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Full text of "Department of State bulletin"

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VOLUME XXVI: Numbers 654-679 

January 7- June 30, 1952 



INDEX 



-VieNT o^ 




u. a. wi-tKiNitNUtNl OF DOCUMENTS 

OCT 22 1952 



Corrections in Volume XXVI 

The Editor of the Bulletin wishes to call at- 
tention to the following errors : 

January H, page 4S, right-hand column^ 5th 
line from hottom. In place of on that date read 
December 20. 

March 24, page 474, left-hand column, 2d line 
from bottom. In place of banks read backs. 

April 7, page 549, left-hand column, 10th line. 
In place of political read potential. 

June 2, 1952, page S81, left-hand column. The 
title of Mr. hinder should read Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Economic Afifairs. 

June 9, page 902. In the .second paragraph of 
the first note read Herrnburg not Horrenberg. 
On the same page the second note is dated May 
29 not May 30. 



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A REVIEW OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CON- 
DITIONS IN FRANCE • by David K. E. Bruce ... 533 

HOW CAN WE DEFEND FREE CULTURE? • by 

Assistant Secretary Sargeant 535 

A COMMON RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACHIEVING 

"HEALTH SECURITY" • by Assistant Secretary 
Thorp * . . . 541 

THE U. S. FOREIGN SERVICE—.* Career for Young 

Americans 549 

THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE 523 



For index see back cover 



Vol. XXVI, No. 667 
April 7, 1952 



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S'miNTfNOfNT OF DOCUMENTS 

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Vol. XXVI, No. 667 • Publication 4557 
April 7, 1952 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington 25, D.C. 

Price: 

52 issues, domestic $7.50, foreign $10.25 

Single copy, 20 cents 

The printing of this publication has 
been approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget (January 22, 1952). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may 
be reprinted. Citation of the Depaetment 
OF State Bulletin as the source wiJI be 
appreciated. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication compiled and 
edited in the Division of Publications, 
Office of Public Affairs, provides the 
public and interested agencies of 
the Government with information on 
developments in the field of foreign 
relations and on the work of the De- 
partment of State and the Foreign 
Service. The BULLETIN includes 
selected press releases on foreign pol- 
icy issued by the White House and 
the Department, and statements and 
addresses .made by the President and 
by the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well aa 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the func- 
tions of the Department, Informa- 
tion is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to 
which the United States is or may 
become a party and treaties of gen- 
eral international interest. 

Publications of the Department, as 
well as legislative material in the field 
of international relations, are listed 
currently. 



THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE 



I 



An Article ' 



The concept of a united Europe, which is many 
centuries old, gained renewed significance with 
the revival of interest in international and Euro- 
pean organization after World War I. European 
unification was pressed by such private organiza- 
tions as the Pan-European Union and also received 
support from some European statesmen such as 
Ai-istide Briand of France and Karl Eenner of 
Austria. Briand's plan for a European union was 
cai-efully studied by the League of Nations but 
could not be put into operation because of the di- 
visive effects of the world depression and the rise 
of totalitarian states. 

During World War II interest in European 
union again revived. In 1944 the governments-in- 
exile of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxem- 
bourg signed a treaty which provided for their 
eventual economic union. Immediately after the 
war numerous popular groups arose to rally public 
sentiment behind European unification. These 
groups, most of whom later united to form what 
was called the European Movement, claimed the 
support of such prominent jiolitical leaders as 
Paul-Henri Spaak, Winston Churchill, Carlo 
Sforza, Georges Bidault, and Paul Ramadier. 

Economic dislocation in the war-torn countries 
and the fear of aggression brought increased coop- 
eration among the nations of Europe in the eco- 
nomic and military fields. The United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe was organized 
soon after the war to assist rehabilitation and to 
further economic cooperation among European 
countries. The Organization for European Eco- 
nomic Cooperation (Oeec), formed in April 1948 
among the Marshall Plan countries, worked 
toward European recovery and closer economic 
cooperation among the member states. The Brus- 

' This article also appears as Foreign Affairs Outline, 
Department of State publication 4492, for sale by the 
Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D. C, 
for 50. 



sels Pact, signed in March 1948, laid the basis for 
military cooperation and for consultation on other 
liiajor problems affecting the five participants, the 
United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
and the Netherlands. 

These developments were, however, insufficient 
to satisfy the supporters of European union. The 
French Parliament in March 1948 passed a resolu- 
tion calling for a European constituent assembly 
to establish a European federation. In May 1948 
a congress of the European Movement met at The 
Hague and passed a resolution supporting the 
formation of a European parliament. Although 
the European Movement was a nongovernmental 
organization composed of private groups, nearly 
every country sent all-party delegations sponsored 
by the political parties. 



Creation of the Council of Europe 

In August 1948 the French Government invited 
the other Brussels pact powers to meet for consid- 
eration of the formation of a European parlia- 
ment. The British were reluctant to support the 
idea of an assembly, preferring rather a committee 
of ministers. However, after considerable nego- 
tiation, the Brussels pact powers agreed upon a 
com^jromise and decided to create a Council of 
Europe composed of two organs, a Committee of 
Ministers, which would make recommendations to 
the member governments upon unanimous agree- 
ment, and a Consultative Assembly, which would 
be a deliberative body empowered to discuss prob- 
lems and make recommendations to the Committee 
of Ministers. In the spring of 1949 five other 
European countries were invited to join with these 
powers in working out final details for the creation 
of the Council of Europe. On May 5, 1949, the 
Statute of the Council of Europe was signed by 
the 10 original members. 



April 7, J 952 



323 



Membership 

The original members of the Council of Eui'ope 
were France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden, Italy, and Ireland. Greece and Turkey 
were invited to become members during the first 
session in 1949, and they joined immediately. Ice- 
land, which had been invited at the same time, 
became a member in March 1950. A few months 
later, in 1950, the German Federal Kepublic and 
the Saar were given associate memberships, which 
entitled them to representation in the Consulta- 
tive Assembly but not in the Committee of Minis- 
ters. On May 2, 1951, the German Federal Eepub- 
lic was admitted to full membership in the Council 
of Europe. 



Purpose and Role 

According to the Statute of the Council, the aim 
of the Council is to "achieve unity between its 
Members for the purpose of safeguarding and real- 
izing the ideals and principles which are their com- 
mon heritage and facilitating their economic and 
social progress." To this end it is to discuss ques- 
tions of common concern and reach agreements for 
"common action in economic, social, cultural, sci- 
entific, legal and administrative matters and in 
the maintenance and further realization of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms." Defense is 
the only field in which the Statute precludes the 
Council from making recommendations to member 
governments. 

At the time the Council of Europe was formed, 
other organizations many of whose functions were 
similar to those of the Council of Europe, such as 
UNESCO, the International Labor Organization 
(Ilo), and Oeec, were already in existence. In 
order to avoid duplication of the work of these 
organizations, article 23 of the Statute provides 
that in planning its agenda the Assembly "shall 
have regard to the work of other European inter- 
governmental organizations to which some or all 
of the Members of the Council are parties." 
Agreements are now being worked out for coop- 
eration between the Council of Europe and Ilo 
and UNESCO. Representatives from Oeec and the 
Council of Europe form a liaison committee be- 
tween Oeec and the Council, one of whose func- 
tions is to coordinate the activities of the two 
bodies. 



The role of the Council of Europe is not limited 
to the specific projects which it originates and 
implements. Of equal importance is its role as a 
stimulus to unified action, a constructive critic, 
and a rallying point for European public opinion. 

In its role as a stimulus to action, the Council of 
Europe may direct attention to the need for coor- 
dinated, expanded, or redirected action in a par- 
ticular field such as that of refugees and surplus 
population. Although, as the problem is exam- 
ined, it may sometimes develop that the Council of 
Europe is not the organization best equipped to 
carry out the particular program, the Council will 
have served its purpose by stimulating action. 

The role of the Council of Europe as a construc- 
tive critic is increasing, and the Committee of 
Ministers is now considering means of further de- 
veloping this side of the Council's work. Oeec 
now submits a report on its activities for discussion 
in the Assembly. The Schuman Plan treaty like- 
wise provides that the High Authority of the pro- 
posed Coal and Steel Community shall submit its 
annual report to the Committee of Ministers and 
the Consultative Assembly and that the Common 
Assembly of the Community shall submit an an- 
nual report to the Consultative Assembly. 

Paul-Henri Spaak has called the Consultative 
Assembly "the Tribune of Europe." Here 15 
different European viewpoints can be focused on 
the major pi'oblems confronting Europe, and the 
spotlight of public opinion can be directed to these 
issues. In carrying out this function of rallying 
public opinion, the Consultative Assembly has a 
role unique among European organizations. 

Organs and Procedures of the Council 

THE ORGANS OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND THEIR 
FUNCTIONS 

The major organs of the Council of Europe are 
the Consultative Assembly and the Committee 
of Ministers. In addition, a Joint Committee, 
composed of representatives from the Committee 
of Ministers and the Consultative Assembly, 
discusses mutual problems and seeks to eliminate 
any conflicts between the two organs. A secre- 
tariat, headed by Secretary General Jacques- 
Camille Paris, services these bodies. 

The Committee of Ministers, the "upper body" 
of the Council, is composed of the Foreign Minis- 
ters of the member states or their deputies. The 
chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers 



524 



Department of State Bulletin 



rotates among the inembers. Among the states- 
men who have represented their countries in the 
Committee of Ministers are Dirk Stikker of the 
Netherlands, Count Carlo Sforza of Italy, Konrad 
Adenauer of Germany, and Robert Schuman of 
France. 

All recommendations made by the Council of 
Europe to the member governments require the 
unanimous approval of the Committee of Minis- 
ters. Major substantive decisions require a 
unanimous vote, but certain minor matters can 
be settled by a two-thii'ds majority. Actually, 
most decisions are reached by unanimous agree- 
ment without the formality of a vote. The 
Ministers have recently adopted a procedure 
slightly modifying tlie unanimity rule, which will 
allow "partial agreements," i.e. agreements among 
certain members which do not bind those who 
abstain. Eecommendations made by the Council 
of Europe are not legally binding on the member 
governments, but, of course, since they are made 
by high-level representatives they would normally 
be reflected in the policy of the governments. 

Sessions of the Committee of Ministers are held 
before and after each session of the Assembly and 
on such other occasions as the Ministers may 
decide. Thus far, the Committee has met approx- 
imately four times a year. The meetings of the 
Committee of Ministers are held in private unless 
the Ministers unanimously decide otherwise. 

The Consultative Assembly is a purely delibera- 
tive body in which each country is represented 
according to relative size. The delegations vary 
in number from 18 for France, Italy, Germany, 
and the United Kingdom to 3 for the Saar and 
Iceland. In the past delegations were selected 
by member governments by whatever means they 
chose. Delegates were almost always members of 
the national parliament and frequently were 
chosen by the political parties. Members of 
opposition parties, except the Communist, have 
been regularly included in the delegations. Under 
a new amendment to the Statute, delegates will 
henceforth be selected by parliaments or in a 
manner approved by parliaments rather than by 
the executive branch of the member governments. 
Among the European political leaders who have 
represented their countries in the Considtative 
Assembly are Georges Bidault, Winston Churchill, 
Finn Moe., and Carlo Schmid. Paul-Henri Spaak 
has served three terms as President of the 
Consultative Assembly. 



Each member of the Consultative Assembly is 
seated and votes as an individual rather than as a 
member of a country bloc, an unusual procedure 
among international organizations. This has 
meant in practice that members of national dele- 
gations can usually be found on different sides of 
any issue. 

The Assembly may debate any matter within 
the scope of the Council. Matters for debate may 
either originate in the Consultative Assembly or 
be referred to it by the Committee of Ministers. On 
the basis of such debates and the work of its com- 
mittees, the Assembly adopts recommendations for 
consideration by the Committee of Ministers. A 
recommendation requires a two-thirds vote before 
it can be submitted to the Committee of Ministers. 

Originally, the Consultative Assembly met once 
a year for one month at Strasbourg, France, the 
seat of the Council of Europe. The long time-lag 
between its yearly sessions retarded consideration 
of problems, particularly those of primary interest 
to the Assembly. Therefore in 1950 the Assembly 
split its one-month session and, after meeting first 
in August, reconvened in November to consider 
the action the Committee of Ministers had taken 
on its recommendations. This procedure was fol- 
lowed again in 1951 and will probably continue 
to be the practice. 

The Standing Cominittee of the Consultative 
Assembly is responsible for Assembly activities 
during the period between sessions. It is com- 
posed of the Bureau of the Assembly, i.e. its Pres- 
ident and Vice Presidents, and 23 representatives 
from the Assembly. Urgent problems requiring 
prompt consideration by the relevant Assembly 
committees are brought to their attention by this 
body. The Standing Committee also supervises 
the implementation of Assembly decisions and 
coordinates the activities of the various com- 
mittees. 



HOW A RECOMMENDATION IS CONSIDERED 

A subject for consideration by the Council of 
Europe can originate in either of the two major 
organs. Although a proposal may originate in the 
Committee of Ministers and be submitted to mem- 
ber governments without reference to the Assem- 
bly, such a procedure would be rare. Most 
recommendations studied by the Council of Europe 
have originated in the Consultative Assembly. 
Upon presentation, a motion is ordinarily sent to 



April 7, 1952 



525 



the appropriate Assembly committee for a report. 
The committees of the Assembly are political 
rather than technical bodies. If the motion raises 
complex social and economic questions, members 
of the committee may consult informally with 
experts in the field or members of interested organ- 
izations and sometimes will work out the formal 
details of a proposal in conjunction with another 
international group. For example, the Draft 
Convention on the Reciprocal Treatment of Na- 
tionals now under consideration was prepared in 
cooperation with the International Institute for 
the Unification of Private Law. A draft report 
on a motion usually must receive a two-thirds vote 
in committee before it is presented to the Assembly. 

After a proposal has been approved in the As- 
sembly, it is normally transmitted to the Com- 
mittee of Ministers. In certain cases, however, 
where the Assembly has been anxious to bring 
parliamentary support to bear on the Committee 
of Ministers, representatives have first introduced 
recommendations in their own parliaments for de- 
bate, in the hope that public and parliamentary 
sentiment would be aroused in support of the pro- 
posal. When a proposal is presented to the Com- 
mittee of Ministers, the Ministers may review the 
broad political implications of a proposal; but, 
if the general principle is acceptable, they usually 
prefer to have specific provisions studied by ex- 
perts before taking any final decision. 

In order to avoid duplication of effort, the Com- 
mittee of Ministers may refer certain recommen- 
dations of the Assembly to other organizations 
such as Oeec and request a report on action al- 
ready undertaken or contemplated. 

After study by the secretariat or government 
experts the proposal is again considered by the 
Ministers. After general approval by the Com- 
mittee of Ministers, the detailed or revised pro- 
posal may be returned to the Consultative Assem- 
bly or the Standing Committee for comment. If 
there is conflict over particular points, represent- 
atives from the Assembly and from the Committee 
of Ministers attempt to reach agreement in the 
Joint Committee. 

A proposal agreed upon by the Council may be 
implemented in several different ways. It may 
be carried out by the member governments them- 
selves, or action on it may be taken by the Council 
of Europe itself, either alone or in cooperation 
with other organizations. In certain cases other 



organizations of which these countries are mem- 
bers may be asked to implement a recommendation. 

Basic Problems and Activities of the Council 

In the brief period since its formation in May 

1949, the Council of Europe has led an existence 
marked by controversy. Even before the internal 
organization of the Council had been established, 
it was torn by conflict over its functions, its 
powers, and its purpose. Conflict over the method 
by which Euroj^ean cooperation could best be 
achieved was accompanied by differences of view 
between the Consultative Assembly and the Com- 
mittee of Ministers. Spirited debates on these 
topics have centered primarily around the prob- 
lem of revision of the Statute of the Council of 
Europe. 

The differences in apiDroach to the problem of 
European unity which were reflected in the organ- 
ization of the Council of Europe are clearly evi- 
dent in this controversy. In the Assembly, most 
of the representatives from the continental powers 
favor a federal approach, which would require 
certain sacrifices of national sovereignty. Al- 
though the majority of the federalists now accept 
the fact that a federation including all of Western 
Europe cannot be attained immediately, they con- 
sider that supranational powers can be given to 
bodies which will be empowered to administer 
particular segments or "functions" in the Euro- 
pean economy. These are considered to be pre- 
liminary steps toward the long-range goal. This 
group has been especially active in pushing for 
amendments to enlarge the functions and powers 
of both the Council and the Consultative Assem- 
bly. The British and Scandinavians, sometimes 
called "functionalists," oppose plans which would 
call for sacrifices of sovereignty, preferring that 
specific problems be worked out on an intergovern- 
mental basis. 

The debate on the problem of European federa- 
tion i-eached a climax in November 1950. During 
the first half of the session the previous summer, 
the British and Scandinavian delegates had told 
the others to go ahead with regional federation 
if they so desired. At the session in the fall of 

1950, a proposal advocating regional federation 
was defeated in committee, although the British 
and the Scandinavians did not oppose it. Many 
of those who had previously supported federa- 
tion were opposed to a federation in which the 
British would not participate. 



526 



Department of State Bulletin 



Although the question of radical revision of the 
Statute was thus settled at least temporarily, pres- 
sure for otlier revisions continued to command the 
interest of the Assembly. Many of these recom- 
mendations for amendment had been pending since 
the first session of the Assembly, and the lack of 
action by the Ministers on this matter had proved 
a major irritant in the relations between the As- 
sembly and the Ministers. Many representatives, 
eager to see concrete progress made, felt that their 
recommendations had been either ignored or dealt 
with in a perfunctory or dilatoi-y fashion. On the 
occasions of the Ministers' regular reports to the 
Consultative Assembly, some representatives 
voiced bitter attacks against the Committee of 
Ministers and the states which they thought had 
taken particularly negative positions. The Joint 
Committee, established in mid-1950, however, 
brought greater understanding between the two 
organs. 

At the sixth session of the Committee of Min- 
isters in November 1950, the Ministers accepted 
the principle of specialized authorities and revi- 
sion of the Statute. A committee of senior offi- 
cials was then established to review the changes 
suggested by the Assembly. 

During the interim between November and the 
session in May 1951, a series of steps were taken 
which were to result in decided improvement of 
relations between the Consultative Assembly and 
the Committee of Ministers at the spring session. 
Although not accepting the amendments regarding 
the abolition of veto or elimination of the restric- 
tion on defense, the Ministers did agree upon a 
number of amendments, which for the most part 
embodied the Assembly's wishes on such questions 
as agenda and selection of representatives. The 
Ministers also reached agreement on a number of 
other questions including the admission of new 
members and the conclusions of conventions. Ad- 
vances were also made toward closer relations with 
other Eurojoean organizations. In early spring, a 
liaison committee between the Council of Europe 
and Oeec was established to facilitate exchange of 
information and to assist in harmonizing the ac- 
tivities of the two organizations. A further step 
was taken when it was agreed that Oeec would 
present regular reports to the Assembly. When 
the Schiunan Plan treaty was signed in x\.pril, a 
protocol relating to relationships between the 
Council of Europe and the Coal and Steel Commu- 
nity was appended which took fully into account 

Aprit 7, 7952 



the recommendations of the Assembly regarding 
reports and common member-ship in the Consulta- 
tive Assembly and the Common Assembly of the 
Community. 

At the ninth session of the Committee of Min- 
isters in August 1951 agreement was reached, as 
noted above, to allow partial agi-eements which 
would permit certain decisions to apply only to 
those members accepting them. ' 

Although substantial progress was made during 
1951 toward improving relations between the Min- 
isters and the Assembly and certain troublesome 
questions were laid aside, at least temporarily, the 
problems regarding the role of the Council and 
particularly the Assembly, although narrowed in 
scope, still require serious attention. At the ses- 
sion in November 1951 the Assembly discussed 
plans for specialized authorities in transport and 
agriculture, but it has already become clear that 
the same problem which arose regarding European 
federation is arising again with respect to special- 
ized authorities— the problem of sovereignty. 
These general problems were iiaramount in the 
mind of Paul-Henri Spaak when, in discussing the 
role of the Assembly at the end of the first half 
of its 1951 session, he stated : 

"To sum up: the constitutional approach has 
been abandoned; the functional (or specialized 
authorities) approach offers only limited possibili- 
ties ; and the consultative method is not working 
satisfactorily. . . . All this, I think, makes it 
necessary for those who believe in the paramount 
necessity of the Council of Europe to give thought 
to its future and to try and work out once and for 
all the road it ought to take." 

Relation of United States to the Council 

The Council of Europe is a purely European 
organization in which, as was indicated above, the 
United States does not participate. However, be- 
cause the United States considers that the Council 
has an important role to play in furthering Euro- 
pean unification, it has followed the activities of 
the Council with great interest. Since the incep- 
tion of the European Recovery Program, the 
United States has emphasized the need for a closer 
integration of the free nations of Europe and has 
encouraged them to take steps toward this goal. 
The United States warmly welcomed the estab- 
lishment of the Council as a further step in this 
direction. 

527 



On May 11, 1949, soon after the Statute of the 
Council of Europe was signed. Secretary Acheson 
stated : 

"This act on the part of those nations is a wel- 
come step forward toward the political integration 
of the free nations of Europe. The people of 
those nations are to be praised for their realization 
that a free Europe, to remain free and attain a 
higher degree of well-being, must be a united 
Europe." 

Although the United States has no official re- 
lationship with the Council, members of Congress 
have met with representatives of the Assembly 
to discuss problems of concern to both the United 
States and the European countries. At its second 
session in the summer of 1950 the Assembly of the 
Council adopted a resolution expressing its wish 
that close cooperation between the countries of 
Europe and North America continue and request- 
ing that close liaison be established between the 
European organizations and the nations of North 
America. In March 1951 the Committee of Min- 
isters invited the Assembly to suggest ways in 
which this liaison might be established. Accord- 
ingly at its third session in May 1951 the Con- 
sultative Assembly invited a delegation from the 
Congress of the United States to meet with a dele- 
gation from the Assembly for a public discussion 
of problems of mutual interest. This invitation 
was accepted by the Congress, and, in November 
1951, 7 members of the Senate and 7 members of 
the House of Representatives met with 18 delegates 
selected proportionately from among the various 
parliamentary delegations to the Assembly for an 
exchange of views on such problems as the develop- 
ment of Euroj^ean unity and the social and eco- 
nomic aspects of the current rearmament effort. 



Major Accomplishments 

Since the aim of the Council of Europe is to 
achieve greater European unity, which is often a 
very intangible thing not measurable merely by 
the various activities or institutional forms under- 
taken, it is difficult to assess the importance of the 
Council in terms of its concrete accomplishments. 
The Council had no assigned task other than that 
of achieving greater unity, since defense matters 
are excluded and action on economic matters is 
primarily the responsibility of other organizations 
such as Oeec. The changes in the Statute, even 



though not radical in form, reflect progress toward 
the goal of unity, as do the agreement on special- 
ized authorities and the growing habit of coopera- 
tion and consultation. 

One of the main functions of the Council is to 
provide a forum for the discussion of major Euro- 
pean problems. How much a debate affects a 
given course of events is difficult, if not impossible, 
to determine. Certainly the Assembly has focused 
the spotlight of public attention on some of the 
crucial issues of our times, ranging from inflation 
to the threat of aggression, and by this means has 
stimulated action on many practical problems. 

For example, although the Council of Europe 
has no power to act in the field of defense, the spir- 
ited debate on this issue in August 1950, according 
to the statements of French Foreign Minister 
Schuman, had considerable effect on the future 
course of events. In outlining the Pleven Plan 
for a European army to the Consultative Assem- 
bly at Strasbourg in November 1950, he stated : 

"But there is no need to put these questions to 
you whose very presence here is a challenge to 
orthodoxy ; to you who by the vote you took here 
have testified to your support of the basic idea of 
our plan, nay more, who are its originator. This 
plan is essentially the one which you recom- 
mended." 

The vigorous debates in the first session of the 
Assembly brought wider public attention to the 
problem of European economic integration and 
focused interest on the activities of Oeec. Strong 
support was given to the Schuman Plan for a coal 
and steel community which was debated in the 
Assembly both before and after the signature of 
the treaty. 

On a number of other questions more definite 
action has been taken within the framework of the 
Council of Europe. Among these are the ques- 
tions of human rights, refugees and surplus popu- 
lation, social security, patents, standardization of 
passports and abolition of visas, and a wide range 
of cultui-al problems. 

A convention on human rights which would re- 
flect those concepts basic to the democratic way 
of life was proposed at the first session of the Coun- 
cil of Europe in 1949 and signed at Rome on No- 
vember 4, 1950. At its ninth session in August 
1951 the Committee of Ministers agreed upon a 
protocol to the convention embodying rights of 
free elections, education, and property which the 



528 



Department of State Bulletin 



Assembly had been especially anxious to have in- 
cluded in the convention itself. 

After recommendations from the Assembly on 
the problem of refugees and the decision of the 
Ministers that the problem of refugees and over- 
population was one of extreme urgency whose 
existence impeded the aims of the Council of Eu- 
rope, a committee of high-level experts of member 
governments was convened to examine the prob- 
lem and determine what action might be taken. 
Experts from Iro, Ilo, Oeec, and the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Eefugees have attended its 
meetings, and the United States, at the request of 
the Council, sent an obsei'ver to the second meet- 
ing of this group, held in September 1951. 

In the social field the Council of Europe has 
agreed on the principle of framing a European 
code of social security in conjunction with Ilo. 
The experts are now working out the general 
principles to be incorporated in the convention. 
They are also working on additional ratifications 
for Ilo conventions, extension of the poor-law con- 
vention, and extension of social-security agree- 
ments concluded by the Brussels pact powers. 

In the economic field, the Assembly has been 
studying the formation of specialized authorities 
concerned with transport and agriculture. Since 
these matters have been studied and debated in 
the Council of Europe, the interest of other West- 
ern European organizations in this field has in- 
creased. Other complex questions, such as the 
problem of full employment and cartels, have 
occupied the attention of working groups in the 
Council. A working party on patents has already 
brought to a successful conclusion its first task, 
that of unifying the procedures and formalities 
regarding the application for and the granting of 
patents among members of the Council. The 
group is now studying the creation of a European 
patents office and its integration with the Inter- 
national Patents Institute at The Hague. 

The great expectations of the most ardent sup- 
porters of the Council of Europe who hoped that 
a European federation would quickly be created 
have clearly not been fulfilled. The Council has 
nevertheless played a useful role, in fact a unique 
role. Although it has taken only limited action 
on the most urgent problems of this period, it has 
demonstrated, through the Consultative Assembly, 
the power to arouse public opinion and stimulate 



activity on a number of pressing issues. Through 
its efforts toward unified action on specific social, 
cultural, and economic problems, the Council is 
assisting in the effort to remove many real but 
unspectacular obstacles to European unity. Thus 
through public debate on broad issues and posi- 
tive action on problems of narrower scope, the 
Council of Europe is providing a useful contribu- 
tion to the growing sense of European unity. 



Further Denial of Soviet 
''Germ Warfare" Allegations 

[Released to the press March 26] 
Statevient by Secretary Acheson 

At his news conference on March 26, Secretary 
Acheson %oa^ asked for comment on the statement, 
highly publicized hy the Comnnunists, of a group 
of jurists who claim to have "substa^itiated^^ the 
waging hy United Nations forces in Korea of germ 
IV ar fa re. 

Secretary Acheson made the folloioing extetn- 
poraneous reply : 

As I understand it, this group of very eminent 
jurists to which you refer are a group of Com- 
munists and former Nazis who have turned Com- 
munist, who have gone from East Germany into 
this area. That would not seem to imply any 
special impartiality or disinterest in their ap- 
proach to it. 

We have stated often, I have stated, General 
Ridgway has stated that there is not the slightest 
truth whatever in these statements. 

We have asked the International Eed Cross to 
make an investigation. We have offered all facil- 
ities to the Red Cross. The World Health Organ- 
ization has proposed that it be used to make an 
investigation, also to attempt to deal with any 
epidemic if such an epidemic exists. We have sup- 
ported that request. The Communists have never 
i-eplied to either request. 

It seems perfectly clear that the Communists 
are determined not to have any fair or impartial 
investigation made. They continue on the one 
hand to say there is no epidemic. On the other 
hand they say that we are engaged in these nefari- 
ous practices. 

There is no truth in the statements. The fact 
that there is no truth is shown by the refusal of 
the Communists to permit any investigation by 
an impartial international body. 



AptW 7, 7952 



529 



Reaffirmation of U.S. Policy Toward Germany 



PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENT BY 
SECRETARY ACHESONi 

On March 10, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister 
Andrei A. Gromyko handed to Elim 0''Shaughn- 
essy, United States Charge dAffaires at Moscow, 
a note containing proposals for a treaty of peace 
with Germany. Identical notes here handed to 
the British and. French Ambassadors at Moscow. 
On March 25 the U.S., British, and French Em- 
hassies at Moscoiu delivered identical notes of 
reply to the Soviet Government. There follow 
texts of a statem,ent hy Secretary Acheson and of 
the U.S. and Soviet notes. 

I should like to anticipate your questions and 
speak for a moment on the reply to the Soviet note 
of March 10 on Germany which the representa- 
tives of the United State's, United Kingdom, and 
France in Moscow delivered yesterday to the 
Soviet Foreign Ministry. 

One of the primary purposes of the reply is to 
seek clarification of Soviet intentions with respect 
to procedures and conditions which would permit 
all-German elections, under international super- 
vision, and tlie establishment of a democratic and 
free Germany. The Soviet note has dealt with 
this subject in an unclear manner and all our ef- 
forts during the past several years to obtain Soviet 
acceptance of satisfactory procedures have been 
unsuccessful. As pointed out in our note, it has 
seemed to us that Soviet cooperation with the U.N. 
Commission of Investigation would be especially 
significant as a touchstone of Soviet intentions. 

When the Soviet Union suggests that the four 
powers "discuss" a German peace treaty, the U.S. 
Government cannot but be reminded of the 7 fruit- 
less years of discussions with Soviet representa- 
tives about an Austrian treaty. It would be an 
encouraging augury for any future discussion 
about a German treaty if the Soviet Government 
were to resjDond favorably to the proposals for an 
Austrian treaty contained in the note of the United 
States Government of March 13. 

The Soviet note has led the United States to 
reaffirm in its reply its policies toward Germany 
and Europe. The peace and prosperity of Europe 
demand that unity among its people shall super- 
sede the play of national interests and national 
forces which have brought so much distress to the 
European Continent. 

' Made on March 26. 



Certain aspects of Soviet policy pursued since 
the close of the war have strongly tended to ac- 
cent the need for a rapid development of a close 
European community. The U.S. Government has 
supported and will continue to support measures 
for the formation of a community in Europe de- 
signed to develop the economic strength and de- 
fensive capacity of the participating countries as 
a whole. 

Germany must be allowed to play its part in 
building a strong European community capable of 
developing its freedoms and of defending itself 
from aggi'ession or subversion. The U.S. Gov- 
ernment is convinced that such a community is en- 
tirely defensive in character and jjurpose. 

The Soviet jiroposal, with its emphasis on na- 
tional forces, points to the past and away from 
the establishment of a new Europe in wliich na- 
tional rivalries would be subordinated to the inter- 
ests of the entire area. The U.S. Government 
firmly believes that the European approach repre- 
sents the most constructive means of eliminating 
dangerous tensions. It has, accordingly, sought 
to make clear in its reply that it will not be de- 
flected from pursuing this path of peace. 

U.S. NOTE OF MARCH 25 

Tlie United States Government, in consultation 
with the Governments of the United Kingdom 
and France, has given the most careful considera- 
tion to the Soviet Government's note of March 10, 
1952, which proposed the conclusion of a peace 
treaty with Germany. They have also consulted 
the Oovernment of the German Federal Kepublic 
and the representatives of Berlin. 

The conclusion of a just and lasting peace treaty 
which would end the division of Germany has 
always been and remains an essential objective of 
the United States Government. As the Soviet 
Government itself recognizes, the conclusion of 
such a treaty requires the formation of an all- 
German Government, expressing the will of the 
German people. Such a Government can only be 
set up on the basis of free elections in the Federal 
Kepublic, the Soviet zone of occupation and Berlin. 
Such elections can only be held in circumstances 
which safeguard the national and individual liber- 
ties of the German people. In order to ascertain 
whether this first essential condition exists, the 



530 



Department of State Builetin 



Background References 

The unitication of Germany on the basis of free, 
deiiiocratie elections has always been strongly sup- 
ported by the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and France. In February 1950, John J. McCloy, U.S. 
High Commissioner for Germany, proposed all- 
German elections for a constituent assembly. A 
chronological list of .subsequent Allied proposals 
and of steps taken by the West German Government 
appeared in the Bulletin of Octolier 29, 1951, p. G95. 

On October 4, 1951, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer 
of West Germany requested the appointment of a 
U.N. commission to investigate whether conditions 
would permit the holding of nation-wide elections. 
A resolution establishing such a commission was 
introduced by the United States, United Kingdom, 
and France on December 1 during the sixth General 
Assembly session (Bulletin of Dec. 24, 1951, p. 
1019) and was adopted, with amendments, on De- 
cember 20 (for text, see Bulletin of Jan. 14, 1952, 
p. 55). The commission was constituted on Febru- 
ary 11 and is to report to the Secretary-General not 
later than September 1, 1952. 

Significant statements on the integration of Gei-- 
many into the European community were made liy 
the Western Foreign Ministers on May 14, 19.50 
(Bulletin of Jlay 22, 19.50, p. 787) ; on September 
19, 19.50 (Bulletin of Oct. 2, 1950, p. 530) ; on 
September 14, 1951 (Bulletin of Sept. 24, 1951, p. 
486) ; on November 22, 1951 (Bullion of Dec. 3, 
1951, p. 891) ; and on February 19, 1952 (Bulletin 
of Mar. 3, 1952, p. 325). 

The Foreign Ministers announced in September 
1950 their decision that the necessary steps should 
be taken to terminate the state of war with Ger- 
many. On October 19, 1951, the Congress resolved 
that the state of war between the United States 
and Germany was terminated, and the President on 
October 24 issued a proclamation to that effect (Bul- 
letin of Nov. 12, 1951, p. 769). 



General Assembly of the United Nations has ap- 
pointed a Commission to carry out a simultaneous 
investigation in the Federal Republic, the Soviet 
zone and Berlin. The Commission of Investiga- 
tion has been assured of the necessary facilities in 
the Federal Republic and in Western Berlin. The 
United States Government would be glad to learn 
that such facilities will also be afforded in the 
Soviet zone and in Eastern Berlin, to enable the 
Commission to carry out its task. 

The Soviet Government's proposals do not indi- 
cate what the international position of an all- 
German Government would be before the conclti- 
sion of a peace treaty. The United States Govern- 
ment considers that the all-German Government 
should be free both before and after the conclusion 
of a peace treaty to enter into associations com- 
patible with the principles and purposes of the 
United Nations. 

In putting forward its proposal for a German 
peace treaty, the Soviet Government expressed its 
readiness also to discuss other proposals. The 
United States Government has taken due note of 
this statement. In its view, it will not be possible 
to engage in detailed discussion of a peace treaty 
until conditions have been created for free elec- 



tions and until a free all-German Government 
which could participate in such discussion has 
been formed. There are several fundamental 
questions which would also have to be resolved. 

For example, the United States Government 
notes that the Soviet Government makes the state- 
ment that the territory of Germany is determined 
by frontiers laid down by the decisions of the Pots- 
dam conference. The United States Government 
would recall that in fact no definitive German 
frontiers were laid down by the Potsdam decisions, 
which clearly provided that the final determina- 
tion of territorial questions must await the peace 
settlement. 

The United States Government also observes 
that the Soviet Government now considers that 
the peace treaty should provide for the formation 
of German national land, air, and sea forces, while 
at the same time imposing limitations on Ger- 
many's freedom to enter into association with 
other countries. The United States Government 
considers that such provisions would be a step 
backwards and might jeopardize the emergence 
in Europe of a new era in which international re- 
lations would be based on cooperation and not 
on rivalry and distrust. Being convinced of the 
need of a policy of European unity, the United 
States Government is giving its full support to 
plans designed to secure the participation of Ger- 
many in a purely defensive European community 
whicli will preserve freedom, prevent aggression, 
and preclude the revival of militarism. The 
United States Government believes that the pro- 
posal of the Soviet Government for the formation 
of German national forces is inconsistent with the 
achievement of this objective. The United States 
Government remains convinced that this policy of 
European unity cannot threaten the interests of 
any country and represents the true path of peace. 



SOVIET NOTE OF MARCHllO 

[Unofficial Translation] 

The Soviet Government considers it necessary 
to direct the attention of the Government of the 
United States of America to the fact that although 
about seven years have passed since the end of the 
war in Europe a peace treaty with Germany is not 
yet concluded. 

With the aim of eliminating such an abnormal 
situation the Soviet Government, supporting the 
communication of the Government of the German 
Democratic Republic to the Four Powers request- 
ing that conclusion of a peace treaty with Ger- 
many be expedited, on its part addresses itself to 
the Government of the United States and also to 
the Governments of Great Britain and France 
with the proposal to urgently discuss the question 
of a peace treaty with Germany with a view to 
preparing in the nearest future an agreed draft 



April 7, 7952 



531 



peace treaty and present it for examination by an 
appropriate international conference witli the par- 
ticipation of all interested governments. It is 
understood that such a i^eace treaty must be 
worked out with the direct participation of Ger- 
many in the form of an all-German Government. 
From this it follows that the U.S.S.R., U.S.A., 
England, and Fi-ance who are fulfilling control 
functions in Germany must also consider the ques- 
tion of conditions favoring the earliest formation 
of an all-German Government expressing the will 
of the German people. 

With the aim of facilitating the preparation of 
a draft peace treaty the Soviet Government on its 
part proposes for the consideration of the Govern- 
ments of the U.S.A., Great Britain and France 
the attached draft as a basis of a peace treaty with 
Germany. 

In proposing consideration of this draft the 
Soviet Government at the same time expressed its 
readiness also to consider other possible proposals 
on this question. 

The Government of the U.S.S.R. expects to re- 
ceive the reply of the Government of the U.S.A. 
to the mentioned proposal at the earliest possible 
time. 

Similar notes have also been sent by the Soviet 
Government to the Governments of Great Britain 
and France. 

ENCLOSURE 

Draft of Soviet Oovernment of Peace Treaty loith Oerm^ny 

Almost seven years have passed since the end of the 
vpar with Germany but Germany still does not have a 
peace treaty, ttnds itself divided, continues to remain in 
an unequal situation as regards other governments. It 
is necessary to end such an abnormal situation. This re- 
sponds to the aspirations of all peace loving peoples. It 
is impossible to assure a just status to the legal national 
interests of the German people without the earliest con- 
clusion of a peace treaty with Gei-niany. 

Conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany has an im- 
portant significance for the strengthening of peace in 
Europe. A peace treaty with Germany will permit final 
decision of questions which have arisen as a consequence 
of the second world war. The European states which 
have suffered from German aggression, particularly the 
neiglibors of Germany, have a vital interest in the solu- 
tion of these questions. Conclusion of a peace treaty with 
Germany will aid improvement of the international situ- 
ation as a whole and at the same time aid the establish- 
ment of a lasting peace. 

The necessity of hastening the conclusion of a peace 
treaty with Germany is required by the fact that the 
danger of re-establishment of German militarism which 
has twice unleashed world wars has not been eliminated 
in as much as appropriate provisions of the Potsdam 
conference still remain unfilled. A peace treaty with Ger- 
many must guarantee elimination of the possibility of a 
rebirth of German militarism and German aggression. 

Conclusion of the peace treaty with Germany will estab- 
lish for the German people permanent conditions of peace, 
will aid the development of Germany as a unified demo- 
cratic and peace-loving government in accordance with tlu> 
Potsdam provisions and will assure to the German people 
the possibility of peaceful cooperation with other peoples. 

As a result of this, the Governments of the Soviet Union, 
the United States of America, Great Britain and France 
have decided urgently to set about working out a peace 
treaty with Germany. 



The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re- 
publics, United States of America, Great Britain and 
France consider that preparations of the peace treaty 
should be accomplished with the participation of Ger- 
many in the form of an all-German Government and that 
the peace treaty with Germany should be formed on the 
following basis : 

Basis of peace treaty with Oermany. 
Participants. 

Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the United States of 
America, France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Hol- 
land and other governments which participated with 
their armed forces in the war against Germany. 

Political provisions. 

(1) Germany is re-established as a unified state, there- 
by an end is put to the division of Germany and a unified 
Germany has a possibility of development as an inde- 
pendent democratic peace-loving state. 

(2) All armed forces of the occupying powers must be 
withdrawn from Germany not later than one year from 
the date of entry into force of the peace treaty. Simul- 
taneously all foreign military bases on the territory of 
Germany must be liquidated. 

(3) Democratic rights must be guaranteed to the Ger- 
man people to the end that all jpersons under German 
jurisdiction without regard to race, sex, language or re- 
ligion enjoy the rights of man and basic freedoms including 
freedom of speech, press, religious persuasion, political 
conviction and assembly. 

(4) Free activity of democratic parties and organiza- 
tions must be guaranteed in Germany with the right of 
freedom to decide their own internal affairs, to conduct 
meetings and assembly, to enjoy freedom of press and 
publication. 

(5) The existence of organizations Inimical to democ- 
racy and to the maintenance of peace must not be i>er- 
mitted on the territory of Germany. 

(6) Civil and political rights equal to all other Ger- 
man citizens for participation in the building of peace- 
loving democratic Germany must be made available to all 
former members of the German army, including officers 
and generals, all former Nazis, excluding those who are 
serving court sentences for commission of crimes. 

(7) Germany obligates itself not to enter into any kind 
of coalition or military alliance directed against any 
power which took part with its armed forces in the war 
against Germany. 

Territory. 

The territory of Germany is defined by the borders es- 
tablished by the provisions of the Potsdam Conference of 
the Great Powers. 

Economic Provisions. 

No kind of limitations are imposed on Germany as to 
development of its peaceful economy, which must con- 
tribute to the growth of the welfare of the German people. 

Likewise, Germany will have no kind of limitation as 
regards trade with other countries, navigation and access 
to world markets. 

Military Provisions. 

(1) Germany will be permitted to have its own national 
armed forces (land, air, and sea) which are necessary for 
the defense of the country. 

(2) Germany is jjermitted to produce war materials and 
equipment, the quantity and type of which nmst not ex- 
ceed the limitations required for the armed forces estab- 
lished for Germany by the peace treaty. 

Germany and the United Nations Organisation. 

The governments concluding a peace treaty with Ger- 
many will sui)port the application of Germany for accept- 
ance as a member of the United Nations Organization. 



532 



Department of State Bulletin 



A Review of Political and Economic Conditions in France 



hy David K. E. Bruce ^ 



In spite of frequent Cabinet changes since the 
liberation, French foreign policy has remained 
remarkably constant. In fact during the last 7 
years, there have been only two Foreign Ministers, 
Bidault and Schuman. By overwhelming majori- 
ties — even though the Communists have always 
voted in opposition — the French Parliament has 
approved all measures for the defense of the 
Western European community. 

To implement this defense, the French Nation is 
currently making, in proportion to national in- 
come, the largest contribution of any Nato 
country except that of the United States, and prior 
to the outbreak of the Korean war the military 
effort of France was larger proportionately than 
our own. 

Naturally, we have recently been deeply con- 
cerned over political developments in France. The 
interplay, the reaction between politics and eco- 
nomics is closely linked. There is an equal appre- 
hension over tiie large, although reduced, Com- 
munist vote that expressed itself in the last gen- 
eral election. 

Yet, these conditions should not be viewed with 
an excess of pessimism. It is quite evident that 
France could make a tremendous, and perhaps 
determining commitment to Nato defense if it 
were not for its involvement in Indochina, in that 
almost unknown war where French Union forces 
killed have now exceeded 30,000. This war at 
times seems a bottomless pit, for into it have been 
thrown the flower of the French professional 
army; almost 50 percent of the officers and non- 
commissioned officers so essential to the training 
and leadership of French Nato forces are engaged 
there, to say nothing of 25 percent of her naval 
contingents, as well as a most enterprising body of 
combat airmen. 

As to communism in France, it no longer con- 
stitutes the threat that it once did to the integrity 
of the Atlantic community. With its parliamen- 

' Excerpts from a statement made before the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations in support of the Mutual 
Security Program for fiscal year 1953 on Mar. 25 and 
released to the press on the same date. Mr. Bruce was 
U.S. Amliassador to France from May 194;> until his ap- 
pointment as Under Secretary. He assumed the latter 
position on Apr. 1. 



tary representation reduced from 180 to 101 As- 
sembly members, its newspapers circulating at less 
than half the momentum of a few years ago, its 
followers in the French Cgt Labor Union con- 
stituting only about y^ of their strength in 1946, 
its hold on the management of nationalized indus- 
tries broken, its infiltration of the armed forces 
neutralized, its dominance in certain Government 
departments vitiated, its directors unable since 
1948 to invoke a crippling strike, its demonstra- 
tions against Eisenhower and Adenauer public 
fiascoes, its propaganda beginning to be effectively 
countered, its submission to orders from Moscow 
increasingly arousing the patriotic suspicions of 
French workmen and farmers, its influence has 
diminished to a point where, though still danger- 
ous, it presents no immediate impediment to the 
realization of policies conceived in the national 
interest. 

Unhappily, the burden of armament, and the 
operation of a fierce and costly anti-Communist 
war in Indochina, superimposed upon the neces- 
sary demands of an economy prostrated by years 
of enemy occupation, and only recently convales- 
cent, have accentuated the inflationary forces in 
France, and rendered its balance-of -payments 
problem, especially in relation to tlie dollar 
zone, unmanageable without substantial foreign 
assistance. 

Although an admirable proportion exists be- 
tween agriculture and industry in France, any 
slight disturbance in it is provocative of unfavor- 
able reactions. Last year there was, due to cli- 
matic conditions, a shortage in bread-grain pro- 
duction, and, as a consequence, large imports of 
wheat became mandatory. Although the output 
of coal in 1951 was the largest in French history, 
as was the performance per miner, the dislocation 
in the movement of that commodity and of coke, 
due primarily to the falling off of traditional im- 
ports from Great Britain and Germany, forced 
the French Government to have recourse to the 
uneconomic expenditure of dollars to import coal 
from the United States — and even so supplies were 
not sufficient to enable the steel industry to operate 
at more than 85 percent of capacity. 

French industry has staged a noteworthy recov- 
ery since 1944, with the details of which you are 



April 7, J 952 



533 



thoroughly familiar. But the continuance of its 
pace depends upon its ability to import those raw 
materials in which it is notably deficient. Even 
within the broad confines of the French Union, 
little petroleum, rubber, cotton, nonferrous metals, 
and many other indispensable ingredients of mod- 
ern industrial production have been found. Be- 
fore the last war, these commodities were freely 
obtained through the use of the substantial foreign 
assets, in dollars and other hard currencies, of the 
Metropole. 

These assets no longer exist. They were looted 
by a skilled and unscrupulous invader, and what 
little remained was devoted to the reconstruction 
of an exhausted plant and depleted inventories. 

Under the impulse of Mai-shall Plan grants and 
loans it seemed for a time that a stable recovery 
was within sight. 

But when the dislocations, inevitably consequent 
upon Nato defense preparations, were added to 
the serious drain in Indochina, coupled with a 
world-wide rise in the price of raw materials, and 
an adjustment on the part of France's trading 
partners to meet this unwelcome situation by re- 
strictions in external commerce, began to have 
their full effect there was a deterioration in public 
finances, both internal and external, of the gravest 
description. 

These were amongst the basic reasons for the 
evils which have afflicted the French economy. 
But, in my personal view, I must say that the 
instability of French politics, the inability to 
create those social conditions that would lessen 
party dissensions, the optimism and national pride 
that influenced the imdertaking of military pi'o- 
grams beyond the real capacity of the national 
economy to support, have aggravated a situation 
that was intrinsically extremely difEcult. 

Retrenchment in expenditures is the usual rem- 
edy for such luihealthy manifestations. Unfortu- 
nately this specific was impracticable of applica- 
tion. The French Government was resolved to 
continue the effort in Indochina and at the same 
time to supply a number of divisions to Nato in 
excess of those scheduled for any other member. 

The result of this resolution confronts us with 
the present dilemma. In spite of the inequities 
in the incidence of French taxation, the amount 
of taxes actually collected in proportion to na- 
tional income has been for some years the highest, 
with the exception of Great Britain, of any major 
country in the non-Communist West. 

Moreover, when the report of the Temporary 
Council Committee of Nato fixed the politico-eco- 
nomic capacity of France to make a defense con- 
tribution in the amount of 1,190 billion francs, 
the French Government not only accepted this 
figure but, after careful deliberation, decided to 
increase it to 1,400 billion francs. 

The only controversy that has arisen over this 
decision is as to how it should be financed, either 
by tightening credit on private industry in order 



to increase Government borrowing, or by increas- 
ing already high and in some cases nearly con- 
fiscatory tax rates on ascertained incomes, or by 
making up the difference, by what may prove to 
be impracticable, through the collection of de- 
linquent taxes. 

There must also be taken into account the lead- 
ership in foreign policy displayed by successive 
French Governments in continental affairs. The 
initiation of the Schuman Plan for a pooling of 
the steel and coal resources of Western Europe, 
the proposal of the Pleven Plan for a European 
Defense Community, both of them leading toward 
the realization of that age old dream of civilized 
man — the formation of a political federation of 
Europe — are perhaps the most significant under- 
takings in the political field that our own, or, for 
that matter, many preceding generations have 
witnessed. 

These developments have already proven so dis- 
turbing to the Soviet Government that it has en- 
deavored in every fashion to counteract these great 
policies, devoted to peace, that are aimed to draw 
Germany into the Western orbit and to coordinate 
and strengthen the defense of the free world. 



VOA Uses New Filter Device 
To Combat Soviet Jamming 

Voice of America stations overseas are using a 
new electronic weapon to combat Soviet jamming, 
the Department of State announced on INIarch 28. 

The new device, known as a heterodyne filter, 
has proven effective in filtering out certain types 
of jamming and other interference. Used at over- 
seas relay bases, the heterodyne filter has increased 
the percentage of Voice of America programs 
which can be relayed. 

The filter eliminates or appreciably reduces in- 
terfering signals without seriously affecting the 
intelligibility of the program being relayed. 
Crystal filters previously in use reduced program 
intelligibility when filtering out interference. 

Inexpensive and small in size, the heterodyne 
filter was developed by Voice engineers under the 
direction of Chief Engineer George Q. Herrick. 
In a recent test at one relay base, the filter proved 
effective against 52 percent of the interference en- 
countered. The filter saved or improved program 
reception 60 percent of the time during another 
test. 

Commenting on the new filter, Wilson Compton, 
Administrator of the International Information 
Administration which heads the Voice, said, "The 
filter is by no means an answer to the Soviet jam- 
ming problem, but it does repi-esent another im- 
portant forward step in our increasingly success- 
ful efforts to pierce tlie electronic curtain erected 
by the Kremlin." 



534 



Department of State Bulletin 



How Can We Defend Free Culture? 



hy Howlamd S. Sargeant, 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs ^ 



A little more than 100 days ago, Assistant Secre- 
tary Edward W. Barrett, speaking before another 
group of prominent Americans meeting in this 
city, revealed for the first time that the Soviets 
had mounted a gigantic cultural offensive aimed 
principally at the United States.- 

What he described is now clearly phase one of 
an all-oiit cultural campaign. Wliile at first the 
Soviets devoted their attention principally to the 
vodka circuit, coming out from behind the Iron 
Curtain only at the most propitious moments, they 
are now waging a major cultural offensive in many 
large and strategic areas of the world which have 
previously escaped saturation treatment. 

Today, I want to report on phase two of the 
Soviet propaganda campaign in which culture is 
used as the cutting tool. As we trace their efforts, 
let us bear in mind that what they are presenting, 
for the most part, is not Russian culture — but a 
Sovietized perversion of it. This perversion for 
jjolitical ends first took place in the Soviet Union 
and then was extended to the satellites, where they 
have sought to eradicate the history and cultural 
heritages of whole countries. Now they are pene- 
trating new areas with the Party's brand of 
culture. 

Let us look at what tl sy are doing in India, for 
example. Eight now the Soviets are making an 
all-out effort in the field of painting at an art 
exhibit which held its grand opening at New Dellii 
earlier this month. 

I have followed with a great deal of interest the 
despatches from our Embassy there ; they add np 
to the blunt fact that the Soviets have seized upon 
the field of art as a major tool in their intensified 
l^ropaganda campaign. Described as a multi- 
million dollar modern art collection, the large 
Soviet exhibition of paintings plus other objects 
of art is the first Soviet display of its kind 
ever held outside the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics. 

Indians are being "treated" to the works of some 



' Address made before a Conference of the American 
Committee for Cultural Freedom at New York, N. Y., on 
Mar. 29 and released to the press on the same date. 

"^ Bulletin of Dec. 3, 1951, p. 903. 



28 Stalin prize winning artists who have put on 
canvas the abundant life and peaceful intentions 
of the Soviet Union. They are seeing, for exam- 
ple, Geldberg's "Friends of Peace" which depicts 
Red soldiers feeding doves. They are being 
shown Nikioh's work which he calls "Election 
Canvassing," and Sorokin's masterpiece with the 
caption "Pepov Shows Admiral Makarov World's 
First Radio Set." 

Now it is no mere accident that the Soviets have 
chosen South Asia, and more particularly India, 
as a priority target for their cultural offensive. 
India needs to develojj itself and wants to live in 
peace. Most of its people want no part of what 
they mistakingly interpret as a struggle between 
two big powers. They do not recognize this strug- 
gle for what it is — a contest between freedom 
and totalitarianism, in which all free men have 
a stake. Some Indians fear that our build-up of 
military strength in defense of freedom might pos- 
sibly be used for aggressive war — that we are war- 
mongers. Others think that so-called decadent 
capitalism is materialistic, if not godless. 

India, therefore, provides potentially fertile soil 
for planting the idea of Soviet interest in the arts. 
It is not difficult to understand why their major 
bid at the moment is through cultural infiltration. 
It is a bid which fits neatly into the pattern of 
their peace offensive. It is a bid which is being 
made with considerable mounting intensity. Let 
us examine what is taking place. 

Methods of Cultural Infiltration in India 

First of all, it would appear that the Commu- 
nists are planning on increased use of motion pic- 
tures for propaganda, and the evidence shows that 
this medium has been assigned a high priority. 
Soviet film festivals have been held in Bombay 
and Calcutta; a three-man "Soviet Cine Art Del- 
egation" was sent to India late in 1951 ; and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics sent the larg- 
est delegation of any country represented to the 
recent international film festival headed by its 
Deputy Minister of Cinematography, Semyonov. 
The large Soviet delegation might well have 
swamped U.S. participation had it not been for 



April 7, 1952 



535 



the personal popularity of Frank Capra and the 
good fortune that a group of American actors were 
on location in India and were thus able to attend 
the festival. 

In addition to the direct approach, the Com- 
munists, of course, form and use "front" groups 
in their cultural campaign. Thus we have the 
All-India Peace Council, the All-India Pro- 
gressive Writers Association, the All-India 
Friends of the Soviet Union, the Indian People's 
Theatre Association, and the India-China Friend- 
ship Association. These organizations are not 
only useful to the Kremlin in direct infiltration 
of the culture of another country but serve in pre- 
senting the Communist line through indigenous 
channels. This indirect approach is apparent in 
the cultural exchanges between Red China and 
India. 

Last fall, for example, an unofficial Indian cul- 
tural mission toured Communist China for 6 weeks 
and a similar mission of Chinese Communists vis- 
ited India. This interchange provided Indians 
with a rosy view of Communist achievements in 
China and emphasized the cultural ties between 
the two countries. The Indian delegation of 15 
was invited by five prominent organizations in 
China to participate in the second anniversary 
celebrations of the People's Eepublic of China at 
Peiping on October 1. 

Host organizations were the China Peace Com- 
mittee, the All-China Federation of Labor, the 
All-China Federation of Democratic Women, the 
All-China Association of Writers and Artists, and 
the New Democratic Youth League. In China the 
good will mission visited villages, factories, uni- 
versities, and schools in Peiping, Tientsin, Nan- 
king, Shanghai, Canton, and Mukden. 

Judging from their statements made in China 
and on their return to India, they were impressed 
with the "spectacle of a great and ancient country 
in the process of a glorious rebirth," with the 
devotion of the new government and government 
leaders to the cause of the people, with progi-ess 
in national reconstruction after only 2 years, with 
the "liberation" of more than 300 million Chinese 
peasants from centuries-old serfdom, with the new 
marriage law insuring freedom and equality to 
the women of China, with the enthusiastic support 
of the Chinese for the new regime. Upon return- 
ing to India, members of the delegation made a 
number of speeches recounting their findings, but 
they pointedly ignored China^ close ties with the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Eepublics. 

A primary element of tliis indirect or indige- 
nous approach on the ]iart of the Kremlin is the 
playing down of political connotations. It is 
therefore less irritating, far more subtle in effect, 
and potentially far more dangerous and difficult 
to cope with. The Soviets are making increased 
use of this technique in their current cultural 
offensive. 

An all-out Communist cultural drive, reacliing 



down to provincial levels and making use of In- 
All-India Peace Council, the All-India Pro- 

gressive Writers Association, the All-India 
ultural Conference and Festival for Peace to be 
hekl in Calcutta, April 2 to 6. The plans, as de- 
scribed in Crossroads, organ of the Communist 
Party of India, furnish the most clear-cut blue- 
print so far available for involving in the Soviet 
"peace" offensive a broadly representative group 
and all aspects of Indian culture. 

The progi-am calls for the organization of 
provincial committees representing workers, art- 
ists, and cultural organizations "of various shades 
of opinion and of different schools" in preparation 
for the conference. These committees are to pre- 
pare exhaustive papers on all phases of Indian 
culture. 

Since the All-India Peace Council, sponsor of 
the conference, is organized at district and even 
subdistrict levels. Communist cultural activities 
probably will be extended to these levels on a more 
highly organized basis as a result of the confer- 
ence. The conference itself may be expected to 
produce a new plan for linking all cultural activi- 
ties being carried on by various front organizations 
and individuals. It may possibly create a new 
cultural organization in line with World Peace 
Council directives of February and November 
1951. 

Their objectives are seen in the papers the Pre- 
paratory Committee has asked the provincial com- 
mittees to prepare. I quote : 

Culture in the Service of Peace : a review of the 
contribution to peace made by literature, art, films, 
dance, and music. 

War Propaganda: a memorandum on the war 
propaganda carried on through films and litera- 
ture, and its effect on the people and on education. 

Peace and the Worhhig Conditions of Cultural 
Workers: the effect of the rising cost of living as 
the result of war and war tension on cultural 
workers and cultural work; effects of high cost of 
paper on printing and literature; effects of non- 
availability of raw film and equipment on the film 
industry. 

Imperialist Strangle hold Over People's Culture: 
how imperialism and its need for war has affected 
Indian culture. 

Cultural Exchanges: how British imperialists 
have sought to cut off India from contact with 
the cultural achievements of other countries. 

These are some of the highlights of the cun-ent 
phase of the Soviet cultural offensive as they liave 
unfolded in one large and strategic area — India. 



Moscow's Voice in Japan and Canada 

One miglit logically inquire : Is the U.S.S.R. 
shifting its focus from Europe to Asia? The 
answer is "no." What the Kremlin commenced 
on a limited scale a year or more ago in the siitel- 
lite countries and extended in sporadic cultural 



536 



Department of State Bulletin 



activities in Europe was the first phase of a greatly 
intensified effort which is now unfolding — a satu- 
ration effort in large and strategic areas. 

The intensified Soviet cultural offensive now 
being directed at India and other areas may next 
be turned on Japan and Southeast Asia. In fact, 
the suspicion that Japan has been earmarked for 
a Soviet cultural offensive is already proving cor- 
rect, when oidy last month it came to light that 
tlie Soviet Union had placed orders for 40,000 
Japanese matrices. 

A survey tliis month among book dealers reveals 
that Soviet-publislied books in Japanese are 
"flooding the market . . . brand new books are 
being sold in second-hand stores as 'clearance 
items' at one-third the list price . . . they are 
selling like hot cakes. The dealers report thai 
they hardly have time to keep them on the shelves." 

Until this year, Soviet-printed Japanese books 
were obtainable "at very low prices at the Soviet 
Mission reading room." But the reading-room 
users were mostly the "intelligentsia," so the circu- 
lation of the books was not wide. In January the 
Mission stopped selling. At the same time, "vast 
numbers of Soviet books began to appear at the 
old book stores in Tokyo's Kanda district." The 
current bestsellers among them are History of the 
Communist Party in the Soviet Union and >S'e- 
lected Works of Lenin. The demand is increas- 
ing for Brief History of Stalin and Nation amd 
Revolution. 

At present, the Soviet cultural offensive in Japan 
is limited chiefly to a book program, and this situ- 
ation probably will continue until the diplomatic 
status of the Soviets in post-treaty Japan is cer- 
tain. Moscow did manage recently, however, to 
bestow the Stalin Peace Prize on Ikuo Oyama, left- 
wing peace-front organizer and a pei'son of some 
prestige. 

Finally, if one takes some measure of comfort in 
the fiction that the Soviet cultural drive is an ocean 
away, he should be interested in reports emanating 
from iust across the international border nearest 
us. Perhaps you saw the banner headline in a 
recent issue of the Financial Post, published in 
Toronto, Canada — "Culture: The New Smoke 
Screen for Canadian Reds"— (Jan. 19, 1952). 

The six-column story under this banner cites 
dozens of examples of Moscow-mesmerized cul- 
tural activities and concludes: 

The Communists have failed dismally to peddle their 
"peace" line to labor . . . now they are out to try to cap- 
ture the people who consider themselves "intellectuals" — 
the teaeliers, scientists, clergy, musicians, composers, 
writers, actors, and art and music lovers. 

At a Party conference in Toronto, the Post 
quotes leader Tim Buck as announcing: 

Our party, locally and nationally, is going to extend its 
activities on the cultural front . . . the Labor Progres- 
sive Party must seek to encourage every activity and every 
trend toward the development o( a People's culture. 

Again, the voice of Moscow — this time being 
mouthed by people a hemisphere removed. 

April 7, 7952 

995853—52 3 



Vulnerability of the Campaign 

It's always difficult to measure the relative suc- 
cess of attempts to influence men's minds, but I do 
think in all honesty we can place some sort of eval- 
uation on the Soviet cultural offensive as a major 
tool of their propaganda machine. I would tend 
to believe, also, that any such appraisal, piecemeal 
though it may be, should seek to give some indica- 
tion of why they succeeded or wliy they failed. 

Now what has been the story of their success 
when they rolled their cultural vehicle onto the 
open highway ? Have they been able to maintain 
their line of Soviet superiority with the same 100 
percent consistency ? 

Phase two of the Soviet cultural offensive shows 
clearly that while they have had their successes, 
they have also had their failures. This is true in 
India and it is equally true elsewhere. 

There is no doubt, for example, that the several 
lavish exhibitions to which I referred earlier have 
had their effect on the Indian populace, particu- 
larly in bolstering the activities of the pro- 
Communist groups. The recent Chinese cultural 
mission to India, for instance, was well received 
by Indians. The reason, perhaps, is that the edu- 
cated Indian public has a genuine curiosity about 
China and very little opportunity to satisfy it. 
For this reason it may be that the exhibit of 
Chinese photographs and art objects may have 
been successful. Probably for this reason also 
many people went to the meetings and listened 
attentively. This desire for information resulted 
in their activities receiving wide press coverage. 

Despite the success of this event and others, 
there are definite signs that tlie intense campaign 
of the Soviets does not always meet with favor 
but at times actually backfires. 

For example, at the International Industries 
Fair in Bombay the Soviets outdid themselves. 
In a spurt of cultural zeal they created what to 
many observers appeared to be a typical square in 
any Soviet city. Six huge red hammer and sickle 
flags shouted their cultural implication in contrast 
to the rather inconspicuous Indian national flag. 
It is reported to have drawn bitter comment from 
exasperated patriotic citizens and the Bombay 
Government subsequently i-efused to permit an 
extension of the fair on the grounds that it was 
being exploited by Communists for propaganda 
purposes. 

Another bug dropped in the Soviet's cultural 
ointment when the Communists complained that 
leaflets "blackguarding the People's China" were 
distributed in front of the Chinese pavilion. To 
this the Bombay National Standard replied in 
part: 

India is still a democracy, and no suggestions of a ban 
on nonviolent expression of opinion should be tolerated. 
If anti-Communist propaganda iu front of the Fair is to 
be deterred officially, because the Russians and the Chi- 
nese are participating, the Indian Government may be 
asked by Mr. Truman with greater justification to sup- 
press anti-American sentiments which the Russians and 

537 



the Chinese are inciting all the time, because America 
has given us economic aid and promises more. 

The paper concluded, "The Russians and the 
Cliinese are here not to help us, but (to help) 
themselves." 

Official translators are supposed to interpret 
accurately but when N.S. Krishnan, famous south 
Indian comedian, toured Russia for 3 weeks he 
found that translators in the Soviet Union inter- 
pret the way the Kremlin wants them to. 

During a dinner in Moscow he declared 
"Gandhi-ism and communism are equally great 
modern ideologies but . . . Gandhi's revolution 
was nonviolent while the Russian revolution was 
not peaceful." 

The Russian interpreter refused to translate the 
sentences and created a scene saying he was sure 
that Gandhi-ism was not as great as communism. 

The Soviet art exhibit now going on in India 
is meeting with a dull thud from the Bombay 
press. No favorable press comment has greeted 
the efforts of Moscow's politically minded artists. 
On the contrary, critical "debunking" articles are 
greeting their efforts. Such headlines as "Krem- 
lin Attempt at Seduction" calls attention to the 
numerous Connnunist cultural raids on India since 
1948, including the present exhibit. 

Now we must not lay too much emphasis on these 
indications of the vulnerability of the Soviet cul- 
tural offensive. Although there are plainly evi- 
dent some indications of weakness, we know that 
in this field as well as in the direct business of in- 
forming, the Communist propagandists are by no 
means weaklings. However, we have learned that 
the Communist propaganda techniques are vulner- 
able because they are founded upon "the big lie." 
We also have seen again and again that Commu- 
nist propagandists bungle and make bad blunders. 
In the long run, the difference between words and 
deeds, between promises and performances, be- 
comes evident to the very people the Kremlin 
propagandists are trying to beguile. 

The Communist degradation of culture for po- 
litical purposes exposes a comparable fundamental 
weakness. The more they come out into the open, 
the more they demonstrate this fact — the more 
they sharpen the focus on their fraud. 

Coupled with their efforts to be best rather than 
honest in cultural interchange, the Soviets find 
it compelling to tear down and destroy, by all 
means at their command, the idea that any laud- 
able culture can exist in Western civilization and 
particularly in the United States. 

A rather striking example is found in a recent 
edition of a French magazine of Communist spon- 
sorship. Here are pictures of spaghetti swooshing 
queens, of slums, of wrestlers in the mud, of jitter- 
bugging, of the American cinema filled with deg- 
radation and violence, of our comic strips which 
have enriched the American language and culture 
with expressions such as : "crack, paf , honk, zok, 
bop, bang, wham." 



It is all summed up neatly in the March 21 
edition of the Cominfonn Journal, which con- 
cludes a piece titled: "Flowering of Science and 
Culture in the U.S.S.R." in these words : 

As for the corrupt "culture" of imperialism, it mutilates 
man, depraves his mind, implants among people mis- 
anthropy, moral dissoluteness, appeals to the lowest 
instincts, cultivates criminal tendencies. . . . For 
this reason advanced and progressive people in all 
countries reject with disgust and hatred this "culture" 
of capitalism that is rotting alive. 



The U.S. Response 

What then should be the response of the United 
States to this vigorous prostitution of culture for 
Soviet political ends? 

Not, surely, to scream "Anything you can do, 
I can do better!" Communists have to believe 
that every human activity is inexorably deter- 
mined by the economic structure from which it 
grows. Thus they are under an endless compul- 
sion to be first in everything in order to demon- 
strate the perfection of the Soviet paradise. Their 
athletic teams must win, even if they have to 
change the rules. Their inventors must have dis- 
covered everything, even if they have to change 
history. Their scientists have to be right, even if 
they have to cliange nature. Their musicians and 
artists and dancers must always be the best, or 
they won't play at all.^ 

Communists also have to believe that all human 
endeavor is to be chained to the support of their 
slave order. Science, art, literature, music can 
have no free ends of their own. The death-laden 
fog of Politburo domination has entered area after 
area of Russian scientific and cultural life, reduc- 
ing to a grotesque and frightening puppetry the 
once-rich welling of genius from that brilliant and 
gifted people. After Pavlov Lysenko, after a 
Moussorgsky or Tschaikovsky, the stultification of 
a talented Shostakovich; after Tolstoi ancl Dos- 
toyevsky and Turgenev, the strident whine of the 
IDroj^agandu novelists; after the rich, moving and 
symbolic religious art of Orthodox Russia, the 
wooden posturing of Soviet art. Only in those 
few areas in which apparent political unim- 
portance has allowed chinks of freedom — such as 
ballet and musical performance, as opposed to 
composition — has the innate Russian creative 
genius been able to remain alive. 

In the free world it is not so. Cultural vitality, 
we believe, grows only f i-om the interaction of two 
elements. One is the free exploration of the sen- 
sitive, individual human spirit seeking clearer and 
more moving forms of expression. The other is 
the common fund of human experience and destiny 
which such creative spirits seek to express and the 

^ For a series of articles on Soviet thought control as 
applied to the educational system, to science and scholar- 
ship, and to cultural activities, see Bulletin of Nov. 5, 
1951, p. 719, Nov. 26, 1951, p. 814, and Dec. 3, 1951, p. 895, 
respectively. 



538 



Department of State Bulletin 



common lieritage of cultural symbols and values 
that gives iniiversal meaning to their work. This 
free and uncompelled union of the individual and 
the common heritage is, in our view, the essence of 
cultural life. It is what makes possible the con- 
tribution of the gifted creator to the common fund 
of human experience and aspiration evei'ywhere; 
it is what makes it possible in turn for the indi- 
vidual everywhere to be enriched by sharing uni- 
veisal cultural insights. 

And I think it is precisely toward the excellen- 
cies that may be peculiar to American culture that 
attention needs to be drawn. It is toward the 
common heritage that is shared and toward the 
common human experience which our culture and 
others alike express. We need to send abroad the 
very best that we have in literature, in art, in 
music, in the dance and in drama, not that we may 
boast its excellence but in order that we may show 
as clearly as we can the fullness and intensity with 
which we share a common human cultural heritage. 

The great problems of human existence are, 
after all, common to all men. The deepest aspira- 
tions of the human spirit are the same everywhere. 
Birth and death, hunger and work, peace and free- 
dom, brotlierhood and love, are common to all men. 
Through this unity of human fears and needs and 
hopes can be communicated in its moving fullness 
and immediacy, the creative outpourings of free 
minds and spirits. Only through freely creative 
and freely shared cultural expression, we believe, 
can every people see its own values, its own funda- 
mental humanity, mirrored in its neighbor. Only 
through such cultural expression can they arrive 
at that sense of identity and common purpose that 
must underlie all efforts at common political and 
economic action. 

Wlien these objectives are clearly understood 
by others to be our only objectives in presenting 
abroad examples of our cultural life in America, 
then the reasons for American participation in ai't 
exhibits, film festivals, and theatrical perform- 
ances become evident. Then an American film be- 
comes not an ideological weapon aimed at cultural 
penetration, but simply a vehicle for conveying 
the artistic intentions of a free and peaceful peo- 
ple. The performance of a theatrical troupe be- 
comes not an appeal for a political ideology but 
simply entertainment put on for the enjoyment of 
an audience. An exhibition of paintings becomes 
not a strained and dull attempt to show the excel- 
lence of a political system but the honest efforts 
of artists to paint pictures which will create honest 
impressions. 

Cultural Interchange Based on the 
Sharing Principle 

That is why we believe that no effort we can 
make in this field can have a deeper or more lasting 
meaning than to throw open the doors for the 
fullest and freest sharing of cultural experience 
between ourselves and other jieoples. 



I hope you will forgive me if I have seemed ex- 
cessively idealistic for a practical Government 
officer. I believe, however, that it is literally true 
that the kind of world-in-the-making to which 
the foreign policy of this country seeks to con- 
tribute can come into being only on the basis of a 
conviction of fundamental human unity under- 
lying all our national differences — a conviction in 
turn that can arise only in the free sharing of the 
individual and national expressions of a universal 
cultural heritage. 

It is my own personal experience over the period 
of the last 5 years in working with the programs 
of International Information and Educational Ex- 
change that this is the basic conviction which we 
must have if these programs are to be successful. 

At the present time, under the able direction of 
Wilson Compton, your Government has a program 
designed to give momentum to this cultural inter- 
change between the United States and other coun- 
tries of the world, based on this princijDle of 
sharing. 

As a result of the close cooperation between our 
Government and private citizens and organiza- 
tions, peoples abroad in the past have seen such 
examples of our national culture as the highly suc- 
cessful tour of Scandinavia by the Howard Uni- 
versity players and the 4-month European tour 
of the American National Ballet Theatre. The 
outstanding i^erformances of such groups as the 
Hall Johnson Choir and the Juilliard String 
Quartet, Judith Anderson's Medea, Astrid Var- 
nay's Isolde, and the colorful show Oklahoma at 
the Berlin Cultural Festival were the results of 
the cooperation of your Government and private 
groups. 

Right now, as you know, we are working with 
the American Committee for Cultural Freedom to 
arrange appearances of the Boston Symphony 
Oi'chestra, the New York City Ballet, and Virgil 
Thompson's opera Four Saints in Three Acts at 
the Paris Festival this spring. Not only will these 
American cultural achievements be seen by Par- 
isian audiences but arrangements have recently 
been made for the New York City Ballet to appear 
in six other European countries, participating in 
festivals in Switzerland, Amsterdam, Florence, 
and Edinburgh. 

Likewise, the Boston Symphony will tour other 
European cities. Plans are also under way be- 
tween the Department and the American National 
Theatre and Academy to send a company to play 
Gershwin's opera Porgy and Bess in Great Brit- 
ain this fall and to tour the continent early in 
1953. 

Another example of how your Government and 
private initiative work together in the cultural 
field are the exchanges of young musicians now 
being undertaken by the National Music League 
and the French organization Jeunesse Musicale. 
As a result, young violinists and pianists of prom- 



Apn\ 7, 1952 



539 



ise from both iications are giving concerts in each 
other's countries. 

Special collections of books including works in 
the field of the arts, literature, and the social and 
physical sciences have been and are being sent to 
many parts of the world. 

This year, with funds from a private donor and 
with the aid of the American Government, an ex- 
hibit of American art is being organized by the 
American Federation of Arts, under the direction 
of David Finley of the National Gallery, to be 
exhibited as part of American participation at the 
summer-long Venice Biennalo in Italy. 

These are but a few of the international cul- 
tural projects we Americans have undertaken or 
plan to undertake. In all of them you find one 
priceless factor — the initiative of the private in- 
dividual with a desire to create and to share. He 
is not directed to do so by his Government. His 
creation is not one of decree, it is one of desire. 
It is not a fraudulent attempt to win plaudits, it 
is an honest attempt to express his innermost ideas 
and feelings and to share these satisfactions with 
his fellow man. These are the elements of free 
culture. 

I believe that you of the x^merican Committee 
and all American artists, scientists, and musicians 
bear a transcending responsibility to yourselves, 
to America, and to free peoples everywhere to 
defend our free culture through the wisest and 
widest possible sharing of that culture. 



The Communist Conference 
In Defense of Children 

[Released to the press March 28] 

The Department of State has received a number 
of inquiries from American citizens concerning 
the so-called "International Conference in De- 
fense of Children" which now is scheduled to con- 
vene at Vienna, Austria, during the period April 
12 to 16, 1952. Since it is apparent that the 
writers of these inquiries are unaware of the true 
nature of this meeting, their attention has been 
drawn to the Department's announcement of 
November 29, 1951, on this subject.^ 

The Department at that time explained that this 
"conference" was planned, is being organized, and 
will be run by the Communist-dominated "World 
Federation of Democratic Women" with the active 
collaboration of the Cominform-run "World Fed- 
eration of Trade Unions." 

This latter body, the Department pointed out, 
was ejected from its headquartei's at Paris by the 
French Government last year and immediately 
migrated to Vienna where it maintains its head- 
quarters in a Soviet-requisitioned btiilding. On 
October 11, 1951, the Austrian Government pub- 

' Bulletin of Dec. 10, 1951, p. 935. 



licly announced that the organization was in 
Vienna at no one's invitation and had repeatedly 
refused to comply with Austrian law. 

It is fair to assume, the Department pointed 
out, that this "conference" is another device in the 
campaign to recruit unsuspecting and well-mean- 
ing people for the cynically hypocritical Com- 
munist "Peace Movement." 



Hungary Nationalizes Real Estate 

[Released to the press March 241 

The following is released as of interest to Amer- 
ican owners of houses, apartments, stores, fac- 
tories, and warehouses in Hungary. 

The Department has now received the text of 
the Hungarian Nationalization Decree, dated 
Februai-y 17, 1952, affecting such property, to- 
gether with the texts of other pertinent laws and 
regulations. 

The American Legation at Budapest informed 
the Hungarian Government on February 19, 1952, 
that it reserves the right to make subsequent rep- 
resentations on behalf of any American citizen 
whose property may be affected by the decree. 

Persons in the United States who have not been 
notified by their caretakers or agents in Hungary 
about the decree and the possibility of appeal from 
the act of nationalization on or before May 3, 
1952, may obtain copies of the translation by writ- 
ing to the Division of Protective Services, De- 
partment of State, Washington 25, D.C. 



New Cuban Government Recognized 

[Released to the press March 27] 

The U.S. Ambassador at Habana on March 27 
informed the Minister of State of Cuba of the 
recognition by the U.S. Government of the new 
Government of Cuba. 



Current Legislation on Foreign Policy 

Defense Production Act. Progress Report — No. 14. 
World .Supply, United States Production, Consump- 
tion, Imports and Exports of Steel, Copper and Alumi- 
num, and Domestic Reqiiirements and Allocations by 
the Joint Committee on Defense Production. S. Kept. 
1310, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 34 pp. 

Suspension of Deportation of Certain Aliens. H. Rept. 

1539, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany S. Con. Res. 
58] 2 pp. 

Suspension of Deportation of Certain Aliens. H. Rept. 

1540, S2d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany S. Con. Res. 
63] 2 pp. 



540 



Department of State Bulletin 



A Common Responsibility for Achieving Health Security 



hy Willard L. Thorp 

Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs ^ 



Today, about one-fifth of the world's population 
lives in economically developed areas where mor- 
tality rates are relatively low and health and sani- 
tation conditions relatively advanced. These are 
the areas of greatest economic producti^'ity and 
tend to be in the vanguard of economic and social 
progress. About another one-fifth of the world's 
population lives in areas fairly well advanced in 
the ajjplication of modern tecluiology. About 
three-fifths of the world's population lives in tech- 
nologically backward countries. Here the stand- 
ard of living is miserably low, and bad health con- 
ditions are a major factor in this tragic situation. 
The cost of preventable disease, which is largely 
responsible for low health status in underdevel- 
oped areas, represents a colossal bui'den. In the 
Philippines in a recent year, for example, in a 
total jjopulation of 20 million people there were 
2 million victims of malaria, with 10,000 annual 
deaths, and 1,300,000 ill from tuberculosis with 
35,000 annual deaths. Here is a tremendous eco- 
nomic loss from these two diseases alone. 

The cost of premature death is also tremendous 
in these underdeveloped areas. In them, a much 
smaller proportion of healthy adults must sup- 
port a much larger percentage of unproductive 
children and disabled grown-ups. For example, 
in various countries of Southeast Asia and the 
Middle East, only about one-half the children 
bom reach the age of 15 and only 15 percent live 
to the age of 60. By contrast, in the United States, 
90 percent become adults and two-thirds are still 
alive at GO. In the underdeveloped areas, the 
chain reactions are all clearly in evidence — poor 
health, low productivity, illiteracy, and poverty. 
All are holding back economic and social progress. 

Let me give an example. In the fertile Terai 
district in India, malaria had become so serious 
that an area which had once sustained 350,000 
population had been reduced to one-fifth that num- 
ber. After only 3 years of malaria control in the 
Terai and neighboring areas, the population had 
increased by over 100,000, the agricultural area 



' Excerpts from an address made before the National 
Health Council at New York, N. Y., on Mar. 13 and re- 
leased to the press on the same date. 



under cultivation had been increased by 35,000 
acres, and grain production increased by 35 per- 
cent. In relation to a country as highly popu- 
lated as India, experts have debated whether 
public-health programs and efforts to reduce mor- 
tality do not accentuate economic and social prob- 
lems. However, health programs such as this 
extend the working life of the jDopulation and the 
span of time during which they can serve as effi- 
cient producers. A healthy, productive farmer is 
always better than a sick one, and increased health 
contributed to increased food supply. 

In 1951 the Iranian Ministry of Public Health 
started a campaign against malaria in an infected 
area near the Caspian Sea where 21/2 million peo- 
ple live. Two hundred and twenty-four tons of 
Ddt shipped from the United States as part of our 
Point Four Program reached Iran in time last 
May to spray half a million dwellings. Already 
the incidence of the disease has been cut from 88 
percent to 35 jjercent — and 2 more years of anti- 
malaria warfare will, experts believe, completely 
wipe out malaria and greatly improve general 
health conditions as well as increase productivity. 

Throughout the underdeveloped areas in 
Africa, the Near and Middle East, and South 
Asia, I think it would be fair to say that up to 90 
percent of the rural population is sick much of 
the time or only half well. When limited human 
energies are concentrated on the day-to-day strug- 
gle for survival the possibilities of economic and 
social progress and democratic growth are almost 
nil. 

It is clear that sickness, poverty, and lack of 
education form a vicious circle and the loss in 
economic terms alone i-esulting from these con- 
ditions is incalculable. Up until recent years the 
possibility of breaking this vicious circle seemed 
dim. Remedies for the control of preventable di- 
sease when they were available were beyond the 
financial means of poor countries. The peoples 
in these nations lived in a hopeless state of misery. 

Controlling Debilitating Diseases 

Recent discoveries in preventive medicine such 
as the antibiotics and powerful new insecticides 



April 7, 1952 



541 



have made it possible to control several of the most 
debilitating diseases at very low cost. For ex- 
ample, with the availability of Dot in India the 
cost of malaria control has been reduced to 12 
cents per capita. This miraculous change from 
disease to health costs only the price of one bus 
ride in New York City. 

It is easy enough to talk about the problem of 
health throughout the world, but the important 
question is what is being done and what should 
be done about improving health conditions. 
We do have a tremendous interest and concern 
about these other less fortunate countries. We 
have a humanitarian interest, but we also have a 
social, an economic, and a political interest. In 
much of the world today, economic development 
and political stability are interdependent. And, 
I need not remind you, the world today is 142 
hours around. 

Doing something helpful about health condi- 
tions in other countries is not a new experience 
for us. Up until a decade ago, nearly all of our 
contributions to world health have been made by 
private organizations and institutions, and their 
rich experience has contributed greatly to the de- 
veloping program of international collaboration 
in health. For many years, remarkable work has 
been done under difficult conditions in many of the 
most needy countries by medical missionaries, and 
by missions for relief and reconstruction such as 
those sent by various religious groups. This 
people-to-people form of service has helped not 
alone to improve health conditions but to exem- 
plify the great concept of brotherhood which has 
been the motivating force back of the individuals 
who went abroad, and the widespread support 
given them by millions of Americans. 

As another illustration of private activity, since 
1913 the Rockefeller Foundation has been pioneer- 
ing in an outstanding way in the international 
health field. It has sponsored public-health 
demonstrations throughout the world. It has 
granted fellowships, organized institutes, carried 
on research, provided the knowledge and experi- 
ence wliich has made far more productive the 
woik of governments, including our own, and the 
World Health Organization. Without this pio- 
neering, we would probably be at the experimental 
stage of demonstrations instead of actually im- 
proving the health of millions of people. Other 
organizations such as the Kellogg Foundation 
have followed in this path, notably with fellow- 
ships. 

The work of the private agencies goes back 
many years. Today, our Government is also 
actively participating in the effort to improve 
health conditions in other countries. For over a 
decade the United States has been cooperating 
with the other American Republics through the 
Institute of Inter-American Affairs in a broad 
variety of cooperative health programs. The In- 
stitute is now the operating arm of our Point Four 



Program in Latin America. This hemispheric 
program has had four chief points of emphasis: 
(1) the development of local health services 
through health centers; (2) sanitation of the en- 
vironment with particular emphasis on water sup- 
ply, sewage disposal, and insect control; (3) 
training and full-time employment of professional 
public health workers; and (4) education of the 
IDublic in health matters. It has concentrated on 
complete community-health development with 
full-time trained direction and active community 
participation. Over 1,300 professionals from 
Latin America in the health field have been given 
advanced training in the United States in public 
health. Some 240 local training courses have al- 
ready been given at subprofessional levels. Some 
2,820 distinct projects have been undertaken 
jointly with the health ministries of these coun- 
tries since 1942. They have included the con- 
struction and operation of health centers ; building 
and administration of hospitals; construction of 
water supply systems, sewage systems, and other 
health facilities such as nursing schools, labora- 
tories, markets, and public laundries. Out of this 
program improved public health has achieved the 
status of a national movement in many of the 
Latin American countries. The experience and 
knowledge gained there are of immeasurable value 
in health programs developing elsewhere in the 
world. 



World Health Programs 

Today the United States is carrying on pro- 
grams not only in our own hemisphere, but in 
many other parts of the world — in Near Eastern 
countries and in Pacific islands, in northern 
Africa and in southern Asia. Various phases of 
these programs have had different bases — relief, 
rehabilitation, reconstruction of war-devastated 
areas, development of strategic resources, contain- 
ment of communism, and long-range social and 
economic development. Whatever the initial 
reason for them, all of these programs have been 
designed to build toward a future secured by 
stronger national and local health services in the 
countries concerned. Each has had, or is making, 
a major contribution to building up a permanent 
world-wide health structure. 

Any review of world health problems and prog- 
ress would be incomplete without paying tribute 
to the role of the World Health Organization 
(Who) whose 79 member nations are dedicated to 
the attainment by all peoples of the highest pos- 
sible level of health. Our participation in the 
World Health Organization represents our con- 
viction that health security can effectively be 
achieved through international pooling of knowl- 
edge and skills under international direction. We 
shall all have an opportunity on World Health 
Day. April 7, to honor the Who objective — "the 
attainment by all peoples of the highest possible 
level of health." 



542 



Department of State Bulletin 



The Who during 1951 expended about 10 mil- 
lion dollars on its world-wide program, including 
3.5 million dollars beyond its regular budget sup- 
plied by the Technical Assistance Program of the 
United Nations. 

The sharing of knowledge, the training pro- 
grams and fellowships, and the field operations of 
Who are vital and effective weapons mobilizing a 
broad range of resources for a concerted attack on 
disease. During the past year the World Health 
Assembly adopted the International Sanitary 
Eegulations which establish a single uniform 
health code in the world for all forms of inter- 
national travel and trade. The Who also issued 
the International Pharmacopoeia which sets uni- 
form standards of strength and purity for a large 
number of drugs. Vitally important also is the 
Who's role in the exchange of publications and 
information. Most important of all, of course, 
is its work directly with the many member gov- 
ernments, in aiding and encouraging them to move 
forward with public health and similar progi-ams. 

The various governments and the Who are im- 
portant instruments, but they are only instruments. 
They can be effective only by means of individuals. 
That is where you and the organizations you rep- 
resent come so importantly into the picture. Cer- 
tainly, a role of major importance must be played 
by tiie international professional societies, and 
their national affiliates. Some of these bodies 
as you know cover a whole profession, such as 
the" World Medical Association, the International 
Council of Nurses, and the International Dental 
Association. Others deal with specific diseases — 
such as the International Union Against Cancer, 
the International Leprosy Association, and the 
International Union Against Venereal Diseases. 
Still others deal with problems i"eflected in their 
names — the International Union for Child Wel- 
fare, the World Federation for Mental Health, 
the International Hospital Federation, and the 
International Association for the Prevention of 
Blindness. A special position is held by the 
League of Red Cross Societies which was formed 
right after World War I to mobilize Red Cross 
societies to promote public health education to 
give popular support to public health work. 

All these and a number of other associations 
have been admitted into formal relationsliip with 
the World Health Organization. But interna- 
tional nongovernmental organizations are still 
lacking in important fields such as those of malaria 
and other tropical diseases, environmental health, 
and sanitary engineering. 

Role of Private Organizations 

The private organizations can make significant 
and invaluable contributions to the world health 
program. The basic requirement is that they re- 
duce their sensitivity to geographical boundary 
lines, and think of their i^roblems in international 

April 7, 7952 



terms. Other countries share the same problems, 
often in a much more serious form. Individuals 
in other countries are working as you are to try 
to record progress. There is here a tremendous 
opportunity to give sympathy, encouragement, 
and help. 

There are certain things which organizations as 
organizations can do. They can contribute to the 
planning and operation of the World Health Or- 
ganization through their consultative arrange- 
ments. Furthermore, we are anxious to see co- 
ordinating committees in each country which will 
help to assure that there will be one integrated 
health program and not many local projects in- 
dependently sponsored by various international 
agencies. If outside help is to have its full effect, 
it must not only aim at strengthening the national 
health service of the country but must also receive 
the full support of the medical and allied profes- 
sions. This can only be assured if the professional 
organizations are willing to sit on the coordinating 
committee and share the responsibilities. 

There are three fundamental types of contri- 
bution which organizations can make. First is 
in the field of professional knowledge — to continue 
to seek solutions to the problems not yet solved. 
Second, they can actively help in the transmission 
of our knowledge and experience to the other less 
fortunate countries. Not only is their help tre- 
mendously important in providing training and 
hospitality to the doctors, nurses, and other health 
workers visiting this country, but they and their 
colleagues as they travel abroad for professional 
or personal purposes can share their store of wis- 
dom and experience with their conferees in other 
parts of the world. 

Third, from the ranks of private organizations 
will come many of the skilled people who are 
needed in the world health program. For many 
of them, this may mean a substantial personal 
sacrifice. I hope that ways and means will be 
found to encourage them, particularly to provide 
professional assurances that these men and women 
going abroad will not be handicapped profes- 
sionally because of their contributions to public 
health service. Moreover, they will be going, 
many of them, to face primative conditions where 
hinnan ingenuity must often substitute for modern 
equipment, and where the capacity to adjust to 
different languages, modes of thought, and tradi- 
tions is as important as the technical knowledge 
they bring to their work. Organizations can as- 
sist them by keeping them in touch with profes- 
sional thoughts and ideas as they develop and 
even in appropriate cases by contributions of 
needed equipment and materials. 

Encouraging and Training Personnel 

Looking at the picture in the longer run, we 
must find ways and means to encourage and to 
train personnel who are equipped for and capable 

543 



of undertaking health assignments for brief or 
long duration outside this country. Lack of 
trained personnel is the most serious bottleneck 
slowing up the world health campaign. Even 
here in the United States there is a serious short- 
age of public-health workers. At present 19 per- 
cent of the budgeted positions for physicians in 
state and local health services are vacant for want 
of qualified personnel; for sanitary engineers 
there is a similar 15 percent vacancy rate ; and for 
graduate nurses 8 percent. 

Our needs, serious as they are, look small com- 
pared to those in underdeveloped countries. 
While in the United States we have one physician 
for a little over 700 inhabitants, most Latin 
American countries have from 2,000 to 10,000 in- 
habitants per physician; Indonesia has about 
80,000 inhabitants per physician. In most of 
these countries the shortage of trained nurses is 
even more serious. Iran, for example, has around 
900 trained nurses in a population of 17 million, 
and Brazil has about 1,300 trained nurses in a 
nation of 52 million. 

Despite these grave needs, the job must be and 
is being tackled with vigor and enthusiasm. New 
and more economical forms of treatment, more 
facilities, professional and subprofessional train- 
ing programs, educatioiial efforts — these are all 
helping to liquidate some of the infectious diseases. 
But despite the fantastic miracles in controlling 
and eradicating yaws, malaria, and the other 
plagues, tough and demanding work lies ahead. 
It is much easier to dust with Dot than it is to 
establish sanitary practices, and there are many 
parasites and diseases which still challenge our 
knowledge and our skill. 

It is to be hoped that as the world campaign 
for public health develops, governments and pri- 
vate organizations together will be able to pro- 
duce a real grassroot movement. A repoi't on a 
Near Eastern project read as follows : "Personal 
hygiene was one of the first subjects in the new 
school and after a few days of seeing their boys 
and girls go in for washing their hands, faces and 
hair, the parents also began to adopt this new 
approach to health." The knowledge spread 
through these programs is almost as infectious as 
the diseases they are trying to control. 

The possibility for building real international 
good will depends fundamentally upon what peo- 
ple do. The chance contact with people from 
another country — the comments made, the atti- 
tudes taken, the interest or lack of interest, the 
personal spirit — the establishment of a common 
enterprise — all these are things which count. One 
of the most effective instruments in the process 
of building physical, and mental and spiritual 
health is the sense of sharing, of cooperation, of 
common responsibility which has no geographical 
barriers. 



Export- Import Bank Grants 
Housing Credit to Ecuador 

The Export-Import Bank announced on March 
25 approval of a credit of $800,000 to the Republic 
of Ecuador to assist in housing reconstruction in 
the areas of Ecuador devastated by the earthquake 
of August 5, lOiO. 

The Government of Ecuador, with technical and 
financial assistance provided by the Pan-Amer- 
ican Union, has made geological studies, which 
serve as the basis for the location of the various 
housing projects under which more than 4,500 
single-family houses are to be built. The Gov- 
ernment, with the assistance of U.S. technicians, 
also has adopted a building code providing for 
certain minimum standards of earthquake-resist- 
ant construction. The houses to be financed under 
this credit will comply with these standards. 

The credit will be used to finance the purchase 
and transportation to Ecuador of U.S. equipment, 
materials, and supplies required for Ecuador's 
housing program in the Provinces of Tungurahua, 
Cotopaxi, and Chimborazo. 

The local costs of materials and erection will 
be obtained in part from donations made to Ecua- 
dor by various governments, organizations, and 
individuals shortly after the earthquake and, in 
part, from the yield of special taxes, the revenue 
of which is distributed to the Reconstruction and 
Planning Boards of the three provinces. The 
U.S. Institute of Inter-American Affairs respon- 
sible for Point Four operations in Latin America 
has been requested by the Ecuadoran Government 
to assist in supervising the housing construction 
program. It is planned by the Ecuadoran Govern- 
ment that the completecl houses will be sold to 
victims of the earthquake by the Reconstruction 
and Planning Boards on a 20-year purchase plan 
without down payment. 

The credit will be repayable in quarterly in- 
stallments over a 20-year period. Interest will be 
paid at the rate of 3I/2 percent per annum. 



Filing Date Extended for Claims 
Under U.S., Panama Convention 

[Released to the press March 26] 

Josiah Marvel, Jr., chairman of the Interna- 
tional Claims Commission of the United States, 
announced on March 26 that the Commission has 
extended the deadline date for filing claims under 
the United States-Panama Claims Convention of 
1950, from February 29, 1952, to June 2, 1952. 
The Commission found it necessary to extend this 
deadline date for the reason that only a small 
percentage of persons entitled to share in a $400,- 
000 settlement fund have filed claims. 



544 



Deparlmenf of Sfafe Bulletin 



It appears from the old files of the State De- 
partment turned over to the Commission that there 
are approximately 300 potential claimants against 
the fund, but the Commission has been able to lo- 
cate less than 100 of these. Notices to the others 
have been returned as undeliverable by the Post 
Office Department. 

These claims have been outstanding since 1931 
and arise from a decision of the Supreme Court of 
Justice of Panama on October 20, 1931, whereby 
certain lands called El Encanto, which certain 
U.S. citizens alleged they had acquired in good 
faith, were declared to be the property of Panama. 
These lands were originally purchased by Amer- 
ican citizens during 1913-15 and were resold 
among small purchasers in the United States from 
1915 to 1923. These small purchasers apparently 
were induced to make investments upon the repre- 
sentation by the land promoters that the lands 
were valuable for agricultural, timber, and cattle- 
raising purposes. However, no development ever 
followed. Most of the original purchasers resided 
in northern California, with some in Utah, Ari- 
zona, and surrounding States. 

Many of the original purchasers of the lands 
have since died but their legal representatives are 
entitled to file claims against the $400,000 fund. 
In many cases the only addresses on file with the 
Commission are those given by the original own- 
ers of the land to the State Department over 20 
years ago. 

Under the terms of the Claims Convention with 
Panama, any amount which remains undistributed 
from the $400,000 fund, less expenses of adjudica- 
tion, will be returned to the Government of the 
Republic of Panama. 

Persons who feel that they may qualify for an 
award under the Panama Claims Agreement 
should communicate with the International Claims 
Commission, U.S. Department of State, Washing- 
ton 25, D. C. 



Facilities for International 
Motor Touring 

[Released to the press March 25] 

The Road Traffic Convention of 1949, a world 
treaty designed to facilitate and encourage inter- 
national motor touring, came into force on March 
25 in the United States and several other countries. 
United States motorists taking their cars abroad 
for travel jDurposes will benefit by liberal provi- 
sions on recognition of their home driving licenses 
and automobile registration. Similar facilities 
will be extended to foreign motorists traveling in 
the United States. 
i The Convention was declared in force by the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, follow- 



ing ratification by the requisite number of nations. 
The United States, France, Czechoslovakia, Mon- 
aco, and Sweden have ratified to date. The pro- 
visions of the treaty will automatically become 
effective in additional countries as they submit 
instruments of ratification. 

The Convention, which was drawn up and 
signed by 21 countries at a U.N. conference held 
at Geneva in 1949, will simplify formalities and 
promote international motoring into and through 
all nations which become party thereto. 

Motorists in participating countries will enjoy 
the convenience and safety of uniform privileges 
on such matters as motor vehicle registration cer- 
tificates, drivers' licenses, and customs bonds ; the 
identification of vehicles in international traffic; 
rules for safe driving; equipment requirements, 
including brakes, lights, and other technical char- 
acteristics; permissible maximum dimensions and 
weights of motor vehicles; and definitions. In 
brief, the Convention establishes the principle of 
international reciprocity for passenger automo- 
biles and for their drivers to the same general end 
as the reciprocal privileges now existing among 
the several states of the United States. It is not 
applicable to commercial trucks and busses. The 
Convention will not require any changes in motor 
vehicle laws in this country. 

Tlie governors of all the States are being noti- 
fied that the Convention is now in force in order 
that proper State agencies may be prepared to 
assist in the eifective operation of its provisions. 
The American Automobile Association and the 
American Automobile Touring Alliance are being 
authorized to issue identification documents pro- 
vided for in the Convention. 

The new Convention is a combination and re- 
vision of two previous and obsolete agreements 
which were concluded at Paris in 1926 — the Con- 
vention Relative to Motor Traffic and the Conven- 
tion Relative to Road Traffic. The United States 
was not a party to either of these Conventions 
because of nonrecognition therein of the Federal- 
State relationship. The United States took an 
active part in the formulation of the 1949 Con- 
vention and in many respects it reflects United 
States practices and recommendations. The new 
Convention was ratified by the President of the 
United States on October 17, 1950, with the advice 
and consent of the Senate. 

Czechoslovakia was one of the nations which 
participated in the U. N. conference in 1949, and 
its ratification was deposited with the United 
Nations on November 3, 1950. Under existing 
conditions, however, it is not expected any Czecho- 
slovakian tourists will travel in the United States, 
nor any private U. S. citizens in Czechoslovakia. 
Passport and visa controls, which are not affected 
by the Convention on Road Traffic, will continue 
to govern the movement of individuals between 
the United States and all other countries. 



April 7, J 952 



545 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



Calendar of Meetings^ 



Adjourned During March 1952 

"Colombo Plan" Exhibition Colombo Feb. 15-Mar. 31 

British Commonwealth Scientific Official Conference Canberra and Melbourne . Feb. 18-Mar. 7 

Ilo (International Labor Organization): 

Advisory Committee on Salaried Employees and Professional Geneva Feb. 18-Mar. 1 

Workers: 2d Session. 

Governing Body: 118th Session Geneva Mar. 3-15 

Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Committee of Geneva •. Mar. 17-29 

Experts on the. 
IcAO (International Civil Aviation Organization): 

3d European-Mediterranean Regional Air Navigation Meeting . . Paris Feb. 26-Mar. 25* 

UN (United Nations): 

Trusteeship Council: 10th Session New York Feb. 27-Mar. 29* 

Economic and Social Council: 

Economic Commission for Europe: 7th Session Geneva Mar. 3-15 

Subcommission on Freedom of Information and of the Press: New York Mar. 3-21 

5th Session. 

Special Session of the Council New York Mar. 24 (1 day) 

Committee on Nongovernmental Organizations New York Mar. 18-21 

Technical Assistance Committee, Working Party New York Mar. 24^28 

UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organi- 
zation) : 

Executive Board: 28th Session Paris Mar. 3-22 

Inter-Amencan Seminar on Human Rights Habana Mar. 11-31 

Special Committee Meeting of the International Sugar Council . . . London Mar. 3-11 

First General Assembly of the International Mathematical Union . . Rome Mar. 6-8 

Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia, Consultative 
Committee on (Colombo Plan; : 

Officials Meeting Karachi Mar. 10-23 

Ministerial Meeting Karachi Mar. 24-28 

Caribbean Fisheries Conference Trinidad Mar. 24-28 

In Session as of March 31, 1952 

International IMaterials Conference Washington Feb. 26, 1951- 

Four Power Conference on Swiss-Allied Accord Bern Mar. 5, 1951- 

West Point Sesquicentennial West Point Jan.- 

IcAO (International Civil Aviation Organization): 

Air Navigation Commission: 9th Session Montreal Jan. 29- 

Council: 15th Session Montreal Jan. 29- 

Tripartite Conference on Aid to Yugoslavia: 2d Conference .... Washington Feb. 19- 

International Conference on German Debts London Feb. 28- 

2d Pakistan International Industries Fair Karachi Mar. 1- 

Van Reibeeck Festival Fair Capetown Mar. 14^ 

UN (United Nations): 

General Assembly Interim Committee New York Mar. 17- 

Economic and Social Council: 

Commission on the Status of Women: 6th Session Geneva Mar. 24- 

Inter-American Conference on Social Security: 4th Session .... Mexico, D.F Mar. 24- 

International Cattle Exposition Habana Mar.- 

Scheduled April 1-June 30, 1952 

Itu (International Telecommunication Union): 

CciR International Radio Consultative Committee: 

Study Group 1 The Hague Apr. 1-* 

Study Group III The Hague Apr. 1-* 

' Prepared in the Division of International Conferences, Department of State, Mar. 25, 1952. 
*Tentative. 
546 Deparfment of State Bulletin 



Calendar oj Meetings — Continued 
Scheduled April 1-June 30, 1952 — Continued 

Itu' (International Telecomnuinication Union) — Continued 

CciB International Radio Consultative Committee — Continued 

Study Group V Stockholm May 15- 

Study Group VI Stockholm May 15- 

Study Group XI Stockholm May 19- 

Administrative Council: 7th Session Geneva Apr. 21- 

Fag (Food and Agriculture Organization): 

Agriculture Extension Workers, 2d Training Course San Jos6 Apr. 6- 

Working Party on Rice Breeding: 3d Meeting Bandung, Indonesia . . . May 5- 

Working Party on Fertilizers: 2d Meeting Bandung, Indonesia . . . May 5- 

International Rice Commis.sion: 3d Meeting Bandung, Indonesia . . . May 12- 

Meeting on Fisheries Statistics Copenhagen May 26- 

Committee on Commodity Problems Rome June 3- 

European Forestry and Forest Products Commission: Meeting Rome June 28- 

of Experts on Torrent Control. 

Council: 15th Session Rome June 9- 

FAO-Caribbean Commission, Meeting on Home Economics and Port-of-Spain June 30- 

Education in Nutrition. 
UN (United Nations): 

International Children's Emergency Fund (Icep): 

Committee on Consultative Status for Unicep Advisory Co- New York Apr. 8- 

mittee of Nongovernmental Organizations. 

Icep-Who Joint Committee on Health Policy New York Apr. 9- 

Working Part.v on the Creation of a General Fund Raising Com- New York Apr. 11- 

mittee. 

Program Committee New York Apr. 14- 

Committee on Administrative Budget New York Apr. 18- 

Executive Board New York Apr. 22- 

Economic and Social Council: 

Committee on Nongovernmental Organizations New York Apr. 8- 

Human Rights Commission: 8th Session New York Apr. 14- 

Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 7th Session New York Apr. 15- 

Social Commission: 8th Session New York May 12- 

14th Session of the Council New York May 13- 

Technica! Assistance Committee New York June - 

International Exhibition of Drawings and Engravings Lugano, Switzerland . . . Apr. 10- 

Inter-American Indian Institute: Meeting of Governing Board . . . Mexico, D.F Apr. 10- 

Milan International Trade Fair Milan Apr. 12- 

4th Inter-American Travel Congress Lima Apr. 12- 

Ilo (International Labor Organization): 

5th Regional Conference of American States Members of the Ilo . Rio de Janeiro Apr. 17- 

Metal Trades Committee: 4th Session Geneva Apr. 21- 

Iron and Steel Committee: 4th Session Geneva May 5- 

Governing Body: 119th Session Geneva May 26- 

35th International Labor Conference Geneva June 4- 

Governing Body: 120th Session Geneva June 30- 

South Pacific Commission: 9th Session Noumea Apr. 18- 

Lyon International Trade Fair, 34th Lyon Apr. 19- 

Pan American Sanitary Organization Executive Committee: 16th Washington Apr. 21- 

Meeting. 

Cannes International Film Festival Cannes Apr. 23- 

6th International Hydrographic Conference Monaco Apr. 29- 

Caribbean Commission: 14th Meeting Guadeloupe May 5- 

Who (World Health Organization) : 

5th Assembly Geneva May 5- 

Executive Board: 10th Session Geneva May 28- 

Rubber Study Group: 9th Meeting Ottawa May 5- 

Sample Fairs Valencia May 10- 

Barcelona June 10- 

Unesco (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Or- 
ganization) : 

Executive Board: 29th Session Paris May 10- 

Nato (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) : 

Planning Board for Ocean Shipping: 4th Meeting Washington May 12- 

South Pacific Commission Fisheries Conference Noumea May 14- 

Upu (Universal Postal Union) : 

13th Congress Brussels May 14- 

International Cotton Advisory Committee: 11th Plenary Meeting . Rome May 17- 

IcAo (International Civil Aviation Organization) : 

Standing Committee on Aircraft Performance: 2d Meeting . . . . Copenhagen May 19- 

6th Session of the Assembly Montreal May 27- 

9th International Congress of Agricultural Industries Rome May 23- 

International Conference on Large Electric High-Tension Systems: Paris May 2S- 

14th Session. 

International Symposium on Problems of Desert Research Jerusalem May - 

♦Tentative. 
April 7, 1952 547 



Calendar of Meetings — Continued 
Scheduled for April 1-June 30, 1952 — Continued 

Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Geneva May - 

Migrants from Europe: 3d Session. 

Canadian International Trade Fair Toronto June 2- 

International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property . Vienna June 2- 

International Commission for the Regulation of Whaling: 4th Meeting London June 3- 

International Meeting of Tonnage Measurement Experts The Hague June 4- 

Inter- American Commission of Women: 8th General Assembly . . , Rio de Janeiro June 8- 

21st Session of the International Criminal Police Commission . . . Stockholm June 9- 

26th Biennial International Exhibition of Art Venice June 14- 

International Philatelic Exhibition Utrecht June 28- 

International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: 2d St. Andrews June 30-* 

Annual Meeting. (New Brunswick) 

♦Tentative. 



NATO Observes Third Anniversary 

[Released to the press March 26] 

Plans for a ceremony in observance of the third 
anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic 
Treaty were announced on March 26 by the De- 
partment of State. The ceremony will take place 
on April 4, as the defensive alliance enters its 
fourth year, from 10 : 30 a.m. to 12 m. in Con- 
stitution Hall at Washington, D.C. 

Among the participants will be the President of 
the United States, Her Majesty the Queen of the 
Netherlands, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, 
Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snyder, Secre- 
tary of Defense Robert A. Lovett, and Director 
for Mutual Security W. Averell Harriman. 

Present at the ceremony will be His Royal High- 
ness the Prince of the Netherlands, members of the 
diplomatic corps from nations of the North At- 
lantic Treaty Organization, the Nato military 
standing group, the Nato military representatives, 
and Members of Congress. Other leaders in pub- 
lic and private life will also be present. 



Committee on Economic Development 
In South and Southeast Asia 

[Released to the press March 2^] 

A ministerial level meeting of the Consultative 
Committee on Economic Development in South 
and Southeast Asia — the body which periodically 
examines the progress of the Colombo Plan — 
opened on March 24. At the invitation of the 
Government of Pakistan the meeting is being held 
at Karachi and is expected to last one week. The 
following countries are expected to attend the 
meeting: Australia, Burma, Cambodia, Canada. 
Ceylon, India, New Zealand, Pakistan, Uniteil 
Kingdom, United States, and Vietnam. 

Tlie U.S. representative to the meeting is Avra 
M. Warren, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan. Am- 
bassador Warren's alternate, and U.S. representa- 



tive at the preparatory meeting of officials which 
began on March 10, is Wilfred Malenbaum, Chief 
of the Investment and Economic Development 
Staff of the Department of State. Advisers to 
the U.S. representatives at both meetings are 
Myron L. Black of the American Embassy at 
Colombo, John A. Loftus of the Embassy at New 
Delhi, Henry W. Spielman of the Embassy at 
Karachi, and Alfred W. AVells of the Embassy at 
Rangoon. The United States participated as a 
member of the Committee in its meeting at Co- 
lombo in January 1951. 

The Consultative Committee is to consider the 
progress of the Colombo Plan in the period since 
its formal inauguration in July 1951, any altera- 
tions in the C-year i^rograms in the light of 
changed circumstances, and detailed programs for 
the first 2 years. 

The Consultative Committee functions in an ad- 
visory and consultative capacity. The 6-year eco- 
nomic development programs submitted by mem- 
ber countries in South and Southeast Asia and 
subsequent modifications of those plans are pre- 
sented to the Committee for discussion. No 
international control is exercised upon the in- 
dividual plans by the Committee. Among the 
advantages arising from the Committee discussion 
are the opportunities for each country to compare 
its development program with others and to ex- 
change information on common problems. No 
funds are channeled through the Committee, all 
foreign assistance programs being arranged bi- 
laterally between donor and recipient governments 
through normal diplomatic channels. 

The United States welcomes these efforts to 
promote cooperative measures for economic de- 
velopment in the area. 



The U.S. in the U.N. 

will not appear in this issue 



548 



Department of State Bulletin 



The U.S. Foreign Service — A Career for Young Americans 



A number of Department and Foreign Service 
officers, in carrying out an intensive recruitment 
campaign, are addressing scores of college grad- 
uating classes on the subject of Foreign Service 
caieers. At the same time, these officers are leav- 
ing with the students copies of a new booklet just 
issued by the Department of State called The U.S. 
Foreign Service — A Career for Young Anien- 
cans.^ The primary purpose of the booklet is to 
draw the interest of i^olitical candidates toward 
the Foreign Service. It tells them, for example, 
what the Foreign Service is all about, why it is as 
satisfying a career as any person can choose, what 
the Foreign Service expects of them, and what they 
can expect of the Foreign Service. 

The following article is based on excerpts from 
the booklet. 



A great deal has been written about the Foreign 
Service in the popular literature of today. At 
times, of course, working abroad has its difficulties 
and monotonies; at other times, there is sparkle 
and adventure. But at all times the Foreign Serv- 
ice provides a resi^onsible job — with opportunities 
limited only by your own ability, ambition, and 
imagination. 

You'll travel a lot in the Foreign Service. 
You'll see places and people you hardly knew ex- 
isted. You'll learn much in the Foreign Service — 
not only about places and people but also about 
the great issues and world realities which we face 
in this latter half of the twentieth century. 

You'll be paid well in the Foreign Service, but 
you won't get rich — not in money. You'll have 
stimulating work, a variety of interesting environ- 
ments, and opportunities to move ahead, as you 
show ability to take on more responsible assign- 
ments, throughout your career. You will also 
have security, ample leave time, extra allowances 
when necessary, and a liberal retirement ])lan. 
You'll make good and lasting friendships and 
you'll collect an inestimable fund of general 
knowledge about the world. 

Above all, you, as a Foreign Service officer, a 
representative of all the American people, will be 
serving your country in a position of trust, thus 
bringing a direction and a meaning into your life 
which cannot fail to be a source of deep personal 
satisfaction. 



' Department of State publk'atiou -1559. 
April 7, 1952 



A Challenge 

The typical Foreign Service officer today usually 
enters the Service soon after he finishes college. 
He and all his colleagues start in class 6, the bot- 
tom of the ladder — at about $350 a month — and 
progress through the classes. He is the career 
man, the all-around Foreign Service man. He 
may — and probably will in the course of his 
career — be called upon to perform a variety of 
duties, from getting a fellow citizen out of jail to 
conducting highly important negotiations con- 
cerning top foreign-policy matters. 

To become this person, j'ou must be, as of 
July 1— 

... At least 20 and under 31 years of age 

. . . An American citizen (and have been one for 

at least 10 years) 
... If married, married to an American citizen 

In addition, you will have to pass a written, an 
oral, and a physical examination. But if you are 
in good health, have the equivalent of a sound 
college education and a reasonable measure of gen- 
eral knowledge, and are not afraid of competition, 
then the tests are a challenge, not a trial. 

Your Job as a Foreign Service Officer 

The professional activities of a Foreign Service 
officer are varied. For example, he keeps his Gov- 
ernment informed of the multitudinous develop- 
ments abroad. He protects American citizens and 
American interests in foreign countries. He culti- 
vates and maintains friendly relations with peo- 
ples of other nations. He negotiates treaties, con- 
ventions, and protocols regarding international 
trade, tariffs, shipping, commerce, and the preser- 
vation of peace according to the instructions of his 
Government. 

Specifically, your assignments as a Foreign 
Service officer will include any or all of the 
following: 

. . . Negotiations with foreign officials 

. . . Political reporting 

. . . Economic reporting in the fields of labor, 
finance, transportation, communications, avi- 
ation, petroleum, etc. 

. . . Commercial reporting and trade promotion 

. . . Agricultural reporting 

. . . Issuance of visas and passports 

. . . Assistance to American shipping 

549 



. . . Protection of American citizens and property 

. . . Dissemination of informational materials via 
press, radio, motion pictures, and publica- 
tions 

. . . Assistance in undertaking exchange-of-per- 
sons programs 
. . Distribution of educational, scientific, and 
cidtural information and material via libra- 
ries and cultural centers 

. . . Participation in technical-assistance pro- 
grams 

In addition, you will have numerous executive 
and administrative duties in connection with the 
maintenance and operation of offices abroad and 
may engage in specialized area and language 
activities. 

To help you prepare for these duties, to develop 
your capacities to the maximum extent, and to 
broaden your professional knowledge ancl experi- 
ence, you will find many opportunities afforded, 
including carefully designed programs of orien- 
tation and training prior to first assignment 
abroad; both "refresher" and advanced foreign- 
affairs instruction at intermediate levels in your 
career; a variety of functional and geographic 
assignments; and special career-development ac- 
tivities such as advanced training in economics, 
language and area specialization, or even assign- 
ments to the National War College. 

The Examinations 

You will find the Foreign Service examina- 
tions challenging. While you are taking them, 
somewhere along the line you will wish you had 
consulted your dictionary more often, that you 
had read just a little more on this or that subject, 
that you had paid somewhat more attention to 
Professor Doe. 

But one thing we might say here : A painstaking 
accumulation of knowledge of foreign affairs and 
foreign languages will be of no avail to you if you 
do not impress the examiners as a man who can 
think and express himself clearly and logically, 
who has imagination and perceptive insights into 
human behavior, and who has the kind of intellec- 
tual balance and sound judgment which will carry 
him successfully through difficult situations. 

Such a man, with a good genei-al education, need 
have no fears concerning the Foreign Service 
examinations. 

Wliere and Wiien 

The first step toward becoming a Foreign 
Service officer is to submit an application. You 
can do this any time after March 1 of the year in 
which the examination is held. To obtain the 



application form, write to: Board of Examiners 
for the Foreign Service, Department of State, 
Washington 25, D.C. 

The deadline for receipt of applications is July 
1 of the year in which the examination is to be 
taken. This means that your application must 
actually be received by the Board of Examiners 
by July 1. It is not enough merely to mail the 
application by that date. It is up to you to get 
your application into the mail early enough to 
arrive in the Department of State by July 1 ; 
otherwise it cannot be considered. 

The written examination will be held in Septem- 
ber at Civil Service examination centers in about 
15 cities in the continental United States. 
Ordinarily these include Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, 
Cincinnati, Dallas, Denver, Los Angeles, New 
Orleans, New York, Philadelphia, St. Louis, St. 
Paul, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington, 
D.C. You can also take the examination in Hono- 
lulu, in San Juan, Puerto Rico, and at any Amer- 
ican diplomatic post or consulate. 

The oral examination is held in Washington in 
the spring of each year. 

The physical examination is taken after a candi- 
date has passed both the written and oral 
examinations. 



A Closing Note 

In a recent interview with a number of young 
Foreign Service officers — class 6 — who had just 
returned to Washington after completing their 
first 2-year assignment abroad, one question put to 
each was, "Well, what do you think of the Foreign 
Service now?" Every one of these yomig Foreign 
Service officers agreed that, long before the first 
tour of duty was over, he was positive he had em- 
barked on a unique and exciting career. As one 
of them summed it up : 

"Thei-e are a number of reasons that draw us 
to the Foreign Service — the travel, visiting foreign 
lands and talking with different peoples, the ad- 
venture, the interest in international affairs and 
in America's role in them, and the desire to serve 
the Nation in a responsible and often quite difficult 
job. 

"All these things are there. But once you're in 
the Foreign Service, there is something else you 
become aware of after a short time. It's more 
than esprit de corps. It's more like an awareness 
of the greatness of your country and its responsi- 
bilities to the world. You feel that even the rou- 
tine things yon do have great significance. 

"This makes your job more than a job. It makes 
it a career in the full sense of the word. That's 
why, long before your leave is up, you are anxious 
to be on the way to your next post." 



550 



Department of State Bulletin 



Legislation Requested To Handle Overpopulation 
Problem in Western Europe 



Message of the President, to the Congress'^ 
To the Congress of the United States: 

One of the gravest problems arising from the 
present world crisis is created by the overpopula- 
tion in parts of Western Europe, aggi'avated by 
the flight and expulsion of people from the op- 
pressetl countries of Eastern Europe. 

This problem is of great practical importance 
to us because it affects the peace and security of 
the free world. It is also of great concern to us, 
because of our long-established humanitarian 
traditions. The Congress has recognized the im- 
portance of this problem and has already enacted 
some legislation to help meet it. I ask the Con- 
gress to give early and favorable consideration to 
additional legislation to make more adequate pro- 
vision for meeting this situation. 

Specifically, I ask the Congress to authorize a 
program that will : 

(1) Provide aid for the unfortunate victims of 
oppression who are escaping from communist 
tyranny behind the Iron Curtain, 

(2) Continue our participation in the interna- 
tional effort now being made to assist in the migra- 
tion and resettlement throughout the world of a 
substantial number of persons from the over- 
populated areas of Western Europe, and 

(3) Authorize additional immigration into this 
country, on a limited basis, to aid in alleviating 
the problems created by communist tyranny and 
overpopulation in Western Europe. 

The solution to these problems cannot, and 
should not, be the responsibility of any one nation. 
It is an international responsibility — an integral 
part of the world crisis which the free nations 
must meet together. It demands the cooperative 
efforts of all interested countries. But a real solu- 
tion can be found only if the United States does 
its part. We have done our part in the past — we 
must not falter now. 

World War II left in its wake a tremendous up- 
heaval of populations in the countries of Europe. 
To meet the situation, this country took the lead 
in establishing the International Refugee Organ- 
ization, which provided care and protection for 
displaced persons and made possible the migration 

' H. doc. 400 ; transmitted Mar. 24. 



of more than one million of them to 48 countries 
thi'oughout the free world. 

As our own contribution to the common effort, 
the Congress in 1948 enacted the Displaced Per- 
sons Act and subsequently amended and extended 
it. Both the Congress and the American people 
have every right to be proud of the achievements 
made under this f arsighted humanitarian legisla- 
tion. 

The Displaced Persons Act is now approaching 
the termination date fixed by the Congress. AVlren 
operations under this law have been finished, al- 
most 400,000 victims of tyranny will have been 
resettled in the United States. The first major 
phase of the program was completed with the issu- 
ance of practically all of the 341,000 visas author- 
ized to be issued by midnight, December 31, 1951. 
In addition, the Congress authorized the admis- 
sion of 54,744 Germans who had fled or been driven 
from areas east of the Iron Curtain. There is 
every likelihood that the remaining visas for these 
German expellees will be issued ahead of the June 
30, 1952, deadline set by the Congress. 

The job has been well done by the Displaced Per- 
sons Commission and other cooperating agencies 
of the Government. ISIuch of the success of the 
program is due to the vital work accomplished by 
private voluntary agencies, representing our ma- 
jor religious faiths and nationality groups, and 
by the State Commissions appointed by the Gov- 
ernors of 34 States. These organizations of citi- 
zens have contributed their efforts and resources 
to resettling the greater part of the displaced per- 
sons admitted to this country. Without them, 
and without the goodwill and cooperative response 
of thousands of American families and church 
groups, this great program could never have been 
carried out. 

Thus, by doing our own share and by acting 
together with the other countries of the free world, 
we have been dealing successfully with the major 
dislocations caused by Hitler's policies of brutality 
and aggression. 

But the movement of large masses of distressed 
people across international boundaries is by no 
means over. Communist tyranny has taken up 
where Hitler's brutality left off. We are, there- 
fore, now turning our attention to the innocent 
and unhappy victims of communist oppression. 



April 7, 1952 



551 



The Victims of Communist Tyranny 

Tliroughout the Soviet, dominated area of cen- 
tral and eastern Europe, the communist regimes 
are increasing their repressive measures. Some 
of the enslaved people are managing to escape to 
the West. Some fifteen to twenty thousand Ger- 
mans are slipping over the border from the Soviet 
Zone of Germany and crossing into Western Ger- 
many every month. From the communist coun- 
tries to the south and east the movement to free 
Europe is much smaller, but still they come, at the 
risk of their lives, past border guards and through 
mine fields. There are about 18,000 of these people 
already West of the Iron Curtain, and they are 
coming in at the rate of about 1,000 a month. 

The people in all these groups come into areas 
where, for the most part, the local economy is 
unable to support the population ali-eady there. 
Western Germany, for example, is overcrowded 
with almost nine million people of German ethnic 
origin wlio were driven there from Eastern 
Europe after the war. Trieste, which is receiving 
many of those escaping from the satellites, is badly 
overcrowded. Italy is struggling with very se- 
rious problems of overpopulation and is urgently 
trying to resettle large numbers of its people over- 
seas. Greece faces great difficulty in absorbing the 
refugees of Greek origin who are being driven out 
of the Balkan satellites by the communists. Thus, 
the brutal policies of Soviet tyranny are aggravat- 
ing overcrowded conditions which are already a 
danger to the stability of these free nations. 

This in general terms, is the nature of the prob- 
lem that now confronts free Europe. 

The Congress is aware of the importance of this 
problem for the free world and the security of the 
United States. Congressional enactments and ap- 
propriations recently enabled the United States to 
take the lead in establishing the Provisional Inter- 
Governmental Committee for the Movement of 
Migrants from Europe, which 17 governments 
have already joined. This organization is already 
at work providing overseas transportation for mi- 
grants from areas of overpopulation to lands 
where more jieople are needed. 

We are taking part in the work of this organi- 
zation and have contributed ten million dollars lo 
its operation. The organization has taken over 
the fleet of ships formerly operated by the Inter- 
national Refugee Organization. 

The legal authority to participate in this organi- 
zation is contained in the Mutual Security Act of 
1951. This authority should be extended, i'ud 
the Congress should make provision for continu- 
ing our financial contribution to this work for the 
next flscal year. 

This is of great importance, but much move 
needs to be done. 

In the first place, specific aid and assistance 
should be provided for the people who are fleeing 
at the risk of their lives from Southern and East- 
ern Europe. These people are Baits, Poles, 



Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Bulgarians, Ru- 
manians, Albanians, Ukrainians, and Russians. 

These people face a desperate situation. Not 
only do they arrive destitute, with only what they 
can carry on their backs, but they find themselves 
in totally strange lands among strange peoples 
speaking strange languages. The local authori- 
ties do not have adequate resources to care for them 
properly. These people need better care when 
they first arrive and they need assistance if they 
are to move on and resettle elsewhere. 

The miserable conditions in which these fugi- 
tives from communism find themselves, and their 
present inability to emigrate to new homes and 
start new lives, lead inevitably to despair. Their 
disillusionment is being effectively exploited by 
communist propaganda. These men and women 
are friends of freedom. They include able and 
courageous fighters against communism. They 
ask only for an opportunity to play a useful role 
in the fight for freedom. It is the responsibility 
of the free world to afford them this opportunity. 

The need is well recognized, both in Eui'ope and 
in this country. Private welfare organizations of 
American citizens, Protestant, Catholic and Jew- 
ish, have been working hard to help these people. 
Last year, these organizations spent substantial 
amounts for their care and resettlement. These 
organizations will continue their efforts this year. 
But the need is greater than they can handle. 

First of all, these fugitives from communism 
need supplemental care and maintenance after 
they arrive in Western Europe. Local govern- 
ments and private relief organizations give a 
minimum amount of this type of aid, but their re- 
sources are inadequate. Additional food, better 
shelter, clothing, medical care, legal advice and 
other kinds of material assistance are needed. 

These people also need assistance in financing 
overseas transportation. The new international 
migration organization and the American private 
relief agencies can and do help with this, but a 
concerted effort is needed to give these people an 
equal opportunity to share in the migration pro- 
gram. At present, because of inadequate re- 
sources, it is these fugitives from communism who 
have the greatest difficulty in arranging for over- 
seas migration. If funds were provided, and an 
adequate administrative organization set up, these 
people would have a better chance to migrate. 

Allocation of MSP Funds 

I am convinced that we must help these people. 
Therefore, acting under the authority of the 
Mutual Security Act of 1951, I am authorizing 
the Director for. Mutual Security to go forward 
with a limited program of assistance in this fiscal 
year. Four million three hundred thousand dol- 
lars will be allocated for this purpose. This pro- 
gram will help alleviate the condition of these 
people in the countries to which they escape and 
will enable many of them to move out of Europe. 



552 



Deparfment of State Bulletin 



The funds that are being made available will sup- 
plement — but not in any sense supersede — the ef- 
forts now being made both by the governments of 
the countries where these people have sought 
i«fuge and by private American organizations. 

Supplemental care and overseas migration do 
not, however, constitute all that should be done 
for those who escape from Eastern Europe. A 
substantial number of them want to stay in Europe 
and should have the chance to do so. They should 
be welcomed in Western Europe and given the 
opportunity to make their individual contribu- 
tions to the free world. Many of them will need 
further education or training so they can prepare 
themselves for useful and productive work in the 
North Atlantic community. 

I urge the Congress, therefore, to provide clear 
and adequate authority for the coming fiscal 
year — together with the necessary funds — so that 
the program of assistance we are now starting for 
the refugees from communism can be carried for- 
ward and strengthened along the lines that I have 
mentioned here. 

In addition to these types of aid, the oppor- 
tunity for military service may provide an answer 
to the problems of a small number of these refu- 
gees. Some of these people will be able to enlist 
in the United States armed forces overseas, under 
Public Law 597, the so-called Lodge Act of 1950. 
So far, however, only a handful have been allowed 
to do this. Security screening requirements have 
necessarily been high, since each person under the 
provisions of the Lodge Act is a potential United 
States citizen. Another type of military service 
for these people is authorized under section 101 
(A) (1) of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, 
which provides that they can be formed into ele- 
ments of the military forces supporting the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization. The question of 
forming such units presents great administrative 
and political difficulties, but it has been receiving 
careful study. Even if it proves possible, how- 
ever, to create such units, military service could 
utilize only a relatively small number of these peo- 
jjle, and would not eliminate the need for addi- 
tional measures to use their skills and energies in 
civilian life. 

Such, in brief, are the measures that can help to 
alleviate the problems of these fugitives from 
Soviet terror. But these problems, important as 
they are, are overshadowed by the need for increas- 
ing migration from the overcrowded areas of 
Europe. 

Overpopulation and NATO Nations 

Overpopulation is one of the major factors pre- 
venting the fullest recovery of those countries 
where it exists. It is a serious drag on the econ- 
omies of nations belonging to the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization. A solution to this problem, 
therefore, becomes vitally necessary to strengthen 
the defense of the North Atlantic Community. 



Our common defense requires that we make the 
best possible use not only of the material resources 
of the free world but of our human resources as 
well. Men and women who cannot be produc- 
tively employed in the free countries of Europe 
because of conditions there are a net loss to the 
strength of the free world. In other countries, 
where they are needed, these same people could add 
to the output and growing power of the free na- 
tions. But left in idleness as they now are, wasted 
and hopeless, they become an easy prey to the 
demagogues of totalitarianism, both right and left. 

The bulk of the emigration needed will have to 
be taken care of by countries other than the United 
States. Some of the free nations, particularly 
those with large unsettled areas or undeveloped 
resources, have a pressing need for large numbers 
of immigrants to build up their countries and 
increase their production. Canada and Australia, 
for example, have already initiated substantial 
programs of immigration. The Australian immi- 
gration progi-am calls for an annual immigration 
of at least 150,000 persons per year. Canadian 
absorption in the last year was at the rate of 
180,000. Additional opportunities for migrants 
are opening up, although moi-e slowly, in the Re- 
publics of Central and South America. 

But the United States can and should take some 
of the migrants now available in Europe. One of 
the reasons we lead the free world today is that 
we are a nation of immigrants. We have been 
made strong and vigorous by the divei'se skills and 
abilities of the different peoples who have mi- 
grated to this country and become American citi- 
zens. Past immigi-ation has helped to build our 
tremendous industrial power. Today, our grow- 
ing economy can make effective use of additional 
manpower in various areas and lines of woi'k. 

The rapid expansion of our industry and the 
enlargement of our defense forces have increased 
the demands on our available manpower reserves. 
Our industry can readily absorb a limited number 
of skilled and trained personnel in the years imme- 
diately ahead. 

In our agriculture particularly, we have a need 
for additional people. Farm operators and farm 
workers are essential in our defense effort. Since 
1949, there has again been a downward trend in 
the farm population of the United States. With 
the resumption of the movement from the farms 
to the cities, there is a real danger that in the years 
just ahead our agricultural production may be 
seriously hampered. 

A rich pool of surplus farmers and farm work- 
ers exists in the overpopulated areas of Western 
Europe. Among the expellees in Western Ger- 
many there are many agricultural families with 
no opportunity for employment on the land. In 
Italy and the Netherlands, too, there are large 
groups of agricultural workers who cannot find 
productive employment on the limited arable land 
available. 



April 7, 7 952 



553 



Besides farm workers, our experience under the 
Displaced Persons Act has demonstrated that we 
can obtain from Europe some ti-ained factory 
workers, engineers, scientific technicians, and 
other kinds of specially qualified people whose 
skills can be put to good use in our economy. 

I am convinced that we should welcome to this 
country a number of those who now must emigrate 
from Europe. We should do this, not only in onr 
own self-interest but also as a way to reaffirm the 
gi-eat tradition of freedom and opportunity which 
we have jiroved in our own experience to be the 
surest path of progress and prosperity. 

In considering the steps to be taken, we should 
measure the needs of the distressed people in 
Europe against our own capacity to make good use 
of additional manpower, and the extent of our 
international responsibilities. The problem we 
face is in the nature of an emergency. This emer- 
gency can be of limited duration, if we of the free 
world act wisely and resolutely. The plight of 
the refugees in Europe and the demands of our 
national defense are both related to the threat of 
communist aggression. When that threat wanes, 
there will be less need for extraordinary measures. 
But while it persists, we should move promptly 
and eifectively to meet it. 

Inadequacy of Existing Immigration Laws 

The existing immigration laws are inadequate — 
both in general and as regards this special problem. 
The Displaced Persons Act will end this year, and 
we will be thrown back on the quota system of im- 
migration. So far as the people escaping from 
communism are concerned, many of them will be 
completely blocked from coming to this country 
because their quotas have been "mortgaged" under 
the Displaced Persons Act, for many years in 
the future. For example, half of the Latvian 
quota has been mortgaged ahead three centuries 
to the year 2274, the Esthonian quota through the 
year 2146, the Lithuanian quota through the year 
2087, and the Polish quota through the year 2000. 

Furthermore, under present law we will be un- 
able to make any substantial contribution to meet- 
ing the problem of overpopulation in Germany, 
the Netherlands, Italy, or Greece. In the latter- 
countries, for example, where the need is partic- 
ularly acute, we can admit annually only 5,677 
Italians and 310 Greeks under the law as it now 
stands. 

To meet the present emergency, we should en- 
large the numbers of immigrants that can be taken 
in from all these critical areas. I ask the Con- 
gress to authorize the admission of some 300,000 
additional persons over a three year period. This 
would include, on an annual basis: 

(1) 7,000 religious and political refugees from 
communism in eastern Europe; 

(2) 7,500 Greek nationals from Greece ; 

(3) 7,500 Dutch from the Netherlands; 
554 



(4) 39,000 Italians from Italy and Trieste; and 

(5) 39,000 Germans and persons of German 
ethnic origin. 

Immigration in these amounts and from these 
sources could readily be absorbed in this country, 
and together with a far larger volume of immi- 
gration to other free countries, would go a long 
way toward solving the emergency problem in 
Europe. 

While the admission of these particular groups 
should constitute a temporary program of limited 
duration, it could well be fitted into desirable per- 
manent changes in our present immigration quota 
system if the Congi-ess finds itself able to make 
such changes at this session. 

Our present quota system is not only inadequate 
to meet present emergency needs, it is also an ob- 
stacle to the development of an enlightened and 
satisfactory immigration policy for the long-run 
future. If our quotas were revised and made 
more flexible, they could probably be utilized to 
take care of most or all of the immigration re- 
quired to meet the present emergency situation. 
The balance, if any, could be admitted without 
reference to quota numbers. These are consider- 
ations that the Congress will wish to keep in mind 
when it takes up the question of improving our 
overall immigration laws. 

It is most important to remember, however, that 
action to meet the emergency problem is needed 
this year. If the Congress cannot agree at this 
session on desirable improvements in our whole 
system of immigration that would take care of the 
emergency problem, it should act to take care of 
the emergency directly. In no event should this 
vital emergency program be tied to or associated 
with restrictive changes in our permanent immi- 
gration laws — changes which would in themselves 
hamper or nullify the operation of the emergency 
program. 

Operation of Displaced Persons Act 

In addition to this emergency three-year pro- 
gram, I recommend that steps be taken to alleviate 
an unfortunate situation arising under the opera- 
tion of the Displaced Persons Act. Although all 
visas authorized for displaced persons were issued, 
some 7,500 of them were lost because the persons 
to whom they were granted did not actually come 
to the United States. On the other hand, a num- 
ber of persons who were seeking admission under 
the Act, and whose applications were under con- 
sideration, were unable to obtain visas prior to the 
time the authority to issue such visas expired on 
December 31, 1951. A substantial portion of these 
applicants were admissible under the standards of 
the Act, and would have made as good immigrants 
as those already admitted. The voluntary agen- 
cies or individual citizens have given the assur- 
ances necessary for the admission of these persons. 
There is still place for them in the United States. 

Deparfmenf of State BuHetin 



It seems unjust and unwise to deprive them of the 
opportunity for whicli they are qualified. Seven 
thousand five hundred visas slioukl be ample to 
take care of the displaced persons in this category. 
I recommend that the Congress authorize up to 
that number of visas for them. 

In carrying out this ^jroposal, and the three-year 
emergency program as well, we should follow the 
lessons of the successful experience we have had 
under the Displaced Persons Act. The same kind 
of provision should be made, for example, for 
security safeguards with resj^ect to those admitted 
to this country, for means to effect their settle- 
ment here on a wide geographic basis, and for safe- 
guards against displacement of United States citi- 
zens from liousing or employment. And similarly, 
as under the Displaced Persons Act, there should 
be no religious, racial or other discrimination in 
the selection of the immigrants. 

With respect to the financing of the emergency 
three-year program, however, the situation is 
rather different from that under the Displaced 
Persons Act, where transportation was financed 
through Government funds. 

Except for the refugees from communisni, the 
peoj^le from the overpopulated areas, who consti- 
tute the bulk of the migi'ants to be admitted, are 
in a better financial position than the displaced 
persons of former years. They are not stateless, 



or dependent wholly on charity. Their countries 
are interested in seeing them migrate and can be 
called on to help with the expense of getting them 
started. The migrants themselves can be asked 
to repay the cost of their overseas transportation, 
once they have resettled. Some of them have assets 
of theirown which can be used. While it may be 
advisable to provide a source of funds to be loaned 
to these migrants to pay for their passage, the net 
additional cost to this Government of transporting 
the people from the overpopulated areas should be 
small. 

The years through which we are passing are 
tragic years for many people. We are faced with 
extraordinary problems which demand extraor- 
dinary solutions. The problem of the refugees 
from communist tyranny and that of overpopula- 
tion in Western Europe are matters of practical 
concern to the entire free world. To us in Amer- 
ica, whose most basic belief is in the inherent worth 
of the human individual, these problems present 
a challenge as well as a i-esponsibility. 

The programs I have here recommended are 
designed to meet the challenge and accept the re- 
sponsibility. I hope that the Congress will give 
them prompt and favorable consideration. 

Haret S. Truman 
The White House, March £4., 1952. 



Transfer of Responsibilities to Mutual Security Director 



[Released to the press iy the White House March 27] 

The President, on March 27, sent identical let- 
ters concerning the duties of the Director for Mu- 
tual Security to Tom GonnaUy, Chairman of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and James 
P. Richards, Chairmcun of the House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs. The text of the Presidenfs 
letter follows, together ivith the text of an ap- 
pended report iy the Director of the Bureau of 
the Budget: 



LETTER TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES 

Pursuant to section 502 (c) of the Mutual Se- 
curity Act of 1951 (P. L. 165, 82d Cong., 1st sess., 
approved October 10, 1951), I hereby inform the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 
(Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives) that I have found that, except as 
hereinafter set forth, all of the powers, functions, 
and responsibilities transferred to the Director 
for Mutual Security by subsection (b) (2) of sec- 
tion 502 of said act are necessary to enable the 
Director for Mutual Security, after June SO, 1952, 
to carry out the duties conferred upon him by sec- 
tion 503 of said act. 



Powers, functions, and responsibilities under 
the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as 
amended, with respect to the following are not 
necessary to enable the said Director, after June 
30, 1952, to carry out the duties so conferred upon 
him : 

1. Creation of a corporation (section 104 (d)). 

2. Consultation with the Secretary of State in 
the specific. manner prescribed in section 105 (b). 

3. Consultation between the chief of the special 
mission and the chief of the United States diplo- 
matic mission in the specific manner prescribed 
in section 109 (b). 

4. Guarantee of investments in enterprises pro- 
ducing or distributing informational media (sec- 
tion 111 (b) (3)). " 

5. Procurement and increased production in 
participating countries, and under sections 115 
(i) (1) and 117 (a), of materials which are re- 
quired by the United States as a result of deficien- 
cies or potential deficiencies in the resources within 
the United States ; and purchase, under section 115 
(i) (2), of strategic and critical materials in any 
participating country. 



April 7, 1952 



555 



6. Promotion and development of travel by citi- 
zens of the United States to and within partici- 
pating countries (section 117 (b)). 

7. Payment of ocean freight charges of relief 
supplies and packages (section 117 (d)). 

The findings under section 502 (c) have been 
framed in terms of a specification of powers to be 
discontinued rather than powers to be continued. 
This approach has been adopted because by the 
enactment of section 503 the Congress has already 
limited the range of the Director's responsibilities 
with respect to the activities of the Mutual Se- 
curity Agency, thereby anticipating the action 
which had originally been contemplated would 
result from the finding under section 502 (c). 

The Congress, in the Mutual Security Act, re- 
affirmed the proposition that the mutual security 
efforts of the fiee world shoidd not fail because 
some cooperating countries cannot now provide 
all the physical and final resources required for 
defense mobilization. The Mutual Security 
Agency already has adjusted its programs and 
organization, and has curtailed some functions 
and modified others in order to direct its full effort 
to the objectives of the mutual security program. 
Under section 502 (b) (2) of the act, however, 
the Mutual Security Agency now is using to 
support mutual defense the same major powers 
and functions which originally were needed to 
assist economic recovery. This experience has 
shown that the basic powers of the Economic Co- 
operation Act, appropriately redirected toward 
the new objectives, are necessary to enable the 
Director for Mutual Security after June 30, 1952, 
to carry out his responsibilities under section 503 
of the Mutual Security Act. Those provisions of 
the Economic Cooperation Act which are not re- 
quired for this purpose are set forth in the above 
finding. 

Although the Mutual Security Agency's author- 
ity to subsidize relief shipments and to make 
guarantees of informational media investments 
will be discontimied, it is essential that these activi- 
ties be carried on after June 30, 1952. There has 
been submitted for the consideration of the Con- 
gress as a part of the 1953 mutual security legisla- 
tion a request for authority and funds which 
would permit the President to designate any de- 
l^artment or agency of the Government to carry on 
the function of subsidizing relief shipments. At 
an early date there also will be submitted for the 
consideration of the Congress a request for author- 
ity to enable the Government to continue the work 
of guaranteeing investments in informational 
media enterprises. 

I am enclosing for your information copies of a 
report relating to the foregoing prepared by the 
Director of the Bureau of the Budget. 
Sincerely yours, 

Harry S. Truman 



REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY 
DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF THE BUDGET 

March 18, 1952 

Subject: Continuation after Jtme 30, 1952, of 
powers, functions, and responsibilities 
established by the Economic Coopera- 
tion Act of J 948, and other laws 

I. Introduction and Recommendations 

Introduction 

Section 502 (c) of the Mutual Security Act of 
1951 provides as follows: 

Not later than April 1, 1952, the President shall Inform 
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representa- 
tlres which of the powers, functions, and responsibilities 
transferred to the Director by subsection (b) (2) are 
found by the President to be necessary to enable the Di- 
rector after June 30, 1052, to carry out the duties con- 
ferred upon him by section 503. The termination pro- 
visions of section 122 of the Economic Cooperation Act of 
1948, as amended, shall come into effect on June 30, 1952, 
and none of the powers, functions, and responsibilities 
conferred by that Act shall be exercised after that date, 
except those powers, functions, and responsibilities found 
necessary to enable the Director to carry out the duties 
conferred on him by section 503 of this Act, which powers, 
functions, and responsibilities unless otherwise provided 
by law shall continue in effect until June 30, 1954. 

Section 503 provides : 

After June 30, 1952, the Director, on behalf of the Presi- 
dent and subject to his direction, shall, in consultation 
with the Secretaries of State and Defense, continue to 
have primary responsibility for — 

(a) the development and administration of programs 
of assistance designed to sustain and increase military 
effort, including production, construction, equipment and 
materiel in each country or in groups of countries which 
receive United States military assistance ; 

(b) the provision of such equipment, materials, com- 
modities, services, financial, or other assistance as he 
finds to be necessary for carrying out mutual defense pro- 
grams ; and 

(c) the provision of limited economic assistance to 
foreifjn nations for which the United States has respon- 
sibility as a result of participation in joint control arrange- 
ments when the President finds that the provision of such 
economic assistance is in the Interest of the security of 
the United States. 

The Bureau of the Budget has examined the 
current and prospective programs and operations 
of the Mutual Security Agency to ascertain which 
of the various powers, functions and responsibili- 
ties established by the Economic Cooperation Act 
of 1948, as amended, and related laws are neces- 
sary for the Director for Mutual Security to carry 
out after June 30, 1952, the responsibilities enu- 
merated in section 503 of the Alutual Security Act 
of 1951. The following recommendations are con- 
curred in by the Director for Mutual Security, the 
Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. 

Rccontiiicndation 

It is recommended that the various powers, functions, 
and responsibilities previously vested in the Economic 



556 



Department of State Bulletin 



Cooperation Administrator and transferred to the Di- 
rector by the Mutual Security Act, except for those noted 
below, be continued after June 30, 1952. The Bureau of 
the Budget has concluded that, although the purposes 
to which assistance is being directed have changed under 
the mutual security program, the major functions author- 
ized under the Economic Cooperation Act must be utilized 
to accomplish the new goals. 

The powers of the China Aid Act of 1948 and the China 
Area Aid Act of 1950 also will be needed by the Director 
after June .30, 1952, to carry out his responsibilities. 

The Mutual Security Agency already has adjusted many 
of its operations and recast some of its functions in order 
to fuUill its new assignment. The performance of many 
of tlie functions which must be continued may be further 
modified. However, the following powers, functions, and 
responsibilities established by the Economic Cooperation 
Act do not appear to be necessary to enable the Director 
to carry out his duties after June .30 : to create a corpora- 
tion (section 104 (d)); to furnish informational media 
guarantees (section 111 (b) (3)) ; to promote travel by 
United States citizens in participating countries (section 
117 (b) ) ; to pay ocean freight charges of relief packages 
and supplies (section 117 (c) ) ; to promote procurement 
and increased production in participating countries of 
materials in which the United States is deficient (sections 
115 (i) and 117 (a)) ; to consult with the Secretary of 
State in the specific manner prescribed in section 105 ; 
and to participate in the consultation procedure between 
the chief of the special mission and tlie chief of the United 
States diplom.atlc mission in the specific manner pre- 
scribed in section 109 (b). 



II. Discussion 

A. PURPOSES OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE 
UNDER THE MUTUAL SECURITY ACT 

By the middle of 19.50. the goals of the European Re- 
covery Program in many instances had been substantially 
achieved. Under new legislation, a start had been made 
to extend assistance by the United States to countries in 
the general area of China. The communist aggression in 
Korea that year, however, forced the free world to accept 
the additional burden of intensifying preparation to de- 
fend against other communist-armed threats. It was 
recognized, therefore, that our economic aid should be 
used to augment the security efforts of friendly nations. 
As rearmament plans were developed, it became apparent 
that while the purely recovery needs of these countries 
were diminishing, further economic assistance from the 
United States beyond the fixed expiration date of the 
Economic Cooperation Act would be necessary for them 
to achieve established defense goals. This need for con- 
tinued assistance in order to achieve more specific security 
objectives was recognized by the Congress in passing the 
Mutual Security Act of 1951. 

The programs of the Mutual Security Agency now are 
designed to provide the marginal assistance required to 
enable countries participating in mutual defen.se efforts 
to expand their financial and productive capacity to build 
their armed forces, to increase the production of military 
goods, to construct bases, air fields, and other necessary 
facilities, and to take related actions. By preserving 
recovery gains, the programs provide the economic base 
on which defenses are being built, and diminish the pos- 
sibility that economic dislocations may lead to internal 
subversion. MSA programs contribute to the security of 
the Far P^ast by supporting defense activities, and by 
attacking hunger, sickness, and other causes of the current 
civil unrest. 

The size of our assistance programs in most countries 
now depends upon a given level of military effort. For 
Euroijean nations, the amount of United States aid planned 
under bilateral agreements is related to the commitments 
made by those countries to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization defense arrangements. As a general rule, 



funds are released only as the agreed-upon plans are 
implemented. 

The present and projected Mutual Security Agency pro- 
grams differ markedly from the activities under the recov- 
ery program which were directed primarily toward closing 
the "dollar gap." Economic Cooperation Administration 
operations previously were designed to increase the pro- 
duction of export goods and to decrease the need for goods 
produced in the dollar areas. Aid was allotted principally 
on the basis of assurances to relax trade restrictions, to 
promote financial stability, to exjiand foreign trade, and 
to take other steps to reduce dollar deficits. 



B. MODIFICATION OF FUNCTIONS UNDER THE ECONOMIC 
COOPERATION ACT TO CONFORM TO NEW PROGRAMS 

Study of the revised Mutual Security Agency programs 
has shown that the basic functions which have been neces- 
sary to provide assistance for recovery are actually those 
required to further mutual security objectives. Certain 
other functions, however, now may be discontinued, and 
certain others modified in the manner in which they are 
exercised. The functions which sliould be continued, and 
the extent to which others now may be discontinued or 
modified, are discussed below. 

1. AH Major Functions Must Be Contimied 

The major powers and functions of the Economic Coop- 
eration Act, though designed for recovery purposes, have 
proved through recent experience to be readily adaptable 
and essential to the new Mutual Security Agency programs 
directed to military support. They will be needed by the 
Director for Mutual Security to fulfill his assignment. The 
following paragraphs cover the principal functions, and 
briefi.y explain their changed uses. 

Under the Economic Cooperation Act, for example, the 
Administrator is authorized to furnish aid in the form of 
commodities and services. Commodities and equipment 
from this country helped the Marsliall Plan nations to 
recover their economic strength. Although the general 
composition of commodity aid remains much the same, its 
end uses have changed in many respects. Coal, machine 
tools, and other materials from this country now are 
enabling our allies to manufacture their share of the mili- 
tary weapons and facilities required to support our joint 
effort. Indeed, without this kind of help, the economic 
conditions making possible the required military efforts 
could not be maintained. 

Under the authority of the act, technical assistance was 
provided to export industries and to capital goods manu- 
facturers to increase the dollar earning power of the par- 
ticipating country economies. This identical authority 
lias been used since the enactment of the Mutual Security 
Act to send American technicians abroad to assist manu- 
facturers of such military goods as combat vehicles, 
artillery, electronics equipment, ships, weapons, and 
small arms. In addition, the Mutual Security Agency 
technical assistance program already has been directed 
to production problems in defense-supporting industries 
such as iron and steel, pipe and tube rolling and drawing, 
iron foundry, forging and stamping, coal mining, oil refin- 
ing, electroplating, and so on. In the Far East, most 
kinds of technical assistance have a direct bearing on 
the security of the area. 

The Administrator originally used his power to approve 
disposition of local currency accounts to guide these funds 
into channels of investment useful to the economic recon- 
struction and stability of participating countries. The 
Congress, in the Mutual Security Act, recognized the 
potential security uses of local currencies. Sizeable 
amounts of counterpart are now being released jointly by 
the United States and participating countries to finance 
military production, construction, equipment, and materiel. 
Decisions on the amount of counterpart to be released and 
its uses will have a direct impact on the size and content 
of national expenditures, including military budgets. 

The Economic Cooperation Act authorizes the transfer 



AprW 7, 1952 



557 



of funds to certain types of international institutions. 
The authority tiius far has been used for contributions to 
the European Payments Union, which has contributed to 
the facilitation of trade between European countries. 
The use of this authority may be necessary in connection 
with arrangements to clear transactions for the exchange 
of military items among North Atlantic Treaty Organi- 
zation countries. The.se efforts represent a major step 
toward regional unification. 

2. Terms of Assistance 

The Administrator is authorized to supply commodities 
and services in the form of grants, upon payment in cash, 
on credit terms, or on other terms of payment. 

The continuation of the power to furnish assistance 
under several financial arrangements is essential. The 
largest part of the aid supplied necessarily must be in 
grants because many recipient countries are incapable of 
assuming substantial additional debt. Bankable enter- 
prises in other participating countries are receiving loans 
from the Export-Import Bank of Washington, which has 
the funds and authority for foreign lending. To preserve 
flexibility, the power to provide assistance on other credit 
terms, including repayment in materials, will continue 
to be needed. 

3. Supporting Functions to he Continued 

The Economic Cooperation Act provides for other func- 
tions which influence the use of aid, or otherwise con- 
tribute to the objectives of economic assistance. Some 
of these supporting functions are necessary for mutual 
security purposes. 

The act, for example, directs the Administrator to give 
full publicity regarding assistance including its purpose, 
source, and character, and Congress otherwise authorized 
Economic Cooperation Administration Information activi- 
ties of a broad kind to promote the objectives of the re- 
covery program. Information activities supported by the 
use of counterpart funds will continue to be important 
to the olijectives of the mutual security program and this 
authorization should be continued. These activities, 
however, are being geared to the more specific objectives 
of the mutual security program and are being integrated 
with related activities so that a single comprehensive 
United States program is achieved. Steps toward this 
objective will be continued under procedures estal)lished 
pursuant to section 507 of the Mutual Security Act. 

The power to guarantee American investments in coun- 
tries included in the mutual security program against 
expropriation and the inability to convert earnings under- 
lies another supporting activity which should be con- 
tinued. The guarantee program, although not now a 
major activity in the Mutual Security Agency, will assist 
in securing the participation of American private invest- 
ment in the program abroad. Since the Mutual Security 
Act extends the guarantee authority to all areas of the 
world to which assistance is being furnished, additional 
plans to utilize this authority are being considered. 

4. Supportinff Functions to be Discontinued 

Some supporting functions which contributed to the 
rehabilitation of weakened economies are not needed to 
achieve nnitnal defense plans. Therefore, these func- 
tions, which are discussed below, either should be ter- 
minated or be made a part of the long-range programs 
of permanent Government agencies. 

The Administrator is authorized in the Economic Coop- 
eration Act to work jointly with the Secretary of Com- 
merce to promote travel by United States citizens abroad. 
Tourist trade for several years has been a major source 
of dollar earnings for countries in Europe. The dollar 
gap must, of course, continue to be a matter of profound 
concern to our national policy : European economic and 
political hcaltli will be jeopardized unless Europe can 
earn more dollars to buy from us military goods and goods 
vital to the functioning of its economy. Programs for 
increasing dollar earnings through promotion of Ameri- 



can tourism, however, are remote from the defense sup- 
port programs of the Mutual Security Agency. 

The guarantee of investments in enterprises for the 
distribution of United States books, magazines, films, 
and other informational media has increased the supply 
of such materials abroad. The informational benefits of 
this program, however, have been of a general kind and 
are not, therefore, in direct support of the more specific 
olijectives of the mutual security program. Accordingly, 
this function may now be discontinued in the Mutual Se- 
curity Agency. There will be sultmitted for the consid- 
eration of the Congress a request for authority to enable 
the Government to carry on this function. 

The Administrator is directed to pay ocean freight 
charges on relief packages to countries receiving aid. The 
Economic Cooperation Administration contributed to the 
shipment abroad of large quantities of private relief sup- 
plies which have earned much good will for the United 
States. In recent years there has been a marked decline 
in the use of this subsidy. Although this program is 
an effective auxiliary to our foreign policy, it does not 
contribute directly to the mutual security program and 
therefore should not be carried on by the Mutual Security 
Agency. There has been submitted for the consideration 
of the Congress as a part of the 1953 mutual securit.v 
legislation a request for authority and funds to permit 
the President to designate any department or agency of 
the Government to carry out this function. 

Sections 115 (i) and 117 (a) of the Economic Coopera- 
tion Act direct tlie Administrator to promote the procure- 
ment and increased production of materials in which the 
United States is deficient. 

There can be no doubt about the importance of increased 
supplies of strategic and critical materials to the military 
production of the United States and its allies. The 
Mutual Security Agency, as part of its country programs, 
will continue to empliasize and support materials projects 
through use of direct assistance and counterpart funds. 
The functions assigned by the act, however, primarily in- 
volve increasing production for the United States stock- 
pile. This task is more directly related to other United 
States programs than to overseas defense support 
activities. 

The President has established a special agency, the 
Defense Materials Procurement Agency, to increase the 
production of essential materials both in this country 
and abroad for use in the United States. Under a recent 
agreement, DMPA, as agent for the Mutual Security 
Agency, is operating projects, previously supervised by 
the Economic Coojieration Administration, the production 
of which will go to the United States. The DMPA, in 
close coordination with MSA, but with its own funds and 
loan authority, can continue to initiate and develop proj- 
ects of this type. The United States defense buildup will 
better be served if all the materials development projects 
primarily related to Unlt(>d States procurement are ad- 
ministered as part of a single, centralized program. The 
Director for Mutual Security, tlierefore, will not continiie 
to require the powers contained in sections 115 (i) and 
117 (a). 

It should be pointed out that section 115 (b) (5) of 
the Economic Cooperation Act, requiring that bilateral 
agreements shall make appropriate provision for facilitat- 
ing the transfer to the United States of deficiency mate- 
rials, will be continued. Furthermore, through the 
continuance of section 115 (h), not less than five percent 
of each counterpart account will continue to be reserved 
for the use of the United Slates Government for the pur- 
chase of deflcienc.v materials wliich are required by the 
United States, and for other purposes. 

5. Administrative Functions to he Continued 

The Economic Cooperation Administrator, was provided 
with operating flexibility which contributed substantially 
to the effective development and administration of a 
dynamic program of economic recovery. The Director 
for Mutual Security now is responsible for an equally 



558 



Department of State Bulletin 



dynamic iirogi-am, and he will continue to need similar 
administrative authority. 

The internal structure of the Economic Cooperation Ad- 
ministration and Mutual Security Agency has been re- 
vised as economic assistance objectives and programs 
have cliansed. Reductions in MSA personnel have been 
made beyond the ten percent reduction required by the 
Mutual Security Act. The special coimtry missions and 
the European office of the agency have undergone person- 
nel changes in line with revised assignments. MSA staff 
overseas are engaged in reviewing country capabilities 
and commodity requirements. They assist European pro- 
ducers to eliminate "bottlenecks" in military production, 
and they assist United States armed services and their 
contractors to locate and develop European sources of 
items to minimize the drain on scarce United States 
supplies. 

In addition to providing customary administrative 
powers, the Economic Cooperation Act empowers the Ad- 
ministrator to employ persons for overseas service at For- 
eign Service rates and to have overseas employees ap- 
pointed to the Foreign Service. 

With the exceptions cited below, the Director for Mutual 
Security will need all the administrative powers in the 
Economic Cooperation Act to carry on his functions and 
responsibilities under the Mutual Security Act. 

The Economic Cooperation Act required countries to 
allocate to the use of the United States Government five 
percent of the counterpart deposited against the grant 
aid they receive. These funds have been used, under the 
review "of the Bureau of the Budget, to meet administra- 
tive and other essential expenses, and the provisions 
should be continued. 

6. Administrative Functions to be Discontinued 

The power to create a corporation, with the approval 
of the President, has never been utilized, and does not 
seem necessary to the discharge of the Director's i-espon- 
sibilities. 

Sections 10.5 (b) and 109 (b) of the act provide for 
coordination between the Administrator and the Secretary 
of State, and between the chief of the special mission 
and the chief of the United States diplomatic mission, 
respectively. These provisions have largely been super- 
seded by the Mutual Security Act, but to eliminate possible 
confusion they should not be continued after .Tune 30, 1952. 
Section 3 of Executive Order 10.300 provides for coordina- 
tion between the Secretaiy of State and the Director for 
Mutual Security in order that mutual security programs 
shall be carried out in conformity with the established 
foreign policy of the United States. Under section 507 
of the Mutual Security Act, the President is providing for 
the country-level arrangements to govern the adminis- 
tration of the mutual security program. 

C. OTHER LAWS 

Several other laws confer powers, functions, and re- 
sponsibilities on the Economic Cooperation Administrator 
which now have l)een transferred to the Director by the 
Mutual Security Act. 

1. The China Aid Act of 19.',8 

Tlie China Aid Act of 1948 authorizes the Administrator 
to furnish aid to China under the applicable provisions of 
the Economic Cooperation Act. It also contains specific 
provision for the establishment of the Joint Committee 
on Rural Reconstruction in China. Title III of the Mu- 
tual Security Act now provides for aid to the general area 
of China. The China Aid Act, with the exception of the 
JCRR provision, does not, of itself, establish any new 
powers, functions, or responsibilities. The striking suc- 
cess of the JCRR in strengthening the economy of Formosa 
argues strongly for the retention of the act and its use in 
support of the mutual defense program now being carried 
on there. For this reason, it is recommended that the 
Administrator's functions under the act be continued after 
June 30, 1952. 



2. The China Area Aid Act of 1950 

The China Area Aid Act of 1950 assigns to the Admin- 
istrator responsibility for furnishing aid to countries in 
the general area of China pursuant to the applicable pro- 
visions of the Economic Cooperation Act. Aid to that 
area is now covered by title III of the Mutual Security 
Act, which similarly authorizes aid to be furnished under 
applicable provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act. 
The China Area Aid Act does not establish any new 
powers ; aid furnished pursuant to its provisions depended 
upon the exercise of powers conferred by the Economic 
Cooperation Act. There are, however, some residual ac- 
tivities, such as the use of certain counterpart funds, 
which depend upon the authority originally contained in 
this act. For that reason, the powers, functions, and re- 
sponsibilities established by the act need to be kept in 
legal force for the tim.e being. 

3. The Far Eastern Economic Assistance Act of 1950 

The Far Eastern Economic Assistance Act of 1950, as 
amended, authorizes the Administrator for Economic 
Cooperation to furnish assistance to the Republic of 
Korea pursuant to the applicable provisions of the Eco- 
nomic Cooperation Act. The Mutual Security Act, in sec- 
tion 303, provides that the functions of the Administrator 
under that act shall be performed by such departments or 
agencies of the Government as the President shall direct. 

4. The India Emergency Food Aid Act of 1951 

The India Emergency Pood Aid Act of 1951 authorizes 
and directs the Administrator to provide emergency food 
relief assistance to India on credit terms. The major part 
of this task will be accomplished by June 30, 1952. The 
remaining functions will be liquidated as appropriate 
under the provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act. 

F. J. Lawton, Director 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: March 22-28, 1952 

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special 
Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Wash- 
ington 25, D.C. Items marked (*) are not printed in the 
Bulletin; items marked (t) will appear in a future 

issue. 

No. Date Subject 
189 3/12 Thorp: Health security 
t203 3/18 Commission on status of women 

*21S 3/22 Death of Ceylon prime minister 

*219 3/24 Visitors to U.S. 

*220 3/24 Wilkinson, Fso, retires 

*221 3/24 Shaw : Ambassador to Paraguay 

*222 3/24 Duke : Ambassador to El Salvador 

t223 3/24 Pan American railway congress 

224 3/24 Property nationalization in Hungary 

225 3/24 S. and S.E. Asia consultative comm. 

226 3/25 Bruce : Statement on Msp 
*227 3/25 Anniversary of Greece 

228 3/25 U.S. reply on German peace treaty 

229 3/25 Road traffic convention 

t230 3/25 Acheson, Dulles: Exchange of letters 

231 3/26 Acheson : Reply to Soviet note 

232 3/26 Germ warfare in Korea 

233 3/26 Panama extends filing-claims date 
t234 3/26 Welling : Point 4 director for Jordan 
t235 3/2Q S. Africa educational exchange 

236 3/26 NATO anniversary ceremony 

1237 3/27 Gordon : Point 4 director for Ethiopia 

238 3/27 Recognition of Cuban Government 

t239 3/28 Corbett : Financial policy director 

240 3/28 Sargeant : Defending free culture 

241 3/28 New VoA filter 

242 3/28 Conference in defense of children 



April 7, 1952 



559 



April 7, 1952 

American Principles 

How Can We Defend Free Culture? (Sargeant) . 

American Republics 

CUBA: U.S. recognizes new government . . . 
ECUADOR: Export-Import Bank grants housing 

credit 

PANAMA : Filing date extended for claims under 

U.S.-Panama convention 

Asia 

Economic Development Committee to examine 
progress of Colombo Plan 

Claims and Property 

Filing date extended for claims under U.S.-Pan- 
ama convention 

Hungary nationalizes real estate 

Communism 

Further denials of Soviet "germ warfare" 

allegations 

How Can We Defend Free Culture? (Sargeant) . 

Congress 

MESSAGES TO CONGRESS: 

Additional legislation on overpopulation in 
Western ETurope requested 

Duties of director of Mutual Security Agency . 
Current legislation on foreign policy .... 

Europe 

The Council of Europe 

FRANCE: A review of political and economic 

conditions (Bruce) 

GERMANY: Reaffirmation of U.S. policy towards, 

text of U.S. notes, Acheson statement . . . 

HUNGARY: Real estate nationalized 

Legislation requested on overpopulation 

(Truman) 

U.S.S.R.: 

Further denials of Soviet "germ warfare" 
allegations 

Reaffirmation of U.S. policy towards Germany, 
text of U.S.-Soviet notes, Acheson state- 
ment 

VGA has new filter to combat jamming . . 

Finance 

Export-Import Bank grants housing credit to 
Ecuador 

Foreign Service 

Booklet released on the Foreign Service as a 
career (excerpts) 

Health 

Common responsibility for achieving health 
security (Thorp) 



Index Vol. XXVI, No. 667 

Information and Educational Exchange 
535 Program 

How Can We Defend Free Culture (Sargeant) . 535 

^'**' International Information 

544 VoA has new filter to prevent Jamming . . 534 

544 International Meetings 

Calendar of Meetings 546 

Economic Development Committee to meet in 

Pakistan 548 

54g International Conference in Defense of Children . 540 

Mutual Security 

The Council of Europe 523 

Hn North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

FRANCE: A review of political and economic 

conditions (Bruce) 533 

Observance of 3d anniversary 548 

529 Presidential Documents 

CORRESPONDENCE: Duties of director of 

Mutual Security Agency 555 

Legislation requested on overpopulation in West- 
ern Europe 551 

III Publications 

540 Booklet released on the Foreign Service as a 

career (excerpts) 549 

523 State Department 

Reaffirmation of U.S. policy toward Germany, 
533 Acheson statement, text of U.S.-Soviet 

notes 530 

530 

540 Technical Cooperation and Development 

551 Economic Development Committee to examine 

progress of Colombo Plan 548 

Treaty Information 

529 Road traffic convention to aid international 

motor touring enters into force .... 545 

530 United Nations 

WHO: Proposes investigation of Soviet "germ 

warfare" allegations 529 

Name Index 

544 Acheson, Secretary Dean 529, 530 

Bruce, David K.E 533 

Compton, Wilson 534 

Connally, Tom 555 

5^Q Lawton, F. J 555 

Richards, James P 555 

Sargeant, Rowland H 535 

Thorp, Willard L 541 

Truman, President Harry S 551,555 

541 Warren, Avra M 548 



U. 5. GOVERNMENT PRJNTING OFFICE; I9S2 



^ ns^. 1 ^-50 



tJ/ie/ ^e^a^meni/ /(w t/iaie^ 




OBSERVANCE OF THIRD ANNIVERSARY OF THE 
SIGNING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY • 

Addresses by President Truman, Secretary Acheson, and W. 
Averell Harriman •• ••••• 568 

FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF SHAPE • Report of General 

Dtvight D. Eisenhotver 572 

U.S. PROPOSALS FOR DISCLOSURE AND VERIFI- 
CATION OF ARMAMENTS • 586 

THE STRUGGLE FOR GERMAN UNITY • By Henry 

B.Cox 563 



For index see back cover 



Vol XXVI, No. 668 
April 14, 1952 




•*tes o* 



".S. SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS 

^P« 29 IBSZ 




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*^^^.^^. bulletin 



Vol.. XXVI, No. 668 • Publication 4565 
April 14, 1952 



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Note: Contents of this publication are not 
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be reprinted. Citation of the Department 
OF State Bulletin as the source will be 
appreciated. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication compiled and 
edited in the Division of Publications, 
Office of Public Affairs, provides the 
public and interested agencies of 
the Government ivith information on 
developments in the field of foreign 
relations and on the work of the De- 
partment of State and the Foreign 
Service. The BULLETIN includes 
selected press releases on foreign pol- 
icy issued by the White House and 
the Department, and statements and 
addresses made by the President and 
by the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the func- 
tions of the Department. Informa- 
tion is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to 
which the United States is or may 
become a party and treaties of gen- 
eral international interest. 

Publications of the Department, as 
well as legislative material in the field 
of international relations, are listed 
currently. 



The Struggle for German Unity 



hy Henry B. Cox 



Postwar efforts to unify Germany may be 
divided into two general pliases. The first en- 
compassed the period 1945-48 in which German 
unification was sought on the basis of the economic 
and political principles of the Potsdam Agree- 
ment. These attempts came to a halt in 1948 with 
the imposition of the Berlin blockade and the 
breakdown of Four-Power control. The second 
phase is represented by the efforts during 1949 
and 1950 to carry out the much more limited steps 
toward unification called for in the modus vivendi 
for Germany agreed upon at the Paris meeting of 
the Council of Foreign Ministers in 1949, and the 
Western Allied and West German initiative in 
1951 and 1952 which culminated in the appoint- 
ment by the General Assembly of the United Na- 
tions of a commission to investigate and determine 
wliether conditions for free elections exist 
throughout Germany. This article deals primar- 
ily with the latter phase of developments relat- 
ing to German unification. 

At the Paris meeting of the Council of Foreign 
Ministers in May 1949, the delegations of the 
United States, France, and the United Kingdom 
offered a proposal for restoring the political and 
economic unity of Germany.^ The Three-Power 
proposal called for the unification of Germany 
in accordance witli the Bonn Constitution, which 
had been promulgated a short time before, by the 
making of appropriate arrangements enabling the 
states of the Soviet zone to accede to it. The pro- 
posal further stipulated a number of principles 
which would apply to such accession of the states 
of the eastern zone, such as freedom of person, 
freedom of speech, freedom for all democratic po- 
litical parties, freedom of elections, and the inde- 
pendence of the judiciary. In addition, the pro- 
posal provided for the prohibition of "all police 

" Bulletin of July 4, 1949, p. 857. 



formations exercising political activities." The 
proposal also included provisions for a Four- 
Power Occupation Statute with reserved powers, a 
quadripartite High Commission operating with 
majority vote, an agreement prohibiting certain 
industries and restricting production in others, 
provision for the delivery of reparations, and the 
return to German ownership of industrial enter- 
prises acquired after May 8, 1945. 

The Soviet proposal for economic and political 
unity called for the re-establishment of the quad- 
ripartite Allied Control Council on its former 
basis as the organ representing supreme authority 
in Germany, as well as the re-establishment of 
the Inter-Allied Kommandatura. The Soviet 
proposal also provided for (a) the creation of an 
all-German State council on the basis of the eco- 
nomic organs existing at the time in the eastern 
and western zones of Germany and (b) the re- 
establishment of the Magistrat of Berlin. 

No agreement was reached at the Paris meeting 
on the question of German unity. 

Intensified Soviet Propaganda 

Following the Paris meeting of the Council of 
Foreign Ministers, the Soviets intensified their 
propaganda campaign designed to convince the 
German people that the U.S.S.E. and the Com- 
munist parties in East and West Germany were 
the only true proponents of German unification, 
the conclusion of a peace treaty, and the with- 
drawal of occupation forces. Through the per- 
sistent efforts of the "National Front" committees 
and the Soviet and Communist-controlled Ger- 
man press in both East and W^est Germany, 
the Soviets tried to keep the initiative on German 
unity. The Soviets have sought to gain popular 
support through appeals which follow the tra- 
ditional lines of the policy of German-Russian 



April 14, 1952 



563 



friendship of Bismarck, Gustav Stresemann's idea 
of Germany as a bridge between East and West, 
and attempts at German-Russian cooperation 
during the Weimar Republic. 

Faced with these developments and impressed 
by the necessity for restating the position of the 
Western Allies on the reunification issue, the U.S. 
High Commissioner for Germany released a state- 
ment calling for the political reunification of Ger- 
many on the basis of free, all-German elections. 
Issued on February 28, 1950, the McCloy state- 
ment deprecated the Soviet device of "the so-called 
National Front" as a "means to democratic unity" 
and decried Soviet exploitation of the natural wish 
of the German people for unity while denying to 
them the free and democratic processes by which 
unity can be obtained. Mr. McCloy also empha- 
sized the readiness of the United States to "assist 
the German people to achieve unity based on true 
democratic principles and reflecting the aspira- 
tions of the entire German nation." 

Action for German Unity 

On March 22 the Federal Republic of Germany 
issued a statement which supported the U.S. High 
Commissioner's proposal, and embodied a concrete 
program for the achievement of German unity.'' 
This program called f or : ( 1 ) all-German elections 
for a National Constituent Assembly to be pro- 
claimed following the promulgation of an election 
law by the four occupying powers ; (2) supervision 
of the elections to the National Assembly by elec- 
tion commissions established by the four occupa- 
tion powers or representatives of the United Na- 
tions; and (3) preparation by this Assembly of 
a draft German constitution to be ratified or re- 
jected in a free national referendum. To these 
proposals, the Bonn Government added four con- 
ditions which it considered as prerequisites for 
the conduct of free elections. Public reaction to 
the Bonn offer was generally favorable in West 
Germany, but as expected, the response of the 
Soviet zone government was to reject the Aden- 
auer proposals. 

On May 25, 1950, Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 
U.S. Commandant in Berlin, delivered a letter on 
behalf of the U.S. High Commissioner for Ger- 
many to Gen. "V. I. Chuikov, Soviet Commandant 
for Berlin, on the question of German unity and 
all-German elections.' The letter referred to the 

' Bulletin of June 5, 1950, p. 885. 
• Ibid., p. 884. 



discussion of German unity by the Foreign Minis- 
ters of the United Kingdom, France, and the 
United States at their London meeting and at- 
tached the text of their conclusions on German 
unification and the manner in which it might be 
accomplished. The letter also made reference to 
the public communique released by the three 
Western Foreign Ministers on May 14 which 
stated that the Western Powers did not contem- 
plate the conclusion of a separate peace treaty 
with the Federal Republic of Grermany, in partic- 
ular because such a move would involve con- 
tinued partition of Germany — a concept with 
which the Western Powers did not wish to asso- 
ciate themselves. 

The letter to Chuikov further called attention 
to paragraph I of the March 22 declaration of the 
Federal Republic suggesting that the four occupa- 
tion powers should assume the responsibility for 
framing an electoral law under which all-German 
elections might be conducted. The U.S. Govern- 
ment, the letter indicated, was prepared to engage 
in conversations on the High Commission level 
for the purpose of framing such an electoral law, 
pointing toward the formation of an all-German 
Government "in conformity with the principles 
set forth in the attached statement of the Foreign 
Ministers." 

No reply was ever made to this letter. 
Addressing the Bundestag of the Federal Re- 
public on September 14, 1950, Chancellor Konrad 
Adenauer condemned the elections to be held in 
the Soviet zone of Germany on October 15 and 
referred again to the Federal Republic's March 22 
proposals for holding all-German elections along 
democratic lines. Immediately following Ade- 
nauer's speech, the Bundestag passed a resolution 
calling upon the Federal Government to make a 
formal request to the occupation powers to ar- 
range in their zones of occupation for the holding 
of "free, universal, secret, and direct elections to 
an all-German parliament, under international 
control, and in which everyone will have an equal 
vote." 

In accordance with the resolution of the Bundes- 
tag, the Federal Chancellor addressed separate 
letters to the four Commissioners on October 1, 
noting with satisfaction that the four Govern- 
ments taking part in the occupation of Germany 
had repeatedly expressed their willingness to 
strive toward the goal of the restoration of the 
political and governmental unity of Germany. 



564 



Department of State Bulletin 



Adenauer stated that "the first and indispensable 
step to achieve this end is the convocation of a 
constituent German national assembly," and sug- 
gested the following measures to achieve this end : 

(1) All-German elections to a national constituent as- 
sembly shall be announced following enactment of an 
electoral law by the four occupying powers. 

(2) Elections to the national constituent assembly shall 
in all parts of Germany take place under the supervision 
of commissions composed of representatives of the four 
occupying powers or of representatives of the U. N. 

(3) The sole taslj of the national constituent assembly 
shall be the drafting of a German constitution. This 
draft constitution shall be submitted to the German people 
for approval. 

In addition to the measures cited, the letter set 
forth certain guarantees of personal and polit- 
ical freedom of movement and activity as pre- 
requisite for the holding of all-German elections. 

After consultation, the U.S., U.K., and French 
High Commissioners dispatched separate com- 
munications dated October 9 to General Chuikov 
referring to their as yet unanswered letters of May 
25 and enclosing copies of the Adenauer letter of 
October 1, the Bundestag resolution of Septem- 
ber 14 and the Adenauer statement made in the 
Bundestag on the same date. The three High 
Commissioners indicated their endorsement of the 
Federal Republic as a "government freely elected 
by the people" and "entitled to speak for Ger- 
many" and commended to the attention of Chui- 
kov and the Soviet Government the aforemen- 
tioned documents as "pronouncements of the Ger- 
man people." In conclusion the three Western 
Powers indicated that they shared the views of 
the Federal Republic on the October 15 Soviet 
zone elections and informed the Soviet Govern- 
ment that it must bear full responsibility for ob- 
structing the accomplishment of the reunification 
of Germany in accordance with its obligations 
under Potsdam. 



Prague Communique 

The next important development on the unity 
issue came with the release on October 21 of the 
Prague communique at the conclusion of the meet- 
ing of Soviet and satellite Foreign Ministers.* In 
brief, the communique referred to the September 
19 communique issued in New York by the three 
Western Foreign Ministers and charged that the 



* For Secretary Acheson's comment on the Prague com- 
munique, see Bulletin of Nov. 6, 1950, p. 727. 

April 14, 7952 



chief concern of the New York meeting was "the 
question of recreating the German Army, the 
question of the remilitarization of Western Ger- 
many." The communique also charged that the 
question of ending the state of war with Germany 
was being brought up "in order to postpone as long 
as possible the conclusion of a peace treaty with 
Germany and thus the unification of Germany." 
In conclusion the eastern,, Foreign Ministers stated 
that they regarded it as an immediate necessity 
that — 

Firstly, the United States, British, French, and the 
Soviet Governments should publish a declaration tliat they 
will not permit the remilitarization of Germany or its 
inclusion in any sort of aggressive plans, and that they 
will determinedly endeavor to see that the Potsdam Agree- 
ment regarding the creation of prerequisites for the for- 
mation of a united, peace-loving, democratic German state 
is really carried out ; 

Secondly, all restrictions that are obstructing the de- 
velopment of peacetime German economy be removed, and 
the restoration of German war potential not be permitted ; 

Thirdly, a peace treaty with Germany be forthwith con- 
cluded, with a restoration of the unity of the German 
state in conformity with the Potsdam Agreement, and the 
occupation troops of all the great powers be withdrawn 
from Germany within a year of the conclusion of the 
peace treaty ; 

Fourthly, an all-German constituent council be formed 
from representatives of Eastern and Western Germany on 
the principle of parity, for the purpose of preparing the 
formation of provisional, democratic, peace-loving, all- 
German sovereign government, this council to submit the 
proper proposals for common approval by the Governments 
of the U.S.S.R., the United States, Great Britain, and 
France, and, until such time as an aU-German Government 
is formed, to be included in discussions on the working 
out of a peace treaty. With regard to this proposal, the 
German people may, under given circumstances, be con- 
sulted directly. 

On their side, the Governments of the U.S.S.R., Albania, 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Roumania, Hungary, 
and the German Democratic Republic will do everything 
possible to facilitate the solution of the immediate tasks 
in the interest of consolidating peace and international 
security. 

The Prague meeting, convened for the an- 
nounced purpose of discussing "the remilitariza- 
tion of West Germany," followed closely on the 
heels of the delivery on October 19 of a Soviet note 
rejecting the protest made by the three Western 
Powers the preceding May against the existence in 
the Soviet zone of paramilitary police. In their 
reply, the Soviets charged that the Western 
Powers themselves were engaged in establishing 
a German army and concluded by stating that "the 
U.S.S.R. will not tolerate such measures." 

565 



As a logical follow-up to the Prague confer- 
ence, the Soviets delivered notes to the U.S., U.K., 
and French Governments on November 3, enclos- 
ing copies of the Prague communique and calling 
for a four-power meeting to discuss the demilitari- 
zation provisions of the Potsdam Agreement. 
The Western Allied reply and the Soviet note of 
December 31 then followed.^ 

The Grotewohl-Adenauer Exchange 

Meanwhile, on December 1, Otto Grotewohl, 
Minister-President of the "German Democratic 
Republic," had a letter delivered to Chancellor 
Adenauer at Bonn. Referring to the "national 
emergency brought about by the division of Ger- 
many, which is accentuated by the remilitariza- 
tion and inclusion of West Germany in plans for 
preparation for war" and citing the need for a 
German solution to the German problem, Grote- 
wohl proposed the formation of an all-German 
constituent council with participation on the 
basis of parity of representatives of East and 
West Germany. This council would prepare the 
formation of an "all-German, sovereign, demo- 
cratic and peaceloving provisional government" 
and would submit proposals to the Governments 
of the U.S.S.R., U.S., Great Britain, and France 
for common ratification. At the same time it 
would consult with the named governments until 
the formation of an all-German government on 
the draft of a peace treaty. Grotewohl further 
suggested that a plebiscite of the German people 
on this proposal could be carried out. 

On January 15, 1951, Chancellor Adenauer re- 
plied to the Grotewohl letter by issuing a public 
statement. In brief, Adenauer referred to the 
March 22, 1950, declaration of the Federal Repub- 
lic which contained proposals for the achievement 
of German unity under conditions of freedom, 
pointed to the failure of the Soviets to respond to 
the Bundestag proposals for German unification 
forwarded to Chuikov on October 9, 1950, and 
stated clearly that the West German Government 
could enter into talks on German unity "only with 
those who are prepared to recognize and guarantee 
without reserve a constitutional order, a free form 
of government, protection of civil rights and pres- 
ervation of freedom." 

The Communist propaganda campaign on unity 
was continued when on January 30, 1951, the 



People's Chamber of the East German Govern- 
ment passed a resolution addressed to the West 
German Bundestag, in which it indicated its will- 
ingness to conduct negotiations "concerning all 
questions connected with the creation and tasks 
of the all-German Constituent Council." 

The Federal Republic issued a statement on the 
same date indignantly rejecting the right claimed 
by the East German parliament to speak "in the 
name of true democracy and of the whole German 
people." It further called upon the German 
people "not to allow themselves to be confused by 
actions of the kind contrived by the Soviet zone 
Government." 

Having decided that it would not reply directly 
to the People's Chamber appeal, the Bundestag 
on March 9 passed a resolution which referred to 
"the contemplated conference of the four occupa- 
tion powers" and called upon the Federal Govern- 
ment to submit to the Four Powers a petition for 
the preparation and execution of free, all-German 
elections. On the same date the Bundestag ap- 
proved the text of a note addressed by Chancellor 
Adenauer to the Allied High Commission which 
echoed the Bundestag resolution, calling upon the 
Four Powers to arrange for all-German elections 
as soon as possible and emphasizing that genuinely 
free elections could only be held if "the indispens- 
able freedoms" were guaranteed in the Soviet 
zone. 

In a speech before the People's Chamber on 
March 14, 1951, East German Premier Grotewohl 
rejected the Federal Republic's proposals for free, 
all-German elections and accused Adenauer of 
ignoring the will of the German people. 

Washington Foreign Ministers Conference 

The next major development in East- West ex- 
changes on the unity question resulted from the 
meeting of the Foreign Ministers of France, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States which 
was held in Washington from September 10 
through September 15, 1951. At the conclusion 
of this conference, the three Ministers issued a 
communique "* in which they "noted with satisfac- 
tion the results already achieved by their three 
countries, together with the other free nations of 
the world, in order to insure their common se- 
curity and to safeguard the peace." In addition, 
they indicated that they had agreed upon instruc- 



'Ibid., Jan. 1, 1951, p. 11. 
566 



'Ibid., Sept. 24, 1951, p. 486. 

Department of State Bulletin 



tions to Allied High Commission for Germany 
for the negotiation of mutually acceptable agree- 
ments with the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
effect of which will be to transform that relation- 
ship completely. In this connection they also 
referred to their hope that current negotiations 
with the Federal Republic would result in Allied- 
German agreement on a German contribution to 
Western defense. 

Reacting quickly, East German Premier Grote- 
wohl denounced the Western communique at a 
special session of the People's Chamber on Sep- 
tember 15 as "a gross deception of the German 
people"' which should not be allowed to succeed. 
Reflecting obvious Communist concern over the 
results of the Washington conference, Grotewohl 
declared: "Wliat San Francisco achieved for 
Japan, Washington is to accomplish for 
Germany." 

On September 27 Chancellor Adenauer replied 
indirectly to the Grotewohl People's Chamber 
proposals in a speech before the Bundestag in 
which he stated that "the supreme aim of the 
policy of the Federal Government is and remains 
that of re-establishing German unity in a free 
and united Europe. This unity should be based on 
the free decision of the entire German people." 
Adenauer then referred to the repeated proposals 
of the Federal Government for free, general, equal, 
secret, and direct elections for a constituent na- 
tional assembly and cited the rejection of these 
proposals by the Soviet zone authorities and fail- 
ure of the Soviets to reply to any of these pro- 
posals. He then declared that the Bonn Govern- 
ment would submit an election procedure for all- 
German elections which would in its essential 
points embody safeguards to insure all the neces- 
sary freedoms. These points were then spelled 
out in detail by Adenauer. 

He indicated that it was the position of the Fed- 
eral Republic that really free elections were pos- 
sible only if the prerequisites for the free ex- 
pression of the will of the people are fulfilled in 
fact in the Soviet zone, and called for the creation 
of a "neutral international commission under the 
supervision of the United Nations" to examine, in 
the Soviet zone and in the territory of the Federal 
Republic, "in how far existing circumstances per- 
mit of free elections taking place." 

The Adenauer statement was adopted by the 
Bundestag by an overwhelming majority, to- 
gether with a motion by the opposition Social 



Democratic Party ( Spd) calling upon the Federal 
Government to forward to the four occupying 
powers a request "to provide the German people 
with the earliest opportunity to conduct free, gen- 
eral, equal, secret and direct elections under inter- 
national control" for a constituent assembly. An- 
other Spd motion called for free elections in Ber- 
lin. 

On October 4, in accordance with the Bundestag 
resolutions. Chancellor Adenauer addressed a let- 
ter to the Tripartite Allied High Commission, re- 
questing the governments of the four occupation 
powers to arrange for all-German elections. In 
this connection, Adenauer called upon the powers 
represented in the Allied High Commission to 
propose the establishment by the U.N. of a commis- 
sion to carry out investigations in the Soviet zone 
and in the Federal Republic to ascertain to what 
extent prevailing circumstances permit the holding 
of free elections. 

The Allied High Commission replied to the 
Adenauer letter on October 15 assuring him that 
the three Governments would, at the first suitable 
opportunity, place the views of the Federal Re- 
public before the United Nations and would pro- 
pose that the United Nations undertake an 
investigation over the whole area of Germany as 
suggested in the Adenauer letter.' In fulfillment 
of this pledge, the United States, the United King- 
dom, and France presented a resolution at the 
sixth session of the United Nations General As- 
sembly calling for the appointment of "an im- 
partial international commission to carry out a 
simultaneous investigation in the Federal Repub- 
lic of Germany, in Berlin, and in the Soviet zone 
of Germany in order to determine whether exist- 
ing conditions will make it possible to hold gen- 
uinely free elections throughout these areas." This 
resolution, which was adopted on December 20, 
1951, by the overwhelming vote of 50 to 6, resulted 
in the appointment of a commission composed of 
representatives of Brazil, Iceland, the Nether- 
lands, Pakistan, and Poland.^ The Polish Gov- 
ernment declined to designate a representative. 

Following its constitution, the Commission held 
its first meeting on February 11, 1952, at Paris. 
On February 23 from its permanent headquarters 
at Geneva it addressed communications^ to the 
Chairman of the Council of the Allied High Com- 



' IhhL. Oct. 29, 1951, p. 694. 

' md., Dec. 24, 1951, p. 1019 ; Jan. 14, 1952, p. 55. 

'Ibid., March 3, 1952, p. 350. 



Apri7 74, J 952 



567 



mission for Germany for transmittal to the au- 
thorities of the Federal Republic and to the 
authorities of West Berlin, and to the Soviet Con- 
trol Commission for transmittal to the authorities 
of the Soviet zone of Germany and the authorities 
of East Berlin. Both the Western Allied and 
German authorities in West Germany and Berlin 
responded promptly, assuring the Commission of 
their complete cooperation in facilitating the task 
assigned to it, and subsequently welcomed the 
Commission's members at Bonn and Berlin. In 
sharp contrast to this reaction, neither the Soviets 
nor the East German authorities have responded 
to three requests on the part of the Commission for 
permission to enter the Soviet zone of Germany 
and the Soviet sector of Berlin. Moreover, 
through their various propaganda mouthpieces — 
both human and journalistic — the Soviets and 
their East German puppets have so far rejected 



the Commission and sought to malign its mem- 
bers. It remains to be seen whether the Soviets 
will revise their attitude toward the Commission 
and permit it to fulfill its important mission which 
is so crucial to future progress toward the realiza- 
tion of German unity. 

Editob'8 Note : On March 10, 1952, Soviet Deputy Foreign 
Minister Andrei A. Gromyko handed to Elim O'Shaugh- 
nessy, U.S. Charge d' Affaires at Moscow, a note containing 
proposals for a treaty of peace with Germany. Identical 
notes were handed to the British and French Ambassadors 
at Moscow. On March 25, the U.S., British, and French 
Embassies at Moscow delivered identical notes of reply 
to the Soviet Government. For texts of these notes and 
(or a statement by Secretary Acheson, see Bulletin of 
Apr. 7, 1952, p. 530. 

• Henry B. Cox, author of the above article, is 
presently Ofjicer-in-Charge, Division of German 
Information, Office of German Public Affairs. 
Mr. Cox formerly served in the Office of GermAjun 
Political Affairs where he specialized on German- 
Soviet policy. 



Observance of Third Anniversary of the Signing of the North Atlantic Treaty 



CONGRATULATORY MESSAGES 

[Released to the press April .J] 

Secretary Acheson has sent the following 
messages to Lester B. Pearson, Secretary of 
State for External Affairs of Canada and 
ChairmMfi of the North Atlantic Gowncil, and to 
Lord Ismay, Secretary General of the North At- 
lantic Treaty Organization, on the occasion of 
the third anniversary of the signing of the North 
Atlantic Treaty: 

Message to Chairman of the North Atlantic Council 

On this third anniversary of the signing of the 
North Atlantic Treaty, I wish to extend to you, 
as Chairman of the North Atlantic Council, the 
sincere greetings of the Goveriunent and peoi^le 
of the United States. Today, it is increasingly 
evident that our hopes for a peaceful and secure 
future depend largely upon the success achieved 
by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 

The last 3 years have been years of gratifying 
progress. We have made solid advances toward 
our goal of an effective mutual defense system, and 
have seen increasing cooperation among the 
Nato countries in many fields of activity. This 
progress has been the product of the effort, sacri- 
fice, and determination of all Nato jDartners. With 
each of us contributing these same qualities in the 
fullest measure, there can be no doubt that we 
will continue to move forward steadily. 

Permit me to add my personal appreciation of 
the contribution which your leadership has made 
to our success during recent months, 

568 



Message to Secretary General of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization 

I want to extend my heartiest congratulations 
to you on assuming the position of Secretary Gen- 
eral of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
To the people of the United States, Nato is a liv- 
ing symbol of our deepest aspirations for peace, 
freedom, security, ancl international friendsliip. 
We are all comforted by the knowledge that the 
grave burdens of leadership in this organization 
will rest upon such capable shoulders. Under 
your guidance and inspiration, we can look for- 
ward confidently to a continued growth in the 
unity, maturity and strength of the Atlantic com- 
munity. 

PURPOSE OF NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 

Address by the President"^ 

[Released to the press hy the White Souse April 4^ 

Wlien 12 nations of Europe and North America 
came together 3 years ago to sign the North At- 
lantic Treaty, one purpose was foremost in our 
minds. That purpose was to preserve peace for 
ourselves and our children. 

In the 3 years since April 4, 1949, the North 
Atlantic community has grown steadily in 
strength and in unity. Two more nations — Greece 
and Turkey — have joined the original twelve. But 

' The President's address and those of Secretary Ache- 
son and Mutual Security Director Harriman, which fol- 
low, were made at the ceremonies in commpmoration of 
the third anniversary of the signing of Nato, Constitu- 
tion Hall, Washington, D. C, on Apr. 4. 

Department of State Bulletin 



our purpose is exactly the same as it was 3 years 



The North Atlantic Treaty is an instrument of 
peace. All the lies and smears of hostile propa- 
ganda cannot conceal the fact that our nations 
have entered this treaty to preserve peace. The 
people of our countries don't want to fight another 
war; they want to prevent one. And they have 
gone about it in the only way that can possibly 
work: tliat is, by banding together for mutual 
self-protection. 

In the past, many of the North Atlantic Treaty 
countries, at one time or another, have tried to 
find peace through neutrality and isolation. It 
didn't work. It never will work. 

The people of the North Atlantic community 
know that if we are to preserve our independence, 
we must join our strength together. 

We have come a long way in these 3 years. We 
have created a common defense organization and 
have begun to develop sizeable defense forces, 
trained and equipped to spring into action against 
aggression. If we continue the hard, sustained 
effort we have begim, we can clearly foresee the 
time when our common military defenses will be 
strong enough to defend us against any attack. 

But we of the North Atlantic community are 
doing far more than simply building militai-y de- 
fenses. We are also working together to build the 
solid social and economic foundations which are 
essential to our military defenses and to our entire 
future. 

It is not our aim to turn the North Atlantic 
community into one huge garrison, concerned 
only with defense. Such an objective would be 
foolish and self-defeating. Our actual aim is far 
different. Our aim is to remove the threat of war 
and thus set free the forces of human progress 
and advancement. We want to get rid of poverty, 
to wipe out ill-health and disease, to provide bet- 
ter educations for all our people, to build finer 
cities and towns and improve conditions on farms. 
We want to open the way to spiritual and religious 
growth, and the continued development of the 
arts and sciences. 

The North Atlantic Treaty has made a tre- 
mendous difference in the outlook of the people 
of our countries — especially in Europe. Three 
years ago, many people were very discouraged — 
they thought the next war was bound to come 
soon, nothing could be done about it, and succes- 
ful defense was hopeless. 

Today, there is a vast difference. Most people 
can now see that we are steadily increasing our 
chances of preventing another world war. And 
they can see that if we succeed, a great new future 
will open up for the human mind and spirit. 

There are enormous possibilities of applying 
modern scientific advances to satisfy the needs and 
desires of men. There are immense opportuni- 
ties to improve our social institutions, to bring 
about better living conditions, to achieve the free 
society men dream of. 

April 14, 1952 



The basic principles of the treaty are the same 
principles that underlie the United Nations: on 
the one hand, to prevent war, and on the other 
hand, to improve the conditions of life for men, 
women, and children everywhere. This is why 
the North Atlantic Treaty means so much to free 
men — not only in our own countries, but in other 
lands. 

The struggle for peace is not easy, and it is not 
a struggle that can be won overnight. We shall 
have to continue to work for peace with all the 
determination and skill that we have. Every one 
of our countries has already accepted heavy bur- 
dens in this common struggle for peace, and there 
will be more burdens and sacrifices in the future. 

But we can attain our goal. We are demon- 
strating in the North Atlantic community every 
day that the dangers and problems of the modern 
world can be successfully overcome by men of good 
will working together in mutual trust and confi- 
dence. And that is the way to peace with freedom 
and justice for all men everywhere. 

AN ACHIEVEMENT OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 

Address hy Secretary Acheson 
[Released to the press April ^] 

Today, we celebrate together the anniversary of 
an institution which is an achievement of demo- 
cratic society in our day. Three years ago — on 
April 4, 1949 — representatives of 12 countries of 
western Europe and Noi-th America signed the 
North Atlantic Treaty here in Washington. 

Today, we again have with us representatives 
of all these countries. And on this anniversary, 
we are joined by representatives of Greece and 
Turkey — the two countries which only a few weeks 
ago were welcomed into the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization. 

We welcome to this ceremony young men from 
the armies, navies, and air forces of our Nato 
allies, who are now in this country to receive 
special training. 

We welcome officials of the military agencies of 
Nato, officials of various agencies of the United 
States Government, and many outstanding mem- 
bers of the Congress of the United States, includ- 
ing Senator Connally, who, together with Senator 
Vandenberg, played a great part in the creation 
of this organization. 

We not only commemorate the birth of Nato 
but mark the progress i,t has made from its incep- 
tion. The extent of this progress is set forth in 
the recent report of the Supreme Allied Com- 
mander, Europe. 

When our 12 countries signed the North At- 
lantic Treaty 3 years ago, our major immediate 
purpose was to protect ourselves against armed 
attack and the threat of it. But the roots of the 
treaty go deeper than the providing of defense. 
They go to the values which we are defending — 

569 



to the common bonds of liberty, of religious free- 
dom, of economic development, of military inter- 
dependence, and of political faith which have 
alvrays united the free peoples of Europe to those 
of North America. And its promise for the future 
is the prospect of common work in many fields to 
gain a better life for all our peoples. 

Today, the creation of defensive strength is 
still our most urgent task. Danger is still with 
us. There is not yet enough strength in the North 
Atlantic area to assure the maintenance of peace. 
The liopes of our peoples for peace, security, and 
prosperity demand greater strength for defense — 
and demand it without delay. 

We are meeting this demand. During the past 
2 years, our armies have grown. They will con- 
tinue to grow. They are being trained and 
equipped. They are being organized effectively. 
This is not something which we hope to do or plan 
to do — it is something we are doing now. 

At the same time, we all realize that the hardest 
part of the task lies ahead. Each of the 14 coun- 
tries represented here today has played an impor- 
tant part in the progress we have already made. 
The full contribution of each will continue to 
be essential. Nato defense can be created only if 
each partner shoulders its full share of the com- 
mon burden. 

The burden is not light. During the past 3 
years, the peoples of all our countries have made 
heavy sacrifices in order to give their agreed con- 
tribution. In many cases, the efforts made have 
approached closely the limits of their economic 
and physical capacities. 

This is a problem which all of us have con- 
stantly in mind. Tlie threat to our security is so 
great that none of us can afford to do too little. 
Yet, we also know that there would be little value 
in building armies unless we can preserve the eco- 
nomic foundations which support these armies 
and the society as a whole. 

I am convinced that we can solve these problems, 
however difficult they may be. I am convinced 
that together we can attain both military strength 
and economic stability. This group of nations 
cannot be free and secure unless they have both. 
By exerting our utmost efforts to help ourselves 
and help one another, we can have both. To- 
gether, our countries have enough manpower, re- 
sources, skills, and faith to master the problem of 
transforming the necessary portion of our poten- 
tial strength into strength in being. 

As we do so, let us remember that we are con- 
structing something more permanent than mili- 
tary formations. In a common enterprise of this 
kind, it is often true that there are consequences 
of our work together which will be more enduring 
than its immediate purpose. As we learn to work 
together to make ourselves strong, we are also 
learning to thinh together and to live together. 

Already, one result of our efforts has taken form 
and substance. The nations of continental Europe 
have begun to develop unified political, economic, 

570 



and military institutions. When completed, these 
institutions can underpin the strength of Europe 
for generations to come. These countries have 
attacked the barriers to trade which in the past 
have limited the efficient use of their skills and 
resources. They have taken steps to add to the 
productivity of labor and to make sure that the 
labor force can be used to the best possible ad- 
vantage. Some of them have developed arrange- 
ments for pooling vital raw materials such as coal 
and .steel, and are working out plans for merging 
their military forces. 

In all these undertakings, ancient national rival- 
ries are being subordinated to the common deter- 
mination of these peoples to maintain their free- 
dom. The primary credit for these decisive steps 
toward unity must go to Europe's own statesmen 
and peoples. We may take pride that Nato has 
greatly encouraged and assisted this process. 

Meanwhile, Nato itself has become a living and 
growing institution. Even while we are forced 
to concentrate on the problems of defense, we 
study possibilities of greater cooperation in the 
political, economic, and cultural fields. We have 
turned our eyes to the future — to the day when 
the peace and security we seek shall open a new 
era of human progress. 

April 4, 1949, began a great experiment in inter- 
national cooperation. It is an experiment in unity 
for strength, for peace, and for progress. The 
unity comes from ancient bonds which have long 
drawn us together. 

May these bonds grow ever more firm and 
strong, for they will sustain an Atlantic com- 
munity which shall be a source of strength to the 
United Nations and to all free peoples — to all 
peoples everywhere who wish to live in peace. 



NEW CONCEPT OF NATO 

hy W. Aver ell Harriman 

Director for Mutual Security 

[Released to the press iy Mutual Security Agency April ^] 

Not the least remarkable thing about this anni- 
versary we celebrate today is that it is only the 
third. It seems scarcely possible that the North 
Atlantic Treaty was signed only 3 years ago. The 
first meeting of the Nato Council took place only 
2^2 years ago. It was only 1 year ago that Gen- 
eral Eisenhower assumed his command. Yet in so 
short a time, Nato has become one of the most 
powerful facts of international life. It is the 
foundation of the structure of security the free 
nations are building around the world. 

We are participating in a new development in 
the history of nations. There have been other 
alliances in the past; in fact, there is another now. 
The Soviet Union has forced its satellites into an 
involuntary alliance held together by force and 
fear. This is the old system of domination and 
dictatorship. 



Depor/menf of S/afe Bulletin 



Nato is the new concept. Twelve European 
countries with Canada and the United States have 
voluntarily come together as free and equal part- 
ners, eager to work out common solutions to com- 
mon problems. It may be harder to find agreement 
among equal nations than it is to dictate agree- 
ment from the Kremlin, but the agreements we 
make will be strong and enduring, because they 
are the voluntary agreements of free men deter- 
mined to preserve their freedom. 

In the preservation of this freedom, our most 
pressing problem is to build a firm defense against 
aggression. It is to accomplish this that most of 
our energies are now bent. That job is not yet 
completed, but already, in 3 years, we see clearly 
that it can be done. We can look forward with 
confidence to the time when the free world is 
strong enough in arms to make aggression imprac- 
tical. When that time comes, we can devote more 
of our energies to strengthening the world in other 
ways. It is then, as the Secretary of State has 
suggested, that Nato may serve as an instrument 
for the fulfillment of the great aspirations of 
mankind. 

But in the meantime, our immediate task re- 
mains with us — to make ourselves secure. Just 
as no individual can find security unless his nation 
is secure, no free nation can find security unless 
the free world is secure. The Nato partners have 
joined their resources in building collective 
strength — not on the basis of narrow nationalism, 
but on the basis of an effective division of labor 
among partners, with each country contributing 
to a balanced, collective force. 

The Nato idea is based upon the principle of 
mutual effort. It can be successful only if each 
nation does its part. The United States, as the 
strongest of the partners, is called upon to make 
the greatest contribution to the mutual security. 
This contribution would be useless if it were not 
matched by vigorous efforts on the part of other 
countries. The extraordinary progress that Nato 
has made is a demonstration that all partners are 
doing their part. 

The United States gives strength to Nato. In 
turn we gain strengtla from it. This is the mean- 
ing of mutual security — the great modern answer 
to the age-old problem of how nations can pre- 
serve peace. It is on this principle that 14 nations 
have bound themselves together in Nato. It is on 
this principle that the United States has em- 
barked upon a great world-wide program of 
mutual security. 

The danger is world-wide and so is our response. 
The danger takes many forms. So does our ef- 
fort to gain security. We have not accepted the 
fallacy that the only threat is a military one. The 
threat of communism does not come only from the 
sword. The threat of communism is strong where 
men are weak — weakened from hunger, injustice, 
or ignorance. We must build security by helping 



people strengthen themselves in other than mili- 
tary ways. We know that the only world in 
which we can be secure is a world in which men 
are strong, healthy, and free. 

This is the philosophy behind all our joint ef- 
forts in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
Through Nato, we are working for the common 
defense against aggression. Through Nato, we 
are working for economic expansion and the pros- 
perity of all our peoples. Through Nato, we are 
working to foster freedom. Through Nato, we 
are seeking to release the intellectual and spiritual 
forces which are our common heritage. 

In joining together for these purposes, the na- 
tions of the North Atlantic community have had 
to shake off the weight of the historic prejudices 
which we all carry. We have had to develop new 
patterns of thought. 

This is as true of the United States as it is of 
the other Nato partners. Perhaps it is even more 
true of us, for the United States has been singu- 
larly protected by its history and geography. 
When we were projected into a position of world 
leadership, there were those who questioned our 
ability to change our traditional outlook. But 
who today, reflecting on the history of the last 
few years, can doubt the capacity of the American 
people to play the role in which we have been 
cast? Wlio, today, reflecting upon the initiative 
shown in Europe, can doubt the capacity of the 
peoples of all the Nato countries to rise to the 
challenge? 

The greatest single asset of the North Atlantic 
community is its human resources. Together we 
number some 400 million of the most creative and 
enlightened people in the world with by far the 
largest part of the world's industrial production. 
With all these resources, why should we live in 
fear? We need not live in fear. Another world 
war is not inevitable. Let no man say it is. 

It is true that there are difficult tasks ahead. 
Let us not delude ourselves that because we have 
accomplished much in 3 years we may now relax 
our efforts. 

The whole process of building mutual security 
is at a critical phase in all its aspects. Courageous 
political decisions must be made. Total produc- 
tion must continue to expand. The military build- 
up must go ahead rapidly. If any of us who are 
joined in this great endeavor slackens his efforts 
now, we will undermine what we have built. This 
is a critical moment in history when the future 
of mankind will be determined by the steadfast- 
ness, the vigor, and the speed with which we all 
press forward. 

In our own lifetime we have seen the terrible 
results of hesitation. There is no time for hesi- 
tation now. The progress of the last 3 years shows 
what can be done when like-minded nations work 
together. Together, this great assembly of free 
men can surely obtain our common objectives of 
security and the opportunity for human progress. 



April 14, 1952 



571 



First Anniversary of SHAPE as an Operational Headquarters 

Report of General Dwight D. Eisenhower 
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe ^ 



One year ago today, Supreme Headquarters 
Allied Powers, Europe [Shape], assumed opera- 
tional control of the forces dedicated to the de- 
fense of Western Europe. From that day on- 
ward, every member of this headquarters has been 
dedicated personally to the cause of peace and 
security. 

This anniversary provides a vantage point to 
review progress during the initial year of our 
joint enterprise, to take stock of our needs, and 
to present to member nations certain views that 
have developed in my Headquarters concerning 
our present security position. Though these ob- 
servations reach beyond the purely geographical 
limits of this command, we have found that no 
turbulence in the world scene fails to react directly 
on our common enterprise in Europe. The strug- 
gle against the threat of dictatorial aggression 
Has no geographical bounds; it is all one. 

It would be disastrous if the favorable signs 
and developments recorded in this report were 
to put any mind at ease, or to create a sense of 
adequate security, for there is no real security 
yet achieved in Europe ; there is only a beginning. 
Equally, it would be unfortunate if anyone were 
to find excuse for defeatism in the manifold diffi- 
culties and shortcomings of our joint effort to 
date. For we have made progress in all aspects 
of security. The momentum must be continued 
with renewed vigor, and since moral force is the 
genesis of all progress, especially progress toward 
security and peace, we must give i^rimary atten- 
tion to this vital element. 

We are competing with an ideological force, 
communism, which has joined with the imperial- 
istic ambitions of a group controlling all life and 
resources found between the Elbe and China Sea. 
Throughout this vast region, unity is achieved by 
the simple techniques of the police state. In this 
concert of action and power lies great danger for 
any single nation exposed directly or indirectly 
to the unrelenting never ending attacks of propa- 
ganda, subversion, force, and the threat of force. 

' Released to the press by Shape, Public Information 
Division, Paris, Prance, on Apr. 2. The report Is made 
to the Chairman of the Standing Group, North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization. 



If the free nations are to remain secure, our peo- 
ples must march together, agreed on common 
goals, and win that cooperative unity possible only 
in a free society. 

We want peace, we want freedom, too, and the 
individual rights to which our whole civilization 
is dedicated, but to want these things is not 
enough, we can kee^i them only by work, selfless- 
ness, constancy, and sacrifice. The enormity of 
the present threat wiU never be met by half- 
hearted measures or by any superficial military 
facade. Required is the full awakening of the 
free world and the pursuit of energetic, far reach- 
ing measures to insure our form of life, even our 
survival. 

During the first 50 years of this century, the 
nations of the Atlantic community have spent 
their strength and heritage in great conflicts which 
began in Europe and spread over much of the 
world's surface. As in all wars, a costly number 
of the natural leaders were killed. Destruction 
was widespread; public treasuries were emptied 
and family savings wiped out through inflation; 
economic conditions inflicted such heavy punish- 
ment on the masses of citizens that social problems 
took on new and bitter prominence ; in important 
areas of Africa and Asia, confidence in Western 
leadership was shaken. 

As we look over these developments, it seems 
almost as if the nations of the West have been, 
for decades, blindly enacting parts in a drama that 
could have been written by Lenin, prophet of 
militant Communistic expansion. This pattern 
of events, which points so surely to ultimate dis- 
aster, can be changed if only the peoples of the 
West have the wisdom to make a complete break 
with many things of the past and show a willing- 
ness to do something new and challenging. Nato 
itself is a significant step to meet both the present 
danger of aggression and the tragic struggles and 
dissensions that have divided our peoples in the 
past, but Nato's development is not automatic: 
action is the test. 

To advance this great effort, unified action is 
required, not only among but within our nations. 
Yet, it has seemed more than once within our 
countries that political factions hold their ovm 
immediate gain higher than the fate of their na- 



572 



Department of State Bulletin 



tion or even that of civilization itself. Then 
there are elements striving to hold back the hands 
of the clock, and apparently placing profits above 
patriotism. At the same time, there are workers 
in our member countries still suffering the delu- 
sion that their interests are served by association 
with Communist-led labor groups. It is night- 
marish that any free worker of the West could 
respond voluntarily to the same Kremlin voices 
that have dictated the elimination of free labor 
unions in Russia and satellite countries. In the 
free system, labor is a full-fledged partner and 
must share in responsibility as equally as it must 
share in productivity. We can thrive mightily in 
an era of good feeling. It can be brought into 
being by vibrant, selfless leadership at all levels 
of society. 

The unity of Nato must rest ultimately on one 
thing — the enlightened self-interest of each par- 
ticipating nation. The United States, for exam- 
ple, is furnishing much of the material resources 
of this project during the current year because it 
believes that America's enlightened self-interest 
is served thereby ; most American people agree as 
to the wisdom and necessity of this course. But 
they will continue to believe their own security 
interests are being served only as other partici- 
pants show cooperation and enterprise in improv- 
ing their own defenses. Consequently, it would be 
fatuous for anyone to assume that the taxpayers 
of America will continue to pour money and re- 
sources into Europe unless encouraged by steady 
progress toward mutual cooperation and full ef- 
fectiveness. To be sure, the citizens of all Nato 
countries are carrying heavy tax burdens, but 
even if these are at optimum levels, there still are 
many steps possible in Europe which would cost 
little and yet bring rich returns through increased 
strength. 

Fundamentally, and on a long-term basis, each 
important geographical area must be defended 
primarily by the people of that region. The aver- 
age citizen must, therefore, feel that he has a vital 
stake in the fight for freedom, not that he is a 
bystander of a pawn in a struggle for power. 
There is so much talk of national and interna- 
tional arrangements and interests that basic issues 
are often obscured from view. Fundamentally, we 
are fighting the battle of individual freedom for 
all. Before all men and before the world, our 
policies must be such as to inspire confidence in 
our strength and determination, and trust in our 
fairness. This is the moral foundation without 
which any military effort, any expenditure in lives 
and treasure, is fruitless. 

By our actions, too, we must demonstrate in 
convincing form that we are masters of our own 
destiny. Within the Atlantic community and in 
Europe, we have the opportunity to build a bul- 
wark of peace — a central position of unity and 
strength for the free world. This, then, must be a 
first and fundamental consideration. 



THE SITUATION ONE YEAR AGO 

[Excerpts] 

From all information presented, it was clear 
that the difficulties facing the new enterprise were 
manifold. Problems and the doubt they bred 
were on every side. It is common knowledge that 
peacetime coalitions throughout histoi'y have been 
weak and notoriously inefficient. Sovereign na- 
tions have always found it difficult to discover 
common ground on which they could stand to- 
gether for any length of time. Nevertheless, we 
were expecting Nato members not only to agree 
on common objectives but to work and sacrifice 
together, over an indefinite period, in order to 
achieve common security. 



THE MILITARY PROBLEM 

[Excerpts] 

To all these problems we now had to turn our 
minds. On the one hand, there was the problem 
of how to persuade the nations of the free West 
to allocate afresh their resources in production 
and manpower, so as to build between themselves 
and the East the required shield. On the other 
hand, was the strategic organization of the huge 
region, stretching from the Arctic Ocean to the 
Mediterranean Sea, which the forces of the West 
must defend. It is with the latter problem that 
I shall deal first. 

Western Europe, from North Cape to Sicily, 
had to be surveyed as a whole. There is the main 
land mass, stretching from the Baltic to the Adri- 
atic — a peninsula, when viewed in perspective, of 
that greatest of all land masses, which is Europe 
and Asia combined. On the flanks of this long 
peninsula we have two main outcrops — apart from 
the Iberian Peninsula and the British Isles. The 
one is Denmark, almost touching the tip of 
Scandinavia, whose western half, Norway, is 
among our brotherhood of nations sworn to defend 
freedom. The southern outcrop is Italy, project- 
ing into the Mediterranean, and affording us a 
strong position for flanking forces with valuable 
air and sea bases. 

We therefore conceived of Western Europe as 
an ultimate stronghold flanked by two defended 
regions: One comprising Denmark and Norway, 
and the other comprising Italy. All three of 
these countries are blessed by certain dispensa- 
tions in the way of natural defensive advantages. 
Norway has its rugged coast and hinterland ; Den- 
mark, its many internal water obstacles ; Italy, her 
mountains with the narrow passes on the north 
and the Adriatic to the East. It seemed sound to 
divide the command of Western Europe into three 
main sectors; Norway and Denmark as the one 
buttress, Italy and adjacent waters as the other, 
and the central mass as the main structure. 



April 14, 1952 



573 



Along these lines, the Shape command structure 
was fashioned. The bulk of ground and air 
strength would of necessity be in the center and 
a smaller number of land and air forces, together 
with naval support, would defend the northern 
and southern flanks. Accordingly, in the spring 
of 1951, there was announced the formation of a 
Northern Allied Command under Admiral Sir 
Patrick Brind, with Maj. Gen. Robert Taylor as 
his Air Commander, Lt. Gen. Wilhelm Hansteen, 
commanding Allied Land Forces, Norway, and Lt. 
Gen. Ebbe Gortz (later Lt. Gen. Erik Moller) 
commanding Allied Land Forces, Denmark. 

In the center. Gen. Alphonse P. Juin was chosen 
to command Land Forces, with Lt. Gen. Lauris 
Norstad in command of Air Forces. To insure the 
coordination of naval units operating in support 
of the center. Vice Admiral Robert Jaujard was 
appointed Flag Officer, Central Europe. These 
officers had the responsible duty of forging into 
single and redoubtable weapons the forces of the 
national contingents unified under their com- 
mands. There were to be units from France, Great 
Britain, the United States, Canada, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The air forces of 
the center were to be so developed and placed that 
they could operate with the central land forces 
and also be able to undertake any needed action 
on the flanks with the least possible delay. 

At the time of activation of the central head- 
quarters the organization for the command of the 
southern flank was still not designated. Our im- 
mediate need was the protection of this flank with 
land and air forces and an effective naval force, 
including carrier based aircraft. This need was 
intertwined with the problems of defense in the 
Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, 
which made for complexities that would take time 
to solve. 

The solution to the military problem was no 
more than begun with the development of the 
command structure and the various headquarters. 
The big task of "forging the weapons" remained — 
that is, the recruiting, training, and equipping 
of the standing forces and reserves, and of provid- 
ing their support in the war of airfields, signal 
communications, and supply lines. All these nec- 
essary elements in men and equipment, the North 
Atlantic Treaty nations were called upon to con- 
tribute to the common defense. 



POLOTICAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 

[Excerpts] 

Everywhere we turned we ran into political and 
economic factors. One thing was clear — nothing 
would be gained and much lost through any sub- 
stantial lowering of the already low standard of 
living in Europe. Our central problem was one 
of morale — the spirit of man. All human prog- 
ress in the military or other fields has its source 



in the heart. No man will fight unless he feels he 
has something worth fighting for. Next, then, is 
the factor of the strength of the supporting econ- 
omy. Unless the economy can safely carry the 
military establislnnent, whatever force of this 
nature a nation might create is worse than useless 
in a crisis. Since behind it there is nothing, it 
will only disintegrate. 

In the general rehabilitation of European econ- 
omy, the Marshall Plan had achieved remarkable 
success in the years 1947-50. The measure of its 
contribution to the well-being and stability of 
Europe could be fully appreciated only by one 
who had seen the situation there before and after. 
Nevertheless, the starting point had been so close 
to rock bottom that only a minimum level of 
economic strength had been regained. 

The Soviets, who wanted no recovery in Western 
Europe, had screamed that the Mai'shall Plan was 
a war measure, even though its terms offered eco- 
nomic assistance to the U.S.S.R. and its satel- 
lites on the same basis as that accepted by the free 
nations. In concept and application, the pro- 
gram was political and economic — to repair the 
chaos of war, to start industry on the road to 
health, and to raise production to a level con- 
sistent with minimum civil needs. 

To assist free nations, in Europe, and elsewhere, 
to build their own defenses against the persistent 
threat of aggression, the United States inaugu- 
rated the Mutual Defense Assistance Program 
(Mdap) late in 1949. The purpose of this pro- 
gram was to furnish items of military equipment 
which the other countries could not produce, and 
to assist in the training required for the effective 
use of those weapons. In the European area, the 
program also provided the countries some of the 
machine tools, materials and various components 
needed to get the production of munitions started. 

The flow of materials to Europe was under way 
during 1951, consisting for the most part of tanks, 
vehicles, aircraft, and guns from existing stocks. 
A number of light naval vessels of combat and 
support types were also transferred to European 
navies. 

For their part, recipient nations were to raise 
and maintain the forces and furnish the balance of 
equipment they needed. In addition, they were 
to prepare to cope with maintenance and replace- 
ment programs of the heavy equipment at the 
earliest practicable date. The United Kingdom, 
with her greater industrial capacity, was in the 
best position to furnish the bulk of her own needs 
in tanks, aircraft and communications equipment. 

Despite this extensive aid, the rearmament pro- 
gram meant heavy budget increases in all Euro- 
pean countries. Larger permanent establish- 
ments were required, and more extensive training 
programs. Facilities had to be created for new 
forces — airfields, depots, and all the requirements 
peculiar to military forces. Of these needs, air- 
fields were by far the most critical and expensive 



574 



Department of Slate Bulletin 



category. For the 1952 airfield program then 
being planned, real estate and construction costs 
amounted to the equivalent of one-half billion 
dollars. 

The effect of defense spending on national eco- 
nomics was greatly magnified by sharp world-wide 
increases in the cost of raw materials. Food, coal, 
and other basic necessities soared to new heights, 
kindling antagonism against governmental de- 
fense programs and the whole rearmament effort. 
In the village where I live not far from Paris, 
ordinary laborers averaged the equivalent of $70 
a month ; yet coal for their cook stoves ranged up 
to $50 a ton. For the price of a pair of shoes, the 
average man in Italy was already working 8 times 
as long as the American worker ; for a pound of 
butter the French worker toiled 5 times as long 
as his American counterpart. 

It is recognized, of course, that such compari- 
sons reflect many factors, including resources, 
management, tools, and efficiency. Nevertheless, 
they show that, heavy as defense costs were to the 
American taxpayer, far lesser burdens could be 
felt seriously by the average European. Under- 
standably, European governments were inclined 
to move carefully in such a political climate. As 
a consequence, all recommendations for augment- 
ing forces, building airfields, or increasing budget 
items were closely examined and frequently sub- 
ject to lengthy negotiation within the various 
parliamentary factions. 

However, the concerted effort toward greater 
strength made progress throughout the spring and 
summer months. The attitude of the governments 
was cooperative, but there did exist a general feel- 
ing that an accurate yardstick was needed within 
Nato to measure the scale and intensity of national 
effort. Obviously, this was an extremely compli- 
cated problem in view of the differences in national 
resources, financial position, industrial potential, 
and standards of living of various nations. Yet, 
failure to meet the situation would eventually lead 
to dissatisfaction and friction among our member- 
ship. 

There were other problems as well. Our plan- 
ning estimates of Shape forces to be created over 
the next few years had been prepared largely from 
the standpoint of military requirements. These 
programs now needed a feasibility test to insure 
that they were within the economic capabilities of 
member countries. However, no one knew the 
price tags. Presumably, some progi-am would in 
time be evolved to coordinate NAxo-wide produc- 
tion. But aside from the equipment pledged by 
the United States, no country knew at the moment 
what weapons it should plan on making for itself, 
what specialties it might make for other Allied 
nations, or what it should procure from others. 

Concern was felt in many quarters over the 
apparent failure to put to full use existing pro- 
duction facilities of Europe. There had always 
been large munitions industries in France and 



Belgium; the Netherlands possessed unused ca- 
pacity in the electrical and other technical fields ; 
several large aircraft factories were idle in Italy. 
The Defense Production Board of Nato had made 
extensive surveys of European production capa- 
bilities and had verified that considerable addi- 
tional military production was possible. Never- 
theless, financial limitations and the lack of firm 
national programs prolonged this distressing 
waste of facilities. 

Recognition of the specific problems impeding 
progress led to the appointment of the Temporary 
Council Committee at the Nato meeting in Ot- 
tawa during September of 1951. Headed by W. 
Averell Harriman of the United States, this com- 
mittee served Nato as an advisory group but, 
nevertheless, had power to investigate the broad 
military effort and the potential of each of the 
member nations. 

The primary task of the Tec was to develop a 
plan of action reconciling the issues arising from 
an acceptable military program with the actual 
capabilities of the member countries. It also con- 
sidered ways and means of reducing the cost of 
building effective defensive forces. In the proc- 
ess, the Committee surveyed the political and 
economic capabilities of each Nato country, as 
well as problems requiring attention in order to 
develop these capabilities. 

The efforts of the Tec represent a monumental 
achievement — an achievement which could only 
have been accomplished with the thoroughgoing 
cooperation of the member nations. Shape was 
a principal beneficiary of its labors. The opera- 
tion of the Committee was truly an innovation in 
that sovereign nations permitted an international 

group to examine their defense programs and 
leir capacity — financial, economic, and military — 
of supporting heavier burdens. 

As a result, the true dimensions of the rearma- 
ment task could be seen for the first time in terms 
of an integrated military, economic, and finan- 
cial effort. For the first time, positive recom- 
mendations could be made for a more efficient 
pooling of production facilities and for a more 
equitable sharing of the burdens incident to the 
defense program. The recommendations of the 
Tec were detailed and far going. They were not 
all acceptable to the governments of the partici- 
pating nations, but in large part they were. The 
final report of the Tec was approved at Lisbon and 
represented one of the great advances made at 
that meeting. 



A NEW SOURCE OF STRENGTH 

[Excerpts] 

Even with the maximum potential realized 
through the collective efforts of member nations, 
there is little hope for the economical long-term 
attainment of security and stability in Europe 



April 14, J 952 



575 



unless Western Gemiany can be counted on the 
side of the free nations. Here in the heart of 
Europe is an area of roughly 100,000 square miles, 
populated by nearly 50,000,000 industrious and 
highly skilled people. Rich in natural resources 
and production facilities, Western Germany alone 
produces one-half as much steel annually as the 
rest of Western Europe combined. The coal of 
the Ruhr, along with the industrial sinews it feeds, 
is a prime economic fact in Europe. 

With Western Germany in our orbit, Nato 
forces would form a strong and unbroken line in 
central Europe from the Baltic to the Alps. 
Depth is always a desirable element in defense ; in 
the restricted area of Western Europe it is manda- 
tory. Defensive depth is indispensable in coun- 
tering the striking power of mechanized armies, 
and the speed and range of modern aircraft. 

At first glance, a military alliance between 
Germany and the European nations of Nato 
would seem to lose sight of history. Too recently 
has Germany been the destroyer of peace in the 
Western world. The thought of a rearmed Ger- 
many is a matter of grave concern to the nations 
of Western Europe, who have suffered much from 
the misuse of German power. CertaiiJy, their 
anxiety is understandable. 

However, the people of Western Germany have 
made substantial progress toward understanding 
and achieving self-government. This develop- 
ment should be further encouraged by bringing 
them into closer association with the freedoms of 
the West. Thus their contributions to the com- 
mon defense must be made on the one possible 
basis, a voluntary one with equality of treatment 
for all. 

Surelj^ it would be foolhardy to assume that 
a gi'eat country like Germany could long remain 
a vacuum. Unless Germany becomes a partner 
of the West, we might, eventually, see a repetition 
of the disaster of Czechoslovakia. Consider the 
glittering blandishments held out to the Germans 
by Moscow during recent months — promises of 
German unity, renewal of her old trade with 
Eastern Europe, a German national army, re- 
moval of occupation forces and restrictions. The 
sturdy determination of the German Federal Re- 
public to ally itself with the freedoms of the West 
has been manifested by its refusal to be blinded 
by such tactics. For the good of the German 
people, this is certainly the only coui-se. For 
them tlie choice is starkly clear — freedom or sub- 
jection. 

As presently conceived, the European Defense 
Force calls for the pooling of forces into a com- 
mon militai-y organization for the defense of all. 
Initially, the forces to be unified would be those 
allocated by the participating nations to the de- 
fense of Europe. Troops required to meet com- 
mitments outside of Europe proper would be re- 
tained under national control. The direction, 
support, and administration of the unified defense 



forces would be vested in a European Defense 
Community, including a European assembly, a 
council, a court of justice, and an executive group, 
along with agencies for military supply, procure- 
ment, and budget. Such integi'ation of military 
forces, and particularly the integi'ation of their 
supply and supporting agencies, would prevent 
any participating nation from embarking on a 
separate course of aggression. 

The European Defense Force would include 
land, air, and naval units, and their supporting 
elements. Basic ground units would be called 
"groupements," of about 12,000 men. The air 
would be organized into wing-size units. At this 
level, troops would not be mixed as to nationality, 
thus preserving the language, customs, and esprit 
of the home peoples. These basic units would be 
combined in larger military formations such as 
army corps, made up of elements of different na- 
tional origin. The practicality of such integi'a- 
tion was proved many times during the last war 
and is currently being demonstrated by our 
United Nations troops in Korea. 

When formed, the European Defense Force 
would be integrated under Shape in the same 
maimer as purely national forces from the United 
States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and other 
countries not members of the European Defense 
Community. The new grouping would not 
modify, conflict with, or in any way supersede the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The con- 
cept of a European Defense Force is the consoli- 
dation of military elements of five nations of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization with forces 
from still another nation. Western Germany. It 
camiot fail to increase greatly the effectiveness of 
our collective security and to facilitate the 
achievement of Nato aims. 

Success would be a long step also toward the 
unification of Europe. This is the central goal 
and the only possible way of creating reasonable 
security, and insuring at the same time, the im- 
provement in living standards that characterizes 
Western civilization. Therein lies the real answer 
to the threat of Communistic inundation. It is 
not enough to know that our combined resources 
outweigh those of the Soviet dictators. Wliat 
matters is our ability to use them in the best pos- 
sible way for our security and well-being. 

Such efficiency demands the closest kind of po- 
litical and economic cooiseration, particularly in 
the area of Western Europe. For if the free na- 
tions of this region were really a unit, tremendous 
benefits would accrue to them individually and to 
Nato. Few Europeans would quarrel with this 
concept : political and economic unity is a popular 
theme to millions who have suffered from past 
differences. Yet progress toward full coopera- 
tion has been limited by the intricate and artificial 
maze of national obstacles erected by man himself. 

The advantages of political and economic unity 
can be demonstrated by such practical examples 



576 



Department of State Bulletin 



as the European Defense Force and the Schuman 
Phm, which embrace the same six countries. The 
Schuman PLan calls for the pooling and produc- 
tion of steel and coal — vital commodities of life 
and defense. 

In my opinion the two plans, the Schuman Plan 
and the European Defense Community, mark his- 
toric advances in European cooperation. If these 
could be supplemented by a Schuman Plan for 
electric power and for agriculture, along with a 
system for standardizing money values, the bene- 
fits would be profound and far reaching. These 
joint efforts would serve as practical laboratories 
for the development of that full political and 
economic unity which alone can make Europe self- 
sustaining and secure. Indeed, until this hope 
becomes an accomplished fact, or some miracle 
brings about a disappearance of the Soviet threat, 
there will be no confident peace and enlarging 
prosperity for any part of the free world. 

Although it is my conviction that a unified 
Europe offere the best hope for permanent sta- 
bility in this critical area, respectable strength 
can nevertheless be achieved within Nato by whole- 
hearted effort and cooperation. Much has been 
done towai'd that end in the past 12 months. 
Viewed separately, as military, economic, and 
political achievements, these gains may not be 
spectacular; but taken as a whole, they have 
created a profound change in morale, the basic 
factor of all. 

Already our active forces have increased to a 
point where they could give a vigorous account 
of themselves, should an attack be launched 
against us. In terms of army divisions, whether 
in service or quickly mobilizable, our foi'ces in 
Western Europe have nearly doubled in numbers. 
The national units pledged to this cominand a year 
ago were for the most part poorly equipped, in- 
adequately trained, and lacking essential support 
in both supplies and installations. Because of 
their weakness on all fronts, and the absence of 
central direction, they could have offered little 
more than token resistance to attack. Today, the 
combat readiness of our troops has improved 
markedly. Readjustments in their deployment 
have enhanced their potential effectiveness against 
the threat from the East. Behind them is a 
steadily expanding supply system, and a command 
organization to plan and direct their coordinated 
efforts. Still disappointingly far from sufficient 
for a determined defense, they nevertheless repre- 
sent a fighting force in whose spirit and increasing 
fitness our nations can take considerable pride. 

Pursuant to the recommendations of the Tem- 
porary Council Committee, our member countries 
have pledged to produce this year 50 divisions 
for European defense, exclusive of those to be 
provided by the two new Nato nations, Greece and 
Turkey. Roughly one-half of the 50 divisions 
will be standing forces; the remainder are plan- 
ned as reserve divisions available for employment 
at periods varying from 3 to 30 days. 

April 14, 7952 

987052—52 3 



The number of divisions pledged does not fully 
represent the magnitude of the effort required 
from the vai'ious member nations. Along with 
the divisions furnished, each nation must produce 
a variety of combat and service support elements, 
such as engineers, heavy artillery, comnumica- 
tions and transport, supply and maintenance units, 
to maintain these divisions in the field. When 
combined with other needs such as antiaircraft 
defenses, these requirements raise manpower and 
equipment totals to twice or three times those 
represented within the combat divisions. 

The building of these priority reserve divisions 
and similar forces to follow them represents one 
of the most difficult and urgent problems now 
before us. Each nation must now organize its 
reservists so as to produce trained formations 
which will be fit to fight without a long period 
of training after mobilization. Air power is the 
dominant factor in war today. It cannot win a 
war alone, but without it no war can be won. 

Our air arm has gradually progressed in 
strength and effectiveness during the past year. 
But the development of air power is a long and 
complex process. 

There is still a long way to go in developing air 
strength in Western Europe. A major task has 
been and continues to be the provision of adequate 
air bases and communications to link them. A 
vast amount of new construction is needed to ac- 
commodate the air power necessary to the defense 
of the West. 

One of the most heartening achievements of 
the Lisbon conference was the approval by mem- 
ber nations of a cost-sharing scheme to Duild a 
large number of additional airfields in Europe. 

As presently scheduled, Nato's European air 
arm will include by the end of 1952 some 4,000 
operational aircraft, a significant proportion of 
which will be modern jet fighteis. When realized, 
this air strength will amount to a greatly im- 
proved situation over what we faced a year ago, 
Ijut it will still be far from our ultimate require- 
ments. 

The naval equation in Western European waters 
is still weighted strongly in our favor. Deficien- 
cies exist in minesweepers, antisubmarine craft, 
and harbor defense installations, but efforts are 
being made toward filling these needs. The main 
advance on the naval side has been realized in 
the excellent coordination and common proce- 
dures evolved by Allied navies in European 
waters. 

These developments will bring to all European 
defense problems — sea, air, and land — the effec- 
tive application of modem sea power and the wide 
range of weapons which its arsenal contains. This 
capability is of particular importance in the 
northern and southern regions of my command. 
With the extension of the southern defense area 
some 1,400 miles eastward a broad flanking posi- 
tion will be organized vmder Admiral Carney, 
combining Shape forces in Italy and the Central 

577 



Mediterranean with those of Greece and Turkey. 
The essential role of sea power here is to link and 
support the defense forces of these countries while 
workinjj in close cooperation with other Allied 
forces in the Mediterranean area. 

Kecently I have had the stimulating experience 
of visiting our two new Nato members, Greece and 
Turkey. Knowing the courage they have shown 
in the face of direct Communist pressure, we are 
proud at Shape to welcome them as allies. 

The growth of military strength reported dur- 
the past year has derived from various 



me 



sources. Certainly it could not have been achieved 
without the arrival in the increasing numbers of 
tanks, aircraft, and heavy equipment from the 
United States and Canada. But arms are use- 
less without trained manpower; and during the 
past 18 months every Western Eiiropean nation 
represented in Shape has increased the length of 
its conscription period. Defense budgets were 
also raised; and among these continental mem- 
bers, military expenditures now average over 
twice the pre-Korean level. 

Extensive field exercises, with air forces and 
ground troops representing eight nations, took 
place in Western Germany last fall. Naval 
exercises and operations have been conducted by 
Allied fleets in the Mediterranean, the Channel, 
and northern waters. With soldiers, sailors, and 
airmen from many nations working together, the 
sense of comradeship, unity and common destiny 
has been strengthened. The merging of diverse 
procedures and many tongues is not an easy task ; 
but techniques have been designed to overcome 
the difficulties, and Allied commanders have been 
able not only to test them, but also to practice 
with valuable results the handling of international 
forces. 

At this time, the forces assigned to Shape are 
not of themselves sufficient to stay the hand of 
an aggressor. Of some comfort in this bleak 
realization is the existence of other military forces 
of the Nato countries in adjacent areas. 

Military strength is of little worth unless backed 
by healthy, expanding economies. In this trvith 
is found the source of many of our bitterest prob- 
lems. Yet, from the very beginning of our en- 
deavor, we have been able to draw some confidence 
from the knowledge that Nato's economic poten- 
tial is superior to that of the East. This potential 
springs from the productive peoples of the Atlan- 
tic community who hold in their grasp the great- 
est economic production, the most advanced tech- 
nology the world has yet seen. 

The process of channeling economic output into 
military ends, though rarely easy, has seemed 

Particularly hard in the present circumstances, 
carcity in Europe has been prolonged and severe. 
To deny even a part of the increased production 
to civil demands has been difficult; to make such 
decisions effective has been burdensome. The 
changes in established patterns of consumption 



and distribution, of trade and income, brought on 
by expanded military requii'ements, have encoun- 
tered resistance of many kinds. Governmental 
decisions in this part of the world must be made 
in an atmosphere of extreme financial stringency 
and under heavy pressure from various groups 
who feel acutely the impact of new taxes, con- 
trols, and higher prices. 

Increasing defense budgets have posed real 
problems of fiscal and financial management. 
Hanging over the Nato defense effort has been the 
menace of inflation, which if unchecked, could 
wipe out all gains. The pictui-e is by no means 
bright, and we are far from being able to regard 
the success of the military budgetary programs as 
already assured. In some countries, the pressure 
of inflation has been effectively cliecked. In 
others, inflation is surging upward and endanger- 
ing the whole defense program. 

From relatively small beginnings, European 
production of the equipment and supplies for 
modern armies, navies, and air forces has in- 
creased during the past year and further inci'eases 
will be undertaken. A significant and gi'owing 
proportion of the military equipment being pro- 
vided by the United States to its Nato partners 
is soon to be produced in European factories. 

After necessary initial armaments have been 
produced, Europe must become self-sustaining 
in military manufactures at the earliest possible 
date. The United States is currently making a 
tremendous effort to furnish a great portion of the 
capital outlay in military equipment. Without 
this, there could be no effective forces on the Con- 
tinent within the next 4 or 5 years. But America 
cannot continue to be the primary source of muni- 
tions for the entire free world. To do so would 
be militarily unsound. Moreover, the United 
Stat«s cannot long continue such expenditures 
without endangering her own economic structure. 
The soundness of that structure is of vital con- 
cern to the entire fi-ee world, for its collapse 
would be a world shaking tragedy. 

There is no precedent in peacetime for the 
Nato concept. At Shape, the basic relationships 
and the sweep of interest of a peacetime interna- 
tional command have evolved from day to day. 
I can state accurately that a great many of the 

Eroblems referred to me^ and often the most dif- 
cult have been economic, political, and psycho- 
logical rather than {purely military. But even in 
the military field we have seen considerable 
change in the specific responsibilities and activi- 
ties of this command. 

The military forces we are building must be 
continually modified to keep pace with new weap- 
ons. To this end an annual review of the full na- 
ture and composition of our military programs 
should be accomplished. 

Our goals are simple ; they are honorable ; they 
can be achieved. Wliy, therefore, should there be 
confusion in the minds of millions of our own 



578 



Department of State Bulletin 



peoples as to the basic aims of our defense pro- 
gram, the necessity for it, and the urgent demand 
for their own individual efforts? 

Once these facts are established in the minds 
of our Atlantic peoples, there will be less bicker- 
ing in our councils, and it will become proOTes- 
aively more difficult for self-seeking individuals 
to delay our progress by exploiting internal na- 
tional divisions or minor grievances between our 
members. Once the truth is understood, once the 
critical dangers present in the world situation are 
really known, there will be less complacency con- 
cerning our present military situation, and the 
harmful effects of delay will be clearly seen. 

The Soviet Army casts its shadow over the 
length and breadth of Europe. The satellite coun- 
tries have increased the size and combat effective- 
ness of their armed forces. Eeports from behind 
the Iron Curtain indicate that the restiveness of 
these captive people has led to even tighter, 
tougher, more brutal measures of state control. 
The familiar technique of the purge, deliberate 
terror, and intimidation has forced a measure of 
unity — however unhappy — in this area. 

The Soviet Air Force in Eastern Germany is 
currently replacing obsolescent aircraft with jet 
planes. Work on airfields, communications, and 
supply installations is being vigorously pursued 
in Eastern Europe. By the prolongation of the 
war in Korea and Indochina, by the constant at- 
tempts at erosion and subversion of effective gov- 
ernment in the Far East and Middle East, heavy 
drains have been imposed upon the Western 
Powers, which reduce the resources available to 
establish a balance in Europe. 

Nevertheless, the tide has begun to flow our 
way and the situation of the free world is brighter 
than it was a year ago. At Lisbon, our member 
nations made great headway on issues vital to 
our continued progress. They strengthened our 
eastern flank by bringing into Nato the stout- 
hearted peoples of Grreece and Turkey. They 
agreed to the concept of a European Defense Com- 
munity and a close relationship with the German 
Federal Republic. They approved a program to 
establish this year a force of 50 standing and 
reserve divisions and 4,000 aircraft. 

When combined with the ready strength avail- 
able in Greece and Turkey, this force — if properly 
armed and trained — should produce an encourag- 



ing degree of security. Considering training, or- 
ganization, materiel, vital installations, and all 
the various factors which go to make up military 
proficiency, I personally would look upon com- 
pletion of this program as clear material evidence 
that the basic goals of our combined enterprise are 
going to be achieved. 

Now our governments must convert the Lisbon 
program into actuality. It demands full and un- 
stinting support, for only through positive action 
by all our nations can we ever achieve tranquility 
and security. 

As we work together in the coming year, we are 
cari-j'ing out our pledge to each other. We are 
reaffirming our true beliefs in the principles oi 
democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of 
law. We are one in our desire to live in peace 
with all peoples and all governments. But we are 
steadfast in our determination to safeguard the 
freedom, the common heritage, and the civilization 
of our member nations. 

This is a great task — a noble charge. In a world 
where powerful forces are working tirelessly to 
destroy the freedom, individual liberty, and dig- 
nity of man, we cannot for one moment delay our 
advance toward security. The task will require 
constant watchfulness, hard work, cooperation, 
and sacrifice, but what we do now can grant us 
peace for generations. 

It can be done, given the will to do it. There is 
power in our union — and resourcefulness on land, 
sea, and air. Visible and within grasp we have 
the capability of building such military, economic, 
and moral strength as the Communist world would 
never dare to challenge. 

When that point is reached, the Iron Curtain 
rulers may finally be willing to participate seri- 
ously in disarmament negotiations. Then, we may 
see fulfilled the universal hope expressed in the 
United Nations Charter to reduce the "diversion 
for armaments of the world's human and economic 
resources." Then the Atlantic community will 
have proved worthy of its history and its God- 
given endowments. We shall have proved our 
union the world's most potent influence toward 
peace among men — the final security goal of 
humanity. 



2 April 1952 



DWTGHT D. ElSENHOWEK 



April 14, 1952 



579 



Visit of Queen Juliana of the Netlieriands 



STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ACHESON 

[Released to the press April 2] 

I want to take, advantage of this opportunity to 
exijress the happiness of all Americans that Her 
Majesty The Queen of The Netherlands, His 
Royal Highness Tlie Prince of The Netherlands, 
His Excellency The Foreign Minister, and the 
other members of Her Majesty's party will arrive 
in Washington in a few hours. This visit will 
further enhance the true friendship which exists 
between the Netherlands and this country. 
Everyone looks forward to making their tour of 
the United States a most happy and memorable 
time. 

All of us are much aware of Dutch contribu- 
tions to this country, to its growth, to its culture, 
to its material develoi^ment. I doubt that there is 
a telephone directory for any major city in the 
United States in which there is less than a full 
page of names beginning with "van." The Neth- 
erlands Government was one of the first Govern- 
ments to lend this counti-y financial aid after the 
American Revolution. In these days when it has 
become necessary for the fi-ee world to stand 
closer together tlian ever before we appreciate this 
early instance of investment in freedom. 



ADDRESS BY QUEEN JULIANA TO THE CON- 
GRESS 1 

I am grateful to be invited to speak to you — 
as once my mother did — to you, the elected Repre- 
sentatives of the American people, and I do so, 
first of all, because of the gratitude my husband 
and I and all of the Netherlands people feel for 
the wonderful welcome given to us by your coun- 
try, which calls itself rightfully the land of the 
free and the home of the brave, in this its very 
sanctuary. 

We feel we appear here in the name of a nation 
of your comrades in the recent war — that crusade 
against evil — in which each performed his par- 
ticular part. A brotherhood was born there in the 
depth of distress and in the height of joy. The 
Dutch people hold in deep respect and grateful 
memory your brave men, who sacrificed their lives 
wlierever we have been fighting side Iby side. 

'Made on Apr. 3, and printed from Cong. Rec. of the 
same date, p. S.'iOO. 



Before you came to our aid we already had a 
comradeship, consisting of a close kinship of 
descent and of a similarity in our national history 
and growth as independent and democratic na- 
tions. We even also seem to share some of our 
virtues and vices. But, nevertheless, there is still 
always need to deepen our understanding for each 
other. Because it is this we need more than any- 
thing else, as contact among mankind is growing 
ever closer, we have never before been so keenly 
aware that in this world of ours we need coopera- 
tion as intimate as that among the cells of one 
body. 

You have seen this, and have planned a program 
for aid to the countries robbed and ruined by 
totalitarian war — help on such a scale as has never 
been conceived before. We in the Netherlands 
were deeply impressed by your great plans and 
their execution. They enable us to stand once 
more on our own feet. We shall do so as soon as 
possible in ever sounder economic circumstances. 

On this occasion again, and in this Hall espe- 
cially, I want to express the thanks of the Nether- 
lands for this proof of generous friendship, 
offered by your Government and by your people 
through the voice of Congress and by countless 
private voices. The call for transoceanic friend- 
ship then became very strong. 

If America does not want to stand alone — and 
I know she does not — I feel that she not only likes 
to give her help to others but that she also counts 
on their support. The Netherlands can give you 
that support, in your eyes perhaps a small amount 
in the form of goods or money, but much in the 
form of good will. 

That is not the indebted feeling of the bene- 
ficiary, or the feeling of the debtor toward the 
creditor; it is not the feeling of the small toward 
the gi'eat, or the feeling of the planned-f or toward 
the planner ; but the feeling of friendship and re- 
lationship of the free for the free, of those who 
can carry responsibility for those who can carry 
it, too, and of mutual respect for each other and 
for all, sprung from that general and very deep- 
rooted sense for the connection, brotherhood, and 
coexistence of all mankind. 

One human race, under the law and the love of 
one God. 

Our human legislations seek from afar to fol- 
low the divine law. They mostly fail, but they 
strive on. 



580 



Department of State Bulletin 



We live in the dawn of a time when we must 
seek to do this as one human race. 

Mankind sliould be one kind. 

A split humanity is like a split personality; it 
is inclinetl to go from bad to worse, unless it re- 
covers its unity of pui'pose, comes to coordinated 
thinking, and gains sanity and happiness. 

The sane part of the mind of humanity must 
always remember it is responsible for the other 
part. The sound half is the one which is desig- 
nated to save the other half. 

The American people have entrusted you with 
the honor and the grave mandate of working out 
your great country's role in this important era. 

I see any task of being a servant to the public 
interest, being one myself, as one of the finest, but 
also as the most difficult and responsible. You, as 
representatives of the people, carry this great re- 
sponsibility both toward your voters and toward 
the general well-being of your country, and conse- 
quently, especially in our modern interwoven con- 
ditions, toward the world at large. 

This places on each of you the full burden of a 
responsibility nobody will envy you, as your de- 
cisions have enormous repercussions all through 
the world. 

It is my personal wish for you that each of you 
may experience individually the gratifying feel- 
ing of satisfaction that your decisions will have 
proved in the end to be essentially and ultimately 
the right ones. 

I do not want to be so short-sighted as to ask you 
to bear in mind the interests of the Netherlands in 
particular, or even those of Europe. What I want 
to plead for, though, are the interests of the world 
as a whole. 

With you, I realize keenly how any apparently 
trifling interest may represent a great pi'inciple 
and, on the other hand, how a necessary sacrifice 
in the local sphere may mean greater well-being 
for the greater community, to the ultimate good 
even of tliose who made the sacrifice. 

Let me assure you that the Dutch people will 
accept, for a common cause, the full share of their 
burden. 

We have been so fortunate as to live in social 
peace and stability, and so we feel we can be a 
reliable pillar of European unity, a unity which is 
growing by means of the Schuman plan, other eco- 
nomic and defensive and — perhaps eventually — 
political integration. Constitutional amendments 
have been voted lately by the Netherlands Parlia- 
ment, in order to remove some remaining obstacles 
to our paitnerahip in future supranational organi- 
zations. 

The Growing Unity of Europe 

There is a growing strength in this growing 
unity of free and democratic Europe, necessary 
for the very strength of the world. 

Only such a vision can lead to that greater unity 
which the world yearns for. 



Only a great vision will some day find the way 
out of the universal fear of war and annihilation. 

Many of us believe we are in a downward spin. 

How can the trend downward become the trend 
upward ? 

I think that the challenge of our time is to start 
a definite ujDward trend to a higher unity and well- 
being than we ever reached before. Judging from 
the results of all our endeavors, however, the right 
answer is still to be found. 

I am not referring to idealism here. I am refer- 
ring to practical solutions. 

Most likely they will mean some sacrifices for us 
all. If we all could only really train our minds — 
and may I also say : Wake up our hearts — to this 
idea of sacrifice. Not only our financial, our eco- 
nomic and our political interests — worse, our sov- 
ereignty and prestige are involved in all this. We 
may succeed in working out plans for coordination 
which will at least make a closer cooperation pos- 
sible between those countries which are aware of 
the overriding interest of integi'ation. We still 
seem far away fi-om this Utopia and yet it remains 
hard to understand why we do not achieve greater 
results with the magnifi.cent tools with which mod- 
ern science has equipped us and with the many 
supei'ior minds which we have in our midst. If we 
could only use the tools properly and place the best 
minds in the most difficult posts we might be able 
to achieve results which would demonstrate that 
the sacrifices which were made in reality proved to 
be blessings in disguise. 

I am not thinking of any particular form of 
coordination or organization. There are brilliant 
minds in abundance, to seek and find the right one. 

The United Nations is still in its infancy and 
although it is encouragingly successful in some 
fields, it has to cope with the greatest difficulties. 
Yet, who would question the value of a world 
organization as the most essential form we need 
to serve this development? 

But there is no avoiding the fact that the world 
is split into two parts, that there are two magnetic 
poles of which one is positive — the one called 
democracy — and the other is negative, indicating 
slavery. To my mind there is no doubt that if 
we could only increase the energy radiated by the 
positive pole of freedom and democracy, it would 
be impossible for the negative pole to withstand 
this force and it would in the end have to yield. 
All the doubting spirits in the woi'ld, in our 
western countries, in the old and young democ- 
racies, in the newly sovereign states on other con- 
tinents, must be enabled to see clearly that only 
the free and democratic world can give them all 
which is considered worth while. 

The U.S. Technical Assistance Program 

That is why I must express a deep appreciation 
here for the far-sighted American policy concern- 
ing a project like the technical-assistance 
program. 



Apr/7 14, 7952 



581 



Through this program the technically more ad- 
vanced countries can extend assistance in a com- 
pletely unbiased and unconditional manner to the 
overpopulated and technically less advanced areas 
in the world, which stand in urgent need of the 
skill and know-how of the western nations. 

Our material resources in the Netherlands are 
not large enough to send important supplies or 
give financial assistance to underprivileged areas. 
We can and do participate in the export of skills, 
the sending of technical experts, which will show 
these countries how to help themselves. For stu- 
dents and scholars who wish to further develop 
their abilities in Europe we have founded the 
Netherlands Universities Foundation for Inter- 
national Cooperation with an Institute of Social 
Studies, which provides courses in a series of 
subjects of particular importance to foreign 
students. 

It is my earnest hope that one memorable day 
the enormous increase of production now de- 
manded by rearmament will be converted to meet 
the demands of these enormous development 
projects. 

The circle of countries around the North At- 
lantic Ocean should avoid imitating the example 
set by the countries behind the iron curtain, which 
have focused their minds so much on their defense 
that they forget to focus as much attention on 
their economic, social, and cultural well-being, let 
alone the progress of the whole family of nations. 

If they do neglect these aspects, someday they 
might find themselves isolated around their ocean 
before, for instance, technical assistance could get 
under way properly and link them with the world 
at large. 

This one might call a cold war for peace. 

The public-minded spirit of service to the world 
at large originates in the United States of America 
if anywhere. 

If tliis spirit gets its chance, it will lead to good 
will among nations and men and good will leads 
to understanding and understanding leads to con- 
fidence. And confidence is the only workable basis 
for international cooperation. Without confi- 
dence it has no base, no efficiency, no success. It is 
a sheer waste of time and money, paper and ink, 
and, worse, of hope. 

A Pax Atlantica 

If it gets its chance, it will grow into a pax 
Atlantica — Atlantic peace. 

I do not think that in a Pax Atlantica the At- 
lantic community could ever become an isolated 
group. Much less could it ever be a threat to other 
parts of the world, for even as an Atlantic com- 
munity we cannot permit ourselves to withdraw 
in splendid isolation and give up our links with the 
rest of the world community. 

The stones of the Atlantic structure which we 



are building together are cemented by our affinity 
for one another, for otherwise they might easily 
fall apart once more. 

It is true that a sea connects, but only when 
people want it so. 

The uninhabitated space of the water by nature 
separates. 

For what purpose are we pulling together but 
to save freedom, the Atlantic freedoms ? 

Freedom is not only the absence of tyranny in 
whatever form ; it is life itself. Life is the positive 
pole, as opposed to the negative one, which is 
slavery and death. 

To accept freedom means to carry responsibil- 
ity. Wherever this is recognized as a right and a 
duty for everybody, we call it democracy. It is 
the only form of fair government. In no other 
regime is human dignity respected so absolutely 
and an equal opportunity given to everybody re- 
gardless of his convictions. Democracies will 
naturally be inclined to be peaceful, as they rep- 
resent the people. These principles were laid 
down in a matchless way in your Declaration of 
Independence. All these things are what we, as 
democratic peoples, have in common. This is 
our unity. 

We all want the Atlantic peace to pioneer the 
peace of the world. 

We cannot hope for better times unless man- 
kind as a whole throws off its shackles — shackles 
of every kind — not only those of tyranny and 
totalitarianism but also those of self-interest, 
prejudice, lack of understanding, and lack of 
confidence. 

It stands to reason that when those are abol- 
ished humanity might radiate the well-being of 
freedom, justice, and security, and might make a 
start for a better world and a full communal life. 

Mankind in its distress has to trust largely to 
your good judgment for its deliverance. 

Let us all do the best we can. Leave the rest to 
God. He will not forsake this poor world for the 
sake of all the good-willing and bravely striving 
souls living in it. 



CORRECTION 

In the Bulletin of April 7, page 536, the second 
column should begin : 

"down to provincial levels and making use of 
Indian art, literature, films, dance, music, and 
education is indicated in plans for the All-India 
Cultural Conference and Festival for Peace to be 
held in Calcutta, April 2 to 6." 

In the same issue, page 549, first column, the 
sentence beginning in line 9 should read: "The 
primary purpose of the booklet is to draw the inter- 
est of potential candidates toward the Foreign 
Service." 



582 



Department of State Bulletin 



Aims of "American Peace Crusade" Exposed 

Statement iy Franeh H. Russell 
Director of the Offlce of Piihlic Affairs * 



The Department of State notes the statements 
which this delegation of the "American peace 
crusade" have just made and those which have 
been received in the past few days from other 
members. Your gi-oup urges (1) "a recognition 
of the right of colonial people to independence and 
self-government," (2) "an end to the rearming of 
the German Nazis," and (3) "peace in Korea 
immediately." 

First of all, although you have not referred to 
it in your statements, it should be made plain 
that your organization is a counterpart in the 
United States of a world-wide Communist cam- 
paign which receives its direction from the 
Kremlin. 

Not only is your "peace crusade" Communist 
directed, it also follows the standard Communist 
tactic of seeking to increase Communist power 
through public confusion. It is part of an effort 
to cover up the Communist goal of world domina- 
tion by drawing over itself a cover of spurious 
ideals which simulate those to which honest and 
well-intentioned people subscribe. 

In this connection it is useful to recall Stalin's 
words that if any foreign minister begins to defend 
"peace" to the death "you can be sure his govern- 
ment has already placed its order for new dread- 
noughts and airplanes. A diplomat's words must 
have no relation to action — otherwise what kind 
of diplomacy is it? "Words are one thing, actions 
another. Good words are a mask for the conceal- 
ment of bad deeds." 

You say that you want "a recognition of the 
right of colonial people to independence and self- 
government." Within the last 12 years the coun- 
tries of the free world have given independence 
and self-government to GOO millions of people. 
This includes the Philippines, India, Pakistan, 
Kepublic of Korea, Indonesia, Burma, Libya, and 
Ceylon, and othei-s are attaining their independ- 
ence as rapidly as the conditions necessary for 
self-government are created. The policies which 
have resulted in this unprecedented series of steps 
toward popular independence still underlie the 
actions of the free world. 

During approximately the same period the So- 
viet Union has deprived of their independence and 
liberties the peoples of Poland, Czechoslovakia, 

' Made before the delegation of the American Peace 
Crusade at the Department of State on Apr. 1 and re- 
leased to the press on the same date. 



East Germany, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Al- 
bania, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. The peo- 
ples of China are also suffering the horrors of 
Communist methods of control. These people 
total over 550 million. 

This record speaks for itself. 

You say that you desire "an end to the rearm- 
ing of the German Nazis". In the parts of Ger- 
many that have been occupied by the American, 
British, and French Governments nazism has been 
supplanted by a genuinely democratic political 
system. Tlie Government of Western Germany 
has indicated no intention of rebuilding German 
militarism. It has on the contrary indicated its 
intention of contributing to the European armed 
forces which will make secure the freedom and 
the independence of the peace-minded peoples of 
Europe. This is the best possible guarantee 
against any form of totalitarian aggression, Nazi 
or Communist. 

At the same time, the Soviet Union in its note 
of March 10 has proposed to allow Germany a 
national army and to grant amnesty to Nazis. 

You urge "peace in Korea immediately". From 
the time Korea was first liberated from the Jap- 
anese the efforts of this Government have been 
directed toward bringing about as quickly as pos- 
sible a free, independent, and peaceful Korea. 
These efforts have been rendered ineffective by the 
refusal of the Kremlin to cooperate with the 
United Nations in accomplishing these objectives 
and by the Communist aggression against the Ee- 
public of Korea. The peace in Korea was broken 
by Communist aggression. It could be restored 
if there were any honest willingness on the part 
of the Communists to restore it. 

The group to which you belong is a tool of 
communism and does not represent any significant 
element of the American people. It can be said 
with confidence that your effort to confuse the 
people of the free world is futile. The gi'owing 
solidarity of the free world has been demon- 
strated at San Francisco, in the various meetings 
of the United Nations, in the progress of Nato 
and the European Defense Community, in the 
Organization of American States, and in the grow- 
ing determination of free peoples everywhere to 
defend themselves against aggression. The free 
world is making progress in the only way in which 
progress is possible toward the goals which you 
falsely claim as your objectives. 



April 14, 7952 



583 



Tenth Anniversary of the Institute of Inter- American Affairs 



STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT 

[Released to the press hy the White House March SI} 

Today, Mai-cli 31, 1952, the Institute of Inter- 
American Affairs celebrates its tenth anniversary. 

Its 10 years of life have been 10 years of inter- 
national cooperation in improving the living 
standards of the people of this hemisphere. 

Tlie climate of peace and prosperity among the 
American Republics is a great source of comfort 
and pride to us all. A real share of the credit for 
this achievement is due to the Institute of Inter- 
American Affairs. 

The program of the Institute of Inter- American 
Affairs is one of the world's best examples of mu- 
tual effort by democratic nations to solve their 
most pressing economic and social problems. No 
other overseas government program better fulfills 
the historic good neighbor policy of the United 
States. The experience of the Institute shows us 
how technical assistance can be made available on 
a cooperative basis not only in the Western Hemi- 
sphere but also in other parts of the world under 
the Point Four concept. 

The Institute undertakes its constructive work 
only at the invitation and with the participation 
of the countries concerned. Two-way coopera- 
tion is the reason for the Institute's success. 
Through the Institute our country works with the 
other xVmerican Republics as self-respecting na- 
tions, on an independent but cooperative basis. 

Over the past decade, the Institute's cooperative 
programs have touched directly or indirectly the 
lives of millions of people in Latin America on 
the farms, in the small towns, and in the big cities. 
Malaria and other dread diseases are being con- 
quered. The capital of a leading Latin American 
country for the first time now has a safe system 
of water supply and sewage. Another nation is 
diversifying its basic agriculture in the first major 
program to change an uneconomic one-crop pat- 
tern established centuries ago. 

In the Andes region, industrial safety experts 
provided by the Institute are serving as advisers 
on safety methods in mining. In the vast Ama- 
zon River Valley, health centers established with 
the help of the Institute and staffed by doctors, 
nurses, and laboratory technicians are wiping out 
diseases and providing preventive medical services 



for jungle dwellers who never before had medical 
attention. 

These and other technical-assistance projects 
are a notable contribution to the unity of the hemi- 
sphere and to its common determination to prove 
that the way of freedom is better than the way of 
communism. 

There is still a great deal to do. In one of the 
leading Latin American nations, for example, pro- 
ductivity is only one-eighth of what it is in the 
United States, life exiJectancy is only 40 years, 
compared to about 68 for the United States; and 
scarcely one out of three children in rural areas 
can go to school. The need for further work is 
evident. The activities of the Institute must con- 
tinue so that we can expand our efforts to fight 
hunger, poverty, disease, and illiteracy through- 
out the American Republics. 

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ACHESON 

[Released to the press March 31] 

We in the Department take great pride in the 
activities of the Institute of Inter-American Af- 
fairs (Iiaa) which, on March 31, 1952, will cele- 
brate 10 years of technical cooperation with Latin 
America in the improvement on a hemispheric 
basis of food production, public health, and basic 
and vocational education. I take pleasure in 
adding my congratulations to those of thousands 
of other Americans throughout both continents. 

As regional administrative office in Latin 
America for all Technical Cooperation Adminis- 
tration Point Four activities, the Institute is 
playing an important role in the attainment of 
mutual security. Today, it is carrying on pro- 
grams of cooperation with 19 republics in Latin 
America. Its jaioneer experience is being utilized 
in Point Four technical-assistance projects in 
many other areas of the free world. 

As the operating and expediting agency in Latin 
America of President Truman's Point Four policy 
of technical assistance to friendly nations, the 
Institute has made a large contribution toward the 
atmosphere of friendship and security prevailing 
in this hemisphere. Its support of the good neigh- 
bor policy during the past 10 years has helped 
build the hemisphere into a neighborhood of self- 
respecting, self-reliant friends. 



584 



Department of State Bulletin 



Historically, the Institute is a logical out- 
growth of the basic aspects of our foreign policy. 
It has strengthened the already strong ties of re- 
spect and unity binding us together in the deter- 
mination to reach goals of better living and eco- 
nomic advancement. It has helped contribute to 
the defense of the free world against aggression. 

Defense can never be assured by military action 
or preparedness alone. To assist in building a 
strong economy among free and friendly people 
is a major objective of the Institute of Inter- 
American Affairs. In this effort, the countries 
of this hemisphere — both large and small — played 
their part. 

Fortunately, we have real friends and allies in 
this hemisphere. They stood by our side in World 
War II, and they are increasing their important 
contributions of strategic materials in the present 
emergency. This contribution is made possible 
by the very projects to which the United States 
is contributing technical assistance through the 
Institute of Inter-American Affairs. This as- 
sistance is not confined to the Institute's coopera- 
tive programs of agriculture, education, health 
and sanitation, and public services. It includes, 
under the expanded program of the Technical 
Cooperation Administration, the coordination by 
the Institute, as the Point Four regional office for 
Latin America, of the work of 44 other United 
States agencies in many other sound economic 
activities. 

Five hundred Americans are now working with 
more tlian 9,000 local technicians in the closest 
collaboration. They have made progress. They 
have economic importance to the countries in 
which they operate and to us. They contribute 
toward providing us with strong, friendly neigh- 
bors and toward improving local economic condi- 
tions. These factors join to provide a favorable 
climate for local and foreign investments and 
the establishment of a large group of potential 
purchasers of American manufactured products. 

The technical-assistance program in Latin 
America has been cooi^erative in every sense of 
the word. The average matching contributions 
by the Latin American host nations for carrying 
on the programs is approximately $8 to $1 from 
the United States. If all Iiaa administrative ex- 
penses are included, the ratio is better than $3 
to each $1 from the United States. Throughout 
the 10 years of the program a chief goal of U.S. 
technicians has been to train Latin American per- 
sonnel to assume full responsibility for each proj- 
ect as soon as possible. 

This spirit of cooperation toward common goals 
has been a source of inspiration and encourage- 
ment to all. We look forward to the continued 
contribution of the Institute of Inter-American 
Affairs in the future. 



Austrian Federal Chancellor 
To Visit U.S. 

The Department of State on March 31 an- 
nounced that the American Embassy at Vienna 
issued the following announcement on March 31 
concerning the invitation which has been extended 
by the Government of the United States to the 
Federal Chancellor of Austria, Dr. Leopold Figl, 
to visit the United States : 

The Austrian Federal ChanceUor has accepted an in- 
vitation of the American Government to visit the United 
States during the month of May. This visit will afford 
an opportunity for a personal exchange of views on que»- 
tions of mutual interest between tlie Governments of 
Austria and the United States. It will provide occasion 
also for the American people to demonstrate their friend- 
ship and admiration for the Austrian people and their 
Government, which Chancellor Figl has headed since De- 
cember 1945. 



Discussions on Free Territory 
Of Trieste 

Statement hy Secretary Acheson 
[Released to the press April 2] 

I should like to inform you that our represent- 
atives in the conversations to be held in London 
within the next few daj's with representatives of 
the British and Italian Governments to discuss 
matters pertaining to the administration of Zone 
A of the Free Territory of Trieste will be Julius 
C. Holmes, Minister of our Embassy in London, 
and Joseph N. Greene, Jr., of the Office of Western 
European Affairs of the Department of State. 
They will be assisted by officers from the Allied 
Military Government in Trieste. 

Obviously, it is impossible to anticipate the sug- 
gestions that will be offered for discussion, or to 
predict results. As for the purpose of the meet- 
ing, I should like to refer you to our announce- 
ment of several days ago which stated the desire 
of the three Governments to reach amongst them- 
selves and with local authorities a closer collabora- 
tion in the zone.* 



' On Mar. 27 the Special Assistant for Press Relations, 
Michael J. McDermott, said tliat "The United States, 
United Kingdom, and Italy liave decided to examine 
jointly the arrangements in Zone A of the free territory 
of Trieste with a view to reaching a closer collaboration 
in the zone amongst themselves and with the local authori- 
ties in the spirit of the friendly relations which unite them 
in the Atlantic alliance." 



April 14, 7952 



585 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



U.S. Proposals for Progressive and Continuing Disclosure 
And Verification of Armed Forces and Armaments 



D. N. doc. DC/Comm. 2/1 
Dated April 5, 1952 

INTRODUCTION 



The General Assembly resolution calling for regulation, 
limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces 
and armaments directs that the Commission be guided 
by a number of principles, including the following: 

(Operative paragraph 3) 

"(a) In a system of guaranteed disarmament there 
must be progressive disclosure and verification on a con- 
tinuing basis of all armed forces — including para-military, 
security and police forces — and all armaments including 
atomic ; 

"(b) Such verification must be based on effective in- 
ternational inspection to ensure the adequacy and accu- 
racy of the information disclosed ; this inspection to be 
carried out in accordance with the decisions of the inter- 
national control organ (or organs) to be established." 

Operative paragraph 5 of the resolution reads as follows ; 

"5. Directs the Commission, in preparing the proposals 
referred to in paragraph 3 above, to consider from the 
outset plans for progressive and continuing disclosure 
and verification, the implementation of which is recog- 
nized as a first and indispensable step in carrying out 
the disarmament programme envisaged in the present 
resolution". 

It is therefore apparent that the General AssembI.T 
resolution contemplates that the newly created Disarma- 
ment Commission should as a matter of priority deal 
with the problem of progressive and continuing disclosure 
and verification of armed forces and armaments. 



U.S. PROPOSALS 

The United States herewith submits for consideration 
the following working paper on progressive and con- 
tinuing disclosure and verification of armed forces and 
armaments. 



A. Extent of Disclosure and Verification 

1. The system of disclosure and verification must be on 
a continuing basis. Disclosure as of a particular date 
on a "one time basis" and subsequent verification of such 
disclosure would not meet the requirements of a continu- 
ing program for regulation, limitation and balanced re- 
duction of all armed forces. Therefore it is contemplated 
that the machinery which will be set up should be on a 



permanent or at least a long term basis, since the dis- 
closure and verification of armed forces and armaments 
will be on a continuing basis. 

2. The disclosure must cover all armed forces of every 
kind including para-military, security and police forces 
and all armanents including atomic. 

3. The verification of armed forces and armaments 
must likewise cover all armed forces of every kind in- 
cluding para-military, security and police forces and all ar- 
maments including atomic. 

4. The i^ermanent machinery to be established must 
provide adequate safeguards under a competent interna- 
tional authority having appropriate status, rights and 
powers. 

B. Stages of Disclosure and Verification 

5. Disclosure and verification must be carried out step 
by step with appropriate provisions for proceedLng to the 
next step when and only when previous steps have been 
satisfactorily completed. The reasons for proceeding by 
stages are two : 

(a) In the existing state of international tensions all 
states must be protected in the event of a serious violation 
or collapse of the system of regulation, limitation and 
balanced reduction of armaments. The existence of 
stages gives all states the opportunity over a period of 
time to test the good faith of all other states. The mere 
agreement to enter into a system for disclosure and veri- 
fication would give no assurance that the parties thereto 
would actually carry it out in full or at all. With dis- 
closure and verification in several stages and with each 
step of one stage completed prior to the commencement 
of the next stage, all States have the opportunity at peri- 
odic intervals of checking the good faith of other States 
through review of the information theretofore disclosed. 

(b) It is contemplated that the disclosure and verifica- 
tion would proceed from the less secret areas which would 
be disclosed and verified in early stages to the more secret 
areas. A phasing of this nature in addition to furnishing 
the best test of the good faith of all States would cause 
the minimum degree of interference in the internal life of 
each country, since the less sensitive information can in 
fact be more readily verified, and would, in cases of differ- 
ences or delays, prevent premature disclosure of infor- 
mation which many States would like reserved until sub- 
stantial cooperation and good faith has been demon- 
strated. 

6. In considering the appropriate number of stages, the 
United States had as its objective the full implementation 
of the program of disclosure and verification as rapidly as 
feasible in the light of the existing state of international 
tensions. An excessive number of stages, each of which 



586 



Deparfmenf of State Bulletin 



must be completed prior to the commencement of the next 
stage, would unduly delay not only the program of dis- 
closure and veritication but also the entire program for 
regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed 
forces and armaments. With this in mind, the United 
States concluded and is proposing that the number of 
stages of disclosure and verification should be five — a fig- 
ure which represents the minimum number consistent with 
the considerations set forth in the previous paragraph. 
In each stage, the disclosure and veriflcation processes 
will go forward simultaneously on a wide variety of items 
in order to accelerate the successful completion of the 
program. 

7. Annex I sets forth in outline the extent of armed 
forces and armaments (excluding atomic) to be disclosed 
in the respective stages and the manner of verification of 
the information required to be disclosed. Annex II sets 
forth the same information with respect to atomic arma- 
ments. The proposals with respect to atomic weapons are 
presented in a separate annex solely in the interests of 
clarit.v of presentation. Both the problems involved and 
the appropriate terminology with respect to atomic 
weapons differ so greatly from the problems and termi- 
nology with respect to other weapons that a single annex 
comprehending both might be confusing. It is contem- 
plated that all stages of disclosure and verification cover 
both atomic and non-atomic weapons. In other words, the 
first stage includes the items set forth both in Annex I 
and in Annex II for disclosure and veriflcation in that 
stage, and the same is true as to all succeeding stages. 

8. Without commenting in detail at this point on the 
specific items subject to disclosure and verification in the 
respective stages, it should be noted that the armed forces 
and armaments to be disclosed in the first stage have three 
general characteristics : 

(a) They should prove to be the least secret items. 

(b) In the main, they are most susceptible of veriflca- 
tion by periodic visits of inspection and through reference 
to statistical records — with the result that verification can 
take place with the minimum of interference in the in- 
ternal life of the respective countries. Some resort would 
nevertheless be required to "on-the-spot" inspection, and 
aerial reconnaisance would be required in all stages to 
assist in checking the adequacy of the disclosure. 

(c) At the same time, these items reveal so vast a seg- 
ment of the military potential of all States that their dis- 
clo.sure and verification as provided in this stage in and 
of itself would act as an indication of good faith and 
would thus greatly facilitate progress towards the ulti- 
mate goals of the entire program of regulation, limitation 
and balanced reduction of all armed forces and arma- 
ments. 

9. The armed forces and armaments to be disclosed in 
the second, third, fourth and fifth stages are progressively 
more secret and more difficult to verify except through 
"on-the-spot" investigations in conjunction with extensive 
aerial reconnaissance. 

10. The character of the items to be disclosed and veri- 
fied in the five stages as outlined in Annexes I and II can 
in general be summarized as follows : 

Stage I. A quantitative count in the nature of a report 
on existing strength levels of all armed forces 
and of the location of installations and facili- 
ties concerned with armaments of all types 
including atomic. 

Stage II. Detailed disclosure of organization of armed 
forces and of installations and facilities con- 
cerned with the basic materials required for 
production of all armaments including atomic. 

Stage III. Detailed disclosure of armaments (except novel 
armaments) fissionable material and installa- 
tions and facilities utilized in their production. 

Stage IV. Detailed disclosure of installations and facili- 
ties utilized in the production of novel arma- 
ments including atomic (armaments not in 



general use by the end of the second World 
War but in volume production today). 

Stage V. Detailed disclosure of novel armaments includ- 
ing atomic. 

11. The information to be disclosed and verified in all 
stages — and particularly in the early stages — is so vast 
that there appear to be advantages in disclosing material 
only at the rate at which it can be processed. Therefore, 
in general within each stage, disclosure should proceed 
progressively step by step in accordance with an agreed 
plan from the less sensitive information to that which is 
more sensitive. 

C. Inspection 

12. The system of disclosure and verification is an 
integral part of the system of safeguards which must be 
established to ensure observance of the overall program 
of regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed 
forces and armaments so as to provide for the prompt 
detection of violations while at the same time causing the 
minimum degree of interference in the internal liife of 
each country. It will not be adequate to provide merely 
for the verification of disclosed information. In addi- 
tion provision must be made for determining the adequacy 
of the di.sclosed information, through broad general powers 
of "on-the-spot" inspection, through access to statistical 
data permitting independent confirmation of required 
reports and through aerial surveys. 

13. Extensive aerial reconnaissance is obviously essen- 
tial to the verification procedure in order completely to 
determine the adequacy of disclosed information. It will 
be obvious that aerial reconnaissance furnishes the 
easiest method of determining the existence of large un- 
disclosed facilities and installations. Aerial survey will 
be essential in aU stages of the disclosure and veriflcation 
procedure. 

14. It is contemplated that "on-the-spot" inspection will 
take place in all stages as a part of the verification pro- 
cedure. Its use, however, will be less extensive in the 
first than In the latter stages because of the greater 
ease of veriflcation through other methods of the items 
disclosed in the first stage. It will of course be necessary 
at each stage to regulate inspection in such a way as 
to prevent disclosure of information which is to be \vith- 
held from disclosure and verification during the particular 
stage. Certain principles governing limitations on the 
right of "on-the-spot" inspections in early stages are set 
forth in Annexes I and II. 

15. Each state at the commencement of each stage 
should submit to the Commission a general description of 
the nature and location of facilities falling within the 
terms of reference for that stage. Access to such loca- 
tions, reasonably suflicient to verify the information dis- 
closed should be granted to inspectors. Inspection in 
each stage should proceed in accordance with a previously 
accepted plan. 

16. It is essential to an effective s.vstem of veriflca- 
tion that the International inspectors, in addition to ex- 
amining declared installations and facilities be permitted 
in all stages to have access to the entire national terri- 
tory in order that the Commission may determine within 
reasonable limits the accuracy and adequacy of the in- 
formation disclosed. Accordingly, each State should be 
required during each stage of the process of disclosure and 
veriflcation to permit the international inspectors such 
freedom of movement and to give them access to such 
installations and facilities, records and data as may rea- 
sonably be required, including the right to inspect physi- 
cal dimensions of all facilities and installations wherever 
situated. 

17. Each state should facilitate the activities of the in- 
ternational inspectors and furnish to them such assistance 
as they may reasonably require. 

18. Procedure should be set up in order to permit a 
determination by the Commission of the necessity for In- 



April 14, 1952 



587 



speetion of any facilities or installations access to which 
is denied to the insijectors and where in the judgment 
of the inspectors such inspection is required. 

19. The inspectors should report to the Commission any 
information indicating a major violation of any provisions 
of the treaties or agreements respecting disclosure and 
verification. In the event of a Commission determination 
confirmed by the Security Council, by the affirmative vote 
of any seven Members, of such a major violation during 
any stage and the failure of the state guilty of violation 
to repair the same within a reasonable specified period, 
other states should be free to suspend the operations of 
the disclosure and verification system. 

20. The first stage of disclosure and verification should 
commence upon (a) the entry into force of the treaties 
dealing with the program of disclosure and verification 
and referred to in operative paragraph 3 of the General 
Assembly resolution, and (b) the establishment pursuant 
to such treaties of international machinery responsible 
for carrying out the program of disclosure and verification 
including the portion of such machinery located within 
the territory of states adhering to the program. 

21. Disclosure and verification in all stages subsequent 
to the first stage could commence upon a Commission de- 
termination that the previous stage has been satisfac- 
torily completed. 



Annex I 

Proposed Stapes of Disclosure and Verification, Armed 
Forces and NonrAtomio Armaments 

STAGE I 

Disclose (a) Over-all manpower strength of regular and 
reserve military forces and para-military or- 
ganizations, including training establish- 
ments and security and police forces, broken 
down into each category, 
(b) Location of all ojjerational military installa- 
tions. 
Verify (a) By examination and cross-checks of central 
records to include personnel, disbursement, 
medical and procurement supplemented by 
access to and spot checks of records at 
selected installations, 
(b) By direct examination, location, manpower 
used, power input and physical dimensions 
of installations, 
(a) and (b) — inspectors will have access to entire 
national territory to extent necessary to determine that 
all facilities and installations have been declared. Aerial 
surveys will be permitted for same purpose and to same 
extent. 



D. Miscellaneous 

22. The United Nations should establish concurrently 
with and at the time of the adoption of the general prin- 
ciples governing this program the necessary inspection 
machinery to ensure effective verification of the armed 
forces and armaments, including those involving atomic 
energy, disclosed pursuant to the program. In establish- 
ing this machinery, consideration should be given to its 
subsequent utilization to supervise the program for the 
regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all arma- 
ments and armed forces. The machinery recommended 
in the United Nations Atomic Energy Plan would pre- 
sumably be utilized in connection with the disclosure and 
verification of armaments involving atomic energy. The 
problem of appropriate United Nations machinery both for 
purposes of the system of disclosure and verification and 
for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of 
armed forces and armaments is the subject of a separate 
study. 

23. It is contemplated that the disclosure and verifica- 
tion processes with respect to all adhering states should 
begin simultaneously and should go forward at approxi- 
mately the same tempo. 

24. The draft treaties or agreements bringing into effect 
the disclosure and verification system should specifically 
provide for adherence of states in accordance with the 
principles set forth in paragraph 5 of the Preamble and 
paragraph 3 (e) of the General Assembly Resolution of 
.January 11, 1952, the relevant portions of which are as 
follows : 

Paragraph 5 of Preamble 

"Recognizing that a genuine system for disarma- 
men . . . must be accepted by all nations whose military 
resources are such that their failure to accept would 
endanger the system . . ." 

Paragraph 3 (e) 

"The treaty (or treaties) shall specifically be open to 
all states for signature and ratification or adherence. 
The treaty (or treaties) shall provide what states must 
become parties thereto before the treaty (or treaties) 
shall enter into force." 



STAGE II 

Disclose (a) Organization, composition and disposition 
of units making up over-all strengths dis- 
closed in Stage I. 
(b) Over-all annual capacity of heavy industry 
relating to armaments to include coal, steel, 
aluminum and electricity. 

Verify (a) By quantitative analysis of records i)er- 
taiuing to personnel, movement of units and 
adminLstrative support supplemented by 
access to and spot checks of selected units 
and installations. 
(b) By cross checks of pertinent statistics and 
employment records, access to plants, and 
analysis of operation with respect to ma- 
terials used, 
(a) and (b) by aerial survey as stated in Stage I. 



STAGE III 

Disclose (a) Equipment (including reserve equipment of 
units making up over-all strengths disclosed 
in Stages I and II except units equipped 
with novel weapons.) 
(b) Production facilities for manufacture of 
weapons and heavy equipment for imits 
making up over-all strengths disclosed in 
Stages I and II (excluding novel weapons), 
giving location, type and capacity. 

Verify (a) By quantitative analysis of records pertain- 
ing to table of organization and equipment, 
and repair and overhaul of equipment sup- 
plemented by access to and spot checks of 
selected units and installations. 
(b) By inspection of physical dimensions of 
plants and examination of records pertain- 
ing to consumption of power and raw mate- 
rials, available labor force, and finances, and 
by access to and spot checks of selected units 
and installations, 
(a) and (b) by aerial survey as stated in Stage I. 



STAGE IV 

Disclose (a) Information as to equipment of units 
equipped with novel weapons to include 



588 



Department of State Bulletin 



biological warfare, chemical warfare, radi- 
ological warfare and atomic weapons. 

(b) Installations and facilities devoted to manu- 
facture of novel weapons. 
Verify (a) B.v cross checks with Stages T and II and 
quantitative inspection of units disclosed. 

(b) By inspection of physical dimensions of 
plants and examination of records pertain- 
ing to consumption of power and raw mate- 
rials, available labor force, and finances, 
and by access to and spot checks of selected 
units and installations, 
(a) and (b) by aerial survey as set forth in Stage I. 



STAGE V 

Disclose (a) Quantities of novel weapons on hand by 
types. 

Verify (a) By physical count of stockpiles of finished 
novel weapons cross checked with informa- 
tion disclosed in Stages I, II, III and IV. 



Annex II 



Proposed Stages of Disclosure and Verification, Atomic 
Armaments 



STAGE I 

Disclose (a) Location of all installations directly con- 
cerned with production of atomic energy, 
or the product of which is primarily useful 
in the production of atomic energy. Also 
manpower employed, physical dimensions, 
and power input of each installation. (Ex- 
cluding weapon storage sites.) 
(b) Uses or functions of these installations. 
This should be confined to a statement giv- 
ing the input material, the produce material 
and the process used in each instance. 

Verify (a) By direct examination, location, manpower 
used, power input and physical dimensions 
of installations. (Inspectors will have ac- 
cess to entire national territory to the ex- 
tent necessary to determine through such 
means as aerial survey, inspection of water 
and railways and power lines, that all 
atomic energy installations have been de- 
clared.) 
(b) Uses and functions insofar as revealed by 
external examination of all structures and 
unhoused equipment. Detailed interior in- 
spection shall take place in subsequent 
stages, the particular stage in which it will 
take place depending upou the function of 
the plant. (Verification of (a) above will 
be of value as partial verification of plant 
use or function.) 
(a) and (b) by aerial survey in all stages for same 

purposes and to same extent as permitted with armed 

forces and non-atomic armaments. (See Annex I.) 



STAGE II 

Disclose (a) Details of design and operation, including 
present and past output, of all those in- 
stallations or parts of installations con- 
cerned with preparation of atomic energy 
raw or feed materials (and such auxiliary 
materials as graphite, heavy water and 
beryllium), from mines up to but not in- 
cluding reactors, isotope separation plants, 
and similar nuclear conversion devices used 
to produce fissionable or fusionable mate- 
rial. 



Verify (a) By direct and detailed inspection of all 
aspects the installations and appropriate 
records. Cross checks with Stage I. 

STAGE III 

Disclose (a) Details of design and operation, including 
present and past output of all those atomic 
energy installations, or parts of installa- 
tions, concerned with the conversion of feed 
materials to fissionable or fusionable mate- 
rials or with the preparation of radioactive 
materials in large quantities. 

(b) Amounts and types of fissionable or fusion- 
able material on hand or in process ; 
amounts and types of radioisotopes on hand 
or in process. 

(c) General design and operational character- 
istics of research laboratories involving re- 
actors operating at a power level of 1 MW 
or more, including amounts of radioactive, 
or fissionable or fusionable materials pro- 
duced. 
Verify (a) By direct and detailed inspection of all as- 
pects the installations and appropriate rec- 
ords. Cross checks with Stages I and II. 

(b) By direct and detailed inspection of fission- 
able or fusionable material, or radioactive 
materials, installations for production 
thereof, and appropriate records. 

(c) By survey of facilities associated with re- 
ported reactors, by detailed inspection of 
reactors themselves. 

STAGE IV 

Disclose (a) Details of design and operation, including 
past and present output of all those atomic 
energy establishments and installations con- 
cerned with the fabrication of atomic or 
radioactive weapons from fissionable or 
other materials. 

Verify (a) By direct and detailed inspection of instal- 
lations and appropriate records. Cross 
checks with Stages I, II and III. 

STAGE V 

Disclose (a) Location, numbers, and types of atomic and 
radioactive weapons on hand. Weapon 
storage sites. 

Verify (b) By direct inspection. Cross checks with 
Stages I, II and III and (a) above. 



IMC Allocations 

Copper and Zinc 

The Copper-Zinc-Lead Committee of the Inter- 
national Materials Conference on March 26 an- 
nounced its recommended distribution of copper 
and zinc for the second quarter of 1952.^ This is 
the third consecutive quarter that plans of dis- 
tribution for these two metals have been agreed to 
through international cooperation. 

The Governments of the 12 countries repre- 
sented on the Committee have given notice of their 
acceptance of the plans of distribution. The 
countries are Australia, Belgium (representing 
Benelux), Canada, Chile, France, the Federal Re- 
public of Germany, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Peru, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States. The 

' For distribution plan, see Imc press release of Mar. 26. 



Aprit 14, 1952 



589 



Chilean Government accepted again the Commit- 
tee's recommendations witli respect to 80 percent 
of the copper production of its large mines. With 
respect to the remaining 20 percent and the pro- 
duction of its small and medium mines it reserves 
the right to dispose of this tonnage without refer- 
ence to the allocation scheme. Notwithstanding 
this reservation, the Chilean Government restated 
that it will give careful consideration wherever 
possible to the Committee's recommendations. 

The two distribution plans have also been for- 
warded to the governments of all countries not 
represented on the Committee for which alloca- 
tions are recommended. The needs of nonmem- 
ber countries were considered along with those of 
member countries. 

Primary copper and zinc (blister and refined 
copper and slab zinc) are included in the schemes. 
Wliile semif abricated products have not been allo- 
cated, all countries are urged to maintain their 
export of such semis at a level commensurate with 
the exporting country's allocation of primary 
metal, in accordance with normal patterns of 
trade. 

Data submitted by Governments forecast an in- 
crease in the availabilities of zinc of approximately 
20,000 metric tons in the second quarter of 1952 
compared to the first quarter. The amount of 
zinc being distributed in the second quarter is 
510,145 metric tons. The supply of zinc is ex- 
pected to continue to improve during the second 
half of 1952 and the situation will be reviewed by 
the Committee at a later date. 

725,000 metric tons of copper have been recom- 
mended for distribution in the second quarter 
compared with 746,180 metric tons in the first 
quarter. The estimate of production on which the 
first quarter distribution was based has since had 
to be revised downward in the light of new infor- 
mation. However, second quarter estimates of 
production do in fact show an increase over revised 
first quarter figures. Estimates for the second half 
of 1952 indicate that the rate of production is in- 
creasing, but the amount of copper available to 
consumers in each of the two following quarters 
is unlikely to be substantially greater than the ton- 
nage which has been allocated during the second 
quarter of 1952. 

Tlie Committee is not yet in a position to recom- 
mend plans of distribution of copper and zinc for 
any period beyond the second quarter. 

As in the fourth quarter of 1951 and the first 
quarter of 1952, the Committee is not recommend- 
ing a distribution plan for lead. 

As in the first quarter, no allocation has been 
recommended for strategic stockpiling either of 
copper or of zinc, without prejudice to the prin- 
ciple of making such provision in future distribu- 
tions. 

In order to conserve supplies of copper and zinc 
available to the free world, the Committee recom- 
mends that all countries do their utmost to elimi- 



nate nonessential consumption and to encourage 
substitution by materials not in short supply. 

Cobalt-Nickel 

The Manganese-Nickel-Cobalt Committee of 
the International Materials Conference on March 
31 announced its recommended plans for the dis- 
tribution of cobalt for the first half of 1952 and 
of nickel for the second quarter of 1952.^ 

All the 11 governments represented on the Com- 
mittee have accepted the j^lan of distribution of 
cobalt. Nine have accepted the plan of distribu- 
tion of nickel with the Federal Eepublic of Ger- 
many dissenting and the reply of India still 
outstanding. 

The member countries are Belgium (for Bene- 
lux), Brazil, Canada, Cuba, France, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, India, Norway, the Union 
of South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. 

The Committee's recommendations have been 
forwarded to all interested governments for im- 
plementation. 

The half-yearly plan of distribution for cobalt 
absorbs the provisional distribution for the first 
quarter announced on December 28, 1951. 

Estimated production of cobalt metal, oxides, 
and salts for the second quarter remains the same 
as for the first quarter of 1952. The amount 
available for distribution in the first half of the 
year is estimated at 4,413 metric tons of metal 
content. 

The Committee, in preparing the semiannual 
plan for cobalt, based its conclusions on the vari- 
ous aspects of each country's position : The impor- 
tance of its defense program, its previous level of 
consumption as well as its stated requirements. 
In some cases, a reduction was made in the light 
of stated requirements from the level of the pro- 
visional allocation for the first quarter. 

The plan of distribution of nickel for the second 
quarter of 1952 includes all marketable forms of 
primary nickel and oxides as in the first quarter. 
Nickel salts remain excluded. 

The availabilities of primary nickel and oxides 
for the second quarter have been estimated at 
34,964 metric tons in terms of nickel content as 
against 33,583 metric tons for the first quarter. 
The additional amount available in the second 
quarter comes principally from the Nicaro plant 
in Cuba and from French New Caledonia. Cana- 
dian production remains unchanged. 

The Nicaro smelter, constructed during World 
War II and shut clown soon after, has been reacti- 
vated because of increasing military requirements. 
The U.S. Government has made considerable in- 
vestment and undertaken large financial risks in 
order to bring the Cuban j^lant back into produc- 



31. 



' For plans of distribution, see Imc press release of Mar. 



590 



Deparfmenf of %\o^e Bullefin 



tion. In view of the particular nature of the proj- 
ect the Committee has accepted a U.S. proposal 
that tlie Nicaro yield should be used to meet direct 
defense needs only and that all free world coun- 
tries having sucla requirements should benefit 
from this additional source of supply in propor- 
tion to tlieir direct defense effort. 

Tlie increased marginal production in New Cale- 
donia is in the form of Fonte, which is a directly 
smelted nickel cast iron of about 30 percent nickel 
content. France will make available for export a 
quantity of 125 metric tons (nickel content) of 
Fonte. The distribution of this material will also 
alleviate critical cases and will provide an oppor- 
tunity for experimenting in a new form of nickel 
which may become available in larger quantities 
during forthcoming quarters. 

Prospects of increased production are encour- 
aging but the supply situation for both metals is 
expected to remain critical for some time. 

Tungsten-Molyhdenwm 

The Tungsten-Molybdenum Committee of the 
International Materials Conference on March 28 
announced its recommended distribution of tung- 
sten and molybdenum for the first 6 months of 
1952.^ The provisional arrangements wliich had 
been made for the first quarter of 1952 are now 
incorporated in the 6 months plan. 

The Governments of the countries, represented 
on the Committee have accepted the recommended 
distribution, except the Government of Spain 
which has reserved its position. There are 13 
members on this Committee: Austi-alia, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, the Federal Re- 
public of Germany, Japan, Portugal, Spain, Swe- 
den, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 

The distribution plans have also been forwarded 
to the governments of all countries not represented 
on the Committee for which allocations are recom- 
mended, with the request that they be imple- 
mented. 

The needs of all countries, both member and 
nonmember, were equally considered. In this con- 
nection, the Committee intends to make a monthly 
review of the working of the plans, and it is hoped 
that any maladjustments in their implementation 
will then be brought to light and rectified. 

Ores and concentrates and primary products of 
both metals are included in the plans. Primary 
products are defined, as in the case of previous 
distributions by the Committee, as ferro-tungsten, 
tungsten powder, tungstic acid and tungsten salts, 
and feiTo-molybdenum, molybdic acid and molyb- 
denum salts, including calcium-molybdate and 
molybdic oxide. Roasted molybdenum concen- 
trates are regarded by the Committee as being 
included in ores and concentrates, as in the case 
of previous distribution plans. 

^ For tables of distribution, see Imc press release of 
Mar. 28. 



The Committee estimates that the production of 
tungsten in the free world during the first 6 
months of 1952 will be 8,200 metric tons metal 
content, and that the production of molybdenum 
will be 10,01(5 metric tons metal content. 

Tungsten and molybdenum have been under in- 
ternational allocation since July 1, 1951. Al- 
though availabilities of the two metals have been 
increasing, they continue to remain in short sup- 
ply. Data recently made public shows that free 
world availabilities of tungsten will have in- 
creased by about 20 percent in the second, over the 
first quarter of 1952. As compared to the first 
quarter of 1951, estimated production for the sec- 
ond quarter of 1952 has increased by about 80 per- 
cent. Free world supplies of molybdenum have 
increased over 10 percent in relation to the pre- 
vious quarter of 1952. Over the year the increase 
in production amounts to just over 20 percent. 
Despite these improvements, the defense require- 
ments of the free world of these alloying mate- 
rials are such as to make it imperative that all 
participating countries do their utmost to imple- 
ment the recommendations recently submitted to 
them by the Committee on measures of conser- 
vation and substitution. 

Existing contracts are to be respected, so far as 
is possible, in carrying out the allocation arrange- 
ments. If such contracts provide for the supply 
of tungsten or molybdenum to any one import- 
ing country in excess of the amounts allocated, it 
is proposed that the importing country should 
divert shipments to other importing countries 
which have not yet filled their import quotas, so 
far as is possible without upsetting the original 
contractual arrangements. 



Frank L. Weil To Serve as 1952 
Chairman for U.N. Day 

Secretary Acheson announced on April 2 that 
Frank L. Weil of New York City had accepted an 
invitation to serve as the 1952 Chairman of the 
National Citizens' Committee for United Nations 
Day — October 24, 1952. Mr. Weil, prominent 
New York lawyer, has been actively engaged in 
civic activities for many years. 

Mr. Weil has met with Rowland H. Sargeant, 
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, to discuss 
plans for the 1952 observance of United Nations 
Day. Emphasizing the importance of the United 
Nations as our best hope for bringing about peace 
and well-being in the world, Mr. Sargeant com- 
mended the National Citizens' Committee for its 
efforts in bringing about wider knowledge and 
understanding of what the United Nations is do- 
ing. He noted that for the first time in history 
people in 60 countries are joining in an observance 
of the same day — October 24, United Nations 
Day — as a symbol of their common aspirations. 



AptW 14, 7952 



591 



Commemorating the birth of the United Na- 
tions, United Nations Day was officially estab- 
lished in 1947 by the General Assembly in a unan- 
imous resolution inviting the support of the mem- 
ber governments and stating that the day "shall 
be devoted to making known to the peoples of the 
world the aims and achievements of the United 
Nations and to gaining their support for the work 
of the United Nations." The first such observ- 
ance on an international scale was held in 1948. 

Some 90 national organizations representing 
civic, veterans', fraternal, women's, labor, and edu- 
cational groups compose the membership of the 
Committee. Headquarters are at Washington. 



Plans for Eighth Pan American 
Railway Congress 

Membership of the Organizing Committee 
which will make the necessary arrangements for 
the eighth Pan American Railway Congress to be 
held in the United States at Washington, D.C., 
and Atlantic City, N.J., beginning on June 12, 
1953, was announced on March 24 by the Depart- 
ment of State. The Congi-ess is expected to bring 
to the United States several hundred delegates 
from the countries in Central and South America. 

Headed by James G. Lyne, President of the 
Simmons-Boardman Publishing Corporation and 
Editor of Raihvay Age, as Chairman, Loyd J. 
Kiernan, Manager of Special Studies of the Asso- 
ciation of American Railroads, as General Secre- 
tary, the Committee includes Charles Sawyer, 
Secretary of Commerce; Willard L. Thorp, As- 
sistant Secretary of State ; Edward G. Miller, Jr., 
Assistant Secretary of State; Clarke L. Willard, 
Associate Chief of the Division of International 
Conferences of the Department of State; and 
Charles D. Mahaffie, a member of the Interstate 
Commerce Conunission. 

Others on the Committee are William T. 
Faricy, President of the Association of American 
Railroads; James M. Hood, President of the 
American Short Line Railroad Association; Ar- 
lon E. Lyon, Executive Secretary of the Railway 
Labor Executives Association; George P. Baker, 
Professor of Transportation of Harvard Univer- 
sity's Graduate School of Business Administra- 
tion; Emil E. Sclinellbacher, Assistant Director 
of the Office of International Trade of the De- 
partment of Commerce; Herbert Ashton, Direc- 
tor of the Transportation, Communications, and 



Utilities Division of the Office of International ' 
Trade of the Department of Commerce ; and Wal- 
ter S. Abernathy, Transportation Economist of 
the Office of International Trade of the Depart- 
ment of Commerce. 

In addition, the Committee includes John W. 
Barriger, President of the Chicago, Indianapolis, 
and Louisville Railway, and Mrs. Barriger; C. 
McD. Davis, President of the Atlantic Coast Line 
Railroad; Harry A. DeButts, President of the j 
Southern System; J. D. Dodson, President and 
General Counsel of the Texas-Mexican Railway; 
J. A. Fisher, President of the Reading Company; 
Walter S. Franklin, President of the Pennsylvania 
Railroad ; Donald V. Eraser, President of the Mis- 
souri-Kansas-Texas Railroad; Fred G. Gurley, 
President of the Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe 
Railway; Clark Hungerford, President of the St. 
Louis-San Francisco Railway; Wayne A. Jolin- 
ston. President of the Illinois Central Railroad; 
D. P. Loomis, Chairman of the Association of 
Western Railways ; G. Metzman, President of the 
New York Central System; Paul J. Neff, Chief 
Executive Officer of the Missouri Pacific Lines; 
D. J. Russell, President of the Southern Pacific 
Company ; Lewis K. Sillcox, Executive Vice Pres- 
ident of the New York Air Brake Company ; J. W. 
Smith, President of the Seaboard Air Line Rail- 
road; and R. B. Wliite, President of the Balti- 
more and Ohio Railway. 

Industrial advisers on the Committee include 
Manuel Alonso, Manager of Foreign Sales of the 
American Locomotive Company; George W. 
Baughman, Vice President of the Union Switch 
and Signal Company ; Nelson C. Dezendorf , Gen- 
eral Manager of the Electro-Motive Division of 
General Motors Corporation ; S. M. Felton, Pres- 
ident of the Shippers' Car Line Corporation ; C. 
L. Heater, Vice President of the American Steel 
Foundries; Charles Kerr, Jr., Consulting Trans- 
portation Engineer of the Westinghouse Electric 
Corporation; and Max K. Ruppert, First Vice 
President of Poor and Company. 

Congresses of the Pan American Railway Con- 
gress Association usually convene every 3 years, 
the last one being held at Mexico, D.F., Mexico, 
in the fall of 1950. The Association, of which the 
United States became a member in 1948, is made 
up of national governments, railroad companies, 
and railway supply manufacturers. The purpose 
of the organization is to promote the develop- 
ment and progress of railroads in the Western 
Hemisphere. 

A few additional members of the Organizing 
Committee will be named at a later date. 



592 



Department of State Bu//efini 



U. S. Delegations to International Conferences 



NATO Petroleum Committee 

The Department of State announced 07i April 1 
that the following statement has been released to 
the press by the Secretariat of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization: 

The first meeting of the newly established North 
Atlantic Petroleum Planning Committee will be 
held April 2 in the London headquarters of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The com- 
mittee has been under consideration since last 
summer and is established pursuant to a resolu- 
tion introduced in the North Atlantic Council 
deputies by the United Kingdom Government 
early last December. 

Petroleum experts from most of the Nato coun- 
tries will attend the conference which has been 
called to prepare studies on the subject of the 
petroleum requirements of North Atlantic Treaty 
members in the event of an emergency. The com- 
mittee will not concern itself with any current 
international petroleum problems. 

The Petroleum Planning Committee is com- 
posed of a representative and an alternate from 
each member country of Nato desiring to partici- 
pate, plus such additional advisers as member 
countries may wish to designate. The committee 
is directed to establish and maintain close working 
relations with other appropriate agencies of Nato 
having an interest in the subject, such as the 
Standing Group, the Planning Board for Ocean 
Shipping and the defense production, financial, 
and economic elements of Nato's international 
Secretariat. 

The United States delegation to the Petroleum 
Planning Committee meeting is composed of: 

C. Stribling Snodgrass — Assistant Deputy Administrator 
of the Petroleum Administration for Defense, Chairman 
of the delegation and U. S. representative to the North 
Atlantic Petroleum Planning Committee 

Oscar Bransky — Petroleum Adviser of the European Office 
of Mutual Security Agency, Alternate U. S. representa- 
tive to the North Atlantic Petroleum Committee 

Charles Hedland — Petroleum Administration for Defense, 
Adviser 

Col. G. H. Montgomery — Department of Defense, Adviser 

C. J. Dvvyer — Mutual Security Agency, Adviser 

Robert Eakens — Petroleum Policy Staff, Department of 
State, Adviser 

James W. Swihart — Office of European Regional Affairs, 
Department of State, Adviser 



The following Nato countries have so far indi- 
cated that they will send delegations to the Petro- 
leum Committee meeting : Belgium, Canada, Den- 
mark, France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portu- 
gal, and the United Kingdom. 

Status of Women 

The Department of State announced on March 
18 that Olive Remington Goldman, U.S. repre- 
sentative on the Commission on the Status of 
Women of the United Nations Economic and So- 
cial Council (Ecosoc), will attend the 6th session 
of the Commission, which will convene at Geneva, 
Switzerland, on March 24, 1952. She will be as- 
sisted by the following advisers: 

AUce Angus Morrison, Women's Bureau, Department of 

Labor 
Rachel C. Nason, Office of United Nations Economic and 

Social Affairs, Department of State 
Ruth Woodsman, Chief of Women's Affairs, Office of the 

United States High Commissioner for Germany, 

Frankfort on the Main, Germany 

Among the items on the provisional agenda for 
this session are political rights of women ; nation- 
ality of married women ; status of women in public 
law ; status of women in private law ; educational 
opportunities for women ; participation of women 
in the work of the United Nations; tecluiical- 
assistance program in relation to the status of 
women; and the report of the Inter- American 
Cornmission of Women. The findings of the 6th 
session will be summarized in a report which will 
be submitted to Ecosoc. 

The Commission on the Status of Women, which 
was established in 1946, is one of the nine perma- 
nent functional commissions of Ecosoc. The Com- 
mission is responsible for the preparation of 
recommendations and reports to the Council on 
the promotion of women's rights in political, eco- 
nomic, social, educational, and civil fields. Eight- 
een governments, elected by the Council, comprise 
the membership of the Commission. The last 
(5th) session of the Commission was held at Lake 
Success, April 30-May 14, 1951. 

Fisheries 

The Department of State announced on March 
18 that a conference on fisheries, sponsored by the 
Caribbean Commission, will convene at Port-of- 



April 14, 1952 



593 



Spain, Trinidad, British West Indies, March 
24-28, 1952. The U.S. delegation is as follows: 

Chairman 

Richard T. Whiteleather, Assistant Chief, Branch of Com- 
mercial Fisheries, Fish and Wildlife Service, Depart- 
ment of the Interior 

Delegates 

Luis Bonnet, San .Juan, Puerto Rico 
Felix Inigo, San Juan, Puerto Rico 

The Caribbean Commission is sponsoring a se- 
ries of conferences for the purpose of increasing 
and disseminating the technical knowledge neces- 
sary to tlie development of the economic resources 
of the Caribbean area. The forthcoming Confer- 
ence is considered particularly important in view 



of the following factors: (1) fish is the principal ' 
protein in the diets of the Caribbean peoples; ; 
(2) the area is dependent upon the importation 
of fish; and (3) new tecluiiques of fishing and 
marketing might make deep-sea fish from the Ca- 
ribbean waters available at reasonable costs. 

The provisional agenda for the Conference in- 
cludes consideration of such matters as: occur- 
rence and distribution of commercial fish species 
in the Caribbean; techniques practiced in the 
Caribbean for fish capture ; types of fishing craft 
in use in the Caribbean ; fish marketing, including 
storage and distribution ; methods for conserving 
and processing fish in the Caribbean; cultivation 
of fish in ponds; application of recent technical 
knowledge to exploration and development of new 
fisheries; and various papers and reports. 



Reports of U.N. Command Operations in Korea 



THIRTY-SIXTH REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD 
DECEMBER 16-31, 1951 < 

U.N. doc. S/2541 
Transmitted February 6, 1952 

I herewith submit report number 36 of the United 
Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 
16-31 December, inclusive. United Nations Command 
Communiques numbers 1114-1129, inclusive, provide de- 
tailed accounts of these operations. 

The armistice negotiations continued on agenda item 
3, concrete arrangements for carrying out the terms of 
the cease fire and armistice, and agenda item 4, prisoners 
of war, with some progress apparently being achieved on 
both items. The discussions vpere marked by the usual 
Communist intransigence including propaganda state- 
ments unrelated to a military armistice, evasive answers 
to pointed and pertinent questions, and puerile illogical 
arguments. This period, as in the past, was marked by 
an earnest and patient effort on the part of the United 
Nations Command delegation to reach a just and equit- 
able agreement. 

Agreement was reached on the following three principles 
for agenda item 3 : 

1. All armed forces under the control of either side, 
including all units and armed personnel of the ground, 
naval and air forces shall cease all hostilities within 
twenty-four hours after the armistice agreement is signed 
and becomes effective. 

2. All armed forces under the control of either side 
shall be withdrawn from the demilitarized zone 
within seventy-two hours after the armistice agreement 
is signed and becomes effective. Except for such armed 
forces of a police nature as may be specifically agreed 



' Transmitted to the Security Council by Ambassador 
Warren R. Austin, U.S. representative in the Security 
Council, on Feb. 6. Texts of the 30th, 31st, and 32d re- 
ports appear in the Bulletin of Feb. IS, 1952, p. 266 ; the 
33d report in the Bulletin of Mar. 10, 19.52, p. 39.5 ; the 
34th report in the Bulletin of Mar. 17, 1952, p. 430 ; and 
the 3.jth report in the BulletiiN of Mar. 31, 1952, p. 512. 

594 



to by both sides, no armed forces of either side shall 
thereafter enter the demilitarized zone ; nor shall the 
armed forces of either side commit any acts of armed 
force against the demilitarized zone. Each side shall 
manage in accordance with the stipulations of the armis- 
tice agreement the administrative affairs of that portion 
of the demilitarized zone lying on its side of the military 
demarcation line. 

3. All armed forces, ground, naval and air, under the 
control of either side shall be withdrawn, within five days 
after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes ef- 
fective, from the rear and coastal islands and waters of 
the other side, meaning islands which were formerly con- 
trolled by the other side and any others specifically and 
mutually agreed to. If they are not withdrawn within the 
stated time limit, and there is no mutually agreed and 
valid reason for delaying the withdrawal, the other side 
shall have the right to take all necessary action against 
such armed personnel for the maintenance of security and 
order. 

The major issues which remained to be solved under 
agenda item 3 were as follows : 

1. Rehabilitation of airfields 

2. Aerial observation and aerial photography 

3. Rotation and replenishment 

The United Nations Command has held from the begin- 
ning tliat no military advantage should accrue to either 
side during the period of an armistice. The rehabilita- 
tion of airfields in Korea would afford the enemy a tre- 
mendous militai-y advantage which is at present denied to 
him. Mutual air inspection constitutes a safeguard for 
both sides, yet the Communists have summarily rejected 
it as being unnece.ssary. 

The Communists oppose unlimited rotation and replen- 
ishment. The United Nations Command holds that both 
sides should have the right to replace their personnel on a 
man-for-man, unit-for-unit basis and their equipment on a 
piece-for-piece basis. Otherwise attrition would result In 
a de facto withdrawal of forces from Korea. Such a with- 
drawal could be agreed to only on a governmental level. 

In an earnest endeavor to reach agreement the United 
Nations Command delegation has introduced three new 



Department of State Bulletin 



I 



proposals. These new proposals would, if accepted, make 
the major concessions to the Communist side. They show 
the purposeful intent of the United Nations Command to 
secure an armistice on honorable and equitable terms. 
These concessions involve : 

1. Elimination of aerial observation and 

2. Provision for the rehabilitation of a reasonable num- 
ber of airfields for civil air operations. The proposed 
United Nations Command principles are as follows: 

(a) In order to ensure the stability of the military 
armistice so as to facilitate a peaceful settlement by ac- 
tion at a political level, both sides undertake not to intro- 
duce into Korea any reinforcing military personnel, com- 
bat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons and ammunition 
after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes ef- 
fective. Such rotation of military personnel as within the 
limit agreed upon by both sides shall be reported to the 
Military Armistice Commission so that the supervisory 
organ of non-combatant nations may be entrusted to con- 
duct on-the-spot supervision and inspection, which shall be 
carried out at the ports of entry in rear agreed upon by 
both sides. 

The rehabilitation of a limited number of airfields 
for civil air operations at specified points shall be agreed; 
such rehabilitation shall not include extension of runways. 
No other airfields shall be rehabilitated or constructed. 

(b) Each side shall designate an equal number of 
members to form a Military Armistice Commission to be 
responsible for supervising the implementation of the 
armistice agreement and for settling through negotiation 
any violation of the armistice agreement. The functions 
of supervision and inspection as stipulated in the armis- 
tice agreement shall be carried out in accordance with 
the following two provisions : 

(1) Within the demilitarized zone, the Military 
Armistice Commission utilizing joint teams directly 
dispatched by it shall be responsible. 

(2) Outside the demilitarized zone, at the ports of 
entry in the rear as agreed upon by both sides and 
at the places where violations of the armistice 
have been reported to have occurred, a supervisory 
organ of representatives of non-combatant nations 
shall be entrusted to be responsible. Upon the re- 
quest to the supervisory organ of non-combatant 
nations by both sides, or either side on the Military 
Armistice Commission, for investigation of a vio- 
lation of the armistice agreement, the supervisory 
organ of non-combatant nations shall carry out the 
Inspection. 

(c) Both sides agree to invite nations acceptable to 
both sides which have not participated in the Korean 
War, to send, upon their consent, an equal number of 
representatives to form a supervisory organ to be en- 
trusted by the Military Armistice Commission to be re- 
sponsible for carrying out the functions of supervision 
and in inspection as stipulated in paragraph (a) and 
paragraph (b) (2) of this agreement. Upon the request 
by both sides or either side on the Military Armistice 
Commission for carrying out these functions the super- 
visory organ of non-combatant nations shall dispatch im- 
mediately inspection teams to carry out the functions of 
supervision and inspection as stipulated in the armistice 
agreement at ports of entry In the rear as agreed upon 
by both sides, and at places where violations of the 
armistice agreement have been reported to have occurred 
outside the demilitarized zone, and shall report on the 
results of supervision and inspection to the Military 
Armistice Commission. In performing their above-stated 
functions, the inspection teams of non-combatant nations 
shall be accorded full convenience by both sides over the 
main lines of communication and transportation as agreed 
upon by both sides. 

In preliminary discussions on item 4, the United Na- 
tions Command Insisted on two essential steps prior to 
reaching an agreement on the exchange of prisoners of 
war: 



1. Exchange of prisoners of war data to Include num- 
bers, nationality, names and locations of prisoners of war 
held by both sides, and 

2. Authority for the enti-y into Communist prisoner of 
war camps of International Committee of the Red Cross 
Delegates who were immediately available for prisoner 
of war relief work. 

While initially the Communists resisted strongly any 
exchange of prisoner of war information prior to reaching 
final agreement on the exchange of prisoners of war, con- 
tinued pressure by the United Nations Command delega- 
tion eventually forced from them an agreement to produce 
some of the required information. On 18 December 19.51 
they furnished a list of prisoners of war whom they 
alleged were available for exchange, including 3,198 
United States, 1,216 other United Nations Command and 
7,142 Republic of Korea, totalling 11,556. This total was 
immediately challenged by United Nations Command as 
being entirely disproportionate to the total number of 
missing in action suffered during the war and completely 
at variance with the information United Nations Com- 
mand had obtained from a variety of sources which indi- 
cated many more prisoners of war should be alive in 
Communist custody. After insistent demands, the Com- 
munists have agreed to furnish additional evidence of the 
whereabouts of approximately 1,000 names furnished to 
them by United Nations Command which were not on the 
Communist lists. After much more discussion, they 
agreed reluctantly on 29 December 1951 to produce what 
they claim will be a full report on all prisoners taken by 
them since the start of the war. Even with this conces- 
sion, the Communists delegates laid the basis for further 
excuses by claiming that any data they produce would 
be incomplete because of the absence of records allegedly 
due to destruction during the war. 

The United Nations Command on the other hand, indi- 
cated its willingness to provide Communists with a com- 
plete accounting for all prisoners of war ever held, even 
though the United Nations Command had been regularly 
forwarding prisoner of war records through Washington 
to Geneva. The United Nations Command indicated that 
it had nothing to hide, and consistent with the complete- 
ness of the data furnished by the individual prisoner of 
war, would disclose to the Communists, as rapidly as the 
large number of prisoners of war involved permitted, any 
data they required. 

Despite repeated efforts by the United Nations Com- 
mand delegation to secure agreement on the entry of 
International Committee of the Red Cross delegates into 
North Korean prisoner of war camps to assist in relief 
work, the Communists would not acquiesce. The Commu- 
nists, when faced with that wording of the 1949 Geneva 
Convention relative to prisoners of war which related to 
visits by the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
were evasive ; they virtually Implied that they would 
observe such portions of the Geneva Convention as suited 
their purposes. The.v were immediately reminded by the 
United Nations Command of the ofiicial promise made by 
the North Korean Government in the early days of the 
war that the North Korean Army would abide by the 
Convention, even though they were not signatory to it. 
Refusal now to live up to their word reatfiruis our belief 
that any agreement we may enter into with the Com- 
munist must include adequate safeguards which would 
not leave the matter of compliance dependent merely upon 
their good faith. Conversely, the United Nations Com- 
mand has consistently supported the role of the Interna- 
tional Committee of the Red Cross permitting free access 
to all its prisoners of war camps and lending every effort 
to assist the International Committee of the Red Cross 
wherever possible. The consistent unwillingness of the 
Communists to permit the International Committee of the 
Red Cross to accomplish the basic humanitarian purposes 
for which it was organized is beyond comprehension. In 
a further effort to secure agreement, the Commander-in- 
Chief, on 21 December 1951 addressed a personal com- 
munication to the Commanders of the North Korean and 



April 14, 7952 



595 



Chinese Communists Forces in whicli he emphasized the 
desirability of permitting International Committee of the 
Red Cross to carry out its work In North Korean prisoner 
of war camps, pointing out that military forces in previous 
wars have always recognized the neutral position of this 
organization and have encouraged its assistance. In re- 
ply, on 24 December 1951, the Communists made a typi- 
cally evasive answer, attempting to lay the blame for 
delay in armistice negotiations on the United Nations Com- 
mand, claiming the prisoners of war they hold are getting 
excellent treatment and do not need outside assistance. 
The Communists suggested, however, that as a concession 
to the United Nations Command, they would have no ob- 
jection to the formation of joint teams of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and the Red Cross of the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Chinese 
People's Republic going to the prisoner of war camps of 
both sides to assist in supervising the prisoners of war 
exchange after the armistice agreement was signed. The 
obvious and understandable reaction of the senior dele- 
gate of the International Committee of the Red Cross 
when this information was presented to him by the United 
Nations Command, was that this proposal was entirely 
untenable since it would violate completely the neutral 
position the International Committee of the Red Cross has 
continually maintained as its fundamental concept. Ob- 
viously the Communist intent was to attempt to identify 
the International Committee of the Red Cross as a United 
Nations Agent, thus providing them vnth propaganda 
material for their continued non-observance of the Geneva 
Convention. 

In the hope that some sort of agreement might be even- 
tually forced from the Communists, the United Nations 
Command requested from Geneva additional International 
Committee of the Red Cross delegates to be available for 
entry into North Korea should permission be secured, and 
to as.sist the United Nations Command in that part of the 
prisoner of war exchange which would occur in its area. 
On 27 December 19.51, six delegates arrived in Tokyo. 
They will proceed to Eighth Army after a short period of 
orientation and will prepare tlieir plans for future opera- 
tions. 

On 24 December 1951, the Communists suggested that 
Christmas letters from prisoners of war be exchanged via 
the sub-delegation on agenda item 4. This was immedi- 
ately accepted by the United Nations Command delega- 
tion. Arrangements were expanded on the United Nations 
Command side to establish not only delivery facilities for 
United Nations Command and Republic of Korea prisoners 
of war in Communist hands and for Communist prisoners 
of war in United Nations Command custody ; but action 
was also taken to establish a temporary postal service to 
handle incoming mail to United Nations Command and 
Republic of Korea prisoners of war. This information, 
complete with details on how mail should be addressed, 
was given world-wide publicity. In this connection, how- 
ever, it is desired to point out that the United Nations 
Command has always given its prisoners of war free and 
unlimited mail privileges and encouraged their use. The 
provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention in this regard 
have always been strictly complied with. 

The thirty-day period during which the armistice was 
to be negotiated (following the agreement on November 27 
on the principles governing the establishment of a military 
demarcation line) passed on December 27 without any 
formal action being taken. 

Action along the Korean battlefront remained minor in 
nature, constant United Nations Command patrolling 
served to reveal improvements in the enemy's defensive 
positions. Numerous hard-fought clashes reflected the 
enemy's determination not to be dislodged from his present 
entrenchments. Although the enemy did not initiate any 
major ground action, his patrols and small-scale probing 
attacks during the hours of darkness clearly showed his 
desire to obtain current combat intelligence. In only three 
Instances did these efforts involve units larger than a 
company. The entire course of the enemy's forward bat- 
tle jiositions, and especially his artillery positions, were 



subjected to constant United Nations Command artillery • 
bombardment. In addition to the resultant steady attri- 
tion of enemy manpower and materiel, incessant United 
Nations Command artillery fire continued to confine enemy ' 
movement and activities in the forward areas to hours of 
darkness and seriously restricted the firing of enemy 
artillery. Early in the period prisoners reported the 
dissolution of the major component elements of the VI 
North Korean Corps. Front lines remained unchanged 
during the period. In the United Nations Command rear 
areas the anti-guerriUa actions succeeded in drastically 
reducing the strength of these dissident elements. 

On the western front United Nations Command patrols 
encountered strong opposition from forward Chinese Com- 
munist combat elements. Rapid and aggressive enemy 
counter-action resulted from attacks by United Nations 
Command raiding parties. Despite the resolute resistance 
offered to United Nations Command patrols these actions 
often resulted in the withdrawal of the enemy unit en- 
gaged. Most frequent patrol contacts on this front were 
effected in Sagimak area. On 18 December the Sagimak 
area was also the site of one of the heaviest enemy at- 
tacks of the period. An enemy battalion made two un- 
successful attempts to pierce United Nations Command 
outpost positions. A similar attack which met with only 
slight initial success occurred in the Punji area on 
28 December. 

Battle action on the central front resembled that of the 
western front. The Sutae area was the site of the most 
frequent patrol encounters. Anti-tank mines along the 
approaches to enemy positions at times hindered the 
movement of United Nations Command armored patrols. 
With the exception of a relief of an enemy division in the 
Pyonggang area by local reserves, the disposition of enemy 
units remained unchanged. 

Except for the Mulguji area, action on the eastern front 
followed the same pattern of aggre.ssive patrolling by 
both sides. Between 25 and 28 December enemy units up 
to battalion strength made repeated night attacks against 
United Nations Command positions in the Mulguji area. 
Initial slight enemy gains resulted in the stubbornly 
contested and successful counter-actions fought in rugged 
snow-covered terrain. During the previous period the 
I North Korean Corps followed the earlier movement of 
the VI North Korean Corps from the western to extreme 
eastern battle area. This redisposition resulted in the 
consolidation in the eastern sector of all major North 
Korean combat elements in the forward areas. This 
movement, apparently designed to bolster the effectiveness 
of the North Korean Army, was immediately followed by 
the apportionment of the three divisions of the VI North 
Korean Corps to increase the troops strength of other 
North Korean units. This action distinctly portrays the 
manpower shortage within North Korea resulting from 
heavy losses inflicted by the United Nations Command 
during the eighteen months of combat. 

Republic of Korea security elements in the southwest- 
ern portion of the Korean Peninsula swept into the second 
phase of the anti-guerrilla campaign. The number of 
guerrilla imits engaged showed a reduction from the 
previous period. This was due principally to the direction 
of all guerrilla resources toward self-preservation by 
evading contact with Republic of Korea elements. Never- 
theless, the vigorous and well-planned actions of the 
Security Elements resulted in the further appreciable 
reduction of guerrilla strength within the Republic of 
Korea. 

The practice of securing replacements for some units 
from other divisional units of the VI North Korean Corps 
slightly reduces the number of combat units available 
for employment by the enemy. With the exception of this 
diminution, the enemy's offensive capability remains un- 
altered. Although the enemy continues his efforts to 
maintain a high state of combat preparedness, he has not 
disclosed any intent to pass from defensive to offensive 
operations within the near future. 

Snow, heavy seas and poor visibility characterized the 
Korean weather during the last two weeks of December. 



596 



Department of State Bulletin 



In spite of unfavorable conditions United Nations Com- 
mand surface and Naval Air Forces maintained a "steel 
curtain" along both coasts of North Korea concentrating 
the heaviest attacks in Central Korea. Shells and rockets 
were delivered around the clock in supporting fire at the 
battle line ; interdiction firing at Kojo, Wonsan, Hungnam, 
Songjin, and Chongjin on the east coast ; and harassment 
firing on enemy troops and supplies in the Chinnampo, 
Haeju and Han River areas on the west coast. Heavy 
damage and many personnel losses were Inflicted on the 
enemy by these incessant bombardments. 

Naval air strikes from the carriers and Marine air 
strikes from carrier and shore bases continued interdic- 
tion and close air support missions with excellent results. 
Numerous bridge and rail cuts, enemy munition and sup- 
ply dumps, and hundreds of enemy personnel caught in 
exi)osed positions were added to the lists of damages and 
casualties imposed by United Nations Command Naval 
Air operations. 

Helicopters furnishing rescue services, air spot, and 
liaison continued to play an important role in the Korean 
War. The loss of a Neptune patrol plane in the Sea of 
Japan on the stormy night after Christmas was dramatized 
by the destroyer rescue of six of the crew from a raft, 
an hour and forty minutes after the plane ditched because 
of engine trouble. 

United Nations Command aircraft under the control of 
the Far East Air Forces, flying an average of 700 sorties 
per day continued to attack targets throughout Commu- 
nist-dominated Korea although heavy weather, cloud cover 
and reduced visibility adversely affected the intensity 
of the attacks. The primary objectives of the United 
Nations Command air attacks, conducted both by day and 
by night, were the interdiction of enemy rail and highway 
traffic, neutralization of airfield in North Korea and the 
provision of close air support as called for by the United 
Nations Command ground forces. Although armed re- 
connaissance aircraft found few enemy troops in the open, 
they were able to detect and destroy many camouflaged 
supply buildings, military dumps and artillery positions 
with the aid of the contrast provided by winter landscapes. 
Fighter-bombers and light bombers, during both day and 
night interdiction operations, rejiorted rail lines cut in 
1,030 places and the damage or destruction of 1,730 ve- 
hicles, twenty-two locomotives and 501 railroad cars as 
well as miscellaneous targets such as bridges, roads, sup- 
ply carts, and tunnels. 

The enemy air-to-air activity over northwest Korea 
showed a decided decline over the previous period due, in 
all probability, to snow cover and low ceilings at Com- 
munist bases in Manchuria, as well as multiple layers of 
clouds over Korea. Strong forces of MIG 15's were ob- 
served on seven days, with a new high of 360 enemy air- 
craft observed by the United Nations Command pilots on 
29 December. The enemy proved to be generally non- 
aggressive and avoided combat on most occasions. As a 
result of the enemy's non-aggressiveness. United Nations 
Command pilots were able to account for only three MIGs 
destroyed and four damaged during this period. The 
recent commitment by United States Air Force of an addi- 
tional group of F-S6 fighter aircraft has improved appreci- 
ably the United Nations Command air-to-air and air de- 
fense capability in Korea. 

Electronic aids to navigation and bombing permitted 
the Far East Air Force Bomber and Combat Cargo Com- 
mands to continue unrestricted operations, despite the 
inclement weather over Korea. A total of 9,800 tons of 
air cargo, including 44,000 passengers and air evacuation 
patients, were transported in support of United Nations 
Command units. A si)ecial phase of the cargo operations 
was the accelerated delivery of backlogged holiday mail 
and packages for United Nations Command i)ersonnel in 
the front lines. B-29's, with bombs and leaflets, were dis- 
patched nightly against targets in North Korea. 

The joint air ground operations center in Korea reported 
no air alerts. On two occasions United Nations Command 
aircraft operating over friendly areas reported night air- 
to-air encounters with unidentified aircraft 



A screening and investigation of individuals detained 
in the United Nations Command prisoner of war camps 
has disclosed the presence of approximately 37,500 civilian 
residents of the Republic of Korea. The detention of 
these civilians was attributable to various circumstances 
attendant upon the confusion inseparable from hostilities 
such as the displacement of large masses of the civilian 
population. A thorough rescreening of these civilians is 
now being conducted jointly by the Republic of Korea and 
the United Nations Command to Insure that none are dan- 
gerous to security of the United Nations Command forces. 
The civilians, ah citizens of the Republic of Korea, have 
now been segregated from the prisoners of war in sepa- 
rate camps and, following the rescreening, will gradually 
be released to return to their homes. The United Nations 
Command has furnished the International Committee of 
the Red Cross at Geneva with complete information con- 
cerning this group, including the names of all individuals 
concerned. 

70,000,000 leaflets were airdropped over the principal 
cities of Northern Korea and the enemy forces in the front 
lines during the three day period of 24, 25 and 26 December. 
These leaflets emphasized the United Nations efforts to- 
wards establishing peace by reiterating the friendship of 
the United Nations for the Korean and Chinese people and 
expressing hope for a new year of i)eace and amity. The 
dissemination of these messages was a major step in the 
continuing drive to make clear to the soldiers and civilians 
throughout the Communist-occupied areas of Korea the du- 
plicity of their leaders in advocating peace while practic- 
ing aggression. News sheets and radio broadcasts, as well 
as other leaflets, carried full reports of the armistice nego- 
tiations, explaining in detail the reasons for the United 
Nations stand on each question and the Communist tac- 
tics of obstruction and delay. 

A memorandum of understanding has been consummated 
between the United Nations Command and the United Na- 
tions Korean Reconstruction Agency. Under the terms of 
this memorandum, the existing agreements governing re- 
lations between the United Nations Command and United 
Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency have been inter- 
preted and made effective. While military operations are 
in progress (known as phase 1), the United Nations Com- 
mand has sole responsibility for the operation of all proj- 
ects of relief and economic aid in Korea. During this 
phase. United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency 
planning teams will be maintained in Tokyo and Korea. 
Joint United Nations Command-United Nations Korean 
Reconstruction Agency Committees are being established 
In Tokyo and in Korea for the resolution of mutual prob- 
lems and resjwnsibilities and for planning for phase two 
of the agreement, when United Nations Korean Recon- 
struction Agency will assume operational responsibility 
in Korea. During the current phase. United Nations 
Korean Reconstruction Agency civilian technical and staff 
personnel on the operating level in Korea, are attached to 
and integrated in the United Nations Civil Assistance 
Command, Korea. 

RiDOWAT 



THIRTY-SEVENTH REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD 
JANUARY 1-15, 19522 

U.N. doe. S/2550 
Transmitted March 4, 1952 

I herewith submit report number 37 of the United Na- 
tions Command Operations in Korea for the period 1-15 
January 1952 Inclusive. United Nations Command com- 
muniques numbers 1130-1144, provide detailed accounts 
of the operations. 



'Transmitted to the Security Council by Ambassador 
Warren R. Austin, U. S. representative in the Security 
Council, on Mar. 4. 



April 14, 1952 



597 



The discussion of ajjenda item number 3 centered on 
the three principles proposed by the United Nations Com- 
mand delegation and quoted in United Nations Command 
report number 30. Although some slight progress was 
made, the stand taken by the Communists causes increas- 
ing doubt as to their true intentions toward an armistice. 
They continue to oppose any restriction on the rehabilita- 
tion of airfields, their arguments centering on "Sovereign 
rights" and "interference in internal affairs". The 
United Nations ("omniand considers these arguments to 
be illogical and contradictory. Any armistice agreement 
must necessarily concomitantly result in some abridgment 
of so-called sovereign rights. The significant fact is that 
such abridgment is voluntarily assumed and mutually 
agreed to by the nations concerned. The right to agree, 
as the United Nations Command delegation has stated to 
the Communist delegates, is the very essence of sover- 
eignty. The Communists have already agreed to limita- 
tions on the introduction of personnel and equipment and 
to ob.servation by non-combatant teams ; and they admit 
that such provisions are required to insure against an 
increase In military capabilities. The United Nations 
Command holds that restriction on Increase in military 
air capabilities is also a fundamental safeguard. Addi- 
tional combat airfields closer to the battle line would 
permit additional sorties per day by the same aircraft. 
This would result in a definite increase in military air 
capability. For either side to construct combat airfields 
during an armistice, therefore, would cause tensions 
which would jeopardize the duration of the agreement. 
The United Nations Command has agreed to the rehabili- 
tation of sufficient airfields in North Korea to insure the 
full conduct of North Korean civil affairs. Hence, the 
Communist insistence on unlimited airfield construction 
is obviously detrimental to the basic objectives of the 
armistice agreement. It is noteworthy that the United 
Nations Command delegation has repeatedly asked the 
question : "Do you agree that neither side should in- 
crease its military air capabilities during the period of 
the armistice?". This question has always met with an 
evasive, equivocal reply from the Communist side. 

In an effort to reach a .sound solution to the problem of 
exchanging prisoners of war which would be acceptable to 
both the United Nations Command and the Communists 
and at the same time preserve the most humanitarian as- 
pects of repatriation, the United Nations Command 
armistice delegation introduced the following proposal, 
which incorporates provisions for all prisoners of war and 
civilians who have been involved in the conflict : 

"Prisoners of war who elect repatriation shall be ex- 
changed on a 1-for-l basis until one side has exchanged 
all such prisoners of war held by it. 

"The side which thereafter holds prisoners of war shall 
repatriate all tho.se prisoners of war who elect to be 
repatriated in a l-for-l exchange for foreign civilians 
interned by the other side, and for civilians and other 
persons of the one side who are at the time of the signing 
of the armistice in the territory under control of the other 
side, and who elect to be repatriated. Prisoners of war 
thus exchanged shall be paroled to the opposing force, such 
parole to carry with it the condition that the individual 
shall not again bear arms against the side releasing him. 

"All prisoners of war not electing repatriation shall be 
released from prisoner of war status and shall be paroled, 
such parole to carry with it the condition that the indi- 
vidual will not again bear arms in the Korean conflict. 

"All remaining civilians of either side who are, at the 
time of the signing of the armistice, in territory under 
control of the other side, shall be repatriated if they so 
elect. 

"In order to insure that the choice regarding repatria- 
tion is made without duress, delegates of the International 
Committee of The Red Cross shall be permitted to inter- 
view all prisoners of war at the points of exchange, and 
all civilians of either side who are at the time of the 
signing of the armistice in territory under the control of 
the other side." 



In defining "civilians" as used in this proposal, the ( 
United Nations Command emphasized they were consid- 
ered to lie individuals of either side who on 25 June 1950 
were bona-flde residents under the Republic of Korea or i 
the Communist regime in North Korea. 

In summary, the United Nations Command proposal 
provides for the release of all prisoners of war including 
soldiers of one side who may have been impressed into 
the armed forces of the other side. It was pointed out 
to the Communists that the United Nations Command 
proposal was consistent in every respect with the initial 
Communist claim that all prisoners of war of both sides 
should be released. 

As regards repatriation, the proposal permits freedom 
of choice of the individual thus insuring that no duress or 
force will be exercised to influence him. It provides re- 
patriation not only for prisoners of war, but for displaced 
persons and refugees as well, who can equally be consid- 
ered as victims of war. Those who so desire are permitted 
to return to their homes as soon as possible. Finally, the 
United Nations Command proposal provides for a super- 
visory organ to interview the persons involved, to insure 
that, whatever their choice, it will be made freely and 
without fear. 

The initial reaction of the Communists in protesting the 
United Nations Command proposal was characterized by 
a series of vicious and slanderous remarks, among which 
the United Nations Command was accused of attempting 
to keep prisoners of war in slavery, to hold them as hos- 
tages and prevent the civilian population in the United 
Nations Command zone from being repatriated. After 
continued and sometimes exasperating discussion, it be- 
came quite clear that the basic objection to the United 
Nations Command proposal was not that the Communists 
did not recognize its workability and humanitarian fea- 
tures, but that they were alarmed at the possibility that 
large numbers of the prisoners we held and of the North 
Korean refugee population now in Southern Korea, would 
refuse return to Communist control. It appeared most 
significant that, while supposedly arguing the right of im- 
pressed Republic of Korea Army soldiers to remain in the 
Communist forces, the Communists insisted that prisoners 
of war of both sides should be forcefully repatriated. 

Throughout subsequent discussion, the Communists have 
attempted to play a variety of themes all aimed at dis- 
crediting the United Nations Command proposal. They 
have been completely unsuccessful in advancing one valid 
statement that can refute the United Nations Command 
proposal to extend the right to elect repatriation to every 
prisoner and civilian internee now in our custody and to 
every civilian who fled into South Korea at the start of 
the war. We have emphasized that the decision of each 
prisoner of war with reference to his repatriation would 
be openly and publicly expressed before a representative 
of the International Red Cross at the point of exchange, 
and that the I'nited Nations Command proposal stands 
openly and conclusively as the most humanitarian, equita- 
ble approach to the exchange of prisoners of war, civilians 
and refugees, and entirely in consonance with the spirit 
of the Geneva Convention. 

The enemy displayed only limited offensive tendencies 
in the battle area and confined his action mainly to night 
patrolling and probing attacks employing units up to the 
strength of a company. One exception to this pattern of 
activity occurred in the extreme Western sector of the 
battle line where advances gained by a limited United 
Nations Command attack were nullifled by a successful 
counterattack by strong enemy forces. During daylight 
hours the enemy concentrated his efforts towards turning 
back the numerous United Nations Command patrols. 
The front lines remained unchanged during the period. 
Continued anti-guerrilla operations further impaired the 
dwindling strength of guerrilla forces within the Republic 
of Korea. 

Fighting in the Punji area was heavy as contrasted to 
the patrol activity along the remainder of the Western 
front. United Nations Command elements attacked on 
3 January to complete the restoration of outpost positions 



598 



Department of State Bulletin 



wliich had been lost as a result of an enemy attack on 
28 December. Five flays of almost constant fighting were 
required to drive the numerically equal enemy defenders 
from these positions. The immediate commitment of two 
additional enemy regiments to a daylight counterattack 
forced the United Nations Command elements from the 
disputed positions. It is estimated that approximately 
3,000 casualties were inflicted on the enemy units during 
the course of this action. 

There were no major military developments on the 
Western or Eastern fronts, the Ijattle scene being dom- 
inated by aggressive patrolling by both sides. On two 
successive nights, 3 and 4 .lanuary, strong enemy combat 
patrols forced the withdrawal of United Nations Com- 
mand outpost positions in the Mulguju area. On both 
occasions the positions were fully restored by immediate 
United Nations Command counter-action. 

The second phase of the anti-guerrilla operation in the 
Southwestern portion of the Korean peninsula was com- 
pleted on 5 .January and the third phase was initiated 
the following day. As a consequence of earlier successes, 
the number and sixe of the dissident groups encountered 
is decreasing steadily. In February 19.51 the effective 
guerrilla strength within the Republic of Korea was esti- 
mated at approximately 27,000. Despite the continuous 
recruitment of additional followers by the guerrillas, the 
Republic of Korea security forces held this sizeable threat 
in check and by November 1951 had reduced the dissident 
strength to an estimated 10,000. During the past six 
weeks an intensified anti-guerrilla operation has further 
reduced the guerrilla forces to a strength of about 6,000 
effectives. 

The enemy's offensive capability remains unaltered. 
Prisoners of war fail to profess any knowledge of plans 
for an early offensive. On the contrary, recent prisoners 
of war reports indicate only plans to continue the defense. 
The bulk of the available evidence supports the prisoners 
of war allegations which point to the enemy's mainte- 
nance of his present defensive attitude. 

In the first weeks of 19.52 United Nations Command 
naval forces and naval and marine air squadrons exerted 
strenuous efforts to help prevent an enemy build-up 
during the lull in ground operations. Sustained ground 
Interdiction was continued along both coasts by the sur- 
face blockading forces in night and day attacks. Their 
harassing and supporting bombardments inflicted per- 
sonnel and material losses on the enemy at the battleline 
and at major North Korean coastal communication 
centers. 

Carrier and land-based naval and marine air squadrons 
continued the interdiction of enemy rail, highway and sea 
routes in spite of marginal weather conditions. Patrol 
squadrons maintained reconnaissance of enemy waters, 
and furnished anti-submarine patrols for friendly supply 
convoys. 

Minesweeping and naval artillery support Are continued 
on a round-the-clock basis. The United States mine- 
sweeper Dextrous, operating near Wonsan, lost one killed 
and two wounded when she was hit several times by 75 
millimeter gunfire from enemy shore-based batteries. 

United Nations Command air attacks constituted the 
most aggressive type of action during the reporting period. 
The enemy continued to counter these attacks with active 
air defense forces and passive defense measures which 
made ground targets difficult to locate and destroy. The 
combination of small arms ground fire, anti-aircraft 
artillery concentrations and high performance interceptor 
aircraft accounted for the destruction of thirty-nine 
United Nations Command aircraft. Despite frequent air- 
to-air combat between MIG-15 and United Nations Com- 
mand aircraft the losses on both sides have been 
comparatively light. Pilots report that many flights of 
the enemy interceptors are non-aggressive and tend to 



avoid combat even when they have strong advantages in 
position and numbers. On other occasions United Nations 
Commant^ pilots have engaged flights of MIGs which 
exhibited aggressive spirit, improved tactics and a high 
degree of pilot technique. On those occasions little ad- 
vantage is enjoyed by either side and claims for kills and 
the number of damaged aircraft remains low. This trend 
in MIG operations is now quite pronounced and lends 
credence to the theory that Northwest Korea is being 
used by Communist forces for systematic advanced train- 
ing of fighter pilots. United Nations Command pilots 
claim destruction of twelve MIGs and damage to twenty 
more in air-to-air combat. 

The bulk of the fighter-bomber and medium bomber 
effort was again directed at interdiction of enemy railroad 
facilities. During daylight hours the principal targets 
were rail cuts along the open lines and attacks on locomo- 
tives, rail cars and supply stacks adjacent to the right 
of way. At night medium bombers attacked key bridges 
in the North Korean rail system. The extent of the 
unrepaired and damaged rail lines south of the Chong- 
Chon River has permitted the allocation of some rail 
interdiction effort to targets North of the previous rail 
interdiction boundary. 

United Nations Command army requirements for close 
support sorties were furnished whenever lucrative targets 
were uncovered. Aircraft of the Republic of Korea Air 
Force provided close support for anti-guerrilla operations 
in rear areas. 

Enemy or unidentified aircraft were reported over 
United Nations Command positions on three occasions. 
These were all night nuisance attacks with damage to 
friendly installations being reported as superficial. A 
typical example occurred during the pre-dawn hours on 
1 January when low performance aircraft dropped mortar- 
shell type fragmentation bombs in the Seoul-Inchon area. 
There were no United Nations Command casualties, but 
one Korean farmer was killed and two others injured. 

United Nations Command leaflets, loudspeaker broad- 
casts, and radio broadcasts reported to enemy soldiers, and 
to Korean civilians under Communist subjugation, the pro- 
traction of armistice negotiations by the continued stall- 
ing tactics of Communist spokesmen at Panmunjon. These 
United Nations Command media reiterated the determina- 
tion of the Korean people and the United Nations Com- 
mand forces to press for the early conclusion of a just and 
realistic armistice agreement despite continuing Commu- 
nist obstruction of efforts to restore peace. Wide publicity 
was given to the United Nations Command proposal to al- 
low prisoners of war to exercise freedom of choice in re- 
patriation. Radio broadcasts and news sheets explained 
in detail the necessity for prohibiting construction or re- 
habilitation of military airfields during the i)eriod follow- 
ing an armistice. 

Under the terms of the approved memorandum of under- 
standing between the United Nations Command and the 
United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, the Joint 
United Nations Command-United Nations Korean Recon- 
struction Agency Committee in Tokyo held its initial meet- 
ing on 5 January 1952. The meetings, leading towards 
initial understanding and agreement, dealt with the United 
Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency organization, com- 
mittee membership, rules of procedure, United Nations 
Command and United Nations Korean Reconstruction 
Agency joint operation, and the procurement of personnel 
for implementing the civil assistance and economic aid 
program. The mission of this joint committee is the reso- 
lution of mutual problems and responsibilities, during 
phase one when the United Nations Command has opera- 
tional responsibility, and planning for phase two when the 
United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency will assume 
operational responsibility. 

BiDQWAY 



April 14, J 952 



599 



The United States in the United Nations 



March 28-AprU 10, 1952 

General Assembly 

United Nations Commission To Investigate Con- 
ditions for Free Elections in Germany — The Com- 
mission returned to its headquarters in Geneva on 
March 25 after consultations in Bomi with the 
Allied High Commission for Germany and with 
the Govermnent officials of the Federal Republic 
of Germany, who agreed to grant the Commission 
all facilities it requested to enable it to undertake 
its work in the Federal Eepublic of Germany and 
western sectors of Berlin. 

Mr. Kristjan Albertson (Iceland), Chairman of 
the Commission, stated that no reply had come 
fi'om General Vassily Chuikov, Chairman of the 
Soviet Control Commission, to the two letters 
sent by the Commission on February 22 and March 
10 expressing its wish to discuss arrangements 
with the authorities in the Soviet zone of Germany 
and in the eastern sector of Berlin. On March 26 
a third letter was sent stating, inter alia: 

The Commission's ability to undertake the work en- 
trusted to it by tlie United Nations is now entirely de- 
pendent on the willingness of the resjwnsible authorities 
in the Soviet zone of Germany and in the eastern sector 
of Berlin to conclude similarly satisfactory agreements 
with the Commission. 



Security Council 

Disarmament Commission — At the March 28 
meeting, Chairman David M. Johnson (Canada), 
under Rule 23 of the Disarmament Commission's 
Rules of Procedure, ruled that specific charges 
of bacteriological warfare use or any other kind 
of warfare should not be raised in the Commission. 
Mr. Malik (U.S.S.R.) challenged tliis ruling, 
which was put to a vote and supported by all the 
members except the Soviet Union. 

On April 2 by a vote of 10-1 (U.S.S.R.)-1 
(China) two Working Committees were estab- 
lished, each consisting of all members, to be 
known as Committee I and Committee II. Com- 
mittee I will be responsible for studying and re- 
porting to the Commission on the matters which 
are mentioned under B in the Program of Work 
adopted on March 28, namely, "Regulation of all 
armaments and armed forces." Committee II will 



be responsible for studying and reporting to the 
Commission on the matters covered by point A in 
the Program of Work, entitled "Disclosure and 
verification of all armaments, including atomic 
armaments, and of all armed forces." The Cana- 
dian proposal that the working committees should 
normally meet in closed session was rejected by 
6-0-6 (Chile, China, France, Pakistan, the United 
States, U.S.S.R.). 

At the first meeting of Committee I, April 4, 
Ambassador Benjamin V. Cohen (U.S.) stated: 

The United States desires to find ways and means of 
devising safeguards which will insure that the obliga- 
tions undertaken will be kept. ... In my opening state- 
ment in the Disarmament Commission, I tried to outline 
some of the objectives and principles which we all must 
accept if we wish to do something about, and not merely 
talk about, disarmament. . . . 

1. We should agree that the goal of disarmament is not 
to regulate but to prevent war, by making war inherently 
and constitutionally impossible as a means of adjusting 
disputes between nations. 2. ... we must eliminate 
mass armies and all Instruments of mass destruction. 
That means that no nation should be in such a state of 
armed preparedness as to be able to undertake a major 
war. We believe that armed forces and armaments should 
be reduced by international agreement to these levels 
(a) necessary for the maintenance of internal order; (b) 
necessary for the maintenance of peace through the 
United Nations collective-security system. 3. We all must 
agree and accept such foolproof safeguards so that we 
can all feel safe and sure that no nation is in a position 
to wage a successful war. 

At the Committee II meeting, April 5, Ambassa- 
dor Cohen submitted the U.S. proposals for pro- 
gressive and continuing disclosure and verification, 
in five stages, of armed forces and armaments, 
including atomic. The first stage, he noted, was 
neither small nor unimportant in scope. He said 

It is a count of armed forces and of the locations and 
facilities concerned with armaments of all types, includ- 
ing atomic. We do feel that any progress that can be 
made in the field of disclosure and verification will 
greatly facilitate progress in the field of limitation, reduc- 
tion and elimination of armed forces and armaments. 

It was not true, he further pointed out, that the 
U.S. plan neglected atomic weapons in favor of 
conventional weapons. "Upon the successful com- 
pletion of the first stage, all states will be in a posi- 
tion to calculate within measurable limits the po- 
tential strength in atomic weapons of all other 
states." Regarding the Soviet argmnent that 



600 



Department of Sfafe Bulletin 



Commission discussions of disclosure and verifica- 
tion would get nowhere until it first made a de- 
cision to reduce armaments and prohibit atomic 
warfare, Ambassador Cohen pointed out that 
"Until we know more clearly what we are going 
to do, we can hardly decide in what time sequence 
we should do it." 



Economic and Social Council 

Commission on Status of Womsn — ^The Com- 
mission held its sixth session at Geneva March 24 
through April 4. It rejected the usual Soviet mo- 
tion to unseat the Chinese Nationalist representa- 
tive as being unacceptable in view of the General 
Assembly resolution 396 providing that questions 
on representation of states be referred to the As- 
sembly or its Interim Committee. 

The Commission concluded examination of the 
Draft Convention on the Political Rights of 
Women and adopted a resolution, (13-0-3 (Soviet 
bloc) ), recommending that Ecosoc open the Con- 
vention for signature. The Convention is de- 
signed to eliminate all discrimination against 
women in the field of political rights. Among 
other resolutions adopted were (1) Resolution 
(11-0-6) calling for effective implementation of 
the principle of equal pay for equal work for men 
and women workers. It recommends that all mem- 
ber states of the Ilo introduce as soon as possible, 
by means of proper legislation and other measures, 
equal remuneration for equal work of men and 
women, urges adoption and implementation of this 
principle in all countries which are not members 
of the Ilo, and requests the Commission on Hu- 
man Rights to include in the Draft Covenant on 
Human Rights an article providing for the prin- 
ciple of equal remuneration. (2) Resolution 
(11-0^) on participation of women in the work 
of the United Nations. It notes with disappoint- 
ment that very few women occupy policy-making 
Sosts in the United Nations ; urges the Secretary- 
eneral to continue appointing women to these 
posts in the Secretariat. 

Trusteeship Council 

The tenth session of the Trusteeship Council 
came to a close at U.N. Headquarters on April 1, 
1952. During almost 5 weeks of the busy "winter 
session" whicn began on February 27, the Council 
devoted most of its time to consideration of annual 
reports on the administration of the four Trust 
Territories in the Pacific area. In addition to con- 
sideration of the written reports which were sub- 
mitted prior to the opening of the session, the 
Council heard statements by the Special Repre- 
sentative of each of the Administering Authori- 
ties concerned : New Zealand for Western Samoa, 
Australia for New Guinea and Nauru, and the 
United States for the Trust Territory of the Pa- 
cific Islands. During the question period follow- 



ing the statement for each territory, special atten- 
tion was given to questions of political, economic, 
social, and educational advancement of the in- 
habitants of that territory. The Council adopted 
specific recommendations on each territory, tak- 
ing note of progress achieved, urging continued 
effort in certain fields, and, in some cases, request- 
ing that additional information be furnished to 
the Council. 

The special representative of the United States 
for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands was 
Senator Elbert D. Thomas, High Commissioner 
of the Trust Territory. To supplement the writ- 
ten and oral information presented to the Council 
by the United States, a film on the Trust Territory 
was shown. Various members of the Council made 
generally commendatory statements on the U.S. 
administration of the Trust Territory. In addi- 
tion, the Council adopted resolutions noting the 
progress achieved in several different fields and 
making suggestions and recommendations for fu- 
ture action. In the political and economic fields, 
for example, the United States was asked to con- 
tinue its efforts to extend the electoral system and 
foster local initiative in the creation of regional 
representative bodies and to continue its efforts to 
develop the material resources and the transpor- 
tation services of the Trust Territory. The Coun- 
cil also expressed hope that organic legislation 
for the Trust Territory would soon be enacted. In 
tlie social field, particular satisfaction was ex- 
pressed at progress made in public health. In 
education, the Council suggested the possibility 
of an expanded scheme of scholarships to enable 
inhabitants to seek higher education outside the 
Trust Territory. 

Acting on the reports of its newly established 
Standing Committee on Petitions, the Council 
during the latter part of its tenth session adopted 
resolutions on each of 35 petitions which had been 
examined. Additional arrangements for the 
forthcoming Visiting Mission to West Africa were 
made with the selection of Australia, Belgium, 
China, and El Salvador to nominate the individ- 
ual members of the Mission. The Mission is to 
begin its visit to the four West African trust ter- 
ritories in August. The Council endorsed a re- 
port on the organization and functioning of 
visiting missions prepared by a committee of the 
Council and also approved a report by the Secre- 
tai-y-General on arrangements for administering 
offers of scholarships for inhabitants of Trust 
Territories. Final action on the revised Ques- 
tionnaire to serve as the basis for future annual 
reports by the Administering Authorities was 
deferred until the next session. On another 
question, that of associating Trust Territory in- 
habitants more closely in its work, the Council 
established a six-member committee — El Salvador, 
France, Iraq, Thailand, United Kingdom, and 
the Unit«d States — to study the matter and report 
to the next session. 



April 14, 1952 



601 



Presidential Mission to Korea 

[Released to the press April 4] 

A special Presidential mission headed by 
Clarence Meyer will depart for Pusan, Korea, on 
April 5, 1952, to discuss economic and financial 
problems of the Republic of Korea with officials 
of tliat Government. 

Mr. Meyer, who is the Chief of the Special 
Mission for Economic Cooperation in Austria 
and was formerly Chief of the Eca Mission in 
Korea, has been made available especially for this 
mission on a temporary basis after which he will 
return to his post in Vienna. He will be assisted 
by Clarence Heer of the University of Nortli 
Carolina and the following representatives of the 
Departments of Defense, Treasury, and State : 

Maj. Gen. Stanley L. Scott, senior military representative 

Col. W. S. Everett, Army 

Col. L. M. Gosorn, Army 

Lt. Col. L. J. Fuller, Jr., Army 

1st Lt. H. A. Fisher, Army 

Dr. R. W. E. Reid, Army 

R. Hirshtritt, Treasury 

William G. Jones, State 

Mr. Meyer will discuss with officials of the Re- 
public of Korea economic and financial problems, 
arising in connection with operations of tlie U.N. 
Command, and measures to help stabilize the 
economy of Korea. 



THE CONGRESS 



Initiation of New Refugee 
Resettlement Program 

[Released to the press by the White House March Zi] 

The President, on March 22, sent identical let- 
ters to Tom Connolly, Chairman, Committee on 
Foreign Relations, United States Senate; James 
P. Richards, Chairman, Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, House of Representatives ; Richard B. 
Russell, Chairman, Committee on Armed Serv- 
ices, United States Senate; and Carl Vinson, 
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, House 
of Representatives. The text of the letter follows : 

In compliance with Section 101 (a) (1) of the 
Mutual Security Act of 1951, I hereby notify you 
that I liave today determined that it will contri- 
bute to the defense of the Nortli Atlantic area and 
to the security of the United States to initiate a 
program to improve the reception and treatment 
and to secure the resettlement of qualified people 
Avho escape from the Iron Curtain area. This 
program will supplement, but in no sense super- 
sede, the efforts now being made by the countries 



bordering on the Iron Curtain area which carry 
the main responsibility for taking care of these 
people. 

This program has been recommended to me by 
the Director for Mutual Security with the concur- 
rence of the agencies concerned. It is their esti- 
mate that approximately $4,300,000 of funds 
appropriated under Title I of the Mutual Security 
Act will be required for the calendar year 1952 to 
fund this program, which together with $2,900,000 
planned to be obtained from other sources includ- 
ing counterpart and privately contributed funds, 
will make possible the carrying out of this 
program. 

Representatives of the Executive Branch are 
prepared, at your convenience, to provide you and 
your Committee colleagues personally with fur- 
ther information about this progi-am if desired. 



THE DEPARTMENT 



John Foster Dulles Completes 
Assignment With Department 

[Released to the press March 25] 

FoUoioing is an exchange of letters between 
Secretary Acheson and John Foster Dulles: ^ 

March 21, 1952 
My Dear Mr. Secretary: I have just written to 
the President that, the Senate having consented to 
the ratification of the Japanese Peace Treaty and 
the three Pacific Security Treaties, I assume that 
my particular official responsibility ends. 

I want to thank you for tlie complete support 
which you have given me throughout this matter 
and I am deeply grateful for the trust and confi- 
dence which you and tlie President reposed in me 
and which has enabled me to share in this great 
task of building peace and security in the Pacific 
area. 

It is perhaps appropriate for me also to mention 
how happy it has been for me to have had this 
association, not only with you, but with the many 
in the State Depai-tment who, under you, are ren- 
dering devoted and sacrificial service and who have 
consistently given me their good will and support. 

I am 

Sincerely yours, 

John Foster Dulles 



' Mr. Dulles has served as Consultant to the Secretary 
since Apr. 6, 1950. 



602 



Department of State Bulletin 



March 24, 1952 
Dear Foster: Thnnk you for your note of March 
21st. Your letter of the same date was forwarded 
to the President. He has voiced the thoughts and 
appreciation of all of us for your great service and 
achievement. 

May I add a personal word in response to your 
kind statement regarding me and your associates 
here in the Department? It has been a joy to 
work with you over these past years. Your grasp 
of the problems, your resourcefulness in solving 
them and your dedication to the task has made our 
association a very happy one. 

I am particularly grateful that after the signa- 
ture of the treaties in San Francisco, you were will- 
ing at the request of the President and myself to 
defer your return to private life so that your 
unique knowledge of the treaties and the negotia- 
tions could be made available to the Senate during 
its consideration of them. 

You take with you the high esteem and affec- 
tionate " regai'd of your many friends and col- 
leagues in the Department, a company in which 
I am happy to be included. 
Most sincerely, 

Dean Acheson 



Appointment of Officers 

Jack C. Corbett as director of the Office of Financial 
and Development Policy, effective March 28. 



Point Four Appointments 

Tracy R. Welling as director of technical cooperation 
in Jordan, effective March 26. 

Marcus J. Gordon as director of technical cooperation 
in Ethiopia, effective March 27. 

Paul Duncan as director of the Program Information 
and Reports StafE of Tca, effective April 2. 



PUBLICATIONS 



Recent Releases 

For sale iij the Superintendent of Documents, Oovern- 
nient Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address re- 
guests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except 
in case of free puhlications, which may be obtained from 
the Department of State. 

First Instrument of Revision of the Occupation Statute 
for Germany. Treaties and Other International Acts 
Series 2255. Pub. 4270. 5 pp. 5«f. 

Agreement between the United States, United King- 
dom, and France — Signed at Bonn Mar. 6, 1951; en- 
tered into force Mar. 7, 1951. 

Health and Sanitation, Cooperative Program in Costa 
Rica. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2256. 
Pub. 4271. 16 pp. 100. 

Agreement between the United States and Costa 
Rica — Signed at San Jos4 Feb. 13, 1951; entered into 
force Feb. 13, 1951. 



What is Point Four? Economic Cooperation Series 30. 
Pub. 4487. 12 pp. Free. 

Address by Secretary of State Acheson Jan. 25, 1952. 

Restitution of Monetary Gold: Submission to an Arbi- 
trator of Certain Claims With Respect to Gold Looted 
by the Germans from Rome in 1943. Treaties and Other 
International Acts Series 2252. Pub. 4283. 8 pp. 5^. 

Agreement between the United States, United King- 
dom, and France — Signed at Washington Apr. 25, 
1951 ; entered into force Apr. 25, 1951. 

Agricultural Mission in El Salvador. Treaties and Other 
International Acts Series 2262. Pub. 4286. 11 pp. 5^. 

Agreement between the United States and El Salva- 
dor — Signed at San Salvador May 11, 1951 ; entered 
into force May 11, 1951. 

Economic Cooperation With Italy Under Public Law 472, 
80th Congress, as amended. Treaties and Other Inter- 
national Acts Series 2263. Pub. 4292. 4 pp. 5(J. 

Agreement between the United States and Italy — 
Signed at Rome May 21, 1951 ; entered into force 
May 21, 1951. 

Economic Cooperation With France Under Public Law 
472, 80th Congress, as amended. Treaties and Other 
International Acts Series 2264. Pub. 4293. 3 pp. 5(f. 

Agreement between the United States and B^ance — 
Signed at Paris May 22, 1951 ; entered into force May 
22, 1951. 



Checi( List of Department of State 
Press Releases: Mar. 31- Apr. 5, 1952 

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the 
Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department 
of State, Washington 25, D. C. Items marked (*) 
are not printed in the Bulletin; items marked (t) 
will appear in a future issue. 

No. Date 

203 3/18 

204 3/18 
223 3/24 
230 3/25 
234 3/26 

237 3/27 

239 3/28 



Suiject 
Commission on status of women 
Conference on fisheries 
Pan American railway congress 
Acheson, Dulles : Exchange of letters 
Welling : Point Four director for 

Jordan 
Gordon : Point Four director for 

Ethiopia 
Corbett : Financial policy director 



Acheson : Tenth anniversary of Iiaa 
Military assistance to Uruguay 
Visit of Austrian chancellor 
N. Atlantic petroleum committee 
Russell : American peace crusade 
Fisher: Foreign policy 
Kennan : Oath of office 
Weil: Chairman U.N. Day, 1952 
Hans Cliristian Andersen 
Acheson: Representatives to Trieste 
Acheson : Visit of Queen Juliana 
Duncan : Information director. Point 

Four 
Visitors to U.S. 
Acheson : Nato anniversary 
Acheson : Messages to Nato officials 
Patterson: Progress toward security 
Murphy : Belgium's contribution 
Presidential mission to Korea 
Compton : Information program 



243 


3/31 


t244 


3/31 


245 


3/31 


246 


4/1 


247 


4/1 


t248 


4/1 


t249 


4/1 


250 


4/1 


*251 


4/2 


252 


4/2 


253 


4/2 


254 


4/2 


*255 


4/3 


2.56 


4/3 


257 


4/4 


t2n8 


4/4 


t2.59 


4/4 


260 


4/4 


1261 


4/5 



April 14, 1952 



603 



April 14, 1952 



Index 



Vol. XXVI, No. 668 



American Republics 

Anniversary of Iiaa, 10th 584 

Pan American Railway Congress (8th) to be 

held 592 

Arms and Armed Forces 

First anniversary of Shape as an operational 

headquarters (Eisenhower) 572 

U.S. proposals on regulation, limitation and 

balanced reduction, text 586 

Asia 
KOREA: 

Command operations, 36th and 37th re- 
ports 594,597 

Presidential mission sent to 602 

Communism 

Alms of the "American Peace Crusade" exposed 

(Russell) 583 

Congress 

MESSAGES TO CONGRESS: Presidential letter 

re Mutual Security Program fimds .... 602 
Queen Juliana's address to Congress 580 

Europe 

AUSTRIA: Chancellor to visit U.S 585 

First anniversary of Shape as an operational 

headquarters (Elsenhower) 572 

GERMANY: The Struggle for Unity (Cox) . . 563 
NETHERLANDS: Queen Juliana addresses Con- 
gress, statement by Acheson 580 

TRIESTE: Tripartite discussions to be held . . 585 

Fisheries 

Conference on sponsored by Caribbean Commis- 
sion, U.S. delegation 593 

International Meetings 

IMC: 

Cobalt-nickel distribution plans 590 

Copper-zinc distribution plans 589 

Tungsten-molybdenum distribution plans . 591 

Pan American Railway Congress to be held, 8th . 592 

U.S. DELEGATIONS: 

Committee on status of women (Ecosoc) . . 593 
Conference on fisheries sponsored by Carib- 
bean Commission 593 

NATO petroleum committee 593 

Mutual Security 

First anniversary of Shape as an operational 

headquarters (Elsenhower) 572 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NATO petroleum committee meets 593 

Observance of 3d anniversary of signing, con- 
gratulatory messages and addresses by 
Truman, Acheson, and Harriman .... 568 



Presidential Documents 

CORRESPONDENCE: Mutual Security Program 

funds 602 

Publications 

Recent releases 603 

State Department 

Alms of "American Peace Crusade" exposed 

(Russell) 583 

Appointment of officers 603 

Dulles completes assignment with Department . 602 

10th anniversary of Iiaa, statement (Acheson) . 584 

Strategic Materials 

Cobalt-nickel distribution announced by Imc . 590 

NATO petroleum committee meets 593 

Plans for distribution of copper and zinc by 

Imc 589 

Tungsten-molybdenima distribution as reported 

by Imc 591 

Technical Cooperation and Development 

POINT FOUR: Appointment of officers .... 603 

United Nations: 

Command operations in Korea (36th and 37th 

reports) 594,597 

Ecosoc, Commission on Status of Women, U.S. 

delegation 593 

GENERAL ASSEMBLY: U.S. proposals for regu- 
lation, limitation and balanced reduction of 

arms and armed forces, text 586 

Question of German elections 563 

U.S. in U.N. (a weekly summary) 600 

Weil to serve as 1952 chairman for U.N. Day . . 591 

Name Index 
Acheson, Secretary Dean . . . 568, 580, 584, 585, 602 

Bransky, Oscar 593 

Corbett, Jack C 603 

Cox, Henry B 663 

Dulles, John Foster 602 

Duncan, Paul 603 

Elsenhower, Gen. Dwlght D 572 

Figl, Dr. Leopold 585 

Goldman, Olive Remington 593 

Gordon, Marcus J 603 

Greene, Joseph N., Jr 585 

Harriman, W. Averell 570 

Holmes, Julius C 585 

Juliana, Queen of the Netherlands 580 

Lyne, James G 592 

McDermott, Michael J 585 

Meyer, Clarence 602 

Russell, Francis H 583 

Scott, Stanley L 602 

Snodgrass, C. Strlbling 593 

Truman, President Harry 8 568, 584, 602 

Well, Frank L 591 

Welling, Tracy R 603 

Whiteleather, Richard T 594 



0. S. eOVERNUENT PRINTINS OFFICEi I9B2 



■^ 



tJAe/ z/)eha/}^'yyien(/ xw t/taie^ 



^5^-5^ ift^^ 





POINT FOUR— A REVOLUTION AGAINST HUNGER, 

DISEASE, AND HUMAN MISERY • Addresses by 
President Truman and Secretary Acheson ...... 607 

PROBLEMS FACING UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS IN 

ASIA AND AFRICA • 6y Ambassador Francis B. Sayre . 623 

GOOD FAITH VS. EMPTY PROMISES IN THE WAR 

OF IDEAS • by Adrian S. Fisher 618 

PROGRESS TOWARD SOLUTION OF EUROPE'S 

REFUGEE PROBLEM • by George L. Warren ... 638 

SIXTH REGULAR SESSION OF THE GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY SUMMARY ACTION: Part I • 6y Paul 

B. Taylor 632 



For index see back cover 




Vol. XXVI, No. 669 
April 21, 1952 



^BNT o^ 




■^tes o* 




^Ae 



Zi^efia/yi^e^ jc^ ^ale Jky LI X 1 \J L X i X 



Vol. XXVI, No. 669 • Publication 4569 
April 21, 1952 



U. S. SUPERmTOffiENT Of BOCUMEWE 

MAY 6 1952 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington 25, D.C. 

Price: 

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Single copy, 20 cents 

The printing of this publication has 
been approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget (January 22, 1952). 

riote; Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may 
be reprinted. Citation of the Depabtment 
OF State Bulletin as the source will be 
appreciated. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication compiled and 
edited in the Division of Publications, 
Office of Public Affairs, provides the 
public and interested agencies of 
the Government with information on 
developments in the field of foreign 
relations and on the work of the De- 
partment of State and the Foreign 
Service. The BULLETIN includes 
selected press releases on foreign pol- 
icy issued by the White House and 
the Department, and statements and 
addresses made by the President and 
by the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the func- 
tions of the Department. Informa- 
tion is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to 
which the United States is or may 
become a party and treaties of gen- 
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Publications of the Department, as 
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of international relations, are listed 
currently. 



Point Four— A Revolution Against Hunger, Disease, And Human Misery 



ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT TRUMAN ' 

I cannot tell you how much it means to me to 
come and meet with you tonight. You have come 
here from all parts of the country, and from all 
sorts of organizations — church groups, business 
groups, labor unions, and farm organizations. 
You have come to discuss ways and means of going 
aliead witli our plans for Point Four. 

Point Four takes its name from the last point 
of a fourfold program for peace in the world — 
the program I set forth in my Inaugural Address, 
3 years ago last January. 

We liave been working on that program, and 
we have been making progress. 

We have done well on the first three points. 

First, we have supported the United Nations. 

Second, we have carried forward our plans for 
world economic recovery. 

Third, we have strengthened free nations 
against aggression. 

But these tliree points by themselves will not 
bring us the permanent peace we desire. The 
fourth point, helping the free peoples of the world 
to help themselves — to produce more — to raise 
their living standards — and to achieve decent, 
satisfying lives — this fourth point is in the long 
run the most important of all. Without it we 
cannot reach the goal. 

Througli the measures we have taken in the last 
several yeai-s — aid to Greece and Turkey, the 
Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty, the 
Pacific treaties, the defense program, the resist- 
ance to aggression in Korea — through measures 
like these we are preventing conquest and world 
war. We have bought time — we have bought it 
at a great cost in lives and money. 

Now it is up to us to use that time intelligently 
and courageously. We must use it to wipe out 
the root causes of war. We must use the time we 
are gaining by defense to campaign against 
hunger and disease and human misery. 

' Delivered by Secretary Acheson for the President 
before the National Conference on International Eco- 
nomic and Social Development at Washington on Apr. 8 
and released to the press by the White House on the 
same date. 



Mass suffering has been used by every dictator- 
ship of our times as a stepping stone to power. 
It was used by the Japanese war lords. It was 
used by Hitler. Today it is the weapon of Soviet 
imperialism. Unless it is wiped out it may be 
used in tlie future by some new dictatorship more 
terrible even than the Soviet. 

To have peace, we must strike at the conditions 
of misery that envelop half the people of the 
earth. That is the purpose and the meaning of 
Point Four. 



Point Four Seen in Light of History 

It will help us to understand Point Four if we 
step back and look at it in the light of history. 

In this century, scientific progi-ess has brought 
us to the point where mankind, for the first time 
in liuman history, can wipe poverty and ignorance 
and human misery clean off the face of the earth. 

Yet this cannot be done unless scientific progress 
is linked with political freedom. That is the les- 
son of history. Without political freedom, scien- 
tific progress can become a menace, rather than a 
boon to humanity. In the hands of totalitari- 
ans, scientific progress can be used to destroy 
civilization. 

But working together, scientific progress and 
political freedom can open such a future as man- 
kind has never dreamed of. 

We have seen what this means in our own 
country. 

What we did here in the United States was to 
create the kind of political system in which men 
could breathe freely and work freely — the kind 
of government in which the energies of human 
beings could be released to make the most of the 
material resources around them. 

This is why our country has become the center 
of industry and science. This is why we have been 
called upon to lead the fight for freedom. We 
have given greater opportunity to the individual 
than has ever been known before. We have given 
more material well-being to all our people than 
any earlier society was ever able to achieve. 

That is what scientific progress and political 



April 27, 7952 



607 



freedom have done for us — and for many other 
countries founded in the traditions of our Western 
civilization. 

Self-Development Fostered in Asia and Africa 

Moreover, tlie tremendous developments that 
have taken place in the Western world in modern 
times are having a profound effect upon the an- 
cient civilizations in Asia and Africa. 

The people of these areas have learned that they 
need not suffer hunger, disease, and poverty. They 
know that something can be done to put a stop to 
these things. They also have learned of the ideals 
of political liberty and self-government. 

These peoples have watched us and learned from 
us. Now they are determined to share as equals 
in the benefits of modern progress. 

They are determined that their resources will 
no longer be developed in the interest of foreign- 
ers on the pattern of the old imperialism. And 
they don't want them developed for the benefit of 
Soviet imperialism either. They insist that these 
resources be developed for their own benefit. 

They are determined to establish their own free 
political and economic institutions — institutions 
which will make use of the best of our experience 
and will, at the same time, retain the best of their 
own cultures, and their own great traditions. 

This, I believe, is the mood and the temper that 
has come to Africa and Asia in my lifetime. It is 
real. It is good. It holds tremendous promise. 

Common Sense as Basis of Point Four 

At the same time, it has gi-eat dangers. Such a 
movement can be easily misled. Communists or 
reactionaries can exploit the hopes and aspirations 
of these peoples for their own evil ends. Un- 
scrupulous agitators can use these forces of change 
to bring about disorder and bloodshed. We must 
do all we can to keep this from happening. 

We want to help the people of these areas. We 
want them to learn the methods of our science and 
our industry and use these methods tp develop 
their own resoui'ces. 

Above all, we want to help them find out and 
apply the secret of our own success^ 'th^_S£cret of 
our American Revolution — the sed'eCtHat the vi- 
tality of our science, our industry, our culture, 
is embedded in our political life — the secret that 
only free men, freely governed, can make the 
magic of science and technology work for the 
benefit of human beings, not against them. 

Now, what does Point Four have to do with 
this? It has everything to do with it. It is the 
way we have chosen to give our help and share 
our experience. It is the right way — and the only 
way — this can be done. 

There is nothing of imperialism in our concept 
of Point Four. We do not propose to dominate 
other people, or exploit them, or force them to 
change their ways of life. 



The two ideas that guide Point Four are — first, 
cooperation, freely sought and freely given, and 
second, help to those who want to help themselves. 

Those are the only methods that can succeed 
today. We must never forget them or depart 
from tliem. In no other way can we work as 
friends and brothers with the awakening peoples 
in the underdeveloped regions of the world. 

This is what Point Four means in the perspec- 
tive of history. It is the way to prevent human 
progress from going off the rails — to prevent a 
smash-up of civilization — and to help bring man- 
kind to the threshold of a brighter, more wonder- 
ful future. 

This is not starry-eyed idealism. It is just plain, 
practical common sense. If we fail to do this job, 
we will never have world peace. We cannot sur- 
vive as an island of prosperity in a sea of human 
misery. But if we do the job, the world will be 
transformed. 



Point Four's Message to the World 

Just take one specific example. If we could 
help the people of the Orient get a well-balanced 
diet — three square meals a day — instead of the few 
mouthfuls of rice that most of them eat now, just 
that one change alone would have more impact 
on the world than all the armies and battles of 
history. 

It is not easj' to do a job like this. To raise 
the level of diet means more than sending seeds 
and hoes abroad. It means that the people of 
these countries must develop farm-credit institu- 
tions, and irrigation projects, and roads and rail- 
roads, and new industries and new employment for 
the millions who live in cities. This will take 
technical assistance and capital development. 

It will take work by the United Nations and 
by the governments of other free nations. It will 
take work by many of our Government agencies. 
Point Four is not just the concern of the State 
Department or the Mutual Security Agency, but 
of the Department of Agriculture, the Public 
Health Service, and other agencies. 

But Point Four was never meant to be just a 
Government program. It is a program of 
people — our people — helping other people 
throughout the world. 

Individually, and through our organizations, 
there is much to do — and no time to be lost. Many 
private organizations are carrying on Point Four 
:)rograms overseas and they need all the help and 
upport they can get. We can send them tools 
,nd books and medical supplies. Our youni: 
people can train themselves as technical experts 
to go abroad. We can welcome students and visi- 
tors to our country ; we can learn from them while 
they learn from us. 

In all we do, we must remember our great tra- 
dition. The American Revolution has never 
stopped. In almost every generation we have 



608 



Department of State Bulletin 



overturned old ways of life, and developed new 
ones — always moving toward more freedom, more 
opportunity, and a better life for all our people. 
We have had setbacks on the way — but in tne end 
we have always moved forward. 

Now, through Point Four, we can help tl^e 
people in the underdeveloped regions to move for- 
ward along the same path. We can help them to 
adapt the principles of freedom, which have in- 
spired our development, to their own needs and 
circumstances. 

This is the way for us to live up to our ideals 
as a Nation, and fulfill our destiny as the greatest 
and most favored Republic God ever made. 



ADDRESS BY SECRETARY ACHESON > 

tExcerpts] 

Very often before the committees of Congress 
and in other audiences to which I have spoken I 
have been asked the question, "Do you think it 
right that in our requests from the Congress we 
should have so large a proportion of our funds 
requested for military purposes as against the 
smaller portion which goes into the constructive 
work of the world?" And I always say : "I think 
it's very sad, it is nothing that we want ; we would 
much prefer to have it otherwise." 

"We are taking the leadership in the world in 
trying to make it otherwise. We have proposals 
now which are being discussed in the United Na- 
tions which would lead to disarmament, lead to 
the world being relieved of this dreadful burden. 
But until that can be accomplished we must, 
whether we like it or not, spend a large part of 
our time and effort, just as the early settlers of 
this country had to do, in protecting oui-selves, 
in building up our defenses so that behind that 
shield the peaceful work can go on. 

And this, in passing, leads me to refer to a 
matter which is perhaps connected with it, and that 
is the matter of organization. So often in talking 
about programs of this sort we get distracted into 
the matter of organization. I'd like to say only 
one word about that, and that is that it's a charac- 
teristic of the human mind that if it fixes itself 
very intently upon a purpose, and in order to ac- 
complish any purpose you have to fix yourself 
intently upon it, but if you do that then that pur- 
pose begins to expand until after a time in your 
mind it encompasses the whole world. I see this 
happening in all the departments of government 
all the time. 

People can start saying, "Well, this is a matter 
of foreign policy and since it's a matter of foreign 
policy the State Department must do it and for- 
eign policy affects everything in the world," so 

" Made before the National Conference on International 
Economic and Social Development at Washington on Apr. 9 
and released to tlie press on the same date. 



that people who take that view want to tend to 
expand the jurisdiction of the State Department. 
Or if you start from the point of view of the 
Treasury Department or the Department of Agri- 
culture or the Department of Commerce you can 
say this leads to that and that leads to the next 
thing, and so this department should control all. 
And so you find people who say, "All you have to 
do is to find two characteristics in a program that 
means that it should be organized and managed by 
one organization" and those two characteristics 
are (1) if it's overseas, and (2) if it's economic. 

Now, everything that is not in the United States, 
Canada, or Mexico, in a sense is overseas. And 
everything that is not purely military is economic 
and even most of the military program is eco- 
nomic. So that this conception, in which you 
must have an overseas organization which will run 
everything outside of the United States, is, I think, 
to lose sight of the real purpose of some of these 
programs. I will not go on with this at length 
but merely say that the economic work which is 
being done in Europe itself in connection with the 
military program is far more closely associated 
with the military program than it is with the sort 
of thing that we are doing here iri Point Four. 
So I urge you not to waste your time on these 
matters of organization at present but to concen- 
trate on the main point. 

So we not only have to build our shield here, our 
military shield, but we have to give great effort 
and great thought to the economic environment as 
well as the security environment. And here I'm 
sorry to say that there is much to discourage the 
person who is interested in helping to get inter- 
national developments in the economic field. It 
isn't enough to have programs which will develop 
undeveloped areas, if you have a completely stag- 
nant situation in the exchange of goods through- 
out the world. We all know that in the early 
stages of development of underdeveloped areas we 
must concentrate on the agricultural side of af- 
fairs. And that means that there must be con- 
siderable trade in other goods. And if one has a 
situation where trade is stagnant because of bar- 
riers, because of lack of foreign exchange, because 
of all the impediments to it which exist, there will 
be a very great break and great drag upon the 
development of underdeveloped areas, no matter 
how enthusiastic we are about Point Four and no 
matter how much effort we put into it. 

I have been working for 12 years on the effort 
to free international trade from some of its bar- 
riers and I regret to say that there are as many 
now as there were when we began and the outlook 
is discouraging. But we must continue to fight for 
it and you must continue to help us because this 
matter of freeing trade throughout the world and 
bringing about a gi-eater exchange of goods is es- 
sential for the purpose that you are meeting here 
today to consider. 



April 27, 1952 



«09 



Cooperation From Private Investors and 
Organizations Urged 

Similarly, in the economic field, there is the 
matter of investment. Unless there is a climate 
to encourage investment abroad you will not get 
the developments in underdeveloped areas which 
we are seeking. And unhappily the climate does 
not seem to be getting better but in many parts of 
the world to be getting worse. There seems to be 
an idea that there is something bad about foreign 
investment in some parts of the world. Com- 
panies, people who have put a great deal of money, 
a great deal of effort into developments in under- 
developed areas are treated as though they were 
enemies of the country in which tliey are working. 
If that goes on it just means that there will not 
be foreign investment and there will not be, as you 
all know, governmental capital sufficient to do this 
job. And, after all, it doesn't make much dif- 
ference whether the investment is the property of 
all the citizens of the country or some of the citi- 
zens. If the whole climate for the reception of 
foreign investment in a country is bad, then the 
capital will not go there, whether it's private or 
governmental. 

And, again, there must be an environment which 
is congenial to the exchange of persons and ideas. 
If, in parts of the world, foreigners are regarded 
as suspicious and as enemies, then again you have 
a lack of the necessary environment to carry on 
the purposes which we want here. In other 
words, this must be a two-way street, there must 
be friendliness on the side of those whom we are 
trying to help as well as the desire on our part to 
be of help. And all through everything that we 
do we must keep in mind that what we are after 
here is to preserve and safeguard the underlying 
human values. 

It's very helpful to me to have this opportunity 
to come and talk with you. A conference of this 
sort, this conference is of tremendous importance 
to the carrying out of this program because this 
program is fundamentally not something which a 
government as a government carries out. Now, I 
don't mean by that merely that private organiza- 
tions are very important in actually carrying out 
programs abroad. That is true, but even more 
than that the entire effort that the government 
agency carries out here is really carried out 
through private organizations. 

We do not have in the Government sufficient 
people to staff these operations, sufficient people 
to give us all the ideas, to give us all the working 
groups which are necessary. We turn to you. 
We turn to the colleges, to the groups, and to the 
organizations in the United States. And it is only 
if we are successful altogether in doing this work, 
as one great undertaking in which we are all con- 
cerned, that it will be successful. It takes the un- 
ending labor of organizations such as yours to 
make young men and women want to go into this 

610 



sort of work and want to go into it with a sense 
of dedication, with a sense of believing, as the 
early missionaries to this country believed, that i 
there is something worth any degree of sacrifice 
in the task. 

I know, in speaking with you, that I do not have 
to convince you that the Point Four Program is a 
good program. I don't have to stress its impor- 
tance. What you would like me to do is to talk 
in the first place, about the subject of the morning, 
the Program in Action. And in doing that, again 
I shall do it not with the pur^jose of trying to 
build up your enthusiasm — because that is built 
up and you understand this program — but from 
the point of view of pointing out some of the un- 
derlying factors which we have to have in mind 
when we operate here. 

Understanding Necessary to Allay Suspicions 

And, again, if I may go back to a hackneyed 
subject, in order to understand the limitations 
which are necessary in the Program in Action and 
the methods which are necessaiy, we have to re- 
mind ourselves once more what it is that we are 
trying to do and what is the background out of 
which our present efforts emerge. Now, that 
background, as the President pointed out last 
night, is that two ideas of greatest importance 
are striking millions of people in the underdevel- 
oped parts of the world at the same time, striking 
them with great suddenness and with great power. 
And these two ideas are, first of all, that a life of 
misery is not foreordained, that something can be 
done about it, that much can be done about it. 
And the second idea is that independence, freedom 
from foreign domination and foreign direction, is 
within their grasp and nothing is going to be al- 
lowed to interfere with that. 

Now, tliese two ideas are ideas which have moved 
peoples profoundly over the centuries and they are 
hitting people, millions of people, in the underde- 
veloped areas for the first time with great power 
since the war. 

And that leads to tremendous ferment. It leads 
to tremendous comings and goings in the popula- 
tion and the thoughts of the population. The 
purpose of the Point Four Program is to help 
direct this energy, this ferment, into peaceful 
channels of development, rather than into mere 
chaos. We know perfectly well that there is a 
tendency to look for panaceas. Indeed in many 
parts of the world these two thoughts which I have 
been describing to you are often confused. Many 
people in many parts of the world are led to be- 
lieve that the mere attainment of national inde- 
pendence will bring automatically the fuller life, 
the freedom from poverty and misery and disease. 
We know of course that that is not the case. 
Therefore, these people, once being disappointed- 
because being free they are not mei'ely immediately 
in good shape — turn to another panacea, which is 

Department of Stale Bulletin 



that of communism, which promises them that if 
they will embrace this doctrine then all these 
things will happen. 

But what the Point Four Program is intended 
to do is to say we have knowledge, we have skills 
which you have seen and which are in part the 
cause of this great ferment which is going on in 
your minds. We are ready to share them with 
you. And we wish to work out with you methods 
by which you can know what we know and we can 
help you develop your own resources for your own 
purposes. 

Limitations in tlie Program 

Now, this being so, if we look at the nature of 
the people and the nature of the situation with 
which we are dealing we begin to see some neces- 
sary limitations in the Program in Action. One 
necessary limitation comes from the fact that 
many, if not most, of the peoples with whom we 
are dealing are suspicious of foreigners. For- 
eigners have come to them very often in the past 
and not always, or pei-haps not often, with the best 
results. Therefore, they are suspicious. Why 
are these people coming to us? Why are they of- 
fering to do this for us? Is there some hidden 
purpose ? Is there some desire on their part to get 
control of our country? These are the questions 
they ask themselves. 

Then there is the limitation of the absorptive 
capacity of the peoples we are trying to help. 
Absorptive in several ways. First of all, they 
must take it in through their mind and through 
the training of their hands. And this cannot be 
done overnight. This is a long process. 

Then there is the confusion in their minds as to 
what they want. Some want one thing and some 
another. Very often they haven't the real knowl- 
edge to understand what it is that they really need 
at the moment. There is a great desire in every 
part of the world for industrialization and there 
is very little understanding of how dangerous 
that is until there is in sight a strong agricultural 
base. 

I think in all the times that I have talked with 
visitors from foreign countries since the war and, 
indeed, during the war, everyone who has come 
into my office starts out with, "We would like a 
steel mill." Well, they want a steel mill in every 
single country in the world. It makes no dif- 
ference whether they have ore or coal or anything 
else. The steel mill is the mark of civilization, 
and that is what they want. 

Now, it's not a question of pouring vast sums 
of money and vast numbers of technicians into 
these areas. It couldn't be done if we wanted to 
do it. Sometimes I have been in meetings where 
people talk about billions of dollars or hundreds 
of thousands of technicians being poured all over 
the world. Those people never stop to think of 
where the technicians are going to sleep and what 



they are going to do. The mere question of 
housing of the missions which are already being 
sent out is a serious one in parts of the world where 
there aren't many houses. This thing has got to 
be done sensibly. 

Adjusting to Internal Situations in 
Foreign Countries 

Now, without going on further into a theoretical 
discussion, let me speak of one or two actual situa- 
tions to show what can be done and what should 
not be done. 

The first real necessity for success is that what 
you offer to do or what you're doing is something 
which the country wants. Now, often it's very 
hard to bring that about because the country 
doesn't know what it wants. But if the country 
does know what it wants and if what it wants is 
the right thing for it, then what you should do 
is to get in behind that and hehi with all your 
power and not say, "Oh, well, I wouldn't do it 
just this way, I would do it that way." If they 
have a good idea and one that is an effective one, 
get behind it and help them. 

That is the situation in India. There the pro- 
gram is one which the Indians have worked out 
themselves. True they have worked it out with 
the help of American technicians, but they sought 
the technicians. We didn't force the technicians 
on them. They came out themselves with their 
own money. They employed these technicians. 
And they went to India and they developed an 
Indian governmental program which was started. 
So that when we came into the picture we could 
throw our help into something which had been de- 
veloped by India with our people merely training 
the Indians who are training their comrades how 
to carry on this program. Immediately the 
thing caught hold like a prairie fire and the Gov- 
ernment has now organized with us the Indo- 
American Fund, a joint undertaking, something 
which they started, something which they believe 
in. And we put all our effort and funds into that. 

Starting with a small group where boys from 
these villages were taught the fundamentals of 
what they should do to increase food production 
and have better public health. Starting with that 
training school, boys, young men go back to their 
villages and persuade the elders of the village to 
adopt this rather revolutionary idea. This 
si)reads on from there to other villages which have 
heard about this. They in turn come in to look at 
it and find everj'body with two or three times as 
much food as they had before. The newcomers 
say, "We want that." Thus you finally get a 
program where the propulsive force comes from 
the country itself, and we are going along to 
help it. 

Now, you find other situations where the coun- 
try not only doesn't know what it wants but 



April 21, 7952 



6U 



isn't equipped to play any part in getting it. And 
there a great mistake would be made if we went 
in and said, "This is what you want, here are a 
lot of Americans, we will do this. We will under- 
take to train your people." What you have got 
to do is to start at the very beginning. 

There was a situation such as that in one coun- 
try which we are helping. There, as in almost all 
these places, the great need was for an increase 
in the food supply. When we got to the country 
we found that the only people dealing with agri- 
culture was the thing called a "bureau," which 
was made up of six people with a budget of 
$6,000 a year. Six people in the entire country 
dealing with agriculture! Well, you couldn't 
get anywhere until the country itself was better 
organized to be a partner in this effort. And, 
therefore, the first job was to show them how to 
develop the proper bureaus to carry on agricul- 
tural extension work in their country. That was 
done. Then programs were developed in con- 
junction with this new governmental outfit. 

The other day I had a visit from some people 
in a very small country and they had come up to 
say, "Go easy. Take it easy. We are being over- 
whelmed by good will." They had at the same 
time six international organizations — the United 
States organization and four private ones — de- 
scend on them. And they said there were almost 
more "good-willers" in the country than there 
were citizens in the country. The country was 
simply bewildered. It didn't know what to do. 
People were starting projects and deciding they 
weren't any good and, the happy phrase, "cut- 
ting their losses," didn't carry much conviction to 
the population. 

So finally we said, "Now, let's all get together 
here and let's all sit down and work out some coor- 
dinated plan, get the people and the government 
of the country in agreement with this and then go 
ahead a little more slowly." 

You must adjust what you're doing to the ab- 
sorptive capacity of the country and the willing- 
ness of the country to have you carry on the pro- 
fram. Money isn't the right way to go at it. 
loney is essential, money is necessary. Some- 
times a lot of money is necessary, as in the Indian 
program where in order to carry out and reach the 
goals within the time which is allotted we must 
rnove much faster than the pure theory of tech- 
nical assistance would permit. 

Exportation of the American Idea 

Those are some of the ideas which can be devel- 
oped much more fully with others in your panel 
discussions this morning. But what I should like 
to leave with you are the points which I have just 
made. 

First of all, that Point Four is one among many 
points. It is not the whole foreign policy. It 
cannot succeed unless the whole foreign policy 
succeeds. 



Second, it must be adjusted. The work that we 
do must be adjusted to the condition, the situa- 
tion in the country. It must be infinitely flexible. 

Third, and it follows from the second, do not 
be doctrinaire about Point Four. Do not be like 
the Socialist Party where you have the pure doc- 
trine and then 50 splinter doctrines coming off it. 
Do not say, "This is with Point Four and this is 
without Point Four." That sort of rigid think- 
ing, I believe, gets us nowhere. Point Four must 
mean that we are primarily engaged in helping to 
teach these people how to help themselves. 

Now, what is necessary to bring that about in 
a particular country depends on that country. 
And, therefore, do not be rigid. Do not have - 
purely doctrinaire ideas. 

And, finally, one last thought. We have said 
over and over again that this is exporting the 
American idea, the American Revolution, or the 
American dream. It is very true, but if that is 
true let us be sure, and be terribly sure, that we 
are preserving the American dream, the American 
idea, in America. 

Do not let us be smug and believe that merely 
because you can read in the books that America 
was like this, or that Abraham Lincoln said it 
was like this, it will be like that without our con- 
stant effort and our constant fighting to make our 
country what we want it to be and what we believe 
it has been and will be in the future. 

Current Legislation on Foreign Policy 

Joint Economic Report. Report of the Joint Committee 
on the January 1952 Economic Report of the Presi- 
dent with Suijplemental and Minority Views and 
Materials Prepared by the Staff on National Defense 
and the Economic Outlook for the Fiscal Year 1953. 
S. Rept. 1295, S2d Cong., 2d sess. 134 p. 

Revision of Immigration and Nationality Laws. Minority 
Views. S. Rept. 1137, Part 2. 82d Cong., 2d sess. 
[To accompany S. 2.550] 11 pp. 

AmendinET Section 3 (A) of the Foreign Agents Registra- 
tion Act of 1938, as Amended. S. Rept. 1319, 82d 
Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany S. 2611] 3 pp. 

Amending Section 32 of the Trading With the Enemy Act. 
S. Rept. 1235, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany 
S. 2544] 4 pp. 

Extension of Rubber Act of 1948. H. Kept. 1513, 82d 
Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany H. R. 6787] 7 pp. 

Investigating the Administration of the Trading With 
the Enemy Act Since December IS, 1941. S. Rept. 
1294, 82d Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany S. Res. 
245] 2 pp. 

Assist in Preventing Aliens From Entering or Remaining 
in the United States Illegally. H. Rept. 1505, 82d 
Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany S. 1851] 3 pp. 

Supplementary Extradition Convention With Canada. 
Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations on 
Executive G. S. Exec. Rept. 5, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 
18 pp. 

Continuance of the Mutual Security Program. Message 
from the President of tlie United States Transmit- 
ting Recommendations for the Continuance of the 
Mutual Security Program for the Fiscal Year End- 
ing June 30, 19.53. H. Doc. 382, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 
14 pp. 



612 



Department of State Bulletin 



U. S.-Netherlands Relations Reviewed 



Address by the President ^ 



The carillon which Your Majesty has presented 
on behalf of the people of the Netherlands will be 
a wonderful gift. When it is completed it will 
greatly enrich the life of this city, and it will bring 
pleasui'e to millions of Americans when they come 
to visit this National Capital. No gift could be a 
better symbol of the harmonious relations which 
have always existed, and which should always con- 
tinue to exist, between the Netherlands and the 
United States. On behalf of the people of the 
United States I am happy to accept this gift from 
the people of the Netherlands. 

Our two countries have always been close to- 
gether in spirit. There are many communities in 
this country, including our largest city, that owe 
their origin to the early Dutch settlers who came 
over here. Tliree of our Presidents — Martin Van 
Buren, Theodore Eoosevelt, and Franklin D. 
Roosevelt — traced their origins to the Netherlands. 

The people of the Netherlands are no strangers 
to us. They are welcome here whether they come 
as visitore or as settlers. 

Last September Queen Juliana wrote a remark- 
able letter to me.'^ In that letter she expressed her 
great concern over the plight of the refugees in 
Europe and expressed the hope that something 
could be done to alleviate their distress and to 
give them new lives of usefulness and dignity. It 
was a letter full of compassion and human under- 
standing for the problems of these unfortunate 
people. 

Since that time, I have been working to find a 
way to help solve this problem. Our Government 
is supporting an international effort to provide 
opportunities for resettlement overseas not only 
for the unfortunate refugees of Europe but also 
for those people who live in overcrowded areas 
and need a chance to migrate. 

' Made on the occasion of the acceptance of a gift of a 
carillon from Queen Juliana at Meridian Hill Park, Wash- 
ington, on Apr. 4 and released to the press by the Wliite 
House on the same date. 

' BuixETiN of Oct. 8, 1951, p. 572. 



I have recently sent a message to the Congress 
recommending that this country provide aid to 
those escaping from Communist tyranny and at 
the same time accept additional immigration into 
this country.^ One of the recommendations I 
made was that we should admit additional families 
from the Netherlands. I hope the Congress will 
act favorably on this recommendation. If they 
do, we can add to the already warm ties which 
bind the United States and the Netherlands 
together. 

The people and the Government of the Nether- 
lands are working closely with us in our struggle 
to bring about permanent peace in the world. 
They know how terrible war can be. They know 
it first-hand from the Nazi invasion. When the 
Netherlands was overrun, the spirit of the people, 
however, did not die. It found expression in the 
courageous resistance movement of the Dntch 
people. Queen Wilhelmina visited us in those 
sad and terrible years. She demonstrated for all 
of us the undying courage of the Dutch people 
and their faith in ultimate victory. In those days, 
we worked together for victory — now we work 
together for peace. 

The American people are proud and happy to 
have been able to contribute to the revival of the 
Netherlands after the war. We have been im- 
pressed by the vigorous way in which the Dutch 
people have rebuilt their economy. We have great 
admiration for the plans now being carried for- 
ward in the Netherlands to reclaim additional 
land from the sea. 

Most of all, we have been impressed by the de- 
termination with which the people of the Neth- 
erlands have joined in the common defense of 
Europe. The Netherlands is an important mem- 
ber of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
And now Dutch Armed Forces are preparing to 
enter into the European Defense Community. It 
is only through this kind of effort, it is only 

' Ibid., Apr. 7, 1952, p. 551. 



April 27, 7952 



613 



through unity with other nations, that any one 
of the free nations can make itself secure against 
the threat of war in the future. Through the 
United Nations, through tlie North Atlantic 
Treaty, the people of the Netherlands and the 
United States are working side-by-side for peace 
in the world. 

Your Majesty, Your Royal Highness, we are 
happy to have you with )is. We are grateful for 
the magnificent gift which the people of Holland 
are making to us. We hope you will come again. 

When you return to your country I hope you 
will carry the thanks of the American people to 
the people of the Netherlands and that you will 
express to them our good wishes and cordial 
friendship. 



General Eisenhower Asks Release 
From SHAPE Assignment 

[Released to the press hy the White House April 111 

The Secretary of Defense has addressed the fol- 
lowing letter to Gen. Dioight D. Eisenhower, Su- 
preme Commander, Allied Potoers Europe: 

April 10, 1952 

Dear General Eisenhower: In accordance 
with your request contained in your letter of 2 
April, and with the approval of the President, 
I am taking appropriate action to secure your 
release from assignment as Supreme Commander, 
Allied Powers Europe, effective 1 June, and to 
have you placed on inactive status upon your re- 
turn to tlie United States. 

With kindest regards, I am 
Very sincerely yours, 

Robert A. Lovett 



The folloioing is the text of General Eisen- 
hoioer''s letter to the Secretary of Defense: 

2 April 1952 

Dear Mr. Secretary: I request that you ini- 
tiate appropriate action to secure my release from 
assignment as Supreme Commander, Allied Pow- 
ers Europe, by approximately June 1st, and that 
I be placed on inactive status upon my return to 
the United States. A relief date fixed this far 
in advance should provide ample time for the 
appointment of a successor and for any prepara- 
tion and counsel that he may desire from me. 

This proposal is in the spirit of the understand- 
ing I gain from officials in Washington who out- 
lined the special purposes of my original 
appointment in December 1950. At that time it 
was believed by those individuals that, because of 
past experience, I had relationships with respect 
to Eui'ope which would facilitate the formation 

614 



of a common defense structure and the establish- y 
ment of a pattern for its operation. An assump- 
tion on the part of responsible officials of our ; 
Government that I could be helpful in the vital 
task of preserving peace was, of course, a compel- 
ling reason for instantaneous return to active serv- 
ice and acceptance of this assignment. 

As of now, I consider that the specific purposes 
for which I was recalled to duty have been largely 
accomplished; the command has been formed, its 
procedures established, and basic questions settled. 
Moreover, a program of growth and development, 
based on early experience and searching reexam- 
ination, has been agi-eed at governmental levels. 
There are many difficulties to be overcome but, 
given the wholehearted support of the Nato com- 
munity, this program will provide a reassuring 
degree of security in this region, despite the con- 
tinued presence of the threat of Soviet commu- 
nism. There is every reason to believe that the 
Nato nations will continue to work together suc- 
cessfully, toward the goal of a secure peace. 
Sincerely, 

DwiGHT D. Eisenhower 



The following is the text of a letter to Lt. Gen. 
Paid Ely, Chairman, The Standing Group, North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization: 

2 April 1952 

Dear Mr. Chairman: I have this date re- 
quested the United States Government to initiate 
action looking to my relief as Supreme Com- 
mander, Allied Powers Europe, by approximately 
the first of June. 

This action is in consonance with my under- 
standing and intentions when the President of the 
United States, in response to request from the 
Nato Council, appointed me to the post more than 
a year ago. It was assumed at that time that 
wartime experience particularly qualified me to 
facilitate the initial organization of Shape, estab- 
lishment of its procedures, and the institution of 
basic programs. Since these phases are now ac- 
complished and in view of the press of other de- 
velopments, it is my hope to return to inactive 
military status. 

In addition to establishing organizational and 
procedural patterns, I feel that we have made con- 
siderable progress during the past year in our 
efforts to build adequate defenses in the European 
region. As related to you in my Annual Report,^ 
these gains were accompanied by a number of 
shortcomings and continuing pi'oblems. But, in 
the main, the results have been definitely positive. 

The way to greater progress over the coming 
months was charted in the memorable conference 
at Lisbon, the prime significance of which was the 

' Bulletin of Apr. 14, p. 572. 

Department of Stale Bulletin 



coordination of military requirements with eco- 
nomic capabilities and the setting of specific p;oals 
for each of the Nato countries. If these goals are 
achieved, we shall see, by the end of this year, re- 
spectable forces established on the Continent, with 
the promise of further increase in future years, 
including substantial German reinforcement 
through the European Defense Force. I know 
that you and your associates will spare no efforts 
to bring into realization all the essential steps 
agreed at Lisbon. 

When I entei-ed upon my duties in December 
1950, I was sure that our common task in Europe 
was a job that had to be done. From later ex- 
perience, I am convinced that it can be done and 
that, given full cooperation, it will be done. 

Throughout the period of my service here, the 
support of the Nato governments, peoples and 
armed services, and of the Standing Group and 
Military Committee has been a prime factor in. 
whatever success we have achieved in this com- 
mand. I am most deeply grateful to you and hope 
that our Nato commands under your direction will 
continue to flourish as guardians of the peace. 
Sincerely, 

D^viGHT D. Eisenhower 



William H. Draper, Jr. 

Named U. S. Representative to NAC 

[Released to the press April 8] 

The President on April 8 designated Ambassa- 
dor William H. Draper, Jr., to be U.S. permanent 
representative to the North Atlantic Council 
(Nac). 

At the same time Ambassador Draper was nomi- 
nated to be U.S. special representative in Europe, 
it was announced that upon the reorganization 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(Nato) , he also would become senior U.S. civilian 
representative in Europe responsible for North 
Atlantic treaty affairs. A reorganization of Nato 
was approved by the North Atlantic Council at 
Lisbon. The reorganization called for the elim- 
ination of the Council of Deputies and the estab- 



lishment of the North Atlantic Council in per- 
manent session. 

Appropriate ministers of the I'espective gov- 
ernments will attend several meetings each year 
as in the past. In between these meetings the 
Council will be in regular session attended by per- 
manent repi'esentatives of each country who will 
represent their governments as a whole. 

Ambassador Draper, as the U.S. permanent 
representative, will represent the U.S. Govern- 
ment as a whole on the North Atlantic Council. 
Ambassador Frederick L. Anderson, the deputy 
U.S. special representative in Europe, will serve 
as Amoassador Draper's general deputy. To as- 
sist Ambassador Draper with respect to his activi- 
ties on North Atlantic ti'eaty matters. Ambassa- 
dor Livingston T. Merchant is being designated 
by the President as alternate U.S. permanent rep- 
resentative to Nac and will be Ambassador 
Draper's chief adviser on Nato matters. 

With the designation of Ambassador Draper as 
U.S. permanent representative, the posts of U.S. 
special representative in Europe and U.S. perma- 
nent I'epresentative have been combined in one 
individual. Thus for the first timej there is a 
single U.S. official in Europe coordmating and 
supervising U.S. participation in the North At- 
lantic Council and the execution of the Mutual 
Security Program. 

Ambassador Draper will be charged with see- 
ing that U.S. activities in these fields are effec- 
tively integrated and administered to assure that 
the defensive strength of the nations concerned 
shall be built as quickly as possible on a basis of 
continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid. 
In this capacity Ambassador Draper will repre- 
sent the President, the Secretaries of State and 
Defense, the Director for Mutual Security, and 
the Mutual Security Agency. 

Ambassador Merchant, in addition to serving 
as alternate U.S. permanent representative, will 
be Ambassador Draper's deputy for political af- 
fairs. Ambassador Draper will also be assisted 
by Paul R. Porter, who will serve as deputy for 
economic affairs, and Daniel K. Edwards, who 
will serve as deputy for defense affairs in connec- 
tion with Nac matters. Messrs. Porter and Ed- 
wards will have the personal rank of Minister. 



April 21, 1952 



615 



Belgium's and Switzerland's Progress Toward Security 



The following statements hy Ambassador Mur- 
phy and Minister Patterson were made over the 
NBC-TV network program, "Battle Report^'' on 
April 6 and were released to the press on the same 
date. 

STATEMENT BY ROBERT D. MURPHY 
U.S. AMBASSADOR TO BELGIUM 

During the past 30 years, I have represented the 
United States — in one capacity or another — in 
some eisht different countries. My official travels 
have taken me through possibly a score of others. 
It is safe to say that Belgium is second to none 
when it comes to making an American feel that he 
is really not too far from home. The people of 
Belgium ai'e as much like Americans as any people 
I know, and as friendly and hospitable. Their 
vigor, their efficiency, their love of liberty, and 
their competitive spirit — all are virtues we 
Americans generally associate with ourselves. 

The same is true of another Belgian characteris- 
tic : The impatient desire to get on with a given 
job and to do that job effectively. 

This is the Belgian's attitude toward meeting 
their international commitments. Their record 
in contributing to their own security, as well as to 
that of the free world, is excellent. Their cooper- 
ation within the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- 
tion is genuine. Their response to the military 
and economic aid we are giving them is that of a 
willing industrious partner in a great common 
effort. 

That effort — as we well know — can mean the dif- 
ference between the preservation of freedom and 
totalitarian enslavement. The free nations either 
build the strength and unity with which to deter 
aggression or face the terrible consequence of 
failure. 

The Belgians have clearly demonstrated their 
awareness of this hard fact. 

Like much of the rest of Western Europe, Bel- 
gium emerged from World War II the victim of 
physical destruction and economic pillage. Its 
people were gripped by that sense of weakness, 
and insecurity, and uncertainty which must be ex- 
pected of those who have experienced foreign oc- 
cupation and devastation. The Belgians have 
suffered these not once, but many times. There is 
little we Americans can teach our Belgian friends 
about the meaning of war and aggression, for they 
have seen far too much of both. 



Belgium has less than 9 million people, about 
as many people as New York City. In size, the 
country is just a little larger than our own State 
of Maryland. But in 7 short years, the Belgians 
have staged a spectacular come-back. American 
aid — although it has been less for Belgium than 
for other western European countries — has, of 
coarse, helped to make that come-back possible. 
But the Belgians' ability to help themselves is 
primarily responsible. Through determination, 
sound policies, and hard work, Belgium has 
reached an enviable state of solvency, not only 
economically, but politically, and militarily. 

This solvency is greatly to the free world's ad- 
vantage. Belgium's currency, for example, is 
among the strongest in the world, and the Belgian 
franc is backed by a sound money policy. 

Up to the end of January 1952, Belgium has 
extended about 370 million dollars in credits 
through the European payments system to her 
neighbors and allies in Europe. In ratio to popu- 
lation that would be the equivalent of at least 
15 billion dollars for the United States. 

Belgian industrial production is today some 40 
percent above prewar levels. Last year, new rec- 
ord highs were set in the production of steel, iron, 
and electric power. 

Belgium's immense overseas territory, the Bel- 
gian Congo, which is really the heart of Africa, 
is an important source of many raw materials of 
great value to the defense effort of the whole 
Western World, and especially to the United 
States. 

But what about Belgium's contribution to the 
defensive military strength of the free world? 

Belgium is the only western European nation 
to demand 24 months of military service of her 
young men. She added 12 months to the service 
period almost immediately after the Communists 
launched their aggression in Korea. 

Belgian infantrymen are fighting with the U. N. 
Forces in Koi-ea. Belgian planes are serving on 
the Korean airlift. 

Belgium has already furnished three divisions 
to the united army which is being molded for the 
defense of Europe. By 1954, the Belgians expect 
to have the full six divisions they have promised 
General Eisenhower ready for duty. They are 
also well on their way to having an air force they 
can be proud of. 

Belgium has long been self-sufficient in the pro- 
duction of small arms and small-anns ammuni- 



616 



Department of State Bulletin 



tion. She is rapidly moving toward self-suffi- 
ciency in the production of a number of other 
military end-items. Equally important, she is 
beginning to produce munitions for other coun- 
tries of the North Atlantic area. 

I am often asked about Belgium's political 
stability. Belgium gives every evidence of being 
in full control of her internal political situation. 

She has had her share of internal political 
differences. But then, what democracy does not? 
The important thing to bear in mind is that 
communism is only a minor nuisance in Belgium. 
At the close of the war, the Communists had 
about 10 percent of the popular vote behind them. 
Today, that percentage is down to 4 and is still 
declining. 

I don't want to leave the impression that Bel- 
gium has reached her peak effort in Western de- 
fense. But from a condition of chaos and de- 
struction which marked the end of the war, 
Belgium has come a long way in the right direc- 
tion. Crises may lie ahead for Belgium, but 
there may also be crises ahead for others including 
ourselves. Every day our power and strength 
to meet crises are growing. 

The problems ahead for the free peoples con- 
tinue grave. We are still in the process of build- 
ing the strength with which to insure the 
freedoms we cherish. But we can, I think, look 
ahead today with confidence that we have the 
ability to meet crises and to overcome them. 

Our partner, Belgium, is giving an excellent 
example of speeding progress toward the security 
we both want. 



STATEMENT BY RICHARD C. PATTERSON 
U.S. MINISTER TO SWITZERLAND 

Switzerland is one country about which the 
average American knows relatively little. Today, 
I'd like to talk about some of the things which 
demonstrate that Switzerland is well worth close 
acquaintance. 

When one mentions Switzerland to the man in 
the street he is most apt to think of a small coun- 
try. It is true that Switzerland is small. It is not 
as large as West "Virginia. Its population is only 
a little more than 4.5 million. But its size belies 
its significance. For Switzerland, indeed, is of 
great importance to the United States and to the 
entire free world. 

The United States and Switzerland have very 
much in common. 

Like the United States, Switzerland is a union 
of states, their states being called cantons. The 
Swiss economy, like ours, is diversified, with free 
enterprise playing the key role. The Swiss Gov- 
ernment also is elected by the people. A Swiss 
citizen enjoys the same civil liberties as does an 
American. I believe that Americans who have 



seen Switzerland at first hand are impressed with 
the contributions which democratic Switzerland 
makes to the free world. 

Why is Switzerland, with which we have so 
much in common so important to us as well as to 
other free nations ? 

Here are just a few of the reasons. 
Switzerland's economy is perhaps the most 
stable in Europe. This has meant much to a 
Western Europe seeking to deter aggression as 
well as to get back on its feet economically after 
a very destructive war. The Swiss have contrib- 
uted more than one-half billion dollars in aid 
and loans to the relief and rehabilitation of post- 
war Europe. They have participated in the Or- 
ganization for European Economic Cooperation, 
which was formed to help carry out the objectives 
of the Marshall Plan. They also belong to the 
European Payments Union and have done a great 
deal to promote the free flow of trade that is es- 
sential to healthy European trade relations. 

But the Swiss — and this is noteworthy — have 
not found it necessary to ask for a single American 
dollar in aid. 

Just as the economic strength of Switzerland 
is valuable to Europe so it is of real moment to 
the United States. We are joined with a free 
community of nations, including Switzerland's 
western European neighbors, in the common de- 
fense of democracy. Switzerland's contributions 
to the economic stability of Western Europe are 
contributions to the over-all strength of democ- 
racy throughout the world. 

While it is true that they have established an 
enviable record in avoiding military conflict, not 
having fought a war for more than 130 yeai's, their 
military significance is striking. Above and 
beyond the obvious importance of Switzerland's 
geographic and strategic position, it has one of 
the largest, best-trained, and best-equipped armies 
in Western Europe. According to an official pub- 
lication, 800,000 soldiers can be mobilized in a 
matter of days. This is impressive evidence of 
an historic democracy's determination to remain 
free. 

As in the United States, Communists exercise 
no influence over national policies and have vir- 
tually no popular following. The Swiss people 
also recognize the dangers of communism and 
maintain constant vigilance to prevent its growth. 
Although traditionally Switzerland has not 
sought security through collective action, its 
policy of armed preparedness is in purpose similar 
to the policy currently being pursued by the 
United States and other countries of the free 
world. The purpose of all of us is security from 
aggression. 

There can be no doubt about Switzerland's will 
to defend itself against any aggressor. The 
ability and determination of the Swiss to resist 
attack are significant contributions to world 
security. 



April 21, 1952 



617 



Good Faith vs. Empty Promises in the War of Ideas 



hy Adrian S. Fisher 
Legal Adviser ^ 



In the early days of the Republic, the Congress 
approved the appointment of three consular offi- 
cials who were considered adequate to handle 
such problems as might confront the new nation 
in the field of foreign affairs. I think we can 
safely predict that that day is gone — never to 
return. 

Through the years, and somewhat reluctantly, 
we have come to realize that our destiny is closely 
linked to that of other nations. As this realiza- 
tion has penetrated deeper into the consciousness 
of succeeding generations of Americans, inter- 
national affairs have occupied a place of increas- 
ing importance in the life of the Nation. In 
keeping with this development, the agency of the 
Government responsible for foreign affairs has 
grown until today the Secretary of State has an 
overseas staff of nearly 20,000 people, including 
persons employed locally, in 290 missions scat- 
tered through nearly 75 countries. In addition, 
there are nearly 10,000 on the headquarters staff. 

Much of the growth shown here postdates 
World War II and as such reflects the world 
leadership thrust upon us after V-J Day. Be 
that as it may, 30,000 people is a lot of people. 
They do the staff work on American foreign 
policy. And when you consider the scope and the 
variety of the international problems facing us 
and the enormous responsibilities we have as- 
sumed, they have plenty to do. But they are not 
"policy-makers" as such. 

In general terms, our foreign policy is an 
amalgam of what the various interested agencies 
of the Government believe is required by Amer- 
ican interests and the security of the people. It 
develops out of a distillate of the knowledge and 
the judgment of hundreds of specialists and 
technicians. It takes shape as a result of recom- 
mendations for action from various officials with 
a subsequent compromise of conflicting views or 

" Excerpts from an address made before the Massachu- 
setts League of Women Voters' School of International 
Relations at Cambridge, Mass., on Apr. 1 and released 
to the press on the same date. 



perhaps a rejection of one proposal in favor of 
another. If a specific plan of action results, it 
may again make the rounds for scrutiny and 
criticism. If a major decision is involved the 
final product then goes to the President for ap- 
proval. 

It is entirely possible that the approved policy 
may contain ideas or suggestions which originated 
in the brain of a first secretary in a legation 
thousands of miles from Washington or which 
first appeared in a report from a staff economist 
of the National Security Resources Board. On 
numerous occasions, policies have been put into 
effect that were first advanced by private indi- 
viduals. 

There are numerous agencies which participate 
in making policy. The Constitution charges the 
President with responsibility for our foreign pol- 
icy. It placed the purse strings in the hands of 
the Congress and treaty ratification in the hands 
of the Senate. The Secretary of State is the top 
specialist on world affairs in the Administration, 
but his function is to advise the President and act 
in his behalf. The Department of Defense, the 
National Security Resources Board, the Treasury, 
the Department of Commerce, the Tariff Commis- 
sion, the National Security Council, and the 
Psychological Strategy Board also have a finger 
in the pie. 

The overseas organization of the Department 
has a vital part to play in policy matters. It oper- 
ates as the eyes and ears of the Nation. The offi- 
cers of the I oreign Service channel back to head- 
quarters a steady flow of reports on political sit- 
uations, economic conditions, trade and labor mat- 
ters, and a variety of other items that bear on 
American interests. This information is the 
factual foundation upon which policy is built. It 
is coordinated and evaluated by the headquarters 
staff and is moved up through the echelons of the 
Departmental organization. 

In a sense, the senior officers of the Department 
make up the professional core of policy making. 
They are at the center of the web, the strands of 



618 



Deparfmenf of Sfafe Bulletin 



which reach into many agencies of your Govern- 
ment. 

There is another group which plays a vital role 
in the formulation and development of our foreign 
policy. That is the public of the United States. 
This does not mean that decisions are made by 
guessing as to what the Gallup Polls would show 
and then following the polls regardless of whether 
it was in the best interest of the United States. 
What it does mean is that experience has shown 
that in the long run no policy can be successful un- 
less it has the support of an enlightened and in- 
formed public. 

The decisions which are made in the field of 
world affairs affect every one of you. Therefore, 
you have the privilege and the duty to take an ac- 
tive part. For this reason, a great Seci'etary of 
State described the fundamental task in the con- 
duct of foreign affairs as focusing the will of a 
hundred and forty million people on problems be- 
yond our shores. 

The necessary synthesis here has to be developed 
out of a relationship between the Government and 
the citizens, wherein the people are fully informed 
on the why's and wherefore's of a particular sit- 
uation. 

Peace With Justice and Honor 

Now, given this frame of policy making— what 
are the policies that have resulted and on what are 
they based? The thesis on which we have oper- 
ated is one, I believe, that is widely accepted and 
earnestly supported by the American people. We 
proceed on the conviction that the welfare and the 
security of the United States are served best by 
peace — peace with justice and with honor. Fur- 
ther, we are of the opinion that such peace is best 
obtained through collective security. 

Implicit in this thesis is the obligation to do 
what we can to aid our partners in the collective 
effort to i^reserve and extend their freedoms be- 
cause, like peace, freedom is an entity. Our own 
freedom is threatened if tlie freedom of others is 
erased by tyranny. 

Some of the critics of American foreign policy 
here in this country indignantly condemn this 
thesis as idealistic and charge that moralizing 
will get us nowhere. I will grant that there is 
here a coloration of idealism, but there is also a 
strong streak of practicality present. I am fur- 
ther convinced that the national interest is best 
advanced by a blend of idealistic as well as prac- 
tical considerations. 

For some months past and certainly for many 
months in the future, a major American objective 
has been opposition to communism and preventing 
the virus from infecting areas which are now free 
of contamination. The means to this objective 
involves the economic, political, and military re- 
construction in regions endangered by Soviet 



pressure. Included are the situations of strength 
now under construction in Western Europe, at 
key points in the Mediterranean, in the Middle 
East, and in the Far East. 

In this effort, we start with three major 
premises which are equal in importance and en- 
tirely interdependent. 

We recognize that to a tragic degree the for- 
eign policy of the Soviet Union is rooted in the 
concept of brute force. Therefore, if a nation or 
group of nations is to stand up to Moscow or deal 
with the Kremlin on anything approaching parity, 
that nation or group of nations has to be able to 
muster tiie kind and quantity of military strength 
that Stalin respects. 

We know that the appeal of communism takes 
its quickest and strongest hold where misery and 
want abound. Therefore, the antidote to the 
spread of the Communist virus is the easement of 
hardshiiJ and a standard of living high enough 
that a man's work yields to him the food, shelter, 
and clothing necessary to life. 

Finally, we have seen that Communist strategy 
relies on despoiling the victim of his faith in the 
future of the free world and surrounding him 
with an atmosphere of social chaos and confusion. 
Therefore, it is essential that we counter by build- 
ing the individual's confidence in his capacity to 
manage his own affairs under conditions of order 
and stability. 

It is evident that the latter two of these 
premises are far broader of base than the first and 
that they are linked with two revolutionary move- 
ments now sweeping certain areas of the world. 
Of both these the United States was a progenitor. 
We were certainly important agents of the revo- 
lution of production and perhaps have an even 
greater hand in the exjjort of the revolutionary 
concept of the dignity of the individual. 

We now witness the reaction of peoples who for 
the first time have seen economic progress previ- 
ously undreamt of. We now see the reaction of 
peoples to ideas of self-government and social jus- 
tice that they had not heretofore known. We are 
identified as the champions of those ideas and it is 
to us that these people look for help in bringing 
them to pass. We cannot welcome them by offer- 
ing tanks and planes alone. If there is to be a 
partnership, it must be a full partnership. It 
must include food for the mind and the spirit 
as well as for the stomach. 

There is idealism here — but there also is a 
strong streak of practicality and would be even if 
there were no Soviet menace. These people are 
our neighbors in a fast shrinking world. The 
first premise — a free world rearmament — is a di- 
rect response to Soviet tactics. It was effected 
when the Soviet Union rejected a workable stand- 
ard of disarmament we offered them. We con- 
tinue to offer it, but as long as the Kremlin fails 



April 21, J 952 



619 



to respond, the free world must look to its 
defenses. 

What has been done by the United States to put 
these premises into force? What has been done 
to build a strong, well-coordinated group of free 
nations, able and willing to defend themselves 
against any potential aggressor? 

A number of milestones have already been 
passed. Through vigorous action in the United 
Nations, the United States forced the Soviet to 
withdraw from northern Iran. Prompt assist- 
ance by the United States enabled the Greek Gov- 
ernment to ci'ush a Communist-instigated revolt. 
American aid enabled the Turkish Government to 
maintain its independence in the face of Soviet 
sabre rattling. The United States put into effect 
the Marshall Plan, which has given essential as- 
sistance in the reconstruction of the economic life 
of an entire continent. The Marshall Plan has 
worked. Someone in 1947 commented that the 
Communists could take over France by picking up 
the phone. Much the same was true of Italy. 
The Communists held Government posts, domi- 
nated trade-unions, and commanded the support 
of important blocks of voters. And their 
strength was rising. 

Decline of Communism in Europe 

Today, no Communist holds a cabinet post in the 
governments of our European allies there. Com- 
munist strength in the parliaments has dropped. 
In France, a Communist stronghold, in 1946, out 
of 627 deputies (in the Parliament) 181 were 
Communists. Today the number is 95. 

The drop in Communist strength is shown in 
other developments. Party membership in West- 
ern Europe is a third lower than in 1946, less than 
lyo percent of the population. The circulation 
of Communist newspapers is half what it was, 
and many trade-unions have freed themselves of 
Kremlin control. 

At the same time, needed economic assistance 
reached friendly free nations in Southeast Asia 
and in the Pacific area which effectively checked 
internal Communist threats and strengthened and 
stabilized the governments concerned. 

Once a start had been made on the road back 
to stability, the North Atlantic Treaty was 
drafted. It declared that an attack on one mem- 
ber of the pact was an attack on all. This gave 
heart to the individual members, particularly the 
smaller members, by assuring them that if they 
were attacked they would not have to fight alone. 
The treaty served notice on any potential aggres- 
sor that the old totalitarian technique of picking 
off victims one by one would no longer work. The 
treaty recognized that if the underlying principle 
of collective security — a joint defense based on 
self-help and mutual aid — was to be applied, a 
political framework had first to be constructed. 



This ])riiiciple was expressly recognized in the 
United Nations Chai'ter. It followed the pattern 
of the Organization of American States and is in 
turn being duplicated by the proposed Pacific 
security arrangements and for the proposed Mid- 
dle East Command. 

To give the initial impetus to these defense 
agreements, the United States launched the Mu- 
tual Defense Assistance Program and followed 
up with the combined economic and military aid 
which is now going forward under the Mutual 
Security Progi-am. 

In December 1950, at the Brussels conference, 
the North Atlantic Treaty powers agreed to a 
Unified Command of their forces in Europe. Gen- 
eral Eisenhower took command of these forces. 
After the great debate, the United States dis- 
jDatched additional troops to Europe as part of 
this force. On the military side both General 
Eisenhower and General Gruenther have said that 
gratifying progress has been made. On the politi- 
cal side, this action has also had important effects. 
It showed the people of Europe that we regard 
them as important. It showed them that they 
had not been consigned to the fate of being over- 
run, devastated, and then liberated. It made pos- 
sible more progress toward the unification of Eu- 
rope than has occurred in the past one thousand 
years. It made possible the Schuman Plan, the 
discussions concerning the European defense 
forces, and the European Defense Community. 

These discussions played a key part in restoring 
Germany to a place in the family of free nations. 
It is extremely important to the people of Europe 
that their defense perimeter included Western 
Germany. It is obviously common sense that the 
German people take part in the defense of their 
own territory. How could this be worked out 
without risking a rebirth of German militarism 
and without imposing conditions offensive to Ger- 
man dignity and their wish for equality, which 
are essential to their willing and enthusiastic 
participation ? 

We should like to see the peaceful unification 
of a free Germany. This was the United States' 
objective when it sponsored the recent U. N. reso- 
lution on Germany. Under that resolution a U. N. 
commission was created to investigate whether the 
necessary conditions for free elections existed in 
all of Germany. We support this resolution and 
welcome the commission. However, the history 
of Communist obstruction, and specifically the 
Communist refusal to permit the commission to 
enter Eastern Germany, does not lead us to hope 
that this objective can be reached in the imme- 
diate future. 

Britain, France, and the United States are 
working toward an end of the occupation by a 
series of contractual arrangements with the Fed- 
eral Republic, thus restoring the fullest German 
sovereignty possible in the present situation. At 
Lisbon, Nato approved the creation of a European 



620 



Deparfmenf of State Bulletin 



Defense Community, in which West Germany 
would participate as an equal member. West Ger- 
man troops would participate in the European 
defense forces. The strength and unity of the 
European community is the primary safeguard 
against the revival of aggressive militarism. 

I believe these steps, the Unified Command un- 
der General Eisenhower, and the progress toward 
a unified European community, represent real ac- 
complishments. It has not been accomplished 
without assistance from the United States. There 
have been large amounts of American aid, money 
which has come out of your pocket. This year it 
is going to require more. The present foreign 
assistance program calls for 7.9 billion dollars. 

With a program of this magnitude, a respon- 
sible administration must answer the question "If 
our policy has been successful, why do we need all 
this money?" 

Reasons for Financial Aid 

Of this amount, 4 billion dollars is for mili- 
tary equipment and 1.8 billion dollars is in defense 
support — that is, funds to enable the North At- 
lantic countries to obtain machinery, equipment, 
and commodities which they must have if they 
are to maintain sound economies capable of carry- 
ing their heavy defense burdens. 

Let us consider what these burdens are. Our 
European allies had to start building their mili- 
tary forces almost from scratch. Since 1949 they 
have doubled their military budgets. Each has 
lengthened its period of military conscription. 
Military production in Europe has been expanded 
almost four times beyond the 1949 level. More 
than half a million men have already been added 
to their military forces on active duty. Even more 
vital has been the steady conversion of these 
troops into effective combat units, through im- 
proved organization. All told, the number of 
combat divisions available in Europe has doubled 
since General Eisenhower assumed command last 
spring. 

The European citizen who has made this 
achievement possible has an income one-third of 
his American prototype. He pays about the same 
percentage of his meager income in taxes. He has 
yet to recover completely from the personal losses 
he sustained during the war. And on top of these 
difficulties, since the outbreak of hostilities in 
Korea, the stepped-up program of rearmament 
has pushed prices up twice as fast as the rise ex- 
perienced in this country. Finally, in certain 
countries such as Britain and France, the Govern- 
ments have assumed heavy commitments in de- 
fense of the other parts of the free world. The 
share of the program which our friends are under- 
taking at the present time comes pretty close to 
the limit of their capacities. To try to go beyond 
these limits might produce a strain on their eco- 

April 21, 1952 

998051—52 3 



nomic and political structures which would 
endanger both their security and ours. 

I have made these references to military 
strength because a defensive shield is an essential 
part of United States policy. This aspect of our 
policy is by no means an end in itself. The United 
States is not trying to beat the Soviet Union at its 
own militaristic game. It is not trying to match 
them gun for gun and tank for tank. We are 
merely trying to make impossible the bargain- 
basement conquest so dear to Soviet hearts. It is 
important that this be understood throughout tlie 
entire world. 

Last fall, in the General Assembly, the United 
States took a leading role in proposing a workable 
system of world disarmament. As a result of this 
a disarmament commission was established, which 
is now 'meeting in New York. At first glance, 
having spoken at such length about building col- 
lective military .strength, it would appear some- 
what contradictory to speak of our desire to reach 
agreement on the reduction of all armaments. But 
on further examination, there is no conflict. The 
free world is not increasing its military strength 
as an end in itself. It is doing so because it is 
compelled to by Soviet policy. 

The very development of sufficient strength 
against aggression may convince the Kremlin that 
aggression can never again be profitable. It may 
convince the Kremlin that its self-interest re- 
quires sincere steps to reach genuine enforceable 
agreements for the reduction and control of 
armaments.^ 

I would like to dwell on this disarmament pro- 
posal because it presents two important aspects of 
our war of ideas with the U. S. S. E. Like it or 
not, we are now engaged with the U. S. S. K. in 
a struggle for the minds of men. We can win 
this struggle only if we convince the people of the 
world that the United States wants to have peace 
and a chance to improve their lot, while the prom- 
ises of the U. S. S. R., despite the tinsel, offer only 
despotism and slavery. 



Purpose of Disarmament Proposals 

A vital component in this struggle is the good 
faith of the United States. The proposals we 
are making in the hope of easing international 
tensions are seriously made. For example, the 
disarmament offer to the Soviet Union is drafted 
with no little effort and much care, so that it can 
be accepted by the Soviet Union if they are really 
interested in a general reduction in armed forces. 
The United States will be overjoyed if the Soviet 
Union agrees to use our proposals as a basis of 
negotiation. We are fully prepared to go through 
with our part of the bargain. There are some 

' For text of the disarmament resolution, see Btjlletin 
of Mar. 31, 1952, p. 507. 

621 



people who feel that the Soviet opposition to the 
disarmament proposal in Paris shows that they 
are not interested in disarmament. They im- 
mediately tab our proposal propaganda. This is 
a serious mistake and one wliich should not be re- 
peated. The United States Overseas Information 
Service capitalized on the United States proposal 
to the fullest. But the reason that it is effective 
in the campaign of truth is basically because we 
are serious about it. That is where the element 
of good faith enters. The people in other parts 
of the world that we are trying to reach have had 
their fill of empty maneuvers. 

This is our advantage over communism in the 
war of ideas. 

The disarmament problem presents another 
aspect of what might at first glance appear to be 
a disadvantage under which we are fighting in our 
war of ideas with the U.S.S.R. The reduction 
and regulation of armaments, particularly atomic 
weapons, is a very complex subject. It requires 
consideration of such matters as a census, the 
levels to which disarmament should be carried, 
and detailed provisions for safeguards and in- 
spection to see that the safeguards are being car- 
ried out. In the atomic energy field in particular 
these safeguards are very complicated. Wlien we 
make a proposal, we make one which we would 
be prepared to live with if it were accepted, and 
one whch contains the safeguards necessary for 
others to feel the same way. The Soviet Union 
labors under no such restriction. In the atomic 
energy field, for example, they have urged the sim- 
ple outlawing of the bomb, even though at the 
same time they would retain the fissionable mate- 
rials from which a bomb could be made in a very 
short time. Against this simple slogan we must 
use relatively complicated, though workable, pro- 
posals. We often appear to be preoccupied with 
procedure. 

The same adherence to simple slogans, whether 
workable or not, appears in other fields. In the 
field of German elections, the Soviet Union urges 
"All-German elections" and leaves it to others to 
deal with the unpleasant fact that a free election 
cannot be held under the heel of the secret police 
and under the shadow of the concentration camp. 
In the Genocide Convention the U.S.S.R. shouts 
for the outlawing of genocide, but objects to pro- 
visions which would permit the world to deter- 
mine whether this heinous crime has been com- 
mitted on the Estonians, Letts, and Lithuanians. 

As I said earlier, at first blush this would appear 
to be a disadvantage in the war of ideas. In the 
world of advertising it is, I believe, a truism that 
short simple slogans sell more soap than compli- 
cated explanations. But a habit of making only 
serious, workable offers in international affairs 
and for dealing only in the truth, no matter how 
complex, will not be a handicap in the war of ideas 
if we conduct ourselves wisely and vigoi-ously. 

The essential difference between our position in 



all these matters and that of the Soviet Union is 
that in these important matters — sometimes going 
to the very heart of national security — we do 
not limit ourselves to mere promises. We are pre- 
pared to set up machinery so that the represent- 
atives of all countries can go into all other coun- 
tries and satisfy themselves and their people that 
what is being jn-omised is being done. Here are 
the short, simple slogans which we can use to sell 
democracy. It is that we have no Iron Curtain, 
no secret police. It is that we are prepared to give 
real security for our international promises, that 
we propose effective controls. It is that we have 
nothing to conceal ; it is that the peoples of other 
countries can satisfy themselves that we want 
peace. It is that they can satisfy themselves that 
in transmitters, the moving pictures, and the 
printed matter which carry news and ideas we 
are not dealing in propaganda. We are dealing 
in the facts of American life. We are showing 
what can be done by men in societies where men 
are free. We are thus striking at a soft spot in 
the monolith of communism. The Iron Curtain 
was dropped to prevent the penetration of these 
ideas because they constitute the one area where 
rigid Soviet controls cannot be applied. 



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622 



Department of State Bulletin 



Problems Facing Underdeveloped Areas in Asia and Africa 

PREPARING FOR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE THROUGH SOUND CULTURAL AND 
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 



hy Anibassador Francis B. Say re 

U.S. Representative in V.N. Trmteeship Council '■ 



My topic this evening is a woi'ld problem, as tre- 
mendous in its proportions, as profound in its 
far-reaching consequences as the stupendous 
struggle now raging between Soviet Russia and 
the free world. It is the problem of the world's 
far-flung underdeveloijed areas. It affects di- 
rectly the question of world peace or war in the 
twenty-first century. Upon its successful solution 
hangs the further advance of civilization. Just 
what is this problem? 



Three Poison-Breeding Factors 

It is the perilous situation resulting today in 
large parts of Asia and in most of Africa from 
the conjunction of three poison-breeding factors: 

First. A condition of appalling human need. 
It is not that the peoples in large parts of Asia 
and Africa lack merely the good things of life. 
They are born into a lifelong struggle against 
desiderate hunger, against disease that saps their 
strength, against ignorance and illiteracy that 
shuts out hope. Living standards in most of Asia 
and Africa are the lowest in the world. In many 
sections, life expectancy at birth is only 32 years. 
One out of every three babies dies before reaching 
its first birthday. Those suffering from malaria 
in Asia today equal the total population of the 
Western Hemisphere — and every year three mil- 
lion of these sufferers die. Tuberculosis, malaria, 
and yaws are rampant. All are controllable dis- 
eases. Monstrous illiteracy bars the door to spirit- 
ual or technological advance. More people in 
Asia and Africa are unable to read a word from a 
printed book or direction than inhabit the whole 
of Europe and of the United States. 

'Address made before the American Academy of Arts 
and Sciences at Boston, Mass., on Apr. 9 and released to 
the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date. 



Seco7id. Embittering memories of cruel racial 
discrimination and exploitation which accom- 
panied much of nineteenth century colonialism. 
These have left livid scars. Racial inferiority 
complexes have been generated; and these today 
offer serious hindrances to Western attempts to 
build bulwarks for freedom. The poison of racial 
hatred has bred among many people in Asia and 
Africa profound distrust, and in some cases fear, 
of all white peoples. 

Third. Surging forces of nationalism. Earlier 
conditions which made for isolation of under- 
developed peojDles have been largely swept away 
by modern commerce, the radio and world-scale 
military activities. In consequence, Asia and 
Africa today, emerging from the primitive con- 
ditions which have locked them in for centuries, 
are being confronted with twentieth-century prob- 
lems which they scarcely understand and for 
which they are quite unprepared. The result is 
the high explosive of nationalism. Even nations 
which have recently achieved independent state- 
hood are often rabidly nationalistic. Many of 
these peoples, freed from the fetters of colonialism 
and awakening to the world around them, are be- 
ginning to feel the striking disparity between the 
peoples of the Western world, in their eyes 
luxuriating in plenty, and themselves, lacking even 
the bare essentials of existence. At the same time, 
they, like the populace of France in 1789, are 
tasting new-found power. For, however success- 
fully it may be curbed for a time by political in- 
stitutions or popular ignorance, power ultimately 
rests in the hands of the people. Millions of men 
and women living in the underdeveloped areas of 
Asia and Africa, more and more insistently are 
asking why they should live as the disinherited 
people of tjie world. 

It is the conjunction of these three interrelated 
factors — desperate himian need, the feeling of re- 



April 21, 1952 



623 



sentment bred by long years of cruel racial 
discrimination, and an explosive, new-found na- 
tionalism — that constitutes the problem of under- 
developed peoples in Asia and Africa. Here is 
a problem which must be comprehended and met 
today if we are to have world peace in the twenty- 
first century. Even if the Soviet state collapsed 
tomorrow, there could be no assurance of world 
peace until this problem is mastered. For peace 
depends inescapably upon human freedom; and 
in the face of desperate hunger and need, of deep- 
rooted racial hatreds, of the sudden acquisition 
of power by peoples quite unprepared for its 
responsibilities, there can be no genuine freedom. 

The March Toward Political Independence 

Significant surface tide rips now and again re- 
veal these strong deep-moving currents at work. 
At Paris last November and December in the Gen- 
eral Assembly, one felt their power in the debates 
of the Fourth Committee [Trusteeship], where 
the representatives of some 60 nations deal with 
problems of trusteeship and dependent peoples. 
Of these 60 nations, eight administer the territories 
of dependent peoples and are responsible for their 
governance. Some 50 do not carry such respon- 
sibility, although within the borders of many of 
them live primitive peoples whose life is much the 
same as that of peoples in non-self-governing 
areas. Consequently, in the Fourth Committee, 
in spite of support from some nonadministering 
delegations, the 8 administering powers can be 
hopelessly outvoted. 

The issues underlying the current Fourth Com- 
mittee debates are basic. Certain peoples, iso- 
lated from the busy pathways of mankind, are 
today underdeveloped and lack the modern re- 
sources, the training, and the experience to govern 
themselves competently or to defend themselves 
against possible attack by aggressor states. 

Leading Western nations during past centuries, 
with or without right, have entered the territoi'ies 
of many of these peoples and successfully exer- 
cised control and government over them. Under 
the system of national sovereignty as developed in 
international law they consider today their right 
to control these people and to exercise sovereignty 
over them legally and constitutionally un- 
assailable. 

But, during the last hundred years, throughout 
the world has come an awakening social con- 
sciousness and a deepening sense of the sanctity 
of those human rights which must lie at the foun- 
dation of every lasting world order. As a result, 
men and women everywhere today are question- 
ing the right of one people to govern and control 
another against the latter's consent ; and the chal- 
lenge is being pressed not onJy by dependent 
peoples but also by many other nations which 
themselves possess no colonial territories. How- 
ever strongly entrenched in law and in constitu- 

624 



tional theory may be the colonial powers' right 
to rule an alien people, there is a growing popular 
tendency today to shift the issue from constitu- 
tional to moral considerations. The resulting 
pressures are intensified by old resentments against 
nineteenth century colonialism. 

The march toward political independence within 
recent years has been assuming dramatic pro- 
portions. Moved by a complex of motives and 
forces, hastened by the pressures of world opinion, 
the great colonial powers today in numerous in- 
stances are giving up former possessions or put- 
ting a time limit on the continuance of their rule. 
Since the Second World War some 500 million 
people — a fifth of the entire population of the 
world — have won political independence. 

Solving New Problems of Independence 

But with independence come new problems; and 
genuine freedom is not to be had until a way can 
be found to solve them. 



LIBYA 

Examples abound. Libya as a result of the 
vote of the General Assembly in 1949 has now 
become a "united, independent and sovereign 
State," and the occupying powers, Great Britain 
and France, have transferred all their govern- 
mental powers to the new Libyan Government as 
from December 24, 1951. Free and democratic 
national elections have already been held there 
and a new constitution has been inaugurated. 

But independence carries with it inescajDable re- 
sponsibilities. Defense involves large outlays of 
money; so do necessary buildings and public 
works. So do adequate educational programs and 
public-health measures. So do schools and hospi- 
tals and training institutions for indigenous school 
teachers and doctors and nurses. Thus far the 
necessary revenues have for the most part come out 
of the treasuries of Great Britain and of France, 
the administering powers. Libya itself lacks suffi- 
cient revenues. The U.N. budget is not large 
enough to support the necessary expenditures. 
For the time being, Great Britain and France have 
pi'omised to make good the deficits in the Libyan 
budget. During the current year the United 
Nations is advancing to Libya over a million dol- 
lars in technical assistance. Similarly, the United 
States is advancing about $1,500,000 in technical 
assistance. But the question still remains: How 
will the Libyan people in the long run meet the 
necessary costs of economic and social and edu- 
cational advancement? From where will the 
money come ? 

SOMALILAND 

Or take another example. The people of the 
former Italian colony of Somaliland in 1950 were 
placed under Italian administration in accordance 

Department of State Bulletin 



with the vote of the General Assembly in 1949 and 
were promised their political independence at the 
end of 10 years. The civil expenditures in Somali- 
land for the past year were almost double the 
amount of receipts derived from the Territory it- 
self. Local receipts totalled $4,616,850, while 
rivil expenditures amounted to $8,463,140. The 
ditference is made up by a direct contribution from 
the administering authority. The Government of 
Italy also assumed all obligations relating to the 
Security Corps. Also, it is worth noting that 
about 75 percent of the direct and indirect taxes in 
Somaliland are paid by Italians. 

Experts express doubt whether Somaliland can 
ever be a viable state, with a high or even moderate 
level of government services. They question 
whether the country possesses sufficient natural re- 
sources or possibility of industrial development 
ever to produce the revenues necessary for an ade- 
quately governed self-sufficient state. In 1960, 
Italy, the administering power, steps out. What 
then? 

Problems such as these face us today in many 
similar areas. Men and women are questioning 
the right of any nation to govern an alien people 
against their will. But the maintenance of in- 
dependence and the development of economic and 
industrial resources cost money and require trained 
personnel. Wliere are they to come from? 
Surely the answer is not simple abandonment. 
Underdeveloped peoples cannot be left to live on 
in ignorance and want. Human progress impera- 
tively demands that they be given a helping hand. 
In many of the underdeveloped areas in Asia and 
Africa, man has today perhaps his last oppor- 
tunity to meet these extended problems with 
humane and Christian solutions. If he fails, can 
he be surprised if communism moves in ? 

Devising System of International Accountability 
for Dependent Peoples 

Underlying the debates in the Fourth Commit- 
tee is the effort on the part of many of the non- 
administering powers to widen the scope of 
international accountability for the government of 
dependent peoples beyond the point specifically 
agreed to by the eight administering powers in 
1945 when the Charter was written and the inter- 
national trusteeship system set up. How far can 
a system of international accountability for the 
government of dependent peoples be pushed ? In 
other words, have the representatives of the 60 
nations which are members of the United Nations 
the power to require the administering states to 
adopt such specific policies in the government of 
their dependent peoples as the Fourth Committee 
may decide upon by a majority vote? 

The contest takes many different forms. Last 
November in the opening days of the session, the 
Fourth Committee voted to grant hearings to rep- 



resentatives of the Ewe people, dwelling within 
the trust territories of French and British Togo- 
land in West Africa. Since these representatives 
were invited to present their views in a contro- 
versy involving an international trust territory, 
there seemed little question as to the Fourth 
Committee's competence to grant the hearings. In 
fact, the United Kingdom representatives at the 
very outset spoke in favor of the invitation. This, 
however, was followed by a resolution similarly 
to grant a hearing to chiefs of the Herero, Nama, 
and Damara tribes dwelling in South-West 
Africa. South-West Africa is not a trust territory 
but a mandated territory set up by the League of 
Nations under the administration of the South 
African Union. The representative of the Union 
Government strongly protested that since South- 
West Africa is not a trust territory, such a resolu- 
tion would be an unconstitutional intervention in 
their domestic affairs and thus a violation of their 
Charter rights. Others took a contrary view. 
Upon the passing of the vote, the Union delega- 
tion promptly withdrew from the Fourth Com- 
mittee and boycotted its further proceedings. 

There followed severe criticism by the repre- 
sentative of Guatemala upon British rule in 
British Honduras; and this in turn was followed 
by critical refei-ences by Greece to British rule in 
Cyprus and by Yemen to British administration 
in Aden. After a strong British protest there fol- 
lowed an attempt on the part of the Arab group 
to question French rule in Morocco. French 
Morocco is neither a trust territory nor under man- 
date. The representative of Iraq charged that the 
"lamentable position of Morocco" was basically 
due to the policy of colonialism pursued by France 
there. Every manifestation of nationalism, he as- 
serted, was being harshly and sternly suppressed. 
The French representative, protesting the illegal- 
ity of the proceeding, and asserting tliat he could 
not continue to take part in a debate which was 
wholly unconstitutional, walked out of the 
Committee. 

In debating the legality of the proceedings most 
of the nonadministering powers took the position 
that the Fourth Committee was entirely competent 
to discuss political matters and political aspects 
not only in trust territories but in all non-self- 
governing territories as well, and a resolution to 
that effect was introduced. Running through 
many minds was the position strongly taken by 
certain nonadministering powers the preceding 
year that the Fourth Committee is competent by 
its vote to determine the specific policies which 
"the administering authorities are under a clear 
obligation to implement." Dark clouds began to 
gather over the Fourth Committee. 

In the end, however, the Iraq representative 
agreed not to press the matter to a vote and the 
French representative returned to the Fourth 
Committee. But none of us could fail to realize 



April 21, 7952 



625 



the deep-seated cleavages becoming manifest. In- 
tense emotions had been aroused ; far-reaching is- 
sues were at stake. 

One must not overmagnify the seriousness of 
these incidents of last November. On the other 
hand, every flier must know the air currents upon 
which he depends. Storm signals are appearing 
in many quarters. It is not wise to ignore them. 
Failure" to recognize and meet tlie problem of 
underdeveloped peoples in Asia and Africa can 
seriously injure the machinery of the United Na- 
tions, might seriously impair our chances for 
world peace in the years to come. 

Relation of Underdeveloped Areas and Political 
Dependency 

We must not become confused in our thinking. 
The problem of underdeveloped areas is not alto- 
gether the same as that of dependent peoples. 
Many dependent peoples, such for instance as those 
of Bermuda or Malta or Hawaii, possess a com- 
paratively high degree of development, but prefer 
or need the continuing protection and assistance 
of a Great Power; whereas, on the other hand, 
some peoples, such as those in Libya, now possess 
political independence but remain as yet for the 
most part underdeveloped. Nevertheless, these 
two problems of underdevelopment and political 
dependency are intimately interrelated; in many 
areas of Asia and Africa they directly coincide. 

Both reach deep into the heart of the problem 
of world peace. 

World peace, as all of us know, can be built only 
upon human freedom. Yet today some 200,000,000 
people are non-self-governing. What is the 
solution ? 

The easy but superficial answer is prompt in- 
dependence for all. This is the answer which the 
Soviets beguilingly espoused at San Francisco 
when the U.N. Charter was being framed in 1945. 
It is an answer that has instant emotional appeal 
to almost everyone. It wins support in every 
General Assembly, particularly among the Latin 
American groups and those Middle Eastern states 
which have achieved their independence after 
long years of struggle. 

We of America, perhaps more than any other 
people, believe that freedom is the rock upon 
which all human progress must be built. Without 
it there can be no democracy, no stable world 
peace. 

Under its Charter, the United Nations is con- 
secrated to the task of assisting all non-self-gov- 
erning peoples in their progi-essive development 
toward independence or self-government. This 
is the deep purpose of every people outside of the 
Soviet ring. 

Since the setting up of the United Nations, as 
has already been pointed out, some 500 millions 
of people have acquired political independence. 
Seven new nations of Asia — India, Pakistan, Cey- 



lon, Burma, the Philippines, the Republic of 
Korea, and Indonesia — have come into existence. 
To these must be added Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, 
and Israel in the Middle East; and in Africa, 
Libya, which was given independence last De- 
cember. Somaliland, Nepal, the new states of 
Indochina, and others loom on the horizon. 

But what so many people fail to understand is 
that political independence is not synonymous 
with human freedom. In 1783 the wresting of 
American independence from the British Crown 
was only the first step toward freedom. As a next 
step it took a constitutional bill of rights to guar- 
antee freedom of speech and of the press, freedom 
of religion, freedom of assembly, freedom from 
illegal process. Thereafter it took the people of 
the independent nation many years of sustained 
effort to build the social and cultural fomidations 
necessary to establish American freedom and make 
it reasonably secure. Indeed, we are still in the 
building process. As we move forward we con- 
tinually gain new vision and new goals. 

Genuine freedom cannot be achieved by mere 
political grant or military victory. It comes only 
as adequate foundations — political, economic, so- 
cial, and educational — can be prepared for it. 

In Somaliland, for instance, unless the people 
can, through actual experience and training, learn 
what majority rule by secret ballot means and 
accept the responsibilities that must go with de- 
mocracy, unless the local revenues can be increased 
through rapid agricultural or industrial develop- 
ment to pay for sorely needed schools and teachers 
and hospitals and doctors, there will be no genuine 
individual human freedom there 10 years from 
now. 

Political independence is a notable step along 
the way. But surely it is only a step, and In no 
sense the goal itself. Peoples can be as effectively 
manacled by economic and social forms of servi- 
tude as by political oppression. In other words, 
among the peoples living in many primitive parts 
of Asia and Africa, the real problems go far 
deeper than political status. In such areas genu- 
ine solutions can come only through slow processes 
of education and training in the fundamentals 
upon which successful self-government must be 
built. 

When the United States undertook the adminis- 
tration of the Philippine Islands in 1898, in spite 
of insistent Filipino demands, we did not give fl 
them independence for almost half a century. ^ 
Instead we sent among them armies of school 
teachers and doctors and road builders. We 
helped them to learn what democracy means in 
action and we gave them practical experience in 
the exasperating art of self-government. 

The grant of premature political independence 
without adequate economic and social preparation 
for it can bring to a people untold harm. Indige- 
nous leaders, unrestrained by the civic standards 
that come with widespread education, can exploit 



626 



Department of State Bulletin 



their compatriots as ruthlessly as aliens or even 
more so. Neither can the cause of international 
peace be served by giving full independence to a 
people unable to defend themselves. Large parts 
of Asia and Africa today possess immense natural 
resources and offer exceedingly valuable strategic 
bases, but are inhabited by peoples quite unable to 
hold their own against lawless aggressors armed 
with twentieth-century weapons. 

Our course is clear. If we are to have lasting 
peace, we must stimulate and help the peoples 
in all underdeveloped areas, self-governing as well 
as non-self-governing, to construct the kind of 
economic and social and educational foundations 
necessary to prepare them for maintaining their 
political freedom and to qualify them for increas- 
ing self-government. 



Task of the U.N. Trusteeship Council 

In this great task the United Nations is now 
engaged on a broad front through its principal 
organs and specialized agencies. These, for ex- 
ample, are the precise objectives of the Trustee- 
ship Council for the trust territories of Africa 
and the Pacific. And it is along these lines in 
fact that significant and promising advances are 
actually being achieved today. 

Of the six principal United Nations organs it 
is the Trusteeship Council which devotes its at- 
tention most directly to the struggle for human 
freedom in areas not yet prepared for full politi- 
cal independence. 

Today 11 trust territories — 7 in Africa and 4 
in the Pacific — have been placed under the inter- 
national trusteeship system. They embrace a pop- 
ulation of some 18,000,000 people. It is true that 
only about a tenth of the non-self-governing peo- 
ples of the world live within the confines of trust 
territories. Nevertheless, among them the Trus- 
teeship Council has a unique opportunity to point 
the pathway which leads to freedom for all. 

I wish there were time to tell you something of 
the adventures of the Trusteeship Council along 
these pathways. I think of the people living in 
the Trust Territory of Western Samoa and of 
how, in 1947, their chiefs and leaders sent a peti- 
tion to the Trusteeship Council asking for self- 
government. In response the Trusteeship Coun- 
cil promptly sent a mission to Samoa, composed 
of a Belgian, a Chilean, and myself. Assisting 
us were a Norwegian, a Frenchman, and a Bra- 
zilian, members of the Secretariat. We spent the 
summer in Samoa, studying the problem at first 
hand, visiting the Samoan villages, talking with 
the people. The mission reached unanimous con- 
clusions. We recommended that immediate steps 
be taken to give Samoans a substantially greater 
measure of self-government. "Even a limited de- 
gree of self-government," declared our report, 
"involves risks which are not underestimated by 
the Mission. But these risks must be taken. 



Training in self-government can come only 
through actual experience sometimes costly." We 
recommended among other things that a Govern- 
ment of Western Samoa should be established and 
that legislative power should be placed in the 
hands of a local legislature. We also recom- 
mended that Samoans should have an absolute 
majority in the legislature. Before the year was 
out the New Zealand Parliament had given to 
the Samoans a new government embodying sub- 
stantially every one of our mission's recommen- 
dations. 

It takes a visit to a trust territory to see what 
trusteeship really means. An inspection trip took 
me not long ago to the former Japanese islands 
of the Pacific, now a trust territory under U.S. 
administration. I went out questioning. I came 
back imi^ressed. 

During the period of the Japanese mandate, the 
peoples of the Islands had been given no train- 
ing, no hope. War had hit the Islands hard. 
During my visit, I found that within the 2i/^ years 
since uie United States had assumed its trustee- 
shif) responsibilities more than 100 local mu- 
nicipalities had been organized to give the 
inhabitants training in the ways of democratic 
government. Approximately 80 percent of the 
Islanders of voting age at present enjoy some 
form of suffrage. Almost every inhabited island 
today has its elementary schools. More than 90 
percent of the children of school age are enrolled 
in local schools. Indigenous teachers are being 
taught in an effective training school at Truk, 
where once the Japanese were building their war 
machine. Disease has been drastically reduced. 
Malnutrition has been virtually eliminated. In- 
digenous medical assistants, dentists, and nurses, 
trained at Guam or at Suva, are carrying their 
ministrations throughout the islands. 

Americans are winning a place in the hearts 
of the Pacific Islanders. Last year came a peti- 
tion to the United Nations from Saipan, one of 
the Pacific Islands. "It is our fervent hope," 
reads the petition, "that all of the islands in the 
Northern Marianas be incorporated into the 
United States of America, either as a possession 
or as a territory, preferably as a territory." To 
their great disappointment the petition was not 
granted. 

Throughout the trust territories, the inhabi- 
tants are learning in the crucible of experience 
•uhat self-government and freedom really mean. 

"But why force upon peoples who through the 
centuries have developed their own cultures and 
found happiness in them, a twentieth-century 
culture which they neither understand nor want?" 
many will ask. "Would it not make for the hap- 
piness of all to leave them unmolested in their 
own ways of life?" 

The answer is that we have no choice in the 
matter. No one can stay the hand of advancing 
cultures — least of all in an age when insistent com- 



April 27, 7952 



627 



mercial and military demands have knit all 
peoples into an inescapable unity. Western 
Samoa during the whole of the second half of the 
nineteenth century struggled unyieldingly to pre- 
serve its indigenous culture and its isolation from 
Western civilization. It was of no avail. Other 
attempts all tell the same story. In our present 
shrunken twentieth century world no people can 
successfully isolate their indigenous culture be- 
hind a Chinese Wall. Each people has incalcula- 
ble contributions to be given to humanity. Our 
twentieth-century life demands that every people 
make its peculiar contributions and together share 
our differing cultures. 

Coordination of Economic Assistance Programs 

Once we know the direction in which to work, 
we must not be dismayed by the magnitude of the 
task. The exciting fact is that today this problem 
of underdeveloped areas is being intelligently at- 
tacked as never before. The attack is on an inter- 
national scale, in the main by the United Nations 
but also by the coordinated efforts of individual 
states. 

Food is one of the paramount issues. As Jose 
de Castro has aptly said : "Only by raising the buy- 
ing power and consuming capacity of the under- 
nourished two-thirds of the world can the other 
third survive and prosper. Isolationism can be 
as dangerous in the matter of food consumption 
as in the realm of war and politics." 

The U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization 
(Fao) is laboring manfully to increase food 
supplies throughout the world. It is showing 
many peoples the superiority of the plow to the 
hoe, of modern scientific agriculture to archaic 
methods of tilling the fields. Even so, progress is 
slow. Two months ago I was watching Arabs 
plowing their fields in northern Morocco. The 
plows consisted of the twisted branches of trees. 
Iron plows were beyond the workers' reach. 

Power development, flood control, irrigation 
projects cost money and cannot be put through 
without capital from the outside. In the past 
fiscal year, 1951, the International Bank for Re- 
construction and Development made 21 loans for 
development projects in 11 countries totaling 
nearly 300 million dollars. 

For the first year of an expanded program of 
technical assistance and economic development, 54 
governments pledged to the U.N. Technical Assist- 
ance Board over 20 million dollars. Nearly 19 
million dollars has been pledged so far for the 
1952 program. Up to June 30, 1951, more than 
500 requests had been received from 64 countries 
and territories. At that date 252 projects had 
been initiated or approved through agreements 
with 45 countries providing for 741 experts and 
551 fellowships. From further agreements, then 
under negotiation, projects requiring the services 



of 674 experts and 590 fellowships were expected 
to result. 

Separate nations are also engaging in this con- 
siderable effort. The U.S. total program of tech- 
nical assistance excluding its contribution to the 
United Nations amounts to more than 200 million 
dollars. This is part of the appropriation of 1 
billion, 440 million dollars voted by Congress last 
October 31 for economic and technical cooperation. 
The United Kingdom in 1945 passed the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act, setting aside 
£120,000,000 to promote the development and wel- 
fare of the colonies. Other administering powers 
are pushing forward in similar developments. 

Difficulties abound. Economic-assistance pro- 
grams cannot be rammed down the throats of un- 
desiring recipients. At least one non-Communist 
country has refused the offer of American tech- 
nical assistance because of their fear or misunder- 
standing of our motives. Also, innovations may 
arouse the opposition of tribal chiefs or the hold- 
ers of vested rights. Then, again, old time sub- 
sistence economies, easygoing and never exacting, 
are often of greater appeal than increased 
revenues. Progress as conceived of in our West- 
ern cultures is not coveted by every people, par- 
ticularly if it involves the abandonment of 
ancestral ways of life. 

The building of economic foundations for free- 
dom clearly involves more than handing out in 
backward areas dollars or pounds or francs for 
expenditure. Like all effective work for human 
progress it requires a deep understanding of the 
people concerned, tempered with infinite patience 
and wisdom. It will not succeed unless wrought 
with an abiding faith in the dignity and worth 
of every personality, regardless of the color of 
his skin or his unfamiliarity with formal educa- 
tion. We have still a long, long way to go. 
Nevertheless, economic progress is being 
achieved — more rapidly it would seem and on a 
more extended scale than ever before in human 
history. 

The Importance of Adequate Social Foundations 

Adequate social fundations are as necessary as 
economic ones. In the space of less than 3 years 
the United Nations has secured the adoption of 
a Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This 
is not a treaty, not a law, but a definition of goals. 
But it has already had an important impact upon 
the thinking of mankind. The treaty on geno- 
cide, now ratified by 35 nations, is an attempt to 
outlaw the practice of mass extermination of 
peoples. 

Basic among social problems is, of course, that 
of disease. Sick men cannot till their lands. In 
this field another U.N. agency, the World Health 
Organization (Who), is mobilizing attack upon 
an international scale. The Trusteeship Council 



628 



Departmenf of Siafe Bulletin 



is also constantly at work, jaioneerinp; in the trust 
territories in the field of social problems. For 
instance, in a recent report covering the Trust Ter- 
ritory of Tanganyika, the former German colony 
of East Africa, the following problems are listed 
as having come under the Council's consideration : 
social welfare and security, population pressure 
and movement, standard of living, housing, child 
marriage, immigration, general labor conditions, 
wage rates, trade-unions, labor disputes, labor 
conventions and legislation, cooperative societies, 
medical sei-vices, hospitals, dispensaries, climes, 
and i^risons. 

In this field perhaps the most profound and baf- 
fling problem of all is racial discrimination. One 
thing we know. Brazen racial discrimination 
undermines the position of the white man in the 
world community. Change will come; and it is 
greatly to the interest of the white race to help 
to guide rather than to impede that change. In a 
number of areas the problem is being solved — 
and successfully solved along the lines pointed 
out by courageous missionaries for many years. 
They call it the pathway of human brotherhood. 
The peoples of the United Nations at the very 
outset of the Charter pledged themselves to a 
"faith in fundamental human rights," and "in 
the equal rights of men and women ancl of nations 
large and small." 

As a matter of fact, experience over many years 
has shown that when colonial administration is 
based upon the exploitation of human beings, it 
has bred only difficulties and well-nigh insuper- 
able problems. On the other hand, when colonial 
administration has come to be based upon the 
conception of sharing common problems and com- 
mon fortunes, stable and reasonably satisfactory 
solutions have generally been reached. One 
thinks of New Zealanders and Maoris, of Ameri- 
cans and Filipinos. Wise colonial administration 
recognizes the oneness of the human race. 

Developing Ideals of Human Progress 

Another and perhaps the most necessary founda- 
tion for human freedom, particularly among 
primitive and tribal peoples, lies in the field of 
education. "If a nation expects to be ignorant 
and free," wrote Thomas Jefferson, "it expects 
what never was and never will be." In Asia, 
Africa, and the South Pacific, many peoples still 
lack any comprehension of what human progress 
outside their own static cultures means. 

In the weird Cargo Cult of the South Pacific, 
one gains a glimpse of the thought processes of the 
primitive mind. Among these peoples runs an un- 
questioning belief in magic, in the power of the 
fetish, in unholy spells. Struck with the utterly 
inexplicable power of foreigners to produce, as 
from the skies, inexhaustible supplies of ships and 



guns and food and kerosene stoves and machine 
monsters of indescribable power, certain South 
Pacific peoples under the spell of the Cargo Cult, 
perhaps touched by a misunderstood conception 
of sacrifice gained from Christian missions, will 
take it upon themselves with sudden decision to 
destroy everything they possess — to tear down 
their houses, burn their pathetic belongings, chop 
down their trees and root up their gardens, in a 
fine gesture of faith and hope that their gods 
or ancestors will thus be induced to send to them, 
too, even as to the foreigners, miraculous machines 
anci a wealth of food. 

As a general rule in underdeveloped areas there 
is an intense eagerness for modern schooling rather 
than resistance to it. In most such areas it is far 
easier to get children to come to school than to pro- 
vide sufficient schools and sufficient trained teach- 
ers to teach them. One cannot plan an educa- 
tional program based upon the use of foreign 
teachers for a population running into millions or 
even tens of millions. Manifestly there are not 
enough foreign teachers to be had. Adequate 
training schools where indigenous teachers can be 
trained constitute the keystone of any effective 
program for widespread education. Into these 
must be gathered the most promising boys ancl 
girls of the territory. This all takes time and 
costs large outlays of money. 

There is also the crucial question of what to 
teach. It will do no good to give to primitive 
peoples a classical education. People living in 
primitive or tribal conditions must learn, not 
higher mathematics or ancient history, but how to 
make life more meaningful and rewarding for 
themselves and their fellows and how to improve 
the conditions under which they live. 

The problem of underdeveloped areas in Asia 
ancl Africa cannot be solved in a night. It re- 
quires endless effort along a hundred different 
fronts. Its solution can come only through pa- 
tient, untii'ing constructive work, and not through 
mass destruction. 

But the great fact is that the free peoples of the 
world are comprehending ever more clearly the 
underlying issues and concentrating upon the con- 
structive way forward. Measurable progress is 
being made. 

The fight for freedom is a twofold fight. It 
involves not only resistance to political oppression 
but also emancipation of men and women from the 
shackles of hunger, disease, and ignorance. Both 
are necessary. Victory in one field contributes to 
victory in the other. 

Soviet communism will not win. Neither 
authoritarianism nor ruthless dictatorship can 
ever permanently prevail. Free men working to- 
gether throughout the world for human freedom 
possess matchless power. Today they are uniting 
as never before. Their power is unconquerable. 



April 27, J 952 



629 



Educational Exchange Agreement 
With South Africa 

[Released to the press March 20] 

The Union of South Africa and the United 
States on March 26 signed an agreement putting 
into operation the program of educational ex- 
changes authorized by Public Law 584, 79th Cong, 
(the Fulbright Act). The signing took place at 
Capetown with J. H. Viljoen, Minister of Educa- 
tion, Arts and Science, representing the Union of 
South Africa, and Waldemar J. Gallman, Amer- 
ican Ambassador to the Union of South Africa, 
representing the Government of the United States. 

In signing the agreement which is the twenty- 
fourth to be concluded under the Fulbright Act, 
Ambassador Gallman said : 

It gives me great pleasure to sign, on behalf of my 
government, this agreement for financing educational ex- 
change programs. I am sure that a wider exchange of 
knowlediie and professional talent through personal con- 
tact will promote cooperation between our two countries 
in a most constructive way. 

In reply, the Minister of Education, Arts and 
Science expressed his thanks to the Government of 
the United States for this 

act of friendship designed to further closer cooperation, 
mutual understanding and respect between our countries. 
We in distant South Africa are already greatly indebted to 
the American people for their generosity in having as- 
sisted many of our students financially or otherwise, 
either to undertake research work in this country or 
pursue their studies in the United States. 

The agreement provides for an annual expendi- 
ture not to exceed the equivalent of approximately 
$16,000 in South African currency for a period 
of 3 years to finance exchanges between that coun- 
try and the United States for purposes of study, 
research, or teaching. The program will be fi- 
nanced from certain funds made available by the 
U.S. Government resulting from the sale of sur- 
plus property to the Union of South Africa. 

All recipients of awards under this program are 
selected by the Board of Foreign Scholarships, 
appointed by the President of the United States. 

Under the terms of the agreement, a U.S. edu- 
cational foundation in the Union of South Africa 
will be established to assist in the administration 
of the program. The Board of Directors of the 
foundation will consist of four members, two of 
whom are to be citizens of the Union of South 
Africa and two to be citizens of the United States. 
The American Ambassador to the Union of South 
Africa will serve as honorary chairman of the 
Board. 

After the members of the foundation in the 
Union of South Africa have been appointed and 
a program formulated, information about specific 
opportunities will be made public. 

630 



Military Assistance Agreement 
With Chile 

The Departments of State and Defense an- 
nounced on April 9 that a bilateral military-assist- 
ance agreement had been signed that day with 
the Government of Chile.' 

The American Ambassador in Santiago, Claude 
G. Bowers, and Eduardo Yrarrazaval, Min- 
ister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, signed the 
agreement. 

This is the fifth bilateral military-assistance 
agreement which the United States has concluded 
with another American Eepublic. The other 
agreements, all very similar, are with Peru, Ecua- 
dor, Cuba, and Brazil. Negotiations on two more, 
with the Governments of Colombia and Uruguay, 
are in progress. What is involved is the provi- 
sion by the United States of military grant aid 
to strengthen the defense of the Western Hemi- 
sphere. This military-aid program for Latin 
American nations was authorized in the Mutual 
Security Act of 1951. It is designed to assist the 
countries concerned in developing their capabili- 
ties to join in carrying out missions important to 
the security of all the American Republics. 

The bilateral military grant aid program is con- 
sistent with inter-American instruments already 
in effect, such as the Rio Treaty, the resolution on 
Inter-American Military Cooperation approved at 
the Washington Meeting of Foreign Ministers of 
the American Republics last year, and is in full 
conformity with the planning of the Inter- Amer- 
ican Defense Board. 



Conversations on Military Assistance 
Agreement With Uruguay 

[Released to the i)rcss March 31] 

The Departments of State and Defense an- 
nounced conversations are being initiated on 
March 31 at Montevideo with the Government of 
Uruguay to study the possibility and desirability 
of concluding a bilateral military assistance 
agreement. 

The American Ambassador at Montevideo, Ed- 
ward L. Roddan, is being assisted by representa- 
tives of the Department of Defense in the con- 
versations. They are being carried on under the 
terms of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, which 
authorized a program of military grant-aid for 
Latin America. 



' For text of agreement, see Department of State press 
release 267 of Apr. 9. 

Department of Stale Bulletin 



Power Credit for Colombia 

The Export-Import Bank announced on April 1 
its authorization of a credit of $2,600,000 to tlie 
Empresa de Energia Electricu, S. A., Medellin, 
Colombia. The purpose of the credit is to assist 
in financing a hydroelectric power plant of 50,000 
kw. capacity on the Rio Grande River near 
Medellin, transmission lines, and related facilities. 
Empresa de Energia Electrica, S. A., owned by 
the city of Medellin, serves the largest and most 
important industrial area in Colombia which has, 
however, lately been suffering from a power 
shortage. 

The granting of the credit which the Bank has 
announced is in furtherance of the policy of sup- 
porting the power program of the Empresa. In 
1944 the Bank extended a credit of $3,500,000 to 
the Empresa for the same purpose. 

The credit of $2,600,000, which will be guar- 
anteed by the Banco de la Republica, will bear 
interest at the rate of 41/2 percent per annum 
and is to be repaid over a 15-year period begin- 
ning in 1953. 

Herbert E. Gaston, Chaii'man of the Board of 
the Export-Import Bank, in announcing the credit 
said, "The availability of power is basic to the 
economic development of Colombia and the Ex- 
port-Import Bank is very happy to be able to 
assist Colombia in this important development." 



in El Salvador since 1944. Its principal activities 
include the completion and partial equipment of 
two hospital-health centers, a tuberculosis pavilion 
and a national nursing school, and carrying out 
an extensive rural sanitation program emphasiz- 
ing the provision of safe water supply and sewage 
systems. The Federal Security Agency, in Sep- 
tember 1951, sent out a specialist in medical social 
work to develop this service in the hospital at San 
Salvador. 

Investigations into the fishery resources of El 
Salvador are being conducted by a fisheries expert 
from the Fish and Wildlife Service of the De- 
partment of the Interior. He also will advise the 
Government on the modernization of the industry. 

In January of last year, an education mission 
was sent out by the Institute of Inter- American 
Affairs to inaugurate a vocational-education pro- 
gram and to assist in organizing the San Salva- 
dor technical school. 

Today, there are 18 American technicians in 
El Salvador working with 620 Salvadoran spe- 
cialists in various phases of the development pro- 
gram. Last year the American contribution to 
the program was $307,900 and the Salvadoran 
contribution was $553,000. 



Trade Negotiations With Venezuela 



Point Four Agreement With El Salvador 

With the signature in San Salvador April 4, 
1952, of a Point Four general agreement be- 
tween the Governments of the United States and 
El Salvador, there are now 33 countries with 
which general agreements have been signed. 
There have been cooperative technical programs 
in operation in El Salvador for the past 10 years. 
The new agreement provides for their continua- 
tion and possible expansion. 

American Ambassador George P. Shaw signed 
the agreement for the United States and Foreign 
Minister Roberto E. Canessa for El Salvador. 
Wyman R. Stone, director of the Health, Welfare 
and Housing Division of the Institute of Inter- 
American Affairs, and other American and Sal- 
vadoran officials were present at the ceremonies. 

An agricultural mission of the Office of For- 
eign Agricultural Relations of the Department of 
Agriculture has been engaged in extensive re- 
search and extension activities since 1942. A large 
demonstration farm and experimental station is 
operated by them in cooperation with Salvadoran 
technicians at San Andres and another at Santa 
Cruz Porillos. 

A health and sanitation mission of the Institute 
of Inter-American Affairs has been in operation 



[Released to the press April 11] 

Formal negotiations with the Government of 
Venezuela to supplement and amend the trade 
agreement with that country which was signed on 
November 6, 1939, will begin according to present 
plans, at Caracas on April 18. 

The head of the U.S. team for these negotiations 
will be Roy R. Rubottom, Jr., Deputy Director of 
the Office of Middle Amei'ican Affairs of the De- 
partment of State. The other members of the 
team ai-e William F. Gray, Office of South Ameri- 
can Affairs of the Department of State; Harold 
P. Macgowan, Adviser on Trade Agreement Pol- 
icy, Office of International Trade, Department of 
Commerce; James H. Kempton, Agricultural At- 
tache, American Embassy, Caracas; Herbert E. 
Striner, Bureau of Mines, Department of the In- 
terior; and G. Lucille Batchelder of the OfKce of 
Middle American Affairs of the Department of 
State who will serve as secretary of the delegation. 

Formal announcement of the intention to nego- 
tiate a supplementary trade agreement with Vene- 
zuela was made on August 29, 1951.^ U.S. parti- 
cipation in the negotiations will be under the pro- 
visions of the Trade Agreements Act of 1934, as 
amended. 



' Bulletin of Sept. 10, 1951, p. 433. 



April 21, 7952 



631 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



Sixth Regular Session of tiie General Assembly 



SUMMARY OF MAJOR ACTION: PART I 



hy Paid B. Taylor 



The U.N. General Assembly held its sixth regu- 
lai- session at Paris fi'om November 6, 1951, to 
February 5, 1952. Around 4,000 persons — mem- 
bers of the Secretariat and of delegations from 
the 60 member countries, including 26 foreign 
ministers — attended all or f)art of the session, in 
addition to observers from a number of non- 
member states and from nongovernmental groups. 
Coverage of the meetings by press and radio serv- 
ices was probably greater than at any previous 
international meeting in history. 

These annual meetings, participated in by the 
great majority of nations and attended by such a 
galaxy of leading personalities, have over the years 
become a powerful forum for the expression of 
governmental views on major foreign-policy 
issues. In it, all member states, through their 
ranking spokesmen, present their points of view. 
Naturally, the Assembly has been the outstanding 
forum for debate of the critical issues of our time — 
those between international communism on the 
one hand and the democratic countries on the 
other. But the scope of the discussions always 
extends more widely, dealing with a variety of 
economic, social, and political problems relating 
to all areas of the world. Moreover, the General 
Assembly has indispensable annual functions in 
the U.N. system : voting the U.N. budget, electing 
members of councils and other bodies, and review- 
ing, in its several committees, the varied work of 
the United Nations as a whole. Over and above 
these organizational functions, the General As- 
sembly lias increasingly become the principal 
political action body of the organization. 

The U.S. representatives at the session wei'e 
Dean Acheson, Warren R. Austin, Mrs. Franklin 
D. Roosevelt, Mike J. Mansfield, John M. Vorys, 
and Philip C. Jessup. 

The alternate representatives included John 
Sherman Cooper, Ei-nest A. Gross, Benjamin V. 
Cohen, Anna Lord Strauss, and Channing H. 
Tobias. 



Assembly Elections 

At its opening meeting, the Assembly elected as 
its President, Ambassador Padilla Nervo of 
Mexico and, as the seven Vice Presidents, the 
heads of the delegations of China, France, Iraq, 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United King- 
dom, United States, and Yugoslavia. The fol- 
lowing committee chairmen were also elected : 

First Committee (Political and Security) : Finn Moe 

( Norway ) 
Second Committee (Economic and Financial) : Prince 

Wan Waitiiayakon (Thailand) 
Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural) : 

Mrs. Ana Figueroa (Chile) 
Fourth Committee (Trusteeship) : Max Henriquez Urena 

(Dominican Republic) 
Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary) : T. A. 

Stone (Canada) 
Sixth Committee (Legal) : Manfred Lachs (Poland) 

Later, the Ad Hoc Political Committee elected 
Ambassador Sarper of Turkey as its chairman. 

Each year the Assembly elects new members of 
the U.N. councils to replace those whose terms have 
expired. It elected Chile, Pakistan, and Greece 
for 2-year terms on the Security Council. The 
third vacancy — the seat formerly held by Yugo- 
slavia — was filled only on the 19th ballot. The 
United States and a number of other countries 
strongly supported Greece for that post ; Byelorus- 
sia, the Soviet candidate for the vacancy, did, how- 
ever, receive substantial backing. To fill the 
vacant seats in the Economic and Social Council, 
Argentina, Belgium, China, Cuba, Egypt, and 
France were elected for the coming 3-year term. 
Argentina then resigned its seat on tlie Trustee- 
ship Council and the Assembly elected El Salvador 
in its place. Six vacancies had to be filled, by the 
Assembly and the Security Council, on the Inter- 
national Court of Justice — one caused by the death 
of a judge, five by the expiration of terms of office. 
Judge Carneiro (Brazil) was elected to fill the 
vacancy caused by the death of Judge Azevedo. 



632 



Department of State Bulletin 



The following five judges were elected for the 
full term: Judge Golunsky (U.S.S.R.), Judge 
Hackworth (U.S.), Judge Klaestad (Norway), 
Judge Rau (India), Judge Ugon (Uruguay). 

Major Political Issues 

The Paris session of the General Assembly of- 
fered great potentialities for influencing public 
opinion on critical issues. The countries of the free 
world had for some years been engaged in a sus- 
tained build-up of military and economic strength 
against, first, the threat and, later, the actuality of 
Communist aggression. This undertaking in- 
volved hard and long sacrifices for many coun- 
tries. The Soviet Union attempted in the General 
Assembly to divide and split the countries of the 
free world, charging that the United States is bent 
on war, that it refuses to make peace in Korea, and 
that it is forcing an armaments race on the world 
and thus causing economic disaster to many popu- 
lations. In contrast, Andrei Vyshinsky and other 
Soviet spokesmen pictured the Soviet Union as a 
true champion of peace and disarmament and con- 
ciliation. These charges were squarely met, and 
it can be said that the Soviet Union failed com- 
pletely to achieve a weakening of the free-world 
effort. On the contrary, the great majority 
showed their determination to persevere in the 
collective U.N. action in Korea and in carrying 
out other major programs undertaken in previous 
years, such as the development of capacity for 
more effective U.N. measures against any future 
aggression. 

Political conditions existing at the beginning of 
the session also brought to the fore a number of 
new and critical issues relating particularly to the 
Middle East and Arab States. The strong 
nationalist movements in this broad area, which 
had already been reflected in such matters as the 
oil controversy in Iran and the controversy be- 
tween Egypt and the United Kingdom over the 
Suez Canal, gave great emphasis in the General 
Assembly to the problem of Morocco and to the 
general issues of self-determination and the opera- 
tion of the trusteeship system. 

Disarmament 

On November 7, France, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States announced that they would 
submit joint proposals for proceeding with the 
regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of 
all armed forces and armaments, including atomic 
weapons.^ Reaffirming their determination to de- 
velop the strength required for their security and 
that of the free world, they declared their belief 
that if all states would sincerely join in disarma- 
ment efforts the security of all nations would be 
increased. A few hours later President Truman, 



' BmjjETiN of Nov. 19, 1951, p. 802. 
April 21, 7952 



in a radio address to the American people, ex- 
plained the new disarmament proposals, making 
clear that they were the result of long and careful 
preparations.'' He said that although the United 
States is determined to build up the necessary de- 
fenses of the free world, we would much prefer 
to see nations cut down their armaments on a basis 
that would be fair to everyone. The two U.N. 
Commissions heretofore working in the arma- 
ments field^the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission 
and the Commission on Conventional Arma- 
ments — should be consolidated into one, and this 
new Commission should consider the tripartite 
proposals. The proposals contained three princi- 
pal points: 

(1) A continuing inventory of all armed forces 
and all armaments should be undertaken in every 
country having substantial military power and 
should be checked and verified in each country by 
impartial U.N. inspectors. 

(2) While this process of inventory and in- 
spection was taking place, nations would work 
out specific arrangements for the actual reduction 
of armed strength. 

(3) On the basis of (1) and (2), reductions 
should be made as soon as possible with full 
knowledge and fairness to all. 

On November 8, Secretary Acheson, in his 
speech in the general debate, outlined the proposals 
further and asked that the item be included in 
the agenda of the Assembly.^ 

Soviet Foreign Minister Vyshinsky made his 
reply the following day. He ridiculed the pro- 
posals as a dead mouse brought forth by a moun- 
tain and said he had been kept awake all the pre- 
vious night laughing at the proposals. He ad- 
vanced Soviet proposals on the same subject along 
the lines of previous rejected Soviet proposals. 
Vyshinsky's cynical remarks brought about an im- 
mediate indignant reaction throughout the world ; 
it was noted that the controlled press in the Soviet 
and satellite countries made no reference to the 
incident, and Vyshinslcy took the unpi'ecedented 
step of making a second address in the general 
debate. In this speech he once more criticized the 
tripartite plan and introduced amended Soviet 
proposals. 

In the Political and Security Committee Secre- 
tary Acheson presented the tripartite proposals 
on November 19.* After considerable discussion, 
a number of the smaller states, particularly those 
in Asia and the Middle East, urged that direct 
negotiations on the problem take place at once 
between the great powers. Accordingly, the Com- 
mittee on November 30 established a subcommittee 
consisting of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United 

■ Ibid., p. 799. 
'Ibid., p. 803. 

* Ibid., Dec. 3, 1951, p. 879. (See also correction ibid., 
Jan. 14, 1952, p. 58.) 

633 



States, witli Assembly Pi-esident Padilla Nervo 
as chairman, to seek by private discussion to for- 
mulate mutually acceptable proposals. The sub- 
committee began its meetings on December 3, and 
on December 10 President Padilla Nervo reported 
on the areas of agreement and disagreement be- 
tween the three Western Powers on the one hand 
and the U.S.S.R. on the other— the areas of agree- 
ment being largely in the field of procedures.^ On 
December 13 the Three Powers submitted a revi- 
sion of their resolution, to include elements to 
which the U.S.S.R. and the three had agi'eed in 
the subcommittee and as many suggestions from 
other members as was possible. They also ac- 
cepted certain sej^arate amendments proposed by 
other members. On December 19 the Committee 
adopted the revised resolution, with some amend- 
ments, by 44 votes to 5 (Soviet bloc) with 10 
abstentions. The proposals of the Soviet bloc 
which, as in previous years, failed to provide safe- 
guards against violations, were overwhelmingly 
rejected. On January 11 the Assembly approved 
the Committee's action by 42 votes to 5 with 7 
abstentions. 

This resolution established a single Disarma- 
ment Commission composed of the members of the 
Security Council plus Canada, and it directed the 
Commission to prepare proposals to be embodied 
in draft treaties for (1) the regulation, limitation, 
and balanced reduction of all armed forces and 
armaments; (2) the elimination of all major 
weapons adaptable to mass destruction; and (3) 
effective international control of atomic energy 
to insure the prohibition of atomic weapons and 
the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes 
only. The resolution laid down certain principles 
to guide the Commission in its work. These in- 
cluded provision for progressive disclosure and 
verification on a continuing basis of all armed 
forces and armaments. In the atomic energy 
field, the U.N. plan is to serve as the basis for 
international control unless a better and more 
effective system is devised. This disarmament 
resolution constitutes the most important achieve- 
ment of the session.® 



Other Political Questions 

The crucial problem of Korea was on the agenda 
in the form of the reports of the U.N. commissions 
working on different aspects of that problem. The 
United States and, in fact, practically all members 
agreed that to discuss the problem while the armis- 
tice negotiations were still in progress would not 
help these negotiations and might well hinder 
them. On the other hand, the Soviet delegation 
tried unsuccessfully from time to time to force a 
debate on Korea, doubtless hoping to confuse the 
issue or to improve the position of the Communist 
negotiators by transferring the discussions to 

" Unci., Jan. 7, 10.^2, p. 17. 

• For text, see ibid., Mar. 31, 1952, p. 507. 



Paris. Since the armistice negotiations continued 
at Panmunjom throughout the session, the As- 
sembly, on the final day, adopted a proposal sub- * 
mitted by the United States, United Kingdom, 
and France that provided for a special session 
of the General Assembly to deal with Korea in 
case of an armistice or of other developments 
which make consideration of the problem de- 
sirable. The resolution was adopted by the over- 
whelming majority of 51 to 5 (Soviet bloc) with 
2 abstentions.' 

The Assembly carried further its collective- 
measures program under the resolution on Uniting 
for Peace adopted at the preceding session. The 
Collective Measures Committee established by that 
resolution had, dui'ing 1951, made a significant 
study of the means by which preparations could 
be made for more effective United Nations col- 
lective action if in a future case such action were 
undertaken. The United States and 10 other 
members of the Collective Measures Committee 
jointly introduced a resolution designed to carry 
forward the work. This resolution, with a num- 
ber of amendments, was adopted by the Assembly 
by 51 votes to 5 (Soviet bloc) with 3 abstentions.* 
In the resolution the Assembly took note of the 
Collective INIeasures Committee report, continued 
the Committee for a further year, and, in effect, 
recommended the continuation and further de- 
velopment of the collective-measures program ini- 
tiated by the 1950 resolution on Uniting for Peace. 

The Yugoslav representative introduced a com- 
plaint against the Soviet group's hostile activi- 
ties toward it, and in his main speech he made a 
detailed indictment of the conduct of all these 
states. The Assembly adopted, by 50 votes to 5 
(Soviet bloc) with 2 abstentions, a Yugoslav reso- 
lution recommending in general that the govern- 
ments concerned conduct their relations in 
accordance with the Charter." 

On a proposal by France, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States the Assembly adopted, by 45 
votes to 6 (Soviet bloc plus Israel) with 8 absten- 
tions, a resolution appointing an impartial U.N. 
Commission to carry out a simultaneous investiga- 
tion in the Federal Republic of Germany, in Ber- 
lin, and in the Soviet zone of Germany in order 
to determine whether existing conditions there 
make possible the holding of genuinely free elec- 
tions throughout these areas.^" 

The members of the Arab League submitted a 
complaint entitled "Violations of the Charter and 
of Human Rights in Morocco." A General Com- 
mittee recommendation that consideration of the 
question of inclusion of this item in the agenda 
be postponed for the time being was adopted by 
the General Assembly by 28 votes to 23 with 7 
abstentions. 



' For text, see iMd., Feb. 18, 1952, p. 260. 
' For text, see ibid., Dec. 24, 1951, p. 1027. 
° For text, see ibid., Jan. 14, 1952, p. 62. 
"For text, see ibid., p. 55. 



634 



Deparfment of Sfafe BuUetin 



The Soviet Union and its satellites pressed a 
number of propaganda themes throughout the 
session, in addition to those relating to disarma- 
ment and Korea. They introduced a resolution 
condemning the United States for the adoption by 
Congress of the so-called Kersten amendment, 
which became section 101 (a) (1) of the Mutual 
Security Act of 1951 and which authorized an 
appropriation of $100,000,000 for "any selected 
persons who are residing in or escapees" from 
Iron Curtain countries "to form such persons into 
elements of the military forces supporting the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization or for other 
purposes."" The U.S.S.R. evidently sought 
through this complaint to brand the military as- 
sistance programs of the United States as inter- 
vention in the internal affairs of other countries 
and as designed to provoke war. The U.S. delega- 
tion flatly denied that Congress had ever intended 
the money to be used for any activities contrary to 
the U.N. Charter. On January 10, 1952, the 
Assembly by 42 votes to 5 (Soviet bloc) with 11 
abstentions decisively rejected the Soviet charges. 

In an omnibus resolution, the Soviet Union at- 
tempted to obtain Assembly approval of its own 
position concerning disarmament (even though 
the disarmament debate had been concluded and 
the resolution adopted), its proposals concerning 
Korea and a Five Power "peace pact," and its at- 
tempts to have the Assembly declare any partici- 
pation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
inconsistent Vvith U.N. membership. The Assem- 
bly referred the Soviet disarmament proposals, 
together with the record of the debates, to the 
newly created Disarmament Commission; it re- 
jected the other proposals. 

The Assembly also dealt with a number of politi- 
cal problems which it had considered at previous 
sessions. Under earlier General Assembly resolu- 
tions, provision had been made for the independ- 
ence of a united Libya by January 1, 1952. The 
United Kingdom of Libya was proclaimed as an 
independent state on December 24, 1951, and the 
General Assembly adopted a resolution designed 
to provide such further assistance as might be 
required and to achieve if possible its admission 
to the United Nations. On the Palestine question, 
the Assembly adopted, by a large majority, reso- 
lutions continuing the Palestine Conciliation Com- 
mission and providing for the adoption of a 3-year 
program, involving the expenditure of $250,000,- 
000, for the relief and reintegration of Palestine 
refugees.^* In a resolution on the treatment of 
people of Indian origin in the Union of South 
Africa, the Assembly continued the efforts to reach 
a conciliatory solution and called upon South 
Africa to suspend implementation of the Group 
Areas Act. 

" For a statement by Mike J. Mansfield, U.S. delegate 
to the General A.ssembly, explaining the U.S. vote against 
this Soviet resolution, see ihid., Jan. 28, 1952, p. 12S. 

'^ For text of the Palestine assistance resolution, see 
iMd., Feb. 11, 1952, p. 226. 



After consideration of the report of the United 
Nations Special Committee on the Balkans 
(Unscob), the General Assembly decided that the 
situation along Greece's northern frontiers had 
improved sufficiently to permit the dissolution of 
that 4-year-old watchdog body. At the same 
time, however, the Assembly provided for the es- 
tablishment at New York of a Balkan subcommis- 
sion of the Peace Observance Commis-sion which 
would be available to conduct observation, on the 
request of states concerned, in any area of tension 
in the Balkans. 

The admission of qualified states to membership 
was the subject of a Peruvian proposal adopted by 
the Assembly. The question of admission, the 
proposal stated, should be determined only on the 
basis of the Charter qualifications of the applicant, 
and it requested the Security Coiincil to recon- 
sider applications in accordance with this stand- 
ard. A Soviet proposal requesting Security 
Council reconsideration of 13 applicants (omit- 
ting the Republic of Korea but adding Libya) 
received a majority vote in the Political Commit- 
tee but failed to be adopted by the Assembly. 

The problem of Chinese representation was 
raised once more by the U.S.S.R., this time in a 
request for inclusion of an item on this subject 
on the agenda." The Assembly adopted a reso- 
lution recommended by the General Committee 
rejecting inclusion of the Soviet item in the 
agenda and postponing for the duration of the 
meetings at Paris consideration of any further 
proposals to unseat the representatives of the Na- 
tional Government of China or to seat representa- 
tives of the Chinese Communist regime. The 
resolution was adopted by 37 votes to 11 with 4 
abstentions. Another question relating to China 
was the complaint by China of Soviet violations 
of the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1945. The Assembly 
adopted, by 25 votes to 9 with 24 abstentions, a 
resolution proposed by China finding that the 
U.S.S.R. had obstructed the efforts of the National 
Government of China in re-establishing Chinese 
national authority in Manchuria after the Japa- 
nese surrender and that it gave military and eco- 
nomic aid to the Chinese Communists against the 
National Government of China, and determining 
that the U.S.S.R. has failed to carry out the treaty 
of friendship and alliance of August 14, 1945,'* 
between China and the U.S.S.R. 

• Mr. Taylor, author of the above artich, is 
officer in charge of General Assembly Affairs for 
the Bureau of United Nations Affairs. He served 
as principal executive officer of the U.S. delegation 
to the Sixth General Assembly. 



" For statements by Secretary Acheson and Ambassador 
Warren R. Austin on this subject, see ibid., Dec. 3, 1951, 
p. 917. 

" For text of the Chinese resolution, see ibid., Feb. 11, 
1952, p. 220. 



April 21, 19S2 



635 



U.S. Delegations to International Conferences 



Cannes Film Festival 

Tlie Department of State announced on April 9 
that the Cannes International Film Festival will 
be held at Cannes, France, April 23-May 10, 1952. 
Chester A. Lindstrom, chief, Motion Picture Sec- 
tion, Department of Afjriculture, will serve as 
U.S. delegate. Gerald M. Mayer, attache, Ameri- 
can Embassy, Paris, and formerly European rep- 
resentative of the Motion Picture Association of 
America, will serve as alternate U.S. delegate. 

The object of this Festival is to encourage the 
development of the motion picture art in all its 
forms and to create and maintain a spirit of emula- 
tion and cooperation among all film producei's in 
all countries. A number of prizes will be awarded 
at the Festival. 

The U.S. exhibit will consist of the following 
three Government-produced documentary films: 
"River Run" (Department of Agriculture); 
"West Point" (Department of the Army) ; and 
"Demonstrations in Perceptions" (Department of 
the Navy). Tliese films were selected by the Re- 
view Committee on Visual and Audio Materials, 
which is composed of representatives of 11 motion- 
picture producing agencies of this Government. 
In addition, the U.S. film industry will send 
several feature-length and documentary films for 
the competition at Cannes. 

Sixth Hydrographic Conference 

The Department of State announced on April 9 
that the Sixth International Hydrogi-aphic Con- 
ference will convene at Monte Carlo, Monaco, on 
April 29, 1952. The U.S. delegation to this Con- 
ference is as follows : 

Delegates 

Capt. Earl O. Heaton, Coast and Geodetic Survey, Depart- 
ment of Commerce 

Capt. George F. Kennedy, TJ.S.N.R., Navy Hydrographic 
Office, Department of Defense 

Technical Advisers 

H. R. Edmonston, Coast and Geodetic Survey, Department 
of Commerce 

Guillermo Medina, Navy Hydrographic Office, Depart- 
ment of Defense 

William G. Watt, Navy Hydrographic Office, Department 
of Defense 

The International Hydrographic Conference 
serves as the deliberative and legislative assembly 
of the International Hydrographic Bureau. The 
Bureau was founded in 1921 for the purpose of 



establishing a close and permanent association 
between the hydrographic services of the member 
states and of coordinating their efforts with a view 
to promoting easier and safer navigation on all of 
the seas of the world. Headquarters of the Bu- 
reau are located at Monte Carlo. United States 
participation in the Bureau was approved by an 
Act of Congress of March 2, 1921. 

International hydrographic conferences are 
usually held quinquennially. The Fifth Confer- 
ence was held at Monte Carlo, April 22-May 5. 
1947. At the forthcoming Conference the activi- 
ties of the Bureau during the last 5 years will b" 
reviewed. 

ITU: Seventh Session of Administrative Council 

On April 9 the Department of State announced 
that Francis Colt de Wolf, Chief, Telecommunica- 
tions Policy Staff, and U.S. representative on the 
Administrative Council of the International Tele- 
communication Union (Itu), will attend the 
seventh session of the Council, which will convene 
at Geneva, Switzerland, on April 21, 1952. Mr. de 
Wolf will be assisted by the following advisers : 

Donald C. Blaisdell, U.S. representative for Specialized 
Agency Affairs, Geneva, Switzerland 

Helen G. Kelly, Telecommunications Policy Staff, De- 
partment of State 

Wayne Mason, U.S. telecommunications attach^, Ameri- 
can Legation, Bern ; resident at Geneva, Switzerland 

The establishment of the Administrative Coun- 
cil was provided for in the Atlantic City Tele- 
communication Convention (1947) and certain 
protocols annexed thereto. The Council func- 
tioned on a provisional basis until the Convention 
entered into force on January 1, 1949. The 
functions of the Council, which serves as the gov- 
erning organ of the Itu, are to insure the efficient 
coordination of the work of the Union, to super- 
vise the administrative functions of the Union, 
to deal with problems arising between plenipoten- 
tiary conferences, and to perform such other oper- 
ations as may be delegated to it by pleni- 
potentiary conferences. The Council, which is 
composed of 18 members of the Union, meets at 
least once a year. The last (sixth) session of the 
Council was held at Geneva, April 16-May 26, 
1951. 



636 



Department of State Bulletin 



At the forthcoming session the Council will con- 
sider the administrative and fiscal operations of 
the Itu. The agenda for the session is limited in 
view of the imminence of the Plenipotentiary Con- 
ference, which is scheduled to be held at Buenos 
Aires in October 1952. 



Inter-American Travel Congress 

On April 11 the Department of State announced 
that the Fourth Inter-American Travel Congress 
will convene at Lima, Peru, on April 12, 1952. 
The members of the U.S. delegation are as follows : 

Paul C. Daniels, American Ambassador to Ecuador ; Chair- 
man 

Jess B. Bennett, Air Transport Association, Washington, 
D.C. 

Franklin Moore, President, Inter-American Hotel Asso- 
ciation, Harrisburg, Pa. 

John D. J. Moore, U.S. Inter-American Council, Inter- 
American Council of Commerce and Production, New 
York, N.Y. 

Robert H. Wall, Assistant Chief, Travel Bureau, Depart- 
ment of Commerce 

Laurin B. Askew, Assistant Attach^, American Embassy, 
Lima ; Secretary 

The purpose of the Fourth Inter-American 
Travel Congress is to encourage and promote 
tourist travel, a matter of economic and technical 
interest to all the countries of the Americas. The 
Council of the Organization of American States 
(Oas) adopted on January 16, 1952, a resolution 
in which the Congress was designated as an "In- 
ter-American Specialized Conference" within the 
meaning of article 93 of the Charter of the Oas. 
In accordance with that resolution, the Inter- 
American Economic and Social Council prepared 
the program and regulations of the Congress in 
collaboration with its Organizing Committee. 

The agenda includes consideration of such mat- 
ters as organization of continuing activities in the 
travel field ; economics of tourist travel ; reduction 
or elimination of travel barriers; role of travel 
agencies in tourist interchange ; resolutions affect- 
ing tourist travel approved at previous Con- 
gresses; travel-publicity techniques; facilities for 
organized groups of tourists ; and policy and plan- 
ning of tourist travel in the inter- American and 
national fields. 

Invitations to participate in the Congress have 
been extended to all the governments of the Ameri- 
can Republics, as well as to a number of inter- 
national and nongovernmental organizations. 

The previous (Third) Inter-American Travel 
Congress was held at San Carlos de Bariloche, 
Argentina, February 15-24, 1949. 

Commission on Narcotic Drugs 

[Released to the press April 11] 

Harry J. Anslinger, Commissioner of Narcotics, 
Department of the Treasury, and U. S. repre- 

April 27, J 952 



sentative on the U.N. Commission on Narcotic 
Drugs, will attend the seventh session of the Com- 
mission which will convene at New York, N. Y., 
on April 15, 1952. George A. Morlock, Office of 
U.N. Economic and Social Affairs, Department 
of State, and Alfred L. Tennyson, Chief of the 
Legal Division, Bureau of Narcotic Drugs, De- 
partment of the Treasury, will serve as advisers. 

The Commission on Narcotic Drugs, which is 
one of the nine permanent functional commissions 
of the U.N. Economic and Social Council, was 
formally established on a permanent basis in 1946 
to assume the functions and powers previously 
exercised by the League of Nations in the appli- 
cation of international conventions on narcotic 
drugs. The functions of the Commission include 
assisting the Council in exercising supervision over 
the application of international conventions and 
agreements dealing with narcotic drugs; advising 
the Council on all questions concerning the control 
of narcotic drugs and preparing draft interna- 
tional conventions thereon; and considering 
changes required in the existing machinery for 
the international control of narcotic drugs. Fif- 
teen governments, elected by the Council, com- 
prise the membership of the Commission. Its last 
(sixth) session was held at Lake Success, April 
15-May 14, 1951. 

Among the items on the provisional agenda of 
the forthcoming session are the proposed single 
convention on narcotic drugs ; progress report on 
the work of the Division of Narcotic Drugs ; aboli- 
tion of opium smoking in the Far East; annual 
reports of governments ; laws and regulations re- 
lating to the control of narcotic drugs; the re- 
port of the U.N. Commission of Enquii-y on the 
Coca Leaf; and illicit traffic in narcotic drugs 
in 1951, including illicit trafficking by the crews 
of merchant ships. 

Communiques Regarding Korea 
to tile Security Council 

The Headquarters of the United Nations Com- 
mand has transmitted communiques regarding 
Korea to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations under the following numbers issued in 
1952: S/2535, February 20; S/2549, March 5; 
S/2551, March 6; S/2552, March 7; S/2553, 
March 10; S/2554, March 10; S/2556, March 11; 
S/2557, March 12; S/2558, March 13; S/2559, 
March 17; S/2560, March 17; S/2562, March 18; 
S/2563, March 20; S/2565, March 24. 



The United States in the United Nations 

A weekly feature, does not appear in this issue. 



637 



Progress Toward Solution of Europe's Refugee Problem 

SECOND SESSION OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE 
FOR THE MOVEMENT OF MIGRANTS FROM EUROPE 



hy George L. Warren 



The second session of the Provisional Inter- 
governmental Committee for tlie Movement of 
Migrants from Europe was held at Geneva from 
February 18 through February 23, 1952'. The first 
session took place immediately after the adjourn- 
ment of the Conference on Migration at Brussels 
on December 5, 1951.^ Fourteen governments at 
Brussels indicated intention to become members 
of the Committee. Seventeen governments were 
represented at Geneva as full participants in the 
Committee. Other governments, the Holy See, 
and international organizations were represented 
as observers. 

At its first session the Migration Committee 
adopted a number of resolutions which brought 
it into formal existence, a budget totaling $36,- 
■954,000, and a plan of operations to move during 
1952, 116,000 migrants and refugees who would 
not otherwise be moved from Europe to overseas 
countries of immigration. Upon the termination 
of operations of the International Refugee Or- 
ganization (Iro) on January 31, 1952, the Migra- 
tion Committee took over the direction and 
operation of ten ships, already reconditioned for 
the movement of migrants, which were relin- 
quislied by Iro. The Committee also undertook 
on that date the movement of 12,205 refugees who 
had received visas to countries of immigration 
prior to that date but whom Iro was unable to 
move because of exhaustion of its funds. Iro made 
a payment to the Migration Committee of $950,000 
toward the estimated cost of this movement 
($2,300,000) and undertook to pay the balance of 
approximately $1,300,000 from any further funds 
that might be received by the Organization during 
its period of liquidation. In February 1952, the 
first month of operations, the Committee moved 

" For an article by Mr. Warren on the Conference on 
Migration and the first session of the Committee for the 
Movement of Migrants from Europe, see Bulletin of 
Feb. 4, 1952, p. 169. 

638 



over 9,000 migrants and refugees from Europe 
and scheduled the movement of over 11,000 per- 
sons for March. 

At the second session at Geneva, the following 
17 Governments were represented as full members 
of the Committee: Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, France, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the 
United States, and Venezuela. Austria and Ven- 
ezuela were not represented at the first session of 
the Committee and Denmark was represented only 
as an observer. The following additional Gov- 
ernments were represented at Geneva as observers : 
Argentina, Colombia, Israel, New Zealand, Nor- 
way, Peru, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
The representatives of New Zealand, Norway, and 
Sweden indicated informally that decisions as to 
membership in the Migration Committee by their 
Governments would be made as soon as considera- 
tion had been given to the allocations of contribu- 
tions made to them by the Committee during the 
course of the second session. The representatives 
of Israel, Peru, and the United Kingdom reported 
that membership in the Committee was under ac- 
tive consideration by their Governments. 

The Deputy Director, Pierre Jacobsen, reported 
that during February 1952 negotiations had been 
initiated with emigration countries to organize 
the necessary facilities and processing for the 
outward movement of migrants and refugees. 
Similar negotiations were also in progress with 
immigration counti-ies in order to complete the 
final schedule of movements planned for 1952. 
The U.S. Displaced Persons Commission had 
made arrangements with the Committee to move 
approximately 28,000 German migrants, eligible 
for admission to the United States under the Dis- 
placed Persons Act, on a full cost reimbursable 
basis, and initial payment on account of this 
movement of $765,000 had already been made to 
the Committee. Other movements during Feb- 

Department of State Bulletin 



ruary and March 1952 comprised 1,000 persons 
to Rio de Janeiro, 3,050 to Australia, and 1,150 to 
Canada. Two of the ships under charter to the 
Migration Committee were being used solely in 
the movement of migrants from the Netlierlands 
to Australia and Canada. The Deputy Director 
also reported that a trust fund of $500,000 had 
been deposited witli the Committee by the Iro to 
cover the cost of transport of any refugees re- 
maining in Shanghai who might secure visas to 
countries of immigration in the future. Over 
150 such refugees had already left Shanghai at 
the expense of the fund. 

Revised Budget Adopted 

As a result of the foregoing developments the 
Committee adopted a revised budget totaling 
$41,350,660, an increase of $4,396,660 over the 
total of $36,954,000 adopted at the first session 
at Brussels. This increase was entirely in tlie 
operational items of the budget — no clianges being 
made in the totals of the administrative expendi- 
tures or of the operating fund. The total num- 
ber of persons to be moved by the Committee by 
the end of December 1952 was increased from 
116,000 estimated at Brussels to 137,500. Tliis 
increase in the persons to be moved was accounted 
for largely by the refugees turned over to the 
Migration Committee by Iro for movement and 
also by the prospect of the movement during the 
year of an additional 10,000 refugees. The larger 
movement envisaged automatically increased the 
total of reimbursements anticipated from govern- 
ments and of dollar equivalents of services ren- 
dered by governments directly, which was set 
down at $22,254,504. Of this total, services paid 
for directly by governments such as the processing 
of migrants were estimated at $8,800,000 and re- 
imbursements for transportation at $13,374,504. 
Included in this latter figure was the $2,100,000 
anticipated to be received from the Government of 
Italy for the movement of 35,000 migrants from 
Italy at $60 per migrant. In addition to the $13,- 
374,504 in reimbursements for transportation, 
$2,737,096 was expected to be received in reim- 
bursements from Iro for the movement of refugees 
from Europe and Shanghai. 

Each member government of the Migration 
Committee is obligated to make an agreed con- 
tribution to the administrative expenditures of 
the Committee. During the session new percent- 
age allocations were made to the following member 
and prospective member governments as follows : 

Percent 

Denmark 1. 144 

Norway 1.060 

Sweden 2.600 

Israel 297 

Argentina 4. 400 

Venezuela 1.000 

New Zealand 2. 119 

Total 12.620 



The representative of Venezuela formally ac- 
cepted the allocation to his Government at the ses- 
sion. As a result of the discussion on the new 
allocations of contributions, the Committee agreed 
that the whole scale of allocations of contributions 
would be reviewed later when a decision was 
reached to continue the activities of the Migration 
Committee for a second year. 

The representatives of the governments present 
at the second session were not in a position to an- 
nounce formally the amounts of their anticipated 
contributions to the operating fund. Contribu- 
tions to the operating fund of $14,000,000 are 
voluntary. The purpose of the operating fund is, 
first, to supply working capital for the Committee's 
operations, and thereafter, to cover the cost of 
movement of those migrants and refugees who are 
not included in the cost reimbursable schemes of 
movement and for whose movement no other funds 
are available. Approximately $9,000,000 of the 
U.S. contribution will constitute a contribution to 
the operating fund. Many of the governments 
represented at the session indicated that the ap- 
propriate procedures had already been initiated 
to provide their contributions to the operating 
fund. 

Appointments to Committee's Staff 

The Deputy Director reported that he was in the 
process of establishing the staff of the Committee 
and of necessity had been obliged to make a lim- 
ited number of apj^ointments from the former Iro 
staff, particularly of those persons directly en- 
gaged in shipping operations. Such appointments 
were essential in order to maintain momentum 
of movement and to avoid demurrage charges on 
ships taken over from Iro. Many appointments 
made to date are of a purely provisional nature 
and subject to change after the full membership 
of the Committee is known in order that the final 
composition of the staff may reflect the appropri- 
ate balance of nationalities. As of Februai^ 1, 
1952, 49 officials of professional grades and 125 
employees had been recruited. Of the officials, 27 
were at headquarters and 22 in field liaison offices. 
Small liaison missions have been established in 
Australia, Austria, Brazil, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, and the United States. The total number 
of officials eventually to be recruited is 107 and 
recruitment is proceeding with respect to the 58 
posts still to be filled. 

The Committee discontinued the arrangement 
adopted at Brussels by which the powers and au- 
thoi-ity of the Director were vested in Franz Lee- 
mans and George L. Warren. In lieu of this 
arrangement, the Committee established an Exec- 
utive Committee consisting of representatives of 
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
and the United States. The chairman of the ses- 
sion, Mr. Leemans, advanced the suggestion that 
the Executive Committee meet at Washington in 



Apri\ 27, 7952 



639 



May 1952. This sugfjestion appeared to meet with 
general approval. The powers and authority of 
the Director were vested temporarily in Mr. 
Jacobsen as Deputy Director until such time as a 
Director is elected by the Committee. 

A close review of the passengers available for 
movement and of their destinations revealed that 
when the current movement to the United States 
is completed in early June 1952, there may be an 
inadequate number of passengers to fill all the 
ships under charter to the Committee until mid- 
July when the peak of the anticipated seasonal 
movements to Canada and Australia will be 
reached. By mid-summer of 1952 the Committee 
may require more ships than are presently avail- 
able to meet the total requirements of movement. 
The Deputy Director, in consequence, urged the 
governments receiving migrants to plan their 
movement schedules in close cooperation with the 
Committee staff in order that an evenly balanced 
movement may be secured throughout the year and 
ships available to the Committee be used at maxi- 
mum efficiency without financial loss resulting 
from demurrage charges. 

Mr. Leemans (Belgium) was elected and served 
as chairman of the second session of the Commit- 
tee. Giusti del Giardino (Italy) served as first 
vice chairman; F. Nilo de Alvaranga (Brazil) as 
second vice chairman ; and Dr. H. von Trutzschler 
(Germany) as rapporteur. The Committee ad- 
journed on February 23, 1952, to be reconvened at 
the call of the Chairman but in no event later than 
September 1952. 

• Mr. Warren, author of the above article, is 
Adviser on Refugees and Displaced Persons, De- 
partment of State. He was U. S. representative 
to the February session of the Migration Com- 
mittee. 



Current United Nations Documents: 
A Seiected Bibliography > 

Security Council 

Decisions Taken and Resolutions Adopted by the Security 
Council During the Tear 1951. Prepared by the 
Department of Security Council Affairs. S/INF/6, 
March 4, 1952. 17 pp. mimeo. 



' Printed materials may be secured in the United States 
from the International Documents Service, Columbia Uni- 
versity Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other 
materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may 
be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United 
States. 

The United Nations Secretariat has established an 
Official Records series for the General Assembly, the Se- 
curity Council, the Economic and Social Council, the 
Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission 
which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and 
reports of the various commissions and committees. In- 
formation on securing subscriptions to the series may be 
obtained from the International Documents Service. 



Economic and Social Council 

Local Hnman Rights Committees or Information Groups. 
E/CN.4,/519/Add.l, March 10, 1952. 5 pp. mimeo. 

The Problem of Statelessness. Information Transmitted 
by States in Pursuance of Economic and Social Coun- 
cil resolution 3.52 (XII) relating to the problem of 
statelessness. E/2164/Add.l9, February 13, 1952. 11 
pp. mimeo. 

Critical Shortage of Insecticides For Public Health Pur- 
poses. Report of the Working Party on Insecticides 
DDT and BHC under Council resolution .'!77 (XIII). 
E/21S3, E/AC.38/1, March 10, 1952. IS pp. mimeo. 

UNICEF Assistance For Long-Range Child Feeding Pro- 
grammes in Central America. E/ICEF/186, March 
13, 1952. 49 pp. mimeo. 

Statement Concerning His Consultations on Preparations 
for an Ad Hoc Meeting on Trade, by the Executive 
Secretary of the Economic Commission for Europe. 
E/ECE/146, March 12, 1952. 7 pp. mimeo. 

Progress Report on UNICEF-Assisted Milk Conservation 
Programmes. E/ICEF/189, March 21, 1952. 27 pp. 
mimeo. 

The Problem of Statelessness. Information transmitted 
by States in pursuance of Economic and Social Coun- 
cil resolution 352 (XII) relating to the problem of 
statelessness. B/2164/Add.4, March 14, 1952. 6 pp. 
mimeo. 

Implementation of Recommendations on Economic and 
Social Matters. Economic and Social Council reso- 
lution 283 (X). Texts of Replies From Governments 
of Member States. E/2165/Add.l5/Corr.l, March 17, 
1952. 11 pp. mimeo. 



Trusteeship Council 

Land Alienation and Land and Potpulation Distribution in 
the Territory of the Cameroons Under French Ad- 
ministration. Memorandum submitted by the Gov- 
ernment of France. T/AC.36/L.40, March 5, 1952. 
32 pp. mimeo. 

Land Utilization in the Trust Territory of the Cameroons 
Under French Administration. Memorandum sub- 
mitted by the French Government. T/AC.36/L.39, 
March 5, 1952. 14 pp. mimeo. 

Committee on the Rural Economic Development of the 
Trust Territories. Population, Land Categories and 
Tenure in Somaliland Under Italian Administration. 
(Working paper prepared by the Secretariat.) 
T/AC.36/L.42, March 6, 1952. 9 pp. mimeo. 

Land Utilization in the Trust Territory of Togoland Under 
French Administration. Memorandum submitted b.y 
the Government of France. T/AC.36/L.38, March 10, 
1952. 6 pp. mimeo. 

Conditions in the Trust Territory of Nauru. Working 
paper prepared by the Secretariat. T/L.244, March 
11, 1952. 25 pp. mimeo. 

Revision of the Provisional Questionnaire. Report of the 
Drafting Committee on the Questionnaire. T/L.246, 
March 17, 1952. 99 pp. mimeo. 

First Report of the Standing Committee on Petitions^ 
T/L.247, March 24, 1952. 7 pp. mimeo. 

Outline of Conditions in the Trust Territory of Western 
Samoa. Working paper prepared by the Secretariat. 
T/L.231/Corr.l, March 24, 1952. 7 pp. mimeo. 

Examination of Petitions. Cameroons and Togoland >m- 
der French Administration. Observations nf the Ad- 
ministering Authority. T/973, March 24, 1952. 9 pp. 
mimeo. 

Conditions in the Trust Territory of Western Samoa. Re- 
port of the Drafting Committee. T/L.248, March 24, 
1952. 5 pp. mimeo. 

Organization and Functioning of Visiting Missions. 
T/L.249, March 26, 1952. 10 pp. mimeo. 

Examination of Petitions. Second Report of the Stand- 
ing Committee on Petitions. T/L.255, March 28, 1952. 
29 pp. mimeo. 



640 



Department of State Bulletin 



Request for Extension of Emergency Powers 



[Released to the press by the White House April 7] 

Tfw President on April 7 sent identical letters 
to Alben W. BarMey, President of the Senate of 
the United States, and Sam Raybum, Speaker of 
the House of Representatives, as follows: 

I ask the Congress as a matter of the utmost 
urgency to act, before it commences its Easter re- 
cess, to extend for a period of sixty days emer- 
gency powers which otherwise will terminate 
when the treaty of peace with Japan becomes 
effective. 

On February 19, acting on the recommendation 
of the Secretai-y of Defense, the Attorney Gen- 
eral, the Chairman of the National Security Re- 
sources Board and the Director of the Bureau of 
the Budget, I transmitted to the Congress a pro- 
posed Emergency Powers Continuation Act ^ and 
recommended favorable action thei'eon. 

This measure would continue specific enumer- 
ated powers until six months after the termination 
of the national emergency proclaimed by the 
President on December 16, 1950, or until earlier 
dates fixed by concurrent resolution of the Con- 
gress or by the President. 

Thei'e was a single, simple reason for this 
measure, namely, the impending termination of 
the state of war with Japan through the coming 
into force of the Treaty of Peace with Japan. 
As I explained in my message, the still-existing 
state of war with Japan — which is the last existing 
state of war between this country and others — 
provides the legal foundation for many important 
statutory powers which this Government is now 
exercising in carrying out the national defense 
program. I pointed out that unless the Congress 
acts to continue these powers they will end when 
the state of war with Japan ends (or, in some 
cases, within a fixed time thereafter), with very 
serious consequences for the national security. 

The Congress has been considering my request, 
but has not yet passed the required legislation. In 
the meantime, the Senate has given its advice and 
consent to the ratification of the Japanese Peace 
Treaty, and the required number of other coun- 
tries have ratified the Treaty so that it is antici- 

' H. Doc. 386. 



pated that it can be brought into effect as soon as 

the ratification by the United States is deposited. 

There are important reasons why the Japanese 
Peace Treaty must be put into force very promptly. 
Failure to do so will be a reflection on responsible 
government in the United States, which will be 
very damaging and impossible to explain to the 
rest of the world. However, in the absence of ac- 
tion by the Congress the coming into force of the 
Treaty would result in the termination of certain 
emergency powers which are now being exercised 
and which are very important. 

I therefore urge the Congress to act immediately 
to provide at least a temporary extension of the 
emergency powers in order to prevent a lapse 
when the Japanese Peace Treaty is put into effect. 

I would like to set forth some of the compelling 
reasons why bringing the Japanese Peace Treaty 
into force cannot be delayed. 

Advance planning has been going on many 
months for the necessary steps involved in turn- 
ing authority back to the Japanese Government 
when the Treaty comes into force. This planning 
has been done not only by the Department of State, 
the Department of Defense, the Supreme Com- 
mander for the Allied Powers, and the Govern- 
ment of Japan, but also on the part of other 
powers concerned. These plans have been made 
on the basis that the present Treaty will come into 
force by the first half of April. Any significant 
delay beyond that time would seriously interfere 
with Japan's orderly transition from the status of 
an occupied country to that of a free and inde- 
pendent country. Furthermore, because of the 
complexity of the plans and the number of gov- 
ernments involved, the date finally established for 
bringing the Treaty into force must be announced 
ten days in advance. This is why action by the 
Congress before Easter is imperative. 

The United States cannot be put in the position 
of delaying the bringing into force of the Treaty. 
The Treaty was signed in the United States — at 
San Francisco — on September 8, 1951. Long be- 
fore that the United States had urged that peace 
be re-established with Japan as promptly as possi- 
ble, and the United States took the lead in nego- 
tiating the Treaty. Because of the special position 



April 21, 1952 



641 



of the United States as the principal occupying 
power in Japan, the Treaty provides that, regard- 
less of other ratifications, it shall not come into 
force without the deposit of the ratification of the 
United States. This deposit has not been made. 
If now the United States were to delay the Treaty's 
coming into force, for avoidable reasons of a do- 
mestic nature, when other countries are ready to 
act, no credit would be brought either to this coun- 
try or to our democratic processes. We would be 
widely misunderstood even among our friends, 
and we would open the way for hostile propa- 
ganda by those in Japan who would turn their 
backs on the democratic way of life. 

It is likewise of the utmost importance to the 
security of the country to continue in effect with- 
out any lapse the emergency powers dealt with in 
the proposed measure I have recommended. 
Among these are the authorizations under which 
the Government is now operating the railroads to 
insure the movement of troops and war materials; 
is controlling the entry into and the departure 
from the United States of aliens and citizens 
whose movements would be dangerous to the 
national security; is continuing the commissions 
of a large number of reserve officers on active duty 
in our armed forces the loss of whom would 
create a serious problem; and is making full use 
of trained aviation officers who would be lost by 
the reinstatement of peacetime limitations. Fur- 
thermore, there are a number of provisions which 
furnish protection and benefits to civilians en- 
gaged in defense activities, to members of the 
armed forces, to veterans, and to the members of 
their families. 

As is apparent, these powers are such that even 
a brief lapse would have the most serious conse- 
quences. 

Consequently, the problem which confronts us 
can be solved only by very prompt Congressional 
action; and I earnestly ask that such action be 
taken. 

Very sincerely yours, 

Harry S. Truman 

Editor's Note: On April 9 Congress passed a bill on 
extension of presidential war powers. However, in the 
final version of the bill, as amended by the Senate and 
concurred in by the House, the extension date of some 60 
war powers was finally established as June 1, in spite of 
President Truman's request for a 60-day extension. 



Coordination Procedures Under 
The Mutual Security Act 

Executive Order 1033S ' 

By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 507 
of tile Mutual Security Act of 1951, 65 Stat. 373 (Public 
Law 165, 82nd Congress, approved October 10, 1951 ) , and 
as President of the United States and Commander In 



" 17 Fed. Reg. 3009. 
642 



Chief of the armed forces of the United States, it is 
ordered as follows : 

Section 1. Functions of the Chief of the United States 
Diplomatic Mission, (a) The Chief of tlie United States 
Diplomatic Mission in each country, as the representative 
of the President and acting on his behalf, shall coordinate 
the activities of the United States representatives (in- 
cluding the chiefs of economic missions, military assist- 
ance advisory groups, and other representatives of agen- 
cies of the United States Government) in such country 
engaged in carrying out programs under the Mutual Se- 
curity Act of 1951 (hereinafter referred to as tlie Act), 
and he shall assume responsibility for assuring the unified 
development and execution of the said programs in such 
country. More particularly, the functions of each Chief 
of United States Diplomatic Mission shall include, with 
respect to the programs and country concerned : 

( 1 ) Exercising general direction and leadership of the 
entire effort. 

(2) Assuring that recommendations and prospective 
plans and actions of the United States representatives are 
effectively coordinated and are consistent with and in 
furtherance of the established policy of the United States. 

(3) As.suring that the interpretation and application 
of instructions received by the United States representa- 
tives from higher authority are in accord with the estab- 
lished policy of the United States. 

(4) Guiding the United States representatives in work- 
ing out measures to prevent duplication in their efforts 
and to promote the most effective and efficient use of all 
United States ofiicers and employees having mutual secu- 
rity responsibilities. 

(5) Keeping the United States representatives fully 
Informed as to current and prospective United States 
policies. 

(6) Prescribing procedures governing the coordination 
of the activities of the United States representatives, and 
assuring that these representatives shall have access to 
all available information essential to the accomplishment 
of their prescribed duties. 

(7) Preparing and submitting such reports on the 
operation and status of the programs under the Act as 
may be directed by the Director for Mutual Security. 

(b) Each Chief of United States Diplomatic Mission 
shall perform his functions under this order in accord- 
ance with instructions from higher authority and subject 
to established policies and programs of the United States. 

(c) No Chief of United States Diplomatic Mission shall 
delegate any function conferred upon him by the provi- 
sions of this order which directly involves the exercise 
of direction, coordination, or authority. 

Sec. 2. Referral of unresolved matters. The Chief of 
the United States Diplomatic Mission in each country 
shall initiate steps to reconcile any divergent views arising 
in the country concerned with resjject to programs under 
the Act. If agreement cannot he reached the Chief of 
the United States Diplomatic Mission shall recommend a 
course of action, and such course of action shall be fol- 
lowed unless a United States representative requests that 
the issue be referred to higher authority for decision. If 
such a request is made, the parties concerned shall 
promptly refer the issue to higher authority for resolution 
prior to taliing action at the country level. The Director 
for Mutual Security shall assure expeditious decisions on 
matters so submitted. 

Sec. 3. Effect of order on United States representatives. 
(a) All United States representatives in each country 
shall be subject to the responsibilities imposed upon the 
Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission in such 
country by section 507 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 
and by this order. 

(b) Subject to compliance with the provisions of this 
order and with the prescribed procedures of their re- 
spective agencies, all United States representatives af- 
fected by this order (1) shall have direct communication 
with their respective agencies and with such other parties 
and in such manner as may be authorized by their respec- 

Department of State Bulletin 



live agencies, (2) shall keep the respective Chiefs of 
United States Diplomatic Missions and each other fully 
and currently informed on all matters, includinf; prospec 
tive plans, recommendations, and actions, relating to pro 
( grams under the Act, and (3) shall furnisli to the 
respective Chiefs of United States Diplomatic Missionsi 
uiJiin their request, documents and information concern- 
ing' the said programs. 

Sec. 4. Further coordination procedures. The Direc- 
tor for Mutual Security shall be responsible for assuring 
the carrying out of the provisions of this order. He is 
authorized to prescribe, after consultation with the in- 
terested Government agencies, any additional procedures 
he may tind necessary to carry out the provisions of 
this order. 

Sec. 0. Prior orders, (a) To the extent that provisions 
of any prior order are inconsistent with the provisions of 
this order, the latter shall control, and any such prior 
provisions are amended accordingly. All orders, regu- 
lations, rulings, certificates, directives, and other actions 
relating to any function affected by this order shall re- 
main in effect except as they are inconsistent herewith 
or are hereafter amended or revoked under proper 
authority. 

(b) Nothing in this order shall affect Executive Orders 
Nos. 10062, 10063, and 10144 of June 6, 1949, June 13, 1949, 
and July 21, 1950, respectively. 

(c) Executive Orders Nos. 9857, 9862, 9864, 9914, 9944, 
9960, 10208, and 10259 of May 22, 1947, May 31, 1947, 
May 31, 1947, December 26, 1947, April 9, 1948, May 19, 
1948, January 25, 1951, and June 27, 1951, respectively, 
are hereby revoked. 

Hakby S. Tkuman 

The White House, 
April 4, 1952 



THE FOREIGN SERVICE 



New Ambassador to U.S.S.R. 
Takes Oath of Office 

Statement hy Ambassador George F. Kennan 
[Released to the press April 2] 

Tliere is very little that I can say at this time. 
As you know, the President has appointed me 
Ambassador to the Soviet Union. I am down 
here in Washington to take the oath of office and 
get ready for my new job. I am going to start for 
Moscow in tlie latter part of this month. 

My job in Moscow, as I see it, will be to imple- 
ment the policies of the U.S. Government within 
the area of responsibility given to me. The Em- 
bassy at Moscow is only one small part of the ma- 
chinery for the implementation of our foreim 
policy and its effectiveness is always going to de- 
pend on the extent to which the Ambassador there 
bears this in mind and contrives to function as a 
member of a team. The opportunities for service 
must be determined, as in the case of any other 
diplomatic mission, largely by circumstances, and 
I cannot foresee them at this time. I will be 
happy if the work at Moscow gives me a chance to 



make a contribution to the reduction of existing 
tensions and the improvement of the international 
atmosphere. Those are objectives which seem to 
me urgently desirable and 1 see no reason why they 
should not be within the realm of possibility, if the 
desire is reciprocated. 



Samuel Reber, Jr., Named U.S. Assistant 
High Commissioner for Germany 

[Released to the press April 8] 

U.S. High Commissioner John J. McCloy announced on 
April 8 the appointment of Samuel Reber as U.S. Assist- 
ant High Commissioner, a post he will fill in addition to 
duties as Director of the Office of Political Affairs. At 
the same time Mr. McCloy announced that Chauncey G. 
Parker, Assistant High Commissioner, will return to 
the United States this week. MaJ. Gea. George P. Hays, 
Deputy High Commissioner, who was recently appointed 
Commanding General of U.S. Forces in Austria, expects 
to leave Germany next week for his new post in Salzburg. 

After General Hays' departure and during the absence 
of Mr. McCloy, Mr. Reber will be the ranking Hicoo 
official. The High Commissioner is planning to fly to 
Washington next week to attend the annual hearings 
before congressional committees. Mr. Parker, who will 
assist him at the hearings, will then reassume his posi- 
tion with the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development from which he has been on loan to Hicoo 
since late 1950. 

The appointment of Mr. Reber, Mr. McCloy pointed out, 
is in line with organizational changes being made through- 
out HicoG in anticipation of the conclusion of contractual 
agreements with Germany and the change-over to Embassy 
status. Mr. Reber, a career diplomat, has been Direc- 
tor of the Office of Political Affairs since June 1950 and 
one of Mr. McCloy's principal advisers. 



Cliecit List of Department of State 


Press Releases: Apr. 5-11, 1952 


Releases 


may be obtained from the Office of the 


Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department 


of State, Washington 25, D. C. Items marked (*) 


are not prin 


ted in the Bulletin ; items marked (f) 


will appear 


in a future issue. 


No. 


Date 


Subject 


235 


3/26 


S. Africa educational exchange 


244 


3/31 


Military assistance to Uruguay 


248 


4/1 


Fisher : Foreign policy 


249 


4/1 


Kennan : Oath of office 


258 


4/4 


Patterson : Progress toward security 


259 


4/4 


Murphy : Belgium's contribution 


*262 


4/7 


Queen Juliana : Program of visit 


t263 


4/7 


Iran : Student assistance 


*264 


4/8 


U. S. representatives to Nac. 


265 


4/8 


Draper : Permanent Nac representative 


266 


4/8 


Reber : New post in Germany 


267 


4/9 


Chile : Military assistance 


268 


4/9 


Cannes film festival 


269 


4/9 


Hydrographic conference 


270 


4/9 


Seventh session of Itu 


271 


4/9 


El Salvador: Point B^our agreement 


272 


4/9 


Acheson : Point Four Program 


273 


4/11 


Venezuela : Trade negotiations 


274 


4/11 


Narcotic drugs commission 


275 


4/11 


Inter-Am. travel congress 



April 27, 1952 



643 



AprU;21, 1952 



Ind 



ex 



Vol. XXVI, No. 669 



Africa 

Underdeveloped areas, problems In, address 
(Sayre) .■■,■' 

XreilON OF SOUTH AFRICA: Educational ex- 
change agreement wltti 630 

American Principles 

Good Faith vs. Empty Promises In the War of 
Ideas (Fisher) V „ • • • 

Point Four— A Revolution Against Hunger, 
Disease and Human Misery (Truman, 
Acheson) ^ ;„" • \ ' cio 

U.S.-Netherlands relations reviewed (Truman) . 613 

American Republics 

CHILE: Military-assistance agreement signed 

with u.s /;,••■ 

COLOMBIA: Export-Import Bank extends power 

credit • ,Vv,' 

EL SALVADOR: Point Four agreement with, 

signed •■•••■ R07 

Inter-American Travel Congress ..... bil 
URUGUAY: Conversations on military-assist- 
ance agreement 630 

VENEZUELA: Negotiations for supplementary 

trade agreement with "31 

Asia 

KOREA: Communiques to Security Council . . 637 
Underdeveloped areas, problems In, address 

(Sayre) °23 

Communism 

Good Faith vs. Empty Promises In the War of 

Ideas (Fisher) 618 

Congress 

Legislation listed 612 

Presidential request for extension of emergency 

powers 641 

Europe 

Belgium's and Switzerland's progress toward se- 

cvirity (Murphy, Patterson) 616 

GERMANY; Reber appointed assistant high 

commissioner 643 

NETHERLANDS: Relations with U.S. reviewed 

(Truman) 613 

SHAPE: Elsenhower, release from assignment as 
Supreme Commander, requested, corres- 
pondence (Ely, Lovett) 614 

Finance 

Export-Import Bank extends power credit to 

Colombia 631 

Foreign Service 

Kennan takes oath of office as ambassador to 

U.S.S.R 643 

Information and Educational Exchange Pro- 
gram 

Educational exchange agreement with South 

Africa 630 

International Meetings 

Cannes Film Festival to be held 636 

Commission on Narcotic Drugs, 7th session . . 637 

Fourth Inter-American Travel Congress . . . 637 
General Assembly, report on 6th session 

(Taylor) 632 

Hydrographlc Conference, Sixth International . 636 

ITU, 7th session of Administrative Council . . 636 

Mutual Aid and Defense 

Conversations on military-assistance agreement 

with Uruguay 630 



Mutual Security 

Belgium's and Switzerland's progress toward se- 
curity (Murphy. Patterson) 616 

Mutual Security Act: Coordination procedures. 

Executive Order 10338, text 642 

North Atlantic Council 

Draper to be permanent U.S. representative . . 615 

Presidential Documents 

Emergency powers requested, letter to Barkley 

and Rayburn 641 

Executive Order 10338, coordination procedures, 

text 642 

Publications 

Recent releases 622 

Refugees and Displaced Persons 

Committee for Movement of Migrants from Eu- 
rope, report of 2d session (Warren) . . . 638 

Technical Cooperation and Development 

POINT FOUR: 

A Revolution Against Hunger, Disease, and 

Human Misery (Truman, Acheson) . . . 607 
Agreement with El Salvador, signed .... 631 

Telecommunications 

Administrative Council (ITU), 7th session, U.S. 

delegation to 636 

Treaty Information 

CHILE: Military-assistance agreement signed . 630 
EL SALVADOR: Point Four agreement signed . 631 
SOUTH AFRICA: Educational exchange agree- 
ment signed 630 

URUGUAY: Military-assistance agreement, con- 
versations 630 

VENEZUELA: Supplementary trade agreement 

negotiations 631 

United Nations 

ECOSOC: Commission on Narcotic Drugs, U.S. 

representative (Anslinger) 637 

GENERAL ASSEMBLY: report on sixth session 

(Taylor) 632 

IRO: Committee for Movement of Migrants from 

Europe, report of 2d session (Warren) . . 638 

SECURITY COUNCIL: Communiques regarding 

Korea 637 

TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL: Problems in under- 
developed areas, address (Sayre) .... 623 

U.N. bibliography: selected documents . . . 640 

Name Index 

Acheson, Secretary Dean 607 

Anslinger, Harry J 636 

Daniels, Paul C 637 

de Wolfe. Francis Colt 637 

Draper, William H., Jr 615 

Eisenhower, Gen. Dwight D 614 

Fisher, Adrian S 618 

Heaton, Earl 636 

Kennan, George P 643 

Merchant, Livingston T 615 

Lindstrom. Chester A 636 

Lovett, Robert A 614 

Mayer, Gerald M 636 

McCloy, John J 643 

Merchant, Livingston T 615 

Murphy, Robert D 616 

Patterson, Richard C 616 

Reber. Samuel, Jr 643 

Rubottom, Roy R., Jr 631 

Sayre, Francis B 623 

Taylor, Paul B 632 

Truman, President Harry S 607, 613, 641 

Warren, George L 638 



V. S. COVERKHENT PRIHTINO OFFICE, I9fz 



^T"b^^, ' ^^0 



^Ae/ ^e^a^i^teTii^ xw t/taie^ 




PROGRESS TOWARD INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND 

UNITY • Address by Secretary Acheson 647 

OUR FAR EASTERN POLICY • by Assistant Secretary 

Allison 652 

THE TUNISIAN QUESTION IN THE SECURITY 

COUNCIL • Statements by Secretary Acheson and 
Ambassador Gross 678 

MUTUAL SECURITY REQUIRES MUTUAL UNDER- 
STANDING • by Wilson Compton 668 

SIXTH REGULAR SESSION OF THE GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY SUMMARY ACTION: Part II • by 
Paul B. Taylor 673 



For index see back cover 



Vol. XXVI, No. 670 
April 28, 1952 



^eNT oj^ 




■»TEa o* 



U. S. SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMEffFS 



MAY 14 1952 




•».T„ 0« 



^. a^^^y... bulletin 



Vol. XXVI, No. 670 • Publication 4576 
April 28, 1952 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Qovernment Printing Office 

Washington 25, D.O. 

Peick: 

52 issues, domestic $7.60, foreign $10.25 

Single copy, 20 cents 

The printing of this publication has 
been approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget (January 22, 1952). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and Items contained herein may 
be reprinted. Citation of the Department 
or State Bulletin as the source will be 
appreciated. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication compiled and 
edited in the Division of Publications, 
Office of Public Affairs, provides the 
public and interested agencies of 
the Government with information on 
developments in the field of foreign 
relations and on the work of the De- 
partment of State and the Foreign 
Service. The BULLETIN includes 
selected press releases on foreign pol- 
icy issued by the W^hite House and 
the Department, and statements and 
addresses made by the President and 
by the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the func- 
tions of the Department. Informa- 
tion is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to 
which the United States is or may- 
become a party and treaties of gen- 
eral international interest. 

Publications of the Department, as 
well as legislative material in the field 
of international relations, are listed 
currently. 



Progress Toward International Peace and Unity 



Address hy Secretary Acheson ^ 



Among the opportunities which this occasion 
offers me, none is more pleasant than to be able to 
express to Senator Wiley my gratitude for the 
kindness and help which I have received from 
him over many years. 

When the Senator came on the Foreign Rela- 
tions Committee in Januai-y 1945, 1 had just taken 
over the duties of Assistant Secretary for Con- 
gressional Relations. From then to the present 
time in varying capacities I have worked closely 
with the Committee and its members. Senator 
Wiley has moved from the junior member of the 
Committee to its ranking Republican member. He 
has carried with him always a nature in which 
kindness and helpfulness to others is fundamental 
and a code of values which has put the interests 
of his country before any partisan or personal 
advantage. 

Such a man is, of course, a firm believer in a 
bipartisan — or, as Senator Vandenberg used to in- 
sist, nonpartisan — approach to foreign policy. He 
has been energetic in Washington and in extensive 
travels abroad to keep abreast of fast changing 
events. He constantly makes suggestions, exam- 
ines closely the suggestions of others, and liolds 
firmly to what he believes, after consideriiig the 
case, to be the best and soundest course. 

He knows also that things cannot always go ac- 
cording to our hopes. And so to him, as one of 
our novelists has said, "A trouble is a trouble and 
to be taken as such; he feels no obligation to 
snatch the knotted cord from the hand of God and 
deal out murderous blows." I salute him with 
affectionate esteem. 

This occasion also affords me another valued op- 
portunity to meet with you, as I have had the priv- 
ilege of doing on a number of occasions over the 
past half a dozen years. 

The other daj', I looked back over some of the 



subjects we have covered in these meetings, and 
it made an interesting short history of the broad- 
ening concerns and the developing programs of 
these postwar years. 

Previous Meetings in Retrospect 

In 1946 we talked about the control of atomic 
energy. 

In 1947 — a year in which we had the Truman 
Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and two fatefully 
unproductive meetings of the Council of Foreign 
Ministers in Moscow and in London — in that year, 
we discussed the implications of the expansionist 
and aggressive policies of the international Com- 
miuiist movement. We recognized that this was 
the fundamental problem we were up against and 
that it could not be talked out of existence. We rec- 
ognized that what we faced was a long and hard 
task of building up strength among the free na- 
tions in place of the weakness that then existed. 
And when we talked about strength we had in 
mind not only a shield of military strength but 
people who had enough to eat and governments 
that had vitality and stability. The next year, as 
I recall, you had a holiday from these homilies. 

In 1949 - we discussed the problems presented 
by the Communist advance in China and the pro- 
grams that were being developed that year for 
military aid to free nations. 

And in 1950,^ on the occasion of my last appear- 
ance before you, we reviewed the principal lines 
of action which had by then been developed to 
safeguard our national security and well-being. 
The unfolding of this design had led to the Eca, 
the Point Four Program, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, the various military-aid pro- 
grams, and the Campaign of Truth, which is a 
necessary part of all we are doing to build a peace- 
ful world. 



' Made before the American Society of Newspajjer Edi- 
tors at Washinston on Apr. 19 and released to the press 
on the same date. 

AprW 28, 7952 



■ Btjixetin of May 8, 1949. p. 585. 
' lUd., May 1, 1950, p. 673. 



647 



Pattern of Events to Date 

Wliat I would like to do this afternoon is to 
bring this story up to date. I think it might be 
useful to look at some of the current developments 
in this continuing story — some of the items you 
are carrying on your front pages these days — to 
examine them, not as isolated phenomena, but as 
part of the whole pattern of events. 

There is a temptation to look at the day-to-day 
events as a kind of verbal badminton game, in 
which some sort of poppycock goes back and forth 
across a net until someone scores a point. But 
the recent events I want to talk about are much 
more meaningful than moves in a propaganda 
game. They grow out of large policies and large 
purposes, both on our side and on the Communist 
side. And the stakes are still high: Whether 
there will be peace or war; whether our cherished 
values will survive. 

Among other things, this spring has brought a 
whole series of Soviet moves which some people — 
mistakenly, I think — have grouped together and 
called a Soviet "peace offensive." 

I think a better name for these procedures might 
be the "golden apple" tactic. You may remember 
a story in Greek mythology, in which all the gods 
were invited to a wedding except one, and that was 
the Goddess of Discord. She was upset about 
this, and she threw a golden apple over the fence, 
hoping to cause a ruckus among the guests and 
break up the party. 

Several apples have been tossed over the Iron 
Curtain this spring. Happily, they have not pro- 
duced discord. The reason why this is so must 
be sought against the background of the great con- 
structive purposes we and our allies have been 
carrying forward and the persistently destructive 
actions of the Communist movement. 

We have arrived at a climactic moment in the 
development of the community of free nations. 
From the end of the war, we have been part of a 
vast constructive effort to create an organization 
of society in the world which would be stable, en- 
during, and strong. 

In jDlace of the shattered and fragmented world 
left in the wake of the Second World War, we and 
others who share the same aspirations have been 
trying to create conditions in the world in which 
our principles of the worth of the individual and 
the unity of society could survive and could flour- 
ish. These are not merely pleasant evangelistic 
ideas which we think it would be nice to 
propagate. 

These efforts grow out of the urgent necessities 
we face in the world and out of the basic fiber of 
American life. 

No free society can exist — neither our own, nor 
any other — if there are large areas of instability 
and weakness in the world. And so we have 
sought to help create a fabric of international so- 
ciety which would be made up of nations who may 



represent great diversity in their traditions but 
who have in common a dedication to freedom, who 
are healthy both economically and politically and 
wliose common strength is such that they need not 
live in fear. 



Soviet Blocking of Constructive Efforts 

Wliat has been the role of the Soviet Union in 
this period ? You who have reported the succes- 
sive events of this story know only too well the 
long string of broken promises, the consistent 
blocking of our attempts to settle problems, the 
long record of noncooperation and hostility. The 
Soviet rulers have demonstrated that they seek to 
perpetuate chaos. Their fundamental aim has 
been to block the constructive efforts of the non- 
Communist states and to exploit weakness and 
discontent. 

I think perhaps the most revealing indication of 
this intention was the Soviet rejection of the invi- 
tation to participate in the European Recovery 
Program. 

Here, as late as 1947, was an offer by the United 
States to aid in the reconstruction, not only of 
Western Europe, but of all Europe. The Soviet 
refusal, and Soviet-compelled rejection by its 
Eastern European satellites, revealed more clearly 
than any other single gesture the direction of So- 
viet policy. 

The Soviet answer was not only a flat "no" but 
a countertactic : The establishment of the Comin- 
form for the express purposes of defeating the 
Marshall Plan ; and the Molotov Plan, designed to 
bring the economies of Eastern Europe more 
firmly under Soviet control. Wlien we sought to 
pull down barriers to trade and mutual assistance 
among all European nations, the Soviet answer 
was to raise still higher the barriers along the 
Elbe and the Danube. 

But desj^ite these obstructions, and despite even 
the Communist use of force, we have been making 
progress. This progress has not been even in all 
parts of the world, because the needs and possi- 
bilities have varied greatly from one area to an- 
other. But, taken together, the results have been 
encouraging enough to demonstrate that we are on 
the right track and must persevere. 

In Europe, we have come to a very large and 
exciting conception, which is on the verge of be- 
ing realized. Tliis is unity in Western Europe 
within the framework of the Atlantic community. 

Sketch of World Setting 

I would like to talk about this at greater length 
in a moment. First, I would like to stretch the 
world setting in which this movement has been 
taking place. 

In other parts of the world, our efforts have 
taken an almost infinite variety of forms but have 
been directed to the same purpose — to create a f ab- 



648 



Department of Stale Bulletin 



ric of international life in which there can be free- 
dom from domination and opportunity to achieve 
individual and national fulfillment. 

In some areas, this has meant primarily efforts 
to develop the underlying conditions of the life of 
the people, so that there could be an orderly de- 
velopment toward freedom and progress. In 
other areas, this has meant dealing with outright 
aggression by force of arms. 

And over all this, there has been the creation 
and development of the United Nations, in which 
we have taken a leading part. We believed, and 
still believe, that a system founded on harmony 
of the great powers and the rule of law offers the 
best framework within which this diverse develop- 
ment could go forward. 

Despite the fact that, at every step of the way, 
we have met nothing but obstructionism and hos- 
tility from the Soviet Union, we have been moving 
steadily, doggedly, and with a good measure of 
success, toward the fulfillment of our purposes. 

The United Nations' success in halting and 
throwing back the aggression in Korea is a tre- 
mendous advance for collective security, which 
should not be obscured by the long and difficult 
negotiations to bring the fighting to an end. 

Soviet obstruction has blocked great-power 
harmony but has not been able to stop the power- 
ful advance of a collective-security system based 
upon the growing strength and unity of nations 
who believe in the Charter of the United Nations. 

Despite Soviet efforts to obstruct, Japan is being 
restored to the community of nations. Without 
benefit of any assistance from the Soviet Union, 
many states have achieved their independence in- 
cluding Indonesia, the Philippines, Ceylon, 
Burma, Pakistan, and India. We and the nations 
associated in the Colombo Plan, again without 
benefit of any cooperation from the Soviet Union, 
are giving practical assistance to the peoples of 
South and Southeast Asia who are energetically 
striving to meet their own needs in their own way. 

And that, indeed, is the touchstone of all our 
technical-cooperation programs and our policies 
throughout the Middle East and in all of Asia and 
Africa — what we seek to do is to help the people of 
these areas to fulfill their aspirations for self-gov- 
ernment and individual freedom and material 
progress in a responsible way, in a peaceful and 
orderly way. 

I think there is a growing understanding among 
the leaders of the peo]Dle in these areas, despite 
the agonizing conflicts that arise as an inevitable 
part of this process of growth and development, 
that our purpose and our record is one of genuine 
help toward responsible and peaceful solutions. 
They have learned to be suspicious of the Com- 
munist Pied Piper who strides through this 
troubled area with a bag of tricky slogans and a 
pretty propaganda tune which leads only to the 
drowning of their hopes in a new imperialism. 



Progress Toward World Unity 

With this setting in mind, I come back to what 
has been happening in Europe. Here all that has 
been going on since 1945 — the programs of relief, 
of economic recovei^y, of bold and courageous ac- 
tion to build stable governments free from foreign 
domination, and the growth toward vigorous mili- 
tary establishments capable of deterring attack — 
all these things have brought our iriends in 
Europe to the threshold of the larger conception 
of the unity of all Western Europe. 

European unity has been a goal for which men 
have striven for centuries, by diplomacy and by 
force. What is important about this effort we 
see before us now is that it will bring together, 
in free and voluntary association, in practical 
institutions growing out of the urgent necessities 
of the times, much of Western Europe. 

There is a kind of unity, perhaps, east of the 
Iron Curtain — but it is the unity of the cemetery. 
This is an abomination against man's nature ; it is 
contrary to histoi"y and it cannot endure. 

What has been going on in Western Europe is 
a totally different thing. It will have strength 
because it meets human needs and desires. It has 
been a process of practical gi-owth, moving halt- 
ingly at times, because it has sought to accommo- 
date real conflicts by negotiation and peaceful 
persuasion. 

The margin between success and failure in this 
operation has sometimes been a narrow one. The 
difficulties are deep and real. Our allies have 
been grappling with critical economic problems. 
They have wrestled with ancient rivalries and 
painful memories of recent conflicts. 

Despite all this, they have come now within 
sight of the goal, and the thing that is at stake 
at this moment is whether they and we will be 
able to go forward to the realization of this con- 
ception. That is the issue. 



Antagonistic Soviet Campaign 

Soft music has been coming out of Moscow, 
about peaceful coexistence, about peaceful trade 
and German unity. This line to Western news- 
men and others would be more persuasive if the 
Soviet propagandists were not at the same time, 
out of the other side of their mouths, engaged in 
one of the most vicious and savage episodes in 
their hate campaign against the West. 

The Communists have trumped up a monstrous 
charge that the U.N. Command has used germ 
warfare in Korea. This charge has been denied 
categorically and repeatedly by the U.N. Com- 
mand in the field and by the Government of the 
United States in Washington. I deny it again 
here. 

Not only this ; but General Ridgway has offered 
to the International Eed Cross every facility to 
investigate this charge behind our own lines. 
Although the Red Cross asked for similar facili- 



April 28, 1952 



649 



ties from the Communists, they received instead 
only defamation and abuse. Again, when the 
World Health Organization offered to help com- 
bat any epidemics which might exist, they were 
ignored. 

American newspaper enterprise has exposed the 
falsity of the alleged "proofs" of these charges 
advanced by the Communists, and the Voice of 
America and our other information media have 
been combating this hate campaign energetically 
with the facts of the situation. 

The Soviet so-called "peace campaign" might 
be more persuasive, too, if our memories were so 
short that we forgot the Stockholm "peace appeal" 
of 1950 — a peace appeal which was immediately 
followed by the Communist attack on Korea. 

Peaceful trade has been another subject of the 
current campaign. Ostensibly called to examine 
world trade policies, a recent Moscow economic 
conference was used to unfold gi"andiose proposals 
for expanded trade. 

The offers made by the President of the Soviet 
Chamber of Commerce linked machinery and her- 
ring, ships and lemons, ball bearings and tex- 
tiles — a cunning mixture of consumer goods with 
items of strategic importance. By appearing to 
offer new markets, the Soviets seek to sow dissen- 
sion and to secure strategic materials to build 
their war-making potential. The facts are, of 
course, that the consumer goods are available to 
them at any time they choose to purchase them and 
through normal channels. 

Other pertinent facts, not advertised in Moscow, 
reveal current Soviet steps to halt trade between 
East Germany and Greece and the well-known, 
long-standing Soviet effort to starve Yugoslavia 
into submission by halting trade between that 
country and its neighbors. 

The security controls, which we and other free 
governments have imposed over trade with the 
Soviet bloc, will continue to be necessary as long 
as the broad course of Soviet policy is directed 
toward the maintenance of a huge luilitary 
machine. 

In this connection, it is pertinent for us to note 
that the United States will increase immeasurably 
the attractiveness of this type of Soviet propa- 
ganda if we permit restrictionism here to shut out 
foreign goods. These restrictive practices will, of 
course, increase rather than lighten the burden on 
the American taxpayer. 

Discussions on Germany Delay Action 

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union has sent two notes 
to the British, the French, and ourselves concern- 
ing Gei'many. 

In its first note, on March 10,* the Soviet Gov- 
ernment urged that the four occupying powers 
should discuss the German peace treaty. The 

' Ibid., Apr. 7, 1952, p. 531. 



treaty they had in mind would permit the crea- 
tion of a German national army and prohibit Ger- 
many fi'om associating in western European de- 
fense. The treaty they propose would also freeze 
the frontiers along the provisional lines discussed 
at Potsdam. 

The three Governments replied to this note on 
March 25,^ after consultation with the Govern- 
ment of the Federal Republic of Germany. This 
reply pointed out that a peace treaty could only be 
discussed with an all-German Government and 
that the existence of an all-German Government 
depended on the holding of free elections in the 
whole of Germany. They called attention to the 
fact that at Potsdam it was decided that frontiers 
should be fixed in the peace treaty. 

The three Governments, again on the basis of 
consultation with the Federal Republic, also made 
it clear that they were engaged in a great forward 
step toward building up the unity of Western 
Europe through a common defense policy and that 
they intended to continue to follow that policy. 

In its second note, the Soviet Union repeated the 
negative positions it had previously taken and 
made no affirmative proposals regarding German 
unity or free elections. Instead, it continued to 
emphasize proposals of what ought to go into a 
German peace treaty, disregarding the necessity 
of having an all-German Government in order to 
have a peace treaty. 

Wlien it came to the question of free elections, 
the only proposal from the Soviet Union was that 
there be more discussion. 

We and our allies have had considerable experi- 
ence with the Soviet Union in discussing things, 
when there is no agreement on principles. We 
have found that discussion, under these circum- 
stances, is a delaying action and a frustrating 
experience. 

We cannot forget that these matters have been 
discussed repeatedly at great length with the 
Soviet Union. This was done in 1947 at the Coun- 
cil of Foreign Ministers meeting in Moscow and 
again in London ; in 1949, for weeks at the Coun- 
cil of Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris; and 
again for months at the Palais Rose in 1951. 

The main things that emerged from the Soviet 
discussion of elections and the creation of a gov- 
ernment which would have jurisdiction over the 
whole of Germany are these : 

First, the Soviet Union never has been willing 
to relax in any i-espect whatever its control over 
Eastern Germany. The Soviet Union would never 
even discuss Soviet ownership over a vast amount 
of East German industry. 

Second, the Soviet Government was bending 
every effort to infilti'ate into Western Germany. 

And third, they insisted that every major ex- 
ercise of power by an all-German Government 
should be subject to a Soviet veto. 

' Ibid., p. 530. 



650 



Department of State Bulletin 



These attitudes have never changed. 

An analysis of the first Soviet communication 
shows phiinly that the Soviet Government is mak- 
ing no commitment of any sort as to what kind 
of elections they are prepared to permit. There 
is no reason to believe that they wish to have a 
Germany any less under their control, and they 
do not make their position on this point any 
clearer. 

Also, the Soviet Government continues to insist 
that a German Government shall be precluded at 
all times from associating itself with the great 
project of the unification of Western Europe. 

The Soviet Union would like the Germans to 
think that there is a contradiction between unifi- 
cation of Western Europe and unification of Ger- 
many. There is not. Germany can be united and 
free as a full member of the free community of 
Europe. But a united Germany cut off from 
defense with and by the West could not be a free 
Germany. The German people have only to look 
across the curtain at their brothers in East Ger- 
many to see what the Soviet Union means by 
freedom. 

We and our allies and the German people can- 
not forget the 7 years of fruitless negotiations 
with the Soviet Union to try to reach agreement 
on an honest basis for German Union. We cannot 
forget the Soviet walk-out from the Allied Con- 
trol Council in Berlin, or the ruthless Soviet at- 
tempt to starve out the two million people of 
Berlin, or the Soviet termination of the quadri- 
partite administration of the city of Berlin. 

Across the border from Germany are the 
Austrians who were promised their independence 
in 1943. After 258 meetings between our deputies 
and the Soviet deputy, we and the Austrian peo- 
ple are still waiting for the Soviet Union to fulfill 
this promise. 

The Western Powers and the West Germans 
have made many proposals for free elections in 
Germany. The latest effort is being made through 
the United Nations, which set up a commission 
to investigate the possibilities of free elections 
throughout Germany. That commission was 
granted free access to all Western Germany, but 
it still waits in vain for i)ermission to enter East- 
ern Germany. 

In the light of all this we are entitled to ask for 
some tangible evidence that there has been a shift 
in the Soviet position. 

Our keen awareness of the past will not prevent 
us from giving serious attention to these or any 
other Soviet proposals. Together with the Brit- 
ish, the French, and the Germans, we are stud_y- 
ing the latest Soviet note. Of course, I cannot at- 
tempt here to forecast the course of these con- 
siderations. 

We are willing and eager to resolve any or all 
major frictions in the world by peaceful negoti- 
ation, when and if there appears to be any honest 
and reasonable basis for negotiations. We have 



given an earnest of this in our proposals for dis- 
armament. 

But we and our allies have made it clear that 
we cannot take a step backwards; we cannot jeop- 
ardize the emergence in Europe of the new era 
of cooperation whicli is replacing the rivalry and 
distrust of the past. And so we continue to give 
our full support to jilans designed to secure the 
participation of Germany in a purely defensive 
European Community. Foi' here is the true path 
of peace. 

Open Door Policy Toward Discussion 

If any believe that the Western attitudes lack in 
initiative and are purely responses to Soviet stim- 
ulus, they must find here the refutation. Here 
they must see proof that we have been moving in 
the right direction. Here they must see on the 
Soviet side responses to the initiatives of the free 
nations in building soundly and strongly. 

As we survey the world aiound us, we still must 
take cognizance of the basic facts in the present 
situation. We are still confronted with massive 
armed forces, backed by a huge military budget 
and powerful reserves. The military resources of 
the satellite nations are still being mobilized. The 
peoples of these countries are being kept in in- 
creasing isolation from the outside world and in 
calculated ignorance of the truth. The Com- 
munist international movement is still fostering 
insurrection and subversion wherever it can. And 
venomous hate continues to pour out of the vast 
Soviet propaganda machine. 

There is only one way to hasten the day when 
we may hope for peaceful actions, not words, from 
the Soviet rules — and that is to push resolutely 
forward on our present course. 

I repeat with undiminished belief what I said 
to you in 1947: This may be a long campaign. 
It will take nerve and steadfastness. We must be 
firm, and we must never close the door to agree- 
ment or discussion. 

Above all, we must hold fast to our faith in 
freedom which shall some day prevail in all the 
world. 



Correction 

In the Bulletin of March 31, 1952, page 508, 
Carroll Binder was incorrectly identified as the 
U.S. representative in the Subcommission on Free- 
dom of Information. Mr. Binder serves on the 
Subcommission as a private individual, not as a 
representative of this Government. The Subcom- 
mission is a body of experts appointed by the U.N. 
Economic and Social Council. 

In the same issue, page 515, second column, line 
19 should read, "On March 21 the representatives 
of Chile, the. . . ." 



April 28, J 952 



651 



Our Far Eastern Policy 



J)y John M. Allison 

Assistant Secretary for Far [Eastern Affairs ^ 



I have found in some 20 years of activity in the 
field of foreign affairs that many of us are apt 
to forget or not to realize the implications of the 
fact that foreign affairs are foreign affairs. As 
Harold Nicolson, brilliant British commentator 
on diplomacy and allied matters, has said, we must 
realize that foreign affairs concern "not our own 
national interests only, but also the interests of 
other countries." We cannot expect a foreign 
policy to be developed and to be put into action 
in the same manner as, for example, a national 
budget, an education bill, or a bill to build a levee 
along the Mississippi. These matters of domestic 
policy can be prepared by a responsible Cabinet 
memiaer or can originate directly in the Congress, 
can then be passed by the Congi-ess and carried 
out by whatever is the appropriate agency. How- 
ever, in dealing with foreign affairs we often ig- 
nore the fact that other countries with interests 
and prejudices as strong as our own must be con- 
sulted and brought into agreement if any policy is 
to be effective. 

This is particularly true in the Far East where 
we have had recent examples of the fact that a 
policy which has much to commend it from a do- 
mestic American point of view finds opposition in 
other countries when we attempt to implement it. 
The Congress, in providing legislation for the es- 
tablishment of a mutual-security program, very 
properly considered that U.S. funds should not be 
made available to countries which were not gen- 
erally in sympathy with the broad aims of the 
United States and the United Nations, and in the 
Mutual Security Act set forth certain conditions 
which had to be met by countries who wished to 
obtain military, economic, or technical assistance 
from the United States. Under the provisions of 



' Excerpts from an address made at the fourteenth 
annual Public Affairs Conference, Principia CoUe.se of 
Liberal Arts, Elsah, 111., on Apr. 17 and released to the 
press on the same date. 



this Act, it has been considered necessary to re- 
quest countries seeking aid to sign agreements in 
which they undertake to observe certain condi- 
tions set forth in the Mutual Security Act. In 
Asia we have found that particularly the younger 
nations, which have just recently achieved their 
independence, have been reluctant to sign such 
agreements as they interpreted any such action as 
indicating they were taking definite sides in the 
cold war, which at present seems to divide the 
world. These new countries, all of them non- 
Communist if not anti-Communist, had hoped to 
be able to follow a neutral course just as our own 
United States tried to do in the early years of its 
independence. It has been necessary for those of 
us who are interested in giving aid and assistance 
to these countries, when they desire it, for the pur- 
pose of achieving stability and security to persuade 
them that they are not violating their own best 
interests in agreeing to the conditions set down in 
the Mutual Security Act. In most cases this has 
been possible but in a few there is still hesitation. 
I believe that when these countries fully under- 
stand the motives behind the U.S. action they will 
agree that our course is proper, but, in the mean- 
time, we do encounter these difficulties. 



The Present Situation in the Far East 

Before we can usefully consider what our policy 
in any part of the world should be, we must spend 
time considering what the present situation is in 
the area with which we are dealing. What is the 
situation in the Far East today? Certainly the 
basic fact which we must always keep in mind is 
that today the nations of the Far East are united 
in at least one thing, if nothing else, and that is 
their desire for national freedom and independ- 
ence. We still hear criticism of Western imperial- 
ism and colonialism, and there are many who 
would have the United States take a strong stand 



652 



Department of Slate Bulletin 



against its European allies in order to remove 
such vestiges of colonialism as still remain. But 
before we agree wholeheartedly with this stand it 
may be helpful to think for a moment of what 
has happened in the Far East in the few years 
since tlie end of World War II. Seven nations 
with a population of over 600 million have at- 
tained independence. These nations were for- 
merly members of the colonial systems of Great 
Britain, France, the Netherlands, Japan, and the 
United States. This is by no means a negligible 
achievement. Much remains to be done but in our 
impatience let us not forget that much has already 
been done. 

It is important to realize that these new coun- 
tries often lack a sufficient number of trained lead- 
ers, that they have achieved independence at the 
end of a long and destructive war which has dis- 
rupted their economies and their social systems. 
It would be unrealistic to expect that in the short 
period of 7 years which has elapsed since the end 
of the war in the Pacific that there would arise 
strong and stable countries who could expect to 
carry on their activities in the same manner and 
with the same degree of success as the older coun- 
tries of the Western world with their long experi- 
ence of independent activity. We might perhaps 
look back at our own history and study the con- 
fusion which existed in the United States during 
the first 7 or 8 years after the conclusion of the 
war of independence and while we were still oper- 
ating under the Articles of Confederation. When 
we see the difficulties that we had in developing 
unity of action and a strong central government 
in a coimtry where a gi'eat majority of the people 
were from the same stock and with the same tra- 
ditions, we cannot be impatient with the efforts 
made by these new countries of Asia with their 
great varieties of races, cultures, and languages 
often under one national leadership. There are 
mutual suspicions among these new countries just 
as there were mutual suspicions and distrust 
among the 13 colonies which made up the new 
American Nation. We must also remember in 
thinking of the attitudes of these new countries 
toward the United States that they look upon us 
as one of the Western Powers and bracket us with 
the European powers, that their experience with 
the West in the past has not always been happy, 
and that there is a residue of suspicion left which 
will take many years and much understanding to 
overcome. 

In addition to these new states such as Burma, 
Ceylon, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, and the Phil- 
ippines, we see in Asia today another great nation 
emerging from 6 years of occupation as a defeated 
country and about to resume its place in the family 
of nations. The peace treaty with Japan will go 
into effect next week and this nation of almost 85 
million vigorous, intelligent, and industrially 
trained people will once again be a factor to be 
reckoned with whenever we think of Asia. 



Aftermath of War and Japan's Future 

Let us consider briefly some of the effects of the 
war on Japan which have a bearing on the future 
of that country. Before the war, Korea and For- 
mosa together supplied Japan almost 2 million 
metric tons of rice annually so that the Japanese 
empire was almost self-sufficient in food. Today, 
Japan must depend upon foreign sources to meet 
the approximate 20 percent deficit in its own 
food supplies. Japan's former sources of raw 
materials in Manchuria and North China are now 
behind the Iron Curtain so that it must seek else- 
where those raw materials which are essential to 
its industrial life. Its own factories have had to 
be put back into operation; its financial system 
reorganized ; its merchant fleet which contributed 
so much before the war to the prosperity of Japan 
has had to be rehabilitated almost in its entirety. 
But even more perhaps than these material factors 
which for some time to come will condition Japan's 
future, there must be considered the effect of the 
war upon the people. The shock of defeat, the re- 
adjustments necessary as the result of the removal 
of many of Japan's former political and industrial 
leaders from their normal activities have created 
problems which cannot be ignored. As I have just 
mentioned, for a period of more than 6 years the 
Japanese people have lived under alien military 
occupation. While there can be no question but 
that this occupation was a most enlightened one, 
nevertheless it was an occupation, and in the final 
analysis the Japanese people have not been respon- 
sible for their own destiny. Up until recently 
when occupation controls were relaxed in antici- 
pation of the treaty's coming into effect, there was 
a natural and inevitable reluctance on the part of 
the Japanese leaders to take the initiative in solv- 
ing the many political, social, and economic post- 
war problems when the final responsibility rested 
elsewhere. This was one of the most pressing rea- 
sons why the U.S. Government made every possi- 
ble effort to bring about an early peace treaty and 
the early end of the occupation. We saw the 
necessity of letting the Japanese leaders stand on 
their own feet and begin to run their own country. 

In addition to the economic, political, and social 
changes brought about as the result of the war, 
anyone who realistically considers the future of 
Japan must take into account the strategic situa- 
tion in which Japan finds itself and the relation- 
ship of the present power situation in Asia to the 
future of Japan. It would be pleasant to ignore 
the question of power relationships and to consider 
only what would be wise and desirable from the 
moral, political, and economic viewpoints. Un- 
fortunately, we cannot ignore the problem created 
by a change in the balance of power in the Far 
East any more than elsewhere in the world. Aii 
astute scholar has recently said that statesmen who 
profess not to believe in the "balance of power" 
are like scientists who do not believe in the law of 
gravity. So if we are to consider the future of 



Aprii 28, 1952 



653 



Japan and our policy toward it as it emerges 
from a disastrous war and 6 years of occupation, 
we must consider the effect of tlie present power 
situation in Asia. This is particularly acute be- 
cause of the completely unarmed position in which 
Japan finds itself off the coast of Asia where Com- 
munist aggression has been most active. In fact, 
there is reason to believe that the outbreak of this 
Communist aggression was at least partially due 
to the unarmed condition of Japan and the belief 
of the aggressors that domination of the Korean 
peninsula would make more easy the ultimate 
domination of Japan with its great industrial base 
and industrially trained population. In develop- 
ing policy toward Japan, these facts cannot be 
ignored nor are they being ignored by the leaders 
of Japan. 

Asian Resistance to Aggression 

In looking at the rest of Asia, we are often dis- 
couraged by the evidences we see of disaster, con- 
tinued fighting in Korea, continued stalling and 
befogging of issues by the Communist negotiators 
at the truce talks, the enslavement of 400 million 
Chinese by a ruthless, Soviet-dominated Commu- 
nist Government, continued pressure by Com- 
munist forces on the young states of Indochina, 
and Communist-directed banditry in Malaya. 
All of these and more are certainly enough to dis- 
courage anyone, but a year ago the situation was 
even worse. One of my colleagues in the Depart- 
ment of State was fond of saying that the sitviation 
in the Far East at that time reminded him of the 
opening sentence of Swiss Family Kobinson. You 
will recall that it goes something like this: "For 
six days the storm raged with unabated fury and 
on the seventh grew much worse." At that time 
the U.N. Forces had almost been thrown out of 
Korea. The Japanese people were becoming 
more and more restive under military occupation 
which, due to Soviet intransigence, there seemed no 
prospect of bringing to a close. The Philippines 
were almost bankrupt; Huk bandits were terror- 
izing the countryside. There were indications of 
an early attack by Communist China on either 
Formosa or Indochina or both. There was not 
even the beginning of any sort of collective-secu- 
rity system in the whole Pacific area. 

Anyone who claims that the situation today 
leaves no cause for worry would be deliberately 
ignoring reality, but nevertheless, compared with 
a year ago, I believe we can point to real progress. 
Let us consider for a moment the situation today 
in Korea. Some short-sighted persons have called 
our action in Korea "useless" and there is con- 
siderable understandable impatience at the long 
drawn-out struggle going on in that peninsula. 
But before we make up our minds that the sacri- 
fices made in Korea by many brave men have 
been useless, let us consider what they have ac- 
complished. We must remember that it was not 



the Republic of Korea, it was not the United 
States, nor was it the United Nations which 
started the fighting; but it was the Republic of 
Korea, the United States, and the United Nations 
which stood up to aggression and beat it back. 
Today the aggressors have been thrown back be- 
yond the point from which they started. The 
Commuiiists have utterly failed in achieving their 
objectives in Korea. They have lost well over a 
million trained soldiers and enormous quantities 
of materiel. North Korea has been devastated and 
for years to come will be an economic liability 
with nothing to compensate for this destruction. 
One of the most important results of the Commu- 
nist aggression in Korea has been the action of the 
United Nations. For the first time in modern his- 
tory, an international organization has shown that 
not only can it be effective in times of peace but that 
it can and will resist aggression. The League of 
Nations was never able to accomi:)lish this. A real 
forward step has been made in development of a 
world organization • determined that aggi'ession 
shall not prosper. 

As I said a few moments ago, a year ago it 
looked as if the Chinese Communist forces might 
soon attack Formosa or Indochina. There is no 
doubt that the action taken by the United Na- 
tions in Korea had a real deterrent effect on the 
plans of the Communist aggressors so that those 
areas have had an additional year in which to con- 
tinue building up their economic, political, and 
military strength. The threat, of course, has not 
disappeared. There are said to be some 200,000 
Chinese Communist troops massed on the Indo- 
chinese border. The Chinese Communist press 
and radio continue to cry for the conquest of For- 
mosa. The free world cannot afford to relax but 
it can have confidence, born of experience in Korea, 
that the nations of the free world will continue 
to resist aggression. 

The Philippines over the past year have made 
remarkable progress. The Communist-led Huks 
have been reduced to small scattered bands still 
able to commit acts of terrorism but now unable to 
mount the large-scale attacks of the past on pro- 
vincial towns. The Government's deficit dropped 
to less than one million pesos from 154 million 
pesos the year before. Production of export crops 
has boomed. But even more important, in my 
opinion, has been the effect on the people of the 
Philippines of the elections of last November, 
which, due to the courageous leadership of Philip- 
pine President Quirino and his Secretary of De- 
fense Magsaysay, were the most honest and free 
of any ever held in that land. The result of the 
election was a great step forward in the establish- 
ment of democratic processes in the Far East and 
was so recognized by President Quirino even 
though his own party suffered defeat. 

Fighting continues in Indochina and we hear 
much about it, but we do not pay enough attention 
to the progress which has been made in other areas 



654 



Department of State Bulletin 



in the three Associated States of Vietnam, Laos, 
and Cambodia. Due in part to American aid, 
there has been a gradual increase in economic re- 
covery. Exports of rubber and rice, wliile still 
far below the prewar level, were the highest last 
year they have been since V-J Day. There has 
been real progress in building up the national 
arm J' of Vietnam, which has been mainly equipped 
through American aid. Approximately 1,000 new 
Vietnamese officers were graduated from training 
schools last year plus significant numbers of 
technicians and noncommissioned officers. The 
progress these three Indochinese States have made 
along the road to independence was most vividly 
illustrated by their participation in the Japanese 
Peace Conference on a basis of equality with all 
the other participants, and their signature of the 
treaty as independent nations. The new nations 
of Indonesia and Burma have been completing 
the organization of their own institutions in such 
a way as to carry out their new responsibilities. 
Constant progress is being made and both of these 
countries have shown a determination to develop 
institutions and to suppress communism. They 
are jealous of their independence and wish to pre- 
serve it in their own way, and they are sometimes 
reluctant to accept assistance as, rightly or 
wrongly, they fear that such assistance might com- 
promise in some manner their newly won inde- 
pendence or prevent them from maintaining their 
position of neutrality in what they tend to view 
as a power struggle now dividing the world. 

An Area Security System Developed 

In looking at the present situation in the Far 
East, we see that whereas a year ago there was 
not even an embryonic security system embracing 
the whole area, today we have a series of mutual 
security and defense pacts soon to be brought into 
effect with Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and 
New Zealand which, as the President has said, are 
"initial steps" in the development of an over-all 
security system for the Pacific area. These pacts 
have two purposes. The peoples of Australia, 
New Zealand, and the Philippines have been much 
closer to Japanese aggression than we have been 
and there was a natural reluctance in those coun- 
tries to think in terms of a peace treaty with Japan 
that would not make impossible by its own terms 
the resurgence of Japan's aggression and the pos- 
sibility of Japanese rearmament. The United 
States, on the other hand, believed that the only 
kind of a treaty which would have any hope of last- 
ing was one which was not punitive, which was 
based on trust and a spirit of reconciliation, and 
that it was not possible to seek certainty about 
Japan's future actions by imposing restrictions in 
a treaty which would deny freedom to Japan. 
Wliile such restrictions might initially give an 
illusion of certainty, it was the belief of the United 
States that such an illusion would be quickly shat- 



tered. The Governments of Australia, New 
Zealand, and the Philippines were able to give 
their people the assurances they needed about 
their future security as a result of the conclusion 
of these mutual .security and defense pacts, and 
they were then able to join with the United Stittes 
in offering to Japan a treaty of reconciliation and 
trust. But these mutual defense and security 
treaties do not look only, or even primarily, to the 
past. They are the basis for hope in the future 
and set forth in the language of our Monroe 
Doctrine our sense of common destiny with these 
peoples of the Pacific. As John Foster Dulles 
stated in his testimony before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee concerning these treaties : ^ 

It is highly appropriate that not only our friends, but 
our potential enemies, should learn that our concern 
with Europe, evidenced by the North Atlantic Treaty, and 
our concern with Japan, in no sense imply any lack of 
concern for our Pacific allies of World War II or lack of 
desire to preserve and deepen our solidarity with them 
for security. The security treaties with these three 
countries are a logical part of the effort not merely to 
liquidate the old war, but to strengthen the fabric of 
peace in the Pacific as against the hazard of new war. 

Having looked for a time at what the present 
situation is in the Far East, let us consider what is 
the U.S. policy for the area as a whole and toward 
specific parts. In some measure the description 
of the present situation has given a clue to various 
aspects of our policy. It is of course true that 
our policy toward the Far East, as is our policy 
toward other areas of the world, is designed to 
strengthen the fabric of peace generally and specif- 
ically the security of our own country. But such 
broad general statements are not of great utility 
in considering what we should do. In thinking of 
our Far Eastern policy, I often go back to a book 
published 30 years ago, "Americans in Eastern 
Asia," by Tyler Dennett, and as I read the con- 
cluding jjaragraph of that work I believe it gives, 
if properly interpreted in today's terms, a brief 
and forthright description of what American 
policy has been and is with respect to the Far 
East. This is that stateinent: 

In conclusion, we repeat that the tap-root of American 
policy in Asia is most-favored-natlon treatment. An atti- 
tude of self-righteousness is neither becoming nor justi- 
fied. American policy is not philanthropic ; it is not, in 
its motive and history, benevolent; but it is beneficent, 
for the United States is so situated that American inter- 
ests in Asia are best promoted by the growth of strong, 
prosperou.s and enlightened Asiatic states. Indeed It is 
diffleult for an American to believe that the repression or 
weakening of any part of Asia is a benefit to any power. 
The United States is committed to its policy by geographi- 
cal, economic and political facts, and in the same measure 
Is also bound to a policy of cooperation with all powers 
which sincerely profess a similar purpose. 

Obviously, if the taproot of American policy is 
most-favoreci-nation treatment with its implica- 
tion of equality of treatment and opportunity, we 
camiot look with equanimity at the Iron Curtain 

' Bulletin of Feb. 4, 1952, p. 190. 



April 28, 7952 



655 



which is being erected to keep the 400 million Chi- 
nese on the mainland of Asia from contact and 
peaceful cooperation with the rest of Asia and 
with the rest of the world. If it is in American 
interest to promote the growth of "strong, pros- 
perous, and enlightened Asiatic states," America 
must continue a policy of assistance and encour- 
agement to the newly independent states of Asia, 
and we must be willing to cooperate, as we are 
doing through the United Nations and through 
our mutual security and defense treaties with other 
powers which sincerely profess a similar purpose. 

Japanese Treaty of Equality Breaks Precedent 

We have made clear through our initiative in 
bringing about a peace treaty with Japan our 
policy toward that nation. We have insisted that 
this treaty should be a liberal one — one which 
would contain promise for the future and not the 
seeds of future wars. We negotiated this treaty 
with Jajjan on a basis of equality — there was mu- 
tual give and take. Wlien the Japanese delegation 
same to San Francisco to sign the treaty they were 
not kept in confinement away from the other dele- 
gations as had been the fate of the German pleni- 
potentiaries at Versailles after World War I. The 
Japanese were received in the same manner as all 
the others. This treaty broke new grovmd in inter- 
national relations. Sir Zarfrullah Khan, the dis- 
tinguished Foreign Minister of Pakistan, said of 
the treaty : 

It opens to Japan the door passing through which it 
may take up among its fellow sovereign nations a position 
of (lisnity, honor and equality .... It is evidence of a 
new departure in the relations of the East and the West 
as they have subsisted during the last few centuries. 

But American policy goes further than just 
advocating that Japan be given a good start and 
a position of equality among the nations as the 
peace treaty goes into effect. We realize that 
Japan must be given security in which to make 
use of her newly won freedom. It is in this field 
of security that Japan's problems will, in many 
respects, be most difficult. For the time being 
Japan's defense from external aggression will be 
dependent upon the maintenance in Japan of 
American forces in accordance with the security 
pact signed by Japan and the United States on 
September 8, 1951.^ At some point Japan must 
decide in what manner she wishes to contribute to 
her own self-defense. That is a problem which 
has both political and economic aspects. 

There is a genuine concern on the part of many 
Japanese as to the means by which they can dis- 
charge their responsibility for their own defense 
while avoiding the creation of a military machine 
such as that which formerly took over and ran 
Japan. There is also the question in Japan as to 
how the great costs of a modern defense establish- 

' For text of the pact, see ibid., Sept. IT, 1951, p. 464. 
656 



ment can be financed without so weakening the 
economic fabric of the country that it would be 
a ready prey to that very Communist infiltration 
which it is designed to combat. These are real 
problems. As President Truman has pointed out, 
a beginning has been made in the development in 
the Pacific area of security on a collective basis 
which will enable each nation to have security 
without developing itself those forces which can 
be an offensive threat. The Japanese Government 
has elected to take part, and it cannot be too often 
emphasized that this choice of Japan's was a free 
choice. As early as February 1951 when Mr. 
Dulles was in Japan he discussed this general 
topic with the Japanese and he said publicly that 
if Japan wished it could share collective pro- 
tection against direct aggression. He went on to 
say: 

That, however, is not a choice which the United States 
is going to impose upon Japan. It is an invitation. The 
United States is not interested in slavi.sh conduct. . . . 
We are concerned only with the brave and the free. The 
choice must be Japan's own choice. 

This decision of the Japanese Government to 
enter into a security pact with the United States 
was undoubtedly a difficult one. However, just 
as the United States has shown trust in the Japa- 
nese people and Government by advocating and 
signing a treaty of reconciliation without arduous 
post-treaty controls, so must the Japanese people 
trust the U.S. Government and people that they 
will so implement this security treaty that it will 
contribute to the true long-term good of both 
countries and the peace of the whole Pacific area. 
The United States will not falter in its determi- 
nation to insiu'e the security of Japan. 

U.S. Aims in Korea 

In Korea our aim is as it always has been — the 
achievement of an independent, united, and free 
Korea. In cooperation with our friends in the 
United Nations we are committed to repel the 
aggression from North Korea and to restore peace 
and security in the area. We have repelled the 
aggression — the aggressors have been thrown back 
beyond the point from which they started. Our 
military leaders are now engaged in armistice 
talks which we devoutly hope will soon bring an 
end to the figliting. If we succeed in getting an 
armistice we shall then proceed to the political 
stage where we will discuss how to bring about 
the independent, united, and free Korea which 
is our objective. If the armistice talks fail, we 
will be confronted with a most serious situation. 
It would not be profitable to speculate at this time 
as to what we should do in that unhappy event. 
We shall continue to do our part to make the talks 
a success — if they fail it will be because the Com- 
munists do not want them to succeed. 

But let me utter a word of caution. Should 
an armistice be obtained it would not mean our 

Department of Slate Bulletin 



troubles are over. There are the political talks 
which I have mentioned. There are other prob- 
lems in the Far East which can still plague us. 
I have spoken of the continuing threat to Indo- 
china and Formosa. The United States and the 
other nations of the free world cannot relax — I am 
afraid we must learn to live for some time to come 
with crisis. We shall need all the resolution, firm- 
ness, and patience we can summon if the tremen- 
dous sacrifices we have already made are not to be 
in vain. 



Conflicts of Opinion Regarding China 

Wliat shall we do about China? This is a ques- 
tion about which there are many conflicts of opin- 
ion, and which evokes much passion. But some 
things are clear and agreed. Communist China 
is an aggressor, declared so by the United 
Nations — the people of mainland China are suf- 
fering under purge after purge in which thou- 
sands are killed and more imprisoned. Foreign 
businessmen and missionaries are not allowed to 
carry on their normal activities, even those whose 
countries have recognized the Communist regime. 
At the same time. Communist Chinese at the 
Soviet-sponsored economic conference in Moscow 
make high-sounding offers of trade deals with the 
West. There are in Red China, American and 
British businessmen through whom it would be 
normal for these trade offers to be made. But no, 
these men are in jail, or being threatened with 
prison or worse if they don't agree to Communist 
demands. Under such circumstances why should 
we take seriously the Communist offer of friendly 
trade with the West? Americans have a tra- 
ditional friendship for the people of China. To- 
day, however, it is only possible to show that 
friendship through the Chinese Government on 
Formosa. Much has been said about the faults 
of that Government. I do not intend to enter that 
controversy. I intend to look to the future — not 
the past — we must work with what we have, not 
what we might like to have. 

It seems to me abundantly clear that the United 
States is committed by the terms of President 
Truman's statement of June 27, 1950,* to prevent 
Formosa from falling into Communist hands. 
That this continues to be our policy is evidenced 
by the fact that the Administration has asked the 
Congress to include in the Mutual Security Act 
provision for funds for economic and military 
support for Formosa which will help the Govern- 
ment and people there to increase their ability to 
defend themselves. In the opinion of the U.S. 
Government the National Government still repre- 
sents China. This opinion is shared by the ma- 
jority of the members of the United Nations. 
There have been 96 votes on this question in more 

' Ibid., July 3, 1950, p. 5. 



than 4.5 international organizations and the 
National Government continues to occupy the 
Chinese seat in all of them. It is our policy that 
this shall continue to be the case. The Chinese 
Government and people on Formosa are making a 
real effort to create conditions there which will 
show the world that they are deserving of its 
support. We shall continue helping them in this 
task. 



U.S. Goal — Toward a True Freedom 

In the rest of Asia we are helping the countries 
of Southeast Asia — Indonesia, Indochina, Burma, 
the Philippines, and Thailand — with military or 
economic assistance programs or both. We are 
giving considerable help to the Associated States 
of Indochina and to France to enable them to con- 
tinue their struggle against the Communist-led 
rebels of the Vietminh. We shall continue to 
give such aid. In their association with France 
the people of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia have 
been granted constantly increasing attributes of 
independence. We all know what would happen 
if the Communists should triumph. There would 
be loud shouting about having thrown the for- 
eigner out and restoring independence to a 
colonial people. But where is the true independ- 
ence of North Korea, Communist China, Outer 
Mongolia, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, or those 
States which were among the first to fall behind 
the Iron Curtain — Estonia, Lithuania, and Lat- 
via? I think we ai-e doing the right thing in 
helping oUr friends in Indochina toward a true 
freedom, not an illusory one. 

The United States need not be hesitant in ac- 
tively working to advance the ideal of freedom 
which was the foundation of our own revolution. 
As recently pointed out by an astute British 
writer, Barbara Ward, in the New York Times, 
Thomas Jefferson once prophesied that this ideal 
would be capable of permanent extension — "to 
some parts sooner, to others later but finally to 
all." Let us not fear to live up to our tradition. 



Communiques Regarding Korea 
To tlie Security Council 

The Headquarters of the United Nations Com- 
mand has transmitted communiques regarding 
Korea to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations under the following United Nations 
document numbers: S/2564, March 21; S/2565, 
March 24; S/2566, March 25; S/2568, March 26; 
S/2569, March 27; S/2570, March 28; S/2572, 
March 31; S/2573, April 2; S/2586, April 2; 
S/2587, April 3 ; S/2588, April 7 ; S/2589, April 7 ; 
S/2591, April 8. 



April 28, 1952 



657 



Ratification of Japanese Peace Treaty 
And Pacific Security Treaties 

Statement hy the President 

[Released to the press hy the White House April 15] 

As President of the United States, it gives me 
great satisfaction to sign, and thus ratify, on this 
day the Treaty of Peace with Japan, the Security 
Treaty with Australia and New Zealand, the Se- 
curity Treaty with Japan, and the IMutual De- 
fense Treat}' with the Kepublic of the Philippines. 
The signing of these documents completes another 
in the series of steps being taken by free nations 
to bring peace and security to the Pacific. 

Wlien the United States and at least two more 
of the countries mentioned in article 23 of the 
Treaty of Peace with Japan have deposited 
their ratifications, the historic ceremonies of 
restoring Japan to a position of independence, 
honoi-, and equality in the world community which 
began at San Fi-ancisco last September will have 
been brought to a conclusion.^ The related se- 
curity and mutual defense treaties will become 
effective when their ratifications are either de- 
posited or exchanged in accordance with their 
respective terms. 

In signing these documents, I know that I ex- 
press the essential unity and will of the American 
people for the earliest possible achievement of 
lasting peace and freedom with security. The 
Treaty of Peace with Jajian and the related secu- 
rity and mutual defense treaties, when they go into 
effect, will bring that goal nearer to realization. 

' Article 23 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan provides 
that the treaty shall come into force when Japan, the 
United States, and any five of the following countries 
have deposited their instruments of ratification with 
the U.S. Government : Australia, Canada, Ceylon, France, 
Indonesia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, and the United Kingdom. 

Up to today ratifications have been deposited by the 
following countries named in article 23 : Japan, the United 
Kingdom. Australia, and New Zealand. Thus, in order 
to bring the treaty into force it will be necessary for the 
United States and two other countries named in article 
23 to deposit their instruments of ratification. 

Subject to the expected prior deposit of at least two 
additional Instruments of ratification, the United States 
plans to deposit its own instrument of ratification on 
Apr. 28, 19.52. These three additional deposits will bring 
the Treaty of Peace with Japan into effect on that date 
for those countries which have deposited their ratifica- 
tions by that time. 

This advance announcement of the planned effective 
date of the Treaty of Peace is being made in order to 
permit an orderly completion of the transition of .Japan 
from the present oci-upation status to that of full sover- 
eignty. In addition, it will enable those nations which 
are reestablishing relations with the Japanese Govern- 
ment to change from their present accreditation to 
the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to that 
of normal peacetime relations with the Japanese 
Government. 

The related security and mutual defense treaties will 
become effective when their ratifications are either de- 
posited or exchanged in accordance with their respective 
specific terms. 



Point Four Agreements Concluded 
With Iran 

[Released to the press April 15] 

The Department of State announced on April 15 
that project agreements for technical cooperation 
in the fields of agriculture, public health, and edu- 
cation have been concluded with the Government 
of Iran. The project agreements were signed on 
April 1, 1952, in Tehran by William E. Warne, 
U.S. Director of Technical Cooperation, for the 
United States, and Khalil K. Taleghani, Minister 
of Agriculture, Mohammad Ali Maleki, Minister 
of Health, and Mahmoud Hessabi, Minister of 
Education, representing Iran. 

The three project agreements, calling for an 
expenditui-e of approximately $11,000,000 by the 
United States, describe the detailed operations of 
the expanded Point Four Program provided for in 
the exchange of notes at Tehran on January 19, 
1952. At that time the United States agreed to 
contribute up to $23,450,000 for the 1952 fiscal 
year toward the program of technical cooperation.' 

The agricultural program includes such proj- 
ects as the development of an agricultural exten- 
sion .service, improved livestock practices, irriga- 
tion development, soil and water conservation, and 
plant development. 

The public-health program provides for the 
establishment of sanitary engineering, nursing, 
and public-health education divisions in the Min- 
istry of Health to combat commimicable diseases, 
improve sanitary conditions, and provide maternal 
and child-health care, and other services necessary 
for the development of a rural public-health 
service. 

The objectives of the education progi-am are to 
provide for improved rural facilities by establish- 
ing demonstration schools, better training for a 
greater number of rural teachers, and the extend- 
ing of the program to remote areas. 

As an emergency measure to meet the local cur- 
rency costs of the Point Four Program, which the 
Iranian Government is unable to pay at the pres- 
ent time, agreements have also been entered into 
which will make rials available for the technical- 
cooperation projects in the amoimt of $6,000,000. 

The first of these is the student emergency as- 
sistance program to provide dollars in the United 
States for subsistence and tuition of stranded 
Iranians whose sources of funds have been cut off 
by the Iranian Government currency restrictions.- 
Under this program, rials must be deposited by 
the students' sponsors in Iran before the students 
may receive dollars in the United States. The 
rials go into a special account to be used by the 
Point Four director in Iran to meet local currency 
requirements. Tlie United States has agreed to 
use up to $1,000,000 in this program. 

' Bulletin of Feb. 11, 1952, p. 217. 
' Ibid., Apr. 28, 1952, p. 659. 



658 



Department of State Bulletin 



The other is a prograin whereby the United 
States will supply approximately 34,000 metric 
tons of sugar valued at $5,000,000. The agree- 
ment to cover the terms of the sugar purchase was 
concluded on March 31, 1952, in Tehran. 

Under the terms of the consumer goods (sugar) 
agreement the Government of Iran will sell the 
sugar through regular commercial channels and 
will deposit the equivalent of the $5,000,000 in 
rials in a special account for the Point Four direc- 
tor to use in meeting local expenses of the pro- 
gram. 

The sugar will be shipped to Persian Gulf poits 
of Iran in three separate shipments in May, June, 
and July. 



the end of the 1951-52 academic year, or thi'ough 
August 21, 1952. The amount a student can re- 
ceive for living expenses is determined by the 
university and in no case may exceed $160 a month. 
The Ii'anian students are attending more than 
200 different schools but more than half of them 
are enrolled in New York University, Columbia 
University, Syracuse University, University of 
California, (at Berkeley and at Los Angeles), 
University of Southern California, Los Angeles 
City College, Indiana University, University of 
Nebraska, Utah State Agricultural College, and 
the University of Maryland. 



Emergency Assistance 
For Iranian Students 

[Rehased to the press April 7] 

A program to provide emergency assistance for 
approximately 1,000 Iranian students stranded in 
the United States by reason of their sources of 
funds having been cut off by the new currency 
restrictions adopted by the Government of Iran 
because of the shortage of dollars, was announced 
by the Department ot State on April 7. 

The purpose of the emergency program is to 
provide dollars in the United States only for 
maintenance and tuition in amounts equivalent to 
Iranian currency made available by the students' 
sponsoi's or jDarents in Iran. The rials (Iranian 
currency) deposited by the sponsors will go into 
a special account to be used by the Point Four 
director in Iran to meet local currency require- 
ments of the technical-cooperation and economic- 
development program. 

The Near East Foundation, 54 East 64th Street, 
New York City, will administer this Iranian 
Student Emergency Assistance Program under an 
agreement with the Technical Cooperation Ad- 
ministration of the Department of State. 

The Point Four Progi-am in Iran is one of rural 
development — improvement in agriculture, health, 
and education at the village level. There is an 
inadequate number of Iranian specialists in most 
fields and much of the success of the Point Four 
Program will depend on increasing the number of 
urgently needed technicians. 

The emergency student assistance progi-am 
covers Iranians enrolled as regular or special 
students in recognized colleges and universities 
and also visiting professors and research workers 
attached to educational and scientific institutions. 
The majority of the Iranian students in the United 
States is studying technical subjects such as ag- 
riculture, engineering, and medicine. 

The emergency program is to cover students' 
living costs and other necessary expenses through 



Recent Publications 

[Released by the Department of State] 

Technical Cooperation, Assistance for Eritrea. Treaties 
and Other International Acts Series 2269. Pub. 4315. 
4 pp. 50. 

Agreement between the United States and tlie United 
Kingdom — Signed at London June 15, 1951 ; entered 
into force June 15, 1051. 

Economic Cooperation Witli the Federal Republic of 
Germany Under Public Law 472, 80th Congress, as 
amended. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 
2278. Pub. 4333. 3 pp. 5(f. 

Agreement between the United States and the Federal 
Republic of Germany — Signed at Frankfort Feb. 27, 
1951, and at Bonn Mar. 28, 1951 ; entered into force 
Mar. 28, 1951. 

Economic Cooperation With Portugal Under Public Law 
472, 80th Congress, as amended. Treaties and Otiier 
International Acts Series 2279. Pub. 4334. 3 pp. 5^. 

Agreement between the United States and Portugal — 
Signed at Lisbon May 17, 1951 ; entered into force 
May 17, 1951. 

Technical Cooperation, Training of Venezuelan Nationals. 

Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2280. Pub. 
4336. 5 pp. St. 

Agreement between the United States and Vene- 
zuela — Signed at Caracas May 23 and June 7, 1951 ; 
entered into force June 7, 1951. 

Violations of Peace Treaty Guaranties of Human Rights. 

European and British Commonwealth Series 31. Pub. 
4376:i. 180 pp. $2. 

Vol. I, Rumania — expression — press and publication. 
Supplement. 

Double Taxation, Taxes on Income. Treaties and Other 
International Acts Series 2316. Pub. 4407. 35 pp. 15<^. 

Convention Ijetween the United States and Switzer- 
land — Signed at Washington May 24, 1951 ; entered 
into force Sept. 27, 1951. 

United States Educational Commission in Japan. Trea- 
ties and Other International .\cts Series 2335. Pub. 4438. 
19 pp. 100. 

.\greement between the United States and Japan — 
Signed at Tokyo Aug. 28, 1951 ; entered into force 
Aug. 28, 1951. 



April 28, 7952 



659 



U.S.-ltalian Negotiations on Import Restrictions 



[Released to the press April 16] 
STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ACHESON 

The Department yesterday delivered a reply to 
the Italian note of January 15 which urged this 
Government to revoke its restrictions on tradi- 
tional Italian products, such as cheese, almonds, 
and hats, and to prevent any further restrictions 
on imports of Italian goods that would increase 
the dollar deficit and aggravate the economic and 
social difficulties of Italy. Copies of the Italian 
note and of our reply are available. 

Tlie Italian note raised important issues re- 
garding recent trends in United States trade 
policy. United States trade policy is an imjDor- 
tant part of our over-all foreign policy which 
seeks to erect a firm foundation for the defenseof 
the free world against aggression. The major 
problem in United States foreign trade today is 
the wide margin by which our exports exceed our 
imports, the so-called "dollar gap," which results 
in foreign countries not being able to pay for the 
American goods they need. 

The dollar gap is as much our problem as that 
of the rest of the world. A big creditor nation 
that refuses to import can never expect to be paid 
for its exports. If we do not want to lose our 
export markets — and certainly no taxpayer wishes 
to continue to bear the burden of foreign aid in- 
definitely to enable other nations to buy our 
goods — we must import. 

Furthermore, if the joint defense effort is to be 
strong enough to stem Soviet aggression, inde- 
pendent nations must act together, each utilizing 
its resources, plants, and manpower in the most 
economic manner. This will not occur by itself. 
It requires cooperative action and bold leadership. 
When inconsistencies show up in United States 
policy, reflecting the pressures for restrictions on 
trade. United States leadership is weakened. In 
the long run, American interests will suffer. We 
cannot throw up barriers here while at the same 
time we urge the destructioia of such barriers 
abroad in the interests of close partnership in the 
free world. I am sure that the American people 
recognize that the United States must cooperate in 

660 



order to receive the cooperation of other nations 
joined with us in the defense of the free world. 

U.S. MEMORANDUM OF APRIL IS 

The Department of State lias considered the Italian 
Embassy's memorandum of January 15, 1952 concerning 
the economic, social, and psychological repercussions on 
Italy of United States import restrictions. In accordance 
with the Embassy's request, copies of the memorandum 
have been furnished to the Department of Agriculture, the 
Tariff Commission, and other United States Government 
agencies most concerned with problems of this nature. 

The Department wishes to assure the Italian Embassy 
of the continuing interest of this Government in expand- 
ing the opportunities for world trade and in permitting 
other countries to earn the dollars with which to pay for 
their essential imports, thus cutting down the need for 
extraordinary United States assistance. The Department 
believes not only that a high level of imports can be ab- 
sorbed by the United States economy but that imports 
benefit the United States as well as the other nations 
joined in the defense of the free world. Existing legis- 
lation provides ample safeguards to protect domestic 
producers in the minority of cases where a high level of 
Imports might cause serious injury to domestic industry. 
To the American consumer a high level of imports means 
a wide variety of goods from which to choose and gen- 
erally lower prices. To many important domestic pro- 
ducers, imports mean an increase in the dollars available 
to foreign nations which makes it possible for them to 
buy American goods, including products from all sections 
of the country and from a wide range of industries. Fur- 
thermore, the threat to the security of the free world 
makes it even more urgent that high levels of world trade 
be encouraged so that the nations of the free world can 
cooperate in making the best possible use of their re- 
sources, their plants, and their labor force. By each con- 
tributing what it can produce most efiiciently, the defense 
and economic stability of the democi'atic nations will be 
strengthened. 

The Department would like to make the following com- 
ments on some of the specific cases which were mentioned 
in the memorandum and which are the subject of concern 
to the Italian Government. With respect to the Em- 
bassy's apprehension that restrictions on Imports of olive 
oil may be imposed, the Department has already replied 
separately to the Embassy's note on this subject. No re- 
strictions on imports of olive oil are contemplated at this 
time. 

Section 104 of the Defense Production Act of 1951 

The Administration is continuing Its opposition to the 
extension beyond June 30, 1952 of Section 104 of the De- 
fense Production Act of 1951. It believes that the import 
restrictions on cheese and other dairy products imposed 

Deparfment of State Bulletin 



under Section 104 are inconsistent with the long-run in- 
terests of the American people including the American 
farmer. The Department's reasons for believing that 
Section 104 should not be extended are reviewed in full 
in the Secretary's letter of March 10, 1952 to Senator 
Burnet R. Maybank, a copy of which is enclosed.' The 
Senate Banking and Currency Committee recently voted 
to replace Section 104 with language corresponding to 
that of Public Law 800, legislation which existed prior 
to Section 104. If the Congress should finally pass legis- 
lation in this form, import restrictions on fats and oils, 
rice and rice products, peanuts, cheese and other dairy 
products would he authorized only ujxin the President's 
determination that they were essential to (a) the acqui- 
sition or distribution of products in short supply, or (b) 
the orderly liquidation of temporary surpluses of stocks 
owned or controlled by the Government. Such legislation 
would enable this Government to act consistently with 
its existing international commitments. 

"Escape Clause" Actions 

The Department appreciates the concern which the Ital- 
ian Embassy has expressed in its memorandum regarding 
the so-called "escape clause" actions, that is, the modifi- 
cation of trade agreement concessions where serious 
injury is caused or threatened to the domestic industry 
producing like or directly competitive products. This 
Government believes that these modifications of conces- 
sions should be retained only for such time and to such 
extent as is necessary to prevent or remedy the injury. 

Accordingly, a system providing for periodic review of 
"escape clause" actions is in the process of being estab- 
lished." Your attention is directed to the President's 
letter of January 5, 1952 to the Chairman of the Tariff 
Commission, a copy of which was furnished the Embas.sy. 

In this letter the President stated that he has requested 
the preparation of an Executive Order which would call 
for periodic investigation and report b.v the Tariff Com- 
mission on each escape clause action indicating whether 
or not the modified concession should be continued in its 
existing form. The Department believes that this pro- 
cedure should help ensure that "escape clause" actions 
will remain in effect only so long as required to prevent 
serious injury to the domestic industry concerned. 

Altnonds 

The Italian Embassy also expressed its concern over 
the fee on imports of shelled almonds over a certain quan- 
tity which the United States recently imposed. This re- 
striction is applicable only to the current marketing sea- 
son ending September .30, 1952, and further investigation 
would be required prior to any decision to extend this 
quota to the next season. 

"Buy America" Policy 

The Department appreciates the concern of the Italian 
Government regarding the application of the "Buy Amer- 
ica" policy to Government procurement. It believes that 
permitting concerns in friendly foreign countries to com- 
pete effectively with domestic concerns in bidding for 
government defense contracts will result in more eco- 
nomical government procurement with substantial sav- 
ings to the United States taxpayer. It will also give 
foreign countries the opportunity to raise their levels of 
production and earn needed foreign exchange. The De- 
partment recognizes that restrictive features of the "Buy 
America" policy, which was incorporated in United States 
statutes as early as 1933, were developed under circum- 
stances far different from those which exist today, and 
warrant careful re-examination in the light of present 
circumstances. 



The Department once again wishes to assure the Italian 
Embassy of its sympathetic interest in the Embassy's con- 
cern in promoting a high level of Italian exports to the 
United States, thereby enhancing Italy's ability to pur- 
chase goods from the United States, strengthen its econ- 
omy, and contribute to the achievement of a prosperous 
and peaceful world, an objective to which both our gov- 
ernments subscribe. 
Enclosure : 
Copy of letter to Senator Burnet R. Slaybank 

Department of State, 
Washington, D. C. 

ITALIAN NOTE VERBALE OF JANUARY 15 

The Italian Embassy presents its compliments to the 
Department of State and has the honor to transmit the 
attached memorandum regarding the grave consequences 
for the Italian economy and Italian-American trade, of 
any restrictions adopted on imports of Italian goods in the 
United States. 

The Italian Embassy will be grateful if the Department 
of State will call the attention of the Department of 
Agriculture, the Tariff CommLssion and the other in- 
terested United States authorities, to the serious eco- 
nomic, social and psychological repercussions that recent 
United States restrictions have had in Italy and other 
friendly countries of Europe, which are trying to increase 
their dollar earnings through exports. 

For the reasons pointed out in the attached memoran- 
dum and in the previous notes submitted by this Embassy 
to the Department of State, the Italian Government is ap- 
pealing to the Government of the United States to revoke 
the recent restrictions on imports of cheeses, almonds, 
hats, etc. and to prevent any further restrictions on im- 
ports of Italian goods that would increase the already 
nnormous dollar deficit and aggravate the economic and 
social difficulties of Italy. 

The Italian Embassy expresses its thanks to the De- 
partment of State for its kind attention to these problems 
and for the action it will deem opportune to take in re- 
sponse to the requests of the Embassy. 

Ambasciatoee Taechiani 



' For text of this letter, see Bot-letin of Mar. 31, 1952, 
p. 517. 

' For text of a report on trade agreement escape clauses, 
transmitted by the President to the Congress on Jan. 10, 
see ibid., Jan. 28, 1952, p. 143. 



AIEMORANDUM: Economic, Social, and Psychological 
Repercus'Sions in Italy of V. S. Import Restrictions and 
other Protectionist Practices 

1. The question of United States trade restrictions and 
other measures which unfavorably affect Italian imports 
into this country has been the subject in recent years of 
frequent communication from this Embassy to the De- 
partment of State, the Treasury Department, and other 
appropriate United States authorities. In this connection 
special reference is made to a number of documents, listed 
under End. A.^ 

2. The international emergency precipitated by the in- 
vasion of Korea, and the subsequent mutual defense ef- 
forts of the United States and its partners and allies, have 
created a new framework which is likely to continue over 
a number of years. It is characterized by a number of 
adverse features, such as shortages of essential materials 
and manpower, inflationary pressures, sudden shifts in 
the volume and terms of international trade, and so forth. 

There is, however, a fair prospect that some of these 
difficulties can be considerably alleviated, and ultimately 
turned to the advantage of the cause of world-wide sta- 
bility, as a result of closer economic coordination among 
peace-loving nations, and among Nato allies in particular. 

Such coordination, as President Truman stressed on 
many memorable occasions, calls for a fuller utilization of 
the joint productive resources of the democratic nations 
for purposes of both defense and economic stabilization. 



= See p. 665. 



April 28, 1952 

999077—52 3 



661 



The need for coordination and utilization of the eco- 
nomic resources and production capacity of free nations is 
also receiving increasing emphasis in the quarterly report 
to the President from the Director of the Office of Defense 
Mobilization, which, furthermore, analyze and bring into 
a single focus the joint defense efforts of this country 
and its European partners. 

3. The effects and implications of the new situation 
are so vast, and its ramificatious so extensive, that it 
becomes desirable, and indeed essential, that each of the 
main aspects of economic relations between the nations 
of Western Europe and the United States be reviewed 
afresh, in the light of current conditions and requirements. 
One such a.spect is foreign trade, which Is of obvious and 
paramount signifieance with respect to both the major 
objectives of the current effort of the United States and 
its allies, i.e., rearmament and the maintenance of do- 
mestic and international economic stability. 

4. It is hardly necessary to recall that the current 
mutual defense effort is based, so far as Western Europe 
is concerned, on the foundations built by the Eca pro- 
gram. In turn, the Eca programs were deeply concerned 
with the establishment of the freest possible flow of trade 
among the participating nations and throughout the free 
world. One of their major purposes was to make a 
frontal attack on the so-called "international dollar gap", 
or "dollar shortage" problem on the assumption that 
only an expanding and well-balanced pattern of foreign 
trade could give stability to Europe and strengthen 
America's first line of defense across the ocean. Conse- 
quently, it was the declared purpose of the Eca program to 
help reduce the unbalance in the world trade due to the 
"dollar shortage" stemming in turn from the chronic 
excess of United States exports over imports. 

The Eca countries were assisted and encouraged in the 
organization of "dollar export drives". Steps were taken 
to stimulate an increasing acceptance of European im- 
ports in the United States. 

The vital significance of this new policy, in the interest 
of the United States and its security, as well as that of 
world economic stabilization, was underscored in a num- 
ber of important State papers such as the Gray report, 
the Rockefeller report, the latest reports of Eca, of the 
Defense Production Administrator, of the Council of 
Economic Advisers, of the National Association of Manu- 
facturers, of the U. S. Chamber of Commerce, and in the 
final declaration of the 38th National Foreign Trade 
Council Convention held in New York October 1951, which 
discussed this important and significant theme : "Inter- 
national Trade and Investment are essential to the De- 
fense and Economic Advancement of the United States 
and the Free World". 

5. All this was highly gratifying and encouraging to 
the Italian Government, which is extremely anxious to re- 
establish a situation in which Italy can earn and pay its 
own way through the exports of products of the skill and 
ingenuity of its enterprise and manpower, rather than to 
continue to rely on assistance. It was also realized that 
neither the administrative nor the legislative branch of 
the United States Government could be expected to dis- 
regard altogether the short-term impact of the new policy 
upon a number of special situations. It was felt, however, 
that the domestic situations requiring special safeguards 
could only be few and relatively limited, given the un- 
precedented level of prosperity reached by the United 
States economy in postwar years and the related situa- 
tions of full employment. 

It was consequently hoped that the new trend in United 
States foreign trade policies — already heralded prior to 
the Second World War by the adoption of the Reciprocal 
Trade Agreements policy — was here to stay, and that the 
anomalies and inconsistencies which still existed with 
respect to their practical implementation would disappear 
as rapidly as possible. 

6. There have been, however, indications in recent 
months that, while the American Government continues 
to be fully committed to the principle of trade liberaliza- 



tion, renewed recourse is being made to restrictive prac- 
tices, and that the inconsistencies between principle and 
practice, far from disappearing, are once more Increasing. 
Should this new trend continue unchecked, a very 
serious situation would result. Much of the progress 
made through Gatt and other agreements would be undone 
and many of the gains of the Marshall Plan would be 
wasted. Such a prospect is naturally viewed by the 
Italian Government with considerable alarm, and is a 
matter of major concern, particularly under the current 
unsettled conditions of the international and European 
economy. 

7. Italian exports to the United States include to a very 
large extent foodstuffs (such as olive oil and cheese), 
certain farm products (such as almonds), and a number 
of specialties and typical commodities. They have en- 
joyed in recent years a moderate expansion which, how- 
ever, has hardly made a dent on the trade unbalance 
between Italy and the United States. In 1951 Italian im- 
ports from the United States exceeded exports to the 
United States by over 6 to 1, representing a total deficit 
of more than 350 million dollars. The hopes and pros- 
pects of further development, however, have been virtually 
nullified by restrictions placed by the United States Gov- 
ernment on the import of a number of commodities which 
are of vital importance to Italy's economy. 
Here are some examples : 

a) Cheese imports from Ital.v and other foreign coun- 
tries have been placed by the Department of Agriculture 
on a quota basis, which will cause a decrease of about 
40% in one of the most important, typical items of Italian 
export and consequently a substantial increase in the 
trade unbalance against Italy. The resulting loss in dol- 
lars, probably more than 2 million, will compel Italy to 
reduce her purchases of wheat, cotton, and other agri- 
cultural products in the United States, whose production 
and export Interest millions of American farmers and 
which constitute a burden on American taxpayers in the 
form of the price-support program. 

The restrictions placed on Italian cheese imports seem 
particularly inappropriate because Italian cheeses do not 
compete, for the most part, with cheeses produced in the 
United States. Being produced from sheep's milk 
(pecorino and romano) or requiring many years of season- 
ing (parmigiano and reggiano), Italian cheeses are not 
competitive with their limitations which are produced 
in small quantity in the United States. 

Imports of Italian and all other foreign cheeses in tlie 
United States as a whole still represent a negligible por- 
tion of total American consumption (less than 5% of total 
consumption). Therefore the benefits gained by Ameri- 
can producers through recent restrictions of imports are 
limited and in any case greatly overcome by the loss of 
export outlets for other important American farm pro- 
ducers. On the other hand, these restrictions are having 
disastrous economic, social, and psychological effects on 
the Italian economy and especially on the poor regions of 
southern Italy, Sicily and Sardinia, where the produc- 
tion and export of sheep's milk cheeses to the United 
States constitutes the principal means of livelihood. 

Moreover, the imposition of direct quantitative import 
restriction is in direct contradiction to the whole spirit of 
.\merican foreign trade policies, and to policies which the 
United States has been sponsoring in Europe. 

As the Italian Embassy has pointed out in recent memo- 
randa to the Department of State, the recent restrictions 
on imports of Italian cheeses have voided the U.S. tariff 
reductions agreed upon at Torquay, reductions for which 
Italy granted equivalent tariff concessions in favor of the 
American exporters. 

b) Another key item in ihe Italian-American trade, 
namely olive oil is threatened by similar restrictions 
(m imports, following the demands of the California pro- 
ducers of olive oil to the Department of Agriculture to 
extend to olive oil Section 104 of the Defense Production 
Act, as amended, or to invoke the "escape" and "peril" 
clauses for an increase in tariff protection, which would 
curtail the imports of olive oil from abroad. I 



662 



Department of State Bulletin 



Italian olive oil, refined and packed in Italy, has earned 
through many years a position of well deserved prestige 
with the American consumers. A large market has thus 
been built in the United States for olive oil of high quality. 
Imports of Italian olive oil into this country have, there- 
fore, in no way endangered, rather they have favored 
domestic production by stimulating a taste for good olive 
oil. 

Olive oil, as cheese, constitutes one of the few Italian 
agricultural sources of foreign exchange earnings. Con- 
tinuous export of this product is essential to Italians in 
order to obtain less expensive vegetable oils needed for 
her domestic consumption. The dollars Italy acquires 
from the export of olive oil are entirely spent in the pur- 
chase of soy beans, .soy oil, and other oil seeds in the 
United States which is a traditional source used by Italy 
in procuring supplies of these products in the substantial 
quantities required. 

c) Following the demands of almond producers, the 
U.S. Tariff Commission proposed and the American Gov- 
ernment recently introduced an increase in duties on 
imported almonds beyond a certain quota. As a matter 
of fact, imported Italian almonds are not competitive 
but supplementary to the American production because 
of their particular quality and characteristics : most Ital- 
ian almonds are bought by the confectionery industry, 
which cannot be completely supplied by the domestic 
production. 

Measures increasing duties or otherwise restricting im- 
ports of almonds into the United States will contribute 
to worsen the trade deficit of a country which imports 
from the United States agricultural products in amounts 
.5-6 times surpassing the value of her exports of specialty 
foodstuffs to the United States. 

d) The tariff duties on women's fur felt hat bodies 
have been raised, from December 1, 1950 by decision of 
the President following a report of the Tariff Commission 
suggesting the recourse to the "escape clause" mostly 
because of strong competition created by hats from Czech- 
oslovakia.* The effect of this action was, of course, to 
impose serious consequences on the Italian hat industry. 

Now that the United States has withdrawn its conces- 
sions to Czechoslovakia under the Gatt Convention, it 
should not be difficult to restore the conventional conces- 
sions to friendly countries, thereby eliminating a situa- 
tion which, in addition to inflicting unnecessary damage 
on Italy and other democratic countries, produces very 
adverse psychological and political repercussions. 

Such a request was made to the Department of State in 
the Embassy's note No. 11340 of October 23, 1951, but to 
date no favorable action has been taken. Meanwhile, the 
Italian hat Industry continues to suffer serious conse- 
quences as a result of being cut off from its most important 
export market, the United States. 

e) New threats concerning the tariff treatment of such 
commodities as wines, cherries, garlic, marble, motor- 
cycles, bicycles, tobacco pipes, leather goods, etc. are loom- 
ing ahead, as a result of representations of domestic 
manufacturers to the U.S. Tariff Commission under the 
"peril point" and "escape clause" of the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Act, or to the Department of Agriculture 
under Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. 

10. The economic and other effects of this new trend 
are only too obvious. To quote from the New York Times 
of September 22, 1951 : 

It is fundamental American policy to encourage as 
free a flow of trade and commerce throughout tie world 
as possible. That is one of the basic premises on which 
rests the Marshall Plan and in fact our whole approach 
to the political and economic problems of Europe, not 
to mention our own Reciprocal Trade Act and the Gen- 
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to which we are 
party. 

Inherent in this policy is the need for Europe to in- 
crease its exports to the U.S. It should be obvious 



'Ihid.,3aii. 21, 1952, p. 96. 



even to the most extreme protectionists that it makes 
more sense to help Europe earn dollars than to keep on 
giving dollars away while preventing Europe from earn- 
ing them. 

In more general terms, the effects of U.S. import re- 
strictions can be summed up under the following heading: 

(a) effects on Gatt and international trade i^olicies at 
large 

(b) effects on the "dollar gap" 

(c) effects on inflationary pressures 

(d) political and psychological effects 

Each of these ell'ects will be briefly reviewed in what 
follows : 

11. To begin with, it is clear that international trade 
policies are a matter not only of principle but also of 
practical implementation. Due tribute has been paid in 
previous sections of this paper to the leadership taken by 
the U.S. Government in bringing about a liberalization of 
international trade relations. The question now is that 
such liberalization appears to be jeopardized by recent 
restrictive actions, and the threats of others to come, 
constituting a return to harmful protectionist practices 
of the past. 

If the United States, or for that matter any of the 
signatories of Gatt, makes increasing recourse to "peril 
level" or "escape clauses" and adopts restrictive mea.sures 
•vith respect to the very items of foreign imports which 
stand to benefit by conventional tariff rates and other con- 
cessions, the very heart of Gatt is impaired and the whole 
policy of trade liberalization, while honored in principle, 
becomes disregarded and inoperative in practice. 

The situation becomes particularly disquieting when 
such practices are adopted by nations having such vast 
power and international responsibilities as the United 
States : 

To quote once more from the New York Times (Novem- 
ber 7, 1951) : 

The issue is serious precisely because the U.S. and 
Belgium are countries heavily committed to trying to 
establish a system of international trade within which 
free enterprise can function. It is not that the U.S. 
and Belgium are worse than anybody else. It is not 
that they, of all countries, should, for reasons that 
from a nationalistic viewpoint are perfectly sound, risk 
making the whole system of international agreements a 
dead letter by penalizing the private enterprises in all 
countries that have relied on being able to do business 
on certain known terms and conditions. 

The hat case report may well become a classic docu- 
ment in international trade history. It shows how 
conclusions about such elements as "necessity", "injury", 
"justifiable protective measures" differ when arrived 
at from the standpoint of the community of nations and 
when arrived at, for example, by the U.S. Tariff Com- 
mission acting in perfect good faith in accordance with 
the terms of agreement to which the U.S. adheres. 

Nobody questioned that the U.S. had a right to con- 
sider the desire of hat manufacturers in Danbury and 
Norwalk, Conn, to require European hat makers to pay 
more than 40% to 50% duties (agreed to by the U.S. 
at Geneva Tariff Conference of 1947) before selling 
their hats in the U.S. But what sticks out a mile from 
this report is the chaos that faces all international 
trade in which private business partakes and which 
requires the investment of substantial capital sums if 
every country acts only on such considerations without 
submitting its actions to international review. The 
nationalized Czeehoslovakian industries could easily 
juggle their prices to sell over any conceivable duty 
barrier. It is the private European companies that 
cannot. 

12. As for the "dollar gap," it is apparent that, if this 
is to be narrowed down to limits compatible with inter- 
national equilibrium, Italy and other EuroiJean countries 
must rely chiefly on an increase in their exports of 
specialties and other typical goods to the United States. 



April 28, 7952 



663 



For Italy cannot be expected to compete in mass pro- 
duced goods and "heavy" durables or appliances, and 
must concentrate on manufactured specialties requiring 
to a large extent the use of specialized labor and tradi- 
tional skills. In all cases, these imports are but a negli- 
gible fraction of total American consumption, hence of 
total domestic production. And while it is the essence 
of competition to bring aliout some redistribution of 
resources in the interest of an efficient division of labor, 
the effect of these imports on American industry, in- 
cluding the interested segments of it, cannot be but ex- 
tremely small, particularly in the context of a prospering 
economy of full employment. 

If escape and peril clauses were involved at will, simply 
to avoid the slightest injury to a marginal fringe of do- 
mestic producers, there could l)e no hope for Italy or 
other countries to develop their imports to the United 
States, and consequently to bring their dollar account into 
balance. 

The situation would become particularly hopeless if the 
slightest indication of success in that direction in any 
individual line or commodity should be used as a signal 
for invoking escape clauses. A vicious spiral would de- 
velop and the whole process would become nugatory. 

13. There can be no question but that restrictive import 
practices at the present time intensify inflationary pres- 
sures in this country and abroad. It is generally recog- 
nized that one of the basic means of fighting inflation, 
domestically and at the international level, is through 
production and more production, so that the gap between 
disposable income and consumers' goods can be narrowed 
and, if possible, closed. Restrictive import practices 
have, of course, exactly the same effect on inflation as 
the curtailment of production, since they affect both the 
supply and the price level of consumers' goods. 

Even more serious is the impact of such restrictions on 
International inflation, since foreign countries, such as 
Italy, which are already sutfering from adverse changes 
in the terms of trade of the past 18 months, are faced 
with additional difficulties with respect to the earning of 
dollars. At one and the same time, economic aid has 
been decreased, the Italian "dollar gap" has increased to 
more than 3.50 million dollars and Italian requirements 
for supplies from the dollar area have increased, both 
for defense production and for rebuilding after the dis- 
asters of recent floods whose damages are estimated at 
more than 500 million dollars. 

It is unnecessary to emphasize this point, since the 
growing threat to the joint defense effort and to the 
economy of the European members of the Nato alliance 
has become a matter of common knowledge, and of urgent 
concern for the American Government. 

14. Finally, there are the political and psychological 
effects to be considered ; these can hardly be overesti- 
mated. What is at stake is the vast store of goodwill and 
gratitude which exists in Italy and other friendly coun- 
tries as a result of the generous iMStwar American aid, 
and of Marshall Plan aid in particular. For, most seg- 
ments of Italian public opinion are altogether at a loss 
to understand how the vast amount of help poured into 
Italy during the past 3 years, with the express purpose of 
restoring the stability of both the domestic and the inter- 
national economy of the nation, can be reconciled with the 
recent restrictions that have hit vital sectors of the 
Italian economy. The very fact that these restrictions 
are but incidental and almost trivial within the over-all 
context of U.S. policies, is bound to intensify their adverse 
impact. This is becau-se they appear to involve the mis- 
taken idea that, while American policies are liberal and 
indeed generous at their over-all level, they acquire an 
altogether different connotation as soon as the protec- 
tion of special interests is concerned. 

This implication, no matter how unwarranted, plays di- 
rectly into the hands of that vocal minority of opinion 
wliich is swayed by Communist propaganda in Europe. 
As it is known, the Communists noisily press their line that 
the Marshall Plan and other aid programs are not really 



664 



meant to bring about the economic emancipation of West- 
ern Europe but to perpetuate their dependence on Amer- 
ican bounty, and that American aid programs are 
calculated to find additional outlets for domestic pro- 
duction, while barring the door to foreign products. The 
result is that a state of confusion and doubt is generated 
in the minds of some people — which is sedulously ex- 
ploited by the Communist minority for its own ends — de- 
spite the constant emphasis of the Italian Government on 
the true facts. 

15. The emergence of renewed symptoms of reversal to 
restrictive trade practices is particularly disquieting and 
disappointing at the present time, when the mutual de- 
fense effort of the democratic nations calls for the greatest 
practicable "pooling" of means and resources. In tils 
connection it may be permissible to call attention to a 
situation whicli appears to stand out as a major incon- 
sistency in the American policies related to the mutual de- 
fense effort, both at the domestic and at the international 
level. The acute shortages which have developed since 
June 1950 in many lines of domestic industrial production 
for military and other essential purposes, make it only 
natural that the greatest possible recour.se be made to im- 
ports, particularly from friendly and allied countries. 

In line with this principle, an Executive Order (no. 
10210) was issued by the President of the United States 
in February 1951, authorizing all military and civilian 
procurement agencies of the U. S. Government to make 
defense contracts "without regard to the provisions of 
law" concerning the making of such contracts. The 
Italian Eml)assy understood that the Executive Order 
would permit the "Buy American" statute either to be 
waived or otherwise modified in application. Yet, certain 
.specific instances, which have occurred recently (for in- 
stance, in connection with bids submitted to the Munitions 
Board on behalf of Italian manufacturers of optical and 
precision instruments) indicate conclusively that the 
Executive Order is still disregarded as concerns the stat- 
ute, on the ground that the use of the authority under the 
Order is permissive and not mandatory. As late as Sep- 
tember 29, 1951, the Munitions Board Informed a foreign 
firm that "to date, this authority has not been exercised." 
The communication continued to the effect that, as far as 
the Board was concerned, the limitations of the "Buy 
American" Act were still being enforced, and for this 
reason a bid which was substantially cheaper than those 
submitted by American manufacturers but not to the ex- 
tent of the full 25 percent prescribed in that Act, was 
rejected. 

Recent examples of difiiculties met by Italian firms be- 
cause of the "Buy American" Act have been brought to the 
attention of the Department of State with Embassy's 
memorandum on the "dollar gap" problem, of September 
19.50, and Embassy's Note no. 13661 of December 18, 1951. 
Because of these difficulties Italy is losing important op- 
portunities of work and the means of earning the much 
needed dollars for her purchases in the United States, and 
the Italian industry is prevented from helping to relieve 
the shortages being encountered in the defense production. 

16. It is unnecessary to stress that legislation sucli as 
the "Buy American" statute, which was passed at the 
height of the great depression and when domestic unem- 
ployment was between 10 and 15 million persons, has be- 
come altogether obsolete and anachronistic under the 
conditions of full employment which have prevailed in 
the United States during the past 10 years. This is even 
more true today under the present emergency, and is 
recognized implicitly in the President's Executive Order 
which permits suspending the operation of tlie Act. The 
Order was widely publicized in Italy as evidence of the 
firm determination of the United States to make the joint 
defense effort mutual in fact as well as In name, and as 
a timely and welcome step toward trade liberalization in 
general. The fact that the Order has apparently had no 
influence on the administration of the statute and that 
the Italian industries are practically excluded from bids 

Department of State Bulletin 



that would assure substantial economy for the U. S. Gov- 
ernment and reduce unemployment in Italy, is also a 
source of considerable embarrassment for the Italian Gov- 
ernment, in the face of the many inquiries and representa- 
tions which are being received by Italian firms desirous of 
liarticlpating in these bids. 

17. In conchision, it is certainly not the desire of the 
Italian Government to overrate the significance of the 
problems outlined in this memorandum, within the gen- 
eral context of the close economic and political relations 
between the two countries. There is no doulit, however, 
that their significance should not be overlooked with re- 
spect to both the present emergency and ultimate trends. 

The Italian Government is confident that the Govern- 
ment of the United States will do everything in its power 
to eliminate obstacles and procedures that are proving so 
distre.'ising for Italian exports to the United States, bear- 
ing in mind the necessity for Italy to reduce unemploy- 
ment and increase her dollar earnings. 

[Enclosure A] 

PREVIOUS ITALIAN MEMORANDA ON U. S. TRADE 
BARRIERS AND IMPORT RESTRICTIONS 

1) Memorandum on situation and outlook of Italian ex- 
ports to the United States (August 1949). 

This memorandum gave a general outline of the trade 
situation between Italy and the United States, illustrating 
the need for reduction of trade restrictions and for the in- 
crease of exports of Italian goods to the United States 
market. 

Particular mention was made of the drastic increase 
in American import duties on all typical and traditional 
Italian exports from 1913 to 1930, and especially of the 
high protective barriers, customs procedures, and 
regulations. 

The memorandum also underlined the importance for 
Italy of resuming her exports to the United States in 
order to maintain and increase her purchases of American 
products. 

2) Memorandum [of September 1949] on the necessitij of 
increasinij ItiiJian exports to the United States. 

This memorandum called the attention of the United 
States authorities to the unnecessary hardships caused 
by a policy which intended to restrict imports of certain 
goods, but which at the same time did not succeed in 
promoting to any worthwhile extent the demand for 
similar or related domestic items. The examples given 
illustrated that the duty on such items during the last 
25 years meant many millions of dollars in taxes paid by 
American consumers in the form of duties and higher 
domestic prices, without developing domestic production. 
This was especially true for items such as olive oil, an- 
chovies, vermouth, pignolia nuts, musical instruments, 
etc. — some of these are absolutely non-competitive, some 
have characteristics which are beyond any possibility of 
imitation, while others, even if sold at much higher prices 
than the corresponding domestic articles in consequence 
of heavy customs duties, still appeal to certain categories 
of American consumers because of their traditional cu.s- 
toms or habits (food habits, for example, of Americans 
of Italian extractions). 

3) Memorandum on import obstacles encountered by 
Italian exporters in the United States market 
(December 1949). 

This memorandum illustrating the facts contained in 
the preceding memorandum, listed a series of specific 
cases of the discouraging experiences of Italian exporters 
and the handicaps encountered by them in the introduc- 
tion of new articles. 

The memorandum also offered suggestions for over- 
coming the difficulties and the obstacles created by the 
highly complicated and strict regulations of the Customs, 
Patent, Food and Drug Administration authorities and 
laws such as the "Buy American" Act, Tariff Act of 
1930, etc. 



4) Memorandum on the need of reducing trade unbalance 
between Italy and the United States throuyh further 
lowering of U. S. tariff duties on typical and non- 
competitive Italian exports products (June 1950). 

This memorandum analyzed briefly the critical situa- 
tion of the Italian export trade based on figures for the 
year 1949. Italy importwl from the United States in 
1949 6% times (in total value) as many goods as she 
was able to export to the United States, ($458.1 million 
versus 71.2 million). Her annual trade deficit mth the 
United States, which before the war {1935-38 average) 
was $21.5 million, in 191,9 became 18 times larger. 

A list was attached to the Memorandum showing some 
typical Italian export items (mostly non-competitive with 
American production subject to U.S. protective duties of 
50 percent, 60 percent, 90 percent ad valorem). 

5) Memorandum on the "dollar gap" problem (Septem- 
ber 1950). 

This memorandum suggested that, in order to reach a 
better equilibrium of trade between Italy and the United 
States and to lessen the Italian "dollar gap," more liberal 
views were needed in solving import problems, some of 
which were directly aggravated by the too strict applica- 
tion of laws or regulations such as : 

1. Custom Bills and Procedures (now being revised) ; 

2. Food and Drug Act ; 

3. Tariff negotiations ; 

4. "Buy American" Act, etc. 

Tlie memorandum pointed out that the continued ex- 
istence of trade barriers raised long ago, under domestic 
and international economic conditions which no longer 
exist, was an anachronism in contradiction with the 
general policy followed by the United States Government 
and with the program of a closer international economic 
cooperation. 

6 ) Note Verbale on the su bject of import quotas on cheeses, 
adopted by the United States on August 9, 1951. 

The note pointed out that none of the circumstances 
mentioned in the amended provisions of the Defense 
Production Act (Andresen Amendment) really existed as 
to require an import control of Italian cheeses, most of 
which were, because of their characteristics (especially 
in the case of sheep's milk cheese) non-competitive xvith 
domestic production. It was also mentioned that the 
restrictions on imports of Italian cheese would amount 
to a violation of the provision of Article 11 of the Gatt 
and would void the U.S. tariff reductions agreed upon at 
Torquay for which Italy had granted similar tariff re- 
ductions in favor of American producers. 

The most striking result of these restrictive measures 
was an increase of the Italian trade deficit and a reduc- 
tion of her dollar earnings from exports to the United 
States, which have been used for the procurement of 
essential foodstuffs and raw material in this country. 

7) Memorandum on the importance for the Italian econ- 
omy of exporting almonds to the United States and 
on the necessity of avoiding any restrictive measures 
in this connection (September 1951). 

This memorandum was Inspired by the pressure exer- 
cised by the California Almond Growers Exchange on the 
U.S. Tariff Commission which resulted in an increase on 
the duties of almonds imported from Italy and the adop- 
tion of other restrictive measures and controls applied to 
this Italian export. The memorandum pointed out that 
there was no real necessity for the application of such 
measures because imports of Italian almonds were not in 
competition with local production. In fact, their particu- 
lar characteristics and quality destined them to special 
uses, for Instance in the confectionery industry, which 
could not be completely supplied out of domestic 
production. 

Again, principal result of these measures was a further 
injury to the Italian economy and the aggravation of 
tlie trade deficit of a country that imported from the 



April 28, 1952 



665 



United States agricultural products in amounts surpassing 
5 to 6 times the value of lier exports to the United States 
of typical Italian foodstuffs lil^e cheese, olive oil, 
wines, etc. 

8) Comments on recent requests hy American manufac- 
turers for tariff inei-ease on leather t/oods (April 1951). 

These were comments on some press reports which de- 
scribed the alarm created among United States leather 
manufacturers by the competition of foreign exporting 
firms. In order to avoid the danger of "bankruptcy" for 
the whole U.S. leather industry, industry spokesmen ad- 
vocated an increase in tariff protection. 

9) Note Verbale of October 1951 on the increase of pro- 
tective tariffs on fur felt hats, hij the application of 
the "escape clause." 

The Note called the attention of the United States au- 
thorities to the fact that the new customs duties of Decem- 
ber 1950 applied to bats and hat bodies imported from 
Czechoslovakia, Italy, and other countries. However, 
since the adoption of other restrictive measures against 
Czechoslovakia, the trade with that country has ceased. 
In consequence the above said measures might be reconsid- 
ered with advantage to both our countries. 

10) Memorandum of November 1951 to the Eca, aimed 
at havinfi Italy included, as an authorized source of 
supply among the countries bidding on commercial 
and government procurement authorization lists, at 
least for the products and services which Italy is in 
a position to offer and export. 

11) Note Verbale of November 2-}, 1951 on the threatened 
adoption of quantity restrictions or increase of duties 
on imports of olive oil. 

The Note related that the California olive oil producers 
intended to invoke the adoption of quantity restrictions 
on imports of olive oil, under the provisions of Section 101 
of the Defen.se Production Act, as amended, or to invoke 
the "escape" and "peril" clauses for an increase of the 
tariff protection, which would curtail the imports of olive 
oil from abroad. 

The Note called the attention of the State Department to 
the fact that olive oil is one of the most important Italian 
exports to the United States and its sale in American mar- 
kets enables Italy to buy in the United States large quan- 
tities of other foodstuffs and raw materials necessary 
to her economy, including the soy beans, soy oil, and other 
oil seeds used in Italian domestic consumption. 

The Note observed also, as in the ca.se of restrictions on 
cheeses, that from a practical point of view none of the 
conditions contemplated in Section 104 of the Defense 
Production Act really subsisted and that none of the cir- 
cumstances under which Art. XIX of Gatt admits the 
application of the "escape clause" were present ; there- 
fore any increase of duty or any quantity restrictions on 
imports of olive oil will be considered a violation of the 
multilateral trade agreements signed at Geneva, Annecy, 
and Torquay, and an unnecessary blow to a traditional 
current of exports which enables Italy to buy heavy 
quantities of agricultural products in the United States. 

12) Note Verbale [of December 16, 1951] complaining of 
the new system of subsidies adopted by the Depart- 
ment of Agriculture in favor of American lemon and 
orange exports, competing with Italian products in 
foreign markets. 

The Note Verbale points out that the adoption of these 
provisions by the Department of Agriculture does not ap- 
pear consistent with the U.S. tariff laws, which contem- 
plate drastic countervailing duties against foreign prod- 
ucts benefiting of subsidies and that such regulations 
failed to comply with the provisions contained in Article 
16 of the Genera! Agreement on Tariff and Commerce 
as well as with the obligation to notify the other Con- 
tracting Parties of the intention to adopt export subsi- 
dies, indicating its importance, nature, and effects. 



The Italian Government is seriously concerned regard- 
ing the effects such measures will have on the Italian 
economy since the citrus production and exports represent 
one of the few economic resources for the poor regions of 
southern Italy and assures work to large masses of the 
population. Exports of lemons, oranges, and their sub- 
products represent, moreover, an important source of 
supply of foreign currency needed for Italy's purchases of 
raw materials and foodstuffs abroad. 

This system of subsidies, which affects important Italian 
trade currents, and the recent quantity restrictions on 
imports of products of particular interest for the Italian 
economy, as cheeses, almonds, etc., besides seriously im- 
pairing the Italian economy tends to destroy the advan- 
tages gained through the Annecy and Torquay regulations 
for which Italy granted the United States adequate tariff 
concessions. 

13) Note Verbale of the Italian Embassy regarding the 
"Buy American" Act (December IS, 1951). 

The Note called the attention of the Department of 
State to the damaging effects of continued application of 
the "Buy American" Act in the present emergency situa- 
tion requiring a closer economic cooperation between the 
United States and Western European countries. 

The "Buy American" Act represented the natural ex- 
pressi(m of a situation of economic depression which, 
happily, no longer exists. Now its protective, drastic 
measures prevent foreign countries from participating 
in bids connected with economic mobilization and defense 
production, place obstacles in the way of relieving short- 
ages in the United States (as machine tools, optical instru- 
ments, etc.) and simultaneously providing democratic 
countries with the means of reducing unemployment and 
earning dollars needed for their economic recovery. 



Recent Soviet Maneuvers 

Statement by Secretary Acheson 

[Released to the press April 16] 

In answer to questioiis on whether the U.S. pol- 
icy of negotiating from strength had changed in 
any way,, in view of the current Soviet '■''peace of- 
fensive" Secretary Acheson at his news conference 
on April 16 made the following extemporaneous 
statement : 

I think that we have always taken the view that 
one wlio is in a stronger position is much more 
able to negotiate than a person who is in a weak 
position. We never changed our view on that. 
We always have negotiated — we have been nego- 
tiating for years with the Soviet Union. 

We have never stopped negotiating. The ques- 
tion is not whether you are willing to negotiate, 
but what you can negotiate about, and whether 
there is any real desire to negotiate. 

I shouldn't say, in the first place, there was a 
stepping up of the peace offensive. If you take 
the whole of the Soviet propaganda together, one 
of the items which has taken an extraordinarily 
large part of the attention of all the media of 
Soviet propaganda has been this biological war- 
fare matter, in which they have made the most 
false, continuous charges against the United 
States, although it is directed also against the 
U.N. Command in Korea. There, over and over 



666 



Department of State Bulletin 



again, proposals have been made by iis to have 
this investigated by the International Red Cross 
and to have the World Health Organization come 
into it.^ But all suggestions looking toward the 
ascertaining of the facts ax'e brushed over by the 
Soviet Union without so much as a comment. 
But the campaign goes on and has taken a vast 
amount of space in all media — radio, press, and 
otherwise. 

Now, that, I should not call a "peace offensive." 
The things which you possibly have in mind are 
the exchange of notes in regard to Germany,^ the 
economic conference,^ and that sort of thino;. 

With respect to the Moscow Economic Confer- 
ence, I spoke on that subject before, and I think 
that everything that has happened has tended to 
bear out what I said at that time. 

I think it is very interesting to note, if you will 
read my comments on March 14, that what has 
happened is that while the Soviet spokesmen in 
Moscow have been indicating a willingness to buy 
quantities of luxury and other goods of that sort, 
this is all wrapped up with and tied to the pro- 
curement of strategic materials, which are impor- 
tant from the Soviet point of view in building up 
their military strength. 

The whole thing seems directed toward raising 
doubts as to whether the defense of the West is 
an urgent matter, and should be carried forward 
with the zeal that we all believe is necessary. I 
don't think that maneuver has succeeded in any 
way. 



Founding of OAS Celebrated 

Remarks hy the President * 

[Released to the press by the White Bouse April H] 

It is a pleasure for me to meet with you and to 
extend to each one of you a personal greeting on 
this Pan American Day. We are celebrating the 
founding of the Organization of American States 
[Oas], which was established 62 years ago. This 
organization symbolizes the good-neighborly rela- 
tions and the peaceful cooperation that we have 
developed in our inter-American system. 

Last year, on December 13, the new charter of 
the Organization came into effect. This was a 
forward step in the long history of this Organiza- 



' Bulletin of Mar. 17, 1952, p. 427, and Mar. 24, 1952, 
p. 452. 

= Ibid., Apr. 7, 1952, p. 531. 

'Ibid., Mar. 24, 1952, p. 447. 

* Made at Washington, on the occasion of receiving mem- 
bers of the Council of the Oas on Pan American Day 
(Apr. 14), 62d anniversary of the founding of the Pan 
American Union, keystone of the Oas. 



tion. From now on, by virtue of its new charter, 
the Organization will have an even better oppor- 
tunity to continue its important work of further- 
ing the cooperation of our respective countries. 

That cooperation was high-lighted about a year 
ago when this Government had the honor to act 
as host to the fourth meeting of Foreign Ministers. 
At that time, the Foreign Ministers gave careful 
consideration to the common problems facing our 
hemisphere by reason of the aggressive policy of 
international communism. Acting in accordance 
with the finest inter-American traditions, they 
worked out a common set of policies regarding our 
regional action in regard to that danger. 

Our governments emphasized at that time our 
determination to uphold our common objective of 
achieving a peaceful and cooperative world order. 
We expressed our firm resolve to strengthen our 
defenses only in order that our countries might 
continue to live in peace and devote themselves to 
promoting the cultural and economic welfare of 
their peoples. Our policy continues to be guided 
by that purpose today. 

The Organization of American States is tan- 
gible evidence of our belief that cooperative effort 
among nations is essential to prevent aggression, 
to eliminate want, and to increase human liberty 
and happiness. In the achievement of these aims, 
the principles of mutual respect, of solidarity, and 
of belief in the dignity of man, upon which our 
inter- American system rests, are of profound im- 
portance. They express the essence of our com- 
mon faith and form the basis of our common 
purpose. 

This anniversary should be a day of rededication 
to the great spiritual values of our common 
heritage. 

In that spirit, I extend my best wishes to each 
of you and through you to the Organization of 
American States and to the peoples which it 
serves. 



Fellowships Available for Study 
In Latin America 

[Released to the press April 17] 

A few fellowships for study in Latin America 
are still available under the U.S. Government's 
educational exchange program for the current 
year, the Department of State announced on April 
17. Offered under terms of the Convention for 
the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Rela- 
tions, which provides for an annual exchange of 
students between the United States and each of the 
signatory republics, the fellowships are tenable in 
Bolivia, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. 



April 28, 1952 



667 



Completed application forms must be returned to 
the International Educational Programs Branch, 
U.S. Office of Education, Federal Security 
Agency, Washington, before May 20. The Ad- 
visory Committee on Exchange of Students will 
nominate a panel of five candidates to be submitted 
to each of the four countries concerned. Final 
selection of two persons to study in each country 
will be made by the government of the respective 
country. Application fonns and further infor- 
mation regarding these fellowships may be ob- 
tained from the Office of Education. 

Under this program the U.S. Government pro- 
vides transportation to and from the receiving 
country, and the host country pays tuition, a 
monthly maintenance allowance, and in some cases 
a small allowance for books and incidental ex- 
penses. It will probably be necessary for the stu- 



dent to supplement his maintenance allowance 
from other sources to meet cost-of-living expenses. 
Applicants should have the following general 
qualifications: U.S. citizenship; a bachelor's de- 
gree or its equivalent at the time of acceptance of 
the grant ; sufficient knowledge of Spanish to carry 
on the proposed study; and a good academic or 
professional record. Since appropriate univer- 
sity study facilities are not available in all the 
countries, candidates must be capable of carrying 
on independent research. They are therefore re- 
quired to present a suitable plan of study or a 
research topic approved by their adviser or super- 
vising professor, if enrolled in an educational 
institution, or by the Office of Education, if not so 
enrolled. All other considerations being equal, 
persons under 35 years of age and veterans are 
given preference. 



Mutual Security Requires Mutual Understanding 



hy Wilso?i Compton 

Adrninistrator, Internaticmal Information Administration ^ 



The U. S. International Information Adminis- 
tration is important. Its commission comes from 
Congress. Its operating tools include press and 
publications services, radio — that is the Voice of 
America — motion pictures, overseas information 
centers, and the interchange of persons. 

The International Information Administration 
deals with ideas. It does not deal with bullets, 
though there is a very specific relationship between 
ideas and bullets. It is my belief — and history 
supports me in this — that ideas can be more pow- 
erful than guns. It is my belief that the success- 
ful operation of the International Information 
Program can mean the difference between global 
peace and global war. It is my belief that our 
security rests in large part upon our ability to 
promote an honest understanding of Amei'ica 
and America's aims as well as to counter the 
lies and the half-truths which the Communists 
are telling about us. 

Today's world is a dangerous world. The 
freedoms which we cherish can no longer be taken 
for granted. The menace of aggressive inter- 
national communism confronts many free nations 

^ Excerpts from an address made before the Southern 
Pine Association at New Orleans, La., on Apr. 7 and 
released to the press on the same date. 



to whose security our own is very directly related; 
and it confronts us. We are concerned for our 
national security today, and we are doing some- 
thing about it. We are concerned also about our 
security tomorrow and we should be doing some- 
thing about that, too. 

That, my friends, is why I want to talk to you 
about America's foreign policy and about the role 
of the International Information and Exchange 
of Persons Program in helping to make that 
policy effective. 

Our Foreign Policy Defined 

What is America's foreign policy? When I 
came to the Department of State some weeks ago 
I asked the same question. I was given a pam- 
phlet of about 75 pages entitled "Our Foreign 
Policy." - That pamphlet made interesting read- 
ing. And it is available to anyone who wants it. 

I was told also that if I wanted a more extensive 
definition I could get it in about an 8-foot shelf 
of documents; or if I wanted it in complete his- 
torical perspective from the beginning of the Re- 
public, I could find it on a whole wall of the 
library. 

' For excerpts from this pamphlet (Department of State 
publication 4466), see Bui-letin of Mar. 24, 1952, p. 478. 



668 



Department of State Bulletin 



Since then I have seen our foreign policy stated 
in 10 short paragraphs on a single typewritten 
page. But I like an even shorter — if unofficial — 
definition : 

"Our foreign policy is the average reaction to 
international affairs of the ordinary decent Amer- 
ican citizen, conscious and reasonably well in- 
formed of our relations with other nations, who 
wants first, to have his own chance in life ; second, 
to assure at least as good a chance in life for his 
children; third, to wear his own collar; fourth, 
to live in peace; fifth, to be a good neighbor." 

Now, this statement of foreign policy has little 
to do either with an 8-foot shelf of documents or 
with official "gobbledegook." And to the extent 
that it implies that the U.S. Government stands 
around waiting for something to happen on the 
international scene before taking concrete action, 
it is certainly not realistic. 

But it does give us an excellent point of de- 
parture. By and large, it is consistent with the 
basic objective of a sound democratic foreign pol- 
icy as the Department of State sees it. That ob- 
jective is to preserve the security of the Nation 
while helping to create a decent world environ- 
ment. 

Simple? Perhaps. But sometimes — and much 
to our regret — the seemingly simple things prove 
to be the most difficult. But the difficulty is not 
so much in determining the policy itself as in 
choosing or deciding the specific means of carrying 
it out. That is where we often get into contro- 
versy. In foreign affairs as in domestic affairs, 
every American has his own opinion. As I have 
said, "He wants to wear his own collar." 

Basic Premises 

Now, I do not want to assail you with a long 
dissertation on foreign policy. I do want to spend 
some time talking about the U.S. International 
Information Administration. But I do think that 
we ought to examine some of the basic premises 
upon which America's foreign policy rests. 

One major premise is that our freedom and our 
security are directly linked to the freedom and 
security of the entire free world. The Mutual 
Security Program, under which we are cooperat- 
ing with our friends in building the defensive 
strength necessary to deter aggression, is based 
on this assumption. 

The truth is that America cannot go it alone in 
this kind of world. I am equally certain that we 
do not want to. I hope that we shall not be penny- 
wise and pound-foolish. If we are, we will pay 
the consequences or, if we do not, our children 
will. 

A second premise of America's foreign policy is 
that it seeks a just peace. Let me repeat that 
phrase : " a just peace." 

It is certain that we cannot have security for 
ourselves if we do not have a just and stable peace. 



It is equally certain that we cannot have security 
with a synthetic peace manufactured in and dic- 
tated fronr the Kremlin. Peace without justice is 
not peace. 

The President made that point in a recent state- 
ment from which I quote : 

. . . we must build peace in the world : not peace at any 
price, but a peace in which the peoples of all countries — 
big and little alike — can live free from the fear of ag- 
gression.' 

A third premise of our foreign policy is that 
America's security is directly affected by the social 
and economic condition of the other free peoples. 
I am thinking here of the living standards of the 
hundreds of millions of people living in the under- 
developed areas. 

America will not have genuine security with- 
out a stable peace. We will not have a stable 
peace so long as hunger, illiteracy, and disease are 
rampant among millions of people who know that 
there is a better way to live and are determined to 
seek it. 

Communism feeds on economic discontent and 
social upheaval. Communism holds out the 
hope — false though it be — of a better world. And 
though the Communists' promises are one thing 
and their actions quite another, we dare not as- 
sume that they are not getting results. For the 
hungry, the sick, and the unlettered, the picture 
the Comnmnists paint is much like the straw for 
which the drowning man grasps. 

If we Americans wish to preserve and 
strengthen our own freedom, we must encourage 
and help the rest of the free world to do likewise. 
It is a tragic fact — but a fact, nevertheless — that 
hungry people are as much concerned with bread 
as they are with freedom. And communism 
pretends to offer bread. 

This is where our Point Four Program of tech- 
nical cooperation with the people of underdevel- 
oped areas comes in. Point Four marks Amer- 
ica's awareness of how our own security is related 
to the standard of living of other peoples. 

It is designed to help the peoples of underdevel- 
oped areas to help themselves. It is designed to 
raise their standards of living by helping them to 
develop a technological understanding of their 
own. Point Four symbolizes the helping hand of 
Christian doctrine even as it is a positive force 
against the inroads of communism. It is one of 
our greatest investments in peace, and one of the 
least expensive. 

A fourth premise of American foreign policy, 
the last I am going to discuss, is that we must 
take positive action to promote both economic sta- 
bility and military strength among our free 
neighbors. The North Atlantic Pact, the job 
which General Eisenhower is doing to build an 
effective European defense force, the Marshall 
Plan, the economic and military provisions of the 
Mutual Security Program — all of these things 

' See md. 



April 28, 7952 



669 



have been and are a part of the building of a free- 
world bastion strong enough to deter aggi-ession 
or, if necessary, to defeat it. 

America cannot go it alone in today's world. 
We are big, but we are not that big. We are a 
wealthy Nation, but not that wealthy. We need 
friends. But we need solvent friends; and we 
need to stay solvent ourselves. 

The aid we are giving Europe is not charity. 
It is an investment in free-world stability and in 
our own security. We are not committed to sup- 
port foreign economies indefinitely and we should 
not be. We are committed to helping these econ- 
omies to become self-supporting. 

But we should not make the mistake of think- 
ing of economic and military aid as distinct and 
separate. They are anything but that. A 
nation's milita'iy potential is— and always has 
been — directly related to its economic potential. 
We should not shut our eyes to this fact. 

An Instrument of Foreign Policy 

Now let me talk about the International Infor- 
mation Administration as an instrument of Amer- 
ican foreign policy. 

Recently, Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief 
of Staff, made a significant statement about the 
International Information Program in his testi- 
mony before Congress. The general, like most 
top military men, is concerned primarily with our 
military defenses. 

This is what the general said about the relation- 
ship between American security and our overseas 
information program : 

We must go all out in the battle of ideas. Only thus 
can we hope to convince potential aggressors that another 
war cannot pay. 

I am convinced that failure to carry on a vig- 
orous offensive in the field of ideas would be to 
invite calamity. Let us make no mistake — we are 
not going to get into a propaganda war. We are 
already in it and we had better stay in it, if we 
want what we need, namely, allies who understand 
us, respect us and have faith in us. 

But there is a vast distinction between what we 
are seeking to do in the international information 
field and what the Soviets are doing. The Iron 
Curtain countries have geared their propaganda 
to the "Big Lie," an inhuman mixture of deceits, 
half-truths and no truths at all. The present 
Soviet charge that we have been using bacterio- 
logical warfare in Korea is typical. It is a com- 
plete fabrication from start to finish. 

Now, it takes a lot of money to sustain a world- 
wide "Big Lie" campaign. The Soviet Union and 
its satellites are now spending more than 1 billion, 
400 million dollars. 

We have geared our program to the "Big 
Truth." That costs nnich less than the "Big Lie." 
During the current fiscal year, we have for the 



"Big Truth" campaign overseas an appropriation 
of 85 million dollars. For the next fiscal year, the 
President has asked 13?> million dollars for these 
purposes. Last week, the House Appropriations 
Committee recommended 111 million dollars to the 
House as a whole for conducting the information 
and educational exchange program. 

Whatever Congress' final decision, we will get 
along. I am more interested in our doing a good 
job with whatever funds Congress decides to make 
available than in complaining because it did not 
appropriate more. 

Our Campaign of Truth is the road to victory 
in the battle of ideas. This is not only a moral 
evaluation, important as that may be. It is a 
conclusion based upon hard facts. 

Consider, if you will, what we are doing with 
the written word. We are reaching a large for- 
eign reading audience. 

Our press materials, for example, daily go to an 
estimated 10,000 foreign newspapers with a read- 
ership of more than 100 million. For the most 
part, these materials are distributed through our 
information centers overseas to the newspapers 
and other publications in their areas. 

As for magazines, pamphlets, and other publi- 
cations, plans call for production of more than 
91 million copies during the current fiscal year. 
Inasnuich as an average of five or more people 
read a single copy, these publications have a mini- 
mum audience of nearly one-half billion people. 
And that is quite an audience. 
I might say, also, that these publications are 
printed in about 60 different languages. One 
publication, for example, has been reproduced in 
26 languages. 

You will be interested to hear that the paper 
which goes into our press releases and publica- 
tions is purchased almost exclusively in this coun- 
try. During the current fiscal year, we will be 
buying some 7,000 tons of newsprint and more 
than 2,000 tons of book and other paper stocks. 

Motion pictures, which we are producing in 40 
different languages, have proved particularly 
effective in telling America's story abroad. Last 
year, our films told that story to more than 500 
million ]5eople in 86 countries. This year, the 
number who will view the films is expected to be 
even greater. 

Another vitally important phase of America's 
Campaign of Truth is the exchange of persons 
program. In the past year, nearly 8,000 students, 
teachers, professors, and leaders came to this 
country from abroad or went overseas on U.S. 
(lovernment-sponsored grants. But many more 
thousands traveled the two-way street of under- 
standing as the guests of private individuals and 
agencies. Right now, for example, there are more 
than 30,000 foreign students studying on about 
1,400 American campuses. Less than 10 percent 
of these students are supported by U.S. Govern- 
ment funds. 



670 



Department of Sfafe Bulletin 



At present, we are putting strong emphasis on 
the exchange of leaders — journalists, labor lead- 
ers, government oflicials — people who are opinion- 
moulders and can exert influence in their home 
countries. These are people who have learned the 
truth about America first-hand and can spread 
the truth among their own peoples when they 
I'eturn. 

In addition to publications, motion pictui-es, and 
the exchange-of-persons program, we are operat- 
ing a vast chain of overseas information centers 
which greatly assist the other programs I have 
just described. At the present time we have 165 
overseas information centers located in 59 coun- 
tries and 34 binational centers in 22 countries. 
These centers provide not only a place for dis- 
tributing materials, but provide local citizens with 
a variety of services. They contain well-stocked 
libraries and are the meeting place for lec- 
tures, discussions, concerts, and motion-picture 
showings. 

Communist Reaction to VOA 

Perhaps the best evidence of the efFectiveness of 
these progi-ams is the reaction of the Communists 
themselves to what we are doing. 

Take radio — the Voice of America. 

We know that the Soviet Union alone is spend- 
ing over a billion dollars a year on its propaganda 
activities. Much of that is being spent to keep 
our information materials and the Voice of Amer- 
ica from penetrating the Iron Curtain. 

The Soviets are spending almost as much on 
jamming our radio broadcasts to Russia as we are 
spending on our entire world-wide radio pro- 
gram — a program in which we are now broadcast- 
ing in 46 languages. The total Soviet expenditure 
on propaganda activities is more than 10 times as 
great as the amount we are spending on our inter- 
national information activities. These are not 
merely educated guesses. These are estimates 
taken from the Soviet Union's own published 
repoi'ts. 

The psychotic Communist fear of the facts and 
of America's Campaign of Truth is also evidenced 
by the methods the Communist governments use 
to keep their people from listening to our broad- 
casts and from reading our information materials. 

Severe penalties are imposed on people in the 
Soviet Union and in the satellite areas who are 
caught repeating what they have heard over the 
Voice of America. In many areas, owners of radio 
sets are under surveillance. Electric current has 
been turned off in rural areas during peak Voice 
of America broadcast hours. 

The Communist press maintains a constant bar- 
rage of criticism of our information program. It 
constantly seeks to discredit our reliability. 

Communist government leaders, such as Pre- 
mier Gottwald of Czechoslovakia, have publicly 



stated that our information campaign is hitting 
them where it hurts. They have warned fellow 
Communists that everything possible must be done 
to "stamp out" listening to the "criminal" Voice 
of America. The Soviet Union has nearly 1,000 
radio stations doing almost nothing else but try- 
ing to jam our broadcasts. The Communists have 
gone to great lengths to keep the Voice of America 
from penetrating the Iron Curtain. But they will 
not succeed. 

We are getting through the Iron Curtain. In 
some of the satellite areas our listening audience 
is as much as 80 percent of those who have radio 
receivers. In some areas in the Soviet Union, 75 
percent of our broadcasts get through the jam- 
ming screen. In Moscow and Leningrad — where 
the jamming is particularly intense — our pene- 
tration average is about 25 percent. 

We are now broadcasting around the clock to the 
Iron Curtain countries in their own languages. 
If we don't get through one time, we do another. 

Recently, as you may know, we commissioned 
a novel floating radio transmitter. It is mounted 
on a ship and is operated for us by the Coast 
Guard. It carries powerful short-wave trans- 
mitters and one 150,000-watt medium-wave trans- 
mitter which is three times as powerful as the 
most powerful transmitter in operation in the 
United States today. We are also building seven 
broadcasting stations with many new electronic 
features. Each of these seven stations will have 
a signal power of a million watts — 20 times as 
great as that of the most powerful commercial 
stations known to be operating anywhere in the 
world today. Two of these transmitters will be 
operated in the United States, one in North Caro- 
lina, and one in the State of Washington. The 
other five are at strategic points overseas. 

We have asked Congress for authority to con- 
struct additional installations of the same power. 
We have also asked for two more floating trans- 
mitters, each with a power of 500,000 watts or 10 
times that of our most powerful domestic stations. 
The House Appropriations Committee has recom- 
mended a substantial amount for these purposes. 
What Congress will do, of course, remains to be 
seen. 

I mention these facts to show the extent to 
which the Voice of America is now penetrating 
the Iron Curtain, the provisions under way and 
in prospect for increasing that penetration and 
overcoming Communist jamming techniques. If 
within a few years we are able to complete these 
powerful radio broadcasting and relay installa- 
tions, we will be able to reach over 98 pei-cent of 
the world's population with the Voice of America. 
Meantime, we hope to keep on improving the 
me.ssage of hope, friendship, and helpfulness with 
which we shall continue to seek the understanding, 
respect, and confidence of all peoples. 



^pt\\ 28, 1952 



A7} 



U.S. Security Intertwined With Free World 

America's security is intertwined with the se- 
curity of the whole free world. We need our 
friends even as they need us. The free peoples 
can effectively deter or defeat aggression only if 
we maintain our strength, our stability, and our 
unity of purpose. 

America has been generous with her assistance 
to other peoples. We are generally respected 
among the other free nations, even admired, and 
considerably envied. But we are by no means uni- 
versally trusted. Many people — even among the 
nations which are our staunch allies — are inclined 
to question our motives. Too many people have a 
distorted picture of our American democracy — 
an impression which is being energetically pro- 
moted by Moscow. This is one of the most for- 
midable aspects of the so-called Cold War in 
which we are now engaged. 

It is important that we do not shut our eyes to 
this fact. Russia is not winning the Cold War. 
But Russia could win it if we fail to meet our re- 
sponsibilities in the informational arena. 

We have made and are continuing to ma,ke posi- 
tive gains. We can make even greater gains with 
your help — with the help of the American people. 
I have said that the business which has brought 
me here is your business just as much as it is my 
business. It is the business of every American. 

We are taxing ourselves and spending huge 
amounts now for a very simple purpose : We do 
not want a third world war. A third world war 
is not necessary. It is not inevitable. It is less 
likely to happen if we are strong. 

But we can never win a peace with armaments 
alone. Ideas and attitudes are equally important. 
The battle for men's minds cannot be neglected. 
In the long run, success in this battle may well 
prevent one of bullets and bombs on the global 
scale. 

And that brings me to the question of Amer- 
ica's long-run economic stability. 

When I was a young fellow I studied economics. 
I have never ceased to study it, and I marvel at 
some of the odd economic adventures which we 
undertake. But it does not take a gi-eat econ- 
omist to know that what we borrow we pay for ; 
that what someone borrows, someone else lends, 
that there is no mysterious way in which liabil- 
ities become assets. The economics which I 
learned says that this applies to governments too. 

We are today investing heavily in the means of 
war because we must. We are investing at the 



same time in the means of peace. That is the kind 
of investment for which I speak to you today. An 
investment in the minds of men everywhere — an 
investment that will build understanding, respect 
and trust for America. If we do not learn to 
make an investment in ideas, no amount invested 
in guns and tanks and bombs will bring peace to 
us or to our grandchildren. 

The kind of peace we seek must — first and fore- 
most — be based upon the unity of all the free 
peoples. That unity cannot be preserved by wish- 
ful thinking or by shirking, avoiding, or ignoring 
the issues which constantly arise. We Americans 
must learn to understand and respect other peo- 
ples. We must help them to understand us. We 
must learn to see and respect the values in their 
customs and cultures as well as our own; and we 
must see that they have an understanding of our 
American way of life. 

The free world's moral strength lies in mutual 
understanding; and if the free world does not 
have moral strength it is not strong, however large 
its armies and however vast its armaments. Let 
us make no mistake about that. We cannot have 
mutual security without mutual understanding; 
and we cannot have mutual understanding if we 
do not work at it. 

We are working at it through the U.S. Inter- 
national Information Program for which I speak. 
That is the reason I say that this program may 
in the long run play a key role in determining 
whether we are to have peace or war. 

As a patriotic organization representing an im- 
portant group of American taxpayers, the South- 
ern Pine Association is, of course, interested in 
keeping governmental expenditures to a minimiun 
level consistent with national security. 

To the extent that our efforts in the "war of 
ideas" strengthen the free world and weaken the 
threat of Communist aggression, to that extent will 
American taxpayers benefit. To the extent that 
we can add to the solidarity and the mutual con- 
fidence of the free peoples, to that extent will we 
Americans have greater security. 

This is not far-fetched. It is simple arithmetic. 
Nearly three- fourths of our governmental ex- 
penditures today is related to national defense and 
national security. 

To skimp on the provisions necessary for our 
national security while the present dangerous 
situation exists, would be foolhardy. But to look 
ahead to a time when such great expenditures for 
these purposes may not be necessary is good eco- 
nomics and plain common sense. 



672 



Department of State Bulletin 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



Sixth Regular Session of tlie General Assembly 



SUMMARY OF MAJOR ACTION: PART II 



iy Paul B. Taylor 



Economic Questions 

A large share of the work of the Second and 
Third Committees, dealing with economic, social, 
and humanitarian questions, consists in the con- 
sideration of the relevant sections of the report 
of the Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc) ; 
they do, however, handle some matters directly 
without prior Council consideration. Most of the 
problems are subjects of continuing study from 
year to year, in the developing work of the United 
Nations in this field. 



this resolution, mainly on the gi-ound that no de- 
veloped country is in a position now to contribute 
to a fund of this nature and that the adoption of 
a resolution calling for a fund, or for studies lead- 
ing to the creation of such a fund, would give rise 
to expectations which could not he fulfilled. On 
the subject of economic development the Assembly 
also adopted a resolution asking Ecosoc, in con- 
tinuing its studies, to pay particular attention to 
the financing of non-self-liquidating projects 
through existing institutions. 



ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 

The Second (Economic) Committee considered 
the general problem of economic develoi^ment 
which has attracted growing attention in United 
Nations economic discussions in recent years. 
The key problem was that of financing economic 
development. As at the preceding session, many 
underdeveloped countries urged that additional 
facilities for international financing of economic 
development be created and that an international 
fund be established by the United Nations to give 
grants in aid for non-self-liquidating projects. A 
resolution proposed by Chile, Cuba, Burma, 
Egypt, and Yugoslavia was adopted by the Gen- 
eral Assembly on January 12 by 30 votes to 16 
with 11 abstentions. The resolution requested 
Ecosoc to submit to the next Assembly session de- 
tailed i^lans for establishing a special fund for 
grants and long-term low-interest loans to under- 
developed countries. The United States opposed 

Editor's Note: Pnrt I of this article appeared in the 
Bulletin of April 21, 1952, page 632. 



LAND REFORM 

Tlie problem of land reform, which Secretary 
Acheson raised in a speech before the fifth session 
of the General Assembly and on which the Assem- 
bly, Ecosoc, Fao, and other specialized a";encies 
had worked during the past year, came up for dis- 
cussion. The Assembly adopted a resolution 
sponsored by the United States and representative 
countries from all the other regions of the world, 
that approved the comprehensive resolution on 
this subject adopted by Ecosoc at its thirteenth 
session " and made additional recommendations 
to governments. 



TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 

On the subject of technical assistance, the main 
resolution,^'' introduced by the United States, ap- 
proved the work which Ecosoc had done in this 
field, provided for the pledging of contributions 

" lUd., Sept. 17, 1951, p. 473. 
^'Ihid., Dec. 17, 1951, p. 995. 



April 28, 7952 



673 



for 1952, called for cooperation by private and 
nonprofit organizations, and recommended the 
strengthening of internal machinery within the 
governments of underdeveloped countries for 
planning prograins. 

A resolution relating to emergency international 
action in the event of famine was introduced by 
the United States. It requested the Secretary- 
General, in consultation with appropriate special- 
ized agencies, to recommend procedures for 
effective concerted action in the event of famine 
caused by national disasters. It also gave the 
Secretary -General the authority to draw upon the 
resources not only of governments but also of pri- 
vate, voluntary organizations. 

Social and Humanitarian Questions 

REFUGEE PROBLEM 

At the sixth session, the Assembly further con- 
sidered the international refugee problem. It 
adopted resolutions that asked the governments to 
cooperate with the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees, authorized the High Commissioner to 
issue an appeal for funds for emergency aid to the 
most needy group of refugees within his mandate, 
and recommended continuing efforts by all states 
and agencies concerned to give special attention 
to the refugee problem in connection with pro- 
grams of economic reconstruction and develop- 
ment and with migration projects. 

CHILDREN'S FUND 

The Assembly continued its support for the 
U.N. International Children's Emergency Fund. 
It appealed to governments and private persons 
to continue to contribute to the fund during 1952. 
The United States has always been by far the 
largest contributor to the refugee and the Unicef 
programs. However, the U.S. delegation ab- 
stained from voting on the resolutions relating to 
contributions to these two programs on the ground 
that it was not in a position to give assurance that 
the United States would make an additional gov- 
ernmental contribution to these programs. 

HUMAN RIGHTS 

The major part of the discussions in the Social 
and Humanitarian Committee related to the draft- 
ing of covenants on human rights. Consideration 
of the difficult problems involved in the prepara- 
tion of such instruments has taken place in 
previous sessions of the Assembly, in the Com- 
mission on Human Rights, and in Ecosoc in past 
years. In the recent session of the Assembly, as 
in previous discussions, the United States made 
clear its readiness to participate in the effort to 
draft acceptable covenants on this problem for 
later consideration and possible ratification by 
member states. The Assembly discussions related 



to a number of general directives which member 
states wished the Assembly to lay down for the 
guidance of the Human Rights Commission in its 
further efforts to draft the necessary legal in- 
strument. One important resolution provided 
that separate covenants shotild lie drawn up at 
the same time, one to contain civil and political 
rights, and the other to contain economic, social, 
and cultural rights. The United States supported 
this action on the grounds that problems of draw- 
ing up and applying treaty provisions in these 
two fields are quite distinct and that to treat them 
together would make the entire process more com- 
plex and difficult." 

Ten resolutions provided directives to the Hu- 
man Rights Commission in the further elaboration 
of this subject. The Social and Humanitarian 
Committee as well as other committees discussed 
the principle of self-determination. A number of 
delegations strongly advocated that provisions on 
this subject be included in the human rights cove- 
nants. The U.S. delegation supported the inclu- 
sion of appropriate provisions on this subject in 
the covenants. The resolution as drafted, how- 
ever, was unsatisfactoi-y to the United States, 
mainly because it dictated to the Human Rights 
Commission the precise language which was to be 
included. The U.S. delegation accordingly op- 
posed the resolution which was adopted on this 
subject. 

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 

In the field of freedom of information, the 
Assembly postponed action on the two conventions 
proposed in this field, as well as on the other as- 
pects of the subject. A significant debate took 
place on the violations of freedom of information 
committed by Czechoslovakia in the trial and im- 
prisonment of William Oatis. Channing H. 
Tobias of the American delegation, as well as a 
number of other delegates, delivered powerful 
indictments of the unjustified actions of the 
Czechoslovak Government in this case. 



Problems of Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing 
Territories 

The work of the Trusteeship Council in relation 
to the trusteeship system takes place under the 
authority of the General Assembly, and a large 
share of the work of the Assembly's Trusteeship 
Committee consists of the detailed consideration 
of the Council's annual report. In addition, by the 
provisions of chapter XI of the Charter, those 
states administering non-self-governing territories 
not under international trusteeship suomit infor- 
mation on economic, social, and educational condi- 
tions in these territories to the Secretary-General. 
In a sense, therefore, a large share of the work of 

" For a statement by Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt on 
this subject, see ibid., Dec. 31, 1951, p. 1059. 



674 



Deparfment of State Bulletin 



the Trusteeship Committee consists of a careful re- 
view of the information submitted to it concerning 
the operation of tlie trusteeship system and the 
pertinent developments in non-self-governing ter- 
ritories reported to it by the responsible powers. 

Of the 60 members of the Committee, 8 are 
states which administer non-self-governing terri- 
tories ; the remaining 52 have no such responsibili- 
ties. Since the inception of the Committee, certain 
members of the administering group have tended 
increasingly to dili'er with certain nonadminis- 
tering members in their approach to questions 
considered by the Committee. These differences 
became somewhat more pronounced at the sixth 
session of the General Assembly. The United 
States at this session continued to pursue moderate 
policies and to attempt to obtain the largest pos- 
sible measure of agreement with respect to such 
policies. 

Most of the resolutions adopted by the Assembly 
on the basis of reports from the Trusteeship Com- 
mittee related to the working of the trusteeship 
system and the treatment of information fur- 
nished on non-self-governing territories under 
article 73 (e) of the Charter. Among the more 
controversial proposals adopted by the Assembly 
were resolutions providing for the pai'ticipation 
of indigenous inhabitants of trust territories in 
the work of the Trusteeship Council ; inviting ad- 
ministering authorities to specify a period of time 
in which it is expected that trust territories shall 
be given self-government or independence ; setting 
up a special committee to consider administrative 
unions affecting trust territories; and providing 
for participation in the Special Committee on In- 
formation from non-self-governing territories. 
With a few exceptions, the United States voted 
for all of the resolutions approved by the Assembly 
in this field. 

The efforts of the United Nations to find a solu- 
tion to the perplexing problem of South-West 
Africa, formerly a mandate under League of Na- 
tions supervision, continued to be a controversial 
issue. When the Trusteeship Committee decided 
to grant a hearing to certain South-West African 
chiefs or their spokesmen, the South African dele- 
gation withdrew from the Committee, contending 
that its action was illegal. The Assembly adojited 
two additional resolutions on the substance of the 
problem. The most important of these ui'ged the 
Union of South Africa to resume negotiations 
with the Ad Hoc Committee on South-West Africa 
for the purpose of concluding an agreement pro- 
viding for the full implementation of the 1950 
advisory opinion of the International Court of 
Justice, which had held that the Union of South 
Africa continued to have the international obliga- 
tions stated in article 22 of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations and in the mandate for South- 
West Africa. The resolution also authorized the 
Ad Hoc Committee to examine reports on the ad- 
ministration of the territory of South-West Africa 

Apri/ 28, 7952 



as well as petitions relating to the territory. In 
a second resolution, the General Assembly re- 
asserted the opinion that the normal way of modi- 
fying the international status of South-West 
Africa would be to place it under the international 
trusteeship system by means of a trusteeship 
agreement. 

Budgetary and Administrative Questions 

The Assembly took a number of important deci- 
sions in the administrative and budgetary field. 
By a vote of 47 to 5, it set the 1952 budget for the 
United Nations at $48,096,780. Although the 
United States, in line with our objective of eco- 
nomical operations without curtailment of essen- 
tial U.N. functions, had unsuccessfully opposed 
in the Administrative and Budgetary Connnittee 
certain increases, it voted in favor of the final 
budget. The opposing votes were cast by the 
Soviet-bloc states on the ground that the budget 
was unduly inflated, particularly since it author- 
ized expenditure of funds to implement a nuniber 
of political decisions opposed by the Soviet Union. 
The Assembly adopted, by 46 votes (U.S.) to none 
with 4 abstentions, permanent staff regulations to 
replace the provisional regulations drawn up in 
1946. These regulations set forth the policies 
governing the relationship between the Secretary- 
Genei'al and his staff. The Assembly also estab- 
lished a Negotiating Committee to solicit funds 
from U.N. members and nonmember governments 
to finance certain operational programs of the 
United Nations which are not provided for in the 
regular budget. These programs include the 
technical-assistance program, the Korean Relief 
and Reconstruction Agency, and the Relief and 
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near 
East. 

One of the most important financial problems, 
from the point of view of the United States, was 
the question of the establishment of the scale of 
assessments for the apportionment of the expenses 
of the United Nations among member govern- 
ments. The United States has maintained since 
the First General Assembly that no one member 
state should contribute more than one-third of the 
ordinary U.N. expenses for any one year. In 
1948 the Assembly endorsed this principle, and 
the U.S. contribution, originally set in 1946 at 
39.89 percent, has gradually been reduced. The 
Committee on Contributions recommended to the 
sixth session that the U.S. contribution for 1952 
be set at 36.90 percent, a reduction of 2.02 percent 
from the 1951 assessment. This recommendation 
was based on the fact that, in considering the rate 
of progress which should be followed in achieving 
the ultimate objective of eliminating maladjust- 
ments, the Committee agreed that for 1952 the 
scale should reduce existing maladjustments by 
one-third. 

Tlie U.S. delegation vigorously maintained that 

675 



the United States contribution should immediately 
be reduced to 33% percent, in accordance with the 
principle established by the Assembly in 1948. 
Since the acceptance of the United States position 
would have meant fairly substantial increases in 
the contributions of other states this year, a ma- 
jority of delegations, although recognizing the 
long-term merits of the United States claim, were 
firmly opposed to the United States position. The 
majority considered that the policy adopted by 
the Contributions Committee would lead to a re- 
duction of the United States contribution to one- 
third over a 3-year period, and this was the max- 
imum concession they could make. Only two 
states voted in favor of the United States position, 
29 voted against, and 20 abstained. The United 
States then abstained in the vote on the resolution 
finally adopted by the Assembly which set the 
United States contribution to 36.90 percent. 
Under section 602 of Public Law 188 (82d Con- 
gress, 2d session), the United States was prohib- 
ited from making a commitment requiring an 
appropriation of funds for a contribution by the 
United States in excess of 33i/^ percent without 
prior consultation with the Appropriations Com- 
mittees of the Senate and House of Kepresenta- 
tives. 



Legal Questions 

The Sixth (Legal) Committee considered, 
among other subjects, the procedure to be followed 
by the United Nations concerning the making of 
reservations to multilateral conventions, the im- 
provement of the Assembly's methods and proce- 
dures for dealing with legal and drafting ques- 
tions, and the definition of aggression. The 
International Law Commission had considered the 
definition of aggression, but was unable to agree 
on specific recommendations. The United States 
strongly maintained that it was impossible to draw 
up a complete list of acts of aggression which 
would include all conceivable situations, that omis- 
sions in the definition would encourage an ag- 
gressor, and that the organs of the United Na- 
tions should pass on the aggressive nature of each 
case submitted to them. The General Assembly 
adopted a procedural resolution simply provid- 
ing for inclusion of the question of the definition 
of aggression in the agenda of its next session. 
The United States voted against this resolution 
because of two paragraphs that somewhat prej- 
udiced the question of whether aggression should 
be defined. 



Conclusions 

In attempting to appraise any single session of 
the General Assembly, one should remember that 
the functions of the General Assembly are not 
those of an ad hoc conference called at a chosen 
time to deal with a particular matter. They are, 



rather, functions which need to be performed reg- 
ularly each year : political action on matters placed 
on the agenda, reviewing the United Nations 
work as a whole, keeping the machinery in motion 
by making necessary financial appropriations and 
holding necessary elections, and providing a forum 
in which any state may say whatever it wishes 
about international affairs in general. The Char- 
ter provided for this procedure on the theory that 
the annual review of the work of the United Na- 
tions and of international events generally is in 
itself useful to the international community. Be- 
yond that, the significance of the acts or debates 
of any session will obviously depend upon the 
circumstances existing in international affairs at 
the time and, in addition, on the effectiveness of 
the between-session work of the councils and other 
bodies which come up for a final stamp of ap- 
proval by the General Assembly. Moreover, many 
of the most important projects of the General 
Assembly are cumulative in nature, extending over 
several years. Thus, the fhial emergence of a 
united and independent Libya, which received the 
blessing of the Assembly at this session, is in large 
part the result of actions taken by the Assembly as 
far back as 1949. 

In our view, the essential political task of the 
General Assembly at this session was the imple- 
mentation and further development of the major 
United Nations and free-world programs, initi- 
ated in previous years, for the maintenance and 
strengthening of peace and security. The broad 
question which was constantly before the Assem- 
bly in many forms was whether nations would 
move forward in realizing this program or would 
be induced by the U.S.S.R. to slacken their efforts 
and accept Soviet substitutes for the progi'am. 
The Assembly decisively rejected as substitutes for 
security the Soviet proposals for paper "disarma- 
ment," a Five Power pact, condemnation of U.S. 
military assistance to other countries, and con- 
demnation of Nato. Had a Korean armistice been 
achieved, the Korean problem would have been 
one of the outstanding items of the session. How- 
ever, since the negotiations at Panmunjom con- 
tinued throughout the entire session, the Assembly 
steadily refused to embark on any discussions of 
the problem in order not to jeopardize these nego- 
tiations in any way; naturally, too, it refused to 
accept the proffered Soviet substitutes for the U.N. 
progi'am in Korea. 

In the notable disarmament resolution, the As- 
sembly advanced the over-all U.N. program one 
important step. The votes on these major East- 
West issues were large; usually only the Soviet 
bloc voted in the negative. However, the inter- 
play of other issues, notably those affecting the 
Near and Middle Eastern countries, led to an 
increased number of abstentions. 

Problems of the Near and Middle East received 
special attention throughout the session, and the 
member states of those areas tended to work to- 



676 



Department of State Bulletin 



gether, in an Arab-Asian bloc, in order to make 
their points of view prevail. 

The Assembly did useful work in the economic, 
social, trusteeship, budgetary, and legal fields. In 
each of these fields, as well as the political field, 
neither the United States nor any other member 
always had its way. 

Although the sixth session was actually slightly 
shorter than average sessions of the Assembly, the 
members generally felt that new efforts should be 
made to shorten future sessions substantially. A 
Norwegian proposal on this subject, submitted 
during the last few days, could not be acted upon. 
However, the Secretary-General will study the 
problem in consultation with permanent U.N. 
delegations and member governments. 

*Mr. Taylor, author of the above article, is 
ofjiceT in charge of General Assenibly Affairs for 
the Bureau of United Nations Affairs. He served 
as principal executive officer of the U.S. delegation 
to the Sixth General Assembly. 



Collective Security 
To Preserve the Peace 

Statement hy Harding F. Bancroft 

Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations ^ 

My Government believes that the task before the 
Committee this year is to carry forward the 
momentum started in the Uniting for Peace res- 
olution ; ^ to strengthen the United Nations in the 
field of collective security. As Secretary of State 
Acheson said in 19^" when the Uniting for Peace 
resolution was iriti-oouced, "The United Nations 
must move forward energetically to develop a 
more adequate system of collective security. If it 
does not move forward, it will move back." ^ This 
year, as in the years to come, we should continue 
to move forward. The world waits to see whether 
we can build on the start we have made. 

The report of the Collective Measures Commit- 
tee last year and the resolution adopted by the 
General Assembly on January 12 * provide guide- 
posts for our work. 

First, my Government suggests that we examine 
the report and fill in the gaps that necessarily re- 
main because of the short period we had at our 
disposal last year. The filling of these gaps in 



' Made in the Collective Measures Committee on Apr. 15 
and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. 
on the same date. 

" Bulletin of Nov. 20, 1950, p. 823. 

' Illd., Oct. 2,1950, p. 523. 

■* For an article by Joseph J. Sisco on the Collective 
Measures Committee's report, see Bulletin of Nov. 12, 
1951, p. 771 ; for test of General Assembly resolution 
see United Nations, Resolutions Adopted by the General 
Assembly during 6th Session, 6 Nov. 1951-5 I'^b. 1952, p. 2. 



the field of collective economic measures as well 
as of military measures can help to insure that 
United Nations collective action will be timely 
and effective in case of need. The Secretariat, 
with its usual competence, has given us a working 
paper ^ which is most helpful in pointing out the 
topics in last year's report which require further 
attention. We believe that the idea of a U.N. 
legion in particular is a subject well worth ex- 
ploration. We think that a realistic evaluation 
of its possibilities should be made this year by the 
Collective Measures Committee. 

I feel sure that members of this Committee, as 
well as the Secretary-General, will have other 
ideas which can be fruitfully considered so that we 
can build on the foundations already laid down. 
It would be well to invite suggestions from other 
states, not represented on this Committee, on mat- 
ters to which attention should be given. Such sug- 
gestions might cover either proposals for more de- 
tailed treatment of subjects touched upon in our 
first report or proposals for study of other sub- 
jects within the general area of our work. In ad- 
dition, the Committee should continue its analysis 
of the U.N. action in Korea since our last report, 
so that the advance planning which the United 
Nations can do will have the full benefit of that 
experience. 

Second, both the report and the resolution of 
the General Assembly stress the need for member 
states to take preparatory action so that they will 
have the capability in immediate readiness to con- 
tribute armed forces and other assistance and fa- 
cilities in support of U.N. collective action. This 
ability and readiness the General Assembly recog- 
nized in its resolution are "essential to an effective 
security system." The Committee should there- 
fore consider what it can do to promote and facili- 
tate national action on the part of member states 
in the four general areas in which the General As- 
sembly has recommended preparatory action. 
These are — 

(1) that states take further action to maintain 
forces so trained, organized, and equipped that 
they could promptly be made available for service 
as U.N. units in accordance with constitutional 
procedures ; 

(2) that states prepare themselves so as to be 
able to provide assistance and facilities to U.N. 
forces engaged in collective measures ; 

(3) that states determine in the light of their 
existing legislation the appropriate steps for car- 
rying out promptly and effectively U.N. collective 
measures of all sorts ; 

(4) that states continue the survey of their re- 
sources in order to ascertain the nature and scope 
of the assistance which can be rendered in support 
of U.N. action. 

In the view of my delegation, the Collective 



' No. 2/52 dated Apr. 7, 1952. 



April 28, 7952 



677 



Measures Committee can be helpful to member 
states in carrying out these recommendations of 
the General Assembly. The need for coordinated 
preparation has been demonstrated. Our work 
can show how individual states can prepare them- 
selves most effectively to unite their strength with 
other members of the United Nations in the com- 
mon objective of keeping the peace. Member 
states have already recognized the need for further 
preparatory steps by their support of the Uniting 
for Peace resolution and of the resolution adopted 
by the General Assembly this year. The Commit- 
tee can build upon this willingness to take such 
action by suggesting further practical steps. 

Another important question for us to consider 
is the nature of the machinery that the United 
Nations should have for the future in order to con- 
tinue its progressive development as a collective- 
security organization. During this second year 
of our work we should be able to foresee with 
greatei' clarity the longer term needs of the United 
Nations in this field. Wliile all of us recognize 
that our basic objectives cannot be accomplished 
in a short time, and that greatest progress may be 
achieved only in graduated steps, we can provide 
that machinery for the United Nations which will 



insure that its development, though gradual, will 
be steady and certain. 

The work of this Committee has the realistic ob- 
jective of organizing our collective strength to pre- 
serve the peace and to insure that neither this 
strength nor the power of individual states will be 
used save in the common interest. Our efforts 
ai'e based on the proposition that the more ef- 
fectively the members of the United Nations are 
organized to unite their strength to maintain 
peace, the less likely it is that world peace will be 
challenged. 

This work in no sense detracts from the funda- 
mental importance of pacific settlement. A sys- 
tem of collective security is more than the 
organization of collective strength. It includes 
also the development of procedures for negotiation 
and other methods of peaceful adjustment, under 
principles of justice and international law. The 
gi-eater progress that we can make in this Com- 
mittee the greater will be the opportunity for 
the processes of pacific settlement to ease the polit- 
ical tensions in the world. It should be our re- 
solve to make the United Nations work in all its 
aspects in accordance with the purposes and prin- 
ciples of the Charter. 



The Tunisian Question in tlie Security Council 



On April £j 11 delegations to the Security Cov/n- 
cil from African and Asian states addressed simi- 
lar letters to the President of the Council drawing 
attention to ''''the present grave situation in Tioni- 
sid'^ and requesting that the Council call a meeting 
for consideration of the matter. The Council held 
its first meeting on the Tunisian question on April 
4.; a second ineeting was held on April 10. At the 
third and final meeting on April H on this ques- 
tion, the Council rejected inclusion of the item in 
its agenda hy a vote of 5 in favor {Brazil, Chile, 
China, Pakistan, U.S.S.R.), 2 against {France, 
U.K.), and If. abstentions {Greece, Netherlands, 
Turkey, U.S.). 

Following are texts of statements regarding the 
U.S. position in ths matter hy Secretary Acheson 
and hy the Deputy U.S. Representative to the 
United Nations, Ambassador Ernest A. Gross: 



PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENT 
BY SECRETARY ACHESON 

{Released to the press April J6] 

I think our position was stated quite clearly by 
Ambassador Gross, but I would be glad to state it 
again. I think what we have to always have in 



mind is Judge Holmes' famous statement, that 
general principles do not decide concrete cases. 

We have a duty as a member of the Security 
Council to exercise our best judgment as a matter 
of policy, as to whether taking up a given matter 
in the Security Council at a particular time will 
or will not contribute to the solution of that prob- 
lem. We cannot get into an automatic position 
where the fact that someone has proposed a resolu- 
tion automatically requires the United States to 
vote that the matter should be discussed at that 
time, when in tlie judgment of the U.S. Govern- 
ment that will not be the best way of contributing 
to the solution of the problem. 

The problem is the problem in Tunisia. The 
people in Tunisia have aspirations. The French 
Government has stated that it is willing to go a 
long way toward meeting those aspirations. It 
seems to us that the sound way to proceed here is 
to give time for the French authorities and the 
Tunisian authorities to discuss, negotiate, and 
find a solution. 

Now, if they can't, another situation is created. 

We can always reconsider whether the time at 
which a matter should be discussed in the Security 
Council is the appropriate time. But what we are 
attempting to do is to exercise our best judgment 



678 



Department of Sfafe Bulletin 



as to how to reach a sound sohition in the inter- 
ests of both parties to a dispute. It seems to us 
tliat our action in saying that this is not tlie time 
when we wish to vote to liave that matter before 
the Council was the best way to contribute to the 
sohition of it. 



STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR GROSS' 

I express the following views of my Govern- 
ment on this subject. 

It is only natural that the States which have 
proposed inclusion of this item on the agenda, 
drawing heavily upon their own past experience, 
should do everything they consider helpful in 
encouraging the progress of other areas towards 
self-government. 

My Government has always considered that the 
United Nations organ should be available for 
examination of any problem which causes serious 
friction in international relations. For this rea- 
son we have supported inscription of charges, 
liowever gi'oundless or malicious, when made 
against us. At the same time, it is clear that 
under the Charter, the parties to a controversy are 
obliged to seek a solution by negotiation. As Se- 
curity Council consideration should be designed 
to help the j^arties reach agreement, each member 
of the Security Council, which acts on behalf of 
all members of the United Nations, has a responsi- 
bility to ask himself whether consideration of a 
problem in the Council at a given moment will 
really help to bring the parties closer to the 
desired agreement. 

From the information available to my Govern- 
ment, it would ajjpear that the essential facts may 
be summed up as follows. There is a genuine and 
broadly shared desire on the part of the inhabit- 
ants of Tunisia for a greater voice in the govern- 
ment of that area. On the other hand, French 
authorities have recognized the validity of 
Tunisian demand for internal autonomy. They 
have proposed a plan for the people of Tunisia 
to progress toward that goal and it is hoped that 
negotiation between the French authorities and 
the Tunisians will soon begin. 

We do not wish to pass judgment upon the most 
recent developments in Tunisia. The United 
States, however, cannot condone the use of force- 
ful methods by either party. Force cannot pos- 
sibly be an end in itself. Force and violence only 
serve to embitter the atmosphere and thus impair 
the chances of jDeaceful progress toward the 
common objective. 

It is the belief of my Government that at this 
moment it is more useful to concentrate on the 



problem of facilitating negotiations between the 
French and the Tunisians than to engage in de- 
bate at this table. The overriding objective of 
the Security Council must be to foster agreement 
through negotiation between the parties them- 
selves. The French program of reforms, in our 
view, appeai-s to constitute a basis for the resump- 
tion of negotiations looking toward the establish- 
ment of home rule in Tunisia. We fervently hope 
that France, faithful to its tradition, will bring 
about faisighted and genuine reforms in Tunisia; 
history has taught us that in the long run the 
voices of those who really represent a people will 
be heard and will assert themselves. 

The Council will note that in stressing the de- 
sirability of negotiation, I am not dealing with the 
question of the Council's competence to consider 
this matter. If this item is not included on our 
agenda at this time, the Council will, nevertheless, 
remain open to any member of the United Nations 
to bring the question to the Council's attention 
again. My Government would naturally reassess 
the situation if that is done. 

For these reasons, Mr. President, I have been 
instructed to abstain on the question of including 
this item on our agenda at this time. 



' Made before the Security Council on Apr. 10 and re- 
leased to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on 
the same date. 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: Apr. 14-19, 1952 

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the 
Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department 
of State, Washington 2.5, D. C. Items marked (*) 
are not printed in the Bulletin ; items marked (t) 
will appear in a future issue. 

No. Date Subject 

261 4/5 Compton : Information program 

2(i.'i 4/7 Iran : Student assistance 

Acheson : Greetings to Cambodia 
Point 4 course completed 
IiAA and Point 4 exhibit 
Human Rights Commission 
( 'owen : Mutual Security Program 
Japanese treaty ratified 
Iran : Point 4 agreements 
Sargeant : Together we are strong 
Aclieson : ,$10 million aid for Korea 
Acheson : Trade policy note to Italy 
Exchange of notes with Italy 
Murphy : Ambassador to Japan 
Sebald : Ambassador to Burma 
Allison: Our Par Eastern policy 
Acheson : U.N. vote on Tunisia 
Acheson : U.S.S.R. "Peace Offensive" 
Aciieson : Greetings to Laos 
Latin American fellowships 
Ilo regional conference 
Inter-Wheat Council 
Colombia : Military assistance 
Sorenson : Point 4 director 
Paso : Executive meeting 
Acheson : World security progress 



*276 


4/14 


*277 


4/14 


*278 


4/14 


279 


4/14 


t2S0 


4/15 


281 


4/15 


282 


4/15 


*283 


4/16 


t2,S4 


4/16 


285 


4/16 


286 


4/16 


*287 


4/16 


*2S8 


4/16 


289 


4/16 


290 


4/16 


291 


4/16 


*292 


4/16 


298 


4/17 


294 


4/17 


295 


4/17 


1296 


4/17 


t297 


4/18 


t29S 


4/18 


2<J9 


4/19 



April 28, J 952 



679 



U.S. Delegations to International Conferences 



Commission on Human Rights (ECOSOC) 

On April 14 the Department of State announced 
that Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, U.S. representa- 
tive on the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 
will attend the eighth session of the Commission, 
which will convene on that day at New York, 
N. Y. She will be assisted by the following 
advisers : 

Advisers 

Herzel H. E. Plaine, Special Assistant to the Attorney 
General, Department of Justice 

James Simsarian, Office of United Nations Economic and 
Social Affairs, Department of State 

Marjorie M. Whiteman, Office of the Assistant Legal Ad- 
viser for Inter-American Affairs, Department of State 

Ad Hog Advisers 

Harper Barnes, Assistant Solicitor, Department of Labor 
Herbert W. Beaser, Office of the General Counsel, Fed- 
eral Security Agency 
Frieda S. Miller, Director, Women's Bureau, Department 
of Labor 

The Commission on Human Rights, which is 
one of the nine permanent functional commissions 
of the U.N. Economic and Social Council, advises 
and assists the Council on all matters relating to 
the obligation assumed by the members of the 
United Nations to promote universal respect for, 
and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, 
sex, language, or religion. Eighteen governments, 
elected by the Council, comprise the membership 
of the Commission. Its seventh session was held 
at Geneva, Switzerland, April 16-May 19, 1951._ 

At its eighth session the Commission will give 
high priority to carrying out the directives con- 
tained in resolutions adopted by the General As- 
sembly of the United Nations. At its fifth regu- 
lar session the General Assembly had decided that, 
as civic and political freedoms and economic, so- 
cial, and cultural privileges were interconnected 
and interdependent, provisions relating to these 
subjects should be included in the Covenant on 



Human Rights. Upon reconsidering the matter 
at its sixth regular session (Paris, Nov. 6, 1951— 
Feb. 5, 1952), the General Assembly decided that 
the Commission, instead of incorporating such- 
provisions in a single instrument, should prepare 
two draft covenants, one relating to civil and po- 
litical rights and the other relating to economic, 
social, and cultural rights. The Commission was 
directed also to incorporate in each draft covenant 
(1) an article concerning the right of all peoples 
and nations to self-determination, and (2) specific 
clauses relating to the admissibility and legal ef- 
fect of such reservations as any country might 
desire to make with respect to provisions of the 
covenant in becoming a party thereto. In addi- 
tion, the Commission was requested by the Gen- 
eral Assembly to prepare recommendations on 
measures for carrying out the provisions of the 
two covenants after their entry into force. 

Priority will also be given by the Commission to 
the formulation of recommendations on interna- 
tional respect for the self-determination of 
peoples, a subject which is to be considered by the 
General Assembly at its seventh regular session in 
1952. Other items on the agenda for this session 
of the Commission relate to such topics as: (1) 
review of the work program of the Commission, 
and the establishment of priorities with respect to 
its activities; (2) definition and protection of po- 
litical groups; (3) injuries suffered by groups 
through the total or partial destruction of their 
media of culture and their historical monuments ; 
(4) development of the work of the United Na- 
tions for wider observance of, and respect for, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms through- 
out the world; (5) amiual reports on human 
rights; (6) a draft declaration on the rights of the 
child; (7) the rights of the aged; (8) the right of 
asylum; (9) an international court of human 
rights; (10) the continuing validity of minorities 
treaties and declarations; and (11) the Yearbook 
of Human Rights. 



680 



Department of State Bulletin 



International Wheat Council 

The Department of State announced on April 17 
that on that date the eighth session of the Inter- 
national Wheat Council would convene at London. 
The U.S. delegation is as follows : 

Delegate 

Leslie A. Wheeler, Collaborator, Office of the Secretary, 
Department of Agriculture 

Alternate Delegate 

Elmer F. Kruse, Assistant Administrator for Commodity 
Operations, Production and Marketing Administra- 
tion, Department of Agriculture 

Congressional Adviser 

Walt Horan, House of Representatives 

Members 

Maurice M. Benidt, Chief, International Wheat Agree- 
ment Staff, Production and Marketing Administration, 
Department of Agriculture 

Albert J. Borton, Chief, Commodity Program Division, 
Grain Branch, Production and Marketing Adminis- 
tration, Department of Agriculture 

Anthony R. DeFelice, Attorney, Office of the Solicitor, 
Department of Agriculture 

Erie Englund, Agricultural Attach^, American Embassy, 
London 

Robert L. Gastineau, Head, Grain Division, Office of 
Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of 
Agriculture 

L. Ingemann Highby, Chief, Food Branch, Agricultural 
Products Staff, Office of International Materials 
Policy, Department of State 

Earl O. Pollock, Assistant Agricultural Attach^, American 
Embassy, London 

Roger Stewart, Chief, Grain Branch, Food and Agricul- 
ture Division, Mutual Security Agency 

The International Wheat Council was estab- 
lished in 1949 pursuant to the terms of the Inter- 
national Wheat Agreement of March 23, 1949, an 
instrument designed to assure supplies of wheat 
to importing countries and markets for wheat to 
exporting countries at equitable and stable prices. 
Administration of the agreement is the primary 
function of the Council, which is composed of the 
representatives of 46 exporting and importing 
countries parties to the agreement. Each mem- 
ber country may be represented at Council sessions 
by a delegate, an alternate delegate, and such tech- 
nical advisers as are necessary. 

Article 22 of the agreement provides that "The 
Council shall, not later than July 31, 1952, com- 
municate to the exporting and importing countries 
its recommendations regarding the renewal of this 
Agreement." It is expected that the Council at 
its forthcoming session, will approach the matter 
through giving detailed consideration to the 
amendments required to make renewal of the 
agreement generally acceptable to all the member 
countries. 

The last (seventh) session of the International 
Wheat Council was held at Lisbon, October 30- 
November 2, 1951. 



American States Members of ILO 

On April 17 the Department of State announced 
tliat on that date the fifth Regional Conference 
of American States Members of the International 
Labor Organization (Ilo) would convene at Rio 
(le Janeiro. The tripartite U. S. delegation to the 
Conference is as follows : 

Representing the Government of the United States 

Delegates 

Philip M. Kaiser, Assistant Secretary of Labor 

H. M. Douty, Chief, Division of Wages and Industrial 

Relations, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department 

of Labor 

•4 d V'isers 

Wilbur J. Cohan, Technical Adviser to the Commissioner 
for Social Security, Federal Security Agency 

John T. Fishburn, Labor Adviser, Bureau of Inter-Amer- 
ican Affairs, Department of State 

Repkesenting the Employees of the United States 

Delegate 

Charles E. Shaw, Director, Employee Relations Overseas, 
Standard Oil Company (N. J.), New York, N. Y. 

Advisers 

Ward H. Donahoe, Insurance and Social Security Divi- 
sion, Department of Standard Oil (N. J.), New York, 
N. Y. 

L. Roy Hawes, Past Master, Mass. State Grange, North 
Sudbury, Mass. 

Representing the Workers of the LTnited States 
Delegate 

Serafino Romauldi, Latin American Representative of the 
American Federation of Labor, A. F. of L. Building, 
Washington 

Adviser 

Michael Ross, Director, Department of International Af- 
fairs, Congress of Industrial Organizations, Wash- 
ington 

The forthcoming Conference is one of a series 
of meetings initiated by the Governing Body of 
the International Labor Office in 1936 for the dis- 
cussion of those subjects relating to the work of 
the Organization which are of particular interest 
to the countries of the American continent. The 
last (fourth) Regional Conference of American 
States Members of the Ilo was held at Monte- 
video, April 25-May 7, 1949. The 19 American 
States which are members of the Ilo have been 
invited to participate in the forthcoming Con- 
ference. 

Among the items on the provisional agenda of 
the Conference are the report of the Director Gen- 
eral, application and supervision of labor legis- 
lation in agriculture, achievements and future 
policy in social security, and methods of remuner- 
ation of salaried employees. 



April 28, 1952 



681 



The United States in tlie United Nations 



April 11-April 24, 1952 

General Assembly 

The Collective Measures Committee — Contin- 
uing its second year of studying the ways and 
means of strengthening international peace and 
security in accordance with the Uniting for Peace 
resohition and the General Assembly's resolution 
of January 12, 1952, the Collective Measures Com- 
mittee (Cmc) held its opening meeting on April 
15, at which it approved a list of twenty nominees 
to the panel of military experts and began general 
debate on its program of work. 

Harding Bancroft, the U.S. deputy representa- 
tive on the Cmc, opened the general debate by 
stressing that the committee should cari-y forward 
this year the momentum of the Uniting for Peace 
resolution of 1950, to strengthen the U.N. in the 
field of collective security. "This year, as in years 
to come," added Mr. Bancroft, "we should con- 
tinue to move forward. The world waits to see 
whether we can build on the start we have made." 

Mr. Bancroft laid particular emphasis on the 
need for member states to take additional prepara- 
tory action to place themselves in a position of 
readiness to make maximum contribution to the 
U.N. collective-security system. Mr. Bancroft 
said that 

both the report and the resolution of the General As- 
sembly stressed the need for member states to take pre- 
paratory action so that they will have the capalnlity in 
immediate readiness to contribute armed forces and other 
assistance and facilities in .support of U.N. collective ac- 
tion. This ability and readiness the General Assembly 
recognized in its resolution are "essential to an effective 
security system." The committee should, therefore, con- 
sider what it can do to promote and facilitate national 
action on the part of member states in four general areas 
in which the General Assembly has recommended prepara- 
tory action. These are : 

One, that states take further action to maintain forces 
so trained, organized, and equipped that they could 
promptly be made available for service as U.N. units in 
accordance with constitutional procedures. 

Two, that states prepare themselves so as to be able to 
provide assistance and facilities to U.N. forces engaged 
in collective measures. 

Three, that states determine in the light of their exist- 
ing legislation, the ajipropriate steps for carrying out 
promptly and effectively, U.N. collective measures of all 
sorts. 

Four, that states continue the survey of their resources 
in order to ascertain the nature and scope of the assistance 
which can be rendered in support of U.N. action. 

In addition, Mr. Bancroft indicated other lines 
along which the committee might proceed during 
the next several months. He suggested that the 
Cmc examine its first report with a view to filling 

682 



in the remaining gaps. In this connection, Mr. 
Bancroft added : 

We believe that the idea of a U.N. legion in particular 
is a subject well worth exploration. We think that a 
realistic evaluation of its possibilities should be made this 
year by the Collective Measures Committee. 

Mr. Bancroft said also that another important ' 
question to consider is the nature of the macliinery 
that the United Nations should have for the future 
in order to continue its progressive development 
as a collective-security organization. Conclud- 
ing, Mr. Bancroft stated : 

The work of this committee has the realistic objective 
of organizing our collective strength to preserve the peace 
and to ensure that neither this strength nor the power of 
individual states will be used save in the common interest. 
Our efforts are based on the proposition that the more 
effectively the members of the United Nations are organ- 
ized to unite their strength to maintain peace, the less 
likely it is that world peace will be challenged. . . . 
This work in no sense detracts from the fundamental 
importance of pacific settlement. 

In addition to holding general debate, the com- 
mittee approved the list of 20 nominees to the 
Panel of Military Experts submitted by the Secre- 
tary-General. Now that Cmc has approved the 
list, the 20 high-ranking officers are available on 
request to states wishing to obtain technical advice 
regarding the training, organization, and equip- 
ment of elements of national armed forces for 
prompt service as U.N. units. Of the 20 officers, 8 
belong to the Army, 6 are Navy officers, and 6 rep- 
resent the Air Force. The U.S. officers are Lt. 
Gen. W. D. Crittenberger, U.S. Army, Vice-Ad- 
miral Oscar C. Badger, U.S.N., and Lt. Gen. H. K. 
Harmon, U.S.A.F. 



Korean Relief 

Cash and commodity contributions totaling 
$4-48,587,702 have been pledged or contributed for 
the relief and rehabilitation of Korea, according 
to the report submitted by the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations to the Economic and Social 
Council. 

$243,940,531 of this total has been contributed 
to the emergency program which has been carried 
on by the Unified Command since the outbreak of 
hostilities. The contributions have come from 3,s 
states, 5 U.N. agencies, and over 20 nongovern- 
mental organizations. The U.S. Government's 
contribution amounted, through March 3, 1952, 
the reporting date of the Secretary-General's re- 
port, to slightly over $215,000,000. 

Department of Stale Bulletin 



I 



$205,000,000 has been contributed to the U.N. 
Korean Reconstruction Agency, which was estab- 
lished by the United Nations to undertake the post- 
war relief and rehabilitation program. Twenty- 
seven states have made pledges to this agency. At 
present, pending the cessation of hostilities, 
Unkra is cooperating closely with the Unified 
Command in the emergency relief program by pro- 
viding personnel and supplies. In conjunction 
with the Unified Command, it is making plans for 
the post hostilities and is gradually assuming a 
larger role in the pi'esent program so that it may 
assume full responsibility by the target date of 
180 days after the cessation of hostilities. 

Economic and Social Council 

Cormnission on Human Bights — On April 14 the 
Commission on Human Rights reconvened at the 
U.N. headquarters for its 8th session. It pro- 
ceeded first to reelect the officers who had served 
at the 7th session : 

Dr. Charles Malik (Lebanon), Chairman; 
Rend Cassin (France), First Vice-Chairman; 
Mrs. Hensa Mehta (India), Second VIce-Chairman 
H. F. E. Whitlam (Australia), Rapporteur. 

By the end of the first week, the Commission had 
adopted a self-determination article for inclusion 
in both the covenants which it is expected to draft : 
one on civil and political rights and one on eco- 
nomic, social, and political rights. The article 
reads : 

All peoples and all nations shall have the risht of self- 
determination, namely the right freely to determine their 
political, economic, social and ciiltiaral status. 

All states, including those having responsibility for the 
administration of non-self-governing and trust territories 
and those controlling in whatsoever manner the exercise 
of that right by another people, shall promote the realiza- 
tion of that right in all their territories, and shall respect 
the maintenance of that right in other states, in con- 
formity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. 

The right of the peoples to self-determination shall also 
include permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth 
and resources. In no case may a people be deprived of its 
own means of subsistence on the grounds of any rights 
that may be claimed by other states. 

The United States voted in favor of the first two 
paragraphs and opposed the third. An article on 
this subject is being included upon the express 
directions of the General Assembly. 

The Commission is currently debating a resolu- 
tion on the subject of self-determination which 
will go forward to the Assembly and will supple- 
ment the article in question. 

The Commission has not yet determined how or 
in what order it will approach the two covenants 
whose completion is its main task for this session. 

Com/mission on Narcotic Drugs — Discussion of 
the proposed single convention on narcotic drugs 
to replace the 1912 convention and 7 other agree- 
ments and protocols is the major item on the 
14-point agenda of the 7th session of the Commis- 
sion on Narcotic Drugs, which convened on April 



16 at U.N. Headquarters. The Commission will 
also study coca leaf addiction in South America 
and control of new synthetic narcotics. 

Last year the Commission undertook a prelimi- 
nary study of a draft convention prepared by the 
Seci'etariat but postponed full discussion because 
few governments had iiad an opportunity to pre- 
pare comments. The U.N. Secretariat draft pro- 
poses to replace the existing Commission on Nar- 
cotic Drugs with an international drug commission 
which, though subject to the general authority of 
the United Nations, would be a relatively autono- 
mous body. The proposed commission would es- 
tablish policy to be implemented by an interna- 
tional drug board, which would replace the present 
Permanent Central Opium Board and Supervisory 
Body. The control of synthetic narcotic drugs 
is being considered on the suggestion of the French 
Government. Although control for certain syn- 
thetics has been established, variations in formula 
make it possible to create new and uncontrolled 
drugs. The commission will consider whether in- 
ternational measures should be taken to meet this 
problem. 

Security Council 

Tunisia — The Council held three meetings, 
April 4, 10, and 14 to discuss inclusion of the 
Tunisian Question on its agenda as requested by 
11 member states: Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, 
India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Philip- 
pines, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. The proposal 
was rejected, April 14, by a vote of 5 (Brazil, 
Chile, China, Pakistan, U.S.S.R.) -2 (France, 
United Kingdom)— 4 (Greece, Netherlands, Tur- 
key, United States). The Council also rejected 
by the same vote : ( 1 ) a Chilean draft resolution to 
incliule in tlie Security Council agenda considera- 
tion of the 11 communications with regard to the 
situation in Tunisia, but to postpone consideration 
"for the time being"; and (2) Pakistani tlraft 
resolution which called for an invitation to be ex- 
tended to the above-sponsoring delegations (with 
the exception of Pakistan) to reply to remarks 
made by the French representative at the Council 
meeting on April 4. 

Ambassador Ernest A. Gross (U.S.) , in explain- 
ing the abstention of the U.S. Government, stated : 

It is the belief of my government that at this moment 
it is more useful to concentrate on the problem of fa- 
cilitating negotiations between the French and the 
Tunisians than to engage in debate at this table. The 
overriding objective of the Security Council must be to 
foster agreement through negotiation between the parties 
them.selves. The French program of reforms, in our 
view, appears to constitute a basis for the resumption of 
negotiations looking toward the establishment of home 
rule in Tunisia. . . . The Council will note that in stress- 
ing the desirability of negotiation, I am not dealing with 
the question of the Council's competence to consider this 
matter. If this item is not included on our agenda at 
this time, the Council will, nevertheless, remain open to 
any member of the United Nations to bring the question 
to the Council's attention again. My government would 
naturally reassess the situation if that is done. 



April 28, 1952 



683 



April 28, 1952 

Africa 

TUNISIA: The Tunisian question in tlie Security 
Council (Acheson, Gross) 

Agriculture 

International Wheat Council to convene . . 

American Principles 

Mutual security requires mutual understand- 
ing (Compton) 

OAS anniversary, remarks by Truman .... 
Progress toward international peace and se- 
curity (Acheson) 

American Republics 

American states members of Ilo 

Fellowships available for study in Latin America . 
OAS : Truman statement on anniversary . . . 

Asia 

IRAN: 

Emergency assistance for students in U.S. . 

Signs Point Four project agreements with U.S. 
JAPAN: U.S. ratifies peace and Pacific security 

treaties 

KOREA: 

Communiques to Security Council .... 

Recent Soviet maneuvers (Acheson) . . . 
Our Far Eastern policy (Allison) 

Communism 

Our Far Eastern policy (Allison) 

Europe 

FRANCE: The Tunisian question in the Security 
Council (Acheson, Gross) 

ITALY: U.S.-ltalian negotiations on import 
restrictions (Acheson) 

U.S.S.R.: Recent Soviet maneuvers (Acheson) . 

International Information 

Inter-American: Fellowships available for study 
in Latin America 

Mutual security requires mutual understanding 
(Compton) 

International Meetings 

American states members of Ilo (U.S. delega- 
tion) 

General Assembly, report on 6th session, part 
n (Taylor) 



Index Vol. XXVI, No. 670 

U.S. DELEGATIONS: 

Commission on Human Rights (Ecosoc) . . 680 

International Wheat Council 681 

678 

Mutual Security 

681 Achievements toward international security . . 647 

Publications 

Recent releases 659 

668 

ggrj Teciinical Cooperation and Development 

POINT FOUR: 
g.„ U.S. aids Iranian students studying in U.S. . 659 

U.S. signs project agreements wrlth Iran . . 658 

Trade 

681 

667 GATT: U.S.-ltalian negotiations on import re- 

667 strlctions (Acheson) 660 

Treaty Information 

IRAN: Project agreements signed with U.S. . . 658 
659 ITALY: U.S.-ltalian negotiations on import re- 
658 strlctions 660 

JAPAN: U.S. ratifies peace and Pacific security 
653 treaties 658 

657 United Nations 

-?„ Collective Measures Committee, proposed action 

°°'' (Bancroft) 677 

Commission on Human Rights (U.S. delegation) . 680 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY: Report on sixth session 

-„ (Part II) (Taylor) 673 

ILO: American states members (U.S. delega- 
tion) 681 

SECURITY COUNCIL: 

Communiques re Korea 657 

The Tunisian question in the Security Council 

^™ (Acheson, Gross) 678 

U.S. in U.N. (weekly summary) 682 

660 

ggg Name Index 

Acheson, Secretary 647, 660, 666, 678 

Allison, John M 652 

Bancroft, Harding P 677 

Compton, Wilson 668 

°°" Douty. H. M 681 

Gross, Ernest A 678 

668 Kaiser, Philip M 681 

Kruse, Elmer F 681 

Romauldi, Serafino 681 

Roosevelt, Mrs. Franklin D 680 

Shaw, Charles E 681 

681 Tarchiani, Ambassador 660 

Truman, President 658, 667 

673 Wheeler, Leslie A 681 



U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE; 1952 



7^S^. / ^30 



^Ae/ u)eha/yl7nen(/ ^c^ t/iate^ 



JAPANESE PEACE AND SECURITY TREATIES 
ENTER INTO FORCE: 
Statements by the President, John Foster Dulles, and 

Prime Minister Yoshida 687 

Proclamation by the President 688 

LAW AND THE GROWTH OF THE INTERNATIONAL 

COMMUNITY • Address by Secretary Acheson. ... 694 

COMPONENT PARTS OF THE MUTUAL SECURITY 

PROGRAM: • Address by Myron M. Cowen ... 702 

A NEW APPROACH TO TREATY MAIUNG • Address 

by Assistant Secretary Allison 689 

THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND CURRENT WORLD 

PROBLEMS • by Charles B. Marshall 698 



For index see back cover 



Vol. XXVI, No. 671 
May 5, 1952 



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^Ae ^^ut/y^me^vC a:^ i/uUe VJ W 1 1 \J L 11 J. 



Vol. XXVI, No. 671 • Publication 4582 
May 5, 1952 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington 25, D.O. 

Peice: 

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Single copy, 20 cents 

The printing of this publication has 
been approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget (January 22, 1952). 
Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may 
be reprinted. Citation of the Department 
OF State Bulletin as the source will be 
appreciated. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication compiled and 
edited in the Division of Publications, 
Office of Public Affairs, provides the 
public and interested agencies of 
the Government with information on 
developments in the field of foreign 
relations and on the work of the De- 
partment of State and the Foreign 
Service. The BULLETIN includes 
selected press releases on foreign pol- 
icy issued by the White House and 
the Department, and statements and 
addresses made by the President and 
by the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the func- 
tions of the Department. Informa- 
tion is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to 
which the United States is or may 
become a party and treaties of gen- 
eral international interest. 

Publications of the Department, as 
well as legislative material in the field 
of international relations, are listed 
currently. 



Japanese Peace and Security Treaties Enter Into Force 



U.S. DEPOSITS INSTRUMENT OF RATIFICATION 



[Released to the press April 2S] 

The treaty of peace -with Japan and the security 
treaty between the United States and Japan, both 
of which were signed at San Francisco on Septem- 
ber 8, 1951, entered into force concurrently on 
April 28, 1952, at 9 : 30 a. m., eastern daylight sav- 
ing time. 

The treaty of peace with Japan was brought 
into force by the deposit at that time in the De- 
partment of State of the instrument of ratification 
by the United States. On that occasion, Secre- 
tary Acheson and the Legal Adviser, Adrian S. 
Fisher, made the following remarks, i-espectively : 

"At this time I formally deposit the instrument of 
ratification by the United States of America of the treaty 
of peace with Japan. 

With the deposit of this instrument the treaty of peace 
with Japan enters into force in accordance with tlie terms 
of article 23. 

Mr. Fisher, it gives me pleasure to turn this document 
over to you to be placed in the archives with the signed 
original of the treaty." 

"Mr. Secretary, I am happy to receive the United States 
instrument of ratification of the treaty of peace with 
Japan. It will be placed in the archives with the treaty. 

The deposit of this instrument of ratification has 
brought the treaty into force on April 28, 1952, at 9 : 30 
a. m., eastern daylight saving time. The treaty is now 
in force between Argentina, Australia, Canada, France, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, the 
United States, and Japan." 

Immediately after the deposit of the U.S. in- 
strument of ratification of the treaty of peace with 

Editor's Xote. — The signature by the President on April 
15 of the treaty of peace with Japan and the security 
treaty between the United States of America and Japan 
constituted the U.S. ratifications of these instruments. 
[Bulletin of Apr. 28, 1952, p. 658.] The treaty of peace 
with Japan provides in article 23 that it shall come into 
force when it has been ratified by Japan and by a majority 
of the 11 signatories named in that article, including 
the United States. As of April 23, Japan and (5 of the 
key Allied signatories have deposited their ratifications, 
including the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, 
Canada, Pakistan, and France, so that the United States 
deposit will bring that treaty into effect. In the case 
of the security treaty between the United States and Japan, 
exchange of ratifications in Washington is provided. 

For text of the treaty of peace with Japan, see Bulle- 
tin of Aug. 27, 1951, p. 349 (also printed as Department 
of State publication 4330) ; for text of the security treaty 
with Japan, see ibid., Sept. 17, 1951, p. 464. .,1 



Japan, Ryuji Takeuchi presented his credentials as 
Charge d'Affaires of Japan to Secretary Acheson, 
and became the first diplomatic representative of 
Japan in the United States since the war. Mr. 
Takeuchi had been until then Chief of the Japa- 
nese Government Overseas Agency in Washington. 

Secretary Acheson welcomed Mr. Takeuchi and 
then proceeded to exchange the instruments of 
ratification of the security treaty between the 
United States and Japan, bringing the security 
treaty into concurrent effect with the treaty of 
peace. A protocol of exchange was signed. 

The ceremony was concluded with a statement 
by the President read by the Secretary and a mes- 
sage from the Prime Minister of Japan read by 
Mr. Takeuchi. The ceremony was attended by 
representatives of the countries parties to the 
treaty of peace with Japan and by other digni- 
taries. 



Statement by the President < 

With the deposit of the U.S. ratification which 
brings into force the treaty of peace with Japan, 
the state of war has been terminated and Japan 
has been restored to a status of sovereign equality 
in the society of free peoples. This great event 
is especially gratifying to the Government and 
people of the United States who have worked in 
close association with the Government and people 
of Japan for its restoration as a prosperous and 
progressive nation. This common effort has 
strengthened the essential bonds of friendship be- 
tween our two peoples. 

The treaty of peace terminates the allied occu- 
pation of Japan and with it the entire regime of 
control and opens a new era in Japan's history. 
During the past 6 years, the Japanese people and 
government have worked to build a democratic 
and peace-loving nation with a sincerity and 
earnestness that has won them the respect of the 
world. The treaty of peace affords Japan an op- 
portunity to make a great contribution to world 
peace and progress. 

' Read by Secretary Acheson. 



May 5, 1952 ,„3^,^,^qoO 



687 



state of War With Japan Terminated 

A PROCLAMATION = 

Whereas the Treaty of Peace svith Japan was 
signed at San Francisco on September 8, 1951 by the 
respective Plenipotentiaries of the United States 
of America and 47 other Allied Powers, and Japan ; 

Whereas the text of the said Treaty, in the 
English, French, Spanish, and Japanese languages, 
is word for word as follows ; 

(Here follows the text of the Treaty) 

Whereas the Senate of the United States of 
America by their resolution of March 20, 1952, two- 
thirds of the Senators present concurring therein, 
did advise and consent to the ratification of the 
said Treaty with the following declaration : 

"As part of such advice and consent the Senate 
states that nothing the treaty contains is deemed 
to diminish or prejudice, in favor of the Soviet 
Union, the right, title, and interest of Japan, or 
the Allied Powers as defined in said treaty, in and 
to South Sakhalin and its adjacent islands, the 
Kurile Islands, the Habomai Islands, the island 
of Shiliotan, or any other territory, rights, or 
Interests possessed by Japan on December 7, 1941, 
or to confer any right, title, or benefit therein or 
thereto on the Soviet Union ; and also that nothing 
in the said treaty, or the advice and consent of 
the Senate to the ratification thereof, implies 
recognition on the part of the United States of 
the provisions in favor of the Soviet Union con- 
tained in the so-called 'Yalta agreement' regard- 
ing Japan of February 11, 1945." 

Whereas the said Treaty was duly ratified by the 
President of the United States of America on April 
15, 1952, in pursuance of the aforesaid advice and 
consent of the Senate and subject to the aforesaid 
declaration ; 

Whereas it is provided in Article 23 of the said 
Treaty that the Treaty will come into force for all 
the States which have then ratified it when instru- 
ments of ratification have been deposited by Japan 
and by a majority, including the United States of 
America as the principal occupying Power, of the 
following States, namely Australia, Canada, Ceylon, 



France, Indonesia, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Pakistan, the Republic of the Philip- 
pines, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, and the United States of Amer- 
ica, and in Article 24 of the said Treaty that all 
instruments of ratification shall be deposited with 
the Government of the United States of America ; 

Whereas instruments of ratification of the said 
Treaty were deposited with the Government of the 
United States of America by Japan on November 
28, 1051 and by the United Kingdom of Great Brit- 
ain and Northern Ireland on January .3, 1952, by 
Australia on April 10, 1952, by New Zealand on 
April 10, 1952, by Canada on April 17, 1952, by 
Pakistan on April 17, 1952, by France on April 18, 
1952, and by the United States of America on April 
28, 1952 ; 

Whereas instruments of ratification were also 
deposited with the Government of the United States 
of America by Mexico on March 3, 1952 and by 
Argentina on April 9, 1952; 

And whereas, pursuant to the aforesaid provi- 
sions of Article 23 of the said Treaty, the Treaty 
came into force on April 28, 1952 ; 

Now, therefore, be it known that I, Harry S. 
Truman. President of the United States of America, 
do hereby proclaim and make public the said Treaty 
of Peace with Japan to the end that the same and 
every article and clause thereof, subject to the 
declaration hereinbefore recited, shall be observed 
and fulfilled with good faith, on and after April 
28, 1952, by the United States of America and by 
the citizens of the United States of America and 
all other persons subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
and do hereby further proclaim that the state of 
war between the United States of America and 
Japan terminated on April 28, 1952. 

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my 
hand and caused the Seal of the United States of 
America to be affixed. 

Done at the city of Washington this twenty-eighth 
day of April in the year of our Lord 
[seal] one thousand nine hundred fifty-two 
and of the Independence of the 
United States of America the one hundred seventy- 
sixth. 

Harry S. Truman 



Japan takes her rightful place of equality and 
honor among the free nations of the world at a 
time when Communist imperialism, having al- 
ready enslaved large areas and many unfortunate 
peoples, is seeking to extend its system of tyranny 
and exploitation by direct and indirect aggression. 
We are confident that the people of Japan are alert 
to this danger and are ready and willing to play 
their full part in meeting the common menace. 
For their part, the American people will continue 
to work with the people of Japan to promote peace 
and security in accordance with the purposes and 
principles of the U.N. Charter. To this end, 
simultaneously with the coming into effect of the 
treaty of peace, the United States has exchanged 
ratifications with Japan, and thus also brought 
into concurrent effect, the security treaty between 
the United States of America and Japan. 

"No. 2974 (17 Fed. Reg. 3813). 
688 



Statement by John Foster Dulles 

The American people join in rejoicing with the 
people of Japan who again have peace, freedom, 
and control of their own destiny as Japan today 
takes her place as an equal and honored member of 
the community of free nations. She is welcomed. 
A long hard road has come to an end. 

A new way lies ahead. It will not be an easy 
way. Indeed, the future difficulties and problems 
are immense, not only for Japan but for every 
nation. We can, however, be confident that these 
problems can be solved in an atmosphere of peace 
and freedom and as between equals. 

As our two nations have worked together over 
these past years we have found that even the most 
difficult problems could be solved if only we cared 
enough to take the time and make a serious effort 
to solve them. This can well be our motto for the 
future — let us care enough to make sure that the 
friendship now begun will endure for all the 
future. 

Department of State Bulletin 



statement by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida^ 

Today, we have witnessed the consummation of 
the treaty of peace with Japan and the concurrent 
coming into effect of the security treaty between 
the United States of America and Japan. 

This is a memorable day for Japan and the 
Japanese people. 

In making our new start today, our people know 
that no nation can live unto itself, that no nation 
can draw dividends unless it contributes to a com- 
mon world effort and invests in the common wel- 
fare of humanity. 

We face a great test to human wisdom and 
human courage. 



Today, stimulated by a broader vision and 
understanding of the principles of humanity, 
equality and justice, I can assure you that our 
people will proceed forward drawing upon the 
fount of our strength and unity. So rooted we 
can meet the challenge of our times. 

On this memorable occasion I would like to ex- 
press the gratitude of my Government and people 
for the enlightened and magnanimous statesman- 
ship of the United States and other countries 
which has made this peace possible and which en- 
ables us to stand again as a full member in the 
community of nations. 



A New Approach to Treaty Making 

hy John M. Allison 

Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs * 



Perhaps the most significant and constructive 
international action by the United States during 
1951 was the negotiation and conclusion of the 
Japanese peace treaty and the Allied mutual de- 
fense and security treaties with the Philippines, 
Australia, and New Zealand. In a brief paper it 
is not possible to deal with these treaties in detail 
but certain aspects are of primary significance in 
the field of international law. These treaties 
broke new ground in the history of treaty making 
from several points of view. The conclusion of 
these treaties was an effective demonstration of 
cooperation between the executive and the legisla- 
tive branches of the Government. The signing of 
the Japanese peace treaty, on September 8, 1951, 
in San Francisco by 48 nations, was also a gi'eat 
demonstration of allied unity. In my opinion it 
is no exaggeration to say that the results achieved 
were due primarily to the vision, imagination, and 
energy of one man, John Foster Dulles. Mr. 
Dulles would be tlie first to admit, as he has on 
many occasions, that he could not have accom- 
plished what he did without tlie complete and 
understanding cooperation of President Truman 
and the Secretaries of State and Defense. 

Of great significance was the demonstration of 
cooperation between the Executive and the Senate 
in bringing a ti-eaty to the point of ratification. 



^ Read by Mr. Takeuchi. 

'Address made before the American Society of Inter- 
national Law at Washington on Apr. 24 and released to 
the press on the same date. 



Before 1918, ratification of treaties, at least in a 
large part of the world, was little more than a 
conventional formula, and generally speaking 
negotiators of treaties were certain that if they 
faithfully executed their instructions the treaty 
they signed would be ratified as a matter of course. 
With the development after the first World War 
of what at that time was called the "new di- 
plomacy," and particularly as a result of the action 
of the United States Senate in refusing to consent 
to the ratification of the Versailles Treaty, it be- 
came clear that the old conditions would no longer 
automatically prevail. The fact that any treaty 
negotiated by the United States can only be rati- 
fied "by and with the advice" of a two-thirds 
majority of the Senate and the fact that such con- 
sent will not be given unless the required majority 
is convinced of the Tightness of their action is a 
great safeguard against secret treaties or secret 
policies and is a necessary element in democratic 
control over foreign policy. However, it can at 
the same time be a highly inconvenient and ineffi- 
cient method of carrying out national jjolicy. In 
discussing this aspect of "democratic diplomacy" 
in his valuable little book on Diplomacy, Harold 
Nicolson states that — 

while the new practice represents an immense gain in the 
direction of "open covenants" it is a terrible responsi- 
bility in respect of negotiation. The art of negotiation is 
severely hampered when one powerful negotiator demands 
concessions from his fellow negotiators without being in 
a position to guarantee that his own promises will simi- 
larly be fulfilled. If democratic diplomacy is to prove 
as efficient as its predecessors, this is one of the problems 
which it will have to solve. 



May 5, 7952 



,689 



Cooperation With Congress 

Harold Nicolson wrote his book in 1939 just be- 
fore the beginning of World War II. In my opin- 
ion, if he were writing today he could use the 
example of the manner in which the Japanese peace 
treaty was negotiated to show that democratic 
diplomacy has gone a considerable distance in solv- 
ing the problem. From the time that he was ap- 
pointed by the President on September 8, 1950, 
as chief U.S. negotiator until just one year later 
on September 8, 1951, when the treaty was finally 
signed, Mr. Dulles and his associates in the De- 
partment of State made a deliberate effort to keep 
the members of the Foreign Relations Committee 
of the Senate informed of what they were doing 
and the way in which they were doing it. During 
this period there was a series of meetings between 
Ambassador Dulles and the members of the con- 
sultative subcommittee on Far Eastern affairs of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. At all 
important stages in the negotiation of the treaty. 
Ambassador Dulles consulted with the subcommit- 
tee and on several occasions with the whole com- 
mittee on specific problems that arose. Sugges- 
tions were received from members of the commit- 
tee as to how many of these problems might be 
solved, and these suggestions played a real part in 
the determination of the final text of the treaties. 
Not only were members of the Foreign Relations 
Committee kept informed but Mr. Dulles made it 
a practice to discuss treaty matters with influential 
members of the Senate who were not members of 
the Foreign Relations Committee but who would 
be called upon to pass final judgment on the 
treaties themselves. There were also several meet- 
ings with members of the Foreign AflPairs Com- 
mittee of the House of Representatives. While the 
House of course has no direct part in the ratifica- 
tion of treaties, nevertheless it does have a part in 
passing implementing legislation by which trea- 
ties can be carried out, and it was therefore believed 
important that as many Members of Congress as 
possible should be kept fully informed. Wlien the 
time came to send a delegation to San Francisco 
to sign the treaties, members of both the Senate 
and the House of Representatives were included 
on the delegation. This procedure, providing con- 
tinuous consultation with the Congress, was proved 
to be justified when the treaty came before the 
Senate. It was approved unanimously by the 
Foreign Relations Committee and was then over- 
whelmingly approved in the Senate itself by a 
vote of 65 to 1 1 . It has been demonstrated that the 
people at the two ends of Pennsylvania Avenue can 
cooperate effectively when both are convinced what 
they are doing is for the true and lasting benefit of 
their country. 

Not only did these treaties set a precedent in the 
manner in which the various branches of the U.S. 
Government handled them, but the method of ne- 
gotiating the treaty with the Allied Powers was 
unique in the modern history of diplomacy. Most 



multilateral treaties are concluded as the result of ' 
a conference of all the nations concerned wherein ; 
the representatives of the various governments, 
gathered around a table, put forth their ideas 
and eventually, through the process of give and 
take, reach agreement on a text of a treaty. At the 
end of the war it was assumed that the normal 
process would be followed in the case of a treaty 
witli Japan. In fact, in the summer of 1047, the 
United States made an attempt to call a prelimi- 
nary conference of the powers most directly con- 
cerned with a view of setting up procedures for the 
negotiation of a Japanese peace treaty. Countries 
invited were the then 11 members of the Far East- 
ern Commission, and in the invitation it was speci- 
fied that decisions of the conference would be by 
majority vote. 

All members of the Far Eastern Commission 
except China and the Soviet Union accepted the 
invitation and agreed to the suggested procedure. 
The Soviet Union maintained that a treaty of 
peace witli Japan should in the first instance be 
discussed by the Big Four prior to discussion with 
the other nations concerned. China was agree- 
able to having the treaty discussed from the be- 
ginning by all members of the Far Eastern Com- 
mission but maintained that the voting procedure 
should be the same as that prevailing in the Far 
Eastern Commission, which in effect meant that 
each of tlie Big Four, the United States, the 
United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China, 
would have a veto. Neither of these positions was 
acceptable to the United States, and the plans for 
the proposed conference were therefore aban- 
doned. It was not until 1950 that serious steps 
were again taken looking toward the early con- 
clusion of a treay. By this time there had been 
radical changes in the situation in the Far East. 
The forces of Nationalist China had been driven 
from the mainland and a Communist regime set 
up which had been recognized by many of the 
countries most intimately concerned in concluding 
a peace with Japan. The Far Eastern Commis- 
sion had been increased to 13 nations, and although 
Nationalist China still retained its seat on the 
Commission, of the remaining 12 nations, 6 recog- 
nized the Communist regime as the lawful govern- 
ment of China. 

Restoration of Freedom to Japan 

It had become evident to the United States that 
time was running out and that it was important to 
bring about a treaty with Japan and restore that 
nation to a position of equality among the nations 
of the world at the earliest possible time. But 
how could this be done? The Soviet Union still 
maintained its position that the treaty should only 
be discussed by the Big Four, and there was an 
obvious difference of opinion between the Soviet 
Union and the United States as to which govern- 
ment of China should be included among the Big 
Four. The United States continued to believe that 



690 



Department of State Bullel'm 



all of the nations on the Far Eastern Commission, 
which were the nations who had been most active 
in the war against Japan, had a right to be con- 
sulted, but here again it was imjjossible to call a 
conference, for these nations were equally divided 
as to which government of China was the legiti- 
mate one. 

In these circumstances, tradition was thrown 
aside. Ambassador Dulles had traveled to Japan 
on a journey of investigation durin^ the summer 
of 1950, at which time he had consulted at length 
with General MacArthur, with members of the 
diplomatic corj^s, members of the American and 
European communities in Japan, and with Jap- 
anese Government and private leaders. He was 
convinced that if Japan was to be kept as a vol- 
untary member of the family of free nations it 
was essential that early progress be made toward 
obtaining a peace treaty. He determined that the 
normal treaty-negotiating procedures should not 
deter him in doing what he could to bring about 
a treaty. If it was not possible to call a confer- 
ence for all the nations concerned to sit around the 
table and discuss the treaty, why not talk to all 
these countries individually? And that is what 
was done. 

The first consultations took place in the autumn 
of 1951 at Lake Success where several of the For- 
eign Ministers of the countries represented on the 
Far Eastern Commission were present to take part 
in the session of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations. During these early talks, the 
representatives of the various countries were 
handed a short, simple memorandum giving a 
general statement of principles which, in the opin- 
ion of the U. S. Government, would govern the 
type of treaty proposed to end the state of war with 
Japan. This brief statement consisted of seven 
points, and it was hoped it would instigate dis- 
cussion among the various countries so that the 
United States could reach a decision as to the 
possibility of obtaining a treaty at all and the 
chances' of obtaining one substantially of the char- 
acter thought by the United States to be most de- 
sirable. These discussions were held with repre- 
sentatives of all members of the Far Eastern Com- 
mission and in addition with representatives of 
Indonesia, Ceylon, and the Republic of Korea, 
nations which had but recently achieved their in- 
dependence. It is important to note that repre- 
sentatives of the Soviet Union participated in 
these discussions although the Soviet Government 
later disavowed these talks. 

As a result of reactions received to the seven- 
point statement, the United States determined 
there was general agreement on the desirability 
of an early peace treaty with Japan and that in 
general, with certain exceptions, general agree- 
ment as to the type of treaty which should be con- 
cluded. Ambassador Dulles had been a member 
of the American Delegation at Versailles which 
drew up the treaty to end the first World War, 



and he was deeply convinced of the unworkability 
of a punitive treaty which, while it might well be 
justified because of the crimes of the aggressor, 
nevertheless contained not an inspiration to co- 
operation and peaceful action in the future but 
rather the seeds of future war. This viewpoint 
was shared by the President and the Department 
of State and the majority of the Congressional 
leaders consulted, so that from the beginning there 
was unanimity in the American Government for 
the course of action followed. The United States 
was determined that the treaty should in fact re- 
store freedom to Japan and that only a treaty of 
reconciliation and trust would in the final analysis 
be effective. 

Consultations on Widespread Scale 

Having ascertained the general reaction of a 
majority of the countries on the Far Eastern 
Commission, it was believed important to consult 
again with Japanese leaders. From the very be- 
ginning it had been the belief of the U. S. nego- 
tiators that this treaty should not be an imposed 
treaty in the traditional sense and that the Japa- 
nese should be given appropriate opportunity to 
express their opinions. It was of course acknowl- 
edged that those powers which had suffered as 
a result of Japanese aggression should have the 
primary voice in determining the treaty's terms. 
In the preliminary talks with the other members 
of the Far Eastern Commission it quickly became 
evident that certain of the powers, those which 
had been in the path of Japanese expansion such 
as the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, 
would be most reluctant to conclude a treaty with 
Japan which did not in itself contain guarantees 
against renewed Japanese aggression and rearma- 
ment unless some other form of security could be 
assured them. 

It was the hope of the United States, therefore, 
that there might be developed some form of col- 
lective security in the Pacific area which would 
enable Japan to take its rightful place and con- 
tribute its share to the collective defense of the 
Pacific area without developing military forces 
which by themselves could be a threat to anyone. 
Ambassador Dulles and members of his staff de- 
parted in January 1951 for Japan and after 
intensive consultation with Japanese and foreign 
leaders continued their journey and visited the 
Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. In 
each of these countries they had the opportunity 
to consult with the local leaders and to receive 
at first-hand the views and feelings of those peo- 
ples toward concluding a treaty with Japan. 
During this trip the foundation was also laid for 
the conclusion of the mutual security and defense 
treaties which form a part of the Japanese peace 
settlement. 

Initial Stages of Treaty Draft 

Upon their return to Washington from this 
tour around the Pacific, Ambassador Dulles and 



May 5, 7952 



«91 



his staff believed the time had come when the 
general principles contained in the earlier seven- 
point memorandum might be expanded and put 
into treaty language. This was done, and, in 
March of 1951, a first draft was circulated to those 
countries with whom the United States had been 
discussing the treaty. This original draft was 
still a brief document and consisted of only 8 
mimeographed pages of foolscap size. It might 
be interesting to interpolate at this point that the 
final treaty draft as signed at San Francisco con- 
sisted of 21 pages of similar size. The change 
from a document of 8 pages to a document of 21 
pages is evidence of the fruitfulness of the dis- 
cussions which took place among all the powers 
concerned and effectively disposes of the charge 
made by the Soviets and its satellites that the 
treaty signed at San Francisco was merely an 
American document forced upon a reluctant 
conference. 

While the United States had been developing its 
ideas as to the proper form of a treaty, the Gov- 
ernment of the United Kingdom had also been 
busy and, as a result of discussions with members 
of the Commonwealth, had produced a draft of 
its own. This draft was circulated by the United 
Kingdom to the Commonwealth and one or two 
other countries and was discussed at length with 
the United States. As a result of these discus- 
sions, which took place over a period of approxi- 
mately 2 months, it was decided that there should 
be a joint U. S.-U. K. draft which would be pre- 
sented for the comments of the other nations. The 
United States and the United Kingdom finally 
completed their draft and circulated it to the 
Allied Powers during the first half of July 1951, 
and it was kept open for further changes until the 
middle of August. 

Prior to completing the joint U. S.-U. K. draft, 
Ambassador Dulles and members of his staff in- 
dividually or collectively had visited London, 
Paris, Karachi, New Delhi, Canberra, Wellington, 
Manila, and Tokyo. It will therefore be evident 
that in addition to communications through nor- 
mal diplomatic channels with all the nations at 
war with Japan, the American negotiators visited 
the capitals of eight of the countries represented 
on the Far Eastern Commission in order to obtain 
their views. 

By the middle of August, the U. K. and the U. S. 
Governments believed that ample opportunity had 
been given to the countries concerned to express 
their views, and, while it was realized the treaty 
was not a perfect document, it was decided that 
if we were to await perfection we would never 
obtain a treaty. Therefore, invitations were is- 
sued to the 50 countries which had been at war with 
Japan to meet in San Francisco and sign the 
treaty, a treaty which had been developed not 
around one large conference table but around 
many conference tables in many countries and 
over a period of almost 11 months. It was made 



clear in the invitations to the conference at San 
Francisco that this was a conference to sign the 
treaty of peace and not one where the whole matter 
would be reopened with results which would most 
certainly have led to indefinite delay. During 
this 11 months' period of consultation and draft- 
ing the U. S. Govermnent had kept the National 
Government of China informed at all stages of the 
type of treaty that was being developed, and in 
view of the vast amount of denunciation of the 
treaty text in specific terms made by the leaders of 
the Chinese Communist regime, it is evident they 
too had been kept informed, presumably by their 
Soviet friends, of the terms of the treaty as they 
were drafted. 

It was a matter of great regret to the Govern- 
ment of the United States that the 400 million 
people of China were not represented at San Fran- 
cisco. As it was not possible for the Allies to 
agree on who should represent China at the time 
of the signing of the peace treaty, it was deter- 
mined that neither the Chinese Nationalist Gov- 
ernment nor the Communist regime would be in- 
vited. However, insofar as possible, as a result 
of consultations with the National Government of 
China, the interests of China were safeguarded in 
the terms of the treaty itself. The sponsors of the 
treaty draft, while disagreeing as to which govern- 
ment represented China, agreed that the people of 
Japan should not be held in subjugation to an 
alien occupation any longer because of dispute 
among the Allied Powers over China. 



Points of Interest to Law Students 

With respect to the terms of the treaty itself, 
there is not the time to go into detail nor do I 
believe that to be necessary in view of the great 
amount of public discussion which has taken place 
concerning the treaty. There are, however, cer- 
tain points which are of special interest to students 
of international law, and these I shall briefly men- 
tion. It will be noted that article 2 of the treaty 
requires Japan among other things, to renounce 
all claims to Formosa, the Kurile Islands, and 
Sakhalin but does not state in whose favor such 
claims are renounced. Here again a practical so- 
lution was needed to meet the problem caused by 
differences among the Allied Powers over the 
question of China. The Potsdam surrender terms 
are the only peace terms to which Japan and the 
Allied Powers as a whole are bound. There have 
been other understandings and agreements be- 
tween certain of the Allied Governments, but these 
did not bind Japan nor were all of the other allies 
bound by these agreements. Therefore, in essence, 
the peace treaty embodies that portion of the 
Potsdam surrender terms which provided that 
Japan's sovereignty should be limited to the four 
main islands and such minor islands as might be 
determined. Certain of the Allied Powers sug- 
gested that the treaty of peace should not merely 



692 



Department of Sfafe Bulletin 



delimit Japanese sovereignty but should specify 
precisely the ultimate disposition of each of the 
former Japanese territories. While from the 
point of view of international law this would have 
been more satisfactory, it would have raised ques- 
tions to which at present there are no agreed 
answers. As Ambassador Dulles pointed out in 
his address at the peace conference in San Fran- 
cisco/ it was necessary — 

either to give Japan peace on the Potsdam Surrender 
Terms or deny peace to Japan wliile the Allies quarreled 
about what should be done with what Japan is prepared, 
and required, to fiive up. Clearly, the wise course was to 
proceed now, so far as Japan is concerned, leaving the 
future to re.solve doubts by invoking international solvents 
other than this treaty. 

Anotlier portion of the treaty believed to be of 
special interest to those concerned with interna- 
tional law is the manner in which the treaty comes 
into force. Article 23 gives the nations most ac- 
tively concerned in the Pacific a special position 
and provides that the treaty shall come into force 
when the instruments of ratification of Japan and 
the majority of the members of the Far Eastern 
Commission wliich signed the treaty, together with 
Indonesia and Ceylon, have been deposited with 
the United States. It is specifically provided that 
this majority must include the United States as 
the principal occupying power. The position of 
primacy given the United States was readily 
agreed to by the other countries in view of the 
great responsibilities of this country in connection 
with the occupation. 

The brief mention previously made of the vari- 
ous mutual defense and security treaties with the 
Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand may 
have given the impression their only purpose was 
to make it possible for those nations to associate 
themselves with the United States in advocating 
a treaty with Japan containing no arduous re- 
strictive clauses, particularly ones dealing with 
rearmament. Wliile this certainly is one of the 
purposes of those treaties, it is not, I believe, the 
chief purpose, for these treaties do not look ordy to 
the past, they look to the future. Let me quote 
Ambassador Dulles before the Senate Foreign 
Kelations Committee : ^ 

It is highly appropriate that not only our friends, but 
our potential enemies, should learn that our concern with 
Europe, evidenced by the North Atlantic Treaty, and our 
concern with Japan, in no sense imply any lack of con- 
cern for our Pacific allies of World War II, or lack of 
desire to preserve and deepen our solidarity with them 
for security. The security treaties with these three coun- 
tries are a logical part of the effort not merely to liquidate 
the old war but to strengthen the fabric of peace in the 
Pacific as against the hazard of new war. 

In bringing to a close this brief consideration 



" Bulletin of Sept. 17, 1951, p. 454. 
'Ibid., Feb. 4, 1952, p. 190. 



of the Japanese peace treaty and the allied treaties, 
we cannot help but ask ourselves whether these 
treaties will last and be effective. In my opinion 
that will depend not so much on the conditions in 
the treaties but on whether or not they express the 
facts of the mutual relationships between the sig- 
natories. Allow me to call to mind the words of 
Professor Morgenthau of the University of Chi- 
cago in his stimulating book, The Idea of the Na- 
tional Interest, when he points. out: 

It is a general law of international politics, applicable 
to all nations at all times, that only those agreements 
have a chance to be effective and to last which express in 
legal terms the identical or complimentary interests of 
the contracting parties, and that they last only as long as 
their terms coincide with those interests. 

I believe the treaties signed last September do 
coincide with the true interests of the signatories. 
As far as the treaties are concerned, the work of 
the lawyers is finished. It is now the task of the 
policy-makers to insure that our future policies 
are such that our fundamental interests will con- 
tinue to coincide and that these treaties will thus 
continue to be effective. 



Voluntary Aid to Korea 
Reaches $10 Million 

Press Confer'ence Statement hy Secretary Acheson 

[Released to the press April 16'] 

I thought you might be interested to know that, 
according to the Advisory Committee on Volun- 
tary Foreign Aid, some 10 million dollars' worth 
of food, clothing, medical supplies, and other com- 
modities has now been provided for assistance in 
Korea by American nongovernmental agencies. 

American organizations including church, wel- 
fare, relief, and other groups have contributed 
commodities and funds for Korean relief to supple- 
ment the efforts of the United Nations to amel- 
iorate the hardships suffered by the people of the 
Republic of Korea as a result of 22 months of 
destructive warfare. 

Many American religious groups have con- 
tributed generously for this purpose and, together 
with the voluntary contributions of groups in 
other countries, have provided the means for 
attacking the serious problems which the Korea 
people face. 

This outpouring of aid is one more example of 
the ability and determination of free peoples to 
assist in overcoming the hardships which have 
overtaken the people of the Republic of Korea in 
their gallant stand against Communist aggres- 
sion. 



May 5, 1952 



693 



Law and the Growth of the International Community 



Address hy Secretary Acheson ^ 



Law in our national societies performs a num- 
ber of functions. One is restraint upon antisocial 
conduct — a negative function, criminal law, for 
example. This requires courts and sheriffs, police 
and prosecutors. Except for tlie trial of war crim- 
inals, our international legal system is here in a 
rudimentary stage. 

Another function of law is accommodation, 
providing rules for the orderly conduct of day-to- 
day life : How property shall be transferred from 
one owner to another; what conduct is consistent 
with the exercise of property rights, or personal 
riglits. 

These are the traditional, nondynamic aspects 
of law. They are important; they have their 
place. 

But the function of law which I propose that we 
discuss this evening is not directed toward impos- 
ing negative restraints, or toward formulating 
rules of accommodation which avoid or resolve dis- 
agreements. It is rather the essentially legislative 
function which mobilizes the community into ac- 
tion to deal with situations which by common 
agreement are unsatisfactory and which can only 
be remedied by positive and sustained measures. 

Wliile the restraining and accommodating func- 
tions of law are addressed to the task of defining 
and protecting existing rights, the legislative func- 
tion is addressed to bringing about progress and 
change. Adjustments are made in society so that 
we can go ahead, so that things happen. 

It is not easy to isolate and analyze this legisla- 
tive function as it operates on the international 
scene. There is no exact international equivalent 
of the national legislative bodies with which we 
are familiar. And international adjudication pro- 
vides little scope for the legislative role played 
by our national courts in, for example, the defini- 
tion of unreasonable restraints on trade or of un- 
fair labor practices. 



' Made before the American Society of International 
Law at Washington on Apr. 24 and released to the press 
on the same date. 



Nevertheless, as Judge Hudson's volumes on 
International Legislation so abundantly prove, 
members of the international community do uti- 
lize the legislative function which I have de- 
scribed. Nations do consult together about inter- 
national problems and adopt rules of action which 
subsequently guide and govern their conduct. A 
glance at the indeix of documents collected in 
Judge Hudson's last volume shows such diverse 
matters as fisheries, patents, sugar, tin, banking, 
highway traffic, insurance, and health. 

Philosophic Consistency in British Law 

The importance of the traditional judicial and 
administrative processes is clear beyond doubt. 
But the dominant task which has to be performed 
in the international, as in the national community, 
is essentially legislative: that task is to pull the 
community together through dynamic, propulsive, 
and creative measures which will change unsat- 
isfactory situations and create new ones responsive 
to human needs. 

What I have said suggests that this legislative 
task, on the national or the international level, is 
not simply a series of haphazard and disassociated 
actions. It is a cohesive whole, guided by certain 
operative principles leading toward the goals 
which the community is seekmg. 

If you were to take from the shelves all the 
volumes which contain the statutes enacted by 
the British Parliament in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, you might well shrink from 
the effort of distilling any guiding principles from 
them. You would surely find the books full of 
unrelated minutiae, but I think you would also 
find yourselves drawn by a defined current. 

The other evening when I was thinking about 
this problem, I remembered a book which I had 
not read for over a quarter of a century, and took 
it from the shelf to see if my memory was right 
and whether some of its thought and analysis was 
as apposite as I remembered. The book was writ- 
ten before World War I. It attempted to iso- 



694 



Deparfmenf of Sfafe Bullefin 



late tlie basic principles lending cohesion and 
strength to the British Nation. Many of you are 
familiar with this book, The Underlying Prin- 
ciples of Modern Legislation^ by an eminent and 
scholarly British constitutional lawyer, the late 
W. Jethi'o Brown. 

This study of nineteenth and early twentieth 
century British legislation may seem a far cry 
from the complex issues of international life with 
which we are gi'appling today. But as' I turned 
over the pages, it seemed to me that this was not so. 

The task the author had set himself, in a world 
so different from ours, was to discover some philo- 
sophic consistency underlying the vast body of 
legislation with which the British people were 
attempting to meet the economic and political 
pressures of the time. He was writing in an era 
of golden placidity — on the surface, at least. But 
he was gravely concerned whether his countrymen 
would be able to solve their problems within the 
orderly pattern of legal processes. If British leg- 
islative ingenuity were unequal to the task, he 
foresaw the dangers of violent revolution which 
had overwhelmed less flexible societies. 

In the record of legislation before him, the 
British lawyer saw the unfolding of Acton's prin- 
ciple of liberty. Liberty, Jethro Brown pointed 
out, has two aspects — the citizen as an end in him- 
self, and the citizen as a member of the community 
contributing to the general well-being. From 
tliese two aspects of libei-ty there are derived, in 
his own words, "two fundamental principles — the 
Worth of Man and the Unity of Society." 

These two principles underlay the broad range 
of legislation which he scrutinized. The prin- 
ciples seemed to work together, not in a conscious 
or deliberate way, to form a balanced and inte- 
grated national attitude. Making themselves felt 
in the concrete responses of the British Parlia- 
ment, these two principles were, in a deeply prac- 
tical sense, the major premises of the British 
community. 



Developing Principles of International Legislation 

We Americans see at once that these principles 
are also the touchstones of our American com- 
munity. 

The worth of man, the fact that all men are 
created equal, has been hammered into our demo- 
cratic tradition on the anvils of revolution and of 
civil war. We are — each of us — firmly and right- 
fully aware of our own individual dignity : our 
right to our own thoughts, our own faith, our own 
politics. 

We Americans are individualists ; but we are at 
the same time keenly sensible of the unity of 
society, of the fact that we are joint venturers in 
the common American enterprise. We don't like 
to be told what to do ; but we revere the law, and 
we gladly serve our country and our community. 
We grumble at taxes, but we pay them, for we 



know, as Justice Holmes put it, that they are the 
price of civilization. 

But these two principles — the worth of man and 
the unity of society — are not merely English prin- 
ciples or American principles. They are aspects 
of the ideal of liberty. And the ideal of liberty 
is going out across the world, as Jefferson said it 
would, "to some parts sooner, to some later, and 
finally to all." 

And so, when nations, seized of the ideal of lib- 
erty, group themselves together in a free interna- 
tional community, we should expect that larger 
community — if it is to be a valid and going con- 
cern — to build upon these two fundamental 
principles. 

I suggest to you this evening, that if we examine 
the recent growth of the international commu- 
nity, viewing that growth as a manifestation of 
international legislation at work, we will find 
Jethro Brown's thesis borne out on the interna- 
tional scene. 

We have no complete reference list of contem- 
poraneous international legislation. But I would 
like to illustrate how international legislation has 
worked and is working; and at the same time, 
suggest what principles seem to me to underlie 
this body of legislation. 

In doing this it is unimportant to argue the 
traditional philosophic question whether a rule 
has the force of law if it lacks organized sanctions 
of power. The important question is whether the 
actors on the international scene, faced by com- 
plex problems, agi'ee among themselves upon prac- 
tical solutions, and thereafter govern their conduct 
accordingly. 



TASK OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY VS. 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 

After all, international problems are human 
problems which have to be solved by human be- 
ings. This basic fact is not changed by the addi- 
tional consideration that the individuals happen 
to be grouped in national societies represented by 
national governments. 

Looked at from this point of view, there is no 
essential diiference between the task of the Ameri- 
can community in applying to a complex of prob- 
lems such a solution as the Tennessee Valley 
Authority, and the task of the international com- 
munity in launching the rehabilitation of postwar 
Europe through the instrumentality of the Mar- 
shall Plan. 

As a national community, we had to deal, in 
the Tennessee Valley, with great potential assets 
and great present liabilities. The valley, com- 
prising seven states, contained areas which were 
among our poorest, industrially, educationally, 
socially. The area contained vast possibilities for 
power development. But the problem was not 
merely one of physical development; it was the 
advancement of the life of four and a half million 



tAay 5, 7952 



695 



people, so that tlie whole area would become a 
great national asset. 

The national community had to take hold of 
this. It had to introduce something new into the 
situation, something that would have a propulsive 
force, to revitalize this whole area. 

And this was done. Around the great power de- 
velopment, there was created a new sense of com- 
munity interest in that river valley that affected 
everything — schools, electric lights, farms, jobs, 
railroads, hospitals, factories, cities, churches — 
everything. 

And all of this was done by taking common ac- 
tion in a legislative and in an administrative way, 
to release and sustain the energy of the people of 
the Tennessee Valley for the solution of their own 
future. 

THE MARSHALL PLAN 

Now, don't we find something of the same sort 
happening on the international scene in the work- 
ing out of the Marshall Plan ? 

Europe, in 1947, had been through the travail of 
war, the destruction of war, with its social, po- 
litical, and economic institutions torn apart. 

It was not just an economic problem ; the prob- 
lems affected the whole life of the people, their 
spirit, their vitality, their determination to re- 
build and face the present and the future. 

Wliat General Marshall said to the people of 
Europe was : we in this country are willing to back 
you if, on your side, you are willing to work to- 
getlier to develop a program which each one of 
you — and all of you together — will implement in 
every way you can, so that new things can be ac- 
complished in Europe. 

And the people of Europe said : yes, we will do 
that. 

They came together and worked out a plan 
which took international action, legislative action 
within countries, administrative action, action by 
private citizens, by workers, by employers, and 
we added to this great help from the United States. 

They set up the Organization for European Eco- 
nomic Cooperation, to which 18 countries now 
belong, and the European Payments Union, and 
laid the groundwork for the Schuman Plan. 

There had to be many adjustments and compro- 
mises; conflicts of interest had to be reconciled. 
But the result it produced was something of a 
miracle in Europe. 

The whole life of Europe became different. It 
become alive; it became hopeful. Individual peo- 

Sle had a new sense of the possibilities of life, 
ational societies became vitalized, and a fabric 
of strong community action among nations had 
been woven. 

THE NORTH ATLANTIC COMMUNITY 

Let us turn to another example, in the field of 
defense. 

696 



By 1948, it had become clear that the Atlantic 
community had to be able to protect itself. 

Something had to be done to assure that every- 
thing that was being created and rebuilt would be 
protected and preserved. 

This was a lesson that we in this country learned 
from our earliest days, from our frontier farming 
communities and our birth as a nation. The lesson 
we learned was that defense was an integral part 
of the function of the community, that as people 
moved to meet this necessity they wove a stronger 
fabric of community life. 

This is what we have found on the international 
stage. As economic recovery progressed, it be- 
came possible to do something about the need for 
protecting ourselves, in a cooperative way. First 
of all, various nations gave one another assur- 
ances of assistance in the event of attack, through 
such instruments as the Brussels Treaty in 1948, 
and the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. 

But assurances were not enough, when real 
strength was lacking. We saw that each of us 
would have to develop our military establishments. 

Then we saw that this wasn't enough. We 
would have to increase our total strength by mak- 
ing our military forces complementary to each 
other rather than complete in themselves. That 
was General Bradley's idea of balanced collective 
forces, instead of balanced national forces. 

And this, in turn, led to the integration of forces 
under a common command, with all that this in- 
volved : a unified command structure, common 
facilities and training programs, and a meshing 
of production, budgets, and even of political insti- 
tutions. 

As always happens in this kind of development, 
there was a movement from immediate necessity 
to broader patterns of cooperation, until finally 
we reached the broadest possible adjustment of 
international interest in the direction of a wider 
and growing unity. 

This is the meaning of the European Defense 
Community, within the broader framework of the 
North Atlantic Community, which in turn is com- 
prehended within the still broader concept of the 
United Nations. 

The European army is a dramatic illustration 
of creative action to find common solutions to com- 
mon problems, action that leads to a whole blos- 
soming of growth and development. For the 
European Defense Community will have not only 
a common army, but joint political supervision, a 
common military budget, a common procurement 
system. It is a great stride toward the long- 
cherished goal of a united Europe, and even more, 
toward the unity of international society. 

What we have been witnessing, in the broad 
sweep of this European experience since the end of 
the war, has been a series of community actions by 
the people of the North Atlantic area, actions to 
establish peace, security and economic well-being 
by grappling with a succession of connected 
problems. 

Deparfmenf of State Bulletin 



We are witnessing a series of positive actions, 
unprecedented in their scope, to acliieve that unity 
of international society which alone can assui'e 
the realization of individual human needs and 
aspirations in the world as it is today. 

THE POINT FOUR PROGRAM 

Let us consider anotlier example, one that has 
to do with other kinds of actions, and other parts 
of the world. 

From the time of the first colonies on the eastern 
seaboard of this country, and through the march 
across the continent, this Nation has recognized 
the interest of the entire community in agricul- 
tural development. 

It was under President Lincoln, almost a hun- 
dred years ago, that there was established in the 
U.S. Government a Department of Agriculture. 
By this step, the Government showed its aware- 
ness of the relation between the problems of the 
farmer in Iowa and the steel puddler in 
Pittsburgh. 

Out of this came the development of the whole 
great activity of the Department of Agriculture 
today, working througli its county agents, through 
land-gi'ant colleges, carrying forward scientific 
experimentation, improving the productivity of 
the land, widening skills and techniques, steadily 
raising the standard of living not only of the 
workers on the farm but also of the entire Amer- 
ican community. 

This is what we have come to call, on the 
international stage, the Point Four Program. 

In the world today there is a comparable rela- 
tionship between tlie rice farmer in Burma, or the 
sheep herder in Uruguay, and the worker at the 
loom in Manchester, England, or Manchester, 
N.H. 

Here again was a problem rising out of the 
need of the individual human being and affecting 
an international society which despite its diver- 
gencies had a genuine unity. 

And here also, in President Truman's Point 
Four Program, was the introduction of an element 
that stimulated a whole range of actions in the 
underdeveloped parts of the world. 

The idea of the unity of society is deeply im- 
bedded in our consciousness. It is not a new idea. 
From time immemorial, man has built up, in con- 
centric circles, the family, the tribe, the city- 
state, and the nation. Nor is the idea of a unified 
international community a new one. Many na- 
tions and many faiths have dreamed of empire. 

What is relatively new is the corollary prin- 
ciple of the worth of the individual. For this 
principle means that a unified society has validity 
only as it serves the human needs of its members. 

THE UNITED NATIONS 

On the international scene, this principle also 
comes into play by way of analogy to the position 
of the individual state within the international 



community. In the community of free nations, 
the basis is one of consent, persuasion, free coop- 
eration. At times tliis may seem a difficult basis 
on which to operate, but it affords restraints 
against the arbitrary exercise of power or will by 
any member of the community. 

Tlie convergence of these two principles — the 
unity of society and the worth of man — finds its 
loftiest symbolic and practical expression in the 
greatest act of international legislation, the crea- 
tion of the United Nations. For, as stated in its 
Charter, that concretely unified society of na- 
tions stakes its faith upon "fundamental human 
rights . . . the dignity and worth of the human 
person" and ". . . the equal rights of men and 
women and of nations large and small". 

It is within the inclusive framework of the 
United Nations that the international legislation 
I have described this evening has gone forward. 

A free international community based on fun- 
damental tenets is all very well, one may say, for 
those who agree on those tenets, but what about 
those who do not? 

In our concept of society, power is lodged in 
the society as a whole for the good of all. In the 
totalitarian state, the state is something separate 
and apart from the people. The state is one party 
in the conflict and the people constitute another 
party. No matter how much dictators prattle 
about "democracy", the dictatorial state does not 
symbolize the rule of the people; it rules the peo- 
ple. Transposed to the international scene, this 
theory inspires a policy designed to bring about 
a result in which a single state dominates other 
states. It does' not contemplate participation on 
an equal basis in a unified society. 

Perhaps the cleavage is gi-aphically illustrated 
by one of the points still unsettled in the truce ne- 
gotiations at Panmunjom. The stand of the 
United Nations in regard to the return of prisoners 
of war rests upon our belief in the worth of the 
individual. As General Ridgway properly said 
this week, the difference in concept of the value of 
human life as held by the Communists and by the 
free world is a fundamental issue at stake in the 
current negotiations over the exchange of pris- 
oners. 

The iiiternational community does not require 
uniformity. On the contrary, one can welcome 
diversity if only there is a common acceptance of 
the basic principles of the unity of society and of 
the worth of the individual. 

Our idea of the international commimity is that 
it is an open-ended one. It is not exclusive. It 
is not directed against anyone. It is open to any 
who accept the fundamental postulates. 

Even with those who do not accept the postu- 
lates and therefore do not become full and inti- 
mate meinbei's of the community, the adjustment 
of differences is always possible, provided one 
thing — and that is that one party does not have as 
a fundamental objective the destruction of the 
other. 



May 5, J 952 



697 



In reflecting upon ways of developing a free 
and peaceful international community, men often 
tend to be governed by a passion for organization 
as a thing in itself. It seems sometimes to be 
assumed that the only thing which is lacking in 
a search for Utopia is the perfection of organiza- 
tion. Sometimes this has led to the theoiy that 
all we need is a code of international rules care- 
fully drawn up and written down and applied by 
an international court to effect the solution of 
every international conflict. 

We know that this is not true. Organization, 
whether national or international, is merely an 
instrument and must be used by skillful craftsmen. 



The existence of an instrument does not elimi- 
nate the need for craftsmanship nor does the ex- 
istence of international organization eliminate the 
need for statesmanship. The day-to-day prob- 
lems, whether they arise among friends or between 
adversaries, require for their solution the contin- 
uous application of human wisdom. This is as 
true among nations as it is within nations. 

So long as tliose who are charged with seeking 
solutions of international problems are animated 
by the companion concepts of the unity of society 
and the worth of the individual, we need not de- 
spair of the wholesome growth of the international 
community. 



The National Interest and Current World Problems 



hy Charles B. Marshall 



My assignment calls for me to relate the national 
interest to the problems of the United States in 
the present world situation. 

Let me comment fii-st on that phrase, "the 
national interest." 

Only a few years ago the economic interpreta- 
tion of virtually everything was in vogue. 
Writers of considerable repute were fobbing off 
the significance of the national interest as a factor 
in foreign policy, interpreting it as merely a 
facade to conceal special interests and to deceive 
the public. 

The return of the phrase to respectable parlance, 
indicating the recognition of a valid national in- 
terest paramount over particular interests, is a 
gain for straight thinking. 

Often a decision in foreign policy is inseparable 
from the question of the domestic consequences 
of the decision. It is necessary in such an instance 
to recognize that our national destiny in a world 
of many nations is more important than the do- 
mestic group interests affected by the decision. 
In settling questions of conflict between the neces- 
sities of national security and group interests, the 
idea of national interest is valid and essential. 

The phrase, moreover, indicates a step away 
from the utopianism beclouding too much the dis- 
cussion of international affaix'S in the sequel to 
both World War I and World War II. 

Nations do have interests. In some instances 
their interests coincide with the interests of other 
nations. Sometimes interests of different nations 
harmonize without coinciding. Sometimes they 
differ, but not incompatibly. Sometimes they are 
mutually exclusive. Out of these variations 

698 



comes the real nature of international life. It is 
useless to try to ignore this by talk about global 
harmony and the universal state. Such talk, 
while edifying to those who like it, only hinders — 
it does not help — the handling of world problems. 

So it is good to hear people talk about inter- 
national problems again in terms of national in- 
terests rather than in the abstractions of world 
government and world law. 

Indeed, it would be a blessed thing if all dif- 
ferences among nations could be translated into 
differences of interest alone and not differences 
of basic purpose and principle. It is unselfish 
to compromise on interests. It is unseemly to 
compromise on one's principles. 

Here I myself stray off into utopianism of an- 
other sort. The world is nowhere near that stage 
of adjustment where all national differences can 
be dealt with as solely differences of interest, and 
the coming of that day is too remote for prediction. 

I have said enough in praise of the idea of na- 
tional interest. Now let me say some things in 
criticism. 

Tlie usefulness and significance of the jjhrase 
are limited. It begs more questions than it an- 
swers. 

In appraising the significance of the national 
interest, I must distinguish between instances in 
which the decision turns on weighing our world 
position as a Nation against the claims of particu- 
lar domestic interests and instances in which the 
issue lies simply between different lines of action 
in the foreign field. 

I know of no case of the latter character in 
which the settlement of an issue of our national 
policy in the line of responsibility would have been 

Deparimenf of Sfafe BuWetin 



facilitated by injecting the question : Shall we or 
shall we not try to serve the national interest ? 

What Is the National Interest? 

The question in the arena of responsibility in 
handling an issue involving foreign policy alone 
is not whether, but how, to serve the national 
interest. That involves the question of what is the 
national interest in a particular situation. 

The question of serving the national interest is 
always a subtle and complex one in real situations. 

I am sure all of the following things are clearly 
in our national interest : To avoid war ; to pi'eserve 
our institutions; to have strong allies; to avoid 
inflation ; to have a prospei'ous civilian economy ; 
to find common grounds on which to stand with 
the various nations which have newly come to 
responsibility; to preserve our access to strategic 
waterways and vital raw materials; and to pro- 
tect the property and safety of our nationals 
abroad. 

I could extend this list by dozens of items. 

Now any matter of foreign policy pertaining 
only to the realization of one of those items would 
not present an issue at all. No one would have to 
work his brains overtime on it. No series of ex- 
haustive meetings would have to be held. No 
protracted debate about the nuances and contra- 
dictions would be necessary. In such an instance 
the policy decision would crystallize spontane- 
ously. 

In any practical question presenting a real issue 
the national interest has several aspects. Indeed, 
there are many national interests, not just one. 

The difficulties arise in the conflict of one inter- 
est with another ; for example, in the clash of the 
interest in peace with the interest in preserving 
national institutions, in the clash of the interest 
in having a strong defense with the interest in 
having a strong civilian economy, or in the clash 
of the interest in preserving access to a waterway 
with the interest in eliciting the adherence of an- 
other country to one's cause. 

I trust I have made my point of the inconclu- 
siveness of the national interest as a guide in any 
particular policy problem. 

Beyond that, I believe the concept of national 
interest is inadequate and misleading even as a 
broad concept on which to found a policy. 

Responsibility as a Guiding Principle 

It seems to me that a more appropriate guiding 
principle is the idea of responsibility. This is a 
very different sort of idea. 

I want to take the rest of my time in talking 
about the contrast between national interest and 
responsibility and examining the idea of responsi- 
bility as it enlightens our present problems. 

First I want to discuss our special role in the 
world today. 



The great political issues of our time revolve 
aroinid rival approaches to the handling of the 
problems growing out of such circumstances pe- 
culiar to modern times as the massing of peoples — 
their expanded numbers and their increased con- 
centration; the sharpening of the clash between 
cultures due largely to awakened consciousness of 
the disparities in well-being between peoples in 
relation to the advance or lag of production tech- 
niques, and the destructiveness of modern war due 
both to the concentration of industry and popula- 
tion and to the greater inherent efficacy of modern 
weapons — their huge lethal power and the capa- 
bility for distance and stealth in attack. 

One approach would exploit these circumstances 
for the purpose of widening the scope and 
strengthening the foundations of a monopoly of 
political power. 

The other approach seeks to compose clashes of 
interest and to work out patterns of accommo- 
dation. 

The legitimate question of politics is not how 
to eliminate conflicts of interest — a Utopian con- 
cept — but how to organize society so that con- 
flicts can be adjusted rather than fought out. 

This difference in approach is brougnt to bear 
both within and among nations. The lines of 
difference are intertwined and subtle, for the lines 
along which great issues form are never as sharp 
as a razor. 

Insofar as the issue has crystallized among 
nations, however, the Soviet Union stands clearly 
as the champion of the first approach. 

Internal political circumstances cast the Soviet 
Union in that role. It is ruled by tyrants, who 
reached the seat of power through conspiracy and, 
having achieved power, have not dared risk their 
hold on it by resort to a valid procedure of con- 
sent. They have remained conspirators after be- 
coming governoi-s, combining the usages of con- 
spiracy with the prerogatives of the state. Both 
at home and in the world at large, the conspiracy 
that walks like a state requires tension and conflict 
to maintain its grip. In the service of this purpose 
it employs a doctrine emphasizing the patterns 
of conflict — class war, subversion, and the like. 

This rule is established over a great range, com- 
manding great resources in people and materials. 

Huge military forces at its disposal are deployed 
in positions bearing on northern and central Eu- 
rope, the eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, 
Southeast Asia, the Republic of Korea, and Japan. 

The Soviet Union has auxiliaries in the form of 
embryonic governments under the guise of do- 
mestic political groups in territories beyond its 
imperium. 

The Soviet power is such that no combination 
of nations adequate to cope with it is conceivable 
without the support and participation of the 
United States. 

The United States thus finds itself in the po- 
sition of leadership among peoples which prefer 



May 5, 1952 



699 



to work out a method of handling the problems 
of our times alternative to the pattern offered by 
the Soviet and which are impeded in this effort 
by the fact of Soviet opposition. 

Our Constitutional Values 

A failure to exercise this leadership would 
almost certainly result in a world power situation 
endangering the survival of our constitutional 
values. These are the values expressed in the 
Preamble of our Constitution. I do not doubt 
that you know them all, but let me enumerate them 
anyway. 

The first is the perfection of our Union, the 
concept of a nation with steadily growing public 
values. 

Second comes the idea of justice — of power sub- 
jected to standards superior to the mere attain- 
ment of the ends of power. 

Third in the enumeration is domestic tranquil- 
lity, conveying the idea of a nation at peace with 
itself, a nation where issues can be decided by 
reason, by discussion, and by compromise. 

Then we come to the common defense — ^the 
protection of the nation from penetration from the 
outside. 

The idea of the general welfare is another of 
the values set forth. It embodies the idea of a 
government which serves and is not master, which 
is accountable to all of its people as contrasted to 
a government which serves the exclusive interest 
of a dominant group. 

Finally, we have the blessings of liberty — the 
situation in which each person can make choices 
for himself, regarding his life, the life of his 
children, his religion, and his thoughts. 

The fundamental and enduring purpose of our 
foreign policy is to maintain in the world circum- 
stances favorable to the continued vitality of these 
values in the United States. 

I want to stress the novelty in the American 
consciousness of the responsibilities which the 
present world situation imposes. 

Our power, whence come our responsibilities, 
has three main foundations: Position, laolitical 
strength, and economic resourcefulness. 

The circumstances surrounding the development 
of each of these were such as to conceal their 
eventual implications. 

The diffusion of power among several nations 
of great magnitude provided the relatively stable 
and protective situation which enabled the Amer- 
icans to move onward from an Atlantic beachhead 
to become a continental Nation, singular among 
the great powers in that it lies in both the Northern 
and Western Hemispheres, faces on both the At- 
lantic and the Pacific, and stretches from the 
tropics to the Arctic. 

Government Based on Accountability and Freedom 

The same circumstances enabled the Americans 
to preserve and mature a Government based upon 

700 



stipulated principles of accountability and free- i 
dom. Their purpose in doing tliis was purely 
domestic. The strength of the Governnient thus 
established is one of the great political facts of 
our time, important for all the globe. 

The Americans developed a fecund agriculture 
and productive industry, without equal, through 
the expansion of an internal market. That cir- 
cumstance concealed from them the eventual 
world importance that American economic 
strength would have. 

Some GO years ago Lord Bryce described the 
United States as living "in a world of peace" and 
as "safe from attack, safe even from menace." 
Such was the national situation in the historic 
past, when the United States was a remote and 
intermittent factor in the ratios of world power 
and when Americans were concerned almost ex- 
clusively with the problems of their own national 
development. Lord Bryce added : "For the pres- 
ent at least — it may not always be so — America 
sails upon a summer sea." 

Within a lifetime the summer sea vanished. 
The world frontiers closed. Two world wars 
were fought. Germany and Japan were eclipsed 
in defeat. Other great powers suffered relative 
declines. Patterns of empire were sundered. 
Many erstwhile dependencies attained sover- 
eignty. Revolutionary communism established a 
power base. Two nations emerged into positions 
of primary magnitude — the United States as one 
and the Soviet adversary, the other. 

So great an accession of responsibility in so 
brief a span has placed great moral tests on this 
Nation. 

One difficulty rises from the sense, as expressed 
recently by former Chancellor Robert M. Hut- 
chins of the University of Chicago, that "this 
country has been thrust against its will into a 
position of world leadership." 

True, no referendum on the issue whether or 
not to be a nation of such wide responsibilities 
was ever held. The choice was made uncon- 
sciously in many decisions of our past. We were 
thrust ahead not against but by our wills. The 
choice is nonetheless binding for having been 
made in unawareness of the consequences. 

Here we liave a paradox — an accession to great 
power accompanied by a sense of deprivation of 
freedom. 

We feel that paradox in another way. 

In our historic past we viewed our role as 
that of standing normally aloof from the power 
balance whose benefits we enjoyed. At most we 
would entertain the idea of throwing in our 
weight only momentarily to reestablish the bal- 
ance whenever it might break down in general 
war. 

We regarded our role as like that of a pedestrian 
who might choose to vary his solitary walks by 
intermittently riding with others, without fore- 
closing himself from choosing to walk alone again. 

Deparlment of State Bulletin 



Now that is changed. Onr power makes our in- 
terposition essential to the preserving of the 
causes with wliich our interests lie. We must go 
along with others if we are to keep others with 
whom to go along. 

Our power is the basis of our essentiality, and 
our essentiality compels us to replace our historic 
sense of fi-eedom by a new consciousness of re- 
sjDonsibility. 

While losing a sense of freedom, we lose also a 
sense of effectiveness. 

In the era when we stood normally aloof from 
the balance of power, our decision to become a 
world factor for a season had drastic and inune- 
diate results in redressing the balance. 

Now, by having become permanently involved 
in preserving the balance, we are no longer vouch- 
saied the opportunty to alter the situation dra- 
matically and radically by sudden action. 

This involvement leaves for us the exacting 
course of seeking a solution in the long pull 
through persistent effort to make the best of the 
situation stage by stage in the knowledge that 
such is the only way of naaking the situation 
better. 

Let us look for a moment at the foreign policy 
which this situation imposes. 

It gives us no promise of arrival at some cal- 
culable moment at which we can say that all our 
troubles are behind us, that everything henceforth 
will be tidy and easy, and that we have crossed 
the one last river. 

I said this to a gi'oup of Texans with whom I 
was discussing our national policy recently. One 
of them asked me whether I actually thought co- 
existence with the Soviet Union was possible. 

That is a curious question. It makes a matter 
of speculation out of something known to be true. 
Coexistence with the Soviet Union is not simply 
possible; it is a fact. Coexistence with a great 
power that tries to lead a double life as state and 
as conspirator is vexatious for sure, but it is pref- 
erable to the tragedy of general war and its sequel, 
whichever side might win. 

Our policy seeks to avoid the tragedy of war, 
to abate the difficulties of coexistence by correct- 
ing the circumstances affording special advantage 
to the adversary, and to work with other nations 
as best we can to guide international life toward 
the patterns of conduct preferable to us. 

This policy, often called the policy of contain- 
ment, is sometimes criticized as if it aimed for a 
protracted, static confrontation — a sort of per- 
petually frozen status quo. 

Such perpetual equilibrium is foreign to the 
processes of history. 

The policy is based upon no assumption of 
arresting change. It rests rather upon the as- 
sumption that the factors of position, population, 
talents, resources, and moral values redound to the 
ultimate advantage of the side of our interests, 
and that, in the long pull, it will be the adversary 
who must adjust his purposes. 

May 5, 7952 

203545— B2 3 



This is not a foregone conclusion. What we 
and our friends do will be an essential factor in 
determining the outcome. 

This is no cause for disquiet. History pi-esents 
no foregone conclusions. I know of no way to 
formulate a policy that will absolve us from the 
subsequent necessity of exercising resolution and 
restraint and paying the costs, whatever they 
may be. 

Three Lines of Policy 

The policy works along three general lines. 

The first is to make coexistence more tolerable. 
This calls for improving our armed strength and 
that of the nations standing with us and com- 
bining them more effectively through a system of 
alliances; for helping the depleted and dislocated 
economies of our friends to regain a healthy level 
of activity ; for helping the economically lagging 
countries to improve their production methods; 
and for widening the area of peace by bringing 
the former enemy countries, Japan and Western 
Germany, back into collaboration with other 
countries. 

The second line is to prevent serious deteriora- 
tions in the conditions of coexistence by avoiding 
losses in areas of sharp political conflict. 

The third general line relates to the develop- 
ment of international usages and institutions of 
responsibility as instruments of free collaboration 
among nations instead of the collaboration by 
intimidation offered by the adversary. 

To succeed in these endeavors will require the 
collaboration of others. 

They will not work along with us on the basis 
solely of our national interest. The collaboration 
must be founded on an identity among their in- 
terests and ours. The primary responsibility for 
discovering and developing that identity of in- 
terests is ours, because we are in the jDOsition of 
greatest strength. 

This is not a simple responsibility. It is irksome 
and expensive and contains no easy formula for 
complete success in a stipulated interval. 

The policy of responsibility lacks the simplic- 
ity — here I use the word "simplicity" in the sense 
of Proverbs 1 : 22 — of the counsel of unlimited vio- 
lence, a counsel based on the fallacy of trying to 
reduce all problems of power to the limits of the 
problems of force. 

The policy lacks the Utopian tidiness of the 
dream of solution by world government. 

It lacks the traditional ring of the counsel of 
solution by default, by which I mean the idea of 
confining our security to this hemisphere — a coun- 
sel put forth by some claiming the mantle of states- 
manship even though the formula on which it rests 
contains a fallacy recognizable to any school boy 
familiar with solid geometry. The fallacy inheres 
in this : Two points on the same sphere can never 
be farther than a hemisphere apart; hence the 
whole world lies in the same hemisphere with us. 

701 



Transcending National Interest 

Tlie policy based on the principle of responsi- 
bility lacks the crisp appeal of a phrase like "the 
national interest." It involves this paradox — that 
we can serve our iiational interest in these times 
only by a policy which transcends our national in- 
terest. This is the meaning of responsibility. 

No nation could ask more of history than the 
privilege of coming to great responsibility. 

To satisfy our American professions of the 
values of competition, we have at hand one of the 
most exacting contests in ideas ever experienced. 

To test our faith in freedom, we have abundant 
opportunity to make choices of action that will 
profoundly affect the course of human affairs. 

To test our devotion to values, we have the op- 
IDortunity not simply to proclaim them but actu- 
ally to support them by gifts and deeds and per- 
severance. 

This juncture in our experience is not comfort- 
ing for those who take the Utopian approach to in- 



ternational problems — those who remind one of 
Kipling's lines: 

Thinking of beautiful things we know ; 
Dreaming of deeds that we mean to do, 
All complete, in a minute or two — 
Something noble, and grand and good, 
Won by merely wishing we could. 

I recall the words opening one of Christina 
Eossetti's poems : 

Does the road lead uphill all the way? 
Yes, to the very end. 

That is the road which a great and responsible 
nation must tread. It is an uphill road all the way. 
For Americans who do not mind walking that kind 
of a road, this is not a time for misgiving but a 
great time in which to live. 

*Mr. Marshall is a member of the Policy Plan- 
ning Staff, Department of State. The above ar- 
ticle is derived from an address made before the 
American Academy of Political and Social Sci- 
ence, Philadelphia, Pa., on Apr. 18. 



Component Parts of the Mutual Security Program: 
Military Aid, Defense Support, Technical Assistance 



by Myron M. Cowen 
Consultant to the Secretary ' 



The world in which we live has been becoming 
more complex each year. At least the problems 
with which we as Americans must contend have 
become more complex with a geometric rather 
than arithmetical progression. In less than the 
lifetime of many of us present, since the year 1900, 
the world which we inherited from our fathers 
has seen more changes than our ancestors had seen 
in thousands of years. It is not only the magni- 
tude of change that affects us, but the accelerating 
rate of change. We have become familiar with 
the new physical forces unknown to the world of 
our grandparents. The new sources of power for 
electricity and petroleum products have changed 
our industrial system. We are now familiar with 
the political changes from what now appears to 
to us as the halcyon years of the Edwardian twi- 
light to the middle of the century. We are en- 
gaged in a race of adjustment. The problem of 
civilized man today is the problem of understand- 
ing, assimilating, and controlling the new forces 
loose in the world. 



' Address made before the University of Colorado World 
Affairs Conference at Boulder, Colo., on Apr. 15 and re- 
leased to the press on the same date. 



In the United States we have a special problem, 
in addition to this, because we must attempt to 
understand and act wisely as our country's posi- 
tion has been changing from the security in which 
it lay beyond two great oceans in the year 1900 
to a world from which that type of security has 
disappeared forever. Wlien we think of security 
today, we must always think in terms of atomic 
explosions, planes, and guided missiles that travel 
faster than the speed of sound. Our way of life 
and our system of Government are being given 
their strongest test today, and they are going to 
succeed or fail depending upon the amount of 
understanding and wisdom with which our citizens 
approach their problems. Forums and conferences 
such as this are indispensable to our survival. You, 
as citizens, must understand what your Govern- 
ment is trying to do, and you must participate in 
its decisions. Regardless of the inlierent com- 
plexity of modern government, you must not dele- 
gate to anyone responsibility beyond your close 
understanding and participation. 

Obviously, without understanding we cannot 
have responsible participation. I would suggest 
that this type of conference which you, by your 



702 



Department of Slate Bulletin 



participation, are jointly developing with the Uni- 
versity of Colorado is rapidly becoming part of 
our democratic machinery. 

MSP: A Basic Vehicle of Our Foreign Policy 

I want to talk to you about the major problem 
which our Government faces today. That is the 
problem of our foreign relations. 

It is not my intention to repeat the familiar 
statements on the nature and scope of the menace 
posed by Soviet communism. We all understand 
that the .United States, and the free world, is con- 
fronted by an aggressive totalitarian force, a 
force which is seeking world domination and 
which is accompanied by a dogma that preaches 
the inevitability of such domination. 

It is my intention to tell you something about 
what our Government is doing to maintain and 
strengthen this Nation's security. The funda- 
mental principle of our foreign policy is, of course, 
to preserve tne security and well-being of our 
own nations. 

Unfortunately, self-preservation in this kind 
of world is no simple matter. Today, that term 
applies a very direct complex relationship be- 
tween ourselves and other free peoples of the 
world. Neither we nor they can stand alone in 
today's world. To attempt to do so would almost 
seem to be fatal. President Truman made that 
point well in a recent message to Congress.^ He 
said: 

Without our friends abroad, the threat of aggression 
would move close to our own shores. Without their 
armed forces, the bases on their soil, and the raw mate- 
rials from their mines and forests, our military power 
would be gravely hampered in its defense of the United 
States, and our whole economy would be seriously 
weakened. 

I could go on and cite innumerable statistics 
to demonstrate how dependent this country is 
upon the rest of the free world. I could point out 
that we are reasonably self-sufficient in only six 
of the basic raw materials which are of strategic 
importance to us production-wise. I could point 
out that the loss of Western Europe alone would 
give the Soviet bloc the balance of power in terms 
of population control, technical skill and man- 
power, and in some of the basic ingredients of the 
industrial capacity. And, of course, the converse 
of this is directly true. The rest of the free world 
would have little chance of survival without the 
strength and determination of the American peo- 
ple to help them. 

But all of this is common knowledge. You and 
I understand that we must work with others if 
we are to bring about an adequate defense against 
aggression. You and I know that the only chance 
for a decent peace lies in a mutual-seCurity effort 
by all of the free peoples. 



' Bulletin of Mar. 17, 1952, p. 40S. 
May 5, 1952 



That is why I want to spend my time today 
talking about America's Mutual Security Program. 
That program is one of the basic vehicles of our 
foreign policy. It is a hard-headed and, I believe, 
a well thought out program to build the collective 
strength we need for our security. The Mutual 
Security Program is one part of our mutual- 
security effort. Its purpose is to be, as General 
Eisenhower said, "a real deterrent to aggression." 
The funds asked by the President for this program 
represent approximately I21/2 percent of that part 
of our budget which is devoted to security. The 
President has recommended appropriations of 6i 
billion dollars in round figures for our major se- 
curity programs, defense programs, and the like. 
He has recommended 7.9 billion dollars specifically 
for the Mutual Security Program to help build the 
strength of our friends and allies. 

TFie Appropriation Recommended 

Let us look at the President's recommendation 
more closely. This recommendation for an ap- 
propriation of 7.9 billion dollars breaks down this 
way: 

Tlie lion's share— $5,350,000,000— is for direct 
military assistance, and $1,819,000,000 is for de- 
fense-support efforts. The remaining $656,- 
000,000 is for economic and technical assistance. 

Direct military assistance, defense support, eco- 
nomic and technical assistance — what do these 
phrases mean? What are included under these 
headings in the President's recommendation ? 

MILITARY ASSISTANCE 

Military assistance is just what it says. It has 
to do with helping our friends develop the weap- 
ons for defense and the trained manpower to 
handle these weapons. It is concerned primarily 
with military production of munitions. It is con- 
cerned — to cite one highly important example — 
with the equipping of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization forces in Europe with the physical 
means of deterring aggression. The overwhelm- 
ing bulk of military-aid funds will go into the pro- 
vision of guns, planes, tanks, and other military 
items within the United States which will be 
shipped to our friends abroad. When you look at 
the appropriation figure, this assistance I have 
just mentioned you will find described under the 
heading "end items." 

You will see, in addition to that heading, an- 
other one called "offshore procurement." In ad- 
dition to the munitions which we produce here in 
this country, we expect to place approximately 
one billion dollars of contracts in Western Europe 
in the coming fiscal year for the production in 
Western Europe of military equipment, ammuni- 
tion, electronics, spare parts, naval craft. This 
so-called "offshore procurement" serves several 
purposes. It produces needed equipment more 
cheaply than it could be produced here. Offshore 

703 



procurement is also a source of needed dollar earn- 
ings. It enables our partners to develop their 
capacity for arms production by making use of 
their available labor and industrial facilities. It 
brings close the time when they will be able to 
carry the production load themselves. All these 
things add up to what we mean when we talk of 
direct military assistance. 

Now, what do we mean when we talk of defense 
support ? In Western Europe you have highly de- 
veloped economies, workshops with the ability to 
produce great quantities of goods. The assistance 
that we give these economies is to allow them to 
import and pay for goods, materials, and com- 
modities which their workshops need in order to 
produce the necessary goods and commodities to 
support their own defense effort. 

Secretary of State Acheson, in his recent testi- 
mony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Re- 
lations, gave an excellent example of defense sup- 
port. He was talking about the close and vital 
relationship between the stability of a nation's 
economy and its ability to defend itself. 

The Secretary of State cited Great Britain as 
an example of an indispensable ally, vitally in need 
of defense-support funds if she was effectively to 
discharge her obligations to the free world's united 
defense program.' 

Now Great Britain has to import heavily if she 
is to survive. Great Britain lives by importing 
food and raw materials, converting these materials 
into exports, selling the exports in order to get 
the means with which to buy more food and more 
raw materials. 

Great Britain thus follows a type of trade cycle. 
As long as her exports and imports are in bal- 
ance^as long as she is not paying out more than 
she is receiving — Great Britain gets along nicely. 
She had reached this state by the middle of 1951. 
She was making ends meet. 

Then when her rearmament program went into 
high gear, that program added to heightened de- 
mand for raw materials on the world market. 
The result : Prices of those materials went up. 

What happened to Great Britain? Her re- 
armament program is primarily dependent upon 
the British metal-using industry. But those in- 
dustries account for 50 percent of all British ex- 
ports in normal times. The rearmament program 
is now taking one quarter of the jiroduction of 
these metal-using industries which account for 
50 percent of all British exports. The upshot is 
that Great Britain is not only paying more for 
her raw materials from abroad ; she also has fewer 
finished products to export, fewer products with 
which to pay the cost of the even more urgently 
needed imports. 

Britain's trade cycle has become a vicious trade 
cycle. This makes for a considerable drain on 
British gold and dollar reserves. The drain is 



'IMd., Mar. 24, 1952, p. 463. 
704 



stepped up even further when other nations — for 
whom Great Britain serves as a sort of bank or 
family clearinghouse — begin to withdraw funds. 
The withdrawals become heavier because the 
prices of products in the world market are going 
up, and these countries want to buy what they 
need before prices get any higher. 

Great Britain is now operating at a large deficit. 
Her financial position is made more difBcult. She 
is caught between Scylla and Charybdis, or, as 
we say here, between a rock and a hard place — she 
is caught between the requirements of the civilian 
population and the demands of military security. 

Faced with this situation, the British are faced 
with the necessity of taking drastic steps and they 
have taken them. They have cut their imports. 
They have cut down their subsidization of foods. 
They have cut the costs of Government. The 
degree of austerity which the British people have 
forced upon themselves is almost inconceivable 
to us. I dare say that most of us here would not 
dream of going without some of the things the 
British are going without unless we were actually 
engaged in a world-wide war. 

But even this austerity has not been enough. 
Britain's reserves have continued to drop off. 
Unless the drain on those reserves is effectively 
halted, Britain will neither be able to maintain a 
going economy nor meet her commitments under 
the free world's mutual-defense program. Britain 
would stop manufacturing the means of defense. 

Britain's failure in this respect — or for that 
matter the failure of any of our other European 
friends — would be fatal to the mutual-defense ef- 
fort. To say the least, America's own security 
would be even more seriously endangered. To 
use the President's words again, "the threat of 
aggression would move close to our own shores." 

DEFENSE SUPPORT 

This, then, is where the defense-support pro- 
gram comes in. Under that program, we Ameri- 
cans are helping Great Britain to do two things. 
We are putting up money to buy some of the raw 
materials which Britain needs to keep her fac- 
tories busy turning out badly needed military 
goods. We are also helping to buy the food and 
textiles needed to help the British people main- 
tain a tolerable standard of living and to con- 
tinue to work effectively for the common good. 

Not only will defense-support funds help to 
keep the British economy sufficiently stable to 
meet defense requirements, it will return much 
more than a dollar in actual defense materials 
for each dollar spent. For the English add their 
skilled labor and their factory plant to the raw 
materials which the American dollar is buying. 

Defense-support aid is absolutely essential if we 
are to have genuine security for America. The 
situation in England is — in many respects — the 
situation in which most of the countries of West- 
ern Europe find themselves. 

Department of State Bulletin 



It is well enough to offer our allies guns with 
one hand. But that gesture will mean relatively 
little if we do not give them the necessary defense 
support with the other. 

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 

Now I have commented at length on two of 
the three types of aid provided under the Mutual 
Security Program. I should like now to consider 
briefly the third type of assistance — technical as- 
sistance. This is more popularly known as Point 
Four. And Point Four is designed to help the 
peoples of the world's underdeveloped areas to 
develop their technologies and thus to better their 
standard of living as well as their ability to defend 
themselves. 

Because the Point Four or technical-assistance 
part of the Mutual Security Program is better 
known than other aspects of it, I shall today touch 
just one part of the program. In fact, just one 
part of the program in one country — India. 

India's overriding problem is food production. 
Accordingly, the assistance program for India 
will emphasize food production, and the work will 
be done at the village level. 

The program will be based on the creation of 
village centers, such as the recent successful vil- 
lage experiments in the Etawah region. Etawah 
is a 100-square-mile area in which a group of 
Indian agricultural experts, with the participa- 
tion of several Americans, increased local food 
production during the period 1949-52 by 46 per- 
cent. The methods used were simple. These 
technicians, or shirt-sleeved diplomats as they 
have been called, convinced local farmers to try 
a better yielding, native variety of wheat and the 
use of a native legume as a green manure crop. 
They introduced a locally made plow with a six- 
pound steel point. They inoculated cattle. They 
started simple sanitation practices in the village. 
As a byproduct the villagers asked for classes in 
adult literacy and volunteered their labor on local 
roads and irrigation ditches. 

The Indian Government seeks, with American 
help, to complete the establishment of 80 such vil- 
lage centers in 1953; each center, starting with a 
few villages as a training base, will reach out 
within 4 years to encompass 200,000 people. Thus, 
the village centers undertaken in 1953 are designed 
to reach 16,000,000 people. 

It is the plan of the Indian Government to ex- 
pand this village work to 160 centers in 1952, 320 
centers in 1955, and 600 centers in 1956. By the 
end of the Indian 5- Year Plan, 1956, the national 
goal is to produce 7,000,000 tons more grain per 
year. Within 3 years we hope to find that our 
American technicians will have worked themselves 
out of their jobs. The development centers will 
be left in the hands of the Indians themselves. 

This is a bold plan. If carried through success- 
fully, it would be the greatest agricultural im- 



provement program ever carried out by an under- 
developed country in so short a time. U.S. assist- 
ance will be used primarily for personnel and 
materials needed from outside India, and most of 
it will be applied to this village approach. Most 
of the cost will be in Indian rupees, and most of 
the personnel will be Indians. 

Since more irrigation water is the largest ulti- 
mate factor in expanding food production, sub- 
stantial American help will be used for engineering 
services and equipment on major irrigation proj- 
ects, now under construction, and calculated to 
increase India's irrigated area by 27,000,000 acres. 

This, then, is but a very small part of the Point 
Four story. What we are seeking to do in India, 
we are also seeking to do in many other under- 
developed areas. In helping those free peoples 
who lack our technological development, we are 
striking a mighty blow for freedom as well as for 
humanity. 

Military aid, defense support, technical assist- 
ance — these are the three component parts of the 
Mutual Security Program budget. 

Are we getting true value received for the funds 
we have been, and are, investing? This is, of 
course, the crucial question. The usual practical 
test as to the effectiveness of an action taken lies 
in the results achieved. 

Answers to Criticisms 

I think, therefore, that we ought to take a look 
at some of the criticisms that have been made of 
the Mutual Security Program. More specifically, 
at some of the questions that have been raised as 
to the manner in which the program is being car- 
ried through. 

One such question has to do with whether or not 
our European friends are shouldering their fair 
share of the load. I should like to state categor- 
ically that they are doing all they can at present 
within the limits imposed by their domestic eco- 
nomic situations. 

They are meeting their commitments to the 
North Atlantic Treaty defense organization. The 
productivity of Western Europe as a whole is now 
some 40 percent above what it was before World 
War II. And it would be well for us to bear in 
mind that Western Europe — not the United 
States — was devastated by war. 

To attempt to impose additional military de- 
fense burdens upon the still shaky economies of 
our European allies would be to court disaster both 
for them and for ourselves. Production-wise, the 
factories of Western Europe are doing as much 
for our common defense as the traffic will bear. 

Much has been made of the statement that the 
Europeans are not taxing themselves as steeply as 
we are. It is true that there are some inequities 
in the tax structures of some of the Western Eu- 
ropean nations. It is not true that the European 
man in the street is not carrying his share of the 



May 5, 7952 



705 



tax burden. Here are just a few of the relevant 
figures ! 

Tax receipts in the United States for 1951 
amounted to 25.8 percent of our gross national 
product. In tlie United Kingdom, the compara- 
tive percentage was 33.7. In the Netherlands, it 
was 28.3. In France, it was 30.7. In the Federal 
Kepublic of Germany (West Germany), it was 
30.3. 

In some of the Western European countries, the 
percentage was somewhat lower than in our own 
country. But, by and large. Western Europe is 
doing its share in footing the bill for the free 
world's defense and security. 

Looking at this matter of the military defense 
tax burden from the standpoint of the average 
citizen, it is well to recall that the typical Ameri- 
can is a lot better off than his Western European 
counterpart. The average yearly income of the 
Western European is about $600, not quite one- 
third of the average in our own country. For us, 
a substantial diversion of our material resources 
to the defense effort may mean less luxury goods 
for the individual. 

For the European, such a diversion of resources 
means less food and less clothing. 

I must reiterate: Our overseas allies are doing 
their share in carrying the load imposed by de- 
fense requirements. They can do more only if we 
help them to do more. 

Now, another criticism of the Mutual Security 
Program's operations which has been widely heard 

foes something like this: Why are we asking for 
.9 billion dollars for the next fiscal year when we 
have yet to expend all of the funds appropriated 
for the current fiscal year ? 

The answer here is a complex one. But it is 
completely valid. 

In the first place, the production of a tank, 
a plane or a piece of artillery does not begin and 
end with an agreement as to a given blueprint. 
From the time a military end-item is authorized 
to the time it comes off the assembly line, a number 
of months must pass. 

This time lag has little relation to any possible 
deficiencies in planning, poor coordination, or 
inefficient productive techniques. 

It has everything to do with the complexity of 
modern arms. 

Let us take the fi^liter plane as an example. It 
takes about 18 months to produce the simplest type 
of fighter plane from the time the basic raw ma- 
terials are gathered together to the time the plane 
is actually finished. The more complex fighter 
and, of course, the bomber take even longer. 

Looking at the fighter plane, we find that its 
complexity has increased considerably since World 
War II. The World War II fighter had 515 elec- 
trical wires measuring about 920 feet. The fighter 
of today has about 5,525 wires measuring about 
23,000 feet. 

The time from drawing board to delivery date is 



much longer than it ever was before. You place 
contracts this year for planes that you wish in 
production next year and the year after. The 
Congress appropriated in 1952 money that will 
not be spent until 1953 or 1954. This is, of course, 
quite proper. Anyone with experience in indus- 
trial planning will readily agree. 

But the time lag between purchase order and 
actual production, then, is one explanation of why 
we haven't as yet spent all of the funds ap- 
propriated for fiscal year 1952. And that lag is 
directly related to the problem of complexity of 
militai-y equipment. 

But there is a second and perhaps even more 
vital explanation — an explanation which has to do 
with the over-all requirements of the American 
people during a period of international instability. 

Today, America is neither completely at war 
nor completely at peace. American boys are 
fighting with the U.N. forces in Korea even as 
are those of our allies. But America is not en- 
gaged in a global warfare. And America is doing 
everything possible to prevent such warfare from 
breaking out. 

The problem we face, economically speaking, is 
to maintain a reasonable balance between the 
needs of military defense and the civilian needs of 
the American people. 

Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett put it 
very well in a recent statement. He said: 

Under the system of partial mobilization, we want to 
expand production so that we do not have to use up more 
metal than is necessary, or divert more manpower than 
in necessary from our civilian economy, not only to pre- 
serve the civilian economy but to give us an expandable 
base in case the tragedy of war hit us. 

Mr. Lovett went on to say that we must have 
enough military material and enough troops ready 
to serve as a deterrent so that any potential ag- 
gressor would know that he would not have an 
easy victory and ultimately that he would be de- 
feated. "We must have," he said, "a military force 
in being but yet maintain sufficient economic flexi- 
bility to improve, add to, or change the nature of 
that force should it become necessary to do so." 

I grant you that this makes for very tricky 
going. But the fact of the matter is that, from 
the defense planning point of view, it cannot be a 
question of going whole hog or none. We have 
to get the planes, tanks, and guns we need into 
the field when they are needed, and where they 
are needed. But we must still have ready access 
to the funds with which to produce different types 
and different quantities of weapons with which 
to meet any changes in the situation that may arise. 

Wliat we have done is to make a conscientious 
choice. We wanted to get enough of the current 
equipment to guarantee that if something hap- 
pened in 1951 or 1952, our fighting men would not 
be without reasonably competent equipment, but 
we did not want to freeze ourselves with equip- 
ment that would be outdated. We wanted to be 



706 



Department of State Bulletin 



sure that we could make the best use of our ad- 
vantages in research and development and be able 
to continue to produce new and better equipment. 

There are, in short, both long and short term 
aspects to the Mutual Security Program. And 
there is the question of maintaining reasonable 
balance between the civilian and military defense 
requirements of the Nation. 

If we bear these things in mind, we will find 
that much of the criticism of our "failure" to 
spend all of the Mutual Security funds heretofore 
allotted is unwarranted. 

The Time for Decision '^ 

The Mutual Security Program is now being 
considered by the Congress. As you know, most 
of the discussion has centered about the amount 
of the program, whether it is too large a program, 
whether the countries who are receiving assistance 
could not do more themselves, whether they ac- 
tually needed this aid. 

The objective of the program is to create such 
forces for ourselves and for our allies that they 
will be, in General Eisenhower's language, a real 
deterrent to aggi'ession. Before this progi-am was 
sent to the Congress by President Truman, each 
part of it had gone through the closest and most 



rigorous screening. This screening had started 
with our missions abroad. Before their recom- 
mendations came to Washington, they had been 
carefully examined by our representatives in each 
country. Then in Washington they were care- 
fully examined again at each stage before the pro- 
gram as a whole was presented to the Director of 
the Budget. Then it was screened again. Ac- 
tually, the program is considerably smaller than 
that which had been recommended by a good many 
officials. In its present form, it can be quite ac- 
curately described as the minimum program to do 
what it sets out to do. 

The hearings in Congress are about through. 
Congress has heard the testimony of the top offi- 
cials from the Executive Branch of the Govern- 
ment and it has heard the opinion of our top mili- 
tary leaders here and overseas. They have said 
in their own opinion that this program for 7.9 
billion dollars is essential if our objective is to 
have at a reasonably early date force and sufficient 
economic and political stability to be a real deter- 
rent to aggi'ession. Anything less than this pro- 
gram could only dangerously delay the establish- 
ment of a healthy and hopeful condition for peace 
and security. The choice and the decision now 
rest with each of you and your elected repre- 
sentatives. 



The Heritage of the Americas 

hy Howland H. Sargeant 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs ^ 



We of the Americas have developed something 
very important to the world. We have evolved a 
system in which men and nations can make gath- 
erings such as this the basis of their relationship. 
There have been difficulties, but we have found 
ways to solve them. 

Over a century ago Jose del Valle, of Honduras, 
who wrote Central America's Declaration of Inde- 
pendence, said that "the proper study of the men 
of America is America." 

We have made that study our business. With 
what results? 

Well, today the nations of the Americas are 
giving the rest of the world a practical demon- 
stration that wars are unnecessary, that interna- 
tional problems cam be settled in friendship and in 
peace. 

The great liberator, Simon Bolivar, said that 



' Address made before the Washington General Assem- 
bly, Knights of Columbus, on Apr. 24 and released to the 
press on the same date. 



war was the epitome of all evils. We of the Amer- 
icas have outlawed war in our hemisphere. 

Maintaining Peace and Freedom 

Understand me. Bolivar did not believe — we 
do not believe — in peace at any price. To quote 
Bolivar: "The sacrifices we have made on behalf 
of peace are less than those we owe to the mainte- 
nance of freedom." 

We of the Americas believe in peace and free- 
dom. We believe that both are attainable if men 
and nations work together toward that goal. 

This togetherness of the Americas has grown 
with the years. It is today firmly cemented in our 
united resolution to preserve our freedom and 
work for an enduring peace. 

The Knights have chosen Columbus as their pa- 
tron. Colmnbus is a hero to all Americans — 
north, central, south. He belongs to all of us. 
The smallest of the American nations has as much 
right to pride in him as the greatest. His name. 



May 5, J 952 



707 



and tlifit of his gi-eat queen, Isabel, are honored 
throughout our hemisphere. Why? 

Well, I do not think it is solely because he "dis- 
covered" America. His name represents to us 
something even more important than that. It 
represents unselfish courage — persistence in the 
face of great difficulties — faith. 

It represents, in sliort, the essence of everything 
we believe America to represent. 

These qualities are always important. Today, 
in the gravest crisis ever faced by free men, they 
are our first defense. 

Courage ! As Secretary Acheson said last Sat- 
urday before the American Society of Newspaper 
Editors," our people must have "nerve and stead- 
fastness" if we are to preserve our liberties. 

In summoning "nerve and steadfastness" to our 
defense, we Americans turn for inspiration to the 
great figures of our past. 

We tliink of Washington in the dark days of our 
struggle for independence. 

We think of Jose Marti, father of Cuban inde- 
pendence. Someone once wrote of Marti : 

"If one were to pick any one man to represent 
the spirit of Latin America, it would be Marti." 

I would add to that. Not Latin America alone 
but all the Americas take courage from the name 
of Jose Marti. Marti was one of the originators 
of the Good Neighbor Policy. He prophesied 
that the day would come when the Americas would 
form one great community to stand or fall 
together. 

Bolivar, too, dreamed of the Americas united 
in peace and standing together in defense of free- 
dom. He foresaw tliat the power of this com- 
munity — the American community — would be 
brought to the defense of any nation threatened 
by a foreign enemy or by internal factions threat- 
ening anarchy. 

Persistence in the face of difficulties ! 

All of these men shared this quality. For none 
was the path made smooth. Most of them knew 
that they must die before their goals were 
achieved. But they persisted. 

Faith ! 

These men believed in that for which they 
fought and worked. Their courage and persist- 
ence had roots in their faith. They knew their 
cause could not fail. 

Jose de San Martin — the Washington of Argen- 
tina, the liberator of Chile and Peru — put that 
cause in these words: "The cause that I defend 
is the cause of the human race." 

These men believed that the "cause of the hu- 
man race" was not limited by national boundaries. 
They saw that when liberty anywhere was threat- 
ened, liberty everywhere was in danger. 

I like to remember that General Miranda, Vene- 
zuela's great hero, volunteered for our Revolu- 
tionary Army. Bolivar corresponded with Henry 



Clay upon the subject of freedom. Artigas, na- 
tional hero of Uruguay, and Tiradentes, revolu- 
tionary martyr of Brazil, carried with them on 
their campaigns the text of the Declaration of In- 
dejDendence of the United States. They quoted 
from that text in talks with their armies. 

All of us remember that it was ih Philadelphia, 
in 1791, that the Peruvian Jesuit, Viscardo, pub- 
lished his famous letter calling on Spanish Ameri- 
cans to assert their freedom. 

I could recall many other great names in the 
history of the Americas. These names are a joint 
heritage for all of the Americas. As with Colum- 
bus, we all claim them as our own. 

Basis of Inter-American Unity 

The basis of our Western Hemisphere unity is 
of long standing. The foundations of that unity 
were laid long before the shadow of the Kremlin 
had darkened the world. In time that shadow 
will pass. When that happy day dawns, we of the 
Americas will be found still working together on 
the problems of peace. Not even the urgent de- 
mands of our defenses have been able to divert 
our energies from that program. 

Most of us remember that it was just 10 years 
ago this month that the Institute of Inter- Ameri- 
can Affairs was founded. That program — a pro- 
gram for the peaceful improvement of the lot of 
men — has become a pattern not only for inter- 
American cooperation but for world cooperation. 

As President Truman has said, "With such a 
program, we could, in cooperation with other 
peoples, inaugurate the most hopeful and fruitful 
jDeriod of peaceful development the world has ever 
seen." ' 

I thank my good friends of the Knights of Co- 
lumbus for the opportunity to be here tonight. 
And I would like to say again, in behalf of my 
country : "You, our distinguished guests from the 
Americas, are very welcome. Come again." 



IMC Reviews Newsprint Situation 

The Pulp-Paper Committee of the International 
Materials Conference on April 16 announced that 
its member governments have unanimously 
accepted its recommendation that no newsprint 
allocations be made at this time; but the Com- 
mittee has been directed to keep free world news- 
print problems under review and to recommend 
allocations or other action if necessary. 

This agreement follows a report from the Com- 
mittee that the 1952 newsprint situation in the 
free world indicates total production of approxi- 
mately 8,928,000 metric tons, and total require- 



' Bulletin of Apr. 28, 1952, p. 647. 
708 



• Ibid., June 4, 1951, p. 883. 

Department of State Bulletin 



ments of approximately 8,920,000 metric, tons, thus 
showing supply and demand virtually in balance. 

This report, based largely upon the reporting 
countries' own estimates of requirements and pro- 
duction, confirms previous indications that the 
tight supply situation which has existed since 
1950 is easing, and that countries now have reason- 
able prospects of improving their newsprint posi- 
tion during 1952. However, such prospects could 
be affected by shortages of producers' raw ma- 
terials, or even by minor variation in consump- 
tion levels of the major consuming countries. 

An important factor in the improved news- 
print position is the increased production of sup- 
plying countries. The Committee reports that 
through more efficient use of existing mills and by 
addition of new capacity, 1952 production in the 
free world of 8,928,000 metric tons will be about 
four percent or 343,000 metric tons above the 1951 
level. This forecast assumes full and continu- 
ous use of production capacity throughout the 
year; irregularity of demand, therefore, could 
lead to reduced production and possibly to new 
supply difficulties. 

The 1952 requirements of leading consuming 
countries showed few appreciable inci-eases over 
last year. Also, total stocks of newsprint at the 
beginning of 1952 were much higher than in Janu- 
ary 1951. Moreover, in arriving at a balance be- 
tween supply and demand for 1952, a further sub- 
stantial increase in free world stocks during this 
year was taken into account. 

The Committee will keep itself fully informed 
on any reversal of present supply and consump- 
tion trends. All member countries have agreed to 
consider recommendations for the resumption of 
allocation plans should circumstances require. 

During the course of its previous studies, the 
Committee recommended four emergency alloca- 
tions totaling 33,650 metric tons of newsprint to 
18 countries, and all these tonnages have now been 
delivered. 

Fifteen nations are represented on the Pulp- 
Paper Committee. They are Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, the Federal 
Kepublic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United King- 
dom, and the United States. 



Arrangements Completed 
for Cotton Credit to Spain 

On April 23 the Export-Import Bank announced 
that arrangements have now been completed for 
the operation of the recently authorized credit of 
12 million dollars for the purchase and export of 
cotton to Spain.^ 



The credit, bearing interest at the rate of 2% 
percent per annum and repayable in 18 months, is 
extended to the following Spanish commercial 
banks with the guaranty of the Bank of Spain 
coupled with exchange assurances : Banco Hispano 
Americano, Banco Exterior de Espaiia, Banco 
Espaiiol de Credito, Banco de Vizcaya, Banco 
Central, and Banco de Bilbao. 

The Spanish commercial banks will in turn 
iitilize the services of U.S. commercial banks. 
The following United States commercial banks 
have been designated for this purpose: Bank of 
America, National Trust & Savings Association ; 
Chase National Bank of the City of New York; 
National City Bank of the City of New York; 
Irving Trust Company, New York ; Bankers Trust 
Company, New York; and Manufacturers Trust 
Company, New York. 

The credit is to be used to finance the purchase 
of raw cotton, including spinnable waste, which 
has been purchased under contract entered into 
subsequent to March 11 and shipped subsequent 
to the date of the contract. 

Further detailed information will be supplied 
through the shippers' banks or their agents in 
Spain. 



Military Assistance Agreement 
With Colombia 

The Departments of State and Defense an- 
nounced on April 17 that a bilateral military as- 
sistance agreement had been concluded on that 
day with the Government of Colombia.^ 

The agreement was effected by an exchange of 
notes signed by the American Ambassador to Co- 
lombia, Capus M. Waynick, and Gonzalo Restrepo 
Jaramillo, Foreign Minister of Colombia. It is 
the sixth of its kind to be signed as the result of 
negotiations which the United States is conduct- 
ing with certain of the other American Republics.^ 
Under these agreements certain of the other Amer- 
ican Republics will be assisted in developing their 
capabilities to participate in the collective defense 
of the Western Hemisphere. 

The agreement concluded with Colombia is con- 
sistent with, and conforms to, inter-American 
instruments already in effect, such as the inter- 
American treaty of reciprocal assistance (the Rio 
treaty) , the resolution on inter-American military 
cooperation approved at the Washington Meeting 
of Foreign Ministers of 1951, and the continuous 
planning of the Inter- American Defense Board. 



" Bulletin of Jan. 14, 1952, p. 47. 
tAay 5, 7952 



" For text of the agreement, see Department of State 
press release 296 of Apr. 17. 

' For text of a similar agreement with Ecuador, see 
Bulletin of Mar. 3, p. 336. 

709 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



Calendar of Meetings^ 



Adjourned During April 1952 

IcAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) : 

Council: 15th Session Montreal Jan. 29-Apr. 2 

Air Navigation Commission: 9th Session Montreal Jan 29-Apr. 2 

Tripartite Conference on Aid to Yugoslavia: Second Conference . . . Washington Feb. 19-Apr. 21 

UN (United Nations) : 

Trusteeship Council: 10th Session New York Feb. 27- Apr. 1 

8th Session of the Trusteeship Council Committee on Rural Eco- New York Apr. 15 and 18 

nomic Development of the Trust Territories. 
International Children's Emergency Fund: 

Committee on Consultative Status for Unicef Advisory Com- New York Apr. 8 and 25 

mittee of Nongovernmental Organizations. 

Unicef- Who Joint Committee on Health Policy New York Apr. 9-11 

Working Party on the Creation of a General Fund Raising Com- New York Apr. 1 1 and 25 

mittee. 

Program Committee New York Apr. 14-17 

Committee on Administrative Budget New York Apr. 18 (1 day) 

Executive Board New York Apr. 22-24 

Economic and Social Council: 

(Commission on Status of Women: 6th Session Geneva Mar. 24- Apr. 4 

Committee on Nongovernmental Organizations New York Apr. 8-9 

Second International Industries Fair Karachi Mar. 1-Apr. 6 

UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organi- 
zation) : 

Executive Board: 29th Session Paris Mar. 13- Apr. 7 

Arid Zone Hydrology, International Symposium on Ankara Apr. 25-29 

4th Inter- American Conference on SocialSecurity Mexico City Mar. 24- Apr. 8 

Itu (International Telecommunication Union) : 

Coir International Radio Consultative Committee: 

Study Group I The Hague Apr. 1-10 

Study Group III The Hague Apr. 1-10 

Nato (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) : 

Petroleum Planning Committee: 1st Meeting London Apr. 2-14 

Fag (Food and Agriculture Organization) : 

Second Training Course for Agricultural Extension Workers of the San Jos6 Apr. 6-25 

Western Hemisphere. 

Meeting of Governing Board of Inter- American Indian Institute . . Mexico City Apr. 10-11 

Milan International Trade Fair Milan Apr. 12-30 

1st Inter- American Convention of National Associations of Travel Lima Apr. 12-15 

Agencies. 

4th Inter- American Travel Congress Lima Apr. 12-20 

Ilo (Internationa! Labor Organization): 

Fifth Regional Conference of American States Members Rio de Janeiro Apr. 17-30 

Meeting of the (IJouncil, Interparliamentary Union Nice Apr. 15-19 

34th International Lyon Fair Lyon Apr. 19-28 

Paso (Pan American Sanitarv Organization) : 

Executive Committee: 16th Meeting Washington Apr. 21-30 

International Cattle Exposition Habana March-April 

In Session as of April 30, 1952 

International Materials Conference Washington Feb. 26, 1951- 

Four Power Conference on Swiss-Allied Accord Bern Mar. 5, 1951- 

West Point Sesquicentennial West Point Jan.- 



' Prepared in the Division of International Conferences, Department of State, Apr. 25, 1952. Asterisks indicate 
tentative dates. 

710 Department of State Bulletin 



Calendar of Meetings— Continued 

In Session as of April 30, 1952 — Continued 

International Conference on German Debts London Feb. 28- 

International Exhibition of Drawings and Engravings Lugano, Switzerland .... Apr. 10- 

UN (United Nations) : 

Economic and Social Council: 

Human Rights Commission: 8th Session New York Apr. 14- 

Narcotie Drugs Commission: 7th Session New York Apr. 15- 

Ad Hoc Committee on Restrictive Business Practices: 2d Meeting. New York Apr. 28- 

International Wheat Council: 8th Session London Apr. 17- 

Ilo (International Labor Organization) : 

Metal Trades Committee: 4th Session Geneva Apr. 21- 

Itu (International Telecommunication Union) : 

Administrative Council: 7th Session Geneva Apr. 21- 

Cannes International Film Festival Cannes Apr. 23- 

South Pacific Commission: 9th Session Noumea Apr. 28- 

Sixth International Hydrographic Conference Monaco Apr. 29- 

Scheduled May 1-Juiy 31, 1952 

Nato (North Atlantic Treaty Organization): 

Petroleum Planning Committee, Meeting of Working Group . . . Paris May 1* 

Planning Board for Ocean Shipping: 4th Meeting Washington May 12- 

Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law Brussels May 2- 

Fag (Food and Agriculture Organization) : 

Working Party on Fertilizers: 2d Meeting Bandung, Indonesia .... May 5- 

Working Party on Rice Breeding: 3d Meeting Bandung, Indonesia .... May 5- 

International Rice Commission: 3d Meeting Bandung, Indonesia .... May 12- 

Meeting on Fisheries Statistics Copenhagen May 26- 

FAO-Caribbean Commission Meeting of International Poplar Com- Rome May 2(5- 

mission. 

Committee on Commodity Problems Rome June 3- 

Council: 15th Session Rome June 9- 

European Forestry and Forest Products Commission: Meeting of Nice June 28- 

Working Party on Torrent Control and Protection of Ava- 
lanches. 

FAQ-Caribbean Commission, Meeting on Home Economics and Port-of-Spain June 30- 

Education in Nutrition: 2d Regional. 
Who (World Health Organization) : 

5th Assembly Geneva May 5- 

Executive Board: 10th Session Geneva May 28- 

Ilo (International Labor Organization) : 

Iron and Steel Committee: 4th Session Geneva May 5- 

Governing Body: 119th Session Geneva May 26- 

35th Session of the Ilo Geneva June 4- 

International Rubber Study Group: 9th Meeting Ottawa May 5- 

Caribbean Commission: 14th Meeting Guadeloupe May 6- 

International Symposium on Problems of Desert Research Jerusalem May 7- 

Sample Fairs Valencia and May 10- 

Barcelona June 10- 

IcAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) : 

Council: 16th Session Montreal May 13- 

Air Navigation Commission: 10th Session Montreal May 13- 

Standing Committee on Aircraft Performance: 2d Copenhagen May 19- 

Sixth Annual Assembly Montreal May 27- 

UN (United Nations): 

Economic and Social Council: 

Fourteenth Session of the Council New York May 13- 

Social Commission: 8th Session New York May 12- 

Technical Assistance Committee New York June- 
Technical Assistance Committee New York July 7- 

Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: 2d Meeting, Bangkok July 28- 

Working Party on Small Scale Industries and Handicrafts 
Marketing. 

Trusteeship Council: 11th Session New York June 3- 

Fisheries Conference, South Pacific Commission Noumea May 14- 

Universal Postal Union: 13th Congress Brussels. May 14- 

Itu (International Telecommunication Union) : 

CciB International Radio Consultative Committee: 

Study Group V Stockholm May 15- 

Study Group VI Stockholm May 15- 

Study Group XI Stockholm May 19- 

European Regional Conference on VHF Broadcasting (41 mc/s to Stockholm May 28* 

216 mc/s). 

May 5, 1952 ' 711 



Calendar of Meetings — Continued 

Scheduled May 1-July 31, 1952 — Continued 

International Cotton Advisory Committee: 11th Session 

Paris International Trade P^air 

UNESCO Executive Board: 30th Session 

Wmo (World Meteorological Organization) : 

Regional Association for Europe: 1st Session 

Meeting of Commission for Maritime Meteorology 

International Conference on Large Electric High Tension Systems: 

14th Session. 
International Convention for Protection of Industrial Property . . . 
Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of 
Migrants from Europe: First Meeting of Executive Committee . 

International Whaling Commission: 4th Meeting 

International Meeting of Tonnage Measurement Experts 

Eighth General Assembly of the Inter-American Commission of Women. 
21st Session of the International Criminal Police Commission .... 
Annual Meeting of the Directing Council of the American Inter- 
national Institute for the Protection of Childhood. 

26th Biennial International Exhibition of Art 

International Philatelic Exhibition 

Second Meeting, International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic 
Fisheries. 

Sixth International Congress for Animal Husbandry 

Fifteenth International Conference on Public Education 

International Conference on Soil Fertility 

18th International Red Cross Conference 

Pan American Institute of Geography and History: 

Third Consultation on Geography 

International Sugar Council 



Rome May 17- 

Paris May 17- 

Paris May 24- 

Zurich May 26- 

London July 14- 

Paris May^28- 

Vienna June 2- 

Washington June 3- 

London May 29- 

The Hague June 4- 

Rio de Janeiro June 8- 

Stockholm June 9- 

Montevideo June 13- 

Venice June 14- 

Utrecht June 28- 

St. Andrews (New Bruns- June 30* 
wick) 

Copenhagen July 9- 

Geneva July 15- 

Dublin July 21- 

Toronto July 23- 

Washington July 25- 

London July or August 



Continuation of Negotiations on Jammu and Kaslimir 

THIRD REPORT BY THE U.N. REPRESENTATIVE FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN 



On April 22 Frank P. Graham, U.N. Repre- 
sentative for India and Pakistan, transmitted to 
the Secretary-General his third report to the 
Security Council (S/2611).^ In it he noted 
progress toward agreement on the remaining four 
projDosals of his 12-point compromise plan. He 
stated that demilitarization of the State of Jammu 
and Kashmir had advanced to the point where 
prerequisites for a plebiscite should be considered, 
and that in the future he intends to consult with 
the U.N. Plebiscite Administratoi'-designate (Ad- 
miral Chester Nimitz). 

Part I (not here printed) of the report deals 
with the 12 proposals for an agreement on demili- 
tarization. In Part II, the U.N. Representative 
discusses the terms of reference laid clown in the 
Security Council's resolution of March 30, 1951, 
analyzes other resolutions relating to his mission, 
and states his conclusions. Part III consists of 



' For excerpts from Mr. Graham's report of Oct. 15, 
1951, see Bulletin of Nov. 5, 1951, p. 738 ; for excerpts 
from his report of Dec. 18, 1951, see ihid., Jan. 14, 1952, 
p. 52. 

712 



his recommendations. Those annexes to the re- 
port which are not printed here include the Secu- 
rity Council's resolution of November 10, 1951 ;- 
the U.N. Representative's letter of September 7, 
1951, to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakis- 
tan; and a resume of a statement made on Feb- 
ruary 5, 1952, by the Foreign Minister of Pakistani. 
Following are the texts of the conclusions and 
recommendations contained in the report of the 
Security Council's resolution of March 30, 1951 
(Annex I of the report), and of the Security 
Council President's statement of January 31, 
1952 (Annex III), which directed the U.N. Repre- 
sentative to continue negotiations : 



U.N. doc. S/2611 
Dated Apr. 22, 19S2 
[Excerpts] 



Conclusions 



PART II 



(1) Progress has been made on the twelve proposals 
Progress has been made in the acceptance of an increas- 



= /6((i., Dec. 10, 1951, p. 959. ' 

Department of State Bulletin 



ins number of the twelve proposals for an agreement on 
demilitarization. On 15 October 1951 in his first report, 
the United Nations Representative reported to the Se- 
curity Council that the two Governments had accepted 
four of the twelve proposals. On 19 December 1951, in his 
second report, he reiwrted to the Security Council tliat 
four more of the twelve proposals, or a total of eight, had 
been accepted by both Governments. 

He can now report acceptance, by Pakistan, of the re- 
maining four proposals, with certain qualifications regard- 
ing the character of forces to be demilitarized. India 
maintains that If agreement can be reached on the issues 
of the number and character of forces to be left on each 
side of the cease-fire line, the other two remaining dif- 
ferences (i. e., the period of demilitarization and the in- 
duction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator) can be 
solved without difliculty. 

The chief remaining obstacle is the difference over the 
number and character of forces to be left on each side of 
the cea.spfire line at the en<l of the period of demilitari- 
zation. 

(2) Progress has lieen made in demilitarization 

(a) Substantial withdrawals of forces from the State of 
Jammu and Kashmir have been made from time to time by 
both India and Pakistan since the cease-fire on 1 January 
1949. 

(b) In response to discussions about further withdraw- 
als of military forces from the State, the Government of 
India has, in addition, decided to withdraw unconditionally 
one division, with supporting armour. It estimates this to 
total lS,OnO men. 

(c) With such withdrawals it appears that the Govern- 
ments of India and Pakistan will have both withdrawn 
over 50 per cent of their forces from the State. 

(d) The Government of India has decided to withdraw 
to distances varying from 70 to 450 miles from the western 
Indo-Pakistan border, the forces which were moved up 
near that border last summer. 

(e) The withdrawals referred to in sub-paragraphs 
(b) and (d) above are now in process of execution. 

(f) The Government of Pakistan has indicated that 
most of its forces that were moved to the western Indo- 
Pakistan border during the past summer have been with- 
drawn to their peace-time stations. 

(3) Inter-dcpcndence of the two resolutions 

Part II of the 13 August 1948 resolution and paragraphs 
4 (a) and (b) of the 5 January resolution have been 
connected by the Governments of India and Pakistan and 
are inter-dependent on questions of demilitarization. 
Part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948 ' and the reso- 
lution of 5 January 1949," as a whole, are inter-dependent 
on requirements relating to the preparation of a plebiscite. 

(4) Conqerning further procedures 

The United Nations Representative should have in mind 
the considerations set forth in this report. In the future, 
the United Nations Representative, in addition to the 
assistance to be provided by his civilian and military 
advisers, has the purpose to have the view or the Pleb- 
iscite Administrator-designate on those problems which 
have a bearing on their common responsibilities. This 
consultation should be without prejudice to the question 
of the formal induction into office of the Plebiscite Admin- 
istrator-designate, which should be a result of the further 
negotiations. 

(5) Urgent need of a settlement 

The need is urgent for the settlement of the dispute 
between India and Pakistan concerning the State of 
Jammu and Kashmir. This dispute has been before the 
Security Council for over four years. More than three 



years ago the two Governments accepted the 13 August 
1948 and the 5 January 1949 resolutions of the United 
Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. A settle- 
ment is important not only for the sake of approximately 
4 million people in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, but 
also for the sake of over 400 million people in India and 
Pakistan, whose peaceful progress is of vital importance 
for the peoples of the world. 



PART III 



Recommendations 



'U.N. doc. S/1100. 
* U.N. doc. S/1196. 



Accordingly, the United Nations Representative recom- 
mends: 

(1) That, taking notice of the progress made in the 
demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir 
through withdrawals of forces from both sides of the 
cease-fire line, the Governments of India and Pakistan 
refrain from taking any action which would augment the 
present military ixjtential of the forces in the State. 

(2) That the Governments of India and Pakistan, tak- 
ing into account their agreements under the Uncip reso- 
lutions and their acceptances under the twelve proposals, 
should : 

(a) Continue their determination not to resort to force 
and to adhere to peaceful procedures ; and to follow faith- 
fully their agreement to instruct their official spokesmen 
and to urge all their citizens not to make statements calcu- 
lated to incite the people of either nation to make war 
against the other with regard to the question of Jammu 
and Kashmir (twelve proposals, paragraphs 1 and 2). 

(b) Observe the cease-fire effective from 1 January 
1949 and the Karachi Agreement of 27 July 1949 (twelve 
proposals, paragraph 3). 

(3) That the Governments of India and Pakistan, as 
a means of further implementing the resolutions of 13 
August 194S and 5 January 1949, should undertake by 
15 July 1952 further to reduce the forces under their 
control in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. 

(4) That the United Nations Representative's negoti- 
ations with the Governments of India and Pakistan be 
continued with a view to : 

(a) Resolving the remaining differences on the twelve 
proposals, with special reference to the quantum of forces 
to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of 
the period of demilitarization, and 

(b) The general implementation of the resolutions of 
the Uncip of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. 



Annex I 

Resolution Adopted hy the Security Council on 
30 March 1951 {S/2017/Rev. 1) 

Having receht:d and noted the report of Sir Owen 
Dixon, the United Nations Representative of India and 
Pakistan, on his mission initiated by the Security Council 
resolution of 14 March 1950 : 

Observing that the Governments of India and Pakistan 
have accepted the provisions of the United Nations Com- 
mission for India and Pakistan resolutions of 13 August 
1948 and 5 January 1949 ; and have reaffirmed their desire 
that tlie future of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall 
be decided through the democratic method of a free and 
impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the 
United Nations ; 

Observing that on 27 October 1950 the General Council 
of the "All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference" 
adopted a resolution recommending the convening of a 
Constituent Assembly for the purpose of determining the 
"Future shape and affiliations of the State of Jammu and 
Kashmir" ; observing further from statements of responsi- 
ble authorities that action is proposed to convene such a 
Constituent Assembly and that the area from wliich such 



May 5, 1952 



713 



a Constituent Assembly would be elected is only a part 
of the whole territory of Jammu and Kashmir ; 

Reminding the Governments and Authorities concerned 
of the principle embodied in the Security Council reso- 
lutions of 21 April 1948, 3 June 1948 and 14 March 1950 
and the United Nations Commission for India and Paki- 
stan resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, 
that the final disposition of the State of Jammu and 
Kashmir will be made in accordance with the will of the 
people expressed through the democratic method of a free 
and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of 
the United Nations ; 

Affibming that the convening of a Constituent Assembly 
as recommended by the General Council of the "All Jammu 
and Kashmir National Conference", and any action that 
Assembly might attempt to take to determine the future 
shape and affiliation of the entire State or any part tliereof 
would not constitute a disposition of the State in 
accordance with the above principle ; 

Declabing its belief that it is the duty of the Security 
Council in carrying out its primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security to aid the 
parties to reach an amicable solution of the Kashmir 
dispute and that a prompt settlement of this dispute is 
of vital importance to the maintenance of international 
peace and security ; 

Observing froin Sir Owen Dixon's report that the main 
points of difference preventing agreement between the 
parties were : 

(a) the procedure for and the extent of demilitarization 
of the State preparatory to the holding of a plebiscite, and 

(b) the degree of control over the exercise of the func- 
tions of government in the State necessary to ensure a 
free and fair plebiscite. 

The Sex!Uritt Council 

1. Accepts in compliance with his request, Sir Owen 
Dixon's resignation and expresses its gratitude to Sir 
Owen for the great ability and devotion with which he 
carried out his mission ; 

2. Decides to appoint a United Nations Representative 
for India and Pakistan in succession to Sir Owen Dixon ; 

3. Instructs the United Nations Representative to pro- 
ceed to the sub-continent and, after consultation with the 
Governments of India and Pakistan, to effect the demili- 
tarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir on the 
basis of the United Nations Commission for India and 
Pakistan resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 
1949; 

4. Calls upon the parties to co-operate with the United 
Nations Representative to the fullest degree in effecting 
the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir ; 

5. Instructs the United Nations Representative to re- 
port to the Security Council within three months from 
the date of his arrival on the sub-continent. If, at the 
time of this report, he has not effected demilitarization in 
accordance with paragraph 3 above, or obtained the agree- 
ment of the parties to a plan for effecting such demilita- 
rization, the United Nations Representative shall report 
to the Security Council those points of difference between 
the parties in regard to the interpretation and execution 



of the agreed resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 Janu- 
ary 1949 which he considers must be resolved to enable 
such demilitarization to be carried out; 

6. Calls upon the parties, in the event of their discus- 
sions with the United Nations Representative failing in 
his opinion to result in full agreement, to accept arbitra- 
tion upon all outstanding points of difference reported 
by the United Nations Representative in accordance with 
paragraph 5 above ; such arbitration to be carried out 
by an Arbitrator, or a panel of Arbitrators, to be appointed 
by the President of the International Court of Justice 
after consultation with the parties ; 

7. Z)ec/(7e.s that the Military Observer group shall con- 
tinue to supervise the cease fire in the State ; 

8. Requests the Governments of India and Pakistan 
to ensure that their agreement regarding the cease-fire 
shall continue to be faithfully observed and calls upon 
them to take all possible measures to ensure the creation 
and maintenance of an atmosphere favourable to the pro- 
motion or further negotiations and to refrain from any 
action likely to prejudice a just and peaceful settlement; 

9. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the 
United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan 
with such services and facilities as may be necessary in 
carrying out the terms of this resolution. 

Annex III 

Statement of the President of the Security Gov/ncil 
on 31 January 1952 ^ 

. . . Speaking as President of the Security Council, I 
have the impression that a very clear and positive con- 
clusion emerges from the practically unanimous state- 
ments made during the present discussion. 

The Council feels that Mr. Graham has made real prog- 
ress in that some measure of agreement was reached be- 
tween the parties on various points, and that he should 
continue his negotiations in pursuance of his terms of 
reference under the resolutions of 30 March 1951 [S/2017/ 
Rev. 1] and 10 November 1951 [S/2392] in order to remove 
the remaining difficulties which he has described. 

It being understood that any member of the Council 
has the right to ask for a Council meeting to be convened 
at any time to deal with the question which is now being 
discussed, the sense of the meeting is also that Mr. 
Graham should submit a report to us, which we hope 
will be final. 

Although we cannot strictly limit the negotiations 
which, to have every chance of success, must be flexible, 
I feel I can say that the Council definitely expects to re- 
ceive a report within two months, that is by 31 March. 

I believe that I am correctly interpreting the feelings of 
my colleagues in stating that in these circumstances Mr. 
Graham, acting under the resolutions I have mentioned, 
will continue negotiations under the terms which I ha?e 
just specified and which reflect the statements made in 
the Council. 



• Official Records of the Security Council, Seventh Year, 
572nd meeting. 



714 



Department of State Bulletin 



Report of U.N. Command Operations in Korea 



THIRTY-EIGHTH REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 16-31, 1952 > 



U.N. doc. S/2593 
Transmitted April 9, 1952 

I herewith submit report number 38 of the United 
Nations Command Operations in Korea for the i)eriod 
16^1 January, inclusive. United Nations Command 
communiques numbers 1145-1160 provide detailed ac- 
counts of these operations. 

Discussion of the airfield question under agenda item 3 
continued in sub-delegation meetings during the major 
part of this period. The United Nations Command dele- 
gates patiently and explicitly reiterated their position 
as outlined in report number 37. At the session of IS 
January the United Nations Command delegation pointed 
out the strange logic of Communists who, while accusing 
the United Nations Command of desiring to prolong a 
state of war, would create dangerous tensions during an 
armistice by insisting on the right to build military air- 
fields. Again on 24 January the United Nations Com- 
mand delegation asked the Communists to state clearly 
whether they intended to increase their military air capa- 
bility during the armistice. Again the Communists evaded 
answering this question. 

On 25 January in an earnest endeavor to break the 
deadlock, the Unite<l Nations Command sub-delegation 
proiK)sed to the Communists that staff officers of each 
side, meeting jointly, immediately begin drafting that 
part of the armistice agreement pertaining to agenda 
item 3 on which tentative agreement had been reached 
and that discussion of the airfield issue be suspended pend- 
ing report by the staff ofBcers of progress made. This 
proposal was accepted by the Communists on 27 January 
at which time the United Nations Command delegate 
made the following statement : "We are prepared to pro- 
ceed on this basis with the clear understanding that we 
reserve the right to return to the subject of airfield re- 
strictions as soon as the sub-delegations reconvene. We 
hereby record our unalterable intention to do so". 

The staff officers held their initial meeting on 27 Jan- 
uary at which time the United Nations Command repre- 
sentatives presented a draft of the armistice agreement 
pertaining to agenda item 3, a copy of which is attached 
hereto.^ This draft was based on the three agreed princi- 
ples stated in United Nations Command report number 
36 and the following additional agreed principles : 

"4. In order to ensure the stability of the military 
armistice so as to facilitate (the attainment of a peaceful 
settlement through the holding by both sides of a political 
conference of a higher level), both sides undertake not 



'Transmitted to the Security Council by Amba.ssador 
Warren R. Austin, U.S. representative in the Security 
Council, on Apr. 9. Texts of the 30th, 31st, and 32d re- 
ports appear in the Bulletin of Feb. 18, 1952, p. 266 ; the 
33d report, iUd., Mar. 10, 1952, p. 395; the 34th report, 
ma.. Mar. 17, 1952, p. 430; the 35th report, iUd., Mar. 31, 
1952, p. 512 ; and the 36th and 37th reports, iMd., Apr. 14, 
1952, p. 594. 

' Not printed here. 



to introduce into Korea any reinforcing military person- 
nel, combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons and am- 
munition after the armistice agreement is signed and be- 
comes effective. Such rotation of military personnel as 
within the limit agreed upon by both sides shall be re- 
ported to the military armistice commission so that the 
supervisory organ of (neutral nations) may be entrusted 
to conduct on-the-spot supervision and inspection, which 
shall be carried out at the ports of entry in the rear agreed 
upon by both sides. 

"5. Each side shall designate an equal number of mem- 
bers to form a military armistice commission to be re- 
sponsible for supervising the implementation of the 
armistice agreement and for settling through negotiation 
any violations of the armistice agreement. The functions 
of supervision and inspection as stipulated in the armis- 
tice agreement shall be carried out in accordance with 
the following two provisions : 

"A. Within the demilitarized zone, the military armis- 
tice commission utilizing joint teams directly despatched 
by it shall be responsible. 

"B. Outside the demilitarized zone, at the ports of entry 
in the rear as agreed upon by both sides and at the places 
where violations of the armistice agreement have been 
reported to have occurred, the supervisory organ of repre- 
sentatives of (neutral nations) shall be entrusted to be 
responsible. Upon the request to the supervisory organ 
of (neutral nations) by both sides or either side on the 
military armistice commission for investigation of a vio- 
lation of the armistice agreement, the supervisory organ 
of (neutral nations) shall carry out the inspection. 

"6. Both sides agree to invite (neutral nations) accept- 
able to both sides which have not participated in the 
Korean war, to send, upon their consent, an equal num- 
ber of representatives to form a supervisory organ to be 
entrusted by the military armistice commission to be re- 
sponsible for carrying out the functions of supervision and 
inspection as stipulated in paragraph four and five B of 
this proposal. Upon the request by both sides or either 
side on the military armistice commission for carrying 
out these functions, the supervisory organ of (neutral 
nations) shall despatch immediately inspection teams to 
carry out the functions of supervision and inspection as 
stipulated in the armistice agreement at ports of entry 
in the rear as agreed upon by both sides, and at places 
where violations of the armistice agreement have been 
reported to have occurred outside the demilitarized zone, 
and shall report on the results of supervision and inspec- 
tion to the military armistice commission. In performing 
their above-stated functions, the inspection teams of 
(neutral nations) shall be accorded full convenience by 
both sides over the main lines of communication and 
transportation as agreed upon by both sides." 

At the close of the period staff officers of both sides were 
meeting in an effort to arrive at a mutually acceptable 
draft of armistice agreement under agenda item 3 with 
the understanding that the airfield issue would be re- 
opened when the item 3 sub-delegation reconvenes. 



May 5, 7952 



715 



With the gradual development of discussion on agenda 
item 4 relating to prisoners of war, the Communists main- 
tained an adamant position that the individual prisoner of 
war must be repatriated after an armistice, v^hether or 
not he desires such action. They have insisted that the 
plain wording of the Geneva Convention supports their 
view. They ignore the fact that forced repatriation is 
completely repugnant to the basic humanitarian concept 
of the Geneva Convention, the concept of protection for 
the individual. Without admitting openly they imply that 
in the matter of repatriation of prisoners of war the 
Geneva Convention is designed to protect the interests of 
the state rather than the individual. In opposition to 
their propaganda attempts to cloud and distort the issues, 
the United Nations Command has resolutely held that 
the principle of freedom of choice stands openly and con- 
clusively as an equitable and humane solution to the 
problem of repatriation. The United Nations Command 
remains opposed to the inadequate, inhumane and revenge- 
ful doctrine of forced repatriation which the Communists 
advocate. 

With equal emphasis, the United Nations Command pre- 
sented, as logically and cohesively as possible, the further 
provisions of its proposal. In addition to establishing 
sound, workable solutions for the exchange of prisoners of 
war, it provides for the return to their homes of persons 
displaced by the war. By using prisoner of war exchange 
facilities, the unfortunate civilian victims of the conflict 
could be returned to their homes swiftly with a minimum 
of inconvenience to the individual and to the military 
forces concerned. The United Nations Command proposal 
insures that, by the application of the voluntary repatria- 
tion clause, those persons who prefer to remain where they 
had been carried by the flow of war would be permitted 
to do so. 

As a further indication of its good faith and sincere de- 
sire to effect an exchange of prisoners which would be 
mo.st advantageous to each side, the United Nations Com- 
mand presented the Communists with newly revised ros- 
ters, in Korean and Chinese, of all the prisoners it had 
reported initially. Included on these lists was all avail- 
able information on each individual listed. The Com- 
munists were informed that additional supplementary 
data on all the prisoners taken, since the start of hos- 
tilities, by the United Nations Command was available on 
short notice and would be provided in return for similar 
data from the Communists on United Nations Command 
and Republic of Korea prisoners taken by that side. 

In view of the Communists' reluctance to make sub- 
stantial effort to reach a satisfactory solution and their 
failure to take any positive steps whatsoever to resolve 
differences, despite their oft-repeated assertions that they 
do, in fact, desire early agreement, the United Nations 
Command decided to take a determined step toward ex- 
pediting agenda item 4. After explaining carefully our 
belief that both sides must take positive steps to resolve 
the issues which have thus far prevented agreement, the 
United Nations Command presented a draft of an agree- 
ment for the disposition of prisoners of war and civilians 
which incorporates all of the items considered essential 
for a complete solution. (A copy of the proposed word- 
ing of this draft is appended hereto.) The initial reaction 
of the Communists, as was expected, indicated no agree- 
ment to those parts of the United Nations Command draft 
wliich touched on voluntary repatriation. 

The Communists claimed that prisoner of war camp 
number eight, Kang-Dong, was attacked by United Na- 
tions Command aircraft at 2100 hours, 14 .January and 
that total prisoner of war casualties included twenty 
killed and fifty-five injured. The Communists admitted 
that the camp was not marked as a prisoner of war 
Installation. The United Nations Command lodged an 
immediate protest of the blatant disregard by the Com- 
munists of the basic humanitarian principles of the 
Geneva Convention, specifically Article 23, which requires 
that all areas holding prisoners of war be plainly marked 
with identifying .symbols and that such areas not be 
located at or near strategic and tactical military targets. 



The United Nations Command further demanded that all 
prisoner of war and civilian internee camps be marked 
without delay so as to be visible from the air and that 
the exact locations of .such installations be reported to the 
delegation. After some delay and weak excuses, the Com- 
munists agreed to United Nations Command demands and 
presented data which they allege shows exact locations 
of prisoner of war camps in their area. A careful in- 
vestigation by United Nations Command of the alleged 
bombing incident indicated only that allied planes were 
in the vicinity of Kang-Dong for the purpose of attacking 
military targets in the area at the time the Communists 
claimed the attack took place. Failure of Communists 
to properly mark or to furnish accurate location of pris- 
oners of war camps made it impossible to determine 
whether United Nations Command aircraft attacked the 
prisoner of war camp at Kang-Dong. 

At the request of the Senior Delegate of the Inter- 
national Committee of the Red Cross the United Nations 
Command provided transportation for two delegates to 
the conference site at Panmunjom where they attempted 
to arrange an interview with the commanders of the 
Korean Peoples Army and the Chinese Peoples Volunteers. 
With full respect for the neutral position which the Inter- 
national Committee of the Red Cross has traditionally 
maintained, the United Nations Command was happy to 
be of assistance to that organization and considers it re- 
grettable that the Communists, without valid reason and 
with deliberate disregard of the humanitarian concepts 
epitomized by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, do not see fit to permit them access to the prisoner 
of war camps in their territory. Their continued pre- 
vention of prisoner of war relief activities remains com- 
pletely at variance with the concepts of the civilized 
world. 

No significant changes were apparent in the character 
of enemy activity across the Korean battle front as con- 
tact was limited primarily to frequent patrol clashes, 
usually of short duration, and minor probes by small 
enemy detachments. Local United Nations Command 
raids into forward enemy positions were met by deter- 
mined opposition and were followed by swift enemy 
counterattacks. These raids served the multiple purpose 
of inflicting ca.sualties, capturing prisoners, securing In- 
telligence, and maintaining a peak of United Nations Com- 
mand combat efficiency, as well as providing a physical 
and psychological deterrent to any hostile plans for ag- 
gressive action. Hostile troop dispositions and front lines 
remained unchanged although the enemy effected the re- 
lief of two of his front line divisions. As a result of 
dwindling guerrilla strength, both the numbers and size 
of dissident groups engaged by Republic of Korea forces 
decreased as the current anti-guerrilla operations entered 
its ninth week. 

Patrol activity on the western front resembled that of 
recent periods. United Nations Command elements con- 
ducted both day and night raids in the Punji, Kigong 
and Mabang areas. These aggressively conducted, small- 
unit operations Invariably encountered determined enemy 
opposition supported by strong artillery and mortar fires. 
The largest enemy unit thus engaged was one of battalion 
strength which tenaciously resisted a United Nations 
Command raid in the Mabang area on 24 January. Re- 
inforced enemy counter action followed each Instance 
wherein a United Nations Command raiding group initially 
succeeded in forcing an enemy withdrawal. The enemy 
chose not to employ his armor in these defense operations, 
although both air and ground observation disclosed the 
continued presence of hostile armor on the western front. 
Each such observation was immediately followed by air 
and artillery strikes which forced the enemy to keep his 
armored elements well hidden, and prevented their con- 
centration in any one locale. The enemy continued the 
periodic rotation of units in contact by effecting the relief 
of a division of the Forty Second Chinese Communist 
Army In the Sagimak area. 

United Nations Command-initiated patrol clashes con- 
stituted the major portion of ground action on the central 



I 



716 



Department of State Bulletin 



and eastern fronts. Hostile action was limited to infre- 
quent patrols and probes during the hours of darkness by 
small enemy groups. The number of small-unit actions 
on these fronts showed a decrease as contrasted to pre- 
vious periods, due largely to the weather conditions which 
adversely affected ground operations in the more moun- 
tainous parts of the battle line, particularly on the eastern 
front. Snow, low overcast, fog and haze restricted 
ground operations during seven days of the period al- 
though United Nations Command elements conducted two 
highly successful raids on enemy positions in the Mulguji 
and Yuusil areas on 21 and 25 January, respectively. The 
only change in enemy unit dispositions occurred in the 
Mulgu,1i area where local Chinese Communist reserves 
were employed in the partial relief of front-line units. 
Republic of Korea forces continued to inflict telling 
blows on guerrilla elements in Southwestern Korea. Ap- 
preciable gains were scored despite a decrease of re- 
munerative guerrilla targets. Of the present guerrilla 
strength in rear areas, it is estimated that only 2,000 are 
armed. Reports further indicate that those who have 
been killed and captured during the current operations 
include a substantial number of local leaders. Partially 
as a result of this factor and the heavy casualties suf- 
fered, the remaining guerrilla elements appear extremely 
reluctant to engage Republic of Korea forces. These 
conditions, coupled with poor communications among the 
guerrilla bands, sharply curtail their capabilities. 

Recent prisoners state that the enemy is continuing his 
efforts to maintain and improve his military capabilities. 
Statements of several Chinese Communist prisoners point 
to a reorganization of combat units which apparently in- 
cludes efforts to augment their fire power. North Korean 
prisoners' statements during the past three months, simi- 
larly reflect an increase in the logisitical position, morale 
and unit troop strength of the North Korean Corps on the 
eastern front. These reports clearly indicate that the 
enemy is determined to maintain and improve his military 
potential in Korea. Despite the evidence of preparations 
for continued hostilities, the enemy thus far fails to dis- 
play any definite inclination for early offensive action. 

United Nations Command naval forces operating in 
the Sea of Japan, the Yellow Sea, and the Gulf of Korea 
expended ammunition at a higher rate during the closing 
weeks of January than the maximum rate recorded dur- 
ing World War II as the blockade and patrol ships shelled 
ma.ior coastal transportation hubs and enemy positions 
at both ends of the battle line with a nearly continuous 
barrage of naval artillery fire. Coastal rail and highway 
routes and bridges were cut repeatedly by night and day 
attacks aimed at preventing the enemy from improving 
his position with respect to supplies. 

The carrier forces operating on both coasts concentrated 
their efforts on the interdiction of enemy transportation 
and continued to increase the number of rail cuts. Their 
planes also assisted in the destruction of enemy supply 
dumps and small craft, and in attacks on enemy troops 
in support of United Nations Command ground forces. 
Land based Marine squadrons divided their attacks be- 
tween enemy troops, gun positions, and transportation 
in the enemy rear areas with excellent results. Although 
enemy anti-aircraft and small arms fire succeeded in in- 
fiicting losses on Naval and Marine squadrons, brilliant 
rescues by helicopters and by ships picketing the North 
Korean ports, saved the pilots of a number of stricken 
aircraft. 

Enemy coast artillery continued to duel with United 
Nations Command ships, but shipboard batteries silenced 
enemy giui iMisitions with the help of air spotting. Quick 
maneuver and heavy return fire prevented damage to 
or casualties on United Nations Command surface ships 
during the period. Check minesweeping and the destruc- 
tion of frequent illegal floater mines encountered were 
continued by surface forces, while patrol planes made 
daily reconnaissance of the waters surrounding Korea. 
On the west coast hundreds of rockets were fired into the 
defense positions around the sea approaches to Chin- 
nampo, inflicting numerous troop casualties. Night bom- 
May 5, 7952 



bardments and heckler missions harassed enemy soldiers 
at battle line and in rear positions along both coasts. 

Amphibious forces carried out replenishment by sea 
of United Nations Command troops near the coasts and 
supplied the garrisons of United Nations Command-held 
outpost islands off the North Korean coasts. Among 
their unusual tasks was the recent evacuation of nearly 
20,000 refugees from west coast Korean islands where 
the Koreans had gone to escape Communist rule. 

The United Nations Command air offensive against 
North Korea was continued as land based aircraft flew 
a total of 11,999 sorties in support of United Nations 
Command operations. Additional attack restrictions and 
precautions were initiated in order to reduce the chance 
for accidental injury by friendly aircraft of United 
Nations Command troops held in Communist prisoner of 
war camps. 

The primary objective of the air attack was the system- 
atic interdiction of enemy rail and highway lines of 
communication, augmented by attacks on rolling stock, 
locomotives, vehicles and supply installations along the 
main arteries for enemy logistics. The shift of some 
railroad interdiction to lines further north, as reported 
during the first half of January, was continued. Several 
successful daylight fighter-bomber attacks were made on 
the Sinanju-Chongju and Kunu-Ri-Huichon lines. These 
were complemented by night medium bomber strikes 
against the key rail bridges at Chongju and Sinhungdong 
and by light bomber attacks on bridge repair crews. 

The repair and reconstruction of enemy airdromes has 
slowed down noticeably. Uiju and Sinuiju, both of which 
are located near the Yalu River, were the only major 
serviceable airfields in North Korea. The latter was 
successfullv attacked by medium bombers on the night of 
26-27 January. All other North Korean bases suitable 
for operation of jet aircraft remained inactive and un- 
serviceable so that no new attacks were required. 

Air-to-air fighting between Communist MIG-15 inter- 
ceptors and friendly fighters was again spotty. More 
than 2,000 MIG sorties were observed during the period ; 
however, only a fraction of this number were actually 
aggressive enough to seek combat with United Nations 
Command aircraft. Although usually heavily outnum- 
bered, formations of United Nations Command aircraft 
destroyed or damaged thirty-one MIGs while flying coun- 
ter air sweeps deep into enemy territory. The heaviest 
day of air-to-air activity was 25 January when friendly 
pilots destroyed ten and damaged four of the 297 MIGs 
sighted. Three of the kills were achieved by pilots who 
were flying air cover for an unarmed United Nations 
Command helicopter engaged in the rescue of a friendly 
pilot who had crash-landed deep in enemy territory. 

The requirement for close combat air support continued 
on a reduced scale due to the general reduction in ground 
force activity all along the front ; however. United Na- 
tions Command reconnaissance and fighter-boml)er air- 
craft regularly patrolled behind the enemy lines in search 
of ground targets and information about enemy troop dis- 
ixjsitions. These operations accounted for an estimated 
348 enemy casualties, ninety-seven destroyed or damaged 
gun positions and eighty-seven destroyed and damaged 
bunkers. In addition, medium bombers regularly made 
night attacks on Communist battle area positions desig- 
nated by United Nations Command ground forces. 

The United Nations Command requirements for high 
priority movement of personnel and supplies by air re- 
mained high as combat cargo aircraft flew 3,030 sorties to 
airlift 7,018 tons of supplies and equipment to Korean- 
based United Nations Command units. This tonnage 
includes United Nations Command sick and wounded who 
were transported between bases in Japan and Korea. 

There were no reports of enemy aircraft operating over 
United Nations Command positions during the period. 

During the annual celebration of the Lunar New Year, 
United Nations Command leaflets, loudspeaker broad- 
casts, and radio broadcasts emphasized United Nations 
efforts to restore peace to the Korean people in the New 
Year. These media reminded North Korean and Chinese 

717 



Communist soldiers of the callousness with which their 
comrades' lives were sacrificed during the past year by 
the leaders of the Communist asgression. United Nations 
proposals for voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war 
were explained and cimti'asted with Communist impress- 
ment of captured Korean soldiers into an alien-controlled 
Army, forcing them to bear arms against their own coun- 
try. Continuing attention was given to dissemination of 
detailed factual reports of the constructive United Na- 
tions Command proposals in the armistice negotiations 
and prolonged Communist obstruction of efforts to restore 
peace. 

A total estimated dollar value of supplies and equip- 
ment of nearly $230,000,000 was programmed in support 
of the United Nations Command for Ko