
threat that affects us all. But I think 
there may have been some misunder- 
standing about who is most at risk from 
that threat. It is not the great powers 
that have elaborate laboratories, that 
have chemical defensive gear, that have 
antidotes and elaborate hospital facili- 
ties. Those nations which are most at 
risk from the threat of proliferation are 
the nations in the Third World, the so- 
called developing nations. 

Steps Toward Building Confidence 

There are those who say that we cannot 
simultaneously support efforts to stop 
proliferation and at the same time sup- 
port efforts to achieve a treaty. The 
United States believes that is the falla- 
cy of a false dichotomy. We believe we 
can and must do both. 

A global ban, a verifiable global 
ban, is the best ultimate answer to the 
problem of proliferation. Those who are 
party now to the spread of chemical 
weapons put further roadblocks in our 
path to the ultimate achievement of 
that total ban. We must take practical 
steps now as governments to achieve 
that global ban. We must take initial 
steps — steps that will make it possible 
to go ahead more rapidly later on, steps 
which will build confidence in the trea- 
ty and in the process. We would like to 
propose three such steps today. 

First, an end to secrecy. There are 
not just two nations that have chemical 
weapons. There are two nations that 
acknowledge they have chemical weap- 
ons. To the best of our information, 
there are 22 nations that have chemical 
weapons in their inventories, con- 
trolled by their military and ready for 
use. It would be a major step forward 
in building confidence in the treaty if 
those other nations which have chemical 
weapons would begin by admitting that 
fact. Only two thus far have made that 
acknowledgment. Only one nation thus 



far has listed by site the location of all 
of the storage facilities for chemical 
weapons on its territory. 

The United States and the Soviet 
Union are moving this week to put a 
further end to secrecy on their parts. 
They are negotiating today in Wash- 
ington and later this week in the 
American State of Wyoming the 
memorandum of understanding which 
will detail the size of their stocks; the 
type of agent; and the type of weapon 
and the locations. And if we can con- 
clude this agreement this week, that 
data will be exchanged by the end of 
this calendar year. The agreement will 
also call for mutual visits to a variety 
of types of facilities on each others' ter- 
ritories. Other nations should follow 
this example. 

Second, we propose today that na- 
tions build confidence in the treaty 
through a variety of unilateral, region- 
al, and multilateral steps. Australia's 
regional conference in support of the 
chemical weapons convention earlier 
this year and Australia's announcement 
today of an organization to begin the 
implementation of the convention are 
two examples of such steps. Pledges not 
to acquire chemical weapons are anoth- 
er example of this sort of measure. 

Third, the United States is propos- 
ing today the creation of a forerunner of 
the technical secretariat that will be 
created when the treaty is imple- 
mented. Some of the tasks that that 
technical secretariat will be called 
upon to do need not wait upon the im- 
plementation of the treaty. They can 
be done now; they should be done now. 
What would such a group do in 
specific? 

We have called the group in our 
preliminary proposal the technical ex- 
perts' group but in discussions here 
yesterday, I have been given a variety 
of other suggestions for names, includ- 
ing the interim international staff or 
the assistance groups. We are not wed- 
ded to any particular name. 

We have some ideas about what 
such a group should start immediately 
to do. It could establish data bases 
from governments and industries. 
There is not today a single reliable list 
of the location of chemical plants in the 
world or their number. A data base 
would be a good beginning. The group 
could assist in national inspections; it 
could assist in multinational trial in- 
spections and develop lessons learned 
from each of them. It could research 
and disseminate information on envi- 
ronmentally safe destruction of chemi- 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1989 



45 



ARMS CONTROL 



cal weapons. The United States has 
much information to offer in this 
regard. 

We have destroyed 15 million 
pounds of chemical weapons agent al- 
ready. We have spent $240 million in 
the creation of a single facility to de- 
stroy chemical weapons stocks. The 
group could coordinate research on 
methods and technologies for verifica- 
tion. Last year the Congress of the 
United States appropriated $6 million 
specifically for research into chemical 
weapons verification. I suspect and I 
hope that other governments in this 
room are also spending money on re- 
search of that kind. Right now that re- 
search might be duplicative. Such a 
group could coordinate the research 
among countries. There are other ideas 
for the group which are outlined in the 
paper distributed by the secretariat. 

It is important, in thinking about 
such a group, to also understand what 
it would not do, and what it would not 
be. It could not be a diversion from the 
real work of getting the convention. It 
must only be a necessary step on the 
way to implementing the convention. It 
should not be an exclusive organization 
but rather one open to all the members 
of the Conference on Disarmament. It 



should not be a committee, such as 
those five that already exist in Geneva, 
to do political work, but rather it 
should be a small body to coordinate 
and to recruit experts, who would be 
brought in for specific tasks, given to it 
by the chairman. It should not be a du- 
plication of existing groups but rather 
an umbrella and a supporting mecha- 
nism for them; not a parallel structure 
but a staff reporting to the existing 
chairman. 

We put this concept forward today 
as a preliminary proposal, with the in- 
tention of obtaining comments and crit- 
icism here, and in Geneva, during the 
intersessionals before we put it for- 
ward formally in the Geneva talks. 

Verification 

Much of the work that this group would 
have to do would focus on verification. 
A lot of discussion has already oc- 
curred here today about verification. 
We in the chemical weapons conference 
must not make the mistake that was 
made in the biological weapons confer- 
ence, for the Biological Weapons Con- 
vention has no effective means of 
verification. We cannot do what we did 
there and simply rush to sign a piece of 



CFE and CSBM Talks Open Round Three 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 7, 19891 

The third round of the negotiations on 
conventional armed forces in Europe 
(CFE) began today in Vienna. 

At the NATO summit in May, al- 
lied leaders endorsed the President's 
initiative to include land-based combat 
aircraft and land-based combat helicop- 
ters and U.S. and Soviet ground and 
air manpower stationed in Europe in 
the negotiations. On July 13, 2 months 
ahead of schedule, the allies presented 
details of this initiative at the negotia- 
tions in Vienna. The tabling of those 
elements of our proposal reflects our 
determination to fulfill the President's 
commitment and move forward as rap- 
idly as possible in these negotiations. 

The members of the Warsaw Pact 
have indicated that they want to con- 
clude a conventional arms reduction 
agreement, and we await their re- 
sponse to our initiatives during this 
round. 



Similarly we hope that the Warsaw 
Pact members will be prepared to dis- 
cuss the 12 detailed measures that we 
and our NATO allies put forward dur- 
ing the last round of the 35-nation talks 
on confidence- and security-building 
measures (CSBMs), which have just re- 
sumed in Vienna. Greater openness and 
predictability about military forces 
and actions in Europe are key elements 
in the NATO alliance's approach to con- 
ventional arms control. 

Our objectives in both these nego- 
tiations is to secure a more stable bal- 
ance of forces in Europe and to reduce 
the risk of arms confrontation on the 
continent. It is a goal we and our allies 
have been seeking for 40 years. We be- 
lieve that the conditions are right for 
achieving sound and stabilizing agree- 
ments which will increase security for 
all the nations concerned. 



' Te.xt from Weekly Compilation 
of Presidential Documents of 
Sept. 11, 1989.B 



paper because we want to ban that type 
of weapon and have not yet been suc- 
cessful in working out the details. The 
Biological Weapons Convention sits 
there today without verification pro- 
cedures, and there are countries today 
actively engaged in creating biological 
weapons, acquiring them for the first 
time. And that convention, because it 
was rushed through without verifica- 
tion procedures, is doing nothing eithei 
to identify those nations or to stop 
them. 

A sloppy job of verification in the 
chemical weapons convention would 
damage the entire international struc- 
ture for arms control. And it would do 
so at a time — a unique time in the 
history of arms control — when we 
can make progress, bilaterally and 
multilaterally, on a number of vital 
agreements. 

Other Arms Control Negotiations 

In addition to the chemical weapons 
talks, the United States and the Soviet 
Union are today implementing the 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
(INF) Agreement. We are blowing up 
missiles in the United States and in thei 
Soviet Union. Perhaps our experience 
there can help answer some of the ques- 
tions about how much it costs to do in- 
spection and how many inspectors you 
need. 

There are today 300 Americans in 
the Soviet Union and an equal number 
of Soviets in the United States verify- 
ing this one small agreement to elimi- 
nate one class of nuclear missiles. Last 
year the agency of the U.S. Govern- 
ment created for verification of that 
agreement — the On-Sight Inspection 
Agency — had a budget of almost $100 
million. That agreement is a very small 
agreement compared to what we are 
trying to achieve here. But it is not the 
only one that is going on. 

We are engaged in negotiations on 
nuclear testing, which will require 
both the United States and the Soviet 
Union to allow very intrusive inspec- 
tion. There will be very intrusive in- 
spection required in the strategic arms 
reduction agreement, in which we are 
attempting to reduce 50% of our strate- 
gic nuclear forces. NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact are negotiating on con- 
ventional forces in Europe and have 
already reached agreement in broad 
principle on numbers of weapons to be 
destroyed, and those numbers of weap- 
ons total in the tens of thousands. That 
entire process of arms control, unique 
in modern history, could be put at risk 



46 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1989 



EAST ASIA 



y bringing to governments and to par- 
aments a chemical weapons conven- 
ion which did not have adequate 
erification means. Verification, as 
ou can see by the example of the INF 
vgi'eement, will not be cheap, and it 
/ill not be easy. But the United States 
lould rather spend money on verifying 
I global ban on chemical weapons than 
would on the production of chemical 
.eapons because no verifiable ban has 
leen achieved. 



ndustry's Role in Verification 

'he role of industry is also crucial in 
■erification, but we must design a 
egime — and I think we can design a 
egime — that allows us to have effec- 
ive verification and, at the same time, 
oes not reveal proprietary informa- 
ion; does not penalize developing coun- 
ties or their chemical industries; and 
joes not damage legitimate commerce 
,n dual-use chemicals. We in the United 
States are proud of our chemical indus- 
ry: proud of its enthusiastic support of 
he chemical weapons convention, and 
ts willingness to undergo inspection 
nee that agreement is implemented. 

We are proud of the announcement 
oday by the U.S. Chemical Manufac- 
urers Association of a five-point plan 
supplement the regulation of the 
J.S. Government on the export of dual- 
se chemicals. We are pleased to note 
hat the European Community chemi- 
al industry and the Japanese chemical 
ndustry have also implemented such 
■oluntary and supplemental regula- 
ions on dual-use chemical exports. 

Industry representation here today 
s larger than it has ever been in Ge- 
leva, but there are many who are not 
lere, who should be. We need to build 
,m this meeting in ways that are best 
eft to industry, to increase and to fos- 
er international cooperation among the 
;hemical industries in support of the 
;hemical weapons convention. 

In conclusion, let me again thank 
;he Government of Australia and in so 
icing, again quote President Bush who 
:5aid this June [in welcoming Prime 
Minister Hawke] that Australia's lead- 
ng role "in organizing global efforts to 
:oiie with the threat of chemical weap- 
ons is one position that is greatly ad- 
mired by Americans. The United 
iStates supports Australia's efforts, and 
lyou may be assured of our commitment 
ito the early achievement of an effec- 
tively verifiable treaty banning these 
weapons." ■ 



Cambodia and Vietnam: Trapped in 
an Eddy of History? 



by Richard H. Solomon 

Address before an international 
symposium sponsored by The Los 
Angeles Times, the Times Mirror 
Company, and the Asia Society in Los 
Angeles on September 8, 1989. Mr. 
Solomon is Assistant Secretary for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs. 

It's a pleasure and honor to join here 
with friends and colleagues in this im- 
pressive display of interest in Indo- 
china. It is a telling sign of the times 
that this gathering is taking place now 
and here in Los Angeles, one of the 
great cities of the Pacific rim. 

Contemporary Asia's economic dy- 
namism and political ferment highlight 
global transformations that are shaping 
the world we will know in the 21st cen- 
tury. Secretary of State Baker has suc- 
cinctly characterized these trends as 
an increasingly integrated global econ- 
omy based on an open market trading 
system sparked by spectacular tech- 
nological change, the failure of com- 
munism as an economic and political 



system, and a worldwide trend toward 
democracy and free enterprise. 

Would that the realization of these 
trends was without conflict and evenly 
accomplished. Yet, as we know, devel- 
opment is an arduous process charac- 
terized by conflict, uneven growth, and 
setbacks as a new era strains to break 
through the constraints of the old. 
Asia's explosive economic growth and 
political ferment have yielded dramatic 
successes, as in the Philippines and 
South Korea, where intense social pres- 
sures shattered authoritarian political 
orders and brought forth democratic 
reform. Yet in Burma, and more re- 
cently in China, we have seen how un- 
certain and painful the rites of passage 
to a new era can be. 

What do these forces for change 
mean for Indochina? Does Vietnam's 
announced intention to end its occupa- 
tion of Cambodia signal a major shift in 
policy? Or do old suspicions, old ambi- 
tions, and old ideologies still hold sway? 
The inconclusive results of the recent 
Paris conference on Cambodia leave us 
with an ambiguous picture of the fu- 



Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs 




S&V-|^ 



Richard H. Solomon 

was sworn in as As- 
sistant Secretary for 
East Asian and Pacif- 
ic Affairs on June 23, 
1989. Previously he 
served as Director of 
the Policy Planning 
Staff of the Depart- 
ment of State (March 
1986-January 1989). 
He held the position 
as head of the Rand 
Corporation's Political 
Science Department (1976^6) and also di- 
rected the corporation's research program 
on international security policy (1977-83). 
From 1971 to 1976, he was Senior Staff 
Member for Asian Affairs on the National 
Security Council (NSC), having earlier 
been Professor of Political Science at 
the University of Michigan (1966-71). 

Dr. Solomon received his Ph.D. from the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1966) 
where he specialized in political science and 



Yi. 



Chinese polities. He has contributed arti- 
cles to a variety of professional journals, 
including Forci'(/H Affairs and the China 
Quarteriy, and has published five books — 
The Soviet Far East Military Buildup: Nu- 
clear Dilemmas and Asian Security (1986), 
The China Factor (1981), Asian Security in 
the IBSO's (1979), A Revolution is Not a Din- 
ner Party (1976), and Mao's Revolution and 
Chinese Political Culture (1971). 

Dr. Solomon has done research and 
consulting work for a variety of U.S. Gov- 
ernment offices and served as a visiting 
professor at the John Hopkins School of Ad- 
vanced International Studies in Washington 
(1972-74). He was an International Affairs 
Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations 
(1971) and served as a consultant to the 
President's Commission on Foreign Lan- 
guage and International Studies (1978-80). 
He was a board member of the National 
Committee on United States-China Rela- 
tions and the International Research and 
Exchanges Board (IREX). He has served on 
the Chief of Naval Operations Executive 
Panel since 1984. ■ 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1989 



47 



EAST ASIA 



ture. Progress on the international as- 
pects of a settlement contrasts with the 
inability, thus far, to construct a proc- 
ess of internal political reconciliation. 

Tonight, I would like to share with 
you some thoughts on the prospects for 
peace in Indochina and about U.S. pol- 
icy toward the region. 

Asia After Vietnam 

In 1967, Richard Nixon wrote his now- 
famous Foreign Affairs article "Asia 
After Vietnam," forecasting the gains 
to American interests that would come 
with an end to U.S. involvement in the 
Vietnam quagmire. The fruits of that 
policy perspective have given us two 
decades of dramatic benefits in Asia: 
normalization of relations with China; a 
general reduction in great power rival- 
ries; and widespread economic growth 
and social advance — especially for the 
noncommunist states of the region. The 
developing countries of Southeast 
Asia — and their regional grouping 
ASEAN, the Association of South East 
Asian Nations — have thrived in this 
post-Vietnam war environment. Thai- 
land and Malaysia are now forecast to 
join Singapore as Asia's newest "newly 
industrializing economies." In the 
Philippines, the dramatic political rev- 
olution brought about by "people pow- 
er" is now being matched by economic 
reform and increasingly sustainable 
growth. And Indonesia, the world's 
fifth most populous nation, enjoys po- 
litical stability and increasingly suc- 
cessful economic reform. 

ASEAN has become one of the pil- 
lars of U.S. policy in Asia. Collectively 
it is our seventh largest trading part- 
ner. Two of our security treaty allies in 
the region, the Philippines and Thai- 
land, are ASEAN states. And since 
Vietnam's invasion and occupation of 
Cambodia in late 1978, we have cooper- 
ated closely with ASEAN in order to 
counter Vietnamese threats to the re- 
gion, whether through military action 
or the major refugee flows that contin- 
ue to burden East Asia. 

It is in this context that we must 
view the contemporary situation in In- 
dochina. Along with the Korean Penin- 
sula, Indochina is one of two conflict 
zones that threaten stability and pros- 
perity in East Asia. And while Viet- 
nam's noncommunist neighbors have 
joined the global economy of computer 
chips and floppy disks, the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam and Cambodia 
seem trapped in an eddy of history, 
as they play out the antipathies and 
ambitions of times past. 



48 



Conflict in Indochina 

To much of the world, Cambodia has 
become "Vietnam's Vietnam." The 
ghoulish horrors of the Khmer Rouge 
reign were replaced in 1979 by the 
harsh realities of what is now a decade 
of Vietnamese occupation. 

This third cycle of warfare in 
Vietnam and Cambodia has reflected 
a volatile mixture of three overlap- 
ping contemporary, yet historical, 
antagonisms. 

Geopolitically, Indochina became 
engulfed by the Sino-Soviet rivalry 
during the 1970s. After the 1968 Tet 
offensive, Hanoi began to increase 
its dependence on the U.S.S.R. This 
trend accelerated when Vietnam fully 
aligned itself with the Soviet Union 
in 1978, in anticipation of its invasion 
of Cambodia — and expected counter- 
pressures from China, thus adding a 
new dimension to the centuries-old 
Sino-Vietnamese antagonism. 

Perhaps even more deep-seated 
than Sino-Vietnamese enmity is the 
historical conflict between the Khmer 
and Vietnamese. Such tensions were 
muted during the second Indochina 
war. Hanoi had nurtured a small Cam- 
bodian communist movement since the 
1930s as an element of the Indochina 
Communist Party, and Vietnam reluc- 
tantly backed the Khmer Rouge during 
their guerrilla days. 

Yet Vietnam has long considered 
hegemony over Indochina a fundamen- 
tal axiom of its own security. In 1950 
Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, Hanoi's leading 
strategist, described Indochina as "a 
single strategic unit." At the 1976 Con- 
gress of the Vietnamese Workers' Par- 
ty, building a "special relationship" 
with Laos and Cambodia was identified 
as a top foreign policy goal. Through 
intimidation and invasion, Vietnam 
persistently built such a relationship. 
As late as 1986, a party resolution ele- 
vated the special relationship among 
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia to "a law 
governing the survival and develop- 
ment of all three fraternal nations." 

Vietnam's objective of hegemony 
over Indochina fueled ancient Khmer 
fears of national survival. Among the 
groups victimized during the Khmer 
Rouge holocaust were ethnic Viet- 
namese and Khmer communists sus- 
pected of loyalty to Hanoi. And like 
Cambodian rulers before them, the 
Khmer Rouge looked to China for 
protection against Vietnamese ambi- 
tions. Border skirmishes along the 
Cambodian-Vietnamese frontier in 1977 



and 1978 grew into a full-scale Viet- 
namese invasion and occupation of 
Cambodia — to which China responded 
with its tutelary border war, thus fully 
interlocking the rivalries of Indochina 
with the Sino-Soviet conflict. 

U.S. Objectives *' 

The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia 
confronted Thailand with the daunting 
prospect that Hanoi — at that time in 
possession of the world's fourth largest 
armed force and an age-old rival for 
influence in Southeast Asia — would 
control Thailand's eastern frontier. In 
response ASEAN, the United States, 
and other Western nations embarked 
on a policy of condemning Hanoi inter- 
nationally and supporting a noncommu 
nist resistance to Hanoi's imposition of 
a surrogate regime in Phnom Penh. 

Over the past decade, we have fol- 
lowed ASEAN's lead in pursuit of threi 
interrelated objectives in Cambodia: 
restoring the country's national sover- 
eignty through a verified Vietnamese 
withdrawal; preventing a return to 
power of the murderous Khmer Rouge; 
and facilitating self-determination for 
the long-suffering Cambodian people. 

Equally consistent has been our 
policy toward Vietnam. While abhor- 
ring Hanoi's occupation of Cambodia, 
we have not closed the door to normal- 
ization of relations. We have made cleai* 
to Hanoi that its occupation of Cam- 
bodia is the principal obstacle to 
normalization — that establishment of 
diplomatic relations can occur only af- 
ter a complete and verified Vietnamese 
withdrawal from Cambodia in the con- 
text of an acceptable settlement. 

Vietnam's troop withdrawal by thai 
end of this month will be a welcome 
step. But it is not enough. After more 
than a decade of occupation, Hanoi 
has an obligation to do more than just 
walk away, leaving Cambodia in a state 
of civil war. Vietnam must partici- 
pate constructively in efforts to bring 
about a settlement in Cambodia that 
combines an equitable and stable 
political reconciliation with national 
independence. 

We have also developed an active 
dialogue with Hanoi on a range of hu- 
manitarian issues, in particular, on a 
matter which this Administration and 
the last have deemed of the highest pri-i 
ority: achieving the most complete ac- 
counting possible of our servicemen 
missing in Indochina. Hanoi under- 
stands that as a practical matter prog- 



I 



Department of State Bulletin/November 198S 



EAST ASIA 



fess in these areas will affect the pace 
"^ind scope of the development of our 
)verall relationship. 

This has been basic U.S. policy 
hrough four Administrations, both 
democratic and Republican. Central to 
realizing these goals has been U.S. and 
kSEAN support for the noncommunist 
j-esistance led by Prince Sihanouk. If 
ihere is to be a political process of na- 
cional reconciliation, we believe that 
:he noncommunist resistance holds the 
vital balance in achieving an independ- 
3nt Cambodia at peace with itself. 

Let me also say a word about Laos, 
vvhich often gets short-changed in dis- 
|:ussions of Indochina. Laos is the one 
state of Indochina with which we have 
maintained diplomatic ties. In the past 
18 months, Laos has embarked on a 
course of market-oriented economic re- 
forms, greater political openness, and 
improved cooperation with its neighbor 
Thailand. These are welcome develop- 
ments that appear to reflect a desire 
for greater interaction with the West. 

Unfortunately, Laos is also a major 
source of narcotics; the involvement of 
some Lao officials in drug trafficking 
has led us to declare Laos ineligible for 
U.S. aid and to oppose some multi- 
lateral aid programs for that country. 
We continue to urge Laos to enhance 
cooperation with us in the war on 
drugs. I am pleased to say that this 
dialogue has recently produced some 
positive results, including a crop 
substitution program that we are now 
developing for a drug-producing area in 
northern Laos. We are also encouraged 
by Lao cooperation on the POW/MIA 
issue. Taken together, these develop- 
ments augur well for the further devel- 
opment of U.S. -Lao relations. 

While our policy has been con- 
stant, what has changed are the 
circumstances, both regionally and 
globally. Vietnam's self-created 
isolation — reinforcing self-defeating do- 
mestic policies of economic socialization 
and political repression — has height- 
ened the deterioration of its economy 
and society. In terms of development, 
Vietnam is now well over a decade be- 
hind buoyant ASEAN neighbors such 
as Thailand. 

The combined impact of this do- 
mestic deterioration, diplomatic and 
economic pressures from abroad, and 
the unrelieved burdens of its occupation 
of Cambodia has led Hanoi to embark 
on a major "renovation" program, with 
the focus on domestic needs. As a con- 
sequence, it decided to withdraw its 
forces from Cambodia and to rethink 
at least its short-term goals. 



Another dramatic change affecting 
the diplomacy of Southeast Asia has 
been the emergence of an international 
environment of accommodation. Since 
the mid-1980s, we have seen new direc- 
tions in Soviet foreign policy which 
have led to agreements on the with- 
drawal of foreign occupation forces 
from Afghanistan and Angola and 
diplomatic efforts to resolve these 
and other regional conflicts. 

One aspect of Mr. Gorbachev's 
new diplomacy has been the effort to 
achieve a Sino-Soviet rapprochement, 
which in turn has fostered a new geo- 
political calculus in Indochina. The 
Soviets have pressed Vietnam to 
withdraw from Cambodia. And China 
has begun a high-level dialogue with 
Vietnam, while expressing its willing- 
ness to cut off aid to the Khmer Rouge 
in the context of a complete and veri- 
fied Vietnamese withdrawal from Cam- 
bodia and a comprehensive political 
settlement. 

Cambodia: The Road to Peace 

What does all this imply for Cambodia? 
The circuitous path that led to the con- 
ference in Paris last month has seen 
many of the same factors at play that 
are at work in other contemporary re- 
gional conflicts: the burdens of a de- 
cade of inconclusive warfare and 
heightened interest among the major 
powers in resolving the conflict — as re- 
flected in U.S. -Soviet discussions on 
regional disputes, and Mr. Gorbachev's 
efforts to normalize relations with 
China. 

But there is one factor that seemed 
to distinguish Cambodia from other 
such conflicts: the existence of a nation- 
al leader around whom a process of po- 
litical reconciliation might be built. 
Well before the pace of diplomacy 
stepped up — and again, following 
ASEAN's lead — the United States took 
steps to enhance the position of Prince 
Sihanouk and the noncommunist resist- 
tance. An initiative launched by Con- 
gressman [Stephen] Solarz in 1985 re- 
sulted in a $3 million humanitarian aid 
program to the noncommunists — 
a program carefully structured to 
prevent materiel from falling into 
the hands of the Khmer Rouge. 

In more recent months. Congress 
has further expressed its support for 
the noncommunists in House and Sen- 
ate resolutions proposed by Represent- 
ative Solarz and Senator [Charles] 
Robb. The objective of such expressions 
of support has been to strengthen 



Prince Sihanouk's hand in anticipation 
of a diplomatic resolution of the conflict. 

The prospect of a political solution 
began to take shape in 1985, as Viet- 
nam vaguely hinted it would withdraw 
its occupation forces from Cambodia by 
the end of 1990. Beginning in December 
1987, Prince Sihanouk held the first of 
a series of meetings with Hun Sen, 
Prime Minister of the Hanoi-backed 
regime in Phnom Penh. 

While progress in these contacts 
was modest, positions were clarified 
and the broad requirements for a set- 
tlement became apparent. Then in Au- 
gust 1988, Indonesia hosted the first of 
what became known as the Jakarta in- 
formal meetings. These meetings 
moved the diplomatic process forward 
by bringing together, for the first 
time, the Cambodian factions, ASEAN, 
and Vietnam. 

The pace of diplomacy quickened 
this past spring as Vietnam announced 
on April 5 that it was accelerating its 
timetable for withdrawal to September 
30, 1989. Hanoi's initiative was an ef- 
fort to structure a settlement so as to 
leave intact its surrogate regime in 
Phnom Penh led by Heng Samrin and 
Hun Sen. By forcing on the internation- 
al community and on Prince Sihanouk 
a time-constrained choice between the 
Hun Sen regime, on the one hand, and 
the Pol Pot faction of the Khmer Rouge, 
on the other hand, Hanoi sought to load 
the diplomatic endgame in its favor. 

This strategy was clearly evi- 
dent during the Paris conference in 
Hanoi's — and Hun Sen's — unwillingness 
to compromise on a formula for power 
sharing as a basis for constructing a 
transitional coalition government under 
Prince Sihanouk. 

A major aspect of the power- 
sharing issue at Paris was what to 
do about the Khmer Rouge. Should the 
Pol Pot wing of the divided Cambodian 
communist movement, responsible for 
the genocidal violence of the 1970s, be 
totally excluded from the political proc- 
ess with only a military option? Or 
should it — less its top leadership — be 
given a limited stake in a transitional 
political coalition that would, under in- 
ternational supervision, face the test of 
Khmer public opinion? 

Secretary Baker has stated clearly 
that, from an American perspective, 
we want no role for the Khmer Rouge 
in a future Cambodian Government. 
However, the judgment of Prince Siha- 
nouk, China, and the ASEAN 
countries — as expressed in the commu- 
nique of their annual ministerial meet- 
ing this past July — has been that the 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1989 



49 



EAST ASIA 



chances for peace are better if the 
Khmer Rouge is included in a four- 
party interim coalition. 

In other words, total exclusion of 
the Khmer Rouge is seen by those most 
directly involved as a sure formula for 
civil warfare, while their inclusion 
holds out some prospect that the strug- 
gle can be contained within a political 
process monitored by the international 
community. 

The Paris Conference 

It was the desire to prevent another 
round of civil warfare that led most 
participants in the Paris conference to 
insist on the need for a comprehensive 
settlement. International conciliation 
and internal reconciliation were thus 
integrally linked. Formation of a 
transitional coalition under Prince 
Sihanouk had to be combined with an 
international control mechanism to ver- 
ify the Vietnamese withdrawal, moni- 
tor a cease-fire and the cessation of 
outside assistance to all the factions, 
and oversee the elections which would 
reestablish a legitimate political au- 
thority in Cambodia. And a UN role in 
organizing and overseeing all aspects 
of this complex effort was seen as es- 
sential to a credible peace process. 

With these considerations in mind, 
France took the initiative in May of 
this year to convene yet another inter- 
national conference in the lengthening 
series of efforts since Geneva in 1954 to 
bring peace to Indochina. France's his- 
toric ties to the region — yet its geo- 
graphic distance — gave Paris a unique 
standing in efforts to catalyze a proc- 
ess that brought together the five per- 
manent members of the UN Security 
Council, the ASEAN six, five other 
concerned nations, the UN Secretary 
General, and the four Cambodian fac- 
tions. Assembled together for 1 month 
in a conference room about one-third 
the size of this hall was an internation- 
al mixture that at times generated high 
political drama. 

Regrettably the historical and per- 
sistent antagonisms, noted earlier sur- 
faced in daily, often bitter, exchanges. 
The hostilities, suspicions, and 
distrust — personal and political — 
among the Khmer factions and between 
the Khmer and Vietnamese, pervaded 
the conference sessions. The code 
words for these divisions — "genocide" 
and "settlers" — suffuse the conference 
documents: the issues of Pol Pot's geno- 
cidal violence and Khmer fears of Viet- 
nam's hegemonial ambitions, as 



reflected in charges of large-scale, ille- 
gal Vietnamese settlement in 
Cambodia. 

All the same, the conference did 
generate some encouraging progress 
on the external aspects of a settlement. 
The three formal working committees 
elaborated many of the enormously 
complex details of an international 
framework: the modalities of a cease- 
fire; the workings of an international 
control mechanism; the definition of in- 
ternational guarantees for Cambodia's 
independence and neutrality; plans for 
the repatriation of refugees; and the 
eventual reconstruction of the Cambo- 
dian economy. 

Yet, the rock on which the Paris 
conference ultimately foundered was 
the deep distrust dividing the Cambo- 
dian factions. While Prince Sihanouk 
tabled, on August 4, a framework for 
power-sharing that might have been 
the basis for negotiations, neither 
Hun Sen nor the Vietnamese displayed 
any real flexibility. If they found the 
Prince's proposal for a transitional co- 
alition government unacceptable, they 
did not propose any realistic alterna- 
tive. Their objective remained to leave 
the Hun Sen regime intact, while hop- 
ing to graft on to it the legitimacy of 
Prince Sihanouk's standing as a Khmer 
nationalist. 

Beyond the Paris Conference 

Where do we go from here? Our com- 
mitment is to a negotiating process 
and a political resolution of Cambodia's 
future. Yet it is clear, in the wake of 
Paris and as the Vietnamese prepare 
to withdraw, that Cambodia faces the 
prospect of continuing conflict. The 
four factions seem prepared to test 
their relative strengths in an internal 
political/military struggle before again 
engaging in an international negotia- 
tion. And Vietnam has expressed, as 
recently as August 24, its willingness 
to reintervene in the conflict if Hun 
Sen requests Hanoi's assistance. 

What should U.S. policy be? Three 
propositions underlie the Administra- 
tion's approach to this continuing 
tragedy: 

First, Cambodia is a challenge to 
the conscience and concern of the entire 
international community. The Khmer 
people deserve their opportunity for 
national sovereignty, self-determina- 
tion, political reconciliation, and 
development — and we want to ensure 
that there are no more Cambodian kill- 
ing fields. The United States will play 



an active role in pursuit of these objec- 
tives, but it must be recognized that we 
have neither the political position nor 
the i-esources to do the job on our own, 

Second, our primary security 
obligation in this region is to Thailand, 
to which we are legally bound by the 
Manila pact of 1954. As well, we have a 
major interest in the continuing integ- 
rity and vitality of ASEAN. 

Third, we have a strategic objec- 
tive in seeing Indochina freed of the 
rivalries of the great powers — an objeo 
tive most likely realized if Cambodia 
and Vietnam are at peace within 
themselves and with their neighbors. 

Given these propositions, the Ad- 
ministration will pursue three levels 
of activity in the months ahead, all 
designed to build on the diplomatic 
momentum of Paris. 

• We will sustain active contacts 
with the five permanent members of 
the UN Security Council. France, Chi 
na, and the Soviet Union are the major 
powers with the most direct influence 
and interests in Cambodia and Viet- 
nam. The Soviet Union, as the primarj 
supporter of Vietnam and Hun Sen, 
must restrict its increasing flow of 
arms into Cambodia and bring Hanoi t( 
see that its own interests will not be 
served by another cycle of warfare in 
Indochina — which certainly will be the 
case if it seeks full power for Hun Sen 
in the absence of a process of political 
reconciliation. In return Hanoi and 
Hun Sen — and the international 
community — have a right to expect 
China to equally restrict the supply of 
arms to the Khmer Rouge. Indeed Bei- 
jing has an obligation to take active 
measures that will prevent the Khmer 
Rouge from again imposing a mur- 
derous rule on the Cambodian people. 
France, for its part, is due credit for 
taking the diplomatic risks associated 
with trying to help the Khmer factions 
bridge their differences. And we should 
remember that the Paris conference 
was only suspended, not adjourned — 
which is one way of saying that France 
and conference cochairman Indonesia 
have continuing credibility as diplo- 
matic deal makers. 

• At a second level, the United 
States will continue to work closely 
with the ASEAN countries in support 
of their political approach to the Cam- 
bodian conflict. Their security inter- 
ests are most directly affected by the 
search for peace in Indochina; we will 
support their efforts — most imme- 
diately at the upcoming session of the 
UN General Assemblv. 



50 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1989J 



EAST ASIA 



• Finally, we will sustain our sup- 
ort for the noncommunist resistance 
nd Prince Sihanouk as the political 
enter of a process of national 
econciliation. 

Some now argue that the threat of 
Khmer Rouge resurgence is such that 
he United States must rely on Hun 
|en rather than press for a comprehen- 
ive political settlement. This approach 
5 seriously flawed on several counts. 
First, a regime imposed and sus- 
ained by foreign force of arms lacks 
jgitimacy. There is a fundamental 
rinciple here, which we would violate 
jt the risk of the integrity of the in- 
ernational system and to our peril in 
aany other parts of the world. Second, 
here is at present little basis for as- 
luming that Hun Sen's unproven forces, 
ibsent their Vietnamese protectors, 
an eliminate the Khmer Rouge, a goal 
■hat eluded Hanoi's vaunted army for 
he past decade. And lastly, in the ab- 
ence of a political settlement sup- 
lorted by Prince Sihanouk, such a move 
TOuld pit the United States against 
Chmer nationalism — a policy hardly ac- 
eptable to the American people. 

As democrats (with a small "d"), 
ur commitment must be to a political 
irocess that permits national self- 
etermination for the Cambodian peo- 
ile. We see press reports of Hun Sen's 
lOpularity — of reformist policies pro- 
noted by Phnom Penh that are re- 
toring Buddhism, allowing private 
)roperty and free market activity. If 
he Phnom Penh regime is as popular 
lis its public relations campaign por- 
rays it to be, it can only benefit by 
aking its case to the people in free 
md fair elections supervised by the 
Jnited Nations. 

The United States remains pre- 
pared to accept the results of such a 
credible test of Cambodian public opin- 
ion and to work with the international 
community in supporting a process of 
political reconciliation in Cambodia 
that contains safeguards against a 
iKhmer Rouge return to dominance. 

Thus the issue comes back to 
whether the Cambodian factions, en- 
couraged by their foreign supporters, 
can join together in a political process 
of national reconciliation. The United 
States will use its influence to move 
events in this direction. China and the 
Soviet Union must do the same. Mos- 
cow, in particular, must accept and act 
on the reality that without some will- 
ingness by Vietnam and Hun Sen to 
compromise on power-sharing, there 
can be no negotiated settlement, no 
respite from armed conflict. 



The immediate lesson of the Paris 
conference is that the divisions and dis- 
trust among the Khmer factions seem 
too great to be bridged by the compro- 
mises and constraints of coalition poli- 
tics. Our continuing challenge is to 
provide the Cambodians an alternative 



to a test of strength on the battlefield. 
For without political reconciliation, 
Cambodia and Vietnam will remain 
outside the mainstream of development 
elsewhere in Southeast Asia, trapped in 
their own sad eddy of history. ■ 



Visit of Japanese Prime Minister 




Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu of 
Japan made an official working visit 
to Washington, D.C., August 31- 
September 2, 1989, to meet with 
President Bush and other government 
officials. 

Following are remarks made by 
the President and the Prime Minister 
after their meeting on September 1. ^ 

President Bush 

An old proverb says, "The foundation 
for a better tomorrow must be laid to- 
day." Mr. Prime Minister, you and I 
are here today to shape tomorrow. On 
America's behalf, let me welcome you 
to this country. 

When I was in Japan earlier this 
year, I observed how ties — national and 
personal — bind our two people. Your 
visit reaffirms those ties and under- 
scores this commitment by you and 
your government to the continued 
health of our historic friendship. That 
friendship lives and grows, as today's 
meeting evidenced. But while we met 



as new friends, our talks were con- 
ducted like old friends. They were 
characterized by cordiality, a positive 
atmosphere and understanding, and by 
broad agreement on the major items of 
our bilateral and international agenda. 
For that, I credit the goodwill and per- 
spective that you brought to these dis- 
cussions and the enduring partnership 
between our two governments. 

That partnership is based on 
shared interests and mutual respect 
and rests on our belief that together we 
can be a global force for peace and 
prosperity. This global partnership 
works in several ways. 

First, as in past meetings between 
our nations' leaders, the Prime Minis- 
ter and I affirmed that the treaty of co- 
operation and mutual security is vital 
not only to our joint security but to the 
stability of the entire Asia-Pacific area. 
In that context, we agreed that this al- 
liance will continue to be crucial to the 
region's future. We vowed to continue 
to consult closely on all aspects and ar- 
rangements of our security partnership 
and shared responsibility for peace and 
stability. 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1989 



51 



EAST ASIA 



Second, the Prime Minister and I 
discussed how we can promote peace 
and prosperity through greater 
freedom — economic and political — 
around the world. Already we have 
joined to support the Multilateral 
Assistance Initiative (MAI) for the Phil- 
ippines launched in Tokyo in July. 
Today we restated our intent to encour- 
age still more open economic and politi- 
cal systems and, specifically, to 
support recent political and economic 
reforms in Eastern Europe, notably in 
Poland and Hungary. We also discussed 
the situation in China for, as I have said 
before, we seek to preserve our rela- 
tions there while endorsing the legiti- 
mate aspirations of the Chinese people 
for political expression. 

Then a third area of agreement 
concerns how diplomacy can help re- 
solve regional conflicts. America and 
Japan, with others, will continue to 
urge a comprehensive settlement that 
gives the people of Cambodia both secu- 
rity and the ability to choose their own 
government. We agreed, too, to accel- 
erate our efforts to protect our citizens 
against international terrorism. In par- 
ticular we repeated the mutual commit- 
ment to aviation security that we made 
at the [economic] summit in Paris and 
pledged to pool our technical and eco- 
nomic resources to combat all forces of 
terrorism that affect civil aviation. 

Finally the Prime Minister and I 
discussed our economic relationship at 
great length. We are mindful that our 
economies are the world's largest. We 
know that the health of our relationship 
partly depends on bringing our eco- 
nomic relationship into better balance. 
The Prime Minister confirmed the 
agreement I reached with his prede- 
cessor at the Paris summit to launch 
talks on structural impediments, and 
these discussions will begin in a few 
days. I stressed to him the importance 
that we attach to the success of those 
talks and to the trade committee talks 
which will also occur next week. I 
share the Prime Minister's belief that, 
while Japan is noted as an exporting 
superpower, the time has also come for 
Japan to be an importing superpower. 
Each of us desires that these discus- 
sions produce results which further 



strengthen our economic relationship 
and open the world trading system. 
To advance that goal, we restated our 
commitment to the success of the 
Uruguay Round, and we also vowed to 
continue our frequent consultations 
at all levels on other international 
economic and trade issues. 

In sum ours has been a highly pro- 
ductive meeting — one which will en- 
hance the broad U.S. -Japanese agenda. 
A writer once observed friendship is a 
sheltering tree. Because of ties which 
prosper and a partnership which en- 
dures, both the United States and Ja- 
pan have been, I believe, and will 
remain better for the shade. 

We have a mature, effective work- 
ing partnership. And with you at the 
helm, I know the partnership between 
Japan and the United States will pro- 
duce positive results. I look forward to 
seeing you again. Thank you very, very 
much for honoring the United States by 
this very early visit in your prime 
ministership. 

Prime Minister Kaifu^ 

I wish to express my heartfelt grati- 
tude for your heartwarming hospitality 
and kind words. This is my first visit 
as Prime Minister, and I have just com- 
pleted my first meeting with the Presi- 
dent. Nevertheless I was able to 
conduct talks with the President as if I 
were meeting an old friend, which I be- 
lieve is because the Japan-U.S. rela- 
tionship rests on a solid foundation laid 
down by the strenuous endeavors of 
both the Japanese and American peo- 
ples over these many years. I conveyed 
to the President my conviction that the 
Japan-U.S. relationship is the cor- 
nerstone of Japan's diplomacy and that 
it shall continue to be so. 

The President and I confirmed 
that we shall firmly maintain the 
Japan-U.S. security arrangements 
which are the basis of our bilateral re- 
lations. The President and I shared a 
view that cooperative Japan-U.S. rela- 
tions, based on the Japan-U.S. security 
ties, are indispensable for the peace 
and stability of the Asia-Pacific region, 
including Japan. 



At the same time, the solution of 
various economic problems that arise 
between our two countries because of 
our close ties requires effort on the 
part of both Japan and the United 
States, and it is important to continue 
efforts and joint collaboration toward 
their resolution. 

I conveyed to the President my 
thinking that Japan will continue to 
promote appropriate macroeconomic 
policies as well as structural reform, 
and make efforts for expanding importi 

I expressed my appreciation to thi 
President for his continuing efforts to 
reduce the budget deficit, improve the 
savings rate, and strengthen compet- 
itiveness. In this connection, I expect! 
the Structural Impediments Initiative 
(SII) between Japan and the United 
States, which will start shortly, 
to bear significant outcome. 

Japan and the United States shar 
such fundamental values as freedom 
and democracy and are partners shar- 
ing major responsibilities in global 
tasks. Japan and the United States 
must join forces in dealing with many 
broad issues related to world peace an 
prosperity, such as management of th« 
world economy, problems of debt in th' 
developing countries, relief for starvai 
tion, efforts for strengthening the fre 
trade system such as the Uruguay 
Round, resolution of regional conflicts 
protection of human rights, interna- 
tional cooperation for the prevention 
of terrorism, and the eradication 
of drugs. 

The President and I expressed oUi 
common determination to actively 
shoulder responsibilities in a manner 
commensurate with our respective 
abilities under such global partnership 
In this connection, the President and 1 
shared the view that further impor- 
tance must be placed on international 
cooperation for the preservation of the 
global environment. My present visit 
will take me to Mexico and Canada 
where I intend to discuss the global 
environmental problems with their 
leaders. 

As a program symbolizing Japan- 
U.S. cooperation in development issue 
such as combating poverty in the work 
and relieving hunger, I proposed to th« 
President the establishment of a Le- 



52 



ECONOMICS 



md memorial program for internation- 
il development in commemoration of 
he ideals and achievement of the late 
Jongressman Leland, and obtained his 
upport.^ 

I stated to the President that my 
ileal in politics is the realization of a 
riore equitable and humane society and 
hat, to this end, I believe it crucial to 
dvance political reform and to pro- 
tiote reforms for improving the Japa- 
lese people's quality of life with an 
mphasis on the views of consumers. I 
trongly emphasized with the Presi- 
ent, who is not relaxing with the 
'uccess of the United States but is 
hnplementing realistic policies aimed 
t realizing the gentler and kinder soci- 
ty, Japan and the United States are 
acing common challenges to realize 
heir aspired societies. 

For example, the role of education, 
vhich brings up the generation which 
jvill shoulder tomorrow's responsibili- 
iies, is very important for both Japan 
md the United States. I stated to the 
'resident that deepening discussion on 
hose tasks, including the problem of 
i'ducation, is useful for Japan and the 
Jnited States and that such discussions 
vill also lead to enhancing genuine mu- 
ual understanding between the two 
lountries. 

I believe the President strongly 
upports my views. I am convinced 
hat the expansion of such an indepth 
lialogue is precisely what is needed to 
jdd another important dimension to 
')ur bilateral relationship. I believe the 
ast decade of the 20th century, which 
s called the century of war and revolu- 
,ion, should be devoted to laying the 
groundwork for a 21st century filled 
Afith peace and prosperity for all. To 
;his end, I am determined to fulfill the 
role that Japan should play in the world 
Dn the basis of close and cooperative 
Japan-U.S. relations. 



Uruguay Round and U.S. Trade Policy: 
A Foundation for the Future 



' Made at the South Portico of the 
White House (text from Weekly Compilation 
of Presidential Documents of Sept. 4, 1989). 

- Prime Minister Kaifu spoke in Japa- 
nese, and his remarks were translated by an 
interpreter. 

''■ U.S. Representative Mickey Leland 
(D-Tex.) was killed in a plane crash in Ethi- 
iOpia in August 1989 enroute to refugee 
!canips in that country.H 



by Carta A. Hills 

Address before the Aynerican 
Chamber of Commerce (U.K.) and the 
Royal Institute for International 
Affairs in London on September H., 
1989. Ambassador Hills is U.S. Trade 
Representative. 

Trade and London are inseparable. For 
centuries they have gone together like 
a stiff wind and a schooner's sails. Open 
trade is the keystone of your prosper- 
ity. Three revered Britons — David 
Hume, Adam Smith, David Ricardo — 
are the intellectual heroes of those of us 
who now defend and seek to expand the 
free trade system. That system per- 
sists but is sorely strained — tested by 
governments that impede the free play 
of market forces, distort trade, and 
constrain competition. 

I am here today to assure you 
that the trade policy of the Bush Ad- 
ministration emanates from the spirit 
of Hume, Smith, and Ricardo and is 
dedicated to the expansion of open 
trade. 

Earlier this year. President Bush 
conducted an extensive review of the 
global trading system and of our trade 
policy. I should like to outline for you 
the results of our deliberations; in par- 
ticular, to articulate the goal of U.S. 
trade policy, our strategy for achieving 
it, and the centrality to it of the 
Uruguay Round. 

Trade Goals and Strategy 
for the 1990s 

We have, I assure you, a clear vision of 
the world that we seek: one where en- 
trepreneurs, not government bureau- 
crats, determine how industries and 
farms compete and how nations trade. 

The policy of the Bush Administra- 
tion is to open markets, not to close 
them; to create an ever-expanding glob- 
al trading system based upon clear and 
enforceable rules. 

The President has designed, and 
we are vigorously executing, a three- 
pronged strategy to achieve our vision. 

• We are committed — and we are 
challenging our trading partners to 
match our commitment — to conclude 



successfully the Uruguay Round of 
multilateral trade talks by the Decem- 
ber 1990 deadline. 

• In a manner that is entirely con- 
sistent with our Uruguay Round aims, 
we will pursue bilateral and regional 
market-opening initiatives. 

• We will use the strength of our 
domestic market to further our objec- 
tives in the Uruguay Round. 

The one essential target of our 
strategy is to get government out of 
business; out of the business of making 
steel, selling grain, growing beef, 
building ships, and the hundreds of 
other ways that governments distort 
trade. This goal drives all of our recent 
trade actions, including: 

• Our negotiations in steel and 
shipbuilding, which aim to curb gov- 
ernment subsidies and open markets; 

• Our clear and constant support 
for the European Communities' (EC) 
march toward a single market and our 
call for it to lower barriers not only 
within Europe but between Europe 
and its trading partners; 

• Our implementation of the 1986 
Trade Act in ways that will free 
global commerce from government 
interference; 

• Our visit last month to Mexico, 
where we applauded the creativity of 
the Salinas Administration, which is 
tearing down tariffs and trade barriers 
and restructuring Mexico's economy; 

• Our visit next month to the Pacif- 
ic rim to reinforce that region's tilt 
toward market-driven trade and invest- 
ment regimes; and 

• Our continued opposition to pro- 
tectionist pressures in our own coun- 
try, such as attempts to restrict foreign 
investment. 

And sometimes we need to prod 
government to eliminate anticompeti- 
tive practices in industry that can 
equally restrain trade. For example 
our Structural Impediments Initiative 
(SII) with Japan is designed to root out 
visible and "invisible" barriers that 
severely limit competition in both 
countries. 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1989 



53 



ECONOMICS 



The Uruguay Round 

Each of these market-opening efforts 
addresses specific issues. But they 
alone will not accomplish the sweeping 
reform of the global trading system 
that is so clearly needed. 

Since World \yar II, the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) — the main platform for inter- 
national trade negotiations — has spon- 
sored seven successful rounds of tariff 
cuts among the world's great trading 
nations. These rounds lowered barriers 
and expanded trade. As a result, our 
economies have grown faster in the last 
four decades than in any similar period 
of world history. 

The GATT continues to promote 
trade e.xpansion and has accommodated 
a growing membership of diverse econ- 
omies. Most important it has generated 
widespread acceptance of, if not always 
adherence to, certain basic principles — 
such as national treatment — that sup- 
port open trade. 

The problem, however, is that the 
trading system is outstripping the 
GATT. As tariffs have decreased, non- 
tariff barriers have increased. More- 
over areas poorly covered by GATT 
rules — like agriculture, or not covered 
at all, like intellectual property, serv- 
ices, and investment — are of much 
greater importance than they once 
were. 

In short the GATT is akin to a one- 
bedroom bungalow on a priceless piece 
of property; the benefits of renovation 
far outweigh the costs. All told more 
than $1 trillion in goods and services 
trade is not adequately covered by in- 
ternational rules of fair play. And when 
rules are weak or nonexistent, trade 
disputes turn into trade wars; export- 
ers are frustrated; inefficient indus- 
tries feed at government troughs. The 
cost is staggering. 

• Europeans spent almost $120 bil- 
lion last year to support agriculture; in 
the United States, the bill came to al- 
most $75 billion. That is $300 or .$400 
out of each of our pockets annually. 

• In the EC, an additional $50 bil- 
lion is squandered in subsidies to Euro- 
pean steelmakers, shipbuilders, and 
other manufacturers. That is another 
$150 taken out of each consumer's 
pocket each year. 

• Inadequate protection of intellec- 
tual property costs U.S. software de- 
signers, pharmaceutical companies, 
and other exporters more than $40 bil- 
lion annually. Their European counter- 
parts lose billions more. This piracy is 
sapping the productivity of the Ruhr 
and "silicon" valleys alike. 



54 



We cannot go on like this. The 
Uruguay Round is our best chance to 
control what may soon be uncontrollable. 

It is for this reason that President 
Bush has made the Uruguay Round — 
launched in Punta del Este, Uruguay, 
in 1986 — America's highest trade pri- 
roity. Right now 100 nations are work- 
ing in Geneva to expand the GATT, 
strengthen it as an institution, broaden 
its coverage of agriculture, and extend 
it to new concerns such as services, 
intellectual property rights, and 
investment. 

My message to Europe is simple — 
and urgent. We must reach for ambi- 
tious results. If we merely tinker at 
the margins, we face a return to 
brinksmanship and trading blocs. For 
too long, we have only reacted to 
changes in global trade. The round is 
this century's last best chance to act. 

• Act in agriculture. The U.S. goal 
is to eliminate all trade-distorting 
measures, while still giving farmers 
time to adjust to market forces. Last 
month we proposed converting all non- 
tariff trade barriers — such as quotas 
and variable levies — to tariffs which 
are visible and thus more easily re- 
duced. Later this month, we will table 
in Geneva a comprehensive proposal un- 
der which farmers can grow what they 
want, when they want, and earn a 
decent income without government 
interference. In our view, without 
fundamental reform in agriculture, the 
round will fail. With reform we all suc- 
ceed; reform could create 3 million new 
jobs in Europe, cut the U.S. budget 
deficit by $37 billion, and boost real 
Japanese wages 2.5%. 

• Act to ensure market access for 
industrial products. The United States 
challenges its trading partners to envi- 
sion a future "zero tariff world. We 
stand ready today to work with others 
to achieve this in key sectors in the 
present round. 

• Act to protect intellectual 
property rights. We submitted a far- 
reaching proposal last year. Negotia- 
tors are now drafting an agreement 
that, in practical terms, should provide 
patent protection for pharmaceuticals, 
chemicals, and other products; copy- 
right protection for sound recordings 
and computer software; trade secret 
protection for manufacturing processes 
and data; and effective enforcement to 
stop trademark counterfeiting and 

the piracy of copyrighted materials 
such as books, motion pictures, and 
recordings. 

• Act to ensure that international 
rules of fair play cover services. 



British and French insurance companl 
ies, U.S. travel agencies, and other r 
service firms must be able to set j 
up shop in foreign countries and be i 
treated like local firms. We will table 1 
our ideas on a comprehensive agree- 
ment in October. 

• Act to curb restrictions on for- 
eign investment. U.S. and Japanese 
automakers, German equipment 
manufacturers, and other companies 
should be able to invest overseas with;' 
out being forced to take a local partm 3 
export a given percentage of their outjl 



put, use local parts, or meet any one ( 



a dozen other investment conditions. 1 
just came from Geneva, where our pri 
vate sector advisers and I spent 2 day 
discussing the investment proposal wi 
tabled in July. 

• Act to end trade-distorting sub* 
sidies. I have mentioned the U.S. ini- 
tiative in steel and shipbuilding, but 
the problem goes beyond these sector: 
Subsidies destroy business and bank- 
rupt budgets. We can help workers an 
regions more effectively without reso 
to subsidies that stifle competition. 
The United States will present an an; 
bitious proposal to limit subsidies by 
year's end. 

• Act to contain disputes. We net- 
new mechanisms to resolve our differ 
ences before the inevitable dispute es< 
calates into a regrettable war. Ideas 
we challenge our trading partners to 
consider run the gamut from arbitra- 
tion to "appellate review" to an actual 
"GATT court." Whatever the final ou 
come, we need a system that is swift, 
fair, and effective. 

Time is short; the task great. By 
the end of this year, countries must ta 
ble all remaining proposals in each of 
the 15 negotiating groups. The United 
States has submitted numerous pro- 
posals. We will present the rest of our 
ideas by year's end. In the first half 
of 1990, countries will work to reach 
agreements in each area. We must the 
hammer these agreements into a com- 
plete package by the time the GATT 
ministers meet in Brussels in Novem^ 
ber 1990. 

Conclusion 

Europe and America have worked 
hand-in-hand to promote freedom 
throughout the world. Whether in 
terms of freedom of expression, reli- 
gion, or political belief, we have fough 
for the right of people everywhere to 
make their own choices. 

Choice is the indelible link be- 
tween our political system and our ecc 



ECONOMICS 



)mic system. Political freedom and 
{onomic freedom are mutually depend- 
it. Everyone should have the ability 
r choose who, when, and where to buy 
• sell goods and services freely in a 
^ir market. That is competition — the 
indamental strength of our two na- 
ons. David Ricardo in 1817 called it 
le freedom to do most what each of us 
■)es best. 

That is what the Uruguay Round is 
1 about — competition. That is why it 
the centerpiece of our trade policy 
hd the key to the future of world 
:ade. If the round is to succeed, there 
re, in our view, certain agreements 
^ must have: 

• Fundamental reform of agri- 
iltural trade; 

• Extension of GATT rules to the 
jiew areas" of services, investment, 
!id intellectual property; 

• Expanded market access for 
ade in goods; 

• Removal of trade-distorting sub- 
dies; and 

• Fair and effective dispute 
'ttlement. 

America does not seek an unfair 
Ivantage, but we will not unilaterally 
sarm. We do not seek to open mar- 
ts for the sole benefit of American 
itrepreneurs. Rather we are firmly 
)mmitted to use our strength to open 
arkets to all who would compete for 
lem. 

We succeeded, for example, in 
3ening the Japanese beef market, 
hich served Australian ranchers at 
ast as well as our own. The lesser de- 
sloped countries in particular must 
ave the openness that we seek, so that 
ley too can become markets for our 
roducts and assume the respon- 
;bilities of the international trading 
ystem. In short we seek what we have 
iways sought — freedom and fairness — 
n- farmers and factory workers 
nroughout the world. 

Each cycle of diplomatic effort adds 
s own chapter to history. Ours should 
eflect our daring, not our fears; our 
lOnfidence, not our insecurities. The 
rading system that best mirrors these 
lualities is one that does most to devel- 
op them. If the Uruguay Round suc- 
eeds, we will have produced a sequel 
."i-thy of the work done 40 years ago — 
st(|uel vibrant with hope and prosper- 
y for the next generation. ■ 



Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights 



by Carlo A. Hills 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Courts, Intellectual Property, 
and the Administration of Justice of 
the House Judiciary Committee on 
July 25, 1989. Ambassador Hills is 
U.S. Trade Representative.^ 

I am pleased to testify today on a topic 
of the utmost importance to the United 
States and the international trading 
community — the trade-related aspects 
of intellectual property rights. This 
hearing is an important part of our 
consultation process with those con- 
gressional committees that have legis- 
lative responsibility for areas affected 
by matters now under negotiation. My 
office has the lead on trade negotia- 
tions, but our negotiating efforts bene- 
fit from the full participation of other 
agencies, especially the Department of 
Commerce, through the International 
Trade Administration and the Patent 
and Trademark Office, and the Depart- 
ment of State. Almost every other exec- 
utive branch agency makes an active 
contribution to our policy development, 
and we benefit greatly from the full 
participation of the Copyright Office 
[under the Library of Congress] and 
the input and assistance of many con- 
gressional advisers and staff. The in- 
put of staff of this subcommittee, in 
particular, has been very helpful. Our 
private sector advisers are indispens- 
able and, on this topic, have never 
failed to respond constructively, 
even on short notice. 

This is a topic of the utmost impor- 
tance. Americans who engage in inter- 
national trade are very concerned 
about the harm to U.S. trading inter- 
ests that results from the lack of ade- 
quate and effective protection of 
intellectual property rights in many 
foreign markets. Our businesses are 
losing money, but more importantly, 
our economy is losing the competitive 
edge we gain from research and devel- 
opment, innovation and creativity. As 
a nation, we simply cannot afford it. 

The share of U.S. exports made up 
of articles that rely heavily on intel- 
lectual property protection (chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, computers, software, 
movies, sound recordings, books, scien- 
tific equipment) has more than doubled 



in the postwar period to over a fourth 
of total exports. U.S. companies expe- 
rience worldwide losses due to in- 
adequate and ineffective intellectual 
property protection. One estimate put 
those losses at $43-61 billion in 1986. 
Recent submissions to my office indi- 
cate that new sources of losses arise at 
least as fast as we solve existing prob- 
lems. With this magnitude of problem, 
it was not surprising to see a dramatic 
shift in the last decade of evolving U.S. 
trade policy to address these problems. 

It was almost exactly 10 years ago 
this month that the last round of multi- 
lateral trade negotiations was conclud- 
ed and implemented by statute in the 
United States. Late in that round, the 
United States sought to include an 
agreement to require strict border en- 
forcement to stem international trade 
in goods bearing counterfeit trade- 
marks. Although that effort was unsuc- 
cessful, it did open multilateral trade 
negotiations to the topic of intellectual 
property rights. 

U.S. trade policy objectives 
evolved in the first half of this decade 
to expand our negotiating mandate on 
intellectual property. The Caribbean 
Basin Initiative, the duty-free treat- 
ment for developing countries under 
the generalized system of preferences 
(GSP), and Section 301 procedures to 
address unreasonable foreign actions 
that burdened or restricted U.S. com- 
merce saw legislation and Admini- 
stration policy include negotiating 
objectives to obtain adequate and effec- 
tive protection of intellectual property 
rights. The underlying premises of the 
Administration's trade-related intel- 
lectual property objectives include 
the following. 

• All countries' economic growth 
and international competitiveness can 
be enhanced by strong domestic intel- 
lectual property protection. 

• When countries do not provide 
strong protection of intellectual prop- 
erty rights, and when an effective sys- 
tem of international enforcement does 
not exist, then substantial distortions 
in international production and trade 
result. 

• The United States has a very 
substantial stake in a healthy system 
of international trade and strong pro- 
tection of intellectual property. 



)epartment of State Bulletin/November 1989 



55 



ECONOMICS 



Unfortunately, many countries do 
not realize that improved protection of 
intellectual property is in their inter- 
est, or knowing it do not pursue it; and 
trade problems for U.S. producers have 
inevitably resulted. These policies 
cause three types of trade-related 
problems for Americans. 

First, U.S. companies lose exports 
and foreign sales, royalties, and the 
value of investments in the market 
where the American intellectual prop- 
erty right is appropriated without 
compensation. 

Second, our firms lose sales in 
third markets when unauthorized prod- 
ucts are sold there. 

Finally, U.S. companies may lose 
sales in our own country to imports — 
involving unauthorized use of goods, 
works, or processes covered by U.S. 
intellectual property laws. 

As our economic interests led us to 
focus on the broader aspects of intellec- 
tual property protection, including the 
adequacy of foreign laws and their en- 
forcement, the United States insisted 
in 1986 that intellectual property pro- 
tection be included in the Uruguay 
Round of multilateral trade negotia- 
tions. We were successful in launching 
these negotiations under the auspices 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT). 

The GATT has formed the back- 
bone of the international trading 
system since 1947. Early rounds of 
negotiations focused almost exclusively 
on the reciprocal reduction of tariffs. 
Our present negotiations on trade- 
related intellectual property rights, in- 
cluding trade in counterfeit goods, is 
one of our top priorities. Success in 
those negotiations is essential to the 
successful conclusion of the round. 

Because of the relationship be- 
tween trade and the protection and en- 
forcement of intellectual property, the 
GATT is an appropriate forum to nego- 
tiate improved minimum standards for 
protection and enforcement of intellec- 
tual property rights. Since the topic 
shares a trade dimension with the 
other subjects under discussion in the 
Uruguay Round, there is an incentive 
for all participants in the round to 
reach a result that includes benefits 
for all. These benefits may come from 
within the context of the trade-related 
intellectual property rights nego- 
tiations or from other areas of the 
negotiations. 

The GATT trade-related intellec- 
tual property rights negotiations also 



56 



present the opportunity for a compre- 
hensive agreement covering all areas of 
intellectual property, including areas 
such as trade-secret protection for 
which no current international agree- 
ments exist. Significantly, the GATT 
forum also provides an opportunity to 
negotiate dispute settlement and inter- 
national enforcement obligations that 
will enhance the implementation of 
agreed standards. Our deliberations 
during recent negotiations on a treaty 
to protect layout designs of semiconduc- 
tor mask works reinforced the view 
that intellectual property-based sanc- 
tions may not be an effective means of 
ensuring that governments meet their 
international obligations to protect 
intellectual property rights. 

Our negotiating objectives on intel- 
lectual property in the Uruguay Round 
were spelled out in the Omnibus Trade 
and Competitiveness Act of 1988. We 
have been successful in obtaining an 
agenda in April in Geneva for the re- 
maining negotiations that closely re- 
flects U.S. objectives. The key points 
in our objectives are to reach a multi- 
lateral agreement that will reduce or 
eliminate trade distortions and impedi- 
ments to legitimate trade through 
agreement on: 

• Adequate substantive standards; 

• Effective enforcement of those 
standards, both internally and at the 
border; 

• An effective dispute settlement 
procedure; and 

• Application of basic principles, 
such as national treatment and trans- 
parency. 

The April Trade Negotiating Com- 
mittee decision sets forth this agenda. 

The topics for negotiation of sub- 
stantive standards in the U.S. proposal 
are copyrights, patents, trademarks, 
trade secrets, and semiconductor chip 
layout designs. In addition, other par- 
ticipants have raised the topics of in- 
dustrial designs, neighboring rights 
and geographic indications, and appel- 
lations of origin. 

I will briefly summarize the major 
elements of the U.S. proposal on each 
of the five topics that we believe need 
to be addressed. The key points in that 
proposal are intended to provide mini- 
mum adequate standards and the ele- 
ments of effective enforcement 
mechanisms. We have drawn provisions 
on standards from international con- 
ventions where they are adequate and 
from laws or other sources where 
the international conventions are in- 
adequate or silent. 



Copyrights 

On copyrights some of our key objec- 
tives are drawn from the Bern Conven 
tion for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works. A consensus seems to 
be emerging that the minimum rights 
and obligations set out in the Bern con 
vention ought to be recognized as part 
of a GATT intellectual property stand: 
ard, and indeed, the U.S. proposal is 
largely based on the convention. The 
U.S. proposal reiterates those feature 
of Bern that are particularly relevant 
and spells out the obligations in those 1 
cases where the convention is weak or 
unclear. 

Specifically the U.S. proposal clan 
ifies the subject matter of protection i 
several important areas. It recognizes 
the growing consensus in over 40 coum 
tries that computer programs are 
protected works. It recognizes the 
conclusion of the 1982 joint WIPO/ 
UNESCO [World Intellectual Propert 
Organization/UN Educational, Scien- 
tific and Cultural Organization] Com- 
mittee of Governmental Experts on 
Copyright Problems Arising from the' 
Use of Computers for Access to or the 
Creation of Works that computer datai 
bases and other machine readable 
works are proper copyright subject 
matter. Our proposal clarifies that all 
compilations are protected subject ma( 
ter. It clarifies that convention's obliga 
tion to provide copyright protection fc 
works embodied in new media of ex- 
pression and to include new forms of 
authorship as they emerge and adds 
sound recordings to the list of pro- 
tected works. The U.S. proposal also 
makes it explicit that works of juridici 
entities are entitled to at least a 50- 
year-from-publication term of protec- 
tion. Our proposal also provides that 
computer software and sound record- 
ings have full copyright protection as 
now received by literary and artistic 
works. This would provide a term of 
the life of the author plus 50 years, or 
50-years-from-publication for works of 
juridical entities. 

Our proposal emphasizes that cop^ 
ing includes copying less than all of a 
work and producing a work that is sub- 
stantially similar to the copyrighted 
work. Our proposal includes a distribu 
tion right for works in addition to cine 
matographic works and makes it clear 
that the rights of the copyright owner 
include the right of public display of a 
work. It also clarifies what constitutes 
a "public performance" and defines 
public. It further clarifies that satel 



Department of State Bulletin/November 19( 



ECONOMICS 



e transmissions are protected even 
they emanate from beyond national 
jundaries. 

The U.S. proposal establishes a 
-esumption against the implementa- 
in of compulsory licenses and re- 
aires that any compulsory licenses be 
|iplemented in strict accordance with 
le Paris text of the Bern convention. 

atents 

;n patents, we propose that patents 
just be granted for all products and 
rocesses that meet the criteria for 
atentability (i.e., novelty, utility, and 
tiobviousness). For the sake of clarity, 
;ie U.S. proposal cites certain items 
[hose very nature do not lend them- 
elves to meeting these criteria. If the 
ublication of a patent document con- 
fining certain subject matter would 
e detrimental to national security, it 
lay be withheld from publication, but 
|ie subject matter itself should be eli- 
dble for purposes of patentability. This 
I'ould change the form, but not the 
ffect, ofU.S. law. 

We have proposed a patent having 
term of at least 20 years from filing 
lid that restoration of the effective 
atent term be encouraged where gov- 
rnmental regulatory approval proc- 
jses delayed the patentee's ability to 
larket the patented invention. We rec- 
gnize that this would require a change 
1 U.S. law but are willing to propose 
nis in the context of overall improve- 
lents in patent standards. 

We spell out that a patent provides 
he right to exclude others from mak- 
flg, using, or selling the patented in- 
dention and that this right, as well as 
he right to exclude importation, ex- 
ends at least to the product directly 
nade by a patented process. 

Our proposal deals with the threat 
trade caused by compulsory licenses. 
Vccordingly, it proposes that compulso- 
■y licenses, if at all, must be granted in 
inly the most extraordinary circum- 
stances. To this end, we have recom- 
nended that these licenses be available 
)nly during declared national emergen- 
ies or to remedy an adjudicated viola- 
ion of antitrust laws. Of course, a 
government has the right to use a pat- 
ented invention for governmental pur- 
poses. However, it must always be 
ensured that the patent owner recovers 
ull compensation if a compulsory li- 
;ense is issued to address a national 
emergency or if use occurs by the 
government. 



Further, exclusive compulsory li- 
censes which deprive a patent owner of 
all rights — including that of practicing 
his own invention — are precluded by 
our proposal. All decisions regarding 
the grant of compulsory licenses and 
the compensation to be paid must be 
subject to judicial review. Lastly we 
propose that merely nonworking of a 
patent should not expose a patentee to 
the overly harsh and counterproductive 
sanction of revocation of the patent. 

Trademarks 

The U.S. proposal on trademarks is 
designed to remedy deficiencies in the 
Paris convention, which result in inade- 
quate standards of protection, and to 
clarify or reinforce certain provisions 
which are not being adhered to and are 
causing distortions of or impediments 
to legitimate trade. 

The U.S. proposal provides a defi- 
nition of a trademark and requires 
that service marks be registered and 
protected the same as trademarks. 
It specifies the exclusive rights of a 
trademark owner and expands protec- 
tion for well-known marks to include 
those that are internationally well- 
known as well as those well-known in 
the country where protection is sought. 
It provides that the regulations and 
procedures implementing the required 
registration system must be transpar- 
ent and that an early opportunity must 
be given to third parties to challenge 
applications or registrations. 

The U.S. proposal provides a spe- 
cific 10-year minimum original term 
and renewal terms of similar duration. 
It specifies what circumstances must 
be considered justification for non- 
use of marks and provides that use of 
the mark by a licensee must inure to 
the benefit of the licensor for use- 
requirement purposes. It prohibits 
special requirements for use of a mark, 
and it prohibits compulsory licensing. 

The U.S. proposal further spe- 
cifies that trademark rights may be ac- 
quired by use or registration, that use 
may be a prerequisite to registration, 
and that assignments must be 
permitted. 

Trade Secrets 

Our trade-secrets proposal is designed 
to ensure a multilateral obligation to 
provide protection for proprietary in- 
formation. It opens the negotiations on 
how to prevent misappropriation and 
unwarranted governmental disclosure. 



Our private sector has identified the 
protection of trade secrets as one of the 
most important areas for obtaining 
adequate protection. 

Integrated Circuit Layout Designs 

Our objectives for integrated circuit 
layout designs are similar to other 
areas; that is, filling gaps or lacunae in 
existing international intellectual prop- 
erty conventions. Our position is not al- 
tered by the proximity of the recent 
Washington treaty. There is a broad 
consensus among countries that have 
legislation providing for the protection 
of integrated circuit layout designs on 
the appropriate standards for the level 
of protection that should be provided to 
this important new technology. Unfor- 
tunately, the treaty adopted for the 
protection of layout designs of inte- 
grated circuits fails to reflect those 
standards. 

Our proposal on protection of inte- 
grated circuits provides basic stand- 
ards for protection and remedies those 
deficiencies by requiring parties to 
provide a term of at least 10 years from 
the date of first commercial exploita- 
tion or the date of registration, if 
required, whichever is earlier. This 
provision is consistent with the term 
provided in every national law enacted 
to date. 

Our proposal includes a compul- 
sory license provision that, combined 
with the reverse engineering provi- 
sions and short duration of protection, 
provides appropriate access to this 
technology. Our proposal also elimi- 
nates any question of whether import- 
ing, selling, or distributing products 
that contain infringing chips are an 
infringement. Finally, our proposal 
requires innocent infringers to pay a 
royalty on chips after receiving notice 
of infringement. 

Each of these provisions repre- 
sents a careful balance between the 
interests of producers and consumers 
of integrated circuits — a balance re- 
flected in the laws of all countries that 
have addressed this right. We believe 
that it is important to provide a level of 
protection that both the producers and 
consumers of chips consider adequate. 
The clarifications and improvements in 
standards contained in our proposal 
are necessary to provide that level of 
protection. 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1989 



57 



ECONOMICS 



Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights 

A second major element of the U.S. 
proposal on intellectual property rights 
is obtaining effective enforcement of 
rights both internally and at the bor- 
der. Our complex task in the area of en- 
forcement will require the flexibility to 
accommodate different legal traditions 
and approaches to the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights. 

Our detailed proposal focuses on 
providing owners of intellectual prop- 
erty rights the means to initiate pro- 
ceedings to enforce their rights and 
receive a fair and open hearing on their 
case consistent with the concepts of due 
process. The thrust of our proposal is 
to ensure that owners of intellectual 
property rights will be provided a 
means by which they can take action 
to enforce their rights; however, we 
recognize that by governments may 
be necessary. In the United States, for 
example, U.S. Customs officials take 
some enforcement actions on their own 
initiative. This is why our proposal 
provides that governments would be 
obligated to take action on their own 
initiative when effective enforcement 
required such steps. 

Governments would be required to 
provide an adequate means for obtain- 
ing evidence necessary to prove an 
infringement and an opportunity to 
present such evidence to the decision- 
maker. Although proceedings could be 
either administrative or judicial or 
a combination of the two, final ad- 
ministrative decisions and initial 
judicial decisions would be subject to 
judicial review. Reasoned decisions 
would be required with significant 
decisions in writing and available 
to the public. 

Appropriate sanctions that deter 
infringement of intellectual property 
rights and deprive persons trading in 
infringing goods of the economic bene- 
fits of this activity are another impor- 
tant element in the U.S. proposal on 
enforcement. We propose providing in- 
terim relief in the form of preliminary 
injunctions and other appropriate 
prompt procedures to prevent the sale 
or disposition of allegedly infringing 
goods pending a final determination 
of infringement. 

Final injunctive relief and mone- 
tary awards sufficient to compensate 
fully owners of intellectual property 
rights should be available. Remedies 
should also include seizure of infring- 
ing goods at the border and internally 
and forfeiture, destruction, and remov- 



58 



al of the goods from commercial chan- 
nels. Criminal remedies should be 
available for at least trademark coun- 
terfeiting and copyright infringement 
which are willful and commercial. 

Enforcement of intellectual prop- 
erty rights at the border is another 
essential element for a trade-related 
intellectual property rights agreement. 
The U.S. proposal builds upon the ear- 
lier effort to address counterfeit trade- 
marks and extends it to all forms of 
intellectual property rights. Owners 
should have the right to initiate action 
against infringing imports before they 
are released from the jurisdiction of 
customs authorities. Authorities should 
have the ability to act on their own ini- 
tiative and seize goods, or when they 
have reason to believe that imported 
goods are infringing, detain such goods 
pending a determination whether they 
are infringing. 

Balanced against the rights of the 
intellectual property right owner is the 
need to minimize the effect of border 
and internal enforcement on legitimate 
trade. Indemnification and bonding re- 
quirements, as well as ensuring both 
owners and alleged infringers due 
process, should provide sufficient safe- 
guards to prevent abuse of enforcement 
mechanisms. 

Recently a GATT dispute settle- 
m.ent panel examined a complaint 
against one of the border enforcement 
mechanisms contained in U.S. law. Sec- 
tion 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. The 
panel has made a recommendation that 
certain aspects of Section 337 be found 
by the GATT to be inconsistent with 
our GATT obligations. The basic issue 
was whether Section 337 procedures 
were less favorable to imported prod- 
ucts than enforcement actions in U.S. 
District Courts were to domestically 
produced products. The matter is now 
before the GATT council for a decision 
whether to adopt the report. If the 
report is adopted, the United States 
would be obligated to bring its pro- 
cedures into conformity with the GATT. 

The Administration is carefully 
considering the merits of the panel's 
complex 72-page report and its implica- 
tions for U.S. law and border enforce- 
ment of intellectual property rights in 
general, if it is adopted. I am not pre- 
pared to discuss the details of our ex- 
amination of the report at this time. 
However, I can say that the United 
States will not be able to accept adop- 
tion of the report until we have thor- 
oughly evaluated these issues and 
conducted consultations with congres- 
sional advisers, including this sub- 



committee. The action we take will be 
consistent with our commitment to 
strong enforcement of intellectual 
property rights against imports of 
infringing goods. 

This commitment provides the co) 
text for our evaluation of the Section 
337 report and any GATT agreement 
provisions on the enforcement of in- 
tellectual property rights. This is, 
of course, wholly consistent with 
the GATT. 

My testimony has focused, to this 
point, on our Uruguay Round negotia- 
tions. Those negotiations are multi- 
lateral and are not in conflict with 
other negotiations in other fora. In- 
deed, no element of our proposal con- 
flicts with existing international 
conventions. Our GATT efforts do not: 
and will not undermine our commit- 
ment to pursue adequate intellectual 
property protection in traditional fora 
Our objective is to achieve adequate 
levels of protection for intellectual 
property rights and effective enforce- 
ment of those rights. We will pursue 
that objective through all available 
multilateral avenues and through 
bilateral initiatives. 

Bilateral Initiatives 

Special 301. The Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988 includes 8 
special criteria and procedures for con 
ducting certain Section 301 investiga- 
tions on intellectual property. The 
provisions require the U.S. Trade Rep 
resentative to identify countries that 
deny adequate and effective intellec- 
tual property protection or fair and eq 
uitable market access to U.S. persons 
relying on intellectual property rights 
The statute empowers the U.S. Trade 
Representative to designate priority 
countries and initiate Section 301 inves 
tigations against those countries which 
have the most onerous and egregious 
policies or practices and largest actual 
or potential markets. 

On May 25, 1989, I announced my 
decision on designation of such priority 
countries. Because of the significant 
progress made in various negotiations, 
I identified no "priority countries" un- 
der the "special" intellectual property 
rights 301 provisions. Rather the Ad- 
ministration singled out 25 countries 
whose practices deserve special at- 
tention and rapid progress. Eight 
countries — Brazil, India, Mexico, the 
People's Republic of China, the Repub- 
lic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, anc 
Thailand — were placed on a priority 
watch list. Action plans have been de 



EUROPE 



loped for resolving outstanding is- 
les with each of these countries and 
leir status under "Special" 301 will 
jain be reviewed no later than Novem- 
?r 1, 1989. Seventeen countries were 
aced on a watch list, and I will also 
iview the progress we make with 
ich of them no later than next April 
I determine what additional measures 
-e appropriate. 

The decision to place these coun- 
■ies on either the priority watch list or 
atch list followed an exhaustive re- 
iew of the laws and practices of most 
' our trading partners. Government 
\perts, including representatives of 
lie Patent and Trademark Office, 
Copyright Office, the International 
rade Administration, and the State 
epartment, worked with the U.S. 
rade Representative on this effort. In 
ddition, we received extensive advice 
nd support from the private sector 
:i(i groups such as the U.S. Chamber 
'Commerce. 

We have either already held, or will 
M very shortly, consultations with all 
) countries. It is my expectation that 
e can make substantial and rapid 
"Ogress with these countries either bi- 
terally or through their cooperation 
1 the GATT intellectual property ne- 
itiations. If we fail to make progress, 
am prepared to exercise the authority 
ranted to me by the 1988 Trade Act 
id initiate investigations. 

Section 301 Actions Initiated in 
espcnse to Petitions. Currently we 
ave one such case pending — a case 
led by the Pharmaceutical Manu- 
icturer's Association concerning 
rgentina's denial of product patent 
rotection for pharmaceuticals and lack 
f protection for proprietary informa- 
on. I am not satisfied with the prog- 
ess we have made to date; therefore 
have instructed my Assistant U.S. 
rade Representative for Latin Ameri- 
an Affairs to travel to Argentina in 
lUgust to intensify our effort to re- 
olve the problem. I must make an un- 
lirness determination no later than 
.eptember23. 

Petitions Under GSP. The 1984 

'rade Act provisions reauthorizing 
jenefits under the GSP also direct the 
'resident to take into account the intel- 
?ctual property laws and practices of a 
ountry in making decisions regarding 
JvSP eligibility and benefit levels. This 
ear we have had two petitions request- 
ntr the removal of GSP benefits based 
n inadequate and ineffective intellec- 
ual property protection: one from the 



copyright industries on the Philippines 
and a second from the pharmaceutical 
industry on Brazil. These petitions are 
now under consideration, and the Presi- 
dent's decision on whether to initiate 
reviews will be announced shortly. 

Science and Technology Agree- 
ments. The Omnibus Trade and Com- 
petitiveness Act of 1988 requires that 
science and technology agreements 
properly protect intellectual property. 
Recently, we have successfully conclud- 
ed comprehensive science and technolo- 
gy agreements that include intellectual 
property annexes with Japan and the 
Soviet Union. Talks are ongoing with 
China, India, Korea, New Zealand, 
Spain, Hungary, and others. The 
importance of protecting and com- 
mercially exploiting the results of 
Federally supported research and de- 
velopment make this an increasingly 
important effort. Concluding these 
cooperative agreements provides an 
incentive for governments to im- 
prove their standards of protection. 

Another bilateral avenue for ad- 
vancing U.S. intellectual property ob- 
jectives is through consultations 
through established bilateral trade 
committees. For example, the U.S.- 
Japan Trade Committee has a subcom- 
mittee on intellectual property, as does 
the U.S. -European Community high 
technology working group. We have 
held two rounds of talks with the Japa- 



nese under the umbrella of the trade 
committee, and a further round is 
scheduled for September. The U.S.-EC 
high technology group has been around 
for several years, and it has proved a 
very useful forum for discussing a 
broad range of issues, most recently 
protection of inventions in the field of 
biotechnology. 

Bilateral negotiations and actions 
we have taken under our domestic legal 
procedures, including Section 301, are 
fully complementary to our Uruguay 
Round objectives. We do not expect 
countries whose practices are identi- 
fied as being of special concern to the 
United States to thank us. But neither 
do we believe that the solutions to the 
problems we are raising are good for us 
and bad for them. 

We do not believe closed markets 
are good. We do not believe in mercan- 
tilist tenets that imports are bad, that 
any domestically produced article is 
better than any import. Protectionism 
is protectionism. It makes little differ- 
ence whether it takes the form of a high 
tariff or a compelled local working re- 
quirement. I can assure you of one 
thing — the United States will do what 
is necessary to eradicate it. 



' The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.B 



U.S. Recalls Ambassador to Bulgaria 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
AUG. 29, 19891 

As a result of the continuing abuse of 
the human rights of Bulgaria's ethnic 
Turkish community, which has caused 
some 310,000 Bulgarian Turks to flee 
to Turkey, the Department is recalling 
Ambassador Sol Polansky to Washing- 
ton for consultations. 

The ongoing abuse of the human 
rights of Bulgarian ethnic Turks by the 
Government of Bulgaria remains an is- 
sue of serious concern to the U.S. Gov- 
ernment. The United States has made 



its views on this matter known to the 
Government of Bulgaria both publicly 
and privately, and President Bush has 
spoken several times to Turkish lead- 
ers to express our strong support for 
their efforts to end this tragic situa- 
tion. The United States has also been 
active in securing NATO support for a 
strong statement deploring the human 
rights problems in Bulgaria and is ex- 
ploring refugee aid to the Government 
of Turkey. 



' Read to news correspondents by De- 
partment deputy spokesman Richard A. 
Boucher. ■ 



Oepartment of State Bulletin/November 1989 



59 



INTERNATIONAL LAW 



Polish Parliament 

Approves 

New Government 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 12, 19891 

The Polish Parliament has approved a 
new Polish Government. This is an im- 
portant date in what has been a histor- 
ical process of transformation. The 
unanimous vote is evidence that the 
new government will enjoy the strong 
support of the Polish people that will 
be necessary to implement successfully 
its programs. 

All political participants should be 
applauded for the statesmanship which 
they have displayed in managing a dif- 
ficult and comple.x process. We look 
forward to discussions with the new 
government and to hearing about its 
plans and programs. The new govern- 
ment can count on our continued 
support. 



' Read to news correspondents by 
Department spokesman Margaret DeB. 
Tutwiler.B 



Additional Food 
and Commodity 
Assistance to Poland 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 14, 19891 

I am pleased to announce today that 
the United States will offer to provide 
additional food and commodity aid to 
the Polish people. Subject to consulta- 
tions with the Polish Governmemt, we 
are prepared to offer an additional $50 
million in assistance in FY 1990. This 
amount would be in addition to the $50 
million already announced on August 
1st. Together with the $8.4 million in 
emergency food aid in FY 1989, this 
new aid brings to $108.4 million the to- 
tal of U.S. food/commodity assistance. 
Our effort works in tandem with the 
$140 million of agricultural aid pledged 
by the European Communities as part 
of the coordinated effort called for by 



the United States at the recent Paris 
economic summit. We expect to offer 
quantities of meat, corn, butter, butter 
oil, cotton seed/sunflower oil, cotton, 
rice, and/or other commodities. 

It is intended that the food aid will 
support long-term reform of the Polish 
agricultural system by providing much 
needed commodities during a transi- 
tional period toward a market economy. 
The food shortages and e.xtremely high 
prices in Poland in recent weeks have 
placed a heavy burden on the Polish 
people. We expect that shipments of the 



|{ 



new assistance will arrive in time for 
the difficult winter months. 

This new assistance is one elemer 
of our continuing effort, working wit! 
our allies and others, to support the 
process of change that is underway in' 
Poland. It underscores our continuing 
commitment to assist the Polish Gov- 
ernment and people in their efforts tc 
introduce market principles and to 
build a private sector that will enable 
Poland to invigorate its economy. 



' Text from Weekly Compilation of Pr 
idential Documents of Sept. 18, 1989. ■ 



Update on U.S.-lran Claims Settlement 



STATE DEPARTMENT 

FACT SHEET, 
AUG. 9, 1989 

Under the Algiers accords, which re- 
solved the hostage crisis in 1981, a 
claims settlement process was estab- 
lished. The Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal in The Hague was set up to 
arbitrate certain claims between the 
two governments and certain claims of 
nationals of each country against the 
other country's government. Escrow ac- 
counts were set up for payment of tri- 
bunal awards to U.S. claimants and 
bank claims. 

In 1981, $9,975 billion was trans- 
ferred by the United States. These 
funds were Iranian funds that the 
United States had frozen during the 
hostage crisis. (These funds are entire- 
ly separate from the Iranian foreign 
military sales trust fund, discussed be- 
low.) Of the $9,975 billion, $1 billion 
was placed in a Security Account to pay 
awards of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribu- 
nal to U.S. nationals and the U.S. Gov- 
ernment, $3,667 billion was placed in 
Dollar Account No. 1 to pay claims of 
bank syndicates of which a U.S. bank 
was a member, and $1,418 billion was 
placed in Dollar Account No. 2 to pay 
nonsyndicated U.S. bank claims. The 
remaining $3.89 billion was trans- 
ferred to Iran. All Iranian property 
not under arbitration at the Claims Tri- 
bunal was returned to Iran in 1981. 

The current status of these ac- 
counts is as follows. 

• The Security Account contains 
$500 million. Iran must replenish it 
whenever it falls below this amount. 

• A separate Interest Account hold- 
ing interest on the Security Account 
contains $106 million. 



• Dollar Account No. 1 contains 
$11.9 million. Since virtually all the 
claims were satisfied, pursuant to at 
bunal order, $454 million was trans- 
ferred from this account to Iran in Ml 
1987; a further $37.9 million was tran 
ferred to Iran in April 1988. 

• Dollar Account No. 2 contains 
$800 million. 

U.S. nationals have been awardei 
approximately $1,278 billion (includir 
interest) by the Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal through August 8, 
1989. The tribunal has also awarded a 
proximately $118 million (not includir 
interest) to Iranian nationals. The re IJ 
maining private U.S. nationals' claim 
against the Iranian Government are 1 
billions of dollars. 

Also pending before the tribunal 
are certain claims of the United Stati' 
and Iran against each other. The re- 
maining Iranian Government claims 
against the U.S. Government are for 
billions of dollars. 

Included among these governme) 
claims is Iran's claim arising out of th 
Iranian foreign military sales pro- 
gram. This program spanned over 15 
years and was massive. By 1979 it cor 
sisted of over 2,800 contracts with a 
cumulative value of over $20 billion. 
Money was paid to the United States 
into a Trust Fund as each contract wj 
entered into, and the fund was drawn 
down as the contracts were imple- 
mented. Iran claims that it is due the 
balance remaining in the Trust Fund 
and the value of military equipment 
purchased but not exported from the 
United States. The amounts in ques- 
tion involve complex legal and accoun 
ing issues and are being arbitrated ii 
the Claims Tribunal. ■ 



I 



60 



Department of State Bulletin/November 



J 



JIDDLE EAST 



tecent Events in the Middle East 



1 John H. Kelly 

, Statement before the Subcommittee 
(J Europe and the Middle East of the 
buse Foreign Affairs Committee on 
iptemberlO, 1989. Ambassador Kelly 
i Assistant Secretary for Near East- 
iii and South Asian Affairs. ' 

hm very pleased to appear before the 
sbcommittee today and to have the op- 
irtiinity to discuss a number of devel- 
1 mciits which have occurred in the 
liddle East and Southwest Asia since I 
l~t testified before this committee in 
. ly. Today I plan to focus on the Mid- 
o East peace process, Lebanon, and 
Ian. 



le Peace Process 

. irst wish to deal with our efforts 
li advance toward a resolution of the 
.:'ab-Israeli conflict. As you well 
I ow, efforts to advance the prospects 
[ a comprehensive peace are fraught 
ijth difficulties. But there are hopeful 
■rns as well. 

On the one hand, the cycle of vio- 
lice continues unabated. The human 
fst is high. Palestinians and Israelis 
intinue to fall victim to violence. 

This is not a time for despair, how- 
ler, for there are positive signs. There 
(growing recognition of the need to 
lannel efforts in the direction of prac- 
I'al and pragmatic steps, grounded in 
lid and enduring principles. 

Uur policy on the peace process 
|iS not changed. The peace we seek 
jould be comprehensive, including all 
Lrties to the conflict. It should come 
liout through direct negotiations. The 
pgotiations should be based on UN Se- 
iirity Council Resolutions 242 and 338 
lid should involve territory for peace, 
icurity, and recognition for Israel and 
:.e legitimate political rights of the 
klestinian people. 

i The Israeli Government took a step 
ward the achievement of these goals 
irough its peace initiative of May 14. 
'e endorse this initiative, and we con- 
nue to believe the proposal for elec- 
pns in the occupied territories holds 
jie potential to launch a political proc- 
l;s of negotiations that can advance the 
bospects of peace. Since my last ap- 
parance before this committee, we 
live pursued our efforts on behalf of 
!ns initiative in a number of ways. 



• I visited Israel, Egypt, and Jor- 
dan in August. Much of my discussions 
focused on the peace process. I came 
away convinced that the leaders of all 
three countries are committed to peace 
and anxious to move forward if mutu- 
ally acceptable mechanisms can be 
found. [Egyptian] President Mubarak 
has been particularly helpful and ener- 
getic in seeking ways to advance the 
process, developing ideas to keep up 
momentum and encouraging all sides 
toward moderation and flexibility. In 
July he advanced a 10-point proposal 
which might provide a bridge for the 
Israelis and the Palestinians. It is im- 
portant to remember that the Egyptian 
10 points are not an alternative to the 
Government of Israel's May proposal 
but, rather, represent Egypt's accept- 
ance of the elections concept and 
Egypt's views on how to get elections 
and make them work. We believe the 
Egyptian points constitute a construc- 
tive and valuable addition to ongoing 
diplomatic efforts. Egypt's efforts are 
continuing. Yesterday Israeli Defense 
Minister Rabin was in Cairo for fur- 
ther discussions on how to bridge dif- 
ferences and get a dialogue started. 
We understand Egyptian-Israeli dis- 
cussions on this will continue in the 
days ahead. 

• In my meeting with Palestinians 
in Jerusalem and in the U.S. dialogue 
with the Palestine Liberation Organiza- 
tion (PLO) in Tunis, we have stressed 
the need for a constructive response to 
the Israeli proposal. There are some 
signs recently that the PLO will move 
in this direction and is seriously con- 
sidering Egypt's 10 points. For our 
part, we take our dialogue with the 
PLO seriously. We have told the Pal- 
estinians that we can provide no guar- 
antees regarding final outcome — this is 
a matter for the negotiations. And we 
have explained the need for a pragmatic 
approach to get a process of negotia- 
tions started. Once they begin, the Pal- 
estinians will be able to bring to the 
table whatever preferences and posi- 
tions they wish. As I noted, we are 
beginning to have a sense that our 
message may be getting through. 

• At the same time, we have contin- 
ued to stress to the PLO that we will 
not accept efforts to have the so-called 
"state of Palestine" admitted to in- 
ternational organizations. The Ad- 



ministration shares the strongly held 
views of Congress on this issue. So 
far we have registered success in our 
efforts — in the World Health Organi- 
zation and the World Tourism 
Organization. 

• We are continuing our exchanges 
with the Soviets on the Middle East, 
as recently as yesterday when Dennis 
Ross [Director, Policy Planning Staff] 
and I met with the Soviets. We contin- 
ued to stress the advantages of the 
elections proposal. Our Soviet inter- 
locutors showed serious interest in our 
views and posed legitimate questions. 
We are not yet persuaded that the So- 
viets will, in fact, pursue the types of 
policies that will contribute to real 
progress. This is something we will 
have to watch carefully and to continue 
to nurture. 

The weeks ahead will see oppor- 
tunities for continuing discussions with 
a variety of regional and other inter- 
ested leaders. In Wyoming, where the 
Middle East will be on the agenda for 
Secretary Baker's meeting with For- 
eign Minister Shevardnadze, we will be 
using the occasion to press the Soviets 
to accept the Israeli elections proposal. 
We will have other occasions in New 
York at the UN General Assembly and 
here in Washington. We intend to make 
full use of these opportunities. 

Lebanon 

Turning to another subject, I would 
like to lay out for you the Administra- 
tion's views about Lebanon. First let 
me explain our decision to temporarily 
withdraw our Embassy personnel from 
Beirut. As we stated at the time, the 
action was taken when we concluded 
that the mission could no longer con- 
duct its work and that there was a 
significantly increased risk to our 
American staff. The evacuation is tem- 
porary, and we intend to return our 
staff as soon as we are convinced that 
circumstances exist in which our pres- 
ence can be reasonably safe and effec- 
tive. The decision does not represent 
a change in policy. It is not, as some 
would say, "an abandonment of 
Lebanon." We are deeply committed as 
a nation to helping Lebanon through 
this difficult time, and we are deeply 
committed as a people to helping end 
the anguish and pain of all Lebanese. 



epartment of State Bulletin/November 1989 



61 



MIDDLE EAST 



We warmly welcome the decision of 
the Arab League Higher Committee on 
Lebanon to reengage. On Saturday, 
September 16, Saudi Foreign Minister 
Prince Sa'ud announced a seven-point 
Arab League plan on Lebanon. The 
plan consists of a cease-fire, lifting of 
all blockades, and a meeting of parlia- 
ment to discuss national reconciliation. 
It also asks Lebanese to pledge not to 
acquire weapons and ammunition and 
asks others to pledge not to ship any to 
Lebanon. Finally the implementation of 
the proposal begins with a trip of Arab 
League Assistant Secretary General 
Lakhdar Ibrahimi to Beirut. Ibrahimi 
arrived in Beirut to begin his work this 
past Sunday. 

We believe that the Arab League's 
plan provides a constructive basis upon 
which all parties to the conflict in 
Lebanon can engage in a political proc- 
ess, devoid of violence and coercion. We 
are pleased that the committee calls 
for a cease-fire and lifting of all block- 
ages, and sets a date for a meeting of 
Lebanon's parliamentarians to discuss 
national reconciliation. These are es- 
sential first steps on the path to restor- 
ing a strong central government in 
control of all of Lebanon's territory 
and to achieving the withdrawal of all 
foreign forces and the disbandment 
of militias, objectives we all share. 

We, therefore, call upon all parties 
to stop the fighting, lift the blockades, 
and allow a political process of recon- 
ciliation to begin. 

Our humanitarian commitment to 
Lebanon has not lessened. Our aid pro- 
grams continue, administered through 
private voluntary organizations on the 
ground. U.S. food aid currently pro- 
vides about half of the food for 800,000 
Lebanese in all regions and commu- 
nities in Lebanon. In fact, the next 
shipment of about $5 million worth of 
rice, lentils, and vegetable oil under 
PL 480 Title II food aid is due to arrive 
in Lebanon later this month. 

This Administration considers our 
efforts to assist Lebanon an important 
part of our overall Middle East policy. 
We will, therefore, continue our active 
diplomatic efforts to promote a political 
resolution to the conflict that can end 
the senseless bloodshed and suffering. 

Now is the time for all of those 
with an interest in bringing peace to 
Lebanon and for all of those who have 
been involved in Lebanon, to support 
the tripartite committee's efforts so 
that the process of peace and healing 
can begin. 



U.S. Diplomats Evacuated From Beirut 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 6, 1989 > 

At midnight last night, Washington, 
D.C., time, September 5 — 7:00 a.m. 
Beirut time, September 6 — we evacu- 
ated all U.S. Government personnel 
from Beirut on a temporary basis be- 
cause local circumstances no longer 
permit the embassy to function effec- 
tively. We have a responsibility to en- 
sure the safety of our personnel. We 
plan to go back to Beirut as soon as 
conditions permit. 

The evacuation does not represent 
a lessening of our intention to try to 
help Lebanon in its time of trouble. We 
will be consulting with friendly Arab 
states, our European allies, and the 
Soviet Union, as well as Lebanon's 
neighbors, on how to try to achieve a 
cease-fire and an end to all blockades 
and the beginning of a political recon- 
ciliation process. 

We are committed to working with 
others to try to end the ongoing trag- 
edy in Lebanon. The United States is 
not abandoning Lebanon. We regret 
having to evacuate the embassy and the 
actions by Gen. Awn [Christian-backed 
leader] and his followers that made it 
necessary. 

The President's and the Secretary's 
policy has always been to maintain our 
embassy as long as useful work could 
be done. But for 5 months, the embassy 
has been unable to go to Muslim west 
Beirut because of shelling and bad 
security conditions. 

Gen. Awn told journalists that he 
would not receive Ambassador Mc- 
Carthy until McCarthy presented his 
credentials to Awn, one of two com- 
peting governments. 

On September 5, a demonstration 
with 1,000 people was organized around 
our embassy and a "blockade" was de- 
clared by the organizers. The demon- 
strators said that this blockade would 
continue until the U.S. Government did 
the following four things: (1) presenta- 
tion of McCarthy's credentials to Gen. 
Awn; (2) recognition of Gen. Awn as the 
"sole legitimate authority in Lebanon;" 
(3) arrival of a special envoy from the 
United States; and (4) the L'nited 
States to force Syria to lift its blockade 
of the Christian enclave. 



The demonstration leader told th 
crowd that U.S. personnel could ente 
and leave "at their own risk." He sale 
the blockade would move closer to the 
embassy and an indefinite next step 
would take place September 6. 

A telephone caller threatened tO' 
shoot down the September 5 scheduk 
helicopter support mission, and shor 
thereafter, the demonstration orga- 
nizer took credit for preventing the 
helicopter mission. 

We were told yesterday by reliab 
journalists on the ground that Gen. 
Awn said that Lebanon needed a goOd 
dose of "Christian terrorism." As Ge 
Awn's threats and implications about 
the United States grew nastier, the 
Department and the embassy were ii 
close touch throughout the Labor Da. 
weekend. On Friday, September 1, 
Gen. Awn told the French newspaper- 
Figaro that perhaps he should take 
"20 American hostages." 

Secretary Baker spoke by tele- 
phone to Ambassador McCarthy on 
September 5. On the morning of Sep 
tember 5, Secretary Baker met with* 
the President who gave his approval 
evacuate. At 2:00 p.m., Washington 
time, following his conversation witl 
Ambassador McCarthy, Secretary B 
er met in the Oval Office with the Pr 
ident, Secretary [of Defense] Chenej 
[President's national security advise: 
Gen. Scowcroft, Chief of Staff Sunun 
and Assistant Secretary [for Near 
Eastern and South Asian Affairs] K( 
ly. They discussed alternative means 
implementing the evacuation and act 
vated the military chain of command. 

Assistant Secretary Kelly was ii 
repeated contact — more than a dozer 
times — yesterday with Ambassador 
McCarthy, throughout the day and tl 
night, consulting the Secretary fre- 
quently for guidance as details were 
worked out with the Ambassador. Se 
retary Baker himself chaired approx 
imately 8-10 meetings yesterday on 
this subject and the course of the 
evacuation on September 5. 



1 Read to news correspondents by 
Department spokesman Margaret DeB. 1 

wiler. ■ 



62 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1(' 



REFUGEES 



, me now address a subject which I 
CI w is on your minds as much as it is 
rniine — the eight American citizens 
vo remain captive in Lebanon and the 
i^rate but related question of our re- 
a^nship with Iran. 

It may help in thinking about these 
sies to remind ourselves of three 
){ic realities. 

• The hostage issue involves the de- 
il'rate, cold-blooded, and calculated 
itse of innocent people. 

'• • The Iranian Government gives 
lEical financial, political, and moral 

Sport to the groups which are re- 
nsible for this. 

• Spokesmen for the Iranian 
}|'ernment deny that Iran has any 
eponsibility for the situation and 
icdemn hostage-taking. And in the 
[it breath, without any apparent 

■sf of shame or logical contradiction, 
1 V add that Iran will only use its 
I uence over the hostage-holders if 
1 United States meets various 
(ditions. 

These facts are clear. What should 
v'do about them? 

We are mobilizing every possible 
(ource to drive home a clear message 
c he Iranian leadership. We have used 
. iriety of private channels to convey 
h message, but it is not a secret. Its 
leiice is as follows: We expect you to 
.1 to obtain the release of the hos- 
ies. Your failure to do so is a funda- 
r.atal obstacle to the normalization of 
J5. -Iranian relations. 

Our objective is to help convince 
1 Iranian Government that it is in its 
r 1 best interest to act to end the 
) ctice of international terrorism. 
pis would remove a fundamental ob- 
ilcle to the normalization of the U.S.- 
inian relationship. We have no quar- 
'( with the system of government of 
1 Islamic Republic. That is a matter 
'< the Iranian people to decide. We be- 
i/e that a more normal relationship 
):ween the United States and the Is- 
: lie Republic of Iran based firmly on 
ttual respect would be desirable, and 
» don't believe Iran should be any- 
)ly's strategic preserve. Our inter- 
I s would be well-served by a strong, 
ijsperous, nonaligned Iran. We would 
e t<i see Iran make a contribution to 
ability in the gulf and Southwest 
ia, instead of threatening its neigh- 



bors. We are ready to play a part in the 
reconstruction of the Iranian economy 
if Iran wants this. But none of this will 
be possible until the Iranian leadership 
turns its back, once and for all, on the 
practice of international terrorism. 

In this regard, although there have 
been some encouraging statements in 
Tehran, Iran's behavior in the world 
continues to leave much to be desired. 
In recent weeks and months, Iran's 
hand has been evident in terrorist at- 



tacks in Europe and the Middle East. 
Iran must end these practices once and 
for all if it wants to rejoin the family of 
nations. We will continue to emphasize 
this message to Iran, but in the end the 
Iranian leadership itself must make its 
own choice. 



' The complete transcript of the hearing 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of Doc- 
uments, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



U.S., Vietnam Agree on 
Emigration of Detainees 



JOINT STATEMENT, 
JULY 30, 1989 

Representatives of the United States 
and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
at a meeting in Hanoi July 27-29, 1989, 
announced that they hope to commence 
by October 1989 a program for the re- 
settlement in the United States of re- 
leased reeducation center detainees 
and their close family members who 
wish to emigrate to the United States. 
The Vietnamese delegation was led by 
Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Vu Khoan. The U.S. delegation was led 
by Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of State [for Refugee Programs] 
Robert L. F\inseth, Acting Director 
of the Bureau for Refugee Programs. 

The Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
and the United States of America, in 
order to resolve one of the issues of mu- 
tual concern to the two countries and 
consistent with their humanitarian 
policies and with the commitments 
undertaken in the declaration and the 
comprehensive plan of action adopted 
by the UN International Conference 
on Indochinese Refugees [June 13-14, 
1989], will — in addition to existing 
programs — allow those released reedu- 
cation center detainees who were close- 
ly associated with the United States or 
its allies and who wish to do so to emi- 
grate, together with their close rela- 
tives, to the United States. 



The U.S. delegation declared that 
released reeducation center detainees 
coming to the United States would be 
subject to all U.S. laws, including those 
affecting the activities of U.S. resi- 
dents toward other countries. The U.S. 
delegation reaffirmed that the United 
States has not encouraged nor does it 
have any intention of encouraging or 
using released detainees to engage in 
any illegal activities hostile or harmful 
to Vietnam — and is opposed to any such 
activities — and that the United States 
will accept these persons solely for hu- 
manitarian reasons and not for any hos- 
tile actions against Vietnam. The 
Vietnamese delegation also reaffirmed 
that Vietnam has not and will not en- 
courage or use released detainees to 
engage in illegal actions hostile or 
harmful to the United States. 

The two sides drew up a draft 
agreement, which included a technical 
annex, and agreed to establish a joint 
working group to coordinate implemen- 
tation of the program. The two sides 
agreed that the program would be in 
addition to the existing Amerasian 
and orderly departure programs. 

The two sides expressed great 
satisfaction with the results achieved 
and expressed hope that the first group 
of 3,000 persons for resettlement in 
the United States under this agree- 
ment will depart Vietnam before the 
end of the year after processing is 
completed. ■ 



ipartment of State Bulletin/November 1989 



63 



TERRORISM 



The Japanese Red Army 



Followiytg is a fact sheet of 
August 2Ji., 1989, prepared by the 
Coordinator for Co unter-Terro rism . 

Goal 

The Japanese Red Army (JRA) at- 
tempts to support, through terrorism, 
a worldwide Marxist-Leninist revolu- 
tion. The JRA has long identified itself 
with radical Palestinian movements, 
especially the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). 

Although based in the Middle East 
and operating woi'ldwide, the JRA also 
has goals for its native Japan — to unite 
leftist anarchist organizations, end the 
imperial system, oppose "Japanese im- 
perialism," and establish a people's re- 
public. As Emperor Hirohito lingered 
near death at the end of 1988, the JRA 
issued a threat saying it would resume 
its fight against Japan's imperial sys- 
tem, a threat the JRA repeated when 
Hirohito died 2 months later. The JRA 
is believed to be affiliated with the 
Anti-War Democratic Front (ADF), 
an overt leftist political organization 
in Japan. 

Links to Libya 

In recent years, the JRA has again 
been linked to Libya, which we suspect 
provides it with financial and other 
assistance. Indicative of this relation- 
ship was the hero's welcome accorded 
to the sole surviving JRA terrorist in- 
volved in the 1972 Lod Airport mas- 
sacre, who was released following a 
prisoner exchange in 1985 and went 
directly to Tripoli. 

After a 9-year lull in terrorist 
activity beginning in the late 1970s, 
JRA members, using the name "Anti- 
Imperialist International Brigade" 
(AIIB), resumed operations in Jakarta 
in May 1986, a month after the U.S. re- 
taliatory raid on Libyan terrorist facil- 
ities. AIIB attacks in 1987 against U.S. 
facilities in Madrid, as well as a 1988 
attack in Naples executed by a known 
JRA member, also took place around 
the time of the anniversary of the U.S. 
air raid on Tripoli and were publicly 
linked to it. 



1986-88 Terrorist Resurgence 

The JRA terrorist resurgence began 
in May 1986 in Jakarta with homemade 
rocket attacks against the U.S., Cana- 
dian, and Japanese Embassies to pro- 
test the Tokyo economic summit. The 
attacks were claimed by the AIIB, 
which appears to be comprised of JRA 
members, possibly working in conjunc- 
tion with Middle Eastern and other ter- 
rorist elements. JRA members were 
also involved in other AIIB-claimed op- 
erations, such as the June 1987 rocket 
and car bomb attacks against the U.S. 
and British Embassies in Rome, again 
to protest that year's economic summit 
being held in Venice. Forensic evidence 
linked the Rome attacks with the AIIB's 
April 1987 rocket attacks in Madrid 
against the U.S. Embassy and U.S. 
Information Service (USIS) offices. 

Following a car bombing outside a 
USO club in Naples on April 14, 1988, 
which killed five persons including a 
U.S. Navy servicewoman and left 17 
persons injured, Italian authorities 
identified known JRA member Junzo 
Okudaira as responsible. The attack 
was claimed under the name "Jihad 
Brigade" to commemorate the U.S. 
retaliatory raid on Libya. 

Two days before the Naples attack, 
JRA member Yu Kikumura was ar- 
rested on the New Jersey Turnpike car- 
rying three 18-inch antipersonnel pipe 
bombs intended for use in a terrorist 
attack in the United States, possibly 
against a Navy recruiting office in 
Manhattan. The bombs were designed 
to cause maximum casualties due to 
shrapnel and fragmentation. This 
thwarted attack was likely planned to 
coincide with the Naples attack. In 
Federal court proceedings, U.S. pros- 
ecutors stated that the evidence sug- 
gested Kikumura was secretly working 
for Libyan leader Mu'ammar Qadhafi. 
Kikumura was convicted in a U.S. Dis- 
trict Court and sentenced to 30 years 
in prison in early 1989. 

JRA Background 

The JRA, headquartered in Lebanon's 
Syrian-occupied Bekaa Valley, was 
formed in 1971 by Fusako Shigenobu 
who had been joined by members of the 
now-defunct Japanese Red Army Fac- 
tion (JRAF) while she served as liaison 
between the JRAF and Palestinian ter- 



rorists. Shigenobu, who was born in 
Tokyo in 1945, remains the JRA leade 
spending a significant amount of time 
in Lebanon. 

The JRA's core strength has prob 
bly never exceeded 25 members. Sym- 
pathizers in Japan probably number 
several hundred. Homeland supportei 
have provided some moral and financi 
assistance as well as an audience for 
JRA propaganda. The primary sourcf 
of JRA funds is believed to be Palesti 
ian factions (primarily the PFLP) ^ 
and Libya. 

From 1972 to 1977, the JRA con- 
ducted terrorist acts on behalf of the' 
PFLP beginning with the massacre c 
some 26 people at Lod Airport in Tel 
Aviv in May 1972. JRA members part' 
ipated in additional PFLP operations 
including a series of bombings and hi- 
jackings in Singapore and Kuwait in 
early 1974. Subsequent JRA actions ii 
the mid-1970s included hostage-takinj 
and hijackings, nearly all of which we 
aimed at freeing jailed JRA memben 
An example was the JRA's August 19' 
occupation of the consulate building o 
the U.S. Embassy in Kuala Lumpur 
and seizure of 52 hostages which, fol- 
lowing threats on their lives, forced 
the release and safe passage to Libya 
of five JRA members who were 
imprisoned in Japan. 

Arrests 

The arrest of several members of the 
Japanese Red Army over an 8-month 
period beginning in late 1987 has shei 
light on the organization's activities 
and probably has had a negative impa 
on its capabilities. 

In November 1987, Japanese au- 
thorities arrested high-ranking JRA 
member Osamu Maruoka in Tokyo. 
Maruoka, who participated in two hi- 
jackings in the 1970s, was carrying st 
eral passports, including one stolen 
from Japanese tourists in Madrid in 
1986. He had traveled widely in Eu- 
rope and Asia and also had a ticket fo 
Seoul, South Korea, leading to specu: 
tion that the JRA would target the up 
coming Olympics. Details released 
following Maruoka's arrest indicated 
that the JRA may have been organizi: 
cells in Manila and Singapore. 

Prior to his arrest in April 1988, 
Yu Kikumura had been in the United 
States just over 1 month and had trav 
eled over 7,000 miles by car, passing 
through 13 States. Kikumura had pre 
viously been arrested in the Nether- 
lands in 1986 carrying explosives at 
Amsterdam's Schipol Airport. He wa: 



64 



Department of State Bulletin/November 19) 



TERRORISM 



orted to Japan but later released on 
i!echnicality. He was known to have 
rintained an apartment in Athens 
1 1 had a bank account in Zurich, 
'tording to evidence presented in 
>;. court proceedings, Kikumura had 
,..ined at a Bekaa camp in late 1986 
iP early 1987. 

In May 1988 Yasuhiro Shibata was 
le.'ited in Tokyo. Shibata was one of 
ue 1970 hijackers of an aircraft to 
\jrth Korea of the "Yodo-go" Japanese 
Hines. The group has remained in 
^ongyang, harbored by the North Ko- 
■in (lovernment. Although the "Yodo- 
j' group predates the formation of the 
I A, some of its members are believed 
ihave been in recent contact with the 
I A. Shibata may have met Maruoka in 
[-cyo before the latter's arrest. 

In June 1988, Philippine authorities 
rested Hiroshi Sensui and deported 
n to Japan. Sensui had been living 
Manila since 1984 and had set up a 
ding company, posing as a legiti- 
te businessman. Investigations re- 
'iled that Sensui, who had undergone 
) Stic surgery and had to be identified 
, -ough fingerprints, created a region- 
luipport base — presumably for the 
\ A — dealing in illegal passports, 
;e-transit facilities for Maruoka and 
)iers, and fundraising through the 
!,pected JRA affiliate, the ADF. Sen- 
: hud previously been convicted of 
nler in Japan but was released in 
['7 as part of an exchange for 156 hos- 
; ;es held by the JRA during a hijack- 
;. The JRA's relationship with the 
* w People's Army in the Philippines 
uncertain. 

[ospects 

I A members have demonstrated an 
jility to travel extensively, establish 
:.'ert support networks (possibly in 
lirope, as well as in Asia), and con- 
ret terrorist operations in widely 
»parate regions of the world. These 
:pabilities — combined with a publicly 
■ited intention to strike at Japanese, 
IS., and other Western government 
trgets and the use of stand-away tech- 
I lui's such as car bombs and rockets 
uich assist the terrorists in making 
tod their escape — means that the JRA 
ilikely to remain a serious threat for 
te forseeable future. 



Selected Incident Chronology 

May 1972, Israel. JRA terrorists car- 
ried out a machinegun and grenade at- 
tack at Lod Airport. Twenty-six people 
were killed, including 16 U.S. Puerto 
Rican citizens on a pilgrimage to the 
Holy Land. 

July 1973, Libya. The JRA partici- 
pated in a joint Arab/Latin American/ 
Japanese operation in which a Japan 
Airlines 747 was hijacked to Libya. The 
hostages were offloaded and the plane 
destroyed when a ransom demand of 
$30 million was not paid. 

January-February 1974, Singa- 
pore. JRA terrorists attacked Shell 
Oil refinery storage tanks and seized a 
ferryboat crew and passengers as hos- 
tages. All hostages were released 
unharmed. 

September 1974, Netherlands. The 

JRA seized 11 hostages at the French 
Embassy in The Hague. The terrorists 
demanded, and were provided, an 
airliner for transport to Syria. Two 
Dutch police were wounded during the 
incident. 

August 1975, Malaysia. Ten JRA 

members took over the consulate build- 
ing at the U.S. Embassy in Kuala Lum- 
pur and seized 52 hostages, including 
the U.S. Consul and the Swedish 
Charge. The terrorists threatened to 
blow up the building and kill the hos- 
tages unless seven prisoners in Japan, 
mostly JRA members, were released 
and allowed safe passage to the Middle 
East. The five who were willing to go 
were flown to Tripoli, Libya, by way of 
Kuala Lumpur. 

September-October 1977, India. 

The JRA hijacked a Japan Airlines 
plane in Bombay and forced it to land 
in Dhaka, Bangladesh. The Japanese 
Government agreed to release nine im- 
prisoned JRA sympathizers and pay 
$6 million in exchange for the 159 hos- 
tages. The JRA hijackers were then 
flown to Algeria. 

May 1986, Indonesia. Fingerprints 
of JRA member Tustomu Shirosaki 
were found in a hotel room from which 
crude mortars were fired at the Japa- 
nese and U.S. Embassy buildings in 
Jakarta. The AIIB claimed respon- 
sibility for the two attacks as well as a 
car bombing at the Canadian Embassy. 

1986, Netherlands. JRA member 
Yu Kikumura was arrested at Schiphol 
Airport in Amsterdam carrying a 
bomb in his luggage. Kikumura was 
later deported to Japan but released 
on a technicality shortly thereafter. 



April 1987, Spain. The AIIB 
claimed responsibility for rocket at- 
tacks on the U.S. Embassy and USIS 
facilities in Madrid and linked them to 
the anniversary of the U.S. 1986 air- 
strike on Libya. 

June 1987, Italy. The AIIB claimed 
responsibility for two rockets fired at 
the British Embassy in Rome and a car 
bomb and rocket attack against the 
U.S. Embassy on the same day. An 
Italian judge later issued arrest war- 
rants for JRA members Shirosaki and 
Junzo Okudaira based upon photo 
identifications. 

November 1987, Japan. Authorities 
in Tokyo arrested Osamu Maruoka, a 
high-ranking JRA member. Maruoka, 
who had participated in two hijackings 
in the 1970s, had traveled widely in 
Europe and Asia. 

April 1988, Italy. A bomb planted 
in front of the USO club in Naples 
killed five people, including one U.S. 
Navy servicewoman. Based on finger- 
prints, Italian police identified JRA 
member Okudaira as responsible for 
the bombing, which had been claimed 
under the name "Jihad Brigade." 

1988, U.S. JRA member Yu 
Kikumura was arrested on the New 
Jersey Turnpike with three antiperson- 
nel bombs in his possession. Kikumura 
was later convicted for transporting 
bombs and sentenced to 30 years in 
prison. 

May 1988, Japan. Yasuhiro Shi- 
bata, one of the original "Yodo-go" hi- 
jackers in 1970 who had since lived pre- 
dominantly in North Korea, was 
arrested in Tokyo. 

1988, India. A Citibank branch in 
New Delhi was heavily damaged by a 
powerful bomb explosion in which one 
person was killed and 13 wounded. Al- 
though no group claimed responsibility, 
Indian authorities believe that the JRA 
is a suspect in the attack. 

June 1988, Philippines. JRA mem- 
ber Hiroshi Sensui was arrested and 
deported to Japan. Sensui, posing as a 
businessman, had created a regional 
support base for the JRA in the 
Philippines. 

July 1988, Spain. Two improvised 
mortar devices were found near the 
U.S. Embassy in Madrid. The AIIB 
claimed responsibility for the at- 
tempted attack, linking it to the U.S. 
July 4th holiday and the previous day's 
unintended downing of an Iranian 
airliner by U.S. naval forces in the 
Persian Gulf. ■ 



ipartment of State Bulletin/November 1989 



65 



UNITED NATIONS 



Security Council Permanent Members 
Discuss international Issues 



JOINT STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 29, 1989 

On 29 September 1989, the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs of the five permanent 
members of the Security Council were 
the guests at a luncheon given by the 
Secretary General of the United Na- 
tions, H.E. Javier Perez de Cuellar. 
Taking part were the Minister of For- 
eign Affairs of the People's Republic of 
China, H.E. Mr. Qian Qichen; the Min- 
ister of State, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of France, H.E. Mr. Roland 
Dumas; the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re- 
publics, H.E. Mr. Eduard A. Shev- 
ardnadze; the Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland, H.E. Mr. John 
Major; and the Secretary of State 
for the United States of America, 
H.E. Mr. James A. Baker, III. 

The ministers and the Secretary 
General exchanged views on a wide 
range of major international issues and 
also reviewed developments over those 
issues since their previous meeting 
with the Secretary General on 28 Sep- 
tember 1988. They agreed that at the 
present time of positive change in the 
international political climate from 
confrontation to relaxation and interac- 
tion among states, the United Nations 
has an important role to play. 

The ministers placed particular 
emphasis on the efforts to resolve the 
current regional conflicts in accord- 
ance with the principles of the Charter 
of the United Nations. They noted with 
satisfaction the trend toward dialogue 
and peaceful settlement of disputes 
which had developed in recent years. 
They welcomed the active involvement 
of the United Nations in this process. 



The ministers expressed their firm 
commitment to the cause of independ- 
ence of Namibia through the holding of 
free and fair elections under the aus- 
pices of the United Nations. They ex- 
pressed their strong support for the 
Secretary General in his efforts to en- 
sure that Security Council Resolution 
435 (1978) is fully implemented. They 
urged all parties concerned scru- 
pulously to abide by their obligations 
under the settlement plan. 

Having reviewed developments in 
the Middle East, the ministers reaf- 
firmed their support for an active 
peace process in which all relevant par- 
ties would participate, leading to a 
comprehensive, just, and lasting peace 
in the region. They reiterated their 
full support for the efforts of the Arab 
League Tripartite Committee to put 
an end to the trials of the Lebanese 
people through the implementation of a 
plan for the settlement of the Lebanese 
crisis in all its aspects by guaranteeing 
the full sovereignty, independence, ter- 
ritorial integrity, and national unity 
of Lebanon. In this regard, they ex- 
pressed the strong hope that the re- 
sumed inter-Lebanese dialogue would 
develop constructively. 

The ministers expressed their sup- 
port for the Secretary General's efforts 
to secure the full implementation by 
Iran and Iraq of Security Council Reso- 
lution 598 (1987) as an integral whole 
and urged both governments to cooper- 
ate with the Secretary General in that 
regard. 

They reaffirmed their support for 
the peace process in Central America 
on the basis of the Esquipulas agree- 
ment and subsequent agreements by 
the Central American states and for 
the efforts of the Secretary General in 
this connection. 



The ministers expressed their 
concern at the current situation in 
Afghanistan and supported the effortj 
of the Secretary General to encourage 
and facilitate the early realization of 
comprehensive political settlement. 
They called on the parties concerned 
implement faithfully the Geneva agre 
ment and last year's General Assembl 
resolution. 

The ministers reviewed the situa 
tion in Cambodia in the light of the oi 
come of the Paris conference. They . 
advocated a comprehensive political 
settlement, which would ensure the ii 
dependent, sovereign, and neutral sta 
tus of Cambodia and a continuation ofi 
the negotiating process initiated to- 
ward this end. 

The ministers exchanged views o 
international cooperation against ter- 
rorism. They condemned all acts of te 
rorism in whatever form and demandi 
the immediate safe release of all 
hostages. The ministers called for 
strengthened international cooperati< 
aimed at combating illicit internation 
drug trafficking. 

The ministers commended the 
peacekeeping operations of the Unit 
Nations, which in their view illustratt 
the vital role of the organization in pi 
venting and resolving regional con- 
flicts. They underlined the importam 
of the effective functioning of these 
operations. 

In view of the primary respon- 
sibility of the Security Council for thi 
maintenance of international peace ai 
security under the Charter, the mini; 
ters expressed their satisfaction at tl 
improved working relations within th 
Council and with the Secretary Gene 
al. They expressed their determinatii 
to continue to work together and in ci 
operation with the Secretary General 
for the prevention and resolution of in 
ternational conflicts. 

The ministers expressed their 
deep appreciation to the Secretary 
General for his contribution to the 
cause of international peace and coop- 
eration. They thanked him for the 
invitation to the meeting which they 
considered a most useful occasion for 
an exchange of views. ■ 



66 



Department of State Bulletin/November 19); 



"'ESTERN HEMISPHERE 



he OAS and the Panama Crisis 



Following are a statement by 
jting Secretary Lawrence S. 
iigleburger before a Meeting ofCon- 
sitatioyi of Ministers of Foreign 
Jifairs of the Organization of Ameri- 
M States (OAS) on August 2i, 1989, a 
dclaration by the president of that 
Keting in consultation, and second 
Sitement by Acting Secretary Ea- 
g'burger at a special session of the 
(\S Permanent Council on August 31. 



iJTING SECRETARY 
EAGLEBURGER'S STATEMENT, 

i]G. 24, 19891 

(pi- first meeting on the crisis in Pan- 
;'pa was held on May 17. Since that 
'|ne, three member states of this orga- 
Kation have changed governments 
^irough democratic processes — El Sal- 
■'dor, Argentina, and Bolivia. In every 
<se, one political party yielded power 
]acefully to another. Today we wel- 
cme the new Deputy Foreign Minister 
^Bolivia, just as in previous meetings 
il; welcomed the new Foreign Minis- 
1rs of Argentina and El Salvador. 

Their presence among us is vivid 
' tness to a powerful force that is in 
■e process of transforming our planet. 

the Philippines, in Poland, in Hung- 
: y, to name but three countries, the 

fees of democracy are on the march. 
urs is a remarkable, a creative time — 
itime when people who for too long 
! ffered the degradation of totalitari- 
■lism, took back into their own hands 

e right to determine their own fu- 

re. Those who stand in the way of 
lat process are on the wrong side of 

story and, in the end, will find them- 
■Ives, as all dictators eventually have, 
. the garbage can of history. 

iioneers of Democracy 

1 many ways, the turn toward democ- 
icy that characterizes our era began 
1 this hemisphere. In recent years, na- 
on after nation has decided to follow 
le democratic path. Together, here in 
le Americas, we are building the 
orld's first democratic hemisphere, 
nd the leaders of the governments 
lat many of you represent are the 
ioiieers in that historic journey. 

The people of Panama also have be- 
un that historic journey toward de- 
locracy. They spoke clearly on May 7 



of this year. They voted for national 
dignity. They voted to end a brutal dic- 
tatorship. They voted to be free. They 
have a right to be free. No one has a 
right to deny that freedom. 

Nevertheless that vote for democ- 
racy was met with [Gen. Manuel An- 
tonio] Noriega's iron pipes and rifle 
butts, hired mobs and prison cells. The 
whole world denounced the violation of 
human rights which we witnessed in 
Panama and so did this Organization of 
American States. Indeed, the images of 
courage and the images of blood from 
that historic week in Panama will al- 
ways be etched in our memory. 

The people of Panama called out 
for our help, and the OAS sought to re- 
spond to their plea. We convened an 
emergency session to defend the prin- 
ciples of our charter and the human 
rights of the people of Panama. The 
question before us was never our com- 
mitment to Panamanian sovereignty, 
nor is it today. For the sovereign will of 
the Panamanian people is what we are 
here defending. The question before us 
was never our commitment to the Pan- 
ama Canal Treaties. For we reaffirmed 
our commitment to uphold those his- 
toric treaties on the first day we met. 

And let us be clear about one 
thing, if nothing else. Noriega did not 
steal the May 7 election because of 
"sanctions" or the legitimate exercise of 
treaty rights. He stole the election be- 
cause he lost it, and attempts to shift 
the focus from that overwhelming fact 
is nothing more nor less than deliber- 
ate obfuscation. 

The OAS Mandate 

The question before us remains what 
we declared it to be in our first reso- 
lution. It is, and I quote: "The grave 
events and the abuses by General Man- 
uel Antonio Noriega in the crisis and 
the electoral process in Panama." We 
recognized then, as we did today, that 
the grave abuses of Gen. Noriega's dic- 
tatorship threaten the peace of our 
hemisphere and violate the charter of 
this organization. That is why we dis- 
patched a mission to Panama. Our dis- 
tinguished Secretary General and the 
distinguished Foreign Ministers of 
Guatemala, Trinidad and Tobago, and 
Ecuador spent countless hours in Pan- 
ama working with the parties trying to 
achieve a transfer of power by Septem- 
ber 1 as called for in their mandate. 



They worked hard, and they made 
a difference. The United States has 
supported the work of the commission 
at every step of the way. Their efforts 
and commitment deserve all of our re- 
spect and gratitude. The commission 
brought the parties together for face- 
to-face negotiations. Together, they 
spelled out a serious agenda. At the 
last meeting, the parties laid out the 
elements that would permit a resolu- 
tion to the crisis: 

• The departure of Gen. Noriega 
from power; 

• Formation of a transition govern- 
ment on September 1; 

• New, free elections within the 
shortest possible time; and 

• The lifting of measures taken by 
the United States in response to the 
crisis in Panama. 

All rational Panamanians agree 
that this formula could resolve the cri- 
sis and establish democracy. The Unit- 
ed States has always been prepared to 
do its part. We want to see the crisis 
end. Nothing would please my govern- 
ment or the American people more than 
to end the measures currently in place 
and reestablish normal relations with a 
democratic Panama. 

Response to the Mandate 

Let us look at how the parties to the 
crisis responded to the commission's 
mandate. 

Were the candidates who won the 
votes of the Panamanian people pre- 
pared to make sacrifices for the good of 
their country? Were they prepared to 
work within the framework established 
by the OAS? Is the United States pre- 
pared to commit itself before the na- 
tions of this hemisphere to respect the 
Panama Canal Treaties and normalize 
relations with a Panamanian Govern- 
ment committed to democracy and 
human rights? Is the United States 
prepared to end the economic measures 
it has taken and resume its normal pro- 
cedures for ensuring the safe passage 
for all nations through the Panama 
Canal in full collaboration with the De- 
fense Forces of a democratic Panama? 
The answer to all of these questions is, 
and has always been, an unequivocal 
"yes." 

But was Gen. Noriega prepared to 
define any formula, any scenario, any 



department of State Bulletin/November 1989 



67 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



set of circumstances under which he 
would be willing to remove the primary 
obstacle to resolving the crisis as de- 
fined by the OAS? The answer is, and 
has always been, an unequivocal "no." 

There is only one obstacle to re- 
solving this crisis, and we all know who 
it is. Indeed, at our last meeting, the 
commission itself, in the report which 
we adopted, made it clear what that ob- 
stacle is: "The continued presence of 
General Noriega as Commander in 
Chief of the Defense Forces," the re- 
port says, "has been identified both by 
supporters and opposition as one of the 
factors, if not the principal factor, 
which must be addressed in order to 
solve the crisis." 

The people of Panama, the govern- 
ments of this hemisphere, and this Or- 
ganization of American States all want 
this crisis to end. But the dangerous, 
violent will of one dictator and a few 
desperate supporters stands in the way 
of democracy and peace in Panama. 

Still, this effort has not been in 
vain. The Noriega dictatorship thought 
it could steal the birthright of the Pan- 
amanian people on May 7 and the world 
would look the other way. Instead, the 
dictatorship has never been more iso- 
lated internally or internationally than 
it is today. And so it will remain. The 
crisis will not be resolved until the 
mandate of the OAS has been fulfilled. 
Indeed, it will only grow worse. 

Drug Trafficking 

There is another issue at stake in this 
debate over Panama — the disgrace, 
the terrible evil of drug trafficking in 
our hemisphere. Just this past week, 
we have been reminded again of the aw- 
ful price brave men and women — and 
whole societies — pay because these 
monsters — these drug traffickers — 
continue in our midst. 

Three days ago, the OAS met to 
discuss recent events in Colombia. 
Many delegations, including my own, 
spoke in tribute to the fallen heroes of 
this battle against the drug cartels; we 
respect and honor their memories. But 
we must do more than that. We must 
protect our children and our societies 
against these peddlers of poison and 
death. This is a war as deadly and as 
dangerous as any fought with armies 
massed across borders; the survival 
of democracy is at stake. 

We have all heard a great deal in 
this chamber in recent months, and 
even today, about the evils of interven- 
tion in the internal affairs of member 
states. It is a legitimate concern. But 



what, in God's name, would we gath- 
ered here today call the international 
drug trade — and those who aid it and 
abet it — but intervention in our inter- 
nal affairs? The murder of public offi- 
cials is interventionism by these drug 
cartels and the states that support and 
protect them. The poisoning of our chil- 
dren by the drug cartels and those who 
support and protect them is interven- 
tionism in our internal affairs. That, 
certainly, is how all decent people 
in this hemisphere regard these ac- 
tivities. That is how the United States 
regards these activities; we intend to 
do all we can to bring them to an end. 

Countries that provide safe haven 
and support for the international drug 
trafficking cartels menace the peace 
and security of this hemisphere just as 
surely as if they were using their own 
military forces to attack our societies. 
The truth is, and every one of us knows 
it. Gen. Noriega has turned Panama 
into a haven for drug traffickers and a 
center for money laundering and the 
transshipment of cocaine. Will Gen. 
Noriega be permitted to falsely wrap 
himself in the flag of Panamanian sov- 
ereignty while the drug cartels with 
which he is allied intervene throughout 
this hemisphere? That is aggression as 
surely as Adolf Hitler's invasion of Pol- 
and 50 years ago was aggression. It is 
aggression against us all, and some day 
it must be brought 
to an end. 

The Panamanian Constitution re- 
quires that in just 8 days a new demo- 
cratic government take office. The 
resolution of the OAS affirms as well 
that a transfer of power through demo- 
cratic mechanisms must take place by 
that date. All of us hope, I know, that 
in the few days remaining, the crisis 
can be resolved, but time is running 
out. Rearranging the deck chairs on 
Noriega's Titanic will not satisfy the 
mandate of the OAS, nor will it resolve 
the crisis. Only a genuine transfer of 
power will achieve the result we all 
seek. 

Panamanian Defense Forces 

This is a time for Panamanians of every 
party and every institution to place the 
interests of their nation first. That is 
as true of the Panamanian Defense 
Forces (PDF) as it is of Panama's civil 
leaders of all political persuasions. This 
is not a partisan matter. Their common 
duty is to defend the constitution and 
the well-being of the people of Panama. 
If they do so, the PDF can and should 
play an important role in a democratic 



Panama. When the history of Panama 
return to democracy is written — ^andl 
will return to democracy — the rolls 
will record for all time those who 
placed the interests of their suffering 
nation first and those who defend a cc 
rupt dictatorship to the bitter end. 

Let the PDF reflect: Who is, in 
fact, threatening their institution to- 
day? The Panamanian people — 
including the men and women of the 
PDF and their families — who voted fl 
an end to the Noriega dictatorship d: 
May 7? The United States, which hasi 
worked in partnership for many yean 
with the PDF in their joint respons 
ibility to ensure safe passage througl 
the canal and which will depend on tl 
PDF to carry out that duty when the 
last U.S. troops leave Panama as the 
treaties call for on December 31, 1999 
The nations of this hemisphere, whicl 
voted to condemn the abuses perpe 
trated by Gen. Noriega against his o^ 
people, including many officers of thi 
PDF? Or is the real threat to the PDl 
posed by the man who abuses their pi 
fessional loyalty and brings suffering; 
on his nation in pursuit of his own pe 
sonal interests and power? 

Conclusion 

If the terms of the OAS mandate havn 
not been met by September 1, then tH 
Noriega regime will have declared it 
self to be an outlaw among civilized 
nations, and we should treat it accord 
ingly. Until the Panamanian people 
enjoy their democratic rights, every 
member of this body has an obligatioi 
to support the mandate of the OAS, t 
defend human rights in Panama, to 
combat the alliance of drug trafficker 
with the Noriega dictatorship, and to 
isolate this outlaw regime. To do any^ 
thing less would be to send a terrible 
dangerous signal to the enemies of de 
mocracy and the drug traffickers in 
our hemisphere. The people of Panani 
and the whole world will be watching. 
I spoke earlier about the powerful 
forces of history transforming our 
planet today. Can anyone doubt that 
this idea of democracy, this vision of 
freedom, represents an idea whose 
time has come. The dictators in their 
uniforms and boots can try to stand 
in the way, but they will be swept asi( 
in time. And then Noriega will be 
but a bad memory, and Panama will 
be free. 



68 



Department of State Bulletin/November 19 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



[siCLARATION, 

^ G. 24, 1989 

I 'he Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Ecu- 
i r, Guatemala, and Trinidad and Tobago, 
j-'ell as the Secretary General of the Or- 
Tjization of American States, are hereby 
linked for the painstaking and efficient 
wk they accomplished in compliance with 
;]: mandate entrusted to them by the 21st 
Kting of consultation. 

2. Grave concern is expressed over the 
:st that the participants in the political dia- 
oue in Panama have not yet arrived at a 
iution to the crisis in their country, which 
iljtion is the exclusive province of the Pan- 
lanians, and they are strongly urged to 
rke new and pressing efforts to achieve, in 
tordance with Resolution I of May 17 and 
J declaration by the president of July 20, a 
1 lonal accord prior to September 1, for 
Aich purpose they may rely on the mis- 
vi's assistance, should all the parties so 
■ uest. 

'■■'•. It is reaffirmed that, in the solution 
. lu- Panamanian crisis, the observance of 
jmxratic principles must be ensured in 
: free exercise of the sovereignty and self- 
i ermination of the Panamanian people. 

4. The Inter-American Commission on 
[-man Rights is requested to conduct, with 
: consent of the Government of Panama, 
iither visit to Panama at the earliest pos- 
iiie date for the purpose of completing and 
ilating the information on the situation of 
man rights in that country. 

5. To keep this meeting of consultation 
in. 



i( TING SECRETARY 
SAGLEBURGER'S STATEMENT, 

(ifG. 31, 1989^ 

[ the early morning hours of August 
i as the Meeting of Consultation of 
[rei,t;n Ministers was concluding its 
liberations on the crisis in Panama, 
t? Panamanian representative repeat- 
Ely challenged my government to, and 
I|Uote, "present to you the evidence 
aainst Noriega." He did so knowing — 
a a skilled criminal lawyer and as a 
rin who last year participated in nego- 
titions with my government on this 
i;ue — that the United States is a na- 
lin (if laws and is not about to conduct 
iriminal trial outside the courtroom. 
I? did so knowing that most of the evi- 
(nce against Gen. Noriega is subject 
t grand jury secrecy prohibitions and 
tat we would ourselves be committing 
■-•riminal offense were we to reveal 
'at evidence in advance of an actual 
lial. And, I would warrant, he did so 
'ping that these constraints and the 

eiiess of the hour would cause us to 

main silent. 



U.S. Severs Diplomatic Contact 
With Noriega Regime 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 1, 1989' 

On May 7, the people of Panama, by an 
overwhelming margin of votes, braved 
repression, intimidation, and fraud to 
choose democracy over dictatorship. 
They sent a clear and unmistakable 
message: They wanted an end to dic- 
tatorship and restoration of elected 
democratic government. 

But this act of self-determination 
was brutally repressed before the eyes 
of the entire world. Noriega answered 
the cry of his people with beatings and 
killings. The candidates chosen by the 
Panamanian people will not be allowed 
to take office today, as required by the 
Panamanian Constitution. Panama is, 
therefore, as of this date, without any 
legitimate government. 

Accordingly the United States will 
not recognize any government installed 
by Gen. Noriega. Our Ambassador will 
not return, and we will not have any 
diplomatic contact with the Noriega re- 
gime. The United States will continue 
to take other steps, including the tight- 
ening of measures to deprive the illegal 
regime of funds that belong to the Pan- 
amanian people, in support of self- 
determination and democracy and to 



counter the threat posed by Gen. Nor- 
iega's support for drug trafficking and 
other forms of subversion. I am confi- 
dent that other governments which sup- 
port human rights, democracy, and 
self-determination and which oppose 
drug trafficking will take similar 
measures. 

This should have been a proud day 
for Panamanians and for all who believe 
in self-determination and democracy. 
Instead it is a sad day — a sad day for 
Panama and for the democratic nations 
of this hemisphere. 

The peoples of Panama and the 
United States have enjoyed a close and 
mutually beneficial relationship since 
Panama's founding in 1903. Our people- 
to-people bonds have become even clos- 
er since the conclusion of the canal 
treaties of 1977, which the United 
States will continue to uphold. We will 
not forget this bond or the sacrifices 
Panamanians have already made to rid 
themselves of the outlaw Noriega re- 
gime. We will continue to stand by the 
people of Panama until their fight for 
self-determination is respected and 
democratic government is restored. 



' Text from Weekly Compilation of Pres- 
idential Documents of Sept. 4, 1989. ■ 



Economic IVIeasures Against Panama 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
SEPT. 12, 19891 

The United States is taking several 
economic measures to deny revenues 
to the Noriega regime. 

On August 31, the United States 
expanded the list of Panamanian com- 
panies and individuals affiliated with 
Noriega and his puppet regime to 
which Americans cannot make pay- 
ments. The list is undergoing further 
revisions, and more additions will be 
published soon. 

Yesterday the Department of the 
Treasury sent letters reiterating to all 
American companies in Panama the 
prohibitions on trade with the regime 
which apply to their businesses there. 
They were informed that the prohibi- 
tions will be strictly enforced. 



Panama's 1989 sugar quota of 
30,537 metric tons has been reallocated 
to the other countries that participate 
in the U.S. sugar quota program. The 
loss of the sugar quota denies the re- 
gime close to $15 million in revenue. 

In a related action, this morning 
the U.S. Trade Representative an- 
nounced the suspension of the addition- 
al quota of 23,403 tons to which Panama 
would have been entitled due to the 
quota increase. 

All of these actions are a direct re- 
sult of Gen. Noriega's continued un- 
willingness to respect the will of the 
Panamanian people by stepping down 
and permitting the installation of a 
freely elected government. 



1 Read to news correspondents by 
Department spokesman Margaret DeB. 
Tutwiler. ■ 



Apartment of State Bulletin/November 1989 



69 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



We respected the lateness of the 
hour on August 24 but will not remain 
silent. We will not permit Gen. Nor- 
iega's representatives to abuse the lim- 
itations our Constitution establishes to 
protect the rights of the accused. We 
cannot accept his characterization of 
our unwillingness illegally to reveal 
evidence in advance of trial as "proof 
that the serious criminal charges 
against Gen. Noriega are frivolous or 
manufactured. 

But neither will we fall into the 
trap that perhaps the representative of 
Panama was seeking to lay for us. We 
will not compromise our ability to pros- 
ecute Gen. Noriega by violating the 
rights that he — like every other crimi- 
nal defendant — is guaranteed under 
our legal system. Nor need we do so to 
produce the "proof that the Panama- 
nian representative so diligently 
sought. 

In addition, we will respond to al- 
legations by Gen. Noriega's representa- 
tive that the United States is reneging 
on our solemn commitment to faithful 
implementation of the Panama Canal 
Treaties and that we are intervening in 
the internal affairs of Panama. 

Today I will lay out the facts on 
those issues as well and allow you to 
judge: Who threatens the canal trea- 
ties? The United States or Gen. Nor- 
iega? Who is engaged in intervention in 
the internal affairs of other countries, 
and who is depriving the Panamanian 
people of their right of self-determina- 
tion? The United States or Panama? 
Who is responsible for destabilizing the 
Panamanian military and Panamanian 
society? The United States or Gen. 
Noriega? Let us review the record. 

The Indictment Process 

On February 4, 1988, Gen. Noriega and 
15 other defendant.s — including Pablo 
Escobar, the Ochoa brothers, and other 
members of the infamous Medellin drug 
cartel — were indicted by a Federal 
grand jury in Miami, Florida, on multi- 
ple counts of narcotics trafficking and 
related offenses. Gen. Noriega and 
Panamanian businessman Enrique 
Pretelt were simultaneously indicted 
by a Federal grand jury in Tampa, 
Florida, on conspiracy to import an 
enormous quantity of marijuana and on 
related charges. 

Let me begin by outlining the 
meaning and seriousness of an indict- 
ment under U.S. law. 



The criminal process is initiated 
when a Federal investigative agency, 
for example the Drug Enforcement Ad- 
ministration (DEA), believes it has evi- 
dence of violations of U.S. law. This 
evidence may be based upon an investi- 
gation involving witnesses, physical ev- 
idence, bank records, etc. The agents 
present this information to the office of 
the U.S. Attorney in their region. A 
prosecutor reviews this information to 
determine whether there is sufficient 
evidence that a crime — or crimes — has 
been committed to bring the case be- 
fore a "grand jury". 

A grand jury is composed of from 
16 to 23 ordinary U.S. citizens selected 
at random. The grand jury operates 
under the supervision of a Federal 
judge. The grand jury has the duty to 
review the evidence submitted by the 
U.S. prosecutors. It has the authority 
to issue a "subpoena" directing a per- 
son to give testimony or to produce evi- 
dence in his possession. And it can also 
issue subpoenas to obtain bank records 
and other corporate documents. 

If a grand jury finds that the evi- 
dence establishes "probable cause" to 
believe that the defendant or defend- 
ants committed crimes, those crimes 
and a summary of the facts based on 
the evidence must be specified in an in- 
dictment. "Probable cause" has been 
defined by U.S. courts as "evidence 
sufficient to cause a person of ordinary 
prudence and caution consciously to en- 
tertain a reasonable belief of the ac- 
cused's guilt." 

Grand jury proceedings are not 
public. It is a crime for a prosecutor or 
a member of the grand jury to discuss 
grand jury proceedings in public. In 
general, evidence obtained by a grand 
jury may only be used at a later crimi- 
nal trial. 

Under our system, the actual trial 
can only occur when the defendant is 
physically present before the court. At 
that time, the prosecutors must pro- 
duce the evidence upon which they are 
relying, including all witnesses. A 
judge and a different jury hear the evi- 
dence of both the prosecutors and the 
defense and reaches a judgment of 
guilty or not guilty. 

For those who come from the many 
nations of this hemisphere which follow 
the civil law system, I would draw an 
analogy. When the prosecutor goes to 
the grand jury, this is roughly equiva- 
lent to an "accusation" in the civil law. 
When the grand jury, after investiga- 
tion, returns an indictment, this is 



equivalent to the conclusion of the in 
vestigative or sumario phase of a civ 
law trial. Only when the defendant h.- 
been physically presented to the ecu 
can the equivalent of the plenario 
phase — the actual trial — begin. Indii 
ments are serious documents, reflect 
ing a thorough investigation and 
considered judgment by impartial 
citizens. 

Let me now turn to the content > 
the two indictments brought by gran 
juries in Florida against Noriega. 

Indictments Against Gen. Noriega 

In the U.S. District Court for the Mi 
die District of Florida in Tampa, Gei 
Noriega and Enrique Pretelt are 
charged with conspiracy to import a 
distribute marijuana. The indictmen 
describe the attempted importation 
into the United States of over 1 milli 
pounds of marijuana during 1983-84. 

The indictment charges that mil 
lions of dollars in U.S. currency re- 
presenting the proceeds from the 
successful importation of 280,000 
pounds of marijuana into the United; 
States by Steven Michael Kalish and< 
others were transported to Panama 
and laundered through Panamanian 
banks and businesses, with the appr 
al and assistance of the defendants. 
They charge that Noriega and otheri 
agreed to facilitate the importation 
400,000 pounds of marijuana into the 
United States and the laundering of 
more than $100 million in illicit pro- 
ceeds through Panama. And they coi 
elude that during the course of the c« 
spiracy, Kalish made payments to 
Noriega and others of approximately 
million for Noriega's authorization a: 
approval of marijuana smuggling anc 
money-laundering activities within 
Panama. 

In the Federal District Court foi 
the Southern District of Florida in M 
ami. Gen. Noriega is charged with e; 
ploiting his official position as head < 
the intelligence section of the Nation 
Guard of Panama and then as com 
mander in chief of the renamed Pana 
Defense Forces (PDF) to receive pay 
offs in return for assisting and prote 
ing international drug traffickers. T' 
individuals he is charged with assist 
in the conduct of narcotics and mone.^ 
laundering operations in Panama in- 
clude Pablo Escobar Gaviria, Gustav 
DeJesus Gaviria Rivero, Jorge Ochoa 
Vasquez, and Fabio Ochoa Vasquez. 

Gen. Noriega protected cocaine 
shipments flown from Medellin, Co- 



70 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1(u 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



o+)ia, through Panama to the United 
: IS. Further he arranged for the 
r isshipment and sale of ether and 
ic'.cone, including such chemicals pre- 
,'iisly seized by the PDF, to the 
kl.'ellin cartel. He provided refuge 
irj a base for continued operations to 
himembers of the Medellin cartel af- 
ethe murder of the Colombian Minis- 
e of Justice, Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, in 
94. He agreed to protect a cocaine 
abratory being constructed in Darien 
'ivince, Panama. And he assured the 
,af passage of millions of dollars of 
lacotics proceeds into Panamanian 
)aks. In return for these services, 
"Ifiega received in excess of $4.6 
nlion. 

Also detailed in the indictment is a 
le 15, 1984, flight into Miami, Flori- 
1; \\ ith over a ton of cocaine resulting 
rm this conspiracy. 

We have asked the Secretariat to 
i ulate to each of you authentic copies 
lihese indictments. 

L|ise and Betrayal 

^^ ' story these indictments tell is sim- 
ilaml chilling. It is the story of that 
?ie shameless excess in the criminal 
ill that we have already seen in the 
Ktical field. When Noriega became 
';P commander in August 1983, what 
rjht have been called "minor" corrup- 
i , became major indeed. What in 
il was a payment of $100,000 for spe- 
ii transshipments of drugs through 
'iiama became, by 1984, a payment to 
^iega of some $4 million for protec- 
i'l of the cartel itself. What had been 
iii'ate opportunism became brazen 
.1 se of public authority and betrayal, 
Ml (if close associates. What had been 
i^ for a few became dangerous for 
"lyone — in the PDF, in Panama, in 
I entire hemisphere. 

Assertions by Noriega and his cro- 
I s that the U.S. charges are not sub- 
tntiated by any evidence are bunk. 
^ shown above, the indictments them- 
nes allege repeated and specific acts 
i:'i-iminality involving Noriega per- 
i'lally. Public testimony before con- 
I'ssional committees by former 
^lamanian Consul General Blandon 
il by individuals who participated in 
lie trafficking or money laundering 
' h .X'oriega — such as Amjad Awan (a 
' niir official of the Bank of Credit 
. I Commerce, International), Nor- 
i as former personal pilot Floyd Carl- 

1, drug trafficker Steven Kalish, and 
■ other Noriega associates — also de- 

1 Noriega's criminal culpability. A 



copy of this testimony is available for 
your inspection at the Secretariat. 

Gen. Noriega's representative here 
challenged the credibility of the wit- 
nesses against him by noting that some 
of them are themselves convicted crim- 
inals. This should come as no surprise 
to those of you who have struggled 
against drug trafficking. Drug traf- 
fickers do not generally carry out their 
conspiracies in the presence of honest 
citizens. Witnesses testify under penal- 
ty of perjury. They can be tried and 
jailed for making false statements to 
the grand jury, the court, or the 
Congress. 

Our prosecutors and grand juries 
are well aware of the background of 
such witnesses. They, therefore, care- 
fully test the statements of such wit- 
nesses against account records, 
physical evidence, and the testimony of 
other witnesses not charged with 
crimes to see if their statements are 
corroborated or contradicted. In this 
case, after investigation, the grand 
jury obviously determined that suffi- 
cient credible evidence existed to indict 
Gen. Noriega. 

Challenge to the Indictments 

Gen. Noriega has retained attorneys in 
the United States to defend him. They 
have challenged the indictments before 
U.S. Federal court. They alleged that 
he was immune because he was "head 
of state." They alleged that the case 
against him was politically motivated. 
They alleged that his drug trafficking 
was protected by the doctrine of sover- 
eign immunity, since he used the insti- 
tutions of the Panamanian state in 
performing these activities. They filed 
documents and made arguments in sup- 
port of these contentions. None of their 
arguments stood. The court ruled 
against them. The indictments stand. 
So let us put aside once and for all 
this contention that Gen. Noriega is a 
poor, humble, honest man who has been 
unjustly accused. He is a man who — as 
the result of an extensive criminal jus- 
tice process — stands accused before 
U.S. courts of the most serious viola- 
tions of U.S. law for his individual be- 
havior. He deserves a fair trial on the 
merits, as any other defendant. And he 
will receive one. But make no mistake; 
he does deserve to be tried. 



Evidence of Other Abuse of Power 

The evidence of Gen. Noriega's abuse of 
power and venality is not limited to his 
drug trafficking. 

The private, ill-gotten gains of 
Gen. Noriega belie his representative's 
appealing but unpersuasive public rela- 
tions image of a poor youth of humble 
origins who, by virtue of individual ef- 
fort, merit, and talent, rose through 
the ranks to become head of a small but 
respectable military force. By conserv- 
ative estimates, we judge Noriega's 
personal wealth — much of it hidden in 
secret bank accounts abroad — to be at 
least $200-300 million. This personal 
fortune includes: 

• A luxurious $600,000 mansion in 
Panama City hung with nearly 50 valu- 
able oil paintings and a chalet near a 
Panamanian air strip in Rio Hato; 

• A vacation home on Madden 
Lake, Panama, a mountain retreat with 
a mansion and several houses on 60 
acres in Chiriqui Province; 

• A farm in France, approximately 
50 minutes from Paris, and a luxury 
apartment in an elite section of Paris; 

• Several luxury apartments in the 
Dominican Republic, where Noriega's 
wife purchased furniture, art objects, 
and antiques valued in the millions of 
dollars; 

• Various jet aircraft, including 
three Lear jets and a twin-engine air- 
craft. In 1984 he purchased a sophisti- 
cated helicopter for his personal use for 
$2 million. In late 1983, Steven Kalish 
negotiated and purchased a Boeing 727 
jet aircraft for $2.2 million for Nor- 
iega; the jet was later used for money 
laundering; 

• Three large pleasure yachts — the 
Macho I, Macho II, and Macho III; 

• In December 1987, Noriega deco- 
rated himself with a decoration called 
the Eagle Medal. The cost of the medal, 
made of gold and precious stones, was 
over $85,000. And, as one of the wit- 
nesses testified, "it was given to Nor- 
iega for no victory or no battle at all;" 

• To give just one example of other 
Noriega family excesses, Jose Blandon 
has testified that when he was Panama- 
nian consul in New York, "one of the 
daughters of Noriega was in New York 
and in one day, she spent over $50,000 
in purchases in New York stores;" and 

• The Senate hearing record in- 
cludes copies of tens of thousands of 
dollars of charges at the Helmsley Pal- 
ace Hotel in New York run up by Gen. 
Noriega and his family. 



Apartment of State Bulletin/November 1989 



71 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



We have previously had the testi- 
mony before our Congress of a then- 
official of the Bank of Credit and Com- 
merce, International that in 1982, Nor- 
iega opened an account at the Panama 
City branch of the Bank of Credit and 
Commerce, International which he 
claimed was a "secret service" account 
which remained open until early 1988. 
Only he had signature authority for 
the account. In addition, his wife and 
three daughters had credit cards, the 
charges for which were paid from this 
account. While the amount of money in 
this transactional account fluctuated, 
as much as $20-25 million were in the 
account at various times. 

Due to legal constraints, we are 
still not at liberty to divulge all of the 
information available to us concerning 
Gen. Noriega's huge secret accounts. 
However, I have asked the Secretariat 
to distribute copies of genuine docu- 
ments signed by Gen. Noriega with the 
Bank of Credit and Commerce, Inter- 
national. These genuine bank docu- 
ments speak for themselves. They 
reveal personal control over millions of 
dollars. Like the tip of an iceberg, they 
allow us to visualize the depths of Nor- 
iega's deceit and criminality. 

Gen. Noriega's illicit activities and 
the wealth he has gained from them are 
the real explanation of why he insists 
on retaining control of the institutions 
of the Panamanian state in defiance of 
the will of his own people. He is no pa- 
triot determined to defend his country 
from external threats. Nor is he even a 
professional soldier seeking to preserve 
his military institution. 

Beginning of the Crisis in Panama 

Let us remember how the crisis in Pan- 
ama began. It did not have anything to 
do with the United States, the canal, or 
any outside threat to Panama or its 
military. Rather the crisis is the result 
of the reaction in June 1987 of a broad 
spectrum of the Panamanian people to 
specific accusations of assassination, 
election fraud, and corruption leveled 
against Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega 
by the then second in command of the 
PDF, Col. Roberto Diaz Herrera. 

Why did Col. Diaz Herrera go pub- 
lic? Perhaps the answer lies in what 
Gen. Noriega was doing to his own 
institution. 

When Gen. Omar Torrijos Herrera 
died tragically in 1981, the senior offi- 
cers of the Panama National Guard 
drew up an agreement to provide for 
institutional stability and transfer of 



72 



command. We have asked the Secre- 
tariat to circulate copies of this signed 
agreement, which was disclosed by one 
of its signers. 

Certain of its key provisions in- 
volved Gen. Noriega, who solemnly 
signed this compact. It was provided 
that he would assume command from 
Gen. Paredes in March of 1984 and 
would place the support of the military 
behind Gen. Paredes' candidacy for the 
presidency. And it provided that Nor- 
iega would retire July 31, 1987. 

We know what happened. Once 
Paredes was out, Noriega worked 
against his candidacy. And when Nor- 
iega's time came to retire, he fired his 
agreed upon successor instead. This 
destabilization of the institution was 
the proximate cause of Diaz Herrera's 
revelations and the subsequent revul- 
sion of the Panamanian people — a 
revulsion that led to strikes and 
demonstrations beginning in the sum- 
mer of 1987, well before the U.S. in- 
dictments, the U.S. sanctions, or the 
U.S. military maneuvers were even 
conceived. 

And his abuse of his institution 
continues. Who has bypassed the Gen- 
eral Staff and the regular chain of com- 
mand by setting up his own shadow 
organization within the military? Who 
has promoted his cronies and jailed his 
opponents in violation of military law 
and the escalafonl Who has led his 
forces into confrontation with their 
own people? Who has placed them in 
conflict with his closest traditional 
ally — the United States — and the rest 
of the democratic world? Who has cre- 
ated "dignity battalions" of thugs to do 
the dirty work of repression, the work 
we all witnessed when the victors of 
the May 7 election were shot at and vi- 
ciously beaten before our very eyes? 
Who created armed groups outside the 
control of the lawful security forces? 

The men of the defense forces know 
who has abused their professional loy- 
alty and brought shame and disgrace 
on their institution. Not a movement, 
not an ideology, not an external or in- 
ternal enemy. One corrupt man. One 
man who knows no limitations. 

Noriega's Claims 

Let us take an example of the lies and 
distortions he feeds to his own troops 
as well as the public. He claims — as his 
representative did August 24 — that his 
problems began when he refused a sup- 
posed request by former national secu- 
rity adviser Adm. John Poindexter to 
assist the Nicaraguan Resistance. 



This charge falls by reason of its 
own logic. Many friendly countries 
adopted policies different from those 
of the United States on the issue of 
Nicaragua. Yet we continue to have 
normal relations with them. 

It also fails on the facts. The met 
ing with Adm. Poindexter that Gen. 
Noriega describes was attended by s 
number of people, including professic 
al U.S. diplomats. The subject was n 
Nicaragua — which was touched on oi 
in passing. The subject was Panama. 
Adm. Poindexter strongly urged Gei 
Noriega to open up some political sp 
and to allow a transition to democrac 
Clearly he did not take that advice. ] 
what is most ironic is his own attitua 
on Nicaragua. 

In late August 1986, according b 
computer note from [National Secur- 
Council staff member Lt. Col.] Olive 
North to the national security advist' 
made available to the U.S. Congress 
personal representative of Manuel N< 
iega proposed that, in exchange for i 
promise from the U.S. Government' 
"help clean up his [Noriega's] image'' 
and a commitment to lift a U.S. ban 
on military sales to the PDF, Norieg 
would "take care of the Sandinista 
leadership. 

Needless to say, the United Stati 
rejected this "offer" of assassination 
How can a man who would make sue) 
an offer — a man who in December 19' 
contributed directly to an attemptec 
military rebellion in Argentina, a m 
who has supported the guerrillas an. 
the drug traffickers in Colombia — ha 
the unmitigated gall to claim that hi; 
problems are the result of his strong) 
stance against intervention. 

The Panamanian representative 
serted that Noriega's May 1984 raid ( 
a cocaine processing plant in Darieni 
Province showed his commitment to 
combating narcotics trafficking. As 
several witnesses testified before a 
U.S. congressional subcommittee, tl 
reality was very different. 

The raid on the Darien operatior 
took place shortly after Noriega 
accepted over $4 million from the 
Medellin cartel to give safehaven to 
cartel leaders and 70-90 bodyguards 
after the cartel had assassinated 
Colombian Minister of Justice Lara 
Bonilla. Prior to that time, Noriega 
had moved in on one of his competito 
in the protection of traffickers and h- 
accepted millions of dollars from the 
cartel to permit the plant to be set u 
After Lara Bonilla's death, Panama- 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



n and Colombian public pressure on 
i riega — and perhaps U.S. pressure — 
cased Noriega to act. On his orders, 
t; PDF did shut down the operation. 
The Medellin cartel, however, felt 
d..(ble-crossed. It took Fidel Castro's 
ijervention to mediate the dispute. In 
t} end, the power plant of 40 mega- 
v'tts, the machinery, the cocaine be- 
iK processed, the chemicals being used 
ft the processing, and the seized air- 
cift were all returned to the Medellin 
c-tel. 

liues of Agreement 

1 1 us turn to some issues raised by 
tp representative of Panama on Au- 
gst 24 with which we can agree. 
Iiere are issues on which there is 
fndamental agreement between my 
gvernment and the overwhelming 
Hjni-ity of Panama's people, Panama's 
'Atinment, and the PDF. In fact, they 
i-.'ulve principles supported by all 
ismbers of this body. 

Panama Canal Treaties. The first 
i ue is the importance of faithful im- 
j "mentation of canal treaties. 

U.S. compliance is willing and 
^ead of schedule. When the treaty en- 
t;-ed into force on October 1, 1979, the 
hited States disestablished the Canal 
; ne and the Canal Zone government. 
' " transferred jurisdiction and gov- 
(nment functions — including ports, 
lilroads, fire protection services, and 
lads — to the Republic of Panama. All 
iilitary installations specified in the 
leaty — including the military installa- 
1)ns of Ft. Gulick, Ft. Randolph, por- 
bns of the land area of Ft. Clayton, 
- . Kobbe Beach, the installations at 
i)co Solo and Corozal, the Pacific Area 
.^])(it, parts of Ft. Amador, the lower 
; ea of Quarry Heights, and others — 
ere handed over to Panama when 
;iecified or sooner. 

Since the treaties entered into 
rc(_', some 2,786 housing units have 
■en transferred to Panama. This rep- 
fsents 64% of the the pretreaty inven- 
iry of housing. U.S. compliance is 
ears ahead of the transfer schedule 
itablished by the treaties. 

The United States has vigorously 
romoted growing Panamanian partici- 
ation at all levels of the canal work- 
irce. In 1979 the canal pilot force 
icluded just two Panamanians. Today 
lere are 56 Panamanian pilots among 
total of 227. Panamanians now make 
p 25% of the pilot force and should 
lake up 95% by 1999. As of the end of 



last month, the Panama Canal work- 
force included 1,009 U.S. citizens, less 
than half the number employed in 1979. 
At the same time, the number of Pan- 
amanian citizens employed by the Pan- 
ama Canal Company has risen to a total 
of 5,521, an increase of 24% since 1979. 
The canal workforce today is 86% Pan- 
amanian and growing. Panamanians 
have risen to the senior levels of the 
canal administration, and more will 
follow. 

The Panamanian representative ac- 
curately described on August 24 the 
close and respectful relations that have 
characterized the joint efforts of the 
U.S. and Panamanian military forces 
to defend the canal under the canal 
treaties. 

But what he did not describe was 
how, since February 1988, Noriega's 
harassment of the overwhelmingly 
Panamanian workforce has directly 
threatened canal operations, showing 
disregard not just for the treaties but 
for the canal itself. The United States 
was forced, as a result, to begin to ex- 
ercise its defensive treaty rights — not 
in the preferred mode of joint coopera- 
tion with the PDF but, nevertheless, in 
full compliance with the clear terms of 
the treaties. Recently this harassment 
of canal workers and of our military 
personnel has diminished notably. 

The representative of Panama told 
the foreign ministers last week that 
"the United States seeks to ruin Pan- 
ama, to destabilize it, to make it fall on 
its knees in order to force Panama to 
conclude a new military treaty that 
will prolong the presence of U.S. 
troops." 

This, too, is bunk. The treaty docu- 
ments provide that U.S. troops could 
be stationed in Panama after the year 
2000 only if both governments agree. 
But that is still more than 10 years 
away. The Government of the United 
States has never raised this issue, be- 
cause we believe this is a decision that 
can be made only at a time much closer 
to the year 2000 and because any last- 
ing arrangements could only be made 
with a Panamanian Government that 
enjoyed the support of its people. It is 
both ironic and revealing that the only 
Panamanians who have ever offered to 
extend U.S. base rights beyond the 
year 2000 have been individuals speak- 
ing for Gen. Noriega. In late 1988, they 
offered base rights in return for nor- 
malization of our relations with his re- 
gime. We flatly rejected this proposal. 



I am submitting to the council a 
number of documents on treaty imple- 
mentation, so I will take up only one 
other set of lies. 

The representative of Panama also 
told the foreign ministers last week 
that the United States is using canal 
annuities for propaganda against Nor- 
iega and that the United States is with- 
holding from Panama the deductions 
for social security and medical care 
from the wages of Panamanian canal 
workers. 

This claim is intentional deception. 
U.S. obligations to Panama, including 
payments called for under the canal 
treaties, are, in accordance with the 
request of the Delvalle government, be- 
ing paid into inviolable escrow accounts 
of the Government of Panama for the 
benefit of the Republic of Panama and 
the Panamanian people. The funds 
are there, in full, for unrestricted 
use by any legitimate Panamanian 
Government. 

As for the social security deduc- 
tions from wages of Panamanian citi- 
zens, the United States, at the request 
of President Delvalle, is, in fact, trans- 
ferring them to the Noriega regime for 
humanitarian reasons. I regret to say, 
however, that the regime is stealing 
those funds rather than using them for 
medical and retirement costs. 

To close this review of treaty im- 
plementation, let me note that since 
1979, the United States has invested 
several hundred million dollars in capi- 
tal improvements for the canal, and we 
invest between $5 and $6 million annu- 
ally in training Panamanians in the 
various skills necessary to operate the 
canal. It is true that were the canal 
to close today or tomorrow, the U.S. 
economy would suffer, but alternate 
container-based overland transporta- 
tion systems are already growing rap- 
idly; without overwhelming costs, all 
goods now transiting the canal could be 
moved from either coast of the United 
States. 

In contrast damage to the econ- 
omies of countries without the same 
alternatives — particularly Nicaragua, 
Ecuador, and Peru — would be major, as 
would the damage to Panama itself. 

More fundamental for the United 
States is a point related to security. 
The United States engaged in the nego- 
tiations leading to the treaties because 
we concluded that the canal's future, 
including international use, could best 
be assured by transferring the canal to 
a stable and popular government in a 



tepartment of State Bulletin/November 1989 



73 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



friendly Panama. The United States, in 
other words, agreed with Gen. Torrijos 
that the keys to the security of the can- 
al are good intelligence and a friendly 
people. 

The U.S. Government remains con- 
vinced that compliance with the Pan- 
ama Canal Treaties is in the national 
interest of the United States. The 
problem today is not the treaties; it is 
the absence of a stable, popular govern- 
ment in Panama. 

Peace and Democracy in Panama. 

Let me turn now to another issue: our 
support for a peaceful and democratic 
solution to Panama's problems. 

In February 1988, the President of 
Panama e.xercised his constitutional 
prerogative to dismiss Gen. Noriega 
from his post as commander of the 
PDF. As you know. President Delvalle 
was then purportedly impeached by a 
rump session of the Noriega-dominated 
National Assembly. After the assem- 
bly's February 26 action, the United 
States immediately stated that it sup- 
ported civilian constitutional rule in 
Panama. We have continued since then 
to recognize President Delvalle as Pan- 
ama's lawful president. Because his 
removal was illegal under Panama's 
Constitution, President Delvalle will 
continue to exercise the powers of the 
President of Panama until his term 
expires at midnight tonight. 

This political crisis could and 
rightfully should have been resolved by 
the May 7 election. But Noriega had 
that election annulled because he lost 
it. On May 17 the OAS condemned "the 
grave events and the abuses by General 
Manuel Antonio Noriega in the crisis 
and the electoral process in Panama." 

Our distinguished Secretary Gen- 
eral and the distinguished Foreign 
Ministers of Guatemala, Trinidad and 
Tobago, and Ecuador worked with the 
Panamanian parties trying to achieve a 
transfer of power. The United States 
supported the work of the commission 
at every step. The commission brought 
the parties together for face-to-face ne- 
gotiations. Together they spelled out a 
serious agenda. During the last round, 
the parties laid out elements that would 
permit a resolution to the crisis: 

• The departure of Gen. Noriega 
from power; 

• Formation of a transition govern- 
ment on September 1; 

• New, free elections within the 
shortest possible time; and 

• The lifting by the United States 
of measures taken in response to the 
crisis in Panama. 



74 



The United States has always been 
prepared to do its part. We want to see 
the crisis end. The measures we have 
taken have been coordinated with 
President Delvalle to demonstrate 
solidarity with the efforts of the 
Panamanian people to oppose what 
was, in effect, a military coup. The 
measures have included a declaration 
under the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act freezing Pan- 
amanian Government assets in the 
United States and banning payments 
to the Noriega/Solis regime of funds by 
U.S. citizens and companies. These are 
not "sanctions" in the sense of a gener- 
alized trade embargo or other meas- 
ures targeted at the economy of the 
country. Rather they are basically a 
prohibition on U.S. citizens making 
payments to the illegal Noriega 
regime. 

These measures are not the basic 
cause of the economic crisis in Panama. 
The economic crisis is, rather, a reflec- 
tion of the political crisis. People and 
companies take their funds and busi- 
ness elsewhere when stability is 
threatened. 

If Gen. Noriega truly believes that 
the release of the approximately $300 
million in payments placed in escrow in 
the United States would resolve the 
economic crisis, why does he not re- 
turn an equivalent amount from the 
funds he has stolen? The money in es- 
crow in the United States is drawing 
interest in the name of the Panamanian 
people and will return to them when 
democratic government is restored. 
Will the money Gen. Noriega has taken 
be returned? 

Nothing would please my govern- 
ment or the American people more than 
to end the measures currently in place 
and reestablish normal relations with a 
democratic Panama. 

There is only one obstacle to re- 
solving this crisis, and we all know who 
it is. On July 20, the OAS commission 
reported that "the continued presence 
of General Noriega as Commander in 
Chief of the Defense Forces has been 
identified both by supporters and oppo- 
sition as one of the factors, if not the 
principal factor, which must be ad- 
dressed in order to solve the crisis." 
Yet Gen. Noriega refuses to define any 
circumstances under which he would be 
willing to remove the primary obstacle 
to resolving the crisis as defined by the 
OAS. 

During all our efforts to seek a 
resolution of the political crisis, we 
have made it clear to Gen. Noriega and 



I 



to all political parties and groups in 
Panama that issues involving the coiri 
position of the Panamanian Govern 
ment and the role of the PDF were | 
issues to be decided by Panamanians- 
perhaps with Latin American media- 
tion — but certainly not by the United' 
States. Both our bilateral talks last | 
year and our support for the OAS \ 
mission of ministers were conducted 
strictly on this basis. 

Problem is Noriega 

This brings us back to the main issu< 
before us, the harsh reality underlyi) 
Panama's suffering. The problem is 
Noriega, and specifically Noriega's 
willingness to put his personal inter- 
ests and his personal gain above his ( 
leagues in the PDF, above his countr' 
and above the international communi 
in this hemisphere and the world. 

Noriega's greed, personal ambi- 
tion, and selfishness are the origin, 
core, and sustenance of Panama's cri- 
sis. So long as he and those around h) 
fail to recognize that reality, attempt 
disguise it, or deflect responsibility 
it to others, the crisis will only worst- 
There are times when good principle 
force us to defend bad men. Some arg 
that this is the case with Noriega ant 
Panama. They argue as if the princip 
of nonintervention requires us to ac- 
cept whatever Noriega does. 

But nonintervention was never 
meant to protect individual criminal 
It was never meant to promote inter- 
vention by drug traffickers in our so( 
eties against our families and childre 
It was never meant to prevent peace! 
and diplomatic action by sovereign 
states in support of democracy. And i 
was never meant to leave the crimina 
free to savage the good and the good 11 
powerless to react. 

One has to look no further than t 
Panama's southern neighbor to see a 
stark contrast. In Panama the regim< 
is aiding — giving refuge to — the nar- 
cotics tarffickers, their front busi- 
nesses, and the banks through which 
they launder their dirty money. 

These are the very people who 
have declared war on civilized societj 
in Colombia and have punished that h 
roic nation with assassinations, bomb 
ings, kidnappings, and threats which 
are undermining the very fabric of Li 
in America's oldest democracy. Presi- 
dent Virgilio Barco is marshaling all 
of his nation's forces — civilian and 
military — to restore decency and re- 
spect for the law in that country. The 



Department of State Bulletin/November 19 r 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



v^ majority of Colombians from all 
pvitical parties support him, for his 
stJggle is their struggle. It is, indeed, 
i ruggle on behalf of all of us. The 
tiffickers in Colombia threaten de- 
m.^racy as surely as would a foreign 
inader; their wares are killing our 
;hdren and corrupting our societies. 
A. the world's nations should provide 
jiwerving support — both moral and 
mterial — to the people and democratic 
Gl/ernment of Colombia. 

The writing is on the wall. The 
pitern is clear. Indifference to the vo- 
luminous evidence can only give license 
d encouragement to Noriega and his 
icid. 

The evasions, the posturings, the 
mipaganda parading as truth — all that 
Ni'iega's defenders have put forward 
;(\eep this criminal in power — have 
t)fn exposed. 

Noriega's actions — graphically de- 
fil in testimony, indictments, re- 
: jts, accounts, personal holdings, in 
irail of evidence that points to mis- 
Mduct on an international scale — 
Nriega's actions are inexcusable. 

But our inaction would be inexcus- 
1 e. This is no time for silence. This is 
utime for timidity. We must see Nor- 
iCa for who he is. 

Colombia and Panama. Barco and 
Sriega. Could we have a starker com- 
P'ison of the moral qualities of the 
j.t and the worse among us in our 
Unisphere? Which one deserves our 
ip; which one deserves to be purged 
hm our midst? For the United States, 
liieast, the answer is clear. 



Cuba: A Threat to Peace 

and Security in Our Hemisphere 



' Press release 160. 

- Press release 164 of Sept. 1, 1989.1 



by Michael G. Kozak 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on 
August 2, 1989. Mr. Kozak is Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Inter- 
American Affairs.^ 

Thank you for the opportunity to come 
here today to discuss our policy with 
respect to Cuba. These hearings are a 
timely initiative on the part of the com- 
mittee. Cuba has been in the news a lot 
lately. Many speculate that events in 
Havana may portend changes in Cuba's 
internal and external behavior and in 
our policies toward the Castro regime. 

Background 

Since January 1, 1959, when Fidel Cas- 
tro assumed power, bilateral relations 
between the United States and Cuba 
deteriorated sharply. This development 
can be attributed in part to the imposi- 
tion of a rigorous dictatorship in Cuba 
and, in part, to a pattern of unaccept- 
able international behavior on the part 
of the Cuban Government. Our princi- 
pal concerns were and remain: 

• Cuba's relationship with the 
Soviet Union; 

• Cuba's support for terrorism and 
efforts to destabilize democratic gov- 
ernments, especially in this hemi- 
sphere; and 

• Widespread human rights abuses 
and political repression within Cuba 
itself. 

More recently, we have had serious 
differences with the Castro regime on 
narcotics. Let's look at these issues one 
at a time. 



The Soviet Relationship 

Since the early 1960s, relations be- 
tween the Soviet Union and Cuba have 
been close. The relationship is mutually 
beneficial. Cuba gets critical economic 
and security assistance which both 
keeps its economy afloat and enables it 
to maintain one of the largest and best 
equipped military establishments in 
the Western Hemisphere. Approx- 



imately 15% of Cuba's population is 
militarized — either in the regular 
army or in the militia. Without Soviet 
help, Cuba's economy would probably 
collapse; without Soviet assistance, 
Cuba would not be able to project its 
power and influence to places like Cen- 
tral America and southern Africa. 
Soviet-bloc aid to Cuba exceeds $4 
billion in economic aid and trade sub- 
sidies and $1.5 billion in military 
assistance annually, accounting for al- 
most a quarter of the national product. 
The Soviet Union, in turn, receives im- 
portant military, strategic, and politi- 
cal benefits. Let me give you some 
examples. Soviet aircraft and naval 
vessels make extensive use of Cuban 
facilities, while shipments of Soviet 
equipment destined for Central Ameri- 
ca are often routed through Cuba. In 
addition, the Soviets have installed the 
largest single intelligence gathering 
installation outside the Soviet Union 
in Cuba. 

Although there are increasing 
signs that the Soviets are becoming 
disillusioned by wasteful Cuban eco- 
nomic policies and stubborn resistance 
to reform and would like very much to 
reduce assistance levels to Cuba, we do 
not believe cuts would be so severe as 
to endanger their special relationship 
with Cuba. The relationship will re- 
main intact for the foreseeable future. 

Cuban Foreign Policy 

For several years now, Cuba has pur- 
sued a two-track policy toward its 
Western Hemisphere neighbors, seek- 
ing formal diplomatic ties and improved 
trade and cultural relations with exist- 
ing governments while continuing sup- 
port for radical political groups and 
violent subversive movements. Cuban 
support for violent groups has included 
military and intelligence training for 
cadres, supplying weapons, providing 
guidance and organizational support, 
and working to unite splintered oppo- 
sition groups. 

Over the years, Cuban support for 
antidemocratic groups has been evi- 
dent in Central America, Colombia, 
Venezuela, Chile, and Cuba's Caribbean 



lepartment of State Bulletin/November 1989 



75 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



neighbors. For example, Cuba provides 
a wide range of support for the FMLN 
[Farabundo Marti National Liberation] 
insurgency in El Salvador; the M-19 in 
Colombia, a terrorist group which it- 
self has ties to trafficking organi- 
zations; and guerrilla groups in 
Guatemala. Cuba has close relations 
with and provides extensive military 
and economic assistance to the Sand- 
inista regime in Nicaragua, which in 
turn provides materiel support to guer- 
rillas throughout Central America. 

Let me take a minute to focus on 
Central America. The nations of Cen- 
tral America have called on govern- 
ments outside the region to stop 
supplying military assistance to in- 
surgent or irregular groups. This is a 
central tenet of the Esquipulas agree- 
ment. The United States is in compli- 
ance with that request. Nicaragua and 
Cuba continue to flagrantly violate the 
Esquipulas agreement through the con- 
tinued military support for the FMLN 
guerrillas in El Salvador. The recent 
discovery of a major insurgent weapons 
cache in San Salvador underscores the 
continuing commitment of Cuba and 
Nicaragua to support the guerrilla war 
in El Salvador. The cache — the largest 
ever captured by government forces — 
comprises a wide variety of modern 
Soviet-designed small arms (including 
14 AK-47 and 329 AKM assault rifles, 
10 antitank launchers, 90 rockets, 50 
grenades, 115 pistols, and other mili- 
tary weaponry) and over a quarter mil- 
lion rounds of ammunition manufac- 
tured in Cuba as recently as 1988. The 
AKM and AK^7 ammunition found in 
the cache was of Cuban manufacture, 
stamped with "Cuban Ammunition 
Loading Factory 13." 

The really disturbing dimension of 
the increased assistance to the FMLN 
from Cuba and Nicaragua is that with 
the provision of Soviet-bloc and North 
Korean weaponry, of which ammunition 
and replacements cannot be found in- 
side El Salvador, the FMLN and their 
Nicaraguan and Cuban patrons show 
little intention of complying with 
Esquipulas. The FMLN also appears 
confident that the arms pipeline will 
continue regardless of longstanding 
commitments to end such support to 
guerrillas in the region. 

Cuba has exploited the situation 
in Panama by increasing its presence 
there and by supporting the Noriega 
regime, thus exacerbating the Panama- 
nian problem by propping up and en- 
couraging Noriega. Castro uses the 



dispute to attempt to rally Latin soli- 
darity against the United States. We 
know from testimony given during the 
Ochoa/De la Guardia trials in Cuba, for 
example, that several Ministry of In- 
terior officials were cited in connection 
with money laundering and other co- 
vert activities in Panama, and that 
Panama was the venue for a number of 
officially sanctioned contacts with Co- 
lombian drug traffickers. We are in the 
process of adding to the designated 
Cuban nationals list additional names 
of Panamanian individuals and firms 
which act on behalf of Cuba. In a re- 
lated action, we have initiated steps 
which would prohibit transactions with 
Panamanian individuals and firms 
which are supporting Gen. Noriega and 
the illegal regime. 

Human Rights 

The Cuban Government is one of the 
worst violators of human rights in this 
hemisphere. Since the 1959 revolution, 
Cuba, under Fidel Castro, has author- 
ized political executions, torture, arbi- 
trary arrests and imprisonment, and 
inhumane prison conditions. Cuban cit- 
izens have been denied the most basic 
democratic rights and processes in both 
political and judicial domains. They 
have been subjected to constant sur- 
veillance by block committees, denied 
basic freedoms and legal due process, 
and prevented from traveling abroad. 
Aryeh Neier of Americas Watch esti- 
mated last month that the number of 
prisoners held on political charges 
could range as high as 300, some of 
whom had been held in prison since 
shortly after Castro came to power. 
Other estimates, which include those 
jailed for religious beliefs or for at- 
tempting to leave the country without 
permission, range in the thousands. 
The Castro regime admitted in March 
of 1988 that 455 prisoners were being 
held for "crimes against state securi- 
ty," i.e., loosely defined political 
crimes. 

In 1988 heavy international pres- 
sure was brought to bear on the Cuban 
regime through U.S. diplomatic efforts 
in international forums and by non- 
government groups, such as the Catho- 
lic Church, Red Cross, and Amnesty 
International. Last September's visit 
by a UN Human Rights Commission, 
(UNHRC) working group also raised 
the international profile of Cuban hu- 
man rights violations. In response the 
Cuban Government made temporary 






i 



improvements in its human rights p« 
formance; but since the UNHRC vis 
we find that abuse and repression cc 
tinue to be the order of the day. Ami 
cas Watch reported last month that 
least 22 Cuban human rights activi&^ 
who were arrested following the visi 
to Cuba last September of the UN 
group, are currently serving prison 
sentences or being held without triai 
Many more were subject to harassm 
and intimidation or apprehended am 
subsequently released. And we have 
noticed that the number of visits by 
human rights groups to Cuba has de 
clined markedly since the UN visit. 
The Cuban Government once again i 
tively discourages such visits and d- 
lomatic contacts with Cuban human 
rights activists. 

Certainly, the recent Ochoa/De 
Guardia scandal in Cuba raises ques' 
tions in the human rights area. Whi 
we cannot condone drug trafficking 
anyone and believe traffickers shoul 
be fully prosecuted, the specter oft 
Ochoa group being apprehended, in-, 
terrogated, investigated, tried, sen- 
tenced, subjected to an appeals proo 
ess, and executed, all within a matt 
of less than 1 month, suggests basic 
process was denied. 

Narcotics 

Cuba lies astride some of the priman 
routes used by South American traf 
fickers shipping their wares into thi 
United States. Witnesses at congres 
sional hearings since 1982 have char 
official Cuban involvement in drug t 
ficking. Indictments returned in 198 
1988, and 1989, respectively, chargec 
Cuban involvement in trafficking. 

Ann Wrobleski, then Assistant 
Secretary of State for International 
Narcotics Matters, stated in March 
of 1988 during testimony before the 
Task Force on International Narcotii 
Control of the House Committee on 
Foreign Relations: 

U.S. law enforcement officals report 
that Cuban air space and territorial watt 
are often used by drug traffickers. There 
are indications that some of this traffic i! 
sanctioned or facilitated by Cuba. 

Cuba figures prominently as a trans- 
shipment point for cocaine destined fort! 
United States in a recent Federal indict- 
ment handed down by a grand jury in Mi; 
on February 26. Four high-ranking Cuba 
officials were indicted in 1982 by a Feder 
grand jury in Miami on narcotics smuggl 
charges. They have not been brought to t 
as they did not voluntarily appear and coil 
not be extradited from Cuba. Other pers 
tried as part of the same conspiracy were 
convicted. 



76 



Department of State Bulletin/November 1!) 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Moreover, former Panamanian official 
1 lUandon tesitified separately before the 
e tc earlier in February that Fidel Castro 
mat ml a drug-related dispute between 
t Xiiriega and key Colombian 
riickers. 

The Cuban Government denies any Cu- 
a'anvolvement in narcotics smuggling, no- 
.rithe imprisonment of several persons, 
icding U.S. citizens, for trafficking in 
ton territorial waters. The Cuban Gov- 
i-nent argues that these arrests prove it 

t involved in narcotics trafficking. 
• 'tlicless, the evidence suggests that 
'II simultaneously facilitates the flow of 
■; ic in selected cases, while prosecuting 
tlji' cases to conviction. 

[Until very recently, Cuban author- 
afe repeatedly denied any official 
r|nofficial involvement in such ac- 
i\ties. In a November 1985 interview, 
'i'l Castro claimed that on the drug 
;:(.■ "Cuba has had an unimpeachable 
e^ird in the past 26 years. First be- 
a:se in our country, where once there 
drug use, production, and traffick- 
1 I lie first thing we did was eradi- 
a- the problem ... I know of not one 
al' in which an official has been in- 
oed in the drug business." As late 
Sthis spring, Cuban officials were 
sling us that Cuba was neither a con- 
uler nor a producer nor a trafficker 
ijrugs. 

But we have evidence that Castro 
r the Cuban Government were aware 
b. they had a drug problem at least 4 
e's ago. In the November 1985 issue 
tiIo)icada, the monthly journal of the 
liistry of Interior, an article ap- 
ered on a Cuban domestic drug prob- 
}i, the first such admission to our 
rrtk'dge. The article indicated that 
hitih there were, indeed, drug users 
n'ulia, they were few, largely under 
o:r(il, and entirely dependent on out- 
ic sources for their drug supply. The 
rcle reported that in June 1985, 5 
iiiths before Castro's denial that traf- 
iting was a problem in Cuba, minis- 
r officials seized over $300,000 worth 
faarijuana being smuggled into the 
entry from a boat offshore east of 
I.-ana. Other than that highly unusual 
(lission, the Cuban Government 
1 med immunity from a problem that 
?s besetting the rest of the world. 

; The dramatic developments in 
'ba during the past month have 
liiued all of that. In an unprece- 
litcil move on June 16, the Cuban 
iernment publicly admitted involve- 
nnt by Cuban officials in the drug 
idf. The Cuban Government claimed 
' el (."astro launched an investigation 
bart because of U.S. charges of drug 
ffficking by Cuban officials. Four- 
*n military officers were arrested. 



The list was headed by Armed Forces 
Gen. Arnaldo Ochoa and Ministry of In- 
terior Col. Tony De la Guardia. Ochoa 
was an extremely popular and highly 
decorated officer who had headed Cu- 
ban forces in Angola and been associ- 
ated with the Castros as far back as the 
days before Castro took power in 
Havana. 

Two weeks of televised trials led to 
guilty verdicts for all and death sen- 
tences for Ochoa, De la Guardia, and 
two others. Appeals were denied in a 
matter of days, and the executions were 
carried out on July 13.