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MMepartnten  t 

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V    of  state -m-^  J    ^ 

le  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volume  89  /  Number  2151 


October  1989 


Dpparimvnt  of  Siaip 

bulletin 


Volume  89  /  Number  2151  /  October  1989 


The  Department  ok  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Pubhc  Com- 
munication in  the  Bureau  of  Public  Af- 
fairs, is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide 
the  public,  the  Congress,  and  govern- 
ment agencies  with  information  on  de- 
velopments in  U.S.  foreign  relations 
and  the  work  of  the  Department  of 
State  and  the  Foreign  Service.  The 
Bulletln's  contents  include  major  ad- 
dresses and  news  conferences  of  the 
President  and  the  Secretai\v  of  State; 
statements  made  before  congressional 
committees  by  the  Seci-etary  and  other 
senior  State  Department  officials;  se- 
lected press  releases  issued  by  the 
White  House,  the  Department,  and  the 
U.S.  Mission  to  the  United  Nations; 
and  treaties  and  other  agreements  to 
which  the  United  States  is  or  may  be- 
come a  party.  Special  features,  articles, 
and  other  supportive  material  (such  as 
maps,  charts,  photographs,  and  graphs) 
are  published  frequently  to  provide  ad- 
ditional information  on  current  issues 
but  should  not  necessarily  be  inter- 
preted as  official  U.S.  policy 
statements. 


JAMES  A.  BAKER,  III 

Secretary  of  State 

MARGARET  DeB.  TUTWILER 

Assistant  Secretary 
for  Public  Affairs 


Director, 

Office  of  Public  Communication 

COLLEEN  LUTZ 

Chief,  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 


The  Secretary  of  State  has  determined  that 
the  publication  of  this  periodical  is  necessary 
in  the  transaction  of  the  public  business  re- 
quired by  law  of  this  Department.  Use  of 
funds  for  printing  this  periodical  has  been 
approved  by  the  Director  of  the  Office  of 
Management  and  Budget  through  Septem- 
ber .30,  1990. 


DeI'AKT.ME.N'T  clF  StATK   Bl'l.I.KTIN  (ISSN 

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NOTE:  Most  of  the  contents  of  this  publi- 
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For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


CONTENTS 


ie  President 


News  Conference  of  August  15 
(Excerpt^i) 


^rica 


Visit  of  Zaire's  President 
(Pyeside)it  Bush,  Mobutu 
Sese  Seko) 

Zaire — A  Profile 


/ms  Control 

I        Status  of  the  Strategic  Arms 
Reduction  Talks  (Richard  R. 

1  Burt) 

i        Status  of  the  Defense  and  Space 
Talks  (Henry  F.  Cooper) 

2  Foreign  Policy  Implications  of 

Biological  Weapons  (H.  Allen 
d  Hohnes) 


hst  Asia 


International  Conference  on 
Cambodia  Held  in  Paris 
(Secretart/  Baker,  Statement) 

U.S.  Response  to  Changes  in 
China  (Ricliard  L.  Williams) 

U.S.  Relations  With  Korea 

FSX  Coproduction  Prohibition 
Disapproved  by  President 
(Letter  to  the  Senate) 


E:onomics 

3        Aviation's  Role  in  Shaping 
Today's  World  (Eugene  J. 
McAllister) 

3        Steel  Trade  Liberalization 

Program  (President  Bush) 


Eivironment 


U.S.  Ratifies  Treaty  to  Reduce 
Smog  Pollutant  (White  House 
Statement) 

World  Environment  Day 
(President  Bush) 


Ejrope 


The  Challenge  of  the  European 
Landscape  of  the  1990s 
(Lawrence  S.  Eagleburger) 

Food  Aid  to  Poland  (President 
Bush) 

Polish  Parliament  Approves 
New  Prime  Minister 
(President  Bush) 

Secretary,  Soviet  Foreign 
Minister  Meet  in  Paris 


FEATURE 


1        U.S. -Canada  Free  Trade  Agreement 
7        Canada 


40 


41 


Anniversary  of  Warsaw  Pact 
Invasion  of  Czechoslovakia 
(Department  Statement) 

Anniversary  of  the  Berlin  Wall 
(President  Bush) 


Human  Rights 

41  Human  Rights  Situation  in  Cuba 

(Richard  Schifter) 

42  Helsinki  Human  Rights  Day, 

nm  (Proclamation) 

43  Ethnic  Turks  in  Bulgaria 

(NATO  and  Department 
Statements) 


IVIiddle  East 

44         U.S.  Diplomacv  in  the  Middle 
East  (.John  H.  Kelly) 


Narcotics 

46  Cuba  and  Narcotics  Trafficking 

(Melvyn  Leritsky) 

47  Emergency  Package  for 
Colombia's  Drug  Fight 
(Presidoit  Bush) 

49         Global  Narcotics  Cooperation 

and  Presidential  Certification 
(Ann  B.  Wrobleski) 


Pacific 


60 


61 
62 


Visit  of  Australian  Prime 
Minister  (President  Bush, 
Robert  J. L.  Hawke) 

Australia — A  Profile 

U.S.  Establishes  Diplomatic 
Relations  With  Marshall 
Islands  and  Micronesia 
(President  Bush) 


South  Asia 

63         Visit  of  Pakistan's  Prime 

Minister  (Mohtra ma  Benzair 
Bhutto,  President  Bush) 

65         Proposal  to  Sell  F-16s  to 

Pakistan  (Tercsita  Schaffer) 


Terrorism 

66         Amei'ican  Hostages  in  the 
Middle  East  (President 
Bush,  Mohammad  bin 
Mubarak  al -Khalifa, 
White  House  Statements) 

68         Commission  on  Aviation  Securi- 
ty and  Terrorism  Formed 
(White  House  Stateinent) 


United  Nations 

69         Indochinese  Refugee 

Conference  Held  in  Geneva 
(Lawrence  S.  Eagleburger, 
Te.rts  of  Declaration  and 
Plan  of  Action) 

73  Security  Council  Adopts  Resolu- 

tion on  Central  American 
Peace  (Herbert  S.  Okun,  Te.ft 
of  Resolution) 

74  The  Concept  of  the  "Unitary 

UN"  (John  R.  Bolton) 


Western  Hemisphere 

76  U.S.-Me.\ico  Binational  Com- 

mission Meets  in  Mexico  City 
(Secretary  Baker,  Fernando 
Solana  Morales,  Joint 
Communique) 

77  U.S.  Travel  Advisory  for 

Colombia  (Department 
Statement) 


Treaties 


84 


Current  Actions 


Index 


FEATURE-Canada 


190    140  120  100  60   80    40        20 


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Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1S 


FEATURE-Canada 


U.S.-Canada  Free  Trade  Agreement 


esident  Bush  began  his  trip  to  Ot- 
va,  Canada,  in  February  1989,  by 
waiting  of  the  U.S.-Canada  Free 
ade  Agreement  (FTA) — a  historic 
abord  representing  the  culmination  of 
Eorts  covering  more  than  100  years — 
uich  went  into  effect  on  January  1, 
H9.  The  FTA  is  a  bilateral  agreement 
-iuiied  primarily  to  eliminate  trade 
1 1  riiTs  and  open  new  avenues  of  trade 
ttween  the  United  States  and  Cana- 
:.  It  strengthens  an  already  e.xtensive 
tjding  relationship  and  enhances  eco- 
rmic  opportunity  on  both  sides  of  our 
[mnion  border 

The  U.S. -Canadian  trade  relation- 
rip  is  the  strongest  in  the  world  today. 
!ich  year  the  United  States  and  Cana- 
;  exchange  more  goods  and  services 
tan  any  two  countries  in  the  world, 
Uh  bilateral  merchandise  trade  of 
imit  .$154  billion  in  1988,  quadruple 
t.'  11174  level.  Clearly,  the  elimination 
[tariffs  and  most  other  barriers  to 
tide  between  the  two  countries  under 
t^  FTA  can  only  serve  to  further  our 
Onomic  progress. 

While  the  FTA  does  not  eliminate 
I  trade  problems  between  the  United 
'ates  and  Canada,  it  does  provide  a 
cnsultative  framework  in  which  these 
i.ues  can  be  managed  before  they  cre- 
£?  serious  economic  and  political  fric- 
tins.  Industries  in  both  the  United 
'ates  and  Canada  can  expect  ongoing 
s'uctural  readjustment  in  adapting 
t  changing  market  conditions  in  the 
lars  ahead.  However,  the  FTA  will  fa- 
(itate  those  changes  and  lead  the  two 
itions  into  a  new  century  with  the 
nst  productive  and  extensive  trading 
ilationship  in  the  world. 


KSIC  FTA  PRECEPTS 

'le  FTA  is  an  agreement  designed 
'th  several  key  points  in  mind.  Specif- 
iilly,  these  objectives  are  to: 

•  Eliminate  tariffs  and  substan- 
tilly  reduce  other  barriers  to  trade  in 
,iods  and  services  between  the  two 
'untries; 


•  Promote  fair  competition; 

•  Liberalize  trade  in  several  areas, 
including  agriculture,  autos,  energy, 
and  government  procurement; 

•  Establish  rules  on  investment 
and  financial  services; 

•  Establish  effective  administra- 
tive procedures  and  resolve  disputes; 
and 

•  Lay  the  foundation  for  further 
bilateral  and  multilateral  cooperation. 

Although  these  objectives  address 
a  great  many  issues,  the  agreement  is 
not  intended  to  circumvent  previously 
existing  arrangements  on  trade  and 
other  bilateral  relations.  On  the  con- 
trary, the  FTA  serves  to  further  en- 
hance our  relationship.  The  FTA  also  is 
fully  consistent  with  U.S.  and  Cana- 
dian obligations  under  the  General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade 
(GATT).  It  does  not  lessen  commit- 
ments to  achieve  multilateral  trade  lib- 
eralization. Rather  it  establishes  useful 
precedents  for  the  ongoing  Uruguay 
Round  of  GATT  negotiations. 

The  GATT  has  served  trading  na- 
tions well  for  more  than  40  years.  How- 
ever, this  global  system  traditionally 
has  been  restricted  to  trade  in  goods. 
There  is  a  missing  link — services  and 
investment,  which  have  become  in- 
creasingly important  international  eco- 
nomic activities  in  which  the  United 
States  and  Canada  have  a  very  strong 
relationship.  Therefore,  the  two  coun- 
tries are  working  together  in  the  Uru- 
guay Round  to  expand  GATT  coverage 
to  include  trade-related  investment  and 
service  activities.  The  implementation 
of  the  FTA  has  provided  needed  impe- 
tus to  these  negotiations. 

Enactment  of  the  FTA  was  not 
easy.  Many  years  of  negotiations  were 
involved  in  hammering  out  the  agree- 
ment. In  the  United  States,  the  Senate 
approved  it  on  September  21,  1988.  In 
Canada,  the  FTA  became  the  center- 
piece of  a  bitter  federal  election  cam- 
paign which  tested  the  commitment  of 
Prime  Minister  Mulroney's  government 
to  the  FTA.  The  result  was  an  endorse- 
ment of  the  FTA  by  the  Canadian 
people,  passage  by  the  Canadian  Par- 
liament on  December  30,  1988,  and  the 
agreement's  entry  into  force  on  Janu- 
ary 1,  1989. 


SUMMARY  OF  KEY  PROVISIONS 

The  agreement  contains  provisions  cov- 
ering virtually  every  trade  sector.  The 
following  is  a  synopsis  of  these 
provisions. 

General  Provisions  on  Product  Trade 

Tariffs.  Eliminates  all  tariffs  on  U.S. 
and  Canadian  goods  by  1998.  Some  tar- 
iffs were  removed  on  -January  1,  1989, 
while  the  others  will  be  phased  out 
in  5  or  10  years. 

Rules  of  Origin.  Rules  of  origin 
define  goods  eligible  for  FTA  treat- 
ment and  prevent  "free  riding"  by  third 
countries.  Goods  produced  only  in  the 
United  States  or  Canada  qualify  for 
FTA  treatment.  Goods  containing 
imported  components  qualify  if  suffi- 
ciently transformed  to  result  in  a  spe- 
cified change  in  tariff  classification.  In 
some  cases,  there  is  an  additional  re- 
quirement that  50%  of  the  cost  of  man- 
ufacturing be  in  the  United  States  or 
Canada. 

Customs.  Ends  customs  user  fees 
for  goods  and  most  duty  drawback  pro- 
grams (under  which  importers  receive 
a  duty  rebate  on  exports)  by  1994  for  bi- 
lateral trade;  ends  duty  waivers  linked 
to  performance  requirements  by  1998 
(except  for  the  auto  pact). 

Quotas.  Eliminates  import  and  ex- 
port quotas  unless  consistent  with  the 
GATT  or  explicitly  grandfathered  (al- 
lowed to  remain  in  place)  by  the  FTA. 

National  Treatment.  Reaffirms 
GATT  principles  preventing  discrimi- 
nation against  imported  goods. 

Standards.  Prohibits  use  of  prod- 
uct standards  as  a  trade  barrier  and 
provides  for  national  treatment  of  test- 
ing labs  and  certification  bodies. 

Emergency  Action.  Allows  tempo- 
rary import  restrictions  to  protect  do- 
mestic industries  harmed  by  increased 
imports  from  the  other  country  in  lim- 
ited circumstances. 


epartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


FEATURE-Canada 


Government  Procurement.  Ex- 
pands the  size  of  Federal  Govei-nment 
procurement  markets  open  to  compe- 
titive bidding  by  suppliers  from  the 
other  country  by  reducing  the  mini- 
mum purchases  covered  to  $25,000. 

Agriculture  and  Industry 

-Ajrriculture.  Eliminates  all  tariffs  and 
export  subsidies  in  bilateral  trade  and 
limits  or  eliminates  bilateral  quantita- 
tive restrictions  on  some  agricultural 
products,  including  meat.  Eliminates 
Canadian  import  licenses  for  wheat, 
oats,  and  barley  when  U.S.  crop  price 
supports  are  equal  to  or  less  than  those 
in  Canada.  Increases  imports  allowed 
under  Canadian  poultry  and  egg  import 
quotas.  For  20  years,  allows  tariffs  on 
fruits  and  vegetables  to  be  reimposed 
on  a  temporary  basis  during  abnor- 
mally low  price  periods. 

Energy.  Prohibits  most  import  and 
export  restrictions  on  energy  goods, 
including  minimum  export  prices.  Re- 
quires any  export  quotas  designed  to 
enforce  either  short  supply  or  conserva- 
tion measures  to  ensure  continuation  of 
the  historical  proportionate  share  of 
resources.  Provides  for  Alaskan  oil  ex- 
ports of  up  to  50,000  barrels  per  day  to 
Canada  under  certain  conditions. 

Autos.  Replaces  eligibility  rule  for 
duty-free  auto  pact  imports  into  the 
United  States  with  a  tougher  F^TA  rule 
of  origin.  (Most  auto  trade  already  is 
duty  free  under  the  1965  U.S. -Canada 
auto  pact.)  FTA  continues  the  auto  pact 
and  programs  allowing  pact-qualified 
companies  to  import  duly  free  into 
Canada  but  does  not  allow  new  firms  to 
qualify  for  pact  membership.  Permits 
U.S.  auto  and  parts  exports  that  meet 
the  FTA  rule  to  enter  Canada  at  FTA 
tariff  rates,  which  will  be  reduced  to 
zero  by  1998.  Ends,  by  1996,  Canadian 
programs  not  covered  by  the  auto 
pact — production-based  duty  remission 
programs  (under  which  producers  pay 
less  duty  for  automotive  imports  into 
Canada  for  meeting  Canadian  produc- 
tion requirements)  and  export-based 
programs  by  1998  (those  based  on  ex- 
ports to  the  United  States  were  ended 
on  January  1,  1989). 

Wine  and  Distilled  Spirits.  Re- 
moves the  most  disci'iminatoi'y  pricing 
and  listing  practices  against  wine  or 
spirits  imported  from  the  othei-  coun- 
try. Prohibits  new  restrictions  on  beer. 


U.S.  Exports 
to  Canada: 
$71  Billion 


Manulactured  Goods 
(14%) 


Agricultural  Goods 

&  Crude  Materials 

(6%) 


Softwood  Lumber.  Preserves  the 
1986  memorandum  of  understanding 
with  Canada  on  lumber  pricing  prac- 
tices of  Canadian  provinces. 

Cultural  Industries.  Exempts 
industries  such  as  publishing,  broad- 
casting, and  films.  However,  if  this 
exemption  results  in  practices  that  re- 
strain trade  (otherwise  inconsistent 
with  the  FTA),  the  injured  party  may 
take  measures  of  equivalent  commer- 
cial effect  without  resort  to  dispute 
settlement. 

Services  and  Temporary 
Business  Travel 

Services.  Commits  governments  not  to 
discriminate  against  covered  service 
providers  of  the  other  country  when 
making  future  laws  or  regulations 
(transportation  services  are  excluded). 

Business  Travel.  Facilitates  cross- 
border  travel  for  business  visitors — 
investors,  traders,  professionals,  or 
executives  transferred  within  the 
company. 


Investment  and  Financial  Services 

Investment.  Provides  that  future  lav 
and  regulations  must  accord  national  ; 
treatment  for  establishment,  acquisi- 
tion, sale,  conduct,  and  operation  of 
business  (exempts  transportation).  E 
isting  measures  that  deny  national 
treatment  remain  in  place.  Commits 
Canada  to  end  review  of  indirect  acq 
sitions  by  U.S.  companies  and  raises 
the  threshold  for  review  of  direct  ac- 
quisitions in  most  sectors  to  C$15(l  m 
lion  (constant  1992  Canadian  dollars). 
Bans  imposition  of  key  performance  i 
quirements  (i.e.,  local  content,  expon 
import  substitution,  and  local  sourcir 
requirements)  imposed  on  foreign  in- 
vestments. Guarantees  free  transfer' 
of  capital  and  current  payments.  Guai 
antees  investors  will  be  compensateo 
in  accordance  with  international  law 
cases  of  expropriation. 

Financial  Services.  Exempts  U. 
bank  subsidiaries  from  the  ceiling  on 
the  share  of  Canadian  domestic  banki 
ing  assets  that  can  be  held  by  foreigr 
banks.  Ends  Canada's  foreign  owner- 
ship restriction  on  U.S.  purchases  ofl 
shares  in  federally  regulated  financii 
institutions.  Assumes  that  reviews  o> 
U.S  firms'  applications  for  entry  into 
Canadian  financial  markets  will  be  o< 
the  same  basis  as  Canadian  firms'  apl 
plications.  Permits  banks  in  the  Uniti 
States  to  underwrite  and  deal  in  debt 
securities  fully  backed  by  the  Govern 
ment  of  Canada  or  Canadian  politicall 
subdivisions.  Establishes  a  formal  coi 
sultative  mechanism  for  financial  sen 
ices,  separate  from  the  general  dispui 
settlement  procedures,  to  resolve  pr( 
lems  and  oversee  further  financial  m; 
ket  liberalization. 


Resolving  Disputes 

General  Dispute  Settlement  (except 
for  cultural  industries — publishing, 
broadcasting,  film,  etc. — financial 
services,  countervailing  duty,  and  an 
dumping  cases).  Establishes  a  binatio 
al  commission  to  resolve  disagreemer 
and  allows  for  arbitration  if  the  partit 
desire. 

Dispute  Settlement  for  Counter- 
vailing Duty  and  .Antidumping  Case 

Countries  will  continue  to  apply  exist 
ing  national  laws,  but  court  review  of 
administrative  agency  determination 
in  either  country  is  replaced  by  a  bi- 
national  jjanel.  The  panel  applies  the 
same  standard  and  scope  of  review 
as  would  the  relevant  court. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  191 


FEATURE-Canada 


'UTTING  THE  FREE  TRADE 
AGREEMENT  INTO  ACTION 

[he  concept  of  free  trade  underlies  the 
PTA,  which  encompasses  a  wide  array 
f  issues  and  products.  The  two  govern- 
lents  have  established  the  Canada- 
J.S.  Trade  Commission  to  ensure 
roper  implementation  and  to  oversee 
urther  elaboration  of  the  agreement, 
'he  FTA  calls  for  the  commission  to 
leet  at  least  once  annually.  At  the 
irst  commission  meeting,  on  March  13, 
989,  it  decided  to  meet  twice  a  year,  at 
>ast  for  the  early  period  of  implemen- 
tation. The  commission  is  responsible 
n-  the  establishment  of  working 
roups  to  monitor  implementation  of 
he  various  chapters  of  the  agreement 
nd  to  undertake  negotiations  to  ex- 
jand  the  agreement's  coverage  in  those 
teas.  The  working  groups  report  di- 
leetly  to  the  commission,  which  is  the 
lighest  decisionmaking  body  under  the 
greement. 

The  following  five  working  groups 
ere  set  up  at  the  first  commission 
leeting: 

Accelerated  Elimination  of  Tar- 
'fs.  To  consider  requests  for  acceler- 
;ed  elimination  of  tariffs  on  particular 
'■oducts  and  make  recommendations  to 
le  commission. 

The  FTA  provides  for  tariffs  not 
ready  eliminated  to  be  phased  out 
/er  o  or  10  years;  either  5  annual  re- 
ictions  of  20%  or  10  annual  reductions 
'10'7(.  The  agreement  also  provides 
r  accelerated  elimination  of  these 
iriff  rates  if  approved  by  both 
jvernments. 

The  process  currently  works  as 
Hows.  Unless  otherwise  specified, 
•quests  for  accelerated  tariff  elimina- 
on  are  due  by  .January  1  of  each  year, 
'both  governments  agree,  the  new 
'hedule  will  become  effective  the  fol- 
wing  January  1.  A  petitioner  for 
I'celerated  tariff  elimination  must 
•ovide  the  following  information: 

•  Requester's  name,  organization, 
Idress,  contact  individual,  telephone 
imber,  and  date  of  request; 

•  Product  on  which  accelerated 
ity  elimination  is  requested  and 
ihether  the  request  pertains  to  the 
I.S.  or  Canadian  import  duty,  or  both; 

•  U.S.  and/or  Canadian  harmo- 
zed  system  subheading  numbers  at 
le  eight-digit  level  along  with  the 
•oduct  description  of  the  subheadings; 


U.S.  Imports 

From  Canada: 

$83  Billion 


Agricultufal  Goods 
(4%) 


[her  Goods 
(5%) 


•  Current  staging  of  the  tariff 
elimination  for  each  product  or  tariff 
subheading; 

•  Requested  accelerated  date  of  the 
tariff  elimination  and  reasons  for  re- 
questing accelerated  tariff  elimination; 

•  Requester's  e.xports  to  and/or  im- 
ports from  Canada  for  each  product  in 
the  most  recent  3-year  period  for  which 
data  are  available; 

•  Requester's  projected  e.xports 
and/or  imports  for  the  product  if  tariff 
elimination  is  accelerated  as  requested; 
and 

•  Names  and  addresses  of  known 
U.S.  manufacturers  of  the  products  in 
question. 

Petitions  should  be  forwarded  with 
10  copies  to  the  Office  of  North  Ameri- 
can Affairs,  Office  of  the  U.S.  Trade 
Representative,  Room  501,  600  17th 
Street,  NW,  Washington  D.C.  20.506. 

Agricultural  Issues.  To  monitor 
implementation  of  Chapter  7  (agricul- 
ture) and  to  oversee  further  coopera- 
tion and  negotiations  to  expand 
coverage. 

The  agricultural  working  group  is 
cochaired  by  the  Under  Secretary  for 


International  Affairs  and  Commodity 
Programs  of  the  U.S.  Department  of 
Agriculture  and  by  the  Senior  Assist- 
ant Deputy  Minister  (United  States) 
and  Coordinator  of  the  Free  Trade 
Agreement  of  Canada  or  their 
representatives. 

To  conduct  detailed  work,  eight 
subworking  groups  were  established 
and  will  report  to  the  main  agri- 
cultural working  group; 

•  Animal  health; 

•  Plant  health,  seeds,  and 
fertilizers; 

•  Meat  and  poultry  inspection; 

•  Dairy,  fruit,  vegetable,  and  egg 
inspection; 

•  Veterinary  drugs  and  feeds; 

•  Food,  beverage  and  color  addi- 
tives, and  unavoidable  contaminants; 

•  Pesticides;  and 

•  Packaging  and  labeling  of  agri- 
cultural, food,  beverage,  and  certain 
related  goods  for  human  consumption. 

Chapter  19  (Subsidies).  To  develop 
more  effective  rules  and  disciplines 
concerning  the  use  of  government  sub- 
sidies and  to  develop  a  substitute  sys- 
tem of  rules  for  dealing  with  unfair 
pricing  and  government  subsidization. 

Customs-Related  Issues.  To  re- 
solve procedural  problems  involved  in 
customs  administration. 

Rules  of  Origin.  To  consider,  as 
appropriate,  changes  in  the  rules  for 
FTA  tariff  eligibifity. 

In  addition,  the  FTA  commission 
established  an  Auto  Select  Panel,  a 
committee  of  private-sector  experts 
from  both  countries,  to  assess  the  state 
of  the  North  American  auto  industry 
and  to  propose  public  policy  measures 
and  private  initiatives  to  improve  its 
competitiveness  in  domestic  and  for- 
eign markets. 

The  U.S.  Congress  has  asked  the 
panel  by  .June  30,  1989,  to  formulate 
proposals  and  recommendations  re- 
garding an  increase  in  the  North 
American  content  rule  to  60*^. 
Congress  also  has  asked  the  panel  to 
report  by  June  30,  1990,  on  trade- 
distorting  policies  and  practices  main- 
tained by  either  party  that  affect  bi- 
lateral trade  in  automotive  goods  and 
the  rationale  for  maintaining  such 
policies  and  practices. 


,epartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


FEATURE-Canada 


QUESTIONS  ABOUT  THE  FTA 

The  following  are  frequently  asked 
questions  about  how  the  FTA  operates 
and  how  it  might  affect  various  sectors 
of  the  U.S.  economy. 

General 

Q.  Does  the  United  States  have  a  free 
trade  agreement  with  countries  other 
than  Canada? 

A.  The  United  States  has  a  less 
comprehensive  free  trade  agreement 
with  Israel. 

Q.  What  other  free  trade  agree- 
ments is  the  Administration 
planning? 

A.  The  Administration  has  no  plan 
at  this  time  to  negotiate  other  free  trade 
agreements.  In  order  to  do  so,  it  would 
need  to  seek  special  authority  from  the 
Congress. 

Q.  Why  did  the  United  States 
agree  to  eliminate  its  duties  over  the 
10  years  on  such  sensitive  products  as 
textiles  and  apparel,  lead,  zinc,  and 
certain  fish  products,  etc.,  when 
these  industries  have  been  in  econom- 
ic distress? 

A.  Both  countries  agreed  to  elimi- 
nate duties  on  all  products,  including 
sensitive  ones.  Canada  also  must  elimi- 
nate duties  on  sensitive  products.  The 
total  elimination  of  tariffs  between  the 
United  States  and  Canada  is  the  only 
way  to  achieve  the  widest  trade  liberal- 
ization possible  in  goods  and  services. 
However,  recognizing  the  sensitivity  of 
certain  industrial  sectors  in  both  coun- 
tries, the  FTA  provides  for  a  lO-year 
phase-out  period  for  duty  elimination. 
The  industry  can  take  advantage  of  this 
full  timeframe,  or  if  the  producers  feel 
that  the  adjustment  is  already  in  place, 
they  may  seek  accelerated  tariff 
reduction. 

Q.  What  does  the  United  States 
gain  from  the  FTA's  services 
provision? 

A.  The  United  States  gains  thi'ee 
important  benefits  because  the  FTA: 

•  Ensures  that  the  U.S. -Canadian 
market,  already  substantially  open  in 
services  trade,  will  become  more  open 
through  the  prospective  establishment 
of  national  treatment; 

•  Establishes  a  mechanism  to  re- 
solve trade  disputes  for  scores  of  serv- 
ice sectors  and  creates  a  forum  for 
bringing  other  sectors  into  the  FTA; 
and 


•  Provides  a  useful  precedent  for 
ongoing  negotiations  in  the  Uruguay 
multilateral  trade  round. 

Q.  Has  the  FTA  eliminated  all 
of  the  trade  disputes  which  our  two 
countries  face? 

A.  No.  Many  issues  remain  unre- 
solved, and  several  disputes — including 
fish,  alcoholic  beverages,  wool,  plywood, 
the  superfund  (a  tax  imposed  on  oil  im- 
ports to  clean  up  toxic  waste  sites  in  the 
United  States),  and  customs-users  fees — 
remain  as  points  of  contention.  However, 
almost  all  our  difficulties  are  more  work- 
able under  the  terms  of  the  FTA  than 
without  it. 

Q.  Does  the  FTA  achieve  every- 
thing the  United  States  wanted  from 
the  negotiations? 

A.  The  overall  agreement  is  some- 
thing of  which  both  countries  can  be 
proud.  However,  neither  side  obtained  all 
it  wanted.  We  are  continuing  negotia- 
tions through  the  joint  trade  commission 
with  a  view  to  improving  the  FTA  wher- 
ever possible.  For  example,  subsidies, 
dumping,  investment,  energy,  services, 
intellectual  property,  government  pro- 
curement, agriculture,  technical  regu- 
lations, product  standards,  and  the 
automotive  rule  of  origin  are  issues 
that  we  wish  to  pursue. 

Q.  Why  doesn't  the  FTA  elimi- 
nate Canadian  subsidies? 

A.  The  agreement  requires  both 
countries  to  eliminate  export  subsidies 
to  each  other.  However,  both  the  United 
States  and  Canada  can  continue  to  have 


U.S.-Canada  Free  Trade 
Agreement  Chronology 


18.54         Reciprocity  Agreement  (termi- 
nated by  the  United  States  in  1866). 

1874         Reciprocity  Agreement  (defeated 
by  U.S.  Senate). 

1911         Free  Trade  Agreement  (defeated 
by  Canadian  electorate). 

1947  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Trade  (multilateral  agreement,  in- 
cluding United  States  and  Canada). 

1948  Free  Trade  Agreement  (suspended 
by  Prime  Minister  King). 

19(i.S  Auto  Agreement  (free  trade  in  au- 
tomobiles and  spare  parts). 

1988  Free  Trade  Agreement  signed. 

1989  Free  Trade  Agreement  entered 
into  force. 

1998         All  tariffs  eliminated  under  Free 
Trade  Agreement. 


domestic  or  production  subsidies.  This  issi- 
will  be  addressed  over  a  .')-7-year  period  ir 
bilateral  negotiations.  Our  joint  aim  is  to  c 
velop  agreed  discipline  on  government  sub 
sidles  that  will  ensure  fair  trade  within  th 
FTA. 


Agriculture 

Q.  Does  the  FTA  impair  Congress' 
ability  to  change  domestic  support- 
programs? 

A.  The  agreement  does  not  affect 
the  ability  of  either  country  to  change 
domestic  support  programs  for  agri- 
cultural products.  Of  course,  the  pro- 
grams would  need  to  be  consistent  wit; 
the  other  provisions  of  the  agreement  i 
garding  such  matters  as  import  duties^ 
and  export  subsidies. 

Q.  Has  the  United  States  given-i 
up  protection  from  unfair  import 
competition  under  Section  22  of  then 
Agricultural  Adjustment  Act  and 
corresponding  GATT  protection? 

A.  Both  countries  reserve  the  rig; 
to  impose  or  reimpose  import  restric- 
tions on  a  particular  grain  (specificalh 
wheat,  oats,  barley,  I'ye,  corn,  triticale 
and  sorghum)  if  imports  increase  signi. 
cantly  as  a  result  of  a  substantial  chan 
in  either  country's  support  programs  f 
that  grain.  The  United  States  may  use 
Section  22  when  there  is  a  significant : 
crease  in  imports  resulting  from  a  sub 
stantial  change  in  the  price  support 
programs  of  either  country  and  provide 
the  conditions  of  Section  22  are  other- 
wise met.  Past  trade  patterns  are  not 
likely  to  be  affected  by  the  elimination 
the  small  U.S.  duties  on  grain  from  C; 
ada.  It  is  not  expected  that  U.S.  impoi 
of  Canadian  grain  will  increase  signifif 
cantly  as  a  result  of  the  removal  of  trai 
restrictions  by  the  FTA. 

Q.  How  does  the  FTA  affect 
trade  in  grain? 

A.  Canada  has  agreed  to  eliminal 
import  licenses  for  U.S.  wheat,  barley, 
oats,  and  their  products  when  U.S.  <  In 
ernment  support  for  the  particular  gr; 
is  equal  to  or  less  than  that  of  Canada. 
That  has  happened  in  the  case  of  oats, 
and  Canada  is  now  eliminating  the  pri 
vious  licensing  system  on  that  grain. 
Each  country  calculates  its  own  suppoi™ 
level  in  accordance  with  the  formula  s< 
out  in  the  agreement;  there  also  is  a 
mechanism  to  resolve  any  disagreeme 
over  calculations.  The  elimination  of  ir 
port  licenses  will  provide  improved  mi 
tual  access  to  respective  markets  for 
both  grains  and  processed  products 
containing  grains. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  19 


FEATURE-Canada 


\uto  Trade 

[j.  Why  didn't  the  United  States  rene- 
(otiate  the  19(i5  auto  pact  to  remove 
ts  inequities,  such  as  Canadian  per- 
"ormance  requirements  (local  con- 
ent,  etc.)  and  multilateral  sourcing 
ncentives? 

A.  Automotive  trade  was  one  of  the 
nost  difficult  issues  in  the  FTA  negotia- 
ions.  The  auto  pact,  under  which  most 
uto  trade  has  been  conducted  for  over 
:0  years,  essentially  provides  for  duty- 
ree  trade  in  automotive  goods  between 
Canada  and  the  United  States  if  certain 
ules  of  origin  are  met.  In  addition, 
Canada  has  duty  remission  (waiver) 
irograms  based  on  meeting  certain 
ierformance  requirements.  The  FTA 
paves  the  auto  pact  in  place  but  freezes 
Eligibility  for  duty-free  entry  into  Cana- 
|a  to  those  existing  firms  appearing  in 
in  F'TA  annex.  FYirthermore,  Canada 
las  agreed  to  restrict  benefits,  such  as 
luty  remission  programs  based  on  pro- 
luetiiin  in  Canada  for  nonpact  members, 
0  a  limited  number  of  firms.  These  pro- 
rams  will  terminate  by  1996.  Programs 
tfhich  tie  benefits  to  exports  to  the  Unit- 
d  States  ended  on  January  1,  1989. 

Q.  Why  doesn't  the  FTA  require 
60%  direct  cost  of  processing  rule 
or  autos  to  increase  the  benefits  to 
S.  industry  and  labor? 

A.  U.S.  negotiators  explored  the 
■ossibility  of  moving  to  a  60%  North 
imerican  rule.  The  Canadian  Govern- 
lent,  however,  was  concerned  that  this 
.'ould  be  too  restrictive  for  new  foreign 
utomotive  subsidiaries  that  recently 
ave  invested  in  Canadian  operations. 
'he  FTA  did,  however,  toughen  the  auto 
act's  50%  rule  of  origin  for  entry  into 
he  United  States  by  basing  it  on  manu- 
icturing  costs  instead  of  value  added, 
s  had  been  the  case.  Profits  and  costs, 
uch  as  advertising  and  administrative 
verhead,  will  no  longer  count  toward 
he  50%. 

Q.  What  will  the  Auto  Select 
'anel  actually  do? 

A.  Article  1004  of  the  FTA  states 
hat  the  panel  is  to  assess  the  state  of 
he  North  American  automotive  indus- 
ry  and  propose  public  measures  and 
■rivate  initiatives  to  improve  its  compet- 
;ivt'ness  in  domestic  and  foreign  mar- 
ets.  The  panel  consists  of  15  members 
rniii  each  country,  with  the  responsibili- 
y  (if  i-eporting  to  the  joint  Canada-U.S. 
'rade  (IJommission. 


Cultural  Industries 

Q.  Why  aren't  cultural  industries  in- 
cluded in  the  FTA? 

A.  Canada  insisted  that  most  pro- 
visions of  the  FTA  could  not  apply  to 
"cultural"  industries.  These  cultural 
industries  include  the  publication,  sale, 
distribution,  or  exhibition  of  books,  mag- 
azines, and  newspapers;  film  and  video 
recordings;  audio  or  video  music  record- 
ings; and  radio,  television,  and  cable 
dissemination. 

The  FTA  does  provide  for  the  elim- 
ination of  tariffs  on  videos,  records, 
and  printed  matei'ial  and  copyright  pro- 
tection for  the  retransmission  of  com- 
mercial broadcasts.  Furthermore,  the 
United  States  retains  the  right  to  re- 
balance concessions  with  measures  of 
equivalent  commercial  effect  if  Canada 
uses  the  cultural  exception  in  a  manner 
detrimental  to  our  commercial  interests. 
The  United  States  also  has  the  right 
to  invoke  the  cultural  exception,  and 
Canada  has  the  right  to  take  counter- 
measures  if  we  do  so.  The  agreement 
does  not  require  invocation  of  its  dispute 
settlement  provisions  in  order  for  either 
party  to  take  such  countermeasures. 

Q.  Doesn't  the  cultural  exception 
adversely  affect  U.S.  firms? 

A.  No.  The  FTA  improves  Canadian 
treatment  of  U.S.  commercial  interests 
in  the  cultural  area.  It  provides  for  tariff 
elimination  (e.g.,  on  videos,  records, 
printed  material),  improved  provisions 
for  sale  of  cultural  industries,  and 
cop.vTight  protection  for  broadcast  re- 
transmissions. In  addition,  the  FTA  al- 
lows the  United  States  to  take  measures 
of  equivalent  commercial  effect  in  the 
event  that  Canada  enacts  additional  re- 
strictions which  impair  U.S.  access  to 
the  Canadian  market  and  which  would 
violate  the  agreement  if  there  were  no 
cultural  exception.  This  right  should 
serve  as  a  disincentive  to  the  use  of  the 
cultural  exception  for  measures  that,  al- 
though nominally  cultural,  have  signifi- 
cant commercial  effects. 

Q.  How  is  border  broadcasting 
affected  by  the  FTA? 

A.  Canada  does  not  grant  income 
tax  deductions  for  advertising  on  U.S. 
stations,  and  this  issue  is  not  addressed 
by  the  FTA.  However,  it  remedies  the 
problem  of  unauthorized  and  uncompen- 
sated retransmission  by  Canadian  cable 
systems  of  copyi'ighted  television  pro- 
grams. By  January  1,  1990,  Canada  will 
need  to  provide  a  right  of  remuneration 


(royalty)  to  the  copyright  holder  for  the 
simultaneous  and  unaltered  retransmis- 
sion of  copyrighted  programming.  In  ad- 
dition, the  FTA  generally  prohibits  the 
nonsimultaneous  or  altered  retransmis- 
sion of  copyrighted  programming  except 
with  permission  of  the  copyright  holder. 

Energy 

Q.  How  does  the  FTA  improve  our  en- 
ergy security? 

A.  The  FTA  provides  the  United 
States  with  more  secure  access  to  Cana- 
dian energy  supplies  to  meet  our  long- 
term  energy  needs  which  is  important  to 
reduce  our  dependence  on  OPEC.  The 
Canadians  have  agreed  that,  even  in  the 
event  of  a  supply  disruption,  they  will 
continue  to  provide  the  United  States 
with  its  historically  proportionate  share 
of  their  energy  supplies.  Rirthermore, 
the  Canadians  have  agreed  that  they  will 
not  discriminate  against  U.S.  consumers 
in  the  pricing  of  their  energy  resources, 
ensuring  that  U.S.  consumers  will  not 
be  cut  off  suddenly  in  the  event  of  short- 
ages. We  have  the  same  commitments  to 
Canada. 

Q.  What  barriers  to  energy  trade 
are  removed  by  the  FTA? 

A.  There  are  virtually  no  barriers 
today  in  our  bilateral  energy  trade. 
However,  in  order  to  preserve  gains  we 


Further  Information 


U.S.  Department  of  State 

Office  of  Canadian  Affairs        (202)  (347-1097 
Office  of  International  Trade    (202)  647-2320 

U.S.  Trade  Representative 

Office  of  Canadian  Affairs        (202)  395-5663 
Office  of  Public  Affairs  (202)  395-3230 

U.S.  Department  of  Commerce 

Office  of  Canadian  Affairs        (202)  377-3101 
Office  of  Public  Affairs  (202)  377-3808 

U.S.  Department  of  Agriculture 

Inter-American  Branch  (202)  382-1338 

U.S.  Department  of  the  Treasury 

Canada  desk  (202)  566-2747 

U.S.  Department  of  Labor 

Office  of  International 
Economic  Affairs  (202)  523-6203 


Canadian  Free  Trade 
Hotline 


1-800-267-6626 


)epartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


FEATURE-Canada 


have  made,  both  sides  agreed  to  pro- 
hibit i-e.strictions  on  imports  or  exports 
in  terms  of  supply,  price,  or  taxes.  Nei- 
ther country  may  impose  any  taxes, 
duties,  or  charges  on  imported  or  ex- 
ported goods  unless  such  charges  also 
are  imposed  in  equal  amount  on  the 
same  products  for  domestic  use. 

Neither  country  may  discriminate 
against  suppliers  or  consumers  in  the 
other  country,  relative  to  its  own  do- 
mestic suppliers  or  consumers,  in  the 
pricing  of  energy  supplies.  For  exam- 
jjle,  under  current  Canadian  regula- 
tions, exporters  of  Canadian  electricity 
may  not  charge  a  price  for  that  electric- 
ity which  is  significantly  less  than  the 
least  cost  energy  alternative  available 
to  their  U.S.  customers.  Canadian  reg- 
ulations, in  the  past,  have  required 
that  the  minimum  price  for  oil  and  gas 
exports  be  higher  than  the  prevailing 
price  to  Canadian  consumers.  These 
practices  have  been  eliminated  under 
the  FTA. 

Q.  What  impact  does  the  FTA 
have  on  U.S.  oil  and  gas  producers? 

A.  The  agreement  is  not  expected 
to  have  any  immediate  direct  effect  on 
U.S.  oil  and  gas  producers,  large  or 
small.  The  FTA  should  not  change  the 
level  of  Canadian  exports  of  oil  or  gas, 
since  the  Canadians  are  not  currently 
restraining  export  levels  or  discriminat- 
ing against  U.S.  consumers  in  the  pric- 
ing of  their  exports.  The  United  States, 
in  turn,  is  not  I'estricting  imports.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  FTA's  rules  against 
arbitrary  or  discriminatory  government 
interference  in  energy  trade  over  the 
longer  term  should  help  energy  pro- 
ducers and  consumers  alike. 

F^inancial  Services 

Q.  How  does  the  agreement  affect 
U.S.  commercial  banks? 

A.  The  FTA  removes  previous  lim- 
its on  growth,  capital,  and  market  share 
in  Canada.  Specifically,  U.S.  banks  are 
now  exempt  from  the  ceiling  on  the 
share  of  Canadian  domestic  banking  as- 
sets that  can  be  held  by  foreign  banks, 
as  well  as  the  individual  capital  limits 
used  to  implement  the  ceiling. 


Q.  How  does  the  FTA  affect  U.S. 
insurance  companies? 

A.  U.S.  insurance  companies  now 
have  the  same  rights  as  Canadian  insur- 
ance companies  to  diversify  in  the  feder- 
ally regulated  financial  sector.  They  can 
either  establish  or  acquire  a  closely  held 
bank  or  an  insurance  or  trust  company. 
As  a  result  of  Ontario  provincial  re- 
forms, they  also  are  able  to  acquire  Ca- 
nadian securities  firms.  (Ontario  is  the 
center  of  Canada's  securities  industry.) 

Q.  How  are  securities  firms 
affected? 

A.  As  a  result  of  the  FTA,  U.S. 
securities  firms  are  granted  access  to 
Canada  and,  for  the  first  time,  are  able 
to  diversify  their  activities  in  Canada  by 
affiliating  with  insurance  companies, 
trust  and  loan  companies,  or  closely  held 
commercial  banks.  Through  a  financial 
holding  company,  they  can  enter  these 
new  areas  of  business  either  as  new  com- 
panies or  by  acquiring  an  existing  firm. 

Prior  to  this  agreement,  U.S.  secu- 
rities firms  established  in  Canada  were 
not  primary  distributors  of  Canadian 
Government  paper  or  money  market 
funds.  The  FTA  assures  that  their  appli- 
cations to  engage  in  these  activities  will 
be  considered  on  an  equal  basis  with 
Canadian  firms. 

Q.  Is  the  FTA  consistent  with  the 
principles  of  the  Glass-Steagall  Act? 

A.  The  FTA  is  fully  consistent  with 
the  Glass-Steagall  Act  but  broadens  its 
application  to  allow  Canadian  (and  other) 
banks  in  the  United  States  to  under- 
write and  deal  in  debt  obligations  fully 
backed  by  the  Canadian  Government  and 
its  political  subdivisions  (the  vast  major- 
ity of  current  business  of  Canadian  secu- 
rities firms).  This  conforms  with  the 
existing  ability  of  banks  in  the  United 
States  to  underwrite  and  deal  in  securi- 
ties of  the  U.S.  Government  and  its  po- 
litical subdivisions,  now  permitted  under 
the  act.  In  addition,  any  future  Glass- 
Steagall  liberalization  would  automat- 
ically apply  to  Canadian,  as  well  as  to 
U.S.,  financial  institutions. 


Dispute  Settlement  and  Remedies 

Q.  If  the  FT.\  does  not  resolve  all 
conflicts  between  the  United  States 
and  Canada,  what  does  it  do  about 
them? 

A.  Most  importantly,  the  FTA  em- 
phasizes dispute  avoidance.  However,  if 
disputes  do  occur,  the  settlement  mech- 
anism, modeled  after  the  GATT,  is  im- 
proved to  assure  more  rapid  and  effec- 
tive settlement.  There  are  four  basic 
steps  involved: 

•  Notification  and  consultation; 

•  Referral  to  a  five-person  panel, 
if  needed; 

•  A  panel  finding  and  recommen- 
dation; and 

•  Dispute  resolution  or  retaliation- 

If  there  is  no  resolution  in  30  days» 
after  the  panel  finding,  a  party  may 
retaliate.  This  process  applies  to  all 
disputes  except  antidumping  and 
countervailing  duty  cases,  as  well 
as  financial  services,  which  have  their 
own  dispute  settlement  processes. 

Q.  Does  the  FTA  change  U.S.  an 
tidumping  and  countervailing  duty 
laws? 

A.  No.  The  FTA  preserves  the 
rights  of  U.S.  companies  to  obtain  reli& 
from  injurious  dumping  and  governmert 
subsidies  under  such  laws.  It  has  creats 
a  procedure  under  which  binational  par 
els,  substituting  for  national  courts, 
review  determinations  in  U.S.  or  Canan 
dian  cases  on  products  of  the  other 
country. 

Q.  Is  it  constitutional  to  have 
a  binational  panel  instead  of  U.S. 
courts  review  antidumping  and  couri 
tervailing  duty  determinations? 

A.  There  is  no  constitutional  right 
to  have  a  federal  court  hear  an  appeal  o 
administrative  decisions  in  such  cases. 
The  Congress  has  the  power  to  prescril 
or  limit  the  jurisdiction  of  federal 
courts;  indeed,  it  was  only  in  1980  that  i 
the  Congress,  by  statute,  provided  for 
the  range  of  appeals  to  Federal  courts 
that  are  now  available.  Moreover,  there' 
is  no  constitutional  right  to  import  or  t( 
be  subject  to  a  particular  tariff.  Conse- 
quently, eliminating  judicial  review  of 
determinations  in  cases  against  Cana- 
dian products  does  not  raise  due  proces 
problems.  ■ 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  19J 


FEATURE-Canada 


Canada 


EOGRAPHY 

anada  is  more  than  9.9  million  squai'e 
ilometers  (8.97  million  sq.  mi.)  in  area 
nd  is  the  second  largest  country  in  the 
orld.  Canada  shares  an  8,892-kilometer 
i,335-mi. )  border  with  the  United 
tates,  unfortified  for  more  than  a  cen- 
iry.  There  are  five  major  geographic 
jgions. 

•  The  Appalachian  region  encom- 
asses  the  Atlantic  Provinces  and  part 
'southeastei'n  Quebec  and  consists  of 
mnded  hills  and  rolling  plains. 

•  The  St.  Lawrence  lowlands  consist 
■fertile,  low-lying  plains  bordering  the 
reat  Lakes  and  St.  Lawrence  River  in 
)uthern  Quebec  and  Ontario. 

•  The  Canadian  Shield  is  an  area  of 
re-Cambrian  rock  extending  from  La- 
rador  to  the  Arctic  islaiids  and  covering 
lost  of  eastern  and  central  Canada.  The 
jrthern  area  of  the  Shield  is  a  moss- 
)vered,  treeless  i)lain  with  permanently 
ozen  subsoil.  The  Shield  is  thickly  for- 
feted  in  the  south. 

I     •  The  interior  plains  extend  from  the 
|.S.  border  to  the  Arctic  Ocean.  In  the 
'•uth,  they  are  unforested  and  form  the 
■eadbasket  of  Canada.  North  of  the 
•airies,  the  plains  are  forested  and  con- 
in  large  deposits  of  oil,  gas,  and 
rtash. 

•  The  Cordilleran  region  is  a  strip  of 
ountainous  terrain  about  800  kilome- 
■rs  (.500  mi.)  wide  that  includes  most  of 
ritish  Columbia,  the  Yukon,  and  part 

western  Alberta. 

The  climate  varies  greatly,  from 
■ctic  to  mild,  but  Canada  may  be  de- 
ribed  generally  as  having  moderate 
mimers  and  long,  cold  winters. 


EOPLE 

f  Canada's  2(5.1  million  people,  80*^  live 
ithin  160  kilometers  (100  mi.)  of  the 

S.  border,  and  half  of  the  population 
ves  in  the  southeastern  part  of  the 
luntry  near  the  Great  Lakes  and  the 
:.  Lawrence  River  Yet,  Canadians  and 

S.  citizens  are  not  as  similar  as  casual 
iscrvers  freijuently  assume.  The  Cana- 
an character  and  outlook  have  beei> 
'Visvd  from  a  distinctive  historical  and 
icial  background. 


iew  of  Roger's  Pass  on  Mount  Abbot. 


department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


FEATURE-Canada 


An  Indian  artist,  member  of  the  Hazelton  band,  paints  designs  on  a  wooden  box. 


Canada's  more  than  (i  million  French- 
s])eaking  citizens  are  primarily  descen- 
dants of  colonists  who  settled  the  coun- 
try three  centuries  ago.  The  English- 
speaking  community  has  been  built  up 
mostly  by  immigration  from  the  United 
Kingdom.  The  largest  influ.x  from  the 
United  States  occurred  during  the 
American  Revolution  when  thousands  of 
"Empire  Loyalist.s"  fled  to  Canada. 

Canadians  of  neither  British  nor 
French  origin  are  generally  of  German, 
Ukrainian.  Scandinavian,  Italian,  Dutch, 
Polish,  indigencjus  Indian,  or  Eskimo 
(Inuit)  origin. 

Cultural  Achievements 

Canadian  culture  has  been  shaped  by 
four  major  influences:  Canada's  multi- 
cultural hei-itage;  English/French  bilin- 
gualism;  sustained  government  funding 
for  artistic  and  literary  pursuits;  and 
the  abundance  and  availability  of  Ameri- 
can cultural  i)roduction.  Canadians  view 
their  country  not  as  a  melting  pot  but 
rather  as  a  cultural  mosaic.  Inuit.  Indian 
nations.  Francophones,  Anglophones, 
and  immigrant  groups  have  all  sought  to 
maintain  their  unic|ue  cultural  identities. 
Such  efforts  have  been  encouraged  by 
e.xtensive  government  funding  of  the 
arts.  After  the  Second  World  War,  the 
government  established  the  Canada 


Council  to  fund  the  arts,  which  has  be- 
come the  major  patron  of  all  forms  of 
creative  endeavor  in  Canada.  Govern- 
ment support,  as  well  as  strict  regula- 
tions mandating  a  specified  amount  of 
Canadian  content  in  the  media,  has  pro- 
duced an  artistic  atmosphere  that  en- 
courages creativity  over  mai-ketability. 
This  atmosphere  pervades  all  areas  tii' 
art  and  culture,  from  television  and 
films  to  literature  and  publishing. 

Canada  has  a  colorful  literary  tradi- 
tion. Margaret  Lawrence,  Margaret  At- 
wood.  Robertson  Davies,  and  Mordechai 
Richlei-  i-ank  among  the  most  influential 
Anglo])hone  authors.  Leading  Franco- 
phone authors  include  Gabrielle  Roy  and 
Jacc|ues  Ferron.  In  visual  arts,  Cana- 
dians are  most  jjroud  of  a  school  of  paint- 
ers known  as  "The  Group  of  Seven."  This 
school,  whose  exclusive  subject  was  Ca- 
nadian landscape,  is  credited  with  a 
strictly  Canadian  style  of  painting,  a 
"pictoral  nationalism."  With  the  support 
of  the  National  Film  Board,  Canadian 
filmmakers  such  as  Harry  Rasky  and 
Bill  Mason  are  world  leaders  in  produc- 
ing documentaries.  Canada  also  has  a 
number  of  world-class  dance  troupes, 
orchestras,  and  repertory  theaters. 
Numerous  well-known  musicians  claim 
Canada  as  their  home,  including  Joni 
Mitchell,  Anne  Murray,  Paul  Anka, 
Gordon  Lightfoot,  Bryan  Adams,  and 
Corev  Hart. 


HISTOKV 

Canada's  early  hi.story  was  dominated  b 
rivalry  between  ^' ranee  and  Britain.  In 
1 197,  .John  Cabot  reached  Newfoundland 
and  claimed  for  Britain  a  large  portion 
of  the  Atlantic  seaboard.  Cabot  was  fol- 
lowed by  the  French  e.xplorer  Jacques 
Cartier,  who  landed  on  the  Gaspe  Penini 
sula  in  1.534  and  claimed  it  for  P' ranee. 

While  the  British  settled  along  the 
coast,  the  French  pushed  rapidly  into  th 
interior,  and  for  more  than  a  century 
Canada  was  a  French  colony.  The  foun- 
der and  settler  of  French  Canada  was 
Samuel  de  Champlain,  who  founded 
Quebec  City  in  1608  and  established  a 
number  of  other  settlements  along  the 
Bay  of  F\mdy  and  the  shores  of  the  St. 
Lawrence  River  Ex|)lorers,  traders, 
and  missionaries,  including  Marquette, 
Joliet,  and  La  Salle,  extended  French 
influence  in  "New  France." 

Following  the  early  years  of  settle- 
ment, French  and  English  pioneers  en- 
gaged in  the  highly  competitive  fur 
trade.  Canada's  political  shape  began  tc 
emerge  from  the  Battle  of  the  Plains  of 
Abraham  at  Quebec,  where  the  British 
defeated  the  French  in  17.59  and  took 
over  the  French  colonies  in  North  Aniei 
ica.  The  memory  of  that  event  still  has  ; 
strong  emotional  appeal  for  French- 
Canadians.  Although  New  France  came 
under  British  control,  it  was  permitted 
to  retain  its  religion  and  civil  code.  To- 
day, by  means  of  the  Meech  Lake  Const' 
tutional  Accord  (subject  to  provincial 
ratification),  Canada  continues  its  quest 
to  develop  a  constitutional  formula  that 
will  .satisfy  the  aspirations  of  French- 
speaking  Quebec. 

During  the  American  Revolution, 
French  and  British  colonists  in  Canadai 
i-ebuffed  the  overtures  of  American  leat 
ei-s  and  chose  British  rule  over  indepent 
ence  in  association  with  the  Ihiited 
States.  A  U.S.  raid  on  Quebec  was  un- 
successful. In  the  War  of  1812,  U.S.- 
British rivalry  in  North  America  again 
resulted  in  the  invasion  of  Canada. 

Several  events  accelerated  the  unio 
of  the  British  colonies  in  Canada  into  a 
new  nation. 

First,  the  political  uprisings  of 
1S87  in  both  English  Ujjper  Canada  and 
French  Lower  Canada  led  to  the  creatio 
of  local  governments  and  to  greater  citi 
zen  particijjation  in  government. 

Second,  at  the  end  of  the  American 
Civil  War,  it  was  feared  that  the  I'nited 
States  might  turn  against  British  Nort 
America. 


nooartmont  nf  Citato  Riillptin/Drtnhpr  198 


FEATURE-Canada 


Finally,  the  e.\i)aiisi()n  of  the  Anieri- 
111  West  and  the  sUiwer  settlement  of 
le  Canadian  West  encouraged  the  de- 
■iopnieiit  of  a  Canadian  transcontinen- 
,1  railroad  and  the  perception  among 
istern  Canadian  political  leaders  that  a 
anadian  federation  from  the  Atlantic  to 
le  Pacific  had  to  be  achieved  if  western 
anada  was  to  avoifl  absorption  by  the 
nited  States. 

The  British  North  America  Act  of 
■1(37  created  the  new  nation  of  Canada, 
)mprising  four  provinces — Ontario, 
uebec,  New  Brunswick,  and  Nova 
:'otia.  It  provided  for  a  federal  union 
id  for  a  parliamentary  system  of  gov- 
•niuent.  Six  other  provinces  eventually 
itered  the  confederation;  the  last  was 
ewfoundland  in  1949. 


OVERNMENT 

anada  is  a  constitutional  monarchy 
ith  a  bilingual  federal  system,  a  parlia- 
entary  form  of  government,  and  strong 
^mocratic  traditions.  Although  in  1982 
anada  consolidated  its  written  consti- 
tion,  many  of  the  country's  legal  and 
irliamentary  practices  are  based  on 
iwritten  custom,  as  is  the  case  in 
le  United  Kingdom.  On  the  other  hand, 
je  federal  structure — uniting  the  10 
•ovinces  in  a  federal  government — 
sembles  the  U.S.  federal  .system.  The 
nstitution  provides  for  a  federal  gov- 
nment  to  which  are  reserved  specific 
iwers,  such  as  those  relating  to  de- 
nse, trade  and  commerce,  banking  and 
irrency,  criminal  law,  postal  services, 
id  certain  taxes,  as  well  as  all  powers 
it  expressly  granted  to  the  provinces, 
ne  provinces  have  authority  to  admin- 
iter  and  legislate  on  such  matters  as  ed- 
■ation,  jjroperty  laws,  health,  and  local 
■fairs  generally.  The  1982  Charter  of 
ights  guarantees  basic  rights  in  many 
eas. 

Queen  Elizabeth  II,  as  Queen  of 
anada.  .serves  as  a  symbol  of  the  na- 
3n's  unity.  She  appoints  the  governor 
meral  on  the  advice  of  the  prime  minis- 
r  of  Canada,  usually  for  a  -S-year  term. 

Canada's  parliament  consists  of  an 
ipointive  Senate  and  an  elective  House 
Commons.  In  practice,  legislative 
iwer  rests  with  the  Commons  (295 
embers).  Senate  members  are  appoint- 
I  by  the  governor  general  on  the  advice 
the  prime  mini.ster.  Commons  mem- 
Ts  are  elected  at  least  every  .5  years 
it  also  at  any  time  that  the  prime  min- 
ter  advises  the  governor  general  to  dis- 
Ive  the  House. 


Canada — A  Profile 


Geography 

.\rea:  9.97  million  sq.  km.  (3.8  million  sq. 
mi.);  second  largest  country  in  the  world.  Cit- 
ies: C(/pi7a/— Ottawa  (pop.  83:^000).  Other 
cities — Toronto  (3.-5  milli(in),  Montreal  (2.9 
million),  Vancouver  (1.4  million).  Terrain: 
Varied.  Climate:  Temperate  to  arctic. 

People 

Nationality:  S'dhh  and  adjective — 
Canadian(s).  Population  (1988):  26.1  million. 
.Annual  growth  rate  (1987-88);  l.29c.  Ethnic 
groups:  British  'Irt^c ,  French  24*^,  European 
W/( ,  indigenous  Indian  and  Eskimo  l.¥/e, 
mixed  background  28'^f.  Religions:  Roman 
Catholic  47''/f ,  United  Church  16'7f ,  Anglican 
10'^.  Languages:  English,  French.  Literacy — 
9.9'/;  of  population  aged  15  and  over  have  at 
least  a  ninth  grade  education.  Health:  Infant 
inortalilii  ra^c— 7.3/1,000  (U.S.  =  11.2/1,000). 
Lite  e.rpectancji — 73  yrs.  males,  80  yrs.  fe- 
males. Work  force  (13.3  million,  1988); 
Agricnitiire — 0.4  million.  Mannfacturing — 
2.1  million.  Trade — 2.2  million.  Communiti/i 
tiiisiness/personal  service — 4.1  million.  Public 
adininixlratinn — 0.8  million. 

Government 

Type:  Confederatiim  with  parliamentary  de- 
mocracy. Independence:  .luly  1.  18(37.  Consti- 
tution: Amended  British  North  America  Act 
|)atriated  to  Canada  in  1982,  charter  of  rights, 
and  unwritten  custom. 

Branches:  Execntive — Queen  Elizabeth 
II  (chief  of  state,  represented  by  a  governor 
general),  prime  minister  (head  of  govern- 
ment), cabinet.  Legislative — bicameral  parlia- 
ment (l()4-member  Senate,  295-member  House 
of  (.'onimons).  Jndicial — Supreme  Court. 

Political  parties:  Progressive  Conserv- 
ative. Liberal,  New  Democratic.  Reform, 
Social  Credit. 

Suffrage:  Universal  over  18. 


Government  budget  (FY  1984-8.5); 
Expenditures — C.$125.5  billion.  Revennes — 
C$97.5  billion.  Dp/Vc/7— C$28.0  billion. 

Defense:  27^  ofGNP. 

Subdivisions:  10  provinces.  2  territories. 

Flag:  A  red  maple  leaf  on  a  white  back- 
ground flanked  by  vertical  red  bands. 

Economy 

GDP  (1988);  .$48(i.3  billion.  Annual  real  GDP 
growth  rate:  4.5^^^.  Per  capita  GDP  (1988); 
$18,707. 

Natural  resources:  Metals  and  minerals, 
fish,  forests,  wildlife. 

.Agriculture:  Products — wheat,  livestock 
and  meat,  feedgrains.  oilseeds,  dairy  prod- 
ucts, tobacco,  fruits,  vegetables. 

Industry:  Ti/pes — motor  vehicles  and 
parts,  fish  and  forest  products,  petroleum 
and  natural  gas,  processed  and  unprocessed 
minerals. 

Trade  (1988);  Exports— $m.i  billion:  mo- 
tor vehicles  and  parts,  lumber,  woodpulp  and 
newsprint,  crude  and  fabricated  metals,  natu- 
ral gas,  crude  petroleum,  wheat.  Partners — 
U.S.  74'*,  EC  18'7r.  .Japan  5'7r.  Imports— 
.$103.6  billion;  motor  vehicles  and  parts,  indus- 
trial machinery,  crude  petroleum,  chemicals, 
agricultural  machinery.  Partners — U.S.  69%, 
EC  8^;;,. Japan  (W. 

Official  exchange  rate  (floating,  average 
closing  rate  for  1988);  C$l=  U.S.  C81.24. 

Fiscal  year:  April  1-March  31. 

Development  assistance  (FY  1987-88); 
$2billi(jnijr0.4';  ofCDP. 

Membership  in 
International  Organizations 

UN,  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization 
(NATO).  North  Atlantic  Fisheries  Organiza- 
tion, Organization  for  Economic 
Coo[ierati<in  and  Development  (OECD), 
Commonwealth,  La  Francophonie,  Agency  for 
Cultural  and  Technical  Cooperation,  Interna- 
tional Energy  Agency  (lEA),  INTELSAT. 


The  cabinet  is  led  by  the  prime  min- 
ister, who  is  the  leader  of  the  political 
party  in  power  The  cabinet  remains  in 
office  as  long  as  it  retains  majority  sup- 
port in  the  Commons  on  major  issues. 

Criminal  law,  a  federal  prerogative, 
is  uniform  throughout  the  nation  and  is 
based  largely  on  British  law.  Civil  law  is 
based  on  the  common  law  of  England,  ex- 
cept in  Quebec,  which  has  retained  its 


own  civil  code  patterned  after  that  of 
France.  .Justice  is  administered  by  fed- 
eral, provincial,  and  municipal  courts. 

Government  in  the  jjrovinces  is  pat- 
terned much  along  the  lines  of  the  cen- 
tral government.  Each  province  is 
governed  by  a  premier  and  a  single,  elect- 
ed legislative  chamber.  A  lieutenant- 
governor,  appointed  by  the  governor 
general,  represents  the  crown  in  each 
province. 


teoartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


FEATURE-Canada 


Principal  Government  Officials 

Chief  of  Statt^Queen  Elizabeth  II 
Governor  General — Madame  Jeanne 

Sauve 
Prime  Minister — Brian  Mulroney 
Secretary  of  State  for  External 

Affairs — ,Joe  Clark 

Ambassador  to  the  United  States — 

Derek  Burney 
Ambassador  to  the  United  Nations — 

Yves  Fortier 

Canada  maintains  an  embassy  in 
the  United  States  at  501  Pennsylvania 
Avenue,  NW.,  Washingrton,  D.C.  20001 
(tel.  202-(382-1740). 


CaiHidicui  coiiKulatefi 
in  the  United  States 
Atlanta,  Georgia 
Boston, 

Massachusetts 
Buffalo,  New  York 
Chicago,  Illinois 
Cleveland,  Ohio 
Dallas.  Texas 
Detroit,  Michigan 
Los  Angeles, 

California 
Minneapolis, 

Minnesota 
New  York, 

New  York 
San  Francisco, 

California 
Seattle,  Washington 


(404) 577-6810 
(617) 262-3760 

(716) 852-1247 
(312) 427-1031 
(216) 771-0150 
(214) 992-9806 
(313)  567-2340 
(213)  687-7432 

(612)  333-1641 

(212)  586-2400 

(415) 981-2670 

(206) 443-1777 


Changing  of  the  guard  ceremony  in  front  of 
Parliament,  Ottawa. 


POLITICAL  CONDITIONS 

The  three  national  parties  in  Canada  are 
the  Progressive  Conservatives,  the  Lib- 
erals, and  the  New  Democratic  Party 
(NDP),  a  Social  Democratic  party  formed 
in  1961.  Since  1921,  either  the  Liberal  or 
the  Conservative  Party  has  controlled 
the  Canadian  Government.  Both  are 
broadbased  parties  of  the  center  that  at- 
tempt to  win  support  from  all  groups 
and  regions  of  the  country.  In  federal 
elections,  the  Liberals  had  relied  in  the 
past  on  strong  support  from  Quebec. 
However,  in  the  1984  and  1988  federal 
elections,  the  Progressive  Conservatives 
took  the  large  majority  of  seats  in  that 
province.  The  Conservatives  tradi- 
tionally have  been  strong  in  the  western 
provinces.  Heavily  populated  Ontario 
shifts  between  the  two  parties  and  often 
plays  a  decisive  role  in  elections. 

The  Progressive  Conservative  Party 
won  169  seats  in  the  House  of  Commons 
in  the  November  21,  1988  election  and 
again  formed  a  majority  government 
with  representation  from  every  region  in 
the  nation.  The  Liberal  Party,  the  official 
opposition,  won  83  seats;  the  NDP,  43. 

Quebec's  status  remains  a  serious 
political  issue  in  Canada.  In  1980,  the 
Parti  Quebecois  sought,  through  a  refer- 
endum, a  mandate  from  the  people  of 
Quebec  to  negotiate  a  new  status, 
"sovereignty-association,"  involving 
political  independence  with  continued 
economic  association  with  the  rest  of 
Canada.  Sixty  percent  of  Quebec  voters 
rejected  the  proposal. 


In  1982,  Queen  Elizabeth  ceremo- 
nially turned  over  full  responsibility  foi 
Canada's  constitution,  the  amended  Brii 
ish  North  America  Act  of  1867,  to  the     j' 
Canadian  Parliament.  Patriation  of  the  u 
constitution  was  made  possible  when  tb 
federal  government  and  nine  provinces 
agreed  on  a  Charter  of  Rights  and  an 
amending  formula.  Only  Quebec  did  not 
concur.  However,  Quebec's  current  Lib- 
eral government  has  strongly  endorsed 
the  1987  Meech  Lake  Constitutional  Ac- 
cord that  would  bring  the  province  into 
Canada's  federal  constitutional  frame- 
work while  recognizing  Quebec  as  a  "dii 
tinct  society."  The  accord  must  still  be 
ratified  by  two  provinces  (Manitoba  an 
New  Brunswick)  by  June  1990  before  it 
takes  effect. 

Federal-provincial  relations  are  a 
central  feature  of  Canadian  politics. 
Quebec  wishes  to  preserve  and  strengt 
en  its  distinct  nature.  Western  pro- 
vinces desire  more  control  over  their 
abundant  natural  resources,  especially 
energy  reserves.  Industrialized  centra 
Canada  is  concerned  with  other  aspect 
of  economic  development,  while  the  At- 
lantic provinces  have  resisted  federal 
claims  to  fishing  and  mineral  rights  off 
their  shores.  Canadians  have  responde 
to  these  differing  regional  needs  by 
strengthening  both  their  confederation' 
and  the  fundamental  democratic  princi 
pies  essential  to  a  balanced  federal- 
provincial  political  system. 


ECONOMY 

Canada  ranks  seventh  in  the  world  in 
gross  domestic  product  and  is  one  of  th 
world's  largest  producers  of  a  wide  vari 
ety  of  minerals.  The  mineral  industry 
has  been  a  major  factor  in  Canada's  eco 
nomic  development.  Canada's  lakes  havi 
more  than  50V(  of  the  world's  fresh  wa- 
ter, and  759'(  of  Canada's  power  needs  a 
met  by  hydroelectric  energy. 

The  year  1988  marked  the  .sixth  an 
.secutive  year  that  Canada  held  its  |)iisi- 
tion  as  one  of  the  strongest  economies  i 
the  t)rganization  for  Economic  Coopeni 
tion  and  Development.  Fueled  by  strmii 
investment  in  plant  and  equipment,  (a; 
ada's  economy  grew  by  5*/^ .  This  perforr 
ance  not  only  surpassed  1987's  growth 
rate  of  4.5'/^  but  was  the  highest  rate 
since  1984.  The  spectacular  growth  of 
Canadian  manufacturing,  particularly 
since  the  1950s,  has  transfoi-med  the  na 
tion  from  a  rural,  agricultural  society 
into  one  primai'ily  industrial  and  urbar 


n<sr>ortmortt  r>f  Qtata  Rl  ■llotm/notnKor  1Qfl 


FEATURE-Canada 


ndustry  is  now  the  leading-  segment  of 
he  nation's  economy,  employing  one- 
hii'il  of  the  woi'k  force. 


iKriiulture,  Forestry,  and  Fisheries 

agriculture's  contribution  to  the  Cana- 
ian  economy  is  very  similar  to  that  of 
he  United  States,  averaging  less  than 
%  of  gross  national  product  and  employ- 
lent  in  the  late  1980s.  Agricultural  ex- 
orts  are  less  than  10*^*  of  all  trade;  led 
y  wheat  and  barley  to  thii'd  markets 
nd  by  pork  and  hoi-ticultui'al  products 
D  the  United  States.  The  United  States 
i  Canada's  leading  mai'ket.  taking  near- 
:  one-third  of  all  food  exi)()rts.  domi- 
ated  by  pork  and  horticultural  products, 
lonversely,  Canada  is  the  United  States' 
econd  largest  market,  primarily  impor- 
ing  fresh  fruits  and  vegetables  and  live- 
tock  products. 

Forest  covers  49"^^^,  or  4.5  million 
quare  kilometers  (1.7  million  sq.  mi.)  of 
'anada's  total  land  area.  Poorest  product 
xports,  including  pulp  and  paper,  repre- 
ent  about  W7(  of  Canada's  total  export 
rade  with  nearly  two-thirds  going  to 
he  United  States.  Canada  is  the  world's 
'ading  jjroducer  of  newsprint,  account- 
ig  for  4(K'(  of  global  output.  The  United 
tates  imports  nearly  759;  of  Canada's 
Dtal  newsprint  production. 

Commercial  fisheries  provide  an  an- 
ual  catch  of  about  1.4  million  metric 
ons  (1.54  million  tons),  and  some  709(  of 
he  catch  is  exported. 

Minerals 

'anada  ranks  first  in  the  world  in  min- 
ral  exports  and  third  in  mineral  pro- 
uction,  after  the  United  States  and  the 
ioviet  Union.  It  is  the  world's  largest 
uroducer  of  zinc,  potash,  uranium,  and 
lickel;  the  second  largest  producer  of  as- 
lestos,  silver,  titanium,  gypsum,  and 
ulfur;  and  a  leading  producer  of  molyb- 
..enuni,  aluminum,  cobalt,  gold,  lead, 
opper,  iron,  and  platinum.  Mineral 
eposits  are  located  in  all  regions. 

Canada  is  a  major  producer  of  hy- 
roelectricity,  oil,  and  gas  and,  unlike 
lost  of  its  industrial  partners,  is  a  net 
xporter  of  energy  (i)rimarily  gas  and 
lectricity).  Canada's  exports  and  im- 
lorts  of  oil  currently  are  in  approximate 
lalance.  Nevertheless,  crude  petroleum 
s  the  largest  single  component  of  Cana- 
da's minerals  output.  In  1988,  Canadian 
|il  reserves  were  about  6.8  billion  bar- 
els,  including  arctic  reserves.  Canada 


produces  annually  more  than  5(XJ  million 
barrels  of  oil  and  about  8.5  trillion  cubic 
feet  of  natural  gas  annually.  The  United 
States  imports  about  69f  of  its  natural 
gas  requirements  from  Canada. 

Foreign  Trade 

In  total  volume  of  trade,  Canada  ranks 
seventh  in  the  world,  after  the  United 
States,  the  Federal  Republic  of  Ger- 
many, France,  the  United  Kingdom, 
Japan,  and  Italy. 

The  value  of  U.S. -Canadian  mer- 
chandise trade  for  1988  was  over  $157 
billion,  more  than  between  any  other 
two  countries  in  the  world.  Also  in  1988 
about  2b^''r  of  all  U.S.  merchandise  ex- 
ports went  to  Canada,  and  Canada 
supplied  about  22Vf  of  total  U.S. 
mei'chandise  imjjorts. 

Almost  one-third  of  U.S. -Canadian 
ti-ade  occurs  under  the  terms  of  the 
U.S. -Canada  Automotive  Agreement 
(Auto  Pact),  which  provides  for  free 
trade  between  the  two  nations  in  cars, 
trucks,  and  auto  parts.  Under  the  1965 
agreement,  two-way  trade  in  automotive 
products  rose  from  $715  million  in  1964 
to  $23  billion  by  1978.  In  1980-81,  the 
two-way  trade  declined  to  about  $18  bil- 
lion, but  it  rose  to  $51.5  billion  in  1988. 

Foreign  Investment 

The  investment  relationship  between  the 
United  States  and  Canada  is  extremely 
close.  The  United  States  is  the  largest 
foreign  investor  in  Canada.  In  late  1988, 
the  stock  of  U.S.  direct  investment  in 
Canada  was  estimated  at  over  $66  billion, 
or  about  SO^f  of  total  foreign  direct  in- 
vestment in  Canada.  Similarly,  Canada's 
investment  exposure  in  the  United 
States  currently  is  quite  substantial.  At 
the  end  of  1988,  the  stock  of  Canadian 
direct  investment  in  the  United  States 
stood  at  $35  billion  (includes  investments 
from  Canadian  holding  companies  lo- 
cated in  the  Netherlands),  or  20'7f  of  total 
foreign  direct  investment  in  the  United 
States. 

U.S.  investment  in  Canada  primar- 
ily is  in  the  mining  and  smelting  in- 
dustries, petroleum,  chemicals,  the 
manufacturing  of  machinery  and  trans- 
portation equipment,  and  finance.  Cana- 
dian investment  in  the  United  States  is 
concentrated  in  petroleum,  real  estate, 
manufacturing,  and  trade. 


FOREIGN  RELATIONS 

In  Canada's  early  days  as  a  nation,  its 
foreign  affairs  were  conducted  by  the 
United  Kingdom.  By  1909,  the  Canadian 
drive  for  autonomy  led  to  the  creation  of 
a  Department  of  External  Affairs.  After 
World  War  I,  Canadian  representatives 
signed  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  and  be- 
gan to  conduct  a  truly  independent  for- 
eign policy. 

World  War  II  gave  considerable  im- 
petus to  Canadian  participation  in  world 
affairs.  Canada  took  an  active  role  in  the 
creation  of  the  United  Nations,  which  it 
has  strongly  supported.  It  has  contrib- 
uted troops  to  UN  forces  in  Korea, 
the  Middle  East,  the  Congo,  Yemen, 
Namibia,  and  Cyprus.  In  addition  to  its 
peacekeeping  activities,  Canada  has  as- 
sumed a  prominent  role  in  the  United 
Nations  in  disarmamant  discussions,  en- 


Canada's  Provinces 
and  Territories 

Atlantic  Provinces:  Newfoundland,  Prince 
Edward  Island,  Nova  Scotia,  New  Bruns- 
wick. ,4i-ra— .541,18()sq.  km.  (208,146  sq. 
mi.).  Population  (1988)— 2.3  million.  Ethnic 
groups — predominantly  British,  French. 
hidnslrii — fishing,  agriculture,  mining, 
manufacturing. 

Quebec:  Area— l,35(i, 790  sq.  km.  (.523,857 
sq.  mi.).  Population  (1988)— 6.7  million. 
Etiinic  groups — predominantly  F'reneh, 
British,  other  European  groups.  Industri/ — 
agriculture,  mining,  manufacturing,  hydro- 
electric power. 

Ontario:  Area— 891,190  sq.  km.  (345,420  sq. 
mi.).  Population  (1988)- 9.5  million.  Ethnic 
groups — British.  French,  other  European 
groups.  Indnstrg — manufacturing,  agricul- 
ture, mining. 

Prairie  provinces:  Manitoba,  Saskatche- 
wan, Alberta.  Area — 1.77  million  sq.  km. 
((WO, 757  sq.  mi.).  Population  (1988)^.5  mil- 
lion. Ethnic  groups — British,  other  Euro- 
pean groups.  Industrg — agriculture,  cattle, 
petroleum  and  natural  gas,  mining, 
manufacturing. 

British  Columbia:  Area — 934,125  sq.  km. 
(3,59,279  .sq.  mi.).  Population  (1988)— 3 
million.  Ethnic  groups — British,  other 
European,  Chinese,  indigenous  Indian. 
Industrg — forestry,  manufacturing,  fish- 
ing, mining,  agriculture. 

Territories:  Northwest  Territory  and 
Yukon  Territory.  Area — 3.79  million  sq.  km. 
(1.45  million  sq.  mi).  Population  (1988) — 
72,300.  Ethnic  groups — British,  indigenous 
Indian,  Inuit.  Industry — mining. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


11 


FEATURE-Canada 


vironmental  activities,  law  of  the  sea  ne- 
gotiations, human  rights  issues,  North- 
South  issues,  and  world  food  problems. 
Canada  also  continues  to  be  a  strong 
supporter  of  the  nuclear  Non- 
Proliferation  Treaty  and  its  goals. 

A  member  of  the  North  Atlantic 
Treaty  Organization  (NATO)  since  its  in- 
ception, Canada  shares  responsibility, 
with  the  United  States  and  other  allies, 
for  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  area.  Due 
to  its  membership  in  NATO,  Canada  is 
an  active  participant  in  discussions  stem- 
ming from  the  Conference  on  Security 
and  Cooperation  in  Europe. 

Two  other  international  organiza- 
tions of  special  interest  to  Canada  are 
the  Commonwealth — an  association  of 
former  British  colonies  that  share  sim- 
ilarities of  language,  customs,  and 
institutions — and  La  Francophonie — an 
association  of  French-speaking  countries 
that  include  France  and  former  French 
colonies.  Since  about  24'%-  of  all 
Canadians  regard  French  as  their 
mother  tongue,  Canada  has  sought  to 
broaden  and  strengthen  ties  with  La 
Francophonie. 

Canadian  economic  assistance  to  de- 
veloping countries  totals  more  than  $2 
billion  annually.  The  official  channel  for 
government  overseas  aid  programs  is  the 
Canadian  International  Development 
Agency.  Canada  also  contributes  sub- 
stantially to  international  and  regional 
development  organizations  and  is  a  major 
supplier  of  food  aid. 


U.S.-CANADL\N  RELATIONS 

Canada  views  its  relationship  with  the 
United  States  as  crucial  to  a  wide  range 
of  Canadian  interests.  The  bilateral  rela- 
tionship is  varied  and  complex.  Although 
differences  inevitably  occur  occasionally, 
the  basic  characteristics  of  Canadian- 
U.S.  relations  are  close  friendship  and 
cooperation  in  a  wide  range  of  fields. 

The  two  countries  cooperate  closely 
in  resolving  transboundary  environment- 
al issues,  an  area  of  increasing  impoi-- 
tance  in  the  bilateral  relationship.  A 
principal  instrument  of  this  cooperation 
is  the  InternationalJoint  Commission 
(I.JC).  Established  in  1909,  the  IJC  is  a 
unique  approach  to  international  envi- 
ronmental cooperation.  The  Great  Lakes 
Water  Quality  Agreements  of  1972  and 
197M,  aimed  at  jjreserving  and  enhancing 
the  water  quality  of  the  Great  Lakes,  are 
historic  e.xamples  of  joint  cooperation  in 


controlling  transboundary  water  pollu- 
tion. The  United  States  and  Canada  fre- 
quently consult  on  possible  approaches  to 
dealing  with  the  difficult  ])roblem  of 
transboundary  air  pollution. 

The  United  States  and  Canada  also 
recently  have  resolved  several  major  is- 
sues involving  fisheries.  By  common 
agreement,  the  two  countries  submitted 
a  Gulf  of  Maine  boundary  dispute  to  the 
ICJ  in  1981;  both  accepted  the  Court's 
October  12,  1984  ruling.  On  January  28, 
198.5,  the  United  States  and  Canada 
signed  the  Pacific  Salmon  Treaty,  the 
culmination  of  years  of  difficult  negotia- 
tions aimed  at  rebuilding  the  Pacific 
salmon  resource. 

U.S. -Canadian  economic  relations 
provide  a  number  of  examples  of  cooper- 
ative efforts,  such  as  the  Auto  Pact, 
which  created  a  largely  integrated  two- 
country  market  for  automobiles,  and  de- 
fense economic  arrangements,  which  di- 
minish obstacles  to  trade  and  technology 
exchange  and  encourage  a  balance  of 
trade  in  defense  related  areas. 

Investment  and  trade  issues  are  a 
constant  feature  of  U.S. -Canadian  rela- 
tions. This  is  to  be  expected,  given  the 
enormous  flows  of  capital  between  the 
countries  and  the  fact  that  each  is  the 
other's  most  important  market. 

The  U.S. -Canada  trading  relation- 
ship has  been  further  enhanced  by  the 
bilateral  Free  Trade  Agreement  (FTA) 
that  became  effective  on  .January  1,  1989. 
Over  a  10-year  period,  the  FTA  will  re- 
move all  tariffs  and  virtually  all  import 
and  export  restrictions;  resolve  many 
longstanding  bilateral  irritants;  and  lib- 
eralize rules  in  several  areas  including 
agriculture,  services,  energy,  financial 
•services,  investment,  and  government 
procurement. 

Energy  and  transportation  issues 
also  need  constant  attention,  some  of 
which  have  caused  differences  in  the 
past,  but,  in  most  cases,  they  have  been 
successfully  resolved  or  managed. 


DEFENSE 

U.S.  defense  arrangements  with  Canada 
are  more  extensive  and  intimate  than 
with  any  other  country.  The  Permanent 
Joint  Board  on  Defense,  established  in 
1940,  provides  policy-level  consultation 
on  bilateral  defense  matters.  The  United 
States  and  Canada  share  NATO  mutual 
security  commitments.  As  the  only  other 


non-European  ally,  Canada  contributes 
forces  to  NATO  commands  in  Europe 
and  the  North  Atlantic.  In  addition, 
U.S.  and  Canadian  military  forces  sincf 
1958  have  cooperated  on  continental  air' 
defense  within  the  framework  of  the 
North  American  Aeros])ace  Defense 
Command,  an  integrated  bilateral  mili- 
tary command  exercising  operational 
control  over  U.S.  and  Canadian  air  de- 
fen.se  forces  and  also  providing  early 
warning  information  on  possible  air  ana 
missile  attack  on  North  America.  Canai 
da  and  the  United  States  work  closely 
in  defense  research  and  production. 


Principal  U.S.  Officials 

Ambassador — Edward  N.  Ney 
Deputy  Chief  of  Mission — Dwight  N. 

Mason 
Minister-Counselor  for  Political 

Affairs — Stephen  Buck 
Minister-Counselor  for  Economic 

Affairs — Lawrence  P.  Taylor 
Minister-Counselor  for  Public  Affairs — 

James  P.  Thurber 
Minister-Counselor  for  Commercial 

Affairs — George  Mu. 

The  LLS.  Embassy  in  Canada  is  lo-^ 
cated  at  100  Wellington  Street,  Ottawa^. 
(tel.  6i;^238-.5335).  There  are  U.S.  con-^ 
sulates  general  in  the  following  Cana- 
dian cities:  Calgary,  Alberta  (tel.  403- 
266-8962);  Halifa.x",  Nova  Scotia  (tel. 
902-429-2480);  Montreal,  Quebec 
(tel.  .514-281-1886);  Quebec  City,  Quebeo 
(tel.  41bM392-2095);  Toronto,  Ontario 
(tel.  416-595-1700);  and  Vancouver, 
British  Columbia  (tel.  604-685-4311). 


Taken  from  the  Bnckgroiind  Notes  of  Junei 
1989,  published  by  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  Department  of  State.  Editor: 
Juanita  Adams.  ■ 


12 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  198 


fHE  PRESIDENT 


NJew  Conference  of  August  15  (Excerpts) 


President  Biisli  held  a  news  con- 
rn  lice  in  the  Briefing  Room  at  the 
Vliitc  House  on  Angnst  15, 1989.^ 

J.  Your  spokesman  said  yesterday 
Ihat  significant  progress  had  been 

tiade  in  pursuing  the  issues  of  the 
ostages.  We're  told  that  you've  been 
m  the  phone  to  foreign  leaders,  that 
here's  been  a  flurry  of  diplomatic 
■ontacts,  but  can  you  say  today  that 
ve're  any  closer  to  seeing  the  hos- 
ages  released  than  we  were,  say, 
ibout  3  weeks  ago  when  the  Israeli 
seizure  of  Sheik  [Abdul  KarimI  Obeid 
iMuslim  cleric  and  Hezbollah  leader] 
set  into  motion  this  chain  of  devel- 
opments that  seems  to  have  raised 
expectations  or  hopes  of  a  break- 
hrough"? 

A.  I  can't  say  that  today,  but  we're 
idiii.u  to  keep  on  trying.  But  I  cannot 
;i\f  you  a  definitive  assessment  of  that. 
just  don't  know.  There  are  a  lot  of  lines 
ml  there,  a  lot  of  initiatives  have  been 
akcn.  As  I  said  earlier,  the  cooperation 
hat  we've  received — some  that  we've  so- 
iciled  and  some  unsolicited — from  lead- 
rs  ai'ound  the  world  has  just  been 
iiaiiiiificent.  But  I  can't  give  you  that 
Kisitive  assessment  at  this  point. 

Q.  In  the  absence  of  an  exchange 
)f  prisoners,  have  you  considered  the 
•xtradition  of  Sheik  Obeid  to  this 
■ountry  to  face  criminal  charges? 

\.  No,  we  have  no  criminal  indict- 
nent  against  Sheik  Obeid. 

Q.  Is  that  any  kind  of  legal 
>ption? 

A.  We  wouldn't  move  against  some- 
)ody  without  the  legal  process  going 
'orward. 

Q.  W^hat  does  it  mean  when  you 
joinfedly  remind  Iran  that  goodwill 
oegets  goodwill'.'  The  United  States 
.vants  the  return  of  the  .\merican 
nostages  in  Lebanon.  If  that  oc- 
curred, what  would  the  United  States 
io  in  return  for  Iran'/ 

A.  Too  hypothetical  to  answer,  but  I 
i\<iul(l  simply  repeat  that  we're  looking 
(ii-  signs  of  change,  certainly  when  it 
•limes  to  holding  of  hostages.  We  all 
\iiiiw  that  we've  had  some  major  differ- 
■iiri-s  with  Iran  and  the  question  of  state 
-liiiiisorship  of  terrorism:  that's  a  given. 
N'l  i\\  we  see  a  new  leader  coming  in,  and 


we  hear  different  signals  coming  out  of 
Iran — some  in  the  old  mode  and  then 
some  that  offer  more  hope.  And  so  I  will 
just  leave  it  stand  that  a  clear  and  good 
signal  would  be  the  release  of  American 
hostages,  and  there  are  many  ways  that 
countries  are  estranged  can  get  back  to- 
gethei',  from  diplomatic  relations  or  a 
wide  array  of  other  things.  So  I  just 
hope  that  the  positive  signs  prevail 
there,  because  there  are  some.  And  they 
are  encouraging. 

We  don't  have  to  be  hostile  with  Iran 
for  the  rest  of  our  lives.  We've  had  a 
good  relationship  with  them  in  the  past. 
They  are  of  strategic  importance.  They 
would  be  welcome  back  into  the  family  of 
law-abiding,  non-terrorist-sponsoring 
nations.  But  I  just  would  repeat  that  I'd 
like  to  see  that  kind  of  change  go  for- 
ward, positive  change. 

Q.  As  you  formulate  your  drug 
plans,  Bill  Bennett  comes  up  with  his 
proposals  to  you,  how  do  you  feel 
about  the  possibility  of  penalizing 
Latin  American  countries  which  fail 
to  cooperate  with  us  in  stemming  the 
flow^  of  drugs  from  Latin  America? 

A.  I  wouldn't  be  opposed  to  that, 
provided  they  were  able  to  cooperate 
with  us.  I  mean,  you  take  a  country  like 
Colombia,  and  I  am  convinced  that  Pres- 
ident Barco  wants  to  cooperate.  But  his 
country  has  been  ripped  asunder  by  the 
drug  cartels.  And  you've  had  Supreme 
Court  justices  slain,  you've  had  people 
hunted  down  in  Eastern  Eui'ope  from 
Colombia  and  killed,  and  so  I  think  there 
has  to  be  some  measuring  of  intention 
before  you  paint  with  an  exti-aordinarily 
broad  brush  and  say.  Hey,  drugs  are 
coming  in  from  your  country,  and  there- 
fore we're  going  to  cut  you  off. 

And  so  I  would  hope  that  we'd  have 
much  more  enlightened  diplomacy  or  en- 
lightened foreign  policy  than  to  isolate 
every  country,  even  though  that  country 
was  trying  to  do  something  about  drugs 
at  the  source. 

Q.  But  are  there  some  countries 
out  there  which  are  not  cooperating, 
and  which  you're  actually  thinking 
about  penalizing  economically? 

A.  No  proposal  has  come  to  me  now, 
but  there's  been  some,  as  you  know; 
there's  been  a  lot  of  suggestions  on  Cap- 
itol Hill  about  this.  But  I  feel  a  certain 
responsibility  to  look  at  the  problems 
that  are  facing  some  of  these  countries 


with  limited  armed  forces  of  their  own, 
with  very  complicated  insurgencies  in 
their  countries,  and  to  formulate  a  for- 
eign policy  that  takes  these  things  into 
consideration. 

Q.  Back  to  Sheik  Obeid  for  a  mo- 
ment. In  light  of  his  reported  role  in 
the  kidnaping  of  Col.  Higgins,  would 
it  not  be  the  appropriate  step  for  the 
United  States  to  convene  a  grand  jury 
and  to  pursue  a  possible  criminal  in- 
dictment against  him,  and  then  for 
the  Administration  to  go  forward 
with  an  effort  to  extradite  him  to 
this  country? 

A.  If  the  justice  system  goes  for- 
ward and  there  is  an  indictment  against 
him,  I  would  be  remiss  if  I  didn't  try  to 
see  him  brought  to  trial. 

Q.  Can't  you  take  the  lead  in  that 
and  encourage  the  Justice  Depart- 
ment to  proceed — 

A.  I  put  it  just  exactly  the  way  I 
want  to  put  it.  [Laughter] 

Q.  Can  you  explain  why  you  have 
not  retaliated  for  the  murder  of 
Col.  Higgins? 

A.  If  I  could  find  some  action — 
diplomatic,  military,  private  sector,  pub- 
lic sector — that  I  thought  would  help  get 
the  hostages  out  or  guard  against  future 
hostage  taking,  I  would  take  such  action. 
Military  action — I'd  like  to  know  what 
action  we  took  was  not  going  to  victim- 
ize a  lot  of  innocent  people.  And  I'd  like 
to  be  sure  of  all  the  facts  before  taking 
action  on  the  Higgins  case.  I  wish  I 
could  tell  you  we  had  all  the  facts,  and 
we  don't. 

When  you  look  at  the  action  that  the 
United  States  can  take,  I  don't  want  to 
be  responsible  for  the  loss  of  innocent 
life.  I  also  would  have  to  weigh,  if  we 
considered  military  action,  the  lives  of 
the  Americans  that  were  being  asked  to 
carry  out  that  action.  So  it's  just  not 
clear  yet.  But  if  I  could  find  a  way  to 
take  those  hostages,  get  them  and  bring 
them  out,  and  that  requii'ed  using  the 
military  force  of  the  United  States, 
make  no  mistake  about  it:  I  would  do  it 
in  an  instant. 

Q.  May  I  ask  what  you're  doing 
to  increase  the  intelligence  that 
would  let  you  do  something  like  that? 
Have  you  ordered  the  CIA  [Central 
Intelligence  Agency]  to  try  to  get 
assets  in  Lebanon? 


pep 


department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


13 


THE  PRESIDENT 


A.  The  problem  there  is,  it  takes  a 
long  time.  I  do  think  that  the  period  that 
we  went  through  quite  a  few  years  ago 
has  resulted  in  less  human  intelligence 
than  is  necessary  to  come  to  grips  with 
something  as  murky  as  hostage  holding. 
I'd  like  to  do  more,  and  the  various  agen- 
cies know  of  my  interest  in  this,  but  I 
don't  want  to  hold  out  the  wrong  kind  of 
hope  that  you  can  say  let's  get  more 
agents,  more  intelligence  of  the  human 
source  and  that  that  happens  overnight. 
It  just  doesn't  work  that  way. 

Q.  On  September  1st,  there  will 
be  an  inauguration  of  the  candidate 
that  Noriega  supported,  effectively 
institutionalizing  what  the  United 
States  considers  a  stolen  election. 
What  is  the  United  States  going  to  do 
now?  Are  we  going  to  be  limited  to 
these  kinds  of  skirmishes  that  we  saw 
last  week,  these  arrests  of  one  side  or 
the  other,  or  is  there  something  else? 

A.  I  don't  know  for  sure  what  we're 
going  to  do.  Part  of  our  understanding  of 
the  OAS  [Organization  of  American 
States]  agreement  was  that  Noriega 
would  be  out.  I'm  not  holding  my  breath 
on  his  voluntary  departure,  but — and  I 
have  told  Mr.  Endara,  who  was  duly  elect- 
ed by  the  people  of  Panama,  the  other 
day  that  we  will  continue  to  support 
what  the  people  of  Panama  voted  foi\  But 
it's  still  rather  murky  as  to  what  will 
happen  beyond  September  1st.  There  are 
some  hints  that  possibly  there  will  be  a 
transfer.  Let  me  just  simply  say  this:  I 
would  reiterate  that  our  argument  is  not 
with  the  Panamanian  Defense  Forces:  it 
is  with  Mr.  Noriega  himself.  And  that  if 
he  were  to  go  out,  and  that  you  had  the 
will  of  the  people  recognized,  we  would 
instantly  have  better  relations  with  Pan- 
ama. It  would  be  good  for  our  country, 
and  certainly  it  would  improve  life  for 
the  Panamanians. 

Q.  I  know  there's  talk  about 
using  military  assistance  to  provide 
to  Colombia,  Peru,  and  Bolivia  to 
help  cut  down  on  drug  trafficking. 
Can  you  tell  me  if  you  would  consider 
deploying  U.S.  troops  in  these  coun- 
tries to  help  in  that  effort? 

A.  I  have  said  previously,  way  back 
in  the  campaign,  that  I  would  give  seri- 
ous consideration  to  an  invitation  from 
countries  to  help  them.  And  I'll  tell 
you  what  I  found  at  this  G-7  [Group  of 
Seven]  meeting.  It  was  a  very  interest- 


ing— from  several  of  the  European  lead- 
ers, the  feeling  that  maybe  we  ought  to 
have  some  kind  of  international  effort  to 
help  countries  in  this  regard,  going  after 
jjeople  where — in  a  country,  at  the  invi- 
tation of  a  government  of  a  country,  peo- 
ple that  have  been  out  of  the  reach  of 
the  law  enforcement  of  the  local — of  the 
country  itself,  of  the  government. 

We  have  no  specifics  on  that  at  this 
point,  but  generally  speaking,  we  have 
used  military  assets,  as  you  know.  We've 
used  helicopters,  for  example,  in  I  be- 
lieve it  was  Bolivia  and  perhaps  Peru. 
And  we're  interested  in  all  of  this.  But 
I  don't  think  you  can  inflict  force  on  a 
country,  and  I  wouldn't  want  to  be  a  part 
ofthat'atall. 

Q.  You  talked  about  some  con- 
flicting signals  coming  out  of  Iran  as 
a  result  of  your  diplomatic  efforts. 

A.  I'm  not  sure  it's  a  result  of  it,  but 
there  are  conflicting  signals  coming  out 
of  Iran. 

Q.  Perhaps  coincident  with  your 
diplomatic  efforts.  Ud  like  to  ask.  do 
you  believe  that  President  [.\li  Akbar 
Hashemi]  Rafsanjani  is  firmly  in 
charge  in  Iran  and  how  long  are  you 
prepared  to  give  this  diplomatic  proc- 
ess before  trving  some  other  means  or 
effort? 

A.  Please  elaborate.  What  do  you 
mean  "before  trying  some  other  means"? 
I'm  not  sure — 

Q.  There  are  those  who  believe 
that  there  should  be  stronger  mili- 
tary messages  sent. 

A,  I  don't  know  the  answer  to  your 
first  part  of  it,  and  I  don't  know  any  e.\- 
pert  in  this  government  who  does.  I  had 
a  meeting  with  various  agency  e.xperts 
on  Iran,  and  I  think  the  jury  is  still  out 
as  to  what  has  happened  internally  there 
in  Iran.  I  think  all  our  experts  feel  that 
there  are  some  hopeful  signs,  and  I 
would  cite  some  of  the  comments  by  Mr. 
Rafsanjani.  Then  you've  seen  some  coun- 
tersigns, one  as  recently  as  yesterday,  by 
Mr.  Khamenei  [Ayatollah  Ali  Khamenei]. 
There  are  others — their  Interior  Minis- 
ter, who  seems  to  be  very  hard  over. 

So,  I  think  we  don't  know  yet.  We 
don't  know  how  it  is  sorting  out.  But 
again,  I  would  go  back  to  the  earlier  an- 
swer, that  that's  fine.  That  can  move  for- 
ward. But  if  I  find  some  other  channel  or 
action  that  would  get  our  hostages  out  of 
there,  I  wouldn't  wait  on  sorting  out  the 
internal  affairs  of  Iran. 


Q.  .lust  how  long  are  you  pre- 
pared to  wait,  and  would  you  consider 
stepping  up  military  pressure  in  this  '; 
process?  And  to  what  extent  do  you 
hold  Iran  responsible  for  the  safety  o 
these  hostages? 

A.  Again,  we're  trying  to  sort 
out — there  certainly — I  think  that  if 
Iran  decided  they  wanted  those  hostages 
to  come  out  of  there,  there  would  be  a 
good  likelihood  that  that  would  happen, 
perhaps  not  with  certainty  but  a  good  -- 
likelihood. 

As  you  know,  the  position  of  the 
U.S.  Government  has  been  that  Iran  am 
a  couple  of  other  states  have  been  in- 
volved in  the  state  sponsorship  of  terror 
ism.  I  don't  think  it's  a  question  of  how  . 
long;  it's  a  question  of  not — in  my  view, 
it's  a  question  of  exploring  every  avenue' 
to  get  these  people  back  and  recognizinji 
that  at  some  point  we  have  to  stand  up 
for  our  interests,  even  if  it  means  mili- 
tary. And  yet  I'm  not  threatening  mili- 
tary action  because  I've  told  you  some  o: 
the  constraints  on  authorizing  military 
action. 

Q.  What  is  the  United  States  do- 
ing, if  anything,  to  try  and  stop  the 
destruction  of  Beirut  that  is  under- 
way? Is  it  a  fear  that  if  the  Syrians 
succeed  in  driving  the  Christians  out 
that  will  seriously  set  back  any  prog- 
ress that's  been  made  on  settling  the 
West  Bank  and  Gaza  problems? 

A.  The  answer  to  your  last  questioi 
is  yes,  and  the  answer  to  the  first  is, 
joining  others  in  calling  for  a  cease-fire 
and  the  withdrawal  of  all  foreign  forces; 
support  for  the  Arab  League  mission, 
which  regrettably  has  hit  an  impasse 
right  now,  but  encouraging  those  three 
countries  involved  to  reenergize  that  inr 
tiative;  joining  where  we  can — I  had  a 
long  talk  with  the  Secretary  General 
[Javier  Perez  de  Cuellar]  to  see  what  rol* 
the  United  Nations  can  play,  and  indeed- 
I  might  take  the  opportunity  to  thank 
him  for  his  timely  dispatch  of  his  emis- 
sary to  the  Middle  East,  although  that 
wasn't  a  mission  about  Lebanon.  It  had 
to  do  with  Col.  Higgins.  I  was  deeply  ap 
preciative  of  his  taking  that  action. 

We're  in  a  vei'y  complicated  situa- 
tion in  Lebanon  where  I'm  not  sure  any 
outside  power  can  do  other  than  exhort 
people  in  the  country  to  have  this  cease- 
fire and  to  withdraw  foreign  forces,  and' 
then  to  take  a  look  at  whatever  constitu- 
tional change  is  necessary  so  you  have  a 
representation  there  that  all  factions  in 
Lebanon  can  feel  comfortable  with.  It's  i 
long  process,  and  in  the  meantime,  I  am 


14 


AFRICA 


iterally  heartbroken.  I've  bored  some 
if  .\<m  with  this,  but  I've  been  to 
A'l)anon  when  I  was  in  business  and  I 
eiall  it  as  the  peaceful  oasis  in  a  then- 
roubled  Middle  East,  and  I  saw  Chris- 
iaiis  living  peacefully  with  the  Mus- 
ims.  And  someday  again,  I'd  like  to 
ihink  that  Lebanon  can  be  restored  to 
'hat— 

Q.  There  are  reports  that  the 
Jnited  States  does  not  want  to  pres- 
;ure  Syria  to  back  off  because  we 
\eed  their  help  to  get  the  hostages 
)ut. 

A.  That's  wrong.  I've  never  heard 
uch  a  report.  But  if  there's  such  a  re- 
)ort  you've  heard,  it  is  wrong. 

Q.  In  an  interview  last  week,  I 
»elieve  with  Hearst  Newspapers,  you 
leemed  to  say  that  you  would  be  wili- 
ng to  kidnap  Gen.  Noriega  to  bring 
lim  to  justice.  Is  that  your  policy, 
ind  would  that  be  an  appropriate 
hing  for  the  U.S.  Government  to  do? 

A.  We  have  an  indictment  out 
igaiiist  Gen.  Noriega  for  drug  traffick- 
n.y.  I'm  told  that  it's  a  good  indictment, 
hat  it's  an  in-depth  indictment.  I'm  not 
a,\'iiig  what  I  would  or  wouldn't  do,  but 
hi'i'e  was  a  case  where  a  man  named 
uscf — I  believe — Yunis  was  appre- 
lended  and  brought  to  justice.  I  have 
in  obligation  to  try  to  bring  people 
o  justice. 

Q.  Are  there  any  constraints  on 
ivhat  means  you  use,  even  though 
here's  a  legal  indictment,  or  are 
here  limits  on  what  would  be  ap- 
)ropriate  in  enforcing  such  an 
ndictment"? 

A.  There  are  always  limits.  There 
u-e  always  limits  in  matters  of  this 
lature.  And  the  limits,  as  far  as  I'm 
•oncerned,  are  the  lives,  first,  of  Ameri- 
■ans,  and  clearly  innocent  life.  You've 
^ot  to  consider  those  things  when  you  go 
ibout  whatever  it  is,  hostages  or  trying 
:o  bring  Mr.  Noriega  to  justice. 

Q.  There  has  been  some  talk  of 
sending  the  Green  Berets  to  South 
America.  Do  you  think  that  the  DEA 
Drug  Enforcement  Administration] 
IS  inept  to  do  this  job,  and  why? 

A.  To  do  the  job  of  helping  at  the 
source?  You'd  have  to  look  at  it  country- 
ly-eountry,  and  then  I  could  tell  you  a 
it  lie  more  about  what  the  problem  is. 
>nnie  of  the  countries  are  faced  with 
iiiirmously  well-organized  and  financed 
insurgencies,  some  of  them  are  faced 


with  the  most  highly  financed  cartels, 
and  so  you'd  have  to  look  individually. 
DEA  isn't  big  enough  or  strong  enough 
to  solve  the  problems  in  these  various 
South  American  countries.  They  can 
help  a  lot,  and  in  some  areas  they  have 
been  very,  very  helpful.  But  I  don't 
think  that  the  DEA  alone  can  solve  the 


problems  of  the  cartels  in  Colombia, 
for  example. 

Q.  Are  your  considering  sending 
the  Green  Berets  to  South  America? 

A.  No,  I'm  not  considering  that. 


'  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Aug.  21,  1989. 


Visit  of  Zaire's  President 


President  Mobutu  Sese  Seko  of  the 
Republic  of  Zaire  made  an  official 
working  visit  to  Washington,  D.C., 
June  28-SO,  1989,  to  meet  with  Presi- 
dent Bush  and  other  government 
officials. 

Following  are  remarks  made  by 
the  two  Presidents  after  their  meeting 
0)1  June  29.'^ 

President  Bush 

Zaire  is  among  America's  oldest 
friends,  and  its  President — President 
Mobutu — one  of  our  most  valued 
friends — entire  continent  of  Africa. 
I  was  honored  to  invite  President 
Mobutu  to  be  the  first  African  head  of 
state  to  come  to  the  United  States  for 
an  official  visit  during  my  presidency. 


I  first  met  President  Mobutu  when 
I  was  Ambassador  to  the  United  Na- 
tions. In  that  capacity,  I  first  visited 
Zaire  in  1972;  and,  always,  I  have  been 
impressed  by  his  insight  and  his  vision. 

In  our  talks,  the  President  and  I 
have  had  the  opportunity  to  review  and 
renew  the  excellent  bilateral  relation- 
ship between  our  countries.  We  have 
noted,  to  our  mutual  pleasure,  that 
those  ties  continue  to  be  beneficial 
and  productive. 

One  of  Africa's  most  experienced 
statesmen.  President  Mobutu  has 
worked  with  six  Presidents.  Together 
they — and  we — have  sought  to  bring  to 
Zaire,  and  to  all  of  Africa,  real  econom- 
ic and  social  progress  and  to  pursue 
Africa's  true  independence,  security, 
stability  as  the  basis  for  that 
development. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


15 


AFRICA 


Over  the  years,  President  Mobutu 
has  helped  international  councils  from 
the  United  Nations  to  the  OAU  [Orga- 
nization of  African  Unity]  to  the  non- 
aligned  movement  address  these  issues 
sensibly,  and  very  effectively,  I  might 
add.  Invariably  he  has  personally 
worked  to  bring  about  the  peaceful  res- 
olution of  conflicts.  Just  last  week,  he 
brought  together,  for  the  first  time,  in 
the  presence  of  18  African  chiefs  of 
state,  the  leadership  of  Angola's  war- 
ring factions,  setting  the  stage  for  na- 
tional reconciliation  in  that  country. 
Thanks  to  President  Mobutu,  we  are 
nearer  the  goal  long  sought,  yet  long 
elusive — peace  and  opportunity  in 
southwestern  Africa. 

We  discussed  that  goal  in  our  talks 
here,  and  the  President  and  I  also  e.\- 
amined  other  important  aspects  of 
regional  conflicts,  especially  the 
southern  third  of  the  African  Conti- 
nent. There  we  share  goals  of  a  rapid, 
peaceful  end  to  apartheid;  the  full  im- 
plementation of  Security  Council  Reso- 
lution 4.3.5  leading  to  the  independence 
of  Namibia;  and  the  total  withdrawal 
of  Cuban  troops  from  Angola.  Zaire's 
stake  in  these  results  is  as  enormous  as 
its  influence.  My  advisers  and  I  found 
President  Mobutu's  analyses  valuable, 
and  we  support  him  as  he  strives  to 
peacefully  resolve  problems. 

In  addition  to  foreign  affairs  and 
regional  matters,  much  of  our  discus- 
sion focused  on  Zaire's  efforts  to 
strengthen  its  economy.  I  want  to  note 
that  Zaire  recently  took  the  construc- 
tive step  of  signing  an  economic  policy 
reform  agreement  with  the  Interna- 
tional Monetary  Fund.  Because  we  be- 
lieve that  strict  adherence  to  its  terms 
can  produce  a  healthy  economy  for 
Zaire,  we  intend  to  support  that  effort. 

During  the  President's  visit,  we 
also  exchanged  the  instruments  of  rat- 
ification of  a  bilateral  investment  trea- 
ty. We  hope  that  this  treaty  will 
encourage  greater  American  invest- 
ment in  Zaire  leading,  in  turn,  to 
greater  economic  development. 

In  conclusion,  we  thank  President 
Mobutu  for  coming  to  the  United 
States  at  this  critical  time.  We  thank 
him  for  his  leadership  in  central 
Africa,  and  we  look  forward  to  contin- 
ued cooperation  between  our  countries. 
The  strong  ties  of  friendship  between 
Zaire  and  the  United  States  endure 
and  prosper.  We  are  proud  and  very, 
very  pleased  to  have  you  with  us  today. 


Zaire — A  Profile 


Geography 


.\rea:  2.3.5  million  sq.  km.  (90.5,063  sq, 
mi. ):  about  the  size  of  the  US  east  of  the 
Missis.sippi.  Cities:  Capital — Kinshasa 
(pop.  about  3  million).  Regional  capitals — 
Kananga.  Lubumbashi,  Mbuji-Mayi, 
Bukavu.  Mbandaka.  Kisangani,  Bandundu, 
Matarii.  Terrain:  Varies  from  tropical  rain 
forests  to  mountainous  terraces,  plateau, 
savannas,  dense  grasslands,  and  moun- 
tains. Climate:  Equatorial;  hot  and  humid 
in  much  of  the  north  and  west,  cooler  and 
drier  in  the  south  central  area  and  the 
east. 


ir 

/  AFRIMK  R£HIBLK\                  \ 

H 

TiOKor^                         1        ( 

\ 

{^    (       ZAIRE      6>**'»"\ 
KjLJ         '"'""^      Tbwuwi      \ 

^^"^"^"^  Kinshasa                          \ 
^        A    ^_.                       k  TAWANIA 

Atlantic 

(                     1                 i~>\ 

Ocean 

/  ANEOtA    r-Jv3       /( 
/                           ZAMB1A,-A_\ 

r'-S.,.,..,.,.,.  ^            Sw-*         X                 ^     ^       ^- 

People 

Nationality:  Smin  and  adjective — 
Zairian(s).  Population:  (mid-1987  est.):  32 
million.  Urban  3()'i-407f;  under  age  1.5, 
4591.  Annual  growth  rate:  3.1%.  Density: 
Ranges  from  266/sq.  mi.  in  Kinshasa, 
through  37/sq.  mi.  in  Bas  Zaire,  to  8/sq. 
mi.  in  Haut  Zaire  and  Shaba.  Ethnic 
groups:  Bantu  tribes  HO^c;  as  many  as  250 
African  tribal  groups  in  all.  Religions: 
Roman  Catholic  TM'/, .  Protestant  20%, 
Muslim  10%,  Kimbanguist  10%,  other  syn- 
cretic sects  and  traditional  religions  10%. 
Languages:  (major)  French,  Lingala, 
Swahili  and  Kingwana  (a  variant),  Kikongo, 
Tshiluba. 

(lovernment 

Type:  Republic  with  strong  presidential 
authority,  one  party.  Independence: 
June  30,  1960.  Constitution: 
June  24,  1967  (amended  1974,  revised  1978). 

Branches:  The  Popular  Movement  of 
the  Revolution  (MPR)  is  the  sole  legal  po- 
litical institution.  Its  component  organs  in- 
clude a  Secretary  General,  a  Central 


Committee,  a  Political  Bureau,  a  Party 
Congress  (meeting  every  o  years),  an  Ex- 
ecutive Council  (Council  of  Ministers),  a 
unicameral  Legislative  Council,  and  a  Judt 
cial  Council.  The  elected  president  of  the 
party  automatically  becomes  president  of 
Zaire. 

Economy 

GDP  (1985,  current  prices  at  the  official 
exchange  rate):  $4.8  billion.  .Annual 
growth  rate  (1985):  2.5%.  Per  capita  GDP- 
(current  1985):  .$170. 

Natural  resources:  Copper,  pe- 
troleum, cobalt,  industrial  and  gem  dia- 
monds, gold,  zinc,  manganese,  tin, 
columbium-tantalum,  rare  earth  metals, 
coal,  wolfamite,  uranium,  cadmium,  silver; 
139;  of  world's  hydroelectric  potential. 

.\griculture:  Products — cash  crops: 
coffee,  palm  oil,  palm  kernel  oil  cake,  quir 
quina,  rubber,  tea,  cotton,  cocoa;  food 
crops:  manioc,  bananas  plantains,  corn, 
rice,  legumes,  ground  nuts,  vegetables, 
fruits,  sugar.  Land — 50%  arable;  2%  culti' 
vated  or  pasture. 

Industry:  Types — processed  and  un- 
processed minerals;  consumer  products,  inl 
eluding  textiles,  footwear,  cigarettes; 
processed  foods  and  beverages;  cement,      j, 

Trade:  Exports— $1. So  billion  (1986 
f  o.b.):  copper,  coffee,  petroleum,  diamonds 
cobalt,  gold,  wood.  Partners — Belgium, 
Luxembourg,  US,  France,  FRG.  Imports-' 
$1.55  billion  (1985  e.i.f ):  petroleum  prod- 
ucts, foods,  textiles,  heavy  equipment. 
Partners — Belgium,  Luxembourg,  France 
FRG,  US. 

Membership  in  International 
Organizations 

UN  and  most  of  its  specialized  and  related 
agencies.  Organization  of  African  Unity 
(OAU)  and  affiliated  specialized  agencies, 
Intergovernmental  Council  of  Copper  Ex- 
porting Countries  (CIPEC),  .African  Devel 
opment  Bank  (AFDB),  International  Coffel 
Organization  (ICO),  International  Tin 
Council  (ITC).  Great  Lakes  States  Eco- 
nomic Community  (CEPGL),  INTELSAT 
Nonaligned  Movement,  Group  of  77,  Eco- 
nomic Community  of  Central  African 
States  (CEEAC)' 


Taken  from  the  Background  Notes  of  Au- 
gust 1988,  published  by  the  Bureau  of  Publi 
Affairs,  Department  of  State.  Editor: 
Juanita  Adams.  ■ 


16 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  198!' 


ARMS  CONTROL 


•resident  Mobutu- 

t  is  an  honor  to  state  in  turn  that 
he  friendship  between  Zaire  and  the 
Jnited  States  is  today  29  years  old.  I 
•n  iiarticularly  pleased  to  have  been 
niioi-ed  by  the  invitation  extended  by 
'resident  Bush  to  come  on  an  official 
,'orking  visit  early  on  in  his  term  of  of- 
ice.  This  has  made  it  possible  for  us  to 
old  talks  marked  by  warmth  and 
riendship.  This  occasion  also  gave  us 
he  possibility  of  assessing  bilateral  co- 
jperation  between  our  two  countries 
Ind  of  identifying  new  goals  to  pursue 
iiui'ther. 

Thus  we  spoke  of  disarmament,  de- 
i-nte,  the  Third  World  debt,  and,  more 
pecifically,  the  African  debt.  We  also 
ipoke  of  the  situation  in  southern 
Vfrica.  In  this  connection,  I  informed 
•resident  Bush  of  the  results  obtained 
DJlowing  the  summit  held  in  Gbadolite 
11  .lune  22d,  which  lay  the  groundwork 
111-  national  reconciliation  in  Angola.  I 
a\('  asked  President  Bush  to  support 
his  process  so  as  to  restore  once  and 
or  all  peace  in  this  country  which 
jhares  a  2,600-kilometer  border  with 
he  Republic  of  Zaire. 

1  wish  to  express  my  satisfaction 
;itli  the  attention  and  the  understand- 
■lu  shown  by  President  Bush  in  ad- 
ressing  these  problems.  I  also 
.elcome  the  fact  that  President  Bush, 
ecause  of  his  long  political  and  diplo- 
latic  experience,  takes  a  special  in- 
erest  in  African  issues,  in  which, 
iicidentally,  he  is  thoroughly  well- 
rounded. 

Regarding  my  country,  Zaire,  I 
poke  to  President  Bush  about  the  new 
greement  that  I  have  just  signed  with 
he  International  Monetary  Fund  and 
he  World  Bank  on  a  3-year  structural 
adjustment  program.  President  Bush 
jias  renewed  the  support  of  his  govern- 
jnent  to  the  Executive  Council  of  Zaire 
n  its  effort  to  implement  this  program, 
n  support  of  this.  President  Bush  has 
ommitted  his  Administration  to  pro- 
noting  and  encouraging  American  in- 
•estment  in  the  Republic  of  Zaire.  This 
's  the  reason  for  which  we  proceeded  to 
exchange  instruments  of  ratification  of 
ihe  bilateral  investment  treaty  be- 
(ween  the  United  States  and  the  Re- 
public of  Zaire.  Furthermore  the 
{^resident  reaffirmed  U.S.  support  for 
''he  program  for  stability  and  security 
n  the  Republic  of  Zaire. 

Finally  I  informed  the  President  of 
he  arrangements  and  measures  of  pro- 
ection  which  have  been  set  up  in  Zaire 
or  some  years  now.  These  arrange- 
nents  have  made  it  possible  for  the  UN 


Commission  on  Human  Rights  to  with- 
draw Zaire  from  the  list  of  those  coun- 
tries which  it  monitors  for  human 
rights.  Since  then  Zaire  can  be  ranked 
among  those  countries  which  observe 
the  rule  of  law,  not  to  be  confused  or 
mistaken  with  any  incidental  mishaps 
that  are  attributable  to  an  administra- 
tion or  to  individuals. 

The  UN  Commission  on  Human 
Rights  and  the  Republic  of  Zaire  invite 
all  governments  and  organizations  con- 
cerned with  human  rights  to  support 
by  all  means  possible  the  efforts  de- 
ployed by  the  Zairian  Department  of 


Human  Rights  and  Freedoms  of  the 
Citizen  for  the  defense  and  the  pro- 
tection of  human  rights  in  Zaire. 

In  concluding  we  would  like  to 
thank  President  Bush  and  his  advisers 
for  the  invitation  that  he  extended  to 
us  to  be  the  first  African  head  of  state 
to  come  on  an  official  working  visit 
since  Mr.  Bush  has  come  to  the  White 
House. 


1  Made  at  the  South  Portico  of  the  White 
House  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  July  3,  1989). 

-  President  Mobutu  spoke  in  French, 
and  his  remarks  were  translated  by  an 
interpreters 


Status  of  the  Strategic  Arms  Reduction  Talks 


by  Richard  R.  Burt 

Statement  made  at  the  Confer- 
ence on  Disarmament  in  Geneva  on 
Ai(gust  S,  1989.  Ambassador  Burt  is 
head  of  ihe  U.S.  delegation  to  the  nu- 
clear and  space  arms  talks  and  chief 
negotiator  at  the  strategic  arms  re- 
duction talks  (START). 

I  would  like  to  say  how  pleased  I  am  to 
be  here  today  to  review  with  the  mem- 
bers and  nonmember  participants  of 
the  Conference  on  Disarmament  the 
latest  developments  regarding  our 
bilateral  nuclear  and  space  talks. 

Update  on  the  Negotiations 

Round  11  of  the  strategic  arms  reduc- 
tion talks  (START)  between  the  United 
States  and  Soviet  Union  has  been  a 
useful  and  constructive  endeavor.  The 
United  States  approached  this  round  as 
a  reconnaissance  and  sought  to  clarify 
the  policy  positions  of  both  parties  and 
to  reaffirm  the  central  structure  of  the 
joint  draft  treaty.  In  fact  we  feel  we 
have  accomplished  more  than  that  in 
many  areas,  including  the  very  impor- 
tant area  of  providing  for  effective 
verification. 

I  have  conducted  a  thorough  review 
of  key  treaty  provisions  and  outstand- 
ing issues  with  my  Soviet  counterpart 
[Ambassador  Yu.  Nazarkin].  He  is  an 
experienced  negotiator  and  leads  a  pro- 
fessional team,  characterized  by  well- 
grounded  expertise.  I  believe  we  have 
established  a  solid,  working  relation- 
ship, despite  the  fact  that  he  has  de- 
cisively demonstrated  during  this 


round  that  he  is  a  far  more  accom- 
plished tennis  player  than  I. 

There  has  also  been  a  good  give- 
and-take  at  the  working  group  level  re- 
lated to  the  treaty  and  protocols  which 
together  comprise  the  START  joint 
draft  text.  The  two  sides  have  held 
worthwhile  discussions  and  debates  of 
various  alternatives.  Together  we  have 
improved  the  text  and  cleared  brackets 
and  narrowed  our  differences  in  small 
but  significant  ways. 

The  process  has  been  businesslike, 
nonpolemical,  and  oriented  to  sub- 
stance not  rhetoric.  Useful  exchanges 
have  taken  place  in  all  areas.  While 
some  significant  differences  continue 
to  separate  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union  in  these  negotiations,  I 
believe  the  sides  more  clearly  under- 
stand and  better  appreciate  the  ra- 
tionale underpinning  each  other's  nego- 
tiating posture.  I  thus  believe  that  my 
Soviet  colleague  and  I  have  been  able 
to  lay  the  groundwork  for  what  I  hope 
will  be  a  productive  discussion  on 
START  between  Secretary  of  State 
Baker  and  Foreign  Minister  Shevard- 
nadze next  month  in  the  United  States. 

Before  I  address  some  of  the  issues 
which  were  the  focus  of  my  discussions 
with  Ambassador  Nazarkin,  I  would 
like  to  comment  on  the  overriding  prin- 
ciples which  guided  the  U.S.  negotiat- 
ing team  in  round  11  and  which  will  be 
of  equal  importance  in  future  rounds. 

Guidance  for  Negotiating 

The  United  States  returned  to  the  Ge- 
neva talks  with  President  Bush's  firm 
pledge  that  "we  will  work  vigorously  to 
achieve  fair  and  far-reaching  agree- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


17 


ARMS  CONTROL 


ments  that  strengthen  peace.  Nothing 
has  higher  priority." 

In  its  early  days,  the  Bush  Ad- 
ministration conducted  a  comprehen- 
sive review  of  American  security  and 
arms  control  policies.  As  a  result  of 
this  review,  the  President  concluded 
that  the  primary  objective  for  strategic 
arms  control  is  to  achieve  verifiable 
agreements  that  reduce  the  risk  of  war. 

The  risk  of  nuclear  war  can  be 
reduced  by  creating  a  more  stable  nu- 
clear balance,  in  which  deterrence  is 
strengthened  and  a  condition  of  crisis 
stability  prevails.  Such  a  condition  e.x- 
ists  when  each  side  is  dissuaded  from  a 
first-strike  because  the  costs  and  risks 
associated  with  such  an  attack  clearly 
outweigh  any  conceivable  benefit. 
Therefore,  an  essential  ingredient  to 
maintaining  crisis  stability  is  having 
survivable,  retaliatory  forces.  In  this 
sense,  it  is  important  to  remember 
that  arms  control  can  only  complement, 
not  replace,  unilateral  measures  that 
must  be  taken  to  maintain  effective 
deterrence. 

Deep  reductions  in  strategic  forces 
can  enhance  stability  if  they  are  prop- 
erly applied.  Provisions  that  could  pro- 
duce greater  stability  are  those  that 
would: 

•  Reduce  force  vulnerability,  since, 
as  I  have  just  said,  survivable  forces 
reduce  the  incentives  to  strike  first; 

•  Enhance  transparency,  since  sta- 
bility is  enhanced  by  greater  openness 
about  the  size  and  nature  of  each  other's 
strategic  forces  and  activities;  and 

•  Foster  predictability,  since  sta- 
bility is  enhanced  by  reducing  uncer- 
tainties about  the  future  evolution  of 
the  forces  of  both  sides. 

The  START  negotiations  to  date 
have  ])roduced  a  lengthy  joint  draft 
treaty  text  that  reflects  the  areas  of 
agreement  and  disagreement.  At  the 
beginning  of  this  round,  we  I'eaffirmed 
the  U.S.  intent  to  proceed  on  the  basis 
of  the  existing  joint  draft  text.  In  par- 
ticular, we  reaffirmed  our  continued 
acceptance  of  the  structure  of  limits 
and  sublimits  that  have  already  been 
agreed:  that  is,  1,600  strategic  offen- 
sive delivery  systems;  6,000  account- 
able warheads;  4,900  warheads  on 
intercontinental  ballistic  missiles 
(ICBMs)  and  sea-launched  ballistic  mis- 
siles (SLBMs);  1,540  warheads  on  154 
heavy  ballistic  missiles;  and  a  reduc- 
tion of  approximately  50'/(  in  Soviet 
ballistic  missile  thi-ow-weight.  While 
we  reaffirm  our  support  of  the  basic 


agreed  numerical  limits  and  other 
U.S.  positions  in  the  joint  draft  text, 
we  have  reserved  the  right  to  suggest 
new  ideas  and  other  changes  that  we 
believe  would  contribute  to  force  sur- 
vivability and  stability. 

To  ensure  that  improvements  in 
force  survivability  remain  valid  over 
the  long  term,  they  must  be  balanced 
with  the  requirement  that  the  size  and 
nature  of  current  and  evolving  strate- 
gic forces  be  transparent  and  predict- 
able and  that  agreements  be  effectively 
verifiable.  Mobile  ICBMs  provide  a 
case  in  point:  the  same  aspect  of 
mobile  ICBMs  that  make  them  more 
survivable — the  fact  that  they  move — 
clearly  also  complicates  effective 
verification. 

The  U.S.  position  on  banning  mo- 
bile ICBMs  remains  unchanged  for  now. 
Our  decision  on  mobile  missiles  de- 
pends in  part,  of  course,  on  support  in 
the  U.S.  Congress  for  the  President's 
ICBM  modernization  program.  None- 
theless we  have  indicated  to  the  Soviet 
side  that  we  are  willing  to  reconsider 
our  position  on  seeking  a  ban,  in  light 
of  the  hundred-plus  mobile  ICBMs  that 
the  Soviets  have  deployed  over  the  past 
several  years,  if  the  sides  can  agree 
upon  a  regime  that  would  allow  the  ef- 
fective verification  of  numerical  limits 
on  mobile  ICBM  systems.  Although 
much  remains  to  be  done,  round  11  has 
produced  significant  clarifications  of 
the  requirements  and  restraints  to  be 
placed  on  both  road  and  rail  mobile 
systems. 

Verification  and  Stability  Initiative 

As  part  of  our  overall  negotiating  ef- 
fort, and  a  prominent  example  of  the 
new  ideas  the  United  States  brought  to 
round  11,  the  United  States  has  pro- 
posed that  the  U.S.  and  Soviet  sides 
make  a  special  effort  to  agree  on,  and 
begin  implementing  as  soon  as  possi- 
ble, certain  verification  and  stability 
measures  drawn  from  proposals  previ- 
ously advanced  by  both  sides.  I  do  not 
need  to  underscore  to  the  Conference 
on  Disarmament  the  central  role  veri- 
fication plays  in  modern  arms  control 
agreements.  Our  verification  and  sta- 
bility initiative  is  a  recognition  of 
that  centrality. 

Specifically  at  the  direction  of  the 
President,  we  proposed  to  the  Soviets 
that  the  START  negotiators  focus  now 
on  the  following  verification/stability 
measures,  which  would  be  reflected  in 
the  ultimate  START  treaty: 


(1)  Immediate,  reciprocal  estab- 
lishment of  perimeter  and  portal  con- 
tinuous monitoring  of  certain  ballistic 
missile  production  facilities  in  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  to 
improve  our  confidence  in  the  accuracy'4 
of  declared  mobile  ballistic  missile 
inventories; 

(2)  Prompt,  reciprocal  exchange  of' 
selected  data  on  each  country's  nuclear 
forces  to  help  us  design  appropriate  in-P 
spection  procedures  to  assist  verifica- 
tion of  the  START  treaty; 

(3)  Cessation  of  ballistic  missile  te^ 
lemetry  encryption  and  data  denial  of 
certain  ICBM  and  SLBM  launches,  so 
that  each  country  has  a  better  under- 
standing of  new  developments  in  the 
forces  of  the  other; 

(4)  Reciprocal  practice  inspections 
to  demonstrate  procedures  for  verify- 
ing that  the  number  of  reentry  vehiclei 
on  specific  existing  ballistic  missiles 
does  not  exceed  the  number  that  the 
United  States  and  Soviet  Union  have 
agreed  to  attribute  to  that  type  of  misi 
sile.  A  mutual  demonstration  could  helji 
the  negotiators  to  develop  sound  in- 
spection provisions  for  these  unprece- 
dented intrusive  inspections;  and 

(5)  Reciprocal  demonstration  of 
technologies  for  unique  identifiers  on 
ballistic  missiles,  a  process  often  re- 
ferred to  as  "tagging,"  in  order  to  facij 
itate  technical  exchanges  on  promising 
approaches. 

In  addition  the  United  States  be- 
lieves that  both  countries  can  benefit 
by  agreeing  to  two  additional  measure' 
that,  while  they  have  not  been  previ- 
ously discussed  in  our  negotiations  and 
would  not  themselves  be  part  of  the 
START  treaty,  would  enhance  strate- 
gic stability  as  separately  agreed 
measures. 

•  Following  the  Soviet  Union's  sug- 
gestion to  Secretary  Baker,  we  are  pre 
pared  to  address  the  problem  of  SLBM 
with  short  times  of  flight,  which  wouk 
include  what  some  refer  to  as  de- 
pressed trajectory  flights. 

•  We  also  suggest  the  two  countrie; 
implement  a  proposal,  discussed  in  a 
previous  exchange  of  letters,  in  which 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Unioi 
would  notify  each  other  of  one  major 
strategic  exercise  each  year. 

The  President's  verification  and 
stability  initiative  complements  the 
work  done  to  date  in  Geneva.  This  ini- 
tiative is  designed  to  expedite,  not 
delay,  the  START  negotiations— the 
START  treaty  will  contain  unprece- 


18 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  198! 


ARMS  CONTROL 


.lented  verification  provisions.  It  is  im- 
)ortant  to  understand  early  on  what 
he  ])roblems  are,  so  that  the  negotia- 
idiis  are  not  prolonged  by  unresolved 
t'ehnical  verification  issues.  Early  im- 
jlementation  of  these  measures  will 
lelp  the  two  countries  to  gain  experi- 
mce  in  verification  procedures  so  we 
■an  draft  realistic  provisions  in  Geneva. 

The  United  States  does  not  intend 
he  U.S.  initiative  to  be  a  take-it-or- 
eave-it  package.  While  we  would  like 
;o  reach  agreement  on  every  measure, 
ve  are  prepared  to  address  only  those 
,hat  the  Soviets  are  ready  to  discuss, 
^rther  the  United  States  intends  that 
;ach  measure  be  fully  reciprocal  and, 
therefore,  apply  equally  to  both 
■ountries. 

To  date  we  have  held  exploratory 
iliscussions  with  the  Soviet  side  which 
Save  allowed  us  to  describe  the  veri- 
ication  and  stability  initiative  in 
greater  detail.  We  expect  the  U.S. 
.erification  and  stability  initiative  to 
agure  prominently  in  the  September 
ninisterial  between  Secretary  Baker 
ind  Foreign  Minister  Shevardnadze. 

J. S. -Soviet  Differences 

have  had  detailed  discussions  with 
ny  Soviet  counterpart  on  prominent 
ireas  where  the  sides  differ — an  ICBM 
varhead  sublimit,  heavy  ICBMs,  air- 
aunched  cruise  missiles  (ALCMs)/ 
leavy  bombers,  submarine-launched 
•ruise  missiles  (SLCMs),  and  the  link- 
ige  of  START  to  the  Antiballistic  Mis- 
sile (ABM)  Treaty.  These  discussions 
ia\e  been  candid  and  substantive  rath- 
•r  than  stale,  rhetorical  recitations  of 
'a  mi  liar  themes. 

The  United  States  continues  to  be- 
lieve that  agreement  should  be  reached 
3n  a  sublimit  of  between  3,000  and 
3,300  warheads  on  deployed  ICBMs. 
Both  countries  would  benefit  from  the 
added  predictability  such  a  limit  would 
provide  since  ICBM  systems  will  re- 
main uniquely  suited  for  use  in  a 
preemptive  attack  and,  thus,  more 
destabilizing  than  other  types  of  stra- 
tegic offensive  arms. 

Heavy  ballistic  missiles  are  partic- 
ularly destabilizing.  Therefore,  the 
United  States  continues  to  maintain  its 
position  that  the  START  treaty  should 
ban  the  production,  flight-testing,  or 


deployment  of  new  or  modernized  types 
of  heavy  ICBMs,  as  well  as  the  produc- 
tion or  deployment  of  additional  heavy 
ICBMs  of  existing  types.  Both  coun- 
tries should  also  undertake  not  to  con- 
duct flights  of  existing  types  of  heavy 
ICBMs  and  not  to  produce,  flight-test, 
or  deploy  heavy  SLBMs.  The  U.S.  posi- 
tion on  heavy  missiles  would  effectively 
provide  for  equality  by  resulting  even- 
tually in  the  phasing  out  of  the  Soviet 
SS-18  force,  the  single  most  destabiliz- 
ing weapons  system  in  the  world  today. 

Regarding  bomber  weapons,  the 
United  States  has  reaffirmed  our  past 
positions  on  ALCM  counting,  range, 
and  distinguishability.  Thus  we  contin- 
ue'to  propose  that  ALCMs  be  counted 
under  an  attribution  rule  that  would 
credit  each  heavy  bomber  equipped  for 
ALCMs  with  an  agreed  number  of  war- 
heads against  the  6,000  limit,  regard- 
less of  the  number  actually  carried. 
The  United  States  also  continues  to 
maintain  the  position  that  only  air-to- 
surface  cruise  missiles  which  are  nu- 
clear armed  and  capable  of  a  range  over 
1,500  kilometers  should  be  subject  to 
START  limits. 

The  U.S.  position  on  SLCMs  re- 
mains sound.  Conventional  SLCMs  are 
not  an  element  of  the  U.S. -Soviet  stra- 
tegic nuclear  balance  and,  therefore, 
should  not  be  part  of  this  agreement. 
After  considerable  review,  the  United 
States  has  concluded  that  the  Soviet 
proposals  for  SLCM  verification  would 
not  provide  for  effective  verification. 
Available  technologies  allegedly  suit- 
able for  detecting  nuclear  SLCM  war- 
heads remotely  and  distinguishing 
them  from  other  nuclear  sources  cannot 
do  either  reliably.  The  recent  Soviet 
demonstration  in  the  Black  Sea  has  not 
altered  this  conclusion.  Consequently 
circumvention  of  provisions  based  on 
these  technologies  would  be  easy.  Even 
if  the  technologies  could  detect  and  dis- 
tinguish nuclear  SLCMs  reliably,  how- 
ever, it  still  appears  highly  doubtful 
that  a  regime  of  effective  verification 
could  be  designed.  The  United  States 
still  knows  of  no  way  to  verify  effec- 
tively limits  on  the  production  and  stor- 
age of  SLCMs,  arguably  the  core  of  the 
SLCM  verification  problem. 

Consequently  the  United  States 
envisions  a  nonbinding  declaration  of 
plans  for  nuclear-armed  SLCMs  by 
both  countries.  Because  nuclear 
SLCMs  are  neither  suitable  for  nor  vul- 


nerable to  a  first-strike,  the  LInited 
States  believes  that  its  proposal  pro- 
vides both  countries  with  the  most 
practical  means  to  build  confidence 
that  nuclear  SLCMs  will  not  circum- 
vent START  limits. 

START  and  Other  Negotiations 

Let  me  conclude  by  addressing  the  re- 
lationship between  START  and  other 
negotiations. 

Some  have  recently  questioned 
whether  conclusion  of  a  START  treaty 
is  a  lower  priority  for  the  Bush  Ad- 
ministration than  conclusion  of  a  con- 
ventional force  in  Europe  (CFE)  treaty 
or  whether  we  want  to  delay  START 
pending  progress  in  CFE.  Let  me  say 
that  neither  is  true.  Both  the  START 
and  CFE  negotiations  are  high,  but  in- 
dependent, priorities  for  the  Bush  Ad- 
ministration. Although  he  has 
expressed  his  hope  that  a  CFE  agree- 
ment can  be  finalized  in  6-12  months, 
the  President  has  not  linked  progress 
in  START  to  progress  in  CFE. 

Because  stabilizing  reductions  are 
in  the  interest  of  both  countries,  com- 
pletion of  a  START  agreement  should 
not  await  resolution  of  thorny  defense 
and  space  issues.  Since  1972  when  the 
Antiballistic  Missile  Treaty  entered 
into  force,  the  magnitude  and  power  of 
the  nuclear  threat  has  grown  several 
fold.  Yet  a  key  premise  of  that  treaty 
was  that  strategic  offensive  arms  re- 
ductions would  soon  follow.  Thus  the 
Soviet  LInion  should  join  with  us  in  con- 
cluding a  START  treaty,  when  it  is 
ready,  without  any  preconditions.  A 
separate  defense  and  space  treaty,  a 
subject  that  Ambassador  Cooper  will 
address  in  more  detail  in  a  moment, 
should  likewise  be  negotiated  on  its 
own  merits  and  at  its  own  pace. 

The  conclusions  of  our  strategic  re- 
view and  the  history  of  negotiations  on 
these  issues  have  convinced  the  United 
States  that  the  task  ahead  is  large. 
Much  has  been  accomplished  already, 
yet  a  great  deal  of  work  lies  ahead.  I 
believe  that  through  serious,  construc- 
tive negotiations,  we  will  be  able  to 
make  significant  progress.  The  United 
States  is  committed  to  building  on  our 
achievements  thus  far  to  reach  agree- 
ments that  fulfill  our  objectives  of  re- 
ducing the  risk  of  war,  moving  beyond 
containment,  and  enhancing  global  se- 
curity and  stability.  ■ 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


19 


ARMS  CONTROL 


Status  of  the  Defense  and  Space  Talks 


by  Henry  F.  Cooper 

Statement  made  at  the  Conference 
oil  Disarmament  in  Geneva  on  Au- 
gust .i,  1989.  Ambassador  Cooper  is 
chief  negotiator  at  the  defense  and 
space  talks  (DST). 

I  am  pleased  to  appear  before  the 
Conference  on  Disarmament  to  discuss 
the  status  of  the  defense  and  space 
talks.  Let  me  begin  with  some  back- 
ground material. 

U.S.  Objectives 

Since  our  talks  began  in  March  198.5, 
the  United  States  has  sought  to  facili- 
tate a  possible  future  cooperative 
transition  to  a  stabilizing  balance  of 
offensive  and  defensive  forces,  should 
effective  defenses  against  strategic  bal- 
listic missiles  prove  feasible.  President 
Bush  has  directed  us  to  preserve  U.S. 
options  to  develop  and  deploy  advanced 
defenses  when  they  are  ready.  We  be- 
lieve that  stability  and  the  security  of 
all  nations  can  be  enhanced  by  such  de- 
fenses, especially  if  they  are  introduced 
at  a  measured  pace  and  in  a  coopera- 
tive way. 


Advancing  Technology 
and  the  ABM  Treaty  ' 

There  is  clearly  a  growing  likelihood  of 
effective,  non-nuclear  defenses  against 
ballistic  missiles.  Great  advances  in 
data  processing,  sensors,  microelec- 
tronics, materials,  propulsion,  and  di- 
rected energy  have  opened  a  window  to 
a  potentially  new  and  safer  era.  Over 
the  past  6  years,  the  creative  talents  of 
our  scientists  and  engineers  have  ex- 
tended these  advances.  Now-  innovative 
non-nuclear  defensive  concepts  are 
emerging  from  laboratories  and  will 
undergo  testing.  If  our  hopes  are  real- 
ized, the  nuclear-or-chemically-armed 
ballistic  missile — by  far  the  most  dan- 
gerous instrument  of  war  to  use  the 
medium  of  space — will  no  longer  be  an 
"absolute  weapon." 

Our  Soviet  colleagues  and  others 
suggest  there  should  be  great  concern 
regarding  these  developments.  I  want 
to  address  their  arguments  head-on. 

In  effect,  various  spokesmen  sug- 
gest that  publics  should  believe  that 
responsible  leaders  ought  not  use  tech- 


nological advances  to  defend  against 
ballistic  missiles.  In  other  words,  ad- 
vancing technology  should  be  used  only 
to  enhance  the  effectiveness  of  the 
threat  posed  by  offensive  ballistic 
missiles — even  if  it  were  technically 
possible  to  defend  against  and  devalue 
that  threat  and  thereby  make  deter- 
rence more  stable.  Of  course,  Soviet 
spokesmen  do  not  make  their  argu- 
ments in  these  terms.  Rather  they  di- 
vert attention  to  misleading  disjuites 
about  the  Antiballistic  Missile  (ABM) 
Treaty. 

For  example,  the  Soviets  inac- 
curately charge  that  our  Strategic 
Defense  Initiative  (SDI)  program, 
because  of  its  openly  declared  purpose, 
violates  the  ABM  Treaty.  They,  of 
course,  know  better — and  have  known 
better  since  the  ABM  Treaty  was 
signed  in  1972.  Marshal  Grechko,  then 
the  Soviet  Defense  Minister,  told  the 
Supreme  Soviet  during  its  ratification 
process  that  the  ABM  Treaty  "imposes 
no  limitations  on  the  performance  of 
research  and  experimental  work  aimed 
at  resolving  the  problem  of  defending 
the  country  against  nuclear  missile 
attack." 

So  we  and  the  Soviets  both  under- 
stand that  there  are  no  limitations  on 
ABM  research  and  experimental  work 
to  determine  if  effective  defenses  are 
feasible.  And  the  Soviets,  themselves, 
are  very  interested  in  strategic  de- 
fenses and  are  conducting  their  own  re- 
lated research  and  experimental  work. 
In  November  1987,  General  Secretary 
Gorbachev,  on  American  television  in 
answer  to  a  direct  question  about  So- 
viet activities  in  this  field,  said  that 
"practically,  the  Soviet  Union  is  doing 
all  that  the  United  States  is  doing." 
Although  he  also  said  that  the  Soviet 
Union  would  not  build  or  dejjloy  its 
SDI,  it  is  capabilities  rather  than  de- 
clared intentions  that  count. 

In  fact  the  Soviets  are  already  do- 
ing far  more  than  the  United  States  on 
strategic  defenses.  The  magnitude  of 
their  civil  and  air  defenses  is  unequaled 
anywhere  else  in  the  world.  They  also 
have  the  world's  only  deployed  ABM 
system,  which  they  are  modernizing — 
as  is  their  right  under  the  ABM  Treaty. 
And  certain  of  their  activities  clearly 
go  beyond  the  limits  of  the  ABM  Trea- 
ty. So  Soviet  actions  make  clear  they 
do  not  oppose  all  defenses,  only  U.S. 
defenses. 


Beyond  their  attack  on  SDI,  the  So- J 
viets  argue  that  the  ABM  Treaty  spe- 
cified, for  all  time,  the  only  possible       ; 
stable  strategic  regime:  one  which  se- 
verely limits  the  deployment  of  strate- 
gic ballistic  missile  defenses.  They 
cannot  explain  why  effective  defenses 
against  the  most  threatening  offen- 
sive weapon — the  strategic  ballistic     "^ 
missile — would  be  destabilizing, 
whereas  their  defenses  in  other  areas, 
such  as  air  defenses,  are  stabilizing. 
Furthermore  it  is  simply  not  true  that 
the  ABM  Treaty  politically  estab- 
lished, for  all  time,  a  particular  strate- 
gic regime.  To  the  contrary,  the  ABM 
Treaty  explicitly  acknowledged  that  thf 
future  strategic  situation  could  change. 
Accordingly,  its  provisions  provide  for 
discussions  and  amendment. 

The  ABM  Treaty  also  provides  an 
explicit  mechanism  that  makes  clear 
that  neither  side  can  veto  the  other's 
decision  to  withdraw  for  its  own  stated 
reasons  of  supreme  interest  and  deploy 
defenses  beyond  its  terms.  The  United 
States  made  clear  in  1972  that  such 
a  reason  might  be  failure  to  achieve 
agreement,  within  5  years,  to  signifi- 
cantly limit  strategic  offensive  arms. 
Such  an  agreement  was  not  achieved. 
Now,  17  years  later,  the  Soviets  are 
seeking  to  apply  reverse  linkage  to  this  > 
fundamental  premise  of  the  ABM  Trea- 
ty. They  say  there  must  be  strict  com- 
pliance with  the  ABM  Treaty  or  there 
cannot  be  a  START  treaty.  Meanwhile 
since  1972,  Soviet  strategic  offensive 
nuclear  weapons  have  quadrupled,  and 
ours  have  doubled.  So  even  the  signifi- 
cant reductions  anticipated  in  the 
START  treaty  will  leave  more  strategic 
weapons  than  existed  in  1972.  It  is  long 
past  time  to  conclude  a  START  treaty, 
as  promised  in  1972,  without  further 
restrictions  on  strategic  defenses. 

A  Predictable  Future 

At  the  same  time,  we  do  understand  the 
Soviet  interest  in  assuring  predict- 
t 

experimental  work  proceeds  and  as  re- 
ductions in  strategic  offensive  arms 
take  place.  We,  too,  wish  to  assure 
predictability — not  only  now  and  in  the 
near  future  but  also  into  the  more  dis- 
tant future  when  advancing  technolo- 
gies may  enable  effective  defenses  to 
play  an  increased  role  in  the  strategic 
forces  of  both  sides.  Therein  lies  a  ba- 


i^. 


20 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


ARMS  CONTROL 


sis  for  agreement  on  a  defense  and 
space  treaty.  And  although  key  differ- 
ences remain  and  the  pace  has  been 
slower  than  we  would  wish,  there  has 
been  some  progress  toward  such  an 
agreement. 

Specific  U.S.  proposals  have  indi- 
icated  how  such  predictability  might  be 
'assured.  In  part,  at  [British]  Prime 
Minister  Thatcher's  suggestion,  we  be- 
jgan  in  1986  proposing  "predictability 
Imeasures."  Then  in  early  1988,  the 
.United  States  formally  proposed  a  pre- 
jdictability  measures  protocol  to  a  de- 
fense and  space  treaty.  While  there  is 
inot  yet  agreement  on  the  specific  pur- 
!pose  for  the  protocol,  both  sides  are 
Iconstructively  drafting  a  joint  draft 
text.  Notably  both  sides  agree  that, 
lunder  this  protocol,  they  would  use  the 
iNuclear  Risk  Reduction  Centers  to 
exchange  data  each  year  on  their  ac- 
tivities regarding  the  development, 
itesting,  deployment,  modernization, 
and  replacement  of  strategic  ballistic 
missile  defenses.  The  United  States 
also  wishes  to  exchange  data  on  re- 
search activities  conducted  prior  to 
the  commencement  of  the  formal  devel- 
opment stage. 

In  working  on  this  protocol,  the 
sides  have  also  agreed  to  have  experts 
meet  and,  on  the  basis  of  the  data  ex- 
changed each  year,  plan  subsequent  ac- 
tivities that  could  include  visits  to  each 
other's  test  ranges  to  observe  certain 
tests  where  the  inviting  party  deter- 
mines the  agenda.  Again  the  United 
States  would  go  further  and  include  in 
the  exchange  visits  to  laboratories  not 
necessarily  at  test  ranges,  the  observa- 
tion of  tests  not  necessarily  at  test 
ranges,  and  activities  not  necessarily 
observable  by  national  technical  means. 
The  United  States  believes  these  meas- 
ures are  practical  only  if  they  are  car- 
ried out  on  a  voluntary,  reciprocal,  and 
comparable  basis. 

Predictability,  Not 
Verification,  Measures 

While  accepting  the  idea  of  such 
confidence-building  measures,  the  So- 
viets also  emphasize  developing  new 
verification  measures,  including  on- 
site  inspections  unacceptable  to  the 
United  States.  Of  course,  the  United 
States  supports  cooperative  means  of 
verification  when  they  can  be  effective 
without  compromising  U.S.  and  allied 
security  interests,  when  they  are  nec- 
essary and  tailored  to  the  circum- 
stances, and  when  they  are  appropriate 


to  the  systems  being  negotiated.  But  in 
this  instance,  verification  of  the  ABM 
Treaty,  as  signed  in  1972,  is  provided 
by  national  technical  means.  While  the 
U.S. -proposed  predictability  measures 
would  provide  more  transparency  into 
activities  of  the  sides  and  thereby 
enhance  some  verification  goals,  they 
are  primarily  confidence-building 
measures. 

In  any  case,  the  significant  prog- 
ress on  this  protocol  has  not  received 
much  public  attention.  Rather  the  em- 
phasis has  been  on  Soviet  threats  that 
there  can  be  no  START  treaty  without 
an  agreement  not  to  withdraw  from 
the  ABM  Treaty  for  a  specified  period 
of  time. 

U.S.  Conditions  for 

a  Nonwithdrawal  Period 

The  fact  is  that  since  1986,  the  United 
States  has  made  clear  that  it  would 
agree  to  conclude  a  separate  treaty  of 
unlimited  duration,  including  such  a 
nonwithdrawal  period — but  not  as  pay- 
ment for  a  START  treaty  that  should 
be  concluded  on  its  own  merits.  Rather 
the  United  States  is  prepared  to  meet 
the  Soviet  demand  for  a  nonwithdrawal 
period  provided  the  Soviet  Union 
meets  three  U.S.  conditions.  First, 
after  the  nonwithdrawal  period,  the 
United  States  will  be  free  to  deploy 
defenses  without  further  reference  to 
the  ABM  Treaty,  after  giving  6  months' 
notice.  Second,  withdrawal  and  ter- 
mination rights  under  international 
law,  other  than  those  associated  with 
deployment  per  se,  will  be  retained. 
Third,  there  must  be  no  disputes  dur- 
ing the  nonwithdrawal  period  about  re- 
search, development,  and  testing — 
including  in  space.  In  this  regard,  I 
would  reiterate  that  the  United  States 
is  conducting,  and  will  continue  con- 
ducting, the  SDI  program  in  compli- 
ance with  all  international  agreements, 
including  the  ABM  Treaty. 

Two  of  these  three  U.S.  conditions 
were  dealt  with  in  the  December  10, 
1987,  Washington  summit  joint  state- 
ment, an  important  benchmark  in  our 
negotiations,  which  directed  us  in  Ge- 
neva to  work  out  an  agreement  with  the 
same  legal  status  as  the  ABM  and 
START  treaties. 

First,  it  was  agreed  in  Washington 
that:  "Intensive  discussions  of  strategic 
stability  shall  begin  not  later  than  3 
years  before  the  end  of  the  specified 
[nonwithdrawal]  period,  after  which,  in 
the  event  the  sides  have  not  agreed  oth- 
erwise, each  side  will  be  free  to  decide 


its  course  of  action."  Thus  was  ac- 
knowledged a  new  regime  after  the 
nonwithdrawal  period  in  which  either 
side  could  decide  to  deploy  ballistic 
missile  defenses  without  further  refer- 
ence to  the  ABM  Treaty.  The  U.S.  posi- 
tion is  that,  unless  and  until  a  party 
exercises  this  "right  to  deploy,"  the 
ABM  Treaty  restrictions  w'ill  remain 
in  force. 

Second,  it  was  also  agreed  that  the 
sides  would  ".  .  .  observe  the  ABM 
Treaty,  as  signed  in  1972,  while  con- 
ducting their  research,  development, 
and  testing  as  required,  which  are  per- 
mitted by  the  ABM  Treaty.  .  .  ."  Gen- 
eral Secretary  Gorbachev  accepted  this 
U.S.  language  which,  over  the  pre- 
ceding 18  months,  the  Soviets  had  re- 
jected in  Geneva  because  they  said  they 
understood  the  United  States  meant  it 
to  mean  that  space-based  ABM  systems 
based  on  other  physical  principles  and 
their  components  could  be  tested  in 
space.  The  Soviets  here  in  Geneva  have 
sought  to  discount  these  Washington 
summit  understandings. 

In  the  first  case,  they  have  sought 
to  terminate  the  defense  and  space 
treaty  at  the  end  of  the  nonwithdrawal 
period,  nullifying  the  agreed  new  re- 
gime after  the  nonwithdrawal  period. 
The  U.S. -proposed  defense  and  space 
treaty  is  of  unlimited  duration  and  pre- 
serves the  agreed  "right  to  deploy" 
along  with  appropriate  notification 
procedures. 

In  the  second  case,  the  Soviets 
have  argued  that  they  did  not  agree  to 
the  "broad  interpretation"  of  the  ABM 
Treaty,  even  though  the  Geneva  nego- 
tiating record  clearly  shows  they  under- 
stood that  the  United  States  meant  the 
"broad  interpretation"  by  the  language 
the  General  Secretary  accepted  at  the 
Washington  summit. 

U.S.  Initiatives  on  Activities 
During  Nonwithdrawal  Period 

Consequently  the  United  States  has 
made  clear  that  concluding  a  defense 
and  space  treaty  is  contingent  upon 
clarifying  this  language  from  the 
Washington  summit  joint  statement  to 
assure  an  unambiguous  mutual  under- 
standing of  the  permitted  testing  ac- 
tivities. To  accomplish  this,  and  to 
move  the  discussion  beyond  disputes 
about  ABM  Treaty  interpretation, 
the  United  States  has  taken  three 
initiatives. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


21 


ARMS  CONTROL 


First,  we  proposed  the  predict- 
ability measures  I  cited  above. 

Second,  talking  into  account  un- 
solvable  verification  problems  and  the 
importance  of  developing  new,  stabiliz- 
ing space-based  sensors,  the  United 
States  proposed  that  the  sides  agree 
not  to  object,  on  the  basis  of  the  ABM 
Treaty,  to  the  development,  testing,  or 
deployment  of  each  other's  space-based 
sensors. 

Third,  taking  into  account  Soviet- 
stated  concerns  about  deployment  of 
ABM  systems  in  space,  or  the  prepara- 
tion of  a  base  for  such  deployment,  we 
provided  last  October  a  space-testing 
assurance.  In  that  assurance,  the 
United  States  pledged  that  it  will  test 
only  from  a  limited  number  of  desig- 
nated ABM  test  satellites  components 
of  space-based  ABM  systems  based  on 
other  physical  principles  and  capable  of 
substituting  for  ABM  interceptor  mis- 
siles to  counter  ballistic  missiles  or 
their  elements  in  flight  trajectory.  The 
number  of  U.S. -designated  ABM  test 
satellites  in  orbit  simultaneously  will 
not  e.xceed  a  number  well  short  of  that 
associated  with  any  realistic  deployed 
capability.  In  conjunction  with  this  as- 
surance, we  proposed  notification  pro- 
cedures relating  to  testing  activities  of 
ABM  test  satellites. 

While  the  Soviets  do  not  yet  accept 
them,  we  are  satisfied  that  these  U.S. 
initiatives  build  on  solid  technical  and 
political  foundations  and  deal  fairly 
with  the  concerns  of  both  sides.  They 
will  provide  predictability  to  both  sides 
concerning  all  strategic  ballistic  mis- 
sile defense  activities.  They  assure 
that  there  will  be  no  deployment  of  ad- 
vanced defenses  beyond  the  terms  of 
the  ABM  Treaty  for  a  specified  period 
of  time,  and  even  then  assure  that 
there  will  have  been  extensive  prior 
discussions  of  strategic  stability  in  the 
U.S. -Soviet  strategic  relationship. 

But  these  U.S.  initiatives  are  also 
designed  to  achieve  a  safer,  more  se- 
cure, and  more  stable  future  regime 
in  which  the  security  of  both  sides, 
and  the  whole  world,  is  based  upon  an 
ever  increasing  role  for  effective  non- 
nuclear  defenses  against  the  most 
threatening  weapon  of  modern  technol- 
ogy— the  offensive  ballistic  missile — 
whether  armed  with  nuclear,  conven- 
tional, or  chemical  warheads.  This  fu- 
ture seems  entirely  consistent  with 
recent  Soviet  statements  that  the 
U.S.S.R.  is  altering  its  overall  mili- 
tary strategy  to  be  defensive  in  nature. 
And  this  future  is  entirely  consistent 


with  the  well-known  Soviet  interest  in 
defenses,  generally  speaking.  Thus  we 
will  be  patient  and  wait  for  a  positive 
Soviet  response. 

Status  of  the  Negotiations 

In  this  regard,  I  want  to  observe  that 
we  are  concluding  a  useful  round  in  our 
negotiations.  The  U.S.  side  has  empha- 
sized the  continuity  of  the  U.S.  position 
on  defense  and  space  and  provided 
some  new  material  relatecl  to  the  proto- 
col. Although  the  Soviets  have  provided 
no  new  material  and  have  refused  to  in- 
corporate both  sides"  positions  in  a  joint 
draft  text  of  the  defense  and  space 
treaty,  they  have  worked  constructively 
on  the  protocol  joint  draft  text. 

There  also  seemed  to  be  a  modest 
shift  in  this  round  toward  more  discus- 
sions of  the  offense-defense  relation- 
ship, based  upon  a  mutual  recognition 
that  there  is  no  absolute  weapon — 
offensive  or  defensive.  Where  such  a 
discussion  will  lead,  in  view  of  the  ad- 
vancing technical  possibilities,  is  un- 
clear, but  it  would  seem  most  unlikely 
to  conclude  that  effective  defense, 


should  they  prove  feasible,  should  not 
be  deployed.  The  United  States  be- 
lieves it  makes  sense  to  develop  effec- 
tive defenses  if  advancing  technology 
makes  this  feasible  and  to  deploy  them 
when  they  are  ready — preferably  at  a 
measured  pace  and  in  a  cooperative 
way. 

Before  I  close,  let  me  take  note  of 
the  work  of  the  Outer  Space  Committee 
here  at  the  Conference  on  Disarma- 
ment. As  you  can  tell  from  my  descrip- 
tion of  the  defense  and  space  talks, 
work  in  this  area  is  exceptionally  com- 
plicated. Building  understanding  in 
this  area  is  not  an  easy  process,  and  I 
congratulate  the  Outer  Space  Commit- 
tee for  its  work  in  developing  greater 
understanding  on  this  subject.  While  a 
fundamental  framework  must  be  first 
established  on  a  bilateral  level,  the 
United  States  remains  interested  in 
and  willing  to  continue  examining  is- 
sues associated  with  space  arms  control 
at  the  Conference  on  Disarmament. 
But  the  United  States  has  not  yet  iden- 
tified any  practical  outer  space  arms 
control  measures  that  can  be  dealt  with 
in  an  multilateral  environment.  ■ 


Foreign  Policy  Implications 
of  Biological  Weapons 


by  H.  Allen  Holmes 

Statement  before  the  Senate  Judi- 
ciary Committee  on  July  26,  1989. 
Ambassador  Holmes  is  Assista)it 
Secretary  for  Politico-Military 
Affair  sJ 

I  am  pleased  to  appear  before  you 
today  to  discuss  the  foreign  policy 
implications  of  biological  weapons 
proliferation.  I  welcome  the  interest 
demonstrated  by  the  committee  in  this 
problem  at  this  time.  A  disturbing  and 
dangerous  trend  has  emerged  in  the  re- 
cent past  in  the  increasing  efforts  by 
states  to  acquire  biological  weapons. 
The  technology  to  produce  them  is 
improving  apace,  and  the  agents 
themselves  are  becoming  ever  more 
threatening. 

I  should  like  to  state  from  the  out- 
set that  the  United  States  is  adamantly 
opposed  to  the  development,  pi'oduc- 
tion,  stockpiling,  or  use  of  biological 
weapons.  We  have  renounced  any  bio- 
logical weapon  capability  of  our  own, 
have  destroyed  our  stockpile,  and  are 


committed  to  doing  all  we  can  to  eli- 
minate these  weapons  from  the  world's 
arsenals. 

In  this  respect,  we  find  useful  the 
efforts  of  the  Congress  to  formulate 
domestic  criminal  legislation  against 
those  who  would  develop  or  produce  bi- 
ological weapons  or  assist  foreign  na- 
tions to  acquire  them.  We  are  presently 
studying  the  language  of  the  draft  leg- 
islation, S.  993,  to  determine  where  we 
can  contribute  to  the  drafting  process. 
I  would  defer  to  my  distinguished  col- 
league from  the  Department  of  Justice 
for  specific  comments  on  the  substance 
of  the  draft  legislation. 

We  feel  that  passage  of  such  legis- 
lation at  this  time  would  give  a  clear 
signal  to  the  world  that  the  United 
States  is  serious  about  controlling  the 
proliferation  of  biological  weajjons.  It 
would  signal  to  terrorists  that  we  are 
deadly  serious  about  keeping  such 
weapons  out  of  their  hands.  The  legisla- 
tion is  timely  and  important,  and  we 
are  grateful  to  the  Congress  for  bring- 
ing it  forward. 


22 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


ARMS  CONTROL 


Now  I  would  like  to  give  you  some 
background  on  the  development  of  U.S. 
policy  on  biological  weapons  and  on  the 
present  state  of  play  in  this  area.  I  will 
then  describe  how  we  are  working  to 
achieve  oui-  goal  of  eliminating  these 
weapons. 

Background 

There  are  two  international  agree- 
ments relating  to  biological  and  toxin 
weapons,  both  of  which  have  proven  in- 
adequate to  prevent  their  proliferation. 
The  192.5  Geneva  protocol  prohibits  the 
first  use  in  war  of  chemical  and  bio- 
logical weapons  but  not  their  devel- 
opment, production,  possession,  or 
transfer.  The  1972  Convention  on  the 
Prohibition  of  the  Development,  Pro- 
duction and  Stockpiling  of  Bacteriolog- 
ical (Biological)  and  Toxin  Weapons, 
commonly  known  as  the  Biological  and 
Toxin  Weapons  Convention  prohibits 
the  development,  production,  stockpil- 
ing, acquisition,  retention,  and  trans- 
fer of  biological  and  toxin  weapons. 

The  United  States  itself  uncondi- 
tionally renounced  all  aspects  of  bio- 
logical warfare  in  1969,  and  President 
Nixon  ordered  the  Department  of  De- 
fense to  destroy  existing  stocks  of  bio- 
logical agents  and  weapons.  In  1970  the 
U.S.  unilateral  ban  was  extended  also 
to  cover  toxins,  that  is,  poisonous 
chemicals  which  occur  in  nature  as  a 
product  of  living  organisms.  All  re- 
search in  the  area  of  biological  warfare 
has  since  been  confined  to  the  devel- 
opment of  strictly  defined  defensive 
measures,  for  example,  development 
of  vaccines. 

Biological  and  Toxin 
Weapons  Convention 

The  United  States  followed  up  these 
unilateral  actions  by  leading  the  fight 
for  an  international  ban,  the  1972  Bio- 
logical and  Toxin  Weapons  Convention. 
Article  I  of  the  convention,  confirmed 
by  the  treaty's  negotiating  record,  pro- 
hibits the  development,  production, 
stockpiling,  and  retention  of  all  biolog- 
ical agents  "that  have  no  justification 
for  prophylactic,  protective  or  other 
peaceful  purposes."  Thus  research  for 
protective  and  prophylactic  defenses 
against  biological  weapons  continued 
to  be  permissible. 

The  Biological  and  Toxin  Weapons 
Convention  was  approved  by  the  U.S. 
Senate  on  December  16,  1974,  and  en- 
tered into  force  on  March  26,  1975.  All 
U.S.  military  stocks  of  biological  and 


toxin  agents,  w^eapons,  equipment,  or 
means  of  delivery  prohibited  by  the 
convention  had  already  been  destroyed 
unilaterally,  pursuant  to  President 
Nixon's  instructions.  Facilities  in  the 
United  States  which  had  been  built  and 
used  for  biological  or  toxin  weapons 
purposes  were  converted  to  other  uses. 
For  example,  some  of  the  military  facil- 
ities at  Ft.  Detrick,  Maryland,  and 
Pine  Bluff  Arsenal,  Arkansas,  previ- 
ously used  for  biological  weapons  ac- 
tivities, are  now  the  property  of  the 
U.S.  Department  of  Health  and  Human 
Services  and  are  used  by  the  National 
Cancer  Institute  and  the  National  Cen- 
ter for  Toxicological  Research. 

After  the  Biological  and  Toxin 
Weapons  Convention  was  completed, 
many  thought  that  the  security  prob- 
lem posed  by  biological  and  toxin  weap- 
ons had  been  solved.  However,  this 
clearly  is  not  the  case.  Despite  the  lim- 
itations of  the  convention,  which  has  no 
verification  provisions,  we  have  identi- 
fied a  number  of  compliance  problems. 
In  previous  years  and  again  in  1988, 
President  Reagan  reported  to  the  Con- 
gress that  the  Soviet  Union  had  contin- 
ued to  maintain  an  offensive  biological 
warfare  program  and  accompanying  ca- 
pability and  that  the  Soviet  Union  had 
been  involved  in  the  production,  trans- 
fer, and  use  of  mycotoxins  for  hostile 
purposes  in  Laos,  Cambodia,  and  Af- 
ghanistan, in  violation  of  the  1972  Bio- 
logical and  Toxin  Weapons  Convention. 
Furthermore  we  have  yet  to  receive  a 
satisfactory  official  explanation  of  the 
unprecedented  outbreak  of  anthrax  at 
Sverdlovsk  in  the  Soviet  Union  in  1979. 

Two  review  conferences  for  the 
convention  have  been  held,  in  1980  and 
1986,  with  the  next  scheduled  for  1991. 
At  the  two  review  conferences,  the 
United  States  confirmed  that  it  is  in 
full  compliance  with  the  convention. 
At  the  second  review  conference,  the 
United  States  expressed  its  concern 
that  the  Soviet  Union,  Laos,  and 
Vietnam  had  violated  the  convention. 
Several  other  states  party  to  the 
convention  also  expressed  concern 
about  compliance.  These  concerns  are 
reflected  in  the  final  declaration  of  the 
1986  review  conference,  w^hich  notes 
statements  that  compliance  with  Arti- 
cles I,  II,  and  III  of  the  Biological  and 
Toxin  Weapons  Convention  was  "sub- 
ject to  grave  doubt"  and  that  efforts  to 
resolve  the  concerns  expressed  had  not 
been  successful.  Since  then  our  con- 
cerns have  intensified  as  evidence 
mounts  of  biological  weapons  prolifera- 
tion, especially  in  areas  of  particular 
concern  to  us. 


U.S.  Implementation 
of  the  Convention 

Article  IV  of  the  Biological  and  Toxin 
Weapons  Convention  provides  that  each 
state  "shall,  in  accordance  with  its  con- 
stitutional processes,  take  any  neces- 
sary measures  to  prohibit  and  prevent 
development,  production,  stockpiling, 
acquisition  or  retention  of  the  agents, 
toxins,  weapons,  equipment  and  means 
of  delivery  specified  in  Article  I  of  the 
Convention,  within  the  territory  of 
such  State,  under  its  jurisdiction  or  un- 
der its  control  anywhere."  As  you  know, 
several  statutes  exist  that  already  reg- 
ulate these  noxious  weapons,  such  as 
the  Toxic  Substances  Control  Act  and 
the  Arms  Export  Control  Act.  These 
laws  prohibit  both  the  manufacturing 
and  transfer  of  biological  toxins. 

We  recognize,  however,  that  addi- 
tional domestic  criminal  legislation  ad- 
dressing biological  materials  may  be 
useful  in  further  implementing  the  con- 
vention. We  believe  that  the  draft  bills 
now  under  consideration  by  the  Con- 
gress are  a  useful  starting  point  for 
such  legislation,  and  we  and  other 
agencies  are  prepared  to  work  with  the 
committee  as  the  legislation  develops. 

Technological  Advances 

In  addition  the  rapid  advance  of  tech- 
nology in  the  biological  field  has  led  to 
another  set  of  problems  for  the  conven- 
tion. In  many  ways,  recent  progress  in 
biological  technology  increases  the 
ease  of  concealment  of  illicit  manufac- 
turing plants,  particularly  for  biolog- 
ically derived  chemicals  such  as  toxins. 
Verification  of  the  Biological  and  Toxin 
Weapons  Convention,  always  a  difficult 
task,  has  been  significantly  compli- 
cated by  the  new  technology.  The  ease 
and  rapidity  of  genetic  manipulation, 
the  ready  availability  of  a  variety  of 
production  equipment,  and  the  prolif- 
eration of  safety  and  environmental 
equipment  and  health  procedures  to 
numerous  laboratories  and  production 
facilities  throughout  the  world  are 
signs  of  the  growing  role  of  biotechnol- 
ogy in  the  world's  economy.  They  also 
make  it  easier  for  nations  and  others 
to  produce  the  lethal  agents  banned 
by  the  convention. 

As  advances  are  made  in  the  field 
of  biotechnology,  the  potential  for  using 
this  technology  for  biological  and  toxin 
weapons  increases  commensurately. 
Not  only  has  the  time  from  basic  re- 
search to  mass  production  of  lethal 
weapons  decreased,  but  the  ability  to 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


23 


ARMS  CONTROL 


create  agents  and  toxins  with  more  op- 
timal weapons  potential  has  increased. 
Simply  put  the  potential  for  undetected 
breakout  from  ti-eaty  constraints  has 
increased  significantly. 

Biological  Weapons  Proliferation 

When  the  convention  was  negotiated, 
only  the  United  States  acknowledged 
having  biological  weapons.  In  contrast 
to  the  openness  we  have  practiced  re- 
garding our  military  programs,  the 
Soviets,  to  date,  have  never  officially 
acknowledged  having  a  biological  weap- 
ons program  and,  in  fact,  only  admit- 
ted in  1987  having  a  chemical  weapons 
program. 

Today  a  number  of  countries  are 
estimated  to  be  working  to  achieve  a  bi- 
ological weapons  capability.  Our  infor- 
mation on  which  states  are  involved  in 
biological  weapons  programs  is  based 
on  e.xtremely  sensitive  intelligence 
sources  and  methods  and  I  would  defer 
to  the  intelligence  community  to  pro- 
vide you  a  fuller  description  of  these 
programs  in  closed  session. 

We  are  especially  concerned  about 
the  spread  of  biological  weapons  in  un- 
stable areas  and  about  the  prospects  of 
biological  and  toxin  weapons  falling 
into  the  hands  of  terrorists,  or  into  the 
arsenals  of  those  states  which  actively 
support  terrorist  organizations.  To 
date  we  have  no  evidence  that  any 
known  terrorist  organization  has  the 
capability  to  employ  such  weapons,  nor 
that  states  supporting  terrorism  have 
supplied  such  weapons.  However,  we 
cannot  dismiss  these  possibilities.  If 
the  proliferation  of  biological  weapons 
continues,  it  may  be  only  a  matter  of 
time  before  terrorists  do  acquire  and 
use  these  weapons. 

U.S.  Biological  Defense 
Research  Program 

The  unilateral  U.S.  renunciation  of 
biological  weapons  in  1969  was  ac- 
companied by  the  recognition  that 
maintaining  a  strong  program  to  pro- 
vide for  defense  against  biological 
weapons  is  essential  for  national  secu- 
rity. That  requirement  is  reflected  in 
Article  I  of  the  convention  which  per- 
mits production  of  biological  agents 
and  toxins  in  quantities  required  to  de- 
velop protective  measures.  In  today's 
circumstances,  with  the  concerns  about 
compliance,  proliferation,  and  rapid  ad- 
vances in  biotechnology,  the  require- 
ment for  defensive  measures  is  even 
greater  than  in  1969. 


The  Biological  and  Toxin  Weapons 
Convention  clearly  permits  research 
and  development  for  protection  against 
biological  and  toxin  weapons.  The  U.S. 
biological  defense  research  program  is 
in  full  compliance  with  the  provisions 
of  the  convention.  It  is  also  open  to  pub- 
lic scrutiny.  No  other  country  even 
comes  close  in  its  openness. 

Eliminating  Biological  Weapons 

Vigorous  action  is  needed  to  deal  with 
the  problems  that  I  have  just  outlined. 
These  problems  are  tough  ones  that 
will  not  be  resolved  easily  or  quickly. 
But  we  are  determined  to  deal  with 
them. 

What  do  we  need  to  do?  We  need  to 
persuade  states  that  are  not  parties  to 
the  convention,  particularly  states  in 
the  Middle  East,  to  renounce  biological 
and  toxin  weapons.  We  have  expressed 
our  desire  to  have  consultations  with 
the  Soviets  under  Article  V  of  the  con- 
vention, and  this  continues  to  be  our 
position.  We  also  need  to  explore  pos- 
sible means  for  strengthening  the  in- 
ternational norms  against  biological 
weapons. 

In  addition  to  ensuring  that  states 
fulfill  their  commitments  not  to  pos- 
sess biological  or  toxin  weapons,  we 
must  persuade  additional  states  to 
make  that  important  commitment. 
Currently  more  than  110  states  have  re- 
nounced biological  and  toxin  weapons 
by  becoming  parties  to  the  Biological 
and  Toxin  Weapons  Convention.  Unfor- 
tunately, while  most  states  in  the  Mid- 
dle East  have  signed  or  acceded  to  the 
convention,  only  about  half  have  rat- 
ified it  and  deposited  their  instruments 
of  ratification,  the  legal  steps  neces- 
sary to  become  full  parties  to  the  con- 
vention. A  number  of  these  states  have 
said  that  they  will  not  take  these  ac- 
tions until  their  neighbors  do  so.  We 
have  recently  renewed  our  efforts  to 
bring  all  states  in  the  Middle  East  into 
the  convention.  We  will  persist  in  this 
attempt  to  break  the  vicious  circle. 

We  are  also  carefully  considering 
whether  export  controls  could  help  re- 
inforce our  efforts  to  prevent  the  acqui- 
sition of  biological  and  toxin  weapons 
by  other  countries.  However,  the  tech- 
nical problems  are  daunting,  over- 
shadowing even  those  associated  with 
chemical  weapons  control.  We  are  ex- 
amining whether  an  export  control 
regime  analogous  to  that  of  the  20 
countries  belonging  to  the  Australian 
group  for  controlling  the  export  of 
chemical  weapons  precursors  would  be 


useful,  but  our  preliminary  impression 
is  that  the  problem  of  identifying  bio- 
logical weapons  precursors  and  produc- 
tion equipment  is  so  difficult  that  such 
a  regime  is  not  practical.  We  will  be 
discussing  this  with  key  allies  who  are 
equally  concerned  about  the  prolifera- 
tion of  biological  weapons. 

We  are  also  considering  new  and 
innovative  approaches  to  making  the  in- 
ternational arms  control  regime  for  bi- 
ological weapons  more  effective.  We 
need  to  strengthen  international  reac-' 
tion  to  deal  effectively  with  proven  vio- 1 
lations  of  the  ban  on  use  embodied  in 
the  1925  Geneva  protocol,  to  include  in- 
ternational sanctions.  We  need  addi- 
tional confidence-building  measures  to 
create  greater  openness  about  biolog- 
ical activities,  such  as  that  practiced 
by  the  United  States  with  respect  to 
our  defensive  research  program. 

The  United  States  has  joined  with 
others  at  the  second  review  conference 
in  calling  for  an  annual  exchange  of 
information  on  each  party's  research 
activities  using  the  U.S.  policies  on 
program  openness  as  the  standard.  In 
this  different  countries  work  for  ex- 
tended periods  in  each  other's  laborato- 
ries. By  creating  greater  openness  in 
these  areas,  we  hope  that  the  norm 
against  biological  weapons  created  by 
the  Biological  and  Toxin  Weapons 
Convention  can  be  strengthened. 

Conclusion 

We  must  continue  to  strive  to  prevent 
biological  weapons  proliferation  by  re- 
inforcing the  moral,  legal,  and  political  i 
constraints  against  biological  weapons  ■ 
and,  where  feasible,  seek  to  prevent 
states  from  obtaining  sensitive  mate- 
rials and  technology  for  biological 
weapons  purposes.  This  will  be  a  par- 
ticularly difficult  task  and,  quite 
frankly,  we  do  not  have  the  answers  yet 
on  how  to  achieve  this.  We  know  we 
cannot  do  it  alone.  Our  efforts  to  con- 
strain biological  weapons  proliferation 
will  require  a  sustained  multilateral 
ap))roach,  involving  both  U.S.  leader- 
ship and  coopei'ation  with  friends  and 
allies.  The  draft  legislation  presently 
under  consideration  could  demonstrate 
once  again  our  concern  and  leadership 
in  this  area. 


'  The  complete  transcript  uf  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee  and 
will  be  available  from  the  Superintendent 
of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office,  Washington,  D.C.  204U2.H 


24 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


EAST  ASIA 


International  Conference 
on  Cambodia  Held  in  Paris 


Following  are  a  statement  pre- 
pared for  delivery  by  Secretary  Baker 
pefure  the  opening  of  the  hiternatioiial 
Conference  on  Canibodia  in  Paris  on 
J  Illy  30.  1989,  and  the  text  of  the  state- 
ment issued  at  the  conclusion  of  the 
conference  on  August  30. 


SECRETARY'S  STATEMENT, 
JULY  30,  1989' 

On  behalf  of  President  Bush  and  the 
lAmerican  people,  I  want  to  express  our 
jdeep  appreciation  to  President  Mitter- 
jrand.  He  took  the  initiative  to  organize 
'this  conference.  And  he  understands 
ithe  great  issues  at  stake  in  our 
deliberations. 

President  Soeharto  of  Indonesia, 
Foreign  Minister  Alatas,  his  prede- 
cessor Dr.  Mochtar,  and  their  ASEAN 
[Association  of  South  East  Asian  Na- 
tions] colleagues  also  merit  our  grati- 
tude. They  have  held  aloft  the  vision  of 
a  peaceful  and  prosperous  Southeast 
I  Asia  despite  all  obstacles.  They  have 
truly  worked  long  and  hard  to  bring  us 
to  this  moment.  Any  actions  we  take 
here  should  be  complementary  to 
ASEAN's  longstanding  efforts. 

I  also  wish  to  salute  UN  Secretary 
General  Perez  de  Cuellar,  a  true  man 
of  peace,  for  his  continuing  efforts  to 
reconcile  regional  conflicts. 

We  are  meeting  here,  today,  be- 
cause a  decade  and  a  half  of  violence 
and  Vietnamese  aggression  have  taken 
a  terrible  toll  on  the  people  of  Cam- 
bodia. The  twin  tragedies  of  Khmer 
Rouge  annihilation  and  Vietnamese  oc- 
cupation have  left  more  than  1  million 
Cambodians  dead.  To  the  lives  lost 
must  be  added  the  wounds  inflicted 
on  the  society  and  the  culture  of  the 
Khmer  people  and  the  instability  that 
has  continued  to  plague  the  region. 
:  The  weight  of  the  terror  visited  on  the 
,  Cambodian  people  is  too  great  for  us  to 
measure  and  too  heavy  for  any  people 
to  bear. 

The  occupation  should  end.  The  vi- 
olence should  end.  The  suffering  should 
end.  We  know  the  path  to  Cambodian 
internal  reconciliation  is  likely  to  be 
long  and  arduous.  But,  today,  we  take 
the  first  steps.  While  moving  forward, 
\Vf  must  be  mindful  of  the  potential  pit- 
falls that  lie  ahead. 


The  United  States  joined  18  other  nation.s  and  the  four  groups  representing  Cambodian 
factions  at  an  international  conference  in  Paris  July  30-August  30,  1989. 


Now  Cambodia  and,  indeed,  the 
entire  international  community  face  a 
tragic  dilemma.  Perhaps  the  folklore  of 
Cambodia  tells  the  dilemma  best  when 
it  speaks  of  the  day  when  the  Khmer 
people  will  be  forced  to  choose  between 
being  eaten  by  a  tiger  or  devoured  by 
a  crocodile.  This  conference  has  been 
convened  in  the  belief  that  Cambodia 
can  avoid  the  tragedy  of  such  a  choice. 
There  is  an  alternative  to  the  teeth  of 
the  Khmer  Rouge  or  the  jaws  of  foreign 
military  domination.  And  that  alterna- 
tive can  be  found  in  a  comprehensive 
settlement  that  gives  the  people  of 
Cambodia  both  security  and  the  chance 
to  choose  their  own  government,  a  set- 
tlement bound  together  by  external 
and  internal  agreements. 

Working  toward  that  settlement 
is  the  purpose  of  this  conference. 
We  must  find  the  political  path  that  can 
lead  Cambodia  away  from  its  war-torn 
past  toward  a  constructive  future.  We 
can  clear  the  way  through  international 
action  and  national  reconciliation,  both 
linked  carefully  together  And  while 
this  path  will  be  difficult,  I  believe  that 
a  comprehensive  settlement  offers  the 
best  route  to  a  better  future. 

The  International  Environment 

Let  me  speak  first  to  the  international 
environment.  Over  the  past  several 
years,  we  have  seen  a  dramatic  easing 
of  global  tensions.  There  is  a  growing 
disposition  to  resolve  regional  conflicts 
through  negotiation.  And  there  is  a 
growing  appreciation  that  a  lasting 
resolution  of  conflict  depends  on  the 
expression  of  the  people's  will. 


Our  meeting,  today,  draws  inspira- 
tion from  this  new  direction  in  world 
affairs.  But  the  signs  of  international 
conciliation  need  another  signal,  this 
time  provided  not  by  the  international 
community  but  by  the  Cambodian  peo- 
ple or,  to  be  more  precise,  their  lead- 
ers. It  is  clear  to  the  United  States, 
and  it  should  be  clear  to  all  of  us  here, 
that  any  actions  we  might  take  to  help 
Cambodia  must  be  based  on  the  will  of 
the  Cambodian  parties  themselves  to 
move  forward.  A  lasting  peace  will  re- 
quire self-determination  by  the  people 
of  Cambodia.  International  conciliation 
cannot  become  a  substitute  for  national 
reconciliation. 

That  is  why  we  believe  a  settle- 
ment that  has  any  prospect  of  success 
must  be  comprehensive  in  its  nature. 
Anything  less  would  be  a  prescription 
for  continued  war.  Today's  war  against 
foreign  occupation  would  become  to- 
morrow's civil  war  splintering  further 
an  already  fragile  land. 

A  comprehensive  solution  has  been 
the  steadfast  position  of  the  United 
States,  ASEAN,  and  our  allies  and 
friends  throughout  the  decade-long 
search  for  peace  in  Cambodia.  Our  col- 
lective resolve  in  support  of  this  posi- 
tion has  helped  pave  the  way  for  this 
meeting,  especially  our  unrelenting 
opposition  to  Vietnamese  aggression 
and  occupation. 

Healing  the  wounds  and  divisions 
of  Cambodia  is  a  task  that  demands  the 
highest  quality  of  leadership.  Cambodia 
has  such  a  leader.  Prince  Sihanouk  per- 
sonifies the  Khmer  nation  and  its  quest 
for  unity  and  national  reconciliation. 
That  is  why  the  process  of  national  rec- 
onciliation through  the  formation  of  an 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


25 


EAST  ASIA 


interim  coalition  government  must  be 
under  Prince  Sihanouk's  leadership.  It 
must  reflect  real  power  sharing,  and 
it  must  provide  executive  authority 
to  the  Prince  and  the  noncommunist 
resistance. 

The  United  States  strongly  be- 
lieves that  the  Khmer  Rouge  should 
play  no  role  in  Cambodia's  future.  We 
are  prepared,  however,  to  support 
Prince  Sihanouk  should  he  deem  it  nec- 
essary to  accept  the  inclusion  of  all 
Khmer  factions  in  an  interim  coalition 
or  an  interim  authority.  The  strength 
of  our  support  for  any  Cambodian  Gov- 
ernment, however,  will  directly  and  in- 
versely depend  on  the  extent  of  Khmer 
Rouge  participation,  if  any,  in  that  gov- 
ernment. There  must  be  safeguards 
that  Pol  Pot  and  other  Khmer  Rouge 
leaders  responsible  for  mass  murders 
will  never  dominate  Cambodia  again. 

We  also  cannot  accept  a  continua- 
tion of  the  present  regime  in  Phnom 
Penh,  which  was  established  through 
Vietnamese  aggression.  We  recognize, 
however,  that  elements  of  that  regime 
are  likely  to  be  included  in  any  transi- 
tional coalition. 

I  urge  that  all  members  of  the  con- 
ference work  to  foster  the  necessary 
acts  of  reconciliation  under  Prince 
Sihanouk's  leadership. 

UN  Role  as  an  International 
Control  Mechanism 

An  effective  international  control 
mechanism  under  the  auspices  of  the 
United  Nations  can  play  a  crucial  role 
in  the  peace  process.  It  can  facilitate  a 
peaceful  transfer  from  Vietnamese  oc- 
cupation to  free  elections,  linking  both 
external  and  internal  aspects  of  a  com- 
prehensive settlement.  Such  a  mecha- 
nism would  serve  three  essential 
purposes. 

First,  it  would  assure  internation- 
al verification  of  a  total  withdrawal  of 
all  Vietnamese  troops  and  advisers. 

Second,  the  mechanism  would  im- 
prove the  prospects  of  stability  during 
the  transition  period,  through  peace- 
keeping activities  such  as  monitoring  a 
cease-fire  and  checking  the  disposition 
of  the  forces  of  the  various  Cambodian 
factions.  It  would  also  oversee  the  ces- 
sation of  foreign  military  assistance 
to  the  four  factions. 

Third,  the  international  control 
mechanism  would  have  a  vital  role  to 
jilay  in  the  process  of  political  transi- 
tion. It  would  monitor  a  national  census 
and  supervise  the  repatriation  of  refu- 


gees. Most  importantly,  it  would  super- 
vise, monitor,  and  verify  free  and  fair 
elections.  The  United  States  stands 
ready  to  recognize  the  victor  in  such 
elections,  regardless  of  the  outcome. 
Ultimately,  those  elections  are  the  key 
to  an  independent,  neutral,  and  peace- 
ful Cambodia. 

We  believe  that  only  the  United 
Nations  has  the  experience,  resources, 
and  credibility  to  shoulder  the  massive 
responsibility  of  such  a  complex  set  of 
undertakings. 

I  must  also  emphasize  once  more 
that  there  is  an  integral  link  between 
the  internal  and  external  aspects  of  the 
settlement  process.  Without  internal 
reconciliation,  we  would  lack  the  basis 
upon  which  to  establish  the  interna- 
tional control  mechanism  that  I  have 
described.  Indeed,  that  mechanism 
could  not  function  without  a  recognized 
interim  government. 

Vietnamese  Withdrawal 

To  facilitate  this  critical  process  of  na- 
tional reconciliation,  it  is  essential  that 
Vietnam  play  a  responsible  role  today 
and  in  the  future.  It  must  live  up  to  its 
pledge  to  withdraw  not  later  than  Sep- 
tember 30  and  must  not  return  again. 
But  after  more  than  a  decade  of  occu- 
pation, Hanoi's  political  and  moral 
obligations  will  not  be  met  simply  by 
withdrawing  its  forces  from  Cambodia 
and  leaving  behind  either  chaos  or  a  re- 
gime imposed  by  force. 

I  think  there  is  little  disagreement 
among  us  that  our  collective  respon- 
sibilities to  regional  security — and  to 
the  Cambodian  people — do  not  end  with 
a  Vietnamese  withdrawal.  That  with- 
drawal came  about  because  we  were 
faithful  to  our  principles:  we  opposed 
the  Vietnamese  aggression,  and  we  re- 
fused to  accept  it  as  permanent.  Now 
that  the  Vietnamese  occupation  is  end- 
ing at  last,  we  must  work  together  to 
hel])  establish  an  independent,  neutral, 
and  stable  Cambodia. 

What  we  do  here  in  this  confer- 
ence— or  what  we  fail  to  do — will  go  far 
to  determine  whether  such  a  just  and 
durable  peace  emerges  in  Cambodia  or 
whether  Cambodia's  future  will  resem- 
ble the  tragedy  of  its  recent  past. 

The  purpose  of  this  conference  is 
not  to  prolong  that  tragedy  but  rather 
to  find  the  path  to  a  very  different  fu- 
ture. We  will  find  that  path,  I  believe, 
through  a  comprehensive  settlement. 
And  while  the  recent  past  holds  little 
hope,  we  have  arrived  at  a  point  where 


the  imperatives  of  international  concil- 
iation intersect  with  the  necessity  for 
national  reconciliation. 

U.S.  Position 

Let  me  sum  up  our  position.  The  Unit- 
ed States  is  committed  to  a  fair  and 
just  political  process.  We  support  a 
comprehensive  settlement  including  nol 
only  a  total  and  verified  Vietnamese 
withdrawal  but  also  an  internal  accord 
and  an  international  control  mecha- 
nism. We  will  respect  the  results  of 
properly  prepared  and  monitored 
free  and  fair  elections. 

All  of  the  nations'  partici])ation  in 
this  conference  can  hasten  the  day 
when  the  killing  fields  of  Cambodia  can 
become  the  fertile  fields  of  a  peaceful 
and  prosperous  people.  The  monument.- 
at  Angkor  Wat  are  a  tribute  to  the 
Khmer  spirit  of  long  ago.  Now  is  the 
time  to  raise  a  new  monument  to  that 
spirit.  We  must  lay  the  foundations  for 
a  new  and  lasting  tranquility  in  Cam- 
bodia and  throughout  Southeast  Asia. 


CONFERENCE  STATEMENT, 
AUG.  30,  1989 

At  the  invitation  of  the  Government  of 
France  and  under  the  cochairmanship 
of  His  Excellency  AH  Alatas,  Foreign 
Minister  of  Indonesia,  the  Internationa 
Conference  on  Cambodia  met  in  Paris 
from  July  30  to  August  30,  1989.  Partic- 
ipating in  the  conference  were  the  I 
representatives  of  Australia,  Brunei       I 
Darussalam,  Cambodia,  Canada,  Chi- 
na, France,  India,  Indonesia,  Japan,       ■ 
the  Lao  People's  Democratic  Republic,   I 
Malaysia,  the  Philippines,  Singapore, 
Thailand,  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist 
Republics,  the  United  Kingdom  of 
Great  Britain  and  Northern  Ireland, 
the  United  States  of  America,  Viet- 
nam, and  Zimbabw'e  in  its  capacity  as 
current  chairman  of  the  Nonaligned 
Movement.  Cambodia  was  represented 
by  the  four  Cambodian  parties  [Nation- 
al United  Front  for  an  Independent, 
Peaceful,  Neutral,  and  Cooperative 
Cambodia  (FUNCINPEC),  led  by 
Prince  Sihanouk:  the  Khmer  People's 
National  Liberation  Front  (KPNLF); 
Democratic  Kampuchea  (Khmer 
Rouge):  and  the  State  of  Cambodia]. 
The  Secretary  General  of  the  United 
Nations  and  his  representatives  also 
participated  in  the  conference. 

The  conference,  mindful  of  the  pre- 
vious efforts  made  at  the  Jakarta  in- 
formal meetings  and  elsewhere. 


26 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


EAST  ASIA 


achieved  progress  in  elaborating  a  wide 
variety  of  elements  necessary  for  the 
reaching  of  a  comprehensive  settlement 
to  the  tragic  conflict  in  Cambodia.  The 
conference  noted,  however,  that  it  is  not 
yet  ])ossibIe  to  achieve  a  comprehensive 
settlement.  It  was,  therefore,  decided 
to  suspend  the  conference. 

The  conference  urges  all  parties 
concerned  to  intensify  their  efforts  to 
achieve  a  comprehensive  settlement. 
To  facilitate  these  efforts,  the  copresi- 
dents  of  the  conference  shall  lend  their 
good  offices  as  required  to  participat- 
ing parties  and  countries  who  can  fa- 
cilitate a  comprehensive  settlement, 
including  the  reconvening  of  the  com- 
mittees as  appropriate. 


The  copresidents  will  begin  con- 
sultations within  6  months  with  the 
participants  in  the  conference  with  a 
view  to  reconvening  the  conference. 

The  French  Government  expressed 
its  readiness  to  make  the  appropriate 
arrangements  to  reconvene  the  confer- 
ence in  due  time  in  Paris. 

The  Indonesian  copresident  and  all 
the  participants  expressed  their  sin- 
cere appreciation  and  deep  gratitude  to 
the  Government  and  people  of  France 
for  hosting  this  important  conference 
and  the  excellent  arrangements  made, 
as  well  as  for  their  generous  hospitality 
extended  to  all  delegations. 


1  Press  release  146  of  Aug.  3,  1989. 


U.S.  Response  to  Changes  in  China 


by  Richard  L.  Williams 

Statements  before  the  Subcommit- 
tees on  Hinnan  Rights  and  Interna- 
tional Organizations,  on  Asian  and 
Pacific  Affairs,  and  on  International 
Economic  Policy  and  Trade  of  the 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
July  IS,  1989,  and  the  Subcommittee  on 
Immigration,  Refugees,  and  Interna- 
tional Law  of  the  House  Judiciary 
Committee  on  July  ^0.  Mr.  Williams  is 
Acting  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for 
East  Asian  a)id  Pacific  Affairs.'^ 


JULY  13,  1989 

I  appreciate  the  opportunity  to  appear 
before  you  this  afternoon  to  continue 
the  important  dialogue  with  the  Con- 
gress on  how  we  as  a  nation  can  best 
respond  to  changes  that  have  occurred 
in  China  since  early  June. 

We  meet  today  in  the  shadow  of  the 
brutal  events  in  and  around  Tiananmen 
Square  on  the  night  of  June  3-4,  and 
the  events  and  arrests  that  have  oc- 
curred since  then.  No  one  who  has  fol- 
lowed those  events  has  not  been  moved 
by  them  and  had  their  judgments  of 
China  affected  by  them.  I  would  like  to 
address  the  policy  implications  for  the 
United  States  of  these  developments 
and  the  steps  which  we  have  taken  in 
response  to  them.  Before  doing  so,  let 
me  provide  a  brief  description  of  the 
fundamental  elements  of  our  relation- 
ship as  it  has  evolved  over  the  last 
two  decades. 


Elements  of  U.S. -Chinese  Relations 

Improvement  in  relations  with  the  Peo- 
ple's Republic  of  China  (P.R.C.)  has 
been  a  central  objective  of  five  succes- 
sive Administrations.  Since  1971  the  re- 
lationship between  the  United  States 
and  China  has  progressed  and  pros- 
pered beyond  anyone's  expectations. 
There  have  been  a  number  of  elements 
that  have  been  central  to  the  develop- 
ment of  our  relations. 

Strategic.  We  have  both  recog- 
nized that  we  are  not  each  others'  ad- 
versary, that  we  share  important 
common  security  interests  globally, 
and  in  Asia,  and  that  our  cooperation  is 
crucial  to  peace  and  stability  in  East 
Asia.  We  have  worked  together  to  bring 
an  end  to  the  Soviet  occupation  of 
Afghanistan,  Vietnamese  occupation 
of  Cambodia,  and  to  further  stability 
in  the  Korean  Peninsula.  China's  op- 
position to  stationing  Soviet  missiles 
in  Asia  buttressed  the  Reagan  Ad- 
ministration's position  and  helped 
achieve  agreement  on  an  INF 
[Intermediate-Range  Nuclear  Forces] 
Treaty  which  removed  intermediate- 
range  missiles  from  both  Asia  and 
Europe.  The  P.R.C. 's  commitment  to 
a  fundamental  policy  of  peaceful  re- 
unification with  Taiwan,  along  with 
highly  positive  developments  in  Taiwan 
and  growing  unofficial  interactions  be- 
tween the  two,  has  led  to  a  significant 
decrease  of  tension  in  the  Taiwan 
Strait.  Even  on  issues  where  our  ap- 
proaches have  differed  at  times,  the 
strong  framework  of  relations  we  have 


built  up — and  the  dialogue  we  have 
achieved — have  served  to  bring  P.R.C. 
positions  much  closer  to  our  own  and  to 
make  China  a  more  constructive  mem- 
ber of  the  world  community  in  our 
view. 

Economic/Commercial.  The  Chi- 
nese Government's  decision  in  the  late 
1970s  to  open  the  economy  to  the  West 
and  implement  meaningful  market- 
oriented  reforms  has  greatly  expanded 
the  opportunities  for  trade  and  invest- 
ment with  the  United  States.  Bilateral 
trade  increased  from  about  $1  billion  in 
1978  to  over  $14  billion  last  year.  China 
is  now  our  13th  largest  trading  partner 
worldwide  and  our  fifth  largest  in  Asia. 
In  1988  major  U.S.  exports  were  grain 
(.$699  million),  industrial  raw  materials 
($596  million),  fertilizers  {.$379  million), 
and  industrial  and  office  equipment 
($905  million).  After  Hong  Kong/Macau, 
the  United  States  is  the  largest  inves- 
tor in  China,  with  about  $3  billion  in 
assets. 

People-to-People.  Since  China 
opened  its  doors  to  reform  and  the  out- 
side world  in  1978,  over  40,000  Chinese 
students  have  come  to  the  United 
States  to  study.  Hundreds  of  scientific 
and  technological  delegations  go  back 
and  forth  under  the  auspices  of  our  sci- 
ence and  technology  accord,  the  largest 
accord  we  have  with  any  country  in  the 
world.  American  professors,  journal- 
ists, and  artists  have  lectured  and  per- 
formed in  China  under  our  cultural 
accord.  Hundreds  of  thousands  of 
American  tourists  visit  China  each 
year. 

This  web  of  relations,  which  I  have 
sketched  only  briefly,  has  served  im- 
portant U.S.  national  interests.  More- 
over, it  has  helped  to  transform  the 
political,  social,  and  economic  land- 
scape of  China.  It  is  an  essential  ele- 
ment of  the  achievements  of  the  10 
years  of  reform  which  provide  the  back- 
drop against  which  we  should  view  the 
recent  tragic  events  in  China.  Without 
this  web  of  relations,  in  my  view  China 
would  not  have  changed  as  dramatically 
as  it  has,  nor  would  it  have  played  as 
constructive  a  role  in  East  Asian  and 
global  politics  as  it  has. 

When  Chinese  troops  moved  into 
Tiananmen  Square  6  weeks  ago  and 
brutally  suppressed  the  demonstration 
for  greater  political  freedoms  and  hu- 
man rights,  the  Administration  reacted 
immediately  with  a  firm,  measured, 
and  carefully  thought  out  program. 
This  policy  was  designed  to  achieve 
several  purposes: 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


27 


EAST  ASIA 


•  To  place  us  on  record,  clearly 
and  without  equivocation,  in  sujjport 
of  those  who  have  advocated  a  more 
open  society  in  China; 

•  To  allow  us  to  respond  speedily  to 
events  in  the  P.  R.C.;  and 

•  To  enhance  and  further  the  long- 
term  strategic  and  foreign  policy  inter- 
ests of  the  United  States. 

Policy  Adjustments 

The  Administration's  policy  since 
June  5  has  been  to  combine  our  strate- 
gic, economic,  and  human  rights  con- 
cerns into  a  coherent  package.  It  is  a 
policy  which  supports  a  more  open  Chi- 
nese society,  recognizes  the  long-term 
value  of  the  U.S. -China  relationship, 
and  strives  to  keep  our  vital  interests 
intact  during  this  difficult  period.  The 
elements  of  the  President's  package  are 
these. 

•  We  have  suspended  all 
government-to-government  sales  and 
commercial  e.xports  of  weapons.  The 
suspension  includes  export,  manu- 
facturing, and  technical  assistance 
licenses. 

•  We  have  suspended  high-level 
U.S.  and  Chinese  exchanges.  Earlier 
we  had  suspended  military  exchanges. 
Several  important  previously  scheduled 
exchanges  were  affected,  including 

a  meeting  of  the  Joint  Commission 
on  Commerce  and  Trade  in  which 
Secretary  [of  Commerce  Robert  A.] 
Mosbacher  was  to  have  participated. 

•  We  are  sympathetically  review- 
ing requests  of  Chinese  nationals  in  the 
United  States  to  extend  their  stay 
here.  All  P.R.C.  nationals  who  were  in 
the  United  States  as  of  June  6,  1989, 
and  who  are  unwilling  to  return  to 
China  will  be  allowed  to  stay  here 
until  June  5,  1990. 

•  We  and  our  friends  and  allies 
have  agreed  to  defer  consideration  of 
new  loans  to  China  by  the  multilateral 
development  banks. 

In  its  totality,  the  Administration's 
policy  adjusts  our  working  relationship 
with  China — taking  into  account  the 
events  of  June  ?>—l  and  since — and  en- 
sures that  our  basic  intei'ests  ai'e  well 
served.  It  is  a  policy  that  in  our  view 
promises  to  advance  our  objectives. 

First,  as  the  President  said  on 
June  .5,  it  provides  us  with  a  program 
for  stimulating  rather  than  stifling 
progress  toward  open  and  representa- 
tive systems  in  changing  communist 
societies.  It  has  sent  a  message,  as 
Secretary  Baker  told  the  Senate  For- 
eign Relations  Committee  on  June  20, 


that  concrete  steps  toward  political  and 
economic  reform  are  necessary  if  Chi- 
na is  serious  about  cooperating  with 
the  international  community  and 
achieving  modernization. 

Second,  the  policy  has  allowed  us 
to  avoid  measures  which  might  advers- 
ely affect  the  economic  well-being  over 
the  long  term  of  both  the  Chinese  and 
American  people.  Mandatory  economic 
sanctions,  unlike  the  measures  target- 
ing military  and  high-level  exchanges 
as  proposed  by  the  President,  would 
damage  our  long-term  economic  posi- 
tion in  China.  As  importantly,  however, 
we  should  not  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that 
our  commercial  relationship  provides 
us  with  a  way  of  encoui'aging  construc- 
tive change  in  China  and  influencing 
those  elements  of  society  most  open  to 
reform. 

Third,  the  policy  has  been  sup- 
ported by  and  coordinated  with 
America's  friends  and  allies.  This 
cooperation,  for  example,  was  critical 
for  getting  agreement  within  the  World 
Bank  and  Asian  Development  Bank  to 
postpone  consideration  of  new  loans  to 
China.  Attempts  to  force  acceptance  of 
broad  economic  sanctions  on  China — to 
which  our  allies  are  not  sympathetic — 
could  break  the  effective  consensus 
that  we  have  achieved  thus  far. 

Fourth,  the  policy  has  been  over- 
whelmingly supported  by  the  American 
people.  Public  opinion  polls,  editorials, 
and  op-ed  pieces  in  every  section  of  the 
country  show  that  the  American  people 
favor  the  measured  approach  taken  by 
the  President.  They  favor  the  way  he 
has  been  attentive  to  the  subtle  inter- 
play of  human  rights,  economic  devel- 
opment, and  geopolitical  and  strategic 
interests  in  formulating  our  present 
policy. 

The  situation  in  China  remains 
unsettled  and,  in  some  respects,  un- 
predictable. No  one  can  say  with  any 
degree  of  certainty  where  China  will 
be  a  few  months  or  a  year  from  now.  We 
and  the  allies  are  taking  a  careful  ap- 
proach, avoiding  precipitous  reactions 
which  might  have  unintended  conse- 
quences and  foreclose  our  options.  We 
continue  to  monitor  events  very  closely. 
It  is  important  that  our  policy  reflect 
the  needs  of  the  situation  as  it  evolves. 

Maintaining  a  Flexible  Policy 

The  Administration  and  the  Congress 
share  similar  concerns  about  China  and 
U.S. -China  relations.  In  almost  all  re- 
spects, we  have  the  same  objectives. 
But  we  do  have  a  difference  of  o|)inion 


as  to  whether  further  legislation  is 
necessary  at  the  present  time.  The 
Administration  believes  that  it  is  not. 
Legislation  such  as  that  adopted  by  the 
House,  which  limits  severely  the  Presi- 
dent's ability  to  respond  quickly  in  a 
rapidly  changing  situation,  would  only 
take  us  down  the  road  toward  economic 
sanctions,  and  the  latter  have  generally 
proven  ineffective,  easy  to  circumvent, 
and  costly  to  the  economic  interests  of 
those  countries  which  have  imposed 
them. 

This  is  a  difficult  time  for  all  of 
us  who  have  followed  China  over  the 
years.  We  have  been  greatly  disap- 
pointed by  recent  events,  which  show 
that  the  road  to  reform  in  China  will  be 
a  harder  one  than  many  Americans  had 
hoped.  Nonetheless,  as  the  President 
noted  in  his  recent  trip  to  Poland,  the 
movement  toward  political  democracy 
and  economic  liberalization  will  be  dif- 
ficult to  stop  in  the  long  run.  Change 
has  its  own  irresistible  momentum.  The 
changes  can  be  sometimes  inspiring,  as 
the  President  found  in  Warsaw,  and 
setbacks  can  be  agonizing  as  they  have 
been  in  China  during  the  past  month. 
But  ultimately  the  governments — 
whether  they  be  in  Poland,  China,  or 
elsewhere  in  the  world — need  the  sup- 
port of  those  they  serve  in  order  to 
create  lasting  economic  prosperity 
and  maintain  social  order.  China,  too, 
will  learn  this  lesson. 

"China's  rendezvous  with  free- 
dom," as  Secretary  Baker  said  in  his 
presentation  at  the  Asia  Society  on 
June  26,  "like  its  rendezvous  with  the 
advancing  nations  of  the  Pacific,  cannot 
be  long  delayed.  We  w-ill  be  there  to 
help  when  day  follows  night."  To  do  less 
would  be  a  disservice  to  those  who  gave 
their  lives  in  and  around  Tiananmen 
Square  on  June  3  and  June  4  and  a  dis- 
service to  those  working  for  change 
today.  The  President  needs  as  much 
flexibility  as  possible  to  respond  to 
changed  circumstances.  We  have  that 
flexibility  now.  We — in  the  Administra- 
tion and  the  Congress — should  work 
together  to  maintain  it. 


JULY  20,  1989 

I  appreciate  the  opportunity  to  ap])ear 
before  you  today  to  consider  the  options 
for  P.R.C.  nationals  now  in  the  United 
States,  especially  those  who  are  F  [stu- 
dents of  academic  or  language  training] 
and  J  [exchange  visitor]  visa  holders. 


28 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


EAST  ASIA 


Chinese  Students  in  the  United  States 

Since  China  opened  its  doors  to  reform 
and  the  outside  world  in  1978,  over 
40,000  Chinese  students  have  come  to 
the  United  States  to  study.  After  dec- 
ades of  isolation,  the  decision  of  the 
P.R.C.  in  1978-79  to  allow  students  to 
go  abroad,  particularly  to  the  United 
States,  to  study  in  large  numbers  rep- 
resented a  landmark  in  the  history  of 
relations  between  our  two  countries. 
Chinese  students  have  made  important 
contributions  to  U.S.  academic  and  re- 
search institutions,  and  those  students 
who  have  returned  to  China  have  made 
important  contributions  to  their  home- 
land. They  have  been,  and  will  continue 
to  be,  an  important  engine  generating 
change,  development,  and  moderniza- 
tion in  China. 

My  colleagues  from  INS  [Immigra- 
tion and  Naturalization  Service]  and 
USIA  [United  States  Information 
Agency]  are  better  able  than  I  to  dis- 
cuss the  situation  facing  these  Chinese 
students  in  the  United  States  today,  in 
the  w^ake  of  the  tragic  events  in  China 
last  month.  I  would  like  to  use  this  oc- 
casion to  describe  the  situation  in  Chi- 
na, particularly  as  it  pertains  to  the 
conditions  to  which  Chinese  students 
currently  in  the  United  States  would 
be  returning  to  in  the  P.R.C.  I  will 
comment  briefly  on  three  aspects  of  the 
situation:  the  treatment  of  students 
now  in  China,  the  treatment  of  other 
participants  in  the  demonstrations,  and 
the  P.R.C.  Government's  official  posi- 
tion regarding  treatment  of  students 
returning  to  China  from  abroad. 

The  students  now  in  China  who 
were  active  in  the  demonstrations  have 
been  warned  by  the  P.R.C.  Government 
to  report  to  the  Public  Security  Bureau 
on  their  own  initiative.  There  is  an  im- 
plicit threat  that  if  they  do  not  report 
to  the  Public  Security  Bureau  on  their 
own,  they  will  be  pursued  and  pun- 
ished. Those  who  have  done  so  volun- 
tarily have  been  asked  to  describe  in 
detail  their  activities  during  the  dem- 
onstrations. In  the  cases  with  which  we 
are  familiar,  those  who  have  reported 
themselves  to  the  Public  Security  Bu- 
reau have  not  been  detained.  It  is  too 
early  to  predict  what  use  the  P.R.C. 
Government  will  make  of  information 
provided  by  these  students  and  others, 
and  to  what  degree  it  could  affect  their 
future.  Understandably,  in  a  country 
where  one's  personal  file — including 
comments  on  one's  political  views — 
follows  one  throughout  one's  life,  these 
activities  give  grounds  for  considerable 
unease. 


The  P.R.C.  Government  has  pub- 
lished a  list  of  21  student  and  dissident 
leaders  it  is  attempting  to  arrest  for 
the  part  they  played  in  the  demonstra- 
tions. Of  these,  at  least  six,  probably 
more,  have  been  arrested.  Several  oth- 
ers have  departed  China  and  are  now 
in  other  countries.  Of  those  arrested, 
as  far  as  we  know,  none  have  yet  been 
officially  charged  or  tried. 

Reports  in  the  P.R.C.  and  Western 
press  of  those  arrested  in  China  follow- 
ing the  demonstrations  range  from 
2,500  to  10,000.  At  the  outset,  the 
P.R.C.  publicized  many  of  the  arrests, 
apparently  with  the  intent  of  sending 
an  object  lesson  to  would-be  dissent- 
ers. Since  the  initial  wave  of  arrests 
there  has  been  little  official  publicity 
of  arrests.  However,  we  have  reason 
to  believe  that  arrests  continue. 
Precise  numbers  are  unknown. 

The  Chinese  have  announced  12  ex- 
ecutions of  people  connected  with  the 
demonstrations — three  in  Shanghai  for 
burning  a  train,  seven  in  Beijing  for 
burning  trucks  and  assaulting  soldiers, 
and  two  in  Chengdu  for  burning  vehi- 
cles. The  execution  of  17  others  in  Jinan 
on  June  22  was  for  crimes  which  the 
P.R.C.  Government  asserts  were  not 
related  to  the  demonstrations.  None  of 
those  executed  to  date  have  been  stu- 
dents, to  the  best  of  our  knowledge. 

Chinese  leaders  have  said  that 
students  who  return  from  abroad  will 
not  be  subject  to  persecution  or  arrest. 
They  have  said  that  the  party  and  gov- 
ernment will  not  blame  students 
studying  abroad  who  took  part  in  dem- 
onstrations or  who  said,  as  they  put  it, 
some  radical  words  as  they  were  far 
away  from  the  motherland,  influenced 
by  Western  mass  media,  and  did  not 
know  the  truth.  The  Chinese  leader- 
ship has  said  that  it  hopes  the  students 
will  study  hard,  and  they  will  be 
welcomed  back  to  work  in  China  upon 
graduation. 

The  Administration  hopes  that  the 
Chinese  Government's  actions  toward 
returning  students  prove  to  be  consis- 
tent with  its  stated  intentions.  How- 
ever, in  our  view  the  actions  of  the 
P.R.C.  Government  since  June  3  pro- 
vide ample  reason  for  the  fears  and 
anxieties  of  Chinese  students  in  the 
United  States  about  conditions  in  their 
home  country.  It  will  take  positive 
P.R.C.  actions  over  a  period  of  some 
time  to  allay  the  concerns  justifiably 
voiced  by  Chinese  students  in  the 
United  States. 


A  Measured  U.S.  Response 

When  Chinese  troops  moved  into 
Tiananmen  Scjuare  7  weeks  ago  and 
brutally  suppressed  the  protesters  seek- 
ing greater  political  freedoms,  the 
Administration  reacted  immediately 
with  a  firm,  measured,  and  carefully 
thought  out  program.  Members  of  this 
committee  are  familiar  with  the  ele- 
ments of  the  Administration's  response, 
which  has  included  suspension  of  all 
weapons  sales  to  the  P.R.C.  suspension 
of  high-level  military  and  other  ex- 
changes, and  in  concert  with  our 
friends'  and  allies'  deferral  of  loans  by 
multilateral  banks  to  the  P.R.C.  In  ad- 
dition to  these  measures,  an  essential 
element  of  the  Administration's  re- 
sponse, articulated  in  the  President's 
statement  on  June  5,  was  the  decision 
to  review  sympathetically  the  requests 
of  Chinese  nationals  in  the  United 
States  to  extend  their  stay  here.  The 
Attorney  General  [Richard  Thorn- 
burgh]  issued  a  directive  June  6  im- 
plementing the  President's  decision, 
which  my  colleague  from  INS  is  best 
able  to  discuss  with  members  of  the 
committee. 

In  response  to  the  Attorney  Gen- 
eral's directive  of  June  6,  the  Immi- 
gration and  Naturalization  Service 
initiated  programs  to  assist  the  Chi- 
nese F  and  J  visa  holders  now  in  the 
United  States.  The  INS  has  developed 
several  options  currently  available  to 
these  individuals.  The  situation  facing 
Chinese  students  upon  their  return  to 
China,  as  I  have  said,  is  uncertain, 
and,  consistent  with  the  Administra- 
tion's policy,  several  options  have  been 
made  available  to  them  permitting 
them  to  stay  in  the  United  States  and 
work  until  at  least  June  5,  1990.  As  we 
continue  to  monitor  events  very  closely, 
we  may  find  that  the  current  options 
available  to  F  and  J  visa  holders  re- 
quire modification.  It  is  important  that 
our  policy  reflect  the  needs  of  the  situ- 
ation as  it  evolves. 

The  situation  in  China  remains 
unsettled  and,  in  some  respects,  un- 
predictable. No  one  can  say  with  any 
degree  of  certainty  where  China  will 
be  a  few  months  or  a  year  from  now.  We 
and  the  allies  are  taking  a  careful  ap- 
proach, avoiding  precipitous  reactions 
which  might  have  unintended  conse- 
quences and  foreclose  our  options. 

Though  what  I  have  said  suggests 
that  caution  and  a  wait-and-see  ap- 
proach are  necessary,  we  at  the  State 
Department  strongly  believe  that  Chi- 
nese students  in  the  United  States 
should  not  be  forced  into  a  premature 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


29 


EAST  ASIA 


return  to  their  homeland.  We  know 
that  many  Chinese  students  in  the 
United  States  want  nothing  more  than 
to  return  home,  to  use  their  knowledge 
and  skills  acquired  here,  and  find  a  re- 
spected place  in  their  country's  devel- 
opment. That  is  our  goal  as  well.  We 
understand  the  Congress"  interest  in 
assuring  the  welfai'e  of  these  students 
in  the  United  States  until  the  justifia- 


ble grounds  for  their  anxiety  and  fear 
are  removed,  and  we  look  forward  to 
discussing  solutions  to  the  problems 
thev  face. 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee  aiul 
will  be  available  from  tlie  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402. ■ 


U.S.  Relations  With  Korea 


In  just  under  four  decades,  the  Repub- 
lic of  Korea  has  emerged  from  the  dev- 
astation of  a  civil  war  into  a  modern 
democratic  nation  and  an  inspiration 
for  developing  nations  throughout  the 
world.  The  modern  U.S. -Korean  rela- 
tionship dates  from  the  end  of  World 
War  II,  when  American  troops  helped 
to  liberate  southern  Korea  from  Japa- 
nese colonial  rule.  In  the  early  1950s, 
U.S.  forces,  acting  under  UN  auspices, 
helped  South  Korea  repel  an  invasion 
from  North  Korea.  Our  mutual  securi- 
ty interests,  embodied  in  the  1954  Mu- 
tual Defense  Treaty,  are  based  on  our 
joint  commitment  to  the  stability  of  the 
Korean  Peninsula  and  Northeast  Asia. 
As  a  tangible  expression  of  this  com- 
mitment, 40,000  U.S.  troops  currently 
are  stationed  in  South  Korea. 

U.S. -South  Korean  defense  ar- 
rangements are  the  key  element  in  this 
nation's  strategic  posture  in  Northeast 
Asia.  In  recent  years,  however,  grow- 
ing anti-Americanism  has  strained  our 
traditional  friendship.  The  continued 
presence  of  U.S.  troops  on  Korean  soil 
has  become  a  point  of  contention,  and 
changes  in  our  economic  relations  are 
redefining  the  nature  of  our  overall 
relationship. 

U.S.  policy  toward  the  Republic  of 
Korea  rests  on  three  interdependent 
components:  security,  democracy,  and 
economic  partnership.  A  stable  Korean 
economy  promotes  greater  security, 
which,  in  turn,  enhances  economic 
growth.  Steps  toward  democracy  pro- 
mote both  security  and  economic 
progress. 

Strategic,  Military, 
and  Security  Concerns 

The  United  States  has  compelling  po- 
litical and  strategic  interests  on  the 
Korean  Peninsula,  where  the  interests 
of  four  major  powers — the  United 
States,  the  Soviet  Union,  Japan,  and 
China — converge.  South  Korea's  securi- 


ty is  critical  to  regional  and  global 
peace  and  stability. 

The  Republic  of  Korea  remains 
wary  of  its  well-armed  neighbor.  North 
Korea,  which  seeks  the  reunification  of 
the  Korean  Peninsula  on  its  own  terms. 
The  military  balance  continues  to  favor 
the  North,  which  maintains  numerical 
advantages  in  nearly  every  measure  of 
combat  power.  Extensively  reorganized 
since  the  early  1980s,  North  Korea's 
Armed  Forces  total  more  than  1  million 
(as  compared  to  South  Korea's  630,000) 
with  a  ground  force  strength  of  about 
930,000.  Efforts  to  modernize  South 
Korea's  Armed  Forces  to  narrow  this 
military  lead  are  essential  to  the  main- 
tenance of  an  effective  deterrent  and 
the  preservation  of  peace  and  stability. 

In  light  of  the  continuing  threat 
from  the  North,  with  which  a  state  of 
war  still  technically  exists,  safeguard- 
ing the  security  of  South  Korea  re- 
mains a  paramount  U.S.  objective.  The 
United  States  is  the  primary  guaran- 
tor of  the  1953  armistice  between  the 
two  nations.  At  the  request  of  the  Gov- 
ernment of  South  Korea,  under  the 
terms  of  the  Mutual  Defense  Treaty, 
the  United  States  continues  to  contrib- 
ute to  the  defense  of  the  Republic  of  Ko- 
rea. A  binational  military  command 
structure,  under  the  joint  political  di- 
rection of  both  governments,  deters 
North  Korean  aggression  and  would  be 
called  on  to  repel  any  future  North  Ko- 
rean incursion.  This  binational  defense 
arrangement  has  provided  a  military 
shield  behind  which  South  Korea  has 
prospered  economically  and  begun 
democratic  modernization. 

The  overwhelming  majority  of  Ko- 
reans remain  committed  to  close  U.S.- 
South  Korean  security  ties,  including 
the  stationing  of  U.S.  forces,  despite 
increased  questioning  of  the  need  for  a 
continued  U.S.  troop  presence  by  a  vo- 
ciferous minority  in  South  Korea.  Our 
two  governments  periodically  review 


the  strength  and  composition  of  U.S. 
forces  in  Korea  and  are  currently  dis- 
cus'sing  sharing  the  costs  associated 
with  their  stationing  there.  U.S.  forces 
will  remain  in  South  Korea  as  long  as 
there  is  a  threat  from  North  Korea  and 
the  South  Korean  Government  and  peo- 
ple wish  them  to  remain. 

Democratization 

The  democratization  of  South  Korean 
political  institutions  is  also  a  major  fac- 
tor in  U.S. -Korean  relations.  The  Re- 
public of  Korea  inherited  a  political 
tradition  that  followed  thousands  of 
years  of  imperial  rule  and  the  authori- 
tarian values  of  Confucianism.  In  the 
absence  of  an  open  political  process, 
neither  democratic  institutions  nor  the 
belief  in  compromise  and  mutual  trust, 
which  are  the  foundation  for  democra- 
cy, developed.  As  a  result,  politics 
based  on  the  strength  of  individual  per- 
sonalities and  concentration  of  political 
power  in  the  hands  of  the  ruling  party 
became  the  hallmark  of  Korean 
politics. 

Recently,  a  dramatic  transforma- 
tion has  occurred  as  democratic  values 
and  a  consensus  on  the  need  for  more 
progress  toward  democratization 
emerge.  In  the  past  2  years,  ratifica- 
tion of  a  new  constitution,  elections  to 
the  National  Assembly,  and  a  presiden- 
tial election  marked  great  strides  in 
Korea's  political  evolution.  For  the  first 
time,  the  ruling  goverimient  party  fail- 
ed to  win  a  majority  in  the  assembly, 
which  now  has  become  an  important  fo- 
rum for  the  public  airing  of  past  and  fu- 
ture policies.  The  election  of  President 
Roh  Tae  Woo  was  the  outcome  of  a  free- 
wheeling, open  campaign  marking  a 
major  step  toward  democracy. 

Bowing  to  the  will  of  the  Korean 
people.  President  Roh  and  leaders  of 
the  opposition  have  publicly  affirmed 
their  willingness  to  cooperate  to  make 
democracy  succeed.  They  have  pledged 
to  work  together  to  ensure  that  the  mo- 
mentum toward  democracy  will  be 
maintained.  Encouraged  by  these  de- 
velopments, the  Korean  people  hope 
that  this  trend  will  continue. 

The  human  rights  situation  in 
South  Korea  also  has  improved 
measurably.  Several  hundred  political 
prisoners  have  been  released,  sen- 
tences commuted,  and  the  civil  rights 
of  political  dissidents  restored.  There 
is  a  more  vital  and  free  press  in  the 
country.  President  Roh  has  pledged  to 
curb  the  power  of  the  police  and  securi- 
ty agencies  to  ensure  that  civil  rights 
are  respected. 


30 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


EAST  ASIA 


The  United  States  has  extended  its 
uiKiualified  support  to  South  Korea's 
steps  toward  greater  democracy.  At  the 
same  time,  we  have  attempted  to  im- 
press upon  the  Korean  leadership  that 
governmental  authority  must  rest  on  a 
foundation  of  respect  for  individual 
rights  and  fundamental  human  liber- 
ties. While  pressing  for  further  im- 
provements in  human  rights,  we  have 
welcomed  recent  constitutional  and  leg- 
islative reforms  which  are  helping  to 
create  a  more  solid  democratic  political 
framework. 

Economic  Success  Story 

The  most  rapidly  developing  area  in 
U.S. -Korean  relations  is  economics  and 
trade.  It  is  in  this  area  that  new  prob- 
lems are  likely  to  arise. 

The  Republic  of  Korea  has  made 
remarkable  economic  progress  in  the 
past  30  years,  becoming  one  of  the  most 
advanced  economies  in  the  Third 
World.  Since  1961  Korea's  spectacular 
economic  growth  has  averaged  over  SVr 
annuallv,  reaching  more  than  12%  per 
year  in'l986-87.  Its  GNP  in  1987  was 
$118  billion,  third  highest  in  East  Asia 
(after  Japan  and  China),  and  per  capita 
GNP  was  more  than  $2,800  (compared 
with  $100  in  1963).  South  Korea  now  is 
in  a  select  category  of  countries — the 
so-called  newly  industrialized  econ- 
omies. It  has  moved  from  labor- 
intensive,  light  industry  into  the  manu- 
facture and  export  of  more  sophisti- 
cated high-technology  products,  such 
as  electronics,  microchips,  and 
automobiles. 

The  Korean  people  have  worked 
long  and  hard  to  achieve  this  success. 
They  have  one  of  the  highest  rates  of 
personal  savings  in  the  world.  Highly 
industrious,  they  have  demanded  and 
received  more  educational  and  on-the- 
job  training,  producing  increasing 
numbers  of  scientists,  engineers,  and 
other  skilled  workers.  The  govern- 
ment's economic  policies,  an  important 
factor  in  this  success  story,  have  in- 
cluded currency  reform,  stronger  fi- 
nancial institutions,  and  flexible 
economic  planning.  Although  govern- 
ment guidance  of  the  economy  is  still 
significant,  market  forces  are  play- 
ing an  increasing  role.  Korean 
chaebols — very  large  and  highly  di- 
versified conglomerates — compete 
fiercely. 

Successive  Korean  administrations 
also  have  focused  on  export-led  growth 
and  the  benefits  it  brings  in  the  form  of 
increased  competitiveness  and  foreign 
exchange  earnings.  In  1987  South  Ko- 


South  Korean  Initiative 
Promotes  Dialogue  with  the  North 


On  July  7,  1988,  South  Korean  President 
Roh  Tae  Woo  announced  an  initiative  to  pro- 
mote dialogue  and  contacts  with  the  Demo- 
cratic People's  Republic  of  Korea — North 
Korea.  He  urged  it  to  open  up  trade  and  oth- 
er contacts  and  suggested  that  South  Ko- 
rea's friends  and  allies  also  should  pursue 
contacts  with  the  North. 

In  January  1989,  North  Korean  Presi- 
dent Kim  II  Sung  rejected  an  offer  by  Presi- 
dent Roh  to  come  to  North  Korea  and  hold 
talks.  President  Kim  had  insisted  upon  pre- 
conditions, such  as  suspension  of  U.S. -South 
Korean  military  exercises,  that  were  unac- 
ceptable to  the  South.  The  focus  since  has 
shifted  to  the  possibility  of  talks  on  the 
prime  ministerial  level.  The  two  national 
Olympic  committees  have  met  to  consider 
forming  a  joint  team  for  the  1990  Asian 
Games  in  Beijing.  The  resumption  of  Red 
Cross  discussions  on  family  reunification 


and  youth  exchanges  has  been  undertaken. 
Informal  trade  relations  between  the  two 
nations  also  are  starting  to  develop. 

To  support  President  Roh's  initiative,  on 
October  31,  1988,  the  United  States  an- 
nounced several  measures  to  facilitate  U.S.- 
North  Korean  private  exchanges  and  hu- 
manitarian exports  and  allow  substantive 
diplomatic  contacts.  However,  the  United 
States  has  not  removed  North  Korea  from 
the  list  of  countries  supporting  terrorism  or 
lifted  the  commercial  trade  embargo.  Be- 
cause the  U.S.  Government  believes  that 
fundamental  decisions  on  the  future  of  the 
Korean  Peninsula  must  be  made  by  the  Ko- 
rean people,  it  refuses  separate  negotiations 
with  North  Korea  and  supports  direct, 
government-to-government  talks  between 
North  and  South  Korean  authorities  to  pro- 
mote greater  understanding  and  reduce 
tensions. 


rean  exports,  which  are  very  diver- 
sified, totaled  $47.3  billion,  "or  40%  of 
GNP.  Large  trade  surpluses  in  the 
1980s  have  enabled  Korea  to  build  up  its 
foreign  exchange  reserves  and  to  re- 
duce its  external  debt  to  less  than  $25 
billion. 

U.S. -Korean  Economic  Relations 

The  United  States  has  been  an  impor- 
tant catalyst  in  South  Korea's  economic 
progress.  U.S.  foreign  assistance  pro- 
grams to  Korea  were  important  in  the 
1960s  and  1970s.  U.S.  purchases  of  Ko- 
rean goods  have  become  significant  in 
the  19"80s.  The  United  States  is  Korea's 
number  one  trade  partner,  taking  38% 
of  Korean  exports  in  1987.  Korea  is  now 
the  seventh-largest  trade  partner  of  the 
United  States  and  the  fourth-largest 
market  for  U.S.  agricultural  products. 
The  United  States  also  is  its  leading 
source  of  foreign  investment  and  tech- 
nology. The  bilateral  economic  relation- 
ship, however,  is  characterized  by  large 
trade  imbalances:  Korea's  surplus  with 
the  United  States  was  $10.4  billion  in 
1988. 

The  United  States  wants  to 
achieve  a  more  balanced  and  equitable 
trade  relationship  with  the  Republic  of 
Korea.  The  U.S.  Government  believes 


that  South  Korea  should  do  more  to 
open  its  markets  to  American  goods 
and  services.  Korea's  trade  in  certain 
agricultural  products  (e.g.,  beef)  and 
some  service  sectors,  such  as  advertis- 
ing and  banking,  have  been  especially 
protected.  Greater  access  to  imports 
would  raise  the  living  standards  of  Ko- 
rean consumers,  reduce  inflationary 
pressures,  and  increase  economic  effi- 
ciency. Some  South  Koreans,  believing 
that  domestic  workers,  farmers,  and 
companies  would  be  hurt  by  substan- 
tially higher  American  imports,  resent 
U.S.  pressure  to  open  up  Korean  mar- 
kets. Progress  is  being  made,  however, 
in  reducing  Korea's  tariff  and  nontariff 
barriers  to  trade.  The  won.  South  Ko- 
rea's currency,  has  been  appreciating 
against  the  U.S.  dollar  since  1988,  mak- 
ing Korean  exports  more  expensive  and 
less  competitive.  Consequently,  the  bi- 
lateral trade  imbalance  appears  to  be 
lessening  in  1989. 

The  United  States  also  hopes  that 
Korea  will  play  a  growing  role  in  the 
liberalization  of  world  trade.  Interna- 
tional protectionism  would  stop  the  en- 
gine of  Korea's  economic  development. 
South  Korea  should  participate  fully  in 
the  ongoing  Uruguay  Round  of  multi- 
lateral trade  negotiations  to  reduce 
barriers  to  the  international  flow  of 
goods  and  services. ■ 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


31 


EAST  ASIA 


FSX  Coproduction  Prohibition 
Disapproved  by  President 


PRESIDENT'S  LETTER  TO  THE 
SENATE,  JULY  31.  1989' 

I  am  returning  without  my  approval  S.J. 
Res.  113,  a  joint  resolution  that  would  pro- 
hibit the  e.xport  of  certain  technology,  de- 
fense articles,  and  defense  services  in 
connection  with  the  codevelopment  and 
coproduction  of  the  FS-X  aircraft  with  Ja- 
pan. The  resolution  is  neither  necessary  to 
protect  the  interest  of  the  United  States, 
n<jr  consistent  with  long-standing  require- 
ments of  the  Arms  E.xport  Control  Act. 
Further,  the  resolution  contains  binding 
provisions  that  unconstitutionally  infringe 
on  the  powers  of  the  E.xecutive. 

I  am  committed  to  the  protection  of 
U.S.  security,  economic,  and  technological 
interests.  Shortly  after  assuming  this  Of- 
fice, I  directed  that  a  review  of  the  FS-X 
program  be  undertaken  to  reassess  its  im- 
pact on  the  United  States.  This  evaluation 
included  active  participation  by  the  Depart- 
ments of  State,  Defense,  and  Commerce, 
and  the  Office  of  the  U.S.  Trade  Represen- 
tative, among  other  agencies.  Following  the 
review,  we  reopened  discussions  with  the 
Japanese  and  clarifications  were  made 
to  ensure  that  valid  U.S.  concerns  and 
requirements  were  met  in  such  areas  as 
U.S.  workshare  and  technology  flowback. 

With  agreement  reached  on  these  clari- 
fications, I  decided  that  we  should  proceed 
with  the  joint  development  of  the  FS-X  air- 
craft. I  determined  that  the  program  is  in 
the  strategic  and  commercial  interests  of 
the  United  States  and  will  contribute  to  our 
security  and  that  of  a  major  ally.  The  ability 
of  Japan  to  carry  its  share  of  the  defense 
burden  will  be  enhanced  as  a  result  of  the 
program,  at  no  cost  to  the  American  ta.x- 
payer.  Moreover,  the  program  will  produce 
substantial  work  for  the  U.S.  aerospace  in- 
dustry without  jeopardizing  our  commit- 
ment to  the  continued  excellence  of  that 
industry.  The  U.S.  economy  will  gain  some 
$2.5  billion  and  22,700  man  years  of  employ- 
ment over  the  course  of  the  codevelopment 
and  coproduction  phases. 

I  remain  fully  convinced  that  proceed- 
ing with  the  program  is  in  the  best  interests 
of  the  United  States  and  that  the  additional 
conditions  prescribed  in  this  resolution  are 
unnecessary.  Such  conditions  include  an  un- 
[irecedented  absolute  prohibition  on  sales  or 


retransfers  of  the  FS-X  weapon  system  or 
any  of  its  major  subcomponents  codeveloped 
or  coproduced  with  the  United  States.  This 
prohibition  is  inconsistent  with  the  current 
agreement  with  .Japan  and  goes  beyond  the 
current  requirements  of  the  Arms  Export 
Control  Act,  which  permit  such  sales  or  re- 
transfers,  but  only  if  the  written  approval 
of  the  United  States  Government  is  first 
obtained.  This  requirement  of  prior  con- 
sent completely  protects  U.S.  security  and 
other  interests. 

This  resolution  also  conflicts  with  the 
President's  proper  authority  under  the  Con- 
stitution. The  Constitution  vests  Executive 
power  in  the  President.  Executive  power  in- 
cludes the  exclusive  authority  to  conduct  ne- 
gotiations on  behalf  of  the  United  States 
with  foreign  governments.  S.J.  Res.  113  vio- 
lates this  fundamental  constitutional  princi- 
ple by  purporting — in  binding  legislative 
language — to  direct  the  United  States  and 
Japan  to  conduct  negotiations  if  coproduc- 
tion of  the  FS-X  is  sought,  and  by  purport- 
ing to  define  in  advance  both  the  form  and 
substance  of  any  resulting  agreement.  In 
the  conduct  of  negotiations  with  foreign  gov- 
ernments, it  is  imperative  that  the  United 
States  speak  with  one  voice.  The  Constitu- 
tion provides  that  that  one  voice  is  the  Pres- 
ident's. While  of  course  the  Congress  has 
authority  under  the  Constitution  to  regulate 
commerce  with  foreign  nations,  it  may  not 
use  that  authority  to  intrude  into  areas  en- 
trusted by  the  Constitution  exclusively  to 
the  Executive.  And  while  I  am  eager  to  co- 
operate with  Congress  in  shaping  a  sound 
foreign  policy  for  our  Nation,  and  will  con- 
sult with  Members  of  Congress  at  every 
opportunity — indeed,  the  ultimate  shape  of 
the  agreement  with  Japan  reflects  healthy 
cooperation  between  our  two  branches — I 
cannot  accept  binding  provisions  like  those 
in  S.J.  Res.  113  that  would  tie  my  hands  in 
the  exercise  of  constitutional  responsibilities. 

The  Constitution's  vesting  of  executive 
power  in  the  President  requires  that  the 
President  exercise  supervisory  authority 
and  control  over  the  internal  deliberations 
of  the  Executive  branch.  The  resolution  in- 
trudes on  this  constitutional  principle  by 
purporting  to  direct  a  particular  Executive 
department  to  solicit  and  consider  comments 
or  recommendations  from  another  depart- 
ment and  to  make  certain  recommendations 


to  the  President.  The  resolution  also  pur- 
ports to  require  the  President  to  consider 
these  recommendations.  Such  provisions  in- 
terfere with  Executive  branch  management 
and  infringe  on  the  President's  authority 
with  respect  to  deliberations  incident  to 
the  exercise  of  Executive  power 

The  reporting  requirement  imposed  by  - 
this  resolution  would  inject  the  General  Ac- 
counting Office,  a  legislative  entity,  into  the 
execution  of  the  FS-X  program  in  a  highly 
intrusive  manner.  It  would  require  the  GAO, 
for  example,  to  track  within  the  Japanese 
aerospace  industry  all  applications  of  tech- 
nology involved  in  the  development  of  the 
FS-X,  including  technology  developed  solely 
by  Japan.  Such  a  role,  tantamount  to  intel- 
ligence gathering,  is  inappropriate  for  a 
legislative  entity,  and  poses  the  clear  and 
significant  risk  of  legislative  entanglement 
in  functions  assigned  under  our  Constitution 
to  the  Executive  branch. 

The  FS-X  program  is  the  first  major 
military  codevelopment  program  between 
the  United  States  and  Japan.  The  FS-X 
will  bolster  .Japan's  self-defense  capability, 
strengthen  our  overall  alliance  with  .Japan, 
and  allow  Japan  to  assume  a  larger  share  of 
the  common  defense  burden.  The  impor- 
tance of  these  achievements  cannot  be  over- 
stated, particularly  given  the  fact  that  our 
relationship  with  .Japan  is  a  foundation  for 
our  political  and  strategic  relations  through- 
out the  Pacific. 

To  reopen  discussions  now  for  additional 
and  needless  changes  can  only  damage  the 
prospects  for  a  successful  agreement.  If  this 
occurs,  substantial  injury  to  the  U.S. -Japan 
security  relationship  is  likely  and  the  con- 
siderable strategic  and  commercial  benefits 
to  the  United  States  will  be  lost.  The  com- 
promising of  U.S.  interests  is  simply  not 
acceptable. 

Finally,  acceptance  of  this  resolution 
would  constitute  a  setback  in  our  objective 
of  achieving  a  close  working  relationship  and 
mutual  respect  between  our  two  branches 
through  the  minimization  of  legislative  mi- 
cromanagement  of  both  foreign  affairs  and 
Executive  branch  internal  deliberations. 

For  all  the  reasons  stated  above,  I  am 
compelled  to  disapprove  S.J.  Res.  113. 

George  Bush 


'  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Pres- 
idential Documents  of  Aug.  7,  19iS9.  ■ 


32 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


ECONOMICS 


Aviation's  Role  in  Shaping  Today's  World 


by  Eugene  J.  McAllister 

Address  before  the  International 
Anation  Club  on  June  20,  1989.  Mr. 
McAllister  is  Assistant  Secretary  for 
Ei-ononiic  and  Business  Affairs. 

I  am  delighted  to  be  here  with  the 
members  and  guests  of  the  Internation- 
al Aviation  Club.  I  have  great  respect 
for  this  organization,  bringing  togeth- 
er representatives  of  one  of  the  most 
competitive  and  fastest  growing  indus- 
tries in  the  world. 

I  would  like  to  talk  to  you  today 
from  the  perspective  of  a  policy- 
maker— a  policymaker  from  the  State 
Department.  We  at  the  State  Depart- 
ment feel  first  hand  the  tremendous 
ferment  as  the  world  shrinks  and  our 
national  economies  become  a  global 
economy.  In  the  past  month  or  two,  we 
have  witnessed  incredible  events  in 
China,  which  commentators  attribute 
to  the  communications  revolution.  I 
don't  disagree  about  the  importance  of 
communications  in  drawing  our  world 
closer  and  making  it  more  difficult  for 
a  nation  to  remain  isolated — indeed,  it 
is  difficult  to  overestimate  the  signifi- 
cance of  modern  communication.  But  I 
would  add  another  factor:  that  of  trans- 
portation. The  tremendous  changes 
that  have  occurred  in  aviation  have 
affected  the  world  in  which  we  live  and 
affected  it  positively — tourism,  busi- 
ness travel,  and  even  the  transporta- 
tion of  products  have  all  played  their 
part  in  shaping  today's  world. 

I  would  like  to  spend  a  few  minutes 
talking  about  three  themes. 

•  What  has  been  accomplished  in 
aviation,  and  what  has  aviation 
accomplished? 

•  Where  are  we  today  with  regard 
to  aviation  policy?  What  are  the  U.S. 
Government's  priorities? 

•  What  does  the  future  of  aviation 
policy,  and  the  aviation  business,  look 
like?  And  how  can  we  in  government 
and  you  in  the  industry  cooperate  to 
assure  that  the  United  States  remains 
at  the  leading  edge? 

Accomplishments  in  U.S.  Aviation 

The  changes  in  the  aviation  industry 
over  the  last  10  years  have  been  truly 
remarkable — remarkable  in  what  has 
been  accomplished,  and  remarkable 


that  we  take  it  all  for  granted.  Step- 
ping back,  progress  can  be  seen  in 
a  number  of  areas:  the  growth  in 
aviation — both  domestic  and  interna- 
tional, technological  advancements, 
and  rapid  development  of  related  in- 
dustries. Let  me  offer  some  concrete 
e.xamples. 

Growth  in  Aviation.  While  avia- 
tion has  continually  expanded  since  its 
inception,  the  changes  over  the  last 
decade,  since  deregulation  began, 
have  been  astounding,  particularly  in 
international  aviation. 

•  The  number  of  international  pas- 
sengers carried  by  U.S.  airlines  dou- 
bled from  16  million  to  32  million  in  the 
last  decade. 

•  The  importance  of  the  interna- 
tional market  has  been  recognized  by  a 
number  of  carriers  that  had  previously 
served  only  domestic  routes.  New  in- 
ternational service  has  been  instituted 
by  American,  Delta,  Continental, 
United,  Federal  Express,  and  other 
airlines.  We  applaud  this  trend  and 
fully  expect  it  to  continue. 

•  U.S.  carriers  control  52%  of  the 
international  market,  up  5%  in  the  last 
2  years.  This  impressive  growth  can  be 
attributed  in  part  to  an  aggressive  ne- 
gotiating stance  of  recent  years,  where 
we  have  actively  sought  new  routes  and 
rights  for  additional  carriers  in  the  in- 
ternational market. 

•  International  service  by  U.S.  car- 
riers is  growing  25  times  faster  than 
domestic  service. 

In  sum,  the  growth  potential  for 
international  service  by  U.S.  carriers 
is  unlimited.  But  government  and  in- 
dustry must  work  together  to  make 
that  growth  continue  at  this  impressive 
rate. 

Effect  on  the  Economy.  This 
growth  in  the  aviation  industry  has  had 
a  profound  impact  on  the  U.S.  economy. 
It  has  sparked  rapid  growth  in  other 
sectors  of  the  economy  and  has  even  re- 
sulted in  the  restructuring  of  some 
sectors. 

For  each  Wc  increase  in  interna- 
tional and  domestic  air  travel  in  the 
United  States,  $600  million  is  added  to 
the  economy,  hundreds  of  new  jobs  are 
created  in  airlines,  and  tens  of  thou- 
sands of  new  jobs  are  created  in  travel- 
related  industries  and  in  other  parts  of 
the  economy. 


Technological  Advancement  and 
Development  of  Related  Industries. 

Behind  many  of  the  changes  in  aviation 
has  been  the  expanded  use  of  computer 
technology.  The  application  of  computer 
technology  coupled  with  the  growth  of 
international  aviation  has  sparked  re- 
markable changes  in  our  lives.  These 
technological  advances  have  even  led, 
in  some  cases,  to  the  development  of 
entirely  new  industries. 

•  The  computer  reservation  sys- 
tem, which  did  not  exist  15  years  ago,  is 
now  a  primary  marketing  tool  for  air- 
lines. Not  only  are  the  majority  of  air 
travel  reservations  made  and  tickets  is- 
sued through  computer  reservation  sys- 
tems, but  train,  hotel,  and  rental  car 
reservations  can  also  be  arranged — a 
full  service  travel  planner  for  the  busy 
traveler. 

•  Improved  cargo  handling — which 
is  faster,  more  efficient,  and  results  in 
fewer  losses — is  now  routine,  thanks  to 
expanded  use  of  computer  technology. 

•  The  development  of  small  package 
delivery  services  and  door-to-door 
service  has  created  thousands  of  jobs 
and  revolutionized  the  way  business  is 
conducted.  Again,  computer  technology 
has  made  this  new  service  possible. 

•  The  linkage  between  trucking 
and  aviation  has  revolutionized  the 
movement  of  freight. 

•  One  of  the  most  impressive  areas 
of  growth  has  been  in  tourism,  which 
accounts  for  7%  of  the  gross  national 
product.  In  1987,  foreign  tourists  ac- 
counted for  .$10  billion  in  income  to  the 
airlines  and  $42  billion  to  other  travel- 
related  industries.  U.S.  and  foreign 
tourists  spent  nearly  $300  billion  on 
travel-related  expenditures  in  the 
United  States  in  1987:  43  States  and 
the  District  of  Columbia  earned  more 
than  $1  billion  from  tourism  in  that 
year. 

But  the  greatest  effect  of  this  ex- 
pansion is  on  the  lives  of  people.  The 
world  has  gotten  smaller.  People  have 
more  opportunities  to  travel  to  other 
countrie.s — to  get  to  know  different  na- 
tionalities and  cultures.  This  leads  to 
greater  understanding  between  nations 
and  strengthens  an  appreciation  for 
that  system  of  government  which  best 
promotes  the  aspirations  of  people — 
democracy. 

Look  at  the  explosive  growth  in  the 
number  of  foreign  students  studying  in 
the  United  States:  in  the  school  vear 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


33 


ECONOMICS 


1977-78,  there  were  235,000  foreign  stu- 
dents here.  By  the  1987-88  school  year, 
that  number  had  shot  up  to  356,000,  a 
jump  of  51'7c.  With  deregulation,  air 
fares  have  actually  declined  42'7(  in  real 
terms  in  the  last  10  years,  making  this 
travel  even  easier  and  more  accessible 
to  more  students.  Of  course,  all  of 
those  students  are  picking  up  ideas  and 
values  and  spreading  them  to  their  own 
countries. 

Japanese  tourism  to  the  United 
States  is  growing  an  unbelievable  2b% 
annually.  In  the  past  10  years,  tourist 
visas  issued  by  American  embassies 
and  consulates  around  the  world  have 
nearly  doubled,  and  e.xchange  visitor 
visas  have  increased  by  VS59(. 

The  common  factor  in  all  of  these 
is  access — aviation  provides  greater 
access  to  people,  resources,  oppor- 
tunities, and  leads,  ultimately,  to 
more  e.xchanges  of  information  and 
more  rapid  development. 

What  is  Our  Current  Agenda? 

This  takes  me  to  my  second  point — 
where  are  we  today  with  regard  to  avi- 
ation policy — what  are  our  priorities? 
We  in  the  government  are  operating 
on  the  following  four  principles  or 
priorities. 

•  Growth  and  expansion  are  our 
watchwords.  Markets  should  be  as  open 
as  possible. 

•  Aviation  is  different  from  the  tra- 
ditional international  service  industry. 
The  markets  are  closed;  market  open- 
ings must  be  specifically  negotiated, 
one  by  one,  on  a  bilateral  basis.  Our  ne- 
gotiators will  continue  to  ensure  that 
we  obtain  economically  equivalent 
rights  abroad  before  granting  new 
rights  to  foreign  carriers. 

•  Aviation  is  becoming  increasingly 
more  complicated  than  routes  and 
rights.  We  must  look  at  security  and  li- 
ability issues  and  their  implications  for 
the  passenger  and  the  industry. 

•  Innovation  is  the  key  to  the  avia- 
tion industry.  By  minimizing  restric- 
tions and  maximizing  opportunities, 
the  aviation  industry  will  continue  to 
thrive  and  expand.  It  is  our  job  in 
government  to  facilitate,  not  impede, 
innovation. 

More  specifically,  our  agenda  can 
be  broken  down  into  three  categories: 
bilateral  negotiations,  security  and 
safety,  and  doing-business  issues,  in- 
cluding computer  reservation  systems 
and  user  charges. 


Bilateral  Negotiations.  Over  the 

past  year,  the  government  has  con- 
ducted 42  sets  of  negotiations  with  23 
countries,  pushing  them  toward  more 
liberal  aviation  regimes.  I  am  proud 
to  be  able  to  report  that  we  have  had 
many  successes. 

•  Our  new  air  agreement  with 
Mexico  has  expanded  air  service  to 
many  cities  in  both  countries  by  new 
carriers.  Combined  with  a  dramatic 
change  in  aviation  policy  in  favor  of  the 
economic  benefits  tourism  can  bring, 
passenger  and  cargo  service  has  grown 
significantly. 

•  In  Brazil,  we  reached  a  new 
agreement  that  provides  for  a  signifi- 
cant expansion  of  passenger,  cargo,  and 
charter  service;  instituted  a  liberal 
pricing  regime;  and  resolved  conver- 
sion and  remittance  problems. 

•  We  negotiated  a  new  agreement 
with  Austria,  the  first  in  over  10  years, 
that  provides  for  new  intermediate 
points  and  service  by  three  carriers. 

•  We  have  new  or  expanded  agree- 
ments with  Australia,  the  Philippines, 
and  Yugoslavia  that  give  us  new  mar- 
ket access  and  provide  for  growth  in 
the  market. 

•  We  are  near  resolution  of  doing- 
business  problems  with  Switzerland 
and  have  solved  two  longstanding 
doing-business  problems  with  Korea. 

During  the  coming  year,  we  will 
look  closely  at  Japan,  Canada,  and 
Europe  to  seek  more  liberal  air  rela- 
tionships and  opportunities. 

We  do  not  believe  Japan  sees  avia- 
tion from  as  broad  a  perspective  as 
it  should.  The  proposal  the  Japanese 
made,  in  May,  does  not  contain  enough 
opportunities  to  satisfy  market  de- 
mand or  command  the  broad  support  of 
U.S.  interests.  We  have  offered  to  meet 
again  in  July  and  are  preparing  a  new 
proposal  that  should  provide  the  basis 
for  mutually  acceptable  expansion.  Key 
U.S.  objectives  are:  more  service  to  .Ja- 
pan by  more  carriers  from  more  U.S. 
cities  and  more  services  to  new  Japa- 
nese cities,  more  cargo  rights,  and 
more  charter  rights.  In  the  longer 
term,  price  competition  is  the  key 
to  creating  more  U.S.  opportunities 
in  Asia. 

There  is  a  greater  gap  between 
consumer  demand  and  supply  in  the 
U.S. -Canadian  market  than  in  any  oth- 
er bilateral  market.  The  growing  eco- 
nomic and  political  ties  between  the 
United  States  and  Canada  make  prog- 
ress all  the  more  important.  The  recent 
expansion  of  our  aviation  relationship 
with  Mexico  is  strong  evidence  that  an 


open  relationship  can  be  beneficial  to 
both  partners,  even  when  their  airlines 
differ  in  size.  Despite  Canadian  con- 
cern about  competition  with  large  U.S. 
airlines,  we  believe  broad  liberalization 
will  benefit  both  countries. 

Europe  is  a  top  priority.  We  value 
highly  our  air  relationships  with 
Europe — the  United  States  and  the 
European  Community  are  each  other's 
largest  bilateral  trading  partners.  One- 
third  of  U.S.  arrivals  and  departures 
by  air  are  traveling  to  or  arriving  from 
Europe.  We  are  pleased  that  services 
are  increasing  with  France  and  Ger- 
many and  hope  to  see  agreement  soon 
on  new  service  to  Manchester,  En- 
gland, and  to  Italy.  We  are  urging  the 
Scandinavian  countries  to  focus  on 
growth  rather  than  restraint  of  a 
healthy  market.  The  United  States 
looks  forward  to,  first  and  foremost, 
the  preservation  of  our  rights  in  Eu- 
rope under  current  bilateral  agree- 
ments. In  addition,  we  seek  continued 
growth  and  expansion  and  freer  pric- 
ing, a  more  liberal  aviation  regime  in 
Europe — one  which  can  foster  new  op- 
portunities for  European  and  Ameri- 
can carriers — and  a  continued  dialogue 
with  the  community  on  how  best  to 
achieve  the  open,  competitive  market 
we  want  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic 
within  the  context  of  a  single-market 
Europe. 

Security,  Safety,  and  Facilita- 
tion. Earlier,  I  spoke  about  the  contri- 
bution that  aviation  makes  to  opening 
up  the  world.  But  there  is  also  a  shadow 
on  international  travel — a  shadow  cre- 
ated by  the  threat  of  terrorist  actions. 

Let  me  state  up  front:  Air  travel  is 
still  the  safest  mode  of  travel  on  earth. 
But  there  is  the  potential  for  terrorist- 
created  accidents.  The  U.S.  Govern- 
ment must  and  will  put  the  safety  of 
passengers  first,  to  ensure  that  pas- 
sengers are  offered  the  highest  quality, 
safest  service  available.  We  are  work- 
ing hard  to  ensure  that  the  pursuit  of 
safety  does  not  unfairly  burden  U.S. 
carriers.  These  are  issues  which  cut 
across  national  boundaries,  and  we  are 
seeking  multilateral  solutions.  We  are 
working  closely  with  the  International 
Civil  Aviation  Organization  to  fight  ter- 
rorism through  the  introduction  of  new 
security  measures  at  international 
airports  and  cooperation  in  counter- 
terrorism  efforts. 

We  also  are  making  significant 
progress  in  our  bilateral  efforts  and 
have  reached  agreement  with  49  coun- 
tries on  the  texts  of  security  articles. 
Plans  are  proceeding  for  the  deploy- 


34 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


ECONOMICS 


meiit  of  new  detection  equipment  at 
airports  and  for  tlie  assignment  of  addi- 
tional security  specialists  overseas. 
This  is  not  an  easy  task  ahead.  These 
AW  difficult  issues  that  sometimes 
-.-aise  sensitive  questions.  We  recognize 
:hat  additional  burdens  are  imposed  on 
the  industry,  and  we  want  to  work  with 
v'ou  to  minimize  those  burdens.  We  re- 
alize that  we  may  not  always  agree  on 
these  issues,  but  in  the  long  run,  if  we 
all  work  together,  we  will  achieve  the 
best  results. 

The  tragedy  of  the  bombing  of  Pan 
Am  Flight  103  has  had  broad  policy  im- 
jjlications  in  several  areas.  In  addition 
io  the  increased  focus  on  aviation  secu- 
rity, it  has  brought  to  public  attention 
the  fact  that  the  United  States  has  not 
yet  ratified  Montreal  protocols  3  and  4 
til  the  Warsaw  convention.  This  is  a  pri- 
ority of  the  State  Department  for  this 
llegislative  session.  We  must  ensure 
that  families  and  victims  of  aviation  ac- 
cidents or  terrorist  acts  will  no  longer 
have  to  endure  additional  suffering  on 
!top  of  the  trauma  of  injury  or  death 
lof  a  loved  one  in  order  to  be  justly 
icompensated. 

Doing-Business  Issues.  The  third 
part  of  our  immediate  agenda  is  the 
resolution  of  the  basic  problems  of  do- 
ing business  in  other  countries.  We  will 
continue  to  aggressively  pursue  resolu- 
tion of  these  issues  that  plague  carriers 
in  many  parts  of  the  world.  In  some 
eases,  these  are  so  egregious  that  they 
minimize  the  value  of  any  route  rights 
that  have  been  negotiated. 

Market  access  for  computer  reser- 
vation systems  is  a  key  issue.  We  will 
not  tolerate  discriminatory  displays, 
denial  of  ticketing  authority  for  U.S. 
systems  in  foreign  countries,  or  other 
restrictions  that  unfairly  inhibit  a  car- 
rier's ability  to  use  this  sophisticated 
tool. 

Let  me  finally  note  that  the  De- 
partment is  in  the  midst  of  arbitrating 
user  charges  imposed  at  Heathrow  Air- 
port. We  believe  these  charges  violate 
our  bilateral  agreement  with  the 
■United  Kingdom  and  a  memorandum  of 
understanding  signed  between  the  two 
governments  in  1983.  This  is  the  larg- 
est aviation  arbitration  in  history  and 
the  first  arbitration  with  the  United 
^Kingdom  in  many  decades.  It  has  re- 
:  quired  a  major  commitment  of  staff  and 
funds,  but  I  believe  it  demonstrates 
our  wholehearted  commitment  to  your 
industry. 


Steel  Trade 
Liberalization  Program 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
JULY  25,  19891 

Today  I  am  establishing  a  steel  trade 
liberalization  program  that  will  extend 
for  2'/2  years  the  voluntary  restraint 
arrangements  that  limit  steel  imports 
into  the  United  States.  I  am  taking 
this  step  to  permit  the  negotiation  of 
an  international  consensus  to  remove 
unfair  trade  practices  and  to  provide 
more  time  for  the  industry  to  adjust 
and  modernize.  The  steel  trade  liberal- 
ization program  is  designed  to  restore 
free-market  forces  to,  and  end  govern- 
ment interference  in,  global  trade  in 
steel.  I  am  directing  U.S.  Trade  Rep- 
resentative Carla  A.  Hills  to  oversee 
implementation  of  this  program. 

Ambassador  Hills  will  negotiate  a 
2'/j-year  transitional  e.xtension  of  the 
restraints  that  currently  limit  steel 
imports  from  voluntary  restraint  ar- 
rangements countries  to  18.4%  of  the 
U.S.  market.  The  extension  will  cover 
all  major  product  categories.  During 
this  transition  to  an  open  market,  the 
ceiling  on  imports  from  voluntary  re- 
straint arrangements  countries  will  be 
increased  at  an  annual  rate  of  one  per- 
centage point.  To  support  our  efforts  to 
achieve  an  international  consensus,  this 
increase  will  be  allocated  to  countries 
that  undertake  and  abide  by  disciplines 
to  address  trade-distorting  practices. 

I  am  also  directing  Ambassador 
Hills  to  seek  to  negotiate,  through  the 
Uruguay  Round  of  multilateral  trade 
negotiations  and  complementary  bilat- 
eral agreements,  an  international  con- 
sensus to  provide  effective  disciplines 
over  government  aid  and  intervention 
in  the  steel  sector  and  to  lower  barriers 
to  global  trade  in  steel.  The  interna- 
tional consensus  will  contain  three 
elements: 

•  Strong  disciplines  over  trade- 
distorting  government  subsidies; 

•  Lowering  of  trade  barriers  so 
as  to  ensure  market  access;  and 

•  Enforcement  measures  to  deal 
with  violations  of  consensus  obligations. 


In  extending  the  voluntary  re- 
straint arrangements  for  a  transitional 
period,  I  am  mindful  of  the  need  to  im- 
prove the  availability  of  steel  in  the 
United  States  and  to  promote  price 
competition.  Accordingly,  to  ensure 
that  adequate  supplies  of  competitively 
priced  steel  are  available  on  a  timely 
basis,  the  Department  of  Commerce 
will  expedite  and  streamline  the  exist- 
ing short-supply  mechanism. 

Since  1984  the  U.S.  steel  industry 
has  made  considerable  progress  toward 
improving  its  competitiveness  and 
modernizing  its  production  facilities. 
It  has  reduced  capacity,  cut  costs,  and 
modernized  its  equipment  and  technol- 
ogy. I  urge  the  industry  to  continue  its 
modernization  and  worker  retraining 
programs  and  will  support  legislation 
to  that  effect.  The  U.S.  International 
Trade  Commission  will  be  asked  to 
monitor  and  report  regularly  on  devel- 
opments in  the  carbon  and  specialty 
steel  industries,  including  investment, 
wages,  and  executive  compensation. 

Consistent  with  this  Administra- 
tion's commitment  to  free  and  open 
trade,  the  voluntary  restraint  arrange- 
ments will  end  on  March  31,  1992. 
Thereafter  U.S.  steel  producers,  like 
other  American  industries,  will  contin- 
ue to  rely  on  domestic  trade  laws  as  an 
ultimate  assurance  against  the  effects 
of  foreign  unfair  trade  practices.  The 
Department  of  Commerce  will  continue 
rigorously  to  endorse  the  laws  against 
injurious  dumping  and  subsidization. 

For  decades  governments  have  sup- 
ported their  steel  producers  through 
subsidies  and  import  restrictions.  Steel 
trade  and  the  international  trading  sys- 
tem as  a  whole  have  suffered.  This  self- 
defeating  rivalry  must  end.  I  urge  our 
trading  partners  to  w'ork  with  us  to 
restore  free  and  fair  trade  to  world 
markets. 


'  Te.xt  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Pres- 
idential Documents  of  July  31,  1989.  ■ 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


35 


ENVIRONMENT 


Challenges  for  the  Future 

The  priorities  just  outlined  are  more 
than  enough  to  keep  U.S.  Government 
negotiators  busy.  But  there  is  one  other 
critical  assignment:  thinking  about  the 
future. 

What  will  it  take  to  be  as  success- 
ful over  the  next  10-25  years  as  we 
were  over  the  last  10  years?  Where  will 
we  be  at  the  turn  of  the  century — or 
more  importantly,  where  do  we  want  to 
be  at  the  turn  of  the  century?  There 
are  a  host  of  issues. 

•  In  Europe,  we  will  be  facing  an 
aviation  industry  shaped  by  1992  and 
constrained  by  limited  airspace.  What 
does  this  mean  for  U.S.  aviation?  What 
will  the  European  aviation  industry 
look  like?  Perhaps  there  will  be  consol- 
idation through  mergers,  even  with 
U.S.  carriers.  We  are  seeing  this  trend 
in  the  manufacturing  sector  already 
and  with  some  airlines  as  well.  What 
are  the  implications  for  airline  planners? 

•  In  Asia,  Japan  is  the  gateway,  yet 
.Japan  approaches  aviation  with  a  phi- 
losophy far  different  from  our  own. 
How  do  we  convince  the  .Japanese  that 
a  more  e.xpansive  approach  to  aviation 
will  advance  Japanese  interests,  as 
well  as  U.S.  interests,  and  improve 
.Japan's  economic  relationship  with  the 
United  States  and  its  other  economic 
partners? 


•  Are  we  reaching  the  limits  of  bi- 
lateral agreements  and  the  bilateral 
negotiating  system?  In  many  countries, 
we  have  all  the  cities  and  routes  we 
want.  The  foreign  carriers  in  some 
countries  want  access  to  more  of  our 
vast  market,  but  we  have  nothing  to 
ask  for  in  return.  In  other  countries, 
we  want  additional  carriers  and  service 
to  different  cities,  but  foreign  carriers 
fear  the  competition. 

•  How  can  we  address  the  interests 
of  the  American  cities  and  additional 
U.S.  carriers,  which  are  now  recogniz- 
ing the  value  of  direct  international 
traffic  and  are  seeking  expanded  routes? 
Should  we  explore  the  possibility  of  a 
multilateral  approach  to  negotiating  for 
the  future? 

These  are  difficult  questions — 
questions  of  tremendous  commercial 
magnitude — and  we  in  the  government 
don't  claim  to  know  the  answers.  But 
we  do  know  two  things:  first,  the  U.S. 
aviation  industry  is  highly  competitive 
and  should  be  extremely  successful  in 
the  future,  if  given  the  opportunity — 
we  in  the  government  will  approach 
these  issues  I  have  just  raised  from 
that  perspective;  second,  that  success 
will  depend  on  cooperation  between 
government  and  all  interested  parties. 
We  need  your  advice  and  counsel.  The 
future  is  in  our  hands.  Let  us  make  the 
most  of  it.  ■ 


U.S.  Ratifies  Treaty  to 
Reduce  Smog  Pollutant 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
.JULY  14,  1989' 

Yesterday  the  United  States  formally 
accepted  the  nitrogen  oxides  (NOx) 
protocol  to  the  Convention  on  Long- 
Range  Transboundary  Air  Pollution  by 
depositing  its  instrument  of  acceptance 
with  the  Secretary  General  of  the  Unit- 
ed Nations.  This  protocol  is  fully  con- 
sistent with  the  goals  set  out  by  the 
President  in  his  proposals  for  the  Clean 
Air  Act. 

The  Convention  on  Long-Range 
Transboundary  Air  Pollution  was 
adojjted  in  1979  under  the  auspices  of 
the  UN  Economic  Commission  for  Eu- 
rope (ECE).  The  ECE  includes  the 
United  States,  Canada,  and  the  coun- 
tries of  Western  and  Eastern  Europe, 
including  the  Soviet  Union. 


The  NOx  protocol  was  signed  last 
November  by  2b  ECE  nations,  includ- 
ing the  United  States.  The  United 
States  is  the  third  country  to  formally 
accept  the  agreement.  When  ratified 
by  16  nations,  the  protocol  will  require 
most  participating  countries  to  freeze 
NOx  emissions  or  their  transboundary 
flows  at  1987  levels  by  the  beginning  of 
1995. 

The  protocol  allows  nations  such  as 
the  United  States,  which  had  already 
begun  a  NOx  reduction  jn-ogram  before 
the  negotiations  began,  to  use  a  differ- 
ent base  year  if  they  choose.  The  Unit- 
ed States  indicated  at  the  time  of 
signing  that  it  would  use  1978  as  its 
base  year.  NOx  emissions  in  the  United 
States  were  21.1  million  metric  tons  in 
1978. 


'  Text  from  Weeklv  Compilation  of  Pres- 
idential Documents  of  .July  24,  191S9.B 


World  Environment 
Day 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
JUNE  5,  1989' 


i: 


Over  the  last  several  years,  people  all 
over  the  world  have  become  more  and 
more  concerned  about  the  global  envi- 
ronment, the  warming  of  the  world's 
climate,  the  depletion  of  the  ozone  lay- 
er, the  loss  of  plant  and  animal  species 
our  mounting  waste  disposal  problemsi 
and  the  pollution  of  the  oceans.  These 
are  enormous  challenges  which  cannot 
and  should  not  be  minimized. 

But  at  the  same  time,  on  this  anni- 
versary of  World  Environment  Day,  I 
am  optimistic  about  the  future.  Here  i 
the  United  States,  we  have  made  re- 
markable progress  in  cleaning  up  our 
air  and  water.  We  have  shown  what  we 
can  do  when  the  will  is  there  and  we 
work  together.  I  believe  that  the  world' 
community  of  nations  can,  and,  indeed 
must  make  that  same  kind  of  progress 
on  a  global  scale.  We  may  speak  differ- 
ent languages  and  worship  God  in  dif- 
ferent ways,  but  we  all  share  the  same) 
Earth.  If  we  can  probe  the  depths  of 
space  and  engineer  the  genetic  build- 
ing blocks  of  life,  we  can  surely  protec 
the  quality  of  our  environment.  We  jusi 
need  the  will  to  do  it. 

I  would  like  to  take  this  occasion  t 
announce  that  the  United  States  in- 
tends to  ban  the  importation  of  ele- 
phant ivory  from  all  countries.  We  do 
this  out  of  mounting  concern  for  the 
rapid  decline  of  the  wild  elephant,  one 
of  nature's  most  majestic  creatures.  If 
their  populations  continue  to  diminish 
at  current  rates,  the  wild  elephant  will 
soon  be  lost  from  this  Earth.  We  urge 
the  nations  of  the  world  to  join  us  in 
this  ban.  We  further  urge  the  countrie 
responsible  for  the  elephant  to  practice 
sound  stewardship  of  these  precious 
creatures  so  they  will  not  be  lost  to  fu- 
ture generations. 


'  Te.xt  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Pres 
idential  Documents  of  June  12,  1989. ■ 


36 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  198! 


EUROPE 


The  Challenge  of  the  European  Landscape 
in  the  1990s 


Iby  Lawrence  S.  Eagleburger 

Statement  l)efore  the  SulKommittee 
nil  European  Affairs  of  the  Senate 
Fiireign  Relations  Committee  on 
June  22,  1989.  Ambassador  Eagle- 
hiirger  is  Depnti/  Secretary  of  State. ^ 

The  topic  of  your  hearing,  Mr.  Chair- 
man [Joseph  R.  Biden,  Jr.J,  and  your 
invitation  to  thinPt  aloud,  highlights  a 
very  key  issue.  As  I  said  at  my  con- 
firmation hearings  before  this  commit- 
tt'c,  if  we  cannot  successfully  manage 
the  West-West  relationship,  we  cannot 
cflfctively  manage  the  East-West  is- 
sues and,  ultimately,  the  North-South 
lilies  as  well.  In  the  hearing  today,  I 
think  we  must  recognize  that  these  are 
largely  speculative  inquiries,  likely 
t(i  raise  more  questions  than  answers. 
Nc\ertheless,  I  believe  it  is  important 
til  take  a  hard  look  at  the  long-term 
policy  and  strategic  interests  of  the 
United  States  in  its  relationship  with 
Western  Europe. 

Changes  are  underway  across  the 
European  Continent.  There  is  a  re- 
newed commitment  to  free  and  open 
markets  as  the  engines  of  prosperity — 
tilt'  great  American  e.\pansion  of  the 
liisds,  based  on  cutting  red  tape  and 
inishackling  business,  is  the  model  for 
the  European  Community's  (EC)  1992 
program.  In  its  own  way.  Eastern 
F.ui'ope  is  drawing  from  Western 
examples  and  experiences  to  rekindle 
economic  growth.  The  e.xplosion  of  in- 
formation, through  satellite  transmis- 
sions, television,  and  computers,  is 
prying  open  Eastern  societies  that  pre- 
viously were  buffered  from  new  ideas. 
The  demand  to  have  a  say  in  one's  own 
destiny  through  enfranchisement  and 
political  pluralism  is  a  major  new  force 
in  Eastei'n  Europe  and  elsewhere. 

These  changes  herald  the  begin- 
ning of  a  more  comple.x  equation  of  eco- 
nomic and  political  balances  of  power, 
and  we  welcome  them — the  forces  re- 
shaping the  European  Continent  are 
ones  that  we  unleashed  in  our  country 
200  years  ago,  with  which  we  are  famil- 
iar, and  in  which  lie  our  strength. 

The  next  10  years  in  our  relation- 
ship with  Europe  will  be  a  transitional 
period  in  which  the  patterns  of  the 
postwar  era  undergo  significant  adjust- 
ment in  the  face  of  change  in  the  East 


and  the  political  and  economic  growth 
of  Western  Europe  itself.  U.S.  rela- 
tions with  Europe  will  become  more 
complicated  as  Europeans  formulate 
their  own  responses  to  Soviet  initia- 
tives, seek  a  more  coherent  political 
and  economic  identity,  and  generally 
adopt  more  assertive  postures  in  deal- 
ing with  the  United  States.  As  a  result, 
we  must  keep  very  much  in  mind  our 
basic  objectives — maintenance  of  a 
close  and  cooperative,  as  well  as  se- 
cure, transatlantic  partnership  and 
pursuit  of  a  less  divided  Europe  built 
on  Western  values  and  around  a  West 
European  identity. 

The  Economic  Partnership 

The  most  exciting  development  in  West- 
ern Europe  is  the  single  market  pro- 
gram. The  first  phase  of  an  integrated 
Europe,  as  envisioned  by  Winston 
Churchill,  Jean  Monnet,  and  Konrad 
Adenauer  40  years  ago,  is  finally  Hear- 
ing completion.  In  less  than  4  years, 
the  European  Community  aims  to  elim- 
inate barriers  to  commerce  and  border 
controls  among  its  12  nations.  The  large 
unitary  market  would  rival  ours  in 
wealth  and  surpass  us  in  population — 
"consumers"  in  a  businessman's  eyes. 
While  important  features  of  a  true  sin- 
gle market  will  be  absent  in  1993,  such 
as  a  single  currency,  sufficient  prog- 
ress has  already  been  made  so  as  to  as- 
sure the  long-run  completion  of  the 
market. 

The  U.S.  Government's  ])olicy  to- 
ward the  single  market  is  clear:  We 
support  the  goal  but  want  to  ensure 
that  our  interests  are  not  discrimi- 
nated against  in  the  process.  The  rein- 
vigoration  of  the  European  economy  is 
emphatically  in  our  interest — as  the 
President  remarked,  "a  strong,  united 
Europe  means  a  strong  America." 
While  we  are  looking  to  improve  the 
channels  of  communication  between  the 
EC  Commission  and  us  on  trade  and  in- 
vestment questions,  we  are  cautiously 
optimistic  that  the  net  result  in  Europe 
of  1992  will  be  a  more  vibrant,  deregu- 
lated, wealthy,  and  open  market. 

More  broadly,  however,  we  must 
give  our  all  to  making  the  GATT  [Gen- 
eral Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade] 
Uruguay  Round  a  success.  In  terms  of 


our  relationship  with  Western  Eui'ope, 
an  improved  and  more  credible  system 
could  help  resolve  trade  disputes — 
ever-present  in  a  trading  relationship 
surpassing  $160  billion  per  annum — 
before  they  drive  wedges  in  an  other- 
wise fruitful  relationship.  By  the  same 
token,  of  course,  we  have  to  be  pre- 
pared to  live  with  the  results;  we 
should  take  steps  to  comply  with  the 
GATT  findings  against  us  on  superfund 
and  customs'  users  fees. 

Let  this  also  be  a  heads-up  to 
American  business,  however:  The  Eu- 
rope of  the  1990s  will  be  a  more  aggres- 
sive competitor.  Regardless  of  whether 
protectionist  policies  are  adopted  in 
the  EC  (and,  generally,  we  are  confi- 
dent such  policies  will  not  be),  competi- 
tion will  make  European  firms  leaner 
and  stronger,  offering  direct  challenges 
to  American  competitiveness  in  high 
technology  and  other  areas.  We  will 
work  to  keep  the  playing  field  level, 
but  American  business  has  to  get  on 
and  play. 

Beyond  the  trade  relationship  we 
should  be  working  with  our  European 
and  Japanese  allies  on  multifaceted 
global  problems.  Third  World  debt  and 
the  precious  cargo  of  democracy  it 
threatens  to  overturn,  the  environ- 
ment, and  the  scourge  of  narcotics  are 
expensive  and  complex  problems  too 
great  for  our  nation  to  manage  alone. 

Foreign  Policy  Coordination 

As  hoped  for  by  the  Community's  foun- 
ders, economic  integration  is  encourag- 
ing deeper  political  and  security 
cooperation.  The  EC  negotiated  and 
signed  the  Montreal  protocol  on  ozone 
as  a  unit;  European  defense  ministers 
have  worked  together  to  produce  an  ac- 
tion plan  on  military  purchases;  nation- 
al governments  are  improving 
coordination  against  terrorists  and 
criminals;  and  the  European  political 
cooperation  mechanism  is  becoming 
more  active  in  developing  some  aspects 
of  foreign  policy  for  the  Twelve. 
Through  the  European  political  cooper- 
ation mechanism,  for  instance,  the 
Twelve  concerted  their  actions  in  with- 
drawing ambassadors  from  Iran  and 
endorsed  sending  a  European  team  to 
the  Middle  East  to  engage  leaders  on 
the  peace  process. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


37 


EUROPE 


Given  our  shared  values,  the  Euro- 
peans come  out  on  our  side  of  most  im- 
portant issues.  It  is,  therefore,  in  the 
U.S.  interest  to  worls  together,  bilat- 
erally and  collectively,  on  pressing 
transnational  problems,  as  well  as  to 
work  for  a  Western  approach  to  situa- 
tions in  South  Africa,  Cambodia,  Iran, 
and  elsewhere.  Of  course,  as  the  Euro- 
pean Community  grows  more  cohesive, 
we  can  e.xpect  them  to  press  their  ideas 
more  forcefully.  On  some  areas,  like 
the  Middle  East  and  Central  America, 
we  may  have  different  perspectives. 
When  we  do,  we  will  have  to  work  to 
ensure  that  our  concerns  are  not 
pushed  aside. 

While  few  EC  officials  openly  seek 
direct  EC  involvement  in  defense  mat- 
ters (the  1986  Single  European  Act 
notes  that  NATO's  primacy  in  security 
matters  should  not  be  impinged),  the 
Community's  interpretation  of  "eco- 
nomic and  political  aspects"  of  security 
will  likely  lead  the  EC  to  discuss  some 
areas  traditionally  reserved  to  NATO. 
CSCE  [Conference  on  Security  and  Co- 
operation in  Europe],  for  instance,  is 
an  e.xample  of  an  area  where  there  is 
some  overlap;  defense  procurement  is 
another.  While  we  seek  an  e.xpanded 
and  deeper  dialogue  with  the  Commu- 
nity on  foreign  policy  questions,  we 
continue  to  see  NATO  as  the  appropri- 
ate forum  for  discussions  affecting  our 
security  interests. 

The  Security  Alliance 

Cooperation  on  military  and  security 
issues  among  West  European  members 
of  NATO  has  been  improving  for  some 
time.  Our  European  partners  are  dis- 
cussing military  and  security  issues 
more  e.xtensively  in  multilateral  Euro- 
pean forums,  particularly  the  Western 
European  Union  (WEU),  the  Euro- 
group,  and,  to  some  degree,  the  Euro- 
pean Community.  Bilateral 
arrangements  between  European 
NATO  members  are  also  on  the  in- 
crease. For  example,  France  and  West 
Germany  are  jointly  developing  a  new 
combat  helicopter  and  are  in  the  proc- 
ess of  forming  a  joint  brigade. 

Our  calls  for  greater  allied  com- 
mitment to  the  common  defense, 
coupled  with  changing  West  European 
perspectives  on  their  roles  and  respon- 
sibility in  that  defense,  have  revived 
efforts  to  strengthen  the  "European 
pillar"  of  the  alliance.  These  coopera- 
tive and  consultative  measures  among 
Europeans  seem  likely  to  foster  a 


Food  Aid  to  Poland 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
AUG.  1.  19891 

I  am  pleased  to  announce  today  that 
the  United  States  will  provide  addi- 
tional support  for  the  Polish  people  and 
the  democratization  process.  We  are 
prepared  to  provide  Poland  with  up  to 
.$.50  million  in  food  aid  in  FY  1990.  It 
will  include,  but  go  far  beyond,  the 
8,000  metric  tons  of  surplus  commodi- 
ties to  be  provided  in  FY  1990  in  accord- 
ance with  the  American  Aid  to  Poland 
Act.  We  intend  to  provide  to  Poland 
supplies  of  sorghum,  corn,  and  butter, 
subject  to  the  availability  of  those  com- 
modities. We  anticipate  that  all  this  aid 
will  be  on  a  grant  basis.  The  commodi- 
ties would  be  sold  in  Poland,  with  the 
proceeds  being  used  to  fund  agricul- 
tural development  activities  there. 


Last  month  in  Paris  at  the  econom 
ic  summit  and  at  an  August  1  meeting 
in  Brussels  of  24  concerned  countries 
chaired  by  the  EC  [European  Com- 
munities] Commission,  the  industrial 
democracies  e.xpressed  concern  over 
Poland's  urgent  need  for  food  aid.  Food 
shortages  are  a  heavy  burden  on  the 
people  of  Poland  and  could  undermine 
the  historic  political  and  economic  re- 
forms Poland  is  undertaking.  The  U.S. 
food  aid  program — the  commodities 
themselves  and  the  projects  funded 
through  their  sale — should  be  of  real 
benefit  to  the  Polish  people.  It  will  as- 
sist in  alleviating  the  impact  of  market 
price  reforms  and  support  continued 
efforts  toward  economic  and  political 
liberalization. 


'  Text  IVoni  Weekly  Compilatidii  nf 
Presidential  Documents  of  Aug.  7,  i;i>s;i.| 


Polish  Parliament  Approves 
New  Prime  Minister 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
AUG.  24,  19891 

I  want  to  congratulate  Mr.  [TadeuszJ 
Mazowiecki  on  his  election  as  Prime 
Minister  of  Poland  and  assure  him  of 
our  strong  support  as  he  seeks  to  lead 
his  country  toward  economic  recovery 
and  democratic  change.  I  also  salute 
President  Jaruzelski  for  his  political 
wisdom  in  endorsing  a  government  re- 
flecting the  genuine  will  of  the  Polish 
people  and  Solidarity,  under  the  leader- 
ship of  Lech  Walesa,  for  its  construc- 
tive role  in  helping  bring  about  a  new 
beginning  in  Poland. 

Since  the  roundtable  agreement  of 
last  A]oril,  Poland  has  pursued  a  path 
of  democratic  change.  The  election  in 
June,  the  convening  of  Poland's  new 
parliament,  and  its  election  of  Gen. 
Jaruzelski  as  President  and  now  the 
election  of  Mr.  Mazowiecki  as  Prime 
Minister  are  further  di-amatic  signs  of 


this  historic  process.  These  develop- 
ments hold  promise  not  only  for  a 
peaceful  democratic  transition  in 
Poland  but  also  for  a  bi'oader  process 
of  European  reconciliation  toward  a 
Europe  whole  and  free. 

At  Hamti'amck,  Michigan  [A]3i-il 
17],  just  after  the  signing  of  the  round- 
table  agreement  between  the  Polish 
Government  and  Solidarity,  I  pledged 
U.S.  support  for  Poland's  economic  and 
political  reforms.  We  reiterated  that 
support  during  visits  to  Warsaw  and 
Gdansk  last  month  and  announced 
measures  we  are  taking  to  assist.  I 
want  the  Polish  people  and  their  new 
government  to  know  that  they  will  have 
our  continued  support  as  they  meet  the 
serious  economic  and  political  chal- 
lenges before  them. 


'  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  l'ix\<- 
idential  Documents  of  Aug.  28,  19cS9.B  a 


greater  West  European  role  in 
defense  and  security  matters  within 
NATO. 

While  we  expect  to  see  a  more  as- 
sertive, coherent  West  European  voice 


within  the  alliance  over  the  next  de- 
cade, it  is  important  to  note  that  these 
efforts  are  not  aimed  at  replacing 
NATO  or  U.S.  leadership  in  NATO.  To 
an  important  extent,  intra-Eurojjean 


38 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


EUROPE 


security  cooperation  is  about  keeping 
hi'  United  States  in  Eui-ope,  not  out. 
■'ill-  example,  the  WEU's  "European  se- 
■urity  platform"  recognizes  the  indi- 
.isibility  of  the  transatlantic  security 
lartnership.  And  leaders  in  both  North 
\inerica  and  Western  Europe  under- 
-tand  that  the  Atlantic  alliance  is 
lased  on  something  more  than  a  com- 
nitment  to  the  common  defense — it  is        „j_ 
aased  on  political,  social,  and  economic      ^p 
.alues  which  our  societies  share. 

Vt'xt  Steps  in  European  Integration 

The  question  being  asked  in  Europe 
iliciut  a  common  market  is  no  longer 
'w  hen?"  but.  "what  next?"  More  pre- 
isi'ly,  the  EC  must  decide  in  the  next 
U'tade  whether  to  enlarge  its  member- 
ship and  whether  to  extend  the  man- 
date of  Community  institutions  into  po- 
litical and  macroeconomic  issues. 

The  sharp  debate  between  mem- 
Imis  of  the  European  Community  over 
powers  and  institutions  for  the  EC 
Ss  an  old  one,  given  new  relevance  by 
fhe  1992  ])rogram.  The  outcome  is 
imcertain — it  is  not  simply  the  United 
jKingdom  against  continental  Europe. 
'It  is  a  very  open  ciuestion,  for  instance, 
whether  fiscal  and  monetary  policies  of 
•he  12  government.s  could  ever  be  close 
■iiiiugh  to  allow  meaningful  Commu- 
iiily  macroeconomic  policymaking,  and 
Liiiifying  tax  or  immigration  policies  is 
nil  easier. 

Furthei'  enlargement  of  the  Com- 
munity could  also  alter  its  economic, 
foreign,  or  security  policy  agenda.  Ap- 
iplications  for  membership  have  been 
made  or  considered  by  countries 
ranging  from  Turkey  to  Austria  to 
Norway — the  complexion  of  the  Com- 
munity could  be  substantially  changed 
in  ways  not  easy  to  predict.  The  Com- 
munity has  decided  to  put  off  any  deci- 
sion on  enlargement  until  after  1992. 
While  we  have  an  interest  in  the  de- 
bate, it  is,  ultimately,  a  matter  for 
Europeans  to  decide. 

Some  argue  the  growing  clout  of 
Europe  warrants  a  reassessment  of  the 
U.S.  role  in  Europe.  We  could  not  dis- 
agree more  strongly.  Regai'dless  of  how 
big  the  EC  gets,  or  what  issues  Euro- 
pean governments  devolve  to  common 
(li'cisionmaking,  the  need  for  a  strong 
American  voice  in  Western  affairs  will 
nut  be  diminished.  The  EC  is  and  will 
remain  a  group  of  separate  and  sov- 
ereign states  deeply  attached  to  the 
tiansatlantic  community,  each  of  which 
values  and  counts  on  the  United  States 
to  help  craft  the  Western  agenda. 
\\'hile  we  expect  Europe  to  shoulder 


Secretary,  Soviet  Foreign  Minister 
IVIeet  in  Paris 


^"   M^ 


Secretary  Baker  and  Soviet  Foreign  Minister  Shevardnadze  were  surrounded  by  news 
correspondents  after  their  meeting  on  July  29,  1989,  in  Paris.  During  the  'J-hour  session, 
they  discussed  the  bilateral  relationship  and  regional  issues,  including  Afghanistan, 
Central  America,  the  Middle  East,  and  the  situation  concerning  the  Turkish  minority 
in  Bulgaria. 


more  of  the  burden  for  the  West's  de- 
fense, and  while  Europe  will  be  more 
forceful  in  asserting  its  own  needs  and 
ideas,  the  President  will  remain  the 
preeminent  spokesman  for  the  free 
world  in  the  decade  ahead. 

Managing  Change  in  Eastern  Europe 

New  economic  realities  are  encourag- 
ing change  in  Eastern  Europe,  too. 
Faced  with  economies  falling  further 
and  further  behind,  some  East  Euro- 
pean leaders  have  become  more  flexible 
and  pragmatic  and  are  addressing  po- 
litical as  well  as  economic  reforms.  As 
the  President  has  declared,  the  United 
States  is  moving  beyond  a  policy  of 
containment  of  the  U.S.S.R.  and  the 
countries  of  the  East.  The  ferment  in 
Eastern  Europe  risks  instability  but 
presents  great  opportunities.  While 
the  evolution  in  Eastern  Europe  and 
the  U.S.S.R.  is  influenced  primarily  by 
internal  forces,  the  West  can  encourage 
political  and  economic  reforms.  It  is 


here  that  I  see  a  real  benefit  to  West- 
ern Europe  and  the  United  States 
focusing  our  energies  and  working 
together. 

As  I  have  said,  successful  Western 
political  and  economic  models  have  in- 
spired many  of  the  changes  occurring 
in  the  East.  A  stronger  Western  Eu- 
rope will  encourage  those  trends — 
closer  economic  integration  of  the  EC 
can  be  a  magnet  guiding  East  Euro- 
pean economic  development,  as  Presi- 
dent Bush  recently  told  the  graduates 
of  Boston  University.  The  EC  is  taking 
steps  to  remove  market  barriers 
against  imports  from  Eastern  Europe 
and  working  out  arrangements  based 
on  market  principles  to  facilitate  West- 
ern investment  and  exports  eastward. 
At  the  same  time,  the  EC  is  conscious 
of  using  improved  economic  relations  as 
a  carrot  to  encourage  reform,  as  dem- 
onstrated recently  when  it  broke  off 
talks  with  Romania  over  human  rights. 
We  should  encourage  this  trend.  It  is 
the  promise  of  being  closer  to  the  EC 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


39 


EUROPE 


economic  dynamo  that  is  encouraging 
some  of  the  more  progressive  groups 
and  individuals  in  Hungary,  Poland, 
and  Yugoslavia  to  seek  bolder  reform. 


Anniversary  of  Warsaw  Pact  Invasion 
of  Czechoslovakia 


NATO— Viability 

Public  opinion  polls  in  Western  Europe 
provide  solid  evidence  of  continued 
strong  public  support  for  NATO  and 
the  U.S.  defense  commitment.  At  the 
same  time.  West  Europeans  are  taking 
a  more  benign  view  of  Soviet  foreign 
policy,  influenced  by  the  hope  and  pos- 
sibility that  Gorbachev's  reforms  may 
lead  to  reduced  East-West  tensions.  We 
hope  this,  in  fact,  occurs.  But  in  the 
meantime  we  must  guard  against  any 
premature  erosion  of  the  public  consen- 
sus around  long-term  alliance  defense 
positions  and  hardnosed,  realistic  arms 
control  policies.  This  will  not  always  be 
an  easy  task. 

NATO  has  been  a  resounding  suc- 
cess over  the  last  40  years  in  carrying 
out  its  mission  of  deterring  Soviet 
aggression.  The  need  for  strong  and 
credible  defense  will  remain  for  the 
foreseeable  future.  But  changing  cir- 
cumstances may  be  altering  the  context 
within  which  the  alliance  operated. 
This  does  not  mean  NATO  is  becoming 
less  relevant — on  the  contrary,  the  At- 
lantic alliance  has  its  best  and  most  im- 
portant years  before  it,  providing  a 
forum  for  managing  the  East-West  rela- 
tionship, and  for  taking  common  actions 
on  the  environment,  science,  and  other 
transnational  issues  confronting  us. 

But  we  should  be  clear  that  our 
goal  of  a  Europe  made  whole,  resulting 
from  real  independence  for  the  nations 
of  Eastern  Europe  and  revolving 
around  a  strong  Western  Europe,  could 
change  the  artificial  division  of  the  con- 
tinent. Moreover,  the  President's  initia- 
tives, if  acted  on  in  good  faith  by  the 
Soviets,  i-aise  un])recedented  potential 
for  change  in  the  East-West  military 
equation.  Coupled  with  the  growing 
centers  of  economic  power  in  Asia  and 
Europe,  the  European  Continent,  and 
the  world  as  a  whole,  is  moving  toward 
a  more  multipolar  structure. 

A  word  about  the  Soviet  perspec- 
tive on  these  developments.  Gorbachev 
has  promoted,  as  you  know,  the  idea  of 
a  "common  European  house" — he  has 
made  clear  this  does  not  include  a  West 
European  identity.  In  Bonn,  Gorbachev 
spoke  negatively  about  1992;  the  Sovi- 
ets have  in  other  ways  sought  to  make 
clear  their  opposition  to  the  strength- 
ening of  European  institutions.  The 
absence  of  a  strong  West  European 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
AUG.  21,  1989' 

Twenty-one  years  ago  today,  Warsaw 
Pact  forces  under  Soviet  leadership  in- 
vaded Czechoslovakia  and  crushed  the 
efforts  of  the  people  of  Czechoslovakia 
and  their  leadership  to  move  toward 
political  reform  and  greater  freedom. 

During  the  "Prague  Spring"  of 
1968,  Czechoslovakia  embarked  upon  a 
program  of  political,  economic,  and  so- 
cial reforms  that  offered  great  promise 
for  a  better  and  freer  life  for  all  the 
nation's  citizens.  The  "action  program" 
of  1968  established  the  precedent  of  a 
ruling  party  seizing  the  political  initia- 
tive and  embarking  on  a  reform  pro- 
gram while  tolerating  and  encouraging 
growing  social  pluralism. 

During  that  Prague  Spring,  the 
government  under  [Alexander]  Dub- 
cek's  leadership  enjoyed  genuine  popu- 
lar support,  and  its  policies  began  to 
regenerate  legitimacy  for  the  party  as 
a  political  institution.  A  generation 
later,  reforms  underway  elsewhere  in 


Eastern  Europe  and  the  Soviet  Union 
draw  much  of  their  inspiration  from  the 
failed  attempts  at  the  Prague  Spring. 

A  new  generation,  too  young  to 
have  first-hand  memories  of  1968,  has 
since  grown  to  adulthood  in  Czecho-     - 
Slovakia.  Neither  this  generation  nor 
the  rest  of  us  should  dismiss  those  days 
as  remote  history.  The  hopes  of  that 
Prague  Spring  and  the  events  of  that 
tragic  August  remain  relevant  to  all 
those  who  live  in  freedom  or  hope  to 
do  so. 

On  this  important  and  sad  anniver- 
sary, with  positive  signs  of  change 
in  Hungary,  Poland,  and  the  Soviet 
Union,  it  is  our  hope  that  the  people 
and  Government  of  Czechoslovakia  will 
recall  the  events  of  1968  and,  together 
with  their  neighbors,  will  display  a 
greater  tolerance  for  freedom  of  ex- 
pression and  assembly  in  accordance 
with  their  Helsinki  [Final  Act] 
commitments. 


'   Read  to  news  correspondents  by 
Department  deputy  spokesman  Richard  A. 
Boucher.  ■ 


identity  in  the  Soviet  vision  of  a  "com- 
mon European  home"  is,  frankly,  one  of 
the  reasons  we  do  not  agree  with  it.  We 
think  a  strong  and  dynamic  Western 
Europe  is  an  essential  element  in  the 
future  of  Europe:  within  the  trans- 
atlantic community,  it  maintains 
essential  balance  in  Europe,  and  it  pro- 
vides the  light  to  guide  Eastern  Eu- 
rope along  the  path  of  Western  values. 

The  Hearts  and  Minds 
of  Europe  and  U.S.  Policy 

The  trend  toward  European  integra- 
tion is  powerful  and  accelerating.  Our 
policy  choice  is  not  whether  to  encour- 
age or  discourage  this  evolution  but  to 
ensure  that  European  integration  rein- 
forces U.S.  and  broad  Western  inter- 
ests in  open  economies,  democratic 
governments,  and  global  stability. 

Our  byword  with  Europe,  over 
the  next  decade,  must  be  cooperation. 
Some  Europeans,  especially  those  who 
want  to  build  Europe  without  Ameri- 
can involvement,  argue  that  American 
commitment  to  joint  projects  or  consul- 


tations on  crucial  issues  is  uncertain  or 
unreliable;  they  criticize  what  they  see 
as  America's  "go-it-alone"  tendencies. 
There  are  instances  when  American 
policy  would  have  been  strengthened 
by  better  coordination — on  the  other 
hand,  leadership  sometimes  requires 
"going  it  alone." 

Our  own  economic  and  jiolitical  po- 
sition in  the  world,  still  eminent  but  no 
longer  dominant,  does  not  so  easily  per- 
mit the  luxury  of  unilateralism.  Global 
developments — Third  World  debt,  envi- 
ronmental degradation,  transforma- 
tions underway  in  communist 
countrie.s — require  better  and  deeper 
cooperative  efforts  among  all  indus- 
trialized democracies.  The  world  is 
]ioised,  with  great  chances  for  positive 
gains  balanced  against  the  ])otential  for 
deterioration — seldom  has  a  time  seemedi 
so  ripe  for  Western  leadership.  Our 
goal  must  be  to  work  together  to  seek 
global  solutions  to  global  problems. 


'  The  complete  tran.-;cript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  lie  |.)ublished  by  the  committee  and 
will  be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402. ■ 


40 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


Anniversary  of 
the  Berlin  Wall 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
}AUG.  12,  1989> 

Twenty-eight  years  ago,  a  barrier  of 
jSteel  and  stone  was  erected  in  the 
iheart  of  Berlin.  It  stands  there  still — 
now  more  than  ever  a  relic  of  a  bygone 
era  and  a  failed  philosophy. 

The  barbed  wire  that  severed  a 
great  city  also  proclaimed  in  stark,  in- 
human terms  the  unnatural  division  of 
^Europe.  Beyond  its  tragic  human  cost 
over  the  years,  rending  families  and 
friends,  the  Berlin  Wall  has  affronted 
the  free  world  with  an  alien  vision  of 
closed  societies  where  basic  freedoms 
ai-c  denied. 

The  courageous  people  of  West 
Berlin  tend  the  precious  fire  of  free- 
dom as  an  e.xample  for  us  all.  The  city 
prospers  and  benefits  from  their  inno- 
ivative  spirit  and  from  expanding  inter- 
inational  ties.  Its  cultural  diversity, 
economic  vigor,  and  political  pluralism 
are  the  fruits  of  boundless  imagination 
at  work  in  a  democratic  community. 
The  United  States  is  proud  to  have  con- 
tributed to  Berlin's  freedom  and  vital- 
ity. We  remain  firm  in  our  commitment 
to  assure  the  city's  security  and  well- 
lieiiig.  In  a  year  which  marks  the  40th 
anniversary  of  the  airlift,  such  his- 
toric bonds  between  Americans  and 
Berliners  carry  special  meaning. 

The  United  States  is  also  commit- 
ted to  improving  the  lives  of  Berliners 
and  to  bringing  closer  the  day  when  the 
i/ity  is  again  united.  Together  with  our 
British  and  French  allies,  we  have  put 
forward  an  initiative  to  make  such 
progress  a  reality.  We  want  Berlin  to 
enjoy  greater  access  to  the  world 
through  expanded  air  links,  to  be  a 
center  of  international  meetings  and 
sports  events,  and  to  foster  more  hu- 
man contacts  which  lead  to  better  un- 
dei'standing.  As  I  said  in  Mainz  on  May 
.  ol,  we  want  Berlin  to  be  a  place  of  coop- 
!  eration,  not  a  point  of  confrontation. 
We  have  asked  the  Soviet  Union,  as 
part  of  its  four-power  responsibilities 
foi-  Berlin,  to  join  us  in  achieving  these 
goals.  We  still  await  what  we  hope  will 
lie  a  positive  response. 


We  observe  this  sad  anniversary 
with  renewed  determination  to  over- 
come the  division  of  Berlin  and  of  Eu- 
rope. On  behalf  of  the  people  of  the 
United  States,  I  reaffirm  this  nation's 
commitment  to  Berlin's  freedom  and 
prosperity.  The  tide  of  history  has 
turned,  and  we  look  to  a  future  Europe 


whole  and  free.  As  we  now  mark  the 
day  the  wall  was  built,  so  shall  we  inev- 
itably celebrate  a  day  when  it  no  longer 
divides  Berlin,  the  German  people,  and 
the  nations  of  Europe. 


'  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Pres- 
idential Documents  of  Aug.  21,  1989.  ■ 


Human  Rights  Situation  in  Cuba 


by  Richard  Schifter 

Statement  before  the  Subcommit- 
tees on  Human  Rights  and  Interna- 
tional Organizations,  on  Western 
Hemisphere  Affairs,  and  on  Interna- 
tional Economic  Policy  and  Trade  of 
the  House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee 
on  August  2, 1989.  Ambassador  Schif- 
ter is  Assistant  Secretary  for  Human 
Rights  and  Humanitarian  Affairs.' 

As  Fidel  Castro  is  not  the  garden- 
variety  human  rights  violator  but  oc- 
cupies a  unique  position  among  the 
world's — or  for  that  matter  history's — 
tyrants,  the  Cuban  human  rights  situa- 
tion deserves  special  attention.  About 
40  years  ago,  George  Orwell  described 
his  nightmarish  vision  of  the  total- 
itarian state  in  his  novel  1984.  As  is 
clear  from  a  reading  of  Orwell's  nonfic- 
tional  account  in  Homage  to  Catalonia, 
the  theme  of  19Slt  was  derived  from 
Orwell's  encounter  with  Stalinism  and 
Stalinists  in  the  course  of  the  Spanish 
Civil  War. 

Though  many  dictators  have  striven 
to  rule  as  did  Big  Brother  in  George 
Orwell's  19Si,  that  objective  was  so 
clearly  in  conflict  with  the  basic  human 
quest  for  freedom  that  only  few  can  be 
said  to  have  come  close  to  achieving 
that  goal. 

As  we  look  at  today's  world,  two 
dictators  stand  out,  because  they  do, 
indeed,  approach  the  totalitarian 
model  described  by  Orwell — the  world's 
longest-serving  tyrants,  Kim  II  Sung  of 
North  Korea  and  Fidel  Castro  of  Cuba. 
Both  of  these  men  appear  to  have  rec- 
ognized their  kinship.  They  are  mem- 
bers of  a  mutual  admiration  society. 
Last  year,  when  North  Korea  decided 
to  boycott  the  Olympic  Games  in  Seoul, 
most  communist  countries,  neverthe- 
less, attended,  but  Castro,  as  a  token  of 
his  friendship  for  Kim  II  Sung,  joined 
the  boycott. 

To  institute  a  totalitarian  system 
following  the  North  Korean  or  Cuban 
model,  the  dictator  must  have  a  single- 


minded  devotion  to  his  goal,  an  ex- 
traordinary gift  for  demagoguery, 
complete  intolerance  for  the  slightest 
form  of  dissent,  and  a  readiness  to  re- 
sort to  the  severest  forms  of  brutality 
to  obtain  his  goals.  In  his  30  years  in 
office,  Fidel  Castro  has  shown  that  he 
possesses  all  of  these  qualities. 

In  the  course  of  the  last  few  years, 
during  which  world  attention  was  final- 
ly focused  on  Cuban  human  rights  con- 
ditions, Castro  has  ostentatiously 
released  some  political  prisoners,  has 
with  a  great  deal  of  fanfare  improved 
some  prison  conditions,  has  allowed 
some  dissidents  to  leave  the  country, 
and  has  tolerated  a  few  muted  voices  of 
dissent.  None  of  these  moves  have  had 
even  the  slightest  impact  on  the  total- 
itarian character  of  the  Castro  regime. 
As  it  is,  most  of  those  minor  changes  of 
last  year  were  canceled  out  this  year. 

In  some  of  his  actions,  Castro  re- 
sembles a  medieval  potentate.  He  re- 
ceives foreign  visitors  w^ho  plead  the 
cause  of  one  or  more  of  his  prisoners. 
Magnanimously  the  great  leader  then 
unlocks  his  dungeon  and  lets  the  for- 
eign guest  take  the  prisoner  with  him. 
But  that  throwback  to  another  age  is 
combined  with  the  unique  characteris- 
tics of  20th  century  totalitarianism. 
The  essence  of  the  Cuban  dictatorship 
is  its  reliance  on  brainwashing  and  the 
total  penetration  of  society  by  a  secret 
police  apparatus. 

Indoctrination  and  Vigilance  Groups 

Indoctrination  is  accomplished  through 
careful,  fine-tuned  utilization  of  all  the 
country's  educational  institutions  from 
preschool  programs  through  university 
and  by  similar  utilization  of  all  the 
country's  modes  of  public  expression: 
newspapers,  magazines,  books,  and 
electronic  media.  I  have  used  the  term 
"utilization"  rather  than  "control"  to 
underline  the  fact  that  the  regime  is 
not  merely  satisfied  with  censoring 
school  programs  and  publications  but 
enlists  them  in  its  total  effort  to  pro- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


41 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


gram  the  thinking  of  the  Cuban  people. 

This  effort  at  brainwashing  is 
backed  up  by  a  coniiirehensive  and 
amazingly  efficient  system  of  domestic 
spying,  record-keeping,  and  distribu- 
tion of  rewards  and  punishment.  Cuba's 
secret  police  is  a  large  organization, 
using  extensive  resources,  and  en- 
hances its  effectiveness  through  the 
work  of  neighborhood  vigilance  groups 
known  as  'Committees  for  the  Defense 
of  the  Revolution.'  Not  only  are  active 
dissenters  severely  punished,  but  edu- 
cation, careers,  income,  and  housing 
are  distributed  on  the  basis  of  the  rec- 
ords of  political  conformity  maintained 
by  the  secret  police. 

We  may  wonder  why  Castro  has 
been  more  successful  than  were  those 
who  undertook  similar  efforts,  such  as 
Hitler,  Stalin,  and  Mao.  The  answer  is 
that  his  country  is  smaller,  he  has  been 
in  power  longer,  and,  importantly,  he 
has  had  the  availability  of  resources 
beyond  those  generated  by  his  own 
economy.  Also  while  the  cult  of  person- 
ality characterizes  them  all,  Castro's 
ability  at  demagoguery  is  rivaled  only 
by  that  of  Hitler.  For  a  long  time,  he 
has  also  exuded  a  great  deal  of  charis- 
ma, although  the  growth  of  his  paunch 
and  jowl  may  have  begun  to  detract 
from  his  personal  appeal. 

What  has  stood  in  the  way  of  total 
success  for  Castro's  totalitarian  system 
has  been  the  proximity  of  the  United 
States,  news  of  the  outside  world  which 
reaches  Cuba  through  Radio  Marti  and 
through  the  numerous  U.S.  relatives  of 
Cuban  citizens,  and  the  utter  failure 
of  the  Cuban  economy. 

The  Apologists'  Line 

Apologists  for  the  Castro  dictatorship 
have,  over  the  years,  pointed  to  its  suc- 
cess in  the  fields  of  health  and  educa- 
tion and  the  egalitarian  character  of 
Cuban  society.  As  to  the  claims  of  im- 
provements in  Cuban  public  health  over 
the  past  30  years,  many  are  based  on 
apparently  doctored  and  falsified  offi- 
cial statistics.  Even  so,  the  question 
that  can  appropriately  be  asked  is 
whethei'  such  improvement  as  has  oc- 
curred has  been  any  greater  than  those 
in  other,  similarly  situated  countries. 
It  has  not  been. 

As  to  education,  we  need  to  ask 
ourselves  whether  we  prefer  a  literate, 
governmentally  programmed  robot  to 
an  illiterate  free  spirit.  A  good  many 
of  us,  if  forced  to  choose,  would  prefer 
the  latter. 

And  as  for  the  alleged  egalitarian 
character  of  Cuban  societv,  it  mav  be 


42 


Helsinki  Human  Rights  Day,  1989 


PROCLAMATION  6005, 
AUG.  1,  1989' 

Fourteen  years  ago,  the  United  States  and 
Canada  joined  33  Eurojjean  countries  in 
signing  the  Helsinki  Final  Act  of  the  Con- 
ference on  Security  and  Cooperation  in 
Europe.  That  action  not  only  marked  the 
culmination  of  the  remarkable  2-year  meet- 
ing of  the  Conference  on  Security  and  Coop- 
eration in  Europe  (CSCE),  but  also  signaled 
a  milestone  in  European  post-war  history. 

The  Helsinki  accords  recognized  the  in- 
herent relationship  between  respect  for  hu- 
man rights  and  fundamental  freedoms  and 
the  attainment  of  genuine  peace  and  securi- 
ty. Following  years  of  diligent  effort,  the 
Western  nations  won  in  these  accords  the 
stated  commitment  of  the  Soviet  Union 
and  Eastern  Europe  to  one  of  the  most  far- 
reaching  sets  of  human  rights  standards 
ever  enunciated  by  governments.  By  signing 
the  Helsinki  Final  Act,  all  participating 
States  agreed  to  respect  freedom  of 
thought,  freedom  of  conscience,  as  well  as 
freedom  of  religion  and  belief.  Signatories 
also  agreed  to  facilitate  the  free  movement 
of  people,  ideas,  and  information  between 
nations.  The  work  begun  at  Helsinki  to  elim- 
inate the  barriers  that  divide  East  and  West 
and  to  advance  our  goals  of  freedom,  open- 
ness, and  security  has  continued  throughout 
three  follow-up  meetings. 

The  ongoing  CSCE  process  represents 
an  invaluable  avenue  to  work  for  change. 
As  recent  developments  in  some  nations  of 
Eastern  Europe  suggest,  the  Western  coun- 
tries' insistence  upon  full  implementation  of 
the  human  rights  and  humanitarian  provi- 
sions of  the  Helsinki  accords  is  contributing 
to  fulfillment  of  my  Administration's  goal 
of 'a  Europe  whole  and  free.'  The  United 
States  welcomes  recent  improvements  in 
human  rights  practices  in  Poland,  Hungary, 
and  the  Soviet  Union.  Nevertheless,  we 
look  for  further  reforms  in  these  countries 
as  well  as  institutionalization  of  the 
reforms  already  introduced. 

Despite  some  positive  signs  of  change  in 
the  U.S.S.R.  and  some  countries  in  Eastern 
Europe,  we  are  still  far  from  achieving  uni- 
versal compliance  with  the  Helsinki  accords. 
The  governments  of  Romania,  Bulgaria, 


Czechoslovakia,  and  East  Germany  continue 
to  systematically  deny  the  fundamental 
rights  of  their  citizens.  Religious  oppres- 
sion, persecution  of  ethnic  minorities,  and 
restrictions  on  freedom  of  information  and 
travel  in  these  countries  violate  the  letter 
and  spirit  of  the  Helsinki  accords  and  im- 
pede the  CSCE  process.  The  United  States^ 
will  continue  to  condemn  such  human  rights 
violations  and  call  upon  these  countries  to 
meet  their  commitments  under  the  Helsinki 
Final  Act. 

Respect  for  individual  liberty  and  fun- 
damental human  rights  is  not  only  the  duty 
of  legitimate  government,  but  also  the  key 
to  economic  prosperity  and  lasting  peace 
among  nations.  The  United  States  thus  re- 
mains firmly  committed  to  securing  full 
implementation  of  the  human  rights  and 
humanitarian  provisions  of  the  Helsinki 
Final  Act. 

In  recognition  of  the  importance  this 
Nation  places  on  human  rights  and  our  con- 
tinuing commitment  to  the  CSCE  process, 
the  Congress,  by  Senate  Joint  Resolution 
1.50,  has  designated  August  1,  1989,  as 
'Helsinki  Human  Rights  Day'  and  has  autho- 
rized and  requested  the  President  to 
issue  a  proclamation  in  its  observance. 

Now,  There  FORK,  I,  George  Bi'sh,  Pres- 
ident of  the  United  States  of  America,  do 
hereby  proclaim  August  1,  1989,  as  Helsinki 
Human  Rights  Day  and  reaffirm  U.S.  dedi- 
cation to  the  principles  of  human  dignity  and 
freedom  enshrined  in  the  Helsinki  Final 
Act.  As  we  Americans  observe  this  day  with 
appropriate  programs,  ceremonies,  and  ac- 
tivities, let  us  call  upon  all  signatories  of  thei 
Final  Act  to  fulfill  their  obligation  to  re- 
spect the  fundamental  rights  and  dignity  of 
all  their  citizens. 

I\  Witness  Whereof,  I  have  hereunto 
set  my  hand  this  first  day  of  August,  in  the 
year  of  our  Lord  nineteen  hundred  and 
eighty-nine,  and  of  the  Independence  of  the 
United  States  of  America  the  two  hundred 
and  fourteenth. 

George  Bush 


'  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  Aug.  7,  1989. ■ 


true  that  the  benefits  allowed  the  Cu- 
ban )io)iu'nklatiira  are  somewhat  less 
than  those  accorded  until  recently  to 
their  East  European  colleagues,  but 
the  fact  is  that  Cuba's  ruling  class  is  ac- 
corded privileges  and  benefits  which 
are  simply  not  available  to  the  mass 
of  ordinary  citizens, 

A  few  comments  should  be  added 
about  the  recent  trial  of  Gen.  Ochoa. 


We  are  not  privy  to  the  real  facts  in  the  » 
case.  But  the  trial  bore  an  uncanny  re- 
semblance to  tliat  of  one  of  Stalin's  vic- 
tims, Marshal  Tukhachevsky,  who  had 
been  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Red 
Army  and  was  tried  for  espionage  and 
treason,  convicted  and  executed  in 
1937.  A  few  years  ago,  a  Soviet  official 
said  to  me:  'You  know,  of  course,  that 
all  the  evidence  in  the  Tukhachevskv 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


case  was  forged."  I  told  him  that  this 
news  hardly  came  as  a  surprise. 

UN  Human  Rights 
Commission  Report 

In  September  1988,  a  working  group 
established  by  the  UN  Human  Rights 
Commission  visited  Cuba  and  thereaf- 
ter submitted  a  comprehensive  report 
on  its  observations.  The  Government  of 
Cuba  then  assured  the  commission  of 
its  willingness  to  cooperate  with  the 
Secretary  General  of  the  United  Na- 
tions in  maintaining  direct  contacts  on 
the  issues  and  cjuestions  contained  in 
the  report.  Accordingly,  in  March  of 
this  year,  the  commission  adopted  a  de- 
cision which  took  note  of  this  assurance 
and  indicated  that  the  Secretary  Gen- 
eral would  take  up  these  contacts  in 
an  appropriate  manner. 

As  far  as  we  know,  the  Government 
of  Cuba  has,  to  this  day,  failed  to  follow 
through  on  its  commitment.  Indeed, 
since  that  time,  the  human  rights  situa- 
tion in  Cuba  has,  as  I  noted  earlier,  de- 
teriorated markedly.  Dozens  of  human 
rights  activists  have  been  subjected  to 
punitive  actions,  from  harassment  and 
beatings  to  detentions  and  imprison- 
ment. Some  were  arrested  after — and 
no  doubt  because  of — their  testimony 
to,  or  attempt  to  give  testimony  to,  the 
UN  working  group.  We  believe  that  the 
United  Nations  and  the  international 
human  rights  community  has  a  moral 
obligation  to  help  those  brave  souls  who 
testified  before  the  UN  working  group 
and  thus  stood  up  for  the  cause  of  hu- 
man rights  in  their  country.  We  con- 
sider it  incumbent  on  the  Secretary 
General  to  take  up  this  issue  as  he  was 
mandated  to  do. 

Failure  of  Subsidized  Economy 

The  spirit  of  freedom  and  human  rights 
is  on  the  rise  throughout  the  world. 
What  has  been  dubbed  as  the  system 
of  "command  economy,"  which  is  fre- 
quently a  euphemism  for  what  is  really 
a  "command  society,"  has  clearly  failed. 
The  Cuban  command  economy  is  an  e.\- 
ample  of  such  failure.  Even  the  present 
level  of  the  Cuban  economy,  low  as  it  is, 
is  maintained  largely  by  Soviet  sub- 
sidies. Increasingly,  questions  are  be- 
ing asked  in  the  Soviet  Union  as  to 
whether  the  Soviet  citizenry,  as  it  tries 
to  rid  itself  of  the  legacy  of  the  past, 
should  be  taxed  to  support  a  system  in 
Cuba  which  has  been  pronounced  a  self- 
defeating  failure  in  the  Soviet  Union. 
The  questions  for  the  future  are  wheth- 
er an  increasingly  assertive  Soviet 
citizenry  will  be  able  to  call  a  halt  to 


this  subsidization  and  what  the  conse- 
quences of  that  would  be  for  Castro's 
dictatorship. 

Throughout  Cuba  a  new  generation 
is  growing  up,  a  generation  which  sees 
the  contrast  between  the  promise  and 
the  reality,  between  what  they  hear  in 
school  and  read  in  the  official  media 
and  the  news  which  reaches  them  from 
the  outside  world.  It  is  a  generation 


which  is  tired  of  the  long-winded 
speeches  of  its  graying  leader,  who 
after  30  years  still  holds  out  the  hope  of 
a  better  tomorrow.  They  recognize  that 
if  that  better  tomorrow  comes,  it  will 
not  be  under  the  rule  of  Fidel  Castro. 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee  and 
will  be  available  from  the  Superintendent 
of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. ■ 


Ethnic  Turks  in  Bulgaria 


NATO  STATEMENT, 
AUG.  9,  1989 > 

In  their  declaration  published  after  the 
summit  meeting  in  May,  our  heads  of 
state  and  government  deplored  the  fact 
that  the  governments  of  certain  East 
European  countries  continue  all  too 
frequently  to  violate  human  rights  and 
basic  freedoms.  They  also  stated  that  a 
continuing  denial  of  basic  freedoms 
cannot  but  have  a  negative  effect  on 
cooperation  with  those  countries. 

There,  unfortunately,  exists  a 
grave  situation  in  Bulgaria.  Policies  of 
forced  assimilation  and  repression 
against  Bulgarian  citizens  of  Turkish 
origin  have  continued  for  nearly  5 
years  in  contravention  of  the  Confer- 
ence on  Security  and  Cooperation  in 
Europe  (CSCE)  documents.  The  situa- 
tion has  now  assumed  a  new  dimension, 
with  the  expulsion  and  subsequent 
mass  emigration  of  ethnic  Turks,  re- 
sulting from  the  deliberate  deprivation 
of  their  basic  human  rights.  The  num- 
ber of  emigrants  has  now  exceeded 
250,000.  Thousands  of  new  divided  fam- 
ilies are  being  created. 

The  harsh  treatment  of  citizens 
of  Turkish  origin  in  Bulgaria  is  a  fla- 
grant violation  of  human  rights.  The  al- 
lies continue  to  keep  this  matter  under 
careful  review. 

The  allies  call  for  the  strict  observ- 
ance of  the  fundamental  rights  of  all 
Bulgarian  citizens  of  Turkish  origin,  in 
line  with  the  obligations  of  the  Bulgar- 
ian Government  under  relevant  interna- 
tional agreements,  and  for  a  mutually 
acceptable  solution  to  facilitate  the 
smooth  and  orderly  emigration  of  eth- 
nic Turks  wishing  to  go  to  Turkey  with 
their  rights  being  fully  protected. 

The  allies  call  upon  the  Bulgarian 
Government  to  respond  positively  to  in- 
ternational appeals  to  meet  its  respon- 
sibilities under  the  CSCE  documents. 


Greece  has  reserved  its  position  on 
the  above  statement.  Greece  stands  in 
an  unequivocal  manner  for  the  respect 
of  human  rights  and  fundamental  free- 
doms but  believes  that  their  application 
must  be  universal.  Moreover  Greece  re- 
served its  position  as  to  the  accurate  le- 
gal terminology  pertaining  to  Muslim 
minorities,  as  stipulated  in  interna- 
tional treaties. 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
AUG.  10,  1989- 

I  would  like  to  draw  your  attention  to 
a  special  statement  released  yesterday 
by  NATO  Secretary  Genei-al  Woerner, 
which  strongly  criticizes  the  Bulgarian 
Government  for  its  policy  of  forced  as- 
similation and  repression  of  its  ethnic 
Turkish  minority. 

You  are  all  aware  of  this  tragic  sit- 
uation. At  latest  count,  over  250,000 
Turks  have  fled  Bulgaria  for  Turkey  as 
a  result  of  this  policy,  which  is  a  fla- 
grant violation  of  human  rights  obliga- 
tions accepted  by  Bulgaria. 

The  United  States  feels  very 
strongly  that  the  Government  of  Bul- 
garia must  meet  its  human  rights 
obligations,  cease  the  religious  and  so- 
cial persecution  of  its  ethnic  Turkish 
minority,  and  provide  an  orderly 
departure — with  dignity  and  personal 
property — for  those  who  wish  to  leave 
Bulgaria. 

Together  with  our  NATO  allies, 
the  United  States  will  continue  to  seek 
every  opportunity  to  express  its  con- 
cern over  the  entire  Bulgarian  human 
rights  situation — involving  not  only  the 
problems  of  the  ethnic  Turkish  popula- 
tion but  of  individual  Bulgarian  human 
rights  activists  as  well. 


'  Made  on  behalf  of  the  NATO  members 
by  Secretary  General  Manfred  Woerner. 

-  Read  to  news  correspondents  by 
Department  spokesman  Margaret  DeB. 
TutwilerB 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


43 


MIDDLE  EAST 


U.S.  Diplomacy  in  the  IVIiddle  East 


by  John  H.  Kclli/ 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
oil  Europe  and  the  Middle  Eafit  of  the 
Hoiifse  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
Jtdij  U,  19S9.  Ambassador  Kelli/  is 
Assistant  Secretary  for  Near  Eastern 
and  South  Asian  Affairs.' 

I  am  ]jleased  to  appear  before  the 
subcommittee  today  to  discuss  recent 
developments  in  the  Middle  East.  I 
welcome  the  opportunity  to  begin  what 
I  hope  will  be  a  series  of  regular 
consultations  on  the  region.  Today,  I 
will  focus  on  the  Arab-Israeli  peace 
process,  Iran  and  the  Persian  Gulf,  and 
Lebanon. 

Arab-Israeli  Peace  Process 

A  longstanding  interest  of  the  United 
States  in  the  Middle  East  is  to  assist  in 
efforts  to  resolve  the  Arab-Israeli  con- 
flict through  direct  negotiations  based 
on  UN  Security  Council  Resolutions 
242  and  338.  This  approach  is  based  on 
key  principles,  including  that  of  the  ex- 
change of  territory  for  peace.  For  a 
settlement  to  be  achieved  and  to  be  du- 
rable, Israel  must  enjoy  security  with 
defensible  borders.  A  settlement  must 
provide  security  and  recognition  for  all 
states  in  the  region,  as  well  as  provid- 
ing for  the  legitimate  political  rights  of 
the  Palestinian  people. 

Principles  alone,  however,  will  not 
guarantee  a  settlement.  We  are  em- 
barked on  a  pragmatic  approach,  de- 
signed to  end  the  current  tragic  cycle 
of  confrontation  and  to  get  Israelis  and 
Palestinians  engaged  in  a  practical 
process.  An  authoritative  dialogue  be- 
tween Israelis  and  Palestinians  from 
the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  could  enable 
the  parties  to  break  down  walls  of  mis- 
trust, alter  their  risk  assessments,  and 
focus  on  ways  to  negotiate.  Such  a  dia- 
logue would  also  help  to  structure  elec- 
tions in  ordei-  to  launch  a  political 
process  involving  negotiations  on  inter- 
im arrangements  and  final  status  of  the 
occupied  territories.  Progress  on  those 
fundamental  issues  would  permit  reso- 
lution of  other  differences  that  now  sep- 
arate Israel  and  other  Arab  states. 
Two  factoi's  now  guide  oui'  thinking. 


First,  we  see  real  ojiportunities  re- 
sulting from  changed  thinking  in  the 
region.  Israelis  and  Palestinians  have 
begun  to  acknowledge  the  need  to  en- 
gage one  another  directly.  Israel  has 
l)ut  forward  a  constructive  initiative, 
which  for  the  first  time  addi'esses  Pal- 
estinians as  Israel's  key  negotiating 
partner.  The  PLO  [Palestine  Liberation 
Organization]  has  finally  accepted  UN 
Security  Council  Resolutions  242  and 
338  and  Israel's  right  to  exist.  Egypt 
has  gained  readmission  to  the  Arab 
League  without  compromising  its 
peace  with  Israel.  These  events  illus- 
trate changes  in  thinking  on  all  sides 
that  are  positive  and  worth  pursuing. 

Second,  however,  the  parties  con- 
tinue to  face  significant  obstacles  that 
have  blocked  progress  to  peacemaking 
in  the  past.  Gaps  between  positions  on 
substantive  issues  are  broad.  Mutual 
suspicions  between  the  parties  have 
been  heightened  by  violence,  and  lead- 
ers on  both  sides  face  divisions  within 
their  own  communities.  Under  these 
circumstances,  a  high  visibility  initia- 
tive by  an  outside  party  cannot  suc- 
ceed. Similarly,  premature  focus  on 
mechanisms  like  an  international  con- 
ference will  only  distract  the  parties 
from  the  difficult  decisions  they  must 
make  to  establish  a  la.sting  peace. 

It  is  within  this  context  that  we 
support  the  Government  of  Israel's 
peace  initiative.  The  Israeli  elections 
projjosal  is  a  serious  effort  that  we  en- 
dorse wholeheartedly.  It  holds  great 
promise  and  is  worth  building  upon. 
We  should  not  allow  ourselves  to  be  dis- 
tracted by  positions  that  do  not  ad- 
vance the  peace  process.  The  May  14 
proposal  adopted  by  the  Government  of 
Israel  is  a  serious  effort  to  engage  the 
Palestinians  directly  in  a  political 
process.  It  acknowledges  that  the  Pal- 
estinians have  political  rights  and  aspi- 
rations that  must  be  satisfied.  The 
initiative  deserves  a  serious  and  posi- 
tive response  from  the  Palestinians  and 
the  Arab  states. 

Many  questions  still  need  to  be  ad- 
dressed about  how  we  get  to  elections, 
the  elections  themselves,  and  the 
relationship  between  elections  and 
negotiations.  These  can  and  should  be 
discussed  in  an  Israeli-Palestinian  dia- 


logue, designed  to  pave  the  way  for 
elections  and  negotiations.  Beginning  a 
Palestinian-Israeli  dialogue  is  the  first  i 
priority. 

Let  me  say  a  word  here  about  the 
U.S.  dialogue  with  the  PLO.  Our  dia- 
logue with  the  PLO  is  not  an  end  in 
itself.  It  is  a  means  to  advance  a  practi- 
cal and  workable  peace  process.  In  bot-h 
formal  and  informal  meetings,  we 
press  the  PLO  to  give  practical  mean- 
ing to  its  commitments  of  last  Decem- 
ber: its  renunciation  of  terrorism  and 
its  recognition  of  the  existence  of  Isra- 
el. We  also  are  trying  to  moderate  PLQi 
positions  on  the  peace  process  and  cre- 
ate conditions  under  w'hich  the  Israeli 
Government  initiative  can  work.  We  arei 
not  trying  to  mediate  between  the  PLQl 
and  Israel.  We  are  seeking  to  deter- 
mine whether  the  PLO  is  ready  to  act 
responsibly  in  the  peace  process. 

I  have  no  major  breakthroughs  to 
report,  but  rather  the  continued  efforts 
of  our  diplomacy  to  move  all  sides  to- 
ward negotiations.  This  is  slow  and 
painstaking  work.  It  has  many  oppo- 
nents in  the  region,  who  seek  to  per- 
petuate the  conflict  rather  than  resolve 
it.  It  is,  nonetheless,  the  way  to  pro- 
ceed in  a  process  designed  to  promote 
our  national  interests  and  to  protect 
the  interests  of  our  friends,  both 
Israeli  and  Arab.  There  is  a  long  way  toi 
go.  I  remain  hopeful  that  we  can  build 
on  what  has  been  done  and  elicit  a  posi- 
tive Arab  and  Palestinian  response,  so 
that  elections  can  be  held  and  negotia- 
tions can  be  launched. 

Iran 

Elsewhere  in  the  Middle  East,  Iran 
continues  to  command  attention  be- 
cause of  its  size,  location,  and  influ- 
ence. It  is  too  early  to  assess  the 
impact  of  Khomeini's  passing  on  Iran's 
internal  politics.  The  leadershij)  moved 
quickly  in  an  outward  display  of  unity 
to  close  ranks  around  Khomeini's  suc- 
cessor. President  Khamenei,  but  Kho- 
meini's death  leaves  the  future  course 
of  Iran  unclear. 

It  is  too  early  to  tell  whether  Iran 
will  move  in  a  more  positive  direction. 
By  that  I  mean  whether  Iran  will  end 
its  supjjort  for  international  terrorism 


44 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989  i 


MIDDLE  EAST 


and  adhere  to  the  accepted  norms  of  in- 
ternational behavior,  and  whether  Iran 
will  use  its  influence  with  those  holding 
(lur  hostages  in  Lebanon  to  help  gain 
their  safe,  immediate,  and  uncondition- 
jal  release.  We  hope  so,  but  obviously 
jhave  no  assurance  it  will.  The  burden 
iof  proof  clearly  is  on  Iran  to  show  it  is 
prepared  to  behave  responsibly.  Ac- 
jtions  are  required,  not  words. 
I       We  are  following  developments  in 
Iran  closely.  We  continue  to  believe  it  is 
in  our  and  Iran's  interests  to  resume 
normal  relations.  President  Bush  has 
i-eiterated  this  position,  but  up  to  now 
we  have  had  no  meaningful  reply  from 
ITehran. 

Let  me  restate  for  the  record  our 
policy:  We  are  ready  to  talk  to  author- 
ized Iranian  Government  representa- 
tives without  preconditions.  However, 
:any  substantial  improvement  in  rela- 
tions will  require  an  end  to  Iranian 
support  for  terrorism  and  Iranian  help 
in  freeing  our  hostages. 

The  Persian  Gulf 

The  cease-fire  in  the  Persian  Gulf  has 
been  in  effect  now  for  close  to  1  year. 
Although  Iran  and  Iraq  have  not  signed 
a  peace  treaty  to  end  hostilities,  we  are 
pleased  that  the  cease-fire  continues  to 
hold.  We  continue  to  support  UN  ef- 
forts to  encourage  the  two  former  bel- 
liuerents  to  negotiate  seriously  and  to 
conclude  a  lasting  settlement. 

Since  I  have  restated  for  the  record 
our  policy  ris-a-ris  Iran,  let  me  do  the 
same  for  our  policy  toward  the  rest  of 
the  gulf.  The  United  States  recognizes 
that  the  Persian  Gulf  is  an  area  of  vital 
strategic  importance.  President  Bush 
and  this  Administration  are  committed 
to  defend  our  vital  interests  in  the 
larea:  the  free  passage  of  oil  through 
Jthe  Strait  of  Hormuz  and  the  security 
|of  friendly  regional  states.  This  com- 
.mitnient  is  as  firm  as  the  commitments 
of  the  Reagan  and  Carter  Administra- 
tions. The  Bush  Administration  is  sim- 
ilarly determined  to  defend  the 
principle  of  freedom  of  navigation  in 
the  Persian  Gulf  and  elsewhere. 

If  I  may  offer  a  personal  observa- 
tion, as  one  who  was  not  directly  in- 
volved in  the  formulation  of  our  gulf 
policy,  I  think  the  reason  our  policy  has 
;succeeded  over  the  years  is  that  there 
!has  been  a  bipartisan  consensus  that 
the  policy  meet  our  vital  national 
interests. 


The  security  of  our  interests  in  the 
gulf  rests  on  security  cooperation  with 
the  member  nations  of  the  Gulf  Cooper- 
ation Council,  including  arms  sales. 
During  our  escort  and  other  deterrent 
operations,  we  learned  daily  the  impor- 
tance of  "interoperability"  of  military 
equipment.  In  a  variety  of  ways,  we 
found  that  common  equipment,  similar 
training,  and  like-minded  planning 
greatly  enhanced  the  cooperation  and 
ultimate  success  of  our  efforts. 

Among  the  states  with  which  we 
enjoy  this  cooperation  is  Saudi  Arabia. 
We  will  be  pleased  to  welcome  King 
Fahd  on  a  state  visit  to  the  United 
States  July  26-30  [postponed  by  the 
Saudi  Government].  We  intend  to  re- 
view these  issues  with  him  when  he 
visits. 
Lebanon 

Moving  on  to  Lebanon,  let  me  begin  by 
saying  that  the  situation  in  Beirut  re- 
mains e.xtremely  volatile.  Both  sides 
accepted,  in  principle,  an  Arab  League 
call  for  a  cease-fire.  However,  sea  and 
land  blockades  continue.  A  crossing 
was  opened  in  Beirut  last  week,  but  the 
sea  blockade  remains  unresolved  over 
the  issue  of  arms  shipments.  These 
blockades  have  caused  severe  shortages 
of  fuel  and  food,  particularly  in  the 
Christian  enclave  of  east  Beirut. 

The  cease-fire  remains  unfulfilled. 
Shelling  continues  on  a  daily  basis.  The 
United  States  strongly  urges  an  end  to 
the  involvement  of  foreign  forces  and 
restraint  in  the  shipment  of  arms  from 
foreign  sources. 

On  June  14,  the  President  met  with 
Prince  Sa'ud  al-Faisal,  Foreign  Minis- 
ter of  Saudi  Arabia,  to  discuss  the  ef- 
forts of  the  Arab  League  to  resolve  the 
Lebanon  crisis.  The  President  wel- 
comed the  collective  efforts  of  the  lead- 
ers of  Saudi  Arabia,  Morocco,  and 
Algeria.  He  expressed  our  support  for 
their  mandate  to  pursue,  urgently,  a 
political  process  in  Lebanon  that  leads 
to  elections,  reforms,  and  a  new  nation- 
al consensus. 

The  United  States  intends  to  do  all 
it  can  to  promote  a  political  solution 
that  will  bring  Lebanon's  turmoil  to  an 
end.  We  believe  a  political  dialogue 
among  the  Lebanese  is  essential  for 
Lebanon  to  regain  its  stability  and  se- 
curity. Such  a  dialogue  is  a  necessary 
step  toward  resolution  of  Lebanon's  suf- 
fering, which  has  gone  on  far  too  long. 


All  parties  to  the  conflict  should  show 
restraint  and  flexibility  at  this  crucial 
point.  All  concerned  should  promote  a 
political  process  that  is  devoid  of 
threats  and  coercion  and  that  leads  to 
national  reconciliation  and  reform.  The 
goal  of  all  friends  of  Lebanon  must  be  a 
reunited  and  sovereign  country — free 
of  foreign  forces  and  armed  militias — 
in  which  the  Lebanese  people  live  in 
harmony. 

Ballistic  Missiles 

and  Chemical  Weapons 

One  further  issue  of  serious  concern  to 
us  in  the  Middle  East  and  South  Asia  is 
the  spread  of  ballistic  missiles  and 
chemical  weapons.  These  weapons  raise 
the  threat  of  violence  to  a  new  order  of 
magnitude  in  a  region  in  which  strong 
conventional  military  forces  already 
exist  and  the  potential  for  conflict  is 
high. 

Ballistic  missiles  with  ranges  of  up 
to  2,500  kilometers  (1,552  miles)  are 
now  entering  the  inventories  of  several 
states  in  the  region.  The  presence  of 
these  weapons  may  encourage  potential 
adversaries  to  launch  preemptive  at- 
tacks or  to  acquire  similar  weapons  as 
a  deterrent.  This  prospect  becomes 
even  more  troubling  when  linked  to  the 
proliferation  of  chemical  warfare 
agents.  The  need  for  concerted  and  en- 
ergetic action  has  been  dramatically  il- 
lustrated by  the  use  of  chemical 
weapons  by  both  parties  in  the  Iran- 
Iraq  war,  by  Iraq's  use  of  chemical 
weapons  against  elements  of  its  own 
population,  and  by  Libya's  attempts  to 
acquire  full-scale  chemical  weapons 
production  capability.  The  Administra- 
tion is  at  the  forefront  of  such  action, 
encouraging  the  coordination  of  export 
controls  through  the  informal  missile 
technology  control  regime,  and  pursu- 
ing efforts  to  contain  chemical  weapons 
proliferation. 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee  and 
will  be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402. ■ 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


45 


NARCOTICS 


Cuba  and  Narcotics  Trafficking 


by  Mi'h'yn  Levitsky 

Statement  before  the  SiibcuiiiDiittee 
oil  Terrorism,  Narcotics,  and  Interna- 
tional Communications  of  the  Senate 
Foreign  Relations  Committee  on 
■Juhj  20,  1989.  Ambassador  Levitsky  is 
Assistant  Secretary  for  International 
Narcotics  Matters.^ 

Before  getting  into  the  main  body  of 
my  testimony,  let  me  summarize  our 
policy  with  regard  to  Cuba  and  drug 
smuggling. 

First,  we  approach  our  dealings 
with  Cuba  on  the  drug  issue  with  pru- 
dence and  a  great  deal  of  skepticism 
based  on  past  performance. 

Second,  our  counternarcotics  ef- 
forts are  pursued  on  all  fronts.  Our 
])urpose  is  to  enlist  the  cooperation  of 
all  countries  in  working  against  the 
cultivation,  production,  trafficking, 
and  usage  of  illegal  drugs. 

Third,  we  believe  Cuba,  like  all 
other  countries,  should  be  expected  to 
halt  the  flow  of  narcotics.  This  is  re- 
flected in  UN  membership  and  in  gen- 
eral international  principle. 

Fourth,  our  concern  about  narcot- 
ics smuggling  through  Cuba — and  there 
is  no  doulDt  that  Cuba  is  a  transit  point 
in  the  illegal  drug  flow — stands  on  its 
own.  It  does  not  affect  other  areas  of 
the  relationship.  As  the  President  said 
on  May  22  and  June  28  of  this  year,  our 
basic  relationship  with  Cuba  will  not 
change  until  Cuba  ceases  systematic 
violation  of  human  rights,  its  military 
and  other  support  for  violent  anti- 
democratic groups,  and  its  relationship 
with  the  Soviet  tjnion  which  is  harmful 
to  our  interests. 

Finally,  Cuba  has  had  ample  op- 
portunity to  cooperate  in  stemming  the 
flow  of  drugs  to  the  United  States.  Our 
policy  will  be  to  put  Cuba  to  the  test 
and  to  see  if  the  Cuban  Government's 
actions  match  its  words.  Again,  we  will 
do  so  with  prudence  and  with  our  eyes 
open.  We  are  not  naive  about  Cuba. 

This  Administration  is  thoroughly 
committed  to  the  war  on  drug  traffick- 
ing, which  causes  our  people  untold 
grief  and  costs  billions  each  year.  A 
wide  range  of  Federal  agencies  are  en- 
gaged in  combatting  this  scourge,  in- 
cluding law  enforcement  agencies  such 
as  the  Drug  Enforcement  Administra- 
tion, the  U.S.  Coast  Guard,  the  U.S. 


Customs  Service,  and  State  and  local 
police  forces.  The  Department  of  State 
is  deeply  involved  in  this  effort,  work- 
ing with  these  agencies  and  foreign 
governments  to  stem  the  flow  of  nar- 
cotics into  the  United  States. 

The  consumption  of  cocaine  and 
other  coca  derivatives,  such  as  "crack," 
has  increased  dramatically  in  this 
country.  Most  of  the  cocaine  consumed 
in  the  United  States  is  produced  in  the 
Andean  countries  of  South  America 
and  much  is  shipped  by  boat  or  plane 
across  the  Caribbean  to  destinations  in 
Florida  and  along  our  east  and  gulf 
coasts.  We  have  made  a  major  commit- 
ment to  interdicting  this  traffic. 

As  you  can  see  from  looking  at  a 
map,  it  stands  amidst  some  of  the  pri- 
mary illicit  drug  routes  into  the  United 
States,  and  its  territory  has  been  used 
by  traffickers  as  a  transshipment 
point.  Although  it  is  difficult  to  gauge 
the  amount  of  trafficking  that  takes 
place  in  Cuba,  we  note  a  marked  in- 
crease in  reported  drug  trafficking 
incidents  in  Cuban  territory  during 
the  first  half  of  1989. 

The  Cuban  Government  has  re- 
fused to  cooperate  with  its  neighbors  in 
the  international  effort  to  stop  the  flow 
of  drugs.  For  years  Fidel  Castro  has 
denied  involvement  by  any  Cuban  of- 
ficials in  the  drug  trade  since  the 
revolution. 

The  United  States  cooperates  on 
narcotics  interdiction  with  many  gov- 
ernments and  attempts  to  involve  all 
nations  in  this  global  struggle.  The  So- 
viet Union,  for  instance,  recently  en- 
tered into  a  cooperative  relationship 
with  us  to  fight  drugs.  Despite  our  se- 
rious reservations  about  Cuban  inten- 
tions, we  are  taking  a  fresh  look  at 
areas  in  which  the  Government  of  Cuba 
could  tangibly  demonstrate  the  serious- 
ness of  its  claimed  willingness  to  coop- 
erate against  drug  trafficking.  We  will 
judge  Cuba  by  its  actions,  not  by  its 
words.  I  would  like  to  turn  to  some  of 
the  issues  that  have  been  raised  in  the 
wake  of  recent  developments. 

Summary  of  Recent  Events 

In  an  unprecedented  move  June  1(5,  the 
official  Cuban  press  accused  Gen.  Ar- 
naldo  Ochoa  and  other  officers  of  nar- 
cotics trafficking.  This  is  the  first  time 
the  Government  of  Cuba  has  admitted 
official  Cuban  involvement  in  the  di-ug 


trade.  The  official  press  stated  that 
agreements  were  concluded  between 
Cuban  officers  and  Colombian  drug 
traffickers  and  that  joint  drug  smug- 
gling operations  were  carried  out, 
including  airdrops,  drug  plane  refuel- 
ings,  and  drug  plane  offloadings,  in 
Cuban  territory  over  the  past  2  years. 

In  total  14  officials  were  arrested. 
The  list  was  headed  by  Ochoa,  an  Inte- 
rior Ministry  general  and  Interior  Min- 
istry Col.  Antonio  de  la  Guardia.  The 
accused  were  brought  before  a  military 
court,  which  sentenced  Ochoa  and 
three  others  to  death  July  7,  although 
drug  trafficking  is  not  a  capital  offense 
in  Cuba.  They  were  executed  July  13. 

During  the  trial,  Fidel  Castro  re- 
newed his  previous  calls  for  dialogue 
with  the  United  States  on  how  to  coop- 
erate to  prevent  the  use  of  Cuban  air- 
space and  territory  by  traffickers 
delivering  drugs  to  the  U.S.  market. 
Castro  also  claimed,  inaccurately,  that 
the  United  States  had  known  about  Cu- 
ban officials'  drug  trafficking  activities* 
but  had  not  shared  the  information 
with  the  Cuban  Government. 

Trial  and  Execution  " 

of  Drug  Traffickers 

Only  Fidel  Castro  can  definitively  an- 
swer the  question  as  to  why  Ochoa  was 
sacked.  We  have  no  information  linking 
Ochoa  to  drug  trafficking,  although  we 
cannot  rule  out  that  possibility.  We  be- 
lieve it  unlikely  that  Castro  could  have 
been  unaware  of  high-level  official  Cu- 
ban involvement  in  narcotics  traffick- 
ing. Ochoa  may  have  been  sacked  and 
executed  for  other  reasons.  We  must 
await  further  informed  analysis  to  de- 
termine what  motivated  Castro  to  act 
against  these  individuals  at  this  time. 
We  have  reports  linking  some  of 
the  14  accused  officers  to  drug  smug- 
gling operations.  Cuban  disclosures 
confirm  links  between  De  la  Guardia 
and  other  Interior  Ministry  officials 
and  Reinaldo  Ruiz,  a  drug  smuggler 
who  pleaded  guilty  to  trafficking  in  a 
U.S.  court  in  March  1989.  We  also  have 
reports  detailing  drug  smuggling  oper- 
ations similiar  in  location  and  type 
to  those  described  by  official  Cuban 
sources  during  the  drug  scandal.  Agair 
it  is  hard  to  believe  that  the  Castro  re- 
gime was  unaware  of  such  allegedly  ex- 
tensive involvement  of  its  most  senior 
officials  and  agencies,  and  it  is  unclear 


46 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  19891 


NARCOTICS 


what  motivated  the  sudden  "revela- 
tions" and  i)unishment  of  these  alleged 
activities. 

The  case  against  Ochoa,  De  la 
Guardia,  and  the  others  was  a  carefully 
choreographed  show  trial  from  begin- 
ning to  end.  When  the  first  newspaper 
editorial  appeared  and  charged  drug 
itrafficking,  the  end  result  was  obvious: 
The  accused  would  be  found  guilty.  The 
only  real  question  throughout  the  pro- 
ceedings was  whether  the  accused 
would  be  e.xecuted.  It  is  also  an  indica- 
tion of  the  fairness  of  the  trial  that  one 
of  the  officers  who  sat  in  judgment  of 
I  Ochoa  is  himself  a  fugitive  from  U.S. 
'justice,  under  indictment  for  drug 
Itrafficking. 

Castro's  Motivation 

There  are  few  available  facts  to  support 
sijeculation  that  Ochoa  was  a  political 
threat  to  Castro  and  that  the  house- 
ilfaning  of  the  Interior  IWinistry  shows 
that  the  Cuban  Government  is  in  trou- 
ble. Castro  deftly  managed  the  show 
trial  and  apjiears  to  have  been  in  firm 
command  throughout  the  incident.  At 
the  same  time,  it  does  not  seem  cred- 
ible that  the  e.xecution  of  Ochoa  and 
others  was  motivated  only  by  a  sudden 
"discovery"  of  drug  involvement  on 
their  part. 

The  defendants  at  the  trial  pre- 
dictably absolved  Fidel  and  Raul 
Casti'o  of  any  foreknowledge  or  cul- 
pability in  their  drug  dealings.  We  seri- 
ously doubt  that  drug  trafficking  by 
high-level  Ministry  of  Interior  officials 
as  described  in  the  trial  could  have 
gone  on  for  2  years,  as  claimed  in  the 
trial  proceedings,  without  the  knowl- 
edge and  possibly  approval  of  the  Cas- 
tro brothers.  We  find  it  hard  to  believe 
that  the  Castros  were  unaware  of  any 
deals  of  this  magnitude  only  days  be- 
fore they  were  made  public.  After  all, 
our  concerns  on  this  issue  were  a  mat- 
ter of  public  record,  reiterated  most  re- 
cently in  our  March  1  international 
narcotics  control  strategy  report. 

U.S.  Knowledge  and  Interests 

We  have  had  reports  of  drug  trafficking 
in  Cuba  and  of  Cuban  official.'^'  involve- 
ment with  narcotics  smuggling  since 
the  eai'ly  1980s  and  have  raised  this 
matter  on  numerous  occasions  before 
the  Congress  and  elsewhere.  For  e.xam- 
plt-',  as  early  as  March  12,  1982,  Thomas 
Eiiders,  then  Assistant  Secretary  for 
Inter-American  Affairs,  stated  before 
the  Subcommittee  on  Security  and  Ter- 


Emergency  Package 
for  Colombia's  Drug  Fight 


PRESIDENTS  STATEMENT. 
AUG.  25,  19891 

At  the  request  of  President  Barco  and 
in  order  to  support  the  Government  of 
Colombia  in  its  battle  against  narcotics 
traffickers,  I  have  today  decided  to 
authorize  a  .$6.5  million  emergency  anti- 
drug support  package  for  the  Colom- 
bian police  and  military.  The  package 
will  include  equipment  for  police  and 
military  personnel,  with  initial  ship- 
ments to  arrive  as  early  as  next  week. 
In  addition,  it  will  include  aircraft  and 
helicopters  to  improve  the  mobility  of 
Colombian  forces  engaged  in  the  anti- 
drug effort.  The  package  was  developed 
over  the  last  few  days  during  which 
there  was  close  consultation  between 
President  Barco  and  myself  and  among 
our  key  advisers. 

No  U.S.  troops  have  been  re- 
quested by  the  Colombian  Government. 
We  will  provide  only  materiel  support 
and  training.  The  United  States  has 
complete  confidence  in  the  capability  of 
the  Colombian  police  and  military  to 
deal  with  this  situation. 

The  support  package  will  be  made 
available  under  the  provisions  of  the 
1986  Foreign  Assistance  Act  which 
enables  the  President  to  direct  the 
Department  of  Defense  to  provide 
military  equipment  and  services  to 
a  foreign  country  in  the  event  of  an 
emergency. 


In  addition  to  this  emergency 
assistance  and  the  funds  being  pro- 
vided under  the  Justice  Department's 
judicial  protection  program,  I  will  au- 
thorize an  expanded  police  and  mili- 
tary assistance  program  for  FY  1990 
which  will  provide  an  increased  level 
of  support  for  the  Colombian  Govern- 
ment's ongoing  antidrug  efforts. 

The  recent  wave  of  assassinations 
and  threats  by  the  drug  cartel  against 
all  Colombians  who  cooperate  and  Pres- 
ident Barco's  antidrug  crackdown 
makes  it  clear  that  it  is  time  for  the 
United  States  and  other  countries  of 
the  world  to  stand  with  President  Bar- 
co during  his  coui'ageous  challenge  to 
these  insidious  forces  that  thi'eaten  the 
very  fabric  of  Colombian  society. 

We  intend  to  work  closely  with  the 
Colombian  Government  to  bring  to  jus- 
tice those  responsible  for  the  scourge  of 
drug  trafficking  and  will  continue  in 
our  efforts  to  assist  the  Colombian  ef- 
fort to  provide  protection  for  judges 
and  other  Colombian  officials  who  are 
on  the  front  line  of  the  war  against 
drugs.  The  Departments  of  State  and 
.Justice  are  working  closely  with  their 
Colombian  counterparts  on  extradition 
matters. 


'  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Pres- 
idential Documents  of  Aug.  28,  1989. ■ 


rorism  of  the  Senate  Judiciary  Commit- 
tee that  "for  the  first  time,  we  now  also 
have  detailed  and  reliable  information 
linking  Cuba  to  trafficking  in  narcotics 
as  well  as  arms."  Obviously,  we  are 
unable  to  share  intelligence  informa- 
tion with  the  Cubans  without  putting 
sources  and  methods  at  risk,  but  our 
conclusions  are  available. 

Four  high-level  Cuban  officials 
were  indicted  in  Miami  in  1982  for 
involvement  in  drug  trafficking.  Infor- 
mation from  those  indictments  was  a 
matter  of  public  record  and  was  pro- 
vided to  the  Cuban  Government,  but  so 
far  the  Cubans  have  not  investigated 
the  allegations,  nor  have  they  caused 
the  officials  in  question  to  come  to  the 
United  States  to  stand  trial.  Rather 
they  have  simply  denounced  our  indict- 


ments as  politically  motivated  without 
any  pretense  of  even  looking  into  the 
merits  of  the  charges.  Other  non-Cuban 
defendants  in  this  case  were  convicted. 
Cuba  also  figures  prominently  as  a  co- 
caine transshipment  point  in  Federal 
indictments  handed  down  in  February 
1988  and  April  1989.  Reinaldo  and 
Ruben  Ruiz,  the  top  defendants  in  the 
1988  case,  pleaded  guilty.  Also  in  1988, 
a  former  Panamanian  intelligence  aide 
to  Gen.  Noriega  testified  publicly  be- 
fore the  Senate  that  Fidel  Castro  me- 
diated a  drug-related  dispute  between 
Noriega  and  key  Colombian  traffickers. 
It  is  clear  that  recent  developments 
in  Cuba  have  raised  many  questions. 
We  do  not  yet  have  all  of  the  answers. 
Only  time  will  tell  whether  the  sudden 
professed  Cuban  commitment  to  the 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


47 


NARCOTICS 


war  on  drugs  is  genuine,  or  whether 
this  is  just  another  issue  they  want  to 
play  politics  w'ith.  Some  evidence  sug- 
gests that  Cuba  simultaneously  facili- 
tates the  flow  of  drugs  in  selected 
cases  while  prosecuting  other  cases 
to  conviction. 

The  indicators  of  high-level  Cuban 
involvement  in  drug  trafficking,  includ- 
ing those  that  predate  recent  events, 
cause  us  to  question  seriously  the  po- 
tential for  working  with  a  government 
that  could  use  the  information  we  pro- 
vide against  us.  The  history  of  coop- 
eration with  Cuba  is  not  reassuring. 
In  the  cases  of  both  the  1973  hijacking 
agreement  and  the  1984  migration 
agreement,  Cuba  has  abrogated  its 
commitments  when  it  suited  its 
interests. 

E.xchanges  with  Cuban  officials  on 
drug  issues  have  occurred  in  the  course 
of  our  normal  contacts,  even  before  the 
current  drug  scandal.  Despite  Fidel 
Castro's  claim  that  Cuba  was  ready  to 
cooperate  with  the  United  States  on 
drugs  to  a  visiting  U.S.  Congressman 
late  last  year,  when  asked  for  clarifica- 
tion, Cuban  officials  subsequently  stat- 
ed that  they  had  no  specific  proposals 
on  the  subject  in  mind.  They  did  not 
encourage  further  exchanges  on  this 
issue.  While  we  do  not  make  public  de- 
tails of  our  private  conversations  with 
other  governments,  I  can  tell  you  that 
we  have  asked  the  Government  of  Cuba 
for  the  results  of  its  investigation  into 
drug  smuggling  by  Cuban  officials  so 
that  w'e  can  review  them  and  take  ap- 
propriate action  on  activities  that  may 
involve  violations  of  U.S.  law. 

Despite  our  longstanding  concerns, 
the  high  priority  the  United  States  at- 
taches to  drug  interdiction  and  Cuba's 
geographic  pro.ximity  and  strategic  lo- 
cation have  caused  us  to  consider  non- 
political  avenues  to  stimulate  serious 


enforcement  action  on  the  part  of  Cuba 
that  would  serve  our  interests.  We  are 
closely  monitoring  Cuban  interdiction 
efforts  to  see  if  Cuban  actions  match 
Cuban  officials'  claims  that  their  gov- 
ernment is,  indeed,  serious  about  com- 
batting narcotics  trafficking. 

Cuban  Actions 

The  Cubans  can  take  a  number  of  posi- 
tive steps  right  away  to  demonstrate 
their  sincerity.  We  are  making  this 
clear  to  them  directly. 

•  They  can  undertake  serious,  uni- 
lateral interdiction  efforts  against  drug 
traffickers,  which,  after  all,  are  in 
their  own  best  interests.  Their  rec- 
ord of  selective  enforcement  is  not 
satisfactory. 

•  They  can  respond  quickly  to  re- 
ports of  airdrops  or  other  suspicious  ac- 
tivities in  their  territory.  Their  record 
is  not  satisfactory. 

•  They  can  take  action  regarding 
the  persons  charged  in  the  U.S.  indict- 
ments. To  date,  they  have  done  nothing 
but  protest  the  indictments. 

•  They  can  share  with  us  the  re- 
sults of  their  investigations  of  Ochoa 
and  others.  To  date  they  have  not  re- 
plied to  our  suggestion  that  they  do  so. 

•  They  should  stop  propping  up 
an  indicted  drug  dealer  in  Panama — 
Noriega. 

Enforcement  against  narcotics 
traffickers  is  a  subject  that  requires 
action,  not  dialogue.  Existing  channels 
of  communication  are  fully  adequate  to 
the  task  if  Cuba  has  the  will  to  move 
vigorously  against  traffickers. 

One  final  note  of  caution.  Castro 
has  stonewalled  us  and  the  rest  of  the 
world  in  this  issue  for  many  years.  We 
must  not — in  our  haste  to  further  the 
war  on  drugs — rush  into  a  situation 
which  might  give  his  government  polit- 
ical and  other  benefits  without  corre- 
sponding advantage  for  ourselves  in 
the  struggle  against  narcotics  traffick- 
ing. We  must  not  allow  Castro  to  clean 
up  his  image  without  cleaning  up  his 
act. 


Make  no  mistake.  We  are  not  naive i 
about  Cuba.  Thirty  years  of  dealing 
with  Cuban  intransigence  and  decep- 
tion have  taught  us  a  number  of  lessons.' 
While  we  are  willing  to  look  at  even  the 
toughest  problems  with  an  open  mind 
to  see  if  an  arrangement  could  be 
worked  out  that  would  benefit  the 
United  States  and  its  people,  we  don't 
intend  to  be  pushed  prematurely  into 
decisions  that  could  work  against  our 
interests.  We  are  committed  to  routing 
out  high-level  drug  traffickers  and  ex- 
posing government  complicity  in  drug 
trafficking. 

We  still  do  not  like  what  we  see 
of  the  Cuban  reality  in  drugs,  human 
rights,  support  for  antidemocratic 
groups,  and  so  on.  Nor  do  we  believe 
that  Cuba  should  be  rewarded  if  its 
sudden  interest  in  drugs  proves  to  be 
genuine.  By  cracking  down  on  drug 
trafficking,  Cuba  would  finally  be  liv- 
ing up  to  its  international  obligation. 
When  it  comes  to  fighting  drugs,  vir- 
tue is  its  own  reward.  After  all,  events i 
have  proven  that  Cuba,  in  spite  of  its 
protestations  to  the  contrary,  is  no 
more  immune  to  the  scourge  of  narcot- 
ics than  the  rest  of  the  world. 

In  addition,  the  burden  is  on  Cas- 
tro to  prove  Cuba  is  ready  to  make  a 
contribution  to  the  war  on  drugs.  For 
many  years  Cuba  has  stonewalled  us 
and  the  rest  of  the  world  on  drugs.  The 
United  States  has  nothing  to  prove. 

As  President  Bush  said  in  a  June  2f 
interview  published  in  The  Miami  Her- 
ald, Castro's  apparent  antidrug  effort 
will  not  move  the  United  States  to  seek 
improved  relations  with  Cuba,  as  long 
as  our  serious  concerns  about  Cuban 
behavior  internally  and  externally  re- 
main unresolved.  The  burden  of  proof 
lies  with  Fidel  Castro. 


'  The  complete  tran.script  of  the  hear- 
ine-s  will  be  published  by  the  committee  and 
will  be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents.  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20520.B 


48 


NARCOTICS 


Global  Narcotics  Cooperation 
and  Presidential  Certification 


/)//  .{nil  B.  Wrobleski 

Statement  before  the  Suljconniuttee 
on  Terroi-isni,  Narcotics,  and  Interna- 
tional Communications  of  the  Senate 
Foreign  Relations  Committee  on  April 
5,  1989.  Miss  Wrobleski  is  Assistant 
Secretary  for  International  Narcotics 
Matters.^ 

The  Bureau  of  International  Narcotics 
Matters  will  provide  testimony  today, 
in  behalf  of  the  Department  of  State, 
concerning  the  determinations  on  nar- 
cotics cooperation,  which  President 
Bush  certified  to  Congress  on  March  1 
and  on  the  International  Narcotics 
Control  Strategy  Report  (INCSR), 
which  provides  the  basis  for  those 
decisions. 


SUMMARY  OF 
RECOMMENDATIONS 

President  Bush  certified  The  Bahamas, 
Belize,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Colombia,  Ecua- 
dor, Hong  Kong,  India,  Jamaica, 
Malaysia,  Mexico,  Morocco,  Nigeria, 
Pakistan,  Paraguay,  Peru,  and  Thai- 
land. The  President  gave  a  national  in- 
terest certification  to  Lebanon  and 
denied  certification  to  Burma,  Laos, 
Panama,  Syria,  Iran,  and  Afghanistan. 

But  the  Administration  did  much 
more  than  simply  certify  cooperating 
countries.  President  Bush,  in  effect, 
gave  four  ratings:  certification,  cer- 
tification with  explanations,  national 
interest  certification,  and  denial  of 
certification.  The  President  provided 
special  statements  explaining  the  certi- 
fications of  The  Bahamas,  Bolivia,  Co- 
lombia, Mexico,  Paraguay,  and  Peru. 
Secretary  Baker,  in  a  special  letter  to 
Congress  [March  1,  1989],  said  that  he 
and  Pi-esident  Bush  "are  both  deeply 
troubled  by  the  state  of  affairs  upon 
which  he  based  his  certification  deci- 
sions. Despite  the  hard  work  and  dedi- 
cation of  many  public  servants  and 
private  citizens,  both  here  and  abroad, 
the  international  war  on  narcotics  is 
clearly  not  being  won.  In  fact,  in  some 
areas  we  appear  to  be  slipping 
backwards." 

"Nonetheless,"  the  Secretary  con- 
tinued, "we  present  you  these  certifica- 


tions in  good  faith  in  the  hope  that  we 
can  work  together  against  the  drug 
menace.  For  six  countries,  there  are 
statements  that  explain  the  certifica- 
tion while  acknowledging  that  each 
of  the  six  can  and  must  do  more  in  the 
future  to  end  the  drug  trade." 

With  respect  to  denial  of  certifica- 
tion, let  me  note  that  aid  is  not  a  factor 
in  Syria,  Iran,  and  Laos  or  with  the 
Government  of  Afghanistan;  aid  had 
been  previously  suspended  to  Burma 
and  Panama.  Laos  is  reportedly  seek- 
ing a  loan  through  the  Asian  Develop- 
ment Bank,  which  will  have  to  be 
opposed.  We  do  have  a  continuing  in- 
terest in  POW/MI A  [prisoner  of  war/ 
missing  in  action]  investigations  with 
Laos,  which  was  the  basis  for  the  pre- 
vious national  interest  certification. 
However,  we  felt  that  the  information 
we  had  concerning  official  involvement 
was  compelling,  given  the  require- 
ments under  Section  2013(b).  Trade 
sanctions  are  discretionary  to  the 
President,  and  no  recommendations  are 
made  affirmative  or  negative  on  trade 
sanctions  for  the  six  countries  denied 
certification. 


1988  IN  SUMMARY 

Our  annual  report  was  submitted  to 
Congress  on  March  1  and,  for  the  bene- 
fit of  this  hearing  record  and  for  those 
in  the  audience  who  have  not  read  the 
INCSR,  my  testimony  presents  the 
major  findings  in  the  report. 

Several  critical  milestones  were 
met  during  1988.  Peru  eradicated  .5,130 
hectares  of  coca — possibly  offsetting 
for  the  first  time  any  expansion  of 
Peru's  coca  crop  which  has  been  in- 
creasing by  an  estimated  10%  a  year. 
Bolivia  exceeded  its  coca  eradication 
targets  ahead  of  schedule  and  passed 
landmark  legislation  which  outlaws 
coca  cultivation  in  most  of  that  country. 
Colombia  seized  23  metric  tons  of  co- 
caine, while  The  Bahamas  seized  10 
tons  of  cocaine.  The  year  1988  pre- 
sented some  opportunities  for 
progress: 


•  The  election  of  new  governments 
in  Mexico  and  Pakistan: 

•  Evidence  of  greater  international 
willingness  to  assist  nations  facing 
problems  with  drug  production  and 
trafficking;  and 

•  The  growing  awareness  among 
developing  nations  now  faced  with  drug 
abuse  epidemics  that  inaction  can  no 
longer  be  tolerated. 

We  have  seen  a  new  willingness  by 
nations  to  work  together  at  the  United 
Nations,  at  the  economic  summit,  and 
on  regional  initiatives,  actions  which 
will  have  consequences  for  narcotics 
control  in  South  America.  Nations  rec- 
ognize that  they  cannot  confront  the 
l)roblem  alone,  that  one  nation's  prog- 
ress has  generally  resulted  in  a  shift  in 
production  and  traffic  to  more  vulner- 
able, less  vigilant  nations. 

However,  there  were  disappoint- 
ments in  1988:  the  continuing  expansion 
of  the  Andes  coca  crop,  particularly  in 
Bolivia,  and  the  slow  progress  of  An- 
dean governments  in  agreeing  upon 
strategies  which  include  wide-scale  her- 
bicidal  eradication.  Central  to  a  viable 
cocaine  control  strategy  is  destruction 
of  a  good  percentage  of  South  America's 
coca  crop,  an  objective  which  cannot  be 
achieved  through  manual  eradication. 
In  1988  farmers  in  Peru,  Bolivia,  Co- 
lombia, and  Ecuador  cultivated  193,136 
hectares  of  coca;  manual  eradication 
destroyed  6,896  hectares,  or  nearly  4% 
of  the  coca  acreage  in  these  countries. 

U.S.  policymakers  were  con- 
fronted once  again  in  1988  by  the 
reality  that  political  and  economic  in- 
stability in  drug-producing  areas  can 
subordinate  drug  control  agendas  to 
other  pressing  concerns.  Narcotics  pro- 
duction and  trafficking  often  go  hand- 
in-hand  with  enormous  social  and  polit- 
ical problems. 

Expansion  of  the  world's  opium 
crop,  especially  in  politically  inacces- 
sible areas  threatens  to  increase  U.S. 
heroin  supplies.  There  is  concern 
among  some  domestic  drug  abuse  ex- 
perts that  heroin  popularity  will  rise 
partly  as  a  result  of  the  highly  pub- 
licized negative  consequences  of  crack 
and  of  increased  production  in  South- 
east and  Southwest  Asia. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


49 


NARCOTICS 


On  the  positive  side,  marijuana 
production  continues  to  decline  in  tra- 
ditional K'l'owing  areas  in  Colombia,  Ja- 
maica, and  Belize,  although  Colombia 
experienced  an  increase  in  new  areas. 
Ironically,  reduction  in  international 
marijuana  supplies  puts  the  United 
Slates  in  the  indefensible  position  of 
being  a  major  supjilier  to  the  domestic 
and  international  market. 


(;()AL:  COCAINE 

Over  (iO''/(  of  the  Bureau  of  Internation- 
al Narcotics  Matters  overseas  narcotics 
control  budget  is  dedicated  to  cocaine 
control  with  the  objective  of  reducing 
cocaine  imports  by  50'/^  by  199:].  This 
year's  brightest  news  comes  from  Peru, 
where  against  tremendous  odds,  4 
months  of  concentrated  manual  erad- 
ication resulted  in  the  destruction  of 
5,180  hectares,  eliminating  a  potential 
10  metric  tons  of  cocaine  from  the  in- 
tei-national  market  and  possibly  stabi- 
lizing coca  e.xjiansion  in  Peru  foi-  the 
first  time.  However,  the  exjumsion  of 
tile  Andean  coca  crop  in  Bolivia  and 
Colombia  and  modest  gains  in  eradica- 
tion make  1988  a  year  of  mixed  results. 
Despite  some  encouraging  efforts  on 
the  part  of  the  Bolivian  Government, 
coca  cultivation  in  that  country  ex- 
panded during  this  |)ast  year,  from  an 
estimated  :'.9,2.5(S  hectares  in  1987  to 
48,500  hectares  after  eradication:  this 
represents  an  increase  in  hectarage  of 
more  than  209^  in  1  year.  Coca  cultiva- 
tion also  increased  slightly  in  Colombia 
fi-om  25,000  hectares  to  approximately 
27,280  hectares. 

The  success  of  our  cocaine  control 
strategy  overseas  depends  on  several 
U.S.  (Jovernment  agencies  working  to- 
gether. The  strategy  incorporates 
eradication,  enforcement,  training, 
public  diplomacy,  and  development 
assistance.  The  Bureau  of  Internation- 
al Narcotics  Matters  airwing,  manda- 
ted by  Congress,  is  fully  operational  in 
South  America  sujjporting  coca  and 
marijuana  control  opei'ations.  During 
FY  1989,  the  airwing  inventory  will 
have  54  aii'craft,  including  a  mix  of  he- 
licopters, utility  aircraft,  fixed-wing 
s|)ray  planes,  and  three  C-128  trans- 
ports. In  conjunction  with  host  country 
officials,  the  Bureau  of  International 
Narcotics  Matters  and  DEA  (Drug  En- 
forcement Administration]  utilize  the 
aircraft  for  aerial  eradication  of  drug 
crops,  transporting  eradication  work- 
ers and  U.S.  and  host  country  law  en- 
forcement i)ersonnel,  training  foreign 
pilots  in  spray  technicjues,  and  trans- 
porting e(|uipment. 


The  Drug  Enforcement  Adminis- 
tration works  with  law  enforcement  of- 
ficials in  South  and  Central  America  in 
an  advisory  capacity;  'Operation  Snow- 
cap,'  a  multicountry,  multifaceted  co- 
caine control  operation,  is  central  to 
our  cocaine  strategy.  Snowcap  ad- 
di'esses  several  as|)ects  of  the  cocaine 
processing  and  trafficking  cycle,  in- 
cluding chemical  control  and  lab  and 
airstrip  destruction.  Most  Snowcap  ac- 
tivity is  currently  taking  place  in  Boli- 
via and  Peru.  Since  its  inception  in 
1987,  this  cooperative  operation  has  re- 
sulted in  the  destruction  of  194  cocaine 
hydrochloride  labs,  15,500  arrests,  and 
the  seizure  of  over  48,000  kilograms  of 
cocaine. 

Other  U.S.  Government  agencies 
have  also  taken  an  active  role  in  train- 
ing and  advising  Andean  law  enforce- 
ment organizations  in  support  of  co- 
caine control  operations.  The  Border 
Patrol  has  trained  UMOPAR  | Bolivian 
rural  police]  units  in  Bolivia;  the  De- 
partment of  Defense  has  trained  law 
enforcement  personnel  in  Bolivia,  Ecua- 
dor, and  Colombia  and  has  ])rovided 
opei'ational  supjjort  to  drug  enforce- 
ment agency  personnel  engaged  in 
cocaine  control  programs. 

While  there  are  indications  that 
certain  segments  of  the  U.S.  market 
for  cocaine  may  have  stabilized,  our 
major  cities  are  faced  with  a  crack  epi- 
demic which  has  bred  violence,  murder, 
and  despair.  Latin  American  cities  are 
also  facing  unprecedented  levels  of 
drug  addiction  with  the  introduction 
of  baauco,  a  highly  addictive  byproduct 
of  cocaine  which  has  characteristics 
similar  to  crack. 

U.S.  seizures  of  cocaine  were  up 
during  1988;  Federal  law  enforcement 
agencies  report  that  in  the  fii'st  10 
months  of  1988,  about  70,000  kilograms 
of  cocaine  were  seized.  This  rejii-esenls 
an  increase  of  18.5  metric  tons  in  sei- 
zures for  the  entire  previous  year. 

Prospects  for  Success 
in  South  America 

Latin  American  governments  have 
been  unable  to  significantly  reduce  the 
Andean  coca  crop  oi'  to  eliminate  co- 
caine trafficking.  The  enormous  profits 
generated  by  the  cocaine  trade  have  en- 
abled the  traffickers  to  intimidate  rep- 
resentatives  of  government  institutions 
and  to  purchase  arms  and  influence. 
Violence,  drug-related  corruption,  and 
intimidation  impede  Andean  govern- 
ments' efforts  to  mount  effective  anti- 
narcotics  campaigns.  Some  evidence 


exists  to  indicate  that  Shining  Path 
guerrillas  in  Peru  actively  attempt 
to  sabotage  coca  eradication  efforts  in 
the  Upper  Huallaga  Valley.  There  is  a 
proven  relationship  between  narcotics 
traffickers  and  the  FARC  [Revolution- 
ary Armed  ?\)rces  of  Colombia]  guer- 
rilla movement  in  Colombia. 

Des))ite  some  country-by-country 
improvements,  no  real  progress  was 
made  in  a  regional  approach  to  cocaine 
control.  The  cocaine  'big  picture'  re- 
mains discouraging  and  suggests  that 
the  current  direction  of  Latin  Ameri- 
can cocaine  control  efforts  may  need  to 
be  reassessed.  In  the  coming  weeks, 
we  will  address  the  cocaine  issue  in  de- 
tail as  we  respond  to  the  request  in  PL 
100-(590  that  we  assess  the  feasibility  ol 
creating  an  integrated  regional  sti'at- 
egy  and  as  we  work  with  the  Office  of 
National  Drug  Control  Policy  on  the 
new  U.S.  national  strategy. 

The  Herbicide  Issue 

While  enforcement  operations  have  I'e- 
sulted  in  significant  seizures,  coca 
eradication  in  the  field  holds  the  most 
promise  for  reducing  worldwide  cocains 
supplies.  The  most  hotly  debated  and 
most  misunderstood  issue  in  1988  drug 
control  efforts  was  the  possible  use  of 
herbicides  against  the  Andean  coca 
crop.  Debate  on  the  environmental  ef- 
fects of  herbicides  was  often  su])ei'fi- 
cial,  taking  no  account  of  the  already 
devastating  environmental  conse- 
quences of  clear  cutting  forests  and 
mountain  areas  or  the  damage  caused 
by  narcotics  refining  and  processing 
chemicals. 

Peru  has  repeatedly  stated  its  com- 
mitment to  testing  safe,  effective  her- 
bicides for  use  against  coca  and,  during 
1988,  completed  the  fii'st  phase  of  its 
testing  program,  applying  six  hei'bi- 
cides  manually  to  several  plots  of  coca 
totaling  under  3  acres.  On  March  17, 
Peru  completed  the  critical  aerial 
test  of  two  herbicides,  across  16  test 
plots,  and,  in  the  coming  weeks,  soil, 
air,  and  water  samjjles  will  be  analyzed 
for  effects. 

Herbicide  testing  is  carried  out  by 
the  L'.S.  Government  and  host  coun- 
tries using  the  same  strict  criteria 
which  are  mandated  domestically  but 
not  internationally.  Herbicides  are  a])- 
plied  carefully  to  ensure  that  unin- 
tended destruction  of  other  crops  does 
not  occur.  Where  possible,  ])ellets  are 
used  to  minimize  the  possibility  of  drift. 


50 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


NARCOTICS 


Critics  of  herbicide  testing  fail  to 
lU'  several  important  issues  which 
ay  help  put  Peru's  coca  eradication 
■(igi-am  into  perspective. 

,     First,  in  the  Upper  Huallaga  Val- 
j|v,  coca  cultivation  is  illegal.  A  large 
'''rcentage  of  the  peasants  cultivating 
:ii  crop  are  not  traditional  coca  farm- 
rs;  they  have  recently  occupied  the 
nd  for  the  sole  purpose  of  growing 
iica  for  the  illegal  market.  Eighty  pei'- 
int  of  the  farmers  grow  nothing  but 
i)ca;  the  remaining  209;^  cultivate  some 
'od  crops  to  supplement  supplies 
jansported  from  other  regions.  The 
ipper  Huallaga  Valley  has  never  been 
traditional  agricultural  area  nor 
ill  it  revert  to  one  after  coca  is 
iminated. 

;     Second,  coca  farmers  and  cocaine 
affickers  have  devastated  the  valley 
jith  irresponsible  use  of  chemicals  and 
'ith  the  careless  destruction  of  the  foi-- 
;t.  Peruvian  environmentalists  are 
•eply  concerned  about  the  silence  of 
ie  world  environmental  community 
)out  the  continuing  destruction  of  nat- 
•al  resources  due  to  coca  cultivation 
ul  see  the  use  of  herbicides  to  destroy 
'Ut  illegal  crop  as  an  acceptable 
adeoff. 

Third,  the  increasing  presence 
the  Sendero  Luminoso  in  coca- 
•oducing  areas  poses  a  grave  threat  to 
f  stability  of  the  Lima  government. 

Herbicidal  destruction  of  the  coca 
op  is  not  the  answer  to  all  coca- 
'lated  problems.  A  number  of  impor- 
nt  questions  still  need  answers  con- 
•rniiig  development,  alternative 
lui-ces  of  income  for  peasants,  and  the 
•oiKimic  future  of  Andean  countries, 
owever,  the  use  of  herbicides  can  pro- 
ide  these  governments  with  an  effec- 
ve  tool  to  eliminate  part  of  the  coca 
■op,  encourage  farmers  to  seek  legal 
velihoods,  and  demonstrate  govern- 
lent  commitment  to  narcotics  control. 

he  IDEC  Initiative 

luring  the  summer  of  1988,  30  nations, 
iicluding  several  European  govern- 
ments, participated  in  a  month-long 
Dcaine  enforcement  operation  under 
le  auspices  of  the  International  Drug 
inforcement  Conference  (IDEC).  At 
•DEC's  April  meeting  in  Guatemala 
'ity,  members  agreed  to  participate  in 
cdiiperative,  coordinated,  multina- 
onai  law  enforcement  operation  dur- 
lu;  .\ugust  to  enhance  their  abilities  to 
L'ize  cocaine  and  cash,  track  fugitives, 
nd  crack  down  on  money  laundering. 


The  United  States  participated  in  the 
IDEC  operation,  committing  National 
Guard  units  in  four  states  to  work  side 
by  side  with  the  U.S.  Customs  Service 
inspecting  cargo. 


GOAL:  HEROIN 

During  1988,  there  was  no  reduction  in 
worldwide  supplies  of  opium  and  her- 
oin. In  every  opium-jiroducing  nation 
e-xcept  Thailand,  opium  production  ap- 
pears to  have  remained  at  1987  levels 
or  increased.  Heroin  conversion  and 
trafficking  remain  serious  problems 
in  Southeast  and  Southwest  Asia  and 
Me.xico;  increased  heroin  supplies  have 
also  alarmed  U.S.  drug  experts  who 
believe  that  the  United  States  may  be 
poised  on  the  brink  of  another  heroin 
epidemic.  Compounding  U.S.  Govern- 
ment frustration  at  increasing  world- 
wide opium  supplies  is  the  fact  that 
90%  of  the  world's  opium  production 
takes  place  in  areas  to  which  the 
United  States  has  limited  or  no  access, 
such  as  Iran,  Afghanistan,  Lebanon, 
Laos,  and  Burma.  Federal  law  enforce- 
ment officials  report  that  1988  heroin 
seizures  are  up  over  last  year's  totals. 

Southeast  Asia 

The  civil  turmoil  in  Burma  has  re- 
sulted in  the  suspension  of  the  Socialist 
Republic  of  the  Union  of  Burma's  annu- 
al aerial  opium  eradication  program. 
Between  January  and  March  1988,  Bur- 
ma reported  eliminating  over  16,000 
hectares  of  opium.  At  year's  end,  it  is 
estimated  that  Burmese  production 
of  opium  is  up  in  absolute  terms,  and 
there  is  no  immediate  prospect  that  the 
aerial  eradication  campaign  will  be  re- 
sumed in  time  to  be  effective  against 
the  1989  crop.  Indeed,  the  disturbances 
will  most  likely  result  in  unchecked 
opium  production  in  Burma. 

There  has  also  been  no  reduction  in 
opium  production  in  Laos,  and  there 
continue  to  be  reports  of  extensive  in- 
volvement of  military  and  civilian  gov- 
ernment officials  in  the  narcotics  trade, 
suggesting  that  such  activity  remains  a 
matter  of  de  facto  government  policy. 

Our  continuous  dialogue  on  this 
subject  with  the  Lao,  our  certification 
program,  and  pressures  from  others  in 
the  international  community  underlie 
the  recent  Lao  decisions  to  begin  to  ad- 
dress the  narcotics  situation.  In  the 
summer  of  1988,  the  Lao  Government 
raided  two  refineries  in  Oudomsai  Prov- 
ince and  later  tried  48  traffickers 


netted  in  the  raid;  among  those  con- 
victed was  the  governor  of  the  prov- 
ince, a  central  committee  member.  A 
high-level  delegation  of  U.S.  Govern- 
ment officials  traveled  to  Vientiane  in 
early  1989  to  discuss  a  number  of  is- 
sues, including  narcotics  control.  Lao 
Government  officials  assured  the  U.S. 
representatives  that  the  Lao  had  begun 
to  address  its  opium  problem,  as  evi- 
denced by  the  Lao  agreement  that 
the  UN  Fimd  for  Drug  Abuse  Control 
(UNFDAC)  could  establish  a  $5.8  mil- 
lion rural  integrated  pilot  program  in 
an  opium  growing  region  in  northern 
Vientiane  Province.  "This  project  is 
scheduled  to  get  underway  before  July. 
For  the  first  time,  Lao  officials  accept- 
ed, in  principle,  previous  offers  of  bilat- 
eral U.S.  narcotics  control  assistance. 

Thailand  was  successful  in  ensur- 
ing that  opium  production  did  not  in- 
crease during  1988.  It  is  possible  that 
no  further  reductions  will  be  made 
in  coming  years  in  the  estimated  28 
metric  tons  of  opium  produced  in  Thai- 
land, given  the  demand  for  opium 
among  the  indigenous  hill  tribe  addict 
population. 

Heroin  trafficking  remains  a  seri- 
ous problem  in  Southeast  Asia,  partic- 
ularly in  Thailand  where  an  excellent 
system  of  roads  provides  traffickers 
good  access  to  international  markets. 
There  is  evidence  that  heroin  is  traf- 
ficked through  Vietnam,  notably 
through  the  port  of  Da  Nang.  During 
1988,  heroin  seizures  in  Thailand  dou- 
bled over  the  previous  year's  totals,  and 
10  heroin  refineries  were  immobilized. 

Southwest  Asia 

Opium  production  and  heroin  traffick- 
ing ai'e  deeply  entrenched  in  the  South- 
west Asian  nations  of  Iran,  Afghani- 
stan, and  Pakistan.  There  is  no  indica- 
tion that  the  Southwest  Asian  opium 
situation  will  improve  in  the  foreseeable 
future.  Political  turmoil  and  limited 
U.S.  access  in  both  Iran  and  Af- 
ghanistan will  complicate  any  future 
opium  control  efforts,  while  the  un- 
stable Afghan  political  outlook  will 
undoubtedly  contribute  further  to 
Southwest  Asia's  opium  and  heroin 
problem.  Pakistan's  new  government 
has  publicly  stated  its  commitment  to 
opium  control  and  has  agreed  to  make 
use  of  aerial  spraying  to  reduce  the 
1989  poppy  crop. 

There  is  little  reliable  information 
emerging  from  Afghanistan  on  the 
amount  of  opium  poppy  cultivated  or 


>epartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


51 


NARCOTICS 


the  amount  of  heroin  trafficked;  it  is 
widely  believed,  however,  that  both  ac- 
tivities increased  during  1988.  There 
are  no  signs  that  either  the  Soviets 
or  the  Kabul  regime  have  been  able  to 
make  any  progress  in  curbing  produc- 
tion and  trafficking.  Estimates  put  the 
amount  of  opium  production  during 
1988  at  between  700-800  metric  tons. 

There  is  also  sketchy  information 
out  of  Iran  concerning  the  amount  of 
o])ium  poppy  cultivation  taking  place. 
It  is  believed,  however,  that  Iran  does 
not  produce  enough  opium  to  supply  its 
estimated  1  million  addicts  and  must 
turn  to  Afghanistan  and  Pakistan  for 
heroin.  Opium  production  is  estimated 
at  between  200-400  metric  tons  per 
year,  similar  to  1987  levels.  Heroin  traf- 
ficking through  Iran  to  Turkey  is  a 
trend  that  concerns  U.S.  and  Turkish 
Government  drug  enforcement  officials; 
Turkish  enforcement  efforts  have  re- 
sulted in  the  relocation  of  some  Kur- 
dish heroin  refining  activities  from 
eastern  Turkey  to  Iran.  There  is  some 
indication  that  the  Government  of  Iran 
is  troubled  by  drug  trafficking  and  ad- 
diction; enforcement  operations  and  the 
execution  of  drug  traffickers  are  two 
manifestations  of  Iran's  desire  to  curb 
drug  trafficking. 

Last  year's  estimate  of  Pakistan's 
opium  crop  {reported  at  between  135- 
160  metric  tons)  was  further  revised  to 
a  range  of  190-220  metric  tons  based  on 
a  new  appreciation  of  yields.  Opium  cul- 
tivation in  1988  did  not  increase  appre- 
ciably, but  the  Government  of  Pakistan 
has  not  been  able  to  bring  production 
down  to  1985  lows.  The  newly  elected 
Bhutto  government  has  stated  its  com- 
mitment to  reducing  opium  cultivation 
and  heroin  trafficking,  and  the  Prime 
Minister  has  urged  the  creation  of  a 
new  cabinet-level  drug  control  entity 
under  her  direct  auspices.  Alarmed  by 
the  estimates  of  1  million  Pakistani 
drug  addicts,  the  government  has 
pledged  to  redouble  its  eradication  and 
enforcement  efforts  and  has  indicated 
to  the  United  States  its  willingness  to 
eradicate  opium  poppy  by  aerial  means 
during  the  1989  season. 

In  late  1988,  the  Government  of 
Pakistan  signed  the  Tribal  Areas  De- 
velopment Agreement  which  will  result 
in  a  major  U.S. -sponsored  development 
project  in  the  Bajaur  and  Mohmand 
tribal  areas.  The  agreement  specifies 
that  an  opium  ban  will  be  gradually  im- 
plemented in  these  remote  areas  over 
the  ne.xt  5  years,  increasing  the  possi- 
bility that  opium  cultivation  can  be  re- 


duced through  concerted  government 
actions.  The  Government  of  Pakistan 
did  arrest  a  major  heroin  trafficker 
this  year,  but  trafficking  organizations 
have  not  felt  real  pressure  to  cease 
smuggling. 

Mexico 

Mexico  expanded  the  scope  of  opium 
and  marijuana  eradication  programs, 
while  taking  steps  to  improve  opera- 
tional efficiency.  Cocaine  seizures  rose 
sharply.  Still,  Mexico  remained  the 
largest  single  country  source  for  her- 
oin, the  second  largest  source  for  mari- 
juana, and  a  leading  transit  point  for 
cocaine.  Newly  elected  President  Car- 
los Salinas  de  Gortari  has  made  anti- 
narcotics  programs  a  national  priority 
for  his  new  government,  and  the  Attor- 
ney General's  budget  for  1989  will  ex- 
ceed $26  million,  up  from  .$19.5  million 
in  1987.  A  strong,  positive  tone  for  bi- 
lateral relations  was  set  in  an  early 
meeting  between  then  President-elect 
Bush  and  Mr.  Salinas,  and  the  U.S. 
Government,  anticipating  continued 
improvements  in  the  program,  is  pre- 
pared to  cooperate  with  Salinas  on 
these  enhancements.  However,  U.S.  of- 
ficials are  concerned  about  the  inhib- 
iting effects  of  corruption  throughout 
the  program. 

Other  Opium  Producers 
and  Heroin  Traffickers 

During  the  past  few  years,  opium  pro- 
duction has  increased  in  countries  such 
as  Guatemala  and  Lebanon  which  are 
not  traditional  cultivators  of  opium. 
Heroin  production  and  trafficking  in 
the  Middle  East  flourish  in  chaotic 
wartime  conditions,  and  there  is  much 
evidence  that  heroin  profits  are  being 
used  to  purchase  arms.  Until  order  is 
restored  in  Lebanon,  gains  in  opium 
control  are  highly  unlikely. 


GOAL:  MARIJUANA 

The  worldwide  marijuana  picture  in 
1988  was  mixed,  with  some  nations 
making  significant  gains  against  mari- 
juana cultivation  and  others  unable  to 
reduce  their  supplies.  In  countries 
where  repeated  aerial  marijuana  erad- 
ication campaigns  have  been  launched, 
such  as  Belize,  cultivation  and  replant- 
ing have  been  significantly  reduced. 
Colombia  has  been  successful  in 
eradicating  marijuana  cultivated  in 


traditional  areas  through  a  series  of 
aerial  eradication  campaigns.  Howeve 
marijuana  farmers  have  begun  cultiv 
tion  in  nontraditional  areas  of  Coloml 
including  the  Cauca  and  San  Lucas 
Mountains;  an  estimated  range  of 
5,927-9,625  metric  tons  were  produce 
by  Colombia  in  1988. 

The  United  States  remains  the 
third  largest  marijuana  producer  for 
our  domestic  market.  During  1988,  lai 
enforcement  personnel  located  and  de 
stroyed  38,531  small,  difficult  to  local 
plantations  and  seized  1,240  indoor 
greenhouses.  Net  production  is  esti- 
mated at  3,000-3,500  metric  tons  for 
1988. 


GOAL:  TRAFFICKING  NETWORK 

Major  international  drug  traffickers 
continue  to  wield  power  in  Latin  Amt 
ica,  demonstrating  their  ability  to  rui 
large  organizations  with  untold  wealt 
a  ready  supply  of  arms,  and  growing 
access  to  the  world's  media.  While 
many  of  the  world's  most  powerful  dr* 
traffickers  remain  at  large,  three  not 
rious  cocaine  traffickers  are  behind 
bars  today.  Carlos  Lehder  was  con- 
victed and  sentenced  to  life  in  prison' 
after  being  extradited  from  Colombia 
Ramon  Matta  Ballesteros,  captured  iJ 
Honduras,  is  serving  time  on  a  sepa- 
rate offense  and  is  awaiting  trial  on 
drug  trafficking  charges,  and  Bolivial 
drug  kingpin,  Roberto  Suarez,  was  an 
rested  by  Bolivian  authorities  and  is 
presently  in  prison. 

Last  year  was  a  banner  year  for 
initiating  what  we  hope  will  be  several 
classic  investigations  of  the  financial 
networks  and  wealth  management  syi 
tems  of  drug  traffickers.  The  value  of 
targeting  the  financial  flows  of  drug 
traffickers  has  achieved  a  new  promi- 
nence in  U.S.  enforcement  operations 
and  has  become  central  to  U.S.  drug 
control  policy.  The  pursuit  of  proceed 
is  enhanced  by  marked  increases  in  ir 
ternational  sensitivity  to  this  issue,    > 
spurred  in  part  by  the  attention  giver' 
to  money  laundering  issues  at  the  Uni 
ed  Nations  and  the  economic  summit  ( 
industrialized  nations  as  well  as  our  e 
forcement  initiatives.  International  ac 
tion  to  stop  money  laundering  is  also 
unquestionably  driven  by  awareness  o 
the  crippling  effects  of  narcotics  traf- 
ficking and  corruption — and  a  desire 
to  avoid  the  stigma  borne  by  countries 
which  have  become  money  laundering 
centers. 


52 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  19C 


NARCOTICS 


A  number  of  international  investi- 
gitions  led  to  major  arrests  and  the 
sizure  of  millions  of  dollars  in  drug- 
riated  assets.  One  of  the  most  success- 
t.  money  laundering  investigations, 
Ojled  "C-Chase"  by  U.S.  Customs  and 
oner  enforcement  agencies,  led  Brit- 
ia,  French,  and  U.S.  authorities  to 
Slit  down  an  international  network  op- 
eating  on  three  continents:  the  Bank 
oCredit  and  Commerce  International 
v.s  indicted. 


OAL:  PUBLIC  DIPLOMACY 

Iternational  public  opinion  is  one  of 
t?  most  crucial  elements  of  a  success- 
fl  narcotics  control  program;  the  U.S. 
(ivernment,  understanding  this,  is 
\)rking  with  a  number  of  foreign  gov- 
(nments  to  raise  public  awareness 
iout  the  global  drug  problem  and  en- 
It  support  for  concerted,  internation- 
i  action  against  all  facets  of  the  illicit 
coig  trade. 

I    The  U.S.  Information  Agency 
(iSIA),  the  Department  of  State,  and 
te  Agency  for  International  Develop- 
i!nt  (AID)  contributed  to  the  U.S. 
(ivernment's  public  awareness  ac- 
tities  during  1988.  In  addition  to  the 
faring  of  information,  the  U.S.  Gov- 
enment  also  provided  technical  assist- 
i  ce  to  a  number  of  countries  in  the 
tea  of  drug  education  and  demand 
ijduction. 

I    The  Agency  for  International  De- 
ilopment  has  also  become  increasingly 
ivolved  in  narcotics  awareness  pro- 
S  ams  and  anticipates  that  10  countries 
uy  receive  assistance  in  this  area 
ixt  year.  AID  obligated  almost  $5  mil- 
Im  for  drug  awareness  programs  in 
88  to  fund  training,  technical  assist- 
iice,  information  dissemination,  and 
le  of  the  media. 


tOAL:  INTERNATIONAL 
OOPERATION 

eveloped  nations  are  becoming  in- 
easingly  involved  in  the  international 
ircotics  issue  as  the  threats  of  drug 
'iafficking  and  abuse  take  their  toll  on 
jost  societies.  Through  diplomatic  and 
"fogram  initiatives,  the  United  States 
1  working  with  other  governments  to 
■isure  that  narcotics  is  elevated  on  the 
ternational  agenda. 

The  annual  certification  process 
the  centerpiece  of  U.S.  diplomatic 
forts  to  encourage  international  co- 


operation in  narcotics  control.  Over 
$1  billion  in  U.S.  foreign  assistance 
is  at  stake  in  these  determinations. 

The  finalization  of  the  UN  traf- 
ficking convention  was  one  of  several 
positive  developments  in  the  area  of  in- 
ternational cooperation.  In  meetings  of 
the  economic  summit  of  industrialized 
nations  (the  United  States,  Canada, 
France,  the  Federal  Republic  of  Ger- 
many, Italy,  Japan,  and  the  United 
Kingdom),  cooperation  on  controlling 
international  narcotics  production, 
trafficking,  and  abuse  were  discussed 
in  detail.  At  the  May  meetings  in 
Toronto,  the  governments  agreed  to 
convene  an  experts  group  later  in  the 
year;  the  United  States  hosted  this  ex- 
perts meeting  in  September  at  which 
representatives  from  six  nations 
(France  declined  to  attend)  made  rec- 
ommendations on  how  to  achieve  en- 
hanced cooperation  in  controlling 
financial  flows,  strengthening  law 
enforcement  initiatives,  reducing 
the  demand  for  drugs,  and  supporting 
development  projects. 

The  United  States  and  U.S.S.R. 
signed  a  bilateral  agreement  in  Janu- 
ary 1989  which  will  lead  to  closer  coop- 
eration between  our  two  nations  in 
narcotics  investigations.  The  agree- 
ment, signed  by  Secretary  Shultz 
and  Foreign  Minister  Shevardnadze, 
provides  a  mechanism  for  exchange 
of  information  on  drug  traffickers, 
shipments,  and  the  source  of  seized 
narcotics.  At  his  confirmation  hearings 
in  January,  Secretary  Baker  outlined 
U.S.  interest  in  expanding  the  estab- 
lished four-part  agenda  for  U.S. -Soviet 
dialogue  (human  rights,  arms  control, 
regional  conflicts,  and  bilateral  rela- 
tions) to  include  a  fifth  agenda  item  of 
global  issues,  such  as  narcotics,  the  en- 
vironment, and  terrorism.  The  Soviet 
Government  agreed  to  this  expansion 
(which  will  make  narcotics  a  regular 
topic  of  discussion  between  U.S.  and 
Soviet  leaders)  during  Secretary  Bak- 
er's introductory  meeting  with  Foreign 
Minister  Shevardnadze  in  Vienna  on 
March  7. 

The  personal  diplomacy  of  U.S. 
Government  officials  such  as  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  and  the  Attorney  General, 
who  both  traveled  to  Latin  America  dur- 
ing 1988,  reinforced  the  priority  that 
the  Administration  places  on  the  nar- 
cotics issue  as  a  major  foreign  policy 
concern. 

International  organizations  such  as 
the  United  Nations,  the  Organization  of 
American  States  (OAS),  the  Andean 
parliament,  the  Association  of  South 
East  Asian  Nations  (ASEAN),  and  the 


Colombo  Plan  were  active  on  the  drug 
front  in  1988.  Last  year  was  the  second 
year  of  operations  of  the  OAS  Inter- 
American  Drug  Abuse  Control  Com- 
mission (CICAD).  The  CICAD's  mem- 
bership expanded  from  11  members  to 
20,  demonstrating  the  growing  interest 
among  OAS  members  in  the  drug  issue. 
During  the  last  year,  the  commission 
launched  regional  projects  using  school 
systems  for  prevention  and  strengthen- 
ing law  enforcement  mechanisms  in  the 
fight  against  drug  abuse  and  traffick- 
ing. CICAD  also  undertook  to  develop 
stricter  regional  controls  on  precursor 
chemicals.  Plans  for  1989  include  a 
meeting  of  ministers  from  the  31  OAS 
member  states  to  reassess  priorities 
for  action. 


THE  ROAD  AHEAD: 
THE  1989-90  AGENDA 

During  the  next  year,  the  Bureau  of  In- 
ternational Narcotics  Matters  intends 
to  support  program  goals  around  the 
world  in  the  following  ways. 

Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean 

Bolivia,  as  President  Bush  noted  in  his 
statement,  must  do  more  to  halt  the 
spread  of  coca  cultivation.  We  think  Bo- 
livia can  gain  control  of  coca  expansion 
by  ensuring  that  the  new  antinarcotics 
law  is  upheld  and  by  vigorously  admin- 
istering the  involuntary  eradication 
program.  Bolivia  must  also  intensify 
interdiction  activities  to  further  dis- 
rupt cocaine  processing  and  encourage 
farmers  to  seek  other  livelihoods  as  a 
result  of  shrinking  coca  markets.  Fund- 
ing in  FY  1990  will  be  used  for  both  in- 
terdiction and  eradication;  special 
emphasis  will  be  placed  on  infrastruc- 
ture support  to  field  units. 

Colombia's  judicial  system  has  suf- 
fered significant  violence  at  the  hands 
of  major  trafficking  organizations;  that 
nation  must  address  problems  in  its 
system  and  take  necessary  steps  which 
will  enable  them  to  bring  traffickers  to 
justice.  The  continuing  expansion  of 
Colombia's  coca  crop  is  troubling  and 
needs  to  be  checked,  preferably  with  an 
aerial  eradication  campaign.  New  mari- 
juana plantations  must  be  destroyed, 
again  through  aerial  means.  President 
Bush  noted  all  of  these  concerns  in 
his  certification  statement,  which  con- 
tained this  summarv  assessment: 


department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


53 


NARCOTICS 


Few  countries,  if  any,  have  contributed 
more  of  their  national  resources  or  lost  so 
many  lives  in  the  effort  to  curb  narcotics 
trafficking.  We  continue  to  stand  in  admi- 
ration of  Colombia's  determination.  Yet. 
we  are  sensitive  as  well  to  how  much  more 
needs  to  be  done,  directly  and  bilaterally. 
As  much  as  has  been  done,  Colombia  must 
do  more,  not  just  to  eradicate  crops,  but 
to  overcome  corruption  and  intimidation. 
Colombia  fights  a  two-front  war  against 
the  traffickers  and  insurgents,  too  often 
in  league  with  one  another  We  will  continue 
to  assist  in  meeting  that  challenge. 

In  FY  1990,  program  funds  will 
be  used  to  support  antinarcotics  police 
enforcement  efforts  throughout  the 
country  to  destroy  cocaine  processing 
laboratories,  to  interdict  cocaine,  and 
build  upon  the  e.xisting  aerial  campaign 
to  eliminate  cannabis  entirely.  Funds 
will  also  be  used  to  support  aerial  erad- 
ication of  coca  should  that  occur. 

Paraguay  remains  a  significant 
drug  transit  point  and  is  probably  used 
as  a  money  laundering  center.  Follow- 
ing last  year's  decision  to  provide  Para- 
guay with  a  limited  'national  interest' 
certification,  a  stronger  commitment 
was  made  in  1988  by  Gen.  Stroessner, 
which  resulted  in  several  significant 
seizures  and  arrests  and  the  passage  of 
a  tough  new  narcotics  law.  As  President 
Bush  said,  'We  are  taking  a  wait-and- 
see  attitude  on  all  aspects  of  the  rela- 
tionship with  new  President  Andres 
Rodriguez.'  We  have  called  upon  the 
new  Paraguayan  Government  to  take 
the  kinds  of  actions  that  will  curb  traf- 
ficking in  cocaine  and  other  drugs,  and 
President  Rodriguez  has  promised  to 
'wage  a  firm  and  intransigent  struggle 
against  drug  trafficking.'  Paraguay  is 
cooperating  currently  on  aerial  mari- 
juana eradication,  which  is  an  encour- 
aging step  which  we  hope  will  lead  to 
other  concrete  actions  to  stem  the  pro- 
duction and  flow  of  drugs. 

Peru  needs  to  e.xpand  eradication 
through  use  of  herbicides  where  appro- 
priate in  its  anticoca  campaign.  Over 
the  coming  months,  we  will  press  the 
agenda  advanced  by  President  Bush: 

The  manual  eradication  effort  in  19S.S 
was  an  e.xtraordinary  improvement  over  the 
meager  results  of  the  previous  year,  but 
there  is  need  for  an  even  stronger  crop  con- 
trol effort  in  1989,  including  completion  of 
the  aerial  tests;  enforcement  in  the  Upper 
Huallaga  Valley  has  had  limited  effect  as  a 
restraint  on  production  or  trafficking,  and 
corruption  is  a  problem.  There  is  a  need  I'oi' 
a  strong  commitment  from  the  Peruvian 
military  against  the  combined,  violent 
forces  of  traffickers  and  insurgents. 


By  working  closely  with  the  inter- 
national environmental  community, 
Peru  can  gain  significant  support  for 
actions  which  will  ameliorate  trafficker 
damage  to  the  environment.  Peruvian 
enforcement  operations  should  also  be 
intensified  to  interrupt  cocaine  proc- 
essing in  the  field.  FY  1990  funds  will 
sup])ort  eradication  and  interdiction; 
security  for  field  workers  will  remain  a 
high  priority,  necessitating  greater 
protection  from  the  Peruvian 
Government. 

Our  Latin  American  regional  fund- 
ing will  be  dedicated  to  the  contain- 
ment of  cocaine  and  marijuana 
production  and  trafficking  in  the  re- 
gion. By  supporting  eradication  cam- 
paigns in  Belize.  Venezuela,  and  other 
marijuana  production  countries  world- 
wide, cannabis  su])plies  will  be  re- 
duced. Brazil's  continuing  efforts  to 
eliminate  coca  and  marijuana  produc- 
tion and  cocaine  trafficking  will  be  sup- 
ported. We  will  also  look  carefully  at 
opium  production  in  Guatemala  during 
the  next  year  and  will  support  eradica- 
tion there.  In  countries  such  as  Para- 
guay, Uruguay,  Argentina,  Chile, 
Haiti,  Honduras,  and  the  Dominican 
Republic,  the  Bureau  of  International 
Narcotics  Matters  will  seek  ways  to 
support  enforcement  operations,  up- 
grade the  enforcement  capabilities  of 
police,  and  support  regional  enforce- 
ment activities. 

Mexico  must  expand  and  intensify 
its  poppy  and  cannabis  eradication  pro- 
grams, using  aerial  surveys  to  compare 
pre-  and  posteradication  totals  to  veri- 
fy the  destruction  of  crops.  An  im- 
proved Operation  Vanguard  should  be 
resumed  next  year.  We  will  continue 
working  with  the  Government  of  Mex- 
ico on  the  issue  of  corruption.  Mexico 
is  callable  of  improving  its  eradication 
campaign  and  could  achieve  the  same 
successful  results  as  they  did  in  the 
1970s;  improvements  must  be  made  by 
increasing  aircraft  utilization  rates 
and  alleviating  current  pilot  shortages. 
Cocaine  interdiction  efforts  could  also 
be  improved.  Increased  funding  is  re- 
quested in  the  FY  1990  budget  to  cover 
costs  of  maintenance  support  for  the 
Mexican  eradication  fleet  and  aerial 
survey  efforts. 

Jamaica  has  kept  down  marijuana 
production  and  should  continue  to  do  so 
through  repeated  eradication  cam- 
paigns. The  U.S.  Government  looks 
forward  to  working  with  the  govern- 
ment of  newly  elected  Prime  Minister 
Michael  Manley,  building  on  recent 
progress  in  eradication  and  enforce- 
ment. Trafficking  networks  must  be 
dismantled  and  traffickers  brought  to 


justice.  Jamaica  also  needs  to  launch 
comprehensive  drug  prevention  pro- 
gram aimed  at  jjreventing  an  increas 
in  cocaine  abuse.  Aerial  eradication  i 
priority  for  FY  1990.  and  funds  will  1 
used  to  provide  aircraft  support  for 
eradication  and  interdiction,  maxi- 
mizing the  efficiency  of  Jamaica's 
programs. 

The  Bahamas  should  seek  ways  t 
undertake  more  indeijendent  interdit 
tion  activities  and  complement  curre 
U.S. -supported  operations.  OPBAT 
[Operation  Bahamas  and  Turks  and 
Caicos]  is  working  well — the  10  metr 
tons  of  cocaine  and  18  metric  tons  of 
marijuana  were  seized  in  1988,  contii 
ing  the  strong  record  of  this  bilateral 
program — and  the  Bahamian  experi- 
ence can  be  valuable  to  other  Carib- 
bean countries  plagued  by  drug 
trafficking.  Drug-related  corruption 
continues  to  be  a  major  concern.  FY 
1990  funds  will  continue  in  support  o 
enforcement  operations. 

Asia  and  Africa 

We  will  continue  to  work  with  Asian 
governments,  where  possible,  to  chee 
opium  expansion  and  drug  abuse.  Ce 
tral  to  our  program  is  the  use  of  her- 
bicides to  destroy  narcotic  crops,  anc 
Asian  governments  will  be  urged  to 
employ  them  in  eradication  campaigr 

Continued  discussions  with  Laos 
most  recently  in  January  19.S9.  have 
identified  areas  of  potential  bilateral 
cooperation.  Bilateral  programs  in 
training  and  narcotics  crop  control  a 
currently  in  the  planning  stages. 

Farther  reductions  in  Thailand's 
opium  crop  will  be  supported  as  welll 
eradication  of  their  marijuana  suppli 
with  FY  1990  funding;  funds  will  alsc 
be  used  for  interdiction  programs  to 
eliminate  heroin  trafficking. 

Funds  have  temporarily  been  sue 
pended  to  Burma;  we  will  continue  to 
watch  that  political  situation  closely, 
waiting  for  an  opportunity  to  revital 
the  opium  eradication  campaign.  If  ai 
when  assistance  flows,  FY  1990  fund; 
will  be  provided  to  continue  operatioi 
aimed  against  opium  producers  and 
heroin  traffickers,  supporting  ongoii 
programs  to  maintain  and  repair  ro- 
tary and  fixed-wing  aircraft  previoui 
supplied  to  the  Burma  Air  Force. 

Pakistan's  opium  crop  must  be  re 
duced  significantly,  and  we  are  urgin 
that  government  to  make  use  of  aeria 
application  of  herbicides  to  do  so.  Pak 
Stan's  new  leaders  must  enforce  the 
opium  ban  and  must  redouble  efforts 


54 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  19 


NARCOTICS 


mantle  heroin  trafficking  networks: 
troy  laboratories:  and  arrest,  try, 
1  convict  major  traffickers.  FY  1990 
ding  will  support  the  extension  of 
[istan's  ban  on  opium  poppy  cul- 
ition  to  the  Bajaur  and  Mohmand 
ions  by  introducing  improved  agri- 
tural  crops  and  by  providing  alter- 
ive  sources  of  income  through  an 
egrated  rural  development  plan 
ich  includes  roads,  schools,  wells, 
1  rural  electrification.  Funds  have 
D  been  included  in  the  FY  1990  bud- 
,  for  Afghanistan  in  the  event  that 
late  1990  the  political  situation 
!;ht  permit  negotiation  of  bilateral 
p  control  efforts. 

We  will  continue  to  support  small- 
le  enforcement  ]3rograms  in  Turkey 
1  in  African  countries  in  an  effort  to 
luce  heroin  supplies  coming  to  the 
ited  States. 

)bal  Support 

erregional  Aviation  Support.  Dur- 

1989,  interregional  aviation  support 

I  become  increasingly  important  as 
;in  American  governments  intensify 
dication  and  enforcement  opera- 
is.  Airwing  assets  will  be  used  in 
iombia  and  other  countries  to  eradi- 
e  marijuana  and  in  Guatemala  for 
um  and  marijuana  eradication.  In 
•u,  aircraft  will  continue  to  trans- 

•t  eradication  workers  and  equip- 
nt  and  will  be  used  in  enforcement 
irations.  In  Bolivia,  assets  will  con- 
ue  to  be  used  in  interdiction  ac- 
ities.  In  FY  1990,  the  program  will 
)port  the  overall  maintenance,  hang- 
ng,  and  operational  costs  for  54 
partment-owned  aircraft  used  in 
•iai  and  manual  eradication,  interdic- 
n  operations,  and  survey  and  logis- 
il  support  activities.  The  principal 
us  will  continue  to  be  in  the  source 
Mntries  of  Peru,  Bolivia,  and  Col- 
Dibia,  as  well  as  smaller  efforts  in 
Inaiea,  Guatemala,  and  Belize,  in 
ahrdance  with  our  airwing  strategy. 

Interregional  Training  and  De- 
i*ind  Reduction.  During  1989,  our 
fids  will  be  used  to  train  foreign  offi- 
cls  in  a  variety  of  law  enforcement 
t-hniques.  Two  foreign  journalist 
\^rkshops,  sponsored  by  Voice  of 
Aierica,  are  scheduled,  and  our  money 
i  being  used  to  fund  the  startup  of 
'^l.A's  International  Narcotics  Infor- 
ritiiiii  Network  which  will  provide 
1  S.  iMTibassies  with  direct  informa- 

II  links  to  Washington  to  facilitate 
t  ■  sharing  of  public  information  on 


drug  abuse,  trends,  policies,  and  U.S. 
and  international  antidrug  efforts. 
Public  awareness  training  courses  are 
also  scheduled  for  host  country  preven- 
tion e.xperts.  During  FY  1990,"  the  De- 
partment will  provide  expanded  U.S. 
Drug  Enforcement  Administration  and 
U.S.  Customs  Service  training  for  ap- 
proximately 2,200  foreign  officials  from 
55-60  countries.  This  training  will  in- 
clude 50  in-country  programs,  14  pro- 
grams conducted  in  the  United  States, 
and  30  executive  observation  programs. 
Increased  emphasis  will  be  placed  on 
other  State-sponsored  programs,  e.g., 
maritime  interdiction  training  and 
narcotic-detector  dog  training. 

Our  public  diplomacy  and  demand 
reduction  program  contributes  to  in- 
ternational narcotics  control  by  mo- 
bilizing support  for  narcotics  control 
policies  and  programs  in  key  producing 
and  transiting  countries. 

International  Organizations. 

In  1989,  the  Department  of  State  will 
support  ongoing  activities  of  the  UN 
Fund  for  Drug  Abuse  Control,  the  OAS, 
ASEAN,  and  the  Colombo  Plan.  The 
FY  1990  budget  will  provide  expanded 
funding  for  the  UN  drug  control  agen- 
cies, including  the  UN  Fund  for  Drug 
Abuse  Control,  the  Colombo  Plan's 
efforts  for  regional  narcotics  control 
activities,  and  other  drug  programs 
undertaken  under  the  auspices  of  other 
international  organizations  such  as  the 
Organization  of  American  States  and 
the  Pan  American  Health  Organization. 

Program  Development  and  Sup- 
port. Finally  the  FY  1989-90  budget 
provides  funds  for  technical  and  ad- 
ministrative support  for  the  overall  in- 
ternational narcotics  program  which  is 
not  otherwise  tied  to  bilateral  projects 
or  specific  interregional  activities. 
This  budget  provides  funding  for 
Washington-based  personnel  costs,  pro- 
gram development  and  evaluation,  spe- 
cial studies,  and  administrative  costs  of 
the  bureau. 


Summary 

Many  lessons  about  the  overall  effec- 
tiveness of  our  international  narcotics 
control  programs  were  learned  during 
1988.  More  than  ever  we  understand 
that  persistence  and  flexibility  are 
crucial  to  the  long-term  success  of  erad- 
ication and  interdiction  programs. 
Eradication  success  will  not  be  meas- 
ured in  a  single  growing  season  or  even 
two;  the  true  measure  of  effectiveness 
in  eradication  is  the  unwillingness  of 


farmers  to  replant  once  their  crops 
have  been  destroyed.  Interdiction  suc- 
cess is  not  only  a  function  of  the  num- 
ber of  seizures  reported  or  laboratories 
hit  but  also  a  function  of  the  institu- 
tional capabilities  of  host  countries  to 
attack  all  links  in  the  drug  chain. 

One  of  the  most  important  tasks 
ahead  is  to  gain  control  of  the  cocaine 
situation  through  an  integrated  pro- 
gram of  demand  reduction  at  home, 
eradication,  and  interdiction.  We  are  at 
a  crossroads  in  our  cocaine  strategy: 
while  waiting  for  Andean  governments 
to  launch  wide-scale  coca  eradication 
programs,  the  United  States  has  had 
the  opportunity  to  participate  in  en- 
forcement o])erations  which  require 
paramilitary  expertise,  not  tradi- 
tionally resident  in  drug  enforcement 
organizations.  Questions  abound: 
Should  the  United  States  continue 
to  commit  resources  and  personnel  to 
operations  in  the  Andean  jungles? 
Are  the  right  agencies  being  tasked 
to  carry  out  these  missions? 

Whatever  decisions  are  made  with- 
in the  next  year,  one  fact  remains  clear: 
We  will  have  only  limited  success  in 
battling  cocaine  until  we  forge  a  com- 
prehensive, multifaceted  strategy 
which  recognizes  that  cocaine  is  not 
simply  a  law  enforcement  issue  but  is 
also  a  complex  foreign  policy  and  eco- 
nomic mattei',  requiring  a  long-term 
approach. 

Our  international  strategy,  re- 
ported in  detail  in  last  year's  report, 
calls  for  us  to  explore  the  possibility  of 
creating  a  "superfund"  to  provide  eco- 
nomic incentives  to  nations  cooperating 
with  the  United  States  in  narcotics 
control.  We  stated  that  such  a  fund 
could  contain  as  much  as  $300  million 
to  be  granted  to  cooperative  govern- 
ments in  an  effort  to  bolster  their  legit- 
imate economies  and  thus  compete 
against  the  influence  of  billions  of  nar- 
codollars.  While  such  a  fund  may  be 
considered  expensive  at  a  time  of  lim- 
ited resources,  it  is  a  small  amount 
compared  to  the  huge  profits  generated 
by  the  international  drug  trade.  We 
also  need  to  explore  ways  to  use  Third 
World  debt  as  a  lever  in  gaining  cooper- 
ation on  drug  control  issues. 

The  antidrug  legislation  of  1988 
suggests  several  actions  in  the  area  of 
international  narcotics  control  includ- 
ing exploration  of  a  multilateral  strike 
force,  convening  a  Western  hemi- 
spheric summit  on  drugs,  and  the 
creation  of  an  international  cocaine 
strategy.  The  Department  will  review 
these  recommendations  during  the 
coming  year. 


Cspartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


55 


NARCOTICS 


COUNTRY  AND  REGIONAL 
SUMMARIES:  1988 

Southwest  Asia 

AfKhanistan,  denied  certification  last 
yeai;  produced  700-800  metric  tons  of 
opium  in  this  past  year  and  remains  a 
principal  but  politically  inaccessible 
source  of  opium/hei'oin  for  European 
and  U.S.  drug  markets.  Given  the  cur- 
rent instability  in  the  wake  of  the  Sovi- 
et withdrawal,  there  are  no  forecasts 
as  to  the  time  and  circumstances  under 
which  a  government  in  Kabul  will  at- 
tempt to  suppress  cultivation  and  refin- 
ing. The  situation  is  complicated  by  the 
resettlement  of  Afghan  refugees  who 
may  turn  to  opium  as  a  cash  crop,  in- 
creasing the  likelihood  that  production 
may  increase. 

India,  the  world's  major  producer 
of  licit  opium  for  processing  into  phar- 
maceuticals, is  of  increasing  concern 
to  U.S.  officials  as  a  transit  route  for 
Pakistani  and  Burmese  heroin  and  for 
precursor  chemicals  used  in  manufac- 
turing heroin.  In  the  last  2  years,  con- 
cern has  grown  over  diversion  from 
licit  production.  India  continues  to  re- 
duce licit  production  in  response  to  a 
declining  market  for  opium  gum.  Di- 
version is  estimated  at  60-120  metric 
tons,  primarily  for  domestic  consump- 
tion. India  has  long  had  a  sophisticated 
money  laundering  system  which  is  but 
one  element  in  a  thriving  underground 
economy.  To  counter  narcotics  money 
laundering,  India  has  adopted  new  as- 
set forfeiture  legislation. 

Iran  was  denied  certification  last 
year  on  grounds  of  noncooperation. 
U.S.  officials  estimate  opium  produc- 
tion at  200-400  metric  tons.  While  this 
amount  would  not  satisfy  Iran's  domes- 
tic addict  population,  opium  and  heroin 
are  flowing  across  Iran  from  Pakistan 
and  Afghanistan  and  e.xported  through 
Turkey  and  other  routes  to  Western 
markets. 

Nepal  is  an  increasingly  used  tran- 
sit point  for  heroin  produced  in  Paki- 
stan and  the  Golden  Triangle,  some  of 
it  routed  through  India  and  conveyed 
onward  by  Indian  traffickers.  There  is 
concern  that  traffic  could  increase  in 
1989  with  the  opening  of  a  new  inter- 
national terminal  at  the  Kathmandu 
airport.  While  there  is  no  conclusive 
evidence  of  money  laundering,  there 
is  a  thriving  market  in  gold,  part  of 
which  is  believed  related  to  narcotics 
smuggling. 


Pakistan  opium  production  re- 
mained high  in  1988  (20.5  metric  tons), 
reflecting  political  instability  in  grow- 
ing areas  and  the  continued  e.xpansion 
of  the  country's  domestic  addict  popu- 
lation. Spurred  by  awareness  of  this 
problem,  which  may  now  include  1  mil- 
lion heroin  addicts.  Prime  Minister 
Bhutto  has  publicly  committed  her  gov- 
ernment to  a  strong  antinarcotics  pro- 
gram, including  strict  enforcement  of 
the  poppy  ban  in  all  areas.  Law  en- 
forcement agencies  maintained  high 
seizure  and  arrest  rates  but  have  not 
pursued  major  traffickers.  One  major 
dealer  is  awaiting  trial  in  Lahore  and 
another  may  be  extradited  to  the 
United  States.  Money  laundering  is 
not  a  major  factor. 

Syria  is  a  transit  point  for  illicit 
narcotics  as  well  as  a  heroin  refining 
center.  Its  military  e.xerts  significant 
influence  over  Lebanon's  Bekaa  Valley, 
allegedly  profiting  from  widespread 
drug  production  and  trafficking  in  that 
area.  For  these  reasons,  the  United 
States  twice  denied  certification  to 
Syria.  However,  after  a  break  of  more 
than  2  years,  limited  discussions  have 
begun  on  possible  narcotics  cooperation 
and  assistance  to  Syria  on  demand 
reduction/prevention. 

South  America 

Argentina  is  of  increasing  concern  as  a 
refining  and  transit  center  for  cocaine 
destined  for  U.S.  and  European  drug- 
markets  and  as  a  source  of  precursor 
chemicals.  U.S.  officials  are  encour- 
aged by  a  much  improved  enforcement 
effort  in  1988  (seizures  and  arrests  dou- 
bled) but  worry  about  the  increasing 
importation  of  Bolivian  paste  and  the 
e.xpansion  of  a  network  of  domestic  co- 
caine laboratories.  The  country  has  a 
high  potential  for  money  laundering. 

Bolivia  conducted  its  first  signifi- 
cant eradication  campaign  in  1987-88, 
exceeding  the  initial  target  of  1,800 
hectares,  but  a  20%  surge  in  cultivation 
spurred  by  higher  leaf  prices  dwarfed 
the  impact  of  the  voluntary  eradica- 
tion program.  Bolivia  passed  a  much- 
strengthened  narcotics  law  and  adopted 
implementing  regulations,  and  its  now- 
experienced  crop  control  organization 
has  set  a  target  of  5,000  hectares  for 
this  year's  program,  which  includes  in- 
voluntary destruction  of  seedbeds.  The 
enforcement  picture  brightened:  major 
trafficker  Roberto  Suarez  was  jailed; 
the  Bureau  of  International  Narcotics 
Matters'  airwing  supported  a  DEA- 
assisted  interdiction  effort  that  sharp- 
ly increased  seizures  of  cocaine  and 


paste  and  the  number  of  base  and  co-'  J 
caine  labs  destroyed.  Bolivia  is  not  a. 
major  factor  in  international  money 
laundering. 

Brazil  is  vital  in  the  cocaine  tra^ 
as  a  transit  country  for  Andean  traf- 
fickers, as  a  producer  of  precursor 
chemicals,  and  as  an  emerging  coca  < 
tivator.  Police  conducted  two  major 
eradication  campaigns  in  1988  and  de 
molished  eight  cocaine  labs  and  seize 
more  than  a  ton  of  cocaine.  Police  als 
destroyed  5,240  metric  tons  of  can- 
nabis. These  high  levels  of  enforcemj. 
activity,  maintained  despite  budget 
constraints,  will  be  enhanced  by  $5 
million  in  equipment  from  UNFDAC 
Brazil  is  not  a  major  factor  in  interm 
tional  money  laundering. 

Colombia  deployed  its  military 
more  extensively  in  an  intensified  ef 
fort  to  suppress  cocaine  refining,  an 
the  results  were  impressive:  over  23 
metric  tons  of  cocaine  seized,  more 
than  800  labs  destroyed  including  29' 
major  complexes,  and  about  600,000 
gallons  of  precursor  chemicals  seizeo 
Colombia  has  destroyed  more  than  9i> 
of  cannabis  growing  in  traditional 
northern  areas,  but  traffickers  have 
planted  extensively  in  the  San  Lucas 
Mountains  and  south  in  Cauca.  Mari' 
juana  tonnage  increased  in  1988  desf 
an  aggressive  eradication  campaign. 
Coca  cultivation  increased  above  the 
1987  level;  eradication  of  230  hectare- 
was  conducted  manually.  Despite  poi 
efforts  to  harass  the  Medellin  cartel 
and  other  trafficking  groups,  large 
amounts  of  cocaine  continued  to  flow 
to  the  United  States;  almost  20  metr 
tons  were  seized  by  U.S.  Customs. 
Overall  enforcement  remains  hamjie 
by  a  judicial  system  that  has  been  in 
timidated  by  violence.  Drug  profits 
flow  into  and  out  of  Colombia,  but  m( 
ey  laundering  per  se  is  not  a  major 
activity. 

Ecuador  has  fallen  below  the  st. 
utory  standard  as  a  coca  jiroducing 
source  country  but  is  a  transit  point 
an  estimated  30-.50  metric  tons  of  cO' 
caine  enroute  to  the  United  States  ai 
also  a  transit  country  for  large  quan-i 
titles  of  precursor  chemicals.  Coca  le 
production  has  dropped  to  400  metric 
tons  a  year  thanks  to  a  vigorous  erad 
ication  program.  New  laws  are  beingi 
proposed  to  curb  trafficking  in  precu 
sor  chemicals;  police  confiscated  l,60i 
drums  of  chemicals  which  could  have 
been  used  in  the  production  of  16 
metric  tons  of  cocaine.  While  coopers 
tion  with  U.S.  enforcement  authoritii 


56 


Dpnartmpnt  nf  Statp  Riillptin/Ortnher  1?! 


NARCOTICS 


I'nains  good,  judicial  corruption  and 
i  efficiency  are  considered  program 
i  pi'diments.  Some  money  laundering 
(•urs  but  is  considered  minor. 

I'arajjuay.  U.S.  officials  are  wait- 
in'  to  see  what  measures  Gen. 
lidriguez,  the  military  leader  who  in 
ibruary  1989  overthrew  former  Presi- 
ont  Stroessner,  takes  against  drugs. 
Ixlriguez,  in  the  past,  has  been  the 
sbject  of  numerous  allegations  of 
i?gal  activity — including  drug 
tifficking  which  he  strongly  denies. 
j'U'v  years  of  indifference  to  narcotics 
cntrol,  Paraguay,  in  1988,  took  several 
5>nificant  steps  to  improve  its  perfor- 
rince:  it  signed  two  narcotics  agree- 
pnts  with  the  United  States,  includ- 
ii  one  providing  for  aerial  spraying  of 
nrijuana,  it  adopted  tough  new  legis- 
1  inn  on  narcotics,  and  it  permitted 
'.iA  to  open  an  office  in  Paraguay. 
'Ihile  Paraguayan  Government  author- 
ies  made  several  significant  seizures 
((drugs  in  1988,  an  important  measure 
(the  new  government's  commitment 
vll  be  its  performance  in  antinarcotics 
ijitters. 

!    Peru  conducted  a  vigorous  manual 
(Indication  program  in  1988  which 
(stroyed  5,130  hectares  of  coca  in 
■  iKinths  and,  for  the  first  time  in  any 
iuiean  country,  eliminated  more  coca 
tin  was  planted.  In  addition,  184,000 
iuare  meters  of  coca  seedbeds  were 
(Stroyed.  In  1987,  only  355  hectares  of 
(ca  and  8,000  square  meters  of  seed- 
Ids  were  eradicated.  Fifteen  times  as 
liny  hectares  of  coca  and  23  times  as 
uny  seedbeds  were  destroyed  in  1988 
tan  in  1987.  Peru  also  continued  to 
t>t  herbicides  which  could  be  used 
aially  against  coca.  Peru  remains  the 
h-gest  cultivator  of  coca,  at  more  than 
'5,630  gross  hectares,  but  is  primarily 
oupplier  of  paste  for  Colombian  co- 
line  refiners.  Enforcement  in  the  Up- 
i'r  Huallaga  Valley,  the  major  growing 
line,  remains  quite  hazardous.  The 
:nited  States  increased  its  support  for 
"terdiction  and  enforcement  efforts, 
^panding  the  Bureau  of  International 
;arcotics  Matters'  airwing  contingent 
i  Peru  to  nine  helicopters,  while  also 
,;panding  the  force  of  DEA  agents  who 
•■sist  the  enforcement  effort. 

Venezuela  is  an  important  point 
r  the  transit  of  precursor  chemicals 
id  cocaine.  Marijuana  is  cultivated 
ung  the  border  with  Colombia,  appar- 
jitly  by  Colombian  traffickers;  as 
uch  as  3,000  inetric  tons  of  cannabis 
ay  be  grown  in  Venezuela  and  export- 
1  via  Colombia. 


Central  America  and  the  Caribbean 

The  Bahamas  continues  to  be  a  major 
transit  country  for  cocaine  and  mari- 
juana entering  the  United  States  and  is 
an  important  money  laundering  center. 
Cooperation  with  U.S.  enforcement 
agencies  in  1988  is  considered  good, 
with  numerous  joint  undercover  as 
well  as  regular  operations,  including 
OPBAT,  underway.  U.S.  assisted  oper- 
ations resulted  in  the  seizure  of  more 
than  10  metric  tons  of  cocaine  and  more 
than  13  metric  tons  of  marijuana.  Fol- 
lowing the  arrest  of  several  important 
traffickers,  the  Bahamas  imposed  new 
and  more  stringent  sentencing;  it  is 
also  more  actively  investigating  cor- 
ruption, which  continues  to  be  a  factor 
affecting  operational  effectiveness.  The 
Bahamas  signed  an  agreement  in  accor- 
dance with  the  Chiles  amendment  on 
February  17,  1989. 

Belize  is  no  longer  a  major  source 
country  for  cannabis,  now  producing 
only  120  metric  tons  a  year  thanks  to  a 
successful  U.S. -assisted  aerial  eradica- 
tion program.  However,  it  is  becoming 
an  increasingly  important  transit  coun- 
try for  cocaine  from  South  America 
and  marijuana  from  Guatemala.  Law 
enforcement  resources  are  limited,  but 
enforcement  capabilities  are  improv- 
ing. Money  laundering  is  not  a  factor. 

Costa  Rica  is  increasingly  impor- 
tant as  a  cocaine  transit  country,  with 
estimates  that  6-12  metric  tons  of  co- 
caine are  being  transported  through  its 
territory  by  air  and  sea.  Authorities 
remain  vigilant  to  the  possibility  of 
labs  being  established;  but  no  new  labs 
were  found  in  the  last  2  years.  Can- 
nabis cultivation  appears  to  be  less  e.\- 
tensive  than  previously  estimated,  and 
the  e.xport  trade  is  a  minor  enterprise. 
Costa  Rica  is  not  a  major  money  laun- 
dering center,  although  a  highly  pub- 
licized money  laundering  trial  has 
focused  attention  on  the  issue. 

Cuba  sits  amidst  some  of  the  pri- 
mary drug  routes  into  the  United 
States,  and  aircraft  and  seacraft  are 
reportedly  eluding  U.S.  agents  by  en- 
tering Cuban  territorial  waters  or  air- 
space. In  the  past,  U.S.  officials  have 
accused  Cuban  officials  of  involvement, 
and  indictments  were  returned  against 
four  ranking  officials  in  1982.  Cuban 
authorities  have  publicly  expressed  an 
interest  in  antidrug  cooperation  with 
the  United  States  but  have  not  elabo- 
rated on  what  kind  of  cooperation  they 
envision. 


The  Dominican  Republic  has  be- 
come an  ideal  staging  ai-ea  and  refuel- 
ing stop  for  traffickers  smuggling 
cocaine  into  the  United  States.  Some 
marijuana  is  also  transshipped  by  traf- 
fickers, who  are  attracted  by  the  is- 
land's 63  airstrips.  The  government 
ranks  the  drug  problem  as  a  major  pri- 
ority and,  in  1988,  passed  tough  new 
antidrug  legislation  which  imposes 
mandatory  sentences.  The  very  effec- 
tive Joint  Information  Coordination 
Center — vital  to  the  monitoring  of 
drug  traffic  through  that  part  of  the 
Caribbean — can  serve  as  a  model  for 
other  countries.  Money  laundering  is 
not  a  problem. 

Guatemala  increased  in  impor- 
tance to  the  U.S.  drug  situation  as  ma- 
jor amounts  of  opium  and  marijuana 
were  produced  during  the  past  year. 
U.S.  officials  estimate  that  as  much  as 
150  kilograms  of  heroin  are  smuggled 
into  the  United  States,  probably  under 
control  of  Mexican  traffickers.  Gua- 
temala is  also  important  to  the  cocaine 
trade,  serving  as  a  transit  point  for 
narcotics  headed  for  Florida,  Louisi- 
ana, and  Texas  and  for  precursor  chem- 
icals destined  for  South  America. 
Guatemala  has  conducted  effective 
eradication  efforts  and  cooperates  with 
U.S.  officials  on  a  chemical-tracking 
program  and  interdiction  efforts.  Mon- 
ey laundering  is  not  a  major  factor. 

Haiti  improved  its  drug  interdic- 
tion efforts  in  1988  despite  two  coups 
and  four  governments.  The  Avril  gov- 
ernment improved  the  climate  for 
cooperation.  Seizures  increased  sub- 
stantially in  1988,  thanks  in  part  to  a 
new  Center  for  Information  and  Coor- 
dination at  Port  au  Prince  airport,  but 
the  volume  of  trafficking  remains  be- 
yond the  capability  of  the  narcotics  po- 
lice. U.S.  enforcement  agencies  are 
concerned  that  the  uncertain  situation 
in  Haiti  and  lack  of  strong  control  by 
the  central  government  has  led  to  the 
increasing  use  of  Haitian  waters  and 
Haitian-registered  vessels  for  the 
transshipment  of  cocaine.  Although  cor- 
ruption remains  a  problem,  the  Avril 
government  did  remove  from  service  a 
number  of  military  officers  suspected  of 
involvement.  There  is  little  information 
on  money  laundering  activity. 

Honduras  is  a  transshipment  point 
for  Colombian  cocaine.  The  key  event  of 
1988  was  the  arrest  and  expulsion  of 
Matta  Ballesteros,  a  major  Honduran 
trafficker  with  Colombian  connections; 
he  is  now  imprisoned  in  the  United 
States.  Honduras  signed  a  bilateral  an- 
tinarcotics agreement  with  the  United 


epartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


57 


NARCOTICS 


States  last  November,  accenting  the  co- 
operation evident  in  the  opening  of  a 
permanent  DEA  office  last  May  and  in 
cooperation  on  seizures  and  investiga- 
tions. While  there  have  not  been  the 
dramatic  seizures  that  occurred  in 
1987,  U.S.  and  Honduran  authorities 
collaborated  on  a  seizure  of  453  kilo- 
grams last  August.  There  was  also  co- 
operation on  operations  at  sea  with  the 
U.S.  Coast  Guard. 

Jamaica  has  reduced  marijuana 
production  dramatically,  from  a  high  of 
1,755  metric  tons  in  1986  to  405  metric 
tons  in  1988.  The  island  is  also  a  transit 
point  for  cocaine;  traffickers  are  now 
paying  for  services  in  kind,  increasing 
the  amount  of  cocaine  available  for  Ja- 
maican consumption.  Money  laundering 
does  not  appear  to  be  a  major  problem, 
with  most  drug  proceeds  being  laun- 
dered elsewhere.  Cooperation  with 
U.S.  authorities  remains  quite  good  on 
the  vigorous  eradication  campaign  as 
well  as  interdiction  and  investigations. 
Seizures  dropped  below  1987  levels,  but 
a  number  of  improvements,  including 
new  procedures  and  e.xpanded  training, 
are  in  place  for  1989  to  enhance  the  en- 
forcement effort.  Heavy  fines  have 
been  levied  by  U.S.  Customs  on  air- 
lines and  shipping  firms  whose  vessels 
have  been  used  to  smuggle  narcotics 
out  of  Jamaica. 

Mexico  e.xpanded  the  scope  of 
opium  and  marijuana  eradication  pro- 
grams, while  taking  steps  to  improve 
operational  efficiency.  Cocaine  seizures 
rose  sharply.  Still,  Me.xico  remained 
the  largest  single  country  source  for 
heroin,  the  second  largest  source  for 
marijuana,  and  a  leading  transit  point 
for  cocaine.  Newly  elected  President 
Carlos  Salinas  de  Gortari  has  made  an- 
tinarcotics  programs  a  national  priori- 
ty for  his  new  government,  and  the 
Attorney  General's  budget  for  1989  will 
exceed  .$2()  million — up  from  .$19.5  mil- 
lion in  1987.  A  strong,  positive  tone  for 
bilateral  relations  was  set  in  an  early 
meeting  between  then  President-elect 
Bush  and  Mr.  Salinas,  and  the  U.S. 
Government,  anticipating  continued 
improvements  in  the  program,  is  pre- 
pared to  cooperate  with  Salinas  on 
these  enhancements.  However,  U.S.  of- 
ficials are  concerned  about  the  inhib- 
iting effects  of  corruption  throughout 
the  program.  U.S.  enforcement  agen- 
cies continue  to  monitor  instances  of 
drug-related  corruption  within  Mexico. 

Nicaragua  continues  to  be  men- 
tioned by  informants  and  traffickers  as 
a  cocaine  transit  point.  In  1986,  there 


were  accusations  that  top  government 
officials  were  engaged  in  trafficking. 
Nicaragua  is  now  cooperating  with 
Costa  Rica  on  drug  matters  but  not 
with  U.S.  enforcement  agencies. 

Panama  was  denied  certification 
in  1988  following  the  indictments  of 
Gen.  Noriega  by  two  U.S.  grand  juries 
on  charges  of  narcotics  trafficking.  De- 
spite being  fired  by  the  lawful  Presi- 
dent of  Panama  in  1988,  Noriega 
illegally  remains  in  control  of  the  Pana- 
manian Defense  Forces.  Panama  con- 
tinues to  be  a  principal  money 
laundering  center  for  the  South  Ameri- 
can cocaine  trade  and  a  transit  site  for 
cocaine  and  precursor  chemical  ship- 
ments. Noriega's  defiance  of  President 
Delvalle  and  continued  control  of  Pan- 
ama's police  forces  prevents  President 
Delvalle  from  effectively  implementing 
his  policy  of  full  cooperation  with  the 
United  States.  While  some  minimal  co- 
operation continues  between  Noriega 
and  DEA  on  a  limited  number  of  en- 
forcement matters,  cooperation  on 
money  laundering  has  bogged  down 
since  Noreiga's  indictment.  President 
Delvalle's  government  continues  to  al- 
low boarding  of  Panamanian  flag  ves- 
sels by  U.S.  narcotics  officials.  U.S. 
prohibition  on  aid  to  the  Noriega-Solis 
regime  continues. 

Europe  and  the  Middle  East 

Bulgaria  is  a  vital  transit  country  for 
heroin  smuggled  along  the  Balkan  truck 
route  from  Southwest  Asia  and  the 
Middle  East.  Although  known  traf- 
fickers were  previously  operating 
openly  in  Sofia,  as  a  consequence  of 
pressure  from  the  U.S.  Government 
and  other  European  states,  the  Bulgar- 
ians have  restricted  these  activities. 
There  has  also  been  some  improvement 
in  Bulgarian  cooperation  with  U.S. 
law  enforcement  agencies.  A  recent  in- 
vestigation involving  laundering 
large  amounts  of  drug  money  through 
Switzerland  revealed  the  involvement 
of  Bulgarian  nationals.  There  is  no 
restriction  on  the  amount  of  foreign 
exchange  that  can  be  brought  into 
Bulgaria  by  foreign  nationals  if  these 
monies  are  properly  documented. 

Cyprus  is  central  to  the  drug  trade 
in  the  Middle  East  and  especially  from 
Lebanon.  Traffickers  use  Cyprus  as  a 
site  for  brokering  deals  and  also  for 
exchanges  of  cash  and  narcotics.  The 
banking  system  is  not  involved  in  the 
money  exchanges.  Cooperation  with 
U.S.  agencies  is  considered  good. 


Egypt  is  an  important  consumer 
opium,  heroin,  and  hashish — support 
ing  production  in  Asia  and  the  Middle 
East — and  is  increasingly  important 
a  transit  point  for  drugs  intended  for 
European  and  U.S.  markets.  Heroin 
moves  from  both  Southwest  and  Sout 
east  Asia,  as  well  as  Lebanon  and  Syi 
which  are  also  the  principal  suppliers^ 
of  hashish.  Egyptian  police  seized  4 
metric  tons  of  opium  and  300  kilogran 
of  heroin  in  a  Suez  Canal  operation  in 
1988,  among  the  largest  seizures  even 
made  outside  of  an  opium  source  coun 
try.  Some  money  laundering  occurs 
but  most  profits  flow  abroad. 

Greece  is  an  important  transit 
point  due  to  its  location  at  the  comme* 
cial  crossroads  between  Europe  and 
the  Middle  East.  Its  long  coastline  an 
sparsely  populated  islands  and  exten 
sive  merchant  marine  facilities  contr 
ute  to  its  role  in  the  international  dru 
trade.  Heroin  transits  Greece  en  rout 
Europe  and  the  United  States.  Police 
increased  their  effectiveness  in  1988, 
particularly  in  interdicting  drugs  at 
the  Athens  airport. 

Lebanon,  which  was  given  a  na- 
tional interest  certification  in  1988, 
continues  to  be  a  major  narcotics  proi 
ducing  and  trafficking  country,  suppll 
ing  heroin  to  Europe  and  the  United 
States  as  well  as  hashish  to  the  Midd 
East  and  Western  countries.  The  as- 
sessment of  Lebanon  takes  into  accou 
the  limited  control  of  the  central  gov 
ernment:  Syria  controls  an  estimated 
65*^  of  the  country,  including  the  stra 
tegic  Bekaa  Valley  where  crops  are  cv 
tivated  and  processed  and  trafficking 
originates. 

Turkey.  Traffickers  take  advan 
tage  of  this  land  bridge  between  Asia 
producers  and  European/LI.S.  consun 
ers  to  smuggle  heroin  and  hashish. 
Some  heroin  is  also  refined  in  Turkey 
There  are  reports  of  increased  heroin 
morphine  smuggling  across  the  Irani! 
frontier  into  Turkey.  Authorities  dran 
matically  increased  seizures  in  1988 
and  successfully  targeted  several 
smuggling  operations.  Turkey  produc 
concentrate  of  poppy  straw  and  contii 
ues  to  be  very  effective  in  preventingi 
diversion  from  its  licit  program. 

Southeast  Asia 

Burma's  political  turmoil  has  ground 
ed  its  large-scale  aerial  eradication 
program  until  an  effective  governmen 
is  seated  in  Rangoon.  Traffickers  cap' 
italized  on  diminished  enforcement  ef 
forts  to  smuggle  large  quantities  of 


58 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  191 


NARCOTICS 


pium  and  heroin  with  little  intei*- 
Tence.  The  prospect  for  1989  is  grim: 
.'ith  highly  favorable  climatic  condi- 
nns  and  the  suspension  of  programs 
1  ik'stroy  crops  or  seize  shipments  of 
rugs  or  precursor  chemicals  from  Chi- 
la,  Thailand,  and  India,  traffickers 
ia.\'  harvest  and  move  as  much  as  1,400 
u'tric  tons  of  opium  to  heroin  refiners 
1  Sijutheast  Asia.  Money  laundering  is 
(it  a  factor. 

The  People's  Republic  of  China 
oes  not  produce  significant  amounts  of 
licit  narcotics,  but  U.S.  officials  are 
ici'easingly  concerned  about  the  trans- 
hipment of  Golden  Triangle  heroin 
hrough  southern  China  to  Hong  Kong 
;nd  traffic  in  precursor  chemicals  into 
he  triangle.  The  Chinese  Government 
5^  responsive  to  these  developments, 
■iiiiically  resulting  from  its  own  "open- 
ess  policy"  and  is  particularly  con- 
iiiicd  about  indications  of  reestab- 
slied  triad  influence  in  southern  Chi- 
a.  A  new  law  controlling  precursor 
ln'inicals  was  enacted  in  December 
Ii.^.s  as  part  of  a  reinvigorated  enforce- 
lent  effort.  China  sent  police  officials 
!o  the  United  States  to  give  evidence  in 
he  "Goldfish"  heroin  case. 

Hong  Kong  is  both  the  financial 
11(1  money  laundering  center  of  the  Far 
last  narcotics  trade  and  an  important 
I'ansit  center  for  Golden  Triangle  her- 
in  destined  for  Australia,  Canada,  the 
'nited  States,  and  Europe.  Hong  Kong 
olice — who  made  record  heroin  sei- 
zures and  arrested  a  number  of  key 
raffickers  in  1988 — believe  that  as 
luch  as  half  the  heroin  seized  came 
verland  through  China.  A  high  degree 
f  cooperation  e.xists  with  U.S.  offi- 
ials.  Hong  Kong  is  moving  forward 
nth  legislation  enabling  the  courts  to 
|race,  freeze,  and  seize  proceeds  of 
Irug  trafficking  and  is  considering  a 
J.S.  proposed  mutual  legal  assistance 
i.ui'eement. 

Indonesia  is  a  transit  site  for  her- 
liin,  opium,  hashish,  and  precursor 
fhemicals.  Heroin  is  exported  to  Aus- 
tralia, New  Zealand,  and  Western 
Surope;  the  amounts  reaching  U.S. 
narkets  are  not  considered  significant. 
:^ew  interest  focuses  on  Bali;  Western 
Europeans  are  heavily  involved  in  the 
ncreasing  traffic  from  this  major  re- 
port area,  which  is  augmented  by  the 
aigh  number  of  international  flights. 
VIoney  laundering  is  not  a  factor. 

Laos  is  the  only  country  to  date  for 
vhich  the  extensive  involvement  of  mil- 
tary  and  government  officials  led  to 
iccusations  that  the  government  is  fa- 
•ilitating  narcotics  trafficking  during 


the  corruption  review  required  by  Sec- 
tion 2013,  PL  99-570.  The  Lao  Govern- 
ment has  made  repeated  efforts  in  the 
past  year  to  convince  U.S.  officials  of 
its  intention  to  curb  illicit  narcotics 
production  and  trafficking.  However, 
U.S.  officials  believe  that  opium  pro- 
duction continues  to  expand  and  could 
be  approaching  the  300-metric-ton 
mark  and  that  heroin  refining  contin- 
ues. Laos  is  exporting  heroin  and  mari- 
juana through  Thailand,  Vietnam,  and 
China.  The  government  has  welcomed 
U.S.  consultations  on  narcotics  and 
a  UN  narcotics-related  crop  substitu- 
tion program. 

Malaysia  is  an  important  heroin 
conversion  and  transit  center,  export- 
ing primarily  to  Europe  and  Australia. 
Plagued  by  drug  abuse  among  its  own 
population  and  concerned  by  the  dom- 
inance of  criminal  elements  in  the 
trade,  Malaysia  considers  drug  traffick- 
ing a  national  security  problem  and  has 
the  death  penalty  for  traffickers.  A 
strong  domestic  enforcement  program, 
which  drove  heroin  seizures  up  by 
TOOVf ,  seems  to  have  reduced  drug 
availability  in  1988,  and  a  new  property 
forfeiture  act  provides  a  vital  new 
weapon.  But  the  expected  bounty  of 
opium  coming  from  the  Golden  Trian- 
gle in  1989  will  put  the  country's  forces 
to  a  test. 

The  Philippines  exports  locally 
grown  and  Thai  marijuana  and  is  also  a 
transit  point  for  Golden  Triangle  heroin 
and  South  American  cocaine  smuggled 
into  Guam,  Australia,  Europe,  and  the 
United  States.  Foreigners  are  still 
principals  in  the  trade,  but  Filipino 
groups  have  also  emerged.  Filipino  po- 
lice conducted  more  than  1,000  narcot- 
ics raids  in  1988  and  made  important 
seizures  and  arrests,  but  the  enforce- 
ment effort,  which  the  U.S.  assists,  is 
hampered  by  budget  and  structural 
restraints. 

Singapore,  which  is  a  transship- 
ment point  for  Southeast  Asian  heroin 
and  has  high  potential  for  money  laun- 
dering, cooperates  with  U.S.  officials 
in  monitoring  and  intercepting  inter- 
national drug  traffic.  Singapore  offi- 
cials are  especially  worried  about  do- 
mestic drug  use. 

Thailand  has  reduced  opium  culti- 
vation to  about  28  metric  tons  but  re- 
mains significant  as  a  refiner  of  heroin 
and  conduit  for  opium/heroin  from  oth- 
er sources  in  the  Golden  Triangle.  High 
quality  Thai  marijuana  is  exported  to 
the  United  States  and  other  markets, 
and  there  is  also  an  active  trade  in  pre- 
cursor chemicals.  The  Royal  Thai  Gov- 


ernment counters  these  efforts  with  a 
vigorous  enforcement  program  that 
doubled  heroin  seizures  in  1988  while 
also  seizing  increased  amounts  of 
opium,  morphine,  and  marijuana.  Thai- 
land is  also  an  important  money  flow 
country. 

Africa 

Cote  d'lvoire  continues  to  suppress 
marijuana  cultivation,  which  is  not  a 
factor  on  the  international  market, 
while  trying  to  cope  with  a  continued 
flow  of  heroin,  cocaine,  and  marijuana 
transiting  Abidjan  en  route  to  Europe 
and  sometimes  the  United  States. 

Kenya  is  of  increasing  importance 
as  a  transit  point  for  Southwest  Asian 
heroin  en  route  to  West  Africa,  Eu- 
rope, and  the  United  States.  Local  con- 
sumption of  heroin  is  increasing.  Small 
amounts  of  marijuana  are  cultivated 
and  consumed  locally.  New  antidrug 
legislation  should  be  adopted  in  1989. 
U.S.  officials  concentrate  on  raising 
awareness  of  these  problems  with  Ken- 
yan officials  and  have  provided  some 
commodity  support  as  well  as  training 
and  technical  assistance. 

Morocco  is  a  source  of  cannabis 
and  hashish,  primarily  for  European 
and  African  markets,  and  also  a  transit 
point  for  heroin  and  cocaine.  Cannabis 
cultivation  is  increasing  as  is  domestic 
consumption.  The  effect  on  the  U.S. 
market  is  considered  insignificant.  A 
UN-funded  crop  substitution  project 
should  begin  in  1989. 

Nigeria  is  a  major  heroin  transit 
country,  a  principal  link  between 
Southwest  Asian  producers  and  con- 
sumer markets  in  Europe  and  the 
United  States.  Cocaine  from  South 
America  is  also  smuggled  through 
Nigeria  en  route  to  Europe.  Improved 
enforcement  at  Lagos  airport  has 
caused  some  diversion  of  heroin  to  oth- 
er West  African  cities  then  back  to 
Nigeria  through  land  routes.  U.S.  offi- 
cials provide  training  and  technical 
assistance. 

Senegal  is  primarily  concerned 
with  an  expanding  domestic  drug  prob- 
lem, but  some  trafficking  in  narcotics 
is  occurring,  which  has  prompted  in- 
creased police  action. 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee  and 
will  be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.B 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


59 


PACIFIC 


Visit  of  Australian  Prime  Minister 


Prime  Minister  Robert  J.L.  Hairke 
of  the  Commonwealth  of  Australia 
made  an  official  visit  to  Washington. 
D.C.,  June  2it-27.  1989.  to  meet  with 
President  Bush  and  other  government 
officials. 

Following  are  remarks  the  Presi- 
dent and  the  Prime  Minister  made  at 
the  welcoming  ceremony  on  June  27.^ 

President  Bush 

Barbara  and  I  are  very  pleased  to  wel- 
come you  as  old  friends  to  the  United 
States  and  to  the  White  House.  We  had 
the  opportunity  to  enjoy  Australia's 
renowned  hospitality  in  1982  during 
Australian-American  Friendship  Week. 
Barbara  and  I  are  just  delighted  to  try 
to  return  that  marvelous  hospitality. 
There  is  another  reason  why  it  is 
so  fitting  for  Australia's  Prime  Minis- 
ter to  be  among  the  fii'st  official 
guests.  Our  nations  share  a  similar 
heritage:  a  pioneer  heritage  in  the  tam- 
ing of  two  vast  continents,  a  heritage  of 
democratic  ideas,  and  a  heritage  of 
common  sacrifice  in  war  and  common 
efforts  in  peace.  In  our  last  visit,  Bar- 
bara and  I  joined  your  countrymen  in 
the  commemoration  of  one  of  the  most 
costly  battles  of  the  Second  World 
War — the  Battle  of  the  Coral  Sea — a 


poignant  reminder  of  how  much  Ameri- 
cans and  Australians  have  sacrificed 
four  times  in  this  century  in  the  de- 
fense of  freedom. 

This  is  not  just  an  alliance  between 
two  great  powers;  it  is  an  intimate 
partnership  between  two  peoples.  Your 
visit  reaffirms  the  vigor  of  this  part- 
nership, the  enduring  strength  of  our 
alliance. 

The  giant  strides  that  we  have 
made  recently  toward  many  of  our  com- 
mon goals — major  progress  in  arms  re- 
ductions; major  progress  in  resolving 
conflicts  in  Afghanistan,  Angola,  and 
Cambodia — all  were  made  possible  by 
the  resolve  of  the  West.  Our  countries 
prize  peace  but  recognize  that  peace 
comes  only  through  Western  strength 
and  vigilance.  We  must  maintain  our 
alliances  and  stand  by  our  friends  if  we 
are  to  fulfill  the  promise  of  a  new  era 
of  lessened  tension  and  confrontation. 
And  that  is  why  the  United  States  is  so 
grateful  for  Australian  leadership  in 
our  common  defense. 

America  also  admires  Australia's 
bold  leadership  in  foreign  policy,  both 
close  to  home  and  far  from  your  shores. 
From  the  South  Pacific  to  Africa,  Aus- 
tralia is  a  force  for  economic  growth 
and  a  beacon  of  democracy.  We  value 
your  contribution,  your  good  judgment, 
and  your  advice. 


We  have  much  to  discuss  at  an  im- 
portant moment  in  history.  Events  in 
China  call  for  close  consultation  amonj 
the  free  nations.  The  United  States  aii 
Australia  have  a  longstanding  traditic 
of  such  consultation  on  important  is- 
sues. I  am  interested  in  hearing  your 
assessments  of  recent  world  events. 

There  are  many  pressing  interna^ 
tional  issues.  Your  leadership  in  orga- 
nizing global  efforts  to  cope  with  the 
threat  of  chemical  weapons  is  one  posi 
tion  that  is  greatly  admired  by  Ameri' 
cans.  The  United  States  supports 
Australia's  efforts,  and  you  may  be  as- 
sured of  our  commitment  to  the  early 
achievement  of  an  effectively  verifiabi 
treaty  banning  these  weapons.  Today 
we  shall  discuss  world  events — arms 
control,  trade,  Pacific  regional  coopen 
tion,  economic  cooperation,  other 
subjects. 

You  have  a  busy  schedule  in  your 
very  brief  time  with  us.  But  we  hope  t 
.  make  your  visit  to  Washington  as 
pleasant  and  as  memorable  as  ours  wa 
to  your  great  country. 

Prime  Minister  Hawke 

It  is  an  immense  pleasure  for  me,  in 
these  3  days  in  Washington,  to  renew 
our  long  friendship.  And  it  is  a  specia 
pleasure  and  privilege  to  join  with  yo 
as  the  elected  chief  of  the  greatest  de 
mocracy  in  reaffirming  the  deep,  abic 
ing  friendship  of  our  two  countries.  Ii 
you  the  Western  world  has  an  experi- 
enced and  forward-looking  leader,  and 
in  you  Australia  has  a  valued  and  long 
standing  friend. 

Today,  as  you  have  said,  I  look  for 
ward  with  you  to  continuing  the  e.\- 
change  of  views  on  all  the  issues 
affecting  our  countries  in  the  spirit  ofi 
friendship  and  of  frankness  which  has- 
always  characterized  our  association 
and  which  befits  the  relationship  and, 
if  I  may  say,  the  partnership  between 
Australia  and  the  United  States.  As 
you  say,  we  are  meeting  at  a  time  of 
historic  and  far-reaching  change  acros 
the  world.  There  now  exists  unpar- 
alleled new  opportunities,  challenges, 
and,  may  I  say,  responsibilities  for 
leadership  and  positive  achievement  oi_ 
crucial  issues  of  peace  and  security, 
East-West  relations,  economic  prog- 
ress, world  trade,  and  the  protection  o 
the  world  environment. 

You  have  already  demonstrated 
your  determination  to  give  leadershipj 
Your  constructive  approach  to  East- 
West  relations  is  demonstrated  by  you: 
creative  and  bold  proposal  for  the  re- 


60 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  19a 


PACIFIC 


i.ction  of  conventional  weapons  in  Eu- 
)^e.  In  this  and  other  arms  control  en- 
( avors  aimed  at  reducing  nuclear 
limaments  and,  as  you  importantly 
iiphasize,  banning  chemical  weapons, 
u  know  that  you  can  count  consist- 
tly  on  the  support  of  Australia. 

In  this  new  and  challenging  era, 
te  constancy,  the  depth,  and  the  vital- 
i,'  of  the  alliance  between  Australia 
ad  the  United  States  will  remain  cru- 
ally  important  to  the  national  inter- 
ns of  both  our  countries.  But  it  has  a 
i(der  regional  and,  indeed,  global  sig- 
ificance.  Under  ANZUS  [Australia, 
few  Zealand,  United  States  security 
leaty],  the  joint  Australia-U.S.  de- 
Inse  facilities  in  Australia  are  signifi- 
(nt  elements  in  maintaining  the  peace 
ad  in  supporting  the  effectiveness  of 
;tms  control  and  disarmament  agree- 
ents.  Over  recent  years,  our  coopera- 
m  and  consultations  at  the  highest 
vels  have  been  stronger,  broader,  and 
ore  productive  than  at  any  other  time 
ince  ANZUS  was  formed. 
!     But  as  we  both  agree,  our  alliance 
pes  far  beyond  our  defense  alliance.  It 
ocompasses  dynamic  economic  links 
iid  broad  and  deep  human  and  cultural 
i.sociations.  But  above  all,  it  is  based 
'1  the  firmest  of  foundations:  our 
:  ared  commitment  to  democracy  and 
individual  liberty  within  the  rule  of 
vv. 

It  is  precisely  because  of  the  depth 
id  the  maturity  of  our  relationship 
lat  the  differences  of  views  that  do  ex- 
t  between  us  can  be  faced  openly  and 
:)nestly  as,  for  example,  on  some  trade 
atters,  particularly  aspects  of  agri- 
dtural  policy.  I  am  quite  confident 
lat  today  we  will  be  able  to  focus  on 
ays  to  minimize,  if  not  entirely  re- 
vive, such  differences.  I  look  forward 
>  exploring  with  you  means  of  cooper- 
ing in  the  current  Uruguay  Round  of 
ultilateral  trade  negotiations  to 
?hieve  some  progress  toward  the  goal 
lat  we  both  want — an  international 
I'ading  system  based  on  free  and  fair 
pmpetition. 

I  know  that  we  both  understand 
lat  moving  in  the  opposite  directions 
jward  a  world  of  separate  and  compet- 
ig  trade  blocs  would  be  economically 
isastrous  and  quite  possibly  strategi- 
jlly  destabilizing.  That  is  one  of  the 
easons,  I  might  add,  why  earlier  this 
tear  I  suggested  the  development  of 
jioser  regional  economic  cooperation  in 
ie  Asia-Pacific  region.  Implementa- 
on  of  my  proposal  could,  I  believe,  im- 


Australia — A  Profile 


Geography 

Area:  7.7  million  sq.  km.  (2.966  million  sq. 
mi.);  about  the  size  of  the  continental 
United  States.  Cities:  (1987  est.)  Capital- 
Canberra  (pop.  286,000).  Other  cities— Syd- 
ney (3.5  million),  Melbourne  (3.0  million), 
Brisbane  (1.2  million),  Perth  (1.1  million). 
Terrain:  Varied,  but  generally  low  lying. 
Climate:  Relatively  dry,  ranging  from  tem- 
perate in  the  south  to  semitropical  in  the 
north. 


PAPUA 
NEW  GUINEA 


/m/iatt  Ocean 


People 

Nationality:  Noun  ami  adjective — Aus- 
tralian(s).  Population  (1988  est.):  16. .5  mil- 
lion. Annual  growth  rate:  1.5%.  Ethnic 
groups:  European  93%,  Asian  5%,  aborig- 
inal 1%.  Religions:  Anglican  26%,  Roman 
Catholic  26%.  Languages:  English,  aborig- 
inal. Education:  Years  compulsory — to 
age  15  in  all  states  except  Tasmania,  where 
it  is  16.  Literacy— 100%.  Health:  Infant 
mortality  rate — 8.8/1,000.  Life  expec- 
tancy— males  73  yrs.,  females  79  yrs. 
Work  force  (end-1987,  7.9  million): 
Agriculture — 6%.  Mining,  manufacturing , 
and  utilities — 26%.  Services — 63%.  Public 
administration  and  Defense — 5%. 

Government 

Type:  Democratic,  federal-state  system 
recognizing  British  monarch  as  sovereign. 
Constitution:  July  9,  1900.  Independence 
(federation):  January  1,  1901. 

Branches:  Executive — prime  minister 
and  cabinet  responsible  to  Parliament. 
Legislative — bicameral  Parliament  (76- 
member  Senate,  148-member  House  of 
Representatives).  Judicial — independent 
judiciary. 

Administrative  subdivisions:  Six 
states  and  two  territories. 


Political  parties:  Liberal,  National, 
Australian  Labor,  Australian  Democrats. 
Suffrage:  Universal  and  compulsory  over 
18. 

Central  government  budget 
(FY  1988-89):  $65.1  billion. 

Defense  (FY  1988-89):  2.7%  of  GDP  or 
9.3%  of  government  budget. 

Economy 

GDP  (1988):  $220.96  billion.  Per  capita  in- 
come: $14,458.  Inflation  rate:  7.3%. 

Natural  resources:  Bauxite,  coal,  iron 
ore,  copper,  tin,  silver,  uranium,  nickel, 
tungsten,  mineral  sands,  lead,  zinc,  dia- 
monds, natural  gas,  oil. 

Agriculture  (1985-86,  4%  of  GDP): 
Products — livestock,  wheat,  wool,  sugar. 
Arable  land—^%. 

Industry  (1985-86,  36%  of  GDP): 
Types — mining,  manufacturing,  and 
transportation. 

Trade  (1988):  Exports— $30.7  billion: 
coal,  wool,  wheat,  meat,  iron  ore  and  con- 
centrates, alumina,  aluminum,  petroleum 
oils,  nonmonetary  gold.  Major  markets — 
Japan.  US  ($3.3  billion  in  CY  1987),  UK, 
Korea,  PRC,  Hong  Kong,  Taiwan,  West 
Germany.  Imports — $30.6  billion:  transpor- 
tation equipment,  capital  goods,  industrial 
supplies,  petroleum  products.  Major  sup- 
pliers—\JS  ($5.5  billion  in  CY  1987),  Japan, 
West  Germany,  UK,  Taiwan,  New  Zealand, 
Italy,  Korea. 

Official  exchange  rate:  The  Aus- 
tralian dollar  floats  freely.  The  November 
1988  rate  was  approximately  US$0.85  = 
Australian  $1. 

Fiscal  year:  July  l^une  30. 

Membership  in 
International  Organizations 

UN  and  most  of  its  specialized  and  related 
agencies,  including  the  UN  Education, 
Scientific,  and  Cultural  Organization 
(UNESCO)  and  the  Food  and  Agricultural 
Organization  (FAO);  Organization  of  Eco- 
nomic Cooperation  and  Development 
(OECD):  Asian  Development  Bank  (ADB); 
Economic  and  Social  Council  for  Asia  and 
the  Pacific  (ESCAP);  Australia-New 
Zealand-US  security  treaty  (ANZUS); 
Commonwealth;  Colombo  Plan;  Interna- 
tional Energy  Agency  (lEA);  the  Antarctic 
Treaty  Consultative  Group;  and  many 
others. 


Taken  from  the  Background  Notes  of  March 
1989,  published  by  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  Department  of  State.  Editor: 
Juanita  Adams.  ■ 


)epartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


61 


PACIFIC 


pi'ove  significantly  the  chances  for  suc- 
cess in  the  Uruguay  Round,  as  well  as 
acting  as  a  catalyst  for  further  growth 
in  our  dynamic  region.  I  am  very  keen 
to  exchange  views  with  you  on  this  pro- 
posal. And  may  I  say  that  I,  indeed, 
welcome  Secretary  Baker's  support  last 
night  [in  an  address  before  the  Asia  So- 
ciety] for  a  new  mechanism  for  multi- 
lateral cooperation  among  the  nations 
of  tlie  region  as  an  idea  whose  time  has 
come.  I  am  delighted  that  the  United 
States  supports  my  call  for  a  minis- 
terial meeting  this  year  as  a  first  step 
if,  as  I  hope  and  e.xpect,  there  is  con- 
sensus in  the  region. 

I  make  this  final  point.  The  A.meri- 
can  presence  has  been  a  prime  factor  in 
creating  and  in  maintaining  the  condi- 
tions for  stability  and  prosperity  in  the 


Asia-Pacific  region.  Americas  continu- 
ing involvement  in  our  region  remains 
a  key  to  its  future  progress.  As  you 
say,  we  have  before  us  an  imposing  dia- 
logue that  we  have  to  deal  with. 

What  gives  this  visit  and  our  dis- 
cussions their  real  substance,  however, 
and  what  will  make  them  so  mutually 
beneficial  is  the  sense  of  common  i)ur- 
pose  that  we  bring  to  these  matters 
based  on  our  common  national  and  in- 
ternational interests  and  on  our  com- 
mon commitment  to  peace  and  to 
freedom. 


1  Made  at  the  South  Portico  of  the  White 
House  where  Prime  Minister  Hawke  was  ac- 
corded a  formal  welcome  with  full  military 
honors  (te.xt  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  July  3,  1989).H 


U.S.  Establishes  Diplomatic  Relations 
with  Marshall  Islands  and  Micronesia 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
JULY  26,  19891 

I  take  great  pleasure  in  signing  into 
law  H.R.  2214  [Public  Law  No.  lUl-62], 
which  approves  diplomatic  relations 
agreements  with  the  Republic  of  the 
Marshall  Islands  and  the  Federated 
States  of  Micronesia.  Since  1986  these 
countries  have  been  our  partners  in 
free  association.  Our  ties  to  them  go 
back  to  the  last  World  War  when  Amer- 
ican forces  liberated  their  islands  in 
some  of  the  bloodiest  fighting  of  the  Pa- 
cific campaign.  We  administered  the  is- 
lands as  part  of  a  UN  trusteeship  until 
late  198(5. 

Under  the  agreements  now  ap- 
proved, our  current  representative  of- 
fices in  Majuro,  the  Marshall  Islands, 
and  in  Kolonia,  Micronesia,  will  become 
fuU-gledged  embassies  with  resident 
American  Ambassadors.  The  same  wel- 
come transformation  will  occur  here  in 
Washington,  and  our  diplomatic  com- 
munity will  be  enlarged  by  the  addition 


of  ambassadors  from  the  Marshall  Is- 
lands and  Micronesia.  This  change  will 
portray  accurately  the  nature  of  our  re- 
lationship with  these  countries  under 
the  Compact  of  Free  Association,  the 
treaty  linking  our  nations  in  a  special 
partnership. 

I  would  like  to  recognize  the  con- 
tributions of  all  those  who  labored 
to  negotiate  and  conclude  these  two 
agreements.  The  one  person  who  de- 
serves special  mention  is  Representa- 
tive Bob  Lagomarsino  of  California, 
who  introduced  this  bill  into  the  House 
and  who  has  been  a  tireless  supporter 
of  the  American  position  in  the  Pacific. 
I  will  also  pay  tribute  to  Their  Excel- 
lencies Wilfred  Kendall  of  the  Marshall 
Islands  and  Jesse  Marehalau  of  Micro- 
nesia. With  the  entry  into  force  of  the 
agreements,  let  me  be  the  first  to  ad- 
dress them  as  Ambassador  Kendall 
and  Ambassador  Marehalau. 


'  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Pres- 
idential Documents  of  July  31,  1989.  ■ 


62 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  19i 


;OUTH  ASIA 


^isit  of  Pakistan's  Prime  Minister 


Prime  Minister  Mohtrama  Benazir 
I  iitlu  of  the  Islamic  Republic  of 
t^kistan  made  an  official  risit  to  the 
hitcd  States  June  5-10.  19S9.  to  meet 
nil:  President  Bush  and  other 
qr(  rnment  officials. 

Following  are  remarks  made  by 
(,  President  and  the  Prime  Minister 
an-  their  meeting  on  June  6.' 

lesident  Bush 

Iwas  a  special  pleasure  for  Barbara 
ad  me  to  welcome  Prime  Minister 
iutto  to  the  White  House  this  morn- 
i  J.  In  fact,  our  relationship  goes  back 
t|1971,  when  she  attended  Harvard 
n\  came  with  her  dad  to  the  United 
htions.  I  have  often  remarked  that 
Yx  father's  1971  appeal  was  literally 

S  of  the  most  moving  speeches  that  I 
r  heard  at  the  United  Nations.  More 
rbently,  we  met  in  Tokyo  last  Febru- 
ay,  where,  I  believe,  we  were  the  most 
riwly  elected  heads  of  government. 
'    Pakistan  and  the  United  States 
l"\e  enjoyed  a  long  history  of  good  re- 
lions,  friends  since  the  time  that 
Ikistan  became  an  independent  na- 
tn.  I  welcome  this  opportunity  to  re- 
a'irm  those  ties  and  to  reassure  the 
lime  Minister  of  our  continued  com- 
rtment  to  assist  in  Pakistan's  security 
ad  its  economic  and  cultural 
cvelopment. 

The  Prime  Minister  knows  our 
c.mtry  well,  and  she  has  many  friends 
h'e.  I  congratulated  her  on  Pakistan's 
htoric  return  to  democracy  last  year, 
alevelopment  of  which  the  people  of 
Ijkistan  can  be  truly  proud.  We  dis- 
cssed  how  important  it  is  for  all  ele- 
I'nts  of  Pakistan  society  to  ensure 
tat  democracy  isn't  just  an  abstract 
ciicept  but  that  it  works. 

The  Prime  Minister  and  I  reviewed 
te  situation  in  Afghanistan.  For  the 
ht  decade,  the  United  States  and 
Ikistan  cooperated  in  supporting  the 
i'ghan  resistance  in  its  fight  against 
f'eign  occupation.  Pakistan  deserves 
J  eat  credit  and  admiration  for  its  ex- 
t.inrdinary  humanitarian  efforts  in 
.-ppiirt  of  the  millions  of  Afghan  refu- 
■  ('>  (luring  this  ]3eriod.  The  effeetive- 
.->  iif  our  mutual  policy  was  proven 
■1  February,  when  the  last  Soviet 
'  "ips  withdrew  from  Afghanistan.  We 
rt'ed,  however,  that  the  job  is  not 
ne.  The  mujahidin  continues,  and 
eir  struggle  for  self-determination 


i^ 


partment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


63 


SOUTH  ASIA 


goes  on,  a  goal  that  both  the  United 
States  and  Pakistan  continue  to  sup- 
port. Prime  Minister  Bhutto  and  I  dis- 
cussed ways  to  encourage  a  political 
solution  in  Afghanistan  that  will  lead 
to  a  nonaligned,  representative  govern- 
ment, willing  to  live  in  peace  with  its 
neighbors,  to  replace  the  illegitimate 
regime  in  Kabul.  The  United  States 
and  Pakistan  will  continue  to  explore 
any  serious  avenue  toward  this  end. 

The  Prime  Minister  and  I  also  re- 
viewed our  efforts  to  enhance  stability 
in  South  Asia,  an  important  objective 
of  both  governments.  I  expressed  our 
strong  support  for  Pakistan's  efforts, 
and  India's  as  well,  to  improve  relations 
and  stressed  the  critical  importance  of 
avoiding  a  regional  nuclear  arms  race 
in  the  subcontinent.  She  assured  me 
that  Pakistan's  nuclear  program  is  com- 
mitted to  peaceful  purposes.  I  under- 
lined my  Administration's  commitment 
to  discourage  proliferation  of  nuclear 
and  chemical  weapons,  ballistic  mis- 
siles, in  the  South  Asia  region  and 
around  the  world. 

We  also  shared  our  concern  about 
the  scourge  of  drug  production  and 
trafficking.  Not  much  detail  yet  on 
that,  but  we're  going  to  go  into  that  one 
in  much  more  detail  later  on.  It's  a  mat- 
ter of  grave  concern  on  the  United 
States.  I  applauded  her  tough  stance  on 
eradicating  the  opium  cultivation  and 
expressed  our  appreciation  for  the  ex- 
tradition of  alleged  drug  trafficker 
Saleem.  To  effectively  combat  this 
menace,  we've  got  to  undertake  a  vigor- 
ous enforcement  campaign,  offering 
U.S.  assistance  wherever  possible. 

Let  me  say  that  as  far  as  I'm  con- 
cerned, these  discussions  have  been 
productive.  Let  me  note  too  that  that 
ceremony  outside  today,  the  first  since 
I've  been  President,  was  a  wonderful 
way  to  welcome  the  Prime  Minister.  We 
just  walked  by  the  Rose  Garden,  which 
also  is  a  lovely  setting,  and  as  the 
Prime  Minister  has  observed,  roses 
have  a  very  special  meaning  in  her  life. 
When  she  was  younger,  her  father 
would  bring  back  roses  every  time  he 
traveled  abroad,  and  in  time,  her  fami- 
ly's gardens  became  filled  with  vari- 
eties of  color.  During  her  own 
detention,  she  struggled  bravely  to 
keep  the  gardens  alive,  for  as  she  has 
written,  "I  could  not  bear  to  watch  the 
flowers  wither,  especially  my  father's 
roses."  Madam  Prime  Minister,  you've 
described  your  time  among  the  roses 
and  the  cool  shade  of  the  gardens  as 
"the  happiest  hours  of  my  life."  Now  as 
a  gesture  of  friendship  between  our 


64 


people  and  to  continue  your  father's 
tradition,  it  is  my  privilege  to  present 
you  with  this  American  rosebush.  May 
it  and  you  prosper  in  the  years  to  come. 

Prime  Minister  Bhutto 

I'm  very  grateful  to  President  Bush  for 
the  kind  invitation  to  pay  an  official 
visit  to  the  United  States,  and  I'd  like 
to  thank  the  President  for  his  consid- 
eration in  giving  me  one  of  the  rose- 
bushes from  the  White  House.  It  shall 
always  remind  me  of  this  very  use- 
ful, productive,  and  helpful  visit — 
supportive  visit — of  mine  to  the  United 
States. 

My  presence  here  underlies  the 
great  importance  that  Pakistan  at- 
taches to  our  relations  with  your 
country.  This  is  not  only  because 
geopolitical  realities  require  a  close  re- 
lationship but,  more  importantly,  be- 
cause of  the  ideals  and  the  objectives 
that  we  share.  As  you  know,  this  is  not 
my  first  visit  to  Washington  or,  indeed, 
to  the  United  States.  I  have  pleasant 
memories  of  my  student  days  at  Rad- 
cliffe,  past  visits  to  Washington,  one  of 
the  great  citadels  of  democracy.  But  it 
is  a  special  privilege  and  honor  to  be 
here  as  the  democratically  elected  lead- 
er of  a  country  which  has  traditionally 
enjoyed  close,  friendly  ties  with  your 
country. 

Over  the  last  10  years,  Pakistan 
has  been  in  the  forefront  of  two  great 
struggles.  We  have  actively  supported 
the  cause  of  the  Afghan  people  and 
their  brave  fight  against  foreign  mili- 
tary intervention,  and  at  the  same 
time,  at  home  in  Pakistan,  we've  strug- 
gled against  military  dictatorship  to 
establish  a  system  based  upon  demo- 
cratic^ values  and  the  respect  for 
human  rights.  In  both  these  epic 
struggles,  we  received  from  the  United 
States  unwavering  support  and  mate- 
rial as  well  as  moral  encouragement.  It 
has,  therefore,  been  a  special  pleasure 
and  privilege  to  come  to  Washington 
and  to  thank  President  Bush  and  the 
Government  and  the  people  of  the 
United  States  for  their  friendship 
and  their  generosity. 

The  President  and  I  have  had  wide- 
ranging  discussions  on  a  number  of  is- 
sues, and  I  am  convinced  that  this  ex- 
change will  be  of  immense  benefit  to 
the  bilateral  relations  that  exist  be- 
tween us  and  also  to  the  cause  of  world 
peace.  President  Bush  has  just  re- 
turned to  Washington  from  a  spec- 
tacularly successful  visit  to  Europe 
and  where  he  has  launched  a  series  of 


initiatives  which  could  open  an  entire 
new  era  in  international  relations,  wi: 
the  exciting  prospect  of  a  genuine  am 
durable  peace.  Pakistan,  which  is  siti 
ated  in  one  of  the  more  sensitive  geO' 
political  regions  of  the  world,  will 
contribute  toward  these  objectives  ai 
efforts. 

While  the  withdrawal  of  Soviet 
forces  has  brought  a  welcome  change 
Afghanistan,  the  continued  fighting 
and  prolonged  presence  of  over  3V2  m. 
lion  Afghan  refugees  pose  serious 
threats  to  the  peace  and  stability  oft 
region.  The  President  and  I  have  re- 
viewed the  situation  in  the  light  of  thi 
prevailing  circumstances,  and  we  are 
in  complete  accord,  both  in  terms  of 
our  analyses  as  well  as  the  future  po! 
cies  that  need  to  be  evolved.  Pakistan 
remains  committed  to  a  political  solu 
tion  of  the  Afghan  problem,  whereby 
the  brave  people  of  Afghanistan  will 
have  the  right  to  freely  choose  their 
own  government  without  interferenc 
from  outside.  Pakistan's  commitment 
peace  and  democracy  are  fundament; 

In  thanking  President  Bush  for  t 
valuable  support  that  the  United  Stai 
has  rendered  to  us  in  the  pursuit  of 
these  objectives,  I  have  assured  him 
our  continuing  efforts  toward  main- 
taining peace  in  the  South  Asian  reg 
and  of  our  determination  to  strength 
the  process  of  nuclear  nonproliferatic 
by  seeking  accords,  both  bilateral  ani 
international,  within  the  regional 
context. 

The  President  and  I  discussed 
measures  to  increase  our  cooperatioi 
in  the  fight  against  drugs.  We  have  ai 
ready  achieved  some  success  in  this  c 
rection  in  Pakistan,  but  much  remain 
to  be  done. 

In  conclusion  I  would  once  more 
wish  to  thank  President  Bush  for  the 
generous  hospitality,  for  the  warmth 
and  the  friendship  with  which  we  ha\ 
been  received.  I  go  home  greatly  en- 
couraged by  our  constructive  and  fru 
ful  discussions.  I  look  forward  to  the 
ojjportunity  of  reciprocating  in  Paki- 
stan some  of  the  warmth,  kindness,  a 
hospitality  that  my  husband  and  I  ha' 
been  privileged  to  receive  from  the 
President  and  Mrs.  Bush  in 
Washington. 


•  Made  in  the  East  Room  of  the  White 
House  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  June  12,  1989).l 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October 


,. 


SOUTH  ASIA 


'roposal  to  Sell  F-16s  to  Pakistan 


I  Teresita  Schaffer 

Statement  before  the  Subconunit- 
,( N  mi  Asian  and  Paeific  Affairs  and 
,1  Arms  Control,  Internationa!  Secu- 

tii.  and  ScieJice  of  the  House  Foreign 
ffdirs  Committee  on  August  2,  1989. 
.  rs.  Schaffer  is  Deputy  Assistant  Sec- 

tarii  for  Near  Eastern  and  South 
Mini  Affairs.^ 

jam  pleased  to  have  this  opportunity 
l  discuss  with  you  the  Administra- 
iii's  plans  to  sell  60  F-16  A/B  fighter 
roraft  to  Pakistan.  This  is  a  partic- 
arly  memorable  event  for  me,  being 
y  first  opportunity  to  meet  with  you 
iRi'  my  appointment  as  Deputy  Assist- 
,it  Secretary.  Assistant  Secretary  [for 
lear  Eastern  and  South  Asian  Affairs 
>hn  H.]  Kelly  regrets  that  he  is  unable 
)  testify  himself.  He  has  spent  the 
I  St  2  days  in  Stockholm  in  bilateral 
scussions  on  Afghanistan  with  Soviet 
qjerts  and  is,  unfortunately,  still  on 
le  road. 

It  has  been  almost  5  months  since 
'presentatives  of  the  State  and  De- 
nse Departments  have  testified 
'fore  the  Asia  and  Pacific  Affairs 
ibcommittee  on  the  Administration's 
reign  assistance  requests  for  Paki- 
an  and  India,  including  the  possi- 
lity  of  selling  additional  F-16s  to 
akistan.  At  that  time,  we  indicated 
lat  we  had  not  reached  a  firm  decision 
[\  how  to  respond  to  the  Pakistan  Gov- 
;-nment's  reciuest  for  additional  F-16s 
;id  intended  to  consider  carefully  the 
'hole  range  of  relevant  factors.  The 
lost  important  of  these  factors  was  the 
npact  of  selling  or  not  selling  on 
iakistan's  security  and  development, 
n  Pakistan's  improving  relations  with 
ndia,  on  the  risks  of  conventional  and 
uclear  arms  proliferation  in  the  re- 
ion,  on  the  new  democratic  govern- 
lent  in  Pakistan,  and  on  U.S.  relations 
'ith  Pakistan. 

'akistan's  Need  for  Modernization 

'akistan  is  surrounded  by  nations  with 
,irge  military  forces — Iran,  Afghan- 
;tan,  the  Soviet  Union,  China, 
!nd  India.  The  ongoing  conflict  in 
ifghanistan,  the  massive  influx  of 
'lodern  weapons  into  Afghanistan  from 
he  Soviet  Union,  and  repeated  attacks 
n  Pakistani  soil  by  the  Kabul  regime 
ontinue  to  pose  a  very  real  threat  to 


Pakistan's  security.  The  current  U.S. 
security  assistance  program  to  Paki- 
stan aims  to  help  it  maintain  a  credible 
deterrent  to  possible  aggressors  by 
sea,  land,  and  air,  but  these  funds  are 
limited.  The  current  Pakistan  Govern- 
ment, like  its  predecessor,  has  made 
the  modernization  of  its  fighter  force  a 
top  defense  priority  and  is  prepared  to 
do  this  out  of  its  own  funds. 

After  her  ascension  to  the  prime 
ministership  in  early  December  1988, 
Benazir  Bhutto  called  for  a  thorough 
review  of  Pakistan's  military  procure- 
ment plans.  At  the  end  of  January,  she 
informed  our  Ambassador  in  Islamabad 
that  she  had  decided  that  Pakistan 
needs  more  F-16s.  She  subsequently  re- 
viewed the  situation  again,  carefully, 
from  the  standpoints  of  regional  rela- 
tions and  affordability.  She  reaffirmed 
her  earlier  decision  and  communicated 
it  to  the  Administration  in  writing  be- 
fore her  visit  here  in  June. 

We  have  discussed  this  decision  in 
detail  with  a  number  of  Pakistan  au- 
thorities. They  explain  that  important 
elements  of  Pakistan's  Air  Force,  such 
as  the  Chinese  variants  of  the  MiG-19 
obtained  in  the  1960s,  are  old  and 
increasingly  outmoded.  Many  of  its 
fighter  aircraft  will  be  retired  in  the 
next  few  years.  Unless  these  aircraft 
are  replaced  with  modern  versions,  the 
present  military  equation  in  South  Asia 
will  shift  increasingly  to  Pakistan's  dis- 
advantage, with  potentially  destabi- 
lizing consequences.  The  Pakistan 
Government  has  examined  various  re- 
placement possibilities,  including  high- 
technology  models  from  other  Western 
countries,  and  has  decided  that  the 
U.S.-built  F-16  A/B,  which  is  present 
already  in  its  air  force,  makes  the  best 
sense  in  terms  both  of  performance  and 
economics. 

The  Bhutto  government,  although 
deciding  to  pursue  the  F-16  purchase, 
has  taken  steps  to  increase  the  develop- 
mental thrust  of  overall  government  ex- 
penditures. The  great  bulk  of  the  $1.5 
billion  cost  of  the  F-16  package  will  be 
covered  by  funds  already  earmarked 
for  an  aircraft  that  Pakistan  had  in- 
tended to  coproduce  some  years  ago.  In 
the  new  government's  budget  for  1989- 
90,  defense  is  allotted  a  small  nominal 
increase,  which  represents  a  substan- 
tial decrease  in  real  terms.  In  contrast, 
spending  on  education  is  up  68%  and 
health  26%.  A  people's  development 


structure  has  been  erected  and  allo- 
cated $143  million  the  first  year  to 
ensure  that  development  monies  are 
spread  widely  at  the  grass  roots. 

Indian  Government's  Concerns 

The  Government  of  India  has  expressed 
its  concern  about  our  intention  to  sell 
more  F-16s  to  Pakistan.  We  have  con- 
sidered India's  views  very  carefully  but 
feel  that  a  sale  of  60  F-16  A/Bs  will  not 
contribute  to  an  escalation  of  military 
technology  on  the  subcontinent,  change 
the  military  balance,  or  destabilize  the 
region.  On  the  contrary,  we  believe 
that  a  more  confident  Pakistan,  with  a 
reasonable  defensive  capability,  will  be 
better  able  to  negotiate  the  kind  of  fair 
and  lasting  agreements  with  India 
which  will  reduce  the  chances  of  war 
between  them.  I  would  note  that  the 
Indian  and  Pakistani  Prime  Ministers 
have  continued  their  efforts  to  improve 
relations  since  the  Administration  for- 
mally notified  Congress  of  this  sale. 

We  believe  also  that  our  own  good 
relations  with  India  are  sustained  by 
a  growing  range  of  mutual  interests. 
Growing  ties  in  trade  and  high  technol- 
ogy occupy  an  increasingly  important 
place  in  our  bilateral  dialogue.  We  do 
not  consider  our  relations  with  India 
and  Pakistan  to  be  a  zero-sum  game.  I 
believe  that  the  Government  of  India 
understands  this  position  and  would 
agree  that  Indo-U.S.  relations  should 
not  be  defined  predominantly  in  terms 
of  our  relations  with  Pakistan,  the  So- 
viet Union,  or  any  other  country. 

We  have  heard  concerns  expressed 
that  the  sale  of  F-16s  to  Pakistan  could 
increase  the  dangers  of  nuclear  prolif- 
eration on  the  subcontinent.  We  believe 
the  opposite  is  true.  None  of  the  F-16s 
Pakistan  already  owns  or  is  about  to 
purchase  is  configured  for  nuclear  de- 
livery. Pakistan,  moreover,  will  be  obli- 
gated contractually  not  to  modify  its 
new  acquisitions  without  the  approval 
of  the  United  States.  More  impor- 
tantly, a  Pakistan  with  a  credible 
conventional  deterrent  will  be  less 
motivated  to  pursue  a  nuclear  weapons 
capability. 

Strengthening  Democratic 
Government 

The  establishment  of  democracy  in 
Pakistan  after  more  than  a  decade  of 
military  rule  is,  we  believe,  one  of 


j)epartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


65 


TERRORISM 


the  most  imijortant  events  in  modern 
Pakistani  and  South  Asian  history.  The 
United  States  should  do  all  it  can  to 
support  and  strengthen  these  demo- 
cratic institutions  and  their  civilian 
leadership.  Our  willingness  to  cooper- 
ate with  the  new  government's  efforts 
to  modernize  its  fighter  force  will  con- 
tribute to  Pakistan's  sense  of  security 
and  assure  the  Pakistani  public  that 
the  country's  defense  needs  can  be  met 
effectively  by  a  civilian  democratic 
government. 

In  May  the  State  Department  con- 
sulted informally  with  a  number  of 
members  and  staff  in  both  the  House 
and  Senate.  Our  conclusion  from  those 
consultations  was  that  there  is  broad- 
based  support  in  Congress  for  the  sale 
of  this  major  weapons  system  as  one  in- 
dication of  U.S.  support  for  the  new 
democratic  government  of  Pakistan. 

In  early  June,  Prime  Minister 
Bhutto  visited  Washington.  In  her  ad- 
dress before  a  joint  meeting  of  Con- 
gress and  in  discussions  with  high-level 
Administration  officials,  she  spoke 
of  a  new  partnership  with  the  United 
States  based  on  shared  democratic  and 
developmental  values  and  on  a  growing 
range  of  common  interests.  She  reas- 
serted Pakistan's  commitment  to 
working  with  the  United  States  in 
supporting  the  Afghan  resistance,  as- 
sisting the  millions  of  Afghan  refugees, 
suppressing  the  illicit  drug  trade,  and 
preventing  nuclear  proliferation.  She 
stated  that  U.S.  military  assistance  to 
Pakistan  has  contributed  to  peace  and 
stability  in  South  Asia.  She  also  reaf- 
firmed the  importance  she  attaches  to 
the  purchase  of  more  F-16s. 

On  June  8,  informal  notification  of 
the  proposed  F-16  sale  was  sent  to  the 
Congress.  This  was  followed  on  July  11 
with  formal  notification.  On  July  27-28, 
the  U.S. -Pakistan  consultative  group 
met  in  Washington  to  review  our  secu- 
rity assistance  relationship,  as  we  do  at 
regular  intervals.  During  these  discus- 
sions, the  two  sets  of  experts  discussed 
the  specifics  of  Pakistan  Government 
funding  and  various  delivery  schedules 
for  the  aircraft  in  the  1990s.  Although 
our  foreign  military  sales  organization 
will  administer  the  proposed  sale,  we 
were  assured  that  the  Government  of 
Pakistan  has  budgeted  to  meet  the  full 
cost  of  the  aircraft  from  its  own 
resources. 


In  sum  the  evidence  we  have  e.xam- 
ined  since  we  testified  before  you  in 
March  persuades  us  that  it  is  strongly 
in  the  interests  of  the  United  States 
that  we  sell  more  F-16s  to  Pakistan. 
Not  to  sell  the  needed  aircraft  would 
not  only  jeopardize  the  close  coopera- 
tion we  have  developed  with  Pakistan 


over  the  past  decade  but  would  show  ai| 
unfortunate  lack  of  support  for 
Pakistan's  fledgling  democracy. 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear 
ings  will  be  published  by  the  committee  an 
will  be  available  from  the  Superintendent 
of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.B 


American  Hostages  in  the  Middle  East 


Lt.  Col.  William  R.  Higgins, 
USMC,  chief  of  the  UN  peacekeeping 
force  in  southern  Lebanon,  was 
kidnapped  on  February  17.  1988.  and 
allegedly  hanged  by  pro-Iranian 
terrorists  on  July  .11.  1989.^ 


PRESIDENT'S  REMARKS, 
JULY  31,  19892 

Before  I  make  my  remarks,  I  want  to 
comment  on  a  very  disturbing  report 
that  we  have  just  heard.  There  are  un- 
confirmed reports  that  Col.  Higgins 
has,  indeed,  been  executed.  I  had 
planned  to  go  on  out  to  Nevada  for 
another  appearance  today  and  then 
to  go  to  Oklahoma  tonight.  But  this 
matter  is  of  such  concern  to  me  and  to 
all  of  you  and  to  the  American  people 
that  I  think  it's  appropriate  that  I  go 
back  to  Washington. 

Whether  the  report  is  true  or  not, 
I  know  I  speak  for  all  here  when  I  try 
to  express  to  the  American  people  the 
sense  of  outrage  that  we  all  feel  about 
this  kind  of  brutality,  this  uncalled-for 
terrorism.  This  was  a  young  American 
colonel  serving  in  an  international 
force,  and  it  is  incumbent  on  all  of 
us  to  try  to  rectify  this  situation,  if 
at  all  possible. 

I  have  no  more  to  share  with  you 
on  this.  We  have  not  been  able  to  con- 
firm this  horrible  report,  but  I  will  go 
back  to  Washington  and  convene  our 
top  national  security  people  and,  first, 
establish  to  the  best  of  our  ability  if  the 
report  is  true  and  then  figure  out  what 
might  conceivably  be  done.  I'm  sorry  to 
bring  to  this  meeting  a  message  of  that 
natui-e — the  bad  news — but  I  felt  you 
would  want  to  know  about  it. 


PRESIDENT'S  REMARKS, 
JULY  31,  1989 ' 

Let  me  just,  on  behalf  of  the  Americai 
people,  express  the  outrage  that  we 
feel  at  the  brutal  nvirder  of  Col.  Hig- 
gins. At  this  juncture,  I  don't  have 
what  I  would  call  a  final  confirmation. 
On  the  way  home  from  Chicago,  I  was 
on  the  phone  to  the  Secretary  Generall 
[of  the  United  Nations  Javier  Perez  da 
Cuellar].  He,  at  that  moment — which 
was  about  an  hour  ago — was  still  hop- 
ing that  Higgins  had  not  been  mur- 
dered. I  called  Col.  Higgins'  wife  and 
talked  to  her — wonderful  stoic  individi 
ual  who  is  going  through  sheer  hell.  I 
will  convene  a  meeting  here  in  the 
White  House  about  5:30  p.m.  to  get  ai 
update  on  the  intelligence  and  to  mee' 
with  my  top  advisers  on  this  whole 
matter. 

There  is  no  way  I  can  properly  ex 
press  the  outrage  that  I  feel.  Somehov 
there  has  got  to  be  a  return  to  decenc 
and  honor,  even  in  matters  of  this 
nature. 

I  will  have  nothing  more  to  say 
about  this  until  I  have  had  this  meeti 
and  been  with  some — I  may  say  some- 
thing more  today  but  probably  not.  AI 
this  juncture,  we  want  to  get  all  the 
information  and  be  sure  we're  dealing 
from  the  facts,  not  from — regret- 
tably— heresay.  It  is  a  most  troubling 
and  disturbing  matter  that  has  shocki 
the  American  people  right  to  the  core 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
JULY  31,  1989 

The  President  met  at  .5:30  this  after- 
noon in  the  Cabinet  Room  with  senior 
advisers  concerning  the  hostage  situ- 
ation in  Lebanon.  The  President  re- 
ceived a  briefing  on  the  status  of  our 
knowledge  of  the  situation.  This  was 
primarily  an  informational  meeting  at^ 
which  all  aspects  of  the  case  involving 


66 


TERRORISM 


1  I.  Higgins  and  the  other  hostages 
\  i-i'  discussed.  Deputy  Secretary  [of 
itr  Lawrence  S.]  Eagleburger  dis- 
j  -..^ed  the  UN  resolution  today  which 
I  idemned  hostage-taking. 

.\ttending  the  meeting  were  the 
h'sident,  the  Vice  President,  Secre- 
ti'v  [of  Defense]  Cheney,  Adm.  Crowe 
[hairman  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff], 
Iri)uty  Secretary  Eagleburger,  Attor- 
ry  General  Thornburgh,  CIA  Director 
\Bbster,  National  Security  Council  ad- 
\^ei-  Scowcroft,  Bob  Gates  [Deputy 
i;sistant  to  the  President  for  National 
Ircuritv  Affairs],  and  Gov.  Sununu 
[hief  of  Staff  to  the  President]. 


UESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 

JLV  31.  1989^ 

'ir  grave  concern  over  the  taking  and 
1  Iding  of  American  citizens  as  hos- 
tges  has  been  made  clear  on  numerous 
licasions  in  the  past. 

Oil  Friday  [July  28  during  a  news 
ditrrence],  I  said  that  the  taking  of 
ay  hostage  was  not  helpful  to  the  Mid- 
(?  East  peace  process.  The  brutal  and 
I  iLiic  events  of  today  have  underscored 
ic  \alidity  of  that  statement.  That 
isiiion,  and  our  firm  opposition  to  ne- 
1  tinting  with  hostage-takers,  was  fur- 
li-r  reinforced  in  my  discussions  this 
lening  within  the  Administration  and 
i  consultations  with  the  congressional 
iidership. 

Tonight  I  wish  to  go  beyond  that 
;atcnient  with  an  urgent  call  to  all — 
:1  parties  who  hold  hostages  in  the 
jiddle  East — to  release  them  forth- 
ith,  as  a  humanitarian  gesture,  to 
'gin  to  reverse  the  cycle  of  violence 
that  region. 


HITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 

I'G.  1,  1989 

|he  President  called  His  Holiness  Pope 
ihn  Paul  II  this  afternoon  to  urge  the 
oly  Father's  intercession  to  have  the 
pdy  of  Col.  Higgins  returned  as  a  hu- 
lanitarian  gesture,  although  we  still 
ive  no  direct  confirmation  of  his  death. 

The  President  and  the  Holy  Father 
sn  discussed  the  situation  in  Lebanon, 
K'  I'scalation  of  the  fighting,  the  shell- 
ig,  and  the  difficulty  of  the  Arab 
t-ague's  peace  efforts. 

The  call  was  described  as  warm, 
■iendly,  and  cooperative.  It  lasted 
ipproximately  12  minutes. 


QUESTION-AND-ANSWER 

SESSION, 
AUG.  2.  1989^ 

Q.  Are  you  going  to  discuss  the  hos- 
tage crisis?  Do  you  think  that  there 
are  any  other  hostages  in  danger? 

President  Bush.  We're  co 
nsidering  that  that  might  well  be  the 
case,  given  statements  that  we've  seen. 
And  yes,  indeed,  we  have  started  to 
discuss  it,  and  I'm  not  going  to  put 
words  in  his  mouth,  but  he  expressed 
his  concern.  You're  free  to  say  some- 
thing if  you  want  to:  you're  our  guest. 

Foreign  Minister  Khalifa.  I  would 
like  to  express  our  condemnation  for 
such  a  terrorist  act  which  we  think  is 
not  aimed  against  the  United  States 
but  against  all  humans  everywhere. 
This  man.  Col.  Higgins.  is  an  interna- 
tional figure;  he  represented  the  L'nit- 
ed  Nations.  He  is  an  American  citizen 
but  he  is  a  world  citizen.  The  attack  on 
him  is  really  against  us  all.  We  think, 
worldwide,  not  only  condemnation  but 
action  should  be  taken  to  stop  such 
acts. 

Q.  What  action  are  you  going  to 
take  or  are  you  considering  taking? 

President  Bush.  You  can  just  rest 
assured  that  we're  going  about  our 
business  in  a,  I'd  say,  prudent  way  and 
not — with  a  heavy  heart,  obviously,  be- 
cause of  the  feeling  that  the  [Foreign] 
Minister  expressed  on  behalf  of  the 
whole  world,  but  the  feeling  that  I  feel 
just  so  personally  about  what  happened 
to  Col.  Higgins.  But  I  would  just  leave 
it  at  that:  please  assume  we  are  think- 
ing prudently  about  this  matter  in  ev- 
ery way  possible. 

We  have  exercised  every  diplomatic 
channel  that  I  can  think  of — some  per- 
sonal, some  through  our  Secretary  of 
State  and  our  national  security  adviser 
[Brent  Scowcroft].  We've  been  in 
touch — I  have  personally — with  many 
world  leaders,  and  our  State  Depart- 
ment has  fleshed  this  out,  so  we're 
leaving  no  stone  unturned.  But  regret- 
tably, as  you  know,  we're  dealing  with 
less  than  a  full  deck  when  it  comes  to 
information.  It  is  very  hard  when 
you're  dealing  with  this  kind  of  coward- 
ice and  this  kind  of  dastardly  act  to  get 
all  the  information  that  you  need  to 
make  a  decision. 


Q.  Do  you  feel  you've  received  as- 
surances from  any  of  the  other  coun- 
tries that  you've  contacted  that  they 
will  be  able  to  help  in  the  situation? 
Is  there  anything  you  can  tell  us  to- 
day that  you  feel — have  some  new 
confidence  at  all? 

President  Bush.  I  feel  that  every- 
body I  have  talked  to,  and  including  my 
distinguished  guests  here,  would  do  ev- 
erything they  can  to  try  to  help.  Yet 
they  face  the  same  problems  that  we 
face  when  it  comes  to  information  and 
trying  to  find  out  exactly  what  hap- 
pened. We  are  not  dealing  with  all  the 
facts.  But  I've  had  assurance  after  as- 
surance from  world  leaders  that  they 
want  to  help.  I'm  sure  you  know,  I  was 
very  recently  on  the  phone  with  [Brit- 
ish Prime  Minister]  Margaret  Thatcher 
and  many  others — several  others — 
today  and  quite  a  few  yesterday,  and  so 
it  transcends  religion,  it  transcends 
alliances. 

It  gets  in,  as  the  [Foreign]  Minis- 
ter said,  to  a  matter  that  concerns  the 
entire  civilized  world.  So  we  will  keep 
on  trying.  In  the  meantime,  we've  got 
to  go  about  our  business,  and  I'm  doing 
that.  But  I  don't  want  anyone  in  this 
country  or  around  the  world  to  think 
that  it  is  anything  of  other  than  tre- 
mendous concern.  But  we  must  pru- 
dently move  on  with  the  business  of  our 
country. 

Q.  Would  it  help  if  the  Israelis 
release  Sheik  Obeid? 

President  Bush.  I  have  made  clear 
the  position  of  the  United  States  that 
I  think — or,  at  least  of  everyone  held 
against  their  will,  would  be  a  good 
thing. 

Q.  How  about  ship  movements? 
Are  you  planning  any  kind  of  military 
action? 

President  Bush.  We're  prudently 
planning. 

Q.  Like  what? 

President  Bush.  Like  that's  all  I've 
got  to  say  about  it.  [Laughter] 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
AUG.  3.  1989 

We  have  seen  a  statement  this  after- 
noon declaring  a  "freeze"  of  the  sen- 
tence issued  earlier  against  hostage 
Joseph  Cicippio  [acting  comptroller  at 


lepartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


67 


TERRORISM 


the  American  Univei-sity  of  Beirut, 
who  was  abducted  from  the  campus  on 
September  12,  1986].  We  regard  this  as 
an  encouraging  and  hopeful  develop- 
ment. But  it  still  does  not  answer  our 
continuing  concern  for  release  of  all 
hostages.  We  urge  that  all  parties  in 
the  region  use  whatever  influence  they 
have  to  end  the  tragedy  of  hostage- 
taking  and  to  release  those  remaining 
in  captivity.  And  we  express  our  appre- 
ciation to  all  those  who  have  been  thus 
far  trying  to  help. 


QUESTION-AND-ANSWER 

SESSION  (EXCERPT), 
AUG.  4,  1989'' 

Q.  What  do  you  make  of  Rafsanjani's 
[President  and  Speaker  of  the  Parlia- 
ment of  Iran]  offer  to  help  resolve  the 
hostage  crisis? 

A.  We  have  engaged  in  an  extraor- 
dinarily broad  exercise  of  diplomacy 
here  in  the  last  couple  of  days,  and  let 
me  say,  I  am  pleased  about  that.  I  don't 
know  what  it  means  fully,  but  I  think  the 
world  is  familiar  with  our  policy.  But 
there  will  be  nothing  that  will  be  done 
ever  that  will  create  a  new  incentive  for 
taking  somebody  else  hostage. 

I  feel  the  burden  of  going  to  every 
end  possible  to  try  to  find — get  the  re- 
turn of  these  Americans  to  their  loved 
ones  and  find  out  the  truth  about  Col. 
Higgins. 

Q.  What  do  you  think  was  the 
motivating  factor  for  the  freeze  on 
the  execution?  And  where  do  you  go 
from  here? 

A.  I  like  to  think  that  a  broad- 
spread  appeal  to  nations  in  every  corner 
of  the  globe  had  something  to  do  with  it. 
And  many — 

Q.  You  don't  know? 

A.  I  don't  know  for  sure.  And  the 
response  that  I  have  had  on  my  personal 
calls  and  that  the  Secretary  [of  State] 
has  had  on  his  has  been  heartwarming. 
It's  come  from  all  sectors.  I've  been 
very,  very  encouraged  by  that.  Where 
we  go  from  here,  though,  we'll  just  keep 
on  trying. 

Q.  What  has  Iran's  role  been  in 
this?  And  do  you  see  an  opening  in 
the  structure  here  to  allow  you  to 
work  for  the  release  of  the  hostages? 

A.  I  just  answered  I  was  certainly 
pleased  that  that  brutal  murder  that  had 
been  threatened  was  set  aside.  I  don't 


Commission  on  Aviation  Security 
and  Terrorism  Formed 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
AUG.  4,  1989> 

The  President  has  announced  [by  Exec- 
utive Order  12686]  his  intention  to  form 
a  Commission  on  Aviation  Security  and 
Terrorism  to  review  and  evaluate  poli- 
cy options  in  connection  with  aviation 
security,  with  particular  emphasis  on 
the  destruction,  on  December  21,  1988, 
of  PanAm  #103.  He  has  complimented 
the  efforts  of  Majority  Leader  Mitchell 
and  Republican  leader  Dole,  and  their 
staffs,  on  their  work  with  families  of 
the  victims  and  with  the  Administra- 
tion in  the  creation  of  this  commission. 

The  commission's  terms  of  refer- 
ence call  for  a  comprehensive  study  and 
appraisal  of  practices  and  policy  op- 
tions with  respect  to  preventing  terror- 
ist acts  involving  aviation  security,  an 
evaluation  of  the  adequacy  of  existing 
procedures  for  aviation  security,  in- 
cluding compliance  and  enforcement, 
and  consideration  of  options  for  han- 
dling terrorist  threats.  In  addition,  the 
commission  will  make  recommenda- 


tions regarding  policies  and  laws  conn 
cerning  the  families  of  victims  of  ter-i 
rorist  acts.  Ongoing,  intensive 
investigations  into  all  aspects  of  the  6 
struction  of  PanAm  #103  will  not  be 
affected  by  the  commission's  work.  ^ 
Rather  the  commission  will  focus  on 
the  need  for  additional  measures  to 
improve  aviation  security. 

The  Commission  on  Aviation  Sect 
rity  and  Terrorism  will  be  independ- 
ent, have  access  to  all  information  it 
needs  to  perform  its  functions,  and  rp 
port  to  the  President  within  6  months 
of  its  formation.  In  the  event  the  com- 
mission's report  contains  classified  p( 
tions,  a  report  for  public  distribution 
shall  also  be  prepared.  The  commissi^ 
will  have  seven  members.  Four  mem- 
bers will  represent  both  parties  in  th«l 
Senate  and  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives and  will  be  appointed  in  consult! 
tion  with  congressional  leadership. 


'  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Prt 
idential  Documents  of  Aug.  8,  1989. ■ 


know  the  total  role  of  any  individual 
country  in  that  area  in  all  of  this,  but 
when  you  see  a  statement  that  offers 
hope  for  the  return  of  our  hostages, 
I  want  to  explore  it  to  the  fullest. 

Q.  Have  you  made  a  decision  to 
take  military  action  if  another 
American  hostage  is  killed? 

A.  If  I  had  made  such  a  decision,  I 
expect  this  would  be  the  last  place  I'd  be 
talking  about  it. 

Q.  Surely  you  must  see  this  as  a 
golden  opportunity  now — you  have 
the  momentum,  you  have  a  diplomatic 
flurry  going  on  in  Damascus,  Inter- 
national Red  Cross,  apparently.  Is 
there  a  new  impetus? 

A.  I'm  encouraged  but  I  don't  want 
to  get  the  hopes  of  the  hostages'  loved 
ones  up  once  again  to  have  those  hopes 
dashed.  This  is  a  brutal  process,  whei-e 
you  see  people  paraded  before  cameras 
and  their  families  get  their  hopes  up. 
My  heart  is  still  with  Mrs.  Higgins.  We 
can't  tell  her  with  any  definition  other 
husband's  fate.  I  have  made  appeal  after 
appeal  for  the  return  of  Col.  Higgins'  re- 
mains, if,  indeed,  he  has  been  killed. 


You  deal  with  what  you  ha\'e  out 
there,  and  what  is  foremost  on  my  min< 
are  the  families  and  the  hostages  themn 
selves.  I  don't  want  to  raise  hopes  be- 
yond fulfillment,  but  there's  reason  to  . 
be  somewhat  encouraged.  I  think  of  thC 
brutality  of  the  process:  a  man  con- 
demned to  die  at  11:00  and  then  it's 
moved  to  3:00  in  the  afternoon.  Put  you) 
self  in  the  position  of  these  families: 
think  of  the  hurt  that  just  that  4  hours 
of  experience  causes  somebody.  I  would 
just  appeal  to  the  civilized  world  or  any, 
country  anywhere  in  the  world  to  lay 
aside  this  holding  of  people  against  thei 
will — hostages — and  do  what  is  right  an 
decent  and  honorable  in  terms  of  the 
release  of  those  hostages  that  are  still 
held,  and  a  full  accounting  in  the  case 
of  Col.  Higgins,  a  distinguished  officer! 
who  was  wearing  the  uniform  of  the 
United  Nations. 

As  the  Foreign  Minister  of  Bahraiii 
said  in  this  office  yesterday  or  the  day 
before,  this  is  the  business  of  the  whole 
world.  Sitting  at  this  desk,  it  is — you  as 
what  I  feel  about  it;  I  feel  for  the  fami- 
lies and  for  those  who  are  held. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  19( 


UNITED  NATIONS 


Q.  This  hostage,  Mr.  Cicippio, 
ws  amons  those  who  stayed  on  in 
pirut  after  the  United  States  had 
w'rned  him  to  get  out — had  warned 
a'Americans  to  get  out  or  stay  at 
tfir  own  risk.  What  kind  of  a  claim 
sbuld  such  a  person  have  on  the  dip- 
Imatic  resources  of  this  country 
wen  they  act  against  the  wishes  of 
ti?  government? 

A.  We  have  put  people  in  that — in 
tl;  past,  people  in  that  part  of  the  world 
olnotice.  But  that  doesn't  fulfill  my 
o'ligation  as  President  if  a  person  is  held 
aiinst  his  will,  in  the  case  of  Mr.  Cicip- 
p:.  That  doesn't  mean  we  w'ash  our 
hiids  of  it.  He's  an  American,  and  he  is 
eiitled  to  the  concern  of  the  President 
E'l  every  one  of  these  Senators  and  ev- 
erbody  in  our  Administration.  He's  got 
ajreat  big  wonderful  family  up  there 
t^t  are  eating  their  hearts  out  in  Nor- 
ritown,  Pennsylvania,  and  we're  very 
ri^ch  concerned  about.  Pve  not  talked  to 
Pr.  Cicipi)io.  The  State  Department  has 
ben  in  daily  contact  with  them — daily. 


VHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 

.J'G.  7,  1989 

le  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation 
(i8I)  today  released  the  results  of  foren- 
a  e.xaminations  of  the  videotape  pur- 
p'-ted  to  be  of  Lt.  Col.  Higgins. '  Mrs. 
Iggins  was  informed  of  the  results  by 
t»  Commandant  of  the  Marine  Corps, 
(n.  Al  Gray.  President  Bush  called 
I's.  Higgins  at  about  2  p.m.  to  offer  his 
spport  and  encouragement.  The  Presi- 
cnt  said  the  U.S.  Government  will  con- 
tme  to  do  all  it  can  to  obtain  a  full 
Ejounting  of  what  happened  to  her 
Isband. 


Indochinese  Refugees  Conference 
Held  in  Geneva 


'  Text.s  from  Weekly  Compilations  of 
lesideiitial  Documents  of  Aug.  7  &  14,  1989. 

-  Made  at  a  meeting  of  the  National  Gov- 
uiors'  Asso.  in  Chicago. 

■  Made  on  the  South  Lawn  of  the  White 
liust'  upon  his  return  from  Chicago. 

'  In  this  statement,  the  President  refers 
t  the  .July  28  kidnapping  of  Sheik  Abdul  Kar- 
ii  Obeid,  senior  cleric  in  southern  Lebanon 
;th  the  Iranian-supported  Hizballah,  and 
tro  aides  from  the  cleric's  home  in  Jibchit 
1  Israeli  commandos. 

"■  Made  in  the  Oval  Office  following  dis- 
^ssions  with  Foreign  Minister  Mohammad 
In  Mubarak  al-Khalifa  of  Bahrain. 

''  Made  in  tlie  Oval  Office. 

'  ."^fter  e.xamining  a  videotape  released 
the  pro-Iranian  group,  FBI  forensic  e.x- 
rts  and  pathologists  concluded  that,  al- 
iiugh  a  positive  identification  could  not  be 
ade,  the  person  depicted  in  the  videotape 
robably  was  Lt.  Col.  Higgins  and  that  he 
as  "within  a  reasonable  degree  of  medical 
■i-tainty"  dead.H 


The  International  Conference  on 
Indochinese  Refugees  ivas  held  in 
Geneva  on  June  IS-U,  19S9.  Following 
are  a  statement  by  Deputy  Secretary  of 
State  Lawrence  S.  Eaglebnrger,  head  of 
the  U.S.  delegation,  and  the  texts  of  the 
draft  declaration  and  comprehensive 
plan  of  action  which  were  adopted  by 
consensus. 


DEPUTY  SECRETARY 

EAGLEBURGER'S 

STATEMENT, 
JUNE  18.  1989 

"Let  us  do  something  meaningful — 
something  profound — to  stem  this  mis- 
ery. We  face  a  world  problem.  Let  us 
fashion  a  world  solution.  History  will 
not  forgive  us  if  we  fail.  History  will 
not  forget  us  if  we  succeed."  It  is  with 
these  words  that  then  Vice  President 
Mondale,  the  head  of  the  U.S.  delega- 
tion to  the  1979  Geneva  meeting  on 
refugees  and  displaced  persons,  chal- 
lenged his  fellow  delegates  to  develop  a 
multilateral  response  to  the  human 
tragedy  of  Indochina's  refugees. 

The  international  effort  that  re- 
sulted from  that  meeting  was  unpre- 
cedented. Since  1975,  over  1.5  million 
Vietnamese,  Cambodians,  and  Laotians 
have  been  resettled  in  third  countries; 
900,000  of  them  in  the  United  States 
alone.  And  yet,  as  shown  by  our  pres- 
ence here  today,  our  work  is  not  fin- 
ished. Much  has  been  accomplished; 
much  more  remains  to  be  done.  The 
1979  program,  important  though  it 
was,  did  not  become  the  truly  viable  al- 
ternative to  clandestine  departure  so 
hopefully  envisaged  a  decade  ago.  The 
simple  fact  is  that  thousands  upon  thou- 
sands of  Vietnamese — unable  to  obtain 
e.xit  permits  from  the  Vietnamese 
authorities — have  fled  their  homeland. 
Until  Vietnam  reforms  its  system,  the 
exodus  of  Vietnamese  will  continue. 

Our  task  today  is  to  deal  as  hu- 
manely and  effectively  as  we  can  with 
this  inescapable  reality,  building  upon 
the  many  accomplishments  that  have 
been  realized  since  the  1979  conference. 
We  must,  first  of  all,  unequivocally  re- 
affirm the  practice  of  first  asylum, 
thereby  safeguarding  the  protection 
and  humane  treatment  of  all  those  who 
seek  asylum.  We  must  address  the  very 
real  and  legitimate  concerns  of  those 


nations  which  have  so  generously  shel- 
tered asylum  seekers.  We  must  ensure 
that  the  means  for  direct  and  orderly 
departures  are  available  as  alterna- 
tives to  hazardous  escape.  We  must 
provide  for  the  dignified  and  safe  re- 
turn to  their  country  of  origin  of  those 
people  who  freely  choose  to  return.  Fi- 
nally, we  must  continue  our  refugee  re- 
settlement programs. 

These  principles  have  the  strong 
bipartisan  support  of  the  LI.S.  Con- 
gress and  the  American  people. 

The  comprehensive  plan  of  action 
w-e  are  asked  to  adopt  at  this  confer- 
ence will — if  approved — move  us  a  long- 
way  toward  the  accomplishment  of 
these  worthwhile  goals.  Those  who 
labored  so  long  and  so  hard  on 
the  comprehensive  plan  are  to  be 
congratulated.  They  have  fashioned  a 
practical  course  of  action  in  a  terribly 
complex  area,  balancing  the  often  con- 
flicting interests  of  states  with  the  hu- 
man needs  of  the  asylum  seekers.  The 
balance  that  has  been  struck  is  deli- 
cate; we  should  not  seek  to  alter  it. 

The  world  looks  to  Vietnam  to  pro- 
vide full  opportunity  for  resettlement 
to  those  who  have  been  detained  in  re- 
education camps.  Nothing  the  Socialist 
Republic  of  Vietnam  could  do  in  this 
area  would  be  more  favorably  received 
by  the  United  States  and  the  interna- 
tional community.  In  1984,  President 
Reagan  affirmed  the  commitment  of 
the  American  people  to  welcome  with 
open  arms  prisoners  and  their  families 
from  reeducation  camps.  Today,  I  reaf- 
firm that  commitment  on  behalf  of 
President  Bush.  And  I  call  upon  Viet- 
nam to  resume  negotiations  with  the 
United  States,  looking  toward  the  day 
when  this  large  group  of  excluded  per- 
sons will  be  allowed  to  emigrate.  Only 
then  will  the  orderly  departure  pro- 
gram become  a  true  alternative  to 
clandestine  departure. 

The  United  States  commits  itself 
to  accelerate  and  expand  orderly  depar- 
tures from  Vietnam.  We  will  assign  ad- 
ditional personnel  to  the  program  so 
that  our  interviews  in  Vietnam  can  be 
more  than  doubled  to  3,500  per  month. 
We  applaud  those  other  resettlement 
nations  which  have  made  similar 
commitments  to  expand  their  own 
programs  for  direct  departure  from 
Vietnam. 


epartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


69 


UNITED  NATIONS 


The  United  States  welcomes  Viet- 
nam's commitment  to  accept,  with 
UNHCR  [UN  High  Commissioner  for 
Refugees]  supervision  and  protection, 
those  of  its  citizens  who  wish  to  re- 
patriate voluntarily.  Clearly,  voluntary 
repatriation  is  both  appropriate  and 
feasible.  But  such  returns  must  be 
truly  voluntai'y  and  not  the  result  of  in- 
tolerable conditions  of  detention.  Fur- 
thermore, it  must  be  accomplished 
under  safe  conditions  and  with  assur- 
ance that  treatment  thereafter  will  be 
humane. 

The  plan  imposes  heavy  respon- 
sibilities upon  the  United  States:  we 
will  carry  them  out  fully  and  gener- 
ously. Since  1979,  we  have  contributed 
more  than  $0.5  billion  to  the  care  and 
support  of  refugees  from  Vietnam, 
Cambodia,  and  Laos.  Beyond  this,  of 
course,  are  the  billions  of  dollars  in  re- 
settlement costs  which  we  have  borne 
as  well.  We  will  continue  to  give  gener- 
ously to  the  UNHCR  and  other  appro- 
priate organizations  for  the  protection 
and  well-being  of  jjersons  in  first  asy- 
lum. We  will  continue  the  historic  ef- 
fort of  the  American  people  to  resettle 
buna  fide  refugees.  And  we  will  contin- 
ue to  defend  the  human  rights  of  indi- 
viduals who  seek  asylum,  whether  or 
not  they  are  found  to  be  refugees.  To 
Vietnam  we  say: 

•  Accept  responsibility  for  the  well- 
being  and  human  rights  of  your  citi- 
zens: initiate  the  reforms — economic, 
social,  and  political — that  will  encour- 
age your  people  to  remain  in  their  cit- 
ies and  villages: 

•  Make  orderly  departure  ])i'o- 
grams  truly  viable  by  agreeing  to  an 
initial  target  of  at  least  6,000  orderly 
departures  per  month;  and 

•  Demonstrate  your  genuine  com- 
mitment to  the  comprehensive  plan  by 
granting  all  those  eligible  for  orderly 
departure  the  right  to  emigrate  freely. 

Voluntary  repatriation,  orderly  de- 
parture, and  other  UNHCR  programs 
called  for  in  the  comprehensive  plan 
must  be  allowed  a  reasonable  time  to 
work.  The  United  States  accepts  as  a 
general  principle  that  asylum  seekers 
who  are  found  not  to  be  refugees  are 
ultimately  the  responsibility  of  their 
country  of  origin.  For  more  than  a  de- 
cade, conditions  in  Vietnam  have  re- 
pelled large  segments  of  its  population. 
So  long  as  these  conditions  continue — 
unless  and  until  dramatic  imjirove- 
ments  occur  in  that  country's  economic, 
social,  and  political  life — the  United 
States  will  remain  unalterably  opposed 
to  the  forced  repatriation  of  Viet- 


namese asylum-seekers.  We  will  not 
consider  forced  repatriation  as  falling 
within  the  rubric  of  "acceptable  under 
international  practices." 

At  the  same  time,  however,  those 
who  flee  clandestinely  and  cannot  es- 
tablish a  well-founded  fear  of  persecu- 
tion must  understand  that  such  flight 
no  longer  leads  to  resettlement.  Such 
persons  will  face  an  indefinite  stay  in  a 
holding  camp  until  conditions  in  their 
homeland  moderate.  It  is  important  for 
those  thinking  of  fleeing  the  former 
North  Vietnam  to  realize  that  most 
will  fail  to  qualify  as  refugees  and  will, 
therefore,  not  be  eligible  for  resettle- 
ment. 

The  comprehensive  plan  calls  upon 
the  countries  of  first  asylum  to  reaf- 
firm the  basic  humanitarian  practice 
of  temporary  refuge  for  all  asylum 
seekers — a  practice  which  has  been  up- 
held with  great  forbearance  and  sacri- 
fice by  those  countries  for  more  than  a 
decade.  New  screening  procedures  and 
the  I'eluctance  of  most  asylum  seekers 
to  repatriate  voluntarily  are  likely  to 
result  in  a  continued  if  temporary 
growth  in  refugee  populations  in  first 
asylum  countries.  'We  note,  in  this  re- 
spect, the  reference  in  the  comprehen- 
sive action  plan  to  the  possibility  of  a 
regional  holding  center  under  the  aus- 
pices of  the  UNHCR.  We  stand  ready 
to  explore  this  possibility  in  the  steer- 
ing committee. 

As  part  of  the  new  regime  envis- 
aged by  the  comprehensive  plan,  coun- 
tries of  first  asylum  would  commit  to: 

•  Treating  all  asylum  seekers  in  a 
humane  manner: 

•  Granting  the  UNHCR  immediate 
access  to  all  new  arrivals:  and 

•  Working  in  a  close  collaboration 
with  the  UNHCR  on  screening  mecha- 
nisms for  determining  refugee  status. 

The  United  States  recognizes  that 
these  new  responsibilities  will  create 
additional  logistical  and  administrative 
requirements  and  awaits  the  UN's  ap- 
peal for  funds  to  support  this  effort. 
We  will  contribute  our  fair  share. 

The  United  States  will  also  assist 
in  alleviating  the  burden  that  long- 
staying  refugees  pose  for  the  countries 
of  first-asylum.  As  of  mid-March  1989, 
first  asylum  countries  supported 
52,000  Vietnamese  who  had  arrived 
before  the  cut-off  dates.  The  United 
States  is  committed  to  resettling 
22,000  persons  from  this  population 
over  the  ne.\t  3  years. 

Similarly,  the  United  States  will 
assist  in  the  resettlement  of  those  new 


arrivals  determined  to  be  refugees, 
anticipate  accepting  up  to  50'^'f  of  thisi 
refugee  population  for  resettlement'Jl 
the  United  States. 

In  Laos,  although  we  have  been 
greatly  encouraged  by  improved  proa 
pects  for  voluntary  repatriation,  the 
comjirehensive  plan  also  recognizes 
that  for  many  Lao  refugees,  third- 
country  resettlement  remains  more  at 
propriate.  We  have  already  welcomed 
over  200,000  Lao  to  the  United  Stater 
and  will  continue  to  process  Lao  refu 
gees  for  resettlement. 

Finally,  a  word  on  the  respon- 
sibilities undertaken  by  the  donor  ano 
resettlement  counti'ies  under  the  com 
prehensive  plan  of  action.  We  all  mus 
remain  steadfast  in  our  common  com- 
mitment to  provide  funding  and  re- 
settlement and  to  stand  together  as 
partners  in  finding  an  effective  solu- 
tion to  this  continuing  tragedy. 

The  United  States  pays  tribute  U 
the  UN  High  Commissioner  and  his 
dedicated  staff  for  their  unflagging 
forts  over  the  past  year  to  protect  thi 
rights  of  those  seeking  asylum,  whili 
the  same  time  addressing  the  conceri 
of  those  countries  most  burdened  by 
asylum  seekers.  In  the  months  aheac 
the  international  community  will  loo' 
to  the  UNHCR  to  continue  its  firm 
leadership  in  the  implementation  of  1 
comprehensive  plan. 

All  of  us — countries  of  origin, 
countries  of  first  asylum,  and  countr 
of  resettlement — have  a  historic  oppo 
tunity.  By  adopting  here  and  now  thi 
humanitarian  and  practical  plan  of  ai 
tion,  we  will  have  embraced  the  begi 
ning  of  a  solution  to  one  of  the  most 
ai)pallingly  difficult  human  problems 
our  times. 

The  plan  is  not  a  perfect  docume: 
but  it  is  a  major  step  forward.  Nor  is 
a  static  concept:  some  of  its  elements 
must  evolve  over  time.  The  steering 
committee  to  be  established  to  monil 
the  plan's  progress  will  assure  flex- 
ibility, while  at  the  same  time — 
because  it  will  act  through  consensus- 
guaranteeing  the  suppoi't  of  all  states 
party  to  the  plan.  The  United  States 
supports  this  monitoring  effort  and 
will  actively  particijiate  in  this  and  th 
subsequent  regular  reviews. 

We  understand  and  appreciate  th; 
the  process  embodied  in  the  plan  of 
action  before  us  is  painful,  costly,  and 
often  slow.  But,  however  great  our  bui 
den  as  we  undertake  this  plan,  it  jiale 
in  comparison  with  the  burden  borne 
by  the  refugees  we  seek  to  help.  Surel 
we  cannot  ask  less  of  ourselves  than 
ask  of  them. 


70 


UNITED  NATIONS 


UAFT  DECLARATION 
LND  COMPREHENSIVE 
'LAN  OF  ACTION. 

IXE  14,  1989 

LOECLARATION 

ri'  Gdi'cniHients  of  the  States  represented 
']  111-  International  Conference  on  Indo- 
i  iH-.-u  Refugees,  held  at  Geneva  from  13  to 
l.|une  1989, 

Having  reviewed  the  problems  of  Indo- 
-!■  asylum-seekers  in  the  South-East 
legion, 

.\i'li))(;  that,  since  1975,  over  2  milllion 
p  ,s(ins  have  left  their  countries  of  origin  in 
Iilo-China  and  that  the  flow  of  asylum- 
sikers  still  continued, 

Aivare  that  the  movement  of  asylum- 
si  ki-rs  across  frontiers  in  the  South-East 
Aan  region  remains  a  subject  of  intense 
h'luinitarian  concern  to  the  international 
cfimunity, 
I  Recalliufi  United  Nations  General  As- 
spbly  resolution  34.55  (XXX)  and  the  first 
feting  on  Refugees  and  Displaced  Persons 
i!>iiuth-East  Asia  convened  at  Geneva  in 
J  y  UI79  under  the  auspices  of  the  United 
Mions  to  address  the  problem. 

Recalling  fitrthev  the  1951  Convention 
rating  to  the  Status  of  Refugees  and  its 
17  Protocol,  and  related  instruments, 

\'iiti)ig  with  satisfaction  that,  as  a  re- 
s  t  uf  combined  efforts  on  the  part  of  Gov- 
e;iments  and  international  organizations 
C'cerned,  a  durable  solution  has  been  found 
fi  ovei- 1.6  million  Indo-Chinese, 

Preoccupied  however  by  the  burden  im- 
1  <-'\.  particularly  on  the  neighbouring 
e  imies  and  territories,  as  a  result  of  the 
citmuation  of  the  outflow  and  the  presence 
oarge  numbers  of  asylum-seekers  still  in 
e  111  IS, 

Alarmed  by  indications  that  the  current 
a'angements  designed  to  find  solutions  for 
a'lum-seekers  and  resolve  problem  stem- 
nng  fi-om  the  outflow  may  no  longer  be  re- 
sjinsive  to  the  size,  tenacity  and  comple.xity 
o:hi'  problems  in  the  region. 

Recognizing  that  the  resolution  of  the 
fiiblem  of  asylum-seekers  in  the  region 
cidd  contribute  positively  to  a  climate  of 
lace,  harmony  and  good  neighbourliness, 

Satisfied  that  the  international  commu- 

I  y.  and  in  particular  the  countries  directly 
i  iilved,  have  responded  positively  to  the 

I I  li'i-  a  new  international  conference  made 
I  till-  States  members  of  the  Association  of 
^uth-East  Asian  Nations  and  endorsed  by 

I:'  Executive  Committee  of  the  Programme 
(;the  United  Nations  High  Commissioner 
f|'  Refugees  at  its  thirty-ninth  session  and 
1  thf  General  Assembly  of  the  United  Na- 
^n^  at  its  forty-third  session, 

Xntiiig  the  progress  achieved  towards  a 
iUiHin  of  this  issue  by  the  various  bilateral 
'\  multilateral  meetings  held  between  the 
1  riles  concerned  prior  to  the  International 
iiilei-ence  on  Indo-Chinese  Refugees, 

Xiiting  that  the  issues  arising  from  the 
fsence  of  Khmer  refugees  and  displaced 
FMins  are  being  discussed,  among  the  par- 


ties directly  involved,  within  a  different 
framework  and  as  such  have  not  been  includ- 
ed in  the  deliberations  of  the  Conference, 

Noting  leith  satisfaction  the  positive  re- 
sults of  the  Preparatory  Meeting  for  the 
Conference,  held  in  Kuala  Lumpur  from  7  to 
9  March  1989, 

Realizing  that  the  complex  problem  at 
hand  necessitates  the  co-operation  and  un- 
derstanding of  all  concerned  and  that  a  com- 
prehensive set  of  mutually  re-enforcing 
humanitarian  undertakings,  which  must  be 
carried  out  in  its  totality  rather  than  selec- 
tively, is  the  only  realistic  approach  towards 
achieving  a  durable  solution  to  the  problem. 

Acknowledging  that  such  a  solution 
must  be  developed  in  the  context  of  national 
laws  and  regulations  as  w'ell  as  of  interna- 
tional standards. 

Have  solemnly  resolved  to  adopt  the  at- 
tached Comprehensive  Plan  of  Action. 


II.  COMPREHENSIVE  PLAN  OF 
ACTION 


A.  Clandestine  Departures 

1.  Extreme  human  suffering  and  hardship, 
often  resulting  in  loss  of  lives,  have  accom- 
panied organized  clandestine  departures.  It 
is  therefore  imperative  that  humane  meas- 
ures be  implemented  to  deter  such  depar- 
tures, which  should  include  the  following: 

(a)  Continuation  of  official  measures  di- 
rected against  those  organizing  clandestine 
departures,  including  clear  guidelines  on 
these  measures  from  the  central  govern- 
ment to  the  provincial  and  local  authorities. 

(b)  Mass  media  activities  at  both  local 
and  international  level,  focussing  on; 

(i)  The  dangers  and  hardship  involved 
in  clandestine  departures; 

(ii)  The  institution  of  a  status- 
determination  mechanism  under  which 
those  determined  not  to  be  refugees  shall 
have  no  opportunity  for  resettlement; 

(iii)  Absence  of  any  advantage,  real  or 
perceived,  particularly  in  relation  to  third- 
country  resettlement,  of  clandestine  and  un- 
safe departures; 

(iv)  Encouragement  of  the  use  of  the 
regular  departure  and  other  migration 
programmes; 

(V)  Discouragement  of  activities  lead- 
ing to  clandestine  departures. 

(c)  In  the  spirit  of  mutual  co-operation, 
the  countries  concerned  shall  consult  regu- 
larly to  ensure  effective  implementation  and 
co-ordination  of  the  above  measures. 


B.  Regular  Departure  Programmes 

2.  In  order  to  offer  a  preferable  alternative 
to  clandestine  departures,  emigration  from 
Viet-Nam  through  regular  departure  proc- 
edures and  migration  programmes,  such  as 
the  current  Orderly  Departure  Programme, 
should  be  fully  encouraged  and  promoted. 


3.  Emigration  through  regular  depar- 
ture procedures  and  migration  programmes 
should  be  accelerated  and  expanded  with  a 
view  to  making  such  programmes  the  pri- 
mary and  eventually  the  sole  modes  of 
departure. 

4.  In  order  to  achieve  this  goal,  the  fol- 
lowing measures  Will  be  undertaken: 

(a)  There  will  be  a  continuous  and  wide- 
ly publicized  media  camjjaign  to  increase 
awareness  of  regular  departure  procedures 
and  migration  programmes  for  departure 
from  Viet-Nam. 

(b)  All  persons  eligible  under  regular 
third-country  migration  programmes,  Am- 
erasians  and  former  re-education  centre  de- 
tainees will  have  full  access  to  regular 
departure  procedures  and  migration  pro- 
grammes. The  problem  of  former  re- 
education centre  detainees  will  be  further 
discussed  separately  by  the  parties 
concerned. 

(c)  Exit  permits  and  other  resettlement 
requirements  will  be  facilitated  for  all  per- 
sons eligible  under  regular  departure  proc- 
edures and  migration  programmes. 

(d)  Viet-Nam  will  fully  co-operate  with 
the  United  Nations  High  Commissioner  for 
Refugees  (UNHCR)  and  the  Intergovern- 
mental Committee  for  Migration  (ICM)  in 
expediting  and  improving  processing,  in- 
cluding medical  processing,  for  departures 
under  regular  departure  procedures  and  mi- 
gration programmes  and  will  ensure  that 
medical  records  of  those  departing  comply 
with  standards  acceptable  to  receiving 
countries, 

(e)  Viet-Nam,  UNHCR,  ICM  and  reset- 
tlement countries  will  co-operate  to  ensure 
that  air  transportation  and  logistics  are  suf- 
ficient to  move  expeditiously  all  those  ac- 
cepted under  regular  departure  procedures 
and  migration  programmes. 

(f)  If  necessary,  countries  in  South-East 
Asia  through  which  people  emigrating  under 
regular  departure  procedures  and  migra- 
tion programmes  must  transit  will,  with  ex- 
ternal financial  support  as  appropriate, 
expand  transit  facilities  and  expedite  exit 
and  entry  procedures  in  order  to  help  facili- 
tate increased  departures  under  such 
programmes. 


C.  Reception  of  New  Arrivals 

5.  All  those  seeking  asylum  will  be  given  the 
opportunity  to  do  so  through  the  implemen- 
tation of  the  following  measures: 

(a)  Temporary  refuge  will  be  given  to 
all  asylum-seekers,  who  will  be  treated 
identically  regardless  of  their  mode  of  arriv- 
al until  the  status-determination  process  is 
completed. 

(b)  UNHCR  will  be  given  full  and  early 
access  to  new  arrivals  and  will  retain  ac- 
cess, following  the  determination  of  their 
status. 

(c)  New  arrivals  will  be  transferred,  as 
soon  as  possible,  to  a  temporary  asylum  cen- 
tre where  they  would  be  provided  assistance 
and  full  access  to  the  refugee  status- 
determination  process. 


tepartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


71 


UNITED  NATIONS 


I).  Refugee  Status 

6.  The  early  establishment  of  a  consistent 
region-wide  refugee  status-determination 
process  is  required  and  will  take  place  in  ac- 
cordance with  national  legislation  and  inter- 
nationally accepted  practice.  It  will  make 
specific  provision,  inter  alia,  for  the 
following: 

(a)  Within  a  prescribed  period,  the  sta- 
tus of  the  asylum-seeker  will  be  determined 
by  a  qualified  and  competent  national  au- 
thority or  body,  in  accordance  with  estab- 
lished refugee  criteria  and  procedures. 
UNHCR  will  participate  in  the  process  in 
an  observer  and  advisory  capacity.  In  the 
course  of  that  period,  UNHCR  shall  advise 
in  writing  each  individual  of  the  nature  of 
the  procedure,  of  the  implications  for  re- 
jected cases  and  of  the  right  to  appeal  the 
first-level  determination. 

(b)  The  criteria  will  be  those  recognized 
in  the  1951  Convention  relating  to  the  Status 
of  Refugees  and  its  1967  Protocol,  bearing  in 
mind,  to  the  extent  appropriate,  the  1948 
Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights  and 
other  relevant  international  instruments 
concerning  refugees,  and  will  be  applied  in 
a  humanitarian  spirit  taking  into  account 
the  specific  situation  of  the  asylum-seekers 
concerned  and  the  need  to  respect  the  fami- 
ly unit.  A  uniform  questionnaire  developed 
in  consultation  with  UNHCR  will  be  the  ba- 
sis for  interviews  and  shall  reflect  the  ele- 
ments of  such  criteria. 

(c)  The  Handbook  on  Procedures  and 
Criteria  for  Determining  Refugee  Status  is- 
sued by  UNHCR  will  serve  as  an  authorita- 
tive and  interpretative  guide  in  developing 
and  applying  the  criteria. 

(d)  The  procedures  to  be  followed  will 
be  in  accordance  with  those  endorsed  by  the 
E.xecutive  Committee  of  the  Programme  of 
the  United  Nations  High  Commissioner  for 
Refugees  in  this  area.  Such  procedures  will 
include,  letter  alia: 

(i)  The  provision  of  information  to  the 
asylum-seekers  about  the  procedures,  the 
criteria  and  the  presentation  of  their  cases; 

(ii)  Prompt  advice  of  the  decision  in 
writing  within  a  prescribed  period; 

(iii)  A  right  of  appeal  against  negative 
decisions  and  proper  appeals  procedures  for 
this  purpose,  based  upon  the  e.xisting  laws 
and  procedures  of  the  individual  place  of 
asylum,  with  the  asylum-seeker  entitled  to 
advice,  if  required,  to  be  provided  under 
UNHCR  auspices. 

7.  UNHCR  will  institute,  in  co- 
operation with  the  Governments  concerned, 
a  comprehensive  regional  training  pro- 
gramme for  officials  involved  in  the  deter- 
mination process  with  a  view  to  ensuring 
the  proper  and  consistent  functioning  of  the 
procedures  and  application  of  the  criteria, 
taking  full  advantage  of  the  experience 
gained  in  Hong  Kong. 


E.  Resettlement 

8.  Continued  resettlement  of  Vietnamese 
refugees  benefiting  from  temporary  refuge 
in  South-East  Asia  is  a  vital  component  of 
the  Comprehensive  Plan  of  Action. 

/.  Long-Stayers  Resettlement  Programme 

9.  The  Long-Stayers  Resettlement  Pro- 
gramme includes  all  individuals  who  arrived 
in  temporary  asylum  camps  prior  to  the  ap- 
propriate cut-off  date  and  would  contain  the 
following  elements: 

(a)  A  call  to  the  international  commu- 
nity to  respond  to  the  need  for  resettlement, 
in  particular  through  the  participation  by  an 
expanded  number  of  countries,  beyond  those 
few  currently  active  in  refugee  resettle- 
ment. The  expanded  number  of  countries 
could  include,  among  others,  the  following: 
Australia,  Austria,  Belgium,  Canada,  Den- 
mark, Germany,  Federal  Republic  of,  Fin- 
land, France,  Ireland,  Italy,  Japan, 
Luxembourg,  Netherlands,  New  Zealand, 
Norway,  Spain,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  Unit- 
ed Kingdom  and  United  States  of  America. 

(b)  A  multi-year  commitment  to  resettle 
all  the  Vietnamese  who  have  arrived  in  tem- 
porary asylum  camps  prior  to  an  agreed 
date,  except  those  persons  already  found  not 
to  be  refugees  under  established  status- 
determination  procedure  and  those  who  ex- 
press the  wish  to  return  to  Viet-Nam.  Refu- 
gees will  be  advised  that  they  do  not  have 
the  option  of  refusing  offers  of  resettlement, 
as  this  would  exclude  them  from  further  re- 
settlement consideration. 

2.  Resettlement  Programme 
for  Newly-Determined  Refugees 

10.  The  Resettlement  Programme  for 
Newly-Determined  Refugees  will  accommo- 
date all  those  who  arrive  after  the  introduc- 
tion of  status  determination  procedures  and 
are  determined  to  be  refugees.  Within  a 
designated  period  after  their  transfer  to  the 
resettlement  area,  those  determined  to  be 
refugees  shall  receive  an  orientation  brief- 
ing from  a  UNHCR  representative  that  ex- 
plains the  third-country  resettlement 
programme,  the  length  of  time  current  ar- 
rivals may  be  expected  to  spend  in  camp 
awaiting  resettlement,  and  the  necessity  of 
adhering  to  the  rules  and  regulations  of  the 
camp. 

U.  Wherever  possible,  a  pledge  shall  be 
sought  from  the  resettlement  countries  to 
place  all  those  determined  to  be  refugees, 
except  those  expressing  the  wish  to  return 
to  Viet-Nam.  within  a  prescribed  period.  It 
shall  be  the  responsibility  of  UNHCR,  with 
the  full  support  of  all  the  resettlement  coun- 
tries and  countries  of  asylum,  to  co-ordinate 
efforts  to  ensure  that  departures  are  effect- 
ed within  that  time. 


F.  Repatriation/Plan  of  Repatriation 

12.  Persons  determined  not  to  be  refugees 
should  return  to  their  country  of  origin  in 
accordance  with  international  practices  re- 


flecting the  responsibilities  of  States  to- 
wards their  own  citizens.  In  the  first  in- 
stance, every  effort  will  be  made  to 
encourage  the  voluntary  return  of  such 
persons. 

13.  In  order  to  allow  this  process  tod 
velop  momentum,  the  following  measure." 
will  be  implemented: 

(a)  Widely  publicized  assurances  b) 
the  country  of  origin  that  returnees  willl 
allow'ed  to  return  in  conditions  of  safety 
dignity  and  will  not  be  subject  to 
persecution. 

(b)  The  procedure  for  readmission 
will  be  such  that  the  applicants  would  be^ 
readmitted  within  the  shortest  possible 
time. 

(c)  Returns  will  be  administered  ii 
aecoi'dance  with  the  above  principles  by 
UNHCR  and  ICM,  and  internationally 
funded  reintegration  assistance  will  be 
channelled  through  UNHCR,  according! 
the  terms  of  the  Memorandum  of  Under- 
standing signed  with  Viet-Nam  on  13  De-i 
eember  1988. 

14.  If,  after  the  passage  of  reasonabli 
time,  it  becomes  clear  that  voluntary  re- 
patriation is  not  making  sufficient  progre 
towards  the  desired  objective,  alternativ 
recognized  as  being  acceptable  under  int' 
national  practices  would  be  examined.  Ai 
gional  holding  centre  under  the  auspices 
UNHCR  may  be  considered  as  an  interir 
measure  for  housing  persons  determinetf" 
not  to  be  refugees  pending  their  eventual 
turn  to  the  country  of  origin. 

15.  Persons  determined  not  to  be  re{\ 
gees  shall  be  provided  humane  care  and 
assistance  by  L'NHCR  and  international! 
agencies  pending  their  return  to  the  coun 
try  of  origin.  Such  assistance  would  inclK 
educational  and  orientation  programmes! 
signed  to  encourage  return  and  reduce  r^ 
integration  problems. 

G.  Laotian  Asylum-Seekers 

16.  In  dealing  with  Laotian  asylum-seeke| 
future  measures  are  to  be  worked  out 
through  intensified  trilateral  negotiation| 
tween  UNHCR,  the  Lao  People's  Democii 
Republic  and  Thailand,  with  the  active  si] 
port  and  co-operation  of  all  parties  con- 
cerned. These  measures  should  be  aimed 

(a)  Maintaining  safe  arrival  and  aq 
cess  to  the  Lao  screening  process; 

(b)  Accelerating  and  simplifying  th 
process  for  both  the  return  of  the  screena 
out  and  voluntary  repatriation  to  the  Lao 
People's  Democratic  Republic  under  safe,! 
mane  and  UNHCR-monitored  conditions.^ 

17.  Together  with  other  durable  solu-^ 
tions,  third-country  resettlement  continq 
to  play  an  important  role  with  regard  tol 
present  camp  populations  of  the  Laotians.J 


72 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1S 


UNITED  NATIONS 


1  Implementation  and  Review 
locedures 

Implementation  of  the  Comprehensive 
i  HI  of  Action  is  a  dynamic  process  that  will 
1  aiire  continued  co-ordination  and  possible 
;:iptation  to  respond  to  changing  situa- 
t  ns.  In  order  to  ensure  effective  implemen- 
t  ion  of  the  Plan,  the  following  mechanisms 
fid!  be  established: 

(a)  UNHCR,  with  the  financial  sup- 
jrt  of  the  donor  community,  will  be  in 
•carge  of  continuing  liaison  and  co- 
(lination  with  concerned  Governments  and 
1  rruiivernmental  as  well  as  non- 
sMinmental  organizations  to  implement 

I,'  Comprehensive  Plan  of  Action. 

(b)  A  Steering  Committee  based  in 
Suth-East  Asia  will  be  established.  It  will 
(jisist  of  representatives  of  all  Govern- 


ments making  specific  commitments  under 
the  Comprehensive  Plan  of  Action.  The 
Steering  Committee  will  meet  periodically 
under  the  chairmanship  of  UNHCR  to  dis- 
cuss implementation  of  the  Comprehensive 
Plan  of  Action.  The  Steering  Committee 
may  establish  sub-committees  as  necessary 
to  deal  with  specific  aspects  of  the  imple- 
mentation of  the  Plan,  particularly  with  re- 
gard to  status  determination,  return  and 
resettleliient. 

(c)  A  regular  review  arrangement 
will  be  devised  by  UNHCR,  preferably  in 
conjunction  with  the  annual  E.xecutive  Com- 
mittee session,  to  assess  progress  in  imple- 
mentation of  the  Comprehensive  Plan  of 
Action  and  consider  additional  measures  to 
improve  the  Plan's  effectiveness  in  meeting 
its  objectives.  ■ 


lecurity  Council  Adopts  Resolution 
m  Central  American  Peace 


Following  are  the  text  of  the  UN 
ciiritfi  Council  resolution  adopted 
Id in»!OHsl)/  on  July  27.  1989,  and 
statement  made  in  the  Security 
iiiiicil  after  the  vote  by  U.S.  Acting 
iiiianent  Representative  to  the 
lilted  Nations  Herbert  S.  Okun. 


N  SECURITY  COUNCIL 
,  RESOLUTION  637 

''(  Si'ciirity  CoiDicil. 

Recatliiiq  its  resolutions  530  (1983)  of 
I  .May  1983  and  562  (1985)  of  10  May  1985 
id  fJeneral  Assembly  resolutions  38/10  of 
November  1983,  39/4  of  20  October  1984, 
:;7  of  18  November  1986,  42/1  of  7  October 
'.^7  and  43/24  of  15  November  1988,  as  well 
-  the  initiative  that  the  Secretary-General 
thf  United  Nations  undertook  on  18  No- 
■niher  1986  together  with  the  Secretary- 
eneral  of  the  Organization  of  American 
tates, 

('iiHri)iced  that  the  peoples  of  Central 
nierica  wish  to  achieve  a  peaceful  settle- 
|ient  to  their  conflicts  without  outside  inter- 
'■rence,  including  support  for  irregular 
ircfs,  with  respect  for  the  principles  of 
.•If-determination  and  non-intervention 
jhile  ensuring  full  respect  for  human 
Sghts, 

Taking  note  of  the  report  of  the 
I'lretary-General  of  26  June  1989  submitted 
I  pursuance  of  Security  Council  resolutions 
:;n  1 1983)  and  562  (1985)  (S/20699), 

Recognizing  the  important  contribution 
1'  the  Contadora  Group  and  its  Support 
iriiup  in  favour  of  peace  in  Central 
unei'ica, 


Welcoming  the  agreement  signed  at 
Guatemala  City  on  7  August  1987  by  the 
Presidents  of  the  Republics  of  Costa  Rica, 
El  Salvador,  Guatemala,  Honduras  and 
Nicaragua  as  the  manifestation  of  the  w'ill  of 
the  peoples  of  Central  America  to  achieve 
peace,  democratization,  reconciliation,  de- 
velopment and  justice,  in  accordance  with 
their  decision  to  meet  the  historical  chal- 
lenge of  forgoing  a  peaceful  destiny  for 
the  region, 

Welconuiiy  the  subsequent  Joint  Decla- 
rations issued  by  the  Central  American 
Presidents  on  16  January  1988  in  Costa  Rica 
and  on  14  February  1989  in  El  Salvador, 

Aicare  of  the  importance  which  the  Cen- 
tral American  Presidents  attach  to  the  role 
of  international  verification  as  an  essential 
component  for  the  implementation  of  the 
above-mentioned  instruments,  including,  in 
particular,  their  commitments  relating  to 
regional  security,  especially  non-use  of  ter- 
ritory to  support  destabilization  of  neigh- 
bouring countries  and  democratization, 
especially  free  and  fair  elections,  as  well  as 
to  the  voluntary  demobilization,  repatriation 
or  relocation  of  irregular  forces,  as  agreed 
in  the  Tesoro  Beach  Agreement  of  14  Feb- 
ruary 1989, 

Airare  o/.s-o  that  the  commitments  en- 
shrined in  the  Guatemala  Agreement  form 
a  harmonious  and  indivisible  whole, 

Noting  icith  appreciation  the  efforts  un- 
dertaken to  date  by  the  Secretary-General 
in  support  of  the  Central  American  peace 
process,  including  his  assistance  in  the  es- 
tablishment of  appropriate  mechanisms  to 
verify  compliance  with  the  provisions  of  the 
Guatemala  Agreement  and  of  the  Joint  Dec- 
laration adopted  by  the  Central  American 
Presidents  at  their  meeting  held  in  El  Sal- 
vador on  14  February  1989,  and  particularly 


the  Secretary-General's  agreement  with 
Nicaragua  to  deploy  a  United  Nations  elec- 
tions observer  mission  in  that  country, 

1.  Coiniiiends  the  desire  for  peace  e.\- 
pressed  by  the  Central  American  Presidents 
in  signing  on  7  August  1987  at  Guatemala 
City  the  agreement  on  "Procedures  for  the 
establishment  of  a  firm  and  lasting  peace  in 
Central  America"  and  in  the  Joint  Declara- 
tions subsequently  signed  in  pursuance  of  it; 

2.  Expresses  its  finnest  support  for 
the  Guatemala  Agreement  and  the  Joint 
Declarations; 

3.  Calls  upon  the  Presidents  to  continue 
their  efforts  to  achieve  a  firm  and  lasting 
peace  in  Central  America  through  the  faith- 
ful implementation  of  the  commitments  en- 
tered into  in  the  Guatemala  Agreement  and 
in  the  expressions  of  good  will  contained  in 
the  Joint  Declaration  of  14  February  1989; 

4.  Appeals  to  all  States,  in  particular  to 
those  which  have  links  with  the  region  and 
interests  in  it,  to  back  the  political  will  of 
the  Central  American  countries  to  comply 
with  the  provisions  of  the  Guatemala  Agree- 
ment and  of  the  Joint  Declaration,  partic- 
ularly that  regional  and  extra-regional 
Governments  which  either  openly  or  covertly 
supply  aid  to  irregular  forces  or  insurrec- 
tional movements  in  the  area  immediately 
halt  such  aid,  with  the  exception  of  the  hu- 
manitarian aid  that  contributes  to  the  goals 
of  the  Tesoro  Beach  Agreement  of  14  Feb- 
ruary 1989; 

5.  Lends  its  full  support  to  the 
Secretary-General  to  continue  his  mission  of 
good  offices  in  consultation  with  the  Securi- 
ty Council  in  support  of  the  Central  Ameri- 
can Governments  in  their  effort  to  achieve 
the  goals  set  forth  in  the  Guatemala 
Agreement; 

6.  Requests  the  Secretary-General  to 
report  to  the  Security  Council  regularly 
on  the  implementation  of  the  present 
resolution. 


AMBASSADOR  OKUN'S 
STATEMENT' 

The  United  States  is  pleased  to  have 
joined  in  the  adoption  of  this  resolution 
supporting  the  Central  American 
search  for  democracy  and  peace.  We 
believe  this  resolution  reflects  and  sup- 
ports three  very  important  elements  in 
the  Central  American  peace  process. 
These  are: 

One,  the  centrality  of  the  fulfill- 
ment of  the  prineiple,s  and  provisions  of 
the  Esquipulas  and  Tesoro  accords  to 
the  achievement  of  peace  and  democra- 
cy in  Central  America; 

Two,  the  crucial  need  for  a  free 
and  fair  election  and  election  process  in 
Nicaragua  to  unlock  regional  movement 
toward  peace,  democracy,  and  develop- 
ment; and 


pepartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


73 


UNITED  NATIONS 


Three,  states  which  are  still  sup- 
plying lethal  assistance  to  insurgent 
forces  in  the  region — namely  Nicara- 
guan  and  Cuban  support  for  the  Fara- 
bundo  Marti  National  Liberation  Front 
(FMLN) — must  cease  this  supply  and 
declare  publicly  that  they  renounce  such 
practices  and  support  solely  the  use  of 
political  means  and  national  reconcilia- 
tion as  provided  for  in  Esquipulas. 

The  United  States  looks  forward  to 
the  reports  of  the  Secretary  General 
regarding  the  efforts  and  findings  of 
the  UN  election  observer  mission  in 
Nicaragua.  We  believe  that  this  mis- 
sion can  strengthen  the  prospects  for  a 
free  and  fair  electoral  process  in 
Nicaragua. 

Although  the  United  States  has  ob- 
served that,  to  date,  the  Government  of 
Nicaragua  has  declined  to  open  the  po- 
litical process  in  accord  with  the  letter 
and  spirit  of  its  Esquipulas  and  Tesoro 
commitments,  we  ai^jilaud  its  decision  to 
hold  elections  in  February  1990,  and  we 
declare  again  our  intentions  to  respect 
the  results  of  those  elections  if  they  are 
carried  out  in  a  free  and  fair  manner. 

We  urge  the  Government  of  Nicar- 
agua to  begin  a  positive  dialogue  with 
the  op])osition  to  set  the  terms  of  a  free 
election.  We  note  that  the  political  op- 
position has  pledged  that  it  will  par- 
ticipate in  the  elections  despite  its 
dissatisfaction  with  the  present  rules. 
Current  practices  of  intimidation, 
therefore,  are  wholly  counterproduc- 
tive to  the  fulfillment  of  democratic 
principles  and  commitments. 

Further  we  call  upon  the  Govern- 
ments of  Nicaragua  and  Cuba  to  cease 
their  9-year  supply  of  weapons,  ammu- 
nition, safehaven,  and  other  lethal 
assistance  to  the  FMLN  insurgents  in 
El  Salvador.  This  support  for  irregular 
forces  in  El  Salvador  has  cost  the  lives 
of  many  Salvadoran  citizens  and  frus- 
trated their  desires  for  peace,  democ- 
racy, and  development  and  continues  to 
undermine  the  Central  American  peace 
accords.  Consistent  with  the  spirit  and 
letter  of  this  resolution  and  the  Es- 
quipulas and  Tesoro  accords,  we  call  on 
all  countries  to  assist  the  Central 
American  governments  in  ensuring  full 
respect  for  human  rights  while  they 
seek  a  peaceful  settlement. 

My  government  commends  the  ef- 
forts of  the  Secretary  General  to  fur- 
ther the  progress  toward  the  peace  the 
Central  American  governments  have 
committed  themselves  to  achieve.  The 
United  States  was,  therefore,  pleased 
to  support  this  resolution. 


The  Concept  of  the  Unitary  UN' 


by  John  R.  Bolton 

Address  before  the  Genem  group 
consuUatire-level  meeting  in  Geneva 
on  June  29,  1989.  Mr.  Bolton  is  Assist- 
ant Secretary  for  International  Orga- 
nization Affairs. 

It  is  a  special  pleasure  for  me  to  partic- 
ipate in  this  my  first  meeting  of  the 
Geneva  group  consultative  level.  This 
forum,  especially  through  the  1980s, 
has  provided  an  important  and  useful 
opportunity  for  exchanging  views  and 
coming  to  conclusions  on  budgetary, 
financial,  and  administrative  issues 
affecting  the  organizations  of  the  UN 
system.  I  look  forward  to  working  with 
all  of  you  in  continuing  our  efforts  to 
assure  that  the  significant  resources, 
we  as  a  group  invest  in  the  UN  system, 
are  put  to  good  use. 

Together,  the  members  of  the  Ge- 
neva group  represent  over  70%  of  the 
contributions  to  the  assessed  budgets 
of  the  UN  system.  Were  we  to  add  our 
voluntary  contributions  to  the  e.xtra- 
budgetary  activities  of  the  UN  agen- 
cies, and  to  the  operational  programs 
such  as  UNDP  [UN  Development  Pro- 
gram], UNICEF  [UN  Children's  Fund], 
UNHCR  [UN  High  Commissioner  for 
Refugees],  and  the  WFP  [World  Food 
Program],  the  percentage  would  be  at 
least  as  high.  It  is  incumbent  on  mem- 
bers of  the  Geneva  group  to  fulfill  our 
res]H)nsibilities  to  our  taxpayers  and  to 
other  members  of  the  organizations  by 
continuing  to  provide  the  leadership 
required  for  adapting  the  UN  system 
to  its  growing  responsibilities.  With 
your  indulgence,  I  will  take  a  few  mo- 
ments at  the  opening  of  the  meeting 
to  discuss  with  you  our  concept  of 
the  'unitary  United  Nations.' 

In  the  course  of  formulating  the 
Bush  Administration's  diplomacy  to- 
ward the  UN  system,  it  struck  me  that 
we  should  have  a  policy  that  treated  the 
United  Nations  comprehensively.  (Let 
me  say  at  the  outset  that  this  analysis 
does  not  in  any  way  implicate  the  IMF 
[International  Monetary  Fund],  IBRD 


[International  Bank  for  Reconstruct! 
and  Development],  oi'  GATT  [General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade].)  It 
stead  of  a  series  of  unrelated  policies 
toward  each  UN  component,  I  felt  th 
we  needed  to  address  the  UN  systenj 
much  the  same  way  as  the  U.S.  State 
Department's  regional  bureaus  interi 
with  the  governments  in  their  respeo 
five  regions.  Just  as  an  action  taken 
toward  one  specific  country  affects 
overall  regional  relationships,  by  an& 
ogy,  so,  too,  do  the  actions  of  individi 
UN  agencies  affect  the  operation  oft 
entire  system.  For  example,  the  ham 
dling  of  UNDP  support  costs,  which. 
will  discuss,  has  a  direct  bearing  on: 
the  assessed  budgets  of  the  specializi, 
agencies. 

The  unitary  United  Nations  con 
cept  provides  us  with  a  basis  to  deal 
herently  with  the  UN  system  on  boti 
budgetary  and  policy  grounds.  We  h 
all  noted  the  proliferation  of  commit 
tees,  councils,  conferences,  and  meel 
ings,  all  of  which  cover  essentially  i\ 
same  issues.  Numerous  governing  b( 
ies  (however  denominated)  all  spend 
precious  time  and  fiscal  resources  di 
cussing  precisely  the  same  issues,  of 
in  several  different  cities.  Moreover, 
most  all  components  of  the  UN  syste 
have  expanded  their  programs  beyon 
their  originally  intended  missions  an 
are  now  duplicating  each  other's  worl 
Moreover,  there  is  always  the  risk  of 
creating  even  more  new  organization 
with  substantial  budgetary  claims, 
when  existing  agencies  could  handle 
emerging  jiroblems. 

Following  the  unitary  United  Ns 
tions  concept  would  provide  us  with  \ 
principled  rule  of  decision  to  prune  t 
thicket  of  LIN  governing  bodies.  It 
would  also  permit  us  to  redefine  the 
proper  limits  of  each  UN  comjionentl 
responsibilities  and  help  avoid  both  e 
pire  building  and  turf  fighting.  By 
adhering  to  the  original  intent  underl 
ing  the  creation  of  each  UN  componer 
we  should  achieve  not  only  budgetary 
savings  but  also  create  a  greater  sens 
of  political  responsibility  among  meni 
ber  governments  and  secretariats. 


USUN  pre.ss  release  ' 


74 


UNITED  NATIONS 


Under  a  unitary  United  Nations 
i  ipt,  even  if  some  elements  of  the 
,-\stem  were  to  take  on  new  respon- 
;!  lities,  we  are  not  suggesting  that 
;1,  Geneva  group  abandon  its  policy 
of,ero  real  growth.  Indeed,  the  pos- 
^i'lity  of  added  responsibilities  in- 
■lases  the  need  for  maintaining  tight 
oilgetary  discipline.  In  fact,  I  view 
tl]  unitary  United  Nations  concept  as 
a)gical  ne.xt  step  beyond  the  policy 
oi;ero  real  growth,  which  is  now  only 
aplied  component  by  component.  But 
ir'mplementing  a  policy  of  zero  real 
gi)wth,  we  must  recognize  that  there 
^^|1  be  instances  where  some  agencies 
rrjst  grow  to  respond  to  new  and 
eierging  developments.  Otherwise 
th'  will  stagnate,  and  initiatives  will 
bltaken  by  other  organizations  which 
d^not  have  the  expertise  or  qualifica- 
tns  to  do  so  in  the  most  effective  way 
p^sible.  Any  such  growth,  however, 
rist  be  offset  by  reductions  in  other 
o^anizations  so  as  to  maintain  zero 
rjil  growth  throughout  the  UN  sys- 
t|n.  Difficult  choices  must  be  made  not 
oly  by  the  secretariats  but  by  us,  the 
nniber  governments;  ultimately,  the 
brden  of  identifying  and  enforcing 
p  orities  rests  with  us.  As  we  have 
S'u,  it  is  not  easy  to  achieve  cutbacks 
i^agency  functions,  but  if  we  want  to 
Ei'engthen  the  UN  system,  it  is  incum- 
bnt  upon  us  to  take  a  hard  look  at  the 
Mrious  components  in  order  to  ration- 
aze  and  harmonize  their  operations. 
'    My  reference  to  the  concept  of  the 
uitary  United  Nations  should  not  be 
rsinterpreted.  I  am  not  now  suggest- 
ii  a  change  in  the  mandate  of  the 
(■neva  group.  I  well  understand  that 
te  Geneva  group  does  not  address  the 
vnole  of  the  UN  system  and  that  its 
landate  e.xplicitly  is  limited  to  concern 
i\'  administrative,  budgetary,  and  fi- 
I'ncial  issues  related  to  the  basic  infra- 
iructure  of  the  UN  system,  i.e.,  the 
igular  assessed  budgets  of  the  spe- 
alized  agencies  and  the  IAEA  [In- 
trnational  Atomic  Energy  Agency], 
jowever,  we  must  recognize  that  this 
ifrastructure  influences,  and  is  influ- 
•iced  by,  a  much  larger  whole.  We  be- 
've  more  attention  must  be  given  to 


this  larger  whole  in  order  to  be  effec- 
tive in  addressing  our  concerns  about 
the  basic  infrastructure. 

Let  me  also  make  clear  that  my  use 
of  the  concept  of  the  unitary  United 
Nations  does  not  mean  that  I  am  ad- 
vocating central  control  in  the  UN  sys- 
tem. I  fully  recognize  that  many  of  our 
substantive  interests  in  the  UN  agen- 
cies are  fostered  and  protected  by  the 
pluralism  of  the  UN  system.  I  am  fa- 
miliar with  the  longstanding  efforts  of 
some  to  do  away  with  this  pluralism  in 
order  to  allow  the  whole  of  the  UN  sys- 
tem to  be  tightly  orchestrated  by  a  po- 
liticized majority  in  the  UN  General 
Assembly.  It  is  because  of  the  plural- 
ism of  the  UN  system,  and  our  interest 
in  maintaining  this  pluralism,  that  I 
urge  the  concept  of  the  unitary  United 
Nations.  The  lack  of  effective  central 
control  in  the  UN  system  increases  the 
need  for  us,  the  member  governments, 
to  guide  our  participation  in  the  differ- 
ent UN  agencies  with  an  eye  on  the 
overall  system. 

One  example  of  the  concept  of  the 
unitary  United  Nations  at  work  is  in 
deciding  upon  the  appropriate  role  of 
the  UNDP  for  the  1990s.  We  believe 
that  the  UNDP  should  play  a  more 
vigorous  coordinating  role.  Over  the 
years,  UNDP  has  been  weakened  con- 
siderably, since  agencies  are  taking  it 
upon  themselves  to  do  what  is  properly 
in  UNDP's  realm.  Indeed,  if  the  Geneva 
group  is  to  be  effective  in  assuring  the 
best  use  of  resources  by  the  United  Na- 
tions' technical  agencies,  it  will  be 
essential  that  we  assure  a  clearer  divi- 
sion of  labor  between  the  UNDP  and 
the  technical  agencies.  Further,  there 
needs  to  be  improved  communication 
among  the  major  donors  on  the 
relationships  between  bilateral  and 
multilateral  assistance  programs.  The 
current  state  of  play,  all  too  often, 
means  that  resources  are  wasted  or 
that  we  work  at  cross  purposes  in  the 
management  of  a  unitary  UN  system. 

This  is  important  because  we  rec- 
ognize the  great  and  growing  need  for 
the  work  of  the  UN  system.  In  addition 
to  the  recent  major  increase  in  UN 
peacekeeping  activities,  still  more  can 
be  expected.  More  directly  related  to 


our  work  at  this  meeting  are  the  signif- 
icant transnational  problems  increas- 
ingly being  addressed.  Certainly,  the 
UN  system  has  the  potential  to  help 
deal  with  issues  such  as  drug  control, 
terrorism,  refugees,  AIDS  [acquired 
immune  deficiency  syndrome],  human 
rights,  and  the  host  of  environmental 
problems. 

Based  on  the  reforms  initiated  in 
the  United  Nations  and  in  the  major 
specialized  agencies,  and  on  the  impor- 
tant UN  peacekeeping  activities  re- 
cently undertaken.  President  Reagan 
decided  last  year  to  seek  restoration  of 
U.S.  financial  support  to  the  United 
Nations  and  its  affiliated  agencies.  He 
included  in  the  fiscal  year  (FY)  1990 
budget  essentially  full  funding  for  U.S. 
assessed  contributions  to  the  organiza- 
tions of  the  UN  system.  As  indicated  in 
our  paper.  President  Reagan  also  in- 
cluded in  the  FY  1990  budget  the  first 
step  in  a  multiyear  plan  for  payment  of 
outstanding  U.S.  arrearages.  This 
commitment  to  restore  U.S.  financial 
support  for  the  UN  system  has  been 
strongly  endorsed  by  President  Bush. 
Final  approval  of  the  budget  requests 
by  Congress  remains  uncertain,  but  we 
are  hopeful  for  support  of  President 
Bush's  program  on  Capitol  Hill. 

In  conclusion,  I  want  to  stress  that 
the  United  States  looks  forward  to 
important  opportunities  in  the  UN 
system  for  dealing  with  critical  world 
problems.  The  renewed  confidence  in 
the  UN  system  must  be  further 
strengthened  and  maintained;  we  must 
guard  against  allowing  the  expected 
return  of  financial  stability  to  result  in 
renewal  of  wasteful  practices.  This  will 
require  continued  vigor  by  the  Geneva 
group  in  insisting  on  value  for  money. 
However,  building  on  what  we  have 
achieved  in  recent  years,  we  must  go  a 
step  further  in  identifying  and  enforc- 
ing priorities  for  the  UN  system  as  a 
whole  in  order  to  be  sure  that  our 
financial  resources  are  being  well 
used.  I  urge  that — within  our  own 
governments — we  all  place  more  em- 
phasis on  what  I  have  called  the  uni- 
tary United  Nations.  ■ 


'enartmpnt  nf  Rtatp  Riillptin/October  1989 


75 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


U.S.-Mexico  Binational  Commission 
IVIeets  in  IVIexico  City 


The  U.S.-Mexico  Binational  Com- 
mission held  its  seventh  meeting  in 
Me.rico  City  on  August  6-7, 1989. 

Following  are  the  prepared  state- 
iiteiif  Secretary  Baker  made  for  the 
opening  session  of  the  meeting;  a  joint 
news  conference  by  Secretary  Baker, 
Attorney  General  Richard  Thorn- 
burgh,  and  Environmental  Protection 
Agency  (EPA)  Administrator  William 
K.  Re  illy  and  Secretary  of  Foreign  Re- 
lations Fernando  Solaria  Morales,  At- 
torney General  Enrique  Alvarez  Del 
Castillo,  Secretary  of  Finance  and 
Public  Credit  Pedro  Aspe  Armella, 
Secretary  of  Commerce  and  Industrial 
Decelopment  Jaime  Jose  Serra  Puche, 
and  Secretary  of  Tourism  Carlos  Hank 
Gonzalez;  and  the  text  of  the  joint 
communique. 


SECRETARY'S  STATEMENT, 
AUG.  7,  1989' 

We  have  gathered  today  in  the  Plaza  of 
the  Three  Cultures — Aztec,  Spanish, 
Mexican.  This  was  the  site  of  the  great 
ancient  marketplace  of  Tlatelolco.  Here 
stands  a  Spanish  church  built  by  the 
conquistadores  using  stones  from  the 
Aztec  temple.  And  here  we  stand  in  the 
heart  of  modern  Me.xico  City — a  true 
amalgam  of  all  that  has  gone  before. 

On  this  very  ground,  Old  and  New 
Worlds  were  fated  to  meet.  As  a  conse- 
quence, both  worlds  faced  the  challenge 
of  change — a  future  profoundly  differ- 
ent than  either  could  have  anticipated. 

And  today,  our  delegations  meet  in 
this  historic  place  at  a  time  of  sweeping 
change  throughout  the  Americas  and 
the  world.  But  unlike  our  Old  and  New 
World  ancestors,  we  have  a  clearer 
sense  of  where  the  world  is  headed.  We 
also  have  the  opportunity  to  shape  our 
destinies. 

The  strategic,  economic,  political, 
and  environmental  aspects  of  national 
security  and  global  well-being  are, 
today,  indivisible.  Democratic  ideas 
and  i)rocesses  are  gaining  momentum 
around  the  world.  Capital,  finance,  and 
trade  flow  across  borders  instantane- 
ously, forming  a  global  marketplace. 
Experience  teaches  us  that  democracy 
and  development  go  hand  in  hand. 


Cooperation  and  Challenge 

Pollution,  narcotics  trafficking,  and 
terrorism  respect  no  borders.  They 
truly  are  transnational,  global  con- 
cerns. The  issues  that  invigorate  U.S.- 
Mexico relations  today  are  a  reflection 
of  these  world  trends.  On  any  given 
day,  our  relationship  is  a  dynamic  mix 
of  cooperation  and  challenge;  growing 
strategic,  commercial,  financial,  and 
demographic  interdependence;  and 
vivid  cultural  exchange. 

In  fact,  if  I  wanted  to  paint  a  pic- 
ture of  our  relations  in  the  changing 
world  I  have  just  described,  I  would  en- 
vision a  great  and  vivid  mural — a  mu- 
ral in  the  artistic  style  of  Rivera  or 
Orozco.  One  with  bright  and  contrast- 
ing colors,  filled  with  scenes  from  fam- 
ily life  and  the  swirling  crowds  of  the 
marketplace.  A  composition  rich  in  cul- 
tural allusion,  historical  allegory,  and 
the  drama  of  politics.  Uniting  these 
varied  images  into  a  conceptual  whole 
would  be  the  democratic  values  and  vi- 
sion of  a  better  world  that  draw  our  two 
peoples  together. 

U.S. -Mexican  relations  are  a  sub- 
ject of  such  breadth,  complexity,  and 
vibrancy  that  they  cannot  be  confined 
within  a  conventional  frame  of  diplo- 
matic reference.  Thousands  upon  thou- 
sands of  lines  of  communication  and 
contact  have  developed  naturally  across 
our  common  border.  By  the  year  2000, 
if  current  trends  continue,  Mexico  will 
be  home  to  the  world's  largest  Spanish 
speaking  population,  and  the  United 
States  will  be  home  to  the  next  largest. 
Today,  we  work  toward  joining  these 
homes  in  a  prosperous  partnership — 
one  that  will  unite  our  governments, 
our  peoples,  and  our  economies  as  nev- 
er before. 

Mexico  is  the  United  States'  thii'd 
largest  export  market  and  our  second 
most  important  source  of  strategic  raw 
materials.  At  the  same  time,  our  gov- 
ernments share  common  interests  in 
protecting  and  promoting  security, 
prosperity,  and  democracy  in  our  two 
countries,  in  our  hemisphere,  and 
throughout  the  changing  world. 

We  are  here  today  because  both 
our  governments  understand  that  we 
must  face  the  challenge  of  change  to- 
gether. We  both  recognize  that  as  the 


new  century  ajjproaches,  we  have  thei 
opportunity  to  forge  a  partnership  foi 
the  future — a  future  that  holds  manyi 
challenges  and  much  promise  for  botl 
our  peoples. 

Some  defined  the  old  U.S.-MexiC) 
relationship  as  "managing  irritants.' 
We  are  committed  to  a  new  relation- 
ship: "creating  common  opportunities 
From  now  on,  we  will  define  the  U.S.» 
Mexican  relationship  not  by  the  narra 
differences  which  divide  us  but  by  th( 
growing  agenda  of  common  opportun; 
ties  that  unite  us  as  never  before.  Th' 
binational  commission  can  play  a  pivot 
al  role  in  turning  opportunities  into 
realities. 

In  preparation  for  this  meeting, 
the  U.S.  delegation  carried  out  an  ex! 
tensive  review  of  our  relations.  We 
know  that  Mexico's  delegation  has  got 
through  a  similar  process.  Reflecting 
the  high  priority  given  our  relationsh 
by  our  two  Presidents,  several  of  us 
have  already  met  with  you  and  your 
colleagues  over  the  past  months. 

Indeed,  our  constructive  and  on- 
going dialogue  began  last  November, 
when  President-elect  Salinas  and 
President-elect  Bush  met  in  Houston 
As  a  Houstonian,  I  was  proud  to  take 
part,  as  were  several  of  those  around 
this  table  today.  President  Bush  said 
then,  and  has  rejieated  many  times 
since,  what  he  and  I  believe:  The  Uni| 
ed  States  has  no  more  impin'tant  rela( 
tionship  than  that  with  its  neighbor  a: 
friend,  the  Republic  of  Mexico.  These 
are  not  mere  words — they  represent 
the  solemn  commitment  of  the  United 
States.  On  both  sides  of  the  border,  w 
now  refer  with  pride  to  the  "spirit  of 
Houston."  That  spirit  moves  us  to  ac- 
tion today. 

Our  delegation  looks  forward  to 
what  we  know  will  be  a  productive  ano 
mutually  beneficial  discussion  on  a  va^ 
riety  of  topics.  Progress  has  been  ma« 
on  many  issues,  but  much  remains  to  i 
be  done. 

The  Drug  Problem 

Let  me  begin  with  an  issue  that  seri 
ously  threatens  both  our  countries: 
drugs.  We  have  long  since  stopped 
pointing  fingers  of  blame,  ai-guing 
whether  drugs  are  a  problem  of  demar 
or  supply.  Instead,  our  governments 
are  working  to  reduce  the  supply  of  thi 


76 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  191 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


on  pushed  on  our  citizens — on  our 

children — by  vicious  traffickers. 

h  of  us  are  making  vigorous  efforts 
^ree  our  city  streets  and  our  youth 
fim  the  prison  of  drug  addiction. 

Mexico's  success,  over  the  last  6 
ninths,  in  capturing  and  prosecuting 
dug  traffickers  has  seized  the  world's 
afention.  Moreover,  to  its  credit,  your 
giTernment  has  made  clear  that  it 
wilts  to  tear  the  roots  of  the  opium 
popy  and  marijuana  plant  from  its  soil. 

My  government,  in  turn,  knows  all 
t(  well  that  (50%  of  the  world's  illegal 
dig  supply  is  consumed  in  the  United 
Sites.  This  is  senseless  demand  that 
mst  be  cut,  through  the  efforts  of  all 
Aiericans.  Zero  tolerance  is  more  than 
aolicy — it's  an  attitude  we  must  foster. 

i»krengthened  Debt  Strategy 

(  a  matter  of  great  concern  to 
iy-.\ico — its  foreign  debt — the  United 
Sites  took  early  leadership  with  the 
aiiouncement  of  a  strengthened  debt 
sategy.  Now,  thanks  to  the  efforts  of 
Scretary  [of  the  Treasury  Nicholas  F.] 
^ady,  Secretary  [of  Finance  and  Pub- 
lii Credit  Pedro]  Aspe,  and  others  on 
b.h  sides,  an  agreement  has  been 
riched.  A  real  reduction  in  Mexico's 
dDt  burden  will  be  achieved. 

Mexico's  bold,  far-sighted  economic 
p'-icies  and  its  negotiating  team  have 
die  outstanding  woi'k  to  convince  the 
p  vate  banks  and  international  lending 
i'.titutions  that  Mexico  is  worthy  of 
edit  and  trust.  We  believe  that  Mex- 
ii-  has  earned  that  faith  and  confi- 
Cnee.  Mexico  can  once  again  set  an 
eaniple  which  other  nations  can  follow. 

lade  and  Investment 

lit  efforts  in  debt  do  not  stand  in  iso- 
Uon  from  other  economic  topics.  Now 
y.  can  focus  even  greater  attention  on 
tose  topics  vital  for  our  common 
fowth.  Our  two-way  trade  in  1988  to- 
tied  more  than  $44  billion.  We  need  to 
a-engthen  our  trade  and  investment 
'■iS  in  order  to  build  a  future  of  growth 
^d  prosperity  for  all  citizens  of  North 
.merica,  whether  they  live  north  of  the 
';o  Grande  or  south  of  the  Rio  Bravo. 
We  admire  and  respect  the  many 
:isitive  economic  changes  introduced 
■  the  Salinas  Administration — tariffs 
leralized,  investment  restrictions 
tt'd,  freer  markets,  more  private 
isiness,  an  increased  opportunity  for 
te  people  of  Mexico — whatever  their 
'^atus  or  station  in  life — to  determine 
'leir  own  economic  future.  We  believe, 
'>  we  know  vou  do  as  well,  that  the  un- 


Secretary  Baker  and  Mexican  Secretary  of  Foreign  Relations  Fernando  Solana  Morales. 


U.S.  Travel  Advisory 
for  Colombia 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
AUG.  25.  1989> 

President  Barco  of  Colombia  has  imple- 
mented a  major  effort  to  control  drug 
trafficking  in  that  country.  Extradition 
of  drug  traffickers  under  indictment  in 
other  nations  is  a  major  element  of  this 
program.  On  August  24,  drug  traf- 
fickers launched  a  violent  campaign  in  an 
attempt  to  force  President  Barco  to  res- 
cind his  newly  established  extradition 
policy. 

The  United  States  is  confident  that 
this  campaign  of  intimidation  will  fail. 
However,  in  light  of  the  violent  retalia- 
tion bv  drug  traffickers,  Americans 


traveling  to  Colombia  could  expose  them- 
selves to  extraordinary  personal  danger. 
The  Department  of  State  strongly  urges 
Americans  to  avoid  visiting  Medellin, 
the  headquarters  of  the  drug  traffickers 
"cartel." 

Americans  who  must  travel  to  Col- 
ombia should  refer  to  the  travel  warning 
of  June  2,  1989,  by  calling  (202)  647-5225. 
After  arriving  in  Colombia,  U.S.  citizens 
are  urged  to  register  with  the  U.S.  Em- 
bassv  or  the  nearest  consulate. 


'  Read  to  news  correspondents  by  De- 
partment deputy  spokesman  Richard  A. 
Boucher.  ■ 


lepartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


77 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


leashing  of  economic  liberty  can  create 
constructive  forces  and  creative  ener- 
gies that  extend  well  beyond  that 
reached  by  the  heavy  hand  of  govern- 
ment directives.  We  also  know  that  the 
success  to  be  reached  is  one  to  be 
earned  by  Mexicans. 

But  we  wish  to  help  where  we  can. 
So  I  am  pleased  our  two  governments 
will  work  with  our  business  commu- 
nities to  create  the  jobs,  the  new  enter- 
prises, the  hope. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  difficult  eco- 
nomic and  business  challenges  still  face 
both  our  countries.  And  we  recognize 
those  challenges  will  sometimes  re- 
quire politically  sensitive  choices  on 
both  sides  of  the  border  But  I  also  rec- 
ognize our  governments  can  transform 
the  challenges  into  achievements  if  we 
work  together.  We  will  do  so. 

For  our  part,  the  United  States  is 
ready  to  accelerate  trade  and  invest- 
ment talks  with  Mexico  under  the  aus- 
pices of  the  U.S. -Mexico  Framework 
Understanding  and  the  Uruguay 
Round  of  the  GATT  [General  Agree- 
ment on  Tariffs  and  Trade].  By  work- 
ing closely  together  in  these  forums, 
and  by  our  talks  here  today,  we  can 
chart  a  new  course  in  U.S. -Mexican  re- 
lations that  builds  on  the  debt  agree- 
ment. We  can  stimulate  commerce  be- 
tween our  nations.  We  can  engage  our 
private  sectors  in  developing  new  op- 
portunities for  growth.  We  can  improve 
the  international  trading  rules  embod- 
ied in  the  GATT. 

Cultural  Relations 

Cultural  relations  between  our  two 
countries  have  never  been  better.  In 
our  discussions  today,  we  will  want  to 
look  at  ways  in  which  our  governments 
can  work  together  to  strengthen  those 
relations  even  further.  Let  us  move  to 
bring  our  peoples  together — students, 
teachers,  government  officials,  and 
journalists — for  our  nations  have  so 
much  to  gain  from  each  othei'  in  learn- 
ing, understanding,  and  friendship. 

A  Common  Vision 

The  opportunities  are  clearly  there. 
Now  we  need  to  get  to  work.  I  am  con- 
fident that,  today,  we  will  build  the 
framework  for  a  successful  state  visit 
by  President  Salinas  to  Washington  in 
October.  Every  day  our  citizens  are 
making  it  clear  that  they  exjiect  their 
goverimients  not  merely  to  plan,  but  to 
act;  not  merely  to  discuss,  but  to  do. 


We  are  here  to  roll  up  our  sleeves 
and  start  building  a  world  where  legiti- 
mate commerce  flows  freely  and  illegal 
drugs  do  not.  For  prosperity  and  jobs 
and  expanding  futures  on  both  sides  of 
our  border  are  a  common  good. 

We  are  here  to  work  together  to 
clean  the  air,  purify  the  water,  and  pro- 
tect our  other  natural  resources,  for 
these  are  the  birthright  of  both  our 
peoples. 

We  are  here  to  work  together  to 
improve  the  climate  of  understanding 
between  our  citizens.  We  want  the  lives 
of  our  children  to  be  enriched  by  expo- 
sure to  the  distinctive  languages,  cul- 
tures, and  histories  of  our  two  proud 
nations. 

And  finally,  we  seek  to  deepen  our 
partnership  of  democratic  values — 
values  upon  which  both  our  nations 
were  founded,  and  which  unite  our  two 
peoples  in  a  common  vision  of  the  future. 

We  pledge  to  you  our  government's 
commitment  to  work  with  Mexico  to 
make  this  common  vision  an  enduring 
reality. 


JOINT  NEWS  CONFERENCE, 
AUG.  7,  1989- 

Secretary  Solana.  The  impression  held 
by  us  in  the  Mexican  delegation  is  that 
the  broadness  of  the  agenda  on  which 
we  worked  today,  the  level  and  depth  at 
which  the  various  topics  were  treated, 
is  really  without  precedent  in  our  bina- 
tional  meetings.  In  fact,  we  thought 
over,  negotiated,  discussed,  exchanged 
points  of  view,  and  found  points  of 
agreement  on  an  agenda  of  eleven 
points  in  seven  different  meetings.  In 
all  the  meetings  of  the  morning  and  the 
afternoon,  there  was  an  atmosphere  of 
mutual  respect,  of  cordiality,  and  of  in- 
telligent analyses  of  the  problems  and 
opportunities  we  have  as  neighbors 
and  of  willingness  to  obtain  concrete 
results.  It  was  a  frank  dialogue 
in  which  no  points  were  ignored. 

As  you  have  just  seen,  six  impor- 
tant documents  wei-e  signed.  But  many 
topics  were  touched  upon  above  and  be- 
yond the  documents  signed.  The  joint 
communique,  which  is  being  distrib- 
uted, expands  upon  the  information  in 
this  regard.  Certain  new  themes 
caught  the  attention,  in  a  positive  way, 
of  the  Mexican  delegation.  I  will  give 
you  only  a  couple  of  examples. 

With  regard  to  drug  trafficking, 
the  sense  of  responsibility  with  which 
the  American  delegation  is  already 


treating  the  problem  of  drug  consum 
tion,  I  think  this  is  something  which; 
allows  us  to  be  much  more  optimistici 
with  regard  to  the  joint  accomplish- 
ments which  we  can  achieve  in  the  fij 
against  drug  trafficking.  We  have  to 
face  it  in  its  different  aspects  of  pro- 
duction and  trafficking,  but  consump 
tion  is  equally  fundamental. 

Another  example  is  the  exchange 
diplomatic  notes  on  immigration  mat 
ters.  This  will  allow  us  a  significant 
improvement  in  the  protection  of  Me 
cans  who  live  on  the  other  side  of  the 
border  Of  course,  this  will  work  bot! 
ways.  But  it  was  very  important  for 
Mexico  to  have  a  somewhat  broader 
framework,  and  some  improvements 
were  made  in  this  regard. 

Great  advances  were  made  in  thi) 
preparation  for  the  trip  President  Ci 
los  Salinas  de  Gortari  will  make  to 
Washington,  which  as  you  know  will 
take  place  starting  October  3,  as  hafi 
been  announced.  We  think  that  the 
agenda  which  we  have  begun  to 
prepare — some  matters  were  dealt 
with  today,  others  were  left  for  that 
occasion — will  make  this  trip  especii 
important. 

Perhaps  best  of  all  is  that  for  all 
the  matters  taken  up,  permanent  fom 
for  discussion  and  negotiation  have 
been  established.  I  believe  that  this 
meeting  confirms  the  political  will  o; 
the  part  of  both  governments  to  recof 
nize  problems  and  opportunities  in  ai 
mature  and  calm  manner.  Two  coun- 
tries as  different  as  the  United  Stab 
and  Mexico,  living  so  closely  togethe 
have  problems  and  opportunities. 
I  believe  it  behooves  us  to  analyze  thi 
problems  with  respect,  mutual  trust, 
and  in  a  spirit  of  cooperation.  And  wi 
need  to  define  these  opportunities  toi 
jointly  and  equitably  make  the  best  o 
them.  This  is  a  very  general  outline  c 
the  Mexican  delegation's  view  of  this 
seventh  binational  meeting  between 
our  two  countries. 

Secretary  Baker.  Let  me  say  or 

behalf  of  our  delegation  that  we  thini 
that  this  was  a  very  productive  and  a 
highly  successful  meeting.  I'd  like  to 
thank  the  numerous  officials  on  both  i 
sides  who  put  in  a  lot  of  hard  work  to 
make  this  possible.  I  think  it  is  fairti 
say  that  we  have  today  carried  forwa; 
the  "spirit  of  Houston"  which  was  es- 
tablished by  President-elect  Bush  am 
Salinas  when  they  first  met  in  Noven 
ber  in  Houston. 

It  seems  to  me  our  two  President 
saw  a  special  opportunity.  They  were 


78 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


1  iii'wly  elected  presidents  of  two 

1  1 1  nations — two  great  nations  whose 

ITS  are  bound  together  with  full 
,■  iiTt  for  one  another.  President  Bush 
laisaid  that  there  is  no  country  with 
viith  the  United  States  has  relations 
h.  is  any  more  important  to  the 
Jited  States  than  Mexico. 

I  think  that  the  sheer  breadth  of 
lUidiscussions  today  is  testimony  to 
hivery  close  and  intei'dependent 
laire  of  this  relationship.  Now,  of 
.■orse,  as  we  said  in  the  closing  ple- 
lajv,  we  cannot  stop  here.  I  would  hope 
hf  this  meeting  would  serve  as  a 
)uding-block  in  a  new  structure 
jfven  closer  cooperation  between 
.hjUnited  States  and  Mexico  across 
hlfuU  range  of  the  issues  that  make 
1]  )ur  agenda. 

j  As  you  have  just  aptly  pointed  out, 
,nnext  step  will  be  when  President 
iiinas  visits  President  Bush  in  Wash- 
n|;on  on  October  3.  I  know  how  much 
fijsident  Bush  is  looking  forward  to 
H;  visit. 

1  would  like  to  single  out,  if  I 
:c:ld,  for  special  mention  the  pro- 
jiwth  economic  policies  that  the  Sa- 
i|(S  Administration  is  implementing 
v!h  great  foresight  and  with  great 
;crage.  We  think  these  are  very  im- 
)(tant:  we  think  that  these  make  pos- 
;i  (■  the  kind  of  dialogue  we  had  today 
ii  whole  range  of  areas — trade,  in- 
/(tment,  debt,  and  so  forth. 

As  the  Secretary  has  told  you  and 
Mv'ou  have  just  witnessed,  we  have 
died  some  agreements  as  well,  some 
((■eements  that  touch  on  various 
Dents  of  this  relationship.  One  of  these 
rolved  a  bridge-crossing  between 
Mxico  and  Texas  over  the  Rio  Grande. 
\d  in  a  way,  I  think  that  bridge  is 
ijnbolic  of  the  linked  future  that  Mex- 
cand  the  United  States  are  destined 
;(share.  I  think  that  today  it  is  fair  to 
ir  that  we  made  i)rogress  towai'd  as- 
ii'ing  that  that  future  is  a  prosperous 
i\  bright  one  for  our  people. 

We  have  just  come  from  a  very 
jicious  lunch  hosted  by  President 
'Unas.  So  let  me  close,  if  I  might, 
I'.h  special  thanks  to  him,  with  special 
:inks  to  you,  Mr.  Secretary,  and  with 
secial  thanks  to  the  other  members  of 
WW  ilelegation  who  made  our  visit  so 
i'rm  and  so  productive.  Thank  you. 

(J.  It  has  been  pointed  out  that 
'■I'  main  problem  is  drug  consump- 
Im.  .Mr.  Baker  recognized  that 
i ' (  of  all  the  world's  drugs  are  con- 
nu'd  in  the  United  States.  Our 
luntry  has  had  a  serious  problem: 
irtification. 


What  measures  will  be  taken  by  the 
Government  of  Mexico  to  do  some- 
thing about  that  policy,  and  what 
steps  could  the  U.S.  Government  take 
to  do  away  with  the  policy  of  drug 
certification? 

Attorney  General  Alvarez.  Of 
course  I  believe  that  the  relations 
between  Mexico  and  the  United  States 
in  the  area  of  drug  trafficking  have 
changed  significantly  this  year  under 
the  Administration  of  President  Sa- 
linas. Of  course  there  is  no  question 
as  to  who  is  to  blame,  consumer  or 
producer.  The  relationship  has  funda- 
mentally changed;  it  has  been  trans- 
formed into  one  of  coordination  and 
collaboration. 

Consequently,  we  are  all  united  in 
the  struggle  against  this  modern  phe- 
nomenon of  criminal  activity,  which  is 
truly  exceptional  in  its  economic  power, 
in  the  way  in  which  it  damages  public 
health  and  the  security  of  the  state, 
and  with  which  we  are  all  involved  in- 
ternationally. The  fact  that  a  country, 
within  its  sovereign  powers,  could  pass 
a  law — with  which  we  may  or  may  not 
agree — a  law  consistent  with  its  sys- 
tem, to  take  for  itself  the  right  to  certi- 
fy other  countries,  is  debatable.  But  for 
us,  this  phenomenon  is  irrelevant  be- 
cause we  do,  out  of  conviction  and  will 
continue  to  do,  whatever  is  necessary 
to  combat  the  plague  of  drug  addiction. 
Fortunately,  Mexico  has  a  very  small 
number  of  addicts,  but  it  must  aid  those 
who  have  more.  And,  above  all,  it  must 
also  eliminate  the  production  of  those 
types  of  drugs  which  are  present  in  our 
country.  I  believe  this  must  be  our  view 
of  our  future  problems. 

Q.  As  you  know,  the  Presidents  of 
the  Central  American  republics  have 
said  today  that  they  have  reached 
agreement  on  a  plan  to  demobilize  the 
contras.  Is  this,  in  your  view,  the  end 
of  the  contras  and  will  the  United 
States  help  carry  out  that  demobiliza- 
tion plan,  or  will  the  United  States 
place  obstacles  in  its  way? 

Secretary  Baker.  F'irst  let  me  say 
that  we  have  not  seen  the  agreements 
that  have  been  reached  at  Tela,  so  I  am 
not  able  to  comment  on  the  specifics  of 
the  demobilization  plan  per  se.  Let  me, 
though,  say  that  the  United  States  and 
the  Central  American  democracies 
have,  for  a  long  time,  been  seeking  a  di- 
rect dialogue  between  the  Government 
of  Nicaragua  and  the  internal  opposi- 
tion. We  have  been  asking  that  that 
takes  place.  We  think  it  is  important  to 


the  peace  process  that  that  occurs,  and 
the  Government  of  Nicaragua  has  been 
resisting  these  calls  up  until  very  re- 
cent days. 

We  are  pleased  now  to  see  that 
there  finally  is  going  to  be  a  dialogue 
between  the  internal  opposition  and 
the  Government  of  Nicaragua.  Certain 
promises  have  now  been  made  about 
preparations  for  the  holding  of  elections 
in  February  of  1990.  It  is  quite  impor- 
tant that  those  promises  be  followed  by 
action,  that  the  words  be  followed  by 
action.  So  we  are  very  pleased  with 
the  steps  that  the  Government  of 
Nicaragua  has  taken  to  establish  a  dia- 
logue with  the  opposition  and  to  move 
toward  procedures  that  might  permit  a 
free  and  fair  election. 

I  am  not  able  to  comment  with 
specificity  as  yet  upon  the  details  of  the 
demobilization  plan  since  I  haven't  seen 
it.  But  let  me  say  this:  It  is  a  promise 
of  Esquipulas  that  any  demobilization 
or  repatriation  would  be,  first  of  all, 
into  safe  and  democratic  conditions, 
and  second  of  all,  would  be  voluntary. 
And  I  do  not  think  for  one  minute  that 
the  Central  American  democracies 
would  do  anything  to  change  the  terms 
of  the  Esquipulas  accord  which  they 
themselves  have  put  forth. 

Q.  There  was  some  talk  of  an 
agreement  on  extradition  of  money 
launderers  from  Mexico,  and  there 
was  apparently  no  accord  on  that 
signed.  I  would  like  to  know  why  and 
and  also  why  no  accords  were  signed 
on  drugs  or  immigration  at  all. 

Attorney  General  Thornburgh. 
With  regard  to  extradition  matters, 
there  is  in  effect  an  extradition  agree- 
ment between  the  Governments  of  the 
United  States  and  of  Mexico,  and  it  has 
been  utilized  to  the  advantage  of  both 
parties  in  the  past  from  time  to  time. 
The  extradition  of  money  launderers, 
like  that  of  an  offender  within  either 
country,  is  subject  to  that  treaty  and 
remains  so  following  our  discussion 
today. 

One  of  the  important  agreements 
reached  between  the  Attorney  General 
of  Mexico  and  myself  today  was  to  form 
a  study  group,  a  working  group  of  pros- 
ecutors within  our  respective  depart- 
ments, well  versed  in  the  technicalities 
of  extradition  to  ensure  that  this  treaty 
and  this  process  are  utilized  to  the  mu- 
tual advantage  of  both  our  countries. 
Therefore,  beyond  the  reaffirming  of 
the  existence  of  the  treaty  and  the  com- 
mitment to  form  this  working  group. 


apartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


79 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


~i 


Q.  We  would  like  to  ask,  what 
has  been  Mexico's  response  with  ri 
sard  to  the  U.S.  proposal  to  set  upi 
niethanisms  to  control  money  laut 
dering,  such  as  banking  laws?  The 
has  also  been  some  talk  that  the  U 
ed  States  is  going  to  suggest  the  p« 
sibility  that  it  be  allowed  to  enter 
Mexican  territory  to  control  drug 
trafficking  planes.  Was  this  issue 
cussed,  and  was  there  any  answer 
the  part  of  Mexico  on  this  matter?! 

Secretary  Solana.  Regarding 
second  point,  it  was  not  discussed  a<| 
this  meeting  because  Mexico's  posit 
has  been  made  very  clear  in  that  it  W 
not  accept  such  a  suggestion.  Mexic  ; 
carrying  out  its  greatest  efforts,  ai 
will  continue  to  do  so,  in  the  fight 
against  drug  trafficking.  But  Mexic 
feels  that  each  country  should  be  re 
sponsible  for  such  a  struggle  within 
its  own  territory. 

With  regard  to  the  problem  of  i  i 
ey  laundering,  and  what  was  discus  i 
perhaps  Secretary  Aspe  would  care 
comment  on  this. 

Secretary  Aspe.  The  U.S.  Tre; 
ury  and  Mexico's  Finance  Ministry 
have  established  a  working  group  tl 
has  been  working  on  the  specific  iss 
of  exchanging  information.  As  you 
know,  in  Mexico  the  only  illegal  acti  ; 
relating  to  money  laundering  is  tax 
evasion.  But  there  is  no  specific  cat( 
gory  for  crimes  of  this  type — as  the 
Attorney  General  can  explain  later. 
Therefore,  during  this  last  2  month 
we  have  been  working  on  the  first  st 
of  exchanging  information.  It  is  goii 
to  take  some  time  to  go  through  the 
details,  and  afterward  the  executive 
branches  of  both  nations  must  agree  i 
terms,  and  the  Senates  should  ratify 
them.  This  is  my  comment  regardin 
the  section  dealing  with  informatior 

Attorney  General  Alvarez  del 
Castillo.  I  would  simply  like  to  mak   I 
the  following  clear.  It  is  true  that  on  I 
of  the  ways  to  trace  funds  from  moni 
laundering  is  through  tax  laws.  But 
is  also  possible  to  prosecute  someont 
for  illegal  or  inexplicable  enrichmen 
These  problems  are  subject  to  invest 
gation  in  concrete  cases.  This  would 
be  my  comment. 

Q.  I  have  a  question  about  the  ■ 
juana  "ditch"  that  was  controversi 
several  months  ago.  My  question  is 
the  U.S.  Government  plans  to  go  fo 
ward  with  the  ditch  and,  if  not,  wh 
alternative  there  is  because  I  unde 
stand  that  the  ditch  initially  re- 
sponded to  environmental  concern: 


there  was  no  need  for  any  additional  ac- 
tion to  bring  money  launderers  or  any 
other  offenders  in  either  country  with- 
in the  reach  of  the  cui-rent  law. 

Attorney  General  .\lvarez  del 
Castillo.  What  we  discussed  was,  in 
a  nutshell,  what  Attorney  General 
Thornburgh  has  said:  a  review  of  the 
treaty  with,  I  believe,  both  parties'  in- 
tention of  making  it  faster  and  more 
efficient  when  jjrosecuting  infractions 
of  all  types,  while  protecting  the  basic 
freedoms  of  citizens  of  the  United 
States  as  well  as  of  Mexico. 

Q.  Up  until  a  few  months  ago. 
Central  America  was  considered  the 
main  source  of  tension  and  conflict  in 
the  relations  between  Mexico  and  the 
United  States.  Now  we  see  that  the 
topic  isn't  even  mentioned  in  the 
agenda  directly. 

I  would  like  to  know  whether 
sources  of  real  conflict  have  been  set 
aside  in  this  binational  meeting. 
There  was,  of  course,  great  optimism, 
and  I  would  like  to  know  if  there  were 
disagreements  on  some  topics. 

Secretary  Baker.  Let  me  simply 
say  that  the  Foreign  Secretary  and  I 
discussed  a  range  of  political  issues  in 
a  bilateral  meeting  that  we  had  in  his 
home  the  night  that  I  arrived — issues 
involving  a  number  of  regions  and 
areas  of  the  world,  not  just  Central 
America.  We  discussed  Central  Ameri- 
ca as  well.  I  will  let  the  Foreign  Secre- 
tary speak  for  himself,  but  I  think 
there  is  more  of  a  congruence  of  views 
between  the  United  States  and  Mexico 
with  respect  to  the  policy  approach 
that  the  United  States  is  now  following 
regarding  Central  America  than  there 
was  before. 

I  am  sorry  to  disappoint  you,  but  I 
really  don't  believe  that  the  divergen- 
cies and  the  differences  of  opinion  that 
you  seem  to  welcome  and  are  seeking 
are  really  there  anymore  on  that  sub- 
ject, although  I  will  let  the  Foreign 
Secretary  speak  for  himself. 

Secretary  Solana.  Of  course,  it 
was  a  binational  meeting  in  which  we 
emphasized  binational  issues.  With  re- 
gard to  regional  issues  or  political 
problems  in  other  areas  of  the  world, 
we  talked  and  exchanged  viewpoints 
and  information.  It  is  true  that  we  are 
not  in  complete  agreement  in  all  our 
views,  in  particular  in  some  cases  hav- 
ing to  do  with  Central  America.  How- 
ever, we  agreed  that  it  was  useful  to 
exchange  our  points  of  view,  as  we  have 
been  doing  for  several  months.  I  believe 


we  have  been  doing  this  in  an  atmos- 
phere of  the  most  complete  respect 
with  regard  to  our  agreements  and 
differences.  It  is  useful  to  know  the 
arguments  that  each  country  has 
with  regard  to  issues  of  this  nature. 

Q.  On  the  other  side  of  the  border 
from  Coahuila,  a  proposed  nuclear 
simulation/explosion  has  been  a  ques- 
tion of  concern,  particularly  among 
environmentalists.  What  agreements 
were  reached  regarding  this  issue  in 
the  conference  today? 

Secretary  Solana.  This  has  been  a 
matter  of  considerable  commentary.  Al- 
though it  was  not  a  specific  item  in  to- 
day's agenda,  it  has  been  commented 
on.  Mexico  has  explained  its  position 
on  this  matter,  and  we  are  working  on 
it  through  the  appropriate  diplomatic 
channels.  We  have  received  a  very  cor- 
dial and  interested  reply  from  the  U.S. 
Government.  I  reiterate  that  we  are 
working  on  this  matter  to  ensure  that 
any  experiment  of  this  nature  will  not 
affect  Mexico's  natural  resources,  in 
this  case  underground  waters,  and 
much  less  the  health  of  persons  any- 
where on  the  border. 

Secretary  Baker.  Let  me  just  add 
to  that;  this  is  not  a  nuclear  explosion. 
We  are  of  the  view  that  there  will  be  no 
collateral  damage.  But  we  have  made 
no  final  decision  to  go  forward,  and 
Mexican  concerns  are  very  important 
to  us.  As  the  Foreign  Secretary  has 
just  indicated,  we  will  be  taking  those 
into  account.  We  will  be  working  this 
through  diplomatic  channels,  and  we 
will  be  proceeding  only  in  close 
consultation. 

Q.  This  is  the  100th  anniversary 
of  the  International  Boundary  and 
Water  Commission,  and  one  of  the 
agreements  signed  today  recognizes 
this  fact.  However,  the  boundaries 
and  water  treaty  signed  by  Secretary 
of  State  Cyrus  Vance  and  Foreign  Sec- 
retary Santiago  Reol  during  the 
Lopez  Portillo  Administration  has 
yet  to  be  ratified  by  the  U,S.  Senate.  I 
would  like  to  know,  what  is  the  status 
of  this  treaty? 

Secretary  Baker.  What  has  hap- 
pended  to  the  treaty  and  its  ratification 
is  that  we  haven't  been  able  to  secure 
ratification  from  the  Senate  yet — we 
are  continuing  to  work  on  that — ^just  as 
we  have  not  yet  received  ratification  of 
the  Mutual  Legal  Assistance  Treaty, 
which  we  in  the  executive  branch  of  our 
government  think  is  very  important. 
We  will  continue  to  work  on  Senate 
ratification  on  both  of  those  treaties. 


r 

itf 


80 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


o;*lexico  before  it  became  an  im- 
rrkration  issue. 

Secretary  Baker.  It  is  my  under- 
sliifling  with  respect  to  tliat  particu- 
lamatter — and  let  me  simply  say  that 
Fill  not  the  expert  on  it  and  I  am  not 
,11'  that  we  have  anybody  up  here  at 
J  table  who  is — but  it  is  my  under- 
siding  that  it  is  on  hold,  and  we  are 
^tl  looking  at  the  situation  and  review- 
1  the  prospect  of  the  construction  of 
tl.t  ditch  and  again  closely  consulting 
wjh  the  Mexican  Government.  I  am 
ni  in  a  position  to  tell  you  here  today 
wether  or  not  we  will  go  forwai'd  with 
itir  not.  But  we  have  put  it  on  hold. 
Secretary  Solana.  I  would  only 
that  we  have,  indeed,  been  consult- 
through  dijilomatic  channels  and 
tljt  our  concerns  have  been  taken  into 
ciisideration.  This  project  would  be 
cried  out  in  U.S.  territory,  thus  it 
i;k  decision  of  the  U.S.  Government. 
Plwever,  the  concerns  put  forth  by 
t?  Mexican  Government  have  been 
htened  to. 

(J.  I  want  to  ask  you  about  the 
areement  on  immigration;  perhaps 
Vi  could  have  more  details  about  this 
areement.  It  seems  that  the  U.S.  del- 
eation  was  particularly  interested  in 
ru-hing  an  agreement  to  control  the 
i  migration  of  third-country  nation- 
al through  the  U.S. -Mexican  border. 
\is  something  achieved  on  this 
i  ue? 

Secretary  Solana.  The  matter  was 
d^cussed,  but  the  exchange  of  infor- 
ntion  was  discussed  more  than  were 
dntrol  issues.  Migration  from  third 
(juntries  to  Mexico  or  through  Mexico, 
f  vice  versa,  is  a  regional  concern,  and 
\'  think  that  the  exchange  of  informa- 
t)n  leading  to  concrete  measures  is 
leful  so  long  as  peoples'  rights  are  al- 
Mvs  protected,  especially  when  they 
;e  in  Mexican  territory.  Therefore,  we 
lought  it  was  beneficial  to  establish  a 
foup  that  would  set  up  formal  mecha- 
Isms  to  exchange  information  that 
■Duld  help  us  to  analyze  this  problem, 
f'cause  we  do  not  understand  it  well — 
;  least  as  far  as  specific  figures  are 
incerned.  We  have  a  general  idea,  but 
is  a  problem  that  is  happening  right 
iw:  and  we  want  more  systematic  and 
mplete  information.  We  think  that 
ith  this  exchange  of  information,  we 
m  make  progress  on  this  issue. 

,     Q.  What  is  the  nature  of  the 
kreement? 


Secretary  Solana.  We  have  ex- 
changed notes  to  begin  this  informa- 
tion exchange.  There  are  more  details 
in  the  joint  communique. 

Q.  I  wonder  if  Mr.  Reilly  could 
tell  us  what  the  effects  of  ammonium 
nitrate  are  on  subsoil  conditions,  be- 
cause that  apparently  is  what  the  det- 
onation outside  of  Del  Rio  is  supposed 
to  be.  Secondly,  I  would  like  to  ask 
whether  we  can  interpret  this  draw- 
ing together  between  Mexico  and 
the  United  States  as  something  that 
might  extend  further  south  with  time 
and  eventually  manifest  itself  in  an 
expression  of  similar  respect  for  Cen- 
tral American  nations  and  leaders 
that  have  beneficial  side  effects  for 
the  American  taxpayers  by  sparing 
the  expenses  of  repeated  long- 
distance phone  calls  placed  by  Presi- 
dent Bush  to  leaders  taking  part  in 
summit  meetings  such  as  Tela,  Hon- 
duras, apparently  in  efforts  to  influ- 
ence their  decisions. 

Secretary  Baker.  I  think  it's  a 
statement.  I'll  answer  the  first  ques- 
tion because  it  was  a  question,  but  I'll 
refei-  it  to  Mr.  Reilly.  who  is  the  envi- 
ronmental expert. 

Administrator  Reilly.  We  are  obli- 
gated by  applicable  law  in  the  United 
States  to  assess  very  carefully  the  en- 
vironmental impact  of  any  activity  that 
is  likely  to  have  a  significant  impact  on 
the  environment.  Whether  this  contem- 
plated simulation  is  such  an  activity  re- 
mains to  be  seen,  and  there  is  a  lot 
more  to  be  determined  about  it.  But  if 
it  is,  in  fact,  a  lot  would  have  to  be  done 
to  make  sure  that  it  is  not  going  to  have 
adverse  consequences  for  the  environ- 
ment before  it  is  permitted  to  go 
ahead.  We  consider  that  we  are  obli- 
gated under  agreements  with  Mexico  to 
consult  very  closely  and  to  inform  the 
Mexican  Government  about  any  such  ef- 
fects. This  is  within  the  area  covered 
by  our  agreements,  and  we  fully  intend 
to  comply  with  those  agreements. 

Q.  Three  major  issues  have  not 
yet  been  addressed.  One  is  the  elim- 
ination of  protectionist  barriers  by 
the  United  States;  two,  the  new  in- 
vestment flows  toward  Mexico;  and 
three,  new  tourism  flows  toward  our 
country. 

Secretary  Serra.  On  trade,  which 
is  your  first  question,  there  was  a  very 
productive  session  with  [U.S.  Trade 
Representative]  Ambassador  Carla 
Hills  in  which  a  number  of  issues  were 


addressed.  Discussion  of  issues  that  fall 
within  the  macroagreement,  which 
governs  the  trade  relations  between 
Mexico  and  the  United  States,  had  a 
short-term  focus  on  issues  dealing  with 
the  steel  industry,  intellectual  proper- 
ty, and  textiles.  We  reached  significant 
agreements  in  these  three  areas  and 
made  sure  that  there  will  be  specific 
proposals  for  the  summit  between 
Presidents  Salinas  and  Bush. 

With  regard  to  the  long  term,  with- 
in that  same  understanding  we  reached 
with  Ambassador  Hills,  we  agreed  that 
we  have  to  make  an  effort  to  give  an 
additional  push  to  that  agreement — a 
framework  agreement  that  at  present 
is  a  forum  for  consultations — to  see  if 
we  can  turn  it  into  an  agreement  for 
action  that  will  permit  us  to  eliminate 
barriers  and  promote  access  to 
markets. 

Regai'ding  investment,  we  also  had 
a  very  productive  meeting  with  Secre- 
tary of  Commerce  Robert  Mosbacher  in 
relation  to  the  new  foreign  investment 
regulations  in  Mexico — very  detailed 
report  on  the  characteristics  but  also 
an  agreement  to  carry  out  promotional 
events  among  investors  in  a  joint  forum 
between  our  two  governments. 

Secretary  Hank  Gonzalez.  With 
regard  to  strengthening  the  flow  of 
tourism,  we  spoke  with  Secretary  Mos- 
bacher in  an  extremely  cordial  climate, 
and  with  a  spirit  of  cooperation  and 
good  will,  about  a  strengthened  flow  of 
tourists  between  our  two  countries, 
about  promoting  together — the  U.S. 
and  Mexico — a  strengthening  of  the 
flows  from  other  continents  toward  the 
United  States  and  Mexico,  and  about 
fostering  joint  U.S.  and  Mexican  in- 
vestments in  infrastructure  and  con- 
struction of  tourist  facilities. 

Q.  I  want  to  ask  Mr.  Baker  if  the 
U.S.  Government  will  support  the  de- 
mobilization agreements  that  the 
Central  American  presidents  may 
have  reached  in  Tela,  Honduras,  or  if 
such  support  would  be  subject  to  any 
progress  attained  in  the  commit- 
ments that  President  Ortega  may 
have  with  the  Nicaraguan  opposition. 

Secretary  Baker.  I  have  already 
said  that  I  haven't  seen  the  details  of 
the  agreement  that  was  reached.  It  is 
my  understanding  that  an  agreement 
was  reached  in  Tela  just  an  hour  or  so 
ago,  and  I  haven't  seen  the  details  of 
that  agreement. 


department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


81 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Let  me  say,  the  only  conditions 
that  I  think  the  United  States  would 
put  on  in  such  agreement  are  the  very 
conditions  that  the  Central  American 
democracies  themselves  put  on  this 
issue  in  the  Esquipulas  peace  agree- 
ment: that  is,  that  any  repatriation 
must  be  voluntary,  and  it  must  be  a 
repatriation  into  safe  and  democratic 
conditions.  So  there  must  be  safe  and 
democratic  conditions  by  the  very 
terms  of  Esquipulas  itself,  which  seems 
to  me  to  argue  quite  strongly  that 
there  should  be  performance  of  the 
promises  by  the  Government  of  Nicara- 
gua if  there  is  to  be  repatriation.  That's 
not  commenting  on  the  specifics  of  the 
plan  because  I  haven't  seen  the  plan. 
But  I  am  quite  sure  that  we  would  want 
to  see  it  carry  through  the  commitment 
of  the  Esquipulas  peace  accord,  which 
the  four  Central  American  democracies 
themselves  subscribed  to. 


JOINT  COMMUNIQUE, 
AUG.  7,  1989 

Responding  to  the  desire  of  the  two  Govern- 
ments to  hold  periodic  meetings  to  examine 
at  the  ministerial  level  the  state  of  relations 
between  our  countries,  the  Seventh  Meeting 
of  the  United  States-Me.xico  Binational 
Commission  was  held  in  Mexico  City  on 
August  6-7,  1989. 

Within  this  framework,  it  was  proposed 
to  negotiate  new  agreements  and  to  consider 
appropriate  actions  with  a  view  to  overcom- 
ing current  problems  and  strengthening  re- 
lations in  all  areas. 

The  meeting  was  particularly  impor- 
tant because  of  the  advances  achieved  in 
preparing  the  agenda  which  will  be  dis- 
cussed during  the  meeting  of  the  Presidents 
of  Mexico  and  of  the  United  States  in  Wash- 
ington this  October. 

The  meeting  was  characterized  by  a  cli- 
mate of  cordiality  and  frankness  which  pre- 
vailed in  the  negotiations  and  in  the  joint 
evaluation  of  problems.  All  que.stions  were 
examined  in  an  exhaustive  and  careful  man- 
ner, and  numerous  and  important  under- 
standings were  achieved. 

In  order  to  systematize  the  work,  both 
delegations  agreed  to  divide  it  into  the  fol- 
lowing topics:  bilateral  relations;  border 
cooperation:  environment:  migration;  legal 
affairs  and  antinarcotics  cooperation;  fi- 
nancial cooperation;  trade  and  investment; 
promotion  of  commerce,  investment  and 
tourism;  and  cultural  affairs. 

Bilateral  and  International  Relations 

Both  governments  reiterated  their  intention 
to  strenthen  even  more  the  relations  be- 
tween Mexico  and  the  United  States,  in 
strict  observance  of  the  indnciples  which 


should  govern  international  relations,  es- 
l)ecially  those  which  make  possible  a  har- 
monious relation  between  neighboring 
countries.  Among  others,  these  principles 
include  support  for  democracy  and  self- 
determination,  respect  for  nonintervention, 
sovereign  equality  of  states,  good  faith  and 
international  cooperation  on  a  fair  and  equi- 
table basis. 

They  confirmed  their  intention  to  give 
impetus  to  the  dialogue  in  the  search  for  so- 
lutions to  current  or  anticipated  problems; 
they  recognized  that  the  complexity  of  the 
relations  requires  a  permanent  dialogue 
taking  into  account,  on  the  one  hand,  the  na- 
tional identity  and  historical  characteristics 
of  each  country  and,  on  the  other,  the  need 
to  cooperate  in  the  search  for  acceptable 
solutions  to  common  problems. 

Both  delegations  took  note  with  special 
satisfaction  of  the  simultaneous  initiation 
of  the  Administrations  of  Presidents  Bush 
and  Salinas;  this  circumstance  led  to  the 
meeting  in  Houston  in  November,  1988  as 
Presidents-Elect.  Within  the  spirit  of  cor- 
diality of  the  Houston  meeting,  a  commit- 
ment was  undertaken  whose  deepening  and 
continuity  will  be  evident  during  the  meet- 
ing of  both  Chiefs  of  State  which  will  be  held 
in  the  United  States  next  October 

The  heads  of  delegation  held  a  wide- 
ranging  discussion  on  international  affairs. 
They  discussed  and  shared  their  respective 
views  on  arms  control,  East-West  relations. 
Central  America  and  other  subjects  of  mu- 
tual concern  to  Mexico  and  to  the  United 
States. 

In  analyzing  the  hemispheric  situation, 
they  indicated  the  importance  of  overcoming 
the  conflicts  in  Central  America,  based 
on  the  Esquipulas  II  and  El  Salvador 
agreements. 

In  evaluating  the  current  state  of  bilat- 
eral relations,  both  sides  agreed  in  charac- 
terizing them  as  very  satisfactory.  However, 
the  need  for  careful  follow-up  was  empha- 
sized to  prevent  situations  from  developing 
which  in  the  past  have  led  to  frictions.  The 
Binational  Commission  mechanism  facili- 
tates this  task. 


Border  Cooperation 

Both  delegations  expressed  their  satisfac- 
tion with  the  manner  in  which  the  border 
ports  of  entry  program  is  developing.  They 
recognized  the  important  advance  deriving 
from  the  exchange  of  notes  formalizing  the 
agreement  to  construct  and  operate  a  bridge 
at  Zaragoza,  Chihuahua-Ysleta,  Texas  which 
occurred  during  the  meeting. 

The  sides  expressed  the  political  will  to 
authorize,  as  soon  as  possible,  border  ports 
of  entry  at  both  Dolores,  Texas-Colombia, 
Nuevo  Leon,  and  Los  Indies,  Texas-Lucio 
Blanco,  Taniaulipas.  Both  sides  also  looked 
forward  to  authorization,  in  the  near  future, 
of  additional  ports  of  entry,  including: 


Matamoros,  Tamaulipas/Brownsville, 

Tex.  Ill; 
Nuevo  Laredo,  Tamaulipas/Laredo, 

Tex.  Ill; 
Piedras  Negras,  Coahuila/Eagle  Pass, 

Tex.  II; 
Diaz  Ordaz,  Tamaulipas/Los  Ebanos,  Tex 

They  took  note  with  particular  prid^ 

the  first  centenary  of  the  Mexico-United 
States  International  Boundary  and  Watf 
Commission;  they  confirmed  the  acti' .-  i 
which  this  institution  has  had  throujjii'K, 
existence  in  the  solution  of  numerous  boi. 
problems  and,  therefore,  the  need  foriM 
continue  functioning  to  enhance  relation! 
between  both  countries. 

The  delegations  took  note  with  satia- 
tion of  the  creation  of  an  Office  of  Bordei 
Affairs  in  the  Secretariat  of  Foreign  Rel 
tions,  and  of  the  intention  of  the  Departr 
of  State  to  create  a  similar  office. 

The  sides  praised  the  work  which  thu 
border  governors  are  undertaking  with  r 
gard  to  the  economic  development  of  thei' 
respective  regions  and  their  contributiot 
to  improvement  of  border  relations  throi 
their  annual  meetings. 

The  delegations  discussed  the  questi 
of  the  appropriate  Federal  role  in  the  ma 
of  cooperation  at  the  local  level,  and  deci' 
that  this  would  be  examined  carefully  by 
the  two  Governments. 


Environment 

Affirming  the  priority  which  Mexico  and 
United  States  assign  to  sanitation  in  bor 
cities,  the  sides  exchanged  diplomatic  no 
for  the  purpose  of  formalizing,  by  means 
an  International  Boundary  and  Water  Cc 
mission  Minute  dated  August,  1989,  the 
commitment  of  both  countries  to  carry  o 
program  of  cooperation  and  to  share  pro^ 
costs  equally  for  cleaning  the  Rio  Grande 
the  vicinity  of  Laredo-Nuevo  Laredo. 

With  respect  to  the  San  Diego-Tijuari 
area,  the  sides  indicated  that  both  count 
view  favorably  a  proposal  for  the  construi 
tion  of  an  international  sewage  treatment 
plant  on  the  United  States  side  of  the  bo: 
der  They  agreed  to  accelerate  the  analys 
of  the  pending  financial  and  technical  qut 
tions  with  a  view  to  reaching  a  final  deci:« 
which  could  be  announced  at  the  October  ' 
Presidential  summit. 

Positive  discussions  were  initiated  to 
examine  the  operation  of  .\nnex  III  of  the 
Border  Environment  Agreement.  Both  p: 
ties  agreed  to  review  the  legal  aspects  of 
the  said  Annex. 

Both  sides  agreed  to  begin  negotiatii 
a  new  Annex  V  to  the  Border  Agreement 
with  regard  to  cooperating  in  monitoring 
air  pollution  in  border  urban  areas. 

The  two  sides  agreed  that  they  share 
the  political  will  to  reach  a  cooperative 
agreement  addressing  the  range  of  envir< 
mental  issues  facing  Mexico  City,  and  tha 
this  agreement  should  be  concluded  by  th 


82 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  1S1 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


f  the  two  Presidents  meet  in  October. 
1  >  aureement  would  involve  SEDUE. 
liF.  the  State  of  Mexico  and  EPA,  and  will 
l;i>ly  be  concluded  as  a  Memorandum  of  Un- 
djstanding  (MOU),  although  the  details  of 
tiform  will  be  left  to  the  negotiations  that 
wiexpect  to  begin  later  this  month. 

Mexico  indicated  it  will  support  on  a 
tilely  basis  the  designation  of  the  Gulf  of 
KkIco  as  a  "Special  Area"  within  the 
fiiniework  of  the  International  Convention 
fdthe  Prevention  of  Pollution  from  Ships 
(lARPOL).  with  the  participation  of  appro- 
pate  coastal  states. 

I  Both  governments  agreed  to  cooperate 
olglobal  climate  issues  and  expressed  their 
iiention  to  work  together  in  the  Inter- 
gfernmental  Panel  on  Climate  Change,  and 
oier  international  fora,  to  complete  prepa- 
rJions  for  commencing  negotiations  on  a 
fimework  convention  on  climate  change. 


Jgration 

.'  intive  to  the  inherent  complexity  of  the 
t  me  of  migration,  the  deliberations  and 
d;isions  were  characterized  by  a  spirit  of 
ndual  understanding. 

i  Both  delegations  decided  to  continue  ex- 
clnging  information  regarding  the  applica- 
tji  of  the  Immigration  Reform  and  Control 
A  (Simpson-Rodino)  of  1986  as  well  as  the 
plgrams  which  could  eventually  be  devel- 
oHl  to  facilitate  documented  worker  flows. 
The  parties  expressed  their  satisfaction 
«  h  the  exchange  of  diplomatic  notes  which 
eiances  a  framework  for  addressing  the 
P'blenis  of  protection  of  nationals  and  mi- 
gUion.  Additional  procedures  were  estab- 
liied  which,  among  other  things,  address 
t'  following  matters:  (a)  the  dissemination 
Oinformation  on  the  Mexican  legal  frame- 
wrk  concerning  migratory  workers  and  the 
Siengthening  of  cooperation  on  specific  la- 
b-  matters  of  interest  to  both  governments; 
(Ithe  maintenance  and  sharing  of  informa- 
t  II  about  accidents  to  Mexicans;  (c)  the 
dcussion  of  existing  conditions  in  both 
cnitries  concerning  the  arrest,  detention 
a:l  imprisonment  of  aliens;  (d)  the  estab- 
I'timent  of  a  system  of  consultations  and  ex- 
cmge  of  information  on  acts  of  violence  or 
aase  of  authority  against  the  nationals  of 
e>h  country;  and  (e)  the  encouragement  of 
C)peration  in  the  struggle  against  the  traf- 
f  king  of  humans  and  false  documentation, 
t!  migration  of  undocumented  third- 
cintry  nationals  and  the  exchange  of  timely 
i:orniation  on  criminal  immigration 
a.ivities. 

The  sides  expressed  their  concern  about 
t-  increase  in  undocumented  migration 
f>m  Latin  American  and  other  continents 
I  ng  Mexico  in  order  to  transit  to  the 
'lited  States  as  well  as  about  criminal 
piups  which  traffic  in  human  beings  and 

sify  migratory  documents.  They  recom- 
inded  exploring  possible  forms  of  coopera- 
'  n  to  repatriate  nationals  from  other 
1  mtries  and  created  working  group  "C"  for 

■  analvsis  and  treatment  of  this  theme. 


Legal  Affairs  and 
Anti-Narcotics  Cooperation 

The  sides  took  into  account  the  different  ju- 
dicial systems  and  the  consequences  that  law 
enforcement  can  have  in  the  neighboring 
country.  They  also  considered  the  fact  that 
certain  acts,  especially  criminal  ones,  have 
impact  beyond  the  border.  Conscious  of  the 
need  for  respect  due  to  each  country's  sover- 
eignty, the  sides  considered  important  legal 
questions  with  a  view  to  cooperating  in  the 
fight  against  criminal  actions  having  inter- 
national effects. 

In  this  context,  both  delegations  agreed: 

1.  To  exchange  information  about  our  re- 
spective legal  systems  as  well  as  relevant 
judicial  processes,  efforts  to  stop  the  traffic 
in  arms  and  contraband  of  stolen  vehicles 
and  aircraft  and  the  handling  of  corruption 
cases  in  both  countries; 

2.  To  create  a  working  group  to  ex- 
change information  about  money  laundering 
and  coordinate  efforts  concerning  the  sei- 
zure of  assets; 

3.  To  analyze  the  possibility  of  ensuring 
more  effective  application  of  the  current  ex- 
tradition treaty; 

4.  To  support  the  continuation  of  joint 
programs  for  the  education  and  training  of 
police  personnel  of  both  countries; 

.5.  The  sides  considered  that  the  produc- 
tion, trafficking  and  consumption  of  narcot- 
ics represent  a  threat  to  humanity.  They 
agreed  that  their  common  efforts  against  il- 
legal narcotics  play  an  important  role  in  the 
international  struggle  to  rid  the  world  of 
this  evil.  They  resolved  to  increase  their 
collaboration  with  a  view  toward  making 
greater  progress  to  stem  the  flow  of 
narcotics; 

6.  With  this  purpose  in  mind,  the  sides 
decided  to  create  and  decided  on  the  compo- 
sition of  a  working  group  whose  mandate 
will  include  the  exchange  of  information 
about  eradication  programs  in  both  coun- 
tries, verification  of  such  eradication,  in- 
cluding the  application  of  new  technologies 
to  achieve  the  same,  and  about  the  advances 
which  have  been  achieved  in  the  control  or 
reduction  of  demand. 


Financial  Cooperation 

The  two  Governments  reviewed  the  prog- 
ress on  the  implementation  of  the  agreement 
on  debt  and  debt  service  reduction  reached 
in  late  July  with  Mexico's  creditor  commer- 
cial banks.  Mexico  and  the  United  States 
agreed  that  this  arrangement  will  provide 
lasting  support  for  the  Government  of  Mex- 
ico as  it  endeavors  to  restore  sustained  non- 
inflationary  economic  growth.  Mexico  and 
the  United  States  also  discussed  efforts  cur- 
rently underway  to  mobilize  external  sup- 
port from  official  sources  for  the  financing 
arrangement. 

Mexico  and  the  United  States  reviewed 
the  substantial  progress  in  implementing 
structural  changes  in  the  Mexican  economic 
system.  The  Government  of  Mexico  has 
made  significant  progress  in  opening  and 


deregulating  its  economy  to  foster  efficiency 
and  improved  growth  and  employment  pros- 
pects. The  two  delegations  reviewed  the  in- 
ternational support  that  exists  regarding 
Mexico's  commitment  to  modernize  its  econ- 
omy. The  U.S.  side  indicated  strong  support 
for  Mexico's  efforts  in  achieving  this 
objective. 

The  U.S.  delegation  confirmed  to  Mex- 
ico an  offer  of  $1,225  billion  guarantee  by 
the  Commodity  Credit  Corporation  to  fi- 
nance the  import  of  U.S.  agricultural  prod- 
ucts during  the  U.S.  fiscal  year  beginning 
October  1,  1989.  Both  delegations  agreed 
that  the  financing  requirements  for  Mexico's 
agricultural  imports  will  continue  to  be 
carefully  reviewed.  The  two  delegations  re- 
iterated their  commitment  to  confront  the 
problem  of  narcotics.  Particular  emphasis 
was  given  to  the  question  of  money  launder- 
ing, to  border  affairs  and  the  possibility  of 
development  of  human  resources.  A  working 
group  was  established  to  promote  coopera- 
tion between  both  countries  on  these  topics. 
This  group  will  also  work  to  improve  cus- 
toms cooperation  to  facilitate  and  monitor 
trade  flows. 


Trade  and  Investment 

They  reviewed  the  advances  of  the  working 
groups  under  the  Framework  Trade  and  In- 
vestment Agreement.  After  being  informed 
about  the  recent  meetings,  both  delegations 
agreed  to  proceed  at  a  more  rapid  pace  in 
the  corresponding  activities.  At  the  same 
time,  the  results  achieved  were  analyzed  to 
facilitate  the  processes  of  trade  and  invest- 
ment. The  plan  of  action  agreed  to  regard- 
ing trucking  was  analyzed  and  accepted; 
there  was  mutual  agreement  to  put  it  into 
effect  immediately. 

After  a  detailed  report  by  both  delega- 
tions, an  understanding  was  achieved  to  ac- 
celerate in  the  short  term  the  negotiations 
on  tariff  and  non-tariff  measures  within  the 
framework  of  the  Uruguay  Round;  to  place 
talks  on  steel  and  intellectual  property 
rights  on  a  fast  track  with  a  view  toward 
achieving  progress  by  the  time  of  the  Octo- 
ber Presidential  summit;  and  to  hold  other 
talks  on  textiles. 

It  was  decided  to  initiate,  at  the  time  of 
the  fall  Presidential  summit,  longer  term, 
comprehensive  talks  on  market  access  and 
trade  and  investment  facilitation  in  specific 
areas  and/or  sectors. 

The  governments  agreed  to  continue  an- 
alyzing diverse  matters  related  to  subsidies, 
countervailing  duties  and  anti-dumping 
rules.  The  Commerce  Department  today  is- 
sued a  notice  of  its  intent  to  revoke  counter- 
vailing duties  on  the  first  often  outstanding 
countervailing  duty  cases.  The  governments 
also  agreed  to  discuss  further  the  related 
benefits  to  Mexico  under  the  Generalized 
System  of  Preferences  (GSP)  and  the  prob- 
lem of  reciprocal  access  to  each  other's 
markets.  The  United  States  Government 
announced  today  its  acceptance  for  review 


Ippartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


83 


TREATIES 


of  43  petitions  filed  by  the  Government  of 
Mexico,  with  an  estimated  export  value  of 
$500  million,  in  the  context  of  the  1989 
GSP  Annual  Review. 


Promotion  of  Commerce, 
Investment  and  Tourism 

Regardin.e  foreign  investment,  the  Mexican 
delegation  made  a  presentation  w-ith  regard 
to  policy  as  well  as  of  the  recent  modifica- 
tion of  the  Foreign  Investment  Law  Regula- 
tions. It  was  agreed  that  the  governments 
will  establish  a  promotion  mechanism  and 
will  formulate  a  plan  of  action  to  take  ad- 
vantage of  the  opportunities  which  will  be 
generated  in  both  countries  for  commerce 
and  investment.  Attention  was  given  to  the 
opportunities  in  the  tourism  sector.  They 
considered  possibilities  of  investments  re- 
lated to  the  privatization  of  public  enter- 
prises, of  telecommunications  and  of  the 
expansion  of  infrastructure. 

The  two  sides  will  examine  further  the 
promising  business  climate  emerging  in 
Mexico.  It  is  hoped  that  plans  can  be  pur- 
sued to  organize  a  high-level  group  of  U.S. 
business  executives  to  travel  to  Mexico  this 
fall  for  the  purpose  of  promoting  mutual 
commercial  and  investment  opportunities. 

They  carefully  analyzed  investment  op- 
portunities in  Mexico's  tourism  sector  fol- 
lowing a  brief  presentation  by  the  Mexican 
delegation.  At  the  same  time,  the  possibility 
was  mentioned  that,  in  the  future,  the  use  of 
the  debt-swap  mechanism  will  be  permitted 
in  the  Mexican  privatization  program  of  pub- 
lic enterprises  and  in  infrastructure  proj- 
ects in  accordance  with  the  guidelines  and 
amounts  as  determined  by  the  Secretariat 
of  the  Treasury  and  Public  Credit. 

They  underscored  the  interest  of  both 
governments  to  sign,  as  soon  as  possible,  a 
convention  to  facilitate  tourist  activit.v,  set- 
ting as  a  date  certain  for  such  an  agreement 
the  visit  of  President  Carlos  Salinas  de  Gor- 
tari  to  Washington  next  October. 

Cultural  Affairs 

Taking  into  account  the  importance  of  bet- 
ter mutual  understanding  between  the  peo- 
ples of  Mexico  and  the  United  States  and  of 
the  responsibilities  of  the  governments  to 
promote  such  improved  perception,  the  sides 
exchanged  points  of  view  and  agreed  to  give 
a  new  impulse  to  cultural  cooperation,  espe- 
cially in  the  respective  border  areas,  where 
our  peoples  need  better  understanding  and 
mutual  respect.  Accordingly,  they  accepted 
the  following  commitments  in  cultural 
affairs: 

To  hold  in  Mexico  in  June  1990  the  VII 
meeting  of  the  Cultural  Cooperation  Com- 
mission and  at  that  meeting  the  two  govern- 
ments will  agree  on  their  1990-93  workplan; 
to  promote  visits  of  officials,  official  spokes- 
men, journalists  and  communications  media 
specialists  and  the  creation  of  data  banks  or 
clearing  houses  for  public  and  private  ex- 
changes; to  restructure  the  Lincoln-Juarez 


lecture  series  to  he  carried  out  annually  in 
F"ebruary  and  March  in  the  United  States 
and  Mexico  respectively;  to  recognize  the 
importance  of  the  border  area  and  to  pro- 
mote ties  between  universities  and  libraries 
of  the  area. 

The  U.S.  side  offered  to  consider  estab- 
lishing a  Fulbright  scholarship  program  for 
border  area  residents;  both  sides  agreed  to 
strengthen  current  scholarship  programs 
and  to  continue  supporting  programs  to  pro- 
mote the  study  of  the  English  and  Spanish 
languages  and  literature  in  their  respective 
countries. 

The  two  governments  will  continue 
their  support  for  measures  to  safeguard  the 
national  heritage  of  both  countries.  The 
U.S.  Government  will  try  to  identify  ways 
to  support  the  project  to  restore  the  "histor- 
ic center"  of  Mexico  Cit.y.  Both  governments 
will  support  the  organization  of  major  ex- 
hibits in  both  countries  as  well  as  promote 
participation  of  performing  groups  and  fes- 
tivals, particularly  film  festivals,  in  both 
countries. 


1  Press  release  149  of  Aug.  8,  1989. 

2  Press  release  150  of  Aug.  9.H 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Aviation 

Protocol  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful  acts 
of  violence  at  airports  serving  international 
civil  aviation,  supplementary  to  the  conven- 
tion of  Sept.  23,  1971  (TIAS  7570).  Done  at 
Montreal  Feb.  24,  1988.  Entered  into  force 
Aug.  6,  1989.1  [Senate]  Treaty  Doc.  100-19. 
Ratification  deposited:  Mauritius,  Aug.  17, 
1989. 

Collusions 

Convention  on  the  international  regulations 

for  preventing  collisions  at  sea,  1972.  Done 

at  London  Oct.  20,  1972.  Entered  into  force 

July  15,  1977.  TIAS  8587. 

Accession  deposited:  Mauritius,  May  21), 

1989. 

Copyright 

Berne  convention  for  the  protection  of  liter- 
ary and  artistic  works  of  Sept.  9,  1886,  as 
revised  at  Paris  July  24,  1971,  and  amended 
in  1979.  Entered  into  force  for  the  U.S. 
Mar.  1,  1989.  [Senate |  Treaty  Doc.  99-27. 
Accession  deposited:  Lesotho,  June  27, 1989.  - 

Gas 

Protocol  for  the  prohibition  of  the  use  in  war 
of  asphyxiating,  poisonous,  or  other  gases 
an<l  of  bacteriological  methods  of  warfare. 
Done  at  Geneva  June  17,  1925.  Entered  into 
force  Feb.  8,  1928;  for  the  U.S.  Apr.  10,  1975. 
TIAS  8061. 


Accessions  deposited:  Bangladesh,-*  Equa-i 

torial  Guinea,  Guinea-Bissau,  Laos.  May;j| 

1989. 

Notification  of  succession  deposited: 

Grenada,  May  20,  1989. 

Judicial  I'rocedure 

Convention  on  the  taking  of  evidence  abro( 
in  civil  or  commercial  matters.  Done  at  Til 
Hague  Mar.  18,  1970.  Entered  into  force 
Oct.  7,  1972.  TIAS  7444. 
Accession  deposited:  Mexico,  July  27, 
1989.  -•  ■' 

Marine  Pollution 

International  convention  on  civil  liability 
oil  ijollution  damage.  Done  at  Brussels  Nc 
29,  1969.  Entered  into  force  June  19,  1975. 
Accession  deposited:  St.  Vincent  and  the 
Grenadines,  Apr.  19,  1989. 

Protocol  of  1984  to  amend  the  Internationa 
convention  on  civil  liability  for  oil  pollutia 
damage,  1969.  Done  at  London  May  25, 1981 
[Senate]  Treaty  Doc.  99-12. 
Accession  deposited:  St.  Vincent  and  the 
Grenadines,  Apr.  19,  1989. 

Protocol  of  1978  relating  to  the  internatio 
convention  for  the  prevention  of  pollution 
from  ships,  1973.  Done  at  London  Feb.  17, 
1978.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  2,  1983. 
Accession  deposited:  Vanuatu,  Apr.  13, 198!» 

Maritime  Matters 

International  convention  on  standards  of 
training,  certification  and  watchkeeping 
seafarers,  1978.  Done  at  London  July  7, 
1978.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  28,  1984.  ' 
Accessions  deposited:  Cameroon,  June  6, 
1989;  Marshall  Islands.  Apr.  25,  1989. 

International  convention  on  maritime  sea| 
and  rescue,  1979,  with  annex.  Done  at  Ha 
burg  Apr.  27,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
June  22,  1985. 
Accessions  deposited:  Italy,  June  2,  1989;, 
Trinidad  and  Tobago,  May  4,  1989.  ^ 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlaw^fi 
acts  against  the  safety  of  maritime  navig; 
tion,  with  protocol  for  the  suppression  of  i 
lawful  acts  against  the  safety  of  fixed  | 
platforms  located  on  the  Continental  Shel . 
Done  at  Rome  Mar.  10,  igSS,-"  [Senate]  Tre. 
ty  Doc.  101-1. 

Accession  deposited:  German  Democratic  ; 
Republic,  Apr.  14,  1989.  ■'• 

Pollution 

Convention  for  the  protection  of  the  ozone 
laver,  with  annexes.  Done  at  Vienna  Mar.  . 
1985.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  22,  1988.  [S  ,• 
ate]  Treaty  Doc.  99-9. 
Accessions  deposited:  Ghana,  July  24,  198 
Thailand,  June  30,  1989. 

Montreal  protocol  on  substances  that  de- 
plete the  ozone  la.ver,  with  annex.  Done  at 
Montreal  Sept.  16,  1987.  Entered  into  fori 
Jan.  1,  1989.  [Senate]  Treaty  Doc.  100-10. 
Ratifications  deposited:  Burkina  Faso, 
Julv  20,  1989;  Thailand,  June  30,  1989. 


84 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  191 


I 


TREATIES 


r)tocol  to  the  1979  convention  on  long- 
rige  transboundary  air  pollution  (TIAS 
li41)  concerning  the  control  of  emissions  of 
r.'-rogen  oxides  or  their  transboundary 
f'kes.  with  annex.  Done  at  Sofia  Oct.  31, 
lis.  J 

/pnival  deposited:  France,  July  20,  1989. 
Aeptance  deposited:  U.S.S.R.,  June  21, 

Pstal 

Oistitution  of  the  Universal  Postal  Union, 
wh  final  protocol.  Done  at  Vienna,  July  10, 
l:|4;  entered  into  force  Jan.  1,  1966.  TIAS 
hU.  Additional  protocol  done  at  Tokyo 
4'.  14,  1969.  Entered  into  force  July  1, 
Ifl.  TIAS  7150.  Second  additional  protocol 
djie  at  Lausanne  July  .5,  1974.  Entered  into 
ftjceJan.  1,  1976.  TIAS  8231. 
Aession  deposited:  Western  Samoa, 
J,y  13,  1989. 

Tird  additional  protocol  to  the  constitution 

o.:he  Universal  Postal  Union  of  July  10,  1964 

CAS  5881),  general  regulations  with  an- 

r<,  and  the  universal  postal  convention 

vih  final  protocol  and  detailed  regulations. 

line  at  Hamburg  July  27,  1984.  Entered 

iJo  force  .Jan.  1,  1986;  for  the  U.S.  June  6, 

1^6. 

fjtifications  deposited:  Niger,  Nov.  25, 

188;  Togo,  Jan.  25,  1989;  Yugoslavia, 

ijc.  22,  1988. 

i^cession  deposited:  Western  Samoa, 

Jy  13,  1989.  •'■ 

R  ney  orders  and  postal  travellers'  checks 
a-eement,  with  detailed  regulations  with 
f  al  protocol.  Done  at  Hamburg  July  27, 
14.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  1,  1986;  for  the 
IS.,  June  6,  1986. 

I,-;tal  parcels  agreement  with  final  protocol 
al  detailed  regulations.  Done  at  Hamburg 
J  v  27,  1984.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  1,  1986; 
f 'the  U.S.  June  6,  1986. 
Itifications  deposited:  Niger,  Nov.  25. 
H8;  Togo,  Jan.  25,  1989;  Yugoslavia, 
Ic.  22,  1988. 

^cession  deposited:  Western  Samoa, 
J)yl3,  1989. 
1 

loperty — Industrial 

(invention  revising  the  Paris  convention  of 
Iir.  20,  1883,  as  revised,  for  the  protection 
industrial  property.  Done  at  Stockholm 
Jly  14,  1967.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  26, 
P;  for  the  U.S.  Sept.  5,  1970,  except  for 
Jits.  1-12  which  entered  into  force  Mav  19, 
170:  for  the  U.S.  Aug.  25,  1973.  TIAS  6923, 

.cession deposited:  Lesotho.  June 27, 1989. ~ 

itellite  Communications  Systems 

(Invention  on  the  International  Maritime 
^tellite  Organization  (INMARSAT),  with 
.■(nex.  Done  at  London  Sept.  3,  1976.  En- 
ured into  force  July  16,  1979.  TIAS  9605. 
^cession  deposited:  Switzerland,  May  17, 
S9. 


Operating  agreement  on  the  International 
Maritime  Satellite  Organization 
(INMARSAT),  with  annex.  Done  at 
London  Sept.  3,  1976.  Entered  into  force 
July  16,  1979.  TIAS  9605. 
Signature:  Switzerland,  May  17, 1989. 

Amendments  to  the  convention  and  operat- 
ing agreement  on  the  International  Mar- 
itime Satellite  Organization  (INMARSAT) 
of  Sept.  3.  1976  (TIAS  9605).  Adopted  at 
London  Oct.  16,  1985. 
Acceptances  deposited:  Belgium,  June  15, 
1989;  Egypt.  June  7,  1989  (op.  agt.). 
Entered  into  force:  Oct.  13,  1989, 

Slavery 

Supplementary  convention  on  the  abolition 
of  slavery,  the  slave  trade,  and  institutions 
and  practices  similar  to  slavery.  Done  at 
Geneva  Sept.  7,  1956.  Entered  into  force 
Apr.  30,  1957;  for  the  U.S.  Dec.  6,  1967. 
TIAS  6418. 
Accession  deposited;  Libya,  May  16,  1989. 

Tonnage 

International  convention  on  tonnage  meas- 
urement of  ships,  1969,  with  annexes.  Done 
at  London  June  23,  1969.  Entered  into  force 
Julv  18,  1982;  for  the  U.S.  Feb.  10,  1983. 
TIAS  10490. 

Accession  deposited:  Marshall  Islands, 
Apr.  25,  1989. 

Trade 

Agreement  on  trade  in  civil  aircraft.  Done 
at  Geneva  Apr.  12,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
,Jan.  1,  1980.  TIAS  9620. 
Ratification  deposited:  Egypt,  July  5,  1989. 

Agreement  on  implementation  of  Article 
VII  of  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs 
and  Trade  [customs  valuation  code].  Done  at 
Geneva  Apr.  12.  1979.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  1.  1981.  TIAS  10402. 

Protocol  to  the  agreement  on  implementa- 
tion of  Article  VII  of  the  General  Agree- 
ment on  Tariffs  and  Trade.  Done  at  Geneva 
Dec.  1.  1979.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  1,  1981. 
TIAS  10402. 

Acceptance  deposited:  Cyprus,  May  24, 
1989. 


BILATERAL 

Argentina 

Agreement  relating  to  the  reciprocal  accept- 
ance of  airworthiness  certifications.  Effect- 
ed by  exchange  of  notes  at  Buenos  Aires 
June  22,  1989.  Entered  into  force  June  22, 
1989. 

Bangladesh 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Apr.  17,  1987,  as  amended,  for  sales  of  agri- 
cultural commodities.  Effected  by  exchange 
of  letters  at  Dhaka  May  31,  1989.  Entered 
into  force  May  31.  1989. 


Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Apr.  17,  1987,  as  amended,  for  sales  of  agri- 
cultural commodities.  Effected  by  exchange 
of  letters  at  Dhaka  July  24,  1989.  Entered 
into  force  July  24,  1989. 

Bolivia 

Swap  agreement  between  the  U.S.  Treas- 
ury and  the  Central  Bank  of  Bolivia/ 
Government  of  Bolivia,  with  related  letters. 
Signed  at  La  Paz  and  Washington  July  11, 
1989.  Entered  into  force  July  11,  1989. 

China 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Feb.  2,  1988,  as  amended,  concerning  trade 
in  textiles  and  textile  products.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  letters  at  Beijing  Nov.  7.  1988, 
and  .Jan.  24,  1989.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  24, 
1989;  effective  Jan.  1,  1989. 

Cote  d'lvoire 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities. Signed  at  Abidjan  June  21,  1989. 
Entered  into  force  June  21.  1989. 

Dominican  Republic 

Agreement  amending  the  administrative  ar- 
rangement of  Dec.  18,  1986,  for  visa  and  cer- 
tification procedures  relating  to  trade  in 
textile  products.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
letters  at  Santo  Domingo  Sept.  8,  1988,  and 
Mar.  27,  1989.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  27, 
1989;  effective  Jan.  1,  1989. 

Agreement  for  the  exchange  of  information 
with  respect  to  taxes.  Signed  at  Santo  Do- 
mingo Aug.  7,  1989.  Enters  into  force  upon 
an  exchange  of  notes  confirming  that  both 
sides  have  met  all  constitutional  and  stat- 
utory requirements  to  effectuate  this 
agreement. 

Postal  money  order  agreement.  Signed  at 
Washington  July  24,  1989.  Entered  into 
force  Sept.  18,  1989. 

Egypt 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Mar.  20,  1989,  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Cairo  July  26,  1989.  Entered  into  force  July 
26,  1989.  " 

European  Atomic  Energy  Community 
(EURATOM) 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of  Jan. 
28,  1982  (TIAS  10338),  in  the  field  of  nuclear 
material  safeguards  research  and  develop- 
ment. Signed  at  Washington  and  Brussels 
June  11  and  27,  1989. 
Entered  into  force  June  27,  1989. 

European  Economic  Community  (EEC) 
Agreement  amending  and  extending  the 
agreement  of  Oct.  1,  1984,  concerning  fish- 
eries off  the  coasts  of  the  United  States. 
Effected  bv  exchange  of  notes  at  Brussels 
Sept.  15,  1988,  and  Feb.  27,  1989. 
Entered  into  force:  Aug.  4,  1989,  effective 
from  July  1,  1989. 


lepartment  of  State  Bulletin/October  1989 


85 


TREATIES 


France 

Agreement  amending  and  extending  the 
memorandum  of  understanding  of  July  8  and 
23,  1982  (TIAS  10422).  as  extended,  covering 
cooperation  in  the  field  of  geological  sci- 
ences. Signed  at  Washington  .July  17.  1989. 
Entered  into  force  Julv  17,  1989;  effective 
July  23,  1988. 

Guatemala 

Project  grant  agreement  for  basic  education 
strengthening,  with  annexes.  Signed  at 
Guatemala  Julv  7.  1989.  Entered  into  force 
July  7,  1989, 

Guyana 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Feb.  22,  1989,  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Georgetown  July  31,  1989.  Entered  into 
force  July  31,  1989. 

Honduras 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Feb.  9,  1989,  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities. Signed  at  Tegucigalpa  July  24, 
1989.  Entered  into  force  July  24,  1989. 

Hong  Kong 

Agreement  for  the  reciprocal  exemption 
with  respect  to  taxes  on  income  from  the  in- 
ternational operation  of  ships.  Effected  by 
an  exchange  of  notes  at  Hong  Kong  Aug.  1. 
1989.  Entered  into  force  Aug.  1,  1989.  with 
respect  to  taxable  vears  on  or  after  Jan.  1, 
1987. 

Hungary 

Agreement  on  the  development  and  facilita- 
tion of  tourism.  Signed  at  Budapest  July  12, 
1989.  Enters  into  force  on  the  date  each  par- 
ty has  informed  the  other  of  completion  of 
necessary  legal  requirements  for  entry 
into  force. 

Iceland 

Agreement  amending  and  extending  the 
agreement  of  Sept.  21,  1984,  concerning 
fisheries  off  the  coasts  of  the  United  States. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Reykjavik 
Nov.  23,  1988,  and  Jan.  17,  1989. 
Entered  into  force:  July  25,  1989,  effective 
July  1,  1989, 

Korea 

Memorandum  of  understanding  on  royalty 
fees  for  U.S.  origin  defense  articles.  Signed 
at  Washington  Julv  18,  1989.  Entered  into 
force  July  18,  1989.' 

Marshall  Islands 

Supplementary  agreement  regarding  the 
military  use  and  operating  rights  of  the 
■  Government  of  the  United  States  and  the 
Marshall  Islands,  with  annex  and  agreed 
minute.  Signed  at  Majuro  June  12,  1989. 
Entered  into  force  July  1,  1989. 


Mexico 

Agreement  on  maritime  search  and  rescue. 
Signed  at  Mexico  City  Aug.  7,  1989,  Enters 
into  force  on  the  date  both  parties  communi- 
cate in  writing  through  the  diplomatic  chan- 
nel that  they  have  satisfied  their  necessary 
domestic  legal  requirements. 

Agreement  for  relief  from  double  taxation 
on  earnings  from  operation  of  ships  and  air- 
craft. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Mex- 
ico City  Aug.  7,  1989.  Entered  into  force 
Aug.  7',  1989. 

Norway 

Memorandum  of  understanding  concerning  a 
cooperative  project  on  investigation  of  the 
ocean  using  radar,  with  annexes.  Signed  at 
Oslo  and  Arlington  June  19  and  July  18, 
1989.  Entered  into  force  July  18,  1989. 

Pakistan 

Agreement  for  the  reciprocal  exemption 
with  respect  to  taxes  on  income  from  the  in- 
ternational operation  of  ships.  Effected  by 
an  exchange  of  notes  at  Islamabad,  July  2(i 
and  27,  1989.  Entered  into  force  July  27, 
1989,  with  respect  to  taxable  years  begin- 
ning on  or  after  Jan.  1,  1987, 

Philippines 

Grant  agreement  for  the  support  for  devel- 
opment program.  Signed  at  Manila  Aug.  1, 
1989.  Entered  into  force  Aug.  1,  1989. 

Romania 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Nov. 
7  and  16,  1984.  as  amended,  relating  to  trade 
in  wool  and  manmade  fiber  textiles  and  tex- 
tile products.  Effected  by  exchange  of  let- 
ters at  Bucharest  Dec.  28,  1988,  and  May  27, 
1989.  Entered  into  force  May  27,  1989. 

Sierra  Leone 

Postal  money  order  agreement.  Signed 
at  Freetown  and  Washington  Mar.  29  and 
Julv  18,  1989.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  18, 
1989. 

Sudan 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
June  8,  1989,  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities. Effected  by  exchange  of  diplo- 
matic note  and  letter  at  Khartoum  July  28, 
1989.  Entered  into  force  July  28,  1989. 

Turkey 

Agreement  amending  the  visa  arrangement 
of  Jan.  10,  1987,  as  amended,  concerning  tex- 
tiles and  textile  articles.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  letters  at  Ankara  June  29  and 
July  17,  1989.  Entered  into  force  July  17, 
1989. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Oct.  19  and  Nov.  l(i,  1988,  concerning  trade 
in  cotton  and  manmade  fiber  textiles  and 
textile  products.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Ankara  June  30  and  July  2(i,  1989. 
Entered  into  force  July  26,  1989,' 


U.S.S.R. 

Agreement  on  maritime  search  and  rescu 
with  exchange  of  letters.  Signed  at  Mosco 
May  31,  1988. 
Entered  into  force:  July  3,  1989. 

Agreement  concerning  cooperation  in  cor 
batting  pollution  in  the  Bering  and  Chuki 
Seas  in  emergency  situations.  Signed  at 
Moscow  May  11,  1989. 
Entered  into  force:  Aug.  17.  1989. 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of 
June  28,  1974  (TIAS  7898),  on  cooperation 
the  field  of  housing  and  other  constructio 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Moscow 
May  2(j  and  Julv  11,  1989.  Entered  into  foi 
July  11,  1989. 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of 
June  19.  1973,  as  amended  and  extended, 
(TIAS  7651).  on  cooperation  in  studies  of' 
world's  oceans.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Moscow  June  9  and  July  11,  1989. 
Entered  into  force  July  11,  1989'. 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of 
June  21,  1973,  as  amended  and  extended 
(TIAS  7655,  10757),  on  scientific  and  tech; 
cal  cooperation  in  the  field  of  peaceful  usi 
of  atomic  energy.  Effected  by  exchange  0 
notes  at  Moscow  June  20  and  July  7.  1989. 
Entered  into  force  Julv  7,  1989;  effective 
June  20,  1989. 

United  Kingdom 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of 
Sept.  18,  1986,  as  extended,  concerning 
Turks  and  Caicos  Islands  and  narcotics  a 
tivities.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Washington  July  20,  1989.  Entered  into 
force  July  20.  1989;  effective  July  21, 
1989. 

Agreement  (on  behalf  of  the  Isle  of  Man) 
for  the  reciprocal  exemption  with  respect 
taxes  on  income  from  the  international  o| 
ations  of  ships.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Washington  Aug.  1  and  15,  1989.  , 
tered  into  force  Aug.  15,  1989,  with  respe' 
to  taxable  vears  beginning  on  or  after 
Jan.  1,  1987. 


>  Not  in  force  for  the  U.S.  | 

-  With  declaration(s).  | 

■*  With  reservation(s).  j, 

■■  Not  in  force. 

'■  Does  not  accept  optional  annexes  II 
IV,  and  V.  ■ 


86 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/October  19i 


'JDEX 


(ctober1989 
olume  89,  No.  2151 


i  ms  Control 

CE  Talks  End  Round  Two  (Ledogar)  ...  75 
Preign  Policy  Implications  of  Biological 

Aeapons  (Holmes)    22 

Mtus  of  the  Defense  and  Space  Talks 

Cuoper) 20 

£jtu.s  of  the  Strategic  Arms  Reduction 

Talks  (Burt)   17 

jSstralia 

/stralia— A  Profile   61 

tit  of  Australian  Prime  Minister  (Bush, 
[awke) 60 

itiiation 

Nation's  Role  in  Shaping  Today's  World 

McAllister)  ". 33 

Cmmission  on  Aviation  Security  and  Ter- 

forism  Formed  (White  House 

statement) 68 

Mgaria.  Ethnic  Turks  in  Bulgaria  (NATO 

ind  Department  statements) 43 

(mbodia.  International  Conference  on 

[■ambodia  Held  in  Paris  (Baker, 

.statement) 25 

(inada 

(jnada 7 

IS. -Canada  Free  Trade  Agreement   1 

C|ina.  U.S.  Response  to  Changes  in  China 

iWilliams) 27 

Clumbia 

Jiergency  Package  for  Colombia's  Drug 

Mght  (Bush) 47 

I -5.  Travel  Advisory  for  Columbia 

Department  statement)    77 

Cngress 

%i  Challenge  of  the  European  Landscape 

If  the  1990s  (Eagleburger)  37 

Cba  and  Narcotics  Trafficking 

Levitsky) 46 

Fj-eign  Policy  Implications  of  Biological 

Veapons  (Holmes)  22 

rX  Coproduction  Prohibition  Disapproved 

j)y  President  (letter  to  the  Senate)    ....  32 
Gbal  Narcotics  Cooperation  and  Presiden- 

ial  Certification  (Wrobleski) 49 

I- man  Rights  Situation  in  Cuba 

Schifter)  41 

Fjposal  to  Sell  F-16s  to  Pakistan 

Schaffer)   65 

IS.  Diplomacy  in  the  Middle  East 

Kelly)   ....'. 44 

IS.  Response  to  Changes  in  China 

Williams) 27 

Cba 

Cba  and  Narcotics  Trafficking 

;Levitsky) 46 

Fman  Rights  Situation  in  Cuba 

Schifter) 41 

Cechoslovakia.  Anniversary  of  Warsaw 

[*act  Invasion  of  Czechoslovakia  (Depart- 

iient  statement)   40 

Fvironment 

13.  Ratifies  Treaty  to  Reduce  Smog  Pollu- 

,ant  (White  House  statement) 36 

virld  Environment  Day  (Bush)  36 

I  rope.  The  Challenge  of  the  European 

landscape  of  the  1990s  (Eagleburger) . .  37 
frmany.  Anniversary  of  the  Berlin  Wall 

Bush) 41 


Human  Rights 

Ethnic  Turks  in  Bulgaria  (NATO  and  De- 
partment statements)   43 

Helsinki  Human  Rights  Day,  1989 
(proclamation)  42 

Human  Rights  Situation  in  Cuba 
(Schifter) 41 

Japan.  FSX  Coproduction  Prohibition  Dis- 
approved by  President  (letter  to  the 
Senate) 32 

Korea.  U.S.  Relations  With  Korea   30 

Marshall  Islands.  U.S.  Establishes  Diplo- 
matic Relations  With  Marshall  Islands 
and  Micronesia  (Bush) 62 

Mexico.  U.S.-Me.xico  Binational  Commis- 
sion Meets  in  Mexico  City  (Baker,  Solana, 
joint  communique)   76 

Micronesia.  U.S.  Establishes  Diplomatic 
Relations  With  Marshall  Islands  and 
Micronesia  (Bush) 62 

Middle  East 

American  Hostages  in  the  Middle  East 
(Bush,  Khalifa,  White  House 
statements) 66 

President's  News  Conference  of  August  15 
(e.xcerpts)    13 

U.S.  Diplomacy  in  the  Middle  East 
(Kelly)   ....". 44 

Narcotics 

Cuba  and  Narcotics  Trafficking 
(Levitsky) 46 

Emergency  Package  for  Colombia's  Drug 
Fight  (Bush) 47 

Global  Narcotics  Cooperation  and  Presiden- 
tial Certification  (Wrobleski) 49 

President's  News  Conference  of  August  15 
(excerpts)    13 

Nicaragua.  Security  Council  Adopts  Reso- 
lution on  Central  American  Peace  (Okun, 
text  of  resolution)  73 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization 

The  Challenge  of  the  European  Landscape 
of  the  1990s  (Eagleburger)  37 

Ethnic  Turks  in  Bulgaria  (NATO  and 
Department  statements) 43 

Pakistan 

Proposal  to  Sell  F-16s  to  Pakistan 
(Schaffer)   65 

Visit  of  Pakistan's  Prime  Minister 
(Bhutto,  Bush) 63 

Panama.  President's  News  Conference  of 
August  15  (excerpts) 13 

Poland 

Food  Aid  to  Poland  (Bush)   38 

Polish  Parliament  Approves  New  Prime 
Minister  (Bush) 38 

Presidential  Documents 

Anniversary  of  the  Berlin  Wall 41 

Emergency  Package  for  Colombia's  Drug 
Fight..". 47 

Food  Aid  to  Poland 38 

FSX  Coproduction  Prohibition  Disapproved 
by  President  (letter  to  the  Senate)    32 

Helsinki  Human  Rights  Day,  1989 
(proclamation)  42 

Polish  Parliament  Approves  New  Prime 
Minister 38 

President's  News  Conference  of  August  15 
(excerpts)    13 

Steel  Trade  Liberalization  Program 35 

U.S.  Establishes  Diplomatic  Relations 
With  Marshall  Islands  and  Micronesia  . .  62 


Visit  of  Australian  Prime  Minister 
(Bush,  Hawke) 60 

Visit  of  Pakistan's  Prime  Minister 
(Bhutto.  Bush) 63 

Visit  of  Zaire's  President  (Bush,  Mobutu)  15 

World  Environment  Day 36 

Refugees.  Indochinese  Refugees  Conference 
Held  in  Geneva  (Eagleburger,  texts  of  dec- 
laration and  plan  of  action) 69 

Terrorism 

American  Hostages  in  the  Middle  East 
(Bush,  Khalifa,  White  House 
statements) 66 

Commission  on  Aviation  Security  and  Ter- 
rorism Formed  (White  House 
statement) 68 

President's  News  Conference  of  August  15 
(excerpts)    13 

Trade 

Steel  Trade  Liberalization  Program 
(Bush) 35 

U.S.-Canada  Free  Trade  Agreement   1 

Treaties 

Current  Actions   84 

U.S.  Ratifies  Treaty  to  Reduce  Smog  Pollu- 
tant (White  House  statement) 36 

U.S.S.R. 

Secretary,  Soviet  Foreign  Minister  Meet  in 
Paris  ." 39 

Status  of  the  Defense  and  Space  Talks 
(Cooper) 20 

Status  of  the  Strategic  Arms  Reduction 
Talks  (Burt)   17 

United  Nations 

The  Concept  of  the  "Unitary  UN" 
(Bolton)  74 

Indochinese  Refugees  Conference  Held  in 
Geneva  (Eagleburger,  texts  of  declaration 
and  plan  of  action)    69 

Security  Council  Adopts  Resolution  on 
Central  American  Peace  (Okun,  text  of 
resolution ) 73 

Warsaw  Pact.  Anniversary  of  Warsaw  Pact 
Invasion  of  Czechoslovakia  (Department 
statement ) 40 

Zaire 

Visit  of  Zaire's  President  (Bush,  Mobutu)  15 

Zaire — A  Profile  16 


Name  Index 

Baker,  Secretary 25,76 

Bhutto,  Mohtrama  Benazir   63 

Bolton,  -John  R  74 

Burt,  Richard  R    17 

Bush,  President    13,15,32,35,36,38, 

41,42,47,60,62,63,66 

Cooper,  Henry  F 20 

Eagleburger,  Lawrence  S 37,69 

Hawke,  Robert  J  L 60 

Holmes,  H.  Allen   22 

Kelly,  .John  H   44 

Khalifa,  Mohammad  bin  Mubarak  al-   ....  66 

Levitsky,  Melvyn   46 

McAllister,  Eugene  J 33 

Mobutu  Sese  Seko 15 

Okun,  Herbert  S 73 

Schaffer,  Teresita 65 

Schifter,  Richard 41 

Solana  Morales,  Fernando  76 

Williams,  Richard  L    27 

Wrobleski,  Ann  B  49 


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^                             Departni4»nt 

ouUetEn 

'he  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreian  Policy  /  Volume  89  /  Number  2152 

.3:89/2152 

eartment  of  State  BuUeti...                                                                                                                          Noyombor   1989 
I 

i 

GOVER;iM£i;rDCGu^ic;;TSD;r';  :'m  \ 

ii\ 

The  Wyoming  Ministerial 


Df»partnt4»ni  of  Siatp 

bulletin 


Volume  89  /  Number  2152  /  November  1989 


The  Department  uf  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public  Com- 
munication in  the  Bureau  of  Public  Af- 
fairs, is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  It.s  purpose  is  to  provide 
the  public,  the  Conj^ress,  and  govern- 
ment agencies  with  information  on  de- 
velopments in  U.S.  foreign  relations 
and  the  work  of  the  Department  of 
State  and  the  Foreign  Service.  The 
Bulletins  contents  include  major  ad- 
dresses and  news  conferences  of  the 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  State; 
statements  made  before  congressional 
committees  by  the  Secretary  and  other 
senior  State  Department  officials;  se- 
lected press  releases  issued  by  the 
White  House,  the  Department,  and  the 
U.S.  Mission  to  the  United  Nations; 
and  treaties  and  other  agreements  to 
which  the  United  States  is  or  may  be- 
come a  party.  Special  features,  articles, 
and  other  supportive  material  (such  as 
maps,  charts,  photographs,  and  graphs) 
are  published  frequently  to  provide  ad- 
ditional information  on  current  issues 
but  should  not  necessarily  be  inter- 
preted as  official  U.S.  policy 
statements. 


JAMES  A.  BAKER,  III 

Secretary  of  State 

MARGARET  DeB.  TUTWILER 

Assistant  Secretary 
for  Public  Affairs 

ANTHONY  A.  DAS 

Director, 

Office  of  Public  Communication 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 

MARILYN  J.  BREMNER 

Assistant  Editor 


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approved  by  the  Director  of  the  Office  of 
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ber 30,  1990. 


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For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
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I 


CONTENTS 


he  President 

Outlines  of  a  New  World  of 
Freedom 


he  Secretary 

I  News  Briefings  in  New  York 
3  News  Conference  of  Septem- 
,1  ber  19 


frica 

)        Independence  Process  in 

Namibia  (Herman  J.  Cohen) 
I        South  African  Elections 
j  (Department  Statement) 

rms  Control 

i        Conference  Against  Chemical 

Weapons  (Richard  A.  Clarke) 

i        CFE  and  CSBM  Talks  Open 
Round  Three  (White  House 
Statement) 

ast  Asia 


J 


Cambodia  and  Vietnam: 
Trapped  in  an  Eddy  of  His- 
tory? (Richard  H.  Solomon) 

Visit  of  Japanese  Prime  Minis- 
ter (President  Bush,  Toshiki 
Kaifu) 


FEATURE 

1        The  Wyoming  Ministerial 

(Secretary  Baker,  Eduard  A.  Shevardnadze, 
Texts  of  Joint  Statements  and  Agreements) 


Economics 


53 


55 


Uruguay  Round  and  U.S.  Trade 
Policy:  A  Foundation  for  the 
Future  (Carla  A.  Hills) 

Trade-Related  Aspects  of  Intel- 
lectual Property  Rights 
(Carla  A.  Hills) 


Europe 

59 


60 


60 


U.S.  Recalls  Ambassador  to 
Bulgaria  (Department 
Statemeyit) 

Polish  Parliament  Approves 
New  Government  (Depart- 
ment Statement) 

Additional  Food  and  Commodity 
Assistance  to  Poland 
(President  Bush) 


International  Law 

60         Update  on  U.S. -Iran  Claims 

Settlement  (State  Department 
Fact  Sheet) 


Middle  East 


61 


62 


Recent  Events  in  the  Middle 
East  (John  H.  Kelly) 

U.S.  Diplomats  Evacuated 
From  Beirut  (Department 
Statement) 


Refugees 

63  U.S.,  Vietnam  Agree  on  Em- 
igration of  Detainees  (Joint 
Statement) 


Terrorism 

64         The  Japanese  Red  Army 

(Fact  Sheet) 


United  Nations 

66         Security  Council  Permanent 
Members  Discuss  Interna- 
tional Issues  (Joint  State- 
ment) 

Western  Hemisphere 

67 
69 
69 
75 
78 


The  OAS  and  the  Panama  Crisis 

(Laivrence  S.  Eagleburger, 

Declaration) 
U.S.  Severs  Diplomatic  Contact 

With  Noriega  Regime 

(President  Bush) 
Economic  Measures  Against 

Panama  (Department 

Statement) 
Cuba:  A  Threat  to  Peace  and 

Security  in  Our  Hemisphere 

(Michael  G.  Kozak) 
Colombia  Drug  Dealers' 

Campaign  of  Intimidation 

(Department  Statement) 


Treaties 

79  Current  Actions 

Press  Releases 

80  Department  of  State 

Publications 

81  Department  of  State 

82  Background  Notes 


Index 


c 


^      I 


Secretary  Baker  and  Foreign  Minister  Shevardnadze  with  the  Grand  Tetons  in  the 
background. 


(Department  of  State  photos  by  Robert  Kaiser) 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1£3 


The  Wyoming  Ministerial 


Soviet  Foreign  Minister  Eduard  A. 
levardnadze  met  with  President 
ish  at  the  White  House  on  Septem- 
r21, 1989,  and  then  accompanied 
cretary  Baker  to  Jackson  Hole, 
yoming,  for  a  ministerial  session 
■ptember  22-23. 

Following  are  remarks  made  by 
cretary  Baker  and  Foreign  Minister 
tevardnadze  on  various  occasions 
{ring  the  visit,  the  texts  of  the  joint 
itements,  and  the  texts  of  the 
reements  they  signed. 


3cretary's 
News  Conference, 
ie  White  House, 
3pt.  21, 1989^ 

'e  just  come  from,  as  you  know,  the 
■esident's  meeting  with  [Foreign] 
inister  Shevardnadze.  I  have  a  brief 
iitement  that  I'd  like  to  give  you  and 
len  I'll  be  glad  to  take  your  questions. 

The  discussion  in  the  meeting 
l:used  on  five  topics; 

First,  a  summit; 

Second,  recent  internal  events  in 
Ie  Soviet  Union; 

Third,  regional  conflicts  around 
Ie  world; 

Fourth,  human  rights;  and 

Fifth,  the  letter  on  arms  control 
'lich  [Foreign]  Minister  Shevardnadze 
ilivered  from  President  Gorbachev  to 
I'esident  Bush. 

With  respect  to  a  summit,  let  me 
'nply  say  that  there  was  a  full  discus- 
■)n  of  a  summit.  As  I  think  perhaps 
(e  [Foreign]  Minister  told  you  out  on 
e  driveway,  we  hope  to  have  a  general 
neframe  for  a  summit  which  we  could 
inounce  during  the  time  that  we're  in 
yoming. 


President  Gorbachev's  letter  is  a 
reply  to  a  letter  that  President  Bush 
sent  him  3  months  ago.  In  President 
Bush's  letter,  he  communicated  his  de- 
sire to  make  progress  on  our  full  arms 
control  agenda.  His  letter  also  covered 
the  key  principles  that  President  Bush 
thought  should  guide  us  in  pursuing 
strategic  arms  control.  The  President 
wrote  of  the  need  to  reduce  the  risk  of 
war  through  enhancing  strategic  stabil- 
ity, especially  by  working  "in  these  ne- 
gotiations to  remove  any  incentive  to 
attack  first."  In  line  with  this,  the 
President  also  wrote,  "We  must  work  to 
ensure  that  the  forces  that  remain  af- 
ter an  agreement  are  survivable." 

In  response  the  Gorbachev  letter 
covers  the  range  of  arms  control  issues. 
It  is  a  detailed  and  technical  reply.  Our 
experts  are  studying  its  contents  seri- 
ously, and  we  e.xpect  to  be  discussing 
that  letter  in  some  detail  in  Wyoming. 

Let  me  make  a  couple  of  general 
points,  if  I  might,  about  the  implica- 
tions of  the  letter  and  then  I'll  be  glad 
to  respond  to  your  questions. 

President  Gorbachev  shares  Presi- 
dent Bush's  concern  with  increasing 
strategic  stability  and  ensuring  surviv- 
ability. He  also  agrees  with  President 
Bush's  emphasis  on  improved  verifica- 
tion measures.  And  in  Wyoming,  we 
hope  to  make  substantial  progress  on 
the  verification  and  stability  measures 
which  we  propose  for  START  [strategic 
arms  reduction  talks]  in  June. 

President  Gorbachev  also  agrees 
with  President  Bush  that  we  must  move 
forward  to  ban  chemical  weapons  from 
the  face  of  the  Earth.  In  this  regard, 
the  memorandum  of  understanding, 
which  we  hope  to  conclude  in  Wyoming 
on  exchanges  of  chemical  weapons  data, 
represents  a  serious  step  forward. 

In  closing,  let  me  simply  say  that  I 
think  the  letter  generally  represents  a 
positive  response  to  President  Bush's 
letter.  We  believe  that  while  the  nego- 


tiations are  complex  and  many  difficult 
issues  still  have  to  be  resolved,  we're 
very  hopeful  that  real  progress  will 
continue  to  be  made  on  the  full  range 
of  our  arms  control  agenda. 

Q.  [Foreign  Minister]  Shevard- 
nadze said  that  the  Americans  pre- 
sented some  new  and  interesting 
ideas.  Can  you  help  us  and  tell  us 
what  they  were? 

A.  I  think  I  alluded  to  some  of  those 
in  my  press  conference  a  day  or  so  ago 
at  the  State  Department.  We  have,  of 
course,  mentioned  before  the  President's 
"open  skies"  proposal.  We  have  talked 
about  the  possibility  of  reaching  a 
memorandum  of  understanding  on  chem- 
ical weapons.  We  have  talked  about  the 
possibility  of  progress  on  the  nuclear 
testing  talks  which  would  permit  us  to 
move  forward  with  the  Threshold  Test 
Ban  Treaty  and  the  Peaceful  Nuclear 
Explosions  Treaty — perhaps  get  those  in 
shape  some  time  next  year  to  send  to  the 
Senate.  These  are  two  treaties  that 
we've  been  abiding  by  for  15  years  and 
that  we  haven't  been  able  to  get  in  shape 
to  send  to  the  Senate.  These  are  some  of 
the  things,  I  think,  that  perhaps  he  was 
talking  about. 

Q.  I  think  he  was  talking  about 
START;  it  seemed  that  he  was.  Did 
you  present  a  new  proposal  on  START 
outside  of  the  banning  of  the  mobiles? 

A.  Nothing  that  I  didn't  refer  to  in 
my  press  conference  of  a  day  or  so  ago. 

Q.  What  is  your  timeframe  for  a 
summit?  I  mean,  you  must  have  some 
ideas  as  well  as — 

A.  We  do,  and  we  hope  we'll  be  able 
to  give  you  that  timeframe  in  Wyoming. 
I'm  not  prepared  to  give  it  to  you  here 
today. 

Q.  Would  it  be  this  year? 

A.  I'm  not  prepared  to  give  it  to  you 
here  today. 


Apartment  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


Q.  Can  you  give  us  a  further 
briefing  on  what  was  said  on  these  in- 
ternal events  in  the  Soviet  Union — 
what  position  the  United  States  took, 
and  what  you  sought  in  today's 
meeting? 

A.  The  President  made  it  very  clear 
that  we  have  a  deep  interest  in  what's 
going  on  in  the  Soviet  Union.  He  re- 
stated our  commitment  to  the  success 
of  perestroika,  our  desire  to  see  per- 
estroika  succeed.  He  indicated  that  he 
thought  that  the  Soviet  Union  had  pro- 
ceeded very  responsibly  and  in  a  very 
measured  way  with  respect  to  changes 
that  are  taking  place,  not  just  in  the  So- 
viet Union  but  in  Eastern  Europe  as 
well.  He  e.xpressed  our  desire  to  see 
that  type  of  an  approach  continue. 

There  was  a  full  discussion  by  both 
President  Bush  and  the  Foreign  Minister 
of  the  economic  situation  in  the  Soviet 
Union.  We  will  be  discussing  that  in  a 
great  deal  more  detail  tonight,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  on  the  airplane  as  we 
fly  to  Wyoming. 

Q.  Baltic  states  come  up? 

A.  As  such,  they  did  not,  no. 
Specifically,  they  did  not  come  up. 

Q.  Was  there  any  discussion  ei- 
ther from  the  President  or  you  or 
Shevardnadze  as  to  how  the  United 
States  might  help  Gorbachev  succeed 
with  perestroika! 

A.  This  meeting  was  about  an  hour 
long  in  the  Cabinet  Room,  and  then 
there  was  a  smaller  meeting  that  went 
on  for  maybe  another  30  minutes  or  so. 
During  the  course  of  that  time,  we  didn't 
get  into  that  level  of  detail,  but  I  e.xpect 
to  get  into  that  level  of  detail  with  the 
Foreign  Minister  during  the  course  of 
this  ministerial,  as  I  did  during  the  last 
ministerial.  And  I  think  perhaps  we'll  be 
able  to  give  you  a  more  complete  fill  on 
what  they  think  we  can  do  to  help,  and 
what  we  think  we  can  do  to  help. 

There  are  a  number  of  things  I  can 
tell  you  now:  a  stable  international  en- 
vironment is  one  thing;  assistance  with 
respect  to  their  economic  problems  is 
another,  and  I  don't  mean — and  there 
was  a  statement  generally  to  the  effect 


in  this  meeting  that  they  didn't  look  for 
an  economic  assistance  package  but 
technical  advice  with  respect  to  their 
economy,  how  can  they  move  after  70 
years  to  more  of  an  open  economy  and 
more  of  a  free-market  system. 

I  mean,  those  kinds  of  discussions 
took  place  today.  We  will  go  into  a  lot 
more  detail  in  part  tonight,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  as  we  fly  to  Wyoming. 

Q.  On  this  question  of  what  it  is 
that  changed  Mr.  Shevardnadze's  po- 
sition, he  said  he  hadn't  really  com- 
plained about  the  President  moving 
too  slowly  but  that  he  did  have  con- 
cerns about  the  Geneva  talks — and  in 
his  words,  "Now  I  see  certain  inter- 
esting suggestions  which  mean  criti- 
cism helped." 

Obviously,  he's  taken  you  to  task 
on  something,  and  you've  answered 
his  concern.  Can  you  give  us  some 
idea  of  what  this  was? 

A.  I  don't  know  that  I  would  totally 
agree  with  that  characterization.  What 
we  have  here  is  the  Soviets  respond- 
ing to  a  June  20th  letter  from  the 
President — responding  on  the  21st  of 
September.  We  still  are  awaiting  a  com- 
plete response  to  the  President's  conven- 
tional forces  initiative.  So  I  don't  believe 
it's  a  case  of  our  doing  all  the  responding. 

Q.  There  must  be  something  that 
has  turned  his  view  around. 

A.  I  don't  know. 

Q.  He's  not  saying  it's  because  he 
brought  you  a  letter.  It's  something 
you  did  that  makes  him  feel  better. 

A.  I  don't  know.  Maybe  he  will  en- 
lighten us  on  what  it  is  that  we've  done 
that's  made  him  so  happy.  But  I  would 
refer  you  to  him.  I  can't  answer  that 
question. 

Q.  Outside  [Foreign]  Minister 
Shevardnadze  mentioned  a  whole  list 
of  arms  control  topics  that  are  in  this 
letter.  He  mentioned  particularly 
strategic  offensive  nuclear  missiles 
and  the  ABM  lAntiballistic  Missile] 
Treaty  issue.  Have  you  evaluated 
what  [General]  Secretary  Gorbachev 
has  said  in  this  letter,  and  can  you 
give  us  your  sense  of  how  much  move- 
ment there  really  is  in  this  letter  on 
arms  control  issues? 


A.  The  letter  is  very  detailed.  It  i 
also  very  technical.  And  it  does  cover  1 
full  range  of  arms  control  issues,  all  th 
way  from  chemical  and  "open  skies"  an 
START  and  nuclear  testing  and  convei 
tional.  It's  a  fairly  long  letter. 

With  respect  to  the  subject  that  y 
mention,  I  think  it's  going  to  require  a 
bit  more  analysis,  but  we  will  be  discu 
ing  that  in  detail  with  them  in  Wyo- 
ming. Let  me  simply  say  that  the  lette 
in  some  instances,  restates  long-held  S 
viet  positions.  In  some  instances,  it  pi 
new  twists  on  those  positions. 

Q.  Did  the  President  bring  up  t 
foot-dragging  charge  and  express  h 
objections  to  that  charge? 

A.  No,  he  did  not. 

Q.  This  week  [President]  Bush 
was  saying  he's  in  no  rush  for  a  sum 
mit.  What  happened  for  you  all  sud< 
denly  to  decide  that  the  time  was 
right  to  set  a  date  for — or  a  general 
timeframe — for  a  summit?  Did  She> 
ardnadze's  visit — 

A.  I  don't  think  the  two  statemen ' 
are  inconsistent.  We've  been  talking.  ^ 
had  a  discussion  with  respect  to  a  sum 
mit  when  I  last  met  [Foreign]  Ministe: 
Shevardnadze  in  Paris  at  the  Cambodi 
conference.  The  question  of  a  summit 
comes  up  in  our  meetings.  I  don't  thin 
it's  inconsistent  for  the  President  to  sa 
he's  in  no  rush  and  for  me  to  tell  you  I 
hope  to  be  able  to  give  you  a  general 
timeframe  when  we  get  to  Wyoming. 

Q.  Where  will  it  be?  The  Unitei 
States? 

A.  That  hadn't  been  decided,  but 

believe  it's  our  turn.  That  bridge  hasn' 
been  crossed.  First,  let's  decide  when 
we're  going  to  have  it.  But  I  think  it's 
our  turn. 

Q.  Did  the  President  and  the  Fc 
eign  Minister  discuss  the  possibilit) 
of  additional  U.S.  aid  to  Poland  and 
Hungary,  and  what  the  Soviet  atti- 
tude would  be  toward  that?  i 

A.  No,  that  was  not  discussed  spei 
cifically,  although  I  believe  there  is  a 
general  understanding  and  approval  b} 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  19' 


Wyoming  Ministerial 


esident  Bush,  Foreign  Minister  Shevardnadze,  and  Secretary  Baker  at  the  White 

)use. 


e  Soviets  of  the  manner  in  which  we 
\e  approached  the  dynamic  changes 
at  are  taking  place  in  Eastern 
arope. 

Q.  Were  you  suggesting  that 
ere  was  nothing  dramatically  new 
1  arms  control  in  the  Gorbachev — 

A.  No,  I'm  not  suggesting  that  at 
I.  I'm  just  simply  saying  that  it  is  a 
iig  letter.  It  is  detailed.  It  is  technical, 
covers  the  full  range  of  arms  control 
sues.  In  some  instances,  there  are  re- 
ated  positions.  In  some,  however,  there 
e  new  twists,  and  we'll  just  have  to — 
?  just  got  it.  So  we'll  have  to  get  into 
e  details  a  little  bit  later  on. 

Q.  Can  you  say  whether  there 
as  an  exchange  on  Nicaragua  and,  if 

.A.  There  was,  indeed,  an  exchange 
1  Nicaragua.  As  I  mentioned  in  my 
leiiing  statement,  the  President  and 
le  I  Foreign]  Minister  talked  about  I'e- 
iiiial  conflicts.  They  talked  specifically 
iijut  regional  conflicts  in  Afghanistan 
id  in  Nicaragua. 


Q.  What  about  the  Middle 
East  now? 

A.  The  Middle  East  was  mentioned, 
but  we  didn't  have  time  to  get  into  that 
in  detail.  I  hope  to  do  that  with  the 
[Foreign]  Minister. 

Q.  On  the  question  of  internal 
problems,  was  there  any  suggestion 
by  the  President  or  by  you  of  what 
might  occur  if  there  is  a  crackdown  of 
any  sort  in  either  the  Baltics  or  the 
Ukraine  or  Baku? 

A.  No,  there  was  no  discussion  in 
this  meeting  of  that  subject.  I  would  an- 
ticipate that  there  would  be  a  discussion 
in  Wyoming  on  that. 

Q.  Were  you  given  any  assur- 
ances on  Nicaragua? 

A.  We  were  given  certain  represen- 
tations with  respect  to  weaponry  that 
was  not  being  shipped  into  Nicaragua  by 
the  Soviet  Union,  and  we  made  the  point 
that,  notwithstanding  that,  shipments 
from  the  Soviet  bloc,  taken  as  a  whole, 
have  not  diminished;  that  this  repre- 


sented a  problem  to  us,  and  we  will  be 
discussing  that  in  quite  some  more  de- 
tail in  Wyoming  as  well. 

Q.  You  at  least  had  enough  chance 
to  see  this  lengthy  letter  from  Gor- 
bachev to  be  able  to  distinguish  be- 
tween longstanding  positions  and  new 
twists  that  are  in  it.  Can  you  tell  us 
what  some  of  these  new  twists  may 
be,  and  does  the  ABM  Treaty — their 
position  on  the  ABM  Treaty — fall  in 
the  category  of  longstanding  position 
or  the  category  of  new  twists? 

A.  I  think  that's  going  to  depend  on 
a  bit  more  analysis.  In  some  respects, 
there's  some  ambiguity  in  the  letter,  and 
in  the  space  of  a  1-hour  meeting,  we  did 
not  have  time  to  get  into  that  level  of  de- 
tail. We  will  do  so.  I'm  not  in  a  position 
to  tell  you  that  right  now. 

Q.  Are  you  talking  about  weap- 
ons that  are  being  shipped,  not  from 
the  Soviet  Union  then  but  from  Cuba 
into  Nicaragua  and  that  you  asked 
the  Soviets  to  give  us  specific  assur- 
ance that  they  will  see  to  it  that  the 
Cubans  stop  those  shipments? 

A.  The  answer  to  both  questions 
is  yes. 

Q.  Did  they  say  they  would? 

A.  They  demur  a  bit  on  that,  and 
they  take  the  position  that  they  can't  to- 
tally control  what  happens  with  respect 
to  Cuba. 

Q.  Do  you  believe  that? 

A.  We  have  some  difficulty  with 
that.  [Laughter] 

Q.  If  you're  agreeing  to  move  in 
concept  toward  a  summit — toward 
setting  a  date — why?  What  would  be 
the  business,  the  goals,  of  the  next 
summit? 

A.  I  think  it's  important  that  the 
leaders  of  the  Soviet  IJnion  and  the 
United  States  get  together  periodically. 
It  will  have  been  some  time,  if  we're 
looking  at  something  into  next  year — 
and  I'm  not  saying  that  that's  the 
timeframe  we're  going  to  give  you  in 
Wyoming — but  I  think  it's  important 
that  they  get  together  from  time  to  time 
and  talk  about  the  full  range  of  the  prob- 
lems between  these  two  countries. 


jepartment  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


We  have  a  very  broad  agenda.  It's 
broader,  quite  frankly,  than  simply 
arms  control.  A  lot  of  this  meeting  was 
spent  on  regional  conflicts,  and  I  think 
the  President  feels  that  he  could  pro- 
ductively spend  time  talking  about 
these  issues  face  to  face  with  the  leader 
of  the  Soviet  Union. 

Q.  Would  it  be  solely  to  exchange 
ideas  or  to  do  business? 

A.  Let's  first  decide  when,  if,  and 
where  we're  going  to  have  one,  and  then 
we'll  talk  about  what  it  will  accomplish. 

Q.  Was  Yeltsin's  [Boris  Yeltsin,  a 
member  of  the  Soviet  Union's  Con- 
gress of  People's  Deputies]  visit  men- 
tioned or  even  discussed  at  all? 

A.  It  was  indirectly  alluded  to. 

Q.  By  whom? 

A.  I  think  it  was  alluded  to  by  the 
other  side. 

Q.  What  was  said? 

A.  There  are  some  things  that  I'm 
not  going  to  repeat  out  of  that  meeting. 
[Laughter] 

Q.  These  new  twists  you  talk 
about,  can  you  say  whether  these 
would  represent  concessions  of  some 
sort  by  the  Soviets,  or  are  they  simply 
just  a  new  way  of  restating — 

A.  I  think  some  of  them  could  be 
characterized  that  way,  but  I  don't  mean 
to  brand  all  of  them  that  way.  Let  me 
again  say  that  this  is  a  very  serious  let- 
ter. It's  received  by  us  in  a  serious  man- 
ner It  will  require  a  lot  of  detailed 
analysis,  because  it  is  a  very  detailed 
and  technical  letter. 

Q.  Can  you  say  which  area  was 
the  most — 

A.  I  really  don't — I  would  hate  to 
make  that,  because  it  could  be  that  there 
would  be  a  different  area  that  would  be 
more  promising. 

Q.  After  today's  meeting  and  af- 
ter looking  at  Gorbachev's  letter, 
could  you  characterize  where  you 
think  U.S. -Soviet  relations  stand 
right  now,  and  where  you  think 
they're  headed? 


A.  I  think  there  has  been,  in  the  re- 
cent past,  a  general  improvement  in  the 
relationship  between  the  United  States 
and  Soviet  Union.  I  know  we  are  fully 
engaged  across  a  broadened  agenda.  The 
agenda  has  been  broadened,  as  I  said  the 
other  day,  at  the  suggestion  of  the  Unit- 
ed States.  We're  talking  to  the  Soviet 
Union  now  about  things  that  we  never 
dreamed  not  long  ago  that  we  would  be 
talking  to  them  about — counterter- 
rorism,  drugs,  the  environment,  these 
transnational  problems. 

We  are  into  a  great  deal  more  depth 
with  them,  I  think,  on  these  regional  is- 
sues than  we  used  to  be.  I  think  the  rela- 
tionship is  moving  forward  positively. 
Sure  we  have  some  problems  between 
us,  and  this  was  pointed  out  by  both  the 
President  and  the  [Foreign]  Minister 
during  the  course  of  this  discussion. 

Q.  Both  you  and  the  President 
have  said  recently  that  you'd  like  to 
see  perestroika  succeed.  Your  Deputy 
[Secretary  of  State  Lawrence  S. 
Eagleburger]  recently  said  it's  not 
necessary  for  Gorbachev  to  succeed, 
or  at  least  he  indicated  that.  Does  the 
Administration  differentiate  between 
the  two?  Can  perestroika  succeed 
without  Gorbachev? 

A.  That's  a  hypothetical  that  I  don't 
choose  to  answer.  Let  me  simply  put  it 
to  you  this  way.  It  is  the  position  of 
the  President,  the  position  of  the  Ad- 
ministration, that  we  want  perestroika 
to  succeed,  and  we'd  like  to  see  the  Gen- 
eral Secretary  succeed  as  well,  because 
we  think,  frankly,  that  his  success  is 
very  important  in  whether  or  not  per- 
estroika succeeds. 


Arrival  Statements, 
Jackson  Hole, 
Sept.  21, 1989^ 

Secretary  Baker.  I  want  to  tell  you 
how  delighted  I  am  to  be  here  in  this 
wonderful  country.  This  area  has  long 
attracted  me,  and  as  many  of  you  know, 
I  have  decided  to  put  down  a  few  roots 
in  a  ranch  not  too  far  away.  The  Grand 
Teton  National  Park  and  the  town  of 


Jackson  Hole  are  living  tributes,  I 
think,  to  the  foresight  of  Americans, 
who  saw  in  this  natural  beauty  an  en 
during  value  that  should  be  preserve 

Now  we  are  about  to  intrude  on 
this  protected  habitat  with  the  diplo- 
matic concerns  of  the  United  States 
and  the  Soviet  Union.  Yet  we  may  be 
able  to  say  that  we  who  gather  here  a  ) 
have  our  eyes  on  the  future.  We  want ) 
preserve  and  to  strengthen  the  impr( 
ing  international  environment.  We 
want  to  leave  as  a  legacy  for  our  chil- 
dren and  our  children's  children  a  spi  t 
of  openness  between  our  two  countri 
May  I  say,  Mr.  Minister,  that  like  Pa'  i 
Jackson,  who  pioneered  here  so  loii,t;- 
ago,  we  hope  to  clear  new  paths  and  4 
plore  new  territory  in  the  search  for 
better  relations. 

And  now,  ladies  and  gentlemen,   [ 
please  accept  our  thanks  for  this  ver 
warm  welcome,  and  we  look  forward 
an  enjoyable  and  productive  time  her 
Thank  you  all,  very  much. 

Foreign  Minister  Shevardnadze 

First  of  all,  I  would  like  to  thank  the 
Secretary  of  State  whose  kind  invita 
tion  is  making  it  possible  for  us  to  ho 
these  negotiations  in  such  unusual  coi 
ditions.  We  are  grateful  to  the  authoi 
ties  of  the  State  of  Wyoming  for  theii 
hospitality  and  to  the  many  members 
of  the  press  for  the  great  interest  tha 
they  are  showing  toward  our  meeting 

Today  a  good  beginning  has  been 
given  to  our  work.  We  had  a  meeting 
with  President  George  Bush,  to  whor 
we  have  conveyed  the  letter  from  Mik 
hail  Gorbachev  dealing  with  importai 
problems  of  arms  control  and  arms  re 
duction.  I  think  that  I  will  e.xpress  th 
common  view  if  I  say  that,  today,  we 
see  the  emergence  of  fairly  good  pros 
pects  for  moving  forward  in  that  ver> 
important  area  and  in  other  areas  of 
the  Soviet-American  relationship. 

I  also  think  that  today  we  see  son 
good  prerequisites  for  bringing  our  r 
lationship  to  a  qualitatively  new  level, 
and  I  hope  that  the  coming  days  will 
move  us  closer  to  that  goal.  We  need 
fresh  ideas,  and,  hopefully,  the  fresh 
mountain  air  of  Wyoming  will  help 
them  to  emerge  and  to  develop.  We 
need  specific  deeds  for  the  benefit  of 
both  sides,  and  as  I  understand  from 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  191 


Wyoming  Ministerial 


r  conversation  with  the  President  and 
%m  my  talk  with  the  Secretary  of 
ate  aboard  the  plane,  the  American 
ie  believes  that  too.  I  hope  that  by 
;b  time  our  negotiations  end,  we  will 
:i  able  to  report  to  you  some  important 
gotiations,  and  we  will  be  able  to  re- 
rt  to  you  some  important  agree- 
!nts,  because  were  it  to  turn  out  that 
have  gone  this  far  just  to  talk,  that 
uld  be  just  unforgivable,  and,  there- 
\e,  we  are  looking  forward  to  results. 
j    Thank  you  for  your  welcome, 
iank  you  for  the  warm  reception. 


acretary's  Statement, 
enary  Session, 
ickson  Hole, 
jpt.  22, 1989^ 

t  me  begin  by  welcoming  you  and 
Ijr  party  here  to  Wyoming.  Obvi- 
lily  it's  somewhat  unusual  to  hold  a 
jnisterial  in  a  place  like  this,  but 

s,  I  think,  is  in  keeping  with  our 
'icussions  in  Moscow  about  moving 
|;  site  of  the  ministerials  outside  of 
ir  nation's  capitals. 

I  hope  you  can  see  this  morning 
ly  I  happen  to  love  this  area  and  this 
:ting,  and  I  think  it's  one  of  the  most 
autiful  and  majestic  parts  of  the 
nerican  West,  and  I  wanted  you  and 
ur  party  to  have  an  opportunity  to 
b  that. 

I  also  think  that  there  is  something 
mbolic  about  a  meeting  in  this  kind 
'unusual  place.  I  really  believe  that 
lations  between  the  United  States 
;d  the  Soviet  Union  are  entering  a 
[w  phase.  I  believe,  and  I  think  most 
iiuld  agree,  that  there  is  a  new  open- 
ss  and  candor  in  our  relationship, 
d  I  think,  hopefully,  we'll  be  able 

take  some  steps  that  are  unprece- 
nted.  So  it  shouldn't  be  unusual  for 

to  take  the  unprecedented  step  of 
eeting  in  a  place  like  this. 


Joint  Statement, 
Sept.  23, 1989 

Secretary  of  State  James  A.  Baker,  III, 
and  Foreign  Minister  Eduard  A.  Shev- 
ardnadze met  September  22-23  [1989]  in 
Jackson  Hole,  Wyoming,  for  discus- 
sions on  the  entire  spectrum  of  U.S.- 
Soviet relations,  in  the  course  of  the 
Foreign  Minister's  official  visit  to  the 
United  States. 

The  Foreign  Minister  also  had  a 
discussion  with  President  Bush  on  Sep- 
tember 21  at  the  White  House,  where 
he  delivered  a  letter  from  Chairman 
Gorbachev  which  contained  new  ideas 
and  proposals  on  security  questions. 
They  had  a  wide-ranging  e.xchange  of 
views  on  the  overall  direction  and 
prospects  for  development  of  the 
U.S. -Soviet  relationship. 

The  two  sides  attach  great  signifi- 
cance to  contacts  between  U.S.  and  So- 
viet leaders  in  the  development  of  the 
U.S. -Soviet  dialogue  at  this  important 
and  promising  point  in  U.S. -Soviet  re- 
lations. Based  on  earlier  understand- 
ings between  President  Bush  and 
Chairman  Gorbachev,  the  sides  agreed 
that  the  next  U.S. -Soviet  summit 
meeting  will  take  place  in  the  United 
States  in  late  spring-early  summer 
1990. 

Both  sides  agree  that  their  com- 
mon goal  is  to  build  a  more  stable,  con- 
structive, and  sustainable  relationship, 
one  in  which  openness  and  cooperation 
increasingly  replace  mistrust  and  com- 
petition. While  significant  differences 
remain  on  certain  issues,  the  Secre- 
tary and  the  Foreign  Minister  believe 
that — with  continuing  efforts  and 
shared  commitment  to  a  candid  dia- 
logue aimed  at  finding  practical  and 
concrete  solutions — it  will  be  possible 
to  further  and  broaden  the  progress 
that  has  been  made  in  recent  years  in 
U.S. -Soviet  relations. 

Toward  this  end,  the  discussions  in 
Jackson  Hole  were  productive  and  seri- 
ous. They  were  complemented  by  the 
efforts  of  experts'  working  groups  on 
all  parts  of  the  five-part  agenda,  both 
in  Wyoming  and  preceding  the  minis- 
terial in  Washington.  The  Secretary 


and  the  Foreign  Minister  reached  spe- 
cific agreements  in  several  areas  and 
defined  new  directions  for  work  in 
other  areas. 

I.  The  Secretary  and  the  Foreign 
Minister  held  a  thorough  and  produc- 
tive review  on  the  range  of  arms  con- 
trol and  disarmament  issues.  They 
noted  with  satisfaction  that,  since  their 
May  meeting  in  Moscow,  the  nuclear 
and  space  talks,  nuclear  testing  talks, 
and  bilateral  consultations  on  chemical 
weapons  have  resumed. 

The  Secretary  and  the  Foreign 
Minister  had  a  detailed  discussion  of 
nuclear  and  space  issues,  including  the 
ideas  contained  in  the  letters  ex- 
changed by  President  Bush  and  Chair- 
man Gorbachev. 

Regarding  ABM  [antiballistic  mis- 
siles] and  space,  the  Soviet  side  in- 
troduced a  new  approach  aimed  at 
resolving  this  significant  issue.  Both 
sides  agree  that  the  Soviet  approach 
opens  the  way  to  achieving  and  imple- 
menting a  START  [strategic  arms  re- 
duction talks]  treaty  without  reaching 
a  defense  and  space  agreement.  The 
sides  agreed  to  drop  the  approach  of  a 
nonwithdrawal  commitment  while  con- 
tinuing to  discuss  ways  to  ensure  pre- 
dictability in  the  development  of  the 
U.S. -Soviet  strategic  relationship  un- 
der conditions  of  strategic  stability  to 
reduce  the  risk  of  nuclear  war.  The 
U.S.  side  said  it  would  consider  care- 
fully the  other  aspects  of  the  overall 
Soviet  approach.  Both  sides  agreed 
that  their  negotiators  would  consider 
these  issues  in  Geneva.  They  also 
agreed  that  the  negotiators  would  dis- 
cuss the  U.S.  invitation  for  Soviet 
Government  experts  to  visit  two  U.S. 
facilities  involved  in  strategic  defense 
research. 

The  Soviet  side  stated  that,  guided 
by  its  longstanding  goal  of  strengthen- 
ing the  ABM  Treaty  regime,  it  had  de- 
cided to  completely  dismantle  the 
Krasnoyarsk  radar  station.  The  U.S. 
side  expressed  satisfaction  with  this 
announcement. 


apartment  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


At  the  same  time,  the  Soviet  side 
stressed  again  the  necessity  of  remov- 
ing its  concerns  about  the  U.S.  radar 
stations  in  Greenland  and  Great  Brit- 
ain. The  U.S.  side  promised  to  consider 
these  concerns,  in  consultation  with  its 
allies. 

In  the  interest  of  promoting  prog- 
ress in  the  negotiations,  the  Secretary 
announced  that  the  U.S.  side  was  with- 
drawing its  proposal  to  ban  mobile 
ICBMs  [intercontinental  ballistic  mis- 
siles] in  START,  contingent  on  the 
funding  by  the  U.S.  Congress  of  U.S. 
mobile  ICBMs.  The  Soviet  side  ex- 
pressed satisfaction  with  this  announce- 
ment, and  the  two  sides  agreed  on  the 
need  further  to  develop  provisions  for 
effective  verification  for  limits  on  mo- 
bile ICBMs.  In  this  connection,  they 
also  reached  agreement  on  additional 
elements  of  common  ground  regarding 
the  verification  of  mobile  ICBMs, 
building  on  the  elements  agreed  at  the 
Moscow  summit  and  subsequent  work 
in  Geneva. 

Both  sides  noted  the  need  to  re- 
solve the  ALCM  [air-launched  cruise 
missile]  and  SLCM  [sea-launched 
cruise  missile]  issues.  On  ALCMs,  the 
Soviet  side  put  forward  a  new  idea  con- 
cerning its  approach  on  how  to  deal 
with  ALCMs  and  heavy  bombers. 

On  SLCMs,  the  Soviet  side  offered 
new  approaches  for  dealing  with  this 
difficult  problem.  The  Soviet  side 
raised  the  possibility  of  dealing  with 
SLCMs  in  a  broader  naval  arms  con- 
text. As  for  the  nuclear  and  space 
talks,  the  Soviet  side  appealed  to  the 
American  side  to  concentrate  on  veri- 
fication and  said  that  in  the  context  of  a 
verification  system  for  SLCMs,  these 
weapons  could  be  limited  outside  of  the 
text  of  a  START  treaty  on  the  basis  of 
reciprocal  obligations.  While  reiterat- 
ing its  willingness  to  study  the  Soviet 
ideas,  the  U.S.  side,  for  its  part,  em- 
phasized its  doubts  about  the  feasibility 
of  a  workable  verification  system  for 
SLCMs  and  noted  its  longstanding 
view  that  there  are  serious  problems 
involved  in  any  discussion  of  the  limita- 
tion of  naval  arms. 


Foreign  Minister  Shevardnadze  and  his  advisers 


The  Soviet  side  responded  pos- 
itively to  President  Bush's  June  initia- 
tive on  verification  and  stability 
measures.  In  this  regard,  the  Secre- 
tary and  the  Foreign  Minister  had  a 
thorough  exchange  on  the  details  of  the 
initiative  and  signed  an  agreement  en- 
couraging the  development  of  such 
measures  and  outlining  principles  for 
implementing  them.  They  also  com- 
pleted an  agreement  on  the  advance 
notification  of  major  strategic  exer- 
cises. The  sides  examined  the  other 
verification  and  stability  measures 
and  agreed  to  explore  these  further 
in  Geneva. 

The  sides  also  agreed  that,  for  pur- 
poses of  the  1,600  START  limit,  ballis- 
tic missiles  will  be  defined  in  terms  of 
missiles  and  their  associated  launchers, 
thus  resolving  a  longstanding  issue. 

New  instructions  will  be  issued  to 
negotiators  to  take  account  of  the  ex- 
changes on  these  and  other  START 
issues. 

The  Secretary  and  the  Foreign 
Minister  reaffirmed  the  objective  of 
early  conclusion  of  a  comprehensive, 
verifiable,  and  truly  global  ban  on 
chemical  weapons.  To  intensify  efforts 
toward  this  goal,  and  to  enhance  open- 
ness and  confidence  between  the  two 
countries,  they  signed  a  Memorandum 
of  Understanding  on  a  bilateral  veri- 
fication experiment  and  data  exchange. 


The  MOU  provides  for  an  exchange  o 
data  on  U.S.  and  Soviet  chemical  we:i 
ons  stockpiles  and  for  visits  and  insp  ■ 
tions  of  chemical  weapons  sites. 

The  sides  adopted  a  special  joint 
statement  on  chemical  weapons  in 
which  they  stressed  the  need  to  con- 
clude a  chemical  weapons  ban  and  un 
derscored  their  concern  about  the 
problem  posed  by  the  proliferation  of 
chemical  weapons. 

The  Secretary  and  the  Foreign 
Minister  examined  the  status  of  the  i 
clear  testing  negotiations.  They  note 
that  the  verification  protocol  for  the 
1976  Peaceful  Nuclear  Explosions  Tn- 
ty  has  been  agreed,  ad  referendum,  1 
their  negotiators  and  reached  agree- 
ment to  incorporate  hydrodynamic  ai 
seismic  monitoring,  as  well  as  on-site 
inspection,  into  the  verification  protc 
col  for  the  1974  Threshold  Test  Ban 
Treaty,  as  well  as  the  levels  above 
which  these  measurements  would  oc- 
cur. In  order  to  obtain  a  statistically 
significant  number  of  data  points  to  i 
prove  the  national  technical  means  of 
each  side,  each  side  will  guarantee  th 
other  side  the  right  to  make  on-site  h; 
drodynamic  yield  measurements  of  at 
least  two  tests  per  year  during  the 
first  5  years  following  ratification  of 
this  treaty.  After  5  years,  each  side 
shall  guarantee  one  such  hydrodynan' 
measurement  a  year  thereafter  unles 
otherwise  agreed  by  the  two  sides. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  19' 


Wyoming  Ministerial 


Tetary  Baker  and  his  advisers. 


ese  agreements  provide  a  framework 
conclusion  of  the  verification  proto- 
s,  completing  a  process  that  began 
years  ago.  They  instructed  their  del- 
itions  to  continue  intensive  work  to 
■olve  all  remaining  issues  so  that 
•se  two  documents  can  be  submitted 
ratification  as  quickly  as  possible. 

The  Secretary  and  the  Foreign 
nister  noted  with  approval  the  work 
ng  done  in  the  negotiations  on  con- 
itional  forces  in  Europe  and  called 
I  rapid  conclusion  of  an  agreement. 
;   The  Secretary  and  the  Foreign 
nister  agreed  in  principle  to  the 
|)en  skies"  concept  proposed  by  Presi- 
'it  Bush  in  May,  which  could  make  a 
luine  contribution  to  openness  and 
iifidence-building.  They  noted  their 
'llingness  to  attend  an  international 
iference  on  the  subject. 

The  sides  noted  the  importance  of 
int  efforts  by  the  United  States  and 
K  Soviet  Union  to  prevent  the  prolif- 
iition  of  missiles  and  missile  technol- 
y  and  agreed  to  activate  bilateral 
isultations  on  this  pressing  problem. 

II.  The  Secretary  and  the  Foreign 
nister  had  a  thorough  and  frank  ex- 
inge  on  regional  issues.  The  sides  re- 
irmed  their  belief  that  active  U.S. 
d  Soviet  support  for  political  solu- 
ns  that  are  comprehensive  and  based 
broad  national  reconciliation  could 
ilitate  the  peaceful  resolution  of  I'e- 
mal  conflicts  around  the  world.  They 


noted  that  the  two  sides  continue  to 
differ  on  some  specific  aspects  of  the 
question  of  arms  supplies  and  their 
effect  on  the  possibility  of  political 
settlements. 

They  noted  that  a  cycle  of  regional 
experts'  discussions  had  been  held  on 
Central  America,  Afghanistan,  Africa, 
the  Middle  East,  and  East  Asia,  South- 
east Asia,  and  the  Pacific.  Both  sides 
found  these  discussions  useful  for  un- 
derstanding one  another's  views  and 
agreed  to  continue  experts'  meetings 
in  the  future. 

The  sides  expressed  their  support 
for  efforts  by  the  Central  American 
countries  to  establish  a  lasting  peace 
in  that  region  on  the  basis  of  the  Es- 
quipulas  treaty  and  subsequent  agree- 
ments, which  include  a  commitment  not 
to  permit  the  use  of  their  territory  to 
support  those  seeking  to  destabilize 
other  Central  American  countries. 
While  noting  their  differences  on  cer- 
tain questions,  including  the  level  of 
arms  flows  to  the  region,  they  called  on 
all  interested  parties  to  support  this 
process  actively  by  respecting  in  full 
the  letter  and  spirit  of  the  accords 
signed  by  the  leaders  of  the  five  Cen- 
tral American  countries.  They  also 
called  upon  all  states  outside  the  region 
to  respect  the  request  by  the  Central 
American  countries  to  end  all  military 
assistance  to  irregular  or  insurgent 
forces. 


The  two  sides  agreed  on  the  need 
for  a  political  settlement  in  Afghani- 
stan on  the  basis  of  national  reconcilia- 
tion, one  that  ensures  the  peaceful, 
independent,  and  nonaligned  status  of 
Afghanistan.  While  their  approaches 
differ  over  how  to  translate  these  prin- 
ciples into  reality,  they,  nevertheless, 
agreed  that  a  transition  period  is  re- 
quired, as  well  as  an  appropriate 
mechanism  to  establish  a  broad-based 
government.  The  sides  reaffirmed 
their  commitment  to  the  Geneva  ac- 
cords on  Afghanistan. 

The  sides  reaffirmed  their  support 
for  an  active  Middle  East  peace  proc- 
ess. Among  other  issues,  they  also  ex- 
changed views  on  the  place  in  that 
process  of  an  Israeli-Palestinian  dia- 
logue leading  to  a  comprehensive  set- 
tlement of  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict 
in  which  all  relevant  parties  will 
participate. 

The  Secretary  and  the  Foreign 
Minister  expressed  in  a  separate  joint 
statement  their  strong  support  for  the 
Arab  League  Tripartite  Committee 
plan  on  Lebanon  to  bring  about  a  cease- 
fire, a  lifting  of  the  blockade,  and  a 
dialogue  among  the  Lebanese  parties 
aimed  at  achieving  a  political  settle- 
ment. They  condemned  the  taking  of 
hostages  and  called  for  the  immediate 
release  of  all  hostages. 

The  Secretary  and  the  Foreign 
Minister  advocated  a  comprehensive 
political  settlement  in  Cambodia  and  a 
continuation  of  the  negotiation  process 
toward  this  end.  At  this  stage,  they 
feel  it  is  most  important  to  take  efforts 
to  avert  intensification  of  the  civil  war 
and  the  return  of  the  Pol  Pot  regime  to 
power.  The  sides  declared  their  readi- 
ness to  announce,  together  with  other 
states,  a  moratorium  on  military 
assistance  to  all  Cambodian  factions  as 
part  of  a  comprehensive  settlement. 

The  Secretary  and  the  Foreign 
Minister  agreed  on  the  need  to  imple- 
ment fully  and  on  schedule  the  UN  plan 
for  the  granting  of  independence  to 
Namibia,  including  the  holding  of  free 
and  fair  elections.  They  expressed  their 
support  for  the  national  reconciliation 


partment  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


process  in  Angola  and  for  efforts  to 
secure  peace  and  stability  in  Mozam- 
bique. The  sides  also  advocated  a 
peaceful,  political  solution  to  the  inter- 
nal conflicts  in  Ethiopia  and  supported 
the  negotiation  process  underway  be- 
tween the  Ethiopian  Government  and 
the  Eritrean  People's  Liberation  Front. 

III.  Within  the  framework  of  the 
ongoing  U.S. -Soviet  dialogue  on  human 
rights  and  humanitarian  affairs,  the 
Secretary  and  the  Foreign  Minister 
held  a  constructive  discussion  of  a 
broad  range  of  human  rights  and  hu- 
manitarian issues,  including  the  role  of 
international  accords  and  generally  ac- 
cepted standards  in  the  field  of  human 
rights  and  of  the  Helsinki  Final  Act 
and  other  CSCE  [Conference  on  Securi- 
ty and  Cooperation  in  Europe]  agree- 
ments. Specific  reference  was  made  to 
policies  and  cases  of  exit  and  entry, 
freedom  of  conscience,  criminal  prac- 
tices concerning  which  questions  had 
been  raised  and  on  which  information 
will  be  e.xchanged.  The  Secretary  and 
the  Foreign  Minister  agreed  to  work  to 
move  forward  on  a  range  of  programs 
that  will  promote  a  better  understand- 
ing of  each  other's  institutions,  legisla- 
tion, and  practices  which  affect  human 
rights  and  humanitarian  issues. 

IV.  The  Secretary  and  the  Foreign 
Minister  discussed  a  range  of  questions 
related  to  the  other  two  parts  of  the 
agenda,  bilateral  and  transnational  is- 
sues. They  signed  two  agreements:  The 
Agreement  Between  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  of  America  and  the 
Government  of  the  Union  of  Soviet  So- 
cialist Republics  Concerning  Mutual 
Visits  Between  Inhabitants  of  the  Ber- 
ing Straits  Region  and  the  Agreement 
Between  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  of  America  and  the  Government 
of  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Repub- 
lics Concerning  the  Bering  Straits  Re- 
gional Commission. 

A  U.S.-U.S.S.R.  joint  statement 
was  also  signed  on  a  uniform  inter- 
pretation of  rules  of  international  law 
governing  innocent  passage  through 
territorial  waters,  which  removes  a  po- 
tential source  of  friction  in  the  relation- 


ship between  the  two  countries.  They 
endorsed  a  working  paper  containing 
proposals  for  e.xtending  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  International  Court  of  Justice.  In 
furtherance  of  this,  the  sides  have 
agreed  to  approach  the  three  other  per- 
manent members  of  the  United  Nations 
Security  Council  with  a  proposal  to  dis- 
cuss this  question. 

U.S.  and  Soviet  experts  together 
elaborated  an  approach  for  resolution  of 
the  Northern  Pacific  maritime  bound- 
ary issue.  The  Secretary  and  the  For- 
eign Minister  directed  the  experts  to 
meet  again  soon  to  complete  their  work 
on  this  basis. 

The  two  sides  agreed  to  start  talks 
regarding  the  possible  expansion  of  air 
routes  between  the  two  countries. 

In  connection  with  the  virtually 
completed  agreement  on  cooperation  in 
the  field  of  peaceful  uses  of  atomic  en- 
ergy, it  was  decided  to  accelerate  com- 
pletion of  proposals  aimed  at  drawing 
up  a  new  agreement  on  cooperation  in 
the  field  of  non-nuclear  energy. 

The  sides  reached  agreement  in 
principle  that  U.S.  and  Soviet  cultural 
and  information  centers  would  be 
opened  in  Moscow  and  Washington, 
respectively. 

The  Secretary  and  the  Foreign 
Minister  approved  a  bilateral  work 
program. 

The  sides  also  discussed  matters 
connected  with  implementation  of  the 
U.S. -Soviet  Memorandum  of  Under- 
standing signed  in  January  1989  re- 
garding cooperation  in  combating  the 
flow  of  illegal  narcotics.  They  ex- 
pressed readiness  to  consider  new 
ideas  for  bilateral  and  international 
cooperation  in  this  field.  They  agreed 
that  experts  from  both  sides  would 
meet  in  Moscow  before  the  end  of  1989 
to  discuss  concrete  proposals. 

The  two  sides  conducted  an  exten- 
sive discussion  on  the  problem  of  com- 
bating international  terrorism  and 
agreed  in  principle  that  experts  would 
meet  again  in  early  1990. 

The  two  sides  underscored  the  de- 
sirability of  intensifying  contacts  be- 
tween high-level  elected  and  appointed 
officials  in  a  variety  of  areas. 

They  devoted  special  attention  to 
continued  and  new  cooperation  on  a 
range  of  bilateral  and  international  en- 


vironmental problems,  including  glob 

and  climate  change,  as  well  as  the 
problem  of  various  sources  of  pollutioi 

The  two  sides  confirmed  their  in- 
tent to  conclude  an  agreement  on  coo) 
eration  on  study  of  the  world  oceans  b 
the  end  of  this  year  and  to  continue 
their  work  of  preparing  an  agreemen 
on  cooperation  in  the  field  of  housing 
and  other  types  of  construction. 

The  two  sides  agreed  to  consult 
and  cooperate  with  the  goal  of  increai 
ing  the  effectiveness  of  the  UN. 

The  Secretary  and  the  Foreign 
Minister  agreed  on  the  necessity  of 
continuing  the  search  for  new  sphere 
of  joint  action  directed  at  qualitative 
movement  on  bilateral  and  transnatio 
al  issues  in  U.S. -Soviet  relations. 

A  detailed  discussion  took  place, 
including  with  the  participation  of  ex.' 
perts,  on  a  range  of  economic  ques- 
tions. It  was  agreed  that  these  useful 
discussions  will  be  continued. 

Both  sides  confirmed  the  utility 
conducting  regular  meetings  at  the 
ministerial  level  for  considering  and 
solving  major  problems  of  U.S.-Sovie 
cooperation. 


Joint  Statement 

on  Chemical  Weapons, 
Sept.  23, 1989 

During  their  September  22-23  meetil 
in  Jackson  Hole,  Wyoming,  Secretary 
of  State  James  A.  Baker,  III  and  For- 
eign Minister  Eduard  A.  Shevardnad; 
reaffirmed  the  commitment  of  the 
United  States  and  the  U.S.S.R.  to  pu 
sue  aggressively  the  prohibition  of 
chemical  weapons  and  the  destructioi 
of  all  stockpiles  of  such  weapons  on  th 
basis  of  a  comprehensive,  effectively 
verifiable,  and  truly  global  ban.  Both 
sides  consider  the  early  conclusion  an 
entry  into  force  of  a  convention  to  thi 
effect  to  be  one  of  the  highest  priorit. 
for  the  international  community.  The} 
believe  that  with  the  active  and  con- 
structive participation  of  all  states,  it 
will  be  possible  to  resolve  expeditious 
the  remaining  issues  and  to  conclude 
the  convention  at  the  earliest  date  am 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  19< 


Wyoming  Ministerial 


11  upon  all  parties  to  the  negotiations 
join  them  in  achieving  this  objective. 
!     The  two  sides  also  believe  that 
reater  openness  between  them  and 
bong  others  could  contribute  to  the 
rospects  for  reaching  an  early  agree- 
lent  on  an  effective  ban  on  chemical 
eapons.  As  a  concrete  expression  of 
le  commitment  of  their  two  countries 
ward  this  end,  the  Secretary  of  State 
\d  the  Foreign  Minister  signed  a 
emorandum  of  Understanding  re- 
Srding  a  bilateral  verification  experi- 
ent  and  data  exchange.  The  steps 
;i'ied  upon  in  the  Memorandum  are 
itended  to  facilitate  the  process  of  ne- 
)tiation,  signature,  and  ratification  of 
comprehensive,  effectively  verifiable, 
id  truly  global  convention  on  the  pro- 
bition  and  destruction  of  chemical 
eapons. 

The  verification  experiment  and 
it  a  exchange  will  be  conducted  in  two 
lases.  Phase  I  involves  the  exchange 
general  data  on  the  sides'  chemical 
ea])(ins  capabilities  and  a  series  of  vis- 
>  t(i  relevant  military  and  civil  facili- 
^s  on  their  respective  territories.  In 
nase  II,  the  sides  will  exchange  de- 
iled  data  and  permit  on-site  inspec- 
ons  to  verify  the  accuracy  of  the 
formation  exchanged. 
I     The  sides  also  agreed  to  undertake 
Icooperative  effort  with  respect  to  the 
astruction  of  chemical  weapons.  They 
jjreed  to  reciprocal  visits  to  monitor 
3st  ruction  operations  of  the  other  side 
id  to  the  exchange  of  information  on 
ast,  current,  and  planned  destruction 
"tivities  and  procedures. 

The  sides  noted  their  agreement  on 
ime  procedures  for  conducting  chal- 
■nge  inspections  and  on  the  provisions 
overning  the  order  of  destruction  of 
lemical  weapons  and  of  chemical 
eapons  production  facilities.  These 
Ko  approaches  will  be  introduced  into 
le  multilateral  negotiations  in  Geneva 
1  an  effort  to  contribute  to  those  nego- 
atinns.  They  also  stressed  the  need  to 
jncentrate  in  the  near  future  on  re- 
living remaining  verification-related 
•sufs.  The  two  sides  intend  to  pursue 
itensively  their  bilateral  discussions 
n  a  chemical  weapons  ban  with  the 
lew  to  help  achieve  further  progress 
1  the  multilateral  negotiations. 


The  Secretary  of  State  and  the 
Foreign  Minister  expressed  their  grave 
concern  about  the  growing  danger  posed 
to  international  peace  and  security  by 
the  risk  of  the  illegal  use  of  chemical 
weapons  as  long  as  such  weapons  exist 
and  are  spread.  They  reaffirmed  the 
importance  of  and  their  commitment  to 
the  final  declaration  of  the  Paris  con- 
ference on  the  prohibition  of  chemical 
weapons  held  earlier  this  year  as  well 
as  their  commitment  to  the  1925  Geneva 
protocol.  The  two  sides  emphasized  the 
obligation  of  all  states  not  to  use  chemi- 
cal weapons  in  violation  of  international 
law  and  urged  that  prompt  and  effec- 
tive measures  be  taken  by  the  interna- 
tional community  if  that  obligation  is 
violated.  In  this  regard,  they  under- 
scored their  support  for  the  UN  Secre- 
tary General  in  investigating  reports  of 
violations  of  the  Geneva  protocol  or  oth- 
er relevant  rules  of  customary  interna- 
tional law. 

The  sides  welcomed  Australia's 
convening  of  a  Government-Industry 
Conference  Against  Chemical  Weapons, 
which  has  just  concluded  in  Canberra. 
They  noted  that  this  conference  pro- 
vided an  important  opportunity  for  se- 
rious discussion  between  government 
and  industry  representatives  from 
around  the  world.  The  sides  expressed 
satisfaction  with  the  extensive  and  pro- 
ductive work  accomplished  at  the  con- 
ference and  the  positive  results 
reflected  in  the  chairman's  final 
summary  statement. 

Finally  the  sides  expressed  the 
view  that  a  truly  global,  comprehen- 
sive, and  effectively  verifiable  ban  on 
chemical  weapons  is  the  best  means  to 
address  the  threat  posed  by  the  spread 
of  chemical  weapons  on  a  durable  long- 
term  basis.  In  the  meantime,  the  sides 
emphasized  their  readiness  to  attempt 
to  prevent  the  proliferation  of  chemical 
weapons.  They  intend  to  continue  con- 
sultations on  this  issue. 


Joint  Statement 
on  Lebanon, 
Sept.  23, 1989 

While  expressing  their  deep  concern 
over  the  absence  of  peace  and  a  settle- 
ment in  Lebanon,  the  United  States 
and  the  Soviet  Union  reaffirm  their  ur- 
gent appeal  to  take  all  necessary  meas- 
ures to  bring  to  an  end  the  sufferings 
of  the  Lebanese  people  and  urge  a  con- 
tinued search  for  a  political  solution  of 
the  Lebanese  crisis.  They  reaffirm  the 
assumption  that  there  is  no  military  so- 
lution to  the  problems  of  that  country. 
A  constructive  dialogue  between 
Lebanese,  who  themselves  must  reach 
lasting  agreements  on  peaceful  ar- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


rangements  in  Lebanon  on  the  basis  of 
a  balance  of  interests,  is  the  only  ration- 
al path  toward  national  reconciliation. 

The  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  welcome  the  resumption  of  the 
peacemaking  mission  of  the  Tripartite 
Committee  of  the  Arab  League  on 
Lebanon  in  accordance  with  the  man- 
date entrusted  to  it  by  the  Casablanca 
Arab  summmit  and  the  committee's  ef- 
forts aimed  at  a  cease-fire,  the  lifting 
of  blockades,  and  initiation  of  the  proc- 
ess of  political  settlement.  They  call 
upon  all  the  parties  involved  in 
Lebanese  affairs  to  respond  positively 
to  these  efforts  and  to  do  their  utmost 
to  support  the  Tripartite  Committee's 
action  to  complete  its  work  success- 
fully. They  also  note  the  importance  of 
extending  strong  international  support 
for  the  activities  of  the  Tripartite  Com- 
mittee and,  for  their  own  part,  intend 
to  proceed  further  in  this  direction. 
Both  sides  reaffirm  their  resolute  posi- 
tion in  favor  of  preserving  the  sover- 
eignty, territorial  integrity,  and 
independence  of  the  Lebanese  state. 

The  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  condemn  any  acts  of  taking  hos- 
tages and  demand  that  they  be  set  free 
no  matter  where  or  by  whom  they  are 
held  captive. 


Secretary's 

News  Conference, 
Jackson  Hole, 
Sept.  23, 19895 

I  really  would  like  to  first  thank  the 
people  of  Wyoming  for  letting  us  share 
this  majestic  location  for  a  few  days. 

The  openness  of  this  setting,  I 
think,  epitomizes  the  new  nature  of  our 
talks  with  the  Soviet  Union.  I  believe 
the  U.S. -Soviet  relationship  is  entering 
a  fresh  phase.  We  have,  in  my  view, 
moved  from  confrontation  to  dialogue 
and  now  to  cooperation — ^joint  action 
on  common  problems,  across  a  broad 
range  of  topics  on  our  five-part  agenda. 


This  has  been  a  productive  minis- 
terial. In  fact,  [Foreign]  Minister  Shev- 
ardnadze told  me  today  that  in  his  view 
this  ministerial  was  unique  from  the 
standpoint  both  of  context  and  content. 

Our  flight  to  Wyoming,  when  we 
discussed  the  challenges  of  the  nation- 
alities problem  and  perestroika,  set  a 
tone  of  openness  for  our  subsequent 
meetings.  We  followed  with  U.S.  pro- 
posals for  "open  skies"  and  open  lands, 
a  human  rights  work  program  to  sup- 
port the  development  of  a  more  open 
Soviet  society,  our  initiative  for  great- 
er environmental  cooperation  including 
exchanges,  and  a  new  discussion  of  the 
economic  changes  taking  place  within 
the  Soviet  Union. 

We  also  took  a  series  of  steps 
across  the  full  arms  control  agenda  to 
overcome  old  misconceptions  and  build 
trust.  In  fact,  [Foreign]  Minister  Shev- 
ardnadze also  told  me  that  he  thought 
we  made  more  progress  across  the  full 
range  of  arms  control  issues  than  in 
any  prior  ministerial  which  he  had 
attended. 

We  have  translated  this  new  spirit 
of  openness  into  some  concrete  achieve- 
ments, too. 

First,  the  Soviets  said  they  have 
dropped  their  linkage  between  com- 
pleting and  implementing  agreement 
on  START  and  achieving  a  defense  and 
space  accord.  I  made  clear  that  the 
President  remains  committed  to  the 
Strategic  Defense  Initiative  (SDI)  and 
offered  the  Soviets  the  opportunity  to 
visit  SDI  research  facilities. 

Second,  the  Soviets  agreed  to  dis- 
mantle their  radar  at  Krasnoyarsk 
without  preconditions. 

Third,  we  broke  a  15-year  deadlock 
by  agreeing  on  the  full  verification  re- 
gime for  the  nuclear  testing  treaties. 
This  provides  a  detailed  framework  for 
the  possible  completion  of  these  trea- 
ties next  year. 

Fourth,  we  signed  a  Memorandum 
of  Understanding  on  chemical  weapons 
data  exchange  and  verification  tests,  a 
good,  realistic  step  toward  addressing 
the  larger  task  of  completing  an  effec- 
tively verifiable  ban  on  chemical 
weapons. 


1 


I 


Fifth,  our  willingness  to  lift  the 
ban  on  mobile  ICBMs,  contingent  on 
congressional  approval  of  funding  for 
the  U.S.  mobile  ICBM  programs,  mad 
it  possible.  I  think,  for  us  to  move 
ahead  on  developing  verification  meas 
ures  for  mobile  missiles. 

Sixth,  based  on  President  Bush's 
June  proposals,  we  signed  an  umbrelh 
agreement  on  START  verification  anc 
stability  measures,  as  well  as  a  sepa- 
rate agreement  on  notification  of  stra 
tegic  forces  exercises. 

Seventh,  the  Soviets  agreed  to 
President  Bush's  proposal  to  explore 
the  details  of  an  "open  skies"  regime 
at  an  international  conference. 

Eighth,  we  explored  new  ideas 
about  resolving  a  number  of  regional 
conflicts.  In  particular,  I  believe  we 
share  a  view  on  the  importance  of  fre^ 
and  fair  elections  in  Nicaragua  and  or 
stopping  support  for  subversion  in  El 
Salvador.  We  also  both  support  effort; 
to  promote  a  Palestinian-Israeli  dia- 
logue. And  we  condemn  hostage-takin 
while  supporting  the  immediate  re- 
lease of  the  hostages  held  in  Lebanon. 

Ninth,  we  followed  up  on  the  en- 
couraging efforts  by  the  Soviets  to  pe 
mit  refuseniks  and  others  to  emigrate 
freely.  We've  also  developed  a  new  hu- 
man rights  work  program  placing  in- 
creased emphasis  on  exchanges  that 
could  promote  the  institutions  that 
should  protect  human  rights  in  the 
Soviet  Union. 

All  in  all,  we  got  a  lot  of  work  don 
We  want  to  keep  on  going  and  we  shall 

In  that  connection,  as  you  know  b; 
now,  President  Bush  and  President 
Gorbachev  have  agreed  to  hold  a  sum- 
mit meeting  in  the  late  spring  or  earl^ 
summer  of  next  year.  [Foreign]  Minis- 
ter Shevardnadze  and  I  will,  of  course 
be  meeting  in  advance  to  try  and  mak' 
that  summit  as  productive  as  possible. 

Before  I  close,  I  want  to  make  one' 
final  announcement.  President  Bush 
intends  to  offer  a  new  initiative  at  the 
United  Nations  on  Monday  that  will 
move  the  world  closer  to  a  ban  on  chem 
ical  weapons.  The  President  believes 
that  U.S.  leadership  is  necessary  to 
turn  good  intentions  into  a  historic 
achievement. 


10 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  igSU 


Wyoming  Ministerial 


Q.  You  just  again  said  that  the 
oviets  removed  the  linkage  between 
fie  defense  and  space  taliis  and  the 
TART  talks.  But  in  what  Mr.  Shev- 
rdnadze  just  got  through  saying,  he 
lid,  effectively,  that  they  retain  the 
ight  to  withdraw  from  the  START 
'eaty  if  they  perceive  that  the  ABM 
jreaty  has  been  violated.  So  they 
ontinue  to  say,  you've  got  your 
hoice;  you  can  have  a  START  treaty 
r  you  can  have  the  SDI.  You  can't 
ave  them  both. 

A.  That's  not  it.  I'm  sorry.  They're 
iyiiig  that  we  can  sign  and  implement  a 
TART  treaty,  whether  or  not  we  have 
)ncluded  a  treaty  on  defense  and  space. 

There  is  a  provision,  as  you  may 
now,  in  the  START  treaty  as  it  is  that 
ould  permit  withdrawal  upon  a  national 
iiterest  determination  within  6  months. 
;ither  side  could  do  that.  So  I'm  sorry, 
it  I  don't  think  that  interpretation  is 
■curate. 

Q.  We  were  told  about  the  new 
eas,  new  suggestions,  made  by 
hairman  Gorbachev  in  his  letter  to 
resident  Bush.  What  is  the  attitude 
'the  American  Administration  to 
lose  ideas? 

And  my  second  question  is,  is  the 
merican  side  ready  to  discuss  cut- 
ng  arms  not  only  on  land,  in  air,  in 
)ace,  but  also  on  sea? 

A.  Let  me  take  the  second  part  of 
lat  question  first.  We  have  some  major 
roblems  with  naval  arms  control.  We 
•e  situated  in  a  far  different  position 
lan  the  Soviet  Union.  We  are  sur- 
)unded  on  two  sides  by  major  oceans. 
k  have  been  a  sea-going  power  for  all  of 
ar  existence.  We  use  our  navy  to  com- 
iiunicate  and  maintain  our  lines  of  com- 
lunication  and  supply  with  our  allies. 

There's  a  significantly  different 
ihysical  situation  as  far  as  the  United 
tates  and  the  Soviet  Union  are  con- 
^rned  when  it  comes  to  naval  arms 
jntrol. 

With  respect  to  the  initial  part  of 
>ur  question,  I  think  that  my  opening 
atement  makes  it  clear  that  we  re- 
."ived  many  of  the  suggestions  and  ideas 
1  President  Gorbachev's  letter  very  pos- 
ively.  We  think  that  some  of  those  made 
possible  for  us  to  move  forward  with 
jncrete  achievements  at  this  minis- 
,irial.  At  the  same  time,  we  think  we 


advanced  some  ideas  and  broke  some 
ground  and  took  some  political  deci- 
sions— hard  decisions — that  were  neces- 
sary to  move  forward  in  other  areas.  I'm 
thinking  particularly  of  the  nuclear  test- 
ing talks  where  for  15  years  we  have 
been  deadlocked. 

Q.  With  the  interpretation  you're 
putting  on  the  Soviet  announcement 
about  SDI  and  its  connection  to  a 
START  treaty,  you  might  draw  the 
conclusion  that  a  START  treaty  is 
closer  to  being  signed  or  more  likely 
to  be  signed  sooner  or  would  become 
more  easily  negotiated.  What  is  your 
view  of  how  difficult  the  issues  re- 
main and  how  soon  a  START  agree- 
ment might  be  signed? 

A.  Let  me  say  that  I  think  there  are 
some  difficult  issues  that  still  remain. 
We  have  the  issues  of  ALCMs  and  SLCMs 
to  deal  with. 

I  think  I've  said,  though,  that  we 
believe  that  this  proposal  is  positive.  I 
think  I  said  that  it  should — if  I  didn't 
say,  I  want  to  say — it  should  enable  us  to 
finish  and  implement  a  START  treaty 
without  first  requiring  an  agreement  on 
defense  and  space,  which  has,  here- 
tofore, we  think  at  least,  been  the  posi- 
tion of  the  Soviet  Union.  So  I  think  it  is 
a  positive  development. 

Now,  you  want  me  to  put  a  time- 
frame on  it.  I'm  not  able  to  do  that  now 
e.xcept  to  say  that,  obviously,  we  will  be 
working — both  sides,  in  good  faith — 
to  move  the  process  forward  as  expe- 
ditiously as  possible. 

Q.  The  Soviets  are  saying,  how- 
ever, that  they  want  at  least  talks  to 
begin  on  what  kinds  of  tests  could  be 
conducted  in  space  that  would  be  per- 
missible under  the  ABM  Treaty  and 
which  ones  wouldn't.  One,  do  you  feel 
that's  a  precondition  for  the  Soviets? 
And,  two,  is  the  United  States  will- 
ing to,  at  least,  enter  into  those 
discussions? 

A.  I  don't  see  it  as  a  precondition.  I 
don't  believe  it  was  presented  as  a  pre- 
condition. It  is  our  interpretation  that  it 
was  not  so  presented. 

This  is  a  pi'oposal  that  was  made 
and  considered  in  1987.  We  had  some 
problems  with  it  at  that  time.  We  have 
agreed  to  look  at  all  of  the  elements  of 
this  overall  proposal  and  take  it  back  to 


Washington,  review  it,  and  give  them  a 
detailed  response  at  the  negotiations  in 
Geneva  which  are  going  to  resume  on 
the  28th  of  September.  The  response 
won't  come  then,  but  it  will  come  as 
soon  thereafter  as  we  can. 

This  is  a  procedure,  though,  that 
we  had  problems  with  in  1987,  and  it  has 
not  significantly  changed  from  what  it 
was  then. 

Q.  Mr.  Shevardnadze  suggested 
that  SLCMs  not  necessarily  should  be 
included  in  the  text  of  the  START 
agreement.  What  is  your  reaction  to 
that?  Would  it  help  to  sign  the  START 
agreement? 

And,  secondly,  what  is  your  reac- 
tion to  suggestions  that  next  year, 
sometime  in  the  late  summer  and 
fall,  there  should  be  a  meeting  of  the 
heads  of  state  of  Europe,  the  United 
States,  and  Canada  to  sign  possibly 
the  conventional  arms  treaty? 

A.  With  respect  to  the  question  on 
SLCMs,  moving  SLCMs  out  of  a  START 
treaty  would  be,  I  think,  a  step  in  the  di- 
rection of  making  progress  on  a  START 
treaty,  because  SLCMs  are  an  extraordi- 
narily difficult  problem  because  of  the 
verification  difficulties.  So  we  would  be 
interested  in  hearing  more  about  ideas 
that  the  Soviet  Union  might  have  to 
handle  the  question  of  SLCMs  outside 
ofa  START  agreement. 

With  respect  to  a  heads  of  state 
meeting  on  CFE,  I  told  the  [Foreign] 
Minister  that  that  was  something  that 
obviously  since  they  had  suggested  it, 
the  United  States  would  give  considera- 
tion to,  but  that's  not  a  decision  for  us  to 
make.  That  is  a  NATO  decision  just  as  it 
is  a  Warsaw  Pact  decision;  that  we  would 
look  at  that  but  that  it  might  be  a  bit 
premature  now  to  lock  into  a  date  until 
we  see  how  much  progress  is  made  on 
CFE. 

As  you  know,  NATO  tabled  its  full 
proposal  just  last  Thursday,  and  we  are 
hoping  for  and  looking  for  a  response 
from  the  Warsaw  Pact  to  a  very  detailed 
proposal  which  has  been  put  on  the 
table. 


department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


11 


Q.  Following  the  Washington 
summit  in  1987,  there  was  the  thought 
about  proceeding  with  a  START  trea- 
ty without  having  a  complete  agree- 
ment between  the  two  countries  about 
what  was  allowed  or  not  allowed  un- 
der the  ABM  Treaty.  At  that  time, 
some  people,  including  especially  the 
Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  felt  it  would  be 
very  dangerous  and  a  bad  idea  to  go 
ahead  with  a  START  treaty  without 
having  complete  understanding  of 
what  could  be  done  on  space.  Do  you 
see  some  of  that  concern  in  this  cur- 
rent situation,  as  it  is  building  up 
with  the  present  Soviet  proposal? 
And  how  do  you  feel  about  that? 

A.  I  think  it's  important  that  we 
make  it  clear  that  our  views  with  re- 
spect to  the  Strategic  Defense  Initiative 
have  not  changed.  We  strongly  support 
that.  That  was  made  abundantly  clear  in 
our  dialogue  here  at  this  ministerial. 

I  think,  as  I've  already  indicated, 
there  are  elements  of  this  proposal  that 
will  have  to  be  carefully  analyzed  and 
weighed  in  Washington,  D.C. 

In  terms  of  whether  or  not  this 
could  open  up  the  prospect  of  moving 
forward  a  START  agreement,  I  think 
you  have  to  say  that  it  might  because  it 
has  been  seen  to  be — assuming  that  it  is 
an  unconditional  dropping  of  the  linkage, 
as  we  interpret  it — I  think  you  would 
have  to  say  that  it  offers  the  prospect  of 
moving  that  forward. 

We  will  be  talking  about  the  kinds  of 
issues  that  you've  just  raised  when  we 
get  back  to  Washington. 

Q.  You've  now  spent  many  hours 
talking  to  Eduard  Shevardnadze 
about  the  problems  that  Mr.  Gor- 
bachev faces — about  the  economy,  the 
nationalities  issue.  After  those  kinds 
of  conversations,  do  you  have  differ- 
ent views  that  you  may  now  carry 
back  to  the  I'resident  about  things 
that  the  United  States  might  be  able 
to  do  to  weigh-in  and  help  the  Soviets 
in  some  way  or  another?  Has  it  al- 
tered your  views  as  to  what  we  might 
or  should  or  could  do? 


A.  We  talked  for  maybe  ;3-4  hours 
on  the  airplane  flying  from  Washington 
to  Wyoming  about  the  just-completed 
plenum,  about  the  approach  to  the  na- 
tionalities problem,  about  the  manner  in 
which  the  relationship  between  the  cen- 
tral government  and  the  republics  in  the 
Soviet  Union  will  be  addressed. 

It  seems  to  be  that  there  is  progress 
in  a  reasonable  and  rational  way  with 
respect  to  that  problem.  I  got  the  sense 
that  it  was  being  addressed,  as  it  should 
be,  seriously  and  substantively  and  that 
there  is  a  desire  on  the  part  of  the  cen- 
tral government  to  provide  more  politi- 
cal and  economic  autonomy  to  those 
republics;  that  that  is  already  provided 
for  by  the  Constitution  of  the  Soviet 
Union  but  that  that  has  not  been  fol- 
lowed in  practice  over  the  course  of 
past  years. 

We  also  talked  at  length  about  the 
economy  and  about  some  of  the  problems 
of  the  economy;  about  the  ruble  over- 
hang, about  how  that  probably  has  to 
be  addressed  before  you  move  to  the 
more  fundamental  questions  of  estab- 
lishing a  price  system  and  getting  to 
convertibility. 

But  I  think  it  was  important  that  we 
began  this  e.xchange  on  these  economic 
issues.  I  hope  the  Soviet  side  felt  the 
same  way.  I  believe  they  did,  and  we 
intend  to  continue  that. 

Q.  So  what  is  your  view  now  of 
whether  or  not  the  United  States 
ought  to  do  more,  or  something,  in 
the  way  of  directly  helping  with  the 
economy — no  change? 

A.  We've  not  been  requested — and 
the  Soviet  side  made  it  quite  clear,  they 
are  not  coming  to  the  United  States  for 
grants,  assistance,  loans,  or  that  sort  of 
thing.  I  think  there  is  an  interest  in 
learning  from  our  experience.  There  is 
an  interest  in  taking  steps  to  open  up 
that  economy  and  move  it  toward  a  more 
open  system,  and  perhaps  there  are 
some  things  that  we  could  contribute 
there. 

So  I  really  believe  the  approach 
that's  being  taken  is  the  right  one,  and 
that's  what  I  will  tell  the  President. 


Q.  What  happened  to  the  joint 
press  conference? 

A.  That  was,  as  I  said  out  there 
when  we  were  signing  the  agreement  -. 
simply  a  busted  signal.  We  anticipated 
that  there  would  be  an  interest  in  a  joii 
appearance.  But  we  failed  to  give  the 
proper  amount  of  notice.  I  don't  want  ti 
blame  it  on  the  other  side.  I  wall  take  a 
equal  amount  of  responsibility  for  it,  ar 
maybe  this  is  a  better  way  to  proceed. 

Q.  In  Washington,  you  told  us 
you  had  some  difficulty  when  Mr. 
Shevardnadze  said  there  were  some 
limits  upon  what  the  Soviet  Union 
could  do  to  restrain  the  flow  of 
Soviet-bloc  arms  to  Nicaragua.  Has 
the  last  couple  of  days  changed  that 
difficulty  you're  having  at  all? 

A.  We've  talked  in  some  detail 
about  that.  First  of  all,  let  me  say  that 
we  are  not  challenging  the  statement  u 
the  Soviet  Union  that  they,  themsehes 
have  ceased  shipping  weapons  to 
Nicaragua.  I  don't  believe  anyone 
in  the  U.S.  Government  ever  did  chal- 
lenge that. 

Our  problem  has  to  do  wdth  an  in- 
crease in  Soviet-bloc  weapons  and  mili^ 
tary  equipment  going  into  Central 
America,  going  into  Nicaragua,  quite 
frankly,  and  from  Nicaragua  to  the 
FMLN  in  El  Salvador.  Most  of  that  is 
coming  from  Cuba.  We  would  simply  lit 
to  see  the  Soviet  Union  do  as  much  as 
it  possibly  could  with  Cuba  to  stop 
that  flow. 


Q.  Are  they  doing  as  much  as 
they  could? 

A.  You're  asking  me  to  be  judgmer 
tal.  What  I  would  like  to  tell  you  is  that 
they've  indicated  to  us  that  they  suppor 
democracy  in  Nicaragua.  They  support 
the  concept  of  free  and  fair  elections  in 
Nicaragua.  They  are  committed  to  usiii 
their  influence  to  do  what  they  can  to 
stop  the  flow  of  weapons  to  the  insurge: 
cy  in  El  Salvador. 

Q.  If  I  could  ask  you  to  reflect 
for  just  a  moment  on  what's  trans- 


12 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  198 


Wyoming  Ministerial 


the  conclusion  of  the  Wyoming  ministerial,  Secretary  Baker  held  a  news  conference. 


red  here.  You've  had  this  extraordi- 
iry  2  or  3  days  of  movement,  facil- 
ated  by  the  Soviets  moving  their 
jsitions  on  a  large  number  of  arms 
)ntrol  issues  and  at  the  same  time 
>u've  had  these  very  frank  economic 
iscussions  with  them.  Is  there  any 
'lationship  between  the  two?  Is  one 
riving  the  other? 

A.  No.  I  don't  think  there  is  any — I 
in't  say  there's  no  relationship  between 
le  two,  but  one  is  not  driving  the  other 

And  may  I  say,  we've  had  the  move- 
lent,  yes,  in  part  because  of  some 
langes  in  Soviet  positions  but  also, 
I  may  say  so,  in  part  because  of  some 
langes  in  U.S.  positions. 

Again  I  would  refer  you  to  the  nu- 
ear  testing  talks  and  I  would  refer  you, 
s  well,  to  the  President's  speech  at  the 
nited  Nations  on  Monday. 


Q.  Also  on  the  economy,  you  said 
that  Mr.  Shevardnadze  had  raised  a 
lot  of  questions  and  wasn't  looking 
for  specific  grants  of  things,  but 
could  you  give  us  your  assessment  at 
this  point  of  just  how  far,  what  kind 
of  strategy — economic  strategy — Mr. 
Gorbachev  has,  and  just  how  far  does 
he  intend  to  go  economically  to  adopt 
a  market  economy? 

A.  I  think  they  want  to  move  in  that 
direction.  I  think  that  they  have  conclud- 
ed that  it  is  in  their  interest  to  do  so.  I 
think  they  recognize  the  difficulties  in- 
volved in  getting  there,  particularly  the 
difficulties  in  establishing  a  price  sys- 
tem. And  you  have  to  do  that,  really,  be- 
fore you  can  address  in  a  comprehensive 
way  the  question  of  convertibility.  And 
you  have  to  have  both  of  those  before  you 
get  to  a  market  system. 


Before  you  do  price  system  and 
convertibility,  though,  there  are  some 
other  problems  that  have  to  be  taken 
care  of,  in  our  opinion. 

One  is  the  ruble  overhang.  One  is 
the  whole  idea  of  incentive  and  compe- 
tition that  has  to  be  somehow  put  into 
that  system.  And  a  third  is  the  require- 
ment for  some  sort  of  a  safety  net,  if 
you  are  going  to  move  to  a  price  system 
after  60  or  70  years,  whatever  it  is,  of 
having  a  totally  different  approach.  It 
is  very  difficult  to  do  it  cold  turkey  and 
do  it  overnight. 

Q.  Was  anything  agreed  here, 
this  weekend,  on  CFE  to  make  that 
mid-1990s  target  deadline  for  a 
completed  treaty  more  possible? 

A.  Of  course,  this  is  not  the  forum 
for  negotiating  CFE.  CFE  should  be  ne- 
gotiated in  Vienna  because  it  is  a  multi- 
lateral negotiation.  We  don't  have  the 
power  to  negotiate  here. 

There  were  some  suggestions  made 
on  the  Soviet  side  with  respect  to  air- 
craft that  we  think  don't  go  far  enough 
but  that  we  will  analyze  and  that  we  will 
refer  to  our  negotiators  in  Vienna.  This 
is  one  of  the  most  difficult  problems  we 
have  in  the  conventional  forces  talks — 
the  definition  of  aircraft.  We  think  air- 
craft should  be  defined  on  the  basis  of 
what  they  are  capable  of  doing,  not  what 
a  particular  country  has  given  them  as 
an  organizational  responsibility.  The  fact 
that  an  aircraft  that  flies  and  shoots  is 
given  a  defensive  role  by  the  military 
authorities  of  a  country  doesn't  mean  it 
ought  not  to  be  counted  as  an  offensive 
aircraft,  in  our  view. 

That's  the  main  difference  separat- 
ing us.  So  we  didn't  come  here  to  nego- 
tiate CFE.  That  was  the  only  proposal 
affecting  CFE  that  came  from  either 
side. 

Q.  With  regard  to  your  more 
open  society,  in  Yellowstone  National 
Park  this  week,  they  offered  the  op- 
portunity for  students  from  the  So- 
viet Union  to  come  and  learn  more 
about  the  environment.  Do  you  see 
more  of  that  kind  of  exchange  and 
perhaps  more  of  an  encouragement 
toward  that  kind  of  exchange  between 
the  two  countries? 


epartment  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


13 


A.  I  certainly  do,  and  we  proposed 
that  as  one  of  our  environmental 
initiatives — that  there  be  greater  envi- 
ronmental exchanges,  not  just  students 
but  people  across  a  wide  spectrum 
of  society  who  are  interested  in  the 
environment — legislators,  environmen- 
talists, and  others — and  we  think  there 
ought  to  be  a  greater  exchange. 

And  let  me  say  on  that  score  that  I 
believe  the  [Foreign]  Minister  shares  my 
view  that  it  is  healthy  that  we  are  now 
engaged  with  the  Soviet  Union  on  these 
transnational  problems.  I  know  a  lot  of 
people  thought  this  was  not  a  partic- 
ularly significant  idea  last  May  when  we 
surfaced  it  in  Moscow,  but  we  are  talking 
about  many  global  problems  that  are 
very,  very  important  to  both  countries, 
and  the  environment  is  one  of  them. 
There  is  genuine  interest  on  both  sides 
in  all  aspects  of  environment. 

Q.  What  kind  of  progress  did  you 
make  on  human  rights  in  the  discus- 
sions? Did  the  Soviets  present  any 
new  evidence  that  they  were  really 
any  closer  to  passing  the  freedom  of 
emigration  law  than  they  were  sever- 
al months  ago?  And  finally,  will  there 
be  a  continued  linkage  between  trade 
and  human  rights? 

A.  Will  there  continue  to  be  a  link- 
age between  trade  and  human  rights?  Of 
course,  there  is  a  legal  linkage  as  far  as 
we  are  concerned  now.  We  have  made  it 
very  clear  that  we  are  prepared  to  move 
to  eliminate  that  linkage  the  minute  the 
Soviet  Union  institutionalizes  its  more 
liberal  emigration  policy. 

There  has  been  very  good  progress 
in  the  Soviet  Union  regarding  freer  em- 
igration. We  talked  about  that.  We 
talked  about  those  remaining  cases  that 
we  think  deserve  consideration  as  we 
usually  do  in  these  ministerials.  We  pre- 
sented a  list  of  names  that  we  request 
they  specifically  look  into.  I  think  you 
have  to  say  they  have  made  good  prog- 
ress on  questions  of  emigration. 

I  can't  tell  you  when  the  Supreme 
Soviet  will  institutionalize  that  prog- 
ress, but  when  they  do,  we'll  be  pre- 
pared to  move  on  Jackson-Vanik  and 
Stevenson. 


14 


Q.  Do  you  expect  the  results  of 
this  meeting  should  silence  some  of 
your  critics,  like  Senator  Mitchell, 
who  has  accused  the  Administration 
of  moving  too  slowly?  And,  secondly, 
when  you  get  back  to  Washington,  do 
you  expect  to  take  these  results  and 
use  them  to  push  Congress  a  little 
harder  on  strategic  issues  in  the 
budget? 

A.  We've  been  trying  to  encourage 
Congress  to  move  on  those  strategic  is- 
sues. We  have  made  it  clear  that  they  are 
very  important  to  the  process  of  negotia- 
tion. We  have  also  asked  that  they  move 
our  initiatives  with  respect  to  Poland 
and  Hungary,  OPIC  [Overseas  Private 
Investment  Corporation]  and  GSP  [gen- 
eralized system  of  preferences]  benefits, 
which  are  still  hung  up.  So  I  think  that 
we  would  like  to  see  action,  frankly,  in 
both  of  those  areas. 

Q.  Mr.  Shevardnadze  said  that  he 
expected  you  to  dismantle  the  radar 
stations  in  England  and  in  Greenland 
in  response  to  his  dismantling  of 
Krasnoyarsk.  That's  just  the  opposite 
of  the  impression  you  gave  when  you 
addressed  us. 

A.  I  would  be  very  surprised  to 
hear  that  he  said  that  he  expected  us  to 
dismantle — 

Q.  Of  course,  it  was  interpreted. 

A.  Yes.  If  he  did,  he  told  you  some- 
thing he  didn't  tell  me. 

Q.  What  does  he  expect?  There  is 
this  impression  this  is  the  Soviet's 
thought. 

A.  As  I  understand  it,  he  said  that 
he  wants  us  to  consider  the  possibility  of 
Soviet  observers  going  to  look  at  those 
radars  to  see  if  there  is  any  violation  or 
to  see  if  they  think,  after  inspection, 
that  there  might  be  any  violation. 

As  I  may  have  mentioned  to  you, 
these  are  not  ABM  radars.  They  existed 
prior  to  the  completion  of  the  ABM  Trea- 
ty and  their  modernization  is  totally  le- 
gal under  the  treaty. 

I  did  tell  him  that  we  would  consider 
his  suggestion,  or  we  would  take  his  con- 
cern into  account.  We  have  an  estab- 
lished process,  as  you  know — I  think  it  is 
the  CSCE  process — by  which  both  sides 
attempt  to  alleviate  concerns  such  as 
this.  We'll  be  taking  a  look  at  that,  be- 
cause we  think  it  is  important  in  main- 


I 


taining  a  relationship  here  of  trust  and; 
confidence  that  when  they  have  some- 
thing they  want  us  to  look  into,  we  lool< 
into  it.  Just  like  we  ask  them  to  look  in 
things  from  time  to  time. 

Let  me  say  one  final  thing.  These 
radars  are  located  on  the  territory  of    k 
our  allies,  and  again,  anything  we  do,  M 
we  will  have  to  do  in  close  consultation 
with  those  allies.  I  do  not  believe — and 
do  not  believe  he  said  that  this  was  a 
precondition  to  his — 

Q.  At  your  press  conference  be- 
fore this  meeting,  you  indicated  you 
will  be  informing  Mr.  Shevardnadze 
on  the  health  of  the  plans  to  aid  froi 
the  United  States  to  both  Poland  am 
Hungary.  I  was  wondering  whether 
the  question  on  the  changes  in  Polai 
and  Hungary  came  up  at  all  in  the 
meeting. 

A.  We  talked  about  Eastern  Euro 
and  the  approach  of  the  United  States 
the  problems  of  Eastern  Europe  yestei 
day  on  the  flight  in.  That  was  one  of  th 
topics  that  we  discussed  in  some  detail 

Q.  When  will  you  two  be  meetir 
again?  Neither  of  you  have  said  that 

A.  We  haven't  decided  what  the  e\ 
act  date  would  be.  We  will  want  to  con- 
sider when  we  do  that  in  light  of  the  no' 
definitive  summit  timeframe. 

Q.  As  far  as  the  summit  is  con- 
cerned, did  you  talk  at  all  about  hav 
ing  a  summit  away  from  Washingtoi 
or  perhaps  including  stops  like  this 
one  during  the  summit? 

A.  No,  we  haven't  talked  about  th£ 

Q.  What  was  the  idea  behind  sa; 
ing  that  next  spring  and  summer,  or 
summer,  would  be  the  time  that  you  | 
should  have  a  summit?  What  went  h> 
hind  that  calculation?  i 

A.  That  was  the  time  that  the  two 
heads  of  state  saw  as  the  most  conven- 
ient time  for  both  of  them.  That  was  thij 
time  that  it  was  determined  would  give 
us  an  opportunity — at  least  to  give  us 
adequate  time  to  prepare  for  a  summit, 
and  we  do  believe  that  a  summit  should 
be  thoroughly  prepared. 

If  we  had  moved  it  up  before  late 
spring,  we  don't  think — and  we  think  tl 
Soviets  share  this  view — there  would 
have  been  adequate  time  for  preparatio 


I 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  19f 


Wyoming  Ministerial 


Q.  In  connection  with  the  events 
f  Eastern  Europe,  the  German  ques- 
t3n  is  often  mentioned  more  in  the 
.merican  media  than  apparently  the 
(erman  media.  Did  you  discuss  any 
iipects  of  that  question  with  [For- 
(gn]  Minister  Shevardnadze? 
j    A.  We  talked  about  the  problems 
iEast  German  migration,  and  we  dis- 
(issed  what  I  think  you  referred  to 
nen  you  say  the  German  question.  I 
')uld  like  to  leave  those  discussions, 
:r  the  time  being,  confidential. 

Q.  Could  we  ask  you  to  be  philo- 
phical  for  a  minute?  All  of  your 
aff  certainly  have  been  very  posi- 
ve  about  what  has  been  accom- 
'ished  here.  You  have  been  very 
jtsitive.  You  come  away  from  this 
(eeting  with  an  enlarged  sense  of 
tiat  is  possible  in  this  relationship, 
I  do  you  see  it  going  on  as  a  steady 
lit  linear  progression  forward? 
"here  does  this  weekend  leave  you 
:S-a-vis  your  own  thoughts  about  the 
1  viet  Union  and  what  is  possible? 

A.  I  think  a  steady  progression  on- 
ird  is  not  a  bad  way  to  characterize  the 
ly  I  see  it.  I  think  we  made  good  prog- 
;ss  here.  I'll  tell  you  that,  and  I  think  it 
Hs  due  to  efforts  on  both  sides. 

Can  there  be  setbacks?  Yes.  Could 
'  move  even  a  bit  better  than  just 
iBady  progress?  I  suppose  that's  possi- 
h.  But  I  think  that  those  who  want  to 
le  an  improvement  in  the  U.S. -Soviet 
:lationship  across  the  full  range  of 
'  r  agenda  should  take  heart  from  this 
anisterial. 


ecretary's  Interview 
on  "Face  the  Nation," 
ept.  24, 1989'' 

'  Outside  of  an  announcement  on  the 
immit,  being  spring  or  early  sum- 
er,  the  big  news  out  of  your  meeting 
.  Wyoming,  as  I  read  it,  was  this  So- 
■et  offer  to  delink  the  whole  ques- 
on  of  "star  wars,"  or  SDI  from  the 
TART  treaty.  And  I  want  to 


know  if  you  consider  that  a  major  vic- 
tory for  the  Bush  Administration,  or 
do  you  think  that  the  Soviets  have 
concluded  that  SDI  ain't  never  going 
to  fly  and  it's  not  worth  all  the  trou- 
ble, and  so  why  not  just  sort  of  make 
it  a  secondary  issue? 

A.  I  think  it  shows  the  merit  in 
sticking  to  your  negotiating  position 
when  you  believe  you're  right.  Of  course, 
we're  not  home  yet  by  a  long  shot  in 
these  negotiations,  either  in  START  or 
in  defense  and  space.  Nevertheless,  I 
think  this  is  a  positive  development  and 
would  mean  that  we  could  have  a  START 
treaty  negotiated  and  implemented  with- 
out having  a  defense  and  space  treaty. 

Q.  Does  that  mean  we  could  have 
a  START  treaty  very  soon — let's 
say  even  in  conjunction  or  at  the 
same  time  that  you  wrap  up  the 
conventional?  Would  that  be  your 
goal? 

A.  I  don't  think  we  would  state  it 
that  way,  because  there  is  a  certain 
timeframe  with  respect  to  the  goal  of  a 
conventional  forces  agreement.  There 
are  still  a  lot  of  problems  in  the  START 
negotiations.  We  have  to  figure  out  how 
to  deal  with  air-launched  cruise  missiles. 
We've  got  to  figure  out  how  to  deal  with 
submarine-launched  cruise  missiles. 
So  I  don't  think  you  can  put  a  specific 
timeframe  on  it.  But  clearly  this  was  a 
major  stumbling  block,  and  this  will 
make  it  easier  to  move  forward. 

Q.  I  want  to  ask  you  more  about 
that,  but  first  let's  stay  on  the  ABM 
or  "star  wars"  question.  Does  this 
mean  that  we've  lost  the  chance  to 
use  "star  wars"  as  a  bargaining  chip? 
And  I  say  that  that  is  important,  be- 
cause Congress  has  really  begun  to 
cut  that  budget  back  so  much,  and  it's 
even  in  our  laws  that  you  can't  do  the 
testing;  Congress  has  passed  laws  to 
prevent  it.  Have  they  removed  it  as  a 
way  for  you  to  use  it  to  get  more  con- 
cessions from  them?  And  doesn't  that 
hurt  us  in  the  end? 

A.  You  know  we  really  never  saw  it 
as  a  bargaining  chip.  I  mean,  it  is  a  con- 
cept that  we  think  is  important,  that  is 
in  the  national  security  interest  of  the 
United  States,  and  we  are  still  every  bit 
as  committed  to  the  Strategic  Defense 
Initiative  as  we  were  before. 


Q.  Yes,  but  with  these  laws,  how 
can  you  go  forward  with  it?  Congress 
says  you  can't. 

A.  Of  course,  if  the  Congress  de- 
cides to  say  you  can't  move  forward,  then 
we  will  be  constrained  from  moving  for- 
ward, and — 

Q.  But  they've  done  that. 

A.  Yes,  and  they  are  making  a 
heavy  run  at  the  budget  on  SDI,  much 
against  the  wishes  of  the  Bush  Ad- 
ministration. We  don't  like  that,  and  we 
are  continuing  to  oppose  that.  The  final 
bill  is  not  out  yet,  so  let's  see  where  we 
come  out  before  we  prejudge  it.  I  mean, 
I  don't  think  you  should  assume  that 
what's  in  the  legislation  from  one  house 
is  going  to  be  the  ultimate  result. 

Q.  Can  we  assume  you're  going  to 
accept  this  proposal  from  the  Soviets 
to  delink  these  two?  Can  I  read  that 
in  what  you've  said  so  far? 

A.  There  are  other  elements  of  this 
proposal.  And  as  I  said  today,  we  will 
have  to  take  those  back  to  Washington 
and  look  at  those  and  analyze  those,  and 
we  will  be  responding  in  detail  to  the 
Soviets  through  our  negotiator  after 
the  defense  and  space  talks  reopen  in 
Geneva  on  the  28th  of  September. 

As  far  as  the  narrow  question  of 
delinkage — unconditional  delinkage — as 
I've  said,  I  think  that  is  a  positive  devel- 
opment and  should  enable  us  to  move  for- 
ward perhaps  more  expeditiously  with 
the  START  treaty. 

Q.  Why  do  you  say  "perhaps"? 
Why  don't  you  just  say,  "This  is  great. 
Now  we  can  really  get  in  there."? 

A.  Because  they're  still — 

Q.  Part  of  the  criticism  is  that 
you  really  don't  want  to  have  START. 
You  know  that's  been  around.  People 
say  that  all  the  time. 

A.  You  know,  there's  a  lot  of  criti- 
cism from  time — there  was  a  lot  of  criti- 
cism in  advance  of  this  ministerial  that  I 
hope  will  be  absolutely  gone  now  because 
we  have  made  some  really  fundamental 
progress,  not  just  in  START,  not  just  be- 
cause the  Soviets  have  delinked  START 
from  defense  and  space.  But  we've  made 
it  across  the  full  range  of  arms  control. 


epartment  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


15 


the  arms  control  agenda.  We  have  bro- 
ken a  15-year  deadlock  in  the  nuclear 
testing  talks.  That  is  a  major  and  very 
significant  achievement. 

Q.  But  we've  been  complying 
with  that  anyway — 

A.  We  have  a  chemical  weapons — 
we've  been  complying  with  it,  but  we've 
never  been  able  to  reach  agreement. 
And  what  I  think  you  see  here  is  an  ex- 
ercise of  political  will  by  the  leadership 
on  both  sides — the  Soviet  Union  and  the 
United  States — to  move  us  forward 
across  the  broad  range  of  our  arms  con- 
trol agenda.  So  I  really  think  you  need 
to  look  at  chemical,  you  need  to  look  at 
nuclear  testing.  Yes,  you  need  to  look  at 
START  and  other  elements,  in  START 
and  defense  and  space  other  than  just 
this  question  of  delinkage. 

The  President's  verification  and  sta- 
bility initiative  that  he  submitted  to  the 
Soviet  Union,  they  have  come  back  and 
said,  yes,  we  like  this  idea,  we'll  work 
with  you  on  it,  let's  see  if  we  can't  make 
it  work.  So  we  have  an  umbrella  agree- 
ment here  with  respect  to  that. 

We've  signed  an  agreement  on  pre- 
notification  of  strategic  air  exercises, 
something  that  would  have  been  unheard 
of  just  a  few  short  years  ago.  We're 
really  moving  in  a  whole  lot  of  areas, 
and  I  don't  think  that  the  criticism, 
if  I  can  say  so — and  of  course  I'm  a  bit 
biased — is  warranted. 

Q.  The  criticism  that  you've 
gone  slowly? 
A.  Yes. 

Q.  But  the  other  half  of  that  is 
that  you,  for  some  reason,  say  there 
are  all  sorts  of  speculations  about 
what  your  reasons  are,  that  you  don't 
want  to  move  that  quickly  on  START. 
I'd  love  to  hear  from  you  that  you  are 
now  ready  to  roll — are  you  ready  to 
roll  your  sleeves  up  and  really  go  in 
there  and  push  for  an  early — you 
know,  Reagan  had  it  half  done. 

A.  Yes,  we  want  a  START  agree- 
ment. We've  said  that  from  the  begin- 
ning of  this  Administration.  But  we 
don't  want  a  bad  one.  We've  said  that 
from  the  beginning  of  this  Administra- 
tion. We  want  a  START  agreement,  but 


The  Bakers  and  the  Shevardnadzes  shared  a  quiet  dinner  at  a  local  restaurant  in  Jack- 
son, Wyoming. 


we  don't  want  one  that  we  can't  get  rat- 
ified. So  we're  proceeding  in  the  man- 
ner that  we  think  is  best  to  get  a  good 
agreement  and  to  get  one  that  we  think 
we  can  get  ratified.  That,  after  all,  is 
the  end  gain. 

We  really  made  progress,  it  seems 
to  me  here,  when  you  look  at  what 
we've  done  on  mobile  missiles,  the 
dropping  of  our  mobile  ban,  the  veri- 
fication and  stability  initiatives.  We 
solved  the  question  of  a  unitive  count. 
We  have  in  the  defense  and  space  talks 
the  Krasnoyarsk  radar  being  dis- 
mantled by  the  Soviet  Union,  and  we 
have  this  question  of  delinkage.  These 
are  major  accomplishments  in  the 
START  and  defense  and  space  area 
flowing  out  of  this  ministerial. 

Q.  Does  the  Administration  still 
have  as  its  goal  the  reduction  of  50% 
of  these  missiles  on  both  sides?  Is  it 
the  heart  of  this  treaty? 


A.  What  had  been  negotiated  in  thi 
Reagan  Administration  is  still  on  the  ta 
ble.  The  joint  draft  text  is  basically  as  i1 
existed  in  the  Reagan  Administration. 

Q.  And  you're  not  going  to  tam- 
per with  that? 

A.  No,  there's  not  going  to  be  any 
tampering  with  that. 

Q.  Here  we  have  the  same  strate- 
gic lineup — two  new  missiles,  two 
new  bombers,  everything  that  we 
wanted  when  our  relationship  with 
the  Soviets  was  so  tense.  They  blew 
up  the  KAL  plane.  Everybody  agrees 
that  the  threat  from  the  Soviet  Unior 
is  greatly  diminished.  The  relation- 
ship is  clearly,  from  what  you're  say- 
ing, much,  much  warmer. 

Why  don't  we  start  unilaterally, 
for  our  own  country's  budget  prob- 
lems— for  whatever  other  reasons — 


16 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  198! 


Wyoming  Ministerial 


tart  cutting  back  on  some  of  the 
^ings  that  we  had  at  the  worst  point 
1  the  relationship? 

A.  The  military  threat  has  not  di- 
linished  if  you  look  at  it  just  in  terms  of 
lilitary  to  military.  The  Soviet  Union 
;ill  has  a  distinct  advantage  in  strategic 
uclear.  We've  been  debating  in  this 
Duntry  the  question  of  strategic  mod- 
rnization  for  15  or  16  years.  We  still 
on't  have  a  resolution  of  it. 

Mobile  missiles  are  a  good  example, 
[obile  missiles  are  stabilizing  types  of 
uclear  weapons.  The  Soviets  have  mo- 
iles,  and  they  have  them  deployed.  We 
ave  them  on  the  drawing  board  and  still 
on't  have  congressional  approval  to  even 
love  forward.  I  think  it  would  be  really 
uite  naive  for  the  United  States  to  talk 
bout  unilateral  reductions  of  its  strate- 
ic  nuclear  arsenal. 

Q.  But  you're  asking  for  new 
capons,  and  we  need  money  to  fight 
rugs,  we  need  money — 

A.  Oh,  yes,  but  we  have  seen  major 
'ductions  in  the  defense  budget  over 
le  course  of  the  past  2  or  3  years. 

Q.  But  not  on  the  strategic 
capons. 

A.  Yes,  we  have.  Oh,  yes  we  have. 

Q.  We  have  an  MX  and  a  Midget- 
lan,  a  B-2,  and  another  bomber.  The 
lajor  components  for  the  big  build- 
p  are  still  in  place. 

A.  But  we  have  seen  reductions  in 
le  defense  budget,  significant  reduc- 
ons  over  the  course  of  the  past  few 
jars.  I  really  think  it  would  be  a  terri- 
le  mistake  for  the  United  States  to  talk 
1  terms  of  stepping  out  here  and  sug- 
ssting  unilateral  reductions  in  its 
rategic  arsenal. 

Let  me  just  say  one  final  thing  on 
pis.  Our  policy  of  flexible  response  and 
•)rward  defense  and  our  nuclear  deter- 
;nt  strategy  have  kept  the  peace  for 
ver  40  years.  It  would  be  a  mistake  for 
<  tn  abandon  that  now  or  to  turn  away 
•om  that  now.  On  the  other  hand,  we 
lould  make  every  effort  to  reduce  nu- 
^ear  weapons  and  to  negotiate  good 
^reements  to  accomplish  that  but  not 
ad  agreements. 


We  went  out  in  a  hurry  in  the  late 
1970s  to  negotiate  the  SALT  agreement 
[Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Treaty],  an 
agreement  that  we  couldn't  get  ratified. 
That  was  a  terrible  mistake  and  we  did 
it  because  there  was  this  frantic  rush  to 
get  an  agreement.  We  think  we're  doing 
this  just  right.  So  far,  at  least,  I  think — 
I  hope — the  facts  bear  us  out. 

Q.  But  is  it  true  that  you  are  not 
saying  that  we  are  now  ready,  for  in- 
stance, to  set  a  timetable  for  START 
as  you  did  for  the  conventional?  You 
said,  let's  finish  it  by  "X"  time.  You 
are  not  willing  to  say  that  on  START? 

A.  No,  I  don't  think  we  should  set 
artificial  deadlines  when  we're  talking 
about  strategic  arms  negotiations.  I 
think  that's  a  bad  policy.  I  think  it's  a  lit- 
tle bit  different  in  the  area  of  conven- 
tional forces.  I  really  do.  But  let  me  say 
this:  We  are  now  going  to  have  a  summit. 

Q.  Where,  by  the  way? 

A.  We  don't  know  where,  and  we 
don't  know  exactly  when.  We  know  it's 
going  to  be  late  spring  or  early  summer 
of  next  year,  and  that's  definite. 

Q.  In  the  United  States? 

A.  I  believe  it's  our  turn.  Yes,  I 
believe — I  thought  you  meant  where  in 
the  United  States.  But  I  believe  it's — 

Q.  I  do  mean  where.  The  Presi- 
dent suggested  Washington,  when  he 
spoke  to  reporters  in  Maine. 

A.  Did  he? 

Q.  Yes. 

A.  Good. 

Q.  Does  that  sound  right  to  you? 

A.  That  sounds  right,  if  the  Presi- 
dent suggested  it.  Sounds  like  an  excel- 
lent idea! 

Q.  Let  me  ask  you  about  the  dis- 
cussions and  the  whole  subject  of 
Eastern  Europe.  Would  it  be  our  poli- 
cy to  support  the  Baltic  states  in 
tiieir  urge  for  independence,  even  se- 
cession, from  the  Soviet  Union? 

A.  I  don't  know  that  I  would  put  it 
that  way.  Let  me  explain  to  you  what  our 
policy  is  with  respect  to  the  Baltic 
states. 

As  you  probably  know,  for  over  40 
years,  the  United  States  has  not  recog- 
nized the  incorporation  of  the  Baltic 


states  into  the  Soviet  Union.  We  hope 
that  whatever  happens  with  respect  to 
the  desire  on  the  part  of  people  in  the 
Baltic  states  for  more  autonomy  and 
more  self-determination  and  more  free- 
dom happens  peacefully.  That  is  our 
view. 

Should  there  be  self- 
determination?  Should  there  be  free- 
dom? Should  there  be  more  autonomy? 
Yes,  we  think  there  should  be — 

Q.  Should  there  be  independence? 

A.  — but  it  should  not  take  place  in 
the  context  of  major  instability,  blood- 
shed, and  that  sort  of  thing.  That's  our 
policy  with  respect  to  the  Baltic  states. 

Q.  There  have  been  a  lot  of  re- 
ports that  the  Administration,  the 
foreign  policy  side,  has  concluded 
that  Mr.  Gorbachev  is  going  to  have  to 
crack  down.  Is  that  a  conclusion  that 
we've  reached? 

A.  No,  it's  not  a  conclusion;  it's  not  a 
conclusion  at  all.  In  my  conversations 
with  [Foreign]  Minister  Shevardnadze  on 
the  airplane  flying  out  here  to  Wyoming, 
he  specifically  rejected  the  use  of  force 
as  not  being  a  feasible  alternative.  And 
he  says  that  is  a  view  that  is  shared  by 
the  Soviet  leadership.  I  think  that's 
significant. 

Q.  What  do  you  say  to  all  the 
critics — and  there  are  a  lot  on  this 
point — that  you're  much  more  con- 
cerned with  stability  and  not  making 
mistakes  and  all  these  questions 
about  being  careful  than  you  are 
about  speaking  to  the  longings  and 
urgings  behind  the  Iron  Curtain  for 
more  freedom,  for  independence,  for 
democracy,  all  of  the  things  we've 
always  wanted? 

A.  I  think  the  Administration  does 
speak  to  the  longings  and  urging  of 
people  around  the  world  for  freedom. 

I've  spoken  to  it,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
with  respect  to  the  Baltic  states.  But  I 
think  there's  a  way  to  speak  to  that  with- 
out, at  the  same  time,  inciting  rebellion 
and  without,  at  the  same  time,  creating 
instability  which  could  have  a  significant 
adverse  result,  in  terms  of  our  relation- 


'epartment  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


17 


ship  with  the  countries  of  Eastern 
Europe  and,  for  that  matter,  our  rela- 
tionship with  the  Soviet  Union. 

We  see  that  relationship  with  the 
Soviet  Union  now  moving  away  from 
competition,  more  to  dialogue  and  to 
cooperation.  There  are  still  some  areas 
where  there's  too  much  competition. 
There  is  now  quite  a  bit  of  dialogue  and 
more  and  more  we're  finding  areas  of 
cooperation,  areas  in  which  the  Soviet 
Union  and  the  United  States  can  move 
to  their  mutual  advantage. 

So  I  think  the  balance  that  we  have 
struck  on  these  issues  is  exactly  the 
right  balance. 

Q.  Let  me  ask  you  a  final  ques- 
tion, and  that  relates  to  Mr.  Gor- 
bachev himself  and  his  chances  of 
success.  At  the  White  House,  you 
said — I  think  for  the  first  time — that 
the  United  States  does  have  an  inter- 
est in  seeing  him  personally  succeed. 
Have  you,  in  your  own  mind,  decided 
in  what  ways  we  can  help  him  beyond 
what  has  been  said  in  the  past? 

A.  Last  week  we  ticked  off  a  num- 
ber of  things  that  we  can  do.  One  is  to 
work  to  maintain  a  stable  international 
environment.  That  is  accomplished,  if  I 
may  say  so,  by  making  the  kind  of  prog- 
ress across  the  full  range  of  our  arms 
control  agenda  that  we  made  here  in 
Wyoming  over  the  last  couple  of  days. 

We  can  help  economically — with 
their  economic  problem — not  by  grants 
and  loans  and  aid  but  by  giving  them 
technical  advice  with  respect  to  how  you 
can  best  move  to  a  free  market  economy. 

We  can  help  by  not  fomenting  rebel- 
lion in  areas  within  the  Soviet  Union  or 
Eastern  Europe,  quite  frankly,  that  are 
having  some  major  difficulties. 

Yes,  we  should  speak  to  the  hopes 
and  aspirations  of  people  all  around 
the  world  for  freedom  because  our 
democracy — our  national  soul — has  been 
built  on  that.  But  we've  got  to  be  careful 
that  in  doing  so,  we  don't  foment  rebel- 
lion and  instability. 

Q.  But  nothing  of  what  you  said 
is  new.  What  is?  Nothing  came  out  of 
these  talks.  I  know  you  and  Mr.  Shev- 
ardnadze talked  about  their  problems. 


A.  It  seems  to  me  we  just  started 
talking  to  the  Soviets  about  economics. 
In  fact,  this  ministerial  was  the  first 
time  we  really  engaged  with  them  in  de- 
tail about  the  specifics  of  their  economic 
problems,  and  time  doesn't  permit  me  to 
go  into  all  of  that  here  with  you  now.  But 
we  got  a  very  detailed  discussion.  We've 
engaged  with  them  for  2  days,  again, 
across  the  full  range  of  arms  control — 
chemical,  conventional,  nuclear.  So  I 
would  not  accept  the  categorization  that 
"nothing  is  new."  These  are  broad  gener- 
al areas  where  we  think  we  can  cooper- 
ate with  the  Soviet  Union  to  the  mutual 
advantage  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  the 
United  States. 


Texts  of  Agreements 


MEMORANDUM  OF  UNDERSTANDING 

BETWEEN  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF 

THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA 

AND  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF 

THE  UNION  OF  SOVIET 

SOCIALIST  REPUBLICS 

REGARDING  A  BILATERAL 

VERIFICATION  EXPERIMENT  AND 

DATA  EXCHANGE  RELATED 

TO  PROHIBITION 

OF  CHEMICAL  WEAPONS 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  of 
America  and  the  Government  of  the  Union  of 
Soviet  Socialist  Republics, 

Determined  to  facilitate  the  process  of 
negotiation,  signature  and  ratification  of  a 
comprehensive,  effectively  verifiable  and 
truly  global  convention  on  the  prohibition 
and  destruction  of  chemical  weapons, 

Convinced  that  increased  openness 
about  their  chemical  weapons  capabilities  is 
essential  for  building  the  confidence  neces- 
sary for  early  completion  of  the  convention, 

Desiring  also  to  gain  e.xperience  in  the 
procedures  and  measures  for  verification  of 
the  convention, 

Have  agreed  as  follows: 


Q.  You  really  seem  up.  You  say 
things  have  improved.  You  say  the  at- 
mosphere has  improved.  How  would 
you  describe  the  state  of  U.S. -Soviet 
relations  right  now?  I  know  you  hate 
the  word  detente,  but  we're  clearly — 

A.  Yes.  I  wouldn't  want  to  put  a 
buzz  word  on  it.  Let  me  say  that  I  think 
we  are  making  steady  progress.  I  think 
I  said  to  you  that  we  are  moving  more 
and  more  away  from  competition.  A  lot 
of  the  relationship  now  could  be  em- 
braced under  the  heading  "dialogue," 
and  we're  moving  more  and  more  into 
cooperation.  It  is  a  process  of  change. 
There's  a  great  deal  of  change  going  on 
in  the  Soviet  Union,  and  there's  a  great 
deal  of  change  going  on  in  our  relation- 
ship in  the  Soviet  Union. 


I.  General  Provisions 

1.  As  set  forth  below,  the  two  sides  shall  con< 
duct  a  bilateral  verification  experiment  and  I 
data  exchange  related  to  the  prohibition  of 
chemical  weapons. 

2.  The  bilateral  verification  experiment! 
and  data  exchange  shall  be  conducted  in  twoi 
phases.  In  Phase  I,  the  two  sides  shall  ex- 
change general  data  on  their  chemical  weap- 
ons capabilities  and  carry  out  a  series  of 
visits  to  relevant  facilities.  In  Phase  II,  the 
two  sides  shall  exchange  detailed  data  and 
perform  on-site  inspections  to  verify  the  ac- 
curacy of  those  data. 

3.  The  bilateral  verification  experiment 
and  data  exchange  is  intended  to  facilitate 
the  process  of  negotiation,  signature  and 
ratification  of  a  comprehensive,  effectively 
verifiable  and  truly  global  convention  on  the 
prohibition  and  destruction  of  chemical 
weapons  by: 

(1)  enabling  each  side  to  gain  confidence 
in  the  data  on  chemical  weapons  capabilities 
that  will  be  provided  under  the  provisions  of 
the  convention; 

(2)  enabling  each  side  to  gain  confidence 
in  the  inspection  procedures  that  will  be 
used  to  verify  compliance  with  the  conven- 
tion; and 

(3)  facilitating  the  elaboration  of  the 
provisions  of  the  convention. 


18 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 ' 


Wyoming  Ministerial 


4.  Terms  used  in  this  Memorandum 
shall  have  the  same  meaning  as  in  the  draft 
convention  text  under  negotiation  by  the 
Conference  on  Disarmament.  The  draft  con- 
vention text  that  is  current  as  of  the  date  of 
the  exchange  of  date  data  shall  be  used. 

5.  Data  shall  be  current  as  of  the  date  of 
Ithe  exchange,  and  shall  encompass  all  sites 
;and  facilities  specified  below,  wherever  they 
jare  located. 

!       6.  Each  side  shall  take  appropriate 
steps  to  protect  the  confidentiality  of  the 
data  it  receives.  Each  side  undertakes  not  to 
divulge  this  data  without  the  explicit  con- 
sent of  the  side  that  provided  the  data. 

II.  Phase  I 

In  Phase  I,  each  side  shall  provide  the  fol- 
'lowing  data  pertaining  to  its  chemical  weap- 
ons capabilities: 

1.  the  aggregate  quantity  of  its  chemical 
weapons  in  agent  tons; 

2.  the  specific  types  of  chemicals  it  pos- 
sesses that  are  defined  as  chemical  weap- 
ons, indicating  the  common  name  of  each 
chemical; 

3.  the  percentage  of  each  of  its  declared 
chemicals  that  is  stored  in  munitions  and  de- 
vices, and  the  percentage  that  is  stored  in 
storage  containers; 

4.  the  precise  location  of  each  of  its 
chemical  weapons  storage  facilities; 

5.  for  each  of  its  declared  chemical 
weapons  storage  facilities: 

•  the  common  name  of  each  chemical  de- 
fined as  a  chemical  weapon  that  is  stored 
there; 

•  the  percentage  of  the  precise  aggre- 
gate quantity  of  its  chemical  weapons  that  is 
stored  there;  and 

•  the  specific  types  of  munitions  and  de- 
vices that  are  stored  there; 

6.  the  precise  location  of  each  of  its 
chemical  weapons  production  facilities,  indi- 
cating the  common  name  of  each  chemical 
that  has  been  or  is  being  produced  at  each 
facility;  and 

7.  the  precise  location  of  each  of  its  facil- 
ities for  destruction  of  chemical  weapons,  in- 
cluding those  currently  existing,  under 
construction  or  planned. 

In  Phase  I,  each  side  shall  permit  the 
other  side  to  visit  some  of  its  chemical  weap- 
;Ons  storage  and  production  facilities,  the  ex- 
;  act  number  of  which  will  be  agreed  upon  as 
^  soon  as  possible.  In  addition,  each  side  shall 
!  permit  the  other  side  to  visit  two  industrial 
chemical  production  facilities.  Each  side  will 
'  select  the  facilities  to  be  visited  by  the  other 
side. 


III.  Phase  II 

In  Phase  II,  each  side  shall  provide  the  fol- 
lowing data  pertaining  to  its  chemical  weap- 
ons capabilities: 

1.  the  chemical  name  of  each  chemical  it 
possesses  that  is  defined  as  a  chemical 
weapon; 

2.  the  detailed  inventory,  including  the 
quantity,  of  the  chemical  weapons  at  each  of 
its  chemical  weapons  storage  facilities; 

3.  its  preliminary  general  plans  for  de- 
struction of  chemical  weapons  under  the  con- 
vention, including  the  characteristics  of  the 
facilities  it  expects  to  use  and  the  time 
schedules  it  expects  to  follow; 

4.  the  capacity  of  each  of  its  chemical 
weapons  production  facilities; 

5.  preliminary  genera!  plans  for  closing 
and  destroying  each  of  its  chemical  weapons 
production  facilities  under  the  convention, 
including  the  methods  it  expects  to  use  and 
the  time  schedules  it  expects  to  follow; 

6.  the  precise  location  and  capacity  of  its 
planned  single  small-scale  facility  allowed 
under  the  convention  for  the  production,  for 
non-prohibited  purposes  under  strict  safe- 
guards, of  a  limited  quantity  of  chemicals 
that  pose  a  high  risk,  i.e..  Schedule  1 
chemicals; 

7.  the  precise  location,  nature  and  gen- 
eral scope  of  activities  of  any  facility  or  es- 
tablishment designed,  constructed  or  used 
since  1  January  1946  for  development  of 
chemical  weapons,  inter  alia,  laboratories 
and  test  evaluation  sites. 


IV.  Timing 

1.  Except  as  specified  below,  Phase  I  data 
shall  be  exchanged  not  later  than  31  Decem- 
ber 1989.  Visits  shall  begin  not  later  than 
30  June  1990,  provided  that  the  sides  have 
agreed,  with  appropriate  lead  time,  on  the 
number  of  visits,  as  well  as  on  the  programs 
and  other  detailed  arrangements  for  the  vis- 
its, and  assuming  that  the  sides  have  agreed 
by  31  December  1989  on  the  type  of  facility 
to  be  visited  by  each  side  in  its  first  visit 
to  the  other  side. 

2.  In  Phase  I  each  side  may  withhold 
temporarily,  for  reasons  of  security,  data  on 
the  locations  of  storage  facilities  that  to- 
gether contain  a  total  quantity  of  chemical 
weapons  that  is  not  more  than  two  percent 
of  the  precise  quantity  of  its  chemical  weap- 
ons. In  addition,  the  other  data  pertaining 
to  these  locations,  as  specified  in  Section  II, 
paragraph  5,  shall  be  grouped  under  the 
heading  "other  storage  locations"  without 
reference  to  specific  locations.  Precise  data 
pertaining  to  these  locations  shall  be  ex- 
changed later  in  Phase  I  on  a  subsequent 
date  to  be  agreed. 


3.  Phase  II  data  shall  be  e.xchanged  on 
an  agreed  date  not  less  than  four  months 
prior  to  the  initialing  of  the  text  of  the  con- 
vention. At  that  time,  both  sides  shall 
formally  and  jointly  acknowledge  the 
possibility  of  initialing  the  convention  with- 
in four  months. 

V.  Verification 

1.  Each  side  shall  use  its  own  national  means 
to  evaluate  Phase  I  data  and  Phase  II  data. 

2.  During  Phase  I,  the  sides  shall  hold 
consultations  to  discuss  the  information  that 
has  been  presented  and  visits  that  have 
been  exchanged.  The  sides  will  cooperate  in 
clarifying  ambiguous  situations. 

3.  During  Phase  II,  each  side  shall  have 
the  opportunity  to  verify  Phase  I  and  Phase 
II  data  by  means  of  on-site  inspections.  The 
purpose  of  these  inspections  shall  be  to  veri- 
fy the  accuracy  of  the  data  that  has  been  ex- 
changed and  to  gain  confidence  that  the 
signature  and  ratification  of  the  convention 
will  take  place  on  the  basis  of  up-to-date  and 
verified  data  on  the  chemical  weapons  capa- 
bilities of  the  sides. 

4.  Prior  to  the  initialing  of  the  conven- 
tion, each  side  shall  have  the  opportunity  to 
select  and  inspect  at  its  discretion  up  to  five 
facilities  from  the  list  of  chemical  weapons 
storage  facilities  and  chemical  weapons  pro- 
duction facilities  declared  by  the  other  side. 
During  Phase  I,  the  sides  will  consider 
whether  each  side  may  inspect  not  less  than 
half  of  the  declared  facilities  of  the  other 
side  if  their  number  is  more  than  10.  Should 
either  side  as  of  the  date  of  the  Phase  II  ex- 
change possess  a  single  small-scale  facility 
for  production  of  Schedule  1  chemicals,  it 
shall  be  subject  to  an  additional  inspection. 

Each  side  shall  also  have  the  oppor- 
tunity to  carry  out  up  to  five  challenge 
inspections,  as  specified  below.  All  inspec- 
tions shall  be  carried  out  within  the  agreed 
four  months  from  the  date  of  the  declaration 
pertaining  to  Phase  II,  referred  to  in  Sec- 
tion IV. 

5.  While  the  signed  convention  is  being 
considered  by  their  respective  legislative 
bodies,  each  side  shall  have  the  opportunity 
to  request  from  the  other  side,  and  to  obtain 
from  it,  updated  data.  Each  side  shall  have 
the  opportunity  to  conduct  up  to  five  chal- 
lenge inspections,  as  specified  below.  Dur- 
ing this  process,  the  two  sides  will  consult 
with  their  respective  legislative  bodies,  as 
appropriate,  in  accordance  with  their  consti- 
tutional requirements. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


19 


For  each  side,  these  inspections  shall  be 
carried  out  within  a  four-month  period,  be- 
ginning with  the  date  that  it  conducts  its 
first  inspection.  The  sides  shall  consult  and 
agree  on  the  dates  when  the  first  inspection 
will  be  conducted  by  each  side.  The  dates 
shall  be  chosen  to  ensure  that  the  inspec- 
tions shall  be  conducted  by  both  sides  at 
appro.ximately  the  same  time.  Once  the 
inspections  begin,  the  sides  may,  by  mutual 
consent,  extend  the  four-month  periods  for 
an  additional  specified  time. 

6.  Inspections  of  declared  facilities,  as 
well  as  challenge  inspections,  shall  be  con- 
ducted in  accordance  with  the  correspond- 
ing provisions  of  the  draft  convention, 
taking  into  account  that  these  inspections 
are  being  carried  out  on  a  bilateral  basis 
and  do  not  involve  the  bodies  that  will  be  es- 
tablished under  the  convention.  If  neces- 
sary, the  two  sides  shall  supplement  the 
provisions  of  the  draft  convention  by 
mutually-agreed  procedures. 

7.  Challenge  inspections  may  be  made  at 
any  location  or  facility  of  the  other  side,  as 
provided  for  in  the  draft  convention  text,  ex- 
cept that,  for  the  purposes  of  this  Memoran- 
dum and  without  creating  a  precedent, 
challenge  inspections  at  facilities  not  on  the 
territory  of  the  sides  may  be  made  only  at 
military  facilities  of  a  side  in  a  limited  num- 
ber of  countries;  the  sides  will  agree  later 
on  these  specific  countries. 

8.  Challenge  inspections  conducted  pur- 
suant to  this  Memorandum  shall  be  con- 
ducted in  a  manner  consistent  with  the 
domestic  law  of  the  side  being  inspected  and 
shall  be  based  on  a  recognition  by  both  sides 
of  the  need  to  resolve  concerns  and  build 
confidence. 

9.  To  clarify  questions  related  to  the 
data  provided  during  Phase  I  and  Phase  II, 
the  two  sides  shall  employ  normal  diplomatic 
channels,  specifically-designated  represen- 
tatives or  such  other  means  as  may  be 
agreed  upon. 

VI.  Format 

1.  Unless  otherwise  provided  in  this 
Memorandum,  the  agreed  data  shall  be  pro- 
vided according  to  the  specifications  con- 
tained in  the  draft  convention  text  for  the 
declarations  that  are  to  be  made  not  later 
than  30  days  after  the  convention  enters  into 
force. 

2.  Precise  locations  shall  be  specified  by 
means  of  site  diagrams  of  facilities.  Each  di- 
agram shall  clearly  indicate  the  boundaries 
of  the  facility,  all  structures  of  the  facility 


and  significant  geographical  relief  features 
in  the  vicinity  of  the  facility.  If  the  facility  is 
located  within  a  larger  complex,  the  dia- 
gram shall  clearly  specify  the  exact  location 
within  the  complex.  On  each  diagram,  the 
geographic  coordinates  of  the  center  of  the 
facility  shall  be  specified  to  the  nearest 
second. 


VII.  Entry  into  Force 

This  Memorandum  of  Understanding  shall 
enter  into  force  upon  signature. 

In  Witness  Whereof  the  undersigned, 
being  duly  authorized  by  their  respective 
Governments,  have  signed  this  Memoran- 
dum of  Understanding. 

Done  at  Jackson  Hole,  Wyoming,  in  du- 
plicate, this  23rd  day  of  September,  1989,  in 
the  English  and  Russian  languages,  both 
texts  being  equally  authentic. 

FOR  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  THE 
UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA: 

James  A.  Baker,  III 

FOR  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  THE 
UNION  OF  SOVIET  SOCIALIST 
REPUBLICS: 

E.A.  Shevardnadze 


AGREEMENT  BETWEEN 

THE  GOVERNMENT  OF 

THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA 

AND  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF 

THE  UNION  OF  SOVIET 

SOCIALIST  REPUBLICS 

ON  RECIPROCAL  ADVANCE 

NOTIFICATION  OF  MAJOR 

STRATEGIC  EXERCISES 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  of 
America  and  the  Government  of  the  Union  of 
Soviet  Socialist  Republics,  hereinafter  re- 
ferred to  as  the  Parties, 

Affirming  their  desire  to  reduce  and  ul- 
timately eliminate  the  risk  of  outbreak  of 
nuclear  war,  in  particular  as  a  result  of  mis- 
interpretation, miscalculation  or  accident. 

Believing  that  a  nuclear  war  cannot  be 
won  and  must  never  be  fought. 

Recognizing  the  necessity  to  promote 
the  increase  of  mutual  trust  and  the 
strengthening  of  strategic  stability. 

Acknowledging  the  importance  of  ex- 
changing advance  notification  of  major  stra- 
tegic exercises  on  the  basis  of  reciprocity, 


Reaffirming  their  obligations  under  thi 
Agreement  between  the  United  States  of 
America  and  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist 
Republics  on  the  Establishment  of  Nuclear 
Risk  Reduction  Centers  of  September  15, 
1987, 

Have  agreed  as  follows: 

Article  I 

On  the  basis  of  reciprocity,  each  Party  shall 
notify  the  other  Party  no  less  than  14  days  i 
advance  about  the  beginning  of  one  major 
strategic  forces  exercise  which  includes  the 
participation  of  heavy  bomber  aircraft  to  be 
held  during  each  calendar  year. 

Article  II 

1.  Each  Party  shall  provide  to  the  other  Pan 
ty  the  notifications  required  by  Article  I 
through  the  Nuclear  Risk  Reduction  Cen- 
ters established  by  the  Agreement  betweer 
the  United  States  of  America  and  the  Unioi 
of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics  on  the  Estab- 
lishment of  Nuclear  Risk  Reduction  Center 
of  September  15,  1987. 

2.  The  notifications  required  by  Articlt 
I  shall  be  provided  no  less  than  14  days  pric 
to  the  date  in  Coordinated  Universal  Time 
(UTC)  during  which  the  relevant  exercise 
will  commence. 


Article  III 

The  Parties  shall  undertake  to  hold  consul- 
tations, as  mutually  agreed,  to  consider 
questions  relating  to  implementation  of  the 
provisions  of  this  Agreement,  as  well  as  to 
discuss  possible  amendments  thereto  aimed 
at  furthering  the  implementation  of  the  ob- 
jectives of  this  Agreement.  Amendments 
shall  enter  into  force  in  accordance  with 
procedures  to  be  agreed  upon. 


Article  IV 

This  Agreement  shall  not  affect  the  ob- 
ligations of  either  Party  under  other 
agreements. 


Article  V 

1.  This  Agreement  shall  be  of  unlimited 
duration. 

2.  This  Agreement  may  be  terminated 
by  either  Party  upon  12  months  written  no- 
tice to  the  other  Party. 


20 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  198! 


J 


Wyoming  Ministerial 


The  Foreign  Minister  and  the  Secretary  signed  several  bilateral  agreements  while  in 
Wyoming. 


Article  VI 

This  Agreement  shall  enter  into  force  on 
January  1,  1990,  and  notifications  pursuant 
to  this  Agreement  shall  commence  with  the 
calendar  year  1990. 

In  Witness  Whereof  the  undersigned, 
being  duly  authorized  by  their  respective 
Governments,  have  signed  this  Agreement. 

Done  at  Jackson  Hole,  Wyoming,  in  du- 
plicate, this  23rd  day  of  September,  1989,  in 
the  English  and  Russian  languages,  each 
text  being  equally  authentic. 

FOR  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  THE 
UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA: 

James  A.  Baker,  III 

FOR  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF 
THE  UNION  OF  SOVIET 
SOCIALIST  REPUBLICS: 

E.A.  Shevardnadze 


AGREEMENT  BETWEEN 

THE  GOVERNMENT  OF 

THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA 

AND  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF 

THE  UNION  OF  SOVIET 

SOCIALIST  REPUBLICS 

ON  PRINCIPLES  OF 

IMPLEMENTING 

TRIAL  VERIFICATION 

AND  STABILITY  MEASURES 

THAT  WOULD  BE  CARRIED  OUT 

PENDING  THE  CONCLUSION 

OF  THE  U.S.-SOVIET  TREATY 

ON  THE  REDUCTION 

AND  LIMITATION  OF 

STRATEGIC  OFFENSIVE  ARMS 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  of 
America  and  the  Government  of  the  Union 
of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics,  hereinafter 
referred  to  as  the  Parties, 


Proceeding  from  their  mutual  interest 
in  using  every  opportunity  to  strengthen  in- 
ternational security  and  reduce  the  risk  of 
war. 

Seeking  to  provide,  through  stability 
and  predictability  in  the  military  sphere,  a 
solid  foundation  for  concluding  the  Treaty  on 
the  Reduction  and  Limitation  of  Strategic 
Offensive  Arms  and  with  a  view  to  expedit- 
ing agreement  on  effective  verification  pro- 
cedures for  this  Treaty, 

Desiring  to  achieve  maximum  confi- 
dence that  the  measures  being  negotiated  at 
the  Nuclear  and  Space  Talks  in  Geneva  to 
verify  compliance  with  the  obligations  as- 
sumed under  this  Treaty  will  be  both  practi- 
cal and  sufficient  for  effective  verification, 

Have  agreed  as  follows: 

1.  In  the  framework  of  the  Geneva  Nu- 
clear and  Space  Talks,  the  Parties  agree  to 
develop  verification  and  stability  measures 
to  be  implemented  pending  the  conclusion  of 
the  Treaty  on  the  Reduction  and  Limitation 
of  Strategic  Offensive  Arms. 

The  purpose  of  the  above  measures  is  to 
conduct  pilot  trials  with  the  aim  of  subse- 
quently refining,  during  negotiations,  the 
verification  procedures  to  be  included  in  the 
Treaty  on  the  Reduction  and  Limitation  of 
Strategic  Offensive  Arms,  as  well  as  en- 
hancing confidence  in  order  to  facilitate 
early  finalization  of  the  Treaty  text  for 
signature. 

2.  Trial  verification  and  stability  meas- 
ures shall  involve  agreed  kinds  of  strategic 
offensive  arms  to  be  covered  by  the  Treaty 
being  drawn  up  and  agreed  facilities  for 
such  arms. 

3.  These  measures  shall  be  selected 
with  a  view  to  e.xamining,  refining  and  try- 
ing out  agreed  on-site  inspection  and  contin- 
uous monitoring  procedures  from  among 
those  proposed  by  the  Parties  for  considera- 
tion and  inclusion  in  the  Treaty  being  drawn 
up. 

4.  Trial  verification  and  stability  meas- 
ures shall  be  worked  out  on  the  basis  of  reci- 
procity and  in  light  of  the  procedures 
agreed  upon  in  the  draft  Treaty  on  Reduc- 
tion and  Limitation  of  Strategic  Offensive 
Arms  as  applied  to  some  designated  loca- 
tions, facilities  and  arms  of  both  Parties. 

5.  These  measures  shall  be  agreed  upon 
concurrently  with  continuing  efforts  to 
work  out  the  draft  Treaty  on  the  Reduction 
and  Limitation  of  Strategic  Offensive  Arms 
and  must  not  slow  down  this  work  in  any 
way  whatsoever. 

The  implementation  of  these  measures 
must  not  be  a  precondition  for  finalizing  and 
concluding  the  Treaty  on  the  Reduction  and 
Limitation  of  Strategic  Offensive  Arms. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


21 


6.  Trial  verification  and  stability  meas- 
ures shall  be  implemented  as  they  are 
agreed  upon,  within  the  time  periods  estab- 
lished by  the  Parties. 

7.  Each  specific  measure  may  be  formal- 
ized either  through  agreements  concluded 
by  the  Parties  or  through  other  means  as 
appropriate. 

8.  This  agreement  shall  enter  into  force 
upon  signature. 

In  Witness  Whereof,  the  undersigned, 
being  duly  authorized  by  their  respective 
Governments,  have  signed  this  Agreement. 

Done  at  Jackson  Hole,  Wyoming,  in  du- 
plicate, this  23rd  day  of  September,  1989,  in 
the  English  and  Russian  languages,  each 
te.xt  being  equally  authentic. 

FOR  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  THE 
UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA: 

James  A.  Baker,  III 

FOR  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF 
THE  UNION  OF  SOVIET 
SOCIALIST  REPUBLICS: 

E.A.  Shevardnadze 


AGREEMENT  BETWEEN 

THE  GOVERNMENT  OF 

THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA 

AND  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF 

THE  UNION  OF  SOVIET 

SOCIALIST  REPUBLICS 

CONCERNING  THE 

BERING  STRAITS 

REGIONAL  COMMISSION 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  of 
America  and  the  Government  of  the  Union  of 
Soviet  Socialist  Republics; 

Desiring  to  promote  cooperation  in  the 
Bering  Straits  Region;  and 

Desiring  to  provide  a  mechanism  for  re- 
solving minor  disputes  at  the  local  level; 

Having  agreed  to  create  the  Bering 
Straits  Regional  Commission  (hereinafter 
Commission)  for  the  settlement  of  local 
minor  incidents  which  shall  be  established 
and  function  as  follows: 

Article  I 

1.  The  Commission  shall  be  composed  of 
three  U.S.  and  three  Soviet  members.  The 
Government  of  the  United  States  of  America 


and  the  Government  of  the  Union  of  Soviet 
Socialist  Republics  shall  each  appoint  three 
Commissioners,  and  each  designate  one  of 
them  as  the  Chief  Commissioner. 

2.  The  Commissioners  shall  cooperate 
in  performing  the  duties  arising  from  this 
Agreement  and  shall  maintain  direct  work- 
ing contacts  with  a  view  to  resolving  expe- 
ditiously matters  which  arise  within  their 
jurisdiction  under  this  Agreement. 

Article  2 

1.  The  official  seats  and  districts  of  opera- 
tion of  the  Chief  Commissioners  shall  be  as 
follows: 

On  the  part  of  the  United  States  of 
America,  the  Chief  Commissioner  shall  have 
a  permanent  seat  in  Gambell  and  Nome.  The 
district  of  operation  shall  be  the  Nome  and 
Kobuk  census  areas  of  Alaska. 

On  the  part  of  the  Union  of  Soviet  So- 
cialist Republics,  the  Chief  Commissioner 
shall  have  a  permanent  seat  in  Provideniya 
and  Anadyr.  The  district  of  operation  shall 
be  the  lultinskiy  Rayon,  Providenskiy  Rayon 
and  Chukotsky  Rayon,  as  well  as  the  eastern 
part  of  the  Anadyrskiy  Rayon,  bounded  on 
the  south  by  the  Anadyr  River  and  on  the 
west  by  Tanyurer  River,  including  Anadyr 
(Chukotsky  Autonomous  Okrug). 

2.  Each  Party  shall  communicate  the 
names  of  the  Commissioners  to  the  other 
Party  through  diplomatic  channels. 

Articles 

1.  The  Commission  shall: 

A.  Investigate  and,  where  appropriate, 
resolve  all  local  minor  incidents  including: 

(1)  The  unintentional  entry  by  individ- 
uals into  the  territory  of  the  other  Party 
without  the  permission  of  that  Party  or 
other  legal  basis; 

(2)  In  cases  not  covered  by  the  Agree- 
ment between  the  United  States  of  America 
and  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics 
on  Mutual  Fisheries  Relations,  the  return  of 
fishing  equipment,  including  crab  pots,  in 
the  territory  of  the  other  Party  as  a  result 
of  natural  causes; 

(3)  As  appropriate,  the  return  of 
property  which,  in  connection  with  an  inci- 
dent, is  found  in  the  territory  of  the  other 
Party. 

B.  Assist  in  arranging  emergency  serv- 
ices for  citizens  of  one  Party  visiting  in  the 
other  Party's  national  territory. 

Such  emergency  services  may  include: 

(1)  checking  and  verifying  the  welfare 
and  whereabouts  of  individuals  who  are  de- 
tained, arrested,  lost,  or  ill; 


(2)  assisting  in  the  transmission  of 
funds  for  the  repatriation  of  destitute 
individuals; 

(3)  assisting  in  matters  arising  from 
the  death  of  an  individual;  and 

(4)  assisting  in  arranging  medical 
treatment  for  individuals  who  take  ill. 

C.  Cooperate  to  prevent  incidents  of  a 
local  character  from  arising. 

D.  In  furtherance  of  the  Maritime 
Search  and  Rescue  Agreement  between  the 
United  States  of  America  and  the  Union  of 
Soviet  Socialist  Republics,  cooperate  in  the 
search  for  persons,  vessels,  and  property 
which  are  lost  in  the  territory  of  each  of  the 
Parties. 

2.  The  Commission  shall  refer  any  inci- 
dent where  there  is  a  dispute  over  the  loca- 
tion of  the  maritime  boundary  for  resolutior 
through  diplomatic  channels. 

Article  4 

1.  Persons  who  have  been  detained  for  unin- 
tentionally crossing  into  the  territory  of  thi 
other  Party  without  the  permission  of  the 
Party  or  other  lawful  basis,  shall  be  re- 
turned as  soon  as  possible  to  the  Commis- 
sioners or  appointed  representative  of  the 
Party  from  whose  territory  they  have 
crossed. 

2.  Vessels,  means  of  conveyance,  floats, 
hunting  and  fishing  gear  and  other  articles 
in  the  possession  of  the  detained  persons 
shall  be  returned  at  the  same  time  such  per 
son  is  returned. 

3.  The  Commission  shall  decide  on  the 
procedure  and  designated  meeting  points 
for  the  return  of  persons  and  property  re- 
ferred to  in  paragraphs  1,  2  and  5  of  this 
article. 

4.  The  Commissioners  shall  not  refuse 
to  accept  the  persons  returned. 

5.  Questions  concerning  the  return  of 
persons  who  have  intentionally  crossed  into 
the  territory  of  the  other  Party  without  the 
permission  of  that  Party  or  other  lawful  ba- 
sis, which  cannot  be  handled  directly  by  the 
Commission  shall  be  dealt  with  through  dip- 
lomatic channels. 

( 
Article  5 

I.  Chief  Commissioners  may,  at  their  discre- 
tion, refer  any  matter  of  particular  impor- 
tance for  settlement  through  diplomatic 
channels. 

2.  All  incidents  of  particular  gravity, 
such  as  homicide,  serious  bodily  harm  or  un- 
authorized overflight,  shall  in  every  case  be 
referred  for  settlement  through  diplomatic 
channels. 


I 


22 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989| 


Wyoming  Ministerial 


llembers  of  the  media  between  events  in  Jackson  Hole. 


3.  Incidents  wliichi  cannot  be  settled  by 
^reement  of  the  Commission  sliall  be  set- 
ed  through  diplomatic  channels.  In  such 
ises,  the  Commission  shall  make  the  neces- 
iry  inquiries  into  the  incident  and  register 
lie  results  in  a  joint  record. 

4.  The  Commission  shall  undertake  ac- 
vities  in  settlement  of  local  incidents  and 
?cord  them  in  the  record. 

5.  When  incidents  are  referred  for  set- 
ement  through  diplomatic  channels,  Com- 
lissioners  shall,  at  the  direction  of  their 
overnments,  cooperate  in  providing  rele- 
int  information. 

irticle  6 

ommissioners  shall  provide  information  to 
isitors  concerning  procedures  available  for 
le  settlement  of  claims.  Commissioners 
lall  not  be  held  liable,  and  shall  not  be  in- 
olved  in,  the  settlement  of  matters  relating 
)  claims  for  compensation  for  damages. 


rticle  7 

ach  Party  will  fund  its  own  expenses  for 
ctivities  pertinent  to  this  Agreement. 


Article  8 

1.  Periodic  meetings  will  be  scheduled  by 
the  Commissioners.  Additional  meetings 
may  take  place  at  the  request  of  a  Commis- 
sioner. The  agenda  of  a  meeting  shall  be  set- 
tled by  means  of  preliminary  discussions  or 
by  correspondence.  Items  not  on  the  agenda 
may  be  dealt  with  by  mutual  consent. 

2.  The  Commission  shall  keep  a  record 
of  each  meeting  which  shall  briefly  indicate 
the  proceedings  of  the  meeting  and  actions 
taken  at  the  meeting.  The  record  shall  be  in 
the  English  and  Russian  languages,  with 
each  te,\t  considered  as  equally  authentic. 

3.  Location  of  meetings  shall  alternate 
between  the  United  States  of  America  and 
the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics. 

4.  Commissioners  may  enter  into  the 
territory  of  the  other  Party  for  the  purpose 
of  attending  Commission  meetings  by  giv- 
ing appropriate  notification  to  the  other  Par- 
ty's Chief  Commissioner.  The  documents 
authorizing  such  visits  are: 

For  the  U.S.S.R.  Commissioners,  a  So- 
viet passport  or  identification  document  and 
written  authorization  issued  by  the  chief  of 
the  U.S.S.R.  Border  Troops; 

For  the  U.S.  Commissioners,  a  U.S. 
passport  and  written  authorization  of  the 
U.S.  Department  of  State. 


Article  9 

Commissioners  shall  inform  each  other  as 
soon  as  possible  of  actions  taken  in  accord- 
ance with  the  decisions  adopted  at  a 
meeting. 

Article  10 

1.  The  Commission  shall  decide  on  the 
procedure  for  the  exchange  of  official 
correspondence. 

2.  Official  correspondence  shall  be  ac- 
cepted at  any  time  of  day  or  night,  including 
holidays  or  other  non-working  days. 

3.  Communications  and  logistics  capa- 
bilities of  agencies  of  the  Parties,  including 
the  U.S.  Coast  Guard  and  the  U.S.S.R.  Bor- 
der Troops,  may  be  utilized  in  furtherance 
of  this  Agreement. 

4.  For  the  purpose  of  implementing  this 
Agreement,  the  Chief  Commissioner  may 
bring  to  the  meetings  an  assistant  and  an 
interpreter,  who  shall  be  enlisted  to  enter 
the  territory  of  the  other  Party  with  at  least 
ten  days  prior  notification  to  the  other  Par- 
ty's Chief  Commissioner.  The  documents  au- 
thorizing the  visit  by  an  assistant  and  an 
interpreter  shall  be  a  passport  or  identifica- 
tion document  and  written  authorization  is- 
sued by  the  Chief  Commissioners 
identifying  the  person  as  an  assistant  or  in- 
terpreter. Such  persons  shall  depart  with 
the  Commissioner. 

5.  The  crew  of  the  aircraft  or  vessel 
transporting  the  Commissioners  to  a  meet- 
ing may  disembark  the  aircraft  or  vessel 
and  remain  in  the  place  designated  by  the 
Chief  Commissioner  of  the  Party  hosting  the 
meeting  until  the  meeting  is  concluded.  The 
crew  shall  depart  with  the  aircraft  or  vessel 
transporting  the  Commissioners.  The  docu- 
ments authorizing  crew  disembarkation 
shall  be  a  passport  or  identification  docu- 
ment and  written  authorization  issued  by 
their  Chief  Commissioner  identifying  the 
person  as  a  crew  member. 

Article  11 

1.  Nothing  in  this  Agreement  shall  preju- 
dice the  ongoing  maritime  boundary  nego- 
tiations between  the  two  Parties  or  any 
agreements  or  understandings  resulting 
from  those  discussions. 

2.  Nothing  in  this  Agreement  shall 
derogate  in  any  way  from  the  rights  and  ob- 
ligations provided  for  in  other  agreements 
between  the  Parties. 


•epartment  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


23 


Article  12 

1.  This  agreement  shall  enter  into  force  on 
the  date  the  Parties  exchange  diplomatic 
notes  notifying  each  other  that  necessary 
internal  procedures  have  been  completed. 

2.  This  Agreement  shall  remain  in  force 
unless  terminated  by  either  Party  upon  six 
months'  advance  notice  to  the  other  Party  of 
its  intention  to  terminate  this  Agreement. 

3.  This  Agreement  may  be  amended  by 
written  agreement  between  the  Parties. 

In  Witness  Whereof  the  undersigned, 
being  duly  authorized  by  their  respective 
Governments,  have  signed  this  Agreement. 

Done  at  Jackson  Hole,  Wyoming,  in  du- 
plicate, this  23rd  day  of  September  1989. 

FOR  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  THE 
UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA: 

James  A.  Baker,  III 

FOR  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF 
THE  UNION  OF  SOVIET 
SOCIALIST  REPUBLICS: 

E.A.  Shevardnadze 


AGREEMENT  BETWEEN 

THE  GOVERNMENT  OF 

THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA 

AND  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF 

THE  UNION  OF  SOVIET 

SOCIALIST  REPUBLICS  CONCERNING 

MUTUAL  VISITS 

BY  INHABITANTS  OF 

THE  BERING  STRAITS  REGION 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  of 
America  and  the  Government  of  the  Union 
of  the  Soviet  Socialist  Republics  (the 
"Parties"); 

Recognizing  that  native  inhabitants  live 
on  both  sides  of  the  U.S. -Soviet  border; 

Noting  that  these  inhabitants  have 
relatives  on  both  sides  of  the  U.S. -Soviet 
border;  and 

Striving  to  promote  contacts  between 
the  U.S.  and  the  U.S.S.R.  inhabitants  of  the 
Bering  Straits  Region; 

Have  agreed  as  follows: 


Article  1 

For  the  purposes  of  this  Agreement: 

1.  "U.S.  inhabitants"  shall  mean  U.S. 
citizens  who  are  permanent  residents  of  the 
designated  U.S.  area. 

2.  "U.S.S.R.  inhabitants"  shall  mean 
U.S.S.R.  citizens  who  are  permanent  resi- 
dents of  the  designated  U.S.S.R.  area. 

3.  "Designated  U.S.  area"  shall  mean 
the  Nome  and  Kobuk  census  areas  of  Alaska. 

4.  "Designated  U.S.S.R.  area"  shall 
mean  the  lultinskiy  Rayon,  Providenskiy 
Rayon  and  Chukotsky  Rayon,  as  well  as  the 
eastern  part  of  the  Anadyrskiy  Rayon, 
bounded  on  the  south  by  the  Anadyr  River 
and  on  the  west  by  the  Tanyurer  River,  in- 
cluding the  city  of  Anadyr  (Chukotsky  Au- 
tonomous Okrug). 

5.  "Relatives"  shall  mean  blood  rela- 
tives, fellow  clan  or  tribe  members  or  native 
inhabitants  who  share  a  linguistic  or  cultur- 
al heritage  with  native  inhabitants  of  the 
other  territory. 

6.  "Designated  U.S.  authorities"  shall 
mean  designated  representatives  of  the  U.S. 
Secretary  of  State. 

7.  "Designated  U.S.S.R.  authorities" 
shall  mean  the  internal  affairs  authorities  of 
the  Magadan  Oblispolkom  and  the  depart- 
ments of  the  internal  affairs  of  city  and  Ray- 
on Ispolkoms  of  the  Magadan  Oblast. 

8.  "Chief  Commissioner"  is  as  defined  in 
the  1989  Agreement  between  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  of  America  and 
the  Government  of  the  Union  of  Soviet  So- 
cialist Republics  Concerning  the  Bering 
Straits  Regional  Commission. 


Article  2 

1.  Upon  invitation  of  relatives,  U.S.  and 
U.S.S.R.  inhabitants  may  travel  to  the  des- 
ignated areas  in  accordance  with  the  pro- 
cedures established  by  this  Agreement. 

2.  U.S.  inhabitants  desiring  to  visit  rel- 
atives residing  in  the  designated  U.S.S.R. 
area  shall  notify  the  U.S.S.R.  Chief  Com- 
missioner, through  the  U.S.  Chief  Commis- 
sioner or  through  a  Soviet  relative  who  has 
extended  them  a  written  invitation  to  visit, 
a  minimum  of  ten  days  in  advance  of  the  vis- 
it. They  shall  provide  their  names  and  pass- 
port numbers,  their  dates  and  places  of 
birth,  the  names  and  addresses  of  the  rela- 
tives who  have  extended  them  an  invitation 
to  visit,  the  date  of  their  intended  visit, 
their  method  of  travel  and  the  intended 
checkpoint  of  entry. 

3.  Upon  notification  of  the  U.S.S.R. 
Chief  Commissioner,  U.S.  inhabitants  may 
enter  and  exit  the  designated  U.S.S.R.  area, 
including  passage  through  U.S.S.R.  terri- 


torial waters,  using  a  U.S.  passport  and  an 
insert  to  the  passport  stating  that  they  are 
inhabitants  of  the  designated  U.S.  area. 

4.  U.S.S.R.  inhabitants  desiring  to  visit 
relatives  residing  in  the  designated  U.S. 
area  shall  notify  the  U.S.  Chief  Commis- 
sioner, through  the  U.S.S.R.  Chief  Commis- 
sioner or  through  a  U.S.  relative  who  has 
extended  them  a  written  invitation  to  visit, 
a  minimum  of  ten  days  in  advance  of  the  vis- 
it. They  shall  provide  their  names  and  pass- 
port numbers,  their  dates  and  places  of 
birth,  the  name  and  address  of  the  relatives 
who  have  extended  them  an  invitation  to 
visit,  the  date  of  their  intended  visit,  their 
method  of  travel  and  the  intended  check- 
point of  entry. 

5.  Upon  notification  of  the  U.S.  Chief 
Commissioner,  U.S.S.R.  inhabitants  may 
enter  and  exit  the  designated  U.S.  areas,  in 
eluding  passage  through  U.S.  terrritorial 
w-aters,  using  a  Soviet  passport  and  an  in- 
sert to  the  passport  stating  that  they  are  in 
habitants  of  the  designated  U.S.S.R.  area. 

6.  Unmarried  children  under  the  age  of 
sixteen  may  travel  only  when  accompanying 
their  parents  or  other  adults.  An  insert  stat 
ing  that  such  children  are  inhabitants  of  the 
designated  U.S.  or  U.S.S.R.  areas  shall  be 
placed  in  the  passport  of  the  parent  or  ac- 
companying adult. 

7.  The  Chief  Commissioners  shall  deter 
mine  the  air  and  sea  routes  permitted  for 
travel. 


Article  3 

1.  The  insert  referred  to  in  article  2  of  this 
Agreement  shall  be  issued  by  the  desig- 
nated authorities  of  the  United  States  of 
America  and  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist 
Republics  in  their  respective  territories. 
2.  The  Chief  Commissioners  shall  ex- 
change sample  inserts,  and  shall  notify  each 
other  of  any  modifications  to  the  insert  thir-- 
ty  days  in  advance  of  the  issuance  of  such 
modified  inserts.  The  insert  text  shall  be  in 
English  and  Russian  and  a  photograph  shall 
be  attached. 


Article  4 

Duration  of  stay  for  U.S.  and  Ll.S.S.R.  in 
habitants  in  the  designated  area  of  the  othei 
Party  shall  not  exceed  ninety  days. 

Article  5 

L  Border  crossings  by  the  U.S.S.R.  and 
U.S.  inhabitants  into  the  designated  areas 
shall  be  made  through  the  following 
checkpoints: 


24 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  198f 


Wyoming  Ministerial 


In  the  designated  U.S.  area,  the  check- 
boints  for  crossing  the  border  shall  be  Nome 
md  Gambell,  Alaska. 

In  the  designated  U.S.S.R.  area,  the 
•heckpoints  for  crossing  the  border  shall  be 
Provideniya,  Anadyr,  Lavrantiya  and  Uelen 
Chukotsky  Autonomous  Okrug). 

2.  U.S.  and  U.S.S.R.  inhabitants  may 
enter  only  at  the  checkpoint  provided  in  the 
prior  notification  to  the  Chief  Commis- 
doners. 

3.  Procedures  for  operation  of  each 
checkpoint  will  be  established  by  agree- 
nient  in  writing  signed  by  the  Chief 
"ommissioners. 


I 


rticle  6 

1.  U.S.  and  U.S.S.R.  inhabitants  crossing 
nto  the  designated  areas  pursuant  to  this 
Agreement  shall  be  subject  to  border  and 
customs  control. 

2.  Customs  control  at  the  checkpoints 
ihall  be  carried  out  in  accordance  with  the 
aws  of  the  Parties  and  bilateral  agreements 
n  force. 

3.  U.S.  and  U.S.S.R.  inhabitants  may 
)riiig  in  with  them  items  for  personal  use  or 
'ur  gifts.  These  items  cannot  be  sold  in  the 
■ountry  of  visit. 

4.  Procedures  for  taking  items,  includ- 
ng  currency  and  financial  documents,  in 
jnd  out  of  the  country  shall  be  subject  to  the 
,aws  of  the  Parties  and  bilateral  agreements 
:n  force. 


Article  7 

1.  In  the  event  that  the  passport  or  the  in- 
serts to  the  passport  of  a  U.S.  or  U.S.S.R. 
inhabitant  is  lost  or  becomes  unusable  dur- 
ing a  visit  in  the  territory  of  the  other  Par- 
ty, such  person  shall  notify  the  designated 
authorities  of  the  country  of  visit. 

2.  After  consultation  with  the  desig- 
nated authorities  of  the  other  country,  the 
designated  authorities  of  the  country  of  visit 
shall  issue  a  document  to  facilitate  return 
travel. 


Articles 

1.  U.S.  and  U.S.S.R.  inhabitants  while  vis- 
liting  in  the  territory  of  the  other  Party  pur- 
[suant  to  this  Agreement  are  subject  to  the 
llaws  of  the  latter. 

;        2.  Persons  acting  contrary  to  the  provi- 
ilsions  of  this  Agreement  or  laws  of  the  coun- 
try of  visit  may  be  denied  permission  to 
enter  the  country  or  to  stay  further  in  its 
territory. 


3.  In  those  cases  referred  to  in  para- 
graph 2,  the  designated  authorities  of  the 
country  of  the  visit  shall  notify  such  person 
of  the  grounds  for  such  decision. 

Article  9 

In  exceptional  circumstances,  such  as  epi- 
demics and  natural  disasters,  a  Party  may 
temporarily  restrict  or  suspend  entry  into 
its  territory,  by  notifying  the  other  Party 
through  diplomatic  channels.  Such  Party 
shall  give  notice  of  the  lifting  of  the  restric- 
tions as  soon  as  possible. 

Article  10 

Questions  relating  to  application  or  inter- 
pretation of  this  Agreement  shall  be  re- 
solved through  diplomatic  channels. 

Article  11 

1.  This  Agreement  shall  enter  into  force  on 
the  date  the  Parties  e.xchange  diplomatic 
notes  notifying  each  other  that  the  neces- 
sary internal  procedures  have  been 
completed. 

2.  This  Agreement  shall  remain  in  force 
unless  terminated  by  either  Party  upon  six 
months'  advance  written  notice  to  the  other 
Party  of  its  intention  to  terminate  this 
Agreement. 

3.  This  Agreement  may  be  amended  by 
written  agreement  between  the  Parties. 

In  Witness  Whereof  the  undersigned, 
being  duly  authorized  by  their  respective 
Governments,  have  signed  this  Agreement. 

Done  at  Jackson  Hole,  Wyoming,  in  du- 
plicate, in  the  English  and  Russian  lan- 
guages, each  text  being  equally  authentic, 
this  23rd  day  of  September  1989. 

FOR  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  THE 
UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA: 

James  A.  Baker,  III 

FOR  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF 
THE  UNION  OF  SOVIET 
SOCIALIST  REPUBLICS: 

E.A.  Shevardnadze 


JOINT  STATEMENT  BY 

THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA 

AND  THE  UNION  OF  SOVIET 

SOCIALIST  REPUBLICS 

Since  1986,  representatives  of  the  United 
States  of  America  and  the  Union  of  Soviet 
Socialist  Republics  have  been  conducting 
friendly  and  constructive  discussions  of 
certain  international  legal  aspects  of  tradi- 
tional uses  of  the  oceans,  in  particular, 
navigation. 

The  Governments  are  guided  by  the 
provisions  of  the  1982  United  Nations  Con- 
vention on  the  Law  of  the  Sea,  which,  with 
respect  to  traditional  uses  of  the  oceans, 
generally  constitute  international  law  and 
practice  and  balance  fairly  the  interests  of 
all  States.  They  recognize  the  need  to  en- 
courage all  States  to  harmonize  their  inter- 
nal laws,  regulations  and  practices  with 
those  provisions. 

The  Governments  consider  it  useful  to 
issue  the  attached  Uniform  Interpretation 
of  the  Rules  of  International  Law  Governing 
Innocent  Passage.  Both  Governments  have 
agreed  to  take  the  necessary  steps  to  con- 
form their  internal  laws,  regulations  and 
practices  with  this  understanding  of  the 
rules. 

FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF 
AMERICA: 

James  A.  Baker,  III 

FOR  THE  UNION  OF  SOVIET 
SOCIALIST  REPUBLICS: 

E.A. Shevardnadze 

Jackson  Hole,  Wyoming 
September  23,  1989 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


25 


UNIFORM  INTERPRETATION  OF 
RULES  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW 
GOVERNING  INNOCENT  PASSAGE 

1.  The  relevant  rules  of  international  law 
governing  innocent  passage  of  ships  in  the 
territorial  sea  are  stated  in  the  1982  United 
National  Convention  on  Law  of  the  Sea  (Con- 
vention of  1982),  particularly  in  Part  II, 
Section  3. 

2.  All  ships,  including  warships,  regard- 
less of  cargo,  armament  or  means  of  propul- 
sion, enjoy  the  right  of  innocent  passage 
through  the  territorial  sea  in  accordance 
with  international  law,  for  which  neither  pri- 
or notification  nor  authorization  is  required. 

3.  Article  19  of  the  Convention  of  1982 
sets  out  in  paragraph  2  an  exhaustive  list  of 
activities  that  would  render  passage  not  in- 
nocent. A  ship  passing  through  the  terri- 
torial sea  that  does  not  engage  in  any  of 
those  activities  is  in  innocent  passage. 

4.  A  coastal  State  which  questions 
whether  the  particular  passage  of  a  ship 
through  its  territorial  sea  is  innocent  shall 
inform  the  ship  of  the  reason  why  it  ques- 
tions the  innocence  of  the  passage,  and  pro- 
vide the  ship  an  opportunity  to  clarify 

its  intentions  or  correct  its  conduct  in  a 
reasonably  short  period  of  time. 

5.  Ships  e.xercising  the  right  of  innocent 
passage  shall  comply  with  all  laws  and  regu- 
lations of  the  coastal  State  adopted  in  con- 
formity with  relevant  rules  of  international 
law  as  reflected  in  Articles  21,  22,  23  and  2.5 
of  the  Convention  of  1982.  These  include  the 
laws  and  regulations  requiring  ships  exer- 
cising the  right  of  innocent  passage  through 
its  territorial  sea  to  use  such  sea  lanes  and 


J 

hk4 

iu> 

*^9^H^^^^E| 

■ 

m^ 

4:4     < 

*^ 

noK 

■ni 


traffic  separation  schemes  as  it  may  pre- 
scribe where  needed  to  protect  safety  of 
navigation.  In  areas  where  no  such  sea  lanes 
or  traffic  separation  schemes  have  been  pre- 
scribed, ships  nevertheless  enjoy  the  right 
of  innocent  passage. 

6.  Such  laws  and  regulations  of  the 
coastal  State  may  not  have  the  practical  ef- 
fect of  denying  or  impairing  the  exercise  of 
the  right  of  innocent  passage  as  set  forth  in 
Article  24  of  the  Convention  of  1982. 

7.  If  a  warship  engages  in  conduct 
which  violates  such  law  or  regulations  or 
renders  its  passage  not  innocent  and  does 
not  take  corrective  action  upon  request,  the 
coastal  State  may  require  it  to  leave  the  ter- 
ritorial sea,  as  set  forth  in  Article  30  of  the 
Convention  of  1982.  In  such  case  the  warship 
shall  do  so  immediately. 


8.  Without  prejudice  to  the  exercise  of 
rights  of  coastal  and  flag  States,  all  differ- 
ences which  may  arise  regarding  a  particu- 
lar case  of  passage  of  ships  through  the 
territorial  sea  shall  be  settled  through  dip- 
lomatic channels  or  other  agreed  means. 


'  Press  release  168. 

~  Press  release  169  of  Sept.  22,  1989. 

•'  Foreign  Minister  Shevardnadze  spoke 
in  Russian,  and  his  remarks  were  translated 
by  an  interpreter 

••  Press  release  170. 

■'  Press  release  171  of  Sept.  26. 

•^  Taped  on  Sept.  23  in  Jackson  Hole  for 
broadcast  the  following  day  (press  release 
172ofSept.  26).  ■ 


26 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


THE  PRESIDENT 


Outlines  of  a  New  World  of  Freedom 


President  Bush  addressed  the  Ji.Ji.th  session 
of  the  UN  General  Assembly  on  September  25, 1989.  ^ 


(White  House  photo  by  Susan  Biddle) 


I  am  honored  to  speak  to  you  today  as 
you  open  the  44th  session  of  the  General 
Assembly. 

I  would  like  to  congratulate  Joseph 
Garba  of  Nigeria,  a  distinguished  dip- 
lomat, on  his  election  as  president  of 
this  session  of  the  General  Assembly, 
and  I  wish  him  success  in  his  presidency. 

I  feel  a  great  personal  pleasure  on 
this  occasion,  for  this  is  a  homecoming 
for  Barbara  and  me.  The  memories  of 
my  time  here  in  1971  and  1972  are  still 
with  me  today — the  human  moments, 
the  humorous  moments  that  are  part  of 
even  the  highest  undertaking. 

With  your  permission,  let  me 
share  one  story  from  one  of  the  many 
sessions  of  the  Security  Council.  I  was 
the  Permanent  Representative  of  the 
United  States.  I  was  45  minutes  late 
getting  to  the  meeting,  and  all  45  min- 
utes were  filled  by  the  first  speaker  to 
take  the  floor.  When  I  walked  in  and 
took  my  seat,  the  speaker  paused  and 
said  with  great  courtesy:  "I  welcome 
the  Permanent  Representative  of  the 
United  States  and  now,  for  his  benefit, 
I  will  start  my  speech  all  over  again — 
from  the  beginning."  That's  a  true  sto- 
ry. At  that  moment,  difference  of  alli- 
ance, ideology  didn't  matter.  The 
universal  groan  that  went  up  around 
that  table,  from  every  member  present, 
and  then  the  laughter  that  followed, 
united  us  all. 

Today,  I  would  like  to  begin 
by  recognizing — again,  a  personal 
privilege — the  current  permanent  rep- 
resentatives with  whom  I  served — 
Ambassador  Dugersuren,  Roberto 
Martinez-Ordones,  Blaise  Rabetafika, 
Permanent  Observer  John  Dube. 

It's  wonderful  to  look  around  and 
see  so  many  familiar  faces — foreign 
ministers,  members  of  the  Secretariat, 
delegates.  And,  of  course,  Mr.  Secre- 
tary General — you  were  then  the  per- 
manent representative  for  your  country 
when  we  served  together.  Under  Secre- 
tary Abby  Farah — you  were  a  perma- 
nent representative  back  then,  too. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


27 


THE  PRESIDENT 


of  history.  They  failed  to  see  the  love 
of  freedom  that  was  written  in  the 
human  heart. 

Two  hundred  years  ago  today, 
the  United  States — our  Congress — 
proposed  the  Bill  of  Rights — fundamen- 
tal freedoms  belonging  to  every  indi- 
vidual; rights  no  government  can  deny. 
Those  same  rights  have  been  recog- 
nized in  this  congress  of  nations — in 
the  words  of  the  Universal  Declaration 
of  Human  Rights,  "a  common  standard 
of  achievement  for  all  peoples  and  all 
nations." 

From  where  we  stand — on  the 
threshold  of  this  new  world  of  free- 
dom— the  trend  is  clear  enough.  If,  for 
those  who  write  the  history  of  our 
times,  the  20th  century  is  remembered 
as  the  century  of  the  state,  the  21st 
century  must  be  an  era  of  emancipa- 
tion— the  age  of  the  individual. 

Make  no  mistake:  Nothing  can 
stand  in  the  way  of  freedom's  march. 
There  will  come  a  day  when  freedom  isi 
seen  the  world  over  to  be  a  universal 
birthright — of  every  man  and  woman, 
of  every  race  and  walk  of  life.  Even  un- 
der the  worst  circumstances,  at  the 
darkest  of  times,  freedom  has  always 
remained  alive — a  distant  dream,  per- 
haps, but  always  alive. 

Today,  that  dream  is  no  longer  dis- 
tant. For  the  first  time — for  millions 
around  the  world — a  new  world  of  free- 
dom is  within  reach.  Today  is  freedom's"^ 
moment. 

You  see,  the  possibility  now  exists 
for  the  creation  of  a  true  community  of 
nations — built  on  shared  interests  and 
ideals.  A  true  community — a  world 
where  free  governments  and  free  mar- 
kets meet  the  rising  desire  of  the  peo- 
ple to  control  their  own  destiny,  to  live 
in  dignity,  and  to  e.xercise  freely  their 
fundamental  human  rights.  It  is  time 
we  worked  together  to  deliver  that  des- 
tiny into  the  hands  of  men  and  women 
everywhere. 

Our  challenge  is  to  strengthen  the 
foundations  of  freedom,  encourage  its 
advance,  and  face  our  most  urgent 
challenges — the  global  challenges  of  the 
21st  century — economic  health,  environ- 
mental well-being,  and  the  great  ques- 
tions of  war  and  peace. 

Economic  Growth 

First,  global  economic  growth.  During 
this  decade,  a  number  of  developing  na- 
tions have  moved  into  the  ranks  of  the 


Ambassador  Aguilar  was  then  here  and 
is  now  back.  And  off  we  go.  It's  an  hon- 
or to  be  back  with  you  in  this  historic 
hall,  and  I  apologize  if  I  have  forgotten 
any  of  you  old  enough  to  have  served  in 
1971  and  1972. 

The  United  Nations  was  estab- 
lished 44  years  ago  upon  the  ashes  of 
war — and  amidst  great  hopes.  The 
United  Nations  can  do  great  things. 
No,  the  United  Nations  is  not  perfect. 
It's  not  a  panacea  for  world  problems. 
But  it  is  a  vital  forum  where  the  na- 
tions of  the  world  seek  to  replace  con- 
flict with  consensus,  and  it  must 
remain  a  forum  for  peace. 

The  United  Nations  is  moving  clos- 
er to  that  ideal.  And  it  has  the  support 
of  the  United  States  of  America.  In  re- 
cent years — certainly  since  my  time 
here — the  war  of  words  that  has  often 
echoed  in  this  chamber  is  giving  way  to 


For  today,  there's  an  idea  at  work 
around  the  globe — an  idea  of  undeniable 
force;  that  idea  is  freedom. 

Freedom's  advance  is  evident  ev- 
erywhere. In  central  Europe,  in 
Hungary — where  state  and  society  are 
now  in  the  midst  of  a  movement  toward 
political  pluralism  and  a  free  market 
economy,  where  the  barrier  that  once 
enforced  an  unnatural  division  between 
Hungary  and  its  neighbors  to  the  West 
has  been  torn  down — torn  down — 
replaced  by  a  new  hope  for  the  future, 
a  new  hope  in  freedom. 

We  see  freedom  at  work  in  Poland — 
where,  in  deference  to  the  will  of  the 
people,  the  Communist  Party  has  relin- 
quished its  monopoly  on  power  and,  in- 
deed, in  the  Soviet  Union — where  the 
world  hears  the  voices  of  people  no 
longer  afraid  to  speak  out  or  to  assert 
the  right  to  rule  themselves. 


In  recent  years... the  war  of  words  that  has  often  echoed  in 
this  chamber  is  giving  way  to  a  new  mood.  We've  seen  a 
welcome  shift— from  polemics  to  peacekeeping. 


a  new  mood.  We've  seen  a  welcome 
shift — from  polemics  to  peacekeeping. 

UN  peacekeeping  forces  are  on 
duty  right  now — and  over  the  years, 
more  than  700  peacekeepers  have  given 
their  lives  in  service  to  the  United  Na- 
tions. Today,  I  want  to  remember  one  of 
those  soldiers  of  peace — an  American, 
on  a  mission  of  peace  under  the  UN 
flag — on  a  mission  really  for  all  the 
world.  A  man  of  unquestioned  bravery, 
unswerving  dedication  to  the  UN  ideal — 
Lt.  Col.  William  Richard  Higgins. 

I  call  on  the  General  Assembly  to 
condemn  the  murder  of  this  solider  of 
peace — and  call  of  those  responsible  to 
have  the  decency  to  return  his  remains 
to  his  family.  Let  us  all  right  now — 
right  here — rededicate  ourselves  and 
our  nations  to  the  cause  that  Colonel 
Higgins  served  so  selflessly. 

Freedom's  Advancement 
Throughout  the  World 

The  founders  of  this  historic  institution 
believed  that  it  was  here  that  the  na- 
tions of  the  woi'ld  might  come  to  agree 
that  law — not  force — shall  govern.  The 
United  Nations  can  play  a  fundamental 
role  in  the  central  issue  of  our  time. 


But  freedom's  march  is  not  con- 
fined to  a  single  continent  or  to  the  de- 
veloped world  alone.  We  see  the  rise  of 
freedom  in  Latin  America,  where,  one 
by  one,  dictatorships  are  giving  way  to 
democracy.  We  see  it  on  the  Continent 
of  Africa — where  more  and  more  na- 
tions see,  in  the  system  of  free  enter- 
prise, salvation  for  economies  crippled 
by  excessive  state  control.  East  and 
West,  North  and  South,  on  every  conti- 
nent, we  can  see  the  outlines  of  a  new 
world  of  freedom. 

Of  course,  freedom's  work  remains 
unfinished.  The  trend  we  see  is  not  yet 
universal.  Some  regimes  still  stand 
against  the  tide.  Some  rulers  still  deny 
the  right  of  the  people  to  govern  them- 
selves. But  now,  the  power  of  prejudice 
and  despotism  is  challenged.  Never  be- 
fore have  these  regimes  stood  so  iso- 
lated and  alone — so  out  of  step  with 
the  steady  advance  of  freedom. 

Today  we  are  witnessing  an  ideo- 
logical collapse — the  demise  of  the  to- 
talitarian idea  of  the  omniscient,  all- 
powerful  state.  There  are  many  rea- 
sons for  this  collapse.  But  in  the  end, 
one  fact  alone  explains  what  we  see  to- 
day: Advocates  of  the  totalitarian  idea 
saw  its  triumph  written  in  the  laws 


28 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  198S 


THE  PRESIDENT 


world's  most  advanced  economies — all 
of  them,  each  and  every  one,  powered 
by  the  engine  of  free  enterprise. 

In  the  decade  ahead,  others  can 
join  their  ranks.  But  for  many  nations, 
barriers  stand  in  the  way.  In  the  case  of 
some  countries,  these  are  obstacles  of 
their  own  making — unneeded  restric- 
tions and  regulations  that  act  as  dead 
weights  on  their  own  economies  and  ob- 
stacles to  foreign  trade. 

But  other  barriers  to  growth  exist, 
and  those,  too,  require  effective  action. 
Too  many  developing  countries  struggle 
today  under  a  burden  of  debt  that 
makes  growth  all  but  impossible.  The 
nations  of  the  world  deserve  better  op- 
portunity to  achieve  a  measure  of  con- 
trol over  their  own  economic  fate  and 
build  better  lives  for  their  own  people. 

The  approach  the  United  States 
has  put  forward — the  Brady  plan — will 
help  these  nations  reduce  that  debt 
and,  at  the  same  time,  encourage  the 
free  market  reforms  that  will  fuel 
growth.  In  just  2  days,  I  will  be  speak- 
ing to  the  International  Monetary 
Fund  and  the  World  Bank.  And  I'll  dis- 
cuss there,  in  more  detail,  the  steps 
that  our  nations  can  take  in  dealing 
with  the  debt  problem.  But  I  can  say 
now,  the  new  world  of  freedom  is  not  a 
world  where  a  few  nations  live  in  com- 
fort while  others  live  in  want. 

The  power  of  commerce  is  a  force 
for  progress.  Open  markets  are  the  key 
to  continued  growth  in  the  developing 
world.  Today  the  United  States  buys 
over  one-half  of  the  manufactured  ex- 
ports that  all  developing  nations  com- 
bined sell  to  the  industrialized  world. 
It's  time  for  the  other  advanced  econ- 
omies to  follow  suit — to  create  ex- 
panded opportunities  for  trade. 

I  believe  we'll  learn  in  the  century 
ahead  that  many  nations  of  the  world 
have  barely  begun  to  tap  their  true  po- 
tential for  development.  The  free  mar- 
ket and  its  fruits  are  not  the  special 
preserve  of  a  few.  They  are  a  harvest 
that  everyone  can  share. 

Environmental  Issues 

Beyond  the  challenge  of  global  growth 
lies  another  issue  of  global  magnitude — 
the  environment.  No  line  drawn  on  a 
map  can  stop  the  advance  of  pollution. 
Threats  to  our  environment  have  be- 
come international  problems.  We  must 
develop  an  international  approach  to 
urgent  environmental  issues — one  that 
seeks  common  solutions  to  common 
problems. 


The  President  with  UN  Secretary  General  Perez  de  Cuellar. 


The  United  Nations  is  already  at 
work — on  the  question  of  global  warm- 
ing, in  the  effort  to  prevent  oil  spills 
and  other  disasters  from  fouling  our 
seas  and  the  air  we  breathe. 

And  I  will  tell  you  now,  the  United 
States  will  do  its  part.  We  have  com- 
mitted ourselves  to  the  worldwide 
phaseout  of  all  cholorofluorocarbons  by 
the  year  2000.  We've  proposed  amend- 
ing our  own  Clean  Air  Act  to  ensure 
clean  air  for  our  citizens  within  a  single 
generation.  We've  banned  the  import  of 
ivory  to  protect  the  elephant  and  rhi- 
noceros from  the  human  predators  who 
exterminate  them  for  profit.  And  we've 
begun  to  explore  ways  to  work  with 
other  nations — with  the  major  indus- 
trialized democracies  and  in  Poland  and 
Hungary — to  make  common  cause  for 
the  sake  of  our  environment.  The  envi- 
ronment belongs  to  all  of  us.  In  this 
new  world  of  freedom,  the  world's  citi- 
zens must  enjoy  this  common  trust  for 
generations  to  come. 

U.S.  Chemical  Weapons  Initiative 

Global  economic  growth  and  the  stew- 
ardship of  our  planet  both  are  critical 
issues.  But  as  always,  questions  of  war 
and  peace  must  be  paramount  to  the 
United  Nations. 


We  must  move  forward  to  limit — 
and  eliminate — weapons  of  mass  de- 
struction. Five  years  ago,  at  the  UN 
Conference  on  Disarmament  in  Geneva, 
I  presented  a  U.S.  draft  treaty  outlaw- 
ing chemical  weapons.  Since  then  prog- 
ress has  been  made,  but  time  is 
running  out.  The  threat  is  growing. 
More  than  20  nations  now  possess 
chemical  weapons  or  the  capability  to 
produce  them.  These  horrible  weapons 
are  now-  finding  their  w^ay  into  regional 
conflicts.  This  is  simply  unacceptable. 

For  the  sake  of  mankind,  we  must 
halt  and  reverse  this  threat.  Today  I 
want  to  announce  steps  that  the  United 
States  is  ready  to  take — steps  to  rid 
the  world  of  these  truly  terrible 
weapons — toward  a  treaty  that  will 
ban — eliminate — all  chemical  weapons 
from  the  Earth  10  years  from  the  day  it 
is  signed.  This  initiative  contains  three 
major  elements. 

First,  in  the  first  8  years  of  a 
chemical  weapons  treaty,  the  United 
States  is  ready  to  destroy  nearly 
all — 98% — of  our  chemical  weapons 
stockpile,  provided  the  Soviet  Union 
joins  the  ban.  And  I  think  they  will. 

Second,  we  are  ready  to  destroy 
all  of  our  chemical  weapons — 100%, 
every  one — within  10  years,  once  all 
nations  capable  of  building  chemical 
weapons  sign  that  total  ban  treaty. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


29 


THE  PRESIDENT 


i 


And  third,  the  United  States  is 
ready  to  begin  now.  We  will  eliminate 
more  than  80%  of  our  stockpile,  even  as 
we  work  to  complete  a  treaty,  if  the  So- 
viet Union  joins  us  in  cutting  chemical 
weapons  to  an  equal  level,  and  we  agree 
on  the  conditions,  including  inspec- 
tions, under  which  stockpiles  are 
destroyed. 

We  know  that  monitoring  a  total 
ban  on  chemical  weapons  will  be  a 
challenge.  But  the  knowledge  we've 
gained  from  our  recent  arms  control 
experience — and  our  accelerating  re- 
search in  this  area — makes  me  believe 
that  we  can  achieve  the  level  of  veri- 
fication that  gives  us  confidence  to  go 
forward  with  the  ban. 

The  world  has  lived  too  long  in  the 
shadow  of  chemical  warfare.  So  let  us 
act  together — beginning  today — to  rid 
the  Earth  of  this  scourge. 

Conventional  Arms  Reductions 

We  are  serious  about  achieving  conven- 
tional arms  reductions  as  well.  And 
that's  why  we  tabled  new  proposals  just 
last  Thursday  at  the  conventional  [arm- 
ed] forces  in  Europe  negotiations  in 
Vienna — proposals  that  demonstrate 
our  commitment  to  act  rapidly  to  ease 
military  tensions  in  Europe  and  move 
the  nations  of  that  continent  one  step 
closer  to  their  common  destiny — a 
Europe  whole  and  free. 

The  United  States  is  convinced 
that  open  and  innovative  measures  can 
move  disarmament  forward  and  ease 
international  tensions.  That's  the  idea 
behind  the  "open  skies"  proposal  about 
which  the  Soviets  have  now  expressed  a 
positive  attitude.  It's  the  idea  behind 
the  "open  lands"  proposal — permitting, 
for  the  first  time  ever,  free  travel  for 
all  Soviet  and  American  diplomats 
throughout  each  other's  countries. 
Openness  is  the  enemy  of  mistrust,  and 
every  step  toward  a  more  open  world  is 
a  step  toward  the  new  world  we  seek. 

Wyoming  Talks 

Let  me  make  this  comment  on  our 
meetings  with  the  distinguished  For- 
eign Minister  of  the  Soviet  Union,  Mr. 
Shevardnadze,  over  the  past  few  days. 
[Secretary  Baker  met  with  Foreign 
Minister  Shevardnadze  in  Jackson 
Hole,  Wyoming,  on  September  22-23.] 
I  am  very  pleased  by  the  progress 
made.  The  Soviet  Union  removed  a 
number  of  obstacles  to  progress  on  con- 


ventional and  strategic  arms  reduc- 
tions. We  reached  agreements  in  prin- 
ciple on  issues  from  verification  to 
nuclear  testing.  And,  of  course,  we 
agreed  to  a  summit  in  the  spring  or 
early  summer  of  1990.  I  look  forward  to 
meeting  Mr.  Gorbachev  there. 

Each  of  these  achievements  is  im- 
portant in  its  own  right,  but  they  are 
more  important  still  as  signs  of  a  new 
attitude  that  prevails  between  the 
United  States  and  the  U.S.S.R.  Seri- 
ous differences  remain — we  know 
that — but  the  willingness  to  deal  con- 
structively and  candidly  with  those  dif- 
ferences is  news  that  we  and,  indeed, 
the  world  must  welcome. 

Regional  Conflicts 

We  have  not  entered  into  an  era  of  per- 
petual peace.  The  threats  to  peace  that 
nations  face  may  today  be  changing,  but 


The  environment  belongs  to 
all  of  us.  In  this  new  world  of 
freedom,  the  world's  citizens 
must  enjoy  this  common 
trust  for  generations  to  come. 


they've  not  vanished.  In  fact,  in  a  num- 
ber of  regions  around  the  world,  a  dan- 
gerous combination  is  now  emerging — 
regimes  armed  with  old  and  unappeas- 
able animosities  and  modern  weapons 
of  mass  destruction.  This  development 
will  raise  the  stakes  whenever  war 
breaks  out.  Regional  conflict  may  well 
threaten  world  peace  as  never  before. 

The  challenge  of  preserving  peace 
is  a  personal  one  for  all  of  you  right 
here  in  this  hall.  Mr.  Secretary  Gener- 
al, with  great  respect,  you  have  made 
it  your  own.  The  United  Nations  can  be 
a  mediator — a  forum  where  parties  in 
conflict  come  in  search  of  peaceful 
solutions. 

For  the  sake  of  peace,  the  United 
Nations  must  redouble  its  support  for 
the  peace  efforts  now  underway  in  re- 
gions of  conflict  all  over  the  world.  Let 
me  assure  you,  the  United  States  is  de- 
termined to  take  an  active  role  in  set- 
tling regional  conflicts.  Sometimes  our 
role  in  regional  disputes  is  and  will  be 
highly  public.  And  sometimes,  like 
many  of  you,  we  work  quietly  behind 
the  scenes.  But  always,  we  are  working 
for  positive  change  and  lasting  peace. 


Threats  of  Narcotics  and  Terrorism 

Our  world  faces  other,  less  conventiona 
threats — no  less  dangerous  to  interna- 
tional peace  and  stability.  Illegal  drugs 
are  a  menace  to  social  order  and  a 
source  of  human  misery  wherever  they 
gain  a  foothold.  The  nations  which  suf- 
fer this  scourge  must  join  forces  in  the 
fight.  And  we  are.  Let  me  salute  the 
commitment  and  extraordinary  cour-    ■ 
age  of  one  country  in  particular —  | 

Colombia — where  we  are  working  with 
the  people  and  their  president,  Virgilic 
Barco,  to  put  the  drug  cartels  out  of 
business  and  bring  the  drug  lords  to 
justice. 

Finally,  we  must  join  forces  to 
combat  the  threat  of  terrorism.  Every 
nation — and  the  United  Nations — mus' 
send  the  outlaws  of  the  world  a  clear 
message:  Hostage-taking  and  the  ter- 
ror of  random  violence  are  methods 
that  cannot  win  the  world's  approval. 
Terrorism  of  any  kind  is  repugnant  to 
all  values  that  a  civilized  world  holds  ii 
common.  Make  no  mistake,  terrorism 
is  a  means  that  no  end — no  matter  how 
just  that  end — can  sanctify. 

Democracy  and  Peace 

Whatever  the  challenge,  freedom 
greatly  raises  the  chances  of  our  suc- 
cess. Freedom's  moment  is  a  time  for 
hope  for  all  of  the  world.  Because 
freedom — once  set  in  motion — takes 
on  a  momentum  of  its  own. 

As  I  said  the  day  I  assumed  the 
presidency  of  our  country:  "We  don't 
have  to  talk  late  into  the  night  about 
which  form  of  government  is  better." 
We  know  that  free  government — de- 
mocracy— is  best.  I  believe  that  is  the 
hard-won  truth  of  our  time — the  un- 
assailable fact  that  still  stands  at  the 
end  of  a  century  of  great  struggle,  of 
human  suffering. 

This  is  true  not  because  all  our  dif 
ferences  must  give  way  to  democra- 
cy, but  because  democracy  makes  room 
for  all  our  differences.  In  democracy, 
diversity  finds  its  common  home. 

At  the  very  heart  of  the  democrat!* 
ideal  is  respect — for  freedom  of  belief, 
freedom  of  thought  and  action  in  all  its 
diversity,  for  human  rights.  The  world 
has  experienced  enough  of  the  ideolog- 
ies that  have  promised  to  remake  man 
in  some  new  and  better  image.  We've 
seen  the  colossal  tragedies  and  dashed 
hopes.  We  know  now  that  freedom  and 
democracy  hold  the  answers.  What  mer 
and  nations  want  is  the  freedom  to  live 
by  their  own  lights  and  a  chance  to 
prosper  in  peace. 


30 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  igSf 


THE  SECRETARY 


JN  Role  as  a  Peacemaker 

hen  I  began  today,  I  spoke  to  you 
'about  peacekeeping.  I  want  to  speak 
:o  you  now  about  peacemaking.  We 
nust  bring  peace  to  the  people  who 
bave  never  l<nown  its  blessings. 

There's  a  painting  that  hangs  on 
.he  wall  of  my  office  in  the  White 
House,  and  it  pictures  President 
^Vbraham  Lincoln  and  his  generals 
meeting  near  the  end  of  a  war  that 
l-emains  the  bloodiest  in  the  history  of 
JTiy  country.  Outside,  at  that  moment,  a 
battle  rages — in  this  picture.  And  yet 
A'hat  we  see  in  the  distance  is  a 
rainbow — a  symbol  of  hope,  of  the  pass- 
ng  of  the  storm.  That  painting  is 
sailed  "The  Peacemakers."  For  me,  it  is 
a  constant  reminder  that  our 
struggle — the  struggle  for  peace — is  a 
struggle  blessed  by  hope. 

I  do  remember  sitting  in  this  hall. 
I  remember  the  mutual  respect  among 
dl  of  us  proudly  serving  as  representa- 
ives.  Yes,  I  remember  the  almost  end- 
ess  speeches — and  I  don't  want  this  to 
De  one  of  them — the  Security  Council 
sessions;  the  receptions,  those  long  re- 
■eiving  lines;  the  formal  meetings  of 
his  assembly;  and  the  informal  dis- 
ussions  in  the  Delegates'  Lounge 
)ver  here. 

And  I  remember  something  more, 
lomething  beyond  the  frantic  pace  and 
ometimes  frustrating  experiences  of 
iaily  life  here — the  heartbeat  of  the 
Jnited  Nations — the  quiet  conviction 
hat  we  could  make  the  world  more 
)eaceful,  more  free. 

What  we  sought  then — all  of  us — 
low  lies  within  our  reach.  I  ask  each  of 
,'ou  here  in  this  hall:  Can  we  not  bring 
i  unity  of  purpose  to  the  United  Na- 
ions?  Can  we  not  make  this  new  world 
)f  freedom  the  common  destiny  we 
>eek'?  I  believe  we  can.  I  know  we  must. 

My  solemn  wish  today  is  that 
lere — among  the  United  Nations — that 
spirit  will  take  hold  and  that  all  men 
ind  all  nations  will  make  freedom's 
noment  their  own. 

Thank  you.  God  bless  you,  and 
nay  God  bless  the  work  of  the  United 
Nations. 


Secretary's  News  Briefings 
in  New  York 


'  Te.xt  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Pres- 
.dential  Documents  of  Oct.  2,  1989.B 


Secretary  Baker  held  news  brief- 
ings in  New  York  City  on  September 
25,28,  and  29, 1989. 


SEPT.  25,  19891 

The  President  will  meet  with  [Colom- 
bian] President  Barco  later  this  week 
in  Washington.  I  don't  have  the  exact 
date  or  time  for  you,  but  I'm  sure  Mar- 
lin  [Fitzwater,  White  House  spokes- 
man] will  have  it  a  little  bit  later. 

The  President,  following  his  speech 
this  morning,  hosted  a  lunch  for  the 
NATO  Foreign  Ministers  and  the  For- 
eign Ministers  of  Australia,  Japan,  and 
Korea.  The  discussion  at  lunch  centered 
around  the  U.S. -Soviet  relationship, 
specifically  the  meeting  the  President 
had  with  Foreign  Minister  Shevard- 
nadze in  Washington  and  the  2-day  min- 
isterial that  we  had  out  in  Wyoming. 

He  then  had  a  bilateral  with  Presi- 
dent Sarney,  during  the  course  of 
which  they  discussed  the  environment, 
the  Brazilian  economy,  Panama,  and 
democracy  and  the  transition  in  Brazil. 
He  then  had  a  bilateral  with  [Israeli 
Vice  Prime  Minister]  Shimon  Peres, 
and  the  major  topics  covered  during 


the  course  of  that  bilateral  were  the 
Israeli  economy,  the  peace  process, 
and  Soviet  Jewish  refugees. 

Q.  On  Mr.  Peres,  could  you  give 
us — because  he — after  all,  he  isn't  the 
Prime  Minister,  he's  a  deputy  and  he 
really  doesn't  represent  the  govern- 
ment's point  of  view.  Can  you  give  us 
some  notion  of  where  you  and  the 
President  are  heading  on  this?  You 
had  hoped  to  have  a  three-way 
meeting — apparently  you  won't — with 
the  Egyptians.  What  is  ahead  in  the 
next  couple  of  weeks? 

A.  I  think  there  is  still  a  very  good 
chance  that  we  will  have  a  three-way 
meeting  at  the  foreign  minister  level.  I 
can't  tell  you  exactly  when  that  meeting 
will  be  held,  but  I  would  suspect  that 
within  the  course  of  the  next  week,  we'll 
be  able  to  arrange  that  meeting.  It's 
been  a  problem  with  scheduling.  I  think 
we  will  have  that  meeting. 

We  continue  to  be  committed  to  the 
Israeli  elections  proposal.  We  continue 
to  view  the  Egyptian  10  points  as  an  ac- 
ceptance, in  effect,  by  Egypt  of  Israel's 
elections  proposal.  We  continue  to  be 


[Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


31 


THE  SECRETARY 


committed  to  trying  to  promote  direct 
discussions  between  Israelis  and  Pal- 
estinians, and  we  continue  to  see  this 
as  a  potential  way  of  getting  there. 
The  President  will  have  a  brief 
meeting  this  evening  with  [Israeli]  For- 
eign Minister  Arens,  and  I  will  have  a 
more  extensive  meeting  with  him  dur- 
ing the  course  of  my  stay  up  here  this 
coming  week,  and  I  don't  know  what 
exact  date  that  is. 

Q.  That  may  make  academic  be- 
yond this  meeting  what  I  was  going  to 
ask  you,  but  let  me  try  anyhow.  Did 
he  get  any  hint,  or  did  the  two  of  you 
get  any  hint,  from  Peres  that  the  oth- 
er part  of  the  Israeli  Government  is 
about  to  come  aboard?  The  Egyptian 
idea. 

A.  I  think  the  way  I  would  charac- 
terize that  is  that  the  proposal  has  not 
been  rejected  by,  as  you  put  it,  the  other 
part  of  the  Israeli  Government;  that  it's 
a  matter  for  continued  discussion  and 
consideration. 

Q.  In  the  talk  with  the  Brazilian 
President,  Panama  came  up.  What's 
left  to  say  about  Panama? 

A.  Simply  that  President  Sarney 
was  talking  about  the  commitment  of 
Brazil  to  democracy  and,  picking  up  on 
the  President's  speech,  was  talking  as 
well  about  the  movement  toward  democ- 
racy in  Latin  America.  He  was  talking 
about  how,  in  Brazil's  case,  they  are  en- 
tering a  transition  period;  they  will  be 
conducting  an  election  in  November.  The 
two  Presidents  agreed  that  the  situation 
in  Panama  was  regrettable  when  you 
consider  that  democracy  there  was  being 
subverted  and  perverted  by  Gen. 
Noriega. 

Q.  Even  after  the  unhappy  expe- 
rience that  you  have  had  with  the 
OAS  lOrganization  of  American 
States],  are  you  still  willing  to 
try  a  multilateral  approach  toward 
Panama? 

A.  We  think  it's  very  important  to 
continue  to  note  that  20  out  of  22  Latin 
American  nations  have  basically  said 
that  Gen.  Noriega  is  the  problem,  and 
they  have  expressed  profound  regret  at 
the  fact  that  the  will  of  the  Panamanian 
people  is  being  thwarted.  We  think  it's 
important  that  they  continue  to  main- 
tain that  position,  and  we  have  every 
reason  to  believe  that  they  will. 

Q.  Was  there  any  suggestion  at 
that  meeting,  though,  that  the  Latin 
Americans  are  prepared  to  go  any 
further  than  that  in  terms  of  pres- 
suring Panama? 


32 


A.  Many  of  these  countries,  as  you 
know,  have  recalled  their  ambassadors, 
and  there  was  a  general  discussion  about 
the  continuation  of  that  as  far  as  Latin 
American  nations  were  concerned. 

Q.  From  your  discussions  with 
Foreign  Minister  Shevardnadze  over 
the  last  weekend,  to  what  extent  do 
you  think  the  Soviets  will  take  up  the 
President's  offer  on  this  chemical 
weapons  idea  that  he  proposed  today? 

A.  I  can't  respond  for  them  and 
don't  want  to  suggest  in  any  way  here  to- 
day that  I  can.  Let  me  simply  say  to  you 
that  we  told  them  this  was  coming — in 
Wyoming — and  we  have  notified  them  in 
detail  in  writing  in  Moscow.  We'll,  I  am 
sure,  see  a  response  from  them  in  due 
course.  I  can't  predict  when  that  will  be. 

Q.  But  you  did  discuss  chemical 
weapons  at  great  length  with  Foreign 
Minister  Shevardnadze.  Presumably 
you  also  discussed  at  great  length 
methods  for  destruction  and  verifica- 
tion and  so  on.  What  is  your  opinion 
of  the  way  the  Soviets  are  approach- 
ing this  question  of  a  bilateral  ar- 
rangement to  reduce  separate  from 
the  multilateral  problem? 

A.  I  read  that,  really,  as  repeating 
the  question  I  was  just  asked  here  by 
Don.  I  don't  want  to  prejudge  or  predict 
what  their  response  will  be  until  we  see 
it. 

Q.  President  Gorbachev,  in  his 
letter,  suggested  a  NATO-Warsaw 
Pact  summit  of  some  sort  to  consum- 
mate the  conventional  arms  deal.  Did 
this  come  up  in  the  President's  report 
to  the  NATO  allies  today?  Did  they 
discuss  this  outlook,  and  is  it  possible 
such  a  large  summit  will  happen? 

A.  It  came  up  in  the  sense  that  we 
reported  it  to  the  NATO  Foreign 
Ministers — and  the  Secretary  General  of 
NATO,  by  the  way,  attended  this  lunch. 
We  reported  it  simply  as  a  fact,  and  we 
told  the  foreign  ministers  that  our  re- 
sponse to  [Foreign]  Minister  Shevard- 
nadze in  Wyoming  had  been — this  is  a 
matter  for  alliance  consideration;  the 
United  States  cannot  unilaterally  make 
that  determination,  and  we  will  take  the 
request  and  consult  with  our  allies  and 
get  back  to  you.  We  are  now  in  the  proc- 
ess of  consulting  with  our  allies  on  that 
suggestion,  and  once  we  finish,  we'll 
have  a  position  and  we'll  get  back  to  the 
Soviet  Union. 


Q.  On  chemical  weapons,  it  seemsij 
the  real  problem  has  not  been  the  So- 
viet Union  but  countries  like  Libya, 
Iran,  and  Iraq.  What  about  the  Presi 
dent's  proposal  makes  it  more  likely 
that  these  countries  will  give  up  theiii 
chemical  weapons? 

A.  Because  this  proposal  really  at- 
tacks the  proliferation  problem  by  mak- 
ing it  impossible  for  these  countries  to 
argue  that  major  countries  have  them 
and  are  just  dragging  their  feet  in  cheni' 
ical  weapons  negotiations — Why  should^ 
we  not  develop  them?  You've  got  them. 
The  point  here  is  that,  assuming  the  So- 
viet Union  joins  in,  we  will  be  taking 
affirmative  and  accelerated  steps  to  getl 
rid  of  them.  So  I  think  it  does  focus  on 
the  proliferation  problem.  It  also  bringsi 
a  bit  more  into  public  focus  the  problems 
of  proliferation,  and  it  shows  what  at 
least  one  major  power  is  willing  to  do  to 
try  and  deal  with  the  problem. 

Q.  Isn't  one  of  their  complaints, 
though,  that  the  big  powers  have  nu- 
clear weapons,  they  don't  need  chem- 
ical weapons,  whereas  these  little 
countries,  it's  a  cheaper  and  easier 
way  for  them  to  protect  themselves? 

A.  The  Third  World's  atomic  bomb 
argument,  yes.  That  is  an  argument 
that  is  heard  more  and  more  frequently 
as  the  proliferation  problem  is  discussec 
but  I  think  it  is  logical  for  the  countries 
that  have  those  weapons  to  say,  look,  yoi 
shouldn't  develop  them,  they're  abhor- 
rent, and  we're  going  to  get  rid  of  ours. 
The  nuclear  question  is  an  entirely  dif- 
ferent question.  We  get  that  in  nuclear 
nonprol iteration  discussions  as  well.  Tha 
point,  I  think,  there  is — at  least  as  far  a 
the  United  States  is  concerned — we've 
had  them  for  over  40  years,  and  we've 
never  used  them.  At  one  point  we  were 
the  only  nation  in  the  world  that  did  havi 
them. 

Q.  What  do  you  do  about  a  coun 
try  like  Iraq  which  not  only  has 
used  them  but  has  acknowledged  that 
they've  used  them,  and  has,  further- 
more, said  that  they  have  absolutely 
no  intention  of  getting  rid  of  them? 

A.  If  we  get  to  the  point  where  we 
are  destroying  and  the  Soviet  Union  is 
destroying  and  other  chemical-capable 
countries  are  joining  with  us  to  promote 
an  absolute  ban,  I  think  you  bring  the 
force  of  public  opinion  to  bear  worldwide 
on  any  country  that  says  that  they're 
going  to  keep  them  and  they're  going  to 
use  them. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1981 


THE  SECRETARY 


Secretary's  Bilateral  Meetings 


Foreign  Minister  Tserenpilyn  Gombosuren 
(Mongolia). 


Foreign  Minister  Jaromir  Johanes 
(Czechoslovakia). 


His  Royal  Highness  Prince  Mohamed 
Bolkiah  (Brunei). 


Foreign  Minister  Alois  Mock  (Austria). 


Foreign  Minister  Sahabzada  Yaqub  Khan 
(Pakistan). 


Foreign  Minister  Hernan  Felipe  Errazuriz 
(Chile). 


Foreign  Minister  Nguz  a  Karl-I-Bond 

(Zaire). 


(Department  of  State  photos  by  Robert  Kaiser) 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


33 


THE  SECRETARY 


Q.  Is  it  just  the  force  of  public 
opinion,  or  will  the  United  States  use 
its  own  diplomatic  and  economic 
leverage  with  a  country  like  Iraq? 

A.  Certainly  you  would  do  every- 
thing you  could  to  bring  them  on  board 
just  like  you  would  any  other  country 
that  was  developing  them  or  keeping 
them  and  flaunting  the  idea  of  joining 
a  worldwide  ban. 

Q.  To  what  extent  is  Mr.  Bush's 
offer  of  today  predicated  on  the 
amount  of  chemical  weapons  Con- 
gress was  demanding  that  the  Ad- 
ministration take  apart  anyway?  Is  it 
a  sizable  part  of  what  you  had  to  take 
apart  to  begin  with? 

A.  I  don't  think  I  would  say  a 
sizable — yes,  there  were  some  that  we 
were  going  to  be  getting  rid  of,  but  by 
reaching  a  prompt  agreement  with  the 
Soviets,  we're  going  to  be  able  to  carry 
out  the  destruction  of  our  unitary  stocks 
well  before  any  congressional  mandate. 

The  congressional  mandate  with  re- 
spect to  unitary  runs  until  1997,  so  that's 
number  one.  Second,  it  seems  to  me  that 
there's  a  virtue  in  having  the  Soviets 
agree  to  this,  not  only  for  the  effect  that 
it  has  on  our  relations  but  also  because  of 
the  effect  that  it  will  have  on  the  inter- 
national community — gets  to  the  ques- 
tion there,  back  there — about  other 
states.  If  you  get  the  Soviet  Union  and 
the  United  States  moving  together, 
you've  got  a  heck  of  a  lot  better  chance, 
in  my  view,  of  getting  to  a  chemical  ban. 

And  third,  if  our  binary  program 
were  to  be  carried  out  to  the  full  e.xtent 
of  what  is  now  planned — and  I'm  not 
going  to  tell  you  what  that  is  because  it's 
classified — and  there  were  no  initiatives 
like  this,  our  chemical  stocks  would  be 
vastly  greater  than  the  interim  20%  lev- 
el that  the  President's  initiative  talks 
about. 

To  say  that  we're  making  a  silk 
purse  out  of  a  sow's  ear  doesn't  wash. 
We're  not. 

Q.  The  French  are  talking  about 
building  their  stocks  of  chemical 
weapons  and,  I  think,  along  with  the 
United  States  and  U.S.S.R.,  have  one 
of  the  largest  inventories.  Was  there 
any  consideration  of  bringing  them  in 
on  this  initiative  that  the  President 
proposed  this  morning? 

A.  I  think  that  there's  an  excellent 
chance  that  we  and  the  French  will  be 
seeing  eye-to-eye  in  this  whole  area  and 
that  we  do  see  eye-to-eye  in  this  whole 
area. 


Q.  On  the  question  of  sanctions, 
how  tough  is  the  United  States  will- 
ing to  be  with  nations  that  would  not 
sign  on? 

A.  I  think  that  this  will  move  this 
process  forward  significantly,  and  I 
think  that  we  would  be  willing  to  be 
pretty  tough. 

Q.  Economic  sanctions? 

A.  I  don't  want  to  stand  up  here  to- 
day and  say  we're  going  to  do  this  whole 
wide  range  of  things  because  we're  just 
now  advancing  the  initiative.  You  know 
how  strongly  the  President  feels  about 
chemical  weapons.  He  tabled  a  treaty, 
he's  now  taking  this  step.  He  feels  ex- 
traordinarily strongly  about  it,  and  I 
would  think  that  if  we  get  to  that  point 
and  could  bring  some  of  the  allies  along, 
certainly  we  would  consider  economic 
sanctions.  They  don't  work,  though,  un- 
less you  get  everybody  joining  in. 

Q.  You  seem  to  be  suggesting  that 
this  might  be  the  first  major  test  of 
whether  the  Soviet  Union  is  willing 
to  join  the  United  States  in  sort  of 
bringing  stability  to  that  part  of  the 
world  which  most  depends  upon 
chemical  weapons — the  Third  World — 
where  regional  conflicts  and  other 
problems  are  taking  place.  Would  that 
be  a  fair  assessment? 

A.  I  don't  know  whether  it  would  be 
fair  to  say  it's  the  first  test.  We've,  as 
you  know — 

Q.  I  said  a  major  test.  I  don't 
know  of  another  one. 

A.  We  have  been  engaged  with  them 
full-time  with  respect  to  regional  con- 
flicts. There  are  some  instances  in  which 
they've  taken  some  positive  positions; 
some  in  which  they've  not  taken  such 
positive  positions.  I  think  it  would  be  a 
pretty  good  example  of  a  test — I  don't 
know  whether  it's  the  first  one. 

Q.  Aside  from  the  Soviets,  what 
was  the  general  feedback  on  this  pro- 
posal at  the  United  Nations  and  the 
President's  speech? 

A.  The  feedback  on  the  President's 
speech  at  lunch  was  very,  very  positive. 
Many  of  the  foreign  ministers  there  were 
congratulating  the  President  on  his 
speech.  And  I  think  that  the  feedback  on 
the  initiative  was  basically  positive,  al- 
though there's  a  lot  in  that  initiative  and 
it  is  not  uncomplicated,  and  I  think  ev- 
erybody wanted  to  see  exactly  how  it 
would  work. 

Many  have  .said  recently  that  the 
United  States  has  been  dragging  its  feet 
in  the  chemical  weapons  negotiations.  We 
don't  believe  we  have,  but  this  ought  to 
put  that  to  re.st  once  and  for  all. 


Q.  Did  the  President,  who  you 
said  feels  extraordinarily  strongly 
about  this  issue,  raise  it  with  anyone 
he  met  with  on  a  one-on-one  basis 
today? 

A.  He  only  met  with  President  Sar- 
ney  and  with  Shimon  Peres,  both  of 
whom  were  very  congratulatory  of  his 
speech. 

Q.  If  I'm  not  mistaken,  he  has 
several  bilaterals  today  throughout 
the  afternoon. 

A.  He  has  only  met  with  two.  I  sat 
in  those  two  meetings.  I  can't  tell  you 
what  is  going  to  happen  in  future  meet- 
ings. I  will  be  in  one  of  those,  but  I  will 
not  be  in  two  because  I'm  here. 

Q.  Can  you  give  us  a  sense  of 
timing  on  when  the  idea  for  this  pro- 
posal came  about  and  how  fast  it 
proceeded — the  chemical  weapons 
proposal? 

A.  Maybe  3  or  4  weeks  ago.  So  it 
proceeded  reasonably  fast. 

Q.  Do  you  think  it  would  be  a 
good  idea  or  do  you  think  that  it 
might  come  about  that  you  would 
meet  again  this  week  with  Foreign 
Minister  Shevardnadze  here  in  New 
York,  perhaps  to  discuss  this  issue  or 
other  things  by  way  of  followup? 

A.  I'm  rather  certain  I  will  talk  to 
him.  Whether  it's  face-to-face  or  on  the 
telephone  with  interpreters,  I  can't  tell 
you,  but  the  way  we  left  it  in  Wyoming 
was  that  we  would  meet  if  there  was  a 
reason  to  do  so;  w'e  will  be  talking  to 
each  other  during  the  course  of  the  week. 

Q.  Was  there  any  discussion  at      | 
the  NATO  ministers'  meeting  about 
Poland  and  Hungary  and  about  trying 
to  step  up  the  pace  of  the  Paris  Club 
rescheduling  or  perhaps  go  farther 
than  that? 

A.  There  was  a  discussion  at  the 
meeting  about  developments  in  Eastern 
Europe  from  the  standpoint  of  my  dis- 
cussions with  the  [Foreign]  Minister  in 
Wyoming;  how  did  the  Soviet  Union  see 
this,  what  were  the  parameters,  what 
was  the  situation,  and  that  sort  of  thing. 
But  there  was  not  a  discussion  that  re- 
volved around  the  initiative  which  came 
out  of  the  economic  summit  which  is 
being  administered  by  the  European 
Community. 


34 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


THE  SECRETARY 


SEPT.  28,  19892 

Let  me  say  that  I've  just  finished  meet- 
ing with  Foreign  Minister  Meguid 
[Egypt]  and  Foreign  Minister  Arens 
'Israel].  There  was  so  much  interest  in 
this  meeting  that  I  thought  I'd  come 
flown  here  and  give  you  the  readout  on 
it  myself. 

We  met  one-on-one-on-one.  We  met 
for  an  hour  and  a  half.  We  had  a  good 
discussion,  I  think,  on  ways  to  move 
forward  in  the  peace  process.  The 
three  of  us  agreed  to  stay  in  close 
touch,  and  I  believe  that  there  may  be 
some  potential  for  progress — and  I 
want  to  emphasize  the  "may." 

It's  important  to  note  that  the 
Israeli  cabinet  is  going  to  be  meeting 
next  week  and  will  be  considering  the 
istatus  of  their  elections  initiative  as  it 
has  developed  since  it  was  announced 
last  May. 

For  our  part,  we  intend  to  remain 
active  and  committed  to  helping  the 
parties  move  toward  dialogue,  elec- 
tions, and  negotiations. 

Q.  What  gives  rise  to  this  hope 
of  yours  that  there  may  be  progress? 
What  changed  today? 

A.  It's  not  a  new  hope;  it  didn't 
spring  just  from  this  meeting.  I  have 
said  for  a  long  time  that  I  thought  the 
Israeli  elections  initiative  offered  some 
prospect  for  moving  forward.  I  think 
that  the  response  that  we've  seen  from 
the  Egyptians  is  positive  when  you  con- 
sider that  the  Egyptians  readily  concede 
that  their  so-called  10-points  proposal 
constitutes  an  acceptance  of  the  concept 
of  elections  as  advanced  by  Israel.  And 
it's  not  in  any  sense  a  competing  proposal. 

Q.  Did  you  agree  on  the  list  of 
the  Palestinians,  which  it  was  re- 
ported, that  [Egyptian  President] 
Mubarak  was  bringing  them  in? 

A.  No,  and  we  didn't  review  any 
such  list.  This  is  one  of  the  major  ques- 
tions of  modalities  with  respect  to  how 
you  get  to  a  dialogue — who  will  repre- 
sent the  Palestinians — and  that  issue  has 
not  as  yet  been  determined. 

Let  me  say  one  more  time,  the 
Israeli  cabinet  will  be  meeting  ne.xt 
week  to  consider  this,  and  we  will  really 
not  know  until  after  that  meeting  has 
been  concluded  whether  there  really  are 
prospects  for  progress  or  not. 

Q.  Did  you  get  more  positive — 
Q.  [Inaudible]  the  Egyptians 

negotiating  for  the  Palestinians  or 

what? 


A.  Did  what?  Do  I  anticipate — that's 
not  what  we  did  today.  We  didn't  get  into 
that  kind  of  level  of  detail.  What  we 
were  meeting  on  was  the  general  concept 
of  the  Israeli  elections  proposal,  and  how 
we  could  take  practical,  pragmatic  steps 
to  make  that  work — how  could  we  move 
toward  getting  Israelis  and  Palestinians 
at  the  same  table  to  talk  about  the  mo- 
dalities for  elections. 

Q.  It  sounds  as  though  you 
reached  some  kind  of — something 
that  moved  the  process  forward  in 
asking  those  questions  among  the 
three  of  you. 

A.  I  think  the  fact  that  we  were 
meeting — the  three  of  us  were  meet- 
ing— is,  to  some  extent,  progress.  Again 
I  want  to  say  that  the  Israeli  cabinet  will 
be  meeting  next  week,  and  much  rests 
on  that  decision  and  that  determination. 

Q.  Did  you  ask  or  encourage  the 
Israeli  Government  to  go  to  Cairo  and 
have  talks  with  the  Palestinians  un- 
der Egyptian  auspices? 

A.  I  don't  want  to  get  into  the  ex- 
quisite detail  of  everything  I  said  in  this 
meeting  or,  for  that  matter,  what  any- 
body else  said.  What  I  did  encourage 
was  that  we — the  three  of  us — continue 
to  look  for  ways  in  which  we  can  move 
this  process  forward;  what  practical 
steps  can  we  take  to  move  the  process 
forward. 

And  when  I  say  "the  process,"  I'm 
talking  now  again  about  the  Israeli  elec- 
tions proposal.  I  want  to  say  one  more 
time  that  the  suggestion  that  the  Egyp- 
tian Government  has  made  is  simply  the 
position  that  the  Palestinians  would  take 
to  the  table  to  start  talking  about  elec- 
tions. It  is  not  in  any  sense  a  competing 
proposal  to  the  Israeli  proposal. 

Q.  There's  a  distinction,  too,  in 
that  the  Palestinians  would  come  to 
the  table — not  exactly  the  Palestin- 
ians the  Israelis  would  like  to  have 
come  to  the  table.  That's  an  issue. 

A.  That  will  be  an  issue.  That  will 
be  a  bridge  that  will  have  to  be  crossed 
in  future  discussions,  absolutely.  The 
question  of  who  represents  the  Palestin- 
ians in  the  territories  is  a  major  issue 
that  will  have  to  be — 

Q.  Is  your  hope — the  hope  you've 
expressed — is  it  based  on  possibly  the 
hope  that  Israel  will  see  the  Egyptian 
proposal  as  a  helpful  facilitator,  or 
is  your  hope  based  possibly  on  some 
blending  now  between  the  Egyptian 
proposal — 

A.  No.  It  is  not  the  latter. 


Q.  — and  the  Israeli  proposal? 

A.  It  is  not  the  latter,  because  they 
are  not  competing  proposals,  and  what 
we  are  trying  to  make  clear — and  I  think 
the  Egyptians  quite  readily  concede — 
they,  too,  are  trying  to  move  the  process 
forward.  They  are  not  trying  to,  in  any 
way,  impede  it  by  putting  a  competing 
proposal  on  the  table. 

This  so-called  Egyptian  10  points 
would  simply  be  the  position  the  Palestin- 
ians woulcl  embrace  at  the  beginning  of  a 
dialogue  with  Israel  on  the  modalities 
for  elections. 

Q.  The  Soviets  have  offered  to 
hold  talks  of  their  own  in  Moscow 
with  all  the  parties  concerned.  How 
do  you  react  to  that?  Mr.  Shev- 
ardnadze made  that  comment  after 
his  meeting  with  Mr.  Arens. 

A.  Yes.  I  don't  react  particularly 
positively  to  that,  frankly,  because  this 
process  is  extraordinarily  difficult  to 
get  started.  There  have  been  many, 
many  suggestions  through  the  years  of 
an  international  conference,  the  meet- 
ings of  the  permanent  five  [members  of 
the  UN  Security  Council],  a  meeting  of 
the  superpowers  to  kick  this  off 

What  we  really  ought  to  concentrate 
on  now  is  not  any  of  these  other  ideas  but 
the  proposal  that  Israel  itself  had  ad- 
vanced for  a  dialogue  with  Palestinians. 
Let's  get  the  parties  talking  together  at 
the  same  table.  Without  that,  you're  not 
going  to  make  any  progress.  That  is  a 
very  difficult  first  step.  It  is  a  very 
important  first  step,  and  that's  what 
we  ought  to  concentrate  on. 

Q.  The  Israeli  cabinet  previously 
has  been  evenly  split  on  whether  the 
Egyptian  10  points  is  what  you  say  it 
is  or  is  a  competing  proposal.  Did  you 
get  any  indication  from  [Foreign] 
Minister  Arens  that  there  might  be  a 
change  in  that  deadlock  at  the  meet- 
ing next  week? 

A.  I  don't  want  to  get  into  questions 
that  involve  internal  Israeli  politics.  But 
what  is  clear  from  our  discussions  today 
is  that  the  United  States  does  not  see  it 
as  a  competing  proposal,  and  Egypt  is 
conceding  quite  readily  that  it  is  not  a 
competing  proposal  but  simply  a  means 
of  trying  to  assist  to  get  the  parties  to 
the  table. 

Q.  Did  you  get  a  more  positive  re- 
action from  Mr.  Arens  than  we  had 
been  led  to  believe  he  would  give?  Is 
that  part  of  the  source  of  your  hope? 

A.  I  don't  know  what  you've  been 
led  to  believe,  so  I  can't  judge  that. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


35 


THE  SECRETARY 


Q.  We  thought  that  he  would  re- 
ject the  10  points  out  of  hand.  Did  you 
get  a  more  positive  response  from  him 
than  that? 

A.  I  want  to  make  it  very  clear,  he 
did  not  accept  or  reject.  He  was  not  in  a 
position  to  do  so,  because  the  Israeli 
Government  will  be  meeting  next  week. 
So  he  was  quite  careful  to  reserve  on 
that. 

I  do  believe  there  is  some  clearer  ex- 
position or  explanation  of  what  at  least 
the  United  States  and  Egypt  see  this 
proposal  as  being.  I  mean,  I  think  there 
was  a  lot  of  misunderstanding  out  there. 
A  lot  of  people  felt  that  this  was  a  com- 
peting proposal  with  the  Israeli  elections 
proposal,  and  it  is  not  that  at  all. 

Q.  I'm  a  little  confused  by  some- 
thing— a  couple  of  things  you  said  to- 
day. You  said  several  times  the  Israeli 
cabinet  has  to  meet  and  make  a  deci- 
sion of  some  sort.  At  the  same  time, 
you've  said  the  decision  on  who  comes 
to  talk  with  the  Israelis  is  something 
to  deal  with  down  the  road. 

A.  That's  correct. 

Q.  That's  a  decision  you  have  to 
face  later  on.  What  is  it  you  expect  to 
occur?  You  keep  talking  about  getting 
the  two  sides  together,  but,  if  you 
wait  down  the  road  to  decide  on  who's 
going  to  come  to  get  together — 

A.  There  is  a  debate  in  Israel  now 
with  respect  to  whether  to  continue  to 
pursue  this  process  at  all,  as  I  under- 
stand. And  it  is  that,  in  part,  that  the  Is- 
raeli cabinet  will  be  debating  on — or  will 
be  considering  early  next  week. 

Q.  In  effect,  you're  first  trying  to 
get  direct  negotiations  between  Likud 
and  Labor,  and  then  you're  going  to 
get— 

A.  No.  We're  not  involved  in  that. 
We're  not  involved  in  that. 

Q.  You  said  that  Arens  would  not 
accept  or  reject  the  Egyptian  pro- 
posal as  a  way  of  facilitating  getting 
to  the  table.  Would  it  be  fair  to  say 
that  he  now  understands  that  he 
would  like  the  Israeli  cabinet  to  ac- 
cept and  move  forward  from  there? 

A.  Let  me  put  it  to  you  this  way: 
The  United  States  would  very  much  like 
the  Israeli  cabinet  to  move  forward  on 
Israel's  initiative,  announced  in  May,  to 
come  to  an  agreement  with  respect  to 
Palestinians  regarding  elections.  That's 
the  way  we  see  this. 

Now,  the  other  items — matters  that 
they  have  to  debate  internally  in  Israel 
early  next  week — are  not  something 


we're  going  to  opine  on  or  state  an  opin- 
ion with  respect  to  or  a  preference. 
That's  a  matter  of  internal  Israeli  politics. 

Q.  Will  you  be  disappointed  if  Is- 
rael does  not  go  with  this  next  week? 
What  effect  will  that  have  on  U.S.- 
Israeli  relations? 

A.  It's  not  going  to  be  something 

that's  going  to  affect  the  fundamental 
U.S. -Israeli  relationship.  Let  me  simply 
say  to  you,  we're  in  this  thing  in  order 
to  try  and  find  a  way  to  move  toward 
peace,  and  we  don't  start  out  taking  that 
position. 

I  think  that's  the  purpose  and  goal 
of  the  Shamir  elections  proposal  as  well. 

Q.  You  expressed  optimism,  and 
I'm  just  wondering,  have  you  received 
any  kind  of  indication — 

A.  I  don't  know  how  much  optimism 
I  expressed.  What  I  said  was  there 
"may"  be — we  "may"  see — some  possi- 
bility of  progress,  and  I  emphasized  the 
"may,"  because  we  may  not.  And  I  want 
everybody  to  understand  that.  This  is  a 
road  that  many  have  tried  to  travel  down 
for  a  long,  long  time,  and  there  are  many 
bumps  and  many  land  mines  in  the  road, 
and  who  knows?  All  I'm  trying  to  do  is 
give  you  a  sense  of  where  we  are  today, 
and  what  took  place  in  this  meeting, 
because  I  know  there's  a  great  deal  of 
interest. 

Q.  If  I  could  complete  my  ques- 
tion; just  for  the  fact  that  there  may 
be  some  progress,  I'm  just  wondering, 
have  you  received  any  kind  of  indica- 
tion that  the  cabinet  may  be  willing 
to— 

A.  No.  And  let  me  simply  say  that 
Moshe  Arens  was  quite  frank  in  saying, 
"Now,  you  know  this  is  something  we 
have  to  consider  next  week,  and  I  cannot 
speak  to  some  of  these  questions."  But  I 
do  think  that  we  have  identified  what 
some  of  the  major  questions  are  that 
have  to  be  answered — 

Q.  And  what  are  they? 

A.  That's  something  I  don't  want  to 
get  into  right  here.  We  identified  those 
among  ourselves.  Some  of  them  have 
been  referred  to — who  sits  at  the  table, 
what  is  the  shape  of  the  table,  who  rep- 
resents the  Palestinians — questions  like 
that.  The  modalities  of  the  dialogue  re- 
specting elections  will  have  to  be — 

Q.  You  keep  saying  that  the  cab- 
inet is  going  to  meet;  we  were  led  to 
understand  that  it  was  going  to  be 
inner  cabinet. 

A.  It  may  be  the  inner  cabinet.  I 
don't  mean  to  suggest  it  won't  be  the 
inner  cabinet.  We  didn't  get  into  that. 


I 


That's  not  something  we  really  got  into 
in  detail.  It  may  just  be  the  inner 
cabinet. 

Q.  Mr.  Peres  got  the  impression 
yesterday  in  Washington  that — and 
he  said  that  he  had  been  told  by  the 
Administration  that  the  .American 
Administration  is  not  going  to  let 
this  momentum  die.  Is  that  true? 

A.  The  American  Administration 
doesn't  have  it  solely  within  its  control 
as  to  whether  or  not  the  momentum  dies 
and  I  wouldn't  overemphasize  the  mo- 
mentum. I  said  there  "may"  be  some  pos- 
sibility for  progress.  There  may  not. 

Q.  When  you  say  that  it  is  a 
Palestinian  position  at  the  outset 
brought  to  the  table,  is  this  what  the 
Egyptian  said  that  these  10  points 
would  be  accepted  by  the  Palestinians 
at  the  outset,  and  was  there  any  dis- 
cussion of  the  10  points  as  to  whether 
they  were  a  package  deal  or  some 
were  acceptable  to  the  Israelis,  some 
were  not? 

A.  No.  Now,  you  see,  that's  where 
there's  a  lot  of  misunderstanding.  It's  not 
a  question  of  whether  they  are  accept-     ■ 
able  to  the  Israelis  or  not;  it  is  not  a         I 
competing  proposal.  The  Israelis  would 
bring  to  the  table  their  original  proposal 
with  respect  to  elections  and  the  transi- 
tional period,  and  their  policy  with  re- 
spect to  permanent  status. 

The  Palestinians,  on  the  other  hand, 
would  start  with  these  10  points  as  their 
opening  position  for  the  discussion  on 
modalities  of  the  election  and  the  transi- 
tional period,  and  they,  too,  would  be 
free  to  raise  their  bottom-line  concerns 
when  the  discussion  turned  to  perma- 
nent status. 


SEPT.  29,  19893 

I  don't  know  whether  some  of  you  who 
have  been  with  us  all  week  are  as  tired 
as  I  am,  but  I  think  it's  been  a  pretty 
good  8  days,  notwithstanding  that.  I've 
had  46  meetings  with  foreign  officials 
over  the  past  5  days,  including  35  bilat- 
erals.  To  sum  it  up,  I  think  that  the 
progress  we  made  in  Wyoming,  partic- 
ularly on  arms  control,  helped  set  a 
positive  spirit  that  is  encouraging  to 
all  members  of  the  United  Nations. 

For  a  while  it's  undoubtedly  true 
that  international  relations  no  longer 
has  to  move  in  the  shadow  of  a  bipolar 
world.  It's  also  true,  I  think,  that  the 
U.S. -Soviet  relationship  remains  very 
important  to  the  entire  international 
community. 


36 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


THE  SECRETARY 


This  week,  of  course,  also  saw  the 
President's  proposal  on  chemical  weap- 
ons which  offers  a  new  and  realistic 
program  for  moving  in  a  practical  way 
toward  a  global  ban  on  chemical  weap- 
,  ons.  It  also  presented  us  with  an  oppor- 
tunity to  address  further  the  process  of 
change  in  Eastern  Europe.  I  believe 
that  the  nations  of  the  West  are  work- 
ing collectively  to  encourage  these 
changes  with  real  support  and  also 
with  a  real  recognition  that  the  success 
of  these  reforms  must  depend  in  the 
end  upon  the  peoples  of  Poland  and 
Hungary  themselves.  We  can  help,  and 
we  should  help,  and  we  will  help,  but 
I  they  must  act. 

It  is  our  hope,  of  course,  that  oth- 
ers in  Eastern  Europe  will  not  be  long 
to  follow.  That's  one  of  the  reasons  that 
I  met  with  the  Czechoslovakian  Foreign 
j  Minister. 

I         I've  also  had  the  chance  this  week 
1  to  discuss  some  other  important  re- 
:  gional  problems  and  opportunities  in 
both  bilateral  and  multilateral  meet- 
ings. It's  been  a  productive  week,  and 
we  look  forward  to  building  on  our  ef- 
forts here  in  the  days  and  weeks  ahead. 

Q.  Could  you  expand  somewhat 
on  your  earlier  comments  about  the 
bilateral  with  the  Chinese  Foreign 
Minister  and  assess  whether  you 
see  any  change  in  China  since  the 
crackdown  in  June — any  lessening 
of  repression? 

A.  I  think  there's  a  desire  on  the 
part  of  the  Chinese  Government  to  do 
what  they  can,  as  I  indicated,  to  pre- 
serve a  relationship  that  is  very  impor- 
tant to  both  countries  from  a  geopolitical 
and  geostrategic  standpoint.  I  think 
we've  made  it  very  clear  in  the  action 
which  the  President  has  taken  and  in  the 
two  meetings  that  I've  had  with  the  For- 
eign Minister  that  we  have  some  prob- 
lems with  the  approach  toward  human 
rights  that  was  e.xemplified,  of  course, 
by  what  happened  in  Tiananmen  Square. 

I  took  this  occasion  to  reiterate 
that.  There's  a  clear  difference  of  opinion 
between  the  two  countries  with  respect 
to  e.xactly  what  happened  and  what  the 
appropriate  approach  should  be,  but  we 
will  continue  to  make  our  views  known 
in  this  respect. 

You  ask  me  to  judge  the  state  of  re- 
pression in  the  People's  Republic  of  Chi- 
na, and  I  cannot  really  quantify  that  for 
you  except  to  say  that  we  have  been  told 
that  people  who  were  simply  expressing 
peaceful  dissent  will  not  be  punished. 
People  who  were  destroying  property 
and  violating  laws — against  that  type  of 
behavioi- — will  be  punished.  That  is  the 
position  of  the  Chinese  Government. 


Q.  There  are  indications  today 
that  the  United  States  is  prepared  to 
and  wants  to  sell  approximately  300 
main  battle  tanks  to  the  Saudis.  Can 
you  say  anything  about  the  appro- 
priateness of  the  reported  effort  by 
the  United  States  to  get  the  Israelis 
not  to  gin  up  a  lobbying  effort  against 
us  on  the  Hill  so  that  this  plan  might 
go  forward?  Is  that  an  appropriate 
thing  for  the  United  States  to  do — 
to  take  that  action? 

A.  First  of  all,  you  would  want  me 
to,  I  think,  confirm  that  that  action  was 
taken,  and  I  am  not  going  to  confirm  it 
nor  deny  it  for  you.  Let  me  simply  say 
that  we  have  a  longstanding  security  re- 
lationship with  Saudi  Arabia.  It's  in  our 
interests,  and  it's  in  the  interests,  we 
think,  of  peace  that  moderately  oriented 
Arab  governments  feel  secure  and  capa- 
ble of  dealing  with  threats  from  radicals. 

We  don't  contemplate  sales  like  this 
to  any  Arab  government  without  first 
taking  into  account  the  question  of  Isra- 
el's security.  We  are  committed,  as  you 
know,  to  maintaining  a  qualitative  edge 
for  Israel,  and  that  commitment  is  sim- 
ply not  going  to  change. 

Q.  Since  you  are  on  the  Middle 
East,  you  met  today  with  the  Foreign 
Minister  of  Syria.  Can  you  tell  us  any- 
thing positive  about  Lebanon,  and 
any  commitment  that  the  Syrians 
will  ever  withdraw  from  Lebanon? 

A.  The  Syrians  did  not  challenge  us 
when  we  said  that  we  think  ultimately 
there  must  be  a  withdrawal  of  all  foreign 
forces  from  Lebanon.  In  fact,  I  got  the 
distinct  impression  from  the  discussion 
that  they  clearly  agree  with  that. 

The  [Foreign]  Minister  did  say  that 
they  support  the  [Arab  League]  Tripar- 
tite Committee's  approach,  and  we,  of 
course,  have  expressed  our  support  for 
that  approach. 

Q.  What  about  the  peace  process? 
Did  he  support  it,  or  [is]  Syria  re- 
jecting it?  Was  that  condition  about 
Mubarak's  10  points — did  you  discuss 
that  with  Syria? 

A.  Do  they  support  the  Tripartite 
Committee's  approach  in  Lebanon? 

Q.  No,  no.  About  the  10  points  of 
Mubarak;  are  they  still  against  it? 

A.  The  position  of  Syria  is  that  they 
should  be  involved  in  any  negotiations 
regarding  the  peace  process  in  the  Mid- 
dle East,  and  I  explained  to  them  that  it 
is  not  the  policy  of  the  United  States 
that  they  should  not  be  involved.  Of  ne- 
cessity, they  will  have  to  be  involved 
where  we  are  dealing  with  questions 
involving  the  Golan  Heights. 


However,  the  problem  confronting 
us  is  to  find  a  way  to  get  Palestinians 
and  Israelis  talking  to  each  other,  and  it 
may  be  that  we  can  do  that  without  the 
active  involvement  of  the  Government  of 
Syria.  That's  the  point  I  made  to  them. 

Q.  Did  they  buy  the  argument 
that  they  should  not  be  involved  in 
any  way  in  negotiations  that  do  not 
involve  issues  of  the  Golan  Heights? 

A.  They  didn't — that's  not  really  the 
way  it  was  put.  The  way  it  was  put  was 
that  it's  not  our  policy  to  take  a — of  gen- 
eral exclusion  of  Syria  from  peace  proc- 
ess discussions.  And,  clearly,  they  must 
be  involved  where  we're  talking  about 
the  Golan  Heights. 

Q.  On  the  Middle  East,  today  you 
and  the  other  four  representatives — 
the  five  permanent  members — signed 
a  statement,  and  in  it,  it  says  the 
ministers — including  you — "the  Min- 
isters reaffirm  their  support  for  an 
active  peace  process  in  which  all  rele- 
vant parties  would  participate."  Is 
that  a  code  word  for  an  international 
conference,  including  the  five  perma- 
nent members? 

A.  No.  Are  you  talking  about  the 
communique  that  came  out  of  the  lunch- 
eon that  the  Secretary  General  gave  for 
the  five  permanent  members?  It's  not  a 
code  word  in  our  view.  You'd  have  to  ask 
others  about  their  interpretation,  but  as 
far  as  the  United  States  is  concerned, 
that  is  not  a  code  word  for 
an  international  conference. 

Q.  What  do  you  mean  by  "all 
relevant  parties"  then? 

A.  What  we  mean  right  now  are  the 
parties  that  are  necessary  to  begin  the 
process  of  dialogue  and  negotiation. 

Q.  Who  are? 

A.  Right  now  that's  Palestinians  and 
Israelis.  It  may  be  that  in  order  to  get 
there,  we  may  need  to  see  the  involve- 
ment of  the  United  States.  We  may  need 
to  see  the  involvement  of  Egypt.  It 
seems  to  me  that,  again,  the  name  of  the 
game  is  to  get  Israelis  talking  to  Palestin- 
ians; and  whatever  is  required  in  that 
regard  is  what  needs  to  be  done,  and 
that  would  include  the  question  of  who 
should  be  in  attendance  at  any  initial 
session  of  that  sort. 

Q.  Now  that  you've  seen  Poland's 
reform  plan,  could  that  be  the  basis, 
or  do  you  think  it  should  be  the  basis, 
for  more  aid  from  the  United  States, 
that's  not  through  the  IMF  [Interna- 
tional Monetary  Fund],  but  in  addi- 
tion to? 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


37 


THE  SECRETARY 


A.  I  think  it  could  be,  and  that  is  a 
matter  that  is  going  to  be  considered  by 
the  Administration  next  week.  I  think 
it's  important  to  note  that  the  stabiliza- 
tion proposal  that  they  have  submitted  is 
consistent  with  the  general  principles 
that  the  President  outlined  in  announc- 
ing his  initial  package  of  aid  before  the 
government  moved  from  a  communist 
government  to  a  democratic  form  of 
government. 

We  had  a  discussion  last  night  at  the 
dinner  of  the  summit  seven  about  the  im- 
portance of  that  stabilization  proposal. 
As  you  may  know,  the  Gl-24  has  met,  and 
there  have  been  pledges  made  to  Poland 
and  Hungary  in  the  amount  of — well,  I 
don't  want  to  put  an  amount  on  it,  be- 
cause I'm  not  sure  of  the  e.\act  amount — 
but  a  substantial,  three-figure,  millions 
of  dollars. 

The  question  is,  will  those  commit- 
ments be  made  as  a  part  of  the  stabiliza- 
tion proposal,  or  will  they  be  made 
separately?  That's  still  a  question  that 
has  to  be  decided. 

Q.  Would  you  comment  on  the 
Afghan  Foreign  Minister's  proposal 
that  the  United  States  send  an  envoy 
to  Kabul  and  also  the  proposal  he 
made  for  a  settlement  in  Afghanistan? 

A.  For  a  settlement.  I'm  not  sure 
that  I  am  aware  of  the  full  details  of 
what  he  said  about  a  settlement  in 
Afghanistan.  Let  me  simply  say  that  the 
United  States  would  like  to  see  a  politi- 
cal settlement  in  Afghanistan.  The  one 
bar  to  that  right  now  is  the  issue  of 
transfer — not  sharing  but  transfer — of 
power  fi-om  Najibullah  to  a  government 
that  is  acceptable  to  all  Afghan  parties. 

That  is  the  one  thing,  in  our  view, 
that  stands  between  us  and  a  political 
settlement  in  Afghanistan.  The  United 
States,  when  it  evacuated  its  Embassy  in 
Kabul  for  security  reasons,  made  it  very 
clear  that  that  was  not  a  permanent 
evacuation,  and  we  will  return  when  we 
think  that  the  situation  warrants  it. 

Q.  What  did  you  demand  or  re- 
quire for  the  Chilean  Government 
about  Le teller's  case? 

A.  We  require  a  solution  of  that 
case.  That's  been  a  longstanding  demand 
of  the  U.S.  Government  with  respect  to 
our  relationship  with  Chile. 

Q.  President  Mubarak  will  be 
going  Monday  to  meet  with  President 
Bush  in  Washington.  How  far  do  you 
expect  some  kind  of  progress  can  be 
achieved  and  what  have  you  done  so 
far  with  the  Egyptians  and  the 
Israelis? 


A.  I  would  hope  that  there  will  be 
some  progress,  but,  as  I  indicated  to  you 
in  a  brief  press  conference  yesterday,  the 
real  question  is  what  action  the  Govern- 
ment of  Israel  takes  when  their  cabinet 
meets  early  next  week. 

I  think  that  President  Mubarak  and 
President  Bush  both  want  to  see  the 
Shamir  elections  proposal  advanced.  I'll 
say  one  more  time  that  the  Egyptian  10 
points  is  not  a  competing  proposal.  It  is 
simply  a  method  of  trying  to  get  imple- 
mentation of  the  Shamir  proposal  and 
simply  a  way  to  afford  Palestinians  to 
meet  with  Israelis.  It  would  be  an  open- 
ing position  or  position  that  would  be 
adopted  by  Palestinians  when  they  sit 
down  with  Israelis  to  talk  about  elections. 

Q.  What  would  be  the  position  of 
the  United  States  if,  when  the  Israeli 
cabinet  meets  next  week,  they  do  not 
take  favorable  action  or  any  action  on 
the  proposal? 

A.  We'd  have  to  go  back  to  the 
drawing  board,  wouldn't  we? 

Q.  It  appears  that  you're  trying 
to  send  them  a  message  in  advance. 

A.  No.  We  want  to  see  progress  to- 
ward peace.  We  think  that  the  Shamir 
proposal  represented  an  excellent  oppor- 
tunity to  get  there,  and  we  just  hope 
that  the  Israeli  Government  will  be  as 
firmly  committed  to  that  proposal  as  it 
has  been  in  the  past  and  will  decide  to 
move  forward  toward  peace. 

Q.  You  met  with  Mexico's  Foreign 
Secretary  and  talked  about  the  agen- 
da of  the  next  week's  visit  by  Presi- 
dent Salinas.  How  do  you  assess  the 
relationship  between  Mexico  and  the 
United  States? 

A.  Better  than  it's  been  in  quite 
a  few  years,  and  I  think  that  view  is 
shared  by  the  Presidents  of  both 
countries — better  than  it's  been,  if  I 
might  say  so,  during  the  9  years  that 
I  have  been  a  member  of  the  U.S. 
Government. 

Q.  The  Swedish  Foreign  Minister 
said  that  continued  U.S.  aid  to  the 
mujahidin  is  [inaudible].  What  is 
your  comment  on  that,  and  what 
should  the  United  States  do  now,  and 
what  will  it  do  now  to  get  a  political 
settlement  in  Afghanistan?  I  mean,  it 
has  been  a  stalemate  for  months  now. 

A.  Let  me  comment  on  human- 
itarian assistance  which  the  United 
States  is  sending  to  the  mujahidin.  We 
don't  think  that's  a  bar  to  a  settlement  in 
Afghanistan. 

Insofar  as  what  we're  willing  to  do 
toward  arriving  at  a  settlement,  we  are 


willing  to  exercise  our  diplomacy,  as  we 
do  every  time  we  get  together  with  the 
Soviets  and  others,  as  we  have  done  on  a 
number  of  occasions  just  today.  We  had  a 
full  discussion  of  that  as  well  at  the  Sec- 
retary General's  lunch  for  the  permanent 
five. 

Q.  A  lot  has  been  said  about  Po- 
land as  well  as  about  Hungary. 
Could  you  elaborate  what  real  aid — 
American  aid — you  have  mentioned 
would  be  for  Hungary,  and  could  you 
sum  up  your  meetings  with  the  Hun- 
garian Foreign  Minister? 

A.  Yes.  I'll  be  glad  to.  I  included 
Poland  and  Hungary  in  my  opening 
statement  when  I  talked  about  spending 
some  time  this  week  further  addressing 
the  changes  in  Eastern  Europe;  and  the 
changes  in  Hungary  we  see  as  every  bit 
as  important  as  the  changes  in  Poland. 
It's  not  a  case  of  weighing  one  against 
the  other. 

Poland  is  making  a  bit  more  prog- 
ress on  the  political  side  in  its  reform. 
That  may  still  be  coming  in  Hungary. 
Hungary,  on  the  other  hand,  has  been 
making  a  bit  more  progress  than  Poland' 
on  the  economic  side. 

We  had  a  full  discussion  of  these  is- 
sues when  the  Hungarian  Foreign  Minis- 
ter met  with  me — a  discussion  of  how  we 
can  assist  them  in  the  reform  effort.  We 
talked  about  the  courageous  decision 
that  the  Hungarian  Government  had  to 
make  with  respect  to  refugees  from  the  ■ 
German  Democratic  Republic  seeking  toi 
go  to  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
and  a  whole  host  of  other  issues. 

Q.  If  I  may  go  back  to  the  Middle 
East.  When  you  said  that  you  are 
waiting  for  the  decision  from  the  Is- 
raeli Government,  what  do  you  expect 
to  follow — that  they  will  negotiate 
only  on  elections  in  the  territories,  or 
is  it  any  way  linked  with  the  compre- 
hensive settlement? 

A.  I  think  we  have  to  take  the  peace 
process  in  the  Middle  East  a  step  at  a 
time,  and  I  think  we  have  to  crawl  before 
we  walk,  and  walk  before  we  run.  The 
name  of  the  game  right  now,  it  seems  to 
me,  is  to,  for  the  first  time,  get  Israelis 
and  Palestinians  talking  to  each  other 

Initially,  of  course,  they  should  talk 
about  elections  and  the  modalities  for 
such  elections.  Ultimately,  those  discus- 
sions should  evolve  into  discussions  of 
transitional  arrangements  and  discus- 
sions respecting  permanent  status. 


3 
J 
( 

J 


>  Press  release  174  of  Sept.  26.  1989. 
-  Press  release  176  of  Sept.  29. 
^  Press  release  179.  ■ 


38 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1983. 


THE  SECRETARY 


News  Conference  of  September  19 


Secretary  Baker  held  a  news 
conference  at  the  Departinent  of  State 
on  September  19, 1989.^ 

I  thought  I  would  join  you  today  to 
share  a  few  perspectives  on  the  upcom- 
ing ministerial  [with  Soviet  Foreign 
Minister  Shevardnadze  in  Jackson 
Hole,  Wyoming],  so  I  have  a  short 
statement  that  I'd  like  to  give  you, 
and  then  I'd  be  pleased  to  take  your 
questions. 

These  discussions  are  taking  place 
against  a  backdrop  of  significant  major 
changes  in  the  Soviet  Union.  We  recog- 
nize progress,  but  we  are  also  alert  to 
the  severe  challenges  and  pressures 
which  the  Soviets  face. 

There  are  no  simple  or  quick  fixes 
to  these.  No  one  from  the  outside  can 
solve  these  problems  for  them.  Having 
learned  the  lessons  of  what  General 
Secretary  Gorbachev  calls  the  "era  of 
stagnation,"  the  Soviets  know  that  it's 
up  to  them  to  make  the  fundamental 
structural  reforms  that  are  necessary. 
The  General  Secretary  has  called  it  a 
revolution,  and  we  would  agree  with 
that  characterization. 

So  the  question  is:  What  can  and 
what  should  we  do?  The  answer,  I 
think,  to  that  is  that  we  should  find 
points  of  mutual  advantage,  gains  that 
help  them  but  that  also  at  the  same 
time  serve  our  interests.  This  approach 
requires,  of  course,  some  creativity  on 
the  part  of  both  of  us. 

I  think  that  this  ministerial  will 
reflect  that  strategy.  We  are  now  fully 
engaged  across  an  increasingly  broad- 
ened agenda — broadened,  if  I  may  say 
so,  at  our  suggestion  in  earlier  meet- 
ings between  us.  So  let  me  mention 
some  of  the  things  that  we  are  doing 
that  we  think  are  to  the  mutual  advan- 
tage of  both  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union. 

First,  I  think  it's  fair  to  say  that 
the  Soviets  can  best  concentrate  on 
internal  reform  if  the  e.xternal  inter- 
national environment  is  stable  and 
positive.  That's  one  reason  why  we've 
urged  them  to  join  us  in  trying  to  set- 
tle regional  conflicts.  It  could  also  save 
the  Soviets  billions  of  dollars  that  we 
still  see  spent  in  a  disappointing  pat- 
tern of  support  for  those  who  fuel 
conflict — in  Central  America,  Cam- 
bodia, Afghanistan,  Cuba,  Ethiopia, 
and  elsewhere. 


Second,  arms  control  could  offer 
the  Soviets  some  real  economic  savings 
if  they  respond  positively  to  our  con- 
ventional forces  initiative.  I  would  sug- 
gest that  it's  their  turn  to  move,  and  we 
hope  that  they  will.  I  think  we  stand  to 
make  progress  across  a  broad  front  of 
other  arms  control  issues  at  this  forth- 
coming ministerial. 

We  will  be  offering  proposals  de- 
signed to  break  the  15-year  nuclear 
testing  logjam,  which  could  free  up  to 
two  testing  treaties  for  ratification 
next  year. 

In  the  area  of  chemical  weapons, 
we  have,  I  think,  a  reasonable  shot 
at  an  agreement  to  exchange  data  on 
chemical  stocks  which  I  think  is  a  first 
practical  step  toward  achieving  real 
controls  and  eventually  a  total  ban. 

In  START  [strategic  arms  reduc- 
tion talks],  we  look  forward  to  a  posi- 
tive Soviet  response  to  our  verification 
and  stabilization  initiatives.  Agree- 
ment on  this  topic  now,  of  course,  would 
help  with  ratification  later,  as  the  Pres- 
ident indicated  when  these  initiatives 
were  announced.  I  also  expect  START 
to  be  a  major  subject  in  the  arms  con- 
trol letter  that  [Foreign]  Minister 
Shevardnadze  has  said  he  would  bring. 
And  while  we  had  hoped  to  see  this  let- 
ter in  advance  of  the  ministerial  so  that 
we  could  work  on  the  subjects  it  raises 
this  week,  we  will  and  do  appreciate 
movement  whenever  we  get  it. 

However,  to  start  the  ball  rolling 
this  week,  I  am  announcing  today  that 
we  will  lift  our  ban  on  mobile  ICBMs 
[intercontinental  ballistic  missiles]  in 
START,  contingent  upon  congressional 
funding  of  our  mobile  ICBMs.  We  will 
be  instructing  our  START  negotiators 
in  Geneva  to  work  out  the  appropriate 
details  of  limits  to  be  applied  to 
mobile  ICBMs  and  effective  verifi- 
cation measures. 

A  third  way  that  I  think  we  can 
make  a  constructive  contribution  to 
perestroika  is  to  assist  the  possible  cat- 
alytic reform  processes  in  Poland  and 
Hungary.  And  this  week,  I'll  be  speak- 
ing with  [Foreign]  Minister  Shevard- 
nadze about  our  intentions  to  play  a 
positive  role  in  helping  those  two  na- 
tions help  themselves. 

Finally,  I  believe  our  efforts  to  in- 
stitutionalize the  human  rights  agenda 
with  the  Soviets  to  expand  our  joint  ef- 
forts on  transnational  problems  such  as 
the  environment  can  support  glasnost 
through  fostering  a  pluralistic  society 


in  the  Soviet  Union.  I  will  be  giving 
the  [Foreign]  Minister  a  list  of  possible 
environmental  initiatives,  and  I  hope 
that  we  can  reach  an  agreement  on  a 
human  rights  statement,  on  the  rule 
of  law,  and  other  topics. 

We  seek  to  encourage  a  spirit  of 
openness  between  the  Soviet  Union 
and  the  United  States,  and  that's  a 
spirit  that  we  hope  to  find  in  Wyoming. 

Q.  Could  you  give  us  some  details 
on  what  you  have  in  mind  specifically 
on  mobile  missiles? 

A.  We  want  to  make  it  clear  that  if 
the  Congress  funds  the  strategic  mod- 
ernization program  that  the  President 
has  asked  for,  we  will  lift  the  ban  which 
currently  is  in  place  in  the  START  nego- 
tiations on  mobile  missiles. 

Q.  In  other  words,  you  would  per- 
mit the  Soviets  to  keep  the  SS-25s? 

A.  No,  we  will  lift  the  ban,  but,  as 
I  indicated,  we  will  instruct  our  negotia- 
tors in  Geneva  to  begin  discussions  upon 
the  appropriate  limits  and  effective  veri- 
fication measures  with  respect  to  mobile 
missiles.  So  those  two  things  will  still 
have  to  be  negotiated  out  within  the  con- 
text of  the  START  discussions. 

Q.  Will  the  chemical  weapons 
agreement  that  seems  to  be  in  sight 
include  inspection  of  American  chem- 
ical weapons  on  West  German  soil,  or 
are  the  Germans  objecting,  and  are 
you  going  to  finesse  that  issue? 

A.  I'd  rather  wait  to  see  if  we  can 
close  this  out,  because  there  are  still  a 
few  issues.  I  said  I  think  we  have  a  fair 
shot  at  this,  and  that's  exactly  where  we 
are  today.  You  had  put  your  finger  on 
one  of  the  last  issues  to  be  resolved.  But 
this  would  involve  a  two-stage  exchange 
of  information  on  locations  and  quan- 
tities of  U.S.  and  Soviet  stocks,  as  well 
as  a  regime  of  inspections  to  confirm  the 
data. 

Q.  Is  a  second  stage  to  tie  in 
the  inspection  regime  to  a  40-nation 
agreement,  or  do  you  hope  to  have  an 
agreement  that  will  stand  on  its  own 
bilaterally,  possibly  being  a  model  for 
others  but  one  that  can  be  carried  out 
by  these  two  countries? 

A.  We  would,  of  course,  prefer  ulti- 
mately to  find  ourselves  in  the  position 
of  moving  multilaterally  in  this  area. 
If  we  can't  do  that,  then,  of  course, 
we  will  move  to  the  extent  that  we 
can  bilaterally. 

Q.  The  United  States,  if  it  lifts 
its  own  distaste  for  mobile  missiles 
unilaterally,  as  you  appear  to  be  an- 
nouncing you're  willing  to  do,  would 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


39 


THE  SECRETARY 


you  expect  the  Soviets  perhaps  to  do 
the  same  thing  with  their  insistence 
on  controlling  submarine-launched 
cruise  missiles  (SLCMs)?  Would  that 
be  something  that  you'd  expect  of  a 
reciprocal — 

A.  I  can't  forecast  what  might  be 
included  in  the  proposal  that  we  presume 
we  will  see  on  Thursday.  So  I  really 
would  prefer  not  to  just  speculate  here 
with  you.  I  just  don't  know  what  could 
be  in  it. 

As  you  know,  we  have  major  differ- 
ences with  the  Soviet  Union  on  the  ques- 
tion of  SLCMs.  I  don't  anticipate  a  lot 
of  progress  on  that  issue  at  this  minis- 
terial. This  has  been  a  very,  very  thorny, 
difficult  problem  throughout  the  entire 
history  of  the  START  negotiations. 

Q.  But  if  the  Soviets  did  with 
SLCMs  what  you  appear  to  be  doing 
with  mobiles,  you  wouldn't  have  to 
face  that  issue,  either  at  this  minis- 
terial or — 

A.  I  can't  guess  with  you  about 
what  they  might  or  might  not  do. 

Q.  Would  you  talk  to  us  a  little 
more  about  what  you're  thinking  of 
vis-a-vis  Poland  and  Hungary?  Are 
you  anticipating  a  greater  level  of 
U.S.  support  that  takes  into  account 
that  Solidarity  is  now  running  the 
government  instead  of  the 
communists? 

A.  I  think  it's  fair  to  say  that  when 
the  President  went  to  Poland  and  Hun- 
gary, we  were  talking  about  how  we 
might  assist  a  communist  government  in 
the  process  of  reform.  Now  we  are  talk- 
ing about  assistance  to  a  democratic  gov- 
ernment seeking  to  survive,  and, 
therefore,  we  should  take  a  harder  look 
at  the  problem  and  at  the  issue.  We  are 
doing  that. 

You  saw  just  the  other  day  where 
the  President  announced  an  additional 
$50  million  in  food  aid  to  Poland.  We 
don't  want  to  make  the  same  mistakes 
that  the  industrialized  democracies  made 
in  the  1970s  when  we  funneled  a  lot  of 
loans  into  Poland  and  a  lot  of  grants  into 
Poland  without  insisting  upon  the  appro- 
priate economic  reforms. 

There  are  a  lot  of  things  that  the 
Poles  need  to  do  to  help  themselves.  We 
need  to  assist  in  that  in  every  way  pos- 
sible. We  need  to  try  and  move,  for  in- 
stance, a  Paris  Club  rescheduling  in  ad- 
vance of  any  requirement  for  an  Interna- 
tional Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  agreement. 
We  need  to  push  to  make  certain  that 
the  cooperative  effort  that  was  agreed  to 
at  the  economic  summit  goes  forward  ex- 
peditiously. As  we  are  presently  doing,  I 
think,  with  Secretary  [of  Commerce] 
Mosbacher  on  a  trip  over  there,  we  need 


to  concentrate  on  the  Enterprise  Foun- 
dation and  fund  so  that  we  can  create  a 
private  sector  in  these  countries.  This  is 
very,  very  important. 

Q.  But  are  you  anticipating  a 
greater  level  of  U.S.  aid  than  the 
President  announced,  other  than  the 
food? 

A.  We've  already  bumped  it  by 
$50  million.  What  I  think  we  need  to  do 
is  take  a  look  at  requirements  and  take 
a  look  at  what  we  can  do,  because  the 
point  you  make  is  a  very  good  one.  We 
are  now  dealing  with  a  democratic  gov- 
ernment seeking  to  survive,  rather  than 
a  communist  government  seeking  to  re- 
form itself.  I  think  it's  appropriate  that 
we  look  particularly  hard  at  our  bottom 
line  and  do  everything  that  we  possibly 
can. 

But  we  shouldn't  make  the  mistake 
of  thinking  that  it's  just  U.S.  aid  in  the 
form  of  grants  and  loans  that's  going  to 
cure  the  problem,  because  it  didn't  cure 
it  in  the  1970s,  and  it's  not  going  to  cure 
it  now.  It's  going  to  take  some  fundamen- 
tal economic  reform  in  both  of  those 
countries. 

Q.  Since  the  Soviets  seem  anx- 
ious to  move  ahead  on  START,  is  the 
United  States  willing  to  move  without 
regard  to  progress  in  the  conventional 
arms  talks,  to  move  on  a  separate 
track  toward  a  START  agreement? 

A.  I  don't  think  we've  ever  condi- 
tioned START  and  CFE  [conventional 
armed  forces  in  Europe],  one  on  the  oth- 
er. We  have  a  fairly  far-reaching  and  am- 
bitious proposal  out  there  on  the  table  as 
far  as  conventional  is  concerned,  as  you 
know.  And,  as  I  indicated  in  my  state- 
ment, we  would  hope  that  the  Soviets 
would  pick  up  that  offer.  This  would  en- 
able them  to  save  a  significant  amount  of 
pioney  and,  as  you  know,  some  of  their 
problems  are  economic  in  nature. 

Q.  But  there's  a  widespread  per- 
ception that  because  of  the  problems 
in  the  Administration  about  what  the 
position  should  be  in  the  START  talks 
relevant  to  the  sea-launched  cruise 
missiles  and  particularly  the  ABM 
[Antiballistic  Missile]  Treaty  that  it 
would  be  easier  to  move  forward  on 
conventional.  The  Soviets,  on  the  oth- 
er hand,  seem  to  want  to  push  very 
hard  on  START.  Are  you  willing  to 
make  that  push? 

A.  As  I  mentioned  in  my  statement, 
we're  going  to  be  moving  across  the  full 
range  of  our  arms  control  agenda.  We're 
going  to  be  moving  in  START;  we're 
going  to  be  moving  in  conventional; 
we're  going  to  be  moving  in  chemical; 
and  we're  going  to  be  moving  in  nuclear 
testing,  we  hope — in  all  of  these  areas. 


Will  we  conclude  a  treaty  in  Wyo- 
ming? The  answer  to  that  is  obviously 
no.  That's  not  the  purpose  or  the  func- 
tion of  these  meetings.  They  are  to  con- 
tinue to  move  the  process  forward,  and 
I  think  if  you  judge  us  at  the  end  of  the 
day — hopefully  next  Sunday — that  you 
will  agree  that  we've  moved  the  process 
forward  substantially  across  the  full 
range  of  our  arms  control  agenda. 

Are  there  still  some  major  issues  in 
START?  You  bet  there  are,  and  they're 
going  to  be  very  difficult  to  resolve,  but- 
we're  going  to  keep  at  it. 

Q.  The  Senate  Majority  Leader 
accused  the  Administration  of  ti- 
midity in  the  face  of  unprecedented 
changes  in  the  Soviet  Union  and 
Eastern  Europe,  and  the  Speaker  of 
the  Hungarian  Parliament  expressed 
unhappiness  with  the  "wait-and-see" 
attitude  on  the  part  of  the  Admini- 
stration. What's  your  reaction  to 
those  charges? 

A.  I  don't  think  that  we  can  appro- 
priately be  accused  of  having  a  "wait- 
and-see"  attitude.  Frankly,  I  think  that 
the  statement,  coming  as  it  did  on  the 
eve  of  the  ministerial,  was  unfortunate 
in  its  timing.  I  also  think  it  ignores  our 
approach  as  I've  laid  it  out  here  to  you  in 
the  opening  statement  that  I  just  made. 

We  have  clearly  recognized  the  his- 
toric changes  that  are  taking  place,  not 
only  in  the  Soviet  Union  but  in  Eastern 
Europe  as  well.  That's  why  we  are  fully 
engaged,  not  just  on  the  full  range  of  our 
arms  control  agenda  but  on  the  broad- 
ened agenda  as  well — environmental 
problems,  drug  problems,  terrorism 
problems,  a  whole  range  of  issues  that 
we  never  used  to  discuss,  even  with  the 
Soviets. 

That's  why  we're  focusing  greater 
efforts  on  regional  conflicts.  That's  why 
we're  offering  technical  economic  advice 
on  what  it's  going  to  take  to  accomplish 
the  kind  of  reform  that's  necessary  in 
Poland  and  Hungary  and,  for  that  mat- 
ter, in  the  Soviet  Union. 

Frankly,  we  could  move  forward  a 
lot  faster  and  with  more  effect,  it  seems 
to  me,  if  the  Congress  would  act  expe- 
ditiously on  the  President's  request  for 
GSP  and  OPIC  [generalized  system  of 
preferences  and  Overseas  Private  In- 
vestment Corporation]  benefits  for 
Poland  and  Hungary. 

So  I  think  we  have  to  be  careful  not 
to  become  frantic  and  rush  out  here  to 
negotiate  a  treaty  on  strategic  arms,  or 
anything  else  for  that  matter,  that  would 
be  nonratifiable.  You  know,  the  United 
States  did  that  recently;  we  did  it,  I 


40 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989  ' 


THE  SECRETARY 


think,  in  the  late  1970s  timeframe,  and 
^t  turned  out  to  be  a  mistake.  I  don't 
;hink  we  ought  to  do  it  again. 

Q.  Your  statement  seems  to  be 
implied  criticism  of  the  previous  Ad- 
ministration, of  which  you  were  a 
3art,  inasmuch  as  they  negotiated 
START  to  the  point  at  which  it  is 
now.  I  mean,  is  that  the  way  we 
should  take  this? 

A.  No.  I  don't  intend  to  be  criticiz- 
ing the  prior  Administration  of  which  I 
was  a  part.  [Laughter]  I  think  what's 
happened  is  they've  taken  it  a  long  way 
clown  the  track.  There  are  about  two  or 
three  really  fundamental,  very  tough, 
difficult  issues  in  START  that  that  Ad- 
ministration was  not  able  to  resolve,  and 
that  so  far  we  have  not  been  able  to  re- 
solve. But  we  need  to  keep  negotiating 
on  those,  and  that's  the  full  thrust  and 
import  of  my  statement. 

Q.  How  much  do  you  feel  your 
hands  are  tied  because  of  the  legisla- 
tive slowness  up  on  Capitol  Hill,  par- 
ticularly with  regard  to  the  mobile 
missile  issue  and  the  B-2  issue  and 
the  "star  wars"  issue?  Has  that  made 
it  difficult  for  the  Administration  to 
even  field  a  coherent  arms  control 
strategy  going  into  this  ministerial? 

A.  I  do  think  it  is  fair  for  us  to  say 
Ihat  we  have  been  debating  in  this  coun- 
try the  question  of  strategic  moderniza- 
tion for  almost  15  or  16  years.  It  is  very 
difficult  to  negotiate  a  strategic  arms 
treaty  until  you  know  for  sure  what  your 
strategic  modernization  program  and 
policy  are  going  to  be. 

So  that  relates  to  the  question 
you've  just  addressed  on  mobiles  and  to 
some  extent,  I  suppose,  in  a  related  way 
on  SDI  [Strategic  Defense  Initiative]  and 
ABM.  On  the  question  of  ALCMs  [air- 
launched  cruise  missiles],  which  is  yet 
another  issue  that's  unresolved  in  the 
START  discussions,  it's  pretty  hard  to 
know  what  limits  or  what  kind  of  trade 
you  should  make  on  ALCMs  until  you 
know  whether  or  not  you're  going  to  have 
a  penetrating  bomber  such  as  the  B-2. 

So  we  do  need  to  move  together — 
the  legislative  and  executive  branches — 
if  we're  going  to  ultimately  reach  a  stra- 
tegic arms  agreement. 

But  I  want  to  say  in  concluding  that 
answer  that  I  hope  you  will  look  at  the 
progress  that  is  going  to  be  made  across 
the  full  range  of  the  arms  control  nego- 
tiations and  not  just  look  only  at  that 
one  negotiation. 

Q.  You  seemed  to  have  condi- 
tioned additional  aid  for  Poland  on 
their  carrying  out  reforms.  But  some 


people  have  said  that  this  government 
is  not  going  to  be  able  to  succeed  with 
a  reform  program  without  massive 
additional  aid  from  the  West.  Could 
you  address  that? 

A.  I'm  not  just  saying  they've  got  to 
reform  and  then  we'll  help  them.  The 
President  has  made  it  quite  clear  that 
we  want  to  help  the  process  of  reform, 
and  we've  made  that  quite  clear  as  well. 
We  want  to  get  OPIC  coverage  for  them 
so  that  we  can  encourage  U.S.  invest- 
ment in  Poland  and  Hungary. 

We  want  to  give  them  GSP  benefits 
so  that  they  get  the  benefit  of  that  in 
their  trading  relationship.  We  want  to 
continue  to  be  liberal  and  generous  in 
our  food  aid  and  assistance.  We  want  to 
continue  to  press  for  a  liberal  Paris  Club 
rescheduling  for  Poland  in  advance  of  an 
IMF  agreement,  and  not  all  countries 
are  quite  so  forward-looking,  if  I  may 
say  so.  We  want  to  see  the  implementa- 
tion of  our  Enterprise  Foundation,  $125 
million  proposal. 

I  think  it's  fair  to  say  that  we  need 
to  assist  them,  and  we  need  to  help  them 
over  the  rough  spot.  Whether  they  suc- 
ceed or  not  is  going  to  depend  on  their 
willingness  to  effect  some  very  funda- 
mental and  substantial  economic  re- 
forms. They've  got  to  find  a  way  to  move 
to  a  free  market  economy. 

Q.  Are  you  going  to  make  Soviet 
bloc  aid  to  Nicaragua  a  priority  issue 
during  the  talks? 

A.  We  have  before  and  we  will 
again,  and  we're  a  little  disappointed  in 
what's  going  on  down  there.  So  we'll 
make  that  known. 

Q.  Are  the  Soviets  contributing 
directly  to  the  build-up  of  the  San- 
dinista  arsenal? 

A.  To  the  buildup  of  the  arsenal,  I 
would  have  to  say  yes,  if  you  ask  me  the 
question  that  way.  Most  of  it  is  coming  in 
indirectly  but  it's  materiel  and  weaponry 
that  we  think  they  could  have  a  signifi- 
cant influence  on  reducing  if  they  so 
chose. 

Let  me  say  one  more  time,  as  I  did 
in  my  statement:  They  are  spending  bil- 
lions of  dollars  in  regional  conflict  situa- 
tions that  we  think  could  be  put  to 
better  use  to  assist  the  process  of  per- 
estroika.  That's  what  I  mean  about  as- 
sisting them  where  it's  to  our  mutual 
advantage  to  do  so.  It's  just  one  example. 

Q.  When  this  ministerial  meet- 
ing was  scheduled,  it  was  agreed  that 
one  of  the  topics  that  would  be  dis- 
cussed would  be  the  question  of  a  fu- 
ture summit  meeting  between 
President  Bush  and  President  Gor- 


bachev. Now  statements  from  the 
White  House  seem  to  suggest  that  it's 
too  early  to  talk  about  a  summit 
meeting.  Could  you  clarify  your  will- 
ingness, or  the  Administration's  will- 
ingness or  unwillingness,  to  consider 
a  summit  meeting  schedule  at  this 
time?  And  what  kind  of  criteria  are 
you  going  to  use — the  President  going 
to  use — to  determine  whether  you 
want  to  proceed  with  one? 

A.  What  I  will  say  for  you  is  that  it 
is  anticipated  and  intended  that  we  have 
a  full  discussion  of  the  possibility  of  a 
summit.  That  will  take  place,  as  we  indi- 
cated it  would,  when  we  broke  up,  I 
think,  following  our  meeting  in  Paris. 
We  will  have  a  discussion  of  when  it 
would  be  appropriate  for  the  General 
Secretary  and  the  President  to  get  to- 
gether. Beyond  that,  I  really  don't  want 
to  go — 

Q.  Is  there  some  feeling  that  this 
is  too  early  to  have  a  summit? 

A.  I  don't  want  to  go  beyond  what 
I've  just  said.  We  will  have  a  full  discus- 
sion of  that. 

Q.  You  said  the  Administration  is 
not  taking  a  "wait-and-see"  attitude 
toward  change  in  Eastern  Europe  and 
in  the  Soviet  Union.  Can  you  explain, 
in  that  context,  why  it  has  not  yet 
acted  on  most-favored-nation  (MEN) 
for  the  Soviets,  and  also  why  you  feel 
the  need  to  talk  to  Mr.  Shevardnadze 
before  taking  additional  steps  in  Po- 
land and  Hungary? 

A.  I  don't  feel  the  need  to  talk  to 
him  before  taking  additional  steps.  What 
I  said  in  my  statement  was  that  I  would 
be  telling  him  what  our  approach  to  Po- 
land and  Hungary  is.  I  don't  feel  a  need 
to  talk  to  him  before  doing  that. 

With  respect  to  MEN,  I  think  we've 
made  it  very  clear  that  this  is  one  way  in 
which  we  could  significantly  assist  the 
process  of  perestwika.  We  made  it  clear 
months  ago  that  the  only  thing  that  was 
a  bar  to  our  moving  on  MFN  was  that 
they  institutionalize  the  freer  emigration 
policies  which  they  have  pretty  consist- 
ently been  following  over  the  course  of 
the  past  year  or  so.  We're  still  waiting 
for  that  institutionalization. 

There's  a  good  case  of,  it  seems  to 
me,  helping  others  help  themselves.  If 
they'd  simply  pass  the  law,  we  would  be 
in.  a  position  to  provide  MFN. 

Q.  But  the  parliament,  as  you 
know,  has  a  lot  of  things  on  its  agen- 
da, and  some  of  the  Soviet  officials 
are  now  saying  that  they  don't  expect 
it  to  happen  right  away.  Yet  the  prac- 
tice is  there.  Why  doesn't  the  Ad- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


41 


THE  SECRETARY 


ministration  do  some  kind  of  selec- 
tive lifting  or  things  that  are  within 
its  purview  or  its  legal — 

A.  Because  I  think  we  took  a  forth- 
coming and  far-reaching  position  on  it. 
We  made  it  very  clear  months  ago  that 
we  were  prepared  to  do  this.  I  think  that 
there  is  substantial  consensus  within  the 
United  States  for  that  approach,  partic- 
ularly when  it  rests  only  on  their  enact- 
ing legislation.  I  don't  think  we  ought  to 
change  our  position. 

Q.  Despite  what  you  said  a  mo- 
ment ago  about  not  wanting  to  rush 
out  and  sign  agreements,  do  you  have 
any  concern,  given  Mr.  Gorbachev's 
domestic  problems,  that  there  may  be 
a  limited  period  of  time  during  which 
you  can  make  agreements  with  this 
regime  in  the  Soviet  Union? 

A.  You  know  we  want  perestroika  to 
succeed.  You  know  we  believe  it's  up  to 
the  Soviet  people  whether  or  not  it  will 
succeed  and  what  happens  to  their 
leadership. 

Let  me  remind  you  that  we  hope — 
hope — to  be  able  to  tell  you  on  Saturday 
night  or  Sunday  that  we've  got  signifi- 
cant movement  on  conventional  forces 
because  we  hope  they're  going  to  come 
back  and  give  us  an  answer  on  our  pro- 
posal. We  hope  to  be  able  to  tell  you 
we're  going  to  have  good  progress  on  nu- 
clear testing,  good  progress  on  chemical 
weapons,  and  some  progress  on  START. 

I  think  that's  responsive  to  the  con- 
cern that  is  suggested  by  your  question. 
It's  one  reason  that  we  believe  in  being 
fully  engaged  across  a  broad  agenda  in 
the  U.S. -Soviet  dialogue. 

Q.  Just  in  regard  to  what  you 
said,  do  you  anticipate  your  remarks 
will  have  some  impact  back  in  Mos- 
cow now  with  a  meeting  going  on 
there,  to  give  a  little  assurance  to 
your  willingness  to  work  with 
Gorbachev? 

A.  I  hadn't  anticipated  that  in 
scheduling  this.  That's  not  the  reason 
I'm  down  here. 

Q.  With  regard  to  most-favored- 
nation  status,  there's  some  debate 
over  whether  or  not  that  would  really 
improve  trade  that  much  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union. 
And  for  those  who  do  argue  that  the 
biggest  problems  that  the  Soviets  face 
internally  pertain  to  the  continued 
stagnation  economically  there,  is 
there  anything  that  the  United  States 
can  do,  practically,  or  that  could  be 
done  at  this  meeting  perhaps? 

A.  Yes,  and  we  hope  to  do  that.  We 
suggested  at  the  last  meeting  that  we 


42 


have  an  informal  dialogue  on  the  subject 
of  economics  generally  and  how  per- 
estroika works  and  how  we  might  assist 
them  through  technical  advice,  or  other- 
wise, in  doing  what  they  need  to  do  to 
move  more  toward  an  open  market-type 
economy. 

They've  got,  as  you  know,  some  ex- 
traordinarily difficult  problems  involv- 
ing the  convertibility  of  their  currency 
and  involving  a  price  system.  These  are 
things  that  have  to  be  at  some  time 
addressed. 

Q.  Is  that  going  to  be  discussed, 
then,  this  weekend? 

A.  Informally,  we  will  be  discussing 

those,  yes. 

Q.  [Foreign]  Minister  Shev- 
ardnadze will  be  coming  to  the  minis- 
terial from  a  nationalities  plenum. 
What  is  our  position  on  the  Baltic 
states?  Do  we  support  the  independ- 
ence of  the  Baltic  states,  or  would  we 
like— 

A.  As  you  know,  it's  been  the  posi- 
tion of  the  United  States  for  some  time 
that  we  do  not  recognize  the  incorpora- 
tion of  the  Baltic  states  into  the  Soviet 
Union.  That  continues  to  be  our  posi- 
tion. We  would  hope  that  whatever  takes 
place  with  respect  to  that  would  take 
place  in  a  peaceful  manner. 

We  do  not  seek  to  foster,  nor  would 
we  profit  from,  instability  in  the  Soviet 
Union.  We'd  like  to  see  a  peaceful  move 
toward  independence  for  the  Baltic 
states. 

Q.  In  the  spirit  of  your  concern 
about  solving  regional  conflicts,  what 
do  you  think  of  [Egyptian]  President 
Mubarak's  lO-point  plan  to  move  the 
peace  process  in  the  Middle  East  for- 
ward? And  how  do  you  assess  the 
U.S.-PLO  [Palestine  Liberation  Or- 
ganization] dialogue  at  the  present 
time? 

A.  Let  me  answer  the  first  one  and 
then  you  ask  me  the  second  one  later,  be- 
cause I'm  going  to  give  you  a  longer  an- 
swer to  the  first  one  than  you  might 
have  anticipated. 

First  of  all,  let  me  say  that  we 
strongly  support  the  Government  of  Isra- 
el's elections  initiative.  We  would  like 
to — and  we  have  been  working  toward, 
ever  since  I've  been  in  this  office — find  a 
way  to  bring  about  a  dialogue  between 
Israelis  and  Palestinians  because  we 
don't  think  there  will  ever  be  peace  in 
the  Middle  East  except  through  direct 
negotiations. 

We  see  Egypt's  10  points  not  as  an 
alternative  to  the  Israeli  Government's 
proposal;  on  the  contrary,  we  think  they 


represent  Egypt's  acceptance  of  the 
Israeli  proposal  and  Egypt's  views  on 
how  to  get  to  elections  and  make  it 
work — how  to  get  to  a  dialogue. 

We  are  encouraged  by  the  recent 
diplomatic  activity  that  has  taken  place 
in  this  regard,  and  we  intend  to  remain 
actively  involved  and  engaged  with  the 
parties. 

I  have  been  in  touch  with  both  For- 
eign Ministers — the  Foreign  Minister  of 
Egypt  and  the  Foreign  Minister  of 
Israel — and  I  would  hope  that  we  will, 
the  three  of  us,  be  able  to  meet  when 
we're  all  three  in  New  York  at  the  UN 
General  Assembly  next  week  to  further' 
discuss  ways  in  which  we  might  imple- 
ment the  Israeli  elections  proposal. 

Q.  Could  you  explain  more  fully 
the  rationale  or  the  reasoning  behino 
your  announcement  here  on  mobile 
missiles?  There  are  some  arms  con- 
trol supporters — I  think  Senator 
Nunn  and  [Representative]  Les 
Aspin — who  have  argued  that  we 
should  maintain  a  ban  on  mobile  mis 
siles  that  carry  multiple  warheads  bfi 
cause  they  maintain  a  breakout 
threat  for  a  START  treaty  while  al- 
lowing single-warhead  mobile  mis- 
siles. I  gather  you're  not  drawing  tha 
sort  of  distinction.  You  would  allow 
both  types. 

A.  I'm  not  getting  into  the  questioi 
of  MIRVing  or  de-MIRVing  or  any  of 
that  right  now.  If  you  ask  me  "rationale, 
I  think,  frankly,  there  has  been  some 
confusion  out  there  about  exactly  where 
the  United  States  was  when  we  have  a 
ban  on  mobile  missiles  in  a  START  nega 
tiation  with  the  Soviet  Union  and  yet  we 
send  a  request  to  the  Congress  for  au- 
thority to  build  and  deploy  mobile  mis- 
siles. I  just  wanted  to  make  that  very, 
very  clear. 

Some  have  faulted  us  for  maintain' 
ing  the  ban.  Others  think  that,  well,  you 
ought  to  maintain  the  ban  until  you  get 
congressional — what  we've  done  here,  I 
think,  is  to  accentuate  the  positive  and 
that's  the  purpose  of  the  announcement. 

Q.  Senator  Mitchell's  criticisms 
yesterday  went  beyond  specifics  re- 
garding Poland  or  Hungary  or  the  So' 
viet  Union.  In  general,  I  think  he  wai 
making  the  assessment  that  the  Ad- 
ministration lacked  vision  and  lead- 
ership and  didn't  have  an  over- 
arching policy  to  deal  with  these  rev- 
olutionary changes.  He  even  went  so 
far  as  to  say  there  was  some 
nostalgia — there  appeared  to  be  nos- 
talgia for  the  cold  war  era.  Can  you 


AFRICA 


address  the  question  more  generally 
than  just  the  specifics  of  what  you  do 
want  to  do  in  each  of  those  countries? 

A.  I  thought  I  addressed  it  gener- 
ally in  the  first  answer  I  gave  you,  be- 
cause I  told  you  what  we  are  doing.  I 
think  that  the  criticism  fails  to  take  that 
into  account.  So  I  disagree  with  the  crit- 
icism. [Note  handed  to  the  Secretary]  I 
have  another  announcement  for  you.  I'm 
sorry,  where  did  I  leave  you? 

Q.  You  said  you  reject  the  criti- 
cism. I'd  say  it  was  an  unusually 
harsh  assessment  of  overall  Ad- 
ministration policy,  and  I'm  asking 
you  to  address  that. 

A.  Let  me  address  it  this  way  by 
saying  that  when  the  President  of  the 
United  States  is  rocking  along  with  a 
10%  approval  rating  on  his  handling  of 
foreign  policy  and  I  were  the  leader  of 
the  opposition  party,  I  might  have  some- 
thing similar  to  say.  [Laugher] 

Q.  Back  to  the  question  for  a  mo- 
ment of  the  instability  in  the  Soviet 
Union,  there  seems  to  have  been  an 
upsurge  in  that  since  your  last  minis- 
terial meetings.  How  do  those  factors 
enter  into  your  thinking  on  the  pace 
of  U.S.  cooperation  with  the  Soviet 
Union?  Do  Mr.  Gorbachev's  internal 
problems — the  difficulty  he  has  in 
getting  his  economic  program  off  the 
ground — put  limits  on  really  what 
you  can  achieve? 

A.  I  don't  think  it  enters  in  in  the 
way  in  which  your  question  would  imply 
because  we  have,  from  the  very  begin- 
ning, felt  that  it  was  important  to  coop- 
erate where  it  was  in  our  interest  as 
well  as  theirs  to  assist  perestroika  to 
succeed.  We've  made  that  very  clear,  and 
we  have  felt  a  certain — all  along — 
dynamic  in  this  thing  to  do  that  without 
any  undue  delay.  That's  exactly  what  our 
position  is  now,  and  that's  why  we're 
moving  across  this  full  range  of  our 
agenda. 

If  you're  asking  me,  does  it  make  us 
frantic  because  of  what's  happened  over 
the  course  of  the  past  3  months,  the  an- 
swer is  no,  and  it  shouldn't  and  it's  not  in 
our  interest  for  it — 

Q.  I  meant  my  question  to  ac- 
tually be  the  opposite.  Does  it  tend  to 
make  you  more  cautious  and  more 
prudent? 

A.  I  would  hope,  and  again  as  we 
said  early  on  in  this  Administration, 
that  we've  been  approaching  this  rela- 
tionship with  the  proper  degree  of  pru- 
dence. We  talked  a  lot  about  the 
importance  of  doing  that.  Why?  Because 


we  can  have  no  assurance  with  respect 
to  what  the  final  result  will  be.  So  we 
shouldn't  go  out,  as  someone  said,  and  do 
something  dumb. 

Q.  Senator  Don  Riegle  is  sending 
you  a  letter  asking  you  to  raise  the 
Baltic  question  in  Wyoming. 

A.  We  will  be  discussing  that. 
That's  an  item  that  we  would  expect  to 
discuss,  the  situation  in  the  Baltics. 

Q.  Will  you  spend  much  or  any 
time  discussing  the  South  African  sit- 
uation with  the  Foreign  Minister? 
And  do  you  have  any  private  indica- 
tions that  the  new  South  African  Gov- 
ernment will  make  the  reforms  that 
you  seek  in  the  near  future? 

A.  We  hope  they  will.  They  haven't 
been  in  very  long.  As  you  know,  when  we 
congratulated  that  government  on  its 
election  and  caught  a  little  flack  for  do- 
ing so,  we  made  it  very  clear  that  that 
congratulation  was  tempered  with  a  de- 


sire on  our  part  to  see  them  move  expe- 
ditiously in  a  whole  host  of  areas  having 
to  do  with  the  abolition  of  apartheid.  I 
hope  that  we  will  see  that. 

We  will  be  discussing  the  situation 
generally  in  southern  Africa.  I'm  not 
sure  we  will  get  into  detailed  discus- 
sions about  the  De  Klerk  government. 

Let  me  say  also  that  I  can  now  in- 
form you  that  allied  representatives 
meeting  in  Brussels  today  have  reached 
agreement  on  tabling  concrete  proposals 
on  verification  information,  exchange, 
and  stabilizing  measures  in  the  CFE  ne- 
gotiations in  Vienna — they  will  table 
these  [on  Thursday,  September  21] — 
together  with  the  proposals  that  were  ta- 
bled on  July  13.  This  fully  implements 
the  decisions  that  were  made  at  the  May 
NATO  summit  as  a  result  of  the  Presi- 
dent's conventional  forces  initiative. 


1  Press  release  167. 


Independence  Process  in  Namibia 


by  Herman  J.  Cohen 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Africa  of  the  House  Foreign  Affairs 
Committee  on  July  20,  1989.  Ambassa- 
dor Cohen  is  Assistant  Secretary  for 
African  Affairs. ' 

I  am  pleased  to  be  here  today  to  discuss 
the  independence  process  in  Namibia. 
This  is  particularly  timely,  since  I  have 
just  returned  from  Africa  and  a  stop  in 
Windhoek,  where  I  had  an  opportunity 
to  view  the  process  firsthand.  In  the 
brief  time  I  was  there,  I  met  with  par- 
ties representative  of  Namibia's  entire 
political  spectrum:  the  Administrator 
General,  the  UN  Secretary  General's 
special  representative,  and  senior  offi- 
cials both  of  the  South  West  Africa  Peo- 
ple's Organization  (SWAPO)  and  its 
principal  opponent  in  the  electoral  cam- 
paign, the  Democratic  Turnhalle  Alli- 
ance (DTA),  as  well  as  observers  from  a 
variety  of  foreign  governments. 

The  United  States  has  long  taken 
the  leading  role  in  negotiations  aimed 
at  achieving  Namibian  independence. 
We  are  proud  of  our  role  in  reaching 
agreement  on  UN  Security  Council 
Resolution  435.  And  we  are  equally 
proud  of  our  mediating  role  in  the  ne- 
gotiations that  led  to  the  New  York 


accords  which  opened  the  way  to 
implementing  that  resolution.  Today 
we  stand  ready  to  assist  the  Secretary 
General,  his  special  representative,  and 
the  UN  Transition  Assistance  Group 
(UNTAG)  as  they  discharge  their 
responsibilities. 

Situation  Since  Implementation  of 
Security  Council  Resolution  435 

Nearly  4  months  into  the  implementa- 
tion of  Security  Council  Resolution  435, 
the  transition  to  Namibia's  independ- 
ence is  firmly  in  place.  Despite  some 
delays,  primarily  caused  by  SWAPO's 
surprise  incursion  on  April  1  and  the 
resulting  administrative  glitches,  all 
parties  remain  committed  to  keeping 
the  independence  process  on  track 
and  ensuring  that  elections  for  the 
constituent  assembly  are  held  in 
November  1989. 

The  Secretary  General's  special 
representative,  Martti  Ahtisaari,  and 
the  Administrator  General,  Louis 
Pienaar,  have  worked  together  to 
achieve  the  repeal  of  discriminatory 
legislation,  the  promulgation  of  a  blan- 
ket amnesty  for  all  returnees,  a  peace- 
ful repatriation  of  refugees,  and  the 
successful  start  of  nationwide  voter 
registration. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


43 


AFRICA 


I  would  note  that  the  South  Afri- 
can Government  has  also  kept  its  side 
of  the  bargain.  Once  the  problems  aris- 
ing from  the  April  1  incursion  were 
solved,  the  withdrawal  and  demobili- 
zation of  the  South  African  Defense 
Forces  and  the  South-West  Africa  Ter- 
ritorial Force  has  proceeded  according 
to  schedule.  As  required  by  the  UN 
plan,  the  remaining  South  African 
forces,  which  may  not  exceed  1,500,  are 
now  restricted  to  bases  at  Grootfontein 
and  Oshivelo  and  monitored  by  UNTAG 
military  units. 

Return  of  Exiles 

and  Voter  Registration 

The  return  of  exiled  Namibians  repre- 
sents another  significant  milestone  on 
the  road  to  independence.  Although  de- 
layed by  4  weeks,  the  arrival  of  the 
first  planeload  of  returnees  at  Wind- 
hoek airport  on  June  12  testified  to  the 
fact  that  transition  to  independence 
was  irreversible.  Over  20,000  refugees 
have  been  repatriated  to  be  full  partici- 
pants in  this  historic  process. 

On  July  3,  the  registration  of  vo- 
ters began.  Having  already  registered 
over  a  third  of  the  estimated  elector- 
ate, representatives  from  the  Ad- 
ministrator General's  office  and 
UNTAG  are  working  side-by-side  to 
sign  up  all  Namibians  who  qualify  to 
vote  in  the  upcoming  elections. 

Obstacles  to  Overcome 

Of  course,  there  are  still  some  obsta- 
cles to  overcome. 

•  The  problem  of  intimidation  in 
the  north  remains. 

•  Reports  of  the  continued  pres- 
ence of  armed  SWAPO  fighters  in 
Angola  prevents  a  complete  sense 

of  security  inside  Namibia. 

•  Final  election  legislation,  while 
under  active  consideration,  has  not  yet 
been  promulgated. 

•  Questions  concerning  SWAPO 
detainees  are  not  fully  resolved,  while 
political  prisoners  remain  in  South 
African  custody. 

•  UNTAG  and  the  Administrator 
General's  office  continue  to  discuss 
whether  additional  legislation  should 
be  repealed  because  of  its  discrimina- 
tory nature. 

In  our  judgment,  these  issues, 
though  not  serious,  do  not  constitute  an 
insurmountable  threat  to  the  independ- 
ence process. 


Let  me  add  a  few  words,  however, 
about  the  issue  of  intimidation.  We 
raised  the  matter  one  more  time  with 
the  South  African  delegation  at  the 
joint  commission  meeting  in  Luanda 
June  7-8.  There  have  been  some  posi- 
tive moves,  including: 

•  Removal  of  heavy  armaments 
from  police  vehicles; 

•  Removal  of  the  large,  mine- 
resistant  casspirs  [large  armored  vehi- 
cles] from  populated  areas; 

•  Reduction  of  the  numbers  of 
casspirs  in  use; 

•  Donation  of  40  casspirs  to 
UNTAG  so  it  can  accompany  South 
West  African  police  patrols;  and 

•  Appointment  of  a  commission  to 
review  complaints. 

However,  the  South  Africans  have 
yet  to  remove  ex-Koevoet  counterin- 
surgency  troops  in  the  police  force 
from  the  north.  We  will  continue  to 
support  the  UN  Secretary  General's 
special  representative  as  he  works  on 
this  problem. 

SWAPO  Detainees 

Let  me  now  turn  to  the  issue  of 
SWAPO  detainees.  At  the  Luanda  joint 


commission  meeting,  the  head  of  the 
Angolan  delegation.  Gen.  Ndalu,  re- 
ported he  found  151  detainees  in 
SWAPO  camps,  of  which  99  had  gone  to 
Namibia  and  52  had  chosen  to  remain 
in  Angola  or  be  repatriated  as  refu- 
gees. However,  2  weeks  ago,  some  of 
the  SWAPO  detainees  who  did  return 
to  Namibia  reported  graphically  to  the 
press  on  their  imprisonment  and  tor- 
ture. A  senior  SWAPO  official  publicly 
apologized  to  the  returnees  and  said 
that  his  organization  would  deal  with  " 
anyone  involved  in  torture. 

I  continue  to  be  concerned  with 
reports  that  not  all  the  detainees  pre- 
viously held  by  SWAPO  have  been  re- 
leased. We  urge  a  full  accounting  from 
SWAPO.  We  also  urge  that  the  South 
Africans  release  all  political  prisoners 
and  detainees  they  still  hold. 

In  sum  I  am  encouraged  by  what  I 
saw  in  Windhoek.  Resolution  435  is  be- 
ing implemented  fully  and  correctly, 
and  we  remain  confident  that  free  and 
fair  elections  will  occur  on  schedule. 


1  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee  anc 
will  be  available  from  the  Superintendent  o: 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


South  African  Elections 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
SEPT.  7,  19891 

We  congratulate  Acting  President 
[F.W.]  De  Klerk  on  his  party's  victory 
at  the  polls  and  for  leading  his  party  to 
win  its  mandate  for  real  change  in 
South  Africa.  Apartheid  must  end.  The 
elections  themselves  once  more  under- 
score the  systematic  denial  of  political 
rights  to  the  majority  population  in 
South  Africa. 

The  international  community  is 
carefully  watching  what  the  new  South 
African  Government  will  do  to  begin 
the  process  of  change.  Promises  of  re- 
form must  be  followed  by  concrete,  spe- 
cific action.  We  are  committed  to 
working  with  all  parties  to  bring  the 
South  African  Government  and  black 
South  Africans  together  in  a  substan- 
tial effort  to  end  apartheid.  We,  there- 
fore, are  prepared  to  work  with  the 
new  government  toward  this  end. 

The  most  important  first  step  in 
the  process  of  change  is  dialogue  be- 


tween South  Africans.  To  begin  this  dil 
alogue,  we  believe  that  the  following 
steps  will  be  necessary: 

•  Release  all  political  prisoners, 
including  Nelson  Mandela  and  Walter 
Sisulu,  and  the  return  of  political  exiles 

•  Lift  the  state  of  emergency  and 
associated  restrictions  on  political  ac- 
tivity and  freedom  of  association  for 
the  black  opposition; 

•  Unban  all  political  organizations, 
including  the  African  National  Con- 
gress (ANC);  and 

•  End  violence  from  all  sources. 

We  urge  the  new  South  African 
Government  to  move  as  quickly  as  pos 
sible  to  create  the  conditions  for  dia- 
logue to  begin.  We  hope  all  parties  will 
take  advantage  of  this  opportunity  to 
pursue  negotiations  on  a  peaceful  proc- 
ess of  constitutional  change  leading  to 
nonracial  democratic  government. 


'  Read  to  news  correspondents  by 
Department  spokesman  Margaret  DeB. 
Tutwiler.B 


44 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  198{ 


^RMS  CONTROL 


Conference  Against  Chemical  Weapons 


The  International  Government- 
'ndustry  Conference  Against  Chemical 
Weapons  was  held  in  Canberra  Septem- 
in- 18-22,  1989.  Following  is  a  state- 
iiiiit  by  Richard  A.  Clarke,  head  of  the 
I'.S.  delegation  and  Assistant  Secre- 
nrii  for  Politico-Military  Affairs,  on 
■September  19. 

'If  I  am  remembered  for  anything,  it 
ivould  be  this,  a  complete  and  total  ban 
m  chemical  weapons."  Those  are  the 
>vnrds  of  George  Bush. 

President  Bush  is  committed  to  a 
verifiable  and  total  ban  on  chemical 
vveapons.  The  U.S.  Government  is  so 
committed.  On  behalf  of  President 
Bush,  I  want  to  extend  my  thanks  to 
!;he  Government  of  Australia  for  host- 
ng  this  unique  and  essential  confer- 
ence against  chemical  weapons. 

It  is  interesting  that  the  very  title 
s  a  conference  against  chemical  weap- 
ons; not  on  chemical  weapons  or  about 
;:hemical  weapons  but  against — for  we 
all  here  are  pledged  to  the  total  elim- 
I  nation  of  chemical  weapons.  This  is  a 
ianique  conference — a  unique  confer- 
mce  because  it  brings  together,  in  a 
'ormal  setting  for  the  first  time,  those 
governments  that  could  make  chemical 
veapons  and  could  also  eliminate  them, 
n  the  same  setting  with  those  indus- 
ries  that  could  make  chemical  weapons 
)r  could  help  us  in  the  process  of  elim- 
nating  them.  It  is  an  essential  confer- 
■iice  because  we  cannot  go  ahead  to 
mplement  a  ban  without  the  coopera- 
;ion  of  industry. 

Role  of  Governments 

Let  me  begin  by  talking  about  the  role 
of  governments.  Those  nations  that 
have  chemical  weapons  bear  a  special 
'responsibility  to  conclude  the  conven- 
tion as  rapidly  as  possible.  Those  na- 
tions which  do  not  have  chemical 
weapons  also  have  a  responsibility  and 
that  is  not  to  acquire  them;  not  to  make 
the  problem  any  worse. 

Both  classes  of  nations  have  a  mor- 
al responsibility  to  prevent  the  diver- 
sion of  dual-use  chemicals  through 
igovernmental  export  controls  and  end- 
user  confirmation.  That  is  the  best  way 
to  stop  proliferation  until  we  have  a 
convention  in  force.  Until  that  time, 
stopping  proliferation  of  chemical 
weapons  is  a  national  responsibility.  It 


would  be  a  mistake  for  us  to  adopt  any 
international  regime  as  an  interim  to 
deal  with  proliferation.  That  would 
only  divert  us  from  the  important  task 
of  completing  the  convention.  While  it 
is  a  national  responsibility,  nations  can 
and  should — and  I  am  pleased  to  say 
many  nations  are — cooperate  in  their 
efforts  to  control  the  spread  of  chemical 
weapons. 

The  threat  of  proliferation  is  a 
threat  that  affects  us  all.  But  I  think 
there  may  have  been  some  misunder- 
standing about  who  is  most  at  risk  from 
that  threat.  It  is  not  the  great  powers 
that  have  elaborate  laboratories,  that 
have  chemical  defensive  gear,  that  have 
antidotes  and  elaborate  hospital  facili- 
ties. Those  nations  which  are  most  at 
risk  from  the  threat  of  proliferation  are 
the  nations  in  the  Third  World,  the  so- 
called  developing  nations. 

Steps  Toward  Building  Confidence 

There  are  those  who  say  that  we  cannot 
simultaneously  support  efforts  to  stop 
proliferation  and  at  the  same  time  sup- 
port efforts  to  achieve  a  treaty.  The 
United  States  believes  that  is  the  falla- 
cy of  a  false  dichotomy.  We  believe  we 
can  and  must  do  both. 

A  global  ban,  a  verifiable  global 
ban,  is  the  best  ultimate  answer  to  the 
problem  of  proliferation.  Those  who  are 
party  now  to  the  spread  of  chemical 
weapons  put  further  roadblocks  in  our 
path  to  the  ultimate  achievement  of 
that  total  ban.  We  must  take  practical 
steps  now  as  governments  to  achieve 
that  global  ban.  We  must  take  initial 
steps — steps  that  will  make  it  possible 
to  go  ahead  more  rapidly  later  on,  steps 
which  will  build  confidence  in  the  trea- 
ty and  in  the  process.  We  would  like  to 
propose  three  such  steps  today. 

First,  an  end  to  secrecy.  There  are 
not  just  two  nations  that  have  chemical 
weapons.  There  are  two  nations  that 
acknowledge  they  have  chemical  weap- 
ons. To  the  best  of  our  information, 
there  are  22  nations  that  have  chemical 
weapons  in  their  inventories,  con- 
trolled by  their  military  and  ready  for 
use.  It  would  be  a  major  step  forward 
in  building  confidence  in  the  treaty  if 
those  other  nations  which  have  chemical 
weapons  would  begin  by  admitting  that 
fact.  Only  two  thus  far  have  made  that 
acknowledgment.  Only  one  nation  thus 


far  has  listed  by  site  the  location  of  all 
of  the  storage  facilities  for  chemical 
weapons  on  its  territory. 

The  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  are  moving  this  week  to  put  a 
further  end  to  secrecy  on  their  parts. 
They  are  negotiating  today  in  Wash- 
ington and  later  this  week  in  the 
American  State  of  Wyoming  the 
memorandum  of  understanding  which 
will  detail  the  size  of  their  stocks;  the 
type  of  agent;  and  the  type  of  weapon 
and  the  locations.  And  if  we  can  con- 
clude this  agreement  this  week,  that 
data  will  be  exchanged  by  the  end  of 
this  calendar  year.  The  agreement  will 
also  call  for  mutual  visits  to  a  variety 
of  types  of  facilities  on  each  others'  ter- 
ritories. Other  nations  should  follow 
this  example. 

Second,  we  propose  today  that  na- 
tions build  confidence  in  the  treaty 
through  a  variety  of  unilateral,  region- 
al, and  multilateral  steps.  Australia's 
regional  conference  in  support  of  the 
chemical  weapons  convention  earlier 
this  year  and  Australia's  announcement 
today  of  an  organization  to  begin  the 
implementation  of  the  convention  are 
two  examples  of  such  steps.  Pledges  not 
to  acquire  chemical  weapons  are  anoth- 
er example  of  this  sort  of  measure. 

Third,  the  United  States  is  propos- 
ing today  the  creation  of  a  forerunner  of 
the  technical  secretariat  that  will  be 
created  when  the  treaty  is  imple- 
mented. Some  of  the  tasks  that  that 
technical  secretariat  will  be  called 
upon  to  do  need  not  wait  upon  the  im- 
plementation of  the  treaty.  They  can 
be  done  now;  they  should  be  done  now. 
What  would  such  a  group  do  in 
specific? 

We  have  called  the  group  in  our 
preliminary  proposal  the  technical  ex- 
perts' group  but  in  discussions  here 
yesterday,  I  have  been  given  a  variety 
of  other  suggestions  for  names,  includ- 
ing the  interim  international  staff  or 
the  assistance  groups.  We  are  not  wed- 
ded to  any  particular  name. 

We  have  some  ideas  about  what 
such  a  group  should  start  immediately 
to  do.  It  could  establish  data  bases 
from  governments  and  industries. 
There  is  not  today  a  single  reliable  list 
of  the  location  of  chemical  plants  in  the 
world  or  their  number.  A  data  base 
would  be  a  good  beginning.  The  group 
could  assist  in  national  inspections;  it 
could  assist  in  multinational  trial  in- 
spections and  develop  lessons  learned 
from  each  of  them.  It  could  research 
and  disseminate  information  on  envi- 
ronmentally safe  destruction  of  chemi- 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


45 


ARMS  CONTROL 


cal  weapons.  The  United  States  has 
much  information  to  offer  in  this 
regard. 

We  have  destroyed  15  million 
pounds  of  chemical  weapons  agent  al- 
ready. We  have  spent  $240  million  in 
the  creation  of  a  single  facility  to  de- 
stroy chemical  weapons  stocks.  The 
group  could  coordinate  research  on 
methods  and  technologies  for  verifica- 
tion. Last  year  the  Congress  of  the 
United  States  appropriated  $6  million 
specifically  for  research  into  chemical 
weapons  verification.  I  suspect  and  I 
hope  that  other  governments  in  this 
room  are  also  spending  money  on  re- 
search of  that  kind.  Right  now  that  re- 
search might  be  duplicative.  Such  a 
group  could  coordinate  the  research 
among  countries.  There  are  other  ideas 
for  the  group  which  are  outlined  in  the 
paper  distributed  by  the  secretariat. 

It  is  important,  in  thinking  about 
such  a  group,  to  also  understand  what 
it  would  not  do,  and  what  it  would  not 
be.  It  could  not  be  a  diversion  from  the 
real  work  of  getting  the  convention.  It 
must  only  be  a  necessary  step  on  the 
way  to  implementing  the  convention.  It 
should  not  be  an  exclusive  organization 
but  rather  one  open  to  all  the  members 
of  the  Conference  on  Disarmament.  It 


should  not  be  a  committee,  such  as 
those  five  that  already  exist  in  Geneva, 
to  do  political  work,  but  rather  it 
should  be  a  small  body  to  coordinate 
and  to  recruit  experts,  who  would  be 
brought  in  for  specific  tasks,  given  to  it 
by  the  chairman.  It  should  not  be  a  du- 
plication of  existing  groups  but  rather 
an  umbrella  and  a  supporting  mecha- 
nism for  them;  not  a  parallel  structure 
but  a  staff  reporting  to  the  existing 
chairman. 

We  put  this  concept  forward  today 
as  a  preliminary  proposal,  with  the  in- 
tention of  obtaining  comments  and  crit- 
icism here,  and  in  Geneva,  during  the 
intersessionals  before  we  put  it  for- 
ward formally  in  the  Geneva  talks. 

Verification 

Much  of  the  work  that  this  group  would 
have  to  do  would  focus  on  verification. 
A  lot  of  discussion  has  already  oc- 
curred here  today  about  verification. 
We  in  the  chemical  weapons  conference 
must  not  make  the  mistake  that  was 
made  in  the  biological  weapons  confer- 
ence, for  the  Biological  Weapons  Con- 
vention has  no  effective  means  of 
verification.  We  cannot  do  what  we  did 
there  and  simply  rush  to  sign  a  piece  of 


CFE  and  CSBM  Talks  Open  Round  Three 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
SEPT.  7,  19891 

The  third  round  of  the  negotiations  on 
conventional  armed  forces  in  Europe 
(CFE)  began  today  in  Vienna. 

At  the  NATO  summit  in  May,  al- 
lied leaders  endorsed  the  President's 
initiative  to  include  land-based  combat 
aircraft  and  land-based  combat  helicop- 
ters and  U.S.  and  Soviet  ground  and 
air  manpower  stationed  in  Europe  in 
the  negotiations.  On  July  13,  2  months 
ahead  of  schedule,  the  allies  presented 
details  of  this  initiative  at  the  negotia- 
tions in  Vienna.  The  tabling  of  those 
elements  of  our  proposal  reflects  our 
determination  to  fulfill  the  President's 
commitment  and  move  forward  as  rap- 
idly as  possible  in  these  negotiations. 

The  members  of  the  Warsaw  Pact 
have  indicated  that  they  want  to  con- 
clude a  conventional  arms  reduction 
agreement,  and  we  await  their  re- 
sponse to  our  initiatives  during  this 
round. 


Similarly  we  hope  that  the  Warsaw 
Pact  members  will  be  prepared  to  dis- 
cuss the  12  detailed  measures  that  we 
and  our  NATO  allies  put  forward  dur- 
ing the  last  round  of  the  35-nation  talks 
on  confidence-  and  security-building 
measures  (CSBMs),  which  have  just  re- 
sumed in  Vienna.  Greater  openness  and 
predictability  about  military  forces 
and  actions  in  Europe  are  key  elements 
in  the  NATO  alliance's  approach  to  con- 
ventional arms  control. 

Our  objectives  in  both  these  nego- 
tiations is  to  secure  a  more  stable  bal- 
ance of  forces  in  Europe  and  to  reduce 
the  risk  of  arms  confrontation  on  the 
continent.  It  is  a  goal  we  and  our  allies 
have  been  seeking  for  40  years.  We  be- 
lieve that  the  conditions  are  right  for 
achieving  sound  and  stabilizing  agree- 
ments which  will  increase  security  for 
all  the  nations  concerned. 


'  Te.xt  from  Weekly  Compilation 
of  Presidential  Documents  of 
Sept.  11,  1989.B 


paper  because  we  want  to  ban  that  type 
of  weapon  and  have  not  yet  been  suc- 
cessful in  working  out  the  details.  The 
Biological  Weapons  Convention  sits 
there  today  without  verification  pro- 
cedures, and  there  are  countries  today 
actively  engaged  in  creating  biological 
weapons,  acquiring  them  for  the  first 
time.  And  that  convention,  because  it 
was  rushed  through  without  verifica- 
tion procedures,  is  doing  nothing  eithei 
to  identify  those  nations  or  to  stop 
them. 

A  sloppy  job  of  verification  in  the 
chemical  weapons  convention  would 
damage  the  entire  international  struc- 
ture for  arms  control.  And  it  would  do 
so  at  a  time — a  unique  time  in  the 
history  of  arms  control — when  we 
can  make  progress,  bilaterally  and 
multilaterally,  on  a  number  of  vital 
agreements. 

Other  Arms  Control  Negotiations 

In  addition  to  the  chemical  weapons 
talks,  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  are  today  implementing  the 
Intermediate-Range  Nuclear  Forces 
(INF)  Agreement.  We  are  blowing  up 
missiles  in  the  United  States  and  in  thei 
Soviet  Union.  Perhaps  our  experience 
there  can  help  answer  some  of  the  ques- 
tions about  how  much  it  costs  to  do  in- 
spection and  how  many  inspectors  you 
need. 

There  are  today  300  Americans  in 
the  Soviet  Union  and  an  equal  number 
of  Soviets  in  the  United  States  verify- 
ing this  one  small  agreement  to  elimi- 
nate one  class  of  nuclear  missiles.  Last 
year  the  agency  of  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment created  for  verification  of  that 
agreement — the  On-Sight  Inspection 
Agency — had  a  budget  of  almost  $100 
million.  That  agreement  is  a  very  small 
agreement  compared  to  what  we  are 
trying  to  achieve  here.  But  it  is  not  the 
only  one  that  is  going  on. 

We  are  engaged  in  negotiations  on 
nuclear  testing,  which  will  require 
both  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  to  allow  very  intrusive  inspec- 
tion. There  will  be  very  intrusive  in- 
spection required  in  the  strategic  arms 
reduction  agreement,  in  which  we  are 
attempting  to  reduce  50%  of  our  strate- 
gic nuclear  forces.  NATO  and  the 
Warsaw  Pact  are  negotiating  on  con- 
ventional forces  in  Europe  and  have 
already  reached  agreement  in  broad 
principle  on  numbers  of  weapons  to  be 
destroyed,  and  those  numbers  of  weap- 
ons total  in  the  tens  of  thousands.  That 
entire  process  of  arms  control,  unique 
in  modern  history,  could  be  put  at  risk 


46 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


EAST  ASIA 


y  bringing  to  governments  and  to  par- 
aments  a  chemical  weapons  conven- 
ion  which  did  not  have  adequate 
erification  means.  Verification,  as 
ou  can  see  by  the  example  of  the  INF 
vgi'eement,  will  not  be  cheap,  and  it 
/ill  not  be  easy.  But  the  United  States 
lould  rather  spend  money  on  verifying 
I  global  ban  on  chemical  weapons  than 
would  on  the  production  of  chemical 
.eapons  because  no  verifiable  ban  has 
leen  achieved. 


ndustry's  Role  in  Verification 

'he  role  of  industry  is  also  crucial  in 
■erification,  but  we  must  design  a 
egime — and  I  think  we  can  design  a 
egime — that  allows  us  to  have  effec- 
ive  verification  and,  at  the  same  time, 
oes  not  reveal  proprietary  informa- 
ion;  does  not  penalize  developing  coun- 
ties or  their  chemical  industries;  and 
joes  not  damage  legitimate  commerce 
,n  dual-use  chemicals.  We  in  the  United 
States  are  proud  of  our  chemical  indus- 
ry:  proud  of  its  enthusiastic  support  of 
he  chemical  weapons  convention,  and 
ts  willingness  to  undergo  inspection 
nee  that  agreement  is  implemented. 

We  are  proud  of  the  announcement 
oday  by  the  U.S.  Chemical  Manufac- 
urers  Association  of  a  five-point  plan 
0  supplement  the  regulation  of  the 
J.S.  Government  on  the  export  of  dual- 
se  chemicals.  We  are  pleased  to  note 
hat  the  European  Community  chemi- 
al  industry  and  the  Japanese  chemical 
ndustry  have  also  implemented  such 
■oluntary  and  supplemental  regula- 
ions  on  dual-use  chemical  exports. 

Industry  representation  here  today 
s  larger  than  it  has  ever  been  in  Ge- 
leva,  but  there  are  many  who  are  not 
lere,  who  should  be.  We  need  to  build 
,m  this  meeting  in  ways  that  are  best 
eft  to  industry,  to  increase  and  to  fos- 
er  international  cooperation  among  the 
;hemical  industries  in  support  of  the 
;hemical  weapons  convention. 

In  conclusion,  let  me  again  thank 
;he  Government  of  Australia  and  in  so 
icing,  again  quote  President  Bush  who 
:5aid  this  June  [in  welcoming  Prime 
Minister  Hawke]  that  Australia's  lead- 
ng  role  "in  organizing  global  efforts  to 
:oiie  with  the  threat  of  chemical  weap- 
ons is  one  position  that  is  greatly  ad- 
mired by  Americans.  The  United 
iStates  supports  Australia's  efforts,  and 
lyou  may  be  assured  of  our  commitment 
ito  the  early  achievement  of  an  effec- 
tively verifiable  treaty  banning  these 
weapons."  ■ 


Cambodia  and  Vietnam:  Trapped  in 
an  Eddy  of  History? 


by  Richard  H.  Solomon 

Address  before  an  international 
symposium  sponsored  by  The  Los 
Angeles  Times,  the  Times  Mirror 
Company,  and  the  Asia  Society  in  Los 
Angeles  on  September  8, 1989.  Mr. 
Solomon  is  Assistant  Secretary  for 
East  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs. 

It's  a  pleasure  and  honor  to  join  here 
with  friends  and  colleagues  in  this  im- 
pressive display  of  interest  in  Indo- 
china. It  is  a  telling  sign  of  the  times 
that  this  gathering  is  taking  place  now 
and  here  in  Los  Angeles,  one  of  the 
great  cities  of  the  Pacific  rim. 

Contemporary  Asia's  economic  dy- 
namism and  political  ferment  highlight 
global  transformations  that  are  shaping 
the  world  we  will  know  in  the  21st  cen- 
tury. Secretary  of  State  Baker  has  suc- 
cinctly characterized  these  trends  as 
an  increasingly  integrated  global  econ- 
omy based  on  an  open  market  trading 
system  sparked  by  spectacular  tech- 
nological change,  the  failure  of  com- 
munism as  an  economic  and  political 


system,  and  a  worldwide  trend  toward 
democracy  and  free  enterprise. 

Would  that  the  realization  of  these 
trends  was  without  conflict  and  evenly 
accomplished.  Yet,  as  we  know,  devel- 
opment is  an  arduous  process  charac- 
terized by  conflict,  uneven  growth,  and 
setbacks  as  a  new  era  strains  to  break 
through  the  constraints  of  the  old. 
Asia's  explosive  economic  growth  and 
political  ferment  have  yielded  dramatic 
successes,  as  in  the  Philippines  and 
South  Korea,  where  intense  social  pres- 
sures shattered  authoritarian  political 
orders  and  brought  forth  democratic 
reform.  Yet  in  Burma,  and  more  re- 
cently in  China,  we  have  seen  how  un- 
certain and  painful  the  rites  of  passage 
to  a  new  era  can  be. 

What  do  these  forces  for  change 
mean  for  Indochina?  Does  Vietnam's 
announced  intention  to  end  its  occupa- 
tion of  Cambodia  signal  a  major  shift  in 
policy?  Or  do  old  suspicions,  old  ambi- 
tions, and  old  ideologies  still  hold  sway? 
The  inconclusive  results  of  the  recent 
Paris  conference  on  Cambodia  leave  us 
with  an  ambiguous  picture  of  the  fu- 


Assistant  Secretary  for  East  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs 


S&V-|^ 


Richard  H.  Solomon 

was  sworn  in  as  As- 
sistant Secretary  for 
East  Asian  and  Pacif- 
ic Affairs  on  June  23, 
1989.  Previously  he 
served  as  Director  of 
the  Policy  Planning 
Staff  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  (March 
1986-January  1989). 
He  held  the  position 
as  head  of  the  Rand 
Corporation's  Political 
Science  Department  (1976^6)  and  also  di- 
rected the  corporation's  research  program 
on  international  security  policy  (1977-83). 
From  1971  to  1976,  he  was  Senior  Staff 
Member  for  Asian  Affairs  on  the  National 
Security  Council  (NSC),  having  earlier 
been  Professor  of  Political  Science  at 
the  University  of  Michigan  (1966-71). 

Dr.  Solomon  received  his  Ph.D.  from  the 
Massachusetts  Institute  of  Technology  (1966) 
where  he  specialized  in  political  science  and 


Yi. 


Chinese  polities.  He  has  contributed  arti- 
cles to  a  variety  of  professional  journals, 
including  Forci'(/H  Affairs  and  the  China 
Quarteriy,  and  has  published  five  books — 
The  Soviet  Far  East  Military  Buildup:  Nu- 
clear Dilemmas  and  Asian  Security  (1986), 
The  China  Factor  (1981),  Asian  Security  in 
the  IBSO's  (1979),  A  Revolution  is  Not  a  Din- 
ner Party  (1976),  and  Mao's  Revolution  and 
Chinese  Political  Culture  (1971). 

Dr.  Solomon  has  done  research  and 
consulting  work  for  a  variety  of  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment offices  and  served  as  a  visiting 
professor  at  the  John  Hopkins  School  of  Ad- 
vanced International  Studies  in  Washington 
(1972-74).  He  was  an  International  Affairs 
Fellow  at  the  Council  on  Foreign  Relations 
(1971)  and  served  as  a  consultant  to  the 
President's  Commission  on  Foreign  Lan- 
guage and  International  Studies  (1978-80). 
He  was  a  board  member  of  the  National 
Committee  on  United  States-China  Rela- 
tions and  the  International  Research  and 
Exchanges  Board  (IREX).  He  has  served  on 
the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  Executive 
Panel  since  1984.  ■ 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


47 


EAST  ASIA 


ture.  Progress  on  the  international  as- 
pects of  a  settlement  contrasts  with  the 
inability,  thus  far,  to  construct  a  proc- 
ess of  internal  political  reconciliation. 

Tonight,  I  would  like  to  share  with 
you  some  thoughts  on  the  prospects  for 
peace  in  Indochina  and  about  U.S.  pol- 
icy toward  the  region. 

Asia  After  Vietnam 

In  1967,  Richard  Nixon  wrote  his  now- 
famous  Foreign  Affairs  article  "Asia 
After  Vietnam,"  forecasting  the  gains 
to  American  interests  that  would  come 
with  an  end  to  U.S.  involvement  in  the 
Vietnam  quagmire.  The  fruits  of  that 
policy  perspective  have  given  us  two 
decades  of  dramatic  benefits  in  Asia: 
normalization  of  relations  with  China;  a 
general  reduction  in  great  power  rival- 
ries; and  widespread  economic  growth 
and  social  advance — especially  for  the 
noncommunist  states  of  the  region.  The 
developing  countries  of  Southeast 
Asia — and  their  regional  grouping 
ASEAN,  the  Association  of  South  East 
Asian  Nations — have  thrived  in  this 
post-Vietnam  war  environment.  Thai- 
land and  Malaysia  are  now  forecast  to 
join  Singapore  as  Asia's  newest  "newly 
industrializing  economies."  In  the 
Philippines,  the  dramatic  political  rev- 
olution brought  about  by  "people  pow- 
er" is  now  being  matched  by  economic 
reform  and  increasingly  sustainable 
growth.  And  Indonesia,  the  world's 
fifth  most  populous  nation,  enjoys  po- 
litical stability  and  increasingly  suc- 
cessful economic  reform. 

ASEAN  has  become  one  of  the  pil- 
lars of  U.S.  policy  in  Asia.  Collectively 
it  is  our  seventh  largest  trading  part- 
ner. Two  of  our  security  treaty  allies  in 
the  region,  the  Philippines  and  Thai- 
land, are  ASEAN  states.  And  since 
Vietnam's  invasion  and  occupation  of 
Cambodia  in  late  1978,  we  have  cooper- 
ated closely  with  ASEAN  in  order  to 
counter  Vietnamese  threats  to  the  re- 
gion, whether  through  military  action 
or  the  major  refugee  flows  that  contin- 
ue to  burden  East  Asia. 

It  is  in  this  context  that  we  must 
view  the  contemporary  situation  in  In- 
dochina. Along  with  the  Korean  Penin- 
sula, Indochina  is  one  of  two  conflict 
zones  that  threaten  stability  and  pros- 
perity in  East  Asia.  And  while  Viet- 
nam's noncommunist  neighbors  have 
joined  the  global  economy  of  computer 
chips  and  floppy  disks,  the  Socialist 
Republic  of  Vietnam  and  Cambodia 
seem  trapped  in  an  eddy  of  history, 
as  they  play  out  the  antipathies  and 
ambitions  of  times  past. 


48 


Conflict  in  Indochina 

To  much  of  the  world,  Cambodia  has 
become  "Vietnam's  Vietnam."  The 
ghoulish  horrors  of  the  Khmer  Rouge 
reign  were  replaced  in  1979  by  the 
harsh  realities  of  what  is  now  a  decade 
of  Vietnamese  occupation. 

This  third  cycle  of  warfare  in 
Vietnam  and  Cambodia  has  reflected 
a  volatile  mixture  of  three  overlap- 
ping contemporary,  yet  historical, 
antagonisms. 

Geopolitically,  Indochina  became 
engulfed  by  the  Sino-Soviet  rivalry 
during  the  1970s.  After  the  1968  Tet 
offensive,  Hanoi  began  to  increase 
its  dependence  on  the  U.S.S.R.  This 
trend  accelerated  when  Vietnam  fully 
aligned  itself  with  the  Soviet  Union 
in  1978,  in  anticipation  of  its  invasion 
of  Cambodia — and  expected  counter- 
pressures  from  China,  thus  adding  a 
new  dimension  to  the  centuries-old 
Sino-Vietnamese  antagonism. 

Perhaps  even  more  deep-seated 
than  Sino-Vietnamese  enmity  is  the 
historical  conflict  between  the  Khmer 
and  Vietnamese.  Such  tensions  were 
muted  during  the  second  Indochina 
war.  Hanoi  had  nurtured  a  small  Cam- 
bodian communist  movement  since  the 
1930s  as  an  element  of  the  Indochina 
Communist  Party,  and  Vietnam  reluc- 
tantly backed  the  Khmer  Rouge  during 
their  guerrilla  days. 

Yet  Vietnam  has  long  considered 
hegemony  over  Indochina  a  fundamen- 
tal axiom  of  its  own  security.  In  1950 
Gen.  Vo  Nguyen  Giap,  Hanoi's  leading 
strategist,  described  Indochina  as  "a 
single  strategic  unit."  At  the  1976  Con- 
gress of  the  Vietnamese  Workers'  Par- 
ty, building  a  "special  relationship" 
with  Laos  and  Cambodia  was  identified 
as  a  top  foreign  policy  goal.  Through 
intimidation  and  invasion,  Vietnam 
persistently  built  such  a  relationship. 
As  late  as  1986,  a  party  resolution  ele- 
vated the  special  relationship  among 
Vietnam,  Laos,  and  Cambodia  to  "a  law 
governing  the  survival  and  develop- 
ment of  all  three  fraternal  nations." 

Vietnam's  objective  of  hegemony 
over  Indochina  fueled  ancient  Khmer 
fears  of  national  survival.  Among  the 
groups  victimized  during  the  Khmer 
Rouge  holocaust  were  ethnic  Viet- 
namese and  Khmer  communists  sus- 
pected of  loyalty  to  Hanoi.  And  like 
Cambodian  rulers  before  them,  the 
Khmer  Rouge  looked  to  China  for 
protection  against  Vietnamese  ambi- 
tions. Border  skirmishes  along  the 
Cambodian-Vietnamese  frontier  in  1977 


and  1978  grew  into  a  full-scale  Viet- 
namese invasion  and  occupation  of 
Cambodia — to  which  China  responded 
with  its  tutelary  border  war,  thus  fully 
interlocking  the  rivalries  of  Indochina 
with  the  Sino-Soviet  conflict. 

U.S.  Objectives  *' 

The  Vietnamese  invasion  of  Cambodia 
confronted  Thailand  with  the  daunting 
prospect  that  Hanoi — at  that  time  in 
possession  of  the  world's  fourth  largest 
armed  force  and  an  age-old  rival  for 
influence  in  Southeast  Asia — would 
control  Thailand's  eastern  frontier.  In 
response  ASEAN,  the  United  States, 
and  other  Western  nations  embarked 
on  a  policy  of  condemning  Hanoi  inter- 
nationally and  supporting  a  noncommu 
nist  resistance  to  Hanoi's  imposition  of 
a  surrogate  regime  in  Phnom  Penh. 

Over  the  past  decade,  we  have  fol- 
lowed ASEAN's  lead  in  pursuit  of  threi 
interrelated  objectives  in  Cambodia: 
restoring  the  country's  national  sover- 
eignty through  a  verified  Vietnamese 
withdrawal;  preventing  a  return  to 
power  of  the  murderous  Khmer  Rouge; 
and  facilitating  self-determination  for 
the  long-suffering  Cambodian  people. 

Equally  consistent  has  been  our 
policy  toward  Vietnam.  While  abhor- 
ring Hanoi's  occupation  of  Cambodia, 
we  have  not  closed  the  door  to  normal- 
ization of  relations.  We  have  made  cleai* 
to  Hanoi  that  its  occupation  of  Cam- 
bodia is  the  principal  obstacle  to 
normalization — that  establishment  of 
diplomatic  relations  can  occur  only  af- 
ter a  complete  and  verified  Vietnamese 
withdrawal  from  Cambodia  in  the  con- 
text of  an  acceptable  settlement. 

Vietnam's  troop  withdrawal  by  thai 
end  of  this  month  will  be  a  welcome 
step.  But  it  is  not  enough.  After  more 
than  a  decade  of  occupation,  Hanoi 
has  an  obligation  to  do  more  than  just 
walk  away,  leaving  Cambodia  in  a  state 
of  civil  war.  Vietnam  must  partici- 
pate constructively  in  efforts  to  bring 
about  a  settlement  in  Cambodia  that 
combines  an  equitable  and  stable 
political  reconciliation  with  national 
independence. 

We  have  also  developed  an  active 
dialogue  with  Hanoi  on  a  range  of  hu- 
manitarian issues,  in  particular,  on  a 
matter  which  this  Administration  and 
the  last  have  deemed  of  the  highest  pri-i 
ority:  achieving  the  most  complete  ac- 
counting possible  of  our  servicemen 
missing  in  Indochina.  Hanoi  under- 
stands that  as  a  practical  matter  prog- 


I 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  198S 


EAST  ASIA 


fess  in  these  areas  will  affect  the  pace 
"^ind  scope  of  the  development  of  our 
)verall  relationship. 

This  has  been  basic  U.S.  policy 
hrough  four  Administrations,  both 
democratic  and  Republican.  Central  to 
realizing  these  goals  has  been  U.S.  and 
kSEAN  support  for  the  noncommunist 
j-esistance  led  by  Prince  Sihanouk.  If 
ihere  is  to  be  a  political  process  of  na- 
cional  reconciliation,  we  believe  that 
:he  noncommunist  resistance  holds  the 
vital  balance  in  achieving  an  independ- 
3nt  Cambodia  at  peace  with  itself. 

Let  me  also  say  a  word  about  Laos, 
vvhich  often  gets  short-changed  in  dis- 
|:ussions  of  Indochina.  Laos  is  the  one 
state  of  Indochina  with  which  we  have 
maintained  diplomatic  ties.  In  the  past 
18  months,  Laos  has  embarked  on  a 
course  of  market-oriented  economic  re- 
forms, greater  political  openness,  and 
improved  cooperation  with  its  neighbor 
Thailand.  These  are  welcome  develop- 
ments that  appear  to  reflect  a  desire 
for  greater  interaction  with  the  West. 

Unfortunately,  Laos  is  also  a  major 
source  of  narcotics;  the  involvement  of 
some  Lao  officials  in  drug  trafficking 
has  led  us  to  declare  Laos  ineligible  for 
U.S.  aid  and  to  oppose  some  multi- 
lateral aid  programs  for  that  country. 
We  continue  to  urge  Laos  to  enhance 
cooperation  with  us  in  the  war  on 
drugs.  I  am  pleased  to  say  that  this 
dialogue  has  recently  produced  some 
positive  results,  including  a  crop 
substitution  program  that  we  are  now 
developing  for  a  drug-producing  area  in 
northern  Laos.  We  are  also  encouraged 
by  Lao  cooperation  on  the  POW/MIA 
issue.  Taken  together,  these  develop- 
ments augur  well  for  the  further  devel- 
opment of  U.S. -Lao  relations. 

While  our  policy  has  been  con- 
stant, what  has  changed  are  the 
circumstances,  both  regionally  and 
globally.  Vietnam's  self-created 
isolation — reinforcing  self-defeating  do- 
mestic policies  of  economic  socialization 
and  political  repression — has  height- 
ened the  deterioration  of  its  economy 
and  society.  In  terms  of  development, 
Vietnam  is  now  well  over  a  decade  be- 
hind buoyant  ASEAN  neighbors  such 
as  Thailand. 

The  combined  impact  of  this  do- 
mestic deterioration,  diplomatic  and 
economic  pressures  from  abroad,  and 
the  unrelieved  burdens  of  its  occupation 
of  Cambodia  has  led  Hanoi  to  embark 
on  a  major  "renovation"  program,  with 
the  focus  on  domestic  needs.  As  a  con- 
sequence, it  decided  to  withdraw  its 
forces  from  Cambodia  and  to  rethink 
at  least  its  short-term  goals. 


Another  dramatic  change  affecting 
the  diplomacy  of  Southeast  Asia  has 
been  the  emergence  of  an  international 
environment  of  accommodation.  Since 
the  mid-1980s,  we  have  seen  new  direc- 
tions in  Soviet  foreign  policy  which 
have  led  to  agreements  on  the  with- 
drawal of  foreign  occupation  forces 
from  Afghanistan  and  Angola  and 
diplomatic  efforts  to  resolve  these 
and  other  regional  conflicts. 

One  aspect  of  Mr.  Gorbachev's 
new  diplomacy  has  been  the  effort  to 
achieve  a  Sino-Soviet  rapprochement, 
which  in  turn  has  fostered  a  new  geo- 
political calculus  in  Indochina.  The 
Soviets  have  pressed  Vietnam  to 
withdraw  from  Cambodia.  And  China 
has  begun  a  high-level  dialogue  with 
Vietnam,  while  expressing  its  willing- 
ness to  cut  off  aid  to  the  Khmer  Rouge 
in  the  context  of  a  complete  and  veri- 
fied Vietnamese  withdrawal  from  Cam- 
bodia and  a  comprehensive  political 
settlement. 

Cambodia:  The  Road  to  Peace 

What  does  all  this  imply  for  Cambodia? 
The  circuitous  path  that  led  to  the  con- 
ference in  Paris  last  month  has  seen 
many  of  the  same  factors  at  play  that 
are  at  work  in  other  contemporary  re- 
gional conflicts:  the  burdens  of  a  de- 
cade of  inconclusive  warfare  and 
heightened  interest  among  the  major 
powers  in  resolving  the  conflict — as  re- 
flected in  U.S. -Soviet  discussions  on 
regional  disputes,  and  Mr.  Gorbachev's 
efforts  to  normalize  relations  with 
China. 

But  there  is  one  factor  that  seemed 
to  distinguish  Cambodia  from  other 
such  conflicts:  the  existence  of  a  nation- 
al leader  around  whom  a  process  of  po- 
litical reconciliation  might  be  built. 
Well  before  the  pace  of  diplomacy 
stepped  up — and  again,  following 
ASEAN's  lead — the  United  States  took 
steps  to  enhance  the  position  of  Prince 
Sihanouk  and  the  noncommunist  resist- 
tance.  An  initiative  launched  by  Con- 
gressman [Stephen]  Solarz  in  1985  re- 
sulted in  a  $3  million  humanitarian  aid 
program  to  the  noncommunists — 
a  program  carefully  structured  to 
prevent  materiel  from  falling  into 
the  hands  of  the  Khmer  Rouge. 

In  more  recent  months.  Congress 
has  further  expressed  its  support  for 
the  noncommunists  in  House  and  Sen- 
ate resolutions  proposed  by  Represent- 
ative Solarz  and  Senator  [Charles] 
Robb.  The  objective  of  such  expressions 
of  support  has  been  to  strengthen 


Prince  Sihanouk's  hand  in  anticipation 
of  a  diplomatic  resolution  of  the  conflict. 

The  prospect  of  a  political  solution 
began  to  take  shape  in  1985,  as  Viet- 
nam vaguely  hinted  it  would  withdraw 
its  occupation  forces  from  Cambodia  by 
the  end  of  1990.  Beginning  in  December 
1987,  Prince  Sihanouk  held  the  first  of 
a  series  of  meetings  with  Hun  Sen, 
Prime  Minister  of  the  Hanoi-backed 
regime  in  Phnom  Penh. 

While  progress  in  these  contacts 
was  modest,  positions  were  clarified 
and  the  broad  requirements  for  a  set- 
tlement became  apparent.  Then  in  Au- 
gust 1988,  Indonesia  hosted  the  first  of 
what  became  known  as  the  Jakarta  in- 
formal meetings.  These  meetings 
moved  the  diplomatic  process  forward 
by  bringing  together,  for  the  first 
time,  the  Cambodian  factions,  ASEAN, 
and  Vietnam. 

The  pace  of  diplomacy  quickened 
this  past  spring  as  Vietnam  announced 
on  April  5  that  it  was  accelerating  its 
timetable  for  withdrawal  to  September 
30,  1989.  Hanoi's  initiative  was  an  ef- 
fort to  structure  a  settlement  so  as  to 
leave  intact  its  surrogate  regime  in 
Phnom  Penh  led  by  Heng  Samrin  and 
Hun  Sen.  By  forcing  on  the  internation- 
al community  and  on  Prince  Sihanouk 
a  time-constrained  choice  between  the 
Hun  Sen  regime,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
the  Pol  Pot  faction  of  the  Khmer  Rouge, 
on  the  other  hand,  Hanoi  sought  to  load 
the  diplomatic  endgame  in  its  favor. 

This  strategy  was  clearly  evi- 
dent during  the  Paris  conference  in 
Hanoi's — and  Hun  Sen's — unwillingness 
to  compromise  on  a  formula  for  power 
sharing  as  a  basis  for  constructing  a 
transitional  coalition  government  under 
Prince  Sihanouk. 

A  major  aspect  of  the  power- 
sharing  issue  at  Paris  was  what  to 
do  about  the  Khmer  Rouge.  Should  the 
Pol  Pot  wing  of  the  divided  Cambodian 
communist  movement,  responsible  for 
the  genocidal  violence  of  the  1970s,  be 
totally  excluded  from  the  political  proc- 
ess with  only  a  military  option?  Or 
should  it — less  its  top  leadership — be 
given  a  limited  stake  in  a  transitional 
political  coalition  that  would,  under  in- 
ternational supervision,  face  the  test  of 
Khmer  public  opinion? 

Secretary  Baker  has  stated  clearly 
that,  from  an  American  perspective, 
we  want  no  role  for  the  Khmer  Rouge 
in  a  future  Cambodian  Government. 
However,  the  judgment  of  Prince  Siha- 
nouk, China,  and  the  ASEAN 
countries — as  expressed  in  the  commu- 
nique of  their  annual  ministerial  meet- 
ing this  past  July — has  been  that  the 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


49 


EAST  ASIA 


chances  for  peace  are  better  if  the 
Khmer  Rouge  is  included  in  a  four- 
party  interim  coalition. 

In  other  words,  total  exclusion  of 
the  Khmer  Rouge  is  seen  by  those  most 
directly  involved  as  a  sure  formula  for 
civil  warfare,  while  their  inclusion 
holds  out  some  prospect  that  the  strug- 
gle can  be  contained  within  a  political 
process  monitored  by  the  international 
community. 

The  Paris  Conference 

It  was  the  desire  to  prevent  another 
round  of  civil  warfare  that  led  most 
participants  in  the  Paris  conference  to 
insist  on  the  need  for  a  comprehensive 
settlement.  International  conciliation 
and  internal  reconciliation  were  thus 
integrally  linked.  Formation  of  a 
transitional  coalition  under  Prince 
Sihanouk  had  to  be  combined  with  an 
international  control  mechanism  to  ver- 
ify the  Vietnamese  withdrawal,  moni- 
tor a  cease-fire  and  the  cessation  of 
outside  assistance  to  all  the  factions, 
and  oversee  the  elections  which  would 
reestablish  a  legitimate  political  au- 
thority in  Cambodia.  And  a  UN  role  in 
organizing  and  overseeing  all  aspects 
of  this  complex  effort  was  seen  as  es- 
sential to  a  credible  peace  process. 

With  these  considerations  in  mind, 
France  took  the  initiative  in  May  of 
this  year  to  convene  yet  another  inter- 
national conference  in  the  lengthening 
series  of  efforts  since  Geneva  in  1954  to 
bring  peace  to  Indochina.  France's  his- 
toric ties  to  the  region — yet  its  geo- 
graphic distance — gave  Paris  a  unique 
standing  in  efforts  to  catalyze  a  proc- 
ess that  brought  together  the  five  per- 
manent members  of  the  UN  Security 
Council,  the  ASEAN  six,  five  other 
concerned  nations,  the  UN  Secretary 
General,  and  the  four  Cambodian  fac- 
tions. Assembled  together  for  1  month 
in  a  conference  room  about  one-third 
the  size  of  this  hall  was  an  internation- 
al mixture  that  at  times  generated  high 
political  drama. 

Regrettably  the  historical  and  per- 
sistent antagonisms,  noted  earlier  sur- 
faced in  daily,  often  bitter,  exchanges. 
The  hostilities,  suspicions,  and 
distrust — personal  and  political — 
among  the  Khmer  factions  and  between 
the  Khmer  and  Vietnamese,  pervaded 
the  conference  sessions.  The  code 
words  for  these  divisions — "genocide" 
and  "settlers" — suffuse  the  conference 
documents:  the  issues  of  Pol  Pot's  geno- 
cidal  violence  and  Khmer  fears  of  Viet- 
nam's hegemonial  ambitions,  as 


reflected  in  charges  of  large-scale,  ille- 
gal Vietnamese  settlement  in 
Cambodia. 

All  the  same,  the  conference  did 
generate  some  encouraging  progress 
on  the  external  aspects  of  a  settlement. 
The  three  formal  working  committees 
elaborated  many  of  the  enormously 
complex  details  of  an  international 
framework:  the  modalities  of  a  cease- 
fire; the  workings  of  an  international 
control  mechanism;  the  definition  of  in- 
ternational guarantees  for  Cambodia's 
independence  and  neutrality;  plans  for 
the  repatriation  of  refugees;  and  the 
eventual  reconstruction  of  the  Cambo- 
dian economy. 

Yet,  the  rock  on  which  the  Paris 
conference  ultimately  foundered  was 
the  deep  distrust  dividing  the  Cambo- 
dian factions.  While  Prince  Sihanouk 
tabled,  on  August  4,  a  framework  for 
power-sharing  that  might  have  been 
the  basis  for  negotiations,  neither 
Hun  Sen  nor  the  Vietnamese  displayed 
any  real  flexibility.  If  they  found  the 
Prince's  proposal  for  a  transitional  co- 
alition government  unacceptable,  they 
did  not  propose  any  realistic  alterna- 
tive. Their  objective  remained  to  leave 
the  Hun  Sen  regime  intact,  while  hop- 
ing to  graft  on  to  it  the  legitimacy  of 
Prince  Sihanouk's  standing  as  a  Khmer 
nationalist. 

Beyond  the  Paris  Conference 

Where  do  we  go  from  here?  Our  com- 
mitment is  to  a  negotiating  process 
and  a  political  resolution  of  Cambodia's 
future.  Yet  it  is  clear,  in  the  wake  of 
Paris  and  as  the  Vietnamese  prepare 
to  withdraw,  that  Cambodia  faces  the 
prospect  of  continuing  conflict.  The 
four  factions  seem  prepared  to  test 
their  relative  strengths  in  an  internal 
political/military  struggle  before  again 
engaging  in  an  international  negotia- 
tion. And  Vietnam  has  expressed,  as 
recently  as  August  24,  its  willingness 
to  reintervene  in  the  conflict  if  Hun 
Sen  requests  Hanoi's  assistance. 

What  should  U.S.  policy  be?  Three 
propositions  underlie  the  Administra- 
tion's approach  to  this  continuing 
tragedy: 

First,  Cambodia  is  a  challenge  to 
the  conscience  and  concern  of  the  entire 
international  community.  The  Khmer 
people  deserve  their  opportunity  for 
national  sovereignty,  self-determina- 
tion, political  reconciliation,  and 
development — and  we  want  to  ensure 
that  there  are  no  more  Cambodian  kill- 
ing fields.  The  United  States  will  play 


an  active  role  in  pursuit  of  these  objec- 
tives, but  it  must  be  recognized  that  we 
have  neither  the  political  position  nor 
the  i-esources  to  do  the  job  on  our  own, 

Second,  our  primary  security 
obligation  in  this  region  is  to  Thailand, 
to  which  we  are  legally  bound  by  the 
Manila  pact  of  1954.  As  well,  we  have  a 
major  interest  in  the  continuing  integ- 
rity and  vitality  of  ASEAN. 

Third,  we  have  a  strategic  objec- 
tive in  seeing  Indochina  freed  of  the 
rivalries  of  the  great  powers — an  objeo 
tive  most  likely  realized  if  Cambodia 
and  Vietnam  are  at  peace  within 
themselves  and  with  their  neighbors. 

Given  these  propositions,  the  Ad- 
ministration will  pursue  three  levels 
of  activity  in  the  months  ahead,  all 
designed  to  build  on  the  diplomatic 
momentum  of  Paris. 

•  We  will  sustain  active  contacts 
with  the  five  permanent  members  of 
the  UN  Security  Council.  France,  Chi 
na,  and  the  Soviet  Union  are  the  major 
powers  with  the  most  direct  influence 
and  interests  in  Cambodia  and  Viet- 
nam. The  Soviet  Union,  as  the  primarj 
supporter  of  Vietnam  and  Hun  Sen, 
must  restrict  its  increasing  flow  of 
arms  into  Cambodia  and  bring  Hanoi  t( 
see  that  its  own  interests  will  not  be 
served  by  another  cycle  of  warfare  in 
Indochina — which  certainly  will  be  the 
case  if  it  seeks  full  power  for  Hun  Sen 
in  the  absence  of  a  process  of  political 
reconciliation.  In  return  Hanoi  and 
Hun  Sen — and  the  international 
community — have  a  right  to  expect 
China  to  equally  restrict  the  supply  of 
arms  to  the  Khmer  Rouge.  Indeed  Bei- 
jing has  an  obligation  to  take  active 
measures  that  will  prevent  the  Khmer 
Rouge  from  again  imposing  a  mur- 
derous rule  on  the  Cambodian  people. 
France,  for  its  part,  is  due  credit  for 
taking  the  diplomatic  risks  associated 
with  trying  to  help  the  Khmer  factions 
bridge  their  differences.  And  we  should 
remember  that  the  Paris  conference 
was  only  suspended,  not  adjourned — 
which  is  one  way  of  saying  that  France 
and  conference  cochairman  Indonesia 
have  continuing  credibility  as  diplo- 
matic deal  makers. 

•  At  a  second  level,  the  United 
States  will  continue  to  work  closely 
with  the  ASEAN  countries  in  support 
of  their  political  approach  to  the  Cam- 
bodian conflict.  Their  security  inter- 
ests are  most  directly  affected  by  the 
search  for  peace  in  Indochina;  we  will 
support  their  efforts — most  imme- 
diately at  the  upcoming  session  of  the 
UN  General  Assemblv. 


50 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989J 


EAST  ASIA 


•  Finally,  we  will  sustain  our  sup- 
ort  for  the  noncommunist  resistance 
nd  Prince  Sihanouk  as  the  political 
enter  of  a  process  of  national 
econciliation. 

Some  now  argue  that  the  threat  of 
Khmer  Rouge  resurgence  is  such  that 
he  United  States  must  rely  on  Hun 
|en  rather  than  press  for  a  comprehen- 
ive  political  settlement.  This  approach 
5  seriously  flawed  on  several  counts. 
First,  a  regime  imposed  and  sus- 
ained  by  foreign  force  of  arms  lacks 
jgitimacy.  There  is  a  fundamental 
rinciple  here,  which  we  would  violate 
jt  the  risk  of  the  integrity  of  the  in- 
ernational  system  and  to  our  peril  in 
aany  other  parts  of  the  world.  Second, 
here  is  at  present  little  basis  for  as- 
luming  that  Hun  Sen's  unproven  forces, 
ibsent  their  Vietnamese  protectors, 
an  eliminate  the  Khmer  Rouge,  a  goal 
■hat  eluded  Hanoi's  vaunted  army  for 
he  past  decade.  And  lastly,  in  the  ab- 
ence  of  a  political  settlement  sup- 
lorted  by  Prince  Sihanouk,  such  a  move 
TOuld  pit  the  United  States  against 
Chmer  nationalism — a  policy  hardly  ac- 
eptable  to  the  American  people. 

As  democrats  (with  a  small  "d"), 
ur  commitment  must  be  to  a  political 
irocess  that  permits  national  self- 
etermination  for  the  Cambodian  peo- 
ile.  We  see  press  reports  of  Hun  Sen's 
lOpularity — of  reformist  policies  pro- 
noted  by  Phnom  Penh  that  are  re- 
toring  Buddhism,  allowing  private 
)roperty  and  free  market  activity.  If 
he  Phnom  Penh  regime  is  as  popular 
lis  its  public  relations  campaign  por- 
rays  it  to  be,  it  can  only  benefit  by 
aking  its  case  to  the  people  in  free 
md  fair  elections  supervised  by  the 
Jnited  Nations. 

The  United  States  remains  pre- 
pared to  accept  the  results  of  such  a 
credible  test  of  Cambodian  public  opin- 
ion and  to  work  with  the  international 
community  in  supporting  a  process  of 
political  reconciliation  in  Cambodia 
that  contains  safeguards  against  a 
iKhmer  Rouge  return  to  dominance. 

Thus  the  issue  comes  back  to 
whether  the  Cambodian  factions,  en- 
couraged by  their  foreign  supporters, 
can  join  together  in  a  political  process 
of  national  reconciliation.  The  United 
States  will  use  its  influence  to  move 
events  in  this  direction.  China  and  the 
Soviet  Union  must  do  the  same.  Mos- 
cow, in  particular,  must  accept  and  act 
on  the  reality  that  without  some  will- 
ingness by  Vietnam  and  Hun  Sen  to 
compromise  on  power-sharing,  there 
can  be  no  negotiated  settlement,  no 
respite  from  armed  conflict. 


The  immediate  lesson  of  the  Paris 
conference  is  that  the  divisions  and  dis- 
trust among  the  Khmer  factions  seem 
too  great  to  be  bridged  by  the  compro- 
mises and  constraints  of  coalition  poli- 
tics. Our  continuing  challenge  is  to 
provide  the  Cambodians  an  alternative 


to  a  test  of  strength  on  the  battlefield. 
For  without  political  reconciliation, 
Cambodia  and  Vietnam  will  remain 
outside  the  mainstream  of  development 
elsewhere  in  Southeast  Asia,  trapped  in 
their  own  sad  eddy  of  history.  ■ 


Visit  of  Japanese  Prime  Minister 


Prime  Minister  Toshiki  Kaifu  of 
Japan  made  an  official  working  visit 
to  Washington,  D.C.,  August  31- 
September  2,  1989,  to  meet  with 
President  Bush  and  other  government 
officials. 

Following  are  remarks  made  by 
the  President  and  the  Prime  Minister 
after  their  meeting  on  September  1.  ^ 

President  Bush 

An  old  proverb  says,  "The  foundation 
for  a  better  tomorrow  must  be  laid  to- 
day." Mr.  Prime  Minister,  you  and  I 
are  here  today  to  shape  tomorrow.  On 
America's  behalf,  let  me  welcome  you 
to  this  country. 

When  I  was  in  Japan  earlier  this 
year,  I  observed  how  ties — national  and 
personal — bind  our  two  people.  Your 
visit  reaffirms  those  ties  and  under- 
scores this  commitment  by  you  and 
your  government  to  the  continued 
health  of  our  historic  friendship.  That 
friendship  lives  and  grows,  as  today's 
meeting  evidenced.  But  while  we  met 


as  new  friends,  our  talks  were  con- 
ducted like  old  friends.  They  were 
characterized  by  cordiality,  a  positive 
atmosphere  and  understanding,  and  by 
broad  agreement  on  the  major  items  of 
our  bilateral  and  international  agenda. 
For  that,  I  credit  the  goodwill  and  per- 
spective that  you  brought  to  these  dis- 
cussions and  the  enduring  partnership 
between  our  two  governments. 

That  partnership  is  based  on 
shared  interests  and  mutual  respect 
and  rests  on  our  belief  that  together  we 
can  be  a  global  force  for  peace  and 
prosperity.  This  global  partnership 
works  in  several  ways. 

First,  as  in  past  meetings  between 
our  nations'  leaders,  the  Prime  Minis- 
ter and  I  affirmed  that  the  treaty  of  co- 
operation and  mutual  security  is  vital 
not  only  to  our  joint  security  but  to  the 
stability  of  the  entire  Asia-Pacific  area. 
In  that  context,  we  agreed  that  this  al- 
liance will  continue  to  be  crucial  to  the 
region's  future.  We  vowed  to  continue 
to  consult  closely  on  all  aspects  and  ar- 
rangements of  our  security  partnership 
and  shared  responsibility  for  peace  and 
stability. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


51 


EAST  ASIA 


Second,  the  Prime  Minister  and  I 
discussed  how  we  can  promote  peace 
and  prosperity  through  greater 
freedom — economic  and  political — 
around  the  world.  Already  we  have 
joined  to  support  the  Multilateral 
Assistance  Initiative  (MAI)  for  the  Phil- 
ippines launched  in  Tokyo  in  July. 
Today  we  restated  our  intent  to  encour- 
age still  more  open  economic  and  politi- 
cal systems  and,  specifically,  to 
support  recent  political  and  economic 
reforms  in  Eastern  Europe,  notably  in 
Poland  and  Hungary.  We  also  discussed 
the  situation  in  China  for,  as  I  have  said 
before,  we  seek  to  preserve  our  rela- 
tions there  while  endorsing  the  legiti- 
mate aspirations  of  the  Chinese  people 
for  political  expression. 

Then  a  third  area  of  agreement 
concerns  how  diplomacy  can  help  re- 
solve regional  conflicts.  America  and 
Japan,  with  others,  will  continue  to 
urge  a  comprehensive  settlement  that 
gives  the  people  of  Cambodia  both  secu- 
rity and  the  ability  to  choose  their  own 
government.  We  agreed,  too,  to  accel- 
erate our  efforts  to  protect  our  citizens 
against  international  terrorism.  In  par- 
ticular we  repeated  the  mutual  commit- 
ment to  aviation  security  that  we  made 
at  the  [economic]  summit  in  Paris  and 
pledged  to  pool  our  technical  and  eco- 
nomic resources  to  combat  all  forces  of 
terrorism  that  affect  civil  aviation. 

Finally  the  Prime  Minister  and  I 
discussed  our  economic  relationship  at 
great  length.  We  are  mindful  that  our 
economies  are  the  world's  largest.  We 
know  that  the  health  of  our  relationship 
partly  depends  on  bringing  our  eco- 
nomic relationship  into  better  balance. 
The  Prime  Minister  confirmed  the 
agreement  I  reached  with  his  prede- 
cessor at  the  Paris  summit  to  launch 
talks  on  structural  impediments,  and 
these  discussions  will  begin  in  a  few 
days.  I  stressed  to  him  the  importance 
that  we  attach  to  the  success  of  those 
talks  and  to  the  trade  committee  talks 
which  will  also  occur  next  week.  I 
share  the  Prime  Minister's  belief  that, 
while  Japan  is  noted  as  an  exporting 
superpower,  the  time  has  also  come  for 
Japan  to  be  an  importing  superpower. 
Each  of  us  desires  that  these  discus- 
sions produce  results  which  further 


strengthen  our  economic  relationship 
and  open  the  world  trading  system. 
To  advance  that  goal,  we  restated  our 
commitment  to  the  success  of  the 
Uruguay  Round,  and  we  also  vowed  to 
continue  our  frequent  consultations 
at  all  levels  on  other  international 
economic  and  trade  issues. 

In  sum  ours  has  been  a  highly  pro- 
ductive meeting — one  which  will  en- 
hance the  broad  U.S. -Japanese  agenda. 
A  writer  once  observed  friendship  is  a 
sheltering  tree.  Because  of  ties  which 
prosper  and  a  partnership  which  en- 
dures, both  the  United  States  and  Ja- 
pan have  been,  I  believe,  and  will 
remain  better  for  the  shade. 

We  have  a  mature,  effective  work- 
ing partnership.  And  with  you  at  the 
helm,  I  know  the  partnership  between 
Japan  and  the  United  States  will  pro- 
duce positive  results.  I  look  forward  to 
seeing  you  again.  Thank  you  very,  very 
much  for  honoring  the  United  States  by 
this  very  early  visit  in  your  prime 
ministership. 

Prime  Minister  Kaifu^ 

I  wish  to  express  my  heartfelt  grati- 
tude for  your  heartwarming  hospitality 
and  kind  words.  This  is  my  first  visit 
as  Prime  Minister,  and  I  have  just  com- 
pleted my  first  meeting  with  the  Presi- 
dent. Nevertheless  I  was  able  to 
conduct  talks  with  the  President  as  if  I 
were  meeting  an  old  friend,  which  I  be- 
lieve is  because  the  Japan-U.S.  rela- 
tionship rests  on  a  solid  foundation  laid 
down  by  the  strenuous  endeavors  of 
both  the  Japanese  and  American  peo- 
ples over  these  many  years.  I  conveyed 
to  the  President  my  conviction  that  the 
Japan-U.S.  relationship  is  the  cor- 
nerstone of  Japan's  diplomacy  and  that 
it  shall  continue  to  be  so. 

The  President  and  I  confirmed 
that  we  shall  firmly  maintain  the 
Japan-U.S.  security  arrangements 
which  are  the  basis  of  our  bilateral  re- 
lations. The  President  and  I  shared  a 
view  that  cooperative  Japan-U.S.  rela- 
tions, based  on  the  Japan-U.S.  security 
ties,  are  indispensable  for  the  peace 
and  stability  of  the  Asia-Pacific  region, 
including  Japan. 


At  the  same  time,  the  solution  of 
various  economic  problems  that  arise 
between  our  two  countries  because  of 
our  close  ties  requires  effort  on  the 
part  of  both  Japan  and  the  United 
States,  and  it  is  important  to  continue 
efforts  and  joint  collaboration  toward 
their  resolution. 

I  conveyed  to  the  President  my 
thinking  that  Japan  will  continue  to 
promote  appropriate  macroeconomic 
policies  as  well  as  structural  reform, 
and  make  efforts  for  expanding  importi 

I  expressed  my  appreciation  to  thi 
President  for  his  continuing  efforts  to 
reduce  the  budget  deficit,  improve  the 
savings  rate,  and  strengthen  compet- 
itiveness. In  this  connection,  I  expect! 
the  Structural  Impediments  Initiative 
(SII)  between  Japan  and  the  United 
States,  which  will  start  shortly, 
to  bear  significant  outcome. 

Japan  and  the  United  States  shar 
such  fundamental  values  as  freedom 
and  democracy  and  are  partners  shar- 
ing major  responsibilities  in  global 
tasks.  Japan  and  the  United  States 
must  join  forces  in  dealing  with  many 
broad  issues  related  to  world  peace  an 
prosperity,  such  as  management  of  th« 
world  economy,  problems  of  debt  in  th' 
developing  countries,  relief  for  starvai 
tion,  efforts  for  strengthening  the  fre 
trade  system  such  as  the  Uruguay 
Round,  resolution  of  regional  conflicts 
protection  of  human  rights,  interna- 
tional cooperation  for  the  prevention 
of  terrorism,  and  the  eradication 
of  drugs. 

The  President  and  I  expressed  oUi 
common  determination  to  actively 
shoulder  responsibilities  in  a  manner 
commensurate  with  our  respective 
abilities  under  such  global  partnership 
In  this  connection,  the  President  and  1 
shared  the  view  that  further  impor- 
tance must  be  placed  on  international 
cooperation  for  the  preservation  of  the 
global  environment.  My  present  visit 
will  take  me  to  Mexico  and  Canada 
where  I  intend  to  discuss  the  global 
environmental  problems  with  their 
leaders. 

As  a  program  symbolizing  Japan- 
U.S.  cooperation  in  development  issue 
such  as  combating  poverty  in  the  work 
and  relieving  hunger,  I  proposed  to  th« 
President  the  establishment  of  a  Le- 


52 


ECONOMICS 


md  memorial  program  for  internation- 
il  development  in  commemoration  of 
he  ideals  and  achievement  of  the  late 
Jongressman  Leland,  and  obtained  his 
upport.^ 

I  stated  to  the  President  that  my 
ileal  in  politics  is  the  realization  of  a 
riore  equitable  and  humane  society  and 
hat,  to  this  end,  I  believe  it  crucial  to 
dvance  political  reform  and  to  pro- 
tiote  reforms  for  improving  the  Japa- 
lese  people's  quality  of  life  with  an 
mphasis  on  the  views  of  consumers.  I 
trongly  emphasized  with  the  Presi- 
ent,  who  is  not  relaxing  with  the 
'uccess  of  the  United  States  but  is 
hnplementing  realistic  policies  aimed 
t  realizing  the  gentler  and  kinder  soci- 
ty,  Japan  and  the  United  States  are 
acing  common  challenges  to  realize 
heir  aspired  societies. 

For  example,  the  role  of  education, 
vhich  brings  up  the  generation  which 
jvill  shoulder  tomorrow's  responsibili- 
iies,  is  very  important  for  both  Japan 
md  the  United  States.  I  stated  to  the 
'resident  that  deepening  discussion  on 
hose  tasks,  including  the  problem  of 
i'ducation,  is  useful  for  Japan  and  the 
Jnited  States  and  that  such  discussions 
vill  also  lead  to  enhancing  genuine  mu- 
ual  understanding  between  the  two 
lountries. 

I  believe  the  President  strongly 
upports  my  views.  I  am  convinced 
hat  the  expansion  of  such  an  indepth 
lialogue  is  precisely  what  is  needed  to 
jdd  another  important  dimension  to 
')ur  bilateral  relationship.  I  believe  the 
ast  decade  of  the  20th  century,  which 
s  called  the  century  of  war  and  revolu- 
,ion,  should  be  devoted  to  laying  the 
groundwork  for  a  21st  century  filled 
Afith  peace  and  prosperity  for  all.  To 
;his  end,  I  am  determined  to  fulfill  the 
role  that  Japan  should  play  in  the  world 
Dn  the  basis  of  close  and  cooperative 
Japan-U.S.  relations. 


Uruguay  Round  and  U.S.  Trade  Policy: 
A  Foundation  for  the  Future 


'  Made  at  the  South  Portico  of  the 
White  House  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation 
of  Presidential  Documents  of  Sept.  4,  1989). 

-  Prime  Minister  Kaifu  spoke  in  Japa- 
nese, and  his  remarks  were  translated  by  an 
interpreter. 

''■  U.S.  Representative  Mickey  Leland 
(D-Tex.)  was  killed  in  a  plane  crash  in  Ethi- 
iOpia  in  August  1989  enroute  to  refugee 
!canips  in  that  country.H 


by  Carta  A.  Hills 

Address  before  the  Aynerican 
Chamber  of  Commerce  (U.K.)  and  the 
Royal  Institute  for  International 
Affairs  in  London  on  September  H., 
1989.  Ambassador  Hills  is  U.S.  Trade 
Representative. 

Trade  and  London  are  inseparable.  For 
centuries  they  have  gone  together  like 
a  stiff  wind  and  a  schooner's  sails.  Open 
trade  is  the  keystone  of  your  prosper- 
ity. Three  revered  Britons — David 
Hume,  Adam  Smith,  David  Ricardo — 
are  the  intellectual  heroes  of  those  of  us 
who  now  defend  and  seek  to  expand  the 
free  trade  system.  That  system  per- 
sists but  is  sorely  strained — tested  by 
governments  that  impede  the  free  play 
of  market  forces,  distort  trade,  and 
constrain  competition. 

I  am  here  today  to  assure  you 
that  the  trade  policy  of  the  Bush  Ad- 
ministration emanates  from  the  spirit 
of  Hume,  Smith,  and  Ricardo  and  is 
dedicated  to  the  expansion  of  open 
trade. 

Earlier  this  year.  President  Bush 
conducted  an  extensive  review  of  the 
global  trading  system  and  of  our  trade 
policy.  I  should  like  to  outline  for  you 
the  results  of  our  deliberations;  in  par- 
ticular, to  articulate  the  goal  of  U.S. 
trade  policy,  our  strategy  for  achieving 
it,  and  the  centrality  to  it  of  the 
Uruguay  Round. 

Trade  Goals  and  Strategy 
for  the  1990s 

We  have,  I  assure  you,  a  clear  vision  of 
the  world  that  we  seek:  one  where  en- 
trepreneurs, not  government  bureau- 
crats, determine  how  industries  and 
farms  compete  and  how  nations  trade. 

The  policy  of  the  Bush  Administra- 
tion is  to  open  markets,  not  to  close 
them;  to  create  an  ever-expanding  glob- 
al trading  system  based  upon  clear  and 
enforceable  rules. 

The  President  has  designed,  and 
we  are  vigorously  executing,  a  three- 
pronged  strategy  to  achieve  our  vision. 

•  We  are  committed — and  we  are 
challenging  our  trading  partners  to 
match  our  commitment — to  conclude 


successfully  the  Uruguay  Round  of 
multilateral  trade  talks  by  the  Decem- 
ber 1990  deadline. 

•  In  a  manner  that  is  entirely  con- 
sistent with  our  Uruguay  Round  aims, 
we  will  pursue  bilateral  and  regional 
market-opening  initiatives. 

•  We  will  use  the  strength  of  our 
domestic  market  to  further  our  objec- 
tives in  the  Uruguay  Round. 

The  one  essential  target  of  our 
strategy  is  to  get  government  out  of 
business;  out  of  the  business  of  making 
steel,  selling  grain,  growing  beef, 
building  ships,  and  the  hundreds  of 
other  ways  that  governments  distort 
trade.  This  goal  drives  all  of  our  recent 
trade  actions,  including: 

•  Our  negotiations  in  steel  and 
shipbuilding,  which  aim  to  curb  gov- 
ernment subsidies  and  open  markets; 

•  Our  clear  and  constant  support 
for  the  European  Communities'  (EC) 
march  toward  a  single  market  and  our 
call  for  it  to  lower  barriers  not  only 
within  Europe  but  between  Europe 
and  its  trading  partners; 

•  Our  implementation  of  the  1986 
Trade  Act  in  ways  that  will  free 
global  commerce  from  government 
interference; 

•  Our  visit  last  month  to  Mexico, 
where  we  applauded  the  creativity  of 
the  Salinas  Administration,  which  is 
tearing  down  tariffs  and  trade  barriers 
and  restructuring  Mexico's  economy; 

•  Our  visit  next  month  to  the  Pacif- 
ic rim  to  reinforce  that  region's  tilt 
toward  market-driven  trade  and  invest- 
ment regimes;  and 

•  Our  continued  opposition  to  pro- 
tectionist pressures  in  our  own  coun- 
try, such  as  attempts  to  restrict  foreign 
investment. 

And  sometimes  we  need  to  prod 
government  to  eliminate  anticompeti- 
tive practices  in  industry  that  can 
equally  restrain  trade.  For  example 
our  Structural  Impediments  Initiative 
(SII)  with  Japan  is  designed  to  root  out 
visible  and  "invisible"  barriers  that 
severely  limit  competition  in  both 
countries. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


53 


ECONOMICS 


The  Uruguay  Round 

Each  of  these  market-opening  efforts 
addresses  specific  issues.  But  they 
alone  will  not  accomplish  the  sweeping 
reform  of  the  global  trading  system 
that  is  so  clearly  needed. 

Since  World  \yar  II,  the  General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade 
(GATT) — the  main  platform  for  inter- 
national trade  negotiations — has  spon- 
sored seven  successful  rounds  of  tariff 
cuts  among  the  world's  great  trading 
nations.  These  rounds  lowered  barriers 
and  expanded  trade.  As  a  result,  our 
economies  have  grown  faster  in  the  last 
four  decades  than  in  any  similar  period 
of  world  history. 

The  GATT  continues  to  promote 
trade  e.xpansion  and  has  accommodated 
a  growing  membership  of  diverse  econ- 
omies. Most  important  it  has  generated 
widespread  acceptance  of,  if  not  always 
adherence  to,  certain  basic  principles — 
such  as  national  treatment — that  sup- 
port open  trade. 

The  problem,  however,  is  that  the 
trading  system  is  outstripping  the 
GATT.  As  tariffs  have  decreased,  non- 
tariff  barriers  have  increased.  More- 
over areas  poorly  covered  by  GATT 
rules — like  agriculture,  or  not  covered 
at  all,  like  intellectual  property,  serv- 
ices, and  investment — are  of  much 
greater  importance  than  they  once 
were. 

In  short  the  GATT  is  akin  to  a  one- 
bedroom  bungalow  on  a  priceless  piece 
of  property;  the  benefits  of  renovation 
far  outweigh  the  costs.  All  told  more 
than  $1  trillion  in  goods  and  services 
trade  is  not  adequately  covered  by  in- 
ternational rules  of  fair  play.  And  when 
rules  are  weak  or  nonexistent,  trade 
disputes  turn  into  trade  wars;  export- 
ers are  frustrated;  inefficient  indus- 
tries feed  at  government  troughs.  The 
cost  is  staggering. 

•  Europeans  spent  almost  $120  bil- 
lion last  year  to  support  agriculture;  in 
the  United  States,  the  bill  came  to  al- 
most $75  billion.  That  is  $300  or  .$400 
out  of  each  of  our  pockets  annually. 

•  In  the  EC,  an  additional  $50  bil- 
lion is  squandered  in  subsidies  to  Euro- 
pean steelmakers,  shipbuilders,  and 
other  manufacturers.  That  is  another 
$150  taken  out  of  each  consumer's 
pocket  each  year. 

•  Inadequate  protection  of  intellec- 
tual property  costs  U.S.  software  de- 
signers, pharmaceutical  companies, 
and  other  exporters  more  than  $40  bil- 
lion annually.  Their  European  counter- 
parts lose  billions  more.  This  piracy  is 
sapping  the  productivity  of  the  Ruhr 
and  "silicon"  valleys  alike. 


54 


We  cannot  go  on  like  this.  The 
Uruguay  Round  is  our  best  chance  to 
control  what  may  soon  be  uncontrollable. 

It  is  for  this  reason  that  President 
Bush  has  made  the  Uruguay  Round — 
launched  in  Punta  del  Este,  Uruguay, 
in  1986 — America's  highest  trade  pri- 
roity.  Right  now  100  nations  are  work- 
ing in  Geneva  to  expand  the  GATT, 
strengthen  it  as  an  institution,  broaden 
its  coverage  of  agriculture,  and  extend 
it  to  new  concerns  such  as  services, 
intellectual  property  rights,  and 
investment. 

My  message  to  Europe  is  simple — 
and  urgent.  We  must  reach  for  ambi- 
tious results.  If  we  merely  tinker  at 
the  margins,  we  face  a  return  to 
brinksmanship  and  trading  blocs.  For 
too  long,  we  have  only  reacted  to 
changes  in  global  trade.  The  round  is 
this  century's  last  best  chance  to  act. 

•  Act  in  agriculture.  The  U.S.  goal 
is  to  eliminate  all  trade-distorting 
measures,  while  still  giving  farmers 
time  to  adjust  to  market  forces.  Last 
month  we  proposed  converting  all  non- 
tariff  trade  barriers — such  as  quotas 
and  variable  levies — to  tariffs  which 
are  visible  and  thus  more  easily  re- 
duced. Later  this  month,  we  will  table 
in  Geneva  a  comprehensive  proposal  un- 
der which  farmers  can  grow  what  they 
want,  when  they  want,  and  earn  a 
decent  income  without  government 
interference.  In  our  view,  without 
fundamental  reform  in  agriculture,  the 
round  will  fail.  With  reform  we  all  suc- 
ceed; reform  could  create  3  million  new 
jobs  in  Europe,  cut  the  U.S.  budget 
deficit  by  $37  billion,  and  boost  real 
Japanese  wages  2.5%. 

•  Act  to  ensure  market  access  for 
industrial  products.  The  United  States 
challenges  its  trading  partners  to  envi- 
sion a  future  "zero  tariff  world.  We 
stand  ready  today  to  work  with  others 
to  achieve  this  in  key  sectors  in  the 
present  round. 

•  Act  to  protect  intellectual 
property  rights.  We  submitted  a  far- 
reaching  proposal  last  year.  Negotia- 
tors are  now  drafting  an  agreement 
that,  in  practical  terms,  should  provide 
patent  protection  for  pharmaceuticals, 
chemicals,  and  other  products;  copy- 
right protection  for  sound  recordings 
and  computer  software;  trade  secret 
protection  for  manufacturing  processes 
and  data;  and  effective  enforcement  to 
stop  trademark  counterfeiting  and 

the  piracy  of  copyrighted  materials 
such  as  books,  motion  pictures,  and 
recordings. 

•  Act  to  ensure  that  international 
rules  of  fair  play  cover  services. 


British  and  French  insurance  companl 
ies,  U.S.  travel  agencies,  and  other  r 
service  firms  must  be  able  to  set  j 
up  shop  in  foreign  countries  and  be  i 
treated  like  local  firms.  We  will  table  1 
our  ideas  on  a  comprehensive  agree- 
ment in  October. 

•  Act  to  curb  restrictions  on  for- 
eign investment.  U.S.  and  Japanese 
automakers,  German  equipment 
manufacturers,  and  other  companies 
should  be  able  to  invest  overseas  with;' 
out  being  forced  to  take  a  local  partm  3 
export  a  given  percentage  of  their  outjl 


put,  use  local  parts,  or  meet  any  one  ( 


a  dozen  other  investment  conditions.  1 
just  came  from  Geneva,  where  our  pri 
vate  sector  advisers  and  I  spent  2  day 
discussing  the  investment  proposal  wi 
tabled  in  July. 

•  Act  to  end  trade-distorting  sub* 
sidies.  I  have  mentioned  the  U.S.  ini- 
tiative in  steel  and  shipbuilding,  but 
the  problem  goes  beyond  these  sector: 
Subsidies  destroy  business  and  bank- 
rupt budgets.  We  can  help  workers  an 
regions  more  effectively  without  reso 
to  subsidies  that  stifle  competition. 
The  United  States  will  present  an  an; 
bitious  proposal  to  limit  subsidies  by 
year's  end. 

•  Act  to  contain  disputes.  We  net- 
new  mechanisms  to  resolve  our  differ 
ences  before  the  inevitable  dispute  es< 
calates  into  a  regrettable  war.  Ideas 
we  challenge  our  trading  partners  to 
consider  run  the  gamut  from  arbitra- 
tion to  "appellate  review"  to  an  actual 
"GATT  court."  Whatever  the  final  ou 
come,  we  need  a  system  that  is  swift, 
fair,  and  effective. 

Time  is  short;  the  task  great.  By 
the  end  of  this  year,  countries  must  ta 
ble  all  remaining  proposals  in  each  of 
the  15  negotiating  groups.  The  United 
States  has  submitted  numerous  pro- 
posals. We  will  present  the  rest  of  our 
ideas  by  year's  end.  In  the  first  half 
of  1990,  countries  will  work  to  reach 
agreements  in  each  area.  We  must  the 
hammer  these  agreements  into  a  com- 
plete package  by  the  time  the  GATT 
ministers  meet  in  Brussels  in  Novem^ 
ber  1990. 

Conclusion 

Europe  and  America  have  worked 
hand-in-hand  to  promote  freedom 
throughout  the  world.  Whether  in 
terms  of  freedom  of  expression,  reli- 
gion, or  political  belief,  we  have  fough 
for  the  right  of  people  everywhere  to 
make  their  own  choices. 

Choice  is  the  indelible  link  be- 
tween our  political  system  and  our  ecc 


ECONOMICS 


)mic  system.  Political  freedom  and 
{onomic  freedom  are  mutually  depend- 
it.  Everyone  should  have  the  ability 
r  choose  who,  when,  and  where  to  buy 
•  sell  goods  and  services  freely  in  a 
^ir  market.  That  is  competition — the 
indamental  strength  of  our  two  na- 
ons.  David  Ricardo  in  1817  called  it 
le  freedom  to  do  most  what  each  of  us 
■)es  best. 

That  is  what  the  Uruguay  Round  is 
1  about — competition.  That  is  why  it 
the  centerpiece  of  our  trade  policy 
hd  the  key  to  the  future  of  world 
:ade.  If  the  round  is  to  succeed,  there 
re,  in  our  view,  certain  agreements 
^  must  have: 

•  Fundamental  reform  of  agri- 
iltural  trade; 

•  Extension  of  GATT  rules  to  the 
jiew  areas"  of  services,  investment, 
!id  intellectual  property; 

•  Expanded  market  access  for 
ade  in  goods; 

•  Removal  of  trade-distorting  sub- 
dies;  and 

•  Fair  and  effective  dispute 
'ttlement. 

America  does  not  seek  an  unfair 
Ivantage,  but  we  will  not  unilaterally 
sarm.  We  do  not  seek  to  open  mar- 
ts for  the  sole  benefit  of  American 
itrepreneurs.  Rather  we  are  firmly 
)mmitted  to  use  our  strength  to  open 
arkets  to  all  who  would  compete  for 
lem. 

We  succeeded,  for  example,  in 
3ening  the  Japanese  beef  market, 
hich  served  Australian  ranchers  at 
ast  as  well  as  our  own.  The  lesser  de- 
sloped  countries  in  particular  must 
ave  the  openness  that  we  seek,  so  that 
ley  too  can  become  markets  for  our 
roducts  and  assume  the  respon- 
;bilities  of  the  international  trading 
ystem.  In  short  we  seek  what  we  have 
iways  sought — freedom  and  fairness — 
n-  farmers  and  factory  workers 
nroughout  the  world. 

Each  cycle  of  diplomatic  effort  adds 
s  own  chapter  to  history.  Ours  should 
eflect  our  daring,  not  our  fears;  our 
lOnfidence,  not  our  insecurities.  The 
rading  system  that  best  mirrors  these 
lualities  is  one  that  does  most  to  devel- 
op them.  If  the  Uruguay  Round  suc- 
eeds,  we  will  have  produced  a  sequel 
."i-thy  of  the  work  done  40  years  ago — 
st(|uel  vibrant  with  hope  and  prosper- 
y  for  the  next  generation.  ■ 


Trade-Related  Aspects  of 
Intellectual  Property  Rights 


by  Carlo  A.  Hills 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Courts,  Intellectual  Property, 
and  the  Administration  of  Justice  of 
the  House  Judiciary  Committee  on 
July  25,  1989.  Ambassador  Hills  is 
U.S.  Trade  Representative.^ 

I  am  pleased  to  testify  today  on  a  topic 
of  the  utmost  importance  to  the  United 
States  and  the  international  trading 
community — the  trade-related  aspects 
of  intellectual  property  rights.  This 
hearing  is  an  important  part  of  our 
consultation  process  with  those  con- 
gressional committees  that  have  legis- 
lative responsibility  for  areas  affected 
by  matters  now  under  negotiation.  My 
office  has  the  lead  on  trade  negotia- 
tions, but  our  negotiating  efforts  bene- 
fit from  the  full  participation  of  other 
agencies,  especially  the  Department  of 
Commerce,  through  the  International 
Trade  Administration  and  the  Patent 
and  Trademark  Office,  and  the  Depart- 
ment of  State.  Almost  every  other  exec- 
utive branch  agency  makes  an  active 
contribution  to  our  policy  development, 
and  we  benefit  greatly  from  the  full 
participation  of  the  Copyright  Office 
[under  the  Library  of  Congress]  and 
the  input  and  assistance  of  many  con- 
gressional advisers  and  staff.  The  in- 
put of  staff  of  this  subcommittee,  in 
particular,  has  been  very  helpful.  Our 
private  sector  advisers  are  indispens- 
able and,  on  this  topic,  have  never 
failed  to  respond  constructively, 
even  on  short  notice. 

This  is  a  topic  of  the  utmost  impor- 
tance. Americans  who  engage  in  inter- 
national trade  are  very  concerned 
about  the  harm  to  U.S.  trading  inter- 
ests that  results  from  the  lack  of  ade- 
quate and  effective  protection  of 
intellectual  property  rights  in  many 
foreign  markets.  Our  businesses  are 
losing  money,  but  more  importantly, 
our  economy  is  losing  the  competitive 
edge  we  gain  from  research  and  devel- 
opment, innovation  and  creativity.  As 
a  nation,  we  simply  cannot  afford  it. 

The  share  of  U.S.  exports  made  up 
of  articles  that  rely  heavily  on  intel- 
lectual property  protection  (chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals,  computers,  software, 
movies,  sound  recordings,  books,  scien- 
tific equipment)  has  more  than  doubled 


in  the  postwar  period  to  over  a  fourth 
of  total  exports.  U.S.  companies  expe- 
rience worldwide  losses  due  to  in- 
adequate and  ineffective  intellectual 
property  protection.  One  estimate  put 
those  losses  at  $43-61  billion  in  1986. 
Recent  submissions  to  my  office  indi- 
cate that  new  sources  of  losses  arise  at 
least  as  fast  as  we  solve  existing  prob- 
lems. With  this  magnitude  of  problem, 
it  was  not  surprising  to  see  a  dramatic 
shift  in  the  last  decade  of  evolving  U.S. 
trade  policy  to  address  these  problems. 

It  was  almost  exactly  10  years  ago 
this  month  that  the  last  round  of  multi- 
lateral trade  negotiations  was  conclud- 
ed and  implemented  by  statute  in  the 
United  States.  Late  in  that  round,  the 
United  States  sought  to  include  an 
agreement  to  require  strict  border  en- 
forcement to  stem  international  trade 
in  goods  bearing  counterfeit  trade- 
marks. Although  that  effort  was  unsuc- 
cessful, it  did  open  multilateral  trade 
negotiations  to  the  topic  of  intellectual 
property  rights. 

U.S.  trade  policy  objectives 
evolved  in  the  first  half  of  this  decade 
to  expand  our  negotiating  mandate  on 
intellectual  property.  The  Caribbean 
Basin  Initiative,  the  duty-free  treat- 
ment for  developing  countries  under 
the  generalized  system  of  preferences 
(GSP),  and  Section  301  procedures  to 
address  unreasonable  foreign  actions 
that  burdened  or  restricted  U.S.  com- 
merce saw  legislation  and  Admini- 
stration policy  include  negotiating 
objectives  to  obtain  adequate  and  effec- 
tive protection  of  intellectual  property 
rights.  The  underlying  premises  of  the 
Administration's  trade-related  intel- 
lectual property  objectives  include 
the  following. 

•  All  countries'  economic  growth 
and  international  competitiveness  can 
be  enhanced  by  strong  domestic  intel- 
lectual property  protection. 

•  When  countries  do  not  provide 
strong  protection  of  intellectual  prop- 
erty rights,  and  when  an  effective  sys- 
tem of  international  enforcement  does 
not  exist,  then  substantial  distortions 
in  international  production  and  trade 
result. 

•  The  United  States  has  a  very 
substantial  stake  in  a  healthy  system 
of  international  trade  and  strong  pro- 
tection of  intellectual  property. 


)epartment  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


55 


ECONOMICS 


Unfortunately,  many  countries  do 
not  realize  that  improved  protection  of 
intellectual  property  is  in  their  inter- 
est, or  knowing  it  do  not  pursue  it;  and 
trade  problems  for  U.S.  producers  have 
inevitably  resulted.  These  policies 
cause  three  types  of  trade-related 
problems  for  Americans. 

First,  U.S.  companies  lose  exports 
and  foreign  sales,  royalties,  and  the 
value  of  investments  in  the  market 
where  the  American  intellectual  prop- 
erty right  is  appropriated  without 
compensation. 

Second,  our  firms  lose  sales  in 
third  markets  when  unauthorized  prod- 
ucts are  sold  there. 

Finally,  U.S.  companies  may  lose 
sales  in  our  own  country  to  imports — 
involving  unauthorized  use  of  goods, 
works,  or  processes  covered  by  U.S. 
intellectual  property  laws. 

As  our  economic  interests  led  us  to 
focus  on  the  broader  aspects  of  intellec- 
tual property  protection,  including  the 
adequacy  of  foreign  laws  and  their  en- 
forcement, the  United  States  insisted 
in  1986  that  intellectual  property  pro- 
tection be  included  in  the  Uruguay 
Round  of  multilateral  trade  negotia- 
tions. We  were  successful  in  launching 
these  negotiations  under  the  auspices 
of  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs 
and  Trade  (GATT). 

The  GATT  has  formed  the  back- 
bone of  the  international  trading 
system  since  1947.  Early  rounds  of 
negotiations  focused  almost  exclusively 
on  the  reciprocal  reduction  of  tariffs. 
Our  present  negotiations  on  trade- 
related  intellectual  property  rights,  in- 
cluding trade  in  counterfeit  goods,  is 
one  of  our  top  priorities.  Success  in 
those  negotiations  is  essential  to  the 
successful  conclusion  of  the  round. 

Because  of  the  relationship  be- 
tween trade  and  the  protection  and  en- 
forcement of  intellectual  property,  the 
GATT  is  an  appropriate  forum  to  nego- 
tiate improved  minimum  standards  for 
protection  and  enforcement  of  intellec- 
tual property  rights.  Since  the  topic 
shares  a  trade  dimension  with  the 
other  subjects  under  discussion  in  the 
Uruguay  Round,  there  is  an  incentive 
for  all  participants  in  the  round  to 
reach  a  result  that  includes  benefits 
for  all.  These  benefits  may  come  from 
within  the  context  of  the  trade-related 
intellectual  property  rights  nego- 
tiations or  from  other  areas  of  the 
negotiations. 

The  GATT  trade-related  intellec- 
tual property  rights  negotiations  also 


56 


present  the  opportunity  for  a  compre- 
hensive agreement  covering  all  areas  of 
intellectual  property,  including  areas 
such  as  trade-secret  protection  for 
which  no  current  international  agree- 
ments exist.  Significantly,  the  GATT 
forum  also  provides  an  opportunity  to 
negotiate  dispute  settlement  and  inter- 
national enforcement  obligations  that 
will  enhance  the  implementation  of 
agreed  standards.  Our  deliberations 
during  recent  negotiations  on  a  treaty 
to  protect  layout  designs  of  semiconduc- 
tor mask  works  reinforced  the  view 
that  intellectual  property-based  sanc- 
tions may  not  be  an  effective  means  of 
ensuring  that  governments  meet  their 
international  obligations  to  protect 
intellectual  property  rights. 

Our  negotiating  objectives  on  intel- 
lectual property  in  the  Uruguay  Round 
were  spelled  out  in  the  Omnibus  Trade 
and  Competitiveness  Act  of  1988.  We 
have  been  successful  in  obtaining  an 
agenda  in  April  in  Geneva  for  the  re- 
maining negotiations  that  closely  re- 
flects U.S.  objectives.  The  key  points 
in  our  objectives  are  to  reach  a  multi- 
lateral agreement  that  will  reduce  or 
eliminate  trade  distortions  and  impedi- 
ments to  legitimate  trade  through 
agreement  on: 

•  Adequate  substantive  standards; 

•  Effective  enforcement  of  those 
standards,  both  internally  and  at  the 
border; 

•  An  effective  dispute  settlement 
procedure;  and 

•  Application  of  basic  principles, 
such  as  national  treatment  and  trans- 
parency. 

The  April  Trade  Negotiating  Com- 
mittee decision  sets  forth  this  agenda. 

The  topics  for  negotiation  of  sub- 
stantive standards  in  the  U.S.  proposal 
are  copyrights,  patents,  trademarks, 
trade  secrets,  and  semiconductor  chip 
layout  designs.  In  addition,  other  par- 
ticipants have  raised  the  topics  of  in- 
dustrial designs,  neighboring  rights 
and  geographic  indications,  and  appel- 
lations of  origin. 

I  will  briefly  summarize  the  major 
elements  of  the  U.S.  proposal  on  each 
of  the  five  topics  that  we  believe  need 
to  be  addressed.  The  key  points  in  that 
proposal  are  intended  to  provide  mini- 
mum adequate  standards  and  the  ele- 
ments of  effective  enforcement 
mechanisms.  We  have  drawn  provisions 
on  standards  from  international  con- 
ventions where  they  are  adequate  and 
from  laws  or  other  sources  where 
the  international  conventions  are  in- 
adequate or  silent. 


Copyrights 

On  copyrights  some  of  our  key  objec- 
tives are  drawn  from  the  Bern  Conven 
tion  for  the  Protection  of  Literary  and 
Artistic  Works.  A  consensus  seems  to 
be  emerging  that  the  minimum  rights 
and  obligations  set  out  in  the  Bern  con 
vention  ought  to  be  recognized  as  part 
of  a  GATT  intellectual  property  stand: 
ard,  and  indeed,  the  U.S.  proposal  is 
largely  based  on  the  convention.  The 
U.S.  proposal  reiterates  those  feature 
of  Bern  that  are  particularly  relevant 
and  spells  out  the  obligations  in  those  1 
cases  where  the  convention  is  weak  or 
unclear. 

Specifically  the  U.S.  proposal  clan 
ifies  the  subject  matter  of  protection  i 
several  important  areas.  It  recognizes 
the  growing  consensus  in  over  40  coum 
tries  that  computer  programs  are 
protected  works.  It  recognizes  the 
conclusion  of  the  1982  joint  WIPO/ 
UNESCO  [World  Intellectual  Propert 
Organization/UN  Educational,  Scien- 
tific and  Cultural  Organization]  Com- 
mittee of  Governmental  Experts  on 
Copyright  Problems  Arising  from  the' 
Use  of  Computers  for  Access  to  or  the 
Creation  of  Works  that  computer  datai 
bases  and  other  machine  readable 
works  are  proper  copyright  subject 
matter.  Our  proposal  clarifies  that  all 
compilations  are  protected  subject  ma( 
ter.  It  clarifies  that  convention's  obliga 
tion  to  provide  copyright  protection  fc 
works  embodied  in  new  media  of  ex- 
pression and  to  include  new  forms  of 
authorship  as  they  emerge  and  adds 
sound  recordings  to  the  list  of  pro- 
tected works.  The  U.S.  proposal  also 
makes  it  explicit  that  works  of  juridici 
entities  are  entitled  to  at  least  a  50- 
year-from-publication  term  of  protec- 
tion. Our  proposal  also  provides  that 
computer  software  and  sound  record- 
ings have  full  copyright  protection  as 
now  received  by  literary  and  artistic 
works.  This  would  provide  a  term  of 
the  life  of  the  author  plus  50  years,  or 
50-years-from-publication  for  works  of 
juridical  entities. 

Our  proposal  emphasizes  that  cop^ 
ing  includes  copying  less  than  all  of  a 
work  and  producing  a  work  that  is  sub- 
stantially similar  to  the  copyrighted 
work.  Our  proposal  includes  a  distribu 
tion  right  for  works  in  addition  to  cine 
matographic  works  and  makes  it  clear 
that  the  rights  of  the  copyright  owner 
include  the  right  of  public  display  of  a 
work.  It  also  clarifies  what  constitutes 
a  "public  performance"  and  defines 
public.  It  further  clarifies  that  satel 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  19( 


ECONOMICS 


e  transmissions  are  protected  even 
they  emanate  from  beyond  national 
jundaries. 

The  U.S.  proposal  establishes  a 
-esumption  against  the  implementa- 
in  of  compulsory  licenses  and  re- 
aires  that  any  compulsory  licenses  be 
|iplemented  in  strict  accordance  with 
le  Paris  text  of  the  Bern  convention. 

atents 

;n  patents,  we  propose  that  patents 
just  be  granted  for  all  products  and 
rocesses  that  meet  the  criteria  for 
atentability  (i.e.,  novelty,  utility,  and 
tiobviousness).  For  the  sake  of  clarity, 
;ie  U.S.  proposal  cites  certain  items 
[hose  very  nature  do  not  lend  them- 
elves  to  meeting  these  criteria.  If  the 
ublication  of  a  patent  document  con- 
fining certain  subject  matter  would 
e  detrimental  to  national  security,  it 
lay  be  withheld  from  publication,  but 
|ie  subject  matter  itself  should  be  eli- 
dble  for  purposes  of  patentability.  This 
I'ould  change  the  form,  but  not  the 
ffect,  ofU.S.  law. 

We  have  proposed  a  patent  having 
term  of  at  least  20  years  from  filing 
lid  that  restoration  of  the  effective 
atent  term  be  encouraged  where  gov- 
rnmental  regulatory  approval  proc- 
jses  delayed  the  patentee's  ability  to 
larket  the  patented  invention.  We  rec- 
gnize  that  this  would  require  a  change 
1  U.S.  law  but  are  willing  to  propose 
nis  in  the  context  of  overall  improve- 
lents  in  patent  standards. 

We  spell  out  that  a  patent  provides 
he  right  to  exclude  others  from  mak- 
flg,  using,  or  selling  the  patented  in- 
dention and  that  this  right,  as  well  as 
he  right  to  exclude  importation,  ex- 
ends  at  least  to  the  product  directly 
nade  by  a  patented  process. 

Our  proposal  deals  with  the  threat 
0  trade  caused  by  compulsory  licenses. 
Vccordingly,  it  proposes  that  compulso- 
■y  licenses,  if  at  all,  must  be  granted  in 
inly  the  most  extraordinary  circum- 
stances. To  this  end,  we  have  recom- 
nended  that  these  licenses  be  available 
)nly  during  declared  national  emergen- 
ies  or  to  remedy  an  adjudicated  viola- 
ion  of  antitrust  laws.  Of  course,  a 
government  has  the  right  to  use  a  pat- 
ented invention  for  governmental  pur- 
poses. However,  it  must  always  be 
ensured  that  the  patent  owner  recovers 
ull  compensation  if  a  compulsory  li- 
;ense  is  issued  to  address  a  national 
emergency  or  if  use  occurs  by  the 
government. 


Further,  exclusive  compulsory  li- 
censes which  deprive  a  patent  owner  of 
all  rights — including  that  of  practicing 
his  own  invention — are  precluded  by 
our  proposal.  All  decisions  regarding 
the  grant  of  compulsory  licenses  and 
the  compensation  to  be  paid  must  be 
subject  to  judicial  review.  Lastly  we 
propose  that  merely  nonworking  of  a 
patent  should  not  expose  a  patentee  to 
the  overly  harsh  and  counterproductive 
sanction  of  revocation  of  the  patent. 

Trademarks 

The  U.S.  proposal  on  trademarks  is 
designed  to  remedy  deficiencies  in  the 
Paris  convention,  which  result  in  inade- 
quate standards  of  protection,  and  to 
clarify  or  reinforce  certain  provisions 
which  are  not  being  adhered  to  and  are 
causing  distortions  of  or  impediments 
to  legitimate  trade. 

The  U.S.  proposal  provides  a  defi- 
nition of  a  trademark  and  requires 
that  service  marks  be  registered  and 
protected  the  same  as  trademarks. 
It  specifies  the  exclusive  rights  of  a 
trademark  owner  and  expands  protec- 
tion for  well-known  marks  to  include 
those  that  are  internationally  well- 
known  as  well  as  those  well-known  in 
the  country  where  protection  is  sought. 
It  provides  that  the  regulations  and 
procedures  implementing  the  required 
registration  system  must  be  transpar- 
ent and  that  an  early  opportunity  must 
be  given  to  third  parties  to  challenge 
applications  or  registrations. 

The  U.S.  proposal  provides  a  spe- 
cific 10-year  minimum  original  term 
and  renewal  terms  of  similar  duration. 
It  specifies  what  circumstances  must 
be  considered  justification  for  non- 
use  of  marks  and  provides  that  use  of 
the  mark  by  a  licensee  must  inure  to 
the  benefit  of  the  licensor  for  use- 
requirement  purposes.  It  prohibits 
special  requirements  for  use  of  a  mark, 
and  it  prohibits  compulsory  licensing. 

The  U.S.  proposal  further  spe- 
cifies that  trademark  rights  may  be  ac- 
quired by  use  or  registration,  that  use 
may  be  a  prerequisite  to  registration, 
and  that  assignments  must  be 
permitted. 

Trade  Secrets 

Our  trade-secrets  proposal  is  designed 
to  ensure  a  multilateral  obligation  to 
provide  protection  for  proprietary  in- 
formation. It  opens  the  negotiations  on 
how  to  prevent  misappropriation  and 
unwarranted  governmental  disclosure. 


Our  private  sector  has  identified  the 
protection  of  trade  secrets  as  one  of  the 
most  important  areas  for  obtaining 
adequate  protection. 

Integrated  Circuit  Layout  Designs 

Our  objectives  for  integrated  circuit 
layout  designs  are  similar  to  other 
areas;  that  is,  filling  gaps  or  lacunae  in 
existing  international  intellectual  prop- 
erty conventions.  Our  position  is  not  al- 
tered by  the  proximity  of  the  recent 
Washington  treaty.  There  is  a  broad 
consensus  among  countries  that  have 
legislation  providing  for  the  protection 
of  integrated  circuit  layout  designs  on 
the  appropriate  standards  for  the  level 
of  protection  that  should  be  provided  to 
this  important  new  technology.  Unfor- 
tunately, the  treaty  adopted  for  the 
protection  of  layout  designs  of  inte- 
grated circuits  fails  to  reflect  those 
standards. 

Our  proposal  on  protection  of  inte- 
grated circuits  provides  basic  stand- 
ards for  protection  and  remedies  those 
deficiencies  by  requiring  parties  to 
provide  a  term  of  at  least  10  years  from 
the  date  of  first  commercial  exploita- 
tion or  the  date  of  registration,  if 
required,  whichever  is  earlier.  This 
provision  is  consistent  with  the  term 
provided  in  every  national  law  enacted 
to  date. 

Our  proposal  includes  a  compul- 
sory license  provision  that,  combined 
with  the  reverse  engineering  provi- 
sions and  short  duration  of  protection, 
provides  appropriate  access  to  this 
technology.  Our  proposal  also  elimi- 
nates any  question  of  whether  import- 
ing, selling,  or  distributing  products 
that  contain  infringing  chips  are  an 
infringement.  Finally,  our  proposal 
requires  innocent  infringers  to  pay  a 
royalty  on  chips  after  receiving  notice 
of  infringement. 

Each  of  these  provisions  repre- 
sents a  careful  balance  between  the 
interests  of  producers  and  consumers 
of  integrated  circuits — a  balance  re- 
flected in  the  laws  of  all  countries  that 
have  addressed  this  right.  We  believe 
that  it  is  important  to  provide  a  level  of 
protection  that  both  the  producers  and 
consumers  of  chips  consider  adequate. 
The  clarifications  and  improvements  in 
standards  contained  in  our  proposal 
are  necessary  to  provide  that  level  of 
protection. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


57 


ECONOMICS 


Enforcement  of  Intellectual 
Property  Rights 

A  second  major  element  of  the  U.S. 
proposal  on  intellectual  property  rights 
is  obtaining  effective  enforcement  of 
rights  both  internally  and  at  the  bor- 
der. Our  complex  task  in  the  area  of  en- 
forcement will  require  the  flexibility  to 
accommodate  different  legal  traditions 
and  approaches  to  the  enforcement  of 
intellectual  property  rights. 

Our  detailed  proposal  focuses  on 
providing  owners  of  intellectual  prop- 
erty rights  the  means  to  initiate  pro- 
ceedings to  enforce  their  rights  and 
receive  a  fair  and  open  hearing  on  their 
case  consistent  with  the  concepts  of  due 
process.  The  thrust  of  our  proposal  is 
to  ensure  that  owners  of  intellectual 
property  rights  will  be  provided  a 
means  by  which  they  can  take  action 
to  enforce  their  rights;  however,  we 
recognize  that  by  governments  may 
be  necessary.  In  the  United  States,  for 
example,  U.S.  Customs  officials  take 
some  enforcement  actions  on  their  own 
initiative.  This  is  why  our  proposal 
provides  that  governments  would  be 
obligated  to  take  action  on  their  own 
initiative  when  effective  enforcement 
required  such  steps. 

Governments  would  be  required  to 
provide  an  adequate  means  for  obtain- 
ing evidence  necessary  to  prove  an 
infringement  and  an  opportunity  to 
present  such  evidence  to  the  decision- 
maker. Although  proceedings  could  be 
either  administrative  or  judicial  or 
a  combination  of  the  two,  final  ad- 
ministrative decisions  and  initial 
judicial  decisions  would  be  subject  to 
judicial  review.  Reasoned  decisions 
would  be  required  with  significant 
decisions  in  writing  and  available 
to  the  public. 

Appropriate  sanctions  that  deter 
infringement  of  intellectual  property 
rights  and  deprive  persons  trading  in 
infringing  goods  of  the  economic  bene- 
fits of  this  activity  are  another  impor- 
tant element  in  the  U.S.  proposal  on 
enforcement.  We  propose  providing  in- 
terim relief  in  the  form  of  preliminary 
injunctions  and  other  appropriate 
prompt  procedures  to  prevent  the  sale 
or  disposition  of  allegedly  infringing 
goods  pending  a  final  determination 
of  infringement. 

Final  injunctive  relief  and  mone- 
tary awards  sufficient  to  compensate 
fully  owners  of  intellectual  property 
rights  should  be  available.  Remedies 
should  also  include  seizure  of  infring- 
ing goods  at  the  border  and  internally 
and  forfeiture,  destruction,  and  remov- 


58 


al  of  the  goods  from  commercial  chan- 
nels. Criminal  remedies  should  be 
available  for  at  least  trademark  coun- 
terfeiting and  copyright  infringement 
which  are  willful  and  commercial. 

Enforcement  of  intellectual  prop- 
erty rights  at  the  border  is  another 
essential  element  for  a  trade-related 
intellectual  property  rights  agreement. 
The  U.S.  proposal  builds  upon  the  ear- 
lier effort  to  address  counterfeit  trade- 
marks and  extends  it  to  all  forms  of 
intellectual  property  rights.  Owners 
should  have  the  right  to  initiate  action 
against  infringing  imports  before  they 
are  released  from  the  jurisdiction  of 
customs  authorities.  Authorities  should 
have  the  ability  to  act  on  their  own  ini- 
tiative and  seize  goods,  or  when  they 
have  reason  to  believe  that  imported 
goods  are  infringing,  detain  such  goods 
pending  a  determination  whether  they 
are  infringing. 

Balanced  against  the  rights  of  the 
intellectual  property  right  owner  is  the 
need  to  minimize  the  effect  of  border 
and  internal  enforcement  on  legitimate 
trade.  Indemnification  and  bonding  re- 
quirements, as  well  as  ensuring  both 
owners  and  alleged  infringers  due 
process,  should  provide  sufficient  safe- 
guards to  prevent  abuse  of  enforcement 
mechanisms. 

Recently  a  GATT  dispute  settle- 
m.ent  panel  examined  a  complaint 
against  one  of  the  border  enforcement 
mechanisms  contained  in  U.S.  law.  Sec- 
tion 337  of  the  Tariff  Act  of  1930.  The 
panel  has  made  a  recommendation  that 
certain  aspects  of  Section  337  be  found 
by  the  GATT  to  be  inconsistent  with 
our  GATT  obligations.  The  basic  issue 
was  whether  Section  337  procedures 
were  less  favorable  to  imported  prod- 
ucts than  enforcement  actions  in  U.S. 
District  Courts  were  to  domestically 
produced  products.  The  matter  is  now 
before  the  GATT  council  for  a  decision 
whether  to  adopt  the  report.  If  the 
report  is  adopted,  the  United  States 
would  be  obligated  to  bring  its  pro- 
cedures into  conformity  with  the  GATT. 

The  Administration  is  carefully 
considering  the  merits  of  the  panel's 
complex  72-page  report  and  its  implica- 
tions for  U.S.  law  and  border  enforce- 
ment of  intellectual  property  rights  in 
general,  if  it  is  adopted.  I  am  not  pre- 
pared to  discuss  the  details  of  our  ex- 
amination of  the  report  at  this  time. 
However,  I  can  say  that  the  United 
States  will  not  be  able  to  accept  adop- 
tion of  the  report  until  we  have  thor- 
oughly evaluated  these  issues  and 
conducted  consultations  with  congres- 
sional advisers,  including  this  sub- 


committee. The  action  we  take  will  be 
consistent  with  our  commitment  to 
strong  enforcement  of  intellectual 
property  rights  against  imports  of 
infringing  goods. 

This  commitment  provides  the  co) 
text  for  our  evaluation  of  the  Section 
337  report  and  any  GATT  agreement 
provisions  on  the  enforcement  of  in- 
tellectual property  rights.  This  is, 
of  course,  wholly  consistent  with 
the  GATT. 

My  testimony  has  focused,  to  this 
point,  on  our  Uruguay  Round  negotia- 
tions. Those  negotiations  are  multi- 
lateral and  are  not  in  conflict  with 
other  negotiations  in  other  fora.  In- 
deed, no  element  of  our  proposal  con- 
flicts with  existing  international 
conventions.  Our  GATT  efforts  do  not: 
and  will  not  undermine  our  commit- 
ment to  pursue  adequate  intellectual 
property  protection  in  traditional  fora 
Our  objective  is  to  achieve  adequate 
levels  of  protection  for  intellectual 
property  rights  and  effective  enforce- 
ment of  those  rights.  We  will  pursue 
that  objective  through  all  available 
multilateral  avenues  and  through 
bilateral  initiatives. 

Bilateral  Initiatives 

Special  301.  The  Omnibus  Trade  and 
Competitiveness  Act  of  1988  includes  8 
special  criteria  and  procedures  for  con 
ducting  certain  Section  301  investiga- 
tions on  intellectual  property.  The 
provisions  require  the  U.S.  Trade  Rep 
resentative  to  identify  countries  that 
deny  adequate  and  effective  intellec- 
tual property  protection  or  fair  and  eq 
uitable  market  access  to  U.S.  persons 
relying  on  intellectual  property  rights 
The  statute  empowers  the  U.S.  Trade 
Representative  to  designate  priority 
countries  and  initiate  Section  301  inves 
tigations  against  those  countries  which 
have  the  most  onerous  and  egregious 
policies  or  practices  and  largest  actual 
or  potential  markets. 

On  May  25,  1989,  I  announced  my 
decision  on  designation  of  such  priority 
countries.  Because  of  the  significant 
progress  made  in  various  negotiations, 
I  identified  no  "priority  countries"  un- 
der the  "special"  intellectual  property 
rights  301  provisions.  Rather  the  Ad- 
ministration singled  out  25  countries 
whose  practices  deserve  special  at- 
tention and  rapid  progress.  Eight 
countries —  Brazil,  India,  Mexico,  the 
People's  Republic  of  China,  the  Repub- 
lic of  Korea,  Saudi  Arabia,  Taiwan,  anc 
Thailand — were  placed  on  a  priority 
watch  list.  Action  plans  have  been  de 


EUROPE 


loped  for  resolving  outstanding  is- 
les with  each  of  these  countries  and 
leir  status  under  "Special"  301  will 
jain  be  reviewed  no  later  than  Novem- 
?r  1,  1989.  Seventeen  countries  were 
aced  on  a  watch  list,  and  I  will  also 
iview  the  progress  we  make  with 
ich  of  them  no  later  than  next  April 
I  determine  what  additional  measures 
-e  appropriate. 

The  decision  to  place  these  coun- 
■ies  on  either  the  priority  watch  list  or 
atch  list  followed  an  exhaustive  re- 
iew  of  the  laws  and  practices  of  most 
'  our  trading  partners.  Government 
\perts,  including  representatives  of 
lie  Patent  and  Trademark  Office, 
Copyright  Office,  the  International 
rade  Administration,  and  the  State 
epartment,  worked  with  the  U.S. 
rade  Representative  on  this  effort.  In 
ddition,  we  received  extensive  advice 
nd  support  from  the  private  sector 
:i(i  groups  such  as  the  U.S.  Chamber 
'Commerce. 

We  have  either  already  held,  or  will 
M  very  shortly,  consultations  with  all 
)  countries.  It  is  my  expectation  that 
e  can  make  substantial  and  rapid 
"Ogress  with  these  countries  either  bi- 
terally  or  through  their  cooperation 
1  the  GATT  intellectual  property  ne- 
itiations.  If  we  fail  to  make  progress, 
am  prepared  to  exercise  the  authority 
ranted  to  me  by  the  1988  Trade  Act 
id  initiate  investigations. 

Section  301  Actions  Initiated  in 
espcnse  to  Petitions.  Currently  we 
ave  one  such  case  pending — a  case 
led  by  the  Pharmaceutical  Manu- 
icturer's  Association  concerning 
rgentina's  denial  of  product  patent 
rotection  for  pharmaceuticals  and  lack 
f  protection  for  proprietary  informa- 
on.  I  am  not  satisfied  with  the  prog- 
ess  we  have  made  to  date;  therefore 
have  instructed  my  Assistant  U.S. 
rade  Representative  for  Latin  Ameri- 
an  Affairs  to  travel  to  Argentina  in 
lUgust  to  intensify  our  effort  to  re- 
olve  the  problem.  I  must  make  an  un- 
lirness  determination  no  later  than 
.eptember23. 

Petitions  Under  GSP.  The  1984 

'rade  Act  provisions  reauthorizing 
jenefits  under  the  GSP  also  direct  the 
'resident  to  take  into  account  the  intel- 
?ctual  property  laws  and  practices  of  a 
ountry  in  making  decisions  regarding 
JvSP  eligibility  and  benefit  levels.  This 
ear  we  have  had  two  petitions  request- 
ntr  the  removal  of  GSP  benefits  based 
n  inadequate  and  ineffective  intellec- 
ual  property  protection:  one  from  the 


copyright  industries  on  the  Philippines 
and  a  second  from  the  pharmaceutical 
industry  on  Brazil.  These  petitions  are 
now  under  consideration,  and  the  Presi- 
dent's decision  on  whether  to  initiate 
reviews  will  be  announced  shortly. 

Science  and  Technology  Agree- 
ments. The  Omnibus  Trade  and  Com- 
petitiveness Act  of  1988  requires  that 
science  and  technology  agreements 
properly  protect  intellectual  property. 
Recently,  we  have  successfully  conclud- 
ed comprehensive  science  and  technolo- 
gy agreements  that  include  intellectual 
property  annexes  with  Japan  and  the 
Soviet  Union.  Talks  are  ongoing  with 
China,  India,  Korea,  New  Zealand, 
Spain,  Hungary,  and  others.  The 
importance  of  protecting  and  com- 
mercially exploiting  the  results  of 
Federally  supported  research  and  de- 
velopment make  this  an  increasingly 
important  effort.  Concluding  these 
cooperative  agreements  provides  an 
incentive  for  governments  to  im- 
prove their  standards  of  protection. 

Another  bilateral  avenue  for  ad- 
vancing U.S.  intellectual  property  ob- 
jectives is  through  consultations 
through  established  bilateral  trade 
committees.  For  example,  the  U.S.- 
Japan Trade  Committee  has  a  subcom- 
mittee on  intellectual  property,  as  does 
the  U.S. -European  Community  high 
technology  working  group.  We  have 
held  two  rounds  of  talks  with  the  Japa- 


nese under  the  umbrella  of  the  trade 
committee,  and  a  further  round  is 
scheduled  for  September.  The  U.S.-EC 
high  technology  group  has  been  around 
for  several  years,  and  it  has  proved  a 
very  useful  forum  for  discussing  a 
broad  range  of  issues,  most  recently 
protection  of  inventions  in  the  field  of 
biotechnology. 

Bilateral  negotiations  and  actions 
we  have  taken  under  our  domestic  legal 
procedures,  including  Section  301,  are 
fully  complementary  to  our  Uruguay 
Round  objectives.  We  do  not  expect 
countries  whose  practices  are  identi- 
fied as  being  of  special  concern  to  the 
United  States  to  thank  us.  But  neither 
do  we  believe  that  the  solutions  to  the 
problems  we  are  raising  are  good  for  us 
and  bad  for  them. 

We  do  not  believe  closed  markets 
are  good.  We  do  not  believe  in  mercan- 
tilist tenets  that  imports  are  bad,  that 
any  domestically  produced  article  is 
better  than  any  import.  Protectionism 
is  protectionism.  It  makes  little  differ- 
ence whether  it  takes  the  form  of  a  high 
tariff  or  a  compelled  local  working  re- 
quirement. I  can  assure  you  of  one 
thing — the  United  States  will  do  what 
is  necessary  to  eradicate  it. 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
ings will  be  published  by  the  committee  and 
will  be  available  from  the  Superintendent 
of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.B 


U.S.  Recalls  Ambassador  to  Bulgaria 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
AUG.  29,  19891 

As  a  result  of  the  continuing  abuse  of 
the  human  rights  of  Bulgaria's  ethnic 
Turkish  community,  which  has  caused 
some  310,000  Bulgarian  Turks  to  flee 
to  Turkey,  the  Department  is  recalling 
Ambassador  Sol  Polansky  to  Washing- 
ton for  consultations. 

The  ongoing  abuse  of  the  human 
rights  of  Bulgarian  ethnic  Turks  by  the 
Government  of  Bulgaria  remains  an  is- 
sue of  serious  concern  to  the  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment. The  United  States  has  made 


its  views  on  this  matter  known  to  the 
Government  of  Bulgaria  both  publicly 
and  privately,  and  President  Bush  has 
spoken  several  times  to  Turkish  lead- 
ers to  express  our  strong  support  for 
their  efforts  to  end  this  tragic  situa- 
tion. The  United  States  has  also  been 
active  in  securing  NATO  support  for  a 
strong  statement  deploring  the  human 
rights  problems  in  Bulgaria  and  is  ex- 
ploring refugee  aid  to  the  Government 
of  Turkey. 


'  Read  to  news  correspondents  by  De- 
partment deputy  spokesman  Richard  A. 
Boucher.  ■ 


Oepartment  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


59 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW 


Polish  Parliament 

Approves 

New  Government 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
SEPT.  12,  19891 

The  Polish  Parliament  has  approved  a 
new  Polish  Government.  This  is  an  im- 
portant date  in  what  has  been  a  histor- 
ical process  of  transformation.  The 
unanimous  vote  is  evidence  that  the 
new  government  will  enjoy  the  strong 
support  of  the  Polish  people  that  will 
be  necessary  to  implement  successfully 
its  programs. 

All  political  participants  should  be 
applauded  for  the  statesmanship  which 
they  have  displayed  in  managing  a  dif- 
ficult and  comple.x  process.  We  look 
forward  to  discussions  with  the  new 
government  and  to  hearing  about  its 
plans  and  programs.  The  new  govern- 
ment can  count  on  our  continued 
support. 


'  Read  to  news  correspondents  by 
Department  spokesman  Margaret  DeB. 
Tutwiler.B 


Additional  Food 
and  Commodity 
Assistance  to  Poland 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
SEPT.  14,  19891 

I  am  pleased  to  announce  today  that 
the  United  States  will  offer  to  provide 
additional  food  and  commodity  aid  to 
the  Polish  people.  Subject  to  consulta- 
tions with  the  Polish  Governmemt,  we 
are  prepared  to  offer  an  additional  $50 
million  in  assistance  in  FY  1990.  This 
amount  would  be  in  addition  to  the  $50 
million  already  announced  on  August 
1st.  Together  with  the  $8.4  million  in 
emergency  food  aid  in  FY  1989,  this 
new  aid  brings  to  $108.4  million  the  to- 
tal of  U.S.  food/commodity  assistance. 
Our  effort  works  in  tandem  with  the 
$140  million  of  agricultural  aid  pledged 
by  the  European  Communities  as  part 
of  the  coordinated  effort  called  for  by 


the  United  States  at  the  recent  Paris 
economic  summit.  We  expect  to  offer 
quantities  of  meat,  corn,  butter,  butter 
oil,  cotton  seed/sunflower  oil,  cotton, 
rice,  and/or  other  commodities. 

It  is  intended  that  the  food  aid  will 
support  long-term  reform  of  the  Polish 
agricultural  system  by  providing  much 
needed  commodities  during  a  transi- 
tional period  toward  a  market  economy. 
The  food  shortages  and  e.xtremely  high 
prices  in  Poland  in  recent  weeks  have 
placed  a  heavy  burden  on  the  Polish 
people.  We  expect  that  shipments  of  the 


|{ 


new  assistance  will  arrive  in  time  for 
the  difficult  winter  months. 

This  new  assistance  is  one  elemer 
of  our  continuing  effort,  working  wit! 
our  allies  and  others,  to  support  the 
process  of  change  that  is  underway  in' 
Poland.  It  underscores  our  continuing 
commitment  to  assist  the  Polish  Gov- 
ernment and  people  in  their  efforts  tc 
introduce  market  principles  and  to 
build  a  private  sector  that  will  enable 
Poland  to  invigorate  its  economy. 


'  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Pr 
idential  Documents  of  Sept.  18,  1989.  ■ 


Update  on  U.S.-lran  Claims  Settlement 


STATE  DEPARTMENT 

FACT  SHEET, 
AUG.  9, 1989 

Under  the  Algiers  accords,  which  re- 
solved the  hostage  crisis  in  1981,  a 
claims  settlement  process  was  estab- 
lished. The  Iran-United  States  Claims 
Tribunal  in  The  Hague  was  set  up  to 
arbitrate  certain  claims  between  the 
two  governments  and  certain  claims  of 
nationals  of  each  country  against  the 
other  country's  government.  Escrow  ac- 
counts were  set  up  for  payment  of  tri- 
bunal awards  to  U.S.  claimants  and 
bank  claims. 

In  1981,  $9,975  billion  was  trans- 
ferred by  the  United  States.  These 
funds  were  Iranian  funds  that  the 
United  States  had  frozen  during  the 
hostage  crisis.  (These  funds  are  entire- 
ly separate  from  the  Iranian  foreign 
military  sales  trust  fund,  discussed  be- 
low.) Of  the  $9,975  billion,  $1  billion 
was  placed  in  a  Security  Account  to  pay 
awards  of  the  Iran-U.S.  Claims  Tribu- 
nal to  U.S.  nationals  and  the  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment, $3,667  billion  was  placed  in 
Dollar  Account  No.  1  to  pay  claims  of 
bank  syndicates  of  which  a  U.S.  bank 
was  a  member,  and  $1,418  billion  was 
placed  in  Dollar  Account  No.  2  to  pay 
nonsyndicated  U.S.  bank  claims.  The 
remaining  $3.89  billion  was  trans- 
ferred to  Iran.  All  Iranian  property 
not  under  arbitration  at  the  Claims  Tri- 
bunal was  returned  to  Iran  in  1981. 

The  current  status  of  these  ac- 
counts is  as  follows. 

•  The  Security  Account  contains 
$500  million.  Iran  must  replenish  it 
whenever  it  falls  below  this  amount. 

•  A  separate  Interest  Account  hold- 
ing interest  on  the  Security  Account 
contains  $106  million. 


•  Dollar  Account  No.  1  contains 
$11.9  million.  Since  virtually  all  the 
claims  were  satisfied,  pursuant  to  at 
bunal  order,  $454  million  was  trans- 
ferred from  this  account  to  Iran  in  Ml 
1987;  a  further  $37.9  million  was  tran 
ferred  to  Iran  in  April  1988. 

•  Dollar  Account  No.  2  contains 
$800  million. 

U.S.  nationals  have  been  awardei 
approximately  $1,278  billion  (includir 
interest)  by  the  Iran-United  States 
Claims  Tribunal  through  August  8, 
1989.  The  tribunal  has  also  awarded  a 
proximately  $118  million  (not  includir 
interest)  to  Iranian  nationals.  The  re  IJ 
maining  private  U.S.  nationals'  claim 
against  the  Iranian  Government  are  1 
billions  of  dollars. 

Also  pending  before  the  tribunal 
are  certain  claims  of  the  United  Stati' 
and  Iran  against  each  other.  The  re- 
maining Iranian  Government  claims 
against  the  U.S.  Government  are  for 
billions  of  dollars. 

Included  among  these  governme) 
claims  is  Iran's  claim  arising  out  of  th 
Iranian  foreign  military  sales  pro- 
gram. This  program  spanned  over  15 
years  and  was  massive.  By  1979  it  cor 
sisted  of  over  2,800  contracts  with  a 
cumulative  value  of  over  $20  billion. 
Money  was  paid  to  the  United  States 
into  a  Trust  Fund  as  each  contract  wj 
entered  into,  and  the  fund  was  drawn 
down  as  the  contracts  were  imple- 
mented. Iran  claims  that  it  is  due  the 
balance  remaining  in  the  Trust  Fund 
and  the  value  of  military  equipment 
purchased  but  not  exported  from  the 
United  States.  The  amounts  in  ques- 
tion involve  complex  legal  and  accoun 
ing  issues  and  are  being  arbitrated  ii 
the  Claims  Tribunal.  ■ 


I 


60 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November 


J 


JIDDLE  EAST 


tecent  Events  in  the  Middle  East 


1  John  H.  Kelly 

,    Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
(J  Europe  and  the  Middle  East  of  the 
buse  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
iptemberlO,  1989.  Ambassador  Kelly 
i  Assistant  Secretary  for  Near  East- 
iii  and  South  Asian  Affairs. ' 

hm  very  pleased  to  appear  before  the 
sbcommittee  today  and  to  have  the  op- 
irtiinity  to  discuss  a  number  of  devel- 
1  mciits  which  have  occurred  in  the 
liddle  East  and  Southwest  Asia  since  I 
l~t  testified  before  this  committee  in 
.  ly.  Today  I  plan  to  focus  on  the  Mid- 
o  East  peace  process,  Lebanon,  and 
Ian. 


le  Peace  Process 

.  irst  wish  to  deal  with  our  efforts 
li  advance  toward  a  resolution  of  the 
.:'ab-Israeli  conflict.  As  you  well 
I  ow,  efforts  to  advance  the  prospects 
[  a  comprehensive  peace  are  fraught 
ijth  difficulties.  But  there  are  hopeful 
■rns  as  well. 

On  the  one  hand,  the  cycle  of  vio- 
lice  continues  unabated.  The  human 
fst  is  high.  Palestinians  and  Israelis 
intinue  to  fall  victim  to  violence. 

This  is  not  a  time  for  despair,  how- 
ler, for  there  are  positive  signs.  There 
(growing  recognition  of  the  need  to 
lannel  efforts  in  the  direction  of  prac- 
I'al  and  pragmatic  steps,  grounded  in 
lid  and  enduring  principles. 

Uur  policy  on  the  peace  process 
|iS  not  changed.  The  peace  we  seek 
jould  be  comprehensive,  including  all 
Lrties  to  the  conflict.  It  should  come 
liout  through  direct  negotiations.  The 
pgotiations  should  be  based  on  UN  Se- 
iirity  Council  Resolutions  242  and  338 
lid  should  involve  territory  for  peace, 
icurity,  and  recognition  for  Israel  and 
:.e  legitimate  political  rights  of  the 
klestinian  people. 

i     The  Israeli  Government  took  a  step 
ward  the  achievement  of  these  goals 
irough  its  peace  initiative  of  May  14. 
'e  endorse  this  initiative,  and  we  con- 
nue  to  believe  the  proposal  for  elec- 
pns  in  the  occupied  territories  holds 
jie  potential  to  launch  a  political  proc- 
l;s  of  negotiations  that  can  advance  the 
bospects  of  peace.  Since  my  last  ap- 
parance  before  this  committee,  we 
live  pursued  our  efforts  on  behalf  of 
!ns  initiative  in  a  number  of  ways. 


•  I  visited  Israel,  Egypt,  and  Jor- 
dan in  August.  Much  of  my  discussions 
focused  on  the  peace  process.  I  came 
away  convinced  that  the  leaders  of  all 
three  countries  are  committed  to  peace 
and  anxious  to  move  forward  if  mutu- 
ally acceptable  mechanisms  can  be 
found.  [Egyptian]  President  Mubarak 
has  been  particularly  helpful  and  ener- 
getic in  seeking  ways  to  advance  the 
process,  developing  ideas  to  keep  up 
momentum  and  encouraging  all  sides 
toward  moderation  and  flexibility.  In 
July  he  advanced  a  10-point  proposal 
which  might  provide  a  bridge  for  the 
Israelis  and  the  Palestinians.  It  is  im- 
portant to  remember  that  the  Egyptian 
10  points  are  not  an  alternative  to  the 
Government  of  Israel's  May  proposal 
but,  rather,  represent  Egypt's  accept- 
ance of  the  elections  concept  and 
Egypt's  views  on  how  to  get  elections 
and  make  them  work.  We  believe  the 
Egyptian  points  constitute  a  construc- 
tive and  valuable  addition  to  ongoing 
diplomatic  efforts.  Egypt's  efforts  are 
continuing.  Yesterday  Israeli  Defense 
Minister  Rabin  was  in  Cairo  for  fur- 
ther discussions  on  how  to  bridge  dif- 
ferences and  get  a  dialogue  started. 
We  understand  Egyptian-Israeli  dis- 
cussions on  this  will  continue  in  the 
days  ahead. 

•  In  my  meeting  with  Palestinians 
in  Jerusalem  and  in  the  U.S.  dialogue 
with  the  Palestine  Liberation  Organiza- 
tion (PLO)  in  Tunis,  we  have  stressed 
the  need  for  a  constructive  response  to 
the  Israeli  proposal.  There  are  some 
signs  recently  that  the  PLO  will  move 
in  this  direction  and  is  seriously  con- 
sidering Egypt's  10  points.  For  our 
part,  we  take  our  dialogue  with  the 
PLO  seriously.  We  have  told  the  Pal- 
estinians that  we  can  provide  no  guar- 
antees regarding  final  outcome — this  is 
a  matter  for  the  negotiations.  And  we 
have  explained  the  need  for  a  pragmatic 
approach  to  get  a  process  of  negotia- 
tions started.  Once  they  begin,  the  Pal- 
estinians will  be  able  to  bring  to  the 
table  whatever  preferences  and  posi- 
tions they  wish.  As  I  noted,  we  are 
beginning  to  have  a  sense  that  our 
message  may  be  getting  through. 

•  At  the  same  time,  we  have  contin- 
ued to  stress  to  the  PLO  that  we  will 
not  accept  efforts  to  have  the  so-called 
"state  of  Palestine"  admitted  to  in- 
ternational organizations.  The  Ad- 


ministration shares  the  strongly  held 
views  of  Congress  on  this  issue.  So 
far  we  have  registered  success  in  our 
efforts — in  the  World  Health  Organi- 
zation and  the  World  Tourism 
Organization. 

•  We  are  continuing  our  exchanges 
with  the  Soviets  on  the  Middle  East, 
as  recently  as  yesterday  when  Dennis 
Ross  [Director,  Policy  Planning  Staff] 
and  I  met  with  the  Soviets.  We  contin- 
ued to  stress  the  advantages  of  the 
elections  proposal.  Our  Soviet  inter- 
locutors showed  serious  interest  in  our 
views  and  posed  legitimate  questions. 
We  are  not  yet  persuaded  that  the  So- 
viets will,  in  fact,  pursue  the  types  of 
policies  that  will  contribute  to  real 
progress.  This  is  something  we  will 
have  to  watch  carefully  and  to  continue 
to  nurture. 

The  weeks  ahead  will  see  oppor- 
tunities for  continuing  discussions  with 
a  variety  of  regional  and  other  inter- 
ested leaders.  In  Wyoming,  where  the 
Middle  East  will  be  on  the  agenda  for 
Secretary  Baker's  meeting  with  For- 
eign Minister  Shevardnadze,  we  will  be 
using  the  occasion  to  press  the  Soviets 
to  accept  the  Israeli  elections  proposal. 
We  will  have  other  occasions  in  New 
York  at  the  UN  General  Assembly  and 
here  in  Washington.  We  intend  to  make 
full  use  of  these  opportunities. 

Lebanon 

Turning  to  another  subject,  I  would 
like  to  lay  out  for  you  the  Administra- 
tion's views  about  Lebanon.  First  let 
me  explain  our  decision  to  temporarily 
withdraw  our  Embassy  personnel  from 
Beirut.  As  we  stated  at  the  time,  the 
action  was  taken  when  we  concluded 
that  the  mission  could  no  longer  con- 
duct its  work  and  that  there  was  a 
significantly  increased  risk  to  our 
American  staff.  The  evacuation  is  tem- 
porary, and  we  intend  to  return  our 
staff  as  soon  as  we  are  convinced  that 
circumstances  exist  in  which  our  pres- 
ence can  be  reasonably  safe  and  effec- 
tive. The  decision  does  not  represent 
a  change  in  policy.  It  is  not,  as  some 
would  say,  "an  abandonment  of 
Lebanon."  We  are  deeply  committed  as 
a  nation  to  helping  Lebanon  through 
this  difficult  time,  and  we  are  deeply 
committed  as  a  people  to  helping  end 
the  anguish  and  pain  of  all  Lebanese. 


epartment  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


61 


MIDDLE  EAST 


We  warmly  welcome  the  decision  of 
the  Arab  League  Higher  Committee  on 
Lebanon  to  reengage.  On  Saturday, 
September  16,  Saudi  Foreign  Minister 
Prince  Sa'ud  announced  a  seven-point 
Arab  League  plan  on  Lebanon.  The 
plan  consists  of  a  cease-fire,  lifting  of 
all  blockades,  and  a  meeting  of  parlia- 
ment to  discuss  national  reconciliation. 
It  also  asks  Lebanese  to  pledge  not  to 
acquire  weapons  and  ammunition  and 
asks  others  to  pledge  not  to  ship  any  to 
Lebanon.  Finally  the  implementation  of 
the  proposal  begins  with  a  trip  of  Arab 
League  Assistant  Secretary  General 
Lakhdar  Ibrahimi  to  Beirut.  Ibrahimi 
arrived  in  Beirut  to  begin  his  work  this 
past  Sunday. 

We  believe  that  the  Arab  League's 
plan  provides  a  constructive  basis  upon 
which  all  parties  to  the  conflict  in 
Lebanon  can  engage  in  a  political  proc- 
ess, devoid  of  violence  and  coercion.  We 
are  pleased  that  the  committee  calls 
for  a  cease-fire  and  lifting  of  all  block- 
ages, and  sets  a  date  for  a  meeting  of 
Lebanon's  parliamentarians  to  discuss 
national  reconciliation.  These  are  es- 
sential first  steps  on  the  path  to  restor- 
ing a  strong  central  government  in 
control  of  all  of  Lebanon's  territory 
and  to  achieving  the  withdrawal  of  all 
foreign  forces  and  the  disbandment 
of  militias,  objectives  we  all  share. 

We,  therefore,  call  upon  all  parties 
to  stop  the  fighting,  lift  the  blockades, 
and  allow  a  political  process  of  recon- 
ciliation to  begin. 

Our  humanitarian  commitment  to 
Lebanon  has  not  lessened.  Our  aid  pro- 
grams continue,  administered  through 
private  voluntary  organizations  on  the 
ground.  U.S.  food  aid  currently  pro- 
vides about  half  of  the  food  for  800,000 
Lebanese  in  all  regions  and  commu- 
nities in  Lebanon.  In  fact,  the  next 
shipment  of  about  $5  million  worth  of 
rice,  lentils,  and  vegetable  oil  under 
PL  480  Title  II  food  aid  is  due  to  arrive 
in  Lebanon  later  this  month. 

This  Administration  considers  our 
efforts  to  assist  Lebanon  an  important 
part  of  our  overall  Middle  East  policy. 
We  will,  therefore,  continue  our  active 
diplomatic  efforts  to  promote  a  political 
resolution  to  the  conflict  that  can  end 
the  senseless  bloodshed  and  suffering. 

Now  is  the  time  for  all  of  those 
with  an  interest  in  bringing  peace  to 
Lebanon  and  for  all  of  those  who  have 
been  involved  in  Lebanon,  to  support 
the  tripartite  committee's  efforts  so 
that  the  process  of  peace  and  healing 
can  begin. 


U.S.  Diplomats  Evacuated  From  Beirut 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
SEPT.  6,  1989 > 

At  midnight  last  night,  Washington, 
D.C.,  time,  September  5 — 7:00  a.m. 
Beirut  time,  September  6 — we  evacu- 
ated all  U.S.  Government  personnel 
from  Beirut  on  a  temporary  basis  be- 
cause local  circumstances  no  longer 
permit  the  embassy  to  function  effec- 
tively. We  have  a  responsibility  to  en- 
sure the  safety  of  our  personnel.  We 
plan  to  go  back  to  Beirut  as  soon  as 
conditions  permit. 

The  evacuation  does  not  represent 
a  lessening  of  our  intention  to  try  to 
help  Lebanon  in  its  time  of  trouble.  We 
will  be  consulting  with  friendly  Arab 
states,  our  European  allies,  and  the 
Soviet  Union,  as  well  as  Lebanon's 
neighbors,  on  how  to  try  to  achieve  a 
cease-fire  and  an  end  to  all  blockades 
and  the  beginning  of  a  political  recon- 
ciliation process. 

We  are  committed  to  working  with 
others  to  try  to  end  the  ongoing  trag- 
edy in  Lebanon.  The  United  States  is 
not  abandoning  Lebanon.  We  regret 
having  to  evacuate  the  embassy  and  the 
actions  by  Gen.  Awn  [Christian-backed 
leader]  and  his  followers  that  made  it 
necessary. 

The  President's  and  the  Secretary's 
policy  has  always  been  to  maintain  our 
embassy  as  long  as  useful  work  could 
be  done.  But  for  5  months,  the  embassy 
has  been  unable  to  go  to  Muslim  west 
Beirut  because  of  shelling  and  bad 
security  conditions. 

Gen.  Awn  told  journalists  that  he 
would  not  receive  Ambassador  Mc- 
Carthy until  McCarthy  presented  his 
credentials  to  Awn,  one  of  two  com- 
peting governments. 

On  September  5,  a  demonstration 
with  1,000  people  was  organized  around 
our  embassy  and  a  "blockade"  was  de- 
clared by  the  organizers.  The  demon- 
strators said  that  this  blockade  would 
continue  until  the  U.S.  Government  did 
the  following  four  things:  (1)  presenta- 
tion of  McCarthy's  credentials  to  Gen. 
Awn;  (2)  recognition  of  Gen.  Awn  as  the 
"sole  legitimate  authority  in  Lebanon;" 
(3)  arrival  of  a  special  envoy  from  the 
United  States;  and  (4)  the  L'nited 
States  to  force  Syria  to  lift  its  blockade 
of  the  Christian  enclave. 


The  demonstration  leader  told  th 
crowd  that  U.S.  personnel  could  ente 
and  leave  "at  their  own  risk."  He  sale 
the  blockade  would  move  closer  to  the 
embassy  and  an  indefinite  next  step 
would  take  place  September  6. 

A  telephone  caller  threatened  tO' 
shoot  down  the  September  5  scheduk 
helicopter  support  mission,  and  shor 
thereafter,  the  demonstration  orga- 
nizer took  credit  for  preventing  the 
helicopter  mission. 

We  were  told  yesterday  by  reliab 
journalists  on  the  ground  that  Gen. 
Awn  said  that  Lebanon  needed  a  goOd 
dose  of  "Christian  terrorism."  As  Ge 
Awn's  threats  and  implications  about 
the  United  States  grew  nastier,  the 
Department  and  the  embassy  were  ii 
close  touch  throughout  the  Labor  Da. 
weekend.  On  Friday,  September  1, 
Gen.  Awn  told  the  French  newspaper- 
Figaro  that  perhaps  he  should  take 
"20  American  hostages." 

Secretary  Baker  spoke  by  tele- 
phone to  Ambassador  McCarthy  on 
September  5.  On  the  morning  of  Sep 
tember  5,  Secretary  Baker  met  with* 
the  President  who  gave  his  approval 
evacuate.  At  2:00  p.m.,  Washington 
time,  following  his  conversation  witl 
Ambassador  McCarthy,  Secretary  B 
er  met  in  the  Oval  Office  with  the  Pr 
ident,  Secretary  [of  Defense]  Chenej 
[President's  national  security  advise: 
Gen.  Scowcroft,  Chief  of  Staff  Sunun 
and  Assistant  Secretary  [for  Near 
Eastern  and  South  Asian  Affairs]  K( 
ly.  They  discussed  alternative  means 
implementing  the  evacuation  and  act 
vated  the  military  chain  of  command. 

Assistant  Secretary  Kelly  was  ii 
repeated  contact — more  than  a  dozer 
times — yesterday  with  Ambassador 
McCarthy,  throughout  the  day  and  tl 
night,  consulting  the  Secretary  fre- 
quently for  guidance  as  details  were 
worked  out  with  the  Ambassador.  Se 
retary  Baker  himself  chaired  approx 
imately  8-10  meetings  yesterday  on 
this  subject  and  the  course  of  the 
evacuation  on  September  5. 


1  Read  to  news  correspondents  by 
Department  spokesman  Margaret  DeB.  1 

wiler.  ■ 


62 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1(' 


REFUGEES 


,  me  now  address  a  subject  which  I 
CI  w  is  on  your  minds  as  much  as  it  is 
rniine — the  eight  American  citizens 
vo  remain  captive  in  Lebanon  and  the 
i^rate  but  related  question  of  our  re- 
a^nship  with  Iran. 

It  may  help  in  thinking  about  these 
sies  to  remind  ourselves  of  three 
){ic  realities. 

•  The  hostage  issue  involves  the  de- 
il'rate,  cold-blooded,  and  calculated 
itse  of  innocent  people. 

'•  •  The  Iranian  Government  gives 
lEical  financial,  political,  and  moral 

Sport  to  the  groups  which  are  re- 
nsible  for  this. 

•  Spokesmen  for  the  Iranian 
}|'ernment  deny  that  Iran  has  any 
eponsibility  for  the  situation  and 
icdemn  hostage-taking.  And  in  the 
[it  breath,  without  any  apparent 

■sf  of  shame  or  logical  contradiction, 
1 V  add  that  Iran  will  only  use  its 
I  uence  over  the  hostage-holders  if 
1  United  States  meets  various 
(ditions. 

These  facts  are  clear.  What  should 
v'do  about  them? 

We  are  mobilizing  every  possible 
(ource  to  drive  home  a  clear  message 
c  he  Iranian  leadership.  We  have  used 
.  iriety  of  private  channels  to  convey 
h  message,  but  it  is  not  a  secret.  Its 
leiice  is  as  follows:  We  expect  you  to 
.1  to  obtain  the  release  of  the  hos- 
ies.  Your  failure  to  do  so  is  a  funda- 
r.atal  obstacle  to  the  normalization  of 
J5. -Iranian  relations. 

Our  objective  is  to  help  convince 
1  Iranian  Government  that  it  is  in  its 
r  1  best  interest  to  act  to  end  the 
)  ctice  of  international  terrorism. 
pis  would  remove  a  fundamental  ob- 
ilcle  to  the  normalization  of  the  U.S.- 
inian  relationship.  We  have  no  quar- 
'(  with  the  system  of  government  of 
1  Islamic  Republic.  That  is  a  matter 
'<  the  Iranian  people  to  decide.  We  be- 
i/e  that  a  more  normal  relationship 
):ween  the  United  States  and  the  Is- 
:  lie  Republic  of  Iran  based  firmly  on 
ttual  respect  would  be  desirable,  and 
»  don't  believe  Iran  should  be  any- 
)ly's  strategic  preserve.  Our  inter- 
I  s  would  be  well-served  by  a  strong, 
ijsperous,  nonaligned  Iran.  We  would 
e  t<i  see  Iran  make  a  contribution  to 
ability  in  the  gulf  and  Southwest 
ia,  instead  of  threatening  its  neigh- 


bors. We  are  ready  to  play  a  part  in  the 
reconstruction  of  the  Iranian  economy 
if  Iran  wants  this.  But  none  of  this  will 
be  possible  until  the  Iranian  leadership 
turns  its  back,  once  and  for  all,  on  the 
practice  of  international  terrorism. 

In  this  regard,  although  there  have 
been  some  encouraging  statements  in 
Tehran,  Iran's  behavior  in  the  world 
continues  to  leave  much  to  be  desired. 
In  recent  weeks  and  months,  Iran's 
hand  has  been  evident  in  terrorist  at- 


tacks in  Europe  and  the  Middle  East. 
Iran  must  end  these  practices  once  and 
for  all  if  it  wants  to  rejoin  the  family  of 
nations.  We  will  continue  to  emphasize 
this  message  to  Iran,  but  in  the  end  the 
Iranian  leadership  itself  must  make  its 
own  choice. 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearing 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Doc- 
uments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. ■ 


U.S.,  Vietnam  Agree  on 
Emigration  of  Detainees 


JOINT  STATEMENT, 
JULY  30, 1989 

Representatives  of  the  United  States 
and  the  Socialist  Republic  of  Vietnam 
at  a  meeting  in  Hanoi  July  27-29,  1989, 
announced  that  they  hope  to  commence 
by  October  1989  a  program  for  the  re- 
settlement in  the  United  States  of  re- 
leased reeducation  center  detainees 
and  their  close  family  members  who 
wish  to  emigrate  to  the  United  States. 
The  Vietnamese  delegation  was  led  by 
Assistant  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
Vu  Khoan.  The  U.S.  delegation  was  led 
by  Senior  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary 
of  State  [for  Refugee  Programs] 
Robert  L.  F\inseth,  Acting  Director 
of  the  Bureau  for  Refugee  Programs. 

The  Socialist  Republic  of  Vietnam 
and  the  United  States  of  America,  in 
order  to  resolve  one  of  the  issues  of  mu- 
tual concern  to  the  two  countries  and 
consistent  with  their  humanitarian 
policies  and  with  the  commitments 
undertaken  in  the  declaration  and  the 
comprehensive  plan  of  action  adopted 
by  the  UN  International  Conference 
on  Indochinese  Refugees  [June  13-14, 
1989],  will — in  addition  to  existing 
programs — allow  those  released  reedu- 
cation center  detainees  who  were  close- 
ly associated  with  the  United  States  or 
its  allies  and  who  wish  to  do  so  to  emi- 
grate, together  with  their  close  rela- 
tives, to  the  United  States. 


The  U.S.  delegation  declared  that 
released  reeducation  center  detainees 
coming  to  the  United  States  would  be 
subject  to  all  U.S.  laws,  including  those 
affecting  the  activities  of  U.S.  resi- 
dents toward  other  countries.  The  U.S. 
delegation  reaffirmed  that  the  United 
States  has  not  encouraged  nor  does  it 
have  any  intention  of  encouraging  or 
using  released  detainees  to  engage  in 
any  illegal  activities  hostile  or  harmful 
to  Vietnam — and  is  opposed  to  any  such 
activities — and  that  the  United  States 
will  accept  these  persons  solely  for  hu- 
manitarian reasons  and  not  for  any  hos- 
tile actions  against  Vietnam.  The 
Vietnamese  delegation  also  reaffirmed 
that  Vietnam  has  not  and  will  not  en- 
courage or  use  released  detainees  to 
engage  in  illegal  actions  hostile  or 
harmful  to  the  United  States. 

The  two  sides  drew  up  a  draft 
agreement,  which  included  a  technical 
annex,  and  agreed  to  establish  a  joint 
working  group  to  coordinate  implemen- 
tation of  the  program.  The  two  sides 
agreed  that  the  program  would  be  in 
addition  to  the  existing  Amerasian 
and  orderly  departure  programs. 

The  two  sides  expressed  great 
satisfaction  with  the  results  achieved 
and  expressed  hope  that  the  first  group 
of  3,000  persons  for  resettlement  in 
the  United  States  under  this  agree- 
ment will  depart  Vietnam  before  the 
end  of  the  year  after  processing  is 
completed.  ■ 


ipartment  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


63 


TERRORISM 


The  Japanese  Red  Army 


Followiytg  is  a  fact  sheet  of 
August  2Ji.,  1989,  prepared  by  the 
Coordinator  for  Co  unter-Terro  rism . 

Goal 

The  Japanese  Red  Army  (JRA)  at- 
tempts to  support,  through  terrorism, 
a  worldwide  Marxist-Leninist  revolu- 
tion. The  JRA  has  long  identified  itself 
with  radical  Palestinian  movements, 
especially  the  Popular  Front  for  the 
Liberation  of  Palestine  (PFLP). 

Although  based  in  the  Middle  East 
and  operating  woi'ldwide,  the  JRA  also 
has  goals  for  its  native  Japan — to  unite 
leftist  anarchist  organizations,  end  the 
imperial  system,  oppose  "Japanese  im- 
perialism," and  establish  a  people's  re- 
public. As  Emperor  Hirohito  lingered 
near  death  at  the  end  of  1988,  the  JRA 
issued  a  threat  saying  it  would  resume 
its  fight  against  Japan's  imperial  sys- 
tem, a  threat  the  JRA  repeated  when 
Hirohito  died  2  months  later.  The  JRA 
is  believed  to  be  affiliated  with  the 
Anti-War  Democratic  Front  (ADF), 
an  overt  leftist  political  organization 
in  Japan. 

Links  to  Libya 

In  recent  years,  the  JRA  has  again 
been  linked  to  Libya,  which  we  suspect 
provides  it  with  financial  and  other 
assistance.  Indicative  of  this  relation- 
ship was  the  hero's  welcome  accorded 
to  the  sole  surviving  JRA  terrorist  in- 
volved in  the  1972  Lod  Airport  mas- 
sacre, who  was  released  following  a 
prisoner  exchange  in  1985  and  went 
directly  to  Tripoli. 

After  a  9-year  lull  in  terrorist 
activity  beginning  in  the  late  1970s, 
JRA  members,  using  the  name  "Anti- 
Imperialist  International  Brigade" 
(AIIB),  resumed  operations  in  Jakarta 
in  May  1986,  a  month  after  the  U.S.  re- 
taliatory raid  on  Libyan  terrorist  facil- 
ities. AIIB  attacks  in  1987  against  U.S. 
facilities  in  Madrid,  as  well  as  a  1988 
attack  in  Naples  executed  by  a  known 
JRA  member,  also  took  place  around 
the  time  of  the  anniversary  of  the  U.S. 
air  raid  on  Tripoli  and  were  publicly 
linked  to  it. 


1986-88  Terrorist  Resurgence 

The  JRA  terrorist  resurgence  began 
in  May  1986  in  Jakarta  with  homemade 
rocket  attacks  against  the  U.S.,  Cana- 
dian, and  Japanese  Embassies  to  pro- 
test the  Tokyo  economic  summit.  The 
attacks  were  claimed  by  the  AIIB, 
which  appears  to  be  comprised  of  JRA 
members,  possibly  working  in  conjunc- 
tion with  Middle  Eastern  and  other  ter- 
rorist elements.  JRA  members  were 
also  involved  in  other  AIIB-claimed  op- 
erations, such  as  the  June  1987  rocket 
and  car  bomb  attacks  against  the  U.S. 
and  British  Embassies  in  Rome,  again 
to  protest  that  year's  economic  summit 
being  held  in  Venice.  Forensic  evidence 
linked  the  Rome  attacks  with  the  AIIB's 
April  1987  rocket  attacks  in  Madrid 
against  the  U.S.  Embassy  and  U.S. 
Information  Service  (USIS)  offices. 

Following  a  car  bombing  outside  a 
USO  club  in  Naples  on  April  14,  1988, 
which  killed  five  persons  including  a 
U.S.  Navy  servicewoman  and  left  17 
persons  injured,  Italian  authorities 
identified  known  JRA  member  Junzo 
Okudaira  as  responsible.  The  attack 
was  claimed  under  the  name  "Jihad 
Brigade"  to  commemorate  the  U.S. 
retaliatory  raid  on  Libya. 

Two  days  before  the  Naples  attack, 
JRA  member  Yu  Kikumura  was  ar- 
rested on  the  New  Jersey  Turnpike  car- 
rying three  18-inch  antipersonnel  pipe 
bombs  intended  for  use  in  a  terrorist 
attack  in  the  United  States,  possibly 
against  a  Navy  recruiting  office  in 
Manhattan.  The  bombs  were  designed 
to  cause  maximum  casualties  due  to 
shrapnel  and  fragmentation.  This 
thwarted  attack  was  likely  planned  to 
coincide  with  the  Naples  attack.  In 
Federal  court  proceedings,  U.S.  pros- 
ecutors stated  that  the  evidence  sug- 
gested Kikumura  was  secretly  working 
for  Libyan  leader  Mu'ammar  Qadhafi. 
Kikumura  was  convicted  in  a  U.S.  Dis- 
trict Court  and  sentenced  to  30  years 
in  prison  in  early  1989. 

JRA  Background 

The  JRA,  headquartered  in  Lebanon's 
Syrian-occupied  Bekaa  Valley,  was 
formed  in  1971  by  Fusako  Shigenobu 
who  had  been  joined  by  members  of  the 
now-defunct  Japanese  Red  Army  Fac- 
tion (JRAF)  while  she  served  as  liaison 
between  the  JRAF  and  Palestinian  ter- 


rorists. Shigenobu,  who  was  born  in 
Tokyo  in  1945,  remains  the  JRA  leade 
spending  a  significant  amount  of  time 
in  Lebanon. 

The  JRA's  core  strength  has  prob 
bly  never  exceeded  25  members.  Sym- 
pathizers in  Japan  probably  number 
several  hundred.  Homeland  supportei 
have  provided  some  moral  and  financi 
assistance  as  well  as  an  audience  for 
JRA  propaganda.  The  primary  sourcf 
of  JRA  funds  is  believed  to  be  Palesti 
ian  factions  (primarily  the  PFLP)  ^ 
and  Libya. 

From  1972  to  1977,  the  JRA  con- 
ducted terrorist  acts  on  behalf  of  the' 
PFLP  beginning  with  the  massacre  c 
some  26  people  at  Lod  Airport  in  Tel 
Aviv  in  May  1972.  JRA  members  part' 
ipated  in  additional  PFLP  operations 
including  a  series  of  bombings  and  hi- 
jackings in  Singapore  and  Kuwait  in 
early  1974.  Subsequent  JRA  actions  ii 
the  mid-1970s  included  hostage-takinj 
and  hijackings,  nearly  all  of  which  we 
aimed  at  freeing  jailed  JRA  memben 
An  example  was  the  JRA's  August  19' 
occupation  of  the  consulate  building  o 
the  U.S.  Embassy  in  Kuala  Lumpur 
and  seizure  of  52  hostages  which,  fol- 
lowing threats  on  their  lives,  forced 
the  release  and  safe  passage  to  Libya 
of  five  JRA  members  who  were 
imprisoned  in  Japan. 

Arrests 

The  arrest  of  several  members  of  the 
Japanese  Red  Army  over  an  8-month 
period  beginning  in  late  1987  has  shei 
light  on  the  organization's  activities 
and  probably  has  had  a  negative  impa 
on  its  capabilities. 

In  November  1987,  Japanese  au- 
thorities arrested  high-ranking  JRA 
member  Osamu  Maruoka  in  Tokyo. 
Maruoka,  who  participated  in  two  hi- 
jackings in  the  1970s,  was  carrying  st 
eral  passports,  including  one  stolen 
from  Japanese  tourists  in  Madrid  in 
1986.  He  had  traveled  widely  in  Eu- 
rope and  Asia  and  also  had  a  ticket  fo 
Seoul,  South  Korea,  leading  to  specu: 
tion  that  the  JRA  would  target  the  up 
coming  Olympics.  Details  released 
following  Maruoka's  arrest  indicated 
that  the  JRA  may  have  been  organizi: 
cells  in  Manila  and  Singapore. 

Prior  to  his  arrest  in  April  1988, 
Yu  Kikumura  had  been  in  the  United 
States  just  over  1  month  and  had  trav 
eled  over  7,000  miles  by  car,  passing 
through  13  States.  Kikumura  had  pre 
viously  been  arrested  in  the  Nether- 
lands in  1986  carrying  explosives  at 
Amsterdam's  Schipol  Airport.  He  wa: 


64 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  19) 


TERRORISM 


orted  to  Japan  but  later  released  on 
i!echnicality.  He  was  known  to  have 
rintained  an  apartment  in  Athens 
1 1  had  a  bank  account  in  Zurich, 
'tording  to  evidence  presented  in 
>;.  court  proceedings,  Kikumura  had 
,..ined  at  a  Bekaa  camp  in  late  1986 
iP  early  1987. 

In  May  1988  Yasuhiro  Shibata  was 
le.'ited  in  Tokyo.  Shibata  was  one  of 
ue  1970  hijackers  of  an  aircraft  to 
\jrth  Korea  of  the  "Yodo-go"  Japanese 
Hines.  The  group  has  remained  in 
^ongyang,  harbored  by  the  North  Ko- 
■in  (lovernment.  Although  the  "Yodo- 
j'  group  predates  the  formation  of  the 
I  A,  some  of  its  members  are  believed 
ihave  been  in  recent  contact  with  the 
I  A.  Shibata  may  have  met  Maruoka  in 
[-cyo  before  the  latter's  arrest. 

In  June  1988,  Philippine  authorities 
rested  Hiroshi  Sensui  and  deported 
n  to  Japan.  Sensui  had  been  living 
Manila  since  1984  and  had  set  up  a 
ding  company,  posing  as  a  legiti- 
te  businessman.  Investigations  re- 
'iled  that  Sensui,  who  had  undergone 
)  Stic  surgery  and  had  to  be  identified 
, -ough  fingerprints,  created  a  region- 
luipport  base — presumably  for  the 
\  A — dealing  in  illegal  passports, 
;e-transit  facilities  for  Maruoka  and 
)iers,  and  fundraising  through  the 
!,pected  JRA  affiliate,  the  ADF.  Sen- 
:  hud  previously  been  convicted  of 
nler  in  Japan  but  was  released  in 
['7  as  part  of  an  exchange  for  156  hos- 
;  ;es  held  by  the  JRA  during  a  hijack- 
;.  The  JRA's  relationship  with  the 
*  w  People's  Army  in  the  Philippines 
uncertain. 

[ospects 

I A  members  have  demonstrated  an 
jility  to  travel  extensively,  establish 
:.'ert  support  networks  (possibly  in 
lirope,  as  well  as  in  Asia),  and  con- 
ret  terrorist  operations  in  widely 
»parate  regions  of  the  world.  These 
:pabilities — combined  with  a  publicly 
■ited  intention  to  strike  at  Japanese, 
IS.,  and  other  Western  government 
trgets  and  the  use  of  stand-away  tech- 
I  lui's  such  as  car  bombs  and  rockets 
uich  assist  the  terrorists  in  making 
tod  their  escape — means  that  the  JRA 
ilikely  to  remain  a  serious  threat  for 
te  forseeable  future. 


Selected  Incident  Chronology 

May  1972,  Israel.  JRA  terrorists  car- 
ried out  a  machinegun  and  grenade  at- 
tack at  Lod  Airport.  Twenty-six  people 
were  killed,  including  16  U.S.  Puerto 
Rican  citizens  on  a  pilgrimage  to  the 
Holy  Land. 

July  1973,  Libya.  The  JRA  partici- 
pated in  a  joint  Arab/Latin  American/ 
Japanese  operation  in  which  a  Japan 
Airlines  747  was  hijacked  to  Libya.  The 
hostages  were  offloaded  and  the  plane 
destroyed  when  a  ransom  demand  of 
$30  million  was  not  paid. 

January-February  1974,  Singa- 
pore. JRA  terrorists  attacked  Shell 
Oil  refinery  storage  tanks  and  seized  a 
ferryboat  crew  and  passengers  as  hos- 
tages. All  hostages  were  released 
unharmed. 

September  1974,  Netherlands.  The 

JRA  seized  11  hostages  at  the  French 
Embassy  in  The  Hague.  The  terrorists 
demanded,  and  were  provided,  an 
airliner  for  transport  to  Syria.  Two 
Dutch  police  were  wounded  during  the 
incident. 

August  1975,  Malaysia.  Ten  JRA 

members  took  over  the  consulate  build- 
ing at  the  U.S.  Embassy  in  Kuala  Lum- 
pur and  seized  52  hostages,  including 
the  U.S.  Consul  and  the  Swedish 
Charge.  The  terrorists  threatened  to 
blow  up  the  building  and  kill  the  hos- 
tages unless  seven  prisoners  in  Japan, 
mostly  JRA  members,  were  released 
and  allowed  safe  passage  to  the  Middle 
East.  The  five  who  were  willing  to  go 
were  flown  to  Tripoli,  Libya,  by  way  of 
Kuala  Lumpur. 

September-October  1977,  India. 

The  JRA  hijacked  a  Japan  Airlines 
plane  in  Bombay  and  forced  it  to  land 
in  Dhaka,  Bangladesh.  The  Japanese 
Government  agreed  to  release  nine  im- 
prisoned JRA  sympathizers  and  pay 
$6  million  in  exchange  for  the  159  hos- 
tages. The  JRA  hijackers  were  then 
flown  to  Algeria. 

May  1986,  Indonesia.  Fingerprints 
of  JRA  member  Tustomu  Shirosaki 
were  found  in  a  hotel  room  from  which 
crude  mortars  were  fired  at  the  Japa- 
nese and  U.S.  Embassy  buildings  in 
Jakarta.  The  AIIB  claimed  respon- 
sibility for  the  two  attacks  as  well  as  a 
car  bombing  at  the  Canadian  Embassy. 

1986,  Netherlands.  JRA  member 
Yu  Kikumura  was  arrested  at  Schiphol 
Airport  in  Amsterdam  carrying  a 
bomb  in  his  luggage.  Kikumura  was 
later  deported  to  Japan  but  released 
on  a  technicality  shortly  thereafter. 


April  1987,  Spain.  The  AIIB 
claimed  responsibility  for  rocket  at- 
tacks on  the  U.S.  Embassy  and  USIS 
facilities  in  Madrid  and  linked  them  to 
the  anniversary  of  the  U.S.  1986  air- 
strike  on  Libya. 

June  1987,  Italy.  The  AIIB  claimed 
responsibility  for  two  rockets  fired  at 
the  British  Embassy  in  Rome  and  a  car 
bomb  and  rocket  attack  against  the 
U.S.  Embassy  on  the  same  day.  An 
Italian  judge  later  issued  arrest  war- 
rants for  JRA  members  Shirosaki  and 
Junzo  Okudaira  based  upon  photo 
identifications. 

November  1987,  Japan.  Authorities 
in  Tokyo  arrested  Osamu  Maruoka,  a 
high-ranking  JRA  member.  Maruoka, 
who  had  participated  in  two  hijackings 
in  the  1970s,  had  traveled  widely  in 
Europe  and  Asia. 

April  1988,  Italy.  A  bomb  planted 
in  front  of  the  USO  club  in  Naples 
killed  five  people,  including  one  U.S. 
Navy  servicewoman.  Based  on  finger- 
prints, Italian  police  identified  JRA 
member  Okudaira  as  responsible  for 
the  bombing,  which  had  been  claimed 
under  the  name  "Jihad  Brigade." 

1988,  U.S.  JRA  member  Yu 
Kikumura  was  arrested  on  the  New 
Jersey  Turnpike  with  three  antiperson- 
nel bombs  in  his  possession.  Kikumura 
was  later  convicted  for  transporting 
bombs  and  sentenced  to  30  years  in 
prison. 

May  1988,  Japan.  Yasuhiro  Shi- 
bata, one  of  the  original  "Yodo-go"  hi- 
jackers in  1970  who  had  since  lived  pre- 
dominantly in  North  Korea,  was 
arrested  in  Tokyo. 

1988,  India.  A  Citibank  branch  in 
New  Delhi  was  heavily  damaged  by  a 
powerful  bomb  explosion  in  which  one 
person  was  killed  and  13  wounded.  Al- 
though no  group  claimed  responsibility, 
Indian  authorities  believe  that  the  JRA 
is  a  suspect  in  the  attack. 

June  1988,  Philippines.  JRA  mem- 
ber Hiroshi  Sensui  was  arrested  and 
deported  to  Japan.  Sensui,  posing  as  a 
businessman,  had  created  a  regional 
support  base  for  the  JRA  in  the 
Philippines. 

July  1988,  Spain.  Two  improvised 
mortar  devices  were  found  near  the 
U.S.  Embassy  in  Madrid.  The  AIIB 
claimed  responsibility  for  the  at- 
tempted attack,  linking  it  to  the  U.S. 
July  4th  holiday  and  the  previous  day's 
unintended  downing  of  an  Iranian 
airliner  by  U.S.  naval  forces  in  the 
Persian  Gulf.  ■ 


ipartment  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


65 


UNITED  NATIONS 


Security  Council  Permanent  Members 
Discuss  international  Issues 


JOINT  STATEMENT, 
SEPT.  29,  1989 

On  29  September  1989,  the  Ministers  of 
Foreign  Affairs  of  the  five  permanent 
members  of  the  Security  Council  were 
the  guests  at  a  luncheon  given  by  the 
Secretary  General  of  the  United  Na- 
tions, H.E.  Javier  Perez  de  Cuellar. 
Taking  part  were  the  Minister  of  For- 
eign Affairs  of  the  People's  Republic  of 
China,  H.E.  Mr.  Qian  Qichen;  the  Min- 
ister of  State,  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  of  France,  H.E.  Mr.  Roland 
Dumas;  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
of  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Re- 
publics, H.E.  Mr.  Eduard  A.  Shev- 
ardnadze; the  Secretary  of  State  for 
Foreign  and  Commonwealth  Affairs  of 
the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain 
and  Northern  Ireland,  H.E.  Mr.  John 
Major;  and  the  Secretary  of  State 
for  the  United  States  of  America, 
H.E.  Mr.  James  A.  Baker,  III. 

The  ministers  and  the  Secretary 
General  exchanged  views  on  a  wide 
range  of  major  international  issues  and 
also  reviewed  developments  over  those 
issues  since  their  previous  meeting 
with  the  Secretary  General  on  28  Sep- 
tember 1988.  They  agreed  that  at  the 
present  time  of  positive  change  in  the 
international  political  climate  from 
confrontation  to  relaxation  and  interac- 
tion among  states,  the  United  Nations 
has  an  important  role  to  play. 

The  ministers  placed  particular 
emphasis  on  the  efforts  to  resolve  the 
current  regional  conflicts  in  accord- 
ance with  the  principles  of  the  Charter 
of  the  United  Nations.  They  noted  with 
satisfaction  the  trend  toward  dialogue 
and  peaceful  settlement  of  disputes 
which  had  developed  in  recent  years. 
They  welcomed  the  active  involvement 
of  the  United  Nations  in  this  process. 


The  ministers  expressed  their  firm 
commitment  to  the  cause  of  independ- 
ence of  Namibia  through  the  holding  of 
free  and  fair  elections  under  the  aus- 
pices of  the  United  Nations.  They  ex- 
pressed their  strong  support  for  the 
Secretary  General  in  his  efforts  to  en- 
sure that  Security  Council  Resolution 
435  (1978)  is  fully  implemented.  They 
urged  all  parties  concerned  scru- 
pulously to  abide  by  their  obligations 
under  the  settlement  plan. 

Having  reviewed  developments  in 
the  Middle  East,  the  ministers  reaf- 
firmed their  support  for  an  active 
peace  process  in  which  all  relevant  par- 
ties would  participate,  leading  to  a 
comprehensive,  just,  and  lasting  peace 
in  the  region.  They  reiterated  their 
full  support  for  the  efforts  of  the  Arab 
League  Tripartite  Committee  to  put 
an  end  to  the  trials  of  the  Lebanese 
people  through  the  implementation  of  a 
plan  for  the  settlement  of  the  Lebanese 
crisis  in  all  its  aspects  by  guaranteeing 
the  full  sovereignty,  independence,  ter- 
ritorial integrity,  and  national  unity 
of  Lebanon.  In  this  regard,  they  ex- 
pressed the  strong  hope  that  the  re- 
sumed inter-Lebanese  dialogue  would 
develop  constructively. 

The  ministers  expressed  their  sup- 
port for  the  Secretary  General's  efforts 
to  secure  the  full  implementation  by 
Iran  and  Iraq  of  Security  Council  Reso- 
lution 598  (1987)  as  an  integral  whole 
and  urged  both  governments  to  cooper- 
ate with  the  Secretary  General  in  that 
regard. 

They  reaffirmed  their  support  for 
the  peace  process  in  Central  America 
on  the  basis  of  the  Esquipulas  agree- 
ment and  subsequent  agreements  by 
the  Central  American  states  and  for 
the  efforts  of  the  Secretary  General  in 
this  connection. 


The  ministers  expressed  their 
concern  at  the  current  situation  in 
Afghanistan  and  supported  the  effortj 
of  the  Secretary  General  to  encourage 
and  facilitate  the  early  realization  of 
comprehensive  political  settlement. 
They  called  on  the  parties  concerned 
implement  faithfully  the  Geneva  agre 
ment  and  last  year's  General  Assembl 
resolution. 

The  ministers  reviewed  the  situa 
tion  in  Cambodia  in  the  light  of  the  oi 
come  of  the  Paris  conference.  They  . 
advocated  a  comprehensive  political 
settlement,  which  would  ensure  the  ii 
dependent,  sovereign,  and  neutral  sta 
tus  of  Cambodia  and  a  continuation  ofi 
the  negotiating  process  initiated  to- 
ward this  end. 

The  ministers  exchanged  views  o 
international  cooperation  against  ter- 
rorism. They  condemned  all  acts  of  te 
rorism  in  whatever  form  and  demandi 
the  immediate  safe  release  of  all 
hostages.  The  ministers  called  for 
strengthened  international  cooperati< 
aimed  at  combating  illicit  internation 
drug  trafficking. 

The  ministers  commended  the 
peacekeeping  operations  of  the  Unit 
Nations,  which  in  their  view  illustratt 
the  vital  role  of  the  organization  in  pi 
venting  and  resolving  regional  con- 
flicts. They  underlined  the  importam 
of  the  effective  functioning  of  these 
operations. 

In  view  of  the  primary  respon- 
sibility of  the  Security  Council  for  thi 
maintenance  of  international  peace  ai 
security  under  the  Charter,  the  mini; 
ters  expressed  their  satisfaction  at  tl 
improved  working  relations  within  th 
Council  and  with  the  Secretary  Gene 
al.  They  expressed  their  determinatii 
to  continue  to  work  together  and  in  ci 
operation  with  the  Secretary  General 
for  the  prevention  and  resolution  of  in 
ternational  conflicts. 

The  ministers  expressed  their 
deep  appreciation  to  the  Secretary 
General  for  his  contribution  to  the 
cause  of  international  peace  and  coop- 
eration. They  thanked  him  for  the 
invitation  to  the  meeting  which  they 
considered  a  most  useful  occasion  for 
an  exchange  of  views.  ■ 


66 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  19); 


"'ESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


he  OAS  and  the  Panama  Crisis 


Following  are  a  statement  by 
jting  Secretary  Lawrence  S. 
iigleburger  before  a  Meeting  ofCon- 
sitatioyi  of  Ministers  of  Foreign 
Jifairs  of  the  Organization  of  Ameri- 
M  States  (OAS)  on  August  2i,  1989,  a 
dclaration  by  the  president  of  that 
Keting  in  consultation,  and  second 
Sitement  by  Acting  Secretary  Ea- 
g'burger  at  a  special  session  of  the 
(\S  Permanent  Council  on  August  31. 


iJTING  SECRETARY 
EAGLEBURGER'S  STATEMENT, 

i]G.  24,  19891 

(pi-  first  meeting  on  the  crisis  in  Pan- 
;'pa  was  held  on  May  17.  Since  that 
'|ne,  three  member  states  of  this  orga- 
Kation  have  changed  governments 
^irough  democratic  processes — El  Sal- 
■'dor,  Argentina,  and  Bolivia.  In  every 
<se,  one  political  party  yielded  power 
]acefully  to  another.  Today  we  wel- 
cme  the  new  Deputy  Foreign  Minister 
^Bolivia,  just  as  in  previous  meetings 
il;  welcomed  the  new  Foreign  Minis- 
1rs  of  Argentina  and  El  Salvador. 

Their  presence  among  us  is  vivid 
'  tness  to  a  powerful  force  that  is  in 
■e  process  of  transforming  our  planet. 

the  Philippines,  in  Poland,  in  Hung- 
:  y,  to  name  but  three  countries,  the 

fees  of  democracy  are  on  the  march. 
urs  is  a  remarkable,  a  creative  time — 
itime  when  people  who  for  too  long 
!  ffered  the  degradation  of  totalitari- 
■lism,  took  back  into  their  own  hands 

e  right  to  determine  their  own  fu- 

re.  Those  who  stand  in  the  way  of 
lat  process  are  on  the  wrong  side  of 

story  and,  in  the  end,  will  find  them- 
■Ives,  as  all  dictators  eventually  have, 
.  the  garbage  can  of  history. 

iioneers  of  Democracy 

1  many  ways,  the  turn  toward  democ- 
icy  that  characterizes  our  era  began 
1  this  hemisphere.  In  recent  years,  na- 
on  after  nation  has  decided  to  follow 
le  democratic  path.  Together,  here  in 
le  Americas,  we  are  building  the 
orld's  first  democratic  hemisphere, 
nd  the  leaders  of  the  governments 
lat  many  of  you  represent  are  the 
ioiieers  in  that  historic  journey. 

The  people  of  Panama  also  have  be- 
un  that  historic  journey  toward  de- 
locracy.  They  spoke  clearly  on  May  7 


of  this  year.  They  voted  for  national 
dignity.  They  voted  to  end  a  brutal  dic- 
tatorship. They  voted  to  be  free.  They 
have  a  right  to  be  free.  No  one  has  a 
right  to  deny  that  freedom. 

Nevertheless  that  vote  for  democ- 
racy was  met  with  [Gen.  Manuel  An- 
tonio] Noriega's  iron  pipes  and  rifle 
butts,  hired  mobs  and  prison  cells.  The 
whole  world  denounced  the  violation  of 
human  rights  which  we  witnessed  in 
Panama  and  so  did  this  Organization  of 
American  States.  Indeed,  the  images  of 
courage  and  the  images  of  blood  from 
that  historic  week  in  Panama  will  al- 
ways be  etched  in  our  memory. 

The  people  of  Panama  called  out 
for  our  help,  and  the  OAS  sought  to  re- 
spond to  their  plea.  We  convened  an 
emergency  session  to  defend  the  prin- 
ciples of  our  charter  and  the  human 
rights  of  the  people  of  Panama.  The 
question  before  us  was  never  our  com- 
mitment to  Panamanian  sovereignty, 
nor  is  it  today.  For  the  sovereign  will  of 
the  Panamanian  people  is  what  we  are 
here  defending.  The  question  before  us 
was  never  our  commitment  to  the  Pan- 
ama Canal  Treaties.  For  we  reaffirmed 
our  commitment  to  uphold  those  his- 
toric treaties  on  the  first  day  we  met. 

And  let  us  be  clear  about  one 
thing,  if  nothing  else.  Noriega  did  not 
steal  the  May  7  election  because  of 
"sanctions"  or  the  legitimate  exercise  of 
treaty  rights.  He  stole  the  election  be- 
cause he  lost  it,  and  attempts  to  shift 
the  focus  from  that  overwhelming  fact 
is  nothing  more  nor  less  than  deliber- 
ate obfuscation. 

The  OAS  Mandate 

The  question  before  us  remains  what 
we  declared  it  to  be  in  our  first  reso- 
lution. It  is,  and  I  quote:  "The  grave 
events  and  the  abuses  by  General  Man- 
uel Antonio  Noriega  in  the  crisis  and 
the  electoral  process  in  Panama."  We 
recognized  then,  as  we  did  today,  that 
the  grave  abuses  of  Gen.  Noriega's  dic- 
tatorship threaten  the  peace  of  our 
hemisphere  and  violate  the  charter  of 
this  organization.  That  is  why  we  dis- 
patched a  mission  to  Panama.  Our  dis- 
tinguished Secretary  General  and  the 
distinguished  Foreign  Ministers  of 
Guatemala,  Trinidad  and  Tobago,  and 
Ecuador  spent  countless  hours  in  Pan- 
ama working  with  the  parties  trying  to 
achieve  a  transfer  of  power  by  Septem- 
ber 1  as  called  for  in  their  mandate. 


They  worked  hard,  and  they  made 
a  difference.  The  United  States  has 
supported  the  work  of  the  commission 
at  every  step  of  the  way.  Their  efforts 
and  commitment  deserve  all  of  our  re- 
spect and  gratitude.  The  commission 
brought  the  parties  together  for  face- 
to-face  negotiations.  Together,  they 
spelled  out  a  serious  agenda.  At  the 
last  meeting,  the  parties  laid  out  the 
elements  that  would  permit  a  resolu- 
tion to  the  crisis: 

•  The  departure  of  Gen.  Noriega 
from  power; 

•  Formation  of  a  transition  govern- 
ment on  September  1; 

•  New,  free  elections  within  the 
shortest  possible  time;  and 

•  The  lifting  of  measures  taken  by 
the  United  States  in  response  to  the 
crisis  in  Panama. 

All  rational  Panamanians  agree 
that  this  formula  could  resolve  the  cri- 
sis and  establish  democracy.  The  Unit- 
ed States  has  always  been  prepared  to 
do  its  part.  We  want  to  see  the  crisis 
end.  Nothing  would  please  my  govern- 
ment or  the  American  people  more  than 
to  end  the  measures  currently  in  place 
and  reestablish  normal  relations  with  a 
democratic  Panama. 

Response  to  the  Mandate 

Let  us  look  at  how  the  parties  to  the 
crisis  responded  to  the  commission's 
mandate. 

Were  the  candidates  who  won  the 
votes  of  the  Panamanian  people  pre- 
pared to  make  sacrifices  for  the  good  of 
their  country?  Were  they  prepared  to 
work  within  the  framework  established 
by  the  OAS?  Is  the  United  States  pre- 
pared to  commit  itself  before  the  na- 
tions of  this  hemisphere  to  respect  the 
Panama  Canal  Treaties  and  normalize 
relations  with  a  Panamanian  Govern- 
ment committed  to  democracy  and 
human  rights?  Is  the  United  States 
prepared  to  end  the  economic  measures 
it  has  taken  and  resume  its  normal  pro- 
cedures for  ensuring  the  safe  passage 
for  all  nations  through  the  Panama 
Canal  in  full  collaboration  with  the  De- 
fense Forces  of  a  democratic  Panama? 
The  answer  to  all  of  these  questions  is, 
and  has  always  been,  an  unequivocal 
"yes." 

But  was  Gen.  Noriega  prepared  to 
define  any  formula,  any  scenario,  any 


department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


67 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


set  of  circumstances  under  which  he 
would  be  willing  to  remove  the  primary 
obstacle  to  resolving  the  crisis  as  de- 
fined by  the  OAS?  The  answer  is,  and 
has  always  been,  an  unequivocal  "no." 

There  is  only  one  obstacle  to  re- 
solving this  crisis,  and  we  all  know  who 
it  is.  Indeed,  at  our  last  meeting,  the 
commission  itself,  in  the  report  which 
we  adopted,  made  it  clear  what  that  ob- 
stacle is:  "The  continued  presence  of 
General  Noriega  as  Commander  in 
Chief  of  the  Defense  Forces,"  the  re- 
port says,  "has  been  identified  both  by 
supporters  and  opposition  as  one  of  the 
factors,  if  not  the  principal  factor, 
which  must  be  addressed  in  order  to 
solve  the  crisis." 

The  people  of  Panama,  the  govern- 
ments of  this  hemisphere,  and  this  Or- 
ganization of  American  States  all  want 
this  crisis  to  end.  But  the  dangerous, 
violent  will  of  one  dictator  and  a  few 
desperate  supporters  stands  in  the  way 
of  democracy  and  peace  in  Panama. 

Still,  this  effort  has  not  been  in 
vain.  The  Noriega  dictatorship  thought 
it  could  steal  the  birthright  of  the  Pan- 
amanian people  on  May  7  and  the  world 
would  look  the  other  way.  Instead,  the 
dictatorship  has  never  been  more  iso- 
lated internally  or  internationally  than 
it  is  today.  And  so  it  will  remain.  The 
crisis  will  not  be  resolved  until  the 
mandate  of  the  OAS  has  been  fulfilled. 
Indeed,  it  will  only  grow  worse. 

Drug  Trafficking 

There  is  another  issue  at  stake  in  this 
debate  over  Panama — the  disgrace, 
the  terrible  evil  of  drug  trafficking  in 
our  hemisphere.  Just  this  past  week, 
we  have  been  reminded  again  of  the  aw- 
ful price  brave  men  and  women — and 
whole  societies — pay  because  these 
monsters — these  drug  traffickers — 
continue  in  our  midst. 

Three  days  ago,  the  OAS  met  to 
discuss  recent  events  in  Colombia. 
Many  delegations,  including  my  own, 
spoke  in  tribute  to  the  fallen  heroes  of 
this  battle  against  the  drug  cartels;  we 
respect  and  honor  their  memories.  But 
we  must  do  more  than  that.  We  must 
protect  our  children  and  our  societies 
against  these  peddlers  of  poison  and 
death.  This  is  a  war  as  deadly  and  as 
dangerous  as  any  fought  with  armies 
massed  across  borders;  the  survival 
of  democracy  is  at  stake. 

We  have  all  heard  a  great  deal  in 
this  chamber  in  recent  months,  and 
even  today,  about  the  evils  of  interven- 
tion in  the  internal  affairs  of  member 
states.  It  is  a  legitimate  concern.  But 


what,  in  God's  name,  would  we  gath- 
ered here  today  call  the  international 
drug  trade — and  those  who  aid  it  and 
abet  it — but  intervention  in  our  inter- 
nal affairs?  The  murder  of  public  offi- 
cials is  interventionism  by  these  drug 
cartels  and  the  states  that  support  and 
protect  them.  The  poisoning  of  our  chil- 
dren by  the  drug  cartels  and  those  who 
support  and  protect  them  is  interven- 
tionism in  our  internal  affairs.  That, 
certainly,  is  how  all  decent  people 
in  this  hemisphere  regard  these  ac- 
tivities. That  is  how  the  United  States 
regards  these  activities;  we  intend  to 
do  all  we  can  to  bring  them  to  an  end. 

Countries  that  provide  safe  haven 
and  support  for  the  international  drug 
trafficking  cartels  menace  the  peace 
and  security  of  this  hemisphere  just  as 
surely  as  if  they  were  using  their  own 
military  forces  to  attack  our  societies. 
The  truth  is,  and  every  one  of  us  knows 
it.  Gen.  Noriega  has  turned  Panama 
into  a  haven  for  drug  traffickers  and  a 
center  for  money  laundering  and  the 
transshipment  of  cocaine.  Will  Gen. 
Noriega  be  permitted  to  falsely  wrap 
himself  in  the  flag  of  Panamanian  sov- 
ereignty while  the  drug  cartels  with 
which  he  is  allied  intervene  throughout 
this  hemisphere?  That  is  aggression  as 
surely  as  Adolf  Hitler's  invasion  of  Pol- 
and 50  years  ago  was  aggression.  It  is 
aggression  against  us  all,  and  some  day 
it  must  be  brought 
to  an  end. 

The  Panamanian  Constitution  re- 
quires that  in  just  8  days  a  new  demo- 
cratic government  take  office.  The 
resolution  of  the  OAS  affirms  as  well 
that  a  transfer  of  power  through  demo- 
cratic mechanisms  must  take  place  by 
that  date.  All  of  us  hope,  I  know,  that 
in  the  few  days  remaining,  the  crisis 
can  be  resolved,  but  time  is  running 
out.  Rearranging  the  deck  chairs  on 
Noriega's  Titanic  will  not  satisfy  the 
mandate  of  the  OAS,  nor  will  it  resolve 
the  crisis.  Only  a  genuine  transfer  of 
power  will  achieve  the  result  we  all 
seek. 

Panamanian  Defense  Forces 

This  is  a  time  for  Panamanians  of  every 
party  and  every  institution  to  place  the 
interests  of  their  nation  first.  That  is 
as  true  of  the  Panamanian  Defense 
Forces  (PDF)  as  it  is  of  Panama's  civil 
leaders  of  all  political  persuasions.  This 
is  not  a  partisan  matter.  Their  common 
duty  is  to  defend  the  constitution  and 
the  well-being  of  the  people  of  Panama. 
If  they  do  so,  the  PDF  can  and  should 
play  an  important  role  in  a  democratic 


Panama.  When  the  history  of  Panama 
return  to  democracy  is  written — ^andl 
will  return  to  democracy — the  rolls 
will  record  for  all  time  those  who 
placed  the  interests  of  their  suffering 
nation  first  and  those  who  defend  a  cc 
rupt  dictatorship  to  the  bitter  end. 

Let  the  PDF  reflect:  Who  is,  in 
fact,  threatening  their  institution  to- 
day? The  Panamanian  people — 
including  the  men  and  women  of  the 
PDF  and  their  families — who  voted  fl 
an  end  to  the  Noriega  dictatorship  d: 
May  7?  The  United  States,  which  hasi 
worked  in  partnership  for  many  yean 
with  the  PDF  in  their  joint  respons 
ibility  to  ensure  safe  passage  througl 
the  canal  and  which  will  depend  on  tl 
PDF  to  carry  out  that  duty  when  the 
last  U.S.  troops  leave  Panama  as  the 
treaties  call  for  on  December  31,  1999 
The  nations  of  this  hemisphere,  whicl 
voted  to  condemn  the  abuses  perpe 
trated  by  Gen.  Noriega  against  his  o^ 
people,  including  many  officers  of  thi 
PDF?  Or  is  the  real  threat  to  the  PDl 
posed  by  the  man  who  abuses  their  pi 
fessional  loyalty  and  brings  suffering; 
on  his  nation  in  pursuit  of  his  own  pe 
sonal  interests  and  power? 

Conclusion 

If  the  terms  of  the  OAS  mandate  havn 
not  been  met  by  September  1,  then  tH 
Noriega  regime  will  have  declared  it 
self  to  be  an  outlaw  among  civilized 
nations,  and  we  should  treat  it  accord 
ingly.  Until  the  Panamanian  people 
enjoy  their  democratic  rights,  every 
member  of  this  body  has  an  obligatioi 
to  support  the  mandate  of  the  OAS,  t 
defend  human  rights  in  Panama,  to 
combat  the  alliance  of  drug  trafficker 
with  the  Noriega  dictatorship,  and  to 
isolate  this  outlaw  regime.  To  do  any^ 
thing  less  would  be  to  send  a  terrible 
dangerous  signal  to  the  enemies  of  de 
mocracy  and  the  drug  traffickers  in 
our  hemisphere.  The  people  of  Panani 
and  the  whole  world  will  be  watching. 
I  spoke  earlier  about  the  powerful 
forces  of  history  transforming  our 
planet  today.  Can  anyone  doubt  that 
this  idea  of  democracy,  this  vision  of 
freedom,  represents  an  idea  whose 
time  has  come.  The  dictators  in  their 
uniforms  and  boots  can  try  to  stand 
in  the  way,  but  they  will  be  swept  asi( 
in  time.  And  then  Noriega  will  be 
but  a  bad  memory,  and  Panama  will 
be  free. 


68 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  19 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


[siCLARATION, 

^  G.  24,  1989 

I  'he  Ministers  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  Ecu- 
i  r,  Guatemala,  and  Trinidad  and  Tobago, 
j-'ell  as  the  Secretary  General  of  the  Or- 
Tjization  of  American  States,  are  hereby 
linked  for  the  painstaking  and  efficient 
wk  they  accomplished  in  compliance  with 
;]:  mandate  entrusted  to  them  by  the  21st 
Kting  of  consultation. 

2.  Grave  concern  is  expressed  over  the 
:st  that  the  participants  in  the  political  dia- 
oue  in  Panama  have  not  yet  arrived  at  a 
iution  to  the  crisis  in  their  country,  which 
iljtion  is  the  exclusive  province  of  the  Pan- 
lanians,  and  they  are  strongly  urged  to 
rke  new  and  pressing  efforts  to  achieve,  in 
tordance  with  Resolution  I  of  May  17  and 
J  declaration  by  the  president  of  July  20,  a 
1  lonal  accord  prior  to  September  1,  for 
Aich  purpose  they  may  rely  on  the  mis- 
vi's  assistance,  should  all  the  parties  so 
■  uest. 

'■■'•.  It  is  reaffirmed  that,  in  the  solution 
.  lu-  Panamanian  crisis,  the  observance  of 
jmxratic  principles  must  be  ensured  in 
:  free  exercise  of  the  sovereignty  and  self- 
i  ermination  of  the  Panamanian  people. 

4.  The  Inter-American  Commission  on 
[-man  Rights  is  requested  to  conduct,  with 
:  consent  of  the  Government  of  Panama, 
iither  visit  to  Panama  at  the  earliest  pos- 
iiie  date  for  the  purpose  of  completing  and 
ilating  the  information  on  the  situation  of 
man  rights  in  that  country. 

5.  To  keep  this  meeting  of  consultation 
in. 


i(  TING  SECRETARY 
SAGLEBURGER'S  STATEMENT, 

(ifG.  31,  1989^ 

[  the  early  morning  hours  of  August 
i  as  the  Meeting  of  Consultation  of 
[rei,t;n  Ministers  was  concluding  its 
liberations  on  the  crisis  in  Panama, 
t?  Panamanian  representative  repeat- 
Ely  challenged  my  government  to,  and 
I|Uote,  "present  to  you  the  evidence 
aainst  Noriega."  He  did  so  knowing — 
a  a  skilled  criminal  lawyer  and  as  a 
rin  who  last  year  participated  in  nego- 
titions  with  my  government  on  this 
i;ue — that  the  United  States  is  a  na- 
lin  (if  laws  and  is  not  about  to  conduct 
iriminal  trial  outside  the  courtroom. 
I?  did  so  knowing  that  most  of  the  evi- 
(nce  against  Gen.  Noriega  is  subject 
t  grand  jury  secrecy  prohibitions  and 
tat  we  would  ourselves  be  committing 
■-•riminal  offense  were  we  to  reveal 
'at  evidence  in  advance  of  an  actual 
lial.  And,  I  would  warrant,  he  did  so 
'ping  that  these  constraints  and  the 

eiiess  of  the  hour  would  cause  us  to 

main  silent. 


U.S.  Severs  Diplomatic  Contact 
With  Noriega  Regime 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
SEPT.  1,  1989' 

On  May  7,  the  people  of  Panama,  by  an 
overwhelming  margin  of  votes,  braved 
repression,  intimidation,  and  fraud  to 
choose  democracy  over  dictatorship. 
They  sent  a  clear  and  unmistakable 
message:  They  wanted  an  end  to  dic- 
tatorship and  restoration  of  elected 
democratic  government. 

But  this  act  of  self-determination 
was  brutally  repressed  before  the  eyes 
of  the  entire  world.  Noriega  answered 
the  cry  of  his  people  with  beatings  and 
killings.  The  candidates  chosen  by  the 
Panamanian  people  will  not  be  allowed 
to  take  office  today,  as  required  by  the 
Panamanian  Constitution.  Panama  is, 
therefore,  as  of  this  date,  without  any 
legitimate  government. 

Accordingly  the  United  States  will 
not  recognize  any  government  installed 
by  Gen.  Noriega.  Our  Ambassador  will 
not  return,  and  we  will  not  have  any 
diplomatic  contact  with  the  Noriega  re- 
gime. The  United  States  will  continue 
to  take  other  steps,  including  the  tight- 
ening of  measures  to  deprive  the  illegal 
regime  of  funds  that  belong  to  the  Pan- 
amanian people,  in  support  of  self- 
determination  and  democracy  and  to 


counter  the  threat  posed  by  Gen.  Nor- 
iega's support  for  drug  trafficking  and 
other  forms  of  subversion.  I  am  confi- 
dent that  other  governments  which  sup- 
port human  rights,  democracy,  and 
self-determination  and  which  oppose 
drug  trafficking  will  take  similar 
measures. 

This  should  have  been  a  proud  day 
for  Panamanians  and  for  all  who  believe 
in  self-determination  and  democracy. 
Instead  it  is  a  sad  day — a  sad  day  for 
Panama  and  for  the  democratic  nations 
of  this  hemisphere. 

The  peoples  of  Panama  and  the 
United  States  have  enjoyed  a  close  and 
mutually  beneficial  relationship  since 
Panama's  founding  in  1903.  Our  people- 
to-people  bonds  have  become  even  clos- 
er since  the  conclusion  of  the  canal 
treaties  of  1977,  which  the  United 
States  will  continue  to  uphold.  We  will 
not  forget  this  bond  or  the  sacrifices 
Panamanians  have  already  made  to  rid 
themselves  of  the  outlaw  Noriega  re- 
gime. We  will  continue  to  stand  by  the 
people  of  Panama  until  their  fight  for 
self-determination  is  respected  and 
democratic  government  is  restored. 


'  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Pres- 
idential Documents  of  Sept.  4,  1989.  ■ 


Economic  IVIeasures  Against  Panama 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
SEPT.  12,  19891 

The  United  States  is  taking  several 
economic  measures  to  deny  revenues 
to  the  Noriega  regime. 

On  August  31,  the  United  States 
expanded  the  list  of  Panamanian  com- 
panies and  individuals  affiliated  with 
Noriega  and  his  puppet  regime  to 
which  Americans  cannot  make  pay- 
ments. The  list  is  undergoing  further 
revisions,  and  more  additions  will  be 
published  soon. 

Yesterday  the  Department  of  the 
Treasury  sent  letters  reiterating  to  all 
American  companies  in  Panama  the 
prohibitions  on  trade  with  the  regime 
which  apply  to  their  businesses  there. 
They  were  informed  that  the  prohibi- 
tions will  be  strictly  enforced. 


Panama's  1989  sugar  quota  of 
30,537  metric  tons  has  been  reallocated 
to  the  other  countries  that  participate 
in  the  U.S.  sugar  quota  program.  The 
loss  of  the  sugar  quota  denies  the  re- 
gime close  to  $15  million  in  revenue. 

In  a  related  action,  this  morning 
the  U.S.  Trade  Representative  an- 
nounced the  suspension  of  the  addition- 
al quota  of  23,403  tons  to  which  Panama 
would  have  been  entitled  due  to  the 
quota  increase. 

All  of  these  actions  are  a  direct  re- 
sult of  Gen.  Noriega's  continued  un- 
willingness to  respect  the  will  of  the 
Panamanian  people  by  stepping  down 
and  permitting  the  installation  of  a 
freely  elected  government. 


1  Read  to  news  correspondents  by 
Department  spokesman  Margaret  DeB. 
Tutwiler.  ■ 


Apartment  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


69 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


We  respected  the  lateness  of  the 
hour  on  August  24  but  will  not  remain 
silent.  We  will  not  permit  Gen.  Nor- 
iega's representatives  to  abuse  the  lim- 
itations our  Constitution  establishes  to 
protect  the  rights  of  the  accused.  We 
cannot  accept  his  characterization  of 
our  unwillingness  illegally  to  reveal 
evidence  in  advance  of  trial  as  "proof 
that  the  serious  criminal  charges 
against  Gen.  Noriega  are  frivolous  or 
manufactured. 

But  neither  will  we  fall  into  the 
trap  that  perhaps  the  representative  of 
Panama  was  seeking  to  lay  for  us.  We 
will  not  compromise  our  ability  to  pros- 
ecute Gen.  Noriega  by  violating  the 
rights  that  he — like  every  other  crimi- 
nal defendant — is  guaranteed  under 
our  legal  system.  Nor  need  we  do  so  to 
produce  the  "proof  that  the  Panama- 
nian representative  so  diligently 
sought. 

In  addition,  we  will  respond  to  al- 
legations by  Gen.  Noriega's  representa- 
tive that  the  United  States  is  reneging 
on  our  solemn  commitment  to  faithful 
implementation  of  the  Panama  Canal 
Treaties  and  that  we  are  intervening  in 
the  internal  affairs  of  Panama. 

Today  I  will  lay  out  the  facts  on 
those  issues  as  well  and  allow  you  to 
judge:  Who  threatens  the  canal  trea- 
ties? The  United  States  or  Gen.  Nor- 
iega? Who  is  engaged  in  intervention  in 
the  internal  affairs  of  other  countries, 
and  who  is  depriving  the  Panamanian 
people  of  their  right  of  self-determina- 
tion? The  United  States  or  Panama? 
Who  is  responsible  for  destabilizing  the 
Panamanian  military  and  Panamanian 
society?  The  United  States  or  Gen. 
Noriega?  Let  us  review  the  record. 

The  Indictment  Process 

On  February  4,  1988,  Gen.  Noriega  and 
15  other  defendant.s — including  Pablo 
Escobar,  the  Ochoa  brothers,  and  other 
members  of  the  infamous  Medellin  drug 
cartel — were  indicted  by  a  Federal 
grand  jury  in  Miami,  Florida,  on  multi- 
ple counts  of  narcotics  trafficking  and 
related  offenses.  Gen.  Noriega  and 
Panamanian  businessman  Enrique 
Pretelt  were  simultaneously  indicted 
by  a  Federal  grand  jury  in  Tampa, 
Florida,  on  conspiracy  to  import  an 
enormous  quantity  of  marijuana  and  on 
related  charges. 

Let  me  begin  by  outlining  the 
meaning  and  seriousness  of  an  indict- 
ment under  U.S.  law. 


The  criminal  process  is  initiated 
when  a  Federal  investigative  agency, 
for  example  the  Drug  Enforcement  Ad- 
ministration (DEA),  believes  it  has  evi- 
dence of  violations  of  U.S.  law.  This 
evidence  may  be  based  upon  an  investi- 
gation involving  witnesses,  physical  ev- 
idence, bank  records,  etc.  The  agents 
present  this  information  to  the  office  of 
the  U.S.  Attorney  in  their  region.  A 
prosecutor  reviews  this  information  to 
determine  whether  there  is  sufficient 
evidence  that  a  crime — or  crimes — has 
been  committed  to  bring  the  case  be- 
fore a  "grand  jury". 

A  grand  jury  is  composed  of  from 
16  to  23  ordinary  U.S.  citizens  selected 
at  random.  The  grand  jury  operates 
under  the  supervision  of  a  Federal 
judge.  The  grand  jury  has  the  duty  to 
review  the  evidence  submitted  by  the 
U.S.  prosecutors.  It  has  the  authority 
to  issue  a  "subpoena"  directing  a  per- 
son to  give  testimony  or  to  produce  evi- 
dence in  his  possession.  And  it  can  also 
issue  subpoenas  to  obtain  bank  records 
and  other  corporate  documents. 

If  a  grand  jury  finds  that  the  evi- 
dence establishes  "probable  cause"  to 
believe  that  the  defendant  or  defend- 
ants committed  crimes,  those  crimes 
and  a  summary  of  the  facts  based  on 
the  evidence  must  be  specified  in  an  in- 
dictment. "Probable  cause"  has  been 
defined  by  U.S.  courts  as  "evidence 
sufficient  to  cause  a  person  of  ordinary 
prudence  and  caution  consciously  to  en- 
tertain a  reasonable  belief  of  the  ac- 
cused's guilt." 

Grand  jury  proceedings  are  not 
public.  It  is  a  crime  for  a  prosecutor  or 
a  member  of  the  grand  jury  to  discuss 
grand  jury  proceedings  in  public.  In 
general,  evidence  obtained  by  a  grand 
jury  may  only  be  used  at  a  later  crimi- 
nal trial. 

Under  our  system,  the  actual  trial 
can  only  occur  when  the  defendant  is 
physically  present  before  the  court.  At 
that  time,  the  prosecutors  must  pro- 
duce the  evidence  upon  which  they  are 
relying,  including  all  witnesses.  A 
judge  and  a  different  jury  hear  the  evi- 
dence of  both  the  prosecutors  and  the 
defense  and  reaches  a  judgment  of 
guilty  or  not  guilty. 

For  those  who  come  from  the  many 
nations  of  this  hemisphere  which  follow 
the  civil  law  system,  I  would  draw  an 
analogy.  When  the  prosecutor  goes  to 
the  grand  jury,  this  is  roughly  equiva- 
lent to  an  "accusation"  in  the  civil  law. 
When  the  grand  jury,  after  investiga- 
tion, returns  an  indictment,  this  is 


equivalent  to  the  conclusion  of  the  in 
vestigative  or  sumario  phase  of  a  civ 
law  trial.  Only  when  the  defendant  h.- 
been  physically  presented  to  the  ecu 
can  the  equivalent  of  the  plenario 
phase — the  actual  trial — begin.  Indii 
ments  are  serious  documents,  reflect 
ing  a  thorough  investigation  and 
considered  judgment  by  impartial 
citizens. 

Let  me  now  turn  to  the  content  > 
the  two  indictments  brought  by  gran 
juries  in  Florida  against  Noriega. 

Indictments  Against  Gen.  Noriega 

In  the  U.S.  District  Court  for  the  Mi 
die  District  of  Florida  in  Tampa,  Gei 
Noriega  and  Enrique  Pretelt  are 
charged  with  conspiracy  to  import  a 
distribute  marijuana.  The  indictmen 
describe  the  attempted  importation 
into  the  United  States  of  over  1  milli 
pounds  of  marijuana  during  1983-84. 

The  indictment  charges  that  mil 
lions  of  dollars  in  U.S.  currency  re- 
presenting the  proceeds  from  the 
successful  importation  of  280,000 
pounds  of  marijuana  into  the  United; 
States  by  Steven  Michael  Kalish  and< 
others  were  transported  to  Panama 
and  laundered  through  Panamanian 
banks  and  businesses,  with  the  appr 
al  and  assistance  of  the  defendants. 
They  charge  that  Noriega  and  otheri 
agreed  to  facilitate  the  importation 
400,000  pounds  of  marijuana  into  the 
United  States  and  the  laundering  of 
more  than  $100  million  in  illicit  pro- 
ceeds through  Panama.  And  they  coi 
elude  that  during  the  course  of  the  c« 
spiracy,  Kalish  made  payments  to 
Noriega  and  others  of  approximately 
million  for  Noriega's  authorization  a: 
approval  of  marijuana  smuggling  anc 
money-laundering  activities  within 
Panama. 

In  the  Federal  District  Court  foi 
the  Southern  District  of  Florida  in  M 
ami.  Gen.  Noriega  is  charged  with  e; 
ploiting  his  official  position  as  head  < 
the  intelligence  section  of  the  Nation 
Guard  of  Panama  and  then  as  com 
mander  in  chief  of  the  renamed  Pana 
Defense  Forces  (PDF)  to  receive  pay 
offs  in  return  for  assisting  and  prote 
ing  international  drug  traffickers.  T' 
individuals  he  is  charged  with  assist 
in  the  conduct  of  narcotics  and  mone.^ 
laundering  operations  in  Panama  in- 
clude Pablo  Escobar  Gaviria,  Gustav 
DeJesus  Gaviria  Rivero,  Jorge  Ochoa 
Vasquez,  and  Fabio  Ochoa  Vasquez. 

Gen.  Noriega  protected  cocaine 
shipments  flown  from  Medellin,  Co- 


70 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1(u 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


o+)ia,  through  Panama  to  the  United 
:  IS.  Further  he  arranged  for  the 
r  isshipment  and  sale  of  ether  and 
ic'.cone,  including  such  chemicals  pre- 
,'iisly  seized  by  the  PDF,  to  the 
kl.'ellin  cartel.  He  provided  refuge 
irj  a  base  for  continued  operations  to 
himembers  of  the  Medellin  cartel  af- 
ethe  murder  of  the  Colombian  Minis- 
e  of  Justice,  Rodrigo  Lara  Bonilla,  in 
94.  He  agreed  to  protect  a  cocaine 
abratory  being  constructed  in  Darien 
'ivince,  Panama.  And  he  assured  the 
,af  passage  of  millions  of  dollars  of 
lacotics  proceeds  into  Panamanian 
)aks.  In  return  for  these  services, 
"Ifiega  received  in  excess  of  $4.6 
nlion. 

Also  detailed  in  the  indictment  is  a 
le  15,  1984,  flight  into  Miami,  Flori- 
1;  \\  ith  over  a  ton  of  cocaine  resulting 
rm  this  conspiracy. 

We  have  asked  the  Secretariat  to 
i  ulate  to  each  of  you  authentic  copies 
lihese  indictments. 

L|ise  and  Betrayal 

^^ '  story  these  indictments  tell  is  sim- 
ilaml  chilling.  It  is  the  story  of  that 
?ie  shameless  excess  in  the  criminal 
ill  that  we  have  already  seen  in  the 
Ktical  field.  When  Noriega  became 
';P  commander  in  August  1983,  what 
rjht  have  been  called  "minor"  corrup- 
i ,  became  major  indeed.  What  in 
il  was  a  payment  of  $100,000  for  spe- 
ii  transshipments  of  drugs  through 
'iiama  became,  by  1984,  a  payment  to 
^iega  of  some  $4  million  for  protec- 
i'l  of  the  cartel  itself.  What  had  been 
iii'ate  opportunism  became  brazen 
.1  se  of  public  authority  and  betrayal, 
Ml  (if  close  associates.  What  had  been 
i^  for  a  few  became  dangerous  for 
"lyone — in  the  PDF,  in  Panama,  in 
I  entire  hemisphere. 

Assertions  by  Noriega  and  his  cro- 
I  s  that  the  U.S.  charges  are  not  sub- 
tntiated  by  any  evidence  are  bunk. 
^  shown  above,  the  indictments  them- 
nes  allege  repeated  and  specific  acts 
i:'i-iminality  involving  Noriega  per- 
i'lally.  Public  testimony  before  con- 
I'ssional  committees  by  former 
^lamanian  Consul  General  Blandon 
il  by  individuals  who  participated  in 
lie  trafficking  or  money  laundering 
'  h  .X'oriega — such  as  Amjad  Awan  (a 
'  niir  official  of  the  Bank  of  Credit 
.  I  Commerce,  International),  Nor- 
i  as  former  personal  pilot  Floyd  Carl- 

1,  drug  trafficker  Steven  Kalish,  and 
■  other  Noriega  associates — also  de- 

1  Noriega's  criminal  culpability.  A 


copy  of  this  testimony  is  available  for 
your  inspection  at  the  Secretariat. 

Gen.  Noriega's  representative  here 
challenged  the  credibility  of  the  wit- 
nesses against  him  by  noting  that  some 
of  them  are  themselves  convicted  crim- 
inals. This  should  come  as  no  surprise 
to  those  of  you  who  have  struggled 
against  drug  trafficking.  Drug  traf- 
fickers do  not  generally  carry  out  their 
conspiracies  in  the  presence  of  honest 
citizens.  Witnesses  testify  under  penal- 
ty of  perjury.  They  can  be  tried  and 
jailed  for  making  false  statements  to 
the  grand  jury,  the  court,  or  the 
Congress. 

Our  prosecutors  and  grand  juries 
are  well  aware  of  the  background  of 
such  witnesses.  They,  therefore,  care- 
fully test  the  statements  of  such  wit- 
nesses against  account  records, 
physical  evidence,  and  the  testimony  of 
other  witnesses  not  charged  with 
crimes  to  see  if  their  statements  are 
corroborated  or  contradicted.  In  this 
case,  after  investigation,  the  grand 
jury  obviously  determined  that  suffi- 
cient credible  evidence  existed  to  indict 
Gen.  Noriega. 

Challenge  to  the  Indictments 

Gen.  Noriega  has  retained  attorneys  in 
the  United  States  to  defend  him.  They 
have  challenged  the  indictments  before 
U.S.  Federal  court.  They  alleged  that 
he  was  immune  because  he  was  "head 
of  state."  They  alleged  that  the  case 
against  him  was  politically  motivated. 
They  alleged  that  his  drug  trafficking 
was  protected  by  the  doctrine  of  sover- 
eign immunity,  since  he  used  the  insti- 
tutions of  the  Panamanian  state  in 
performing  these  activities.  They  filed 
documents  and  made  arguments  in  sup- 
port of  these  contentions.  None  of  their 
arguments  stood.  The  court  ruled 
against  them.  The  indictments  stand. 
So  let  us  put  aside  once  and  for  all 
this  contention  that  Gen.  Noriega  is  a 
poor,  humble,  honest  man  who  has  been 
unjustly  accused.  He  is  a  man  who — as 
the  result  of  an  extensive  criminal  jus- 
tice process — stands  accused  before 
U.S.  courts  of  the  most  serious  viola- 
tions of  U.S.  law  for  his  individual  be- 
havior. He  deserves  a  fair  trial  on  the 
merits,  as  any  other  defendant.  And  he 
will  receive  one.  But  make  no  mistake; 
he  does  deserve  to  be  tried. 


Evidence  of  Other  Abuse  of  Power 

The  evidence  of  Gen.  Noriega's  abuse  of 
power  and  venality  is  not  limited  to  his 
drug  trafficking. 

The  private,  ill-gotten  gains  of 
Gen.  Noriega  belie  his  representative's 
appealing  but  unpersuasive  public  rela- 
tions image  of  a  poor  youth  of  humble 
origins  who,  by  virtue  of  individual  ef- 
fort, merit,  and  talent,  rose  through 
the  ranks  to  become  head  of  a  small  but 
respectable  military  force.  By  conserv- 
ative estimates,  we  judge  Noriega's 
personal  wealth — much  of  it  hidden  in 
secret  bank  accounts  abroad — to  be  at 
least  $200-300  million.  This  personal 
fortune  includes: 

•  A  luxurious  $600,000  mansion  in 
Panama  City  hung  with  nearly  50  valu- 
able oil  paintings  and  a  chalet  near  a 
Panamanian  air  strip  in  Rio  Hato; 

•  A  vacation  home  on  Madden 
Lake,  Panama,  a  mountain  retreat  with 
a  mansion  and  several  houses  on  60 
acres  in  Chiriqui  Province; 

•  A  farm  in  France,  approximately 
50  minutes  from  Paris,  and  a  luxury 
apartment  in  an  elite  section  of  Paris; 

•  Several  luxury  apartments  in  the 
Dominican  Republic,  where  Noriega's 
wife  purchased  furniture,  art  objects, 
and  antiques  valued  in  the  millions  of 
dollars; 

•  Various  jet  aircraft,  including 
three  Lear  jets  and  a  twin-engine  air- 
craft. In  1984  he  purchased  a  sophisti- 
cated helicopter  for  his  personal  use  for 
$2  million.  In  late  1983,  Steven  Kalish 
negotiated  and  purchased  a  Boeing  727 
jet  aircraft  for  $2.2  million  for  Nor- 
iega; the  jet  was  later  used  for  money 
laundering; 

•  Three  large  pleasure  yachts — the 
Macho  I,  Macho  II,  and  Macho  III; 

•  In  December  1987,  Noriega  deco- 
rated himself  with  a  decoration  called 
the  Eagle  Medal.  The  cost  of  the  medal, 
made  of  gold  and  precious  stones,  was 
over  $85,000.  And,  as  one  of  the  wit- 
nesses testified,  "it  was  given  to  Nor- 
iega for  no  victory  or  no  battle  at  all;" 

•  To  give  just  one  example  of  other 
Noriega  family  excesses,  Jose  Blandon 
has  testified  that  when  he  was  Panama- 
nian consul  in  New  York,  "one  of  the 
daughters  of  Noriega  was  in  New  York 
and  in  one  day,  she  spent  over  $50,000 
in  purchases  in  New  York  stores;"  and 

•  The  Senate  hearing  record  in- 
cludes copies  of  tens  of  thousands  of 
dollars  of  charges  at  the  Helmsley  Pal- 
ace Hotel  in  New  York  run  up  by  Gen. 
Noriega  and  his  family. 


Apartment  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


71 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


We  have  previously  had  the  testi- 
mony before  our  Congress  of  a  then- 
official  of  the  Bank  of  Credit  and  Com- 
merce, International  that  in  1982,  Nor- 
iega opened  an  account  at  the  Panama 
City  branch  of  the  Bank  of  Credit  and 
Commerce,  International  which  he 
claimed  was  a  "secret  service"  account 
which  remained  open  until  early  1988. 
Only  he  had  signature  authority  for 
the  account.  In  addition,  his  wife  and 
three  daughters  had  credit  cards,  the 
charges  for  which  were  paid  from  this 
account.  While  the  amount  of  money  in 
this  transactional  account  fluctuated, 
as  much  as  $20-25  million  were  in  the 
account  at  various  times. 

Due  to  legal  constraints,  we  are 
still  not  at  liberty  to  divulge  all  of  the 
information  available  to  us  concerning 
Gen.  Noriega's  huge  secret  accounts. 
However,  I  have  asked  the  Secretariat 
to  distribute  copies  of  genuine  docu- 
ments signed  by  Gen.  Noriega  with  the 
Bank  of  Credit  and  Commerce,  Inter- 
national. These  genuine  bank  docu- 
ments speak  for  themselves.  They 
reveal  personal  control  over  millions  of 
dollars.  Like  the  tip  of  an  iceberg,  they 
allow  us  to  visualize  the  depths  of  Nor- 
iega's deceit  and  criminality. 

Gen.  Noriega's  illicit  activities  and 
the  wealth  he  has  gained  from  them  are 
the  real  explanation  of  why  he  insists 
on  retaining  control  of  the  institutions 
of  the  Panamanian  state  in  defiance  of 
the  will  of  his  own  people.  He  is  no  pa- 
triot determined  to  defend  his  country 
from  external  threats.  Nor  is  he  even  a 
professional  soldier  seeking  to  preserve 
his  military  institution. 

Beginning  of  the  Crisis  in  Panama 

Let  us  remember  how  the  crisis  in  Pan- 
ama began.  It  did  not  have  anything  to 
do  with  the  United  States,  the  canal,  or 
any  outside  threat  to  Panama  or  its 
military.  Rather  the  crisis  is  the  result 
of  the  reaction  in  June  1987  of  a  broad 
spectrum  of  the  Panamanian  people  to 
specific  accusations  of  assassination, 
election  fraud,  and  corruption  leveled 
against  Gen.  Manuel  Antonio  Noriega 
by  the  then  second  in  command  of  the 
PDF,  Col.  Roberto  Diaz  Herrera. 

Why  did  Col.  Diaz  Herrera  go  pub- 
lic? Perhaps  the  answer  lies  in  what 
Gen.  Noriega  was  doing  to  his  own 
institution. 

When  Gen.  Omar  Torrijos  Herrera 
died  tragically  in  1981,  the  senior  offi- 
cers of  the  Panama  National  Guard 
drew  up  an  agreement  to  provide  for 
institutional  stability  and  transfer  of 


72 


command.  We  have  asked  the  Secre- 
tariat to  circulate  copies  of  this  signed 
agreement,  which  was  disclosed  by  one 
of  its  signers. 

Certain  of  its  key  provisions  in- 
volved Gen.  Noriega,  who  solemnly 
signed  this  compact.  It  was  provided 
that  he  would  assume  command  from 
Gen.  Paredes  in  March  of  1984  and 
would  place  the  support  of  the  military 
behind  Gen.  Paredes'  candidacy  for  the 
presidency.  And  it  provided  that  Nor- 
iega would  retire  July  31,  1987. 

We  know  what  happened.  Once 
Paredes  was  out,  Noriega  worked 
against  his  candidacy.  And  when  Nor- 
iega's time  came  to  retire,  he  fired  his 
agreed  upon  successor  instead.  This 
destabilization  of  the  institution  was 
the  proximate  cause  of  Diaz  Herrera's 
revelations  and  the  subsequent  revul- 
sion of  the  Panamanian  people — a 
revulsion  that  led  to  strikes  and 
demonstrations  beginning  in  the  sum- 
mer of  1987,  well  before  the  U.S.  in- 
dictments, the  U.S.  sanctions,  or  the 
U.S.  military  maneuvers  were  even 
conceived. 

And  his  abuse  of  his  institution 
continues.  Who  has  bypassed  the  Gen- 
eral Staff  and  the  regular  chain  of  com- 
mand by  setting  up  his  own  shadow 
organization  within  the  military?  Who 
has  promoted  his  cronies  and  jailed  his 
opponents  in  violation  of  military  law 
and  the  escalafonl  Who  has  led  his 
forces  into  confrontation  with  their 
own  people?  Who  has  placed  them  in 
conflict  with  his  closest  traditional 
ally — the  United  States — and  the  rest 
of  the  democratic  world?  Who  has  cre- 
ated "dignity  battalions"  of  thugs  to  do 
the  dirty  work  of  repression,  the  work 
we  all  witnessed  when  the  victors  of 
the  May  7  election  were  shot  at  and  vi- 
ciously beaten  before  our  very  eyes? 
Who  created  armed  groups  outside  the 
control  of  the  lawful  security  forces? 

The  men  of  the  defense  forces  know 
who  has  abused  their  professional  loy- 
alty and  brought  shame  and  disgrace 
on  their  institution.  Not  a  movement, 
not  an  ideology,  not  an  external  or  in- 
ternal enemy.  One  corrupt  man.  One 
man  who  knows  no  limitations. 

Noriega's  Claims 

Let  us  take  an  example  of  the  lies  and 
distortions  he  feeds  to  his  own  troops 
as  well  as  the  public.  He  claims — as  his 
representative  did  August  24 — that  his 
problems  began  when  he  refused  a  sup- 
posed request  by  former  national  secu- 
rity adviser  Adm.  John  Poindexter  to 
assist  the  Nicaraguan  Resistance. 


This  charge  falls  by  reason  of  its 
own  logic.  Many  friendly  countries 
adopted  policies  different  from  those 
of  the  United  States  on  the  issue  of 
Nicaragua.  Yet  we  continue  to  have 
normal  relations  with  them. 

It  also  fails  on  the  facts.  The  met 
ing  with  Adm.  Poindexter  that  Gen. 
Noriega  describes  was  attended  by  s 
number  of  people,  including  professic 
al  U.S.  diplomats.  The  subject  was  n 
Nicaragua — which  was  touched  on  oi 
in  passing.  The  subject  was  Panama. 
Adm.  Poindexter  strongly  urged  Gei 
Noriega  to  open  up  some  political  sp 
and  to  allow  a  transition  to  democrac 
Clearly  he  did  not  take  that  advice.  ] 
what  is  most  ironic  is  his  own  attitua 
on  Nicaragua. 

In  late  August  1986,  according  b 
computer  note  from  [National  Secur- 
Council  staff  member  Lt.  Col.]  Olive 
North  to  the  national  security  advist' 
made  available  to  the  U.S.  Congress 
personal  representative  of  Manuel  N< 
iega  proposed  that,  in  exchange  for  i 
promise  from  the  U.S.  Government' 
"help  clean  up  his  [Noriega's]  image'' 
and  a  commitment  to  lift  a  U.S.  ban 
on  military  sales  to  the  PDF,  Norieg 
would  "take  care  of  the  Sandinista 
leadership. 

Needless  to  say,  the  United  Stati 
rejected  this  "offer"  of  assassination 
How  can  a  man  who  would  make  sue) 
an  offer — a  man  who  in  December  19' 
contributed  directly  to  an  attemptec 
military  rebellion  in  Argentina,  a  m 
who  has  supported  the  guerrillas  an. 
the  drug  traffickers  in  Colombia — ha 
the  unmitigated  gall  to  claim  that  hi; 
problems  are  the  result  of  his  strong) 
stance  against  intervention. 

The  Panamanian  representative 
serted  that  Noriega's  May  1984  raid  ( 
a  cocaine  processing  plant  in  Darieni 
Province  showed  his  commitment  to 
combating  narcotics  trafficking.  As 
several  witnesses  testified  before  a 
U.S.  congressional  subcommittee,  tl 
reality  was  very  different. 

The  raid  on  the  Darien  operatior 
took  place  shortly  after  Noriega 
accepted  over  $4  million  from  the 
Medellin  cartel  to  give  safehaven  to 
cartel  leaders  and  70-90  bodyguards 
after  the  cartel  had  assassinated 
Colombian  Minister  of  Justice  Lara 
Bonilla.  Prior  to  that  time,  Noriega 
had  moved  in  on  one  of  his  competito 
in  the  protection  of  traffickers  and  h- 
accepted  millions  of  dollars  from  the 
cartel  to  permit  the  plant  to  be  set  u 
After  Lara  Bonilla's  death,  Panama- 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


n  and  Colombian  public  pressure  on 
i  riega — and  perhaps  U.S.  pressure — 
cased  Noriega  to  act.  On  his  orders, 
t;  PDF  did  shut  down  the  operation. 
The  Medellin  cartel,  however,  felt 
d..(ble-crossed.  It  took  Fidel  Castro's 
ijervention  to  mediate  the  dispute.  In 
t}  end,  the  power  plant  of  40  mega- 
v'tts,  the  machinery,  the  cocaine  be- 
iK  processed,  the  chemicals  being  used 
ft  the  processing,  and  the  seized  air- 
cift  were  all  returned  to  the  Medellin 
c-tel. 

liues  of  Agreement 

1 1  us  turn  to  some  issues  raised  by 
tp  representative  of  Panama  on  Au- 
gst  24  with  which  we  can  agree. 
Iiere  are  issues  on  which  there  is 
fndamental  agreement  between  my 
gvernment  and  the  overwhelming 
Hjni-ity  of  Panama's  people,  Panama's 
'Atinment,  and  the  PDF.  In  fact,  they 
i-.'ulve  principles  supported  by  all 
ismbers  of  this  body. 

Panama  Canal  Treaties.  The  first 
i  ue  is  the  importance  of  faithful  im- 
j "mentation  of  canal  treaties. 

U.S.  compliance  is  willing  and 
^ead  of  schedule.  When  the  treaty  en- 
t;-ed  into  force  on  October  1,  1979,  the 
hited  States  disestablished  the  Canal 
;  ne  and  the  Canal  Zone  government. 
' "  transferred  jurisdiction  and  gov- 
(nment  functions — including  ports, 
lilroads,  fire  protection  services,  and 
lads — to  the  Republic  of  Panama.  All 
iilitary  installations  specified  in  the 
leaty — including  the  military  installa- 
1)ns  of  Ft.  Gulick,  Ft.  Randolph,  por- 
bns  of  the  land  area  of  Ft.  Clayton, 
- .  Kobbe  Beach,  the  installations  at 
i)co  Solo  and  Corozal,  the  Pacific  Area 
.^])(it,  parts  of  Ft.  Amador,  the  lower 
;  ea  of  Quarry  Heights,  and  others — 
ere  handed  over  to  Panama  when 
;iecified  or  sooner. 

Since  the  treaties  entered  into 
rc(_',  some  2,786  housing  units  have 
■en  transferred  to  Panama.  This  rep- 
fsents  64%  of  the  the  pretreaty  inven- 
iry  of  housing.  U.S.  compliance  is 
ears  ahead  of  the  transfer  schedule 
itablished  by  the  treaties. 

The  United  States  has  vigorously 
romoted  growing  Panamanian  partici- 
ation  at  all  levels  of  the  canal  work- 
irce.  In  1979  the  canal  pilot  force 
icluded  just  two  Panamanians.  Today 
lere  are  56  Panamanian  pilots  among 
total  of  227.  Panamanians  now  make 
p  25%  of  the  pilot  force  and  should 
lake  up  95%  by  1999.  As  of  the  end  of 


last  month,  the  Panama  Canal  work- 
force included  1,009  U.S.  citizens,  less 
than  half  the  number  employed  in  1979. 
At  the  same  time,  the  number  of  Pan- 
amanian citizens  employed  by  the  Pan- 
ama Canal  Company  has  risen  to  a  total 
of  5,521,  an  increase  of  24%  since  1979. 
The  canal  workforce  today  is  86%  Pan- 
amanian and  growing.  Panamanians 
have  risen  to  the  senior  levels  of  the 
canal  administration,  and  more  will 
follow. 

The  Panamanian  representative  ac- 
curately described  on  August  24  the 
close  and  respectful  relations  that  have 
characterized  the  joint  efforts  of  the 
U.S.  and  Panamanian  military  forces 
to  defend  the  canal  under  the  canal 
treaties. 

But  what  he  did  not  describe  was 
how,  since  February  1988,  Noriega's 
harassment  of  the  overwhelmingly 
Panamanian  workforce  has  directly 
threatened  canal  operations,  showing 
disregard  not  just  for  the  treaties  but 
for  the  canal  itself.  The  United  States 
was  forced,  as  a  result,  to  begin  to  ex- 
ercise its  defensive  treaty  rights — not 
in  the  preferred  mode  of  joint  coopera- 
tion with  the  PDF  but,  nevertheless,  in 
full  compliance  with  the  clear  terms  of 
the  treaties.  Recently  this  harassment 
of  canal  workers  and  of  our  military 
personnel  has  diminished  notably. 

The  representative  of  Panama  told 
the  foreign  ministers  last  week  that 
"the  United  States  seeks  to  ruin  Pan- 
ama, to  destabilize  it,  to  make  it  fall  on 
its  knees  in  order  to  force  Panama  to 
conclude  a  new  military  treaty  that 
will  prolong  the  presence  of  U.S. 
troops." 

This,  too,  is  bunk.  The  treaty  docu- 
ments provide  that  U.S.  troops  could 
be  stationed  in  Panama  after  the  year 
2000  only  if  both  governments  agree. 
But  that  is  still  more  than  10  years 
away.  The  Government  of  the  United 
States  has  never  raised  this  issue,  be- 
cause we  believe  this  is  a  decision  that 
can  be  made  only  at  a  time  much  closer 
to  the  year  2000  and  because  any  last- 
ing arrangements  could  only  be  made 
with  a  Panamanian  Government  that 
enjoyed  the  support  of  its  people.  It  is 
both  ironic  and  revealing  that  the  only 
Panamanians  who  have  ever  offered  to 
extend  U.S.  base  rights  beyond  the 
year  2000  have  been  individuals  speak- 
ing for  Gen.  Noriega.  In  late  1988,  they 
offered  base  rights  in  return  for  nor- 
malization of  our  relations  with  his  re- 
gime. We  flatly  rejected  this  proposal. 


I  am  submitting  to  the  council  a 
number  of  documents  on  treaty  imple- 
mentation, so  I  will  take  up  only  one 
other  set  of  lies. 

The  representative  of  Panama  also 
told  the  foreign  ministers  last  week 
that  the  United  States  is  using  canal 
annuities  for  propaganda  against  Nor- 
iega and  that  the  United  States  is  with- 
holding from  Panama  the  deductions 
for  social  security  and  medical  care 
from  the  wages  of  Panamanian  canal 
workers. 

This  claim  is  intentional  deception. 
U.S.  obligations  to  Panama,  including 
payments  called  for  under  the  canal 
treaties,  are,  in  accordance  with  the 
request  of  the  Delvalle  government,  be- 
ing paid  into  inviolable  escrow  accounts 
of  the  Government  of  Panama  for  the 
benefit  of  the  Republic  of  Panama  and 
the  Panamanian  people.  The  funds 
are  there,  in  full,  for  unrestricted 
use  by  any  legitimate  Panamanian 
Government. 

As  for  the  social  security  deduc- 
tions from  wages  of  Panamanian  citi- 
zens, the  United  States,  at  the  request 
of  President  Delvalle,  is,  in  fact,  trans- 
ferring them  to  the  Noriega  regime  for 
humanitarian  reasons.  I  regret  to  say, 
however,  that  the  regime  is  stealing 
those  funds  rather  than  using  them  for 
medical  and  retirement  costs. 

To  close  this  review  of  treaty  im- 
plementation, let  me  note  that  since 
1979,  the  United  States  has  invested 
several  hundred  million  dollars  in  capi- 
tal improvements  for  the  canal,  and  we 
invest  between  $5  and  $6  million  annu- 
ally in  training  Panamanians  in  the 
various  skills  necessary  to  operate  the 
canal.  It  is  true  that  were  the  canal 
to  close  today  or  tomorrow,  the  U.S. 
economy  would  suffer,  but  alternate 
container-based  overland  transporta- 
tion systems  are  already  growing  rap- 
idly; without  overwhelming  costs,  all 
goods  now  transiting  the  canal  could  be 
moved  from  either  coast  of  the  United 
States. 

In  contrast  damage  to  the  econ- 
omies of  countries  without  the  same 
alternatives — particularly  Nicaragua, 
Ecuador,  and  Peru — would  be  major,  as 
would  the  damage  to  Panama  itself. 

More  fundamental  for  the  United 
States  is  a  point  related  to  security. 
The  United  States  engaged  in  the  nego- 
tiations leading  to  the  treaties  because 
we  concluded  that  the  canal's  future, 
including  international  use,  could  best 
be  assured  by  transferring  the  canal  to 
a  stable  and  popular  government  in  a 


tepartment  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


73 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


friendly  Panama.  The  United  States,  in 
other  words,  agreed  with  Gen.  Torrijos 
that  the  keys  to  the  security  of  the  can- 
al are  good  intelligence  and  a  friendly 
people. 

The  U.S.  Government  remains  con- 
vinced that  compliance  with  the  Pan- 
ama Canal  Treaties  is  in  the  national 
interest  of  the  United  States.  The 
problem  today  is  not  the  treaties;  it  is 
the  absence  of  a  stable,  popular  govern- 
ment in  Panama. 

Peace  and  Democracy  in  Panama. 

Let  me  turn  now  to  another  issue:  our 
support  for  a  peaceful  and  democratic 
solution  to  Panama's  problems. 

In  February  1988,  the  President  of 
Panama  e.xercised  his  constitutional 
prerogative  to  dismiss  Gen.  Noriega 
from  his  post  as  commander  of  the 
PDF.  As  you  know.  President  Delvalle 
was  then  purportedly  impeached  by  a 
rump  session  of  the  Noriega-dominated 
National  Assembly.  After  the  assem- 
bly's February  26  action,  the  United 
States  immediately  stated  that  it  sup- 
ported civilian  constitutional  rule  in 
Panama.  We  have  continued  since  then 
to  recognize  President  Delvalle  as  Pan- 
ama's lawful  president.  Because  his 
removal  was  illegal  under  Panama's 
Constitution,  President  Delvalle  will 
continue  to  exercise  the  powers  of  the 
President  of  Panama  until  his  term 
expires  at  midnight  tonight. 

This  political  crisis  could  and 
rightfully  should  have  been  resolved  by 
the  May  7  election.  But  Noriega  had 
that  election  annulled  because  he  lost 
it.  On  May  17  the  OAS  condemned  "the 
grave  events  and  the  abuses  by  General 
Manuel  Antonio  Noriega  in  the  crisis 
and  the  electoral  process  in  Panama." 

Our  distinguished  Secretary  Gen- 
eral and  the  distinguished  Foreign 
Ministers  of  Guatemala,  Trinidad  and 
Tobago,  and  Ecuador  worked  with  the 
Panamanian  parties  trying  to  achieve  a 
transfer  of  power.  The  United  States 
supported  the  work  of  the  commission 
at  every  step.  The  commission  brought 
the  parties  together  for  face-to-face  ne- 
gotiations. Together  they  spelled  out  a 
serious  agenda.  During  the  last  round, 
the  parties  laid  out  elements  that  would 
permit  a  resolution  to  the  crisis: 

•  The  departure  of  Gen.  Noriega 
from  power; 

•  Formation  of  a  transition  govern- 
ment on  September  1; 

•  New,  free  elections  within  the 
shortest  possible  time;  and 

•  The  lifting  by  the  United  States 
of  measures  taken  in  response  to  the 
crisis  in  Panama. 


74 


The  United  States  has  always  been 
prepared  to  do  its  part.  We  want  to  see 
the  crisis  end.  The  measures  we  have 
taken  have  been  coordinated  with 
President  Delvalle  to  demonstrate 
solidarity  with  the  efforts  of  the 
Panamanian  people  to  oppose  what 
was,  in  effect,  a  military  coup.  The 
measures  have  included  a  declaration 
under  the  International  Emergency 
Economic  Powers  Act  freezing  Pan- 
amanian Government  assets  in  the 
United  States  and  banning  payments 
to  the  Noriega/Solis  regime  of  funds  by 
U.S.  citizens  and  companies.  These  are 
not  "sanctions"  in  the  sense  of  a  gener- 
alized trade  embargo  or  other  meas- 
ures targeted  at  the  economy  of  the 
country.  Rather  they  are  basically  a 
prohibition  on  U.S.  citizens  making 
payments  to  the  illegal  Noriega 
regime. 

These  measures  are  not  the  basic 
cause  of  the  economic  crisis  in  Panama. 
The  economic  crisis  is,  rather,  a  reflec- 
tion of  the  political  crisis.  People  and 
companies  take  their  funds  and  busi- 
ness elsewhere  when  stability  is 
threatened. 

If  Gen.  Noriega  truly  believes  that 
the  release  of  the  approximately  $300 
million  in  payments  placed  in  escrow  in 
the  United  States  would  resolve  the 
economic  crisis,  why  does  he  not  re- 
turn an  equivalent  amount  from  the 
funds  he  has  stolen?  The  money  in  es- 
crow in  the  United  States  is  drawing 
interest  in  the  name  of  the  Panamanian 
people  and  will  return  to  them  when 
democratic  government  is  restored. 
Will  the  money  Gen.  Noriega  has  taken 
be  returned? 

Nothing  would  please  my  govern- 
ment or  the  American  people  more  than 
to  end  the  measures  currently  in  place 
and  reestablish  normal  relations  with  a 
democratic  Panama. 

There  is  only  one  obstacle  to  re- 
solving this  crisis,  and  we  all  know  who 
it  is.  On  July  20,  the  OAS  commission 
reported  that  "the  continued  presence 
of  General  Noriega  as  Commander  in 
Chief  of  the  Defense  Forces  has  been 
identified  both  by  supporters  and  oppo- 
sition as  one  of  the  factors,  if  not  the 
principal  factor,  which  must  be  ad- 
dressed in  order  to  solve  the  crisis." 
Yet  Gen.  Noriega  refuses  to  define  any 
circumstances  under  which  he  would  be 
willing  to  remove  the  primary  obstacle 
to  resolving  the  crisis  as  defined  by  the 
OAS. 

During  all  our  efforts  to  seek  a 
resolution  of  the  political  crisis,  we 
have  made  it  clear  to  Gen.  Noriega  and 


I 


to  all  political  parties  and  groups  in 
Panama  that  issues  involving  the  coiri 
position  of  the  Panamanian  Govern 
ment  and  the  role  of  the  PDF  were     | 
issues  to  be  decided  by  Panamanians- 
perhaps  with  Latin  American  media- 
tion— but  certainly  not  by  the  United' 
States.  Both  our  bilateral  talks  last  | 
year  and  our  support  for  the  OAS       \ 
mission  of  ministers  were  conducted 
strictly  on  this  basis. 

Problem  is  Noriega 

This  brings  us  back  to  the  main  issu< 
before  us,  the  harsh  reality  underlyi) 
Panama's  suffering.  The  problem  is 
Noriega,  and  specifically  Noriega's 
willingness  to  put  his  personal  inter- 
ests and  his  personal  gain  above  his  ( 
leagues  in  the  PDF,  above  his  countr' 
and  above  the  international  communi 
in  this  hemisphere  and  the  world. 

Noriega's  greed,  personal  ambi- 
tion, and  selfishness  are  the  origin, 
core,  and  sustenance  of  Panama's  cri- 
sis. So  long  as  he  and  those  around  h) 
fail  to  recognize  that  reality,  attempt 
disguise  it,  or  deflect  responsibility 
it  to  others,  the  crisis  will  only  worst- 
There  are  times  when  good  principle 
force  us  to  defend  bad  men.  Some  arg 
that  this  is  the  case  with  Noriega  ant 
Panama.  They  argue  as  if  the  princip 
of  nonintervention  requires  us  to  ac- 
cept whatever  Noriega  does. 

But  nonintervention  was  never 
meant  to  protect  individual  criminal 
It  was  never  meant  to  promote  inter- 
vention by  drug  traffickers  in  our  so( 
eties  against  our  families  and  childre 
It  was  never  meant  to  prevent  peace! 
and  diplomatic  action  by  sovereign 
states  in  support  of  democracy.  And  i 
was  never  meant  to  leave  the  crimina 
free  to  savage  the  good  and  the  good  11 
powerless  to  react. 

One  has  to  look  no  further  than  t 
Panama's  southern  neighbor  to  see  a 
stark  contrast.  In  Panama  the  regim< 
is  aiding — giving  refuge  to — the  nar- 
cotics tarffickers,  their  front  busi- 
nesses, and  the  banks  through  which 
they  launder  their  dirty  money. 

These  are  the  very  people  who 
have  declared  war  on  civilized  societj 
in  Colombia  and  have  punished  that  h 
roic  nation  with  assassinations,  bomb 
ings,  kidnappings,  and  threats  which 
are  undermining  the  very  fabric  of  Li 
in  America's  oldest  democracy.  Presi- 
dent Virgilio  Barco  is  marshaling  all 
of  his  nation's  forces — civilian  and 
military — to  restore  decency  and  re- 
spect for  the  law  in  that  country.  The 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  19  r 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


v^  majority  of  Colombians  from  all 
pvitical  parties  support  him,  for  his 
stJggle  is  their  struggle.  It  is,  indeed, 
i  ruggle  on  behalf  of  all  of  us.  The 
tiffickers  in  Colombia  threaten  de- 
m.^racy  as  surely  as  would  a  foreign 
inader;  their  wares  are  killing  our 
;hdren  and  corrupting  our  societies. 
A.  the  world's  nations  should  provide 
jiwerving  support — both  moral  and 
mterial — to  the  people  and  democratic 
Gl/ernment  of  Colombia. 

The  writing  is  on  the  wall.  The 
pitern  is  clear.  Indifference  to  the  vo- 
luminous evidence  can  only  give  license 
d  encouragement  to  Noriega  and  his 
icid. 

The  evasions,  the  posturings,  the 
mipaganda  parading  as  truth — all  that 
Ni'iega's  defenders  have  put  forward 
;(\eep  this  criminal  in  power — have 
t)fn  exposed. 

Noriega's  actions — graphically  de- 
fil  in  testimony,  indictments,  re- 
:  jts,  accounts,  personal  holdings,  in 
irail  of  evidence  that  points  to  mis- 
Mduct  on  an  international  scale — 
Nriega's  actions  are  inexcusable. 

But  our  inaction  would  be  inexcus- 
1  e.  This  is  no  time  for  silence.  This  is 
utime  for  timidity.  We  must  see  Nor- 
iCa  for  who  he  is. 

Colombia  and  Panama.  Barco  and 
Sriega.  Could  we  have  a  starker  com- 
P'ison  of  the  moral  qualities  of  the 
j.t  and  the  worse  among  us  in  our 
Unisphere?  Which  one  deserves  our 
ip;  which  one  deserves  to  be  purged 
hm  our  midst?  For  the  United  States, 
liieast,  the  answer  is  clear. 


Cuba:  A  Threat  to  Peace 

and  Security  in  Our  Hemisphere 


'  Press  release  160. 

-  Press  release  164  of  Sept.  1,  1989.1 


by  Michael  G.  Kozak 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Western  Hemisphere  Affairs  of  the 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
August  2,  1989.  Mr.  Kozak  is  Deputy 
Assistant  Secretary  for  Inter- 
American  Affairs.^ 

Thank  you  for  the  opportunity  to  come 
here  today  to  discuss  our  policy  with 
respect  to  Cuba.  These  hearings  are  a 
timely  initiative  on  the  part  of  the  com- 
mittee. Cuba  has  been  in  the  news  a  lot 
lately.  Many  speculate  that  events  in 
Havana  may  portend  changes  in  Cuba's 
internal  and  external  behavior  and  in 
our  policies  toward  the  Castro  regime. 

Background 

Since  January  1,  1959,  when  Fidel  Cas- 
tro assumed  power,  bilateral  relations 
between  the  United  States  and  Cuba 
deteriorated  sharply.  This  development 
can  be  attributed  in  part  to  the  imposi- 
tion of  a  rigorous  dictatorship  in  Cuba 
and,  in  part,  to  a  pattern  of  unaccept- 
able international  behavior  on  the  part 
of  the  Cuban  Government.  Our  princi- 
pal concerns  were  and  remain: 

•  Cuba's  relationship  with  the 
Soviet  Union; 

•  Cuba's  support  for  terrorism  and 
efforts  to  destabilize  democratic  gov- 
ernments, especially  in  this  hemi- 
sphere; and 

•  Widespread  human  rights  abuses 
and  political  repression  within  Cuba 
itself. 

More  recently,  we  have  had  serious 
differences  with  the  Castro  regime  on 
narcotics.  Let's  look  at  these  issues  one 
at  a  time. 


The  Soviet  Relationship 

Since  the  early  1960s,  relations  be- 
tween the  Soviet  Union  and  Cuba  have 
been  close.  The  relationship  is  mutually 
beneficial.  Cuba  gets  critical  economic 
and  security  assistance  which  both 
keeps  its  economy  afloat  and  enables  it 
to  maintain  one  of  the  largest  and  best 
equipped  military  establishments  in 
the  Western  Hemisphere.  Approx- 


imately 15%  of  Cuba's  population  is 
militarized — either  in  the  regular 
army  or  in  the  militia.  Without  Soviet 
help,  Cuba's  economy  would  probably 
collapse;  without  Soviet  assistance, 
Cuba  would  not  be  able  to  project  its 
power  and  influence  to  places  like  Cen- 
tral America  and  southern  Africa. 
Soviet-bloc  aid  to  Cuba  exceeds  $4 
billion  in  economic  aid  and  trade  sub- 
sidies and  $1.5  billion  in  military 
assistance  annually,  accounting  for  al- 
most a  quarter  of  the  national  product. 
The  Soviet  Union,  in  turn,  receives  im- 
portant military,  strategic,  and  politi- 
cal benefits.  Let  me  give  you  some 
examples.  Soviet  aircraft  and  naval 
vessels  make  extensive  use  of  Cuban 
facilities,  while  shipments  of  Soviet 
equipment  destined  for  Central  Ameri- 
ca are  often  routed  through  Cuba.  In 
addition,  the  Soviets  have  installed  the 
largest  single  intelligence  gathering 
installation  outside  the  Soviet  Union 
in  Cuba. 

Although  there  are  increasing 
signs  that  the  Soviets  are  becoming 
disillusioned  by  wasteful  Cuban  eco- 
nomic policies  and  stubborn  resistance 
to  reform  and  would  like  very  much  to 
reduce  assistance  levels  to  Cuba,  we  do 
not  believe  cuts  would  be  so  severe  as 
to  endanger  their  special  relationship 
with  Cuba.  The  relationship  will  re- 
main intact  for  the  foreseeable  future. 

Cuban  Foreign  Policy 

For  several  years  now,  Cuba  has  pur- 
sued a  two-track  policy  toward  its 
Western  Hemisphere  neighbors,  seek- 
ing formal  diplomatic  ties  and  improved 
trade  and  cultural  relations  with  exist- 
ing governments  while  continuing  sup- 
port for  radical  political  groups  and 
violent  subversive  movements.  Cuban 
support  for  violent  groups  has  included 
military  and  intelligence  training  for 
cadres,  supplying  weapons,  providing 
guidance  and  organizational  support, 
and  working  to  unite  splintered  oppo- 
sition groups. 

Over  the  years,  Cuban  support  for 
antidemocratic  groups  has  been  evi- 
dent in  Central  America,  Colombia, 
Venezuela,  Chile,  and  Cuba's  Caribbean 


lepartment  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


75 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


neighbors.  For  example,  Cuba  provides 
a  wide  range  of  support  for  the  FMLN 
[Farabundo  Marti  National  Liberation] 
insurgency  in  El  Salvador;  the  M-19  in 
Colombia,  a  terrorist  group  which  it- 
self has  ties  to  trafficking  organi- 
zations; and  guerrilla  groups  in 
Guatemala.  Cuba  has  close  relations 
with  and  provides  extensive  military 
and  economic  assistance  to  the  Sand- 
inista  regime  in  Nicaragua,  which  in 
turn  provides  materiel  support  to  guer- 
rillas throughout  Central  America. 

Let  me  take  a  minute  to  focus  on 
Central  America.  The  nations  of  Cen- 
tral America  have  called  on  govern- 
ments outside  the  region  to  stop 
supplying  military  assistance  to  in- 
surgent or  irregular  groups.  This  is  a 
central  tenet  of  the  Esquipulas  agree- 
ment. The  United  States  is  in  compli- 
ance with  that  request.  Nicaragua  and 
Cuba  continue  to  flagrantly  violate  the 
Esquipulas  agreement  through  the  con- 
tinued military  support  for  the  FMLN 
guerrillas  in  El  Salvador.  The  recent 
discovery  of  a  major  insurgent  weapons 
cache  in  San  Salvador  underscores  the 
continuing  commitment  of  Cuba  and 
Nicaragua  to  support  the  guerrilla  war 
in  El  Salvador.  The  cache — the  largest 
ever  captured  by  government  forces — 
comprises  a  wide  variety  of  modern 
Soviet-designed  small  arms  (including 
14  AK-47  and  329  AKM  assault  rifles, 
10  antitank  launchers,  90  rockets,  50 
grenades,  115  pistols,  and  other  mili- 
tary weaponry)  and  over  a  quarter  mil- 
lion rounds  of  ammunition  manufac- 
tured in  Cuba  as  recently  as  1988.  The 
AKM  and  AK^7  ammunition  found  in 
the  cache  was  of  Cuban  manufacture, 
stamped  with  "Cuban  Ammunition 
Loading  Factory  13." 

The  really  disturbing  dimension  of 
the  increased  assistance  to  the  FMLN 
from  Cuba  and  Nicaragua  is  that  with 
the  provision  of  Soviet-bloc  and  North 
Korean  weaponry,  of  which  ammunition 
and  replacements  cannot  be  found  in- 
side El  Salvador,  the  FMLN  and  their 
Nicaraguan  and  Cuban  patrons  show 
little  intention  of  complying  with 
Esquipulas.  The  FMLN  also  appears 
confident  that  the  arms  pipeline  will 
continue  regardless  of  longstanding 
commitments  to  end  such  support  to 
guerrillas  in  the  region. 

Cuba  has  exploited  the  situation 
in  Panama  by  increasing  its  presence 
there  and  by  supporting  the  Noriega 
regime,  thus  exacerbating  the  Panama- 
nian problem  by  propping  up  and  en- 
couraging Noriega.  Castro  uses  the 


dispute  to  attempt  to  rally  Latin  soli- 
darity against  the  United  States.  We 
know  from  testimony  given  during  the 
Ochoa/De  la  Guardia  trials  in  Cuba,  for 
example,  that  several  Ministry  of  In- 
terior officials  were  cited  in  connection 
with  money  laundering  and  other  co- 
vert activities  in  Panama,  and  that 
Panama  was  the  venue  for  a  number  of 
officially  sanctioned  contacts  with  Co- 
lombian drug  traffickers.  We  are  in  the 
process  of  adding  to  the  designated 
Cuban  nationals  list  additional  names 
of  Panamanian  individuals  and  firms 
which  act  on  behalf  of  Cuba.  In  a  re- 
lated action,  we  have  initiated  steps 
which  would  prohibit  transactions  with 
Panamanian  individuals  and  firms 
which  are  supporting  Gen.  Noriega  and 
the  illegal  regime. 

Human  Rights 

The  Cuban  Government  is  one  of  the 
worst  violators  of  human  rights  in  this 
hemisphere.  Since  the  1959  revolution, 
Cuba,  under  Fidel  Castro,  has  author- 
ized political  executions,  torture,  arbi- 
trary arrests  and  imprisonment,  and 
inhumane  prison  conditions.  Cuban  cit- 
izens have  been  denied  the  most  basic 
democratic  rights  and  processes  in  both 
political  and  judicial  domains.  They 
have  been  subjected  to  constant  sur- 
veillance by  block  committees,  denied 
basic  freedoms  and  legal  due  process, 
and  prevented  from  traveling  abroad. 
Aryeh  Neier  of  Americas  Watch  esti- 
mated last  month  that  the  number  of 
prisoners  held  on  political  charges 
could  range  as  high  as  300,  some  of 
whom  had  been  held  in  prison  since 
shortly  after  Castro  came  to  power. 
Other  estimates,  which  include  those 
jailed  for  religious  beliefs  or  for  at- 
tempting to  leave  the  country  without 
permission,  range  in  the  thousands. 
The  Castro  regime  admitted  in  March 
of  1988  that  455  prisoners  were  being 
held  for  "crimes  against  state  securi- 
ty," i.e.,  loosely  defined  political 
crimes. 

In  1988  heavy  international  pres- 
sure was  brought  to  bear  on  the  Cuban 
regime  through  U.S.  diplomatic  efforts 
in  international  forums  and  by  non- 
government groups,  such  as  the  Catho- 
lic Church,  Red  Cross,  and  Amnesty 
International.  Last  September's  visit 
by  a  UN  Human  Rights  Commission, 
(UNHRC)  working  group  also  raised 
the  international  profile  of  Cuban  hu- 
man rights  violations.  In  response  the 
Cuban  Government  made  temporary 


i 


improvements  in  its  human  rights  p« 
formance;  but  since  the  UNHRC  vis 
we  find  that  abuse  and  repression  cc 
tinue  to  be  the  order  of  the  day.  Ami 
cas  Watch  reported  last  month  that 
least  22  Cuban  human  rights  activi&^ 
who  were  arrested  following  the  visi 
to  Cuba  last  September  of  the  UN 
group,  are  currently  serving  prison 
sentences  or  being  held  without  triai 
Many  more  were  subject  to  harassm 
and  intimidation  or  apprehended  am 
subsequently  released.  And  we  have 
noticed  that  the  number  of  visits  by 
human  rights  groups  to  Cuba  has  de 
clined  markedly  since  the  UN  visit. 
The  Cuban  Government  once  again  i 
tively  discourages  such  visits  and  d- 
lomatic  contacts  with  Cuban  human 
rights  activists. 

Certainly,  the  recent  Ochoa/De 
Guardia  scandal  in  Cuba  raises  ques' 
tions  in  the  human  rights  area.  Whi 
we  cannot  condone  drug  trafficking 
anyone  and  believe  traffickers  shoul 
be  fully  prosecuted,  the  specter  oft 
Ochoa  group  being  apprehended,  in-, 
terrogated,  investigated,  tried,  sen- 
tenced, subjected  to  an  appeals  proo 
ess,  and  executed,  all  within  a  matt 
of  less  than  1  month,  suggests  basic 
process  was  denied. 

Narcotics 

Cuba  lies  astride  some  of  the  priman 
routes  used  by  South  American  traf 
fickers  shipping  their  wares  into  thi 
United  States.  Witnesses  at  congres 
sional  hearings  since  1982  have  char 
official  Cuban  involvement  in  drug  t 
ficking.  Indictments  returned  in  198 
1988,  and  1989,  respectively,  chargec 
Cuban  involvement  in  trafficking. 

Ann  Wrobleski,  then  Assistant 
Secretary  of  State  for  International 
Narcotics  Matters,  stated  in  March 
of  1988  during  testimony  before  the 
Task  Force  on  International  Narcotii 
Control  of  the  House  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations: 

U.S.  law  enforcement  officals  report 
that  Cuban  air  space  and  territorial  watt 
are  often  used  by  drug  traffickers.  There 
are  indications  that  some  of  this  traffic  i! 
sanctioned  or  facilitated  by  Cuba. 

Cuba  figures  prominently  as  a  trans- 
shipment point  for  cocaine  destined  fort! 
United  States  in  a  recent  Federal  indict- 
ment handed  down  by  a  grand  jury  in  Mi; 
on  February  26.  Four  high-ranking  Cuba 
officials  were  indicted  in  1982  by  a  Feder 
grand  jury  in  Miami  on  narcotics  smuggl 
charges.  They  have  not  been  brought  to  t 
as  they  did  not  voluntarily  appear  and  coil 
not  be  extradited  from  Cuba.  Other  pers 
tried  as  part  of  the  same  conspiracy  were 
convicted. 


76 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1!) 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Moreover,  former  Panamanian  official 
1  lUandon  tesitified  separately  before  the 
e  tc  earlier  in  February  that  Fidel  Castro 
mat  ml  a  drug-related  dispute  between 
t  Xiiriega  and  key  Colombian 
riickers. 

The  Cuban  Government  denies  any  Cu- 
a'anvolvement  in  narcotics  smuggling,  no- 
.rithe  imprisonment  of  several  persons, 
icding  U.S.  citizens,  for  trafficking  in 
ton  territorial  waters.  The  Cuban  Gov- 
i-nent  argues  that  these  arrests  prove  it 

t  involved  in  narcotics  trafficking. 
•  'tlicless,  the  evidence  suggests  that 
'II  simultaneously  facilitates  the  flow  of 
■;  ic  in  selected  cases,  while  prosecuting 
tlji'  cases  to  conviction. 

[Until  very  recently,  Cuban  author- 
afe  repeatedly  denied  any  official 
r|nofficial  involvement  in  such  ac- 
i\ties.  In  a  November  1985  interview, 
'i'l  Castro  claimed  that  on  the  drug 
;:(.■  "Cuba  has  had  an  unimpeachable 
e^ird  in  the  past  26  years.  First  be- 
a:se  in  our  country,  where  once  there 
drug  use,  production,  and  traffick- 
1  I  lie  first  thing  we  did  was  eradi- 
a-  the  problem  ...  I  know  of  not  one 
al'  in  which  an  official  has  been  in- 
oed  in  the  drug  business."  As  late 
Sthis  spring,  Cuban  officials  were 
sling  us  that  Cuba  was  neither  a  con- 
uler  nor  a  producer  nor  a  trafficker 
ijrugs. 

But  we  have  evidence  that  Castro 
r  the  Cuban  Government  were  aware 
b.  they  had  a  drug  problem  at  least  4 
e's  ago.  In  the  November  1985  issue 
tiIo)icada,  the  monthly  journal  of  the 
liistry  of  Interior,  an  article  ap- 
ered  on  a  Cuban  domestic  drug  prob- 
}i,  the  first  such  admission  to  our 
rrtk'dge.  The  article  indicated  that 
hitih  there  were,  indeed,  drug  users 
n'ulia,  they  were  few,  largely  under 
o:r(il,  and  entirely  dependent  on  out- 
ic  sources  for  their  drug  supply.  The 
rcle  reported  that  in  June  1985,  5 
iiiths  before  Castro's  denial  that  traf- 
iting  was  a  problem  in  Cuba,  minis- 
r  officials  seized  over  $300,000  worth 
faarijuana  being  smuggled  into  the 
entry  from  a  boat  offshore  east  of 
I.-ana.  Other  than  that  highly  unusual 
(lission,  the  Cuban  Government 
1  med  immunity  from  a  problem  that 
?s  besetting  the  rest  of  the  world. 

;  The  dramatic  developments  in 
'ba  during  the  past  month  have 
liiued  all  of  that.  In  an  unprece- 
litcil  move  on  June  16,  the  Cuban 
iernment  publicly  admitted  involve- 
nnt  by  Cuban  officials  in  the  drug 
idf.  The  Cuban  Government  claimed 
'  el  (."astro  launched  an  investigation 
bart  because  of  U.S.  charges  of  drug 
ffficking  by  Cuban  officials.  Four- 
*n  military  officers  were  arrested. 


The  list  was  headed  by  Armed  Forces 
Gen.  Arnaldo  Ochoa  and  Ministry  of  In- 
terior Col.  Tony  De  la  Guardia.  Ochoa 
was  an  extremely  popular  and  highly 
decorated  officer  who  had  headed  Cu- 
ban forces  in  Angola  and  been  associ- 
ated with  the  Castros  as  far  back  as  the 
days  before  Castro  took  power  in 
Havana. 

Two  weeks  of  televised  trials  led  to 
guilty  verdicts  for  all  and  death  sen- 
tences for  Ochoa,  De  la  Guardia,  and 
two  others.  Appeals  were  denied  in  a 
matter  of  days,  and  the  executions  were 
carried  out  on  July  13. 


The  U.S.  Response 
to  Cuban  Behavior 

In  response  to  severe  provocation  on 
the  part  of  the  Castro  government  and 
the  specter  of  widespread  executions 
by  firing  squads  of  those  deemed  ene- 
mies of  the  regime,  the  United  States 
broke  relations  with  the  Castro  govern- 
ment in  January  of  1961.  Over  the  years 
since  then,  our  relationship  with  Cuba 
has  been  characterized  by  the  following 
key  elements. 

Absence  of  Normal  Diplomatic 
Relations.  Although  the  interests  sec- 
tions established  in  1977  provide  a  line 
of  communication  between  our  two  gov- 
ernments, their  existence  does  not  con- 
stitute diplomatic  recognition.  Legally, 
we  are  represented  in  Havana  by  the 
Ambassador  of  Switzerland. 

Diplomatic  Isolation.  The  policy 
of  the  United  States  has  been  to  deny, 
to  the  extent  possible,  acceptance  of 
Cuba  as  a  member  of  the  international 
community.  Thus  we  have  opposed 
Cuban  membership  in  international  or- 
ganizations and  discouraged  normal 
economic  and  diplomatic  relationships 
between  Cuba  and  third  countries. 

Economic  Embargo.  In  effect, 
since  1962  under  the  authority  of  the 
Trading  with  the  Enemy  Act,  a  com- 
prehensive embargo  prohibits  almost 
all  transactions,  including  payments 
for  travel  services,  and  trade  between 
persons  subject  to  U.S.  jurisdiction 
and  Cuba  or  its  nationals  unless  li- 
censed under  the  Cuban  Assets  Control 
or  Export  Administration  Regulations. 

Some  say  that  our  embargo  policy 
has  failed  given  the  survival  of  Fidel 
Castro's  communist  regime.  Such  criti- 
cism misses  the  point.  Given  Castro's 
ideological  commitment  to  his  vision  of 
revolution,  it  is  unlikely  that  economic 
sanctions  alone  will  ever  induce  him  to 


abandon  his  goals.  What  the  embargo 
does  is  to  deny  Cuba  opportunities  to 
earn  hard  currency  and  acquire  goods, 
thus  limiting  the  resources  available  to 
the  government  to  carry  out  policies  in- 
imical to  U.S.  interests.  To  put  it  in 
starker  terms,  every  dollar  that  the 
embargo  prevents  Cuba  from  earning 
from  an  American  tourist  is  a  dollar 
that  Cuba  cannot  spend  to  provide  a 
rifle  to  overthrow  a  democratically 
elected  government  in  our  hemisphere. 

Cuba's  hard  currency  crisis,  the 
growing  reluctance  of  its  trading  part- 
ners and  aid  suppliers  to  further  sub- 
sidize an  economy  failing  under  the 
weight  of  Marxist  orthodoxy,  and  the 
government's  desperate  attempts  to  re- 
vive the  tourist  industry  attest  to  the 
cumulative  impact  the  embargo  and 
Castro's  economic  policies  have  had  on 
the  availability  of  resources.  Due  in 
part  to  the  embargo,  Cuba  is  faced 
with  harder  economic  choices  than  ever 
before.  As  long  as  Castro — with  mas- 
sive Soviet  assistance,  I  would  add — 
can  finance  both  extensive  social  serv- 
ices and  the  export  of  revolution,  he 
will  do  both.  Our  policy  is  to  enforce 
the  embargo,  thereby  forcing  him  to 
make  the  hard  choices  about  the  use  of 
his  limited  resources.  I  refer  you  to  the 
report  on  this  issue  submitted  to  Con- 
gress by  the  U.S.  Trade  Representa- 
tive last  November. 

Radio  and  TV  Marti.  One  of  the 

characteristics  of  any  authoritarian  re- 
gime is  a  monopoly  on  information.  The 
government  seeks  to  control  the  media 
to  assure  that  the  people  hear  only 
what  they  are  supposed  to  hear  and 
nothing  more.  So  it  has  been  with  Cuba. 
For  over  25  years,  officially  controlled 
radio,  television,  and  newspapers  care- 
fully censored  the  information  diet  of 
the  Cuban  population,  denying  them 
the  facts  about  their  own  government's 
internal  and  external  behavior.  That 
changed  in  May  of  1985,  when  Radio 
Marti  went  on  the  air  for  the  first  time 
with  news  and  other  programming  for 
the  Cuban  people.  Although  many  were 
skeptical  at  first,  no  one  now  can  deny 
that  Radio  Marti  is  a  success.  Trav- 
elers to  Cuba  and  recent  immigrants 
report  it  is  widely  listened  to  through- 
out the  island.  We  know  also  that  com- 
petition from  Radio  Marti  has  forced 
the  Government  of  Cuba  to  be  more 
honest  about  what  it  tells  its  own  peo- 
ple. I  congratulate  the  men  and  women 
who  have  made  Radio  Marti  a  success 
over  the  years. 


i^partment  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


77 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


TV  Marti  is  a  logical  follow-on  to 
Radio  Marti.  Both  Congress  and  the 
President  have  endorsed  the  concept. 
Television  access  to  the  Cuban  people 
offers  the  potential  for  furthering  the 
dramatic  impact  that  Radio  Marti  has 
had  on  the  lives  of  the  Cuban  people. 

Exceptions  to  the  Rule.  The 

strained  relationship  between  Cuba 
and  the  United  States  during  the  past 
30  years  has  not  precluded,  however, 
the  possibility  of  cooperating  and/or 
reaching  agreement  on  specific  issues 
of  interest  to  the  United  States  and 
Cuba  as  geographic  neighbors.  Exam- 
ples include  agreements  or  understand- 
ings on  migration  and  search  and 
rescue  and  efforts  to  negotiate  ar- 
rangements on  radio  interference. 
These  are  issues  where  specific  U.S. 
interests  can  be  furthered  without 
compromising  our  basic  political  and 
security  objectives.  For  example, 
since  the  November  1987  reimplementa- 
tion  of  the  Mariel  Migration  Agreement 
(which  had  been  suspended  by  the  Cu- 
bans in  May  of  1985  as  a  response  to 
Radio  Marti's  startup),  approximately 
8,000  immigrants  and  refugees  have 
departed  Cuba  for  the  United  States. 
Another  example  is  southern  Africa. 
Starting  in  the  1970s,  Cuba  has  inter- 
vened heavily  in  Africa.  In  total,  more 
than  400,000  Cubans  and  massive  quan- 
tities of  military  equipment  were  sent 
to  Angola  alone.  Supported  by  Soviet 
advice  and  equipment,  the  Cuban  Gov- 
ernment became  a  major  player  in  the 
region.  In  1987  Cuban  authorities  sig- 
naled that  they  were  prepared  to  par- 
ticipate in  discussions  leading  to  Cuban 
withdrawal  from  Angola  and  relin- 
quishment of  South  African  control 
over  Namibia.  U.S. -mediated  negotia- 
tions resulted  in  the  signing  of  an 
agreement  among  South  Africa,  An- 
gola, and  Cuba  in  December  of  1988. 
Under  the  agreement,  Cuban  troops 
are  being  withdrawn  from  Angola 
as  scheduled. 

We  are  skeptical  about  the  inten- 
tions of  the  Cuban  Government  and  its 
purported  commitment  to  the  war  on 
drugs.  If  the  Cuban  Government  was 
serious  about  combating  drug  traffick- 
ing, it  would  not  be  supplying  military 
and  political  assistance  to  prop  up  the 
Noriega  dictatorship  in  Panama.  We  do 
not  know  yet  the  true  motivation  be- 
hind the  execution  of  Gen.  Ochoa  and 
others  and  find  it  highly  improbable 
that  extensive  and  high-level  official 
Cuban  involvement  could  have  escaped 
the  attention  of  the  Cuban  leadership 


Colombia  Drug  Dealers' 
Campaign  of  Intimidation 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
AUG.  25,  19891 

President  Barco  of  Colombia  has  imple- 
mented a  major  effort  to  control  drug 
trafficking  in  that  country.  Extradition 
of  drug  traffickers  under  indictment  in 
other  nations  is  a  major  element  of  this 
program.  On  August  24,  drug  traf- 
fickers launched  a  violent  campaign  in 
an  attempt  to  force  President  Barco  to 
rescind  his  newly  established  extradi- 
tion policy. 

The  United  States  is  confident  that 
this  campaign  of  intimidation  will  fail. 
However,  in  light  of  the  violent  retalia- 
tion by  drug  traffickers,  Americans 


traveling  to  Colombia  could  expose 
themselves  to  extraordinary  persons 
danger.  The  Department  of  State 
strongly  urges  Americans  to  avoid  v 
iting  Medellin,  the  headquarters  of 
drug  traffickers'  "cartel." 

Americans  who  must  travel  to 
Colombia  should  refer  to  the  travel 
warning  of  June  2,  1989,  by  calling 
(202)  647-5225.  After  arriving  in 
Colombia,  U.S.  citizens  are  urged  to 
register  with  the  U.S.  Embassy  or  t 
nearest  consulate. 


'  Read  to  news  correspondents  by  D 
partment  deputy  spokesman  Richard  A. 
Boucher.  ■ 


only  to  be  recently  "discovered."  Nev- 
ertheless, if  for  any  reason  Cuban  poli- 
cy in  this  area  is  changing,  we  would 
like  to  take  advantage  of  it.  We  intend 
to  do  what  we  can  to  stimulate  serious 
action  by  Cuba  against  drug  traffick- 
ing. Interdicting  drug  trafficking  is  a 
very  high  priority  for  the  United 
States.  If  we  become  convinced  that 
the  Cuban  Government  has  had  a 
change  of  heart  and  genuinely  intends 
to  stamp  out  trafficking  by  Cu- 
ban officials  and  citizens,  we  can  con- 
sider mutually  beneficial  information 
exchanges.  How  can  we  know  whether 
this  has  happened?  Instead  of  just  talk- 
ing, the  Cubans  could  begin  acting  like 
a  country  with  a  serious  antidrug  poli- 
cy- 

•  They  could  stop  propping  up  Pan- 
ama's Noriega,  an  indicted  drug  dealer. 

•  They  could  respond  vigorously  to 
reports  of  air  drops  or  other  suspicious 
activities,  as  they  have  not  done  in  the 
past. 

•  They  could  cause  Cuban  officials, 
mentioned  in  indictments,  to  come  to 
the  United  States  to  stand  trial  or,  fail- 
ing that,  take  proper  enforcement  ac- 
tion on  their  own.  This  has  not  been  the 
case;  rather,  at  least  one  member  of  the 
tribunal  that  judged  Ochoa  and  the  oth- 
er three  officials  executed  by  the  Cu- 
ban Government  is  under  indictment  in 
the  United  States  for  drug  trafficking. 

•  They  could  share  with  us  the  re- 
sults of  their  investigations  of  Ochoa, 
De  la  Guardia,  and  others  so  that  we 


could  initiate  parallel  investigations 
in  the  United  States,  if  warranted. 
After  all,  most  if  not  all  of  the  drugs 
in  question  were  destined  for  the 
United  States. 

•  They  could  stop  dealing  with  t 
Medellin  cartel. 

We  are  interested  in  deeds,  not 
words.  To  the  extent  operational  coo 
dination  is  required,  the  channels  al 
ready  exist  in  the  communications 
between  our  air  traffic  authorities, 
coast  guards,  and  through  our  inter 
sections. 

The  Outlook 

As  indicated  earlier  in  this  presenta 
tion,  U.S.  policy  is  the  result  of  an  u 
acceptable  pattern  of  domestic  and 
international  behavior  on  the  part  of 
the  Cuban  Government.  This  behavi 
continues,  and  as  long  as  the  Castro 
regime  refuses  to  make  concessions 
areas  of  concern  to  us,  relations  can- 
not and  should  not  improve.  And  the 
changes  must  be  permanent  ones.  W 
have  witnessed  the  superficial  and  t« 
porary  efforts  on  the  part  of  the  Cul 
Government  to  improve  the  human 
rights  situation  in  that  country  in  19 
only  to  resume  their  bad  habits  aftei 
the  pressure  was  off. 


78 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1!^ 


TREATIES 


The  Government  of  the  United 
it.es  is  not  naive  about  the  difficulty 
)fiaking  progress  with  Cuba.  We  rec- 
)gize  that  issues  not  connected  with 
lajonal  security  and  ideology  are  eas- 
e:-:o  solve,  and  we  have  made  some 
18  Kvay  on  such  issues.  We  have  been 
viing  to  look  at  even  the  toughest 
irplems  with  an  open  mind  to  see  if 
v^ould  bring  about  a  change  in  Cuban 
lekvior  that  would  be  advantageous  to 
h'United  States.  We  are  following 
luown  agenda,  whether  we  are  broad- 
afing  accurate  information  to  Cuba 
infiadio  Marti,  raising  Cuban  human 
ijits  violations  in  the  UNHRC  in  Ge- 
i€p,  or  discussing  problems  whose 
eblution  could  benefit  the  American 
)eple. 

One  central  fact  remains:  We  still 
Iciot  like  what  we  see  of  the  Cuban  re- 
Iv.  U.S.  policy  is  strongly  influenced 
1}  angible  Cuban  conduct,  not  merely 
„  It  ions  of  good  conduct.  In  Cuba  one 
rvi  e.xercises  decisive  control  over  his 
;dntry's  destiny,  and  he  has  never 
)en  a  friend  of  the  United  States  or 
if ree  men  anywhere.  He  proved  this 
igin  last  week  when,  in  a  long  ha- 
■ague,  he  said  that  the  United  States 
1^  never  been  more  threatening  than 
KJ-  to  Cuba.  He  understands  better 
,hi  anyone  else  exactly  what  kind  of 
I ;  reat  we  pose.  We  threaten  Castro 
)*ause  the  United  States  represents 
\Mt  people  can  achieve,  including 
h  Cuban  community  in  the  United 
5ttes,  given  freedom  and  opportunity. 
Vontrast  the  Cuban  revolution  has 
noverished  and  imprisoned  the  Cu- 
)c  people. 

As  President  Bush  acknowledged 
)iVIay  24,  and  again  on  June  28,  our 
joicy  must  remain  a  constant  one  until 
iih  time  as  Cuba  begins  to  act  as  a  re- 
ijnsible  member  of  the  international 
:cimunity  instead  of  a  threat  to  the 
)(ice  and  security  of  its  neighbors. 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hear- 
m  will  be  published  by  the 
:oimittee  and  will  be  available  from  the 
Siierintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Govern- 
nit  Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C. 
>M2.U 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Arbitration 

Convention  on  the  recognition  and  enforce- 
ment of  foreign  arbitral  awards.  Done  at 
New  York  June  10,  1958.  Entered  into  force 
June  7,  1959;  for  the  U.S.  Dec.  29,  1970. 
TIAS  6997. 

Ratification  deposited:  Argentina,  Mar.  14, 
1989.1 

Aviation 

Convention  on  international  civil  aviation. 
Done  at  Chicago  Dec.  7,  1944.  Entered  into 
force  Apr.  4,  1947.  TIAS  1591.  Adherence  de- 
posited: Mongolia,  Sept.  7,  1989. 

Protocol  on  the  authentic  trilingual  text  of 
the  convention  on  international  civil  aviation 
(TIAS  1591),  with  annex.  Done  at  Buenos 
Aires  Sept.  24,  1968.  Entered  into  force 
Oct.  24,  1968.  TIAS  6605. 
Acceptances  deposited:  Cyprus,  July  21, 
1989;  Mongolia,  Sept.  7,  1989. 

Protocol  on  the  authentic  quadrilingual  text 
of  the  convention  on  international  civil  avia- 
tion (TIAS  1591),  with  annex.  Done  at  Mon- 
treal Sept.  30,  1977.2 
Acceptance  deposited:  Cyprus,  July  21, 
1989. 

Human  Rights 

International  covenant  on  civil  and  political 
rights.  Done  at  New  York  Dec.  16,  1966. 
Entered  into  force  Mar.  23,  1976.^ 
Ratification  deposited:  Algeria,  Sept.  12, 
1989.1 

International  covenant  on  economic,  social, 

and  cultural  rights.  Done  at  New  York 

Dec.  16,  1966.  Entered  into  force  Jan  3, 

1976.3 

Ratification  deposited:  Algeria,  Sept.  12, 

1989. 

Maritime  Matters 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful 
acts  against  the  safety  of  maritime  naviga- 
tion, with  protocol  for  the  suppression  of 
unlawful  acts  against  the  safety  of  fixed 
platforms  located  on  the  Continental  Shelf. 
Done  at  Rome  Mar  10,  1988.2  [Senate]  Trea- 
ty Doc.  101-1. 
Ratification  deposited:  Spain,  July  7,  1989. 

Patents 

Patent  cooperation  treaty,  with  regulations. 
Done  at  Washington  June  19,  1970.  Entered 
into  force  Jan.  24,  1978.  TIAS  8733, 
Accession  deposited:  Spain,  Aug.  16,  1989. 

Satellite  Communications  System 

Operating  agreement  on  the  International 
Maritime  Satellite  Organization  (INMAR- 
SAT), with  annex.  Done  at  London  Sept.  3, 
1976.  Entered  into  force  July  16,  1979.  TIAS 
9605. 
Signature:  Cuba,  July  25,  1989. 


Sugar 

International  sugar  agreement,  1987,  with 
annexes.  Done  at  London  Sept.  11,  1987.  En- 
tered into  force  provisionally  Mar  24,  1988. 
Ratification  deposited:  Panama,  July  14, 
1989. 

Taxation — Organization  for  Economic  Co- 
operation and  Development  (OECD) 

Convention  on  mutual  administrative  assist- 
ance in  tax  matters.  Done  at  Strasbourg 
Jan.  25,  1988.2 

Ratification  deposited:  Norway,  June  13, 
1989.1 

Terrorism 

International  convention  against  the  taking 
of  hostages.  Done  at  New  York  Dec.  17,  1979. 
Entered  into  force  June  3,  1983;  for  the  U.S. 
Jan.  6,  1985. 

Accessions  Deposited:  Cote  d'lvoire, 
Aug.  22,  1989;  Turkey,  Aug.  15,  1989. 
Ratification  deposited:  Haiti,  May  17,  1989. 

Torture 

Convention  against  torture  and  other  cruel, 
inhuman  or  degrading  treatment  or  punish- 
ment. Done  at  New  York  Dec.  10,  1984.  En- 
tered into  force  June  26,  1987.-'  [Senate] 
Treaty  Doc.  100-20. 

Ratifications  deposited:  Algeria,  Sept.  12, 
1989;i  Australia,  Aug.  8,  1989;  Finland,  Aug. 
30,  1989;!  Poland,  July  26,  1989. 

Women 

Convention  on  the  elimination  of  all  forms  of 
discrimination  against  women.  Done  at  New 
York  Dec.  18, 1979.  Entered  into  force 
Sept.  3,  1981.3 

Accession  deposited:  Antigua  and  Barbuda, 
Aug.  1,  1989. 


BILATERAL 

Costa  Rica 

International  e.xpress  mail  agreement,  with 
detailed  regulations.  Signed  at  San  Jose  and 
Washington  Aug.  19  and  Sept.  14,  1989.  En- 
tered into  force  Sept.  15,  1989. 

Ethiopia 

International  express  mail  agreement,  with 
detailed  regulations.  Signed  at  Addis  Ababa 
and  Washington  Aug.  3  and  Sept.  1,  1989. 
Entered  into  force  Sept.  15,  1989. 

Germany,  Federal  Republic  of 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  July 
14  and  Aug.  3,  1988,  concerning  German  sup- 
port of  the  joint  U.S.  services  program  for 
testing  and  evaluation  of  the  IFFN  system. 
Signed  at  Bonn  and  Washington  June  15, 
1989.  Entered  into  force  June  15,  1989. 

Convention  for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxa- 
tion and  the  prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with 
respect  to  taxes  on  income  and  capital  and 
to  certain  other  taxes,  with  a  related  proto- 
col, exchanges  of  notes,  and  memorandum 
of  understanding.  Signed  at  Bonn  Aug.  29, 
1989.  Enters  into  force  upon  the  exchange 
of  instruments  of  ratification. 


Apartment  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


79 


PRESS  RELEASES 


Hong  Kong 

Agreement  for  the  reciprocal  exemption 
with  respect  to  taxes  on  income  from  the  in- 
ternational operation  of  ships.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Hong  Kong  Aug.  1, 
1989.  Entered  into  force  Aug.  1,  1989,  with 
respect  to  taxable  years  on  or  after  Jan.  1, 
1987. 

Hungary 

Air  transport  agreement,  with  annex  and 
memorandum  of  understanding.  Signed  at 
Budapest  July  12,  1989.  Entered  into  force 
provisionally  July  12,  1989,  definitively  on 
the  day  when  the  parties  notify  each  other 
through  diplomatic  channels  of  the  comple- 
tion of  their  respective  constitutional  rules. 

India 

Convention  for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxa- 
tion and  the  prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with 
respect  to  taxes  on  income.  Signed  at  New 
Delhi  Sept.  12,  1989.  Enters  into  force  on 
date  of  later  notification  indicating  that 
constitutional  requirements  have  been 
satisfied. 

Japan 

Agreement  concerning  reciprocal  exemption 
from  taxation  of  income  accruing  from  the 
business  of  shipping.  Effected  by  exchange 
of  notes  at  Washington  Aug.  29,  1989.  En- 
tered into  force  Aug.  29,  1989. 

Madagascar 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  and 
rescheduling  of  certain  debts  owed  to,  guar- 
anteed by,  or  insured  by  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment and  its  agencies,  with  annexes.  Signed 
at  Antananarivo  Aug.  9,  1989.  Entered  into 
force  Sept.  14,  1989. 

Morocco 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  and 
rescheduling  of  certain  debts  owed  to,  guar- 
anteed by,  or  insured  by  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment and  its  agencies,  with  annexes.  Signed 
at  Rabat  Aug.  21,  1989.  Entered  into  force 
Sept.  25,  1989. 

Netherlands 

International  express  mail  agreement,  with 
detailed  regulations  in  respect  of  Aruba. 
Signed  at  Oranjestad  and  Washington 
Aug.  15  and  Sept.  14,  1989.  Entered  into 
force  Oct.  16,  1989. 

Niger 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  and 
rescheduling  of  certain  debts  owed  to,  guar- 
anteed by,  or  insured  by  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment and  its  agencies,  with  annexes.  Signed 
at  Washington  June  29,  1989.  Entered  into 
force  Aug.  24,  1989. 

Nigeria 

Treaty  on  mutual  legal  assistance  in  crimi- 
nal matters,  with  attachments.  Signed  at 
Washington  Sept.  13,  1989.  Enters  into 
force  upon  exchange  of  instruments  of 
ratification. 


80 


Poland 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  and 
rescheduling  of  certain  debts  for  1985,  owed 
to,  guaranteed  by,  or  insured  by  the  U.S. 
Government  and  its  agencies,  with  annexes. 
Signed  at  Warsaw  July  10,  1989.  Entered 
into  force  Sept.  6,  1989. 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  and 
rescheduling  of  certain  debts  for  1987,  owed 
to,  guaranteed  by,  or  insured  by  the  U.S. 
Government  and  its  agencies,  with  annexes. 
Signed  at  Warsaw  July  10,  1989.  Entered 
into  force  Sept.  6,  1989. 

Romania 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of 
Dec.  4,  1973,  as  amended  and  extended, 
(TIAS  7901,  9431,  10703)  relating  to  civil  air 
transport.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Bucharest  Aug.  10  and  11,  1989.  Entered  into 
force  Aug.  11,  1989;  effective  July  31,  1989. 

Saint  Lucia 

International  express  mail  agreement  with 
detailed  regulations.  Signed  at  Castries  and 
Washington  Aug.  11  and  Sept.  14,  1989. 
Entered  into  force  Sept.  15,  1989. 

Senegal 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  and 
rescheduling  of  certain  debts  owed  to,  guar- 
anteed by,  or  insured  by  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment and  its  agencies,  with  annexes.  Signed 
at  Dakar  July  14,  1989.  Entered  into  force 
Aug.  24,  1989. 

Sri  Lanka 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Sept.  30,  1988,  as  amended,  for  the  sale  of 


Department  of  State 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Office  of  Press  Relations,  Department  of 
State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520-6810. 


No.       Date 


Subject 


146      8/3        Baker:  statement  at  the  In- 
ternational Conference  on 
Cambodia,  Paris,  July  30. 

*147     8/7        Thomas  M.T.  Niles  sworn  in 
as  Ambassador  to  the  Eu- 
ropean Communities, 
June  28  (biographic  data). 

*148     8/8        Baker:  departure  remarks, 
Paris,  July  31. 

149  8/8        Baker:  statement  at  opening 

session  of  the  U.S. -Mexico 
Binational  Commission, 
Mexico  City,  Aug.  7. 

150  8/9        Baker,  Solana:  news  confer- 

ence, Mexico  City,  Aug.  7. 
*151      8/8        Morton  I.  Abramowitz  sworn 
in  as  Ambassador  to  Tur- 
key, June  29  (biographic 
data). 


agricultural  commodities.  Effected  by  eij 
change  of  notes  at  Colombo  July  26,  1989.1 
Entered  into  force  July  26,  1989. 

Switzerland 

Supplementary  agreement  amending  the 
agreement  on  social  security  of  July  18, 
1979,  with  supplementary  administrativs 
agreement  (TIAS  9830).  Signed  at  Bern 
June  1,  1988. 
Entered  into  force:  Oct.  1,  1989. 

Trinidad  and  Tobago 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidatinn  ; 
rescheduling  of  certain  debts  owed  to,  gi  •• 
anteed  by,  or  insured  by  the  U.S.  Goverr 
ment  and  its  agencies.  Signed  at  Port-of- 
Spain  July  28,  1989.  Entered  into  force  S 

13,  1989. 

United  Kingdom 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of . 

14,  1987,  as  extended,  concerning  Montst 
rat  and  narcotics  activities.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Washington  Aug.  3(? 
1989.  Entered  into  force  Aug.  30,  1989; 
effective  Sept.  1,  1989. 

Uruguay 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  1 
30,  1983,  and  Jan.  23,  1984,  as  amended,  < 
cerning  exports  of  certain  textile  produc 
manufactured  in  Uruguay  to  the  United 
States.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Montevideo  Nov.  9,  1988,  Jan.  18  and  Julj 
1989.  Entered  into  force  July  26,  1989. 


'  With  declaration(s). 

2  Not  in  force. 

3  Not  in  force  for  the  U.S.I 


n52  8/11  Robert  D.  Orr  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  Singapo 
June  29  (biographic  dat! 

"153  8/11  Richard  H.  Solomon  sworr 
as  Assistant  Secretary 
East  Asian  and  Pacific 
Affairs,  June  23  (biogra 
ic  data). 

"154  8/11  Raymond  G.H.  Seitzswor 
as  Assistant  Secretary ; 
European  and  Canadiar 
Affairs,  Aug.  8  (biograp 
data). 

455      8/14      Abraham  D.  Sofaer  reap- 
pointed Legal  Adviser  c 
the  Department  of  Statf 
July  11  (biographic  data 

"156  8/16  Jonathan  Moore  sworn  in ! 
U.S.  Alternate  Represe 
tative  to  the  UN  for  Spe 
Political  Affairs,  Aug.  8 
(biographic  data). 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  1!) 


PUBLICATIONS 


1       8/16 

Alexander  F.  Watson  sworn 

in  as  U.S.  Deputy  Perma- 

nent Representative  to  the 

UN,  Aug.  8  (biographic 

data). 

8/16 

M.  James  Wilkinson  sworn  in 

as  U.S.  Deputy  Represen- 

tative on  the  UN  Security 

Council,  Aug.  8  (biographic 

data). 

8/18 

William  L.  Swing  sworn  in  as 

Ambassador  to  South 

Africa  (biographic  data). 

1     8/24 

Eagleburger:  statement  at 

the  OAS. 

8/25 

Richard  A.  Clarke  sworn  in 

as  Assistant  Secretary  for 

Politico-Military  Affairs, 

Aug.  8  (biographic  data). 

!     8/28 

Eagleburger:  interview  on 

CBS  Morning  News. 

i     8/29 

Program  for  the  official 

working  visit  of  Japanese 

Prime  Minister  Toshiki 

Kaifu,  Aug.  31-Sept.  2. 

1     9/5 

Eagleburger:  statement  at 

the  OAS,  Aug.  31. 

i     9/7 

Julia  Chang  Bloch  sworn  in 

as  Ambassador  to  Nepal 

(biographic  data). 

3     9/11 

Princeton  N.  Lyman  appoint- 

ed Director,  Bureau  for 

Refugee  Programs,  Sept.  5 

(biographic  data). 

7     9/19 

Baker:  news  conference. 

!     9/21 

Baker:  news  conference. 

White  House. 

9     9/22 

Baker,  Shevardnadze:  arrival 

statements,  Jackson  Hole, 

Wyo.,Sept.  21. 

0     9/22 

Baker:  plenary  statement. 

Jackson  Hole,  Wyo. 

1     9/26 

Baker:  news  conference,  Jack- 

son Hole,  Wyo.,  Sept.  23. 

2     9/26 

Baker:  interview  on  (iBS- 

TV's  "Face  the  Nation," 

Jackson  Hole,  Wyo.,  Sept. 

24. 

3     9/25 

Baker:  interview  on  NBC- 

TV's  "Today  Show." 

4     9/26 

Baker:  news  briefing, 

New  York  City,  Sept.  25. 

5     9/28 

Howard  K.  Walker  sworn  in 

as  Ambassador  to  Mad- 

agascar and  the  Comoros, 

Sept.  7  (biographic  data). 

6     9/29 

Baker:  news  conference,  New 

York  City,  Sept.  28. 

7     9/29 

Baker:  interview  for  CNN, 

New  York  City. 

'8     9/29 

Program  for  the  state  visit  of 

Mexican  President  Carlos 

Salinas  de  Gortari, 

Oct.  1-6. 

rg      N/D 

Baker:  news  conference, 

USUN,  New  York  City, 

Sept.  29. 

*  Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin.  I 


Department  of  State 


Free  single  copies  of  the  following  Depart- 
ment of  State  publications  are  available  from 
the  Public  Information  Division,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  Department  of  State,  Wash- 
ington, D.C.  20520. 

President  Bush 

Outlines  of  a  New  World  of  Freedom,  44th 
UN  General  Assembly,  New  York  City, 
Sept.  25,  1989  (Current  Policy  #1207). 

Freedom  and  World  Prosperity,  World  Bank/ 
IMF  annual  meeting,  Sept.  27  (Current 
Policy  #1210.) 

Secretary  Baker 

ASEAN:  Challenges  and  Opportunities, 
ASEAN  postministerial  conference.  Ban- 
dar Seri  Begawan,  Brunei,  July  6-7,  1989 
(Current  Policy  #1190). 

Multilateral  Assistance  Initiative  for  the 
Philippines,  special  public  session  of  MIA 
pledging  conference,  Tokyo,  July  4,  1989 
(Current  Policy  #1192). 

International  Efforts  for  a  Peaceful  Cam- 
bodia, International  Conference  on  Cam- 
bodia, Paris,  July  30,  1989  (Current  Policy 
#1202). 

U.S. -Mexico  Relations:  Cooperation  and 
Challenge,  opening  session  of  the  U.S.- 
Mexico Binational  Commission,  Mexico 
City,  Aug.  7,  1989  (Current  Policy  #1203). 

U.S. -Soviet  Relations:  A  Discussion  of  Pe- 
restroika  and  Economic  Reform,  Senate 
Finance  Committee,  Oct.  4,  1989  (Current 
Policy  #1209). 

Points  of  Mutual  Advantage:  Perestroika  and 
American  Foreign  Policy,  Foreign  Policy 
Association,  New  York  City,  Oct.  16,  1989 
(Current  Policy  #1213). 

Prerequisites  and  Principles  for  Arms  Con- 
trol, Commonwealth  Club,  San  Francisco, 
Oct.  23,  1989  (Current  Policy  #1215). 

Africa 

Review  of  U.S. -South  Africa  Relations,  Am- 
bassador Perkins,  Foreign  Policy  Associa- 
tion's Think  International  essay  contest, 
New  York  City,  June  6,  1989  (Current 
Policy  #1189). 

African  Refugees  (GIST,  Aug.  1989). 

Arms  Control 

U.S.  Efforts  Against  the  Spread  of  Chemi- 
cal Weapons,  Under  Secretary  Bar- 
tholomew, Subcommittee  on  International 
Finance  and  Monetary  Policy,  Senate 
Committee  on  Banking,  Housing,  and  Ur- 
ban Affairs,  June  22, 1989  (Current  Policy 
#1188). 

Vigilance:  The  Price  of  Liberty,  Ambas- 
sador Rowney,  American  Legion  national 
convention,  Baltimore,  Sept.  7, 1989  (Cur- 
rent Policy  #1200). 

Canada 

U.S. -Canada  Free  Trade  Agreement,  July 
1989  (Public  Information  Series). 


Department  of  State 

United  States  Department  of  State  Bicen- 
tennial, 1789-1989,  Sept.  1989  (Public  In- 
formation Series). 

Ambassador  Edward  J.  Perkins  sworn  in  as 
Director  General  of  the  Foreign  Service 
and  Director  of  Personnel  (Public  Infor- 
mation Series). 

East  Asia 

U.S.  Response  to  Changes  in  China,  Acting 
Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  Williams, 
Subcommittees  on  Human  Rights  and  In- 
ternational Organizations,  on  Asian  and 
Pacific  Affairs,  and  on  International  Eco- 
nomic Policy  and  Trade,  House  Foreign 
Affairs  Committee,  July  13,  1989,  and  the 
Subcommittee  on  Immigration,  Refugees, 
and  International  Law,  House  Judiciary 
Committee,  July  20  (Current  Policy 
#1195). 

Cambodia  and  Vietnam:  Trapped  in  An 
Eddy  of  History?,  Assistant  Secretary 
Solomon,  international  symposium  on  the 
future  of  U.S. -Indochina  relations  spon- 
sored by  The  Los  Angeles  Times,  the 
Times  Mirror  Company,  and  the  Asian  So- 
ciety, Los  Angeles,  Sept.  8,  1989  (Current 
Policy  #1206). 

U.S.-Japan  Trade  (GIST  Aug.  1989). 

U.S.  Cambodia  Relations  (GIST,  Oct.  1989). 

Economics 

Aviation's  Role  in  Shaping  Today's  World, 
Assistant  Secretary  McAllister,  Interna- 
tional Aviation  Club,  June  20,  1989  (Cur- 
rent Policy  #1187). 

U.S.  Views  on  the  EC  Single  Market  Exer- 
cise, Assistant  Secretary  McAllister, 
American  Asso.  of  E.xportersand  Import- 
ers, New  York  City,  May  18,  1989  (Current 
Policy  #1193). 

European  Community  (GIST,  July  1989). 

Economic  Policy  Coordination  and  the  Dol- 
lar (GIST,  Sept.  1989). 

U.S.  Prosperity  and  the  Developing  Coun- 
tries (GIST,  Sept.  1989). 

Environment 

Recognizing  the  Global  Nature  of  Environ- 
mental Problems,  Assistant  Secretary 
Bernthal,  15th  session  of  the  UNEP  Gov- 
erning Council,  Geneva,  May  16,  1989 
(Current  Policy  #1198). 

Europe 

The  Challenge  of  the  European  Landscape 
of  the  1990s,  Deputy  Secretary  Ea- 
gleburger, Subcommittee  on  European 
Affairs,  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Com- 
mittee, June  22,  1989  (Current  Policy 
#1194). 

The  NATO  Summit:  40  Years  of  Success, 
June  1989  (Selected  Documents  #37). 

Western  Security:  The  U.S.  and  Its  NATO 
Allies,  June  1989  (Regional  Brief). 

Human  Rights 

Ethnic  and  National  Rights:  A  CSCE  Score- 
card,  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  Do- 
briansky,  CSCE  Experts'  Meeting  on  the 


Ipartment  of  State  Bulletin/November  1989 


81 


PUBLICATIONS 


Human  Dimension,  Paris,  June  16,  1989 
(Current  Policy  #1197). 

Cuba's  Human  Rights  Abuses  Under  the  UN 
Spotlight,  Ambassador  Valladares,  Sub- 
committees on  Western  Hemisphere 
Affairs  and  on  Human  Rights  and  Inter- 
national Organizations,  House  Foreign 
Affairs  Committee,  Sept.  20,  1989  (Cur- 
rent Policy  #1212). 

26th  Semiannual  Report:  Implementation  of 
the  Helsinlii  Final  Act,  Oct.  1,  1988-Mar. 
31,  1989  (Special  Report  #182). 

Middle  East 

U.S.  Diplomacy  in  the  Middle  East,  Assist- 
ant Secretary  Kelly,  Subcommittee  on 
Europe  and  the  Middle  East,  House  For- 
eign Affairs  Committee,  July  12,  1989 
(Current  Policy  #1196). 

Ongoing  Efforts  for  Peace  in  the  Middle 
East,  Assistant  Secretary  Kelly,  Subcom- 
mittee on  Europe  and  the  Middle  East, 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee,  Sept. 
19,  1989  (Current  Policy  #1211). 

Narcotics 

Global  Narcotics  Cooperation  and  Presiden- 
tial Certification,  Assistant  Secretary 
Wrobleski,  Subcommittee  on  Terrorism, 
Narcotics,  and  International  Communica- 
tions, Senate  Foreign  Relations  Commit- 
tee, Apr.  5,  1989  (Current  Policy  #1165). 

Narcotics 

Orderly  Departure  of  Refugees  From  Viet- 
nam, Acting  Director  for  Refugee  Pro- 
grams Funseth,  Subcommittee  on 
Immigration,  Refugees,  and  Interna- 
tional Law,  House  Judiciary  Committee, 
June  28,  1989  (Current  Policy  #1199). 

United  Nations 

The  Concept  of  the  "Unitary  UN,"  Assistant 
Secretary  Bolton,  Geneva  group 
consultative-level  meeting,  Geneva, 
June  29,  1989  (Current  Policv  #1191). 

U.S.-UNESCO  Relations,  Acting  Deputy 
Assistant  Secretary  Ponticelli,  interna- 
tional symposium  for  engineering  deans 
and  industry  leaders  sponsored  by  Ohio 
State  University's  College  of  Engineering 
in  cooperation  with  UNESCO,  Columbus, 
July  17,  1989  (Current  Policy  #1201). 

The  United  States  and  UNESCO:  1989,  As- 
sistant Secretary  Bolton,  Subcommittee 
on  International  Operations,  House  For- 
eign Affairs  Committee,  Sept.  19,  1989 
(Current  Policy  #1214). 


Western  Hemisphere 

Cuba:  A  Threat  to  Peace  and  Security  in 
Our  Hemisphere,  Deputy  Assistant  Secre- 
tary Kozak,  Subcommittee  on  Western 
Hemisphere  Affairs,  House  Foreign 
Affairs  Committee,  Aug.  2,  1989  (Current 
Policy  #1204). 

The  OAS  and  the  Crisis  in  Panama,  Acting 
Secretary  Eagleburger,  OAS,  Aug.  24, 
1989  (Current  Policy  #1205). 

U.S.-Brazil  Relations  (GIST,  July  1989). 

Central  America:  U.S.  Policy  (GIST,  Sept. 
1989). 

U.S.-Nicaragua  Relations  (GIST,  Oct.  1989). 

Prospects  for  Democratic  Elections  in 
Nicaragua,  July  1989  (Regional  Brief).  ■ 


Background  Notes 


This  series  provides  brief,  factual  summa- 
ries of  the  people,  history,  government, 
economy,  and  foreign  relations  of  about  170 
countries  (excluding  the  United  States)  and 
of  selected  international  organization^. 
Recent  revisions  are: 

Canada  (June  1989) 
France  (June  1989) 
Guinea  (Sept.  1989) 
Guyana  (May  1989) 
Honduras  (Sept.  1989) 
Hungary  (May  1989) 
Korea,  North  (July  1989) 
Libya  (Sept.  1989) 
Morocco  (July  1989) 
Mozambique  (May  1989) 
New  Zealand  (July  1989) 
Norway  (July  1989) 
Oman  (June  1989) 
Panama  (June  1989) 
Papua  New  Guinea  (July  1989) 
Philippines  (Sept.  1989) 
Saudi  Arabia  (July  1989) 
Sweden  (July  1989) 

A  free  copy  of  the  index  only  may  be  ob- 
tained from  the  Public  Information  Division, 
Bureau  of  Public  Affairs,  Department  of 
State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

For  about  60  Background  Notes  a  year, 
a  subscription  is  available  from  the  Superin- 
tendent of  Documents,  U.S.  Government 
Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402, 
for  $14.00  (domestic)  and  $17.50  (foreign). 
Cheek  or  money  order,  made  payable  to 
the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  must 
accompany  order.  ■ 


82 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/November  VJ 


lEX 


Kjmber  1989 
)hme  89,  No.  2152 


a.istan.  Secretary's  News  Briefings 

1  ,>w  York  31 

nControl 

ifience  Against  Chemical  Weapons 

:ke)  ..'. 45 

E.nd  CSBM  Tallis  Open  Round  Three 

Nile  House  statement)  46 

li^s  of  a  New  World  of  Freedom 

m 27 

narv's  News  Briefings  in  New 

u.   .' 31 

r^ary's  News  Conference  of 

ejember  19  39 

ilyoming  Ministerial  (Baker, 
hfardnadze,  texts  of  joint  statements 

nagreements)  1 

Ipria.  U.S.  Recalls  Ambassador  to 

iu^aria  (Department  statement)  59 

nodia.  Cambodia  and  Vietnam: 
rbped  in  an  Eddy  of  History? 

vimim)    47 

I!.  St'cretary's  News  Briefings  in 

:.  York 31 

I  -hia.  Colombia  Drug  Dealers' 
;i,|iaign  of  Intimidation  (Department 

;;>mrnt) 78 

(less 

);A  Threat  to  Peace  and  Security  in 

HI  Hemisphere  (Kozak)   75 

ej'ndence  Process  in  Namibia 

ien)    43 

■tl  K vents  in  the  Middle  East 

\ly)   61 

.q  Related  Aspects  of  Intellectual 

fierty  Rights  (Hills) 55 

Ji  Cuba;  A  Threat  to  Peace  and  Security 

lur  Hemisphere  (Kozak) 75 

)iimics.  Outlines  of  a  New  World  of 

Y'dom(Bush) 27 

ifionment.  Outlines  of  a  New  World 

freedom  (Bush)   27 

lin  Right.s.  U.S.  Recalls  Ambassador  to 

iijaria  (Department  statement) 59 

ei'ctual  Property.  Trade-Related  As- 
t  s  of  Intellectual  Property  Rights 

His) 55 

eiational  Law.  Update  on  U.S. -Iran 
Itms  Settlement  (State  Department  fact 

h>t) 60 

Biational  Organizations  &  Confer- 
res.  Conference  Against  Chemical 
^ipims  (Clarke)   45 


Iran 

Recent  Events  in  the  Middle  East 
(Kelly)   61 

Update  on  U.S. -Iran  Claims  Settlement 
(State  Department  fact  sheet)    60 

Japan.  Visit  of  Japanese  Prime  Minister 
(Bush,  Kaifu)  51 

Lebanon 

Recent  Events  in  the  Middle  East 
(Kelly)   61 

U.S.  Diplomats  Evacuated  From  Beirut 
(Department  statement) 62 

Middle  East 

Recent  Events  in  the  Middle  East 
(Kelly)   61 

Secretary's  News  Briefings  in  New 
York   31 

Secretary's  News  Conference  of 
September  19  39 

Namibia.  Independence  Process  in 
Namibia  (Cohen) 43 

Narcotics.  Colombia  Drug  Dealers' 
Campaign  of  Intimidation  (Department 
statement) 78 

Nicaragua.  Secretary's  News  Conference 
of  September  19 39 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization.  CFE 
and  CSBM  Talks  Open  Round  Three 
(White  House  statement)  46 

Organization  of  American  States.  The 
OAS  and  the  Panama  Crisis  (Eagleburger, 
declaration)    67 

Panama 

Economic  Measures  Against  Panama  (De- 
partment statement)   69 

The  OAS  and  the  Panama  Crisis  (Eagle- 
burger,  declaration) 67 

Secretary's  News  Briefings  in  New 
York   31 

U.S.  Severs  Diplomatic  Contact  With 
Noriega  Regime  (Bush) 69 

Poland 

Additional  Food  and  Commodity  Assistance 
to  Poland  (Bush)   " 60 

Polish  Parliament  Approves  New  Govern- 
ment (Department  statement) 60 

Secretary's  News  Conference  of 
September  19  39 

Presidential  Documents 

Additional  P^ood  and  Commodity  Assistance 
to  Poland  60 

Outlines  of  a  New  World  of  Freedom 27 

U.S.  Severs  Diplomatic  Contact  With 
Noriega  Regime   69 

Visit  of  Japanese  Prime  Minister  (Bush, 
Kaifu) 51 

Publications 

Background  Notes  82 

Department  of  State 81 


Refugees.  U.S.,  Vietnam  Agree  on  Emigra- 
tion of  Detainees  (joint  statement)  ....  63 

South  Africa 

Secretary's  News  Conference  of  Septem- 
ber 19  39 

South  African  Elections  (Department 
statement) 44 

Terrorism.  The  Japanese  Red  Army  (fact 
sheet) 64 

Trade 

Trade-Related  Aspects  of  Intellectual 
Property  Rights  (Hills) 55 

Uruguay  Round  and  U.S.  Trade  Policy:  A 
Foundation  for  the  Future  (Hills) 53 

Treaties 

Current  Actions   79 

The  Wyoming  Ministerial  (Baker,  Shev- 
ardnadze, texts  of  joint  statements  and 
agreements)  1 

U.S.S.R. 

Secretary's  News  Briefings  in  New 
York   .' 31 

Secretary's  News  Conference  of 
September  19  39 

The  Wyoming  Ministerial  (Baker,  Shev- 
ardnadze, texts  of  joint  statements  and 
agreements)  1 

LInited  Nations 

Outlines  of  a  New  World  of  Freedom 
(Bush) 27 

Security  Council  Permanent  Members 
Discuss  International  Issues  (joint 
statement) 66 

Vietnam 

Cambodia  and  Vietnam:  Trapped  in  an 

Eddy  of  History?  (Solomon) 47 

U.S.,  Vietnam  Agree  on  Emigration  of  De- 
tainees (joint  statement)   63 

Warsaw  Pact.  CFE  and  CSBM  Talks 
Open  Round  Three  (White  House 
statement) 46 

Name  Index 

Baker,  Secretary   1,  31,  39 

Bush,  President' 27,  51,  60,  69 

Clarke,  Richard  A    45 

Cohen,  Herman  J   43 

Eagleburger,  Lawrence  S 67 

Hills,  Carla  A  53,  55 

Kaifu,  Toshiki 51 

Kelly,  John  H   61 

Kozak,  Michael  G 75 

Shevardnadze,  Eduard  A 1 

Solomon,  Richard  H 47 


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15  THE 
r    ISSO& 

^  cove*r". 


Department 
of  State 


V    of  State  ^^  V    ^ 

buUetBn 


ne  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volume  89  /  Number  2153 


9/2153 

ifnt  of  State  Bulleti... 


December  1989 


Dppariineni  of  Siaip 

bulletin 


Volume  • 


Number  2153  /  December  1989 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public  Com- 
munication in  the  Bureau  of  Public  Af- 
fairs, is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide 
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but  should  not  necessarily  be  inter- 
preted as  official  U.S.  policy 
statements. 


JAMESA.  BAKER,  III 

Secretaiy  of  Stale 

MARGARET  DeB.  TUTWILER 

Assistant  Secretary 
for  Public  Affairs 

ANTHONY  A.  DAS 

Director, 

Office  of  Public  Communication 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 

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Assistant  Editor 


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n 


CONTENTS 


FEATURE 


Mexico 


Visit  of  Mexican  President  Salinas  (President  Bush,  Carlos 

Salinas  de  Gortari,  Fact  Sheets  07i  Agreements) 
Mexico — A  Profile 


Te  President 

8        Freedom  and  World  Prosperity 

Te  Secretary 

Kj  Points  of  Mutual  Advantage: 
Perestroika  and  American 
Foreign  Policy 

1i       Prerequisites  and  Principles  for 
Anns  Control 
U.S.-Soviet  Relations:  A  Discus- 
sion of  Perestroika  and 
Economic  Reform 

2t       Interview  on  "Meet  the  Press" 

Arica 


2!       South  Africa  (Herman  J.  Cohen) 
3'        Efforts  Toward  Peace  and  Recon- 
ciliation in  Angola  (Warren 
Clark,  Jr.) 
3;       President's  Meeting  With  UNITA 
Leader  (White  House  State- 
yyient) 

/>ms  Control 

31        Nuclear  and  Space  Arms  Talks 

Open  12th  Round 

(Richard  R.  Burt) 
3:        Defense  and  Space  Talks  Open 

12th  Round  (Henry  F.  Cooper) 


East  Asia 

34        The  Promise  of  Pacific  Economic 
Cooperation  (Richard  H. 
Solomon) 

37         Political  Situation  in  Bui-ma 
(David  F.  Lambertson) 

Europe 

39         Assistance  for  Poland  and  Hun- 
gary (White  House  Statement) 

39         Constitutional  Amendments  in 
Hungary  (White  House  State- 
ment) 

41         Third  Report  on  Cyprus 

(Message  to  the  Congress) 

41  President's  Meeting  With  Cyprus 

President  (White  House  State- 
ment) 

42  Visit  of  Italian  President 

(President  Bush,  Francesco 
Cossiga) 

43  Italy— A  Profile 

44  President  Meets  With  NATO 

Secretary  General  (Wliite 
House  Statement) 


Middle  East 

45  President  Meets  With  Egyptian 

President  (Secretary  Baker) 

46  Agreement  on  Lebanese  National 

Reconciliation  (Department 

Statement) 


United  Nations 

53         UN  Mandate  Under  Central 

America  Agi-eements  (Depart- 
ment Statement,  Secretary's 
Lettefr  to  UN  Secretary  General) 

53  United  Nations  Day,  1989 

(Proclamation) 

54  Cuba's  Human  Rights  Abuses 

Under  the  UN  Spotlight 
(Armando  Valladares) 


Western  Hemisphere 

55  Terrorist  Attacks  in  El  Salvador 

(Department  Statements) 

56  President  Meets  With  Colombian 

President  (White  House  State- 
ment) 

Treaties 

57  Current  Actions 

Press  Releases 

59  Department  of  State 

Publications 

60  CSCE  Semiannual  Report 

Released 

Index 


Terrorism 

47         Cooperation  in  Countering 

TeiTorism  (Morris  D.  Busby) 

49         Sende7-o  Luminoso:  Peruvian  Ter- 
rorist Group 


FEATURE 


FEATURE 


Mexico 


Visit  of  Mexican  President  Salinas 


President  Carlos  Salinas  de  Gortari 

of  the  United  Mexican  States 

made  a  state  visit  to  the  United  States  of  America 

October  1-6,  1989,  to  meet  with  President  Bush 

and  other  government  officials. 

Following  are  remarks  made  by  the  two  Presidents 

on  October  3  at  the  welcoming  ceremony, 

at  the  agreements'  signing  ceremony,  and  at  the  state  dinner.^ 


Welcoming  Ceremony^ 


lesident  Bush 

I  ss  than  1  year  ago,  we  met  in  Houston, 
Ixas,  as  two  Presidents-elect  and  began 
t  focus  on  what  for  each  of  us  is  a  major 
Eesidential  responsibility:  defining  and 
Ehancing  the  U.S.-Mexican  relationship. 

You  and  I  went  to  Houston  certain  of 
t?  importance  of  our  responsibilities,  for 
crs  is  one  of  the  world's  broadest  and 
Dst  complex  bilateral  relationships.  But 
Ihink  that  few  could  have  envisioned 
ts  degi-ee  of  success  that  our  talks 
6)uld  have.  That  success  was  embodied 
t  what  has  come  to  be  known  as  the 
''Dii'it  of  Houston" — our  joint  commit- 
rmt  to  create  a  framework  of  mutual 
tist  and  understanding.  And  in  the  past 
i,ar  that  spirit  has  strengthened  our 
fexican-American  ties. 

Together  Mexico  and  the  United 
:ates  have  worked  to  negotiate  a  solu- 
tm  to  the  debt  question  and  develop 

! eater  cooperation  in  the  war  against 
ugs.  Together  we've  improved  oppor- 
Enities  for  bilateral  trade  and  invest- 
5nt  and  nuitured  our  envu-onment;  in 
m,  finding  new  ways  to  reaffii'm  old 


bonds.  When  President  Salinas  and  I  met 
last  July  in  Paris,  these  steps  were  al- 
ready underway — steps  crucial  to 
countries  with  such  shared  social, 
economic,  and  regional  interests. 

Now,  as  I  welcome  President  Salinas 
to  our  capital  for  his  first  state  visit,  I 
look  foi-ward  to  continued  progress  and 
additional  proof  of  how  Mexico  and  the 
United  States  can  work  together  toward 
common  ends,  towai'd  positive  results. 
Those  ends  are  reflected  in  today's  agen- 
da, for  as  major  trading  partners  we  must 
explore  ways  to  expand  our  commerce 
and,  as  members  of  the  Organization  of 
American  States,  discuss  how  democracy 
can  be  restored  to  Panama  and  free  and 
fair  elections  held  in  Nicaragua. 

This  year  we  celebrate  a  centui-y  of 
joint  projects  by  the  International  Bound- 
ary and  Water  Commission.  We  must 
renew  that  cooperation  and  continue  to 
strengthen  our  assault  on  the  plague  of 
ding  use  and  trafficking,  for  we  know 
that  what  threatens  one  nation  in  oui- 
hemisphere  threatens  us  all.  In  each  case, 
strong  bilateral  cooperation  is  fundamen- 
tal to  an  effective  multilateral  response. 
Thankfully  our  countries  share  the  good 
will  and  dedication  to  confront  and  meet 
our  challenges — meet  them  through 
mutual  candor,  through  mutual  i-espect. 


I've  often  spoken  of  the  need  to 
recognize  the  permanent  importance  of 
the  U.S.-Mexican  relationship.  And  I'd 
like  again  to  refer  to  that  need  today,  for 
U.S.-Mexican  affairs  are  vital  to  oui- 
respective  national  agendas.  Our  rela- 
tions now  are  strong,  and  they  must  grow 
even  stronger — and  they  will. 

On  behalf  of  the  United  States  of 
America,  President  Salinas  and  Mrs. 
Salinas,  let  me  welcome  you  both  to  the 
White  House,  and  to  this  country,  and  to 
your  fi'iends. 


President  Salinas 

It  gives  me  gi-eat  pleasure  to  come  to  this 
land  of  liberty.  I  bring  the  greetings  and 
the  desire  of  the  Mexican  people  to  raise 
our  finendship  with  the  United  States  to 
a  new  level  of  direct,  effective,  and 
respectful  dialogue  and  to  an  economic 
cooperation  without  precedent  for  our 
common  prosperity.  I  am  deeply  gi'ateful 
for  the  welcome  that  I  have  received 
from  you  and  fi"om  your  wife,  Mrs.  Bush, 
and  from  many  Americans  in  this  beauti- 
ful city  of  Washington. 

I  come  to  share  with  you  the  idea 
that  one's  own  well-being  is  more  lasting 
when  it  is  accompanied  by  the  well-being 
of  others.  I  come  here  convinced  that 
there  is  a  spirit  of  cordiality  between  us — 


epartment  of  State  Bulletin/December  1989 


FEATURE 


Mexico 


born  in  Houston,  reaffirmed  in  Paris,  and 
ratified  in  Camp  David — which  is  ready 
to  aid  us  in  making  the  most  of  our  points 
in  common  and  resolving  our  differences.  . 
That  is  the  basis  of  finendly  relations  be- 
tween two  neighbors  who  are  different 
but  determined  to  benefit  from  their 
coexistence  and  to  hve  up  to  the  values 
that  their  people  share. 

We  have  good  reasons  to  take  new 
steps  in  those  matters  that  concern  and 
interest  both  of  our  countries:  a  less  un- 
certain world,  one  that  is  less  threatened 
and  more  propitious  to  the  development 
of  all  nations;  a  cordial  and  respectful 
bilateral  relationship  that  will  loosen  fet- 
ters of  inertia,  improve  mutual  under- 
standing, and  permit  the  steady 
development  of  the  human  potential  of 
our  peoples.  We  can  open  a  new  stage  in 
trade  between  our  countries.  We  can  find 
a  way  to  deal  more  humanely  wath  the 
migi-ation  of  Me.xicans  to  the  United 
States.  We  can  strike  lethal  blows  against 
drug  trafficking  to  free  the  world  from 
that  international  scourge.  We  can 
respond  to  the  urgent  demand  for  a 
healthier  environment,  for  an  ecological 
future  of  the  kind  that  cm-  children 
deserve.  These  are  topics  that  will  occupy 
our  closest  attention. 

The  history  of  our  relations  provides 
examples  that  show  us  how  valuable  it  is 
for  us  to  cooperate  and  how  sterile  con- 
frontation is.  Working  together,  we  have 
gotten  to  know  each  other  better,  and  we 
have  learned  to  take  more  advantage  of 
the  opportunities  that  arise  from  our  com- 
plex interrelationship. 

We  are  neighbors  who  are  important 
to  each  other.  We  shall  study  our  common 
problems  and  move  toward  resolving 
them,  because  it  is  in  the  interest  of  the 
Mexican  and  the  American  peoples  to 
turn  neighbors  into  friends  and  challeng- 
es into  opportunities  for  our  mutual 
benefit.  May  this  gi-eeting  to  President 
Bush  be  seen  as  well  as  the  expression  of 
our  most  cordial  gi'eeting  to  all  the  people 
of  the  United  States  of  America. 


Signing  Ceremony 
for  Agreements 


President  Bush 

Let  me  just  say  that  these  agreements 
we're  about  to  sign  are  symbolic  of  the 
breadth  and  ever-growing  closeness  of 
the  U.S.-Mexican  ties.  They  do  prove  the 
special  relationship  between  our 
countries;  it's  never  been  stronger.  And  I 
welcome  them  as  a  commitment  of  our 
two  governments  and  of  the  President 
and  myself  to  make  progress  over  a  wide 
variety  of  issues. 

The  understanding  regarding  trade 
and  investment  facilitation  talks,  for  ex- 
ample, moves  beyond  the  consultation  en- 
couraged by  our  framework  understand- 
ing on  trade  to  create  a  mandate  for 
negotiation.  By  taking  the  initiative,  we 
will  promote  the  increased  trade  and  in- 
vestment that  can  benefit  both  sides  of 
our  border. 

The  agreement  on  the  protection  and 
improvement  of  the  environment  of 
Mexico  City  is  also  significant,  pai'ticulai*- 
ly  in  these  times,  for  it  commits  our 
governments  to  jointly  find  ways  to 
resolve  air  and  other  pollution  problems 
in  one  of  the  largest  cities  in  the  world. 
Improving  the  quaHty  of  Ufe  for  our 
people  is  a  priority  for  both  of  our  govern- 
ments, and  we  welcome  the  personal  com- 
mitment to  this  matter  by  President 
Sahnas  and  his  leaderehip.  So  is  finding  a 
balanced  response  important — a  balanced 
response  to  our  envii-onmental  needs. 
This  agreement  confi-onts  those  needs. 

These  two  agreements,  and  others 
that  will  be  signed  this  afternoon,  as  well 
as  our  joint  efforts  to  fashion  a  plan  for 
addressing  Me.xico's  external  debt,  ai-e 
concrete  examples  of  how  our  Administra- 
tions have  worked  closely  together 
during  the  last  10  months.  These  agree- 
ments come  from  teamwork.  They  show 
what  can  and  must  be  done  to  maJ<e  rela- 
tions between  our  two  gi-eat  nations  even 
closer  than  they  are  today.  Mi-.  President, 
I  am  delighted  to  be  with  you  as  we  wit- 
ness the  signing  of  these  two  historic 


agreements,  and  I  would  welcome  youj 
comments. 

President  Salinas 

The  signing  of  these  agreements  simp] 
comes  to  show  the  atmosphere  of 
friendship  that  leads  to  concrete  result! 
which  will  undoubtedly  benefit  our  tw( 
nations. 

The  fii'st  one,  the  one  on  trade  anc 
vestments,  for  the  facilitation  of  trade 
and  investment,  simply  opens  up  addit 
al  sources  of  emplojinent  in  Mexico  foi 
Mexicans.  It  is  also  encom-aging  the  ex 
port  of  products  to  generate  well-beinj 
among  all  oui-  citizens.  It  will  further  t 
investment  processes  so  that  Mexicans 
can  find  a  job  in  Mexico.  That  is  the 
central  purpose  of  my  visit  to  this 
country.  This  is  a  good  and  very  positi^ 
atmosphere  of  dialogue  which  shows 
respect  in  our  relations.  There  ai-e  dif- 
ferences, there  are  points  of  coincidenc 
But  what  it  simply  comes  to  show  is  th 
although  we  have  differences,  we  have 
respect  for  them.  In  trade  we  have  mO' 
points  of  convergence  that  could  even 
furthered.  Mexico  has  a  political  vnll  in 
order  to  translate  these  specific  agi'ee- 
ments  into  benefits  that  will  become  a 
reaUty. 

The  second  one,  which  is  the  agree 
ment  on  the  protection  and  the  improv 
ment  of  the  envii-onment,  is,  as  you  mi{ 
well  realize,  of  great  relevance.  Mexico 
City,  the  metropolitan  area  of  Mexico, : 
the  most  populated  and  most  polluted 
city  in  the  world.  The  number  of  in- 
habitants that  this  city  has  is  more  tha: 
the  total  population  of  Central  Americi 
We  want  better  air  for  the  Mexicans,  ft 
their  children,  and  for  the  children  of 
then-  children  in  Mexico. 

The  signing  of  these  agreements  is 
proof  of  the  good  will  that  e.xists  betwei 
the  two  countries  in  relation  to  the 
benefits  that  this  will  derive  for  Me.xicQ 
and  for  those  who  will  vi.sit  Mexico,  to  r 
only  i-eceive  its  vei-y  cordial  and  brothe 
ly  hospitality  but  to  enjoy  its  beauty  an 
its  culture. 

May  my  recognition  and  my  acknc 
ledgment  go  together  with  my  gi-atitud 
for  the  veiy  positive  attitude  that  the 
U.S.  Government  has  shown  in  this  ope 


' 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  19 


FEATURE 


Mexico 


l:log:ue  which  is  proved  today  when  we 
)scribe  and  sign  these  agreements  for 
b  benefit  of  the  two  countries. 


Dinner  Toasts 


esident  Bush 

President  and  Mrs.  SaUnas  and 
lored  guests  and  ladies  and  gentlemen, 
•bara  and  I  ai-e  just  delighted  to  wel- 
16  you  to  the  White  House.  Your 
ntry  has  often  extended  to  us  that 
dness  for  which  Mexico  is  so  famous, 
light,  we  are  honored  to  have  you  both 
e. 

We  fii-st  met  last  November  in  Hous- 
,  Texas.  We  met,  if  I  might  add  this 
sonal  note,  the  day  after  your  Har- 
d  football  team  fell  to  the  mighty  men 
fale.  It  seemed  at  the  time  like  an  in- 
picious  start,  somehow.  But  we've 
med  anew  how  special  the  relation- 
p — you're  trying  to  get  even — 
ighter] — the  relationship  between 
xico  and  the  United  States  can  be,  this 
itionship  which  has  been,  and  con- 
ies to  be,  bound  by  so  many  ties, 
've  become  good  friends.  Those  ties,  of 
irse,  include  our  2,000-mile  border  and 
ions  of  dollars  in  trade,  and  they're 
icational,  they're  political,  they're 
nomic,  they're  envu'onmental.  Our 
5  rest  on  respect,  maturity,  and  com- 
nication,  consultation.  The  values  that 
cherish  link  our  cultm-es:  values  of 
;h,  family,  and  respect  for  tradition. 

As  a  young  man,  you  did  study  in  the 
ited  States.  You  know  us  well,  and  you 
ne  to  understand  our  ties.  I,  too, 
'ere  them,  for,  as  a  Texan,  I've  lived 
ny  years  side-by-side  virith  Mexico  and 
5W  and  appreciate  your  beautiful 
mtry  and  its  wonderful  people.  Such 
lerstanding,  I  think,  leads  to  trust,  and 
:h  trust  can  lead  to  progress.  Speaking 
ti-ust,  I  trust  that  you  ch-ied  out  from 
;  golf  cart  tour  of  Camp  David  on  Sun- 
y.  [Laughter]  There  was  a  true  down- 
ur.  President  and  Mrs.  Salinas  came  up 
;re  in  the  mountains.  But  I  was  anxious 


President  and  Mrs.  Bush  and  President  and  Mrs.  Salinas  before  the  state  dinner  at 
the  White  House. 


for  the  President  to  look  around,  so  he 
and  I  set  out  on  a  golf  cart  in  this  driving 
rain.  Barbara  was  convinced  that  I  had 
just  dealt  a  severe  blow  to  Mexican- 
United  States  relations.  [Laughter]  It  is 
this  kind  of  trast  that  I'm  talking  about. 
For,  from  its  eai-liest  days,  your  Ad- 
ministration has  acted  as  our  neighbor 
and  equal  partner,  and  known  that  by  ap- 
plying oui'  resoui'ces  to  common  problems 
we  can  ensure  a  richer  life  for  all. 

Let  us  deteitnine  to  do  more.  Let  us 
increase  bilateral  trade  and  achieve 
economic  gi-owth.  Let's  e.xpand  coopera- 
tion and  enhance  investment  opportunity. 
And  let  us  support  democracy  in  our 


hemisphere,  and  thus,  regional  security 
and  stability.  We  must  also  reaffirm  our 
commitment  to  combating  narcotics;  that 
is  both  a  national  priority  and  a  hemi- 
spheric crusade.  I  thank  you  for  your  fan- 
tastic cooperation  in  this  regard,  for 
unless  we  defeat  drug  use  and  trafficking, 
we  will  help  rob  our  children  of  their  very 
dreams. 

There's  an  ancient  proverb  which 
goes:  "God  guides  whom  he  wills  to  a 
straight  path."  Mr.  President,  let  our  path 
be  straight  and  ti-ue,  affiiTning  all  that 
which  imites  us,  and  so  enrich  this  genera- 
tion and  all  the  generations  to  come.  In 
that  spirit,  I  ask  all  of  you,  our  guests 


FEATURE 


Mexico 


here  this  evening,  to  rise  and  raise  your 
glasses  to  Mexican-American  Mendship, 
to  a  better  world  for  om-  children  and  all 
cliildren,  and  to  the  health  and  happiness 
of  our  fiiend  and  colleague,  the  President 
of  Mexico,  and  Mrs.  Salinas. 

President  Salinas 

President  George  Bush,  Mi-s.  Barbara 
Bush,  ladies  and  gentlemen,  dear  friends, 
I  would  like  at  this  dinner  to  express  my 
gi-atitude  to  the  people  and  Government 
of  the  United  States  for  the  warmth  they 
have  shown  toward  the  Mexican  delega- 
tion which  I  head.  I  have  found  in  Presi- 
dent George  Bush  a  fi'iend  who  is  not 
only  worthy  of  esteem  but  also  an  out- 
standing leader  who,  in  the  shoit  time  he 
has  been  in  office,  has  managed  to  give  a 
new  thrust  to  the  United  States  and  to 
national  i-elations  based  on  the  human  un- 
derstanding that  is  the  legacy  of  freedom 
handed  down  by  the  Founding  Fathers  of 
this  great  Republic. 

We  Mexicans  have  been  witnesses  to 
yom-  willingness  to  engage  in  fi-ank,  open, 
and  substantive  dialogue.  This  has  been  a 
good  starting  point  for  embarking  on  a 
different  phase  in  our  bilateral  relation. 
The  same  applies  to  the  congressmen  and 
officials  wdth  whom  we  have  held  ft-uitful 
talks  on  both  sides  of  the  border  that 
have  led  to  improved  understanding  be- 
tween our  peoples. 

I  have  come  to  the  United  States 
with  the  intention  of  establishing  a  new 
i-elationship  of  friendship.  Free  of  myths 
and  mistnist,  I  have  come  determined  to 
stress  common  points  of  view  and  shared 
ideals,  to  pave  the  way  for  a  mutually 
respectful  united  and  solitary  progress  as 
neighbors  toward  the  future.  We  ai-e 
aware  of  the  historical  difficulties  that  we 
have  had  in  our  relations  and  of  the 
problems  that  are  still  pending.  Neverthe- 
less we  are  sure  that  the  time  has  come 
to  derive  mutual  benefits  from  the  ad- 
vantages of  the  border  that  joins  us, 
thereby  strengthening  the  identity  of 
each  nation  at  a  time  of  profound 
worldwide  changes. 

In  Mexico  we  are  presently  ex- 
periencing a  time  of  renewed  social  op- 
timism. On  concluding  an  important  stage 


Mexico — A  Profile 


Geography 

Area:  1.978  million  .sq.  km.  (764,000  sq.  mi.); 
about  thi'ee  time.s  the  size  of  Texas.  Cities: 
Capital — Mexico  City  (pop.  18  million,  est. 
1985).  Other  cities — Guadalajara  (  3  million), 
Monterrey  (2.7  million),  Ciudad  Juai-ez  (1.12 
million),  Puebla  de  Zaragoza  (1.1  million),  Leon 
(1  million).  Terrain:  Varies  from  coastal 
lowlands  to  high  mountains.  Climate:  Varies 
from  tropical  to  deseit. 

People 

Nationality:  Ncm  ti  a  >id  adjective — 
Mexicandi).  Population  (July  1987):  81.9  mil- 
lion. Annual  growth  rate  (1987  est.):  2.09%. 
Ethnic  groups:  Indian-Spanish  (mestizo) 
60%,  American  Indian  30%,  Caucasian  9%, 
other  1%.  Religion:  Roman  Catholic  97%, 
Protestant  3%.  Language:  Spanish,  many  In- 
dian dialects.  Education:  Years  cam/mlsory — 
10.  Lrteraci/— 88%.  Health: /n/ani  mortality 
rate  (1984)— 51/1,000.  Life  expectancy 
( 1 984)— 65.4  years.  Work  force  (26.3  million, 
1985):  Seti'ices — 31.4%'.  Agncultiire,  foi-estry, 
hunting,  fishing~26%.  Commerce — 13.9%. 
Manufacturing — 12.8%.  Constructicm — 9.5%. 
Mining  and  qiuin-ying — 1.3%.  Transportation 
and  communications — 4.8%.  Electricity — 
0.3%. 

Government 

Type:  Federal  Republic.  Independence: 

First  proclaimed  Sept.  16, 1810;  Republic  es- 
tabhshed  1822.  Constitution:  Feb.  5,  1917. 

Branches:  Executive — president  (chief 
of  state  and  head  of  government).  Legislative — 
bicameral.  J»dir(a;— Supreme  Court,  local  and 
federal  systems. 

Political  parties:  Institutional  Revolu- 
tionai-y  Party  (PRI),  National  Action  Pai-ty 
(PAN),  Party  of  Democratic  Revolution 
(PRD),  Populai-  Socialist  Pai-ty  (PPS),  the 
Authentic  Paity  of  the  Mexican  Revolution 
(PARM),  Party  of  the  Cardenist  Front  of  Na- 
tional Reconstrtiction  (PFCRN).  Suffrage: 
Universal  over  18. 


in  the  process  of  renegotiating  the 
foreign  debt  a  few  months  ago,  we 
provided  Me.xicans  with  a  new  horizon  for 
progress.  I  extend  my  gi-atitude  to  Presi- 
dent Bush  for  the  understanding  and 


Administrative  subdivisions:  31 

states  and  the  federal  district. 

Flag:  Green,  white,  and  red  vertical 
bands.  An  eagle  holding  a  snake  in  its  beak  at 
perciiing  on  a  cactus  is  centered. 

Economy 

GDP  ( 1 987  est ):  $1 26  billion.  Per  capita 
GDP  (1987  est.):  $1,537.  Annual  real  GDP 
gi-owth  (1987  est.):  1.5%.  Avg.  inflation  rat> 

(1987  prehm.):  158.8%. 

Natural  resources:  Petroleum,  silver, 
copper,  gold,  lead,  zinc,  natural  gas,  timber. 

Agriculture:  Products — corn,  beans,  o: 
seeds,  feedgrains,  fruit,  cotton,  coffee,  sugar- 
cane, winter  vegetables. 

Industry:  Types — manufacturing,  serv 
ices,  commerce,  transportation  and  com- 
munications, petroleum  and  mining. 

Trade  (1987  est):  £'.rpof/.s— g^Hi  billion 
manufactui-ing  48%,  petroleum  an^terivativ 
42%,  agi'iculture  7%,  mining 3%.  Imports — 
$12.1  billion:  intermediate  goods  73%,  capital 
goods  21%,  consumer  goods  6%.  Major  tradit 
partners — US,  EC,  Japan. 

Official  exchange  rate  (midJan.  1988 
2.207  pesos=US$1.00  (controlled  rate);  2,223 
pesos=US$1.00  (free  market  rate). 

Membership  in 
International  Organizations 

UN  and  some  of  it.s  specialized  and  related 
agencies,  including  the  World  Bank,  the  Inter 
national  Monetary  Fund  (IMF),  and  the  Inter 
national  Civil  Aviation  Organization  ( ICAO); 
the  General  Agreement  on  Tai-iffs  and  Ti-ade 
(GATT);  Seabeds  Committee;  Inter-American 
Defense  Board  (lADB):  Organization  of 
American  States  (OAS);  Latin  American  In- 
tegration Association  (ALADI);  INTELSAT^ 
and  many  others. 


Taken  from  the  Background  Notes  of  Feb. 
1988,  published  by  the  Bureau  of  Public  Af- 
faij's.  Department  of  State.  Editor:  Juanita 
Adams.  ■ 


solidarity  he  has  shown  which  enabled  us 
to  reach  a  successful  outcome  to  this  im- 
portant process  so  essential  for  oui- 
gi'owth. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  198!i 


FEATURE 


Mexico 


I  In  Mexico  we  are  determined  to  mod- 
lize  om-  country.  We  Mexicans  are  seek- 
ifthe  best  way  to  mobilize  the  full 
icjntial  of  social  energy,  of  groups,  and 
ifegions.  Despite  a  severe  economic 
rds,  we  have  not  succumbed  to  apathy 
ir.espair.  With  strong  institutions  we 

I  cuiTently  striving  to  regain  oui- 
lilwth  and  to  continue  transfoi-ming  our 
ciiDmic  stiTJctures  and  renovating  om- 
Ktical  practices.  Rights  and  respon- 

i  lities  are  now  becoming  a  salient  fea- 
1 .'  (if  all  social  activities,  the  economy, 

1 H  ilitics.  The  needs  and  dreams  of 
/Aicans,  especially  those  of  modest 

II  ms,  demand  this  major  transforma- 
i'l. 

Ti-ade  exchanges  worldwide  have  in- 
dsified  significantly  with  the  shortening 
il  istances.  Accordingly,  exchanges  be- 
Ti'en  our  countries  are  increasingly 
Hiamic  and  diversified.  Ti-ade  offers  an 
':rai)rdir}M|tf  potential  for  mutual 
)( efits  artWor  gi-owlh,  which  is  essen- 
i  fur  my  country.  Few  economies  have 
II  iifd  up  as  much  and  as  rapidly  as 
,'Kiiii's.  A  similar  opening  up  of  the 
^  eiican  market  would  not  only  repre- 
(t  reciprocal  treatment  but  a  stimulus 
our  new  friendship.  A  renewed  period 
iJTadual  growth  will  enable  us  to  assign 
■eoui'ces  to  investment,  to  the 
tengthening  of  the  domestic  market, 
lil  to  the  generation  of  employment  for 
I  1  million  young  people  who  cm-rently 
1  naml  it.  My  aim  is  for  all  Mexicans  to 
i  1  work  in  Mexico.  However,  the  dif- 
tences  between  our  economies  attract 
t'xican  labor  to  contribute  to  the 
1/elopment  of  the  United  States.  We 
'.i\  do  much  to  abohsh  mistreatment  of 
»rkers  on  both  sides  of  the  border  and     ; 
.'^nsm-e  respect  for  their  dignity. 

My  government  views  the  in-depth     ; 
jht  against  drug  trafficking  as  a  tii-eless  ' 
);tle.  We  have  not  hesitated  to  resort  to 
i  itical  will  and  economic  resources  to 
)t  an  end  to  the  international  crime.        ^ 
ttny  Mexican  lives  have  been  lost  in  this  ' 
uuuie.  We  know,  however,  that  stamp- 
^;  out  the  traffic  in  droigs  is  a  matter  of 
tional  security  to  us,  of  preserving  the 
alth  of  our  youth  and  the  basic  prin- 
ile  of  international  solidarity  in  the  face 
an  evil  that  affects  us  all.  No  one  can 


feel  untouched  by  it  as  long  as  there  are 
teenagers  trapped  in  addiction  while 
their  families  look  on  helplessly. 

Bilateral  cooperation  between  our 
countries  will  be  enriched  by  concrete  ac- 
tions undertaken  by  both  governments  to 
halt  environmental  pollution  on  our  com- 
mon border,  to  make  joint  progi-ess  in  re- 
storing the  purity  of  the  air  and  water  in 
both  territories,  and  to  engage  in  com- 
mon efforts  to  protect  the  tropical  forests 
that  are  the  lungs  of  the  world.  Allow  me 
to  add  that  with  this  cooperation  regard- 
ing the  envii'onment  and  to  halt  environ- 
mental pollution,  that  will  enable  the 
children  in  Mexico  to  paint  the  sky  blue 
again  and  to  find  the  stars  in  the  sky. 

Out  of  culture,  a  valiant  history — 
invincible  in  the  face  of  adversity — has 
been  forged.  It  is  the  source  of  our  self- 
assurance,  oui-  identity,  in  opening  our 
doors  to  the  world  and  participating  in  its 
transformation.  By  strengthening  our- 
selves as  an  independent  nation  in  today's 
interdependent  world,  cooperation 
between  us  will  prosper  and  our  relation 
as  neighbors  will  become  the  new 
ftiendship  of  the  coming  decade. 


President  Bush,  Mrs.  Bush,  you  have 
given  us  a  cordial  welcome.  In  it,  we  see 
the  spuit  that  sums  up  what  has  always 
existed  between  our  peoples:  the  hope  of 
sharing  an  era  of  mutual  benefits,  of 
exploring  areas  of  agreement,  and  of 
working  side-by-side  to  shape  a  future  of 
mutual  prosperity.  By  joining  our  efforts, 
our  two  governments  can  more  clearly 
hear  the  wise,  generous  voice  of  the  men 
and  women  who  give  meaning  to  this 
meeting. 

In  this  new  stage  of  respect  and 
friendship,  let  us  join  now  in  a  toast  to 
the  strength  of  Mexico  and  of  the  United 
States;  to  a  hemisphere  with  peace, 
democracy,  and  development;  to  the 
beginning  of  a  new  ftiendship  that 
inspires  us  to  hve  up  to  the  expectations 
of  our  peoples;  and  to  your  own  well- 
being  and  that  of  your  family. 


'  Texts  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Oct.  9, 1989. 

2  Held  at  the  South  Portico  of  the  White 
House  where  President  Salinas  was  accorded  a 
foi-mal  welcome  with  full  military  honors.  ■ 


U.S.  Ambassador  to  Mexico 


John  D.  Negroponte 

was  born  Jvily  21, 1939. 
He  received  a  B.A.  de- 
gree fi'om  Yale  (1960). 
He  entered  the 
Foreign  Service  in 
1960  and  since  that 
time  has  served  as 
Vice  Consul  in  Hong 
Kong  (1961-63), 
Second  Secretary  and 
Political  Officer  in 
Saigon  (19(54-68),  mem- 
ber of  the  U.S.  delegation  to  the  Paris  peace 
talks  on  Vietnam  (1968-69),  member  of  the 
U.S.  delegation  to  the  Conference  on  Disarma- 
ment in  Geneva  (1970),  member  of  the  Nation- 
al Seciu-ity  Council  staff  (1970-73),  First 


Secretai'y  and  Political  Counselor  at  Quito 
(1973-75),  Consul  General  in  Thessaloniki 
(1975-77),  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary 
for  Oceans  and  Fisheries  Affaire  (1977-79), 
Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for  East  Asian 
and  Pacific  Affairs  (1980-81),  Ambassador  to 
Honduras  (1981-85),  Assistant  Secretai-y  for 
Oceans  and  International  Environmental  and 
Scientific  Affairs  (1985-87),  and  Deputy  Assist- 
ant to  the  President  for  National  Security  Af- 
fairs (1987-89).  In  1987,  Ambassador 
Negroponte  was  also  a  member  of  the  faculty 
at  the  Georgetown  University  School  of 
Foreign  Service  where  he  taught  a  course  on 
Science,  Technology,  and  Foreign  Policy.  He 
speaks  French,  Spanish,  and  Greek. 

He  was  sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Mexico  on  June  26, 1989.  ■ 


liartment  of  State  Bulletin/December  1989 


FEATURE 


Mexico 


Fact  Sheets 


Tourism  Agreement 

The  tourism  agreement  marks  one  more 
step  in  our  rapidly  improving  relations 
with  Mexico.  Tourism  is  Mexico's  third 
largest  industry — after  manufacturing 
and  oil — and  the  fastest  growing  one.  Its 
labor  intensiveness  brings  badly  needed 
jobs  for  Mexico's  growing  population  of 
82  million  and  is  one  of  Mexico's  largest 
foreign  exchange  earners.  Mexico's  most 
important  tourism  market  is  the  United 
States.  In  1988, 13.4  million  Americans 
traveled  to  Mexico,  spending  $4.7  billion. 
Mexicans  were  the  second  most 
numerous  visitors  to  the  United  States, 
numbering  7.5  mOlion  in  1988  and  spend- 
ing $2.7  billion. 

The  agreement,  superseding  and 
replacing  the  tourism  agreement  of  April 
1983,  will  commit  the  United  States  and 
Mexico  to  facilitate  and  promote  tourism 
in  both  countries. 

Specific  articles  call  for  the  exchange 
of  diplomatic  status  for  tourism  person- 
nel. The  development  of  a  tourist  in- 
frastructure wall  be  encom-aged  and 
expedited.  Toui-ist  travel  will  be 
facilitated  by  simplifying  and  streamlin- 
ing procedural  and  documentai-y  requii'e- 
ments,  opening  additional  border 
crossing  points,  and  encouraging  bination- 
al  cultural  events.  The  exchange  of  techni- 
cal infoiTTiation  and  documents  will  be 
encouraged  to  aid  each  country  in  the 
provision  of  tourism  sei-vices.  Both 
countries  pledge  to  improve  the 
reliability  and  compatibility  of  tourism 
statistics  with  the  establishment  of  a  bina- 
tional  technical  committee  on  tourism 
statistics.  Joint  U.S.-Mexican  marketing 
activities  in  third  countries  are  to  be  ex- 
plored. Cooperation  and  effective  par- 
ticipation in  the  World  Tourism 
Organization  will  be  encouraged.  Tourism 
matters  are  to  be  discussed  in  bilateral 
consultations  under  the  framework  of  the 
U.S.-Me.xico  Binational  Commission.  This 
tourism  agreement  is  to  remain  in  force 
for  5  years,  to  be  reviewed  and  renewed 
at  5-year  intervals  thereafter. 


Joint  Promotion  Committee 
for  Investment  and  Trade 

The  Joint  Promotion  Committee  for  In- 
vestment and  Trade  (JPCIT)  originated 
as  a  consequence  of  recent  bilateral  trade 
and  investment  discussions  between  the 
U.S.  Department  of  Commerce  and  the 
Mexican  Secretariat  of  Commerce  and 
Industrial  Development  that  focused  on 
improved  U.S.-Mexico  commercial  oppor- 
tunities. 

The  memorandum  of  understanding 
signed  at  this  meeting  will  establish  the 
JPCIT  as  a  mechanism  to  strengthen  and 
enhance  commercial  ties.  It  addresses  in- 
vestment opportunities  and  bairiers,  sup- 
ports promotion  of  these  opportunities, 
facilitates  coordination  of  trade  and  in- 
vestment promotion  events,  and  coopera- 
tion in  assembling  statistical  infomiation 
related  to  investment  flows. 

Representatives  of  the  U.S.  Depait- 
ment  of  Commerce  and  the  Mexican 
Secretariat  of  Commerce  and  Industrial 
Development  wall  meet  semiannually, 
alternating  between  the  United  States 
and  Me.xieo,  to  review  the  status  of  joint 
trade  and  investment  promotion. 

Trade  and  Investment 
Facilitation  Understanding 

The  trade  and  investment  facilitation  un- 
derstanding marks  the  deepening  and 
broadening  of  our  close  and  highly 
cooperative  economic  relationship  with 
Mexico.  Mexico  is  the  United  States' 
third  ranked  trade  partner,  pui-chasing 
over  $20  billion  of  our  exports  and  supply- 
ing nearly  $23  billion  of  our  imports.  Our 
trade  and  investment  relationship  is  vital 
to  the  well-being  and  prosperity  of  both 
nations,  and  this  understanding  signals 
both  governments'  commitment  to 
facilitating  and  enhancing  it  (note:  this 
text  is  different  and  separate  fi-om  the 
joint  trade  and  investment  promotion  un- 
derstanding). 


This  understanding  creates  a  foru 
for  expanding  the  bilateral  trade  and  i 
vestment  relationship  through  future 
negotiations.  It  builds  on  the  cooperat 
developed  under  the  1987  fi-amework  ■ 
derstanding  which  provided  a  dispute 
tlement  mechanism  for  resolving  tradi 
issues.  The  understanding  signed  Oc- 
tober 3  establishes  a  mandate  for  futa 
negotiations  and  an  action  plan  with  C( 
Crete  targets  to  be  achieved  over  the 
next  2  yeai-s.  In  November  the  two 
governments  will  determine  product 
areas  and  interrelated  issues  requiring 
facilitation  (such  as  tariff  and  nontarifl 
barriers).  The  agreement  calls  on  both 
sides  to  establish  working  groups  to 
determine  how  best  to  resolve  and 
negotiate  solutions. 

Border  Environmental  Agreemei 
Annex  V 

In  1983  President  Reagan  and  Preside 
De  la  Madrid  signed  an  agreement  est 
Kshing  a  framework  for  cooperation  to 
protect  and  improve  the  environment 
along  the  U.S.-Mexico  border.  Under  t 
1983  agi'eement,  the  two  governments 
pledged  to  cooperate  by  adopting  ap- 
propriate measures  to  prevent,  reduce 
and  eliminate  sources  of  pollution  whic 
affect  the  border  area  of  the  other 
country.  To  date  four  anne.xes  to  the 
agreement  have  been  concluded  by  the 
two  governments  to  addi-ess:  (1)  the  bo 
der  sanitation  pi-oblem  at  Tijuana;  (2)  a 
cidental  spills  of  hazardous  substances; 
(3)  regulation  of  transboundary  move- 
ments of  hazardous  wastes;  and  (4)  air 
pollution  from  smelters  in  the  Arizona- 
Sonora  "copper  triangle." 

The  fifth  annex,  signed  during  this 
state  visit,  commits  the  United  States 
and  Mexico  to  cooperate  in  addressing ! 
pollution  in  urban  areas  along  the  bordt 
beginning  with  El  Paso,  Texas/Ciudad 
Juarez,  Chihuahua. 

Mexico  City  Environmental 
Agreement 

Improving  the  quality  of  life  for  our 
people  and  finding  balanced  responses  t 
the  serious  environmental  challenges  w 
face  ai-e  priorities  of  both  the  U.S.  and 
Mexican  Governments. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  19' 


FEATURE 


Mexico 


A(f  Hnuse  photo  by  Susan  Biddle) 


During  the  state  visit  of  President  Salinas  (in  the  background  with  President 
Bush),  Secretary  Baker  and  Foreign  Minister  Solana  signed  several  agreements. 


The  cooperative  agreement  on 
V  xieo  City  environmental  pollution  com- 
n  s  the  United  States  and  Mexico  to 
wrk  together  to  address  the  aii'  and 
D  er  pollution  problems  of  one  of  the 
vrld's  largest  cities. 

I'liiTOS  of  cooperation  envisaged 
Uler  this  framework  agreement  include 
lehnology  transfers,  scientific  and  techni- 
■;  advice,  environmental  monitoring  and 
'  iinnmental  impact  assessments  by 
V-xiian  authorities,  joint  meetings  and 
■  iiws,  exchange  of  relevant  personnel 
li  exchanges  of  environmental  informa- 
;■!  and  data,  coordination  on  national 
1  grams,  and  cooperation  in  developing 
i  iiopriate  environmental  funding 


mechanisms.  Annexes  to  the  agreement 
may  be  concluded  to  establish  specific 
programs. 

The  an-angement  established  under 
this  agreement  will  have  application  to 
other  efforts  now  underway  to  resolve 
pollution  problems  in  other  large  cities  in 
both  the  United  States  and  Mexico. 

Tijuana  Sanitation  Problem 

The  rapidly  gi-owing  city  of  Tijuana  has 
an  inadequate  sewage  collection  and 
treatment  system,  which  has  resulted  in 
an  overflow  of  waste  onto  beaches  in 
south  San  Diego. 

The  exchange  of  notes  on  Tijuana 
sanitation,  for  the  first  time,  formally 


commits  the  two  governments  to  con- 
struct a  U.S.-Mexican  international 
sewage  treatment  plant  in  the  United 
States,  just  north  of  Tijuana.  This  plant 
will  provide  secondary  treatment  and  dis- 
posal of  waste  not  now  treated  by 
Tijuana  and  provides  for  future  growth. 

Further  details  will  be  contained  in  a 
minute-agreement,  expected  to  be  con- 
cluded soon  by  the  International  Bound- 
aiy  and  Water  Commission.  The 
exchange  of  notes  describes  the  principal 
elements  which  will  be  contained  in  that 
agreement.  ■ 


Qlpartment  of  State  Bulletin/December  1989 


THE  PRESIDENT 


I 


Freedom  and  World  Prosperity 


President  Biish's  address  before  the 
World  Bank  I  International  Monetary 
Fund  (IMF)  annual  meetiyig  on  Septem- 
ber 27, 1989.^ 

We  in  the  United  States  are  keenly 
aware  of  these  annual  gatherings,  the  im- 
portance of  them — you  drive  the  work  of 
all  of  us  in  maintaining  a  strong  interna- 
tional economic  and  financial  system. 

This  is  my  first  opportunity  to  speak 
to  you  as  President  of  the  United  States. 
But  I  have  followed  the  activities  of  the 
International  Monetary  Fund  and  the 
World  Bank  throughout  my  years  of 
public  sei-vice.  I  have  visited  many  of 
yom-  homelands  and  seen  firsthand  the 
problems  created  by  inadequate  growth 
and  development,  problems  that  your 
two  distinguished  institutions  are  work- 
ing hard  to  solve. 

We  have  witnessed  a  dramatic  shift 
over  the  past  few  years  in  the  debate 
over  how  to  achieve  sustained  growth 
and  development. 

All  across  the  world,  there  has  been 
an  almost  simultaneous  rediscovery  of 
the  power  created  when  individuals  are 
given  the  fi-eedom  to  act  in  their  own  best 
interests. 

Economic  and  Political  Freedoms: 
Inseparable  Companions 

True,  we  are  here  today  mainly  to  discuss 
economic  freedom.  But  make  no  mi-stake; 
in  the  end,  both  economic  freedom  and 
political  freedom  are  essential  and  in- 
separable companions  on  the  road  to  na- 
tional prosperity. 

The  jui-y  is  no  longer  out.  Look  at 
the  two  economic  systems  and  see  which 
has  prospered  and  which  has  struggled. 
Let  us  put  an  end  to  this  economic  e.xperi- 
ment,  because  history  has  decided. 

It  is  not  climate,  natural  resources, 
or  cultural  traditions  that  make  the  dif- 
ference. I  said  it  in  my  own  inaugural  ad- 
dress: "We  know  what  works.  Freedom 
works. ..We  know  how  to  secui'e  a  more 
just  and  prosperous  life  for  man  on 
Earth — thi'ough  free  mai'kets,  ft-ee 
speech,  free  elections,  and  the  exercise  of 
free  will  unhampered  by  the  state." 

In  Latin  America,  Africa,  and 
Mexico,  courageous  leaders  are  turning 
away  fi-om  state  control  of  their 
economies.  Economic  restnicturing  and 
deregulation  are  opening  the  door  to 
privates  initiative.  Already  they're 
seeing  results. 


Even  more  stunning  is  the  transfor- 
mation in  thinking  in  the  communist 
countries — in  both  the  Soviet  Union  and 
in  Eastern  Europe.  During  my  recent 
travels  in  Poland  and  Hungai-y,  I  was  im- 
pressed by  the  people;  but  also  impressed 
by  the  almost  universal  acceptance  of  the 
free  mai'ket  as  the  best  hope — indeed, 
the  only  hope — for  reversing  the 
economic  fortunes  of  these  two  proud 
countries. 

We  will  welcome  the  efforts  of  the 
Soviet  Union  to  liberalize  and  decentral- 
ize then-  economy.  I  have  said  many 
times — and  I  want  to  repeat  it  here 
today — that  I  want  to  see  perestroika  suc- 
ceed. A  more  open  and  humane  Soviet 
Union  can  only  be  in  the  best  interest  of 
the  West.  And  as  we  see  the  evidence  of 
that  reform,  we  can  match  it  with  steps  of 
our  own. 

The  rediscovery  of  these  basic  truths 
in  the  East  has  been  matched  by  a  recom- 
mitment to  them  in  the  West.  Today  the 
members  of  the  European  Community 
are  dedicated  to  eliminating  internal  bar- 
riers to  economic  activity  by  the  end  of 
1992.  Em-ope 's  leaders  assure  me  that 
this  will  not  be  at  the  cost  of  new  exter- 
nal ban-iers  to  trade  with  the  European 
Community. 

The  Pemvian  economist,  Hernando 
de  Soto,  has  helped  us  understand  a 
worldvidde  economic  phenomenon.  By 
walking  the  streets  of  Lima,  not  analyz- 
ing official  statistics,  he  found  that  the 
poor  of  Latin  America — who  have  never 
read  Jefferson  or  Adam  Smith — ran  theii- 
affairs  democratically,  outside  the  foi-mal 
economy,  organizing  their  private,  paral- 
lel economy  in  a  free  and  unregulated 
manner.  De  Soto's  great  contribution  has 
been  to  point  out  what,  in  retrospect, 
may  seem  obvious:  People  everywhere 
want  the  same  things.  When  left  alone  by 
government,  people  everywhere  organize 
their  lives  in  remarkably  similar  ways. 

De  Soto's  prescription  offers  a  clear 
and  promising  alternative  to  economic 
stagnation  in  Latin  America  and  other 
parts  of  the  world.  Governments  must 
bring  the  "informal"  workers  into  the 
regular  economy  and  then  get  out  of  the 
way  and  let  individual  enterprise  flourish. 

Coordinating  Economic  Policies 

We  each  must  do  our  part.  Yes,  the  in- 
dustrial countiies  have  a  special  respon- 
sibility. We  must  coordinate  economic 
policies  to  help  provide  sustained  growth 


with  low  inflation,  reduced  trade  imbal 
ces,  and  greater  stability  in  exchange 
markets.  We  in  the  United  States  are 
working  especially  hai'd  to  reduce  our 
own  Federal  budget  deficit  and  to  in- 
crease our  national  savings  rate. 

All  om'  nations  have  a  responsibilii 
to  ensm-e  a  fair  and  open  trading  syste? 
We  have  a  tremendous  opportunity  to : 
vance  that  cause  now,  by  making  succe 
of  this  all-important  Uruguay  Round  o 
trade  negotiations.  Making  the  politica 
commitments  necessai'y  to  ensure  a  su 
cess — look,  they  will  not  be  easy,  but  w 
must  strengthen  the  GATT  [General 
Agi-eement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade]  and 
allow  our  markets  to  open  in  a  mutual, 
step-by-step  fashion. 

As  we  seek  to  extend  and  expand 
gi'owth  in  the  world  economy,  the  debt 
problems  faced  by  developing  countrie 
are  central  to  the  agendas  of  the  IMF ; 
the  World  Bank.  Over  the  past  year,  th 
international  community's  strengthene 
approach  to  these  problems  has 
provided — truly  provided — a  new  hops 
for  the  debtor  nations.  America's 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  Nick  Brady, 
has  helped  direct  the  focus  on  debt  I'ed 
tion  as  a  complement  to  continued  luw 
lending — bringing  developing  nations ; 
commercial  banks  back  to  where  they 
belong:  back  to  the  negotiating  table. 

Quick  action  by  both  the  IMF  and 
the  World  Bank  has  given  this  new 
strategy  vital  support.  By  making  cleai 
the  teiTns  under  which  they  will  suppo: 
the  reduction  on  debt  burdens — and  by 
working  with  countries  to  develop  the 
necessary  economic  refonn  programs- 
these  institutions  have  made  it  possibU 
to  reduce  debt  burdens  and  provide  a 
solid  foundation  for  grovrth. 

Thanks  to  these  initiatives,  Mexico 
reached  an  agi-eement  with  its  creditor 
banks  enabling  Me.xico  to  make  enormc 
progi'ess  in  reducing  its  debt  burden.  I' 
also  helped  restore — almost  instantly— 
confidence  in  the  Mexican  economy.  It 
has  already  resulted  in  a  return  of  capr 
and  new  foreign  investment. 

This  agi-eement  underscores  the 
benefits  other  debtor  countries  stand  Xt 
realize  from  this  approach.  Mexico's 
savings  ft-om  this  package  will  fi-ee 
resom-ces  for  productive  use  in  the 
economy,  leading  to  increased  invest- 
ment, leading  to  improved  growth.  Wh 
Mexico  has  done  is  not  a  miracle.  It's  a 
product  of  hard  work  and  sustained  coi 
mitment. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December 


" 


THE  PRESIDENT 


si     I       i 


%. 


V!e  House  photo  by  Susan  Biddle) 

The  strengthened  debt  strategy  is 
1  ,ible  enough  to  address  the  unique 
I'  (is  of  each  country.  But  the  strategy 
V,  lint  work  without  sound  economic 
I'icies  in  the  debtor  countries.  Ineffi- 
iit,  unrealistic,  growth-stifling  policies 
i  jily  must  go.  Benefits  are  available  to 
:  idad  range  of  other  countries  that  pur- 
1  economic  reforms.  Several  are  now  ac- 
i-'ly  engaged,  I  am  told,  wdth  the  IMF 
il  World  Bank  and  with  the  banking 
I  imunity  itself. 

Commercial  banks  have  a  special 
'<?  in  making  this  process  work.  And 
1  y  must  follow  through  on  efforts  made 
( h  Mexico  and  the  Philippines  and 
naden  their  efforts  wath  other 
(.ntries.  We  encourage  these  steps,  not 
iself'-sacrifice  but  self-interest.  iSue, 
1  cess  not  only  vrill  help  the  debtor  na- 
is,  hut  it  will  also  strengthen  the 
)ik>  by  putting  theii'  own  portfolios  on 
1  luiider  basis.  One  of  the  lessons  of  the 
^Os,  especially  the  debt  crisis,  is  that 
\'re  all  in  this  together.  When  we 
'iperate,  we  all  come  out  winners. 

Tlie  IMF  and  the  World  Bank  are  at 
"■  crossroads  of  our  cooperative  efforts. 
le  IMF  must  continue  to  foster  the 
iiiil  economic  policies  necessary  for  sus- 
riol  gi'owth.  As  part  of  that  respon- 
iliiv,  the  Fund  has  assumed  an 


important  and  very  welcome  role  in  the 
strengthened  debt  strategy. 

The  United  States  recognizes  that 
the  IMF  must  have  adequate  resources 
to  fulfill  its  critical  role.  We  will  continue 
to  work  wdth  other  members,  in  the  hope 
of  reaching  a  decision  on  the  quota  ques- 
tion by  the  end  of  the  year.  The  United 
States  has  always  supported  the  IMF, 
and  we  vdll  continue  to  do  so. 

We  will  all  look  to  the  World  Bank  to 
help  build  the  foundation  for  a  future 
global  prosperity  that  reaches  all  peoples. 
Its  efforts  to  promote  structm'al  reform 
and  development  ai'e  absolutely  crucial  to 
resolving  debt  problems.  The  Bank's 
decisions  to  take  on  new  responsibilities 
on  the  debt  front  are  veiy  welcome. 

Addressing  the  Challenges 
of  the  1980s 

Development  and  Environmental 
Efforts.  Also,  to  address  the  significant 
problems  of  the  poorest  countries,  the  In- 
ternational Development  Association 
(IDA)  was  estabHshed  and  will  continue 
to  have  the  support  of  the  United  States. 

We  have  also  learned,  as  I  em- 
phasized Monday  at  the  United  Nations 
and  last  summer  at  the  Paris  summit, 
that  envii-onmental  destruction  knows  no 
borders.  To  make  growth  tnily  sus- 


tainable, we  must  weigh  environmental 
considerations  more  heavily  as  we  make 
economic  decisions.  We  must  also  find 
ways  to  sti'engthen  our  envii-onmental 
and  development  efforts  through  innova- 
tive thinking  such  as  the  "debt  for  nature 
transactions." 

Over  the  years — as  we've  come  to 
understand  the  effect  of  environmental 
destruction  on  the  long-tenn  growth  of 
developing  countries — the  World  Bank 
has  increased  the  priority  it  assigns  to  en- 
vironmental concerns.  We  applaud  those 
efforts.  But  there  is  more  to  be  done.  We 
need  to  work  more  cooperatively  to 
develop  constructive  solutions  to  global 
wanning,  including  measures  to  promote 
energy  efficiency  and  conservation  and 
greater  protection  of  forest  resources. 

Drug  Trafficking  and  Money 
Laundering.  In  addressing  the  challeng- 
es of  the  1980s,  we  have  come  to  a  deeper 
understanding  of  the  importance  of 
cooperating  as  a  community  of  nations  to 
address  common  problems.  I  can  think  of 
no  better  current  example  than  the  need 
to  work  together  to  deal  with  internation- 
al drug  trafficking  and  money  laundering. 
It  is  a  worldwide  problem.  Drag  money 
undermines  honest  businesses,  cori-upts 
political  institutions,  and  even  threatens 
the  security  of  nations.  To  conceal  their 


>partment  of  State  Bulletin/December  1989 


THE  SECRETARY 


obscene  profits,  dnjg  barons  must  wash 
theii-  money  by  cycling  it  thi-ough  finan- 
cial institutions  and  illegitimate  shell  cor- 
porations. 

The  United  States  renews  its  call 
upon  all  countries  to  ratify  the  UN  Vien- 
na convention  and  make  money  launder- 
ing a  criminal  and  extraditable  offense. 
We  need  tough  measures  to  crack  down 
and  track  down  and  confiscate  the  profits 
of  drug-related  crimes.  I  am  encouraged 
by  the  G-7  democracies  interested  in  this 
coordinated  response  to  the  money 
laundering  menace.  But  I  urge  everyone 
to  join  with  us  to  explore  new  ways  to 
stop  money  laundering  in  its  tracks. 

Poland.  There  may  be  no  gi-eater 
opportunity  before  us — all  of  us — today 
than  the  challenge  of  Poland;  and  then  on 
the  broader  landscape,  Eastern  Europe — 
the  entire  Eastern  Europe — where 
countries  ai-e  in  the  throes  of  dramatic 
political  and  economic  changes. 

The  United  States  and  its  interna- 
tional partners  have  already  undertaken 
new  initiatives  toward  Poland.  But  now, 
in  the  light  of  clearly  gi-owing  needs,  the 
recent  accession  of  a  Solidarity-led 
government,  and  our  self-evident  stake  in 
its  success,  we  must  do  more.  We  under- 
stand the  Polish  Government  has  under 
consideration  a  bold  plan  for  economic 
recovery. 

I  call  on  the  IMF  and  World  Bank  to 
work  rapidly  with  Poland  to  develop  such 
a  progi'am  and  ensure  its  successful  im- 
plementation. For  its  part,  the  United 
States  intends  to  be  out  in  front  of  this  ef- 
fort, to  take  advantage  of  this  historic 
development,  and  to  ensure  its  success. 

Facing  the  Issues  Together 

Today  our  mutual  efforts  to  improve 
global  growth,  to  ease  the  burdens  of 
developing  countries — their  indebted- 
ness— and  to  open  markets  for  trade 
have  demonstrated  anew  that  progress  is 
best  achieved  by  facing  pressing  issues 
together. 

This  is  a  lesson  that  we  must  cany 
with  us  into  the  1990s  if  we  are  to  pass  on 
to  future  generations  a  global  economy 
that  is  strong  and  resilient  and  able  to 
provide  for  the  aspirations  of  the  citizens 
of  all  oiu' countries. 

Thank  you  very  much  for  your  hai'd 
work.  Thank  you  for  youi-  service.  Thank 
you  for  your  commitment.  God  bless  you 
and  the  nations  that  you  represent. 


1  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Oct.  2,  1989.1 


Points  of  Mutual  Advantage: 
Perestroika  and  American  Foreign 
Policy 


Secretary  Baker's  address  prepared 
for  delivery  before  the  Foreign  Policy 
Association  in  New  York  City  on 
October  16, 1989} 

Since  the  end  of  World  War  II,  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  have 
been  engaged  in  constant  struggle,  a  con- 
test of  superpower  strength  but  also  a 
contest  of  values  and  vision.  No  relation- 
ship has  been  more  difficult  or,  ultimately, 
more  promising.  Difficult  because  tradi- 
tional Soviet  ideology  has  used  the  same 
words  as  we  do — democracy,  human 
rights,  freedom,  peace,  and  justice — 
while  in  practice  denying  the  values  be- 
hind them.  Promising  because  in  the 
nuclear  age,  the  imperative  of  avoiding 
disaster  has  compelled  us  both  to  search 
for  common  interests. 

We  are  in  a  time  of  rising  promise. 
Relations  with  the  Soviet  Union  have  im- 
proved considerably  since  1985,  when 
Mikhail  Gorbachev  launched  what  he 
called  perestroika — a  total  restructuring 
of  Soviet  society,  including  Soviet  foreign 
and  defense  poHcies.  And  this  Administra- 
tion has  been  building  on  what  was 
achieved  during  the  Reagan  years  so  that 
improved  American-Soviet  relations  will 
last.  As  President  Bush  has  declared,  "we 
will  work  together  to  move  beyond  con- 
tainment of  the  Soviet  Union  ...." 

We  now  have  a  historic  opportunity 
with  the  Soviet  Union.  We  have  the 
chance  to  leave  behind  the  postwar 
period  vdth  the  ups  and  downs  of  the  cold 
war.  We  can  move  beyond  containment  to 
make  the  change  towai-d  better  super- 
power relations  more  secure  and  less  re- 
versible. Our  task  is  to  find  enduring 
points  of  mutual  advantage  that  serve 
the  interests  of  both  the  United  States 
and  the  Soviet  Union. 

There  are  two  reasons  why  we  think 
that  the  prospects  for  a  lasting  improve- 
ment in  U.S.-Soviet  relations  are  better 
than  ever  before.  First,  we  in  the  West 
have  demonstrated  through  oui-  strength, 
unity,  and  fidelity  to  our  values  that 
democracy  and  free  mai-ket  economies 
work  and  work  well  together.  Second,  the 
alternative  vision  advocated  by  the 
Soviet  Union  has  failed  to  produce  either 
prosperity  or  an  attractive  society.  Simp- 
ly put — freedom  works!  Communism 
doesn't! 


As  a  consequence  of  the  failure  of 

theii-  system,  the  Soviets,  led  by  Mikhai 
Gorbachev,  have  begun  the  process  of 
reform  and  rebuilding  called  perestroika 
And  it  is  this  process,  combined  with  oii 
own  achievements,  that  offers  promise 
for  the  ftitm-e. 

The  President  has  said  and  I  have 
said  that  we  want  perestroika — includiri 
the  restructuring  of  Soviet- American 
relations — to  succeed.  We  have  reached 
this  conclusion  not  because  it  is  our  busi 
ness  to  refoiTn  Soviet  society  or  to  keep 
particular  Soviet  leader  in  power — we 
can  really  do  neither — but  because 
perestroika  promises  Soviet  actions  mo: 
advantageous  to  our  interests.  Our  task 
is  to  search  creatively  for  those  points  c 
mutual  U.S.-Soviet  advantage  that  may 
be  possible — and  many  more  may  be  pa 
sible  because  of  perestroika.  Ultimately: 
of  course,  even  as  we  explore  Soviet 
"new  thinking,"  we  must  be  prepared  to 
protect  our  vital  interests,  come  what 
may.  We  must  maintain  a  defense  budg< 
commensurate  with  our  security  requin 
ments,  and  we  must  be  vigilant  and  pusi 
Moscow  toward  cooperative  behavior 
across  the  full  range  of  oui-  relations. 

Now,  I  want  to  explain  this  policy  a 
ours  in  more  detail — specifically  what  vw 
see  in  perestroika,  why  we  want  it  to  su( 
ceed,  and  what  we  are  doing  to  find  thos 
points  of  mutual  advantage  that  will 
benefit  both  American  interests  and 
perestroika  itself. 

Perestroika  and  Soviet 
Domestic  Policy 

I  think  it  is  important  to  begin  by  under 
standing  the  origins  of  perestroika.  Firs' 
and  foremost,  it  is  a  Soviet  response  to  a 
rapidly  changing  world  in  which  they  set 
themselves  increasingly  hard  pressed  to 
compete  economically,  technologically, 
politically,  and  militarily.  The  exponents 
of  perestroika  see  their  country  as  lich  i) 
natural  resources  and  human  talent  but  I 
stifled  by  the  legacy  of  stagnation — a  syi 
tem  incapable  of  producing  the  economic 
progress  and  political  legitimacy  which 
Soviet  citizens  have  the  right  to  expect. 
And,  as  both  President  Gorbachev  and 
Foreign  Minister  Shevardnadze  have  en 
phasized  in  their  conversations  with  me, 
the  cause  of  this  problem  goes  beyond 
just  a  question  of  material  assets.  It  is 


10 


THE  SECRETARY 


,ed  in  the  very  psychology  of  Soviet 
fity,  reinforced  by  equally  stagnant 
;tical  and  legal  systems. 

Thus  the  very  logic  of  perestroika  re- 
ires  that  the  Soviets  themselves  must 
,1  e  their  own  problems  in  a  comprehen- 
i ',  ( i)-ganic  way.  Not  only  must  the 
Hiiiiiiiic  system  be  reformed  but  the 
)i  tiial  and  legal  systems  too. 
'rsiroika  is,  therefore,  different  than 
■:liri-,  failed  attempts  at  refomiing  the 
t.e  l>enin  founded  and  Stalin  built. 
3  iss  inputs  such  as  the  redistribution  of 
lal  labor  to  industry  or  sources  of 
la]!  I'aw  materials  are  no  longer  avail- 
il '  t(i  "jump-start"  the  economy. 

Noi-  are  Soviet  problems  susceptible 
qescue  fi'om  abroad  through  abundant 
tetern  credits — the  failed  poHcy  of 
'.-zhiiev's  "era  of  stagnation."  President 
;  1  lachev  bluntly  expressed  this  point  in 
li  r.iss  New  Year's  address  when  he 
:.l:  "We  must  not  think,  comrades,  that 
1 1(1  me  will  resolve  our  problems  for  us. 
It  everything  around  us  vidll  change  at 
1  «  ave  of  a  magic  wand  as  midnight 
t  kfs  on  New  Year's  Eve.  No.  We  must 
latc  the  future  ourselves,  help  the 
(tnieturing  by  our  actions...."  As  Ed 
l.vctt,  a  Western  expert  on  the  Soviet 
■dinmy,  has  put  it, "...  however  strong 
Astern  feelings  may  be  about  the  pos- 
i  I  ■  I  ait  comes  of  this  reform  effort, 
i\-t('rn  policymakers  should  see  that 
hir  'influence'  on  this  process  can  be  no 
ne  than  modest." 

The  self-rehant  and  radical  nature  of 
Iciestic  pefestroika  has  become  even 
n  -e  ciiicial  as  the  reforms  have  en- 
■(iitcred  increasing  difficulties.  Thus  far 
Vl  ( Inrbachev  and  his  colleagues  have 
)i  II  willing  to  place  their  bets  on  reform 
ill  til  double  them  if  necessary. 

Pvrestroika  may  have  reached  a 
.iiiiiig  point  where  the  bets  will  have  to 
)irtMl(iubled  again.  Consumer  shortages 
u  IK  it  likely  to  be  relieved  nor  produc- 
i  t y  increased  without  the  incentives  of 
(  able  currency,  free  and  competitive 
rrkcts,  private  property,  and  real 
'  v~.  Elements  of  Marxist-Leninist 

'  'sy  such  as  the  dominant,  exclusive 
the  Communist  Party  appear  to  be 
latible  with  the  decentralized  politi- 
I  economic  system  necessary  to 
>ui  Moscow's  ills.  And  new  political  ar- 
:■:  iJ''ments  will  be  necessaiy  to  alleviate 
;1  uiievances  and  demands  of  Soviet  eth- 
T  minorities  and  republics. 

Finally  the  systemic,  organic  nature 
.sf>-oiA:a  takes  it  beyond  the 
•  ry  of  an  exclusively  domestic 
!■  '<i  III.  President  Gorbachev  has 
'  H'atedly  pointed  to  the  links  between 
NIK  Stic  refoiTn  and  the  new  thinking  in 


foreign  policy,  saying  just  a  few  months 
ago,  "...  there  exists  an  indissoluble  link 
between  the  new  foreign  policy  and 
perestroika  wdthin  the  country." 

And  that  is  where  we  come  in.  Fas- 
cinating as  domestic  change  in  the  Soviet 
Union  may  be,  we  are  mainly  affected  by 
the  way  the  Soviet  Union  approaches  the 
rest  of  the  world. 

Here,  too,  perestroika  promises  a 
radical  reform. 

Perestroika  in  Soviet  Foreign 
and  Defense  Policies 

Compare  the  kind  of  Soviet  foreign  policy 
we  used  to  face  with  what  we  see  today. 
Under  Brezhnev,  Soviet  influence, 
primai-ily  through  armed  proxies,  ex- 
panded around  the  globe.  Hand-in-hand 
with  these  adventui-es,  the  Soviets  under- 
took an  across-the-board  defense  build- 


•  MiUtai-y  and  political  gains  in  the 
Thii-d  World  were  expensive,  and  the 
shallow  successes  were  nearly  always 
fleeting. 

•  Regional  conflicts  could  escalate 
and  produce  undesu-ed  confrontations. 
Possible  gains  were  not  worth  the  risks 
inherent  in  such  situations. 

These  are  the  lessons  the  Soviets 
speak  of  having  learned  from  Brezhnev's 
failures,  theoretical  lessons  that  have 
shaped  the  new  thinking  and  perestroika. 

But  while  in  theory  they  have 
learned  these  lessons,  they  have  not  put 
them  all  into  practice  by  any  means. 

In  defense  policy  and  arms  control, 
the  Soviets  have  shown  gi-eater  under- 
standing of  the  need  to  promote  mutual 
security.  In  both  conventional  and 
nuclear  arms  control  talks,  the  Soviets 
have  shifted  their  positions  to  correspond 
more  closely  wdth  long-held  Western  as- 


.../^perestroika7  is  a  Soviet  response  to  a  rapidly  chang- 
ing world  in  which  they  see  themselves  increasingly 
hard  pressed  to  compete  economically,  technologically, 
politically,  and  militarily. 


up,  well-expressed  by  foi-mer  Secretary 
of  Defense  Harold  Brovro  when  he  said, 
"When  we  build,  they  build;  when  we 
stop,  they  build." 

Yet  for  all  the  expansion  of  their 
military  forces  and  their  efforts  to  estab- 
lish beachheads  around  the  globe,  the 
Soviets  bought  neither  gi-eater  security 
nor  lasting  success. 

Indeed  the  lessons  of  the  1970s 
learned  by  today's  Soviet  leadership  ap- 
pear- to  contradict  fundamentally  the  rose- 
colored  view  of  the  Brezhnev  era. 
Gorbachev  and  his  gr-oup  of  "new 
thinkers"  now  speak  of  the  following  les- 
sons. 

•  The  Brezhnev  miUtary  buildup 
brought  greater  insecurity  instead  of  in- 
creasing security.  Soviet  actions — such  as 
the  deployment  of  SS-20s  in  Western 
Europe,  for  example — provoked  Western 
responses,  making  the  correlation  of  for- 
ces less  favor-able  to  Moscow,  not  more. 

•  The  military  buildup  also 
banki-upted  the  economy.  The  mihtary's 
across-the-board  fii-st  call  on  more  and 
more  resources  had  to  cease. 

•  Secur-ity  could  not  be  achieved 
unilaterally,  only  multilaterally. 


sumptions  about  preventing  war  and 
producing  greater  stability.  President 
Gorbachev  has  promised  cuts  in  the 
Soviet  defense  budget.  He  has  promised 
to  tur-n  swords  into  plowshares  by  trans- 
forming tanks  into  tr-actors.  Here  we  are 
still  looking  for  concrete  r-esults. 

In  regional  conflicts,  the  picture  is 
vei-y  mixed.  The  Soviets  have  withdrawn 
fi-om  Afghanistan.  And  they  fostered  the 
settlement  in  Angola.  But,  overall,  Mos- 
cow appears  less  willing  to  make  hard 
choices  on  the  regional  questions  than  on 
ar-ms  contr-ol.  We've  seen  a  sui-ge  in 
Soviet  amis  shipments  to  Afghanistan 
and  Ethiopia;  in  Cambodia,  Soviet  ship- 
ments this  year  are  ah-eady  twice  as  high 
as  all  of  1988;  and  Soviet  bloc  ar-ms  con- 
tinue to  end  up  in  Nicaragua.  These  dis- 
turbing actions,  this  seeming  preference 
for  mihtar-y  solutions,  may  work  in  the 
short-run  to  keep  a  NajibuUah  or  a  Hun 
Sen  or  a  Mengistu  in  power.  In  the  long- 
run,  however,  only  political  solutions 
based  on  national  r-econciUation  can  settle 
these  conflicts.  That's  the  true  lesson  of 
the  1970s. 


[apartment  of  State  Bulletin/December  1989 


11 


THE  SECRETARY 


Perestroika  and  American  Policy 

What  explains  this  mixed  record?  Some 
analysts,  invoking  past  disappointments, 
argue  that  the  Soviets  are  engaged  in  a 
mere  "peredyshka" — a  breathing  space 
until  Leninism  is  strong  enough  to  do  bat- 
tle once  more  with  capitalism.  Others,  in- 
voking future  hope,  argue  that  the  new 
thinkers  are  so  consumed  by  domestic 
concerns  that  old  thinking  still  holds 
sway  over  certain  aspects  of  foreign 
policy. 

But  to  me,  it  reveals  something  else. 
I  find  a  certain  parallel  between  the 
course  of  Soviet  domestic  perestroika  and 
new  thinking  in  Soviet  foreign  policy. 
Domestically,  as  Gorbachev  has  sought  to 
turn  theory  in  practice,  his  progi-am  has 
altered  and  evolved.  And  just  as  the 
Soviets  have  come  face-to-face  with 
domestic  dilemmas  that  must  now  be 
resolved  if  progress  is  to  be  made,  so 
they  will  come  face-to-face  vdth  the  need 
for  further  change  in  their  foreign  policy. 

Domestically  we  can  have  but  small 
dii'ect  impact  on  how  the  Soviets  resolve 
their  dilemmas.  But  in  foreign  and 
defense  policies,  through  a  prudent 
search  for  points  of  mutual  advantage,  we 
can  more  I'eadily  shape  and  alter  the  cal- 
culus so  that  the  Soviets  face  up  to  the 
contradictions  between  the  new  thinking 
and  old  habits.  In  ai-ms  control,  the  Ki-em- 
lin  has  made  some  poUtically  difficult 
choices  and  in  some  areas  selected  the 
path  of  mutual  progi-ess.  Now  we  must 
also  shape  the  Soviet  calculus  so  that  Mos- 
cow chooses  the  path  of  progress  in 
regional  conflicts. 

In  the  course  of  our  seai'ch  for 
mutual  advantage,  we  must  not  succumb 
to  a  false  optimism  that  perestroika  in 
Soviet  foreign  policy  has  gone  fai'  enough 
and  that  we  can  rely  on  the  new  thinking 
to  take  account  of  our  interests. 

It  would  be  an  equally  gi'eat  blunder 
to  ignore  the  possibility  that  perestroika 
might  go  much  further  and  to  retreat  in- 
stead into  a  suspicious  stance  of  dis- 
engagement that  would  never  put 
perestroika's  promise  to  the  test.  Either 
approach  would  sacrifice  the  great  oppor- 
tunity before  us. 

Thus  our  mission  must  be  to  press 
the  seai-ch  for  mutual  advantage.  Where 
we  find  Soviet  agreement,  we'll  both  be 
better  off.  Where  we  meet  Soviet  resist- 
ance, we'll  know  that  we  have  to  redouble 
our  efforts  so  that  Moscow  practices,  not 
just  preaches,  the  new  thinking.  By  ac- 
ting reahstically  to  engage  Moscow  in  the 
search  for  mutual  interests,  we  can  seize 
the  opportunities  inherent  in  Gorbachev's 
revolution.  By  standing  pat,  we  would 


12 


gain  nothing  and  lose  this  chance  to 
revolutionize  East-West  relations. 

In  practice,  our  search  to  find  mutual 
advantage  has  focused  on  resolving  politi- 
cal conflicts,  both  in  Europe  and  in  the 
Third  World;  on  reducing  the  risk  of  war 
through  arms  control;  and  on  promoting 
internal  Soviet  change.  Progress  in  these 
areas  wrill  serve  Soviet  and  American  in- 
terests in  their  broadest  sense,  both  by 
relieving  tensions  and  by  releasing 
resources  for  the  work  of  peace. 

Europe  Whole  and  Free 

Our  first  search  for  mutual  advantage 
must  concern  the  most  important  and 
vital  flash  point  of  the  cold  war — the 
division  of  Europe.  President  Bush  has 
stated  our  puipose  to  see  a  Europe  that 
is  whole  and  free,  and  our  allies  in  NATO 
have  agreed  on  a  comprehensive  program 
to  attain  that  goal.  Part  of  that  progi'am 
is  an  accelerated  timetable  for  an  agree- 
ment on  conventional  force  reductions  in 
Europe  that  would  con-ect  existing  asym- 
metries and  reduce  the  risks  of  suiprise 


[President  Gorbachev] 
has  promised  to  turn 
swords  into  plowshares  by 
transforming  tanks  into 
tractors. 


attack.  Such  an  agreement  would  make 
not  only  for  a  more  secure  deteiTent  but 
would  also  promote  greater  militai-y  open- 
ness, which  will  .strengthen  mutual  con- 
fidence and  reduce  the  chances  of 
misunderstanding  and  miscalculation. 

Even  more  importantly,  an  agree- 
ment on  conventional  armed  forces  in 
Europe  (CFE)  could  redraw  the 
European  security  map,  severely  inhibit- 
ing Soviet  military  intimidation  not  only 
of  Western  Europe  but  of  Eastern 
Europe  too.  Soviet  occupation  forces  in 
Eastern  Europe  would  have  to  be  cut  to 
less  than  half  the  levels  they  had  at  the 
beginning  of  this  year. 

CFE  would  also  help  perestroika  in 
the  Soviet  Union.  Moscow  can  save  bil- 
lions on  conventional  forces  by  agreeing 
to  a  CFE  agi-eement.  If  Gorbachev  is 
serious  about  converting  guns  into  but- 
ter, then  CFE  is  the  surest  path  to  big 
savings. 

Above  all  an  agi-eement  would 
demonstrate  clearly  to  the  world  that 


East  and  West  could  dispel  the  political 
and  militaiy  legacies  of  the  cold  war. 

A  whole  and  fi'ee  Europe,  however 
is  more  than  arms  control  or  arms  redu< 
tion.  The  Helsinki  agreement  provides 
for  common  measures  on  human  rights  i 
prevail  in  Europe. 

Both  we  and  the  Soviet  Union  are 
challenged  to  deal  with  change  in  the 
countries  behind  the  now-i-usting  Iron 
Curtain.  Because  they  each  followed  th< 
same  ill-suited  Stalinist  models,  each  ofl 
them  has  been  afflicted  in  varying 
degi'ees  wdth  the  same  ailments  that 
provoked  perestroika  in  the  Soviet 
Union.  These  nations,  however,  cannot 
treated  as  a  single  case.  Some  of  them- 
notably  Hungaiy  and  Poland — have 
begun  to  take  bold  steps  away  fi'om  the 
economic  and  even  the  political  systemsi 
they  have  known. 

In  East  Germany,  the  people  them< 
selves  are  taking  bold  steps.  As  I  said 
last  week,  it  is  time  for  perestroika  and 
glasnost  to  come  to  East  Germany.  Thai 
status  quo  is  as  unacceptable  to  the 
people  of  that  nation  as  it  is  to  the 
peoples  of  Poland  and  Hungary.  The 
people  of  East  Germany  cannot  be 
forever  denied  at  home  the  better  life 
they  now  seek  by  fleeing  to  the  West.  C 
course  the  United  States  and  our  NATC 
partners  have  long  supported  the  recon 
ciliation  of  the  Geiman  people.  Theii' 
legitimate  rights  must  some  day  be  met 
But  let  me  be  clear — reconciliation 
through  self-deteiTnination  can  only  be 
achieved  in  peace  and  freedom.  Nor- 
malization must  occur  on  the  basis  of 
Western  values  with  the  end  result  beir 
a  people  integrated  into  the  community 
of  democratic  European  nations. 

We  have  made  clear  our  view  that  i 
Europe  can  never  be  whole  or  free  if  the 
so  called  Brezhnev  doctrine  justifying 
Soviet  military  intervention  against  its 
Warsaw  Pact  allies  continues  to  be  a  pri 
ciple  of  Soviet  foreign  policy.  Without  e? 
plicitly  renouncing  that  doctrine. 
President  Gorbachev  and  F'oreign  Minis 
ter  Shevardnadze  have  declared  that  th* 
use  of  force  to  detennine  the  political  sy 
terns  of  other  countries  is  impermissible 
They  have  said  that  each  state  should  b( 
able  to  choose  its  own  course.  My  only 
change  in  that  fomiula  would  be  to  say 
that  the  people  of  each  state  should  be 
able  to  choose  their  owii  course. 

We  have  seen  in  Poland  the  electioi 
of  a  noncommunist  prime  minister  to  lei 
a  coaHtion,  including  the  Communist 
Party,  as  that  country  seeks  a  way  out  o 
its  legacy  of  disastrous  economic  mis- 
management. This  is  a  remarkable 
development  which  gives  us  hope.  Politi 
cal  institutions  tnily  responsible  to  the 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  19£' 


THE  SECRETARY 


1  )ple  are  the  only  guarantee  of  long- 
t  -in  stability.  We  hope  this  model  of 
crnge  will  be  followed  elsewhere  in  the 
i^on. 

We  seek  to  encourage  reform  so  that 
t  'se  countries  may  once  again  regain 
t  'ir  rightful  place  as  independent  na- 
t  lis,  working  within  a  European 
f: iiifwork  to  make  social  and  economic 
p  igress.  As  with  perestroika  in  the 
jvift  Union,  the  essential  decisions 
list  be  taken  by  those  nations  them- 
>  ves.  Building  upon  these  decisions,  we 
J 1  (lur  allies  in  Western  Europe  can 
jer  help  at  thi-ee  stages. 

•  In  the  short  term,  we  can  offer  aid, 
jiecially  food,  that  can  help  to  alleviate 

; '  immediate  crisis. 

•  Over  the  medium  term,  working 
;-ough  the  International  Monetary 

F  nd  (IMP^)  and  other  multilateral  finan- 
:•  1  institutions,  we  can  put  together 
;  jkaijes  that  combine  monetary 
ibilization,  structural  reform,  and  effec- 
:  e  debt  management. 

•  Over  the  long  term,  we  can  en- 
.iiaue  and  stimulate  the  creation  of  a 
,;  \  ale  sector  and  conditions  to  attract 
:  vate  capital  for  the  reconstruction  of 
;  'se  economies. 

None  of  this  will  be  easy.  The  mar- 

2  IS  fur  error  after  years  of  compounded 
cnders  are  very  thin.  That  is  why  we 

:i  e  IK  it  repeat  our  earlier  mistakes  of 
t  ■  I'.tTOs.  Our  assistance  must  be  careful- 
I;  arreted,  integi'ated  with  effective 
r'orms  by  the  countries  themselves,  and 
sjpiirted  by  the  international  com- 
nmity.  That  is  why  the  President,  after 
viting  Poland  and  Hungai-y  this  simi- 
rT,  asked  for  and  received  the  coopera- 
t  n  I  if  oiu-  European  allies  in  devising 
5:h  a  progi'am.  Such  a  progi'am  is  now 
tdnu  shape  in  cooperation  with  our 
\_^stern  pai-tners.  The  United  States 
list  continue  to  be  the  catalyst  to  make 
i.vnrk. 

A  final  comment  on  political  change 
iEastem  Europe:  as  I  have  noted,  we 
f  111'  a  process  that  gives  these  countries 
t-ir  right  to  self-determination  and 
I'eiliim.  President  Bush  has  made  clear 
t  It  It  is  not  our  pui-pose  to  exploit  the 
I  iveiiient  toward  fi-eedom  in  oi-der  to 
I  rni  the  security  of  the  Soviet  Union. 
I)  one — I  repeat,  no  one — will  benefit  if 
t?  entire  trend  toward  beneficial 
f  iiiiiinic  and  political  changes  are  en- 
)  Ifed  in  violence. 

liut  all  will  benefit  if  the  reforms  suc- 
led  ill  Eastern  Europe.  The  people  of 
istern  Europe  vnW  benefit  as  their 
alinist  shackles  are  lifted.  Western 
iri  ipeans  will  benefit  as  their  continent 
made  whole  again.  Gorbachev  and  the 


reformers  will  benefit  as  examples 
flourish  in  Eastern  Eui'ope  of  the  power 
of  reform.  And  we  will  benefit  as  we 
move  beyond  the  cold  war 

Resolving  Regional  Conflicts 

A  second  major  point  where  we  must 
search  for  mutual  advantage  with  the 
Soviets  concerns  regional  conflicts.  Each 
of  these  bears,  to  some  degr-ee,  the  poten- 
tial for  becoming  the  scene  of  superpower 
rivalry  and  tension.  With  the  spread  of 
missiles  and  chemical  weapons 
throughout  volatile  regions,  conflicts  in 
the  Third  World  are  likely  to  take  on  a 
more  dangerous  character.  Regional  con- 
flicts are  likely  to  be  more  difficult  to  con- 
tain, more  likely  to  engulf  more  countries, 
and  more  susceptible  to  escalation. 

Neither  the  United  States  nor  a 
Soviet  Union  in  the  midst  of  perestroika 
has  an  interest  in  being  drawn  into  such 
conflicts.  As  President  Gorbachev  said 


And  just  as  the  Soviets 
have  come  face-to-face 
with  domestic  dilem.- 
m,as...so  they  will  come 
face-to-face  with  the  need 
for  further  change  in  their 
foreign  policy. 


recently,  "We  now  need,  perhaps  more 
than  ever  before,  favoi'able  external  con- 
ditions so  that  we  can  cope  wdth  the 
revolutionary  and  broad  task  towai'd 
renewing  Soviet  society."  Resolution  of 
conflicts  in  Central  America,  Afghanis- 
tan, Cambodia,  and  Afiica  would  surely 
spare  the  Soviets  the  biUions  they  spend 
each  yeai-  on  supporting  client  states. 
This  is  an  ai'ea  where  the  Soviets  can 
help  themselves.  And  we  have  made  it 
clear  that  we  are  ready  and  wiUing 
partners,  partners  who  recognize  that 
settling  and  defusing  regional  tensions 
can  diminish  the  dangers  we  all  face. 

Reducing  the  Risks  of  War 

Arms  control  is  the  third  area  where  we 
are  seeking  points  of  mutual  advantage 
with  Moscow.  In  oui-  various  efforts,  we 
can  work  with  the  Soviets  to  lower  the 
risk  of  war  and  the  cost  of  preventing  it. 
Our  ai-ms  control  efforts  have  focused  on 
reducing  the  risk  of  war  by  lowering  the 
incentives  for  surprise  attack,  not  arms 


reductions  in  and  of  themselves.  To  this 
end,  we  have  focused  in  CFE  on  those 
weapons — tanks,  ai'tilleiy,  and  aiTnored 
personnel  cai'riers — most  suited  to 
launching  and  sustaining  invasions.  In 
START  [strategic  arms  reduction  talks], 
we've  placed  a  premium  on  reducing 
weapons  most  suited  to  a  first-strike — 
such  as  the  Soviet  SS-18s — while 
encouraging  those  which  ai'e  more 
stabilizing  and  less  useful  for  striking 
first,  for  example,  bombers.  We've  moved 
off  our  ban  on  mobile  missiles,  contingent 
on  congressional  fimding,  because  mobile 
missiles,  if  effectively  verified,  increase 
sui'vivability  and  enhance  stability. 

We  have  also  attempted  to  foster 
greater  openness  between  East  and  West 
to  provide  gi-eater  reassurances  about  in- 
tentions and  capabilities  and  to  reduce 
misperceptions.  To  that  end,  the  Presi- 
dent announced  his  "open  skies"  initiative 
which  has  been  received  positively  by  the 
Soviets. 

In  pursuing  these  arms  control  objec- 
tives, this  Administration  has  sought  to 
learn  from  its  predecessors.  We  have 
kept  our  eye  fii-mly  on  the  ball,  working 
to  bring  home  treaties  which  the  Senate 
will  ratify  and  which  will  verifiably  lock 
in  new  U.S.-Soviet  security  relations. 
This  emphasis  on  realistic,  verifiable 
agreements  was  the  impetus  behind  our 
verification  and  stability  measures  in 
START  and  om-  data  exchange  with  the 
Soviets  on  chemical  weapons — both  of 
which  the  Soviets  agreed  to  in  Wyoming. 

We  also  took  realistic  steps  there  to 
begin  U.S.-Soviet  cooperation  geai-ed 
toward  controlling  growing  threats  not 
just  in  the  East- West  arena  but  to  global 
security  as  well.  The  chemical  weapons 
initiative  announced  by  the  President  at 
the  United  Nations  will  produce  massive 
reductions  in  Soviet  and  U.S.  stockpiles 
at  an  accelerated  pace. 

Promoting  Perestroika  Internally 

While  our  primai-y  focus  is  on  those 
points  of  mutual  advantage  that  we  can 
find  in  these  thi-ee  ai'eas — Europe, 
regional  conflicts,  and  arms  control — we 
are  also  seeking  a  foui'th  area:  the 
strengthening  of  glasnost  and 
democratization.  Through  our  exchanges, 
we  are  actively  encouraging  the  growth 
of  pluralistic  institutions  and  practices  in 
the  Soviet  Union.  We  beUeve  the  em- 
phasis on  the  rale  of  law  in  the  writings 
of  the  reformers  is  a  positive  step.  We  are 
encouraging  the  Soviets  to  make  per- 
manent in  then-  legal  code  and  practice 
the  protection  of  individual  rights  to 
which  they  subscribed  in  the  Helsinki 
accord. 


bpartment  of  State  Bulletin/December  1989 


13 


THE  SECRETARY 


Through  our  transnational  dialogue, 
we  also  hope  to  involve  the  Soviets  on 
those  global  issues,  especially  the  en\dron- 
ment,  where  Soviet  practice  in  the  past 
has  not  lived  up  to  international  stand- 
ards. Foreign  Minister  Shevardnadze 
showed  great  interest  in  Wyoming  about 
these  transnational  problems,  particulai'- 
ly  global  waiTning,  and  I  believe  gi'eater 
U.S.-Soviet  cooperation  can  pave  the  way 
for  moi'e  effective  international  action. 

Finally,  we  have  begun  to  explore  a 
fifth  area  of  potential  mutual  advantage. 
This  last  area  relates  to  perestroika's  in- 
ternal aspects.  We  are  prepared  to  pro- 
vide technical  assistance  in  certain  areas 
of  Soviet  economic  reform.  The  Soviets 
are  entering  uncharted  watere,  ex- 
perimenting with  markets,  competitive 
enterprises,  and  realistic  pricing,  all  of 
which  we  take  for  granted.  In  Wyoming 
Foreign  Minister  Shevardnadze  and  I 
had  extensive  discussions  on  the  kinds  of 
steps  that  would  facilitate  price  reform,  a 
necessary  step  toward  ruble  convert- 
ibility. The  Soviet  leadership  is  clearly 
interested  in  our  ideas  about  their 
economic  refoiTns,  and  we  will  continue 
our  discussions  on  these  issues. 

These  areas  offer  fertile  ground  in 
which  to  find  points  of  mutual  advantage. 
Perestroika,  after  all,  means  for  the 
Soviet  Union  a  new  way  of  conducting 
then-  pohtical,  economic,  and  legal  af- 
fairs— a  new  set  of  standards,  if  you  will. 

We  do  neither  of  us  any  good  if  we 
relax  our  own  standards  in  the  name  of 
helping  refoiTn.  That's  why  we've  told  the 
Soviets  to  codify  the  changes  we're 
seeing  in  their  emigration  practice  so  that 
we  can  waive  the  Jackson- Vanik  amend- 
ment as  we've  promised.  That's  why 
today  we  see  discussions  about  Soviet 
membership  in  GATT  [General  Agree- 
ment on  Tariffs  and  Trade]  or  the  other 
international  financial  institutions  as 
premature.  That  is  also  why  our  approach 
to  trade,  based  on  previous  experience 
both  with  the  U.S.S.R.  and  other 
countries,  must  be  on  a  commercial  basis. 
Mutually  beneficial,  nonstrategic  commer- 
cial exchanges  ai'e  the  best  way  to  ex- 
pand Soviet  participation  in  the 
international  economy. 

Conclusion 

Let  me  sum  it  all  up.  We  want 
perestroika  to  succeed  at  home  and 
abroad  because  we  believe  that  it  wall 
bring  about  a  less  aggressive  Soviet 
Union,  restrained  in  the  use  of  force,  and 
less  hostile  to  democracy.  A  perestroika 
that  resulted  simply  in  a  more  efficient 
and  more  capable  Soviet  state  would. 


indeed,  be  a  more  formidable  and 
dangerous  competitor. 

But  I  do  not  believe  that  perestroika 
can  succeed  without  increasing  measures 
of  free  markets,  free  speech,  and  institu- 
tions, more  accountable  to  the  people — in 
short,  without  more  freedom!  And  that 
means  a  more  democratic  society,  more 
respectful  of  human  lights  and  legal 
noiTns  which  could  provide  a  lasting  foun- 
dation for  more  constructive,  less 
dangerous  Soviet  behavior  abroad;  a 
society  that  produces  not  subjects  who 
are  to  be  acted  ujjon  but  citizens  who  par- 
ticipate in  the  policy  process;  and  a 
society  where  citizens  have  a  say  in  what 
theh'  government  does  at  home  and 
abroad.  In  such  a  Soviet  Union,  the 
people  and  the  government  will  agree 
that,  as  Foreign  Minister  Shevai'dnadze 
has  said,  "a  foreign  policy  that  is  not  open 
and  explained  to  the  people  and  does  not 
gain  their  support  is  impossible."  That 
government  is  far  more  likely  to  establish 
as  its  measure  of  success  internal 
progress  rather  than  external  expansion. 

That  is  why  a  pi-udent  policy  of 
search  for  mutual  advantages  between 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  is 
worth  our  serious  and  substantial  effort. 
It  is  the  best  way  to  find  out  whether  the 
promise  of  perestroika  in  foreign  policy 
can  be  fulfilled. 

Let  me  conclude  this  review  of 
perestroika  and  American  foreign  policy 


by  reiterating  my  convictions  that,  in- 
deed, we  do  have  a  historic  opportunity 
to  make  lasting  improvements  in  U.S.- 
Soviet relations.  It  is  an  opportunity 
produced  by  actions  on  both  sides.  And, 
as  President  Bush  has  stated,  "Our 
aspu'ation  is  a  real  peace,  a  peace  of 
shared  optimism,  not  a  peace  of  armed 
camps." 

And  what  could  that  aspiration,  tha 
shared  optimism,  really  mean?  Nothing 
less  than  an  end  to  the  dangerous  East- 
West  stalemate  which  has  disfigured 
postwai'  international  politics.  It  could 
mean  a  new  U.S.-Soviet  relationship, 
which  I'eplaces  competition  where  pos- 
sible with  a  creative  and  cooperative  ap 
proach  to  international  problems.  A  nevit 
relationship  that  would  be  sustained  no\ 
by  rhetoric  or  pious  hope  but  by  the 
reality  of  a  Europe,  free,  whole,  and  at 
peace  with  itself.  A  new  relationship 
where  the  reality  of  regional  conflicts 
would  be  resolved  at  last  so  that  the 
promise  of  development  can  be  fulfilled. 
A  new  relationship  that  would  produce  i 
sustainable  arms  control  process  that 
provided  more  secuiity  through  en- 
hanced stability  and  gi-eater  openness  &• 
lower  cost.  And  a  new  relationship,  abo^ 
all  else,  that  would  lead  to  the  fulfiUmeni 
of  those  human  rights  wliich  are  the 
birthright  of  all  mankind. 


■Press  release  192  of  Oct.  17, 1989.1 


Prerequisites  and  Principles 
for  Arms  Control 


Secretanj  Baker's  prepared  address 
before  the  Commonwealth  Club  in  San 
Francisco  and  the  question-and-answer 
session  with  the  audience  on  October  23, 
1989} 

As  you  know,  this  speech  was  supposed 
to  be  given  last  week.  A  terrible  tragedy 
intervened  [earthquake  in  the  San  Fran- 
cisco area  on  October  17],  and  naturally  I 
thought  at  first  that  I  should  cancel  it. 

In  view  of  the  suffering,  it  did  not 
seem  right  to  come  here  and  speak  to  you 
about  aiTns  control.  But  you  requested 
that  I  fulfill  this  commitment,  and  that  is 
a  telling  sign  of  your  character.  It  is  the 
tiaily  American  character  of  facing  up  to 
disaster,  taking  its  measure,  and  then  get- 
ting on  with  the  work.  It  is  the  truly  bay 
area  character  of  looking  to  the  future. 

Your  deeds,  beyond  the  power  of  any 
words  to  convey,  ai'e  the  most  eloquent 


testimony  to  your  resilience;  a  resilience 
I  might  add,  that  is  capturing  the 
imagination  of  the  whole  countiy.  You  a) 
working  hand-in-hand  with  one  another 
to  turn  crisis  into  opportimity,  to  turn 
pain  into  progress,  and  to  turn  a  world 
tossed  upside-down  right-side  up.  My 
heartfelt  condolences  go  out  to  the 
families  of  the  victims.  And  my  prayers 
are  with  you. 

I  would  like  to  begin  my  discussion 
with  you  today  by  talking  about  another 
October  crisis,  a  crisis  fi'om  27  years 
ago — the  Cuban  missile  crisis  of  1962. 
For  it  is  a  crisis  that  seems  so  far,  far 
away,  so  remote  from  the  tragedy  you  ai 
now  overcoming  so  well. 

The  contrast  in  relations  between 
Moscow  and  Washington  in  October  196i 
and  in  October  1989  could  not  be  gi-eatei 
In  October  1962,  we  faced  a  blustering 
Soviet  Union;  its  leader  talked  of  bmyin 


14 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  198 


THE  SECRETARY 


Today  we  face  a  sobered  Soviet 

ion;  its  leader  talks  of  restructuring 

society. 
In  October  1962,  the  Soviet  economy 

s  growing  and  ready  to  feed  an  un- 

enting  arms  buildup.  Today  the  Soviet 

inomy  is  virtually  bankrupt. 
In  October  1962,  the  Soviet  space 

(gram  raised  fears  we  would  lose  the 

e  to  the  Moon.  Today  the  Soviet  Union 
ffacing  to  avoid  being  left  behind  as 
lich  of  the  world  moves  from  the  in- 
i^trial  age  into  a  new  century. 

j  And  27  years  ago  this  month,  we 
iiod — as  you  all  no  doubt  recall — 
>eball-to-eyeball  on  the  brink  of  war. 
I  lay,  by  contrast,  superpower  relations 
(■  as  ])romising  as  we  have  ever  found 
J'lii  since  the  Second  World  War.  Look- 
1  back  the  Cuban  missile  crisis  posed 
,)■  clearest  possibility  for  nucleai'  war  in 
},■  ]jnstwar  era.  Looking  forward  we 
Ve  the  clearest  opportunity  to  reduce 

■  risk  of  war  since  the  dawn  of  the 
1  'learage. 

Ihe  President  has  described  our 
)  pi  ise  as  moving  beyond  the  peace  of 
med  camps  to  the  peace  of  shared 
)  imism.  Last  week  I  described  our 
rtategy  for  achieving  this  goal  through  a 
iideiit  search  for  points  of  mutual  ad- 
!  ita^e.  Today  I  want  to  talk  in  more 
i  ail  about  one  of  those  points:  arms  con- 
il. 

Arms  control  can  lend  a  strong  hand 
iijuilding  an  enduring  peace,  but  arms 
citrol  does  not  proceed  in  a  political 
v;uum.  Let  me  be  clear :  We  compete 
B  itarily  because  we  differ  politically. 
Flitieal  disputes  are  fuel  for  the  fire  of 
ans  competitions.  Only  by  resolving 
p  itical  differences  can  we  dampen  the 
ans  competition  associated  writh  them. 
I  follow  Clausewitz,  if  war  is  the  con- 
tuation  of  politics  by  violent,  military 
aans,  arms  control  is  the  search  for  a 
3  ble,  predictable  strategic  relationship 
b  peaceful,  political  means. 

That  is  why  our  times  are  now  so  full 
B:promise.  Over  the  last  40  years,  arms 
citrol  played  only  a  limited  role  in  shap- 
ii;  the  U.S.-Soviet  secui'ity  relationship, 
fcause  our  political  differences  were 
?iply  too  wide  to  allow  enduring  and 
s  isiantial  progress.  Western  strength 
a  I  Western  unity  sustained  deterrence 
t  -oughout  tliis  period  when  we  all  lived 
ii;he  shadow  of  opposed  values  and  con- 
f  1  iiiK  purpose.  Now  perestroika  in 
'"  \  i'  t  domestic  and  foreign  policy  could, 
i  [lart,  lift  the  shadow.  The  political  pre- 
I'  |ii!^ite  for  enduring  and  strategically 
J  iiiilcant  arms  control  may  finally  be 

atcrializing.  Sui'ely  the  President  was 


right  when  he  wi-ote  President  Gor- 
bachev in  June,  "We  bear  enormous — and 
mutual — responsibility  to  take  advantage 
of  the  promise  of  these  extraordinary 
times  to  improve  international  security." 

The  President  and  I  have  both  said 
that  we  want  perestroika  to  succeed.  It 
would  be  folly,  indeed,  to  miss  this  oppor- 
tunity. Soviet  "new  thinking"  in  foreign 
and  defense  poUcy  promises  possibilities 
that  would  have  been  unthinkable  a 
decade  ago,  such  as  deep,  stabilizing  cuts 
in  strategic  forces  and  parity  in  reduced 
conventional  arms  in  Europe.  Yet 
perestroika's  success  is  far  from  assured. 

Any  uncertainty  about  the  fate  of 
reform  in  the  Soviet  Union,  however,  is 
all  the  more  reason,  not  less,  for  us  to 
seize  the  present  opportunity.  For  the 


...we  seek  reductions  in 
first-strike,  surprise  at- 
tack capabilities. 


works  of  our  labor — a  diminished  Soviet 
threat  and  effectively  verifiable  agi'ee- 
ments — can  endui-e  even  if  perestroika 
does  not.  If  the  Soviets  have  already 
destroyed  weapons,  it  will  be  difficult, 
costly,  and  time  consuming  for  any  future 
Ki'emlin  leadership  to  reverse  the 
process  and  to  assert  mihtai-y  superiority. 
And  vrith  agreements  in  place,  any  at- 
tempt to  break  out  of  treaties  will  serve 
as  one  indicator  of  an  outbi-eak  of  "old 
thinking." 

We  can  take  advantage  of  the  new 
political  climate  to  consoHdate  deterrence 
at  lower  levels  of  risk.  Through  sound 
and  verifiable  agi'eements,  we  can  shape 
and  institutionalize  a  more  stable,  predict- 
able strategic  relationship.  The  changing 
political  relationship  between  the  Soviet 
Union  and  the  United  States  should  be 
reflected  in  changing  Soviet  force  struc- 
tures and  strategic  concepts.  In  this  way, 
we  can  help  to  codify  political  progress  in 
military  reality  and  by  doing  so,  underpin 
that  progress  and  strengthen  it. 

Strategy  and  the  Changing 
Strategic  Environment 

Before  outlining  the  tenets  of  this 
Administration's  aims  control  poUcy,  I 
would  like  to  say  a  few  more  words  about 
the  broader  strategic  environment  in 
which  arms  control  must  operate. 


Politically  the  Soviet  Union  is  in  the 
midst  of  this  revolution  of  perestroika, 
glasnost,  and  democratization.  The  new 
thinkers  understand  that  Stalin's  system 
must  change  fundamentally  if  the  Soviet 
Union  is,  as  Mr.  Gorbachev  has  said,  to 
enter  the  21st  century  in  the  manner  wor- 
thy of  a  great  power.  To  this  end,  the 
Soviet  leadership  has  done  much  and 
promised  even  more  for  political, 
economic,  and  legal  reforms.  While  his 
reforms  need  to  be  extended,  codified,  in- 
stitutionalized, and  made  habitual,  the 
pohtical  face  of  Soviet  power  is  being 
changed  already. 

The  prospects  for  reform  are  just  as 
great — in  some  cases  perhaps  even 
greater — in  Poland,  Hungary,  East  Ger- 
many, Czechoslovakia,  and  the  other 
countries  of  Eastern  Europe.  While  the 
trends  should  not  be  overstated,  the 
political  foundations  of  a  Europe  di\aded 
by  force  since  1945  are  crambling  away. 
We  can  move  toward  the  President's 
vision  of  a  Europe  whole  and  free. 

These  great  political  changes  are  set 
in  a  time  of  vast  technological  changes. 
Our  military  tools  are  being  reshaped  by 
emerging  technologies  that  could  offer 
greater  security.  Advances  in  sensor  tech- 
nology, data  processing  capabilities,  and 
precision-guided  munitions  present  novel 
ways  to  strengthen  deterrence. 

We  need  to  be  careful,  however,  also 
to  see  the  darker  side  of  changing  tech- 
nological realities.  More  nations  are  ac- 
quiring the  capacity  to  make  chemical 
weapons  and  to  manufacture  missiles. 
With  many  of  these  regimes  locked  in  con- 
tinuing regional  conflicts,  the  explosive 
escalation  potential  of  their  disputes  is  ob- 
vious. 

I  would  add,  too,  that  these  tech- 
nological changes  are  taking  place  in  a 
time  of  changing  defense  economics. 
Everyone  has  noted  the  Soviet  Union's 
compelling  need  to  convert  some  of  its 
vast  expenditures  for  the  militaiy  into 
domestic  reconstnjction.  The  era  of  rapid- 
ly rising  defense  budgets  is  over  in  the 
West  too.  From  the  new  technologies,  we 
are  going  to  have  to  pick  very  carefully 
those  weapons  that  strengthen  deter- 
rence most  cost-effectively. 

What  do  these  political,  economic, 
and  technological  changes  add  up  to? 
Strategically,  the  world  we've  planned  for 
since  the  Cuban  missile  crisis  is  increas- 
ingly distinct  from  the  world  we  actually 
face.  Threats  to  our  interests  are  chang- 
ing politically  and  multiplying  technologi- 
cally. Our  capabilities  are  being  improved 
technologically  but  constrained  economi- 
cally. 


Cipartment  of  State  Bulletin/December  1989 


15 


THE  SECRETARY 


Our  fundamental  values  and  inter- 
ests will  endure.  But  as  our  strategic  en- 
vironment is  transformed,  we  need  to 
look  anew  at  some  of  our  guiding  con- 
cepts and  approaches.  Many  long-held  as- 
sumptions may  need  to  be  rethought. 
Strategy  aligns  ends  and  means.  As  both 
shift,  strategy  may  have  to  shift  too. 

For  example,  we  need  to  think  about 
the  future  of  both  European  security  rela- 
tions and  the  central  supeipower 
strategic  relationship.  Today's  historical 
political  transfoiTTiations  in  Eastern 
Europe — if  suitably  institutionalized — 
make  such  reassessments  doubly  impor- 
tant. In  light  of  the  growing  threat  to  our 
global  interests  and  power  projection  for- 
ces posed  by  the  proliferation  of  new  tech- 
nologies, we  also  need  to  reconsider  our 
strategy  for  Thu-d  World  conflicts.  Over 
the  longer  term,  we  need  to  consider  if 
strategic  defense  options,  deep  reduc- 
tions in  nuclear  and  conventional 
weapons,  increasingly  powerful  conven- 
tional munitions,  and  shifts  in  Soviet 
strategy  will  alter  our  requirements  for 
deteiTence. 

To  cope  with  this  changing  environ- 
ment, defense  progi-ams  and  arms  control 
must  work  together.  This  a  pi'erequisite 
for  a  coherent,  integrated  strategy  that 
reduces  the  risk  of  war  by  deten-ing  ag- 
gression while  promoting  American 
values.  Both  defense  programs  and  arms 
control  can  serve  the  common  goals  of  en- 
hancing stability,  ensui-ing  predictabihty, 
and  bolstering  deterrence.  As  our 
strategy  may  change  in  response  to  an 
evolving  strategic  environment  so,  too, 
our  defense  programs  and  arms  control 
positions  would  also  change.  Together 
security  will  be  enhanced. 

Clearly  neither  defense  programs 
nor  arms  control  can  do  the  job  alone.  No 
remotely  achievable  START  [strategic 
arms  reduction  talks]  agreement,  for  ex- 
ample, can  restore  the  survivability  of 
our  silo-based  ICBMs  [intercontinental 
baUistic  missiles].  To  maintain  the  in- 
tegrity of  the  triad,  we  will  need  to  rely 
upon  the  deployment  of  mobile  missiles 
as  a  key  component  of  our  nuclear  mod- 
ernization program.  But  START  can  ]5lay 
a  key  role.  It  can  reduce  the  Soviet  threat 
to  our  forces  and  thereby  make  sur- 
vivability through  mobility  more  feasible. 
Without  START  to  constrain  the  Soviet 
threat,  the  job  of  ensuring  reliable  deter- 
rence would  be  less  predictable  and  'af- 
fordable. Without  the  START 
negotiations,  the  domestic  consensus 
needed  to  support  essential  modern- 
ization programs — not  only  mobile 
ICBMs  but  also  B-2,  Tiident,  and  SDI 
[Strategic  Defense  Initiative] — would  be 


difficult  to  sustain.  Likewise  without  our 
strategic  modernization  program,  the 
benefits  of  a  START  agi-eement  would  be 
sharply  reduced.  Thus  our  force  modern- 
ization and  ai"ms  control  efforts  reinforce 
one  another. 

In  September  I  announced  the 
President's  decision  to  allow  mobile  land- 
based  missiles  in  START.  Pennitting 
mobile  missiles  only  makes  sense  if  the 
United  States  is  wiUing  to  deploy  them. 
For  this  reason,  this  decision  is  contin- 
gent on  congressional  funding  of  our 
mobile  missile  progi-am.  Congress  needs 
now  to  support  START,  not  undercut  it, 
by  funding  this  program.  As  Senator 
[Sam]  Nunn  said  recently,  "Unless  we  in 
the  Congress  can  manage  to  put  our 
ICBM  modernization  progi-am  back  on 
track. ..the  START  negotiations  face  a 
very  bleak  and  a  vei-y  long  future  indeed." 

Another  prerequisite  for  a  successful 
strategy — for  defense  progi-ams  and 
aiTTis  control  that  work  together — is  the 
need  for  unity  as  a  nation  and  as  an  al- 
Uance.  This  follows  from  a  simple  traism: 
United  we  stand,  divided  we  fall.  We 
should  not  temi:)t  the  Soviets  with  ex- 
ploitable differences  between  the  Ad- 
ministration and  Congress  or  between 
the  United  States  and  its  allies.  That  does 
not  exempt  us,  of  course,  from  the  need 
for  infomied  debate.  It  is  imperative  that 
we  maintain  open  and  honest  discussions 
about  strategy  and  arms  control  matters 
writhin  the  strategic  community  and  wdth 
the  public  at  lai-ge.  As  we  deter  possible 
aggression,  we  must — as  the  noted 
military  histoi-ian  Michael  Howard  has 
put  it — reassui-e  oui-  peoples  that  their 
defense  dollars  are  efficiently  and  effec- 
tively supporting  the  cause  of  peace.  An 


Greater  openness  is  the 
surest  path  to  greater 
predictability  and  a  lower 
risk  of  war,  especially 
inadvertent  war. 


open,  frank  debate  is  the  surest  formula 
for  unity.  But  such  a  debate  must  begin 
and  seek  to  reach  some  resolution  before 
treaties  are  signed  if  we  are  to  bring 
home  treaties  in  the  national  interest. 


The  Goal  of  Arms  Control 
and  the  Path  to  It 

As  a  contribution  to  such  a  debate,  I 
would  like  to  move  now  ft-om  the  prereq-( 
uisites  of  aiTns  control  to  the  basic  goal  a 
our  arms  control  policy  and  the  principle! 
for  achieving  it. 

The  main  goal  of  arms  control  is  to 
reduce  to  risk  of  wai* — any  war,  nuclear 
or  conventional.  We  hope  to  prevent  wan 
by  working  toward  a  stable,  predictable 
strategic  relationship.  Stability  requires" 
military  forces  and  policies  such  that  no 
one  can  gain  by  sticking  lir-st  even  in  tha 
worst  crisis.  Beginning  a  war,  especially 
nuclear  war,  must  never  become  a  Soviet 
option — even  a  least-worst  option,  as  a 
noted  strategist  once  put  it.  Predict- 
ability requii'es  that  sufficient  openness 
and  transparency  prevails  to  prevent 
misperception,  miscalculation,  and  an  in^ 
advertent  war — a  war  no  one  wanted  bu 
no  one  could  stop.  The  more  open  and 
transparent  Soviet  military  affairs,  the 
gi'eater  trust  and  confidence  we  can  hav 
in  Soviet  intentions. 

Four  principles  guide  our  search  foi 
a  stable,  predictable  strategic  relation- 
ship. 

First,  we  seek  reductions  in  first- 
strike,  surprise  attack  capabilities.  We 
seek  stability  through  proposals  to 
reduce  those  capabilities  most  suited  for 
offensive,  blitzkrieg-sty\e  actions  and 
preemptive  first-strikes.  In  CFE  [conve^ 
tional  ai'med  forces  in  Europe  negotia- 
tions], we've  concentrated  on  eliminatinj; 
Soviet  advantages  in  those  weapons  mos 
suited  to  seizing  and  holding  teiritory: 
tanks,  artillery,  and  armored  personnel 
cai-riers.  In  START  we  have  focused  on 
reducing  the  most  destabilizing  weapons 
especially  vulnerable,  silo-based  heavy 
ICBMs,  such  as  Soviet  SS-18s.  These 
weapons  ai"e  suited  principally  for 
preemptive  first-strikes  and  not  for 
retaliatory  missions.  In  Wyoming  we 
proposed  banning  shoit-time-of-flight  s© 
launched  ballistic  missile  (SLBM)  tests, 
seeking  in  this  way  to  reduce  the 
capability  for  a  Soviet  decapitating  fii-st- 
strike.  Our  START  proposals  emphasize 
the  relative  merits  of  slow-flying 
weapons — such  as  cimise  missiles  and 
bombers  which  are  not  suitable  for  a  firs' 
strike. 

Our  SDI  pi-ogram  also  suppoi-ts  oui 
emphasis  on  stability.  Effective  strategi 
defenses  can  contribute  to  survivable, 
cost-effective  barriers  to  a  successful 
first-strike.  That  is  why  we  look  favora- 
bly on  the  decision  made  by  the  Soviets 
Wyoming  to  delink  the  defense  and  spat 
talks  fi-om  START.  This  Soviet  decision 


16 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  198 


THE  SECRETARY 


i  no  longer  hold  START  hostage  to 
■solution  of  defense  and  space  issues 
■moves  a  key  obstacle  to  a  START 
eaty  while  enabling  us  to  proceed  wath 
ir  SDI  plans.  We  remain  committed  to 
esei'ving  our  right  to  conduct  SDI  ac- 
vities  consistent  with  the  ABM  [Antibal- 
itic  Missile]  Ti-eaty.  And  we  will  use  the 
efense  and  space  talks  to  explore  a 
(loperative  and  stable  transition  to  a 
j^eater  reliance  on  stabiUty-enhancing, 
list-effective  strategic  defenses. 
I     Our  second  principle — predict- 
iility  through  openness — expands  the 
mditional  focus  of  ai-ms  control  on 
(ipabilities.  Every  war  has  its  ovra 
ique  causes,  but  surely  Thucydides 
,de  an  important  general  point  when  he 
ote,  "What  made  war  inevitable  was 
e  gi-owth  of  Athenian  power  and  the 
r  which  this  caused  in  Sparta."  Anns 
introl  has  mainly  focused  on  the  iirst 

!,rt  of  this  equation:  constraining  or 
ducing  destabilizing  miUtary 
pabilities.  Now  in  expanding  the  agen- 
,,  we  are  working  to  deal  wdth  the  other 
i'pect  of  Thucydides'  equation:  fears  of 
i;gi-essive  intent.  We  are  pushing  to 
lake  Soviet  militai"y  activities  more  open 
:id  ti-ansparent.  The  more  we  know  and 
udcrstand,  the  more  we  can  be  assured 
lat  our  fears  are  not  results  of  misper- 
cption  or  miscalculation.  Greater  open- 
I  ss  is  the  surest  path  to  greater 
jedictability  and  a  lower  risk  of  war, 
specially  inadvertent  war. 

The  President's  "open  skies"  initia- 
le  is  a  clear  example  of  this  new  focus 
i  arms  control.  Openness  about  militaiy 
irces  and  activities  is  at  the  heail  of  the 
tiks  on  confidence-  and  security-buOding 
i?asures  (CSBMs)  among  all  the  states 
( Europe.  In  those  negotiations,  we  are 
joposing  an  all-European  military  data 
(change  about  our  forces  and  weapons 
lograms.  In  keeping  wdth  the  spirit  of 
(■enness  we  found  at  the  Wyoming  minis- 
trial,  we  signed  an  agreement  on 
I'tification  of  strategic  exercises  and  in- 
v;ed  the  Soviets  to  visit  our  SDI 
l:ilities.  The  chemical  weapons  data  ex- 
(ange  will  help  us  move  toward  a  verifi- 
:  k'  global  ban.  [Soviet]  Defense  Minister 

izo\-'s  visit  earlier  this  month  is  just  one 
(a  series  of  exchanges  that  provide  face- 
t-face opportunities  to  understand  the 
^vift  military.  And  we  have  pushed  the 
i:i\-iets  to  publish  a  real  defense  budget 
*at  reveals  the  inputs  into  and  outputs 

)ni  their  defense  production  process. 
Openness  in  militai-y  affairs  is  just 
)  rt  ijf  our  overall  emphasis  in  our  deal- 

5s  with  the  Soviets  on  creating  open, 

uralistic  institutions.  On  his  recent 


visit,  Soviet  Defense  Minister  Yazov 
talked  of  the  increasing  influence  of 
Supreme  Soviet  committees  over  the 
Soviet  defense  complex.  We  hope  that 
Soviet  military  power  may  increasingly 
be  exposed  to  the  salutai-y  effects  of 
detailed  and  searching  public  debate. 
Greater  openness  combined  with 
force  reductions  wall  support  political 
change  as  well.  In  CFE  our  proposals  vrill 
reduce  the  potential  not  only  for  a  Soviet 
blitzkrieg  but  for  Soviet  intimidation  of 
Western  Europe.  The  Soviet  Army  we 
face  as  a  potential  ai-my  of  aggression  is 
to  East  Eui'opeans  an  army  of  occupa- 
tion. The  weight  of  the  Soviet  military 
presence  in  Eastern  Europe  will  be 
reduced.  Freed  from  the  cold  shadow  of 
Soviet  military  domination,  political 


...a  stable,  predictable  U.S.- 
Soviet strategic  relation- 
ship depends  in  part  on 
regional  stability  and  vice 
versa. 


pluralism  and  free  markets  should 
flemish  moi-e  easily  in  Eastern  Europe. 

A  more  predictable  strategic 
relationship  should  also  be  less  expen- 
sive. Anns  control  can,  as  the  President 
wTote  Mr.  Gorbachev,  "introduce  predict- 
abiUty  into  militai-y  planning  so  that  we 
can  slow  the  pace  of  military  competi- 
tion." A  slower  competition  could  be  a 
cheaper  and  safer  competition.  But  our 
desire  to  save  money  must  not  come  into 
conflict  with  the  necessity  for  security. 

The  third  principle  of  our  policy  is  a 
broadened  aiTns  control  agenda,  far 
wider  than  its  traditional  East- West 
nuclear  focus.  We  are  broadening  our 
agenda  with  the  Soviets,  both  in  terms  of 
dealing  with  pressing  global  aiTns  control 
problems,  like  chemical  and  missile 
proliferation,  as  well  as  focusing  on 
regional  conflicts.  In  an  increasingly  inter- 
twined world,  a  stable,  predictable  U.S.- 
Soviet strategic  relationship  depends  in 
part  on  regional  stability  and  vice  verea. 
Earlier  I  noted  that  advanced  tech- 
nologies were  proliferating  to  the  Third 
World.  Advanced  fighters  have  gone  to 
Libya,  Syria,  and  North  Korea.  Over  20 
states  possess  the  capability  to  produce 
chemical  weapons.  And  nucleai-  prolifera- 
tion, notably  North  Korea's  reactor  pro- 


gi'am,  remains  dangerous.  Arms  control 
should  increasingly  focus  on  such 
problems. 

The  President's  UN  initiative  can 
lead  us  towai'd  a  verifiable  global  ban  on 
chemical  weapons.  The  President's 
proposal  represents  a  realistic  road  map 
for  progress.  As  a  step  toward  a  multi- 
lateral ban,  we  will  move  bilaterally  with 
the  Soviets  to  reduce  chemical  weapons 
to  20%  of  the  current  U.S.  levels.  We  will 
further  slash  stocks  to  just  2%  of  theii' 
current  levels  within  8  years  after  the 
multilateral  convention  goes  into  effect. 
This  total  cut  of  98%  is  a  substantial  ac- 
celeration of  previous  destruction  plans. 
Then  we  will  move  to  zero  within  2  years 
of  adherence  to  the  ban  by  all  chemical 
weapons-capable  states. 

We  realize  it  may  be  difficult  to  per- 
suade problem  states  such  as  Libya  and 
Iraq  to  join,  but  we  are  creating  an  en- 
vu-onment  where  evei-yone  will  have  in- 
centives to  join  and  costs  to  pay  for 
remaining  an  outlaw.  Export  controls  on 
precursor  chemicals  will  be  strengthened, 
building  on  progi-ess  made  at  the  recent 
Canberra  conference.  The  President  has 
also  ordered  a  study  on  sanctions  to  deter 
and  punish  chemical  weapons  use  and 
other  violations  of  a  convention.  States 
must  know  that  they  will  pay  a  price  for 
theii-  inhumanity. 

Our  fourth  principle  is  in- 
stitutionalization of  a  safer  world.  The 
President  aims  to  reduce  the  risk  of  war 
permanently,  not  temporarily.  We  want 
to  see  Soviet  defensive  militaiy  opera- 
tions made  habitual.  We  want  to  see  the 
"new  thinking"  concretely  built  into  the 
Soviet  force  structure.  We  want  to  see 
weapons  destroyed,  not  merely  removed. 
And  we  want  agreements  that  can  en- 
dure. 

Effective  verification  can  ensure  that 
the  treaties  we  sign  ai-e  doing  their  job  to 
institutionalize  a  safer  world.  Because  of 
the  primacy  of  effective  verification  in 
this  Administration's  approach  to  arms 
control,  our  negotiators  have  already 
proposed  data  exchanges  and  trial 
veiification  measui-es  that  would  be  im- 
plemented even  before  the  agreements 
themselves  are  concluded.  Such  measures 
in  START  and  in  chemical  weapons  will 
help  us  build  confidence  and  gain  practi- 
cal experience  that  will  facilitate  the  con- 
clusion of  sound,  verifiable  agreements.  A 
sustainable  and  endming  aiTns  control 
process  also  means  avoiding  limits,  for 
example,  on  sea-launched  ci-uise  missiles, 
that  would  create  unmanageable  verifica- 
tion and  compUance  problems. 

Neither  have  we  stood  still  in  press- 
ing the  Soviets  to  comply  fully  with  agree- 


{epartment  of  State  Bulletin/December  1989 


17 


THE  SECRETARY 


merits  already  signed.  In  September 
President  Gorbachev  informed  the  Presi- 
dent that  the  Krasnoyarsk  radar  would 
finally  be  destroyed.  We  welcome 
Moscow's  step  to  come  into  compliance 
with  the  ABM  Treaty. 

A  Realistic  Path  to  Risk  Reduction 

These  four  principles  of  a  more  stable, 
open,  broader,  and  less  reversible 
strategic  relationship  offer  a  realistic 
path  to  a  lasting  reduction  of  risk.  It  is  a 
path  best  traveled  by  steady  steps  that 
build  on  one  another,  rather  than  grand 
leaps  that  are  often  as  not  unrealistic  or 
undone.  In  START,  in  CFE— in  all  our 
negotiations — we  have  made  fah-,  respon- 
sible proposals  designed  to  find  enduring 
points  of  mutual  advantage.  The  Soviets 
have  said  yes  to  much  of  what  we  have 
proposed.  Now  we  have  rolled  up  our 
shirt  sleeves  and  set  to  work  together  to 
put  principle  into  practice. 

We  should  be  clear  about  the  task 
ahead.  We  are  not  on  the  verge  of  a  per- 
petual peace  in  which  war  is  no  longer 
possible.  We  cannot  disinvent  nuclear 
weapons  nor  the  need  for  continued  deter- 
rence. Nor  can  we  completely  eliminate 
Soviet-American  rivalry.  But  that  rivalry 
does  not  requii-e  that  we  stand  on  the 
brink  of  Ai-mageddon  as  we  did  27  years 
ago  this  month.  Peace  need  no  longer 
hang  solely  on  Winston  Churchill's 
"process  of  sublime  irony...  where  safety 
will  be  the  sturdy  child  of  terror  and  sur- 
vival the  twin  brother  of  annihilation." 

Deterrence  need  not  rest  only  on  a 
delicate,  technical  balance  of  ten-or  dis- 
turbed by  periodic  crises.  Opportunity  in- 
vites us,  instead,  to  move  beyond 
containment,  beyond  the  cold  war,  to  a 
new  strategic  relationship  based  on  a 
sound  political  footing. 

A  new  relationship  in  which  the 
capabilities  and  incentives  to  attack  fii'st 
are  minimized  and  the  possibilities  of 
strategic  defenses  are  pursued.  A  new 
relationship  in  which  Soviet  military 
power  is  open  to  the  naked  eye,  not  just 
satellites  in  the  sky.  A  new  relationship  in 
which  all  the  peoples  of  Europe  are  free 
of  militai'y  intimidation.  A  new  relation- 
ship in  which  effectively  verifiable 
treaties  lock  in  a  lower  risk  of  war.  And  a 
new  relationship  in  which  arms  control 
aids  our  people  in  turning  the  seeds  of 
war  into  the  fniits  of  peace. 

This  is  the  strategic  relationship  we 
seek. 


Q.  We're  pleased  to  have  one  of  our 
own  members,  and  in  fact  a  past 
president,  Shirley  Temple  Black,  as 
Ambassador  to  Czechoslovakia. 
What  is  the  ratio  of  women  in  the 
U.S.  ambassadorial  corps  at  the 
present,  and  what  do  you  see  for 
the  future? 

A.  The  ratio  is  higher  than  it  used  to 
be,  and  I  would  hope  that  the  future 
would  be  even  higher,  but  I  can't  give  you 
the  e.xact  number.  I  believe  that  it's 
higher.  I  think  you'll  find  that  to  be  the 
case. 

But  let  me  simply  say  that  Ambas- 
sador Black  is  not  engaged  in  her  fii-st 
tour  as  an  ambassador.  She  did  an  ex- 
traordinarily good  job  in  this  capacity 
before,  and  she's  doing  a  wonderful  job 
for  us  now  as  Ambassador  in  Czecho- 
slovakia. 

Q.  Do  you  expect  that  the  Presi- 
dent will  appoint  more  Foreign 
Service  Officers  to  be  ambassadors? 

A.  He  will  appoint  more  than  were 
ambassadors  in  the  prior  Administration. 
I  think  the  ratio  when  we  came  into  office 
was  about  60%  cai-eer  Foreign  Service, 
40%  political.  The  President  has  stated 
his  intention  to  get  that  ratio  at  least  up 
to  two-thirds  career,  one-third  political. 
And  I  believe  right  now  we're  at  65% 
career,  35%  political. 

Q.  Having  once  been  a  chief  of 
staff  yourself,  what  systems  proce- 
dure staff  have  you  put  in  place  to 
gate-keep  your  agenda  as 
Secretary  of  State? 

A- 1  don't  know  quite  how  to  answer 
that,  other  than  to  say  that  I'm  following 
pretty  much  the  same  management  prac- 
tices and  procedures  that  I  followed  when 
I  was  the  chief  of  staff,  although  that's 
much  more  of  a  staff  position  than  this. 
But  I'm  following  the  same  practices  and 
management  procedures  that  I  followed 
as  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  for  31^ 
years. 

Q.  No  discussions  of  arms  con- 
trol can  be  complete  without  dis- 
cussing those  flying  and  sometimes 
floating  pork  barrels  such  as  the 
B-2,  the  Osprey,  and  the  Bradley 
vehicle.  Is  there  a  way  to  cut  these 
projects  even  if  the  Administration 
decides  they're  unnecessary  for  na- 
tional defense? 

A-  We're  not  having  complete  suc- 
cess in  deleting  from  the  Defense  budget 
all  of  those  items  that  the  Administration 
found  not  to  be  requu-ed  for  our  security 
needs  today.  This,  of  course,  is  simply 
evidence  of  the  fact  that  we  have  a 


government  of  shared  power,  and  that 
the  Congi-ess  is  a  co-equal  branch  of  the 
government  with  the  executive  branch. 
And  it  gets  back  to  the  point  I  made  in 
my  formal  remarks  about  the  importance 
of  having  a  full,  complete  public  debate  oi 
these  issues,  so  that  when  we  go  out  and 
negotiate  anns  control  treaties,  we'll 
bring  back  treaties  that  are  supported  by 
the  public  and  supported  by  the  Congres; 
We've  had,  on  the  other  hand,  some 
successes  as  well  in  eliminating  programs 
that  we  did  not  think  in  this  period  of 
severe  budget  restraints  were  absolutely 
required  for  the  national  security  inter- 
ests of  the  United  States. 

Q.  The  Stealth  bomber,  by  its 
very  nature,  seems  to  be  an  offen- 
sive weapon.  How  can  we  justify 
such  a  bomber? 

A.  We  think  that  the  Stealth  bomber 
is  a  veiy  important  element  of  our  deter- 
rent capability.  As  I  mentioned  in  my 
remarks,  bombers  are  not  destabilizing  ii 
the  same  sense  that  intercontinental  bal- 
listic missiles  ft-equently  are,  and  it's 
simply  a  matter  of  making  certain — again 
as  I  mentioned  in  my  remarks — that  you 
maintain  adequate  deterrence. 

The  fact  that  we  are  better  able  now 
to  pursue  and  negotiate  meaningful 
agi-eements  with  the  Soviet  Union  is  for 
one  reason  due  to  the  fact  that  we  are 
steadfast  in  maintaining  our  will  and  our 
resolve  when  we  needed  to.  And  the 
nuclear  deteri-ence  that  has  been  the 
foundation  of  the  strategy  of  the  North 
Atlantic  Ti-eaty  alliance  for  40  yeai-s  has 
served  us  very  well  and  kept  the  peace 
for  40  years. 

So  we  need  the  means  to  deliver  thai 
nuclear  deterrence  if  it  should  ever  be- 
come necessaiy  that  we  do  so.  We  think 
that  the  B-2  is  one  of  those  items — one  ol 
those  means  that  are  needed. 


Q.  Why  not  spend  less  money 
on  arms  and  more  on  disaster 
relief?  Thousands  of  people  have 
lost  their  homes  and  can't  afford 
double  mortgages  here.  How  about 
reducing  the  Pentagon's  budget 
and  shifting  that  money  into  the 
Federal  Emergency  Management 
Agency? 

A.  We  have  reduced  the  Pentagon's 
budget  significantly  over  the  course  of 
the  past  few  years  and  again  this  yeai-.  I   , 
can't  give  you  the  figui'es  with  respect  to 
how  much  has  been  spent  over  the  coui-se 
of  the  past  2  or  3  years  in  tenns  of  dis- 
aster relief,  but  I  would  be  sui-prised  if  it 
hadn't  been  an  ever-increasing  sum  of 
money  with  each  passing  year. 


a 


18 


THE  SECRETARY 


Again  you  know  the  number  one 
nction  of  the  Federal  Government  is  to 
vide  for  the  national  secmity.  That  is 
e  most  important  function  that  your 
iederal  Government,  I  think,  under- 
ikes,  and  that  is  a  function  that  most 
mericans  want  to  know  when  they  go  to 
3d  at  night  is  being  adequately  and 
roperly  performed.  [Applause] 

Over  the  coui-se  of  the  past  few 
eai's,  we've  seen  some  rather  significant 
id  substantial  reductions  in  the  Defense 
udget.  I've  just  given  you  30  minutes  of 
;marks  on  why  I  think  ai-ms  control  and 
sfense  programs  have  to  operate  in  tan- 
3m  with  each  other.  But  if,  indeed,  we  do 
ui.'  a  new  political  opportunity  here, 
lerc's  no  reason  to  think  that,  as  I  put  it 
I  the  speech,  the  era  of  unrestrained 
lending  is  going  to  come  back  upon  us 
ly  time  in  the  near  future. 

Q.  Are  regional  conflicts  more 
nportant  now  as  the  cold  war  of 
le  superpowers  thaws? 

A.  Regional  conflicts  are  extraor- 

manly  important.  Regional  conflicts 
iw,  more  than  anything  else,  we  think, 
i\  ('  the  potential  of  erupting  into  active 
jntlicts  that  could  easily  involve  the  su- 
^rpiiwers.  And  that's  why  we  spent  so 
iR'h  of  our  time  in  om*  dialogue  with  the 
)vii.'t  Union  emphasizing  regional  con- 
ct  s  and  emphasizing  our  desire  to  work 
ith  them  to  resolve  regional  conflicts. 

This  is  the  one  area,  if  I  might  say  so, 
ht-re  the  so-called  new  thinking  in 
iviet  foreign  poUcy  has  proved  some- 
hat  disappointing  to  us.  We  have  not 
'en  the  evidence  of  the  "new  thinking" 
regional  conflicts  to  the  extent  that  we 
1(1  hoped  to  when  the  "new  thinking" 
as  tlrst  announced. 

Q.  What  are  the  Russians  doing 
ow  in  Nicaragua?  Some  reports 
state  that  they  have  agreed  to  stop 
id  to  Nicaragua.  Other  reports 
jlaim  otherwise. 

A.  You  might  be  interested  to  know 
lat  just  recently  at  the  Honduran  bor- 
er t  liere  was  intercepted  a  tnickload  of 
eapons  moving  from  Nicai'agua  to  the 
[surgency  in  El  Salvador,  the  FMLN 
•'aiabundo  Mai'ti  National  Liberation 
ront]  in  El  Salvador — ^just  further 
vidence  of  the  fact  that  these  Eastern- 
loc  weapons  come  into  Cuba;  they  are 
•ansshipped  ft'om  Cuba  to  Nicaragua; 
lence  from  Nicaragua  to  rebels  in  El  Sal- 
a<l(ir  to  foment  an  insurgency  in  a 
juntry  that  has  just  conducted  five 
einocratic  elections. 


The  Soviets  have  told  us  that  they 
are  no  longer  shipping  weapons  to 
Nicaragua,  and  we  have  no  reason  to  dis- 
believe that,  that  they  stopped  that  some 
time  during  1988.  On  the  other  hand,  we 
know  and  we  have  told  them  that  we  con- 
tinue to  see  Soviet-bloc  weapons  going 
into  Cuba  in  very  large  numbers,  at 
levels  every  bit  as  large  as  those  of  the 
last  couple  of  years  and  that  we'd  hke  to 
see  them  use  their  influence  with  some  of 
their  friends  in  the  region,  such  as  Cuba 
and  Nicaragua,  to  stop  this  practice. 

They've  indicated  to  us  that  they 
would  do  so.  I  have  to  tell  you,  the  jury  is 
still  out  on  that  one. 

Q.  What  should  the  United 
States  do  about  Noriega? 
[Laughter] 

A.  Let  me  simply  say  that  there  will 
not  be  any  normalization  of  relations  be- 
tween Panama  and  the  United  States  as 
long  as  Gen.  Noriega  remains  in  power. 
It's  no  secret  we  would  like  to  see  him 
leave  power,  and  we  intend  to  continue 
the  diplomatic  pressure  that  we  have 
been  exercising  through  the  Organization 
of  American  States  and  otherwise.  We  in- 
tend to  continue  the  economic  pressure 
that  we  have  been  utilizing  through  om* 
economic  sanctions,  and  we  do  not  iiile 
out  using  any  and  all  means  that  might  be 
suitable  or  appropriate  under  the  cir- 
cumstances. 

Q.  Why  doesn't  the  Colombian 
Government  declare  martial  law 
and  war  against  the  drug  lords? 
Why  do  they  give  them  so  much 
due  process? 

A.  First  of  all,  let  me  say  I  think  it's  a 
little  hai'd  for  us  to  condemn  due  process, 
coming  as  we  do  from  200  years  of  tradi- 
tion in  which  that  has  been  the  very  basis 
of  our  society. 

But  I  think  we  have  to  take  our  hats 
off  to  the  Government  of  Colombia.  These 
people,  fi'om  President  Barco  on  down, 
under  gi'eat  threat  to  their  own  personal 
safety,  have,  in  effect,  begun  to  wage  real 
war  against  the  drug  lords.  I  think  we 
should  be  praising  what  the  Colombian 
Government  is  doing  and  not  in  any  way 
criticizing.  They're  taking  on  a  very,  very 
difficult  task  and  they're  showing  a  great 
deal  of  courage  in  doing  so. 

Q.  What  can  be  done  to  bring 
non-superpowers — for  example, 
Libya  and  Israel — into  meaningful 
arms  control  agreements? 

A.  I  spoke  about  the  importance  of 
the  major  nations  working  together  to 
prevent  the  proliferation  of  chemical  and 
nuclear  weapons.  It's  important  that  all 
countries  join  the  International  Atomic 
Energy  Agency. 


We  are  working  veiy  hard — I  men- 
tioned in  my  remarks,  the  importance  of 
continuing  to  press  North  Korea  against 
pursuing  its  nuclear  activities  and  con- 
tinuing to  push  it  to  join  the  international 
agency.  It's  very,  very  important  that  we 
recognize  the  threat  that  is  presented  to 
world  peace  through  proliferation  of 
nuclear  and  chemical  weapons. 

Q.  How  anxious  are  you  to 
resolve  longstanding  issues  of  nor- 
malization of  relations  with  Viet- 
nam and  the  establishment  of  a 
dialogue  with  Iran? 

A.  Let  me  speak  to  Iran  first.  The 
Iranian  Government  has  known  for  a  long 
time  that  we  are  quite  prepared  to  have 
open  discussions  with  representatives  of 
that  government  provided  they  renounce 
then-  pui-suit  of  teiTorism  and  provided 
they  take  actions  to  seek  the  release  and 
ft-eedom  of  our  American  hostages.  That's 
been  our  position  for  quite  some  time.  It's 
the  pohcy  the  Reagan  Administration 
pursued  and  it's  the  policy  of  this  Ad- 
ministration. 

With  respect  to  Vietnam,  let  me 
simply  say  that  one  of  the  preconditions 
for  a  little  improvement  in  our  relation- 
ship with  Vietnam  has  been  with  the 
removal  of  Vietnam's  troops  fi'om  Cam- 
bodia. We're  still  in  the  process  of  verify- 
ing the  extent  to  which  there  may  or  may 
not  be  some  Vietnamese  troops  remain- 
ing in  Cambodia.  That  was  one  of  the 
preconditions  for  oui*  improving  relations 
with  Vietnam. 

It  is  very  important  that  the  Viet- 
namese Government  support  not  just  an 
external  solution  in  Cambodia  but  an  in- 
ternal solution  as  well,  and  that  means 
they,  along  with  their  Soviet  friends, 
should  bring  their  influence  to  bear  on 
the  puppet  Hun  Sen  regime,  which  is  now 
ruling  Cambodia,  to  share  power  with  the 
noncommunist  factions  in  Cambodia. 

Q.  One  of  our  members  tells  me 
you  will  be  attending  Australia 
next  month.  What  do  you  hope  to 
achieve? 

A.  Every  year  we  have  a  meeting  of 
the  ANZUS  treaty  partners  [Australia, 
New  Zealand,  United  States  security 
pact] — Australia,  now,  and  the  United 
States.  In  addition  to  that  this  year,  we 
are  combining  that  annual  meeting  with 
discussions  with  the  members  of  the 
ASEAN  [Association  of  South  East 
Asian  Nations]  gi-oup  of  nations — 
Thailand,  Indonesia,  Singapore,  Malaysia, 
the  Philippines  [Brunei] — to  discuss  the 
possibiHty  of  creating  a  Pacific  Basin 
cooperation  entity  which  some  say  might 
be  something  like  the  OECD  [Organiza- 
tion for  Economic  Cooperation  and 


•epartment  of  State  Bulletin/December  1989 


19 


THE  SECRETARY 


Development]  insofar  as  European 
countries  ai-e  concerned.  Tlie  exact  na- 
tiu-e  of  that  Pacific  lim  organization  is 
something  that  we  will  be  working  out 
during  the  coui-se  of  this  meeting  in 
Australia. 

But  we  see  the  Pacific  Basin  and 
Pacific  rim  as  an  area  of  expanding  impor- 
tance in  terms  of  its  relationship  to  the 
United  States  and  the  rest  of  the  world. 
We  think  it's  important  that  we  look  for 
new  means  to  coordinate,  particularly  in 
some  of  the  economic  areas,  some  of  the 
activities  of  the  major  Pacific  Basin  na- 
tions. 

Q.  I  have  a  number  of  questions 
here  about  Germany.  In  fact,  one  of 
them  was  phoned  in  by  one  of  our 
members.  It  is  said  that  those  who 
don't  learn  the  lessons  of  history 
are  sure  to  repeat  past  behavior. 
Do  you  believe  that  the  post-World 
War  II  generation  of  German 
citizens  has  learned  lessons  of  the 
past,  that  a  reunited  Germany  will 
not  revert  to  neo-Nazi  behavior? 

Also  would  a  reunited  Germany 
be  an  economic  threat  to  central 
Europe? 

A.  Is  it  an  economic  threat?  Let  me 
simply  say  that  for  over  40  years,  it's 
been  the  policy  of  the  United  States  and 
the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  alliance  to  sup- 
port the  reunification  of  Germany. 

I  think  it's  important,  though,  that 
we  understand  that  when  we  talk  about 
that,  we're  talking  about  self-determina- 
tion for  the  people  of  East  Gennany  and 
self-deter-mination,  or  reunification  or 
reconciliation — call  it  what  you  wall — 
achieved  in  peace  and  ft'eedom  so  that  the 
people  of  East  Germany  ultimately  will 
be  integi-ated  into  a  community  of 
democratic  Eui'opean  nations. 

When  you  mention  the  word 
"reunification,"  to  some  it  conjur-es  up 
visions  of  a  return  to  1937  borders  or  per- 
haps to  a  reunification  that  is  not 
achieved  through  peace  and  freedom.  So 
I  think  we  should  make  it  clear  that  when 
we  talk  about  reconciliation  or  reunifica- 
tion, we're  talking  about  self-determina- 
tion for  the  people  of  East  Gennany 
achieved  in  peace  and  freedom. 

Q.  In  order  to  restore  the 
balance  of  power  in  Europe,  would 
it  be  more  important  to  help  the 
democratization  of  Poland, 
Czechoslovakia,  and  Hungary — 
even  more  important  than  to  help 
perestroika  to  succeed? 

A.  I  think  the  two  are  related,  as  I 
mentioned  in  my  remarks.  They're  cer- 
tainly helping  reform  in  Eastern  Europe 
and  helping  pevestroika  to  succeed. 


They're  not  mutually  exclusive  goals,  and 
I  don't  think  we  ought  to  treat  them  as 
mutually  exclusively.  We  believe  it's  in 
our  interest  to  see  perestroika  succeed  be- 
cause we'll  see  a  more  open,  stable,  and 
secure  Soviet  Union. 

We  also  think  it's  in  om-  interest  to 
see  the  reform  process  in  Eastern 
Europe  proceed,  because  the  refonn 
processes  are  moving  the  countries  of 
Eastern  Europe  toward  our  values,  the 
Western  values  of  political  freedom,  politi- 
cal pluralism,  and  free-market  economics. 

Q.  You  spoke  of  chemical  arms 
a  little  earlier.  What  is  the  method 
by  which  the  chemical  stockpiles 
will  be  reduced?  How  does  the 
government  plan  to  ensiu*e  that 
they  don't  inadvertently  end  up 
seriously  damaging  our  own 
population  for  years  to  come? 

A.  They're  going  to  have  to  be 
destroyed  in  a  safe  and  secure  manner 
and  under  safe  and  secure  conditions. 
Beyond  saying  that,  I  probably  shouldn't 
comment  any  further.  But  they  will  be 
destroyed  in  a  safe  and  secure  way. 

Q.  Do  you  foresee  any  move- 
ment on  the  stalemate  in  the  Mid- 
dle East,  and  will  the  United  States 


engage  in  shuttle  diplomacy  in  that 
area? 

A.  We've  been  working  very  hard 
through  means  other  than  shuttle 
diplomacy  to  try  and  move  the  peace 
process  foi'ward  in  the  Middle  East. 

I  said  in  New  York,  during  the 
course  of  the  UN  General  Assembly 
several  weeks  ago,  that  there  may  be 
room  for  some  progress;  that  I  wasn't 
going  to  say  it  was  a  probability  but  thati 
I  would  say  that  there  was  a  possibility.  I 
don't  think  I  could  change  that  formula^ 
tion  any  today.  I  don't  see  it  as  anything 
more  than  a  possibility. 

I  would  hope  that  we  could  find  a 
way  to  move  the  initiative  of  Prime  Minis 
ter  Shamir  of  Israel  for  elections  in  the 
territories — find  a  way  to  move  that  for- 
ward. But  we  can't  move  it  forward  un- 
less we  can  get  Palestinians  and  Israelis, 
sitting  down  at  the  same  table,  and  engag 
ing  each  other  in  a  dialogue.  It  is  that 
that  we  have  been  tiying  vei-y  hard  to  as 
sist.  Over  the  course  of  the  past  few 
weeks,  the  Egyptians  have  likewise  been 
trying.  I  can't  give  you  any  better  predic 
tion  then  that  right  now. 


'Press  release  197 


U.S.-Soviet  Relations:  A  Discussion 
of  Perestroika  and  Economic  Reform 


i 


Secretary  Baker's  statement  pre- 
pared for  the  Senate  Finance  Committee 
on  October  I,,  1989} 

Since  1985,  the  Soviet  Union  has  pursued 
an  extraordinary  effort  at  internal 
reform — an  effort  now  known  to  the 
world  through  the  words  "perestroika" 
and  "glasnost."  Perestroika  and  glasnost 
are  an  inextricable  mix  of  political, 
economic,  and  legal  measures.  As  Presi- 
dent Gorbachev  has  stated,  overhauling 
the  Soviet  economy  requu'es  a  transfor- 
mation of  the  political  and  legal 
landscape — a  ti-ue  "revolution." 

The  need  to  establish  the  political 
and  legal  setting  for  reform  explains 
Gorbachev's  early  emphasis  on  glasnost — 
freedom  for  people  to  speak  openly  about 
the  shortcomings  of  the  Soviet  economy 
and  society  so  as  to  build  support  for 
change.  The  need  for  political  and  legal 
changes  has  become,  with  time,  an  even 
more  prominent  feature  of  Gorbachev's 
reforms. 


The  changes  Gorbachev  has  made  in 
the  political  and  legal  structui-es  have 
sought: 

•  A  Politburo  and  Central  Commit- 
tee that  would  agi'ee  to  radical  reforms; 

•  A  Supreme  Soviet  that  would 
enact  laws  and  decrees: 

•  A  bureaucracy  that  would  imple- 
ment, not  obstruct,  reforms;  and 

•  A  general  public  that  would 
embrace  and  sustain  necessary  changes. 

Gorbachev  and  his  allies  have  had  to 
define  and  legitimize  a  new  Soviet 
market  system — ft-equently  described  as 
a  "socialist  market."  This  effort  requires 
much  more  than  a  technically  sound  pro- 
gram. It  necessitates  an  overhaul  of  the 
thinking  and  attitudes  of  millions  of 
people.  It  requii-es  changing  a  political 
culture  with  deep  Russian,  as  well  as 
Soviet,  roots.  Indeed  it  involves  a  recon- 
sideration of  Soviet  doctrine  in  several 
sensitive  areas.  Other  members  of  the 
leadership  are  bound  to  resist  this  assaul' 
on  Marxist  ideology. 


20 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  198 


THE  SECRETARY 


For  instance,  perestroika  requires  a 
negotiation  of  the  Soviet  "social  con- 
act."  The  Soviet  people  had  received 
:traordinary  security  and  distributive 
(uality  (except  for  the  privileged  and 
le  coiTupt,  a  gi'owing  gi'oup)  but  at  the 
jjice  of  political  dictatorship,  the  absence 
(j  civil  liberties,  few  economic  incentives, 
iid  limited  economic  opportunities.  One 
(lemma  of  the  traditional  Soviet 
(onomy  was  summed  up  in  the  cynical 
]U'ase  of  Soviet  workers:  "They  pretend 
1  i3ay  us,  and  we  pretend  to  work." 

I'erestroika  also  forces  new  thinking 
iiout  the  tradeoff  between  efficiency  and 
(luality.  This  tradeoff,  in  tiu'n,  raises  the 
(iestion  of  the  roles  of  property  and 
Kentives.  In  the  absence  of  teiTor  or  an 
(ferriding  social  task  (e.g.,  a  war), 
fonomic  incentive  is  the  prime  motiva- 
ton  for  productivity,  and  private  propei'- 
li  is  the  key  to  economic  incentive.  The 
,')viets  also  need  to  rethink  the  role  of 
e  ( 'ommunist  Party  and  the  state  in 
nniiig  the  economy.  The  information 
.  pldsion  of  the  last  20  years  has 
(tmunstrated  that  a  centrally  planned 
<onomy  cannot  keep  up. 

It  is  sometimes  hard  for  people  used 
)  living  in  a  market  economy  to  under- 
and  the  width  of  the  gulf  separating 
jviet  thinking  on  economic  questions 
oni  our  own.  For  instance,  in  the  Soviet 
)mmand  economy,  output  and  allocation 
•e  set  through  quantity  targets  accoi'd- 
g  to  a  central  plan,  not  by  market 
I'.-ices.  Instead  of  signaUng  scarcity, 
irices  ai'e  used  as  an  accounting  tool, 
ubles  are  not  freely  convertible  into 
3ods  within  the  Soviet  Union,  much  less 
-itside.  For  example,  a  factoi^  may  have 
lenty  of  rubles  but  still  be  unable  to  buy 
iw  materials  because  the  plan  directs 
le  materials  elsewhere.  Or  the  factory 
lay  be  allocated  certain  ruble  credit  but 
jfily  for  specified  purchases.  A  high-level 
inctionary  may  have  access  to  a  store 
iith  stocked  shelves,  whereas  a  citizen 
olding  an  equal  number  of  rubles  cannot 
hd  goods  to  buy.  Money  and  markets  do 
ot  command  resources — central  alloca- 
011  decisions  do. 

1  n  summary,  it  would  be  a  mistake  to 
nalyze  perestroika  as  simply  an 
conomic  phenomenon.  The  course  set  by 
resident  Gorbachev  involves  changes  in 
olitical  sti-ucture,  ideology,  legal  prac- 
ces,  and  popular  attitudes,  as  well  as  the 
c'liiKimy.  Much  of  it  is  experimental, 
esigned  to  cope  with  problems  of  the  mo- 
leiit.  Frankly,  it  is  a  staggering  task. 


Lessons  From  Soviet  Economic 
Reform  Failures 

Perestroika  is  not  the  first  effort  to 
reform  the  Stalinist  model  of  a  command 
and  control  economy.  In  the  1950s, 
Khi-ushchev  implemented  the  "new 
lands"  policy  in  an  effort  to  spark  agricul- 
tiu-al  pi-oduction.  In  the  1960s,  Kosygin 
introduced  the  Lieberman  reforms,  a 
forerunner  of  current  efforts  to  increase 
enteiprise  autonomy.  In  the  1970s, 
Brezhnev  sought  increased  management 
efficiency  by  increasing  cross-sector  coor- 
dination, i.e.,  increased  centralization  and 
bureaucratization.  All  these  efforts  repre- 
sented tinkering  with  the  basic  Stalinist 
model.  All  failed. 

The  causes  of  these  failures  give  us  a 
better  idea  of  what  conditions  may  be 
necessai-y  for  perestroika  to  succeed.  I 
believe  these  conditions  include:- 

1.  Top-level  political  support; 

2.  Clear  recognition  of  the  need  for 
economic  changes; 

3.  An  openness  that  permits  the 
rethinking  of  ideology  and  economic 
theory  so  as  to  justify  change; 

4.  A  conducive  international  envii-on- 
ment; 

5.  Consistency  in  the  design  and  im- 
plementation of  refoiTns;  and 

6.  Ability  to  counter  the  power  of  the 
antirefoiTn  bureaucracy. 


...economic  incentive  is  the 
prime  motivation  for 
productivity,  and  private 
property  is  the  key  to 
economic  incentive. 


Even  these  conditions  may  not  total- 
ly suffice,  for  the  reformers  are  taking  on 
Russian  as  well  as  Soviet  ti'aditions.  This 
society  did  not  experience  many  impor- 
tant Western  movements — neither  the 
RefoiTnation  nor  the  Renaissance 
touched  this  borderland  of  Europe.  It  is 
rent  by  divisions  among  many 
nationalities.  These  splits  are  exacer- 
bated by  a  grovdng  movement  of  strikes. 
Openness  may  bring  conflict  as  well  as 
progress. 

The  first  four  conditions  for  a  suc- 
cessful reform  effort  are  probably 
present.  But  the  fifth  and  sixth  pose  real 
challenges  for  President  Gorbachev.  At 
this  point,  the  real  dangers  to  perestroika 
are: 


•  A  poorly  designed  and  noncom- 
prehensive  progi-am,  reflecting  com- 
promises among  top  leaders  or  the  lack  of 
top-level  appreciation  of  the  need  for 
changes; 

•  Poor  implementation  due  to 
bureaucratic  opposition; 

•  Public  opposition  due  to  the  loss  of 
benefits  from  the  old  system  before  the 
advantages  of  the  new  system  kick  in;  and 

•  Failure  to  win  a  constituency  for 
the  refoiTn  due  to  uncertainty  about  its 
staying  power  and  legal  protections. 

Given  the  magnitude  of  the  chal- 
lenge, it  should  not  be  surprising  that 
perestroika  has  turned  out  not  to  be  one 
reform  program  but  an  amalgam  of  many. 
It  is  an  ongoing  experiment,  relying  on  a 
fail'  amount  of   "seat-of-the-pants"  logic. 
It  has  reflected  compromises  made  neces- 
sary by  the  Soviet  system  of  collective 
leadership.  It  has  incorporated  contradic- 
tions because  different  factions  pressed 
alternative  solutions.  These  compromises 
and  contradictions  have  created  am- 
biguities, which  in  tui'n  have  opened 
opportunities  for  bui-eaucratic 
"reinterpretations"  and  obstructions. 
This  lack  of  an  internally  consistent,  com- 
prehensive, and  integrated  reform  pro- 
gram— while  understandable — remains  a 
major,  ongoing  weakness. 

The  Roots  of  Perestroika 

The  roots  oi perestroika  predate 
Gorbachev.  The  Stalinist  system 
produced  a  swift  industrialization  of  the 
Soviet  economy,  albeit  at  gi-eat  cost.  By 
the  early  1980s,  the  Soviet  leadership  un- 
derstood that  some  kind  of  economic 
reform  was  necessary.  Yuii  Andropov,  in 
his  brief  tenure  as  General  Secretary  of 
the  Communist  Party,  outlined  some 
measures  that  became  the  precursors  to 
Gorbachev's  program.  But  it  is 
reasonable  to  ask  why  the  Soviet  leader- 
ship took  on  this  major  challenge  at  this 
point  in  time. 

I  believe  a  combination  of  four  fac- 
tors convinced  the  Soviet  leadership  of 
the  need  for  reform. 

The  first  was  the  overall  decline  in 
economic  perfoiTnance.  Soviet  growth 
rates  declined  precipitously  from  5%  in 
the  late  1960s  to  1.8%  in  the  early  1980s. 
(Some  suggest  growth  was  even  lower,  or 
stagnant.)  The  era  of  great  gains  from 
deploying  more  resources  was  over  The 
economy  seemed  incapable  of  taking  the 
next  step  of  using  available  resources 
more  efficiently.  Moreover,  the  technologi- 
cal backwai'dness  of  the  Soviet  economy 
became  increasingly  obvious,  as  did  the 


department  of  State  Bulletin/December  1989 


21 


THE  SECRETARY 


poor  quality  of  Soviet  goods.  In  a  phrase, 
the  period  of  extensive  Soviet  economic 
growth — growth  based  on  expanding  in- 
puts— had  come  to  an  end.  And  the 
Soviet  economy  was  unable  to  switch  to 
an  intensive  growth  policy,  based  on 
productivity  gains.  In  part,  this  was 
because  the  Soviets  were  increasingly  un- 
able to  develop  and  deploy  technology 
effectively. 

A  second  factor  promoting  reform 
was  the  decline  in  the  competitive  posi- 
tion of  the  Soviet  economy.  The  gap  be- 
tween the  U.S.S.R.  and  the  West  was 
gi'owing,  not  narrowing.  Even  more 
shocking,  the  Soviets  could  see  the  newly 
industrializing  economies  surging  for- 
ward. China,  too,  was  instituting  refoiTns 
that  would  leave  the  Soviet  Union  behind 
if  it  did  not  change. 

The  Soviet  Union's  relative  decline 
was  starkly  apparent  fi"om  its  internation- 
al trading  position.  The  relative  impor- 
tance of  Soviet  manufacturing  exports  to 
Eastern  Europe  was  falling,  leading  to 
increased  reliance  on  exports  of  raw 
materials  (like  a  less  developed  country). 
And  by  the  mid-1980s,  the  fall  in  the  price 
of  oil,  a  major  Soviet  export,  was  cutting 
into  hard  cun-ency  earnings.  Moreover, 
the  Soviets  failed  to  develop  the  increas- 
ingly important  service  sector  (in  con- 
trast to  a  number  of  developing  nations). 
In  summary,  a  very  proud  people  faced 
the  prospect  of  being  overtaken  economi- 
cally by  China,  South  Korea,  and  others 
in  the  Third  Worid. 

The  militai-y  implications  of  Soviet 
economic  failure  were  a  third  reason  for 
reform.  The  Reagan  Administration's 
military  buildup  proved  difficult  to 
counter  without  drawing  off  an  even 
greater  share  of  civilian  resources  and 
increasing  the  already  heavy  defense  bur- 
den. The  estimates  of  the  Soviet 
military's  share  of  GNP  vary,  from  16%  to 
18%,  or  even  higher.  (This  compares  with 
about  6%  in  the  United  States.)  Soviet 
military  spending  was  gi'ovdng  so  large 
that  the  party  leaderehip  began  to  ques- 
tion the  economy's  ability  to  sustain  that 
level  of  military  force.  As  former  Soviet 
Chief  of  Staff  Ogarkov  stated,  technologi- 
cal backwai'dness  would  eventually  lower 
military  capability  as  the  Soviet  economy 
would  not  cope  with  the  new  "revolution 
in  mihtai'y  affairs"  occui'ring  in  the  West. 

The  fourth  factor  was  the  emer- 
gence of  new  leadership  in  the  Soviet 
Union.  This  leadership  represented  a 
new  generation.  They  had  gi-own  up  after 
the  traumas  of  collectivization  and  the 
rapid  industrialization  in  the  1930s.  Some 
of  these  leaders  were  less  rooted  in  the 


22 


old  system,  less  dogmatic,  and  readier  to 
experiment  with  new  answers.  Not 
having  a  stake  in  the  construction  of  the 
Stalinist  system,  Gorbachev's  generation 
has  been  more  willing  to  restructure  that 
system. 

Moreover  the  new  leadership  knew 
from  early  reform  efforts  that  the  Soviet 
economic  engine  required  more  than  a 
tuneup.  Nor  would  the  Brezhnev 
strategy  of  trying  to  jump-start  the 
economy  thorough  external  credits  and 
technology  prove  successful.  In 
Gorbachev's  words,  the  Brezhnev  period 
was  an  "era  of  stagnation"  based  on  the 
faulty  premise  that  outside  help  could 


Unlike  Eastern  Europe  or 
the  Baltic  states,  the  Soviet 
Union  has  no  heritage  of 
private  enterprise  on  which 
to  draw. 


substitute  for  fundamental  change  at 
home.  But  the  new  leadership  was  far 
fi-om  agi'eed  on  what  new  reforms  were 
necessaiy. 

First  Efforts:  "This  Time  We'll  Do  It 
Better,"  or  Perestroika  as 
Reconstruction 

Gorbachev's  initial  reform  program  fol- 
lowed the  lead  of  his  patron,  Andropov. 
He  emphasized  "uskoreniye" — "accelera- 
tion." 'The  aim  was  to  accelerate  growth 
through  more  intensive  use  of  inputs 
rather  than  just  massing  additional 
resoui'ces.  The  elements  of  this  program 
included: 

•  Higher  growth  targets  (still 
centrally  planned); 

•  A  traditional  focus  on  increased 
investment  in  equipment,  modernization, 
and  machine  tools; 

•  Improving  quality  by  creating  a 
new  quality-control  bui-eaucracy 
igospriyemka); 

•  The  antialcohol  campaign,  to  raise 
worker  productivity; 

•  A  worker  discipline  effort;  and 

•  New  decrees  on  wages  and  social 
benefits  to  cope  wath  wage  leveling  and 
the  lost  link  between  performance  and 
income,  to  increase  pensions,  and  to 
improve  health  and  schools. 


The  result  was  further  economic 
deterioration.  Growth  continued  to  stag- 
nate. Planning  based  on  higher  but  unine 
tai'gets  exacerbated  imbalances.  The 
extra  investment  did  not  improve  efficiet 
cy,  because  there  were  no  market  sig- 
nals— such  as  prices  and  profits — to 
guide  the  allocation  of  capital.  The 
bureaucratic  system  rejected  quality  coni 
trol,  because  it  hurt  the  ability  to  meet 
plan  targets  which,  in  turn,  would  reduct 
bonuses.  Quality  control  was  also 
inconsistent  with  higher  production 
tai'gets. 

The  antialcohol  campaign  had  short- 
term  positive  effects,  but  before  long  it 
pushed  alcohol  production  outside  the 
legal  system.  This  led  to  a  major  loss  of 
state  income  fi'om  the  tax  on  alcohol,  in- 
creasing the  budget  deficit.  Criminality 
increased.  The  wage  and  benefit  rules 
also  turned  out  to  be  ambiguous  and  con-i 
tradictoiy.  Enterprises  still  focused  on 
quantity  rather  than  quality  or  the 
efficiency  of  production. 

There  was,  however,  one  major  gaini 
The  Soviet  leadership  recognized  more 
drastic  action  was  necessaiy.  They  did 
not  agi'ee  on  the  exact  action,  but  they 
knew  they  could  not  sit  still. 


Next  Round:  Broader  Based,  But 
Still  Piecemeal  Reforms,  or 
Perestroika  as  Restructuring 

By  1987  Gorbachev  was  ready  to  move 
beyond  the  Andropovian  approach  to 
reform.  Some  attribute  this  to  the  failure 
of  the  earlier  changes;  others  to 
Gorbachev's  gi'ovidng  political  power.  The 
answer  may  well  be  a  mixture  of  the  two; 
Whatever  the  explanation,  Gorbachev  in^ 
troduced  major  reform  measures — specif 
cally  the  "Basic  Provisions  for 
Fundamental  Perestroika  of  Economic 
Management  and  the  Law  on  State 
Enterprises" — at  the  June  1987  Central 
Committee  plenum.  These  measures  ad- 
dressed a  number  of  sectors  and  issues  of 
economic  organization.  While  broad- 
based,  these  changes  were  neither  com- 
prehensive nor  integrated  with  one 
another.  Indeed  the  nature  of  collective 
leadership  and  adaptations  to  ideology 
produced  compromises  which,  at  times, 
led  to  contradictory  results. 

For  example,  the  reforms  were  to 
produce  a  greater  reUance  on  enterprise 
independence  as  opposed  to  planning.  Ye 
planners  did  not  really  let  go.  The  ab- 
sence of  competition  and  market  prices 
subverted  the  expected  benefits  of 
decentralized  authority.  It  led  to  higher 
wages  but  not  improved  efficiency  and 
quality. 


I 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  198! 


THE  SECRETARY 


The  effort  to  make  enterprises  self- 
Wncing  could  be  seen  as  a  first  step 
)warcl  a  business  system  disciplined  by 
foiitability.  Firms  were  supposed  to 
im  their  own  resources,  and  subsidies 
ere  to  be  curtailed  or  ended.  Yet  self- 
hancing  could  not  work  effectively 
iithout  piices  that  reflected  market 
iipply  and  demand.  As  long  as  prices  of 
iputs  and  outputs  were  determined  ad- 
linistratively,  the  profits  (or  losses)  of 
le  fiiTTis  were  hardly  dependent  on  their 
efficiency  and  competitiveness.  Moreover, 
j-edit  and  other  inputs  were  still  control- 
}d  by  planners,  so  fii-ms  could  not  com- 
3te  fi-eely.  Instead  of  going  banki-upt, 
iprofitable  fii-ms  were  still  subsidized, 
hich  contributed  to  the  growing  budget 
jficit. 

Cooperatives  were  supposed  to  give 
quick  boost  to  sales  and  production  by 
ermitting  gi'oups  of  workers  to  enjoy 
le  fi-uits  of  theu-  labors.  This  extra 
I'Diluction  could  demonstrate  to  con- 
imers  that  perestroika  had  a  payoff. 
lit  y  could  also  be  an  evolving  form  of 
i-i\  ate  ownership,  which  would  provide 
nvard  to  people  for  their  work  and  in- 
pnuity.  Yet  the  compromises  of  the 
boperative  program  produced  a  legal 
[id  business  envu'onment  that  one  might 
ave  designed  with  a  purpose  to  kill  the 
)operative  movement. 

First,  planners  still  channeled  most 
puts  to  state  fii-ms,  forcing  co-ops  to 
derate  through  illegal,  higher-priced 
3lack"  markets.  This  hurt  the  public 
gitimacy  of  co-ops.  Second,  in  the  ab- 
'?nce  of  real  competition,  many  co-ops 
inied  monopoly  profits,  further  eroding 
hblic  support.  Since  many  co-ops 
oerated  as  trading  intermediaries,  they 
so  faced  the  wrath  that  producers  and 
)nsiuners  usually  reserved  for  "mid- 
lemen."  Third,  the  government's  reac- 
on  was  to  grant  local  authorities  wide 
titude  in  taxing  co-ops,  which  in  some 
arts  of  the  Soviet  Union  is  likely  to  lead 
)  harsh  taxes.  In  addition,  the  govem- 
lent  forbade  co-ops  from  operating  in 
jrtain  sectors  (e.g.,  medicine,  printing) 
lat  had  proven  popular  and  profitable, 
ourth,  the  very  tenuousness  of  the  co- 
ps' existence  has  led  many  to  distribute 
rofits  instead  of  reinvesting  them. 

Despite  all  these  handicaps,  the 
30i)erative  sector  has  grown  and 
r(is])ered.  Deputy  Prime  Minister 
.halkin  recently  estimated  that  co-ops 
iiw  account  for  about  3%  of  national 
icdme  and  employ  about  2.9  million 
eople.  But  the  future  of  co-ops  remains 
luertain.  They  were  a  prime  target  of 
nion  complaints  during  the  recent 


strikes.  Recently,  the  Supreme  Soviet 
only  narrowly  defeated — 205  to  190 — a 
proposal  to  close  all  trading  cooperatives. 

The  agricultural  sector,  a  leader  for 
the  introduction  of  market  incentives  in 
some  other  communist  reform  efforts, 
also  proved  a  disappointment.  Although  a 
new  idea  of   "contract  leasing"  (long- 
term  leaseholds  to  create  an  incentive  for 
farmers)  was  announced,  the  potential 
leaseholders  were  hai'assed  through  high 
taxation,  refusal  to  deHver  inputs,  and  a 
lack  of  legal  guarantees  for  leaseholders. 
They  were  dependent  on  a  hostile  state 
sector  for  forward  and  backwai'd 
Unkages.  Moreover,  the  problems  ran  to 
the  farmers  themselves;  they  didn't  know 
how  to  run  faims.  Their  experience  was 
as  day-laborers,  not  small  businessper- 
sons.  And  given  the  uncertainty  of  the 
new  incentive  system,  many  people  were 
waiy  of  the  risk  of  running  a  farm. 

The  Law  of  Individual  Labor  Ac- 
tivity represented  a  fii'st  timid  step 
toward  building  a  private  sector.  But  this 
move  was  a  half  measure.  It  limited 
entrepreneurs  to  the  sei^vice  sector  and 
kept  prohibitions  on  hiring  labor. 
Moreover  it  was  contradicted  by  the  ac- 
companying campaign  against  "unearned 
income" — which  cracked  down  on  the 
same  small  businesses  the  law  on  in- 
dividual labor  activity  was  supposed  to 
encourage.  Indeed  this  was  symptomatic 
of  the  Soviet  society's  ambivalence,  even 
hostility,  toward  private  entei-prise.  Un- 
like Eastern  Europe  or  the  Baltic  states, 
the  Soviet  Union  has  no  heritage  of 
private  enterprise  on  which  to  draw. 

In  summai-y,  the  piecemeal  reforms 
of  1987  proved  inadequate.  They  were 
not  successful  in  activating  unused 
reserves  or  substantially  increasing  ef- 
ficiency. The  reforms  ran  into  bottlenecks 
and  vested  interests.  Government  spend- 
ing increased,  and  revenues  fell.  The 
large  deficit  was  financed  through  print- 
ing more  rubles,  which  sent  inflation 
climbing  (perhaps  as  high  as  10%,  accord- 
ing to  some  estimates).  People  no  longer 
tiTisted  the  value  of  the  i-uble,  so  they 
began  to  exchange  cuirency  for  real  as- 
sets as  quickly  as  possible.  This  hoarding 
of  goods  exacerbated  shortages.  The 
leadership  recognized  that  perestroika 
must  move  even  further. 

Lessons  From  Perestroika  to  Date 

As  of  late  1989,  perestroika  has  been  com- 
prised of  a  gi'ab  bag  of  economic  refoiTns. 
Some  are  striking  changes  from 
Brezhnev's  economic  system.  Unfor- 
tunately, not  much  has  worked — at  least 
as  measured  in  terms  of  economic  per- 
formance. 


The  political  changes,  however,  have 
been  exceptional.  Gorbachev  has  decided 
that  he  needs  to  change  the  poUtical  sys- 
tem to  support  economic  reforms.  Yet 
glasHost  also  opens  up  the  failm-es  of  the 
Marxist  system  for  the  world  and  Soviet 
citizens  to  see.  The  lessons  of  early 
failures  are  clear.^ 

1.  The  old  Brezhnev  model  was 
totally  discredited. 

2.  The  Andropovian  moral  discipline 
fix  was  a  bust. 

3.  G.D.R.  [German  Democratic 
Republic]-type  streamhning  efficiency 
didn't  work. 

4.  Piecemeal  reforms  of  enterprises 
and  industrial  organization  couldn't  be 
successful  as  long  as  they  operated  in  a 
system  hostile  to  private  initiative,  com- 
petition, markets,  and  profits. 

5.  Even  the  agricultural  sector — the 
leading  edge  for  the  Hungarians  and  the 
People's  Republic  of  China — was  imper- 
vious to  reform. 

There  was,  however,  a  positive  les- 
son as  well:  Reform  must  be  comprehen- 
sive— economically  and  politically — to 
have  a  reasonable  chance  of  success.  A 
comprehensive  program  might  take  a 
number  of  forms,  each  involving  different 
risks.  I  divide  comprehensive  strategies 
into  three  categories: 

•  One-shot  radical  reforms  all  at 
once,  the  "big  bang"  approach,  perhaps 
after  some  basic  groundwork  is  laid; 

•  Gradual  changes  but  sequenced 
cai-efuUy  to  enable  reforms  to  take  hold; 
or 

•  Major  transformation  by  sector. 

Each  strategy  requires  a  shift  from 
the  ad  hoc  adjustment  of  the  past.  And 
there's  the  inb.  It  will  be  exceedingly  dif- 
ficult for  a  collective  leadership  to 
develop  a  comprehensive  effort.  This 
should  be  no  sui-prise.  It  is  hai'd  for  our 
decentralized  political  system  to  develop 
comprehensive  programs  too.  But  oui' 
basic  political  and  economic  systems 
work.  The  Soviet  Union's  does  not.  And 
many  members  of  the  Soviet  political 
leadership  remain  ideologically  resistant 
to  the  necessary  reforms. 

What  Is  To  Be  Done? 

It's  with  a  touch  of  irony  that  one  asks, 
"What  is  to  be  done?,"  the  title  of  a  book 
written  by  Lenin  in  1902.  The  thesis  of 
this  book  is  that  a  tightly  knit,  highly  dis- 
ciplined party  vanguard  exercising 
strong  central  control  is  necessary  to 
achieve  a  revolution.  But  the  Lenin  of  the 
1920s  introduced  a  new  economic  policy 
that  was  more  willing  to  decentralize 


lepartment  of  State  Bulletin/December  1989 


23 


THE  SECRETARY 


economic  authority,  at  least  as  a  tem- 
porary expedient.  Today  many  Soviet 
reformers  are  seeking  to  trace  the  antece- 
dents of  their  market-oriented  ideas  to 
that  new  economic  policy  in  order  to  win 
legitimacy  in  the  Soviet  ideological  pan- 
theon. 

I  don't  consider  it  my  place  to  offer 
detailed  prescriptions  to  the  Soviets. 
Their  society  is  vastly  different  from 
ours.  I  would  not  presume  to  know  the 
political  and  ideological  constraints.  And 
thei'e  is  much  we  still  don't  know  about 
what  goes  on  there.  But  a  few  economic 
points  stand  out  to  me  personally. 

First,  market  price  reform  is  the 
key.  Whatever  the  problem,  the  solution 
keeps  coming  back  to  market  prices  be- 
cause they: 

•  Signal  the  scarcity  of  goods  and 
create  incentives  for  production; 

•  Allow  firms  to  compete  for  inputs, 
not  rely  on  a  planner's  allocation; 

•  Enable  markets  to  assess 
profitability; 

•  Guide  efficient  investment; 

•  Estabhsh  rewards  for  work;  and 

•  Offer  a  purchaser's  assessment  of 
quality. 

In  addition,  the  introduction  of 
market  prices  is  an  important  step 
toward  achieving  a  convertible  ruble, 
which  is  necessary  for  effective,  competi- 
tive interaction  writh  the  international 
economy. 

Second,  there  is  a  reasonable  case 
that  price  reform  cannot  proceed  until 
the  Soviets  have  stabilized  the  value  of 
the  ruble.  The  massive  deficits  financed 
by  printing  rubles  and  the  large  number 
of  rubles  chasing  too  few  goods  have  led 
Soviet  citizens  to  prefer  real  assets  to 
monetary  assets  of  declining  value.  If 
prices  were  fi'eed  at  present,  the  demand 
for  goods  should  send  prices  soaring.  The 
Soviets  refer  to  this  problem  as  the  ruble 
overhang. 

Policies  to  absorb  e.xcess  rubles 
might  include:  selling  state-owned  assets 
such  as  apartments,  equipment,  and  land 
(with  the  additional  benefit  of  building 
private  ownership);  issuing  financial  in- 
stnmients  with  positive  rates  of  return 
after  inflation;  and  possibly  selling  con- 
sumer goods  imports  at  a  substantial 
markup.  The  sizable  Soviet  gold  stocks 
might  also  be  used  to  back  the  value  of 
the  ruble  or  government  bonds;  since  the 
Soviets  ai"e  major  gold  producers,  they 
could  use  future  gold  production  to  regu- 
late the  money  supply. 


The  Soviets  would  need  to  comple- 
ment these  monetai-y  policies  with  fiscal 
restraint  to  avoid  recreating  a  new  ruble 
overhang.  Spending  restraint  could  come 
from  cutting  subsidies  to  firms,  defense 
spending,  expenditures  on  massive  for- 
show  construction  projects,  and  military 
aid  to  foreign  clients  (e.g.,  billions  of  dol- 
lars given  to  Cuba,  Nicaragua,  Afghanis- 
tan, Ethiopia,  Vietnam,  and  Cambodia). 
Improved  production  efficiency,  especial- 
ly in  agriculture,  could  also  reduce 
government  spending.  Reliance  on  high 
taxes,  in  contrast,  will  hinder  the  develop- 
ment of  business  initiative. 

Third,  market  prices  and  macro- 
economic  stabilization  measures  will  not 
suffice  in  the  absence  of  macroeconomic 
reforms  in  industrial  organization. 
Enterprises  and  coopei-atives  must  be 
fi-ee  to  compete.  Monopolies  must  end. 
State  controls  should  not  limit  the  ease  of 
entry  and  exit  of  competitors.  Market  sig- 
nals, not  central  planners,  should  allocate 
resources. 

Competition  in  the  neglected  service 
sector  could  provide  a  real  shot  in  the 
arm  for  perestroika.  Unlike  manufactur- 
ing, the  service  sector  does  not  requii-e 
dismantling  existing  state  enterprises 


...Gorbachev  and  his  allies 
still  must  operate  as  mem- 
bers of  a  collective  leader- 
ship with  very  different 
notions  of  what  reform 
means. 


and  controls.  Its  products  could  be  en- 
joyed directly  by  consumers. 

Fourth,  the  Supreme  Soviet  must 
establish  legally  certain  property  rights. 
While  ideology  may  constrain  references 
to  private  property,  other  an-angements 
may  be  able  to  substitute  for  a  time — 
such  as  transfei-able,  long-tei-m 
leaseholds.  If  Soviet  citizens  are  uncer- 
tain about  their  rights  to  assets,  the 
profit  motive  could  lead  to  counterproduc- 
tive exploitation  and  disinvestment.  Also 
the  effectiveness  of  any  program  to  sell 
government  assets  obviously  depends  on 
the  rights  of  the  purchasei-s  to  hold,  use, 
inijirove,  and  dispose  of  those  assets. 

Fifth,  the  Soviet  Union  will  have  to 
move  carefiiUy  in  substituting  tax  and 
regulatory  policies  for  confiscation  and 
production  dii-ectives.  The  power  to  tax 


remains  the  power  to  destroy.  Heavy- 
handed  regulation  can  choke  off  striving 
enterprises.  Ironically  excessive 
decentralization  of  political  authority 
over  economic  matters  could  enable  local 
hostilities  against  profitmaking  to  take 
the  form  of  stifling  controls  and  taxation. 
Finally,  the  Soviet  Union  will  need 
to  develop  a  "safety  net"  that  protects 
those  who  cannot  fend  for  themselves  in 
the  changed  economic  environment.  For 
example,  industrial  competition  is  likely 
to  require  unemployment  insui'ance  and_ 
worker  retraining  programs.  The  Soviets 
wall  need  a  bankruptcy  law  that  pennits 
the  restructuring  or  liquidation  of  failed 
enterprises.  If  enterprises  are  freed  of 
the  staggering  burden  of  supplying  multi.' 
pie  social  services,  the  government  will 
need  to  encourage  new  providers. 

These  six  tasks  are  a  tall  order  for 
perestroika.  But  even  this  brief  analysis 
points  out  the  inteiTelationships  among 
necessai-y  reforms.  Action  on  any  one  ele 
ment  standing  alone  will  not  suffice.  The 
pieces  must  fit  together  if  the  new 
economic  machine  is  going  to  work. 


What  Can  or  Should 
the  United  States  Do? 


' 


L 


This  Administration  wants  perestroika  ta 
succeed.  We  believe  it  can  help  create  a 
more  open  society,  institutionalize  inter- 
ests that  will  resist  militaiy  adventurismi 
establish  claims  for  societal  resoui'ces 
that  were  previously  channeled  into  the 
military,  and  transform  the  So\iet  Unioni 
into  a  moi'e  cooperative  contributor  to 
the  international  community. 

It's  in  our  long-term  foreign  policy 
interest  for  more  people  around  the  globf 
to  share  our  core  values — democracy  and 
self-deteiTnination,  respect  for  individual 
rights  and  fi-eedoms,  economic  liberty. 
reliance  on  a  mai'ket  economy,  and  peace- 
ful resolution  of  conflicts.  So  we  welcome 
the  Soviet  Union's  movement  towai'd 
those  values. 

We  must  be  realistic,  however,  in  as- 
sessing what  actual  influence  we  can  have 
on  the  success  of  perestroika.  As  Presi- 
dent Gorbachev  has  stated  on  numerous 
occasions,  the  success  of  Soviet  restnic- 
turing  depends  on  the  Soviets  them- 
selves. It  is  "old  thinking"  to  believe  that 
Western  technology,  credits,  and  know- 
how  could  produce  a  Soviet  economic 
tui-nai-ound.  That  was  the  failed  approach' 
of  General  Secretai-y  Brezhnev — the  "era 
of  stagnation"  in  Gorbachev's  words. 

As  Ed  Hewett,  a  noted  analyst  of  the 
Soviet  economy,  has  written:  "The 


24 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  1989: 


THE  SECRETARY 


(  lamics  of  reform  in  the  U.S.S.R.  are 
f  niarily  internal;  what  happens  is  af- 
fted  by,  but  hardly  driven  by,  develop- 
rnts  in  the  outside  world.  Western 
Lluence.  through  various  policies,  will  at 
n'st  be  capable  of  forcing  minor  coirec- 
tJis  in  the  course  of  reform." 

Nevertheless  I  believe  our  policy  can 
spport  President  Gorbachev's  reform 
pjicies  in  sLx  mutually  advantageous 
wys. 

First,  and  above  all,  Gorbachev 
n^ds  a  stable  international  envir-onment 
sthat  he  can  focus  the  energies  of  his 
C'lntry  on  internal  change.  As  Gor- 
b?hev  said  on  August  1:  "We  now  need, 
prhaps  more  than  ever  before,  favorable 
e;ernal  conditions  so  that  we  can  cope 
w;h  the  revolutionai-y  and  broad  tasks 
tward  renewing  Soviet  society." 

We  have  tried  to  create  these  condi- 
tks  by  placing  increased  emphasis  on 
virking  with  the  Soviets  to  resolve  the 
((hgerous  i-egional  conflicts  that  dot  the 
g  'be.  At  both  the  expert  and  ministerial 
li  els,  we  regularly  examine  oppor- 
tdties  to  achieve  peace  and  reconcilia- 
tjn  in  Central  America,  Afghanistan, 
^ia,  Lebanon,  the  Middle  East,  and 
A'ica.  We  remain  dismayed,  however,  at 
ti  pattern  of  ongoing  Soviet  military 
s  jport  for  conflict  in  many  of  these 
r^ons. 

Second,  arms  control  that  reduces 
t '  risk  of  conflict  can  help  both  of  us.  Ap- 
pipriate  aiTns  control  agreements  can 
hp  stabilize  the  international  environ- 
nnt  by  reducing  the  risk  of  sm-prise  at- 
t;k.  Such  agi'eements  can  also  reduce 
ti'  burden  of  defense  spending.  This 
"  >aee  dividend"  would  be  especially 
n:able  for  the  Soviets  if  we  are  able  to 
rich  an  agreement  to  reduce  convention- 
a'orces.  That  is  one  reason  President 
Esh  has  maintained  the  initiative  in  the 
C'E  [conventional  armed  forces  in 
Erope]  negotiations.  We  also  seek 
nitually  beneficial  results  in  START 
[srategic  ai'ms  reduction  talks],  the 
d'ense  and  space  talks,  chemical 
«apons,  and  nuclear  testing. 

Third,  the  peaceful  achievement  of 
r.brm  in  Eastern  Europe  would  simul- 
tiieously  serve  as  a  model  to  boost 
Sviet  reformers,  enable  the  Soviets  to 
riuce  fm'ther  their  mihtary  presence, 
ai  peacefully  stabilize  the  region 
t/ough  freedom,  openness,  and  restruc- 
t  'int;- — politically  and  economically.  Ac- 
c-(liiigly,  this  Administration  has  and 
\  1  C(  mtinue  to  work  actively  with  other 
nidiis  of  the  West  to  support  the 
I  ict'ss  of  change  in  Eastern  Em-ope  in  a 
•nthreatening  fashion. 


Fourth,  our  efforts  to  institutional- 
ize human  rights  and  the  rule  of  law  and 
to  encourage  common  action  on  transna- 
tional dangers  hke  diiigs,  the  environ- 
ment, and  terrorism  can  help  build  a 
more  pluralistic  and  open  Soviet  society. 
Pluralistic  institutions,  in  turn, 
strengthen  the  foundations  for  the  suc- 
cess of  perestroika  and  make  its  gains 
more  difficult  to  reverse. 

Imleed  this  is  the  logic  behind  the 
President's  May  12  initiative  on  [the] 
Jackson- Vanik  [amendment].  If  the 
Soviets  enact  and  implement  emigi-ation 
legislation  consistent  with  international 
standards,  we  will  work  with  the  Con- 
gi'ess  to  seek  a  waiver  of  Jackson- Vanik, 
paving  the  way  for  the  grant  of  most- 
favored-nation  trading  status.  Indeed  we 
hope  the  Supreme  Soviet  will  codify  the 
new  open  Soviet  emigration  ijolicies  later 


...perestroika  requires  a 
renegotiation  of  the  Soviet 
"social  contract. " 


this  year  or  eaiiy  next  so  we  can  move 
forwai-d  on  this  issue. 

Fifth,  we  may  be  able  to  offer  the 
Soviets  some  technical  economic  assist- 
ance as  they  struggle  with  the  massive 
task  of  restructming  their  economy. 
Foreign  Minister  Shevardnadze  and  I 
have  had  lengthy  discussions  on  the 
problems  of  perestroika  and  the 
nationalities.  At  our  Wyoming  minis- 
terial, we  also  had  infonnal  expert-level 
discussions  of  economic  reforms.  We  in- 
tend to  continue  to  conduct  these  discus- 
sions as  part  of  our  bilateral  issues 
working  groups.  Our  talks  can  be  supple- 
mented by  other  exchanges  of  private 
economists  and  various  government 
speciahsts.  For  example,  the  Soviets 
need  technical  help  in  creating  a  statisti- 
cal base  to  enable  them  to  evaluate 
reforms.  The  Department  of  Commerce's 
Joint  Commercial  Commission  plays  an 
important  expert  role  in  the  field  of  trade 
relations. 

Finally,  we  can  challenge  the 
Soviets  to  implement  the  domestic 
economic  changes  that  are  the  critical 
predicate  for  increased  international 
economic  interaction.  It  is  my  opinion, 
however,  that  the  Soviet  economic  sys- 
tem remains  significantly  incompatible 
with  the  operations  of  institutions  like 
GATT  [General  Agreement  on  Tariffs 


and  Trade],  the  IMF  [International 
Monetai-y  Fund],  and  the  World  Bank. 
The  nible  is  not  even  convertible  internal- 
ly, much  less  with  other  cm-rencies.  As 
long  as  prices  are  set  by  planners,  not 
markets,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  the 
Soviet  economy  would  comport  with  the 
GATT  principle  of  transforming  trade 
barriers  into  tariffs  that  are  set  as  per- 
centages of  prices.  An  administered  price 
change  could  easily  offset  the  gain  of  a 
bargained  tariff  cut.  Furthennore,  given 
the  size  of  the  Soviet  Union,  its  member- 
ship could  prove  disruptive  of  the 
Bretton  Woods  institutions — especially  if 
the  long-term  Soviet  commitment  to  the 
values  represented  by  those  institutions 
remains  uncertain. 

While  the  Soviet  Union  is  still  evolv- 
ing toward  Western  poUtical  and  market 
values,  I  beUeve  we  best  serve  ourselves 
and  the  Soviets  by  insisting  that  trade 
and  other  economic  relations  be  con- 
ducted on  a  commercial  basis.  Indeed  it 
was  the  effort  to  meet  the  requii'ements 
of  the  world  market  economy  that  led  the 
newly  industrializing  economies  of  Asia 
onto  a  successful  path  of  export-led 
gi-owth.  Operating  under  these  terms,  we 
welcome  mutually  beneficial,  non- 
strategic  trade.  Our  sti-eamlined  COCOM 
[Coordinating  Committee  for  Multilateral 
Security  Export  Conti'ols]  system  should 
be  enforced  actively.  Easier  economic 
terms  are  neither  in  our  interest,  nor 
would  they  speed  the  cause  of  Soviet 
reform. 


Conclusion 

President  Gorbachev  wants  to  remake 
the  Soviet  Union.  That's  what  perestroika 
and  glasnost  are  all  about.  That  may  not 
have  been  his  aim  in  1985,  but  the  failures 
of  the  early  reform  efforts  convinced  him 
and  his  colleagues  that  change  must  dig 
deeper  into  Soviet  society.  These  are 
utilitarian,  pui-poseful,  and  deteiTnined 
men — yet  we  should  recognize  that  they 
are  not  pursuing  fi-eedom  for  fi-eedom's 
sake.  Their  aim  is  to  modernize  the 
Soviet  Union,  but  their  frame  of  refer- 
ence is  not  the  age  of  reason  or  the  spirit 
of  enlightenment.  They  are  the  descen- 
dants of  other  great  Russian  modem- 
izere,  like  Peter  the  Great  and  Alexander 
II,  fundamentally  rooted  in  the  unique 
Russian  experience. 

Gorbachev  has  not  been  deterred  by 
the  failure  to  produce  economic  results. 
To  the  contrai-y,  his  recourse  when  facing 
obstacles — as  we  saw  again  this  sum- 
mer— is  to  use  problems  to  further  con- 
solidate his  authority.  Then  he  takes 


[partment  of  State  Bulletin/December  1989 


25 


THE  SECRETARY 


steps  to  press  political  and  economic 
reforms  further.  He  does  not  fold;  he  does 
not  call.  He  raises  the  stakes. 

Nevertheless,  Gorbachev  and  his 
allies  still  must  operate  as  members  of  a 
collective  leadership  with  very  different 
notions  of  what  reform  means.  So  the 
leadership  decisions  are  often  com- 
promises. The  results  are  often  confusing. 

This  ad  hoc  policy  development 
process  is  a  severe  handicap  when  the  ob- 
jective is  to  overhaul  a  society's  attitudes 
toward  work,  competition,  property, 
responsibility,  and  freedom.  Policy  is 
often  incoherent.  People  remain  uncer- 
tain. No  one  really  knows  what  the  future 
will  bnng. 

It  would  be  a  mistake,  howevei",  to 
conclude  that  the  challenges  ai'e  too 
daunting  or  that  the  impediments  to  suc- 
cess are  too  gi-eat.  So  far  Gorbachev  has 
secured  greater  power  over  the  years, 
and  he  reveals  every  intention  to  "stay 
the  com-se."  The  juiy  is  still  out  on 
whether  he  will  succeed  or  fail. 

Yes,  we  do  want  perestroika  and 
glasnost  to  succeed.  But  we  also  recog- 
nize the  limits  of  our  influence.  This  is  an 
internal  evolution.  Its  success  depends  ul- 
timately on  the  Soviet  people. 

For  our  part,  the  United  States 
should  and  will,  of  course,  pursue  our  own 
national  interest.  But  that  interest  does 
not  exist  in  isolation  fi-om  the  events 
taking  place  in  the  Soviet  Union  and  East- 
ern Europe.  I  see  our  task  as  a  creative 
search  for  points  of  mutual  advantage — 
areas  where  both  we  and  the  Soviets  can 
gain.  In  my  opinion,  our  recent  broad- 
based  engagement  at  the  Wyoming  minis- 
terial— on  regional  conflicts,  arms 
control,  human  rights,  transnational  rela- 
tions, and  bilateral  topics  such  as 
economics — is  a  good  example  of  this 
policy  in  practice. 


'  Press  release  184.  The  complete 
transcript  of  the  hearings  will  be  published  by 
the  committee  and  will  be  available  from  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Govern- 
ment Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402. 

-These  conditions  are  drawn  from  Anders 
Aslund's  recent  book,  Gorbacliev's  Struggle  for 
Economic  Reform  (1989). 

■'  This  list  draws  from  a  number  of  ac- 
counts, but  the  primary  source  is 
Anders  Aslund,  Gm-bachev's  Struggle  For 
Economic  Reform  (1989).  ■ 


Interview  on  "Meet  the  Press" 


Secretary  Baker  was  interviewed  on 
NBC-TV's  "Meet  the  Press"  on  October 
10, 1989.  by  Garrick  Utley  and  John 
Dancij  of  NBC  Netvs  and  Elizabeth  Drew 
of  The  New  Yorker.' 

Q.  Just  about  every  day  this  past 
week  has  dropped  a  new  problem 
or  challenge  on  the  desk  of  the 
Secretary  of  State — the  coup  at- 
tempt in  Panama,  and  how  the 
Bush  Administration  handled  or 
mishandled  it;  a  call  from  Israel  for 
the  United  States  to  get  directly  in- 
volved in  the  Middle  East  peace 
process  yet  again;  Gorbachev  in 
East  Berlin;  and  yesterday 
Hungary's  Communist  Party  voting 
overwhelmingly  to  abandon  com- 
munism: Marxist  ideology. 

Before  we  get  to  some  more 
recent  developments  occurring 
around  the  world  this  weekend, 
let's  catch  up  on  what  happened  in 
Panama  earlier  this  week. 

There  is  a  report  this  morning 
in  The  Washington  Post  that  on 
Tuesday,  just  before  the  coup  at- 
tempt failed  and  collapsed,  an 
order  was  sent  to  American 
military  commanders  in  Panama 
that  if  they  were  able  to  get  ahold 
of  Noriega,  they  should  go  ahead 
and  do  it  as  long  as  it  did  not  in- 
volve conflict — shooting;  that 
American  personnel  could  even  be 
used  in  an  undercover  situation. 

What's  your  comment  on  that? 

A.  First  of  all,  I'm  not  entirely  sure 
that  that  is  accurate.  I  think  the  real 
issue  here  and  the  real  reason  that 
there's  been  as  much  criticism  as  there 
has  been  is  that  many  people,  out  of  a 
sense  of  frustration,  I  tliink,  frankly  dis- 
agree wdth  the  bottom-line  decision  which 
the  President  made,  which  was  not  to 
risk  American  military  forces  in  a 
military  action  in  Panama. 

As  you  know,  the  President  spoke  to 
this  a  day  or  so  ago.  He  said,  "In  the  light 
of  the  facts  that  have  developed  since 
then,  and  wath  20/20  hindsight,  I  can't 
think  of  anything  I  would  do  differently 
than  what  I  did." 

It  seems  to  me  that  there's  only  one 
person  who's  in  a  position,  really,  to  make 
a  judgment  call  in  a  situation  like  this, 
and  that's  the  commander  in  chief  based 
on  advice  and  consultation  with  his 
military  commanders  on  the  ground. 


« 


Q.  Let's  follow  up  on  this  par-  • 
ticular  point,  though.  Are  you  den 
ing  that  a  call — an  order— did  go 
from  the  Chairman  of  the  Joint 
Chiefs  of  Staff,  Gen.  Powell,  to  the 
American  command  in  Panama  oi 
Tuesday? 

A.  No.  No,  I  am  not  denying  that  ai 
all.  I'm  simply  saying  that  I'm  not  sure 
that  the  full  report  that  you  speak  of— 
and,  by  the  way,  I've  just  seen  that,  the 
report  of  that  in  the  Post  myself  this 
moniing  a  few  moments  ago — I'm  not 
sure  that  it's  exactly  accurate  as 
reported.  That's  all  I'm  saying,  and  I  do 
not  intend  to  deny  the  story  in  its  en- 
tirety. 

Q.  What  was  the  order?  What 
was  the  message  that  was  sent  on 
Tuesday  to  our  commanders  there 

A.  I  think  the  message  that  was  sen 
was  that  if  there  were  an  opportunity  to, 
do  this  without  risking  bloodshed  and  sij 
nificant  loss  of  American  life,  and  to  do  st 
without  open  military  involvement,  then 
he  was  free  to  go  ahead — the  commande 
on  the  ground  was  free  to  go  ahead. 

Q.  So  he  could  have  used  covei 
methods  to  carry  out — to  get 
Noriega  if  he  saw  an  opportunity? 

A.  I'm  not  going  to  say  that  he  coulc 
do  that,  because,  frankly,  I'm  not — that's 
the  part  of  this  that  I'm  not  totally 
familiar  with.  So  I  want  to  reserve  on 
that,  and  you  should  ask  that  question  of 
the  Chairman  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff , 
or  the  Secretai'y  of  Defense.  | 

Q.  You  talk  about  the  decisions  P 
that  the  President  made.  One  of  th 
criticisms  is  about  a  decision  he 
wasn't  asked  to  make.  As  you  kno' 
Senator  Boren,  who  was  briefed 
by — his  Intelligence  Committee 
was  briefed  by  Gen.  Powell  and  Mr 
Cheney — and  he  says  that  there 
was  a  period  of  about  1  or  2  hours 
when  our  people  on  the  ground  in 
Panama  knew  that  a  group  was 
coming  in,  not  by  an  expected 
route  but  via  the  airport  and  downi 
a  different  route,  at  the  same  time 
that  our  troops  were  blocking 
those  two  routes. 

And  the  Senator  says  that 
during  that  period,  (a)  we  never 
told  the  rebels  that  this  group, 
which  ultimately  put  down  the 
coup,  was  coming  by  another  road 
and  (b)  the  President  was  never 


I 


26 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  198! 


h 


THE  SECRETARY 


ased  "yes  or  no,  should  we  block 
tat  road?"  Now  how  did  that  hap- 
pa? 

A.  Again  I'm  not  siu-e  that  that  is  ex- 
ady  accurate.  Thi-oughout  this  matter 
t!!  President  was  giving  consideration  to 
ti  question  of  whether  he  should  commit 
Aierican  troops  and,  if  so,  to  what  ex- 
Mt. 

j  He  came  down  against  doing  that, 
ail  he  has  said — and  I  frankly  agree  with 
tls — that  under  the  cii-cumstances,  it 
wuld  probably  have  been  a  mistake  to 
dthis.  You  do  not  commit  American 
lies  on  somebody  else's  timeframe,  some- 
bly  else's  plan,  and  somebody  else's 
S'ledule. 

It's  very  easy  to  sit  back  and  second- 
gess  a  situation  such  as  this  that  was 
dveloping  with  gi-eat  rapidity,  dui-ing 
ti  coui-se  of  which  there  was  confusion, 
b?ause  there  was  confusion,  fi-ankly,  on 
t '  uiound  in  Panama.  So  that  would  be 
r'  answer  to  yom*  question. 

I    Q.  You've  raised  a  lot  of  ques- 
titns.  The  armchair  quarterbacks 
viom  you  accuse  say  that  for  some 
tne  it's  been  our  policy  to  try  to 
gt  the  Panamanian  Defense  Force 
(IDF)  or  part  thereof  to  conduct  a 
dup.  They  conducted  a  coup,  and 
M  weren't  ready.  We  can't  pick  the 
tne — that  they're  going  to  pick  the 
tne.  But  on  the  use  of  troops,  the 
I-esident  did  commit  the  use  of 
toops  to  block  road  A  and  road  B. 
A.  That  is  correct. 

Q.  So  the  issue  is,  why  didn't 
tey  use  the  information  and  get  a 
(icision  to  block  road  C,  which 
^as  the  crucial  road? 

A.  The  President  committed  troops 
1  block  the  roads  that  we  were  re- 
ijiested  to  block.  We  took  that  action,  and 
■e  also  took  action,  if  I  may  say  so,  to 
:'ve  humanitarian  refuge  to  people,  be- 
•  use  these  were  the  things  that  were 
;ked  of  us. 

There  have  been  some  suggestions 
lat  the  people  engaged  in  the  insurrec- 
m  offered  to  turn  Gen.  Noriega  over  to 
;.  That  is  simply  not  the  case.  That 
ner  happened.  There  are  people  now 
ho  are,  I  think — who  have  recently, 
ithin  the  past  24  hours,  who  were 
igaged  in  that  attempt  down  there,  who 
u  I'  confiiTned  this  to  us  and  will  be 
.ailable  to  confinn  it. 

Q.  Did  you  think  when  this  all 
egan  and  the  coup  leaders  first 
iame  to  you  that  you  might  be 
eing  set  up  by  the  Noriega  forces? 


A.  There  was  some  suspicion  of  that, 
because  the  leader  of  this  attempt,  of 
course,  had  been  actively  involved  in  put- 
ting down  a  prior  coup  attempt. 

Q.  But  again  the  intelligence 
briefings  on  the  Hill  on  Friday  had 
it  that  the  CIA  people  on  the 
groiuid  were  asked  to  check  about 
Gen.  Giraldi,  because  he  had  put 
down  a  previous  coup,  and  their 
bottom  line  report  was  that  this 
man  was  sincere  about  trying  to 
overthrow  Noriega  and  would,  in 
fact,  carry  out  the  coup.  So  that 
was  the  information  you  had  from 
the  field? 

A.  That  is  correct.  The  question  that 
was  just  asked  of  me  was,  was  there 
some  reason  to  suspect  that  maybe  that 
was  not  the  case,  and  I  think  there  was 
some  reason.  The  intelligence  agency  in- 
formation was  persuasive.  Maybe  it 
wasn't  conclusive.  I  don't  know  how  you 
make  a  determination  in  a  case  like  that; 
that's  all  black  or  white,  where  you  have 
someone  as  close  to  the  general  as  this 
man  was  and  who  had  been  involved  ac- 
tively in  putting  a  prior  coup  attempt 
down. 

Q.  Let  me  ask  you  about  some- 
thing you  just  said  and  something 
you  said  on  the  Hill  last  week,  and 
that  is  that  you  don't  commit 
American  forces  on  any  time 
schedule  except  your  own  and  with 
yoiu-  own  plan.  Aren't  you,  in  effect, 
ruling  out  any  American  support 
for  some  future  coup  attempt  in 
Panama? 

A- 1  don't  think  I  said  "except."  If  I 
said  "except,"  I  didn't  mean  to  say  "ex- 
cept." What  I  said  was,  you  don't  run  the 
risk  of  committing  American  troops  and 
risking  American  lives  without  having 
yoiu-  plans  together,  without  knowdng 
what  it  is  you  specifically  want  to  do. 

I  also  said  dui'ing  the  course  of  that 
hearing  that  we  do  not  i-ule  out  the  use  of 
force.  We  retain  that  as  an  option,  and,  if 
you  ai-e  asking  me,  would  we  ever  use 
force  during  the  course  of  another  insur- 
rection attempt,  the  answer,  I  think,  has 
to  be  we  would  not  rule  that  option  out.  I 
don't  intend  to  rule  that  out  except  under 
circumstances  in  which  we'd  go  in  and  do 
all  the  planning.  But  we  must  have,  I 
think,  better  conditions  and  a  better  at- 
mosphere before  the  President  of  the 
United  States  is  going  to  commit 
American  lives. 

Q.  We  can  understand  that,  but 
is  it  still  first  official  American 
presidential  policy  that  we  want  to 
see  a  coup  there  and  Noriega 


thrown  out  or  handed  over?  And,  if 
it  is  still  official  presidential  policy, 
how  can  we  have  it  both  ways? 
What  kind  of  a  signal  are  we  send- 
ing to  the  military  down  there  if 
they  have  to  go  out  and  stick  their 
necks  out,  not  knowang  whether 
we're  going  to  come  to  their  aid? 

A.  It  is  official  American  policy  that 
we  would  like  to  see  Gen.  Noriega  out, 
and  we  ai"e  going  to  utilize  all  the  means 
at  our  disposal  to  get  that  accomplished. 
We're  going  to  use  diplomatic  means,  as 
we  have  been.  Basically,  Gen.  Noriega 
now  is  a  pariah.  He's  isolated  by  practical- 
ly all  the  countries  of  the  world,  including 
20  out  of  22  countries  in  Latin  America. 
We're  going  to  use  economic  sanctions,  as 
we  have  been.  We're  going  to  continue 
that.  And  we're  not  going  to  rule  out  the 
use  of  force — either  force  that  we,  our- 
selves, plan  totally  and  direct  or  force  in 
conjunction  with  some  other  operation. 
We're  simply  not  going  to  rule  that  out. 

Q.  Yesterday,  White  House 
Chief  of  Staff  John  Sununu  said 
that  he  is  giving  8-to-5  odds  that 
Noriega  will  be  out  within  the  next 
6  months.  Do  you  go  along  with 
that? 

A.  I  don't  want  to  put  any  specific 
odds  on  it.  That's  not  the  business  that 
I'm  in.  But  what  I  would  say  is  that  we 
should  keep  the  pressui-e  on,  and  we  in- 
tend to  do  that.  I  think  our  pressure  is 
working,  frankly.  As  I  mentioned  a  mo- 
ment ago,  he  is  isolated.  We  are  seeing 
his  sole  base  of  support — the  Panama 
Defense  Force — come  unglued,  engage  in 
insui'rections  against  him,  and,  I  think, 
ft-ankly,  that  this  is  moving  in  the  right 
direction.  And  I  would  argue  that  there's 
a  very  good  possibility  that  Gen.  Noriega 
is  a  lot  weaker  after  this  unfortunately 
unsuccessful  attempt  than  he  was  before. 

Q.  The  inner  cabinet  [of  the  Is- 
raeli Government]  has  rejected  an 
Egyptian  proposal  to  get  talks 
going  between  Israel  and  Pales- 
tinians about  future  elections  in 
the  occupied  territories,  and  the  Is- 
raeli Government  is  now  saying  it's 
time  for  the  United  States — for  you, 
Secretary  of  State  Baker — to  get  in- 
volved. They  say  that  you  have 
promised  to  send  them  a  written 
message,  a  communique,  as  to  how 
you  would  play  a  role  in  the  Middle 
East.  Have  you  sent  that  message 
to  the  Israeli  Government?  Are  you 
prepared  to  get  involved? 

A.  Let  me  simply  say  that  we  have 
been  involved  over  the  course  of  the  past 
10  days  to  2  weeks — very  actively  in- 


Jepartment  of  State  Bulletin/December  1989 


27 


THE  SECRETARY 


volved  for  the  week  that  I  spent  up  at  the 
United  Nations  meeting  with  both  the  Is- 
i-aeli  Foreign  Minister  and  the  Egyptian 
Foreign  Minister.  I  spent  quite  a  bit  of 
time  on  the  telephone  Friday  with  both  of 
these  gentlemen.  As  soon  as  I  leave  this 
set,  ril  be  talking  again  to  the  Foreign 
Minister  of  Egypt. 

I  don't  think  that  that  vote  yester- 
day means  things  are  dead  in  the  water 
at  all.  I  think  that  there's  still  some 
chance  that  we  can  work  with  the  Shamir 
elections  proposal.  The  Mubarak  10-point 
proposal  was  actually  an  effort  to  move 
the  elections  proposal  forward.  I  have  dis- 
cussed— as  I  indicated  to  you  as  recently 
as  Friday — some  specific  language  with 
Foreign  Minister  Aj-ens  of  Israel  and 
with  Foreign  Minister  Meguid  of  Egypt, 
and  they  ai'e  taking  a  look  at  this  lan- 
guage, and  we'i-e  going  to  continue  to 
work  to  see  if  we  can  put  this  together. 

We  are  veiy  actively  involved.  We're 
not  involved  by  getting  on  an  airplane 
and  flying  over  to  the  Middle  East,  but 
the  suggestion  that  we're  not  involved, 
I'm  son-y,  is  simply  not  accurate. 

Q.  But  let's  be  specific,  because 
Foreign  Minister  Arens  of  Israel 
told  his  people  in  Israel,  in 
Jerusalem,  that  he  is  expecting  a 
letter,  a  message,  from  you,  saying, 
yes,  you  will  get  involved  personal- 
ly to  help  tackle  this  difficult  ques- 
tion of  who  would  be  the 
Palestinian  representatives  in 
these  negotiations.  Are  you — 

A.  That's  one  of  the  questions. 

Q.  That  is  one  of  the  questions. 
There  are  many  others. 

A.  That's  one  of  the  questions. 

Q.  Have  you  or  are  you 
prepared  to  send  Foreign  Minister 
Arens,  the  Israeli  Government, 
such  a  message? 

A.  Let  me  simply  say  that  we  have 
sent  such  a  message.  It's  already  been 
sent.  It's  been  sent  to  both  capitals.  And  I 
want  to  say,  though,  having  said  that, 
that  this  is  not  in  any  way  a  separate  or 
competing  proposal.  What  we  are  trying 
to  do  is  to  implement  the  basic  Shamir 
elections  proposal,  and  we  are  working 
with  language  to  tiy  and  bridge  the  gap 
between  Israelis  on  the  one  hand  and 
Palestinians  on  the  other  We  vdll  con- 
tinue to  work  vei-y  hard  to  do  that. 


Q.  But  you  are  prepared  to 
take,  perhaps,  a  slightly  larger  role 
in  the  specifics  of  the  negotiation? 

A.  I'm  going  to  continue  to  take  the 
same  role  I've  been  taking  over  the  past 
2  weeks,  which  I  would  argue  to  you  has 
been  very  lai-ge.  It  just  hasn't  been  flam- 
boyant, and  it  hasn't  been  out  in  the 
public  view  the  entire  time. 

Q.  Given  the  events  in  East  Ger- 
many in  the  last  week  or  so,  how  do 
you  foresee  the  future  of  East  Ger- 
many and  the  likelihood  or  "when" 
of  a  reunited  Germany? 

A.  The  question  of  reunification  of 
GeiTnany  is  a  sensitive  issue — has  been  a 
sensitive  issue — but  I  think  we  should  ac- 
knowledge a  few  tilings  about  that. 

Fu-st,  it's  been  the  policy  of  NATO 
for  quite  some  time.  It  has  also  been  the 
policy  of  the  United  States  to  support  the 
concept  of  the  reimification  of  Geiinany, 
provided  it  is  achieved,  if  you  will,  in 
peace  and  freedom.  It  seems  to  us  that 
there  should  be  no  concern  about  a 
unified  GeiTnany  which  is  integi-ated  into 
the  democratic  community  of  European 
nations. 

Q.  Does  this  mean  that  the 
former  East  Germany  would  be 
part  of  NATO? 

A,  No.  It  doesn't  mean  that  it  would 
be  a  part  of  NATO.  The  President  spoke 
to  this,  by  the  way,  in  his  speech  in  Mainz, 
GeiTnany,  when  he  was  over  there,  I 
think,  in  May  when  he  called  for  a  Europe 
which  is  whole  and  a  Europe  which  is  ft-ee 
and  for  an  undivided  Europe.  My  only 
point  is  this  has  been  the  U.S.  and  NATO 
policy  for  quite  awhile. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Soviet  Union 
has  made  it  clear  to  us  in  our  discussions 
with  them  recently,  and  particularly 
during  our  ministerial  meetings  in  Wyo- 
ming, that  it's  their  view  that  the 
countries  of  Eastern  Europe  should  have 
the  kind  of  governments  that  their  people 
want. 

Their  bottom  line,  if  you  will,  is  that 
those  governments  not  leave  the  Warsaw 
Pact  and  perhaps  not  leave  CEMA,  the 
economic  organization.  There  is  a  dif- 
ference between  those  two  positions.  Yes, 
indeed. 

Q.  That's  what  I  don't  under- 
stand. If  it's  NATO  policy  to  have  a 
united  Germany,  then  does  the 
former  West  Germany  go  out  of 
NATO  or  does  East  Germany  come 
in?  And,  further,  what  is  the  pos- 
sibility that  these  Eastern 


European  nations — the  more  they 
liberalize  and  democratize — won't 
be  interested  in  staying  in  the  War 
saw  Pact? 

A.  I  don't  know  about  that.  That's 
one  we'll  have  to  look  at  down  the  line. 
With  respect  to  your  firet  question, 
though,  I  think  the  issue  is  normalization 
of  relations  between  the  two  GeiTnanys 
on  the  basis  of  Western  values. 

Does  that  mean  that  the  German 
Democratic  Republic  would  have  to  mo\ 
more  toward  the  position  which  has  bee:' 
articulated  by  the  United  States  and 
NATO?  Yes,  it  would,  if  you  were  going 
to  get  there.  Therein  lies  the  iiib,  and 
there  is  a  distinct  difference  between  thn 
approach  of  the  East  and  the  approach  c 
the  West  with  respect  to  that  question. 

Q.  Let  me  turn  to  Central 
America  for  just  a  moment.  You 
have  been  pressing  the  Soviets  to 
get  the  Cubans  to  cut  off  arms  flov 
to  Nicaragua.  Foreign  Minister 
Shevamadze  has  just  completed  a 
trip  to  Nicaragua  and  Cuba.  Do  w« 
have  any  information  that,  in  fact, 
he  complied  with  our  request  that> 
he  press  the  Cubans  to  cut  off  arm< 
flow  to  Nicaragua? 

A.  We  have  reason  to  believe  that  h 
told  the  Nicai'aguans  that  they  should 
begin  to  look  more  and  more  toward 
economic  assistance  than  militai-y  assist 
ance.  That's  really  all  I  think  I  should  sa- 
with  respect  to  that  subject  this  morninj 


Q.  If  the  Sandinistas  are  suc- 
cessful next  February  in  winning 
an  election  that  is  manifestly  free 
and  fair  on  the  testimony  of  inter- 
national observers,  is  the  United 
States  prepared  to  drop  its  boycotv 

A- 1  think  that's  an  issue  that  we  wi 
have  to  address  at  the  time.  The  real 
question  is  whether  or  not  the  election  is 
tvee  and  fair.  If  you  believe  in 
democracy — and,  of  course,  we  do — then 
you  must  accept  the  results  of  a  free  and 
fair  election  without  regai'd  to  your 
preferences  with  respect  to  who  should 
have  won  the  election. 


28 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  198S 


AFRICA 


That  doesn't  mean  that  you  neces- 
lai'ily  have  to  take  the  additional  step 
,'ou've  talked  about.  If  for  some  reason 
A^e'd  have  a  serious  difference  of  opinion 
ibout  whether  it  was  a  free  and  fair  elec- 
iion,  I  can't  sit  here  today  and  tell  you 
vi'hat  we  would  do. 

If  we  are  satisfied  that  it  is  a  free 
Ud  fail-  election,  it  would  be  logical  for  us 
0  take  the  action  that  you've  suggested. 

j       Q.  In  conclusion  let's  come 
back  to  what  may  be  the  most 
dramatic  event  of  the  last  few  days, 
[n  Hungary — in  Budapest  yester- 
day— the  Communist  Party  there, 
in  effect,  abandoned  Marxist- 
Leninism.  It's  changed  its  name;  it's 
saying  it's  now  going  to  be  a  social- 
democratic  party,  in  effect. 

Given  that,  and  once  elections 
^re  held  early  next  year — free  elec- 
tions— would  you  consider  Hun- 
gary to  be  a  communist  country  or 
a  noncommunist  country?  And,  if 
it's  not  a  noncommunist  country, 
how  does  that  change  our  policy? 

A.  I  think  what  you're  seeing  is  what 
has  happened  in  Poland,  and  I  think  that 
lyou  could  argue  that  Poland  has  moved 
from  communism  toward  a  democratic  or 
jmore  democratic  form  of  government; 
and  I  think  that  may  be  what  you  see 
taking  place  in  Himgaiy. 

Again  I  think  it's  significant  that  the 
So\iets  have  told  us,  particularly  here 
recently  in  Wyoming,  that  the  form  of 
government  that  these  Eastern 
European  countries  choose  is  a  matter  for 
them  to  determine.  And  the  real  issue  is 
whether  or  not  they  stay  within  the  War- 
isaw  Pact,  and  I  think  the  Soviet  bottom 
line  is  they  can  have  a  democratic  form  of 
government.  That  will  be  acceptable  to 
|the  Soviet  Union.  But  they  would  be  ex- 
pected to  remain  as  members  of  the  War- 
saw Pact. 


1  Press  release  186  of  Oct.  10, 1989.1 


South  Africa 


by  Herman  J.  Cohen 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  African  Affairs  of  the  Senate  Fweign 
Relations  Committee  on  Octobers,  1989. 
Mr.  Cohen  is  Assistant  Secretary  for 
African  Affairs.'- 

I  am  pai'ticularly  glad  to  be  here  now,  as 
part  of  our  continuing  effort  to  build  a 
bipartisan  approach  for  U.S.  policy  on 
South  Afr'ica.  Along  with  Central 
America,  South  Africa  was  highlighted  at 
the  outset  by  Secretary  Baker  as  an  area 
where  the  breakdown  of  bipartisan  sup- 
poit  undercut  the  ability  of  the  United 
States  to  encourage  a  peaceful  transition 
to  democracy.  We  want  to  be  able  to  send 
a  cleai'  signal  of  broad,  bipai'tisan  support 
for  a  policy  premised  on  unequivocal  ab- 
hoiTence  of  apartheid,  reflected  in  a  sus- 
tained U.S.  commitment  to  promoting 
negotiations  between  the  government  in 
Pretoria  and  legitimate  black  repre- 
sentatives leading  to  a  nonracial  and 
democratic  South  Africa.  Our  intention 
now  is  to  proceed  in  close  consultation 
with  Congress. 

We  have  heai'd  your  views  and  those 
of  many  others.  Throughout  we  have 
kept  a  cai'eful  eye  on  the  events  unfolding 
during  the  last  several  months  in 
southern  Africa,  some  of  which  have 
given  us  reason  to  believe  that  the  pos- 
sibility for  a  peaceful  end  to  apartheid  is 
increasing.  But  we  have  also  kept  before 
us  a  clear  sense  of  the  moral  outrage  of 
the  American  people  in  this  41st  year  of 
South  Afi'ica's  government-imposed, 
repressive  apartheid.  This  outrage  at 
apai'theid  is  shared  by  this  Administra- 
tion and  is  the  impetus  for  our  according 
priority  attention  to  change  in  South 
Africa. 

Basic  Guiding  Principles 

Outrage  alone,  of  course,  is  not  enough.  It 
must  be  put  into  guiding  principles  and 
translated  into  a  progi-am  of  sustained 
and  comprehensive  effort.  An  accurate 
understanding  of  events  on  the  ground  is 
also  necessary.  I  would  like  to  take  this 
opportunity  briefly  to  lay  out  for  you 
these  elements  as  we  see  them. 

The  basic  principles  which  will  guide 
U.S.  policy  toward  South  Africa  in  this 
Administration  are  clear: 


•  Our  commitment  to  an  end  to 
apaitheid  and  to  fundamental  political 
change,  leading  to  a  nonracial,  democratic 
South  Africa; 

•  Full  enforcement  of  the  Com- 
prehensive Antiapartheid  Act; 

•  Expanding  assistance  to  black 
South  Africans; 

•  Active  U.S.  diplomacy  to  resolve 
conflicts  and  support  economic  develop- 
ment throughout  southern  Africa; 

•  Intensive  consultations  with  other 
nations,  especially  South  Africa's  major 
trading  partners  and  the  front-line  states; 
and 

•  Closer  cooperation  with  the  Con- 
gress on  a  bipartisan  approach. 

The  process  of  translating  these  prin- 
ciples into  policy  will  be  taken  against  the 
backdrop  of  perceptible  political  evolu- 
tion in  South  Africa,  amidst  signs  of  nas- 
cent movement  on  both  sides  toward 
dialogue. 

Evolution  in  South  Africa 

On  the  one  side,  we  saw  several  interest- 
ing developments  beginning  with  the 
July  meeting  between  P.W.  Botha  and 
Nelson  Mandela.  To  many  this  historic 
meeting  was  a  clear  indication  that  the 
South  Aft'ican  Government  had  come  to 
recognize  that  the  future  of  South  Afiica 
could  not  be  settled  without  dialogue 
with  credible  leaders  like  Mandela.  More 
recently  we  saw  the  new  President  of 
South  Africa,  F.W.  De  Klerk,  declare 
that  the  white  electorate  had  given  him  a 
mandate  for  change.  He  then  moved 
quickly  to  allow — contrary  to  the  pre- 
vious government — several  peaceful 
political  demonstrations  to  take  place 
despite  emergency  restrictions.  On  the 
other  side,  we  saw  that  black  South 
Africans,  inside  and  outside  South  Africa, 
were  taking  the  possibility  of  dialogue 
seriously  enough  to  begin  formulating 
their  positions  on  possible  negotiations. 
There  was  much  that  was  encouraging 
and  worth  fm-ther  discussion  in  the 
African  National  Congress  ( ANC) 
proposals  released  in  Harare  last  August. 

Of  course  nothing  about  the  move 
toward  dialogue  is  assui-ed.  During  this 
same  period,  for  example,  detention  of 
political  activists  again  increased,  and 
some  demonstrations  were  blocked, 
though  without  bloodshed.  It  is  still  too 
early  to  say  whether  the  first  steps  of  the 
new  De  Klerk  government  will  lead  to  a 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  1989 


29 


AFRICA 


process  of  dialogue  and  an  end  to  the 
state  of  emergency,  but  they  offer  reason 
to  hope. 

Conditions  to  Facilitate  Dialogue 

For  our  part,  we  view  the  commence- 
ment of  dialogue  between  the  govern- 
ment and  credible  representatives  of  the 
black  majority  as  the  most  important 
first  step  in  the  process  of  change.  We, 
therefore,  welcomed  President  De 
Klerk's  affii-mation  that  the  "door  is 
open"  to  such  a  pi'ocess.  We  also  made 
clear  our  view  of  the  conditions  which 
would  facilitate  dialogue: 

•  Releasing  all  political  prisonei's,  in- 
cluding Nelson  Mandela  and  Walter 
Sisulu,  and  allowing  the  return  of  political 
exiles; 

•  Lifting  the  state  of  emergency  and 
associated  restrictions  on  political  ac- 
tivity and  freedom  of  association  for  the 
black  opposition; 

•  Unbanning  all  political  organiza- 
tions, including  the  ANC;  and 

•  Ending  violence  from  all  sources. 
We  know  that  it  is  unreasonable  to 

expect  that  evei'ything  can  be  done  at 
once.  But  we  believe  that  the  new  South 
Afi-ican  Government  should  move  quickly 
on  this  agenda  to  begin  creating  the  con- 
ditions for  dialogue  to  begin.  And  we  call 
on  all  parties  to  reexamine  their  previous 
ways  of  reacting  to  each  other  and  there- 
by prepare  themselves  to  take  advantage 
of  all  opportunities  which  arise  to  pursue 
negotiations  on  a  peaceful  process  of  con- 
stitutional change.  This  is  primarily  a 
process  for  South  Africans.  But  we  ai-e 
pi'epared  to  assist  where  we  can  be  useful. 

U.S.  Commitments 

Our  policy  will  balance  pressure  and  in- 
centives. We  have  broadened  and 
deepened  our  dialogue  with  black  South 
Africans,  both  inside  and  outside  their 
country.  In  this  respect,  I  want  to  pay 
tribute  to  Ambassador  [to  South  Africa] 
Ed  Perkins  who  opened  many  doors  for 
us  in  South  Africa.  We  will  continue  to 
denounce  apai-theid  and  identify  with  the 
aspirations  of  black  South  Africans.  We 
are  committed  to  active  expansion  of  our 
progi'am  of  "positive  measures"  designed 
to  strengthen  multiracial  resistance  to 
apartheid,  build  black  bargaining  power, 
and  help  blacks  not  to  endure  apartheid 
but  to  prepare  themselves  for  leadership 
in  a  postapartheid,  nom-acial  democracy. 
To  accomplish  this,  we  intend  to  increase 
assistance  for  university  scholai-ships, 
human  rights,  and  community  leadership. 
We  will  seek  to  upgrade  Voice  of  America 


transmissions  to  South  Africa,  provide 
tai'geted  assistance  to  universities  in 
South  Africa  that  are  open  to  all  students 
regardless  of  race,  and  stimulate  jjrivate 
sector  aid  for  bursaries  and  training — per- 
haps via  mechanisms  such  as  Con- 
gi-essman  Dymally's  proposal  to  establish 
a  U.S.  commission  on  southern  Africa. 

At  the  same  time,  we  are  committed 
to  maintaining  access  to  South  Africa's 
white  leadership  and  actively  supporting 
the  U.S.  business  presence,  which  has 
helped  lead  the  way  toward  better  race 
relations.  Secretary  Baker  met  earlier 
this  year  with  the  chief  executive  officers 
of  major  U.S.  companies  in  South  Africa 
and  told  them  they  are  an  integral  part  of 
our  effort  to  be  a  force  for  positive 
change  in  South  Africa.  Our  aim  in  all  of 
this  is  to  position  the  United  States  so  as 
to  maximize  our  ability  to  promote 
dialogue  leading  to  full-fledged  negotia- 
tions on  a  nonracial  democratic  future  for 
South  Afiica. 

Regional  Interests 

Regionally  though  there  are  ups  and 
downs,  efforts  to  resolve  conflict  thi-ough 
negotiations  ai'e  undei-way  in  Angola  and 
Mozambique,  and  the  independence 
process  is  well  underway  in  Namibia.  We 
helped  create  these  opportunities,  and  we 
will  remain  active  in  seeing  them  through 
to  success.  We  will  base  our  approach  on 
U.S.  interests  in  the  region,  keeping  our 
opposition  to  apartheid  at  the  center  of 
our  policy  and  coordinating  as  closely  as 
possible  with  South  Africa's  important 
trading  partners,  the  front-line  states, 
and  other  interested  parties.  In  this 
regard,  I  call  upon  the  Congress  to 
remove  sanctions  on  Namibia  immedi- 
ately after  UN  certification  of  the  Novem- 
ber elections  and  thus  show  a  U.S. 
commitment  to  the  successful  emergence 
of  this  new  nation. 

In  teiTTis  of  our  relations  with  South 
Aftica,  we  have  long  used  diplomatic  and 
other  pressm-e  to  promote  foi-ward  mo- 
tion in  South  Afiica's  internal  policies. 
The  Administration  is  committed  to  effec- 
tive enfoi'cement  of  existing  sanctions — 
the  most  comprehensive  of  South  Africa's 
major  trading  partnei's.  At  the  same 
time,  it  is  important  to  maintain  a  level  of 
official  representation  that  enables  us  to 
sustain  contact  with  all  communities  in 
South  Africa.  We  intend  to  maintain  this 
policy  and  will  not  move  toward  full  nor- 
malization of  our  diplomatic  relations  in 
the  absence  of  significant  progress 
toward  ending  apartheid  and  establishing 
a  nom-acial  democracy. 


We  will  also  continue  to  work  with 
the  other  states  in  southem  Africa  to 
strengthen  their  independence  and 
reduce  their  vulnerabiUty  to  extei-nal 
pressure.  At  the  same  time,  we  will 
promote  regional  cooperation  in  order  to 
reduce  inefficiencies,  allow  gi-eatei-  play 
to  mai-ket  forces,  give  all  parties  an  in- 
creased material  stake  in  regional 
stabiUty,  and  estabhsh  the  groundwork 
for  postapartheid  regional  economic  in- 
tegration. 

For  the  first  time  in  years,  it  is  pos- 
sible to  be  somewhat  hopeful  that  a 
negotiation  scenaiio  may  be  just  beyond 
the  horizon.  The  great  pressures,  intemali 
and  external,  on  South  Afiican  whites  to 
accept  change  ai-e  gi'owing  and  are  help- 
ing convince  the  South  African  Govern- 
ment that  it  must  move  beyond  its 
cui-rent  position  and  accept  fundamental 
change.  Sanctions  have  played  a  role  in 
stimulating  new  thinking  within  the 
white  power  stnicture.  It  is  now  increas- 
ingly cleai-  to  that  government  that  the 
well-being  of  the  white  minority  cannot 
be  sustained  without  a  negotiated  politi- 
cal settlement  that  results  in  political 
equaHty  for  all  South  Afiicans.  In  fact  the' 
new  De  Klerk  government  has  indicated 
it  is  prepared  to  take  conci-ete  steps  to  ad-t 
dress  this  need.  For  this  reason,  the  Ad- 
ministration recommends  that  no  new 
sanctions  be  considered  at  the  present 
time,  while  existing  measures  be  main- 
tained in  the  hope  and  expectation  that 
positive  signs  of  a  commitment  to  change 
will  emerge  in  the  near  future.  You  can 
be  assured  that  we  will  be  working  active-' 
ly  towai-d  this  goal,  and  we  trust  that  we 
can  continue  to  find  common  ground  with 
you  in  om-  mutual  effort. 

I  believe  the  newly  elected  political 
leaders  of  the  white  minority  imderstand 
fully  the  necessity  for  a  political  settle- 
ment and  are  developing  a  strategy  for 
negotiations.  It  would  be  appropriate, 
therefore,  to  allow  that  leadership 
reasonable  time  to  demonstrate — mindful 
of  outside  expectations  but  without  in- 
creased outside  pressure  at  the  present 
time — the  will,  the  capability,  and  the 
courage  to  launch  the  dismantling  of 
apailheid  on  an  inevitable  course. 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearing 
will  be  publi.shed  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


30 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  1989 


f forts  Toward  Peace 

nd  Reconciliation  in  Angola 


AFRICA 


ii  Warren  Clark,  Jr. 

I    Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
d  Afinca  of  the  House  Foreign  Affairs 
6mmittee  on  September  27, 1989.  Mr. 
lark  is  Acting  Assistant  Secretary  for 
mean  Affairs.^ 

]is  a  real  pleasure  and  a  distinct  honor 
fc-  me  to  appear  before  the  House 
hreign  Affairs  Subcommittee  on  Africa 
tday  to  describe  recent  efforts  to  obtain 
jasting  peace  and  national  reconciliation 
i  Angola. 

tyerview 

'le  Angolan  internal  peace  process  is 
king  place  against  the  backdrop  of  sig- 
ificant  changes  in  the  region,  particular- 
the  reduction  and  eventual  elimination 
li  foreign  troops  from  Angola. 

In  the  New  York  accords  of  Decem- 
fcr  22, 1988,  the  Republic  of  South 
.frica,  the  Republic  of  Cuba,  and  the 
^iople's  Republic  of  Angola  agreed  to  a 
femework  for  the  total  withdrawal  of 
aban  troops  from  Angola  and  Namibia's 
ansition  to  independence.  South  African 
■oops  had  already  withdrawal  from  An- 
'ila  by  the  end  of  August  1988  in  accord- 
ace  with  the  Geneva  protocol  of  August 
.'  The  external  settlement,  brokered  by 
rmer  Assistant  Secretary  [for  African 
ffairs]  Chester  A.  Crocker  following 
any  months  of  intensive  efforts,  was  a 
iumph  for  American  diplomacy. 

Two  weeks  ago,  I  traveled  to  Havana 
■r  the  fifth  regular  meeting  of  the  joint 
immission,  whose  members — South 
frica,  Cuba,  and  the  People's  Republic 
'Angola,  plus  the  United  States  and  the 
o\det  Union  as  observers — oversee  im- 
lementation  of  the  accords.  At  this  meet- 
ig,  the  South  Africans,  Cubans,  and 
ngolans  reaffinned  their  commitment  to 
le  peace  process. 

f.S.  Relations  With  Angola 

lefore  reviewing  recent  developments, 
Jt  me  say  a  word  about  U.S.  policy 
bward  Angola. 

Fu-st,  we  have  made  it  cleai-,  during 
ie  tripartite  Angola/Namibia  negotia- 
ioiis  and  subsequently,  that  the  United 
|.tates  will  continue  appropriate  and  effec- 
ive  assistance  to  UNITA  [National 


Union  for  the  Total  Independence  of 
Angola]  unto  national  reconciliation  is 
achieved.  Second,  until  national  reconciha- 
tion  is  achieved,  the  United  States  wall 
not  recognize  any  government  in  Angola. 

Let  me  also  state  that  our  support 
for  UNITA  is  designed  to  impress  upon 
the  MPLA  [Popular  Movement  for  the 
Liberation  of  Angola]  that  there  is  no 
alternative  but  to  negotiate  peace  and 
national  reconciKation.  There  can  be  no 
solution  on  the  battlefield.  We  strongly 
believe  that  we  are  on  the  road  to  achiev- 
ing our  goal  and  that  our  support  has 
been  a  key  ingi-edient  in  getting  the  inter- 
nal peace  process  underway.  I  should  un- 
derline that  Soviet  military  assistance  to 
the  MPLA  continues  at  massive  levels. 

I  would  also  like  to  add  a  few  words 
about  oiu'  relationship  with  the  MPLA. 
We  are  committed  to  dialogue  and  discus- 
sion with  Luanda.  We  have  had  numerous 
contacts,  both  before  and  after  the  sign- 
ing of  the  New  York  accords.  Oui-  door  is 
always  open  to  meet  with  MPLA  repre- 
sentatives. However,  until  national  recon- 
ciliation is  achieved,  it  vdll  be  premature 
to  talk  about  U.S.  recognition  of  any 
government  in  Angola. 

Steps  Leading  to  Gbadolite 

On  March  13  of  this  year.  Dr.  Savimbi 
[Jonas  Savimbi,  President  of  UNITA] 
made  a  series  of  offers  on  national  recon- 
ciliation which  reiterated  and  broadened 
UNITA's  position  favoring  discussions 
with  the  MPLA.  He  announced  a  4-month 
unilateral  moratorium  on  major  offensive 
actions  and  the  release  of  MPLA  miUtai-y 
prisoners  and  offered  to  reopen  the  Ben- 
guela  railway  for  nonmilitary  traffic.  In 
addition  the  UNITA  communique  of 
March  13  stated  that  its  President  would 
not  participate  in  actual  negotiations  with 
the  MPLA  and  would  also  not  participate 
in  a  transitional  government  that  would 
guide  the  country  after  reconciliation  was 
achieved,  prepai'atory  to  ft'ee  elections. 
The  MPLA,  for  its  part,  responded 
to  the  UNITA  offer  with  its  own  peace 
platform,  based  initially  on  its  existing 
program  of  "amnesty"  for  individual 
UNITA  members.  This  concept  of  "am- 
nesty" had  been  adamantly  rejected  by 
UNITA,  which  saw  it  as  an  attempt  to 
split  and  defeat  the  movement.  However, 
by  the  time  the  chiefs  of  state  of  eight 
African  nations  gathered  in  Luanda  on 


May  16,  the  MPLA  peace  plan  used  the 
term  "national  reconciliation"  for  the  first 
time,  and  it  appeai-ed  that  a  direct 
dialogue  between  the  waning  parties 
might  be  possible.  The  so-called  Luanda 
peace  plan,  however,  contained  a  number 
of  elements  which  were — and  remain — 
anathema  to  UNITA.  It  called  for  the 
"exile"  of  Dr.  Savimbi,  the  "integi'ation" 
of  UNITA  into  the  MPLA,  and  "respect 
for  the  Constitution"  of  the  People's 
Republic  of  Angola. 

UNITA  objected  to  these  terms  be- 
cause, despite  Dr.  Savimbi's  offer  of 
March  13  not  to  participate  in  an  interim 
government,  UNITA  would  continue  to 
requii-e  his  leadership  during  the  negotia- 
tion and  transition.  Second,  UNITA 
viewed — quite  rightly — the  formulation 
of  "integi'ation"  as  a  means  of  submerg- 
ing its  members  into  the  MPLA,  a  con- 
cept that  is  inconsistent  with  the  goal  of 
national  reconciliation.  Finally,  it  viewed 
"respect  for  the  Constitution"  as  tan- 
tamount to  acceptance  of  the  existing  one- 
party,  Marxist-Leninist  state. 

The  Gbadolite  Summit 

Despite  these  gaps  in  the  MPLA  and 
UNITA  positions,  intense  diplomatic 
efforts  to  estabhsh  a  basis  for  dialogue 
continued.  These  culminated  in  the  June 
22  summit  of  18  Afiican  heads  of  state 
and  leaders  at  GbadoUte,  Zaii-e,  hosted  by 
President  Mobutu.  Most  significantly.  Dr. 
Savimbi  was  invited  and  attended  the 
meeting.  There,  for  the  first  time,  he  and 
[Angolan  President]  Dos  Santos  met 
publicly  and  participated  in  the  now 
famous  handshake  signifying  their 
mutual  desire  to  end  the  civil  war  and 
begin  the  critical  talks  of  national  recon- 
ciliation. 

The  summit  was  built  on  an  intricate 
choreography  of  direct  and  indirect  con- 
tacts and  recitation  of  positions  in  the  ab- 
sence (or  presence)  of  the  principal 
parties — all  conducted  in  at  least  three 
languages.  A  number  of  contentious  is- 
sues were  discussed  without  being 
resolved.  In  the  minds  of  some  of  the  par- 
ticipants, there  was  agi'eement  on  the 
key  MPLA  desiderata  of  exile,  integra- 
tion, and  respect  for  the  MPLA  constitu- 
tion. UNITA  has  categorically  rejected 
this  inteipretation,  and  the  published 
communique  fully  supports  the  view  that 
all  parties  agreed  to  only  three  principles: 


)epartment  of  State  Bulletin/December  1989 


31 


AFRICA 


•  Mutual  desire  to  end  the  war  and 
effect  national  reconciliation; 

•  Proclamation  of  a  cease-fire  effec- 
tive June  24;  and 

•  Establishment  of  a  mixed  UNITA- 
MPLA  commission  under  the  mediation 
of  President  Mobutu  to  negotiate  the 
political  future  of  Angola. 

Cease-Fire 

Despite  this  very  promising  beginning, 
the  cease-fii'e  declared  on  June  24  failed 
to  take  hold  as  both  sides  continued 
limited  operations  to  achieve  local  and 
tactical  advantages.  In  the  absence  of  any 
mechanism  to  discuss  and  resolve  viola- 
tions— or  even  agi'eement  on  what  was 
and  was  not  peiTnitted — a  return  to  large- 
scale  operations  was  inevitable.  The 
MPLA  launched  a  major  offensive 
toward  the  UNITA  center  at  Mavinga  on 
August  18. 

Meanwhile  the  parties  had  met  in 
Kinshasa  for  four  negotiating  sessions  on 
a  cease-fire  document  under  Zairean 
mediation  between  June  22  and  August 
17.  Substantial  progress  was  made  in 
hammering  out  a  cease-fire  agreement.  It 
appears  that  all  of  the  elements  of  an 
agreement  are  now  acceptable  to  both 
sides,  including  the  principle  that  direct 
negotiations  on  the  core  political  issues  of 
national  reconcihation  should  begin  upon 
signature  of  the  cease-fii'e  document. 

Unfortunately,  these  very  promising 
developments,  achieved  through  quiet 
and  patient  diplomacy,  have  been  over- 
shadowed and  undercut  by  continuing 
public  disagreements  over  what  was 
agreed  to  at  Gbadolite. 

The  Harare  Summit 

Against  this  growing  discord  of  militai-y 
conflict  and  public  acrimony,  a  follow-on 
summit  of  African  leaders  took  place  in 
Harare  on  August  22— without  UNITA 
present.  As  far  as  we  know,  UNITA  was 
not  invited  to  attend.  The  Harai-e 
summit's  final  communique  asserted  that 
thi'ee  additional  principles  had  been 
agreed  upon  at  Gbadolite  which  had  not 
been  publicly  disclosed  at  that  time: 

•  Respect  for  the  (existing)  constitu- 
tion and  laws  of  the  People's  Republic  of 
Angola  (the  MPLA); 

•  Integration  of  UNITA  into  exist- 
ing MPLA  institutions;  and 

•  Acceptance  of  Jonas  Savimbi'stem- 
[joraiy  and  voluntai'y  retirement. 

As  I  have  pointed  out,  UNITA  has 
consistently  rejected  these  three  points. 


The  Kinshasa  Summit 

The  results  of  the  Harai-e  summit,  and  in 
particular  President  Mobutu's  participa- 
tion, led  UNITA  to  question  the  impar- 
tiality of  the  mediator.  As  a  consequence, 
we  have  devoted  considerable  efforts  to 
clarify  the  basis  for  negotiation  and  en- 
hance UNITA's  confidence  in  the 
mediator  This  effort  became  particulai-ly 
intense  as  the  date  for  the  scheduled  Sep- 
tember 18  Kinshasa  summit  approached. 

Assistant  Secretary  [for  Afiican  Af- 
fairs Herman  J.]  Cohen  met  with  Presi- 
dent Mobutu  on  September  11  and  with 
Dr  Savimbi  several  days  later.  Although 
UNITA  agi-eed  to  sign  a  cease-fire  agree- 
ment— and,  in  fact,  empowered  a  delega- 
tion to  do  so — Dr  Savimbi  decUned  to 
attend  the  summit,  despite  our  ovra  ef- 
forts and  those  of  other  concerned 
countries. 

In  his  absence,  the  summit  was  un- 
able to  achieve  the  progress  we  think  is 
necessaiy  and  achievable;  namely  to 
achieve  a  cease-fire  and  the  start  of 
dii-ect  political  negotiations.  The  Kin- 
shasa participants  agi-eed  to  meet  again 
in  Gabon  at  a  date  not  yet  specified. 


U.S.  Position 

Let  me  briefly  address  what  the  U.S. 
position  is  in  light  of  all  these  develop- 
ments. All  of  us  hei'e  today  agree  that  the" 
disastrous  14-year-old  civil  war  in  AngoU 
must  end  and  that  the  difficult  task  of  na- 
tional reconciliation  should  proceed  as 
quickly  as  possible. 

The  Administration  believes  that 
lasting  peace  and  national  reconciliation 
can  take  place  only  in  a  scenario  in  which 
there  are  no  losers,  only  winners.  This 
can  be  accomplished  only  if  political 
negotiations  proceed  with  no  precondi- 
tions and  without  prejudice  to  the  posi- 
tions of  either  side.  Following  a  cease-fin 
agreement,  all  topics  should  be  open  fni- 
discussion  at  the  negotiating  table.  We 
also  note  that  pubhc  statements  by  both 
UNITA  and  the  MPLA  have  been"  unhel] 
ful — both  sides  should  negotiate  confideii 
tially,  rather  than  thi'ough  the  press. 

We  will  be  continuing  our  efforts  to 
enhance  confidence  in  the  mediator  and 
the  peace  process,  to  stop  the  fighting, 
and  to  move  toward  genuine  national 
reconcihation  in  Angola. 


'The  complete  tran-script  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  ba 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


President's  Meeting  Witli  UNITA  Leader 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
OCT.  5, 19891 

President  Bush  met  with  UNITA  [Na- 
tional Union  for  the  Total  Independence 
of  Angola]  leader  Dr.  Jonas  Savimbi  for 
approximately  30  minutes  in  the  Oval  Of- 
fice this  morning.  Dr  Savimbi  is  in  the 
United  States  on  a  private  visit.  He  has 
met  with  President  Bush  several  times 
during  the  last  Administration. 

President  Bush  used  the  occasion  of 
today's  visit  to  stress  the  U.S.  continued 
support  for  UNITA  and  the  goal  of  na- 
tional reconciliation  in  Angola. 

The  President  urged  Dr  Savimbi  to 
work  with  President  Mobutu  [of  Zaire] 
and  others  in  the  region  to  foster  the 
peace  process.  He  noted  our  longstanding 
support  for  a  cease-fire  and  face-to-face 
negotiations  and,  ultimately,  free  and  fair 
elections. 


(White  House  photo  by  Da\id  Valdez) 


'  Text  ft-om  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Oct.  9, 1989.1 


32 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  198 


ARMS  CONTROL 


Nuclear  and  Space  Arms  Talks 
Open  12th  Round 


Following  is  a  press  statement  by 
Ambassador  Richard  R.  Buii,  head  of  the 
U.S.  delegation  to  the  nuclear  and  space 
arms  talks  (NST)  and  chief  negotiator  at 
the  strategic  arms  reduction  t-alks 
(START),  in  Geneva  on  September  29, 
1989. 

Today  marks  the  opening  of  round  12  of 
the  nuclear  and  space  ai-ms  talks.  With 
me  is  Ambassador  Henry  Cooper,  the 
chief  defense  and  space  negotiator. 

Earlier  today  I  met  with  Ambas- 
sador Yuin  Nazarkin,  my  Soviet  counter- 
part, in  an  opening  heads-of-delegation 
meeting.  We  held  a  useful  session  which 
,  underscored,  in  my  view,  that  the  spirit  of 

I'  Jackson  Hole  has  moved  to  Geneva.  That 
ministerial  was  a  very  productive  and 
stimulating  dialogue  and,  I  believe,  en- 
■  hanced  the  prospects  for  success  in  the 
nuclear  and  space  arms  talks. 

The  objectives  of  the  United  States 
in  these  Geneva  talks  remain  sound.  We 
seek  to  make  progi'ess  towai'd  a  START 
ti-eaty  that  provides  for  reductions  in 
strategic  offensive  ai-ms  which  will 
strengthen  strategic  stability  and 
military  predictability  and  thus  reduce 
the  risk  of  nuclear  war.  In  the  defense 
and  space  area,  we  also  seek  an  agi'ee- 
ment  that  strengthens  deterrence  and 
stability. 

The  United  States  returns  to  the  bar- 
gaining table  with  new  momentum  and 
I'enewed  vigor.  We  ai'e  ready  to  build  on 
the  successful  dialogue  in  Wyoming.  This 
is  a  critical  round.  We  are  pleased  with 
the  new  proposals  which  came  out  of  the 
nii'etings  last  week  between  Secretary  of 
State  James  Baker  and  Foreign  Minister 
Eduai'd  Shevardnadze.  It  is  now  neces- 
sary to  flesh  out  these  new  ideas  and 
translate  them  into  concrete  achieve- 
ments. This  is  our  task  in  Geneva. 

The  United  States  has  shown  its 
readiness  to  make  substantive  progress 
by  lifting  its  proposed  ban  on  mobile 
ICBMs  [intercontinental  balKstic  mis- 
siles], contingent  on  congi-essional  ap- 
proval of  funding  for  such  progi-ams.  This 
step  allowed  the  two  sides  to  make  head- 
way in  Wyoming  on  the  vexing  problem 
of  verification  for  mobile  missiles.  During 
this  round,  negotiators  will  continue  their 
wiirk  on  the  crucial  issue  of  verification. 

In  Jackson  Hole,  the  Soviet  Union 
resjjonded  positively  to  President  Bush's 
M'rification  and  stability  initiative.  This 


package,  proposed  by  the  United  States 
at  the  beginning  of  round  11,  was  based 
on  the  principle  that  eaiiy  agreement  and 
implementation  of  such  measures  will  ac- 
celerate the  completion  and  ratification  of 
a  START  treaty.  At  the  ministerial,  the 
two  sides  held  e.\tensive  discussions  on 
the  details  of  President  Bush's  initiative 
and  signed  a  so-called  umbrella  agi-ee- 
ment  encouraging  the  development  of 
such  measures  and  outlining  principles 
for  eaiiy  implementation.  As  you  know, 
the  two  ministers  in  Wyoming  also  signed 
the  first  of  these  measures,  an  agreement 
on  advance  notification  of  major  strategic 
exercises. 

During  this  round,  we  will  be  work- 
ing to  agree  on  additional  measures 
within  the  fi-amework  provided  by  the 
umbrella  agreement. 

The  Soviet  side  also  has  offered  new 
ideas.  The  Soviet  side  appears  to  have 
made  a  positive  move  by  deciding  to  drop 
the  linkage  between  the  implementation 
of  a  START  treaty  and  an  agi-eement  on 
defense  and  space.  This  step  apparently 
means  that  START  is  no  longer  held 
hostage.  Removal  of  this  obstacle  should 
enable  the  two  sides  to  move  ahead  to 
tackle  other  remaining  differences  in 
START. 

Yet  while  this  Soviet  move  appears 
constructive,  we  need  to  learn  more 
about  the  Soviet  approach  and  how  it 


would  affect  our  strategic  defense  re- 
search efforts.  The  United  States 
remains  committed  to  develop  SDI 
[Strategic  Defense  Initiative]  and  deploy 
it  when  it  is  I'eady. 

We  also  welcomed  the  Soviet 
decision  to  completely  dismantle  the 
Ki'asnoyarsk  radar  without  precondi- 
tions. This  removes  a  major  obstacle  to 
concluding  a  START  agi-eement. 

The  Soviet  side  also  put  forth  some 
new  ideas  on  the  question  of  cruise  mis- 
siles. The  unresolved  areas  of  ALCMs 
[air-launched  ci-uise  missiles]  and  SLCMs 
[sea-launched  ci-uise  missiles]  are  extraor- 
dinarily complex  and  offer  no  simple  solu- 
tions, especially  in  the  area  of  SLCMs, 
where  verification  poses  formidable 
problems.  We  will  be  looking  foi-ward  to 
healing  more  ft'om  the  Soviet  side  on  its 
approach. 

It  is  my  goal  that,  during  this  round 
of  talks,  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  will  engage  actively  on  all  of  the 
remaining  disputed  issues.  There  are  no 
simple  answers,  easy  solutions,  or  quick 
fixes  to  questions  of  strategic  stability 
and  nucleaj'  arms  control.  But  the  Jack- 
son Hole  spirit  creates  a  real  opportunity 
for  real  momentum  and  substantive 
progress.  We  seek  to  build  on  this  momen- 
tum and  place  the  START  talks  on  a 
short  road  towai'd  completion  of  a  sound 
and  verifiable  treaty.  ■ 


Defense  and  Space  Talks 
Open  12th  Round 


Folloiving  is  a  press  statem,ent  by 
Ambassador  Henry  F.  Cooper,  chief 
negotiator  at  the  defense  aiui  space  talks, 
in  Genexta  on  September  29, 1989. 

The  U.S.  delegation  returns  to  the  12th 
round  of  the  defense  and  space  talks 
prepared  to  continue  work  toward  agree- 
ment on  ways  to  ensure  predictability 
and  stability  in  the  development  of  the 
U.S.-Soviet  strategic  relationship.  Our  ef- 
forts are  directed  both  toward  the  near- 
term — during  which  both  sides  conduct 
their  reseai'ch,  development,  and  testing 
as  required  to  evaluate  the  feasibihty  of 
advanced  strategic  defenses — and  toward 
the  future  to  preserve  our  options  to 
deploy  advanced  defenses  when  they  are 
ready. 


During  the  previous  rounds,  the 
sides  have  made  progress  on  developing 
the  joint  draft  text  of  a  protocol  on 
various  predictability  measures.  For  ex- 
ample, agreement  has  been  reached  on 
annual  exchanges,  through  the  Nucleai' 
Risk  Reduction  Centers,  of  data  on  the 
sides'  development,  testing,  deployment, 
modernization,  and  replacement  activities 
in  the  field  of  strategic  ballistic  missile 
defense.  The  sides  have  also  agreed  to 
have  experts  meet  annually  to  review 
these  data  and  plan  reciprocal  visits  to 
each  other's  counti-y  to  observe  tests. 

Although  there  is  already  agi-eement 
on  this  broad  agenda,  the  Soviet  side  has 
thus  far  been  reluctant  to  extend  such 
reciprocal  exchanges  into  the  research 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  1989 


33 


EAST  ASIA 


stage,  as  the  United  States  has  proposed. 
We  believe  that  the  rislt  of  technological 
sm'prise  could  be  reduced  by  including  re- 
search activities  long  before  they  can  be 
observed  by  national  technical  means.  So 
we  will  continue  to  seek  to  include 

^<?^ciprecal  and  comparable  exchanges  on 
such  research  activities  in  a  defense  and 
space  agreement  on  predictability 
measures. 

As  an  illustration  of  this  important 
aspect  of  the  U.S.  approach,  at  the  recent 
meeting  in  Wyoming,  Secretai-y  of  State 
Baker  extended  an  invitation  to  Foreign 
Minister  Shevardnadze  to  have  Soviet  ex- 
perts visit  two  U.S.  laboratories  involved 
in  SDI  [Strategic  Defense  Initiative]  re- 
search on  directed  energy  weapons. 
During  this  visit,  Soviet  experts  would  be 
given  briefings  and  a  close-up  look  at  two 
directed  energy  devices.  One  of  the 
devices  was  recovered  after  a  successful 
flight  into  space  and  the  other  is  undergo- 
ing preparatory  research  for  a  planned 
flight  into  space  in  the  mid-1990s. 
Foreign  Minister  Shevardnadze  called 
this  U.S.  invitation,  which  was  extended 
without  conditions,  constructive,  and  he 
and  Secretary  Baker  instnicted  us  to  dis- 
cuss it  further  in  Geneva.  We  hope  to 
work  out  arrangements  for  such  a  visit 
during  round  12. 

This  planning  process  and  the  visit  it- 

^3elf  should  be  very  helpful  in  establishing 
precedents  for  future  reciprocal  and  com- 
parable exchanges  over  a  wade  range  of 
U.S.  and  Soviet  ballistic  missile  defense 
activity. 

During  round  12,  we  will  continue  to 
preserve  U.S.  options  to  develop  and 
deploy  advanced  defenses  when  they  are 
ready.  The  United  States  believes  that  ef- 
fective defenses  would  enhance  security 
and  stability,  especially  when  introduced 
at  a  measured  pace  and  in  a  cooperative 
way.  In  our  view,  a  key  to  achieving  a 
stable  balance  of  offensive  and  defensive 
forces  at  least  cost  is  in  building  gi-eater 
mutual  understanding  of  both  sides' 
strategic  balhstic  missile  defense  ac- 
tivities, at  the  same  time  as  long  awaited 
reductions  in  strategic  offensive  arms 
take  place.  ■ 


The  Promise  of 

Pacific  Economic  Cooperation 


by  Richard  H.  Solomon 

Statement  before  the  Seriate  Foreign 
Relations  Committee  on  September  21, 
1989.  Mr.  Solomon  is  Assistant  SecretaTy 
for  East  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs.'^ 

I  welcome  this  oppoi'tunity  to  review 
with  the  committee  the  Administration's 
approach  to  enhancing  economic  coopera- 
tion in  the  Pacific  region.  This  is  a  topic — 
as  Secretary  Baker  suggested  in  a  major 
policy  address  last  June  [26  before  the 
Asia  Society] — whose  time  seems  to  have 
come.  The  Secretaiy  has  called  for  a  new 
Pacific  pai-tnership,  of  which  Pacific  rim 
cooperation  is  an  important  element.  A 
variety  of  proposals  have  been  put  for- 
ward in  recent  months,  among  them  one 
by  the  distinguished  chairman  of  the  Asia 
subcommittee  [Senator  Alan  Cranston] 
who,  as  a  Califomian,  has  a  keen  aware- 
ness of  the  economic  djTiamism  of  the 
Pacific  rim.  We  have  been  working  with 
the  Secretary  to  meld  the  best  elements 
of  these  proposals  into  our  strategy  for 
advancing  economic  cooperation  in  order 
to  help  realize  his  call  for  a  new  Pacific 
partnership. 

As  the  Secretai-y  noted  in  his  June 
speech,  the  international  institutions  that 
have  guided  us  through  the  postwar 
yeai's  require  reassessment,  refurbishing, 
or  recreation,  for  in  Asia  as  in  Em-ope  a 
new  international  era  is  upon  us.  The 
dominant  trends  of  tliis  new  era,  which 
will  shape  the  world  of  the  21st  century, 
are  an  increasingly  integrated  global 
economy  sparked  by  spectacular  tech- 
nological change;  the  bankruptcy  of  com- 
munism as  an  economic  and  political 
alternative;  and  a  worldwide  trend 
toward  democracy  and  free  enterprise. 
Our  policy  challenge  is  to  give  institution- 
al form  to  these  trends  in  a  manner  con- 
sistent vnth  U.S.  interests  and  to  the 
benefit  of  our  allies  and  friends. 

The  countries  of  the  Pacific  Basin 
are  on  the  cutting  edge  of  these  trends, 
which  makes  East  Asia  a  region  of  gi-eat 
and  gi'owing  importance  to  the  United 
States.  In  recognition  of  this  fact,  both 
President  Bush  and  Vice  President 
Quayle  visited  East  Asia  within  the  first 
100  days  of  taking  office.  Secretary  Baker 
has  made  several  trips  to  the  region  as 
well.  Indeed  as  we  meet  to  discuss  these 
issues,  the  Vice  President  has  embai'ked 
on  his  second  trip  to  the  area.  This  high- 


level  attention  reflects  our  commitment 
to  the  objective  that,  just  as  the  United 
States  has  long  been  a  European  power 
and  will  remain  one,  so  too  are  we  a 
Pacific  power,  and  we  wall  seek  to  find 
ways  to  enhance  our  diverse  and  gi'owang 
relations  with  this  vast  and  dynamic 
region. 

The  Pacific  Success  Story 

The  remarkable  success  of  the  outwai'd- 
looking,  market-oriented  economies  of 
East  Asia  is  in  no  small  measure  a  result 
of  the  stable  envii'onment  created  by  our 
security  presence  and  om-  promotion  of 
an  open  trading  system  in  the  framework 
of  GATT  [General  Agi-eement  on  Tariffs 
and  Ti'ade].  Most  di-amatically,  Japan  has 
become  the  world's  second  largest 
economy  and  a  financial  superpower  in  its 
own  right. 

The  four  "lesser  dragons"  of  East 
Asia — South  Korea,  Singapore,  Hong 
Kong,  and  Taiwan — have  averaged  an 
outstanding  9%  annual  gi'owth  during  the 
past  generation.  And  now  Thailand  and 
Malaysia  ai-e  forecast  to  join  them  as 
newly  industrializing  economies. 

Taken  together,  the  12  largest 
economies  of  the  Asia-Pacific  region  now 
account  for  24%  of  the  world's  GNP — 
roughly  equal  to  that  of  the  United 
States.  They  are  becoming  major  playei-s 
in  the  world's  trading  and  financial  sys- 
tems. They  are  increasingly  the  engine  of 
global  gi'owth  in  a  region  fully  integrated 
into  the  global  economy.  For  more  than  a 
decade,  transpacific  trade  flows  have  sur- 
passed those  crossing  the  Atlantic.  Last 
yeai'  commerce  across  the  Pacific  totaled 
$280  billion,  overshadowing  by  almost 
50%  the  $190  billion  in  transatlantic  trade. 

U.S.  trade  with  East  Asia  now  ac- 
counts for  more  than  one-third  of  oiu' 
total  foreign  commerce,  and  our  exports 
to  East  Asia  now^  exceed  those  to 
Europe.  While  oui-  trade  deficit  with  the 
Asia-Pacific  region  totaled  $98  billion  in 
1988,  seven  of  our  20%  largest  export 
markets  are  in  the  region.  U.S.  invest- 
ment in  East  Asia  now  is  in  excess  of  .$33 
billion,  accounting  for  23%  of  all  overseas 
profits  eai'ned  by  American  corporations. 

Dilemmas  of  Success 

These  measures  of  success,  of  couree, 
must  be  seen  in  the  context  of  the 


34 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  1989i 


EAST  ASIA 


problems  of  adjustment,  as  the  global 
trading  system  seeks  to  accommodate  the 
dynamic  producers  and  exporters  of  East 
Asia.  Our  large  and  sustained  trade 
deficit  with  the  region  has  given  rise  to 
pressures  for  responses  which — in  effect 
if  not  intent — would  establish  protec- 
tionist barriers  to  the  open  trading  sys- 
tem which  has  brought  such  dramatic 
gi-owth  and  prosperity  to  both  sides  of 
the  Pacific. 

Today's  dazzling  pace  of  commerce 
and  capital  flows,  and  of  technological 
change,  are  outstripping  the  international 
mechanisms  designed  to  manage  their  ef- 
fects. The  rapid  maturing  of  the 
economies  of  East  Asia  has  transfoiTned 
longstanding  allies  into  robust  commer- 
cial rivals.  They  now  compete  not  only  in 
.such  manufacturing  sectors  as  electronics 
and  telecommunications  but  also  in  the 
services  sector  and  finance.  These  chal- 
lenges are  some  of  the  dilemmas  of  suc- 
cess; and  they  confront  us  with  the  need 
to  find  ways  of  resolving  difficulties 
without  destroying  the  trading  and  finan- 
cial systems  that  have  propelled  foi-ward 
the  global  economy. 

Opportunities  for  Regional 
Cooperation 

It  is  in  this  conte.xt  that  we  are  now  as- 
sessing various  approaches  to  enhancing 
economic  cooperation  among  the  nations 
of  the  Pacific  rim.  We  can  easily  identify  a 
host  of  common  concerns  that  need  to  be 
addressed  if  we  are  to  facilitate  economic 
integi-ation  in  the  Pacific  region — from 
transport  and  communications  to 
resource  depletion,  energy,  and  the  en- 
vironment. These  common  problems  pro- 
vide a  compelhng  rationale  for  enhanced 
regional  cooperation. 

Let  me  consider  these  issues  in 
greater  detail. 

Transportation.  The  region's  rapid 
growth  has  strained  the  transport  in- 
frastructure of  the  Pacific.  The  increasing 
movement  of  goods  and  people  requu-es 
inijirovements  in  port  facilities,  cargo 
management,  airline  capacity,  customs 
clearance,  safety  controls,  and  personnel 
training. 

Telecommunications.  Enhancing 
the  region's  communications  infrastruc- 
ture and  information  networks  would 
promote  economic  gi-owth  by  facilitating 
the  flow  of  information  and  ideas. 
Dialogue  on  coordinating  bilateral  and 
multilateral  aid  flows  in  the  Pacific  sector 
could  help  leverage  and  minimize  redun- 
1  dancy  and  inefficiency. 


Energy.  The  need  to  enhance  access 
to  stable  and  predictable  supplies  of  ener- 
gy is  universal.  Pooling  data  on  energy 
use,  demand  projections,  and  resource 
availability  would  clearly  benefit  all  na- 
tions in  the  Pacific.  And  collaboration  in 
energy  conservation  will  become  an  im- 
perative as  we  enter  the  21st  centui-y. 

Environment.  Resource  depletion, 
coastal  protection,  and  pollution  control 
are  among  the  issues  which  can  be 
managed  effectively  only  through  region- 
wide  cooperation. 

In  assessing  approaches  to  dealing 
with  these  problem  areas,  I  am  mindful  of 
a  point  that  Deputy  Secretary  [of  State 
Lawrence  S.]  Eagleburger  has  made  on 
numerous  occasions  in  recent  years: 
While  Europe,  over  the  decades,  has 
developed  an  infrastnicture  of  multina- 
tional institutions  to  manage  its  inter- 
dependence and  facihtate  its  integi-a- 
tion— which  will  culminate  in  1992  vvith 
the  creation  of  a  single  market — the 
Pacific,  in  contrast,  lacks  such  region- 
wide  mechanisms  of  collaboration. 
Moreover  our  institutional  links  to  the 
Pacific  are  meager  relative  to  our 
European  ties. 

T'hese  facts  reflect  reahties  pecuhai* 
to  the  Asia- Pacific  region.  The  vast 
geogi'aphic  expanse  of  the  Pacific  and  its 
cultural  diversity  are  obvious  obstacles  to 
integration.  Moreover  historic  rivalries 
and  resentments  generated  in  eras  past 
still  ftiel  lingering  disti-ust. 

There  is  also  a  North-South  dimen- 
sion to  the  international  equation  of  the 
Pacific  rim.  Unlike  Europe  levels  of 
economic  development  in  the  Pacific 
Basin  vary  greatly.  There  are  several 
tiers  of  economies:  fi'om  the  advanced  in- 
dustrial states  like  the  United  States  and 
Japan,  to  the  newly  industrializing 
economies  such  as  South  Korea,  to 
developing  economies  such  as  Indonesia 
and  the  Philippines. 

These  complex  factors  help  to  ex- 
plain why  the  idea  of  a  Pacific  community 
has  yet  to  find  an  organizational  expres- 
sion commensurate  with  its  compelling 
economic  realities.  Yet  these  reahties 
have  generated  proposals  for  association 
among  nations  of  the  Pacific  in  one  form 
or  another  for  decades. 

This  was  certainly  the  genesis  of 
ASEAN  [Association  of  South  East 
Asian  Nations],  the  most  successful  of 
these  regional  concepts.  In  the  aftermath 
of  the  U.S.  withdrawal  from  Vietnam, 
and  as  the  Pacific  economies  entered 
their  most  dramatic  decade  of  growth, 
ASEAN  acquired  an  integrity  that  had 
eluded  its  predecessors.  Although 


originally  conceived  as  an  economic- 
oriented  association,  ASEAN  gained  a 
certain  political  dimension — as  has  been 
recently  expressed  in  a  collective  effort 
to  resolve  the  Cambodia  conflict. 
ASEAN's  vitality  has  now  made  it  one  of 
the  pillars  of  U.S.  relations  with  the 
Pacific;  and  we  view  the  association  as  an 
essential  ingredient  in  any  entity  of 
regional  economic  cooperation.  Indeed 
this  year's  ASEAN  ministerial  and 
postministerial  meetings  were  an  impor- 
tant foi-um  for  discussing  possibilities  of  a 
new  mechanism  of  Pacific  cooperation. 

I  should  also  note  that  growing 
region-wide  economic  imperatives  have 
given  rise  to  several  other  semiofficial  or 
private  economic  institutions,  most  nota-     -• 
bly  the  Pacific  Economic  Cooperation 
Council  (PECC).  PECC  was  launched  in 
1980  as  an  outgi'owth  of  suggestions  by 
Australian  Prime  Minister  Eraser  and 
Japanese  Prime  Minister  Ohira.  Its  mem- 
bers, including  government  officials  pai'- 
ticipating  in  their  private  capacities, 
business  leaders,  and  academics,  have 
been  meeting  on  a  regular  basis  to  dis- 
cuss a  broad  range  of  trade,  economic, 
and  financial  issues.  Its  unofficial  status 
has  attracted  to  it  14  Pacific  economies  in- 
cluding the  People's  Repubhc  of  China, 
Taiwan,  and  a  gi'oup  of  South  Pacific 
states.  And  then  there  is  the  Pacific 
Basin  Economic  Council  (PBEC),  an  or- 
ganization of  business  executives  fi'om 
the  Pacific  rim  economies  which  has  been 
in  existence  since  1968. 

Why  Now  Enhance  Pacific 
Economic  Cooperation? 

Over  the  past  year,  the  idea  of  a 
mechanism  to  enhance  economic  coopera- 
tion in  the  Asia-Pacific  region  has 
gathered  an  unprecedented  head  of 
steam.  Why  so?  It  appears  that  the  cre- 
scendo of  trade  disputes,  a  maturing  of 
the  newly  industrializing  economies 
beyond  the  current  fi-amework  of  trade 
and  investment  mechanisms,  and  perhaps 
the  anticipation  of  Eui'opean  economic  in- 
tegration in  1992  have  catalyzed  a  collec- 
tive recognition  that  the  time  is  ripe  for 
some  new  form  of  consultative  coopera- 
tion in  the  Pacific. 

In  July  1988  [before  the  Association 
of  Indonesian  Economists  in  Jakarta], 
Secretary  Shultz  suggested  the  creation 
of  a  "...Pacific  Basin  foram  where  like-  ~* 

minded  countries  could  compare  experien- 
ces, discuss  ideas,  and  prepare  analyses 
on  subjects  that  are  of  interest  to  most 
countries  in  the  region."  He  proposed  an 
initial  focus  on  regional  infrastructure 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  1989 


35 


EAST  ASIA 


development  in  such  areas  as  transport, 
telecommunications,  education,  natural 
resoui'ces,  and  the  envii-onment.  At  the 
same  time,  Secj-etaiy  Baker — while  at 
the  Ti-easui-y — was  quietly  testing  the 
waters  of  increased  cooperation  among 
the  major  Pacific  economic  players. 

These  tiial  balloons  appear  to  have 
stimulated  thinking  on  the  issue  both  at 
home  and  abroad.  Last  December 
Senator  Bradley  called  for  a  coalition  of 
eight  Pacific  rim  economies  to  reinforce 
the  Uruguay  Roimd  of  GATT,  enhance 
policy  coordination,  and  remove  obstacles 
to  LDC  [less  developed  country]  gi-owth. 

In  April  of  this  yeai-.  Senator 
Cranston  introduced  a  resolution  calling 
on  President  Bush  to  initiate  a  Pacific 
Basin  foi-um  which  would  hold  annual 
summit  meetings  to  discuss  "economic, 
security,  and  diplomatic  issues  unique  to 
the  region."  The  Senator  called  for  obtain- 
ing "the  broadest  possible  composition" 
of  such  a  forum. 

Internationally,  this  past  February, 
Australia's  Prime  Minister  Hawke 
launched  an  initiative  for  what  was  first 
called  a  "Pacific  OECD  [Organization  for 
Economic  Cooperation  and  Develop- 
ment]" to  support  multilateral  trade 
liberalization,  encourage  policy  coordina- 
tion, and  remove  trade  barriers  in  the 
region.  He  suggested  creating  a  small 
secretai'iat  to  backstop  a  series  of  high- 
level  meetings.  Several  weeks  later, 
Japan's  MITI  [Ministry  of  International 
Ti-ade  and  Industiy]  offered  a  similar 
though  more  trade-oriented  proposal. 

The  U.S.  Response 

The  Bush  Administration  has  carefully 
reviewed  a  plethora  of  proposals  put  for- 
ward in  recent  months — among  them 
Senator  Cranston's  call  for  a  Pacific  Basin 
forum.  We  view  the  creation  of  a  new 
mechanism  of  economic  cooperation  as  an 
important  component  of  our  vision  of  a 
new  Pacific  partnership.  We  have  sought 
to  integrate  elements  from  the  various 
proposals  in  formulating  the  objectives  of 
such  a  mechanism. 

Secretai-y  Baker  reviewed  our  think- 
ing with  Prime  Minister  Hawke  when  he 
visited  Washington  in  June.  The  issue 
was  a  major  topic  of  discussion  at  the 
ASEAN  postministerial  meeting  in 
Brunei  this  past  July.  And  just  last  week, 
a  senior  officials'  meeting  was  held  in 
Australia  in  order  to  develop  an  agenda 
for  a  ministerial-level  meeting  which 


Prime  Minister  Hawke  will  host  in 
November. 

As  these  efforts  have  proceeded,  our 
approach  has  been  guided  by  the  follow- 
ing perspectives. 

•  We  have  sought  to  avoid  imposing 
a  "made  in  America"  blueprint  for  a 
transpacific  gi'ouping.  Given  the  history 
of  unsuccessful  efforts  in  this  direction, 
and  the  sensitivities  involved,  progi'ess 
requires  careful,  incremental  consensus- 
building  if  an  economic  cooperation 
mechanism  is  to  be  created. 

•  In  our  view,  a  mechanism  of 
cooperation  will  be  most  useftil  if  it  en- 
compasses a  wide  array  of  issues — not 
just  ti-ade  and  investment  mattei-s  but 
those  related  to  transport  and  com- 
munications, resource  management,  and 
the  environment — issues  aimed  at  effec- 
tive management  of  gi'owing  regional  in- 
terdependence. 

•  The  stiTicture  and  agenda  of  a 
Pacific  cooperation  entity  should  take 
into  account  the  diversity  of  the  region's 
social  and  economic  systems  and  the 
markedly  different  levels  of  national 
development. 

•  Membership  must  begin  with 
those  economies  committed  to  enhancing 
private  initiative  and  free-market 
policies — to  facilitating  the  free  flow  of 
goods,  services,  capital,  technology,  and 
ideas.  But  we  want  participation  to  be  in- 
clusive, wath  the  door  open  to  eventual 
participation  by  those  countries  which 
are  still  early  in  the  process  of  economic 
reform. 

•  It  is  imperative  that  any 
mechanism  that  evolves  from  current  con- 
sultations complement  e.xisting  institu- 
tions and  processes  such  as  the  Uruguay 
Round  of  the  GATT.  the  OECD,  and 
ASEAN.  It  must  help,  not  hinder,  efforts 
to  keep  the  global  trading  system  as  open 
as  possible.  We  seek  to  create  neither  a 
regional  superbloc  nor  a  new  internation- 
al bureaucracy. 

•  Finally,  any  new  ;u-rangement  in 
the  Pacific  should  be  flexible.  It  must  be 
adaptable  in  a  way  that  reflects  the 
changing  needs  of  regional  economic  ac- 
tivity and  the  contributions  that  private 
sector  institutions  as  well  as  govern- 
ments can  bring  to  enhanced  cooperation. 

While  seeing  great  promise  in  this  ef- 
fort, we  also  are  clear-eyed  about  .the  dif- 
ficulties inherent  in  forging  a  new 
institution.  Building  a  consensus  re- 
quires, among  other  things,  assuring  the 
ASEAN  countries  that  a  new  mechanism 


will  not  weaken  their  collective  efforts  or 
dilute  their  identity  as  a  regional  associa- 
tion. 

Another  sensitive  issue  is  member- 
ship. Should  nonmarket  economies  par- 
ticipate? Should  countries  outside  the 
region  be  included? 

Despite  the  many  complications  and 
obstacles.  Secretary  Baker  is  convinced 
that  there  is  much  to  be  gained  by  start- 
ing the  process  of  building  a  framework 
to  help  manage  the  increasingly  inter- 
dependent economies  of  the  Asia-Pacific 
region.  The  dialogue  in  which  we  are  now 
engaged  has  the  potential  to  sti-engthen 
the  consensus  for  an  open  trading  and  in- 
vestment system  essential  for  sustaining 
global  economic  gi'owth  into  the  21st  cen- 
tury. 

Our  experience  to  date  is  that  con- 
sensus-building is  a  delicate  and 
measured  process.  Last  week  at  the 
senior  officials'  meeting,  we  witnessed 
significant  progress  in  building  the  sup- 
port needed  to  launch  this  new  initiative. 
A  strong  spirit  of  cooperation  was  evi- 
dent tlu-oughout  the  2-day  meeting, 
which  developed  the  agenda  for  the 
November  ministerial. 

At  present  our  achievements  in  this 
new  undertaking  must  be  measured  by 
success  in  sustaining  the  momentum  of 
consultations.  This  enteiprise  will  take 
time.  It  will  require  consistent  effort  and 
patience.  Momentum  is  likely  to  be  in- 
creased at  the  Canben-a  ministerial  in 
early  November — which  Secretary  Baker 
plans  to  attend.  The  already  agi'eed  upon 
agenda  lays  the  basis  for  wide-ranging 
discussion,  encompassing  issues  ft-om  the 
multilateral  trade  system  to  the  region's 
inft-astioicture.  And  we  now  anticipate  fol- 
low-on meetings  in  an  East  Asian  capital 
within  the  next  yeai*. 

Thus,  in  conclusion,  there  should  be 
no  doubt  that  the  Bush  Administration  is 
committed  to  a  long-tenn  effort  at  en- 
hancing Pacific  economic  cooperation,  for 
America's  futiu-e  lies  in  the  Pacific.  Let 
me  add  that  the  Administration  ap- 
preciates the  sti'ong  bipai'tisan  intei-est 
which  you  and  other  members  of  Con- 
gi'ess  have  shown  in  this  effort.  We  look 
forwai'd  to  working  closely  with  you  in 
what  we  believe  is  an  important  and 
promising  initiative  in  the  world's  most 
dynamic  region  of  economic  growth. 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  healings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. ■ 


36 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  1989 


EAST  ASIA 


Political  Situation  in  Burma 


py  David  F.  Lambertson 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittees 
n  Human  Rights  and  International  Or- 
(oiizations  and  on  Asian  and  Pacific  Af- 
iirs  on  September  13. 1989.  Mr. 
Aiiiihertson  is  Deputy  Assista7it 
lecretary  for-  East  Asian  and  Pacific 
Xffairs.'^  ' 

n  March,  when  I  last  spoke  before  a  con- 
ressional  committee  on  the  situation  in 
iurma,  the  militai-y  government  there 
ad  just  announced  its  intention  to  hold 
lultiiJai-ty  elections  by  May  1990.  Over 
00  jiolitical  parties  had  been  officially 
egistered  and  were  cai'iying  out  cam- 
aign  activities,  although  martial  law 
emained  in  effect,  and  fi-eedom  of  expres- 
ion  was  heavily  restricted.  Burma's  lead- 
ig  opposition  leadei',  Aung  San  Suu  Kyi, 
/as  able  to  travel  throughout  much  of 
iurma  on  speaking  tours,  despite  vary- 
ig  degrees  of  opposition  from  local 
military  commanders.  Her  political  party. 
He  National  League  for  Democracy 
VLD),  had  emerged  as  the  clear  public 
ivorite  among  the  Burmese  people  who, 
n-ough  massive  demonstrations  in  1988, 
emonstrated  theii-  deep  desire  for  fun- 
amental  change  in  their  countiy  in  the 
lirection  of  multiparty  democracy  and 
onomic  freedom. 
The  regime  has  insisted  from  its  out- 
:3t  in  September  1988  that  it  did  not  seek 
ower  for  powers  sake  and  that  it  would 
[organize  and  hold  elections  once  law  and 
'  rder  were  restored.  The  limited  political 
ctivity  the  regime  had  allowed  up  to 
lai-ch  1989  was  a  hopeful  sign  that  the 
o\'ernment  might  make  good  on  its 
roniises.  However,  since  Mai'ch  a  num- 
ev  (if  developments  have  occuiTed  in 
kii'ina  which  we  believe  call  into  ques- 
ioii  the  militai-y  government's  pledge 
hat  it  wall  hold  fi-ee  and  fair  elections  and 
Lu-n  over  power  to  a  civilian  government 
.iiich  results  from  those  elections.  In  oiu- 
iew,  the  area  of  greatest  immediate  con- 
ern  is  human  rights.  For  the  past  year, 
■  f  have  consistently  called  attention  to 
rt'dible  reports  of  human  rights  viola- 
ions  in  Burma.  Both  thi-ough  direct  ap- 
11  laches  to  the  Burmese  Government 
ml  pubKc  statements,  we  have  ex- 
I'cssed  our  strong  concern  over  the 
nurse  of  events  in  Burma  and  our  view 
hat  the  reported  violations  of  human 
igiits  undercut  the  regime's  commitment 
n  a  free  election.  We  intend  to  maintain 


this  policy  in  the  hope  that  it  will  have 
some  ameliorating  effect  on  the  Burmese 
Government's  behavior.  There  is  some 
evidence  that  the  force  of  international 
opinion  has  had  such  an  impact  in  the 
past.- 

Status  on  Elections 

Politically  events  since  March  have  not  of- 
fered reason  to  be  optimistic  that  free 
and  fair  elections  vnll  take  place  in 
BuiTna.  Most  significantly  we  believe  the 
military  government  since  July  20  has  ar- 
rested thousands  of  opposition  party 
members,  principally  from  Aung  San  Suu 
Kyi's  National  League  for  Democracy. 
Aung  San  Suu  Kyi  herself,  together  with 
NLD  coleader  Tin  Oo,  were  put  under 
house  aiTest  in  Rangoon  July  20  and  are 
now  vtr-tually  cut  off  fi-om  the  i-est  of  the 
world.  We  understand  that  Suu  Kyi  was 
briefly  on  a  hunger  strike  in  July  and 
early  August  to  protest  her  detention 
and  that  of  her  followers  but  that  she  has 
ended  the  strike  and  is  now  in  good 
health.  The  NLD,  while  remaining  widely 
popular  among  Bunnese,  is  fighting  for 
survival  as  an  organization;  almost  all  of 
its  senior  leadership  is  behind  bai's.  Other 
opposition  parties  have  seen  their  leader- 
ship ranks  thinned  by  an-ests.  Recent 
measures  introduced  by  the  regime,  os- 
tensibly to  register  prospective  voters, 
appear  designed  to  engineer  an  electoral 
victoi-y  by  the  leading  progovemment 
party. 

The  Burmese  Government — also 
known  as  the  State  Law  and  Order  Res- 
toration Council  (SLORC) — continues  to 
state  that  it  will  hold  a  multiparty  elec- 
tion next  year  and  that  restrictions  on 
poHtical  activity  will  be  relaxed  in  the 
months  leading  up  to  the  election.  We  con- 
tinue to  hope  strongly  this  will  prove 
true.  The  elections  are  intended  to  elect 
representatives  to  the  National  Assemb- 
ly, which,  before  it  was  dissolved  last  Sep- 
tember, consisted  of  representatives  from 
489  constituencies.  The  government  has 
promulgated  an  election  law,  including  a 
timetable  leading  up  to  an  election  which 
would  take  place  next  May.  The  law  is 
fairly  unexceptionable  and,  if  imple- 
mented, could  pei'mit  free  and  fair  elec- 
tions. However,  while  most  featm-es  of 
the  draft  are  at  least  benign,  the  govern- 
ment retains  substantial  leeway  to  in- 
fluence the  process.  An  election 
commission,  established  by  then-Presi- 
dent Maung  Maung  shortly  before  the 


military  takeover  last  September, 
remains  in  existence.  It  is  widely  viewed 
as  a  virtually  powerless  rubber-stamp  for 
the  military  government.  Both  we  and 
other  governments  have  offered  to  sup- 
ply election  monitors  and  electoral  exper- 
tise, but  we  have  seen  no  indication  the 
BuiTnese  Govemment  will  peiTnit  neutral 
or  international  monitors  to  observe  the 
election. 

The  government  denies  that  it  is 
making  political  airests  or  is  mistreating 
detainees.  It  likewise  denies  credible 
reports  we  have  of  instances  of  torture. 
Instead  it  claims  that  those  detained  are 
criminal  offenders  who  will  be  tried  as 
such.  In  our  view,  given  numerous 
credible,  first-hand  reports  of  the  regime 
tai'geting  opposition  political  activists,  in 
the  absence  of  verifiable  charges,  the  Bur- 
mese Government's  version  of  events 
simply  do  not  square  with  the  facts.  In- 
deed there  seems  to  be  a  pattern  of  at- 
tacks against  the  larger  opposition 
political  parties. 

Equally  disturbing  to  many  ob- 
servers of  Burma  are  statements  by  some 
high-ranking  SLORC  officials  that  next 
yeai-'s  election  will  lead  not  to  a  dh-ect 
transfer  of  power  fi'om  the  military  to 
civihans  but,  instead,  to  the  fonnation  of 
a  constituent  assembly  which  would  draw 
up  a  new  constitution.  Only  after  the  con- 
stitution was  ratified  would  a  civilian 
government  be  formed.  While  Burmese 
statements  on  this  score  are  in  some 
cases  contradictory,  there  is  an  obvious 
cause  for  apprehension  that  such  a  con- 
stitution process  could  be  prolonged  for 
yeai's,  keeping  the  army  in  power  in- 
definitely. 

Military  Crackdown 

The  latest  crackdown  in  Burma  no  doubt 
reflects  some  key  concerns  of  the  military 
government.  First  and  foremost  is  a 
determination  to  avoid  repetition  of  last 
year's  upheavals,  which  swept  away  the 
Bunna  Socialist  Progi-am  Pai'ty  govern- 
ment and  paralyzed  the  economy.  A 
second  concern  is  to  maintain  the  in- 
tegrity of  the  aiTned  forces.  Since  last 
yeai-'s  upheavals,  which  saw  the  defection 
of  a  handful  of  military  personnel,  the 
Saw  Maung  government  has  been  par- 
ticularly sensitive  to  any  sign  of  political 
parties  or  foreigners  sowing  dissent 
within  the  ranks  of  the  army  and  has 
generally  reacted  quickly  to  any  such  per- 
ceived threat.  Aung  San  Suu  Kyi's 


lepartment  of  State  Bulletin/December  1989 


37 


EAST  ASIA 


speeches  in  July,  before  demonstrations 
which  violated  mai'tial  law,  called  on  the 
aiTned  forces  to  abandon  theii-  support  for 
Ne  Win  and  his  militai-y  colleagues.  This 
may  well  have  convinced  the  loiling 
military  council  that  she  and  ihe  NLD 
were  a  serious  threat  to  the  army's  unity. 
Further,  the  lai'ge  numbers  of  Burmese 
attending  her  rallies  in  July— up  to  15,000 
on  some  days — may  have  led  the  militaiy 
to  conclude  that  a  second  nationwide 
uprising  was  imminent  and  that  a  crack- 
down on  Aung  San  Suu  Kyi  and  the  NLD 
was  the  only  means  to  prevent  another 
cycle  of  upheaval. 

The  government  has  accused  Aung 
San  Suu  Kyi  of  being  heavily  influenced 
by  communists  who  are  on  her  staff. 
While  Aung  San  Suu  Kyi  herself  has  ac- 
knowledged that  some  of  her  advisers  are 
former  members  of  the  Burma  Com- 
munist Party,  she  strongly  denies  that 
she  or  her  party  ai-e  a  communist  front. 
Our  own  assessment  supports  this  view. 

We  certainly  understand  the  militas-y 
government's  desire  to  maintain  national 
unity  and  a  functioning  economy.  But  we 
believe  that  actions  which  further  under- 
mine confidence  in  the  government's 
pledge  to  hold  fi'ee  and  fair  elections  will 
only  intensify  the  Burmese  public's  un- 
rest and  dissatisfaction  with  their  current 
system.  In  our  view,  last  yeai''s  upheavals 
and  demonstrations  were  a  direct  expres- 
sion of  the  BuiTnese  people's  strong 
desh-e  for  fundamental  democratic 
change  in  their  country.  While  the  govern- 
ment of  Bui-ma  is  a  matter  for  the  Bur- 
mese themselves,  we,  of  couree, 
sympathize  with  such  aspirations.  As  the 
State  Department  spokesman  has  said  on 
several  occasions  this  year,  we  hope  the 
military  government  will  fi-ee  political 
prisoners  and  relax  restrictions  on  politi- 
cal activity  to  give  Bui-mese  some  con- 


fidence that  real  change  might  occur 
following  next  year's  election.  We  have 
shared  our  views  directly  with  the  Saw 
Maung  government  and  offered  to  assist 
in  next  year's  election,  without  any  sub- 
stantive response  from  the  Bui-mese. 

With  regard  to  Ne  Win,  though  tech- 
nically he  is  now  a  private  citizen,  he  un- 
doubtedly remains  the  most  powerful 
single  person  in  Bumia.  It  is  not  cleai- 
what  role  he  takes  in  the  day-to-day  con- 
duct of  the  government.  He  is  most 
probably  consulted  on  a  regular  basis  by 
the  SLORC  and  undoubtedly  provides 
guidance  on  government  policy  when  he 
sees  fit.  Within  the  SLORC  itself,  there  is 
some  evidence  of  a  rivahy  between  some 
council  members,  but  for  the  most  part, 
SLORC  members  ai-e  careful  to  maintain 
an  image  of  unaniinity. 

Assistance  and  Human  Rights 
Concerns 

A  number  of  other  countries  have  joined 
with  us  in  calling  attention  to  human 
rights  violations  and  political  develop- 
ment in  Burma.  These  include  the 
European  Community  (EC)  nations,  as 
well  as  Australia,  India,  and  Japan;  the 
EC  12,  in  particular,  issued  a  joint  state- 
ment on  September  8  expressing  their 
concern  at  the  worsening  of  the  policy  of 
repression  in  Bui-ma  in  recent  weeks. 
Burma  has  not  been  isolated  by  the  inter- 
national community  but  neither  has  it 
been  able  to  pursue  normal  relations  with 
many  countries  as  a  consequence  of  last 
year's  coup  and  the  repressive  nature  of 
the  military  regime.  We  intend  to  pursue 
the  issue  of  human  rights  in  Burma 
through  appropriate  international  fora. 

Many  of  Burma's  traditional  aid 
donors  have  suspended  assistance  or 
postponed  approving  new  aid  until  free 
and  fail"  elections  take  place.  The  United 


States  suspended  all  assistance  to  Burma 
in  the  wake  of  the  militai-y  takeover  last 
September;  earlier  this  year,  we 
suspended  Bui-ma's  generahzed  system  o 
preferences  (GSP)  tariff  benefits  due  to 
the  demonstrated  absence  of  fi'ee  trade 
unions  there.  West  Germany,  which  in 
recent  years  was  Burma's  second-largest 
aid  donor,  also  suspended  aid  last  fall.  We 
understand  it  has  no  plans  to  resume  aid 
funding  absent  a  fair  election.  Japan, 
Burma's  lai'gest  donor  for  many  years, 
has  also  decided  not  to  approve  any  new 
aid  to  Bm-ma  until  elections  occur.  Japan, 
which  had  suspended  disbursing  pre- 
viously approved  aid  after  the  military 
takeover,  resumed  these  disbursements 
last  Febinaiy,  before  the  most  recent 
crackdown. 

In  closing,  let  me  say  that  the  Unite 
States  has  no  intention  whatsoever  of  in- 
terfering in  the  internal  affairs  of  Burma 
We  look  forward  to  a  renewal  of  the  gooc 
relations  which  we  foiTnerly  had  with 
Buj-ma.  In  particular,  we  have  an  impor- 
tant interest  in  working  with  Bm-ma  to 
eliminate  the  production  of  opium  and  th 
ilUcit  traffic  in  heroin  produced  in  Burm& 
We  do,  however,  understand  the  yearn- 
ings of  the  Burmese  people  for 
democracy,  and  we  encourage  peaceful 
democratic  evolution.  We,  therefore, 
must  strongly  condemn  unreasonable 
restrictions  on  political  activity,  political 
airests,  the  mistreatment  of  prisoners, 
and  other  violations  of  human  rights  by 
the  present  regime.  We  urge  that  regime 
to  hold  the  fi-ee  and  fail-  elections  as 
promised  and  transfer  power  to  those 
elected. 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  heainngs 
will  be  published  bv  the  committee  and  will  bt 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


38 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  1989 


I 


EUROPE 


Assistance  for  Poland  and  Hungary 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
OCT.  4, 19891 

The  world  has  watched  with  wonder  as 
Poland  has  moved — swiftly  and  peace- 
fully— to  form  a  new  government  under 
Prime  Minister  Mazovvaecki,  the  first  non- 
iommunist  government  in  Eastern 
Europe  in  more  than  40  years.  We  salute 
Prime  Minister  Mazowiecki,  President 
ranizelski,  Solidarity  leader  Lech 
»Valesa,  and  so  many  other  distinguished 
.-"olish  leaders  for  theii'  courage  and  wis- 
lom  in  helping  bring  about  a  new  begin- 
ling  for  Poland. 

From  the  very  start  of  this  Ad- 
ninistration,  President  Bush  has  taken 
:  he  lead  in  supporting  reform  in  Poland 
111(1  Hungary.  At  Hamtramck,  Michigan, 
n  A\m\,  on  the  day  of  the  signing  of  the 
oundtable  agreement  in  Poland,  the 
^resident  announced  a  set  of  measures  to 
ipen  U.S.  mai'kets  and  encourage  private- 
ector  loans  and  investments.  In  July  he 
isited  Poland  and  Hungary  and  spoke 
lefore  the  Pohsh  Parliament,  as  well  as 
0  a  massive  gathering  at  the  SoUdarity 
nonument  in  Gdansk.  He  announced  a 
,  arther  comprehensive  package  of  assist- 
'  nee  measures  to  support  Poland's 
I  conomic  and  political  regeneration,  a 
jiackage  which  took  account  of  the  fact 
ihat  Poland  did  not  yet  have  its  new 
(i:overnment  or  its  new  economic  policies 
':i  place. 

He  announced  a  similar  program 
niuring  his  visit  to  Hungary,  which  is  also 

Imbai-ked  on  a  promising  path  of  pohtical 
|,nd  economic  reforms.  A  few  days  later, 
it  the  Paris  economic  summit,  the  Presi- 
[illent  proposed  and  our  summit  pai'tners 
l:.gi'eed  to  a  plan  for  concerted  Western  ac- 
lion  to  encourage  and  assist  economic 
'eforms  and  democratic  changes  in 
Poland  and  Hungary. 

In  early  September,  the  Administra- 
lion  submitted  to  Congi-ess  a  comprehen- 
jive  legislative  proposal  that  would 
|reate  a  $100  miUion  entei-prise  fimd  for 
roland  and  a  $25  million  fund  for  Hun- 

r^ary,  as  well  as  a  labor  initiative  and  an 
nvironmental  initiative  together  totaUng 
20  million.  In  addition  to  this  $14.5  mil- 
ion  proposal,  and  other  initiatives  taken 
)y  reprogramming  existing  resources,  we 
lave  offered  $100  million  in  emergency 
cod  aid  to  Poland  in  the  coming  fiscal 
'ear,  in  addition  to  $8  million  in  FY  1989. 
n  doUai"  terms,  this  total  package  al- 
■eady  involves  over  $250  miUion. 


We  have  also  moved  to  encourage 
new  trade  and  investment  by  proposing 
that  Congi-ess  gi-ant  both  Poland  and 
Hungary  access  to  the  U.S.  generaUzed 
system  of  preferences  (GSP)  and  that  it 
authorize  the  Overseas  Private  Invest- 
ment Corporation  (GPIC)  to  operate  in 
both  countries.  On  September  18,  the 
President  announced  that  he  would  grant 
Hungary  permanent  most-favored-nation 
(MFN)  status,  contingent  upon  passage 
by  the  Hungarian  Parliament  of  new 
emigration  legislation,  which  has  since 
occurred. 

We  have  engaged  the  resources  and 
creativity  of  the  private  sector,  recogniz- 
ing that  the  U.S.  Government  alone  could 
not,  and  should  not,  render  all  the  sup- 
port Poland  and  Hungaiy  require.  On  the 
eve  of  his  trip  to  those  countries  in  July, 
the  President  hosted  a  White  House  sym- 
posium in  which  he  urged  leaders  from 
the  American  private  sector — labor 
leaders,  businessmen,  educators,  and 
others — to  be  actively  engaged  in  sup- 
porting economic  and  political  changes  in 
Eastern  Europe.  Labor  Secretary  Dole 
visited  Poland  in  August  and  signed  an 
agreement  providing  for  U.S.  technical  as- 
sistance and  bilateral  exchanges  in  the 
labor  field.  In  mid-September,  Commerce 
Secretaiy  Mosbacher  led  a  U.S.  invest- 
ment mission  to  Poland  and  Hungary, 
where  he  and  American  businessmen 


developed  concrete  proposals  to  en- 
courage new  private  investments,  joint 
ventures,  and  other  fonns  of  expanded 
U.S.  business  involvement  in  redevelop- 
ing these  two  economies. 

The  dramatic  changes  in  Poland  over 
the  past  2  months  have  lent  new  urgency 
to  our  efforts.  What  Poland  is  doing  is  his- 
toric, in  the  largest  sense  of  the  word.  It 
holds  the  promise  not  only  of  a  peaceful 
transition  to  democratic  rule  in  Poland 
but  also  of  the  beginning  of  the  end  of 
Eui'ope's  division  toward  a  Europe  whole 
and  free.  It  is  also  unprecedented:  Never 
before  has  a  counti-y  attempted  a  success- 
ful transfoiTnation  of  a  state-controOed 
economic  and  pohtical  system  into  one  of 
pohtical  pluralism,  democracy,  and  a 
market  economy.  The  new  Polish  Govern- 
ment, under  Prime  Minister  Mazowiecki, 
has  a  chance  to  consolidate  the  public 
ti-ust  that  is  needed  for  the  difficult 
economic  steps  ahead,  but  it  faces  major 
economic  problems. 

There  is  no  disagi-eement  that  both 
Poland  and  Hungary  need,  and  will  have, 
strong  U.S.  support.  There  is  no  disagi'ee- 
ment  that  the  United  States  needs  to 
play  a  leading  role  in  developing  a  con- 
certed Western  approach  to  Poland's 
economic  recoveiy.  The  question  is  how 
best  to  achieve  our  goal.  We  beheve,  as 
do  our  Western  economic  partners,  that 
Poland  can  best  go  forward  by  reforming 


Constitutional  Amendments 
in  Hungary 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
OCT.  19, 19891 

Yesterday  the  Hungarian  Pariiament 
passed  a  series  of  constitutional  amend- 
ments that  mai'k  a  further  dramatic  step 
toward  democratic  change.  These  amend- 
ments provide  for  free  and  open  elections 
and  guarantee  the  freedoms  of  speech, 
assembly,  and  worship  enshrined  in  our 
own  Bill  of  Rights.  Indeed  Hungarian 
legislators  and  scholars  visited  the 
United  States  several  times  to  study  the 
Ameiican  Constitution  and  Bill  of  Rights, 
which  they  saw  as  models  for  their  own 
constitution. 

These  changes  signify  a  historic 
break  from  the  one-party  state  toward 


multiparty  democracy,  symboUzed  by  the 
alteration  of  the  country's  official  name 
from  the  Hungarian  People's  Repubhc  to 
the  Republic  of  Hungary. 

The  United  States  welcomes  these 
new  steps,  undertaken  peacefully  and 
through  parhamentary  means,  and  we 
take  pride  in  the  fact  that  in  this  bicenten- 
nial year  of  the  Bill  of  Rights,  that  U  ving 
document  has  helped  inspii'e  democracy 
in  Hungary.  We  are  inspired  that  the  idea 
of  freedom  is  putting  down  new  roots  in 
Eastern  Europe  and  pledge  our  con- 
tinued strong  support  for  this  historic 
process. 


'  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Oct.  23, 1989.1 


')epartment  of  State  Bulletin/December  1989 

i 


39 


EUROPE 


its  economy  and  becoming  creditworthy 
again  by  reaching  early  agi'eement  with 
the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF) 
on  an  economic  reform  plan.  We  also  sup- 
port a  prompt  and  generous  Paris  Club 
rescheduling  of  Poland's  international 
debt.  This,  along  with  agi-eement  with 
the  IMF,  will  make  Poland  eligible  for 
IMF  and  World  Bank  loans  totaling 
hundreds  of  millions  of  dollars  annually. 
It  will  also  give  confidence  to  official  and 
commercial  lenders  and  to  investors, 
whose  participation  in  Poland's  recovery 
is  vital. 

Poland  is  taking  important  steps 
toward  refoiTning  its  economy.  The  Ad- 
ministration had  a  series  of  meetings  last 
week  with  key  ministers  in  the  new 
Polish  Government  and  reviewed  the  out- 
lines of  their  economic  reforni  program. 
It  is  an  ambitious  and  bold  plan,  caUing 
for  radical  economic  refoi-m  and  rapid 
movement  toward  agi'eement  with  the 
IMF.  An  integral  part  of  the  plan  is  an  ur- 
gent request  for  Western  economic  assist- 
ance in  helping  to  stabilize  the  Polish 
economy  as  reforms  are  implemented.  In 
the  context  of  an  agi-eement  with  the 
IMF,  the  Poles  seek,  in  addition  to  IMF 
and  World  Bank  support,  .$1  billion  in 
stabilization  funds  from  the  Western 
industrialized  countries. 

In  response  to  Poland's  request,  the 
President  has  decided  on  two  major  new 
steps. 

He  will  ask  Congress  to  approve  a 
$200  million  gi-ant  for  stabilization  pur- 
poses, which  would  be  the  U.S.  contribu- 
tion to  the  $1  billion  in  Western 
assistance  the  Poles  have  requested.  The 
gi-ant  would  be  contingent  upon  con- 
clusion of  an  IMF  agreement  and  upon 
the  recommendation  of  an  e.xperts'  mis- 
sion that  the  President  will  send  to 
Poland  soon.  The  United  States  wall  be 
working  closely  with  the  summit  seven 
and  its  other  allies  to  make  certain  that 
the  entire  $1  billion  is  available  to  Poland 
for  this  stabilization  fund  since  the  con- 
cept can  be  effective  only  if  the  fund  is 


fully  financed.  A  program  for  use  of  the 
Polish  $200  million  U.S.  contribution  will 
be  developed  with  the  Polish  Govern- 
ment. The  President  wants  to  work  with 
Congi-ess  to  develop  a  strong  bipartisan 
approach  toward  the  common  goal  of 
providing  prompt  and  effective  support 
to  the  Government  and  people  of  Poland. 

It  is  important  to  complete  develop- 
ment of  a  strategy  to  assist  Poland's 
recovery.  Toward  that  end,  the  President 
wall  send  to  Warsaw  within  the  next  few 
weeks  a  presidential  mission — including 
senior  U.S.  officials,  business  leaders,  and 
experts — to  discuss  with  the  Polish 
Government  its  economic  plans  and 
evaluate  its  needs.  This  mission  will  make 
recommendations  to  the  President  based 
on  their  own  findings  and  their  delibera- 
tions with  experts  ft'om  the  24-nation 
"Group  for  Economic  Assistance  to 
Poland  and  Hungary"  as  to  the  most  effec- 
tive use  of  the  $1  billion  stabilization 
fund.  This  mission  will  also  focus  on  those 
economic  sectors  where  U.S.  expertise 
and  experience  can  be  of  greatest  assist- 
ance— agiiculture,  business  management, 
financial  services,  and  others — pinpoint- 
ing areas  for  refoiTn  and  for  productive 
use  of  assistance  resources.  The  Congi-ess 
can  certainly  be  helpful  in  this  endeavor. 
This  initial  mission  will  be  followed  by 
experts'  missions  in  key  economic  sec- 
tors. In  addition.  Administration 
economists  will  examine  urgently  the 
structural  economic  challenges  Poland 
will  face  now  and  in  the  years  ahead  so 
that  we  can  provide  the  most  effective 
help  possible  to  the  Polish  Government. 

As  the  President  has  said,  the  fu- 
tui-es  of  Poland  and  Hungaiy  depend  on 
concerted  and  sustained  Western  action. 
These  efforts  must  be  complementary, 
not  duplicative,  and  must  be  coordinated 
with  the  efforts  of  the  IMF  and  Worid 
Bank.  That  is  why  the  President  called  on 
our  G-7  economic  partners  at  the  Paiis 
economic  summit  to  establish  new 
mechanisms  for  coordinating  our  efforts. 
The  resulting  24-nation  gi'oup  has  al- 
ready met  three  times  under  the  chair- 


manship of  the  European  Commimity 
(EC)  Commission.  The  EC  on  October  3 
committed  itself  to  $330  million  in  addi- 
tional assistance,  over  and  above  the  $271 
million  in  emergency  food  aid  already 
pledged  by  the  United  States,  the  EC, 
and  other  donors.  It  has  also  begun  to 
develop  a  common  assistance  strategy  foi 
Poland  and  Hungary,  along  with  working 
groups  on  food  aid,  en\ironment,  man- 
power training,  and  other  specific  areas 
of  assistance.  The  goal  is  to  set  clear 
priorities,  avoid  redundant  efforts,  and 
assume  maximum  aid  effectiveness. 

West  Germany,  France,  Britain, 
Japan,  and  several  other  countries  have 
already  announced  their  intention  to  pro- 
vide substantial  bilateral  assistance.  The 
IMF  has  indicated  it  will  move  quickly  in 
assisting  Poland  to  develop  an  overall 
economic  stabilization  and  reform  pro- 
gram, and  the  World  Bank  is  prepared  to 
extend  promptly  major  new  credits  once 
an  IMF  program  is  in  place  and  to 
develop  additional  loans. 

Finally,  in  order  to  continue  the 
dialogue  with  Poland's  leaders  that  he 
began  in  July,  the  President  is  inviting 
President  Jai-uzelski  and  Prime  Minister 
Mazowiecki  to  visit  Washington  at  times 
convenient  for  each  of  them. 

These  are  the  steps  the  Administra- 
tion has  taken  and  will  be  taking  in  sup- 
port of  democratic  change  in  Poland  and 
Hungary:  economic  assistance  condi- 
tioned upon  real  progi'ess  toward  refonn, 
business  and  technical  assistance,  the 
opening  of  investment  and  trade  oppor- 
tunities, and  concerted  Western  action  in 
conjunction  with  other  industrialized 
democracies  and  the  international  finan- 
cial institutions.  These  combined 
measures  constitute  an  inteniational 
recovery  program  that  provides  broad 
and  substantial  Western  support  for  the 
historic  changes  now  underway  in  Poland 
and  Hungai-y. 


1 


I 


'  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Oct.  9.  1989.1 


40 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  1989 


EUROPE 


rhird  Report  on 
'yprus 

[ESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
ePT.  22, 19891 

accordance  with  Public  Law  95-384, 1  am 
,bmitting  to  you  this  bimonthly  i-eport  on 
■ogi'ess  toward  a  negotiated  settlement  of  the 
v'pi'us  question. 

1  am  pleased  to  note  that  the  negotiating 
riccss  under  the  auspices  of  the  United  Na- 
ms  Secretai'y  General  is  continuing.  The  last 
eeting  between  the  parties  was  held  in 
ew  York  on  June  28^29,  at  which  time  a  com- 
unique  was  issued  by  the  Secretary  General 
iting  his  satisfaction  and  declaring  that  "the 
fort  made  by  the  two  leaders  since  August 
''88  had  made  it  possible,  as  never  before,  to 
ckli'  the  issues  that  must  be  resolved  if  a 
Jut  inn  to  the  Cyprus  problem  is  to  be  found." 

II  inimunique  also  stated  that  an  outhne 

ill  I  preparation  "would  provide  the  basis  for 
c  negotiation  of  an  overall  agi'eement." 

The  Secretai'y  General  asked  both  leaders 
ciintinue  the  talks  with  his  I'epresentative  in 
.'pius,  and  copies  of  a  draft  outline  were 
ovided  to  both  communities'  leadere  in  mid- 
ly.  .\s  of  mid-September,  however,  these 
ks  have  yet  to  reconvene  because  of  con- 
ivcrsy  over  the  status  and  content  of  the 
aft  outline.  It  is  our  objective  to  have  the 
ks  resume  at  an  early  date,  and  we  are  work- 
;  directly  with  the  Secretai'y  General  in  this 
ilcavor. 

The  Secretary  General  used  his  biannual 
[Mirt  to  the  Security  Council  on  U.N.  opera- 
iis  in  Cyprus  for  the  period  December  1, 
^1^,  1(1  May  31, 1989  (copy  attached),  to 
cicw  the  progress  made  in  the  latest  com- 
mal  negotiations.  He  also  used  the  report  to 
iterate  his  concern  about  the  mounting 
ficit  faced  by  the  U.N.  Peacekeeping  Force 
Cyprus  (UNFICYP),  but  recommended 
at  its  mandate  be  renewed  for  another  6 
inths.  The  U.N.  Security  Council  on  June  9 
teil  unanimously  to  extend  UNFICYP's 
indate  through  December  15, 1989. 

( )n  July  19,  disturbances  broke  out  in  the 
,-ios  Kassianos  ai'ea  of  Nicosia  dui'ing  a 
'monstration  by  Greek  Cyjiiriots  marking  the 
miversary  of  the  events  of  July  1974.  Accord- 
e;  to  the  United  Nations  some  1,000  Greek 
I'luiots  forced  their  way  into  the  U.N.-con- 
ulled  buffer  zone  at  Ayios  Kassianos,  in  part 
ramming  a  bus  through  a  U.N.  fence.  The 
N'FICYP  ultimately  was  able  to  contain 
ost  of  the  demonstrators.  Before  all  could  be 
ntained,  however,  Turkish  Cypriot  secui'ity 
rci  ~  arrived  on  the  scene  and  ai'rested  some 
ii)  persons.  Those  arrested  were  held  in  cus- 
il\  liy  Tiu'ldsh  Cypriot  authorities  and  were 
leased  several  days  later.  The  apparent  un- 
illiugness  of  Greek  Cypriot  police  to  stop  the 
■nil  mstrators  from  entering  the  buffer  zone 

III  the  Turkish  Cypriot  secui'ity  authorities' 
Te-t  of  some  of  them  were  both  factors 
'tiiinental  to  int«rcommunal  relations  and 

e  ongoing  efforts  to  reach  a  settlement  on 
'.e  island. 


lepartment  of  State  Bulletin/December  1989 


From  the  outset  of  the  disturbances,  the 
United  States  worked  actively  in  support  of 
U.N.  efforts  to  defuse  the  situation  and  to  re- 
store the  status  quo  ante.  We  urged  all  con- 
cerned to  act  with  restraint  and  to  respond  to 
U.N.  appeals  for  the  immediate  release  of 
those  detained.  We  also  stressed  the  need  for 
both  communities  to  cooperate  with  the 
United  Nations  in  preventing  the  entry  of 
unauthorized  persons  into  the  buffer  zone. 

In  my  meetings  and  conversations  with 
then-Greek  Prime  Minister  Papandreou, 
Tiu'kish  President  Evi'en  and  Prime  Minister 
Ozal,  and  Cypriot  President  Vassiliou,  I  have 
stressed  our  continued  commitment  to  support 
the  efforts  of  the  Secretary  General  to  resolve 
the  Cyprus  dispute. 

Finally,  I  am  pleased  to  inform  you  that  in 
Jime  Nelson  C.  Ledsky  was  appointed  Special 
Cyprus  Coordinator.  Unlike  his  predecessor, 
M.  James  Wilkinson,  who  served  with  distinc- 
tion in  that  position  since  1986,  Mi'.  Ledsky  will 
devote  all  his  time  to  Cypiiis.  Mr.  Ledsky  is  a 
cai'eer  Foreign  Service  Officer  whose  most 
recent  assignment  was  as  Special  Assistant  to 
the  President  for  National  Security  Affaii-s 


and  Senior  Director  for  European  and  Soviet 
Affairs  at  the  National  Secui'ity  Council. 

Mr.  Ledsky 's  appointment  underlines  our 
continued  commitment  to  the  search  for  a 
Cyprus  settlement.  He  met  with  the  Secretary 
General  and  the  leaders  of  the  two  com- 
munities on  the  mai'gins  of  their  June  28-29 
meetings  in  New  York.  During  early  August, 
Mr.  Ledsky  consulted  key  authorities  in 
Ankara,  Athens,  Nicosia,  and  London.  He 
urged  that  all  support  fully  the  U.N.'s  efforts 
to  continue  the  intercommunal  talks,  and,  to 
that  end,  he  has  worked  directly  with  the  staff 
of  the  Secretary  General  during  the  first  part 
of  September  in  an  effort  to  reschedule  the 
talks. 

Sincerely, 

George  Bush 


'  Identical  letters  addi'essed  to  Thomas  S. 
Foley,  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives, and  Claiborne  Pell,  chaii-man  of  the 
Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee  (text 
from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Docu- 
ments of  Sept.  25, 1989).  ■ 


President's  Meeting  With  Cyprus  President 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
OCT.  4, 19891 


The  President  met  this  afternoon  with 
Cypriot  President  George  Vassiliou.  The 
two  leaders  discussed  a  number  of  issues 
relating  to  efforts  to  bring  a  peaceful  solu- 
tion to  the  Cyprus  dispute. 


The  President  reaffii-med  our  sup- 
port for  the  negotiations  under  the 
auspices  of  the  United  Nations  and  ex- 
pressed his  hope  that  the  talks  will  be 
resumed  at  the  earUest  possible  date.  The 
President  noted  that  the  negotiations 
were  not  an  end  to  themselves  but  a 
means  to  a  peaceful  solution  to  the  dis- 
pute. 

Also  present  at  the  meeting  were 
Secretai-y  of  State  James  Baker,  Chief  of 
Staff  John  Sununu,  national  security  ad- 
viser Brent  Scowcroft,  Special  Cyprus 
Negotiator  Nelson  Ledsky,  Cyriot 
Foreign  Minister  George  lacovou,  and 
Ambassador  [to  the  United  States] 
Michael  Sherifis.  The  meeting  began  at  2 
p.m.  and  lasted  approximately  40  minutes. 


'  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Oct.  9, 1989.1 


41 


EUROPE 


Visit  of  Italian  President 


President  Francesco  Cossiga  of  the 
Italian  Republic  made  a  state  visit  to  the 
United  States  October  10-17, 1989,  to 
meet  with  President  Bush  and  other 
government  officials. 

Following  are  remarks  made  by  the 
two  Presidents  at  tlw  welcoming 
ceremony  on  October  11} 

President  Bush 

Mr.  President  and  distinguished  members 
of  the  Italian  delegation,  good  morning, 
and  a  wai-m,  hearty  welcome  to  the 
White  House. 

When  your  visit  was  being  planned,  I 
suggested  we  invite  a  few  friends  of  Italy 
to  gi-eet  you.  We  discovered  that  finding 
friends  of  Italy  here  in  America  is  like 
finding  fine  art  in  Florence  or  canals  in 
Venice;  they're  all  ai'ound  us.  And  Bar- 
bara and  I  are  just  delighted  to  have  this 
opportunity  to  retui-n  the  wann 
hospitality  that  we  received  in  Rome  ear-- 
lier  this  year.  Italy  was  my  first  stop  on 
my  first  visit  to  Europe  as  President,  en 
route  to  a  critical  and  ultimately  highly 
successful  NATO  summit.  And  I'll  always 
remember  that  the  road  to  continued  al- 
liance unity  began  in  Rome. 

Our  two  countries  are  linked  in  many 
ways,  by  ties  of  fi'iendship  and  the  bonds 
of  family.  And  on  this  past  Memorial  Day 
weekend,  I  paid  a  visit  to  the  cemetery  at 
Nettuno,  on  the  coast  south  of  Rome,  to 


42 


honor  the  thousands  of  American  sol- 
diers— many  of  Italian  ancestiy — who 
gave  their  lives  to  help  liberate  Italy. 

For  more  than  40  years,  Italy  and 
America  have  been  finends  and  allies,  fel- 
low members  of  the  family  of  free  na- 
tions. President  Cossiga  is  himself  a 
symbol  of  Italy's  democratic  renaissance, 
a  man  of  supreme  ability  and  integrity 
who  has  served  his  nation  in  more  posi- 
tions of  public  trust  than  we  have  time  to 
name.  I  am  particularly  pleased  that  the 
President  has  honored  us  wdth  a  visit  to 
America  on  the  eve  of  our  Columbus  Day. 
The  son  of  Genoa,  discoverer  of  the  New 
World  that  became  America,  is 
celebrated  here  in  our  country,  and 
thi-ough  the  tradition  of  Columbus  and 
the  gi'eat  explorers  Uve  on. 

Soon,  aboard  the  space  shuttle  Atlan- 
tis, a  space  probe  begins  its  6-year 
voyage  to  the  planet  Jupiter.  Galileo — a 
mission  across  the  millions  of  miles  of 
space  to  the  moons  the  famed  astronomer 
discovered  over  three  centuries  ago — 
Galileo  is  just  one  element  in  a  very  excit- 
ing, very  ambitious  space  program.  I 
know  that  the  Vice  President,  Dan 
Quayle,  who  is  doing  a  tremendous  job  as 
Chaii-man  of  our  National  Space  Council, 
agi'ees  wdth  me  that  every  voyage  into 
space  is  a  voyage  into  oiu-  futui-e. 

Italy,  too,  is  active  in  the  new  woi'ld 
of  space  exploration.  After  his  meetings 
here.  President  Cossiga  will  visit  my 


hometown  of  Houston  and  the  Johnson 
Space  Center.  He's  going  to  hear 
firsthand  how  much  the  United  States 
values  its  partnership  with  the  Italian 
space  agency,  a  partnership  that's  going 
to  be  built  to  result  in  the  flight  of  the 
first  Italian  astronaut  aboard  one  of  our 
space  shuttle  missions  in  1991. 

In  just  a  few  minutes,  the  President 
and  I  wall  move  inside  to  begin  our  discus 
sions.  Both  of  us  have  been  to  Poland  this 
year.  We'll  discuss  the  momentous  chang- 
es taking  place  in  Eastern  Europe  and 
the  progress  we've  made  in  developing 
concerted  Western  action  to  support 
movement  toward  democracy  there.  Of 
course  we'll  talk  about  developments 

,  within  the  Soviet  Union  and  our  deter- 
mination to  continue  pushing  foi-ward 

,  with  NATO's  call  for  the  early  conclusion 
of  a  conventional  arms  reduction,  agi'ee- 
ment  wdth  the  Warsaw  Pact.  We  vnll  also 
discuss  other  issues  of  mutual  concern: 
the  war  on  drugs  that  we're  waging  here 
in  the  United  States,  and  Italy's  crack- 
down on  organized  crime,  narcotics  traf- 
ficking, and  drug  abuse. 

We'll  discuss  alliance  issues  and  the 
need  for  unity  that  is  critical  today  when' 
tensions  are  easing,  but  the  threat  to 
peace  and  freedom  still  exists.  I  look  for- 
ward to  a  productive  meeting,  a  meeting 
of  the  mind  and  heait  that  takes  place  be^ 
tween  fi-iends,  takes  place  between  alUes 

President  Cossiga,  welcome,  sir.  I 
wish  you  and  your  distinguished  col- 
leagues a  pleasant  and  productive  visit  tc 
our  countiy.  There  are  few  nations  whers 
the  ties  are  so  strong,  the  affection  so 
genuine  and  mutual,  than  between  our 
two  countries.  I  know  that  here  and  on 
the  rest  of  yoiu-  travels,  you  will  find 
America  welcomes  you  with  open  arms. 
Thank  you,  and  God  bless  you.  God  bless 
the  United  States  of  America  and  the 
Republic  of  Italy.  Welcome  to  the  White 
House. 

President  Cossiga 

I  am  most  gi-ateful  to  you  for  your  warm 
words  of  welcome.  It  is  a  great  pleasure 
for  me  to  be  in  this  gi-eat  country  with 
which  Italy  has  ancient  and  solid  ties  of 
friendship  and  alliance,  as  the  result  of  a 
choice  that  is  shared  by  the  whole  of  the 
Italian  people,  as  the  expression  of  a  com 
mon  desire  for  peace  and  of  common 
values  of  freedom  and  democracy. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  1 98 


EUROPE 


After  40  years  of  histoi-y  marked  by 
infrontation  between  the  East  and  the 
'est,  we  are  witnessing  gi-eat  changes  oc- 
rring  worldwide,  events  that  are  full  of 
'omise  and  that  strike  the  imagination 
our  peoples.  The  changes  in  the  dii-ec- 
)n  of  democracy  which  are  taking  place 
the  Soviet  Union,  Poland,  and  Hun- 
iry  are  developments  that  would  have 
sen  unthinkable  even  a  very  short  time 
;o.  In  this  new  climate,  it  is  becoming 
issible  to  act  with  realism  but  wdth  weU- 
ounded  confidence  to  restore  that 
lole  and  free  Europe  of  which  you,  Mr. 
•esident,  have  spoken  with  such  vision 
id  insight. 

The  West  has  the  historic  duty  to 
ntribute  to  us  making  this  difficult 
ocess  successful,  giving  generously  of 
I  farsighted  support  and  its  financial  as- 
;tance.  I'm  thinking  in  particular  of  the 
eat  Polish  nation  that  is  currently  in 
e  throes  of  serious  difficulties  in  its 
urageous  attempt  to  work  its  renewal 
d  which  needs  more  substantial  aid 
)mus. 

Italy  identifies  a  specific  role  at 
)me  and  is  ready  to  take  on  direct 
isponsibilities  in  creating  a  new  relation- 
dp  vkith  Eastern  Europe,  in  particular 
ith  the  countries  of  the  opposite  shores 
the  Adriatic  and  over  the  Alps,  which 
not  divide  but  unite  the  peoples  in  the 
anube  Basin.  This  is  a  demanding  mis- 
3n  which  Italy  intends  to  pursue  vidth 
le  aim  of  contributing  toward  overcom- 
g  the  political  tensions  and  the 
Gnomic  difficulties  in  the  southern  part 
'central  Europe,  which,  if  not  kept  at 
ly,  might  lead  to  upheavals  and 
.ngerous  tendencies  toward  disintegra- 
Dn. 

For  both  geographical  and  historical 
asons,  Italy's  policy  toward  the  Middle 
ast  and  the  Mediterranean  area  is  im- 
led  with  the  same  concern.  In  these 
•eas,  we  should  work  not  only  to  settle 
le  grievous  conflicts  which  are  still 
;ing  waged  but  also  to  prevent  the 
ionomic  and  demographic  imbalances 
cm  worsening  and  threatening  the 
rability  of  the  whole  area. 

In  relation  to  the  fiiendly  sister  na- 
ons  of  Latin  America,  too,  Italy  views 
3  aid  policy  as  a  means  not  only  of  assist- 
g  their  economic  development  but  also 
restoring  or  consolidating  fi'ee  and 
jmocratic  systems. 

We  are  the  witnesses  to  a  new  and 
ajor  turning  point  in  history.  A  decade 
hich  opened  under  the  cloud  of  con- 
ision  and  uncertainty  is  about  to  end 
ader  the  sign  of  hope — a  decade  whose 
jginning  was  marked  by  difficult  and 
linful  decisions  on  the  part  of  those 


Italy— A  Profile 


Geography 

Areas:  301,225  sq.  km.  (116,303  sq  mi.);  about 
the  size  of  Georgia  and  Florida  combined. 
Cities:  Capital — Rome  (pop.  2.8  million). 
Other  cities — Milan,  Naples,  Tui-in.  Terrain: 
Mostly  nigged  and  mountainous.  Climate: 
Generally  mild  Mediterranean;  cold  northern 
winters. 

People 

Nationality:  Nmui  and  adjective — Italian(s). 
Population  (mid-1988):  57.4  million.  Annual 
growth  rate  (1988):  0.2%.  Ethnic  groups: 

Primarily  Italian,  but  small  groups  of  Gemian-, 
French-,  Slovene-,  and  Albanian-ItaHans. 
Religion:  Roman  Catholic.  Language: 
Italian.  Education:  Years  compulsory — 8. 
Literacy— 98%.  Health:  Infant  mortality  rate 
(1987)— 9.611.000  live  births.  Life  expectancy— 
73  yrs.  Workforce  (1988, 24  million;  employed 
21.1  million):  Agnculture — 10%.  Industry  and 
commerce — 32%.  Services — 58%. 

Government 

Type:  Republic  since  June  2, 1946. 
Constitution:  January  1, 1948.  Kingdom  of 
Italy  proclaimed  March  17, 1861. 

Branches:  Executive — president  (chief 
of  state),  Council  of  Ministers  (cabinet), 
headed  by  the  president  of  the  cou?wil  (prime 
minister).  Legislative — bicameral  parliament; 
630-member  Chamber  of  Deputies,  322-mem- 
ber  Senate.  -Judicial — independent  constitu- 
tional court  and  lower  magistracy. 

Subdivisions:  94  provinces,  20  regions. 

Political  parties:  Chi'istian  Democratic 
(DC),  Italian  Communist  Party  (PCI),  Italian 
Socialist  Party  (PSI),  Italian  Social  Movement 
(MSI),  Italian  Social  Democratic  Party  (PSDI), 


Italian  Republic  Party  (PRI),  Italian  Liberal 
Party  (PLI).  Suffrage:  Universal  over  18. 
Defense:  (1988*):  2.1%  of  GDP 
Flag:  Three  vertical  bands — gi-een,  white, 
and  red. 

Economy 

GDP  (1988*):  $825.6  billion.  Per  capita  in- 
come (1988*):  $14,383.  Avg.  inflation  rate 
(last  4  yrs.):  6%.  Annual  GDP  growth:  3.9%. 

Natural  resources:  Fish,  natural  gas. 

Agriculture:  Products — ivheat,  rice, 
grapes,  olives,  citrus  fruits. 

Industry:  Types — automobiles, 
machinery,  chemicals,  textiles,  shoes. 

Trade  (1988*):  E.rpoHs  (f.o.b.)— $128.4  bil- 
lion: machinery  and  transport  equipment,  tex- 
tiles, foodstuffs,  chemicals,  footwear.  Imports 
(c.i.f.) — $138.3  billion:  machinery  and  transport 
equipment,  foodstuffs,  feiTous  and  nonferrous 
metals,  wool,  cotton,  petroleum.  Major  trade 
partners  (1988*)— F.R.G.  20%,  France  16%, 
U.K.  7%,  U.S.  7%,  U.S.S.R.  2%-,  OPEC  5%. 

Exchange  rates  (1988,  fluctuates)  1,302 
lire=U.S.$l. 

Membership  in 
International  Organizations 

UN  and  some  of  its  specialized  and  related 
agencies,  NATO,  Organization  for  Economic 
Cooperation  and  Development  (OECD), 
European  Community  (EC),  Western 
European  Union,  Council  of  Europe,  INTEL- 
SAT. 


*1988  figures  are  estimates.  Taken  from 
the  Background  Notes  of  May  1989,  published 
by  the  Bureau  of  Public  Affairs,  Depaitment  of 
State.  Editor:  Juanita  Adams.  ■ 


vested  with  the  responsibilities  of  govern- 
ment. But  those  decisions  have  con- 
tributed, as  indeed  they  were  designed 
to,  toward  strengthening  peace  and  open- 
ing up  encom-aging  prospects  for  recon- 
ciliation and  dialogue.  It  is  our  duty  today 
to  look  ahead  to  the  futui'e,  indeed,  to 
build  up  that  future  by  taking  the  initia- 
tive with  determination  and,  at  the  same 
time,  to  consolidate  the  foimdations  of 
what  we  had  already  constructed:  the 
edifice  of  the  alliance  among  the  free  na- 
tions of  the  West. 

In  Italy  we  hstened  with  great  inter- 
est to  the  reference  you  made  last  May  to 
the  common  values  which  constitute  the 
veiy  mortar  that  binds  the  United  States 
to  Em'ope  and  the  basis  of  our  defense  al- 
liance, which  for  over  40  years  has  helped 
to  keep  peace.  At  a  time  when  it  is 
precisely  these  values  that  are  winning 
thi'ough,  even  outside  the  alliance,  we 
must  confiim  with  even  gi-eater  forceful- 


ness  and  conviction  our  commitment  to 
fostering  them.  Together  we  must  con- 
tinue to  close  ranks  on  the  side  of 
freedom  and  justice,  human  rights  and 
the  peaceful  progress  of  all  peoples,  par- 
ticularly by  bridging  the  gap  between 
North  and  South.  Together  we  must  ex- 
tend a  hand  of  fi-iendship  to  the  peoples 
who  are  still  deprived  of  the  benefits  of 
economic  development.  The  more  closely 
united  Europe  of  tomorrow  is  ready  to 
take  up  these  challenges  in  a  spirit  of 
open  cooperation  with  the  United  States 
and  the  conviction  that  entrenchment  is 
incompatible  with  progress;  entrench- 
ment is  incompatible  with  prosperity. 
Scientific  progress  and  economic 
growth  ai-e  the  indispensable  precondi- 
tions for  e.xtending  development  to  all 
sections  of  society  and  to  all  the  regions 
of  the  world.  Moreover,  we  ai'e  convinced 
that  teclmological  and  industrial  develop- 
ment, which  is  the  expression  of  the  iire- 


epartment  of  State  Bulletin/December  1989 


43 


EUROPE 


versible  progress  of  mankind,  is  not 
incompatible  with  environmental  protec- 
tion and  respect  for  nature.  However,  we 
must  do  all  we  can  to  seek  to  strike  a  just 
balance  which  will  demand  imagination, 
political  courage,  and  above  all  the 
cooperation  of  evei-yone. 

I  am  particularly  happy  to  make  this 
visit  because  I'm  certain  that  we  will  be 
able  to  fui'thei-  strengthen  our  two 
countries'  bilateral  relations,  that  ah-eady 
constitute  a  tightly  interwoven  network 
in  the  ai-eas  of  the  economy,  culture, 
science,  and  combating  the  scourge  of 
crime  and  diaig  trafficking.  It  is  only  by 
continuing  to  closely  coordinate  our  ef- 
forts that  we  shall  be  in  a  position  to 
defeat  the  tremendous  threat  looming 
over  our  societies  because  of  drugs. 

Common  values,  common  interests, 
common  duties — these  form  the  soUd  and 
concrete  basis  of  relations  between  Italy 
and  the  United  States  on  which  we  have 
to  work  together.  I  trust  that  my  visit, 
which  is  so  important  and  so  welcome  to 
me,  may  constitute  a  significant  step  for- 
ward in  this  new  dynamic  and  mutually 
enriching  process. 

God  bless  you,  Mr.  President.  God 
bless  the  United  States  of  America.  God 
bless  Italy. 


President  Meets  With 
NATO  Secretary  General 


'  Held  at  the  South  Portico  of  the  White 
House,  where  President  Cossiga  was  accorded 
a  formal  welcome  with  full  militai-y  honors 
(text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  Oct.  16, 1989).  ■ 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
OCT.  11, 1989' 

The  President  met  this  afternoon  with 
NATO  Secretaiy  General  Manft-ed 
Woerner.  The  two  leaders  discussed  a 
variety  of  alliance  issues  and  develop- 
ments in  Eastern  Europe.  The  President 
complimented  the  Secretary  General  on 
his  leadership  at  the  May  NATO  summit 
and  noted  that  the  summit  declaration 
was  designed  to  chart  a  new  course  for 
NATO  in  a  period  of  change  in  the  East- 
West  relations,  giving  the  alliance  the 
mission  of  working  to  overcome  the 
division  of  Europe.  The  President  e.\- 
pressed  his  strong  commitment  to  sup- 
porting the  process  of  economic  and 
poHtical  refoiTns  in  Poland  and  Hungary. 

The  President  and  the  Secretary 
General  also  discussed  the  ongoing  CFE 


'I 


[conventional  arined  forces  in  Europe] 
negotiations  and  the  importance  of  sus- 
taining the  momentum  created  by 
NATO's  recent  tabhng  of  its  proposals. 
They  reaffii-med  the  commitment  to  an  ai 
celerated  timetable  for  reaching  a  CFE 
agreement  within  6-12  months. 

The  meeting  began  at  2  p.m.  and 
lasted  30  minutes.  Also  present  were 
Secretaiy  of  State  James  Baker,  Chief  oi 
Staff  John  Sununu,  national  security  ad- 
viser Brent  Scowcroft,  U.S.  Permanent 
Representative  to  NATO  William  Taft, 
and  Deputy  Assistant  Secretaiy  Gener; 
Robert  Pearson.  Following  the  meeting 
with  the  President,  the  Secretary 
General  met  with  Vice  President  Quayle 
for  15  minutes. 


'  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Oct.  16, 1989.1 


44 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  198! 


s 


w 


il, 


IDDLE  EAST 


^resident  Meets  With  Egyptian  President 


Secretary  Baker  held  a  ixews  hriefing 
t  the  White  House  on  October  2, 1989} 

resident  Bush  and  President  Mubai-ak 
ave  just  finished  a  productive  45-minute 
iscussion  on  a  wide  range  of  issues.  In- 
vitably,  of  coui'se,  the  discussion  focused 
n  the  Middle  East  peace  process.  I  think 
's  fair  to  say  that  we  all  hope  that  condi- 
(His  exist  for  progi'ess  and  that  the  Is- 
leli  ( lovernment's  elections  initiative 
oiiits  the  way. 

Rather  than  go  any  further  with 
aspect  to  a  statement,  I'd  be  dehghted 
1  ti-y  and  respond  to  your  questions. 

Q.  One  of  the  Egyptian  10 
oints  involves  a  freeze  on  further 
sraeli  settlements  in  the  occupied 
?rri lories.  Does  the  United  States 
upport  that? 

A.  The  United  States  supports  the 
\itiation  of  a  dialogue.  We've  said  for  a 
■ng  time  we  don't  think  we'll  get  to 
?ace  until  we  have  Palestinians  and  Is- 
lelis  speaking  to  each  other.  We've  made 
i\e  point  over  the  course  of  the  past 
1,'veral  weeks  that  the  Egyptian  10 
jints  do  not  represent,  in  our  view,  a 
impeting  proposal  to  the  Shamir-  elec- 
ins  initiative. 

President  Mubarak  indicated  today 
lat  in  his  view,  it  does  not  represent  a 
)mi)eting  proposal.  They  represent  a 
eans  of  getting  a  dialogue  established. 
D  I  don't  think  it's  productive  for  us  to 
t  here  and  go  through  one-by-one  the  10 
Dints.  There  are  some  of  those,  of 
)urse,  that  we  agree  with,  some  that  we 
lay  not  agree  with. 

Q.  As  a  matter  of  policy,  do  you 
'ant  the  Shamir  government  to 
ike  those  10  points  and  say  yes? 

A.  What  we  would  like  to  see  hap- 
en,  of  course,  is  for  the  Israeli  Cabinet — 
I'hich  I  understand  is  going  to  be 
leeting  on  Thursday — to  conclude  that 
ley  would  like  to  go  forward  with  discus- 
ions  respecting  a  dialogue  between  Is- 
lelis  and  Palestinians  that  could  lead  to 
lections;  that  it  lead  to  the  implementa- 
on  of  their  proposal. 

Q.  Yes,  but  on  the  terms  that 
Ir.  Mubarak  says,  namely  wath 
'alestinians  outside  the  territory? 

A.  It's  not  an  either-or  you  see.  What 
resident  Mubarak  is  suggesting  is  that 
lese  might  be  the  terms  that  Pales- 
nians  would  take  to  the  table  as  their 
peiiing  position  when  they  come  to  the 


table  to  talk  about  elections  and,  as  the 
Shamir  initiative  indicated,  transitional 
aiTangements  which  might  follow  elec- 
tions. 

Q.  Do  you  have  agreement  from 
[Palestine  Liberation  Organization 
(PLO)  leader]  Yasir  Arafat  that  he 
agrees  to  the  proposals? 

A.  I  don't  have  any  agreement  that 
he  agi'ees  to — 

Q.  Do  we  have  any — that  Arafat 
agrees  or  disagrees  with  the 
Mubarak  proposals? 

A.  I  don't  have  any  evidence  that  he 
agi'ees  or  disagrees. 

Q.  Is  the  United  States  suggest- 
ing an  Israeli-Egyptian  commission 
to  try  to  get  the  dialogue  going? 

A-  I'm  not  sure  you  could  call  it  a 
commission.  What  has  been  suggested  is 
the  possibihty  that  the  thi-ee  nations 
could,  in  some  way,  determine  the  Pales- 
tinian representation  with  respect  to  the 


dialogue.  That  would,  of  course,  give  Is- 
rael a  chop  on  the  representation  of  the 
people  in  the  occupied  territories  who 
would  be  representing  the  Palestinians. 

Q.  Have  you  had  any  indication 
yet,  one,  that  Yasir  Arafat  wants  to 
come  address  the  United  Nations, 
and  two,  what  would  you  and  the 
President  use  for  your  criteria  in 
deciding  on  whether  to  grant  such 
an  application? 

A.  The  second  is  piu-ely  hypothetical, 
because  we  haven't  had  any  indication  at 
all  from  him  that  he  wants  to  come  ad- 
dress the  United  Nations,  and  that's  a 
very  hypothetical  question.  We  don't 
have  it  before  us. 

Q.  Did  President  Mubarak  indi- 
cate in  any  way  that  the  PLO  was 
willing  to  accept  the  conditions  of 
his  10- point  plan? 

A.  He  did  not  indicate  that  expressly 
during  the  course  of  this  meeting  with 
President  Bush.  And  you're  going  to  have 
a  chance  to  ask  him  these  questions  out 
here.  I  would  suggest  you  direct  those 
questions  to  him.  I'm  answering  from  the 
standpoint  of  the  United  States. 

Q.  There's  a  report  today  that 
Israel  wants  the  United  States  to 
provide  money  to  assist  in  resettle- 
ment of  Soviet  Jews,  some  of  whom 
would  be  resettled  on  the  West 
Bank.  What  would  be  our  attitude 
toward  such  a  request,  and  would 
there  have  to  be  conditions  that 
they  could  not  be  settled  on  the 
West  Bank? 

A.  The  U.S.  policy,  of  course,  is  to  op- 
pose additional  settlements  in  the  oc- 
cupied territories.  Let  me  say  though, 
having  said  that,  that  we  are  very  sym- 
pathetic to  the  problems  of  those  who 
wish  to  emigi-ate  from  the  Soviet  Union. 
We,  of  coui'se,  will  be  accepting  more 
Soviet  Jews  as  refugees  into  the  United 
States  this  year  than  we  ever  have 
before,  and  the  United  States  would  be  in- 
terested in  seeing  Soviet  Jews  who  want 
to  go  to  Israel  go  to  Israel.  So  we  would 
be  sympathetic  in  general.  But  the  ques- 
tion of  where  we  would  find  $400  million 
is  a  very  good  question  in  this  day  of 
severe  budget  constraints. 

Q.  So  you're  saying  the  money 
isn't  there? 

A.  The  money  would  have  to  be 
found  if  this  were  something  that  we 
determined  should  go  into  oui"  budget  or 


epartment  of  State  Bulletin/December  1989 


45 


MIDDLE  EAST 


should  be  submitted  to  the  Congi-ess  in 
the  form  of  a  supplemental.  And  then,  all 
I'm  really  saying  to  you  is  that  we're  all 
aware  of  the  very  serious  budget  con- 
straints that  we  are  facing.  We  are  ad- 
dressing, for  instance,  the  question  of 
what  we  might  do  by  way  of  additional 
assistance  to  Poland  where  we  have  a 
rather  dramatic  transformation  taking 
place.  We  now  have,  instead  of  a  com- 
munist government  reforming,  we  have  a 
democratic  government  seeking  to  sur- 
vive. So  it  should  come  as  no  sui-prise 
that  we've  got  some  very  major  budget 
problems. 

Q.  Could  we  even  consider  fund- 
ing if  some  of  the  settlers  were 
going  to  be  resettled  in  the  West 
Bank? 

A.  I  think  I  indicated  to  you  our 
poKcy  would  be  contrary  on  that  point. 

Q.  Did  President  Mubarak 
bring  up  the  issue  of  the  world 
water  development  summit  that  he 
intends  to  host  next  summer? 

A.  That  did  not  come  up,  but  I  would 
expect  that  we  would  probably  talk  about 
that  at  the  lunch  that  I'm  going  to  host 
for  him  at  the  State  Department  as  soon 
as  we're  finished  here. 

Q.  It  is  said  that  one  of  the 
things  that  Mr.  Mubarak  sought 
here  was  some  sort  of  stamp  of  ap- 
proval from  the  President  of  the 
United  States  for  his  peace  plan,  to 
give  it  some  impetus.  Did  he  get 
that?  Do  you  have — 

A.  We  have  been  supportive  of  this 
process  for  quite  a  while,  because  we  see 
this  as  complementai-y  to  the  Israeli  elec- 
tions proposal.  We  see  the  Mubarak  10 
points  as  a  means  of  permitting  a 
dialogue  to  get  started  which  would 
enable  us  to  move  forward  with  a  Shamir 
elections  proposal.  And  I  frankly  believe 
that  that's  the  way  that  the  Egyptian 
Government  views  this  as  well.  But 
again,  you'll  have  an  opportunity  to  ask 
that  question  outside. 

Q.  Do  you  have  any  presiden- 
tial words  to  share  with  us  on  that 
score? 

A- 1  think  I  just  shared  it  with  you, 
that  we  do  support  this.  We're  very  ap- 
preciative of  what  President  Mubarak 
has  been  doing  to  move  the  peace  process 
forward  in  the  Middle  East.  It  is  quite 
consistent  with  what  we  think  is  the  ap- 
propriate approach,  which  is  to  try  and 
find  a  way  to  implement  the  Shamir  elec- 
tions proposal.  And  the  Mubarak  10 
points  represents  just  that,  in  our  view. 


Q.  Is  the  next  move,  then,  up  to 
the  Israelis?  And  how  optimistic 
are  you  that  that  will  happen  quick- 
ly? 

A.  I  think  I  mentioned  the  Israeli 
Cabinet  is  scheduled,  I  believe,  to  meet 
on  Thursday. 

Q.  And  you  think  they  will  give 
a  yes  or  no — 

A.  I  would  rather  not  prejudge  it.  I 
think  that  they  are  going  to  be  meeting 
to  consider  this  because  it's  important  to 
them.  No  one  wants  peace  more  than  Is- 
rael. That's  a  point  that  they  make  in  all 
of  these  discussions,  and  one  that  I  think 
most  everyone  accepts. 

Q.  With  a  cease-fire  now  in 
Lebanon,  is  the  United  States 
prepared  to  reoccupy  its  Embassy 
in  Beirut? 

A.  We  ai'e  having  discussions  about 
the  possibility  of  that.  We  said  when  we 
left  that  it  was  a  temporary  departure, 
and  we'd  like  to  get  back  just  as  soon  as 
two  things  happen;  that  we  felt  we  could 
do  our  work  there  and  that  we  felt  that 
our  people  would  be  secure. 

Q.  And  who  are  you  discussing 
this  with — Gen.  Awn  [Christian- 
backed  leader]? 

A.  We  ai'e  having  discussions.  We've 
had  some  discussions  with  people  in 


Lebanon.  We  are  ha\ang  discussions  as 
well  with  the  Lebanese  Ambassador  hen 
in  the  United  States. 

Q.  The  Middle  East,  the  peace 
process — it  seems  almost  endless 
and  there  always  seems  to  be  rela- 
tively little  progress  made.  Do  you 
have  any  reason  this  time  to  have 
any  reason  for  optimism? 

A.  What  I  said  in  New  York, 
Thursday  or  Friday,  I  think,  was  that 
there  may  be  the  potential  for  progress 
here.  That's  exactly  the  way  I  would 
leave  it.  And  I  think  that  it  is  possible.  I 
think  it's  too  early  to  say  it's  probable. 

Q.  Can  you  tell  us  to  what  ex- 
tent the  United  States  is  asking  Mr 
Shamir  to  take  Mubarak's 
proposals  and  move  forward? 

A.  I  met  with  [Israeli  Foreign]  Minis 
ter  Arens  in  New  York  twice,  once  alone 
and  once  again  with  the  Foreign  Ministe: 
of  Egypt.  The  President  saw  [Foreign] 
Minister  Ai'ens.  I  talked  to  him  on  the 
phone  today.  We  would  like  very  much 
for  the  Shamir  elections  proposal  to  mov^ 
forward,  and  we  think  that  the  Egyptian 
10  points  affords  us  a  means  of  im- 
plementing the  Shamir  elections 
proposal.  So,  we're  encouraging  that. 
We'd  like  very  much  to  see  that  happen. 


5 


'  Press  release  181.1 


Agreement  on  Lebanese 
National  Reconciliation 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
OCT.  23, 19891 

The  United  States  warmly  welcomes  the 
news  that  the  Taif  conference  has 
reached  agi'eement.  Through  the 
courageous  efforts  of  the  Lebanese 
deputies  and  the  Ai"ab  League  Higher 
Committee,  Lebanon  has  a  unique  chance 
to  move  toward  ending  the  suffering  and 
violence  of  so  many  years.  We  extend  to 
the  deputies  and  Arab  League  committee 
our  sincere  congi-atulations. 

Lebanon  now  has  an  agreement  for 
national  reconciliation  reached  after 
much  careful  discussion,  debate,  and  com- 
promise by  one  of  Lebanon's  last  bodies 
with  unchallenged  legitimacy.  The  chal- 


lenge now  is  for  all  concerned  parties  to 
seize  tliis  extraordinary  opportunity  to 
consolidate  and  implement  what  has  beei 
achieved.  The  international  community 
should  take  appropriate  measures  to 
demonstrate  its  support  for  the  deputies 
and  what  they  have  accomplished. 

The  deputies  should  be  permitted  to 
continue  their  work  in  Lebanon  fi-ee  ft*on 
thi-eats  and  intimidation.  We  fully  sup- 
port the  continuation  of  the  process 
begun  by  the  Arab  League  committee 
and  deputies  in  Taif.  In  our  view,  this 
process  should  lead  to  a  sovereign  and 
unified  Lebanon  free  from  foreign  forces^ 


'  Read  to  news  correspondents  by  Depart 
ment  spokesman  Margaret  DeB.  Tutwiler.r 


46 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  198 


ERRORISM 


:ooperation  in  Countering  Terrorism 


''  Morris  D.  Busby 

Statement  before  the  Senate 
mernmental  Affairs  Committee  on 
iptember  11, 1989.  Ambassador  Busby 
I  Coordinator  for  Counterterrorism} 

'lank  you  for  the  opportunity  to  discuss 
te  terrorism  threat  facing  the  United 
iates  and  the  steps  the  executive 
ianch  is  taking  in  cooperation  with  the 
(mgi'ess  to  address  this  menace. 

As  your  previous  panel  has  already 
soken  on  the  international  threat,  I  will 
pvide  only  brief  introductory  remarks 
c  that  aspect  of  your  hearing.  Instead  I 
^11  concentrate  on  the  issues  of  interna- 
tnal  cooperation,  interagency  organiza- 
'  n,  and  executive  branch  management 
'  lich  you  and  Senator  Lieberman  raised 
i  v'our  letter  of  invitation. 

1  treat  Situation 

I  a  nation,  we  continue  to  be  reminded 
o;he  many  forms  of  the  international  ter- 
rism  threat.  A  few  days  before 
Cristmas  last  year,  there  was  the  bomb- 
i]  of  PanAm  #103.  In  August  there  were 
t;  callous  video  of  Lt.  Col.  Higgins  hang- 
'v  by  the  neck  and  death  threats  against 
h'.tage  Joseph  Cicippio.  Most  recently 
t;  re  has  been  a  reign  of  teixor  in  Colom- 
b  as  narco-traffickers  try  to  intimidate 
F;sident  Barco  into  backing  down  ft-om 
hi  decision  to  extradite  these  criminals. 

Too  often  people  suggest  that  ter- 
nism  is  just  an  American  problem  or  an 
Iiaeli  problem  or  a  British  problem  or  a 
piblem  only  for  the  people  of  Colombia, 
lit  is  wi'ong;  it  is  an  international  prob- 
l6i.  In  1988  international  terrorist  inci- 
lits  affected  the  citizens  and  property 
d:'9  nations  in  a  total  of  68  countries 
tloughout  the  world.  A  single  incident 
C!  kill  or  maim  victims  fi'om  many  na- 
tiis.  The  bombing  of  PanAm  #103,  for 
e;imple,  killed  citizens  of  nearly  20  dif- 
Fent  nations. 

Terrorists  cooperate  with  each  other, 
(^apons  are  shared;  safehouses  are  used 
t>;terrorists  from  more  than  one  group; 
tl  latest  technology  for  bombs  spreads 
q  ckly  throughout  the  international  ter- 
r  ist  network;  travel  documents  stolen 
i)  >ne  area  of  the  world  are  used  by  ter- 
r  ists  thousands  of  miles  away. 

The  best  strategy  for  deahng  wdth 
t'l-orism — be  it  in  the  United  States  or 
■  oad — is  for  the  nations  of  the  world  to 


cooperate  in  fighting  against  the  ter- 
rorists. We  must  make  common  cause  and 
work  together  to  ensure  that  teiTorists 
are  arrested,  extradited,  tried,  and 
severely  punished  for  theii-  crimes. 
Above  all,  nations  must  stand  together  in 
dealing  with  countries  that  support  ter- 
rorism, where  possible  to  convince  those 
countries  to  abandon  their  support  for 
terrorism  and,  where  this  is  not  possible, 
to  apply  sanctions  or  other  appropriate 
measui'es  as  incentives  to  change  their  be- 
havior and  to  reduce  their  capacity  to  sup- 
port terrorist  acts. 

International  Cooperation 

The  very  nature  of  terrorism  requires 
that  the  defense  against  terrorism  be  in- 
ternational in  scope.  Terrorists  often 
operate  in  small  cells  with  rigorous 
security.  They  may  rely  on  couriers  in- 
stead of  electronic  communications.  Ter- 
rorists will  strike  across  international 
frontiers  in  pursuit  of  a  target,  and 
groups  of  different  nationahties  wall  train 
vwth  each  other. 

Improving  international  coopera- 
tion— not  just  between  the  United  States 
and  its  traditional  allies  but  also  with 
other  nations — must  be  one  of  the 
primary  elements  in  any  effective 
strategy  for  containing  and  deterring  ter- 
rorist attacks.  We  must  and  do  work  with 
other  governments  to  collect  intelligence 
on  terrorist  organizations.  We  exchange 
thi'eat  information  as  appropriate.  Law 
enforcement  personnel  must  continue  to 
work  with  theii-  colleagues  from  other  na- 
tions in  the  laborious  process  of  identify- 
ing, apprehending,  and  prosecuting 
terrorists.  In  short,  collective  efforts 
among  law-abiding  nations  are  needed  to 
maximize  the  economic  and  political  sanc- 
tions against  states  that  assist  teiTorists. 

The  United  States  is  in  the  forefront 
of  the  international  commimity's  efforts 
to  develop  and  implement  successful 
countermeasures  to  terrorism.  We  dis- 
cuss terrorism  on  a  bilateral  basis 
regularly  with  a  number  of  countries  and, 
when  appropriate,  exchange  sensitive  in- 
telligence and  analyses.  We  work  through 
both  bilateral  channels  and  multilateral 
organizations  to  strengthen  international 
pohcies  on  aviation  and  maritime 
security.  With  several  nations,  we  coor- 
dinate our  respective  training  and  assist- 
ance programs  to  learn  from  each  other 
and  to  minimize  duplication.  With  some 
governments,  our  own  counterterrorism 
units  actually  "cross-train"  to  exchange 


tactical  information  and  techniques  which 
help  each  nation  to  pi-epare  itself  better 
to  respond  to  a  terrorist  incident. 

But  there  are  minuses  as  well  as 
pluses.  While  there  are  fewer  and  fewer 
states  that  do  not  cooperate  on 
counterteiTorism  measures,  we  still  do 
not  have  a  sohd  front.  While  some 
countries  are  willing  to  take  a  tough 
stand,  others  are  more  equivocal.  As  we 
approach  the  1990s,  we  need  to  make  it 
clear  to  countries  supporting  teiTorism 
that  their  relationships  with  the  rest  of 
the  world  are  at  risk  if  they  do  not  stop. 
Just  as  terrorism's  victims  come  fi-om 
countries  all  over  the  world,  so  must  the 
response  be  multinational.  Unfortunately 
we  are  not  yet  there.  Commercial  inter- 
ests, political  agendas,  including  mis- 
guided notions  of  how  to  show  sympathy 
with  certain  causes,  and  differences  over 
strategy  and  tactics  continue  to  prevent 
international  cooperation  from  reaching 
the  level  essential  for  deahng  effectively 
with  this  threat. 

We  also  work  in  the  United  Nations 
and  other  international  organizations  to 
get  our  message  across  and  to  press  our 
position  that  terrorism  is  an  unacceptable 
tactic,  regai'dless  of  the  motivation.  It  is 
not  always  easy,  especially  in  the  United 
Nations  where  there  can  be  prolonged 
disputes  over  words  in  resolutions.  The 
UN  Security  Council  recently  passed  a 
resolution  calling  for  the  release  of  all  the 
hostages,  a  step  we  welcomed. 

We  have  had  good  success  in  the  UN 
specialized  agencies,  such  as  the  Interna- 
tional Civil  Aviation  Organization  (ICAO) 
and  the  International  Maiitime  Organiza- 
tion (IMO).  At  ICAO,  the  main  forum  for 
efforts  to  improve  international  civil  avia- 
tion standards,  a  new  international  con- 
vention was  drafted  last  year  on  airport 
security.  ICAO  is  also  considering  addi- 
tional international  civil  aviation  stand- 
ards to  help  prevent  another  PanAm 
#103  type  incident.  IMO  became  con- 
cerned about  maritime  terrorism  in  the 
aftermath  of  the  Achille  Lauro  shipjack- 
ing  and,  in  response,  developed  a  conven- 
tion on  maritime  security.  Both  of  these 
protocols  have  been  submitted  to  the 
Senate,  and  we  hope  you  and  your  col- 
leagues vnll  give  your  advice  and  consent 
to  these  treaties  this  year. 

In  addition  to  these  UN-affiliated 
organizations,  we  engage  other  forums  in 
multilateral  cooperation  against  ter- 
rorism. For  example,  the  United  States 
works  closely  vrith  our  alUes  through 


Cpartment  of  State  Bulletin/December  1989 


47 


TERRORISM 


gi'oupings,  such  as  the  summit  seven  of 
western  industrialized  nations  and  the 
European  Community  (EC).  We  have 
developed  a  good  working  relationship 
with  the  EC  "Ti-evi  gi'oup"  of  justice  and 
interior  ministers.  The  Attorney  General, 
the  director  of  the  FBI,  and  I  meet  with 
Trevi  ministers  when  they  hold  their 
semiannual  sessions.  The  European  Com- 
munity, after  some  hesitation,  played  an 
important  role,  for  example,  in  taking 
economic  and  diplomatic  steps  against 
Libya  and  Syria  in  1986  after  Libya  was 
implicated  in  the  Berlin  disco  bombing 
and  British  courts  found  that  Syrian  offi- 
cials were  responsible  for  an  unsuccessful 
effort  to  place  a  bomb  aboard  an  El  Al 
passenger  airliner  at  London's  Heathrow 
Airport. 

We  also  work  closely  with  other 
countries  both  in  sharing  information  to 
help  prevent  terrorist  attacks  and  in  in- 
vestigating attacks  that  have  taken  place. 
The  PanAm  #103  bombing,  for  example, 
has  touched  off  the  largest  international 
criminal  investigation  in  history,  involv- 
ing a  number  of  countries.  We  also 
cooperated  closely  vidth  West  German  offi- 
cials in  the  recent  case  that  resulted  in  a 
life  sentence  for  Mohammad  Hammadi 
for  his  role  in  the  hijacking  of  TWA  #847 
and  the  murder  of  a  U.S.  Navy  diver, 
Robert  Stethem. 

Besides  the  normal  diplomatic 
avenues  of  discussion  and  assistance  to  in- 
vestigators, the  Department  of  State 
provides  antiteiTorism  training  to 
security  officials  of  a  significant  number 
of  governments  throughout  the  world. 
Over  7,000  persons  from  more  than  50  na- 
tions have  participated  in  such  progi-ams 
in  the  last  5  years.  We  provide  training 
and  related  equipment  for  antiteiTorist 
measures  ranging  from  aviation  security 
and  crisis  management  to  the  technical 
specialties  of  postblast  investigation  and 
forensic  evidence  analysis.  This  program 
not  only  improves  technical  skills  but  also 
develops  contacts  and  working  relation- 
ships between  the  United  States  and  the 
participating  nations.  In  so  doing,  we  help 
foster  safety  both  for  our  Embassies  and 
other  overseas  facilities,  as  well  as  for  the 
American  business  and  private  com- 
munity abroad. 

A  final  area  of  effective  international 
cooperation  is  research  and  development 
of  new  equipment  to  counter  existing  and 
potential  teiTorist  capabilities.  The 
United  States  undertakes  such  reseai'ch 
itself  and  in  cooperation  with  several  al- 
lied countries.  Such  cooperation  is  essen- 
tial if  we  are  to  draw  upon  scientific  and 
manufacturing  expertise  to  counter  ter- 
rorist threats,  such  as  the  plastic  ex- 
plosives used  to  blow  up  PanAm  #103. 


48 


U.  S.  Government  Coordination 
and  Organization 

Just  as  working  with  other  governments 
is  a  major  element  of  our  counterter- 
rorism  efforts,  so  too  is  ensuring  that  the 
United  States  is  organized  and  ready  to 
respond  to  terrorist  incidents.  Over  the 
last  half  dozen  years,  and  particularly 
since  the  issuance  of  the  report  prepared 
by  then- Vice  President  Bush  in  1986,  ac- 
tions taken  within  the  executive  branch 
have  prepared  us  to  deal  more  effectively 
vrith  terrorism. 

The  State  Department  is  the  desig- 
nated lead  agency  in  dealing  with  interna- 
tional ten'orist  incidents  which  occur 
outside  U.S.  territories,  while  the  Depart- 
ment of  Justice  and  the  FBI  have  respon- 
sibility in  regard  to  terrorist  incidents 
which  take  place  within  U.S.  territory. 
Additional  resources  have  been  provided 
thi'oughout  the  government  to  improve 
our  capabOities  to  collect  and  assess  infor- 
mation on  terrorist  gi'oups  and  to 
respond  in  an  effective  and  coordinated 
way. 

Policy  oversight  and  management  of 
a  wide  variety  of  terrorism-related  issues 
is  coordinated  by  the  Department  of 
State  through  the  Policy  Coordinating 
Committee  on  Ten-orism.  I  chair  this 
gi'oup,  which  includes  representatives  at 
the  assistant  secretaiy  level  from  1 1  dif- 
ferent agencies  and  departments  having 
terrorism-related  responsibilities. 

We  have  a  well  developed  crisis 
management  structure  to  respond  to  ter- 
rorist events.  The  principal  departments 
and  agencies,  as  well  as  the  White  House, 
have  contingency  plans  and  hold  exer- 
cises regularly.  At  the  State  Department, 
for  example,  we  have  specific  procedui-es 
for  establishing  a  task  force  on  short 
notice  which  pulls  together  knowledge- 
able staff  from  thi'oughout  the  Depart- 
ment to  serve  as  the  focal  point  for 
handling  a  terrorist  incident.  The  task 
force  is  in  contact  with  the  crisis  teams  es- 
tablished at  the  White  House,  the  Pen- 
tagon, and  within  the  intelligence 
community  to  handle  the  terrorist  inci- 
dent. We  use  this  stiiicture  to  stay  in  con- 
stant touch  with  our  missions  overseas 
and  to  gathei'  information,  monitor  the 
situation,  coordinate  our  responses,  and 
prepare  for  oiu'  posts  abi'oad.  We  use  it  to 
develop  policy  options,  keep  in  touch  with 
the  immediate  families  of  terrorist  vic- 
tims, brief  the  Congi-ess,  and  interact 
with  the  media.  I  have  just  had  my  first 
experience  with  this  mechanism  as  head 
of  the  State  Department's  task  force  es- 
tablished during  the  recent  Lebanon 
hostage  crisis.  That  task  force  and  the 


persons  assigned  to  it  made  a  major  coni 
tribution  to  oiu-  comprehensive  responst 
to  this  incident. 

Finally,  although  I  don't  want  to  ge 
into  the  classified  aspects  of  our  work,  ^ 
do  have  specially  trained  teams  that  can 
assist  our  Embassies  in  responding  to  a 
terrorist  incident.  These  teams  can  play 
an  essential  role — based  on  their  ex- 
perience in  crisis  management  and  their 
understanding  of  U.S.  response 
capabilities — in  assisting  both  our  EmBs 
sy  and  foreign  governments  in  dealing 
with  a  terrorist  incident. 

Current  Issues 

This  brings  me  to  the  final  area  you  indi 
cated  you  would  like  me  to  discuss:  cur- 
rent issues  and  problems,  including 
intelligence  gatheiing.  It  is  difficult  to  d 
cuss  the  intelligence  aspects  of 
counterteiTorism  in  a  public  fonim.  but 
can  make  a  few  general  comments. 

Effective  counterterrorist  policy 
must  be  based  on  sound  principles  and  1 
consistent.  And  to  be  effective  and  an- 
ticipatory, it  must  be  intelligence-based: 
and  driven.  Simply  reacting  to  teiTorist 
incidents  as  they  occui-  is  not  enough.  W' 
need  successful  and  consistent  intel- 
ligence gathering  and  analysis  if  we  are 
to  have  any  prospect  of  preventing  ter- 
rorist operations. 

By  then-  veiy  nature,  teiTorist 
gi-oups  are  hard  to  penetrate  and  track. 
They  depend  on  surprise  and  secrecy  fo 
their  success.  Some  groups,  such  as  the 
Lebanon-based  Shi'a  Hizballah  gi-oup 
that  holds  American  hostages  in 
Lebanon,  present  special  problems.  The 
often  include  only  members  of  the  same 
extended  family,  which  makes  them  ex- 
tremely difficult  to  penetrate.  That  is  n« 
to  say  we  are  helpless.  Effective  cooper 
tion  among  intelligence  sei-vices  is  an  in 
portant  tool.  While  the  whole  picture  m' 
not  be  available  to  any  one  intelligence 
service,  effective  sharing — both  betwee 
intelligence  agencies  within  the  U.S. 
Government  as  well  as  with  our  allies- 
helps  to  piece  together  the  complex  puz 
zle  presented  by  terrorism. 

Another  important  undertaking  is 
developing  more  effective  mechanisms  i 
promote  "crosstalk"  between  law  enfon 
ment  and  intelligence  organizations.  Int 
ligence,  even  though  it  may  not  be  of 
evidentiai-y  value  in  a  court  of  law,  can 
help  guide  investigations.  And  informa-| 
tion  developed  during  legal  investiga- 
tions or  court  proceedings  can  provide 
invaluable  insights  for  the  intelligence 
analysts.  We  are  working  to  improve  th 
facet  of  our  cooperative  efforts.  I  under 
stand  that  the  Senate  already  has  voted 


TERRORISM 


request  a  repoit  from  the  executive 
•anch  on  the  situation,  and  I  beheve  it 
3uld  be  better  to  defer  to  that  process 
ther  than  go  into  detail  on  the  subject 
,this  public  hearing. 

Anothei-  cun-ent  problem  is  funding 
te  research  and  development  needed  to 
(unter  terrorist  tactics.  For  several 
;ai's,  the  State  Department  has  funded 
^.d  managed  a  national  counterterrorism 
iseai-ch  and  development  progi-am  to  fill 
isearch  gaps  identified  by  an  interagen- 
(  group  of  experts.  This  program 
]ovides  initial  seed  money — research 
id  development  funds — and  takes 
jojects  often  to  the  point  of  producing 
jototype  equipment,  where  they  can  be 
'anded  off  to  another  agency  that  can 
18  the  final  product  and  take  it  to  the 
11  ]mxluction  stage.  Research  projects 
(nvntly  undei-way  include  those  to  im- 
Dvc  om-  capabilities  to  detect  plastic  ex- 
I  isi\  es  and  to  help  deal  with  chemical 
i  d  biological  threats  that  teiTorists 
(.lid  pose  in  the  future. 

This  progi-am,  while  small,  is  funded 
1  the  Congi-ess  at  levels  well  below  the 
;pri)i_)riation  sought  by  the  President. 
]  r  example,  the  Administration  sought 
3  million  for  this  initiative  for  FY  1989. 
J  though  the  Congress  authorized  the 
f!  request,  the  Senate  "zero-funded" 
t  s  jirogram  in  the  Commerce,  Justice, 
;  I  State  appropriation  bill  last  year,  and 
i;he  conference  with  the  House,  the  re- 
E  irch  and  development  program 
r  -eived  only  $3  million.  I  am  concerned 
eDut  similar  possible  cuts  in  FY  1990 
Hiich  I  believe  would  be  contrary  to  the 
f  quently  expressed  statements  by 
riny  members  of  Congress  that  we  must 
c  more  to  deal  with  the  threat  posed  by 
t-rorism.  Here  is  a  case  where  a  limited 
i'estment  can  pay  enonnous  dividends 
iprotecting  American  lives.  The  types 
cdevices  being  developed  could  help 
fevent  future  tragedies  like  the  PanAm 
t33  bombing. 

A  final  area  where  action  is  impor- 
tit  is  in  improving  the  legal  tools  that 
V'  can  array  against  teiTorism.  We 
5'ongly  support  legislation  to  make  it 
I  )re  difficult  for  suspected  terrorists  to 
ft  visas  to  the  United  States  and  to  ex- 
lilite  deportation  of  those  who  do 
image  to  get  into  the  country. 

Another  area  of  related  concern  is 
t.'  financing  of  international  ten-orism. 
■'  nic  gToups,  such  as  the  Abu  Nidal  or- 
,  nization,  supplement  their  receipts 
f '111  state  sponsors  by  establishing  front 
I  iipanies  overseas  which  then  furnish 
th  cover  and  profits  to  support  ter- 
"ist  operations.  Closer  to  home,  we  are 
icerned  about  the  abihty  of  terrorists 


to  engage  in  fund-raising  or  other 
methods  for  raising  revenue  in  this 
country.  We  ai-e  exploring,  therefore, 
thi-ough  the  PoUcy  Coordinating  Commit- 
tee on  Terrorism  and  with  the  Justice 
Depai'tment,  possible  legislation  intended 
to  prohibit  the  flow  of  financial  assets  to 
terrorist  gi'oups.  We  hope  to  be  able  to 
consult  this  autumn  with  Membei-s  of 
Congi-ess  on  deaUng  with  these  potential 
legislative  mattei-s. 

In  conclusion  effectively  fighting  ter- 
rorism is  a  cooperative  effort,  both  inter- 
nationally and  within  the  U.S. 
Government.  There  ai-e  few  easy  solu- 
tions and  no  magic  answers.  Your  next 


panel,  I  understand,  will  discuss  policy  op- 
tions, and  I  won't  dwell  on  that  point.  For 
my  part,  I  would  like  to  close  emphasiz- 
ing that  we  must  be  persistent,  reahzing 
that  combatting  teiTorism  is  a  long-term 
effort.  And  we  must  work  together, 
vidthin  the  executive  branch,  with  the 
Congress,  and  with  other  like-minded  na- 
tions, to  defeat  the  scourge  of  internation- 
al teiTorism. 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Sendero  Luminoso: 
Peruvian  Terrorist  Group 


The  follomng  fact  sheet  and  chronol- 
ogy were  prepared  by  the  Office  of  the  Am- 
bassador at  Large  for  Counter-Terrorism 
and  made  available  on  October  5, 1989. 

Introduction 

Peru's  Sendero  Luminoso  (Shining  Path) 
is  an  extremely  dangerous  and  unpre- 
dictable terrorist  and  insurgency  group. 
Its  declared  aim  is  to  destroy  existing 
Pei-uvian  institutions  and  replace  them 
with  an  Indian-based  peasant  revolution- 
ary regime,  inspired  in  part  by  Mao 
Zedong's  Cultui-al  Revolution  in  China. 

Sendero  intimidates  the  populace  by 
executing — frequently  in  giiiesome 
ways — civilians  who  have  government 
ties  and  others  it  considers  ideological 
enemies.  It  aggi-essively  conducts  politi- 
cal indoctrinations  in  areas  it  controls 
and,  since  1987,  has  developed  ties  to  nar- 
cotic traffickers  and  to  the  peasant  coca 
growers  whom  it  seeks  to  protect.  Al- 
though initially  operating  as  a  gueirilla 
force  in  the  niral  ai-eas,  Sendero  has 
added  urban  terrorism  as  a  complement 
to  its  rui'al  "people's  war"  insurgency. 

Background 

Estimates  of  total  numbers  of  people 
killed  since  May  1980 — when  Sendero 
began  its  violent  campaign — reach  almost 
15,000,  with  nearly  2,000  killed  last  year. 
Sendero  began  as  a  movement  in  the 
late  1960s  at  the  National  University  at 
San  Cristobal  of  Huamanga  in  Ayacucho, 
a  colonial-era  provincial  capital  high  in 
the  Andes,  230  miles  southeast  of  Lima. 
Abimael  Guzman  Reynoso,  its  founder 


who  is  called  "President  Gonzalo"  by  his 
followers,  was  a  philosophy  professor  at 
the  university  and  a  leader  of  the  pro- 
Chinese  faction  within  Peru's  Communist 
Party.  In  1970  he  and  his  faction  took  the 
name  "Shining  Path  of  Jose  Carlos 
Mariategui,"  the  founder  of  the  Com- 
munist Party  in  Pem  in  the  1920s. 
Sendero  went  underground  in  1978  and,  2 
yeai-s  later,  launched  its  fii-st  violent  at- 
tack— on  a  iniral  polling  station  on  May 
17, 1980,  burning  all  the  ballot  boxes.  " 
Se7idero's  antidemocratic  nature  was  par- 
ticularly apparent  in  this  first  attack 
since  the  1980  election  marked  the  return 
to  civilian  mle  in  Peru  after  12  years  of 
military  dictatorehip. 

Estimates  of  the  number  o{  Sendero 
militants  range  up  to  5,000,  with  many 
more  supporters.  Although  Sendero 
focuses  its  appeal  on  the  disadvantaged 
ethnic  Indian  segment  of  Peru's  popula- 
tion, it  has  successftilly  recruited  among 
the  sons  and  daughters  of  the  middle  and 
upper  classes  as  well.  It  also  seeks  to 
reciiiit  13-15-year-olds  as  anned 
militants  since  they  can  be  more  easily 
propagandized  into  supporting  with  un- 
mitigating  violence  Sendero's  cause. 

Ideology 

Looking  to  Mao  Zedong  for  inspiration, 
Sendero  considers  its  philosophy  as  the 
fullest  development  of  "scientific  com- 
munist thought"  and  seeks  to  establish, 
through  violent  revolution,  a  "People's 
Republic  of  New  Democracy"  in  Peru.  It 
deeply  distrusts  Soviet  and  Cuban 
"revisionism"  and  has  dubbed  the  Soviets 
"social  imperialists."  Sendero  also  dis- 
tiTists  Nicaragua,  North  Korea,  and  vir- 


f'partment  of  State  Bulletin/December  1989 


49 


TERRORISM 


tually  all  other  communist  regimes.  It 
denounces  Deng  Xiaoping's  "revisionism" 
in  China,  viewing  instead  the  deposed 
"Gang  of  Four"  as  heroes  of  the  Cultural 
Revolution.  Sendero  leader  Guzman,  ac- 
cording to  documents  fi-om  the  group's 
fourth  plenum  of  the  Central  Committee, 
also  labeled  Libya's  Muammer  Qadhafi 
"a  fake." 

Sendero's  goal  is  to  destroy  not  only 
the  government  but  also  the  social  order. 
It  claims  to  champion  the  disadvantaged 
Indian  peasants  but  shows  no  remorse  in 
killing  those  who,  in  its  view,  display  a 
"petit  iiiral  bourgeoisie"  mentality. 
Sendero  also  implements  a  strict  moral 
code — including  no  smoking  or  drinking — 
and  despite  aiding  nai'cotic  traffickers 
and  coca  growers,  it  is  known  to  have  ex- 
ecuted those  under  its  control  found 
using  drugs  themselves. 

Strategy  and  Tactic 

Sendero  has  attempted  to  terrorize  the 
population  through  violence  and  has  mur- 
dered government  officials,  parliamen- 
tai'ians,  judges,  political  activists, 
journalists,  development  workers  (both 
foreign  and  native),  professors,  teachers, 
peasants,  and  occasionally  tourists.  In 

1988  alone,  it  killed  17  provincial  mayors. 
It  has  attacked  government  buildings  and 
foreign  embassies.  Following  the  shoot- 
ing of  two  pai'liamentary  deputies  in  May 

1989  (one  attack  apparently  criminally 
motivated),  over  20  parliamentaiy 
deputies  from  two  different  political  par- 
ties publicly  announced  that  they  had 
I'eceived  death  threats  or  attempts  on 
their  lives,  indicating  the  extent  to  which 
public  officials  have  been  threatened  by 
the  terrorist  violence. 

Rural  and  Urban.  Similar  to  Mao's 
doctinne  of  encircling  the  cities  fi'om  the 
countryside,  Sendero  sees  the  rural  areas 
as  the  principal  theater  for  its  armed  at- 
tacks. Urban  subversion  and  teworism, 
however,  have  become  increasingly  im- 
portant to  its  strategy.  In  a  July  1988  in- 
terview (the  first  the  secretive  Sendero 
leader  had  given  since  1979),  Guzman 
stated  that  Sendero  must  be  prepared  for 
what  he  characterized  as  the  "final  as- 
sault"— the  taking  of  the  cities.  Other 
documents  fi-om  early  1988  also  indicate 
that  Sendero  was  stressing  urban  subver- 
sion and  terrorism  as  a  complement  to  its 
rui'al  warfai'e. 

This  new  urban  emphasis,  however, 
was  dealt  a  severe,  but  not  crippling, 
blow  when  Osman  Morote  Barrionuevo, 
believed  to  be  Sendero's  second-in-com- 
mand, was  arrested  in  Lima  and  con- 
victed later  in  1988.  Other  recent 


50 


setbacks  were  the  eai'ly  August  ai-rests 
in  Lima  of  29  Sendero  members  which,  ac- 
cording to  the  Peruvian  Interior  Minister, 
dismantled  a  major  subversive  network, 
and  the  an-est  later  in  the  month  of 
Samuel  Vidal  Espinoza,  a  Sendero  leader 
who  was  charged  with  several  crimes,  in- 
cluding the  mui'der  of  Rodrigo  Franco,  a 
high-ranking  government  official. 

In  addition  to  terrorism,  Sendero's 
urban  strategy  includes  seeking  to  in- 
filtrate trade  unions,  student  organiza- 
tions, and  leftist  political  parties.  It  has 
also  been  responsible  for  armed  strikes  in 
several  niral  areas  in  1989  and  a  1-day 
general  strike  in  July  which  paralyzed 
transportation  in  much  of  Lima. 

Economic  Sabotage.  Sendero  also 
pursues  a  campaign  of  economic  sabotage 
and  in  1988  alone  was  responsible  for  los- 
ses estimated  as  high  as  $2.65  billion.  It  is 
responsible  for  numerous  blackouts  and 
brownouts  in  Lima  and  other  areas  of 
PeiTi  through  its  systematic  bombing  of 
electic  pylons.  This  campaign  culminated 
when  Sendero  blacked  out  Lima  as  well 
as  many  interior  departments  for  a  total 
of  21  days  during  the  month  of  August. 

Sendero  has  attacked  lairal  develop- 
ment programs,  killing  government  en- 
gineers who  were  working  to  upgrade 
rural  facilities.  Examples  included  the 
December  1987  attack  on  the  office  of  the 
government  irrigation  project  in 
Ayacucho,  in  which  it  killed  three  en- 
gineers, including  the  head  of  the  Cachi 
River  irrigation  project.  The  project, 
which  Sendero  had  vowed  to  block,  would 
irrigate  34,000  acres  of  fai-mland  and  pro- 
vide 25,000  kilowatts  of  electricity  to  the 
region.  In  June  1988,  Sendero  executed 
an  American  U.S.  Agency  for  Internation- 
al Development  (AID)  contract  employee 
and  a  Peruvian  colleague  neai-  Quicha 
Baja  who  were  working  on  a  local  agricul- 
tural project.  In  December  1988,  it  killed 
two  French  and  two  Peruvian  engineers 
working  on  a  rural  assistance  project  in 
the  south  central  Depailment  of 
Apurimac  and  also  that  month,  attacked  a 
development  project  run  by  the 
European  Economic  Community.  The 
EEC  recalled  its  aid  employees  because 
of  that  attack,  and  in  January  1989,  the 
Dutch  Government  withdrew  its  develop- 
ment workers  from  the  countryside  be- 
cause of  the  threat  of  Sendero  attacks. 

Although  these  development 
programs  would  aid  the  naral  populations 
whose  interests  Sendero  claims  to  defend, 
Sendero  attacks  them  in  order  to  under- 
mine the  established  government  and  to 
present  to  the  peasantry  no  hope  for  im- 
provement until  Sendero  authority  is  es- 
tablished. In  the  words  of  Guzman  quoted 


at  Sendero's  fourth  plenum  of  the  Centra' 
Committee,  "Oui-  policy  is  to  raze  to  the 
ground,  to  leave  nothing.. ..In  a  war,  what 
you  can't  use  or  cai-ry  off,  you  destroy, 
you  burn." 

Antielection  Campaign.  Sendero 
appears  to  have  launched  a  campaign 
against  the  upcoming  municipal  elections' 
in  November  and  the  general  elections  ii 
April  1990.  Dui'ing  the  summer  months, 
Sendero  terrorists  selectively  assas- 
sinated over  a  score  of  political  leadei-s  ti 
include  local  mayors,  paity  repre- 
sentatives, and  candidates.  Through 
lethal  intimidation,  Sendero  poses  a 
potential  threat  to  Peru's  democratic  sys. 
tem  as  the  constitution  calls  for  a  cancelll 
tion  of  the  vote  count  if  30%  of  the 
electorate  are  prevented  from  casting 
their  ballots. 


The  Coca  Connection 


Sendero  guerrillas  have  become  increas- 
ingly active  in  Upper  Huallaga  Valley, 
the  locale  of  most  of  Peru's  illegal  coca 
production,  and  have  become  a  threat  to 
the  Peruvian  Government's  U.S.-assistei' 
drug  eradication,  crop  substitution,  and 
interdiction  efforts.  Attacks  by  both  trai 
fickers  and  Sendero  guerrillas  have  in 
creased  substantially  in  1989,  forcing  tha 
suspension  of  some  of  these  operations 
for  6  months. 

Sendero  reportedly  acts  as  an  inter- 
mediary between  the  peasant  gi^owei-s 
and  the  dimg  traffickers,  winning  higher' 
prices  for  the  gi'owers,  taking  a  cut  of  thi 
profits,  and  providing  protection.  In  a 
police  raid  on  a  suspected  di-ug  target  in 
the  town  of  Uchiza  in  Febi-uai-y  1989, 
45  kilos  of  cocaine  paste  were  seized  andi 
eight  suspects  arrested.  Two  were 
Sendero  members. 

Sendero's  involvement  in  di'ugs  havf 
become  increasingly  apparent  since  1987 
when,  in  June  of  that  year,  the  director  o 
Brazil's  Narcotics  Division  stated  publiclj 
that  Sendero  was  involved  with  the  traf- 
fickers operating  on  the  Brazilian  borderj 
and  received  large  amounts  of  money 
from  them. 

Sendero,  which  now  dominates 
dozens  of  villages  in  the  region  and  is  in^ 
fluential  in  several  larger  towns,  has 
publicly  stated  that  the  government's 
antinarcotics  operations  are  a  cover  for 
"imperiahst  expansion" — a  convenient 
ideological  rationale  for  attacking  them. 
Sendero  is  organizing  coca  growere  to 
protest  the  antidiiig  operations,  and  a     P; 
proSendero  newsweekly  has  contributed 
to  Sendero's.  disinfonnation  campaign  by 
reporting  that  crop  eradication  herbicide 
were  poisoning  children,  several  of 


ie 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  198 


TERRORISM 


11)111,  the  newsweekly  claimed,  have 
,  eady  died.  The  poisoning  claims  are  un- 
le  :ind  except  for  a  one-time  application 
4,  herbicides  have  not  been  used  in  the 
I  ip  eradication  efforts. 


lartial  Incident 
(hronology 


189 

5'ptember.  Sendero  is  suspected  in  the 
?  Hiting  death  of  Dario  Fennin  Azpai'- 
1  it,  the  Major  of  Jumanga  in  the 
/:acueho  Department.  The  62-year-old 
iiyiir  was  a  member  of  the  Peravian 
t  iiiniunist  Party. 

Hooded  terrorists  believed  to  be 
iiiilcm  members  stabbed  to  death 
I  (li'i  1  Alberca  in  a  hospital  and  took  his 
1  ;ly  to  the  main  square  of  Punum  Town 
.  Huacho.  Alberca  was  the  regional 
jneral  secretary  of  the  Peruvian  Com- 
I  mist  Party  as  well  as  the  spokesman 
f  tlie  communist  United  Left  Front. 

Sendero  is  suspected  in  the  killing 
a  1  decapitation  of  nearly  20  victims 
V  ose  bodies  were  seen  floating  down 
t  ■  Huallaga  River  in  front  of  a  jungle 
b;e  from  which  U.S.  Drug  Enforcement 
/ministration-assisted  Peruvian  an- 
t  in-otics  police  ai'e  operating. 

August.  Sendero  is  believed  respon- 
s  le  f(ir  kiUing  Zacarias  Briceno,  the 
I\  yi  u-  of  Sanagoran  District  in  northern 
F  -11,  after  having  rounded  up  the  resi- 
d  Its  into  the  main  town  square.  Briceno 
v\s  a  i-egional  leader  of  the  communist 
lited  Left  Front.  The  terrorists  burned 
dvn  the  city  hall  building  prior  to 
riiarting. 

Relieved  responsible  for  bombing 
t  Inline  of  Rafael  and  Emma  Benavides, 
led  leaders  of  FREDEMO  (the 
Emocratic  Front).  Both  were  injured  in 
tl  attack.  Mrs.  Benavides  is  a  candidate 
ft  Mayor  of  Huancavelica. 

Police  believe  Setidero  killed  15 
pisants  over  a  weekend  period,  many  by 
giiades  hurled  at  residents  celebrating 
r'.ional  festivities  in  two  towns  in  the 
Aacucho  highlands  and  three  local 
leders  in  the  Chincayllapa  District  who 
wre  tied  to  poles,  doused  with  fuel,  and 
Si  on  fire. 

Suspected  in  the  killing  of  Samuel 
I  lalia,  the  SociaUst  Accord  candidate 
fi  Mayor  of  Cerro  De  Pasco,  an  impor- 
f.  t  SieiTa  mining  town. 

Srndero  terrorists  shot  and  killed  a 
I'iri'  health  department  official  in  the 
I  1111  Department  who  was  travehng  on 


July.  Suspected  in  bombing  a  bus  in 
the  port  of  Callao  which  was  carrying 
Soviet  crew  members  on  shore  leave 
from  a  fishing  vessel;  33  were  wounded. 

Killed  17  peasants  of  the  village  of 
Tinte,  some  by  machinegun  fii-e  and 
others  by  stabbing,  after  herding  mem- 
bers of  a  local  self-defense  force  into  the 
village  square  and  subjecting  them  to  a 
"people's  trial." 

June.  Took  over  the  town  of 
Huaytan  in  Pilpichaca  and  killed  six, 
including  the  mayor  and  the  district's 
heutenant  governor. 

Dynamited  the  home  of  the  Mayor  of 
Huacho  in  the  Lima  Department  and  as- 
sassinated the  ex-lieutenant  governor 
and  his  wdfe. 

Assassinated  the  director  of  health 
for  the  northern  cone  of  Lima. 

Attacked  the  Santa  Maria  mine  in 
the  Huaral  District,  killed  the  resident  en- 
gineer, and  stole  all  explosives  stored  at 
the  site. 

Killed  Manuel  Espinoza  Monroe,  a 
leader  of  the  ruhng  APR  A  party 
(American  Popular  Revolutionary 
Alliance)  and  Mayor  of  Tingo  Maria  in 
Huanuco;  returned  the  next  day  to 
severely  beat  three  workers  who  were 
constructing  a  mausoleum  for  the  slain 
mayor. 

Assassinated  Eduardo  Reyes  Boliva, 
the  district  Mayor  of  Supe  in  the  Lima 
Department. 

Assassinated  Eugenio  Soria  Quiroz, 
the  APR  A  Mayor  of  Succha  in  Ancash. 

Assassinated  14  community  leaders 
from  various  districts  in  Huancavelica  for 
not  complying  with  a  forced  strike. 

Assassinated  Cesar  Zapata  Castillo, 
the  Mayor  of  Aucayacu  in  Huranuco. 

Bombed  a  bus  can-ying  presidential 
guards  in  Lima,  killing  7  and  wounding  15. 

Assassinated  Felipe  Moreno  Solor- 
zano,  the  Mayor  of  La  Merced  in  Junin. 

Killed  the  director  of  the  Education- 
al Center  of  Agronomy  in  San  Lorenzo, 
Junin. 

May.  Killed  El  Comercio  journalist 
Barbara  D'Achille  in  an  isolated  ai'ea  in 
the  Huancavelica  Department,  along  writh 
an  engineer  who  was  directing  a  UN 
study  on  the  South  American  llamas. 

Executed  a  British  tourist  after  drag- 
ging him  to  a  local  town  squai'e.  The 
tourist  had  been  on  a  treking  expedition 
in  the  scenic  Ancash  Department.  In  a 
separate  incident  also  in  the  same  area, 
SeJidero  dynamited  a  hotel  after  warning 
the  occupants,  including  foreign  tourists, 
to  leave. 


Injured  six  people  during  an  attack 
on  a  tourist  agency  and  bombed  a  moun- 
tain guide  headquarters  in  the  Huaraz 
area  in  the  Andean  mountain  range. 

Believed  responsible  for  the  brutal 
killing  in  Lima  of  a  Soviet-educated 
Peruvian  professor  at  the  National  En- 
gineering University.  The  assassins  left  a 
handprinted  poster  on  the  professor's 
back  reading,  "Thus  die  the  servants  of 
social  imperialism." 

Suspected  in  at  least  one  of  the  two 
shootings  of  parliamentary  deputies.  Fol- 
lowing the  attacks,  23  other  deputies 
publicly  stated  they  had  received  death 
threats  or  attempts  on  their  lives. 

February.  Suspected  in  the  attack 
on  the  U.S.  Embassy  in  which  an  ex- 
plosive device  was  thrown  from  a  passing 
vehicle  at  the  chancery  building.  No  one 
was  injured. 

1988 

December.  Suspected  of  having  assas- 
sinated in  Bolivia  the  Peruvian  naval  at- 
tache who  was  gunned  down  in 
downtown  La  Paz,  although  the  attack 
was  pubhcly  claimed  by  a  local  terrorist 
group. 

Brutally  murdered  two  French  en- 
gineers along  with  two  Peruvians  work- 
ing on  a  i-ural  assistance  project  in  the 
Apurimac  Department.  Sendero  also  at- 
tacked a  development  project  run  by  the 
EEC. 

July.  Killed  a  federal  judge  in  the 
provincial  capital  of  Chincha,  120  miles 
from  Lima,  several  days  after  killing  the 
province's  governor. 

June.  Assassinated  the  Mayor  of 
the  Andean  city  of  Puno. 

Killed  an  American  AID  contract 
employee  and  a  Peruvian  coworker  in  an 
ambush  near  Quicha  Baja.  The  two  were 
involved  in  an  agricultural  project.  The 
killers  wrote  in  red  ink  in  the  American's 
notebook,  "This  is  the  way  the  lackeys  of 
Yankee  imperialism  die." 

May.  Caused  a  blackout  of  most  of 
Lima  at  a  time  when  the  Pope  was  visit- 
ing. 

April.  Hanged  thi-ee  peasant 
women  in  the  highlands  near  Ayacucho 
after  accusing  them  of  washing  soldier's 
clothes  and  selling  them  food. 

Believed  responsible  for  the  killing 
in  Lima  of  a  technical  adviser  to  the 
presidential  palace  and  the  wounding  of  a 
Lima  city  councilwoman. 

Killed  six  villagers,  including  the 
mayor,  after  a  "people's  trial"  in  Andajes, 
a  small  village  in  the  northeast  Lima 
Department. 


Ijipartment  of  State  Bulletin/December  1989 


51 


TERRORISM 


Believed  responsible  for  killing  the 
manager  of  a  textile  factoi-y  in  the  central 
Ancles  Mountains  who  was  a  Yugoslavian 
immigi'ant. 

Murdered  two  workers  and  a  com- 
panion in  a  U.S.-financed  coca  crop-sub- 
stitution project. 

March.  Blew  up  approximately  20 
electrical  transmission  towers  near 
Ayacucho  and  Huanta  causing  a  blackout 
likely  timed  to  coincide  with  the  start  of  a 
religious  jirocession  in  Ayacucho. 

Killed  the  manager  of  the  Andahuasi 
agincultural  cooperative  60  miles  outside 
Lima  and  another  person  after  a 
"people's  trial." 

January.  Massacred  17  peasants  in 
a  village  northeast  of  Ayacucho  after  or- 
dering them  into  a  line  and  opening  fire 
with  automatic  weapons. 

Massacred  24  peasants  in  another  vil- 
lage in  the  Ayacucho  area,  shooting  and 
hacking  them  to  death. 

1987 

December.  Blacked  out  Lima  and  parts 
of  eight  other  departments  in  its  fii-st 
New  Year's  Eve  blackout  since  1984. 

Killed  the  recently  reelected  Mayor 
of  Pisco,  a  leading  coastal  city  about  150 
miles  ft'om  Lima. 

Killed  24  in  Rumii-umi  in  the 
Ayacucho  Department,  including  village 
officials,  the  local  school  teacher,  and 
members  of  an  ai-my-organized  peasant's 
patrol.  The  victims  had  been  gathered  in 
the  town  square  and  killed  by  machine- 
gun  fire  while  others  had  their  throats 
sht. 

Killed  an  engineer  with  the  govern- 
ment development  agency  after  a 
"people's  trial"  in  Huaraz,  275  miles  north- 
east of  Lima. 

Attacked  the  office  in  Ayacucho  of 
the  Cachi  River  iirigation  project,  killing 
three  engineers  including  the  project's 
dir-ector  and  a  local  guard. 

Killed  the  Mayor  of  Huanta. 

October.  Suspected  in  the  assas- 
sination of  a  leader  of  the  iiiling  party. 


September-October.  Killed  over 
40  civilians  in  attacks  against  two  towns 
in  the  Tocache  Province. 

August.  Killed  another  leader  of 
the  i-uling  pai'ty. 

April.  Ambushed  with  dynamite 
and  machinegun  fii-e  a  bus  canying  ap- 
proximately 40  people,  kiUing  10  soldiers 
and  4  civilians. 

Attacked  a  restaurant  in  Lima  kill- 
ing 6,  including  2  military  officers,  and 
wounded  10  others  with  indiscriminate 
machinegun  fii-e.  The  attackers  entered 
the  restaurant  weai-ing  school  and  police 
unifoiTns. 

Attacked  the  North  Korean  Commer- 
cial Mission  in  Lima,  wounding  at  least 
three  jjeople. 

March.  Wounded  the  Bank  of 
Tokyo's  general  manager,  a  Japanese 
national,  in  an  assassination  attempt  in 
Lima. 

January.  Attacked  the  Indian  Em- 
bassy in  Lima  while  the  Peruvian  Presi- 
dent was  on  an  official  visit  to  New  Delhi. 
The  Sendero  attackers  later  took  over 
the  local  Reuters  office  and  forced  its 
staff  to  send  its  communique  over  the 
wires. 

1986 

October.  Shot  and  killed  former  Navy 
Minister  Admiral  Cafferatta. 

July.  Bombed  the  Soviet  Embassy 
in  Lima. 

June.  Instigated  simultaneous  riots 
in  three  prisons  which  were  brutally  put 
down  by  the  security  forces.  Over  200 
suspected  Sendero  prisoners  were  killed. 

Bombed  a  Cuzco  train  packed  with 
tourists  and  bound  for  the  stone  rains  of 
Machu  Picchu,  kiUing  8  (including  2 
Americans)  and  wounding  40  (including  9 
Americans). 

March.  Publicly  executed  three 
provincial  mayors  in  Chacra  Pampas. 


February.  Killed  the  Mayor  of  the 

village  of  Chupac. 

1985 

December.  Set  off  a  bomb  in  the  park- 
ing lot  of  Lima  airport,  killing  a  child. 

August.  Bombed  a  bus  at  Lima's 

Chamber  of  Commerce. 

April.  Critically  wounded  a  former 
Supreme  Court  Justice  who  was  serving; 
as  president  of  the  National  Elections 
Tribunal. 

February.  Blacked  out  most  of 
Lima  during  the  Pope's  visit,  while  simuj 
taneously  burning  a  large  hammer  and 
sickle  on  a  mountainside  within  view  of 
the  capital. 

1984 

November.  Bombed  the  U.S.-Peruvian 

Cultui'al  Institute  in  Lima. 

August.  Burned  an  evangelical 
church  in  the  Ayacucho  Department  run' 
by  U.S.  missionaries. 

1983 

May.  Blew  up  electrical  poweriines  caus 
ing  a  blackout  in  Lima,  then  set  off  over 
30  bombs  causing  tens  of  miUions  of  dol- 
lars in  damage. 

1982 

July.  Threw  two  explosive  devices  con- 
taining dynamite  at  the  U.S.  Embassy  in 
Lima  and  set  off  bombs  at  thi'ee  private 
businesses,  injuring  three  people. 


1981 

August.  Bombed  the  U.S.  Embassy  in 
Lima,  as  well  as  the  Bank  of  America,  th( 
Coca  Cola  bottler,  and  a  daii-y  firm  as- 
sociated with  the  Carnation  Company. 

1980 

May.  Attacked  a  polling  station  in  Chus- 
chi  and  burned  the  ballot  boxes.B 


52 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  198 


JNITED  NATIONS 


JN  Mandate  Under 

Central  America  Agreements 


EPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
CT.  16, 19891 

.'ci'ftary  Baker  has  asked  Assistant 
"cii'tary  [for  International  Organization 
flairs]  John  Bolton  to  meet  with  the 
jiTotaiy  General  today  to  discuss  UN 
ans  to  implement  its  mandate  under 
s(|iiipulas  and  the  Tela  agi-eements.  Mr. 
olt(in  is  caiTying  a  letter  from  the 
?ert'taiy,  copies  of  which  we  will  make 
/ailable  to  you  after  the  briefing  [text 

Hows]. 

The  role  of  the  United  Nations  to  fui'- 
ii'i'  the  goals  of  democratization  and 
'arc  in  Central  America  has  been  most 
til  lime.  The  United  States  has  a  special 
tfii'st  in  the  peace  and  stability  of  this 
tal  region,  and  we  want  to  work 
igether  with  the  Secretary  General  to 
■ing  about  our  shai'ed  goals. 

We  believe  that  it  is  vitally  impor- 
nt  for  the  United  Nations  to  insist  that 
j  of  the  conditions  of  Esquipulas  and  the 
;!la  accords  be  fully  implemented.  For 
e  mission  to  be  successful,  it  is  impera- 
•e  that  the  United  States  be,  and  be 
ei!  to  be,  impartial. 

We  have  emphasized  to  the  United 
ati(jns  the  priority  of  the  establishment 
id  continuing  verification  of  democi-atic 
ntlitions  and  guarantees  of  secm-ity  for 
ose  who  choose  to  return  to  Nicaragua 
the  first  step  in  demonstrating  to 
esistance  members  that  they  may  safe- 
retum  home  should  they  voluntai'ily 
lOose  to  do  so. 

The  political  and  secmity  situations 
Nicaragua  must  improve  and  accom- 
lodate  Resistance  concerns  before  they 
,n  be  expected  to  voluntarily  demobihze 
id  repatriate.  The  Tela  accords  requir-e 
rect  contacts  between  the  Government 
Nicaragua  and  the  Resistance  and 
'rifiable  guarantees  of  theu-  basic  rights 
\d  freedoms. 

Respected  human  rights  organiza- 
jns  have  documented  a  systematic  pat- 
ni  I  )f  deaths  and  disappearances  of 
esistance  members  and  theii"  families, 
pwards  of  1,700  still  languish  in 
mdinista  prisons.  These  violations  con- 

It  was  recently  reported  that  a 
isldto  commander  and  seven  of  his  men 
eiv  captured  by  the  Sandinistas  on 
-tdlier  6  and  summarily  executed  on 
ftdber  7.  The  Government  of  Nicaragua 
list  address  these  issues  if  it  is  serious 
■)uiit  complying  with  the  Tela  agreement. 


SECRETARY'S  LETTER  TO 

UN  SECRETARY  GENERAL, 
OCT.  15, 1989 

Continued  strife  in  the  Central  American 
region  is  of  serious  concern  to  my  government. 
The  role  of  the  United  Nations  to  further  the 
goals  of  democratization  and  peace  in  Central 
America  has  been  most  welcome.  The  United 
States  has  a  special  interest  in  the  peace  and 
stability  of  this  vital  region,  and  we  want  to 
work  together  with  you  to  bring  about  oui- 
shared  goals.  The  five  Central  American 
governments  have  called  on  your  good  offices 
to  facilitate  the  Esquipulas  pi'oeess  to  which 
they  have  committ«d  themselves.  It  is  a 
process  which  my  government  supports,  and  I 
look  foi-ward  to  closer  consultations  between 
us  in  fui'therance  of  that  process. 

It  is  in  that  spirit  that  I  share  with  you 
now  my  deep  concern  about  reports  that  some 
officials  of  the  United  Nations  are  attempting 
to  inteiject  an  approach  which  is  contrai-y  to 
goals  we  all  share — the  achievement  of 
democracy  in  Nicaragua,  a  necessary  condition 
to  assui'e  Resistance  members  that  they  have 
the  option  to  return  with  safety  and  freedom 
to  participate  in  the  social,  economic,  and  politi- 
cal fabric  of  Nicaragua — as  the  Government  of 
Nicaragua  has  committed  to  do  in  the 
Esquipulas,  Tesoro  Beach,  and  Tela  Agree- 
ments. Absent  such  conditions,  I  believe  we 
both  agree  that  the  Resistance  is  unlikely  to 
demobilize  voluntarily  and  return  to  what  is 
recognized  as  hostile  control  and  recrimination 
from  the  Sandinista  government.  That  is  an 


outcome  that  will  dim  all  prospects  for  peace  in 
Central  America. 

I  sincerely  hope  that  you  intend  to 
proceed  even-handedly  and  to  simultaneously 
carry  out  yoiu'  mandate  to  ensure  that  the 
Government  of  Nicaragua  adheres  to  its  com- 
mitments for  an  amnesty,  verifiable  secuiity 
guarantees  and  democratic  conditions,  and  the 
guarantee  of  the  "basic  rights  and  freedoms" 
{Tela  Agreement)  of  Resistance  members  and 
their  families.  Respected  human  rights  or- 
ganizations have  documented  a  systematic  pat- 
tern of  deaths  and  disappeai-ances  of 
Resistance  members  and  their  families.  Up- 
wards of  1700  still  languish  in  Sandinista 
prisons. 

I  urge  you  to  encoiu'age  all  parties  to  the 
conflict  to  abide  by  commitments  which  they 
have  agi'eed  to  in  order  to  restore  to  the  area 
the  peace,  democracy,  and  security  it  so  justly 
deserves  and  desires.  I  hope  that  the  mis- 
characterizations  of  the  problems  and  potential 
solutions  to  those  problems  can  be  corrected 
promptly.  The  United  Nations  must  be,  and  be 
seen  to  be,  impartial  in  its  conduct  if  there  is  to 
be  success. 

As  we  move  forwai'd  together,  I  look  for- 
ward to  staying  in  continuing  close  touch  with 
you. 

With  best  personal  regai-ds. 

Sincerely  yours, 
James  A.  Baker,  III 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by  Depart- 
ment spokesman  Mai'garet  DeB.  Tutwiler.  ■ 


United  Nations  Day,  1989 


PROCLAMATION  6052, 
OCT.  19, 1989' 

Each  yeai-.  United  Nations  Day  provides  us 
the  opportunity  to  reaffii-m  the  principles  upon 
which  the  United  Nations  was  founded  in  1945. 
Those  principles  are  eloquently  expressed  in 
the  preamble  to  the  Universal  Declaration  of 
Human  Rights,  which  was  adopted  by  the 
U.N.  General  Assembly  on  December  10,  1948. 
In  that  historic  document,  the  peoples  of  the 
United  Nations  agreed  that  "I'ecognition  of  the 
inherent  dignity  and  of  the  equal  and  in- 
alienable rights  of  all  members  of  the  human 
family  is  the  foundation  of  fi-eedom,  justice 
and  peace  in  the  woi-ld."  The  ongoing  efforts  of 
the  United  States  and  other  members  of  the 
United  Nations  are  rooted  in  the  conviction 
that  human  rights  should  be  protected  by  the 
rule  of  law. 

Today,  mankind  is  filled  with  hope,  for  the 
prospects  for  peace  have  improved  greatly  in 


regions  where  it  .seemed  impossible  just  a  few 
yeare  ago.  Throughout  the  world,  we  are  wit- 
nessing the  triumph  of  freedom  and 
democratic  ideals  over  regimes  maintained  by 
intimidation  and  force.  The  United  Nations 
and  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Himian 
Rights  have  contributed  much  to  tliis 
progress,  both  symbolically  and  practically. 

The  effectiveness  and  credibility  of  the  or- 
ganization have  been  enhanced  by  a  continuing 
series  of  internal  refomis,  and  the  United  Na- 
tions plays  an  impoilant  role  in  promoting  con- 
sti-uctive  dialogue  and  the  peaceftil  resolution 
of  differences  between  nations.  It  has  helped 
advance  or  implement  the  settlement  of  a  num- 
ber of  regional  conflicts,  and  it  has  helped 
promote  the  economic  and  political  develop- 
ment of  countries  beset  by  strife  and  poverty. 
The  United  Nations  has  also  begim  to  offer 
leadership  in  the  fight  against  drug  trafficking, 
as  well  as  in  efforts  to  protect  the  global  en- 
vironment. 


lepartment  of  State  Bulletin/December  1989 


53 


UNITED  NATIONS 


Much  of  the  U.N.  work  is  carried  out  by 
its  technical  and  specialized  agencies,  such  as 
the  International  Civil  Aviation  Organization 
(ICAO).  This  year  marks  the  45th  anniversai-y 
of  the  Convention  on  International  Civil  Avia- 
tion, which  provided  for  the  establishment  of 
the  ICAO.  Since  its  inception,  the  ICAO  has 
led  efforts  to  promote  safety  in  international 
air  navigation  and  to  ensure  the  orderly 
gi'owth  of  international  civil  aviation 
thi-oughout  the  world. 

In  recent  years,  the  ICAO  has  devoted  in- 
creasing attention  to  the  threat  of  teiTorism. 
Earlier  this  yeai\  it  adopted  a  plan  of  action  to 
thwart  teiTorists  attempting  to  place  bombs 
on  board  passenger  aircraft.  The  organization 
is  cun-ently  developing  a  regimen  for  the  mai-k- 
ing  and  detection  of  plastic  explosives.  The 
ICAO  has  long  been  a  useful  foi-um  in  which  to 
address  the  problem  of  aircraft  hijackings.  In 
fact,  the  incidence  of  aircraft  hijackings  around 
the  world  has  decreased  markedly — in  large 
part  as  a  result  of  improved  security  measwes 
recommended  by  the  ICAO  and  implemented 
by  its  member  states. 

The  International  Civil  Aviation  Organiza- 
tion is  one  e.xample  of  the  positive  role  played 
by  the  technical  and  specialized  agencies  of  the 
United  Nations.  Throughout  the  U.N.  system, 
men  and  women  from  around  the  world  ai'e 
working  together  to  help  make  the  world  a 
safer,  healthier  place  in  which  to  live.  Their  ef- 
forts reflect  the  vision  of  those  who,  in  signing 
the  United  Nations  Charter,  "reaffirm[ed 
their]  faith  in  fundamental  human  rights  [and] 
in  the  dignity  and  worth  of  the  human  pereon." 

Now,  Therefore,  I  George  Bush,  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  of  America,  by  vir- 
tue of  the  authority  vested  in  me  by  the 
Constitution  and  laws  of  the  United  States,  do 
hereby  proclaim  October  24, 1989,  as  United 
Nations  Day.  I  ui'ge  all  Americans  to  observe 
that  day  with  appropriate  programs, 
ceremonies  and  activities. 

In  Witness  Whereof,  I  have  hereunto 
set  my  hand  this  nineteenth  day  of  October,  in 
the  year  of  oui-  Lord  nineteen  hundred  and 
eighty-nine,  and  of  the  Independence  of  the 
United  States  of  America  the  two  hundred  and 
fourteenth. 

George  Bush 


'  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Oct.  23, 1989.1 


Cuba's  Human  Rights  Abuses 
Under  the  UN  Spotlight 


by  Armando  Valltidares 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittees 
on  Western  Hemisplwre  Affairs  and 
Human  Rights  and  International  Or- 
ganizations  of  the  House  Foreign  Affairs 
Committee  on  September-  20, 1989.  Am- 
bassador Valladares  is  U.S.  Repre- 
sentative to  the  UN  Commission  on 
Human  Rights.^ 

Last  year  when  I  appeared  before  this 
body,  I  was  able  to  report  to  you  a  sig- 
nificant victory  for  human  rights  that  we 
had  achieved  when  the  UN  Commission 
for  Human  Rights  decided  to  conduct  an 
investigation  into  the  Government  of 
Cuba's  human  rights  practices.  That 
decision  resulted  in  the  visit  to  Cuba  by  a 
six-member  worl^ing  gi-oup  which  was 
able  to  collect  first-hand  evidence  of  the 
sweeping  human  rights  abuses  which 
routinely  occur  in  Cuba. 

Following  the  United  Nations'  his- 
toric decision  to  conduct  a  full  investiga- 
tion into'Cuban  human  rights,  a  number 
of  quite  remarkable  things  occurred. 
Castro  actually  seemed  prepared  to 
tolerate — in  an  unofficial  manner,  of 
course — the  existence  of  several  small, 
but  vocal,  human  rights  committees  that 
were  independent  of  the  government.  He 
permitted  and  cooperated  with  the  visits 
of  international  human  rights  monitors, 
including  the  International  Committee  of 
the  Red  Cross  and  the  Cathohc  Church. 
He  released  many  of  the  longest  held 
political  prisoners  and  permitted  them  to 
emigi-ate  to  the  United  States.  The  shark 
can  never  be  tamed,  and  Castro  has  all 
his  teeth,  as  I  will  presently  make  cleai*. 
He  permitted  these  things  to  happen  be- 
cause he  was  in  the  United  Nations'  spot- 
light, and  he  had  no  other  choice  to  avoid 
tarnishing  his  "progr-essive"  image.  But 
unless  the  United  Nations  continues  to 
spotlight  Cuba,  the  system  will  continue 
to  chew  up  and  spit  out  those  who  at- 
tempt to  change  it  peacefully  from  within. 

As  most  of  you  know,  I  spent  22 
years  in  various  prisons  and  labor  camps 
in  Cuba.  I  know  that  international  pres- 
siu-e  is  decisive  in  swaying  Fidel  Castro. 
Following  yeai's  of  quiet  diplomacy  on  my 
behalf,  it  was  only  after  a  well-publicized 
campaign  involving  a  number  of 
respected  human  rights  gi-oups  and 
private  individuals  around  the  world  that 
I  was  freed  from  Castro's  gi-asp.  I  am 
living  proof  that  international  attention, 
criticism,  and  pressure  can  influence  and 
perhaps  change  the  behavior  of  dictator- 


ships, even  one  as  entrenched  and  bloodi 
as  Fidel  Castro's. 


t 
1 


K 


Report  on  UN  Investigation 

The  agreement  by  the  UN  commission  t 
finally  look  into  the  many  allegations  of ' 
serious  human  rights  abuses  in  Cuba  wg 
a  vei-y  hopeftil  sign  that  the  United  Na- 
tions was  truly  capable  of  carrying  out  r 
mandate  to  improve  human  rights  in  an) 
country.  The  investigative  working  grou 
was  able  to  receive  evidence  and  tes- 
timony dh'ectly  fi"om  individual  Cuban 
citizens  who  had  experienced  abuses  of 
their  human  rights.  Two  thousand  in- 
dividuals sent  written  testimony  to  the 
working  group.  The  report  which  this 
UN  working  gi'oup  produced  was  400 
pages  and  contained  detailed  accounts  o 
hundreds  of  separate  incidents  of  gross 
human  rights  violations.  It  is  a  truly  im- 
portant document  that  contains  a  wealtJ 
of  proof  and  first-hand  testimony  on  the 
situation  of  human  rights  in  Cuba — the 
fi'eedom  of  movement,  of  privacy,  of  as- 
sociation— all  these  rights  do  not  exist. 
Soviet  publications  such  as  Moscow  New 
and  Sputnik  are  banned  from  Cuba  as 
subversive.  As  Jose  Marti  said,  "Solo  la 
opresion  debe  temer  el  ejercicio  plena  de 
las  libertades. "  [Only  oppressors  need 
fear  the  full  exercise  of  Uberty.] 

Despite  the  weight  of  this  testimoni 
and  the  observations  that  the  working 
group  members  were  able  to  make  for 
themselves  dui'ing  their  visit  to  Cuba,  tl 
report  contained  no  conclusions.  Nor  is 
this  sui-prising.  At  the  outset  of  its  work 
the  group  had  agi-eed  to  function  by  con^ 
sensus.  Although  a  majority  of  the  grou) 
reportedly  was  in  favor  of  incorporating 
conclusions,  no  consensus  was  reached  o 
what  those  conclusions  should  be. 
Moreover,  it  is  significant  that  repre- 
sentatives from  five  geographical  region 
were  able  to  agree  on  so  much.  The  in- 
clusion of  the  information  that  makes  up 
the  body  of  the  report  could  not  be 
denied,  and  the  world  can  draw  its  own 
conclusions.  This  report  does  not  repi-e- 
sent  my  opinion  nor  that  of  the  U.S. 
Government.  It  is  the  United  Nations 
that  describes  Cuba's  dismal  human 
rights  record. 

Although,  as  I  have  said,  the  report 
was  overwhelming  in  its  presentation  of 
thoroughly  documented  cases  of  himian 
rights  abuses,  the  commission  at  its  ses- 
sion this  year  could  not  agree  to  continue 
the  mandate  of  the  working  group  to 


!l 


f 


S 


54 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  198 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


aintain  contacts  with  the  Cuban  people 
id  Government.  Instead,  a  less  well- 
!fined  mandate  was  given  to  the 
'cretary  General  to  establish  contact 
,th  the  Cuban  Government  and  to  raise 
iiman  rights  cases  which  come  to  the 
;»cretai7  General's  attention.  The  resolu- 
on,  which  conveyed  this  mandate,  was 
;>onsored  by  Panama — essentially  front- 
ig  for  Cuba — and  had  Cuba's  support. 

We  went  to  this  year's  session  of  the 
N  Human  Rights  Commission  hoping  to 
Mid  on  last  yeai-'s  historic  success  there. 
Te  felt  that  the  UN  working  group's 
:poit  would  furnish  ample  grounds  for 
lintinuing  to  examine  Cuba's  human 
:jhts  practices.  Continuing  to  keep  the 
■essure  on  Castro  would  be  the  best 
:iai-antee  that  human  rights  would  con- 
lue  to  improve.  But  already  there  were 
aming  signs. 

'astro's  Harassment  Campaign 

uring  the  last  quarter  of  1988,  following 
le  United  Nations'  visit  to  Cuba,  there 
ere  several  ominous  occurrences.  In 
olation  of  his  open  pledge  to  cooperate 
ith  the  UN  investigation  and  to  allow 
I  Cubans  to  speak  freely  wdthout 
prisals  to  the  UN  team  members, 
istro's  agents  conducted  a  campaign  of 
Lrassment,  beating,  and  imprisonment 
Tied  against  the  leaders  of  Cuba's 
(man  rights  community,  many  of  whom 
A  been  in  contact  wath  the  United  Na- 
)ns.  This  campaign  actually  began  while 
e  team  was  still  present  in  Cuba  and 
ntinues  to  date.  It  has,  in  fact,  inten- 
ded during  the  past  few  weeks  when 
e  heads  of  several  important  human 
^hts  organizations  were  re-arrested  and 
iprisoned  on  vague  chai-ges. 

Those  arrested  include  Tania  Diaz 
astro,  who  was  set  upon  and  brutally 
saten  by  plainclothes  government 
rents  as  she  was  visiting  a  relative  at 
ombinado  del  Este  Prison  last  Novem- 
;r  and  then  tried  and  sentenced,  all  in  1 
ly,  for  distui'bing  the  peace.  She 
mains  in  jail  today.  Elizardo  Sanchez, 
ho  visited  this  country  1  year  ago  and  is 
lown  to  many  of  you,  was  arrested  in 
ugust  and,  if  convicted,  faces  4  years  in 
•ison  on  charges  of  spreading  false 
•opaganda.  Others  have  been  arrested 
id  jailed  on  even  less  credible  charges. 

These  recent  developments  in  Cuba 
•e  a  tragedy  not  only  because  of  the  in- 
vidual  human  suffering  involved  but  be- 
luse  people  who  had  staked  their 
ell-being  on  the  United  Nations' 
■edibility — who  had  been  encouraged 
id  emboldened  by  the  belief  that  the 
nited  Nations  would  publicize  all  at- 
mipts  by  Castro  to  silence  his  critics — 


are  now  the  targets  of  a  renewed  and 
intensified  crackdown  by  Castro.  Just  as 
I  can  attribute  improvements  in  Cuba 
which  occurred  when  the  spotlight  was 
cleai'ly  focused  upon  Cuba,  I  can  at- 
tribute this  backsliding  to  Castro's  per- 
ception that  the  United  Nations  has  not 
yet  shown  that  it  is  fully  committed  to 
the  cause  of  improving  human  rights  in 
his  country. 

U.S.  Support  for 
UN  Monitoring  Role 

I  believe  that,  notvirithstanding  the  fact 
that  we  got  less  than  we  hoped  for  at  the 
last  session  of  the  commission,  the  I'esolu- 
tion  adopted  by  the  commission  is  strong 
enough  to  ensure  that  Cuba  remains  a 
subject  of  UN  scrutiny.  For  that  reason, 
we  supported  it  after  stronger  language, 
w^hich  we  originally  had  supported,  failed 
on  a  tie  vote. 

It  is  now  up  to  the  Secretary  General 
to  act  upon  the  mandate  given  him  to  fol- 
low up  on  the  numerous  credible  allega- 
tions of  human  rights  abuses  in  Cuba.  I 
am  aware  that  many  Cubans  living  in  and 
outside  of  Cuba  have  documented  human 
rights  abuses  by  the  Government  of  Cuba 
and  transmitted  them  to  the  United  Na- 
tions. I  hope  the  Secretary  General  wall 


cai'efuUy  reviev  tho?''  cses  9nd  bring 
them  to  the  attention  of  the  Cuban 
authorities  for  their  response.  If  the 
Cuban  Government  fails  to  respond  satis- 
factorily to  the  United  Nations,  the  fact 
of  their  noncooperation  wall  be  fuither 
reason  to  continue  the  United  Nations'  in- 
volvement. 

This  is  our  bottom  line — to  continue 
to  have  international  monitoring  of  the 
situation  of  human  rights  in  Cuba  and  to 
maintain  Cuba  on  the  agenda  of  the 
Human  Rights  Commission.  Nor  must  we 
be  swayed  to  believing  that  Castro  has 
turned  over  a  new  leaf.  Cuba  continues  to 
be  one  of  the  bleakest  outposts  of  the 
communist  and  totalitarian  world.  At  a 
time  when  communist  leadere  in  all  but  a 
few  countries  recognize  that  their  dic- 
tatorial and  repressive  system  is  at  fault 
for  catastrophic  failures  of  their 
economies  and  political  structures, 
Castro  continues  to  press  for  reinforcing 
the  Marxist  model.  He  is  a  thi'owback — 
and  far  from  the  "progi'essive"  model  for 
Thii'd  World  nationbuilding  as  he  had 
been  30  yeai's  ago.  He  is  now  a  dinosaur, 
blind  to  his  own  impending  extinction. 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  healings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Terrorist  Attacks  in  El  Salvador 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
OCT.  18, 1989' 

In  an  act  of  terror  for  which  the  FMLN 
[Farabundo  Mai'ti  National  Liberation 
Front]  has  become  known,  a  guerrilla 
death  squad  yesterday  gimned  down  23- 
year-old  Ana  Isabel  Casanova.  Her  crime: 
her  father  is  a  military  officer.  This  was 
not  a  political  act  but  murder,  pure  and 
simple.  We  wish  to  express  our  deepest 
sympathy  to  her  family 

The  FMLN  committed  a  similar  kill- 
ing of  civihans  on  October  10,  when  its  hit 
men  slayed  the  wife  and  son  of  a  conserv- 
ative newspaper  editor.  In  addition,  the 
guerrillas  executed  eight  captured  Sal- 
vadoran  Army  recioiits  on  September  26. 
The  governments  of  Nicaragua  and  Cuba 
have  supplied  the  FMLN  with  the 
weapons  and  training  to  conduct  this  con- 
tinuing reign  of  terror,  and  they  bear 
responsibility  for  these  crimes. 


The  FMLN  tells  the  press  that  such 
barbarities  ai'e  unauthorized  by  the  guer- 
rilla command.  In  fact,  the  assassination 
teams  are  trained,  equipped,  and  directed 
by  the  FMLN  command. 

President  Cristiani  has  made  every 
effort  to  negotiate  seriously  with  the 
FMLN  to  end  the  war  The  time  has 
come  for  the  FMLN  to  end  this  wanton 
bloodshed  and  agree  to  the  cease-fire  the 
Cristiani  government  has  offered.  We  con- 
demn these  killings  and  emphasize  in  the 
strongest  terms  that  civilized  nations  will 
never  permit  carnage  such  as  this  to  be 
used  as  a  negotiating  tactic. 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
OCT.  19, 19891 

We  understand  that  the  home  of 
Democratic  Convergence  leader  Ruben 
Zamora  was  bombed  last  night.  Yester- 


epartment  of  State  Bulletin/December  1989 


55 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


day  we  condemned  the  biutal  killing  of 
the  young  daughter  of  a  militai-y  officer. 
Today  we  condemn  with  equal  vigor  this 
reprehensible  act  against  Mr.  Zamora  and 
his  family 

We  have  fiiTnly  and  steadfastly  op- 
posed violence  fi'om  either  extreme, 
violence  which  has  only  one  objective— 
the  undoing  of  El  Salvador's  fledgling 
democracy.  We  do  not  know  which  group, 
from  which  teiTorist  extreme,  per- 
petrated this  criminal,  cowardly  act.  We 
hope  a  thorough  investigation  will  un- 
cover their  identity.  At  the  same  time,  we 
urge  the  vast  majority  of  democratic  Sal- 
vadorans  and  their  representative  par- 
ties to  continue  to  work  to  prevent  such 
acts  and  to  work  toward  a  return  to  the 
peace  and  normalcy  Salvadorans  have 
earned. 


'  Read  to  news  correspondent.s  by  Depart- 
ment spokesman  Maigarut  DeE.  Tutv/ilfcr.K 


President  Meets  With 
Colombian  President 


j     i 

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i  1 

1 

i  n   1 

Lj 

i  ■ 

M       ^ 

■  1 

"•™-'^^^^™!IW 

WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
SEPT.  28, 19891 

President  Bush  and  President  Barco  met 
for  approximately  IV2  hours  in  the 
Residence,  followed  by  a  brief  social 
reception.  Joining  them  were  Attorney 
General  Thornbui-gh,  drug  coordinator 
William  Bennett,  Gen.  Scowcroft  [Assist- 
ant to  the  President  for  National  Security 
Affairs],  Gov.  Sununu  [Chief  of  Staff], 
Deputy  Secretary  of  State  Lawrence 
Eagleburger,  deputy  national  secuiity  ad- 
viser Gates,  and  Ambassador  [to  Colom- 
bia Thomas  E.]  McNamara.  President 
Barco  is  in  the  United  States  to  address 
the  UN  General  Assembly. 


The  President  took  the  opportunity 
to  invite  him  to  the  White  House  for  a  di 
cussion  of  the  international  di-ug  situatiC' 
and  President  Barco's  courageous  effort' 
against  the  drag  cartels.  The  Pi'esident 
reaffinned  the  strong  commitment  of  thi 
United  States  in  assisting  President 
Barco's  efforts  and  noted  that  Colombia' 
fight  against  the  di'ug  traffickers  is  an  e; 
ample  to  the  rest  of  the  world. 

The  two  Presidents  talked  about  thi 
domestic  drug  problem  in  the  United 
States  and  the  Administi-ation's  efforts  1 
reduce  consumption.  They  discussed  U.i 
assistance  to  Colombia  to  ensure  that 
Colombia  was  receiving  the  necessary 
equipment  in  its  fight  against  drug  traf- 
fickers. They  also  discussed  the  pos- 
sibility of  other  nations  assisting 
Colombia  in  its  efforts  against  the  cartel 
and  the  President  indicated  his  willing- 
ness to  encourage  such  support. 

President  Barco  outlined  the  efforti 
that  the  Government  of  Colombia  is 
taking  against  di-ug  traffickers.  He  ex- 
pressed his  appreciation  for  the  help  of 
the  United  States  and  noted  that  this  is 
global  effort  in  which  international 
cooperation  is  important.  President 
Barco  also  discussed  Colombia's  econom 
situation.  President  Bush  said  the  Unite 
States  is  prepared  to  resume  discussions 
with  Colombia  and  others  in  order  to 
resolve  the  fundamental  problems  of  the 
current  International  Coffee  Agi'eemenl 

The  President  indicated  his  intentio 
to  work  closely  with  President  Bai'co  to 
e.xpand  bilateral  trade  and  investment  0 
portunities  in  order  to  spur  Colombia's 
economic  growth.  He  has  asked  the  U.S. 
Tr-ade  Representative  to  lead  an  inter- 
agency effort  to  examine  m'gently  what 
can  be  done,  particularly  with  respect  to 
generalized  system  of  preference  (GSP) 
benefits  and  in  the  area  of  agiicultural 
and  manufactured  items.  The  President 
noted  the  U.S.  willingness  to  work  with 
the  international  financial  institutions  to 
support  increased  economic  assistance  fc 
Colombia. 


'  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Oct.  2,  1989.1 


56 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  198 


^EATIES 


Ijrrent  Actions 


>?LTILATERAL 

\-iculture — Diseases 

I'niational  agi'eement  for  the  creation  at 

'is  lif  an  International  Office  for  Epizootics, 

V I  annex.  Done  at  Paris  Jan.  25,  1924. 

■_.  i-ii'il  into  force  Jan.  17, 1925;  for  the  U.S. 

r2',i,  1975.  TIAS  8141. 

Sessions  deposited:  Malta,  Apr.  27, 1989; 

(Iigdlia.  May  4,  1989. 

L^ation 

'i  nrnl  (in  the  authentic  quadrihngiial  text  of 
In  I  invention  on  international  civil  aviation 
IV.'^  1  ")91),  with  annex.  Done  at  Montreal 
;(t.:;(i,  1977." 
L-plance  deposited:  Malta,  Oct.  4, 1989. 

Misions 

'  wntion  on  the  intei'national  regulations 
'  iii'\  i-nting  collisions  at  sea,  1972,  with 
1  ilai  II ins.  Done  at  London  Oct.  20,  1972. 
:   ri  il  into  force  July  15, 1977.  TIAS  8587. 
u'ssii in  deposited:  Togo,  July  19, 1989. 

Iiiservation 

'million  on  international  trade  in  en- 
aivii'd  species  of  wild  fauna  and  flora,  with 
pndices.  Done  at  Washington  Mar.  3, 1973. 
;i  ■!•(•(  1  into  force  July  1, 1975.  TIAS  8249. 
i!  ssion  deposited:  Vanuatu,  July  17, 1989. 

't  eiilion  on  the  conservation  of  Ant-ai'ctic 

i;  ne  living  resoui'ces,  with  annex  for  an  ar- 

ii  1  tribunal.  Done  at  Canberra  May  20, 

9  ^  Entered  into  force  Apr.  7,  1982.TIAS 

on. 

.t.s.sjnns  deposited:  Finland,  Sept.  6, 1989; 

'e,  June  23, 1989. 

J  ndnient  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  3,  1973, 

a  tei'national  trade  in  endangered  species  of 

i  fauna  and  flora.  (TIAS  8249)  Adopted  at 

ainme  Apr.  30, 1983.  [Senate]  Treaty  Doc. 

SI).' 

■cptances  deposited:  Botswana,  Sept.  4, 

1)1':  I'inland,  June  27, 1989;  Luxembourg, 

I  -I'J.  1989;  Rwanda,  Aug.  30, 1989. 

ilsular  Relations 

iina  convention  on  consular  relations.  Done 
;  fnna  Apr.  24,  1963.  Entered  into  force 
I:  l!i,  1967;  for  the  U.S.  Dec.  24,  1969.  TIAS 

A  s-nms  deposited:  Bulgaria,  July  11, 1989;- 

II  h  Africa,  Aug.  21, 1989. 


^toms 

iinms  convention  on  containers,  1972,  with 
1  M  -  and  protocol.  Done  at  Geneva  Dec.  2, 
J .  I-.ntered  into  foi-ce  Dec.  6, 1975;  for  the 
'.  .May  12, 1985. 
J  SSI  I  in  deposited:  Indonesia,  Oct.  11,  1989. 

iinnis  convention  on  the  international 
I'll  of  goods  under  cover  of  TIR  carnets, 
:ii  iic.xes.  Done  at  Geneva  Nov.  14,  1975. 

.  iv,l  into  force  Mar.  20, 1978;  for  the  U.S. 

1  1^,  1982. 

LJJssiim  deposited:  Indonesia,  Oct.  11,  1989. 


Diplomatic  Relations 

Vienna  convention  on  diplomatic  relations. 

Done  at  Vienna  Apr.  18, 1961.  Entered  into 

force  Api-.  24, 1964;  for  the  U.S.  Dec.  13, 1972. 

TIAS  7502. 

Ratification  deposited:  South  Africa,  Aug.  21, 

1989. 

Finance 

Article.?,  of  agreement  of  the  International 
Monetary  Fund,  formulated  at  Bretton  Woods 
conference  July  1-22, 1944.  Entered  into  force 
Dec.27, 1945.  TIAS  1501. 
Simatui-e  and  accei^tjince  deposited:  Angola, 
Sept.  19, 1989. 

Articles  of  agreement  of  the  Intemational 
Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  Development  for- 
mulated at  Bretton  Woods  conference  July  1- 
22,  1944.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  27, 1945. 
TIAS  1502. 

Signatiu'e  and  acceptance  deposited:  Angola, 
Sept.  19, 1989. 

Gas 

Protocol  for  the  prohibition  of  the  use  in  war  of 
asphyxiating,  poisonous,  or  other  gases  and  of 
bacteriological  methods  of  warfare.  Done  at 
Geneva  June  17,  1925.  Entered  into  force  Feb. 
8, 1928;  for  the  U.S.  Apr.  10, 1975.  TIAS  8061. 
Accession  deposited:  Cameroon,  July  20, 1989. 

International  Court  of  Justice 

Declaration  recognizing  as  compulsory  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  International  Couit  of  Justice  under 
Art.  36,  para.  2  of  the  statute  of  the  Court.  59 
Stat.  1055;  TS  993. 

Declaration  deposited:  Guinea-Bissau,  Aug.  7, 
1989. 

Load  Lines 

Intemational  convention  on  load  hnes,  1966. 
Done  at  London  Apr.  5, 1966.  Entered  into 
force  July  21, 1968.  TIAS  6331, 6629,  6720. 
Accession  deposited:  Togo,  July  19, 1989. 

Maritime  Matters 

International  convention  on  standards  of  train- 
ing, certification,  and  watchkeeping  for 
seafarei-s,  1978.  Done  at  London  July  7, 1978. 
Entered  into  force  Apr.  28,  1984.-' 
Accession  deposited:  Togo,  July  19,  1989. 

Protocol  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful  acts 
against  the  safety  of  fixed  platfomis  located  on 
the  Continental  Shelf  Done  at  Rome  Mai-.  10, 
1988.'  [Senate]  Ti-eaty  Doc.  101-1. 
Accession  deposited:  Ti'inidad  and  Tobago, 
July  27, 1989. 

Narcotic  Drugs 

Protocol  amending  the  single  convention  on 

nai'cotic  diiigs,  1961.  Done  at  Geneva  Mar.  25, 

1972.  Entered  into  force  Aug.  8, 1975.  TIAS 

8118. 

Accession  deposited:  Jamaica,  Oct.  6, 1989. 

Convention  on  psychotropic  substances.  Done 

at  Vienna  Feb.  21, 1971.  Entered  into  force 

Aug.  16,  1976;  for  the  U.S.  July  15, 1980.  TIAS 

9725. 

Accession  deposited:  Jamaica,  Oct.  6, 1989. 


Nuclear  Accidents 

Convention  on  assistance  in  the  case  of  a 

nucleai'  accident  or  radiological  emergency. 

Done  at  Vienna  Sept.  26,  1986.  Entered  into 

force  Feb.  26,  1986;  for  the  U.S.  Oct.  20, 1988. 

[Senate]  Treaty  Doc.  100-4. 

Ratifications  deposited:  Egypt,  Oct.  17,  1988r* 

Israel,  May  25, 1989;-  Thailand,  Mar.  21, 1989;2 

Tunisia,  Feb.  24, 1989. 

Accession  deposited:  Cyprus,  Jan.  4, 1989. 

Approvals  deposited:  France,  Mar.  6, 1989;- 

Monaco,  July  19, 1989.- 

Convention  on  the  early  notification  of  a 
nuclear  accident.  Done  at  Vienna  Sept.  26, 
1986.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  27,  1986;  for  the 
U.S.  Oct.  20, 1988.  [Senate]  Ti-eaty  Doc.  100-4. 
Ratifications  deposited:  Israel,  May  25, 1989;^ 
Thailand,  Mar  21, 1989;-  Timisia,  Feb.  24, 1989. 
Accession  deposited:  Cypiiis,  Jan.  4, 1989. 
Approvals  deposited:  France,  Mai-.  6, 1989;^ 
Monaco,  July  19, 1989.- 

PoUution 

Protocol  of  1978  i3'..ti  ^, -^     p  .-t.i-.i;.!::^,r.ii 
convention  for  the  prevention  of  pollution  fi-om 
ships,  1973.  Done  at  London  Feb.  17, 1978. 
Entered  into  force  Oct.  2, 1983. 
Accession  deposited:  Cypi-us,  June  22, 1989. ■' 

Protocol  to  the  1979  convention  on  long-range 
transboundai-y  air  pollution  concerning  the  con- 
trol of  emis.sions  of  nitrogen  oxides  or  their 
transboundary  flukes,  with  annex.  Done  at 
Sofia  Oct.  31, 1988.' 

Ratification  deposited:  Noi-way,  Oct.  ''1. 1989. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Netherlands,  Oct.  11, 
1989. 

Convention  for  the  protection  of  the  ozone 
layer,  with  annexes.  Done  at  Vienna  Mar.  22, 
1985.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  22, 1988. 
[Senate]  Ti-eaty  Doc.  99-9. 

Accessions  deposited:  Cameroon,  Aug.  30, 
1989;  Chad,  May  19,  1989;  China,  Sept.  11, 
1989;  Iceland  and  Malaysia,  Aug.  29, 1989; 
Trinidad  and  Tobago,  Aug.  28,  1989;  Tunisia, 
Sept.  25, 1989. 

Montreal  protocol  on  substances  that  deplete 
the  ozone  layer,  with  annex.  Done  at  Montreal 
Sept.  16, 1987.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  1, 1989. 
[Senate]  Ti-eaty  Doc.  100-10. 
Accessions  deposited:  Cameroon,  Aug.  30, 
1989;  Iceland  and  Malaysia,  Aug.  29, 1989; 
Ti-inidad  and  Tobago,  Aug.  28,  1989;  Tunisia, 
Sept.  25, 1989. 

Safety  at  Sea 

Intei-national  convention  for  the  safety  of  life 

at  sea,  1974,  with  annex.  Done  at  London  Nov. 

1, 1974.  Entered  into  force  May  25, 1980.  TIAS 

9700. 

Accession  deposited:  Togo,  July  19, 1989. 

Protocol  of  1978  relating  to  the  international 
convention  for  the  safety  of  life  at  sea,  1974. 
{TIAS  9800).  Done  at  London  Feb.  17, 1978. 
Entered  into  force  May  1, 1981.  TIAS  10009. 
Accession  deposited:  Togo,  July  19, 1989. 


•tartment  of  State  Bulletin/December  1989 


57 


TREATIES 


Timber 

Intel-national  tropical  timbei-  agi-eement,  1983, 
with  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva  Nov.  18, 1983. 
Entered  into  force  provisionally  Apr.  1, 1985; 
fortheU.S.  Apr.26, 1985. 
Acces.sion  deposited:  Portugal,  July  3, 1989. 

Tonnage 

International  convention  on  tonnage  measure- 
ment of  ships,  1969,  with  annexes.  Done  at  Lon- 
don June  23, 1969.  Entered  into  force  July  18, 
1982;  for  the  U.S.  Feb.  10, 1983.  TIAS  10490. 
Accession  deposited:  Togo,  July  19, 1989. 

Torture 

Convention  against  torture  and  other  cruel,  in- 
human, or  degi'ading  treatment  or  punish- 
ment. Done  at  New  York  Dec.  10, 1984. 
Entered  into  force  June  26, 1987.^ 
Ratification  deposited:  Guinea,  Oct.  10, 1989. 

Trade 

United  Nations  convention  on  contracts  for  the 
international  sale  of  goods.  Done  at  Vienna 
Apr.  11, 1980.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  1, 1988. 
[52  Fed.  Reg.  6262] 

Accession  deposited:  Byelorussian  S.S.R.,  Oct. 
9, 1989. 

Treaties 

Vienna  convention  on  the  law  of  treaties,  with 

annex.  Done  at  Vienna  May  23,  1969.  Entered 

into  force  Jan.  27, 1980.-' 

Accession  deposited:  Solomon  Islands,  Aug.  9, 

1989. 

UNESCO 

Protocol  to  the  agreement  on  the  importation 
of  educational,  scientific,  and  cultural  materials 
of  Nov.  2, 1950.  Adopted  at  Nairobi  Nov.  26, 
1976.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  2, 1982;  for  the 
U.S.  Nov.  15, 1989. 

Ratification  deposited:  Germany,  Fed.  Rep.  of, 
Aug.  17, 1989.-' 

Weapons 

Convention  on  prohibitions  or  restrictions  on 

the  use  of  certain  conventional  weapons  which 

may  be  deemed  to  be  excessively  injurious  or 

to  have  indiscriminate  effects,  with  protocols. 

Done  at  Geneva  Oct.  10, 1980.  Entered  into 

force  Dec.  2, 1983.^ 

Ratification  deposited:  Liechtenstein,  Aug.  16, 

1989. 

Acceptance  deposited:  Liechtenstein,  Aug.  16, 

1989.6 

Wheat 

Wheat  trade  convention,  1986.  Done  at  London 
Mar.  14, 1986.  Entered  into  force  July  1,  1986; 
definitively  for  the  U.S.  Jan.  27, 1988.  [Senate] 
Treaty  Doc.  100-1. 


Food  aid  convention,  1986.  Done  at  London 
Mai-.  13, 1986.  Entered  into  force  July  1, 1986; 
definitively  for  the  U.S.  Jan.  27,  1988.  [Senate] 
Ti-eaty  Doc.  100-1. 

Ratifications  deposited:  Belgium,  June  2,  1989; 
Italj,  July  28,  1989;  Portugal,  July  17, 1989. 


BILATERAL 

Bolivia 

Swap  agi-eement  between  the  U.S.  Treasui-y 
and  the  Central  Bank  of  Bolivia/Government 
of  Bolivia,  with  related  letter.  Signed  at  La  Paz 
and  Washington  Sept.  14  and  15,  1989.  Entered 
into  force  Sept.  15, 1989. 

Canada 

Agi-eement  for  water  supply  and  flood  control 
in  the  Souris  River  Basin,  with  annexes. 
Signed  at  Washington  Oct.  26, 1989.  Entered 
into  force  Oct.  26, 1989. 

Cape  Verde 

Civil  aviation  secui-ity  agreement.  Signed  at 
Washington  Oct.  11, 1989.  Entered  into  force 
Oct.  11, 1989. 

Comoros 

Agi-eement  relating  to  radio  communications 
between  amateur  stations  on  behalf  of  third 
parties.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Moroni  Mai'.  8  and  Sept.  8, 1989.  Entered  into 
force  Oct.  8, 1989. 

Dominican  Republic 

Agi-eement  relating  to  the  agreement  of  June 
30, 1987,  for  sales  of  agricultural  commodities. 
Signed  at  Santo  Domingo  Aug.  24, 1989. 
Entered  into  force  Aug.  29, 1989. 

Agreement  amending  the  agi-eement  of  Aug. 
24, 1989,  for  sales  of  agi-icultural  commodities. 
Signed  at  Santo  Domingo  Sept.  27, 1989. 
Entered  into  force  Sept.  27, 1989. 

Egypt 

Grant  agreement  for  cash  transfer.  Signed  at 
Cairo  Aug.  17, 1989.  Entered  into  force  Aug. 
17,  1989. 

Finland 

Convention  for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxa- 
tion and  the  prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with 
respect  to  taxes  on  income  and  on  capital. 
Signed  at  Helsinki  Sept.  21, 1989.  Enters  into 
force  30  days  after  later  notification  of  ratifica- 
tion, accept-ance,  or  approval. 

Guyana 

Agi-eement  regarding  the  consolidation  and 
rescheduUng  or  refinancing  of  certain  debts 
owed  to,  guaranteed  by,  or  insured  by  the  U.S. 
Government  and  its  agencies,  with  annexes. 
Signed  at  Georgetown  Sept.  8, 1989.  Entered 
into  force  Oct.  13,  1989. 


Jamaica 

Agi-eement  regai-ding  the  consoUdation  and 
rescheduling  of  certain  debts  owed  to,  guarai 
teed  by,  or  insured  by  the  U.S.  Government 
and  its  agencies,  with  annexes.  Signed  at 
Kingston  July  6, 1989.  Entered  into  force  Auj 
24, 1989. 

Agi-eement  amending  the  agreement  of  Sept 
22,  1988,  as  amended,  for  sales  of  agi-icultura 
commodities.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
Kingston  Aug.  18  and  Sept.  12, 1989.  Entere» 
into  force  Sept.  12, 1989. 

Marshall  Islands 

Agi-eement  relating  to  diplomatic  relations, 
with  related  notes.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Washington  Aug.  23  and  Sept.  6, 19* 
Entered  into  force  Sept.  6, 1989. 

Mexico 

Swap  agi-eement  between  the  U.S.  Treasury 
and  the  Banco  de  Me.xico/Government  of 
Mexico,  with  memorandum  of  understanding 
Signed  at  Washington  and  Mexico  Sept.  14, 
1989.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  14, 1989. 

Micronesia 

Agi-eement  relating  to  diplomatic  relations, 
with  related  notes.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Washington  Aug.  23  and  24,  1989. 
Entered  into  force  Aug.  24, 1989. 

Mongolia 

Agi-eement  for  cooperation  in  cultural  and 
educational  exchange.  Signed  at  New  York 
Sept.  29, 1989.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  29, 
1989. 

Pakistan 

Program  grant  agreement  for  the  agricultur< 
sector  support  progi-am.  Signed  at  Islamabat 
Sept.  27, 1989.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  27, 
1989. 

Philippines 

Grant  agreement  for  the  Agrarian  Reform 
Support  Program  (ARSP).  Signed  at  Manila 
Aug.  28,  1989.  Entered  into  force  Aug.  28, 19 

Vietnam 

Agi-eenient  on  the  implementation  of  the  spe 
cial  released  reeducation  center  detainees 
resettlement  program,  with  annex.  Effected 
by  exchange  of  letters  at  Washington  and 
Hanoi  Aug.  18  and  28, 1989.  Entered  into  for 
Aug.  28, 1989. 


'  Not  in  force. 

-  With  declai-ation(s). 

■'  With  reservation{s). 

'  Not  in  force  for  the  U.S. 

■'  Does  not  accept  optional  annex  III. 

"Pi-otocolsl.  II,  andlll.B 


58 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/December  19 


RESS  RELEASES 


epartment  of  State 


jss  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Office 
press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
shington,  D.C.  20520-6810. 

Subject 

Baker:  toast  at  reception  for 
OAU  ambassadors,  New 
York  City,  Sept.  29. 

Baker:  news  briefing,  White 
House. 

Computerized  visas  for 
visitors  to  the  U.S. 

Donald  P.  Gregg  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  the 
Republic  of  Korea,  Sept.  14 
(biograpliic  data). 

Baker:  statement  before  the 
Senate  Finance  Committee. 

Progi-am  for  the  state  visit  of 
Italian  President  Cossiga, 
Oct.  10-17. 

Baker:  intei-view  on  NBC- 
TV's  "Meet  the  Press," 
Oct.  8. 

Baker:  intej-view  on  CBS  Eve- 
ning News,  Oct.  10. 

Sheldon  J.  Krys  assumes  posi- 
tion as  Assistant  Secretary 
for  Diplomatic  Secitfity, 
Aug.  9  (biogi-aphic  data). 

William  LudwigJacobsen,  Jr, 
sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Guinea-Bissau  (biographic 
data). 


*190      10/16 


••191       10/17 


192      10/17 


*193      10/18 


*194      10/18 


"195      10/18 


*196      10/26 


197 


'198 


10/23 
10/26 


*199      10/27 


200      10/25 


Progi-am  for  the  official  work- 
ing visit  of  Korean  Presi- 
dent Roh  Tae  Woo,  Oct. 
16-18. 

Program  for  the  official  work- 
ing \isit  of  Spanish  Prime 
Minister  Felipe  Gonzales, 
Oct.  18-20. 

Baker:  address  before  the 
Foreign  Policy  Association, 
New  York  City,  Oct.  16. 

Marion  V.  Creekmore,  Jr, 
sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Sri  Lanka  and  the  Maldives 
(biographic  data). 

Lannon  Walker  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  Nigeria, 
Oct.  17  (biographic  data). 

James  Richard  Cheek  sworn 
in  as  Ambassador  to  Sudan, 
Oct.  16  (biogi'aphic  data). 

Johnny  Young  sworn  in  as  Am- 
bassador to  Sierra  Leone, 
Oct.  30  (biographic  data). 

Baker:  address  before  the 
Commonwealth  Club,  San 
Francisco. 

Penne  Percy  Korth  sworn  in 
as  Ambassador  to  Mauritius 
(biographic  data). 

Kenneth  Lee  Brown  sworn  in 
as  Ambassador  to  Cote 
d'lvoire  (biogi'aphic  data). 

Baker:  news  conference, 
White  House. 


*201       10/26      Morris  D.  Busby  sworn  in  as 
Coordinator  for  Counterter- 
rorism,  Sept.  21  (biographic 
data). 

*202      10/27      John  Giffen  Weinmann  sworn 
in  as  Ambassador  to  Fin- 
land, Oct.  23  (biographic 
data). 

*203      10/27      Melvin  F.  Sembler  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  Australia 
and  Nauru,  Oct.  13 
(biographic  data). 
204      10/30      Baker:  news  briefing,  San 
Jose,  Oct.  27. 

*205      10/31      Sally  Johnson  Novetzke 

sworn  in  as  Ambassador  to 
Malta,  Oct.  28  (biogi-aphic 
data). 

*Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin.  ■ 


,3partment  of  State  Bulletin/December  1989 


59 


PUBLICATIONS 

1 

CSCE  Semiannual  Report  Released                                                                   1 

On  behalf  of  the  President,  the  Secretary 

countries  but  highlights  as  well  the  fact 

of  State  transmitted  on  June  14, 1989, 

that  in  many  cases,  citizens  of  these 

the  26th  semiannual  report  on  the  im- 

countries continue  to  face  sometimes 

plementation  of  the  Conference  on 

severe  obstacles  to  the  exercise  of  their 

Secuiity  and  Cooperation  in  Eui-ope 

basic  human  rights  and  fundamental 

(CSCE)  Helsinki  Final  Act  and  the 

freedoms. 

Madrid  and  Vienna  concluding  documents 

The  current  report  also  reviews  the 

to  the  congi-essional  Commission  on 

results  of  the  CSCE  foUowup  meeting 

Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe. 

which  ended  Januai-y  19  in  Vienna.  That 

'/"h-  S'ni  ir  .ua     3j oi .  covers  the 

meeting  produced  the  third  major  docu- 

parijd October  i,  1&58,  through  March 

ment  in  the  CSCE  process,  after  the  Hel- 

31,1989,  and  provides  an  assessment  of 

sinki  Final  Act  and  the  Madrid  con- 

Soviet and  East  Eui-opean  compUance 

cluding  document.  In  Vienna  the  par- 

with commitments  these  states  under- 

ticipating states  took  on  major  new 

took  in  adopting  the  Helsinki  Final  Act 

human  rights  commitments,  including 

and  the  Madrid  and  Vienna  concluding 

with  regard  to  the  rights  of  CSCE 

documents.  Among  the  issues  discussed 

monitors.  They  also  established  an  impor- 

in the  report  ai-e  human  rights  and 

tant  new  mechanism  pemiitting  in- 

humanitarian concerns;  security-  and  con- 

dividual CSCE  states  to  make  inquii-ies 

fidence-building  measures;  economic. 

into  specific  human  rights  cases  in  other 

scientific,  and  technological  cooperation; 

countries. 

emigration;  freedom  of  information  and 

This  report  is  a  central  element  in 

education;  and  cultural  exchanges. 

the  continuing  effort  by  the  United 

The  report  acknowledges  that  the 

States  to  assess  the  progress  and 

record  of  compliance  by  the  Soviet  Union 

shortcomings  in  the  implementation  of 

and  East  Em-opean  states  with  CSCE 

the  CSCE  goals  of  protecting  human 

commitments  vai'ies  from  countiy  to 

rights,  strengthening  security,  expanding 

country,  reflecting  the  increasingly  dif- 

cooperation, and  building  mutual  con- 

ferentiated situation  in  that  part  of  the 

fidence.  We  believe  that  vigorous  ex- 

world. The  report  makes  evident  that  the 

amination  of  an  individual  country's  per- 

overall performance  by  the  Wai-saw  Pact 

formance  is  important  to  ensuiing  that 

countries  in  the  area  of  human  rights  and 

verbal  and  written  commitments  are 

human  contacts  remains  unsatisfactoi-y  in 

transformed  into  reality. 

a  number  of  significant  ways  and  in  cer- 

Free single  copies  of  this  54-page 

tain  instances  amounts  to  a  serious  viola- 

report are  available  ft-om  the  Public  Infor- 

tion of  CSCE  commitments.  The  report 

mation  Division,  Bureau  of  Public  Affairs, 

takes  note  of  positive  developments 

Department  of  State,  Washington,  D.C. 

which  have  taken  place  in  certain  of  these 

20520-6810.  Please  request  Special 

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of  State  Bulletin.   It  ceased  publication  with  the  December  1789  issue. 
The  reason  given  for  its  demise  was  its  expenseC typesetting  costs  were 
*100,000)  and  the  fact  that  the  material  was  "duplicative"  and  appeared 
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the  Bulletin  is  the  single  publication  which  reaches  people  across  the 
country  through  their  libraries  and  is  the  only  government  published 
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While  depository  libraries  will  have  many  of  the  publications  listed  by 
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for  them.   Other  libraries  will  have  very  few  of  the  publications,  the 
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be  indexed.   So  that  you  know  your  editor  is  not  exaggerating,  here  is  a 
list  of  the  material  that  the  State  Dept.  recommends  be  used  in  place  of 
the  Dept.  of  State  Bulletin: 

Nato  Review   S  1.135:   not  depository 

UN  Chronicles 

USAID  Highlights   S  18.61:   900-C-21 

Foreign  Relations  of  U.S.   S  1.1:   872 

American  Foreign  Policy,  Current  Documemts   S  1.72:   875 

Business  America   C  61.18:   127-A 

OECD  Observer  (Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  «t 

Development) 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Documents   AE  2.109:   577-A 
Congressional  Hearings  Y  4.F  76/1:  and  Y  4.F  76/2   1017-A, 

1017-B(mf)  and  1039-A,  1039-B(mf) 
Treaties  and  other  International  Acts  Series   S  9.10:   899 
Organization  of  American  States  Official  Records 
Arms  Control  &  Disarmament  Agency  Issue  Briefs 
Dept.  of  State  Foreign  Policy  Press  Briefings 
Frontline  (Agency  for  International  Development) 

cont'd,  on  p. 3 


IvJDEX 


iecember  1989 
olume89,  No.  2153 


;igola 

I'll  It  s  Toward  Peace  and  Reconciliation  in 

Aii^nla  (Clai-k) 31 

cshlent's  Meeting  With  UNITA  Leader 

i\\  hite  House  statement)   32 

rms  Control 

'f'ciise  and  Space  Talks  Open  12th  Round 

(Cnoper)  33 

iK-liar  and  Space  Anns  Talks  Open  12th 

Round  (Burt) 33 

t'i-cc|uisites  and  Principles  for  Arms 

jControl  (Baker) 14 

^rma.  Political  Situation  in  Burma  (Lam- 
In  rtson)   37 

olombia.  President  Meets  With 

(  I  ilnmbian  President  (White  House  state- 

niint) 56 

pngress 

)0]H'ration  in  Countering  TeiTorism 

il'.n^by) 47 

ili:i'>  Human  Rights  Abuses  Under  the  UN 

Simtlight  (Valladai-es)   54 

■flirts  Toward  Peace  and  Reconciliation  in 

Anjiola  (Clark) 31 

ilitiral  Situation  in  Burma  (Lambertson)    .  37 
H'  I'l-dmise  of  Pacific  Economic  Cooperation 

(S(il(imon) 34 

nth  Africa  (Cohen)  29 

ird  Report  on  Cyprus  (message  to  the 

Congress) 41 

S.-Soviet  Relations:  A  Discussion  of 
Pi  rc.stroika  and  Economic  Reform 

:Baker)  20 

^iba.  Cuba's  Human  Rights  Abuses  Under 

the  UN  Spotlight  (Valladares)  54 

t^jrus 

'.  esident's  Meeting  With  Cyprus  President 

(White  House  statement)   41 

'lird  Report  on  Cypius  (message  to  the  Con- 
gress)    41 

:ist  Asia.  The  Promise  of  Pacific  Economic 
( 'iHi|)eration  (Solomon) 34 


Economics 

Freedom  and  World  Prosperity  (Bush) 8 

The  Promise  of  Pacific  Economic  Cooperation 
(Solomon) 34 

Egypt.  Pi-esident  Meets  With 

Egy^)tian  President  (Baker) 45 

El  Salvador.  Terrorist  Attacks  in  El  Salvador 
(Department  statements)  55 

Germany.  Secretary's  Interview  on  "Meet 
the  Piess" 26 

Human  Rights.  Cuba's  Human  Rights 
Abuses  Under  the  UN  Spotlight 
(Valladares)  54 

Hungary 

Assistance  for  Poland  and  Hungary  (White 
House  statement)  39 

Constitutional  Amendments  in  Hungary 

(White  House  statement)   39 

Secretary's  InteiTiew  on  "Meet  the  Press"  .  26 

Israel.  President  Meets  With  Egyptian  Presi- 
dent (Baker) 45 

Italy 

Italy— A  Profile   43 

Visit  of  Italian  President  (Bush,  Cossiga) ...  42 

Lebanon 

Agieement  on  Lebanese  National  Reconcilia- 
tion (Department  statement)  46 

President  Meets  With  Egyptian  President 
(Baker) ". 45 

Mexico 

Mexico — A  Profile   4 

Visit  of  Mexican  President  Salinas  (Bush, 
Salinas,  fact  sheets  on  agreements) 1 

Middle  East.  Secretary's  Interview  on  "Meet 
the  Press" 26 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization. 
President  Meets  With  NATO  Secretai-y 
General  (White  House  statement) 44 

Nicaragua.  Secretary's  Interview  on  "Meet 
the  Press" 26 

Panama.  Secretary's  Interview  on  "Meet  the 
Press" ." 26 

Peru.  Sendero  Luminoso:  Peruvian  Terrorist 
Group  49 

Poland.  Assistance  for  Poland  and  Hungary 
(White  House  statement) 39 

Presidential  Documents 

Freedom  and  World  Prosperity 8 

Third  Report  on  Cyprus  (message  to  the  Con- 
gress)    41 

United  Nations  Day,  1989  (proclamation)  . .   53 

Visit  of  Itahan  President  (Bush,  Cossiga)  ..   42 

Visit  of  Mexican  President  Salinas  (Bush, 
Salinas,  fact  sheets  on  agreements)   1 


Publications.  CSCE  Semiannual  Report 

Relea.sed    60 

South  Africa.  South  Africa  (Cohen) 29 

Terrorism 

Cooperation  in  Countering  Terrorism 
(Busby)   47 

Sevdero  Luminoso:  Peruvian  Terrorist 
Group 49 

Terrorist  Attacks  in  El  Salvador  (Department 
statements) 55 

Treaties.  Current  Actions   57 

U.S.S.R. 

Defense  and  Space  Talks  Open  12th  Round 
(Cooper) 33 

Nuclear  and  Space  Arms  Talks  Open  12th 
Round  (Burt)    33 

Points  of  Mutual  Advantage:  Perestroika  and 
American  Foreign  Policy  (Baker) 10 

Prerequisites  and  Principles  for  Arms  Control 
(Baker) 14 

U. S.-Soviet  Relation.s:  A  Discussion  of 
Perestroika  and  Economic  Reform 
(Baker) 20 

United  Nations 

UN  Mandate  Under  Central  America  Agree- 
ments (Department  statement.  Secretary's 
letter  to  UN  Secretary  General) 53 

LInited  Nations  Day,  1989  (proclamation)  . .   53 

Western  Hemisphere.  UN  Mandate  Under 
Central  America  Agreements  (Department 
statement,  Secretai-y's  letter  to  UN 
Secretary  General)   53 

Name  Index 

Baker,  Secretary   10,14,20,26,45,53 

Burt,  Richard  R  33 

Busby,  Morris  D 47 

Bush!  Pre.sident  1,8,41,42,53 

Clark.  Warren,  Jr 31 

Cohen,  Herman  J 29 

Cooper,  Henry  F   33 

Cossiga,  Francesco   42 

Lambertson,  David  F  37 

Salinas  de  Gortari,  Carlos 1 

Solomon,  Richard  H 34 

Valladares,  Aimando  54 


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'he  Official  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  p|)lfy^?^^TO7 
■ ^ f — ^ — ^-^^'c^,, 


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t,„-N^s.  2142-2153 


Wyoming  Ministerial 


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DepartntPiii  of  Siaip 

bulletin 


Vol  89/  Nos  2142-2153 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public  Com- 
munication in  the  Bureau  of  Public  Af- 
fairs, is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide 
the  public,  the  Congress,  and  govern- 
ment agencies  with  information  on  de- 
velopments in  U.S.  foreign  relations 
and  the  work  of  the  Department  of 
State  and  the  Foreign  Service.  The 
Bulletln's  contents  include  major  ad- 
dresses and  news  conferences  of  the 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  State; 
statements  made  before  congressional 
committees  by  the  Secretary  and  other 
senior  State  Department  officials;  se- 
lected press  releases  issued  by  the 
White  House,  the  Department,  and  the 
U.S.  Mission  to  the  United  Nations; 
and  treaties  and  other  agreements  to 
which  the  United  States  is  or  may  be- 
come a  party.  Special  features,  articles, 
and  other  supportive  material  (such  as 
maps,  charts,  photographs,  and  graphs) 
are  published  frequently  to  provide  ad- 
ditional information  on  current  issues 
but  should  not  necessarily  be  inter- 
preted as  official  U.S.  policy 
statements. 


GEORGE  P.  SHULTZ 
JAMES  A.  BAKER,  III 

Secretaries  of  State 

CHARLES  REDMAN 
MARGARET  DeB.  TUTWILER 

Assistant  Secretaries 
for  Public  Affairs 

PAUL  E.  AUERSWALD 
ANTHONY  A.  DAS 

Directors, 

Office  of  Public  Communication 

COLLEEN  LUTZ 

Chief,  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 

SHARON  R.  HAYNES 
MARILYN  J.  BREMNER 

Assistant  Etlitors 


The  Secretary  of  State  has  determined  that 
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Use  of  funds  for  printing  this  periodical 
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September  30,  1989. 


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INDEX:  Volume  89,  Numbers  2142-2153 


bram,  Morris,  Sept.  88 
dams,  Alvin  P.,  Jr.,  May  78 
fghanistan: 

Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 
Oct.  56 
Economy,  Mar.  86 
Soviet  occupation  and  withdrawal: 
Bush,  Apr.  5;  NAC,  Feb.  46; 
Reagan,  Mar.  89 
Geneva  negotiations.  Mar.  74 
Human  rights  issues.  Mar.  85 
International  concerns.  Mar.  84 
Kabul  regime  and  national  recon- 
ciliation policy,  Mar.  79 
Military  situation.  Mar.  76 
Political  settlement:  Baker,  Nov. 
38;  U.S. -Soviet  joint  state- 
ment, Nov.  7 
Regional  context.  Mar.  83 
Resistance  activities.  Mar.  76,  81 
Self-determination  for  Afghanis 
(Baker),  Apr.  23,  Aug.  60, 
Sept.  51 
Soviet  decision  to  withdraw:  Mar. 

73;  Bush,  Apr.  48 
UN  General  Assembly  Resolution 

43/20  (Walters),  Jan.  40 
U.S.  policy.  Mar.  89 
UN  Afghanistan  Emergency  Fund, 
FY  90,  U.S.  funding,  proposed 
(Vogelgesang),  May  82 
UN  involvement: 
Peacekeeping  force  (Reagan),  Feb.  6 
Humanitarian  aid,  Mar.  87 
j'rica  {see  also  Refugees  and  yiames  of 

individual  countries): 
Agency  for  International  Develop- 
ment (AID)  progi'ams  (Perkins), 
Aug.  72 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 

^        States  1955-1957,  Volume  XVIII, 
Africa,  released,  July  80 
rganization  of  African  Unity  (OAU): 
Reagan,  Jan  14;  Traore,  Jan  14, 
15 
Regional  conflicts  (U.S. -Soviet  joint 

statement),  Nov.  7 
Southern: 
Economic,  social,  political  situation 

(Perkins),  Aug.  70 
UN  educational  and  humanitarian 
progi-ams  (Vogelgesang),  May 
83 
U.S.  policy  and  objectives 
(Perkins),  Sept.  73 
Sub-Sahara: 
International  Finance  Corporation 
assistance  (Brady),  June  28 


I 


Africa  (Cont'd) 

U.S.  aid,  FY  90,  request:  Baker, 
Apr.  20;  Rosenberg,  July  39 
U.S.  policy  (Perkins),  Aug.  69,  71 
African  Development  Bank  (AFDB), 
U.S.  funding,  FY  90  request 
(Brady),  June  29 
African  Development  Fund  (AFDF), 
U.S.  funding,  FY  90  request 
(Brady),  June  29 
Agriculture  (see  also  Wheat): 
Agrarian  Reform  Support  Program 
(ARSP),  grant  agreement  with 
Philippines,  Dec.  58 
Agricultural  commodities,  sales  of,  bi- 
lateral agreements:  Bangladesh, 
Oct.  85;  Costa  Rica,  Jan.  50,  Feb. 
75;  Cote  d'lvoire,  Oct.  85; 
Dominican  Republic,  Dec.  58; 
Egypt,  Feb.  75,  June  69,  Oct.  85; 
El  Salvador,  Feb.  75;  Ghana, 
Jan.  50,  June  69;  Guyana,  Oct. 
86;  Honduras,  May  87,  Oct.  85; 
Indonesia,  Feb.  75;  Jamaica,  Jan. 
50,  Dec.  58;  Kenya,  Feb.  75; 
Morocco,  Feb.  75;  Pakistan,  Jan. 
50;  Peru,  Aug  90;  Sri  Lanka, 
Jan.  51,  Aug.  90,  Nov.  80; 
Sudan,  Sept.  93,  Oct.  86;  Ugan- 
da, Apr.  63;  Yemen  Arab 
Republic,  Jan.  51;  Zaire,  Jan.  51; 
Zambia,  July  78 
Agi-icultural  commodities  and  equip- 
ment, bilateral  grant  and  loan 
agi-eement  with  Pakistan,  Jan.  50 
Agricultural  sector  support  program, 
bilateral  agreement  with  Pakis- 
tan, Dec.  58 
European  Community  common  policy: 
Jan.  25;  Delors,  Feb.  29;  Lambi 
Feb.  35;  Schultz,  Feb.  29 
GATT  trade  negotiation  issues  (Hills), 

June  31 
International  office  for  epizootics,  in- 
ternational agreement  (1924): 
Malta,  Mongolia,  Dec.  57 
International  plant  protection  conven- 
tion (1951),  Oman,  June  68 
International  trade  issues,  Feb.  36 
Multilateral  development  banks 

project  funding  (Brady),  June  25 
Raw  agricultural  products  involved  in 
commerce  between  Me.xico  and 
U.S.,  bilateral  agi-eement  with 
Me.xico,  Mar.  93 
Subsidies:  Delors,  Shultz,  Feb.  29 
Trade  issues  (Hills),  Nov.  54 
U.S. -Canada  Free  Trade  Agreement, 
Oct.  2,  3 
Algeria,  treaties,  agi'eements,  etc.,  Apr. 

62,  May  86,  June  68,  Nov.  79 
Alvarez  Del  Castillo,  Enrique,  Oct.  79 


American  Foreign  Policy:  Current 

Documents,  1987,  released,  Mar.  94 
American  Foreign  Policy:  Foreign  Af- 
fairs Press  Briefings,  198^.  Supple- 
ment,  released,  Feb.  77 
American  ideals:  Baker,  Apr.  11;  Bush, 

Apr.  1;  Shultz,  Jan.  1 
Angola,  People's  Republic  of: 
Angola/Namibia  Peace  Accords:  Crock- 
er, Feb.  10;  Shultz,  Feb.  11; 
White  House,  Feb.  10 
Protocol  of  Brazzaville,  text,  Feb. 

11 
Tripartite  Agreement,  text,  Feb.  13 
Cuban  troop  withdrawal  settlement: 
Baker,  May  29;  Department,  Jan. 
16 
Termination  of  Cuban  military  mis- 
sion, bilateral  agreement  with 
Cuba,  text,  Feb.  13 
International  Bank  for  Reconstruction 
and  Development/International 
Monetarv  Fund,  agi'eement,  Dec. 
57 
Peace  process,  overview  and  U.S. 
policy  (Clark),  Dec.  31 
Chronology,  1974-1988  (Howland), 
Feb.  ie 
Antarctica  (see  also  Conservation): 
Antarctic  Treaty  (1959),  Colombia, 

June  68 
Mineral  resources  activities,  conven- 
tion (1988):  Argentina,  Chile, 
July  76;  China,  Sept.  93;  U.K., 
July  76;  U.S.,  Feb.  23 
Antig-ua  and  Barbuda,  treaties,  agree- 
ments, etc.,  Jan.  49,  Feb.  73,  74, 
75,  Mar.  91,  92,  May  86,  87,  June 
69,  Nov.  79 
ANZUS  (Australia,  New  Zealand,  U.S.) 

security  agreement,  Apr.  37 
Arab-Israeli  conflict  (see  also  Israel  and 
Middle  East): 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 

States,  1955-1957,  Volume  XIV, 
Arab-Israeli  dispute,  1955, 
released,  Aug.  92 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 
States,  1955-1957,  Volume  XV, 
Arab-Israeli  dispute,  Jan.  1-July 
26,  1956,  released,  Aug.  93 
Occupied  territories: 
Palestinian  statehood:  Baker,  June 

13,  18 
West  Bank  elections:  Baker,  June 
12,  July  26,  Aug.  15,  59,  Sept. 
8,  68,  Dec.  20;  Van  den  Broek, 
Sept.  52 
Peace  process:  Hussein,  July  55; 

Kelly,  Oct.  44,  Nov.  61;  Murphy, 
Feb.  57 


apartment  of  State  Bulletin/Index  1989 


Arab-Israeli  conllict  (Cont'd) 

Egyptian  10-point  plan  (Baker), 
Nov.  31,  35,  38,  42,  Dec.  45 
Egypt's  role  (Walker),  May  62 
European  Community  proposal 

(Baker),  May  60 
Jordanian  position:  Baker,  May  1, 

4;  Walker,  May  64 
Multinational  Force  and  Observers 
(MFO),  U.S.  aid,  FY  90,  re- 
quest (Walker),  May  64 
Palestine  Liberation  Organization: 

Reagan,  Feb.  51 
Palestinian-Israeli  negotiations: 
Baker,  May  2,  4,  26,  Nov.  35, 
38;  Bush,  May  7;  Murphy,  Feb. 
55;  U.S. -Soviet  joint  state- 
ment, Nov.  7 
Soviet  role;  Baker,  May  2,  July  27, 

30,  Nov.  35;  Reagan,  Feb.  5 
U.K.  support  (Baker),  Aug.  44 
U.S./PLO  dialogues:  Baker,  Aug. 

59,  Sept.  9;  Pelletreau,  May  66 
U.S.  initiative  and  objectives: 

Baker,  Apr.  19,  June  10,  July 
24,  31,  Dec.  27;  Bush,  May  4,  16 
Arbitration,  recognition  and  enforce- 
ment of  foreign  arbitral  awards,  con- 
vention (1958):  Algeria,  May  86;  An- 
tigua and  Barbuda,  Feb.  23,  May 
86;  Argentina,  Nov.  79;  Dominica, 
Jan.  49;  Kenya,  May  86;  Lesotho, 
Aug.  88 
Arens,  Moshe,  May  63 
Argentina: 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 
Oct.  56 
Political  situation  (Shultz),  Feb.  8 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  50, 
July,  76,  77,  Aug.  89,  Oct.  85, 
Nov.  79 
U.S.  military  aid:  Baker,  Aug.  42,  43; 
Kozak,  June  64 
Armacost,  Michael  H.,  Feb.  54 
Armaments,  U.S.  (see  also  Defense  and 
national  security): 
Arms  sales,  proposed: 
Pakistan  (Schaffer),  Oct.  65 
Saudi  Arabia  (Baker),  Nov.  37 
Coproduction  of  the  MlAl  tank, 
bilateral  agi'eement  with  Egypt, 
Feb.  75 
Foreign  military  sales  (FMS)  program 

(Baker),  Apr.  20 
FSX  Aircraft,  codevelopment  agree- 
ment with  Japan:  Bush,  July  48; 
Eagleburger,  July  49 
Lance  missiles  and  NATO:  Baker, 

Apr.  39,  40;  Bush,  Aug.  51 
Multiple  launch  rocket  systems 
(MLRS)  (Baker),  Aug.  42 


Arms  control  and  disarmament  (.see  also 
Europe:  Confidence-  and  Security- 
Building  Measures  (CSBMs)  negotia- 
tions; Europe:  Conventional  armed 
forces  in  Europe  (CFE),  negotia- 
tions; Europe:  Mutual  and  balanced 
force  reduction  talks;  and  Soviet 
Union:  U.S.  arms  control  negotia- 
tions): 
Certain  conventional  weapons  with  e.\- 
cessively  injurious  or  indis- 
criminate effects,  convention  with 
protocols  (1980):  Benin,  Aug.  89; 
Cyprus,  Mar.  92 
Conventional  weapons  and  forces: 
Burns,  Jan.  43;  Bush,  May  9,  15, 
Aug.  39,  Nov.  ;30;  Shultz,  Feb.  47 
Conventional  Parity  Initiative: 
Baker,  Aug.  42,  43,  68,  Sept. 
10;  Oct.  44,  45;  Bush,  Aug.  16, 
30,  32,  Sept.  24;  White  House, 
Sept.  76 
NAC  heads  of  state  meeting,  Brus- 
sels (1989),  comprehensive  con- 
cept, Aug.  27 
NAC  ministerial  meeting,  Brussels 
(Dec.  1988),  statement  on  con- 
ventional arms  control,  text, 
Feb.  43 
NATO  perspective,  Aug.  9 
Stability  talks  (Shultz),  Feb.  48 
East-West  relations:  Bush,  Sept.  25; 

Nitze,  Apr.  45 
Initiatives  (NAC  heads  of  state), 

Aug.  19 
Missile  technology  control  regime 

(Shultz),  Jan'.  3,  9 
NAC  heads  of  state  meeting,  Brus- 
sels (1989),  comprehensive  con- 
cept of  arms  control  and  disarma- 
ment, te.xt,  Aug.  22 
NAC  ministerial  meeting,  Brussels 
(Dec.  1988),  final  communique, 
Feb.  44 
NATO  Conventional  Armaments  Plan- 
ning System  (CAPS),  NAC,  Feb. 
46 
NATO  Defense  Planning  Committee, 
Brussels  (1988),  final  communi- 
que, Feb.  42 
NATO  "flexible  response"  policy, 

Aug.  7 
NATO  Nuclear  Planning  Group,  The 
Hague  (1988),  final  communique, 
Jan.  28 
NATO  Nuclear  Planning  Group,  Brus- 
sels (1989),  final  communique, 
June  36 
Nuclear  weapons  (NAC  heads  of 

state),  Aug.  26 
"Open  skies"  initiative:  Baker,  Nov. 
7,  10,  Dec.  17;  Bush,  July  16, 
Aug.  16,  Nov.  30 
Third  world  countries  and  prolifera- 
tion of  weapons:  Baker,  Dec.  19; 
Kelly,  Oct.  45 


Anns  control  and  disannanient  (Cont'd 
U.S.  arms  control  initiatives  (see  also 
Conventional  Parity  Initiative 
and  "Open  skies"  above) 
(Cooper),  Oct.  22 
U.S.  arms  control  objectives:  Baker, 

Dec.  14,  16;  Burns,  Jan.  41 
Verification  issues  (Nitze),  Apr.  46 
Asia  {see  also  Pacific  Ocean  region  and 
names  of  indiridnal  countries): 
East  Asia: 
Economic  development,  Apr.  33 
U.S.  aid,  FY  90,  request  (Clark), 
May  49 
Southeast  Asia,  refugees  (Bush), 
Sept.  60 
Asian  Development  Bank  (ADB),  U.S. 
funding,  FY  90,  request  (Brady), 
June  29 
Asian  Development  Fund  (ADF),  U.S. 
funding,  FY  90,  request  (Brady), 
June  29 
Aspe  Armella,  Pedro,  Oct.  80 
Association  of  South  East  Asian  Nation; 
(ASEAN):  Apr.  36;  Baker,  Sept. 
58,  60;  Lambertson,  May  38; 
Quayle,  Aug.  55;  Shultz,  Jan.  8; 
Solomon,  Nov.  48 
Australia: 

Economic  development,  Apr.  37 
Profile,  Oct.  61 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar.  92, 
Mav  86,  87,  July  77,  Aug.  89, 
Nov.  79 
U.S.  visit  of  Prime  Minister  Hawke: 
Bush,  Hawke,  Oct.  60 
Austria: 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 
States,  1953-1957,  Volume  V, 
Austrian  State  Treaty;  Sninmit 
and  Foreign  Ministers'  Meeti)igs 
1955,  released,  Apr.  64  h 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  74,   I 
Mar.  92,  May  86,  July  77,  Aug.   \ 
89,  Sept.  93  i 

Automobile  industry,  U.S. -Canada  Frecl  j. 

Trade  Agreement,  Oct.  2,  5  ! 

Aviation: 
Additional  services,  memo  of  under- 
standing with  Mexico,  Jan.  50 
Air  services,  bilateral  agreements: 
Austria,  July  77;  Greece,  U.K., 
Aug.  90 
Air  transport,  bilateral  agi-eements: 
Australia,  July  77;  Bolivia,  May 
87;  Czechoslovakia,  June  69; 
Federal  Reijublic  of  Germany, 
July  77;  Hungary,  Nov.  80;  Indii 
Aug.  90;  Italy,  Feb.  75;  Mexico, 
May  88;  Philippines,  July  78; 
Spain,  Aug.  90;  Yugoslavia,  Feb 
76 
Air  transport,  capacity  for  North 
Pacific,  South  Pacific  and  Guam 
routes,  amendment,  bilateral 
agreement  with  Australia,  July  7 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/Index  19f 


viation  (Cont'd) 

Airline  fitness  and  citizenship  deter- 
minations, reciprocal  recognition, 
bilateral  agreement  with  U.K., 
Aug.  90 
Airworthiness  certifications,  reciprocal 
acceptance,  bilateral  agreement 
with  Argentina,  Oct.  85 
All-cargo  services,  memo  of  under- 
standing with  Me.xico,  Jan.  50 
Chai'ter  flights,  memo  of  under- 
standing with  Me.xico,  Jan.  50 
Civil  aviation  (McAllister),  Oct.  33 
Civil  air  transport,  bilateral  agi'ee- 
ments  with  Romania,  June  69, 
Nov.  80 
Developing  and  modernizing  the 
Bahamas  civil  aviation  system, 
memo  of  agreement,  Aug.  89 
Developing  and  modernizing  the 
Marshall  Islands  civil  aviation 
system,  bilateral  agi-eement, 
Sept.  94 
International  civil  aviation,  conven- 
tion (1944):  Bhutan,  July  76; 
Mongolia,  Nov.  79 
Protocol  on  authentic  trilingual 
text  (1968):  Cyprus,  Mon- 
golia, Nov.  79 
Protocol  on  authentic  quadrilin- 
giial  text  (1977):  Antigua  and 
Barbuda,  Jan.  49;  Cyprus, 
Nov.  79;  Malta,  Dec'.  59 
Security,  bilateral  agreement  with 
Cape  Verde,  Dec.  58 
International  air  services  transit 
agreement  (1944),  Antigua  and 
Barbuda,  Mar.  91 
International  recognition  of  rights  in 
aircraft,  convention  (1948): 
Bangladesh,  Guatemala,  Apr.  62 
Reduced  air  fares,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Mexico,  Jan.  50 
Security  and  Terrorism  Commission 
formed,  (White  House),  Oct.  68 
Suppression  of  unlawful  acts  against 
the  safety  of  civil  aviation,  con- 
vention (1971):  Laos,  June  68; 
Marshall  Islands,  Aug.  88;  Zim- 
babwe, May  86 
Protocol  (1988):  Austria,  Belgium, 
Byelorussian  S.S.R.,  Sept.  93; 
Cameroon,  Apr.  62;  Congo,  Fin- 
land, Aug.  88;  Gabon,  Sept.  93; 
German  Democratic  Republic, 
Hungary,  Aug.  88;  Ireland,  Jor- 
dan, Sept.  93;  Democratic 
People's  Republic  of  Korea, 
Aug.  88;  Kuwait,  Luxembourg, 
July  76;  Marshall  Islands,  Sept. 
93;  Mauritius,  Aug.  88,  Oct.  84; 
Morocco,  New  Zealand,  Peru, 
Sept.  93;  Philippines,  Apr.  62; 
St.  Vincent  and  the  Grena- 
dines, Saudi  Arabia,  Soviet 
Union,  Spain,  Sri  Lanka,  Togo, 


Aviation  (Cont'd) 

Turkey,  Sept.  93;  United  Arab 
Emirates,  May  86 
Suppression  of  unlawful  seizure  of 
aircraft,  convention  (1970):  Laos, 
June  68;  Marshall  Islands,  Aug. 
88;  Vanuatu,  Zimbabwe,  May  86 
Technical  assistance  to  improve 
Oman's  air  transportation  serv- 
ices, bilateral  agi-eement  with 
Oman,  Jan.  50 
U.S.  policy  and  objectives  (Mc- 
Allister), Oct.  33 


B 


Bahamas: 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 
May  69,  Oct.  57 
Treaties,  agi-eements,  etc.,  May  87, 
Aug.  89 
Bahrain: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  73, 

Mar.  91 
U.S.  visit  of  Foreign  Minister  al- 
Khalifa,  Oct.  67 
Baker,  James  A.,  Ill: 
Addresses,  remarks,  and  statements: 
Acid  rain,  Apr.  28,  30 
Afghanistan,  Apr.  23,  Aug.  60, 

Sept.  51,  Nov.  38 
Arab-Israeli  conflict  and  peace 

process  {for  details  see  Arab-Is- 
raeli conflict):  May  1,  4,  60 
Egyptian  10-point  plan,  Nov.  31, 

'  35,  38,  42,  Dec.  45 
Palestinian  issues.  May  2,  4,  26, 

June  13,  18,  Nov."35,  38 
Soviet  role.  May  2,  July  27,  30, 

Nov.  35 
U.S.  initiative  and  objectives, 
Apr.  19,  June  10,  July  24, 
31,  Dec.  27 
U.S.-PLO  dialog-ues,  Aug.  59, 

Sept.  9 
West  Bank  elections,  June  12, 
July  26,  Aug.  15,  44,  59, 
Sept.  6,  8,  12,  30,  32,  52,  61, 
68,  Nov.  36,  Dec.  20 
Argentina,  U.S.  military  aid  to, 

Aug.  42,  43 
Arms  control  and  disai'mament. 
May  56,  Nov.  32,  Dec.  16,  17, 
20 
Conventional  Parity  Initiative, 
Aug.  42,  43,  68,  Sept.  10,  44, 
45 
U.S.  troop  reduction  proposals, 
Aug.  42,  44 
Association  of  South  East  Asian  Na- 
tions (ASEAN),  Sept.  58,  60 
Baltic  states,  U.S.  policy,  Nov.  17, 

42 
Beriin  Wall,  Aug.  58 


Baker,  James  A.,  Ill  (Cont'd) 

Cambodia,  U.S.  policy,  Sept.  59, 

61,  62,  Oct.  25 
Canada,  U.S.  relations,  Apr.  11, 

17,  28,  June  9 
Caribbean  Basin  Initiative,  June  7, 

8 
Central  America,  Apr.  12,  17,  28,  29 
Bipartisan  accord,  June  56 
Esquipulas  agreement,  June  7, 
10,  Oct.  79,  82 
Change  and  international  relations, 

July  36,  Aug.  55 
Chemical  weapons,  Apr.  15,  19, 
May  58,  Nov.  1,  32,  34,  39, 
Dec.  17,  20 
China: 
ASEAN  relations,  Sept.  62 
Human  rights  issues,  May  10, 

Sept.  64 
Political  and  economic  reforms, 

July  23,  29,  Aug.  66,  Sept.  6 
Student  demonstrations  and 
government  reprisals,  July 
29,  Aug.  14,  67 
U.S.  response,  Sept.  5,  11,  61, 

63,  64,  Nov.  37 
U.S.  relations,  Apr.  18,  Aug.  58, 
59 
Conventional  armed  forces  in 
Europe  (CFE),  negotiations. 
May  56,  59,  Nov.  13 
Creative  I'esponsibility  sharing  and 
regional  problems,  Aug.  57,  60, 
65,  Sept.  46,  56 
Cuba,  Castro's  position,  Sept.  10 
Debt  management,  June  18,  Sept. 

4,  5,  7,  8,  32,  56,  65 
Defense  and  national  security,  Dec. 
15 
Defense  budget,  Apr.  28,  31, 

Nov.  17,  Dec.  18 
European  based  missiles,  July  28, 

29,  34,  35 
Multiple  launch  rocket  system 

(MLRS),  Aug.  42 
Stealth  bomber,  Sept.  12,  Dec.  18 
Strategic  Defense  Initiative 

(SDI),  June  16,  Nov.  10,  11, 
12,  15 
Democracy  and  democratic 

progress,  June  6,  July  36,  Aug. 
48 
Denmark,  in  NATO  aUiance,  Apr. 

40 
Drugs,  narcotic.  May  68,  Oct.  49 
(quoted) 
Latin  America,  June  8,  Oct.  13, 
14,  76,  Dec.  19 
East- West  relations,  Apr.  18,  30, 
May  56,  June  10,  Aug.  56, 
Sept.  3 
Economy,  world,  July  24,  Sept.  51 
Summit  of  the  Arch,  Sept.  3,  63 
Environmental  problems  and  con- 
trol, Sept.  32,  Oct.  80 


'epartment  of  State  Bulletin/Index  1989 


Baker,  James  A.,  Ill  (Cont'd) 
Ethics  issues,  Apr.  22,  30 
Europe,  Eastern,  reform  movement: 
U.S.  response  to  change,  Aug. 

42,  Sept.  7,  10,  52,  Nov.  40, 

43,  Dec.  20 
Warsaw  Pact,  Dec.  28,  29 

European  Community,  Apr.  12,  18 
Foreign  policy,  Apr.  16,  Mav  10, 
Junes,  11 
Bipartisanship,  May  24,  June  9 
Foreign  Service  issues,  Dec.  18 
Freedom,  Apr.  11,  May  56,  Aug.  6 
Germany,  Federal  Republic  of, 
June  15,  17 
Reunification,  Dec.  20,  28 
Short-range  nuclear  missile 

deployment,  Aug.  13,  14 
U.S.  relations,  Apr.  21,  39,  July, 
22,  28,  34 
Greece,  in  NATO  alliance,  Apr.  41 
Human  rights  issues,  May  10,  July 

29,  Nov.  14 
Hungary: 
Democratic  progress,  Dec.  29 
U.S.  support  for  reforms,  Sept. 
4,  11,  46,  Nov.  38 
Iceland,  in  NATO  alliance,  Apr.  38 
India,  nuclear  weapons,  Aug.  69 
Iran,  U.S.  relations,  Aug.  57,  Oct. 

13,  14 
Israel,  U.S.  relations.  May  63 
Italy,  aid  to  Nicaragua,  June  15 
Japan,  U.S.  relations,  Apr.  24,  May 

2,  Aug.  65 
Korea,  ambassadorial  appointment, 

July  29 
Latin  America,  shared  destiny, 

June  5 
Leadership  and  bipartisanship, 

Apr.  11,  16,  June  9 
Lebanon,  cease-fire  efforts,  July  30, 
Oct.  14,  Nov.  37 
Hostages,  Oct.  13 
Luxembourg,  in  NATO  alliance, 

Apr.  42 
Mexico,  Apr.  12,  17,  June  9,  18, 
Oct.  78 
Mexico-U.S.  bilateral  commission 
meeting,  Oct.  76 
Middle  East,  Apr.  15,  19,  Dec.  45 
Palestine  Liberation  Organization 
(PLO),  Apr.  22,  July  65, 
Aug.  15,  Sept.  68 
Netherlands,  U.S.  relations,  Sept. 

50,  52 
Nicaragua: 
Contra  aid,  Apr.  21,  May  23, 

Oct.  79 
Democratic  progress.  May  25, 

Dec.  28 
Soviet-bloc  aid  to,  May  24,  26, 
60,  June  10,  13,  15,  July  24, 
32,  Nov.  3,  12,  41,  Dec.  19, 
28 
Western  aid  to,  June  15 


Baker,  Jamesi  A.,  Ill  (Cont'd) 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization 
(NATO),  May  4,  26,  July  21, 
Aug.  61,  Nov.  32 
Comprehensive  concept  on  arms 
control  and  disarmament, 
Aug.  55,  63 
Conventional  Parity  Initiative, 

Aug.  55,  58,  62 
Short-range  nuclear  forces  (SNF) 
agreement,  Apr.  39,  July  22, 
24,  28,  34,  Aug.  29,  34 
Norway,  in  NATO  alliance,  Apr.  40 
Pacific  area,  economic  development, 
Apr.  13,  18,  Sept.  58,  60,  Dec. 
20 
East  Asia/Pacific  rim,  U.S.  rela- 
tions, Aug.  64 
Panama  {for  detads  see  Panama): 
Elections,  June  6,  13,  17,  July  32 
Normalization  of  relations  and 
Noriega  presence,  June  7, 
Aug.  15,  69,  Dec.  19,  26 
U.S.  position,  July  23,  27,  Aug. 
15,  60,  Oct.  14,  15,  Nov.  32 
Philippines,  Multilateral  Assistance 

Initiative,  Sept.  56 
Poland  IJ'or  detads  see  Poland): 
Political  and  economic  reforms, 
June  14,  Aug.  69,  Sept.  6,  8, 
66 
Solidarity  request  for  Western 

aid,  Sept.  31,  65 
Summit  of  the  Arch,  Western  sup- 
port, Sept.  4,  5,  7,  11,  29, 

32,  44,  46,  67 

U.S.  support  for  reforms,  Nov. 
38,  40,  41 
Presidential  power,  May  25 
Refugees,  Southeast  Asian,  Aug. 

44,  Sept.  60 
Regional  conflicts,  Apr.  15,  19,  July 

30,  :38,  Dec.  13,  19 
Saudi  Arabia,  tank  sales,  Nov.  37 
Security  clearances,  Apr.  31 
Soviet  Union  {for  detads  see  Soviet 
Union): 
ABM  Treaty,  Nov.  14 
Arms  control  negotiations,  July 
30,  Aug.  43,  44,  61,  Sept.  10, 
Nov.  1,  5,  10,  Dec.  13 
Domestic  reforms,  Mav  26,  July 

33,  Aug.  57 

Economic  issues,  Aug.  13,  Sept. 

67,  Nov.  12,  13,  Dec.  10,  20 
Foreign  policy,  June  16,  Dec.  12 
Glasnost  and  democratization, 

Dec.  13 
Gorbachev's  role,  Aug.  14,  30, 

Sept.  68,  Nov.  4,  42 
Human  rights,  July  29,  Nov.  14 
Intermediate-range  nuclear  forces 

(INF)  treaty,  July  28 
Perestroika.  July  29,  32,  34,  36, 

Aug.  58,  Nov.  2,  Dec.  10,  20 


1 


Baker,  James  A.,  Ill  (Cont'd) 

Regional  conflicts,  role  in,  July 

30,  38,  Aug.  62,  Dec.  13 
Short-range  nuclear  forces  (SNF) 

July  31,  32,  34,  35 
Strategic  arms  reduction  talks 
(START),  Apr.  39,  May  60, 
June  15,  16,  Sept.  44,  Nov. 
11,  15,  39,  Dec.  16 
Summit  meeting  proposed,  June 

14,  Nov.  1,  10 
Trade  relations,  Apr.  29,  Sept.  ^ 

66,  Nov.  41,  42 
U.S.  relations,  Apr.  12,  14,  18, 
May  59,  June  10,  13,  July  3, 
Nov.  3,  16 
U.S.  technical  assistance,  Nov.  2) 
Dec.  14,  25 
South  Africa,  new  government, 

Aug.  60 
Spain,  in  NATO  alliance,  Apr.  42 
Sudan,  famine  relief,  Apr.  24 
Terrorism,  Apr.  14,  23,  42,  May  79 

(quoted) 
Trade  issues,  Aug.  13,  65,  Sept.  & 

Oct.  77 
Transnational  issues,  Apr.  13,  14, 

18,  July  30,  38 
United  Kingdom,  Apr.  39,  Aug.  42 

43 
Vietnam,  U.S.  relations,  Sept.  62, 

Dec.  19 
Warsaw  Pact  and  East  European 
reforms,  Dec.  28,  29 
Biographical  data,  Apr.  9 
Meeting  with  Shevardnadze,  Paris 

(July  1989),  Oct.  39 
Messages  and  reports  to  Congi'ess, 

May  68 
News  conferences,  press  briefings, 
and  question-and-answer  ses- 
sions, Jan.  13,  Mar.  6,  Apr.  28, 
38,  May  59,  July  21,  30,  34,  Aug, 
34,  41,  Sept.  3,  29,  50,  60,  63, 
Oct.  78,  Nov.  10,  31,  Dec.  18 
Senate  confirmation  hearings,  Apr.  1( 
Swearing-in  as  Secretary  of  State: 

Baker,  Bush,  Apr.  8 
TV  and  radio  interviews,  Apr.  21, 
May  10,  23,  25,  June  12,  July  27, 
Aug.  29,  (57,  Sept.  7,  Dec.  26 
Visits  to: 
Belgium  (NATO  headquarters), 

July  34 
Brunei,  Sept.  58 
China,  May  10 
Denmark,  Apr.  40 
France,  Apr.  42 
Germany,  Federal  Republic  of, 

Apr.  39 
Greece,  Apr.  41 
Hungary,  Sept.  37 
Iceland,  Apr.  38 
Italy,  Aug.  12 
Japan,  May  1,  Sept.  56 
Luxembourg,  Apr.  42 


H 


i 


«t 


h 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/Index 


1^. 


iker,  James  A.,  Ill  (Cont'd) 
Netherlands,  Sept.  50 
Norway,  Apr.  40 
Poland,  Sept.  29 
Portugal,  Apr.  42 
Soviet  Union,  July  29 
Spain,  Apr.  42 
United  Kingdom,  Apr.  38,  Aug.  41 
Wyoming  ministei'ial  meeting,  Jack- 
son Hole  (Sept.  1989),  Nov.  1,  5, 
10,  39 
ilance-of-payments  support  and  special 
development  fund,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Pakistan,  Jan.  51 
liltic  Freedom  Day,  1989,  proclamation 
I    (Bush),  Aug.  80 
Bangladesh: 
Flood  relief,  Summit  of  the  Arch, 

economic  declaration,  Sept.  16 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  50, 
Apr.  62,  Aug.  89,  Sept.  93,  Oct. 
84,  85 
inking  and  financial  services,  U.S.- 
C'anada  Free  Trade  Agreement, 
Oct.  6 
artholomew,  Reginald,  Sept.  74 
Belgium: 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar.  92, 
May  87,  June  68,  July  77,  Aug. 
89,  Sept.  93,  Oct.  85,  Dec.  58 
Visit  of  Secretary  Baker  (NATO  head- 
quarters), July  34 
Bilize: 

Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 
May  70,  Oct.  57 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Apr.  63, 

Sept.  93 
'iiiii,  treaties,  agi'eements,  etc.,  Aug. 

89 
'ring  Straits  region: 
Bering  Straits  Regional  Commission, 
bilateral  agi'eement  with  Soviet 
Union,  te.xt,  Nov.  22 
Mutual  visits  by  inhabitants,  bilateral 
agreement  with  Soviet  Union, 
text,  Nov.  24 
U.S. -Soviet  joint  statement,  Nov.  8 
;rlin  Wall,  28th  anniversary  (Bush), 

Oct.  41 
hutan,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Apr. 

62,  July  76 
hutto,  Mohtrama  Benazir,  Oct.  63,  64 
iological  weapons: 

Biological  and  Toxic  Weapons  Conven- 
tion (1972)  (Holmes),  July  43, 
Oct.  23 
Development,  production  and  stockpil- 
ing of  bacteriological  and  toxin 
weapons,  convention  (1972),  Bah- 
rain, Feb.  73 
Foi-eign  policy  implications  (Holmes), 

Oct.  22 
U.S.  Biological  Defense  Research  Pro- 
gram (Holmes),  Oct.  24 


Biological  weapons  (Cont'd) 

U.S.  policy  (Bartholomew),  Sept.  74, 
77 
BoHvia: 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 
Oct.  56 
Treaties,  agi-eements,  etc.,  Feb.  74, 
75,  May  87,  Aug.  89,  Oct.  85, 
Dec.  58 
Bolton,  John  R.,  Oct.  74 
Borg,  Parker  W.,  Jan.  33,  Mar.  17 
Botswana,  treaties,  agreements,  etc., 

Mar.  92,  July  77,  Dec.  57 
Brady,  Nicholas  F.,  May  53,  June  21, 

Sept.  78 
Brazil: 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 
Oct.  56 
Trade  import  duties  (Reagan),  Jan.  49 
Treaties,  agi-eements,  etc.,  Jan.  50, 
Mar.  92,  June  69,  Aug.  89 
Bremer,  L.  Paul,  III,  May  74 
Brown,  Kenneth  L.,  May  27 
Brundtland,  Gro  Harlem,  Apr.  41 
Brunei: 
Treaties,  agi-eements,  etc.,  Jan.  50, 

May  86 
Visit  of  Secretary  Baker,  Sept.  58 
Bulgaria: 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 
Oct.  58 
Human  rights:  Abram,  Sept.  88; 
Department,  Oct.  43,  Nov.  59; 
NATO,  Oct.  43;  White  House, 
Sept.  90 
Recall  of  U.S.  ambassador  (Depart- 
ment), Nov.  59 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Aug.  89, 
Dec.  57 
Bureau  of  International  Communications 

and  Information  Policy,  July  62 
Burkina  Faso,  treaties,  agreements, 
etc.,  Feb.  74,  Mar.  91,  Aug.  89, 
Oct.  84 
Burleigh,  A.  Peter,  May  61 
Burma: 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts:  Lambertson, 
May  41;  Wrobleski,  May  70,  71, 
Oct.  58 
Human  i-ights  issues  (Lambertson), 

May  42 
Political  situation  and  democratic 
progress  (Lambertson),  May  40, 
Dec.  37 
Profile,  May  41 

Thailand,  relations  with  (Lam- 
bertson), May  42 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  73, 

Mar.  92 
U.S.  policy  (Lambertson),  May  43 
Burns,  William  F.,  Jan.  41,  Mar.  9 


Burt,  Richard  R.,  Aug.  73,  Oct.  17, 

Dec.  33 
Burundi: 
Human  rights  issues  (Brow-n),  May  27 
International  trade  in  endangered 
species  of  wild  fauna  and  flora, 
convention  (1973),  Jan.  50 
Busby,  Morris  D.,  Dec.  47 
Bush,  George  H.  (see  also  Proclama- 
tions by  the  President): 
Addresses,  remarks,  and  statements: 
Acid  rain,  Apr.  27 
Afghanistan,  Apr.  5,  6,  48 
Arab-Israeli  conflict,  peace  process, 

May  4,  7,  16 
Arms  control  and  disarmament, 
Apr.  30,  May  15,  Aug.  17,  31, 
39,  Sept.  25 
Conventional  Parity  Initiative, 
Aug.  16,  30,  32,  Sept.  24 
"Open  skies"  proposal,  July  16, 
Aug.  16,  Nov.  30 
Asian-Pacific  region,  development, 

May  19 
Berlin  Wall,  28th  anniversary,  Oct. 

41 
Cambodia,  peace  settlement.  May 

6,22 
Canada,  U.S.  relations,  Apr.  26, 

July  46 
Central  America,  Apr.  6,  May  16, 

June  55 
Chemical  weapons.  Mar.  6  (quoted), 

Nov.  29 
China,  May  6,  13 
Chinese-Soviet  relations.  May  7 
Chinese  students  in  U.S.,  Aug. 

50,  51 
Political  and  economic  reforms, 

Aug.  48,  50 
Student  demonstrations  and 
government  reprisals,  July 
47,  Aug.  75,  80,  81 
U.S.  response,  Aug.  46,  47,  48 
U.S.  relations,  Apr.  4,  May  7, 
11,  16,  22,  Aug  49,  Sept.  54, 
55 
Cuba,  May  83 

Debt  management,  Sept.  21,  26 
Defense  and  national  security,  July 
48 
Conventional  arms.  May  9,  July 

21 
Missile  systems,  July  20,  46, 

Aug.  51 
Strategic  Defense  Initiative 
(SDI),  Apr.  3,  5,  May  15 
Democracy  and  democratic 

progress,  June  1,  July  19,  47, 
Aug.  32,  38 
Drugs,  narcotic,  Oct.  47,  Dec.  9 
East- West  relations,  Aug.  82,  Sept. 

20 
Economy,  world,  May  16,  Nov.  28 


Apartment  of  State  Bulletin/Index  1989 


Bush,  George  H.  (ConVd) 

Environmental  problems  and  con- 
trol, Apr.  27,  July  47,  Aug.  39, 
Sept.  27,  48,  Oct.  36,  Nov.  28 
El  Salvador,  May  16,  June  2 
Europe,  Eastern,  Aug.  38,  39, 

Sept.  21,  44,  48 
Eui'ope,  Western,  and  U.S.  rela- 
tions, July  18,  Aug.  11 
Freedom,  July  21,  Sept.  22,  33,  47, 
53,  86  (quoted),  Oct.  41,  Nov. 
27,  Dec.  8 
Germany,  Federal  Republic  of, 

Apr.  6,  Aug.  38 
Global  role  of  U.S.,  May  8 
"Hamtramck"  speech  on  Poland, 

June  3 
Human  rights.  May  6,  Aug.  49 
Hungary,  Sept.  36,  37,  39,  40,  46 
Inaugural  address,  Apr.  1 
India,  May  6 
Iran,  Apr.  5,  Aug.  47,  49 
Italy,  Aug.  12 

Japan,  free  trade.  May  6,  9,  22 
Korea,  May  17,  21 

U.S.  troops  in.  May  16,  19 
Latin  America,  June  1 
Lebanon,  Aug.  83 

Hostages,  Oct.  66,  67,  68,  Nov.  26 
Marshall  Islands,  diplomatic  rela- 
tions established,  Oct.  62 
Me.xico,  U.S.  relations,  Dec.  2,  3 
Micronesia,  diplomatic  relations  es- 
tablished, Oct.  62 
Middle  East,  Apr.  5,  May  16 
Palestine  Liberation  Organiza- 
tion, Apr.  4 
NATO,  Apr.  6,  May  4,  July  18,  46, 

Aug.  38 
Nicaragua,  Apr.  6,  May  16,  June  1, 
Sept.  91 
Conventional  Parity  Initiative, 

Aug.  16,  32,  Sept.  24 
Short-range  nuclear  forces  (SNF) 
negotiations,  July  46,  Aug. 
31,  81 
Summit  accomplishments,  Aug.  45 
Pakistan,  U.S.  relations,  May  6 
Panama,  June  2,  July  46,  66,  68, 

70,  Aug.  51,  Dec.  19 
Paraguay,  democratic  progress, 

June  2 
Peace  Corps,  Hungary,  Sept.  40 
Philippines,  multilateral  assistance 

initiative,  May  8 
Poland: 
Address  before  Polish  Parlia- 
ment, Sept.  25 
Democratic  progi'ess,  Aug.  48, 

69,  78,  Sept.  23,  Oct.  38 
Food  and  commodity  aid,  Sept. 

19,  Oct.  38,  Nov.  60 
U.S.  support  for  reform  efforts, 
June  3,  Sept.  24,  26,  54 


Bush,  George  H.  (Cont'd) 

Western  support  for  reform  ef- 
forts, Sept.  7  (quoted),  Dec. 
10 
Soviet  Union  {for  details  see  Soviet 
Union): 
Chinese-Soviet  relations.  May  7 
Economic  issues,  Sept.  18,  19,  20, 

21 
Nicaragua,  Soviet  bloc  aid,  June 

1,56 
Perestroika,  July  20,  Aug.  51 
Strategic  arms  reduction  talks 
(START),  May  15,  July  17, 
Aug.  73 
U.S.  relations,  Apr.  4,  May  9, 
July  16,  19,  Aug.  18,  32,  39, 
Sept.  54 
Summit  of  the  Arch,  review,  Sept. 

17,  19 
Terrorism,  May  79  (quoted) 
Trade,  U.S.,  Apr.  28,  Sept.  40, 

Oct.  35 
Trade,  world.  May  9 
UN,  peacekeeping  role,  Nov.  31 
World  Bank/International  Monetary 
Fund,  Dec.  8 
Meetings  with  heads  of  state  and  offi- 
cials of,  remarks  and  joint  com- 
muniques: 
Colombia,  Dec.  56;  Cyprus,  Dec.  41; 
Egypt,  June  40,  Dec.  45;  El  Sal- 
vador, June  66;  Ireland,  June 
39;  Israel,  June  42;  Italy,  Dec. 
42;  Japan,  Apr.  32,  Nov.  51; 
Jordan,  July  54;  Mexico,  Dec. 
1;  NATO,  Dec.  44,;  Pakistan, 
Oct.  63;  Zaire,  Oct.  15 
Messages  and  reports  to  Congress: 
Address  before  Joint  Session,  Apr.  3 
Cyprus,  Apr.  43,  Sept.  89,  Dec.  41 
EURATOM  cooperation,  June  44 
FS-X  aircraft,  coproduction  with 

Japan,  Oct.  32 
Science  and  technology,  internation- 
al activities,  June  51 
News  conferences  and  question-and- 
answer  sessions,  Apr.  4,  5,  May 
4,  July  45,  Aug.  16,  30,  34,  40, 
46,  80,  Sept.  17,  54,  Oct.  13 
North  Atlantic  Council  (NAC),  heads 
of  state  meeting,  Brussels  (May 
1989),  Aug.  15 
TV  interview.  May  11 
Visits  to: 
Belgium,  Aug.  15 
Canada,  Apr.  26 
China,  May  11 
Germany,  Federal  Republic  of, 

Aug.  34 
Hungary,  Sept.  36 
Italy,  Aug.  11 
Japan,  May  4 
Korea,  May  17 
Netherlands,  Sept.  47 
Poland,  Sept.  23 


United  Kingdom,  Aug.  40 
Business,  U.S.,  multilateral  develop- 
ment banks  projects  (Bradv),  June 
26 
Byelorussian  S.S.R.,  treaties,  agree- 
ments, etc..  Mar.  92,  Apr.  62,  May 
87,  July  77,  Aug.  88,  89,  Sept.  93, 
Dec.  58 


Cambodia: 

International  Conference,  Paris 

(1989):  Baker,  Oct.  25;  conference 
statement,  Oct.  26;  Solomon, 
Nov.  50 
Peace  settlement:  Baker,  Sept.  61,  62 
Bush,  May  6;  Solomon,  Nov.  47; 
Walters,  Feb.  65 
Profile,  May  39 
UN  role  (Baker),  Oct.  26 
U.S.  aid  to  noncommunist  resistance: 
Lambertson,  May  38;  Solomon, 
Nov.  49 
FY  90,  request  (Clark),  May  52 
U.S.  policy:  Baker,  Sept.  59;  Bush, 
May  22;  Lambertson,  May  37; 
Reagan,  Jan.  17 
Cameroon,  treaties,  agi'eements,  etc., 

Apr.  62,  Sept.  93,  Oct.  84,  Dec.  57 
Canada: 
Aircraft  hijacking  agreement  (Depart^ 

ment),  Jan.  39 
Defense,  Oct.  12 
Economic  and  political  conditions,  Oct. 

10 
Foreign  relations,  Oct.  11 
Geogi'aphy,  peoples  and  culture,  Oct. 
Government,  Oct.  9 
History,  Oct.  8 
Profile,  Oct.  9,  11 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  50, 
Feb.  73,  May  87,  June  68,  69, 
Aug.  89,  Sept  93,  Dec,  58 
U.S. -Canada  Free  Trade  Agreement: 
Chronology,  Oct.  4 
Questions  and  answers,  Oct.  4 
Summary  of  key  provisions,  Oct.  1 
U.S.  fisheries  relationship  (Wolfe), 

July  57 
U.S.  relations:  Oct.  12;  Baker,  Apr. 
11,  17,  28,  June  9 
Cape  Verde,  treaties,  agi'eements,  etc., 

Apr.  63,  Dec.  58 
Captive  Nations  Week,  1989,  proclama- 
tion (Bush),  Sept.  91 
Caribbean  region.  See  under  Latin 

America 
Carter,  Jimmy,  Jan.  44 
Central  America.  See  under  Latin 

America  a)id  see  also  names  of  in- 
dividual countries 
Chad,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb, 
74,  May  86,  Dec.  57 


^ 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/Index  1981 


lange  and  international  relations: 

Baker,  July  36,  Aug.  55;  Shultz, 
j    Jan.  6,  9 

'lemical  weapons  (CW):  Baker,  Apr. 
15,  19,  May  58,  Nov.  39;  Burns, 
Jan.  42;  Bush,  Mar.  6,  May  15; 
Nitze,  Apr.  45;  NAC,  Aug.  25,  28; 
Shultz,  Jan.  3,  9;  U.S.-Soviet  joint 
statement,  Nov.  8 

Au.straHa  Group  (Bartholomew),  Sept. 
75 

jBilateral  verification  experiment  and 
data  exchange  relating  to  prohibi- 
tion, memo  of  understanding  with 
Soviet  Union,  text,  Nov.  18 

Conference  on  Prohibition  of  Chemical 
Weapons,  Paris  (1989):  Burns, 
Mar.  9;  Reagan,  Shultz,  Mar.  4; 
White  House,  Jan.  16 
Final  declaration,  text.  Mar.  9 

Federal  Republic  of  Germany:  Baker, 
Apr.  22,  39;  Bartholomew,  Sept. 
76;  Department,  Mar.  71;  Shultz, 
Mar.  53 

International  Government-Industry 
Conference  Against  Chemical 
Weapons,  Canberra  (1989): 
Clarke,  Nov.  45;  U.S.-Soviet 
joint  statement,  Nov.  9 

ilraq  (Baker),  Nov.  32 

Libva:  Baker,  Apr.  22;  Bartholomew, 
'  Sept.  76;  Shultz,  Mar.  7,  8,  53 

Middle  East:  Murphy,  Feb.  58; 
Shultz,  Feb.  8,  Mar.  8 

Prohibition  of  use  in  war  of  asphyxiat- 
ing, poisonous,  or  other  gases, 
and  of  bacteriological  methods  of 
warfare,  protocol  (1925):  Antigua 
and  Barbuda,  Bahrain,  Mar.  91; 
Bangladesh,  Oct.  84;  Cameroon, 
Dec.  57;  Equatorial  Guinea, 
Grenada,  Guinea-Bissau,  Oct.  84; 
Democratic  People's  Republic  of 
Korea,  Republic  of  Korea,  Mar. 
91;  Laos,  Oct.  84;  St.  Lucia,  Mar. 
91 

Role  of  chemical  industry  (Shultz), 
Mar.  7 

Soviet  Union  (Shultz),  Mar.  7 

Third  World  use  (Baker),  Nov.  32 

U.S.  disposal  program  (Friedersdorf), 
June  19 

U.S.  initiatives:  Baker,  Nov.  34,  Dec. 
17;  Bush,  Nov.  29 

U.S.  pohcy:  Baker,  Dec.  20;  Bar- 
tholomew, Sept.  74,  77 

U.S.-Soviet  memo  of  understanding: 
Baker,  Nov.  1;  joint  statement, 
Nov.  6 

Verification  issues  (Clarke),  Nov.  47 

lile: 

Democratic  progi'ess  (Kozak),  June  65 

Fruit  export  and  sale:  Baker,  U.S.- 
Chile joint  statement.  May  85 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  July  76,  77 


China,  People's  Republic  of  (Bush), 
Apr.  4 

Afghanistan,  involvement  in,  Mar.  84 

ASEAN  nations,  relations  with 
(Baker),  Sept.  62 

Cambodian  policy:  Lambertson,  May 
40;  Solomon,  Nov.  49 

Chinese  students  in  U.S.:  Bush,  Aug. 
50,  51;  Williams,  Oct.  28 

Communications  satellites  (Depart- 
ment), Veh.  26 

Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 
May  71,  Oct.  59 

Human  rights  issues:  Baker,  May  10, 
Sept.  64;  Bush,  May  6 

Political  and  economic  reforms:  Baker, 
July  23,  29,  Aug.  66,  Sept.  6; 
Bush,  Aug.  47,  48,  50 

Political  unrest  and  safety  of  U.S. 
citizens  (Department),  Aug.  75 

Soviet  Union,  relations  with  (Bush), 
May  7 

Student  demonstrations  and  govern- 
ment reprisals:  Baker,  July  29, 
Aug.  14,  67;  Bush,  July  47,  Aug. 

75,  80,  81;  Department,  Aug.  75, 

76,  77;  White  House,  Aug.  75, 
77;  Williams,  July  48,  Oct.  29 

U.S.  response:  Baker,  Sept.  5,  11, 
61,  63,  64,  Nov.  37;  Bush,  Aug. 
46,  47,  48;  White  House,  Aug. 
77 
Taiwan: 

Economic  development:  Apr.  36 
Trade  relations  with  U.S.;  Hippler 
Bello,  Holmer,  Mar.  12 
Trade  relations  with  U.S.,  Apr.  35 
Treaties,  agi'eements,  etc.,  Jan.  50, 
Feb.  75,  Mar.  91,  92,  Apr.  63, 
May  87,  June  68,  July  77,  Aug. 
88,  Sept.  93,  Oct.  85,  Dec.  57 
U.S.  relations:  Baker,  Apr.  18,  Aug. 
58,  59;  Bush,  May  7,  11,  16,  22, 
Aug.  49,  Sept.  54,  55;  Depart- 
ment, May  14;  Shultz,  Feb.  25; 
Williams,  Oct.  27 
Visit  of  Secretary  Baker,  May  10 
Civil  emergency  planning  (NAC),  Feb. 

46 
Clark,  Warren,  Dec.  31 
Clark,  William,  Jr.,  May  49 
Clarke,  Richard  A.,  Nov.  45 
Cleveland,  Paul  M.,  June  45 
Coffee: 
International  Coffee  Agreement 
(1983),  U.K.  (extended  to  St. 
Helena),  July  76 
International  Coffee  Agreement 
negotiations  (Wallis),  Mar.  15 
Cohen,  Herman  J.,  Nov.  43,  Dec.  23 


Colombia: 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts:  Baker,  Dec. 
19;  Department,  Oct.  77,  Nov. 
79;  Eagleburger,  Nov.  70,  74; 
Wrobleski,  Oct.  56 
Travel  advisory  issued  (Department), 

Oct.  77 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar.  92, 

Apr.  62,  June  68,  69 
U.S.  aid,  emergency  anti-drug  sup- 
port package  (Bush),  Oct.  47 
U.S.  visit  of  President  Barco  (White 
House),  Dec.  56 
Commodities: 
Commodity  imports,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Egypt,  Sept.  93 
Common  F'und  for  Commodities, 
agreement,  entered  into  force, 
Aug.  88 
Prices  and  agreements  (Wallis),  Mar. 
15 
Communications,  mutual  support,  memo 
of  understanding  with  U.K.,  Mar. 
93 
Comoros,  radio  communications  between 
amateur  stations  on  behalf  of  third 
parties,  bilateral  agreement,  Dec.  58 
Conference  on  Disarmament  (CD), 
Geneva: 
Chemical  weapons  ban  (Bar- 
tholomew), Sept.  74 
Defense  and  space  talks  (Cooper), 

Oct.  20 
START  (Burt),  Oct.  17 
Congo,  treaties,  agi-eements,  etc.,  Feb. 

74,  Aug.  88 
Congress,  U.S.: 
Africa,  human  rights  issues,  Brown, 

May  27;  Ferrand,  May  32 
Angola,  peace  and  reconciliation  ef- 
forts (Clark),  Dec.  31 
Arms  sales  to  Pakistan  (Schaffer), 

Oct.  65 
Biological  weapons  (Holmes),  July  43, 

Oct.  22 
Bipartisanship  and  leadership 

(Baker),  Apr.  11,  16,  June  9 
Burma,  political  situation  and  human 
rights  (Lambertson),  May  40, 
Dec.  37 
Cambodia,  update  (Lambertson),  May 

37 
Certification  for  narcotics  source  and 
transit  countries  (Wrobleski), 
May  68,  Oct.  49 
Chemical  weapons  (Bartholomew), 

Sept.  74 
China,  demonstrations,  and  U.S. 

response  (Williams),  July  48,  Oct. 
27 
Confirmation  hearings.  Secretary- 
designate  Baker,  Apr.  10 
Cuba: 
Human  rights:  Schifter,  Oct.  41; 
Valladares,  Dec.  54 


epartment  of  State  Bulletin/Index  1989 


Congress,  U.S.  (Cont'd) 

Narcotics  trafficking  (Levitsky), 

Oct.  46 
U.S.  security  (Kozak),  Nov.  75 
East-West  relations  and  NATO 

(Baker),  Aug.  61 
High  definition  television,  global 
production  standards  (Landau), 
June  48 
Immigration  and  refugee  issues 

(Moore),  July  59 
International  fisheries  matters 

(Wolfe),  July  56 
Legislation: 
Berne  Convention  Implementation 

Act,  1988  (Reagan),  Jan.  35 
Defense  Department  Appropria- 
tions Act,  1989  (White  House), 
Jan.  45 
Genocide  Convention  Implementa- 
tion Act,  1987:  Reagan,  Jan. 
38;  White  House,  Jan.  39 
Joint  Resolution  on  Cambodia  (Wal- 
ters), Feb.  66 
1988  Trade  Act:  Hippler  Bello,  Hol- 
mer,  Mar.  11 
Legislation,  proposed: 
Foreign  affairs  budget,  FY  90: 
Foreign  operations,  overview 
(Baker),  Apr.  16 
East  Asia  and  the  Pacific 

(Clark),  May  49 
International  organizations  and 
progi'ams  ( Vogelgesang), 
May  81 
Latin  America  and  the  Carib- 
bean (Kozak),  June  59 
Middle  East:  Burleigh,  May  66; 

Walker,  May  61,  62,  64 
Migration  and  refugee  assist- 
ance (Moore),  May  72 
Multilateral  development  banks 

(Brady),  June  21,  29 
Security  assistance  (Holmes), 

June  52 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  (Rosen- 
berg), July  39 
Terrorist  Alien  Removal  Act 
(Bremer),  Feb.  64 
Middle  East,  U.S.  diplomacy  (Kelly), 

Oct.  44 
Namibia,  independence  process 

(Cohen),  Nov.  43 
Pacific  region  economic  cooperation 

(Solomon),  Dec.  34 
Philippines,  future  prospects  (Lam- 

bertson),  May  43 
Presidential  address,  joint  session 

(Bush),  Apr.  3 
Senate  advice  and  consent,  interna- 
tional natural  rubber  agreement, 
Feb.  74 
Senate  confirmation  hearings  on 

Secretary-designate  Baker,  Apr. 
10 
South  Africa  (Cohen),  Dec.  29 


Congress,  U.S.  (Cont'd) 
Soviet  Union  and  perestroika  (Baker), 

Dec.  20 
Terrorism  and  counterteiTorism: 
Rushdie  affair  (Adams),  May  78 
U.S.  counterterrorism  policy: 

Bremer,  May  74;  Busby,  Dec. 
47 
Trade  negotiations,  Uruguay  Round 

(Hills),  June  30 
Trade-related  asjjects  of  intellectual 
property  rights  (Hills),  Nov.  55 
UN  and  PLO  admission  (Vogel- 
gesang), July  65 
Western  Europe,  U.S.  relations 
(Eagleburger),  Oct.  37 
Conservation  (see  also  Fish  and 
Fisheries): 
Antarctic  marine  living  resources,  con- 
vention (1980):  Finland,  Dec.  59; 
Italy,  July  76;  Peru,  Dec.  59 
Endangered  species  of  wild  fauna  and 
flora,  international  trade  in,  con- 
vention (1973):  Burundi,  Jan.  50; 
Chad,  May  86;  Ethiopia,  Gabon, 
Malta,  New  Zealand,  Aug.  88; 
St.  Vincent  and  Grenadines,  May 
86;  Vanuatu,  Dec.  57 
Amendment  (1983):  Botswana,  Dec. 
59;  China,  Jan.  50;  Denmark, 
May  86;  Finland,  Dec.  59; 
India,  May  86;  Luxembourg, 
Dee.  59;  Mauritius,  Jan.  50; 
Rwanda,  Dec.  59;  Sri  Lanka, 
May  86 
International  Trade  in  Endangered 
Species,  convention  (CITES),  FY 
90,  U.S.  funding,  proposed 
(Vogelgesang),  May  83 
Wetlands  of  international  importance, 
especially  as  waterfowl  habitat, 
convention  (1971):  Malta,  Viet- 
nam, May  86 
Protocol  (1982):  Egypt,  Greece, 
Apr.  62;  Venezuela,  May  86 
Construction,  cooperation  in  housing 
and  other  construction,  bilateral 
agreement  with  Soviet  Union,  Oct. 
86 
Consular  relations: 
Vienna  convention  on  (1967):  Antigua 
and  Barbuda,  Feb.  73;  Bulgaria, 
Dec.  59;  Byelorussian  S.S.R., 
Aug.  88;  Mongolia,  Aug.  88; 
South  Africa,  Dec.  59;  Soviet 
Union,  Ukrainian  S.S.R.,  Aug.  88 
Cooper,  Henry  F.,  Oct.  20,  Dec.  33 
Copyright: 
Berne  convention  for  the  pi-otection  of 
literary  and  artistic  works  (1896), 
revised  and  amended  (1979): 
Lesotho,  Oct.  84;  Liberia, 
Mauritius,  Peru,  Trinidad  and 
Tobago,  May  86;  U.S.  Apr.  62 
U.S.  proposal  for  amendment 
(Hills),  Nov.  50 


Copyright  (Cont'd) 
Copyright  protection,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Indonesia,  Sept.  93 
Trade  issues,  U.S.  proposal  (Hills), 

Nov.  56 
Universal  copyright  convention  (1971), 
Trinidad  and  Tobago,  Apr.  62 
Cossiga,  FVancesco,  Dec.  46 
Costa  Rica: 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 
May  70,  Oct.  57 
Economic  development  (Kozak),  June 

63 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  50, 
Feb.  75,  May  87,  June  69,  Nov. 
79 
Cote  d'lvoire: 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 
Oct.  59 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Oct.  85, 
Nov.  79 
Criminal  matters.  See  Judicial  matters 
Crocker,  Chester  A.,  Feb.  10 
Cuba: 
Angola,  involvement  in: 
Angola/Namibia  peace  accords: 
Crocker,  Feb.  10;  Shultz,  Feb 
11;  White  House,  Feb.  10 
Angola/Namibia  tripartite  agree- 
ment, text,  Feb.  13 
Protocol  of  Bi'azzaville,  text, 
Feb.  11 
Chronology  (Howland),  Feb.  16 
Cuban  troop  withdrawal  settle- 
ment: Feb.  14,  16;  Baker,  May 
29;  Department,  Jan.  16 
Bilateral  agreement  to  terminate 
Cuban  military  contingent, 
text,  Feb.  13 " 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts:  Kozak,  Nov. 
76;  Levitsky,  Oct.  46;  Wrobleski, 
May  69.  Oct.  57 
Economic,  social,  political  situation: 
Apr.  60;  Baker,  Sept.  10;  Kozak, 
Nov.  75 
Human  rights  issues:  Apr.  59;  Kozak, 
Nov.  76;  Lister,  Jan.  37;  Schifter, 
Oct.  41;  Valladares,  Dec.  54 
UN  Human  Rights  Report  (Bush), 
May  83 
Nicaragua,  aid  to  Sandinistas  (Baker), 

Nov.  3,  12 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  50, 

May  86,  Nov.  79 
U.S.  policy  (Kozak),  Nov.  77 
Cultural  relations: 
Conference  on  Security  and  Coopera- 
tion in  Europe  (CSCE),  conclud 
ing  document.  Mar.  33 
Cultural  and  educational  exchange, 
bilateral  agi'eement  with  Mon- 
golia, Dec.  58 


!1 


t. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/Index  1981  <[ 


ultural  relations  (Cont'd) 

Cultural  property,  means  of  prohibit- 
ing and  preventing  the  illicit  im- 
port, export,  and  transfer  of 
ownership,  convention  (1970): 
Byelorussian  S.S.R.,  Colombia, 
Soviet  Union,  Uki-ainian  S.S.R., 
Apr.  62 

Hungary,  scientific  and  cultural  ex- 
changes: Bush,  Sept.  40;  White 
House,  Sept.  42 

Importation  and  distribution  of 

foreign  motion  pictures,  bilateral 
agreement  with  Republic  of 
Korea,  May  88 
^  Management  and  protection  of  nation- 
al parks  and  other  protected 
natural  and  cultural  heritage 
sites,  bilateral  agreement  with 
Mexico,  May  88 

Poland,  establishment  of  cultural  and 
information  centers,  bilateral 
agi-eement:  Sept.  94;  Bush,  Sept. 
27;  White  House,  Sept.  29 

U.S. -Canada  free  trade  agreement, 
Oct,  5 

U.S. -Mexico  Binational  Commission, 
joint  communique,  Oct.  84 

World  cultural  and  natural  heritage, 
protection,  convention  (1972): 
Byelorussian  S.S.R.,  May  87; 
Cape  Verde,  Apr.  63;  German 
Democratic  Republic,  Republic  of 
Korea,  May  87;  Paraguay,  Apr. 
63;  Soviet  Union,  Ukrainian 
S.S.R.,  May  87 

World  Heritage  Fund,  FY  90,  U.S. 
funding,  proposed  (Vogelgesang), 
May  83 

ustoms: 

Containers,  customs  convention 
(1956),  Antigua  and  Barbuda, 
Feb.  73 

Containers,  safe,  international  conven- 
tion (1972):  Indonesia,  Dec.  57; 
Mexico,  Aug.  88;  Vanuatu,  May 
86 

Harmonized  commodity  description 
and  coding  system,  international 
convention  (1983),  protocol  (1986), 
U.S.,  Apr.  62 

International  transport  of  goods 

under  cover  of  TIR  carnets,  con- 
vention (1975):  Algeria,  May  86; 
Indonesia,  Dec.  59 

International  Union  for  the  Publica- 
tion of  Customs  Tariffs,  conven- 
tion (1980),  protocol  (1949), 
Colombia,  June  68 

Mutual  assistance,  bilateral  agi-ee- 
ment:  Finland,  Norway,  Aug.  90 

yprus: 

Cease-fire  and  deconfrontation 
(Department),  July  52 


Cypnis  (Cont'd) 

Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 
Oct.  58 

Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 

States,  1952-195!t,  Volume  VIII, 
Eastern  Europe;  the  Soviet 
Union;  the  Eastern  Mediter- 
ranean, released,  Jan.  53 

Reports  to  Congress:  Bush,  Apr.  43, 
Sept.  89,  Dec.  41;  Reagan,  Feb. 
50 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Mar.  92, 
Oct.  85,  Nov.  79,  Dec.  57 

U.S.  visit  of  President  Vassiliou 
(White  House),  Dec.  41 
Czechoslovakia: 

Human  rights:  Abram,  Sept.  89; 
Department,  Jan.  29;  Shultz, 
Mar.  53 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  May  87, 
June  69,  July  77,  Aug.  89 

Warsaw  Pact  invasion,  anniversary 
(Department),  Oct.  40 


D 


Debt  management: 
Brady  Plan:  Baker,  June  18;  Bush, 

Sept.  21 
Debt  consolidation  and  rescheduling, 

bilateral  agi'eements:  BoKvia, 

Aug.  89,  Gabon,  Aug.  90; 

Guyana,  Dec.  58;  Jamaica,  July 

78,  Dec.  58;  Madagascar,  Nov". 

80;  Malawi,  June  69;  Mali,  Sept. 

93;  Morocco,  Nov.  80;  Niger, 

Aug.  90,  Nov.  80;  Poland, 

Senegal,  Nov.  80;  Tanzania,  Aug. 

90;  Trinidad  and  Tobago,  Nov.  80 
Egypt  (Walker),  May  63,  64 
International  debt  (Brady),  May  53, 

June  22 
Latin  America:  Kozak,  June  61; 

Shultz,  Jan.  11,  Feb.  30 
Mexico  (Baker),  June  18,  Oct.  77 
Multilateral  development  banks 

(Brady),  June  22 
North-South  conference  (Baker), 

Sept.  5,  7,  8 
PhiUppines:  Baker,  Sept.  57;  Lam- 

bertson,  May  41 
Poland:  Baker,  Sept.  32;  Bush,  Sept. 

26;  White  House,  Sept.  28 
Summit  of  the  Arch:  Baker,  Sept.  4, 

65;  Bush,  Sept.  21;  Economic  dec- 
laration, Sept.  14 
Third  World  debt  (Whitehead),  Jan.  19 
Defense  and  national  security  {see  also 
Armaments,  U.S.;  Security  assist- 
ance, U.S.) 
Arms  control  issues  (NAC),  Aug.  28 
ANZUS  treaty  (Hawke),  Oct.  61 
Defense  and  space  talks  (Cooper), 

Oct.  20 


Defense  and  national  security  (Cont'd) 

Defense  budget:  Apr.  31;  Baker,  Apr. 
28;  Nov.  17,  Dec.  18;  Reagan, 
Feb.  7 

Military  use  and  operating  rights  of 
the  U.S.  Government  and  Mar- 
shall Islands,  bilateral  agi-ee- 
ment,  Oct.  86 

Mutual  logistical  support,  bilateral 
agreements:  Canada,  Sept.  93; 
Jordan,  Jan.  50 

National  security  export  controls 
(Wendt),  Jan.  20 

NATO  based  short-range  nuclear  mis- 
siles (Baker),  July  28,  29,  34,  35 

NATO  Defense  Planning  Committee, 
Aug.  78 

NATO  insensitive  munitions  informa- 
tion center,  establishment  and 
operation  of,  multilateral  agi*ee- 
ment:  Canada,  France,  Nether- 
lands, Norway,  U.K.,  U.S.,  Sept. 
93 

Nuclear  missiles:  Aug.  8;  Baker,  Dec. 
16;  Bush,  July  46 

Philippines,  U.S.  military  bases  agree- 
ment (Lambertson),  May  45 

Reciprocal  advance  notification  of 
major  strategic  exercises, 
bilateral  agi'eement  with  Soviet 
Union,  text,  Nov.  20 

Security  clearances  (Baker),  Apr.  31 

Security  strategy  for  the  1990s 
(Bush),  July  19 

Stealth  bomber  (Baker),  Sept.  12, 
Dec.  18 

Strategic  Defense  Initiative  (SDI): 
Apr.  3,  5;  Baker,  June  16,  Nov. 
10,  11,  12,  15;  Bush,  May  15 

Strategic  planning  (Baker),  Dec.  15 
Delors,  Jacques,  Feb.  27 
Democracy  and  democratic  progress  (see 
also  names  of  individual 
countries):  Baker,  July  36;  Bush, 
June  1,  July  19,  47,  Aug.  32,  38, 
48;  Powell,  Jan.  30;  Quayle,  Aug. 
53;  Shultz,  Jan.  10,  Mar.  1 
Denmark: 

Treaties,  agi-eements,  etc..  Mar.  91, 
92,  May  86,  87,  July  77,  Aug.  89, 
Sept.  93 

Visit  of  Secretary  Baker,  Apr.  41 
Developing  countries: 

Development  program,  support,  grant 
agreement  with  Philippines,  Oct. 
86 

Economic  and  democratic  progress 
(Powell),  Jan.  32 

Newly  industrialized  economies,  Apr. 
36 

OECD  final  communique,  Sept.  83 

Role  in  United  Nations  (Williamson), 
Feb.  70 

Summit  of  the  Arch,  economic  declara- 
tion, Sept.  14 

Uruguay  Round  issues,  Feb.  36 


department  of  State  Bulletin/Index  1989 


Diplomacy: 

Diplomatic  matters,  Vienna  conven- 
tion (1961),  South  Africa,  Dec.  59 

Diplomatic  relations,  bilateral  agree- 
ments: Marshall  Islands, 
Micronesia,  Dec.  58 

Land  lease  and  purchase  for  construc- 
tion of  diplomatic  facilities, 
bilateral  agreement  with  Israel, 
May  88,  July  78 
Dobriansky,  Paula,  June  35 
Dominica,  recognition  and  enforcement 
of  foreign  arbitral  awards,  conven- 
tion (1958),  Jan.  49 
Dominican  Republic: 

Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 
May  69,  Oct.  57 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Oct.  85, 
Dec.  58 
Drugs,  narcotic  {see  also  names  of  in- 
dividual countries):  Shultz,  Jan.  9 

Argentina,  cooperative  agreement  for 
reducing  demand,  preventing 
abuse,  and  combating  illicit 
production  and  traffic  of  drugs 
and  psychotropic  substances, 
Aug.  89 

Asia,  production,  trafficking,  control 
(Wrobleski),  Oct.  51 

Belize,  mutual  cooperation  for  reduc- 
ing demand,  preventing  illicit 
use,  and  combating  illicit  produc- 
tion and  traffic  of  drugs,  bilateral 
agreement,  Apr.  63 

Certification  for  narcotics  source  and 
transit  countries:  Baker,  May  68, 
Wrobleski,  May  68,  Oct.  49 

Cocaine,  production,  trafficking,  con- 
trol efforts  (Wrobleski),  Oct.  50 

Cooperation  to  combat  illegal  nar- 
cotics trafficking,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Soviet  Union,  Mar.  93 

Heroin,  South  Asia  (Wrobleski),  Oct. 
51,  52 

International  cooperation  in  control  ef- 
forts (Wrobleski),  Oct.  53,  55 

hitemational  Narcotics  Control 
Strategy  Report,  May  69 

Investigation  of  drug  trafficking  offen-' 
ses  and  seizures  and  forfeiture  of 
proceeds  and  instrumentalities  of 
drug  trafficking,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  U.K.,  June  69 

Latin  America,  trafficking:  Baker, 
June  8,  Oct.  13,  14;  Bush,  June  2; 
Wrobleski,  Oct.  49,  53 

Marijuana,  production,  trafficking,  con- 
trol (Wrobleski),  Oct.  52 
U.S.  production  (Wrobleski),  Oct.  50 

Medellin  cartel  and  Noriega  indict- 
ment (Eagleburger),  Nov.  70,  74 

Money  laundering  (Bush),  Dec.  10 


Drugs,  narcotic  (Cont'd) 

Morocco,  joint  cooperative  agreement 
in  fighting  against  international 
terrorism,  organized  crime,  and 
the  illicit  production,  trafficking, 
and  abuse  of  narcotics.  May  88 

Narcotic  drugs  and  jisychotropic  sub- 
stances, control,  bilateral  agi-ee- 
ment  with  the  Bahamas,  May  87 

OAS  Drug  Commission  (Shultz),  Jan. 
12 

Opium  production  and  trafficking: 
Lambertson,  May  41;  Wrobleski, 
Oct.  54 

Paraguay,  mutual  cooperation  for 
reducing  demand,  illicit  produc- 
tion and  traffic  of  drugs,  bilateral 
agreement,  Jan.  51 

Psychotropic  substances,  convention, 
1971:  Canada,  Feb.  83;  Jamaica, 
Dec.  59 

Reducing  demand,  preventing  illicit 
production  and  trafficking  in 
drugs,  bilateral  agi-eements: 
Malaysia,  July  78;  Nigeria,  May 
88 

Single  convention  on  (1961),  Jamaica, 
Dec.  59 

Summit  of  the  Arch,  economic  declara- 
tion, Sept.  16 

Trafficking  networks  (Wrobleski), 
Oct.  52 

U.K.,  bilateral  agi-eements  re:  An- 
guila.  Mar.  93,  Aug.  90;  British 
Virgin  Islands,  Jan.  51,  July  78; 
Cayman  Islands,  Mar.  93,  July 
78;  Monserrat,  May  88,  Nov.  80; 
Turks  and  Caicos  Islands,  Apr. 
63,  Oct.  86 

United  Nations  Conference  for  the 
Adoption  of  a  Convention 
Against  Illicit  Traffic  in  Narcotic 
Drugs  and  Psychotropic  Substan- 
ces, Vienna,  text,  Apr.  49 

U.S.  aid  to  Andean  democracies,  FY 
90,  request  (Baker),  Apr.  20 


E 


Eagleburger,  Lawrence  S.,  July  49,  Oct. 
37,  69,  Nov.  67 

East- West  relations:  Baker,  Apr.  18, 
30,  May  56,  June  10,  Aug.  56,  Sept. 
3;  Bush,  Aug.  82,  Sept.  20;  Mares- 
ca.  May  36;  Miller,  Aug.  1;  Mit- 
terand,  Aug.  82;  NAC,  Feb.  45,  46, 
Aug.  19,  21,  23;  Nitze,  Apr.  47 

Economy,  domestic,  federal  budget 
deficit:  McCormack,  July  50; 
Whitehead,  Jan.  19 

Economy,  world  (see  also  Debt  manage- 
ment; Developing  countries;  and  In- 
vestment): Baker,  July  24;  Bush, 
May  16,  Nov.  28,  Dec.  8 


Economy,  world  (Cont'd) 

African  Development  Bank  (Brady), 

June  24 
Asian  Development  Bank  (Brady), 

June  24 
Cash  transfer,  gi-ant  agreement  with 

Egypt,  Dec.  58 
Creative  responsibility  sharing 

(Baker),  Sept.  46' 
European  Community,  Jan.  23 
Foreign  direct  investment,  OECD 

final  communique,  Sept.  81 
Freedom  and  world  prosperity 

(Bush),  Dec.  8 
Group  of  7:  Baker,  Sept.  51;  Bush, 
May  9;  Whitehead,  Jan.  19 
Summit  of  the  Arch,  15th  economic 
summit,  Paris,  (July  1989): 
Baker,  Sept.  63 
Declarations  on: 
China,  Sept.  2;  Baker,  Sept.  3,. 

5 
East- West  relations,  Sept.  2; 

Baker,  Sept.  3 
Economic  declaration,  text, 

Sept.  13 
Human  rights,  Sept.  1 
Terrorism,  Sept.  2 
Review:  Baker,  Sept.  3;  Bush, 
Sept.  17,  19 
Hungarian-American  Enterprise 
Fund:  Bush,  Sept.  39;  White 
House,  Sept.  41 
Inter-American  Development  Bank 

(Brady),  June  24 
Mexico,  foreign  direct  investment, 

July  73 
Multilateral  development  banks,  U.S, 
funding,  FY  90,  proposed 
(Brady),  June  21,  29 
Polish- American  Enterprise  Fund: 
Baker,  Sept.  29;  Bush,  Sept.  26;l 
White  House,  Sept.  27 
Swap  agreement,  memo  of  under- 
standing with  Argentina,  Jan.  50, 
Swap  agreement  between  U.S.  f[ 

Treasury  and  Central  Bank  of     '  [ 
Bolivia/Government  of  Bolivia,       [ 
bilateral  agreement,  Oct.  85,  DecH 
58  {! 

Swap  agi'eement  between  U.S.  \  [ 

Treasury  and  the  Banco  de 
Mexico/Government  of  Mexico, 
bilateral  agreement,  Dec.  58 
Swap  agreement  between  U.S. 

Treasury  and  the  Central  Bank 
of  Venezuela/Government  of 
Venezuela,  bilateral  agreement, 
June  70 

U.S.  and  world  economy:  McCormackP 
Julv  49;  Quayle,  Aug.  53;  !;,,, 

Whitehead,  Jan.  18  '  ' 

U.S. -foreign  direct  investment,  June 
32 


10 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/Index  ^9fl  g, 


Economy,  world  (Cont'd) 

Energy: 

Environmental  problems  and  control 

U.S.  investment  in  China  (Bush), 

Coal/heavy  oil  coprocessing,  bilateral 

(Cont'd) 

May  13 

agreement  with  Canada,  May  87 

Mexico-U.S.  border  issues:  fact  sheet, 

U.S.  role  (Bush),  May  16 

International  Energy  Agency  (lEA), 

Dec.  6;  U.S. -Mexico  binational 

Ecuador: 

ministerial  meeting,  Paris  (1989), 

commission,  joint  communique, 

Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 

communique, Sept.  83 

Oct.  82 

ing,  control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 

Oil  and  gas  technology  and  export  con- 

Nuclear simulation:  Baker,  Oct.  80; 

Oct.  56 

trols  (Wendt),  Jan.  21 

Reilly,  Oct.  81;  Solana,  Oct.  80 

International  Atomic  Energy  Agency 

Private  sector  power,  bilateral  agree- 

Multilateral development  banks 

(IAEA),  statute  and  amendment 

ment  with  Pakistan,  Jan.  51 

project  (Brady),  June  23,  24,  25 

(1984),  Mar.  91 

Environmental  problems  and  control 

Ozone  layer,  protection,  convention 

Education: 

{see  also  Oil  pollution):  Baker,  Apr. 

(1985):  Burkina  Faso,  Aug.  89; 

Basic  education  strengthening,  project 

13,  14,  18;  Bush,  Nov.  28 

Cameroon,  Chad,  China,  Dec.  57; 

grant  agreement  with  Guatemala, 

Acid  rain.  Baker,  Apr.  28,  80;  Bush, 

German  Democratic  Republic, 

Oct.  86 

Apr.  27;  Mulroney,  Apr.  27,  July 

May  86;  Ghana,  Oct.  84;  Greece, 

Conference  on  Security  and  Coopera- 

46, 47 

Apr.  62;  Iceland,  Dec.  57; 

tion  in  Europe  (CSCE),  follow-up 

Clean  air  legislation  (Bush),  July  47 

Ireland,  Italy,  Feb.  74;  Jordan, 

meeting,  concluding  document, 

Conference  on  Security  and  Coopera- 

Aug. 89;  Kenya,  Feb.  74;  Liech- 

Mar. 33 

tion  in  Europe  (CSCE),  follow-up 

tenstein,  May  86;  Malaysia,  Dec. 

Science  and  engineering  workforce 

meeting,  concluding  document, 

57;  Malta,  Feb.  74;  Nigeria,  Jan. 

(McCormack),  July  52 

Mar.  28 

50;  Panama,  May  86;  Peru,  Aug. 

3gypt: 

Energy  issues,  lEA  communique, 

89;  Thailand,  Oct.  84;  Trinidad  . 

1  Arab-Israeli  peace  process,  10-point 

Sept.  84 

and  Tobago,  Tunisia,  Dec.  57; 

plan  (Baker),  Nov.  31,  35,  38,  42, 

German-U.S.  cooperation  (Bush), 

U.S.,  Feb.  74;  Uruguay,  May  86 

Dec.  45 

Aug.  39 

Montreal  protocol  (1987):  Australia, 

Cairo  Water  Supply  II,  bilateral 

Global  cKmate  change:  Baker,  Apr. 

Aug.  89;  Austria,  Feb.  74,  July 

agreement,  Jan.  50 

13;  Mulroney,  July  47 

77;  Belgium,  Mar.  92;  Burkina 

Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 

Global efforts:  Bush,  Sept.  48;  OECD 

Faso,  Feb.  74,  Oct.  84; 

ing,  control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 

final  communique,  Sept.  82;  Van 

Byelorussian  S.S.R.,  Mar.  92; 

Oct.  58 

den  Broek,  Sept.  50,  51 

Cameroon,  Dec.  57;  Congo, 

Telecommunications  IV,  bilateral 

Hungary,  regional  environmental  cen- 

Feb, 74;  Denmark,  European 

agreement,  Jan.  50 

ter:  Bush,  Sept.  40;  White 

Community,  France,  Mar.  92; 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  50, 

House,  Sept.  41 

German  Democratic  Republic, 

Feb.  74,  75,  Apr.  62,  June  68, 

Intergovernmental  Panel  on  Climate 

May  86;  Federal  Republic  of 

69,  July  77,  Sept.  93,  Oct.  85, 

Change  (IPCC),  FY  90,  U.S. 

Germany,  Mar.  92;  Ghana,  May 

Dec.  57,  58 

funding,  proposed  (Vogelgesang), 

86;  Greece,  Mar.  92;  Hungary, 

U.S.  aid,  FY  90,  request:  Baker, 

May  83 

July  77;  Iceland,  Dec.  57; 

Apr.  20,  Walker,  May  62 

Intervention  on  the  high  seas  in  cases 

Ireland,  Feb.  74,  Mar.  92; 

U.S.  visits  of  President  Mubarak: 

of  pollution  by  substances  other 

Italy,  Mar.  92;  Jordan,  Aug. 

Baker,  Dec.  45;  Bush,  Mubarak, 

than  oil,  protocol  (1973),  Egypt, 

89;  Kenya,  Feb.  74;  Liech- 

June 40 

June  68 

tenstein,  May  86;  Malaysia, 

SI  Salvador: 

Long-range  transboundary  air  pollu- 

Dec. 57;  Malta,  Feb.  74,  Apr. 

Democratic  progress,  Jan.  44;  Bush, 

tion,  convention  (1979),  protocol 

62;  Netherlands,  Nigeria,  Mar. 

May  16,  June  2;  (Department), 

(1984):  Italy,  Apr.  62;  Poland, 

92;  Panama,  May  86;  Philip- 

May 84;  Shultz,  Jan.  13 

Feb.  74;  Portugal,  Apr.  62 

pines,  Feb.  74;  Singapore,  June 

Duarte,  Jose  Napoleon,  Jan.  45,  46 

Protocol  (1988):  Austria,  Belgium,  Bul- 

68; Soviet  Union,  Feb.  74; 

Economy  (Department),  Jan.  48 

garia,  Byelorussian  S.S.R., 

Spain,  Mar.  92;  Switzerland, 

Farabundo  Marti  National  Liberation 

Canada,  Czechoslovakia,  Den- 

Mar. 92;  Thailand,  Feb.  74, 

Front  (FMLN)  (Department), 

mark,  Finland,  Aug.  89;  France, 

Oct.  84;  Trinidad  and  Tobago, 

Jan.  45,  46 

Aug.  89,  Oct.  85;  German 

Tunisia,  Dec.  57;  Uganda,  Feb. 

Human  rights:  Department,  Jan.  47; 

Democratic  Republic,  Federal 

74;  U.K.,  Mar.  92;  Venezuela, 

Kozak,  June  65 

Republic  of  Germany,  Greece, 

May  86 

Terrorism  (Department),  Dec.  55 

Hungary,  Ireland,  Italy,  Liech- 

Philippines Multilateral  Assistance  Ini- 

Treaties, agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  74, 

tenstein,  Lu.xembourg,  Aug.  89; 

tiative  (Baker),  Sept.  57 

75,  June  69,  July  77,  Sept.  93 

Netherlands,  Norway,  Aug.  89, 

Poland,  air  and  water  pollution,  U.S. 

U.S.  relations:  Department,  Jan.  48; 

Dec.  59;  Poland,  Spain,  Aug.  89; 

aid  package:  Baker,  Sept.  32; 

Shultz,  Jan.  13 

Soviet  Union,  Aug.  89,  Oct.  85; 

Bush,  Sept.  27;  White  House, 

U.S.  visit  of  President-elect  Cristiani 

Sweden,  Switzerland,  Ukrainian 

Sept.  28 

and  Vice-President-elect  Merino 

S.S.R.,  U.K.,  Aug.  89;  U.S., 

Pollution  in  Bering  and  Chukchi  Seas, 

(White  House),  June  66 

Aug.  89,  Sept.  93,  Oct.  36 

combating  in  emergency  situa- 

employment of  dependents  of  official 

Marine  environment  of  the  wider 

tions,  bilateral  agreement  with 

government  employees,  bilateral 

Caribbean  region,  convention 

Soviet  Union,  July  78,  Oct.  86 

agreement  with  Botswana,  July  77 

(1983),  Cuba,  Jan.  50 

Prevention  of  marine  pollution  by 
dumping  of  wastes  and  other  mat- 
ter, convention  (1978),  Portugal, 
July  77 

Department  of  State  Bulletin/Index  1989 

11 

Environmental  problems  and  control 
(Cont'd) 
Prevention  of  pollution  from  ships,  in- 
ternational convention  (1973): 
Annex  V:  pollution  by  garbage 
(1973):  Algeria,  Belgium, 
China,  Suriname,  June  68 
Protocol  (1978):  Algeria,  June  68; 
Cyprus,  Dec.  59;  Suriname, 
Syria,  Apr.  62;  U.K.  (extended 
to  Gibraltar),  June  68; 
Vanuatu,  Oct.  84 
Prohibition  of  military  or  other  en- 
vironmental modification  tech- 
niques, convention  (1977),  An- 
tigua and  Barbuda,  Feb.  73 
Summit  of  the  Arch:  Bush,  Sept.  18; 

economic  declaration,  Sept.  14 
Tropical  rain  forest  protective 

measures  (Brady),  June  24 
U.S. -Canada  bilateral  concerns:  Bush, 

Mulroney,  Apr.  27 
Water  supply  and  flood  control  in  the 
Souris  River  Basin  (1989), 
bilateral  agreement  with  Canada, 
Dec.  58 
World  Environment  Day  (Bush),  Oct. 
36 
Equatorial  Guinea,  treaties,  agree- 
ments, etc.,  Oct.  84,  Dec.  58 
Estonia: 
Cultural  and  political  history 

(Dobriansky),  June  35,  38 
U.S.  policy  toward  (Dobriansky), 
June  31 
Ethics  issues  (Baker),  Apr.  30 
Ethiopia: 
Human  rights  issues  (Brown),  May  29 
Treaties,  agi-eements,  etc.,  Aug.  88, 
Nov.  79 
Europe  (see  also  East- West  relations; 
European  Community  and  names 
of  individual  countries): 
American  military  forces  stationed  in 

(Baker),  Aug.  12 
Conference  on  Security  and  Coopera- 
tion in  Europe  (CSCE);  Aug.  7, 
9;  Ledogar,  May  34;  NAC,  Feb. 
44,  45,  Aug.  23;  Shultz,  Mar.  8,  50 
Conference  on  the  Human  Dimen- 
sion, Paris  (1989),  Abram, 
Sept.  88 
Follow-up  meeting,  Vienna  (1986- 
1989),  concluding  document: 
Mar.  21;  Reagan,  Mar.  22;  Zim- 
merman, Mar.  25 
Conventional  arms  negotiations. 

Mar.  26 
Cultural  exchanges,  Mar.  33 
Education,  Mar.  33 
Environmental  problems  and  con- 
trol, Mar.  28 
Fourth  follow-up  meeting,  Hel- 
sinki, 1992,  Mar.  34 
Helsinki  Final  Act,  Mar.  22 


Europe  (Cont'd) 

Human  dimension.  Mar.  34,  46 

Human  contacts,  Mar.  30 

Human  rights,  Mar.  23 

Industrial  cooperation.  Mar.  27 

Information  access.  Mar.  32 

Mediterranean  area  security, 
Mar.  30 

Migrant  workers,  Mar.  29 

Science  and  technology,  Mar.  28 

Stockholm  conference  (1984- 
1986),  assessment.  Mar.  26 

Terrorism,  Mar.  23 

Tourism,  Mar.  29 

Trade  relations.  Mar.  27 

Transportation,  Mar.  29 
Follow-up  meeting,  Vienna  (1986- 
89),  concluding  document,  an- 
nexes: 

Annex  I,  Meeting  of  experts  on 
peaceful  settlement  of  dis- 
putes. Mar.  35 

Annex  II,  Negotiations  on  con- 
fidence- and  security-building 
measures,  March  1989,  Mar. 
36 

Annex  III,  Negotiations  on  con- 
ventional armed  forces  in 
Europe,  Vienna  (1989),  Mar. 
36 

Annex  IV,  Meetings  concerning 
the  course  of  the  negotiation 
on  conventional  armed  forces 
in  Europe,  Mar.  39 

Annex  V,  Conference  on 
economic  co-operation  in 
Europe,  Mar.  39 

Annex  VI,  Meeting  on  the  protec- 
tion of  the  environment, 
Mar.  41 

Annex  VII,  Meeting  on  the 
Mediterranean,  Mar.  42 

Annex  VIII,  Information  forum. 
Mar.  43 

Annex  IX,  Symposium  on  the  cul- 
tural heritage.  Mar.  45 

Annex  X,  Conference  on  the 
human  dimension.  Mar.  46 

Annex  XI,  Chairman's  statement. 
Mar.  50 
Helsinki  Final  Act  and  the  Madrid 
and  Vienna  concluding  docu- 
ments, semi-annual  report, 
released,  Dec.  60 
Information  Forum,  London  1989 
(Marks),  Sept.  86 
Confidence-  and  security-building 

measures  (CSBMs),  negotiations, 

Vienna:  Baker,  May  .56;  Bush, 

May  33;  Department,  Aug.  74; 

Maresca,  May  35;  White  House, 

Julv  44,  Nov'  46 


Europe  (Cont'd) 

Conventional  armed  forces  in  Europe 
(CFE),  negotiations:  Aug.  9; 
Baker,  May  56,  59,  Nov.  13; 
Bush,  May  33;  Ledogar,  May  33, 
Sept.  75;  Western  position  paper, 
May  34;  White  House,  July  45, 
Sept.  76,  Nov.  46 
Eastern:  Bush,  Aug.  38,  39,  Sept.  7 
(quoted),  21,  48;  Solomon,  Feb.  4J 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 
States,  1952-1951,,  Volume     ^ 
VIII,  Eastern  Europe;  the 
Soviet  Union;  the  Eastern 
Mediterranean,  released,  Jan. 
53 
Freedom  of  expression  (Marks), 

Sept.  87 
Reform  movement  and  U.S.  sup- 
port (Baker),  Aug.  42,  Sept.  7, 
10,  51,  52,  Nov.  40,  43,  Dec.  20 
Relations  with  European  Com- 
munity (Eagleburger),  Oct.  39 
Strategic  technology  exports 

(Baker),  Sept.  7 
U.S.  aid,  Soviet  view  (Baker),  Nov, 
2 

Warsaw  Pact  relations  (Baker), 
Dec.  28,  29 
Mutual  and  balanced  force  reductions 
talks,  concluded:  Apr.  25; 
Ledogar,  May  34 
Western,  and  U.S.  relations:  Bush, 
Julv  18.  Aug.  11;  Eagleburger, 
Oct.  37 
European  Atomic  Energy  Community 
(EURATOM): 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Oct.  85 
U.S.  cooperation  (Bush),  June  44 
European  Communities  (EC)  Commis- 
sion: 
Legislation  on  trade  barriers  (Lamb), 

Feb.  32 
Ministerial  meeting,  Brussels  (1988): 

Delors,  Shultz,  Feb.  27 
U.S.  visit  of  Jacques  Delors  (White 
House),  Aug.  83 
European  Communitv  (Baker),  Apr.  12, 
18 
Agriculture  policy:  Delors,  Feb.  29; 
Lamb,  Feb.  35;  Shultz,  Feb.  29 
Background  and  institutions,  Jan.  27 
Defense  procurement  (Shultz),  Feb.  21 
Program  and  goals,  Jan.  23 
Relations  with  Eastern  Europe 

(Eagleburger),  Oct.  39 
Trade  issues.  Lamb,  Feb.  31,  33;  Wal 

lis,  Feb.  31 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar.  92, 

July  77,  Oct.  85 

U.S.  relations:  Jan.  24;  Eagleburger,  fl 

Oct.  37;  Hippler  Bello,  Holmer,    1 

Mar.  12  i 

European  Free  Trade  Association 

(Lamb),  Feb.  32 


12 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/Index  1£ 


'arrand,  Robert  W.,  May  32 
'iji  (Department),  Feb.  60 
U.S.  aid,  FY  90,  request  (Clark), 

May  52 
'inland,  treaties,  agreements,  etc., 
Mar.  91,  92,  July  77,  Aug.  88,  89, 
90,  Nov.  79,  Dec.  57,  .58 
'ish  and  fisheries: 

Conservation  of  Atlantic  tunas,  inter- 
national convention  (1966), 
protocol  (1984):  Cuba,  Ghana, 
May  86;  Venezuela,  June  68 
Cooperation  in  ensuring  safety  and 
wholesomeness  of  fresh  and 
frozen  oysters,  clams,  and  mus- 
sels, exported  to  U.S.  from 
Chile,  bilateral  agreement  with 
Chile,  July  77 
Faroese  fishing  in  fisheries  off  coast 
of  U.S.,  bilateral  agreement  with 
Denmark,  July  77 
Fisheries  off  the  coasts  of  the  U.S., 
bilateral  agreement  with: 
European  Economic  Community, 
July  77,  Oct.  85;  Iceland,  July  77, 
Oct.  86;  Korea,  July  78,  Sept.  93 
International  fishing  in  U.S.  waters 

(Wolfe),  July  56 
Mutual  fisheries  relations,  bilateral 
agi'eement  with  Soviet  Union, 
Feb.  76 
Pacific  Islands  regional  fisheries 

treaty  (1987):  New  Zealand,  Feb. 
73;  Tonga,  Sept.  93;  U.S.,  Feb. 
73;  Western  Samoa,  Mar.  91 
Pacific  salmon,  treaty,  bilateral  agree- 
ment amending  Annex  IV,  with 
Canada,  June  69 
Salmon  and  tuna  fisheries,  conserva- 
tion issues  (Wolfe),  July  57,  58 
U.S.  bilateral  fisheries  relationships 
(Wolfe),  July  57 
i'ood  and  Drug  Administration  (FDA), 
Chilean  fruit  in  U.S.  markets: 
Baker,  U.S. -Chile  joint  statement. 
May  85 
""oreign  affairs,  U.S.  See  Diplomacy  and 

Foreign  policy,  U.S. 
i'oreign  aid,  U.S.  (see  also 

Humanitarian  aid  and  Security  as- 
sistance, U.S.):  Powell,  Jan.  31 
Burma  (Lambertson),  May  42 
Cambodian  noncommunist  resistance 

(Lambertson),  May  38 
Colombia,  anti-drug  support  package 

(Bush),  Oct.  47 
Communications  development  assist- 
ance, July  63 
Development  assistance  (definition), 

June  61 
Economic  support  fund  (ESF),  June  61 
Food  for  Peace  (PL  480),  June  61 
International  affairs,  FY  90  budget, 
request: 


Foreign  aid,  U.S.  (Cont'd) 
Foreign  assistance  funding 
programs  (Baker),  Apr.  20 
East  Asia  and  the  Pacific  (Clark), 

May  49 
Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean 
(Kozak),  June  59,  62  (chart), 
64  (chart) 
Middle  East  (Walker),  May  61 
--   Migration  and  refugee  assistance 
progi'ams  (Moore),  May  72 
Southwest  Asia  and  Persian  Gulf 

(Burleigh),  May  66 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  (Rosenberg), 
July  39 
Foreign  operations  (Baker),  Apr.  20 
International  organizations  and 
progi'ams  (Vogelgesang), 
May  81 
Philippines:  Apr.  37;  Lambertson, 
May  46 
Multilateral  Assistance  Initiative 
(MAI):  Clark,  May  51;  Lam- 
bertson, May  47 
Foreign  policy,  U.S.:  Baker,  June  8; 
Perkins,  Sept.  70 
Africa,  Sub-Saharan  (Rosenberg), 

July  40 
Agenda  (Baker),  Apr.  16 
American  Foreign  Policy:  Foreign  Af- 
fairs Press  Briefings,  198i,  Sup- 
plement, released,  Feb.  77 
Biological  weapons  (Holmes),  July  43, 

Oct.  22 
Bipartisanship  (Baker)  May  24, 

June  9 
El  Salvador,  military  assistance,  Jan. 

44 
European  Community,  Jan.  24 
50th  anniversary.  Department  of 

State  S((//e)()),  July  1 
Human  rights  issues  (Lister),  Jan.  36 
Initiatives  (Baker),  May  10 
Regional  conflicts  and  influence  of 
U.S.  support  (Powell),  Jan.  30 
Soviet  Union  and  perestroika  (Baker), 

Dec.  10,  12 
Trade  relations  and  export  controls 

(Wendt),  Jan.  21 
UN  peacekeeping  activities  and  U.S. 

support  (Powell),  Jan.  30 
U.S.  refugee  progi'am  (Moore),  May 
72 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States , 
1952-195i,  Volume  VIII,  Eastern 
Europe;  the  Soviet  Union;  the  East- 
ern Mediterranean,  released,  Jan. 
53 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States, 
195-2-195i,  Volume  X,  Iran  (1931- 
195i),  released,  Aug.  93 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States, 
1955-1957,  Volume  V,  Austrian 
State  Treaty;  Summit  and  Foreign 
Ministers'  Meetings,  1955,  released, 
Apr.  64 


Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States, 
19.55-1957,  Volume  XIII,  Near 
East:  Jordan-Yemen,  released, 
Apr.  65 

Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States, 
1955-1957,  Volume  XFV,  Arab-Is- 
raeli Dispute,  1955,  released,  Aug. 
92 

Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States, 
19.55-1957,  Volume  XV.  Arab-Is- 
raeli Dispute,  Jan.  1-Jubj  26,  1956, 
released,  Aug.  93 

Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States, 
1955-1957,  Volume  XVIII,  Africa, 
released,  July  80 

Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States, 
19.55-1957,  Volume  XXFV,  Soviet 
Union;  Eastern  Mediterranean, 
released,  July  80 

Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  Sates, 
Supplement,  Memoranda  of  the 
Secretary  of  State,  1949-1951,  and 
Meetiyigs  and  Visits  of  Foreign  Dig- 
nitaries, 19^9-1952,  microfiche  pub- 
lication, released,  Apr.  65 

France: 
Treaties  and  agreements,  Feb.  74, 
Mar.  92,  May  87,  June  69,  Aug. 
89,  Sept.  93,  Oct.  85,  86,  Dec.  57 
U.S.  visit  of  President  Mitterand: 

Bush,  Mitterand,  Aug.  79 
Visit  of  Secretary  Baker  (Baker), 
Apr.  42 

Freedom:  Baker,  Apr.  11,  May  56,  Aug. 
6;  Bush,  July  21,  Sept.  22,  33,  47, 
53,  86  (quoted),  Oct.  41,  Nov.  27, 
Dec.  8;  Powell,  Jan.  30 

Freedom  of  expression:  Abram,  Sept. 
88;  Marks,  Sept.  86 

Friedersdorf,  Max  L.,  June  19 

Fund  for  Special  Operations,  U.S.  fund- 
ing, FY  90,  request  (Brady),  June 
29 


G 


Gabon,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb. 
74,  May  87,  June  69,  Aug.  88,  90, 
Sept.  93 
Gambia,  The,  protection  of  victims  of  in- 
ternational armed  conflict,  June  68 
Geneva  conventions  on  treatment  of 
armed  forces,  civilian  persons,  and 
prisoners  of  war  (1949),  Kiribati, 
June  68 
Protocol  I  (1977)  re  protection  of  vic- 
tims of  international  armed  con- 
flict: The  Gambia,  June  68; 
Greece,  Hungary,  Malta,  Aug. 
89;  Nigeria,  Solomon  Islands, 
May  86;  Spain,  Aug.  89 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/Index  1989 


13 


Geneva  conventions  on  treatment  of 
armed  forces,  civilian  persofis,  and 
prisoners  of  war  (19i9)  (Cont'd) 
Protocol  II  (1977)  re  protection  of  vic- 
tims of  non-international  armed 
conflicts:  The  Gambia,  June  69; 
Hungary,  Malta,  Aug.  89; 
Nigeria,  Solomon  Islands,  May 
86;  Spain,  Aug.  89 
Genocide,  prevention  and  punishment, 
convention  (1948):  Antigua  and  Bar- 
buda, Feb.  73;  Korea,  Democratic 
People's  Republic  of.  May  86; 
Libya,  Aug.  89;  U.S.  Feb.  73; 
Yemen,  June  68 
German  Democratic  Republic: 
Berlin  Wall,  Aug.  58 
Reunification  with  West  and  NATO  in- 
volvement (Baker),  Dec.  28 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  May  86, 
87,  July  77,  Aug.  88,  89,  Oct.  84 
Germany,  Federal  Republic  of  (Bush), 
Apr.  6 
Joint  and  U.S.  services  program  for 
testing  and  evaluation  of  IFTN 
system,  bilateral  agreement, 
Nov.  79 
Libyan  chemical  weapons  plant: 
Baker,  Apr.  22,  39;  Bar- 
tholomew, Sept.  76;  Department, 
Mar.  71;  Shultz,  Mar.  53 
Loans  to  Eastern  Europe  and  Soviet 

Union  (Baker),  June  17 
Nicaraguan  aid  (Baker),  June  15 
Reunification  issues  (Baker),  Dec.  20, 

28 
Short-range  nuclear  missile  forces 
deployment.  Baker,  Apr.  39,  July 
22,  24,  28,  34,  Aug.  13,  14 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  74, 
Mar.  92,  May  87,  June  69,  July 
77,  Aug.  89,  90,  Nov.  79,  Dec.  58 
U.S.  relations,  Baker,  Apr.  21,  June 
17,  July  28;  Bush,  Aug.  34,  38; 
Kohl,  Aug.  33 
U.S.  visit  of  Chancellor  Kohl:  Kohl, 

Reagan,  Mar.  56 
Visit  of  Secretary  Baker  (Baker), 
Apr.  39 
Ghana,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan. 

50,  May  86,  June  68,  69,  Oct.  84 
Gorbachev,  Mikhail  S.: 
Soviet  Union: 
Human  rights.  Mar.  61  (quoted) 
Rule  of  law,  Jan.  7  (quoted) 
U.S.  relations.  Mar.  55 
U.S.  visit  (Reagan),  Feb.  3 
Greece: 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 
Oct.  58 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 
States,  1955-1957,  Volume 
XXIV,  Soviet  Union;  Eastern 
Mediten-anean,  released,  July  80 


14 


Greece  (Cont'd) 
Terrorism  and  counterterrorism: 
Department,  Feb.  62;  Shultz, 
Feb.  48 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Mar.  92, 

Apr.  62,  Aug.  89,  90 
U.S. -Greek  defense  agi'eement,  ex- 
pires (Department),  Feb.  47 
Visit  of  Secretary  Baker:  Baker, 
Papandreou,  Apr.  41 
Grenada,  treaties,  agi'eements,  etc., 

Sept.  93,  Oct.  84 
Guatemala: 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 
May  70,  Oct.  57 
Judicial  reforms  (Kozak),  June  65 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Apr.  62, 
Oct.  86 
Guinea-Bissau,  treaties,  agreements, 

etc.,  Oct.  84,  Dec.  57 
Guyana: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Oct.  86, 

Dec.  58 
U.S.  economic  aid  (Kozak),  June  65 

H 

Haiti: 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 
May  69,  Oct.  57 
Treaties,  agi'eements,  etc.,  July  76, 

77,  Nov.  79 
U.S.  policy  (Kozak),  June  64 
Hank  Gonzalez,  Carlos,  Oct.  81 
Hannibalsson,  Jon  Baldvin,  Apr.  38 
Hawke,  Robert  J.L.,  Oct.  60 
Helsinki  Human  Rights  Day,  1989, 

proclamation  (Bush),  Oct.  42 
Higgins,  William  R.,  murder  in 

Lebanon,  Oct.  66 
Hills,  Carla,  June  30,  Nov.  53,  55 
Hippler  Bello,  Judith,  Mar.  11 
Holmer,  Alan  F.,  Mar.  11 
Holmes,  H.  Allen,  June  52,  July  43, 

Oct.  22 
Honduras: 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 
May  7,  Oct.  57 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  75, 
May  87,  July  77,  Oct.  86 
Hong  Kong: 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 
May  71,  Oct.  59 
Economic  development,  Apr.  36 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar.  92, 
Oct.  86,  Nov.  80 
Howe,  Sir  Geoffrey,  Apr.  38 
Howland,  Nina  D.,  Feb.  16 


Human  rights  (see  also  Europe:  Con- 
ference on  Security  and  Coopera- 
tion in  Europe  (CSCE):  Bush,  Aug. 
49;  U.S. -Soviet  joint  statement, 
Nov.  8 

Afghanistan,  Mar.  85 

Africa:  Brown,  May  31;  Farrand,  May 
32 

Baltic  states  (Dobriansky),  June  36 

Bulgaria:  Abram,  Sept.  88;  Depart- 
ment, NATO,  Oct.  43,  Nov.  59; 
White  House,  Sept.  90 

Burma  (Lambertson),  May  42 

Burundi  (Brown),  May  27 

Cambodia  (Lambertson),  May  40 

China:  Baker,  May  10;  Bush,  May  6 

Conference  on  the  Human  Dimension, 
Paris,  (1989)  (Abram),  Sept.  88 

Convention  against  torture  and  other 
cruel,  inhuman,  or  degrading 
treatment  or  punishment  (1984): 
Algeria,  Australia,  Finland,  Nov. 
79;  Guinea,  Dec.  58;  Italy,  Apr. 
62;  Libya,  Aug.  89;  Netherlands, 
May  87;  Poland,  Nov.  79;  Por- 
tugal, May  87;  U.K.,  Mar.  92; 
Yugoslavia,  June  69 

Cuba:  Apr.  59;  Bush,  May  83;  Kozak, 
Nov.  76;  Lister,  Jan.  37;  Schifter, 
Oct.  41;  Valladares,  Dec.  54 

Czechoslovakia  (Abram),  Sept.  89 

El  Salvador:  Jan.  47;  Kozak,  June  65 

Ethiopia  (Brown),  May  30 

Genocide  Convention  Implementation 
Act,  1987,  signing:  Reagan,  Jan. 
38;  White  House,  Jan.  39 

Indochinese  refugees  (Eagleburger), 
Oct.  70 

International  covenant  on  civil  and 
political  rights  (1966),  Algeria, 
Nov.  79 

International  covenant  on  economic, 
social,  and  cultural  rights  (1966), 
Algeria,  Nov.  74 

International  convention  on  genocide 
(White  House),  Jan.  39 

Kenya  (Brown),  May  27 

Liberia  (Brown),  May  27 

Mozambique  (Brown),  May  27 

Nongovenmental  organizations,  role 
of  (Lister),  Jan.  37 

Philippines  (Lambertson),  May  45 

Racial  discrimination,  elimination  of, 
convention  (1965):  Antigua  and 
Barbuda,  Feb.  74;  Mauritania, 
Mar.  92;  Yemen,  June  68 

Religious  freedom  (Baker),  July  29 

Romania  (Abram),  Sept.  89 

Somalia  (Brown),  May  30 

South  Africa:  Brown,  May  31; 
Perkins,  Sept.  71 

Soviet  Union:  Abram,  Sept.  88; 

Baker,  July  29,  Nov.  14;  Shultz, 
Feb.  7,  47,  Mar.  52;  Solomon, 
Feb.  40;  White  House,  Mar.  69 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/Index  1989 


Juman  rights  (Cont'd) 

Sudan  (Brown),  May  30 
,  Uganda  (Brown),  May  27 
U.S.  goals  and  objectives:  Abram, 

Sept.  89;  Lister,  Jan.  36 
Universal  Declaration  of  Human 
Rights  (1968),  40th  anniversary: 
Reagan,  Mar.  66;  Schifter,  Mar. 
59;  Walters,  Mar.  68;  Whitehead, 
Mar.  64;  Williamson,  Mar.  61 
luman  Rights  Day,  Bill  of  Rights  Day, 
and  Human  Rights  Week,  1988, 
proclamation  (Reagan),  Mar.  67 
lumanitarian  aid  (Moore),  May  73 

Afghanistan,  Mar.  89 
lungary: 
Democratic  progi'ess:  Baker,  Dec,  29; 
Bush,  Sept.  36,  37;  White  House, 
Aug.  78,  Dec.  39 
Iron  Curtain  barbed  wire,  presenta- 
tion by  Premier  Nemeth,  Sept.  43 
Summit  of  the  Arch,  declaration  on 
East- West  relations:  Baker, 
Sept.  4,  11,  46;  Bush,  Sept.  39; 
text,  Sept.  2;  White  House,  Sept. 
41 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  75, 
May  87,  July  77,  Aug.  88,  89, 
Oct.  86,  Nov.  80 
U.S.  aid  for  reform  efforts:  Baker, 
Sept.  4,  11,  46,  Nov.  38;  White 
House,  Dec.  39 
U.S.  relations  (Bush),  Sept.  46 
Visit  of  Secretary  Baker,  Sept.  37 
lussein  I,  July  54 


celand: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  July  77, 

Oct.  86,  Dec.  57 
Visit  of  Secretary  Baker:  Baker,  Han- 
nibalsson,  Apr.  38 
mmigration,  Mexico:  July  75;  Solana, 
Oct.  81;  U.S. -Mexico  binational  com- 
mission, joint  communique,  Oct.  82 
mport  duties  increase  on  certain 
Brazilian  products,  proclamation 
(Reagan),  Jan.  49 
ndia: 
Afghanistan,  involvement  in,  Mar.  83 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 
Oct.  56 
Nuclear  weapons  development 

(Baker),  Aug.  69 
Pakistan,  U.S.  arms  sales  (Schaffer), 

Oct.  65 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  May  86, 

July  78,  Aug.  90,  Nov.  80 
U.S.  relations  (Bush),  May  6 
Indonesia: 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 
May  71,  Oct.  59 


Indonesia  (Cont'd) 

Economic  development,  Apr.  37 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  74, 
75,  Mar.  92,  July  77,  Sept.  93, 
Dec.  57 
U.S.  aid,  FY  90,  request  (Clark), 
May  52 
Industrial  property,  Paris  convention 
for  the  protection  of  industrial 
property  (1967),  Lesotho,  Oct.  85 
Information  exchange,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  U.K.,  Feb.  76 
Information  technology,  multilateral 
development  banks  project  funding 
(Brady),  June  26 
Intellectual  property: 
Berne  convention  for  protection  of 
Hterary  and  artistic  works:  Hills, 
Nov.  56;  Reagan,  Jan.  35 
GATT  trade  negotiation  issues  (Hills), 

June  31 
1988  Trade  Act:  Hippler  Bello,  Hol- 

mer.  Mar.  12 
Rights  enforcement  (Hills),  Nov.  58 
Royalty  fees  for  U.S.  origin  defense 
articles,  bilateral  agreement  with 
Korea,  Oct.  86 
Tax  reimbursement,  bilateral  agi'ee- 
ment  with  World  Intellectual 
Property  Organization,  Mar.  93 
Trade-related  issues  (Hills),  Nov.  55 
Uruguay  Round  issues:  Feb.  36; 

Hills,  Nov.  55 
U.S.  bilateral  initiatives  (Hills),  Nov. 

58 
Woi-ld  Intellectual  Property  Organiza- 
tion, convention  (1967),  Malaysia, 
Feb.  74 
Inter-American  Development  Bank 
(IDB)  (Brady),  June  24,  30 
U.S.  funding,  FY  90,  request 
(Brady),  June  29 
Inter-American  Investment  Corporation 
(IIC),  U.S.  funding,  FY  90,  request 
(Brady),  June  29 
Interdependence  of  modern  world: 
Solomon,  Feb.  38;  Shultz,  Jan.  9, 
12;  Thatcher,  Jan.  10  (quoted) 
International  Atomic  Energy  Agency 
(IAEA),  U.S.  funding,  FY  90, 
proposed  (Vogelgesang),  May  82 
IAEA  Statute  (1956),  amendment 

(1984),  Burma,  Feb.  73 
Safeguards  in  connection  with  the 
treaty  for  prohibition  of  nuclear 
weapons  in  Latin  America, 
bilateral  agreement  with  IAEA, 
May  87 
Tax  reimbursement  agreement,  July 
78 
International  Bank  for  Reconstruction 
and  Development  (IBRD): 
Articles  of  agi-eement  (1944),  Angola, 
Dec.  59 


International  Bank  for  Reconstruction 

and  Development  (IBRD)  (Cont'd) 

Debt  management  programs:  Brady, 

May  55;  Bush,  Dec.  8 
Monetary  debt  policy  reforms 

(Brady),  June  22 
Philippines,  aid  to  (Lambertson),  May 

49 
Poland,  loans  to:  Bush,  Sept.  26; 

White  House,  Sept.  28 
U.S.  funding,  FY  90,  request 
(Brady),  June  29 
International  Conference  on  Cambodia, 
Paris,  (1989).  See  under  Cambodia 
International  Conference  on  Indochinese 
Refugees,  Geneva  (1989).  See  under 
Refugees 
International  Development  Association 
(IDA),  U.S.  funding,  FY  90,  re- 
quest (Brady),  June  29 
International  Drug  Enforcement  Con- 
ference (IDEC)  (Wrobleski),  Oct.  51 
International  Energy  Agency  (lEA), 
ministerial  meeting,  Paris  (1989), 
communique,  Sept.  83 
International  Finance  Corporation 
(Brady),  June  28 
U.S.  funding,  FY  90,  request 
(Brady),  June  29 
International  Maritime  Organization 

(IMO),  May  86 
International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF): 
Articles  of  agreement  (1944),  Angola, 

Dec.  59 
Debt  management  programs:  Brady, 

May  55;  Bush,  Dec.  8 
Philippines  aid  (Lambertson),  May  49 
International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  En- 
hanced Structural  Adjustment 
Facility,  U.S.  funding,  FY  90, 
proposed  (Brady),  June  21,  27,  29 
International  Narcotics  Control 

Strategy  Report  (INCSR):  May  69; 
Wrobleski,  Oct.  49 
International  Natural  Rubber  Organiza- 
tion, tax  reimbursement,  bilateral 
agreement,  Feb.  75 
International  Tropical  Timber  Organiza- 
tion (ITTO)  tax  reimbursement, 
bilateral  agreement,  Apr.  63 
Investment: 
Mutual  exchange,  U.S. -Mexico  Bina- 
tional Commission,  joint  communi- 
que, Oct.  84 
Reciprocal  encouragement  and  protec- 
tion, bilateral  agi-eements: 
Bangladesh,  Cameroon,  Grenada, 
Sept.  93;  Zaire,  Sept.  94 
U.S. -Canada  free  trade  agreement, 
Oct.  1 
Investment  of  private  capital  abroad: 
Hungary:  Baker,  Sept.  4,  11,  39,  46; 
White  House,  Sept.  41,  Dec  39 
Investment  incentive,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Marshall  Islands,  May 
88 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/Index  1989 


15 


Investment  of  private  capital  abroad 
(Cont'd) 

Philippines  Multilateral  Assistance  Ini- 
tiative (Baker),  Sept.  57 

Poland:  Baker,  Sept.  29,  32,  Nov.  40, 
41;  Bush,  June  4 
Ii-an  (Bush),  Apr.  5 

Afghanistan,  involvement  in.  Mar.  84 

Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 
Oct.  56 

Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 
States,  1952-195Jf,  Volume  X, 
Iran  (1951-195i),  released,  Aug. 
93 

Normalization  of  relations,  U.S. 
terms  (Bush),  Aug.  47,  49 

Preventing  collisions  at  sea,  interna- 
tional regulations,  convention 
(1972),  June  68 

Rushdie,  Salman,  death  threats: 
Adams,  May  78;  Baker,  May  78 
(quoted);  Bush,  May  79  (quoted); 
Department,  May  78,  79  (quoted) 

Preventing  collisions  at  sea,  interna- 
tional regulations  convention 
(1972),  June  68 

U.S.  hostages  in  Lebanon:  Baker, 
Aug.  57;  Bush,  Oct.  68;  Kelly, 
Nov.  63;  Reagan,  Feb.  6 

U.S. -Iran  claims  settlement  (Depart- 
ment), Nov.  60 

U.S.  relations:  Baker,  Oct.  13,  14, 
Dec.  19;  Kelly,  Oct.  44 
Iran  arms  and  contra  aid  controversy 

(Bremer),  Feb.  61 
Iraq: 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Mar.  91, 
Aug.  90 

U.S.S.  Stark,  claims  resulting  from  at- 
tack on,  bilateral  agi'eement, 
June  69 
Ireland: 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  74, 
Mar.  92,  Aug.  89,  Sept.  93 

U.S.  visit  of  Prime  Minister  Haughey 
(Bush),  June  39 
Israel  (see  also  Arab-Israeli  conflict  and 
Middle  East): 

Cooperation  in  the  fields  of  social  serv- 
ices and  human  development, 
bilateral  agi-eement,  F'eb.  75 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  74, 
Mar.  92,  May  88,  July  78,  Sept. 
93,  Dec.  57 

U.S.  aid,  FY  90,  request:  Baker, 
Apr.  20;  Walker,  May  61 

U.S.  relations:  Arens,  Baker,  May  63 

U.S.  visit  of  Defense  Minister  Rabin 
(White  House),  Aug.  84 

U.S.  visit  of  Prime  Minister  Shamir: 
Bush,  June  42;  Shamir,  June  43 

West  Bank  elections,  Likud  Party 
position  (Baker),  Sept.  6,  12",  30, 
32,  52,  61,  Nov.  36 


Italy: 
Nicaraguan  aid  (Baker),  June  15 
Profile,  Dec.  43 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  F'eb.  74, 

75,  Mar.  92,  Apr.  62,  June  68, 

July  76,  Aug.  89,  Sept.  93,  Oct. 

84,  Dec.  58 
U.S.  relations  (Bush),  Aug.  12 
U.S.  visit  of  President  Cossiga:  Bush, 

Cossiga,  Dec.  42 
Visit  of  Secretary  Baker,  Aug.  12 
Ivory  Coast.  See  Cote  d'lvoire 


Jamaica: 

Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 

May  70,  Oct.  54,  58 
Treaties,  agi-eements,  etc..  Mar.  92, 

May  88,  July  78,  Dec.  57,  58 
Japan: 

FSX  Aircraft,  codevelopment:  Bush, 

July  48,  Oct.  32;  Eagleburger, 

July  49 
Investment  in  U.S.,  Apr.  35 
Japanese  Red  Army  terrorist  group, 

Nov.  64 
Philippines,  multilateral  assistance  ini- 
tiative: Bush,  May  8;  Lam- 

bertson.  May  48 
Trade  relations  \vith  U.S.:  Apr.  34, 

Sept.  78;  Hippler  Bello,  Holmer, 

Mar.  12,  13 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  73, 

75,  May  88,  June  69,  Aug.  90, 

Nov.  80 
U.S.  relations:  Baker,  Apr.  24,  May 

2,  Aug.  65,  Bush,  May  6,  9,  22 
U.S.  visit  of  Prime  Minister  Kaifu: 

Bush,  Nov.  51;  Kaifu,  Nov.  52 
U.S.  visit  of  Prime  Minister 

Takeshita:  Bush,  Apr.  32; 

Takeshita,  Apr.  33 
Visits  of  Secretary  Baker,  May  1, 

Sept.  56 
Jordan: 

Profile,  July  54 

Treaties,  agi'eements,  etc.,  Jan.  50, 

Aug.  89,  Sept.  93 
U.S.  aid,  FY  90,  request  (Walker), 

May  64 
U.S.  visit  of  King  Hussein  I:  Bush, 

July  53;  Hussein,  July  54 
Judicial  matters: 

Child  abduction,  international,  civil 

aspects,  convention  (1980):  Belize, 

Sept.  93;  Norway,  Apr.  62; 

Sweden,  July  76;  U.S.,  Jan.  50 
Execution  of  judicial  matters,  bilateral 

agreement  with  Thailand,  Feb.  76 
E.xtradition  treaties  (Shultz),  Jan.  5 


Judicial  matters  (Cont'd) 

International  Court  of  Justice,  compul- 
sory jurisdiction,  Guinea-Bissau, 
Dec.  57 

Letters  rogatory,  inter-American  con- 
vention (1975):  U.S.,  Jan.  50 
Additional  protocol  (1979):  U.S., 
Jan.  50 

Mutual  assistance  in  criminal  matters, 
bilateral  agreement  with  Nigeria, 
Nov.  80 

Service  abroad  of  judicial  and  ex- 
trajudicial documents  in  civil  and 
commercial  matters,  convention 
(1965):  Canada,  Feb.  73;  Pakis- 
tan, Mar.  91 

Taking  of  evidence  abroad  in  civil  or 
commercial  matters,  convention 
(1970),  Mexico,  Oct.  84 

Transfer  of  sentenced  prisoners,  con- 
vention (1983):  Italy,  Sept.  93; 
Malta,  Feb.  74 


K 


Kaifu,  Toshiki,  Nov.  52 
Keel,  Alton  G.,  Jr.,  Aug.  18 
Kelly,  John  H.,  Oct.  44,  Nov.  61 
Kenya: 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 
Oct.  59 
Human  rights  issues  (Brown),  May  29 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  74, 
75,  May  86 
Khalifa,  Mohammad  bin  Mubarak  al-, 

Oct  66 
Kiribati,  Geneva  convention  relative  to 
the  protection  of  civilian  persons  in 
time  of  war,  June  68 
Kohl,  Helmut,  Mar.  56,  Aug.  33 
Korea,  Democratic  People's  Republic  of: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar.  91, 

May  86,  87,  Aug.  88 
U.S.  relations:  Oct.  31;  Bush,  May, 
21;  Department,  Jan.  17 
Korea,  Republic  of: 
Ambassadorial  appointment  (Baker), 

July  29 
Democratic  progi'ess:  Oct.  30;  Bush, 

May  20,  22 
Dialogues  with  North  Korea,  Oct.  31 
Economic  development:  Apr.  36; 

Bush,  May  20 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  74, 
Mar.  91,  Mav  88,  Julv  78,  Sept. 
93,  Oct.  86 
Unification  proposal  (Bush),  May  19, 

21 
U.S.  relations:  Oct.  30;  Bush,  May  17, 

18,  20 
U.S.  troops  in  (Bush),  May  16,  19 
Kozak,  Michael  G.,  June  59,  Nov.  79 
Kuwait,  treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar. 
93,  May  87,  June  69,  July  76 


16 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/Index  1989 


jamb,  Denis,  Feb.  31 

.ambertson,  David  F.,  Mav  37,  40,  43, 

Dec.  37 
landau,  Sonia,  June  48 
,aos: 

Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 
May  71,  Oct.  59 
Refugees,  Conference  on  Indochinese 

Refugees,  Oct.  72 
Suppression  of  unlawful  seizure  of 

aircraft,  convention,  June  68 
U.S.  relations  (Solomon),  Nov.  49 
latin  America  (see  also  names  of  in- 
dividual cotodries): 
Caribbean  region: 
Caribbean  Basin  Initiative,  Baker, 

June  7,  8;  Kozak,  June  64 
Economic  development  and  telecom- 
munications (Borg),  Mar.  17 
U.S.  aid,  FY  90,  request:  Baker, 
Apr.  20;  Kozak,  June  59 
Central  America:  Baker,  Apr.  12,  17, 
28,  29;  Bush,  Apr.  6 
Central  American  peace  plan 
(Ai'ias/Esquipulas  II  agree- 
ment): Baker,  June  7,  10,  Oct. 
79,  82;  Bush,  May  16;  Central 
American  Presidents  joint  decla- 
rations, Alajuela,  June  57,  El 
Tesoro,  June  58;  Shultz,  Jan.  13 
Peace  process,  U.S. -Soviet  joint 

statement,  Nov.  7 
Refugee  assistance  (Moore),  Aug.  87 
UN  mandate  under  peace  agi'ee- 
ments:  Baker,  Department, 
Dec.  53 
UN  Resolution  637,  Central 

American  peace,  Okun,  text, 
Oct.  73 
U.S.  aid,  FY  90,  request  (Baker), 

Apr.  20 
U.S.  bipartisan  accord  on  Central 
America:  Baker,  June  56; 
Bush,  June  55;  te.xt,  June  57 
Debt  management;  Bush,  June  2; 

Kozak,  June  61;  Shultz,  Jan.  11 
Democratic  progi-ess:  Baker,  June  6; 

Bush,  June  1;  Kozak,  June  63 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts:  Bush,  June  2; 
Kozak,  June  62;  Shultz,  Jan.  12 
Economic  development:  Bush,  June  1; 

Kozak,  June  60,  Shultz,  Jan.  11 
International  Commission  for  Central 
America  Recovery  and  Develop- 
ment (Sanford  Commission) 
(Kozak),  June  62 
Multinational  cooperation  in  develop- 
ment (Kozak),  June  63 
Political  trends  (Kozak),  June  60 
Terrorism  (Bremer),  Feb.  63 
U.S.  aid,  FY  90,  request  (Kozak), 
June  59 


Latvia: 
Cultural  and  political  history 

(Dobriansky),  June  35,  38 
U.S.  policy  toward  (Dobriansky), 
June  37 
Lebanon  (Department),  Feb.  58 
American  hostages:  Baker,  Oct.  13; 
Bush,  Apr.  5,  Nov.  26;  White 
House,  Oct.  67 
Iranian  role:  Baker,  Aug.  57;  Bush, 
Oct.  68;  Kelly,  Nov.  63; 
Reagan,  Feb.  6 
Murder  of  Col.  Higgins:  Bush,  Oct 
66,  67;  White  House,  Oct.  66, 
69 
Cease-fire  efforts:  Baker,  Oct.  14, 
Nov.  37;  Department,  June  44; 
Kelly,  Oct.  45,  Nov.  61;  White 
House,  June  44 
Arab  League  peace  initiative; 

(Department)  May  65,  June  43, 
July  55 
French  support  for  (Bush),  Aug.  83 
U.S. -Soviet  joint  statements,  July 
30,  Nov.  9 
Disaster  relief  funds  (Department), 

July  54 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 
Oct.  58 
National  reconciliation  agreement 

(Department),  Dec.  46 
U.S.  aid,  FY  90,  request  (Walker), 
May  66 
Ledogar,  Stephen  J.,  May  33,  Sept.  75 
Lesotho,  treaties,  agi-eements,  etc., 

Aug.  88,  Oct.  84,  85 
Levitsky,  Melvyn,  Oct.  46 
Liberia; 
Human  rights  issues  (Brown),  May  28 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar.  92, 
May  86 
Libya; 
Chemical  weapons:  Department,  Mar. 

71;  Shultz,  Mar.  7,  53 
MiG-23  aircraft  shot  down  by  U.S. 
Navy:  Carlucci,  Defense  Depart- 
ment, Mar.  70;  Okun,  U.S. 
report  to  U.N.,  Mar.  90 
Terrorism:  Nov.  64;  Bremer,  Feb.  61, 

62 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  June  68, 

Aug.  88,  89,  Oct.  85 
U.S.  oil  companies  resume  operations 
(White  House),  Mar.  71 
Liechtenstein,  treaties,  agreements, 
etc..  May  86,  Aug.  89,  Dec.  58 
Lister,  George,  Jan.  36 
Lithuania: 
Cultural  and  political  history 

(Dobriansky),  June  35,  38 
U.S.  policy  toward  (Dobriansky), 
June  37,  38 
Loadlines.  See  under  Maritime  matters 


Lu.xembourg: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Mar.  92, 
May  87,  July  76,  Aug.  89,  Sept. 
93,  Dec.  59 
Visit  of  Secretary  Baker:  Baker, 
Poos,  Apr.  42 


M 


Macao,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  May 

88,  June  69 
Madagascar,  treaties,  agreements,  etc., 

Aug.  89,  Nov.  80 
Malawi,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  May 

86,  June  69 
Malaysia: 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 
May  72,  Oct.  59 
Economic  development,  Apr.  37 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  74, 

Mar.  93,  July  78,  Aug.  90,  Dec.  59 
U.S.  aid,  FY  90,  request  (Clark), 
May  53 
Mali: 
Consolidation  and  rescheduling  of 
debts  owed  to,  guaranteed  by,  or 
insured  by  the  U.S.,  Sept.  94 
U.S.  visit  of  President  Traore: 

Reagan,  Jan.  14;  Traore,  Jan.  14, 
15 
Malta,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb. 
74,  Apr.  82,  May  86,  July  76,  77, 
Aug.  88,  89,  Dec.  59 
Marine  pollution.  See  Environmental 
problems  and  control  and  Oil  pollu- 
tion 
Mai'itime  matters: 
Deep  submergence  rescue  system, 
memo  of  understanding  with 
France,  June  69 
Facilitation  of  international  maritime 
traffic,  convention  (1965), 
Vanuatu,  June  68 
International  Maritime  Organization, 

convention  (1948),  Malawi,  May  86 
Law  of  the  Sea,  rules  of  international 
law  governing  innocent  passage, 
bilateral  agi-eement  with  Soviet 
Union,  te.xt,  Nov.  26 
Load  lines,  international  convention 
(1966):  Haiti,  July  76;  Mauritius, 
Feb.  73;  Tanzania,  July  76;  Togo, 
Dec.  59 
Maritime  search  and  rescue,  bilateral 
agreements:  Mexico,  Oct.  86; 
Micronesia,  Feb.  75;  Soviet 
Union,  Oct.  86 
Mai'itime  search  and  rescue,  conven- 
tion (1979):  Italy,  Trinidad  and 
Tobago,  Oct.  84 


lepartment  of  State  Bulletin/Index  1989 


17 


Maritime  matters  (ConVd) 
Prevention  of  collisions  at  sea,  interna- 
tional regulations,  convention 
(1972):  Iran,  June  68;  Malta,  July 
76;  Mauritius,  Oct.  84;  Togo,  Dec. 
59 
Amendments  (1987),  U.S.,  Sept.  93 
Safety  of  life  at  sea,  international  con- 
vention (1974):  Haiti,  Suriname, 
July  77;  Togo,  Dec.  57 
Protocol  (1978):  Indonesia,  Feb.  74; 
Togo,  Dec.  59 
Safety  on  the  Great  Lakes  by  means 
of  radio,  bilateral  agreement  with 
Canada,  May  87 
Standards  of  training,  certification, 
and  watchkeeping  for  seafarers, 
international  convention  (1978): 
Algeria,  Apr.  62;  Cameroon,  Oct. 
84;  Ghana,  June  68;  Haiti,  July 
77;  Marshall  Islands,  Oct.  84; 
Togo,  Dec.  59;  Trinidad  and 
Tobago,  U.K.  (extended  to  Ber- 
muda), June  68 
Suppression  of  unlawful  acts  against 
the  safety  of  maritime  naviga- 
tion, convention  (1988):  China, 
Denmark,  Finland,  Iraq,  New 
Zealand,  Mar.  91 
Protocol  (1988)  for  suppression  of 
unlawful  acts  against  the  safety 
of  fixed  platforms  located  on 
the  Continental  Shelf:  Belgium, 
July  77;  Brunei,  May  86; 
Byelorussian  S.S.R.,  July  77; 
China,  Mar.  91;  Czechoslo- 
vakia, July  77;  Denmark,  Mar. 
91;  Egypt"  July  77;  German 
Democratic  Republic,  Oct.  84; 
Iraq,  Mar.  91;  Netherlands, 
May  86;  New  Zealand,  Mar.  91; 
Nigeria,  July  77;  Poland,  Mar. 
91;  Saudi  Arabia,  July  77; 
Seychelles,  May  86;  Soviet 
Union,  July  77;  Spain,  Nov.  79; 
Switzerland,  June  68;  Trinidad 
and  Tobago,  Dec.  59;  Ukrainian 
S.S.R.,  July  77 
Tonnage  measurement  of  ships,  inter- 
national convention  (1969):  Haiti, 
Indonesia,  Malta,  July  77;  Mar- 
shall Islands,  Oct.  85;  Mauritius, 
Feb.  74;  Togo,  Dec.  58;  U.K.  (ex- 
tended to  Gibraltar,  Guernsey), 
Uruguay,  Vanuatu,  June  68 
Marks,  Leonard,  Sept.  86 
Marriage,  consent  to,  minimum  age  for, 
and  registration,  convention  (1962), 
Antigua  and  Barbuda,  Feb.  73 
Marshall  Islands: 
Diplomatic  relations  established 

(Bush),  Oct.  62 
Treaties,  agi-eements,  etc..  May  88, 
Aug.  88,  Sept.  93,  94,  Oct.  84, 
85,  86,  Dec.  58 


18 


Mauritania,  international  convention  on 
the  elimination  of  all  forms  of  racial 
discrimination.  Mar.  92 
Mauritius,  treaties,  agreements,  etc., 
Jan.  50,  Feb.  73,  74,  May  86,  88, 
Aug.  88,  Oct.  84 
McAllister,  Eugene  J.,  Oct.  33 
McCormack,  Richard  T.,  July  49 
Mexico  (Baker),  Apr.  12,  17 

Boundary  and  water  agreements: 

Baker,  Oct.  80;  U.S. -Mexico  Bina- 
tional  Commission,  joint  communi- 
que, Oct.  82 

Debt  management:  July  73;  Baker, 
June  18 

Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts:  Alvarez,  Oct. 
79,  80;  Aspe,  Oct.  80;  Baker,  Oct. 
76,  83;  Solana,  Oct.  80; 
Thornburgh,  Oct.  79;  U.S.-Mexico 
Binational  Commission,  joint  com- 
munique, Oct.  83;  Wrobleski, 
May  69,  July  75,  Oct.  58 

Economy,  U.S.-Mexico  Binational 
Commission,  joint  communique, 
Oct.  83 

Environmental  issues,  fact  sheet, 
Dec.  6 

Immigration  of  third-country  nationals 
through  U.S.  border:  Solana,  Oct. 
81;  U.S.-Me.xico  Binational  Com- 
mission, joint  communique,  Oct. 
82 

Profile.  July  76,  Dec.  4 

Tourism:  fact  sheet,  Dec.  6;  Hank  Gon- 
zalez, Oct.  81;  U.S.-Mexico  Bina- 
tional Commission,  Oct.  84 

Trade  issues,  fact  sheet,  Dec.  6 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  50, 
Feb.  74,  75,  Mar.  93,  Apr.  63, 
May  87,  88,  June  69,  July  78, 
Aug.  88,  Oct.  84,  86,  Dec.  58 

U.S.  fisheries  (Wolfe),  July  57 

U.S.  foreign  policy  objectives,  July  76 

U.S.-Mexico  Binational  Commission 
meeting,  Me.xico  City  (1989): 
Baker,  Oct.  76;  joint  communi- 
que, text,  Oct.  82 

U.S.  relations:  July  73;  Baker,  June 
9,  Oct.  78;  Bush,  Dec.  2,  3; 
Salinas,  Dec.  2,  4;  Shultz,  Feb. 
71;  Solana,  Oct.  78;  U.S.Mexico 
Binational  Commission,  joint  com- 
munique, Oct.  82 

U.S.  visit  of  President  Salinas:  Bush, 
Salinas,  Dec.  1 
Micronesia,  Federated  States  of: 

Diplomatic  relations  established 
(Bush),  Oct.  62 

Treaties,  agi-eements,  etc.,  Feb.  75, 
Dec.  58 
Middle  East:  Baker,  Apr.  15,  19,  22; 
Bush,  May  16;  Walker,  May  61; 
White  House,  Aug.  84 

Arms  proliferation  (Kelly),  Oct.  45 


Middle  East  (Cont'd) 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 

States,  1955-1957,  Volume  XIII, 
Near  East:  Jordan-Yemen, 
released,  Apr.  65 
Palestine  Liberation  Organization 
(PLO): 
Arafat,  Yasir,  denied  U.S.  visa: 
Department,  Feb.  53;  Murphy, 
Feb.  55;  Reagan, 
Terronst  threat  (Armacost),  Feb.  5^ 
U.S.-PLO  dialogues:  Baker,  Aug. 
59,  Sept.  9;  Pelletreau,  May  66; 
Reagan,  Shultz,  Feb.  51 
U.S.  policy  toward:  Baker,  Apr.  22„ 
July  65,  Sept.  68;  Department, 
July  66;  Shultz,  Feb.  28;  Vogel- 
gesang,  July  65 
Regional  peace  efforts  (Murphy), 

Feb.  58 
U.S.  diplomacy  (Kelly),  Oct.  44 
West  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip,  U.S.  aid, 
FY  90,  request  (Walker),  May  62 
West  Bank  resettlement  by  Soviet 
Jews  (Baker),  Dec.  45 
Migrant  workers.  Conference  on 

Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe 
(CSCE),  concluding  document.  Mar. 
29 
Military  personnel,  exchange  of  officers, 
memo  of  understanding  with  Papuat 
New  Guinea,  Sept.  94 
Miller,  James  E.,  Aug.  1 
Mitterrand,  Francois,  Aug.  79,  81,  82 
Mobutu  Sese  Seko,  Oct.  17 
Monaco,  convention  on  assistance  in  the 
case  of  a  nuclear  accident  or 
radiological  emergency  (1986),  Dec. 
57 
Mongolia,  treaties,  agreements,  etc., 

Aug.  88,  Nov.  79,  Dec.  58 
Moore,  Jonathan,  May  72,  July  59,  Aug. 

85,  87 
Morocco: 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 
Oct.  59 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  75, 
Mar.  92,  May  88,  Sept.  93,  Nov. 
80 
Mozambique: 
Human  rights  issues  (Brown),  May  27 
Refugees,  protocol  relating  to  the 
status  of  (1967),  July  77 
Mubarak,  Mohammed  Hosni,  June  40 
Mulroney,  Brian,  July  45 
Murphy,"  Richard  W.l  Feb.  55,  57 


N 


Namibia  (see  also  Angola,  People's 
Republic  of): 
Independence:  Baker,  Feb.  15,  May 
29;  Cohen,  Nov.  43;  Department, 
June  18 


! 


egroponte,  John  D.,  biographical  data, 

Dec.  5 
fepal: 

Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 
Oct.  56 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Mar.  93, 

May  86 
[etherlands: 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar.  92, 
May  86,  87,  Aug.  89,  Sept.  93, 
Nov.  80,  Dec.  57 

U.S.  relations:  Baker,  Van  den 
Broek,  Sept.  50,  52 

Visit  of  Secretary  Baker,  Sept.  50 

ew  Zealand: 

Economic  development,  Apr.  31 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  73, 
74,  Mar.  91,  July  78,  Aug.  88,  89, 
Sept.  93 

U.S.  relations  (Cleveland),  June  45,  46 

icaragua: 

Contra  aid:  Baker,  Apr.  21,  May  23, 
Oct.  79;  Bush,  Apr.  6,  June  55; 
White  House,  Jan.  45 

Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 
May  70,  Oct.  58 

Economic  assistance  from  Italy  and 
Germany  (Baker),  June  15 

Elections:  Baker,  May  25,  Dec.  28; 
Bush,  June  56,  Sept.  92;  Depart- 
ment, June  67 

Organization  of  American  States 

(OAS),  protocol  of  amendment  to 
charter,  ratified,  Feb.  74 

Peace  and  democracy,  need  for 
(Bush),  June  1 

Restriction  of  entry  by  officials  and 
employees  into  U.S.  (Reagan), 
Jan.  47 

Sandinista  oppressions  (Bush),  May  16 

Soviet  bloc  aid  to  Sandinistas:  Baker, 
May  24,  26,  60,  June  10,  13,  15, 
July  24,  32,  Nov.  3,  12,  41,  Dec. 
19,  28;  Bush,  June  1,  56;  White 
House,  June  67 

U.S.  policy  (Reagan),  Feb.  5 

iger,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Aug. 
90,  Oct.  85,  Nov.  80 

igeria: 

Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 
Oct.  59 

Treaties,  agi'eements,  etc.,  Jan.  50, 
Mar.  92,  May  86,  88,  July  77, 
Nov.  80 

;tze,  Paul  H.,  Apr.  44 

oith  Atlantic  Council  (NAC),  heads  of 
state  meeting,  Brussels  (May  1989): 
Baker,  Aug.  61,  62;  Bush,  Aug.  15, 
16,  45;  Kohl,  Aug.  34 

Comprehensive  concept  on  arms  con- 
trol and  disarmament:  Baker, 
Aug.  55,  63;  NATO  Defense  Plan- 
ning Committee,  Aug.  77 


North  Atlantic  Council  (NAC)  (Cont'd) 
Text,  Aug.  22 

Conventional  Parity  Initiative:  Aug. 
20,  25,  26;  Baker,  Aug.  55,  58, 
62;  Bush,  Aug.  16,  32,  Sept.  24 

Declaration,  Aug.  18 

Short-range  nuclear  forces  (SNF) 
agreement:  Baker,  Aug.  34,  55; 
Bush,  Aug.  81 
North  Atlantic  Council  (NAC),  minis- 
terial meeting,  Brussels  (Dec. 
1988): 

Extracts  from  minutes,  Feb.  46 

Final  communique,  Feb.  44 

Statement  on  conventional  arms  con- 
trol, Feb.  43 
North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization 
(NATO):  Baker,  May  4,  July  21; 
Bush,  Apr.  6,  May  4,  July  18,  Aug. 
38,  61;  Mulroney,  July  46 

Alliance  building:  Aug.  6;  Bush,  Aug. 
31;  NAC,  Aug.  20,  24 

Arms  control  agenda  (Shultz),  Jan.  3 

Conventional  armed  foi'ces  in  Europe 
(CFE),  negotiations:  Ledogar, 
May  33,  White  House,  July  44 

Conventional  weapons  limitations 
proposal:  Baker,  Nov.  32;  Bush, 
Aug.  16;  Keel,  Aug.  18;  White 
House,  Sept.  76 

Creative  responsibility-sharing  and 
regional  problems  (Baker),  Aug. 
57,  60 

Defense  ministers'  meeting,  Brussels 
(Dec.  1988),  final  communique, 
Feb.  42 

Defense  ministers'  meeting,  Brussels 
(June  1989),  final  communique, 
Aug.  77 

Defense  Planning  Committee,  Brus- 
sels (1988),  final  communique, 
Feb.  46 

Flexible  response  policy:  Aug.  7; 
Baker,  May  26;  Mi'ller,  Aug.  3 

40th  anniversary,  chronology:  Aug.  7; 
Baker,  Aug.  55 

German  reunification  (Baker),  Dec.  28 

History  of  (Miller),  Aug.  1 

Meeting  of  Secretary  General 

Woerner  with  President  Bush 
(White  House),  Dec.  44 

Nuclear  Planning  Group,  meeting. 
The  Hague,  (Oct.  1988),  final  com- 
munique, Jan.  28 

Nuclear  Planning  Group,  meeting, 
Brussels  (April  1989),  final  com- 
munique, June  36 

Security  challenges  in  the  1990s 
(Nitze),  Apr.  44 

Short-range  nuclear  forces  (SNF) 
negotiations:  Baker,  Apr.  39, 
July  22,  24,  28,  34;  Aug.  29,  34; 
Bush,  July  46,  Aug.  31,  81;  Mit- 
terand,  Aug.  81;  Mulroney, 
July  46 


North  Atla  ntic  Treaty  Organization 
(NATO)  (Cont'd) 

Soviet  Union,  relations  with  (Nitze), 
Apr.  47 

Summit  meeting.  See  North  Atlantic 
Council,  heads  of  state  meeting 

U.S.  goals  and  objectives,  Aug.  6; 
Baker,  Aug.  63 

U.S.  troop  reduction  proposals 
(Baker),  Aug.  42,  44 

Visit  of  Secretary  Baker  to  alliance 
countries,  Apr.  38 

Warsaw  Pact,  relations  (Bush),  Aug. 
32 
Norway: 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc..  Mar.  92, 
Apr.  62,  Aug.  89,  90,  Sept.  93, 
Oct.  86,  Nov.  79,  Dec.  57 

Vist  of  Secretary  Baker:  Baker, 
Brundtland,  Apr.  40 
Nuclear  accidents: 

Assistance,  convention  (1986): 

Cyprus,  Egypt,  France,  Israel, 
Monaco,  Thailand,  Tunisia,  Dec. 
57 

Early  notification,  convention  (1986): 
Cyprus,  France,  Israel,  Monaco, 
Thailand,  Tunisia,  Dec.  59;  Yugo- 
slavia, May  86 
Nuclear  energy: 

Decommissioning  nuclear  facilities, 
bilateral  agi'eement  with  U.K., 
July  78 

50th  anniversary  (Shultz),  Jan.  1 

International  Atomic  Energy  Agency 
(IAEA)  Statute  (1956),  amended 
(1984):  Bangladesh,  Sept.  93; 
Ecuador,  Mar.  91;  Ghana,  Italy, 
Libya,  Tunisia,  June  68;  Uganda, 
Aug.  88 

Liquid  metal-cooled  fast  breeder  reac- 
tors, bilateral  agreement:  France, 
Germany,  Federal  Republic  of. 
May  87;'japan,  U.K.;  May  88 

Nuclear  materials  safeguards  research 
and  development,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  EURATOM,  Oct.  85 

Nuclear  plant  life  extension  research, 
bilatei'al  agreement  with  Switzer- 
land, Sept.  94 

Peaceful  uses  of  atomic  energy,  scien- 
tific and  technical  cooperation, 
bilateral  agi'eement  with  Soviet 
Union,  Oct.  86 

Physical  protection  of  nuclear 

material,  convention  (1979):  Ar- 
gentina, July  77;  Austria,  May 
86;  China,  Aug.  89;  Japan,  Feb. 
73 

Radioactive  waste  management, 
bilateral  agi'eement  with  Bel- 
gium, May  87 


3partment  of  State  Bulletin/Index  1989 


19 


Nuclear  energy  (Cont'd) 
Safeguards  in  connection  with  the 
treaty  for  the  prohibition  of 
nuclear  weapons  in  Latin 
America,  bilateral  agreement 
with  International  Atomic  Ener- 
gy Agency  (IAEA),  May  87 
Nuclear  nonproliferation:  Burns,  Jan. 
42;  Shultz,  Jan.  1 
Treaty  (1968):  Bahrain,  Feb.  73; 
Qatar,  Aug.  89 
Nuclear  testing: 
Limited  test  ban  treaty  (1963),  An- 
tigua and  Barbuda,  Mar.  91 
Nuclear  simulation,  environmental 
and  safety  concerns:  Baker,  Oct. 
80;  Reilly,  Oct.  81;  Solana,  Oct.  80 
Nuclear  testing  talks  (White  House), 
Feb.  24,  Sept.  77 
Nuclear  weapons  {see  also  Arms  control 
and  disarmament):  NAC,  Aug.  26; 
NATO,  Feb.  42 
Ballistic  missiles,  proliferation 

(Shultz),  Jan.  2,  8 
Deployment  in  Europe  (Bush),  Aug. 

30 
India  (Baker),  Aug.  69 
NATO  Nuclear  Planning  Group  meet- 
ing, Brussels  (April  1989),  final 
communique,  June  36 
Proliferation,  concerns  (Bush),  June  41 


o 


Oceans  (see  also  Maritime  matters  and 
Science  and  technology): 
Investigation  of  the  ocean  using 

radar,  cooperative  project,  memo 
of  understanding  with  Norway, 
Oct.  86 
World  ocean  studies  cooperation, 
bilateral  agi'eement  with  Soviet 
Union,  June  69,  Oct.  86 
Oil  pollution: 
Civil  liability  for  oil  pollution  damage, 
international  convention  (1969): 
Canada,  Egypt,  June  68;  St.  Vin- 
cent and  the  Grenadines,  Oct.  84 
Protocol  (1984):  Canada,  June  68; 
Germay,  Federal  Republic  of, 
Feb.  74;  St.  Vincent  and  the 
Grenadines,  Oct.  84 
International  fund  for  compensation 
for  damage,  convention  (1971): 
Canada,  Vanuatu,  June  68 
Protocol  (1984),  Germany,  Federal 
Republic  of,  Feb.  84 
Intervention  on  the  high  seas  in  cases 
of  oil  pollution  casualties,  interna- 
tional convention  (1969),  Egypt, 
June  68 
Oken,  Herbert  S.,  Mar.  90,  Oct.  73 
Oman: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  50, 
Feb.  74,  June  68 


20 


O^nan  (Cont'd) 

U.S.  aid,  FY  90,  request  (Burleigh), 
May  67 
Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation 
and  Development  (OECD)  meeting, 
Paris  (1989):  Brady,  Sept.  78;  final 
communique,  Sept.  79 
Tax  matters,  mutual  administrative 
assistance,  convention  (1988),  Nor- 
way, Nov.  79 
Organization  of  American  States  (OAS): 
Kozak,  June  63;  Shultz,  Jan.  10 
Charter,  protocol  of  Cartegena  de  In- 
dias  (1985):  Argentina,  Jan.  50; 
Bolivia,  Feb.  74;  Brazil,  Jan  50; 
El  Salvador,  Me.xico,  Nicaragua, 
St.  Vincent  and  the  Grenadines, 
Suriname,  Feb.  74 
Involvement  with  Panama:  Declara- 
tion, Nov.  69;  Eagleburger,  Nov. 
67,  74;  Resolution  1,  July  72 
U.S.  funding  proposed,  FY  90  (Vogel- 
gesang).  May  82 


Pacific  Ocean  region: 
America's  leadership  role  (Quayle), 

Aug.  52 
Creative  responsibility-sharing 

(Baker),  Aug.  65 
Economic  development:  Apr.  33; 
Baker,  Aug.  65,  Sept.  58;  Bush, 
May  19 
East  Asia  (Solomon),  Dec.  34 
Pacific  rim:  Baker,  Apr.  13,  18, 
Sept.  60,  Dec.  20;  Solomon, 
Dec.  35 
Economic  indicators,  1987  (table), 

Apr.  35 
New  Pacific  partnership  (Baker), 

Aug.  64 
Transition  and  impact  on  world 
change  (Cleveland),  June  45 
U.S.  aid,  FY  90,  request  (Clark), 
May  49 
South  Pacific  region  (Clark),  May  51 
Pakistan: 
Afghanistan,  involvement  in:  Mar.  83; 

Bush,  May  6 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 
Oct.  .54,  56 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  50, 

51,  Mar.  91,  93,  Oct.  86,  Dec.  58 
U.S.  visit  of  Prime  Minister  Bhutto: 
Bhutto,  Oct.  64;  Bush,  Oct.  63 
Panama: 
Democratic  progress  (Baker),  June  6 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts:  Eagleburger, 
Nov.  68;  Wrobleski,  May  70,  Oct. 
58 
Noriega  political  crisis  (Baker),  July  27 


Panama  (Cont'd) 

May  elections:  Baker,  June  17,  July 
"  32;  Bush,  June  2,  July  46,  66; 
De|)artment,  July  66,  67,  68; 
White  House,  July  69 
Election  fi'aud  and  international 
response:  Baker,  Aug.  60; 
Bush,  July  68;  Department, 
July  70,  71,  72;  Eagleburger, 
July  69;  OAS,  July  72 
Noriega's  drug-related  activities: 
Eagleburger,  Nov.  70;  Wrobles- 
ki, May  70 
Normalization  of  relations  and 

Noriega  presence:  Baker,  June 
7,  13,  Aug.  15,  69,  Dec.  19; 
Bush,  Aug.  51,  Dec.  19; 
Eagleburger,  Nov.  74 
U.S.  response  (Baker),  July  23, 
Oct.  14,  15,  Nov.  32,  Dec.  26 
OAS  response:  Baker,  Nov.  32; 
Eagleburger,  Nov.  67;  OAS 
ministers'  declaration,  Nov.  69 
Safety  of  U.S.  citizens  (Bush),  July 
70 
Panama  Canal  treaties  (Eagleburger), 

Nov.  73 
Plan  for  national  unitv  (Department), 

Feb.  72 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  74, 
May  86,  87,  Nov.  79 
Panama  Canal  neutrality  treaty, 

protocol  (1977),  Soviet  Union,  Jan. 
49 
Papandreou,  Andreas,  Apr.  41 
Papoulias,  Karolos,  Apr.  41 
Papua  New  Guinea,  treaties,  agree- 
ments, etc..  May  88,  Sept.  93 
Paraguay: 
Democratic  progress:  Bush,  June  2; 

Kozak,  June  65 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 
Oct.  52,  57 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  51, 
Apr.  63 
Patents: 

International  recognition  of  deposit  of 
micro-organisms  for  patent  proce- 
dure, Budapest  treaty  (1977): 
Czechoslovakia,  Aug.  89;  Germar 
Democratic  Republic,  July  77 
New  varieties  of  plants,  protection,  ir 
ternational  convention  (1961), 
revised  (1981),  Australia,  May  86 
Patent  cooperation  treaty  (1970): 
Burkina  Faso,  Mar.  91;  Spain, 
Nov.  79 
U.S.  trade  policy  objectives  (Hills), 
Nov.  57 
Peace  Corps,  Hungary,  English 
teachers:  Bush,  Sept.  40;  White 
House,  Sept.  43 
Pelletreau,  Robert  H.,  Jr.,  Feb.  52, 

May  66 
Perkins,  Edward  J.,  Aug.  69,  Sept.  69 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/Index  19iLi 


'ersian  Gulf: 

U.S.  diplomatic  efforts  (Kelly),  Oct.  45 

U.S.S.  stark,  Iraqi  attack,  compensa- 
tion settlement  (Department), 
May  67,  June  69 

U.S.S.  Vincennes,  shooting  down  of 
Iranian  air-bus,  compensation  set- 
tlement (Department),  Sept.  91 

era: 

Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 
Oct.  57 

Herbicide  spraying,  cocaine  (Wrobles- 
ki) Oct.  50 

Sendem  Liiminoso  terrorist  group, 
Dec.  49 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  74, 
75,  May  86,  88,  Aug.  89,  90, 
Sept.  93,  Dec.  57 
hilippines: 

Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 
May  72,  Oct.  59 

Economic  development:  Apr.  37;  Lam- 
bertson.  May  46 

Human  rights  (Lambertson),  May  45 

Multilateral  Assistance  Initiative 
(MAI):  Baker,  Sept.  56;  Bush, 
May  8;  Lambertson,  May  47,  48 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  51, 
Feb.  74,  Apr.  62,  July  78,  Oct. 
86,  Dec.  58 

U.S.  aid,  FY  90,  request:  Clark,  May 
50;  Lambertson,  May  46 

U.S.  economic  and  security  assistance, 
Apr.  37 

U.S.  military  bases  agreement  (Lam- 
bertson), May  45 

U.S.  policy  (Lambertson),  May  43 

oland: 

Democratic  progi'ess:  Baker,  June  14, 
Sept.  6,  8;  Bush,  Aug.  48,  Sept. 
23,  24;  Department,  Nov.  60 

Elections:  Baker,  Sept.  66;  Bush, 
Aug,  78,  Oct.  38 

Solidarity  relegalization  accords 
(White  House),  June  37 

Solidarity  request  for  Western  aid: 
Baker,  Sept.  31,  65;  Bush,  Sept. 
54 

Soviet  bloc,  relations  with  (Baker), 
Aug.  69 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  74, 
75,  Mar.  91,  Aug.  89,  Sept.  94, 
Nov.  79,  80 

U.S.  support  for  reform  efforts: 
Baker,  Nov.  38,  40,  41;  Bush, 
Sept.  24,  26;  White  House,  Dec. 
39 
Action  Plan  (White  House),  Sept.  27 
Food  and  commodity  aid  program 

(Bush),  Oct.  38!  Nov.  60 
"Hamtramck"  speech  (Bush),  June  3 
Technical  assistance  for  economic 
transition  and  reform  (White 
House),  Sept.  36 


Poland  (Cont'd) 

Visit  of  Secretary  Baker,  Sept.  29 
Western  support  for  reform  efforts: 
Baker,  Sept.  46;  Bush,  Sept.  7 
(quoted),  19,  Dec.  10;  White 
House,  Sept.  27 
Summit  of  the  Arch,  declaration  on 
East-West  relations:  Baker, 
Sept.  4,  5,  7,  11,  29,  32,  44,  46; 
White  House,  Sept.  27 
Text,  Sept.  2 
Poos,  Jacques,  Apr.  42 
Portugal: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Apr.  62, 

May  87,  July  77,  Aug.  90,  Dec.  58 
Visit  of  Secretary  Baker  (Baker), 
Apr.  42 
Postal  matters: 

INTELPOST  service,  memos  of  un- 
derstanding: Bangladesh,  Aug. 
89;  New  Zealand,  July  78;  Soviet 
Union,  June  70 
International  express  mail,  bilateral 
agreements:  Bolivia,  Feb.  75; 
Botswana,  Mar.  92;  Costa  Rica, 
Ethiopia,  Nov.  79;  Gabon,  May 
87;  Iraq,  Aug.  90;  Liberia,  Mar. 
93;  Netherlands,  St.  Lucia,  Nov. 
80;  Togo,  Mar.  93;  Uganda,  Feb. 
76;  Vanuatu,  Sept.  94 
Money  orders  and  postal  travelers' 
checks,  agi-eement  with  final 
protocol  (1984);  Chad,  Syria,  Feb 
74 
Postal  money  order  agi'eement, 

bilateral  agi-eements:  Dominican 
Republic,  Oct.  85;  Israel,  Mar. 
92;  Sierra  Leone,  Oct.  86 
Postal  parcel  agi-eement,  with  final 
protocol  and  detailed  regulations 
(1984):  Bolivia,  New  Zealand, 
Feb.  74;  Niger,  Oct.  85;  Oman, 
Syria,  Feb.  74;  Togo,  Oct.  85; 
Venezuela,  Feb.  74;  Western 
Samoa,  Yugoslavia,  Oct.  85 
Universal  Postal  Union,  constitution 
(1964): 
Second  additional  protocol  (1974), 

Western  Samoa,  Oct.  85 
Third  additional  protocol  (1984): 
Bolivia,  Chad,  New  Zealand, 
Feb.  74;  Niger,  Oct.  85;  Oman, 
Syria,  Feb.  74;  Togo,  Oct.  85; 
Venezuela,  Feb.  74,  Western 
Samoa,  Yugoslavia,  Oct.  85 
Powell,  Colin  L.,  Jan.  30 
Presidential  power  (Baker),  May  25 
Press  Releases: 
State  Department:  Jan.  51,  Feb.  76, 
Mar.  93,  Apr.  63,  May  89,  June 
70,  July  78,  Aug.  90,  Sept.  94, 
Nov.  80,  Dec.  59 
USUN:  Jan.  51,  Apr.  63,  Aug.  91 
Proclamations  by  the  President; 
Baltic  Freedom  Day,  1989  (5990), 
Aug.  80 


Proclamations  by  the  President  (Cont'd) 
Captive  Nations  Week,  1989  (5996), 

Sept.  91 
Helsinki  Human  Rights  Day,  1989 

(6005),  Oct.  42 
Human  Rights  Day,  Bill  of  Rights 
Day,  and  Human  Rights  Week, 
1988  (5921),  Mar.  67 
Import  duties  on  Brazilian  products 

(5885),  Jan.  49 
Restrictions  on  entry  of  Nicaraguan  of- 
ficials and  employees  (5887),  Jan. 
47 
Territorial  sea  of  the  U.S.  (5928), 

Mar.  72 
United  Nations  Day,  1989  (6052), 

Dec.  53 
World  Trade  Week,  1989  (5971),  July 
51 
Public  service  (Shultz),  Mar.  1 
Publications: 
State  Department:  Jan.  52,  Feb.  76, 
Mar.  93,  May  89,  June  70,  July 
79,  Aug.  92,  Nov.  81 
American  Foreign  Policy:  Cuirent 
Documents,  1987,  released, 
Mar.  94 
American  Foreign  Policy:  Foreign 
Affairs  Press  Briefings,  198^. 
Supplement,  released,  Feb.  77 
Background  Notes,  Apr.  66,  July 

81,  Nov.  79 
Conference  on  Security  and 

Cooperation  in  Europe  (CSCE) 
Helsinki  Final  Act  and  the 
Madrid  and  Vienna  concluding 
documents,  semi-annual  report, 
released,  Dec.  60 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 
States,  1952-195Jt,  Volume 
VIII,  Eastern  Europe;  the 
Soviet  Union;  the  Eastern 
Mediten-anean,  released,  Jan. 
53 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 
States,  1952-195i,  VohmeX, 
Iran  (1951-195^),  released, 
Aug.  93 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 
States,  1955-1957,  Volume  V, 
Austrian  State  Treaty;  Summit 
and  Foreign  Ministers'  Meet- 
ings, 1955,  released,  Apr.  64 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 
States,  1955-1957,  Volume 

XIII,  Near  East:  Jordan- 
Yemen,  released,  Apr.  65 

Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 
States,  1955-1957,  Volmne 

XIV,  Arab-Israeli  dispute, 
1955,  released,  Aug.  92 

Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 
States,  1955-1957,  Volume 

XV,  Arab-Israeli  Dispute,  Jan. 
1-July  26,  1956,  released  Aug. 
93 


Oepartment  of  State  Bulletin/Index  1989 


21 


Publications  (Cont'd) 

Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 
States,  1955-1957.  Volume 
XX'llL  Africa,  released,  July  80 

Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 
States,  1955-1957,  Volume 
XXIV,  Soviet  Union;  Eastern 
Mediterranean,  released,  July 
80 

Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 
States,  Supplement,  Memoran- 
da of  the  Secretary  of  State, 
19J,9-1951,  and  Meetings  and 
Visits  of  Foreign  Dignitaries, 
1949-1952,  microfiche  publica- 
tion, released,  Apr.  65 


Q 

Qatar,  nonproliferation  of  nuclear 

weapons,  treaty  (1968),  Aug.  89 
Quayle,  J.  Danforth,  Aug.  52 
Visits  to:  El  Salvador,  Apr.  7, 
Venezuela,  Apr.  7 


R 


Reagan,  Ronald: 
Addresses,  remarks,  and  statements: 
Angola/Namibia  peace  accords,  Feb. 

12 
Afghanistan,  Feb.  6,  Mar.  89 
Brazil,  trade  with,  Jan.  49 
Cambodia,  independence,  Jan.  17 
Chemical  weapons,  conference.  Mar. 

4  (quoted) 
Defense  spending,  Feb.  7 
Iran,  hostage  negotiations,  Feb.  6 
Nicaragua,  Jan.  47,  Feb.  5 
Nuclear  and  space  arms  talks,  Mar. 

10 
Nuclear  war,  Jan.  2  (quoted) 
Organization  of  African  Unity 

(OAU),  Jan.  14 
Palestine  Liberation  Organization 

(PLC),  Feb.  6,  51 
Soviet  Union: 
Gorbachev,  view  of,  Feb.  5 
Middle  East,  role  in,  Feb.  5 
Trade  relations,  Feb.  6 
U.S.  relations,  Feb.  3,  4,  Mar.  54 
Correspondence  and  messages.  Con- 
ference on  Security  and  Coopera- 
tion in  Europe  (CSCE),  follow-up 
meeting.  Mar.  22 
Meetings  with  heads  of  state  and  offi- 
cials of,  remarks  and  joint  com- 
muniques: Germany,  Federal 
Republic  of.  Mar.  56;  Mali,  Jan. 
14;  Soviet  Union,  Feb.  1,  3; 
U.K.,  Mar.  57 
Messages  and  reports  to  Congress, 

Cyprus,  Feb.  50 
News  conferences,  Feb.  4 


22 


Refugees: 
Afghan:  Mar.  87;  Moore,  May  73 
African:  Brown,  May  31;  Moore,  May 

73,  July  59 
Burmese  (Lambertson),  May  42 
Central  American  (Moore),  Aug.  87 
East  Asian  (Moore),  May  73,  July  59 
Migration  and  refugee  assistance 
programs: 
FY  89  budget  (Moore),  May  72 
FY  90  budget,  request  (Moore), 
May  72 
Palestinian  (Moore),  May  73 
Refugee  admissions  ceiling,  FY  89, 
proposed  revisions  (Moore),  July 
60 
Southeast  Asian  (Baker),  Aug.  44, 
Sept.  60 
International  Conference  on  In- 
dochinese  Refugees,  Geneva, 
June  (1989)  (Eagleburger),  Oct. 
69 
Comprehensive  plan  of  action, 

text,  Oct.  71 
Draft  declaration,  text,  Oct.  71 
Soviet  Union  (Moore),  July  59 
Special  released  reeducation  center 
detainees  resettlement  program, 
bilateral  agreement  with  Viet- 
nam, Dec.  58 
Status  of,  protocol  (1967):  Hungary, 
Aug.  89;  Mozambique,  July  77 
U.S.  assistance  programs:  Brown, 

May  31;  Moore,  Aug.  87 
U.S.  policy  (Moore),  May  72,  July  59, 

Aug.  85 
Vietnamese  (U.S. -Vietnam  joint  state- 
ment), Nov.  63 
Regional  issues  (Baker),  Apr.  15,  19 
Reilly,  William  K.,  Oct.  81 
Restrictions  on  entry  by  Nicaraguan  offi- 
cials and  employees,  proclamation 
(Reagan),  Jan.  47 
Romania: 
Human  rights  (Abram),  Sept.  89 
Treaties,  agi-eements,  etc.,  May  88, 
June  69,  Sept.  94,  Oct.  80 ' 
Rosenberg,  Alison,  July  39 
Rubber: 
International  Natural  Rubber  Or- 
ganization, tax  reimbursement, 
bilateral  agreement,  Feb.  75 
International  natural  rubber  agree- 
ment (1987):  Belgium,  Denmark, 
EEC,  Mar.  92;  Finland,  Mar.  92, 
July  77;  France,  Feb.  74;  Ger- 
many, Federal  Republic  of, 
Greece,  Ireland,  Italy,  Luxem- 
bourg, Morocco,  Netherlands,  Nor- 
way, Mar.  92;  Soviet  Union,  June 
69;  Spain,  Sweden,  Mar.  92;  Swit- 
zerland, Sept.  93;  Thailand,  U.K., 
Mar.  92;  U.S.,  Feb.  74,  Aug.  89 
Rwanda,  endangered  species  of  wild 
fauna  and  flora,  convention  (1973), 
amendment,  Dec.  57 


Safety,  promotion  of,  on  Great  Lakes 
by  means  of  radio,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Canada,  Jan.  50 
St.  Lucia,  treaties,  agreements,  etc., 

Mar.  91,  Nov.  80 
St.  Vincent  and  the  Grenadines, 

treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  74 
May  86,  88,  Sept.  93,  Oct.  84 
Salinas  de  Gortari,  Carlos,  Dec.  1 
Satellites: 
Distribution  of  progi-am-carrying  sig- 
nals, convention  (1974),  Soviet 
Union,  Feb.  74 
INMARSAT,  convention  and  opera- 
tion agi-eement  (1976):  Cuba, 
Nov.  79;  Czechoslovakia,  May  87 
Switzerland,  Oct.  85 
Amendments  (1985):  Belgium,  Oct. 
85;  Egypt,  Feb.  74,  Oct.  85; 
Gabon,  June  69;  Germany, 
Federal  Republic  of,  Feb.  74; 
New  Zealand,  Aug.  89;  Oman, 
May  87;  Singapore,  Feb.  74; 
U.S.,  Oct.  85 
INTELSAT,  agreement  and  operat- 
ing agreement  (1971):  Nepal,  Zir 
babwe.  May  86 
International  trade  in  commercial 
launch  services,  bilateral  agi'ee- 
ment  with  China,  May  87.  July  ' 
Liability  for  satellite  launches, 

bilateral  memo  of  agreement  wit 
China,  Feb.  75,  July  77 
PACSAT/VITA,  July  64 
Satellite  technology  safeguards, 

bilateral  memo  of  agreement  witi 

China,  Feb.  75,  July  77 

Saudi  Arabia: 

Arms  sales  to,  by  China  (Bush),  June 

41 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  July  77, 

Sept.  93 

U.S.  visit  of  Foreign  Minister  Sa'ud 

al-Faisal  (White  House),  Aug.  84 

Schaffer,  Teresita,  Oct.  65 

Schifter,  Richard,  Mar.  59,  Oct.  41 

Science  and  technology: 

Antarctica  mineral  resource  activities 

convention,  (Department),  Feb, 
Basic  scientific  research,  bilateral 
agreement  with  Soviet  Union, 
Mar.  93 
China,  cooperation  in,  bilateral  agree 

ment,  Apr.  63 
China,  technology  transfer  (Bush), 

May  13 

Conference  on  Security  and  Coopera- 
tion in  Europe  (CSCE),  foUow-u; 
meeting,  concluding  document, 
Mar.  28 
Cooperation  in  high  energy  laser-mat 
ter  interaction  physics  research 
and  development,  bilateral  agree 
ment  with  France,  May  87 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/Index  19*  k 


Science  and  technology  (Cont'd) 

Cooperation  on  geothermal  and  re- 
lated volcanic  investigations, 
bilateral  agi'eement  with  Mexico, 
July  78 

Earth  sciences,  cooperation,  bilateral 
agreements:  Japan,  Feb.  75; 
Kuwait,  Mar.  93 

Energy  and  related  fields,  research 
and  development,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Japan,  Aug.  90 

Geological  sciences,  cooperation, 

bilateral  agreement  with  France, 
Oct.  86 

Geoscience  research,  cooperation, 
bilateral  agreement  with  Poland, 
Feb.  75 

High-energy  laser-matter  interaction 
physics  research  and  develop- 
ment, bilateral  agi-eement  with 
France,  Mar.  92 

High  energy  laser  technology,  coopera- 
tive projects  for  research  and 
development,  bilateral  agreement 
with  Germany,  Federal  Republic 
of,  July  77 

Imaging  of  an  ocean  using  radar, 
cooperative  research,  bilateral 
agreement  with  U.K.,  Aug.  90 

Integrated  circuit  layout  designs,  intel- 
lectual property  issues  (Hills), 
Nov.  57 

Intergovernmental  Panel  on  Climate 
Change  (Baker),  Apr.  13 

International  activities  (Bush),  June  51 

International  Convention  and  Scien- 
tific Organization  (ICSO),  FY  90, 
U.S.  funding,  proposed  (Vogel- 
gesang).  May  82 

Joint  Loran-C  and  Chayka  radio 
navigation  system,  bilateral 
agreement  with  Soviet  Union, 
May  88 

Marine  and  freshwater  scientific  and 
technological  cooperation, 
bilateral  agi'eement  with  Israel, 
Sept.  93 

Maritime  patrol  aircraft,  cooperative 
progi'am  for  development  and 
production,  bilateral  agreement 
with  Germany,  Federal  Republic 
of,  July  77 

World  Meteorological  Organization, 
convention  (1947),  Antigua  and 
Barbuda,  Mar.  91 
Seabeds,  seabed  disarmament  treaty 
(1971):  Antigua  and  Barbuda,  Mar. 
92;  Bahamas,  Aug.  89 
Security  assistance,  U.S.  (see  also 
Defense  and  national  security): 

Appropriations  request,  FY  90: 

Baker,  Apr.  20;  Holmes,  June  52 
East  Asia  and  Pacific  (Clark),  May 
49 


Security  assistance,  U.S.  (Cont'd) 
Latin  America  and  Caribbean 

(Kozak),  June  .59 
Middle  East:  Burleigh,  May  67; 

Walker,  May  61 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  (Rosenberg), 
July  39,  41 
Defense  acquisition,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Switzerland,  Feb.  76 
Defense  cooperation,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Spain,  Feb.  76,  July  78 
Extended  air  defense,  cooperative  pro- 
gi'am, memo  of  agi'eement  with 
Gei'many,  Federal  Republic  of, 
Aug.  90 
Foreign  military  sales  financing 
(FMSF)  programs,  June  61 
Argentina  (Kozak),  June  64 
Foreign  military  sales  (FMS)  program: 
Egypt  (Walker),  May  63 
Israel  (Walker),  May  61 
Jordan  (Walker),  May  65 
Yemen  Arab  Republic  (Burleigh), 
May  68 
Greece,  U.S.  defense  agreement,  ex- 
pires (Department),  Feb.  47 
International  military  education  and 
training  (IMET)  program:  June 
61;  bilateral  agreement,  Brazil, 
June  69 
Japan: 

Bilateral  agreements  on  acquisition 
and  production  of: 
F-15  aircraft,  June  69 
HYDRA  70  rocket  system,  June 

69 
P-3C  weapon  system,  June  69 
SH-60J  and  UH-60J  aircraft, 
June  69 
Development  of  support  fighter 
(FS-X)  weapon  system, 
bilateral  agreement:  Feb.  75; 
Bush,  Oct.  32 
Joint  defense  space  research  facility, 
bilateral  agi-eement  with 
Australia,  Mar.  92 
Military  assistance,  protocol  II, 
bilateral  agreement  with  Hon- 
duras, Feb.  75 
Military  bases,  bilateral  agreement 
with  Philippines,  Jan.  51 
Senegal: 
Consolidation  and  rescheduling  of 
debts,  bilateral  agreement,  Nov. 
80 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 
Oct.  59 
Seychelles,  suppression  of  unlawful  acts 
against  the  safety  of  maritime 
navigation,  with  protocol  re  safety 
of  fixed  platforms  on  the  Continen- 
tal Shelf,  convention  (1988),  May  86 
Shamir,  Yitzhak,  June  43 


Shevardnadze,  Eduard  A.: 

Soviet  Union: 
Human  rights,  Jan.  7  (quoted) 
Military  power,  Jan.  7  (quoted) 
Wyoming  ministeral  meeting,  Jackson 
Hole  (Sept.  1989):  Nov.  4;  joint 
statement,  Nov.  5 
Shultz,  George  P.: 
Addresses,  remarks,  and  statements: 
Afghanistan,  Soviet  occupation  and 

withdrawal,  Feb.  7 
Agricultural  subsidies,  Feb.  29 
Angola/Namibia  peace  accords,  Feb. 

11 
Arafat,  Yasir,  Feb.  8,  9 
Argentina,  coup,  Feb.  8 
Arms  control  and  disarmament, 

Jan.  1,  Feb.  48 
Central  America,  Arias  peace  plan, 

Jan.  13 
Change  and  international  stability, 

Jan.  6 
Chemical  weapons,  Jan.  3,  9,  Feb. 

8,  Mar.  4,  6,  53 
China,  U.S.  relations,  Feb.  25 
Conference  on  Security  and 

Cooperation  in  Europe 

(CSCE),  Mar.  53,  54 
Czechoslovakia,  political  unrest. 

Mar.  53 
Democracy  and  democratic  prin- 
ciples, Jan.  10,  Mar.  1 
Duarte,  Jose  Napoleon,  Jan.  10,  13 
El  Salvador,  U.S.  aid,  Jan.  13 
Europe,  arms  reduction  efforts, 

Feb.  47 
European  Communities,  ministerial 

meeting,  Feb.  27 
Extradition  treaties,  terrorists, 

Jan.  5 
Gorbachev,  Mikhail,  assessment  of, 

Mar.  54 
International  cooperation,  Jan.  9,  12 
Latin  America,  debt  management, 

Jan.  10,  Feb.  30 
Mexico,  U.S.  relations,  Feb.  71 
Mutual  and  balanced  force  reduction 

talks.  Mar.  54 
Nicaragua,  Sandinista  repressions, 

Jan.  13 
Nuclear  weapons  proliferation,  Jan. 

2,  8 
Organization  of  American  States 

(OAS),  Jan.  10 
Palestine  Liberation  Organization 

(PLO),  Feb.  57 
Public  service.  Mar.  1 
Rule  of  law,  Jan.  5 
Soviet  Union  {for  details  see  Soviet 

Union): 
ABM  Treaty,  noncompliance, 

Feb.  7 " 
Angola/Namibia  peace  accords, 

Feb.  12 
Arms  reduction  efforts,  Feb.  47 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/Index  1989 


23 


Skultz,  George  P.  (Cont'd) 

Human  rights,  Feb.  7,  49,  Mar. 

52 
U.S.  relations,  Jan.  3,  6,  Feb.  7. 
48 
Terrorism  and  counterterrorism, 

Jan.  4,  9,  Feb.  8,  9,  48 
Trade,  free,  Jan.  11 
News  conferences  and  press  briefings, 

Jan.  13,  Feb.  27,  46,  Mar.  6,  52 
TV  interviews,  Feb.  7,  71 
Visits  to: 
El  Salvador,  Jan.  10 
Mexico  (Shultz),  Feb.  71 
Sien-a  Leone,  treaties,  agreements, 

etc.,  Feb.  75,  Oct.  86 
Singapore: 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 
May  72,  Oct.  59 
Economic  development,  Apr.  36 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  74, 

June  68 
U.S.  aid,  FY  90,  request  (Clark), 

May  52 
U.S.  relations  (Quayle),  Aug.  54 
Slavery,  convention  to  suppress  the 
slave  trade  and  slavery  (1926), 
protocol  (1927),  supplementary  on 
abolition  of  slavery,  slave  trade, 
and  institutions  and  practices 
similar  to  slavery  (1956):  Antigua 
and  Barbuda,  May  87;  Libya,  Oct. 
85 
Social  security,  bilateral  agreements: 
Portugal,  Aug.  90;  Switzerland, 
Nov.  80 
Solana  Morales,  Fernando,  Oct.  78,  80 
Solomon,  Richard  H.,  Feb.  38,  Nov.  47, 

Dec.  34 
Solomon  Islands,  treaties,  agreements, 

etc..  May  86,  Dec.  58 
Somalia,  human  rights  issues  (Brown), 

May  30 
South  Africa: 
Angola/Cuban  troop  withdrawal  settle- 
ment (Department),  Jan.  16 
Angola/Namibia  tripartite  agreement, 

text,  Feb.  13 
Apartheid  and  reform:  Baker,  Aug. 
60;  Perkins,  Sept.  71 
U.S.  policy  and  objectives:  Cohen, 
Dec.  29;  Perkins,  Sept.  69 
Elections  (Department),  Nov.  44 
Human  rights  issues:  Brown,  May  31; 

Perkins,  Sept.  71 
U.S.  visit  of  Albertina  Sisulu  (Bush), 

Sept.  71 
Vienna  convention  on  diplomatic  rela- 
tions (1961),  Dec.  57 
Soviet  Union: 
ABM  Treaty:  Baker,  Nov.  14; 

Cooper,  Oct.  20;  U.S. -Soviet  joint 
statement,  Nov.  5 
Angola,  involvement  in,  chronology 
(Howland),  Feb.  16 


Soviet  Union  (Cont'd) 

Soviet  noncompliance:  Department, 
Jan.  16;  Burns,  Jan.  42;  Shultz, 
Feb.  7 

Afghanistan,  and  U.S.  economic  sanc- 
tions: Baker,  Aug.  13;  Bush, 
Aug.  39 

Angola/Namibia  peace  accords:  Crock- 
er, White  House,  Feb.  10; 
Shultz,  Feb.  12 

Arms  control  issues:  Aug.  7;  Reagan, 
Feb.  5 
Conventional  Parity  Initiative, 

Baker,  Aug.  68;  Bush,  Aug.  32 
Soviet  initiatives  (Shultz),  Feb.  47, 
49 

Baltic  states,  U.S.  policy:  Baker, 

Nov.  17,  42;  Dobriansky,  June  38 

Chemical  weapons  (Burns),  Jan.  42 

China,  relations  with  (Bush),  May  7 

Common  European  homeland 
proposal:  Baker,  June  16; 
Eagleburger,  Oct.  40 

Cuba,  relations  with  (Kozak),  Nov.  75 

Cultural-informational  exchanges 
(Baker),  July  30,  Nov.  13 

Defense  and  space  talks:  Burns,  Jan. 
41;  Cooper,  Dec.  33 

Earthquake,  Dec.  1988  (White 
House),  Feb.  39 

East  Euroi^ean  reform  efforts 
(Baker),  Dec.  12 

Economic,  political,  and  social 

reforms:  Baker,  July  36,  Dec.  10; 
Bush,  July  16;  Cleveland,  June 
45;  Kozyrev,  Medvedev,  Jan.  7 
(quoted) 

Economic  summit  participation: 

Baker,  Sept.  67;  Bush,  Sept.  18, 
19,  20,  21 

Elections  (Baker),  May  26 

Fisheries  agreements  with  U.S. 
(Wolfe),  July  57,  58 

Foreign  policy:  Baker,  Dec.  11; 
Powell,  Jan.  31 

Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 

States,  1952-195J,,  Volume  VIU, 
Eastern  Europe;  the  Soviet 
Union;  the  Easter)/  Mediter- 
ranean, released,  Jan.  53 

Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 
States,  1955-1957,  Volume 
XXIV,  Soviet  Union;  Eastern 
Mediterranean,  released,  July  80 

Glasnost  and  democratization  (Baker), 
Dec.  13 

Gorbachev's  role:  Baker,  Aug.  14,  30, 
Sept.  68,  Nov.  4;  Bush,  Aug.  18 

Human  rights:  Abram,  Sept.  88; 
Baker,  July  29,  38,  Aug.  61, 
Nov.  14;  Shevardnadze,  Jan.  7 
(quoted) 
CSCE  follow-on  conference, 

proposed  (White  House),  Mar. 
69 


Soviet  Union  (Cont'd) 

Emigration:  Baker,  July  32,  Moore, 
May  72 
Intermediate-Range  Nuclear  Forces 
(INF)  treaty:  Baker,  July  28; 
Burns,  Jan.  41;  Bush,  July  19; 
Shultz,  Jan.  2;  White  House, 
Aug.  74 
Anniversary  (White  House),  Feb.  2 
Middle  East  position  (Murphv),  Feb. 

58 
Military  capabilities:  Baker,  Sept.  10; 
NATO.  Feb.  42;  Shevardnadze, 
Jan.  7  (quoted) 
Nicaragua,  Soviet  bloc  aid  to:  Baker, 
Mav  24,  26,  60,  June  10,  13,  15, 
July  24,  32,  Nov.  3,  12,  41,  Dec. 
19,  28;  Bush,  June  1,  56;  White 
House,  June  67 
Nuclear  and  space  arms  talks  (NST): 
Burt,  Aug.  73,  Dec.  33;  Bush, 
Aug.  73;  Reagan,  Mar.  10 
Nuclear  nonproliferation  talks,  Feb.  5 
Nuclear  testing  talks:  Burns,  Jan.  42; 

White  House,  Feb.  24 
Perestroika:  Baker,  July  29,  32,  34, 
36,  Aug.  58,  Nov.  2,  Dec.  10,  20; 
Bush,  Julv  20,  Aug.  51;  Solomon. 
Feb.  41 
Regional/ethnic  problems  (Baker), 

Aug.  58 
Rule  of  law  (Gorbachev),  Jan.  7 

(quoted) 
Shevardnadze/Baker  meeting,  Paris, 

July  1989,  Oct.  39 
Short-range  nuclear  forces  (SNF) 
reductions  (Baker),  July  31,  32, 
34,  35 
Soviet  leadership  in  world  affairs 

(Quayle),  Aug.  52 
Strategic  arms  reduction  talks 

(START):  Baker,  Apr.  39,  May 
60,  June  15,  16,  Sept.  44,  Nov. 
11,  15,  39,  42,  Dec.  16;  Burns, 
Jan.  41;  Burt,  Oct.  17,  Dec.  33; 
Bush,  May  15,  July  17,  Aug.  73; 
Nitze,  Apr.  45;  Shultz,  Jan.  2; 
U.S. -Soviet  joint  statement,  Nov 
6 
Review  of  status  of  talks  (Burt), 

Oct.  17 
U.S.  objectives  (Miller),  Aug.  8 
Verification  issues:  Burt,  Oct.  18; 
U.S. -Soviet  joint  statement, 
Nov.  7 
Trial  verification  and  stability 
measures,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Soviet  Union, 
text,  Nov.  21 
Third  World  development  (Kozyrev), 
Jan.  7  (quoted) 


24 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/Index  19fl  ij; 


miet  Union  (Cont'd) 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.  (see  also 
names  of  treaties  under  Soviet 
Union):  Jan.  49,  Feb.  74,  76, 
Mar.  93,  Apr.  62,  May  87,  88, 
June  69,  70,  July  77,  78,  Aug.  88, 
89,  Sept.  93,  94,  Oct.  85,  86 
U.S.  arms  control  negotiations  {see 
also  Chemical  weapons  and  ABM 
Treaty,  INF  Treaty,  and  START 
undey  Soviet  Union):  Baker,  July 
30,  31,  38,  Aug.  43,  44,  61,  Sept. 
10,  Nov.  1,  5,  10,  Dec.  13;  Burns, 
Jan.  41;  Bush,  May  9;  Depart- 
ment, Jan.  16;  Reagan,  Feb.  5; 
Shultz,  Feb.  48;  Solomon,  Feb.  40 
Prevention  of  dangerous  military  ac- 
tivities, bilateral  agi-eement 
with  Soviet  Union,  Sept.  94 
Soviet  Union  initiatives  (Shultz), 
Feb.  47,  49 
U.S.  relations:  Baker,  Apr.  14,  18, 
June  11;  Bush,  Sept.  54;  Miller, 
Aug.  4,  5;  Reagan,  Feb.  3,  4,  5, 
6;  Shultz,  Jan.  6,  Feb.  48 
Arms  control  agenda  (Shultz),  Jan.  2 
Baker/Shevardnadze  meeting,  Vien- 
na (Mar.  1989)  (Baker),  May  59 
Embassy  reconstruction  in  Moscow 

(Department),  Jan.  29 
Global  issues:  Baker,  July  30,  33, 

39,  Aug.  62;  Solomon,  Feb.  38 
Regional  issues:  Baker,  July  30,  31, 
38,  Aug.  62,  Dec.  13,  19; 
Solomon,  Feb.  41;  U.S.-Soviet 
joint  statement,  Nov.  7 
Summit  meeting  proposed:  Baker, 
June  14,  Nov.  1,  10;  U.S.- 
Soviet joint  statement,  Nov.  5 
U.S.  response  to  Soviet  reform  ini- 
tiatives: Baker,  June  13,  Nov. 
2,  12,  42,  Dec.  14,  20,  25; 
Bush,  Apr.  4 
U.S.  trade  relations:  Baker,  Apr.  29, 
Sept.  66,  Nov.  41;  Reagan,  Feb. 
6;  Wendt,  Jan.  22 
U.S.  visit  of  President  Gorbachev 

(Reagan),  Feb.  1,  3 
Visit  of  Secretary  Baker,  July  29 
Wyoming  ministerial  meeting,  Jack- 
son Hole  (Sept.  1989):  Baker, 
Nov.  1,  4,  5,  39;  Shevardnadze, 
Nov.  4;  U.S.-Soviet  joint  state- 
ment, Nov.  5 
>ace: 

Astronauts,  rescue  and  return,  and 
return  of  objects  launched  into 
outer  space,  agreement  (1968): 
Antigua  and  Barbuda,  China, 
Mar.  91 
I)rsign,  development,  operation,  and 
utilization  of  the  permanently 
manned  civil  space  station, 
bilateral  agi-eements:  Denmark, 
Sept.  93;  Japan,  June  69;  Nor- 
way, Sept.  93 


Space  (Cont'd) 

Exploration  and  use  of  outer  space,  in- 
cluding the  Moon  and  other  celes- 
tial bodies,  treaty  (1967):  Antigua 
and  Barbuda,  Mar.  92;  Togo, 
Sept.  93 
International  liability  for  damage 
caused  by  space  objects,  conven- 
tion (1972):  Antigua  and  Bar- 
buda, China,  Mar.  92 
Joint  defense  space  communications 
station  in  Australia,  bilateral 
agreement  with  Australia,  Mar. 
92 
Registration  of  objects  launched  into 
outer  space,  convention  (1975): 
Antig-ua  and  Barbuda,  June  69; 
China,  Mar.  92 
Space  cooperation,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Spain,  June  69 
Spain: 
North  Atlantic  alliance  participation: 
NAC,  Feb.  46;  NATO,  Feb.  43 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  76, 
Apr.  92,  June  69,  July  78,  Aug. 
89,  90,  Sept.  93,  Nov.  79 
Visit  of  Secretary  Baker  (Baker), 
Apr.  42 
Sri  Lanka,  treaties,  agreements,  etc., 
Jan.  51,  May  86,  Aug.  90,  Sept.  93, 
Nov.  80 
State  Department: 
50th  anniversary,  Depaiiment  of 

StateBulle'tin,  July  I 
Foreign  operations,  FY  90  budget,  re- 
quest (Baker),  Apr.  20 
Foreign  Service  (Baker),  Dec.  18 
Status  of  forces,  bilateral  agreement 
with  Papua  New  Guinea,  May  88 
Subunits,  exchange  of,  memo  of  under- 
standing with  U.K.,  Jan.  51 
Sudan: 
Cease-fire  and  famine  relief:  Baker, 
Department,  Apr.  24,  Jan.  15, 
July  41 
Human  rights  issues  (Brown),  May  30 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Sept.  94, 
Oct.  86 
Sugar,  international  sugar  agreement 
(1987)  with  annexes:  Austria, 
Colombia,  Mar.  92;  El  Salvador, 
July  77;  Republic  of  Korea,  Feb.  74; 
Mexico,  May  87;  Panama,  Nov.  79 
Suriname,  treaties,  agreements,  etc., 

Feb.  74,  Apr.  62,  June  68,  July  77 
Sweden,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.. 

Mar.  92,  July  76,  Aug.  89 
Switzerland,  treaties,  agi'eements,  etc., 
Feb.  76,  Mar.  92,  June  68,  Aug.  89, 
Sept.  93,  94,  Oct.  85,  Nov.  80 
Syrian  Arab  Republic: 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 
Oct.  56 


Syrian  Arab  Republic  (Cont'd) 
Terrorism  (Bremer),  Feb.  61 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  74, 
Apr.  62 


Takeshita,  Noboru,  Apr.  33 
Tanzania,  treaties,  agi-eements,  etc., 

July  76,  Aug.  90 
Taxes: 
Double  taxation: 
Avoidance  of,  and  prevention  of  fis- 
cal evasion  with  respect  to 
taxes  on  income,  bilateral 
agi'eements:  Belgium,  Sept.  93; 
India,  Nov.  8;  Finland,  Dec. 
58;  Germany,  Federal  Republic 
of,  Nov.  79" 
Relief  from,  on  earnings  from  opera- 
tions of  ships  and  aircraft, 
bilateral  agreement  with 
Mexico,  Oct.  86 
Exchange  of  information  with  respect 
to  taxes,  bilateral  agreements: 
Costa  Rica,  June  69;  Dominican 
Republic,  Oct.  85;  Trinidad  and 
Tobago,  Apr.  63;  U.K.  (on  behalf 
of  Bermuda),  Feb.  76 
Income  and  property,  convention 
(1967),  protocol  (1988),  bilateral 
agreement  with  France,  Mar.  92 
Mutual  administrative  assistance  in 
tax  matters,  convention  (1988): 
Norway,  Sweden,  U.S.,  Aug.  89 
Reciprocal  exemption  of  income  tax: 
Income  accruing  from  the  business 
of  shipping,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Japan,  Nov.  80 
Income  derived  from  international 
operation  of  ships,  bilateral 
agreements:  Hong  Kong,  Oct. 
86,  Nov.  80;  Pakistan,  Oct.  86; 
Peru,  May  88;  U.K.  (on  behalf 
of  Isle  of  Man),  Oct.  86 
Income  derived  from  international 
operation  of  ships  and  aircraft, 
bilateral  agreements:  India, 
July  78;  Luxembourg,  Sept.  93; 
Malaysia,  Aug.  90;  St.  Vincent 
and  the  Grenadines,  May  88 
Tax  reimbursement,  bilateral  agree- 
ments: International  Atomic  Ener- 
gy Agency  (IAEA),  July  78; 
World  Intellectual  Property  Or- 
ganiztion.  Mar.  93 
Telecommunications: 
Assignments  and  usage  of  television 
broadcast  channels  along  the  U.S.- 
Mexico border,  bilateral  agi-ee- 
ment  with  Mexico,  Feb.  75 
Caribbean  Basin  economic  develop- 
ment (Borg),  Mar.  17 
Caribbean  Basin  Radar  Network 
(CBRN): 


epartment  of  State  Bulletin/Index  1989 


25 


Telecommunications  (Cont'd) 

Colombian  integi-ation  into,  memo 
of  understanding  with  Colom- 
bia, June  69 
Establishment,  bilateral  agreement 
with  Honduras,  July  77 

Communications  satellites,  trade 
agi'eement  with  China  (Depart- 
ment), Feb.  26 

Development,  U.S.  contributions, 
July  62 

High-definition  television  (HDTV) 
production  standards  (Landau), 
June  48 

High  frequency  radio  communications 
facility,  bilateral  agreement  with 
Australia,  May  87 

International  telecommunications  con- 
vention (1982),  Western  Samoa, 
Feb.  74 

Land  mobile  service  in  the  bands  470- 
572  MHz  and  806-890  MHz  along 
the  common  U.S. -Mexico  border, 
bilateral  agreement  with  Mexico, 
May  88 

LORAN-C  transmitting  station  at 
Sylt,  operation,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Germany,  Federal 
Republic  of,  June  69 

Network-based  information  services 
(Borg),  Jan.  33 

Private  sector  contributions  to 
development,  July  64 

Radio  communications  between 
amateur  stations  on  behalf  of 
third  parties,  bilateral  agi'eement 
with  (IJomoros,  Dec.  58 

Television  broadcasting  channels 
along  the  U.S. -Mexican  border, 
bilateral  agreement  with  Mexico, 
Jan.  50 

U.S.  Telecommunications  Training  In- 
stitute (USTTI)  (Borg),  Mar.  20 

World  Administrative  Telegraph  and 
Telephone  Conference  (WATTC) 
(Borg),  Mar.  19 
Territorial  sea  of  the  U.S.,  proclamation 

(Reagan),  Mar.  72 
Terrorism  and  counterterrorism:  Baker, 
Apr.  14;  Bremer,  May  74;  Depart- 
ment, Feb.  63;  Shultz,  Feb.  48 

Aircraft  hijacking,  U.S.  and  Canada 
agreement  (Department),  Jan.  39 

Andean  countries  (Bremer),  Feb.  63 

Aviation  security:  Bremer,  May  76; 
McAllister,  Oct.  34;  White  House, 
Oct.  68 

Conference  on  Security  and  Coopera- 
tion in  Europe  (CSCE),  follow-up 
meeting,  concluding  document, 
Mar.  23 

Counterterrorism,  international 
cooperation:  Bremer,  May  76; 
Busby,  Dec.  47 


Terrorism  and  counterterrorism  (Cont'd) 
Crimes  against  persons  and  related 
extortion  of  international  sig- 
nificance, convention  (1971): 
Panama,  Peru,  Feb.  74 
El  Salvador  (Department),  Dec.  55 
Greece  (Department),  Feb.  62 
Hawari  Group  (Department),  Feb.  64 
Iran  (Baker),  Apr.  23,  42 
Death  threats  against  Salman  Rush- 
die: Adams,  May  78;  Baker, 
Bush,  May  79  (quoted);  Depart- 
ment, May  78,  79  (quoted) 
International  convention  against  the 
taking  of  hostages  (1979):  Brunei, 
Jan.  50;  Cote  d'lvoire,  Haiti, 
Nov.  79;  Kuwait,  May  87;  Nether- 
lands, Mar.  92;  Turkey,  Nov.  77; 
Venezuela,  Mar.  92 
Israel  (Shultz),  Feb.  8 
Japanese  Red  Army,  Nov.  64 
Libya  (Bremer),  Feb.  61,  62,  May  75 
Maritime  security  (Bremer),  May  77 
Morocco,  joint  cooperation  in  fighting 
against  international  terrorism, 
organized  crime,  and  the  illicit 
production,  trafficking,  and  abuse 
of  narcotics,  bilateral  agreement. 
May  88 
Narcoterrorism:  Bremer,  Feb.  63; 

Shultz,  Jan.  9 
Palestine  Liberation  Organization 
(PLO):  Department,  Feb.  53; 
Murphy,  Feb.  55;  Shultz,  Feb.  51 
Pan  American  Airlines  #103,  bombing 

(Bremer),  May  74 
Prevention  and  punishment  of  crimes 
against  internationally  protected 
persons,  convention  (1973): 
Bhutan,  Apr.  62;  Kuwait,  June 
69;  Netherlands,  Mar.  92 
Rule  of  law:  Bremer,  May  75;  Gor- 
bachev, Jan.  7  (quoted);  Shultz, 
Jan.  5 
Security  awareness,  measures,  and 

management  (Shultz),  Jan.  4 
Sendero  Liiniiiiuso,  Peruvian  terrorist 

group,  Dec.  49 
Syria  (Bremer),  Feb.  61,  May  75 
U.S.  antiterrorism  assistance  program 

(Bremer),  May  77 
U.S.  counterterrorism  policy 
(Bremer),  Feb.  61,  May  74 
Textiles: 
Cotton  and  manmade  fiber  textiles 
and  textile  products,  trade  in, 
bilateral  agi'eements:  Costa  Rica, 
May  87;  Mauritius,  May  89; 
Turkey,  Feb.  76,  Oct.  86 
Cotton  textiles,  trade  in,  bilateral 
agi'eement:  El  Salvador,  Sept. 
93;  Nepal,  Mar.  93 


Textiles  (Cont'd) 

Cotton,  wool,  and  manmade  fiber  tex- 
tiles and  and  textile  products, 
bilateral  agi'eements:  Brazil,  Mar. 
92;  Hungary,  May  87;  Macao, 
May  88,  June  69;  Malaysia,  Mar. 
93;  Mexico,  Mar.  93,  May  88, 
June  69;  Peru,  Feb.  75;  Romania, 
May  88 

Exports  of  certain  textile  products 
from  Uruguay  to  U.S.,  bilateral 
agreement,  Nov.  80 

GATT  trade  negotiations  issues 
(Hills),  June  31 

International  trade  in,  arrangement 
(1973),  protocol  (1986):  Brazil, 
Aug.  89;  El  Salvador,  June  69 

Trade  in  (certain)  te.xtiles  and  textile 
products,  bilateral  agi'eements: 
Burma,  Mar.  92;  China,  Sept.  93, 
Oct.  85;  Hong  Kong,  Mar.  92; 
Jamaica,  Mar.  92,  May  88;  Macao 
May  88;  Pakistan,  Jan.  50,  Mar. 
93;  Sri  Lanka,  Jan.  51 

Visa  system  relating  to  trade  in  (cer- 
tain) textile  products,  bilateral 
agreements:  Dominican  Republic, 
Oct.  85;  Indonesia,  Mar.  92; 
Jamaica,  Macao,  Romania,  May 
88;  Turkey,  Mar.  93,  Oct.  86; 
United  Arab  Emirates,  June  70; 
Uruguay,  Feb.  76,  Sept.  94 

Wool  and  manmade  fiber  textiles  and 
textile  products,  bilateral  agi-ee- 
ment  with  Romania,  Sept.  94, 
Oct.  86 

Wool  textiles  and  textile  products, 
visa  system  for  exports  to  U.S., 
bilateral  agreement  with  Hun- 
gary, Feb.  75 
Thailand:  " 

Burmese  refugees  (Lambertson),  Ma> 
43 

Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 
May  71,  72,  Oct.  59 

Economic  development,  Apr.  37 

Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  74, 
76,  Mar.  92,  Oct.  84,  Dec.  57 

U.S.  aid,  FY  90,  request  (Clark), 
May  51 
Thatcher,  Margaret,  Jan.  10  (quoted), 

Mar.  57,  Aug.  40 
Thornburgh,  Richard,  Oct.  79 
Timber: 

International  tropical  timber  agree- 
ment (1983):  Gabon,  Feb.  74; 
Panama,  May  87;  Portugal,  Dec. 
58 

International  Tropical  Timber  Or- 
ganization (ITTO),  tax  reimburse 
ment,  bilateral  agreement,  Apr. 
63 
Togo,  treaties,  agi'eements,  etc.,  Mar. 
93,  Sept.  93,  Oct.  85,  Dec.  57,  58 


26 


Department  of  State  Bulletin/Index  19( 


'onga,  Pacific  island  regional  fisheries 

treaty  (1987),  Sept.  93 
ourism: 

Conference  on  Security  and  Coopera- 
tion in  Europe  (CSCE),  follow-up 
meeting,  concluding  document, 
Mar.  29 
Development  and  facilitation  of 

tourism,  bilateral  agreement  with 
Hungary,  Oct.  86 
rade: 

Conference  on  Security  and  Coopera- 
tion in  Europe  (CSCE),  follow-up 
meeting,  concluding  document. 
Mar.  27 
Coordinating  Committee  on  Multi- 
lateral Export  Controls 
(COCOM)  policy:  Baker,  Apr.  30, 
Aug.  13;  Wendt,  Jan.  20 
East-West  (NAC),  Feb.  46 
General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Trade  (GATT):  Feb.  36;  Hippler 
Bello,  Holmer,  Mar.  12,  14;  Wal- 
lis,  Feb.  31;  Whitehead,  Jan.  19 
Article  VII  (customs  valuation 
code),  agi'eement  (1979), 
protocol  (1979),  Cyprus,  Oct.  85 
Foreign  investment  issues,  Feb.  36 
Intellectual  property  issues  (Hills), 

Nov.  56 
Safeguards  for  domestic  industries, 

Feb.  37 
Tariffs,  Feb.  37 
Uruguay  Round:  Feb.  36;  Hills, 
June  30,  Nov.  53;  Lamb,  Feb. 
35;  McCormack,  July  52 
Global  economic  integi-ation 

(Whitehead),  Jan.  18 
Open  multilateral  trading  system.  Or- 
ganization for  Economic  Coopera- 
tion and  Development  (OECD), 
final  communique,  Sept.  82 
Summit  of  the  Arch,  economic  declara- 
tion, text,  Sept.  14 
UN  convention  on  contracts  for  inter- 
national sale  of  goods,  Vienna 
(1980):  Byelorussian  S.S.R.,  Dec. 
58;  Denmark,  German  Democratic 
Republic,  May  87 
rade,  U.S.: 

Association  of  South  East  Asian  Na- 
tions (ASEAN),  Apr.  36 
Bangladesh,  bilateral  agi-eement  con- 
cerning trade  in  certain  apparel 
categories,  Jan.  50 
Brazil  (Reagan),  Jan.  49 
Canada  (Wallis),  Feb.  31 
U.S. -Canada  free  trade  agreement: 
Chronology,  Oct.  4 
Questions  and  answers,  Oct.  4 
Summary  of  key  provisions,  Oct.  1 
China:  Apr.  35;  Bush,  May  13;  Depart- 
ment, Feb.  26 
East  Asia,  Apr.  34 


Trade,  U.S.  (Cont'd) 
European  Community:  Jan.  24; 
Eagleburger,  Oct.  37;  Hippler 
Bello,  Holmer,  Mar.  12;  Lamb, 
Feb.  34;  Shultz,  Feb.  38;  Wallis, 
Feb.  31 
Hungary,  most-favored-nation  status: 
Bush,  Sept.  40;  White  House, 
Sept.  41 
International  trade  deficit,  (Wallis), 

Feb.  30 
Japan:  Apr.  34,  Sept.  78;  Baker,  Aug. 
65;  Bush,  May  9;  Hippler  Bello, 
Holmer,  Mar.  12,  13 
Korea:  Oct.  30;  Bush,  May  20,  21 
Latin  America  (Shultz),  Jan.  11 
Libya  (White  House),  Mar.  71 
Mexico:  July  73,  74  (chart);  Baker, 
Oct.  77;  fact  sheet,  Dec.  6;  Serra, 
Oct.  81;  U.S.-Mexico  Binational 
Commission,  joint  communique, 
Oct.  83 
Mexico,  safety  and  wholesomeness  of 
fresh  and  fresh  frozen  oysters, 
clams,  and  mussels  exported  to 
the  U.S.,  bilateral  agreement, 
Apr.  63 
Newly  industrialized  economies,  Apr. 

36 
Soviet  Union:  Baker,  Aug.  13,  Sept. 
66;  Reagan,  Feb.  6;  Wendt,  Jan. 
20,  22 
Steel  (Bush),  Apr.  28,  Oct.  3b 
Strategic  technology:  Baker,  Sept.  66; 

Wendt,  Jan.  20 
Taiwan  (Hippler  Bello,  Holmer),  Mar. 

13 
Thailand,  Apr.  37 
U.S.  policy:  Hills,  Nov.  53;  Hippler 
Bello,  Holmer,  Mar.  11;  Mc- 
Cormack, July  49 
Uruguay,  exports  of  certain  textile 
products  to  U.S.,  bilateral  agree- 
ment, Sept.  94 
Uruguay  Round,  ti'ade  objectives, 

Feb.  35 
Wine  and  wine  products,  market  ac- 
cess in  Korea,  bilateral  agree- 
ment with  Republic  of  Korea, 
May  88 
Trade,  world,  and  economic  growth 

(chart)  Feb.  37 
Trademarks,  U.S.  trade  policy  objec- 
tives (Hills),  Nov.  57 
Transportation,  Conference  on  Security 
and  Cooperation  in  Europe 
(CSCE),  follow-up  meeting,  conclud- 
ing document.  Mar.  29 
Traore,  Moussa,  Jan.  14,  15 
Treaties,  agi'eements,  etc.,  Jan.  50, 
Feb.  73,  74,  Apr.  62,  Aug.  89, 
Sept.  93,  Oct.  36,  62.  85,  Nov.  18, 
20,  21,  22,  24,  26 
International  Convention  on  Genocide 
(1948):  White  House,  Jan.  39 


Treaties,  agreements,  etc.  (Cont'd) 
Vienna  Convention  on  the  Law  of 
Treaties  (1969),  Solomon  Islands, 
Dec.  58 
Trinidad  and  Tobago,  treaties,  agree- 
ments, etc.,  Apr.  62,  63,  May  86, 
June  68,  Oct.  84,  Nov.  80,  Dec.  57 
Tunisia,  treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  June 

68,  Dec.  57 
Turkey: 
Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 
ing, control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 
Oct.  58 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 
States,  1955-1957,  Volmne 
XXIV,  Soviet  Union;  Eastern 
Mediterranean,  released,  July  80 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  76, 
Mar.  93,  Sept.  93,  Oct.  86,  Nov. 
79 
Visit  of  Secretary  Baker:  Baker,  Yil- 
maz,  Apr.  41 


u 


Uganda: 
Human  rights  issues  (Brown),  May  28 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Feb.  74, 
76,  Apr.  63,  Aug.  88 
Ukrainian  S.S.R.,  treaties,  agreements, 
etc.,  Apr.  62,  May  87,  July  77, 
Aug.  88,  89 
United  Arab  Emirates,  treaties,  agree- 
ments, etc..  May  86,  June  70 
United  Kingdom: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  51, 
Feb.  76,  Mar.  92,  93,  Apr.  63, 
May  88,  June  68,  70,  July  76,  78, 
Aug.  89,  90,  Sept.  93,  Nov.  80 
U.S.  relations:  Baker,  Aug.  42,  43; 

Bush,  Aug.  41;  Thatcher,  Aug.  41 
U.S.  visit  of  Prime  Minister  Thatcher: 
Reagan,  Mar.  57;  Thatcher,  Mar. 
58 
Visit  of  Secretary  Baker:  Baker, 
Howe,  Apr.  38 
United  Nations: 
Afghanistan,  involvement  in.  Mar.  75, 

86,  87 
Cambodian  peace  settlement  (Baker), 

Oct.  26 
Central  American  peace  agreements, 
mandate:  Baker,  Department, 
Dec.  53 
Conference  for  the  Adoption  of  a  Con- 
vention Against  lUicit  Traffic  in 
Narcotic  Drugs  and  Psychotropic 
Substances,  Vienna  (1988),  text, 
Apr.  49 
Cuba,  human  rights  investigation  (Val- 

ladares),  Dec.  54 
Disarmament  Commission,  U.S.  posi- 
tion (Burns),  Jan.  43 
General  Assembly: 


•epartment  of  State  Bulletin/Index  1989 


27 


1 

United  Nations  (Cont'd) 

United  Nations  Educational  and  Train- 

w 

Resolution  43/19  on  Kampuchea, 

ing  Progi-am  for  Southern  Africa 

Feb.  67 

(UNETPSA),  FY  90,  U.S.  funding, 

Walker,  Edward  S.,  May  61 

Resolution  43/20  on  Afghanistan, 

proposed  (Vogelgesang),  May  83 

Wallis,  W.  Allen,  Feb.  30,  Mar.  15 

Jan.  40 

United  Nations  Environment  Program 

Walters,  Vernon  A.,  Jan.  40,  Feb.  65 

Libyan  aircraft  shot  down  by  U.S. 

(UNEP),  FY  90,  U.S.  funding. 

War,  renunciation  of  war  as  an  instru- 

' Navy,  (Okun),  Mar.  90 

proposed  (Vogelgesang),  May  82 

ment  of  national  policy,  treaty 

Palestine  Liberation  Organization 

United  Nations  Fellowship  Progi-am 

(1928),  Antigua  and  Barbuda,  Mar. 

(PLO)  and  U.S.  policy:  Baker, 

(UNFP),  FY  90,  U.S.  funding. 

92 

July  65;  Department,  July  66; 

proposed  (Vogelgesang),  May  83 

Warsaw  Pact  (Ledogar),  May  33 

Shultz,  Feb.  8,  9;  Vogelgesang, 

United  Nations  High  Commissioner  on 

Conventional  armed  forces  in  Europe 

July  65 

Refugees  (UNHCR),  Indochinese 

(CFE)  negotiations,  resumed 

Peacekeeping  role  and  activities: 

refugee  settlement  (Eagleburger), 

(White  House),  July  44 

Bush,  Nov.  26,  31;  Powell,  Jan.  30 

Oct.  70 

East  European  reforms  (Baker),  Dec. 

Privileges  and  immunities,  convention 

United  Nations  Human  Rights  Commis- 

28, 29 

(1946),  Antigua  and  Barbuda, 

sion  (Schifter),  Oct.  43 

Weapons,  prohibitions  and  restrictions 

Feb.  75 

United  Nations  Industrial  Development 

on  use  of  certain  conventional 

Role  in  world  affairs  (Bolton),  Oct.  74 

Organization  (UNIDO),  FY  90, 

weapons  which  may  be  deemed  to 

Security  Council: 

U.S.  funding,  proposed  (Vogel- 

be excessively  injurious  or  to  have 

Resolutions  242  and  338  on  Israel: 

gesang),  May  83 

indiscriminate  effects,  with 

Murphy,  Feb.  55;  Reagan, 

United  Nations  Transition  Assistance 

protocols  (1980),  Liechtenstein,  Deo 

Shultz,  Feb.  51 

Group  (UNTAG)  (Baker),  May  29 

58 

Resolution  435  on  Namibian  inde- 

United Nations  Trust  Fund  for  South 

Wendt,  E.  Allen,  Jan.  20 

pendence:  Feb.  15,  16,  19,  21; 

Africa  (UNTFSA),  FY  90,  U.S. 

Western  Samoa,  treaties,  agi-eements, 

Cohen,  Nov.  43 

funding,  proposed  (Vogelgesang), 

etc.,  Feb.  74,  Mar.  91,  Oct.  85 

Resolution  637  on  Central  American 

May  83 

Whaling,  international  whaling  conven- 

peace, Oct.  73 

United  Nations  Voluntary  Fund  for  Vic- 

tion and  schedule  of  regulations 

Security  Council  members  ministerial 

tims  of  Torture  (UNVFVT),  FY  90, 

(1946),  withdrawal,  Egypt,  Feb.  75 

meeting,  joint  statement,  Nov.  66 

U.S.  funding,  proposed  (Vogel- 

Wheat: 

U.S.  contribution  to  funding  (Baker), 

gesang),  May  83 

Food  aid  convention  (1986):  Luxem- 

Apr. 21 

U.S.S.R.  See  Soviet  Union 

bourg,  U.K.,  Sept.  93 

U.S.  relations  and  objectives  (William- 

Uruguay, treaties,  agi-eements,  etc.. 

Wheat  trade  convention  (1986):  Bel- 

son), Feb.  68 

Feb.  76,  May  86,  June  68,  Sept.  93, 

gium,  Dec.  58;  Israel,  Feb.  75; 

Universal  Declaration  of  Human 

Nov.  80 

Italy,  Portugal,  Dec.  58;  U.S., 

Rights  (1948),  40th  anniversary: 

Sept.  93 

Reagan,  Mar.  66;  Schifter,  Mar. 

Whitehead,  John  C,  Jan.  18,  Mar.  64 

59;  Walters,  Mar.  68;  Whitehead, 

V 

Williams,  Richard  L.,  July  48,  Oct.  27 

Mar.  64;  Williamson,  Mar.  61 

Williamson,  Richard  S.,  Feb.  68,  Mar.  6 

United  Nations  Capital  Development 

Valladares,  Armando,  Dec.  54 

Wolfe,  Edward  E.,  July  56 

Fund  (UNCDF),  FY  90,  U.S.  fund- 

Van den  Broek,  Hans,  Sept.  50 

Women: 

ing,  proposed  (Vogelgesang),  May 

Vanuatu,  treaties,  agi'eements,  etc.. 

Convention  for  elimination  of  all 

82 

May  86,  June  68,  Sept.  94,  Oct.  84, 

forms  of  discrimination  against 

United  Nations  Children's  Fund 

Dec.  57 

(1979):  Antigua  and  Barbuda, 

(UNICEF),  FY  90,  U.S.  funding. 

Venezuela: 

Nov.  79;  Libya,  Aug.  89;  Luxenn 

proposed  (Vogelgesang),  May  81 

Drugs,  narcotic,  production,  traffick- 

bourg. May  87;  Madagascar,  Aug 

United  Nations  Day,  1989,  proclamation 

ing,  control  efforts  (Wrobleski), 

89;  Sierra  Leone,  Feb.  75 

(Bush),  Dec.  53 

Oct.  57 

Political  rights,  convention  (1953):  An' 

United  Nations  Development  Fund  for 

Treaties,  agi-eements,  etc.,  Feb.  74, 

tigua  and  Barbuda,  Feb.  75; 

Women  (UNIFEM),  FY  90,  U.S. 

Mar.  92,  May  86,  June  68,  70 

Libya,  Aug.  89 

funding,  proposed  (Vogelgesang), 

Vietnam: 

World  Administrative  Telegraph  and 

May  83 

Cambodian  occupation  and 

Telephone  Conference  (Borg),  Jan. 

United  Nations  Development  Program 

withdrawal:  Lambertson,  May  37; 

33 

(UNDP),  FY  90,  U.S.  funding. 

Solomon,  Nov.  47;  Waltei-s,  Feb. 

World  Bank.  See  International  Bank  foi 

proposed  (Vogelgesang),  May  81 

65 

Reconstruction  and  Development 

United  Nations  Economic,  Scientific  and 

POW/MIAs  (Lambertson),  May  37 

(IBRD) 

Cultural  Organization  (UNESCO), 

Refugee  resettlement  agi-eement, 

World  Intellectual  Property  Organiza- 

importation of  economic,  scientific 

U.S. -Vietnam  joint  statement. 

tion  (WIPO),  tax  reimbursement, 

and  cultural  materials,  protocol 

Nov.  63 

bilateral  agreement,  Mar.  93 

(1976),  Germany,  Federal  Republic 

Treaties,  agi-eements,  etc..  May  86, 

World  Meteorological  Organization 

of,  Dec.  58 

Dec.  58 

(WMO),  FY  90,  U.S.  funding. 

U.S.  relations:  Baker,  Sept.  62,  Dec. 

proposed  (Vogelgesang),  May  82 

19;  Lambertson,  May  37 

World  Trade  Week,  1989,  proclamation 

Vogelgesang,  Sandra  L.,  May  81,  July 

(Bu.?h),  July  51 

'65 

Wrobleski,  Ann  B.,  May  68,  Oct.  49 

28 

Department  of  State  Bulletin/Index  191 

'emen  Arab  Republic: 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  .51, 

June  68 
U.S.  aid,  FY  90,  request  (Bm-Ieigli), 

May  66 
'ilmaz,  Mesut,  Apr.  41 
'ugoslavia; 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 

States,  Volume  VIII,  1952-195J,, 

Eastern  Europe;  the  Soviet 


Yugoslavia  (Cont'd) 

Union;  the  Eastern  Mediter- 
ranean, released,  Jan.  53 
Treaties,  agi'eements,  etc.,  Feb.  76, 
May  86,  June  69,  Oct.  85 


Zaire: 
Profile,  Oct.  16 


Zaire  (Cont'd) 
Treaties,  agreements,  etc.,  Jan.  51, 

Sept.  94 
U.S.  visit  of  President  Mobutu:  Bush, 
Oct.  15;  Mobutu,  Oct.  17 
Zambia,  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, bilateral  agreement,  July 
78 
Zimbabwe,  convention  for  suppression 
of  unlawful  acts  against  the  safety 
of  civil  aviation  (1971),  May  86 
Zimmerman,  Warren,  Mar.  25  ■ 


department  of  State  Bulletin/Index  1989 


29 


I 


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