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Given By 

iJAe/ ^efia/^tmen(/ ^(w t/ta^e^ 




the President ••..• 528 


Communique 523 

Statement by the Council 524 

Statement and Address by Secretary Acheson • . . 525 


VISIT IN CHINA, 1944 • 541 


Howard 531 

For index see back cover 

October 1, 1951 

^.^^^^y^.. bulletin 

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Note: Contents of this publication are not 
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Of State Bulletln as the source will bo 

Vol. XXV, No. 640 • Publication 4373 
October 1, 1951 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a ueekly publication compiled and 
edited in the Division of Publications, 
Office of Public Affairs, provides the 
public and interested agencies of 
the Government with information on 
developments in the field of foreign 
relations and on the uork of the De- 
partment of State and the Foreign 
Service. The BULLETIN includes 
selected press releases on foreign pol- 
icy issued by the White House and the 
Department, and statements and ad- 
dresses made by the President and by 
the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as tvell as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the func- 
tions of the Department. Informa- 
tion is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to 
which the United States is or may 
become a party and treaties of gen- 
eral international interest. 

Publications of the Department, as 
well as legislative material in the field 
of international relations, are listed 


OCT 16 1951 
Results of Meeting of NAC, Ottawa, September 15-20 


[Released to the press Septemier 21] 

1. The North Atlantic Council has concluded 
its Seventh Session, in which for the first time the 
member governments were represented by Foreign 
Ministers, Defense Ministers and Economic or Fi- 
nance Ministers. The new composition of the 
Council reflects the wide fields in which coordi- 
nation is being steadily developed. 

2. In an exchange of views on the world situa- 
tion, note was taken of the growing confidence and 
strength of the Atlantic community in a world of 
continuing tension. The Council was informed 
by the Occupying Powers of the progress of dis- 
cussions directed toward the establishment of a 
new relationship with the German Federal Repub- 
lic. It M'as also informed of the statement made 
by the three foreign ministers after their meeting 
in Washington in which they welcomed the plan 
for a European Defense Community of which 
Germany would form part.^ 

3. Tlie Council, considering that the security 
of the North Atlantic area would be enhanced by 
the accession of Greece and Turkey to the North 
Atlantic Treaty, agreed to recommend to the 
member governments that, subject to the approval 
of national Parliaments under their respective leg- 
islative procedures, an invitation should be ad- 
dressed as soon as possible to the Kingdom of 
Greece and the Eepublic of Turkey to accede to 
the Treaty. 

4. The Council considered the reports submitted 
by the military and civilian agencies of the Treaty 
Organization : 

(a) The Standing Group reported on the es- 
tablishment and development of the integrated 
force under General Eisenhower, and progress on 
other military matters. 

(b) The Defense Production Board reported 
on the problems relating to the further develop- 
ment of production and recommended means of 
dealing with these problems. 

(c) The Financial and Economic Board pre- 
sented a report analyzing the economic and finan- 
cial impact of the Nato defense effort with sj^e- 

' Bulletin of Sept. 24, 1951, p. 4SG. 

cial reference to the equitable sharing of the 

(d ) Tlie Council Deputies, the permanent work- 
ing body of the Treaty Organization, reported on 
their activities in political, oi-ganization, and ad- 
ministrative matters and in developing closer co- 
ordination between the Treaty agencies. 

(e) The Chairman of the Council Deputies 
summarized the major issues before the Organi- 
zation and suggested action to meet them. 

As a result of the study of these reports, the 
Council issued guidance and directives to the re- 
pective agencies concerning their future work. 

5. All member governments recognize as their 
joint aim the building up defense forces to a suf- 
ficient level of strength, and the no less important 
objective of a sound and stable economy necessary 
to support that effort. The reports of the Defense 
Production Board and of the Financial and Eco- 
nomic Board, and the discussion thereon, have 
indicated a number of difficulties in the production 
and economic fields. The member countries recog- 
nize the need to surmount such difficulties in order 
to assure the continued progress of their efforts 
to strengthen the free world. The Council has 
noted the danger of inflation, the burdens which 
increa.sed defense efforts place on the balance of 
payments, and the obstacles to an adequate de- 
fense arising from price and allocation pressures 
on raw material supplies. The Ministers recog- 
nized that tlie common effort requires a common 
attack upon these problems, and agreed to take 
such action severally and jointly as they deem 
appropriate to find solutions to them. 

6. Accordingly a temporary committee of the 
Council was established to survey urgently the 
requirements of external security, and particularly 
of fulfilling a militarily acceptable N.\to plan 
for the (Icfense of Western Europe, and the realis- 
tic political-economic capabilities of the member 
countries, with a view to determining possible 
courses of action for their reconciliation so as to 
achieve the most effective use of the resources of 
the member countries. 

7. The Council received reports from the mem- 
ber governmonts on the status of the defense ef- 
fort in their countries and referred them to the 
military agencies and appropriate commands for 

October 1, 1 95 1 


study and recoinmendations to improve the early 
effectiveness and availability of forces. 

8. The Council noted that agreement had been 
reached on the financing of an "infrastructure" 
program of airfields, communications, and certain 
installations for the support of forces. These 
projects will continue without delay. 

9. The Council has issued a separate statement 
making clear the importance which the member 
governments attach to the development of the 
Atlantic community, not only to safeguard their 
freedom and common heritage on an equal foot- 
ing but also to strengthen their free institutions 
and to advance the well-being of their peoples. 
The statement announced the establishment of 
a ministerial committee to study and recommend 
lines of future action toward these objectives. 

10. The Council resolved that, in order to de- 
velop more effective unity of action, and in ac- 
cordance with its duties as the institution for 
forming the policy and directing the operations of 
the Treaty Organization, its meetings would be 
held more frequently and at more regular inter- 
vals. In order to continue progress on the prob- 
lems discussed at the Seventh Session, it was 
agreed that a further meeting of the Council 
would be held in Rome in the near future. 


IReleased to the press September 21] 

The peoples of the North Atlantic community 
are united under the North Atlantic Treaty to 
preserve their freedom and to develop their com- 
mon heritage of democracy, liberty and the rule 
of law. During the past two years, since the 
Treaty came into being, North Atlantic countries 
have joined in collective efforts for their defense. 
They will continue to work together closely to con- 
solidate the North Atlantic community. All ob- 
stacles which hinder such cooperation on an equal 
footing should be removed. 

The persistent attempts which have been made 
and are being made to divide the peoples of the 
North Atlantic community will fail. Those who 
made these attempts do not understand the nature 
or the strength of the close ties between the free 
peoples of the North Atlantic community. The 
preservation of peace is the very essence of that 
community, and free discussion as to how this can 
best be done is a source of continuing strength. 

It was the threatening international situation 
that brought 12 nations of the North Atlantic 
community formally together under the North 
Atlantic Treaty to create sufficient strength to pre- 
serve their freedom and liberty. A series of so- 
called peace offers as vague in language as they 
are obscure in content are made from time to 
time. The peoples of the North Atlantic com- 
munity will test these offers by the deeds that 
follow them. They will never reject any genuine 

move for peace, but will not be deflected from 
building up their defensive strength by mere 
empty words about peace. 

The strengthening of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization in the past two years has developed 
in the minds of the peoples a strong sense of their 
common interests and ideals. There is a desire 
within the North Atlantic Community to meet 
specific needs in all fields where close collaboration 
will advance the welfare of the community. 

One source for the further development of the 
North Atlantic community is Article II of the 
North Atlantic Treaty which states : 

The Parties will contribute towards the further de- 
velopment of peaceful and friendly international rela- 
tions by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing 
about a better understanding of the principles upon which 
these institutions are founded, and by promoting condi- 
tions of stability and well-being. They will seek to 
eliminate conflict in their international economic policies 
and will encourage economic collaboration between any 
or all of them. 

A clear sense of the direction in which the com- 
munity is developing should make it easier to take 
practical steps towards that end. 

The Council has therefore decided to set up a 
Ministerial Committee composed of representa- 
tives from Belgium, Canada, Italy, Netherlands 
and Norway, to consider the further strengthening 
of the North Atlantic Community and especially 
the implementation of Article II of the North 
Atlantic Treaty. 

The Committee, assisted by the Council Depu- 
ties, will, in particular, consider and make recom- 
mendations to the Council on the following mat- 

(a) Coordination and frequent consultation on 
foreign policy, having particular regard to steps 
designed to promote peace. 

(b) Closer economic, financial and social co- 
operation designed to promote conditions of sta- 
bility and well-being, both during the period of 
rearmament and thereafter, within the North At- 
lantic Treaty Organization or through other 

(c) Collaboration in the fields of culture and 
public information. 

In these and other ways the Council will build 
up the inner strength of the North Atlantic com- 
munity, without duplicating the work of other in- 
ternational organizations which promote the same 

The Council endorses the recent declaration of 
the Organization for European Economic Coop- 
eration which called on all sections of the Euro- 
pean community to increase production and play 
their part in the collective effort for jDeace and 

In develoiiing the North Atlantic community, 
the Council would act in conformity with and seek 
to strengthen the purposes and princijDles of the 

' Bulletin of Sept. 24, 19.51, p. 487. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Charter of the United Nations. It is only by the 
work and by the enlightened understanding of the 
free peoples everywhere that the cause of freedom 
and democracy will be upheld against any chal- 


There is an understandable feeling from time 
to time that when the Council meets there should 
be a whole series of world-shattering decisions 
which are made. That I think is not a proper 
way to approach these things, and I think one of 
the decisions which was taken at this meeting will 
be very helpful for molding these meetings into 
proper perspective. 

We hope to have much more frequent meetings, 
so that each meeting in itself is not a great event. 
They should be held regularly, and there should 
be several meetings every year so that we do not 
pile up a lot of work and have these treated as 
extraordinaiy events. The whole machinery and 
operations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organi- 
zation have come a long way in the two years since 
it was organized, and I think that if you look back 
now at that day in 1949 when we signed this 
treaty, we really see what a tremendous advance 
has been made both in the operation of the treaty 
organization through the Council and the deputies, 
and also in the physical work which has gone on 
in the organization of the forces that is proceeding 
under General Eisenhower. 

Then, the agreement that was reached here in 
Ottawa about that strange word "infrastructure"' 
has been extremely helpful. That has to do with 
the basic facilities which are required for these 
North Atlantic forces — the air fields, communi- 
cations facilities, and things of that sort. 

The work has been going forward up to the 
present time. There has been difficulty about how 
the financing should be borne — should it be by each 
government, in respect of its particular part of 
these facilities, or should there be some specific 
division of it. That was worked out and a good 
agreement was reached so that the solution can 
be pressed to a very speedy conclusion. 

We are not going to get an adequate air force 
until we get fields to put it on, nor an adequate 
command structure until there is a whole system 
of communication which can be used by that com- 
mand structure. All those things have been done. 
A most important one which came about as the 
result of the amendment dealing with our struc- 
ture was proposed by the Canadian Government, 
which brings in the financial, economic, and the 
military side. 

Our meeting with the foreign ministers has 
enlarged the attendance in the room somewhat. 

' Extemporaneous; reinnrks made at a pres.s conference 
at Ottawa on Sept. 20 and released to the press at Wash- 
ington Sept. 21. 

With the really brilliant performance of the 
Canadian Army Signal Corps in bringing about 
instantaneous translations, we were able to con- 
duct these large meetings efficiently. AVe had real 
discussions, a real exchange of views, and real 

One of the outstanding things to me was the 
helpful and brilliant part played by many of the 
representatives of the smaller member countries. 
I need not enlarge upon that; you can readily 
know who they were. They played a very impor- 
tant part in the success of these meetings, through 
their keen observations, submission of proposals, 
suggestions for alterations in resolutions, and so 
on. There was a real, thorough, and complete dis- 
cussion of all these matters, and a most worth- 
while preparation for the meeting to be held in 
Rome sometime in November. 

Another thing which was important was to ap- 
point a group to get to work on the non-military 
side of this organization. All those activities could 
properly fall under Article II of the treaty. They 
have a great bearing on the thinking of people in 
all of our countries who are very much interested 
in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Peo- 
]de sometimes feel in some instances that the or- 
ganization is too preoccupied with militai-y con- 
siderations and should give more attention to the 
other side of its work. The ministerial men are 
taking a lead in this thinking. They will work 
with the deputies in London and will be ready at 
the time of the Eome meeting to submit to us spe- 
cific ideas which have been worked out. 

One of the problems here is not to duplicate the 
work done in other organizations, and to work 
out immediate programs on which we can all get to 

Now, the main thing which was accomplished 
here was the conclusion on the part of all the 
nations to take the proper steps with their legis- 
latures to add Greece and Turkey to the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization. That was a matter 
which raised vei-y difficult problems. These prob- 
lems had to be discussed by tlie various representa- 
tives of their ministries, and within the respective 
parliaments all over the world. 

All of this was far from easy, for many coun- 
tries to come to a conclusion — but a unanimous 
conclusion was reached, and now we will go for- 
ward with the necessary legislative steps. That 
involves ratification by our Senate of the necessary 
amendment to the treaty. The treaty must be 
amended by adding the two countries and certain 
changes made describing the areas covered by the 

When the Committee on Foreign Relations had 
its meeting two years ago, I was asked by Senator 
Vandenberg whether under Article X admission 
of new members would require ratification by the 
Senate. I answered then that such an amendment 
would constitute in effect a new treaty, and would 
have to be laid before the Senate, just as the origi- 

Ocfober I, J 95 J 


nal treaty was. And so we -will prepare a pai)er 
which will be signed by the officials of various 
governments, and when ratified will accomplish 
this result. That was the big, the concrete and im- 
mediate achievement of this meeting. 

Other matters are not in a state of readiness 
for action. We hope that they will be by the next 
meeting, and that further steps looking toward 
some participation by Germany in the defense of 
Western Europe will be ready for consideration by 
the Council when we meet in November. 

It had been hoped that we could have a meeting 
at the end of October in Eome. That will not now 
be possible, because of the British elections, so the 
next meeting will have to be postponed a little 
while. That will be worked out. I imagine it 
will be sometime toward the latter part of Novem- 
ber. That is speculation. 

I think that describes in a broad way what we 
have covered at this Ottawa meeting. I might say 
one other thing : I should not overlook the resolu- 
tion appointing the 12-man committee to look into 
the reconciliation of military requirements with 
the economic availabilities and capabilities of the 
countries concerned. This is a problem which the 
organization has been working on for a long time. 
We have had our Defense Production Board an- 
alyzing the whole physical possibilities for pro- 
duction in Europe. 

The Finance and Economic Board has been an- 
alyzing the effects of the rearmament program on 
the economic and financial structures of the vari- 
ous countries. A committee of the Standing 
Group is working on the force requirements. All 
of this must be put together. The deputies have 
a great deal to do ; they are working very hard in 
preparation for the Rome meeting, and it was 
thought that the thing to do was to get a tempo- 
rary group together who could work and come 
up with a conclusion by the latter part of Novem- 
ber. Each man has the full confidence of his Gov- 
ernment and represents its views in an authorita- 
tive way, and the group will come up with a 
recommendation which the Council can act on. 

That is a matter on which the United States 
Government will have to get to work pretty soon 
because, as you know, the basic decisions on these 
matters have to be made in time for the President's 
budget message, which goes to Congress shortly 
after it meets in January. We have tremendous 
work ahead of us, which covers a great many fields. 
Much of it has been accomplished and is now be- 
hind us, and we have laid the foundation for the 
rest of it. We hope to have another meeting this 
year and one early next year. We will get through 
these problems. It will all take time and effort and 
ingenuity. The organization is strong and du- 
rable and moving forward, and we can be very 
satisfied and happy about this meeting here in 


It is fitting that this meeting of the North 
Atlantic Comicil should be held in Ottawa. 

Among the first to see and express the need 
for the Atlantic nations to unite their strength 
in the face of the common danger were Mackenzie 
King and St. Laurent. 

Since that time, the people of Canada and their 
Government have continued to give leadership and 
inspiration to the development of effective unity 
of purpose and action for peace through the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization. 

Both a key geographical position and a broad 
world outlook contribute to Canada's prominent 
and significant role in the further evolution of this 
great experiment in international cooperation. 

"Growth Toward Unity" 

If I were asked to sum up the current develop- 
ment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
I would describe it as a process of "growth toward 

It is sometimes the case that men may feel only 
the dim outlines of the historical developments 
of which they are a part, and I suspect that this 
may be true of the process of growth toward unity 
which we are now witnessing in this organization. 

At the time of its signing, the treaty registei'ed 
a unity of purpose which was already in existence. 
I expressed the belief then, and I am even more 
firmly convinced of it now, that the treaty did not 
create something new as much as it recorded a 
basic reality — a unity of belief, of spirit, and of 
interest — which was already felt by the nations 
of the North Atlantic Community. 

But since the signing of the treaty, we have 
seen emerging an increasing unity of practice and 
cooperation among these nations. 

There has been a steady translation into reality 
and action of the resolute determination expressed 
in the treaty by the member nations to unite their 
efforts for collective defense and for the preserva- 
tion of peace and security. 

^^liat was a paper plan of defense only a year 
ago has now become a defense force — an inte- 
grated defense force— serving under a unified 

Week in and week out, the deputies have been 
meshing national points of view into a common 
program of action. And the Council, as it is now 
organized, brings together the ministers of foreign 
affairs, defense, and finance, thus engaging the 
essential branches of government of the member 
nations upon the common effort. 

Meanwhile, many new organizations for co- 
operation have been emerging and developing 

* Made over Canadian Broadcasting Corp. network Sept. 
18 and released to tlie press on the same date by the 
American Embassy at Ottawa. 


Department of State Bulletin 

among the nations of the European and North 
Atlantic areas. Among these are the Benelux 
Economic Union, the Schuman Plan, the Euro- 
pean Payments Union, and the Organization for 
European Economic Cooperation — all of them 
aspects of a growing sense of community. 

The present effort to establish a European de- 
fense community is now the frontier of this 
development, a practical advance in cooperation 
for which the experience of the past 2 years has 
prepared us. 

But as we look ahead beyond the present defense 
efforts, it seems to me that the time has come to 
make clear to our respective peoples and to the 
world the importance which we all attach to the 
development of the North Atlantic Community 
as a framework for our progressively closer long- 
term association in all fields. 

Affirmation of Common Values 

The North Atlantic Treaty is far more than 
a defensive arrangement. It is an affirmation of 
the moral and spiritual values which we hold in 
common. It represents the will of the peoples 
of the North Atlantic Community not only to safe- 
guard their freedom, but to seek increasing ful- 
fillment of it. The central idea of the treaty is 
not a static one ; it is conceived rather in the spirit 
of growth, of development, of progress. Wliat 
we seek to preserve is the opportunity for a living 
heritage of freedom to continue to grow. 

This broad and constructive intent is made clear 
in Article II of the treaty, which expresses the de- 
termination of the member nations to strengthen 
their free institutions, to promote conditions of 
stability and well-being, and to encourage eco- 
nomic cooperation wherever possible. 

We cannot afford to lose sight of these broad 
objectives, even though we are compelled, by the 
dangers which face us, to give first priority of 
effort and resources to the establishment of an 
integrated defense. 

Since security is essential to freedom and well- 
being, we are now obliged to devote very great 
effort to building our military defenses. We would 
be guilty of the greatest folly in history if we 
allowed ourselves to be content with a defensive 
effort less than adequate to the enormous threat 
which now hangs over us all. 

IMore Tlian Military Strength Needed 

But the threat, as we are all well aware, is more 
than a military one, and we recognize the neces- 
sity of building not only our military strength, but 
our economic, political, and social strength to the 
limit of our capabilities. 

This aspect of our defense effort, by which we 
are now underpinning our military strength, is 
at the same time creating a basis for cooperation 

which will greatly aid us in reaching our affirma- 
tive goals. 

We look forward to a time when the capital ex- 
penditure of our military defenses shall have been 
made, and we shall then need to sustain only the 
lesser burden of maintaining our defenses. Even 
in the face of the great defense effort we have been 
making, considerable economic gains have been 
possible. But our thinking must go beyond these 
gains, to a time when the member nations will be 
able safely to concentrate their efforts on promot- 
ing the individual well-being of their people, and 
thus fortify the stability and vitality of their dem- 
ocratic institutions. This is our primary purpose, 
which together we shall be able to advance on the 
basis of the cooperation that is now being 

We are beginning now to study the formula- 
tion of long-term concrete measures to this end. 

This is the direction, I believe, in which the 
process of growth toward unity points for the 

Practical Solutions to Specific Problems 

But I think we must always keep in mind that 
this process of growth is a practical rather than 
a theoretical one. It is a step-by-step process. 
It results from a succession of practical and co- 
operative solutions to specific problems. 

Many of the problems we have confronted in 
building our defenses pay no respect at all to na- 
tional frontiers. Our experience in the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization is constantly bring- 
ing home to us the need for new ways of dealing 
with these problems of military organization, of 
production, and of finance. 

Each felt need, as it has arisen, has led to co- 
operation in a specific way. Each such effort ad- 
vances the habit of cooperation, and is woven into 
a fabric of community. 

I stress the practical character of this process 
of growth toward a community sense because I be- 
lieve this way offers more real progress than the 
pursuit of formulas which would overlap the 
problems immediately before us. 

I think we can anticipate an increasing sense 
of community among the nations of Europe and 
North America. Our first aim is to develop a 
conmaunity in which the individual can be rree 
from fear. Beyond this, we look forward to the 
day when a citizen from any one of our countries 
may travel freely and easily anywhere throughout 
the Atlantic Community, finding understanding 
and friendship, and enjoying the same basic rights 
and opportunities as the people he visits. 

I think we can develop closer links in trans- 
portation and communications, and in the whole 
field of ideas. We can, I believe, anticipate an 
increased exchange of skills and experience 
between us in such matters as agriculture and 

Ocfober I, 1 95 1 


There lie before us possibilities for tlie progres- 
sive development of closer economic collaboration, 
and the development of opportunities for normal 
trade and investment. 

These are, of course, long-term matters which 
cannot be developed overnight. But I believe 
tliere will emerge from our Ottawa meeting of the 
North Atlantic Council clear and inspiring proof 
of our common determination to work in this direc- 
tion. And I believe that our present efforts 
toward increasing coordination of our foreign 
policies and our common efforts toward increasing 
our economic productivity will stand as practical 
demonstrations of our intentions. 

And this, in turn, is part of a larger pattern. 
The North Atlantic Community is but one of a 
series of overlapping circles which join the na- 
tions of the world in ever-closer relationships. 

We can discern the same development manifest- 
ing itself in the British Commonwealth of Nations, 
the Organization of American States, and among 

the nations newly associated in security arrange- 
ments in the Pacific area.* These groupings of 
nations, while adapted to the separate needs and 
purposes of their several states, are nevertheless 
interlocked with each other in a common pursuit 
of peace and progress. 

Overarching these groups of nations stands the 
greater edifice of the United Nations, which con- 
tinues to grow in strength and in importance, and 
may someday, we devoutly hope, be able to express 
the universal will of all nations and all people. 

This, as I see it, is the larger pattern of which 
our efforts in the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- 
tion form a part. As I said at the outset, I believe 
it represents a process of growth toward unity. 
Gradual but steady, practical rather than theo- 
retical, these efforts move us confidently forward 
toward the advancement of human well-being and 
a time of peace. 

' Bulletin of July 23, 1951, p. 147 ; Aug. 27, 1951, p. 335 : 
Sept. 24, 1951, p. 486. 

The Constitution — A Means of Correcting Injustices in Human Society 

Address hy the President ^ 

We have met here this morning to put some 
pieces of parcliment away in specially sealed cases, 
in order to preserve them from physical and 
chemical change. These are already old docu- 
ments, written in a style and a hand which are no 
longer familiar to us. If they were only historical 
relics, it might seem strange that we sfiould make 
a ceremony out of this occasion of sealing them up. 

But the Declaration of Independence and the 
Constitution are more than historical relics. They 
are a living force in our life today. 

We may have some difficulty in preserving the 
parchment on which these two documents have 
been written, but the ideas they set forth will never 
perish. These documents express the highest prin- 
ciples of political life : that all men have certain 
inalienable rights, that governments are set up to 
provide for the welfare of the people, and that 
the rule of law stands above government and 
citizen alike. 

These ideas have a life of their own. They have 
been a dynamic force in the history of our Nation. 
They have inspired men, all around the world, to 

"MadP at the Library of Conjiress on Sept. 17 and 
released to the press by the White House on the same date. 
The ofcasion was the transfer of the Declaration of In- 
dependence and the Constitution to new cases desiRned to 
preserve them permanently. Dr. Luther Evans, Librarian 
of Consress, presided at the ceremony. 


create new and independent governments, and to 
improve the conditions under which they live. 

These are very explosive documents. Dr. Evans. 
We may think we have them safely bottled up, 
but the ideas they express will go on forever. 
They will continue to give energy and hope to new 
generations of men, here and in other countries, 
in the long struggle to create a better society on 

Revolutionary Documents 

The Declaration of Independence and the Con- 
stitution, when they were written, were revolu- 
tionary documents. But they were revolutionary 
in a very unusual sense. 

Many revolutions are simply a resort to force 
and violence to impose a new despotism upon the 
people. But these documents were for a very 
different purpose ; their aim was to make despotism 
impossible. Both the Declaration of Independence 
and the Constitution seek to make the rule of law 
and the concepts of justice the dominating factors 
in government. And to a large extent they have 

The struggle against the use of naked force as 
an instrument of government was an old one even 
before these two documents were written. Our 
forefathers created a new nation, but they based 

DepartmenI of State Bulletin 

it upon the long experience of the English people 
in maintaining human freedom. 

The right to trial by jury, the right to be free 
from unreasonable search and seizure, the right of 
habeas corpus, the prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment, the guarantees of freedom of 
the press, freedom of assembly, and freedom of 
religion — all these were basic concepts in the days 
of our Revolution. They were concepts for which 
men had worked and even given up their lives for 

But they had never been made the foundation 
stones of a government until they were put in the 
Declaration of Independence and in the Consti- 
tution and its first 10 amendments — the Bill of 
Kights — which are just as fundamental a part of 
our basic law as the original version of the Con- 
stitution that we are sealing up here today. 

These rights have become so well established 
in this country that we take them for granted. 
They are so much a part of our lives that they 
may seem dry and uninteresting. But the history 
of other countries in recent j'ears has shown us 
how vital and important they are. Recent history 
has demonstrated that the unrestrained use of 
force by government is just as great a danger to 
human progress now as it was ages ago. It has 
demonstrated that unless citizens have rights 
against the government, no one can be safe or 

The Tyranny of Soviet Communism 

In our own lifetime, we have learned anew the 
human misery that an absolute, power-mad gov- 
ernment can create. We have seen it in the brief 
history of the Fascist and Nazi tyrannies. We 
are witnessing it today in the tyranny of Soviet 

A constitution is not just a matter of words. 
There are other constitutions which may read 
as well us ours. Take, for example, the consti- 
tution of the Soviet Union. That has a lot of 
fine language in it. The constitution of the Soviet 
Union says tliat Soviet citizens are guaranteed 
freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and free- 
dom of assembly. It professes to guarantee that 
citizens of the Soviet Union shall be secure in their 
persons and in their homes. And in addition, it 
purports to guarantee equality, the right to work, 
the right to an education, the right to rest and 
leisure, freedom of religion, and a lot of other fine 

But these good words in the Soviet Constitution 
mean less than nothing. They are empty prom- 
ises, because the citizens of the Soviet Union have 
no way of enforcing their rights against the state. 

In the Soviet Union, the power of the state is 
above all rights. The Government does not have 
to obey the law. As a result, the citizens of the 
Soviet Union enjoy none of the fi'eedoms which 
they are guaranteed by their constitution. They 

do not have freedom of speech or freedom of the 
press. They may be arrested without cause; their 
homes may be invaded without a search warrant ; 
t hey may be executed or exiled without a fair trial 
and without appeal. 

The Soviet citizens live in fear. Their society 
is a jungle, through which the naked power of the 
Government prowls like a beast of prey, making 
all men afraid. 

The Connnunists claim that they have to use the 
weapons of tyranny in order to improve the con- 
ditions of the people. But that is not true. That 
is a rejection of the long experience of mankind. 
By resorting to the woi'st evils of ancient tyranny, 
the Soviet rulers have held their citizens in terror 
and bondage, while freedom is growing in the 
rest of the world. 

And the evils which the Communists brought 
back into the world — the evils of political perse- 
cution and unrestrained state power — have grown 
and flourished, and become much more terrible 
than they ever were before. Modern inventions, 
modern means of communication, modern meth- 
ods of propaganda make the power of the state 
more formidable than it was in the days of the 
stage coach and the muzzle-loading musket. The 
power of the Kremlin is more effective, more vio- 
lent, more far reaching than the power of the 
Czars, or the power of Genghis Khan, or the power 
of other tyrants of the past. 

Today, the tyrant can uproot and liquidate 
whole classes of people and entire nations. The 
death camps of Hitler Germany or of modern 
Siberia demonstrate that the unrestrained power 
of the government can be a greater evil in our 
modern civilization than it ever was in ancient 

The only guarantee against such a society of 
fear and cruelty is the principle that the govern- 
ment is not above the law. Our Declaration of 
Independence and our Constitution proclaim that 
the government is subject to the fundamental law. 

The Constitution sets up a system of internal 
checks and balances which may seem cumbersome 
to us at times, but which succeeds in preventing 
any part of the government from having absolute 
power. Under our Constitution, it is not only the 
citizens who are made to conform to the principles 
of justice, but the government itself. And the 
citizen has the power to enforce his rights against 
the government. The rule of law is made supreme. 

Protection From the Evils of Tyranny 

Our Constitution protects us from the evils of 
tyranny. But this is not all our Constitution does. 
If it were, it would not be enough. 

A constitution must do more than provide re- 
straints against the illegal use of power. It must 
give the people a means of dealing with their day- 
to-day problems, of continually correcting the 
injustices that spring up in human society. A con- 

Ocfober 7, 1 95 J 


stitution that is not adaptable — that prevents the 
government from acting for the general welfare 
of the people — will not long survive. It will be- 
come a mere historical curiosity. 

Ours is not such a constitution. We have dis- 
covered, over the years, that it offers the means for 
correcting present evils without throwing away 
past gains. 

There are always those who oppose necessary 
reforms. Such people often turn to the Constitu- 
tion to justify their position. But our Constitu- 
tion has seldom proved to be a barrier to changes 
which were needed for the welfare of all the peo- 
ple. Our Constitution has not set up an aristoc- 
racy of wealth or privilege. It does not serve the 
privileged few at the expense of the great ma- 
jority of the people. 

The great advances we have made in recent 
years in legislation to improve the condition of 
labor, to bring economic security to the farmer, to 
provide aid for the needy, to develop the resources 
of the country for the benefit of all, to improve 
the health, the education, and the housing of the 
average family — all these advances have been op- 
posed in the name of the Constitution. But it 
never was the purpose of the Constitution to bar 
such advances. On the contrary, the Constitution 
provides the means for carrying into effect the 
fundamental ideas of justice and liberty and hu- 
man progress on which our Government is founded. 

Acting under our Constitution, we have been 
able to solve the problems which have driven 
other countries into revolution. We have been 
able to make necessary reforms without overthrow- 
ing the ancient guarantees of our liberty. Build- 
ing on the experience of the past we have opened 
the way to a brighter future. 

On this occasion, we ought to pray to Almighty 
God that the American people will remain faithful 
to the spirit of the Declaration of Independence 
and the Constitution. We should ask that they be 
ever mindful of the great wisdom and truth that 
are embodied in these two documents, and through 
them, in our form of government. 

The wisdom of our form of government is that 
no men, no matter how good they may appear to be, 
may be entrusted with absolute power. The great 
achievement of our form of government is that it 
has enabled us to meet the changing needs of the 
people while providing a rule of law that restrains 
all men, even the most powerful. The glory of 
our form of government lies in the fact that it has 
held us faithful to the concept that the aims of 
government are human betterment and human 

If the American people remember these things 
and understand them well, this Nation will move 
forward in the future as it has in the past. And 
these documents, which we are today sealing 
against physical decay, will always be remem- 
bered and cherished, finding new life in each new 
generation of Americans. 


Norway Signs Agreement for Mobile 
Hospital in Korea 

Acting Secretary James E. Webb and Charge 
d'Affaires Eigil Nygaard of the Norwegian Em- 
bassy, on September 17, signed an agreement under 
which Norway agrees to pay in dollars for the 
logistical support furnished by the United States 
to the Norwegian mobile surgical hospital par- 
ticipating in the United Nations operations in 

This agreement will be supplemented by tech- 
nical arrangements between the Department of the 
Army and the Norwegian Government covering 
administrative and accounting matters. Pay- 
ments are to be made on a regular basis as vouchers 
are submitted by the United States to the Nor- 
wegian Government. 

The Norwegian mobile surgical hospital is a 
200-bed mobile-hospital unit comprising 15 nurses, 
62 doctors, and enlisted men. Under the com- 
mand of Col. Herman Kamstad of Bergen, Nor- 
way, the hospital unit was intensively trained at 
Osaka, .Japan, before going into the field in July 
19.51. Maj. Gen. Edgar Erskine Hume, surgeon, 
Far East Command, recently said. "The Nor- 
wegian mobile army surgical hospital has assumed 
its place in the over-all medical support of the 
United Nations forces in Korea. They have more 
than proven their worth for their excellent sur- 
gery and medical care. Due to their high profes- 
sional standards and their total unselfish efforts 
the lives of many of our gallant fighting men in 
Korea have been saved." 

The United States has undertaken to provide 
this unit with the materials, facilities, supplies, 
.and services required in Korea which the Nor- 
wegian Government is unable to furnish, either 
because the supplies cannot be procured elsewhere 
or because it is not feasible to establish separate 
lines of supply. This arrangement is similar to 
that made with other U.N. Forces participating in 
the Korean action. 

It has been the practice of the United States to 
reach an understanding in principle, at the time 
arrangements are made for the participation of 
the forces of a U.N. member in Korea, that the 
.United States would be reimbursed for the logisti- 
cal support furnished. Under this procedure, the 
task of working out the details as to reimburse- 
ment is undertaken at a later time and does not 
delay the movement of personnel to Korea. A 
formal agreement similar to the one just signed 
with Norway has already been reached with 
Sweden.' Some of the other participating gov- 
ernments have been making interim payments to 
the United States even though they have not yet 
concluded formal agreements. 

' For text of similar agreement with Sweden see Bul- 
letin of .July 9, I'J.jl, p. 75. For text of the agreement 
with Norway, see Department of State press release no. 
834 of Sept. 17. 

Deparfmenf of State Bulletin 

The United Nations and Greece 


hy Harry N. Howard 

The following article reviews the report of the United Nations 

Special Committee on the Balkans { U.N. doc. A/ 1857) , which, siqned 
at Geneva, Smt3erla7id, 07i August 15., 1951, represents a basic illus- 
tration of the evolution of the Greek question in the United Nations. 
Like those of 19^8, 1949, and 1950, the report of 1951 {a) traces the 
creation, function, and organization of the United Nations Special 
Committee on the Balkans; (&) outlines the conciliatory role of the 
Special Committee and the problem of frontier relations; (c) 
describes the external aid and assistance rendered to the Greek guer- 
rilla movement during the course of the past year; (d) analyzes the 
refugee problem in Greece; and (e) characterises the aggressive, sub- 
versive propaganda directed against the Greek Government. It 
closes with conclusions drawn from the evidence before the Special 
Committee and recommendations to the sixth General Assembly. 

The Greek question, in one form or another, has 
been before the United Nations since January 
194(). and the United Nations Special Committee 
on the Balkans (Unscob) has functioned in Greece 
since November lO-iT.^ In view of the changed 
character of the problems confronting the Special 
Committee, it underwent a reorganization in 1951 
into three ad hoc subcommittees to enable the Com- 
mittee more efficiently to study the evidence con- 
cerning external assistance to the Greek guerrilla 
movement, to interrogate international refugees in 
Greece, and to examine and report on radio propa- 
ganda against Greece emanating particularly 
from the "Free Greece" radio station in Rumania.- 
During the course of 1950-1951 the Special Com- 
mittee, in order to become better acquainted with 
the frontier areas with which it was dealing and 
to obtain first-hand information beyond that pro- 
vided in the reports of its observers, made a num- 
ber of visits to the frontier regions.^ 

The Conciliatory Role of the 
Special Committee 

As in years past, the Si^ecial Committee noted 
that, because of the refusal of the northern neigh- 
bors to cooperate with it, it had not been able to 
fulfill its conciliatory role. Although Yugoslavia 

See footnotes at end of article. 

Ocfofaer J, ]95J 

had no official relations with the Special Com- 
mittee, the report noted with satisfaction 

the improvement in relations between that country 
and Greece throujrh direct negotiations, as revealed 
by the exchange of Ministers (28 November, 1050), 
the signature of a postal agreement on 2 February 
1951, a rail traffic agreement on 12 February 1951, 
an air transport agreemt'nt on Hi March 1^^5l, and 
finally a trade agreement on 10 April 1!I51.' 

It also noted with satisfaction "the continuing 
repatriation, with the cooperation of the Interna- 
tional Ked Cross, of a certain number of Greek 
children and adults." Among other things, the 
Special Committee called attention to "the con- 
tinued improvement in Greek- Yugoslav frontier 
relations" but noted the "non-existence" of rela- 
tions on the Greek-Albanian frontier and a few 
meetings between authorities on the Greek-Bul- 
garian frontier.' It also observed that, despite 
their refusal to cooperate in any way with it, Al- 
bania and Bulgaria persisted in submitting com- 
munications to the United Nations alleging viola- 
tions of their frontiers by the Greek armed forces. 
The report declared: 

These allegations thus fell directly within the terms 
of reference conferred upon the Special Committee by 
the General Assembly. Since the Governments of 
Albania and Bulgaria have consistently refused 
throughout the existence of the Special Committee 


to facilitate action concprning their allegations on 
the part of the Special Committee, the apprepriate 
United Nations body, it is clear that their complaints 
were submitted to the United Nations solely for pur- 
poses of pitliticity. The Greek Government has sub- 
mitted complaints alleging frontier violations on the 
part of the Albanian and Bulgarian armed forces."^ 

The Special Committee had evidence of a num- 
ber oJF relatively minor incidents along both the 
Greek-Biilgariaii and Greek-Albanian frontiers 
although the Greek guerrilla forces had been sub- 
stantially liquidated during tlie course of 1949 
and the character of the problems of the Special 
Committee, of course, had changed basically since 
that year. Nevertheless, a serious clash was 
brought to the attention of the Special Committee 
at the end of May 1951 on the Greek-Bulgarian 
frontier north of Drama when a Greek army fron- 
tier patrol was aml>ushed on Greek territory by 
a Bulgarian patrol. After exhaustive inquiry, 
the Special Committee concluded that the incident 
constituted a clear violation by the Bulgarian 
army of a well-marked frontier, and it seemed 
"impossible to believe that the Bulgarians were 
not aware of the fact that they were on Greek 
territory."^ Although a number of meetings 
were held between Greek and Bulgarian frontier 
authorities with the view to settling various in- 
cidents, none of these meetings achieved any sub- 
stantial results or served to improve frontier 
relations between the two countries. 

During 1950-1951, the Special Committee con- 
tinued to devote attention to problems of frontier 
conventions and frontier markings. It noted the 
"principles for the maintenance of good frontier 
relations," proposed in its report of 1950 and 
reaffirmed in February 1951, and pointed out "that 
the conclusion of frontier conventions was a de- 
sirable means of preventing misunderstanding and 
hostilities" between neighboring States.^ The 
Committee also maintained that clear frontier 
markings were desirable in the same general in- 
terest, some progress in the latter direction having 
been made with regard to the Greek- Yugoslav 
frontier especially although no responses to com- 
munications from the Secretary-General to the 
Governments of Albania and Bulgaria with re- 
spect to this matter were ever received. Indeed 
the Special Committee received no indications that 
the Albanian Government had taken any positive 
steps to improve the situation along the Greek- 
Albanian frontier or shown any desire to cooperate 
with the Greek Government in the repair of 
border markings or the conclusion of new frontier 
conventions. A similar situation obtained with 
respect to Bulgaria.' 

External Aid to the Greek Guerrilla Movement 

Although the situation within Greece had 
changed substantially since the liquidation of the 
guerrilla forces in 1949, the Special Committee 

See footnotea at end of article. 

found ample evidence of external assistance to the 
Greek guerrilla movement. As the report noted : ^^ 

Since August, 1950, the Special Committee has wit- 
nessed a new development in the nature of the ex- 
ternal support afforded to the Greek guerrillas and 
has also seen a change in tactics on the part of the 
Greek guerrilla movement itself. . . . During the past 
12 months the guerrillas have not ventured to un- 
dertake any specifically military operations against 
the Greek army, and the task of the various small and 
scattered groups of Greek guerrillas in Thrace, Mace- 
donia and Epirus, although armed and prepared to 
use their weapons when cornered by the Greek army, 
has been and is, in the main, of a subversive, political 
and propaganda nature. 

Although the methods employed have changed, the 
primary aim of the Greek guerrilla movement remains 
the same: the overthrow of the Greek Government. 
As in the past, this aim has received the close sui)- 
port of Albania and Bulgaria, and the Special Com- 
mittee has noted that the various groups of Greek 
guerrillas have been infiltrated across the Greek- 
Albanian and Greek-Bulgarian frontiers with the 
active assistance of the Albanian and Bulgarian au- 
thorities. Moreover, these groups have been fed, 
lodged, clothed, armed and equipped in Albania and 
particularly in Bulgaria with the connivance of the 
Governments of these two States. 

But it is of particular interest that the Special 
Committee also obtained evidence that States other 
than Albania and Bulgaria, namely, Czechoslo- 
vakia, Hungary, and Poland, had given assistance 
to Greek guerrillas in providing training facilities 
on their territories and later in aiding in their 
return to Greece. This evidence clearly showed 
that "a widespread and carefully coordinated sys- 
tem now exists for selecting, training and eventu- 
ally smuggling armed subversive groups into 
Greece across the Albanian and Bulgariait fron- 
tiers." " The Special Committee declared:^ 

Therefore, the genera! situation is that of a sub- 
versive political drive on the part of the Greek 
guerrilla movement aimed at the overthrow of the 
Greek Government, by specially selected and trained 
groups under the direction of the Greek Communist 
Party against a background of present military 
passivity on the part of the bulk of the former guer- 
rilla army. This drive is being sustained in the first 
instance liy the direct help given by the Albanian and 
Bulgarian authorities and, in the second instance, by 
the facilities afforded in particular by the Czechoslo- 
vak, Hungarian and Polish authorities. 

Viewed as a 'whole this subversive campaign, al- 
though differing from former large-scale guerrilla 
warfare, nevertheless retains certain military aspects 
and pursues the same ends. It reflects a change in 
tactics but not in the strategic objectives. The ex- 
ternal direction and support that it enjoys make it 
evident that such a campaign presents a serious 
threat to Greece because, as long as it continues to be 
organized and reinforced from abroad, it cannot be 
definitely suppressed by the country's security forces. 
Without this assistance from abroad the guerrilla 
groups now operating in the northern frontier areas 
of Greece could neither initiate their work nor con- 
tinue to carry it out. 

Although the report provided some detail on 
Albanian and Bulgarian assistance to Greek guer- 
rilla groups, the evidence concerning assistance by 


Deparfment of Sfa/e Bulletin 

Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania 
was or special interest." For example, it was 
clear that in these countries indoctrination and 
training for sabotage and espionage, not to men- 
tion possible guerrilla action, were given, and 
groups were sent from these countries primarily 
tlirough Runumia to Bulgaria and then into 
Greece. The report stated, for instance, that, al- 
though the Special Committee had no evidence of 
training courses in Rumania, the Committee, 
nevertheless, had received testimony which 
showed that the Rumanian authorities had "facili- 
tated the transit of Greek guerrillas through Rou- 
manian territory, provided accommodation for 
guerrilla groups in Bucharest, and, in general, 
condoned the operation within Roumanian terri- 
tory of the specialized organization for sending 
guerrillas to Greece on subversive missions." " 
It also had evidence of a conference in Rumania 
in October 19.50, at which leaders of the Greek 
Communist Party and representatives of guerrilla 
groups operating in Greece were present. Ru- 
manian authoi'ities appeared to have made ample 
preparations for the travel of guerrilla repi-esent- 
atives from Greece, some witnesses indicating that 
representatives of the Greek guerrilla groups 
"were supplied with new khaki uniforms which 
they took back with them to Greece." " 

The report also indicated that, despite the reso- 
lutions of the General Assembly in 1949 and 19.50, 
the Special Committee had not been able to verify 
the disposition and disarming of Greek guerrillas 
who had fled across the northern Greek frontiers. 
Albania and Bulgaria, not to mention other east- 
ern European countries, "deliberately disregarded 
the recommendations of the General Assembly" 
concerning this matter. No steps were taken "for 
the final disarming and disposition of the Greek 
guerrillas." '" In its analysis of the nature of the 
task of guerrilla forces in Greece, the Special 
Committee pointed out that, since the defeat of 
the guerrilla forces in 1949, bands reentering 
Greece, although armed, have been instructed to 
avoid open clashes with the Greek National Army. 
The Committee stressed : " 

Underground re-orsanization of a Greek guerrilla 
network, the establishment of contacts with sympa- 
thizers, and subversive political agitation designed 
to foment as much discontent as possible, directed 
ultimately, as always, at the overthrow of the Greek 
Government, have now become the primary aims of 
the Greek guerrilla movement. To enable the Greek 
guerrillas sent back to Greece to organize these types 
of subversive activities special training schools 
. . . were established in Czechoslovakia, Hungary 
and Poland. Detailed instructions were given in 
Bulgaria prior to the crossing of the Greek-Bul- 
garian frontier, or upon arrival in Greek territory. 

It was obvious that the "activities of the Greek 
guerrillas in Greece" were "the culmination of 
those carried on through a highly organized net- 
work extending through the greater part of East- 
ern Europe." '* 

See footnotes at end of article. 

The Problem of Refugees in Greece 

As in years past, the Special Committee gave 
considerable attention to the problem of refugees 
in Greece, including international refugees, and 
the repatriation of Greek civilians, members of 
the Greek armed forces, and Greek children. The 
Conunittee found no indication of any willingness 
on the part of any of the states concerned, with 
the exception of Yugoslavia, to comply with the 
recommendations of the General Assembly con- 
cerning these questions.*® 

According to information supplied by the Greek 
Government, by January 31, 1951, there were 
12,146 international refugees in Greece, an in- 
crease of 4,757 since June 1950, an estimate which 
included 11,000 refugees of Greek ethnic origin 
from Rumania and Albania. A majority of the 
refugees was centered in three camps at Lavrion, 
Syros, and Salonika. In the view of the Com- 
mittee, the problem was more difficult for refugees 
of other than Greek ethnic origin, and these refu- 
gees were entering Greece across the Albanian, 
Bulgarian, and Yugoslav frontiers at an average 
rate of 30 a month. 

According to the Greek Government, such refu- 
gees by January 1951, included 50G from Albania, 
286 from Bulgaria, 231 from Yugoslavia, and 23 
from Rumania. The problem of international 
refugees in Greece was essentially of a "political" 
nature, and the committee felt that the extended 
stay of these political refugees was unlikely to 
improve relations between Greece and her northern 
neighbors, despite the fact that political activities 
on the part of these people were forbidden.^" 

The report of the Special Committee also dealt 
with the problem of the Greek civilians who, for 
one reason or another, had gone beyond the north- 
ern frontiers of Greece. The peaceful repatriation 
of all those who desired to return to Greece and 
to live in accordance with the law of the land had 
been recommended by the General Assembly in 
1949. According to the Greek Red Cross, there 
were, by April 1, 1951, 3,1.50 adult Greek civilians, 
as distinct from guerrillas, who might be involved, 
492 of whom were stated to be in Albania, Bul- 
garia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Ru- 
mania, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia. Twelve 
had been lepatriated from Yugoslavia, but no 
information was received from any of the other 
countries as to repatriation.^* 

Neither had any information been received on 
members of the Greek armed forces who had been 
captured in Greece, removed by the Greek guer- 
rillas across the frontiers, and detained in certain 
of (he countries in Ea.stern Europe despite the fact 
that they could not be regarded as prisoners of 
war b-y tlic Slates detaining (hem atul desj)ite (he 
resolution of the General Assembly of 1950 with 
respect to their repatriation. The" Committee re- 
ported that, again with the exception of Yugo- 
slavia, no progress had been made. The Yugoslav 

Ocfofaer I, J 95 1 


authorities, by January 1, 1951, had returned 63 
members of the Greek armed forces who were in 
that country. But no reports were received indi- 
cating the return of these people from any other 
counti-y, and the Albanian and Bulgarian Govern- 
ments appeared completely indifferent. The 
Greek Red Cross, in a report of April 20, 1951, 
claimed that 2,950 members of the Greek armed 
forces had not been repatriated although 146 of 
these had been traced by the International Tracing 
Service or by the Greek Eed Cross. Subsequently, 
on May 31, 1951, the Special Committee learned 
that the General Staff of the Greek Army had 
established a list of 3,295 names. The Special 
Committee felt that it could establish the precise 
number, identification, and location of the missing 
members of the Greek armed forces only with the 
cooperation of the States concerned." 

From the inception of the problem in 1948, the 
Special Committee was much concerned with the 
repatriation of the Greek children removed from 
Greece by the Greek guerrillas to the territories of 
the northern neighbors of Greece although the In- 
ternational Red Cross had a primary responsi- 
bility with regard to this problem. According to 
the 1951 report of the Special Committee, with the 
exception of Yugoslavia, which repatriated a total 
of 289 children between November 25, 1950, and 
May 25, 1951, the other states concerned made no 
progress in repatriating these children.^^ Al- 
though technical difficulties existed, they could be 
"overcome only with the full cooperation of the 
States concerned," and the Special Committee de- 
plored the fact that, with the exception of Yugo- 
slavia, the other States had "not only refused to 
furnish lists of the children in their territories, 
but have also failed to cooperate with the Inter- 
national Red Cross." The Special Committee, 
therefore, voiced "its deep anxiety concerning the 
fate of the missing children." 

In this connection it is interesting to note the 
report of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies trans- 
mitted to the Secretary-General on August 3, 1951, 
which confirms the findings of the Special Com- 
mittee.^^ Among other things, the report of the 
International Red Ci'oss refers to the "highly and . 
exclusively humanitarian character" of the prob- 
lem of the Greek children and to the fact that the 
representatives of certain countries harboring 
these children, through the statements of their 
representatives at the United Nations and else- 
where, had appeared to offer a pledge of good will 
in this matter. The International Red Cross in- 
dicated that it had lists of 9,954 names of children 
claimed by their parents and that the Yugoslav 
Red Cross had identified 289 children who had 
been repatriated but that its efforts in the other 
countries concerned had proved fruitless. None 
of the other Red Cross societies concerned had sent 
the results of any examination of the lists for- 

warded to them although they had "declared their 
willingness to consider them." The Bulgarian, 
Hungarian, and Rumanian Red Cross societies had 
sent no information whatever concerning the re- 
sults of their comparisons of lists, and the Czecho- 
slovakia Red Cross has apparently confined itself 
merely to examining the first lists received. ^^ The 
International Red Cross could hardly believe, 
therefore, that the delay and silence were "due 
exclusively to technical difficulties." The Inter- 
national Red Cross also reported that it had "en- 
countered insurmountable obstacles" in its attempt 
to make direct contact with the Red Cross socie- 
ties in the harboring countries. In spite of all its 
representations, it "found it impossible to date to 
hold conversations with the Hungarian and Ru- 
manian Red Cross societies or to pursue the pre- 
liminary talks begun with the Bulgarian and 
Czechoslovak Red Cross Societies" although the 
original effort had been made in the spring of 
1949 on the basis of a unanimous resolution of the 
General Assembly approved in November 1948. 
By the end of 1949, the International Red Cross 
had found that "all representations to several Red 
Cross societies were fruitless" although an attempt 
was made to hold a meeting with the Red Cross so- 
cieties concerned at Geneva, Switzerland, on March 
9-10, 1950. A further attempt was made on March 
9, 1951, with the Bulgarian, Hungarian, Ruman- 
ian, and Czechoslovak Red Cross societies, but only 
the Rumanian Red Cross replied, and it took no 
further action on the problem. Meanwhile, as 
early as September 12, 1949, the Czechoslovakian 
Red Cross sent a list of 138 Greek children who 
had been identified with the list of repatriation 
requests received from the International Red 
Cross, but nothing further was done about the 
matter, and none of the 138 Greek children iden- 
tified in Czechoslovakia was repatriated. The In- 
ternational Red Cross, in analyzing the difficulties 
arising from the terms of the resolutions of the 
General Assembly, declared 

All the objects which we have encountered may be 
traced to one common cause viz., the total and re- 
grettable absence of constructive cooperation b.v the 
majority of the Red Cross Societies in the harboring 
countries. The unanimous adoption of the General 
Assembly Resolutions, had nevertheless, led us to 
hope for such cooperation. 

Interestingly enough, the International Red Cross 
indicated diat, far from any desire to cooperate, 
certain of the countries in Eastern Europe, in their 
press and radio propaganda, had vehemently at- 
tacked those who were making the effort toward 
repatriation. Thus, the report of the Interna- 
tional Red Cross declared : 

Not only have we received no support in general for 
our efforts, but the few repatriations of Greek chil- 
dren which have been possible have formed the subject 
of numerous criticisms, and even of vehement accusa- 
tions usually coming from persons or groups domiciled 
in the harboring countries. 

See footnotes at end of article. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Aggressive Propaganda Against the Greek 

The report of the Special Committee also under- 
lined the aggressive subversive propaganda cam- 
paign which has been directed against the Greek 
Government from the Soviet satellites during the 
course of the past year as in previous years.^^ It 
pointed out that the primary source of this cam- 
paign was the so-called "Free Greece" radio sta- 
tion, an official organ of the Greek Communist 
Party located at least since 1949 in the vicinity of 
Bucharest. It was significant that the center of 
Cominform propaganda activities was situated at 
Bucharest, and the Special Committee believed the 
Rumanian Government could "scarcely plead ig- 
norance of the existence of the 'Free Greece' radio 
situation on its territory, since its location within 
Roumania was made known in the 1949 and 1950 
reports of the Special Committee." Also note- 
worthy is the fact that official broadcasts of the 
Rumanian and of certain other governments, espe- 
cially those of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia, and Poland, frequently repeated 
the propaganda of the "Free Greece" radio. One 
example of the type of propaganda broadcast over 
the "Free Greece ' radio was the proclamation of 
the Greek Communist Party broadcast on January 
23-24, 1951 : 

Whatever the monarcho-fascists decide to do, and 
whatever they do, they aim at only one thing : war 
and the complete and general annihilation of the 
people of Greece. They want to send us to the 
slaughter like sheep . . . 

If in 1946-49 the Democratic Army of Greece had 
won, our troubles would now be over and we should 
today have been under the warm aegis of the Soviet 
tfnion, exactly the same as the other people's democ- 
racies ; we should have been free to build and rehabili- 
tate our proud and beautiful country. 

The "Free Greece" radio also claimed the 
imminence of a Greek attack on Albania and Bul- 
garia and, therefore, of a Greek threat to the peace 
and security of the Balkan region although the 
Special Committee found "that there was no evi- 
dence of any aggressive designs on the part of the 
Greek Government against Albania or Bulgaria, 
and that the propaganda accusing Greece of such 
aggressive plans was totally unfounded." Another 
activity of the "Free Greece" radio was the broad- 
casting of Greek Communist Party resolutions and 
proclamations and the promotion of insurrection 
in Greece against the con.stitutional government of 
that country. Thus the "Fighters" seminars were 
broadcast regularly for the purpose of providing 
Communist indoctrination and fjiving specific in- 
structions on subversive techniques and tactics to 
be employed. On February 27, for example, a 
"Free Greece" broadcast declared : 

The objective situation is exceptionally favorable for 
a revolutionary movement despite the hard conditions 
for underground work. The Kke are collecting their 
forces in order to pass into the new attack . . . 

Amid the daily struggle for bread, work, freedom and 
peace the KKii's are training and preparing the army 
for the new decisive struggle ahead. 

The Special Committee, after analyzing numer- 
ous broadcasts, considered that "the 'Free Greece' 
radio was employed as a medium for issuing in- 
structions on every phase of subversive activity, 
with the clear intent of encouraging from outside 
Greece, a revolt against the Government of that 
country." The Committee also noted that the 
"Free Greece" radio had "become an instrument 
of a new type of attack on Greece" and that its 
activity constituted "a flagrant violation of the 
principles of international law and of the Charter 
of the United Nations." 

Conclusions and Recommendations of the 
Special Committee 

The conclusions and recommendations of the 
Special Committee do not differ radically from 
those contained in its report of 1950. iVmong otlier 
things, the Special Committee noted the continu- 
ally improved relationship between Greece and 
Yugoslavia although it found no basic change in 
Greek-Albanian or Greek-Bulgarian relations. 
The Committee also emphasized that no interna- 
tional verification had been made of the disarming 
and disposition of Greek guerrillas who had fled 
beyond the northern frontiers of Greece and that 
no effort, except on the part of Yugoslavia, had 
been made to comply with General Assemblj' rec- 
ommendations concerning the repatriation to 
Greece of detained military personnel or of Greek 
civilians. The Special Committee also pointed 
out, again with the exception of Yugoslavia, that 
no goveriunent concerned had made any effort to 
"permit the return to their homes in Greece of 
the children whose repatriation had been re- 
quested." The Committee also took special note 
of the complaints of Albania and Bulgaria con- 
cerning alleged frontier violations on the part of 
Greece and expressed the opinion 
that action should be taken to draw the attention of 
the Governments of Albania and Bulgaria to the 
fact that an appropriate United Nations body, estab- 
lished by the General Assembly, already exists pre- 
ci.sely for the examination and investigation of such 
complaints, and that this investigation can only be 
carried out if those States will cooperate with the 
Special Committee. 

As noted above, the Special Committee con- 
sidered the instructions broadcast by the "Free 
Greece" radio station a "significant" illustration 
of the fact that the leadership of the guerrilla 
movement came from outside Greece. Although 
the guerrilla movement had changed its tactics 
since 1949 and no attempt to resume large-scale 
guerrilla warfare had been made, the Special 
Committee noted that 
in ojienly avowed pursuance of the same ultimate 
aim — the forcible overthrow of the Greek Govern- 

See footnotes at end of article. 

Ocfober I, 7 95 J 


ment — the Greek guerrilla leaders have resorted to 
subversive agitation carried on in the frontier areas 
of northern Greece by small armed groups of spe- 
cially selected and trained guerrillas vphich are un- 
der instructions to effect the underground re-organi- 
zation of the Greek Communist and "Agrarian" par- 
ties, collect intelligence regarding the Greek armed 
forces, foment discontent, incite to insurrection, and 
generally prepare for a future attack to overthrow the 
Greek Government by force. 

The Special Committee also noted its evidence 
concerning the network for the training of guer- 
rillas in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and 
Rumania and tlieir dispatch into Greece. Al- 
though the threat to the independence and in- 
tegrity of Greece had changed in character since 
1949 in view of the "tension" in the Balkans and 
of the "actively, hostile attitude of certain east 
and central European states toward Greece," the 
Special Committee "deemed it inadvisable to rec- 
ommend its own dissolution." -' Based on its ex- 
perience since 1947, the Special Committee felt 
that the "constant vigilance of the United Na- 
tions" with regard to Greece had "been an impor- 
tant element in the maintenance of peace in the 
Balkans." The continuing threat to Greece and 
to peace in the Balkans could be removed only if 
the States concerned would act in their relations 
with Greece in accordance with the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations Charter and the 
recommendations of the General Assembly. 

The Special Committee largely reiterated its 
previous recommendations concerning the Greek 
question ( Chapter VII ) . Among other things, it 
recommended that the General Assembly 

reassert the importance of maintaining peace in the 
Balkans and continue its efforts to eliminate the 
threat to Greece by considering the problem of achiev- 
ing peaceful cooperation between Greece and the 
States from which the threat comes 

and that it appropriately reaffirm its recommen- 
dations concerning assistance to the Greek guer- 
rilla movement, the renewal of diplomatic and 
good-neighborly relations, the establishment of 
frontier conventions, and the repatriation of 
Greek military personnel, adult civilians, and 
children. The Special Committee also recom- 
mended that the General Assembly take note of 
the evidence concerning the existence of a network 
in eastern and central Europe for the training and 
clandestine introduction into Greece of guerrilla 
agents to carry on subversive activities, espionage, 
and sabotage for the purpose of overthrowing the 
Greek Government. It also urged the General 
Assembly to take into account the 

changed but continuing threat to Greece, [and to] 
consider the advisability of maintaining United Na- 
tions vigilance of the Balkans in the light of the 
present nature of the threat to Greece in that area. 

• Mr. Howard, author of the above article, is 
United Nations Adviser for the Bureau of Near 
Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. 



(U.N. doc. A/1857, Chapters VI-VII) 
Chapter VI — Conclusions 

205. Tlie dual functien of conciliation and obsei-vatlon 
with which the Special Committee was charged by the 
General Assembly, and which the latter confirmed by reso- 
lution 382 (V) adopted on 1 December 1950, has always 
remained the Special Committee's constant concern. It 
has continued to observe the compliance or non-compliance 
by the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and 
Greece with the recommendations of the Assembly.^" 

206. Full diplomatic representation between Greece and 
Yugoslavia was restored by an exchange of ministers on 
28 November 1950. The two Governments have continued 
their efforts through diplomatic channels to solve their 
common problems, and progress is being made in the es- 
tablishment of normal relations between the two Govern- 
ments. A series of trade and communications agreements 
have been signed, and the repatriation of Greek children 
and other Greek nationals from Yugoslavia to Greece is 
proceeding. Yugoslavia has cooperated with the interna- 
tional Red Cross organizations and the Swedish Red Cross 
in making possible the progress thus far achieved. The 
children so far repatriated have been reunited promptly 
with their parents. In the light of this improvement in 
the situation the following paragraphs do not concern 
themselves with Greek-Yugoslav relations."'" 

207. Diplomatic and good-neighbourly relations do not 
exist between Albania and Bulgaria, on the one hand, and 
Greece on the other. Whereas the Government of Greece 
has continued to co-operate with the Special Committee 
in the latter's efforts to promote the establishment of such 
relations, the Governments of Albania and Bulgaria have 
persisted in their refusal to recognize it as a legally con- 
stituted body of the United Nations.^™ 

208. In complete disregai-d of repeated General Assem- 
bly recommendations, those States at present accommo- 
dating the large number of Greek guerrillas known to 
have i-etreated into Albania and Bulgaria in 1949 have 
failed to iwrmit any international verification of their 
disarming and disposition, thereby continuing a situation 
which constitutes a potential threat to the political inde- 
pendence and territorial integrity of Greece. Similarly, 
those States detaining Greek military personnel and other 
Greek nationals taken into the territories of the countries 
to the north of Greece as a result of the guerrilla warfare, 
in continued violation of accepted international practice, 
have made no effort to comply with the General Assembly 
recommendations concerning the repatriation either of 
such Greek military personnel, or of those other Greek 
nationals who desire to return to Greece and live in accord- 
ance with the law of the land.^" 

209. In disregard of fundamental humanitarian princi- 
ples, and despite the recommendations of the General 
Assembly in 1948, 1949 and 1950, which sought a solution 
of the problem on a purely humanitarian basis divorced 
entirely from political considerations, the States detain- 
ing the Greek children, with the exception noted above of 
Yugoslavia, have made no effort to permit the return to 
their homes in Greece of the children whose repatriation 
has been requested.^" 

210. The problem of international refugees in Greece 
has undergone further development during the course of 
the past year. In view of the continued movement of 
political and other refugees across the northern fron- 
tiers into Greece, the Special Committee remains of the 
opinion that it would be desirable that these refugees 
should be resettled outside Greece."^ 

211. Although the Governments of Albania and Bul- 

Sec footnotes at end of article. 


Department of State Bulletin 

garia have consistently disregarded the recommendations 
made by the General Assembly with regard to co-operation 
by them with the Special Committee, those two Govern- 
ments have continued to submit to the Secretary-General 
complaints alleging frontier violations. As the submis- 
sion of these complaints implies recognition of the juris- 
diction of the United Nations in the matter, it is the opin- 
ion of the Special Committee that action should he t.^ken 
to draw the attention of the Governments of AUiatiia and 
Bulgaria to the fact that an appropriate United Nations 
body, established by the General Assembly, already exists 
precisely for the examination and investigation of such 
complaints, and that this investigation can only be car- 
ried out if those States will co-operate with the Special 

212. The "Free Greece" radio station of the Greek 
guerrilla movement has continued to operate from Ro- 
manian territory, transmitting instriictions to the so-called 
"fighters" of this movement. The similarity between, on 
the one hand, the instructions given to guerrilla groups 
introduced clandestinely into Greece, as revealed by in- 
terrogation of members of these groups and, on the other 
hand, the instructions broadcast by the "Free Greece" 
station, affords a significant illustration of the fact that 
the leadership of the guerrilla movement comes from 
outside Greece."' 

213. Furthermore, "Free Greece" broadcasts, accusing 
Greece of aggressive intentions towards Albania and Bul- 
garia, have been echoed by the Government-controlled 
propaganda emanating from certain East and Central 
European States. The presence of the Special Committee 
in Greece and the facts which it was able to establish on 
the spot made it possible for the Committee to affirm the 
groundliness of these alarmist allegations and to ensure 
that they were assessed by world opinion at their true 

214. Since the forced retreat of the guerrilla formations 
across the northern frontiers of Greece In 1949, the Greek 
guerrilla movement has changed its tactics and has not 
attempted to resume large-scale guerrilla warfare. In 
openly avowed pursuance of the same ultimate aim — the 
forcible overthrow of the Greek Government — the Greek 
guerrilla leaders have resorted to subversive agitation 
carried on in the frontier areas of northern Greece by 
small armed groups of si>ecially selected and trained guer- 
rillas which are under instructions to effect the under- 
ground re-organization of the Greek Communist and 
"Agrarian" parties, collect intelligence regarding the 
Greek armed forces, foment discontent, incite to insurrec- 
tion and generally prepare for a future attack to over- 
throw the Greek Government by force.^'° 

215. The Special Committee has obtained a considerable 
amount of evidence showing not only that aid to the 
Greek guerrilla movement has continued to come from 
Albania and Bulgaria, but also that it is now afforded 
in varying forms b.v other Central and East European 
States, in defiance of the General Assembly's injunction 
to Albania and Bulgaria to cease rendering any support 
to the Greek guerrillas, and its recommendation to all 
States to refrain from any action designed to assist any 
armed group fi.irhting against Greece.'"' 

216. There has been ample evidence to show that such 
guerrilla groups have been trained along parallel lines 
at special schools for Greek guerrillas in Poland, Czecho- 
slovakia and Hungary for their subversive work in Greece. 
By means of a widespread and highly organized network 
extending from these three countries through Romania 
to Bulgaria, they are infiltrated secretly into Greece. The 
groups are instructed, equipi>ed, and frequently also 
armed, in Bulgaria and then aided by the Bulgarian au- 
thorities to cross, and in some later to re-cross, the 
Greek-Bulgarian frontier. There has also been at least 
one characteristic instance of a similar group from Eastern 
Europe returning to Greece through Albania with the as- 

sistance of the Albanian authorities. Without such as- 
sistance from abroad the guerrilla groups now operating 
in the northern frontier areas of Greece could neither 
initiate their work nor continue to carry it out.'" 

217. The threat to the political independence and ter- 
ritorial integrity of Greece has thus changed in chai'acter 
since the retreat from Greece of the guerrilla forces in 
1949. During the past year, this change has resulted in 
tension in the Balkans, by reason of the actively liostile 
attitude of certain East and Central European States 
towards Greece. Thus, the Special Committee has deemed 
it inadvisable to recommend its own dissolution. 

218. It is the considered opinion of the Special Com- 
mittee, based on its experience since 1947, that the con- 
stant vigilance of the United Nations with respect to the 
political indeitendence and territorial integrity of Greece 
has been an important element In the maintenance of 
peace in the Balkans. Hnwever, the situation depicted 
in the foregoing paragraphs constitutes a continuing threat 
to Greece and to peace in the Balkans, which can only be 
removed if the States concerned will act in their relations 
with Greece in accordance with the and Prin- 
ciples of the United Nations Charter and the recommen- 
dations of the General Assembly. 

Chapter VII — Recommendations 

219. In the light of the evidence before it, and of the 
conclusions it 1ms drawn therefrom, and reserving its 
right to submit either suiiplementary or revised recom- 
mendations prior to tlie convening of the .sixth session of 
the General Assembly if deemed advisable or necessary: 

7'he Special Committee recommendu: 

1. That the General Assembly re-assert the Importance 
of maintaining peace in the Balkans, continue its efforts 
to eliminate the threat to Greece by considering ways and 
means of achieving peaceful co-operation between Greece 
and the States from which this threat comes, and to that 
end re-affirm its recommendations to the appropriate 
States as to 

— the cessation of all assistance or support to the Greek 
guerrilla movement in its activities against Greece; 

— the renewal of diplomatic and good-neighbourly 
relations ; 

— the renewal, revision or establishment of frontier 
conventions ; 

— the disarming and di.sposition of Greek giterrillas ; 

— the provision of no arms and materials of war either 
directly or indirectly to Albania and Bulgaria until 
it has been determined that the unlawful assistance 
of these States to the Greek guerrillas has ceased ; 

— the repatriation of (Jreek military personnel, Greek 
children and other Greek nationals; 

— the co-operation of the States concerned with the ap- 
propriate United Nations body, particularly as re- 
gards the prompt and impartial investigation of their 
complaints and allegations. 

2. That the General Assembly take note of the evidence 
concerning the existence in Eastern and Central Europe of 
a network for the training and clandestine re-introduction 
into Greece of Greek guerrilla agents for the purpose of 
conducting subversive activities, espionage, sabotage, 
propaganda and underground reorganization of the Greek 
guerrilla movement in Greece in preparaticm for an at- 
tempt to overthrow the Greek Government by force. 

3. That the General Assembly take into account the 
changed hut contiiming threat to Greece within the con- 
text of the hostile attitude towards Greece of a number of 
Eastern and Central Eurojiean States, particularly Bul- 
garia, and the consequent tension in the Balkans. 

4. That the General As.sembly consider the advisability 
of maintaining United Nations vigilance over the Balkans 
in the light of the present nature of the threat to peace in 
that area. 

See footnotes at end of article. 

Ocfofaer I, 1 95 1 

96S081— 51 




September IG Unscob signed a supplementary report to the Fourth Session of the General Assembly 

(U.N. doc. A/981). 

September 28-29, October 18- 

November 3 Discussion of the Greek Question in Political and Security Committee of the 

General Assembly. 

September 29 On initiative of Australia, First Committee of General Assembly established a second 

Conciliation Committee, composed of President of General Assembly, Secretary- 
General, Chairman, and Vice-Chairman of First Committee, to explore possibilities 
of reaching pacific settlement between Greece and northern neighbors (U.N. doc. 

October 5 Joint report by International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red 

Cross Societies addressed to the Secretary-General of the U.N. on repatriation of 
Greek Children (U.N. doc. A/1014). 

October 14 The Greek Government accepted the proposals of the Conciliation Committee as to 

territorial integrity and independence based on U.N. Charter and as to establishment 
of Mixed Frontier Commissions, suggesting neutral Chairmen. Similarly, on October 
17, Yugoslavia substantially accepted suggestions. Albania and Bulgaria did not 
(U.N. doc. A/C.1/506). 

October 18 The Conciliation Committee reported that, after holding 29 meetings, it was unable 

to develop a basis of conciliation on which agreement could be reached between 
Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Greece (U.N. doc. A/C.1/503). 

October 22 The Conciliation Committee reported lack of success in resolving issues, which were 

clarified, if not narrowed. Greece and Yugoslavia accepted tentative suggestions for 
draft agreements set forth by Committee on October 14. Albania and Bulgaria did 
not. As result of work, "agreement" in principle reached that (1) diplomatic rela- 
tions be established between Greece, on the one hand, and Albania an<l Bulgaria, 
on the other; (2) frontier conventions for settlements of frontier incidents be 
renewed, revised or established; and (3) mixed frontier commissions be established 
(U.N. doc. A/C.1/506). 

November 18 The General Assembly, by vote of 50-6-2, approved continuation of Unscob (Res. 

288 (IV) A) and imanimously approved resolution on repatriation of Greek children 
(Res. 288 (IV) B). 

December 10 President Romulo stated in General Assembly that, in light of conversations of Con- 
ciliation Committee with representatives of Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and 
Greece, prospects for peace were encouraging and he was confident of progress "if 
all parties abide in good faitli by resolutions of the General Assembly and the 
provisions of the Charter." He also thought that the fact that tliere had been no 
executions in Greece since enactment of leniency legislation was happy augury that 
"attitudes of humanitarianism and tolerance, compatible with security and puldic 
order," could not "but help to facilitate the work of conciliation wliich nmst even- 
tually take place among the States involved in this problem." (U.N., 4th Sess., 
G. A., Officiai Records, Plenary Meetings, p. 276. ) 

December 22 In communication to Unscoh, repeated to Secretary-General on January 2, 1950, 

Greek Government announced readiness: (1) to make renewed endeavors to settle 
all differences with Yugoslavia; (2) to re-establish good-neighborly relations with 
Albania and Bulgaria; and (3) to renew previously operative conventions with 
northern neighbors or to conclude new ones (U.N. docs. A/AC.10/8S7, 902, 903; 
A/1307, pars. 32-33). 


February 21 Unscob asked Secretary-General to remind governments of Poland and U.S.S.R. that 

seats continued to be held open for them (U.N. doc. A/1307, par. 17; A/AC.16/923). 
Letters of Secretary-General despatched on March 6, but no replies ever received 
(U.N. doc. A/AC.16/1016). 

March 5-13 Unscob made tour of frontier area of Greece, visiting Drama, Komotinia, Salonika, 

Fiorina, and other places (U.N. doc. A/AC.16/949/Rev. 1). 

March 18 Albanian Government, in communication to Secretary-General, reiterated views as 

to Unscob, denounced Unscob reports, charged Greece with hostility and with fron- 
tier provocations (U.N. doc. A/AC.16/9'J5). Albania ready for peaceful settlement 
of differences provided Greece renounced "territorial aspirations." 

April 8 Bulgarian Government charged failure to restore normal relations resulted solely 

from Greek refusal to recognize frontiers between Greece and Albania as final, and 
charged Greece with numerous frontier incidents (U.N. doc. A/ AC. 16/982). 

April 13, 24 Greek Government estimated that 1,713 members of Greek armed forces, captured by 

guerrillas, were in territories of northern neighbors of Greece (U.N. doc. A/AC.16/ 

April 27 Marshal Tito stated there was possibility of improving relations between Yugoslavia 

and Greece, indicating Yugoslavia would send new envoy to Greece (U.N. doc. 
A/AC.16/Monitor 37, 38). 

' For a similar chronology for the period 1946-1949, see H. N. Howard, Greece and the United Nations, 19Jf6~1949, 
Department of State publication 3645, pp. 28-31. 

538 Department of State Bulletin 

1950 — Continued 

April 29 Premier Plastiras stated Greek desire for normal relations with Yugoslavia, indi- 
cating Greece would appoint new Minister to Yugoslavia (U.N. doc. A/1307, pur. 45). 

May 21 Greece and Yugoslavia agreed to exchange of Ministers ( U.N. doc. A/AC.16/Monitor 

37, 38). 

June 2-13 Unscob made frontier visit in northern Greece along Albanian-Greek and Bulgarian- 
Greek frontiers (U.N. doc. A/AC.16/1056). 

June 20 Unscob re(iuested tlie Secretar.v-General to draw the attention of the governments 

concerned to the detention of tlie soldiers of the Greek National Army, captured by 
the Greek guerrillas and taken into tlie countries to the nortli of Greece (U.N. doc. 
A/1307, pars. 182-lSG; A/AC.16/1035). 

July 18 Unscob advised U.N. Secretary-General that Cominform country charges of aggres- 
sive intentions on part of Greek Government were "entirely devoid of truth" 
(U.N. doc. A/AC.lG/1049). 

July 31 Unscob signed report at Geneva, Switzerland, calling attention to altered character 

in threat to Greece and recommending continued vigilance (U.N. doc. A/1307). 

September 11-15 Unscob made third visit to frontier area at Konitsa, Kastoria, and Koniotini (U.N. 

doc. A/AC.16/\V.12S). 

September 19 The SecretaiT-General communicated with Yugoslav Delegation concerning detained 

Greek military personnel, requesting it to see what could be done about problem 
(U.N. doc. A/AC.l 6/1086 and annex I). 

October 9 Unscob special report on situation on Greek-Albanian frontier circulated to memljers 

of General Assembly, dated September S (U.N. doc. A/1423). 

November 28 Full diplomatic relations between Greece and Yugoslavia were restored with ex- 
change of Ministers. 

December 1 Tlie General Assembly approved three resolutions in Greek case: (1) Kepatriation 

of Greek military personnel, by vote of 53-6-1 ; (2) continuation of Unscob, by vote 
of 53-6-0; (3) repatriation of Greek children, by vote of 50-0-5 (lies. 382 (V), 
A, B, C). 


January 23 The Greek Communist Party stated in proclamation : "If In 1946-49 the Democratic 

Army of Greece had won, our troubles would now be over and we should today have 
been under the warm aegis of the Soviet Union, exactly the same as the other people's 
democracies. . . ." (U.N. doc. A/AC.lO/Monitor/SO). 

February 2 Greece and Yugoslavia signed an agreement for the reestablishment of postal, 

telephonic, and telegraphic communications. 

February 12 Greece and Yugoslavia signed an agreement for the reestablishment of railway 

service, to be effective on February 15, 1951. 

October 12 Unscob sent materials to Secretary-General for information of General Assembly on 

problem of Evros Island (U.N. doc. A/1438 and Add. 1). 

November 3 Submission of Report of International Committee of Ked Cross and League of Red 

Cross Societies (September 18, 19.50) and Report of Secretary-General on question 
of repatriation of Greek children to General Assembly in which failure to achieve 
suljstantial results is noted (U.N. doc. A/1480). 

November 10-14 Discussion of Greek case in the Political and Security Committee at Fifth Session 

of General Assembly. 

November 24 Fifty-five members of Greek National Army repatriated from Yugoslavia : .52 on 

November 7 and 3 on November 24. Greek Red Cross indicated that 2,9.50 remained 
to be repatriated from various Balkan countries, only 146 of whom identified liy 
April 1, 19.51 (U.N. doc. A/AC.16/SR.230/Add. 1, A/AC.16/1128, 1148). Subsequently 
211 were identified (U.N. doc. A/AC.16/1251) . 

November 25 The President of the Greek Red Cross reported to the President of the International 

Red Cross on the transfer of 21 Greek children at Termanya Banya, Yugoslavia 
(U.N. doc. A/AC.16/IXF.2.5/Rev. 1). 

February 27 Unscob approved a program of activities for year 1951, based on observational and 

conciliatory functions, in accordance with terms of reference (U.N. doc. 

March 15 Greece and Yugoslavia signed agreement for the restoration of air communications. 

March 20 In communication to Secretary-General, U.nscob indicated desire for cooperation of 

Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. Secretary-General transmitted communication 
on April 4 (U.N. docs. A/AC.16/1172, 1186, 120.5, 1217). Similar comiiiunications. 
same dates, sent with respect to Soviet and Polish participation in work of Special 
Committee (U.N. doc. A/AC.16/1187, 1203). 

April 11-13 Unscob visited Albanian-Greek frontier area in neighborhood of Kastoria and ex- 
pressed conviction that there was "no evidence of any aggressive designs against 
Albania on the part of the Greek Government and the propaganda emanating from 
foreign radio and press sources accusing Greece of hatching aggressive plans was 
totally unfounded" (U.N. doc. A/AC.16/1241). 

April 17 On visit to Athens, Secretary-General Tryg^•e Lie met with Unscob. 

May 5 Delegation of U.S.S.R. to U.N. returned U.N. Secretariat communication of April 18. 

together with Unscob communication of March 20 as to par. 10 of Res. 3^8 (IV) 
as to the repatriation of detained Greek nationals, noting that it contained "slan- 
derous and entirely unfounded statements" (U.N. doc. A/AC.16/1697, 1244). 

May 7-11 Unscob visited Greek-Bulgarian frontier area, finding there was no basis "whatso- 
ever for the Cominform propaganda allegations that (]!reece has aggressive designs" 
(U.N. doc. A/AC.16/1236). 

October I, I95I 539 

1951 — Continued 

May 24 214 Greek children were returned to Greece from Yugoslavia (A/AC.16/1252). 

May 27 According to Unscob Bulgarian Army clearly violated Greek territory over well- 
marked frontier, one Greek soldier being killed and another wounded. It was 
impossible "to believe that the Bulgarians were not aware of the fact that they were 
on Greek territory" (U.N. doc. A/AC.16/0/G-B/76/Sl/Conels ) . 

June 15 Commenting on Soviet communication of May 22, 1951, to President of General 

Assembly, Unscou noted that in case of 21 children repatriated on 25 November 1950, 
54 repatriated on March 14, 1951 and 214 repatriated on May 24, from Yugoslavia, 
representatives of International Ked Cross had stated that "the children were 
promptly re-united with their parents in Greece" (U.N. doc. A/AC.lfi/1245, 1252). 

August 3 The International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies 

transmitted memorandum to U.N. Secretary-General indicating that, with exception 
of Yugoslavia, it had had no success in repatriation of Greek children. In view of 
lack of cooperation, it was impossible to hold conversations or meetings with satellite 
Red Cross societies, obstacles encountered being "insurmountable," delays and 
silence not being due "exclusively lo technical difticulties" (U.N. doc. A/1848). 

August 15 Unscob signed its report to Sixth General Assembly, which was officially released on 

September 16, 1951. Among other things, report noted its view that "the constant 
vigilance of the United Nations with respect to the iwlitical independence and terri- 
torial integrity of Greece" had "been an important element in the maintenance of 
peace in tlie Balkans," indicating that the threat could be removed only "if the 
States concerned" would "act in their relations with Greece in accoidauee with the 
purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter and the recommendations of the General 
Assembly" (U.N. doc. A/1S57). 


' For previous Unscob reports see especially U.N. docs. 
A/574, C44, 692, 935, 981, 1307. See also H. N. Howard, 
"The Greek Question in the Fifth Session of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations," Bulletin of Feb. 26, 
1951, p. 333. 

= .U.N. doc. A/1S57, pars. 19-21. 

'Hid., pars. 22-24. 

* Ibid., par. 30. Typical of past and current Cominform 
propaganda against Unscob was the broadcast fiom 
Tirana, Albania, on Sept. 5, 1951, which included an article 
from Zeri I Popullit on "Unscob, War Agency," which 
stated that the 1951 Unscob report was "full of lies 
about Albania and Bulgaria," that Unscob "has acted as 
an instrument of provocation, espionage, and war in the 
Balkans in the service of the State Department," that 
the United Nations "must reject these lying reports, fab- 
ricated by an illegal body created by the Anglo-US 
majority to conceal its belligerent activities," and '"must 
dissolve this commission designed to light new fires in 
this part of the world." 

'Ihid., par. 64. 

'Ibid., par. 32. As early as Mar. 17, 1948, the Albanian 
Government itself declared that its communications to 
the Secretary-General were "presented solely for the in- 
formation of the Secretary-General of the U.N. and of 
public opinion," not for examination by Unscob or any 
other U.N. body (U.N. doc. A/574, par. 118). For de- 
tailed calendar of alleged incidents on Greek-Albanian 
and Greek-Bulgarian frontiers, August 1950-June 1951. 
see U.N. doc. A/AC.16/1261. 

' U.N. doc. A/1857, pars. 48-49. 

' U.N. doc. A/1307, annex IV ; A/1857, par. 65. See also 
U.N. doc. A/CN.4/48, report of the International Law 
Commission covering its 3d session. May 16-July 27, 1951, 
chap. III. 

° U.N. doc. A/1857, pars. 66-70A. 

"Ibid., par. 71-72. 

" Ibid., par. 74. 

"Ibid., pars. 75-76. 

" Ibid., pars. 11.3-134. 

"Ibid., par. 130. 

"■Ibid., par. 131. 

" Ibid., pars. 142-147. 

"Ibid., par. 148. 

" fbid., pars. 148-1.52. 

" Ibid., ch. IV. pars. 153-165. 

"Ibid., pars. 153-164. For more detailed study see U.X. 
doc. A/AC.16/1227. 

" U.N. doc. A/1857, pars. 165-169. 

" Ibid., pars. 170-174. 

'■'Ibid., pars. 175-183. 


" U.N. doc. A/1848. 

" Curiously enough, however, the Soviet representative 
to the United Nations, Yakov Malik, on Aug. 22, 1951, was 
able to furnish an evidently verified list of S3 names fur- 
nished by "Greek emigrants residing in Czechoslovakia," 
who sought the "repatriation" of their children from Yugo- 
slavia to Czechoslovakia 'U.N. doc. A/1S71). See also 
U.N. doc. A/1876 for Greek comment. 

"U.N. doc. A/1S57, pars. 184-204. 

"See also the White Book on Aggressive Activities by 
the Govcrnmrut.'< of the USSR, Poland, Czeclioslot'nkin, 
Ilungaru. Riniiaiiid. Itiih/nriii and Albania Toward Yiigo- 
stavia (Belgrade, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Fed- 
eral People's Republic of Yugoslavia, in.">l), and the Yugo- 
slav complaint against Albania, on Sept. 11, 1951 (U.N. 
doc. A/1875), for other aspects of Balkan tension. 

•" See chapter II, pars. 25-30. 

•" See chapter II. par. 30 ; chapter IV, pars. 175-183. 

™ See chapter II, pars. 2.5-30. 

™ See chapter III, pars. 142-147; chapter IV, pars. 

'■'"■ See chapter IV, pars. 175-183. 

•" See chapter IV, pars. 155-164. 

"' See chapter V, pars. 184-203. 

-■ Ibid. 

--" See chapter III, pars. 71-152. 

"" Ibid. 

-' Ibid. 


For background on the Greek case, see especially: 
Harry N. Howard, The United Nations and the 
Problem of Greece, Department of State publication 
2909; The General Asseniblij and tin- Problem of 
Greece, Department of State publication 2986, Bul- 
letin Supplement of December 7. 1947 ; "The Prob- 
lem of Greece in the Third Session of the General 
Assembly," Documents and State I'aprrs. January 
1949, Department of State publication 3438; Greece 
and the United Nations, ID^S-lO-'iO, Department of 
State publication 3645; The Greet: Question in the 
Fourth General Assemblii of the United Nationjt, 
Department of State publication 3785 ; Report of 
VNSCOB to the General Asscmblii: .4 Summary 
Account, Bulletin of September 4, 19.50 ; "The Greek 
Question in the Fifth Session of tiie General As- 
sembly of the United Nations." Bclletin of Febru- 
ary 26, 1951, pages 333-348. 

Department of State Bulletin 

Documents Relating to Henry A. Wallace's Visit in China, 1944 

[Released to the press hy the White House September 23] 


Sepi'embeu 22, 1951 

Dear Mr. Vice President : 

I am sending you a copy of a letter, together 
with certain documents, which I recently received 
from Mr. Henry A. Wallace. 

These papers deal with the facts of Mr. Wal- 
lace's trip to the Far East in 1944, and the part 
played by his advisers on that trip. These papers 
deal with certain matters which may be of interest 
to the Senate and its Committees. I am therefore 
making Mr. Wallace's letter available to you for 
use in such ways as you deem appropriate. 

Very sincerely yours, 

Harry S. Truman 


Farvue, South Salem, New York. 

September 19, 1951. 

During the last three weeks there has been con- 
siderable newspaper and radio controversy as to 
what part John Carter Vincent and Owen Latti- 
more played in my trip to the Far East in 1914. 
This controversy arose from certain testimony be- 
fore the Senate Committee on Internal Security 
during August. Therefore I have decided to 
make available to you for what disposition you 
care to make of it the complete file of my reports 
to President Roosevelt on my Far Eastern trip in 
1944. Parts of these reports were at one time 
looked on as secret but with the situation as it 
is today there is no reason why these reports should 
not be made available to the public. I shall, of 
course, take no steps to publish this letter myself 
but I wish you to feel completely free to handle it 
in any way which you deem will best minister to 
the welfare of the United States. 

The following comments as well as the docu- 
ments themselves should clear up any confusion 
as to what I was trying to do in China. The part 

of various individuals in my trip will also be made 
more clear. In March of 1944 I wrote Secretary 
Hull asking him to designate someone to accom- 
pany me on the projected trip and the State De- 
partment named John Carter Vincent, then Chief 
of the Division of Chinese Affairs. The OWI sent 
Owen Lattimore to handle publicity matters in 
China. I ])assed through Soviet Asia on my way 
to China but Cliina wjiere the situation was criti- 
cal, formed the sole subject of my reconmiendations 
to President Roosevelt. These recommendations 
were contained in two related documents: 

First, a message drafted in Kunming, China on 
June 26, 1944, but whicli because of difficulties of 
communication from Kunming, was cabled to the 
President from New Delhi on June 28, 1944. Tliis 
was divided into two parts, the first part being a 
quick resume of the political situation in China 
and of my talks in the days innnediately preceding 
with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek; and the sec- 
ond part, a resume of the military situation, its 
implications and requirements. 

Second, a formal report to President Roosevelt 
covering whole trip, including also certain longer 
term proposals about American jiolicy in China 
which I presented in person at the Wliite House 
on July 10, 1944. 

These were the only documents originated by me 
and contained all recommendations of mine re- 
sulting from the trip. Mr. Vincent, of course, 
transmitted to the State Department the detailed, 
reportorial accoiuit of my conversations with the 
Generalissimo whirli liave already been published 
in the State Depart nient "NAHiite Paper. 

There has been testimony before the Senate In- 
ternal Security Connnittee that Messrs. Vincent 
and Lattimore wei'e members of the Conununist 
Part}' at that time and were relied on by the party 
leadership to "guide"' me along the party line. 
Hence it is important to sjiecify the parts tluit 
these two men took in the recommendations that I 
presented to President Roosevelt. As to Mr. Lat- 
timore, he had no part whatever. He did not con- 
tribute to and to the best of my knowledge knew 
nothing about either the cable from New Delhi or 

Ocfober I, ?95J 


the formal report to the President delivered in 
"Washinjrton. He offered me no political advice at 
any time Hufficiently Hignificant to be recalled now, 
and when we were together, he talked chiefly about 
scholarly subjects of common interest such as the 
history of Chinese agriculture and the relation- 
ship of the nomadic tribes with the settled peas- 

Mr. Vincent as the designated representative of 
the State Department was naturally consulted by 
me when we were travelling together. Aside from 
serving as reporter at the meetings with Chiang 
Kai-shek, his most important part was his assist- 
ance in the preparation of the two-part cable sent 
from New Delhi. In Kunminj?, the knowledge I 
had already gained in Chungkfng of the urgency 
of the Chinese situation, and of the grave dangers 
of the Japanese offensive then going on in East 
China was heavily underlined by General C. L. 
ChennauJt's presentation to me of the current mili- 
tary pic-ture. In the light of this presentation and 
in responwi to Chiang Kai-shek's request made of 
me on June 24 I decided to cable President Roose- 
velt on June 20. Mr. Vincent joined in the advance 
discussions of the projected cable, was present 
while it was drafted and concurred in the result. 
The finished cable was, of course, mine but I was 
disturbed by the fact that I was making far-reach- 
ing recommendations without having had an op- 
portunity to fonsult the Theater Commander, Gen- 
eral Joseph Stilwell. My recommendations were 
80 drastic that Vincent would certainly have urged 
that I get in touch with General Stilwell if he 
(Vincent) had had oVjjections. Instead Vincent 
concurred in the cables of June 28. 

On the otlxrr hand, as both Mr. Vincent and 
Secretary of State D(!an Acheson have stated, Mr. 
Vincent took no part in the preparation of my 
formal repo;t to Presid(!nt Roosevelt on July 10 
and U) the best of my knowledge was not aware 
of its cont(!nts. I wrote tlie July 10 report myself 
and went alone to tlie While House to present it 
to the Presidi^nt. In rloing tlie work of writing 
I made use of various ni(!moranda which had 
accumulated during the journey, some no doubt 
from Vincent. However, the strong(!st influence 
on me in prcitariiig this final report of July 10 
was my recollect if)ii of tin; analyses offered me by 
our then Ambassador to (!liina, Clarence E. Gauss, 
who later occupied one of the Republican places 
on the Exf)oi t-Imi)ort Bank Board. 

With regard to the two-part Kunming-New 
Delhi cable of June 28, it should be said that the 
military recommendations contained therein were 
the most impoH.ant contribul ion I made while in 
C^hiiia. These reconuucndations were that China 
he. KejHiral.rd from (he command of General Stil- 
well, that General Wedemeycr should be consid- 
ered ill the (;hoice of a new military commander 
in China, and that (he new conunander should 
bo given the additional assignment of '■'■PevHonal 


reprefserdative" of the President at Chungking. 
The name and record of General Wedemeyer are 
enough to indicate that the purport of these rec- 
ommendations was the opposite of pro-communist. 

Some months later the change of military com- 
mand I proposed to the President was carried out 
at the most urgent plea of Chiang Kai-shek. His- 
tory suggests that if my recommendations had 
been followed when made, the Generalissimo 
would have avoided the disasters resulting from 
the Japanese offensive in East China later that 
summer. And if Chiang's government had thus 
been spared the terrible enfeeblement resulting 
from these disasters, the chances are good the 
Generalissimo would have been ruling China to- 

The political section of the Kunming-New Delhi 
cable of June 28 should be read with the atmos- 

Ehere of that time in mind. Much emphasis had 
een placed from the very beginning of the war 
on the primary importance of "beating the Japs", 
and by the spring of 1944 even the most conserva- 
tive American publications were urging that the 
Chinese communists could contribute substanti- 
ally to this end. Roosevelt talked to me before 
I left, not about political coalition in China, but 
about "getting the two groups together to fight 
the war". Chiang Kai-shek for internal political 
reasons had, on his own initiative so I was in- 
formed, opened talks between the Nationalists 
and the Communists but, so he told me, with no 
prospect for success. When I cabled the President 
that "the attitude of Chiang Kai-shek towards the 
problem is so imbued with prejudice that I can 
see little prospect for satisfactory long term set- 
tlement" I was referring not to "political coali- 
tion" but to this "military problem" of "getting 
the two groups together to fight the war." On the 
other hand, when I said that the "disintegration of 
the Chungking regime will leave in China a politi- 
cal vacuum which will be filled in ways which you 
will understand", I was, of course, warning 
against the possibility of a Communist political 
triumph in China. 

The July 10 report does not recommend any 
political coalition between the government of 
Chiang Kii-shek and the Chinese communists. It 
was written, however, against a Chinese political 
background which is still quite unknown to most 
Americans. In brief, one of the worst of several 
ills from which the Chungking government was 
suffering at the time, was the absolute control of 
all positions of political, military and economic 
power by an extreme pro-Asian, anti-American 
group within the Kuomintang. This was much 
cmphiusized by Ambassador Gauss who plainly 
stated that this group in Chungking was doing the 
Chinese connnunists' work foi- them. The more 
Western-minded, more eflicient and more pro- 
American Chinese Nationalist leaders had been so 
completely driven from power that Dr. T. V. 

Department of State Bu//ef/n 

Soong's appearance as interpreter at mv talks with 
the Generalissimo was authoritativelT reported to 
be his first emergence fiom a sort of informal 
house arrest, while the most highly praised of the 
Chinese Generals. General Chen Cheng, now Prime 
Minister in Formosa, had been dismissed from all 
conmiand some months before. These facts are 
hinted at in mv report to Roosevelt on July 10 in 
which it is noted as "significant" that "T. V. Soong 
took no part in the discussions (with the Grener- 
alissimol except as interpreter", while General 
Chen Cheng is mentioned along with Generals 
Chang Fa-kwei and Pai Chung-hsi as the sort of 
men who might rally the Chinese armies to greater 

In this concluding section of this final report 
to President Roosevelt on July 10. a coalition is in 
fact suggested but not with the Communists. In- 
stead President Roosevelt is urged to use Amer- 
ican political influence to "support" the "progres- 
sive banking and commercial leaders." the "large 
groups of western trained men'^. and the "con- 
siderable group of generals and other officers who 
are neither sul^rvient to the landlords nor afraid 
of the peasantry." In short I urged President 
Roosevelt to help the Generalissimo s government 
to help itself, by bringing back to power the bet- 
ter men in the Chinese Nationalist ranks. These 
better and more enlightened Nationalists, being 
more able to stand on their own feet, were some- 
what more independent of the Generalissimo than 
the extreme pro- Asia groups. Hence it was neces- 
sary to point out to President Roosevelt that if 
the desired changes were made in the Chinese Na- 
tionalist government, the Greneralissimo's future 
woidd depend on his "political sensitivity", and his 
ability to make himself the real leader of the re- 
constituted administration. Internal reform at 
Chtmgkinff was. in short, my proposed means of 
avoiding the "revolution" and insuring the "'evcv- 
lution" that are referred to earlier in this report of 
July 10. It is worth noting that the Generalissimo 
must have been thinking along parallel lines, since 
the extremists began to lose their control and Dr. 
Soong and General Chen Cheng were brought 
back to power by the Generalissimo himself dur- 
ing the same month that I rendered my report to 
President Roosevelt. 

Such were the reconunendations. such was the 
direction of the influence of my trip to the Far 
East in the spring of 1944. During the years im- 
mediately following the end of the war my think- 
ing about Chinese problems underwent a sharp 
change. My views during this later period are 
known as are now my views in ItiM-t. Recent events 
have led me to the conclusion that my judgment 
in 1^44 was the sound judgment. I append here- 
with a copy of the two-part Kunming-New Delhi 
cable of June 2S in the War Department para- 
phrase given to me when I returned to Washington 
and of the final report to President Roosevelt of 
July 10 as presented by me to him. 


JcxT 10, 1&44 

Our first stop in China was at Tihua (Urumchi) , 
capital of Sinkiang province. The Governor, 
General Sheng Shih-tsai. is a typical warlord. 
The Government is personal and carried out by 
thorough police surveillance. Ninety percent 
(90fc) of the population is non-Chinese, mostly 
Uighur (Turki). Tension between Chinese and 
non-Chinese is growing with little or no evidence 
of ability to deal effectively with the problem. 
General Sheng. two years ago pro-Soviet, is now 
anti-Soviet, making life extremely difficult for the 
Soviet Consul General and Sovirt citizens in 

There seems little reason to doubt that the diffi- 
culties in the early spring on the Sinkiang-Outer- 
Mongolia border were caused by Chinese attempts 
to resettle Kazak nomads who fled into Outer-Mon- 
golia, were followed by Chinese troops who were 
driven back by Mongols. The Soviet ilinister in 
Outer-Mongolia stated that Mongolian planes 
bomoed points in Sinkiang in retaliation for Chi- 
nese bombings in Outer- Mongolia. He did not 
appear concerned regarding the siniation now. 

Soviet officials placed primary responsibOitv mi 
General Sheng for their difficulties in Sinkiang 
but our Consul at Tihua and our Embassy officials 
felt that Sheng was acting as a front for Chung- 
king, willingly or unwittingly. Sinkiang is an 
area which wlU bear close watching. 

Due to bad weather at Chtmgking. we stopped 
for two hours at the large 2'Xh Bomber Command 
I B— 29 ) airfield near Chengtu. The first bombing 
of Japan had taken place only a few days before. 
We foimd morale good bat complaint was freely 
made of inability to obtain intelligence regarding 
weather and Japanese positions in north China 
and leak of intelligence to the Japanese. 

Summary of conversations with President 
Chiang Kai-shek is contained in a separate memo- 
randum. Principal topics diseased were: (1) 
Adverse military situation which Chiang attrib- 
uted to low morale due to economic difficulties and 
to failure to start an all-out Btmna offensive in 
the spring as promised at Cairo: (2» Relations 
with the Soviet Union and need for their better- 
ment in order to avoid po6sibilitT of conflict 
I Chiang, obviously motivated by necessity rather 
than conviction, admitted the desirabilitT of un- 
derstanding with USSR, and requested our good 
offices in arranging for conference) : (Z) Chinese 
Govemment-Cc«nmtmist relations, in regard to 
which Chiang showed himaelf so prejudiced 
against the communists that time a ct aae d littlt» 
prospect of satisfactory or endming settlement 
as a result of the negodatioDS now under war in 

' Tnjoaained kr Mr. Wallaee to PreaMeat iraowLn-U •■ 
Jxiij 10.1944. 

Ocfober I, 1 951 


Chungking; (4) Dispatch of the United States 
Army Intelligence Group to north China, includ- 
ing "Communist areas, to which Chiang was 
initially opposed but on last day agreed reluc- 
tantly but with apparent sincerity; (5) Need for 
reform in China, particularly agrarian reform, to 
which Chiang agreed without much indication of 
personal interest. 

It was significant that T. V. Soong took no part 
in the discussions except as an interpreter. How- 
ever, in subsequent conversations during visits 
outside of Chungking he was cjuite outspoken, 
saying that it was essential that something "dra- 
matic" be done to save the situation in China, that 
it was "five minutes to midnight" for the Chung- 
king government. Without being specific he spoke 
of need for greatlv increased United States Army 
air activity in China and for reformation of 
Chungking government. He said that Chiang was 
bewildered and that there were already signs of 
disintegration of his authority. ( Soong is greatly 
embittered by the treatment received from Chiang 
during the past half year.) 

Conversations with Ambassador Gauss and 
other Americans indicated discouragement re- 
garding the situation and need for positive Ameri- 
can leadership in China. 

Mr. AVallace and Mr. Vincent called on Dr. Sun 
Fo and Madame Sun Yat-sen. Dr. Sun had little 
to contribute. He was obviously on guard. 
Madame Sun was outspoken. She described un- 
democratic conditions to which she ascribed lack 
of popular sui^port for government ; said that Dr. 
Sun Fo should be spokesman for liberals who 
could unite under his leadership ; and advised Mr. 
Wallace to speak frankly to President Chiang who 
was not informed of conditions in China. Madame 
Sun's depth and sincerity of feeling is more ini- 
pressive than her political acumen but she is sig- 
nificant as an inspiration to Chinese liberals. Dr. 
Sun Fo does not impress one as having strength of 
character required for leadership but the fact that 
he is the son of Sun Yat-sen makes him a potential 
front for liberals. 

Mr. Vincent talked with Dr. Quo Tai-chi, for- 
mer Foreign Minister and for many years Ambas- 
sador in London, and to K. P. Chen, leading 
banker. They see little hope in Chiang's leader- 
ship. Dr. Quo sjKjke in support of Sun Fo under 
whom he thought a liberal coalition was possible. 
Quo is an intelligent but not a strong character. 
K. P. Chen said that economic situation had re- 
solved itself into a race against time; that new 
hope and help before the end of the year might 
be effective in holding things together. 

Conversations with other Chinese officials in 
Chungking develoi)ed little of new interest. The 
Minister of Agriculture (Shen Hung-lieh, who in- 
cidentally knows little about agriculture) showed 
himself an outspoken anti-communist. General 
Ho Ying-chin, Chief of Staff and Minister of War, 
also an anti-communist, is influential as a political 

rather than a military general. Dr. Chen Li-fu, 
Minister of Education, a leading reactionary party 
politician, also had little to say. Ironically, he 
took Mr. Wallace to visit the Chinese Industrial 
Cooperatives which he is endeavoring to bring 
under his control to prevent their becoming a 
liberalizing social influence. 

Conversations with provincial government offi- 
cials were also without much significance. As an 
indication of political trends, there were uncon- 
firmed reports that the provincial officials in 
Yunnan, Kwangsi, and Kwangtung provinces 
were i^lanning a coalition to meet the situation in 
the event of disintegration of central government 
control. In Szechuan province the Governor, 
Chang Chun, is a strong and loyal friend of Presi- 
dent Chiang. The loyalty of military factions, 
however, is uncertain. In Kansu province the 
Governor, Ku Cheng-lun, is a mild appearing re- 
actionarj' who, during his days as Police Com- 
missioner in Nanking, earned the title of "bloody 

Developments subsequent to conversations with 
Generals Chennault and Vincent in Kunming and 
Kweilin have confirmed their pessimism with re- 
gard to the military situation in east China. 
There was almost uniform agreement among our 
military officers that unification of the American 
military effort in China, and better coordination of 
our effort with that of the Chinese, was absolutely 
essential. It was also the general belief that, the 
Japanese having during recent months made 
China an active theatre of war, it was highly ad- 
visable to take more aggressive air action against 
such Japanese bases as Hankow, Canton, Naiiking 
and Shanghai. However, the factor of loss of 
Chinese life at those places was recognized as an 
important consideration. It was the consensus 
that Chinese troops, when well fed, well ecjuipped, 
and well led, can be effectively used. A number of 
Chinese generals were mentioned as potentially 
good leaders. Among them were (Jenerals Chen 
Cheng, Chang Fa-kwei and Pai Chunghsi. 

In Outer-Mongolia there is considerable evi- 
dence of healthy progress, military preparedness, 
and nationalistic spirit. Soviet influence is with- 
out doubt strong but political and administrative 
control appear to be in the hands of capable Mon- 
gols. Any thought of resumption of effective 
Chinese sovereignty would be unrealistic. On the 
contrary, it is well to anticipate considerable agita- 
tion in Inner-Mongolia for miion with Outer- 
Mongolia after the war. 

Specific conclusions and recommendations i-e- 
garding the situation in China were incorporated 
in telegrams dispatched from New Delhi on June 
28 (copies attached). 

We should bear constantly in mind that the 
Chinese, a non-fighting people, have resisted the 
Japanese for seven years. Economic hardship 
and uninspiring leadership have induced some- 
thing akin to physical and spiritual anemia. 


Department of State Bulletin 

There is wide-spread popiilur dislike for tlie Kuo- 
miiitang o:overiiment. But there is also strong 
popular dislike for the Japanese and confidence 
in victory. 

Chiang, a man with an oriental military mind, 
sees his authority threatened by economic deterio- 
ration, which he does not understand, and by 
social unrest symbolized in Communism, which he 
thoroughly distnists; and neither of which he 
can control by military commands. He hoped 
that aid from foreign allies would pull him out 
of the liole into which an unenlightened adminis- 
tration (supported by landlords, warlords and 
bankers) has sunk him and China. 

Chiang is thoroughly "eastern" in thought and 
outlook. He is surrounded by a group of party 
stalwarts who are similar in character. He has 
also, reluctantly, placed confidence in westernized 
Chinese advisere (his wife and T. V. Soong are 
outstanding examples) with regard to foreign re- 
lations. Now he feels that foreign allies have 
failed him and seeks in that and the "communist 
menace" a scapegoat for his government's failure. 
His hatred of Chinese connnunists and distrust 
of the USSR cause him to shy away from liberals. 
The failure of foreign aid has caused him to turn 
away from liis uncongenial "western" advisers 
and draw closer to the group of "eastern" ad- 
visers for whom he has a natural affinity and for 
whonr he has been for years more a focal point 
and activating agent of policy than an actual 

At this time, there seems to be no alternative 
to support of Chiang. There is no Chinese leader 
or group now apparent of sufficient strength to 
take over the government. We can, however, 
while supporting Chiang, influence him in every 
possible way to adopt policies with the guidance 
of progressive Chinese which will inspire popular 
support and instill new vitality into China's war 
effort. At the same time, our attitude should be 
flexible enough to permit utilization of any other 
leader or group that might come forward offering 
greater promise. 

Chiang, at best, is a short-term investment. It 
is not believed that he has the intelligence or 
political strength to run post-war China. The 
leaders of post-war China will be brought forward 
liy evolution or revolution, and it now seems more 
likely the latter. 

Possible Policy Line Relative to Liieral Elements 
In China 

Our policy at the present time should not be 
limited to support of Chiang. It is essential to 
remember that we have in fact not simply been 
supporting Chiang, but a coalition, headed by 
Chiang and supported by the landlords, the war- 
lord group most closely associated with the land- 
lords, and the Kung group of bankers. 

We can, as an alternative, support those ele- 
ments which are capable of forming a new coali- 

tion, better able to carry the war to a conclusion 
and better qualified for the post-war needs of 
China. Such a coalition could niclude progressive 
banking and connnercial leaders, of the K. P. 
Chen type, with a competent understanding both 
of their own country and of the contemporary 
Western world ; the large group of western-trained 
men whose outlook is not limited to perpetuation 
of the old, landlord-dominated rural society of 
China ; and the considerable grouj) of generals and 
other officers who are neither subservient to the 
landlords nor afraid of the peasantry. 

The emergence of such a coalition could be aided 
by tlie manner of allotting both American military 
aid and economic aid, and by the formulation and 
statenient of American political aims and sym- 
pathies, both in China and in regions adiacent to 

The future of Chiang would then be determined 
by Chiang himself. If he retains the political 
sensitivity and the ability to call the turn which 
originally brouglit him to power, he will swing 
over to the new coalition and head it. If not, the 
new coalition will in the natural course of events 
produce its own leader. 


Message No. 1. 

The discussions between the representative of 
the Chinese Comnumists and those of the Chinese 
Government are taking place in Chungking but 
tlie attitude of Chiang Kai-shek toward the prob- 
lem is so imbued with prejudice that I can see 
little prospect for satisfactory long-term settle- 
ment. Chiang has assured me that only "politi- 
cal'' measures will be used to reach a settlement. 

Chiang expressed a desire for an improvement 
in relations witli Russia and for our assistance in 
bringing about a meeting of representatives of 
China and Russia. I emphasized to him the im- 
portance of reaching an under.standing with 

The economic, political and militai-y situations 
in China are extremely discouraging. The morale 
of tlie Chinese is low and demoralization is a pos- 
sibility with resulting disintegration of central 
authority. With regard to the economic situa- 
tion, there is little that we can do, and tlie Chinese 
appear incapable of coping with it. However, a 
general collapse does not seem innninent. Insta- 
bility and tenseness characterize tlie political sit- 
uation with a rising lack of confidence in the 
Generalissimo and the present reactionary lead- 
ership of the Kuomintang. With regard' to the 
military situation, I can only sav that it might be 
worse. It is critical in Hunan Province. Poten- 
tialities and plans are in existence for stiffening 

' Drafted at Kunmiii? on June 26, 1944, and dispatched 
from New Dellii about June 28. 

Ocfober 7, ?95I 


China's defense south of the city of Hengyang but 
there is a serious threat that east China may be 
severed from contact with west China. Morale 
in remaining free China would of course be af- 
fected by such a development. 

Prior to the receipt of your message of June 23 
on the subject of a U. S. Army observer group pro- 
ceeding to north China to obtain military intelli- 
gence, Chiang had informed me of his agreement 
to the dispatch of the group as soon as it could be 
organized. After receipt of your telegram I again 
discussed the matter in detail with Chiang. Gen- 
eral Ferris, Chief of Staff in charge of General 
Stilwell's Headquarters at Chungking, was present 
and we obtained what should prove to be the full 
cooperation of Chiang in arranging for the early 
dispatch and effective operation of the group. 

Chiang Kai-shek seems to be unsure regarding 
the political situation; bewildered regarding the 
economic situation, and, while expressing confi- 
dence in his army, distressed regarding military 
developments. Current military reverses are at- 
tributed by him to low morale caused by economic 
difficulties. He is convinced that a general offen- 
sive in Burma early this year would have bolstered 
the Chinese will to resistance and have prevented 
military reverses. He has assured me that the 
Chinese will continue to resist to the limit of their 
ability but he displays discouragement rather 
than optimism. 

Our need is vital for a more vigorous and better 
coordinated United States Government represen- 
tation in China. In its military and related po- 
litical aspects our effort in China requires more 
positive direction and closer cooperation with the 
Chinese if this area is to be an effective basis of 
operations against the Japanese. 

Message No. 2. 

There is a strong probability that east China 
will be severed from west China in the near future. 
It is the general opinion that such a development 
can only be pi-evented by unforeseeable chance. 
There are various estimates with regard to the 
rapidity with which the Japanese may be able 
to carry out their intentions. Although the time 
factor may be longer than most people seem to 
expect, I feel that we should be prepared to see 
all of east China in Japanese hands within three 
or four weeks. 

The loss of east China will nullify our military 
effort in this area. It will also prove a violent 
political and economic shock to the Chungking 

China may be rendered almost valueless as an 
Allied military base unless determined steps are 
taken to halt the disintegrative process. Popular 
and military morale, both seriously impaired al- 
ready, must somehow be strengthened. A new 
offensive effort must somehow be organized, pri- 
marily guerrilla in character probably. 

It is necessary also to consider political factors. 


Disintegration of the Chungking regime will leave 
in China a political vacuum which will be filled in 
ways which you will understand. 

The foregoing picture has been drawn on the 
basis of the best available information to show you 
how serious is the situation. However, the situa- 
tion is far from hopeless and may actually be 
turned to both military and political advantage 
if the right steps are taken promptly. The Gen- 
eralissimo is alarmed, anxious for guidance, and, 
I believe, prepared to make drastic changes if 
wisely approached. Insecurity has undermined 
vested interests in the Government. It should be 
possible to induce Chiang to establish at least the 
semblance of a united front necessary to the res- 
storation of Chinese morale and to proceed there- 
after to organize a new offensive effort. 

As I took leave of Chiang, he requested me to 
ask you to appoint a personal representative to 
serve as lia,ison between you and him. Carton de 
Wiart occupies somewhat the same position be- 
tween Churchill and Chiang. In my opinion a 
move of this kind is strongly indicated by the 
politico-military situation. 

An American General officer of the highest cali- 
ber, in whom political and military authority will 
be at least temporarily united, is needed. It ap- 
pears that operations in Burma make it impossible 
for General Stilwell to maintain close contact with 
Chiang. Furthermore, Chiang informed me that 
Stilwell does not enjoy his confidence because of 
his alleged inability to grasp overall political con- 
siderations. I do not think any officer in China is 
qualified to undertake the assignment. Chennault 
enjoys the Generalissimo's full confidence but he 
should not be removed from his present military 
position. The assignment should go to a man 
who can (1) establish himself in Chiang's confi- 
dence to a degree that the latter will accept his 
advice in regard to political as well as military ac- 
tions ; (2) command all American forces in China ; 
and (3) bring about full coordination between 
Chinese and American military efforts. It is essen- 
tial that he command American forces in China 
because without this his efforts will have no sub- 
stance. He may even be Stilwell's deputy in China 
with a right to deal directly with the White House 
on political questions or China may be separated 
from General Stilwell's present command. 

Without the appointment of such a representa- 
tive you may expect the situation here to drift 
continuously from bad to worse. I believe a rep- 
resentative should be appointed and reach Chung- 
king before east China is finally lost so that he 
can assume control of the situation before it de- 
generates too far. 

While I do not feel competent to propose an 
officer for the job, the name of General Wedemeyer 
has been recommended to me and I am told that 
during his visit here he made himself persona 
grata to Chiang. 

Depattmeni of Sfafe Bu//ef/n 

I realize that my opinions are based on a very 
short stay and tliat the number of people who 
could be consulted has necessarily been limited. 
In particular, I regret not having been able to see 

General Stihvell and get his views. Nevertheless, 
I am convinced of the need for the decisive action 
summarized in the final paragraph of my previous 

Iranian Oil Problem Reviewed 

[Released to the press September 19] 

Ambassador W. Averell Harrim-an, special as- 
' sistant to the President, today authorized the pub- 
lication of his exchange of 7nessages tuith Prime 
Minister Mohammad Mosadeq of Iran. These 
documents are being released to the press at Tehran 
by the Iranian Government. 


September 12, 1951 
The Saheb Gharanieh Conference which came 
into existence as a result of Your Excellency's en- 
deavours and good will and in which the Iranian 
Government and people had lodged their complete 
faith unfortunately did not produce the desirable 
results. Subsequent to this His Excellency Mr. 
Stokes - and Your Excellency left Iran on August 
22 and 24 respectively, and the negotiations were 
declared to be suspended in spite of the fact that 
in my last meeting with Mr. Stokes I gave him 
in writing the viewpoints of the Imperial Iranian 
Government and His Excellency promised to give 
due consideration to the same and inform me about 
his views from London. While the Iranian Gov- 
ernment expected that the negotiations would be 
started on the basis of the viewpoints submitted to 
him unfortunately we have been kept in suspense 
up to the present. It is even said that they are 
expecting new proposals from us in London. This 
state of suspense which has lasted has become in- 

Since Your Excellency representing His Ex- 

' On May IS, the United States expressed deep concern 
over the dispute between tlie Iranian and British Govern- 
ments over Iranian oil. In the course of correspondence 
with the Prime Minister of Iran. President Truman sug- 
gested in his message of .July 8 that his special assistant, 
AV. Averell Harriman. act as a mediator in the oil negotia- 
tions. Upon the acknowledgment of the President's sug- 
gestion by Prime Minister Mosadeq on July 11, Ambassa- 
dor Harriman left Washington for Iran on July 1."! to begin 
negotiations. For further information concerning the 
Iranian oil situation see the Bulletin of May 28, 1951, 
p. 851 ; June 4, 1951, p. 891 ; July 9, 1951, p. 72, 73 ; July 23, 
1951, p. 129; September 3, 1951, p. 382. 

' Richard Stokes is Lord Privy Seal and head of the 
British delegation at the Iranian oil discussions. 

cellency, the President of the United States of 
America, has arranged the negotiations between 
Iran on the one hand and the British Government 
representing the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Com- 
pany on the other, and on your departure from 
Tehran and later in London and Washington has 
kindly proposed your voluntary cooperation, 
hence the Iranian Government ventures to offer 
the present proposals through Your Excellency 
witii a re(|uest of their inunediate transmission to 
tlie Britisli Government as the representative of 
the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company : 

Firstly, as Your Excellency is well aware the 
main point of difference which had appeared dur- 
ing the last days of negotiations concerned itself 
with the management of the National Oil Com- 
pany of Iran. Mr. Stokes suggested that either 
an operating agency or a British General Director 
should have charge of the management of the oil 
industry in the south of Iran. While the Iranian 
Government coidd not give its accord to such a 
proposal because according to the formula which 
had been submitted by Your Excellency to the 
British Government and both the Iranian and the 
Bi-itish (lovernments had agreed with the same 
it was ol)vious that all the exploiation, extraction 
and ex])loitation activities should be in the hands 
of the Iranian Government, and to accept any pro- 
jiosal contrary to the said formula wouhl be 
looked upon as submission to a revival of the 
former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company under a new 

The Iranian Government does not deny the fact 
of its need in a foreign technical staff and also 
the fact that such technical men need to have suffi- 
cient autonomy and liberty of action which would 
be conducive to the best management of the in- 
dustry. The former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 
was divided to various departments having at the 
head of each department foreign experts with 
necessary and proper liberty of action. The 
Iranian Government has in mind to keep the same 
organization insofar as it does not contradict the 
terms of the Nationalization Law and to employ 
the managers and the responsibles of technical 
sections in the National Oil Company with the 

Ocfober 7, 7957 


same amount of authority which they have en- 
joyed previously. Furthermore, in order to keep 
pace M-ith the technical advance of the modern 
world in the line of oil technology the Imperial 
Iranian Government is prepared to take advantage 
of the expert knowledge of foreign technicians 
from neutral countries and to provide in the or- 
ganization law of the National Company the 
existence of a mixed executive board composed of 
such experts and the Iranian specialists who would 
jointly manage the administrative and technical 
affairs of the National Oil Company of Iran. 

Secondly, while it has been repeatedly stated 
that the Iranian Government has never intended 
and is not intending to confiscate the properties 
of the former company yet it proposes the follow- 
ing three methods for an equitable settlement of 
the just claims of the former Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company with due regard to the claims of the 
Imperial Iranian Government: 

(A) The determination and the amount of com- 
pensation to be based on the quoted value of the 
shares of the former company at the prevailing 
quotations prior to the passage of the Oil Nation- 
alization Law. 

(B) The rules and regulations relative to na- 
tionalization in general which have been followed 
in democratic countries to be regarded as a basis 
for the determination and the amount of com- 

( C ) Or any other method which may be adopted 
by mutual consent of the two parties. 

Thirdly, with reference to the sale of oil as we 
have been informed Britain has been using about 
10 million tons of Iranian oil per year for its in- 
ternal consumption, the Iranian Government de- 
clares its readiness to sell this amount of oil for a 
period agreed upon by mutual consent of both 
parties every year at the prevailing international 
prices on the basis of the f.o.b. value in Iranian 

Fourthly, one of the proposals of His Excellency, 
Mr. Stokes, was the transport of Iranian oil by a 
company which he proposed. It must be said that 
we can agree to deliver the fixed amount of oil 
which is sold to Gi'eat Britain to any company or 
transport agency of their designation. The afore- 
said points are to be regarded as a basis for starting 
new negotiations and the Iranian Government 
hopes that eventually an agi'eement may be 

The Iranian Government and people can no 
longer tolerate this state of suspension because on 
the one hand there are a great number of British 
experts in Abadan who are prevented by the former 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to be employed by the 
National Oil Company of Iran and the Iranian 
Government therefore with all its good intentions 
and expectations to arrive at a mutually satis- 
factory conclusion has so far abstained from em- 
ploying experts from other countries. On the 


other hand so long as the existing differences have 
not been removed and certain employees of the 
former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company cause new 
agitation everyday and create misunderstandings 
in the relations between the two governments of 
Great Britain and Iran, it is quite obvious that 
other countries will not be i-eady to send their 
experts to Iran and enter into transactions for the 
purchase of oil with us. It must be pointed out 
that as a result of this confused state of affairs and 
the derangements in the economic and financial 
affairs of the country in addition to the enormous 
maintenance costs of the oil industry imposed on 
our budget, we cannot endure such a situation for 
a long time and the Iranian Government because 
of its great responsibility deems it necessary to 
bring to a close this period of uncertainty. Hence 
if in the lapse of 15 days from the date at which 
this present proposal is submitted to the British 
Government no satisfactory conclusion is achieved, 
the Imi^erial Iranian Government regi-ets to state 
its compulsion to cancel the residence permits held 
by the British Staff and experts now residing in 
the southern oil fields. 


September 15, 1951 

Your Excellency's message of September 12 has 
been communicated to me by the Iranian Ambas- 
sador. I share your regret that the discussions 
between the Iranian Government and the British 
delegation under Lord Privy Seal Stokes did not 
culminate in an agi-eement upon a settlement of 
the oil controversy. I know that the continued 
interruption to the production and shipment of 
Iranian oil imposes a very considerable hardship 
upon the economy of Iran as it does upon the 
economy of Great Britain. The United States 
and the entire free world looked anxiously upon 
these discussions in the hope that some solution 
could be found which would satisfy the legitimate 
interests of both i^arties. 

I assure Your Excellency that I continue to 
stand ready to assist in any way that I can in 
finding a just solution. In my efforts thus far I 
have endeavored to be frank and objective in the 
advice that I have given to the Iranian Govern- 
ment, as well as to the British Government. It is 
in this objective and friendly spirit, and in an 
effort to be helpful to you in arriving at a settle- 
ment, that I should like to comment upon the 
substance of your communication. 

With reference to the proposals in general, I 
should say at the outset that they appear to be 
the same as proposals made by the Iranian Govern- 
ment during the course of the negotiations in 
Tehran, which the British Mission did not accept 
since they did not conform to practical and com- 
mercial aspects of the international oil industry. 
In some respects the proposals in fact represent 

Department of State Bulletin 

a retrogression from the positions taken during 
the discussions. 

Your Excellency has suggested that the various 
departments of the xVnglo-Iranian Oil Company 
be retained, insofar as this does not conflict with 
the terms of the Nationalization Law, and that 
the managers and other responsible personnel of 
the technical sections be employed in the National 
Oil Company of Iran with the same authority 
which they enjoyed previously. You have also 
stated that the Iranian Government is prepared 
to create a mixed executive board composed of 
Iranian and neutral foreign technicians who 
would jointly manage the administrative and tech- 
nical atfairs of the National Oil Company of Iran. 

In discussing this possibility during the negotia- 
tions in Tehran, I endeavored to point out to the 
Iranian representatives the impracticability of 
attempting to operate a large and complex in- 
dustry on the basis of a number of section heads 
reporting to a board of directors, with no single 
individual being given executive authority. I 
believe that no organization can operate eifec- 
tively in this manner and I understood Mr. Stokes' 
position in Tehran to be that the British would 
not consider it workable. Moreover, I have 
pointed out that effective operations, particularly 
of a refinei-y of the size and complexity of that in 
Abadan, i-equire the employment of an integrated 
organization rather than the employment of in- 
dividual foreign specialists. Competent techni- 
cians would not themselves consent to employ- 
ment except under conditions satisfactory to them. 
Such conditions would include assurance that the 
industry was under capable management and 
operated in a manner which would assure safety 
and efficiency. 

Your Excellency has expressed concern that the 
arrangements for the operation of the oil industry 
must take into account the requirements of the 
Nationalization Law. I am convinced that ar- 
rangements are possible which would meet this 
objective and at the same time would assure that 
the oil industry is conducted on an efficient basis. 
During our visit in Tehran Mr. Levy and I dis- 
cussed with Iranian officials arrangements under 
which a competent organization could be em- 
ployed to operate under the control of the National 
Oil Company of Iran. Such arrangements are a 
common business practice throughout the world. 

Your Excellency has reiterated that the Iranian 
Government has not intended and does not intend 
to confiscate the property of the Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company and has suggested methods for the 
determination of the amount of compensation. 

While I have no comments upon your sugges- 
tions for determining the value of the assets, it is 
obvious that payment of compensation must de- 
pend upon and will be affected by arrangements 
for the efficient operation of the oil industry to 
assure that the products continue to be made avail- 
able for sale to world markets. As I have pointed 

out to Your Excellency, in the view of the United 
States Government the seizure by any government 
of foreign-owned assets without either prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation or alternative 
ariaiigt'inents satisfactory to the former owners is, 
regardless of the intent, confiscation rather than 
nationalization. There must be more than a 
willingness to pay; there must be the ability to do 
so in an effective form. I believe, however, that if 
arrangements for the sale of oil are made with the 
British interests the compensation problem could 
be worked out satisfactorily and that the net oil 
income accruing to Iran could be as large as that 
of any other oil-]iroducing country under com- 
jiarable circumstances. 

Your Excellency has stated that the Iranian 
Government is ])rcparod to sell to the British ten 
million tons of oil per year, this quantity re]:)re- 
senting an estimate of Iranian oil previously used 
in Great Britain. It is specified that sales would 
be at prevailing international prices on the basis 
of the f.o.b. value at Iranian ports. It is also 
stated that this oil would be delivered to any com- 
pany or transport agency designated by the 

As I pointed out to Your Excellency in Tehran, 
in order to be assured of continuous sales of sub- 
stantLal quantities of its oil in world markets Iran 
must make arrangements with customers that can 
make available large transportation and distribu- 
tion facilities for marketing it on a world-w'ide 
basis. Potential customers would not make such 
arrangements unless they could obtain Iranian oil 
on a basis as favorable as that on which they could 
buy or develop oil in other producing countries. 
This, of course, is a practical business considera- 
tion. It is also true that only those who have 
developed markets for Iranian oil are in a posi- 
tion to commit themselves for its purchase in the 
large quantities produced. 

The ]iroduction of Iranian oil before the pres- 
ent controversy arose amounted to some 30 million 
tons per year. The major portion of this produc- 
tion was handled by British concerns and affiliates 
which have developed markets for it throughout 
the world. Only they have the great transporta- 
tion facilities needed to carry the oil from Iran to 
its markets, where only they have the necessary 
distribution facilities for it. Arrangements, in- 
cluding financial terms, for the sale of only that 
portion of the oil which previously went to Great 
Britain would leave the problem of shipping to 
and distribution in other jiarts of the world un- 
.solved, and would force the British interests to 
develop other sources of supply. 

During the negotiations in Tehran the Iranian 
Government indicated its willingness to consider 
a long-term contract for the sale of Iranian oil to 
an organization acting on behalf of former pur- 
chasers of the products. Lender this suggestion, 
that portion of the industry's output which was 
not covered by this contract could be sold directly 

October 1, J 95 J 


by the National Oil Company of Iran to its own 
customers. Your Excellency's present suggestion 
would indicate that there has been a change in this 

Your Excellency, in pointing out that the sus- 
pension of negotiations with the British and the 
shutdown of the Iranian oil industry have cre- 
ated a serious situation in Iran, has stated that if 
a satisfactory conclusion is not achieved within 15 
days from the date on which your proposal is sub- 
mitted to the British Government the Iranian 
Government intends to cancel the residence per- 
mits held by the British staff and experts now re- 
siding in the southern oilfields. 

As I have pointed out to Your Excellency, the 
proposals which you have set forth in your com- 
munication do not represent an advance from the 
positions taken in the discussions in Tehran and 
in some respects appear to be the opposite. I be- 
lieve that the problem with which Iran and Great 
Britain are confronted can be settled only by nego- 
tiations based upon recognition of the practical 
business and technical aspects of the oil industry 
and based upon mutual good will between the 
parties. Such a settlement, which would attain 
Iranian aspirations for control of the oil industry 
within Iran, is, I am convinced, possible and 
feasible in accordance with the discussions we have 
had in Tehran and the comments I have made. 
However, I consider that my passing your com- 
munication to the British Government would 
militate against a settlement, particularly in view 
of the position taken regarding the expulsion of 
the British employees in southern Iran, a position 
which I believe will only further aggravate an 
already serious situation. 

As a sincere friend of Iran, I earnestly hope 
that Your Excellency will reconsider the points 
set forth in your communication and that a basis 
can be developed under which negotiations can 
soon be resumed. I want to tell Your Excellency 
how much I appreciate your communicating with 
me on this matter. As stated earlier, I am anxious 
to be as helpful as circumstances permit, but for 
the reasons I have set forth I regret that it is not 
possible for me to meet your request in this par- 
ticular instance. 

Trade Concessions on Bulgarian 
Imports Suspended 

[Released to the press September IT] 

The President today notified the Department of 
the Treasury that after the close of business on 
October 17, lO.'il, U.S. concessions, made in trade 
agreements, will be suspended with regard to im- 
ports from Bulgaria. The action was taken in 
accordance with section 5 of the Trade Agree- 
ments Extension Act of 1951 which provides, in 

part, that "As soon as practicable, the President 
shall take such action as is necessary to suspend, 
withdraw, or prevent the application of any re- 
duction in any rate of duty, or binding of any 
existing customs or excise treatment, or other con- 
cession contained in any trade agreement ... to 
imports from any nation or area dominated or 
controlled by the foreign government or foreign 
organization controlling the world Communist 

A provisional commercial agreement concluded 
between the United States and the Bulgarian Gov- 
ernment on August 18, 1932, provided for most- 
favored-nation tariff treatment in their trade. 
This agreement was subject to termination under 
its own terms, on 3-months' notice by either party. 
Notice by the United States of its intention to 
terminate the agreement was transmitted to the 
Bulgarian Government, through the Swiss Gov- 
ernment, on July 12, 1951. The notice was trans- 
mitted through the Swiss Government by reason 
of the fact that the United States and Bulgaria 
had suspended diplomatic relations in February 
1950. The provisional agreement will terminate 
on October 12. Announcement of the giving of 
this notice was made on July 6.^ 

On August 1 the President signed a proclama- 
tion ordering the suspension of trade-agreement 
concessions from Communist-dominated countries. 
Because, however, the United States on that date 
had international commitments with several such 
countries, which were not consistent with the with- 
drawal of concessions from them, the proclama- 
tion stated that the Treasury would be notified, 
from time to time, of the countries from whose 
goods the concessions should be suspended. On 
the same date the President notified the Treasury 
of the suspension, as of August 31, of trade-agree- 
ment concessions on imports from various specified 

Total U.S. imports from Bulgaria in 1949 were 
valued at $1,937,000, of which $1,612,000 worth 
were dutiable. By far the largest item on the 
list was cigarette leaf tobacco, other than Latakia 
leaf type, unstemmed. Imports of this product 
in 1949 were valued at $1,556,000 and were subject 
to a concession contained in the U.S. agreement 
of 1939 with Turkey. Imports of I'ose oil were 
valued at $201,000 in 1949. Rose oil, however, is 
free of duty under the Tariff Act of 1930 and is 
not subject to any trade-agreement concession. 
Imports from Bulgaria in 1949 of goat and kid 
skins, dry and dry-salted, bound free in a trade- 
agreement concession, were valued at $98,000. 
Thus concession items accounted for 96.5 percent 
of total dutiable, and 30.2 percent of total duty- 
free, imports from Bulgaria in 1949. 

Total U.S. exports to Bulgaria in 1949 were 
valued at about $1,400,000; in 1950 the figure de- 
clined to about $800,000. 

' Bulletin of .Tuly 16, 1951, p. 95. 
^ Bulletin of Aug. 20, 1951, p. 291. 


Department of State Bulletin 


Calendar of Meetings 

Adjourned During September 1951 

Festival of Britain England May 3-Sept. 30 

9th International Exhibition of Decorative and Industrial Arts and Milan May 5-Sept. 30 

Modern Architecture 
UN (United Nations): 

Economic and Social Council: 13th Session Geneva July 30-Sept. 21 

Economic Commission for Europe: 

2d European Regional Conference of Statisticians Geneva Sept. 17-22 

XII International Festival of Cinematographic Art Venice Aug. 8-Sept. 10 

Edinburgh Film Festival Edinburgh Aug. 19-Scpt. 9 

International Union of Geodesy & Geophysics: 9th General As- Brussels Aug. 21-Sept. 1 


Izmir International Fair Izmir Aug. 20-Sept. 20 

40th General Assembly, Interparliamentary Union Istanbul Aug. 31-Sept. 6 

Fag (Food and Agriculture Organization): 

Training Center on Nematology Hardenden, (England) Sept. 3-14 

Land Utilization in Tropical Areas of Asia and the Far, Nuwara Eliya, (Ceylon) Sept. 17-29 

Regional Meeting on. 

Plant Quarantine Conference Rome Sept. 25-27 

Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Pan American Insti- Mexico City Sept. 3-6 

tuto of Geography and History 
IcAO (International Civil Aviation Organization): 

Search and Rescue Division: Third Session Montreal Sept. 4-22 

Conference for Conclusion and Signature of Treaty of Peace with San Francisco Sept. 4-8 


Levant Fair, 40th Bari (Italy) Sept. 8-25 

Venezuelan National Petroleum Convention Caracas Sept. 8-18 

6th Annual Meeting of Boards of Governors of International Bank Washington Sept. 10-14 

for Reconstruction and Development and the International 
Monetary Fund 
Tripartite Meeting of Foreign Ministers of France, the United Washington Sept. 10-14 

Kingdom and the United States 

First Meeting of the Inter-American Cultural Council Mexico City Sept. 10-25 

18th International Conference on Documentation Rome Sept. 15-22 

Nato (North Atlantic Treaty Organization): 

7th Session of the Council Ottawa Sept. 15-20 

3d International Congress of Social Defense San Marino Sept. 16-22 

World Tobacco Congress Amsterdam Sept. 17-24 

Who (World Health Organization) : 

2d Session of the Regional Committee for the Western Pacific Manila Sept. 18-Jl 

1st Meeting of the Regional Committee for Africa Geneva Sept. 22-30 

4th Session of the Regional Committee for the Eastern Mediter- Cyprus Sept. 24-29 
ranean Area 

International Tin Study Group: 6th Meeting Rome Sept. 24-29 

14th Meeting of Executive Committee of the Pan American Sanitary Washington Sept. 20-22 


International Convention on Table Grapes Hoeilaart (Belgium) Sept. 28-29 

In Session as of September 30, 1951 

UN (United Nations): General Assembly: 5th Session, Committee New York 

International Materials Conference 'SVashington 

' Prepared in the Division of International Conferences, Department of State, Sept. 24, 1951. 
Ocfofaer I, 7957 

Sept. 19, 1950- 
Feb. 26- 


Calendar oj Meetings — Continued 

In Session as of September 30, 1951 — Continued 

Itu (International Telecommunication Union): 

Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference Geneva Aug. 16- 

ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) : 

Legal Committee: 8th Session Madrid Sept. 11- 

Council: 14th Session Montreal Sept. 28- 

International Fair of Thessaloniki Salonika Sept. 16- 

Gatt (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) : 6th Session of the Geneva Sept. 17- 

Contracting Parties 

Pan American Sanitary Organization: 

14th Meeting of Executive Committee Washington Sept. 20- 

5th Session of the Directing Council Washington Sept. 24- 

Who (World Health Organization) : 3d Meeting of Regional Com- Washington Sept. 24- 


International Lumber Exposition Lyon Sept. 23- 

9th International Road Congress and International Exhibition of Lisbon Sept. 22- 

Roadmaking IMaterials 

Scheduled October 1-December 31 

International Council for the Exploration of the Sea Amsterdam Oct. I- 

Ilo (International Labor Organization) : 

2d Conference on Migration Naples Oct. 2- 

Asian Advisory Committee: 3d Session Geneva Nov. 10- 

Governing Body: 117th Se-ssion Geneva Nov. 14- 

Asian Manpower Conference Bangkok Dec. 12- 

Inland Transport Committee: 4th Session Genoa Dec. 4- 

Wmo (World Meteorological Organization) : Executive Committee, Geneva Oct. 3- 

2d Session. 

Pan American Sanitary Organization: 15th Meeting of the Executive Washington Oct. 3- 

UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization) : 

Regional Conference of Professional Librarians on tlie Develop- Sao Paulo Oct. 3- 
ment of Public Libraries in Latin America. 

Executive Board: 27th Session Paris Oct. 23- 

2d Regional Conference of Representatives of National Commis- Bangkok Dec. 10- 

International Symposium on Arid Zone Hydrology Undetermined Dec. 18- 

International Conference on Land Tenure, Land Use and Related Madison (Wis.) Oct. 7- 

IcAO (International Civil Aviation Organization): 

Special Meeting, Coordination of Air Traffic in Western Europe . Paris Oct. 8- 

Aeronautical Maps and Charts Division: 5th Session Montreal Oct. 9- 

South American-South Atlantic Regional Air Navigation Meeting: Buenos Aires Oct. 30- 
2d Session. 

Facilitation Division: 3d Session Buenos Aires Nov. 21 

Fag (Food and Agriculture Organization) : 

European Forestry and Forest Products Commission Rome Oct. 8- 

Technical Working Party for Continuation of Studies of Chestnut Rome, Naples, Florence, Oct. 12- 
Trees. Italy; and Lugano, Switz. 

13th Session of the Council Rome Nov. 12- 

Annual Conference: 6th Session Rome Nov. 19- 

14th Session of the Council Rome Dec. 10- 

Plant Nutrient Problems, Latin American Mtg. on Rio de Janeiro Nov. 

5th Pan American Highway Congress Lima Oct. 8— 

International Congress on Early History and Future of Paris . . . Paris Oct. 8- 

1st Latin Union Congress Rio de Janeiro Oct. 12- 

Scientific Unions, International Council of: Meeting of Executive Washington Oct. 14- 

Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe Strasbourg Oct. 15- 

Ibo (International Refugee Organization): 

Executive Committee: 10th Session Geneva Oct. 18- 

Gcneral Council: 8th Session Geneva Oct. 22- 

Itu International Telephone Consultative Committee (Ccif): 16th Florence Oct. 22- 
Plenary Assembly. 

♦South Pacific Commission: 8th Session Noumea Oct. 27- 

Caribbean Commission: 13th Meeting St. Croix Oct. 29- 

Conference on Administrative and Scientific Problems Relating to London Nov. 1- 

Food Aspects of Civilian Defense. 

Inter-American Bar Association: 7th Conference Montevideo Nov. 22- 

552 Departmenf of State Bulletin 

Calendar of Meeting s^Conilnu^d 

Scheduled October 1-December 31 — Continued 

Nato (North Atlantic Treaty Organization): Council: 8th Session. Europe 

International Statistical Institute: 27th Session (o '^,"' R'""" 


Special Meeting of Board of American International Institute for Montevideo 

the Protection of Childhood. 

2d Pan American Pharmaceutical Congress Lima 

United Nations: 

Economic and Social Council: 

Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection New York 

of Minorities: 4th Session 

Regional Conference of Nongovernmental Organizations on Paris 

United Nations Information 

Subcommission on Statistical Sampling: 5th Session New Delhi 

Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: 

Conference on Trade Promotion Singapore 

Railway Subcommittee Bangkok 

Special Committee on Information Transmitted Under Article Geneva 

73 (e) of the Charter 

Narcotic Drugs Supervisory Body: 36th Session Geneva 

Permanent Central Opium Board and Narcotic Drugs Supervisory Geneva 

Body: 6th Joint Session 

Permanent Central Opium Board: 58th Session Geneva 

General Assembly: 6th Session Paris 

Dec. 5- 
Dee. 16- 















. 1- 
. 6- 

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences 

Contracting Parties (GATT): 6th Session 

The Department of State announced on Sep- 
tember 17 that tlie U.S. delegation to tlie sixth 
session of the contracting parties to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Gati-), which 
will convene at Geneva, Switzerland, on that date, 
is as follows : 

The Honorable Willard L. Thorp, Assistant Secretary 
of State for Economic Affairs 

Vice Chairman 

John M. Leddy, Acting Director, Office of Economic De- 
fense and Trade Policy, Department of State 


George Bronz, Special Assistant to the General Counsel, 
Department of the Treasury 

Jack C. Corhett, Deputy Director, Office of Financial and 
Development Policy, Department of State 

Joseph Greeuwald, Commercial Policy Staff, Department 
of State 

John W. Hight, Economic Specialist, Office of Special 
Representative In Europe, Economic Cooperation Ad- 
ministration, Paris 

Walter Mollis, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of 

Walter M. Kotschnig, Director, Office of United Nations 
Economic and Social Affairs, Deiiartment of State 

J. Robert Schaetzel, Special Assistant to the Assistant 
Secretary for Economic Affairs, Department of State 

Robert B. Schwenger, Office of Foreign Agricultural Re- 
lations, Department of Agriculture 

Robert Simpson. Office of International Trade, Depart- 
ment of Commerce 

Ocfofaer J, I95I 

Technical Secretary 

Helen L. Brewster, Policy Reporting Staff, Office of the 
Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, Department 
of State 

Secretary of the Delegation 

Robert E. Read, Office of the Conference Attach^, Ameri- 
can Consulate General, Geneva, Switzerland 

Under the provisions of the General Agreement, 
the representatives of the contracting parties meet 
from time to time for the purpose of facilitating 
the operation and furthering the objectives of the 
agreement. A detailed agenda for the sixth ses- 
sion will be adopted at the opening of tlie meeting. 
Among the items which will be considered are 
the strengthening of the administration of the 
General Agreement, a review of restrictions ap- 
plied for balance-of-payment reasons, and other 
problems relating to the application of the agree- 
ment. As was announced on July 31, tlie contract- 
ing parties will also consider at the sixth session 
the proposal of the United States that all obliga- 
tions between it and Czechoslovakia by virtue of 
the provisions of tlie agreement be suspended or 
terminated. The fii'st session of the contracting 
parties was held at Habana, February 28-March 
24, 1948; the second session at Geneva, August 16- 
September 14, 1948; the third session at Annecy, 
France, April 8-August 13, 1949; tlie fourth ses- 
sion at Geneva, February 23-April 4, 19.")0; and 
the fifth session at Torquay, England. November 
2-December IC, 1950. 


Committee for Western Pacific 
Region (WHO): 2d Session 

The Department of State announced on Sep- 
tember 17 that the second session of the Regional 
Committee for the Western Pacific Region of the 
World Health Organization (Who) will be held 
at Manila, the Philippines, September 18-21. Dr. 
Howard Kline, chief, Education and Training 
Branch, Division of International Health, Public 
Health Service, Federal Security Agency, will at- 
tend the meeting as official U.S. observer. 

This session will consider the budget and or- 
ganization for the Western Pacific Region and 
examine reports on present and future health and 
sanitation programs and their implementation in 
the countries which have signified their desire to 
be members of that regional organization. 

The first session of this Regional Committee was 
convened at Geneva, Switzerland, on May 18, 1951. 

U.N. Special Committee on Information 

On September 17 the Department of State an- 
nounced that Benjamin Gerig, Director, Office of 
Dependent Area Affairs, will attend the meeting 
of the U.N. Special Committee on Information 
transmitted under article 73 (e) of the U.N. Char- 
ter, scheduled to convene at Geneva, Switzerland, 
on October 2, in his capacity as U.S. representa- 
tive on the committee. He will be assisted by the 
following other members of the U.S. delegation : 

Special Advisers on Economic Conditions and 

William J. Stibravy, Special Assistant to the Director, 
Office of Financial and Development Policy, Depart- 
ment of State 

Roberto deJesus, Director of Budget, Puerto Rican Gov- 


Capt. Thomas F. Darden, U.S. Navy Department 
James P. Davis, Director, Office of Territories, Depart- 
ment of the Interior 
Vernon McKay, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Depart- 
ment of State 

This committee, which was reconstituted by the 
General Assembly in 1949, for a 3-year period, 
carries out a preliminary review of documents pre- 
pared by the U.N. Secretariat on the basis of the 
information transmitted by administering mem- 
bers on economic, social, and educational condi- 
tions in their non-self-governing territories and 
makes certain recommendations thereon to the 
General Assembly. The United States is a mem- 
ber of the committee by virtue of the fact that it is 
one of the members of the United Nations trans- 
mitting information on such territories. 

The agenda for this meeting of the Special Com- 
mittee includes consideration of education, eco- 
nomic conditions, and development in non-self- 
governing territories; information on technical 
assistance accorded to non-self-governing terri- 

tories by the United Nations and the specialized 
agencies; the Secretary-General's summaries and 
analyses of information transmitted during 1951 ; 
and examination of factors to be taken into ac- 
count in deciding whether any territory is or is 
not a territory whose people have not yet attained 
a full measure of self-government. 

The last meeting of the Special Committee con- 
vened at Lake Success, N.Y., on August 18, 1950. 

Pan American Sanitary and 
Healtfi Organizations 

The Department of State announced on Sep- 
tember 17 that the fifth session of the Directing 
Council of the Pan American Sanitary Organiza- 
tion (Paso) and 3d meeting of the Regional Com- 
mittee of the World Health Organization for the 
Americas will be held at Washington, D.C., Sep- 
tember 24-October 2, 1951. The United States 
delegation is as follows : 

U. S. Representative 

Leonard A. Scheele, M.D., Surgeon General, Public Health 
Service, Federal Security Agency 

Alternate U. S. Representatives 

H. van Zile Hyde, M.D., Director, Division of Health and 
Sanitation, Institute of Inter-American Affairs 

Howard B. Calderwood, Office of United Nations Economic 
and Social Affairs, Department of State 


William G. Bowdler, Division of International Adminis- 
tration, Department of State 

Frederick J. Brady, M.D., Assistant Chief, International 
Organization Branch, Division of International 
Health, Public Health Service, Federal Security 

Marcia M. Fleming, Office of Assistant Legal Adviser for 
United Natiims Affairs, Department of State 

Simon N. Wilson, Office of Regional American Affairs, 
Department of State 

The fourteenth and fifteenth meetings of the 
Executive Committee of the Paso will also be held 
at Washington, D.C., September 20-22, and Octo- 
ber S-A, 1951, respectively. The U.S. delegation 
to these meetings is as follows : 

U.S. Representative 

H. van Zile Hyde, M.D. 

Alternate U.S. Representatives 

Frederick J. Brady, M.D. 
Howard B. Calderwood. 


Simon N. Wilson. 

Both U.S. representatives and their alternates 
were previously appointed by the President. 

The F'an American Sanitary Organization, or- 
ganized in 1902 as the Pan American Sanitary 
Bureau, has as its purpose the coordination of the 
public health efforts of the countries of the West- 
ern Hemisphere. Technical advisory services are 


Deparfmenf of State Bulletin 

provided, and programs, including the control of 
tuberculosis, venereal disease, yellow fever, ma- 
laria, and other insect-borne diseases, are being 
carried on to assist member governments in raising 
the level of health and thereby contributing to 
the improvement of the economic and social well- 
being of the people of the Americas. 

Tlie Directing Council, created in 1947, serves 
as the executive body of the Paso between quad- 
rennial sessions of the Pan American Sanitary 
Conference, which is the Organization's governing 
body. It also serves as the Regional Committee 
of the World Health Organization for the Ameri- 
cas. The last annual meeting of the Directing 
Council was held at Ciudad Trujillo, Dominican 
Republic, in September 1950. 

The forthcoming session of the Directing Coun- 
cil and Regional Committee is the first held at 
Washington, which was selected by the thirteenth 
Pan American Sanitary Conference as the per- 
imanent headquarters of the Pan American Sani- 
tary Organization. 

The Executive Committee, composed of seven 
governments, elected by the Directing Council, 
performs interim executive and advisory functions 
between meetings of the council and prepares 
agenda for council meetings. The last meeting 
of the Executive Committee was held at Wash- 
ington, D.C., April 23-May 1, 1951. 

Among the most important agenda items to be 
considered at the Washington meetings are the 
program and budget of the Paso for 1952 and 
1953 ; agenda items for the fourteenth Pan Ameri- 
can Sanitary Conference to be held in 1954; im- 
plementation of the program for the control of 
insect-borne diseases, including organization of 
sanitary services, and contemplated revisions of 
the constitution of the Pan American Sanitary 

Latin American Fisheries (FAO> 

On September 17 the Department of State an- 
noimced that the Latin American Fisheries meet- 
ing of the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(Fao) of the United Nations will convene at 
Lima, Peru, September 17-22. The U.S. delega- 
tion is as follows: 

William C. Herrington, Special Assistant to the Under 
Secretary, Department of State 

A fl risers 

Milton Lindner, Fish and Wildlife Service, Fishery Mis- 
sion to Mexico, Mexico, D. F., Mex. 

Harold Gary, Manager, American Tuna Boat Association, 
San Diego, Calif. 

The meeting at Lima has been called to consider 
the desirability of establishing a Fisheries Council 
for the Latin American area, and, if favorably 
received, to adopt a form of agreement for sub- 

Ocfofaer I, ?95I 

mission to the sixth session of the Fao conference 
to be convened at Rome in November 1951. If 
approved by the conference, it will be forwarded 
to interested member governments for action. 

The particular object of the Council is stated 
to be the promotion and improvement of fisheries 
by increasing knowledge of aquatic resources in 
order to make possible maximum use in perpetuity 
and to use the Council's good oflices to promote 
and secure action in this field. This is in line with 
the general objectives of the Fao of raising levels 
of nutrition and standards of living of peoples 
by contributing to improvements in efficiency of 
production and distribution of all food and agri- 
cultural products. 

The principal agenda items include considera- 
tion of the functions of the Council, i.e., its ob- 
jects, its fields of interest, and the means of 
achieving its objectives, and a draft instrument 
for establishment of the Council. 

First International Congress on Allergy 

The Department of State announced on Sep- 
tember 17 that the First International Congress 
on Allergy will convene at Ziirich, Switzerland, 
September 23-29. The U.S. delegation is as 
follows : 


Arthur Stull, M. D.. Pathology and Allied Sciences Divi- 
sion, Office of the Surgeon General, Department of 
the Army 


Arthur J. Berger, Lt. Col., M.C., U.S.A., Chief, Clinical 
Pathology, Walter Reed General Hospital, Washing- 
ton. D.C. 

Milton G. Bohrod, M.D., Pathologist and Director of Lab- 
oratories, Rochester General Hospital, Rochester, 

Joseph Harkavy, M.D., Professor of Medicine, College of 
Physicians and Surgeons, Columbia University, New 
Toi-k, N.Y. 

Hownrd Osgood, M.D., Chief, Allergy Clinics, Buffalo, 

Arnold A. Rich, JI.D., Baxley Professor of Pathology, 
Johns Hopkins Hospital, Baltimore, Md. 

Louis Schwartz, M.D., Acting Assistant Surgeon, Co- 
lumbia Medical Surgeon, Columbia Medical Annex, 
Washington, D.C. 

James J. Smith, M.D., Chief, Education Division, Depart- 
ment of Medicine and Surgery, Veterans Administra- 

An untold number of people throughout the 
world are incapacitated for varying periods of 
time from allergies. This meeting will alTord the 
first opportunity for international discussion of 
this important field in medicine and health. 

The agenda for the First International Congress 
on Allergy includes an examination of the nature, 
causes, and effects of allergies, as well as a determi- 
nation of means of treatment through laboratory, 
clinical, and other practical methods. 


Documents Relating to Armistice Negotiations in Korea 

Message from North Korean and Communist 
Commanders to U.N. Commander 

[September 19, 1951] 

Followhig is the text of a message hroadcast by the 
Peiping radio on September 20: 

Your reply dated Sept. 17 ' has been received. 

Both yonr letter and the letter from Vice Admiral Joy, 
chief delegate of your side, to General Nam II, chief 
delegate of our side, dated Sept. 11,^ have admitted the 
fact that United Nations forces aircraft strafed the Kae- 
song neutral zone on Sept. 10. 

However, your side still denies the various incidents 
which took place before Sept. 10 when the United NatiOLS 
forces violated the Kaesong zone neutrality agreement 
from the air and on the ground, which made it impossible 
to proceed with the Kaesong negotiations. 

This kind of denial though can by uo means alter or 
do away with all the witnesses and the material evidence 
which we possess concerning these incidents. And, there- 
fore, the Incidents which our side has drawn attention to 
and protested about must be dealt with in a responsible 

In view of the fact that your side has expressed regret 
concerning the latest incident in which the United Nations 
forces violated the Kaesong neutral zone and willingness 
to take a responsible attitude regarding violations of the 
Kaesong zone neutrality agreement and in order not to 
let the previously mentioned unsettled incidents continue 
to obstruct the progress of the negotiations of both sides, 
we. therefore, propose that the delegates of both sides 
should immediately resume the armistice negotiations 
at Kaesong without any need for further discussion of the 
conditions for the resumption of the armistice negotia- 

As to dealing with the previously mentioned unsettled 
incidents, and stipulating and guaranteeing strict agree- 
ment on the zone neutrality, we propose that at 
the first meeting after the resumption of the Kaesong 
armistice negotiations appropriate machinery be set up by 
arrangement of both sides to carry out these tasks. 

Of course, all agreement, reached through such appro- 
priate machinery will be valid only after ratification by 
the delegates of both sides. 

If you agree we hope that you will immediately order 
the liaison officers of your side to consult with our liai.son 
officers concerning the date and time for resuming the 
negotiations at Kaesong. 

Kim II Song, 
Supreme Commander Korean Peoples Army. 

Peng Teh-htjai, 
Commander of the Chinese Peoples Volunteers. 

Sept. 19, 1951. 

' Bulletin of Sept. 24, ia-)l, p. 513. 
' Not here printed. 

Announcement by the U.N. Command 

[September 19, 1951] 

Following is the text of the United Nations Command 
announcement of September 19, after investigation of fft« 
Communist charge of violating the neutrality zone. 

Four unarmed South Korean medical corps soldiers 
wandered into the Communist Panmunjom checkpoint oi. 
the fringe of the Kaesong neutral zone yesterday and wert 
held for twenty hours until the completion of a Unitec 
Nations Command (U.N.C.) investigation of the incideni 
this morning. The soldiers and the truck in whch thej 
were riding have been released to U.N.C. control. 

The four soldiers, part of an anti-epidemic unit anc 
armed with nothing more dangerous than D.D.T., losi 
their way yesterday afternoon and ci-ossed the Panmuu 
jom bridge into the neutral zone. In charge of the groui 
was First Sergt. Na Kwang Sin. The unit is attached 
to the First R.O.K. (Republic of Korea) Division. 

Notification that an Incident had occurred involving 
ground forces of the U.N.C. reached the U.N.C. advance 
headquarters last night and liaison officers went to Pan- 
munjom this morning to investigate. The group with 
Lieut. Col. Norman B. Edwards of Diamond, W. Va., 
charge, and with Col. Minir K. Wilson of Cleveland, Ohio, 
as an observer, arrived at Panmunjom at 9 a. m. Colonel 
Wilson is the inspector general of I (First) Corps and an 
investigating officer of allegations which concern western 
front ground troops 

During the investigation, the U.N.C. investigators in- 
terrogated the R.O.K. soldiers, following which they and 
the lM;-ton truck which had been captured with them were 

Sergeant Na asserted that the unit, sent out to spray 
R.O.K. billets, had been unable to locate the units and had 
inadvertently entered the neutral zone. 

Advised of his error by the Communists at the check- 
point, Sergeant Na offered to turn back. The checkpoint 
personnel, however, notified the Communists' liaison group 
in Kaesong and the sergeant and his men were detained. 

The Medical Corps soldiers were not mistreated durin.g 
their overnight stay in Kaesong nor were their items of 
equipment confiscated or damaged. 

The investigation took place without incident and in an 
atmosphere almost completel.v devoid of tension. The 
approach to Kaesong showed noticeable changes. Nearly 
all of the Communist soldiers along the road stood rigidly 
at attention as the U.N.C. party passed and one soldier 
held a stiff salute as the convoy entered and left the city. 
Many of the civilians in Kaesong smiled as the U.N. per- 
sonnel passed by, in marked contrast to the inscrutable 
countenances they have shown on other occasions. 

The last contact Sergeant Na and his men had with 
U.N. forces before they wandered into the checkpoint was 
at a sentry post a few miles to the south. There, accord- 
ing to the sergeant, a .sentry said he could go "some 
farther" along the road. 

When Na halted the Japanese-made truck at the check- 


Department of State Bulletin 

Joint he was subsequently told that in onler to settle the 
natter quickly he must take the vehicle and the peison- 
lel to Kaesong. In the concluding minutes of the investi- 
;ation, Colonel Edwards told Colonel Chang, Communist 
iaison officer : "It is ohvious to us that the men were lost, 
hat they wanted to turn back and that there was no 
ntention of violating the neutral zone." 

Edwards emphasized that the men were unarmed and 
)n a purely medical mission and then requested that the 
nen and their equipment be turned over to him "for return 
o their organization and such disciplinary action as we 
nay take." 

Colonel Chang replied that "according to our original 
igreement" no one except the delegation party was to 
inter the neutral zone and "consequently we think (this 
mtry) was a violation of the agreement." 

The Communist liaison officer further pointed out "there 
nust have been guards on your side ... it was broad 
Jaylight . . . there was clear visibility on the high- 

"By the order of our senior delegate I call your serious 
ittention to this case," Colonel Chang said. 

"I hand over these men to you now," he added. 

Colonel Chang declared: "We desire that you will ob- 
^ «erve the neutrality agreement faithfully and that you 
wnl\ not permit such things [to occur]." 

Colonel Edwards said that the men wanted to turn back 
at Panmunjom, were detained there, and so did not enter 
he neutral zone voluntarily. 

"I'll report the matter to Admiral Joy who is as anxious 
IS you are that no intentional violations of the neutral 
;one occur," Colonel Edwards said. 

Following this exchange a receipt was prepared ac- 
jnowledging the return of the soldiers and their equip- 
nent to the control of the TJ. N. C. 

The only other matter discussed during the course of 
the investigation was a proposal for changing the radio 
requency in use between the delegations. At Colonel 
Edwards' suggestion, signal officers of both sides will 
neet at 2 p. m. September 19 in Kaesong to discuss the 

inessage From U.N. Commander to 
Communist Commanders 

[Septembee 23, 1951] 

The following message was broadcast to Generals Kim II 
Song and Peng Teh-huai and was handed to Communist 
iaison ojficers at P'anmunjom at 10 a.m. (Korean Time) 
September 23: 

Your message of 19 September received 20 September 
19."il and has been noted. 

Your suggestion therein that there are Instances of 
alleged violations of the Kaesong neutral zone which 
remain unsettled is rejected. 

Each of these several cases wherein you reported an 
alleged violation was fully investigated. Where United 
Nations Command forces were responsible, that fact was 
reported. Where United Nations Command forces were 
not involved you were so advised and the cases were 
closed. I have so instnicted my representatives. 

I likewise reject the charge repeated in your letter that 
alleged violations of the neutral zone by United Nations 
Command forces made it impossible to continue negotia- 
tions. The responsibility unnecessary (words 

missing) incident to the resumption of negotia- 
tions, in spite of the fact that the armistice discussions 
have been interrupted for prolonged periods because of 

incidents or alleged incidents. I have therefore given 
instructions to my liaison officers to insure that this vital 
subject receives careful attention in any future discussion 
with your liaison officers in order to minimize the likeli- 
hood of further interruption. 

Since you are now ready to terminate the suspension of 
armistice talks which you declared on 23 August, my 
liaison officers will be at the bridge at P'anmunjom at 
1000 hours 24 September to meet your liaison officers and 
to discuss conditions mutually satisfactory for a resumi>- 
tion of the armistice talks. 

Message from Communist Commanders 
to U. N. Commander 

[Septembee 24, 1951] 

Your reply dated Sept. 23 has been received. Although 
yoiu- message still refuses to acknowledge the various air 
and ground violations of the Kaesong neutrality agree- 
ment which were committed b.v the United Nations forces 
before Sept 10 and which made it impossible for the 
Kaesong negotiations to proceed, pretending that all the 
incidents had been fully investigated by your side, yet 
from our side there was every reason and right to go on 
demanding that your side deal responsibly with these inci- 
dents because we possess adequate evidence concerning 
them and your side has time and again refused to make 
the investigations. 

We have already instructed our delegates to put for- 
ward our demands for the appropriate machinery which 
should be set up by mutual agreement after the resumption 
of the Kaesong talks in order to deal with unsettled 

It is generally known that what directly made it impos- 
sible for the Kaesong negotiations to continue was the 
provocate incidents of Aug. 22 ' and the series of similar 
incidents that followed, all of which were created by your 
side. Naturally therefore, your side has to bear the re- 
sponsibility for it. Only since your side expressed regret 
for the Sept. 10 incident, that is the latest Kaesong neu- 
trality violation by the United Nations forces, and will- 
ingness to deal responsibly with the Kaesong neutrality 
agreement violations, we considered that the armistice 
negotiations should be resumed at Kaesong immediately. 

And these unsettled incidents should not be allowed to 
go on impeding the progress of the negotiations between 
both sides. 

Our side has always requested that a strict agreement 
on the neutrality of the Kaesong area be worked out to 
avoid future violations and to reduce or even eliminate 
any iwssibility of the negotiations being suspended in the 
future. But the working out of such specific and strict 
stipulations as will be agreeable to both sides at the same 
time must be done not by the liaison officers, who liave 
never had the ix)wer to do this, but by the delegates of both 
sides in discussions. 

In order that the armistice negotiations may not be 
affected we proposed that appropriate machinery to deal 
with such matters be set up by discussions of both sides 
at the first meeting at the resumed Kaesong armistice 
negotiations. We hold that this is the most reasonable 

Therefore, we have ordered the liaison officer of our side 
to meet the liaison officer of your side at 10 a. m. on 
September 24 to discuss the date and time for resuming 
the negotiations in Kaesong. 

' Bulletin of Sept 3, 1951, p. 389. 

Oc/ober J, 195? 


New Volume on German Foreign Policy Released 

On September 8 the Department of State re- 
leased The Aftermath of Munich, October 1938- 
March 1939, volume IV, series D, of Documents 
on German Foreign Policy, 1918-19Jf5, which 
covers the closing phase of an independent 
Czechoslovakia, from the signature of the Munich 
agreement in September 1938 until the occupation 
of Prague in March 1939. The documents pub- 
lished in this volume continue the story of Ger- 
many's relations with the Great Powers and with 
Czechoslovakia which was described in volumes 
I and II of this series (volume III dealt with the 
Spanish Civil War) . 

The documents contained in this volume were 
selected from the official German papers cap- 
tured by American and British forces in April- 
May 1945. 

The volume is divided into ei^^ht chapters, the 
first dealing with the main subject, Czechoslo- 
vakia, the others with the relations between Ger- 
many and the principal powers. 

German policy towards Czechoslovakia ap- 
pears to go through three phases. At first, the 
Germans were prepared to act as though Czecho- 
slovakia had retained its independence (see Docu- 
ments 16, 44, 54). German requirements were dis- 
cussed with the other Great Powers at the sessions 
of the International Commission which had been 
established to carry out the Munich agreement 
(Documents 2, 10, 11, 20, 24, 33, 41). An effort 
was made to settle the conflicting claims of Po- 
land, Hungary, and Slovakia to territory on the 
former borders of the Czechoslovak Eepublic 
(Documents 37, 62, 72, 73, 74, 87). It is clear 
from a brief supplied by the Foreign Ministry 
for Hitler on October 7 on the subject of Slovakia 
and Ruthenia (Document 45), that it did not de- 
sire to see Slovakia absorbed by Hungary, and still 
less by Poland. , Hitler accepted the Foreign 
Ministry view (Document 46). Eventually, on 
November 2, the Axis Powers attempted a formal 
mediation between the Hungarians and Slovaks 
by the Vienna Award (Documents 98 and 99). 

Alongside this policy to maintain the Czecho- 
slovak Republic in existence, military plans were 
being made for its eventual liquidation. These 
were laid down in a secret directive to the Armed 
Forces on October 21, 1938 (Document 81) which 

was elaborated by a further instruction of Decern 
ber 17, 1938 (Document 152). 

During the late fall and winter there was n( 
need for these plans to go into operation. Th( 
policy pursued by the Czech Government is showr 
by a despatch dated October 23, 1938, by the Ger- 
man representative in Prague ( Document 85 ) t( i 
the effect that the Czechoslovak leaders were con 
vinced of the necessity to cooperate with Germanj 
as closely as possible. 

The Czech Government was prepared to gc 
further. On January 21, 1939, the Foreign Min 
ister, M. Chvalkovsky, visited Berlin ready to sigi 
a treaty of friendship which would have placed his 
country under effective German political and eco 
nomic control (Documents 150, 158, 159) . 

In the first days of March 1939 there is a notice- 
able sharpening of tone towards the Czechs (Docu- 
ments 177, 178, 185). On March 10 negotiations 
between the Czechs and Slovaks broke down, the 
Slovaks having demanded the right to declare 
their independence of Prague (Document 186), 
The German Foreign Ministry supported the Slo- 
vaks (Documents 191 and 193). On March 13 
Mgr. Tiso, the Slovak leader, was summoned to 
Berlin and told by Hitler to choose between inde- 
pendence and annexation by Hungary (Document 
202). On the evening of March 13 President 
Hacha asked for an interview with Hitler (Docu- 
ments 207, 216). He came, and the final curtain 
was rung down on the Czechoslovak Republic by 
the abrupt ultimatum to Hacha and Chvalkovsky 
in Berlin (Documents 228, 229). 

Germany's relations with the major powers — 
treated in the remaining chapters — are naturally 
overshadowed by Munich. From nearly all capi- 
tals came the interpretations of the crisis. The 
longest of these is also the most illuminating: 
Theodor Kordt's report from London ( Document 
248). The rest of this chapter shows the repeated 
efforts of the British Government to settle the dif- 
ficulties outstanding between British and German 
commercial interests, as well as the attempt to 
reconcile naval construction plans (Documents 
276, 278, 279, 288, 294-8, 328, 329), and it ends 
abrujitly with a note of Sir Neville Henderson, the 
Ambassador in Berlin (Document 330) occasioned 
by Hitler's seizure of Czechoslovakia. 


Department of Slate Bulletin 

After lengthy negotiations the Franco-German 
declaration of December 6, 1938, was signed in 
Paris as a belated counterpart to the Anglo-Ger- 
man declaration brought back from Munich by 
Neville Chamberlain, Ribbentrop having gone 
;here for this purpose (see chapter III). At this 
time he threatened that Germany would sooner or 
later have to shake off the encircling treaties of 
France with the East by negotiation or "by some 
jther means" (Document 370). 

German-Italian relations continued, on the 
whole, to be good (chapter IV). After an initial 
ilence Mussolini agreed in principle to the expan- 
sion of the anti-Comintern Pact into a military 
alliance. While the parallel negotiations with 
"'apan dragged on he was constantly pressing, in 
he face of German evasion, for the commence- 
ment of staff talks. The perennial conflicts over 
:he South Tyrol question continued and a be- 
wildered Propaganda Ministry even inquired in 
what way current publications were to be doctored 
;o meet the situation (Document 439). The prob- 
em of Italian payments in foreign currency was 
;he main issue of the routine economic negotia- 
tions (Documents 399, 414-20, 423-33, 445-48) 
which were concluded by the agreements of Feb- 
ruary 13, 1939, and the signing of the third of the 
series of secret protocols dealing with the plan- 
ning of mutual economic aid — particularly for 
:imes of emergency ( Document 451 ) . 

The chapter on relations with the Soviet Union 
(VI) is short. Politically there was little activity 
and the German diplomats in Moscow confined 
themselves to reporting the official interpretation 
of the Munich crisis (Documents 476, 477, 480) 
and speculating on the line Soviet policy might 
now take (would Litvinov's view prevail ? ) 

Significantly enough quite a different atmos- 
phere pervades the economic talks which form 
the bulk of this chapter. The persistent German 
quest for Russian raw materials found the Rus- 
sians not uncooperative and the great interest of 
all German economic authorities in an extension 
of trade with the Soviet Union already fore- 
shadows the subsequent agreements. 

By contrast chapter VII records the steady de- 
terioration of relations with the United States, 
particularly after the pogroms of November 1938 
when Ambassador Dieckhoff stated that "at the 
moment a hurricane is raging here which renders 
steady work impossible" (Document 501). 

Thereafter formal relations — conducted without 
ambassadors — were limited to an exchange of stiff' 
notes ; and on January 4, 1939, Ribbentrop actually 
forbade his staff any social intercourse with mem- 
bers of the U.S. Embassy in Berlin (Document 
520). In the absence of any clear-cut policy the 
German diplomats busied themselves with a vari- 
ety of vexing problems : now blaming "radical and 
Jewish circles" for Roosevelt's policy (Document 
512), now contemplating the economic results of a 
complete rupture of diplomatic relations (Docu- 

Ocfober I, 7951 

ments 504, 505), or anxiously investigating the 
activities of the Butid. 

The final chapter — on the Far East — deals 
largely with the withdrawal of German military 
advisers and arms aid from China (Document 
540), and with German attempts to expand the 
anti-Comintern Pact into a military alliance 
(Documents 543, 547, 549, 550). In spite of Japa- 
nese hesitation the Germans realized that the 
Chinese war was progressively estranging Japan 
from Britain and America and "had automatically 
brought Japanese policy closer to the Axis Pow- 
ers" (Document 549). 

The publication of these volumes, illustrative of 
German foreign policy before and during World 
War II, is being undertaken jointly by the British, 
French, and U.S. Governments. The American 
editor-in-chief is Dr. Bernadotte E. Schmitt, for- 
merly professor of modern history at the Univer- 
sity of Chicago and winner of the Pulitzer Prize 
in history in 1931 for his book The Cominq of the 

Copies of these volumes may be purchased at the 
Office of the Superintendent of Documents, Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, Washington, D. C. at 
$3.25 each. 

Check List of Department of State 

Press Releases: Sept. 17-23, 1951 

Releases ma.v be obtained from the OfiBce of the 

Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department 

of State, Washington 25, D.C. 

Numher Date 




German Doc. Vol. 4 Released 



Financial Aid Agreement With Nor- 



Exchange of Persons 



Exchange of Persons 



Anniversary of Costa Rica 



Anniversary of Mexico 



Information Committee Appointments 



Contracting Parties (Gatt) : 6th Sess. 



Western Pacific Region (Who) 



Latin American Fisheries (Fao) 



U.N. Information Committee 



Pan American Organizations 



Congress on Allergy 



Bulgarian Imports Suspended 



Turkey Signs Torquay Protocol 



Lacy to Overseas Library (rewrite) 



Point 4 Technicians Assigned 



Cale : Dir. American Affairs (rewrite) 



Anniversary of Chile 



Harriman-Mosadeq Communications 



Malaya Invites U.S. to Study Tin 



Austria Signs Torquay Protocol 



Foreign Service Changes 



Visitors to U.S. 



Nac Communique and Statement 



Aeheson : Nac Press Conference 



Film Advisory Committee 


Not printed in the Buixettn; (f) Will ap- | 


n a fut 

ure issue. 


October 1, 1951 


Vol. XXV, No. 640 

American Republics 

Latin American Fisheries meeting (Fao) , Sept. 

17-22 555 

Pan American Sanitary Organization, 5tli session 

of Directing Council 554 

Arms and Armed Forces 

Documents relating to armistice negotiations in 

Korea 556 


CHINA: Documents relating to Henry A. Wal- 
lace's visit (1944) 541 

Committee for Western Pacific Begion (Who) 

2d session 554 

IRAN: Messages of Harriman and Mosadeq on oil 

problem 547 

KOREA: Armistice negotiations 556 


OTTAWA: Nac meeting, 7th session (Sept. 15-20) 

statements by Acheson and Nac 523 


"The Constitution," address by Truman at 

Library of Congress 528 

Documents relating to Henry A. Wallace's visit 

to China (1944) 541 

Review of Unscob report on Greek question . . 531 


BULGARIA: Trade concessions on imports to 

U.S. suspended 550 

Defense of Western Europe, Nato plan for and 

recommendations at 7th session of Nac . . 523 

GERMANY: New volume on foreign policy re- 
leased 558 

GREECE: Review of Unscob report on Greek 

question 631 

NORWAY: Signs agreement with U.S. for mobile 

hospital in Korea 530 

SWITZERLAND: First International Congress on 

Allergy 555 


Latin American Fisheries meeting (Fao) Sept. 

17-22 555 


Committee for Western Pacific Region (Who) 

2d session 554 

First International Congress on Allergy . . . 655 
Pan American Sanitary Organization, 5th session 

of Directing Council 554 

International Meetings 

Calendar of Meetings 551 

U.S. delegations: 

Committee for Western Pacific Begion (Who) 

2d session 554 

Contracting parties (Gatt) : 6th session . . 653 
First International Congress on Allergy . . . 555 
Latin American Fisheries meeting (Fao) . . 555 
Pan American Sanitary Organization, 6th ses- 
sion of Directing Council 554 

U.N. Special Committee on Information . . 554 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

Nac meeting, 7th session, at Ottawa, Sept. 15-20, 

statements by Acheson and Council . . . 523 


New volume on German foreign policy released . 558 

Refugees and Displaced Persons 

Review of Unscob report on Greek question . . 531 

State, Department of 

Release of new volume on German foreign 

policy 558 

Strategic Materials 

Messages of Harriman and Mosadeq on Iran oil 

problem 547 



Contracting parties, 6th session . . . . . 553 
Trade concessions on Bulgarian imports to 

U.S. suspended 550 

Treaties and Other International Agreements 

NOB WAY: Signs agreement with U.S. for mobile 

hospital in Korea 530 

United Nations 

Documents relating to armistice negotiations in 

Korea 656 

Fao: Latin American Fisheries meeting, Sept. 

17-22 555 

Pan American Sanitary Organization, 5th ses- 
sion of Directing Council 554 

Norway signs agreement with U.S. for mobile 

hospital in Korea 530 

Beview of Unscob report on Greek question . . 531 

U.N. Special Committee on Information . . . 554 

Who: Committee for Western Pacific Begion, 2d 

session 554 

Name Index 

Acheson, Secretary Dean 523 

Barkley, Vice President 541 

Gerig, Benjamin 554 

Harriman, W. Averell 647 

Herrington, William C 555 

Howard, Harry N 631 

Hyde, H. van Zile 554 

Kim U Song 556 

Kline, Howard 554 

Mosadeq, Mohammed 647 

Nygaard, Eigil 630 

Peng Teh-hual 656 

Ridgway, Gen. Matthew B 556, 657 

Scheele, Leonard A 554 

Schmitt, Bernadotte E 559 

Stuli, Arthur 555 

Thorp, Willard L 553 

Truman, President Harry S 528, 541, 560 

Wallace, Henry A 641 

Webb, James E 530 

JAe/ ^e^a^tmeni^ ^ c/iafe^ 





Philip C. Jessup 573 


Statement by Isador Lubin 590 


COTTON • Article by Lester E. Edmond 586 

For index see back cover 

Vol. XXV, No. 641 
October 8, 1951 


NOV 1 1951 


Qje/u^l^me^ 4^ ytdta JOUilGiiil 

Vol. XX\', No. 641 • Publication 4378 
Octfher 8, 1951 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington 25, D.C. 


62 issues, domestic $7.60. foreipi $10.25 

Single copy, 20 cents 

The printing of this publication has 
been approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget (July 29, 1949). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may 
be reprinted. Citation of the Depaetmknt 
OF Staik Bulletin as the source will be 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a tceekly publication compiled and 
edited in the Division of Publications, 
Office of Public Affairs, provides the 
public and interested agencies of 
the Government urith information on 
developments in the field of foreign 
relations and on the trork of the De- 
partment of State and the Foreign 
Service. The BULLETIN includes 
selected press releases on foreign pol- 
icy issued by the White House and 
the Department, and statements and 
addresses made by the President and 
by the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as u:ell as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the func- 
tions of the Department. Informa- 
tion is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to 
tchich the United States is or may 
become a party and treaties of gen- 
eral international interest. 

Publications of the Department, as 
uxllas legislative material in the field 
of internatioruil relations, are listed 

U.S. and Italy Discuss Topics of Mutual interest 


[Released to the press September 25 bii the White House] 

President Truman and Prime Minister de Gas- 
peri met at the White House on Tuesday, Septem- 
ber 25. The meeting was devoted to an exchange 
of views on the present international situation and 
on matters of mutual concern to Italy and the 
United States. 

The President and the Prime ilinister agreed on 
the importance of continuing the joint effort of the 
free nations united in the Noi"th Atlantic Treaty 
Organization to the preservation of world peace. 
Each reaffirmed the conviction of his Government 
that the free nations must be strong in order to 
make the world safe from aggression. Prime 
Minister de Gasperi reaffirmed that the Italian 
people are fully determined to continue their ef- 
forts for the common cause. He described Italy's 
particular need to strengthen its economic position 
as part of its general defense effort. President 
Truman assured the Prime Minister that the 
United States, as in the past, will continue to assist 
Italy and the other Allies in achieving economic 
and social stability and in increasing their 
capacity for defense. He agreed with Mr. de 
Gasperi that the defense of Europe is vital to the 
preservation of the free world. 

Mr. de Gasperi referred to the contradictions be- 
tween the spirit of the Italian peace treaty and 
Italy's present position as an equal member of the 
community of free nations. He informed the 
President of the legitimate desire of the Italian 
people that these contradictions be removed. The 
Prime Minister also expressed satisfaction at the 
opportunity he has had to exchange views on the 
question with the Secretary of State, as well as 
with the British and French Foreign Ministers. 
The President assured the Prime Minister that the 
United States Government is determined that the 
situation he had described be corrected in a spirit 
of equity and friendship. He expressed confi- 
dence that the consideration now being given to 
this matter would be satisfactorily concluded. 

The Prime Minister stressed, and the President 
recognized, the importance to the Italian people 

of the Trieste question, in regard to which the 
policies of both Governments are well-known. The 
question was fully taken into consideration. 

Mr. de Gasperi emphasized to the President the 
seriousness of the problem of overpopulation in 
Italy and informed him of the Italian Govern- 
ment's efforts toward finding international solu- 
tions to the related problem of resettlement. The 
President assured the Prime Minister that the 
United States fully recognizes the urgency of 
reaching international agreements which will help 
alleviate distress in overpopulated countries such 
as Italy and contribute to the development of other 

The President and the Prime Minister each ex- 
pressed gratification at the opportunity given by 
the latter's visit to reaffirm the friendship and 
identity of views of the two nations. They stated 
the determination of their respective Governments 
to continue to work for a peace based on the prin- 
ciples of the United Nations Charter, to which each 
is dedicated. 


[Released to the press September 26] 

The President of the United States, the Secre- 
tary of State, and the Prime Minister of Italy have 
met during the past 3 days and had a full exchange 
of views on questions of mutual interest to both 
countries. For the discussion of economic mat- 
ters, the Acting Administrator of the Economic 
Cooperation Administration, ^Ir. [Richard M.] 
Bissell. and the Minister of the Italian Budget, 
Mr. [Giuseppe] Pella, joined the gi'oup. At the 
conclusion of the conversations, the Secretary of 
State and the Prime Minister issued the following 
statement : 

Conversations were held in the spirit of friend- 
ship and cooperation which governs the relations 
between the United States and Italy. They re- 
vealed continuing agreement between the govern- 
ments of the two countries on common objectives 
and means of achieving them. 

The Secretary of State and the Prime Minister 
reviewed the general international situation, and 
agreed that both nations, jointly with the other 

October 8, 7957 


free nations, must devote their entire energies to 
achieving peace with security. They agreed fur- 
ther on the need for positive action to bring to- 
gether the peoples and governments of the Atlan- 
tic community. The Secretary of State and the 
Prime Minister reviewed the steps already taken 
to bring about a closer association of the Western 
European nations, including the German Federal 
Republic and a European defense force, and the 
Prime Minister expressed to the Secretary of 
State Italy's determination to lend cooperation 
fully in these efforts. 

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
as a means of regional defense under the United 
Nations Charter and its particular importance 
in closer political and economic cooperation be- 
tween both Western European and Mediterranean 
nations were fully recognized. They also recog- 
nized that the Mediterranean area is essential to 
the common defense, and welcomed the steps that 
had been taken at the recent meeting of the North 
Atlantic Council at Ottawa. 

The Secretary of State reiterated the determi- 
nation of the United States to press for Italy's 
admission into the United Nations in order that 
Italy may cooperate to the fullest extent in the 
maintenance of peace and the removal of causes 
of international tension. 

The Secretary of State assured the F'rime Min- 
ister that his request on behalf of the Italian 
people for removal of the restrictions and dis- 
criminations in the Italian peace treaty has been 
given most favorable consideration by the United 
States Government. The declaration by the 
United Kingdom, France, and the United States 
on this subject has been published. The Secre- 
tary of State expressed hope that all the govern- 
ments signatory to the treaty would give their full 
concurrence to this declaration. 

Regarding Trieste, both the Prime Minister and 
the Secretary of State agreed that a solution to 
this question would greatly strengthen unity of 
Western Europe. As stated in the conversation 
between the Prime Minister and the President, the 
policies of both governments on this question are 
well known. The solution should take into ac- 
count the legitimate aspirations of the Italian 

The Prime Minister described the urgency of 
measures to assist in the full utilization of Italian 
manpower resources. The Secretary of State ex- 
pressed complete imderstanding of the importance 
of this question and the readiness of the United 
States Government to cooperate in its solution. 
He informed the Prime Minister that the United 
States will cooperate with other governments hav- 
ing an interest in evolving practical plans for an 
international organization to consider and put into 
effect concrete plans for the solution of the related 
problems of Italian and European overpopulation. 

The economic problems common to the two 
countries were reviewed in detail by the repre- 


sentatives of the two governments. On the Amer- 
ican side, great satisfaction was expi'essed at the 
progress made in strengthening Italy's economic 
and financial situation. The Prime Minister was 
assured that it is the intention of the United States 
Government to contribute as in the past, within the 
limits of the funds appropriated to this end by 
Congress, the military and economic aid necessary 
to support the Italian effort to develop greater 
economic strength, social stability, and capacity 
for defense of its freedom and independence. 

Particular attention was given to the idle capac- 
ity existing in some sectors of Italian industry, and 
to the possibility of the United States Government 
placing orders for additional defense production 
which will contribute to a speedier and fuller 
Italian participation in the production effort of 
the Nato countries and which will increase the 
level of employment in Italy. 

Assurance was given of United States help in 
getting priorities for the equipment necessary to 
increase the production of electric power and steel 
in Italy. 

The Secretary of State and Minister Pella 
signed an agreement supplementing the Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation of 1948, 
which will provide for an increased flow of invest- 
ments between the two countries. 

This friendly and exhaustive exchange of views, 
both on political and economic matters, confirmed 
the determination of the two countries to further, 
in concert with other democratic Nations, their 
close cooperation in order to solve effectively the 
problems of welfare, security, and peace. 


Address by the President > 

On behalf of the American people, I am happy 
to accept the gift of these four beautiful statues 
from the people of Italy. These statues were de- 
signed by American artists and made by Italian 
craftsmen. Italian foundries and Italian work- 
men, using the secrets of their craft that go back 
to the days of Michelangelo, cast these heroic fig- 
ures in bronze and covered them with gold. 

These statues bear witness to the artistic tradi- 
tions and the fine workmanship of the Italian 

Four of the workmen who made these bronze 
groups have come to this country for the cere- 
mony, and we are delighted to have them with us. 
We are also fortunate to have with us a representa- 
tive of the trade-union leaders of Italy who are 
striving for a free, democratic labor movement. 
These leaders are fighting in the cause of free 

' Made at Washington, D.C., on September 26 at the cere- 
mony dedicating the equestrian statues at Arlington Me- 
morial Bridge Plaza, and released to the press by the 
White House on the same date. 

Deparfment of State Bulletin 

trade unions and free people everj-where. The 
presence here of these Italian citizens testifies to 
the friendship and trust between the people of 
Italy and the people of the United States in the 
struggle for himian freedom. 

Ever since the war, our two countries have been 
working together to preserve world peace. We 
have been seeking to create economic conditions 
that will make it possible for all men to do useful 
work and live their lives in freedom. The Italian 
people have made great progress. Mr. Prime 
Minister, since your last visit to Washington in 

Your people have made progress in agriculture 
and industry. Industi'ial production in Italy is 
now- 45 percent higher than it was in 1947. Elec- 
tric-power production is almost double what it 
was before the war. You have been moving for- 
ward in land reclamation and Hood control. 

But this is not all. Italy is engaged in a pro- 
gram of economic and social reforms. Low-cost 
housing developments have been started. Land 
reform is giving thousands of farmers a new 
stake in the land they work. The whole island 
of Sardinia has been freed from the scourge of 
malaria and as a result offers new and greater 
opportunities for economic development. 

We in the United States regard steps like these 
as vitally important. We believe most deeply that 
the benefits of economic progress and increased 
production should be made available to all the 

That is why we are so glad to see the new devel- 
opments that are taking place in Italy today. 
Italy is making progress by evolution and not by 
revolution. And it is progress that benefits the 
ordinary citizen. We are confident that the firm 
devotion to freedom and democratic principles 
that has guided you, Mr. Prime Minister, and your 
colleagues in office, will result in further advances 
for the Italian people. 

Through these difficult years since the war, the 
Italian people have proved their right to partici- 
pate fully — and as equal partners — in the great 
constructive tasks of the free world. 

During your conferences here, Mr. Prime Min- 
ister, we have discussed ways in which our two 
countries can continue to work together in the 
effort of the free nations for peace and human 

It is clear that Italy cannot do its full share in 
this effort under the existing restrictions of the 
Italian peace treaty. As it stands, the treaty does 
not give Italy the position of equality among the 
free nations to which it is now entitled. Among 
other things, the treaty places unnecessary 
shackles on Italian efforts for the common defense 
of the conununity of free nations. We intend to 
do everything we can to see that these unfair re- 
strictions and discriminations are removed. 

AVe also intend to keep on working for the ad- 
mission of Italy to the United Nations. If the 

Soviet LTnion keeps on vetoing Italy'.s member- 
ship, other ways must be found to enable Italy to 
play a full and equal part in upholding the princi- 
ples of the United Nations. 

In the economic field, we realize that one of 
Italy's biggest problems is surplus manpower — 
and that jobs and homes must be found in other 
lands for many of those who cannot be employed 
in Italy. The history of the United States shows 
that a nation is most fortunate if it can obtain 
the energies and skills of Italian immigi'ants. I 
hope we can set up an effective international pro- 
gram to help solve Italy's problems of surplus 
manpower. There are many places in the world 
where people from Italy are needed and where 
they can lay the foundations for a prosperous 
future for themselves and their children. 

In addition to idle manpower, Italy has fac- 
tories which could be used for defense production 
if they were not hampered by shortages of mate- 
rials and lack of foreign exchange. When fac- 
tories and workers in Italy stand idle, that is a 
needless loss to the strength of the free world. 
Acting together, our governments must take steps 
to use the resources of Italy's manpower and in- 
dustrial pi'oduction as fully as possible in the 
great mobilization effort of the free nations for 

The future of Italy lies not only in domestic 
progress but also in closer ties and greater unity 
with the free nations that are its neighbors. We 
have followed with great interest the efforts of 
Italian statesmen to bring about a greater sense 
of European unity, based on moral and cultural 
values. We expect Italy, with its great religi- 
ous and cultural heritage, to take a leading part in 
that effort. 

Greater unity in defense, gi^eater unity in eco- 
nomic effort, the removal of obsolete national bar- 
riers from the North Sea to the Mediterranean — 
these are things that are needed to ])rovide not 
only security, but social and economic advance- 
ment for the peoples of Europe. 

Only by such changes can we preserve the fun- 
damental values of the past. Only by such a com- 
bined effort can we counter the menace of Soviet 
aggression. Only through sucli cooperation by 
all, can we raise the living standards and increase 
the opportunities of any single nation. 

In these great tasks, Mr. Prime Minister, we 
wish the Italian people good fortune and speedy 
success. Rest assured that we are with you, and 
will do all we can to help. 

Remarks by Secretary Acheson 

[Released to the press September 26] 

Following are the rem/irks of Secretary Ache- 
son in introducing the Prime Minister of Italy, 
Alcide de Gasperi: 

"History," wrote Thomas Carlyle, "is the es- 
sence of innumerable biographies. 

Ocfober 8, 1 95 1 


Certainly one of those whose lives must figure 

Srominently in the histoi-y of these times is Alcide 
e Gasperi, President of the Council of Ministers 
and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy. 

Throughout his lifetime, Mr. de Gasperi has 
been identified with the cause of freedom and his 
country's independence. In the difficult years 
since his rise to the position of Italy's first Minis- 
ter, Mr. de Gasperi has continued to demonstrate 
the courage and the wisdom which have always 
been associated with his name. 

In recent weeks I have had the pleasure of know- 
ing at first hand the qualities of mind and of per- 
son which have enabled Mr. de Gasperi to fulfill 
so distinguished a role in the history of Italy, and, 
indeed, of all Europe. 

This privilege I now take pleasure in sharing 
with all of you. 

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen — His Ex- 
cellency, Prime Minister de Gasperi. 

Address by Prime Minister de Gasperi 

A few months ago at Florence I delivered one 
of these statues to Ambassador Dunn before it was 
shipped to the United States. 

ISow, here, we have all four grouped in front 
of us, and I think that, in a certain way, they fit 
into the general picture of our meetings and of my 
visit to the United States. For here you have por- 
trayed Spiritual Elevation, the Arts, Agriculture, 
Gallantry, and Sacrifice. 

Surely all this can stand for the spiritual and 
material development of man, his humanity, his 
traditions, and his free determination to defend 
them if threatened. 

That is our common objective and the aim of our 
Atlantic community. 

But they represent something more — I mean the 
gratitude of us Italians for the generosity of the 
American people. 

These statues, a remarkable expression of mod- 
ern American art, were cast and finished in four 
different cities — Naples, Florence, Milan, Kome — 
by artisans and workers coming from all parts of 
Italy, some of whom are here with us today. To- 
gether, these groups represent, not only the gift of 
a Government, but the action and the skilled con- 
tribution of Italian industry and labor which have 
been so efficiently supported, throughout the land, 
by the Marshall Plan assistance. 

This aid is but one of the many proofs of United 
States friendship. It would be easy for me to re- 
call others. Suffice it to mention the recent evi- 
dence we have had in these days that we can count 
on the sympathetic and effective cooperation of 
the American people represented by their Presi- 
dent and their Government. 

We have, in fact, examined with you, Mr. Presi- 
dent, and with your Government many and com- 
plex problems which go from the economic and 
financial cooperation between our two Govern- 


ments to the legitimate claims of Italy and the 
solution to that which, perhaps, is the most im- 
portant problem — overpopulation. In the frame- 
work of our close cooperation and cordial friend- 
ship, the solution of these problems has accom- 
plished considerable progress during the course of 
the conversations of these recent days. 

You and we, in facing and resolving these prob- 
lems, aim above all at attaining a better general 
settlement of advantage to the interests of the 
community of free nations. 

We cannot, however, underestimate the fact that 
this genuine, loyal, and constructive friendship 
between our two countries is one of the most prom- 
ising elements in these troubled times. 

It is, therefore, with pleasure that, on behalf 
of the President of the Italian Republic and of my 
Government and — I am certain — of all Italians in 
Italy and the world over, I offer you, Mr. Presi- 
dent, this token of deep gratitude. 

At the same time, I formulate the sincere wish 
that your country and mine, under the banner of 
freedom and justice and in prosperity may always 
work together for democracy, progress, and peace. 


Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, and Members of 
Congress, it is a high honor for me to speak in 
this assembly, this great stronghold of world 
democracy. The events of my political life 
have led me to experience different regimes, 
to sustain struggles for national independence 
and freedom, to witness the suppression of the 
democratic parliamentary system, and finally to 
see the triumph of our free institutions. My 
past therefore lends weight to my testimony 
when I say that the American Congress has shone 
in the last 40 years as a beacon of light which has 
drawn wandering humanity back on the path of 
democratic progress. Here, in the darkest days, 
resounded the guiding voices of the Presidents 
of the United States ; here you Members of Con- 
gress took the most important decisions for 

As a democrat, as a European, as an Italian, I 
pay tribute to the greatness of your providential 

You have admirably and generously accom- 
plished this mission by intervening at decisive 
moments with the armed forces of liberation. 
You have accomplished it in peace and in war, by 
encouraging resistance, appealing to moral forces, 
recalling to peoples their common heritage of 
human dignity and reviving the feeling of brother- 

' Made on Sept. 24 and printed from Cong. Rec. of Sept. 
24, 1951, p. 12233. 

Department of Stale Bulletin 

liness which knows no inequalities, neither before 
God nor before men. 

How many times, Honorable Members of Con- 
gress, how many times bent under oppression or 
tyranny, did we raise our hearts and our hopes 
by meditatino; on those words of the Declaration 
of Independence : 

We hold these truths to be self-evident : th:it all men are 
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator 
with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. 

By these truths and by your faith in those 
human rights you were impelled to act and to in- 
tervene in far away countries, where freedom was 
in peril. The actions of peojile are complex : 
good and evil, egoism and unselfishness may 
alternatively affect their course. But the basic 
idea, the underlying force that provides the im- 
pulse is but one : yours is not imperialism, it is 
not a spirit of conquest. It is your love for free- 
dom which — as Lincoln wrote to a compatriot of 
ours — unlike the pattern of the French Revolu- 
tion, upholds the rights of citizens, but also has a 
moral content because it sanctions their duties. 

What is. after all, your endeavor to set up the 
United Nations, if not an effort to overcome con- 
flicts and war on the basis of equality and reason? 
And since on the opposite side unity is not desired 
and dissension is fostered, what is the Atlantic 
Pact if not another attempt at solidarity among 
men of good will in building a free world and de- 
fending it — if attacked — by the force of arms? 

I have just paid homage to the Unknown Soldier, 
the symbol of all those who died in your wars and 
in ours. Before that monument I thought of all 
the fallen of yours and of ours, who lie in the ceme- 
teries of Italy and I thought of all the sacrifices 
that have been made. None of those dead sol- 
diers — as reads that superb inscription — is un- 
known to God; and all must have their place in 
the hearts of the nations who have fought, and 
are still fighting, for right against aggression. 
The Italian people feel that this iron law of soli- 
darity in defense is the price of freedom and of 

Should they be faced with an a<rgression which 
all attempts at conciliation had failed to avert, the 
Italian people would stand by to give their con- 
tribution to common defense. 

Nobody can believe that free men such as you 
are, men who have had an intimate experience of 
the evils of war as we have had, can look to war 
as the solution of our problems. 

A well-known British author recalls in his book, 
Diplomacy, a very ancient address delivered by 
King Arcliidamus about 2,300 years ago to the 
Lacedaemonians at the Conference of Sparta : 

I have not, oh Lacedaemonians, reached the age that I 
have, without having gained experience in many wars. 
There are some among you of the same age as myself, 
who will not make the unfortunate mistake of imagining 
in their ignorance that war is a desirable thing, or that 
it brings with it either advantage or security. 

We who have gone through two world wars know 
that we must avert a third. 

Members of this Congres.s, this is also your will 
as well as the intention of President Truman. But 
it is now clear that we cannot avoid war unless we- 
achieve a balance of forces. I would say that re- 
armament, a reasonable rearmament, is not in con- 
trast with, but it is in Europe a condition for, re- 
construction, in the same way as economic re- 
covery, as laid down by the Marshall plan, aims 
at insuring the defense of freedom and democracy. 

In shouldering such considerable sacrifices on 
behalf of tite United States ])eople in view of our 
economic survival, Congress has achieved much in 
the way of defense. It has won the first battle. 
Not all our goals have been reached, it is true. But 
it is also true that without your generous contribu- 
tion Europe, at least most certainly the anti- 
Comnuinist front line of continental Europe, 
would already have collapsed. I fully realize the 
heavy sacrifices of your countrymen, but President 
Truman has rightly stated: 

The best way to stop subversion by the Kremlin is to 
strike at the roots of social injustice and economic dis- 

We in Italy, a land of small means but of great 
traditions, have gone a long way toward recon- 
struction and social justice. Public order has been 
restored and the level of purchasing power has 
been strenuously defended. These two achieve- 
ments were a prerequisite for any further develop- 
ment. For it is clear that no social reform, no bold 
program of public works can be successfully imple- 
mented, if the Government is unable to protect the 
democratic institutions against revolutionary at- 
tempts and if the country has no confidence in the 
currency. After a tremendous inflation which cut 
the prewar lira down to one-fiftieth of its value, 
monetary stability was essential. Within the 
limits imposed by this basic requirement, economic 
recovery was successfully promoted. Production 
is 30 percent higher than the prewar level. Food 
consumption per cajiita has attained its prewar 
level. A large-scale land reforui has been planned 
and is now being gradually enforced. A full fiscal 
reform has also been enacted by Parliament and 
will be enforced before the end of this year. 

We are endeavoring to carry on simultaneously 
our program of social reforms and our rearma- 
ment program. This is not easy in my country. 
In Italy, taxation absorbs already more than 21 
percent of the national income. But our national 
income is one-seventh of the American citizen's 
income. Hence every further cut in consumption 
incides on essential living connnodities. 

We are striving to increase employment at home 
and to find new outlets for our labor abroad : an 
arduous task in a country which has about 2,000,- 
000 unemploved, out of an active population of 
about 21,000.000. 

We ask you to assist us. We are a proletarian 

Ocfober 8, ?957 


Nation which above all needs work : work at home 
on orders for civilian or military supplies, and 
work abroad through temporary or permanent em- 
ployment of our sui'plus manpower. You are 
first-hand witnesses of the industriousness of our 

However, we would not come to you urged only 
by material needs. If we did, we would not de- 
serve consideration nor your friendship. But as 
freemen to freemen we wish to tell you we are 
grateful to you because by demanding the revision 
of our unfair peace treaty, you have acknowledged 
that an effective and stanch alliance cannot exist 
without equality of rights and full recognition of 
the independence, sovereignty, and dignity of a 

I thank you for the action taken by many Mem- 
bers of Congress and I hope that through the wis- 
dom of the President this matter will be brought 
to a successful end. 

None of you sliould think that we are victims of 
a narrow nationalism. 

If we ask for the question of Trieste to be finally 
solved in the framework of the Anglo-French- 
American Declaration of 1948, it is because we 
want to consolidate our western coalition in 
Europe. It is because we want to create a front 
where old difficulties may no longer exist, and thus 
solidly establish the bulwark of European unity 
behind this common alinement of forces. 

Europe, once finally united, will relieve you of 
your sacrifices in men and arms for Europe, for she 
will by herself contrive the defense of her peace 
and the common freedom. 

Rallying the exhaustless energies of her moral 
and civil traditions, she, Europe, will, then, gen- 
tlemen, again take her turn in impressing on the 
course of human progress the mark of her de- 
cisive contribution. 

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, honorable Members 
of Congress, this assembly deserves the gratitude 
of all free peoples. Italy, through me here, re- 
news this expression of her thankfulness and re- 
states her solemn pledge of cooperation. 

May God assist us in our work for the salvation 
of freedom. 


[Released to the press Septemher 25] 

An agreement supplementing the Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation of Febru- 
ary 2, 1948, between the United States and the 
Italian Eepublic was signed on September 25 at 
Washington. The Secretary of State signed for 
this Government and Giuseppe Pella, Minister of 
the Budget, for Italy. The agreement rounds out 
the comprehensive rules governing general eco- 
nomic relations between the two countries estab- 
lished by the treaty of 1948. The main objective 

of the agreement is to encourage the flow of private 
capital investment by providing more fully for the 
transfer of capital, earnings and other funds, and 
by amplifying the principles of equitable treatment 
set forth in the treaty. The agreement is subject 
to ratification by the two Governments. When it 
becomes effective it will form an integral part of 
the treaty of 1948. 

The agreement was signed at the conclusion of 
several days of discussions between the Secretary 
of State and Italian Prime Minister de Gasperi, 
on matters of mutual interest to the two countries. 
It expresses the common interest manifested dur- 
ing those talks in closer economic relations be- 
tween the two countries, both for their own 
advantage and as a contribution to greater 
economic collaboration within the North Atlantic 

The agreement contains nine articles amplifying 
various provisions of the treaty of 1948 or estab- 
lishing mutually agreed standards in matters not 
covered by that treaty. These articles deal with 
such diverse subjects as the transfer of funds, the 
application of exchange regulations, the fair and 
nondiscriminatory treatment of legally acquired 
rights, and interests of citizens and coriiorations 
of one country within the territories of the other, 
the employment of technical personnel, social se- 
curity, and commercial arbitration. A special 
feature is article V, which confirms to United 
States investments in Italy the advantages con- 
ferred by special Italian domestic legislation for 
the development of southern Italy and of partic- 
ular industrial areas. 


The United States of America and the Italian Republic, 
desirous of giving added encouragement to investments of 
the one country in useful undertakings in the other coun- 
try, and being cognizant of the contribution which may 
be made toward this end by amplification of the principles 
of equitable treatment set forth In the Treaty of Friend- 
ship, Commerce and Navigation signed at Rome on Febru- 
ary 2, 1948, have resolved to conclude a supiilementary 
Agreement, and for that purpose have ajipointed as their 

The President of the United States of America : 

Dean Acheson, Secretary of State of the United States 
of America, 
The President of the Italian Republic : 
Giuseppe Pella, 
Minister of the Budget 
of the Italian Republic. 
Who, having communicated to each other their full 
powers found to be in due form, have agreed as follows : 

Article I 

The nationals, corporations and associations of either 
High Contracting Party shall not be subjected to arbitrary 
or discriminatory measures within the territories of the 
other High Contracting Party resulting particularly in: 
(a) preventing their effective control and management of 
enterprises wliich they have been permitted to establish or 


Department of State Bulletin 

acquire therein; or (b) impairinR their other legally 
acquired rights and interests in smh enterprises or in the 
investments which they have made, whether in the form 
of funds (loans, shares or otherwise), materials, equip- 
ment, services, processes, patents, techniques or otherwise. 
Each High Contracting Party undertakes not to discrimi- 
nate against nationals, corporations and associations of 
the other High Contracting I'arty as to their obtaining 
under normal terras the ca|)ital, manufacturing processes, 
skills and technology which may be needed for economic 

Articu: II 

With reference to Article I, paragraph 2 (c), of the 
said Treaty of Friendsliip, Commerce and Navigation, laws 
regarding qualifieations for the practice of a professicm 
shall not prevent the nationals, corporations and associa- 
tions of either High Contracting Party from engaging, or 
contracting for the services of. technical and administra- 
tive experts for the particular purpose of making, ex- 
clusively within the enterprise, examinations, audits and 
technical investigations for, and rendering reports to, 
such nationals, corporations and associations in connec- 
tion with the planning and operation of their enterprise, 
and enterprises in which they have a financial interest, 
within tlie territories of the other High Contracting I'arty. 

Article III 

1. Regarding the transferability of capital invested by 
nationals, corporations and associations of either High 
Contracting Party in the territories of the other, and the 
returns thereon, the High Contracting Parties undertake 
to grant each other the most liberal treatment practicable. 

2. Each High Contracting Party will permit the na- 
tionals, corporations and associations of the other High 
Contracting Party to tran.sfer freely, by obtaining ex- 
change in the currency of their own country : 

(a) Earnings, whether in the form of salaries, interest, 
dividends, commissions, royalties, payments for 
technical services or otherwise, and funds for amor- 
tization of loans and depreciation of direct invest- 
ments, and 

(b) Funds for capital transfers. 

If more than one rate of exchange is in force, the rate ap- 
plicable to transfers referred to in the present paragraph 
shall be a rate which is specifically approved by the In- 
ternational Monetary Fund for such transactions or, in the 
absence of such specifically approved rate, an effective rate 
which, inclusive of any tax or surcharges on exchange 
transfers, is just and reasonable. 

Article IV 

1. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article III of the 
present Agreement, each High Contracting Party shall re- 
tain the right, in periods of foreign exchange stringency, 
to apply: (a) exchange restrictions to the extent neces- 
sary to assure the availability of foreign exchange for 
payments for goods and services essential to the health 
and welfare of its people; (b) exchange restrictions to 
the extent necessary to prevent its monetary reserves 
from falling to a very low level or to effect a moderate in- 
crease in very low monetary reserves; and (c) particular 
exchange restrictions specifically authorized or requested 
by the International Monetary Fund. In the event that 
either HlLrh Contracting' I'arty applies exchange restric- 
tions, it shall within a iieriod of three months make rea- 
sonable and specific provisions for the transfers referred 
to in Article III. ijaragraph 2 (a), together with such 
provisions for the transfers referred to in Article III, 
paragraph 2 (b), as may be feasible, giving consideration 
to special needs for other transactions, and shall afford 
the other High Contracting Party adequate opportunity 
for consultation at any time regarding such provisions 
and other matters affecting such transfers. Such provi- 
sions shall be reviewed in consultation with such other 
High Contracting Party at intervals of not more than 
twelve months. 

2. The provisions of the present Article, rather than 
those of Article XXIV, paragraph 1 (f) of the said 
Treaty, shall govern as to matters treated in the present 

Article V 

In addition, and without prejudice to the other pro- 
visions of the present Agreement or of the said Treaty, 
there shall be applied to the investments made in Italy 
tlie regulations covering the special advantages set forth 
in tlie fields of taxation, customs and transportation rates, 
for the industrialization of Southern Italy under Law 
No. 1598 of December 14, 1948, and for the development 
of the Apuanian industrial area and the industrial areas 
of Verona, Gorizia, Trieste, Leghorn, Marghera, Bolzano 
and other areas covered by tiie Italian legislation now 
existing or which may in the future be adopted. 

Article VI 

The clauses of contracts entered into between nationals, 
coriwrations and associations of either High Contracting 
Party, and nationals, corporations and a.ssociations of 
the other High Contracting Party, that provide for the 
settlement by arbitration of controversies, shall not be 
deemed unenforceable within the territories of the other 
High Contracting Party merely on the grounds that the 
place designated for the arbitration proceedings is out- 
side such territories, or that the nationality of one or 
more of the arbitrators is not that of such other High 
Contracting Party. No award duly rendered pursuant to 
any such contractual clause, which is final and enforce- 
able under the laws of the place where rendered, shall 
be deemed invalid or denied effective means of enforce- 
ment within the territories of either High Contracting 
Party merely on the grounds that the place where such 
award was rendered is outside such territories or that the 
nationality of one or more of the arbitrators is not that 
of such High Contracting Party. It is understood that 
nothing herein shall he construed to entitle an award to 
be executed within the territories of either High Contract- 
ing Party until after it has been duly declared enforceable 

Article VII 

1. The two High Contracting Parties, in order to pre- 
vent gaps in the social insurance i)rotcction of their resiiec- 
tivc nationals who at different times accumulate sub- 
stantial iteriods of coverage under the principal old-age 
and survivors insurance system of one High Contracting 
Party and also under the corresponding system of the 
other High Contracting Party, declare their adherence to 
a policy of permitting all such periods to be taken into 
account under either such .system in determining the 
rights of such nationals and of their families. The High 
Contracting Parties will make the necessary arrangements 
to carry out this policy in accordance with the following 
principles : 

(a) Such periods of coverage shall be combined only 
to the extent that they do not overlap or duplicate 
each other, and only insofar as both systems provide 
comparable types of benefits. 

(b) In cases where an individual's periods of coverage 
are combined, the amount of benefits, if any, pay- 
able to him by either High Contracting Party shall 
be determined In such a manner as to represent, 
so far as practicable and equitable, that proportion 
of the individual's combined coverage which was 
accumulated under the system of that High Con- 
tracting Party. 

(c) An individual may elect to have his right to bene- 
fits, and the amount thereof, determined without 
regard to the provisions of the present paragraph. 

Such arrangements may provide for the extension of the 
present paragraph to one or more special old-age and 
survivors insurance systems of either High Contracting 
Party, or to permanent or extende<l disability insurance 
systems of either High Contracting I'arty. 

Ocfober 8, J 95 7 


2. At such time as the Maintenance of Migrants' Pen- 
sion Rights Convention of 1935 enters into force with 
respect to both High Contracting Parties, the provisions 
of that Convention shall supersede, to the extent that they 
are inconsistent therewith, paragraph 1 of the present 
Article and arrangements made thereunder. 

Article VIII 

Each High Contracting Party shall accord sympathetic 
consideration to, and shall afford adequate opportunity 
for consultation regarding, such questions as the other 
High Contracting Party may raise with respect to any 
matter affecting the operation of the present Agreement 
or of the said Treaty. 

Article IX 

The present Agreement shall be ratified, and the ratifica- 
tions thereof shall be exchanged at Washington as soon 
as possible. It shall enter into force on the day of ex- 
change of ratifications, and shall thereupon constitute an 
integral part of the said Treaty of Friendship, Commerce 
and Navigation. 

In witness whereof the re-spective Plenipotentiaries 
have signed the present Agreement and have affixed here- 
unto their seals. 

Done in duplicate, in the English and Italian languages, 
both equally authentic, at Washington, this twenty-sixth 
day of September, one thousand nine hundred fifty-one. 

Removal of Certain Restrictions 
From Italian Treaty Favored 

Declaration hy U.S., France, and TJ.K. 
[Released to the press Septemher 26] 

The Governments of the United States, France, 
and the United Kingdom have considered for some 
time how best to resolve, in the interests of the 
harmonious development of cooperation between 
the free nations, the problem presented by the 
peace treaty with Italy. 

In accordance with the desire of the Italian 
people, Italy, which loyally cooperated with the 
Allies during the latter part of the war as a co- 
belligerent, has reestablished democratic institu- 
tions. In the spirit of the United Nations' Charter, 
Italy has invariably extended to other peaceful and 
democratic governments that cooperation indis- 
pensable to the solidarity of the free world. 

Nevertheless, although Italy has on three occa- 
sions received the support of the majority of mem- 
ber states voting in the General Assembly, it is still 
prevented by an unjustifiable veto from obtaining 
membership in tlie United Nations in spite of the 
provisions of the treaty and the Charter. 

Moreover, Italy is still subject under the peace 
treaty to certain restrictions and disabilities. 
These restrictions no longer accord with the situ- 
ation prevailing today nor with Italy's status as 
an active and equal member of the democratic and 
freedom-loving family of nations. 

Each of the three governments, therefore, de- 
clares hereby its readiness to give favorable con- 
sideration to a request from tlie Italian Govern- 

ment to remove so far as concerns its individual 
relations with Italy, and without prejudice to the 
rights of third parties, those permanent restric- 
tions and discriminations now in existence which 
are wholly overtaken by events or have no justifica- 
tion in present circumstances or affect Italy's ca- 
pacity for self-defense. 

Each of the three governments hereby reaffirms 
its determination to make every effort to secure 
Italy's membership in the United Nations. 

The three governments trust that this declara- 
tion will meet with the wide approval of the other 
signatories of the peace treaty and that they will 
likewise be prepared to take similar action. 

Military Aid Program for Indochina 

[Released to the press by Departments of State and De- 
fense September 23] 

Discussions which have been going on for the 
past week between General of the Army, Jean de 
Lattre de Tassigny, French High Commissioner 
in Indochina and Commander in Chief of the 
French Union Forces in Indochina, and officials 
of the Departments of Defense and State, were 
concluded September 22 in an atmosphere of cor- 
diality and unity of purpose. 

The participants were in complete agreement 
that the successful defense of Indochina is of great 
importance to the defense of all Southeast Asia. 
United States officials stated that General de Lat- 
tre's presentation of the situation in that area had 
been invaluable to them and had demonstrated 
that United States and French policies in the as- 
sociated states were not at variance. 

In the coui'se of the discussions with the Depart- 
ment of Defense, the military-aid program for 
Indochina was reexamined, with the result that 
considerable imjirovement will be made in the rate 
of deliveries of many items of equipment. Gen- 
eral de Lattre has been advised that the question 
of additional aid for the French and Vietnamese 
forces in Indochina in the fiscal year 1952 program 
is under study by the United States Government. 


U.S. Proposes New Convention for Free- 
dom of Information — in the Bulletin of 
September 24, 1951, page 50-i, footnote 1 
should read "released to the press by the 
U. S. delegation to Ecosoc." 


Department of Sfafe Bulletin 

Participation of Greece and Turitey in NATO 


[Released to the press September 241 

The President on September 21 sent a message 
to the President of Turkey, Celal Bayar, express- 
ing gratification at the decision of the North At- 
lantic Council recommending that Greece and 
Turkey he in'-vited to become full members of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. On the 
same date he sent to Prime Minister Sophocles 
Venizelos of Greece a similar m-essage, delivered 
by Ambassador John E. Peurifoy. The following 
is the text of the message to President Bayar, 
which was delivered by Ambassador George Wads- 

I wish to convey to you my deep personal grati- 
fication, as well as that of my Government, at the 
decision of the North Atlantic Treaty Council, 
meeting in Ottawa, that subject to ratification by 
their governments they would extend to Turkey an 
invitation to become a full member of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization. I am sure that you 
have by this time received from the President of 
tlie Council a formal notification of this action.^ 

I am particularly pleased with this decision be- 
(■;uise I know that it represents tlae fulfillment of a 
deep desire on the part of the Turkish Government 
and Turkish people, and a recognition of the 
valiant efforts Turkey has made in the postwar 
period to maintain her independence and integrity 
in the face of persistent threats and pressures. We 
have, as you know, long had the desire that Turkey 
be invited to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. 
We have had the firm conviction tliat Turkey can 
contribute greatly to the objectives of the Treaty, 
which represents a milestone in the efforts of the 
Atlantic community to create a security system to 
protect their independence and their common 

Turkey will, I feel sure, benefit greatly from 
her membership in the Treaty Organization. As 
a signatory of the Treaty, Turkey will have the 

' Editor's Note. On Sept. 20, at the conclusion of the 
North Atlantic Council meeting at Ottawa (Bulletin of 
Oct. 1, 19.51, p. .523), Belgian I-'orcigu Minister Paul van 
Zeelantl, as President of the Council, orall.v notified the 
Anibas.sadors of Greece and Turkey to Canada of the 
Council's recommendation. 

same rights and, of course, will assume the same 
responsibilities as other members. We are glad 
that the excellent cooperation between your coun- 
try and ours, which has enabled us, since 1947, to 
assist in the building up of Turkey's economic and 
military strength, can now be fitted into the larger 
framework of the North Atlantic Treaty. 

It will take some time to meet the constitutional 
requirement for parliamentary ratification by the 
various governments, including our own, of the ac- 
tion taken by the Council before a formal invita- 
tion can be extended. I hope, however, that the 
time to achieve this can be reduced to a minimum. 

I wish to assure you once again of our pleasure 
at the prospect of welcoming Turkey into full 
membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organ- 
ization to which we attach such great significance. 
We look forward to working with Turkey in this 
organization to help build the bastions of the free 
world for defense against the Communist menace 
which Turkey knows so well. 


[Released to the press September 28] 

The U.S. representative on the North Atlantic 
Council of Deputies, Ambassador Charles M. 
Spofford, has received from President Truman the 
full powers which authorize him to sign for the 
United States the protocol on the admission of 
Greece and Turkey to Nato. 

At Ottawa last week, the North Atlantic Council 
agreed to recommend to the member governments 
that Greece and Turkey be invited to accede to the 
North Atlantic Treaty as soon as possible. This 
recommendation will be acted upon according to 
the respective national procedures of each country, 
whicli for the United States will involve the ad- 
vice and consent of the Senate. Adoption of the 
protocol which Mr. Spofford is now authorized to 
sign on behalf of the United States is a necessary 
step in tlie })rocedure agreed upon by the Council. 

The United States has acted promptly in au- 
thorizing its deputy to sign and hopes that signa- 
ture by the Council deputies on behalf of their 
respective Governments will further the process 
through which Greece and Turkey may become full 
members of Nato without delay. 

Ocfober 8, ?95J 


Queen Juliana Makes Plea 
For Assimilation of Refugees 

On September' 21 the Netherlands Ambassador, 
Dr. J. H. van Roijen presented the following let- 
ter from Queen Juliana of the Netherlands to 
President Ti'uman which was released to the press 
by the Netherlands Embassy on the same date : 

[September 11, 1951] 

In these postwar years I have been thinking 
more and more about the evergrowing problem of 
the refugees and the homeless in all parts of the 

Regardless of the causes for this distressing sit- 
uation I am deeply concerned with the needs of the 
refugees and the expellees and most of all of the 
residual groups which for a long time to come will 
be in the need of care and maintenance. 

I fully realize the magnificent and wonderful 
work which in the course of these years has been 
done and the results that have been achieved by 
Unrra, Iro, the churches and the voluntary 
agencies. In all these efforts the American people 
provided the greatest share as regards workers 
and means. We in the Netherlands try to do our 
share too, notwithstanding our own grave over- 

Iro is now finishing its task. A High Com- 
missioner has been appointed by the United Na- 
tions to provide international protection for large 
groups of refugees, but international protection is 
not enough. International machinery has been 
establi^ed for Korea and the Arab refugees, but 
elsewhere such machinery is lacking. There is no 
guarantee that material aid will be given to large 
groups of refugees who badly need it. Nor is it 
certain that the necessary measures will be taken 
designed to make possible the assimilation of 
nonresettleable refugees in the countries of their 

As the free nations are overburdened by the po- 
litical, military and economic issues of the day the 
refugee problem might vanish into the back- 

But you will surely agree that political ques- 
tions can be most dangerously aggravated by 
the discontentment and restlessness of millions 
which are numerous enough to populate a major 

In this uncertainty I put the problem before you 
in all its urgency for this moment and for the 
future. I would like to ask you to take the initia- 
tive for a new approach to cut this sore spot out of 
the body of humanity, where otherwise it will re- 
main an imminent, political danger. 

This can only be achieved, as I see it, by reliev- 
ing these people from their feeling of discontent- 
ment and frustration and so helping them to re- 
gain their independence and self-respect. I be- 
lieve that the best way to help them is by integrat- 

ing them into economic life in order to make them 
able to bear the responsibility for those who are 
dependent upon them. 

The assimilation of refugees must be the aim. 
In many cases this will require further material 
assistance, but — as you will agree — that can only 
be effective when given in a Christian spirit of 
mutual responsibility and love. Then only the 
individual will feel, that effective care is being 
taken of his problem in its different aspects, and 
that the sum total of his basic human rights, which 
the United Nations have proclaimed, is being im- 
plemented. I feel that in such a spirit only we 
can find a solution for this and other great human 

They should — so to speak — be looked at through 
the eyes of the social worker. Too often the 
refugees ai-e dealt with only on the basis of their 
value as a labor potential. Insofar as they are 
unable to work they are then considered as a lia- 
bility. We cannot, however, disregard the old, 
the sick, the disabled, and the children. Nor 
should we allow conditions under which families 
are being split up. As long as these things happen 
the world must seem to them a hostile place. This 
must embitter them deeply — and we all learn our 
lesson as to how embittered people are liable to 
adhere to totalitarian ideologies. 

In measures of relief, quality is still more im- 
portant than quantity, and here like always any 
therapy can only achieve results when applied 
in a spirit of respect for the freedom of each per- 
son and each people since only such freedom will 
enable them to play their part in the building of a 
sound world. 

Knowing how heavy the burden is on the shoul- 
ders of the President of the United States I have 
hesitated to approach you in this matter. How- 
ever I know that you not only see its political 
importance but that you also have the human 
understanding and the faith which are needed to 
tackle it. 

W. Averell Harriman Named 
To Special Committee of NAC 

[Released to the press hy the White House September 26] 

The President has appointed W. Averell Har- 
riman as U.S. representative to the Special North 
Atlantic Council Committee established Septem- 
ber 19 at Ottawa by the North Atlantic Council. 
The Committee's task will be to prepare a coordi- 
nated analysis of all Nato defense plans in relation 
to the political and economic capabilities of the 
member countries. 

This analysis will provide a basis for dealing 
with the complex problems which must be solved 
if the free world is to be assured of continued prog- 
ress in building its defenses. 

The Committee will make a progress report to 
the Council at its nest meeting. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Meeting Strength With Strength 

Address hy Philip C. Jesswp 
Amhassador-At-Large ^ 

It is a great pleasure for me to address a con- 
ference sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace. The Endowment's no- 
bility of jjurpose and breadth of accomplishment 
are known to all, and over the years my own small 
measure of participation in the work of the En- 
dowment has been a source of enduring satisfac- 
tion to me. 

I jiarticularly welcome this opportunity to 
address this Conference on World Affairs, because 
it is a confei'ence of educators and, as one who has 
spent most of his life as a teacher, I feel at home 
among you. The task you have set yourselves — 
to study American participation in world affairs 
and to formulate effective techniques for wide- 
spread American discussion of foreign problems — 
seems to me a task which is assiuning a greater 
urgency every day and every hour. Ours is a rep- 
resentative government. Accordingly. American 
foreign policy, like American domestic policy, 
must at all times reflect the collective will of the 
American people — a collective will which in turn 
reflects the best thinking of each constituent seg- 
ment of our national life. Those who mold the 
opinion of America — whether they be teachers, 
clergymen, journalists, statesmen, or leaders of 
farm, business, professional, or labor groups — are 
also those who mold the conscience and the pur- 
pose of America. On their dedication to their 
task, and on their humble devotion to the prin- 
ciples of good will which guide free men, there 
may depend — and I say this in all deliberation — 
the preservation of our country and our way of life. 
I have no doubt that the task will continue to be 
well done. 

There is something gravely ironic about speak- 
ing today on Soviet policy to a conference con- 
voked liy an Endowment for International Peace. 
The Endowment established half a century ago 

' Made before the Round Table on World Affair.s in 
Extension Education of the Carnegie Endowment for In- 
ternational Peace at Washington on Sept. 26 and released 
to the press on the same date. 

by the doughty Scottish steelworker is dedicated 
to "international peace" — genuine peace among 
free and equal nations. But the Soviet despotism 
established by Lenin and led for more than a quar- 
ter of a century by his ruthless Georgian successor 
is dedicated to a far different aim — the aggran- 
dizement of its power through the imposition 
of totalitarian communism, by stealth or force, 
upon the free peoples of the world. 

The aim of Andrew Carnegie is our aim and the 
aim of all free nations. It is the aim so vigorously 
and prayerfully enshrined in the Charter of the 
United Nations 6 years ago, when "We, the 
Peoples of the United Nations" affirmed our high 
resolve : 

to save succeeding generation!? from the scourge of war, 
which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow 
to mankind, and to reafBrni faith in fundamental human 
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in 
the equal rights of men and women and of nations large 
and small . . . 

Coping With Misguided Soviet Policy 

The Russians, as they are wont to remind us, 
were also signatories of the U.N. Charter; but it 
is sadly apparent that the high principles of the 
Charter mean something different when translated 
into Russian. Words like "democracy" and 
"peace" have a very different meaning when 
spoken by a Soviet representative. We have 
learned tlie Soviet meaning of peace from the bit- 
ter tragedies of the satellite countries — those chill 
and dimly lit anterooms of the Soviet prison. 
Peace on Soviet terms ignores "fundamental 
human rights . . . the dignity and worth of the 
human person . . . the equal rights of men and 
women and of nations large and small . . ." 
Peace on Soviet terms consists only of the brutal 
and silent domination of the master over the 
slave. For, behind the banners and the slogans, 
the clenched fists and the burni.shed bayonets, the 
Iron Curtain and the iron bars, we see that Soviet 
"peace," like Soviet "freedom," is but a new mask 

Oc/ofaer 8, J 95 J 


for the wrinkled face of imperialism, long since 
repugnant to free peoples everywhere. 

To know the nature of Soviet policy is not, how- 
ever, enough. We must ask ourselves what we can 
do about it. What, in short, is our policy and the 
policy of the free nations with whom, in this one 
world, our fate is inextricably linked? And in 
talking about "our policy" and that of our friends, 
I am not limiting myself to the conventional word 
"diplomacy" which appears in the title of our 
discussion today. I am talking rather of our 
composite policy — political, economic, and mili- 
tary—buttressed by that fundamental faith in 
human liberty and "human dignity without which 
our efforts would lack meaning and hope of ulti- 
mate success. . 

Briefly, what we can and what we must do m 
the face of the Soviet threat is to proceed reso- 
lutely upon our present course. In cooperation 
with our friends, we must continue to develop 
strength-in-being which will offset that of the 
Soviet Government and its satellites. The Soviets 
are realists. They recognize facts and respect 

To develop strength which is dedicated to the 
preservation of peace has been the unwavering 
policy of this Government ever since the Soviet 
Government revived its predatory purposes fol- 
lowing World War II. It is the policy which 
underlies the Truman Doctrine— the President's 
resolute aid to Greece and Turkey announced in 
1947. It is the policy which inspired the Marshall 
Plan, launched by General Marshall in 1948, for 
aid to the devastated nations of Europe— the plan 
which has matured into Eca, Point Four, and the 
Mutual Security Program. It is the policy which 
met Soviet force in Berlin with the great airlift 
in 1948. This policy produced the North Atlantic 
Treaty in 1949. It is the policy which underlies 
Secretary Acheson's program of "situations of 
strength" — the program charted in his Berkeley 
speech of March 16, 1950.^ It is the same policy 
which enabled us to act swiftly and decisively, in 
cooperation with the vast majority of our fellow 
members of the United Nations, in defense of 
Korea when it was wantonly attacked on June 25, 
19.50. For, whether or not the battle in that 
stricken land comes to an early end, the masters of 
the Kremlin have already learned that aggression 
against even the weakest of nations does not pay- 
that a union of free and united nations is stronger 
than its strongest link. It is a lesson which we 
learned from Ben Franklin long ago, and it is, I 
think, the proof of our policy of meeting strength 
with strength. 

Power of Free Nations Growing Stronger 

This combined strength of the free nations — the 
bargaining power which is the essential prerequi- 

' Bulletin of Mar. 27, 1950, p. 473. 

site for genuine international peace — is growing 
day by day. I think the leaders of the Soviet 
Government know this ; I think they know it be- 
cause they do have a realistic understanding of 
power. I also think they know it because their 
policy— their "diplomacy," if you will— has been 
so desperately and unsuccessfully directed toward 
isolating us from the other free nations of the 
world. And if they know the pace at which our 
strength has grown and continues to grow, their 
knowledge will carry with it the realization that 
their day of easy conquest is past — that they can- 
not divide and conquer the free nations one by one. 
What have been the concrete achievements of the 
policy and its manifestations to which I have 
referred ? 

Greece, aided by the Truman Doctrine, has 
thrown off the Communist-supported guerrilla at- 
tack, and both Greece and Turkey will, we expect, 
soon become joint partners in the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization. The economic recovery of 
Western Europe under the Marshall Plan has 
beaten down the Communist attempt to capture 
those countries from within through local Com- 
munist parties. As announced week before last by 
the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and France, the way has been 
paved for Western Germany to take her equal 
place in the community of free nations as a partner 
in its defensive strength and gi'owing prosperity. 
At Ottawa last week, the members of the North 
Atlantic community took further significant steps 
toward building its immediate strength and con- 
solidating its long-range solidarity in political, 
economic, social, and cultural matters. 

In Paris this spring at the meetings of the four 
deputies in the Palais Rose, the Russians learned 
that their efforts to drive a wedge between the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and France 
merely resulted in uniting us all the more firmly. 
This week, in conversations with Prime Minister 
de Gasperi, our long friendship with Italy is being 
further strengthened. 

In the Far East, as a result of the triumphant 
diplomacy of the San Francisco conference, so ably 
prepared "by John Foster Dulles, and guided with 
such distinction by Secretary Acheson, Japan will 
resume its place in the international community as 
a democratic, peace-loving, and peace-supporting 
member. Japan's readiness for this step is due not 
only to the efforts of its own people but to the mag- 
nificent leadership of General MacArthur. The 
security of the Pacific lias been strengthened by 
pacts with the Philippines, and with Australia, 
and New Zealand. In Indochina, with assistance 
from us and under the brilliant generalship of a 
recent visitor to Washington, General de Lattre 
de Tassigny, France and the Associated States 
have checked the Communist aggression of Ho Chi 
Minh. In Korea, the United Nations have taught 
the Communist aggressors a bitter lesson and 
denied them the fruits of aggression. 

Department of State Bulletir 

Above all, in the United Nations, the free na- 
tions have demonstrated over and over again their 
solidarity in the cause of peace and their rejection 
of the false and empty propaganda of the Soviets. 
They have agreed with us in refusing to allow 
the Chinese Communist aggressors to be seated in 
any of the 46 different U.N. bodies. They are 
working together in carrying out the Acheson 
Plan which was embodied in the General Assem- 
bly's resolution on "Uniting for Peace." 

If the Soviet leaders study carefully this catalog 
of present and continuing achievement, they may 
learn much. Particularly, they would do well to 
ponder three principles which guide the policy of 
the free nations of the world : 

1. The free nations cherish peace. But, deeply 
as we cherish peace, we cherish our freedom more. 
We will not be bullied, and, if attacked, we will 
fight to preserve our freedom. 

2. Because we cherish peace, because we have no 
wish to impose our ways on others, and because we 
believe in and welcome peaceful settlements of 
international differences as the only lasting settle- 
ments, we reject the delusive remedy of preventive 

3. To be prepared to defend our freedom, and to 
create that equal bargaining power which is the 
present prerequisite of any genuine settlement of 
international differences, we will, in concert with 
each other and in harmony with the principles of 
the United Nations, continue to strengthen the 
community of free nations. 

Even if the Soviet leaders continue to hide be- 
hind their Ii-on Curtain, these principles will en- 
dure. And to these principles we may add a 
corollary, but this the Soviet leaders will find it 
harder to understand : The free nations count their 
ultimate strength not merely in planes, and ships, 
and tanks, but in their faith in people — faith in the 
full liberty and equal worth of each man and 
woman. As long as we maintain that faith, we 
are impregnable. 

That faith will sustain us in the hard road that 
lies ahead of us. 

For making peace is not a "push-button'" matter. 
It takes sustained and patient effort. 

We are now building the strength and unity of 
free men. If we continue this task with unflag- 
ging determination, I believe we can face the fu- 
ture with confidence. 

Swiss Income Tax Convention 

IRclfiisrd fo the picts September 27] 

According to information received from the 
American Legation at Bern, ratifications of the 
convention signed with Switzerland May 24, 1951, 

regarding the avoidance of double taxation with 
respect to taxes on income were exchanged Sep- 
tember 27, 1951. 

The exchange of ratifications having taken place 
before October 1, under the terms of article XX 
(1) the convention becomes effective for taxable 
years beginning on or after January 1, 1951. 

The convention will continue effective for a 
period of 5 yeare beginning with 1951 and indefi- 
nitely after that period, but may be terminated by 
either country at the end of the 5-year period, or 
at any time thereafter, provided that at least 6 
months' prior notice of termination has been given. 

The convention is designed to eliminate, so far 
as possible, double taxation with respect to income. 
The taxes referred to in the convention are (a) in 
the case of the United States, the Federal income 
taxes, including surtaxes and excess profits taxes; 
and (b) in the case of the Swiss Confederation, 
the federal, cantonal, and communal taxes on in- 
come (total income, earned income, income from 
property, industrial, and commercial profits, etc.). 

The Senate gave its advice and consent to the 
ratification of the convention subject to a reserva- 
tion which reads as follows : "The Government of 
the United States of America does not accept 
paragraph (4) of Article X of the Convention, 
relating to the pi'ofits or remuneration of public 
entertainers." Switzerland has accepted the 

Friendship Treaty Witli Denmaric 

[Released to the press Octoter 1] 

A treaty of friendship, commerce, and naviga- 
tion between the United States and Denmark was 
signed on October 1 at Copenhagen. Ambassador 
Eugenie Anderson signed for the United States 
and Ole Bj0rn Kraft, Minister for Foreign Af- 
fairs, signed for Denmark. The event mai'ks the 
first occasion in the history of American diplo- 
macy where a woman as Ambassador has signed 
a treaty for the United States. 

The new treaty supersedes the convention of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, signed at 
Washington on April 26, 1826, which was the first 
treaty of any kind to be entered into between the 
United States and Denmark, and the only treaty 
dealing with general economic relations to have 
been concluded between the two countries up to 
the present time. Moreover, the convention of 
1826, signed by Henry Clay as Secretary of State 
during the administration of John Quincy Adams, 
is the second major economic treaty in terms of 
length of existence and continuing force con- 
cluded by the U.S. Government; it is antedated 
only by the 1815 treaty with Great Britain. 

Under the terms of the new treaty each of the 
two (governments (1) agrees to accord within its 
territories to citizens and corporations of the 
other, treatment no less favorable than it accords 

Ocfober 8, 195? 


to its own citizens and corporations with respect 
to normal industrial, commercial, and cultural 
pursuits; (2) formally endorses standards regard- 
ing the protection of persons, their property and 
interests that reflect the most enlightened legal 
and constitutional principles; (3) seeks to assist 
the private investor in such matters as the transfer 
of funds and management of business enterprises ; 
and, (4) reasserts its adherence to the principles 
of nondiscriminatory treatment of trade and 

The U.S. program for the negotiation of 
treaties of this type is an integral part of this 
country's policy for the furtherance of liberal 
principles of trade and economic relations in gen- 
eral, and particularly for creating throughout the 
world conditions favorable to economic develop- 
ment. The new treaty is the fifth to be concluded 
by the United States during the current year and 
the eighth since 1948 ; similar treaties have been 
concluded by the United States with Italy, Uru- 
guay, Ireland, Colombia, Greece, Israel, and 

The new treaty is the first friendship, com- 
merce, and navigation treaty to be entered into by 
the United States with a member of tlie North 
Atlantic community since the signing of the 
North Atlantic Treaty. The new treaty not only 
affirms and demonstrates the fundamental com- 
munity of interest between the United States and 
Denmark but is a practical illustration of cooper- 
ation between Nato countries on nonmilitary ob- 
jectives. The importance of this cooperation was 
stressed by Secretary Acheson on September 18 
at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council at 
Ottawa and later attested in the Ottawa Declara- 

The Secretary said : 

I think we can develop closer links in transportation and 
communications, and in the whole field of ideas. We can, 
I believe, anticipate an increased exchange of skills and 
experience between us in such matters as agriculture and 

There lie before us possibilities for the progressive 
development of closer economic collaboration and the 
development of opportunities for normal trade and in- 

Signatures to Torquay Protocol 


[Released to the press Septemher 17] 

The Department of State has been informed 
that the Government of the Republic of Turkey 
signed on September 17 the Torquay Protocol to 
tlie General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade at 
the headquarters of the United Nations at New 
York. Under the provisions of the protocol Tur- 
key will become a contracting party to the General 
Agreement on October 17, 1951, 30 days after 
signing the protocol. Turkey is the third of the 
governments which negotiated at Torquay for 
accession to the General Agreement, to sign the 
protocol. The Federal Republic of Gei'manj' was 
the first, and Peru the second.^ 

Under the protocol U.S. concessions initially 
negotiated with Turkey at Torquay will go into 
effect on October 17, as will Turkish concessions 
initially negotiated with the United States. 

In 1939 the United States and Turkey concluded 
a recii)rocal trade agreement under the Trade 
Agreements Act of 1934 which will be replaced by 
the General Agreement after Turkey's accession 
to the latter instnnnent. Most of the commodities 
covered by the 1939 agreement were covered in the 
negotiations at Torquay. 

' Bulletin of Sept. 24, 1051, p. 493. 


Turkish concessions negotiated with the United 
States at Torquay apply to U.S. products which, 
in 1949. were imported into Turkey to the value of 
about $28,038,000. Turkish customs duties on 
some of these items were reduced, and on others 
existing duties or duty-free treatment were 
bound. In addition to concessions initially nego- 
tiated directly with the United States, Turkey 
made concessions to other countries at Torquay 
which will apply to imports into Turkey from the 
United States. 

The principal Turkish concessions apply to the 
following categories of articles : automotive prod- 
ucts — both reductions and bindings of duties; 
machinery and electrical appliances — chiefly 
bindings of moderate rates, but with some substan- 
tial reductions; iron and steel products of various 
types; canned and dried prunes, and prune juice; 
canned asparagus; and cornstarch. 

U.S. concessions initially negotiated with Tur- 
key at Torquay apply to products which were im- 
ported into the United States from that countr}' 
in 1949 to the value of about $44,604,000, of which 
$30,803,000 was accounted for by cigarette leaf 
tobacco. U.S. concessions which have been 
granted to other countries apply also to the prod- 
ucts of Turkey. 

lit negotiations with Turkey at Torquay the 
United States granted tariff reductions on some 

Deparfmenf of Sfate Bulletin 

items and bindings of existing duties or duty-free 
treatments on others. 

Principal U.S. concessions initially negotiated 
■with Turkey at Torquay apply to the following 
products: cigarette leaf tobacco, which in 1949 
accounted for some 60 percent of all U.S. imports 
from that country, on which the duty was reduced 
from 20 cents to 15 cents per pound ; licorice ex- 
tract, duty reduced from 15 percent ad valorem to 
121/^ percent; opium, duty reduced by 50 percent 
(manufacture and distribution of all opium prod- 
ucts in the United States is under the regulation 
of the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics) ; shelled filberts, 
duty-bound at pre-Torquay level of 8 cents per 
pound ; chrome ore and licorice root, bound duty- 


[Released to the press Septemier 19] 

The Department of State has been informed 
that the Government of Austria signed on Septem- 
ber 19 the Torquay Protocol to the General Agree- 
ments on Tariffs and Ti'ade, at the headquarters 
of the United Nations at New York. Under the 
provisions of the protocol Austria will become a 
contracting party to the General Agreement on 
October 19, 30 days after signing the protocol. 

Austrian concessions initially negotiated with 
the United States at Torquay will become effec- 
tive on the same date, as will those U.S. conces- 
sions initially negotiated with Austria which have 
heretofore been withheld. 

Austrian concessions negotiated with the United 
States at Torquay apply to products of which Aus- 
tria's imports from this country in 19-19 were 
valued at about 58 million dollars. The principal 
items are fresh, dried, and canned fruit; grains; 
oilseeds and vegetable oils; miscellaneous food- 
stuffs and other agricultural products; chemicals 
and related products; textiles; rubber products; 
naval stores; petroleum products; industrial and 
office machinery ; and electrical equipment. 

At Torquay, Austria granted concessions to 
other countries which will apply also to products 
of the United States. The Austrian concessions 
included reductions and bindings in duties, and 
bindings of duty-free treatment. 

U.S. concessions negotiated with Austria in- 
cluded reductions and bindings of duties and will 
appl}' to commodities of which 19-19 imports fi'om 
Austria into this country were valued at about 
$6,500,000. The principal U.S. concessions were 
binding the existing duty on precious and semi- 
precious stones, which constitute the principal 
U.S. import item from Austria in 1949 ; reduction 
of one-third in the duty on dead-burned and grain 
magnesite and periclase ; and binding the existing 
duties on wool-knit outerwear and other articles. 

Concessions previously granted by the United 

October 8, 1957 

969163—51 3 

States to other countries will also apply to the 
products of Austria. 

TCA Board Urges Emphasis 
On Adequate Food Supply 

[Released to the pi-ess September 2S] 

A board of agricultural consultants to the Point 
Four Pi-ogram urged the Technical Cooperation 
Administration on September 28 to exercise its 
authority under Public Law 535 to "secure uni- 
fied planning and operation of technical coopera- 
tion programs:" 

The consultants, all authorities in the field of 
agriculture and rural life, also declared that Point 
Four should put "first emphasis" on developing an 
adequate world food supply, through the "grass 
roots" method of American farm extension agents. 

Six members of the board met for 5 days this 
week at the offices of Henry Gr Bennett, Techni- 
cal Cooperation Administrator. They conferred 
with Clayton E. Whipple, chief of Tca's Food 
and Natural Kesources Division, and other Tca 
staff members. 

The board membership includes: 

Harold B. Allen, New York City, Director of Education, 
Near East Foundation 

Abner Bowen, Delphi, Ind., farmer and businessman 

John H. Reisner, New York City, Agricultural Missions, 

J. .Stuart Russell, Des Moines, Iowa, Farm Editor, Des 
Moines Register 

The Rt. Rev. L. G. Ligutti, Executive Secretary, Cath- 
olic Rural Life 

William A. Schoenfeld, Corvallis, Oreg., Organization 

The board recommended that the Tca pro- 
gram in Food and Natural Kesources be directed 
toward an adequate world food supply through 
expansion of the production and utilization of 
food in the underdeveloped areas. 

"AVe favor the grassroots approach in which 
extension-type specialists, both U.S. and in- 
digenous personnel, work directly with rural 
people," the board said. 

"Extension work should be given priority in 
extending technical assistance but utilizing experi- 
mental 23rojects where needed to find out best vari- 
eties, types of seed, livestock, etc., and methods of 
production best suited to respective areas," the 
recommendations said. 


In the Bulletin of September 24, 1951, 
page 504, the head, "U.S. Proposes New Con- 
vention for Freedom of Information," 
should read "U.S. Opposes New Convention 
for Freedom of Information." 


Present Conduct of Foreign Affairs Reflects Ciianging World Conditions 

hy James E. Webb, 
Under Secretary of State ^ 

From newspapers and from the radio, it is easy 
to get the impression these days that almost all of 
our foreign relations are handled by Dean Ache- 
son, or Mr. Acheson assisted by John Foster 
Dulles, and perhaps one or two others. But this 
is a dangerous oversimplification. At the seat of 
our Government in Washington, 73 missions are 
maintained by foreign countries for the purpose 
of doing business with the Government of the 
United States. In these 73 missions, foreign gov- 
ernments employ about 3,000 persons to do their 
business with us. We, ourselves, maintain over- 
seas nearly 300 foreign missions through which we 
carry out the business of the United States in 
foreign lands and receive reports which permit 
us to take our actions on the basis of facts and 
not surmise. To tie this network of missions to- 
gether and to supervise our foreign operations, the 
State Department maintains a world-wide system 
of rapid communications. In and out of the De- 
partment of State will go tonight, roughly a 
thousand cables important enough to put in our 
secret codes. This thousand cables will represent 
many more words that have to be encoded and de- 
coded than will be handled in plain English in 
Washington by the Associated Press. In addition 
to this, the Dej^artment of State will handle this 
month over a quarter of a million other reports 
and documents. 

Is there a problem important to an American 
citizen anywliere in the world? If so, it is very 
likely to be communicated through one of our over- 
seas missions to one of our nine operating vice 
presidents in Washington, Mhose duty it is to see 
that the proper agency of the Government knows 
about it and takes appropriate action. Does a 
king or a prime minister desire to send an urgent 
message to the President? His ambassador calls 
on the proper Assistant Secretary or the Secre- 

' Excerpts from an address made before the Executives 
Club at Riileish, N. C, on Sept. 25 and released to the 
press on the same date. 


tary of State himself, who arranges for delivery 
of the message and for a prompt answer. 

All of you know about the Voice of America, but 
I doubt if many of you realize that its operations 
are larger than NBC or CBS. While we are meet- 
ing here tonight, broadcasts are going out to every 
region of the world in more than 45 different lan- 
guages. To guide those who prepare and give 
these broadcasts, most of which originate in New 
York, policy guidance directives are issued from 
our central headquarters in Washington every 4 
hours so that what the world hears over the Voice 
of America is right up to date. 

Prior to May of 1949, a little more than 2 years 
ago, the U.S. Government had never established 
an adequate legal foundation for the creation of 
a State Department which could do the job we 
need in the modern world. The present legal 
foundation was based on the work of the Com- 
mission on the Organization of the Executive 
Branch, of which Herbert Hoover was the chair- 
man and Dean Acheson the vice chairman. Un- 
der it, in an unbelievably short time for such a 
major undertaking. President Truman and Secre- 
tary Acheson have created a State Department or- 
ganized along the same simple lines as our best- 
managed business corporations. 

Policy formulation and control have been cen- 

Operations under approved policy have been 

Just as our more progressive business corpora- 
tions have developed cost and {production control 
methods of supervision, we in the State Depart- 
ment have developed a most ingenious means of 
supervision through control of communications. 

Although there are in the Department literally 
thousands of experts preparing materials for de- 
cision-making officers, and hundreds of officers 
making decisions every day in the field of foreign 
policy, the communications which implement these 
decisions are all channeled through a central con- 

Deparfment of Stale Bulletin 

trol and are matched against the central policy files 
! of the Department every day. This means that 
every decision-making oflicer has continuously 
available to him the latest action taken by any of- 
ficial of our Government on any subject relating to 
the affairs of any country or region for which he 
has responsibility — whether in the field of eco- 
nomics, trade, agriculture, shipping, aviation, 
public health, telecommunications, education, mil- 
itary affairs, U.N. affairs, or diplomatic affairs. 
This means that when the President and the Secre- 
tary of State arrive at their desks the first thing 
in the morning, they have before them the text of 
every message implementing a decision which is 
either of sufficient importance for them to see, or 
which initiates a trend that is expected to I'equire 
a new high-level policy decision. It also means 
that although operations are decentralized to a 
/ large number of decision-making officers who must 
I deal every day with a vast array and variety of 
problems, the highest officials of the Government 
are constantly kept informed of decisions taken 
and are able to judge when new policies are re- 

Complexities in Finding Correct Solutions 
to Foreign Policy Problems 

If we may turn now from the complexities of 
organization to the complexities of finding the 
kind of solutions to our problems that will meet 
our needs and requirements, I think one thing 
will stand out. It is the hai'd fact of international 
life that right now all over the world freedom is 
under a serious threat. 

When we Americans look out to the far interna- 
tional horizons, we face a world situation char- 
acterized by two clashing concepts of political and 
social organization. One is based on freedom; 
the other on totalitarianism. We see in every 
direction acts which force the inescapable con- 
clusion that the fanatic doctrine of Soviet Com- 
munist imperialism is relentlessly driving to im- 
pose its absolute authority over all the peoples 
of the world. 

We must remember that when the war ended 
in Europe, 6 years ago, the Soviet forces already 
occupied a whole series of European countries. 
Also, in those countries which had not been over- 
run by the Red army, circumstances were highly 
favorable to the Communist purpose of seizing 
power. In most of them the German occupation 
had disrupted the prewar pattern of political life 
and had damaged the confidence which people had 
in their former political institutions. Experience 
taught that there would normally be a wave of 
bitterness and restlessness in the immediate post- 
war period. Suspicion and hostility toward the 
exile governments had been assiduously sown and 
cultivated by Communist agitators. Their pur- 
pose was to make conditions as chaotic as possible. 
By penetrating into the underground resistance 

movements, the Communists had placed them- 
selves in an excellent position to act with telling 
effect. The large popular followings which they 
had amassed enabled them to participate in par- 
liamentary governments when established. They 
could make favorable deals with non-Communist 
parties, use these connections to damage their 
non-Communist associates, invoke the influence of 
government, and distort its purposes to their own 

In these circumstances, it is a remarkable tribute 
to the brave people of these nations that Western 
Europe is today a citadel of freedom. 

Collective Security Overcoming Soviet Pressure 

For a period after the war, it seemed that none 
could withstand the ruthless Soviet pressure. 
Then came the turning point. First Iran, then 
Turkey, then Greece, felt the pressure and decided 
to I'esist. We Americans were able to help, and, 
in the process, we took the measure of the Soviet 
purpose and method. Others did likewise. To us, 
and to other peoples desperately seeking to estab- 
lish a firm and lasting peace, Soviet actions were 
a rude shock, but ones that cleared the air. We 
and our friends went to work, and the results are 
known everywhei-e. The Marshall Plan has been 
a successful joint effort. The Organization of 
American States, the Western Union Treaty, the 
Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty, 
the European Payments Union, the Schuman 
Plan — all these are important organized coopera- 
tive efforts. All of them have contributed to the 
laying of a foundation for the most important 
single concept affecting international life today. 
That concept is the concept of collective security. 

I should like to consider with you the implica- 
tions of this concept as I see them, but first, I 
think it is important to ask the question : ""Wliy 
at the end of the war, in its weakened condition, 
did Europe resist and why did we help?" Follow- 
ing 1945 as the pattern of Soviet intentions and 
actions took shape, it became clearer that in the 
Soviet system everj^ satellite is subservient to Mos- 
cow, and becomes an inferior state; that every 
individual is a pawn of the all-powerful Com- 
munist party masters. It also became clear that 
among these masters there was no respect for 
human dignity, no milk of human kindness, no 
restraint of law. "WHierever this system spread its 
power, people who were not completely subservient 
were coerced, enslaved, imprisoned, or murdered. 
It was clear to the peoples of Europe and to us 
that aggressive imperialism had captured com- 
munism and had embarked on a campaign to im- 
pose on free peoples wherever it could the deadly 
apparatus of the police state. 

Wliat is that police state? In the U.S.S.R. 
every worker is required to have an internal pass- 
port, a labor book, and a paybook. The Govern- 
ment exercises absolute control over his job and 

Ocfober 8, 195? 


movements. He cannot change his job without 
permission. If lie quits his job or is absent from 
work, he pays a stiff fine or serves months in a 
labor camp. Even to change his residence, a 
Soviet worker must get permission from the police 
and must register with the police within 24 hours 
after the move. The same iron rule applies when 
he wishes to visit another city — he checks in and 
out with the police at both points. He has prac- 
tically no choice of where or at what he will work 
and almost no freedom of movement. He is told 
what to think in a continuous stream of skillfully 
planned propaganda. Except for the Voice of 
America, and other transmissions from the free 
nations, he lives in a darkness of ignorance about 
the outside world. 

These are the facts of life in the Soviet "work- 
er's paradise." These are the conditions of servi- 
tude imposed on a vast population to build up 
the Soviet Armed Forces and the international 
Communist api3aratus. 

Does anyone here believe that this Communist 
apparatus was not at the center of the conspiracy 
to launch aggression against the Republic of 
Korea last year? 

If so, let me give you some figures. In 1945, 
some 3,700 North Koreans were enrolled in Soviet 
oriented cultural societies. By 1949 this number 
had been increased to over 1,300,000. During the 
3-year period prior to 1948, some 770.000 copies of 
72 Russian books were published in North Korea. 
In 1949 some 500 books were translated and large 
numbers of copies distributed. Numerous classes 
in the Russian language were organized. In 1948 
almost 70,000 lectures and concerts were given in 
North Korea by Soviet artists, writers, and other 
cultural representatives. An even greater num- 
ber were given in 1949. In the course of the 5- 
year period preceding hostilities, hundreds of 
intellectual, industrial, and political leaders from 
North Korea were taken to Moscow for indoctrina- 
tion. Thus did Communist imperialism proceed 
to seduce a whole population for violent ends. 

If the history of this century records the un- 
leashing of vast forces of violence, revolutions, 
the collapse of empires, and the decline of imperial 
systems, it must also record the bringing into 
practical application of a new concept of inter- 
national cooperation. In our relations with other 
nations, we Americans are showing by our actions 
that we are committed to this concept. We do 
this through the United Nations, the North At- 
lantic Treaty Organization, the Organization of 
American States, and now the four treaties signed 
this month in San Francisco. Last week at 
Ottawa, the Nato powers gave favorable con- 
sideration to a program which, subject to the 
necessary parliamentary approval, would bring 
Greece and Turkey into the pact. During the next 
few months we will take another major step to- 
ward bringing Western Germany back into the 
community of free nations. The foundation of 


our policy is a belief that if the free nations of 
the world work together we can face the future 
with confidence. We have a deep and abiding 
faith that when we have overcome the threat of 
armed aggression the strength of our democratic 
institutions can make secure the blessings of lib- 
erty to ourselves and our posterity. 

Democratic Action Achieved Within Constitution 

The difficulty of finding in a democracy such 
as ours a formula which will permit the individual 
citizen to understand and accept as a part of his 
own way of life his proportionate share of the 
national self-interest required to support our 
necessary international arrangements is one of the 
most complex problems of our time. The accept- 
ance by the citizen of this proportionate share be- 
comes even more difficult as the scope of our 
international arrangements broadens to include 
many nations with widely varying systems of 
taxation, conscription, and the sharing of scarce 

It is my suggestion that citizens make it a prac- 
tice to examine carefully the facts put forward by 
the President in support of his proposal. This 
would constitute an important step in the direction 
of establishing a solid base of continuing public 
support for those actions which our best minds 
find most likely to advance our self-interest. 
These facts are always set forth in great detail 
in the three major Presidential messages which 
come every year at the beginning of the Congress. 
I refer, of course, to the message on the state of 
the Union, the economic report, and the budget 
message. No documents of government are more 
carefully put together or are more revealing to 
the citizen seeking facts as to what his government 
considers in his self-interest. None show better 
the role of the Executive in what our Government 
has become — a positive action democracy. 

In the development of means to achieve demo- 
cratic action within the framework of the Con- 
stitution, a large development of the staff agencies 
and procedures which assist the President has 
created around his office what students of govern- 
ment now call "the institution of the Presidency." 
The recommendations submitted by the President 
to the Congress are thus from many points of view 
institutional rather than personal recommenda- 
tions. We all know that in the dramatics of 
modern politics it is the colorful personality 
which most often catches the public eye. Every 
official action becomes associated with the person 
taking it. and little attention is given the institu- 
tionalized staff agencies which have become in- 
dispensable to responsible Executive action. But 
it is only within the framework of facts, sup- 
ported by the careful analysis of such institution- 
alized staff agencies as the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
in the Defense Department' and the Policy Plan- 
ning Staff in the State Department, that the 

Departmenf of State Bulletin 

individual citizen can decide whether or not a sug- 
gested action desei-ves his support. 

The important points I wish to make are that 
under tlie evolving practice of our constitutional 
form of government the responsibility for sub- 
mitting programs and proposals to meet our needs 
rests with the Executive, and that the means for 
fulfilling this executive responsibility are con- 
stantly improving. The Congress reviews and ap- 
proves, or modifies, every detail of these proi^osals. 
The complete program, particularly through the 
budget process, is available for study and analysis 
by every interested citizen. The ultimate respon- 
sibility rests with the citizen to make his influence 
felt in the decisions taken. 

U.S. Invited to Study 
Malayan Tin Industry 

[Released to the press September 18] 

In the interest of a better understanding of 
Malayan tin production and mai'keting problems, 
the Malayan Government and the United King- 
dom Government, acting on a resolution of the 
Federated Malay States, Chamber of Mines, have 
extended an invitation to the U.S. Government 
to send qualified representatives to Malaya for 
first-hand observation of the local tin industry. 

The United States has accepted this invitation 
l)ut because of the International Tin Study Group 
meeting scheduled in Rome beginning September 
1^4, a mission cannot be properly staffed and ready 
to depart until late October. The U.S. group 
will be composed of qualified officials from Gov- 
ernment agencies. 

Canada Offers To Construct 
St. Lawrence Seaway 

[Released to the press hy the White Bouse September 28] 

The following announceTnent was made subse- 
quent to a White House conference on Septeniber 
^8 between Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent of 
Canada and President Truman: 

The President and the Prime Minister discussed 
the St. Lawrence project. They agreed on the 
vital importance to the security and the economies 
of both countries of proceeding as rapidly as pos- 
sible with both the seaway and the power phases 
of the project. They explored the matter of the 
next steps to be taken in achieving the early con- 
struction of the project. They both agreed that 
it would be most desirable to proceed along the 

lines of the 1941 agreement between the United 
States and Canada. 

The Prime Minister informed the President of 
the needs of Ontario for power and of the arrange- 
ment the Canadian Government could make with 
the Govei'nment of that Province for its partici- 
pation with the appropriate Federal or State 
authority in the United States for the power de- 
velopment. In these circumstances the Prime 
Minister indicated the Canadian Government 
would be willing to construct the seaway as a 
Canadian project if it is not possible to have the 
joint development undertaken on the basis of the 
1941 agreement. 

The President expressed his strong preference 
for joint action on the seaway and his hope that 
the Congress would soon authorize such action, 
but stated he would support Canadian action as 
second best if an early commencement on the joint 
development does not prove possible. 

U.S. Urges Aid for Brazilian 
Rehabilitation Program 

[Released to the press September 27] 

The Depa?'tment of State has been advised by 
the Brasilian Emhassy that the Minister of Fi- 
nance in Brazil, His Excellency Horacio Lafer, 
upon his return to Rio de Janeiro, after a visit to 
Washington, issued the following statement: 

The Brazilian Finance Minister, Dr. Horacio 
Lafer, came to Washington to attend the meeting 
of the Boards of Governors of the International 
Monetary Fund and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. During his 
stay in Washington he had the opportunity to com- 
municate, in clear and precise terms, to the U.S. 
Government and other officials concerned with fi- 
nancial matters, the steps which are being taken 
in Brazil in order to implement the plan of Na- 
tional Rehabilitation and Reequipment set up by 
President Getulio Vargas. The plan is being 
thoroughly studied and fully developed in the 
Joint Brazil-United States Commission. The 
steps taken are within the spirit of President Tru- 
man's Point Four. 

The Minister of Finance had the opportunity to 
explain and discuss the steps which have been 
studied in Brazil, and which have been submitted 
for approval to the appropriate Brazilian author- 
ities concerned for the purpose of meeting the re- 
quirements of this plan. The financing of this 
plan, on the Brazilian side, will require about 10 
billion cruzeiros during a 5-year period. The 
communication of the steps taken and the require- 
ments needed, presented by the Minister of Fi- 
nance, received special consideration by the offi- 
cials of the World Bank, as well as the U.S. 

October 8, 1 95 1 


authorities in Washington, including the Export- 
Import Bank. They welcomed the information 
given by the Minister of Finance concerning the 
decision of the Brazilian Government to provide 
the necessary cruzeiro funds for these purposes 
through special legislation to mobilize internal 
financial resources. The Brazilian Government 
will shbrtly make a formal announcement on this 

The World Bank, as well as the Export-Import 
Bank within its particular sphere of activity, are 
greatly interested in this program. The manage- 
ments of these institutions expressed their interest 
and willingness to provide the needed amounts in 
foreign currencies for the implementation of proj- 
ects mcluded in the plan and approved by the 
Bank concerned, with the understanding that all 
projects submitted would have the prior study 
and recommendation of the Joint Brazil-United 
States Commission. 

The Joint Commission, as a result of its pre- 
liminary studies, is recommending that first pri- 
ority be given to a program to attend to the most 
urgent rehabilitation needs of the ports and rail- 
ways of Brazil. This program, which is the first 
step of the over-all transport development pro- 
gram of the Commission, may reach a cost equiva- 
lent to 4 billion cruzeiros, including the amount 
needed in foreign currencies. 

The management of the World Bank, and the 
management of the Export-Import Bank with re- 
spect to the particular elements of the program 
that afi'ect its operations, also share the opinion 
that this program deserves high priority, and have 
therefore given assurances that foreign currencies 
which will be a substantial part of the total cost 
will be available to cover the external cost of any 
individual projects within this program which are 
recommended by the Joint Commission and ap- 
proved by the Bank concerned as being sound and 

Argentine Dollar Obligations 
To Be Liquidated 

The Export-Import Bank of Washington and 
the Special Commission of the Central Bank of 
Argentina — which acts for the consortium of 
Argentine commercial banks in connection with 
the credit which the Export-Import Bank estab- 
lished to liquidate dollar commercial obligations 
of Argentina — announced on September 25 that 
the commission will continue its activities in 
liquidating such obligations from Buenos Aires 
beginning October 1. At the same time, it was 
made known that the Export-Import Bank had 
extended its authorization for making payments 
under the credit until December 31, 1951. 

This decision has been made in view of the fact 


that the great bulk of the obligations which are 
to be liquidated from the proceeds of the credit 
have now been paid. 

Accordingly, beginning as of October 1, all 
claims of the banks and creditors of the United 
States should be addressed directly to the 

Comision Especial 

Banco Central de la Eepublica Argentina 

Keconquista 266 

Buenos Aires (Eepublica Argentina) 

The remaining obligations which are eligible for 
liquidation under the credit will be certified for 
payment by the commission to the Export-Import 
Bank in accordance with the procedures which 
have been followed up to date and which were 
made known in the press release of November 13, 

New Transmitter Project To 
Combat Kremlin Aggression 

hy Edward W. Barrett 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs ^ 

The best estimates today indicate that we are be- 
ing heard by a majority of the radio-set owners in 
the satellite countries. While we were almost 
jammed out of Russia 18 months ago, we are now 
getting more than 20 percent of our broadcasts 
through to Moscow and 60 percent through the 
smaller cities and rural areas in Russia. In 
Russia, by the way, there are about 4 million re- 
ceiving sets that can hear the Voice of America. 
More important, we have learned that expenditures 
for the construction of mammoth new transmitter 
facilities can force the Russians either to let the 
truth through or practically to go broke in the 
eiiort to keep it out. 

I can state now that we are presently construct- 
ing five transmitters which will be several times 
more powerful than any transmitter now in exist- 
ence anywhere. The exact power is secret, but I 
can say that one of them will be located in the 
State of North Carolina. Another will be in 
the State of Washington. The other three will be 

A recent study by top scientists in this country 
has shown us that by building certain new types 
of transmitter facilities we can force the Russians 
to spend five to one in terms of manpower and dol- 
lars if they are going to keep us from being heard. 

That is why we have high hopes of going back 
to the Congress in the near future with a request 
for approval of a vast new transmitter project. 
As you know, the Congi-ess has given us the bulk 

' Excerpts from an address made before the Southern 
Newpaper Publishers Assn. at Hot Springs, Arl£., on 
Sept. 25 and released to the press on the same date. 

Deparfmenf of State Bulletin 

of the operating funds we need, but it turned down 
a preliminary request for large-scale expansion 
of our transmitter facilities. Those plans have 
now been reviewed again by some of the best tech- 
nical brains in the country and enthusiastically 
endorsed by a committee from the radio industry. 
With this support, we believe the Congress will not 
fail to see the wisdom of going ahead with this 
large program. While it is unprecedented in cost 
and in scope, we must remember that the total pro- 
gram will cost less than the amount needed today 
to build one battleship. 

There are those who say we should not be too 
prim and proper about sticking to the truth. I 
disagree and I disagree violently with that. 

Truth can be used — and is being used — around 
the world to show up the essentially vicious, phony, 
and truly reactionary nature of Communist 

Truth can be used — and is being used — to en- 
courage other free nations to cooperate with us — 
by our showing up the Soviet lies about us and by 
demonstrating that we are a decent and honest 
nation whose physical strength and moral strength 
can be counted on. 

Truth can be used — and is being used — to help 
build a spirit of unity, and spunk, and determina- 
tion, among all the nations of the free woi'ld. 

Truth can be used — and is being used — to build 
up behind the Iron Curtain every possible ob- 
stacle to Kremlin aggression. Truth is being used 
to give hope to the satellite peoples and to the 
Russian peoples themselves, to make them go slow 
in cooperating with their masters in aggressive 
plans, to make them realize that the way of free- 
dom is bound to win out in the long rmi. 


Recent Releases 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Oovern- 
mcnt Printing Offlee, Wushington 25, I). C. Address re- 
quests (lireet to the Superintendent of Documents, except 
in the case of free publications, which may be obtained 
from the Department of State. 

The Department of State Today. Department and For- 
eign Service Series IS. Pub. 3069. 33 pp. lu?". 

Booklet describing the foundations and functions of 
the Department of State. 

Customs Concessions on Automobiles. Treaties and 
Other International Acts Series 2178. Pub. 4112. 3 pp. 

Provisional agreement between the United States and 
Chile — Effected by exchange of notes signed at San- 
tiago April 9, 1949. 

Anthropological Research and Investigation, Cooperative 
Program in Colombia. Treaties and Other International 
Acts Series 2179. Pub. 4113. 7 pp. 5^. 

Agreement between the United States and Colom- 
bia — Effected by exchange of notes signed at Bogota 
Nov. 20 and 24, 1950. 

Exchange of OflScial Publications. Treaties and Other 
International Acts Series 2180. Pub. 4114. 4 pp. 5^. 

Agreement between the United States and Costa 
Rica — Effected by exchange of notes signed at San 
Jos6 Nov. 30 and Dec. 2, 1950. 

Education, Cooperative Program in Bolivia. Treaties and 
and Other International Acts Series 2181. Pub. 4115. 
6 pp. 5(^. 

Agreement between the United States and Bolivia — 
Effected by exchange of notes signed at La Paz Aug. 
1, 1947, and May 16, 1949. 

Mutual Defense Assistance. Treaties and Other Interna- 
tional Acts Series 2187. Pub. 4121. 16 pp. lOi*. 

Agreement, with annexes, between the United States 
and Portugal — Signed at Lisbon Jan. 5, 1951 ; entered 
into fore Jan. 5, 1951. 

Termination of Reciprocal Trade Agreement of March 28, 
1935. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2189. 
2 pp. 50. 

Agreement between the United States and Haiti — 
Signed at Port-au-Prince Dec. 29, 1949. 

Health and Sanitation, Cooperative Program in Bolivia. 

Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2191. 3 pp. 

Agreement between the United States and Bolivia — 
Effected by exchange of notes signed at La Paz Sept. 
18 and Oct. 7, 1950. 

Air Transport Services. Treaties and Other International 
Acts Series 2196. Pub. 4142. 2 pp. 50. 

Agreement between the United States and Ecuador, 
amending agreement of Jan. 8, 1947 — Effected by 
exchange of notes signed at Washington Jan. 3 and 
10, 1951. 

Economic Cooperation With Denmark Under Public Law 
472 — 80th Congress, as Amended. Treaties and Other 
International Acts Series 2218. Pub. 4181. 2 pp. 50. 

Agreement between the United States and Denmark — 
Effected by exchange of notes signed at Copenhagen 
Feb. 2 and 9, 1951. 

Automobiles Customs Concessions. Treaties and Other 
International Acts Series 2222. Pub. 4187. 4 pp. 50. 

Provisional agreement between the United States 
and Chile — Effected by exchange of notes signed 
at Santiago Nov. 18 and Dec. 8, 1950. 

Technical Cooperation. Treaties and Other International 
Acts Series 2226. Pub. 4192. 8 pp. 50. 

Agreement between the United States and the Domin- 
ican Republic — Effected by exchange of notes signed 
at Ciudad Trujillo Feb. 20, 1951. 

Technical Cooperation. Treaties and Other International 
Acts Series 2231. Pub. 4202. 8 pp. 50. 

Agreement between the United States and Colombia — 
Effected by exchange of notes signed at Bogotd Mar. 
5 and 9, 1951. 

(Continued on page 699) 

October 8, 1 95 1 



U.K. Requests U.N. Action in Iranian Controversy 


U.N. doc. S/2357 
Sept. 29, 1951 

The following is the text of a letter, dated Sep- 
tember 28, fro77i J. E. Coulson, TJ.K. Deputy Per- 
manent Representative, to Dr. Ales Bebler of 
Yugoslavia, President of the Security Council, and 
to the Secretary-General : 

In accordance with instructions received from 
His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom 
I have the honour to request that the following 
item be placed on the provisional agenda of the 
Security Council : "Complaint of failure by the 
Iranian Government to comply with provisional 
measures indicated by the International Court of 
Justice in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case." 
2. It will be recalled that the International Coui't 
of Justice, acting under Article 41 paragraph 2 of 
its statute, notified the Security Council of the pro- 
visional measures indicated by the Court on July 
5th 1951, at the request of the Government of the 
United Kingdom in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Com- 
pany case. The United Kingdom's request to the 
court for the indication of provisional measures 
was based on the contention that the actions of the 
Iranian authorities threatened to bring the whole 
process of oil pi'oduction and refining to a stand- 
still in circumstances calculated to cause irrepa- 
rable damage to the oil producing and refinery 
installations and seriously to endanger life and 
property and cause distress to the areas concerned. 
The findings of the court constituted an implicit 
recognition of the accuracy of this contention. The 
United Kingdom Government at once publicly 
proclaimed their full acceptance of the Court's 
findings and so informed the Government of Iran, 
but the Government of Iran rejected these findings 
and have persisted in the course of action, includ- 
ing interference in the Company's operations, 
which led the United Kingdom Government to 
apply to the Court for interim measures. More- 

over the Government of Iran have now ordered 
the expulsion of all the remaining staff of the 
Company in Iran and this action is clearly con- 
trary to the provisional measures indicated by the 

3. His Majesty's Government in the United King- 
dom are gravely concerned at the dangers in- 
herent in this situation and at the threat to peace 
and security that may thereby be involved. 
In view of the fact that the expulsion order issued 
by the Government of Iran is scheduled to take 
effect by Thursday October 4th, I have the honour 
to request that the Council should consider this 
matter as one of extreme ui'gency and I would 
ask that a meeting of the Council be called for the 
morning of Monday October 1st. Since His Ex- 
cellency Ambassador ISIuniz will be the President 
of the Security Council on that date, I am sending 
a copy of this letter to him. 

4. In order to facilitate speedy discussion of 
this question, I have the honor to enclose a draft 
resolution which Your Excellency will no doubt 
be good enough to have circulated at once. 


D.N. doc. S/2358 
Sept. 29, 1951 

Whereas the International Court of Justice, 
acting under Article 41, Paragraph 2, of its stat- 
ute, notified the Security Council of the provi- 
sional measures (the text of which is annexed 
hereto) indicated by the Court on July 6tli 1951 at 
the request of the Government of the United 
Kingdom in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 
case; and 

Whereas the United Kingdom's request to the 
Court for the indication of provisional measures 
was based on the contention that the actions of the 

'The refiner.v at Abailan was seized by Iranian soldiers 
.'^ept. 27, a move wliicli carried out the threat voiced by 
Prime Minister Mosadeq in his message of Sept. 12 to Am- 
bassador Harrimau ; see Bulletin of Oct. 1, 1951, p. 547. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Iranian authorities tlu'eatened to bring the whole 
process of oil production and refining to a stand- 
still in the circumstances calculated to cause irrep- 
arable damage to the oil producing and refinery 
installations and seriously to endanger life and 
property and cause distress to the areas concerned 
and the findings of the Court constituted an im- 
plicit recognition of the accuracy of this conten- 
tion; and 

Whereas the United Kingdom Government at 
once publicly proclaimed their full acceptance of 
the Court's findings and so informed the Govern- 
ment of Iran but the Government of Iran rejected 
these findings and have persisted in the course of 
action (including interference in the Company's 
operations) which led the United Kingdom to ap- 
ply to the Court for interim measures; and 

Whereas the Government of Iran have now or- 
dered the expulsion of all the remaining statf of 
the Company in Iran and this action is clearly 
contrary to the provisional measures indicated by 
the Court : 

The Security Council 

Concerned at the dangers inherent in this sit- 
uation and at the threat to peace and security that 
may thereby be involved : 

1. Calls upon the Government of Iran to act in 
all respects in conformity with the provisional 
measures indicated by the Court and in particular 
to permit the continued residence at Abadan of 
the Staif affected by the recent expulsion orders or 
the equivalent of such staff: 

2. Requests the Government of Iran to inform 
the Security Council of the steps taken by it to 
carry out the present resolution. 


Provisional measures indicated by the International 
Court of Justice on July Sth, 1951. 

The Court 

Indicates, pending its final decision in the proceedings 
instituted on Jlay 26th, 19.")1, by the Government of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
against the Imperial Government of Iran, the following 
provisional measures which will apply on the basis of 
reciprocal observance : 

1. Tliat the Iranian Government and the United King- 
dom Government should each ensure that no action is 
taken which might jTrejudice the ri;rhts of the other I'arty 
in respect of the carrying out of any decision on the 
merits which the Court may subsequently render ; 

2. That the Iranian Government and the United King- 
dom Government should each ensure that no action of any 
kind is taken wliich might aggravate or extend the dis- 
pute submitted to tlie Court; 

3. That tlie Iranian Government and the United King- 
dom Government should each ensure that no measure of 
any kind should be taken designed to hinder the carrying 
on of the industrial and commercial operations of the 
Anglo-Iranian Oi) Company, Limited, as they were carried 
on prior to May 1st, 19."il 

■i. That the Company's operations in Iran should con- 
tinue under the direction of its management as it was 
constituted prior to May 1st. 19.jl, subject to such modi- 
fications as may be brought about by agreement with the 
Board of Supervision referred to in paragraph 5 ; 

r>. That, in order to ensure the full effect of the pre- 
ceding provisions, wliich in any case retain their own 
authority, there should he established by agreement be- 
tween the Iranian Government and the United Kingdom 
Government a Board to be known as the Board of Super- 
vision composed of two Members appointed by each of 
the said Governments and a fifth Meinlier, who should be 
a national of a third State and should lie chosen by agree- 
ment between these Governments, or, in default of such 
agreement, and upon the joint request of the Parties, by 
the President of the Court. 

The Board will have the duty of ensuring that the 
Company's operations are carried on in accordance with 
the provisions above set forth. It will, hitcr alia, have 
the duty of auditing the revenue and expenses and of 
ensuring that all revenue in excess of the sums required 
to be paid in the course of the normal carrying on of the 
operations and the other normal expenses incurred by the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Limited, are paid into ac- 
counts at banks to be selected by the Board on the under- 
taking of such banks not to dispose of such funds except in 
accordance with the decisions of the Court or the agree- 
ments of the Parties. 

Goals Accomplished at Recent 

Remarks hy Secretary Acheson at Neios 

[Released to the press September 26] 

Since we last met here, the United States and 
other nations working for peace and freedom have 
been engaged in considerable diplomatic activity. 
It may be useful, therefore, to recapitulate briefly 
the facts of what we have been doing and where we 
are heading. 

In San Francisco we demonstrated that the 
overwhelming majority of the nations of the 
world are earnestly working for peace, know how 
to make it, and are willing to adjust diiferences in 
order to reach the common goal. Those who at- 
tempted to prevent this achievement clearly dem- 
onstrated, on the other hand, that while they 
.speak of peace, they do not really want it and will, 
in fact, do everything they can to prevent it. 

In the Conference of Foreign Ministers in 
Washington, the United States, the United King- 
dom, and France further cemented their unity in 
creating the situations of strength, without which 
diplomatic efforts would be largely ineffective. 

Furtlier progress on this realistic road to peace 
was made in the Nato Council meeting in Ottawa 
where, among other things, we recommended the 
inclusion of Greece and Turkey in Nato, tightened 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, empha- 
sized the nonmilitary objectives of Nato, and set 
up a committee to .study the total requirements 
and total resources of this great alliance which 
provides such a hopeful bulwark against further 
aggression in Europe and the Near East. 

We fully expect to make further progress along 
this road in two other major diplomatic meetings 
immediately ahead — the sixth General Assembly 
in Paris and the Nato Council in Rome. 

Ocfofaer 8, 1957 


In summary, I believe that in this series of 
meetings we have accomplished three principal 
things : 

We have further cemented the unity of the free 
world in the pursuit of peace and freedom. 

We have further increased the confidence of the 
free world in its ability to achieve these objectives. 

We have made further progrens toward these 

I want to say finally that no one — and no na- 
tion — should misjudge our purpose or our method. 
Our purpose is peace with fi'eedom and justice. 
Our method, as I have said before, is to build 
those situations of strength which are essential to 
the achievement of our purpose. This is based on 
our conviction that the desire for peace is not 
enough; the free world must also have the 
strength to enforce peace. 

Recent International Discussions on Cotton 

hy Lester E. Edmond 

Two intergovernmental conferences devoted to 
consideration of international cotton develop- 
ments and problems convened in 1951 : the tenth 
plenary meeting of the International Cotton Ad- 
visory Committee met from February 1-9, at 
Lahore, Pakistan ; ^ and the Cotton-Cotton Linters 
Committee of the International Materials Con- 
ference convened at Washington on March 5. 

International Cotton Advisory Committee 

The International Cotton Advisory Committee 
(IcAc), whose membership consists of 28 of the 
major cotton producing and consuming nations 
of the world, is an advisory and fact-finding or- 
ganization designed to promote cooperation in the 
solution of international problems affecting cot- 
ton. Its continuing objectives are to furnish in- 
formation regarding the current world cotton 
situation and to formulate recommendations and 
suggestions for international collaboration in 
studying and dealing with world cotton problems. 

The IcAC, which is the outgrowth of aii inter- 
national cotton meeting held in September 1939, 
has, in its relatively short existence, seen con- 
siderable fluctuation in the cotton supply and de- 
mand situation. The period of large cotton sur- 
pluses and depressed prices, in which the com- 
mittee was born, gave way to one of threatened 

' Member governments which participated in the tenth 
plenary meeting were Argentina, Australia, Celgium, Bra- 
zil, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, India, Italy, .Japan, the Netherlands, 
Pakistan, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. Member governments which did not par- 
ticipate were Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Austria, China, 
Greece, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, and Turkey. The 
following nonmember governments were observers at the 
meeting : Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Poland, Switzerland, 
S.vria, and Yugoslavia. ( Switzerland became a member 
of the IcAc following the tenth meeting.) An observer 
from the Organization for European Economic Coopera- 
tion was also present. 

shortages and high prices in 1947-48. By 1949-50, 
however, the rapid rise in world cotton production 
had caused the supply to exceed the demand again 
by a substantial margin. In the following year, 
another complete reversal took place, and between 
the time of the ninth plenary meeting in May 1950, 
and the tenth in February 1951, the world found ' 
that the cotton surplus had disappeared and that 
a severe cotton shortage was in prospect. This 
situation was in large measure due to an extraor- 
dinary coincidence — a sharply reduced cotton crop 
in the United States, compared with the levels of 
previous years, came at a time when world cotton 
consumption as a result of the outbreak of fighting 
in Korea far surpassed any previous pre- World 
War II or postwar level. 

The major concern of those attending the ninth 
plenary meeting in May 1950 was the then increas- 
ing world surplus of cotton as compared with the 
effective world demand. Evidence of this concern 
is found in some of the resolutions adopted by the 
ninth meeting. For example. Resolution XII, 
paragraph B, of the ninth plenary meeting called 
for the Standing Committee to follow develop- 
ments in the balance-of-payments situation as it 
affected cotton and to report on the matter at the 
tenth plenary meeting. Paragraph F of the same 
resolution called for the Standing Committee to 
consider certain intergovernmental measures re- 
lating to commodity agreements with specific ref- 
erence to cotton and to report to the tenth plenary 
meeting.^ In both of the above cases the Secre- ■ 
tariat was instructed to prepare studies for con- 
sideration of the Standing Committee. 

The sudden change from a surplus condition to 
one of world deficit in cotton is evident from the 
nature of the problems considered at the tenth 
plenary meeting as compared with those consid- 
ered at the ninth. Resolution IX of the tenth 

^ For text of this and other resolutions of the ninth 
plenary meeting, see Bulletin of July 24, 1950, p. 146. 


Deparimeni of S/afe Bulletin 

meeting, referring to the Secretariat's report Cot- 
ton and the Balance of Payments, noted that the 
dollar situation of certain countries had consider- 
ably improved during the second half of 1950 
and requested the Standing Committee to keep the 
situation under review and to report to the 
eleventh plenary meeting in the event of signifi- 
cant deterioration.^ Resolution X referred to the 
Secretariat's report, Consideration of Intergov- 
ernmental Commodity Arrangements in Relation 
to Cotton, and chapter VI of the proposed charter 
of the International Trade Organization and asked 
the Secretariat to continue its studies and re- 
search into the question of commodity agreements 
with the objective of preparing data which might 
be needed for further study. These data would 
include statistical information and consideration 
of the problem of buffer stocks in cotton. Reso- 
lution XI requested the Secretariat, under super- 
vision of the Standing Committee, to call to the 
attention of various United Nations agencies, and 
other international agencies concerned with tech- 
nical and financial aid, the benefits that would re- 
sult from the immediate promotion of increased 
yields in cotton production in underdeveloped 

A special subcommittee considered the problem 
of export taxes on cotton. Although the subcom- 
mittee recognized that the imposition of fiscal 
measures was the prerogative of governments, 
delegates from many importing countries ex- 
pressed grave concern that the levy of such taxes, 
by increasing the price of cotton, impaired the 
regular flow of cotton and cotton goods, as well as 
good will in the cotton trade. The aggravating 
effect of export taxes on cotton price fluctuations, 
resulting from the addition of a further unstable 
element in the cotton price structure, was also 
stressed. On the other hand, delegates of some 
of the producing countries said that export taxes 
should not be considered responsible for the in- 
creased prices of the 1950-51 season. Export 
I taxes, they said, had been imposed because cotton 
prices had previously risen to such high levels as 
to make the imposition of taxes necessary to avoid 
or suppress inflation in certain cotton-exporting 

Other resolutions pertained to the organization 
and finances of the Icac and to the problem of 
increasing the efficiency of the operation of the 
Committee's informational and statistical func- 
tions in order to enhance the benefits derived from 
them by recipients. It was recommended that 
member governments establish a national coordi- 
nating agency or designate an existing office as 
liaison to the International Cotton Advisory Com- 
mittee Secretariat and that specified information 

' For text of resolutions of the tenth meeting, see 
Proceedings of the Tenth Plenary Meeting of the Inter- 
national Cotton Advisory Committee, published by the 
International Cotton Advisory Committee, South Asri- 
culture Building, Washington, D.C., $2.00. 

be made available to the Secretariat on a regular 
basis. A request was made that member govern- 
ments improve cotton-price data in conjunction 
with a recommendation that governments of cot- 
ton-exporting countries publish weekly f.o.b. 
prices of their principal qualities and/or varieties. 
A work program was established for the Secre- 
tariat to consist of the regular publication of the 
Monthly Review of the World Cotton Situation 
and the Statistical Bulletin, and, insofar as feasi- 
ble, of five special studies, as follows : 

( 1 ) A special study of world cotton prices, with 
attention to the availability and reliability of cot- 
ton-price data, ways and means of improving these 
data, and factors affecting the price of cotton. 

(2) Analysis and comparison of national sta- 
tisliical procedures, giving particular attention to 
statistics of cotton production, consumption, and 
stocks, with a statement of the views of the Secre- 
tariat as to which procedures are preferable. 

(3) The preparation and publication of a refer- 
ence book of world cotton statistics. 

(4) A study of the potentialities of man-made 
fibers as a substitute for meeting the world fiber 
shortages, and as a competitor of cotton when cot- 
ton supplies become adequate. 

(5) A comparison of the various growths of 
cotton with respect to staple length, grade stand- 
ards, and spinning qualities in order to provide the 
basis for a better understanding of price differ- 

It was also recommended that the International 
Cotton Advisory Committee cooperate to the full- 
est extent with the Cotton-Cotton Linters Com- 
mittee of the International Materials Conference 
in providing information and statistics, so that 
duplication and unnecessary expense might be 

Cotton-Cotton Linters Committee, 
International Materials Conference 

The International Materials Conference (Imc) 
was formed to help solve the critical problems fac- 
ing the nations of the free world resulting from 
the world-wide shortages existing in many com- 
modities.^ On January 12, 1951, the Governments 
of the United States, tlie United Kingdom, and 
France announced that they had agreed that jjro- 
posals should be made to other interested govern- 
ments for the creation of a number of standing 
international commodity groups, representing the 
governments of producing and consuming coun- 
tries throughout the free world which have a sub- 
stantial interest in the commodity concerned. At 
the present time seven commodity committees are 
in existence, one of which is the Cotton-Cotton 
Linters Committee. 

Thirteen countries are members of the Cotton- 

* For an article on the International Materials Confer- 
ence see Bulletin of July 2, 1951, p. 23. 

Ocfober 8, J 95 J 


Cotton Linters Committee. These are Belgium 
(representing Benelux), Brazil, Canada, France, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Italy, 
Japan, Mexico. Peru, Turkey, the United King- 
dom, and the United States. The terms of refer- 
ence for all the Imc committees state that their 
purpose is to consider and recommend, or report 
to governments concerned, specific action which 
should be taken in order to expand production, 
increase availabilities, conserve supplies, and as- 
sure the most effective distribution and utilization 
of supplies among consuming countries. 

The Cotton-Cotton Linters Committee convened 
on March 5, 1951, and by March 15 completed its 
first set of meetings. The committee surveyed the 
1950-51 world cotton situation and the prospects 
for the 1951-52 cotton year on the basis of the data 
submitted by participating governments and by 
the Secretariat of the International Cotton Ad- 
visoi-y Committee. Although the Cotton-Cotton 
Linters Committee noted the improved prospects 
for the 1951-52 world cotton supply, it invited all 
interested governments to submit to the commit- 
tee comprehensive statistics and other relevant 
information to enable it to make a detailed study 
of the position in cotton and cotton linters. Little 
could be accomplished with respect to the distribu- 
tion of the 1950-51 cotton supply since the cotton 
year was 7 months old at the time of the convening 
of the Cotton-Cotton Linters Committee. The 
committee therefore recessed, pending the sub- 
mission of the statistics and information by the 
interested governments and the summarization of 
the returns by the Secretariat. 

On June 18 the committee reconvened and since 
tliat time has completed an examination of the 
prospective 1951-52 raw cotton situation. On the 
basis of the available data, the committee, on 
August 15, concluded that the supply situation 
had improved sufficiently so that no special inter- 
national action affecting the distribution of cot- 
ton and cotton linters was necessary at that time. 
The principal factor in the committee's decision 
was the official cotton report of the United States 
on August 8, which indicated a crop of 17,200,000 
bales (of 500 pounds gross weight) as compared 
with the exceptionally small crop of 10,012.000 
bales last season. However, the Cotton-Cotton 
Linters Committee is keeping its organization in- 
tact and will be prepared to resume activity if, in 
the future, such action appears to be necessary or 

No inconsistencies are involved in the activities 
of the International Cotton Advisory Committee 
and the Cotton-Cotton Linters Committee of the 
International Materials Conference. The latter 
body, under its terms of reference, is concerned 
with immediate problems of raw material short- 
ages and would consider long-term measures only 
if a long-term shortage were to threaten. Its view 
til at no international action is necessary at this 
t ime to affect the distribution of cotton and cotton 

linters is taken fi'om its own special standpoint 
and is predicated on a finding that these commodi- 
ties are not now in short supply. The Icac, on 
its part, is concerned with basic long-term prob- 
lems of countries primarily interested in cotton 
as producers and exporters, as well as with the 
problems of countries that are primarily im- 
porters and consumers; and its field of interest is 
necessarily much broader than that of shortages. 
It is an interesting fact that all governments par- 
ticipating in the Cotton-Cotton Linters Commit- 
tee of the Imc are members also of tlie Icac. The 
two committees cooperate effectively, and the Icac 
with its large fund of statistical data and its well- 
established channels of information has been able 
to lend invaluable assistance to the Cotton Com- 
mittee of the Imc. 

In normal j'ears, nearly half of the world's cot- 
ton exports are supplied by the United States. As 
a result, many countries look to the United States 
for their supplies of cotton while, on the reverse 
side of the coin, this country finds it necessary to 
export a very substantial portion of its annual 
production if the cotton sector of the economy is 
to be maintained on a healtliy basis. With the 
United States so deeply involved in the world cot- 
ton picture, this country will continue to play an 
active role in international discussions concerning 

• Mr. Edmond, mithor of the above article, is an 
international econ-omist on the Agrictiltwral Prod- 
vets Staf, Office of I ntematioTial Materials Policy. 
The article, had the benefit of reinew and comment 
hy Arthur W. Palmer, head of the Cotton Division. 
Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Depart- 
ment o'/ Agriculture. 

Korean Armistice Negotiations 

Message from U.N. Commander 
to Communist Commanders 

General Matthew B. Ridgtcay on Sepfemier 27 sent 
the fntlnicinff message to the Communist commanders: 

Since your liaison ofiicers have stated they are not an 
thorized to discuss or arrange satisfactory conditions tCr 
resumption of armistice talks, I submit the following pr.. 
posal directly to you. I believe this proposal provides for 
arrangements that can be mutually satisfactory to both 
our sides. 

I propose that both delesations meet as early as possi- 
ble at a place approximately midway between the batil 
lines in the vicinity of Songhyon-ni. 

It would, of course, be agreed by both sides that this 
meeting place would be kept free of armed troops and 
that both sides would abstain from any hostile acts or 
exercise of authority over members of the other side in 
their passage to this point or while they are there. 

I propose that upon resumption of delegation meetings 
at this place both delegations be prepared to return to 
the discussion of item two of the agenda immediately fol- 
lowing any discussion that may be needed to clarify phys- 
ical and security arrangements at the meeting place. 

If you <()ncur I will arrange to have our liaison officers' 
meet to discuss immediate erection of the necessary phys- 
ical facilities. 


Department of State Bulletin 

U.N. Ground Commander 
Reports on Summer Campaign 

Lf. Gen. James A. Van Fleet issued the follow- 
ing statement at Eighth Army He ad quarters in 
Korea on September 30: 

As commanding general of the Eighth Army, 
responsible for the United Nations forces in 
Korea, I feel that an informal report both to my 
command and to the peoples of the free world, is 
essential at this time. 

On 25 September, 1951, United Nations forces 
concluded a summer's limited objective campaign 
against Communist aggression. This campaign 
phase, following our successful spring counter- 
offensive extended from 25 May, 1951, to 25 Sep- 
tember, 1951. As of this date, we launched our 
autumn offensive. Whether this effort will be 
limited or otherwise, I am not at liberty to say. 

My basic mission during the past four months 
has i>een to destroy the enemy so that the men of 
the Eighth Army will not be destroyed. During 
the Kaesong conference, there was at no time any 
positive assurance of an immediate cease-fire. 
Consequently each loaded enemy weapon was a 
definite threat to the E'iiihth Army. 

It was imperative that we knock out as many of 
these weapons as we could find. 

On 25 May, 1951, we had established ourselves 
solidly as the repeller of aggression. Between the 
date of that victoi-y and 25 September, 1951, we 
have been chewing successfully at his vitality. 
There are a number of reasons why we didn't pur- 
sue tlie Communist aggressor and finish him off in 
the early months of summer. Foremost, the 
enemy at that time, if we had continued full-scale 
United Nations pressure, could have withdrawn 
to his Manchurian sanctuary, recouped at his lei- 
sure and then returned to spill his violence on the 
Eighth Army. Rather than march to the banks 
of the Yalu and dig in for inevitable attack, we 
found it far more profitable during the summer 
months to punish his ranks, his communications 
and supply lines midway in Korea. 

It was imperative that the Eighth Army remain 
active to forestall the dreaded softening process of 
stagnation. A "sit-down" army is subject to col- 
lapse at the first sign of an enemy effort. An army 
that stops to tie its shoestrings seldom regains the 
initiative essential to effective combat. As com- 
mander of the Eighth Army, I couldn't allow my 
forces to become soft and dormant. I couldn't let 
1 them slip into a condition that eventually would 
I cause horrendous casualties. So the Eighth Army 
jkept needling the enemy witli limited objective 

While these attacks served further to cripple 
the Communist aggressor, United Nations forces 
were working at their trade. Day by the day they 
were absorbing new lessons and gradually learn- 
ing the profession of fighting — a profession they 
liad to learn to do properly the job assigned. 

October 8, 195? 

Week by week, as new men replaced rotated vet- 
erans, the Eighth Army was utilized more a.nd 
more as a combat school. The system of rotation 
has provided us with thousands of veterans at 
home, while here in Korea the replacements are 
steadily assuming the poise that attends combat 
experience. We are a far superior army today 
than we were last spring or a year ago. 

In prodding the enemy in the deep belly of the 
peninsula, we have suffered casualties. To me they 
represent a personal as well as a military loss. We 
suffered many of these casualties in taking hills 
which on the surface appeared minor in signifi- 
cance. These hills demanded upward steps— steps 
courageously made in June, July, August, and 
September— steps that trampled the Communist 

It was militarily essential to take these hills to 
deny the enemy commanding terrain in close 
proximity. It was mandatory that we control the 
high ground features so that we would look down 
the throats of the enemy and thereby better per- 
form our task of destruction. It was paramount 
that we keep the enemy off balance during our 
limited offensive so that he couldn't close in, build 
up at our cloorstep and then plunge into our lines. 
In seizing these hills, we lost men but, in losing 
a comparative few, we saved other thousands. As 
we open our autumn campaign, the enemy poten- 
tial along the front line has been sharply reduced 
liy our hill-hopping tactics. United Nations 
forces have punched him off balance and he has 
never regained the equilibrium essential to a 
sound, methodical buildup operation. 

The Communist forces in Korea are not liqui- 
dated, but they are badly crippled. Evacuated 
enemy casualties inflicted by ground action alone 
during the period 25 May to 25 September, total 
188,237. For every man we lost, killed and 
wounded, the enemy paid dearly. In four 
months, he suffered not only staggering personnel 
elimination, but his hopes for combat recovery 
were sharply retarded. 

The storied boy hero of Holland who jammed 
his finger in a dike to stem the flow of a possible 
resurgent flood was a soldier. The gallant men of 
the Eighth Army who have died during the "dim 
out" war months of summer have performed the 
same mission. They have placed their lives in the 
United Nations bulwark so that not only are we 
intact but we are stronger than ever. If the 
Dutcli boy hadn't plugged the aperture, the po- 
tential floodwater might well have destroyed the 
civilization he knew. 

And so it was with the Eighth Army. During 
the past four months, if we had allowed the tide 
of the enemy to sweep the United Nations defense 
wall above the thirty-eighth parallel without con- 
stantly plugging our leaks and seeking out his 
strong points, we should have been overpowered 
and washed away pending resumption of full- 
scale combat. 


In seizing a predominant scaling objective, we 
lost men — men who jammed their fingers in the 
dike so that the Communist flood waters could not 
destroy a free civilization. 

It has been essential, in the combat shadows 
stemming from the accordion peace light at Kae- 

song, to maintain a stern watch in the peninsula 
and to keep the enemy at bay by seeking him out 
and destroying him. 

We await the hour when he concludes his trans- 
gression and trust then that the guns will be 

U.S. Proposes U.N. Action on Cartels 


The question of international restrictive business 
practices is relatively new to conferences on inter- 
national affairs. It is new, not merely in the sense 
that this is the first time the subject has come before 
the Economic and Social Council. It is new in the 
sense that only in the postwar years have govern- 
ments seriously given consideration to the problem 
and worked upon it together. 

Since it was the United States which placed the 
item on the Council's agenda,^ I want to speak for 
a little while about the reasons why we proposed 
it and about what we feel might flow from the fact 
that an important organ of the United Nations 
may choose to act in this field. 

For more than 60 years, the public policy of the 
United States has condemned cartels and mon- 
opolies. During this period we have repeatedly 
tightened our laws against monopolies and have 
steadily increased our budgetary expenditures and 
the size of the staff we use to discover and prose- 
cute monopolies. We now initiate about two new 
legal proceedings per week, designed either to 
destroy existing monopolies and cartels or to fore- 
stall the rise ot new ones. Although we have not 
been wholly successful in eliminating restrictive 
business practices, we have been able to keep the 
industrial markets of the United States basically 
competitive and thereby provide an essential safe- 
guard for our high productivity, our rapid indus- 
trial progress, and our high and continuously ris- 
ing standard of living. 

The Government of the United States looks upon 
any action to prevent restrictive business practices 
by the United Nations as a supporting arm for 
policies which already have been accepted by this 

To be more specific, we are all agreed that the 

' Made before the Economic and Social Council at Geneva, 
Switzerland, on Sept. 11 and released to the press by the 
U.S. Mission to the U.N. on Sept. 13. 

'Bulletin of Aug. i:{, 1051, p. 277. 

most pressing problem before the world today is 
increasing the standards of living of people every- 
where. Yet international cartels, which are now 
in the process of increasing their power and the 
range of their influence, can, should they so desire, 
frustrate the end we seek. 

We are agreed similarly that measures must be 
taken to increase international trade. Yet cartels 
can undo much of the positive work that govern- 
ments now are doing collectively. 

We are agreed that strenuous efforts should be 
made to promote economic development, to utilize 
efficiently our natural and human resources, to im- 
prove productivity and the adaptation of modern 
technology in industry. We may not always agree 
on the affirmative steps needed to accomplish these 
ends. But we should be able to agree rather read- 
ily to prevent private business practices which 
obstruct their achievement. 

Business practices which have monopolistic ef- 
fects are inconsistent with the economic and social 
ends sought by free governments. Unchecked, 
they can become a major barrier to the economic 
programs cherished by this Council. In this sense, 
the measures here proposed by the United States 
are designed to protect the structure we are build- 
ing together, to prevent its being undermined or 

One of the major foreign policy objectives of 
governments since the war has been to increase the 
volume of international trade by reducing trade 
barriers. To this end. many countries have partic- 
ipated in the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, under which tariffs, quantitative restric- 
tions, and other trade barriers have been reduced 
or eliminated. Other special arrangements have 
sought the same end — for example, the European 
Payments Union, the Benelux agreement, and the 
Schuman Plan. 

Yet the trade barriers imposed by cartels are 
fully Civjjable of bringing about the same result"- 
as tariffs, quotas, and other trade restrictions, 
nearly as fast as they are removed by governments. 
In fact, they can limit trade even more severely. 


Deparfmenf of Sfafe Bulletin 

Example of Cartel Operation 

Let me give you a case in point. The most com- 
mon form of international cartel is one in which 
an individual company, or a group of companies 
operating in the same country, is given the exclu- 
sive right to sell in its home market. In return, 
this company or gi'oup agrees to stay out of the 
home markets of other participants in the cartel. 
Markets of countries in which there is no cartel 
member are allocated or divided up among the in- 
dividual cartel members by agreement. 

A relatively short time ago my Government un- 
covered and broke up, by court decree, a cartel 
composed of American and European producers, 
which had deliberately prevented the development 
of an important industry in Latin America. 

Certain European and American manufacturers 
had agreed upon an arrangement under which they 
^ave each other exclusive rights to sales in their 
iwn national tei-ritory. In addition, this arrange- 
nent gave the United States producers exclusive 
•ights to sell in India, Iran, Iraq, and Egypt. The 
narkets of China, South America, and certain 
Jentral American countries were divided between 
:\.merican and European producers under quotas 
;hat varied from country to country. 

The participants undertook even to prevent in- 
lependent business enterprises, that is, non-cartel 
nembers, from making shipments that might off- 
set the restrictive effects of the quotas assigned. 
In this particular instance, if a cartel member 
railed to keep a non-member producer in his own 
:ountry from shipping the controlled product into 
ixport markets dominated by the cartel, the cartel 
nember in question had his own export quota cut 
jy an amount corresponding to what the non- 
nember had shipped abroad into cartel territory. 
[n other words, cartel members were put into the 
wsition where they had to police independent pro- 
lucers in their respective countries. 

The cartel members also agreed that if any mem- 
3er should erect a plant in any export mai-ket re- 
served for him, that plant would not be permitted 
o export to other countries. If a member of tlie 
•artel erected a plant in a country whose markets 
le shared with other members of the cartel, it was 
igreed that he would offer proportionate owner- 
hip to those pai'ticular members. 

These provisions in themselves were enough to 
•etard industrial development in the countries 
v'hose markets were divided among members of 
he cartel. But in practice, the cartel members 
rent even further. They used their market 
'greement to establish high prices. When they 
leard of any independent attempt to build a com- 
)eting ])lant in any country, they cut prices in that 
)articular country, just long enough to prevent 
he new plant from getting started. In one case, 
ine of the cartel members actually built a small 
ilant in a Latin American country to forestall the 
rection of a larger plant by an independent com- 

The purpose of the cartel I have been describ- 
ing, as revealed in the court proceedings in the 
suit brought by the United States Government, 
was to preserve for its members as much of their 
export markets as possible, by limiting the devel- 
opment of production within those markets. 

This example, taken from real life — from the 
records of the United States courts — illustrates 
how international cartels can influence the econ- 
omy of the world. By allocating export mar- 
kets among its members, an international cartel 
may channel trade as it wishes, to or from any 
market. It can do so as decisively as a government 
could through tariffs and preferential agreements. 
By setting private quotas, it may impose quanti- 
tative restrictions on trade fully as effective as any 
quota set by any government. By preventing im- 
ports into the home markets of its members, it may 
impose a series of private embargoes upon trade, 
embargoes as effective as any governmental re- 
striction. The over-all effect may be not only to 
hinder the growth of trade; it may also frustrate 
the efforts of underdeveloped countries to develop 
any particular industry. 

Distinction Between Cartel Restrictions and Tariffs 

There is one important difference between the 
trade barriers established by cartels and those 
establi-shed by governments. A tariff law in a 
free country must be voted by the representatives 
of the people. The lawmakers must decide on the 
size and shape and form of trade restriction which 
reflects the interests of their nation and its citi- 
zens. But a cartel agreement is arranged by pri- 
vate organizations, and the interests served are 
private interests alone. Moreover, in a cartel, the 
enterprises making these decisions may not even 
be owned by the citizens of the country whose 
trade they allocate. They may not even be dom- 
iciled within that country. 

A second objective of governments, as revealed 
by the activities of this Council, is the attainment 
of high levels of production and employment. 
The restrictions imposed by cartels may thwart 
this puri)ose also, by restricting production and 
con.sequently restricting employment. 

In the last 10 years, the United States has in- 
voked its anti-trust laws against more than 60 in- 
ternational restrictive arrangements, and it has 
examined a considerable number of others. We 
have not encountered any case in which a cartel 
agreement contains any provision designed to reg- 
ularize employment or expand payrolls. If car- 
tels ever do serve such a purpose, it is only indi- 

Indeed, court hearings have shown instances 
where, for the purpose of maintaining prices, car- 
tels have reduced the volume of production or sale 
and have prevented the construction of new 
plants. Such restrictions, with few exceptions, 
have been adopted without reference to their ef- 

)cfober 8, 1951 


fects on employment. The possible exceptions are 
in the few countries where cartels are under ex- 
plicit or tacit surveillance by the State. 

A third objective of this Council and of gov- 
ernments is to impi-ove technology. This is an 
end sought by all progressive countries. But it is 
especially important for underdeveloped countries. 

I have already mentioned how, to protect the 
export business of their members, cartels may limit 
their own investment in productive facilities in the 
countries which they regard as export marlcets, 
and how they may also seek to prevent such invest- 
ment by others. To discourage independent pro- 
ducers, our court records show that they often use 
the weapons of cut-throat competition, denial of 
access to patents and technical know-how, refusal 
to supply raw materials, and efforts to prevent ac- 
cess to credit. 

If they fail to prevent the rise of an industry in 
a new country, cartel members have been known to 
acquire a share of ownership in locally owned 
plants, not for the purpose of developing them, 
but for the purpose of retarding and limiting their 

In developed and underdeveloped countries 
alike, cartel members may delay the introduction 
of new technology to avoid a decline in the value 
of the equipment they already possess. A favorite 
device for repressing new technology is through 
the "patent pool." Cartel members have been 
known to obtain patents both on the process which 
they themselves intend to use and on alternative 
processes which non-member competitors might 

By exchange of patents, it is possible for each 
member of the cartel to obtain, in the markets allo- 
cated to him, the strength that inheres in all of 
the patents owned by all of the members, and at 
the same time prevent any independent company 
from using these patents. Thus, in many 
countries, the cartel member may reserve to him- 
self alone the patented technology which he 
actually makes use of, may limit production under 
that technology, and may prevent any competitor 
from using patented technology developed by all 
the cartel members, wdiicli he owns, but does not 

A fourth major purpose of this Council and of 
our Governments, especially since the Second 
World War. has been to raise the level of produc- 
tivity of industry. 

Where cartel restrictions take the place of com- 
petition they often impair productivity and reduce 
efficiency. They may give undue protection to the 
inefficient concern. In some cartels, our experi- 
ence in prosecuting them has shown that prices are 
deliberately set high enough to cover the costs of 
even the least efficient members of the industry. 

Cartels may also reduce efficiency by employing 
restrictions which destroy the incentive for cartel 
members to expand their businesses. Wliere a 
cartel assigns quotas to its members, the quota 

system protects the inefficient enterprise against 
loss of its market. At tlie same time it binds the 
efficient enterprise to its limited market. 

Cartels may also reduce efficiency by curtailing 
output. Limitations on markets prevent an in- 
dustry from using its plant capacity fully, thereby 
increasing the unit cost of operation. This effect 
may be enlarged still further by restrictions which 
prevent members from adopting new productive 
methods to replace old ones. 

Mr. President, at the core of our work here in 
the Council is a common goal, the goal of enabling 
all people to enjoy a higher standard of living. To 
accomplish this purpose, the prices of consumer 
goods must be low relative to the compensation of 
labor. The ratio of wages to prices must tend to 
become more favorable with passing time. 

Cartels often stand in the way of this primary 
goal. They may be used to raise prices or to pre- 
vent price declines. They thus maximize profits at 
the expense of the standard of living. Through 
such cartel practices as price-raising and price- 
maintaining, they take unfair advantage of the 
fact that business can organize more readily and 
more effectively than consumers. 

Corrective Action Needed 

Thus, cartel restrictions may impose trade bar- 
riers while governments are trying to reduce 
trade barriers. Cartel restrictions may reduce 
production and employment while governments 
are trying to increase them. Cartel restrictions 
may thwart industrial development while govern- 
ments are trying to promote it. They may reduce 
productive efficiency while governments ai"e trying 
to stimulate it ; and, by raising prices, may reduce 
the buying power of consumers while governments 
are trying to raise the standard of living of con- 
sumers. Such effects call for corrective action by 

Now is the time to take such action. Although 
the war destroyed some cartels and temporarily 
reduced the effectiveness of others, the revival of 
cartel restrictions is evident at present, in spite 
of the conspicuous absence of a trade depression, 
which is often used as an excuse for cartels. Sinct 
the beginning of 1946, the United States has found 
it necessary to institute legal proceedings against 
29 different business arrangements restrictive of 
international trade, in each of which both Amer- 
ican enterprises and enterprises fi'om other coun- 
tries participated. We have encountered evidence 
of the postwar existence, in territories outside of 
American jurisdiction, of at least 19 different in- 
ternational cartel arrangements. And, in at least 
eight of these cartels, it is apparent that steps have 
been taken since the war to renew or strengthen 
tlieir ])ower. Postwar trade has not yet succinnbed 
to a system of private restrictions as stifling and 
pervasive as that of the two decades preceding the 
war. But a trend back to such a system is be- 
coming apparent. 


Department of Stale Bulletin 

Restrictions that reduce productivity and tech- 
nological progress are always objectionable if our 
effort is to secure higher levels of production and 
rising living standards. They are peculiarly ob- 
jectionable in this period when the security as well 
as the prosperity of the free nations depends upon 
full production. To curb objectionable restric- 
tions now is therefore especially important. It 
will be easier to do so at this time than it may be 
a few years hence when private business restric- 
tions, if unchecked, may have proliferated into 
an even more thorny hedge of trade barriers. 

Small countries and small companies stand to 
gain most from the removal of international cartel 
barriers that restrict exports. They stand to gain 
most from the removal of cartel arrangements that 
restrict efficient production and from the removal 
of cartel obstacles to economic development and 
technical progress. 

Business enterprises that are compelled by in- 
ternational cartel agreements to limit themselves 
to a relatively small national market are likely to 
be unable to become either large enough or special- 
ized enough for efficient production and may be 
specifically prevented from adopting efficient 
methods. In the bargaining within a cartel for 
export markets, the more powerful and efficient 
enterprises tend to obtain a gradual increase in 
their percentage of the total business and thus to 
weaken further the position of the producers in 
the smaller cotnitries. A cartel is not a chari- 
table institution, and it gives the small and weak 
no better terms than they are able to exact. 

That the problem of monopolistic cartel restric- 
tions is one in which all governments have a com- 
mon interest is further attested by the utterances 
of statesmen and the action of governments. 

Growing National Concern About Monopolies 

The United States is encouraged to believe in 
the possibility of effective international action 
against monopoly by the fact that domestic legis- 
lation on the same subject has been recently 
adopted or is now under consideration in many 
countries. We have applauded the recent state- 
ment by the distinguished Premier of France 
against secret price-raising agreements that pro- 
tect inefficiency and tend to impair production; 
and we have taken note with pleasure of his ex- 
pressed intention to sponsor legislation against 
such agreements. We have admired the rapidly 
developing prograin of the United Kingdom for 
investigating questionable business arrangements 
and taking legislative action against them where 
harm to the public interest becomes apparent. 
We have been interested in the investigatory legis- 
lation of Sweden and the corrective legislation in 
Norway and Denmark. We are following with 
interest the consideration of corrective measures 
against abuses of economic power which have 
reached various stages of development in France, 

Ocfober 8, 195 1 

Belgium, Sweden, Italy, Norway, and Denmark. 
We hope and believe that national concern about 
monopoly problems will continue to grow and will 
provide an increasing amount of agreement upon 
which international cooperation can rest. 

But although national action to cope with re- 
strictive business practices that are international 
in scope is partly effective, it is not sufficient. The 
experience of the United States shows clearly the 
limitations of national laws that are not reinforced 
by international action. Such laws do not enable 
consuming countries, dependent upon imports 
from a cartel that is domiciled abroad, to protect 
themselves from arbitrary decisions by the cartel 
about the price or quality of the commodities they 
import. Through their national laws such con- 
suming countries cannot prevent their national 
markets from being allocated to a particular mem- 
ber of a foreign cartel, and cannot prevent that 
meinber from exploiting his monopoly position. 
Neither can such consuming countries use their 
national laws to overcome barriers to industrial 
development that may be imposed from abroad 
by a cartel. 

Moreover, national laws may be insufficient to 
enable a single country to ascertain the facts about 
cartel practices that affect its trade. Cartel meet- 
ings may be held abroad and the records of their 
proceedings may be kept abroad where they are 
inaccessible. International cartel members may 
get around their national laws by having foreign 
subsidiaries act in their behalf in making agree- 
ments that would be illegal, if made by the parent 
corporation in its home country. IVIoreover, an 
agreement made by an American corporation 
which is unenforceable in the United States may be 
enforced in the courts of some other country or 
under arbitral procedures which have the force of 
law in certain countries. Thus, international 
action is needed to supplement national action in 
discovering the existence of harmful cartel 
arrangements and in making it possible for indi- 
vidual governments to protect their citizens 
against them. 

More important still, however, is the fact that 
international action is needed to safeguard the 
strength, the stability, and the prosperity of the 
international trade system, upon which the well- 
being of all participating nations largely depends. 
The United States knows that it cannot be pros- 
perous in a world that is poor, nor have a large 
volume of trade in a world where trade is restricted 
or shrinking. It has recognized this fact in its 
policy of making loans for economic development 
and expansion; in its policy of furthering eco- 
nomic cooperation ; in its sponsorship and financ- 
ing of technical assistance. What is true of us is 
equally true of other nations. The trade of every 
country suffers when the flow of world trade is re- 
stricted. Any action by cartels that lowers Euro- 
pean standards of living by curtailing production 
and trade in Europe does direct harm to the West- 


ern Ih' and to Asia. By the same token 
any action oy cartels tliat interferes with the stand- 
ard of liviiijj; in the United States and Latin 
America automatically has detrimental eil'ects on 
both Asia and Europe. Hence, every country has 
an interest in contributinjir to the efforts of the 
others to thwart monopolistic restrictions wher- 
ever they may be found, even thoufrh its own ex- 
ports and imports are not directly involved. 

Almost alone among the {.n-eat economic prob- 
lems of the postwar worhl, the problem of restric- 
tive business practices is one for which there is not 
now any international program of action. Gov- 
ernmental barriers to trade are being reduced by 
the (Jeneral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
Arrangements are in existence to cope with any 
surpluses that may arise among primary materials. 
The United Nations has established a technical 
assistance program and has taken steps to promote 
full employment and economic development. But 
there is no international program in effect to elim- 
inate business restrictions that substitute private 
trade barriers for public ones; to prevent private 
international cartels from flouting publicly spon- 
sored agreements dealing with commodity sur- 
pluses; to prevent action by private gi-oups that 
may run contrary to the full employment and 
economic development policies of the United Na- 
tions. A proposal for such a program was 
included in the draft charter for an International 
Trade Organization, prepared at Havana, but that 
charter is no longer under active consideration by 
governments. No resolution on the subject has 
ever been adopted by this Council. 

United States Proposals 

The resolution that is before you proposes that 
this Council take two steps. The first is to re- 
affirm the principle that was formulated in the 
Havana Charter. The second is to set up an 
cul hoc committee to devise appropriate machinery 
to give effect to that principle. 

The principle that was included in the Havana 
Charter was subjected to study by every country 
that participated in the drafting of that document. 
Two preliminary conferences were held before the 
long conference of Havana itself, as well as many 
informal discussions at a staff level between inter- 
ested governments. The difference of opinion be- 
tween those who thought cartels were always bad, 
and those who thought they were sometimes "ood 
and sometimes bad, was reconciled by a provision 
that action should be taken against restrictive f)usi- 
ness practices, not on an arbitrary basis, but upon 
a showing tiiat they liad harmful effects ujion 
trade. Tiie fact that this a])proach to the problem 
has been subsequently invoked in other interna- 
tional agreements of a temporary nature convinces 
the United States that its reasonableness has now 
been generally accepted. 

Th(( first part of our draft resolution recom- 

mends that governments observe this principle in 
their dealings with one another. 

The remainder of our draft resolution provides 
that steps shall lie taken to give effect to the princi- 
ple. The machinery provided to deal with re- 
strictive business ])ractices in the Havana Charter 
assumed the existence of the rest of the administra- 
tive machinery of the International Trade Organi- 
zation. In the absence of such an organization, 
there is need to devise new machinery in order that 
states may effectively cooperate with one another 
for this particular common purpose. 

In devising such new machinery two stages of 
activity are required. The first involves the for- 
mulation of appropriate methods of cooperation 
among governments in dealing with objectionable 
business practices. It includes consideration of 
such matters as devising procedures for receiving 
complaints, for ascertaining facts, and for agi'ee- 
ing ui)on such remedial action as may be needed. 
It also includes the formulation of appropriate 
plans for the study of restrictive practices in order 
that governments may have the necessary informa- 
tion ito guide them in arriving at agreements as to 
the proper policies to be followed in dealing with 
such matters. 

This part of the preparatory work is assigned to 
an ad hoc committee of the Council. We visualize 
the committee as formulating the terms of an in- 
ternational agreement about restrictive business 
practices, omitting, however, the portion of such 
an agreement which determines the final location 
of the work. 

Since this committee will need to consider a 
large number of details, we think that its member- 
ship should be small. So far as is possible in a 
small committee, we have tried to include, in our 
suggestion for membership, countries which have 
had experience in curbing restrictive business 
practices by various means, countries which are 
now actively developing legislation for this pur- 
pose, countries substantially engaged in interna- 
tional trade both as exporters and as importers, 
and representation by both countries with a high 
degree of industrial development and countries 
which are not so developed. 

The second stage of activity requires the consid- 
eration of what international body should carry 
out any agreement tliat may be made by govern- 
ments concerning the elimination of restrictive 
business practices. It is not necessary to decide 
this question until the general nature of the pro- 
jiosed procedures has been formulated. Accord- 
ingly, our resolution ]irovides that the Secretary- 
(leneral shall consult witli other international 
bodies as to the ])roper body to act as aii instrument 
for implementing any international arrangement 
dealing with restrictive business practices, and 
that, after he has obtained these views, he shall 
make a report and recommendations to the Coun- 
cil. The combined reconunendations of the ad hoc 
conunittee and the Secretary-General will const i- 


Department of Sfafe Bulletin j 

tute the proposed terms of an agreement to give 
effect to the principle contained in the first part of 
our resolution. 

Restrictive business practices such as I have 
been discussing are international in scope. The 
companies that engage in them in the international 
market are nationals of many different countries — 
among them, 1 regret to say, nationals of the 
United States. We do not deny or seek to conceal 
the fact that Americans have participated in inter- 
national cartels. 

But when they do so they violate the law and 
public policy of the United States. And when the 
Government of the United States discovers such 
violation, we take corrective action. 

Sixty-one years ago, in 1890, to be exact, the first 
American law was passed forbidding monopolies 
and agreements to restrict trade in the United 
States. Twenty years later, supplementary laws 
were passed for the purpose of adding preventive 
action to the corrective action that had been pro- 
vided in the older legislation. These new statutes 
undertook to stop monopolistic practices in their 
incipiency. They also set up machinery for in- 
vestigation, designed to inform the Congress of 
any new monopoly problems that might not be 
adequately dealt with by existing laws. In 1936 
we tightened our law against price discrimination 
that might injure competition; and in 1950 we 
made it unlawful for one corporation to acquire 
the assets of another if competition is thereby sub- 
stantially lessened. 

During the 60 years of operation of our original 
anti-trust law we have prosecuted approximately 
1,000 cases in our coui-ts of law. The more recent 
laws have also been very actively used. Today, 
more than 600 people are engaged in the enforce- 
ment of these laws. As I have already told you, 
during the last 10 years at least 60 of our prosecu- 
tions have been directed against cartel activities in- 
volving international as well as domestic trade. 

Mr. President, the United States is fully aware 
of the fact that our institutions are not perfect. 
We are also aware of the fact that we have not 
fully succeeded in avoiding restrictive business 
practices. But it is a part of the democratic way 
of life that where there is a wrong there shall be a 
remedy. The American anti-trust laws are our 
remedy against nuMiopolies and cartels. The reso- 
lution we are projxising here is designed to take 
the first step in providing an international remedy 
against international monopolies and cartels, when 
they have harmful effects upon international trade. 


The Economic and Social Ctouncil ; 

Recognizing that restrictive business practices on the 
part of private or public commercial enterprises may have 
harmful effects on the expansion of production or trade, 

' Introduced in Ecosoc Sept. 11 and released to the press 
by the U.S. Mission to the U.N on the same date. 

October 8, 1 95 1 

on the economic development of under-develoi)ed areas, 
and on standards of living; 

Recognizing that national and cooiwrative interna- 
tional action is needed in order to deal effectively with 
such practices ; and 

Noting that various governments and international 
bodies have taken, and are considering, individual or col- 
lective action in this field, but that the Council has not 
dealt directly with the problem of restrictive business 
practices ; 

1. Recommends to states members of the United Nations 
that they take appropriate measures, and cooperate with 
each other, to prevent, on the part of private or public 
commercial enterprises, business practices affecting inter- 
national trade which restrain competition, limit access to 
markets, or foster monopolistic control, whenever such 
practices have harmful effects on the expansion of pro- 
duction or trade, on the economic development of under- 
developed areas, or on standards of living; 

2. Establishes an ad hoc committee on restrictive busi- 
ness practices consisting of the following member states: 
Canada, France, India, Sweden, United Kingdom, United 
States, Uruguay ; 

3. Determines that the committee shall prepare and 
submit to the Council as soon as possibu- ;uid, in any case, 
not later than the sixteenth ses.sion pmixisuls on methods 
to be adopted by international agri'cnuiit for implement- 
ing the recommendation in the above paragraph, includ- 
ing inter alia provision for continuing consideration of 
problems of restrictive business practices. In preparing 
its proposals, the committee may consult with interested 
governments. Specialized Agencies, intergovernmental or- 
ganizations and non-governmental ; 

4. Instructs the Secretary General to seek from any 
appropriate intergovernmental bodies or agencies their 
views as to the organization which could most appropri- 
ately implement these proposals and in the light of these 
views to make a report and recommendation at a later 
session of the Council. 


U.N. doc. E/2133 
Adopted Sept. 13, 1951 

The Economic and Social Council ; 

Recognizing that restrictive business practices on the 
part of private or public commercial enterprises which, 
ill international trade, restrain competition, limit access 
to markets and to the means of production necessary for 
economic development or foster monopolistic control, may 
have harmful effects on the expansion of production or 
trade, on the economic development of under-developed 
areas, on standards of living and the other aims and ob- 
jectives set out in Chapter I of the Havana Charter, 

Recognizing that national and co-operative international 
action is needed in order to deal effectively with such 
l)ractices, and 

Noting tiat Tarious governments and international 
bodies have taken, or are considering. Individual or col- 
lective action in this field, but that the Council has not 
dealt directly with the problem of restrictive business 

1. Recommends to States Members of the United Nations 
that they take appropriate measures, and co-operate with 
each other, to prevent, on the part of private or public 
commercial enterprises, business practices affecting in- 
ternational trade which restrain competition, limit access 
to markets, or foster monopolistic control, whenever such 
practices have harmful effects on the expansion of pro- 
duction or trade, on the economic development of under- 
developed areas, or on standards of living ; 

2. Recommends that the measures adopted In the cases 
and for the purposes stated in the preceding pariigraph 
shall be based on the principles set forth in Chapter V of 


the Havana Charter, concerning restrictive business prac- 
tices ; 

3. Establishes an A<1 Hoc Committee on Restrictive Busi- 
ness Practices consistins of the following Member States: 
Belgium, Canada, France, India, Mexico, Pakistan, 
Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay ; 

4. Determines that the Committee shall prepare and 
submit to the Council as soon as possible, and in any case 
not later than March 1953, proposals on methods to be 
adopted by international agreement for implementing the 
recommendation in paragraph 1 above including inter 
alia provision for containing consideration of problems 
of restrictive business practices. In preparing its pro- 
posals, the Committee may consult with interested Gov- 
ernments, specialized agencies, intergovernmental organ- 
izations and non-governmental organizations : 

5. Determines, further, that the Committee shall: 

(a) Obtain information from Governments, from spe- 
cialized agencies and from other sources of information, on 
restrictive business practices, whether based on cartel 
agreements or not, that affect international trade and 
international economic co-operation generally, and on 
legislation adopted and measures taken by individual Mem- 
ber States in connection with restrictive business practices 
and with the object of restoring the freedom of competi- 
tion; and 

(b ) Present to the Economic and Social Council analyses 
of this information together with the proposals mentioned 
in paragraph 4 ; and 

6. Instructs the Secretary-General to seek from any 
appropriate intergovernmental bodies or agencies their 
views as to the organization which could most appro- 
priately implement these proposals and, in the light of 
those views, to make a report and recommendation at a 
later session of the Council. 

IMC Recommendation 
On Allocation of Newsprint 

tons; and Yugoslavia, 1,890 tons. 

The committee stressed in the announcement 
that the quantity of newsprint being made avail- 
able for allocation is limited because it will be 
diverted from contracts between Canadian and 
United States producers and Canadian and 
United States publishers. The latter are fore- 
going such newsprint for this purpose. As a con- 
sequence, allocations were made only to countries 
where emergency conditions existed. The quanti- 
ties allocated so far will be taken into account in 
any future program. 

The committee is still considering the over-all 
newsprint situation, taking into consideration the 
limited supplies available for any allocation. 
The committee advises all consumer countries not 
to cancel their contracts or fail to take up supplies 
offered in the hope of receiving newsprint through 
Imc allocations on more advantageous terms. 

The 14 member governments of the Pulp-Paper 
Committee are Australia, Austria. Belgium, 
Brazil, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands. Norway, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United 


The Pulp-Paper Committee of the International 
Materials Conference (Imc) announced on Sep- 
tember 24 that its member governments have ac- 
cepted a unanimous recommendation made to them 
by the Committee in favor of a third emergency 
allocation of newsprint to countries in special 

This third allocation of 15,800 metric tons has 
been made to 10 countries as follows : 

Metric tons 

Brazil 1, 200 

Chile 1, 000 

Dominican Republic 500 

France 2, 000 

Germany 5, 000 

Indonesia 1,500 

Nicaragua 400 

Spain 1, 000 

Uruguay 1, 200 

Yugoslavia 2, 000 

The third allocation brings the aggregate allo- 
cation of newsprint by Imc to date to 27,500 
metric tons. The two previous allocations of 
newsprint made by Imc on May 30 and June 24 
amounted to 11,700 metric tons, divided as fol- 
lows: France, 2,700 tons; Cireece, 1,440 tons; 
India, 2,250 tons; Malaya and Singapore, 630 
tons; Pakistan, 450 tons; the Pliilippines, 2,340 


Film Advisory Committee Formed 

The Department of State announced, on Sep- 
tember 23, the formation and first meeting of the 
Film Advisory Committee to the U.S. Advisory 
Commission on Information. The Film Advisory 
Committee is one of six committees being formed 
to operate as an advisory body to the U.S. Inter- 
national Information Program. Each committee 
will have as its chairman a member of the Ad- 
visory Commission on Information. In the case 
of the Film Advisory Committee, the chairman 
will be Mark A. May. director of the Institute 
of Human Relations at Yale University. The fol- 
lowing outstanding motion picture specialists will 
serve as members of the new committee : 

Gordon Biggar, President, Industrial Audio-Visual Asso- 

Frank Capra, Director-Producer, representing the Motion 
Picture Industry Council 

Ned E. Depinet, President, RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., and 
the Council of Motion Picture Organizations 

Y. Frank Freeman, Vice President, Paramount Pictures 
Corporation, and Chairman of the Board, Association 
of Motion Picture Producers 

Gunther R. Lessing. Chairman of the Board of Directors, 
Society of Independent Motion Picture Producers 

John G. McCarthy, Vice President, Motion Picture Asso- 
ciation of America, Inc. 

Department of State Bulletin 

Joseph J. MePherson, Executive Secretary of Department 
of Audio-Visual Instruction and Director, Division of 
Audio-Visual Instruction, National Education Asso- 

Peter J. Mooney, President, Non-Theatrical Film Pro- 
ducers Association, Inc. 

Edmund Reek, Vice President, Movietonews, Inc. 

Ralph W. Steetle, Executive Director, Joint Committee 
on Educational Television 

Donald K. White, Executive Vice President, National 
Audio-Visual Association, Inc. 

Walter A. Wittich, Director, Bureau of Visual Instruc- 
tion, University of Wisconsin 

The Film Advisory Committee is holding its 
first meeting on September 24 at Washington. 
The initial session will be largely introductory for 
the purpose of acquainting members with the De- 
partment's information program, how it fits into 
the over-all American foreign policy, and finally 
considering the more specific nature of the work 
ji the International Motion Picture Division. 

The new committee will serve as a consulting 
ind contributing panel to the U.S. Advisory Com- 
nission on Information, which, is given, by act 
jf Congress, the duty of carrying out a continuing 
examination of the information program and mak- 
ng semiannual reports and recommendations to 
he Congress. 

The Film Advisory Committee is established in 
)rder to bring into play the knowledge and skills 
)f the film industry that are applicable to the 
government's overseas information program. It 
vill meet from time to time, examine the informa- 
ional aims of the Department, closely observe the 
ype of movies now being used, and make what 
•ecommendations it sees fit on the broad policies 
)r mechanics involved in the international motion- 
)icture ojieration. The committee will in addition 
onsider ways in which cooperation can be fur- 
hered between the Department and the private 
ilm industry. 

kppointment of Officers 

Donald D. Kennedy as Director of the Office of South 
isian Affairs. Tlie Office of South Asian Affairs handles 
Jnited States relations with India, PalJistan, Afghanis- 
an, Ceylon, and Nepal. The Office is a part of the Bureau 
f Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, headed 
y Assistant Secretary George C. MeGhee. 

Edward G. Cale as director of the Office of Regional 
anerican Affairs, effective September IS. 

Dan JIabry Lacy as chief of the Division of Overseas 
nformation Centers in the Department of State, effective 
eptember 17. 

Wilson M. Compton as Staff Director of the U.S. Ad- 
isory Commission on Information. 


consular Offices 

The American Consulate at Valletta, Malta, will be re- 
lovcd from the supervisory consular jurisdiction of the 

Consulate General at Tunis, Tunisia, effective October 1, 


On September 13, 1951, the Senate confirmed the nomi- 
nation of Lo.v W. Henderson to be Ambassador Extraor- 
dinary and Plenipotentiary to Iran. 

On September 13, 1951, the Senate confirmed the nomi- 
nation of Edward L. Roddan to be Ambassador Extra- 
ordinary and Plenipotentiary to Uruguay. 

On September 13, 1951, the Senate confirmed the nomi- 
nation of Harold B. Minor to be Envoy Extraordinary and 
Minister Plenipotentiary to Lebanon. 

Norman Armour Resigns 
As Ambassador to Venezuela 

[Released to the press by the White House September 22] 

The President has sent the foUowimg letter to 
Nomian Armour^ accepting his resignation as 
TJnited States Amba^Hsador to Venes/iiela: 

My dear Mr. Armoitr: It is with sincere regret 
that I accede to your request to be relieved of your 
ambassadorial duties in Venezuela, effective on a 
date to be determined following your return to the 
United States on or about October first. 

Though already retired to a well-earned rest 
after a long and distinguished career in the service 
of our Government, you responded generously to 
my call last September to head one of our im- 
portant embassies during this trying period of 
world-wide relations. During your tenure of of- 
fice you exhibited your usual high standard of per- 
formance of duty. I have noted particularly that 
your sincere interest in Venezuela and its people 
has won for you their admiration and high regard 
and has also created an even closer relationship 
between the two countries. 

As you again resume retirement, please accept 
my best wishes for good health and happiness in 
the years to come. 

Very sincerely yours, 

Harry S. Truman 

FoUoxcing is the text of Arnbassador Armour'' s 
letter to the President: 

American Embassy, 

Caracas, Venezuela, 
September 13, 1951. 

My dear Mr. President: "\Mien you were kind 
enough to call me back from retirement to assume 
the jwst of Ambassador to Venezuela, it was, I be- 
lieve, the understanding that the assignment would 
be a temporary one only, the period of a year being 
mentioned. As that period is now almost com- 
pleted, I feel that, for personal reasons, I must ask 
you to relieve me of my duties here and to accept 
my resignation as of October 1, next. 

'cfober 8, 7957 


At the same time, I wish to assure you again of 
my deep appreciation of the confidence you have 
shown me in entrusting to nie this important and 
interesting mission. It has been a great privilege 
to be affonled this opportunity to serve under you 
aeain, particuUirly in these difficult days 

With assurances of my high regard, I am, my 
dear Mr. President 

Faithfully yours, 

Norman Armour 

The United States In the United Nations 

V weekly feature, does not appear in this 
issue, but will be resumed in the issue ot 
October 15. 

Current United Nations Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography' 

Security Council 

Statement dated May 18, 19.51 by the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Korean People's Democratic Kepublic 
to the President of the Security Council. S/2167, May 
24, 1951. 7 pp. mimeo. 

Information Transmitted by the Governments Concern, 
ine Prisoners of War. Ad Hoc Commission on Pns- 
onlrs of War. A/AC.46/l/Add.l, July 18, 1951. 13 
pp. mimeo. 


Protocol and Liaison. Special Informational Bulleto. 
List of Permanent Delegations Accredited to the Eu- 
ropean Office of the United Nations at Geneva. ST/ 
SG/SEK.C/2, July 12, 1951. 7 pp. mimeo. 
Analysis of Replies from Governments to the Full Employ- 
ment Questionnaire Covering the Period 1950-51, Sul> 
mitted Under Resolutions 221 E (IX) and 290 (XI) 
of the Economic and Social Council. Report by the 
Secretary-General. E/2035, June 27, 1951. 41 pp 
Report by the Secretary-General Under Economic and 
cial Council Resolution 296 (XI) on Procedures foi 
Intergovernmental Consultations on Problems of Pri 
mary Commodities. E/2039, June 27, 1951. 28 pp 

Report of the Committee on the Draft Convention on Fret 
dom of Information. Legal Problems Raised by Cei 
tain Amendments to the Draft Convention. Memoran 
dum by the Secretary-General. E/2046, July 5, 195: 
21 pp. mimeo. 

World Economic Situation. Economic Development ( 
Underdeveloped Countries. Relation of Fluctuatior 
in the Prices of Primary Commodities to the Abillt 
of Underdeveloped Countries To Obtain Foreign E: 
change. Report by the Secretary-General. E/204 
July 5, 1951. 113 pp. mimeo. 

General Assembly 

Letter dated May 15, 1951 from the Representative of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United 
Nations, Addressed to the President of the General 
Assembly. A/1804, May 22, 1951. 3 pp. mimeo. 

Uniting For Peace. Implementation of Paragraph 8 of 
Resolution 377 (V) Adopted by the General Assembly 
on November 3, 1950. A/1822, June 25, 1951. lb pp. 

Addi"iona?'Measures To Be Employed To Meet the Aggres- 
sion in Korea. Reports from Governments on Meas- 
ures taken in Accordance with General Assembly Res- 
olution 500 (V) of May 18, 1951. A/1841, July 12, 
1951. G2 pp. mimeo. , „ 

Letter dated 17 July 1951 from the Permanent Rep- 
resentative of the Federal People's Republic of Yugo- 
slavia to the United Nations. Observance in Bulgaria, 
Hungary, and Romania of Human Rights and Funda- 
mental Freedoms. Addressed to the Secretary-Gen- 
eral. A/1S43, July 25, 1951. 5 pp. mimeo. 

Information Transmitted by Governments Concerning 
Prisoners of War. A d Hoc Commission on Prisoners 
of War. A/AC.46/1, June 28, 1951. 52 pp. mimeo. 

' Printed materials may be secured in the United States 
from tlie International Document Service, Columbia Uni- 
versity Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other 
materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may 
he consulted at certain designated libraries in the United 

The United Nations Secretariat has established an 
Official Records series for the General Assembly, the Se- 
curity Council, the Economic and Social Council, the 
Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission 
which Includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and 
reports of the various commissions and committees. Pub- 
lications in the Official Records series will not l)e listed in 
this department a.s heretofore, l)Ut information on securinir 
suh.wriptions to the series may lie obtained from the Inter- 
national Documents Service. 


Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: Sept. 24-30, 1951 

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the 
Spi'cial Assistant for Press Relations, Department 
of State, Washington 25, D.C. Items marked (*) 
are not printed in the Bulletin. 

Information Committee appointments 
Turkey signs Torquay protocol invites U.S. to study tin 
Austria signs Torquay protocol 
Film Advisory Committee 
Warren : Ambassador to Ven e zuela 

































870* 9/26 
871 9/26 










Atwood : Port of N.Y. authority 
Webb : Conduct of foreign affairs 
Truman: Greece and Turkey-NATO 
Barrett: Voa transmission facilities 
Italian agreement signed 
Declaration on Italian peace treaty 
Acheson: Goals achieved at confs. 
Jessup: U.S. policy toward U.S.S.R 
Communique re: de Gasperi visit 
Anniversary of New Zealand 
Acheson: Introducing de Gasperi 
Aid to Brazil for rehabilitation 
Swiss income tax convention 
Treaty of friendship with Denmark 
Hawley: Adviser to German youth 
SpofCoi-d to sign Nato protocol 
Visitors to U.S. 
TcA board urges food aid 


Deparfment of Sfafe Bulled 

(Continued from page 5S3) 

Forei^ Relations of the United States, 1934. Vol. II: 
Europe, Near East, and Africa. Pub. 4212. xcv, 1002 
pp. $3.75. 

A collection of official papers relating to the foreign 
relations of the United States. 

Technical Cooperation. Treaties and Other International 
Acts Series 2249. Pub. 4247. 8 pp. 50. 

Agreement between the United States and Ecuador — 
Signed at Quito May 3, 19.")1. 

American Labor and World Trade. Commercial Policy 
Series 139. Pub. 4254. 8 pp. Free. 

A fact sheet on U. S. expansion of world trade and 
its significance to the American worker. 

Technical Cooperation. Treaties and Other International 
Acts Series 2254. Pub. 4260. 4 pp. 50. 

Agreement between the United States and Pakistan — 
Signed at Karachi Feb. 9, 1951 ; entered into force Feb. 
9, 1951. 

Strength for Free Europe: Contributions of Our North 
Atlantic Allies. (Jeneral Foreign Policy Series 55. Pub. 
4268. 7 pp. Free. 

A fact sheet on tlie North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- 
tion (NATO). 

United Nations: 60 Countries Pledged To Act. Inter- 
national Organization and Conference Series III, 71. Pub. 
4296. 9 page folder. 50. 

.\n information pamphlet on highlights of U.N. 

The United Nations Today. International Organization 
and Conference Series III, 72. Pub. 4298. 10 pp. 4 
charts. 100. 

A background summary of the activities and organiza- 
tion of the United Nations and its specialized agencies. 

The Communist "Peace Crusade." General Foreign Policy 
Series 65. Pub. 4328. 5 pp. 100. 

A background summary of the Soviet's peace crusade 
as compared to the American peace drive. 

Japanese Peace Conference, San Francisco Sept. 4-8, 1951. 
International Orgaulzatiim and Conference Series II, Far 
Eastern 2. Pub. 4371. 21 pp. Free. 

Opening and closing statements, the rules of procedure, 
and answers to Soviet charges. 

Two Weeks in August: P^st German Youth Strays West. 
European and Briti-sh Commonwealth Series .30. Pub. 
4363. 13 pp. 100. 

A background summary of the Communist youth 
festival in Berlin. 

The American Frontier — 1951. General Foreign Policy 
Series 64. Pub. 4313. 9 pp. Free. 

Address by Harry S. Truman, President of the United 
States, in connection with the celebration of the 2.")0th 
anniversary of the founding of Detroit, July 28, 1951. 

Communist Festival for Youth, East Berlin, August 1951. 

European and British Commonwealth Series 27. Pub. 
4325. 8 pp. 100. 

A Background summary of the festival and the role 
played by the Frric Deutsche Jiiyend (Fdj). 

Draft Treaty of Peace With Japan With Declarations by 
the Government of Japan. Far Eastern Series 49. Pub. 
4330. 32 pp. 200. 

Final draft treaty for use at Japanese Peace Con- 
ference with draft declarations by the Government 
of Japan. 

Japanese Peace Conference, San Francisco, September 
1951. International Organization and Conference Series 
II, Far East 1. Pub. 4355. 12 pp. 100. 

A background summary of the important events. Is- 
sues, and developments leading to the Japanese peace 

United Nations poster. Free. 

A poster for Unitefl Nations Day, October 24, 1951. 



Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, and the Judici- 
ary Appropriation Bill, 1952. S. Rept. 697, 82d Cong., 
1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 4740] 33 pp. 

Expressing Indignation at the Arrest and Conviction of 
Associated Press Correspondent William N. Oatis by 
the Czeehoslovakian Government. S. Kept. 696, 82d 
Cong., 1st sess. [To accompany H. Con. Res. 140] 
3 pp. 

Providing for the (^ontrol by the United States and Co- 
operating Foreign Nations of Exports to any Nation or 
Combination of Nations Threatening the Security of 
the United States, Including the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics and all the Countries Under its 
Domination. S. Rept. 698, 82d Cong., 1st sess. [To 
accompany H. R. 4550] 8 pp. 

Relating to Voluntary Contributions for Korean Relief. 
S. Rept. 699, 82d Cong., 1st sess. [To accompany 
H. J. Res. 281] 2 pp. 

United States Foreign Aid Programs in Europe, Report 
of the subcommmittee of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations on United States economic and military as- 
sistance to free Europe. S. Doc. 56, S2d Cong., 1st 
sess. 46 pp. 

The Mutual Security Program. Hearings before the Com- 
mittee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 
Eighty-second Congress, first session, on (H. R. .5020 
and H. R. 5113) the Mutual Security Program. June 
26, 27, 28, 29, July 2, 3, 10, 11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 
23, 24. 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, and 31, 1951. 1600 pp. 

Mutual Security Act of 1951. Hearings before the Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
Armed Services, United States Senate, Eighty-second 
Congress, first session, on S. 1762, a bill to promote 
the foreign policy and provide for the defense and 
general welfare of the United States by furnishing 
assistance to friendly nations in the interest of na- 
tional security. July 26, 27, 30, 31, August 1, 2, 3, 6, 
7. 8, and 9, 1951 . 801 pp. 

The Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 19.52. Hearings 
before subcommittees of the Committee on Appropria- 
tions, House of Representatives, Eighty-second Con- 
gress, first session, on the supplemental appropriation 
bill for 19.52, ii, 822 pp. 

Amending Section 32 (A) (2) of the Trading With the 
Enemy Act. S. Rept. 503, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To 
Accompany S. .302] 6 pp. 

Ocfober 8, 1951 


October 8, 1951 


Vol. XXV, No. 641 


TCA board urges emphasis on adequate food 

supply ^"^"^ 

American Republics 

ARGENTINA: Dollar obligations to be liqui- 
dated 582 

BRAZIL: Aid urged for rehabilitation program . 581 

.\rms and Armed Forces 

Military Aid Program for Indochina reexamined . 570 


Rldgway proposes resumption of armistice 

negotiations 588 

Van Fleet reports on summer campaign . . . 589 

MALAYA: U.S. to study tin industry 581 

INDOCHINA: Military Aid Program reexamined . 570 
TURKEY: Signs Torquay protocol 576 


Willing to construct St. Lawrence Seaway ... 581 


Meeting strength with strength (Jessup) . . . 573 
New transmitter project to combat Reds (Bar- 
rett) 582 

Present conduct of world affairs reflects chang- 
ing world conditions (Webb) 578 


Legislation listed 599 


AtJSTRIA: Signs Torquay protocol 576 

DENMARK: Signs treaty of friendship with U.S. 575 
Italian contributions to defense of Europe (ex- 
change of views by Truman and de Gasperl) . 563 
Discusses mutual Interest with U.S. . . . 563 
U.S.. U.K., Prance favor removal of certain 

restrictions of Italian peace treaty .... 570 
SWITZERLAND: Income tax convention with 

U.S. ratified 575 

YUGOSLAVIA: British ask U.N. action on Iran- 
ian oil (letter, Coulson to Bebler) .... 584 

Foreign Service 

Consulate at Valletta. Malta removed from Juris- 
diction of Consulate General at Tunis . . . 597 

Resignations : Norman Armour as Ambassador to 

Venezuela 597 


IMC recommends allocation of newsprint . . . 596 

Information and Educational Exchange Program 
VOA: New transmitter project discussed . . . 582 

International Meetings 

Goals accomplished at recent conferences . . . 585 

Recent international discussions on cotton . . 586 

U.S. to study Malayan tin industry 581 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

Ambassador Spofford to sign protocol on admis- 
sion of Greece and Turkey 571 

Harriman named to special committee of Nac . . 572 
Meeting strength with strength (Jessup) . . . 573 
Council meeting at Ottawa, accomplishments 

discussed (Acheson) 585 

President's message to Celal Bayar, on Turkey's 

participation In Nato, text 571 

Presidential Documents 


Letter from Queen Juliana to the President . . 572 
Letter to Ambassador Armour accepting his 

resignation 597 

President's message to President of Turkey, 

text 571 


Recent Releases 583 

State, Department of 

Appointment of officers 597 

Film Advisory Committee formed 596 

Present conduct of foreign affairs reflects chang- 
ing world conditions (Webb) 578 

Strategic Materials 

British ask U.N. action on Iranian oil (letter 

from Coulson to Bebler) 584 

Recent International discussions on cotton . . 586 


U.S.-Swiss income tax convention ratified . . . 575 

Technical Cooperation and Development 


Aid urged for Brazilian rehabilitation pro- 
gram 581 

TCA board urges emphasis on adequate food 

supply 577 


Austria signs Torquay protocol 576 

Turkey signs Torquay protocol 576 

U.S. proposes international restrictive business 

practices 590 


Canada offers to construct St. Lawrence Seaway . 581 

Treaties and Other International Agreements 

AUSTRIA: Signs Torquay protocol 576 

DENMARK: Signs treaty of friendship, com- 
merce, and navigation with U.S 575 

Italian peace treaty restrictions to be removed . 570 
SWITZERLAND: Income tax convention with 

U.S. ratified 575 

TURKEY: Signs Torquay protocol 576 

United Nations 

ECOSOC: U.S. representative proposes action on 

cartels 590 

Text of U.S. draft resolutions 595 

Text of Ecosoc resolution 595 

Rldgway proposes resumption of armistice nego- 
tiations 588 

Security Council: British propose U.N. action on 

Iranian oil (Coulson to Bebler) 584 

U.N. bibliography: selected documents . . . 598 

Van Fleet reports on summer campaign in Korea. 589 

Name Index 

Acheson, Secretary Dean 565. 576, 585, 597 

Anderson. Eugenie 575 

Armour, Norman 597 

Barrett, Edward W 582 

Bayar. Celal 571 

Bebler, Ales 584 

Cale, Edward G 597 

Compton, William 597 

Coulson, J. E 584 

de Gasperi, Prime Minister 563 

de Tassigny, Lattre 570 

Edmond, Lester E 586 

Harriman, W. Averell 572 

Henderson, Loy W 597 

Jessup, Philip C 573 

Juliana, Queen 572 

Kennedy, Donald D 597 

Kraft, Ole BJtirn 575 

Lacy, Dan M 597 

Laf er. Horacio 581 

Lubln. Isador 590 

May, Mark A 596 

Minor, Harold B 597 

Pella, Giuseppe 563 

Rldgway, Matthew B 588 

Roddan, Edward L 597 

St. Laurant, Prime Minister 581 

Spofford. Charles M 571 

Truman, President Harry S. . . . 563, 571, 572, 581 

Van Fleet, James A 589 

Venizelos, Sophocles 571 

Webb, James E 578 

Whipple, Clayton E 577 

ri€/ uJeha/y^tment ^ t/taie^ 



by George C. McGhee 612 


Suspension of Trade Concessions 621 

Refugee Train Episode 624 

Sudeten German Population 628 

U.S. POLICY TOWARD CHINA, 1945-50 • Statement by 

Ambassador-at- Large Philip C. Jessup 603 

For index see back cover 

Vol. XXV, No. 642 
October 15, 1951 

NOV 1 1951 

%/Ae z/)efia/it^men/t /)£ C/iui^ A_/ LA 1 1 Kj L 111 

Vol. XXV, No. 642 . Publication 4386 
October 15, 1951 

For lale by the Superintendent o( Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

WashlUEton 25, D.O. 


82 Issues, domestic $7.60, foreign $10.25 

Single copy, 20 cents 

The printing of this publication has 
been approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget (July 29, 1949). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrfghtcd and Items contained herein may 
be reprinted. Citation of the Department 
or State Bulletin as the source will be 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication compiled and 
edited in the Division of Publications, 
Office^ of Public Affairs, provides the 
public and interested agencies of 
the Government with information on 
developments in the field of foreign 
relations and on the work of the De- 
partment of State and the Foreign 
Service. The BULLETIN includes 
selected press releases on foreign pol- 
icy issued by the White House and 
the Department, and statements and 
addresses made by the President and 
by the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international 'affairs and the func- 
tions of the Department. Informa- 
tion is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to 
which the United States is or may 
become a party and treaties of gen- 
eral international interest. 

Publications of the Department, as 
well as legislative material in the field 
of international relations, are listed 

U.S. Policy Toward China, 1949-50 

Statement hy Philip C. Jessup 

On October 3 and ^, Ambassador Jessup ap- 
peared before a special subcom/mittee of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee created to consider 
Ms nomination to be a U.S. representative to the 
sixth session of the U.N. General Assembly which 
opens at Paris November 6. In the course of his 
testimony, Ambassador Jessup made the following 
statement on U.S. policy toioard China: 

In the summer of 1949, the Secretary of State 
invited Everett Case, president of Colgate Uni- 
versity, and Raymond Fosdick, former president 
of the Rockefeller Foundation, to devote some time 
in the Department as consultants. He asked them 
to work with me in a general examination of prob- 
lems confrontingr the United States throughout 
Asia. In his letter of August 23, 1949, to Messrs. 
Case and Fosdick (made public in State Depart- 
ment Press Release No. 647) Secretary Acheson 
said, "We desire every possible assistance in reach- 
ing wise conclusions regarding the policies which 
the United States should follow in promoting the 
interests of this country." He said that all the 
resources and personnel of the Department would 
be at their disposal and continued : "I hope you 
will also seek the views of other competent per- 
sons in civilian and official life and weigh all opin- 
ions which you can assemble within the physical 
limitations of the time which you are able to de- 
vote to this problem." Accordingly, on August 
18 I wrote a letter to a considerable number of 
individuals who had either had extensive personal 
experience in the Far East or who had made a 
special study of the area or some part of it. On 
belialf of Mr. Fosdick, Mr. Case, and myself, I 
invited a summary of their views on the objectives 
of U.S. policy. I will file with the committee a 
copy of this letter together with a list of those 
who submitted memoranda. The list was pub- 
hshed in State Department Press Release No. 491 
of May 12, 1950. We intended to draw up a list 

Ocfofaer 75, J95I 

which might elicit many different points of view, 
and I believe we succeeded. For example, the list 
included former Ambassador William Bullitt and 
former Under Secretary Castle, former Ambassa- 
dor Stanley Hornbeck, former Under Secretary 
Grew, Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, and a number 
of people in the academic world, including Prof. 
Owen Lattimore, as well as former President 
Isaiah Bowman of Johns Hopkins, Prof. Hugh 
Borte, and others. After we had examined these 

Memorandum From Secretary Acheson 
to Ambassador-at-Large Philip C. Jessup 

Ambassador Jessup, at his second appearance 
before the Senate Foreign Rclotion^ subcojiimit- 
tee on October 4, read the following memorandum 
before proceeding to his prepared statement on 
V.S. policy toward China: 

July 18, 1949 

Xou will please take as your assumption that 
it is a fundamental decision of American policy 
that the United States does not intend to permit 
further extension of Communist domination on 
the Continent of Asia or in the Southeast Asia 
area. Will you please draw up for me possible 
programs of action relating to various specific 
areas not now under Communist control in Asia 
under which the United States would have the 
best chance of achieving this purpose. These 
programs should contain proposed courses of 
action, steps to be taken in implementing such 
programs, estimate of cost to the U.S., and the 
extent to which U.S. forces would or would not 
be involved. I fully realize that when these pro- 
posals are received it may be obvious that cer- 
tain parts thereof would not be within our capa- 
bilities to put into effect, but what I desire is the 
examination of the problem on the general as- 
sumptions indicated above in order to make ab- 
solutely certain that we are neglecting no oppor- 
tunity that would be within our capabilities to 
achieve the purpose of halting the spread of 
totalitarian communism in Asia. 

Dean Acheson 


memoranda, we decided that it would be useful 
to bring together a group of people for a 3-day 
conference in the Department. This decision was 
in line with the policy of the Department's Office 
of Public Affairs which has arranged similar con- 
ferences on a number of different subjects. Since 
•we were still anxious to get as many views as pos- 
sible the list of persons invited to the round table 
conference, which was held on October 6 through 
8, 1949, included only a few of those who had 
been asked to submit memoranda. I will submit 
to the committee the full list of those who attended 
the round table and a list of additional persons 
who were invited but were unable to attend. This 
list was published in State Department Press Re- 
lease No. 491 of May 12, 1950. The committee will 
notice on examining the list that it included people 
from the academic world, former Government offi- 
cials and diplomats, representatives of banking 
and business, and a representative of the Interna- 
tional Missionary Council. The invitations to 
these people were contained in telegi-ams sent by 
the Secretary of State. Those invited were told 
that the Department would pay their travel ex- 
penses and a per diem. I had expected to act as 
chairman throughout the conference but my duties 
in New York as a member of the delegation to the 
U.N. General Assembly nnide it impossible for me 
to attend throughout. Mr. Fosdick presided when 
I was not there. I chaired the discussion on Octo- 
ber 7. I conceived my role to be solely that of 
chairman. The purpose of the conference was to 
obtain the views of the outside participants and 
I caref ullj' avoided intruding any ideas of my own. 
I raised various points for discussion and asked 
questions designed to bring out all points of view. 

In accordance with the practice in such consul- 
tations, all of the participants were assured that 
the discussion was confidential and would not be 
made public. This is considered necessary in such 
meetings in order to assure complete freedom of 
expression. I should like to repeat that the list 
of persons invited to submit memoranda, as well 
as the list of persons invited to the conference, 
was drawn up with a view to eliciting as many 
different opinions as possible. President Case, 
Dr. Fosdick, and I had no thesis to prove or to 
sustain. In most instances we had no advance 
information concerning the specific views of the 
participants but endeavored by covering the cate- 
gories to which I have referred to get a repre- 
sentative group. 

I should also like to point out that neither the 
memoranda nor the discussions in the round table 
conference "made policy." In addition to these 
contacts we discussed matters with many officers of 
the State Department, with members of both 
Houses of Congress, and with other individuals. 
The consultants did not make a report. In his 
public letter of August 23 to which I have already 
referred, Secretary Acheson said : 


I shall not ask you to present a report, but I do count 
on you from time to time as your study progresses to 
confer fully and frankly with me and with the other 
principal officers of the Department so that we may have 
the benefit of your views in framing recommendations 
which I shall make to the President and discuss with 
members of the Senate and House of Representatives. 

Senator McCarthy's statement that Mr. Latti- 
more wrote "secret advice and instructions" to me 
in connection with my trip through Asia in early 
1950 is completely false. It is apparent that he 
has attempted to place this misinterpretation on 
one of the 31 memoranda which I have described. 

Recent public discussions of this matter have 
focused largely on the question of the policy of the 
United States with respect to the recognition of 
the Chinese Communist regime. I should accord- 
ingly like to lay before the committee a statement 
in regard to this policy. I shall first summarize 
the main points in connection with this problem 
and then go into some detail on a chronological 

First then, by way of summary : 

1. The United States has never considered the recog- 
nition of Communist China ; it has continued to recog- 
nize the National Government of China. 

2. The United States has consistently asserted Its 
influence against the recognition of Communist China 
by other governments. 

3. The United States has consistently supported the 
National Government of Cliina as the representative of 
China in the United Nations and has opposed the seating 
of representatives of Peiping. 

4. The United States has never agreed with any other 
government that the United States would under any given 
circumstances recognize Communist China. 

5. The United States has never expressed its approval 
or concurrence with the action taken by any other gov- 
ernment in recognizing Communist China. 

6. The Department of State has never recommended to 
the President or to the National Security Council that 
the United States recognize Communist China. 

The actual history of the matter has been as 
follows : 

The capture of the Nationalist capital of Nan- 
king in April 1949 by Chinese Communist forces 
and indications that they might soon form a so- 
called national government led the Department of 
State on May 6, 1949, to instruct the U.S. Em- 
bassies in London, Paris, Rome, Brussels, the 
Hague, Ottawa, Lisbon, and Canberra, to take up 
the subject with the Foreign Ministers of those 
Governments, emphasizing (1) the disadvantages 
of initiating any moves toward recognition or 
giving the impression through statements by their 
officials that any approach by the Chinese Com- 
munists seeking recognition would be welcomed, 
and (2) the desirability of concerned Western 
Powers adopting a common front in this regard. 

The prompt response was in general support 
of this position. An informal agreement was 
reached that the concerned nations would consult 
among themselves before taking any further ac- 
tion on the question of recognition. A number of 
other countries were informed from time to time 
of this informal agreement. 

Department of State Bulletin 

On July 1, 1949, the Secretary of State, Dean 
Acheson, in a letter to Senator Tom Connally, 
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Com- 
mittee, taking note that the question of recognition 
of a Communist regime in China had been i-aised 
on the floor of the Senate, gave assurances that 
if and when the question of recognition arises, the 
Foreign Relations Committee would be consulted 
concerning the facts involved and the courses of 
action being considered. This understanding has 
been scrupulously carried out. 

In his press and radio news conferences of 
August 5 and August 24, 1949, the Secretary of 
State publicly reiterated liis assurances that the 
Department would engage in the closest consulta- 
tion with the committees of Congress if this sub- 
ject should come up for decision. 

In mid-September 1949, the question of recog- 
nition was discussed at the meeting of the Foreign 
Ministers of the United Kingdom and France with 
the Secretary of State. Mr. Acheson outlined the 
reasons why the United States would not recog- 
nize the Chinese Communists in the existing cir- 
cumstances. Foreign Minister Bevin pledged 
caution on the part of the United Kingdom, but 
indicated the British might find it necessary to 
take different action. Foreign Minister Schuman 
indicated premature recognition of the Commu- 
ists was out of the question for France. 

On October 1, 1949, Mao Tse-tung proclaimed 
the establishment of the "People's Republic of 
China." The Soviet Union extended recognition 
the next day. Six of its satellites followed. 

At his press and radio news conference on 
October 12, 1949, Secretary Acheson restated the 
main tests which the United States believed should 
be applied to the question on recogiiition of gov- 
ernments, as follows : 

(1) That it control the country that it claimed to 
control ; 

(2) That it recognize its international obligations ; and 

(3) That it rule with the acquiescence of the people 
•who were ruled. 

On that same day the Department of State, in 
*n instruction to 27 diplomatic and consular es- 
tablishments abroad and to the U.S. delegation to 
the United Nations, restated the U.S. Government 
position of non-recognition, for use sliould any 
foreign government first raise the question with 
our representative or if they had reason to believe 
that the foreign government to which they were 
accredited might contemplate independent action 
to recognize without prior considtation. 
, On November 1, 1949, the British Government 
informed this Government of the views which were 
influencing it toward early recognition of the Chi- 
nese Communist regime and requested consulta- 
tion with this Government on the basis of its 
appraisal of the situation. The British gave their 
own conclusion that recognition should be 

Looking toward the forthcoming meeting in 

Ocfober 15, 7951 

Paris, during the second week in November 1949, 
of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, 
France, and the United States, the Department of 
State sought to determine the attitudes of other 
countries with primary interests in Asia. In gen- 
eral, almost all of the countries friendly to the 
United States continued to support our view, in 
theory at least. Certain governments, however, 
had replied to the Chinese Communist bid for 
recognition in a way and in terms which could 
be interpreted as departing from the agreed policy 
of holding prior consultation and making no haste. 
No government had stated categorically that it 
would not recognize the Communists. On the con- 
trary, the general attitude was that recognition 
would be dependent upon certain factors such as 
protection of trade interests, protection of the 
borders of neighboring states, the regime's will- 
ingness to accept its international obligations, or 
questions connected with the vague term "timing." 

During the meeting of the three Foreign Minis- 
ters in Paris on November 10, 1949, Mr. Acheson 
referred to the agreement among the Western 
Powers to consult regarding recognition and to 
follow a common line, and pointed out that the 
U.S. position was that the Communists must ap- 
proach a certain standard of international be- 
havior before recognition could be considered. 

On November 28, 1949, the British informed us 
of the results of a meeting between the Foreign 
Minister and the High Commissioners of the Com- 
monwealth governments in London on the subject 
of recognition. The differences of views at that 
meeting among the Commonwealth nations were 
on timing rather than on principle. 

We learned almost immediately that India ex- 
pected to extend recognition some time between 
December 15 and December 25. That Government, 
on November 21, 1949, outlined its view to us 
in favor of recognition. 

On December 9, 1949, the Secretary of State 
communicated orally to the British Ambassador 
this Government's views regarding the British po- 
sition set forth in its memorandum of November 
1. Mr. Acheson 's general conclusion was that this 
was not the time to give any consideration to 

On December 16, 1949, the British Foreign Min- 
ister in a personal message to the Secretary of 
State informed him of a Cabinet decision in prin- 
ciple to extend recognition, indicating the action 
would be taken in early January and restating the 
British reasons for the action. 

Mr. Acheson replied to Mr. Bevin in a personal 
message on December 23, thanking him for the 
frank exchange of views and pointing out that 
there was nothing more he could add in the nature 
of comment to the views which had previously 
been stated by this Government in Washington 
and Paris. He pointed out to Mr. Bevin that we 
might find it desirable at the time of the British 
announcement to make a statement of our own 


reasons as to why we consider it unwise to recog- 
nize the Communists. Mr. Acheson also expressed 
regret tliat the Bi'itish Government had decided to 
recognize, pointing out that he had hoped a com- 
mon course of action could be followed and reiter- 
ating the hope that a common course could be fol- 
lowed in all other matters of mutual concern in 
the Far East. 

On December 30, 1949, India announced its rec- 
OOTiition. The United Kingdom took the same ac- 
tion on January G, 1950. The British announce- 
ment said they were "ready to establish diplomatic 
relations on the basis of equality, mutual benefit, 
and mutual respect for territory and sovereignty 
and are prepared to exchange diplomatic repre- 
sentatives with the Central Peoples Government." 
The Chinese Communists have never reciprocated 
this recognition. 

On January 14, 1950, the Chinese Communists 
seized U.S. consular property in Peiping, and the 
United States announced that it took a very seri- 
ous view of this action and accordingly was with- 
drawing all official U.S. personnel from Commu- 
nist China. The Communists had been advised of 
this intended action if they should carry through 
their threats to seize the property. 

At his press and radio news conference on Jan- 
uary 18, 1950, Mr. Acheson stated that the seizure 
of U.S. property in Peiping had a very immediate 
effect on the question of recognition and that the 
question of recognition could not come up or be 

With a view to keeping friendly governments in- 
formed of the recent development and with a view 
to pointing up our belief that recognition of the 
Communists or any change in the existing position 
regarding diplomatic relations with the National- 
ist Government would be premature, the Depart- 
ment instructed a number of its missions abroad to 
bring this Government's position again to the at- 
tention of foreign governments. 

During the months which followed, the Depart- 
ment received many letters from American citizens 
on the question of recognition. Many of these 
urged that we accord recognition and many others 
took the opposite view. The following statement, 
taken from a letter of May 9, 1950, is typical of 
what was said by the Department in reply to this 
correspondence : 

Recofcnition on Chinese terms would net only short-term 
and illusory advantages at the expense of our long-term 
interests. The United States (Jovernment is therefore 
unable at the present time to give active consideration to 
the recognition of the Chinese Communist regime. 

The attack upon the Kepublic of Korea on June 
25, 1950 further aggravated the situation and con- 
stituted addit innnl reasons for our non-recognition 
policy since it was readily apparent that the Chi- 
nese Conuuunists were providing material and 
manpower to the North Koreans. 

Under the existing circumstances, it is apparent 
that recognition of the Chinese Communist regime 


camiot be a subject for consideration by this Gov- 

On the question of Chinese representation in the 
United Nations, I believe that it is unnecessary for 
me to go through the matter in detail since it was 
very fully covered by Secretary Acheson in his 
testimony in the Hearings before the Committee 
on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign 
Kelations last June.^ He then pointed out that the 
question of Chinese representation had arisen in 
U.N. organs 77 times, and that in 76 of those cases 
the U.S. view that the Chinese Nationalist repre- 
sentative should be seated and that the Chinese 
Communist representative should not be seated 
prevailed. (He pointed out that in the one case 
in which contrary action was taken over U.S. op- 
position, namely in the Universal Postal Union, 
the action had been reversed at a subsequent ses- 
sion.) Since Secretary Acheson's testimony, nine 
additional cases of the same kind have arisen and 
in each one of those cases the United States has 
sustained the same point of view and that point of 
view has prevailed. 

I participated in the formulation of tliis policy 
of non-recognition of the Chinese Communist re- 
gime. I believe it is a sound policy and the policy 
which best serves the interests of the United States. 
During 1949 and early 1950 when the question of 
the recognition of the Chinese Communist regime 
was being discussed in various quarters, it was 
true that different people had different views just 
as different governments had different views. The 
fact that an individual American disagreed with 
me and believed that we should recognize the 
Chinese Communists did not seem to me at the 
time and does not seem to me now proof that he 
was a Communist any more than I thought the 
British Government, much as I regretted its action 
in recognizing the Peiping regime, was a Soviet 
satellite. I can recall that in some of the discus- 
sions which I had with various individuals ditring 
that period we discussed the traditional recogni- 
tion policy of the United States. This was one of 
the subjects in which I had been much interested 
during my academic career as a teacher of inter- 
national law at Columbia University. It is quite 
possible that in some such conversations — although 
I recall no particular one at the moment — I may 
have described the so-called de facto theory which 
the United States at times had followed. This 
theory was based on the notion that the decision 
whether or not to recognize a new government 
should be based on the factual circumstance of its 
exercising governmental authority in the country 
in question and that recognition should not be 
withheld as a means of exerting pressure or as an 
instrument of policy. It is quite possible that 
after the British Government extended recogni- 
tion I may have said that the British Government 
was proceeding on this factual theory and that 
its recognition did not indicate that it approved 

' Bulletin of June 18, 1951, p. 9G3. 

Department of Sfafe Bulletin 

the Chinese Communist regime. So far as the 
policy of the United States is concerned, however, 
it seemed to me clear in the first place that the 
Communist regime did not even meet the test of 
factual control. Moreover, it failed to meet the 
other two tests which the United States follows in 
connection wnth recognition ; namely, that the gov- 
ernment recognizes its international obligations 
and that it rules with the acquiescence of the 
people who are ruled. In my mind, therefore, the 
point was never reached at which even under the 
traditional tests the question of recognition by the 
U.S. Government ever arose. Moreover, it seemed 
to me clear that, in view of the general attitude 
taken by the Peiping authorities in regard to 
American nationals and American interests and 
its general international obligations, and in view 
of its subservience to Moscow, the extension of 
recognition could not be considered. It may well 
be that in various conversations in which I took 
part the question was raised regarding the future — 
■what would the United States do about recogni- 
tion if the Chinese Government met our traditional 
tests, that is if it actually had control of all of 
China, if it ruled with the acquiescence of the 
Chinese people, and if it demonstrated that it 
would carry out all its international obligations, 
including the abandonment of its typically Com- 
munist policy of direct and indirect aggi-ession? 
In answering such a question we must remem- 
ber in the first place that no foreign policy is 
settled for eternity. Foreign policy is designed 
to serve the interests of the United States in the 
world situation which it faces from time to time. 
If facts and situations change, policies are re- 
examined to see if they still serve our interests. 
If it should appear that the facts on which our 
non-recognition of the Peiping regime have 
changed, the situation would be discussed by the 
Secretary of State with the committees of Congress 
in accordance with his repeated statements. Un- 
der the existing circumstances as I have stated, 
recognition of the Chinese Communist regime 
cannot be a subject for consideration by this Gov- 

Release Requested on Round Table 
Discussions of China Policy 

[Released to the press October 5] 

The Department this afternoon sent the follotv- 
ing telegram to the 25 consultants who attended 
a round table to discuss United States policy to- 
ward China at the Department of State on October 
6, 7, 8, 1949: 

The round table discussions on problems of U.S. 
Policy Toward China, held in the Department of 

October 15, 1 95 J 

State on October 6, 7, and 8, 1949, were stated at 
the time to be on an informal and confidential 
basis, with the transcript of the discussion to be 
made available only to officers in the Department 
concerned with that policy. The Department has 
made every effort up to the present time to main- 
tain the integi-ity of that understanding. As you 
have undoubtedly noticed, there has been extensive 
reference in the press and before committees of 
Congress to those meetings and numerous asser- 
tions concerning the nature of the statements by 
the various participants. The Department has re- 
ceived requests from several of the participants, 
from Members of Congress, and from the press to 
make public the transcript of the discussions. 
Will you please wire immediately collect your 
views on a possible public release oi the transcript 
of the discussion at the meetings. 

List of Consultants 

Joseph W. Ballantine, The Brookings Institution, Wash- 
ington, D. C. 

Bernard Brodie, Department of International Relations, 
Tale University, New Haven, Conn. 

Claude A. Bus.-,, Stanford University, Palo Alto, Calif. 

Kenneth Colegrove, Department of Political Science, 
Northwestern University, Evanston, 111. 

Arthur G. Coons, President, Occidental College, Los An- 
geles, Calif. 

John W. Decker, International Missionary Council, 156 
Fifth Avenue, New York 10, N. Y. 

John K. Fairbank, Committee on International and Re- 
gional Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 

William R. Herod, Nato, % American Embassy, London, 

Arthur N. Holcombe, Department of Government, Harvard 
University, Cambridge, Mass. 

Benjamin H. Kizer, Graves, Kizer, and Graves, Spokane, 

Owen Lattimore, Director, Walter Bines Page School of 
International Relations, Johns Hopkins University, 
Baltimore, Md. B. MacNaugbton, Chairman of the Board, First Na- 
tional Bank, Portland, Oreg. 

George C. Marshall, Dodona Manor, Leesburg, Va. 

J. Morden Murphy, Assistant Vice President, Bankers 
Trust Company, New York, N. Y. 

Nathaniel Peffer, Department of Public Law and Govern- 
ment, Columbia University, New York, N. Y. 

Harold S. Quigley, Department of Political Science, Uni- 
versity of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn. 

Edwin O. Reischauer, Department of Far Eastern 
Languages, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 

William S. Robertson, President, American and Foreign 
Power Company, New York, N. Y. 

John D. Rockefeller, 3d, President, Rockefeller Brothers' 
Fund, New York, N. Y. 

Lawrence K. Rosinger, American Institute of Pacific Re- 
lations, New York, N. Y. 

Eugene Staley, Executive Director, World Affairs Council 
of Northern California, San Francisco, Calif. 

Harold Stassen, President, University of Pennsylvania, 
Philadelphia, Pa. 

Phillips Talbot, Institute of Current World Affairs, 522 
Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 

George E. Taylor, University of Washington, Seattle, 

Harold M. Vinacke, Department of Political Science, Uni- 
versity of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio. 


statements Relating to Mr. Stassen's Testimony 
Before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security 

Following are texts of oral statements hy 
Michael J. McDerjnott, special assistant for Press 
Relations, regarding testimony made hy Harold E. 
Stassen on October 1 before the Senate Judiciary 
Subcotnmiftee on Internal Security. 

The first statement ivas made on October 2 and 
released to the press on the same date; the second 
statement was made at a press a/nd radio news 
conference on October 3. 


I have been getting questions all day about the 
testimony yesterday of Harold Stassen and his 
allegations, which sununarized were : 

1. That Secretary Acheson, according to the 
late Senator Vandenberg, proposed in November 
1950, the cutting off of aid to Nationalist China 
in a dramatic move "toward world peace." 

2. That at the October 1949 round table, [Owen] 
Lattimore and Lawrence K. Rosinger headed the 
"prevailing group" which recommended the rec- 
ognition of Red China at an early date and other 
moves favorable to Red China. 

3. Tliat the State Department tended to "im- 
plement" the "Lattimore-Rosinger recommenda- 
tions" and to ignore those presented by Mr. Stassen 
and others. 

4. That Ambassador Jessup, who presided at 
some of the meetings, told Mr. Stassen, who ap- 
pealed to him against the "recommendations" of 
the "prevailing group," that there was "greater 
logic" on the Lattimore side. 

In taking them up, one by one, with respect to 
the allegations of Mr. Stassen that Secretary Ache- 
son and Ambassador Jessup at a White House 
meeting proposed the cutting off of aid to Nation- 
alist China in a dramatic move "toward world 
peace," I fear that Mr. Stassen's memory is play- 
ing him tricks. An exhaustive search of the rec- 
ords has been made and no record can be found 
of any such meeting ever having taken place. 
Secretary Acheson has no recollection of such a 
meeting. Ambassador Jessup has no recollection 
of such a meeting. We have checked the records 


at the White House thoroughly. We have checked 
the Secretary's records and find nothing. 

Moreover, there has never been any proposal to 
abolish economic aid to Nationalist China by Sec- 
retary Acheson, by Ambassador Jessup, or by any 
other authorized official of the Department of 
State. Insofar as military aid is concerned, this 
was covered by the President's statement of Jan- 
uary 5, 1950,^ and exhaustively covered by Secre- 
tary Acheson and others during the course of the 
MacArthur hearings. 

2. About the "prevailing group" : Wliile the 
Department must, in fairness to the confidential 
pledge given participants in the round table, 
adhere to that pledge, it can state — following a 
close study of the stenogi'aphic transcript — the 
following : 

Eighteen members of the panel spoke on the 
subject of recognition of Red China. Of these, 
two — Messrs. Lattimore and Rosinger — recom- 
mended that recognition be extended to Red China. 
The consensus among 1 1 others was that the situ- ■ 
ation obtaining at that time (1949) was such that 
recognition could not be withheld for an indefinite 
period. In general, they expressed the view that 
this was largely a matter of timing in the light o\ 
future developments. Five, including Mr. Stassen 
recommended that recognition not be considered 
at that time. 

3. Mr. Stassen's allegation that the Department 
tended to implement what he (Stassen) refers tc 
as "the Lattimore-Rosinger recommendations" not 
only is not confirmed by history, but history proves 
that the policy of the Department tended in the 
opposite direction. One may quibble over impres- 
sions, but there is no quibbling with facts. These 

The United States has not recognized Red 
China. As you gentlemen know, the Secretary' 
at various press conferences stated that nothing 
would be done with respect to that question with- 
out full consultation with the appropriate com- 
mittees of the Congress. Similar assurances were 
given the committees themselves. 

Mr. Stassen admits that the point in the "Latti- 

' Bulletin of Jan. 16, 19.50, p. 79. 

Department of Sfafe Bulletit 

more-Rosinger proposal" regarding U.S. recogni- 
tion of the Cliinese Communists was not 
implemented. He charges that a "collateral Latti- 
more proposal" that this country encourage the 
British and others to give that recognition was 
carried out. This charge is absolutely without 
basis in fact. The record shows that this Govern- 
ment not only made it clear to the British Govern- 
ment that in the U.S. view recognition of Com- 
munist China was unwise and could not be given 
consideration by the United States, but it repeat- 
edly instructed U.S. diplomatic representatives 
abroad to make this view known to governments 
to which they were accredited. 

Another point which, according to Mr. Stassen, 
was proposed by Lattimore and Rosinger and, by 
implication, adopted by the State Department was 
that "it should be U.S. policy to turn Formosa 
over to the Chinese Communist Government." It 
has at no time been U.S. policy to turn Formosa 
over to the Chinese Communists and the Depart- 
ment of State has at no time suggested or advo- 
cated this policy. 

Here again the facts of history refute such an 
implication. As the Secretary and others pointed 
out in great detail during the course of the Mac- 
Arthur hearings, the policy of this Government 
was to prevent the fall of Formosa to the Chinese 
Reds. The decision of the Joint Chiefs, however, 
was that no U.S. Forces should be used in this 
undertaking and that, therefore, the implementa- 
tion of this policy must rest upon diplomatic and 
economic means. 

Under the circumstances set forth by the Presi- 
dent in his statement of January 5, 1950, and 
subsequently set forth in greater detail, a decision 
was made not to provide additional military aid 
to Formosa. The accent there is on the word 
"additional" — not to provide additional military 
aid to Formosa. However, existing programs of 
military assistance were continued to completion 
and the press carried stories and photographs of 
shipments of military supplies under existing pro- 
grams shortly following the President's statement. 
Until the assignment of the Seventh Fleet to the 
protection of Formosa, and the provision of addi- 
tional military aid to Nationalist Forces on the 
island, the policy of preventing the fall of Formosa 
to Conununist hands was pressed with vigor 
through diplomatic and economic means. The in- 
disputable facts are that Formosa remains in 
Nationalist hands and that the United States lent 
diplomatic, economic, and military aid in assuring 
', the retention of the island in Nationalist hands. 
Nor is there any basis in fact for the implication 
by Mr. Stassen that "it should be U.S. policy to 
permit the Chinese Communists to take Hong 
Kong if they insisted." I can state categorically 
that this has never been U.S. policy and the State 
Department has never advocated that it should be. 
Now, with respect to "breaking the Chinese 
blockade," I think you gentlemen are fully aware 

Ocfober J 5, 795? 

of our position on that. The port-closure orders of 
the Chinese National Government did not meet the 
legal requirements of a blockade and the United 
States did not recognize it as such. Moreover, 
the Chinese National Government itself did not 
claim that it constituted a blockade. 

The U.S. Government, in accordance with its 
obligations to protect American shipping, pro- 
tested to the Chinese Government certain cases 
in which it considered these rights violated. How- 
ever, and I should like particularly to emphasize 
this: The U.S. Government repeatedly warned 
American mastei-s of tlie danger of entering 
"closed ports" and in practice followed the general 
policy of doing nothing to lessen the effectiveness 
of the Chinese Government's port-closure order. 

4. That Ambassador Jessup, who presided at 
some of the meetings, told Stassen, who appealed 
to him against the recommendations of the "pre- 
vailing group," that there was "greater logic" 
on the Lattimore side : With respect to that. Am- 
bassador Jessup has no recollection of ever hav- 
ing made any such remark. When questioned 
about this. Ambassador Jessup pointed out that 
the purpose of the round table was to get the in- 
dependent views of a well-rounded group of con- 
sultants with varying points of view. Accordingly 
he did not consider it appropriate, nor did he ex- 
press any opinions, regarding the views expressed 
by individual members of the panel. 

" Mr. Stassen, by implication, alleges the adop- 
tion by the Department of other points which he 
described as the Lattimore "proposals." These 
were that Asia should be considered as a long- 
term problem to be studied and deferred, that pri- 
ority be given to Europe, and that aid to Asia not 
be started until after long and careful study. 

The record is clear that the United States has 
exercised, and is now exercising through the Mar- 
shall Plan, Nato, and the European Defense Force, 
its leadership in welding the forces of free Europe 
against the threat of Soviet aggression. But that 
does not for an instant mean that it has adopted a 
policy of deferring coming to grips with the prob- 
lems of Asia. You will recall the efforts of the 
administration, and particularly of Secretary 
Acheson, in getting through the Congress the Aid 
Bill for Korea. You will recall that that bill was 
defeated in the House over the vehement pro- 
testations of the Secretary. It was subsequently 
passed. You will recall the Griffin Mission to the 
Philippines and Southeast Asia in the spring of 
19.50 in preparation for a program of economic aid 
to the countries of that area. You will also recall 
the MnAP Mission to the same area in the summer 
of 1950. 

Again Mr. Stassen implies that U.S. policy was 
based on the assumption that the Russian Com- 
munists were not as aggressive as Hitler and 
would not be apt to take direct military action to 
expand their empire. This implication is refuted 
by the facts. The Marshall Plan, the Nato, Mdap, 


the security treaties with the Philippines, -with 
Australia, "and New Zealand, the bilateral agree- 
ment with Japan, all go to show the concern of 
this country against the threat of Communist sub- 
version and actual hostilities. Moreover, it should 
be clear to all that this Government recognized 
and now recognizes that the fifth column activities 
of the Communists were and are more menacing 
than the fifth column activities of the Nazis. 

Finally, it is obviously not appropriate for me 
to comment on any implications of how this Gov- 
ernment should regard the Prime Minister of 
India. Suffice it to say that the policy of this 
Government with respect to India is well known. 


In respect to Mr. Stassen's testimony before the 
Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on Oc- 
tober 1, 1951, I stated yesterday that the Depart- 
ment had been unable to locate any record of a 
conference between the President, Senator Van- 
denberg. Secretary Acheson, and Ambassador 
Jessup in late 1949 or 1950. Since yesterday I 
have had an oportunity to go further into the 
records concerning this matter. The following 
are the facts that relate to it : 

On January 14, 1949, the President directed 
that the military supplies under the Cliina Aid 
Act should be delivered insofar as possible in 
accordance with the advice of our military author- 
ities in China. At the time this decision was made, 
the armies of the Chinese Nationalists were crum- 
bling rapidly and it appeared that the mainland 
of China would be in Communist hands in a short 
time. It was therefore essential that the advice of 
U.S. military authorities on the ground govern 
the shipment of supplies in order to prevent such 
supplies from being delivered into Communist 

Accordingly the advice of Maj. Gen. David G. 
Barr, the senior U.S. military representative in 
China, was requested. On January 26, 1949, 
General Barr recommended that pending clarifica- 
tion of the situation in China, no military aid 
supplies be shipped. The President, after dis- 
cussing this matter carefully with his civilian and 
military advisers, discussed the matter with con- 
gressional leaders on February 5, 1949, at which 
time the President pointed out that under the cur- 
rent military realities, military aid could not be 
effectively used by the Nationalists and that such 
supplies might well fall into the hands of Chinese 
Communists or other interests inimical to the 
United States. The meeting of February 5 was 
held at the White House. It was attended by the 
President, the Vice President, the Secretary of 
State Mr. Acheson, Senators Connally and Van- 
denberg, and Congressmen Bloom and Eaton. It 
was the unamimous opinion of the congressional 
advisers present tliat no action should be taken 
which would in effect place an embargo or stop- 


page on continued shipments to China. Subse- 
quently, the President decided that shipments 
should be continued in order not to discourage 
continued Chinese resistance to Communist ag- 
gression, but with precautions to assure that such 
supplies not fall into Conmaunist hands. 

Now, the above facts are relative to the point 
raised by Mr. Stassen before the Senate subcom- 
mittee. It is clear that the question at the time 
had to do with whether deliveries of military 
supplies to the mainland of Cliina in the military 
situation of early 1949 would have any beneficial 
effect or might result in such equipment falling 
into Communist hands. It is also entirely clear 
that Mr. Jessup, who was a member of the United 
States mission to the United Nations at the time, 
was not involved in any way in this matter, and 
that Mr. Stassen's testimony to this effect was 

Sense of Community Increasing 
Among Free Nations 

Remarks hy Secretary Acheson ^ \ 

I am honored to play a part in the tenth anni- 
versary celebration of Freedom House. Freedom 
House is dedicated to the eternal truth that free- 
dom is the central value to which our efforts are 

There is no man anywhere in the world who 
does not have a stake in freedom, and for whom 
freedom is not the key to what he most desires in 

To one man, freedom may mean the right to 
live in individual dignity ; to another, it may mean 
opportunity — some land to till, food to eat, peace 
to enjoy life with one's family. 

In the eloquent Declaration of Freedom issued 
this morning by Freedom House, there is a sen- 
tence which reads: 

"Only freedom keeps the future open." 

It seems to me that this goes to the heart of the 
matter. The defense of freedom, to which we 
must now give our utmost effort, is a defense ol 
the future. It is an act of affirmation toward the 

The burden of arms, wliich falls with an onerous 
weight upon us, is a pledge that the future wil] 
not be sacrificed to concentration camps, to the 
l^olice state, to the stifled and oppressive rule ol 

Alen who believe in freedom the world over are 
now engaged in a heroic effort to build their com 
mon strength. In this strength lies our best liopt 
of a iJeaceful future, for unless we are sti-ong 
tyranny would triumph, by tlrreat, by guile, bj 

' Made over Columbia Broadcasting System Oct. 7 ant 
released to the press on the same date. 

Department of State Bulletin 

force of arms. Being strong, we hope to preserve 
our peaceful way of life, and fulfill our aspirations 
for human progress. I believe that we are ap- 
proaching a turning-point in this effort to build 
our defenses. 

The free nations have made impressive prog- 
ress in building their strength. 

The staunch and vigorous defense against ag- 
gression in Korea bv the United Nations, the 
structure of defense loeing erected in the North 
Atlantic community, the foundations of security 
being laid in the Far East — these achievements 
have brought us to a point where our goals are at 
least in sight. 

But our success will not be achieved without 
great effort. 

There are two necessities of the hour which we 
must keep before ourselves with absolute clarity ; 
one is the need for speed in building our strength 
so that we can pass through this period of danger 
as quickly as possible. The other is the need for 
unshakeable unity among the free nations. 

Our program this afternoon is aptly dedicated 
to "Unity and Freedom." There is general agree- 
ment that unity is essential to freedom, and that 
unity is a good quality, but the times call for 
action, not abstraction. 

"Wliat does unity mean, in action ? Unity means 
that we must approach each other with sympa- 
thetic insight, we must understand each other's 
problems, and help to work at them together. 
We shall always have differences among us, be- 
cause cooperation among free nations does not 
imply regimentation or uniformity-. 

But to these differences, we must bring to bear 
a sense of perspective, which will constantly re- 
mind us that our differences are slight alongside 
our common interests, and our common stake in 
the future. By working together, we not only 
augment our total strength, but we assure the 
rightness of our course. 

No one nation has a monopoly of wisdom, and 
the accommodation of differences can lead us to 
a wise and balanced course of action. The quality 
of balance is essential to our success — ^balance be- 
tween the burden of arms-building we must shoul- 
der and the sacrifices this entails; balance between 
firmness and restraint in the use of the power we 
are building together. 

In this way, by facing our problems side-by-side 
and not ranged against one another, we have al- 
ready developed a habit of cooperation. Out of 
this habit, we can see that a sense of community is 
growing among us. 

We may not now be able to foretell the forms 
and outlines that this spirit of community will 
take in the future, but we can be confident that 
we shall find in it not only our common safety, but 
the gateway to a future full of promise for all 

Second Atomic Explosion 
Within U.S.S.R. Reported 

Statement iy Joseph Short 
Secretary to the President ^ 

Another atomic bomb has recently been exploded 
within the Soviet Union. In spite of Soviet pre- 
tensions that their atomic-energy program is be- 
ing directed exclusively toward peaceful purposes, 
this event confirms again that the Soviet Union 
is continuing to make atomic weapons. 

In accordance with the policy of the President 
to keep the American people informed to the full- 
est extent consistent with our national security, 
the President has directed me to make this state- 
ment and to stress again the necessity for that 
effective enforceable international control of 
atomic energy which the United States and the 
large majority of the members of the United Na- 
tions support. 

Further details cannot be given without ad- 
versel,y affecting our national security interests. 

' Made on Oct. 3 and released to the press by the White 
House on the same date. 



Joint Resolution To Authorize the President To Proclaim 
a Special Period for Intensified Voluntary Contribu- 
tions of Clothing and Kindred Supplies in Connection 
With the Collection Effort of American Relief for 
Korea, Incorporated. Approved August 31, 1951. 
H. J. Res. 281, PubUc Law 138, 82d Cong., 1st sess. 
2 pp. 

An Act To Authorize the Transfer of Certain Naval 
Vessels. Approved September 15, 1951. H. R. 3463, 
PubUc Law 146, S2d Cong., 1st sess. 1 p. 

Increase in and Extension of Lending Authority of E!x- 
port-Import Bank of Washington. H. Rept. 978, S2d 
Cong., 1st sess. [To accompany S. 2006] 6 pp. 

Suspension of Deportation of Certain Aliens. H. Rept. 

1008, 82d Cong., 1st sess. [To accompany S. Con. Res. 
39] 2 pp. 

Suspension of Deportation of Certain Aliens. H. Rept. 

1009, 82d Cong., 1st sess. [To accompany S. Con. Res. 
41] 2 pp. Mission to Australia To Attend Australian Com- 
monwealth Jubilee in Canberra, Australia, June 1951. 
Report by Hon. A. S. J. Carnahan. Missouri, Chair- 
man ; Hon. Daniel J. Flood, Pennsylvania ; Hon. Karl 
51. LeCompte, Iowa : Hon Chester E. Merrow, New 
Hampshire, pursuant to H. Res. 204. H. Rept. 1087, 
S2d Cong., 1st sess. (September 25. 1951) viii, 82 pp. 

Simplifying Customs Administration and Procedures. H. 
Rept. 1089, S2d Cong., 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 
5505] 43 pp. 

October 15, ?95J 


The Oil Problem in the Middle East 

Address hy George C. McGhee 

Assistant /Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs 

I am glad to have this opportunity to discuss 
with you the critical oil problem we face in the 
Middle East today. You all know what im- 
portance the Middle East has for the United States 
and its allies. First, there is oil — oil in the most 
prolific quantities yet found in the world. The 
250-mile .strip of the Arabian Peninsula bordering 
the Persian Gulf is now considered to have re- 
serves equal to of the entire United States. 
Those of you who have seen a Schlumberger log 
on, for example, a Burgan well, must have had 
the same shock I had when I first looked at the 
thousand feet of saturated sand. And they have 
only just touched the surface. 

The Arabian- American Oil Company ( Aramco) 
was recently surprised by striking oil in a shallow 
core drill test out in the waters of the Persian 
Gulf; the huge oil slick which appeared made it 
plain to Arabs and oilmen alike that the sub- 
merged areas might have the same staggering po- 
tentialities as the spectacular structures on dry 
land. I believe Aramco has drilled 13 wildcats, 
all told. Ten were discoveries of fields averaging 
a billion barrels reserve. Like all wildcatters, 
however, they make very persuasive but familiar 
a^uments that the three misses were either "just 
oil structure" or they should have drilled "just 
a few feet further." 

It is the same story in Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, and 
Qatar — ju-olific quantities of oil with only a small 
part of the area tlioroughly explored. The com- 
panies out there have had to do a negligible amount 
of wildcatting. Virtually all fields have been 
located by sm-face geology. I undei-stand that 
there isn't any .seismograph crew currently operat- 
ing in any ot these four countries. You have all 
seen the cartoon showing Arabs looking at a drill- 
ing rig with the caption under it reading " 
between you and me I wish they'd hit water." 
That happ ened in reverse in Kuwait— while drill- 

' iMncIc hefore the American Institute of Mining and 
Metallurgical Engineers at Oklahoma City, Okla., on Oct. 
3 and released to the press on the same date. 


ing for water the Kuwait Oil Company reportedly 
got oil. 

Now, I am not trying to tell you that these 
fabulous sands and cavernous limestones are di- 
rectly essential to our own economic life. In 
absGiUte terms, they are without doubt the most 
imjjortant oil concentration in the world. But 
they are not as directly and immediately important 
to us as east and west Texas and the Panhandle, 
and these derricks and gathering lines right out- 
side your city here. They are not as directly im- 
portant to us as Maracaibo and eastern Venezuela 
and the Williston Basin. 

Oil Necessary to Free World 

But we cannot look at the big picture of world 
oil resources and needs solely in terms of our own 
direct requirements at this immediate point of 
time. We have to take the broader view of the 
needs and availabilities of the whole free world. 
We are a partner and the leader in a community of 
nations that we have come to refer to as "the free 
world." As the leading member of that commu- 
nity we are locked in a struggle, half-war, half- 
peace, that we have come to refer to as "the cold 
war." Aggression has struck, is still striking, in 
Korea. It may strike again anywhere, any time. 
We are engaged in a bitter contest, the end of which 
is nowhere in sight. In that contest, we are the 
leading player — the captain, if you will — of a 
team. We have to think in team terms. We have 
to evaluate the importance of Middle East oil, 
not just directly to ourselves, but to the team as a 

From this point of view the oil of the Middle 
East is of absolutely overriding importance. 

The free world needs it. Our Euroi)ean allies 
are particularly dependent on Middle East oil for 
their industrial machines and their rearmament 
efforts. European demand for petroleum has 
doubled since the war ; refinery throughout has in- 
creased three times. Four-fifths of this oil comes 

Department of State Bulletin 

from the Middle East. I don't have to tell you 
what the impact would be on Western Euroj^e di- 
rectly, and the United States indirectly, if we were 
denied these Middle East oil i-esources. 

P'urthermore, we would not be very smart to 
think of this oil solely in terms of the immediate 
present. We must look ahead. No one knows how 
long we will be able to go on producing 6 million 
barrels a day. We may or may not be able to find 
new sedimentary basins out of which to increase 
our production as our needs grow. I am all too 
familiar with the fate that befalls those who try to 
double in brass as prophets, and I am not going to 
expose myself by asserting either that our produc- 
tion will decline or that it will not increase fast 
enough. It is clear, however, that our needs will 
grow as our dynamic economy grows, and that we 
may well come in time to take a quite different 
view, than we now do, of the direct importance to 
us of Middle East oil. 

This aspect of our problem is only one facet of 
a much more general problem of raw materials. I 
think you will be struck by certain pertinent facts 
taken from the testimony which Nelson Rocke- 
feller made before the House Foreign Affairs Com- 
mittee in suppoi't of the Mutual Security Bill.^ He 
pointed out that although we have only 6 percent 
of the population and 7 percent of the land area of 
the world, we produced before the war one.-third of 
the world's manufactured goods and one-third of 
the world's raw materials. Now, however, we have 
50 percent of the world's manufacturing capacity 
but produce only the same one-third of the world's 
raw materials. Furthermore, this manufacturing 
capacity' will increase 20 percent more by 1953, 
this increase alone amounting to more than the 
total productive capacity of any single country in 
Western Europe. 

Nationalism Growing in Middle East 

I have spoken to you at some length about the 
importance of Middle East oil. However, the 
Middle East has more than just oil. Without an 
anticline, the Middle East would still be a most 
important piece of the earth's crust. It lies 
athwart the air, land, and sea crossroads of three 
continents. It contains the Suez Canal, a vital 
artery which keeps the free world connected and 
communicating. Every major international air- 
line connecting Europe, Asia, and Africa passes 
through the Middle East. Even its vast deserts 
and barren wastes of lava and limestone are stra- 
tegically important. They have historically con- 
stituted one of the greatest natural defensive areas 
in the world. Rommel and Montgomery were only 
the last generals to have discovered how difficult 
it is to pursue the enemy into the desert. It is 
difficult to move armies without water. 

So, one, there is the oil ; and two, there is the 
area — but the Middle East has more — it has 

= Bulletin of Aug. 27, 1951, p. 328. 

October 15, 1951 

people. We need people on the side of the free 
nations. We want these people on that side. We 
want these people to stay free, to become strong, 
to be members of the great conmiunity of free 
nations. If these people were to be successfully 
wooed by our enemies, the Middle East, rather 
than an asset, would become a strategic weakness 
in the defense of the free world. However, the 
people are more than just a means to an end — 
they constitute an end in themselves. In a very 
real sense the most strategic area in the world is 
the minds of men. We seek to win that strategic 
objective. We wish to prove to these people, most 
of whom live in conditions of extreme poverty, 
ignorance, disease, and despair, that the way of 
the free world offers more and can give more to 
them in their lifetime than can the agents from 
the Kremlin, or those among them, who preach 
hatred of all foreigners. 

The people of the Middle East are beginning to 
stir, to look for a better way of living. This force 
is reflected from Morocco to the Far East by a 
growing nationalism. Although it can be subject 
lo abuses, nationalism is in itself a good thing. 
Our own history is clear with regard to the ad- 
vantages of controlling our own destiny. It has 
worked well; other people like the pattern and 
want it for themselves. So our problem with these 
countries lies in helping to guide this force of 
nationalism, at the right pace, toward objectives 
that we and the other free nations of the world 
are striving for. We must not let the Communists 
succeed in their efforts to play a spurious role as 
the champions of national asfjirations in these 
countries. This they are trying to do — with typi- 
cal cynicism but with some success. 

These, then, are the three ingredients of the oil 
problem in the Middle East — the oil, the area, the 
people. The three ingredients affect one another 
in a variety of ways. The oil, for example, is one 
of the reasons why the area is of such strategic 
importance. It is the oil — and the wealth it can 
produce — that holds out to the people their only 
substantial hope of finding enough capital to 
finance that economic development which they so 
hungrily desire. Because the area is so important 
in tlie strategy and structure of the free world, it 
is imperative that we do all we can to preserve 
peace and promote stability in the area. But, in 
the light of the underdeveloped nature of their 
economies, the aspirations of the people, and the 
importance to them of their income from oil, there 
is a strong tendency for instability and conflict 
to develop around the arrangements under which 
foreign companies produce oil. This is what has 
been happening for these past several months in 

U.S. Policy on the Oil Problem 

I am sure you will agree that the oil problem in 
the Middle East, if you consider all of these in- 
gredients, is exceedingly complicated. But out of 


the maze of facts and relationships I have recited, 
certain conclusions stand out pretty clearly. 
Taken together they constitute, if not the full 
detail, at least the main lines of our national policy 
in this matter. Let me state them for you briefly : 

1. Our interest in stability and peace in the 
Middle East area is so urgent that we must con- 
stantly seek stability in oil-industry operations in 
the region — the development of i-elationships be- 
tween oil companies and governments that, while 
flexible enough to adapt itself to changing circum- 
stances, will be so firmly rooted in equity and 
mutual confidence that it can survive and serve the 
legitimate interests of all parties concerned. 

2. As regards the financial terms of oil-conces- 
sion arrangements we have hoped, and we still 
hope, that this stability can be achieved along the 
general lines of the 50-50 formula, that is, the con- 
cept that the profit earned by the company that 
develops the oil i-esources should approximately 
equal the total paj'ments to the government of the 
country that owns the oil resources. This formula 
has proved itself in Venezuela, it is proving itself 
in Saudi Arabia, and its self-evident equity should 
commend it to men of good will everywhere as a 
sound governing concept for the long pull. It is 
not in the interest of oil-producing countries to 
push their revenues beyond the point where oper- 
ating companies are still willing to take risks and 
make outlays. A country that does so will lose in 
the end. When oil from some one country or field 
bears too high a royalty cost and tax burden rela- 
tively to oil from other countries and other fields, 
its production will not be pushed and expanded. 
Indeed, this principle is general in its application. 
In the whole broad field of foreign investment a 
disposition on the part of the countries needing 
capital to try to drive too hard a bargain can only 
retard that flow of capital from developed to 
underdeveloped countries, which it is so much in 
the common interest to accelerate rather than to 

3. Oil development in the Middle East should, 
in general, proceed equitably as between different 
countries so that no one country can reasonably 
feel that its economic development is being re- 
tarded to suit the convenience of a foreign oil 
company, or that it is getting an unreasonably low 
rate of compensation tor the use of its oil resources 
as compared with the basis of payment to its 
neighbors. Otherwise there will be 'friction, con- 
flicts of interest, and jealousies within the region, 
and resultant instability. 

4. The relationships between oil companies and 
governments should be embodied in simple and 
straightforward contracts understandable by the 
people of the countries. They must not only be 
fair, but they must be demonstrably fair. These 
contracts should be honored scrupulously by both 
parties. The doctrine of sanctity of contracts— 
and the corollary doctrine that disputes arising 
under a contract should be negotiated and arbi- 


trated in an orderly way through established ma- 
chinery — is not only of critical importance to 
sound foreign-oil operations but, indeed, to all 
foreign investment and international business. It 
is of equally critical importance to the countries 
that grant oil concessions. Small countries de- 
pend on respect for contracts and observance of 
projDer procedures for their very existence. In 
the last analysis, so do the most powerful nations. 
No country can disregard the impact of its policies 
on the outside world. We are all dependent on one 

5. The oil of the Middle East should make the 
largest possible contribution to the real welfare of 
the people and states of the area. If oil revenues 
are properly applied they can make possible the 
economic rebirth of the Middle East. They can 
finance a sound and durable pattern of economic 
development. They can help to provide better 
standards of living through improved housing, 
much-needed irrigation facilities, a healthy agri- 
culture, and the beginning of industrialization. 
The responsibility for carrying out these develop- 
ments must rest primarily in the governments of 
the countries getting the oil revenues. But there 
are many things also that oil companies can do 
by collaboration on special-development projects. 
Aramco has done pioneering work in this regard 
in Saudi Arabia and has given a glimpse of what 
can be done. Also there are many things that your 
government can do, by advice and encouragement 
through normal diplomatic contacts, and by spe- 
cial Point-Four projects of technical assistance 
and cooperation. 

These are the main principles which guide us 
in our appraisal of the constantly shifting oil sit- 
uation in the Middle East. 

Free World's Needs for Raw Materials 

In conclusion let me stress that the oil problem 
is part of a larger problem. I have talked to you 
today as oilmen, and we have focused attention 
principally on the oil problem. But the larger 
issue in which the oil problem is set is the whole 
broad question of the free world's increasing needs 
for raw materials — ^the question of the interde- 
pendence, within the community of free nations, 
between the industrialized countries of the West 
and the economically underdeveloped areas where 
such significant quantities of raw-material re- 
sources exist. 

In the same testimony which I mentioned earlier, 
Nelson Rockefeller advances the thought that the 
Communists may have scrapped their first world 
conquest plan — Lenin's concept which called for 
winning over labor in the industrial areas of the 
world. It didn't work. Now the strategy may 
be to cut off the source of raw materials for the in- 
dustrial world from the underdeveloped areas. 
Three-fourths of our needs for strategic and crit- 
ical materials come from the underdeveloped areas. 

Department of State Bulletin 

This is something to think about. It reemphasizes 
Mr. Rockefeller's conclusion that "we are depend- 
ent on the peoples of other countries; they are 
dependent on us; none can solve his problems 

Right of U.N. To Consider 
Anglo-Iranian Dispute 

Statement hy Ambassador Warren R. Austin 
V.S. Representative to the Secv/rity Cowncil ^ 

The representative of the Soviet Union has ob- 
jected to the adoption of the provisional agenda of 
the Security Council, and he has been supported in 
that objection by the representative of Yugoslavia. 
Thus far, all the discussion I have listened to has 
been in favor of adoption of the agenda, and I must 
say that I agree in the reasoning of all of those who 
have spoken in favor of the agenda. 

The point, as I understand it, made by the rep- 
resentative of the Soviet Union against this pro- 
visional asrenda is item 2. readinsr "ComDlaint of 
failure by the Iranian Government to comply with 
provisional measures indicated by the Interna- 
tional Court of Justice in the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company Case." Therefore, if the purpose of the 
Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia is to raise the 
question of whether the matter is essentially within 
the domestic jurisdiction of Iran, it depends upon 
a consideration of the very substance of this item. 

Now, the United Nations does deny itself the 
right to interfere with essentially domestic con- 
cerns. However, this denial follows adoption of 
the agenda in consideration of the point raised. 
It does not precede it unless there are no opposing 
inferences. It cannot at once make a decision on 
that constitutional question unless there are no 
opposing inferences over the subject matter being 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a 

Well, now, here the situation is just the contrary. 
Here the weight of opinion already expressed 
shows that far more members of the Security 
Council consider that this is not a matter essen- 
tially within the domestic jurisdiction. Certainly, 
it appears that there is a prima facie case to be 
presented to the Security Council and if the Se- 
curity Council is going to deny to the United 
Nations the right to consider this item on the 
, agenda, it must be only after studying the item 
and coming to a decision upon thorough and rea- 
sonable consideration. That does not, of course, 

'Made before the Security Council on Oct. 1 and 
released to the press by the U.S. mission to the U.N. on 
the same date. 

as has been repeatedly stated here decide the merits 
of the case, but here we have a complaint by the 
United Kingdom of the failure by the Government 
of Iran to take certain specified action. Clearly, 
it is one aspect of a dispute of the nature men- 
tioned in the Charter, that is, a dispute the con- 
tinuance of which might lead to international dis- 
turbance. Moreover, this question is singularly 
important and within the purview of the Security 
Council because it is also the subject of litigation 
in the International Court of Justice. That at 
once gives the Security Council a reason for not 
accepting the objection that this is essentially a 
matter within the domestic jurisdiction of Iran. 

This becomes a matter of great public interest 
because it involves peace, and we are for peace, 
and that is why we want this matter considered 

By putting this item on its agenda, the Security 
Council gives the United Nations its right to pass 
upon the matter in a reasonable manner and to 
make a decision after looking into the general 
character of the situation. This is not only a dis- 
pute — this is also a situation — both of which 
justify putting this item on the agenda. 

Another reason is that where international peace 
is threatened by a situation like this, where it is 
alleged to be under test and strain, it is highly 
important for the Security Council if the subject 
matter is brought to its attention to put the dispute 
at res pendentes in the Security Council so as to 
bring to bear upon the parties those restraints, 
those self-disciplines also, which have also been 
regarded as appropriate and necessary to justice 
while the dispute is in res pendentes. 

For these reasons, and without at all committing 
my Government upon the merits, the substantive 
questions here, and dealing only with this question 
related to the agenda, my Government will vote for 
the provisional agenda. 

I ought to say, because I believe it, that my Gov- 
ernment has no doubt about the competence of 
the Security Council to consider the dispute on 
its merits between the United Kingdom and Iran. 
I need simply recall that it is the Security Council 
which has the primary responsibility for the main- 
tenance of international peace and security. And 
the first step, the very first step toward the exercise 
of that duty, performance of that responsibility, 
is to consider any dispute or situation which may 
affect the maintenance of international peace and 
security. In this case, the United Kingdom is a 
member of the Security Council and the Govern- 
ment of Iran is not a member of the Security Coun- 
cil, though it is a member of the United Nations. 
Presumably, Iran will be invited to sit at our table 
after the adoption of tlie agenda. Tlierefore, it 
seems to my Government that a decision on 
competence should come after the Government of 
Iran has been invited to the table. 

Ocfober J 5, 795? 


Japanese Peace Treaty Viewed as Positive Step 
In Free World's March Toward Peace 

Address hy John Foster Dulles 
Considtant to the Secretary of State 

During the last month some good blows were 
struck in the cause of world freedom. 

We signed with Japan a treaty of reconcilia- 
tion and liberation in a great drama of peace- 
making unity such as the world had never seen 

The Soviet delegates, who had come to San 
Francisco in the blustering mood of wreckers, were 
made to seem insignificant for the first time in 
conference history, and in the end they faded al- 
most unnoticed from the scene. 

The United States made a series of collective 
security treaties which formalized its determina- 
tion to join with the peoples concerned to hold the 
island chain which, from the Aleutians to New 
Zealand, marks the western rim of the Pacific. 

What happened is good. But it is not good 
enough so that we can relax in a mood of con- 
templative admiration. In Japan and Asia, we 
have made only a beginning. The future is ob- 
scure and there are signs that are ominous. There 
will be continuing need of the driving power which 
we have developed. Therefore, it will perhaps be 
useful to analyze how that came about, so that 
we can more surely sustain our momentum. 

Decision Reached for Conclusion of tlie Treaty 

A first ingredient was the will to i-each a clearly 
defined goal, namely, peace with Japan. When I 
speak of "will" I mean more than a lackadaisical 
hope ; I mean a resolute determination which had 
behind it the full power and authority of govern- 

Tliat will was born in 1950 out of a growing 
realization of the danger of perpetuating the 
existing situation in Japan. China had gone and, 
unless we acted positively, it seemed that Japan 
niiglit go, too. Stalin had boasted: with Japan, 

' Made before the Governors Conference, Gatlinburg, 
Tenn., Oct. 1 and released to the press on the same date. 


"we are invincible." We do not have to admit 
that. But we must admit that Japan was formi- 
dable when it fought alone in Asia, and if its man- 
power and industrial resources could be joined 
with those of China and exploited by Soviet Rus- 
sia, the total combination could be extremely 

A principal source of danger lay in the con- 
tinuance of the military occupation of Japan. 
That occupation, begun in 1945, had by 1950 fully 
served the purposes specified in the Japanese sur- 
render terms. From then on the occupation would 
become alien interference in the internal aiiairs 
of a proud and sensitive people. It would be in- 
creasingly resented and that resentment would be 
fanned by all the propaganda skills of which 
communism is master. The free world would be 
in the position of jailor; while the Communist 
world would be jangling what it claimed were the 
keys to freedom. 

General MacArthur had seen danger coming. 
He had warned that the occupation could not 
safely be continued beyond 5 years. In 1950 the 
5 years were up. But we seemed to be caught in 
a trap. We were committed to occupation until 
there was peace, and the Soviet Union had 
thwarted the peace proposals which the United 
States and the United Kingdom had made in 1947. 

Between 1947 and 1950 we were without any 
strong purpose. Then in June 1950 the Secretary 
of Defense, Mr. Johnson, the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Bradley, and I went 
to Japan to study the problem with General Mac- 
Arthur. General MacArthur emphasized the 
danger and he made concrete proposals for sur- 
mounting it. 

The need of positive action was further driven 
home by the armed attack on the Republic of 
Korea which occurred while we were in Tokyo. 
That attack was probably made because of the 
strategic importance of Korea in relation to Japan. 

Department of Sfafe Bullefin 

It showed the lengths to which Soviet communism 
w as prepared to go to dominate Japan. It made 
it imperative that we should put equal resolution 
beliind a program for peace. 

On our return, the President decided that the 
United States should proceed with all possible 
vigor to set Japan free, and do so in such a way 
as to make it likely that Japan would use its free- 
dom to join its destiny with that of the free world. 
( )n September 8, 1950, the President formalized 
his decision and asked me to cari-y it out. 

One year later, to the day, the peace treaty was 
signed." During that year there had been many 
Hioments of difficulty and of concern. We had 
had to be firm with friends, and we had had to be 
idurageous in facing up to threats from non- 
friends. Never, however, has there been any wav- 
ering on the President's part. Having made his 
decision, he put behind it the full power of his 
office, and at all times, he, with Secretary Acheson 
and Secretary Marshall, gave me 100 percent 
support. That fact deserves to be recorded. 
Without that kind of determination there could 
not have been success. 

Bipartisan Support of the Treaty 

It was, however, necessary to have more than the 
determination of the Administration. National 
unity was an essential ingredient. AVhat had to 
be done could not be done as a partisan affair nor 
could I, as a Republican, have operated on those 
terms. Fortunately, we found national unity. 
Governor Dewey, the titular head of our Party, 
Senator Taft who is chairman of the Republican 
Policy Committee in the Senate, and Senator Mil- 
liken who is chairman of the Republican confer- 
ence in the Senate, were well aware of the grave 
issues; they approved of my mission and gave 
me support and counsel. I worked with complete 
intimacy with Republicans and Democrats alike 
on the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate 
and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House. 

At the time of General MacxVrthur's relief, our 
national unity of purpose was severely tested. A 
lesser man would have wanted to see confusion 
and failure follow his abrupt elimination from the 
Japanese scene. But, from his plane leaving 
Tokyo he spoke to me, on my plane Tokyo bound, 
and his message was : "Carry on with the peace." 
With the President's knowledge and approval I 
continued regularly to consult with General Mac- 
Arthur and I was constantly strengthened by the 
pledge of his support. 

There were four U.S. signers of the Japanese 
peace treaty and of each of the three related 
Pacific security treaties. Of the total of 16 signa- 
tures, 9 were Republicans, 7 were Democrats. 

What happened proves that when responsible 
Americans see for themselves that their country 
faces a great danger, when they know that their 
help is needed to avert that danger, then they will 

Ocfober 15, 195? 

970349—51 3 

help, if they are permitted to do so, in ways that 
they can justify to their reason and conscience. 
That unity is often indispensable in these grave 
times. Friendly nations will not adjust their 
policies into concert with ours, and unfriendly 
nations will not give way before our policies, if 
those policies are merely party policies, which may 
be reversed in a j'ear. 

Efforts To Create a Treaty Free From 
Discriminatory Limitations 

So, we developed here at home a will for posi- 
tive action, and national unity behind it. Start- 
ing with tiiat powerfid impetus we sought, as a 
third ingredient, the enlightened qualities of the 
free world. We tried to avoid the usual sordid 
aftermath of victory. We proposed a peace of 
reconciliation, of trust, and of opportunity. We 
invited Japan to return as a free and equal mem- 
ber of the society of nations. That meant a 
treaty without economic limitations, and without 
military limitations. Any such limitations would 
not only be discriminatory, but \xe felt that in the 
case of a country situated as was Japan they would, 
in the long run, be unenforceable and even pro- 
vocative of violations. 

Japan, under the surrender terms, had already 
been divested of its colonial possessions. This the 
treaty confirmed. The only abnormal liability to 
be placed upon Japan was a reparations liability, 
which she willingly accepted, toward the countries 
she had invaded. This liability was carefully re- 
stricted so as not to undermine Japanese solvency, 
or to destroy Japanese initiative, or to prevent 
the Japanese, by their own efforts, from improving 
their standards of living. 

We tried to write treaty terms which would not 
violate the high ideals which the free world pro- 
fesses, but which often are cut across by lower 
motives when the time for action comes. 

Also, in our dealings with the Japanese, we rec- 
ognized their personal dignity and worth and 
sought to break down the wall of division which 
war had erected between us. 

I had witnessed the treatment of the Germans 
at Versailles. It was so humiliating that the 
treaty never had a chance to make real peace. 

In 1919 the Germans sent a distinguished and 
liberal delegation to Versailles. They were put 
into a barbed-wire enclosure. They were forbid- 
den to have any personal meeting with any Allied 
delegate. When the treaty had been finally 
drafted they were shown a copy and given a few 
days within which to submit written observations. 
Tliese, when received, were almost wholly disre- 
garded. Such indignities created bitter resent- 
ment and it took the utmost i)ressure of a starva- 
tion blockade to produce any Germans to sign for 

We were not going to repeat that blunder in 
the case of Japan. In January of this year our 
presidential mission went to Japan, where we con- 


suited fully with the Japanese Government and 
with repi-e.sentatives of the principal political 
l)arties. of the labor unions, of business, and of 
cultural institutions. Again in April our mission 
renewed such consultations in Japan. In addi- 
tion. 1 was in frequent conmiunication by cable 
and mail with Prime Minister Yoshida. He made 
many suggestions about the treaty which we ac- 
cepted and. throughout, tlie Japanese nation knew 
that its opinions were sought and judged on their 
merits. We tried to show qualities of courtesy 
and humanity which the free world uniquely 
possesses, ancl which make men want to belong 
to that society. In the end, the Japanese Prime 
Minister headed a distinguished parliamentary 
delegation to the San Francisco conference and 
they glaclly made Japan's committal to the free 

Unity and Approval of the Free Allies 

The fourth ingredient of our action was unity 
with our free Allies. We won that unity by mak- 
ing proposals which were simple and inspired by 
ideals which they shared equally with us. In 
order, however, to translate that unity into the 
terms of an agreed treaty text, we hacl to invent 
some new procedures. 

There were over 50 Allies. Normally, all or 
some of them would have met at one place, at one 
time, to negotiate the treaty. This was the course 
which had been proposed in 1947 and which the 
Soviet Union had blocked. Since then, we had 
had 3 years of Russian sabotage of efforts to con- 
clude treaties with Germany and Austria. It was 
evident that there would be great difficulty in con- 
cluding a Japanese peace treaty at a Soviet- 
attended confei'ence, even assuming that the Soviet 
Union would renounce the veto power which, in 
fact, it continued to demand until the end. We did 
not, however, want to call a conference from which 
the Soviet Union would be excluded by our act. 
Many Allies were willing to go along with a peace 
from which the Soviet Union excluded itself; but 
they shied away from a peace from which the 
Soviet TTnion was excluded by others. 

The situation was further complicated by Allied 
differences regarding China. 

In the end. the President established a special 
mission which, with the use also of diplomatic 
channels, would deal directly and independently 
with eacli of the Allied Powers. There was no 
precedent for using this procedure in an affair of 
this magnitude, but it worked. It solved the prob- 
lem of dealing with Russia. We were willing to 
and did discuss the treaty with Russia, but since 
Russia was not a party to our talks with others, 
it lost its best chance to be obstructive. Also, our 
procedure let us consult with the National Gov- 
ernment of Ciiina, without this involving the 
many Allied Governments which do not recognize 
the National Government or which, even though 


they continue to recognize it for certain purposes, 
would not deal with it in relation to peace treaty 

The treaty was negotiated into final form with- 
out any general conference whatsoever, and the 
procedure was found generally acceptable. The 
Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia con- 
tinued to the last to claim that the procedure was 
illegal, but the overwhelming majority paid trib- 
ute to it. 

It was not always easy for our friendly Allies to 
embrace the kind of treaty that we sought. For 
example, in Australia, New Zealand, and the 
Philippines, there were many persons who felt 
that the peace treaty should limit any future 
Japanese military establishment. In the Philip- 
pines, Indonesia, and elsewhere, many persons felt 
that we were unduly solicitous in protecting Japan 
from their vast reparation claims. In Allied 
countries located in and about the Pacific Ocean, 
many wanted the treaty to prevent the Japanese 
from fishing generally on the high seas. In Allied 
Nations which were industrialized, many wanted 
to restrict Japan's power to compete, particularly 
in the fields of textiles, ship building and shipping. 

However, the governments of the Allied signa- 
tories saw the problem in true perspective and 
they placed the common good of the free world 
above local advantages. They showed that the 
Allies can wage peace together as they waged 
war together, and that they will make sacrifices 
for peace as they made sacrifices for victory. That 
is something that needed showing, and all honor 
is due those who showed the will and made the 

The United Kingdom cosponsored the final text 
of treaty. That was not easy for it to do, because 
the United Kingdom faces a difficult economic fu- 
ture, ancl Japan can be a dangerous competitor. 
Great Britain, in a victor's role, might well have 
sought trade advantages. Yet Britain played the 
larger role of leadership within a Commonwealth 
whose membership included many Pacific and 
Asian countries. 

Joint action by the United States and Britain 
may not be wholly popular in either country. 
When I first discussed this with Foreign Secretary 
Morrison last June, I remarked to him that prob- 
ably we would both be acclaimed at home if we 
took separate courses regarding Japan. But I 
knew that the place where that woukl be most ac- 
claimed M-ould be the Kremlin, and we could not 
afford to give satisfaction there or invite the bold- 
ness which would surely follow. The United 
States and the United Kingdom agreed, and we 
gave leadership together. That I rate as one ol 
the good byproducts of our endeavor. 

We sought the approval not merely of the great 
nations, and those which were directly concernec 
in the Pacific war, but of all the Allies. Most oJ 
the nations of the Americas, Europe, West Asia 
and Africa had not been physically damaged bj 

Deparfmenf of State Bullefin 

lie Pacific war. Their contribution to victory liad 
jeen more political and moral than military. It 
liad become customary to exclude such countries 
from any genuine part in the peacemaking. But 
nhy should we seek broad moral support for mak- 
ing war and then exclude that moral influence 
frum making peace? So our proposed peace terms 
were submitted to all of the Allied Powers in 
time to permit each to express its views. Many 
:lid so and changes were made as a result of their 
tjood suggestions. 

Our efforts resulted in a striking display of 
Allied unity. Fifty-four Allied Powers were in- 
v-ited to San Francisco. Three — India, Burma, 
md Yugoslavia — did not attend, preferring, for 
different reasons, to make peace separately. The 
Soviet Union and its two satellites, Poland and 
Czechoslovakia, attended but did not sign. Forty- 
^iiilit Allied Powers signed. 

Some will perhaps wonder why so much time 
and effort were expended to get Allied unity. The 
United States could conceivably have written its 
own treaty of peace with Japan, imposed it upon 
Japan through its forces of occupation, and left 
it to others to take it or leave it as they saw fit. 
Some few argue that this should have been our 

There may come times when a nation must act 
wholly on its own responsibility. But usually the 
decision to act alone springs from a desire to do 
what, it is feared, world judgment would con- 
demn. Nations which align their policies with 
moral principles do not have to act furtively or 
to stand alone. Therefore the Allied Powers and 
Japan, 49 nations, stood together and made, pub- 
licly and in unison, their great covenant of peace 
and liberation; and the drama of that act stirred 
the hearts of men everj'where who love fi'eedom, 
peace, and justice. 

Threats of the U.S.S.R. and Communist China 

The fifth ingredient of our action was courage, 
without recklessness. Communist propaganda 
had been openly threatening that if Japan signed 
a so-called "separate peace," i. e., a peace which 
was not joined in by the Soviet Union and Com- 
munist China, that act would touch off a revival 
by these two countries of active war against Japan. 
The Soviet and Chinese Communist Governments 
had hinted the saiue thing. 

We could not tell certainly whether this was 
bluff or whether it was serious menace. Those 
best qualified to judge felt that there was at least 
I some risk that the Soviet Union and Communist 
China would make Japan's signature of a peace 
treaty and security treaty the pretext for reviving 
open war. 

That was a risk which the President and his 
responsible advisers weighed. To have given in 
to the threats M'ould have been to invite immea- 
surable disaster. They did not give in, but went 

That was a solemn and necessary decision, which 
required courage; but it equally called for an 
avoidance of recklessness. There was a duty to 
proceed in a way that would reduce, not increase, 
the risk of the awful disaster of general war. We 
believed that the risk would be reduced if the peace 
obtained general world approval. Contrariwise, 
the risk would increase if we alienated world 

In these matters the Soviet Communists seem 
to take into account the morale factor which plays 
a decisive part in the outcome of long wars. They 
treat propaganda and subversive possibilities as 
weapons of equal importance to military weapons. 
So, while free world unity is no insurance against 
general war, free world disunity probably in- 
creases the risk of general war, particularly if the 
disunity involves the United States being con- 
demned by a large part of free world opinion. 

That is the additional reason why we sought a 
peace which would win general support and why 
we negotiated ]:)atiently and in simplicity in an 
effort to consolidate that support into a climactic 
demonstration of world unity. 

In that connection the attitude of India was a 
disappointment. We had scarcely expected that 
India would sign a peace treaty that was rejected 
by Soviet Eussia and Communist China. That 
might have involved a departure from a policy 
which the Indian Government, within its rights, 
has judged will best serve its national interests. 
But the reasons given by India for declining our 
invitation seemed at that time to give encourage- 
ment to the Chinese Communists who had revived, 
for their own imperialist purposes, the old battle 
cry of "Asia for the Asiatics," and who were de- 
manding that all United States influence should 
be eradicated from Ja]ian. 

If India's position had in fact been followed 
generally by the other Asian States, there might 
have resulted the grave breach in world unity 
which the Soviets had been seeking. 

Fortunately for peace, this did not happen. 
Over a quarter of the Allied Nations at San Fran- 
cisco were Asian States, and Zafndla Khan of 
Pakistan, Subardjo of Indonesia. Jayewardene of 
Ceylon, and Charles Malik of Lebanon voiced 
eloquently and authentically the overwhelming de- 
termination of Asia to seek peace through world 
unity rather than to divide continents and races 
into hostile camps. 

However, as Secretai-y Acheson said in closing 
the San Francisco peace conference, while we re- 
gretted that some were unwilling to work with us 
and criticized our efforts, "for those people we 
feel no bitterness; but we urge them now to join 
in the great effort which lies before us all." 

All who heard the moving statements made at 
San Francisco by the delegates of the 49 signing 
slates will understand why the Soviet delegation 
did not present there any warlike ultinuitum and 
why September 8 passed without any new outbreak 
of war. 

Ocfober 15, J957 


Some, wlicn they lieunl that the Russians were 
coming to San Francisco, thought we had 
bhmdeied. Tiiey said we sliouid never have in- 
vited the Russians and should have had no speak- 
ing conference, hut only a silent signing. They 
overrated the Russians; they underrated the Al- 
lied unitv that had been achieved, and they de- 
veloped t'imidity at the point where boldness was 
our best insurance. 

We knew what we were doing when we invited 
a Soviet delegation to he at San Francisco. We 
were confident that we had built soundly and that 
nothintr the Russians covdd do would enable them 
to ]niirdown what had been built. We were not 
afraid. We wanted the Russians to hear what 
they heard, to see what they saw, and to fail as they 

a "decent respect for the opinions of mankind." 
We discomntted the despots ; and that is nothing 
new to a nation which, when it was still young 
and weak, defied the Holy Alliance formed by the Czar Alexander and, by the moral courage 
of its ]\Ionroe Doctrine, threw those despots into 

Our troubles today stem from too much reliance 
upon what is new — our bigness, our material 
power. We are overly entangled by the com- 
plexities of our modern industrial civilization. 
What we need is more reliance on what is old, and 
what should be enduring. If the San Francisco 
conference succeeded, it was because our nation 
operated naturally and simply, in accordance with 
the faith and the works of our fathers. 

U.S. Action Commensurate With American Tradition 

What happened at San Francisco has been 
called a "diplomatic success." That is true — in 
the best sense of the word "diplomacy." In a 
larger sense, the results came simply from follow- 
ing in the way of American tradition. I like to 
think that in some measure we did the kind of 
thing that our forebears would have expected 
of us. 

"Wlien I speak of our tradition I am not thinking 
merely of our historical interest in the Pacific, 
although this, too, can usefully be remembered. 
Nearly one hundred years ago Commodore Perry 
made a treaty with Japan which was the first 
modern link between Japan and the West. Fur- 
ther, if you will permit a personal reference, I 
cannot forget that it was my grandfather who, in 
1895, negotiated a treaty of peace between Japan 
and China. 

The ground we are today traversing is not new 
to Americans. But I am thinking primarily in 
terms of our spiritual heritage. 

We achieved national unity; and surely it is 
nothing new to have national unity in the face of 
external danger. Today we argue about unity in 
new-fangled terms: "bipartisanship," "nonparti- 
sanship," "unpartisanship." To me it is old- 
fashioned "Americanship." 

We sought for Japan a peace of reconciliation; 
and that is nothing new to a nation whose every 
child has memorized Lincoln's immortal appeal 
for a peace of malice toward none and charity 
toward all. 

We sought a peace which would liberate Japan 
from occupation; and that is nothing new to a 
nation whose Declaration of Tndepenclence, as Lin- 
coln has said, otlVred "liberty not alone to the 
peojjle of tliis country but hope for the world for 
all future time." 

We sought a peace which would deserve and 
receive the approbation of the free world; and 
that is nothing new for a nation whose own in- 
dependence was expressly based on the proposi- 
tion that all people in great affairs should act with 


Summary of Pacific Treaty 

[Released to the press by the White House October .{] 

FoUoioing is a letter to the President from, 
John Foster Dulles: 

October 3, 1951 

My Dear Mr. President : On January 10, 1951, 
you designated me as your Special Representative 
with the responsibility for conducting, on behalf 
of the United States, the further negotiations 
necessary to bring a Japanese Peace Settlement to 
a satisfactor}' conclusion.^ At the same time you 
authorized me to develop certain security arrange- 
ments among Pacific Island nations. 

I now have the honor to report that the negotia- 
tions with which you entrusted me have been con- 
cluded and have resulted in the following acts : 

1. A Treaty of Peace between Japan and forty- 
eight Allied Nations, including the United States, 
signed at San Francisco on September 8, 1951 ; ^ 

2. A Mutual Assistance Treaty between the 
Philippine Republic and the United States signed 
at Washington on August 30, 1951 ; ^ 

3. A Security Treaty between Australia, New 
Zealand and the United States, signed at San 
Francisco on September 1, 1951 ; * 

4. A Security Treaty between the United States 
and Japan, signed at San Francisco on Septem- 
ber 8, 1951 ; ° 

5. An exchange of notes between the Secretary 
of State of the United States and the Prime Min- 
ister of Japan, dated September 8, 1951, pledging 
Japan to permit and facilitate the support, in and 
about Japan, of forces engaged in United Nations 
action in the Far East.^ 

' Bulletin of .Tan. 20, 1951, p. 18.5. 

''Ibid., Aug. 27, 10.-il, p. 349; Sept. 17, 1951, p. 447. 

' Ibid., Aug. 27, 1951, p. 335 ; Sept. 10, 1951, p. 422. 

* Ihid., .Tuly 23, 1951, p. 148 ; Sept. 24, 1951, p. 495. 

'Ibid., Sept. 17, 1951, p. 464. 

° Il>id., p. 465. 

Department of State Bulletin 

I understand that the Secretary of State will, 
in due course, transmit to you the texts of the fore- 
going documents. 

The Treaty of Peace with Japan is designed 
formally to end the Pacific war wliich began on 
December 7, 1941. 

Tlie ^lutual Assistance and Security Treaties, 
togetlier with tlie prospective arrangements cov- 
ering tlie Eyukyu and Bonin Islands, authorized 
by Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace witli Japan, 
are designed to constitute what you i-eferred to in 
your statement of April 19, 1951 as "natural ini- 
tial steps'' which "will strengthen the fabric of 
peace in the whole Pacific Island area, where se- 
curity is strongly influenced by sea and air 

The Notes are designed to assure that the re- 
acqnisition l)y Japan of the exercise of full sov- 
ereignty will not interrupt assistance to United 
Nations action in the Far East such as Japan has 
been and now is rendering, in accordance w^th the 
Charter of the United Nations. 

I take this occasion to express my deep appre- 
ciation of the confidence which you reposed in me 
in placing in my hands the i-esponsibility for ne<;o- 
tiating the foregoing Treaties and my grateful 
recognition of the support which has at all times 
been given me by yourself, by the Secretary of 
State and by the Secretary of Defense. 

I am, respectfully yours, 

John Foster Dulles 

Trade Concessions on Czechoslovak Imports Suspended 


[/*' Iragcd to the press October 2] 

The President on October 2 notified the Depart- 
ment of the Treasury that after the close of busi- 
ness on November 1, 1951, U.S. concessions made 
in trade agreements will be suspended with regard 
to imports from Czechoslovakia. The action was 
taken in accordance with section 5 of the Trade 
Agreements Extension Act of 1951 which states, 
in part, that "As soon as practicable the President 
shall take such action as is necessary to suspend, 
withdraw, or prevent the application of any reduc- 
tion in any rate of duty, or binding of any existing 
customs or excise treatment, or other concession 
contained in any trade agreement .... to im- 
ports from any nation or area dominated or con- 
trolled by the foreign government or foreign 
organization controlling the world Connnunist 

The Department of State announced on July 31, 
1951,' that the United States had detennined to 
withdraw from Czechoslovakia the benefits of 
trade-agi-eement tariff concessions and to request 
the contracting parties to the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade, which is now meeting at 
Geneva, Switzerland, to concur in the termination 
of all of the obligations existing between this Gov- 
ernment and Czechoslovakia by virtue of the pro- 
visions of the General Agreement. 

On September 27 the contracting parties by a 
vote of 24 to 1, with four abstentions, agi-eed that 
the Governments of the United States and of 

' Bulletin of Aug. 20, lO.^l, p. 290. 

Ocfofaer 75, J 95 7 

Czechoslovakia should be free to suspend their 
obligations to each other which occur in the Gen- 
eral Agreement. On September 29 the chairman 
of the United States delegation to the contracting 
parties notified the Secretariat of the contracting 
parties that the U.S. Government was invoking its 
rights mider the declaration adopted on September 
27 and was suspending, effective immediately and 
mitil further notice, the obligations of the United 
States with respect to Czechoslovakia under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 

United States concessions provided for in 
schedule XX of the General Agreement will con- 
tinue to be applied to imports from other countries 
to which the United States is currently granting 
tlie benefit of trade-agreement concessions. 

On August 1 the President signed a proclama- 
tion ordering the suspension of trade-agreement 
concessions from Communist-dominated coun- 
tries.' Because, however, on that date the United 
States had international commitments witli sev- 
eral such countries which were not consistent with 
withdrawal of concessions from them, the proc- 
lamation stated that the Treasury, from time to 
time, would be notified of the countries from whose 
goods the concessions sliould be suspended. On the 
same date the President notified the Ti-easury of 
the suspension, as of August 31, of trade-agree- 
ment concessions on imports from various specified 

On September 17 the President notified the 
Treasury of the suspension, effective October 17, 
of trade-agreement concessions on imports from 

'' Bulletin of Aug. 20, 1951, p. 291. 

'Ifiirl.. Oct. 1, in.->l, p. 550. 



Statement hy Wi//anl L. Tliufp 

Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs ^ 

Let ine begin bv stating specifically what it is 
that we propose. " Briefly, we ask the contracting 
parties, acting inider the authority given to them 
by article XXV of the General Agreement, to set 
aside the connnitnients of tlie General Agreement 
as tliev apply between the United States and 
(Czechoslovakia. It will be recalled that article 
XXV, in paragraph 5 (A), states that "in ex- 
ceptional circumstances, not elsewhere provided 
for . . . the contracting parties may waive 
an obligation imposed upon a contracting party" 
by the agreement. 
' AVe have distributed to the other delegations, for 
their consideration, a draft of a declaration de- 
signed to give effect to this proposal (Gatt/ 
CP.G/5/ add. 2). 

So nuich for a description of the proposal itself. 
Now, more broadly, what does it mean, and what 
would be its practical effect? 

First, our request is not a unilateral, one-sided 
proposal applying only to the obligations of the 
United States toward Czechoslovakia. We are 
not seeking any liberty or privilege for ourselves 
which we are not also prepared to see accorded to 
Czechoslovakia. On the contrary, our proposal 
would also free the Czechoslovak Government 
equally of its obligations under the agreement 
toward the United States. We consider that this 
conce])t of mutuality in the severance of obliga- 
tions, as in the undertaking of them, is fully con- 
sistent with the principles of equity and reciproc- 
ity which underlie the General Agreement and 
which run throughout its administration and 

Second, the terms of our proposal would apply 
exclusively to the relations between the United 
States and Czechoslovakia. It would not affect 
tiie ol)ligations of the United States toward the 
other contracting parties in any respect. For ex- 
am])le, it would not mean an increase in the rate 
of duty on any product imported from the otlier 
contracting parties into the United States. Nor 
would it mean tlie cancellation of the complaint 
under article XIV, previously brought against the 
United States and now lying before the contract- 
ing parties, merely because that complaint was 
initiated by the Government of Czechoslovakia. 

Similarly, the proposal of the United States 
is not intended to affect the rights or obligations 
of other contracting parties toward Czechoslo- 
vakia, nor of ( 'zechosiovakia toward them. We are 
here concerned solely and exclusively with the 
state of our own relations directly with the Gov- 

' MiKle bpfore (lelogafes of the contracting parties to the 
Oenernl AKreement on Tariffs and Trade (Gatt) at 
Geneva, Switzcrhinil, on Sept. liC ; printed from telegraphic 


ernmcnt of Czechoslovakia and, in the excep- 
tional circumstances which prevail between us, 
with the impossibility of fulfilling commercial 
policy obligations which were originally entered 
into under quite different circumstances. 

Our proposal, then, is strictly limited in its 
scope and, so far as we are concerned, is not in- 
tended to have implications for other countries. 
It is reciprocal in effect, and conforms to the spirit 
of mutuality which pervades the General Agree- 
ment. It does not distui'b the relations between 
any of the other parties to the agreement. 

Now, I should like to explain why the Govern- 
ment of the United States feels compelled to take 
the steps which it now pro]ioses for the severance 
of commercial policy obligations between the 
United States and Czechoslovakia. 

Economic Benefits of GATT Nullified 

It has been known to my Government for some 
time that the economic system of Czechoslovakia 
is being manipulated by its present Government 
in such a way as to nullify the economic benefits 
which the United States had expected to accrue 
from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
Ordinarily these actions would, of course, proijerly 
be the subject of a complaint by the United States 
against Czechoslovakia pursuant to the provisions 
of article XXIII. But it is clear to us that there 
is and can be no real remedy under the provisions 
of article XXIII because we can not reasonably 
anticipate an improvement of our commerce with 
Czechoslovakia so long as the present state of re- 
lations between us exists. 

It is, I think, an elementary proposition that 
fruitful economic relations between any two coun- 
tries, and the value of commercial obligations be- 
tween them, must presuppose some reasonable de- 
gree of tolerance between the governments con- 
cerned, .some reasonable degree of mutual respect, 
some reasonable degree of good faith by each in its 
dealing with the other. Intolerance, lack of re- 
spect, absence of good faith, must surely call into 
question the validity of promises, which at bottom, 
rest on a foundation of morality. If one govern- 
ment considers that another government has. as a 
matter of deliberate policy and practice, harassed 
its representatives and severely limited tlieir num- 
ber and scope of operations, if one government 
considers that another has systematically refused 
even to receive its representations or even to listen 
to its ])rotests against acts in violation of treaties 
or of international law; if one government con- 
siders that another has persistently demonstrated 
mitrustworthiness in its dealings between the two 
governments; if it is impossible for one govern- 
ment to obtain from another even the most ele- 
mentary connnercial and economic information 
which is essential to the conduct of commercial in- 
tercourse; if normal relations between business 
men and enterprises in the two countries are made 
impossible by drastic limitations on their activ- 

Deporfmenf of Sfafe Bulletin 

ities; if there is no genuine means of communica- 
tions between the two governments; tlien what 
possible basis can tliere be for the fultilhnent of 
commercial policy obligations such as we find in 
the General Agreement on Taritfs and Trade? I 
think it must be abundantly clear that there can be 
none. The very premises on which the contract 
was based have been removed. 

This, I believe, accurately describes the state of 
the relations which, under the regime of the pres- 
ent government of Czechoslovakia, have developed 
between that government and the Government of 
the United States. 

Czechoslovak Economic System Altered 

The negotiations which led to the assumption 
by Czechoslovakia and the United States of com- 
mercial policy obligations toward each other were 
foncluded 4 years ago, in the fall of 1947. Since 
that time Czechoslovakia has radically altered its 
entire economic system, its method of doing busi- 
ness with the United States, and the general atti- 
tude of its government toward the people and Gov- 
ernment of the United States. Following upon 
these basic changes which, I repeat took place 
after Czechoslovakia and the United States agreed 
to become parties to the General Agreement, the 
general relations between the two governments 
have steadily deteriorated. In the view of the 
United States these relations have now fallen be- 
low that minimum degree of mutual tolerance and 
respect which is essential to the effective discharge 
of the obligations of the General Agreement. We 
ask, therefore, that these obligations be formally 
liquidated in order that there may be no question 
as to their continuing validity. 

I should like to emphasize at this point that our 
proi)osal does not introduce any new principle of 
international law. Clauses for the termination of 
international commitments which can be invoked 
at the will of either party have almost alwaj's been 
included in bilateral commercial agreements and 
treaties. And, so far as the General Agreement 
is concerned, no one would question the right of 
any country to withdraw from the agreement en- 
tirely, thus severing its obligations toward all the 
other parties. The United States proposal would, 
of course, lead to a situation in which two coun- 
tries could continue to be parties to the General 
Agreement even though the agreement has ceased 
to apply between them. But this kind of situa- 
tion the contracting parties have already accepted 
in principle and in practice through the adoption 
of article XXXV. It will be recalled that under 
article XXXV, one country is not compelled to 
assume the obligations of the General Agreement 
toward another country if that intent is made clear 
at the time either of them join. Unfortunately, 
article XXXV was not incorporated in the Gen- 
eral Agreement until after the United States and 
Czechoslovakia had become contracting parties, 

Ocfober 75, J95I 

and it was not until later that the Government of 
Czechoslovakia fundamentally altered the nature 
of its relations with the United States. It is for 
these purely circumstantial reasons that the pro- 
visions of article XXXV are not, under the strict 
letter of the agreement, technically open to us. 
But in spirit they should apply, and it is the hope 
of my Government that the justice of this view 
will be recognized by the contracting parties. 

In asking this, we are not seeking to inject 
political disputes into the debates of the contract- 
ing parties. Over the years, the contracting 
parties have developed a tradition of confining dis- 
cussion to economic and trade questions, of stick- 
ing to the technical merits of an issue, of exclud- 
ing irrelevancies, of foregoing the temptations of 
political harangue. This is a wise tradition. We 
believe in it and shall do our utmost to preserve it. 

We do not, therefore, ask the contracting parties 
to discuss the political questions which are in- 
volved in the relations between the United States 
and Czechoslovakia. We do not ask them to decide 
whether Czechoslovakia or the United States is 
right or wrong on any political question. We do 
not ask them to examine into the causes of the 
situation which has come to pass, or to consider 
the methods by which it could have been avoided 
or might be remedied. All we ask is that the con- 
tracting parties recognize what is an evident fact — 
that, irrespective of the merits of any political 
issue, the incompatibility between the Govern- 
ments of the United States and Czechoslovakia on 
all issues involved in their relations with one an- 
other is at this time so acute and fundamental that 
the commercial policy obligations under the Gen- 
eral Agreement cannot in practice be fulfilled and 
ought, of right and in honesty, to be suspended. 
This, in our judgment, is the only way in which 
the integrity of the General Agreement can be 
fully preserved. 

It may be asked whether, in taking such action, 
the contracting parties might not create a prece- 
dent which would apply whenever there are dif- 
ferences of opinion between particular contracting 
parties on political or other matters not germane 
to the General Agreement. 

In our view, no such pi-ecedent would be created. 
For we are not now dealing with particular con- 
troversies between Governments over well-defined 
and specific issues, nor with the right of any coun- 
try to take economic measures in order to compel 
a settlement of unrelated political dis]Kites of this 
kind. Wliat we are confronted with here is a 
general state of relations between two Govern- 
ments, extending to all matters, economic as well 
as political, which has grown so tenuous and un- 
satisfactory that there is no practicable way in 
which the conunercial policy obligations between 
them can be enforced. This, clearly, is an "excep- 
tional circumstance" which does not easily lend 
itself to other situations less fundamental and 
sweeping in character. 


To summarize, Mr. Chairman, our position on 
this matter: 

1. We ask the contractino; parties to suspend 
tlie obligations of tlie General Agreement between 
the Ignited States and Czechoslovakia. 

2. We ask this because of the exceptional cir- 
cumstance that the general relations between the 
I'nited States and Czechoslovakia have now be- 
come so fundamentally altered that commercial 
policy undertakings between them are no longer 

3. In scekin<jr this action, we are requesting it 
in a form which will not disturb the relations 

which other contracting parties may have or 
choose to have with ourselves or with Czechoslo- 

4. Our proposal is in conformity with the spirit 
of the legal principles already recognized in the 
agreement. It would not, in our judgment, create 
a new and undesirable precedent for other cases 
less fundamental in character. 

5. We consider our request to be entirely fair to 
all concerned and believe that it shoukl be ap- 
proved by the contracting parties as a matter of 
justice and common sense. Accordingly, we are 
confident that it will receive the necessary support. 

U.S. Rejects Czechoslovak Charges of Complicity in Refugee Train Episode 

[Released to the press October 1] 

On September 11, 1951, a Czechoslovak train, 
hearing a number of Czechoslovak citizens seeking 
political asylum outside their native land, entered 
the U.S. zone in Germany at Selb in Bavaria. 
Those passengers ahoard who unshed to ref'urn to 
Czcchuslovakia ire re permitted to do so and ar- 
rangements were undertaken for return of the 

On September 20 the Czechoslovak Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs sent two notes to the American 
Embassy at Praha} The first of these notes 
demanded return of the train, alhi/eil fluif n fiigee 
passengers had been foreihly detn'incd^ and liisisfrd^ 
that those ti^ho organized the action be cdiradited. 
The second note protested that criminal treatment 
was accorded four Czechoslovak representatives 
who entered the U.S. zone on an investigative 
mission of the incident. 

The Embassy at Praha, on October 1, trans- 
mitted replies to the uhove-mentioned notes. The 
first reply points out that the United States is not 
obligated to return political refugees and states 
that the train will be delivered pending comple- 
tion of certain arrangements. The second reply 
categorically rejects the Czech protest of mistreat- 
ment a<:corded the four-man investigative mission. 

Following are texts of the Czechoslovak notes 
of September 20, together with texts of the notes 
tran-smitted by the United States in reply: 

' A pri'vious note on the subject, A:\\n\ Scptombi'i- 12. had 
been transmitted by tlie CzcchnsliiViik Military Missiim iu 
Berlin to npproi)i-i!itp IT.S. jmtlioritles in" the Allied 
Liaison and rrotoeol Section. The note referred to the 
train's entrance into the U.S. zone for the purpose of re- 
pairinK defective braites and requested that necessary 
step.s be taken to return the train and its passengers to 



The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its 
compliments to the Embassy of the United States 
of America and has the honor to advise as follows: 

On September 11, 1951, a gi'oup of terrorists got 
hold of the operation of train Cheb-Asch, and 
made it pass the Czechoslovak state frontier into 
the territory of the occupation zone of the United 
States of America in Germany. Armed terrorists 
employed violence against the train staff who 
wished to prevent this criminal activity. They 
kidmipfied several tens of ]ieaceful travellers, in- 
cluding old people and children, and endangered 
their lives and security. In addition, they com- 
mitted other crimes under common law which are 
also punishable under the legal order of both the 
Czechoslovak Republic and of the United States 
of America. All offences have been committed 
within the territory of the Czechoslovak Republic. 
As it has been ascertained, the action has been pre- 
pared long before, plotted, and financed by a 
foreign agency. 

Instead of taking immediate measures for the 
return of the kidnapped Czechoslovak citizens and 
of the forcibly removed Czechoslovak property, 
and for surrendering the culprits of the quoted 
offences to the Czechoslovak authorities, the oc- 
cupation authorities of the United States of 
America in Germany on the contrary immediately 
granted these criminals their support and aid pre- 
])aied beforehand. Occupation authorities could 
entertain not least doubts of the fact that these 
criminals have committed a number of grave 
crimes, as particularly the willful and unlawful 
obstruction of the railroads, endangering human 
lives, kidnapping minors and adults for unlawful 

Department of State Bulletin 

iiuls, robbery and theft, or accomplicity and par- 
tici])ation in these crimes respectively. These are 
ci'inies of common law which are specified in Arti- 
cle II of the treaty between the Czechoslovak 
Republic and the United States of America of July 
2, 1925 concerning mutual extradition of fugitive 
criminals, as being just the crimes or offenses on 
account of which parties to the treaty have under- 
taken the liability to deliver up mutually culprits 
thereof : Article II, Paragraph 1, Nos. (>, 10, Ki, 17, 
Article II, Paragraph 2. The procedure of the 
occupation authorities is, therefore, contrary not 
only to the general principles of international law 
on combatting criminality, but also to the United 
States of America Government's contractual com- 
mitments under the stipulations of the quoted 

On the other hand, the occupation authorities 
of the United States of America restricted in- 
humanly and unworthily the personal liberty of, 
and put in various forms pressure upon, the vic- 
tims of terrorists. 

The occupation authorities of the United States 
of America in Germany are still forcibly detaining 
a part of the kidnapped Czechoslovak citizens, 
including even minors, and preventing the repre- 
sentatives of the Czechoslovak Republic to get in 
touch with them. 

Moreover, the occupation authorities of the 
United States of America in Germany are still 
illegally hindering the railroad administration in 
the Western Zones of Germany to comply with 
their obligations and to restore without delay the 
train forciblv removed, as they themselves wished 
to do immediately. 

The Government of the United States of Amer- 
ica and its occupation authorities in Germany have 
by their actions proved again that, whilst inflict- 
ing every possible detriment upon the peaceful 
citizens of the Czechoslovak Republic, they ap- 
prove and actively support acts of criminals, ter- 
rurists, and saboteurs, directed against the Czecho- 
^ll)vak people. 

The Government of the United States of Amer- 
ica thus is systematically misusing its status of 
an occupation power in Germany for the purpose 
of its aggressive policies which are contrary to 
all the principles, tasks, and aims of the occu- 
pation. Wliilst, pursuant to international com- 
mitments of the great powers, the main objective 
of the occupation of Germany is to secure peace, 
tlie occupation, as carried out by the Government 
of the United States, has become a direct menace 
to peace. 

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs wishes to pro- 
test most vigorously against the actions of the 
occupation authorities of the United States of 
America in Germany and requests : 

1. That the occupation authorities of the United 
States of America in Germany enable without 

delay the representative of the Czechoslovak mili- 
tary mission in Berlin to enter into contact with 
the Czeclioslovak citizens who have been forcibly 
abducted, and still are against their will and un- 
lawfully detained in the Western Zones of Ger- 

2. That the occupation authorities of the United 
States of America in Germany release without 
delay those persons and enable them to return 
freely to their country. 

3. That the Government of the United States 
of America take without delay measures to effect 
that persons who have committed common crimes 
or offenses within Czechoslovak territory be, upon 
extradition requisition duly vouched, delivered up 
to the Czechoslovak authorities for penal prose- 

4. That the occupation authorities of the United 
States of America cancel without delay measui'es 
hindering the railroad administration of the West- 
ern Zones of Germany to restore to the Czechoslo- 
vak railway administration the train consisting 
of one engine, a tender, one service van, and three 
passenger coaches. 

Lists of the persons whom requests sub 1, 2, and 
3 concern are attached hereto. 

The Government of the Czechoslovak Republic 
reserves the assertion of claim of full compensa- 
tion for damage caused to the Czechoslovak state, 
its citizens, and Czechoslovak legal persons, in 
connection with the above quoted acts. 

Annex A — List of persons referred to in the re- 
quests sub 1 and 2 of note No. 139,359-A/V-1/5L 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 

1. Frantisek Krahulec, member of SMB. 

2. Gemeter Verguljak, private soldier. 

3. Bohumil Hiazsky, private soldier. 

4. Vjesja Koselovska, student. 

5. Frantiska Bublikova, clerk. 

6. Zdenek Jager, student. 

7. Otto Ocenasek, student. 

8. Jaroslav Bures, student. 

9. Jiri Krystofek, employee of the CSSZ. 

Remarks : 

1. List contains persons so far ascertained by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 

2. Applications for the immediate return of the 
young mentioned in the list have been submitted to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by their families. 

A7inex B — List of |">ersons referred to in request 
sub 3 of note of Ministry of Foreign Affairs No. 
139, 359-A/V-1/51. 

Persons so far ascertained by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs as culprits and organizers of 
crimes and offenses : 

1. Dr. Jaroslav Svec, physician. 

2. Vaclay Trobl, clerk. 

3. Karel Truska, employee of CSD. 

4. Jaroslav Konvalinka, employee of CSD. 

OcJober J5, J957 



The American Embassy presents its compli- 
ment to the Czechoslovak ^IJ'^^t^ «J foreign 
Affairs and has the honor to acknowledge the Mm- 
fttrv-s note of September 20 with an enclosure the unscheduled departure from 
Czechoslovakia for Germany on bepteraber 11 
last of a train carrying approximately 100 per- 
sons, a number of whom have since f ree y indi- 
cated their desire not to return to Czechoslovakia 
In this connection the Ministry makes a number 
of assertions, accusations, and complaints as w-ell 
as several requests, in regard to a 1 of ^yhlch the 
Embassy has been directed to reply on behalf of 
the American Government as follows: 

The contents of the Ministry's note, and of pub- 
licity simultaneously emanating froni ofticial 
sources in Prague on the same subject, seem 
founded on the notion that the tram in question 
was seized by Czechoslovak "terrorists" and that 
this seizure 'was part of a conspiracy involving 
these so-called terrorists and certain foreign 
agents The Ministry implies that these con- 
ioined forces are sinister, and their purposes hos- 
tile and, furthermore, that their behavior has been 
irritatino- to the Czechoslovak Government. Ihe 
Ministrf further implies that the Czechoslovak 
Government would like to get its hand on the 
persons who ran off with their train. 

The Ministry's note employs this fiction ap- 
parently with the purpose to conceal, if possible, 
the fact that the direction and departure of the 
train from Czechoslovakia was an unaided under- 
taking of certain citizens of that country who 
adopt'ed this somewhat unconventional method of 
leaving the country and simultaneously indicated 
their altitude. It is noted, moreover, that this ex- 
planation does not conform with the original at- 
tempt to intimate that defective brakes were re- 
sponsible for the entry of the train into Western 
Germany. However much the Czechoslovak Gov- 
ernment has chosen thus to explain the occurrence 
or attempt thereby to keep from the Czechoslovak 
peojile the actual circumstances of this departure, 
the United States cannot underetand how the 
Czechoslovak authorities can seriously attempt: to 
use this fiction in a diplomatic note to a foreign 

To declare that a foreign agency aided in the 
execution of this enterprise is not only contrary 
to the facts but underestimates the ingenuity of 
the Czechoslovak citizens concerned, in which con- 
nection the Embassy has been authorized to make 
clear tliat the jiart ])layed by the American Gov- 
ernment in the episode in question has been limited 
to action by the United States authorities in Ger- 
many in granting political asylum to all those as- 
serting that they did not desire to return to 

According to such information as has come to 
the knowledge of the United States Government, 
recent departures from Czechoslovakia have been 


effected among other means by such vehicles as 
bicycles, automobiles, and trucks, as well as con- 
siderable assortment of airplanes and even a glider, 
whereof the train is merely the latest and largest 
conveyance to be employed. In addition there has 
been rather substantial exodus of Czechoslovak 
citizens proceeding on foot. World opinion has 
not been accustomed to hold, as the Ministry ap- 
parently attempts to do, that such persons who 
have sought to leave their country in order to ob- 
tain political asylum abroad are "terrorists" and 
"criminals." Based on records of the United 
States authorities in Germany, one quality which 
these Czechoslovak citizens coming to Western 
Germany have in common is the desire for human 
freedom. . 

The American Government accordingly rejects 
the assertion that "grave crimes" were committed 
in an action involving the departure from Czecho- 
slovakia for political reasons, or that the activities 
could be considered to come within the purview 
of the extradition treaty mentioned in the Minis- 
try's note. In this connection reference is made 
to the United States position when the Czecho- 
slovak Government asked for the extradition as 
"criminals" and "terrorists" persons leaving 
Czechoslovakia for political reasons by three 
Czechoslovak transport planes which landed at 
Erding Field near Munich on March 24, 1950.^ 
It was explained at that time that no basis m law 
exists for making or complying with such an extra- 
dition request. Neither the Extradition Treaty of 
1925 nor any other treaties presently in force be- 
tween the United States and Czechoslovak Gov- 
ernments can be considered applicable to the 
question of returning from the United States Zone 
in Germany any of those now accused by the 
Czechoslovak Government. It may be noted that 
Article III of the Extradition Treaty specifically 
excludes its application to any crime or offense of 
a political character and recognizes the right of 
the state receiving an extradition request to de- 
cide whether a case is of a political character. 
The United States has never recognized, as is also 
the case with many other countries, any obligation 
to extradite in the absence of a treaty. No basis 
therefore exists for the charge of the Czechoslovak 
Government that the United States has contra- 
venecl any principles of international law or the 
stipulations of the Extradition Treaty. 

The train in question had aboard approximately 
100 persons when it reached Germany. Those who 
of their own free volition expressed a desire to 
return numbered 79 individuals, all of whom, ex- 
cept two, were permitted to depart from Gennany 
within two days of their arrival, that is, as soon 
as their wishes had been ascertained and necessary 
arrangements for their return had been completed. 
The remaining two were returned on September 
21. Wliile they were in United States custody all 
appropriate facilities were provided for their 

' Bulletin of Apr. 17, 1950, p. 595. 

Department of State Bulletin 

comfort and welfare. The Czechoslovak Govern- 
ment may care to note how the United States 
authorities carried out this obligation of comity 
in comparision with the retention by Czechoslovak 
authorities for 26 days of two Western jet pilots 
in the United States jet planes who, on becoming 
lost and running out of fuel, were obliged to land 
near Praha on June 8.^ 

The train itself, which has been in the custody 
of appropriate authorities, will be released at the 
frontier near Asch. It will not be necessary for 
Czechoslovakia to send a delegation to Germany 
for this purpose. It may be pointed out in this 
connection that the Ministry did not proceed prop- 
erly in attempting at the outset to obtain a release 
of the train by sending four representatives to the 
United States Zone without official notification 
to the United States Government. 

Finally, note is taken of the statement in the 
communication under acknowledgment to the 
effect that Czechoslovakia seeks to reserve the 
assertion of a claim for "full compensation for 
damage caused to the Czechoslovak state," in reply 
to which the Embassy is dii'ected to observe that 
whenever Czechoslovakia may feel impelled fur- 
ther to promote this project, that the Government 
may expect to receive a counter-claim including 
various expense incurred by the American Gov- 
ernment in connection with the train in Germany. 

As of probable interest to the appropriate 
Czechoslovak authorities, the Embassy encloses 
the original signed statement of seven passengers 
on the train, six of whom were listed in Annex A 
of the Ministry's note as being "forcibly abducted 
. . . against their will and unlawfully de- 
tained." ■* As the Ministry will observe, no asser- 
tion could be farther from the truth. 

Since the Czechoslovak Government has already 
published its communications of September 20 to 
the American Government, it is requested that 
comparable publicity be given ijy the Czechoslovak 
Government to this communication. 


The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its 
compliments to the Embassy of the United States 
of America and referring to the facts quoted in 
the note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs No. 
139.359, A/V-1/51 has the honor to notify it of 
the following : 

On September 13, 1951, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs sent its plenipotentiaries to the occupation 
zone of the United States in Germany, in order to 
make with the authorities of the United States of 
America all necessary arrangements concerning 

'Ibid., June 25, 1951, p. 1019, July 2, 1951, p. 12, and 
July 16, 1951, p. 93. 

' Copies of the statements have not yet been received ; 
they will be made public upon receipt. 

the speedy return of forcibly abducted and against 
their will unlawfully detained Czechoslovak citi- 
zens. The head of the plenipotentiaries, repre- 
sentatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
bearers of proper diplomatic passports, was pro- 
vided with a special power. Their passports as 
well as the special passport of the driver of their 
car, had been provided with a valid permit of 
entry into, and stay in, the occupation zones of 
Germany for the time from September 12 to 19, 
inclusively, issued on September 12, 1951, in Praha, 
by the authorized office of the occupation authori- 

Immediately after having passed the Czecho- 
slovak frontier the vehicle of the representatives of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was followed by a 
motorized patrol of the United States Anny, 
armed, among others, with a heavy machine-gun, 
ready to fire. 

At the railroad station of Selb-Plossberg where 
the train with the kidnapped Czechoslovak citi- 
zens had been forcibly removed the resident officer 
of the United States area of administration re- 
fused to enable the Czechoslovak representatives 
to get in touch with the Czechoslovak citizens, or 
even to indicate the place where they had been 
forcibly carried away. He also refused to discuss 
the return of the kidnapped persons and of the 
train, as well as the extradition of the culprits of 
the abduction. 

The American military commander of the area 
had the chief representative of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, in spite of his strong protest, 
guarded by an agent of the counter intelligence 

In consequence of the resolute and undaunted 
attitude of the Czechoslovak citizens who had been 
kidnapped, and forcibly detained by the occupa- 
tion authorities, the latter were at last compelled 
to release the majority of the Czechoslovak citi- 
zens, after an intervention of the representative of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with superior au- 
thority at Munich. They took, however, trickish 
measures so that the representatives of the i\Iin- 
istry of Foreign Affairs might not enter into 
contact with them. A part of the Czechoslovak 
citizens have been against their will further de- 
tained by the occupation authorities. 

When, upon recommendation of the resident 
officer and the military commander of the area, the 
Czechoslovak plenipotentiaries travelled to Mu- 
nich, in order to obtain from higher authorities 
to whom they had been referred, the release of 
those persons, their vehicle was attacked by an 
armed patrol of American and Bavarian police, 
on highway Niirnberg-Munich, 15 kilometei-s 
north of Munich, on September 14, 1951, at about 
0900. The car was surrounded by members of the 
Bavarian police, armed with automatic carbines 
ready to fire, and then in spite of the strongest 
protest of the Czechoslovak representatives, es- 
corted to the post of the American traffic police at 

Ocfober IS, 7 95 J 


Munich. It is significant that the American com- 
mander of the patrol liad prepared steel handcuffs 
of the type used for the arrest of dangerous 

Two men who produced the identity cards of 
members of the counter intelligence corps brought 
the Czechoslovak plenipotentiaries to a represent- 
ative of the occupation authorities (immigration 
officer) with whom they lodged protest against the 
unheard of treatment ihey had received from the 
occupation administration organs, and presented 
again their requests. 

The representative of the occupation authorities 
not only refused to comply with the rightful re- 
quests of the Czechoslovak plenipotentiaries, but 
even declared their valid permits for Western oc- 
cupation zones of Germany to be immediately 
canceled. He made their stay at Munich depend- 
ent upon obviously unacceptable conditions (con- 
finement and liability to selves every day), 
declaring that otherwise the plenipotentiaries 
must inunediately return under escort to Czecho- 

Not even the request of the Czechoslovak repre- 
sentatives to meet the land commissioner for 
Bavaria or his deputies has been granted. 

During all this time the Czechoslovak repre- 
sentatives were watched over by member of the 
counter intelligence corps. On their way back 
they were under armed escort directed by an ab- 
surdly long detour via Niirnberg and Bayreuth. 

The occupation authorities of the United States 
proceeded in an unheard-of manner against the 
representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the Czechoslovak Republic who were provided 
with proper diplomatic passports and a special 
])ower, restricted their freedom of movement, 
menaced them with weapons, and canceled arbi- 
trarily their valid permits issued shortly before 
bv the competent office of the occupation authori- 

This unexampled procedure is contrary to all 
principles of international law, and to all usages 
generally recognized in international relations. 

The occupation authorities of the United States 
of America in Germany are fully responsible for 
the quoted facts. The occupation administration 
organs themselves, whilst performing their ac- 
tions, referred explicitly to higher orders. 

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs wishes to pro- 
test most strongly against the actions of the oc- 
cujiation authorities of the United States of Amer- 
ica in Germany, and requests that severe measures 
be taken against all responsible persons. 

The Ministry expects to be informed by the 
Embassy of the United States of America of steps 
that have been taken. 


Tlie American Embassy presents its compli- 
ments to the Czeciioslovak Ministry of Foreign 


Affairs and has the honor to acknowledge the 
Ministry's note of September 20 concerning the 
treatment allegedly received in the United States 
Zone of Germany by four Czechoslovak officials 
who the Ministry now states were sent as pleni- 
potentiaries in connection with the question of the 
train and approximately one hundred persons 
making an unscheduled entry from Czechoslovakia 
to Western Germany on September 11, 1951. 

The Ministry will underetand that the issuance 
of visas does not in itself carry an unlimited ob- 
ligation on the part of the authorities issuing 
visas to conduct official business with those to 
whom visas are issued. On the contrary, estab- 
lished custom clearly requires the agreement of 
those authorities to negotiate. The Ministry 
should recall that the Czechoslovak Government 
failed to inform either the American Embassy in 
Prague or the Liaison Representative at Berlin 
that the Czechoslovak Government desired to send 
official representatives to the United States Zone ; 
instead it dispatched a "mission" in a manner 
quite novel to international practice, bearing a 
letter "To Whom It May Concern." The Embassy 
has accordingly been directed to reply that the 
United States Government rejects completely this 
unwarranted protest as having no valid basis in 
international law or international practice. 

It is of course regretted if the gentlemen in 
question feel they suffered inconvenience through 
failure of the Ministry to make appropriate ar- 
rangements with the United States Government 
for their reception and for the conduct of their 

U.S.-Czech Notes on 
Sudeten German Population 

[Released to the press October 3] 

The A7}ierican Embassy at Praha on Septem- 
ber 29 transmitted a note to the Czechoslovak 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejecting charges 
contained in a Czechoslovak note, dated August 6, 
which accused U.S. authorities in Germany of 
encouraging chauvinism,, militarising and revi- 
sionism, among the Sudeten German population 
transferred from Czechoslovakia to Germany in 
aeeordaiice with terms of the Potsdam Agreement. 

Following is the unoMcial translation of the 
Czechoslovak note, together with text of the U. S. n 
reply: I 

Czechoslovak Note of August 6 

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its 
compliments to the Embassy of the United States 
of America and has the honor to state as follows : 

The Government of the Czechoslovak Republic 

Department of State Bulletin 

has consistently drawn the attention of the Gov- 
ernment of the United States of America to the 
fact tliat American occupation autliorities in Ger- 
many tolerate that Germans, who were transferred 
from the Czechoslovak Republic to the American 
occupation zone of Germany in accordance with 
the provisions of the Potsdam Agreement, carry 
on hostile activities aimed against the Czechoslo- 
vak Republic. 

Already on October 6, 1947, the Czechoslovak 
military mission to the Allied Control Council 
in Berlin delivered to the Director of the Political 
Affairs of the Military Government of the United 
States of America a memorandum in which atten- 
tion was drawn to concrete cases of banding to- 
gether of transferred Germans in the American 
occujiation zone and that, moreover, such activi- 
ties do not contribute to the peaceful democratic 
development of Germany. 

On November 8, 1947, the Embassy of the 
United States of America in Praha issued a special 
statement on the standpoint of the military gov- 
ernment of the United States in Germany towards 
Germans transferred from Czechoslovakia to the 
American occupation zone of Germany. In this 
statement particular stress was laid on the fact 
that authorities of the United States of America 
in Germany do not permit Germans transferred 
from Czechoslovakia to create independent organ- 
izations, whose principal purpose is political 

This statement, however, did not even at that 
time correspond to reality, and in a note which the 
Ministry of Foi-eign Affairs handed to the Em- 
bassy of the United States of America in Praha 
on December I7th, 1947, there was mentioned a 
number of serious circumstances and phenomena 
which had occurred at that time in the American 
occupation zone as far as organized hostile activi- 
ties of transferred Germans against Czechoslo- 
vakia was concerned. 

In its note of December 22, 1947, the Embassy 
of the United States of America in Praha acknowl- 
edged the receipt of the said note of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and stated that its content 
had been connnunicated to the Department of 
State and to the American authorities in Germany. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs never received 
any answer on the substance itself, but develop- 
ments that followed in the American occupation 
zone in Germany gave and gives clear answer to 
the question in which w'ay the Government of the 
United States is viewing Germany in general and 
Germans transferred from Czechoslovakia to the 
American occupation zone in particular. 

The Government of the Czechoslovak Republic 
has continued to draw the attention of the Govern- 
ment of the United States to the fact that in the 
American occupation zone in Germany, German 
chauvinist nationalism is again coming into being, 
continuing in Hitlerite Pan-German aggressive 

October J5, 7951 

nationalism, and that occupation authorities of the 
United States of America are directly supporting 
these (ierman chauvinist aggressive activities. It 
did so in its note handed on October (5th, 1949, to 
the Ambassador of the United States in Praha. In 
a note which was delivered on February 7th, 1951, 
the (Government of the Czechoslovak Republic 
called attention to the fact that the United States 
is intentionally reviving German militarism and 
aggressive attitude and that in following tliis line 
of policy, aiming at the preparation of imperialist 
aggression, they employ groups of Germans trans- 
ferred from the Czechoslovak Republic. 

The Government of the United States of Amer- 
ica is continuing to support German chauvinist 
nationalism and militarism. It has advanced so 
far on this dangerous road that the American 
occupation authorities in Germany are not only 
]iermitting and intentionally promoting revenge 
and revisionist activities of these transferred Ger- 
mans but are even taking direct part in such activi- 
ties by their representatives. Recently there has 
been a whole number of such actions, of which a 
rally held on July 1, 1951, at Frankfort on the 
Main, which its organizers described as "a Con- 
gress of United East German Compatriots," was 
especially typical. At this public gathering, at 
vrhich the speakers "appealed to the world to 
endeavor that those expelled might in a united 
Europe return to freedom to their native land," 
there appeared also persons who are considered by 
the American occupation authorities in Germany 
as political representatives of Western Germany, 
such as Herbert von Bismarck. Fianz Blnecher, 
etc. Bluecher made an official speech at the gather- 
ing in the name of the so-called Bonn Govern- 
ment in which aggressive designs against the east- 
ern neighbors of Germany is distinctly reflected. 

Bluecher's provocative statement expresses the 
efforts of the German militarists. It is very char- 
acteristic that such a statement was made m pub- 
lic by one of the foremost representatives of the 
Adenauer "government" at a time when the United 
States of America is about to accomplish the re- 
militarization of Western Germany, which is to 
serve as the basis for their aggressive policy in 

The Government of the Czechoslovak Republic 
protests most strongly against this line of policy 
of the United States of America, which is a further 
gross violation of valid agreements on Germany 
and fundamental principles of international 

U.S. Reply of September 29 

The American Embassy presents its compli- 
ments to the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and has the honor to reply, on instructions 
from its Government, to the Ministry's note of 
August 6, 1951, setting forth various charges 
about U. S. policy in Germany and the activities 
of the Sudeten population transferred to Germany. 


The Embassy emphatically rejects the allegation 
that the U. S. Government is fostering militarism 
and irredentism in Germany. Such charges have 
no basis whatever in fact and the Embassy can 
onlv conclude that such completely unfounded 
charges are made for the sole purpose of endeavor- 
ing to mislead the peoples of Czechoslovakia and 
otner countries. 

As indicated in the Embassy's statement of No- 
vember 8, 1047, the objective of the U. S. au- 
thorities in Germany has been, and is, to bring 
about as soon as possible the assimilation of Ger- 
mans transferred from Czechoslovakia to the U. S. 
zone into the German economy and social struc- 
ture as well as the identification of their interests 
with those of Germany. This purpose is, of 
course, being accomplished in a democratic man- 
ner, permitting organizations among such persons 
seeking to protect or improve the welfare of mem- 
bers, and permitting also peaceful and orderly 
expression of views. 

The basic democratic principle of free expres- 
sion of views including those not concurred in by 
others is apparently not understood by the present 
Government of Czechoslovakia. Strict controls 
over freedom of speech such as are imposed on the 
people of Czechoslovakia do not accord with demo- 
cratic traditions on which the Federal Republic of 
Germany, as well as the Western occupying 
powers, is based. 

In pursuance of the policy of fostering the de- 
velopment of free and democratic institutions in 
Germany, the Occupation Statute of April 10, 

1949, was enacted. Under this statute the U. S. 
authorities no longer exercise control over the es- 
tablishment of organizations in the U. S. zone 
which engaged in political activity. The activities 
of such organizations are within the scope of the 
Con-stitution of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
which became effective on May 22, 1949. This 
constitution does not provide for controls by a 
single totalitarian party, such as once existed in 
Nazi Germany and now exist in certain other 

The Ministry has protested because Franz 
Bluechcr, Vice Chancellor of the Federal Republic 
of Germany, attended a meeting at Frankfort on 
July 1, sponsored by the Union of East German 
Compatriots, and made a statement described by 
the Ministry as "provocative." 

The U.S. Government has found no evidence that 
Dr. Bluecher in his stiitcment manifested "ag- 
gi-essive designs" as alleged by the Ministry and 
regrets that his remarks were distorted in this 
fashion. Dr. Bluecher spoke of the Charter of 
East German Compatriots adopted August 5, 

1950, and took as his principal thesis the follow- 
ing sentence from the charter : "We, the expellees, 
renounce all thoughts of revenge and retaliation 
and shall support with all our strenfftli every en- 
deavor direetcd towards the cstablislnnent "of a 
United Europe in which nations may live in free- 
dom from fear and force." 


The U.S. Government fails to understand how 
a speech based on the concept of "a united Europe 
in which nations may live in freedom from fear 
and force" which appears to accord with the in- 
terests and hopes of all European peoples, is con- 
sidered "provocative" and "aggressive" by the 
Czechoslovak Government. 

Steps are now being taken toward the ideal of 
such a united Europe by various democratic Gov- 
ernments in Europe, including the Federal Re- 
public of Germany. This development is en- 
couraged by the U.S. Government as an important 
contribution to the stability, peace, and progress 
of Europe so that smaller nations can live in secu- 
rity and freedom, without fear of attacks and im- 
positions by powerful neighbors such as took place 
in Central Europe, prior to and during the last 
war, and again in Eastern Europe since 1945. 

The U.S. support of peaceful international co- 
operation in Europe provides a striking contrast 
to the apparent intent of the Czechoslovak Gov- 
ernment as evidenced by the note under reference 
and other acts. By consistent distortion of facts, 
by attacking freedom of expression and informa- 
tion both at home and abroad, by seeking to pre- 
vent contact between the people of Czechoslovakia 
and other peoples of Europe whereby free interna- 
tional cooperation may be achieved, the Czecho- 
slovak Government is contributing not to peace 
but to increased international tension. Such ac- 
tions, in the view of this Government, are not in 
the interest of the people of Czechoslovakia or of 
Eurojje as a whole. 

Despite the accusations of the Czechoslovak 
Government that the policy of the United States 
and its allies is aggressive because consideration 
is being given to including German armed units 
in European defense forces, the reasons for the 
present strengthening of West European defenses 
is clear to all who objectively examine postwar 
developments. At the close of the war the United 
States and other Western countries, looking for- 
ward to a 23eacef ul future after years of bloodshed, 
effectively demobilized their forces. 

In contrast the Soviet Union alone maintained 
vast numbers of men under arms. At the same 
time that country embarked on a policy of break- 
ing agreements designed to serve as the basis of 
future peace, initiated a policy of conquest and 
threatened European peace further by aiming 
satellite regimes, including that established in 
the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany. 

The free countries of Europe, in cooperation 
with the United States, had no recourse therefore 
but to take measures for common defense. While 
undertaking such a program, however, the concept 
of a united Eurojie is not lost sight of but strength- 
ened. The Czechoslovak Government in abetting 
Soviet propaganda and tactics appears to stand 
firmly opposed to efforts of free countries to 
ensure their freedom and working i^eacefully 

Deparfmenf of Sfate Bulletin 

President Submits Report on 
U.S. Lend-lease Operations 

Message of the President to the Congress 
[Released to the press ly the White House Octoher 3] 

I am transmitting herewith the Thirty-second 
Eeport to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations, for 
the period from April 1, 1950, to March 31, 1951, 

During the period covered by this report, a sup- 
plement to the Lend-Lease Settlement Arrange- 
ment of April 15, 1948, was signed with Brazil 
and final settlement commitments were signed with 
Colombia, Costa Eica, and Mexico, while Bolivia, 
Ecuador, and El Salvador liquidated the amounts 
which were outstanding on their lend-lease ac- 
counts incurred within the terms of their respec- 
tive lend-lease agreements. 

The major development in lend-lease activities 
during this period was the resumption on January 
15, 1951," of formal across-the-table negotiations 
with representatives of the U.S.S.E.. In prepara- 
tion for these negotiations, the Secretary of State 
discussed with me the major points involved and 
I approved his recommendations, the objectives 
of which are : just and reasonable compensation 
to the United States for the civilian-type lend- 
lease supplies remaining on hand in the Soviet 
Union at the end of the war; the return to the 
United States, pursuant to a request submitted in 
accordance with the provisions of the master lend- 
lease agreement, of those defense articles trans- 
ferred to the U.S.S.R. under lend-lease procedures 
which I have determined to be useful to our Gov- 
ernment; and the payment by the U.S.S.R. of 
satisfactory compensation to United States owners 
of patented processes which are being used in the 
U.S.S.R. in oil refineries supplied under the lend- 
lease program. Despite the continued efforts of 
the United States negotiators to reach a satis- 
factory settlement, no substantial agreement on 
several of the major issues has yet been achieved. 
These negotiations are described more fully in 
the report itself. 

Other lend-lease activities during the period 
covered by this report include negotiations for 
settlements with other countries and, also, the 
management of fiscal, administrative, and policy 
matters arising from and related to the lend-lease 
settlements wliich already have been concluded 
with certain of our Allies of World War II. 

Harry S. Truman 

The White House, 
October 3, 1951 

U.S. and Bolivia Discuss 
Economic Problems 

[Released to the press October 5] 

Conversations about basic Bolivian economic 
problems of mutual interest to the United States 
and Bolivia, and related to the common defense 
effort, were resumed October 5. A committee of 
United States officials was appointed in April 1951 
to study, with a committee of Bolivian officials, 
the needs and possibilities of providing additional 
United States technical and financial assistance, 
public and private, in order to contribute to an 
increase in Bolivian production of strategic min- 
erals and to the development of increased agri- 
cultural and industrial production, but conversa- 
tions between the two committees were suspended 
in May. 

The members of the Department of State com- 
mittee appointed to resume the talks are Rollin S. 
Atwood, Acting Director, Office of South Ameri- 
can Affairs; Ambassador Merwin L. Bohan, U.S. 
representative on Inter- American Economic and 
Social Council ; Clayton E. Whipple, Chief, Food 
and Natural Resources Division, Technical Co- 
operation Administration; and Wilfred Malen- 
baum. Chief. Investment and Economic Develop- 
ment Staff, Office of Financial and Development 

The members of the Bolivian committee are 
Ricardo Martinez Vargas, Ambassador to the 
United States; Luis Fernando Guachalla, Ambas- 
sador to the Organization of American States; 
Hector Ormachea, Special Ambassador; and Juan 
Pefiaranda, Minister-Counselor of the Bolivian 

Trade Agreement With Peru 
To Be Superseded by GATT 

The trade agi'eement concluded between the 
United States and Peru in 1942 will be superseded, 
as of October 7, 1951, by the provisions of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, to which 
Peru will become a contracting party on that date, 
the Department of State announced on October 3. 

Supersession of the 1942 agreement is provided 
for in an exchange of notes between the two Gov- 
ernments at Lima. The Peruvian note was signed 
on September 12 and the American reply on Sep- 
tember 28. 

Announcement that Peru had signed the Tor- 
quay protocol to the General Agreement on Sep- 
tember 7, and would become a contracting party 
on that date, was made on September 10.^ 

As was stated at that time, the concessions ex- 
changed by the two countries at Torquay in the 
General Agreement are of considerably wider cov- 
erage than those in the 1942 agreement. 

^ H. doc. no. 227. 

' BuxLETiN of Jan. 15, 1951, p. 93. 

Ocfober 15, J 95 1 

' Bulletin of Sept. 24, 1051, p. 493. 



Support for U.N. Children's Fund Urged 

Statement hy John D. Hickerson 

Assistant Secretary for United Nations Affairs ' 

I very much appreciate the opportunity you 
have given me to appear in support of an authori- 
zation of $12,000,000 to be appropriated as a U.S. 
contribution to the U.N. International Children's 
Emergency Fund (Unicef) for the fiscal year 
1952. The Senate has passed such a measure in the 
form of S. 2079, and I very much hope that it will 
have the support of this committee and of the 

I am sure that you are well acquainted with the 
background and work of this organization which 
Las done a most constructive job over the last 4 
years. In Europe alone, it has helped more than 
15,000,000 children. Last year marked a turning 
point in the operations of the Fund when the 
General Assembly of the United Nations extended 
the life of the Fund until December 1953. A re- 
constituted 2fi-nation executive board, in accord- 
ance with the wishes of the General Assembly, 
shifted emphasis away from Europe, where the 
primary purpose for which the Fund was estab- 
lished was rapidly being fulfilled. At the last 
meeting of the Fund's executive board in May 
1951, allocations were approved for programs in 
22 countries, of which 5 were in Asia, 6 in Latin 
America, 8 in the Middle East, and 3 in Europe. 
Por 5 of these countries, Iran, Libya, Turkey, 
Panama, and Trinidad, this action constituted the 
first assistance from the Fund, which brought the 
total of Unicef assisted countries and territories 
to 64. The needs of the children of underde- 
yeloiied countries are great and so is our interest 
in meeting them. AVe are concerned with their 
welfare, not only for humanitarian reasons, but 

■ Made before the House ForeiRn Affairs Cnminittee on 
October 5 and released to the press on the same date. 


also because we are aware of the fact that, as citi- 
zens of the future, they will carry tremendous 
resjjonsibilities which they cannot hope to carry if 
their development is stunted and warped at this 
time. The social stability which the Children's 
Fund is helping to develop is inseparable from 
the cause of world peace. 

The United States has taken the lead in respond- 
ing to the challenge of these needs by directly con- 
tributing $80,750,000 on behalf of the children of 
the world. This figure is exclusive of the U.S. 
share, in the amount of $23,400,000, of Unrra re- 
sidual assets made available to tlie organization at 
its inception. It is also exclusive of private con- 
tributions of $1,100,000 from U.S. sources. 

In June of this year, the last of the $75,000,000 
originally appropriated by the Congress was con- 
tributed to the Fund. This supplemented over 
$29,000,000 contributed directly to the Fund for 
its general purposes by other countries, and an 
amount, more than equal to these direct contribu- 
tions, made available by beneficiary countries. In 
terms of this total, the U.S. contribution of $75,- 
000,000 represented approximately one-third of 
the Fund's resources. 

Also in June of this year, the amount of $5,- 
750,000 was appropriated for further contribution 
by the United States to the Children's Fund. 
Other governments have made further direct con- 
tributions of approximately $3,600,000. AVhen 
these funds are exhausted, there will be no further 
program for the Children's Fund if United States 
support is not forthcoming, beyond the possible 
availability of an approximate $3,000,000 m addi- 
tional pledges by other governments — which 
pledges were undoubtedly made on the assumption 
that continued U.S. support would give the Chil- 

Department of State Bulletin 

dren's Fund a strong and effective program which 
would have some hope of making an impact upon 
the tremendous needs to be met. The Fund's only 
other significant resource is a balance of $7,000,000 
allocated for the children of China's mainland 
prior to the outbreak of hostilities, since which 
time the allocation has been suspended. The great 
need of China's children has not been lessened by 
the present conflict in Asia, but I feel that the 
Children's Fund should not give aid to any re- 
gime while it stands condemned by the United 
Nations as an aggressor and is engaged in armed 
conflict against the United Nations. 

The recommendation I am supporting today 
that the amount of only $12,000,000 be authorized 
for a])propriation is realistic in the recognition 
that the impact of the defense effort on U.S. re- 
sources must be taken into account. The $80,- 
750,000, authorized and appropriated over 4 
years, from August 1947 thi'ough June 1951, rep- 
resents a contribution of $21,000,000 a year. In 
this perspective the $12,000,000 now requested to 
be authorized for contribution during the fiscal 
year 1952 represents a sizeable scale-down. 

In some quartei-s there is a feeling that we are 
somehow becoming increasingly involved in fi- 
nancial obligations to the United Nations and its 
specialized agencies and special voluntary pro- 
grams, to the inter-American organizations, and 
to the smaller organizations to which we contrib- 
ute annually. The record does not support any 
such conclusion. In our preoccupation with par- 
ticular problems we sometimes forget that during 
the last 6 years, our financial support for these 
organizations has actually decreased in total. In 
1948, when U.S. support for Unrra was at its 
peak, we were contributing almost $1,700,000,000 
to these organizations. In 1947, the total was al- 
most $550,000,000. In 1948 it dropped to less than 
$122,000,000. In 1949, it was less than $130,500,- 
000 and in 1950 it was about $123,600,000. For 
the fiscal year 1951, it dropped to about $97,000,000- 

With respect to the terms under which the 
$12,000,000 requested to be authorized would be 
paid out, if appropriated — these terms are left 
to the determination of the President by the lan- 

giiage of the bill under consideration. If the 
ongress approves this appropriation, the U.S. 
contributions will be made, in their timing, with 
a very definite regard to the urgency of the Fund's 
need for money and in such a way as to give rea- 
sonable assurance that, even with respect to this 
year, we will not end up the year having made 
a contribution which represents more than one- 
third of the total governmental contributions made 
to the Fund's work in the fiscal years 1951 and 
1952, including those contributions made by re- 
ceiving countries in the form of local services and 
currencies. We would attempt to do this in two 
ways. First, though contributing in advance of 
the receipt of contributions from other govern- 
ments, we would look closely at the status of 

October 15, 1951 

pledges from other non-beneficiary countries to 
see whether they gave assurance of materializing. 
Second, we would consider the status of contribu- 
tions by beneficiary countries as certified to by the 
Fund. We feel that, with regard to this year and 
prior to the taking of stock with respect to what 
we hope to give next year, this maximum of one- 
third should not be exceeded. 

Finally, I would like to observe that Katherine 
Lenroot, U.S. representative on the executive 
board of the Children's Fund, is here with me 
today and will be glad to answer any questions 
and provide any information you may wish. I 
would like to take this opportunity to express our 
high regard for the service Miss Lenroot has 
rendered and is rendering to her Government in 
this capacity. As you know, she has recently re- 
tired as chief of the Children's Bureau, and the 
U.S. Government has suffered a real loss inas- 
much as her great competence and understanding 
will no longer be available in that capacity. We 
therefore feel doubly gratified that we are to con- 
tinue to have the benefit of her services as U.S. 
representative on the Executive Board of the 
Children's Fund. 

Mr. Chairman, the program you are considering 
here is one which, although not designed to offer 
direct aid or assistance to the United States, is of 
gi-eatest benefit to us for it demonstrates as noth- 
ing else can that we understand that the responsi- 
bility of world leadership calls for humanity as 
well as strength. If the United States continues 
to support this program, the countries of the 
world, particularly those who most closely com- 
pare our behavior with that of our only competitor 
for world leadership, the Soviet Union, will under- 
stand that the tremendous defense effort which has 
been forced upon us does not sacrifice all to its 
purposes — and most certainly does not sacrifice the 
welfare of the world's children. 

Korean Armistice Negotiations 

Message From Communist Commanders 
to U.N. Commander 

[OCTOBEB 3, 1951] 

Tour letter of reply dated 27 September has been re- 

In your letter you apain proijosed anew to change the 
conference site which was previously proposed by you on 
6 September and already rejected by us in our letter dated 
11 September.' We consider it entire void of reason. 

To have Kaesong as the conference site was agreed upon 
by your side. The neutralization of tlie Kaesong area was 
established by mutual agreement, also following your pro- 
posal on 13 July. Since then, other than the accidental 
incident that occurred on 4 August and which was ex- 

BuLLETiN of Oct. 8, 1951, p. 588. 
' Not here printed. 


peditiously and realistically settled by us and considered 
satisfnetory by your side, yon have not raised any 
complaint concernini; the neutralized condition of the 
Kaesong neutral zone. Since 22 August, the disruption 
of the armistice conference was caused only by your viola- 
tions of the Kaesong neutral zone, thus rendering it impos- 
sible for the conference to make progress. 

Because your side had admitted the incident of viola- 
tion of the Kaesong neutral area by the U.N.C. on 10 
September and had expressed your desire to responsibly 
settle the matter, we immediately proposed to resume the 

The immediate problem, therefore, is to resume the 
Kaesong armistice conference at once and at the meeting 
to stipulate strict agreement re^'arding the neutralization 
of the Kaesong area, thus guaranteeing against future re- 
currence of such incidents of agreement violation. Branch 
details should not grow out from the main stem ; there- 
fore, you sliould not propose the new problem of changing 
the conference site. Everybody will easily discover that 
you deliberately violated the neutrality of the Kaesong 
area. Even though this was proposed by yourself. 

By following your proposal in changing the conference 
site, how can it be guaranteed that you will not again 
proceed to violate when you desire to disrupt or break 
the negotiations, and would not the state of negotiations 
only become worse? 

Therefore, the unreasonable demand proposed by you, 
if it is not to create a threat, then it merely is to create 
new pretexts to continue to prolong the negotiations. Our 
sincere and responsible attitude toward the negotiations 
is known the world over. However, whether or not the 
negotiations could be immediately resumed and smoothly 
attain fruitful results, that could not be unilaterally de- 
cided by our side alone. 

It is very obvious that only if your attitude toward the 
negotiations is as sincere and responsible as ours, and not 
to have any thwarting branch issues, will the negotiations 
attain a reasonable conclusion which should have no diflS- 
culty whatsoever and which is the anxious hope of all the 
peoples of the combatant nations. 

Therefore, I once again propose that the delegations of 
both sides Immediately resume the conference at Kaesong. 
At the first meeting following the resumption of the con- 
ference, an appropriate machinery should be established 
to stipulate the strict agreement concerning the neutrali- 
zation of the Kaesong area, and to assure its execution in 
order to benefit the progress of the armistice negotiations. 
Subsequent to your agreement, our liaison officers will 
meet your liaison officers to discuss the matter concerning 
the resumption of the conference at Kaesong by both dele- 

Kim II Song, 
Supreme Comtna-nder, Korean People's Army, 
Peng Teh-huai, 
Commander, Chinese People's Volunteers. 

Message From the U.N. Commander 
to the Communist Commanders 

[OCTOBEB 4, 1951] 

Generals Kim II Song and Peng Teh-huai : 

Your letter to me, dated 3 October 1951, in answer to 
my letter to you dated 27 September 1951, has been re- 

I have already made clear to you my views regarding 
the unsuitahility of Kaesong as a conference site. Events 
have proved that ('(niality of movement and control has 
not been and cannot be assured there. Satisfactory con- 
ditions for the resumption of the armistice talks can only 
be insure<l by moving the conference site to an area which 
is not under the exclusive control of either side. 

Since you reject my suggestion to meet at Songhyon, I 
propose that our delegations meet at a site selected by you 
and acceptable to me approximately midway between our 
respective front lines where the armistice discussions can 


be promptly resumed, under the conditions stated in my 
message to you of 27 September 1951. 


General, United States Army, 

CovimanAer in Chief, 

United Nations Command. 

Australia Will Augment 
Its Forces in Korea 

[Released to the press Ootolier 4] 

The Austrcalian Prime Minister, Robert G. Men- 
zies, has just announced that Australia will make 
a further contribution to the U.N. Forces in 
Korea. This additional contribution will consist 
of a battalion of ground troops, thus doubling 
Australian infantry forces already in Korea. Aus- 
tralian naval and air units went into action as 
part of the U.N. Forces resisting aggression im- 
mediately following the attack upon the Republic 
of Korea. Shortly thereafter ground forces were 
also recruited and dispatched to Korea. 

The decision of the Australian Government to 
augment its forces is warmly appreciated by the 
Government of the United States as the Unified 
Command. This is a further demonstration of 
the determination of Australia to do its part as 
a member of the United Nations, in resisting ag- 
gression in Korea. 

International Materials Conference: 
Copper and Zinc Allocation Accepted 

The Copper-Zinc-Lead Committee of the Inter- 
national Materials Conference announced Septem- 
ber 28 that its member governments have accepted 
its proposals for the allocation of copper and zinc 
for the fourth quarter of 1951. Twelve countries 
are represented on the Committee. They are Aus- 
tralia, Belgium (representing Benelux), Canada, 
Chile, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Italy, Mexico, Norway, Peru, the United King- 
dom, and tlie United States. In accepting the 
Committee's proposals, the Chilean Government 
has made one reservation which is explained 

The two plans of allocation have been for- 
warded to all interested governments for imme- 
diate implementation. 

Both plans deal with the distribution of pri- 
mary metal only i.e., blister and refined copper, 
and slab zinc. 

The total estimated production available to the 
free world has been taken into account. The Com- 
mittee's analysis of available information shows 

Department of Slate Bulletin 

that stated requirements of copper and zinc in the 
fourth quarter of 1951 exceed refinery or smelter 
production by approximately 100,000 metric tons 
of each metal (15.8 percent in the case of copper 
and 21.4 percent in the case of zinc) . 

The Chilean Government accepted the Commit- 
tee's recommendations with respect to 80 percent 
of the copper production of its large mines. With 
respect to tlie remaining 20 percent and the pro- 
duction of its small and medium mines it reserves 
the right to dispose of tliis tonnage without ref- 
erence to the allocation sclieme. Notwithstanding 
this reservation, the Chilean Government stated 
that it will give careful consideration wherever 
possible to the Committee's recommendations. 

The allocations for each participating country 
are in the form of a "total entitlement for con- 
sumption" — the amount of primary metal which 
may be processed or consumed by the country con- 
cerned, either from domestic production or im- 
ports. They do not specify from which source 
or sources a country's metal shall be obtained. 
Participating countries will, therefore, be free 
to purchase from any source or sell to any desti- 
nation within their allocation, but it is suggested 
that, so far as possible, the normal patterns of 
trade should be followed. 

In accepting the plan, governments assume the 
responsibility for seeing that their allocations are 
not exceeded. As this is the first international 
allocation of copper and zinc, and it has not been 

announced before the beginning of the allocation 
period, some countries have stated that they will 
experience difficulties in implementing fully the 
allocations, although every effort will be made to 
do so. In the event that adjustments are neces- 
sary, these will be made in a subsequent period. 

The Committee has recommended that exports 
of semifabricatcd products be maintained at a 
level commensurate with the exporting country's 
allocations of primary metal. 

In calculating the allocations, the Committee 
used consumption in 1950 as a basis. Special cir- 
cumstances of individual countries were taken into 
consideration, and the most recent estimates of 
production and requirements submitted by all in- 
terested governments were taken into account. Re- 
quirements for direct defense were given priority 
and some provision was made for requirements for 
strategic stockpiling. The remainder was allo- 
cated for essential civilian consumption. 

Nonmember governments were given an oppor- 
tunity to supplement the information submitted by 
them by oral representations to the Committee 
concerning their individual requirements. 

So that the current supplies of copper and zinc 
may be used to the best advantage, the Committee 
has recommended that countries adopt measures 
to eliminate unessential consumption and to en- 
courage substitution by materials not in short 

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences 

Regional Conference of Librarians (UNESCO) 

The Department of State announced on October 
2 that the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (Unesco) Regional 
Conference of Professional Librarians on the De- 
velopment of Public Libraries in Latin America 
will convene at Siio Paulo, Brazil, October 3-12, 
1951. The United States delegates to this confer- 
ence are : 

Charles Gosnell, director, New York State Library, Albany, 

New York 
Andy G. Wilkison, librarian. United States Information 

Center, United States Embassy, Buenos Aires, 


The purpose of this conference, which has been 
called by Unesco, is to aid in the development of 
public libraries in Latin America. The Organiza- 
tion of American States and the Brazilian Gov- 
ernment are cooperating in its sponsorship. About 
60 delegates from Western Hemisphere nations 
are expected to participate, most of them leading 

professional librarians interested in further ex- 
tending the services which public libraries have 
to offer. 

Agenda items include (a) regional development 
of public library services; (b) inter-American ac- 
tion for public libraries; (c) public library serv- 
ices for children; and (d) professional training 
for work in public libraries. 

Migration: 2d Conference 

The Department of State announced on October 
2 that the United States delegation to the second 
conference on migration which will convene today 
at Naples, Italy, is as follows : 


Robert West, Special Consultant to the Secretary on Mi- 
gration Affairs, Department of State 


Philip Arnow, Associate Director, Office of International 
Labor Affairs, Department of Labor 

Ocfober 15, 1951 


Robert M. Barnett, Economic Officer (Labor), American 
Legation. Bern. Switzerland, (Resident at Geneva) 

Eleanor Finger, Labor Economist, Office of Labor Ad- 
visers, Ek'onomic Cooperation Administration 

Otis E. Mullilcen, Officer in Charge of United Nations So- 
cial Affairs, Department of State 

Irwin ^L Tobin, Deputy to the Special Consultant on Mi- 
gration Affairs, Department of State 

Tlie purpose of this conference is to consider 
problems of excess populiitions in some countries 
of Europe and the need for additional manpower 
in other countries of Europe and elsewhere. 

Regional Conference on Trade 
Promotion (ECAFE) 

The Department of State announced on October 
2 that the Regional Conference on Trade Promo- 
tion of the Economic Commission for Asia and 
the Far East (Ecafe) will convene at Singapore, 
October 9-18, 1951. The U.S. delegation is as 
follows : 


Eugene M. Braderman, co-chairman, Deputy Director, Far 
Eastern Division, Office of International Trade, De- 
partment of Commerce 

Emil E. Schnellbacher, co-chairman, Assistant Director, 
Office of International Trade, Department of Com- 


John Goodyear, Ajnerican Consul, Singajwre 
Joseph Rogatnicli, American Vice Consul, Singapore 
Morris S. Rosenthal, President, Stein, Hall and Company, 

Inc., 2S5 Madison Avenue, New York, N. Y. 
Rufus Burr Smith, Commercial Attach^, American Em- 
bassy, Bangkok 
Victor B. Smith, Vice President, Sperry Division, General 
Mills, Inc., San Francisco, Calif. 

The purpose of this Conference is to provide 
both government commercial officials and nongov- 
ernment trade interests an opportunity to come 
together to suggest specific steps to strengthen 
trade promotion machinery and to increase trade 
both intra-regionally, and between Asia and the 
Far East and other parts of the world. 

This Conference is an ad hoc meeting for gen- 
eral discussion with a view to improving trade 
between nations. It is not a subsidiary body of 
the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far 
East ; and no voting will take place. However, a 
report of its findings will be submitted to the 
eighth session of Ecafe scheduled to convene at 
Rangoon in January. 

Agenda items include methods of improving 
trade-promotion machinery, including government 
trade and commercial representation abroad; 
problems of, and arrangements for, training trade 

Eersonnel; and need for, and availability of, mar- 
et information on prices and products for export 
f roin the region ; methods of expanding trade ; and 
the impact of rearmament on trade in capital and 
consumer goods in the region. 


Pan American Highway Congress 

The Department of State announced on October 
5 that the United States delegation to the fifth Pan 
American Highway Congress, which will convene 
at Lima, Peru, on October 8, is as follows : 

Chairman of tlie United States Delegation 

Delos W. Rentzel, Under Secretary for Transportation, 
Department of Commerce 

Special Congressional Delegate 

John J. Dempsey, Public Works Committee, House of 


Robert B. Brooks, Consulting Engineer, St. Louis, Mo. 
Hal Hale, Executive Director, American Association of 

State Highway Officials 
Edwin W. James, Chief, Inter-American Regional Office, 

Bureau of Public Roads, Department of Commerce 
H. H. Kelly. Office of Transport and Communications 

Policy, Department of State 

Technical Advisers 

Chester Cotton, Austin-Western Manufacturing Company, 
Aurora, 111. 

Ralph A. Moyer, Chairman, Highway Research Board, 2101 
Constitution Ave., Washington, D.C. 

Paul Reinhold, President, American Roadbuilders Asso- 
ciation, 1,319 F Street NW., Washington, D.C. 

Francis C. Turner, Assistant to Commissioner of Public 
Roads, Department of Commerce 

The Pan American highway congresses, which 
were inaugurated at Buenos Aires in 1925, are 
official governmental meetings designed to permit 
highway authorities of the Americas an opportu- 
nity to consider mutual problems of road design, 
construction, maintenance, and traffic, and to make 
recommendations on all phases of highway devel- 
opment. The fourth congress was held at Mexico, 
D.F., Mexico, September 15-24, 19-41. 

The forthcoming congress is being convened by 
the Government of Peru and is also being spon- 
sored by the Inter- American Economic and Social 
Council (lA-Ecosoc) and the Organization of 
American States. It is expected that delegations 
from all the 21 American Republics will attend. 

The principal agenda items to be considered 
are highway engineering, including the planning, 
construction, improvement, and maintenance of 
highways; traffic, particularly matters referring 
to vehicles and drivers, safety factors, and traffic 
controls; highway economics, finances, adminis- 
tration, and legislation; highway education, liai- 
son, and publicity; and international matters, 
which include problems of the Pan American high- 
way system, uniform traffic regulations, and stand- 
ardization of American highway terminology. 

An exposition is scheduled to be held in con- 
junction with the congress in the new laboratory 
and warehouse buildings of the Peruvian Bureau 
of Roads located just outside of Lima on the North 
Pan American Highway. 

Department of State Bulletin 

World Meteorological Organization: 
(WMO): 2d.Session 

The Department of State announced on October 
2 that Francis W. Reichelderfer, Chief, Weather 
Bureau. Department of Commerce, and President 
)f the World Meteorological Organization ( Wmo) , 
will serve as U.S. representative to the second ses- 
5ion of the Wmo Executive Committee, which will 
.'onvene at Lausanne, Switzerland, on October 3. 
1951. The other members of the United States 
delegation are : 
Alternate U.S. Representative 

N'orman R. Hagen, Meteorological Attach^, American 
Eiubassy, London 


Donald Blaisdell. U.S. Representative for Specialized 

Agency Affairs, Geneva, Switzerland 
N-rman A. Matson, Weather Bureau, Department of 


Dr. Reichelderfer was elected President of the 
World Meteorological Organization at the First 
Congress held at Paris. March 19-April 29. 1951. 
The World Meteorological Organization, which is 
in the process of becoming one of the specialized 
agencies of the United Xations. is the successor to 
the International Meteorological Organization, a 
semiofficial body created about 75 years ago. 

The Executive Committee, which serves as the 
executive body of the Wmo, has certain prescribed 
■unctions, including supervision of the execution of 
the resolutions of the World Meteorological Con- 
gress; providing technical information, counsel, 
and assistance in the field of meteorologv' : study- 
ing and making recommendations on any matter 
affecting international meteorology and the opera- 
tion of meteorological services: and administra- 
tion of the finances of the Organization. 

The first session of the Executive Committee 
was held at Paris, April .30-May 2. 1951, imme- 
diately following the adjournment of the First 
World Meteorological Congress. 


General Manager of Exchange Program 
Authorized To Sign Working 
. Agreement Letters ' 

September IT, 1951. 

Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of 
State by section 4 of Public Law 73, 81st Congress, and in 
accordance with the authority contained in Public Ltiw 
355, 76th Congress (53 Stat. 1290) ; Public Law 402. SOth 

Congress (United States Information and Educational 
Exchange Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 6) ; Public I^w 265, 81st 
Congress: Public Law 327, 81st Congress (Foreign Aid 
Appropriation Act of 1950) : Title IL Public Law 535, Congress (China Area Aid Act of 19.50) : and Public 
Law SGI, 81st Congress: the General Manager of the 
International Information and Educational Exchange 
Programs and his Deputy are hereby authorized to sign 
letters of working agreement with other government 
agencies concerning the details of projects under the 
international exchange of persons program. 

W. K. Scott, 
Deputy Assintant Secretary. 

J. Burke Knapp Appointed 

to U.S.-Brazil Joint Commission 

On October 2, the Department of State an- 
nounced that the President had appointed J. Burke 
Knapp to be the U.S. Commissioner on the Joint 
Brazil-U.S. Economic Development Commission 
under the Point Four Program with the personal 
rank of Minister. Mr. Knapp will succeed the late 
Francis Adams Truslow.* 

• BnxETis of May 21, 1951, p. 814. 

' Delegation of Authority 46, printed from 16 Fed. Reg. 

Check List of Department of State 

Press Releases: Oct. 1-7, 1951 


may be obtained from the Office of 

the Special 

Assistant for Press Relations. De- 

jKirtment ol 

State. Washington 25. D.C. Items 

marked ( * ) 

are not printed in the Btn-LExiN : 

items marked (t) will appear in a future issue. | 

Ab. Date 


879 10/1 

Dulles : Japan peace conference 

880 10/1 

Czechoslovak exchange of notes 

88lt 10/1 

VOA program in Polish 

SS2* 10/1 

Madsre Lee Guard retires 

883 10/2 

Executive Committee ( Wmo) 

884 10/2 

Regional conference (Ecatk) 

885 10/2 

Knapp to U.S.-Brazil Commission 

886t 10/2 

Panama credentials 

887* 10/2 

Foreign Service changes 

888 10/2 

Czechoslovak concessions suspended 

889 10/2 

2d migration conference 

890 10/2 

UNESCO librarians conference 

891 10/3 

Peru 1942 agreement superseded 

892 10/2 

McGhee : oil problem 

893 10/3 

Czechoslovak Sudeten problem 

8»4t 10/3 

Correspondence with Rep. Flood 

895 10/2 

McDermott: Stassen testimony 

896 10/4 

Australia contributes to U.N. forces 

897* 10/5 

Anniversary of Portugal 

898t 10/5 

Thorp : land and the future 

899 10/5 

Hickerson : funds for Unicet 

900* 10/5 

Foreign Service changes 

901 10/5 

Pan American Hiu'hway Congress 

902* 10/5 

Exchange program 

903* 10/5 

Visitors to U.S. 

904 10/5 

Bolivian defense problems 

905 10/5 

Acheson : unity and freedom 

906t 10/6 

McGhee : mutual security 

907 10/5 

Release requested on China policy 


Ocfober 75, 1957 


The United States in the United Nations 

September 21, 1851-October 11, 1951 

Security Council 

'•Complaint of failure hy the Iranian Govern- 
ment to compli/ vith provisional measures indi- 
cated by the Iniirnational Court of Justice {IGJ) 
in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case." — At a 
meeting on October 1 the Council voted 9-2 
(U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia) to place this item on the 
agenda at the request of the United Kingdom 

In the letter to the Council,^ dated September 
28, 1951, J. E. Coulson (U.K.) pointed out the 
following: (1) As a result of the application 
made to the Icj by his Government on May 26 
for interim measures of protection against the 
Iranian Empire in the case of the nationalization 
of tlie Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Ltd., the 
Court had delivered on July 5 a 5-point order, 
which, inter alia, stated that the Governments of 
Iran and the United Kingdom each should ensure 
that no action or measures would be taken which 
might aggravate the situation or hinder the op- 
erations of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company ; and 
which called for the establishment of a 5-man 
Board of Supervision composed of two members 
appointed by each of the said Governments and 
a fifth memoer from a third State chosen either 
by agreement of these Governments or by the 
President of the Court, to ensure that the opera- 
tions of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company are 
carried on as they were prior to May 1st; that 
the Company's operations should continue under 
the direction of its management subject to such 
modifications as may be brought about by agree- 
ment with the Board of Supervision. (2) The 
United Kingdom had immediately proclaimed full 
acceptance of the Court's findings, but that the 
Iranian Government had rejected them and had 
now ordered the expulsion of all the remaining 
staff of the oil company in Iran to take effect Octo- 
ber 4. (3) A draft resolution was enclosed, which 
set forth these facts and called upon the Govern- 
ment of Iran to conform with the provisional 
measures of the Court and to permit the remaining 
company staff of 350 to remain in Abadan. 

Sir Gladwyn Jebb (U.K.) requested that the 
Council adopt the draft resolution submitted by 
his Government. He presented the historical 
background of the dispute and gave a brief review 
of the legal position, as well as stating the efforts 
of W. Avcrell Harriman, Personal Representative 
of President Truman, to assist in whatever way 
possible to facilitate the negotiations. 

Sir Gladwyn pointed out that it was his Gov- 
ernment's view that 

' UuixKTi.N of Oct. 8, 19.51, p. ij84. 

It is intolerable that one party to a matter laid before 
the International Court should be allowed to flout 
the Court's findings and to impose unilaterally its own 
will in regard to this matter. . . . 
The Government bases its whole policy on the United 
Nations Charter which, as we all know, lays down 
that the solution of international problems must, if 
possible, be solved by peaceful negotiations 

and that was why his Government has decided to 
bring the present dispute before the Security Coun- 
cil, "which is the appropriate body to deal with 
matters likely to endanger international peace and 

He stated that his Government did recognize 
"the principle of the nationalization of the oil 
industry in Iran" and was willing to negotiate a 
settlement with the Iranian Government on that 
basis. In answer to the statements made by the 
U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavian delegates that this com- 
plaint dealt with matters essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of Iran and was not within 
the competency of the Security Council, he pointed 
out that 

in the finding on interim measures which the Court 
gave last July, it indicated very clearly that His 
Majesty's Government had a case which was at least 
prima facie internationally justiciable and not 
therefore a mere matter of domestic jurisdiction. . . . 

In closing, he stated "Given a minimum of good 
will, there is absolutely no reason why an arrange- 
ment entirely satisfactory to both sides should not 
be worked out, and worked out quickly." 

The members agreed that adoption of the agenda 
in no way determined that the Council was compe- 
tent to consider the problem. It would be neces- 
sary to hear both parties to the dispute before this 
question of competency could be determined. 

Dr. Ali Gholi Aradalan (Iran) , who was invited 
to the Council table to participate in the debate, 
expressed surprise that the United Kingdom had 
brought its complaint before the Council, but said 
that Iran would present its case in the Council. 
Therefore, he requested an adjournment pending 
arrival of accredited representatives fi'om Iran. 
The Council agreed to an adjournment of approxi- 
mately 10 days. Dr. Mohammed Mosadeq, Prime 
Minister of Iran, and other members of his delega- 
tion arrived in New York on October 8, and, at 
his request, the next Council meeting was sched- 
uled for October 15. 

India-Pakistan Question — Dr. Frank P. Gra- 
ham, the United Nations Representative for India 
and Pakistan, and his staff returned to New Yori 
on September 28 after spending approximatelj 
2| months on the subcontinent conferring with 
representatives of the Governments of India anc 


Department of Slate Bulletir 

The Security Council, in a resolution adopted 
March 30, instructed the United Nations repre- 
sentative, after consultations with the Govern- 
ments of India and Pakistan, to effect the demili- 
tarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir 
on the basis of the two United Nations Commis- 
sion for India and Pakistan (Unicip) resolutions 
of August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949, and to 
report back to the Council within 3 months if 
he was unable to effect such demilitarization or 
secure the agreement of the parties concei'ued. 
Dr. Graham's report will be submitted to the 
Council some time this month. 

General Assembly 

Collective Measures Committee — The 14-mem- 
ber Committee, established under the Uniting for 
Peace resolution, completed its work October 3 
with the adoption, without formal vote, of its 
report to the sixth session of the General Assem- 
bly. The report includes the recommendations 
of the three subcommittees on political, economic, 
and financial and military measures, together with 
the conclusions reached by the whole committee 
regarding collective measures to resist aggression. 

The Chairman, Ambassador Joao Carlos Muniz 
(Brazil) commented that the report of the mili- 
tary subcommittee was "essentially an inquiry 
into methods, procedures, and techniques which 
may guide United Nations action in coordinating 
and integrating the resources of member states in 
the event of a breach of the peace or act of aggres- 
sion." It was "not a plan or blueprint for any 
specific action against any specific aggression." 
"It is not directed against any state or group of 
states, however different their political and juri- 
dical conceptions may be from those shared by 
the majority of the member states." The under- 
lying theme of the report was "peace, . . . 
through security and cooperation between 
member states." 

The United Nations Conciliation Commission 
for Palestine has been meeting with representa- 
tives of the Arab States and Israel in Paris since 
September 13 in an attempt to reach a permanent 
solution of the Palestine problem. The Chair- 
man, Ambassador Ely E. Palmer (U. S.), sub- 
mitted the Commission's mediatory proposals to 
the Arab States — Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and 
Syi"ia — on September 17 and to Israel on Septem- 
ber 21. Although both delegations have ex- 
pressed their readiness to cooperate with the Com- 
mission, no formal reply from either side has as 
yet been received by the Commission to these pro- 
posals. These proposals, consisting of a pi-eam- 
ble and five articles, were made public on Sep- 
tember 24, and briefly, include the following: 

1. The preamble calls for an affirmation from 
the 5 countries to respect their undertakings as 
signatories of the armistice agreements and as 

members of the United Nations. 2. The 5 articles 
suggest {a) mutual agi-eement to cancel war- 
damages claims; (6) repatriation by Israel of a 
certain number of Arab refugees; (c) agreement 
by Israel to pay a global sum for compensation to 
refugees not repatriated, which sum is to be de- 
termined by the United Nations; {d) mutual 
agreement on the release of blocked bank accounts, 
to be paj'able in sterling; and {e) revision or 
amendment of the armistice agreements including 
territorial adjustments; formation of an interna- 
tional water authority for the Jordan and Yarmuk 
Rivers; a free port at Haifa; border regulations 
with special attention to access to Holy Places; 
common narcotics and contraband controls; ar- 
rangements to facilitate the general economic de- 
velojjment of the area including resumption of 
communication and economic relations between 
Israel and neighbors. 

Economic and Social Council 

Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labor — This 
Committee, which was set up by the International 
Labor Oi'ganization in accordance with a resolu- 
tion adopted at the twelfth session of Ecosoc, 
began its first meeting on October 8 in Geneva. 
The members are Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar (In- 
dia), Chairman; Paal Berg, former Chief Justice 
of the Norwegian Supreme Court; and Felix Ful- 
gencio Palavicini, former Mexican Ambassador 
to England, France, and Italy. 

In order to obtain the various documents and 
publications for the Committee which were men- 
tioned dui'ing the debate on this subject at the 
twelfth session of Ecosoc, the Seci-etarv-General 
addressed letters to Byelorussian S.S.R., Chile, 
Czechoslovakia, France, Mexico, Poland, U.S.S.R., 
United Kingdom, and the United States, and also 
to the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions and the World Federation of Trade 
Unions. As of September 13, replies had been 
received from Chile, France, Poland, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, and the Ifctu. The 
text of these replies, together with certain docu- 
ments received from the Governments of France, 
United Kingdom, and the United States have been 
submitted to the Connnittee for study. In addi- 
tion, the Committee will have before it the re- 
centh' i.ssucd report of the Ifctu on Soviet slave- 
labor policies and activities. The report estimates 
that there are between 10 to 20 million persons in 
the Soviet slave camps. In its detailed presenta- 
tion of the operation of the Communist slave- 
lalior system, the report depends upon two chief 
sources of information : the Soviet law code itself, 
and reports from the thousands of persons who 
have escaped from these slave camps. 

Ocfober 75, 195? 


October 15, 1951 


Aid to Foreign Countries 

Support for U.N. Children's Fund urged 
American Republics 

BOLIVIA: To discuss economic problems with 

U.S. officials 632 

BRAZIL: U.S. delegation to Unesco regional con- 
ference of professional librarians .... 635 

Pan American Highway Congress to convene . . 636 

PE21U: Trade agreement to be superseded by 

Gatt 631 

Arms and Armed Forces 

Australia to send additional forces to Korea . . 634 


CHINA: Release of round-table discussions 

requested 607 

Communist China: U.S. policy of nonrecognl- 

tion. statement by Philip C. Jessup ... 603 
IRAN : Right of U.N. to consider oil dispute . . 615 

Peace treaty viewed as step In march toward 

peace (Dulles) 618 

Summary of Pacific treaty developments . . . 620 

Additional forces from Australia 634 

Resumption of armistice negotiations pro- 
posed 633 

MALAYA: Regional conference on trade pro- 
motion (ECAFE) 636 

The oil problem in the Middle East (McGhee) . . 612 
RUSSIA: Explosion of second atomic bomb 

(Short) 611 

Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments 

Explosion of second atomic bomb in U.S.S.R. . 611 

Prime Minister announces contribution of addi- 
tional forces In Korea 634 


Czechoslovakia and U.S. Government exchange 

notes on Sudeten German population . . 628 

U.S. policy of nonrecognltion of Communist 

China 603 

U.S. rejects Czech charges in note concerning 

refugee train 624 


Legislation listed 611 



Notes exchanged on Sudeten German popula- 
tion 628 

Trade concessions on Imports suspended . 621 

U.S. rejects charges in note concerning refugee 

train 624 

ITALY: U.S. delegates at 2d conference on mi- 
gration 635 

SWITZERLAND: U.S. delegation to 2d session of 

Wmo Executive Committee 637 

Human Rights 

Freedom keeps the future open 610 

Information and Educational Exchange Program 

General Manager authorized to sign letters of 

working agreement with other goverimients . 637 

International Meetings 

Copper-Zinc-Lead Committee (Imc) proposes al- 
location of copper and zinc 634 

U.S. delegations: 

2d conference on migration 635 

2d session of Wmo Executive Committee . . . 637 
Pan American Highway Congress to convene . 636 

Mutual Aid and Defense 

The oil problem In the Middle East (McGhee) . . 612 

Vol. XXV, No. 642 

Presidential Documents 

CORRESPONDENCE: President's message to 

Congress on lend-lease operations .... 631 

State, Department of 

APPOINTMENTS: J. Burke Knapp appointed to 

U.S.-BrazU Joint commission 637 

General manager of IE program authorized to 
sign working agreements with other coun- 
tries 637 

Regional conference on trade promotion (Ecafe) . 636 

Statements regarding Stassen testimony . . . 608 

Strategic Materials 

Bolivian and U.S. officials to increase industrial 

production 631 

Imc Committee proposes allocation of copper- 
lead-zinc 634 

The oil problem in the Middle East (McGhee) . . 612 

Right of U.N. to consider Anglo-lranlan dispute 

(statement by Austin) 615 

Technical Cooperation and Development 

POINT 4: J. Burke Knapp appointed to U.S.- 
Brazil Joint commission 637 



Proposal for severance of obligation between 

Czechoslovakia and U.S 621 

Supersession of agreement with Peru .... 631 
U.S. suspends trade concessions on Czech Im- 
ports 621 

President submits report to Congress on lend- 
lease operations 631 

Regional conference on trade promotion (Ecape) . 636 


U.S. rejects Czech charges in note concerning 

refugee train 624 

Treaties and Other International Agreements 


Peace treaty, summary of developments . . 620 
Peace treaty viewed as step in march toward 

peace (Dulles) 616 

United Nations 

Documents relating to armistice negotiations In 

Korea 633 

SECURITY COUNCIL : Right of U.N. to consider 

Iranian oil dispute (Austin) 615 

Support for U.N. Children's Fund urged . . . 632 
UNESCO: U.S. delegates to regional conference 

of professional librarians 635 

U.S. in the U.N. (biweekly summary) 638 

Name Index 

Acheson, Dean 610 

Atwood, Rollin S 631 

Austin, Warren R 615 

Braderraan, Eugene M 636 

Dempsey, John J 636 

Gosnell, Charles 635 

Hickerson, John D 632 

Jessup. Philip 603 

Kim II Song 633 

Knapp, J. Burke 637 

McDermott, Michael J 608 

McGhee, George C 612 

Peng Teh-hual 633 

Reichelderfer, Francis W 637 

Rentzel, Delos W 636 

Rldgway, Matthew B 633 

Schnellbacher, Emil E 636 

Stassen, Harold E 608 

Thorp, Willard L 621 

Truman, Harry S 631 

Vargas, Rlchardo Martinez 631 

West, Robert 635 

WUkison. Andy G 635 


J/ie^ ^efid^imenl/ ^ t/tate^ 


Statement by Secretary Acheson 647 

Text of Four-Power Proposal 647 




by George C. McGhee 643 


Statement by Secretary Acheson 660 

Address by Willard L. Thorp 661 

For index see back cover 

Vol. XXV, No. 643 
October 22, 1951 

Me Qle/ia^em&nyt A)^ ^Icile JOllllGtlll 

Vol. XXV, No. 643 • Publication 4393 
October 22, 1951 

tat nle by tbe SupcrinteDdent of Documenta 

U.S. Oovemmcnt Printing Office 

Washington 25, D.C. 


62 iBsoea, domestic S7.S0, foreign S10.25 

Single copy, 20 centa 

The printing of thb publication bas 
been approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of tbe Budget (July 29. IMQ). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and Items contained herein may 
be reprinted. Citation of the Depaetuent 
or State Bihxetin as tbe source will be 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication compiled and 
edited in the Division of Publications, 
Office of Public Affairs, provides the 
public and interested agencies of 
the Government with information on 
developments in the field of foreign 
relations and on the work of the De- 
partment of State and the Foreign 
Service. The BULLETIN includes 
selected press releases on foreign pol- 
icy issued by the tfhite House and the 
Department, and statements and ad- 
dresses made by the President and by 
the Secretary of State and other 
officers of tlic Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the func- 
tions of the Department. Informa- 
tion is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to 
which the United States is or may 
become a party and treaties of gen- 
eral international interest. 

Publications of the Department, as 
tcell as legislative material in the field 
of international relations, are listed 

Mutual Security in the Near East 

Address hy George C. McGhee 

Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern^ South Asian and African Affairs^ 

Our Government finds organizations such as 
youi-s to be among our best media for what we 
in the Department call the ''grass-roots approach" 
to the Near East. All of you possess ties of par- 
entage and culture which draw you close to repre- 
sentative peoples in Syria and Lebanon. Those 
of you who are businessmen can discuss American 
industrial methods with the Beirut merchant or 
the Damascus cement manufacturer. You in the 
audience who may be farmers can acquaint kins- 
men in the Jezira cotton belt or the Beqaa wheat- 
fields with American agricultural techniques. 
The doctors amongst you share with practitioners 
in Aleppo and Tripoli the universal bond of 

Captain Jabara has still another message to 
give the peoples of the Arab World. His message 
is fundamental to all the othei-s. and by his per- 
sonal experience in Korea he qualifies well to serve 
as its exponent. Each time Captain Jabara flew 
a mission he knew that his life and the lives of 
his fellow pilots hinged upon teamwork and co- 
operation. Teamwork and cooperation brought 
him survival in a deadly struggle, and these same 
factors will decide the survival of a free world. 
The Eoman theme of "divide and rule" must not 
triumph in the Russian slogan of "confuse and 

Since 1947 creeping aggi'ession has been de- 
terred by the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, 
by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and 
in Korea by the forthright opposition of deter- 
mined United Nations troops. In each instance 
our determined stand has closed the ranks of the 
, free nations further, sometimes in an economic 
sense, at other moments politically and militarily, 
but most notably in the creation of spiritual unity. 
The economic recovery in ravaged Greece and 
Western Europe laid the foundation for Nato and 

• Made before the Syrian- and Lebanese-American Fed- 
erations of Eastern States at Atlantic Cit.v. N. J., on Oct. 7 
and released to the press on the same date. 

its emerging military strength. The new sense of 
teamwork which was created gave these programs 
the impetus which the\" required for success. 

Significance of NATO and Mutual Security Program 

Within the last month there have been two new 
and significant steps taken to project this team- 
work into the Near and Middle East areas. First, 
at the Ottawa conference in the middle of Sep- 
tember, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
voted to recommend an invitation to Greece and 
Turkey to become membei'S of N.\to.- When the 
formal steps required for admission have been 
completed, these two countries will participate as 
full members in a common defense against the 
threat to world freedom. Greece and Turkey 
will enjoy the full rights which membership in 
Nato will confer on them, and in return the right 
flank of Europe, which in the obvei-se is the left 
flank of the Near East, will be secured. 

Second, the U.S. Mutual Security Program has 
now passed both the Senate and the House of 
Representatives. I entertain firm hopes that, be- 
fore many more weeks pass, the Mutual Security 
Program will be an operating actuality. '\Mien 
the United States puts this plan into effect shortly, 
what will it mean to your kinsmen and to the 
other Near Eastern peoples \ 

The Mutual Security Program makes it pos- 
sible for countries of the Near East to share in 
a substantial fund of 160 million dollars of tech- 
nical and economic aid. Provision is made also 
for some military assistance. This help should 
enable the Near East to augment its indigenous 
defensive capabilities, while strengthening in- 
ternal security and bolstering national economies. 
At the present time the people of the Near East, 
although capable of drawing on a large reservoir 
of manpower, are not in a position to do more 

= BrixEmN of Oct. 1, 1951, p. 523. 

Ocfober 22, T9SI 


than oflFer token resistance to invasion by a mod- 
ern army. The Mutual Security Program will, 
if approved, make available appropriate modern 
equipment which will help these people to play 
an effective role in the defense of their homes, 
their lands, and their vital lines of communica- 
tion. They will derive new pride and confidence 
from their strength and achievements. 

However, I want to interject here a word of 
caution that the Mutual Security Program is not 
a source of unlimited aid. The United States har- 
bors an industrial potential unequalled by the 
rest of the globe, but potential is what we must 
stress for the moment. Our industry is expand- 
ing rapidly to supply the weapons for world de- 
fense against a new threat of domination by a 
ruthless enemy. Nevertheless, until our military 
production attains higher levels, and the needs of 
our fighting forces can be met, we cannot supply 
all of the needs of our allies and friends. 

The United States recognizes that military as- 
sistance alone is not enough. Although people 
without arms have no defense, people beset with 
economic and social tribulations have no basis 
upon which even to build a sound defense, and 
people deprived of hope of betterment lack the 
incentive for defense. Therefore, the United 
States proposes to complement military aid with 
technical assistance and grant aid in the social 
and economic fields. From an appropriation 
which will be close to 160 million dollars for the 
Near East and Africa, the Arab States can expect 
a substantial portion for (1) better land utiliza- 
tion and expanded food production, irrigation 
and hydroelectric power, diversification of light 
industry for export and for home consumers, the 
enlargement of public-health service and sanita- 
tion, improvement of vocational-education prac- 
tices, and improvement of roads, harbors, and 
other transport facilities; and (2) the reintegra- 
tion of the Palestine refugees as productive and 
contributive members of their communities. 

The Mutual Security Program will encompass 
both short-range and long-range projects. It will 
try to make an immediate contribution where help 
is most sorely needed. At the same time it will 
seek to contribute to plans of the Arab States for 
permanent economic and social development. The 
Mutual Security Program will not by itself erase 
the poverty and disease and inequities in the Near 
East. We hope it can, however, be the catalyst to 
hasten the Arab awakening to new opportunities 
of national progress and achievement. Is it not 
better to light a candle than curse the darkness? 

General Aims of U. S. Project for Aid to the Near East 

Here in a few words I have discussed what we 
hope will soon become the reality of the Mutual Se- 
curity Program. Its details are being settled in 
the Congress, but let our interest this afternoon 


remain in the general aims of the program. Why 
are we offering aid to the Near East? What do 
we expect in return? 

All of our foreign-aid programs are designed 
fundamentally to protect the immediate and long- 
term interests of the United States. The enor- 
mous expenditures could scarcely be justified to 
the American taxpayer otherwise. The practical 
steps we propose to take under this program, in 
building situations of strength abroad, are essen- 
tial to our own safety and well-being. As Secre- 
tary of State Acheson said recently before a House 
of Representatives committee, the Soviet Union 
wants to see the United States try to "go it alone." 
By sporadic aggression, by cautious retreat, by un- 
ending propaganda, by economic sabotage, by seiz- 
ing control in one area, by playing on diffei'ences 
in another — by all such acts, the Kremlin seeks 
to produce a situation in which the United States 
will ultimately be pushed into a position of try- 
ing "to go it alone." 

That is why, at the same time we are converting 
our potential military strength into actual mili- 
tary strength, we must, through our security pro- 
gram, make sure that we have strong and reliable 
friends and allies abroad. 

The mutual aspect of our program becomes im- 
mediately apparent when one considers what are 
the immediate and long-term interests of the 
United States. They are strikingly similar to the 
interests of Near Eastern peoples — we both desire 
to maintain our independence and the opportunity 
to seek a better life ; we both desire a stable peace- 
ful world based on the principles of the United 
Nations. We do not seek in the Near East a 
sphere of influence, extraterritorial rights, or pup- 
pet governments. 

The United States has been blessed, in our own 
development, with long periods of peace and a 
country rich in natural resources. However, we 
remember that our own development was made 
possible by technical assistance and monetary aid, 
originally from abroad. We also applied the 
principles of self and mutual help. The pioneer 
custom of helping a neighbor to build his house 
or clear his land remains in the United States to 
this day. Many were the inventors and artisans 
of the Old World who came to our country and 
brought with them their crafts and skills to be 
passed on to those unacquainted with new tech- 
niques. Many were the investors in Europe who 
supplied the capital which built our railroads, 
founded our heavy industry, and mined our re- 
sources. Our Nation is peopled by the descend- 
ants of Old World immigrants, and we remember 
the benefits given us by them. 

In a large sense the Mutual Security Program 
is a return of assistance once given to us. Wliat 
we have learned we wish to pass on as good neigh- 
bors. The peoples of the Near East, in the light 
of their short histories as new nations, deserve the 
assistance which we received in our youth. It is 
our hope that they will recognize the Mutual Se- 

\iepar\men\ of Sfafe ^\i\\e\\n 

curity Program as a friendly offer of help to 
equals, not, as our enemies would self-consciously 
interpret it, as a demand to satellites. 

Although the United States makes no conditions 
for a q^iid pro quo return for the Mutual Security 
Program, it does hope that the Near East Govern- 
ments and people will cooperate fully with the 
program and that it will be accompanied by a re- 
birth of spirit and teamwork in the Near East. 
Tliere must be a determination to use these tools 
which we are providing and to forge with them 
a key to a better future. The benefits which can 
flow from the Mutual Security Program nnist be 
distributed equitably; this is no offer for the en- 
richment of the few or the intrenchment of special 

In speaking of our own assistance, I do not in- 
tend to underestimate the remarkable strides to- 
ward development which the Near Eastern States 
are undertaking presently on their own initiative. 
Since 1945 primary and secondary schools have 
multiplied throughout Syria and Lebanon. In 
Jordan, Musa Bey Alami is sponsoring an agri- 
cultural development community for Palestine 
refugees which includes model housing and experi- 
mental farms. The Dujeila Settlement along the 
banks of the Tigris is a significant step by the 
Iraqi Government to bolster the number of small 
landowners and the cultivation of this historically 
fertile valley. February 1951 witnessed the in- 
troduction in Egypt of the first Social Security 
Program in the Arab States. 

Past and Present U. S.-Near Eastern 
Cooperative Endeavors 

Within the last three decades the United States 
has become better known to the Near Eastern 
peoples. Prior to that time we were a distant 
and relatively unfamiliar nation represented in 
the Near East mostly by educational and religious 
groups. The American University of Beirut, 
founded in 1866, has trained some 8,000 Near East- 
ern students. The contribution made in the Near 
Eastern States by the graduates of this distin- 
guished institution is vei'y great indeed. Mis- 
sionaries founded primary and secondary schools, 
and they brought medical care to small isolated 

By 1950 the pattern had changed. In combined 
exports and imports the United States ranked first 
in Syrian trade for the first three quarters of that 
year. Botli Syria and Lebanon derive large reve- 
nues from the operations of the Trans-Arabian 
Pipeline Company. Syrian gi-owers in the boom- 
ing cotton fields of the Jezira are today using 
American seed and American tractors to produce 
their crops. Point Four experts from the United 
States are mapping the middle stages of the great 
Litani River project of the Lebanon. The build- 
ing of the great dams they are designing will 

create considerable employment and will, when 
completed, supply new sources of hydroelectric 
power and irrigation. 

Also linked with the development endeavors of 
Near Eastern Governments are the Near East 
Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 
U.S. Navy's Medical Research Unit. The Near 
East Foundation operates agricultural experiment 
stations in Syria which assist in the selection of 
the best varieties of plants and trees for cultiva- 
tion ; in addition the organization operates a model 
village in which sanitation, homecraft, and first- 
aid principles are taught. The Egyptian village 
of Sindibis, a few miles north of Cairo, is receiving 
sanitation treatment in an experiment by the 
Rockefeller Foundation; this project has dem- 
onstrated how strikingly disease incidence can be 
reduced through DDT spraying and the rudiments 
of sanitation. Meanwhile, the U.S. Naval Medi- 
cal Unit in Cairo has beenj since 1946, a center for 
the Near East of research in tropical medicine ; its 
findings constitute an important factor in the never 
ending struggle against the inroads of disease in 
the Near East. 

Inevitably, this closer acquaintance and ex- 
change between the Unite<i States and the Near 
East has generated some criticism of our aims 
and actions. Friendship should not, however, 
demand perfection. We do not want to pose as a 
nation without shortcomings. We sincerely hope, 
however, that our friends in the Near East will in 
a just appraisal value our virtues over our faults. 
We have faith in the good will and friendship of 
the Near Eastern peoples and we feel confident 
that our faith will be justified. 

Comments on the Dangers of 
Near Eastern Neutralism 

In conclusion, I want to remark upon a disturb- 
ing factor which is gi'owing in the Near Eiist 
despite the bold-writ lesson of history. Neu- 
trality has sowed its fallacies within the minds of 
many persons in that region. The causes are sev- 
eral : for some, it is fear of Russia's proximity 
to their own ill-defended borders ; for others, it is 
bitterness and spite over what they think the 
West's faults and errors; for still others, it is 
ignorance of Russia's true designs and a mis- 
guided belief that the U.S.S.R. is the champion 
rather than the foe of national sovereignty. 

Organizations such as yours — tlirough its many 
and direct contacts with the peoples of the Near 
East, can do a great deal to alter this feeling of 
neutralism. The accident of geography has 
placed the Near Eastern countries squarely in the 
path of potential aggression from the North. 
They are, however, not alone in this respect. 
Other nations are similarly threatened. If the 
Near Eastern countries would survive this tlireat, 
they must place confidence in the principle of col- 

Ocfober 22, J 95 J 


krtive security throogh the United > atioii=, 
which has raUied the free countnes of the world 
in the defense of Korea. Onlj through the devel- 
opment of true collective security can HmaU stat^ 
sich as thc^ of the >'ear East hope to survive 
Thev cannot survive by hiding their head= in the 
sanl The Soviets are no respecter of neutral- 
ism Thev know no gratitude. The weakness 
which flows from neutralism is to them an inevi- 
table enticement- -i. u^„„ 
Nor can recriminations against the past bring 
securirr in the future. The Near Eastern States 
are todav fully sovereign nations, partafang of 
the pri^leges and responsibilities which that 
status entails. They have gained this position in 
the familv of nations by a steady advancement 
in self-refiancc and seir-govemment L*t them 
not allow past difference and controversies to 
separate them from their friends, nor blind them 
to the greater danger which confronts us all. 

It would todav be a dangerous mistake to see 
Eussian moves as merely a revival of Tsanst aims 
and methads. Between the vanished impenalism 
of Tsarist Rusia and the new expansionism of 
the Soviet Union there are important differences. 
At least the old Eussian Empire set itself rela- 
tively limited aims : it made specific demands m 
Manchuria, in the Far East, in Iran, in the iliddle 
East, and for control of the Dardanelles. There 
are no limits to the new Eussian expansionism. 
The all encompa^ng aim of the Soviet Union is 
world domination. . 

The Russians have left written proof of their 
contemporary Near Eastern aims among German 
Foreign Offif-e documents captured after World 
War n bv the U. S. Army. In a report dated 
November 2C. 1940, the German Ambassador to 
Moscow, Count von Schulenberg, stated that, sub- 
ject to certain conditions, Molotov was ready to 
enlarge the Nazi-Soviet agreement into a four- 
power pact with all Axis nations. One of these 
conditions was that 'Hhe area south of Datum and 
Baku in the fjerieraJ. direction of the Persian Gulf 
be recognized as the center of the aspirations of 
the Soviet Government."* 

Your Government has formulated the Mutual 
Security Program to dispel fear in the Near East 
and to reinforce hope for the maintenance of peace, 
Btability, and development. The Syrian- and 
Lebanese-American Federations can underwrite 
that program by telling their friends, their rela- 
tives, and their associates in the Near East what 
the program means and what it involves in team- 
worlc. You can tell them, with the personal ap- 
peal which a government does not have, that neu- 
trality in the face of creeping aggression can only 
result in defeat. You can tell them of the advice 
which Benjamin Franklin gave to the struggling 
UnitcJ States in their infancy : "We must all hang 
tfjgether, or assuredly we will all hang separately. ' 

' Sazi-H'/ciet ReUitiont, I9i0-jy.',l, Department of State 
pablication SOZi, pp. 2.'i>y-25&. 


Mutual Security Act Signed 

Statement hy the President 

[Belea*e4. to the pre*» by t\e White House October 10\ 

I have todav signed H Jl. 5113, the Mutual Se- 
curity Act of" 1951. Under this legislation, the 
United States will continue to participate m the 
CTeat collective defense effort of the free nations 
and to assist free peoples around the worid who 
want to develop and safeguard their freedom and 
maintain the peace. , i i • 

This is constructive legislation— hopeful legis- 
lation. The amounts authorized are less than I 
requested, but this act will bring substantial help 
to those who are eager to help themselves. It will 
enable our free nation partners to continue to in- 
crease their contributions to the common defense 
effort. Their contributions are as important as 
our own. We must never forget that we are just 
as dependent upon the efforts of other nations as 
thev are on ours. 

This act will mean military equipment for 
troops who want to be able to defend their home- 
lands if attacked. It will mean raw materials 
and production equipment for factories that can 
turn out guns and tanks and planes for the com- 
mon defense of freedom. It will mean technicians 
and books, fertilizer and seeds: irrigation pumps 
and medical supplies, and many other things for 
people in underdeveloped areas who want to grow 
in strength and independence. In these and many 
other wavs. this act will mean life and energy for 
the great collective effort of the free nations to 
build a better world. 

The peoples of the underdeveloped areas of the 
world want desperately to take fuller advantage of 
their human and natural resources. We are now 
supplying material and technical assistance to 
help them realize these aspirations, and I believe 
that we should continue to do so. I am thinking 
particularly of the necessity of supporting the 
free nations of Asia in their efforts to strengthen 
the economic foundations of their independence. 
There is some misapprehen.sion that the free 
world is embarked on nothing but an armaments 
race with the Soviet empire. This is not the case. 
What the free world is actually doing is to un- 
leash the constructive forces of human freedom. 
We are building armaments, of course— we would 
be fools if we did not. But we are doing far 
more than that. We are joining with and helping 
the free nations organize into stronger interna- 
tional as^sociations than ever before. We are help- 
ing to restore the productive power of war-shat- 
tered countries. We are helping to build up the 
health, the education, and the welfare of free men 
all around the world. 

In short, we are joining with other peoples t( 
prove by deeds that the way to freedom is tht 
way of peace and human progress. 

Department of State Bulletir 

Egypt Invited To Participate In A New Middle East Command 


[Released to the press October 10] 

The American Embassy in Cairo has confirmed 
that the Egyptian Prime Minister on October 8 
introduced in the Egyptian Chamber of Deputies 
draft legislation which would abrogate the Anglo- 
Egyptian treaty of 1936 and the Anglo- Egyptian 
condominium agreements of 1S99. which provide 
for joint Anglo-Egyptian administration of the 

The parties directly involved are the United 
Kir.irdom and Egypt and. in the case of the 1S99 
- ;:reenients, the Sudanese people as well. How- 

;r. these matters are also of general concern to 

e free world for they affect the security and 
defense of the important Middle East area. 

Xone of the agreements in question provides for 
abrogation. The U-S. Government believes that 
proper respect for international obligations re- 
quires that they be altered by mutual agreement 
rather than by unilateral action of one of the 
parties. Furthermore, it should be noted that pro- 
cedures wholly in accord with such respect for 
international commitments have already been set 
in motion. 

During past months, new proposals to be 
offered to Egypt have been under consideration 
and the Egyptian Government had been informed 
that proposals were to be presented to it within 
the next few days. It is the belief of the United 
States that a solution to the Anglo-Egyptian ques- 
tion can be foimd through these proposals. The 
United States considers that the new proposals 
shonly to lie presented to the Egyptian Govern- 
ment should serve as a sound basis for an agree- 
ment which will not only sjitisfy the interests of 
all parties concerned but also contribute to the 
defense of the free world in wliich the Middle 
East plays such an important r^^le. 


[Released to the pre*s October 151 

Following is the test of proposals presented to 
e Egyptian Government by the Goverimients of 

tiie United States, the United Kingdom, France. 

and Turkev on October 13: 

DocntEST A 


Bgrpt bdODgs to the fre* wor'.d and in ccnseqneEce b«r 
defense and that of the Middle East in seneral is egnsllj- 
vital to otlier demooatic nadooSL 


The defense of Egypt and of odter c ounH ies iB ttw 
MIdd'.e East against ag^ressioo fnm withoot can only be 
secured b.v the cooperation of all interested powers. 

porsT rn 

The defense of Egypt can only be assmed throat tbe 
eSecrire defense of the Middle E^ast area and tbe coocdiBa- 
tion of this defense \rith thauof adjacoit areas. 


It therefore seems desirable to establi^ an Allied 
Middle East Conurand in whicb tbe conntiies able and 
willing to contribute to the defense of the area sboold 
participate. France, Torkey. the United Kingdom and 
the rnited States are prepared to participate with otb^ 
inieresied countries in establishing socb a Ooguaand. Ii»- 
vitanons to participate in tbe CommaBd bare been 
addressed to Australia. New Zealand, tbe TTotoo of Sontb 
Africa, who have icdicated their interest in tbe defense 
of the area and who have agreed in prinrjplo 

porsT V 

Egypt is invited to participate as a ftoosder laeiriier of 
the Middle East Command on a basis of equality and part- 
nership with other founder members. 

If Egypt is prepared to cooperate ftilly in tbe Anted 

Command Organiiatior. ■ . -.<■ ;• •-» vi -v, ji|^ ptovi^ons 
of the attached annex. :"--' : r"mefll for their 

part would be willing : - ■ ~>:on of tbe I9S6 

Treaty anii would also i V ..,._; ..-.^^ ,v withdrawfrom 
Egypt such British forves as are not allocated to tbe 
Allied Middle East Command by agreement between the 
Egyptian Government and the Oovernn»ents of other eoozt- 
tri^ also participating as founder members. 

As regards armed forces to be placed at the disposal 
of the Allied Middle East Command and the provision to 
that Command of the neoessary strategic defense facilities. 
such as military and air bases, commonications. ports. etc_ 
Egypt will be expected to make her contribution on the 
same footing as other participating powers. 

POINT vra 

In keeping with tbe spirit of these arrang^HDents Egypt 
would be invited to accept a position of high antboritT 
and responsibility with the Allied Middle East Command 
and to designate Egyptian officers for integration in the 
Allied Middle East Command Headquarters staff. 

Ocfofaer 22, J 95 1 



Facilities to train and equip her forces will be given to 
Egypt by those participating members of the Allied Com- 
mand in a position to do so. 

The detailed organization of the Allied Middle East 
Defense Organization and its exact relationship with the 
N.A.T.O. have yet to be worked out in consultation be- 
tween all the powers concerned. For this purpose it is 
proposed that all founding members of the Allied Middle 
East Command should send military representatives to 
a meeting to lie held in the near future with the object 
of preparing detailed proposals for submission to the gov- 
ernments concerned. 

Document B 



In common with other participating powers who are 

making similar contributions to the defense of the area. 

(a) Egypt will agree to furnish to proposed Allied 
Middle East Coniniand Organization .such strategic de- 
fense and other facilities on her soil as are indispensable 
for the organization in peacetime of the defense of the 
Middle East 

(b) that she will undertake to gi'ant forces of the 
Allied Middle East Command all necessary facilities and 

assistance in the event of war, imminent menace of war, 
or apprehended international emergency including the use 
of Egyptian ports, airfields and means of communication. 

We should also hope that Egypt would agree to the 
Allied Supreme Commander's Headquarters being located 
in her territory. 


In keeping with the spirit of these arrangements, it 
would be understood 

(a) that the present British base in Egypt would be 
formally handed over to the Egyptians on tie understand- 
ing that it would simultaneously become an Allied base 
within the Allied Middle East Command with full Egyp- 
tian participation in the running of this base in peace and 

(b) that the strength of the Allied force of participat- 
ing nations to be stationed in Egypt in peacetime would 
be determined between the ijarticipating nations including 
Egypt from time to time as progress is made in building 
up the force of the Allied Middle East Command. 


It also would be understood that an air defense organi- 
zation including both the Egyptian and Allied forces would 
be set up under the command of an oflBcer with joint 
responsibility to the Egyptian Government and to the 
Allied Middle East Command for the protection of Egypt 
and Allied bases. 

U.S.S.R/s Reply to Declaration on Italian Treaty 
Disregards Italy's Present Status 


[Released to the p/'css October 12] 

On September 26 the Governments of the United 
States, France, and the United Kingdom issued 
a dedaration on the Italian peace treaty.^ The 
text of the dechiration was communicated by note 
to the U.S.S.R. by each of the three governments 
on tile same date. 

The reply of the Soviet Union to the note trans- 
mitting the declarat ion does not in a single sentence 
recognize or acknowledge that the spirit of this 
treaty no longer accords with Italy's present status 
as an active and equal member of the democratic 
and freedom-loving family of nations. It disre- 
gards all that Italy has accomplished since the war. 
It attributes to that honorable and peace-loving 
Nation intentions as unfounded as they are absurd. 
With specious and false arguments the Soviet note 
attempts to justify as a condition for revision of 
the peace treaty the separation of the defense of 
Italy from that of the free world. Presiunably 

' Bui.i.KTi.N of Oct. 8, lO.'jl, p. 570. 

by such argumentation the Soviet Union would 
contemplate for Italy a status of subjugation cx)m- 
parable to that of its satellites in Eastern Europe. 
As Secretary Acheson declared recently, the 
United States Government does not propose to 
be deterred by such propaganda from its effort to 
find the way to recognize Italy's new stature and 
its right to participate with the other free nations 
in working for international peace and security. 
The Soviet note asserts that "the Soviet Union 
never objected to the acceptance of Italy as a mem- 
ber of the United Nations on equal ground of all 
other states having that legal right." The record 
of Soviet actions in the United Nations belies this 
assertion. The question of Italy's application for 
membership in the United Nations lias been dis- 
cu.s.sed on four occasions by the U.N. Security 
Council — August 21, 19-17, September 29-October 
1, 1947, April 10, 1948, and September 13, 1949. 
The Italian application, however, has not yet been 
approved by that body owing entirely to the con- 


Department of State Bulletin 

sistent objection of the Soviet Union, which luis 
exercised its veto in each instance. 

The Soviet Union has refused to agree to the 
admission of Italy unless the other members will 
agree to the admission of the other ex-enemy 
states, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania, which, 
on the basis of their aggressive conduct toward 
their neighbors and disregard for human rights, 
have not been found qualified by the General As- 
sembly for membership. 

The United States in common with practically 
all members of the United Nations outside of the 
Soviet bloc takes the position that the exclusion 
of Italy by Soviet vetoes is completely unjustified 
and results in grave injustices to the Italian Na- 
tion, which on three occasions has been found by 
the General Assembly to be fully qualified for 
membership within the meaning of article 4 of the 
United Nations Charter. 

Following is an unofficial English translation 
of the Soviet note of October 11 : 

Text of Soviet Note 

In connection with the joint declaration of the Govern- 
ments of the United States of America, Great Britain, 
and France transmitted hy the Embassy of the United 
States of America to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on September 
26 of this year in which these governments pose the 
question of the revision of the Treaty of Peace with Italy, 
the Soviet Government considers it necessary to state the 
following : 

1. The Governments of the United States of America, 
Great Britain, and France, in posing the question of the 
revision of the Treaty of Peace with Italy, refer to the 
fact that this revision in some fashion is necessary in 
the interests of the "development of cooperation between 
free nations." Such explanation is only a cover for the 
actual purposes of revision of the peace treaty. Facts 
show that actually it is a matter not simply of the devel- 
opment of the cooperation of Italy with the other coun- 
tries but of the use of Italy in the interests of the ag- 
gressive Atlantic bloc and for that the removal 
of limitations established by tie peace treaty relative to 
her armed forces. 

The Soviet Government in its notes in July and Septem- 
ber 19-i9 has already drawn the attention of the Govern- 
ment of the United States of America as well as the Gov- 
ernments of Great Britain, France, and Italy to the fact 
that having entered the aggressive North Atlantic bloc 
Italy has taken upon itself obligations incompatible with 
the peace treaty and to the responsibility which rests with 
the mentioned governments in this connection. 

The Italian Government, which at the present time is 
putting into effect a broad program of military prepara- 
tions in violation of its obligations in accordance with 
the peace treaty, is becoming one of the basic suppliers of 
manpower for the North Atlantic bloc, which fact is 
frankly recognized by the leaders of the armed forces of 
Italy. Thus, in October 1950, the Chief of the Italian 
General Staff, General Marras, who was in Washington, 
stated that Italy already had made available for the dis- 
position of Atlantic Union armed forces, in lesser measure, 
equal to the forces of the other greatest continental powers 
and that Italy together with France and West Germany 
will be the power "which will make the greatest contri- 
bution in manpower." Minister of Defense of Italy 
Paccardi, in November 1950, in an interview with the 

correspondent of the United Press agency stated that 
taking into account the war in Indochina which is being 
carried on by France he did not see that "any other power 
of the Atlantic Union could make available more divisions 
than Italy." 

Thus the Governments of the United States of America, 
Great Britain, and France are attempting to use the re- 
vision of the peace treaty with Italy in order to adapt 
the territory of Italy, her people, and material re.sources 
to the fulfillment of the aggressive aims of the North At- 
lantic Pact which is in accord with the whole ilirectinn of 
the aggressive policy of the United States of America, 
Great Britain, and France. 

This iKjlicy has nothing in common with the interests of 
the maintenance of peace in Europe as it has nothing in 
common with the interests of the Italian people which has 
still not recovered from the deprivations imposed upon 
it by the Second World War. Such a policy cannot fail 
to bring to Italy and the Italian people still greater pover- 
ties than those already once brought about by the iiolicy 
of Hitler and Mussolini. 

2. In the declaration of the Governments of the United 
States of America, Great Britain, and France, there is 
contained also a statement regarding the necessity of 
assuring Italy of her acceptance as a member of the United 
Nations in which the matter is set forth as if the accep- 
tance of Italy as a member of the United Nations up to this 
time has been impeded by the application of the so-called 

Such a statement does not correspond to reality sinc"e 
the Soviet Union never objected to the acceptance of Italy 
as a member of the United Nations on equal grounds with 
all other states having that legal right. If Italy until 
the present time has not been accepted as a member of the 
United Nations, that is exclusively the fault of the United 
States of America, Great Britain, and France, who have 
taken in the United Nations a completely unacceptable 
IKisition on the question of acceptance of new members. 

.3. As is known, the Soviet Government already in March 
1944, before it was done by other countries, established 
immediate and direct relations with Italy and exchanged 
with her representatives having diplomatic status. 

The Soviet Government, guiding itself by the wish to 
see Italy as an equal state, states that it has no objection 
to the revision of the peace treaty with Italy, to the revi- 
sion of the limitations established by the peace treaty, 
and to the acceptance of Italy in the United Nations upon 
condition of analogous revision of the peace treaties with 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Finland, and Rumania and their ad- 
mittance to the United Nations which [nations] were 
during the war in the same position as Italy. 

At the same time the Soviet Government considers that 
the revision of the peace treaty with Italy must not cause 
any sort of harm to the maintenance of peace and must 
not be used to involve Italy in the aggressive military 
plans of the North Atlantic bloc. On the contrary, the 
Soviet Government considers that revision of the peace 
treaty with Italy must be accomplished in the aim of 
strengthening peace and assuring actual equality and 
independence for Italy. It is, however, doubtless a fact 
that the participation of Italy in the structure of the 
aggressive North Atlantic bloc fundamentally is contra- 
dictory to the interests of peace and thrusts Italy onto 
the path of aggressive war. The very presence on Italian 
territory of foreign military bases and foreign armed 
forces not only does not strengthen but on the contrary 
undermines the equality and independence of Italy, trans- 
forming her into a dependent country. 

In view of this the Soviet Government, guiding itself 
by the interests of maintenance and strengthening of 
peace, states that it can proceed to the revision of the 
peace treaty with Italy and the elimination of appropriate 
limitations only in case Italy leaves the aggressive North 
Atlantic bloc and does not permit military bases and 
armed forces of foreign nations on its territory. 

October 22, 1 95 1 


Greece and Turkey Reply to President's 
Message Regarding NATO Membership 

[Released to the press Octolier 9] 

Follovring are texts of replies received from, 
President CeJal Bayar of Turkey and Prime Min- 
ister Sophocles Venizelos of Greece in acknowl- 
edgment of President TrumarCs message of Sep- 
temher SJ, lohich expressed gratification over the 
North Atlantic CounciVs decision to recom<mend 
invitation of Greece and Tv/rkey to hecome full 
memhers of NATO:'^ 

with your view that this cooperation will become 
closer and more fruitful within the wider frame- 
work of the Atlantic Pact, and share the pleasure 
you express at this prospect. 

Furthermore, it is an added pleasure for me to 
affirm that Turkey will never fail to carry out the 
obligations that will devolve upon her within the 
Atlantic Pact community which she is about to 
join. I assure you that the Turkish Government 
is equally looking forward to cooperating with 
our great friend the United States of America 
within this Organization, toward the defense of 
the free world. 


I have been deeply moved by the message which 
3'ou have been so kind as to send me on the oc- 
casion of the decision taken by the Nato Council 
at its meeting in Ottawa, to invite Turkey to be- 
come a full member of the Atlantic Pact, subject 
to ratification by the member countries. 

In your message, which is a further manifesta- 
tion of your feelings of true friendship toward the 
Turkish nation as well as those of the great Amer- 
ican people who spare no sacrifice for the safe- 
guard of human rights, you very kindly express 
your personal gratification as well as that of your 
Government at the Ottawa decision. I wish to 
express my heartfelt thanks for your kind senti- 

This message which reflects your feelings that 
entirely correspond to our affection for, and our 
faith in your country, has been widely echoed in 
all parts of Turkey and will leave an indelible im- 
pression in our hearts. 

The Government of the United States, which 
has already proved its understanding of and in- 
terest in the common cause of security of the free 
nations by rendering aid to my country up to the 
present time, has made most effective efforts and 
has greatly contributed toward the admission of 
Turkey to the Atlantic Pact. I am happy to reit- 
erate my sincere personal thanks as well as that 
of my Government in this instance. 

You have made a most proper reference in your 
message to the unflinching will and determination 
of Turkey to maintain her independence and ter- 
ritorial integrity in the face of all pressure and 
threats. I would like to assure you again that my 
country will act in the future, as she has done in 
the past, with the same unshaken will and de- 

Turkey fully api)reciates the great value of the 
cooperation between our two friendly countries 
whicli lire wholeiieartedly devoted to the policy 
of world p eace and prosperity. I fully concur 

' For tpxt of President Truman's message to the Presi- 
dent of Turkey, see Bulletin of Oct. 8, 1951, p 571 
' Delivered ou Oct. 9 by Ambassador Feridim Erkin 


September 24, 1951 

The Greek Government and myself have been 
deeply moved by your message. The decision of 
the North Atlantic Council to invite Greece to 
accede to the Treaty, subject to the sanction of 
the Governments concerned, has been indeed 
greeted by the Greek people with profound 

It is true that Greece, faithful to its traditions 
would, if confronted by an aggression, fight once 
more for its independence if necessary alone. But 
it is for us a great relief to know that we are to 
participate in a defensive organization to which 
belong so many countries animated by the same 
ideals of peace, justice and democracy and by the 
same determination to safeguard their independ- 
ence. For we believe, more than ever in these 
troubled times, that no other policy than collective 
security can preserve humanity from the evils of 

We do not and shall not forget that the United 
States under your Presidency, after having since 
1947, by their moral and material support helped 
us to overcome Communist aggression and to be- 
gin to rehabilitate our country, have this time been 
the promoters of our admission to the North At- 
lantic Treaty. 

Being conscious of the advantages as well as the 
obligations which shall result for us from our 
entry in this community of free nations, we hope, 
that with the help of God our solidary effort will 
lead to a lasting peace of which our country is so 
much in need. 

NAC Releases Protocol Inviting 
Greece and Turkey To Join NATO 

[Released to the press October i5] 

The text of a protocol agreed to by the North 
Atlantic Dejiuties providing for the extension of 
an invitation to the Governments of Greece and 
Turkey to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty 


Department of State Bulletin 

was released by the North Atlantic Council 
Deputies at London on October 15. After the 
Council Deputies liave been authorized to sign the 
protocol it will be referred to eacli of the member 
governments for ratification. (The U.S. Deputy, 
Charles M. S])offord, has been authorized to sign 
on behalf of the United States.' Following ratifi- 
cation by all member governments an invitation to 
Greece and Turkey to accede to tlie treaty will be 
extended by the ITnited States on belialf of all the 
parties. The protocol will enter into force when 
Greece and Turkey have formally accepted this 
Text of the protocol follows : 

The parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at 
Washington on April 4, 1949, being satisfied that the 
security of the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by 
the accession of the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic 
of Turkey to that treaty, agree as follows : 


Upon the entry Into force of this Protocol, the Govern- 
ment of the United States of America shall, on behalf of 
all the Parties, communicate to the Government of the 
Kinjrdom of Greece and the Government of the Republic 
of Turkey an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic 
Treaty, as it may be modified by Article II of the present 
Protocol. Thereafter the Kingdom of Greece and the 
Republic of Turkey shall each become a Party on the 
date when it deposits its Instrument of accession with the 
Government of the United States of America in accordance 
with Article 10 of the Treaty. 


If the Republic of Turkey becomes a Party to the North 
Atlantic Treaty, Article 6 of the Treaty shall, as from 
the date of the deposit by the Government of the Republic 
of Turkey of its Instrument of accession with the Govern- 
ment of the United States of America, be modified to read 
as follows : 

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one 

or more of the Parties is deemed to Include an armed 


(1) On the territory of any of the Parties in Europe 
or North America, on the Algerian Departments of 
France, on the territory of Turkey, or on the islands 
under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the 
North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer ; 

(2) On the forces, vessels or aircraft of any of the 
Parties, when in or over these territories or any other 
area in Europe in which occupation forces of any 
of the Parties were stationed on the date when the 
Treaty entered into force, or the Mediterranean Sea 
or the North Atlantic area, north of the Tropic of 


The present Protocol shall enter into force when each 
of the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified 
the Government of the United States of America of its 
acceptance thereof. The Government of the United States 
' of America shall inform all the Parties to the North At- 
lantic Treaty of the date of the receipt of each such noti- 
fication and of the date of the entry into force of the 
present Protocol. 


The present Protocol, of which the English and French 
texts are equally authentic. shaU be deposited In the 

' Bulletin of Oct. 8, 1951, p. 571. 
October 22, 1951 

archives of the Government of the United States of 
America. Duly certified copies thereof shall be trans- 
mitted by that Government to the Governments of all the 
Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. 

U.S. Rejects Polish Charges 

in Closing N.Y. Information Service 

On August 9, 19.51, the Department of State 
called in the Ambassador and informed 
him that tlie activities of the Polish Research and 
Information Service at New York would have to 
be terminated within 24 hours. This action fol- 
lowed the request on August 8, 1951, by the Polish 
Foreign Minister to the American Ambassador at 
Warsaw that the United States Information Serv- 
ice (Usis) terminate its activities of that date.' 

On August 14, 1951, the Polish Ministry of For- 
eign Affairs delivered to the American Embassy 
at Warsaw a note which accused the Usis of en- 
gaging in "war-mongering" and other alleged 
offenses and charged that the United States de- 
mand for the closing of the Polish Research and 
Information Center in New York was a baseless 
and illegal reprisal. 

The Polish note also alleged that the closing of 
the Polish Research and Information Service 
"proves that the United States Government wishes 
to separate the American people behind an Iron 
Curtain from all news of the peaceful attitude and 
activities of the Polish nation." 

In its reply, delivered to the Polish Ambassador 
in Washington on September 20, the Department 
noted, among other points, that the "extent to 
which the contents of this note are made known 
to tlie people of Poland by the Polish press and 
radio will provide a significant commentary on the 
location of the Iron Curtain." 

As far as the Department is aware, the Polish 
Government has not, to date, made known to the 
Polish people any particulars of the United States 
Government's reply. 

Following is the telegraphic text of the Polish 
note together with the note sent by the United 
States in reply : 


The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compli- 
ments to the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw and has the honor 
to communicate the following: 

On August 9, 1951, the Department of State commu- 
nicated to the Ambassador of the Polish Republic at 
Washingt<m that by way of reprisal for terminating activ- 
ities in Polish of the U.S. Information Service the Govern- 
ment of the United States demanded the termination of 
activities of the Polish Information Bureau In New York. 

The Polish Government considers this U.S. action as 

' Bulletin of Aug. 20, 1951, p. 298. 


entirely illegal and without basis and definitely protest 
against it. 

Tlie Polish Information Bureau in New York was an 
institution whose only aim was to inform the American 
people about Polish all'airs. Information film cxhiliits us 
well as publications pertained exclusively to Polish prol)- 
lems, Polish participation in efforts to make peace perma- 
nent, Polish post-war reconstruction and achievements in 
the sphere of economy, culture, and ever-mounting stand- 
ards of living of Polish nations. In its activities the 
Polish Information Bureau (Pkis) strictly adhered to laws 
of the United States. Copies of various publications were 
regularly pre.sented to the Department of Justice ; budget 
and financial reports were handed over to U.S. control 
authorities. Officials of Pbis did not benefit from any 
diplomatic privileges. There was not one case in which 
activity of Pris ever pertained to internal affairs or for- 
eign policies of the United States. Never did the Polish 
Bureau violate any kind of regulation of American 
statutes and never throughout its entire period of activity, 
dedicated to perpetuating friendly relations between the 
Polish nation and the American nation, did it encounter 
the slightest complaint from any American authorities 

I'kis was surrounded with the sympathy of wide circles 
of American people who with interest followed develop- 
ments of peaceful and Polish social life. 

The United States has not therefore the slightest reason 
for preventing activity of this kind of Bureau which it 
apparently acknowledges because while communicating 
with the Polish Ambassador about its illegal decision it 
did not even try to give any basis for its action. 

Termination of Usia activities in Poland cannot be 
taken as a basis for repression. Therefore the Polish 
Government definitely rejects description of U. S. steps 
in the name of repression. The United States' linking the 
closing of Usis in Warsaw with the decision concerning 
the closing of Pbis in New York is artificial and without 
foundation, while Puis in carrying out its activities 
strictly adhered to directives of statutes of state on whose 
terrain it had functioned and to standards of international 
law principles. Usis in a very open manner violated all 
of these directives on Polish soil. 

As the U. S. Ambassador was informed by the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, Usis activ- 
ity exceeded the realm of normal activity of the diplomatic 
mission of which it was a part. Abusing diplomatic 
privileges Usis in its publications unceasingly occupied 
itself in a hostile manner with Polish internal and foreign 
relations, slandered Polish allies in an unprecedented 
manner and spread war and anti-peace propaganda. Usis 
bulletins published in the Polish and English languages 
contained a very small percentage of information concern- 
ing the United States or the life and economy of the 
American people. On the other hand about two-thirds 
of the bulletins were regularly devoted to attacks on the system, on Polish allies and continually contained 
threats of the use of atomic weapons. Usis "bulletins in 
the year ]f)51 qualified themselves as a transgression 
against the law of the defense of peace enacted by 
of the Uepublic of Poland on December 19.50 and only 
diplomatic immunity protected responsible ones from 
merited legal con.sequenees. 

The Minister of Foreign Affairs has many times called 
the attention of the U. S. Ambassador to the inadmissibil- 
ity of this state of affairs. As early as the year 1940 the 
Minister was forced to demand that an official functionary 
of the U. S. Embassy, Mr. Opal, who was responsible for 
publication of Usis bulletins, leave Poland. 

Despite .steps which should have caused the U. S. Em- to conform to international customs and despite 
further intervention in following years— the U. S. Embassy 
further continued this practice. Decisions of the Polish 
Covernment are therefore entirely justified both from the 
point of Poland as well as internal rights and customs; 
this decision also responds to the will of the Polish nation 
which cannot tolerate continuance In Poland of hatreds 
among nations, of propagandizing of aggression, and mass 


slaughter with the aid of weapons of mass destruction. 
This is in the interest of the American nation which 
certainly wishes harmony with all nations. The decision 
was approved by the opinions of many millions of 
defenders of peace who wish to end once and for all all 
war propaganda. 

The Polish Government believes that continuation of 
anti-peace activities through the Usis mission in Poland 
against the rights and against the protest of the Polish 
Government was a part of American politics directed 
against peace and a peace-loving nation. Representatives 
of the U.S. Government publicly expressed what they 
expected from their propaganda machine in general and 
in particular Usis mLssious in the People's Democracies. 
At the cost of millions of dollars building their propa- 
ganda war machine, creating a bureau of strategic psy- 
chology, the American Government expected that Usis 
would assist in the establishment in Poland of centers 
of diversion and sabotage to undermine the masses' faitli 
in their government. This was stated by Assistant Secre- 
tary of State Barrett in his speech of December 4, 19."iO 
emphasizing that this does not call for open revolt since 
this would be "a clear invitation to our friends to commit 
suicide." ' 

In light of the above facts the closing of Usis was a 
justifiable action directed against the privileges and in- 
ternational activities of that mission. 

The clo.sing of the Polish Information Bureau proves 
that the United States wishes to separate its community 
behind an Iron Curtain from all news of peace and ac- 
tivities of the Polish nation. 

The Polish Government protests against the unjustified 
closing of the Polish Information Bureau in New York 
and it rejects the equity of this step as an act of repres- 
sion ; it reminds the U.S. Government that it will employ 
every means at its disposal in accordance with interna- 
tional law to provide truthful information of Poland in 
the interest of world peace and the interest of the Ameri- 
can and Polish people. 


[Released to the press October 9] 

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to 
His Excellency, the Ambassador of Poland and has the 
honor to refer to the note which was delivered to the 
United States Embassy at Warsaw by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs on August 14, 1951. This note protested 
the closing of the Polish Research and Information Serv- 
ice at New York, and also made certain charges against 
the United States Information Service at Warsaw. 

The Government of the United States finds it difficult 
to believe that the Polish Government can .seriously con- 
tend that the action of the United States in requesting 
the closing of the Research and Information Serv- 
ice was a baseless and illegal reprisal. 

The Polish Government will recall that on August 8. 
1951 the Polish Foreign Minister received the United 
States Ambassador at Warsaw and delivered a note pro- 
testing the proposal by the United States Government 
that the 19.31 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Con- 
sular Rights be amended l)y the elimination of Article \'I 
of that treaty. It was at the conclusion of this interview 
that the Foreign Minister demanded the closing of the 
United States Information Service office at Warsaw. 

It is of interest that the Polish Embassy at Washington 
in a press release issued on August 10. 1951. also clearly 
linked the two subjects of the proposal to terminate 
Article VI of the 1931 Treaty and the closing of the United 
States Information Service office at Warsaw. These two 
subjects, so closely connected in time and in the actions 
of the Polish Government, can, therefore, hardly be uncon- 

' Bulletin of Dec. 18, 1950, p. 968. 

Department of State Bulletin 

nectecl in the minds and in tlie intentions of the responsilile 
officers of that Government. 

The United States Government is always prepared to 
encourage, on a fair and reciprocal basis, the free exchange 
of information between nations. It can, however, only 
regard as hypocritical or naive the attitude of a Govern- 
ment which, having practiced reprisals in the name of 
legality, then proceeds to denounce as "reprisals" the 
practice, by another Government, of the principle of 

The Polish Government also alleged in its note of August 
14, 1951, which, it may be noted, was issued as a press 
release three days later by the Polish Embassy at Wash- 
ington, that the closing of the Polish Research and Infor- 
mation Service proves that the United States Government 
wishes to separate the American people behind an Iron 
Curtain from all news of the peaceful attitude and activ- 
ities of the Polish nation. 

The facts which are relevant to this allegation must be 
known to the Polish Government. It is a matter of com- 
mon knowledge where the Iron Curtain was created and 
where it is maintained by governments exercising a 
monopoly of police and political power and claiming to 
exercise a monopoly over all sources of public Information. 
It is also a matter of common knowledge, reported almost 
daily in the free press of the world, from which direction 
and from which countries, men, women, and children 
escape, at desperate risk, to join the community of free- 
dom in the Western World. 

The extent to which the contents of this note are made 
known to the people of Poland by the Polish press and 
radio will provide a significant commentary on the location 
of the Iron Curtain. 

The Government of the United States rejects the con- 
tention of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the activ- 
ities of the United States Information Service in Poland 
went beyond the accepted scope of normal activity of a 
diplomatic mission or were against the interests of peace. 
The United States carries on these activities as part of 
its diplomatic functions in sixty-four nations, where, far 
from being subject to police harassment and ofiicia! im- 
pediments, the activities are welcomed by the governments 
concerned, which in many cases cooperate heartily with 
the United States Information Service in its work among 
their people. Only in Communist China, Hungary, 
Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and now Poland has 
the United States Information Service been compelled by 
governmental action to suspend operations. 

The many governments that welcome and cooperate 
with the United States Information Service are surely not 
incompetent judges of what constitutes normal diplomatic 
activity. Nor can they be considered to be insensitive as to 
what constitutes diplomatic privilege. 

The United States Government also rejects the asser- 
tion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the publica- 
tions of tlie linited States Information Service in Poland 
spread war propaganda and propaganda hostile to Poland. 
The publications at the United States Information Service 
in Poland, notably the Dailji Wireless Bulletin, undertook, 
among other things, to provide those citizens of Poland 
who desired to be informed, with accurate accounts of the 
views expressed and the positions taken by the responsible 
governmental officials of the United States, in the United 
Nations and elsewhere. Not less importantly, the Bulletin 
continually rejxirted the views of the duly elected repre- 
sentatives of the people of the United States, and of the 
responsible journals of fact and opinion In the United 

To allege, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs endeavors 
to do, that the publication of such material is to engage 
in war mongering is to deny the validity of the open and 
democratic processes b.v which free public opinion is 
formed. It is only in this way that free legislative 
assemblies can function, that the executive authority of 
a free government can exercise leadership, and that sound 
and intei'national judgments as expressed in the 
United Nations, of which Poland is a member, can be 

Ocfober 22, 1 95 1 

The fact that these democratic processes involve the 
expression of views repugnant to those held by the present 
Government of Poland, does not conjure them out of ex- 
istence or render them propaganda for war. On the 
contrary, these views are held by governments and indi- 
viduals keenly desirous of maintaining international peace, 
concerne<l by developments threatening it, and determined 
to forestall the betrayal of peace by all possible means. 

A government which undertakes to deny its people access 
to such information, the right freely to judge the validity 
of the views expressed, accordingly assumes the most 
serious responsibility. To attempt to kwp people in ig- 
norance of the facts of the world in which they live, of 
the forces at work in it, and the reactions which these 
forces can create, is not to work for peace but for those 
miscalculations and errors that in the past have often led 
to misunderstandings between nations. History abund- 
antly proves that governments which adopt the policy of 
denying their peoples access to all tlie avenues to truth 
have done so at their own loss. 

VOA To Broadcast Polish Program 
From Munich 

[Released to the press October 1] 

The Depaitment of State announced that the 
first program in a series of Polish language broad- 
casts originating at Munich will be transmitted 
on October 1. 

The new program, the first of a series of foreign- 
language broadcasts which will originate in Euro- 
pean studios, is designed to cut down the time lag 
involved in news programs originating from New 
York and secondly to make available at first hand 
defector and refugee interviews. 

In addition to the defector interviews, the new 
Polish language program will consist of Eastern 
European news and special features and commen- 
tary, supplementing the Voice's standard Polish 
language program from New York. 

The new program will be broadcast at 2 : 30 and 
8 : 30 p. m., eastern standard time, and will be car- 
ried on the medium wave 251 meter band. 

Security Efforts of Free World 
Aided by Danish Contributions 

/Statement hy Eugenie Anderson 
Ambassador to Denmark ^ 

First, I think, we should take note of the size 
and location of the country. Denmark has about 
half as many people as New York City. They live 
in an area one-third as large as New York State. 
Lying at the mouth of the Baltic Sea, Denmark is 
on the very boundary of Soviet territory, for the 
Soviet zone in Germany is only 27 miles away. 
Copenhagen, the beautiful capital city, is less than 

' Made on "Battle Report" over NBC Television Network 
on Oct. 14 and released to the press on the same date. 


an hour's flight from Russiiin-lield air bases. The 
Danes are always conscious of this uncomfortable 
fact. , , , 

In World War II the Germans invaded and 
occupied Denmark. The Danes do not want to be 
occupied again. One such experience was quite 
enough for them. Although there are still a few 
Danes who cling to old isolationist policies, today 
the majority of the Danish people have decided 
that the best way to prevent war is to support the 
North Atlantic Treatv, which Denmark joined m 
1949 along with the other Western democracies. 
But for nearly a centuiy the Danes have had 
little or no military experience. During the Nazi 
occupation even the small existing military forces 
were disbanded and their arms destroyed. The 
Danish Navy scuttled itself to avoid German cap- 
ture. This meant that after tlie war the Danes 
had to start from scratch in building their de- 
fenses. It takes time to build from little or noth- 
ing, and it takes materiel— it takes trained officers 
totrain men. It takes heavy industry, and it takes 

In spite of shortages and real obstacles, the 
Danes are determined to carry their full share of 
our common defense burden. Their military 
forces have been reorganized along modern lines. 
A hard core of permanent military personnel, 
hi"-hly trained and skilled specialists and techni- 
cians, is being developed. The training period 
has been extended and the numbers of troops under 
arms are being steadily increased. 

For a very small country, Deimiark has made 
substantial contributions to the free world's secur- 
ity efforts. She has troops in occupied Germany. 
Her hospital ship, the Jutlandia, is giving shelter 
and care to wounded fighting men m Korea^ By 
a recent agreement she has given the United States 
the right to develop and use facilities in Green- 
land, a Danish possession. This vast land is ab- 
solutely essential to the defense of the North 
Atlantic area. 

These things that Denmark is doing take sacri- 
fice for a country of its size. They take courage 
for a country so near the Iron Curtain. But they 
come from a growing realization among the Dan- 
ish people themselves that the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization offers the only safeguard 
against Soviet aggression and the best hope of 
achieving genuine peace. The Danes have been 
encouraged by receiving military supplies from 
the United States under the Mutual Defense As- 
sistance Program. Danish confidence in mutual 
defense and self-defense is growing in proportion 
to the actual ability to defend their country and 
the possibilities of a successful defense. 

There is .still a long way to go, but with the help 
and encouragement of the United States and its 
allies in the North Atlantic Treaty, Denmark can 
be counted on to do its share in our great common 
cause — the mutual defense of peace with freedom. 


U. S. Cooperation in Meeting Brazilian 
Economic and Material Requirements 

FolJoioing is the text of a letter, dated September 
14, addressed by Secretary Acheson to Eoracio 
Lafer, Brazilian Finance Minister: 

My Dear Mr. Minister : 

During your visit to Washington for the pur- 
pose of attending the meeting of the Boards of 
Governors of the International Monetary Fund 
and the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and DevelojDment, you have reviewed with rep- 
resentatives of this Department certain aspects 
of the relationships between the United States 
and Brazil in regard to delivery by the United 
States to Brazil of scarce essential products during 
the emergency period. I wish to confirm herein 
the understanding of the Department of State 
with respect to these conversations. 

All aspects of the problems of supply were care- 
fully discussed during the Fourth Meeting of Con- 
sultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of 
American States held in Washington last March 
and April. Resolutions XIV and XVI have par- 
ticular reference to this problem.^ Resolution 
XVI contains the introductory General State- 
ment set forth below and in paragraphs 1 and 4 
contains certain basic understandings as quoted: 2 

General Statement 

That in order to meet the emergency situation and the 
subsequent period of adjustment, the American States 
shall do all in their power to provide one another with the 
products and services necessary to sustain the common 
defense effort, and declare that the maintaining of essen- 
tial civilian activities and public services and the economic 
development of underdeveloped countries are considered 
as an essential element in the total concept of defense 
of the American Hemisphere, without disregarding the 
fact that the strengthening of their defense is the principal 
duty of the American States in the present emergency. 

Specific Principles 

Whenever the emergency situation makes it imperative 
to apply the system of allocations and priorities, the 
American States will observe the following principles : 

1. The essential needs for the functioning of civilian 
economic activities should be met. 

[Defense and Security Controls] 

During the emergency and the period of adjustment 
following it, the principle of relative equality of sacrifice 
shall apply in the reduction or limitation of civilian needs, 
and an endeavor shall be made not to impair the living 
standards of the low-income population groups. . . . 

The United States hereby specifically reaffirms 
to Brazil its intention in its relations with Brazil 
to effectuate faithfully the spirit and letter of 
the reference resolutions adopted by the Foreign 

It is my understanding that during your visit 

' Bulletin of Apr. 9 and 16, 1951, pp. 5G6 and 611. 

Deparfment of State BuUefin 

to Washington you have had occasion to review 
with the appropriate officials of the Department 
of State the progress wliich has been made in ef- 
fectuating the terms of these resolutions in regard 
to specific commodities for which the United 
States has been the traditional supplier for Brazil. 
I am happy to learn that you have expressed satis- 
faction over the manner in which Brazil's require- 
ments have been and are being met. I am happy 
to reiterate that it is the intention of the United 
States to continue to take into account the needs 
of Brazil of those raw materials and manufactured 
products for which Brazil looks to this country, 
within the terms of Resolution XVI which are 
quoted above. Naturally the ability of the United 
States to meet the requirements of Brazil or any 
other friendly country is subject to the limitations 
imposed by the present emergency which, as you 
know, also affect the ability of our own produc- 
tive facilities to meet the requirements of our own 
citizens. In the event that the present emergency 
situation should become more serious and the re- 
armament program should have to be intensified, 
the availability of cei'tain materials for civilian 
consumption within this country or for export 
might be further restricted. However, in any such 
event, the United States would continue to take 
into account the requirements of Brazil's economy 
within the spirit of the resolutions of the Foreign 
Ministers Conference and would afford Brazil 
ample opportunity for consultation. 

The United States believes that it is important 
that there be at all times complete and continuous 
consultation as to these matters. The necessity 
for consultation was explored in detail between 
His Excellency Joao Neves da Fontoura and his 
advisers and representatives of this Government 
during the Foreign Ministei's Conference in 
Washington. It was then decided between our 
two governments to establish at Rio de Janeiro a 
Joint Group on Emergency Supply Problems, the 
functions of which are : 

a) to ascertain and submit recommendations on essen- 
tial needs of the Brazilian economy for scarce prod- 
ucts to be imported from the United States : 

6) to consult on measures for facilitating the export 
to the United States of Brazilian products needed 
in the economy of the United States; 

c) to act as an instrumentality for continuous con- 
sultation within the meaning of Resolution XVI 
of the Fourth Consultative Meeting; 

d) to make recommendations for improving the op- 
eration of the systems of export control and priori- 
ties adopted by the two countries. 

I am happy to note that in your discussions in 
Washington you have expressed satisfaction over 
the work of this Joint Group. It should be the 
intention of our two governments to obtain the 
maximum usefulness of this group, and it is the 
firm intention of our Government to support the 
work of this group to the fullest possible extent. 

October 22, 195? 

Letter of Credence 


The newly appointed Ambassador of Panama, 
Don Roberto M. Heurtematte, presented his cre- 
dentials to the President on October 2, 1951. For 
the text of the translation of the Ambassador's 
remarks and for the text of the President's reply, 
see Department of State press release 886 of Octo- 
ber 2. 

Transcript of Discussion on 
China Policy Made Public 

[Rcleiiiscd to the press October 11] 

At the request of the Senate Internal Security 
Committee and the subcommittee of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee considering the 
nomination of Ambassador Philip C. Jessup to be 
a U.S. delegate to the forthcoming U.N. General 
Assembly, tiie Department of State on October 
9 released to that Committee and subcommittee 
the transcript of the round-table discussion held in 
the State Department on October 6, 7, and 8, 1949, 
on American policy toward China. In view of the 
public discussion that has taken place concerning 
this meeting and the requests for its release, the 
transcript is being made public. 

In the summer of 1949, Secretary Acheson in- 
vited Everett Case, president of Colgate Univer- 
sity, and Raymond Fosdick, former president of 
the Rockefeller Foundation, to work with Am- 
bassador Philip C. Jessup in a study of problems 
confronting the United States throughout Asia. 

On August 18 Ambassador Jessup wrote a letter 
to a considerable number of individuals who had 
either had extensive personal experience in the 
Far East or who had made a special study of the 
area. He invited a written summary of their views 
on the objectives of U.S. policy. The list was 
drawn up in order to elicit as many different points 
of view as possible. The list included among 
others former Ambassador William Bullitt, for- 
mer Under Secretary William R. Castle, former 
Ambassador Stanley Hornbeck, former Under Sec- 
retar}^, Joseph E. Grew, Admiral Harry E. Yar- 
nell, and former President Isaiah Bowman of 
Johns Hopkins University. In addition, it was 
decided to bring together a similar group of people 
for an informal conference. 

In order to make the views expressed at this 
meeting available to Department officers con- 
cerned but imable to attend, a stenographic record 
was made. A compilation of the principal sec- 
tions of the discussion was distributed to interested 
officers of the Department. 


The Departinent's verbatim transcript of Gov- 
ernor Stassen's statements at the conference ^vas 
sent to him following the meetings, and his prin- 
cipal statement in the report contains his editorial 
changes. Colonel McCann's statements have also 
been edited. The rest of the transcript is unedited. 

The participants were informed at the outset of 
the meeting that there would be no effort to arrive 
at a consensus of views. They were also told that 
the transcript would not be made available to 
anyone outside the Department, so that there could 
be the freest possible exchange of ideas without 
the necessity of careful consideration of phrase- 

In view of the requests from the Senate subcom- 
mittees, the Department has recently inquired of 
the participants concerning their willingness to 
have the full transcript released to the public. 
All agreed to the release of the transcript. 

In recent hearings before the Senate Subcom- 
mittee on Internal Security, Mr. Stassen has 
declared that: 

(a) There was a prevailing group at the con- 
ference and that there were two leaders in this 
group, Owen Lattimore and Lawrence Rosinger. 

(b) This group recommended 10 points for 
American policy in China and in Asia. 

(c) There was a "prevailing agreement" on the 
10 points. 

■ A careful scrutiny of the transcript discloses 
that Mr. Stassen's statements are factually in- 
correct. The transcript fails to reveal a "pre- 
vailing group" led by Mr. Lattimore and Mr. 
Rosinger — or anyone else. The reading fails to 
disclose a 10-point policy recommendation upon 
which there was a "prevailing agi-eement." 

One of the topics of discussion at the round table 
was the question of recognition or nonrecognition 
of Communist China. The transcript indicates 
that a majority of the round-table participants 
inclined toward eventual recognition — with due 
attention given to the question of timing — or be- 
lieved that eventually recognition was inevitable 
in view of the probability that the Communists 
would gain complete control of Chinese territory. 
At no point, however, did the discussions take 
the shape of anything resembling a policy recom- 
mendation. Such was not the purpose of the 
round table, and nothing of that character resulted. 

The record of the U.S. Government in its re- 
fusal to accord recognition to tli©, Communist 
regime in Peiping from before the round-table 
conference to elate is thoroughly documented from 
official records. These records have been made 
available to the Senate Committee on Foreign Re- 
lations. These show conclusively that the De- 
partment of State has never advocated the recog- 
nition of Communist China. Therefore it is 
beyond challenge that any statements made by 
Mr. Stassen to the effect that a recognition policy 
favored by a majority of persons at the round- 


table conference was either favored or followed 
by the Department of State are not correct. 

It is apparent from the transcript that the dis- 
cussion was arranged for the purpose, first, of 
obtaining a full expression of varying points of 
view and, secondly, of having those various points 
of view subjected to the scrutiny and comment of 
persons holding other views. It is apparent from 
the transcriiDt that those who took part in the dis- 
cussion were made fully aware of the fact that the 
group was not being asked to make any recom- 
mendations as a gi-oup nor even to attempt to ar- 
rive at a consensus. The purpose of the meeting 
was to give to those in the Department who were 
charged with the responsibility of recommending 
policy the assurance that they were being given 
the benefit of a full and free discussion of a given 
situation by an informed group of citizens who 
had no official responsibility. 

Secretary Acheson Comments 
on Mr. Stassen's Testimony 

[Released to the press October 10] 

In anstoer to questions concerning testimony of 
Harold Stassen, before the Senate judiciary Sui- 
comniittee on Internal Secn-nty, with respect to a 
White House meeting in 1949, Secretary Acheson 
at his neivs conference on October 10 made the 
following statement: 

On January 14, 1949, the President directed that 
the military supplies under the China Aid Act 
should be delivered insofar as possible in accord- 
ance with the advice of our military authorities in 
China. At the time this decision was made the 
military situation in China was deteriorating. It 
was therefore essential that the advice of the U.S. 
military authorities on the ground govern the ship- 
ment of supplies, in order to prevent such supplies 
from being delivered into Communist hands. 

Accordingly, the advice of Maj. Gen. David G. 
Barr, the senior U.S. military representative in 
China, was requested. On January 26, 1949, Gen- 
eral Barr recommended that pending clarification 
of the situation in China no military aid supplies 
be shipped. He pointed out that there was not 
only the danger of these munitions' falling into 
the hands of Chinese Communists but also the dan- 
ger that they might be sold and used in countries 
engaged in internal dissent adjacent to or south 
of China. On February 2, 1949, the Secretary of 
Defense, James Forrestal, presented the problem 
posed by General Barr's report to the top military 
and civilian advisers of the President. 

On February 3 it was agreed that the Presideiit 
should advise congressional leaders that it seemed 
wise, pending clarification of the situation, to sus- 
pend shipments except for selected materials which 

Department of %tate Bulletin 

could be used effectively in view of the existing 
military situation. It was also agreed that he 
should point out to them the danger that ship- 
ments might well fall into the hands of the Chinese 
Communists or other interests inimical to the 
United States. 

I concurred in these recommendations. 

On February 5, 19-19, the President, acting on 
the above recommendations, called a meeting at 
the White House, attended by the Vice President, 
the Secretary of State, Senators Connally and 
^^andenberg, and Congressmen Bloom and Eaton, 
to discuss this matter. It was the unanimous opin- 
ion of the congressional advisers present that no 
action should be taken which would in effect place 
an embargo or stoppage on continued shipments 
to China. 

On February 8, 1949, the President directed 
that, in order not to discourage continued Chinese 
resistance to Communist aggression, shipments of 
military aid should not be suspended or termi- 
nated but directed that a close check be kept on 
the situation. 

These are the facts relative to the situation. It 
is clear that no proposal was put forward as a 
"dramatic peace move" but that the question at 
the time had to do with whether deliveries of mili- 
tary supplies in the military situation of early 
1949 would have any beneficial effect or might re- 
sult in such equipment falling into Comnumist 
hands. It is also clear that Mr. Jessup, who was a 
member of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations 
at the time, was not involved in any way in this 

Ambassador Jessup Refutes 
Mr. Stassen's Charges 

Following are texts of letters se7\t hy A7nbassa- 
dor at Large Philip C. Jessup to Senator John J. 
Sparkman, chairman of the Senate Subco?nmdttee 
on Internal Security. 

The first of these letters, dated Octoher 10 and 
released to the press on the same date, refers to 
an assertion hy Harold E. Stassen that ATnhas- 
sador Jessup in 191^7 was opposed to the Truman 
Doctrine of aid to Greece and Turkey; the second 
letter, dated October 11 and released to the press 
on the same date, substantiates Mr. Jessup^s denial 
that he was presey\t at a. White House conference 
on China policy held on February 5, 19^9, as al- 
leged by Mr. Stassen before the Subcommittee on 
Internal Security. 


Dear Senator Sparkman : 

M,v attention has been drawn to a communica- 
tion to you from Harold Stassen in which he 
refers to some lectures which I delivered at tlic 

Claremont College in 1947. Mr. Stassen asserts 
that in one of these lectures I opposed the Tru- 
man Doctrine of aid to Greece and Turkey. 

Tliis is a completely erroneous assertion. I did 
at the time take exception to the form in which 
the President enunciated the doctrine but not to 
the {principle of aid to Greece and Turkey. The 
lecture to which Mr. Stassen refers was published 
by Claremont College in 1947 in a book entitled 
The Internutional Problem of Governing Man- 
kind which I understand is available to your Com- 
mittee. If this is not the case, I shall be glad to 
procure a copy and send it to you. 

The quotation in ]\Ir. Stassen's telegram is a 
composite of two different passages in the lecture 
separated by ten pages of discussion. The first 
part appears on page 40 and the second part on 
page 51. The title of this lecture is "International 
Guaranty of Democratic Government" and its 
general thesis is that there are great potentialities 
in and through the United Nations for handling 
international problems arising from civil strife. 
The exception that I took to the President's state- 
ment on March 12, 1947,^ enunciating the Truman 
Doctrine was due to my belief that his statement 
had not sufficiently taken account of the role of the 
United Nations in this matter. The Government 
of the United States, itself, took account of tliis 
factor, to which many people called attention at 
the time, through a statement made by Ambassa- 
dor Austin in the Security Council on March 28, 
1947. To the same end the Congress adopted at 
the suggestion of the late Senator Vandenberg 
a provision in Public Law 75 approved May 22, 
1947, authorizing aid to Greece. The preamble of 
the law contains several clauses stating that the 
United States aid is in support of the principles 
and purposes of the United Nations. Section 5 of 
the Act provides that the United States aid shall 
be withdrawn inter alia "If the Security Council 
finds (with respect to which finding the United 
States waives the exercise of any veto) or the 
General Assemblv finds that action taken or as- 
sistance furnished by the United Nations makes 
the continuance of such assistance unnecessary or 

In my lecture I referred to Ambassador Austin's 
statement in the Security Council but stated my 
view that clarification of our full support of 
United Nations procedures should have been given 
in advance. The course which at the time I advo- 
cated is the course which the United States Gov- 
ernment has actually followed in regard to Greece 
and Turkey, namely, that of extending aid in full 
agreement andjn cooperation with the activities of 
the United Nations, although it was not found 
appropriate to utilize all of the measure I sug- 
gested. This policy of the United States has been 

I emphasized the proved validity of this policy 
in an address which I delivered in Washington on 

' Bn.i.ETiN of Mar. 23, 1947, p. 534. 

Ocfober 22, 1957 

!)71198— 51 3 


September 26, 1951 - (of which I attach a copy ) , in 
which I made the following statement: 

Briefly, what we can and what we must do in the face 
of tlie Soviet threat is to proceed resolutely upon our 
present course. In cooperation with our friends we must 
continue to develop strength-in-being which will offset 
that of the Soviet Government and its satellites. The 
Soviets are realists. They recognize facts and respect 

To develop strength which is dedicated to the preserva- 
tion of peace has been the unwavering policy of this 
Government ever since the Soviet Government revived 
its predatory purposes following World War II. It is the 
policy which underlay the Truman Doctrine — the Presi- 
dent's resolute aid to Greece and Turkey announced in 
1947. It is the iKilicy which inspired the Mar.shall Plan, 
launched by General Marshall in 1948, for aid to the 
devastated nations of Europe — the plan which has ma- 
tured into EcA, Point 4, and the Mutual Security Pro- 
gram. It is the policy which met Soviet force in Berlin 
with the great airlift in 1948. 

This policy produced the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. 
It Is the policy which underlies Secretary Acbeson's pro- 
gram of "situations of strength" — the program charted in 
his Berkeley speech of March 16, 1950.^ It is the same 
iwlicy which enabled us to act swiftly and decisively, in 
cooperation with the vast majority of our fellow mem- 
bers of the United Nations, in defense of Korea when it 
was wantonly attacked on June 25, 1950. 

Later in the speech I referred to the success of 
the Truman Doctrine in enabling Greece to throw 
off the Communist-supported guerrilla attack. 

I should like to conclude by repeating that an 
examination of the entire Claremont lecture will 
reveal that Mr. Stassen is completely wrong in 
intimating that I opposed aid to Greece and Tur- 
key and in his further insinuation that in 1047 I 
was expressing an isolationist view. Quite the con- 
trary, the whole lecture is devoted to expounding 
my conviction that the international approach 
through the United Nations is the proper course 
for the United States to follow. This actually is 
the policy of the United States Government. 

Since Mr. Stassen's telegram was made public. 
I am also making this letter public. 


Dear Senator Sparkman : 

Mr. Harold Stassen testified before your sub- 
committee on the basis of his recollection of a con- 
versation with the late Senator Vandenberg that 
I had attended a meeting in the White House on 
February 5, 1949. The fact that Mr. Stassen's 
statement was not correct has already been estab- 
lished by the official records of the United States 
Mission to the United Nations which show that 
I was in New York on February 5, 1949, and there- 
fore could not have attended a meeting in Wash- 
ington at the same time. I enclose a copy of a 
telegram from Ambassador Austin citing the 

' I hia., Oct. 8, 1951, p. 573. 
* Ibid., Mar. 27, 19.50, p. 473. 

record. Since the question of my attendance at 
this meeting at the White House has attracted 
public attention I think you would wish me to 
supply you for the use of the subcommittee further 
information regarding my activity on that day and 
during that period. 

The fact is that at 11 : 00 in the morning of Feb- 
ruary 5. 1949, when the meeting took place in the 
Wliite House, I was calling on General Eisen- 
hower, as President of Columbia Univei-sity, to 
discuss with him the extension of my leave of 
absence from the University in order to enable me 
to continue in government service. 

The background of this visit is as follows : 

On January 10, 1949, 1 went to the White House 
with Mr. Lovett, who was then Acting Secretary 
of State. I had come down from New York at 
Mr. Lovett's request. We went in to see the Presi- 
dent at 12 : 30 and discussed with him a question 
concerning an appointment to a United Nations 
commission dealing with an aspect of the Pales- 
tine case with which the United States Mission to 
the United Nations was concerned; I was then 
attached to the Mission and had been dealing with 
the Palestine question. 

The President also discussed with me the ques- 
tion whether I would take on another assignment 
with the Government. I had written him on De- 
cember 15, 1948, submitting my resignation, since, 
as I explained, I had been serving at the United 
States Mission to the United Nations during a 
year's leave of absence from Columbia University, 
which would expire in February, 1949. I told 
the President on January 10 that I still felt that 
I should return to my university work. The 
President said that he would like me to stay in the 
government service and asked me to think the 
matter over. 

Mr. Lovett remained with the President after 
I left, there being a Cabinet luncheon at the White 
House on that day. 

According to the travel vouchers on file. I came 
back to Washington from New York on January 
30 and my own records as well as those of the Sec- 
retary of State show that on the following day 
I saw Secretary of State Acheson who had taken 
office on January 21. The Secretary told me that 
the President and he wished me to stay on in gov- 
ernment service as Ambassador at Large and 
after some discussion I told him that I would try 
to have my leave of absence from Columbia ex- 
tended in order to take on this work. On Febru- 
ary 4 I sent to the President and to Secretai'y 
Acheson the enclosed letters. It appears from the 
corrections on the carbons in my file that the let- 
ters were dictated on February 1 but mailed on 
February 4. This accounts for the fact that in 
my letter to the Secretary I referred to "our con- 
versation yesterday" with obvious reference to our 
talk on the 31st of January. I returned to New 


Department of State Bulletin 

York on the night of January 31 and was in New 
York the rest of that week. 

As ah-eacl,y established by the official records of 
the United States Mission, I left the office of the 
Mission at 2 Park Avenue, New York City, at 
10 :30 on the morning of February 5 and went to 
Columbia University where I saw President Eisen- 
hower about extending my leave of absence. 
Under date of February 9 I sent to General Eisen- 
hower a formal request for such further leave 
which I had first dictated on February 1 but pre- 
sumably had not wished to send until I had talked 
with him. On February 10, 1949 it was announced 
that the President had appointed me Ambassador 
at Large.'' On February 12, General Eisenhower 
wrote me that the University had granted my ex- 
tended leave. Copies of that letter and of my 
letter of February 9 are attached. On March 1, 
1949, the Senate confirmed my appointment as 
Ambassador at Large.^ 

It is further pei-tinent for me to state that dur- 
ing January and February 1949, I was not con- 
cerned with the questions of the China policy of 
the United States and did not participate in any 
of the discussions leading up to the Wliite House 
conference of February 5. During this period I 
did represent the United States at meetings of the 
United Nations Security Council dealing with the 
Indonesian question and, at one session, with the 
Kashmir case. As appears from the facts which I 
have set forth above, up until January 31, 1949, 1 
was planning to retire from government service 
and return to my duties at Columbia University. 
It was not until the end of June 1949, that my 
assignments in the Department of State began to 
include questions of general Far Eastern Policy. 
For the convenience of the Committee I enclose 
herewith a list of my principal official assignments 
from January 5, 1948, to the present. 

To: Srrrrtnrii of State 

No. : UNMIS 68, October 9, 1951 5 : 50 p. m. 

For: Paul Meyer, UNA, and Adrian Fisher, L 
Re : Ambassador Jessup's Whereabouts Feb. 5, 1949 

In reply to Department query by phone today, offi- 
cial records of U.S. Mission to U.N. show that Ambas- 
sador Jessup was conveyed in one of our vehicles from our 
office at 2 Park Avenue to Columbia University between 
10 : 30 and 11 : 00 a. m. on February 5, 1949, and subse- 
quently from Columbia University to his temporary resi- 
dence at 407 East 44 Street, arriving at the latter at 1 : 00 
p. m. Five minutes later he was driven in the mission 
car to his office at 2 Park Avenue. Our records show he 
was the sole passenger on that trip. 

In addition, our official mission records show that 
Ambassador and Mrs. Jessup were among the guests at 
an official dinner given by Mrs. Austin and myself that 
evening at the Waldorf-Astoria in honor of tlie departure 
from this country of the French Ambassador to the U.N., 
M. Parodi. 


Enclosure 2 

Febbuabt 4, 1949 

Dear Dean : 

As I told you in our conversation yesterday, I appreciate 
very deeply your wanting me to take on the new job. 
Certainly one of the aspects of it which makes it particu- 
larly attractive is the fact that it is you wlio will be Secre- 
tarv. If I can be helpful to you in carrying on your 
terrific job that will be something worth while. I do feel 
deeply, however, as I told you, that I have a sincere con- 
viction that I should take on this work on a temporary 
basis, not onlv because I am convinced a career of re- 
search and writing is the one to which I ought to return, 
but because I think from the Department's point of view 
this set-up ought to be considered an experimental one 

Since the President talked with me about the matter, I 
have felt that I ought to write to him also. I enclose a 
copy of the letter which I am sending him. 
Very sincerely yours, 

Philip C. Jessup 

Enclosure 3 

Februaby 4, 1949 

' Ibid., Feb. 13, 1949, p. 185. 
' md.. Mar. 13, 1949, p. 332. 

Ocfober 22, 7951 

Dear Mr. President: 

I have learned from Dean Acheson that, in accord 
with what you told me personally, you do not wish to 
accept my resignation from Government service at this 
time. I must of course accept your decision and I deeply 
appreciate this indication of your confidence in me. At 
the same time, I am sure you will not mind my saying 
that I have not changed my own conviction that X can, 
in the long run, render greater service in my university 

1 understand the needs of the moment and the difficulty 
of finding new personnel at short notice. I do not believe 
that it is impossible to find a number of other persons 
who can, in the ensuing years, share and take over various 
of the tasks which need to be performed in the conduct 
of our international relations. I therefore ask you to 
allow me to take on a new assignment on a temporary 
basis and to defer the acceptance of my resignation 
from Government service only until the time marked by 
the end of the fourth session of the General Assembly 
of the United Nations which will meet in September of 
this year and which presumably will end in December 
1949. During the interval I am sure you and the Secre- 
tary of State will have ample opportunity to select some- 
one to continue with this work. 

I should also like to say that, despite my basic convic- 
tion that I should return to Columbia University, in ac- 
cepting a further temporary governmental assignment I 
do with a feeling of great satisfaction that any work 
which I now undertake in connection with our interna- 
tional relations is to be done under your leadership and 
that of Dean Acheson. The general program laid down 
in your inaugural address and the i)hilosophy umlerlying 
it seem to me to give great promise of accomplishments 
of vast historical significance in terms of a foreign policy 
based upon the United Nations and the strengthening 
of that organization. 

Respectfully yours, 

Philip C. Jessup 

[Enclosure 4, not here printed, is a letter dated Febru- 
ary 9, 1949, from Ambassador Jessup to Dwiiiht D. Eisen- 
hower, president of Columbia University, requesting an 
additional year's leave of absence. The reply (enclosure 
5), dated February 12, states: 

"The university feels justly proud of the high honor con- 
ferred upon you by President Truman and Secretary 
.\cheson. We regret you will not be back with us as we 
so confidently expected, but our traditions of public service 
are such that we grant you, without hesitation, the leave 
of absence for the additional year you request to permit 
you to fill the important post of Ambassador at Large." 

Enclosure 6. not here printed, is a list of Ambas.sador 
Jessup's principal assignments since January 5, 1948.] 



Conference on World Land Tenure Problems 

On October 8 the Conference on World Land 
Tenure Problems was convened at Madison, Wis.; 
the Conference, sponsored by the University of 
Wisconsin and attended by representatives of 50 
countries, will continue until November 17. 


I would like to express our interest in and sup- 
port of a significant event which opened yes- 
terday at the University of Wisconsin. 

The University of Wisconsin is convening in 
Madison, a Conference on World Land Tenure 
Problems. For 6 weeks, men and women from 
50 countries are going to be studying at this Con- 
ference what can be done about protjlems having 
to do with land use and landownership — includ- 
ing such questions as how to improve agricultural 
marketing techniques, how to get better farm- 
credit systems, and what can be done about out- 
moded land-tenure systems. Following the Con- 
ference, a group of younger representatives of 
about 25 of these countries will study the same 
subjects in more detail for a year. 

We think this is worth widespread attention 
because this project is a first-rate example of 
people-to-people diplomacy which grows right out 
of our own American experience. 

These are matters which directly affect the lives 
of three quarters of the world's population. For 
millions of people in the world, there is no more 
urgent problem than the impoverishment result- 
ing from primitive methods of cultivation of the 
land under antiquated systems of landownership. 
Soviet propagandists have dangled promises of 
great changes to these impoverished and hungry 
people, and to many, in such a state, it may have 
seemed tha t any change must be an improvement. 

' Made on Oct. 9 anrl released tn the press on the same 

But the peasants of Eastern Europe, like the pea- 
sants of Russia, have learned that Soviet "col- 
lectivization," or land reform imposed from the 
top, brings worse oppression than before. 

Instead of this false lure to desperate people, 
we believe that an exchange of experiences among 
the free democracies can offer real guidance and 
help. In our own country, almost from the very 
beginning of our national existence, we have re- 
garded our family-sized farms, our homestead 
laws, our laws relating to farm ci-edit, as being of 
fundamental importance to the prosperity and sta- 
bility of the entire nation. Our democracy has its 
roots in a sound land policy. 

We have sought to demonstrate this conviction 
on our part in the Occupation of Japan, where 
under General MacArthur's leadership, a land 
policy was instituted under which about Ma per- 
cent of the farmers are now full owners of the land 
they cultivate, in contrast to some 30 percent 6 
years ago. 

This practical example, coupled with the im- 
provements in techniques of farming which are 
being demonstrated in many parts of the world 
under the Point Four Program, can help millions 
of people to understand that freedom and progress 
move forward hand-in-hand. 

We wish to congratulate the University of Wis- 
consin on sponsoring an international conference 
of such significance. It is a genuinely constructive 
fulfillment of the spirit of the resolutions on land 
reform which have been adopted within the past 
year by the U.N. General Assembly and more 
recently by the Economic and Social Council. 


Department of State Bulletin 


by Willard L. Thorp 

Assistant Secretmy for Economic Affaii's - 

In all probability, there have never before been 
so many dissatisiied people in the world. This is 
not because there is more starvation, more pain, or 
more misery than at other times. The facts are 
quite to the contrary. Tlie rising discontent is 
rather because of knowledge — the increased 
knowledge of how other people live. When people 
lived in isolated communities, completely ignorant 
of the world beyond the horizon, they had only 
local standards of comparison. But today, they 
have information, and misinformation, about the 
delights of distant green pastures. This becomes 
the basis of resentment against their lives and 
their surroundings. The resulting discontent is 
responsible for much of today's political instabil- 
ity and economic unrest. 

The answer lies in large part in further in- 
creasing the flow of knowledge. If greater 
knowledge has contributed to the creation of dis- 
content, it can also be an instrument for dealing 
with it. The discontent also creates an oppor- 
tunity. Periods of complacency are never periods 
of progress. Given a desire for improvement, 
streams of knowledge can flow back to these people 
in many countries, and they can benefit from the 
experience of others who have made greater 

In this general context, no one can possibly 
overstate the importance of the problems which 
you have come to Madison to consider, those re- 
lating to land, and the people on the land. You 
will be talking about two-thirds of the world's 
population. There are many countries where 
more than three-fourths of the people are on the 
land. In no country can their problems and atti- 
tudes be disregarded. This Conference, and each 
of you individually, can contribute greatly to the 
development and flow of knowledge so essential 
to the process of economic and social betterment. 

Problems of the Tenant Farmer 

There are tremendous differences in the lives 
and productivity of the people on the land, 
throughout the world. Let me describe the kind 
of situation which presents the greatest problems. 
Let us consider a farmer who has to support his 
family of six on tlie produce of less than 2 acres. 
He does not own the land. He rents it from an 
absentee landlord who takes two-thirds of the 
crop for rent. He has no security of tenure. He 
doesn't know how long he can work on this farm. 
Another tenant may come along next year and 
offer even higher rent. This farmer has had to 

' Excerpt.s from an adrlress made before the Conference 
on World Land Tenure Problems on Oct. 9 and released 
to the press on the same date. 

borrow money from a professional money lender. 
He pays 40 percent interest and his debt is bigger 
now than it was a year ago. He has friends who 
pay 00 percent interest — one who borrows at 80 

This farmer of oui-s is tired and discouraged. 
He has to farm on worn-out soil with the most 
primitive tools. He can never allow any land to 
be fallow, and he has never even heard of com- 
mercial fertilizer. He uses seed saved from his 
own crop of the year before. His 2 acres are di- 
vided into 3 plots, all widely scattered. It takes 
him almost 2 hours to go from his home to the 
nearest plot. That part of his crop which he sells 
he takes to market on the back of a donkey. And 
when he gets it to market, he must take whatever 
price is offered — he has no method of storage. 

Last year he had nothing to market. He gave 
all his surplus to the money lender in partial pay- 
ment of his interest charges. I need not describe 
his standard of living — it can hardly be called 

The problem of this farmer is not that he does 
not work hard enough, although his energies may 
be sapped by bad health conditions and malnu- 
trition. As a matter of fact, he works from dawn 
to dark. His difficulty is that he is enmeshed in 
an archaic economic and social system. He is the 
victim of a state of technological ignorance and 
of the absence of the help which might be pro- 
vided by capital, equipment, marketing organiza- 
tion, and the like. 

Some have suggested that the best solution for 
a country where such conditions prevail is to dis- 
regard the situation of farmers like this and place 
emphasis upon industrial development. I do not 
wish to decry the importance of industrial devel- 
opment, but it is a tragic conclusion to insist that 
it is the exclusive path to economic betterment. 
Surely the improvement of agriculture must be a 
prime objective of economic development. 

"Land Reform" Sometimes Synonymous 
With Collectivization 

A general program to alleviate land problems 
is frequently — though not always — referred to as 
land reform. This assembly is called the Con- 
ference on World Land Tenure Problems. The 
U.N. General Assembly and the Economic and 
Social Council have used the label "land reform" 
in their resolutions on the subject. I do not wish 
to quibble over words, but sometimes labels are 
misleading, and I wish to sound a note of caution. 
In some parts of the world, the term "land re- 
form" has been widely used as a cover for the 
ruthless confiscation of the land by the State and 
the liquidation of private holdings and often of 
private holders as well. The propaganda appeal 
of the label is strong, but such a process is not land 
reform in any sense. It begins with the promise of 
land to the farmer. Very quietly it becomes 

October 22, J95J 


merely the transfer of ownership from private 
owners to the State. Tliere is no improvement in 
the status of the worker on the hvnd. Instead, in 
many instances, harsh production quotas and de- 
livery deadlines make the farmer's condition worse 
—often desperate. A story in the New York 
Ti7nes a few davs ago (September 2G, 1951) con- 
firms this fact'. It tells of desperate Soviet 
farmers who have resorted to stealing from the 
collective farms. As a result, new regulations 
have had to be established requiring that the books 
and accounts of collective farms be audited U times 
a year by Communist Party and Government 

This is not land reform. Nothing can be called 
land reform which does not have as its basic and 
primary concern the improved welfare of the man 
•who works the land. The economic and social 
institutions surrounding his life on the farm must 
be improved to bring him a higher standard of 
living and increased psychological satisfactions. 

There are many who think of land reform pri- 
marily as redistribution of the land — as the break- 
ing up of large landholdings into small ones. This 
may be a part of a land-reform program, but cer- 
tainly only one part — and not the most important 
one at that. In fact, there are certain crop and 
land conditions where large-scale enterprises may 
be the most efficient, although there still may be 
opportunities for economic and social improve- 

The U. N. Economic and Social Council at its 
recent meeting in Geneva adopted a resolution 
which indicates quite clearly the broad range of 
objectives that nmst be sought in a genuine land- 
reform program.^ This resolution, which was in- 
troduced and strongly supported by the United 
States, covers efficient size of farm units, security 
of tenure on the land, the right to ownership of 
land by the man who works it, clear titles to land 
and water, adequate credit at reasonable rates, 
more efficient marketing methods, and equitable 
taxes on land and its produce. The resolution also 
suggests the development of farm cooperatives 
for cultivation, marketing, and processing agri- 
cultural products. 

These recommendations relate directly to agri- 
cultural matters. But there are other problems 
■which do not arise from defects in the agrarian 
structure itself. These too nmst be remedied if 
the strictly agricultural programs are to succeed. 
The Economic and Social Council recognized this 
important fact in its resolution. It rcconnnended 
diversification of economies so that agriculture 
might be better integrated into general economic 
development. It rcconnnended the establishment 
of small-scale and cottage industries. It urged 
nations to develop literacy programs, to engage in 
research, and to extend education through exten- 
sion services. It might well also have noted the 
relevance of i)ublic-health programs. 

' r.i :i.i.KTiN of Sept. 17, 1951, p. 473. 

These many elements in a genuine land-refoi-ra 
program must, of course, be spelled out in much 
greater detail. They will vary in their form and 
applicability from country to country. However, 
in one respect they will be similar everywhere — 
they often will require political action. In a 
number of countries there are many competent 
persons who understand the economics of land 
reform. There are many who know the tech- 
niques. But frequently these talents cannot be 
put to work. The required legislation may be 
lacking. Necessary funds are not appropriated. 
Substantial progress often requires political de- 
cisions, and there are often strong-vested interests 
which stand in the way. 

This problem may have to be solved before con- 
siderable economic benefits can be realized. 
Where this is true, a long and careful educational 
program may have to be instituted. Widespread 
public education through discussion may be nec- 
essary. The benefits of an improved land-system 
will have to be made clear at every level — na- 
tional, state, and local ; in the cities as well as 
on the farms. 

This is a difficult problem, but one not without 
hope of solution. Each one of us has within our 
own governmental structure the means of solution 
through our own established processes. It re- 
quires work and imagination, but it can be done. 
In fact, it must be done. 

The United States has been actively engaged 
in improving the lot of the farmer on the land — 
land reform, if you will — since the very begin- 
ning of its national existence. 

We recognize, of course, that our land problems 
have been different from those of many other 
countries. In many respects they have been less 
acute. We were most generously endowed with 
fertile soil. We have never experienced severe 
population pressure on the land. We have had 
large areas of public lands to dispose of, but, 
nevertheless, we have had land problems to solve. 
In common with others, we will continue to have 
problems. This is not a reason for complaint. 
It is the pattern of any evolving and progressive 

U.S. Policy: Farmer-Owned, Family-Sized Farms 

For ourselves, we in the United States have 
been firm believers in the farmer-owned, family- 
sized farm. We consider it one of the bulwarks of 
a healthy agriculture and a vigorous tlomocracj'. 
For this reason we began very early in our national 
life to make it relatively easy for farmers to pur- 
chase Government-owned lands in parcels of mod- 
erate size. Back as far as 1800, ]iublic lands were 
sold at $2 an acre. Later we encouraged the family 
farmer by selling SO acres at $1.25 an acre. And 
this liberal tendency continued througii the pas- 
sage of the Homestead Act of 18(52. This Act gave, 
without charge, ICO acres to anyone who would. 


Department of State Bulletin 

reside upon and cultivate the land for 5 years. As 
a matter of fact, we made purchase of these lands 
too easy. Out of this policy arose one of our most 
difficult problems, the careless and wasteful utiliza- 
tion of land. 

It soon became clear to us that oiimership and 
proper size of farm unit were not in themselves 
enough for a sound land policy. A happy and 
prosperous farmer and a healthy agriculture 
could be assured only with the addition of agricul- 
tural education and research, adequate financial 
and marketing arrangements, good transportation 
at reasonable rates, a fair tax structure, and so on. 
In 1862 our Congress passed a law giving public 
lands to each State to endow and support a college 
where instruction was to be given in agriculture 
and the mechanical arts. In 1887 another Act 
provided funds for the establishment of agricul- 
tural experiment stations in the various state col- 
leges. Additional programs have provided funds 
for distribution among the state agricultural col- 
leges for short-term winter courses, correspondence 
courses, lectures, and publications dealing with 
land and related problems. 

Agricultural education was augmented by the 
creation of a Federal Commissioner of Agriculture 
to collect and disseminate agricultural information 
among the people of the United States. This 
bureau later became a Government Department 
whose head, the Secretary of Agriculture, is a 
member of the President's Cabinet. 

We have had to pass laws to provide credit for 
the farmer. Some needed money to buy lands; 
others needed funds to tide them over from one 
crop to another. Ordinary commercial banks did 
not meet this need, so, in 1916, we established a 
system of Federal land banks. Later we organized 
the Farm Credit Administration which provides 
a coordinated system for the extension of both 
short- and long-term credit to farmers. This was 
helpful to the established family-farmer, but it 
didn't solve the problem of the farm tenant or the 
hired farm-worker who wanted to buy a farm. To 
encourage this development, we enacted legislation 
to authorize loans which could be repaid over a 
period of 40 years. Small farmers can get loans 
to enlarge their farms or to build them up with 
livestock and equipment. 

These, then, are some of the things we have done 
to improve the position of the farmer on the land 
in the United States. These, together with others, 
such as encouragement and aid to cooperatives and 
the Interstate Commerce Act, to assure fair and 
nondiscriminatory freight rates, constitute our 
land-reform program. We still have problems, 
especially those involving the tenant farmer, the 
share cropper, the hired farm-worker, and more 
recently, the migratory farm-worker. We are 
still struggling with these problems, but even in 
such difficult fields, substantial progress has been 

Ocfober 22, 1951 

U.S. Interest in Land Problems of Other Nations 

Our interest in solutions to land problems has 
not only persisted through the years but it has 
extended to the problems of our neighbors in the 
world community. This is indicated, in part, by 
our strong support last fall of the U.N. General 
Assembly Resolution on Land Reform and of our 
active role in promoting the Land Reform Reso- 
lution adopted by the Economic and Social Council 
in Geneva this summer. 

It has been further demonstrated in Japan 
where, under the Allied Occupation, we encour- 
aged the Japanese Government to initiate, and 
assisted it in the execution of, extensive land- 
reform measures. This program, which I under- 
stand will be discussed in detail during the course 
of this Conference, achieved notable changes in a 
centuries-old, uneconomic, and anti-democratic 
land-system. It brought substantial benefits to 
3,000,000 Japanese farmers, 50 percent of the 
total. Only 30 percent of Japanese farmers were 
full owners of the land which they cultivated 
before land reform. Today approximately 85 
percent are full owners of the land they work 
The percentage of land operated by full'tenants 
has been reduced from 46 percent to 12 percent. 
Absentee ownership has almost completely dis- 
appeared. All of this was done in a little more 
than 2 years in a thoroughly orderly and demo- 
cratic way. 

There are other examples of active land-reform 
programs in other countries, most of which you 
will be discussing later in the Conference— India, 
the Philippines, Italy, Turkey, and many others. 
We can all learn mucli from each other's experi- 
ence. All of them deserve our closest study and 
friendly encouragement. 

I have spoken about the experience of the 
United States with land problems. I wish to make 
it clear that I am not suggesting that the fomi and 
structure of American land-institutions and prac- 
tices provide the solution to the problems of other 
countries. Certainly forms and structures suitable 
to the American economy may not be suitable to 
others. Each nation must find solutions to its own 
problems within the framework of its own cul- 
tural and institutional background. U.S. experi- 
ence will be helpful principally as it can be modi- 
fied and adapted to other situations. 

But while we hold no special brief for American 
form and structure, we do feel a sense of pride in 
the motives and methods of land reform as applied 
by the United States and by other nations of the 
free world. We feel this because in both motives 
and methods, there is a critical difference between 
land reform as practiced in the free world and 
wliat has been improperly called "land reform" in 
the Soviet-dominated world. With respect to mo- 
tives, we seek the economic and social welfare of 
the farmer, rather than the consolidation of the 


power of the State. Witli respect to method, we 
have followed an orderly constitutional pj-ocess 
rather than rely upon the confiscation of property 
and the liquidation of land owners, with all its 
attendant hai-dship. The results of our motives 
and methods have been just as revolutionary, but 
they have achieved the goal of genuine improve- 
ment in a thoroughly practical and democratic 

Foundations for Improvement of World-Wide 
Land Systems 

The report on land I'cform by the U.N. Secre- 
tary-General, published in June of this year, is an 
important new document in this field. It reveals 
land problems of almost f rigjitening proportions. 
It shows the terrific job ahead of us. In another 
sense, however, the report presents a picture of 
promise. It records that a large number of coun- 
tries have recognized the importance of their land 
problems and have set about to solve them. It 
reveals what amounts to a world-wide movement 
to improve the life and output of the farmer on 
the land. 

The important question is : how can this move- 
ment toward land reform be encouraged '? Again 
there must be national answers. It is basically the 
job for the people of each nation. They must want 
it. They must see the importance of land prob- 
lems to their own national development. They 
must become aware of the promise which land 
reform holds for their future. They must define 
their own goals and shape their programs in the 
light of their own institutional backgrounds. 
They must set about the task of training their own 
technicians. They must create a political envii-on- 
ment favorable to the development of an improved 

It is only upon this foundation that the en- 
couragement and assistance of others can be built. 
The United Nations and its agencies can render 
great assistance. The Fao, Unesco, the Ilo — 
each within its own field of special competence — 
can help by accumulating technical "know-how" 
and by making it available to interested nations. 
They shoidd be requested to do so. The United 
Nations and its agencies can and should be urged 
to arrange their meetings to assure the full ex- 
change of land experience among nations. 

Great good and much encouragement can come 
from nongovernmental conferences like this one. 
I can visualize regional conferences of this kind 
being organized in the future — one in Asia, one in 
Latin America, another in Europe, still anotlier 
in the Middle East. Wider participation through- 
out the area, and a sharjjer focus on the problems 
discussed, would provide mutual assistance of 
immense value. 

The United States has no special responsibility 
for, and no unique competence in, solving land 
problems the world over. Solutions to these prob- 

lems do not lie in the heads, or hands, or pockets, 
of any one nation. We have, howevei', encouraged 
and supported the land-reform programs of other 
nations. We will continue that encouragement 
and sujjport. You may be sure that we will con- 
tinue, as we have in the past, to support land 
reforms through international organizations, such 
as the General Assembly, the Economic and 
Social Council, and the Food and Agriculture 

We want to do more than this to encourage 
genuine land reform. In the past, the IT. S. Gov- 
ernment has provided technical aid in connection 
with problems of economic and social organization, 
as well as the technological problems involved in 
land tenure and related fields. We have provided 
both technical and financial assistance to drain, 
irrigate, and otherwise reclaim, lands not under 
cultivation. We have provided technical and fi- 
nancial aid to industrialization and other worthy 
projects which have also served the purpose of 
providing employment for surplus farm-popula- 
tions. We will continue to do these things. We 
will do whatever else we can appropriately do to 
encourage and assist programs which show prom- 
ise of bringing lasting benefits to farm people and 
of enhancing the role of agriculture in the na- 
tional economy. 

I liave great hoi>es for this Conference, as I am 
sure each of you have. We do not, of course, ex- 
pect final solutions to the problems or even to 
segments of problems. Land problems arise only 
in part from the land itself. They arise more 
from the relationship of people to the land, the 
dependence of people upon the land, and their 
attitudes toward it. As one goal is reached or 
approached, another goal emerges. The solution 
to one problem sows the seed of still other prob- 
lems. The continuous quest for a better life itself 
creates fresh problems. 

You have undertaken to explore a problem of 
tremendous significance. Undoubtedly it is a ma- 
jor contributor to the unrest so prevalent in the 
world today. The problem is difficult and com- 
plex. The stakes are high. The rewards of a 
succe.ssful attack upon the problem are immeas- 
urable. They will come in terms of a happier 
and more humane life, a more efficient economy, a 
more vigorous democrac}', and a stable and last- 
ing peace. On behalf of my Government I wel- 
come you to Madison and am happy to extend to 
you our very best wishes for a successful and 
fruitful conference. 

The United States in tlie United Nations 

A weekly feature, does not appear in this 
issue, but will be resumed in the issue of 
October 29. 


Department of State Bulletin 

International Materials Conference 

Nickel and Cobalt Allocation Accepted 

The InternatioiKil Materials Conference an- 
nounced on October 11 that the governments of the 
countries represented on the Manganese-Nickel- 
Cobalt Committee have accepted the Committee's 
recommendation that plans of distribution of 
nickel and cobalt for the fourth quarter of 1951 
be put into operation at once. These countries are 
the following: Belgium (representing Benelux), 
Brazil, Canada, Cuba, France, the Federal Repub- 
lic of Germany, India, Norway, the Union of 
South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. 

The plans of allocation have been forwarded to 
all intei-ested governments for immediate imple- 

In both cases the total available production of 
primary metal, oxides, and salts of all participat- 
ing countries has been taken into account for 
distribution ; individual allocations represent en- 
titlements for consumption in the fourth quarter, 
out of domestic j^roduction or imports. At the 
same time the Committee has calculated the net 
amount that each country shall purchase for im- 
port or sell for export during the quarter. 

In order to ensure that countries normally im- 
porting semimanufactured products will continue 
to receive sufficient supplies of these products for 
essential end uses, the Committee recommended 
that exporting countries maintain their exports in 
accordance with normal patterns of trade and at a 
level commensurate with their allocation. 

In accepting the plans of distribution, govern- 
ments assume the responsibility for seeing that 
their allocations are not exceeded and for taking 
whatever action is necessary to implement the 

All countries were urged to adopt measures to 
eliminate nonessential uses of these metals and to 
encourage, where possible, tlieir substitution by 
metals more readily available. In this connection 
it was recommended that countries using pure 
nickel or a high nickel alloy for coinage consider 
the possibility of substituting a down-graded 
alloy or plated material. 

Nonmember governments were given an oppor- 
tunity to supplement the information submitted 
by them by oral representations to the Committee 
concerning their individual requirements. It has 
been provided that all governments would have 
the right to appeal to the Committee within one 

In arriving at its conclusions the Committee 
considered the estimated production and require- 
ments of nickel and cobalt for the fourth quarter 
of 1951. Its study has shown that, for this period. 

nickel production is expected to be 31,500 metric 
tons; total stated requirements amount to 56,800, 
indicating a deficit of some 25,300 tons. Produc- 
tion of cobalt is estimated at 2,075 metric tons; 
total stated requirements amount to over 4,000, in- 
dicating a deficit of appi'oximately 2,000 tons. 

The methods of distribution developed and the 
specific allocations recommended for the fourth 
quarter of 1951 were not intended to carry any 
commitment for the future on the part of either 
the Committee or the participating governments. 

U.S. Representative Named 
to Central Group of IMC 

[Released to the press October 8] 

Gabriel J. Ticoulat has been appointed U.S. 
representative on the central group of the Inter- 
national Materials Conference (Imc), Washing- 
ton, D.C., vice Edwin T. Gibson, who recently 
tendered his resignation. 

Mr. Ticoulat, Deputy Administrator for Inter- 
national Problems, Defense Pi'oduction Adminis- 
tration, was formerly Depiity Assistant Adminis- 
trator of the National Production Authority's 
Chemical, Rubber, and Forest Products Bureau, 
and, prior to that, was Director of Npa's Pulp, 
Paper, and Paper Board Division. He is on leave 
from his post as vice president of the Crown Zeller- 
bach Corporation, a paper manufacturing com- 
pany at San Francisco, Calif. He is also president 
of two of the corporation's subsidiary companies. 

By agreement, the United States, on behalf of 
the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States, issued invitations in Feb- 
ruary 1951 to 24 countries to participate in one 
or more of six committees on raw materials in 
short supply. A seventh committee was sub- 
sequently formed. The committees are of in- 
definite duration and make reconnnendations to 
the participating governments (27 at present) 
respecting production and distribution of (1) 
copper-zinc-lead; (2) sulphur; (3) cotton-cotton 
linters; (4) tungsten-molylxlenum ; (5) man- 
ganese-nickel-cobalt; (6) wool; and (7) pulp- 

Although the committees function independ- 
ently, a central group composed of eight of the 
world's largest producing and consuming coun- 
tries — Australia, Brazil, Canada. France, India, 
Italy, United Kingdom, and the United States — 
and two organizations representing states on a 
regional basis in the Americas and Europe — the 
Organization of American States (Oas) and the 
Organization for European Economic Cooperation 
(Oeec) — is responsible for the coordination of the 
general action of the Conference as a whole. This 
group, however, does not have the power to direct 
the recommendations of the respective committees. 

Ocfober 22, 1 957 


U.S. Views on Report of 

U.N. Collective Measures Committee 

Statcmriif hy Tlard'ing F. Bancroft 

U.S. Deputy Representative, 

V.N. Collective Measures Committee 

[Released to the press Oct. 7 by the U.S. Mission to the 

The present phase of the Committee's work to- 
ward collective peace has now been brought to a 
close. It is pioneering work in a new field — an 
effort to push out frontiers toward the building of 
a framework of collective security for the peace 
of the world. 

The Uniting for Peace resolution gave further 
impetus to the determination of the peoples of the 
United Nations that they should never again be 
subjected to the scoui'ge of war. The report of 
the Committee, and the action which the General 
Assembly takes upon it, will, I hope, continue the 
momentum so that the United Nations can move 
forward realistically toward the goal of collec- 
tive security.^ 

Certain salient features stand out in the con- 
clusions of the Committee's report. First, it has 
emphasized the steps which states can take now 
to put themselves in readiness to contribute to 
collective measures undertaken by the United Na- 
tions. A collective-security system requires the 
means to maintain or restore international peace. 
The Committee seeks to develop these means not 
to use them but to the end that they shall never 
be used. But they will be available in case of 
need. In the future a potential aggressor may 
think twice before taking the step that will bring 
upon him and the peoples of his nation the col- 
lective strength of a world community that is not 
only resolute but is also organized and equipped 
to suppress aggression. 

The Uniting for Peace resolution recognizes that 
one of the essential elements of the U.N. collective- 
security system is the existence of forces in being, 
units within national armies which would be so 
organized, trained, and equipped as to be promptly 
available for U.N. action in accordance with their 
constitutional processes. The responses from 
member states to tlie Assembly's recommendations 
to maintain such forces are "encouraging. They 
show great promise for the future. 

The Committee's study and analysis also stresses 
the necessity for the prompt availability of other 
forms of assistance and facilities which could be 
contributed by states in support of U.N. collective 
action. It IS my Government's belief that states 
should pay greater attention to this ancillary sup- 
port winch they can provide to the United Nations, 
including materiel, transportation, and other sup- 
plies and se rvices, as well as rights of passage and 

'The report will be .submitted to the Security Council 
and to the Sixth Ses.sion of the General Assembly. 

related rights which would enable U.N. forces in 
action to travel through and obtain assistance and 
facilities in the territory of a state. 

Secondly, the Committee has done important 
work in establishing guiding principles and formu- 
lating procedures which cannot help but be useful 
to the Security Council or General Assembly, as 
well as to the cooperating states throughout the 
world, if at any time in the future the United 
Nations is called upon to take collective measures. 
Again we must hope that these procedures and 
principles will never have to be applied — but they 
will remain a part of the capital of the United 
Nations available and in readiness for use if 
needed. They are a solid foundation on which the 
further studies of the United Nations can build. 

The Committee considered, in a preliminary 
way, the complicated problem of how regional and 
collective self-defense arrangements fit into the 
universal collective-security system. Committee 
members agreed that collective self-defense and 
regional arrangements constitute an important 
aspect of the universal collective-security system 
of the United Nations; that there should be a 
mutually supporting relationship between the ac- 
tivities of such arrangements and collective meas- 
ures taken by the United Nations; and that such 
arrangements can and should make a valuable con- 
tribution to the U.N. collective-security system. 
In short, we agreed that in addition to their own 
specific contributions, states should seek to obtain 
in and through the international bodies and ar- 
rangements to which they belong the maximum 
support for collective measures undertaken by the 
United Nations. 

The task which the Assembly set the Committee 
is a continuing one that cannot be successfully con- 
cluded in a short year's work. The report recog- 
nizes that there are many problems which we have 
not reached or whose surface has been only 
scratched. The report shows the need and points 
the way to an endeavor that is serious and worth 
while pursuing. Just as further preparatory 
steps by national action are required by states, so 
must the United Nations itself continue its work 
toward collective peace. The strengthening of 
the United Nations is a fundamental part of 
the policy of the U.S. Government. The United 
States will continue to work for the development 
of an effective system of collective security under 
the United Nations. 

U.S. Makes Interim Financial 
War Settlement With Korea 

[Released to the press October 10] 

The United States has paid to the Government 
of the Republic of Korea $12,155,714 in settlement 
for W63,05 1,922,270 Korean currency which has 
been made available by the Republic of Korea to 


Department of State Bulletin 

the U.S. Forces and which lias been utilized in 
Korea through July 31, 1951, for direct sale to 
U.S. personnel for their personal expenditures, it 
was announced on October 10 by the Departments 
of State, Defense, and Treasury. 

The payment is without prejudice to settlement 
for other amounts of currency made available by 
the Kepublic of Korea under the terms of the 
financial agreement of July 28, 1950. 

The financial agi'eement provides that negotia- 
tions for settlement of any claims shall be de- 
ferred to a time or times mutually satisfactory to 
the United States and to the Republic of Korea. 
The payment to the Government of the Republic 
of Korea at this time is intended to assist the 
Korean Government in supplying essential com- 
modities for the war-torn Korean economy, over 
and above the types of relief supplies being 
brought in by the U.N. Command. 

Korean Armistice Negotiations 

The Communist Commanders to the 
U.N. Commander 

[October 7, 1951] 
Gener.\l Ridgwat: 

We have rpceived your letter of 4 October on 5 October.' 
We have already twice sufliciently explained, in our let- 
ters of 11 September and 3 October, that there is no 
reason for the changing of the Kaesong conference site. 
Moreover in this letter you failed to present any new 
reasons why Kaesong was not suitable as the conference 
site. Therefore, we can see that the demand regarding 
changing the conference site fundamentally cannot be 
formulated. However, in your letter you demanded for 
the third time that the site be moved to another place. 
If this sort of demand is not to continue to delay the 
negotiation.s, it i.s just to evade the responsibility of dis- 
posing of the continuous provocation actions in which 
your side vicilateii the Kaesong neutral zone agreement, 
by changing the target. However, as a matter of fact, 
the incidents in which your side violated the Kaesong 
neutral zone agreement are entered in the records of 
history and can by no means be eliminated even though 
the conference site be changed. Moreover, the responsi- 
bilit.v wliich your side should assume concerning such 
incidents cannot be evaded even if the conference site 
is changed. As everyone knows, the immediate problems 
are: to resume the armistice negotiations immediately, 
to prevent the recurrence of the incidents in which your 
side violated the agreement in the past, and by the dele- 
gates of both sides meeting at the conference table and 
regulating the agreement concerning the security of the 
conference site. Especially, both sides should assume the 
whole responsibility for the agreement. It will not be 
acceptable again for your side, making the excuse that 
you have no responsibility for this zone, to destroy it 
at will and deny it, restricting our side only, as you 
have in the past. 

For this object, and in order to test once again whether 
your side has good faith toward the armistice negotia- 
tions, we will again make an effort. We now propose to 
you as follows: namely, we propose that the scope of 
the neutrality of the conference site be expanded to a 

rectangular zone to include Kaesong and Munsan, that 
the conference site be moved to Panmunjom and that both 
sides assume the responsibility of protecting the confer- 
ence site. At the same time, we propose that the delegates 
of both sides resume the conference immediately at 
Panmunjom, and at the first meeting after the resumption 
of the conference make regulations concerning the ex- 
pansion of the scope of the neutral zone and the principles 
concerning the security of the conference site; that by 
establishing appropriate machinery in which both sides 
participate, concrete and strict regulations be discussed; 
and that by guaranteeing their enforcements the smooth 
progress of the armistice negotiations be assured. After 
you agree to our proposal our liaison officers will imme- 
diately meet your liaison officers to discuss matters con- 
cerning the resumption of the conference by both 

Kim II Sono 
Supreme Commander, Korean People's Army 
Peng Teh-huai 
Commander, Chinese People's Volunteers 

The U.N. Commander to the Communist 

[October 8, 19.51] 

Generals Kim II SfNc, and Peng Teh-huai : 

Tour message of 7 October 19.51 has been received. I 
refer you to my previous messages and again categorically 
state that the responsibility for the delay in the negotia- 
tions during the past several weeks is yours. 

In my messages to you of 27 September ' and 4 October, 
I stated the fundamental condition which must exist in 
order to insure equality of movement and control to, from, 
and within the conference site. That condition is, I repeat, 
that the conference site be one situated approximately 
midway between our respective front lines. Only so can 
each side be expected to discharge its share of responsi- 
bility for the security of the approaches to the conference 
site and of the site itself. 

In regard to your proposed expansion of the neutral 
zone, it is my view that all that is necessary is a small 
neutral zone around the new conference site, with Kaesong, 
Munsan, and the roads to Panmunjom from Kaesong and 
Munsan free from attack. In the belief that a site in the 
Immediate vicinity of Panmunjom will meet the funda- 
mental condition of equality of movement and control, and 
that you will share my views regarding its neutrality, I 
am instructing my liaison officers to meet with yours at 
10 a. m. on 10 October [8 p. m. Oct. 9, eastern standard 
time] for the purpose of discussing matters concerning 
the resumption of negotiations by your respective 

M. B. RinowAT 
General, United States Army 

The Communist Commanders to the 
U.N. Commander 

[October 9, 1951] 

We received your message of 8 October on 9 October. 

Tou again try in your message to shift the responsibility 
onto our side for dragging out the armistice negotiations. 
We consider this statement of yours is completely invalid ; 
in our previous messages to you we have very clearly 
given the facts and reasons which show that the respon- 
sibility for drawing out the armistice negotiations rests 
entirely with your side, and which your side cannot in 
any way deny. Nor in this message of yours, are you 
able to bring forward any new reasons. Thus it is evident 

' BuiiETiN of Oct 15, 1951, p. 634. 

' BuiXETiN of Oct. 8, 1951, p. 588. 

October 22, 1 95 1 


that solid facts cannot be discaided by your arbitrary 
statement and the responsibilities which devolve on your 
side cannot in any way be thrown o£f. 

In the past your side used the agreements on the neu- 
trality of the armistice conference site merely to restrict 
our side while you deliberately violated it and then denied 
on the pretext that you had any responsibility regarding 
the area. 

We have therefore proposed that the scope of the ar- 
mistice conference neutral zone be extended to a rec- 
tangular area including Kaesong and Munsan with both 
sides taking responsibility for it and that the conference 
site be removed to Panmunjom with both sides equally 
responsible for safeguarding its security. 

Since your messajje agrees to the I'anmunjom area as 
the conference site and expi'esses your willingness to carry 
out equal and responsible control by both sides, the ques- 
tion of extending the neutral zone between Kaesong and 
Slunsan may be reserved for settlement at the conference 
of the delegations of both sides. Therefore, the two dele- 
gations should immediately resume their armistice ne- 
gotiations in I'anmunjom and, as we proposed in the 
previous message, at their lirst meeting draw up the prin- 
ciples for extending the scope of the neutral zone and safe- 
guarding the security of the conference site and the 
setting up of appropriate machinery to solve the various 
concrete questions concerned. 

We have instructed our liaison officers to meet your 
liaison officers at 10 a. m. on Oct. 10 to discuss the matters 
of both sides. 

Kim II Sung, 

Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army 
Peng Teh-huai, 
Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers 

U.N. Commander Expresses Regret Over 
Aircraft Violation 

The folloivinp is the text of a statement issued on- Oetober 
15 hy Oen. Matthew B. Ridgway on attacks by U.N. planes 
on the area of the truce talks: 

An investigation of the two air attacks within the area 
of the Kaesong neutral zone in Korea, about 5 : 30 on 
the afternoon of 12 October, 1951, indicates beyond reason- 
able doubt that both the attacks were made by aircraft 
of the United Nations Command. 

This incident is doubly regrettable, not only because it 
violates standing United Nations Command instructions 
and consequently an agreement to which the United Na- 
tions Command was a party, but even more so because 
it resulted in the death of one 12-year-old boy and the 
wounding of his 2-year-old brother. The conduct of mili- 
tary operations must often result in casualties to innocent 
noncombatants, but I am sincerely saddened in this in- 
stance, since this occurred in a zone considered as a neutral 

I know that I speak for every member of the United 
Nations in expressing sympathy and heartfelt 
grief for the bereaved Korean family for their tragic loss. 

It h:is hi'retofore been, and will continue to be, the prime 
obj<Htiv(> of the United Nations Command to avoid loss of 
life and destruction of property of the noncombatant popu- 
lation. To this end the United Nations Command will 
continue its efforts to prevent any recurrence of incidents 
which may bring suffering to blameless individuals. 

Communiques Regarding Korea 
to the Security Council 

Tlie Headqtiartcrs of the United Nations Com- 
iniirnl liiis transmitted communiques regardinjr 
Korea to the Secretary-General of the United Na- 
tions under the following United Nations docu- 

ment numbers : 
September 10 ; 
September 12 ; 
September 17; 
September 18 ; 
September 20 ; 
September 24 ; 
September 27; 
September 28. 


September 6 ; 
September 12 ; 
September 14 ; 
September 13 ; 
September 19; 
September 24; 
September 25; 
September 27; 




U. S. Delegations to 
international Conferences 

Aeronautical Maps and Charts Division (ICAO) 

The Department of State announced on October 
8 that the fifth session of the Aeronautical Maps 
and Charts Division of the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (Icao) will convene at 
Montreal, Canada, on October 9. The U.S. dele- 
gation is as follows : 

Commander E. R. McCarthy, United States Coast and 
Geodetic Survey, Department of Commerce 


Loren A. Bloom, Aeronautical Chart and Information 

Service, Department of the Air Force 
Samuel W. Boggs, Office of Special Adviser on Geography, 

Department of State 
R. C. Dailey, Commander, USN, Hydrographic Office, 

Department of the Navy 
B. J. Maguire, Hydrographic Office, Department of the 

Paul C. Schauer, Colonel, USAF, Aeronautical Chart and 

Information Service, Department of the Air Force 

The Aeronautical Maps and Charts Division is 
one of 10 technical divisions of the Air Navigation 
Commission, as established by the Icao Council. 
These divisions are responsible for formulating 
for the Commission and for eventual Council ac- 
tion recommendations on standards, procedures, 
and facilities which aj^pear to be necessary or de- 
sirable for the safety, refj;ularity, or efficiency of 
international air navigation. In practice, the di- 
visions function as technical or specialized con- 
ferences open to delegations from all Icao con- 
tracting states, 57 at present. The fourth session 
of the Aeronautical Maps and Charts Division was 
held at Brussels, Belgium, March 8-April 5, 1948. 

The principal work of the forthcoming session 
will be to (a) prepare amendments to annex 4, 
Icao Standards and Recommended Practices 
(aeronautical charts) ; (b) prepare specifications 
for several types of charts, such as instrument 
approach and landing charts, route charts, and 
airport obstruction charts; and (c) discuss alloca- 
tion of chart production responsibility and chart- 
ing problems that are constantly arising as new 
types of airplanes and new types of radio aids 
are placed in operation. 

Department of State Bulletin 

Current United Nations Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography ^ 

Economic and Social Council 

Report of tie Committee on the Draft Convention on 
Freedom of Information. E/2031/Add.2, July 17, 
1951. 3 pp. mimeo. 

Report of the Committee on the Draft Convention on 
Freedom of Information. E/2031/Add.5, Jul.v 26, 
19.51. 1 p. mimeo. 

Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance. Uesolu- 
tion of 30 August 1951. E/210S, September 3, 1951. 
3 pp. mimeo. 

Forced Labour. Background Paper. E/AC.36/3, Sep- 
tember 11, 1951. 4 pp. mimeo. 

Forced Labour. Index of Economic and Social Council 
documents. E/AO.36/2, September 11, 1951. 4 pp. 

Communications from Governments and Non-Govern- 
mental Organizations. Memorandum by the Secre- 
tariat of the United Nations. E/AC.36/4, September 
13, 1951. 15 pp. mimeo. 

General Assembly 

Repatriation of Greek Children. Note dated 22 August 
1951, from the delegation of the Union of Soviet So- 
cialist Republics to the United Nations, addressed to 
the Seeretiiriat of the United Nations. A/1871, Sep- 
tember 4, 1951. 7 pp. mimeo. 

Note dated 22 August 1951 From the Delegation of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Na- 
tions. addres.sed to the Secretariat of the United Na- 
tions. A/1S72, September 6, 1951. 4 pp. mimeo. 

Security Council 

Letter dated 10 September 1951 From the Representative 
of Israel Addressed to the President of the Security 
Council. S/2334, September 11, 1951. 4 pp. mimeo. 

Letter dated 4 September 1951 From the Acting Represent- 
ative of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics to 
the Secretariat of the United Nations. S/2327/Rev. 
1, September 11, 1951. 2 pp. mimeo. 


United Nations Chronology. Supplement No. 6. January 
1-December 1950. ST/DPI /SER.B/6. Aaril (5. 1951. 
33 pp. mimeo. 

Department of Public Information 
Research Section 

The International Court of Justice. ST/DPI/SER.A/6G. 
Background Paper No. 66. 47 pp. mimeo. 


' Printed materials may be secured in the United States 
from the International Documents Service, Columbia Uni- 
versity Press, 2!H50 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other 
materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may 
be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United 

The United Nations Secretariat has established an 
OffUnal Records series for the General Assembly, the Se- 
curity Council, the Economic and Social Council, the 
Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission 
which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and 
reports of the various commissions and committees. In- 
formation on securing subscriptions to the series may be 
obtained from the International Documents Service. 

October 22, 1 95 1 

Former Employee of INP Asked 
To Substantiate His Charges 

Wlieii informed that a series of articles was 
beginning in the Scranton Tribune on October 11, 
written by Frank Stout, a former employee of the 
Division of International Press and Publications 
(Inp). making serious charges against that divi- 
sion, Edward W. Barrett, Assistant Secretary for 
Public Affairs, made the following statement on 
October 11: 

I have sent a telegram to Frank Stout today, asking 
him to come to Washington immediately and report per- 
.sonally on his serious but unsubstantiated charges against 
the International Press and Publications Division. Nei- 
ther when he was in the Department of State nor after 
his severance from the payroll did he make any com- 
plaints of the sort that he is now writing as an employee 
of the Scranton Tribune. If he felt that any such com- 
plaints were justified, he was derelict in failing to report 
them to me or to other responsible managers of this 

I know of no basis for the kind of charges he is quoted 
as having made. If there is any basis, I am requesting 
him to provide the material to me immediately. 

An advisory commission to do the sort of inves- 
tigating that Mr. Stout proposes has already been 
established by Congress. It operates on a contin- 
uing basis and reports regularly to the Congress. 

Mr. Stout worked in the Department of State 
for 8 months. For several months he was a re- 
porter for the Washington coverage desk of the 
International Press and Publications Division, 
covering stories at the State Department, Wliite 
House, Congi-ess, and so forth. Thereafter he 
was on the news desk of the Division. 

HIcog Given Authority Over German 
Educational Grants ' 

August 23, 1951 
Pursuant to authority contained in section 4 of Pub. 
Law 73,° 81st Congress, it is hereby ordered that the Chief, 
Exchanges Staff, Office of the United States High Com- 
missioner for Germany, is authorized to make, amend or 
terminate grants: (a) To German students, trainees, 
teachers, guest instructors, professors and leaders in tields 
of specialized knowledge or skill, (b) to teachers, guest 
instructors, professors and leaders in fields of specialized 
knowledge and skill from other European countries, and 
(c) to German private or Governmental agencies or in- 
stitutions, for the purpose of carrying out exchange of 
persons programs between Germany and other European 
countries administered or serviced by the Office of the 
United States High Commissioner for (Jermany under au- 
thority vested in the Department of State. 
This delegation shall be effective as of June 1, 1951. 
For the Secretary of State : 

W. K. Scott 
Deputy Assistant Secretary 

' Delegation of Authority No. 42, printed from 16 Fed. 
Reg. 9099, supersedes Delegation of Authority No. 21, 
dated May 22, 1950 (15 Fed. Reg. 3400). 

'63 Stat. Pt. 1, p. 111. 


Correspondence on Gen. Wedemeyer's Testimony 
Before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security 

[Released to the press October S] 

Folloiiying is an exchange of correspondence be- 
tween Representative Flood of Pennsylvania and 
the Department: 


October 2, 1951 
Hon. Dean G. Acheson 
Secretary of State 

Dear Mr. Secretary: I have noticed a great 
deal of reference in the press to testimony given 
by General Wedemeyer before the Senate Internal 
Security Subcommittee. As reported in the press, 
the testimony indicated tliat General Wedemeyer 
lacked conficlence in four Foreign Service Officers 
who served under his command in China : John P. 
Davies, John K. Emmerson, John S. Service and 
Raymond Ludden. 

According to a report printed in The Washing- 
ton Post, General Wedemeyer testified in response 
to a direct question as to whether he believed the 
above-named officers to be disloyal, "I can't say, 
but if I had followed their advice, the Communists 
would have run rampant over China far faster 
than they did." 

Now if this newspaper story is an accurate ac- 
count of General Wedemeyer's testimony in re- 
gard to these men, what I would like to know is 
tliis: On assumption of command of the China 
Theater as General Stilwell's successor — and dur- 
ing his tenure as Commander of the China 
Theater— did General Wedemeyer demand that 
these officers be relieved and investigated, and if 
he did, why was his request refused '< 

I would also like to know if Davies, Emmerson, 
Service, and Ludden are on the list of Foreign 
Service Officers, and if they are, where and in what 
capacity are they now serving? 
Sincerely yours, 

Daniel J. Flood 



October 3, 1951 

Mt Dear Mr. Flood : I have your recent letter to 
the Secretary in which you refer to news accounts 
of General Albert Wedemeyer's testimony before 
the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on 
September 19, in regard to Foreign Service Of- 
ficers Davies, Emmerson, Service, and Ludden. 
You note that according to one press account 
General Wedemeyer stated that he "can't say'' 
whether these officers were disloyal but that if he 
had followed their advice ". . . the Com- 
munists would have run rampant over China far 
faster than they did". 

You ask : "On assumption of command of the 
China Theater, as General Stilwell's successor— 
and during his tenure as Commander of the China 
Theater — did General AVedemeyer demand that 
these officers be relieved and investigated, and ii 
he did, why was his request refused ?" 

The Department has no record of General 
Wedemeyer's having asked either that these of- 
ficers be relieved or that they be investigated. On 
the contrary, it would appear from the corre- 
spondence that I am enclosing that General Wede- 
meyer was entirely satisfied with their services 
while they were assigned to his staff — so much sc 
that he not only commended them in writing, but 
further, was instrumental in having the War De- 
partment enter a strong plea that they be con- 
tinued on his staff on the grounds that his wai 
activities would be hampei'ed if he were to lose 
their services. 

I should also like to call attention to Genera) 
Wedemeyer's testimony before the two Senate 
Committees on pages 2293-2567 in the Hearing; 

Department of Sfafe Bulletir 

before the Committee on Armed Services and the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, 82nd Congress, 
1st Session, less than 5 months ago, in regard to 
Foreign Service Officers Davies, Emmerson, Serv- 
ice and Ludden. I enclose an extract of this testi- 
mony because of its pertinence to the question you 

Messrs. Davies, Ludden, Service, and Emmer- 
son are presently on the Foreign Service List and 
are assigned as follows: Davies — Office of the 
American High Commissioner, Germany; Lud- 
den — American Embassy, Brussels; Service and 
Emmerson, respectively — Office of Operating Fa- 
cilities and Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, De- 
partment of State, Washington. 
Sincerely yours, 

Carlisle H. Humelsine 
Deputy Under Secretary of State 
for Administration 

Enclosure A 




A. P. O. 879 

7 February 19Ji6 
AIr. John Davies 

% American Consul General 
New Delhi, India 

Dear John : Your kind note conceniing my 
promotion just arrived and I hasten to thank you 
for the good wishes and congratulations it 

We do feel that some progress has been made 
in this area and are hopeful of making a realistic 
contribution to the overall war effort. No one 
knows better than do you the complexities, machi- 
nations, and imponderables which combine to 
make our job difficult. 

I do not believe that your former chief wrote 
the letter to the State Department concerning your 
work here or suggesting that you not be assigned 
to Russia. He talked to me at great length sub- 
sequent to your departure, and I hope that I helped 
to change some of his ideas, which were almost 
convictions. Actually I never realized the extent 
of the schism between you and him until (hat last 
morning when you asked me to be present at a 
conference in my quarters. There had been in- 
timations on your part and also his, but I did not 
know tliat he felt so strongly. 

Ludden and Service I like very much and believe 
that they are going to follow your precedent ex- 
actly in giving us loyal and effective support. 
Emerson has returned to the States but I expect 
him back in a month or so. 

I received a fine letter from Frank Roberts, who 
is located in the area of your new post. Frank 
asked to be remembered to you, and now I will 
request that you convey my best to him personally. 
I know and like Avriel Harriman very much and 
if it would help I would be glad to write him a 
personal note concerning your fine work here. I 

October 22, 1 95 J 

do not want to embarrass you in the premises and 
await your suggestion. 

Sincere good wishes for your continued success 
and happiness. 

Faithfully yours, 

A. C. Wedemeter 
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding 

Enclosure B 

Chungking, China 

May 10, 1945 

Suiject: Letter of Commendation 
To: The Hon. Secretary of State, 

Washington, D. C. 

Mr. John S. Service is highly commended for 
outstanding aid rendered Headquarters. United 
States Forces, China Theater, in advising the Com- 
manding General on political matters which have 
direct and important bearing on the military situa- 
tion in China. Mr. Service was influential in the 
establishment of a Military Observer Group in 
Yenan, accompanying the initial group there him- 
self. His thorough knowledge of Chinese customs 
and language enabled him to develop and maintain 
cordial relations with Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, and 
other Communist leaders. During his extended 
residence in Yenan he wrote a great number of de- 
tailed reports on military, economic, and political 
conditions in areas under Communist control, a 
field in which the American Government liad pre- 
viously had almost no reliable information. He 
prepared valuable analyses of the political situa- 
tion as it affected the war potential of the Chinese 
Government and by correlation that of the United 
States Forces in China. 

In recognition of his outstanding performance 
of duty, the Commanding Cieneral, U. S. Forces, 
China Theater, expresses to Mr. Service the appre- 
ciation of the United States Forces in China. 

A. C. Wedemeyer 
Lieutenant General, U. S. A. Commanding 

Enclosure C 

Chungking, China 

12 May 1943 

Subject : Letter of Commendation 
To: The Hon. Secretary of State, 

Washington, D. C. 

Mr. John K. Emmerson is highly commended 
for outstanding service rendered the Headquar- 
ters, United States Forces, China Theater, through 
his efforts in the development of a coordinated 
procedure in psychological warfare for use against 
the Japanese in the China and India-Burma Thea- 
ters of war. Because of his thorough knowledge 
of the Japanese language he was able to conduct 
personal interrogations of Japanese prisoners of 
war. He investigated and reported on the activi- 
ties of the Japanese Emancipation League, spon- 
sored by the Communists in Yenan. He wrote 


reports on democratic and communistic move- 
ments within Japan which might be utilized in the 
event of an Allied landing in Japan proper and 
as the basis for a new democratic movement in 
Japan after Allied occupation. 

In recognition of these outstanding services the 
Commanding General. U.S. Forces, China Thea- 
ter, extends to Mr. Emmerson the appreciation 
of the United States Forces in China. 
A. C. Wedejieyxr 
Lieutenant General, V. S. A. Communding 

Enclosure D 

War Department 

Wmhington, January 5, 194S 
The Hon. Secretary of State 

Dear Mr. Secretary : I refer to your letter of 
December 26. 1944, with respect to the Foreign 
Service Officers assigned as political advisors in 
the China Theater. 

As the State Department has already been ad- 
vised. General AVedemeyer has informed the War 
Department that Mr. John Da vies is preparing to 
leave Chungking for assignment to the Moscow General Wedemeyer is very desirous 
that Mr. Davies remain in Chungking, however, 
until the arrival of Mr. John Service who, it is 
understood, should be ready to leave Washington 
for China early in January. 

Your letter indicates that the Embassy in 
Chungking is now sufficiently staffed so as to ob- 
viate the necessity of having a political advisor 
detailed to the U.S. Forces in that city, although 
you believe that the retention of one or two officers 
in Chinese Communist territory is advantageous, 
and you the question of releasing any or all 
of the Foreign Service Officers. Your need for 
Foreign Service Officers and your request that 
three out of the four advisors assigned to China 
Theater be released was communicated to General 
Wedemeyer in November. As I advised in my 
letter of November 22, 1944, he indicated that three of the original four advisors were 
retained, military activities would be hampered. 
Since that time military and political problems in 
the China Theater have increased. However, Gen- 
eral Wedemeyer has again been queried as to 
whether he can relinquish the service of the For- 
eign Service Officers now assigned to his head- 
quarter-s. Your indication that if General Wede- 
meyer requests the retention of Mr. Ludden you 
believe favorable consideration could be given 
thereto, as well as the question of his and .Mr. 
Emmerson's proceeding to the United States for 
leave and consultation has also been submitted to 
General Wedemeyer. You will be informed as 
promptly as possible of his reply. 
Sincerely yours, 

Henry L. Stisison 
Secretary of War 


Enclosure E 

War Department 
Washington, Navemher 22, 19Jf^ 

The Hon. Acting Secretary of State 

Dear Mr. Secretary: I refer again to your 
letter of November 8. 1944, in regard to the release 
of three of the four Foreign Service Officers who 
have been attached to the United States Army 
forces in China, Burma and India. 

Your need for the restoration of these officers 
to regular Foreign Service duty is very evident. 
It was presented in full to Generals Sultan and 
Wedemeyer, the Commanding Generals of the 
India-Burma and of the China Theaters, respec- 
tively, and their views on the matter have now 
been received. 

Unfortunately the only officer who, it appears, 
can be spared is ^Ir. Ludden. and General AVede- 
meyer indicates his regi'et at losing his services. 
Nevertheless when he returns from the field in 
approximately two months General AA'^edemeyer 
states that in accordance with your request 5lr. 
Ludden will be given prompt air transportation 
to AA^'ashington. 

As for Messrs. Davies. Service and Emmerson, 
who, as you know, are all detailed for duty in 
China. General AA^edemeyer indicates that it is his 
conviction that unless these three officers are re- 
tained, military activities will be hampered. I 
therefore hope that their assignment to the China 
Theater need not be changed. 

There is no political adviser assigned to the 
India-Burma Theater at the present time. Gen- 
eral Sultan speaks of the former China-Burma- 
India Theater as having been full of political com- 
plexities and of your Foreign Service Officers 
having been an indispensable link with the State 
Department in connection therewith, as well as of 
the superior manner in which they performed their 
duties. Being without a political adviser not only 
would liamper our military activities, he states, 
but the British, who have a regularly assigned 
political adviser at Southeast Asia Command 
Headquarters and thoroughly understand such a 
position, would not comprehend General Sultan's 
having to secure advice from the American Mis- 
sion in New Delhi. On the basis of the assign- 
ment of a really qualified political adviser to the 
India-Burma Theater being a necessity, he ear- 
ne.stly requests that Mr. Max AA^aldo Bisliop be 
assigned by the State Department to the India- 
Burma Theater. At the same time he appreciates 
your need for having the services of all possible 
Foreign Service Officers and will keep the situa- 
tion constantly in mind so that as sof)n as tlie need 
for a political adviser is at an end this will be re- 

In view of the above I trust that the request of 
General Sultan to have Mr. Max AValdo Bishop as- 
signed to the India-Burma Theater, and (ieneral 
AA^cdemeyer's desire to retain Messrs. Davies, 

Department of Sfafe Bulletin 


Service, and Emmerson in the China Theater can 
be acceded to. 

Sincerely yours. 

Henbt L. Stimsox 
Secretary of War 

Enclosure F 

unitary Situation in the Far Ea*t 
before the 

CoMStlTTEE ox Armtti SeRVICES 

and the 
CoJonrxEz ox Forzigx' Relatioxs 
UxTTED States Sex'ate 
^_ Eighty-Second Consrress. First Session 

jimduct an Inquiry into the ililitary Situation in 

be Far East and the Facts Surrounding the Relief 

if General of the Army Douglas MacArthur from 

his Assignments in that Area 


(page 2553) 

Wiexcs of State Department Personnel in China 

Sexator Gkeex. Xow. there is one other matter 
tbat has come up since I questioned you yesterday. 
md that is some newspa|>er commentary on your 
»stimony yesterday. I think it was while I was 
lot here, and I should say. in explanation, that I 
lave been obliged to attend hearings of the Appro- 
sriations Conimittee and the Rules Committee, at 
:he same time that I am supposed to be here, and 
o I have not been able to attend all of the places I 
im supposed to be at one time. This is the news 
Tern : 

■itenant General Wedemeyer told Senators today 

: ir State Department advisers in China in 1944 and 

.-.: were "very critical" of the Chinese Nationalist 

Government, but made "favorable" reiwrts on the Com- 


Well, the inference that any reader will draw 
from that is that you were dissatisfied with them, 
ind they didn't represent your views : and I could 
lardly believe that, because you had expressed 
oreviously entire confidence in these same men. 
[ would like to have your comment on that news 

Gexekal Wedemetek. "Wliat occurred there, 
oerhaps some newspaperman took it out of context, 

You heard me develop that subject, perhaps. 
■Jiis morning, sir. and I was asked whether I 
^bought these men were Communists, or fellow 
ravelers. I think the term was used : but anyway. 

Slated that I did not believe them to be Com- 
Qunists or fellow tnivelei-s. sir: .and their interests 
Tere as Foreign Service officers in the economic 
nd diplomatic and political field, and very rarely. 
■ot occasionally, they would comment on military 
perations that they observed. 

Thev were constantly out in the field. Senator. 

and with my authority, full cognizance. They 
would submit these oral, more often written mem- 
oranda indicating the result of a trip or an ob- 
seryation. or some lirtle tidbit that they had picked 
up. sir. 

Sex-atoe Grzex. Well, as long as their comments 
were objectiye, that met with your approval, did 
it not* 

Gex-eral Wedemeter. Well, you see. I tell you 
I put my emphasis, my first interest, into the naili- 
tary situation. It wasn't good when I went over 
there. We were getting l)ooted around by the 
Japanese, and I wasn't sure that I could hold my 
area. So I must tell you that I did not pay as 
much attention to the work of those men as I 
probably should have as theater commander. 

But I never suspected them. I don't suspect 
people- I accept people to be all right and honest 
and good Americans imtil I find them proven 
otherwise, and I never suspected them. But they 
were transferred to the Embassy. I wasn't in 
command of the theater more than probably 6 
months, and maybe not that long — I tliink they 
were transferred aroimd February or Marcli. 

Letters on State Department Employees in China 
Sexator Greex. May I draw attention to two 
items which are a matter of public record, and 
they were printed in the State Department loyalty 
investigation hearings. Senate Resolution' 231. 
part 2. appendix. The first is at page 1905. 

That is a communication from Henry L. Stim- 
son. Secretary of War. dated November 22, 1944, 
in regard to Messrs. Davies, Service, and Emmer- 
son. I wUl quote from the letter. 

As for Messrs. I>avies, Service, and Emmerson. who. as 
you know, are all detailed for duty in China, General 
\Vedemeyer indicates that it is his conviction that unless 
these three officers are retained, military activities will 
be hampered. I therefore hope that their assignment to 
the China theater need not be changed. 

Gex-erax Wepemeter. Wliat was the date of 

that, please, sir! 

Sexator Greex. Xovember 22. 1944. 

Gex-eral Wedemeter. Yes, sir. 

Sexator Greex. And then at the end he says : 

I am very aware of how great your need is to have as 
many of your Foreign Service officers as possible returned 
to regular duty. At the same time, these two theaters 
( India-Burma and China i have the most untisual political 
problems confronting them constantly, and your help in 
the matter is a real necessity. 

In view of the above. I trust that the request of General 
Sultan to have Mr. Max Waldo Bishop assigned to the 
India-Burma theater, and General ^Ve^1emeye^■s desire 
to retain Messrs. Davies, Service, and Emmerson in the 
China theater can be acceded to. 

Xow that would seem as though you made very 
strong protestations. 

Gexer-\l WEDEiTETER. Well, I dou't believe 
they were too strong, sir. You see when I as- 
sumed command of ihe theater in September of 
1944 I didn't corne home ; I went from Xew Delhi, 
Ceylon, rather, right over to assume command in 

•cfober 22, J 95 J 


What came up, I think, was these men were 
worried about their status— John Davies, Jack 
Service, Ludden, and Emmerson — and I told them 
I would be happy for them to continue on, to con- 
tinue to function just as they did under General 
Stilwell, and those representations were for- 

The strength of those representations I am not 
qualified to say, except that I was happy to have 
any assistance" from any American because I was 
in an awful tight spot when I got over there, 
and I would not have relieved them. 

The situation was brought up by Ambassador 
Hurley. I would not have relieved them unless 
I had the conviction that they were guilty of dis- 
loyalty or failing to carry out the duties that I 

Senator Green. That was in November? 

General Wedemeter. That was November 
1944, sir. 

Senator Green. When you had been there only 
a short time ? 

General Wedemeter. That is right, sir. 

Senator Green. Now the following May 1945 
you, yourself, wrote a letter. The subject was let- 
ter of commendation. It was written to the Hon- 
orable the Secretary of State, Washington, D. C. 
It was sent from Chungking, China. I quote : 

Mr. John S. Service Is highly commended for outstand- 
ing aid rendered headquarters, United States Forces, 
China theater, in advising the commanding general on 
political matters vehich have direct and important bearing 
on the military situation in China. 

Then I will omit a long series of different mat- 
ters in which his service was commended by you. 
At the end : 

He prepared valuable analyses of the political situation 
as it affected the war potential of the Chinese Government 
and by correlation that of the United States forces in 

In recocnition of his outstanding performance of duty, 
the commanding general. United States Forces, China 
theater, expresses to Mr. Service the appreciation of the 
United States Forces in China. 

A. C. Wedemeter, 
Lieutenant General, USA, Commanding 

So your first good impressions were confirmed? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes. I have stated, sir, 
I never had any feeling that there was anything 
wrong with those men. 

Senator Green. And so the inferences that 
people might draw from this news item were un- 
justified, I take it? 

General Wedemeyer. In my judgment they 

Senator Green. Thank you very much. 

General Wedemeyer. I think the newspaper- 
man took it out of context. 


Legislation Listed 

Recording the Lawful Admission For Permanent Resi- 
dence of Certain Aliens. S. Rept. 528, 82d Cong. 1st 
sess. [To accompany S. 100] 6 pp. 

100 Things You Should Know About Communism. Series: 
— in the U. S. A. — and Religion — and Education — 
and Labor- — and Government and Spotlight on Spies. 
H. Doc. 136, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 126 pp. 

United States Relations With International Organiza- 
tions. Research summary on technical assistance 
proposals of the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations (FAO), Seventh Intermediate 
Report Prepared by the Staff for the use of the Com- 
mittee on Expenditures in the Executive Depart- 
ments. H. Rept. 670, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 24 pp. 

Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Reorganization 
of the Committee on Expenditures in the E.xecutive 
Departments, United States Senate, 82d Cong. 1st 
sess. on S. 1166. A bill to create a commission to 
make a study of the administration of overseas ac- 
tivities of the Government, and to make recommenda- 
tions to Congress with respect thereto, May 31, and 
June 5, 1951. 79 pp. 

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur and the Ameri- 
can Policy in the Far East. Joint Statement by the 
Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, United States Senate Relative to 
the Facts and Circumstances Bearing on tlie Relief 
of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur and on 
American policy In the Par East, S. Doc. 50, 82d 
Cong. 1st sess. 3 pp. 

State, Justice, Commerce, And The Judiciary Appropria- 
tion Bill, Fiscal Year 1952. H. Rept. 685, S2d Cong. 
1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 4740] 39 pp. 

Fur Labeling. Hearings before the Committee on Inter- 
state and Foreign Commerce, House of Representa- 
tives, S2d Cong., 1st Sess. on H. R. 2321. A bill to 
protect consumers and others against misbranding, 
false advertising, and false invoicing of fur products 
and furs. April 17, IS, 19, and 20, 1951. 182 pp. 

Creating A Commission To Study The Administration Of 
Overseas Activities Of The Government, And To Make 
Recommendations To the Congress With Respect 
Thereto. S. Rept. 543, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To Ac- 
company S. 1166] 10 pp. 

Military Situation In The Par East. Hearings Before 
the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee 
On Foreign Relations, United States Senate, S2d 
Cong. 1st sess. To Conduct an Inquiry into the 
Military Situation in the Par East and the Facts 
Surrounding the Relief of General of the Army 
Douglas MacArthur from his Assignments in that 

May 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 14, 1951. i, 

724 pp. 

May 15, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 1951. 

li, 937 pp. 

June 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, and 13, 1951. ili, 904 pp. 


Department of Sfafe Bulletin 

Mutual Security Act of 1951. H. Rept. 1090, 82d Cong., 
1st sess. Conference Report. [To accompany H. R. 
5113] 30 pp. 

Annual Report. Office of Alien Property. Department of 
Justice. Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1950. H. Doe. 
16S, S2d Cong., 1st viii, 132 pp. 

Contribution to the United Nations International Chil- 
dren's Emergency Fund. S. Rept. 723, 82d Cong., 1st 
sess. [To accompany S. 2079] 5 pp. 

Restoration in the Philippines. S. Rept. 729, 82d Cong., 
1st sess. [To accompany S. 1415] 8 pp. 

Authorizing the President To Proclaim Regulations for 
Preventing Collisions at Sea. S. Rept. 838, 82d Cong., 
1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 5013] 9 pp. 

Authorizing the Sale of War-Built Coastal Ships to the 
Republic of South Korea. S. Rept. 839, 82d Cong., 
1st sess. [To accompany S. J. Res. 104] 6 pp. 

Individual Views of Certain Members of the Joint Com- 
mittee on Armed Services and Foreign Relations of 
the United States Senate Relating to Hearings Held 
on the Dismissal of General MacArthur and the 
Military Situation in the Far East. S. Doc. 69, 82d 
Cong., 1st sess. May 3-June 27, 1951. vii, 104 pp. 
iMutual Security Act of 1951. Conference Report on the 
Bill (H. R. 5113) To Maintain the Security and 
X^romote the Foreign Policy and Provide for the 
General Welfare of the United States by Furnishing 
Assistance to Friendly Nations in the Interest of In- 
ternational Peace and Security. S. Doc. 73, 82d 
Cong., 1st sess. 16 pp. 

Amending Communications Act of 1934. Index to Hear- 
ings before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce, House of Representatives, Eighty-second 
Congress, first session on S. 658, an act to further 
amend the Communications Act of 1934. April 5, 6, 
9, 24, 25, 26, 27, and 30, 1951, 11 pp. 

Hearings Relating to Communist Activities in the Defense 
Area of Baltimore. (Based on the Testimony of Mary 
Stalcup Markward). Hearings before the Committee 
on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, 
Eighty-second Congress, first session, June 19, 20, 21, 

26. 27. 2S, July 11 and 13, 1951, iii, 903 pp. (Maryland 
Committee for Peace and Baltimore County Commit- 
tee for Peace), Hearings before the Committee <in 
Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, 
Eighty-second Congress, first session. June 19, 20, 26, 

27, 28 ; July 10, 12, and 13, 1951. iii, 1131 pp. 

tk Commission To Study Overseas Activities of the Fed- 
eral Government. Hearings before a subcommittee 
of the Committee on Expenditures in the executive 
departments. House of Representatives, Eighty-.second 
Congress, first session. June 11, 12, and August 2, 
1951, iv, 102 pp. 

Olilitary Situation in the Far East. Hearings before the 
Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-sec- 
ond Congress, first session. To conduct an inquiry 
into the military situation in the Far East and the 
facts surrounding the relief of General of the Army 
Douglas MacArthur from his assignments in that 
area. Appendix and index. August 17, 1951. iii, 
3691 pp. 
Amend Section 606 (c) of Communications Act of 1934. 
(Electromagnetic Radiations). Hearings before the 
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 
House of Representatives, Eighty-second Congress, 
first session, on S. 537, an act to further amend the 
Communications Act of 1934. August 22, 1951. ill, 
27 pp. 

Weather Control and Augmented Potable Water Supply. 
Joint Hearings before the Subcommittees of the Com- 
mittees on Interior and Insular Affairs, Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce and Agriculture and For- 
estry, United States Senate, 82d Cong., 1st sess., on 
S. 5. A bill to provide for research into and demon- 
stration of practical means for the economical pro- 
duction from sea or other saline waters, or from the 
atmosphere (including cloud formations), of water 
suitable for agricultural, industrial, municipal, and 
other beneficial consumptive uses, and for other pur- 
posf'S. S. 222 — A bill to provide for the develop- 
ment and regulation of raethods of weather modifica- 
tion and control and S. 798 — A bill to authorize the 
Secretary of Agriculture to conduct research and ex- 
periments with respect to methods of controlling and 
producing precipitation in moisture-deficient areas. 
Hearings held at Washington, D.C., March 14, 15, 
10, 19, and April 5, 1051. 353 pp. 

Export-Import Bank Amendments. Hearing before a sub- 
committee of the Committee on Banking and Currency, 
United States Senate, Eighty-second Congress, first 
session, on S. 2006, a bill to increase the lending au- 
thority of the Export-Import Bank of Washington and 
to extend the period within which the bank may 
make loans. August 28, 1951. iii, 29 pp. 

Check List of Department of State 

Press Releases: Oct. 8-15, 1951 

Releases may be obtained from the OflSce of the 


al Assistant for Press Relations, Department 

of State, Washington 25, D. C. Items marked (•) 

are not printed in the Bulletin. 






VOA Program in Polish 



Panama credentials (rewrite) 



Thorp: Land and the Future 



McGhee : Mutual Security 



Tieoulat to Imc 



ICAO: 5th Session 



Greece, Turkey Reply to President 



Polish Information Terminated 



Bennett: Land and Independence 



Anniversary China Republic 



Acheson : Land Tenure Conf. 



Acheson : Anglo-Egyptian Relations 



Ache-son : Death of Sir Henry Gurney 



Acheson : Stassen Testimony 



Truman: Nepal Holiday 



U.S. Payment to Korea 



Jessup to Sen. Sparkman 



Miller : Columbus and Isabella 



China Policy Transcript Released 



Jessup : General Assembly : 6th Sess. 



Barrett: Charges Against Inp 



Jessup to Sen. Sparkman 



Greece, Turkey: Protocol to Nato 



State Department Awards 



Soviet Reply to Declaration on Italy 



Anderson : Danish Contributions 

Dc/ober 22, 7957 


October 22, 1951 


Vol. XXV, No. 643 

Ifcw propoeals — possible solution of Anglo- 

I^yptlan proWem (Aclieson) . j_ ■ - - 647 
Statement iy Acbeson on Anglo-Egyptian 

qnestlan; text of Ftanr-Power {OopoE^ . 647 

.\id to Foreisii Countries 

TTPtTTT. : -ajs. to coopsate In meeting economic 

arid matalal needs 654 

American R«poblics 

BRAZIL; U. S. to cooperate In meeting economic 

and material needs S54 

PAKAilA; Xr=ly appointed ambassador presents 

credentials 6=5 

Anns and Armed Forces 

Ki^ean armistice negotiations 667 

Tertliaonx of Gen. Wedemeyer en internal se- 

cmlty 670 


CHISA: Transcript of disctission on policy made 

pmbllc 655 


Armistice negotiations 667 

XJ£. paynient to sujiply essential commodi- 
ties 666 

KE&B KAST: Mutual Security Program 

(McGnee) 643 

TDBKET: Invited to Join Nato 650 


Aeronautical Maps and Cliarts Division. (Icao) 

Mbaeasiom 668 


»<-Ki~nji refutes accusations of Jessup . . . 656 
I^nd refonn. comparison of VS. and Soviet 

methods (Thorp) 660 


OOBEESFONDENCE: Testimony of Gen. Wede- 
meyer before ccanmlttee on internal se- 
curity 670 

Legislation listed 674 

Testimony of Harold Staasen (statement by 

Acheson) 656 


DEHMABK : Contributions aid to security efforts 

of bee world 6S3 

G^BMANT: Hicoc given authority over educa- 
tional grants 669 

GREECE: Invited to Join Nato 650 

Greece and Turkey reply to Invitation to Nato 

membeiahlp 650 

ITALY: Soviet note on revision of peace treaty . 648 


Closing of N.Y. Information Service, note of 

August 14: US. reply of Sept. 20 ... . 651 
New VOA program originates at Munich . . 653 

U.K.: Near Eastern Conimand proposed as solu- 
tion to Anglo-Egyptian question .... 647 

VBS.B..: Note on revision of Italian peace 

treaty 648 

Information and Educational Exchange Pro- 
VGA: New Polish- language program .... 653 

International Meetings 

Conference on world land tenure problems . . 660 
IMC announces acceptance of nicSel and cobalt 

allocation 665 

VS. DKLZGATION: Aeronautical Maps and 

Charts Division (Icao), 5th session . . . 668 
U.S. representative named to Central Group, 

iMC 665 

U.S. views on report of TJJf. Collective Measures 

Committee "(Bancroft) 666 

Matual .Aid and Defense 

Mutual Sectirity Act signed I Truman) . . . 646 

Muraal Security Program in the Near East 

iMcGheei 643 

Prime Minister of Greece and President of Tur- 
key reply to Trtiman message on Nato mem- 
bership, texts 650 

VS. to cooperate in meeting Brazil's economic 

and material needs ( Acheson to Laf er ) . . 654 

U.S. views on report of Collective Measures 

Committee (Bancroft) 666 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

Greece and Turkey to Join 650 

Prime Minister o: Greece and President of Tur- 
key reply to Invitation to Join 650 

State, Department of 

Former employee of Inp asked to verify serious 

charges 669 

EicOG given authority over German educational 

grants 669 

Jessup refutes Stassen's charges (letters; Jessup 

to Sparkman) 657 

Transcript of discussion on China's policy made 

public 655 

Strategic Materials 

iMC announces acceptance of nickel and cobalt 

aUccation 665 

United Nations 

Armistice negotiations In Korea 667 

ECOSOC: resolution on land reform discussed 

(Thorp ) 660 

SECURITY COUNCIL: Communiques regarding 

Korea 668 

VJH. bibliography: selected documents . . . 669 
VS. views on report of Collective Measures 

Committee (Bancroft) 663 

Name Index 

Acheson, Secretary Dean 647, 654, 656, 660 

Anderson, Eugeiile 653 

Bancroft, Harding P 666 

Barrett. Edward W 669 

Bayar, Celal 650 

Flood, Rep. Daniel J 670 

Green, Senator 673 

Heurteniatte, Don Roberto li. 665 

Humelsine, Carlisle H. 671 

Jessup. PhUip C 657 

Kim n Sung 667 

Lafer, Horacio 654 

McCarthy, E. R 668 

McGhee, George C 643 

Peng Teh-huai 667 

Rldgway. Matthew B 667 

Stassen, Harold E. 666 

Stlmson, Henry L 672 

Stout, Frank 669 

Thorp. Wlllard L. 661 

Tlcoulat, Gabriel J 665 

Truman, President Harry 8 646 

Venlzelos, Sophocles 650 

Wedemeyer, Gen. A. C 670 

tJne' ^e/ia^yX^ne^ii/ m t/tat& 

SECURINC THE PEACE • »*■■■ hj Ae rtiuitmt ... 679 


Exchange of Views an International Tension MT 

SoTiet Charges of U. S. Remilitaiizatian in Anstria . . in 

Life in the $o>riet Uxii<Hi as Seen br tlie U. S. Amhae- 
sador • kr ^<Ib* G. Kirk 681 


THE MIDDLE E.VST • by Jolu, .4. Lcftms 703 




^ Qjefut/yimene ^ y^kile L)Ui1GL1I1 

Vol. XXV, No. 644 • Publication 4396 
Oa^ber 29, 1951 

For lale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington 25, D.O. 


S2 Issues, domestic $7.50, foreign $10.26 

Single copy, 20 cents 

Tbe printing of this publication bos 
been approved by the Director of tbe 
Bureau of tbe Budget (July 29, 1949). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and Items contulried ht'reln may 
be reprinted. Citation of the Dkpaktment 
OF Statu Bolletin as the source will be 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication compiled and 
edited in the Division of Publications, 
Office of Public Affairs, provides the 
public and interested agencies of 
the Government with information on 
developments in the field of foreign 
relations and on the work of the De- 
partment of State and the Foreign 
Service. The BULLETIN includes 
selected press releases on foreign pol- 
icy issued by the White House and 
the Department, and statements and 
addresses made by the President and 
by the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as wellas 
special articles on various phases of 
international [affairs and the func- 
tions of the Department. Informa- 
tion is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to 
which the United States is or may 
become a party and treaties of gen- 
eral international interest. 

Publications of the Department, as 
well as legislative material in the field 
of international relations, are listed 

Securing the Peace 

Address by the President ^ 


NOV 19 1951 


Our country is standing before the bar of his- 
tory today in a very conspicuous phice. All the 
world is watching us, because all the world knows 
that the fate of civilization depends, to a very large 
extent, upon what we do. 

At the present time this Nation of ours is en- 
gaged in a great series of positive actions to secure 
peace in the world. This eti'ort is costing us a great 
deal — in taxes, in energy, in unwelcome changes 
in our daily living. It is even costing us the lives 
of some of our bravest and best young people who 
are fighting in the front lines against aggression. 

Like any positive effort, this one is being ques- 
tioned and criticized. There are people who ask 
whether it is worth doing. There are people who 
point to the sacrifices, the inconvenience, the cost, 
and who say it would be better to do nothing — or 
as close to nothing as possible. But it is clear, to 
most of us at least, that the effort is woith mak- 
ing — indeed that we have to make it. Our great 
effort for peace is a national effort. It is not the 
decision of one group or one person. It is the re- 
sult of our entire national experience over the last 
few decades. 

Cy the end of "World War II we had learned, 
as a Nation, that we could not have peace by keep- 
ing out of tlie affairs of the world. AVe were deter- 
mined to act, positively and vigorously, Avith other 
nations to preserve peace. That is why we em- 
braced the United Nations and pledged to sup- 
port it. 

Everything that we have done since has been the 
result of this decision. All we have done, our 
treaties with other nations, our defense program, 
our aid to other countries, has been the result of 
our determination to uphold the principles of the 
United Nations. It has been harder and more 
dangerous than we expected because of tlie refusal 
of one of the Great Powers to cany out the spirit 

' Made at Winston-Salem, N. C. on Oct. 15 and released 
to the press by the White House on the same date ; printed 
also as Department of State publication 4308. 

Ocfober 29, 195? 

of the United Nations and to live peacefully and 
cooperatively with its neighbors. 

But, if I understand this country correctly, 
there is no desire to backtrack on the path we have 
taken toward peace. There is no intention of run- 
ning out on ilie obligation we undertook to support 
the principles of the Charter. We made our deci- 
sion, it was the right decision, we are going to 
follow it out — and that's that. 

It is important to remember, as our defense 
program begins to turn out more and more weap- 
ons, and our alliances for defense begin to take 
effect, that our basic objective — our only objec- 
tive — is peace. 

I am afraid that some people, here and abroad, 
believe tliat the creation of armed defenses must 
inevitably lead to war. This is not the case. We 
do not think war is inevitable. We b<>lieve that the 
creation of defenses will make war less likely. 
So long as one country has the jiower and the 
forces to overwhelm others, and so long as that 
country has aggressive intentions, real peace is 
unattainable. Tlie stronger we become, the more 
possible it will be to work out solid and lasting 
arrangements that will prevent war. Our 
strength will make for peace. 

We saw the folly of weakness in the days of 
Hitler. AVe know now that we must have defenses 
when there is an aggressor abroad in the world. 
But once we have defenses strong enough to pro- 
vent the sneaking, creeping kind of aggression that 
Hitler ]n-acticed — what is the next ste)' ? Must we 
then have a show-down and a war until one side or 
tlie otlier is completely victorious? 

I think not. Our policy is based on the hope 
that it will be possible to live, without a war. in 
the same world as the Soviet Union — if the free 
nations have adequate defenses. As our defenses 
improve, the chances of negotiating successfully 
with the Soviet Union will increase. Tlie growth 
of our defenses will help to convince the leaders 
of the Soviet Union that peaceful arrangements 
are in their own self-interest. And as our strength 


increases, we should be able to negotiate settle- 
ments that the Soviet Union will respect and live 
up to. 

For example, the Kremlin may then be willing 
to discuss the possibility of genuine, enforceable 
arrangements to reduce and control armaments. 
Since the end of World War II we have been try- 
ing to work out a plan for the balanced reduction 
and control of armaments. Long before the So- 
viet Union got the atomic bomb, we developed a 
plan to control atomic weapons. Other nations 
endorsed this plan. It was a good plan. It would 
work. It would free the world from the scourge 
of atomic warfare. But the Soviet Union re- 
jected it. 

Working with other nations, we also developed 
initial plans looking toward the balanced reduc- 
tion and control of other types of weapons. The 
Soviet Union rejected these plans, too. 

Last year, before the United Nations, I proposed 
further work on the problem of disarmament and 
a new approach. I proposed a merger of the two 
United Nations commissions working in this field, 
the one on atomic energy and the one on other 
types of weapons. Work on this proposal has 
gone forward and good progress has been made. 
We are ready now, as we have always been, to sit 
down with the Soviet Union, and all the nations 
concerned, in the United Nations and work to- 
gether for lifting the burden of armaments and 
securing the peace. 

We are determined to leave no stone unturned 
in this search not only for relief from the horror 
of another world war but also for the basis of a 
durable peace. I hope that the growing strength 
of the free world will convince the leaders of the 
Soviet Union that it is to their own best interest 
to lay aside their aggressive plans and their phony 
peace propaganda and join with us and the other 
free nations to work out practical arrangements 
for achieving peace. 

This is the goal we are working for. It is for 
this great goal of peace that we have a defense 
program, and higher taxes, and a program of aid 
to other nations. It is for this purpose that our 
men, and the soldiers of other free nations, are 
striving and fighting in the hills of Korea. 

I cannot guarantee that we will reach our goal. 
The result does not depend entirely on our own 
efforts. Tlie rulers of the Kremlin can plunge the 
world into carnage if they desire to do so. But 
that is something that this country will never do. 
This I can say. Peace comes high in these 
troubled days, and we have shown that we are 
willing to pay the price for it. We have shown by 
positive acts that we are willing to work and sacri- 
fice for peace. 

Twice within one generation we have spent our 
blood and our treasure in defense of human free- 
dom. For six long years now we have contended, 
with all the weapons of the mind and spirit, 
against the adherents of the false god of tyranny. 
When the nations of Europe, our neighbors, were 
left, like the man in Scripture who fell among 
thieves, robbed and wounded and half dead, we 
have offered them our oil and our wine, without 
stint and without price. When one of the newest 
and smallest nations of Asia was invaded, we led 
the free world to its defense. 

These positive acts have not been easy to do. 
They have brought upon us hatred and threats and 
curses of the enemies of freedom — and may bring 
upon us even worse troubles. Nevertheless, if this 
Nation is justified by history, it is these things 
that will justify it and not the negative virtue of 
meaning no harm. 

God forbid that I should claim for our country 
the mantle of perfect righteousness. We have 
committed sins of omission and sins of commis- 
sion, for which we stand in need of the mercy of 
the good Lord. But I dare maintain before the 
world that we have done much that was right. 

To the sowers of suspicion, and the peddlers of 
fear, to all those who seem bent on persuading us 
that our country is on the wrong track and that 
there is no honor or loyalty left in the land, and 
that woe and ruin lie ahead, I would say one thing: 
"Take off your blinders, and look to the future. 
The worst danger we face is the danger of being 
paralyzed by doubts and fears. This danger is 
brought on by those who abandon faith and sneer 
at hope. It is brought on by those who spread 
cynicism and distrust and try to blind us to our 
great chance to do good for all mankind." 


On October 19, 1951, the Senate conflnned the nomina- 
tion of W. Averell Harriman to be Director for Mutual 

On O 'tober 19, 1951, the Senate confirmed the nomina- 
tions of the following persons to be representatives to the 
sixth session of the General Assembly of the United 

Warren R. Austin 
Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Michael J. Mansfield 
John M. Vorys 

The nominations of the following-named persons were 
confirmed to be alternate representatives: 

John Sherman Cooper 
Ernest A. Gross 
Benjamin V. Cohen 
Anna Lord Strauss 
Channing H. Tobias 


Department of Sfafe Bulletin 

Life in the Soviet Union as Seen by the U.S. Ambassador 

by Alan G. Kirk 
Ambassador to the U.S.S.R} 

You all understand, certainly, that I am still the 
U.S. Ambassador to tlie Soviet Union. Further, 
as my speech tonight will necessarily be short, it 
may contain certain categoric statements for 
which I ask your indulgence, as there is not the 
time to explain in detail. 

Any chief of mission on post abroad must of 
necessity be assisted in the various duties ex- 
pected of him by the Government. Fortunately 
our Government has set up under the Department 
of State a career service of diplomats, called the 
Foreign Service. The personnel of this Foreign 
Service are men and women of high character, 
tried loyalty, trained, intelligent, trustworthy. 
To those of them who served with me in Brussels 
and in Moscow, I extend my grateful thanks. 

After living over 2 years in Moscow, perhaps 
the most striking impression of the Soviet Union 
one carries away is that of its mass. This huge 
land area with its mighty rivers, its wide plains, 
its mountains, its deserts, its great inland seas and 
lakes, its many swamps, is so enormous that 
one easily comprehends that it comprises a vast 
amount of the land area of the earth — one sixth, 
in fact. Naturally all foreigners, including the 
diplomats, are intrigued by its size and want to 
visit and see it, but unfortunately there ai-e restric- 
tions placed on foreign diplomats which prevent 
the freedom of movement we westerners are accus- 
tomed to, at home and abroad. In 1941, after the 
war began, the Soviet Government issued a decree 
restricting access by foreigners to large areas. 
This decree was reaffirmed in September 1948. 
In general, the areas thus restricted are: the 
western frontiers, the Black Sea coast lines, the 
Baltic Sea coast, central Asia, northern Siberia, 
eastern Siberia, and many towns on certain rivers 
and railway lines. Those of us who live in 

' Excerpts from an address delivered at the Alfred E. 
Smith Memorial Dinner at New York, N. Y., on Oct. 18 
and released to the press on the same date. 

Moscow are restricted to a distance of 50 kilo- 
meters and that only on certain roads. 

But a curious exception has been made by the 
Soviet Government for selected visitors. There 
have been groups of partisans of peace, or trade 
union delegations, or medical groups, coming 
from various western countries, such as Great 
Britain, France, and even the United States, who 
are allowed to see, in fact are taken to see, many 
of the places denied accredited diplomatic mis- 
sions. Among places thus visited are Tashkent 
and Alma Ata in central Asia, or a city like Kiev 
in the Ukraine. We have been forced to conclude 
that these special groups given this special treat- 
ment consist of people selected for their sympathy 
with the Communiist cause, and whose reactions 
will be along anticipated lines. These groups go 
on planned tours ; they are hurried from place to 
place ; they are generally pretty exhausted at the 
end of the day ; and, as they are not experienced 
observers, the comments they make when they re- 
turn to their own countries should be treated with 

In another way also the diplomatic personnel 
are discriminated against, that is by the ex- 
asperating obstructions and delays in trips to 
authorized areas. They are often told that 
unfortunately there will be no hotel accommoda- 
tions, or that there is no space on the train or the 
plane, and they may arrive at a given destination 
to find that there are no rooms. Tickets for trips 
in the Soviet Union are generally delivered but 
a few hours before the time of departure of the 
train or plane, so that the traveler is left in un- 
certainty until the last moment as to whether he 
will make the trip or not. Placing obstacles in 
the way of travelers is a highly developed art in 
the Soviet Union, and this skill in dragging the 
feet is one which must be weighed in several other 

Ocfofaer 29, ?95J 


A Trip to Lake Baikal 

My own travels in the Soviet Union included 
authorized trips to places such as Stalingrad, 
Leningrad, Lake Baikal, Tiflis, and several towns 
close to Moscow. To me the trip to Lake Baikal 
was the most interesting, although I did have 
some difficulty in persuading the authorities to 
let me make this trip. First of all it was asked: 
Why do you want to go? Tliere are no hotels. 
Tlie little town is inadequately equipped for visi- 
tors, et cetera. However, my reply was that 
the lake was tlie most interesting fresh-water lake 
in the land-mass of Asia, 300 miles long, and the 
deepest indentation of the earth's crust outside of 
the sea, it has seals, sturgeon, and of course is 
completely frozen over in winter. Well, an ap- 
proval finally was given and we left — a party of 
three plus the four Soviet secret service men who 
always accompany the American Ambassador 
even on trips. 

Leaving Moscow at 8 p.m. on a Thursday, we 
arrived at our destination at 9 a.m. the following 
Friday week. The train was composed of 13 cars, 
one a Pullman of 1906 vintage, one a restaurant 
car, and the engine. It was interesting to note 
that the train traveled all the way to Novosibirsk 
with only one engine, which meant the crossing 
of the Urals was over grades sufficiently low for a 
single engine to pull the train. We had dinner 
every night in the restaurant car where the menu 
included caviar, borsch, shashlik, beef Stroganov, 
vegetables, compote of fruit; and for beverages 
we had beer, Russian wine, or tea. Most of the 
distance, the track was single with long sidings 
for passing. This railroad has a 5-foot gauge 
and the train rode quite comfortably. We saw 
many track gangs, composed usually of girls plus 
one man, working to keep the roadbed in repair. 
They were laying the rails, or the ties, and shifting, 
ballast. They seemed quite happy to do so. At 
all the stations, the station clock kept the hour of 
Moscow even though we were several hours east, 
and Radio Moscow blared out the party line at 
each stop and in the train itself. At each station 
also there was the office of the security police, 
the Mm). On most station platforms there would 
be for sale chicken, eggs, fruit, and sometimes 

In central Siberia the land is rolling, like our 
western prairies, and has been brought under 
rather extensive cultivation. We saw some fields 
which we estimated to be 5 miles in length and 
stretching over the horizon. They had obviously 
been plowed and sown by mechanized agricultural 
machinery, and we passed a number of machine- 
tractor stations. 

On arrival at our destination, the little town of 
Sludyanka, we were met by the local security rep- 
resentatives who took us to a small house where 
we were to spend the night. Tliis was the custom- 
ary Russian log hut, one story high, with three 
small rooms and kitchen. It had been prepared 


for our reception. A radio was installed, also a 
telephone. We were protected by the local militia, 
and at night the wooden shutters were closed, 
ostensibly because of an impending hurricane. 
Our hostess was a fair cook and was as hospitable 
as she could be under the circumstances. Cars 
were provided for a short trip along the shores 
of the lake, and we were able to hire a dory for a 
row on the lake. 

Our principal guide was a Mr. Smirnov who 
was carefully coached to give th& most noncom- 
mittal of answers to all our simple questions. For 
example, when we spoke of the lake water being 
very cold, he said, "Yes, sometimes it was cold but 
sometimes it was warm." We asked if it were 
frozen over in winter. He said, "Yes, sometimes 
it was frozen and sometimes it was not." Was 
there good fishing? Yes, in some spots, other 
places, no. Did they have violent storms on the 
lake ? Sometimes they did, sometimes they didn't. 
Was it a fact that seals existed in the lake? This 
he was rather vague in answering, not having been 
briefed as to that particular question. As a mat- 
ter of fact there are, for at some point in the past, 
seals swam from the Arctic Ocean up the Yenisei 
River, up the Angara, and got into the lake — 
where they exist to this day. The return the fol- 
lowing day was by train as far west as Novosi- 
birsk, where we took a plane, flying in the night 
in the rain, and stopping at Omsk, Sverdlovsk, 
and Kharkov. The pilot was competent, brought 
us down on grass runways, and landed us safely 
at Moscow airport in the early morning. 

A trip of this kind is very instructive, giving an 
indication of the size of the country, the wide 
spacing between towns, the lack of a road-net 
paralleling the railway, and an atmosphere of 
hustle, bustle as of frontier towns. There is 
imagination and driving force at work in this part 
of Siberia, which is being brought imder inten- 
sive modern cultivation and with new towns and 
industrial plants springing up at many places. 

The Enigma of the Russian People 

Let us ask now, who are these people that in- 
habit the Soviet Union? Here I am obliged to 
state that, except for certain officials of the Min- 
istry of Foreign Affairs and certain Soviet em- 
ployees of my Embassy, I know no Russians. 
Soviet citizens are not allowed to visit, to enter- 
tain, or to know foreigners. It is not just Ameri- 
cans who are taboo — it is all foreigners. This 
may seem extraordinary, but it is a fact. Can you 
imagine living 2 years in Rome and knowing no 
Italians. Or 2 years in Paris and knowing no 
Fi-enchmen? Yet such is the case in the Soviet 
Union — we westerners know no Russians. 

Therefore, when answering the question, "Wlio 
are these people who inhabit the Soviet Union?", 
my reply has to be based on information other than 
that derived from personal contact with the peo- 

Deparfment of State Bulletin 

pie themselves. There are 200 million of them, 
as we estimate, since no trustworthy figures on 
population have been issued since 1939; a people 
of mixed races and tribes with the Slavic, or Great 
Russian, type predominatinir. Even in the Asso- 
ciated Soviet Socialist Republics it would seem that 
by translation of population the Slavic strain is 
now over 50 percent. As it is the policy of the 
Communist Party to keep Slavs in control in all 
these areas, the change in populations has been 
enormous. For instance, Moscow itself has a pop- 
ulation of 5 to 6 million souls, composed of per- 
sons most of whom never lived in Moscow before 
the Revolution. Needless to say, those of the 
other regime, or as the Russians call them, "the 
other people," are gone and gone forever. 

Certain major points of difference in the his- 
torical background of these people may be of in- 
terest. We know that the Great Russians centered 
around Moscow were subjected to many invasions 
from the East. There need only be mentioned, in 
passing, the Golden Horde or the invasions of the 
Tartars ; but in the end Moscow prevailed and the 
Slavs clung to their land and beat off the invaders. 
It was Ivan the Terrible who stormed the strong- 
hold of the Tartars at Kazan and, to commemo- 
rate this victory, had the Crescent placed under the 
Cross, where it remains to this day. 

When Christianity came to the old Russia it 
came from Byzantium and is therefore that of the 
Greek Orthodox Church. But the Russians did 
not participate in the crusades, nor was there 
experienced the great renaissance, in our terms, 
when art, architecture, literature, and music un- 
derwent that tremendous revival which profound- 
ly affected our Western civilization. There was 
no reformation as we knew it, and liberalism in 
thought was delayed and sluggish. It is true 
Catherine the Great was influenced by the writ- 
ings of Voltaire, and some liberal thought did 
spread from France prior to the French Revolu- 
tion; but, when that revolution occurred, Russia 
closed her doors to all except the emigre royalists, 
and the effect the French Revolution had on 
Western Europe was not duplicated in Russia. 
You will note, therefore, that the historical back- 
ground of the Russian people varies greatly from 
our own. We westerners inherit certain traditions 
which the Russians do not understand, and things 
we take for granted in the historical sense mean 
nothing to them. 

The Communist Regime — A Study in Coercion 
and Persuasion 

Now the Russia of today, or the Soviet Union, 
or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, is a 
totalitarian state, based primarily on the theories 
of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin, and governed by the 
Bolshevik Party, some 6 million strong, who rule 
the remaining 190-odd millions. It is a one-party 
system with control vested in the Central Commit- 

Ocfober 29, 7 957 

tee of the Communist Party — and this is a fact, 
unpalatable though it may be to us. Furthermore, 
it is a fact accepted by the masses of the Russian 
people, too. It is government by coercion and 
persuasion. It is a nation governed by a new set 
of rulers who gained power by force, and the for- 
mer ruling groups have been eliminated and are 
gone. There are new people in government, in 
industry, in agriculture, in the arts. They have 
made technological advances which we must not 
overlook, even though it has often been by pirating 
the inventions of other nations. 

This is a young nation with an average age prob- 
ably between 30 and 35 — 200 million strong and 
working. There are not many old people in 
Russia, but there are lots of young. In some ways 
the present situation in the Soviet Union can 
be compared to that of the United States in the 
early 1800's. They, too, are a young race, virile 
and vigorous, with imagination and inspiration. 
They are governed and controlled by an elite Com- 
munist Party which works constantly to main- 
tain the power of the party. They are likewise an 
educated people, for schooling is compulsory. 
There is an urge to learn. They feel that knowl- 
edge is power. There is competition for advance- 
ment to the higher schools of learning. Literacy 
is widespread, perhaps reaching even 85 percent. 
All want to learn, all want to know, all want to 

In this competitive atmosphere one finds little 
sign of human kindness, compassion, coiirtesies, 
aiding the weak. It is each one for himself. 
They are a serious people, their sense of humor is 
very limited and blunt. One rarely sees smiles 
on faces of people in the streets. 

The Communist Party direction extends every- 
where. It is designed to preserve the Communist 
regime in power. There is a constant stream of 
jiropaganda and agitation to "the masses"' through 
the press, through the radio, movies, television. 
The Government has no Department or Ministry 
of Public Information, but the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party has a Department of 
Propaganda and Agitation which controls all 
jnedia of mass communication. From Pravda, 
the organ of the Central Committee, to the small- 
est town newspaper, everything that is printed is 
prepared and calculated to produce a desired ef- 
fect on the Russian people. But the spoken word 
is also employed in face-to-face contact with the 
masses, when selected workers of the party, better 
known as "agitators," educate small groups in face- 
to-face contact by explaining a single idea very 
carefully and thoroughly — to the party's advan- 
tage, it is a form of personal indoctrination 
which is most important. 

Naturally the regime must protect "the masses" 
of the people from Western ideas so that thinking 
may continue along lines of "truth" — as seen 
by the Politburo. Wliereas, in our own country 
we welcome the exchange of ideas with other na- 


tions, we read their newspapers and books, we 
view their plays, we listen to their music, we re- 
ceive their travelers; in the Soviet Union that is 
not true, except for some classical works of music, 
certiiin classical writing, because nothing like 
this is allowed to take place. For current events, 
only items of foreign origin which are critical of 
the capitalistic world are allowed to be circulated. 
And news of the outer world is always colored 
and distorted to the detriment of the truth. So 
most citizens of the Soviet Union live in con- 
siderable ignorance of us as we really are. Their 
picture of us, and especially of the United States, 
is one of poverty, deprivation, slums, endless toil, 
low standard of living. This picture is served to 
them by the Communist Party daily, and to some 
extent is accepted. Is there any skepticism among 
the people? Most likely, but concealed. 

Repression of Human Instincts for Freedom 
and Religious Expression 

But does the Soviet citizen not long for free- 
dom, for liberty? Is such an urge inherent in 
man? Is it self-generating? We wrote in our 
Declaration of Independence: "We hold these 
truths to be self-evident that all men are created 
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator 
with certain unalienable rights, that among these 
are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." 
These are pregnant words to us, but I should 
hesitate to attempt to define the Soviet citizen's 
reaction to a similar statement in his own lan- 

So one is forced to ask : Is the concept of liberty, 
or of freedom, inspired by tradition, or is it in- 
stinctive? Is it self -generating ? Can Soviet 
thought parallel, or be in consonance with our 
own concept? The answer to this would be im- 

Similarly, in religious matters you will recall 
that when the Communist Party seized power it 
abolished religion; and that every member of the 
Communist Party is ipso facto an atheist. En- 
tering Red Square between the walls of the Krem- 
lin and those of the Historical Museum one sees 
on the latter a plaque which reads: "Religion is 
the opium of the masses." This, on the site of 
the famous church of the Iberian Virgin, is highly 
symbolic of the Communist Party's attitude. An- 
otlier interesting sidelight— guides in museums or 
galleries when referring to dates of past events 
never use our system, that is to say, by A.D. or 
B.C., but always use the term "our era." Thus, 
they say "the fifth century of our era," or "the 
third century before our era," rather than the fifth 
century A.D., or the third century Before Christ. 

Nevertheless, there is some toleration of reli- 
gious practices and customs. There are regular 
church services and the feast days, such as Easter, 
are days of great solemnity and ceremony. The 
Orthodox Church remains a force but not as a 


force against the State; rather it is tolerated by 
the Communist Party because it reinforces passiv- 
ity among the people, and, in fact, supports the 

Here arise other great and grave questions. 
Can the religious instincts of man, if never nour- 
ished, be obliterated by the passage of time? Is 
it possible that, after several generations of re- 
pression, this instinct in man will disappear? 
Can materialism satisfy the human soul? What 
will be the effect of education on the religious in- 
stincts of these people? I, myself, would rather 
think that man is inherently and instinctively 
aware of and recognizes a Higher Power, that 
broader intellectual capacity will of itself generate 
doubts concerning the aesthetic attitude of the 
Communist Party ; that man's innate humility will 
bring him to realize there is a Higher Order than 
pure materialism. 

The Privileged Politburo 

Of course our own immediate concern is not 
with the masses of the Soviet Union but with its 
Government, that is to say the Politburo of the 
Central Committee. We should realize, I feel, 
that these are men, humans, not supermen nor 
superhumans. They have made mistakes but 
those mistakes are concealed from "the masses," 
from the people. For this Politburo is respon- 
sible neither to any parliament, nor to any con- 
gress, nor to the people. There are no questions, 
no investigations, no airing of abuses for all the 
people to see. We must also recognize that this 
Government has large forces at its disposal. In 
the military sphere their strength appears formid- 
able, although there is certainly a lack of indus- 
trial capacity for its support. Nevertheless, we 
should remember that in 34 years the Communist 
Party and the Soviet Government have restored 
the boundaries of Peter the Great. They have 
added the satellite states on the West. They have 
gained the adhesion of China to their doctrine. 
We should recall, I suggest, the fate of Europe 
in the seventh century when the Saracens over- 
ran the Mediterranean Basin and in 60 years con- 
quered nearly all its shores plus the Iberian Penin- 
sula. The rapidity with which that avalanche 
took place, should give us pause at the present 

So a menace to our peaceful existence does exist, 
whether by subversive methods or otherwise, and 
to compose our differences by negotiation is diffi- 
cult. Under the tenets of the Politburo, they are 
always right. What then is our duty ? It seems 
to me we must refresh our moral and physical 
strength, keep our own ideals bright, and show by 
our example what real democracy means. We 
must be calm, cool, and cold-blooded. We must 
keep our physical strength at a proper level. We 
must accept the fact that a challenge to our way 
of life does exist, that it is serious, that it must be 

Department of Stale BuUetin 

met squarely. To do this, we of the Western 
AVorld must make the necessary sacrifices, and it 
may be that our way of life will have to be modi- 
fied. We cannot negotiate with the Soviets when 
we are weak. We must have strength, and our 
rearmament is designed for the purpose of mak- 
ing our voice listened to in negotiations — and for 

that alone. But our strength must be actual, in 
being, not potential. In our dealings with the 
Soviet Government we must be strong, we must be 
firm, and we must be consistent. 

But most of all we, as Christians, must keep our 
faith in God and, as free men, be prepared to de- 
fend our liberty. 

Where Do We Stand in the World Today? 

Statement hy Secretary Acheson ' 

After the San Francisco conference, many of 
you who saw the conference on television wrote me 
letters. I appreciated getting them. You gave 
me most welcome encouragement. You asked me 
questions and you made comments on foreign 
affairs. This afternoon we are going to take a 
brief look at where we stand in the world today, 
and then talk about some of your questions and 

What you saw on your television screens from 
San Francisco were builders, from many nations, 
laying the foundations of peace in the Pacific. 
They were ending a war which had cost all of us 
precious lives, and years of anguish and sorrow 
and work. They were ending it generously and 
wisely, so that all the sacrifices could lead to peace 
and reconciliation. 

In the days before and after the scenes you 
saw, we made agreements with the Philippines and 
Australia and New Zealand and again with Japan, 
to strengthen and support this structure of peace. 
For peace — a just and safe peace, under which free 
men can live as free men— doesn't come by wish- 
ing for it. It must have the strength and union 
to defend and maintain it. 

This is what you saw at San Francisco. And 
from your letters I know that you felt, as I did, 
that we were all present at one of the great mo- 
ments of history. 

In a few days I'm leaving on a mission of many 
weeks to carry on this work in another part of 
the world — at the U.N. meeting in Paris and at 
the North Atlantic Council in Rome. 

This great town meeting of the woi'ld, held this 
year in Paris, has a vast amount of business. But 
you can say that it divides into about three groups. 

The first deals with the first great purpose of 
the U.N. — to settle all the disputes peaceably 
and not by fighting or threats. Right away this 

' Made on "Battle Report" over NBC Television Net- 
work on Oct. 21 and released to tbe press on the same 

means Korea. It means doing everything pos- 
sible to strengthen General Ridgway's superb men 
who are fighting the invaders of Korea. It means 
to assist him in evei\y way in his efforts to end 
the aggression by an honorable armistice, which 
will safeguard the people of Korea and the prin- 
ciples for which so much blood has been shed. 

Under this heading also comes the program, 
started last year, of uniting the nations for peace 
in concrete measures to meet aggression. Under 
this heading also comes the work of years to lift 
the burden of armaments. 

The second type of business consists in hearing 
nations who claim to have been treated wrongly, 
or hearing disputes which cannot be settled by the 
parties; and in working out sensible and just 
solutions. For example, the General Assembly 
will take up the continued tension in the Middle 

Thirdly, the meeting will push ahead with a 
most constructive group of projects to make the 
daily lives of millions of people throughout the 
world infinitely better through their own efforts. 

All through the vast area of Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America, men and women face elemental 
problems of hunger, poverty, and disease. To 
many people in this area, the most important of 
all world problems comes down to where their 
next meal is coming from. 

The United Nations is grappling with these 
problems, and making real progress. 

But I can't spend all my time in Paris at the 
U.N. meeting. For I shall have to be working 
with our High Commissioner to Germany, Mr. 
McCloy, and with British and French Ministers 
on German questions. Here again we are trying 
to bring peace, and the institutions of peace, to 
replace the occupation. This means agreements 
witli the German Republic by which it can have an 
honorable and equal part in the European com- 
munity and take its place among those who are 
maintaining the peace and security of the Atlantic 

Ocfober 29, J 95 1 


And this leads on to the Rome meeting. Ihere 
we hope that the negotiations with Germany can 
have the approval of our North Atlantic part- 

There's another hard question to tackle at Rome. 
We must devise ways and means by which our 
defense can be assured at a cost which we all can 
afford. "We must remember that in many Euro- 
pean countries cunning and determined Commu- 
nist groups seize upon every opportunity to under- 
mine the government and to divide the nations of 
the free world. Inflation, and the hardship it 
brings to people, would assist the Communists. 
It must be avoided. 

Averell Harriman is working on this now as 
part of the group called "Operation-Wise Men." 
They must be "wise men" because the problems 
they are wrestling with are very serious and diffi- 
cult indeed. 

All of these weeks of work, you see, have a cen- 
tral purpose. The use of every means at our dis- 
posal to organize for peace — to maintain peace — 
to strengthen those who are defending peace — to 
find every means to settle all questions within the 
peace — to make plain that the hopes and expecta- 
tions of all people can be, and are being, met, and 
can only be met, with peace. 

The task takes more wisdom and strength than 
any man can bring to it. One can only attempt it 
in the unshakeable faith that the effort serves our 
beloved country, our fellow citizens, and every- 
thing that is dear to every one of us. 

Questions and Answers 

Middle East 

What are we doing about this trouble between 
Britain and Egypt that is now going on? 

. . . Although the Middle East is in the headlines right 
now, the troubles there didn't begin just this week, or this 
month— they go back quite a long time. And we have 
been working on Middle East problems for a long time, 

Back in 1946, when the Soviets tried to put the heat on 
Turke.v, to get control over the Dardanelles, we backed up 
the Turks, and helped them keep their independence. 

And we stood firm when it was a question of getting 
the Russian troops out of Iran in 1046; and they came out. 

Then, in 1047, the Communists had another try at 
Greece and Turkey, and the whole Eastern Mediter- 
ranean. You remember how this country responded, 
quickly and effectively, with what has been called the 
"Truman Doctrine." 

Now, the danger of Communist aggression from outside 
IS <mly one of the prolilems that these people have to worry 
about. They've also got tough economic and social prob- 
lems to deal with. And there's another important factor, 
too, which we must understand, that is, awakened national 
spirit all through this area. 

This is something we can understand because of our 
own history. V,e have been helping these people improve 
their conditions of life. Our record is good and clear on 

What we are trying to do now is to make sure that 
what happens in this part of the world doesn't jeopardize 
the security of all the rest of us. These people live in an 


area that is of critical importance to the security of the 
rest of the whole world. 

In the trouble between Egypt and Britain, we think 
and say that the Egyptian Government can't throw its 
international obligations overboard. 

Over the past few months, we've been working with 
France. Britain, and Turkey on a Middle East Command. 
Egypt has been offered an equal partnership in this Com- 
mand. We still have hopes that the Egyptians will go 
along with us on this proposal. This will not only help to 
settle the dispute: it will also put the defense of this 
whole area on a stronger basis. 

The Congress has also acted to strengthen this defense 
in the Mutual Security Act, by providing funds for mili- 
tary equipment and economic aid to the Middle East. 

When we add to this the new arrangements by which 
Greece and Turkey will be linked to the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, we will be making real headway. 

So, the answer to this question is that we are doing all 
we can, with our friends in Europe and the Middle East, 
to work out the problems of this area with common sense 
and with justice to all sides. 


What have we gained by all this fighting in Korea? 

. . . First, let's see what would have happened if 
we had not met the attack on Korea — head on. Korea 
would have been over-run in no time. That would have 
been only the first step. Other countries in the Far East 
could have been picked off one by one. Our troops in 
Japan would be in a very dangerous and exposed position. 

All over the world, free countries, faced with the threat 
of Communist aggre.ssion, would have been paralyzed 
by fear tliat they might be next on the list — and that they 
would be alone and without support. 

The whole idea of the United Nations would have been 
shattered too. 

Instead of that, the Communists have stiffered a serious 
setback. They've had more than a million casualities, 
and they are back behind the place where they started. 
This aggression has failed, and it failed because, for the 
first time in history, a world organization stood up and 
said, "This lawless aggression has got to stop." 

We believe this firm and courageous action will dis- 
courage aggression on a larger scale and save us from 
the catastrophe of world war. 

Aid to Europe 

Why should we sacrifice here to help European 
countries who are not trying to help themselves? 

. . . In the first place, it isn't right to say these 
people are not trying to help themselves. They are. 
They have picked themselves up off the ground after the 
war, and have done miracles to get production in factory 
and farm rolling, and to begin building their defenses. 

Surely, our help was important. But it wouldn't have 
l)een worth anything unless these jieople were willing to 
roll up their sleeves and go to work, as they did. 

And in the second place — their defense and our defense 
are part of the same thing. Our economic and military 
aid to Europe helps us too, l>ecause we are all in the same 
boat. If they go under we would find ourselves in very 
great danger. They, and we, are trying to work together 
to help one another, each doing what he can. It is vital 
to the security of the United 'States to do this. 

The man who heads up the whole Atlantic defense is 
General Eisenhower. He has been all over Europe, look- 
ing at the defense work of the various countries. He 
doesn't say that they are not helping themselves. 

Neither they nor we are building our defenses rapidly 
enough, in view of the danger we face. We have got to 
solve common problems in a common program. 
(Continued on page 70?) 

Department of Stale Bulletin 

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Exchange Views on International Tension 

[Released to the press Octoiei- 17] 

As is customary, iefor'e leaving Moscow for the 
United States, Ambassador Alan G. Kirk paid a 
call on the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei 
Vishinsky, on October 5, 1951. With the author- 
ization of the U. S. Government, Ambassador Kirk 
took this occasion to refer to his previous conver- 
sation with Acting Foreign Minister Gromyko on 
June 27} At that time, Amhassador Kirk had 
sought clarification of the statements made hy the 
Soviet representative to the United Nations, Am- 
bassador Malik, in his broadcast of June 25, con- 
cerning the possibility of concluding an armistice 
in Korea} Andrei Gromyko informed the Am- 
bassador, on that occasion, that the Soviet Govern- 
meyit had in inind an armistice on a military basis 
with political provisions to be left for future 

The attitude of the Comnntnist negotiators dur- 
ing these truce talks had not been consistent with 
the aim of a military armistice. The Ambassador 
thus attempted to ascertain whether the Soviet 
Government still lent support to an armistice on 
that basis. 

On October 15, 1951, Foreign Minister Vishin- 
sky made a Ktafiment to Hugh S. Cummvings, Jr., 
U'.S. Chnri/'' iPAffi/ires at Moscow. Texts of the 
tu''0 statements follow: 


I have been instructed before leaving Moscow 
for an extended period to take advantage of the 
opportunity to discuss certain matters now caus- 
ing international tension and standing in the way 
of improved relations between our two countries. 

At the present time the most explosive outstand- 
ing issue is Korea, and the armistice talks are the 
most immediate aspect of that problem. The ces- 
sation of fighting in Korea on a mutually accept- 
able basis would serve to reduce tensions and 

' BtnixTiN of July 9, 1951, p. 45. 

Ocfober 29, 1 95 1 

contribute to an atmosphere in which further con- 
structive steps might be taken toward the solution 
of other pressing international problems. 

The developments between the United Nations 
Command and the North Korean and Chinese 
Communist negotiators are incomprehensible to 
the United States Government. The North 
Korean and Chinese Communist proposals in re- 
gard to an armistice line are inconsistent with the 
current military situation and with statements 
which Acting Foreign Minister Gromyko made to 
me upon the occasion of my call on him on June 
27 of this year to clarify the earlier public state- 
ment by Mr. Malik in New York on June 25. In 
that interview Mr. Gromyko explained that the 
Soviet Govermnent envisaged a meeting of the 
opposing commands to conclude a military armi- 
stice which would include a cease fire and which 
would be limited strictly to military questions and 
would not involve any political or territorial mat- 

The United Nations Command was surprised 
and disappointed to discover that the opposing 
negotiators kept insisting upon an armistice line 
not strictly military in character which introduced 
complicated political and territorial issues con- 
trary to the understanding on which the United 
Nations Command had entered the negotiations 
and which does not conform to the military re- 
quirements for a satisfactory armistice line. To 
take important political steps in military con- 
versations between the United Nations Com- 
mander on the one side and commanders on the 
other, who profess to represent Chinese "volun- 
teers" and a North Korean regime which enjoys 
no international status, cannot be accepted. The 
United Nations Commander was authorized to 
participate in such military talks with the thought 
that this would provide the Soviet Government 
with an opportunity to assist in bringing, about an 
armistice. This does not mean that the United 
States Government is prepared to dispose of im- 
portant political matters in talks with such irregu- 
lar Communist military personnel. Political 
issues of a Korean settlement must be dealt with 


subsequent to an armistice by the United Nations 
and by the governments concerned on a responsi- 
ble basis. 

In the opinion of the United States Govern- 
ment the attitude of the Communist bloc toward 
the restoration of peace will be tested by whether 
the North Korean and Chinese Communist nego- 
tiator are prepared to reach an armistice settle- 
ment based on purely military factors ; upon a rea- 
sonable line affording safety to the armed forces 
of both sides ; and upon adequate arrangements for 
the inspection of compliance with the armistice 
terms: and for the satisfactory disposition of pris- 
oners of war. The Soviet Government must surely 
recognize that, as a simple statement of fact, the 
breakdown of armistice talks in Korea would 
add greatly to the explosive character of the 
situation and might stimulate a course of events 
which would be undesirable from the point of 
view of both our governments. The United States 
Government for its part has clearly shown by its 
declarations and by its actions that it desires an 
end to the conflict in Korea and to prevent its 
spreading to other areas, purposes which the 
Soviet Government has publicly stated it shares. 

With regard to the current status of the armis- 
tice talks, I wish to affirm that the United Nations 
Command is sincerely desirous of concluding an 
armistice. However, past experience with the 
Kaesong site fully illustrates the fact that this 
place does not afford adequate protection guar- 
anteeing the security of the negotiations. The 
insistence of the United Nations Command upon 
another site which will not be under the control 
of either side and to which both sides will have 
free access should eliminate the possibility of in- 
cidents and insure that the talks can be resumed 
with good prospect of success. In proposing to 
discuss the change of site from Kaesong, the sole 
purpose of the United Nations Command has 
been to obtain a resumption of the talks in a truly 
neutral area with equality of rights and access and 
to obviate the possibility of charges and counter- 
charges concerning incidents which have plagued 
the talks to this date. In the eyes of the United 
Nations Command there is no reason why agree- 
ment on another site truly neutral cannot be 
quickly agreed upon by both sides and the talks 

Of all the problems and causes of tensions in 
the postwar world the Korean problem presents 
the clearest immediate issue. Tlie invasion of 
South Korea on June 25, 1950 was an act of naked 
aggression — a fact understood throughout the 
world. The verj^ fact that the North Korean 
Army almost succeeded in reaching Pusan in the 
early stages of the war demonstrates clearly upon 
whose responsibility the aggression lay. How- 
ever, I have no desire now to enter into a fruit- 
less discussion concerning what has been done; 
what I do wish to impress upon you is the serious- 
ness of the present impasse in the Korean armis- 

tice talks. It is hoped that the Soviet Government 
will act to the end that the North Korean and Chi- 
nese Communist negotiators will conclude a re- 
alistic armistice agreement which would afford 
safety for both sides and which does not become 
involved with political and territorial issues with 
which the governments of the United Nations must 

I assume that the Soviet Government is receiv- 
ing full and objective reports concerning develop- 
ments outside the Soviet Union and the attitude 
of the United States and other states confronted 
by Soviet policies which have proved uncompro- 
mising and not contributory to the solution of 
mutual problems. The Soviet Government does 
not need to be told that other nations are deter- 
mined to defend their own way of life and inde- 
pendence. The measures now being taken by the 
United States and other governments to increase 
their security are for defense and defense alone. 
On specific instructions of my government I wish 
to assure the Soviet Government that the United 
States has no aggi-essive designs on the U.S.S.R 
or on anyone and it is our hope that there may 
soon be restored to the nations of the world a sense 
of confidence and security which should be condu- 
cive to the settlement of outstanding issues em- 
bittering international relations. Nothing could 
contribute more to this as an immediate first step 
than the successful outcome of the Korean ar- 
mistice talks. 

Without the achievement of an armistice in 
Korea, there is little if any prospect for any 
real solution of other problems besetting us 
throughout the world. An armistice in Korea 
might open up perspectives for the useful discus- 
sion of other measures which may be taken to alle- 
viate existing tensions. In conclusion I should 
like to express the hope of the United States Gov- 
ernment that an armistice can be achieved and 
that the Soviet Government will act to that end. 



On October 5, I received, at his request, the 
Ambassador of the United States of America in 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Alan 
Kirk, who stated he would like to discuss the 
question of the improvement of relations between 
our two countries. The Ambassador stated, in this 
connection, that he was authorized — ^by the Gov- 
ernment of the United States of America— to 
ask that the statement — which he was authorized 
to make on this question — be brought to the knowl- 
edge of the Soviet Government and brought to 
the personal attention of Generalissimo Stalin. 
Then the Ambassador read an extended statement 
of seven to eight pages. 

To my surprise, the Ambassador replied — ^to 


Department of State Bulletin 

the expression of my wish to receive the text of 
this statement — that, in accordance with his in- 
structions, he must make this statement only in 
oral form and not leave the text. 

1. The content of the oral statement made by 
Mr. Kirk essentially consists of the following: 

(A) It is pointed out in the statement read 
by Mr. Kirk that the Korean question is the 
sharpest and most dangerous international ques- 
tion at the present time, requiring immediate so- 
lution. The American Government attaches tre- 
mendous significance to the armistice discussions 
in Korea, considering that a favorable outcome 
of the armistice discussions would permit settle- 
ment of other unresolved questions — causing ten- 
sion in international relations — and would open 
up the perspective for an improvement of rela- 
tions between the U. S. S. E. and the United States 
of America. The Ambassador stated that the 
Government of the United States of America 
hopes for the cooperation of the Soviet Govern- 
ment toward a positive completion of these discus- 
sions. Together with such reference to the Soviet 
Government for cooperation. Mr. Kirk, however, 
made rather strange allusions to some sort of 
possible '"unpleasantnesses" between the U.S.S.R. 
and the United States of America in case of un- 
favorable results of these discussions. 

The Ambassador also stated that the American 
Command objects to discussion at Kaesong of the 
question of determination of the line of cease fire, 
referring to the fact that this question bears a 
political character. 

(B) In the statement, attention is also given to 
the question of Soviet -Ajnerican relations, in con- 
nection with which, an attempt is made to shift 
responsibility for tension in international rela- 
tions to democratic countries, called by the Am- 
bassador the "Communist bloc" — as if they were 
not manifesting a desire for settlement of unre- 
solved international questions. It is also indicated 
in the statement that the Soviet Union occupies 
some sort of irreconcilable position in relation to 
many international problems and this, he said, is 
causing alarm in the United States and other 

Mr. Kirk gave assurance also that measures 
taken by the Government of the United States in 
the military field have no aggressive aim with 
relation to the Soviet Union and other countries 
and are directed solely toward defense — and that 
he makes the statement officially with the full au- 
thority of his government. 

2. In his oral statement Mr. Kirk dwelt mainly 
on two questions — the situation in Korea and So- 
viet-American relations. 

The Soviet Government attaches important sig- 
nificance to these questions in connection with 
which it is necessary to state the following : 

(A) Regarding the position in Korea: From 
Mr. Kirk's statement it is evident that the Gov- 
ernment of the United States of America is con- 

cerned by the situation which has been created 
in Korea and the course of discussions regarding 
the termination of military action. Such concern 
is fully understandable, inasmuch as it is known to 
all that, having unleashed war against the Ko- 
rean people, the American Government found it- 
self in a situation which caused it uncertainty 
about the outcome of the military adventure which 
it began in Korea. 

However, the statements of the Ambassador — 
regarding the aspiration of the Government of the 
United States of America for the successful con- 
clusion of discussions at Kaesong — are incompat- 
ible with the policy which the American Govern- 
ment is carrying forth in this question, systemati- 
cally declining all proposals which are directed 
toward the actual peaceful settlement of the Ko- 
rean question and, specifically, proposals for the 
immediate termination of the aggressive war in 
Korea, for the withdrawal from Korea of all 
foreign troops, and for settlement by peaceful 
means of the whole Korean question. 

In this connection it is necessary to direct the 
attention of the Government of the United States 
of America to the efforts of the Soviet Union 
to achieve a successful conclusion of negotiations 
at Kaesong and the termination of the war in 

It was not the Government of the United States 
nor the United Nations, but specifically the Soviet 
Government, which took upon itself the initiative 
for a peaceful settlement of the Korean conflict. 
Even in the beginning of July 1950 the chairman 
of the Council of Ministers "of the U. S. S. R., 
J. V. Stalin, came out for the speedy settlement 
of the Korean conflict through the Security 

At the fifth session of the General Assembly in 

1950, the Soviet Government also introduced a 
proposal for the immediate peaceful settlement 
of the Korean question and for the withdrawal 
from Korea of foreign troops.' Finallv, in June 

1951, the representative of the U. S. S". R. at the 
U.X.. Y. A. Malik, introduced a proposal that, 
as a first step on the path to a peaceful settlement 
of the Korean question, there be begun negotia- 
tions between the belligerent parties for the ter- 
mination of military action and for an armistice 
with the reciprocal withdrawal of troops from 
the 38th parallel. 

As reirards the assertion of the Ambassador that 
the position taken by the Command of the North 
Korean troops and Chinese volunteers is some- 
how the reason for the delay in the negotiations at 
Kaesong. this assertion is completelyunfounded. 
But it is known that the Command of the Anglo- 
American troops in Korea systematicallv created 
various obstacles to a successful course of nesrotia- 
tions, not stopping at the creation of various kinds 
of incidents employed by General Ridgway to 
complicate the negotiations. 

• BiiiEnx of Aug. 14, 1950, p. 278. 

Ocfober 29, I95I 


Exactly siK-li interference created by the Amer- 
ican commander is the real reason for the delay 
of the Kaesong negotiations. 

The best way to assure a favorable outcome of 
the armistice negotiations would be to instruct 
General Ridgway not to complicate negotiations 
with all kinds of incidents, not to create artificial 
interference by the empty argument relative, for 
example, to the relocation of negotiations from 
Kaesong to some other sort of place. 

As regards the remarks of the Ambassador rela- 
tive to the line at which the armed forces of both 
sides will be located after termination of military 
activity, in the opinion of the Soviet Government, 
this question is organically connected with the 
question of termination of military action and con- 
sequently cannot be passed over in the armistice 

The Soviet Government does not consider it 
necessary to dwell on assertions contained in the 
statement regarding aggression in South Korea, 
inasmuch as already earlier the slanderous nature 
of such assertions has been incontrovertibly 

According to the Ambassador's statement, the 
Government of the United States of America 
hopes for cooperation on the part of the Soviet 
Government toward a positive conclusion of nego- 
tiations at Kaesong. But it is known that the 
Soviet Union is not a party to these negotiations. 
On the contrary, the Government of the United 
States of America is such a party and consequently 
itself can take measures for the successful con- 
clusion of negotiations. It goes without saying 
that all kinds of actual efforts in this direction 
will meet at the present time, as they would have 
in the past, the full and energetic support on the 
part of the Soviet Union. 

(B) Regarding Soviet- American relations, the 
Ambassador stated that the Government of the 
United States of America authorized him to re- 
quest that the attention of the Soviet Govern- 
ment and personally of Generalissimo J. V. Stalin 
be drawn to the necessity of improving relations 
between our countries, having remarked that in 
this matter, as in the matter of settlement of other 
unresolved international questions, a great role 
l^elongs to the satisfactory conclusion of armistice 
negotiations in Korea. 

It goes without saying that in the interests of 
improving the inteniational situation it is urgent- 
ly necessary to attain a peaceful settlement of the 
Korean question. The Soviet Government many 
times has attempted to negotiate with the United 
States on other important questions of Soviet- 
American relations as well as other unresolved 
international jjroblems of first importance, such 
as : the question of measures which would assure 
the creation of a unified, peaceful, democratic, 
and independent German Goveniment and the con- 
clusion of a peace treaty with Germany; of a 
peaceful settlement with Japan; of unconditional 


prohibition of atomic weapons and the establish- 
ment of strict international control ; of the term- 
ination of the armaments race and reduction of 
armed forces ; the prohibition of war propaganda ; 
and of the conclusion of a peace pact. 

On the initiative of the Soviet Government, 
there was created in Paris in 1951 a conference of 
Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs on German 
and other important international questions. The 
Soviet Government proposed to include in the 
agenda, designed for the session of the Council 
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, a series of ques- 
tions demanding urgent decisions including such 
important questions as that of the Atlantic Pact 
and American military' bases in Europe and in 
the Near East. However, this proposal was de- 
clined by the Government of the United States 
of America as well as by the Governments of 
Great Britain and France. 

If the Government of the United States ac- 
tually stands for improvement of Soviet- American 
relations and for the elimination of misunder- 
standings in a series of important international 
problems, mentioned above; if it actually stands 
for peace ; then it has had no lack of opportunities 
to conform by action its peace aspirations, of 
which mention is made in the statement of the 
Government of the United States. It is known, 
however, that the Government of the United States 
has not done this. 

(C) According to Mr. Kirk's statement, the 
United States does not have any kind of aggres- 
sive intention with relation to the Soviet Union 
and other countries and aspires to improvement of 
relations between our countries. The Govern- 
ment of the United States is not making such 
statements for the first time. In this connection, 
it is appropriate to recall the message of the Presi- 
dent of the United States, Mr. Truman, and the 
joint resolution of the Senate and House of Rep- 
resentatives of the United States, which were sent 
to the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet of the U.S.S.R., N. Shvernik.^ In these 
documents there were also contained statements of 
such nature. However, this did not prevent the 
Government of the United States from simulta- 
neously abrogating the commercial agreement of 
the United States with the Soviet Union, which 
had been in effect, until the present, from 1937; 
from passing, under the pretext of alleged stra- 
tegic considerations, a law for the prohibition of 
any kind of financial or economic so-called "aid" 
to countries who may export their goods to the 
U.S.S.R. and to countries friendly toward the 
Soviet Union; nor from taking a series of other 
measures directed toward the termination of eco- 
nomic ties between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. 

In the statement read by Mr. Kirk, it is also 
said that the measures — in the military field un- 
dertaken by the Government of the United 

' Bulletin of July 16, IS.ol, p. 87. 

Department of State Bulletin 

States — have only defense in view and do not pur- 
sue any kind of aggressive aims in relation to the 
U.S.S.E. and other countries. This sort of 
statement, however, is in contradiction to actions 
of the United States which show that the Govern- 
ment of the United States is concerned not at all 
with the maintenance of peace. This finds its ex- 
pression in : the conduct of war against the Korean 
people; in the creation of an aggressive Atlantic 
bloc directed against the U.S.S.R. and other 
democratic countries; in the remilitarization of 
Germany and Japan; and in the creation around 
the Soviet Union of innumerable American npli- 
tary bases, et cetera. 

(D) The Soviet Government cannot pass over 
the Ambassador's observation regarding "un- 
desirable consequences" and of po.ssible "un- 
pleasantnesses" between our countries in case 
negotiations at Kaesong do not give positive re- 
sults. Is it permissible, first of all, to ask exactly 
what "undesirable consequences" or "unpleasant- 
nesses" the American Government has in mind? 
If it is a question of the possibility of a further 

worsening of Soviet- American relations, then it 
is only barely possible to imagine that these rela- 
tions can woreen even more after President Tru- 
man stated to the whole world that agreements 
with the Soviet Union are not worth the paper 
on which they are written. In such circum- 
stances, is it possible to take seriously statements 
about a wish to improve Soviet- American rela- 
tions ? Would it not be truer to suppose that the 
Government of the United States actually does not 
aspire to an improvement of Soviet-American rela- 
tions and cooperation with the Soviet Union but is 
interested only in conversations about cooperation 
and agreements? 

Nonetheless, the Soviet Government, following 
its peaceful policy and constantly striving for the 
establisliment of cooperation with all countries 
who are prepared to cooperate with the Soviet 
Union, agrees to examine — with the participation 
of the Government of the United States — all im- 
portant and unsettled questions and to discuss 
measures for the improvement of international 
relations including relations between the Soviet 
Union and the United States. 

U.S. Replies to Soviet Charges of Remilitarization in Austria 

Statement hy Walter J. Donnelly 

United States High Commissioner for Austria'^ 

The following statement was made in answer to 
charges of AuMrian remilitarization made by 
Soviet High Commissioner V. P. Sviridov in the 
Allied Council on September 28. Similar charges 
have been made with increasing emphasis hy the 
Soviets in Austria during the last few- months., and 
they may well foreshadow a new Sonnet line in the 
Austrian treaty negotiations. Thus another 
flimsy pretext would he added to the jn-any pre- 
vious ones for the Soviet refusal to conclude an 
Austrian settlement, which the United States ami 
the other "Western powers regard as long overdue. 

At the last meeting of the Allied Council the 
Soviet High Commissioner was prompted to make 
a statement under the item, "Any Other Business," 
on a subject which, I should have thought, he 
would have preferred to avoid in this body : name- 
ly, the exploitation of Austria, and remilitariza- 
tion. As I indicated at that meeting, I also should 
like to ask the question : "Wlio is exploiting Aus- 

' Made in the Allied Council at Vienna on Oct. 12, 19.51 ; 
printed from Vienna despatch no. 539 of Oct. 11. 

tria" and "Who is supplying visible evidence of 
militarization" at this time? 

It seems to me that our Soviet colleagues would 
have the Austrian people not believe their own 
eyes. He referred to jet airplane factories, V-2 
plants, and a number of other alleged and mysteri- 
ous military enterprises which, he charged, were 
to be found in the American zone of Austria. The 
charges were so preposterous that I at once ex- 
tended an invitation to General Sviridov on behalf 
of General Irwin - to come and see these imaginary 
installations for himself. Not having heard from 
General Sviridov, I took pleasure in allowing three 
Soviet newspapermen to tour the zone in hopes 
they would present a true picture to General 
Sviridov. The failure to accept my invitation can 
only be taken as an admission on the part of the 
Soviet High Commissioner that the charges are in 
themselves ridiculous. 

Within the mass of Soviet charges I managed 
to sort out two specific claims : that the Steyr- 

' Lt. Gen. Leroy Irwin, Commanding General of the U.S. 
Forces in Austria. 

Ocfober 29, 1 95 J 


Daimlcr-Puch underground aircraft factory at 
Linz and the Eichlinger V-2 factory at Hallein 
•^ere fully preserved." What nonsense I Cate- 
gorically, here and now, I should like to state that 
aU factories in the U.S. zone which formerly pro- 
duced armaments for the German Army under the 
Nazi regime have either been destroyed, aban- 
doned, or are engaged in the manufacture of arti- 
cles for peacetime consimiption. The underground 
aircraft factory which has so upset the Soviet 
Element is an empty hole in the ground. It is a 
simple matter of arithmetic — when you remove a 
hole in the ground you merely leave a bigger hole. 
The Soviet spokesman is privileged, of course, to 
pursue such fantasies to the end of the rainbow, 
but I suggest a return to reality. 

Today is not the first time that these Soviet 
charges have been refuted. The U.S. High 
Commissioner presented assurances to the Allied 
Council on September 13, 1946, that his zone had 
been properly demilitarized in accordance with 
the control agreement. This was reaffirmed on 
several subsequent occasions, notably on Decem- 
ber 23. 1947. The Allied Council reported to the 
Cotmcil of Foreign Ministers on February 8, 1947, 
that there were no military or para-military or- 
ganizations in existence which were known to the 
Allied Coimcil, that all known military armament 
and equipment had been destroyed or rendered 
useless or entirely removed from Austria or taken 
over by the Occupying Powers, that all known 
military installations had been destroyed or dis- 
persed except those in use by the Occupying Pow- 
ers, and that all industrial enterprises and all 
known technical, scientific, and research institu- 
tions formerly employed in the production of. or 
research in, military armaments had been demili- 
tarized and placed under the supervision of the 
Occupying Powers in their respective zones. 
Again, the Allied Council acknowledged on De- 
cember 23, 1947, that all former war factories in- 
spected by the ililitary, Xaval, and Air Direc- 
torates were now engaged entirely in peacetime 

ECA Contributions Toward Austria's Rehabilitation 

I would be the first to agree that the Marshall 
Plan, in which the Soviet Element sees a spectre of 
disaster for Austria, has spent hundreds of mil- 
lions of Schillings on improving roads and com- 
munications, building dams, repairing bridges, 
and providing new dwellings along with the 
power and light to go into them. The U.S. Ele- 
ment, of course, is proud of the extensive con- 
tributions the U.S. people have made toward Aus- 
tria's rehabilitation — and the pattern of Eca in- 
vestments represents the most effective use to 
which the Austrian Government has been able 
to apply this aid. The facts are that, so far. the 
Austrian authorities have seen fit to invest their 
Eca funds as follows : 873 million Schillings in 


manufacturing, 2,715,000,000 Schillings toward 
improvement of transportation and communica- 
tions, and 762 million Schillings for other pur- 
poses such as housing and the tourist industry. 
Eca has. in addition, assisted in reviving the Aus- 
trian steel and aluminum industry — a vital asset 
to this ccxmtry in its struggle to meet its own needs 
and win back its commercial position in the world. 
I am sure that the Soviet Element would be pleas- 
ed to see the discontinuation of Eca with its con- 
sequences of impoverishment and unrest, but I 
can assure it that it is our desire and the desire of 
the Austrian people that it be continued — and it 
will be continued. 

In the minds of more objective experts. Atis- 
trian production, including that aided by Eca, is 
entirely devoted to peacetime goods. In inter- 
preting the Soviet definition of "'military-indus- 
trial potential" my attention was drawn to a state- 
ment by the Soviet Element in an executive com- 
mittee meeting some years ago, in which a button 
factory was labeled as "military potential," since 
it m.ight be converted to producing buttons for 
military pants. If buttons are militarily dan- 
gerous, then so are kitchenware, knitting needles, 
cosmetics, cigarettes, bicycles, farm tractors, and 
plows, and all other similar items now being pro- 
duced in the Western zones — at least to the per- 
son who cannot get war out of his mind. 

In expressing compassion for the heavy bur- 
den borne by the Austrian workers, the Soviet 
Element neglects to add that first and foremost, 
they must pay for the continued maintenance of 
a Soviet field army of upward of 50.000 men in 
the .Soviet zone of Austria. The Austrian work- 
er, farmer, and businessman must also continue 
to defray in tax payments the cost of housing 
requisitioned for these Soviet forces — a mass of 
buildings which has been estimated as amounting 
to one-third of all the available housing in the 
Soviet zone. 

The Soviet High Commissioner speaks of mili- 
tary installations in Western Austria, which I 
have invited him to come and inspect. He does 
not speak of the vast .Soviet training area of Doel- 
lersheim, from which Austrian farmers have been 
evicted: he says he does not even know the loca- 
tion of it. Here, to refresh his memory, is a map 
showing the location of Doellerscheim — an area 
larger than the city of Vienna. On it you will 
also find the Soviet military bastion of Baden. 
You will find the Soviet maneuver area at Apelton. 
You will find the locations of the military air- 
fields used by the Soviets for their fleets of jet 
and bomber aircraft. 

Dismantling of Austrian Industry 

The Soviet High Commissioner voices his con- 
cern about the uses of some of the Marshall Plan 
funds that are being put into Austria. Let me 
remind him of the extent of what the Soviets, for 

Department of Sfafe Bulletin 

:'.dr part, are taking out of Austria. Let us be- 
_;n bv recalling that dismantlings of Austrian 
iustrial equipment upon order of the Soviets 
. ached a total value of over 2C»Ci million dollars. 
T'len, Soviet removals of Austrian oil, shipping 
ar.d rolling stock from 1946 through the first half 
of 1951 are estimated as having reached a total of 
another 150 million dollars. 

Let us talk about Usia [Soviet-Controlled Axis- 

trian Enterprises], the industrial grab-bag into 

■^hich the Soviet Element has thrown some 350 

A ;~trian manufacturing and commercial con- 

-ms in order to serve itself. Yet Usia enter- 

ises. vital to Austria's lifeblood as they are, 

ve been snatched away from the Austrian peo- 

They pay no normal taxes — a fact which has 

far deprived the Austrian Government and peo- 

e of fully half a billion Schillings of revenue. 

They live outside the law : they ignore all Austrian 

!^>:ial security legislation. They drain off Aus- 

■■\n natural and industrial wealth to the East — 

!'.ions of Schillings" worth within the last -1 

• cars — and bring back nothing in return. It is 

miperialism of the crudest sort. It is not only 

a monopoly, but a colonial monopoly, gutting the 

central part of Europe, and this in the year 1951. 

I find tliat the antiquated Soviet charges of 

Austrian army formations have been well aired in 

past Allied Council meetings. I believe the U.S. 

Hiirh Commissioner aptly presented the U.S. 

" irwpoint in the Allied Council meeting of April 

-:^ last year. The fact that 5 years after these 

- iirious assertions were begun finds Austria 
:hout a single soldier gives ample proof of the 

cuunierfeit nature of these empty allegations. I 
need only refer the Soviet Element to the speech 
made by Foreign Minister Gruber last Saturday 
for a very elective reply to these charges. The 
training of the gendarmerie, to which the Soviets 
objected, is only that which any modem police 
force receives. The Soviet disappointment at the 
existence of an efficient police and gendarmerie is 
understandable, since these law enforcement 
agencies constitute the principal obstacles to the 
promotion of internal disorders so necessary to 
the objectives of Soviet puppets whose loyalty lies 
not with Austria. 

I would like to discuss the kind of peace that 
reigns in the Soviet zone. In the last 6 years, the 
^ viet zone and sector of Vienna have been the 

- ene of hundreds of abductions of Austrian citi- 
zens, all of whom have vanished without known 
J.arge or trial into the darkness of the interior. 

Is it "peace" when an Austrian police inspector, 

Marek, is suddenly and secretly whisked away — 
and when 3 years pass before the Soviet Element 
casually admits his abduction ? Or take the case 
of Paul Katscher. also seized and deported back 
in 194S. He died in captivity that same year. 
How do we know* Because the Soviet Element 
finally got around to admitting it — 2 years later. 
In the Soviet zone last month, a tank company of 
the Soviet army went out for a shoot and casu- 
ally blasted a terrified Unle village named Breit- 

I was struck with the peculiar similarity of Gen- 
eral Sviridov's statement and that made by the So- 
viet Element on January 16. 194S. From a close 
comparison, they appear to be the same barren 
tirade. Yet in spite of all the dire predictions of 
Austria's military might, we find S^o years later a 
coimtry completely devoid of national military 
forces, and instead, devoting its energies entirely 
to peaceful pursuits. Such cannot be said of Aus- 
tria's eastern neighbors who. under the compulsion 
of the U.S.S-R. and against their own wishes, 
are now engaged in an intensive rearmament, con- 
trary to the peace treaties to which they acceded. 

U. S. S. R. Challenged To Act on Austrian Treaty 

General Sviridov's statement is replete with in- 
accuracies, misleading statements, and baseless 
allegations, designed ?or the sole purpose of try- 
ing to further frustrate a eood Austrian people 
who have been subject to Boviet obstructionism 
and delaying tactics for the past 6 years. The 
Austrian people are fed up with the occupation. 
They want the occupying forces to leave the coim- 
try. and they should leave, and they should have 
left a long time ago. If there is one iota of sin- 
cerity in the Soviet statements, then I challenge 
them to meet with the Western Powers at the 
earliest possible moment to conclude the State 
Treaty so that all of the occupying forces may 
withdraw from this country forthwith. We are 
sincere in this statement. It is now up to the 
Soviets to prove their sincerity, and make it possi- 
ble for the himdreds of prisoners of war and the 
kidnapped Austrians to return to their families. 

The United States has full confidence in the 
Austrian Government and the Austrian people, 
and it is committed to the policy of cooperating 
with them in rehabilitating their country and in 
reestablishing their independence and sovereignty, 
which was promised to them as long ago as the 
Moscow Conference of 1943. We wifl not deviate 
one moment from this policy. 

Ocfober 29, 7951 

972070 — 51 S 


Proposal for Holding Free Elections in Germany 

On October i Chancelor Konrad Adenauer of 
West Germany wrot-e to the U.S., British, and 
French High Commissioners for Germany request- 
ing that a U..y. com,mission be appointed to inves- 
tigate whether conditions in East Germany would 
permit the holding of nation-wide elections. 

On October 15 the Allied High Commissioners 
replied to Chancelor Adenauer. Following^ are 
texts of the communications, together with a 
chronological list of principal Western proposals 
made in the past for free all-German elections: 


[Printed from telegraphic text} 

In its declarations of March 22,^ September 14, 
1950 and March 9, 1951, the Federal GoTernmcnt 
proposed the holding of free, general, equal, secret, 
and direct elections in the whole of Germany, for 
the purpose of electing a constituent national as- 
sembly. At the same time it laid down indispen- 
sable prerequisites for the carrying out of free 
elections. In my letter of March 9, 1951. ad- 
dressed to the Chairman of the Allied High Com- 
mission (Ahc), I had requested goverimients 
represented in the Aiic, in the course of negotia- 
tions between the four occupation powers on the 
subject of Germany, to obtain acceptance of the 
Federal Government's demands in respect of legal 
and psychological preconditions for the holding 
of free elections. 

The Federal Government now repeats the pro- 
posal and requests the governments of the four 
occupation powers to give the German people the 
earliest opportunity, through elections carried out 
under international supervision, to elect a con- 
stituent and legislative national assembly for rhe 
area of the four occupation zones and Berlin, 
which will also form a government and watch 
over its activities. The Federal Government will 
shortly be in a position to transmit to the Ahc an 
electoral procedure for all-German elections, 
which will allow the holding of free elections. 
The Government declaration of September 27, 
1951 already contains the essentials of electoral 

* Bulletin of June 5, 1050, p. 885. 

The Federal Government feels obliged to do all 
in its power in order to insure that the actual con- 
ditions for holding of all-German elections, pro- 
posed by it, are given. Vis-a-vis the territory at 
large, this can only be done by a neutral interna- 
tional commission — under United Nations con- 
trol — carrying out investigations in the Soviet 
Zone and in the Federal Republic, to establish in 
how far prevailing circumstances make the hold- 
ing of free elections possible. The Federal Gov- 
ernment requests that such an international 
inquiry be immediately carried out for the terri- 
tory of the Federal Republic and would ask the 
governments represented in the Allied High Com- 
mission to propose the establishment of such a 
commission to the United Nations without delay. 
The Federal Government will in every way facili- 
tate the execution of the tasks of such a commis- 
sion and will in particular allow it access to all 
Federal and Land Administrative offices as well as 
to all official papers and documents which it may 
require to see in order to complete its task. 


[Released to the press October 151 

Your letter 202-04 U 11375/51 of October 4 
was transmitted to the three Governments repre- 
sented on the Allied High Commission and has 
been considered by them. 

In your letter you repeated the proposals made 
by the Federal Government on March 22 and Sep- 
tember 14, 1950 and on March 9, 1951 for the hold- 
ing of free, general, equal, secret, and direct elec- 
tions in the whole of Germany. You also re- 
quested the Governments of the four Occupying 
Powers to give the German people the earliest 
opportunity to elect under international super- 
vision and under the legal and psychological con- 
ditions specified in the various proposals of the 
Federal Government, a constituent and legislative 
national assembly. The three Governments, who 
have always supported and continue to support 
the unification of Germany as soon as it can take 
place along democratic lines insuring the crea- 
tion of a free Germany able to play its part in a 
peaceful association of free European nations, 
now renew their support for the idea of elections 
under the safeguarding conditions which have 
been specified as necessary to protect the indi- 

Deparfmenf of State Bulletin 



February 28 High Commissioner McCloy proposed all-German elections for a Constitutional Con- 

March 22 Chancelor Adenauer on behalf of the Federal Republic made a similar proposal and out- 
lined the conditions necessary for such an election. 

May 14 The United States, French, and British Foreign Ministers meeting in London welcomed 

and endorsed Chancelor Adenauer's resolution of March 22, and set forth very specific 
conditions for unification. 

May 26 The United States, French, and British High Commissioners in Germany sent identical 

letters to the Soviet Commissioner, General Chuikov, proposing the joint drafting of 
an election law for all-German elections. 

July 3 ■^'S'^ Commissioner McCloy again declared himself for free democratic elections in all 


September 14 A resolution was passed by the German Federal Parliament calling for free elections in all 

of Germany. 

September 19 The Foreign Ministers of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom issued a 

communique at Xew York restating their desire to see Germany unified and referring 
to previous Allied proposals for all-German elections. 

October 1 Chancelor Adenauer WTOte the three Western High Commissioners endorsing the Federal 

Parliament's resolution of September 14. 

October 10 The United States, French, and British High Commissioners again wrote to Soviet General 

Chuikov referring to their unanswered letters of May 26, and calling attention to the 
West German proposals as representing the desire of the German people for unitv. 

October 25 Secretary Acheson in a statement referred to our repeated proposals for free elections in 

aU Germany and renewed our strong support for such elections as the necessary prelude 
to a peace treaty. 


January 15 Chancelor Adenauer once more stated the Federal Republic's position in favor of free, 

general, equal, and secret elections. 
January 21 German Social Democratic leader Dr. Kurt Schumacher supported Chancelor Adenauer's 

declaration and said that only by bringing the freedom of the West to the German 

East would Germany be unified. 
March 5 The United States, French, and British deputies at the Paris Four-Power Conference 

proposed that the "re-establishment of German unity" be one of the problems to be 

discussed at any meeting of the four Foreign Ministers. 
March 9 Chancelor Adenauer and the German Federal Parliament once more demanded free all- 
German elections, under conditions fuUy safeguarding individual liberties in the Soviet 


vidua! and national liberties of the German people. 
They refer among other things to the letters sent 
by the British, French, and United States High 
Commissioners in Germany on May 26. 1950 - and 
on October 10, 1950 to General Chuikov. to the 
statements issued by the British, French, and 
United States Foreign Ministers in London on 
May 14, 1950 ^ and in New York on September 19, 
1950 * and to the proposals made by the British, 
French, and United States Deputies at the Paris 
Four Powers Conference on March 5, 1951. 

In your recent letter you have made an addi- 
tional proposal. You wrote : 

The Federal Government feels obliged to do all in its 
power in order to ensure that the actual conditions for 
holding of all-Germnn elections, proposed by it. are given. 
Vis-ii-vis the territory at large, this can only be done by 
a neutral international commission — under United Nations 
control — carrying out investigations in the Soviet Zone 
and in the Federal Republic, to establish in how far pre- 
vailing circumstances make the holding of free elections 
possilile. The Federal Government requests that such an 
international enquiry lie immediately carried out for the 
territory of the Federal Republic and would ask the 
governments represented in the Allied High Commission 

' Ihid., p. S&t. 
• Ihid., p. SS5. 
*md., Oct. 2, 1950, p. 530. 

to propose the establishment of such a commission to the 
United Nations without delay. The Federal Government 
will in every way facilitate the execution of the tasks of 
such a commission and will in particular allow it access 
to all Federal and Land Administrative offices as well as 
to all official papers and documents which it may require 
to see in order to complete its task. 

The three Governments warmly welcome the 
constructive initiative which you have taken in 
making the proposal for a United Nations com- 
mission to investigate the extent to which pre- 
vailing circumstances allow the holding of free 
elections in the Federal Republic and in the So- 
viet Zone of Germany. They have not failed to 
note the desire of the Federal Government that 
such an inquiry take place immediately in its 
territory. The three Governments desire to in- 
form you that they will, at the first suitable oppor- 
tunity, put your views before the United Nations 
and will propose that the United Nations under- 
take an investigation over the whole area of 
Germany as is suggested in your letter. They 
consider that only by such means can it be ex- 
peditiously and satisfactorily determined whether 
or not conditions exist in the entire area of Ger- 
many which would make it possible to consider as 
a practical matter the holding of general elections. 

Ocfober 29, 1 95 1 


In the Front Line of Freedom 

hy Eugenie Anderson 
Ambassador to Denmarh ■ 

Not long ago, the Foreign Minister of Denmark, 
Ole Bj0rn Kraft, was making a speech about the 
Danish role in the North Atlantic Treaty. He 
described Denmark's position today in a singu- 
larly vivid way. He spoke of Denmark and the 
Danish people as being "in the front line of free- 
dom." I was struck by that phrase because it de- 
scribed so well the physical and psychological 
position of Denmark today. I was also struck 
by it because it could be just as well applied to 
the role of the United States in the over-all world 
struggle for freedom. In a very real sense Den- 
mark is in that front line. In another equally real 
way — ideologically, economically, politically, and 
militarily — the United States carries the respon- 
sibility and is the spearhead for all the front lines 
in our great crusade for survival and freedom. 

Let me tell you first something about Denmark's 
peculiarly strategic and sensitive position today. 
Most of you know that Denmark, with a popula- 
tion of only 4 million, is a small country. Den- 
mark, the Jutland Peninsula, lying at the mouth 
of the Baltic across the Baltic Straits, is both the 
gate and the entrance to the countries east of the 
Iron Curtain. Not long ago I visited the eastern- 
most island of DenmarTc. You know Denmark is 
not only a peninsula, but it also consists of 500 
islands mostly adjacent — eastward — to that penin- 
sula. Its eastern-most island, Bornholm, is located 
far into the Baltic — almost within sight of Polish- 
held eastern Germany and within less than an 
hour of Soviet-held air bases. 

The courageous people of that important little 
islaiid, whicli I visited recently— just as the peo- 
ple in all of Denmark — are always acutely con- 
scious of their physical pi-oximity to the Soviet 
countries. Being a flat and unprotected country, 
open on nearly all sides without any natural bar- 
riers, the geogi-aphy of Denmark plays an es- 

' Excerpts from an address made before the Women's 
National Press Club at Washington on Oct. 16 and released 
to the press on the same date. 


pecially important role in the history and psy- 
chology of the people. The Danish people are a 
friendly, democratic people, highly skilled, edu- 
cated, and cultured, devoted to the development of 
a good life for all, and desirous of a peaceful one. 

Since 1864, when the Danes suffered a disastrous 
defeat from the Germans with the loss of Schles- 
wig-Holstein, Denmark's foreign policy had been 
a policy of strict neutrality, of unarmed neutral- 
ity. The attitude of neutrality, and the pacifism 
that developed with it, has been ingi-ained deeply 
into the thinking of the people for almost a hun- 
dred years. 

Neutrality was fairly effective for Denmark in 
keeping it out of big power embroilments until 
1940. But, with the Nazi invasion in April of 
that year, and the subsequent occupation of the 
country for 5 hard years, the Danish people came 
to realize — just as we Americans have — that the 
world had changed and that what had .worked be- 
fore — neutrality, pacifism, and isolationism — was 
no longer adequate for today. 

Witii the growing threat of Soviet aggression 
through 1946-48 Denmark fii'st sought, along with 
the other Scandinavian countries — Norway and 
Sweden — to create a Scandinavian defense pact. 
JNIost Danes sincerely believed that a Scandinavian 
defense pact would have been the answer to their 
security needs. 

Denmark Becomes a Member of NATO 

But when this pact failed to be realized, Den- 
mark, in 1949, joined with Norway and the other 
members of the North Atlantic Treaty to become 
part of a broader mutual defense system — part 
of the North Atlantic community. "Wliile this 
decision was made with the full consent of the 
Danish Parliament and the majority of the peo- 
ple it represented, still it was a sharp and sudden 
change for a country to make. 

No nation— large or small — can reverse the basic 
direction of its foreign-policy thinking so com- 

Department of Sfafe Bulletin 

pletely and so quickly without difficulty. There 
have been many new problems created aloni; with 
many doubts and many anxieties over tliis new 
policy. There will continue to be some doubts — 
and even outriglit opposition to it — since one or 
two of the smaller Danish political parties still 
remain opposed to the North Atlantic Treaty. 

The important fact is that today the majority 
of the Danish people are fully convinced that 
their adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty is 
the only policy which makes possible the deter- 
rence of attack and which offers tliem security 
against the threat of aggression. Furthermore, 
there has been a growing realization in Denmark 
that the North Atlantic Treaty carries with it 
not only advantages for Denmark but also re- 

It has been an inspiring thing for me to witness 
tlu> development of this sense of responsibility and 
til see very tangible evidences of it. What are 
some of these concrete signs of Denmark's prog- 
ress during the last 2 years ? 

First, and underlying all other developments, 
there has been an increasing public awareness of 
what it means to be a member of an international 
community, and more specifically of a mutual de- 
fense organization. There is today no doubt but 
that nearly every thinking person in Denmark is 
aware that his country's foreign policy is North 
Atlantic Treaty policy. 

While Denmark, at the present time, has a coali- 
tion government, consisting of the Moderate Lib- 
eral (or Farmers' Party) and the Conservative 
Party, this coalition government has the full sup- 
port of the Social Democrats on all questions of 
foreign policy. The political leaders of these 
major parties are constantly bringing to the peo- 
ple a convincing and reasoned explanation of for- 
eign-policy questions. 

The press, which in Denmark mostly represents 
particular political party views, gives daily evi- 
dence of this educational process. Several of the 
major newspapers in Copenhagen have carried on 
a real campaign to tell the people the truth about 
tlie dangers that we all face and to tell them the 
facts about what must be done to create adequate 
strength and unity. Two years ago, when I first 
came to Denmark, it was not uncommon to read 
editorials and leading articles strongly tinged with 
neutralism and defeatism. Today this neutralist 
manifestation has practically disappeared from 
the press and has been replaced by an active, posi- 
tive support of Danish participation in the North 
Atlantic Treaty. 

In addition to this growth of responsible awai'e- 
ness, there has been a real and definite increase in 
the country's defense forces. The Danish military 
forces, which had never been sizable, were com- 
pletely destroyed during the war. For a country, 
such as Denmark — wholly without natural re- 
sources and without heavy armament industries — 

an adequate defense force is not something which 
can be achieved overnight. Lacking trained offi- 
cers, lacking equipment — indeed, possessing only 
a small amount of modern weapons, lacking bar- 
racks and training facilities — Denmark has faced, 
and is still facing, a tremendous job to build up 
quickly its defense potential. But definite progress 
has been made. 

For the year 1952 the Defense budget is almost 
twice what it was in 1950-51. The number of men 
under arms has increased considerably, and will 
continue to build up. Last year, a new defense 
law was enacted giving Denmark, for the first 
time, a unified defense command, an air force, and 
an increased military training period. The Home 
Guard, which is a voluntary organization consist- 
ing of men who have had military training, has 
increased its numbers from 10,000 to 40,000 men 
during the last 2 years, and is constantly expand- 
ing as rapidly as equipment can be provided. 

Major Step Taken in Defense of Greenland 

One of the major steps which Denmark has 
taken toward our mutual defense system was the 
agreement made between Denmark and the United 
States last year concerning the defense of Green- 
land. Greenland, a Danish possession, is essential 
to the defense of the United States and the North 
Atlantic area. In making this joint defense ar- 
rangement, Denmark has made one of the greatest 
contributions it could possibly make — both to our 
defense and that of the entire area. The agree- 
ment — wliich was the first agreement that I have 
had the honor to sign for my country — guarantees 
continued Danish sovereignty but gives the United 
States the right to establish air bases on Greenland. 

But perhaps more striking than any of these 
developments is the basic improvement in the 
spirit of resistance. Along with the former Dan- 
ish policy of neutrality and pacifism had grown 
up a traditional attitude of skepticism and de- 
featism. Having suffej-ed defeats several times 
in the past at the hands of the Greater Powers 
and liaving most recently suffered Nazi invasion 
and occupation, the Danish people had come to 
feel that there was really nothing that a small 
country like Denmark could do to defend itself. 
Such a spirit of fatalism is not easily overcome. 
Over and over during the first year that I was in 
Denmark, I heard the phrase, "But Denmark is 
such a little country; there is really nothing that 
we can do." 

So long as Denmark was alone, isolated, and 
neutral, probably this was true. For that matter, 
today there is little that any one country, small 
or large, can do alone and unaided against the 
world-wide conspiracy we all face. But with the 
growing consciousness of Denmark's membership 
in the North Atlantic Treaty, there has been a 
corresponding decrease in the defeatist and skep- 
tical attitude. 

Ocfober 29, 1951 


Todiiy, Donmnrk knows that it is not nione. 
Todiiy. I lie D;inisli people realize that mutual de- 
fense means also self-defense. There is growing 
belief that what Denmark does can be of decisive 
importance. The negative defeatism and skepti- 
cism have been essentially replaced with a spirit 
of courage and determination. 

Spirit and Will of the Danisli Home Guard 

One of the leaders of the Danish Home Guard 
recently told me that he could hardly believe the 
change that had taken place within that organi- 
zation. Practically every community, from the 
great and beautiful city of Copenhagen to the 
smallest hamlet, has its home guard organization 
training men and women who. while they know 
that they may be too old to fight in the regular 
army, still are determined to do their bit against 
a fifth column or against a potential invader. 

I want to tell you about a talk I had recently 
with a member of the Danish Home Guard. This 
man had fought with the Danish Army when it 
was overwhelmed by the Nazi invaders in 1940. 
He told me of the bitter heartache of being help- 
less against powerful Panzer divisions, for he was 
one of only a handful of Danish soldiers stationed 
near tlie Danish-German Border. 

Later he had joined the Danish Resistance 
Movement and, as a result of his activities, he had 
been imprisoned by the Nazis, and had spent 2 
years in a concentration camp. He had learned 
the hard way what it meant to see his country 
lose its independence, as well as to suffer the loss 
of his own personal freedom. Today he is work- 
ing in the Home Guard, desperately anxious that 
Denmark will not again lack the means to defend 

He too told me about the constantly increasing 
numbers of able-bodied and trained men volun- 
teering for the Home Guard. He also told me 
that they still lacked adequate weapons. But 
even in spite of their serious shortage of arms and 
ammunition, the spirit — the will to resist — is good 
and is growing. 

I win always remember this patriot's intensity 
as he talked with me, especially his stirring final 
words : 

"We want to be aWe to defend our country if need be. 
We want to have guns enouRh, tanks enoujrh, planes 
enough — In time! But we will fight with our bare hands 
if we Inclt the weapons. Only, you liuow, we can't stop 
tanks with bare hands. Believe me, we would rather 
flght and die than becomes slaves !" 

There were but a few signs of such a spirit when 
I first came to Denmark almost 2 years ago. To- 
day, there are many such evidences. And they are 
the best indication of the real change that has 
taken place in the Danish people. 

U. S. Aid to Danish Self-Defense 

And now, what are some of the American ac- 
tions and policies that have stimulated, supported, 


and encouraged these new developments? For it 
is surely true to say that, without American lead- 
ersliip, these changes could not have taken place. 

We all know, of course, how interdependent we 
are with the rest of the free world today. But 
unless one has been living in a Western European 
country, particularly as in Denmark — the out- 
post of the Western Democracies — it is difficult to 
realize exactly how interrelated and, indeed, how 
dependent we are on each other. 

First, of course, I should mention the continua- 
tion of our economic aid and the development of 
our military-assistance program. Without the 
substantial economic aid, the Danish economy to- 
day could not possibly be in its position of rela- 
tive stability. I say, "relative stability" because 
Denmark still has a serious balance of payments 
problem ; that is, of matching the money it earns 
from its exports with what it must have for its 
vital imports. A country, such as Denmark, with- 
out natural resources and with an almost purely 
agricultural economy, is particularly dependent 
on its ability to trade with other nations. With- 
out our Marshall Aid, the Danes could not pos- 
sibly have increased their agricultural and in- 
dustrial production to the high level that it has 
achieved today — more than 100 percent over pre- 
war levels. 

In the same way, our military aid has been 
absolutely essential. Lacking steel, coal, and other 
mineral resources, it would be impossible for the 
Danes to equip any sort of an army or to contrib- 
ute to the Western European defense without 
receiving substantial amounts of military equip- 
ment from the United States. The technical and 
military guidance in the use of this equipment 
and in the training of officers has been of equal 
importance, especially significant for Denmark 
since its lack of trained officers, as a result of the 
war, is one of its most serious handicaps. The 
Danish will to self-defense has increased in al- 
most direct proportion to its ability of self-de- 
fense, and I know that this is true for all of West- 
ern Europe. Without this economic and mili- 
tary aid, this potential could not possibly be de- 
veloped — nor could there be the good morale and 
hope in the future. 

U. S. Stock Bolstered by Decision To Resist 
Aggression in Korea 

But it is since Korea that the most striking de- 
velopment has taken place in Denmark and in 
Europe as a whole. Indeed, there may come a 
day when we will be able to look back and say 
that it was Korea which marked the turning point 
in all our fates. Our historic decision to come to 
the side of the South Koreans was the clearest 
proof to the Danes, as indeed to the whole world, 
that we meant what we said about resisting ag- 
gression no matter where it occurred. 

I can remember so well those anxious hours be- 
tween the first word of the Communist attack 

Deparfment of State Bulletin 

and the moment when President Trimian an- 
QOiinced that American forces were on their way 
to Korea. I want to tell you that I was especially 
proud to be the American Ambassador that day. 

There had been great uneasiness during those 
hours. Would we really dare to match our fine 
words with bold deeds? Perhaps no one would 
have cared to say so at that moment, but, if the 
United States had not acted immediately and 
decisively then, the whole world would have 
known that both the United Xations and the North 
Atlantic Treaty were as dead and as empty as 
a haunted house. 

But we did act. We acted bravely and in ac- 
cordance with our principles. We acted with the 
support and with the sacrifices of the American 
people ; and with the precious lives of thousands 
of American men. The repeated demonstrations 
of the unity of the free world in the United Na- 
tions in tlie months following the first attack 
have been a continuing source of strength and 
confidence to the Danes. 

Time after time, on the critical issues con- 
cerning U. N. action in Korea, the United States 
has given wise, courageous leadership, and — in- 
cidentally — time after time, on all those crucial 
votes, Denmark took its place with the free na- 
tions on the side of resisting the aggressor. 

Of equal significance, for Denmark and indeed 
for the entire free world, has been the demonstra- 
tion in Korea of our military strength. Our 
heavy initial losses, followed by the terrible shock 
of the Chinese invasion, might have caused great 
harm to our prestige as the strongest free nation 
had we not been able to recover so quickly our 
strength and, indeed, to seize the offensive. 

It is still true that strength attracts strength, 
and the effect of observing once more the superior- 
ity of American military might and manpower 
has been one of the surest factors in strengthening 
the military and moral potential of our Allies 

Regardless of how long the struggle in Ko- 
rea may go on — and I well realize the fremendous 
and tragic cost of this struggle — still it has been 
and will remain a tremendous achievement for 
the free world. It must be considered today as 
the most positive proof of our strength and deter- 
mination, as important to our Allies as to would- 
be aggressors. 

Along with this magnificent action in Korea has 
been the great reassurance of our all-out mobili- 
zation program. The respect which most Danes 
feel for the American productive capacity is 
, something akin to awe. And it is mightily en- 
couraging to them to know that, since December 
1950, we have been on an emergency mobilization 
basis. They have followed with the closest con- 
cern all the complicated steps we have been tak- 
ing to convert our industries to a near wartime 
basis — and at the same time to control inflation — 
inflation being a very real and ghastly nightmare 

to most Europeans. Sometimes I wish it seemed 
as real to the American people. 

Danes Impressed by American Policies of the Pest 
Two Years 

But I suppose if you were to ask the average 
man in the street in Denmark what American ac- 
tion during the past year has brought the most 
reassurance to the people there, he would probably 
say : "The European assignment of General Eisen- 
hower.-' There is no doubt but that the mere fact 
of his being in Europe and of his quick establish- 
ment of Supreme Headquarters of Allied Po\\ers 
in Europe (Shape) has been a dynamic symbol 
of our own close involvement with European c'e- 
fense. He has radiated confidence and hope and 
inspiration not only to the political and military 
leaders with whom lie has come in contact, but just 
as effectively to the people themselves. 

General Eisenhower came to Europe in January 
1951 — at a time when Europe was still reeling from 
the shock of the Chinese entry into the war in 
Korea and on the heels of the disclosure of Ameri- 
can and European military weakness existing at 
that time. The effect of General Eisenhower's 
timely arrival backed up with our assurances of 
more troops to come could be compared with 
watching the temperature of a very feverish pa- 
tient go down after a crisis. Also the feeling of 
urgency which General Eisenhower has been able 
to instill has been important. Of course, as he, 
himself, says, — his real job — the building of an 
integrated North Atlantic Treaty Defense force — 
has c7il/ been started, but a definite achievement 
has talven place during these last 8 months. 

In any evaluation of American actions or poli- 
cies, our resolution of the "great debate" and the 
decision to send substantial numbers of troops to 
Europe must be emphasized. When this so-culled 
"great debate" began, coming, as it did, in one of 
our most anxious hours, I must admit that I was 
one who thought it might be a bit hard on the 
nerves of our European friends. And there were 
times when it was hard on everj'body's nerves. 
But certainly the end result, so far as our friends 
in Europe were concerned, was to increase their 
confidence in the dependability of our decision and 
in the reliability of our democratic processes. 

In the same way, the debate following the recall 
of General MacArthur — at first perhaps confus- 
ing — in the end strengthened and clarified our 
policies abroad. I think that I need only mention 
that the mere fact of MacArthur's recall did a 
great deal to convince the Danes and all our allies 
that our policies were firmly oriented toward the 
prevention of further aggression and against the 
spreading of the Far East conflict. 

During the course of this debate. President 
Truman's positive reaffirmation, repeated over 
and over, of our determination to preserve peace 
and to prevent another world war, was impressed 

OcJober 29, 1 95 1 


deeply on the Danish people. There is no doubt 
but that the policies of our Government thus be- 
came more clearly understood abroad, just as they 
did at home. And here it is fitting to say that both 
President Truman and Secretary Acheson are 
regarded with the highest esteem and affection by 
the Danish people and statesmen. Indeed, Sec- 
retary Acheson's prestige in Western Europe 
probably exceeds that of any previous American 
Secretary of State. 

This all-too-brief and incomplete report of the 
major developments on the Danish front line and 
developments on the American front lines — is to 
me basically a report of gi-owth and progress. 
Both Denmark and the United States, along with 
the otlier members of the free world, have grown 
significantly during the past 2 years — in strength, 
in unity, and in basic confidence. 

Today, there is no doubt in anyone's mind about 
our ability to defend our freedom : the front lines 
of freedom have been strengthened, they will hold. 
Nor is there any doubt about our unity of purpose 
and our desire and capacity to harmonize the 
interests and the needs of the many free nations 
into one effective whole. Nor should there be any 
doubt today about the growth in real confidence 
that we can have in each other ; in our Allies ; and 
in ourselves. 

We have been through a severe test altogether 
this past year. There will be other tests in the 
future perhaps even more severe and more de- 

It would be a tragic — perhaps a fatal — mistake 
for anyone to think that our job is more than well 
begun. We have built the foundations for our 
future strength, we have put up the framework — 
but we are still a long way from having a safe 
structure on which to depend. The real attain- 
ment of adequate power and closer unity, are still 
far ahead. Many serious problems we have only 
begun to consider — many deep questions we do 
not yet know how to frame. 

We are going to need our very utmost patience 
and skill and endurance. We are going to need 
imagination too, and real creative planning. 
Most of all, perhaps, we need the long view and 
the acceptance of the long-term pull. 

But, on the basis of what we have accomplished 
together up to now, we have good reason to be- 
lieve in each other. We have good reason to be- 
lieve in ourselves and in our basic purposes. We 
are joined together for the defense of human 
dignity, happiness, and freedom. We believe that 
by creating the basic conditions of free-world 
strength and unity, both peace and freedom will 
be possible. Yes, we believe that all of us in the 
front lines of freedom still have a chance for con- 
structing peace and that it can be the kind of peace 
in which men and women and children can be free 
and fair and human. 


Denmark Concerned by Criticism 
of Defense Efforts 

[Released to the press October 16'] 

The Danish Ambassador, Henrik de Kauff- 
mann, called on Under Secretary Webb on Octo- 
ber 16 to convey his Government's strong concern 
over statements regarding Denmark's defense ef- 
forts as contained in recent testimony before the 
House Subcommittee on Appropriations. ' In ex- 
pressing his regi-et over this unfortunate incident 
and the misleading effects of these statements, Mr. 
Webb asked Mr. de Kauffmann to convey to his 
Government the following: 

The United States fully recognizes that it is the 
Government of Denmark which must decide the 
extent of Denmark's defense efforts. It has not 
been and is not now the intention of the United 
States to apply pressure of any kind on the Danish 
Government. Eather, it is our desire to maintain 
constant consultation concerning the requirements 
for our common defense and the contributions 
thereto of which we are individually and collec- 
tively capable. The United States clearly recog- 
nizes the pai'ticular difficulties facing the Danish 
Govermnent in its efforts to develop its defense and 
appreciates the important steps which have al- 
ready been taken in that direction. 

HI COG Reports Soviet Interference 
In Bavarian Radio Transmission 

[Released to the press October 17] 

Following is the text of a press release issued 
October 16 hy the Office of the U.S. High Com- 
missioner for Germany in Frankfort : 

Serious disturbance to transmissions of the Ba- 
varian Eadio by a Soviet zone German transmis- 
sion obviously planned for interference purposes 
was reported today by Shepard Stone, Director of 
the Office of Public Affairs, HicoG. 

Mr. Stone said the interference began on Oc- 
tober 4 and was traced to a station located at Er- 
furt operating between regular broadcast chan- 
nels on a frequency of 801.85 kilocycles, ostensibly 
for the purpose of relaying the progi-ams of Radio 
Leipzig, but actually to cause interference to the 
Bavarian radio station which has been operating 

' See Mutual Security Program Appropriations for 1952, 
Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations, House of Representatives, 82d Cong., 1st 
sess., Part I, pp. 241-245, pp. 374-375. 

Department of State Bulletin 

on the frequency of 800 kilocycles since July 12, 

Mr. Stone said : 

This is not the first time this type of radio interference 
has been used by tlie radio stations in the Soviet zone of 
Germany. Our technical experts are studying the situa- 
tion to talie action necessary to overcome the interfer- 
ence. Since July 32 wlien the Bavarian Radio began using 
the frequency 800 kilocycles at Ismaning with special 
directional antenna, radio reception in southern Bavaria 
was generally improved without disturbing transmis- 
sions on the same frequency by the Leningrad Radio. 
The construction of the directional antenna was intended 
to give the Bavarian Radio better reception and avoid 
interference with the Leningrad Radio in its national 
broadcast area. 

As we stated on July 9 in announcing the assignment 
of the frequency 800 kilocycles to the Bavarian Radio, the 
protection of the Leningrad service by directional antenna 
was provided in accordance with the policy of the U.S. 
Government which was adopted because the European 
Broadcasting Convention at Copenhagen in 1948 failed to 
make adequate provisions for radio broadcasting in Ger- 
many. We take this occasion to state again that the 
U.S. Government will continue to maintain all essential 
broadcasting for which it is responsible and will attempt 
to hold interference to a minimum. 

Prospects for U.S. Participation 
In Refugee Plan 


[Rrleaseii to the press October 181 

Following is the text of a letter from President 
Truman to Qv^en Juliana of the Netherlands in 
reply to her letter to him of September 11 : ^ 

October 9, 1951 

My Dear Queen Juliana: I have received 
through the Ambassador of the Netherlands your 
letter of September eleventh concerning the un- 
resolved problems of refugees. Your appeal, re- 
flecting as it does the concern of your people who 
have extended such generous hospitality to ref- 
ugees, particularly the aged and ill among them, 
reviews a problem that is constantly before me. 
I share with you the desire to maintain the effort 
to meet the needs of those who bear so heavily 
the burdens of political change resulting from 

We should not, as you suggest, rest upon past 
achievements, but rather, intensify our efforts to 
re-establish the refugees and restore them to lives 
of dignity and full participation in the struggle 
of the democratic world to achieve peace and 
security. I note with sincere satisfaction that 
your thoughtful letter speaks throughout from the 
compassionate heart of a mother as well as the 

' Bulletin of Oct. 8, 1951, p. 572. 
Ocfober 29, 1 95 J 

grave interest which is yours as a royal sovereign 
responsible for the well-being of a great Nation. 
What we all need in seeking the solution of this 
complex problem is the spirit of compassion which 
your lines so eloquently express. 

I support wholeheartedly your conviction that 
integration and assimilation offer the best hope 
for the grave majority of refugees. I believe, 
however, that integration and assimilation of this 
majority must take place within each individual 
country of residence. The problem must be at- 
tacked in different countries in different ways ac- 
cording to the prevailing conditions. In Ger- 
many, for instance, the refugees constitute such 
a large proportion of the population that their 
needs are not essentially different from those of 
the population as a whole. 

Constructive action on their behalf should not 
be isolated from the effort to improve the total 
economy of Germany. The restoration of econ- 
omic balance in Germany has been the constant 
objective of the United States Government since 
the conclusion of the war. The German people, 
including the refugees, can only regain dignity 
and freedom and make their contribution to the 
defense of the free democratic world as they be- 
come self-dependent and regain decent standards 
of living. There are many measures in process 
looking toward the economic recovery of Ger- 
many which often are not identified in the public 
mind as measures of relief for refugees, but which, 
I am confident, are producing and will produce in- 
creasingly rehabilitative effects, particularly as 
they are better understood and supported by the 
German people and all those interested in this 
important problem. 

Other measures aimed to maintain opportuni- 
ties for the emigration of refugees and to increase 
the movement from Europe of persons for whom 
employment is not available in the foreseeable 
future will prove helpful. The United States 
Congress has such measures under active consid- 
eration. Present plans are admittedly modest and 
offer no wholesale solution. They must be tested 
in experience before application on a larger scale. 
In this connection, I have faith that those coun- 
tries which make their contribution by receiving 
refugees and migrants will give increasing atten- 
tion, as they are now doing, to the primary neces- 
sity of preserving the unity of the family. 

We must be constantly alert, as measures de- 
vised to meet former conditions are terminated, 
to work out other measures of a practical nature, 
better suited to the problems immediately before 
us. The period of change involved should not be 
interpreted as reflecting any relaxation in the pur- 
suit of our common purposes and objectives. 

I believe that the free democratic world has the 
faith and will to resolve the problems which you 
have sensed with such understanding and sym- 
pathy because we all realize that the dignity of 
individuals is at stake. For this reason, I am con- 


vinced that our common purposes and objectives 
will be achieved. 

Harry S. Truman 


[Released to the press October 19] 

The release of the President's letter to Queen 
Juliana of The Netherlands in regard to the long- 
term problems of refugees and migration indi- 
cated this Government's deep and abiding con- 
cern in resolving these grave issues. The Depart- 
ment is particularly gratified to see that Queen 
Juliana of The Netherlands, speaking for the 
Dutch people, has shown a similar determination 
to proceed with the resolution of these questions. 
As the President's letter indicated, it is particu- 
larly important to note, at a time when former 
measures designed to deal with these humane issues 
are being concluded, that new and continued 
efforts are being made. 

The Mutual Security Bill (P. L. 165) provides 
authorized legislation for the use of a 10-million 
dollar U.S. fund for migration activities. The 
legislative history supporting this authorization 
indicates that it is the intention of Congress that 
the U.S. Government participate in the near 
future in a conference of nations interested in the 
varied problems of surplus populations in Europe, 
displaced persons, and Iron Curtain refugees. 
The Department of State is prepared to proceed 
to carry out the intent of Congress in this regard 
and is only awaiting the assurance that the funds 
will be actually appropriated and made available. 
The bill providing for the money has passed each 
house ; it is now in conference for the adjustment 
of differences in the total amount. 

The plan under development envisages the es- 
tablishment of a provisional arrangement among 
the participating governments for the movement 
of some 115 thousand persons during the first full 
year of operation at an approximate cost of 34 
million dollars. 

U.S. Sends Condolences on Death 
of Prime Minister of Pakistan 

[Released to the press hy the White House October 16] 

The President sent the following message to the 
Begum Liaquat Ali Khan of Karachi, Pakistan, 
on the occasion of the assassination of Prime Min- 
ister Liaquat Ali Khan on October 16 : 

I send you sincere condolences, in which Mrs. Truman 
and our daughter Join me, in your great sorrow which 
has come so suddenly and under such tragic circum- 
stances. Pakistan, which under the Prime Minister's 
wise leadership, has met and overcome so many obstacles 


in taking its place in the world family of nations, has 
suffered a grievous blow. I know the people of Pakistan, 
whose qualities have been so clearly reflected in the 
progi-ess of your country, will carry on with calm stead- 
fastness and wisdom. 

To you I wish to convey my sorrow and that of your 
many American friends in the loss of your husband. 

Following is the text of a message the President 
sent to His Excellency Kliwaja Nazimuddin, Gov- 
ernor General of Pakistan : 

I send to Tour Excellency my condolences and deep 
personal sympathy on the tragic death of His E3xcellency 
Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan. The 
American Government and i)eople will share with me 
the sorrow which has come to the Pakistan nation with 
such sudden impact. I know that the memory of Mr. 
Liaquat Ali Khan's wise leadership and statesmanship 
will long remain a guide and inspiration to the Govern- 
ment and people of Pakistan. 

Egypt Rejects Proposals 

for Middle East Defense Command 

Statement hy Secretary Acheson 
[Released to the press October 17] 

It is with genuine regret that the U. S. Gov- 
ernment received notification on October 15 of the 
rejection by the Egyptian Government of the 
proposals presented to it on October 13 by the 
United States, France, Turkey, and the United 
Kingdom.^ This Government has noted with 
surprise that the Egyptian Government rejected 
proposals of such importance without having 
given them the careful and considered delibera- 
tion which they merited. These proposals were 
formulated by the nations interested in the wel- 
fare and security of the Middle East after the most 
intensive and thorough consideration of the spe- 
cial problems of the area. The invitation to join 
with the other sovereign nations of the free world 
in a joint and cooperative effort to make the world 
safe from aggression was wholly consistent with 
the independence and sovereignty of Egypt. 

Vigilance in protecting the liberties we enjoy 
is the responsibility of every nation of the free 
world. The spirit of responsibility to others re- 
quires that no nation carelessly precipitate events 
which can have no constructive end but which by 
their nature create those elements of confusion and 
weakness which tempt aggression. It is the hope 
of the U. S. Government that Egypt will care- 
fully reconsider the course of action on which it 
has embarked and will recognize that its own 
interest will be served by joining the other na- 
tions of the free M'orld in assuring the defense of 
the Middle East against the common danger. 

The U. S. Government must reafErm its belief 

' Bulletin of Oct. 22, 1951, p. 647. 

Deparfment of Stafe Bulletin 

that the .action of tlie E<;yptian Government with 
respect to the Anglo-K<iyptian Treaty of 1936 
and the agreements of IsOiJ regarding the Sudan 
is not in accord with proper respect for inter- 
national obligations. For its j)art, the U. S. Gov- 
ernment considers the action of the Egyptian Gov- 

ernment to be without validity. 

It is tlie sincere hope of the United States that 
gi'eat restraint will be shown in the present situa- 
tion and that the obligation of all nations towards 
the preservation of world law and order will be 

Quest for Unity of View and Purpose in the Middle East 

hy John A. Loftus 

Econondc Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern., South Asian and African Affairs ' 

In international relations there are few if any 
problems that are at the same time both more 
important and more difficult than the one with 
which we are concerned today. Our problem is 
the common interest of the United States and the 
British Commonwealth in the Middle East — the 
need for a unity of view and purpose and the rea- 
sons why that needed unity is not in fact always 

It should be noted at the outset that what is in 
truth a problem of common interest between the 
United States and the Commonwealth is, in prac- 
tice and in its outward manifestations, a prob- 
lem of common interest between the United States 
and the United Engdom. Essential as the Middle 
East has been in the past to the integrity and 
viability of the British Empire — and essential as 
it is today for all the great strategic interests of 
the Commonwealth as a whole — the fact is that 
the Dominions have taken relatively little direct 
action and have by tacit agreement entrusted to 
the United Kingdom the responsibility of serving 
as custodian for the Commonwealth. Canada for 
example has, so far as I know, no resident diplo- 
matic representative in any of the Arab States or 
in Iran. Mr. Lester Pearson has an essay in the 
current issue of "Foreign Affairs" in which he 
discusses brilliantly the origins, the present com- 
plexities, and the distinguishing tones of Can- 
ada's external relations with various parts of the 
world ; he does not, however, mention the Middle 

The Commonwealth countries other than the 

'Address made before the Rotary Club, Windsor, Ont., 
on Oct. 22 and released to the press on the same date. 

United Kingdom have, of course, not been unaware 
of or uninterested in the problems of the Middle 
East. Many young men from Australia, New 
Zealand, and South Africa, as well as from Can- 
ada, had an opportunity to observe the social 
and political problems of the Middle East during 
World War II, particularly in Egypt. Useful 
and important studies of the Near East have 
been initiated at McGill University and scholarly 
work of high quality is being done by Professor 
Wilfred Cantwell Smith and othei-s. Interest 
in the Near East on the part of Canada has not 
been limited to observation and to academic in- 
quiry. Canada had concerned herself with strate- 
gic and economic problems of the Middle East in 
a thoroughly constructive way, specifically pro- 
viding the first Director General of the United 
Nations Agency for Palestine Refugees and con- 
tributing generously to the work of that Agency. 

Furthermore, among the Dominions, Pakistan, 
and to a lesser extent India, has had a close and 
natural connection with the Middle East. Since 
its emergence as a separate national state, Paki- 
stan has shown considerable interest in the polit- 
ical and economic affairs of the Middle East. 
Indeed, important circles in Pakistan have ap- 
parently given serious thought to the possibility 
of creating a Moslem or Islamic group of coun- 
tries in which Pakistan would provide intellec- 
tual and material leadership. 

Nevertheless, on the whole, the political and dip- 
lomatic interests of the Commonwealth in the 
affairs of the Middle East have been largely en- 
trusted to the Government of the United King- 
dom which is, as it were, an agent for the whole 

Ocfober 29, 7957 


Commonwealth in the politics and economics of 
the Middle East. 

Britain's Role in Middle Eastern Affairs 

British association with the affairs of the Mid- 
dle East goes back a long way into history and 
has very solid foundations in accumulated ex- 
perience. It has its roots in Britain's needs, from 
the start of the 18th century, to insure her sea 
routes to India and more broadly to protect the 
far-flung communications lines of the Empire. 
It has its roots in Britain's role, throughout the 
19th century, in the tangled diplomacy of "the 
Eastern question." It has its roots also in the 
fact that oil rights in the Middle East rank as the 
largest and strategically most important of Brit- 
ain's overseas assets. 

Because of these historical circumstances, the 
Middle East area is of peculiar psychological sig- 
nificance to the British people. Because of the 
long experience in administration and contact in 
this area and because of the specialized studies 
that developed in British universities to facilitate 
the creation of a corps of able Near Eastern ad- 
ministrators and diplomats, Britain has accumu- 
lated a social storehouse of knowledge and famil- 
iarity with the problems and peoples of this area. 
Finally, of course, Britain has an obviously great 
stake in the area, for in it are still to be found the 
transportation crossroads on which British com- 
merce depends, the oil with which British industry 
is fueled, and the gateways to the subcontinent 
of South Asia and to the African continent, in 
both of which Britain has so large an interest. 

But the situation in the middle of the 20th cen- 
tury differs in essential respects from anything 
that existed before. 

In the first place, the British position in the 
area — British prestige and influence and knowl- 
*edge — can no longer be viewed as, so to speak, 
the private property of the United Kingdom or 
of the Commonwealth for which Britain acts as 
trustee. In the Middle East as elsewhere, Britain 
is primarily a partner in the community of free 
nations and must think and act in that primary 
capacity. The enormous strategic significance 
of the Middle East is a common interest of the en- 
tire free world. The oil of the Middle East is an 
economic asset not only for Britain but for all 
of Western Europe and it is a key factor in 
the economic and military logistics of the free 

In the second place, British prestige and in- 
fluence in the area are no longer what they were. 
This is partly the result of a relative decline in 
military, naval, and economic power, made visible 
by the retrenchment of British commitments as 
in Greece. It is partly the fruit of a general surge 
of anticolonial emotion which is sweeping all of 
Asia and of which Great Britain is the principal 
target by virtue of having been the major im- 
perial power in the days before World War I. 


In the third place, the accumulated British 
knowledge of the Middle East is based upon ex- 
perience of the past two centuries and is an ir- 
replaceable asset to us all. Nevertheless, great 
changes in the political and social order are in 
process in the Middle East. In the evaluation of 
such fundamental changes, experience of the past 
and knowledge based thereon do not necessarily, 
do not always, provide the key to understanding. 
The British, influenced by their background, tend 
to assess the depth and intensity of nationalism 
and anticolonialism in the Middle East quite dif- 
ferently than do Americans and many others. 

Special Characteristics of the U.S. Position 

Another respect in which the position of the 
Middle East is basically different from what it was 
before World War I has to do with the role of 
the United States. 

The United States has developed a major stake 
in the security and stability of this highly stra- 
tegic area. Indeed, as the largest and the lead- 
ing power in the coalition of nations determined 
to resist Soviet aggression and to preserve peace 
with honor, the United States has a role to play 
comparable in importance to that which has 
heretofore been played by Britain and the Com- 
monwealth ; and in that role, is planning this year, 
for example, to provide some half a billion dol- 
lars of military' and economic assistance and to 
send out many technicians and advisers. 

Moreover, the United States has a direct com- 
mercial interest and a more general economic in- 
terest in the oil resources of the area. American 
corporate interests account currently for the pro- 
duction of some 114 million barrels of oil a day in 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, and Bahrein. This 
is 70 percent of the current total from the Middle 
East area ; and even if Iran were back in produc- 
tion at normal levels, the American proportion 
would be more than half. The continued output 
and effective use of Middle East oil constitute a 
key factor in the economic strength of Europe to 
which the United States has contributed so largely 
through the Marshall Plan, and an important fac- 
tor in the development of economically underde- 
veloped areas. 

Now, there are certain special characteristics of 
the United States position of which note should 
be taken. 

For one thing, Americans are, in some respects, 
late-comers in this area. Until after World War 
I we took relatively little interest in it, except for 
important educational and philanthropic activi- 
ties. Outside of these and oil company circles, the 
number of Americans who have had administra- 
tive or commercial experience in the area is small. 
While we have had wide educational experience in 
the area through the Near East College Associa- 
tion and otherwise, and while important groups 
of scholars on the historical and modern Middle 
East are being developed at some of our major 

Departmenf of Sfafe Bullefin 

jniversities, we have as jet no university centers 
Df comparable stature with Cambridge and Paris 
svhere Near Eastern studies have been extensively 
ind intensively pursued for many years. Ameri- 
:an academic and diplomatic experts on the Mid- 
ile East are among the ablest that can be found — 
out thej' are few in number. 

In the second place, the United States is a pros- 
perous nation and has some of the faults of judg- 
ment that go with wealth — such as the disposition 
:o assume that money is, if not the root, then the 
remedy of all evils. Being prosperous, we tend 
ilso to be generous. We invite demands by show- 
ing a disposition to meet them. Our evaluation 
oi alternative policies is not too rigidly constricted 
by a consideration of their comparative costs. 
This is not boasting ; it is perhaps criticism ; it is, 
in any event, recognition of a fact — that our views 
3n many matters in the Middle East differ from 
British views inasmuch as we do not have to 
reckon economic costs too closely. 

In the third place, and in part because of the 
fact I have just mentioned, we have been on the 
whole well-liked in the Middle East. I do not 
mean to imply that the test of a sound diplomacy 
is the same test as governs a popularity contest. 
I do not ignore the fact that the United States 
has the largest measure of political and economic 
power in the free world and that the powerful are 
seldom popular. Nor do I ignore the fact that we 
Americans have been less tenderly regarded since 
we passed over from being only "saints and schol- 
ars" — that is, philanthropists and educators — to 
being also oil operators and military planners and 
diplomats. We are not always well-liked by 
everyone. Much of the discontent and resentment 
among Arabs over the Palestine issue is visited 
equally upon the United States, the United King- 
dom, and the United Nations. Nevertheless we 
are, on the whole and most of the time, held in rel- 
atively high regard. And the reason for this is, 
I think, quite profound and not readily visible on 
the surface of things. 

The reason is, I believe, that the great moving 
force in the turjnoil of the Middle East today is 
"nationalism" and that the United States is re- 
garded as the champion and supporter of nation- 
alist aspirations, not just in the Middle East but 
everywhere. This is not a matter of rigidly na- 
tional analysis but rather of intuitive apprehen- 
sion. In this regard perhaps other peoples know 
us Americans better and see us more clearly than 
we know and see oui-selves. They realize that the 
twin notions of the sovereign right of a people to 
■ control its own destiny and of the equal rigiits of 
sovereign states whether great or small, are rooted 
in our history and in our constitution. 

Indeed, the United States achieved national ex- 
istence by virtue of a revolution predicated on 
these notions; the United States has itself been 
called "an indestructible union of weak states"; in 
the American system, Delaware and New York, 

Ocfober 29, J 95 1 

Kliode Island and California, are equally repre- 
sented in the Senate; and the integrity and the 
sovereigntv of the smallest states are un- 

This basic notion has carried over into and pro- 
foundly influenced our foreign policy throughout 
our national history. The Monroe Doctrine, Wil- 
son's Fourteen Points, and the Truman Doctrine 
have been, in different ways, subsequent applica- 
tions of it to changing circumstances. Without 
philosophizing very much about it, indeed often 
without formulating or articulating a concrete 
statement of it, Americans simply find it repug- 
nant to take any other position, as issues arise, 
tlian that every national group has an inherent 
right to manage its own affairs, to fly proudly its 
own flag, and to stand up in the councils of na- 
tions. In this respect the United States, almost 
unconsciously and without specific design, rides 
a great tide in the affairs of men in the twentieth 
century and is the beneficiary, in consequence, of 
an unsought bounty of good will and general 

Conclusions on the Nature of 
the Anglo-American Partnership 

Thus far I have put before you only a series of 
obseiwations, I hope reasonably correct, about the 
nature of the United States and British interests 
in and attitudes toward the Middle East. They 
add up to certain conclusions, which can be stated 
as follows: 

1. While the United Kingdom has had historically a 
greater stake and interest in the area, the United States 
has come also to have major involvements ; and in any 
case it is no longer the separate national interests of 
each that are important but rather the larger issues of 
security and stability and strength in the free world — • 
interests with respect to which both the United States 
and the United Kingdom, in their several ways, are not 
separate and competing national powers hut joint trustees 
for the common interests of the free world taken collec- 

2. While Britain has a longer and richer heritage of 
experience in the area, the United States has a governing 
philosophy and tradition that is likely to be more determi- 
native of "the outcome in an area where aspirations toward 
sovereignty, national independence, and the right to a 
voice and a view In world affairs are probably the domi- 
nant element in a state of social and political travail. 

3. Because the interests of the two nations are com- 
mon, because they face a common danger, and because 
the attributes of prestige in the two cases are potentially 
complementary, there should be, and indeed in essentials 
there is. an identity of objectives. 

4. There are, however, divergencies in the choice of 
methods for achieving the common objective — divergencies 
arising out of the differences in economic status between 
the United States and the United Kingdom; the differ- 
ent intellectual approaches to and techniques of analyz- 
ing specific sets of facts; tlie different historical experi- 
ences and resultant national attitudes ; and out of different 
conceptions as to what can realistically be expected to 
emerge in the way of a social and political order. 

5. An elimination of such divergencies, at least as re- 
gards all essential matters, is of the greatest importance 
to the United States, to the United Kingdom, to the 
Commonwealth, to the Middle East itself, and to the 
common interests of the free world as a whole. 


6. The achievement of a common view in the face of a 
commoD interest mnst be integral for the area as a whole. 
The problems of the area are integral and interrelated ; 
it is the area as a whole, not its component parts, that is 
a key factor in the global stratefrr of freedom. 

7. Joint pursuit by nations of a common interest involves 
problems very similar to those arising in the conduct 
of a business partnership. Partners confer general 
agency pt;wers upon each other : they must therefore 
be able to trust one another's integrity and judgment to 
the limit. For each partner, however, to merit and win 
such trn.«t from another, he be willing to subject his 
individual judgments to the scrutiny and criticism of his 
partners and to refrain from unilateral action if his part- 
ners con.sider his judgment in the particular instance 
to be wrong. Partners mtist pool their skills in such a 
way that the peculiar competence of each can be employed 
to the common advantage. Partners must pool their re- 
sources and each must contribute without stint in sup- 
port of common decisions once taken. If these con- 
ditions cannot be met. if the basis for trust and for co- 
operative use of talents and for the assumption of un- 
limited liability does not exist, then the partnership will 
not be effective. 

The great Anglo-American partnership in the 
Middle East can meet these conditions. But the 
internal mechanics of assuring harmony within 
the partnership can and should be improved. 
Divergencies of business judgment within a com- 
mercial partnership almost inevitably lead to fric- 
tion, if not to bankruptcy. Divergencies of polit- 
ical judgment within a diplomatic partnership 
have comparable consequences. If the intellec- 
tual basis on which the facts of the Middle East 
situation are evaluated by the British were funda- 
mentally different than "that on which American 
judgments are predicated, then the partnership 
might be indeed untenable. But if the differences 
are something less than fimdamental. as they 
indeed are, then a more systematic machinery foV 
the coordination of views and appraisals, more 
energetically and faithfully employed, should 
insure the needed harmony of policies within the 

Policy Objectives in the Middle East 

In conclusion, let me put forward one funda- 
mental concept about the object of the partnership, 
that is, Pbout the objective in the Middle East, that 
is common to the United States and the United 
Eongdora and the Commonwealth and all the free 
nations. The objective is quite simple, actually. 
It is that the troubled area of the Middle East 
should play its proper role in the grand strategy 
of freedom: that its peoples should be infused 
with a sense of purpose shared commonly with 
the other free countries and a pride of participa- 
tion in the common endeavor of the free world: 
that it should actively pursue strength so that it 
may be stable and free: that its resources should 
be developed and available in support of the com- 

mon interest: that its internal quarrels and jeal- 
ousies should be put to rest : and that all groimds 
for its suspicion and distrust of the so-called 
-Western powers" should be eradicated. 

If this be a fair summary of a right objective 
of policy in the Middle East, then it follows that 
the United States and the Commonwealth coun- 
tries should work together to promote those con- 
structive forces in the area that seek economic de- 
velopment, political maturity, and national dig- 
nity. If such constructive forces are associated 
with movements and trends loosely described as 
nationalism, then nationalism merits our en- 
couragement, our support, and our guidance so 
that its energies may be directed into channels 
serving, rather than obstructing, the conmion 

Export-Import Bank Grants Credit 
to Venezuelan Corporation 

The Board of Directors of the Export-Import 
Bank announced on October 16 that it had author- 
ized a credit of 4 million dollars to C. A. Vene- 
zolana de Cementos, a Venezuelan corporation, to 
assist in financing a 12 million-dollar expansion 
program at their Pertigalete plant near Barcelona 
on the easterly Venezuelan coast. 

Venezolana de Cementos was fotmded in 1943 
and now operates three of the six cement plants in 
the coimtry, which make it the largest single pro- 
ducer in Venezuela. The Pertigalete plant is be- 
ing expanded from a present capacity of 85,000 
metric tons per year with a single kiln to a total 
annual capacity of 480,000 tons using three kilns. 

The 4 million-dollar credit will assist in covering 
U.S. dollar costs of equipment and teclijiical serv- 
ices needed to accomplish the expansion program. 
The additional cement produced will assist such 
projects as the expansion of petroleum production, 
the rapidly expanding iron-ore development on the 
Orinoco River, considered vital to the defense pro- 
gram, as well as highways and public works proj- 
ects necessary in the economic development of the 
country. It is estimated that in 1950 Venezuela 
imported approximately 42 percent of its cement 

The credit authorized by the Bank wiE be guar- 
anteed by the Corporacion Venezuelana de Fo- 
mento, a financial agency of the Venezuelan Gov- 
ernment, and will bear interest at 41^ percent. 
Repayment will be made in 10 equal semiannual 
installments commencing in 1954, when it is esti- 
mated the expanded facilities will be in full 


Department of Sfafe Bulletin 

Acheson — Continued from page 686 

I think the answer to this question is that we must all 
sacrifice — here and in Europe — to help one another in the 
joint defense. 

.*e Spendinri 

How much longer can we go on spending all this 
money without going bankrupt? 

. . . Throughout our history, we hare spent what 

w.n < necessary for defense and we hare not gone banltrupt. 

".-^ are a strons and powerful country. We're growing 

.-'er all the time. We face the future with courage 

■ onfidence. We can do whatever is necessary to de- 

i)urselves and still be a long way from bankruptcy. 

rtainly we shouldn't be reckless with our resources. 

ertainly shouldn't waste them. Every dollar we 

:^I>fijd. at home or away from home, should be spent 

shrewdly and wisely. We should be sure that every dollar 

sT^nt is necessary and that we get a full dollar of defense 

' - :' — and more, if jwssible. 

. Our present defense program is large because 
ad our allies are buying the equipment for our de- 
iHii-i'. . . . When we get equipped to defend our- 
selves, the cost of maintenance and operation is a different 
thing altogether. 
"it our chief worry right now is not whether we are 
- too much but whether we are doing enough. We 
the capacity, the initiative, and the resources of 
►'it-ry kind. What we need now is stuff delivered on 
the line. 

We've got to get production — the stuff that spells the 
difference between safety and danger. The problems we 
face will have a different look about them, when our 
production really rolls. 

U.S.SJl. in the VS. 

Why don't we kick the Russians out of the U.N.? 

. . . The first thing to get down, is tliat the decL«ion 
is not ours to make. We don't run the United Nations. 
We're one of the members and there are 59 others who 
have their own ideas. 

In the second plac-e — the reason that you ask the ques- 
tion is that you know — and the millions of other people 
all over the world know — the way the Russians have be- 
haved in the United Nations. Now. who convinced you 
that the Soviets were blocking the United Nations' work 
for peace? The Russian delegates themselves. They have 
done more to ci^nvinee the world that their propaganda 
is false and phony than all the rest of us put together. 
As long as they act in this way it's terribly important 
that none of us are deceived about them. 

And finally, it's equally important that there shall al- 
ways be a meeting place where nations can talk thinss 
over — and are required to talk things over — and settle 
issues peaceably, if they have the will to peace. The 
great purpose of all we do is to keep the peace and settle 
matters with peace and justice. The door must always 
be kept open. 

Anniii{7 th- W 


When two outfits start packing guns, there is bound 
, to be some shooting, isn't that going to be the 
case with our arming of the Western World? 

. . . These i)eople on the other side are not only 
packing guns — thev're shooting. That's what Korea is 

" ' isn't the way we'd like to have things. We would 

-r sit around a table and work things out. and we 

-.^ ready to do that any time of day or night. What we 

say to the other people is: "If you want to talk, we're 

Ocfober 29, ?95J 

willing to talk: but if you shoot, we're going to shoot 
back." And if thev know we mean it. and we've got the 
stuff to shoot back with, we think, maybe, they'U choose 
to be peaceful citizens. 

If the only idea we had was just to pack guns, and big- 
ger and bigger guns, surely, that would get us into trouble. 
But what we are trying to do is — what we have done in 
this country from the very beginning — to have a system 
of law and order in the world. 

The only way to get law and order in the world, the 
way things are "today, is to make sure that the people who 
are" on the side of peace are strong enou::h to keep the 
peace. That's the important thing about Korea. There, 
the forces of law and order stepped in and said to the 
outlaws : "Ton can't get away with it." 

Now, there are risks in this course. There are always 
risks in standing up to a tough guy. But if we get busy 
and produce the firepijwer — and we can do it faster than 
they can. when we really get at it — why, these pe-'ple will 
seethat they will have everything to lose, and nothing to 
gain, by puUing their guns. And that's our best hope of 
preventing war from ever happening. 

Peruvian Minister of Education 
Arrives Under Point 4 Sponsorship 

[Relcaged to the prea October 16] 

The Minister of Education of Peru. Col. Juan 
Mendoza. has arrived in the United States for a 
visit under the Point Four Program operated by 
the Department of State. Colonel Mendoza's trip 
to studv U,S, educational institutions was ar- 
ranged "by the Institute of Inter- American Af- 
fair?, a Point Four technical-assistance agency 
of the U.S. Government. He arrived at Wash- 
inffton October 15. After a i'-day visit. Colonel 
Mendoza wiE go to Fordham University and then 
to the University of Xorth Dakota where he will 
receive honorary degrees of Doctor of Laws. 

The purpose of Colonel Mendoza's trip is to get 
first-hand information about primary and tech- 
nical education and teacher training in the United 
States. He will also tell U.S. educators about 
Peru's national plan of education made possible 
by Point Four cooperation between Peru's Minis- 
try of Education and the Education Division of 
the Institute of Inter- American Affairs. 

During his stay in the United States, Colonel 
Mendozif will visit Fordham University, the Uni- 
versitv of North Dakota. St. Cloud State Teach- 
ers College in Minnesota. Central State Teachers 
College of Wisconsin, the University of Wiscon- 
sin, and the Western State College of Kentucky. 

While in Washington the Minister will meet 
Edward G. Miller. Jr.. Assistant Secretary for 
Inter-^\jnerican Affairs : Henry G, Bennett. Tech- 
nical Cooperation AdministnUor : Kenneth R. 
Iverson. president of the Institute of Inter- 
American Affairs : Wilfred O. Mauck. director of 
the Education Division of the Institute of Inter- 
American Affairs: and Earl James McGrath. 
commissioner of the Office of Education. 



Twenty-seventh Report of U.N. Command Operations in Korea 


I herewith submit report number 27 of the 
United Nations Command Operations in Korea 
for the period 1-15 August, inchisive. United 
Nations Command Communiques numbers 962- 
976, inclusive, provide detailed accounts of these 

It is with extreme regret that I report there has 
been no progress in the armistice negotiations dur- 
ing the period. Item Number two of the agenda, 
^'Fixing of military demarcation line between both 
sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as a 
basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in 
Korea", has remained under discussion without 
any suggestion that the Communist delegates will 
depart from their arbitrary insistence upon the 
38th Parallel as the sole line of demarcation which 

' Transmitted to the Security Council by Ambassador 
Warren R. Austin, U.S. Representative in the Security 
Council, on Oct. 15. For texts of the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, .5th, 
6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th reports to the Security 
Council on U.N. Command operations in Korea, see Bul- 
letin of Aus. 7, 1950, p. 203 ; Aug. 28, 1950, p. 323 ; and 
Sept. 11, 19.50, p. 403 ; Oct. 2, 1950, p. 534 ; Oct. 16, 1950, p. 
603 ; Nov. 6, 19.50, p. 729 ; Nov. 13, 1950, p. 7.59 ; Jan. 8, 1951, 
p. 43, and Feb. 19, 1951, p. 304, respectively. Reports 
nos. 1-11 are published separately as Department of 
State publications 30,3.5, 3955, 3962, 3978, 3986, 4006, 4015, 
and 4108 respectively. The 12th, 13th, and 14th reports 
appear in the Bulletin of Mar. 19, 1951, p. 470; the 15th 
and 16th reports in the Bulletin of Apr. 16, 1951, p. 625 ; 
the 17th report in the Hutxktin of Apr. 30, 1951, p. 710 ; the 
18th in the Bulletin of May 7, 1951, p. 755; a special re- 
port by the U.N. Commanding General, in the Bui-letin 
of May 21, 1!)51, p. 828; the r.)th report in the Bulletin 
of June 4, 1951, p. 910; the 20th report in the BurXETiN 
of June 11, 1951, p. 948 ; the 21st report in the Bulletin of 
July 2, 1951, p. 30; the 22d in the Bulmtin of July 23, 
1951, p. 1.55; the 23d and 24th reports in the Bulletin of 
Aug. 13. 1951, p. 2(!5; the 25th report in the Bulu^tin of 
Aug. 20, 1951, p. 303, and the 2Gth report in the Buixetin 
of Sept 24, 1951, p. 510. 


they would consider. The enemy's delegates have 
refused to discuss in detail the United Nations 
Command proposals relating to this item and have 
even rejected the United Nations Command recom- 
mendation that other items on the agenda be ex- 
plored in the interest of producing some progress 
in the conference. 

The Chinese and North Korean negotiators have 
made repeated vehement statements in support of 
a military line of demarcation on the 38th Parallel. 
Furthermore, the arguments of General Nam II 
give rise to the belief that the Chinese and North 
Korean Communists have undertaken the negoti- 
ations only to give needed respite to their defeated 
forces and to provide one more outlet for their 
jiropaganda. In the twenty-five sessions to date, 
there has unfortunately been little evidence which 
indicates the enemy has honest intentions of ar- 
riving at honorable terms of an armistice. 

The Communist negotiators remain adamant 
in opposition to the position taken by the United 
Nations Command Delegation on item 2 of the 
agenda. The United Nations Command position 
is that the zone of neutrality and the line of de- 
marcation between the opposing forces during the 
armistice period must be premised upon military 
realities, the most significant of which are the 
geographical location of the present front lines 
and the necessity of retaining defensible terrain. 
The United Nations Command has continued to 
reiterate its refusal to abandon the strong defen- 
sive position it has won by throwing back the 

Incidents attendant upon the negotiations prove 
the validity of the concern felt at dependence upon 
the words or guarantees of the Communist leaders. 
On 4 August approximately one company of Com- 
munist infantry armed with grenades, mortars 
and machine guns in addition to small arms, 
traversed the neutral zone, passing not over one 

Department of Sfofe Bulletin 

hundred yards from the conference house. Sub- 
sequent to my protest and suspension of negotia- 
tions pending receipt of satisfactory exph\nation, 
this action was admitted by Kim II Sung and 
Peng Teh-huai to be in viohxtion of their solemn 
pledge and assurances of 14 July, but the whole 
matter was passed off by them as "minor" and 
"trivial". This indifference to the violation of 
their guarantee displayed by the North Korean 
and Cliinese Communist leaders commends to the 
United Nations Command great prudence in the 
grave enterprise of insuring that the minimum 
required security arrangements for the Republic 
of Korea and United Nations Forces precede a 
cessation of hostilities. 

The above incident was followed by completely 
unsupported counter-charges that the United Na- 
tions Command was guilty of violations of the 
neutrality agreements. On 9 August, General 
Nam U, through his Liaison Officer, claimed that 
the United Nations Command had violated its 
guarantees by attacking a Communist vehicle 
plainly marked with white cloth and carrying a 
white flag. The sole guarantee ever given by 
United Nations Command Liaison Officer with 
regard to aircraft refraining from the attack of 
the Communist delegations' vehicles was con- 
tingent upon their being properly marked and 
upon prior notification being given of the time 
and route of their movement. The latter speci- 
fication had not been complied with and United 
Nations aircraft did machine gun the truck. The 
United Nations Command cannot accept the risk 
of its forces entailed in refraining from attacks 
on any vehicles observed in rear of the battle zone 
except those reported by the Communist delega- 
tion as being in the service of the delegation. On 
14 August, the Communists complained of a like 
incident. They have been informed again that 
the United Nations Command provides no im- 
munity for vehicles unless the time and route of 
movement have been communicated to the United 
Nations Command. 

Another charge, trumped up by the Com- 
munists, was leveled at United Nations ground 
forces. They alleged that a United Nations con- 
tingent on 7 August fired into the town of 
Panmunjom on the eastern edge of the neutral 
zone from a position two hundred meters away. 
A thorough investigation made at the direction 
of General Van Fleet proves this to have been 
pure fabrication, an impossibility in consideration 
of the relative location of forces on that particu- 
lar day. 

As a result of the Communist violation, the ses- 
sions were suspended from 5 August until 10 Au- 
gust; sessions were held on all other days of the 
period. There is unfortunately little gi'ound for 
optimism at this time, that satisfactory agree- 
ments will derive from the Kaesong meetings. 
However, it is the intention of the United Nations 
Command Delegation to continue to work for 

just and honorable terms which are based upon 
the present military situation and which will pro- 
vide for adequate guarantees against a renewal 
of Communist aggression in Korea. 

The front was only moderately active through- 
out the period. The enemy stiffened his counter- 
reconnaissance screen and undertook extensive 
small patrol reconnaissance of United Nations po- 
sitions. On the central and eastern fronts from 
Kumhwa to Pohang, he conformed to his pre- 
vious pattern of firm resistance to all United Na- 
tions advances; and in the twenty-mile sector of 
the western front from Tuilchang to Pangye, he 
has increased noticeably the vigor of his reactions. 
On the extreme western front, in the Korangpo- 
Changdan sector, he resisted all United Nations 
patrols operating more than three thousand yards 
in advance of the main United Nations line. 

Increased strength in hostile artillery and mor- 
tars is in evidence along the entire front, except on 
the extreme flanks, and in several instances the 
enemy has delivered relatively heavy concentra- 
tions of medium caliber artillery fire. The volume 
of fire suggests that he has succeeded in accumu- 
lating considerable stocks of ammunition in for- 
ward areas. 

Both ground operations and air reconnaissance 
were hampered by poor visibility and heavy rains. 
Despite swollen streams, United Nations patrols 
maintained steady pressure on enemy positions. 
The most intense fighting of the period took 
place three miles to the south and southeast of 
Changjong on the eastern front where United Na- 
tions Forces overcame bitter resistance to seize 
high ground to their immediate front and success- 
fully repulsed numerous sharp counterattacks by 
forces up to battalion strength. Attempts to ad- 
vance into Otan Amhyon, Cliuktong, Hoegok, and 
Pia sectors continued to encounter resolute op- 

Front lines remained generally unchanged ex- 
cept on a twelve-mile front in the vicinity of 
Chungdong where United Nations patrols con- 
trolled ground about five miles in front of the 
United Nations main forces. At the close of the 
period, the line of contact ran generally north- 
east from Changdan to Chorwon, eastward to Pia, 
thence northeast to the vicinity of Pohang. 

Hostile guerrilla forces operating in the United 
Nations rear areas have maintained a limited po- 
tential for harassing action even though exposed 
to relatively heavy attrition by United Nations 
security forces. Guerrilla activities, however, 
have been almost entirely confined to foraging 
and defense. 

As in previous periods, the enemy has taken 
full advantage of the respite from major com- 
bat operations. His stocks of military supplies in 
forward areas have been increased significantly 
in the past two weeks under tlie cover of bad 
weather and poor visibility. Simultaneously, he 
has filled and bridged many of the anti-tank 

Ocfober 29, J 95 7 


ditches which he had earlier installed on the west- 
em and central fronts. There is considerable evi- 
dence of increased tank and vehicle activity in 
forward areas. Prisoners of war continue to re- 
port plans for a "sixth phase offensive." Amid 
growing indications that the enemy has the means 
to resume the offensive, it must be presumed he will 
do so if that suits his purpose. 

UN Naval Forces conducted constant patrol 
and reconnaissance operations which continued to 
deny to the enemy the waters surrounding Korea 
and to safeguard the movement of United Nations 
shipping in those waters. 

Flying conditions were generally poor over 
Korea during much of this period due to the prev- 
alence of low flying clouds. Despite these un- 
favorable conditions, United Nations carrier- 
based and Marine land-based aircraft flew sub- 
stantial numbers of effective sorties in close air 
support of United Nations Ground Forces and 
in interdiction of enemy lines of communication. 

United Nations surface units continued a daily 
program of interdiction by Naval gimfire against 
enemy railroads, highways, supply and troop con- 
centrations and moving transport. On the east 
coast, these operations were concentrated in the 
Wonsan, Songjin and Chongjin areas. 

On the west coast, the Han and Taedong River 
estuaries and the Hoeju areas received primary 
attention. Good results were achieved in these 

Active and effective naval gunfire support of 
United Nations Ground Forces was furnished by 
United Nations cruisers and destroyers along the 
east coast of Korea. 

Check minesweeping operations continued on 
both coasts of Korea, particularly in the Won- 
san area. The usual number of drifting mines 
were sighted and destroyed by United Nations 
Forces during the period of this report. 

The power of the Far East Air Forces land- 
based planes was concentrated on the disruption 
of enemy main supply routes as the relatively 
static ground situation lessened the demand for 
close air support sorties. Generally poor flying 
weather over Korea, however, require a con- 
siderable proportion of the missions to be flown 
through clouds and rain. 

B-29 medium bombers attacked more than a 
dozen marshalling yards in addition to enemy 
supply dumps, troop concentrations, and airfields. 
Anti-aircraft fire was frequently experienced, 
some damage resulting; but no enemy aircraft 
were encountered. 

Fighters and fighter-bombers, both jet and pro- 
peller types, flew larger formations and deeper 
into enemy territory to bomb out lengthy sections 
of railroad track and to hit bridges and other sup- 
ply route targets. Many sorties were flown 
against anti-aircraft gun positions on flak neu- 
tralization strikes to pave the way for bomber at- 
tacks. Fighter and fighter-bombers, including 


the South African Air Force mustangs, furnished 
requested close air support of United Nations 
Ground Forces undertaking limited offensive 

B-26 light bombers and shore based United 
States Marine Corps aircraft, attacking flare- 
illuminated targets, destroyed or damaged more 
than 1,000 Communist vehicles as the heavy 
southward flow of enemy supply trucks continued. 
Enemy air fields were hit almost nightly and kept 
inoperable by B-26's. No effective threat has 
developed from North Korean air fields. 

Royal Australian Air Force pilots in British- 
made meteor jet fighters joined the United States 
F-86's in escort and fighter sweep missions deep 
into Northwest Korea. Enemy aircraft were 
sighted but they generally declined to fight. On 
9 August enemy MIG's jumped F-80's on a bridge- 
bombing run but no damage was suffered by either 
side. Later that day, a reconnaissance F-80 was 
slightly damaged by four MIG's. 

A flood swollen Korean river set the stage for 
the largest air rescue of the war when ninety-five 
United Nations troops threatened with drowning 
were evacuated by USAF helicopters. The 
last sixteen troops were hauled aboard by "hoist 
lines." The United Nations Command negotiators 
continue to depend upon the helicopters for trans- 
portation to Kaesong from their base camp. 

Cargo aircraft, including the Royal Hellenic 
and Royal Thailand transports, airlifted more 
than 6,500 tons of military supplies and equip- 
ment from Japan to Korea and air dropped some 
130 tons to advanced friendly forces whose ground 
resupply had been jeopardized by flood waters. 
More than 14,000 soldiers and airmen of all par- 
ticipating nations were flown between Japan and 
Korea in furtherance of the rest and recuperation 

In an attempt to minimize the harm to North 
Korean civilians, a series of leaflets were dropped 
over enemy territory pointing out the various 
types of military tai'gets that the North Korean 
and Communist Chinese have established in popu- 
lation centers and warning them to remain as far 
away from these attacks as possible. 

A large proportion of the enemy prisoners of 
war detained by the United Nations have been 
transferred from the Pusan area to the island of 
Joje (Koje-Do). The enemy prisoners of war 
l^opulation of Koje-Do as of midnight, 8 August 
51, was 14,690 and the population at prisoner of 
war enclosure No. 1 at Pusan was 16,168. 

United Nations Command leaflets, loudspeaker 
and radio broadcasts are making the widest pos- 
sible dissemination of news reports on the discus- 
sion of substantive items at the Kaesong armistice 
negotiations. These media have made it clear that 
the scope of the Kaesong conferences is solely 
military and that political questions cannot be 
considered at this time. Radio broadcasts for 
front line troops, and additional leaflets air 

Deparfmenf of Siafe Bulletin 

dropped far to the north of the ground battle line, 
have explained, to soldier and civilian alike, the 
United Nations Command proposal for an armi- 
stice based upon the actual military situation. 
They have exposed the Communist attempt to re- 
vive the militarily irrelevant 38th Parallel as a 
demarcation line. 

IMC Recommends Allocation of 
World Crude Sulphur Supply 

The Sulphur Committee of the International 
Materials Conference (Imc) announced on Octo- 
ber 17 that in view of the continuing serious short- 
age of sulphur, it has reconnnended to govern- 
ments an allocation of available world supplies of 
sulphur for the fourth quarter of 1951.^ Govern- 

' BuiXETiN of July 30, 1951, p. 194. 

ments represented on the Committee, with the ex- 
ception of Brazil, have accepted these recom- 
mendations. The 14 member countries are : Aus- 
tralia, Belgium (representing Benelux), Brazil, 
Canada, France, the Federal Kepublic of Germany, 
India, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, 
the Unioii of South Africa, the United Eangdom, 
and the United States. 

This is an allocation of crude sulphur only. 
The Committee has not allocated the relatively 
small quantities of sulphur which enter into inter- 
national trade as crushed, gi-ound, refined and 
sublimed sulphur, or in the form of flowers. The 
Committee expects that trade in these forms of 
refined and processed sulphur will follow the 
normal pattern. 

The attached schedule shows the quantity allo- 
cated to each country (column 2) ; the import 
quota of each importing country (column 3) ; the 
export quota (column 4) of the four exporting 
countries (Italy, Mexico, Noi"way, and the United 
States) whose production has been taken into 

Allocation Schedule of Crude Sulphur for the Fourth Quarter of 1951 
(in long tons) 




Import quota 

Export quota 


Belgium and Luxembourg. 


British Colonies 

Canada ^ 







30, 800 

8, 200 

17, 100 

13, 000 


20, 800 


17, 000 

13, 000 


French North Africa 

Germany, Fed. Republic of. 




Mexico _ 

New Zealand. 




Sweden . 


Union of South Africa 

United Kingdom 

United States 


Oil Refineries in Bahrein, Netherlands Antilles, Trinidad, and Indonesia. 
Other Countries 





5, 800 

29, 600 


19, 100 



3 36, 000 






« 2, 300 

14, 700 

15, 600 
102, 300 

2 1, 098, 500 

1, 175 

8, 520 




25, 600 
8, 100 


16, 000 



4, 300 

15, 600 

101, 000 





1, 467, 818 

15, 000 

18, 500 

278, 500 

' The Canadian allocation is included in the United States figure in column 2. 

' Does not include 10.000 tons of crude sulphur to be exported as refined or processed. 

' Does not include 1,400 tons of crude sulphur to be exported as refined c 

Ocfober 29, J 957 


account by the Committee for the purpose of this 
allocation. Where the allocation exceeds the im- 
port quota, the difference is explained by domestic 
production or reduction of stocks. 

In arriving at these recommendations, the Com- 
mittee has examined statistics representing world 
consumption of sulphur (excluding certain coun- 
tries for which data are not obtainable). Most 
of this information has been supplied in response 
to questionnaii'es circulated to all interested gov- 
ernments in April and July. The Committee also 
has had the benefit of oral statements from cer- 
tain governments who, while not represented on 
the Committee, wished, in response to the Commit- 
tee's general invitation, to supplement their 
written replies in this way. Tlie governments 
heard were: Argentina, Austria, Ceylon, Cuba, 
Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Greece, Iraq, Ireland, 
Israel, Sweden, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. 

U. S. Delegation to 
International Conference 

membership of the organization, as well as of the 
General Council. The Executive Committee is 
composed of nine member countries. 

The forthcoming sessions are expected to be the 
last formal meetings of the Iro, which is sched- 
uled to terminate operations as of December 31, 
1951. The functions of the Iro with respect to 
legal and political protection of refugees are being 
assumed by the Office of the High Commissioner 
for Refugees, headquarters at Geneva. 

The principal agenda items for the General 
Council and the Executive Committee sessions re- 
late to the termination of Iro operations; and 
include consideration of the annual report of the 
Director General for the fiscal year 1951 ; financial 
statements for the fiscal year 1951; revised plan 
of expenditure for the supplementary and closure 
period ; and the Director General's report on term- 
ination of operations. 

Since its establishment, 1,590,000 refugees have 
come to the attention of the Iro. Among these, 
986,378 have been resettled in new countries, and 
72,617 have been repatriated to their own coun- 
tries. At the peak of its operations the Iro had 
under charter a fleet of 36 ships for the overseas 
movement of refugees. As of June 30, 1951, 43 
refugee camps were being operated by the Iro. 

General Council (IRO), Tenth Session; 
Executive Committee (IRO), Eighth Session 

On October 18 the Department of State an- 
nounced that the President had designated George 
L. Warren, adviser on Refugees and Displaced 
Persons, as U.S. representative to the eighth ses- 
sion of the General Council of the International 
Refugee Organization (Iro) and the tenth ses- 
sion of the Executive Committee of the Iro, both 
of which will convene at Geneva, Switzerland, on 
October 22 and October 18, respectively. Donald 
C. Blaisdell, U.S. representative for Specialized 
Agency Affairs at Geneva, has been designated 
alternate U.S. representative to the forthcoming 
Iro sessions. Other members of the U.S. dele- 
gation to the two meetings are : 


Michael A. Parrell, Chief, Displaced Persons Branch, 

Office of the United States High Commissioner for 

Austria, Vienna 
Eric M. Hushes, OfHce of Political Affairs, Office of the 

High Commissioner for Germany, Frankfort 
Edward M. O'Connor, Commissioner, Displaced Persons 


Since July 1, 1947, the Iro has functioned as a 
temporary specialized agency of the United Na- 
tions charged with the solution of the problem of 
bona fide refugees and displaced persons. The 
organization is composed of the General Council, 
which is the ultimate policy-making body, and the 
Executive Conuuittee, which performs interim 
functions between the semiannual sessions of the 
council. Eighteen member countries comprise the 


Current United Nations Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography^ 

General Assembly 

Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories: Sum- 
mary and Analysis of Information Transmitted Under 
Article 73 e of the Charter. Report of the Secretary- 
General. A/1835, September 17, 1951. 6 pp. mimeo. 

Additional Measures To Be Employed To Meet the Ag- 
gression in Korea. Reports from Governments on 
Measures Taken in Accordance with General As- 
sembly Resolution 500 (V) of 18 May 1951. A/1841/ 
Add.3, September 28, 1951. 4 pp. mimeo. 

Administration of the Trust Territory of Togoland. Re- 
ports of the French Government for the Years 1949 
and 1950. A/1861, September 17, 1951. 1 p. mimeo. 

Administration of the Trust Territory of Cameroons. Re- 
ports of the French Government for the Years 1949 
and 1950. A/1S63, September 17, 1951. 1 p. mimeo. 

^ Printed materials may be secured in the United States 
from the International Document Service, Columbia Uni- 
versity Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other 
materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may 
be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United 

The United Nations Secretariat has established an 
Official Records series for the General Assembly, the Se- 
curity Council, the Economic and Social Council, the 
Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission 
which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and 
reports of the various commissions and committees. Pub- 
lications in the Official Records series will not be listed in 
this department as heretofore, but information on securing 
subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the Inter- 
national Documents Service. 

Department of State Builetin 

Administration of the Trust Territory of Tanganyika. 
Report of ttie United Kingdom Government for the 
Year 1949. A/1865, September 17, 1951. 1 p. mimeo. 

Administration of tlie Trust Territory of Somalilund. 
Report of the Italian Government for the Period April 
1950-December 1950. A/1S66, September 17, 1951. 
1 p. mimeo. 

Administration of the Trust Territory of Western Samoa. 
Report of the New Zealand Government for the Year 
Ending 31 March 1950. A/1SC8, September 17, 1951. 
1 p. mimeo. 

Dlection of Members of the International Court of .Tustice. 
Memorandum by the Secretary-General. A/1885, 
S/2352, September 26, 1951. 6 pp. mimeo. 

lepatriation of Greek Children. Letter Dated 21 Sep- 
tember 1951 Addressed to the President of the General 
Assembly by the Representative of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics to the United Nations. A/1888, 
September 28, 1951. 2 pp. mimeo. 

Economic and Social Council 

i\ill Employment. Views of Certain Non-Governmental 
Organizations on the Experts' Report on National and 
International Measures for Full Employment. 
E/1695/Add.6, August 2, 1951. 21 pp. mimeo. 

Yorld Economic Situation. Replies from Member Gov- 
ernments to the Secretary-General's Communication 
of 2 January 1951 Concerning General Assembly Reso- 
lution 406(V) on the Current World Economic Situa- 
tion. E/1912/Add.lO, July 27, 1951. 19 pp. mimeo. 

i!conomic Development of Under-Developed Countries 
Methods of Financing Economic Development. 
E/AC.6/L.47, July 26, 1951. 4 pp. mimeo. 

leport of the Committee on the Draft Convention on Free- 
dom of Information. Suggestions and Observations of 
Governments on the Draft Convention. E/2031/ 
Add.6, July 26, 1951. 1 p. mimeo. 

World Economic Situation. Reports from Governments 
on Action Taken Concerning Production, Distribution 
and Prices of Commodities and Measures To Combat 
Inflation, Replies from Member Governments to the 
Secretary-General's Communication of 3 May 1951 
Concerning Economic and Social Council Resolution 
341 A (XII) on Action Taken Concerning Production, 
Distribution and Prices of Commodities and Measures 
to Combat Inflation. E/2034/Add.2, July 16, 1951. 
4 pp. mimeo. 

World Economic Situation. Philippines : Revised Draft 
Resolution Incorporating Amendments Proposed by 
the United States and Revised Last Paragraph. 
E/L.lS2/Rev.l, August 11, 1951. 2 pp. mimeo. 

EJconomic Development of Under-Developed Countries. 
Methods of Financing Economic Development. Chile : 
Amendments to the Draft Resolution Contained in the 
Report of the Economic Committee (E/2061) E/L.195, 
August 11, 1951. 4 pp. mimeo. 

Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance. Resolu- 
tion of 30 August 1951. E/2108, September 3, 1951. 
3 pp. mimeo. 


Letter Dated 23 September 1951 from the Chief of Staff of 
the Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine Ad- 
dressed to the Secretary-General Transmitting A Re- 
port on Fighting in the Tel El Mutila Area. S/2359, 
October 1, 1951. 6 pp. mimeo. 

Trusteeship Council 

Land Alienation, and Land and Population Distribution 
in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Memo- 
randum Submitted bv the Government of the United 
States of America. T/AC.36/L.28, September 5, 1951. 
11 pp. mimeo. 

The United States in the United Nations 

A weekly feature, does not appear in this 
issue, but will be resumed in the issue of 
November 5. 

Communiques Regarding Korea 
to the Security Council 

The Headquarters of the United Nations Com- 
mand lias transmitted communiques regarding 
Korea to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations under the following United Nations doc- 
ument numbers : S/2362, October 1 ; 8/2363, Oc- 
tober 2; S/2365, October 4; S/2366, October 4; 
S/2367, October 5; S/23G9, October 8; S/2370, 
October 9 ; S/2371, October 10. 

Consular Offices 

The Consulate at Bari, Italy, which was established on 
April 19, 1951, was officially opened to the public on Sep- 
tember 1, 1951. The United States Informational Ex- 
change (U.S. I.E.) office, also established on April 19, will 
be opened to the public later. 

Checic List of Department of State 

Press Releases: Oct. 15 21, 1951 

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the 

Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department 

of State, Washington 25, D. C. Items marked (*) 

are not prin 

ted in the Bulletin; items marked (t) 



in a future issue. 






Thorp: security and shortages 



Anderson : front line of freedom 



Aoheson : TV appearance 



Proposals to Egypt 



Reply to Adenauer on elections 



Exchange of persons 



Foreign Service changes 



Peruvian Minister to study Point 4 



Visitors to U.S. 



Exchange of persons 



Denmark's defense effort 



Bavarian radio interference 



Kirk's impressions of U.S.S.R. 



Acheson : honor awards 



Aclieson ; Egypt rejects proposals 



Allison : year ahead in Japan 



Warren to IRO 



Truman : aid to refugees 



Kirk, Vishinsky: U.S.-U.S.S.R. 



Acheson : awards ceremony 



Mutual security for refugees 



Visitors to U.S. 


10 '19 

Loftus : Middle East affairs 



Acheson : faith in peace efforts 
1 Bulletin of Oct. 22. 1951. 

1 Printed i 

Ocfober 29, 1951 


Devotion to Duty Lauded in Department 

Remarks hy Secretary Acheson ^ 

"Wniat I want you to think about with me this 
afternoon is: What is in the work wliich we 
are all doing together which has made a person 
devote willingly and enthusiastically and eagerly 
50 years of her life to this work? What is it that 
makes each one of us every day, day in and day 
out, work eagerly and enthusiastically and loyallj' 
and devotedly at what we are doing? Wliy is it 
that every time I go home — I think I stay much too 
late at the Department of State — I find that there 
are scores of other people who are staying later 
than I have stayed ? I see lights all over the build- 
ing. Sometimes when I get home and want to talk 
to one of my colleagues and telephone him at his 
home I find he isn't there at all, he is still at the 
Department. I find that my colleagues and all 
of you give up yovir holidays, give up your eve- 
nings, give up your week ends to stay and work 
on projects which have fired your imagination. 
Sometimes I have to order my colleagues to get 
out of that building, to go away and stay away 
for a few days, and I fincl, as many Secretaries of 
State have found before me, that no one pays the 
slightest bit of attention to these orders. What 
is it that fires this whole wonderful outfit of which 
we are all parts? 

We know certain things that it most certainly 
is not. It isn't any desire for applause or popu- 
larity or {)ower, because it takes a very short time 
for all of us to find out that that just isn't in the 
cards for people who work in the State Depart- 
ment. It isn't that. It certainly isn't any great 
material reward. It is not always clear that all 
of us are going to get any reward. However that 
may be, porliaps that was unduly crystal. We do 
not find tjiat a long career in the State Department 
leads to being listed among the 50 richest men and 
women in the United States. So it isn't that. 
What is it then ? 

' Made before employees of the Department of State at 
the Third Annnnl Awards Ceremony in the Departmental 
Auditorium, WnHliinclon, P. C, on Oct. 18 and released 
to tlie pres,s on the same date. 


It seems to me that what it is is the chance tc 
serve your country and to serve it as part of ar 
outfit of which you can be proud, where you car 
be happy, where you can know that your col- 
leagues feel the same way about it that you do, anc 
you know that you can trust and be trusted all thi 
way through. It is a chance to serve. It is tht 
same sort of thing in this Department which 
creates great military outfits, groups of men whc 
have lived together and fought together and havt 
I)ride in their organization. That, I think, is whj 
it is that this Department is so great. 

I have been in other Departments of the Gov- 
ernment. I have been in Washington for over 3( 
years and I don't think any of my colleagues ir 
"the Cabinet would think it amiss of me if I said 
that after having worked for 11 years in the De- 
partment of State I think it is the finest outfit 
in the entire Government. I don't think any oi 
my distinguished predecessors would think in any 
way that I was reflecting upon prior administra- 
tions if I said that the State Department today 
is better than it ever has been in its long and great 
history. I think they would feel that of course it 
sliouki be, that if it ever stopped making progress, 
if it ever stopped meeting from year to year the 
increasing demands upon it, then it would be 
slipping back. 

No organization can stay static. It has to move 
forward or it has to move backward, and the De- 
partment has been moving, I am glad and de- 
lighted to say. further and faster ahead every 
year. The responsibilities laid upon us are 
enormous, tremendous responsibilities, and we 
have grown to meet those with each new added 

Now this view which we have of ourselves, 
which I do not think is the conceited view, is not 
shared by everybody. There are people who have 
other views about the Department of State, and 
those people are by no means shy in expressing it. 
I should be the last one to be tender about criti- 
cism. I criticize the Department of State, I like 

Department of State Bulletin 

o be criticized by my colleagues and by anybody 
7ho understands what they are talking about. 
Criticism is good for us. The very fact that criti- 
ism is going on means that the people of the 
Jnited States are interested in what we are doing, 
f they weren't interested they wouldn't talk about 
; and we wouldn't be criticized, but they know 
ow important what we are doing is for the coun- 
Many people have ideas, many of the ideas are 
ell-informed, some of them are not, but at any 
ite they are all expressed and that leads to debate 
5 to whether we are doing the right thing or 
lonld do something different. That is all to the 
3od and I have no objection about that at all. 
But the other thing is very different from that, 
nd that is criticism which springs from narrow 
olitical motives, criticism which is reckless and 
sedless of