(navigation image)
Home American Libraries | Canadian Libraries | Universal Library | Community Texts | Project Gutenberg | Children's Library | Biodiversity Heritage Library | Additional Collections
Search: Advanced Search
Anonymous User (login or join us)
Upload
See other formats

Full text of "Department of State bulletin"

w^W^wWWmW^WW 



. *1««*Jr itrxi x*i* j,«?leliTv I»iHa»."F«*iir^3ifi7Z _ if ii-"frr.*if si^ j^ *t.i \3 c^■L^^*tf \ 



^^^^^^mm§muu^^ 



rf 



Sf^o^aM^x^M 



^ 



'^^S^i 






-n:^ 

■!■?> 



m^ 




1^1 






^■ 




:A2^^!^^ 



t 



Given By 

I S. SUr-T. OF DOCUMENTS 



3^ 



JAe/ ^eha^{^teni}^ a)^ Cnaie^ 




Vol. XXVII, No. 693 
W October 6, 1952 




'-»TE3 O* 




THE UNITED NATIONS: CORNERSTONE OF U.S. 

FOREIGN POLICY • Remarks by the President and 
Secretary Acheson 529 

GUARDING THE RAMPARTS OF FREEDOM • fay 

Ambassador at Large Philip C, Jessup ....... 511 

JAPAN'S APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO 

THE U. N.: 
Remarks by Ambassador Robert D. Murphy .... 524 
Statements by Ambassador Warren R. Austin . . 526, 527 

U.S. NOTES TO THE U.S.S.R. ON GERMANY AND 

TRIESTE 516,521 

BREAKING THE BARRIERS TO CAPITAL INVEST- 
MENT ABROAD • by Eric A. Johnston 538 

THE TOTALITARIAN THEATER • by Marc Connelly . 542 



I 



For index see back cover 




Me Qje/ia^eme^ ^ ^(ute 13111161111 



Vol. XXVII, No. 693 • Publication 4730 
OaoheT 6, 1952 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington 26, D.O. 

Peick: 

62 issues, domestic $7.60, foreign $10.26 

Single copy, 20 cents 

The printing of this publication has 
been approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget (January 22, 1962). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and Items contained herein may 
be reprinted. Citation of the Depabtuxnt 
or State Bullitim ss the source will be 
appreciated. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication compiled and 
edited in the Division of Publications, 
Office of Public Affairs, provides the 
public and interested agencies of 
the Government with information on 
developments in the field of foreign 
relations and on the work of the De- 
partment of State and the Foreign 
Service. The BULLETIN includes 
selected press releases on foreign pol- 
icy issued by the White House and 
the Department, and statements and 
addresses made by the President and 
by the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well aa 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the func- 
tions of the Department. Informa- 
tion is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to 
which the United States is or may 
become a party and treaties of gen- 
eral international interest. 

Publications of the Department, as 
well as legislative material in the field 
of international relations, are listed 
currently. 



Guarding the Ramparts of Freedom 



hy Philip C. Jessup 
Ambassador at Large ^ 



From time to time there is a recurrent demand 
tliat there should be "one more try" to negotiate 
a settlement with the Soviet Union. Sometimes 
this demand comes from people who have the idea 
that if only four men would sit around a table 
they would be sure to reach agreement. Doubt- 
less, four men grouped ai'ound a table can accom- 
plish much when they are all interested in reach- 
ing agreement. But I have sat at several tables, 
and I can add to the abundant testimony, based on 
our experience thus far, that where one of the 
four is a representative of the Soviet Union there 
is, as of today, little reason to expect that agi-ee- 
ment will result. If you want detailed evidence 
about tliis, I suggest that you read a recent book 
entitled Negotiating with the Russians — a collec- 
tion of 10 essays written by Americans who have 
participated in such negotiations. 

These experiences make clear that up to now 
Soviet representatives have come to conference 
tables with their minds primarily set upon the 
making of propaganda rather than upon the solu- 
tion of international tensions. Nevertheless, in 
spite of the difficulties and the disagreements, the 
United States, France, and the United Kingdom 
have never closed and will never close the door to 
settlement of the great issues dividing the world. 
Whenever the Soviet Union is ready to undertake 
real negotiation, we will not be found wanting. 

To understand the obstacles confronting us in 
establishing a stable relationship with the Soviet 
Union, it is worthwhile to remind oui'selves from 
time to time of what the record shows on some 
of the principal areas of negotiation with the So- 
viets since the end of the war. Many men of 
good will have entered hopefully into such nego- 
tiations and have come out disillusioned as to the 
prospects of leady agreement. This has been the 
experience of all of our Secretaries of State from 

' Address made before the Toronto Women's Canadian 

Club at Toronto on Sept. 26 (press release 7!50 dated 
Sept. 24). 



Stettinius at San Francisco through the many 
meetings attended by Secretaries of State Byrnes, 
Marshall, and Acheson. A characteristic reaction 
was that expressed by Mr. Byrnes, looking back 
upon his many sessions with Molotov : 

I have had quite a broad experience in dealing with 
men. My active practice as a trial lawyer was rich with 
such experience. In my service in the House of Repre- 
sentatives and in the Senate I served with over two 
thousand Representatives and nearly two hundred Sena- 
tors. I conferred with nio.st of them in the adjustment 
of differences within each branch and between the two 
branches of Congress. As Justice of the Supreme Court, 
as Director first of Economic Stabilization, and then of 
War Mobilization, I met many men with many interests, 
and settled many Issues. But through all these years I 
had no experience that prepared me for negotiating with 
Mr. Molotov. 

I remember once at London one of the newspaper cor- 
respondents, reluctant to believe that Mr. Molotov would 
break up the conference rather than meet the view of 
the rest of us, asked me incredulously : 

"But are you certain you have explored every avenue 
of approach to the problems?" 

"My friend," I replied, "I've not only explored every 
avenue, but I've gone down every lane, byway and high- 
way. I've tried everything I ever learned in the House 
and Senate. But there I worked with a majority rule. 
This is more like a jury. If you have one stubborn juror, 
all you can exi)ect is a mistrial." 

World Negotiations for Unity and Peace 

On the question of Germany, we have been ne- 
gotiating for 7 years. Some of the negotiation 
has been carried on by correspondence and much 
of it has been carried on in meetings at various 
levels. The Council of Foreign Ministers has 
dealt with the subject six times. At various levels 
representatives of the Four Powers have met end- 
lessly in Berlin. It has been discussed in Moscow. 
Last year my colleagues and I spent over 3 montlis 
meeting day after day with Gromyko in the Palais 
Rose in Paris, and we got exactly nowhere. When 
we found that they had absolutely no desire to 
agree on an agenda for a meeting of the Ministers, 
the three Governments invited the Soviets to come 
to Washington and meet without a prearranged 



Ocfober 6, 1952 



511 



agenda. The Soviets did not come. In March 
of tliis year they started again to write notes about 
the subject, and the negotiation by correspond- 
ence is still continuing. An analysis of these 
recent exchanges, like the earlier experience, leads 
inescapably to the conclusion that the Soviet 
Union is not trying to reach an agreed settlement 
on Germany but is intent on disrupting the 
notable progress which is being made in Western 
Europe toward unity and strength in freedom. 

In regai'd to Austria, in addition to the meet- 
ings of the Foreign Ministers themselves, their 
deputies have met 258 times. We called another 
meeting of the deputies in January of this year, 
but the Soviets refused to attend. We did not 
give up but suggested by correspondence a short 
form of a treaty which would provide for the 
restoration to Austria of the free status which the 
Soviets joined in promising to them in the Moscow 
Declaration of 1945. When the Soviets raised 
four specific objections to our new draft, we agreed 
to meet them on all four points. Another meeting 
of the deputies has been called for Monday, 
September 29, and we will see whether the Soviet 
deputy will attend and, if so, whether the Soviet 
attitude has changed. 

Let us turn for a moment to the other side of 
the world and look at the situation in Korea. 
Everyone is familiar with the Communist obsti- 
nacy which for so many months has blocked the 
patient efforts of the TQ.N. negotiators at Pan- 
mun j om. Although the Soviet representatives are 
not personally in attendance at the armistice nego- 
tiations, the pattern is familiar to those who have 
spent thankless months arguing with the Soviets. 
Indeed, the Panmunjom pattern is particularly 
familiar to those who recall the 2 years of fruitless 
negotiation in 1946 and 1947 when we tried to 
reach agreement with the Soviets upon a settle- 
ment which would provide for the unification of 
Korea. But I do not mean to suggest that a mo- 
ment of the Panmunjom negotiations is wasted 
time; if and when an armistice is achieved, the 
effort will have been amply repaid. 

Essential Steps Taken by U.N. 

In analyzing the process of negotiation with the 
Soviets, it is particularly important to note the 
diversity of techniques which we have attempted 
over these many years. We have tried public 
meetings, restricted meetings, and secret meetings, 
Palais Rose, for example. Wlien the negotia- 
tions have not been successful we have gone to the 
United Nations. Thus, when the Soviets started 
the Berlin Blockade in 1948, the U.K., the U.S., 
and France negotiated in the Allied Control Coun- 
cil in Berlin, through our Embassy in Moscow, and 
finally in the U. N. Security Council. In that 
instance, further negotiations finally led to the 
lifting of the Blockade, but it is important to re- 
member that for our part our negotiations were 
backed up by the stupendous achievement of the 



Berlin Airlift and by countermeasures, both of 
which made the Soviet lawlessness a distinct loss 
to them. 

More recently, having failed to get Soviet agree- 
ment on the essential steps leading up to free elec- 
tions throughout Germany in order that Germany 
might be united, we again turned to the United 
Nations. The General Assembly appointed a U.N. 
commission to investigate and make recommenda- 
tions. They were given the fullest support by the 
German Federal Republic and by the German au- 
thorities in the Western sectors of Berlin. The 
Soviets never even answered the Commission's 
letters. 

In regard to Austria, the Austrian Government 
has appealed for U.N. assistance in bringing about 
the settlement for which the Three Powers have 
striven so long, and we welcome the fact that this 
question is on the agenda of the forthcoming 
meeting of the General Assembly. 

In regard to Korea, when our negotiations with 
the Soviets brought no results in 1947, we took the 
matter to the United Nations and the United Na- 
tions helped to set up the Republic of Korea. The 
U.N. Commission was refused access to the terri- 
tory controlled by the Soviet Union. When the 
Communists resorted to blatant aggression we 
turned to the United Nations — and the United 
Nations, with your participation and ours and 
that of other members, has successfully thrown 
back the aggi-ession and with amazing patience is 
still conducting the armistice negotiations. 

Problem of Disarmament 

Let us also consider another subject of negotia- 
tion — disarmament. In 1946, the United States 
made a proposal which, I believe, will go down in 
history as one of the most extraordinary offers 
ever made by a great power. At that time we 
had a monopoly of the atomic bomb. We went 
into the United Nations and offered to turn over 
our monopoly to an international authority under 
the United Nations. The members of the United 
Nations, with no exception except for the members 
of the Soviet bloc, have repeatedly endorsed the 
U.N. plan which was developed as the result of a 
discussion of the original U.S. offer. Concur- 
rently, we have attempted over these 6 years to 
negotiate a settlement of the general problem of 
disarmament with which men have wrestled 
throughout this century. 

At the opening of the General Assembly last 
fall, the Governments of the United States, United 
Kingdom, and France made a new specific pro- 
posal outlining in broad and imaginative terms the 
possibilities of general agreement on the control 
and reduction of armaments and calling for thi3 
achievement of such agreement through a new U.N. 
organ — the Disarmament Commission — which was 
to supersede the old U.N. Atomic Energy Com- 
mission and the Commission on Conventional 
Armaments. We negotiated on this proposal in 



512 



Department of State Bulletin 



the General Assembly. Again, in response to the 
thought of many that private conversations might 
succeed where public debate failed, the represent- 
atives of the United States, United ICingdom, and 
France met in secret sessions with Mr. Vyshinsky, 
under the chairmanship of Padilla Nervo, the 
President of the General Assembl}'. In spite of 
the fact that there seemed to be no progress, we 
did not give up but instead have worked most 
diligently in the newly established Disarmament 
Commission. Like the representatives of your own 
and other member governments, Ambassador 
Cohen of the United States has returned again 
and again to the effort to find some solution to the 
impasse. To assist Ambassador Cohen in search- 
ing out every remote possibility of progress, our 
Government has appointed a distingui&Tied advi- 
sory group which is hard at work. But the Soviet 
representative on the Disarmament Conunission 
has not moved. Nevertheless, in this field of ne- 
gotiation, as in others, we shall persevere. 

I should like to comment in a little more detail 
on the nature of the difficulty in reaching agree- 
ment with the Soviets on disarmament. With that 
parrot-like repetition which is so characteristic of 
the Soviet negotiators, they have argued over and 
over again that the only approach to disarma- 
ment is to begin by agreeing to a prohibition on 
the use of atomic weapons and other weapons of 
mass destruction. Now, this kind of a proposal 
marked some progress when it was discussed at 
the first Hague Peace Conference in 1890 on the 
initiative of the Czar of Russia. At that time the 
world had not moved in the direction of interna- 
tional organization, and so the nations concerned 
agreed upon a multilateral exchange of promises 
providing for the prohibition of such military 
practices as the use of dumdum bullets and the 
poisoning of wells. Scholars who have studied 
the history of these early efforts have pointed out 
that, to the extent these reciprocal promises were 
observed, observance was principally due either 
to the military inefficacy of certain of the practices 
banned, or, as to other practices, to the dangers of 
retaliation in kind. Today, such considerations 
are largely inapplicable. In the atomic realm, for 
example, we all know the efficacy of the weapons; 
we also know that, although reliance on the de- 
terrent effect of the free world's atomic might is 
a present necessity, such reliance cannot be re- 
garded as a satisfactory long-range guaranty 
against aggression. 

Moreover, there is another new element in the 
present situation. Although modern history af- 
fords several examples of aggressive totalitarian 
regimes, the Soviet Union is the first great nation 
which, since the opening of Japan to the West in 
1853, has shut itself off from the rest of the world 
behind an Iron Curtain. When you combine the 
three factors — the nature of modern war and mod- 
ern weapons, the existence of a great military 
power which operates as a great conspiracy for 



world domination, and the fact that this power is 
completely shut off from the rest of the world and 
operates in total secrecy — you have an indication 
of why a simple prohibition no longer meets the 
need of the world community. The Soviet Union 
wants to continue to make atomic bombs while 
promising not to use them except for "civilian 
purposes." But the simple and inescapable fact 
is that we would not trust the Soviets to lieep such 
a promise. We of the free world would keep 
it, and the Soviets would therefore have bought 
our disarmament without paying anything for it. 
We cannot stake the security of the free world 
upon their unproved word. 

We have, therefore, insisted, and properly in- 
sisted, that any plan for the control and reduc- 
tion of armaments, whether atomic or other, must 
be put into operation in such a way that nations 
can rely on knowledge of the facts and not on 
simple promises. You and we, and the others 
outside of the Iron Curtain, are ready to agree 
to effective international inspection and control. 
The Soviets are not willing. 



U.N. Plan for Atomic Control 

More broadly, this problem needs to be viewed 
in terms of one of the really basic issues which 
confronts — and divides — the world today. That 
issue can be stated as follows: "Are the govern- 
ments of the world willing to accept limitations 
on their sovereignty in order to make peace secure 
under the United Nations?" Your country and 
mine and the overwhelming majority of members 
of the United Nations agree we are willing. We 
gave that answer when we approved the U.N. plan 
for the control of atomic energy. That plan is 
not limited to a mere promise that certain weap- 
ons would not be manufactured or used. It is 
a plan for the surrender to effective intei'national 
ownership or control of one of the most vital re- 
sources of states. This willingness of govern- 
ments to submit to international control under the 
United Nations is of the utmost significance. It 
reveals a new approach to the problem of inter- 
national peace. The same spirit has now inspired 
the nations of Western Europe to set up a supra- 
national institution to control the coal and steel 
industries and to follow that same course in pro- 
viding for the common defense in the European 
Defense Community. 

How does the Soviet Union answer this basic 
question concerning limitations on sovereignty as 
that question arises in the field of atomic energy ? 
The Soviet Union states that some form of inter- 
national control of atomic weapons is desirable — so 
long as that control does not impinge upon its 
"domestic" affairs — i.e., its "sovereignty." But 
the Soviet Union has thus far refused to state 
what intei-national controls it would find com- 
patible with its sovereignty. The Soviet Union 
has persisted in this obdurate attitude despite re- 



Ocfober 6, J 952 



513 



peated requests for clarification from other mem- 
bers of the Disarmament Commission. For in the 
atomic reahn, the Disarmament Commission, 
under the mandate of the General Assembly, is 
directed not only to consider the U.N. plan but 
any other equally effective plan. 

The one fact which is obvious in this intricate 
field is that any effective plan must involve ele- 
ments of international control which modify our 
traditional concepts of sovereignty. The non- 
Soviet world accepts this fact. We want to exer- 
cise our sovereignty to build up an international 
organ for peace. But the Soviet Union says 
"Nyet." 

I think you will be interested in a typical for- 
mulation of that attitude — Mr. Vyshinsky's 
words of response to Mr. Pearson in 1949, after 
your distinguished Minister of External Affairs 
had urged the advantages of what the Soviets 
always deliberately mislabeled the "United States" 
jilan on atomic energy: 

Mr. Pearson .stated that he considered that the Soviet 
Union assertion that the United States plan liquidated 
state .sovereignty was absurd. He said that his plan 
was a step forward in the strengthening of state sov- 
ereignty ; that it meant not a loss of .sovereignty but the 
enjo.vment of sovereignty. Regardless, however, of the 
way in which one may assess the United States plan 
from the point of view of sovereignty, one thing is 
doubtle-ss : that the United States plan obviously means 
an abandonment of sovereignty. 

Soviet Rejection and Concealment 

Mr. Vyshinsky was trying to conceal in one of 
his storms of words the fact that the Soviet Union 
is afraid that any form of international inspection 
or control within their territory would bring their 
people into touch with the true world which is now 
concealed from them by the Iron Curtain. The 
Soviet Union fears that its despotic regime would 
crumble if exposed to the light and the truth. 

For all its boasting about alleged progress in 
the Soviet Union, the Soviet rulers are still back 
in the days of the Czar. Suppression and secrecy 
are their replies to offers for cooperation and 
confidence. 

The Soviet rejection of this great new interna- 
tional spirit which is now alive in the world can 
be documented by volumes of quotations from 
their official statements, l)oth at home and in the 
organs of the United Nations. Let me cite just 
one other illustrative example. 

Last June, Soviet war planes shot down two 
unarmed Swedish aircraft flying over interna- 
tional waters in the Baltic. After making its pro- 
test against this cruel and illegal act, the Swedish 
Government suggested that there be a resort to 
some international procedure "to elucidate the 
facts and to determine the legal consequences." 
Tlie Swedish Government suggested that the In- 
ternational Court of Justice would be the most 
.suitable organ. The Soviet Government replied 
to this suggestion that it— 

514 



considers it necessary to draw attention to the fact that 
the guarding of the Soviet Union frontiers is the un- 
deniable right and duty of the Soviet Union. The USSR 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs sees, therefore, no grounds to 
turn to some International procedure or other for the 
examination of questions connected with the encroach- 
ment of the frontiers of the Soviet Union. 

The complete and fitting commentary on this 
kind of reasoning was made by Ambassador Cohen 
in a recent speech : 

True and legitimate self-interest in the international 
field as in the national field seldom suffers from justifying 
itself within the framework of the general good. In an 
interdependent society, supreme selfishness rarely accords 
with true self-interest. We all know that individuals, 
groups and nations may carry the pursuit of naked 
power and aggrandizement to a point where, far from 
promoting self-interest, it may prove actually self-de- 
structive. In this Twentieth Century, Germany destroyed 
its own rich heritage by a blind and unrestrained pursuit 
of what it called its national interest. 

In the tent at Panmunjom, in the ornate Palais 
Rose in Paris, in the council chambers of the 
United Nations in New York, the representatives 
of the free nations continue with patience and per- 
sistence to meet and counter this reactionary in- 
sistence upon the doctrine of secret sovereignty. 
We must never retreat from the new positions to 
which we of the free world have advanced in the 
United Nations. We cannot abandon our striving 
for the new concepts of international cooperation 
and go back to precedents of the last century which 
are not only outmoded but which today would lead 
the free countries into positions of mortal damage. 

I think we will all agree that, despite the difficul- 
ties and frustrations, we must always be ready to 
talk to the Soviets in the hope that some day they 
will really be ready to negotiate. 



Continuous Watchfulness Needed 

But what should the free nations do in the 
meantime? There are sincere people who are 
pacifists and nonresisters. I respect those whose 
religious teachings lead them individually to this 
way of life, though I, myself, cannot agree with 
this view. Even, however, from the point of view 
of such people, it must, be recognized that there is 
a vast difference between the position of an in- 
dividual and the position of a government. An 
individual may follow the teachings in which he 
believes in conscientious objection to war and, if 
necessary, undergo imprisonment or personal suf- 
fering. But a government, responsible for all its 
people, cannot accept subjection to a foreign 
tyranny. 

No — faced by a great military power whose air- 
fields spread from the center of Europe to the 
Bering Strait, and whose huge armies, whether 
Soviet or satellite, are poised at the borders of 
many a free nation — we must look to our own 
defenses. 

Department of Sfafe Bulletin 



A colleague of mine, Wilson Compton, has 
recently recalled the Old Testament story of the 
Prophet Nehemiah. After the city of Jerusalem 
had been destroyed by the armies of Babylon, 
Nehemiah obtained permission from the Babylon- 
ian king to return to the "City of his fathers." 
Nehemiah found the walls of Jerusalem "broken 
down and the gates thereof consumed with fire" ; 
and he said unto his people: "Let us rise up and 
build." 

But the Ammonites in the surrounding plains 
did not want Jerusalem rebuilt. They laughed at 
Neliemiah and his little crew of helpers. But 
Nehemiah kept on building the wall. Then they 
tried cajolery, then propaganda, then threats. 
But Nehemiah kept on building. He "set a watch 
against them day and night," as the ancient story 
goes. He "set in the lower places behind the wall, 
and on the higher places, the people and their 
families, with their swords, their spears, and their 
bows. And it came to pass that half of the people 
wrought in the work and the otlier half of them 
held the spears, the shields, the bows and the 
habergeons," and "everyone with one of his hands 
wrought in the work and with the other hand held 
a weapon." 

Finally the Ammonites tried trickery. San- 
ballat, the chief of the plainsmen, sent a messenger 
to Nehemiah saying : "Come down in to the plains 
of Ono and let us reason together," for they 
thouglit to destroy him. But Nehemiah would not 
be deilected from his purpose to i-ebuild the walls 
of Jerusalem; and the answer which he sent to 
Sanballat still comes down through the ages of 
history as a ringing challenge to you and to me 
and to all those who would build a better world. 
This was Nehemiah's answer : "I am doing a great 
work and I will not come down. Why should the 
work cease whilst I leave it and come down to 
you?" So they finished the wall! 

You Canadians, and we in the United States, 
have stretched our hands across the North Atlantic 
which binds us to our friends in Europe. In the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization we are build- 
ing the wall. Like Nehemiah's countrymen there 
are those who must hold the spears, the shields, 
the bows, and the habergeons, and there are others 
who work in the factory, in the mines, in the for- 
ests, and on the farms to continue to build up 
righteous strength. Like Nehemiah, we will not 
halt our building to talk. We are ready, however, 
to talk as we build or, when the wall is completed, 
to talk as we maintain our guard over the ramparts 
of freedom. But we will not be tricked into 
coming down, defenseless, into the plain. 

There is another part to the old story of Ne- 
hemiah which reminds us of the necessary task 
which all of us must perform. Nehemiah was also 
a religious leader of his people and exhorted them 
not to forget their spiritual defenses. In our de- 



mocracies, each one of us has the privilege and the 
duty of making known and holding fast those 
principles of belief in "fundamental human 
rights" and "in the dignity and worth of the 
human person" upon which our coimtries and the 
Charter of the United Nations are founded. If 
we can hold those principles fast — if we can dem- 
onstrate that free communities of free men can 
meet the needs of all men everywhere — in time the 
Soviet Union will learn that the faith and resolu- 
tion, and hence the might, of the free world are 
greater than its own, and that it must seek ways 
to live peacefully with those who live in freedom. 



Soviet Ambassador Zarubin 
Presents Letter of Credence 

Press release 756 dated September 25 

Text of Ambassador'' s Remarhs 

Mr. President : I have the honor to present to 
you the Letters of Recall of my predecessor and 
the credentials by which the Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics accredits me as Ambassador Extraordi- 
nary and Plenipotentiary of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics to Your Excellency. 

I can assure you, Mr. President, that the people 
of the Soviet Union entertain a feeling of sincere 
friendship towards the people of the United States 
and that the Government of the Soviet Union, in 
pursuing consistently the policy of the strengthen- 
ing of peace, is striving to maintain friendly po- 
litical, economic, and cultural relations between 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the 
United States of America in the interests of the 
people of our countries and of a universal peace. 

All my activities as Ambassador of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics will be devoted to the 
strengthening of peace and cooperation between 
our countries. 

May I express the hope that in the fulfillment 
of this task I shall meet with the necessary under- 
standing and assistance from you, Mr. President, 
and from the Government of the United States. 



Text of the Presidenfs Reply 

Mr. Ambassador : It gives me pleasure to accept 
tlie Letter of Credence by which the Presidium of 
the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Social- 
ist Republics accredits Your Excellency as Am- 
bassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the 
Government of the United States of America. At 
the same time, I accept the Letter of Recall of your 
predecessor, Alexander S. Panyushkin. 



Ocfober 6, 1922 



515 



I am glad to note Your Excellency's assurances 
that the peoples of the Soviet Union entertain a 
feeling of sincere friendship toward the people of 
the United States. In turn, I assure you that the 
people of the United States have only the friend- 
liest feelings for the peoples of the Soviet Union. 

You may rest assured, Your Excellency, that the 
Government of the United States desires only to 
see a world wherein friendly, neighborly relations 



exist between every country. It is the constant 
policy of this Government to seek to create condi- 
tions which will result in a stable and prosperous 
world wherein all peoples may live at peace. 

As Ambassador of the Soviet Union your ac- 
tivities devoted to strengthening the peaceful rela- 
tions between our two countries will be recipro- 
cated and supported by the Government and by 
the people of tlie United States. 



U.S., U.K., France Renew Proposal for Four Power Meeting 
To Discuss Commission on German Elections 



The Govermnents of the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and France, through their re- 
spective Embassies at Moscoxo, on September 23 
delivered identical notes to the Soviet Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in reply to the Soviet note of 
August 23, 1952 concerning Germany. Following 
is a statement by Secretary Acheson, together with 
texts of the U.S. and Soviet notes. 



STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ACHESON 

Press release 748 dated September 24 

The note which the U.S. Government delivered 
on September 23 to the Soviet Government on the 
subject of Germany is another attempt to persuade 
the Soviet Union to face up to the one problem 
which must be met if we are to end the present 
artificial division of Germany. That problem is 
to hold free elections throughout Germany. 

The Soviet Government has been seeking 
through this whole exchange of notes to talk about 
German unity but to avoid talking about a free 
election, which is the only way to get unity in free- 
dom. The Soviet Government wants to talk about 
an eventual peace treaty, or about the North At- 
lantic Treaty, or almost any other matter, but not 
about elections. 

The Soviet Government leans heavily, for exam- 
ple, on the provisions of the Potsdam" Agreement 
calling for the restoration of Germany as a "united, 
independent, peace-loving, democratic state." 
This IS indeed our objective in Germany. But 
what does the Soviet Government mean by these 
words ? 

We have learned in these postwar years that 
such words have meanings for the Soviet Govern- 
ment and for Communist Parties everywhere 
which are entirely diiferent from their traditional 
meanings in the Russian, English, French, Ger- 
man, or any other language. 

516 



We have learned that Soviet statesmen use the 
word "democratic" exclusively for countries or 
groups tightly run by elements recognizing the 
political authority of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union. 

We have learned that "independent" means 
about the same thing and is used most frequently 
to describe states having the outward trappings of 
sovereignty but which are actually in Soviet Com- 
munist leading strings. 

We have learned that "peace-loving" means to 
Soviet statesmen anything which advances the 
cause of Communist Parties recognizing the au- 
thority of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union. By the same token it appears that any- 
thing which implies resistance to the aims of such 
Communist Parties is immediately branded as 
"warlike" or "aggressive" in intent. 

It behooves us, therefore, to take a good long 
look when the Soviet Government says it wants an 
"independent, peace-loving, democratic" Germany. 
We can well understand that these words, Soviet 
style, scarcely fit in with free elections. 

Conditions in the Soviet zone are not such as to 
encourage the belief that elections can now be held 
there under conditions of freedom. We would like 
an impartial commission to go in, give us a factual 
report, and suggest what needs to be done in order 
to prepare the way for a really free election in 
which people can vote as they wish and for men 
and women truly representative. This is the only 
logical way to start the process of unification. 

I think the free world will agi-ee that day by 
day the need for changing conditions in the Soviet 
zone, if free elections are to be held there, is rein- 
forced more strikingly. The area is one from 
which kidnapers can issue forth and to which kid- 
naped persons can be taken and held for weeks, 
months, and years without trial or sign of life. 

Department of State Bulletin 



The case of Dr. Linse, kidnaped out of free Berlin, 
is a recent shocking example.^ 

The area is one where farmers and villagers are 
dispossessed overnight without recourse, in the 
name of security against nonexistent "spies, diver- 
sionists, terrorists, etc." The area is one from 
which a steady stream of thousands of refugees 
flee every montli. 

The necessity for an impartial commission is 
abundantly clear from the "elections" started in 
the Soviet zone in tlie autumn of 1950, which the 
German jieople know to have been anything but 
free and democratic. 

The world has noted the decision taken at the 
July conference of the Communist Socialist Unity 
Party that tlie Soviet zone sliould press forward 
on the road to communism, thus alienating the 
Soviet zone still further from the major part of 
Germany and clearly pushing aside the attain- 
ment of a unified democratic Germany. 

It is precisely because developments in the So- 
viet zone have proceeded in this manner tliat we 
insist that conditions must be examined and 
changed in order to make possible free elections 
and thus to bring about German unity in freedom. 

In our note we liave been very plain-spoken and 
down-to-earth. We refuse to be distracted by at- 
tacks on extraneous subjects. We want to unify 
Germany. Tlierefore, we want free elections. So 
we have asked the Soviets once more whether they 
are ready to do something about it. 



U.S. NOTE OF SEPTEMBER 23 

Press release 747 dated September 23 

The United States Government has carefully 
considered the Soviet Government's note of August 
23 about Germany. It had hoped that the note 
would have marked some progress towards agree- 
ment on the essential question of free all-German 
elections. This is the first question which must be 
settled among the four powers so that Germany 
can be unified, an all-German Government formed 
and a peace treaty concluded. 

Possibly in order to divert attention from this 
issue, the greater part of the Soviet note of August 
23 is, however, devoted to wholly unfounded at- 
tacks upon the Atlantic Pact, the European De- 
fense Community and the conventions signed at 
Bonn on May 26. As the United States Govern- 
ment has often emphasized, these agreements are 
purely defensive and threaten no one. The Bonn 
conventions and the Edc treaty, far from being 
imposed on the German people, are a matter for 
free decision by fi-eely elected Parliaments, in- 
cluding of course that of the German Federal 
Republic. Insofar as the Bonn conventions re- 
serve certain strictly limited rights to the three 
Western powers, a fundamental consideration has 

' For the text of the first U.S. protest to Soviet authori- 
ties in the Linse case, see Bulletin of Sept. 1, 1952, p. 320. 



been specifically to safeguard the principle of 
German unity and to keep the door open for agree- 
ment with the Soviet Union on the unification of 
Germany. 

The United States Government must insist on 
the necessity of starting four-power discussions 
at the only point where they can in fact start, 
which is the organization of free elections. In its 
note of July 10,^ the United States Government 
drew attention to the obvious fact that this is the 
first point which must be settled if any progress 
is to be made towards uniting the Soviet zone with 
the Federal Republic, which constitutes the 
greater part of Germany. In its first note, as in 
its last, the Soviet Government has evaded this 
clear issue. Instead of putting first things first, 
it now relegates to the background the problem of 
elections and proposes that the four-power con- 
ference "should discuss in the first place such 
important issues as a peace treaty with Germany 
and the formation of an all-German Government". 
But until elections are held, no all-German Gov- 
ernment can be formed, nor can Germany be uni- 
fied. Until an all-German Government is formed 
which will be in a position to negotiate freely, it 
is impossible to discuss the terms of a German 
peace treaty. 

In complete accord with the views of the United 
States, French and United Kingdom Govern- 
ments, the Soviet Government originally said 
that "the preparation of the peace treaty should 
be effected with the participation of Germany in 
the form of an all-German Government". ^ The 
Soviet Government has now shifted its gi'ound. 
It now substitutes for this, the participation of 
representatives of the Soviet zone and the Federal 
Republic in the four-power meetings "during the 
discussion of relevant questions". The United 
States Government cannot accept this proposal. 
A peace treaty for the whole of Germany cannot 
be negotiated with, and accepted by, any German 
representatives other than the all-German Gov- 
ernment which would have to carry it out. Such 
a government can only proceed from free elec- 
tions. It is moreover well known that the East 
German administration is not representative of 
the German population of the Soviet zone. This 
fact is not controverted by the assertion in the 
Soviet note of August 23 that this administration 
acted "at the request" of that population in en- 
forcing recent measures further dividing East and 
West Germans in defiance of their clear desire for 
unity in freedom. 

The United States Government is compelled to 
remind the Soviet Government that conditions 
have altered radically since the Potsdam Agree- 
ment of 1945, which laid down certain political 
and economic principles to govern the initial con- 



' Ibid., July 21, 1952, p. 92. 

' For text of the Soviet note of Mar. 10, 1952, see ibid., 
Apr. 7, 1952, p. 531. 



October 6, 1952 



i517 



trol period. The Soviet conception of a peace 
treaty drafted by the four powers and imposed 
upon Gennany is entirely unsuitable in 1952. The 
United States Government could never agree to 
a peace treaty being drafted or negotiated without 
the participation of an all-German Government. 
Any other procedure would mean a dictated 
treaty. That indeed would be "an insult to the 
German nation". 

The United States Government again insists 
that genuinely free elections with a view to the 
formation of an all-Gennan Government must 
come first. It has however learned by hard ex- 
perience in recent years that terms such as "free 
elections" have one meaning in common parlance 
and another in the official Soviet vocabulary. The 
contrast between the concept of free elections 
which obtains in West Germany and that which 
prevails in the Soviet Zone is clear. It is for the 
German people to choose between these alterna- 
tive ways of life. But they must be able to make 
their choice in genuine freedom and full responsi- 
bility. Only genuinely free elections can reflect 
the will of the German people and permit the for- 
mation of an all-German Government with the 
necessary freedom of action to discuss and accept 
a peace settlement. 

In order to create the conditions necessary for 
free elections, there has been four-power agi-ee- 
ment that there should be a commission of investi- 
gation. The Soviet Government has now pro- 
posed that this commission should be composed 
of representatives of the People's Assembly of 
the "German Democratic Republic" and of the 
Bundestag of the German Federal Republic. A 
commission of investigation must, however, be gen- 
uinely impartial. A German commission would 
be no more able than a four-power commission to 
meet this requirement. The underlying prin- 
ciple of the present Soviet proposal was contained 
in one which emanated from the Soviet zone on 
September 15, 1951. This was rejected by the 
Bundestag, which then suggested investigation 
by a United Nations Commission. It was thus 
the freely elected representatives of fifty millions 
of the German people wjio themselves proposed 
the creation of a neutral investigation commission 
under United Nations supervision. Neverthe- 
less, the United States Government repeats its 
readiness to discuss any practical and precise pro- 
posals, as stated in its note of the tenth of July. 

The United States Govermnent continues to seek 
a way to end the division of Germany. This will 
not be accomplished by premature discussions 
about a peace treaty with a Germany not yet 
united and lacking an all-German Government. 
The United States Government therefore renews 
the proposal made in its note of July 10 for an 
early four-power meeting — which could take 
place in October — to discuss the composition, 
functions and authority of an impartial commis- 
sion of investigation with a view to creating the 



conditions necessary for free elections. The next 
step would be to discuss the arrangements for the 
holding of these elections and for the formation 
of an all -German Government, as proposed in 
paragraph 11 (IV) of the United States Govern- 
ment's note of May 13. When free elections have 
been held and an all-German Government formed, 
the peace settlement can be negotiated. The 
United States Government, in concert with the 
French Government and the United Kingdom 
Government and after consultation with the Ger- 
man Federal Government and the German authori- 
ties in Berlin, most earnestly urges the Soviet 
Government to reconsider its refusal to join the 
other powers in a single-minded effort thus to 
come to grips with the problem of free elections 
in Germany. 

SOVIET NOTE OF AUGUST 23 

[Unofficial translation] 

In connection with the note of the Government 
of the U.S.A. of July 10 of this year, the Soviet 
Government considers it necessary to state the 
following : 

1. In its note of May 2i * as well as in its pre- 
vious notes, the Soviet Government proposed to 
the Government of the U.S.A. as well as to the 
Governments of Great Britain and France to pro- 
ceed without delay to immediate negotiations con- 
cerning a peace treaty with Germany and the for- 
mation of an all-German Government. The Soviet 
Government in order to facilitate the decision of 
these questions had already on March 10 proposed 
for joint examination by the four Governments — 
the U.S.S.R., U.S.A., Great Britain, and France- 
its own draft on the basis for a peace treaty with 
Germany, expressing at the time its readiness to 
discuss other possible proposals as well on this 
question. However, as is known, the Government 
of the U.S.A. and also the Governments of Great 
Britain and France evaded immediate negotiations 
with the Soviet Government on the question men- 
tioned above. 

The note of the Government of the U.S.A. of 
July 10 shows that the three Governments are con- 
tinuing, just as they formerly did, to delay dis- 
cussion of such important questions as the ques- 
tion about restoration of unity of Germany and 
the conclusion of a German peace treaty. 

2. The Governments of the U.S.A., Great Brit- 
ain, and France, while delaying the exchange of 
notes with the Soviet Government on the German 
question, entered into a deal with the Adenauer 
government. In flagrant violation of the Potsdam 
Agreement, the Governments of the Three Powers 
on May 26 concluded with the Bonn Government 
a separate so-called "agreement," calling it a con- 
vention concerning relations between the three 
Western Powers and the German Federal Repub- 

' Ibid., July 21, 19.'52, p. 93. 



518 



Deparfment of State Bulletin 



lie,' and following that on May 27 there was signed 
in Paris an "agreement" concerning a so-called 
"European Defense Community." Having signed 
these "agreements," the Governments again dem- 
onstrated that they were not at all interested either 
in unification of Germany or in tlie conclusion of 
a peace treaty with Germany, but were aiming at 
strengthening and deepening of the division of 
Germany and at tying in West Germany and the 
West Germany Army organized by the Govern- 
ments of the three Western Powers with the North 
Atlantic bloc and utilizing West Germany more 
completely for aggressive purposes of that bloc. 
The separate Bonn "agreement" of the United 
States, Great Britain, and France with the Ade- 
nauer govei'nment represents an open military 
alliance plainly pursuing aggi-essive purposes. 
This "agreement" legalizes the rebirth of German 
militarism, the creation of a West German mer- 
cenary army, headed by Fascist Hitlerite generals. 
We place the word "agreement" in quotation 
marks, since the separate Bonn "agi'eement" was 
not freely accepted by the Germans of West Ger- 
many ; it was imposed upon West Germany against 
the will of the German people. 

The Governments of the Three Powers are try- 
ing in every way to conceal from the German 
people the character of the separate Bonn "agree- 
ment," which is one hostile to their national inter- 
ests and dangerous to the cause of peace. They 
are trying in this connection to create an impres- 
sion that tlie "agi'eement" opens up to Germany 
the possibility for a wide and free association with 
other nations of Europe, and they wish to make 
the people believe that the Governments of the 
United States, Great Britain, and France in some 
way are striving for the creation of an all-German 
Government which, according to their statement, 
"must have the necessary freedom of action and 
powers inherent in a government." However, the 
content of the separate Bonn "agreement" is in 
direct conflict with these assurances. As is evi- 
dent from the text of the separate Bonn "agree- 
ment," the Governments of the three Western 
Powers have fully reserved to themselves the so- 
called "special rights," giving as their motives for 
this the peculiarities of the international position 
of Germany. These "special rights" give the Gov- 
ernments of tlie U.S.A., Great Britain, and France 
unlimited possibility for stationing their forces on 
the territory of West Germany, as well as at any 
time within their own discretion the bringing 
about in West Germany the establishment of a 
state of emergency and taking into their own 
hands full power. The Government of the U.S.A., 
and also the Governments of Great Britain and 
France, have by this "agreement" assured them- 
selves of the right of intervention on a wide scale 
in tlie internal affairs of West Germany up to and 

'For a summary of this convention, see ibid., June 9, 
1952, p. 888. 



including the use of ai-med forces of the Occupy- 
ing Powers for the purposes of imposing their 
Diktat on West Germany. 

All this is evidence that the Bonn separate 
"agi'eement" does not only not open up for Ger- 
many any possibility of future free development, 
as the Government of the U.S.A. proclaims in its 
note of July 10, but excludes sucli a possibility, 
leaving West Germany in a state of complete sub- 
ordination and dependence on the Occupying Pow- 
ers, as this has been under the Occupation Statute. 

3. Evading immediate negotiations concerning 
the formation of an all-German Government and 
the conclusion of a ti-eaty of peace, the Govern- 
ment of the U.S.A., for the purpose of disguising 
its position, raises in its note of July 10 the ques- 
tion of guaranties which should be given by the 
Four I'owers to the effect that an all-German Gov- 
ernment established as a result of free elections, 
would have the necessary freedom of action in the 
coui-se of the i^eriod prior to the entry into effect 
of the peace treaty. 

However, there can be no question of any "free- 
dom of action" of an all-German Government as 
long as there exists the separate Bonn "agi'ee- 
ment," from article 7 of which it is evident that 
the very possibility of the creation of a united 
Gei-many is made provisional upon the obligatory 
retention by the Governments of the three Western 
Powers of all privileges which were envisaged in 
the Bonn "agreement" and which deprived Ger- 
many of her governmental independence and 
integrity. 

It is entirely clear that the Government of tlie 
U.S.A., as well as the Governments of Great 
Britain and France, in signing the separate Bonn 
"agreement," are actually not striving for the uni- 
fication of Gennany, the establishment of an all- 
German Govenmient, and the extension to that 
Government in reality freedom of action. The 
question raised in the note of the Government of 
the U.S.A. of July 10, concerning the guaranties 
of "freedom of action" for the future iill-German 
Government, is a false phrase, designed to conceal 
the aspirations of the Governments of the three 
Western Powers to subordinate Germany entirely 
to theJTiselves, and their aggressive purposes. In- 
sofar as the Goveriunent of the U.S.A. raises in 
its note of July 10 the question concerning the 
guaranties of f reetlom of action of an all-Geiinan 
Government, which is inimediately connected with 
the question of the authority of an all-German 
Government, the Soviet Government finds it neces- 
sary to recall that the ix)sitioii of the Soviet Gov- 
ernment on this question was exhaustively set 
fortli in its note of May 24. In this note it was 
stated "as far as an all-German Government and 
its powere are concerned this Government must, 
of course, also be guided by the Potsdam provi- 
sions, but after the conclusion of a peace treaty 
by the provisions of the peace treaty, which must 
serve the establishment of a firm peace in Europe." 



Ocfober 6, 1952 



519 



This flows directly from the Potsdam Agi-eement, 
which establislied the principles on which the Ger- 
man state — peace-loving, democratic, independent, 
united, German state — must be established. The 
entire activity of the Government of the United 
States in Western Germany is in plain contradic- 
tion to these principles. 

In connection with this, the Soviet Govermnent 
finds it necessary to note that the Government of 
the United States is interpreting in distorted fash- 
ion the reference of the Soviet Government in its 
note of May 24 to the Potsdam Agreement, making 
it look as though in this note there was envisaged 
the "re-creation of a Four Power system of control" 
although in reality the note of the Soviet Govern- 
ment of May 24 spoke not of the establishment 
of a Four Power system of control but of the ne- 
cessity for the observance of the principles of the 
Potsdam Agreement concerning the reestablish- 
ment of Germany as a unified, independent, peace- 
loving, and democratic state. 

4. The Government of the United States in its 
note of July 10 again raises the question regarding 
the right of the German people to "join other 
nations in peaceful aims" and to conclude appro- 
priate agreements. In this regard, the Soviet Gov- 
ernment in its note of April 9 " pointed out the 
provision contained in the Soviet draft of a "basis 
of a peace treaty" regarding the obligation of 
Germany "not to enter into any kind of coalition 
or military alliance directed against any other 
power which has participated with its armed 
forces in a war against Germany." As is quite 
evident this provision in no way limits the right 
of Germany to join other nations for peaceful 
purposes. But this provision deprives Germany 
of the possibility of joining such groups as, for 
example, the North Atlantic bloc which pursues 
aggressive aims and the activity of which repre- 
sents the threat of development of a new world 
war. The Soviet Government continues to con- 
sider that in such provision there is no limitation 
on sovereign rights of the German state and that 
such provision is in accordance with the agree- 
ments of the Four Powers on the German question 
and fully responds also to the interests of all states 
neighboring Germany and is equally to the na- 
tional interests of Germany itself. 

5. The Government of the United States in its 
note of July 10 refers to the measures carried out 
at the present time in the German Democratic 
Republic (Gdr) for the strengthening of its se- 
curity, stating that these measures in some way 
are "deepening the division of Germany" and in 
some way are directed to the prohibition of contact 
between the Germans living in the Gdr and West- 
ern Germany. 

Such a statement has no foundation. As is 
known the Government of the Gdr has widely 

• IMd., May 26, 1952, p. 819. 



published that mentioned measures are taking 
place at the request of the population which suffers 
injury on the part of spies, diversionists, terror- 
ists, and contrabandists sent from the Western 
zone of Germany with provocatory purposes which 
are directly connected with the policy of remili- 
tarization of Germany and the inclusion of West- 
ern Germany in preparation of a new war. 

C. In reply to the Soviet Government's pro- 
posal in its note of May 24 to enter joint discussion 
on the questions regarding a peace treaty with 
Germany without delay and the creation of an 
all-German Government, the Government of the 
United States states it considers it impossible for 
a German peace treaty to be worked out before an 
all-German Government is created and in view 
of this, it is necessary to limit itself only to the 
creation of a commission of investigation in Ger- 
many. However, such an assertion does not 
correspond to the Potsdam Agreement which 
placed on the Council of Foreign Ministers the 
obligation to prepare a "peace settlement for Ger- 
many to be accepted by the Government of Ger- 
many when a government adequate for the 
purpose is established. 

The Soviet Government considers as without 
any kind of foundation the refusal of the Gov- 
ernments of the United States, Great Britain, 
and France to work out a peace treaty with Ger- 
many before an all-German Government is 
created. It would be incorrect and in no way 
justified to put off for an indefinite time the 
discussion of such important questions as the ques- 
tion of a peace treaty with Germany and the re- 
establishment of the unity of Germany as pro- 
posed by the Governments of the United States, 
Britain, and France. 

As is evident, the proposals of the Government 
of the United States are designed to continue to 
prolong for an indefinite time the discussion of 
the question of a peace treaty with Germany and 
the re-establishment of the unity of Germany and 
consequently retain Occupation forces in Ger- 
many for an indefinite period. 

7. Regarding the question of the creation of a 
commission to determine the existence of German 
conditions for the conduct of general free elec- 
tions, the position of the Soviet Government was 
set forth already in its notes of April 9 and May 
24. The Government of the United States men- 
tions some sort of advantages to the inspection 
in Germany by such a commission. But the pro- 
posal for the creation of an international commis- 
sion for inspection in Germany and thus to 
convert Germany into a subject of investigation 
cannot be considered other than an insult to the 
German nation. Such a proposal can be brought 
forward only by those who forget that Germany, 
in the course of more than 100 years, has lived 
under conditions of a parliamentary regime with 
general elections and organized political parties 
and that therefore it is impossible to put before 



520 



Department of State Bulletin 



(lermany such requirements which ordinarily are 
put before backward countries. 

As regards the composition of a commission for 
the investigation of the existence in Germany of 
conditions for the conduct of general free elec- 
tions, the most objective such a commission would 
be that created, with the agreement of the Four 
Powers, by the Germans themselves and composed 
of Germans representing, let us say, the People's 
Chamber of the Gdr and the Bundestag of West- 
ern Germanj'. Such a commission which would 
not insult the Germans at the same time would 
represent the first step of the road toward the 
unification of Germany. 

As regards tlie inspection of Germany with the 
aim of determining the existence of conditions for 
the conduct of free all-German elections, it is self- 
evident that the first question is to determine in 
what measure there are being fulfilled the decisions 
of the Potsdam Conference, the realization of 
which represent the condition for actual free all- 
German elections and the formation of an all-Ger- 
man Government representing the will of the 
German people. Such a decision of the Potsdam 
Conference is the decision regarding the demili- 
tarization of Germany in order, as mentioned in 
the Potsdam Agreement, "permanently to prevent 
the revival or reorganization of German militar- 
ism and Nazism," that Germany never again can 
threaten its neighbors or the maintenance of peace 
throughout the world. Such a decision is the reali- 
zation of the political principles enunciated by 
the Potsdam Agi-eement regarding Germany 
which obligate : "to destroy the National Socialist 
Party and its affiliated and supervised organiza- 
tions, to dissolve all Nazi institutions, to ensure 
that they are not revived in any form, and to pre- 
vent all Nazi and militarist activity or pi'opa- 
ganda." To such principles also is related the 
provision of the Potsdam Conference "to prepare 
for the eventual reconstruction of German politi- 
cal life on a democratic basis and for eventual 
peaceful cooperation in international life by 
Germany." 

8. The Governments of the United States, Great 
Britain, and France propose to convene a meeting 
of representatives of the four Governments for 
discussion only of the question of the creation, 
function, and powers of a commission for the in- 
vestigation of the existence in Germany of condi- 
tions necessary for the conduct of free elections. 
It may be noted that correspondence on this ques- 
tion has in some measure reconciled the points of 
view of the Soviet Government on the one hand 
and the Government of the United States as well 
as the Governments of Great Britain and France 
on the other hand, but the Soviet Government does 
not see any foundation for the limitation of the 
questions set forth for discussion at a meeting of 
representatives of the Four Powers only to the 
question of the above-mentioned commission. In 
limiting the scope of questions put forth for dis- 
cussion of the representatives of the mentioned 



Four Powers and to avoid review of the most 
important questions relating to Germany, the Gov- 
ernment of the United States, and also the Govern- 
ments of Great Britain and France, act as though 
they were striving that the meeting of the repre- 
sentatives of the Four Powers should produce the 
least possible results or should have absolutely no 
result. Nonetheless, the Soviet Government is 
prepared to discuss at the meeting of the Four 
Powers proposed by the Governments of the Three 
Powers tlie question of a commission for investi- 
gation of conditions for the conduct of free elec- 
tions in all of Germany. But the Soviet Govern- 
ment, meanwhile, considers that a meeting cannot 
and should not limit itself to discussion of only 
this question. The Soviet Government considers 
it necessary that this meeting as a matter of first 
importance discuss such important questions as the 
peace treaty with Germany and the formation of 
an all-German Government. 

Proceeding from the foregoing the Soviet Gov- 
ernment proposes to convene at the earliest time 
and in any case in October of this year a meeting 
of the representatives of the Four Powers with the 
following agenda: 

A. Preparation of a peace treaty with Germany. 

B. Formation of an all-German Government. 

C. Conduct of free all-German elections and a commis- 
sion for the verification of the existence in Germany of 
conditions for the conduct of such elections, its composi- 
tion, functions, and powers. 

Meanwhile, the Soviet Government proposes to 
discuss at this meeting of the Four Powers the 
question of the date of withdrawal from Germany 
of Occupation troops. 

The Soviet Government proposes also that repre- 
sentatives of the Germany Democratic Repuolic 
and the German Federal Republic take part in a 
meeting to examine appropriate questions. 

The Soviet Government has sent similar notes 
also to the Governments of Great Britain and 
France. 



U.S. Rejects Soviet Charges 
on Administration of Trieste 

Press release 744 dated September 22 

Following is the text of the U. S. reply to the 
Soviet note of Jvme 2^, 1952, on Trieste, delivered 
to the Soviet Foreign Office on September W. A 
parallel note was delivered hy the U.K. 

U.S. Note of September 20 

The United States Government categorically re- 
jects the allegation of the Ministry's note of June 
24 that the Memorandum of Understanding of 
May 9 between the United States, the United 
Kingdom and the Italian Governments concern- 
ing administrative arrangements in Zone A of the 



Ocfofaer 6, J 952 



521 



Free Territory of Trieste ^ in any way controverts 
the peace treaty with Italy. 

The United States Government also calls atten- 
tion to its note dated June 16, 1950 ^ which con- 
tained a reoly to the allegations of an earlier So- 
viet note making identical assertions in regard to 
the maintenance of the United States- United 
Kingdom military occupation and administration 
of Zone A of the Free Territory of Trieste. 

Finally, with reference to the Peace Treaty, 
the United States Government wishes to state that 
it remains convinced that, in so far as the pro- 
visions regarding the Free Territory of Trieste 
have not been implemented, the principal responsi- 
bility rests with the attitude and conduct of tha 
Soviet Goveminent itself, which first rendered im- 
possible the execution of the settlement envisaged 
by the Treaty. 

Soviet Note of June 24 

[Unofficial translation] 

In connection with the agi-eement published 
May 10 between the Governments of the United 
States, Great Britain, and Italy, on the question 
of the participation of Italy in the government 
of the Anglo-American Zone A ©f the Free Terri- 
tory of Trieste, the Soviet Government considers 
it necessary to state the following : 

On November 17, 1951, the Soviet Government 
sent the Government of the United States and also 
the Governments of Great Britain and France a 
note ^ concerning statements published in the press 
of official representatives of the mentioned West- 
ern Powers, pointing out that, as was evident from 
these statements, the Governments of the United 
States, Great Britain, and France with the par- 
ticipation of the Italian and Yugoslav Govern- 
ments were preparing a division of the Free Terri- 
tory of Trieste between Italy and Yugoslavia. The 
Soviet Government also pointed out in its note 
that the projected division of the Free Territory 
of Trieste has as its aim to adapt this territory, 
neutral according to the peace treaty with Italy, 
its human and material resources to the war plans 
of the aggressive Atlantic bloc and to strengthen 
the Trieste area as a permanent military and naval 
base of the United States and Great Britain. 

It was also mentioned in the note that this divi- 
sion, which is a continuation of the policy of vio- 
lation of the peace treaty with Italy, is incom- 
patible with the problems of maintenance of peace 
and security in Europe and is contradictory to 
the interests of the population of this territory, 
depriving it of the possibility of enjoying demo- 
cratic rights foreseen in permanent statute of the 
Free Territory of Trieste. 

The Soviet Government in its note of Novem- 



' BuLLBiriN of May 19, 1952, p. 779. 
' IHd., June 26. 1950, p. 1054. 
' Ibid., Dec. 3, 1951, p. 911. 



ber 17 insisted on fulfillment by the Governments 
of the United States, Great Britain, and France 
of their obligations regarding the Free- Territory 
of Trieste, particularly on the withdrawal of for- 
eign troops from this territory and liquidation 
of illegal Anglo-American military and naval 
base in Trieste and proposed that the Security 
Council without delay take measures for appoint- 
ment of a Governor of the Free Territory of 
Trieste. 

The Governments of the United States and 
Great Britain not only did not take measures 
dependent on them for appointment by the Se- 
curity Council of a Governor of the Free Terri- 
tory of Trieste, for removal of the occupation 
regime, and withdrawal of occupation troops from 
the territory of Trieste which would be the first 
step in the matter of fulfillment of the peace treaty 
with Italy re Trieste, but rather moved to further 
violations mentioned in the treaty. 

Conversations which took place in London from 
April 3 to May 9 between the Governments of the 
United States, Great Britain, and Italy accom- 
plished conclusion of the agreement for inti'oduc- 
mg Italy into the government of Zone A, Free 
Territory of Trieste. As is evident from the text 
of the agreement which established that "com- 
mander of troops of the United Kingdom and 
United States retains full authority for govern- 
ment of the zone," the Anglo-American occupation 
authorities who use this zone in the aggressive 
aims of North Atlantic bloc remain, as before, 
complete masters Zone A, Free Territory of 
Trieste. Having concluded the mentioned agree- 
ment, the Governments of the United States and 
Great Britain strive to strengthen the regime of 
military occupation of the Free Territory of 
Trieste for an indefinitely long time in order to 
retain the illegally created Anglo-American mili- 
tary and naval base at Trieste. 

The agreement concluded May 9 between the 
Governments of the United States, Great Britain, 
and Italy was dictated by interests which have 
nothing in common with the problems of the main- 
tenance of peace in Europe. This agreement is 
directed toward the further violation of the pro- 
visions of the peace treaty with Italy of February 
10, 1947, regarding the Free Territory of Trieste 
and simultaneous deprivation of the population 
of Trieste of the possibility to enjoy democratic 
rights and basic freedoms guaranteed it by the 
peace treaty with Italy. 

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to 
direct the attention of the Governments of the 
United States and Great Britain to the illegality 
of the agreement signed by them at London May 9 
of this year and charges the governments of the 
mentioned countries with full responsibility for 
their new violation of the obligations which they 
accepted in the peace treaty with Italy. 

A similar note has been sent to the Government 
of Great Britain. 



522 



Department of State Bulletin 



Soviet Noncooperation Paralyzes 
Prisoner of War Commission 

The U.N. Ad Hoc Commission on Prisoners of 
War, oneeting at Geneva, has suhmitted the follow- 
ing speci-al report to the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations: 

D.N. doc. A/AC.46/10 
Dated Sept. 12 

1. The Ad Hoc Commission on Prisoners of War, 
established under the terms of General Assembly 
Resolution 427 (V) and consisting of Mr. J. G. 
Guerrero, Vice-President of the International 
Court of Justice, as Chairman, Countess Berna- 
dotte, and Mr. Aung Khine, Judge of the High 
Court of Burma, convened for its third session on 
26 August 1952 at the European Office of the 
United Nations, Geneva. 

2. Mr. King Gordon was Secretary of the Com- 
mission. 

3. The Commission held three public meetings 
and fifteen private meetings and was in session 
from 26 August to 13 September 1952. 

4. Independently of its report to the Secretary- 
General on the work of its third session as a whole, 
the Commission has decided to consult the Mem- 
bers of the United Nations on a special aspect of its 
terms of reference under General Assembly resolu- 
tion 427 (V) of 14 December 1950. 

5. It appears from paragraph 3 of this resolu- 
tion that the Commission would only be in a posi- 
tion to bring its work to a successful conclusion if 
it received the co-operation of all the governments 
concerned in its task of settling the question of the 
prisoners of war in a purely humanitarian spirit. 

6. From the outset, at its first session held at New 
York from 31 July to 15 August 1951, the Commis- 
sion tried to win the confidence of all the govern- 
ments by informing them of the way in which it 
interpreted its humanitarian task. During that 
session it asked governments to give it their assist- 
ance, particularly in the following ways : 

(a) Transmission to the Commission of any 
information which it may deem necessary to re- 
quest from the governments concerned with a view 
to facilitating the accomplishment of its task ; 

{b) Transmission to the Commission of any 
suggestion which would come within the frame- 
work of its mission ; 

(c) The establishment of direct contact between 
the Commission and representatives of the gov- 
ernments concerned. 

7. In reply to a special invitation to consult 
with the Commission addressed to certain govern- 
ments specially concerned with the problem of 
prisoners of war the Governments of Australia, 
Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, and the United States of America signi- 



fied their readiness to collaborate with the Com- 
mission in its work, and sent representatives to 
the second and third sessions, held in Geneva in 
February and August 1952. The only govern- 
ment from which the Commission has had no reply 
is that of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 

8. In the course of its second session the Com- 
mission, not having received from the Government 
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics any of 
the information specified in paragraph 2 of the 
Resolution of the General Assembly, again ap- 
proached that Government and asked it to furnish 
the Commission with a list of the names of pris- 
oners of war who had died in its custody. In a 
letter dated 9 February 1952 addressed to the 
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re- 
publics the Commission recognized that owing to 
the devastation of war certain relevant records 
and archives might have been destroyed ; and con- 
sequently it requested the Government of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to furnish it 
with as complete a list as possible of such deceased 
prisoners of war and at least with a list of those 
prisoners who had died since 1947. 

9. In accordance with a decision taken at its 
second session (A/AC. 46/8, paragraph 18) the 
Chairman addressed letters dated 18 April and 
31 July 1952 to certain governments that were 
detaining prisoners of war on charges of war 
crimes or under sentence for such crimes, request- 
ing them to send it such detailed information as 
the following: 

(a) name of person prosecuted; 
(6) date of trial ; 

(c) place of trial ; 

(d) offence with which the person was charged; 

(e) date of judgment; 

(/) conviction or acquittal; 

((7) penalty imposed; and 

(ft) place where sentenced person is under detention. 

The Governments so addressed were the follow- 
ing: Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Nor- 
way, Philippines, United Kingdom of Great Brit- 
ain and Northern Ireland, Union of Soviet Social- 
ist Republics, and Yugoslavia. On 31 July 1952 
a reminder letter was despatched to the same 
Governments. 

10. The Commission has received no response 
to these requests for information from the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics. 

11. The Commission is obliged to state, there- 
fore, that its attempts to obtain the co-operation 
of the Government of the Union of Soviet Social- 
ist Republics have been unsuccessful. Conse- 
quently the Commission has regretfully come to 
the conclusion that it is unable to perform the 
basic task for which it was set up, namely, to settle 
"the question of the prisoners of war in a purely 
humanitarian spirit and on terms acceptable to all 
the Governments concerned". 

12. The Ad Hoc Commission considers it to be 
its duty to inform the Secretary-General of this 



October 6, 1952 



523 



obstacle that is paralysing its work and increasing 
the difficulty of verifying the large amount of in- 
formation furnished by other governments di- 
rectly concerned in the repatriation of prisoners 
who have not yet returned to their homes. 

13. In accordance with the resolution adopted 
by the General Assembly on 14 December 1950 
(resolution 427 (V)) the Commission intends, at 
its next session, to prepare the final report on the 
results of its work together with such conclusions 
as may be drawn from the documentation in its 
possession. 



14. In the meantime, the Commission has de- 
cided to send this special report to the Secretary- 
General, with the request that he transmit it to 
the Members of the United Nations before the 
opening of the seventh session of the General As- 
sembly. The Commission hopes that a fresh 
appeal for international co-operation among the 
Members of the United Nations and to their spirit 
of humanity might have the effect of giving a more 
promising direction to the work that has so far 
been carried on, with only limited success, by the 
Ad Hoc Commission on Prisoners of War. 



Japan's Application for Membership in the United Nations 



On September 18 the United Nations Security 
Council voted on a draft resolution proposed hy 
the United States {U.N.doc.S/276i) recommend- 
ing the admission of Japan to the United Nations. 
Jacob A. Malik, the U. S. S. R. representative on 
the Council, cast the 52d Soviet veto to defeat the 
resolution. Ambassador Warren R. Austin, per- 
manent U.S. representative to the United Nations, 
spoke twice on the resolution — on September 17 
and again on September 18, after Mr. Malik\<s 
explanation of his country^s stand. On Septem- 
ber 2Jf Robert D. Murphy, U.S. Ambassador to 
Japan, discussed the subject before the directors of 
the United Nations Association of Japan. 

Following are texts of A^nbassador Murphy\'i 
remarks in Tokyo and of Ambassador Austin's 
two Secwrity Council statements. 



REMARKS BY AMBASSADOR MURPHY i 

[Telegraphic text] 

This opportunity to meet with you on the occa- 
sion of the seventh session of the Board of Direc- 
tors of the United Nations Association of Japan 
is a great privilege. I know something of the 
struggle and hard work it has meant for you 
gentlemen to found and develop this organization. 
You have passed through difficult years, but you 
have succeeded in making a genuine contribution 



* Made before the directors of the United Nations Asso- 
ciation of Japan at Tokyo on Sept. 24. 



to the prestige and future of the new Japan in a 
complex world situation. I congratulate your 
distinguished President and the able and devoted 
members of the Board of Directors on a record of 
patriotic service having for its object the re-estab- 
lishment of Japan in its rightful place in the fra- 
ternity of nations. And I wish you every success 
in the solution of the problems which lie ahead. 

My Government, as you know, is an ardent sup- 
porter of Japan's desire to be admitted among the 
great powers as a full member of the United Na- 
tions. It has continued to give practical and un- 
qualified support to Japan's application and it will 
continue to do so. How happy we all would be 
today if the Security Council had not been frus- 
trated in its overwhelming desire to vote Japan's 
admission this past week. All the members of the 
Security Council representing the free nations, 
including the U.S. representative, voted in favor 
of Japan's application for membership. Who 
alone voted against it ? Why was it disapproved ? 
What was said against Japan's application ? 

The i^erson who vetoed approval of Japan's 
entry to her rightful place in the United Nations 
was the Soviet representative on the Security 
Council, Jacob Malik. Mr. Malik has grown up 
in the hard school of Russian dialectics and the 
education he has received apparently enabled him 
to ignore with supreme indifference any distinc- 
tion between truth and falsehood. Despite what 
Mr. Malik's masters have said about the fine prin- 
ciples and lofty ideals of the world movement in 
which they are engaged, unfortunately it is simply 



524 



Department of State Bulletin 



the case that the spiritual world in which he and 
they live is so distorted that all distinction be- 
tween honesty and dishonesty has disappeared. 
In their book the end justities the means and re- 
sort is permitted to cynicism, hypocrisy, and fraud 
as instruments to an end. That end is world 
domination. 

Why was Malik the only one of 11 representa- 
tives on the Security Council to vote against 
Japan's aiaplication for membership in the United 
Nations ? Why did he say "Nyet" ? Was it for the 
same reason that the Soviet Union would not join 
with other nations in the conclusion of a peace 
treaty which Japan had earned ? Is it for the same 
reason that Japanese prisoners of war are not al- 
lowed to return from the Russian labor camps 7 
years after the war ended? Is it the same reason 
that sees Russian forces illegally occupying the 
Japanese Islands of Habomai and Shikotan ? Mr. 
Malik did not explain these things. He resorted 
with characteristic hypocrisy to the threadbare 
device of falsely accusing Japan of militarism. 
Wliat cynicism; what hypocrisy. The truth is 
that the Soviet masters feared the addition to the 
membership of another free nation determined to 
exercise its rights of independence in the family of 
democratic nations. 

Thus, for the fifty-second time, the Soviet repre- 
sentative exercised the right of veto permitted 
under the United Nations Charter. Witnessing 
the debasement of the rules by one of the powerful 
members of the organization, no doubt we are 
justified in wondering whether it can succeed in 
its purposes when such obstructionism is possible. 
But the free nations are determined that it will 
succeed and that determination will win over all 
odds. 

Not content with this type of sabotage in the 
United Nations, the forces of Russian imperialism 
and expansionism have adopted the device of 
"peace" conferences set up in satellite countries. 
These things can be organized so that no dissent- 
ing voice mars the harmonious progress of the 
propaganda steam roller. Thus the campaign of 
hate can be developed without opposition. So it 
has been in Poland and Czechoslovakia and now 
the world is to be treated to another exhibition 
of Pax Sovietica, this time in Peiping. The 
forum of the United Nations is not only available 
for legitimate peace proposals but is designed for 
discussion of them. But in the United Nations 
some of the rules are inconvenient for partisan 
maneuvers. It is much easier to announce in a 
well-rigged partisan forum, where there will be 
no jeers, that baseball was invented in the Soviet 
Union or that South Korea attacked North Korea. 

Japan's Progress in the Free World 

But it is not my intention to bore you by be- 
laboring a dead horse. I do want to say some- 
thing constructive about relations between Japan 
and the United States. The U.S. Government is 



particularly pleased that Japan recently was ad- 
mitted to membership in the International Mone- 
tary Fund and the International Bank for Recon- 
struction and Development. My Government also 
notes with satisfaction Japan's increasing partici- 
pation in the economic activities of the free world. 
For the United States firmly believes that Japan's 
resumption of international trade and economic 
relations is an important factor in world economy. 
It is, of course, obvious that economic recovery 
after a devastating war is not without tremendous 
difficulties. In line with U.S. objectives in con- 
tributing to the security and economic well-being 
of friendly nations in the Far East, the responsible 
agencies of the United States are following with 
the closest attention Japan's efforts to sti-engthen 
its economy and improve the living standards of 
the Japanese people, which is one important aspect 
of the economic development of the whole area. 
The U.S. Government, naturally, is willing to 
consider rendering technical and economic assist- 
ance in the furtherance of this development. 

The United States will continue to procure a 
substantial volume of goods and services in Japan 
and thus directly aid in balancing its international 
accounts. Such procurement will include expendi- 
tures : 

(1) For the maintenance of U.S. forces sta- 
tioned in Japan ; 

(2) By U.S. military and Government employ- 
ees and their dependents in Japan ; 

(3) For goods and services needed in connection 
with the Korean hostilities and Korean relief and 
rehabilitation ; and 

(-1) For goods and services needed in connection 
with U.S. assistance programs in the Far East. 

The United States anticipates that the total of 
such expenditures will approximate 750 million 
dollars in the current U.S. fiscal year, that is, be- 
tween July 1 of this year and June 30, 1953. 

The Japanese should have no difficulty in dis- 
cerning the difference between spurious claims of 
friendship mouthed by the Soviet Union and con- 
crete evidence of support given by Japan's true 
friends. Even though Japan is not a member of 
the United Nations, the United States looks upon 
Japan as an equal partner in the efforts of the 
free world to build a stable and secure society. 

Even though denied membership, Japan has 
nevertheless a contribution to make and an obliga- 
tion to fulfill to the world community of free 
nations. Neither her contribution nor her obliga- 
tion can be vetoed by the willful action of one state. 
If Japan's representative is denied the opportunity 
to sit at the Councils of the United Nations and cast 
his vote, there is no doubt that Japan's influence 
will be felt just the same, for the great majority 
of the free nations of the world have already shown 
their willingness to accept Japan as a sovereign 
partner. Meanwhile, I hope the U.N. Association 
of JajDan will not become discouraged but will con- 



Ocfober 6, 1952 

224276 — 52 3 



525 



tinue the important work it has begun, applying 
greater zeal tlian ever against the day when justice 
will be clone as it ultimately must. 

Again, Mr. President, I wish to thank you and 
your associates for this privilege of meeting with 
you and to hope that the eighth session of the 
Board of Directors of the U.N. Association of 
Japan will see Japan established as a full member 
of the United Nations. 



AMBASSADOR AUSTIN'S 
STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 17 

tJ.S./CN. press release dated September 17 

The United States has submitted a draft resolu- 
tion recommending a great nation, Japan^ for 
membership in the United Nations (S/2754). 
After almost 4 years of the most bitter hostilities 
in which the United States and other Allied 
Powers and Japan were engaged, the Japanese 
people repudiated their military masters and un- 
dertook to rebuild a new Japan. They have suc- 
ceeded in their undertaking. They have produced 
a new structure of government and brought into 
leadership those who know the ways of freedom 
and of peace. The Japanese people have a gen- 
uine love of peace and warm appreciation of duty. 
They are a people of art, beauty, and sentiment. 
They possess high skills. 

Onr decision here will touch their lives. 
Through membership, the United Nations can 
oifer them new avenues of political and economic 
cooperation as well as a system of collective se- 
curity. 

In its application for membership which Japan 
filed on June 23, 1952, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs said : 

The .Tapnnese people have an earnest desire to partici- 
pnte in the work of the United Nations and to ntilize the 
purposes and principles of the Charter as a guide to the 
conduct of tlit'ir affairs. There exists among the Japanese 
peoi)le nation-wide sympathy with the ohjectives of the 
United Nations to foster international peace and coopera- 
tion among nntions. The Government of Japan is eager to 
apply for memhcrship in the United Nations and there- 
fore will midertake to fulfill the obligations of membership 
in the organization by all means at its disposal. 

The United States accepts this statement as a 
true indication of the intentions of the Japanese 
Goveinuient and of the Japanese people. 

The application of Japan comes to us as a logical 
consequence of the Treaty of Peace with Japan 
which entered into effect on April 28, 1952. This 
re-establisiied Japan as a sovereign and independ- 
ent state. Upon that date Japan resumed not only 
her rights but also her duties as a member of the 
family of nations. Japan had already recognized 
these duties when, in the preamble of the peace 
treaty, site declared her intention to apply for 
membersliip in the United Nations and in all cir- 



cumstances to conform to the principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations. 

The significance of this pledge is, I think, recog- 
nized by all of the 48 states who signed the Treaty 
of Peace at San Francisco. 

By her acts, Japan has shown that she honors 
this pledge and has taken her place in the organ- 
ized international community. She has a long his- 
tory of cooperation in many areas with the United 
Nations. Japan has cooperated with the United 
Nations in combating aggression by complying 
with the resolutions of the General Assembly and 
the Security Council. 

Japan is a responsible member of most of the 
specialized agencies of the United Nations: the 
International Telecommunication Union, the Uni- 
versal Postal Union, the World Health Organiza- 
tion, the International Labor Organization, the 
Food and Agriculture Organization, and Unesco. 

Recently Japan became an associate member of 
the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far 
East. 

Japanese women have for several years attended 
as unofficial observers the meetings of the U.N. 
Commission on the Status of Women. 

The ideals and objectives of the United Nations 
and its specialized agencies have received wide 
support in the cities and towns throughout Japan. 
Associations dedicated to advancing knowledge of 
the United Nations and its specialized agencies 
have been established from Hokkaido to the south- 
ernmost islands. The Japanese people have made 
sizable contributions to the U.N. International 
Children's Emergency Fund. 

These, then, are some of the facts indicative of 
Japan's attitude toward the United Nations and 
what it stands for. By such facts we can test the 
reality of the declaration that the Government of 
Japan will undertake to fulfill the obligations 
of membership. 

It is significant that Japan, having declared her 
intention in the Treaty of Peace to apply for mem- 
bership in the United Nations, submitted her ap- 
plication for membership in the United Nations 
less than 2 months after the treaty came into force. 
It seems to my Government entirely appropriate 
that now, on the first occasion that the Security 
Council has been considering recent apjilications, 
it should address itself to the application of Ja]ian. 

It is for the Security Council to say whether 
Japan is a peace-loving state, able and willing to 
carry out its obligations under the Charter. In 
the opinion of my Government, Japan fully poss- 
esses all of these qualifications. Japan desires to 
be a part of and play an important role in the 
international community. As a state which now 
lacks the means of self-defense, she needs collec- 
tive security as envisioned by the U-N. Charter. 
The UnitedNations needs this nation of 85,000,000 
people. Japan's membership will strengthen the 
United Nations and will assist in achieving the 
maintenance of international peace and security. 



526 



Deparfmenf of State Bulletin 



The United States is proud to recognize Japan's 
return to the international connnunity of nations 
and to put before tlae Security Council the draft 
resolution in support of Japan's application for 
admission to the United Nations. 

This draft resolution is simple and self-con- 
tained. Japan's application is not related to the 
application of any other state. I submit it to 
3'ou to be considered and voted on solely upon its 
merits. 

The question before the Security Council when 
it votes on this draft resolution is a simple one: 
Does Japan possess the qualifications for member- 
ship required by the Charter? The world will see 
the answer to that question by the vote of each 
member of the Security Council on the draft 
resolution. 



AMBASSADOR AUSTIN'S ^ 

STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 18 

U.S. /D.N. press release dated September 18 

I should like to comment briefly on some of the 
charges which the representative of the U.S.S.R. 
made yesterday. 

(1) What Mr. Malik calls a separate peace 
treaty is a treaty with Japan signed by 48 states, 
all members of the United Nations or applicants 
for membership. Is it the opinion of 48 states or 
the opinion of the U.S.S.R. which determines the 
international concensus of opinion with respect to 
Japan's eligibility to return to the family of na- 
tions? If the U.S.S.R. is still at war with Japan 
it is the choice of the U.S.S.R. Incidentally, the 
U.S.S.R. declared war on Japan but 6 days before 
the cessation of hostilities. The Soviet Union re- 
fused to become a party to the peace settlement 
with Japan reached at San Francisco. Efforts of 
the United States to consult with the U.S.S.R. 
were rebuifed during the preliminary stages of 
negotiations which led to the draft peace treaty. 
The U.S.S.R. sent a delegation to San Francisco 
ostensibly to be present on the occasion of signing 
the treaty. In fact, this delegation attempted to 
obstruct the conclusion of the treaty which, as I 
have said before, was signed by 48 states. 

It is also appropriate to note that Japan is at 
peace with the Government of the Republic of 
China. 

(2) Mr. Malik characterizes Japan as still ex- 
isting under a foreign military occupation. The 
Treaty of Peace with Japan provides that all oc- 
cupation forces of the Allied Powers shall be with- 
drawn from Japan as soon as possible after the 
coming into force of the treaty. This has been 
done. But the signatories of the peace treaty, in- 
cluding Japan, recognized that Japan, lacking the 
means of self-defense, could not exist in a power 
vacuum with the danger of uncalled-for aggi'es- 



sion in the world. The treaty therefore recognized 
that foreign armed forces might be stationed in 
Japan under agreement between one or more of 
the Allied Powers on the one hand and Japan on 
the other. The Japanese people, clearly seeing 
this danger of aggression, concluded a security 
pact with the United States under which U.S. 
troops would be retained in Japan temporarily, 
until the danger was passed or international peace 
and security would have been assured under the 
United Nations' auspices or a collective security 
arrangement. This is a matter of public record 
and represents one step that a free nation is taking 
in order to assure itself some measure of security 
as she returns to the international community of 
nations. 

(3) The representative of the U.S.S.R. alleges 
that the United States is fostering the resurgence 
of militarism in Japan. What are the facts? 
Japan was completely demilitarized and its forces 
demobilized after the surrender. Japan today 
has only a national police reserve of some 75,000 
men to maintain internal order and security. 
This force is in the process of being expanded to 
110,000 men. No nation can suspect Japan of 
aggressive designs because of this small internal 
security force. 

(4) The Soviet representative alleged that the 
members of the Japanese National Police Reserve 
have participated in U.N. actions in Korea. The 
United States categorically denies this allegation. 
All states supporting U.N. action in Korea are 
similarly aware of the untruth of the Soviet 
allegation. 

(5) The Soviet charges that Japan is undemo- 
cratic, that it is being tyrannized by the United 
States, and that its sovereignty is subject to U.S. 
control, thereby making Japan ineligible for mem- 
bership in the United Nations, have already been 
repudiated by the members of the Security Council 
who spoke yesterday in favor of Japan's admission 
to the United Nations. 

The unity of 10 out of the 11 members of the 
Security Council increases the strength and moral 
power of those countries of the world which be- 
lieve the gospel of the Charter of the United 
Nations. 

The renewed opposition by the Soviet Union to 
the application of Japan challenges the peoples of 
those 10 states to develop the effectiveness of public 
opinion toward liberalization of the joractices of 
the Security Council. The present threat of the 
use of the veto should strengthen the interest of 
those who have long considered improvement in 
the means of executing policies and principles 
under chapter VI, in pacific methods of settling 
disagreements, and in the admission of new mem- 
bers. Many young people who are students of 
international problems can well review the policies 
stated by my country and our colleagues in the 
Security Council and in the General Assembly, of 



Ocfofaer 6, J 952 



527 



the spirit of the Charter, contemplated, for ex- 
ample — 
Tlie General Assembly, 

Mindful of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter 
of the United Nations, and ha%'ing taken notice of the 
divergencies which have arisen in regard to the applica- 
tion and interpretation of Article 27 of the Charter; 

Earnestly requests the permanent members of the Se- 
curity Council to make every effort, in consultation with 
one another and with fellow members of the Security 
Council, to ensure that the use of the special voting 
privilege of its permanent members does not impede the 
Security Council in reaching decisions promptly ; 

Recommends to the Security Council the early adoption 
of practices and procedures, consistent with the Charter, 
to assist in reducing the difficulties in the application of 
Article 27 and to ensure the prompt and effective exercise 
by the Security Council of its functions ; and 

Further recommends that, in developing such practices 
and procedures, the Security Council take into considera- 
tion the views expressed by members of the United Na- 
tions during the second part of the first session of the 
General Assembly. 

The situation in the Security Council today, on 
the draft resolution submitted by the United 
States August 28, 1952, is a cause for repetition 
of a portion of the address, on September 17, 1947, 
by the Honorable George C. Marshall, Secretary 
of State, before the General Assembly of the 
United Nations, to wit: 

The effective operation of the United Nations Security 
Council is one of the crucial conditions for the main- 
tenance of international security. The exercise of the 
veto power in the Security Council has the closest bearing 
on the succes.s and the vitality of the United Nations. 

In the past the United States has been reluctant to 
encourage proposals for changes in the system of voting 
in the Security Council. Having accepted the Charter 
provisions on this subject and having joined with other 
permanent members at San Francisco in a statement of 
general attitude toward the question of permanent mem- 
ber unanimity, we wished to permit full opportunity for 
practical testing. We were always fully aware that the 
successful operation of the rule of unanimity would 
require the exercise of restraint by the permanent mem- 
bers, and we so expressed ourselves at San Francisco. 

It is our hope that, despite our experience to date, such 
restraint will be practiced in the future by the permanent 
members. The abuse of the right of unanimity has pre- 
vented the Security Council from fulfilling its true func- 
tions. That has been especially true in cases arising 
under chapter VI and in the admission of new members. 

The Government of the United States has come to the 
conclusion that the only practicable method for improving 



this situation is a liberalization of the voting procedure 
in the Council. 

The United States would be willing to accept, by what- 
ever means may be appropriate, the elimination of the 
unanimity requirement with respect to matters arising 
under chapter VI of the Charter and such matters as 
applications for membership. 

We recognize that this is a matter of significance and 
complexity for the United Nations. We consider that the 
problem of how to achieve the objective of liberalization 
of the Security Council voting procedure deserves careful 
study. Consequently, we shall propose that this matter 
be referred to a special committee for study and report to 
the next session of the Assembly (Resolution 21 November 
1947). Measures should be pressed concurrently in the 
Security Council to bring about improvements within the 
existing provisions of the Charter, through amendments 
to the rules of procedure or other feasible means. 

It is well for us to remember on this occasion 
that resolutions have been adopted at meetings of 
the General Assembly, of the Interim Committee, 
and of the Security Council aiming at the accom- 
plishment of these policies and principles "to 
develop friendly relations among nations based on 
respect for the principle of equal rights and self- 
determination of peoples, and to take other appro- 
priate measures to strengthen universal peace." 

On several occasions the representative of the 
United States, as President of the Security Coun- 
cil, has invited the permanent members to consult 
toward solution of the veto problem of voting in 
the Security Council but has not achieved progress 
beyond the point of meeting. Obviously, greater 
pressure of moral power is necessary on the part 
of the peoples of the United Nations. Repetition 
of the defeat of the applications of states that are 
admittedly qualified as peace-loving states, and 
which accept the obligations contained in the pres- 
ent Charter, and, in the judgment of the organiza- 
tion are able and willing to carry out those obliga- 
tions, occurs because of one veto based on horse- 
trading methods. 

Wliile we increase the doctrines of the Charter 
of the United Nations through practice in the Se- 
curity Council, by so large a majority as approxi- 
mates unanimity, we believe that development on 
present improvement of the rules and practice, and 
other means, can be achieved if peoples and gov- 
ernments become animated by the spirit of the 
Charter. 



528 



Department of State Bulletin 



The United Nations: Cornerstone of U.S. Foreign Policy 



REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT' 

Since I first came to the White House in 1945, 1 
have worked to build and strengtlien the United 
Nations. In this work, I think that I have done 
no more than the American people wanted me 
to do. 

This Nation looks upon the United Nations as 
the cornerstone of our foreign policy. We see in 
the United Nations the world's best hope for peace. 
We have pledged our support to the United Na- 
tions because it stands for the only pi'inciples 
ujjon which true peace can be based. These are 
the principles of mutual respect among nations 
and justice and morality in international affairs. 

These great principles were brutally violated by 
the aggression in Korea. The authority and the 
future existence of the United Nations were 
threatened by that aggression. This Nation un- 
derstood then and understands now that if we 
let brute force destroy the United Nations there 
can be no hope for peace any time in the future. 
The other free nations also realize this fact. They 
have joined with us in the defense of Korea and in 
the defeat of the Communist aggressors there. 

When we entered the United Nations in 1945, 
we did not know that it would be put to the test 
so soon. But we did not enter lightly on this great 
international compact. We were determined at 
the outset — and we are determined now — that the 
United Nations will work, and we have sacrificed 
much to make it work. 

In spite of the great achievements of the United 
Nations, in spite of the hope that it holds for all 
mankind, we face within our borders a growing 
attempt to undermine it. 

Since Senator Vandenberg died, the old isola- 
tionists have grown bolder. They are urging us 
to abandon our Allies, to pull out of Europe and 
out of Korea, to slash our Mutual Security Pro- 
gram, and to turn back in our onward march 
toward peace. This attack on the United Nations 
offers us no plan for the future and no hope for 
eventual success. The enemies of the United Na- 



' Made nt the White House nn Sept. 26 before the Na- 
tional Citizens' Committee on U.N. Day. October 24, the 
anniversary of the day the U.N. Charter came into force 
in 1945, is observed as U.N. Day. 



tions tell us one day to pull out of Korea, and on 
the next day they tell us to extend the conflict even 
further. They ask us to reduce our defenses and 
at the same time to take steps that create a greater 
risk of total war. They lament the loss of mil- 
lions of people to Communist enslavement, and 
yet, at the same time, they recommend that we 
should cut off aid to those who are still free. 

We must disregard this hysterical and conflict- 
ing advice. We must withstand the efforts of 
those who would play politics with security and 
the welfare of our Nation and the freedom of our 
Allies. 

This is the last time that I shall meet with this 
group while I am President. My last official word 
to you is to continue your work for the United 
Nations with all your might and main. You must 
give even more of your energies to telling the 
people in this country and around the world about 
the basic concepts of the United Nations. You 
must make it clear that the United Nations is 
supported by the jjeople. 



REMARKS BY SECRETARY ACHESON ' 

Press release 765 dated September 26 

First of all, I want to thank you deeply and 
from the bottom of my heart for the tremendous 
work which you are doing under Mr. [Frank L.] 
Weil's brilliant chairmanship for this year's U.N. 
Day. It has gone further and deeper than ever 
before, the work of your organizations with Cake, 
with the Advertising Council, to bring home not 
only to the peojDle of this country but all over the 
world the significance of U.N. Day. It is a tre- 
mendous contribution. I am very grateful indeed. 

The President has already expressed his grati- 
tude to you. All of this effort of yours is to bring 
home to people the significance of something which 
it is so easy to forget, to have drift out of our lives 
because it is not always as successful as once we 
hoped it would be. But it remains the great hope 
of the future, it remains something so essential to 
the progress of international life today that if this 

' Made on Sept. 18 at a meeting in the Department of 
State auditorium. 



Ocfofaer 6, 1952 



529 



United Nations did not exist now we would have 
to set about immediately to create it. Therefore, 
it is most important, in all the multiple activities 
which you have set in motion for U.N. Day, that 
there should be centered around, clustered about, 
an understanding of the United Nations, an undei'- 
standing of its problems, an understanding of 
what it has done, what it has not done, what it is 
trying to do, and what we hope it will do. That 
is the central purpose. 

Now, when this great endeavor was launched in 
1945, the hope was — and a well-founded hope as 
exjDressed by Mr. Hull in one of his last speeches — 
that the great powers would harmonize their in- 
terests, and that tlu'ough the United Nations they, 
and small and medium sized powers, would all 
subject themselves to the rule of law and justice. 
That didn't mean merely subjecting themselves 
to an international court. That is by no means 
the extent of what we mean when we talk about 
the rule of law. It means subjecting themselves, 
first of all, to restraints, and the great restraint 
is that force and the threat of force is not to be 
used as an instrument of policy. 

Secondly, that they would subject themselves 
to the opinion of the world. 

Thirdly, that they would subject themselves to 
what amounts to an international legislative sys- 
tem, not imposing laws enforced by sanctions, but 
by creating international programs, policies, 
standards, to which the international life of the 
world would conform. 

The United Nations was to deal in three gi'eat 
fields. It was, first of all, to bring about security, 
to eliminate force, and the threat of force. 

In the second field it was to deal with the life 
of people throughout the world, the economic and 
social conditions which would bring about a fuller 
and better life for the millions and millions of 
people who dwell on this earth. 

Third, it was to deal with the individual, and 
the rights of the individual. It was to attempt 
to bring home to all nations, all governments 
throughout the world the fundamental necessity 
of creating that barrier around the individual into 
which no government, no country, no majority 
might intrude, and to guarantee to the individual 
certain inalienable rights. Those were the three 
fields in which it was to work. 

Soon we all met with a great disappointment. 
It appeared that one of the great powers, the 
Soviet Union, was not going to harmonize its in- 
terests with the others. It was not going to sub- 
ject itself to these restraints and disciplines about 
which I have spoken, but it was to use every oppor- 
tunity which it could find to advance its own 
interests and to undermine the interests of others. 
That was a great disappointment, but that did 
not mean that this organization was destroyed. 
It didn't mean that it had no usefulness. It meant 
really that its importance was even greater, and 



the United Nations has done much and will con- 
tinue to do much. 



The Prohibition of Force 

If we take, for instance, this field of the pro- 
hibition of force or the threat of force as an in- 
strument of national policy, we have to look not 
only at what the United Nations has done itself 
but what it has inspired in others throughout the 
world. It is no small thing that wars have been 
stopped, that the killing of people has been 
brought to an end, that the spread of destruction 
of war has been stopped in such instances as that of 
the Israeli-Arab war, of the troubles in Kashmir, 
of tlie fighting in Indonesia. That is no small 
thing. It is no small thing either that where an 
aggression did break out, as in Korea, it was 
through the machinery of the United Nations that 
that aggression was met and stopped. 

But what the United Nations has done, and I 
think that this is of preeminent importance, is to 
bring home to the entire civilized world that the 
use of force to achieve one's end is immoral, il- 
legal, is condemned by the rest of the world and 
is a crime. That is very important indeed. It 
has also brought home to everyone that the right 
of individual and collective self-defense, pending 
some operation of an international machinery, is 
an inherent right and with that goes the inherent 
duty so that when aggression is resisted it is not 
merely the choosing up of sides because the in- 
terests of some people lie on one side and the 
interests of others lie on another side. It is the 
fact that others are rallying in support of a people 
who are engaging in one of the fundamentally 
just activities of any people, which is to defend 
themselves. And when other nations come to 
their aid, whether through the machinery of the 
United Nations or through the exercise of collec- 
tive self-defense, they are doing something re- 
garded by all the world as essential and necessary 
and moral and right. 

Now, that is important. That puts a wholly 
new idea into the world and animates people with 
a wliolly new emotion, and we must look at things 
which are being done in this field outside of the 
United Nations as well as through its machinery. 

It soon became clear that a very large, almost 
a predominant amount of the force of the world 
was on the side of a groujD that did not want to 
carry out the principles of the United Nations, 
and that those who Iselieved in these principles. 
those who believed that they should be carried 
out, were not strong enough to maintain that posi- 
tion in the event of conflict. Therefore, through 
a whole series of regional arrangements, people 
began to get together to put themselves in a posi- 
tion of strengtli so that they could say, "We are 
going to defend the right as it is announced in this 
Iharter, and we are going to be strong enough to 
do it." That is very important. 



530 



Deparfment of State Bulletin 



This was not a ganging up of alliances created 
helter-skelter around the world. It was a com- 
bination of those who believed in peace, those who 
believed that force was evil and wrong, to protect 
themselves against those who were denouncing and 
not abiding by these principles. That has been an 
essential element of the development of the world 
in this postwar period. 



Social and Economic Problems 

Now, tliere are other fields in which the United 
Nations is working. We mentioned the economic 
one. Much of your activity in this committee's 
work is directed to that through your cooperation 
with Care. In other fields the United Nations is 
bringing technical cooperation, relief to refugees, 
instruction in higher standards, all through the 
world. Here again it has stimulated a great 
amount of activity outside of the United Nations. 
Our own programs are going on in cooperation 
with the United Nations. Those of the Common- 
wealth are doing the same thing. Those of many 
other countries, with a group of our own friends 
in Latin America, are doing the same thing. 

This comes from another great idea which lies 
in the Charter, and that is that the social and eco- 
nomic condition of peoples throughout the world 
is a matter of international concern. It is a mat- 
ter on which we ought to be and should be and 
must be concerned and, therefore, whether we are 
working through the machinery of the United 
Nations or whether we are working through our 
own programs with our own friends, we are 
animated by that idea which springs from the 
Charter. 

Then there is the field of the position of the 
individual as against the government, the com- 
munity, the majority, whoever it may be, the 
rights of the individual, the obligations of the 
community to the individual and of the individual 
to the community. 

Here, as you know, Mrs. Roosevelt has done 
heroic work. It is a field of incredible difficulty 
because those who operate in this whole field with 
the tongue in the cheek are continually putting 
insincere provisions into these documents which 
are being drawn up, provisions which they haven't 
the faintest idea of ever carrying out, and wliich 
are so fanciful in many cases that people who 
really wanted to carry them out couldn't do it. 

Again it is difficult because so often people who 
have not really wrestled with this question of the 
individual being protected against the majority 
and against the state want to put in ideas which 
seem wonderful but are totally impracticable, 
ideas which have no relation between the capacity 
and the state of development of the country and 
the aspirations which it has. So it is a very diffi- 
cult field. It is a field to which Mrs. Roosevelt, 
as I said, has devoted herself and will continue 



to devote herself and in which some day, I hope 
and believe, we will have real progress. 

These are some of the things which we should 
study, which we should bring to the attention of 
everybody in this country and in other countries 
on U.N. Day and in connection with it. We 
should not be discouraged that the United Nations 
is not able to solve every question in the world. 
Many questions can only be solved by the peoples 
involved having the desire and the understanding 
that they must be settled. 

For instance, in the very grave situation of the 
Palestine war, the United Nations was able to 
bring that to an end, was able to stop the fighting, 
but it has not been able to bring the people of that 
part of the Middle East to a condition where they 
are ready to have a lasting peace between them 
as the result of mutual agreement, and nobody 
can force that on people. It has got to be a proc- 
ess of education in which the United Nations can 
help, help in many ways, help by preventing the 
destruction of war from starting again, help by 
bringing understanding, help by taking care of 
the refugees of the war, help by bringing up the 
standard of living in those countries so that a 
settlement becomes possible. 

I am sure that in this session of the General 
Assembly we will have considerable discussion 
about other conflicts between peoples who are 
asjjiring to freedom or have newly come to free- 
dom and peoples of the European part of the 
world. These questions cannot be settled in the 
sense that an imposed settlement can be put on 
people. The most that can be done is to approach 
them in an atmosphere of understanding, an 
atmosphere of calm, not exchanging epithets but 
looking for solutions and realizing what the basic 
interests of all the parties to the controversies are. 
The United Nations plays a great part, can play 
a greater part in doing that. 

it is impossible to say that one of these aspects 
of the United Nations is more important than 
another. There is one which particularly appeals 
to me. That is the effect of the United Nations 
in bringing to a nation which, without its wish, 
has found itself in a position of leadership in the 
free world, the moral discipline which is necessary 
in order to exercise that leadership wisely and 
well. 

The Responsibility of Leadership 

We all become so sure in the purity and virtue of 
our own purposes, sometimes it comes to us as a 
shock that they are not automatically recognized 
by all the restof the world. It should not come 
to us as a shock because we have not always rec- 
ognized the purity and disinterestedness of the 
motives of other people, but it is particularly im- 
portant that a nation that wishes to exercise leader- 
ship among free peoples — this would not be true 
if you were dealing with satellites that you order 



October 6, 1952 



531 



about — but if you are exercising leadership among 
free peoples, you must subject yourself to criti- 
cism, to the debate of that great assembly which 
I am going to attend within a month 

You must accept the necessity of being able to 
persuade people of the rightness of views which 
you put forward and accept the result that if you 
are not able to do that there is probably something 
wrong with the views. 

It means, I think, that leadership in the free 
world means responsibility, responsibility for 
what one does. To lead, therefore, one has the 
responsibility of putting forward views and pro- 
posals which recognize and protect interests wider 
than the immediate and narrow interest of the 
country which puts them forward. 

If all we are doing is putting forward the most 
narrow conception of American interests, how can 
we ask the rest of the world blindly to go along 
with us ? What people want in a leader is leader- 
ship which encompasses their interests also, and 
that means responsibility. That means that we 
cannot brush off other peoples' points of view with 
impatience. It means we must understand them. 
It means that in what we do they must be taken 
into account. It means that in the proi:)osals we 
make we are furthering and advancing the inter- 



ests of all who wish to join with us in the great 
effort of maintaining peace without war, without 
battle, and advancing the world toward a better 
life. 

If there was any one realization which I could 
hope that my years of service in the Government 
would bring to the people of the United States, it 
would be the essentiality of this idea of responsi- 
bility. If we could once see, once feel deeply in 
our bones throughout this country, that we are 
responsible for more than ourselves, that we are 
responsible for wise and enlightened leadership, 
that we are responsible in a very true way for the 
fate of those who follow our leadership, then we 
will have achieved the responsibility of which I 
speak. It means a sense of humbleness in consid- 
ering programs, considering ideas which one 
wishes others to accept. 

Now, that to me is one of the great functions 
which the United Nations performs for us. It is 
a function for which we ought to be profoundly 
grateful every day of the year. For here is an 
institution which prevents us from being proud, 
from being headstrong, from believing that we 
are always right, because we must subject our- 
selves to the opinion of mankind, and we must 
abide by that opinion. 



Iranian Prime Minister Rejects U.S.-U.K. Proposal, 
Offers Counterproposal 



Press release 757 dated September 25 

FoUowing is the English translation of a letter 
dated September 2If from the Iranian Prime Min- 
ister to President Ti-v.man transmitting the text 
of a letter from. Prime Minister Mossadegh of the 
same date to Prime Minister Churchill of the 
United Kingdom in reply to the Churchill- 
Truman Joint Proposals of August 30, 1952: ^ 



Letter from the Iranian Prime Minister 
to the President 

In acknowledgment of the receipt of Your Ex- 
cellency's message dated August 30, 1952, I beg 
to submit lierewith the duplicate of the reply 
which is being sent to the British Government. 

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey the 
reassurances of my highest esteem. 

Dr. Mosadeq, 
Prime Minister 
Second of Mehr, 1331, Septemb&r 2^, 1952 

' BxTLLETiN of Sept. 8, 1952, p. 360. 



Letter from the Iranian Prime Minister to the 
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom 

Your Excellency's message, which was received 
in the form of a proposal for the solution of the 
oil problem and the settlement of the dispute be- 
tween the former company and the Iranian Gov- 
ernment, has been carefully considered and ex- 
amined. Although one would have thought that 
after having spent a year and a half the British 
Government should have appreciated the real 
meaning of the national movement of Iran, and 
should have ceased giving improper protection to 
the former company, unfortunately, contrary to 
expectations, the effort, which, ever since the ap- 
proval of the law nationalizing the oil industry of 
Iran, has been made by the former company to 
revive the invalid 1933 agreement, is plainly 
noticeable and obvious in the latest message in 
changed terms of phraseology. Since it was cer- 
tain that such a proposal would never be accepted 
nor approved by the Iranian nation, I pointed 
out immediately to your government's charge 
d''affaires that if there was desired a solution of 
the oil i^roblem, it would be better if this proposal 



532 



Department of State Bulletin 



were withdrawn and drafted in such a way that 
it could be presented to Iranian public opinion 
and could be used as a basis for future negotia- 
tions. This request had no result and after a 
few days, that is on Sharivar 8, 1331 (August 30, 
1952), the message was delivered to me without 
any change whatsoever. 

Before proceeding with the transmission of a 
counterproposal I find it necessary to explain 
briefly the position of the Iranian Government in 
regard to the message. 

The said message, like previous proposals, is 
inconsistent with the laws of nationalization of 
the oil industry. Of course, whatever has been 
mentioned in the beginning of the message con- 
cerning the creation of friendly relations for the 
early solution of the dispute between the two 
countries is in conformity with the wishes and 
aspirations of the Iranian nation which has 
always endeavored and is still endeavoring to 
strengthen friendly relations with the British 
people notwithstanding the heavy damages and 
interminable injuries that it has suifered during 
recent centuries from the imperialistic policy of 
the British Government. 

My Government as shown by documents and 
other proofs has from the very beginning not 
neglected this matter in any way whatsoever, and 
has always been prepared to negotiate within the 
limits of legal principles for the settlement and 
solution of the oil problem. The failure to 
achieve any result up to this time has been due to 
the fact that the British Government has desired 
to retain the influence of the former company un- 
der other titles in the same shape and form as 
before, in violation of the law and of the rights 
and desires of the Iranian nation. This has been 
and still is intolerable to the Iranian nation. 

Another point worthy of attention in this mes- 
sage is the word "equitable" which has been 
included therein and the solution which has been 
proposed following this word, which solution is 
not only inequitable but far more inequitable than 
previous solutions and proposals. 

In its latest message the British Govenmient 
has wanted to convert the oil question, which is an 
internal affair and which has been confirmed as 
such by the decision of The Hague Court, into a 
dispute between two governments through the 
signing of an agreement. 

Article I of the annex to the message speaks of 
compensation which should be paid to the former 
company for the nationalization of the oil indus- 
try. This Article has been drawn up in such a 
manner that it is feared that it is desired thereby 
to legalize the invalid 1933 agreement which has 
never been acceptable to the Iranian people be- 
cause reference has been made therein to the legal 
position of both parties immediately prior to the 
nationalization of the oil industry. If it were 



intended that compensation for the property of 
the former oil company in Iran should be paid, 
my government has always been prepared to enter 
into negotiations with due regard to the claims of 
both parties and to find a just and equitable solu- 
tion. If it were meant that, in the event of dis- 
agreement the question should be referred to the 
International Court of Justice, such procedure 
should be agreed to between the Iranian Govern- 
ment and the former oil company and there would 
be no need of an agreement between two govern- 
ments. 

If by Article II of the annex the purchase of 
oil is intended, the Iranian Government has always 
been prepared to sell and has repeatedly declared 
this to the world. If, however, it is intended that 
a purchase monopoly be given to a specific com- 
pany and interference in the management of the 
oil industry be renewed, this will never be ap- 
proved by the Iranian nation, for, as a I'esult of 
such monopoly and interference, economic crises 
and difficulties might be ci'eated which would lead 
to the same situation which existed before the 
nationalization of the oil industry. 

It is in fact admitted in Article III that the 
British Government's motive in its previous meas- 
ures are to bring economic pressure on the Iranian 
nation as well in order that the latter should sub- 
mit to the unfair terms of that government. In 
paragraph A of this article it is stated that if the 
other terms are accepted they would be prepared 
to move the oil stored at Abadan but nothing is 
said about the price, the fixing of which is post- 
poned until subsequent agreement is reached. If 
the object of this were to aid and assist they should 
have specified their views about the price as well, 
in order that the Iranian Government would be 
able to make a definite decision. 

In paragi-aph B of this article mention is made 
of existing restrictions on exports of commodities 
and the use of sterling funds by Iran which have 
repeatedly been the subject of protests by the 
Iranian Government. It has been expressly ad- 
mitted that such restrictions which have been im- 
posed until now do exist, and it has been promised 
that in the event the other terms are accepted these 
restrictions will be i-emoved. Contrary to what 
has been claimed in the message it is neither 
friendly nor equitable to make the removal of 
illegal restrictions contingent upon the acceptance 
of certain terms; furthermore, the restrictions by 
the British Government directed against the Ira- 
nian Government and nation are not confined to 
these two instances. 

After having stated briefly the objections of the 
Iranian Government I wish to inform Your Ex- 
cellency that the Iranian people after suffering 
interminable hardships have unanimously nation- 
alized the oil industry in the country, a right which 
is within the province of any nation in respect of 



Ocfober 6, 1952 



533 



its sovereignty. It had two motives in taking this 
action, namely : 

1. To eradicate foreign influence and agents in 
the country and thus take charge of its own destiny 
and insure the political independence of the coun- 
try while cooperating shoulder to shoulder with 
the other freedom-loving nations in maintaining 
world peace. During the half century of the for- 
mer company's domination it has never been pos- 
sible for the Iranian Government to make a free 
decision in its internal affairs and its foreign pol- 
icy. Your Excellency having been at the head of 
the British Government over a long period of years 
is of course aware, as was once expressly admitted 
by His Excellency Mr. Eden, Foreign Secretary 
in your Cabinet after the cruel occupation of Iran 
during the last World War, that the attitude of 
the British Government towards Iran was not just 
and should be changed and that England must 
take useful and effective steps to win over the pub- 
lic opinion of the Iranian nation and to make up 
for the past. Unfortunately, however, this prom- 
ise was never kept and no sign of a change in the 
British attitude became apparent and as soon as 
signs of the awakening of the Iranian nation were 
noticed, British capitalists persuaded the British 
Government to employ all kinds of pressure so 
that the Iranian nation should never be able to 
check their covetous aims. Consequently, after 
the Iranian nation decided to nationalize the oil 
industry the British Government, instead of ap- 
preciating the true desires of the Iranian people 
against principles, intervened in the dispute and 
gave protection to the former company, doing 
everything it could to put obstacles and difficulties 
in the way of the carrying out of the desires of 
the Iranian people. It wrongfully dragged the 
case before the Security Council and from there 
to the International Court of Justice in The Hague, 
and now that it has been proven in both places 
that the Iranian nation is justified, it is not pre- 
pared to abandon its old attitude in order that 
an agreement may be reached between the former 
company and the Iranian Government for the 
settlement of the dispute. 

2. The Iranian nation's other motive in taking 
this action was to improve economic conditions 
because during the period when the former com- 
pany was engaged in exploiting the resources of 
Iran, it was never prepared to consider and observe 
the rights of the Iranian nation, even in conformity 
with the D'Arcy concession and the invalid 1933 
agreement. During this time the taxes which the 
company paid to the British Government and 
which were wrongfully assessed on the dividends 
accruing to the Iranian Government, were several 
times the income paid to the original owners of the 
oil, i. e., the Iranian nation. It is surprising that 
in spite of its participation in the profits, the Ira- 
nian nation was never able to ascertain the quan- 
tity of oil which the British Admiralty had ob- 

534 



tained from the company nor the amount of money 
which had been paid. 

By nationalizing the oil industry the Iranian 
people wanted to take for themselves the maximum 
profits made from their resources by a foreign 
company over a long period of years and by 
making up for the past injustices and by recouping 
their losses to make every effort to provide for the 
welfare of a people, 90 percent of whom are de- 
prived of all the advantages of life in human 
society. 

In the present circumstances the Iranian nation 
may follow one of two roads ; either it should en- 
deavor to improve the social conditions and amel- 
iorate the situation of the deprived classes, some- 
thing that would be impossible without the income 
from oil, or, if this road should remain blocked, 
it should surrender itself to probable future events 
which would be to the detriment of world peace. 
I have repeatedly stated and I explicitly de- 
clare once more that the Iranian Government is 
exceedingly eager that the existing differences be 
removed as soon as possible in order that the two 
nations may, as a result of a good understanding, 
enjoy the results of cooperation and mutual as- 
sistance, and fulfill their duty for the preserva- 
tion of world peace in the best manner. 

With reference to the above, I bring the fol- 
lowing to Your Excellency's attention. Iranian 
courts are the only competent channel for investi- 
gating the former company's claims and are pre- 
pared to adjudicate them, but should the company 
not wish to refer its claims to the above-mentioned 
competent authorities and should the Interna- 
tional Court of Justice at The Hague be able to 
deal with the dispute between the Iranian Gov- 
ernment and the former oil company on the basis 
of an agreement between the two parties, and 
should there be no illusion that such action recog- 
nizes the existence of a dispute between the two 
governments, my government in order to show its 
complete good will after agreement on the four 
articles below is prepared to agree to the judg- 
ment of the International Court, and in this case 
the International Court will be requested to issue 
its final verdict as soon and as far as possible 
within six months. 

Article I. Compensation. Determination of the 
amount of comi>ensation to be paid for property belong- 
ing to the former oil company at the time of the nationali- 
zation of the oil industry in Iran and arrangements for 
paying this by installments based on any law carried 
out by any country for nationalizing its industries in 
similar instances which may be agreed to by the former 
oil company. 

This is the only compensation which the Iran- 
ian Government will pay to the former company 
and the company will have no right to make any 
further claims whatsoever. 

Article II. Basis of Examination of Claims. Exam- 
ination of claims of both parties on the basis on one of 

Department of State Bulletin 



the following three provisions to be recofmized by the 
International Court of Justice as fair and just for settling 
the parties claim and used by it as the basis for judgment : 

A. Examination of claims of two parties up to the 
date of nationalization of the oil industry on the basis 
of the D'Arcy agreement with due regard to the calcu- 
lation of income tax which the Iran Government should 
have received in accord with the country's enacted laws. 

The above-mentioned agreement is referred to 
only for the purjiose of settling the financial dif- 
ferences up to the date of the nationalization of 
the oil industry (ninth of Ordibehesht 1330 which 
is equivalent to the thirtieth of April 1951). As 
from that date this agreement ceases to apply 
and can in no way be used or invoked by either 
of the parties, and from that date the company 
has been acting as a trustee. 

B. Examination of claims of both parties from 1933 
to the end of 1947 on the basis of the invalid 1933 agree- 
ment and from the beginning of 1948 to the thirtieth of 
April 19.51 on the basis of the above-mentioned invalid 
agreement and the Gass-Golshayan supplementary draft 
agreement, which was agreed to and signed by the former 
company but which both Houses of the Iran Parliament 
did not consider adequate for obtaining the Iranian na- 
tion's rights. 

Reference to the 1933 agreement is solely and 
exclusively for the purpose of solving financial 
differences between the parties up to the end of 
1947; and the above-mentioned invalid agreement, 
with the addition of the Gass-Golshayan supple- 
mentary draft agreement, is solely and exclusively 
for solving financial differences from the begin- 
ning of 1948 to the thirtieth of April 1951. All 
effects of the agreements cease from the date of 
nationalization of the oil industry and cannot be 
used or invoked in any way by either of the par- 
ties and from that date the company has been 
acting as a trustee. 

C. Examination of the claims of both parties on the 
basis of the fairest concession agreements of other oil 
producing countries in the world, where the cost of 
producing oil, according to that concession, is not cheaper 
than the cost of producing Iran oil during a correspond- 
ing period. Obviously, from the date of nationalization 
of the oil industry the company is acting as a trustee. 

There is no need to mention that the use of any 
of the three above-mentioned provisions as a basis 
is merely in order to calculate the financial claims 
of the parties up to the date of the nationalization 
of the oil industry and has no connection with the 
articles of the above-mentioned agreements which 
refer to the investigation of differences. 

The claims of both parties as specified above 
should be judged directly by the International 
Court of Justice. 

Article J II. Di'trrmitidticin of damaacs. Examination 
and determination of the amount of damages caused to 
the Iranian Government resulting from the difficulties and 
obstacles put in tbe way of the sale of Iranian oil by 
direct and indirect activities of the former oil company 
as well as losses resulting from the delay in payment 
of funds, which are definitely debts owed by the company. 



Article IV. Payment in Advance and on Account. Pay- 
ment in advance and on account of 49 million pounds 
shown on the former oil company's balance sheet for 
19r)0 as increases in royalty, taxes and dividends due to 
Iran from the reserves. 

From this amount any part due from royalty and tax, 
as it was guaranteed on a gold basis, must be paid in 
sterling convertible into dollars. 

Although the said amount is definitely owing 
to the Iranian Government by the company, in 
order to show its utmost good will the Iranian 
Government agrees that if the International 
Court of Justice does not consider Iran entitled 
to all this amount or any part of it, sums received 
in this connection will be regarded as the Iranian 
Government's debt to the former oil company and 
will be settled without delay by delivery of oil. 

Reference to the judgment of the International 
Court of Justice on the basis of the four articles 
mentioned above, which is a sign of extraordinary 
concessions on the part of the Iranian Govern- 
ment, is binding on the latter only when they are 
accepted in their entirety. None of these articles 
can be invoked separately. 

Of course, the Iranian Government will take up 
through the International Court of Justice, as a 
case between two governments, the question of 
losses caused by various difficulties and obstacles 
created by the British Government in their at- 
tempt to support the former company, as well as 
losses resulting from restrictions imposed on ex- 
ports to Iran and on the use of sterling which the 
British Government has acknowledged in sub- 
paragraph B of Article 3 of the annex to the joint 
message. 

This proposal is valid for 10 days from the date 
of delivery. 

In conclusion I bring to Your Excellency's at- 
tention the fact that the National Iran Oil Com- 
pany is always prepared to sell its oil products. 



Prime Minister, 
Dr. Mohammad Mosadeq 



Tehran, ^ Mehr 1331 



Point Four Aid to Iran 
in Land Distribution 

Press release 739 dated September 18 

The long-range plan of the Shah of Iran for 
dividing his vast holdings into small farms and 
selling them to nearly 50,000 peasants living on 
them will be carried out with American technical 
advice and financial assistance through the Point 
Four Program. 

The Shah in a brief ceremony in Tehran on 
September 17 inaugurated the Bank for Rural 
Credit, an integral part of the joint program in 



Ocfofaer 6, 7 952 



535 



which the Technical Cooperation Administration 
(Tca) is cooperating with the Crown Lands Com- 
mission. The banlf will finance cooperatives and 
other rural services and provide trained Iranian 
farm supervisors to help the peasants thi'ough the 
first 5 years of their new undertaking in self- 
management and independent ownership. 

William E. Warne, Point Four director in Iran, 
informed the Shah that Tca would contribute 
$500,000— half the initial capital— to get the bank 
started. Point Four will also provide an Amer- 
ican financial adviser to assist the bank in develop- 
ing its policies and carrying out its operations. 

The Shah said, in thanking Mr. Warne, 

The help of the United States through Point Four in 
this program is greatly appreciated by myself and Iran. 
This program cannot be permitted to fail. Your interest 
in it is most encouraging. 

The Near East Foundation will help train the 
village supervisors. Ultimately, the bank will re- 
ceive nearly 25 million dollars from the proceeds 
of the land sales. No part of these proceeds is to 
revert to the Crown, nor are they to be used for 
general economic or industrial development. All 
of the money from the sale of lands is to be 
devoted to rural services and other benevolent 
purposes for the direct benefit of the peasants, 
according to the terms of the Shah's decree. 

Arranf;ements with the Crown Lands Commis- 
sion covering Point Four participation in this 
program are expected to be completed later this 
week. 

This marks the first major step by the United 
States to implement in the Middle East its policy 
of cooperating with other governments in carry- 
ing out programs of land reform which they 
initiate themselves. 

The Shah of Iran, on January 27, 1951, ordered 
the crown lands distributed to the peasants living 
on them. Since then the Crown Lands Commis- 
sion has made surveys, divided up some of the 
lands, and transferred title to about 900 small 
farms in the Varamin area, about 30 miles east of 
Tehran. 

Several months ago the Crown Lands Com- 
mission sought American advice on development 
of basic policies and machinery for assuring the 
success of this immense and higlily significant 
undertaking. The agreement which was signed 
today is the result of intensive study and recom- 
mendations made in Iran earlier this year by 
Paul V. Maris, one of the foremost experts in the 
United States in matters of land tenure, super- 
vised agricultural credit, and rural improvement. 
Following the request of the Crown Lands Com- 
mission for American advice, Mr. Maris, a veteran 
of 37 years with the Department of Agriculture, 
was sent to Iran in April by the Technical Co- 
operation Administration. 

During the ensuing 9 weeks, Mr. Maris made a 
series of detailed recommendations covering every 



aspect of the crown-lands program, from the 
training of Iranian farm supervisors all the way 
through to completion of the distribution some 20 
years from now. Tca Director Warne described 
Mr. Maris' work as "the best job of its kind I have 
ever seen done at home or abroad." 

These recommendations were accepted in prin- 
ciple by the Crown Lands Commission and the 
Tca mission in Iran. 



Basic U.S. Contribution 

The most important American contribution to 
the program in the long run may prove to be the 
application of principles which are considered to 
be essential in all efforts to improve tenancy con- 
ditions among peasant-type farmers. These prin- 
ciples include division of lands into family-size 
units; intensive advice and supervision in farm 
management during the first few years of inde- 
pendent operation ; extension of credit in direct 
combination with such supervision ; organization 
of cooperatives for buying, marketing, and sup- 
plying of needed services; and help in organizing 
rural services for education, health, transporta- 
tion, water supply, and the like. 

The Shah's program for distributing the crown 
holdings, a plan which is entirely benevolent in 
character, was intended as a model and an in- 
spiration to other landlords to follow suit. As 
such, it is considered imperative by the Shah and 
the Crown Lands Commission that the scheme be 
successful. The Commission has moved with 
great care and deliberation, first making a general 
survey of the extensive holdings, with their 
300,000 acres now in cultivation, 131,000 acres of 
arable land not presently in cultivation, and 494,- 
000 acres suitable for cultivation if properly irri- 
gated. It was decided first to survey and divide 
into fairly uniform plots the 17,000 acres in the 
Varamin Plains area. Distribution of these 
lands to the peasants living on them has now been 
completed. 

But land reform is much more than simply 
dividing up lands and transferring title. It was 
in recognition of this fact that American advice 
was sought by the Crown Lands Commission. 

The prospective farm owners have a tradition 
of many years of peasanthood behind them, in 
which they have had few management decisions 
to make and few business responsibilities. As a 
rule, they have little education, their tools are 
simple and inefficient, their livestock is of inferior 
quality, they know little of modern farming tech- 
niques. Suddenly finding themselves in the posi- 
tion of ownership and responsibility, with annual 
payments to make, they would have little chance 
for success unaided, in spite of a great capacity 
for hard work. 

To guard against the discouragement and fail- 
ure which would be the lot of many of the new 
owners, the heart of the program is a plan to 



536 



Department of State Bulletin 



make available to each group of about 75 peasant 
families the services of a technically trained 
Iranian farm supervisor. 

A service charge of 1 percent of the price of 
the peasant's land allotment will be levied an- 
nually for 15 years to meet the cost of supervisory 
service. This means that the peasant's annual 
payments will be about 75 dollars a year while he 
is receiving the benefits of technical guidance, 
whereas they would be about 15 dollars less than 
that if the help of supervisors were not provided. 
The returns to the farmer from such a guidance 
are expected to exceed the cost many times. 

Villagers To Be Trained as Supervisors 

The supervisors, all of whom will be Iranian 
villagers, trained in a special school conducted by 
the Near East Foundation under the auspices of 
the Iranian Ministry of Education, will help the 
farmers with advice, planning, and supervision in 
developing cropping systems, applying proper 
fertilizers, controlling insects and diseases, organ- 
izing and using cooperative services, installing 
and maintaining farm irrigation works, and in 
various other ways. 

The cost of training the supervisors will be 
borne by Point Four. Inasmuch as the proceeds 
of the 1-percent service charge will not be sufficient 
at the outset to cover costs of supervision, the sal- 
aries of supervisors in the Varamin Plains demon- 
stration area will be paid out of the Point Four 
contribution to the Rural Credit Bank funds. 

The bank will make loans to farmers and will 
finance cooperatives and other enterprises of di- 
rect benefit to farmers, for purposes such as ac- 
quiring improved livestock and seeds, needed 
machinery and supplies ; providing basic commu- 
nity facilities in the villages; developing irriga- 
tion works, and so on. Its activities will include 
1-year crop loans, l-to-5-year farm improvement 
and equipment loans, and longer-term community 
facility loans. 

The funds of the bank will be progressively 
augmented by the annual purchase-price payments 
by farmers on the crown lands. These will aver- 
age about 60 dollars each (not including the serv- 
ice charge for farm supervision), amounting in 20 
years to almost 25 million dollars. The purchase 



price of the farms will be about 80 percent of the 
assessed valuation, without any interest charge. 
None of the proceeds revert to the Crown. 

The surveying, allotment, distribution, sale, and 
settlement of the crown holdings will take a good 
many years to complete. Under present plans, 
the peasants will be given 25 years to pay off their 
interest-free notes, and it will be almost 20 years 
before all the 49,117 farm families on the Shah's 
estates will be started on the road to ownership. 
Approximately 3,000 farms will be laid out and 
transferred to the peasants each year after the 
program gains momentum. 

Point Four woi'k in village improvement, 
health, education, water development, irrigation, 
and other fields is being planned and carried out 
in Iran with a view to supporting the basic objec- 
tives of the crown-land pi-ogram. The farm 
supervisors will develop and encourage partici- 
pation in these and other community activities and 
services. The Point Four Program will assist in 
meeting village needs in these respects. 



Military Assistance Negotiations 
With Dominican Republic 

Press release 745 dated September 22 

The Departments of State and Defense have an- 
nounced that negotiations were initiated Septem- 
ber 22 in Ciudad Trujillo with the Government of 
the Dominican Republic looking toward the con- 
clusion of a bilateral military assistance agree- 
ment between the United States and the Do- 
minican Republic. 

The American Charge d'Affaires ad interiw, 
in Ciudad Trujillo, Richai'd A. Johnson, is being 
assisted by representatives of the Department of 
Defense in the negotiations. They are being car- 
ried on under the terms of the Mutual Security 
Act of 1951, as amended, which authorized a pro- 
gi'am of military grant aid for Latin America. 

The Dominican Republic is one of several 
American Republics with which conversations on 
this subject have been carried on. 



Ocfober 6, 7952 



537 



Breaking the Barriers to Capital Investment Abroad 



hy Eric A. JohTiston 

Chairman of the International Development Advisory Board^ 



Notliing I have been able to do in my 7 months' 
association with the International Development 
Advisory Board has been more significant or more 
useful than what I am doing at this moment. For 
I am convinced tliat you hold the key to the door 
of progress and a better way of life for a billion 
human beings in the less advanced nations of the 
still-free world. 

More than that, I believe your willingness to 
turn the key of progress for these people may well 
determine the future of the democratic institutions 
of free men. Perliaps you think that is an over- 
statement. Perhaps you believe I am laying it on 
a bit too tliick. If you do, I can only invite you 
to consider the premises which have led me to 
that conviction. 

First of all, you represent the social force that 
built America — the creative power of American 
free enterprise that made possible the American 
achievement. That force, with its vast resources 
of experience, capital, and skill, must now be put 
to work to help give economic strength and vitality 
to the community of free peoples who share our 
belief in the dignity of man. 

Necessity for Economic Security 

For the security of the free world is more than 
a matter of armaments or military alliances or 
containment. The threat to democratic institu- 
tions lies less in the might than in the method of 
the aggressive totalitarianism that stalks the 
peoples of tlie world today, preying on their 
misery and discontent, undermining their alle- 
giances with hollow promises and fallacious 
doctrine. 

The subtle danger is the greater. We must be 
sure that the strength and solidarity of the free 



' Address made before Government and business leaders 
at the Pacific Coast Conference on Private Investment in 
International Development at San Francisco, on Sept. 24. 



world is not sapped and weakened, like a house 
destroyed by termites, bit by bit. We know that 
communism thrives on misery. But it starves on 
progress. We must starve it to death in every 
corner of the still-free world. 

Once we have thus identified the necessity of 
developing the economic structure of less advanced 
nations with the ultimate security of our demo- 
cratic system, it seems to me that the problem 
becomes mainly one of mechanics. 

By what means, in other words, can we best ex- 
tend our help to the people of those countries? 
What is the best formula for bringing our re- 
.sources of skill, scientific knowledge, and capital 
to their aid? 

I think the answer to that question is Point 
Four. 

Interpreting Point Four 

Now there seem to be some very widespread and 
fundamental misconceptions about Point Four, 
and I would like to take just a moment to make it 
clear what I think Point Four is. 

Many people seem to regard it as another "Gov- 
ernment give-away," or as an adventure in "global 
do-gooding." Somehow the idea has got about 
that it is an expensive system of generous hand- 
outs to indigent nations, from whom we may ex- 
pect nothing in return but recrimination and 
dislike. 

But Point Four is none of these things, I assure 
you. Indeed, I think it is inaccurate even to con- 
sider it a Government program, for it is consider- 
ably more than merely that. 

Point Four, it seems to me, is an idea as big and 
as broad as American life itself. It is the idea 
that the people of the United States, through their 
own democratic institutions, private as well as 
public, can help the less advanced nations of the 
free world to develop their human and material 
resources as we liave developed ours. 



538 



Department of State Bulletin 



Evidence of the practicality of this idea is right 
under our noses, in the prominent role played by 
European capital and know-how in the develop- 
ment of our resources in North America over past 
decades — to the mutual profit and benefit of all 
concerned. There's no reason, given proper plan- 
ning and cooperation between governments and 
businesses, why our North American experience 
cannot be repeated elsewhere in the world. 

Very few people understand that private enter- 
prise — on our part and on the part of those we 
want to help — is the very essence of the Point 
Four idea. Very few appear to realize that Ameri- 
can industry is the strong right arm upon which 
the whole idea depends. 

For Point Four, as spelled out by Congi-ess in 
the Act for International Development, clearly 
recognizes the traditional spheres of activity re- 
served in our system for public and private initia- 
tive. Government activities under the act have 
been directed primarily toward the job of helping 
underdeveloped peoples to increase their produc- 
tion of food and to improve their levels of educa- 
tion and public health. These certainly are legiti- 
mate functions for Government, in line with our 
basic conception of the respective spheres of 
public and private action. 

And, also in line with that conception, Point 
Four relies upon the initiative and imagination 
of private capital for the enormous task of in- 
dustrial and commercial development which must 
be accomplished before the underdeveloped na- 
tions can be said to have achieved a solid base of 
economic and social stability. It does this wisely, 
in my opinion, because in the long run, only the 
continuous flow of private investment capital into 
sound and productive undertakings in these coun- 
tries — undertakings profitable to the country itself 
as well as to the investor — can do the job that must 
be done. 



3 Years of Point Four in Government 

Stanley Andrews ^ will tell you this afternoon 
what the Government has been able to do in the 
3 years since Point Four began. I will only say 
that in those 3 years, technical-cooperation activi- 
ties under the Act for International Development 
have cost the American people a total of 280 mil- 
lion dollars. I leave it to you to decide, after 
hearing Mr. Andrews, whether that money is 
being wisely spent. 

In any event, I urge you to broaden your think- 
ing about Point Four. I urge you to think of it 
not as a Government program but as a means of 
focusing all of the creative forces of our free so- 
ciety on a task that can only be accomplished by 
all of them together. 

Our purpose at this meeting is to examine the 
part of private capital in the performance of that 

'Administrator, Technical Cooperation Administration, 
Department of State. 



task. At the risk of presuming upon the preroga- 
tives of a keynote speaker, I should like to offer 
a suggestion or two regarding our discussions on 
that question. 



Surmounting Investment Obstacles 

First of all, I suggest that we assume that we 
all know about the obstacles to a larger flow of 
investment capital to the underdeveloped areas. 
Very formidable impediments do exist ; but surely 
by this time they are too well known to all of us 
to require further definition. 

I believe I could name a dozen lengthy reports 
by highly competent groups in private industry 
and in the (lovernment setting forth in great de- 
tail the nature of the barriers to capital invest- 
ment abroad. 

I hope, therefore, that we will concern our- 
selves this afternoon and tomorrow with the prob- 
lem of finding out how to break these barriers 
down, or surmount them, or get around them in 
one way or another. Let us start out with the 
attitude that nothing is impossible. The situa- 
tion calls for imagination and resourcefulness. 
The obstacles — many of them, at least — are a part 
of the reality of our time; and our job, it seems 
to me, is to find out how to live with that reality. 

Second, I propose the empirical approach. We 
are after practical, workable solutions. I 
believe we shall find many of them in the ex- 
perience of hundreds of investors who have found 
it possible and profitable, despite the obstacles, 
to establish successful operations in many coun- 
tries of the free world. 

Just before I left Washington, I asked a Gov- 
ernment expert to give me a short list of com- 
panies now engaged in foreign enterprise of one 
kind or another. The reply was that a repre- 
sentative list would have to include the names of 
something like a thousand of the best known cor- 
porations in the country. WHiat becomes of the 
obstacles and hazards in the light of that illumi- 
nating fact? 

Third, I would suggest that we regard the U.S. 
Government as a willing partner in the search for 
ways and means of facilitating foreign invest- 
ment. It is the policy of the Government, clearly 
expressed in the Act for International Develop- 
ment, to encourage private enterprise to invest in 
the underdeveloped countries; and I can assure 
you that the agencies of Government concerned 
are eager to provide every measure of encourage- 
ment within their power. 



An Exchange of Views Between Government and 
Business 

Representatives of those agencies are present 
here today. They have come for the purpose of 
obtaining your ideas and suggestions as to how 
they might do more to encourage capital to go 



October 6, 1952 



539 



abroad. They are prepared also to help you find 
out what the various agencies of the Government 
can do now to hel]) the potential investor in the 
international field. The discussions at the con- 
ference are designed to be free and frank, in the 
nature of an exchange of views between Govern- 
ment and business, and I hope you will take full 
advantage of the opportunity they are intended 
to provide. 

Finally, with respect to our discussions at this 
conference, I hope we will undertake to learn and 
understand the point of view of some of the coun- 
tries whose development means so much to the 
security and prosperity of the free world. 

From those countries, at our invitation, have 
come representatives of government and of busi- 
ness to discuss with you the nature of their own 
problems and the opportunities open to American 
capital. My only regi-et is that it was imprac- 
ticable to invite representatives from all of the 
free nations of the world. 

I believe that we shall learn from those who 
have honored us by their presence at this con- 
ference that we can solve most of the problems, 
surmount most of the obstacles, by the time-tested 
American process of sitting down and talking 
things over. We will find on their part, I believe, 
a sincere welcome to American capital if it is 
willing to come into their countries in a spirit of 
cooperation and work for the people of the coun- 
try as well as for itself. It is necessary, I believe, 
to try to understand the other fellow's situation if 
we are to act with intelligence and statesmanship. 



Investments Abroad — A Sound Enterprise 

Not long ago, a news reporter in Washington 
asked me why we should expect American capital 
to go abroad when there are ample oppoi'tunities 
with less risk in the United States. 

The answer, it seems to me, is that it has proved 
to be good business. Income from our direct in- 
vestment abroad was 1 billion, 148 million dollars 
in 1949. In 1950 it was 1 billion, 469 million 
dollars. And in 1951 it totaled 1 billion, 632 mil- 
lion dollars. That was an increase of nearly half 
a billion dollars between '49 and '51. During that 
period, the total value of American direct foreign 
investment grew from 11 billion, 200 million dol- 
lars to more than 13 billion, 500 million dollars. 

Yet during those years, the annual outflow of 
direct investment capital, exclusive of reinvest- 
ment of earnings abroad, declined from 786 mil- 
lion dollars to approximately 600 million dollars. 

Now one can only hazard a guess at the amount 
of private capital we might reasonably be ex- 
pected to send abroad annually. As a possible 
yardstick, however, we might consider the fact 
that Great Britain, at the height of her world eco- 
nomic power, sent as much as 21/0 percent of her 
national income into foreign investment. Two 
percent of our own national income today would 



exceed 5 billion dollars, but even such an optimist 
as I would scarcely hope that the total will reach 
that figure. 

But it would seem to be apparent that American 
industry should be able to put a far larger stake 
into the industrial development of the less ad- 
vanced countries of the world than it is now 
investing. 

The opportunities are abundant. The profit 
potential is good. In many of these countries, 
such as India, Pakistan, and Colombia, for ex- 
ample, the climate for foreign investment is good 
or steadily improving as the result of deliberate 
efforts to attract development capital from abroad. 
And even where the climate is reported to be less 
favorable, American concerns appear to be 
operating successfully. 

What, then, is the reason for the lag? Why 
are we holding back ? What can be done to break 
the jam ? These are the fundamental questions I 
hope this conference will help to answer. 

For I am convinced that we are on the thresh- 
old of an era of industrial statesmanship that 
will see American enterprise at work throughout 
the world in new patterns of cooperation with 
the capital of other nations. Those patterns are 
already beginning to emerge from the experience 
of imaginative and constructive American indus- 
trialists who have found that partnership with the 
enterprise of other lands produces not only profits 
but friends. 

And in a politically bipolar world, the friend- 
ship and confidence that gi-ows from working and 
building together for mutual benefit and the com- 
mon good is more important to us than ever 
before. It can be the strongest of the nails that 
hold the structure of the free world together. 

Very often I am advised not to talk to business- 
men in terms of moral responsibility and the obli- 
gations incumbent on us all as citizens of the 
Nation to which the free world looks for leader- 
ship. Businessmen, I am told, are not interested 
in abstractions of that kind ; talk to them in solid 
terms of dollars and cents. 



Interplay of Social and Economic Forces 

Well, I haven't followed that advice before and 
I haven't followed it today. I simply refuse to 
accept the idea that the members of the business 
community are insensitive to the interplay of 
social and economic forces which condition and 
influence the course of world affairs. Perhaps that 
is why I find it so easily possible to assume that 
American initiative and capital will accept the 
challenge to statesmanship iiilierent in the realities 
of our time. 

One of those realities pertains directly and im- 
mediately to the future of American industry it- 
self. It seems to me to remove the whole question 
of foreign investment from the realm of the de- 
si rable into the realm of the essential. That reality 



540 



Department of State Bulletin 



is our growing dependence upon foreign sources 
for the supply of raw materials essential to the 
continued expansion of our own economy. 



Increasing Need for More Raw Materials 

Doubtless many of you have read the report of 
the President's Materials Policy Commission,' 
headed by William Paley of the Columbia Broad- 
casting System. Those of you who have not will 
find it, I believe, one of the most illuminating and 

Erovocative documents produced in recent years, 
let me quote from the report : 

By the midpoint of the twentieth century we had en- 
tered an era of new relationships between our needs and 
resources ; our national economy had not merely grown 
up to its resource base, but in many important respects 
had outgrown it. We had completed our slow transition 
from a raw materials surplus nation to a raw materials 
deficit nation. 

The hard political facts of the mid-twentieth century 
add further great weight to the proposition that it will 
be to the mutual advantage of all freedom-loving peoples 
of the earth to work toward a greater economic and politi- 
cal cooperation founded on the principles of mutual help 
and respect. 

Security and economic growth for the United States 
and the rest of the free world must be the essential aim of 
any policy worth the name. Materials strength is a 
prime ingredient of general economic strength and growth, 
which in turn is the foundation of rising living standards 
In peace and of military strength in war. This Commis- 
sion is convinced that if the United States and other free 
nations are to have such strength, they must coordinate 
their resources to the ends of common growth, common 
safety, and common welfare. In turn, this means that 
the United States must reject self-sufficiency as a policy 
and instead adopt the policy of the lowest cost acquisi- 
tion of materials wherever secure supplies may be found. 

It now requires something like two and a half 
billion tons of raw materials to feed the gigantic 
maw of our industrial machine, according to the 
report. By 1975, it probably will take double 
that amount. Technology, conservation, and de- 
velopment of new domestic sources will help to 
keep pace with this enormous growing appetite, 
but they will not be enough. 

The sober fact is that we must seek abroad for 
an ever-increasing proportion of the essential in- 
gredients of our industrial production. Our 
ability to maintain the level of our own economy 
depends on how successfully we are able to find 
and develop new sources of raw materials supply. 



' H. doc. 527, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 



Incentive for a Program of Results 

In other words, the chips are down. If there 
is a question of incentive, it can no longer be 
phrased solely in terms of the obligations of world 
leadership or of moral responsibility for the less 
fortunate peoples of other lands. Our own eco- 
nomic self-interest has become inextricably bound 
up with theirs. 

Let me try to sum up the situation as I see it. 

In the free world there are a billion people just 
emerging from centuries of social lethargy. They 
are the people of the ancient lands of Asia, Africa, 
and the Middle East, whose aspirations for a 
better life have produced the cataclysmic social 
upheavals which rock those regions of the world 
today. They are the people, also, of the young 
lands of Latin America, sensitive of their inde- 
pendence, and eager for growth. 

These billion people want a gi-eater share of the 
fruits of progress and enlighteimient in the mod- 
ern world, and we have the capacity to help them 
get it. 

They, in turn, have the capacity to help us. 
They own the sources of raw materials supply on 
which our industrial economy increasingly de- 
pends. More than that, they are a vast potential 
market for the produce of our industry. 

What we do to help them will determine their 
ability to help us ; how we go about it will deter- 
mine their willingness. We must consider their 
interests on an equal basis with our own, in a rela- 
tionship of partnership and mutuality. They can 
be our friends ; today they look to us for leadership 
and aid in tlie enormous tasks confronting them. 
If we fail them, they may turn tomorrow to our 
enemies. 

That brings me to the point I made when I 
began. Wliether we fail them depends upon the 
willingness of American private enterprise to turn 
the key of economic development and progress for 
these lands. If we fail them, we shall have also 
failed ourselves. 

Now there is work to be done. I invite you to 
share in it with a sense of mission as well as with 
the practical common sense that has made Ameri- 
can industry what it is. 

I do not expect miracles from you at this one 
conference. But as the first of a series of regional 
meetings on this subect, I believe you can point the 
way to a practical program which will bring 
substantial results. 

So, let's get down to business. 



Ocfober 6, 1952 



541 



The Totalitarian Theater 



hy Marc Connelly ' 



[Telegraphic text] 

Napoleon I loved the drama and acknowledged 
its power to enhance and embellish his empire. A 
case in point is the Congress of Princes he con- 
voked in Erfurt in 1808. Napoleon brought the 
greatest French actor, Talma, and the choice en- 
semble of the Comedie Fran^aise for what a wit- 
ness called a "veritable levee en inasse of tragedy." 
There was just one thing wrong with that Hevee 
en masse" — the tragedy all stemmed from the 
period of Louis XIV. The contemporary French 
playwrights M'rote only the lightest of light 
comedy. 

This sorry state of affairs irritated Napoleon 
very much. What he did not or would not grasp 
was that the censorship which Fouche and Savary 
practiced in his name, and which even expurgated 
the subversive lines of Corneille, was not condu- 
cive to great dramatic writing. 

It was at this Congress of Princes in Erfurt 
that Napoleon had his famous conversation with 
Goethe, in the course of which he suggested that 
Goethe ought to write a new C'aesar''s Death with 
a more constructive twist. That new Caesar's 
Deaths he said, should demonstrate to the world 
that Caesar would have brought about the happi- 
ness of humanity if only he had been given time 
to carry out his vast projects. Goethe was a great 
achnirer of Napoleon. In our time he would have 
probably been condemned as a collaborationist. 
He professed to find the Emperor's proposition 
divinely naive and ingenious. Still, he ne%'er 
followed it up. 

And here you have in a nutshell the theatrical 
problem which confronts all dictators and all 
dramatists working under the dictatorships: 

' Address made on Sept. 24 at the first International 
Conference of Artists held at Venice, Sept. 22-2S, under 
the auspices of the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (Unesco). Mr. Connelly, well- 
known playwright, is a member of the National Commis- 
sion for UNESCO and was the principal speaker on the 
subject of the theater at the Conference. 

542 



That is, the chemistry of the drama and the chem- 
istry of political expediency never coincide. That 
is why dictators never get their money's worth out 
of their theater when they subject it to censorship 
and thought control. And yet they invariably try 
to do just that. 

The Theater in Hitler Germany 

Hitler was one of those dictators who, though 
fond of tlie theater, signally misunderstood its 
nature. It was characteristic of his ilk that with 
the Third Reich hardly under way, he put the 
German tlieater under the control of Dr. Goebbels' 
Propaganda Ministry. He could not have pro- 
claimed his intentions more blatantly. It was 
to make Schiller's "moral institution" into a 
political instrument. As was to be expected, it 
worked only in the negative. That is, no plays 
could be produced which made fun of the regime 
or reflected the lurid and tragic conflicts caused 
by its monstrous principles and laws. But on the 
other hand, no plays were produced which pro- 
moted Nazi ideology. There weren't any. In 
fact, during the 12 years while the Nazis lasted, 
not one new play of any interest was created in 
(iermany. Nor did any provocative foreign play 
reach the German stage, a stage which in general 
is notably hungry for new things and very 
catholic in its tastes. Even some of the German 
classical works were put on the Nazi index — espe- 
cially Lessing's Nathan, the iS'age, a play extolling 
racial tolerance and therefore downright sub- 
versive. 

Still there wa.sn't total censorship. Goebbels 
thought it inadvisable to forbid Schiller, with the 
result that the German audience broke into wildly 
demonstrative applause whenever they heard 
Marquis Posa pronounce his famous line "Sire, 
give us freedom of thought." 

We will have more to say about the totalitarian 
theater in another context. But let me note that 
while censorship impoverishes the repertoire, it 
would be a mistake to believe that it kills the 

Department of Stale Bulletin 



theater. Nothing can kill the theater. As we 
said before : no reality is ever so deadening as to 
end man's hunger for that "world of dimly remem- 
bered beauties." Thus, even though the choice of 
plays was restricted, the Germans flocked to their 
theaters under the Nazis, seeking solace there from 
gruelling air attacks and impending defeat. 

All of which indicates that the vitality of the 
theater borders on the miraculous. At this very 
moment it is asserting itself all across the world 
and under the most varied circumstances. In 
some countries the theater leads a free and vigoi - 
ous existence. In other countries it has to put 
up with ideological corsets which threaten to 
squeeze the breath out of it. But it is a safe bet 
that when the ideologies in question will have been 
long dead, the theater will still live. 



Behind the Iron Curtain 

The question is, how is the theater doing in 
the world which is not so free — the world "behind 
the Iron Curtain"? 

There is perhaps no other country wliich has 
a greater national affinity to the theater than Rus- 
sia. The names of a Stanislawski, of a Meyer- 
hoff, of a Tchekov evolve delight in the hearts of 
all theater lovers. Up to about 1936 the Soviet 
theater functioned in comparative freedom. The- 
atrical artists enjoyed considerable privileges. 
They were well-housed, well-dressed and well- 
paid. The Ki-emlin, realizing that the Russian 
theater enjoyed world fame, took considerable 
pride in it. It still does, for that matter. Mos- 
cow still counts 15 big national theaters, each with 
its own creative traditions and style. Their pro- 
duction level is still of the highest. But each 
year thought control and censorship weigh more 
heavily on these wonderful theaters. Stalin, like 
other dictators before him, is wildly determined 
to make the drama into an instrument of political 
propaganda. 

True, the Russians are still allowed to play 
Gogol, Tolstoy, Tchekov, and even Shakespeare 
and Calderon. But generally plays which fail 
to carry the Marxist message are stigmatized as 
"formalistie," "naturalistic," or "cosmopolitan." 
"Cosmopolitanism" is the latest and worst criti- 
cism which can befall a Russian dramatist. The 
suspicion that he believes in the universality of 
art and in the possibility of an artistic rapproche- 
ment between East and West makes a writer very 
unloved all around. Then, too, one can only pity 
the playwrights who are scolded by Pravda for 
ignoring themes arising from the great new 
power and irrigation projects, the feats of pro- 
gressive woi-kers and collective farmers and the 
growth of Russian culture and living comforts. 
If only the dictators didn't confuse theater plays 
with propaganda tracts! The result is that the 
new Russian play writing is exceedingly poor. 
But how could it be otherwise ? 



Poland, Czechoslovakia, and all the other satel- 
lites take their cue from Moscow's theater policy. 
Theoretically, they too see in the theater an in- 
strument designed to educate the perfect Commu- 
nist citizen and frown on "counter-revolutionary" 
plays which advocate views contrary to the party 
line. 

The satellites still make concessions to bourgeois 
taste. In Poland especially, where there reigns an 
immense enthusiasm for theater, they still play 
musical comedies American style. It is interesting 
to note that Warsaw, with a population of 700,000 
people, has 12 professional theaters and only 9 
film houses. It could easily fill 10 more theaters. 
In Czechoslovakia, Mrs. WarretCs Profession 
and The Importance of Being Earnest are still 
hits. But most of the new Czech play writing is 
very political and strictly Marxist. Some of the 
new Czech plays, especially Ota Safraneck's The 
HonoraUe Lieutenant Bal-er, are outright anti- 
American propaganda. 

As I said before, censorship and thought con- 
trol stifle the theater, but they don't kill it. Noth- 
ing can really kill it. But we cannot be content 
with indestructibility. We must ask how it can 
be brought to its most perfect flowering at a time 
when its spiritual aid is so greatly needed by a 
suffering humanity. 

The old Greeks knew the curative effect of the 
theater. Up on the hills, overlooking the great 
hospital city of Epidaurus, they built a large the- 
ater. Here the sick who underwent the therapy 
of the healing waters of the springs also under- 
went the spiritual therapy of the theater. 

The theater is still a hospital of the spirit. Both 
the clown and the poet serve as part of its health- 
restoring and strength-renewing personnel. Both 
provide the cleansing, replenishing element of 
man's examination of himself. This is why the 
theater must I'eceive governmental assistance, 
preferably through regional rather than federal 
agencies. And it must be free of political control. 
The theater is a part of the human rights objec- 
tives to which UNESCO is dedicated. The personal 
and intellectual freedoms of all peoples, the enjoy- 
ment of physical and mental health by a peaceful 
world are merely stages of advance in the prep- 
aration of man for his ensuing enrichments from 
art. In terms of finalities, art is as abstract and 
intangible as democracy. Democracy is a stream, 
an urgency toward, and an evidence of, the good 
in man's spirit. Although by its nature it can 
never have definite culmination, a point of final 
accomplishment where man can some day stand 
and regard everything behind him as an approach 
to a realized perfection, it must never halt or 
civilization will die. The theater as a form of art 
sheds light, a light governments should keep burn- 
ing so that at every pause of his journey man may 
look at himself, and by what he sees, be encour- 
aged to continue to his destiny. 



Ocfober 6, 1952 



543 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



Calendar of Meetings' 



Adjourned During September 1952 

Inter-American Seminar on Vocational Education University of Maryland . Aug. 2-Sept. 6 

International Conference on Agricultural and Cooperative Credit . . . Berkeley, Calif .... Aug. 4-Sept. 12 

Sixth International Edinburgh Film Festival Edinburgh Aug. 17-Sep't. 7 

Thirteenth International Exhibition of Cinematographic Art Venice ' Aug 8-Sept 12 

UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organi- 
zation) : 

International Conference to Negotiate a Universal Copyright Con- Geneva Aug. 18-Sept 6 

vention. 

International Congress of the Arts Venice Sept. 22-28 

IcAo (International Civil Aviation Organization) : 

First Aeronautical Information Services Division Meeting .... Montreal Aug. 19-Sept. 9 

Itu (International Telecommunication Union) : 

International Radio Consultative Committee (Ccie): Study Group X . Geneva. . . . Aug 25-Sept 4 

UN (United Nations): 

Forty-first General Assembly of the Interparliamentary Union .... Bern Aug. 28-Sept. 2 

International Anthropological and Ethnological Congress: 4th Session . Vienna Sept. 1-8 

Fag (Food and Agriculture Organization) : 

Working Party of Experts to Study an International Emergency Food Rome Sept. 1-13 

Reserve. 

/Id //oc Commission on Prisoners of War: 3d meeting Geneva Aug. 25-Sept. 13* 

Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: 

Second Regional Conference of Statisticians Bangkok Sept. 1-13 

Working Party of Experts on Mobilization of Domestic Capital: Bangkok ....... Sept! 22-27 

2d Session. 

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Inter- Mexico Sept. 3-12 

national Monetary Fund: 7th Annual Meeting of the Boards of 
Governors. 

Eighth General Assembly of the International Astronomical Union . . Rome Sept. 4-13 

Second International Congress of Analytical Chemistry Oxford (England) . . . Sept! 4-9 

Gatt (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) : 

.4d //of Committee on Agenda and Intersessional Business Geneva Sept. 4-12 

UN Ad Hoc Committee on Factors (Non-Self-Governing Territories) . New York ! Sept! 4-9 

Conference of the International Union of Family Organization .... Oxford (England) . . . Sept. 8-16* 

Nineteenth International Geological Congress Algiers Sept. 8-15 

Thirteenth International Horticultural Congress London Sept! 8-15 

Ilo (International Labor Organization) : 

Chemical Industries Committee: 3d Session Geneva Sept. 9-20 

Wmo (World Meteorological Organization): 

Executive Committee: 3d Session Geneva Sept. 9-30 

Paso (Pan American Sanitary Organization) : 

Executive Committee: 17th Meeting Habana Sept. 10-12 

Sixth Meeting of the Directing Council and Fourth Meeting of the Habana Sept. 15-24 

Who Regional Committee. 

Executive Committee: 18th Meeting Habana Sept. 25-26 

Fourth International Congress of African Tourism Lourengo Marques . . Sept. 15-20 

UN Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner for Refugees: 2d Geneva Sept. 15-20* 

Session. 

Twenty-first International Congress of Housing and Urbanization . . Lisbon Sept 21-27 

Who (World Health Organization) : 

Fourth Meeting of the Regional Committee (See also Paso) .... Habana Sept. 15-24 

Western Pacific Regional Conference: 3d Session Saigon Sept. 25-30 

Fourth Meeting of the International Committee of Research on Tryp- Lourenjo Marques . . Sept. 25-30 
anosomiasis. 

Fourth Meeting of the Executive Board of the International Council of Amsterdam Sept. 30 (1 day) 

Scientific Unions. 

' Prepared in the Division of International Conferences, Department of State, Sept. 24, 1952. Asterisks indicate 
tentative dates. 

^'*^ Department of State Bulletin 



Calendar oj Meetings — Continued 
In Session as of September 30, 1952 

Fao (Food and Agriculture Organization) : 

Eucalyptus Study Tour 

Fao-Eci.a Central American Seminar on Agricultural Credit .... 
IcAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) : 

Council: 17th Session 

Special Diplomatic Conference to Conclude a Convention on Damage 
Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface. 

Air Transport Committee 

Statistics Division Meeting: 2d Session 

Air Navigation Commission: 11th Session 

UN (United Nations) : 

Economic and Social Council: 

Restrictive Business Practices: 3d Session 

Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: 

Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Pro- 
tection of Minorities: 5th Session. 
Committee on Industry and Trade, Subcommittee on Electric 
Power. 

General Assembly Committee on Administrative Unions 

UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza- 
tion) : 
International Seminar on the Role of Museums in Education. . . . 
Ilo (International Labor Organization) : 

Seminar on Social Security 

First Inter-American Congress of Public Health 

Cfm (Council of Foreign Ministers): 

Deputies for Austria 

International Council for the Exploration of the Sea. • ■ ■ 

Committee on Improvement of National Statistics: 2d Session .... 



Australia Sept. 1- 

Guatemala City .... Sept. 15- 

Montreal Sept. 9- 

Rome Sept. 9- 

Montreal Sept. 10- 

Montreal Sept. 16- 

Montreal Sept. 23- 

Geneva Sept. 8- 

New York Sept. 22- 

Bangkok Sept. 29- 

New York Sept. 23- 

Brooklyn Sept. 14- 

Rio de Janeiro .... Sept. 15- 

Ilabana Sept. 26- 

London Sept. 29- 

Copenhagen Sept. 29- 

Ottawa Sept. 29- 



Scheduled October 1-December 31, 1952 

Sixth General Assembly of the International Council of Scientific Unions 
Itu (International Telecommunication Union): 

International Plenipotentiary Telecommunication Conference . . . 
International Conference on Legal Metrology, Meeting of Provisional 

Committee. 
Gatt (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) : 

Seventh Session of the Contracting Parties to Gatt 

South Pacific Commission: 10th Session 

UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza- 
tion): 

Seminar on Education of Asian Youth _ 

Fourth Meeting of Representatives of National Commissions . . . 

Seventh Session of the General Conference 

First Regional Conference on Free and Compulsory Education in 
South Asia and the Pacific. 
International Committee on Weights and Measures: Biennial Session . 
PiCMME (Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement 
of Migrants from Europe): 

Finance Committee 

Fourth Session of Picmme 

Paigh (Pan American Institute on Geography and History) : 

Sixth Consultation of the Commission on Cartography 

Fao (Food and Agriculture Organization): 

European Forestry and Forest Products Commission: 5th Session . . 

Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council: 4th Session 

Coordinating Committee 

Technical Advisory Committee on Desert Locust Control: 2d Meeting 

Committee on Commodity Problems: 20th Session 

Committee on Financial Control 

Committee on Veterinary Matters: 1st Meeting 

Council: 16th Session ■ • ■ 

Forestry and Forest Products Commission for Asia and Pacific: 2d 
Session. 

Meeting of Experts on Index Numbers 

Technical Meeting on Storage of Rice 

Inter-American Meeting on Livestock Production 

Fao/Who Joint Meeting on Malnutrition in Mothers, Infants and 
Children. 
Ilo (International Labor Organization): 

Petroleum Committee: 4th Session 

Asian Advisory Committee: 4th Session 

OcJofaer 6, J 952 



Amsterdam Oct. 1- 

Buenos Aires Oct. 1- 

Brussels Oct. 2- 

Geneva Oct. 2- 

Noum^a Oct. 6- 

Rangoon Oct. 7- 

Paris Nov. 8-; Dec. 11- 

Paris Nov. 12- 

Bombay Dec. 12- 

Sfevres Oct. 7- 

Geneva Oct. 9- 

Geneva Oct. 13- 

Ciudad Trujillo .... Oct. 12- 

Geneva Oct. 14- 

Manila Oct. 23- 

Rome Oct. 27- 

Rome Nov. 3- 

Rome Nov. 5- 

Rome Nov. 5- 

Rome . ' Nov. 10- 

Rome Nov. 17- 

Singapore and Kuala Dec. 1- 
Lumpur. 

Rome Dec. 1- 

Bangkok Dec. 1- 

Sao Paulo Dec. 8- 

Gambia, Africa .... Nov. 28- 

Scheveningen Oct. 14- 

Geneva Nov. 17- 



545 



Calendar of Meetings — Continued 

Scheduled October 1-December 31, 1952 — Continued 

Ilo — Continued 

Governing Body: 120th Session 

Latin American Manpower Technical Conference 

Technical Meeting on the Protection of Young Workers in Asian 
Countries, with relation to their vocational preparation. 
UN (United Nations): 

General Assembly: 7th Session 

Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labor: 3d Session 

Economic and Social Council: 

Economic Commission for Europe, Seminar on Rural Electrification . 
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: Seminar on Power 
Alcohol. 

Trusteeship Council: 11th Session (2d part) 

UN South-West Africa Committee (ad hoc) 

First Ibero- American Congress on Archives, Libraries and Copyrights 
Pan American Highway Congress, Committee on Programming and 

Planning. 
IcAO (International Civil Aviation Organization): 

Aerodromes, Air Routes and Ground Aids Division Meeting: 5th 

Session. 
Special European-Mediterranean Regional Frequency Allocation 
Meeting. 

Standing Committee on Aircraft Performance: 3d Session 

Pan American Highway Congre.ss, Extraordinary Session 

Fourth Inter-American Congress of Radiology 

American International Institute for the Protection of Childhood: Re- 
gional Meeting of Technical Delegates 

International Wool Study Group: 5th Meeting 

West Indian Conference: 5th Session 

UN International Children's Emergency Fund: 

Executive Board 

Program Committee 

Caribbean Commission: 15th Meeting 

Sixth International Conference of Social Work 

Nato (North Atlantic Treaty Organization): 

Coimcil: 10th Session 

American International Institute for the Protection of Childhood: Meet- 
ing of the Directing Council. 



Geneva Nov. 25- 

Undetermined Dec. 1- 

Ceylon Dec. 1- 



New York Oct. 14- 

Geneva Oct. 14- 

Geneva Oct. 12- 

Lucknow Oct. 23- 

New York Nov. — 

New York Oct. 1- 

Madrid Oct. 20- 

Mexico City Oct. 20- 



Montreal Oct. 21- 

Paris Oct. 28- 

Montreal Nov. 11- 

Mexico City Oct. 26- 

Mexico City Nov. 2- 

Mexico City Nov. 3-6 



London Nov. 3- 

Jamaica Nov. 24- 

New Y'ork November 

New York November 

Jamaica Dec. 1- 

Madras Dec. 14- 

Paris Dec. 15- 

Montevideo December 



U.S. Delegations 

to International Conferences 

Council of Scientific Unions 

Tlie Departmeiit of State announced on Septem- 
tember 26 (press release 758) that the United 
States will be represented at the sixth General 
Assembly of the International Council of Scien- 
tific Unions (Icsu), to be held at Amsterdam, 
October 1-3, by the following delegation : 

W. Albert No.ves, Jr., Chairman, Dean of the Graduate 
School, University of Rochester, Rochester, N. T. ; 
Chairman of the Division of Chemistry and Chemical 
Technology, National Research Council 

Wallace W. Atwood, Jr., Director, Office of International 
Relations, National Academy of Sciences-National 
Research Council 

Lloyd V. Bcrkner, President, Associated Universities, Inc., 
Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, Long Is- 
land, N. Y. 

Dirk Brouwer, Professor of Natural PhUosophy and As- 
tronomy, Director of the Observatory, Yale Uni- 
versity, New Haven, Conn. 

Walter H. Bucher, Professor and Chairman, Department 
of Geology, Columbia University, New York; Presi- 
dent, American Geophysical Union 



Donald B. Eddy. Foreign Affairs OflBcer, Division of In- 
ternational Conferences, Department of State 

James Wallace Joyce, Deputy Science Adviser, Depart- 
ment of State 

C. Euf;ene Sunrterlin, Deputy Director, National Science 
Foundation 

International scientific unions affiliated in Icsu 
comprise those in the fields of astronomy, biol- 
ogy, chemistry, crystallography, geodesy and geo- 
physics, geography, liistory of sciences, mechan- 
ics, physics, and radio science. Icsu provides for 
cooperation among the representative scientific 
agencies of various countries and among interna- 
tional scientific organizations; directs interna- 
tional scientific activity on certain subjects not 
within the purview of existing international as- 
sociations ; and enters into relationships with gov- 
ernments of member states through the national 
adhering organizations in order to promote scien- 
tific investigation in those countries. The Na- 
tional Academy of Sciences-National Research 
Council adheres to Icsu on behalf of the United 
States. 

The work of the Council is directed by the Gen- 
eral Assembly, held triennially, which reviews the 



546 



Department of State Bulletin 



Icsu program and expenditures for the ?> years 
past and establishes the program and budget for 
the succeeding period. The forthcoming Assem- 
bly at Amsterdam will consider the adoption of 
revised statutes, the admission of new unions, and 
the appointment of National Committees for the 
International Geophysical Year 1957-8. The 
fifth General Assembly was held at Copenhagen 
in September of 1949. 

The membership of Icsu expected to partici- 
pate in the Amsterdam Assembly consists of (a) 
the 10 international scientific unions enumerated 
above and (b) 43 countries, which adhere to the 
Council either through their appropriate national 
scientific bodies or directly through their govern- 
ments. 



Subcommittee on Electric Power (ECAFE) 

The Department of State announced on Sep- 
tember 26 (press release 763) that the United 
States will be represented at the second meeting 
of the Subcommittee on Electric Power of the 
U. N. Economic Commission for Asia and the 
Far East (Ecafe) by Anthony Bisgood, Indus- 
tries Officer of the Mutual Security Agency Mis- 
sion at Bangkok, Thailand. The meeting will 
take place at Bangkok from September 29 to Oc- 
tober 2. Mr. Bisgood's advisers will be two pri- 
vate experts who are currently on loan to the Gov- 
ernment of Japan from their respective organi- 
zations in this country. They are F. Douglas 
Campbell of the Detroit Edison Company, an 
internationally known expert on electric-power 
survey procedures, particularly on heavy-power 
equipment availability, and Leroy L. Hinckley of 
the Pacific Gas and Electric Company, a spe- 
cialist in methods of forecasting loads and system 
capability. 

The availability of electric power on a reason- 
able basis is considered fundamental to the sound 
expansion of modern industry in any area of the 
world. Increases in electric-power generation and 
distribution are particularly important elements 
in achieving Asiatic and Far Eastern goals of 
greater industrialization and economic develop- 
ment. 

Important topics scheduled for discussion at the 
forthcoming meeting are the requirements and 
availability of electric-power plants and equip- 
ment, and techniques of estimating future power 
demands. 



Statistics Division of ICAO 

The Department of State announced on Sep- 
tember 16 (press release 735) that the U.S. dele- 
gation to the second session of the Statistics Divi- 
sion of the International Civil Aviation Organi- 
zation (IcAo) , to be convened on that date at Mon- 
treal will be as follows : 



Delegate 

Ernest A. Lister, alternate U.S. Representative on the 
International Civil Aviation Organization Council 

Advisers 

Allan Craig, Acting Chief, Accounting and Statistics Di- 
vision, Civil Aeronautics Board 

Ben W. Ashmead, Acting Chief, Analysis (Accidents) 
Division, Civil Aeronautics Board 

Mary C. Hillyer, Air Transport Examiner, Civil Aero- 
nautics Board 

Stafford Kernan, Chief Statistician, Civil Aeronautics 
Administration, Department of Commerce 

R. Ij. Jones, Pan American Airways Assistant Chief Ac- 
countant, Air Transport Association of America 

The collection, analysis, and publication of sta- 
tistics on air transport is one of the most impor- 
tant responsibilities of Icao. Certain of the 
organization's statutory duties in the technical, 
economic, and legal fields can be discharged only 
on the basis of reliable, complete, and up-to-date 
statistical data. Such information is also neces- 
sary to assist civil-aviation authorities in con- 
tracting states to formulate their own national 
policies in the light of established facts. 

In 1945, the first year of its existence, the Pro- 
visional International Civil Aviation Organiza- 
tion approved forms to be used by states for 
reporting data, including traffic reports, cost sta- 
tistics, and financial statements, and also estab- 
lished within the Secretariat a section responsible 
for receiving and collating the data. In 1947 the 
Organization decided that a Statistics Division 
should be convened for the general purpose of re- 
vising the statistical reporting forms. The first 
session of the Division, held at Montreal in Jan- 
uary 1948, was attended by representatives of 18 
IcAo member states and observers from 4 non- 
contracting states and five international organi- 
zations. 

Delegates to the forthcoming meeting will re- 
view in detail the statistical activities of the or- 
ganization and the statistical reporting system, 
which have now been in effect 6 years. Other items 
to be discussed are cooperation of statistical ex- 
perts within states or groups of states, definitions 
for aviation statistics, statistical publications and 
work program, and plans for the third session of 
the Division. 

The Air Transport Committee, which approved 
the agenda for the Division's meeting, also decided 
that the Division sliould bear in mind methods to 
insure that (1) the statistics collected and pub- 
lished by IcAO are adequate to meet the require- 
ments of contracting states and of other users of 
aviation statistics; (2) the reporting procedures 
required are sufficiently simple and economical to 
be within the capabilities of contracting states; 

(3) all contracting states discharge fully and 
promptly the reporting obligations agreed upon 
and that the information so furnished, or a suit- 
able resume thereof, is promptly published; and 

(4) the statistical publications of Icao are de- 
signed to furnish contracting states with essential 



October 6, 1952 



547 



information in a form that will facilitate refer- 
ence, comparison, and analysis. Finally, the Divi- 
sion is asked to consider that the Secretariat be au- 
thorized to interpret the reporting requirements, 
to waive or modify nonsubstantive provisions in 
proper cases, and to initiate revisions in scope, 
content, format and definitions — all with the pur- 
pose of providing the progi-am with flexibility. 

Petroleum Planning Committee (NATO) 

The Department of State announced on Septem- 
ber 2-1 (press release 753) that the U.S. Govern- 
ment will be represented at the third meeting of 
the North Atlantic Ti-eaty Organization (Nato) 
Petroleum Planning Committee, to be held ait 
Paris on October 2, 1952, by the following dele- 
gation : 

U.S. Representative 

J. E. Brantly, Assistant Deputy Administrator, Foreign 
Petroleum Operations, Petroleum Administration for 
Defense, Department of the Interior 

U.S. Alternate Representative 

Oscar E. Bransl^y, Chief of Petroleum Section, Office of 
the Special Representative in Europe, Paris 

Advisers 

Robert H. S. Eakens, Petroleum Policy Staff, Department 
of State 

Charles Hedlund, Director, Program Division, Petroleum 
Administration for Defense, Department of the In- 
terior 

Col. G. H. Montgomery, Munitions Board, Department of 
Defense 

The Petroleum Planning Committee is com- 
posed of representatives from each member coun- 
try of Nato. Its first meeting was held at Lon- 
don on April 2, 1952, and the second at Nato 
Headquarters at Paris on May 19, 1952. 

The forthcoming meeting will be attended by 
petroleum experts from most of the Nato coun- 
tries, who will study the subject of the petroleum 
requirements of North Atlantic Treaty members 
in the event of an emergency. The Committee 
does not concern itself with any current interna- 
tional petroleum problems. 



IMC Allocation of Tungsten 
and Mlolybdenum 

The Tungsten-Molybdenum Committee of the 
International Materials Conference (Imc) an- 
nounced on September 25 its recommended distri- 
bution of tungsten and molybdenum for the fourth 
calendar quarter of 1952.^ The Governments of 
all 13 countries represented on the Committee have 
accepted the recommendations. These countries 
are Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, 

'For distribution tables (not printed here), see Imc 
press release dated Sept. 25. 

548 



Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States. 

In accepting the recommendations, the Govern- 
ment of the United States made the condition that 
domestic users of tungsten and molybdenum in the 
United States should be authorized to purchase 
the quantity of such materials allocated to other 
countries participating in the International Mate- 
rials Conference and not used by any such par- 
ticipating country. In view of this, the Commit- 
tee agreed to make arrangements whereby such 
domestic users in the United States or other coun- 
tries would have the opportunity to purchase 
tungsten or molybdenum allocated to other coun- 
tries participating in the International Materials 
Conference but not used by any such participating 
country. 

Tungsten and molybdenum have been under in- 
ternational plans of distribution since July 1, 1951. 
Although availabilities of the two metals have 
been increasing, both continue to be in short sup- 
ply as compared with the requirements of the con- 
suming countries. This is especially so when the 
stockpiling requirements of these countries are 
taken into consideration. 

The total free- world production of tungsten in 
the fourth quarter of 1952 is estimated by the 
Committee at 4,957 metric tons metal content, and 
the free-world production of molybdenum at 
5.680 metric tons metal content. The above esti- 
mate of tungsten production shows an increase of 
37 percent as compared with the actual rate of 
production in the second half of 1051 and more 
than double the rate of production in 1950. Molyb- 
denum production as above estimated shows an 
increase of nearly 15 percent as compared with 
actual production in the second half of 1951 and 
over 50 percent above the rate of production in 
1950. On the other hand, the defense and stock- 
piling requirements of the free world are still in 
excess of the production in the case of both metals. 
It is necessary, therefore, that all countries of the 
free world should do their utmost to implement 
the present recommendations for the distribution 
of the metals ."nd give every attention to the meas- 
ures recommended by the Committee for conser- 
vation and substitution. 

The plans recommended provide for the distri- 
bution of the whole free-world production of tung- 
sten and molybdenum, both in the form of ores and 
concentrates and primary products. Primary 
products are defined, as in the case of previous dis- 
tributions by the Committee, as ferrotungsten, 
tungsten powder, tungstic acid and tungsten salts, 
and ferromolybdenum, molybdic acid and molyb- 
denum salts, including calcium-molybdate and 
molybdic oxide. Roasted molybdenum concen- 
trates are regarded by the Committee as being in- 
cluded in ores and concentrates, as in the case of 
previous distribution plans. 

In framing the recommended plans of distribu- 
tion, the needs of all countries, whether members ji 

Department of State Bullefin 



f the Tungsten-Molybdenum Committee or not, 
-ere carefully considered. The distribution plans 
re now transmitted to all governments, includmg 
liose not represented on the Committee, wherever 
he countries concerned are interested in the ex- 
lort or import of tungsten or molybdenum in the 
orm of ores and concentrates or primary prod- 
cts. All governments are being requested to 
arry out the plans of distribution recommended. 
Of the quantity of 4,957 metric tons metal con- 
ent of tungsten estimated to be produced in the 
bird calendar quarter of 1952, the distribution 
>lan provides that 4,709.4 metric tons are to be 
listributed in the form of ores and concentrates 
,nd 247.6 metric tons in the form of primary pro- 
lucts. This latter quantity is distributed, in the 
irst instance, in the form of ores and concentrates 
o countries manufacturing this material into the 
)rimary products. Similarly, of the total esti- 
nated production of 5,680 metric tons metal con- 
-ent of molybdenum to be produced in the fourth 
lalendar quarter of 1952, the distribution plan 
provides that 5,362.8 metric tons be distributed in 
,he form of ores and concentrates and 297.2 metric 
;ons as primary products, this latter quantity also 
Deing distributed, in the first instance, to countries 
nanufacturing primary products from ores and 
concentrates. 

Table III shows the export and import quotas 
jf the two metals derived from the distribu- 
;ion shown in tables I and II. The quantities 
shown in table III are the export and import quotas 
of tungsten and molybdenum (ores and concen- 
trates only) for the period October 1 to December 
31, 1952. These quotas correspond with the quan- 
tities set forth in tables I and II. The import 
quotas include the quantities to be imported for 
processing and reexport as primary products. 

In issuing the above described plans of distribu- 
tion, the Committee recommends that existing con- 
tracts be respected as far as possible. If such con- 
tracts provide for the supply of tungsten or molyb- 
denum to any one importing country in excess of 
the amounts allocated, it is recommended that the 
importing country should divert shipments to 
other importing countries which have not yet filled 
their import quotas, so far as possible without up- 
setting the original contractual arrangements. 



U.N. Offers New Proposals for 
Settling Prisoner of War Issue 

Lt. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr., chief United 
Nations negotiator at the Panmunjom armistice 
talks, on September 28 made the folloioing state- 
ment to the Communist delegation: ^ 

I have an important statement to make. For 
many weeks the prisoner of war issue has blocked 
the achievement of an armistice in Korea. On 



July 1 we suggested to you that a solution to the 
problem must oe one that to a reasonable degree 
meets the requirements of both sides. You have 
admitted the soundness of that proposition. 

It must now be clear to you that one of the re- 
quirements of our side which cannot be compro- 
mised is that of no forced repatriation. 

Within this humanitarian principle the United 
Nations Command has made honest efforts to 
achieve an armistice. So that there can be no 
doubt of the objectivity and sincerity with which 
the United Nations Command delegation has at- 
tempted to find a solution to the prisoner of war 
question, I will restate the proposals which we 
have previously offered and which you have sum- 
marily rejected. 

We have previously proposed that joint teams 
or Ked Cross teams, with or without military ob- 
servers of both sides, be admitted to the prisoner 
of war canqDS of both sides to verify the fact that 
non-repatriates would forcibly resist return to the 
side from which they came. As an alternative we 
proposed that all prisoners of war of both sides 
be delivered in groups of appropriate size to the 
demilitarized zone and given the opportunity to 
express their preference on repatriation, the inter- 
view to be done by one or a combination of the 
following: 

A. International Committee of the Red Cross 

B. Teams from impartial nations 

C. Joint teams of military observers 

D. Eed Cross representatives from each side 

Either one of these proposals, if accepted by 
your side, would have allayed any legitimate fear 
you might have had that the prisoners of war were 
being coerced into rejecting repatriation to your 
side and would have produced an armistice. 

I now present to you three additional alternate 
proposals any one of which will lead to an armis- 
tice if you truly desire one. 

I ask that you give careful consideration to them 
because they represent the only remaining avenues 
of approach on which our side can agree to an 
armistice. All of these proposals are based on the 
prior formal acceptance of an armistice by both 
sides, with the disposition of prisoners of war to 
be determined thereafter according to one of the 
following procedures. 

A. Proposal Number One : 

As soon as the armistice agreement goes into effect all 
prisoners of war in the custody of each side shall be 
entitled to release and repatriation. Such release and 
repatriation of prisoners of war shall begin in accordance 
with the provisions of article three of the armistice agree- 
ment. Both sides agree that the obligation to exchange 
and repatriate prisoners of war .shall be fulfilled by having 
them brought to an agreed exchange point in the demili- 
tarized zone. The prisoner of war shall be identified and 
his name checked against the agreed list of prisoners of 



" For a statement made on Sept. 6 by Lieutenant General 
(then Major General) Harrison on the prisoner of war 
problem, see Bulletin of Sept. 29, p. 474. 



October 6, 1952 



549 



war in the presence, if desired, of one or a combination 
of the International Committee of the Red Cross, joint 
Red Cross teams, or joint military teams. The prisoner 
of war shall thereupon be considered as fully repatriated 
for the purposes of the agreement. Both sides agree, 
however, that any prisoner of war who at time of identi- 
fication states that he wishes to return to the side by whicli 
he had been detained shall immediately be allowed to 
do so. 

Such former prisoner of war shall thereupon go into 
the custody of the side to which he wishes to go, which 
side shall provide him witli transportation from the 
demilitarized zone to territory under its control in Korea. 
Such individual, of course, shall not be detained as a 
prisoner of war but shall assume civilian status, and, in 
accordance with paragraph ,52 of the armistice agreement, 
shall not again be employed in acts of war in the Korean 
conflict. 

B. Proposal Number Two : 

As soon as the armistice agreement goes into effect all 
prisoners of war who desire repatriation will be exchanged 
expeditiously. All prisoners objecting to repatriation will 
be delivered to the demilitarized zone in small groups 
where, at a mutually agreeable location, they will be 
freed from military control of both sides and interviewed 
by representatives of a mutually agreed country or coun- 
tries whose forces are not participating in the Korean 
hostilities, such persons being free to go to the side of 
their choice as indicated by such interview. The fore- 
going procedure will be accomplished, if desired, with or 
without military representation from each side and under 
the observation of one or a combination of tlie following : 

1. International Committee of the Red Cross 

2. Joint Red Cross teams 

3. Joint military teams 

C. Proposal Number Three: 

As soon as the armistice is signed and becomes effective, 
all prisoners of war who desire repatriation will be ex- 
changed expeditiously. Concurrently, if logistical capa- 
bility permits, or as soon as possible thereafter, those 
prisoners of war who have previously expressed their 
objections to repatriation will be delivered in groups of 
appropriate size to a mutually agreed upon location in 
the demilitarized zone and there freed from the military 
control of both sides. Without questioning, interview, 
or screening, each individual so released will be free to 
go to the side of his choice. We will agree, if desired, to 
have this movement and disposition of non-repatriates 
accomplished under the observation of one or a combina- 
tion of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
joint teams of military observers, or Red Cross repre- 
sentatives from both sides. 

We have now oiTered yoti tlie ^Yidest selection of 
choices the United Nations Command can offer. 
Each of them will produce an armistice. 

I urge that you give mature and careful consid- 
eration to our proposals. 

For that purpose I propose a recess for 10 days, 
and that we meet again here at 1,100 hours on 8 
October. 

Our staff officers will be available at any time to 
answer questions on any of our proposals. 



The United States in 
the United Nations 

[Sept. 29-Oct. 31 

Security Council 

The Secretary-General reported to the President 
of the Security Council on September 30 that 
Valerian Alexanderovitch Zorin, Deputy Minister 
for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., will serve as 
Soviet representative on the Council. Mr. Zorin 
replaces Jacob A. Malik. 

Hernan Santa Cruz (Chile) succeeds Joao 
Carlos Muniz (Brazil) as President of the Se- 
curity Council for October. 

Disannament Commisxiofi — Over strong objec- 
tions on the part of the Soviet representative, Mr. 
Zorin, the Commission decided on October 1 by 
a vote of 9-2 (U.S.S.R., Chile )-l (Pakistan) to 
take up its second draft report in closed meetings. 
Mr. Zorin attributed this decision to a prearranged 
deal and contended tlie U.S., U.K., and others 
were trying to hide the Commission's shortcom- 
ings from public opinion. 

The Soviet spokesman made it clear his delega- 
tion was not satisfied witli the report and indicated 
it would submit amendments on the form of the 
draft. 

_ Before taking up the second report, the Commis- 
sion heard Canada's representative state that 
Canada accepted the ceilings on armed forces pro- 
vided for in the tripartite proposals on limitation 
of armed force.*.' It was necessary and desirable, 
according to David M. Johnson, to make a distinc- 
tion between tlie armed forces of the five major 
military powers and those of other states. After 
pointing out that the sponsors had repeateclly 
stated the plan was only one element in the com- 
prehensive disarmament program, Johnson com- 
mented that he could not see nuich logic in refus- 
ing to discuss a part because it was not the wltole. 
Although incomplete, the tripartite proposals hacl 
gone a great deal farther toward getting down 
to brass tacks than had the proposals of any other 
delegation. Canada tliought they had made a 
real contribution to the Commission's work — 
a contribution which had not been sufficiently 
recognized. 

It was a big tiling, Mr. Johnson declared, for one 
of the two most powerful nations in the world to 
offer to cut its armed forces in half if the other 
did likewise, as part of a general sclieme of dis- 
iirmament which would include prohibition of all 
weapons of mass destruction. His Government 
hoped those who did not want to take the tripartite 
jjroposals as a basis of discussion would provide 
the Disarmament Commission M-ith equally spe- 
cific alternative proposals. The Commission 
then might be able to begin the work of serious 
negotiation. 



' For text, see Buixetin of Aug. 25, 1952, p. 292. 



550 



Department of State Bulletin 



In opening discussion of the second draft report, 
Ml-. Zorin said the U.S.S.R. believed it would be 
ippropriate to submit amendments to and com- 
inent on the draft. The French delegate was pre- 
pared to discuss the procedure for the handling 
3f the report but not the substance of it. Mr. 
Zorin replied that all members had had an oppor- 
tunity to study the report, and added that in view 
of the short time before the opening of the Gen- 
eral Assembly he did not deem it desirable to post- 
pone the discussion. The U.K. delegate suggested 
the report be taken up at closed meetings and that 
imendments be submitted in writing. Mr. Zorin 
countered that since disarmament questions were 
3f great interest to the public, he saw no reason 
to hold private sessions. 

Ambassador Benjamin Cohen (U.S.) stated that 
the primary objective should be to adopt a pro- 
cedure to facilitate prompt agreement. The U.S. 
had nothing to hide from the ])ublic, but it was 
opposed to reopening debates. The Disarmament 
Commission should follow the Security Council's 
practice of considering the report in private meet- 
ings. However, the U.S. would not insist on this 
point. 

During subsequent procedural discussion, 
France, China, the Netherlands, Brazil, and 
Greece endorsed the U.K. proposal to hold the dis- 
cussion in private sessions. Mr. Zorin attributed 
these endorsements to a prearranged deal not to 
publicize the Disarmament Connnission's work. 
Following adoption of the proposal for closed 
meetings, Mr. Zorin stated that the decision con- 
firmed his view that there had been a deal. The 
U.S.S.R. was against hiding the results of the 
Commission's work, which revealed substantial 
shortcomings. 

General Assembly 

Convmittee on AdminiMrative Unions — The 
Committee, on September 30, approved a Brazilian 
resolution on the British Togoland Administrative 
Union, following acceptance by Brazil of several 
Indian Amendments bringing it into closer accord 
with the Trusteeship Council's own conclusions. 
It was agreed to use the same text, suitably modi- 
fied, for the British Cameroons. 

A Secretariat draft reflecting previous Commit- 
tee discussion of Ruanda-Urundi was adopted, 
along with the first part of a similar paper on 
Tanganyika. Action on the remainder was de- 
ferred pending circulation of U.S. amendments. 

Ad Hoc Committee on South West Africa 

The Committee has been meeting at intervals 
during September and October to make a further 
effort to reach agreement with the Union of South 
Africa as to means whereby South Africa would 
carry out its international obligations toward the 
mandated territory of South-West Africa, which 
in the opinion of the International Court of Justice 



remain in force. Except for the replacement of 
Denmark by Norway, the membership of the Com- 
mittee remains the same as that of last year's 
Ad Hoc Committee. Other members of this year's 
Committee are Syria, Thailand, and the United 
States. Benjamin Gerig has continued as U.S. 
representative. Although negotiations with South 
Africa have been resumed, the Committee has not 
yet completed its task. 



Communiques Regarding Korea 
to tlie Security Council 

The Headquarters of the United Nations Com- 
mand has transmitted communiques regarding 
Korea to the Secretary-General of the United Na- 
tions under the following United Nations docu- 
ment numbers: S/2763, September 2; S/2764, 
September 3; S/2765, September 4; S/2766, 
September 5; S/2767, September 9; S/2769, 
September 9; S/2772, September 10; S/2774, 
September 15; S/2775, September 15; S/2776, 
September 15; S/2777, September 11; S/2778, 
September 16. 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: Sept. 22-26, 1952 

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the 
Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department 
of State, Washington 25, D. C. 

Press releases issued prior to Sept. 22 which ap- 
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 735 of 
Sept. 16 and 739 of Sept. 18. 

Subject 
Meeting of Worlsing Party (Ecafe) 
U.S. reply to Soviet on Trieste 
Military assistance for Dominican Re- 
public 
Awards to newsmen 
U.S. reply to Soviet note on Germany 
Acheson: Reply to Soviet note, Ger- 
many 
Jessup : Department Peoples 
Jessup: Guarding the Ramparts of 

Freedom 
Guatemala : Letter of credence 
Iran : Letter of credence 
NATO petroleum committee 
Land credit conference 
India : Letter of credence 
U.S.S.R. : Letter of credence 
Letter to President from Mossadegh 
Council of Scientific Unions 
Sargeant ; Military factors 
Panama : Presidential inauguration 
Acheson : Press Club speech, Jan. '50 
Resignation of Katharine Lenroot 
Electric power meeting (Ecafe) 
Acheson : Press Club speech, Jan. '50 
Acheson : U.N. Day 

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 
*Not printed. 



No. 


Date 


t743 


9/22 


744 


9/22 


745 


9/22 


•746 


9/22 


747 


9/23 


748 


9/24 


t749 


9/24 


750 


9/24 


1751 


9/24 


t7.52 


9/24 


753 


9/24 


*754 


9/25 


t755 


9/25 


756 


9/25 


757 


9/25 


758 


9/26 


t759 


9/26 


•760 


9/26 


•761 


9/26 


t762 


9/26 


763 


9/26 


*764 


9/26 


765 


9/26 



October 6, 1952 



551 



October 6, 1952 



Ind 



ex 



Vol. XXVII, No. 693 



American Principles 

Guarding the ramparts of freedom (Jessup) . . 511 
UJJ. cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy .... 529 

American Republics 

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: Military assistance 

negotiations 537 

Asia 

JAPAN : Application for membership in the U.N. 

(Austin, Murphy) 524 

KOREA: 

Communiques regarding Korea to the Security 

Council 551 

U.N. offers new proposals for settling prisoner 

of war Issue 549 

Aviation 

Statistics Division of Icao 547 

Communism 

Guarding the ramparts of freedom (Jessup) . . 511 

Europe 

GERMANY: U.S., U.K., France renew proposal 
for Four Power meeting to discuss Commis- 
sion on German Elections; texts of U.S. and 
Soviet notes 516 

TRIESTE; U.S. rejects Soviet charges on admin- 
istration; texts of U.S. and Soviet notes . . 521 

U.S.S.R.: 

Japan's application for membership In the 

U.N. (Murphy, Austin) 524 

Soviet Ambassador Zarubln presents letter of 

credence 615 

Soviet noncooperatlon paralyzes Prisoner of 

War Commission 523 

Finance 

Breaking the barriers to capital investment 

abroad (Johnston) 538 

International Meetings 

Calendar of meetings 544 

U.S. DELEGATIONS: 

Council of Scientific Unions 546 

Petroleum Planning Committee (Nato) . . 548 

Statistics Division of Icao 547 

Subcommittee on Electric Power (Ecafe) . . 547 

Mutual Aid and Defense 

Military assistance negotiations with Dominican 

Republic 537 



Near East 

IRAN: 

Point Fotu- aid in crown lands distribution . . 535 
Prime Minister rejects UJS.-U.K. proposals, 

offers counterproposal 532 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
Petroleum Planning Committee 548 

Prisoners of War 

Soviet noncooperatlon paralyzes Prisoner of War 

Commission 523 

U.N. offers new proposals for settling prisoner 

of war Issue 549 

Strategic Materials 

IMC allocation of tungsten and molybdenum . 548 
Iranian Prime Minister rejects U.S.-U.K. pro- 
posals on oil, offers counterproposal . . . 532 

Technical Cooperation and Development 

POINT POUR: Aid to Iran In crown lands dis- 
tribution 535 

Treaty Information 

Military assistance negotiations with Dominican 

Republic 537 

United Nations 

Communiques regarding Korea to the Security 

Council 551 

Cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy 529 

Japan's application for membership In the U.N. 524 
Soviet noncooperatlon paralyzes Prisoner of War 

Commission 523 

Totalitarian Theater 542 

U.N. offers new proposals for settling prisoner of 

war issue 549 

U.S. in the U.N 550 

Name Index 

Acheson, Secretary 516, 529 

Austin, Warren R 524 

Bisgood, Anthony 547 

Bransky, Oscar E 548 

Brantley. J. E 548 

Connelly, Marc 542 

Harrison, Lt. Gen 549 

Jessup, Philip C 511 

Johnston, Eric A 538 

Lister, Ernest A 547 

Mossadegh, Prime Minister 532 

Murphy. Robert D 624 

Noyes, W. Albert, Jr 546 

Tiuman, President 515, 529, 532 

Zarubln, Ambassador 615 



U. S. COVERHMENT PRINTING OFFlCEi I9B2 



I -/ ^ - 



J/ie/ u)eha^^^me7ii/ ,<w t/taie^ 




''ol. XXVII, No. 694 
October 13, 1952 




"•^tbs o* 



I 



THE ROLE OF THE BIBLE IN OUR NATIONAL LIFE • 

Remarks by Secretary Acheson 555 

UNDERSTANDING TODAY'S WORLD • by Assistant 

Secretary Sargeant 558 

THE PROBLEM OF DEPENDENT PEOPLES • by Am- 

bassador at Large Philip C. Jessup 571 

PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN TURKISH-AMERICAN 

RELATIONS • by Ambassador George C. McGhee . . 564 

CARIBBEAN CONFERENCE ON HOME ECONOMICS 

AND NUTRITION • Article by Lydia J. Roberts ... 576 

FOREIGN POLICY LEGISLATION IN THE EIGHTY- 
SECOND CONGRESS 584 



For index see back cover 



M. 



e 



U. S. SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCU^lt^ ; 

NOV 4 1952 




Z2^efia/yi^€^ jO^ ^ate Jk_/ LI 1 1 Kj L X i 1 



Vol. XXVII, No. 694 • Publication 4740 
October 13, 1952 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Qovernment Printing Office 

Washington 25, D.C. 

Price: 

62 Issues, domestic $7,50. foreign $10.25 
Single copy, 20 cents 

The printing of this publication has 
been approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget (January 22, 1952). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may 
be reprinted. Citation of the Department 
OF State Bulletlv aa the source will be 
appreciated. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication compiled and 
edited in the Division of Publications, 
Office of Public Affairs, provides the 
public and interested agencies of 
the Government with information on 
developments in the field of foreign 
relations and on the work of the De- 
partment of State and the Foreign 
Service. The BULLETIN includes 
selected press releases on foreign pol- 
icy issued by the White House and 
the Department, and statements and 
addresses made by the President and 
by the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on variotis phases of 
international affairs and the func- 
tions of the Department. Informa- 
tion is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to 
which the United States is or may 
become a party and treaties of gen- 
eral international interest. 

Publications of the Department, as 
well as legislative material in the field 
of international relations, are listed 
currently. 



The Role of the Bible in Our National Life 



Remarks hy Secretary Acheson ^ 



The President has asked me to express his deep 
regi-et that he is unable to be with you this eve- 
ning and to participate with you in the celebration 
of this august event. 

I am most honored and happy to present his 
greetings to you and to join with you in this great 
meeting to inaugurate a new version, a new trans- 
lation of the Bible. Years of patient scholarship 
and devoted labor have culminated in presenting 
with new learning and with the language of our 
time the ageless narrative, the incomparable 
poetry, and the revealed wisdom and teaching of 
these basic documents of our Nation's spiritual 
life — the documents which we rightly describe as 
the Word of God. 

It is right and necessary that these eternal and 
vigorously living books should continually be re- 
born in fresh and living words, just as the earth 
is continuously reborn and renewed. It is right, 
too, that many of us should cling to the older 
words — particularly those who, if they apply Lin- 
coln's phrase to themselves, must describe them- 
selves as old men. For when he said that of him- 
self in February 1861, he was almost 10 years 
younger than I am now. 

We are made from the soil out of which we 
grew. And as we grow older we continually go 
back to origins. For each of us those origins are 
different. For me they lie in the Connecticut Val- 
ley and in the King James Version. As my mind 
goes back beyond clear memory, there is a merg- 
ing. Soon we shall come to All Saints Day and the 
Advent season. The mail trucks will exhort us to 
mail Christmas packages early and tell us the 
days that remain. This brings to me, like wood 
smoke, memories not seen but felt — the squeak of 
dry snow under foot, voices no longer heard, the 
laughter of greetings about a doorway, the steam 
of breath in the cold air — and these words : 



' Made before a meeting sponsored jointly by the Na- 
tional Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. and 
the Washington Federation of Churches at the National 
Guard Armory, Washington, D.C., on Sept. 29 and released 
to the press (No. 766) on the same date. 



And it came to pass in those days, that there went out 
a decree from Caesar Augustus that all the world should 
be taxed. And this taxing was first made when Cyrenius 
was governor of Syria. And all went to be taxed, every 
one unto his own city. 

Then one knew that it was indeed Cliristmas. 

So our rejoicing in a new version of the Bible 
does not, and need not, diminish our love for the 
older ones. 

Apart from the familiarity with a particular 
version which engages our affections, the im- 
portant thing for us is the place of these books in 
the civilization which we have inherited and which 
we are strengthening and defending in our own 
lives and in the national life of our country. 

Its place is enormous — shared only, I think, by 
the influence of the land itself, the country in 
which we live. I am not forgetful of the great 
inheritance of Greek thought — indeed it is felt 
in these books themselves — or Roman institutions, 
or of the effect of the ideas and passions which 
spread across the ocean from eighteenth century 
France and England. But the effect of this Bible 
and this country were in my judgment predom- 
inant. And effect upon what ? And this forms 
the third element to produce the United States of 
America — the people who came here and who were 
born here. 



Identified With Early History 

In the earliest days in the Northeast, the Book 
was All. The settlers came here to live their own 
reading of it. It was the spiritual guide, the 
moral and legal code, the political system, the sus- 
tenance of life, whether that meant endurance of 
hardship, the endless struggle with nature, battle 
with enemies, or the inevitable processes of life 
and death. And it meant to those who cast the 
mold of this country something very specific and 
very clear. It meant that the purpose of man's 
journey through this life was to learn and iden- 
tify his life and effort with the purpose and the 
will of God. To do this he must purge his nature 
of its rebellious side. And this, in turn, meant 



Ocfofaer T3, 1952 



555 



that the struggle between good and evil was the 
raging, omnipresent battle in every life, every day. 

The test was not one's own will or desire, not 
the dictate of the government, not the opinion of 
the day, but the will of God as revealed by the 
prophets and to be found, in the last analysis, by 
the individual conscience — guided, instructed, 
chastened, but in the end, alone. 

Out of the travail of these lives the idea of God- 
fearing was given powerful content and effect. It 
meant a voluntary, eager, even militant submis- 
sion to a moral order overriding the wills of the 
low and great and of the state itself. And this 
carried with it the notion of restraints against all, 
of areas blocked off into which none might enter 
because here the duty of the individual conscience 
must be performed. 

But this was not all. This did not exhaust the 
teachings of this Bible. For it taught also that the 
fear of God was the love of God and that the love 
of God was the love of man and the service of 
man. 

What was written in the Book was taught also by 
the life of this country. Never was self-reliance 
so linked with mutual help as in those early days, 
when from birth to death neighbor turned to 
neighbor for help and received it in overflowing 
measure. No characteristic so marks Americans 
to this day as this quick and helping hand, a hand 
offered not only to our fellow citizens but to our 
fellow men. 

Contrast to Soviet Teachings 

It shocks and surprises us to be told that this is 
a weak and soft attitude. A few weeks ago I read 
to another audience the teaching which is being 
given to a people who only a few years ago re- 
garded us as friends.^ Here it is : 

Soviet patriotism is indissolubly connected with hatred 
toward the enemies of the Socialist Fatherland. "It is 
impossible to conquer the enemy without having learned 
to hate him with all the might of one's soul. . . ." The 
teaching of hatred toward the enemies of the tollers en- 
riches the conception of Socialistic humanism by distin- 
gui.shing it from sugary and hypocritical "philanthropy." 

This is a quotation from a Soviet encyclopedia. 

Now philanthropy means love of man. It is sad 
and tragic that a people who once read the same 
books should be taught today to hate in order to 
avoid the softness of the love of man. 

In order to love our own country we do not have 
to hate anyone. There is enough to inspire love 
here. And the first thing is the country itself. I 
am not speaking now of abstractions, the national 
entity, its institutions, its history, and power — 
great as these are — but of some piece of earth with 
the sky over it, whoever owns it, which we think 
of when we think of our country. For it is this 



' For the Secretary's address to the International Asso- 
ciation of Machinists on Sept. 11, see Bulletin of Sept. 
22, 1952. p. 423. 



love of a specific place which gives great strength 
and comfort to the human heart. 

Not far from here there are a few acres which 
even to think of brings me peace, and to be on, to 
see and touch, gives unending joy and refreshment. 
They came to me fi'om the same family which 
received them from the Lord Proprietor and 
which, at the beginning of our country's history, 
built a modest house under the trees. Here for 
generations men and women have worked hard and 
with loving care to make a livelihood and to make 
a home. The house, the barn, the workshop were 
built to outlast the centuries and have done so. To 
every effort nature has responded a thousandfold, 
entering a partnership to make the land each sea- 
son more beautiful than before — the turf softer 
and richer, the trees greater to shelter the small 
house under their embracing spread. To carry on 
man's side of this partnership brings a sense of 
merging with the land and with the generations 
who have been at one with it before. 

It is a good beginning to the love of country to 
love some small piece of it very much. 

And, finally, the central figure of this heritage — 
man himself. Wlio are these people, the Ameri- 
cans? They are a people who, as we have said, 
hold sacred the Word of God. They are a people 
molded by the dangers and the beauty and the open 
bounty of this continent. 

Out of many, they are one. Theirs is a unity 
based upon the brotherhood of man under the 
Fatherhood of God; theirs, too, the great and 
vigorous diversity based on respect for man, the 
individual. Here is no orthodoxy, no worship of 
authority. At the center of this society stands the 
individual man. His back is straight, he looks 
you in the eye — and calls no man his master. 
Sometimes our friends abroad ask whether, be- 
cause of our machines and our worries about the 
world, we are losing this American quality, 
whether a pressure for uniformity is gradually 
turning us into so many sausages, all alike, in our 
dress, our thinking, and in the way we live. I do 
not think this will be our fate. We are too proud, 
too stubborn, too cussedly independent for the 
bridle. And this, indeed, is the secret of our 
strength, and of the lasting power of our society. 
For the solidarity which is built, not upon ser- 
vility, but upon the common loyalty of free men, 
is resilient and enduring. 

And the source and record of the spiritual pur- 
pose of this community of men is the Holy Writ — 
the Book which brings us together this evening. 
This occasion reminds us of the tremendous vital- 
ity of these writings, which form the core, the 
vertebra of our society. 

These reflections upon the interplay of the Bible, 
the land, and the people in creating the national 
life of our country are made vivid for me as I go 
home these autumn evenings. With me, as I leave, 
are the worries, the exasperations, the frustrations 
of the day. Then the rush of the city traffic falls 



556 



Department of State Bulletin 



away. Instead there are fields and lines of cattle 
facing the same way, with heads down. Lights 
spring up in the thinning houses. In time, the 
road becomes a dirt lane, which leads through a 
grove of oaks around a Quaker Meeting House, 
hidden in its ivy, beside it, the graveyard, with its 
rows of little headstones. I know that as I breast 
the hill, there will be lights at the end of the lane. 

And there is peace. 

And I think of the moving prayer that we should 
be kept all the day long of this troublous life 
'til the shadows lengthen, and the evening comes, 
and the busy world is hushed and the fever of life 
is over; and our work is done; and that then we 
be given a safe lodging and a holy rest and peace 
at the last. 

In the times in which we live there is no safe 
lodging and no rest. But all that we do and shall 
do is that there may be peace among men. So 
striving, we may find peace within ourselves. 



of international law." This comes from a Govern- 
ment which has itself, over a period of years, 
created practices in international intercourse 
which violate the traditions and customs of civil- 
ized peoples developed over generations, and which 
adversely affect efforts to maintain good relations 
with the Soviet Government. The Russian peoples 
themselves must be shamefully aware that foreign- 
ers within the Soviet Union are customarily 
treated by the Soviet Government in ways which 
are the exact contrary of civilized international 
usage. The violator of accepted usage is the Soviet 
Government, which has created the situation accu- 
rately described in Ajnbassador Kennan's Berlin 
statement. 

The Soviet Government will be informed of this 
conclusion. Ambassador Kennan is now in 
Geneva. He will remain in Western Europe tem- 
porarily and will later return to Washington for 
consultation. 



U.S.S.R. Requests Recall 
of Ambassador Kennan 

Statement by Secretary Acheson ' 

Press release 777 dated October 3 

The U. S. Government today received a note 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet 
Union stating that the Soviet Government con- 
siders Ambassador George F. Kennan as persona 
non grat<L and requesting Mr. Kennan's immediate 
recall from the post of Ambassador of the United 
States of America in the Soviet Union. The Soviet 
Government in its note bases its request on the 
statement made on September 19 in Berlin by Mr. 
Kennan to representatives of the West Berlin press 
and American correspondents, which the Soviet 
Government characterized as "slanderous attacks 
hostile to the Soviet Union in rude violation of 
generally recognized norms of international law." 
The Government of the United States does not ac- 
cept as valid the charges made by the Soviet Gov- 
ernment. 

Ambassador Kennan is recognized not only in 
this country but throughout the world as a man 
deeply versed in knowledge of the Soviet Union 
and sympathetic to the legitimate aspirations of 
the Russian peoples. There is no doubt that the re- 
quest of the Soviet Government reflects their 
knowledge that the factual statement Ambassador 
Kennan made in Berlin on September 19 will be 
recognized in most parts of the world as a truthful 
one. 

The reasons given by the Soviet Government for 
requesting the recall of Ambassador Kennan are 
that he has violated "generally recognized norms 



' Made at a special press conference on Oct. 3. 
Oc/ofaer 73, J 952 



Text of Soviet Note 

Press release 778 dated October 3 

Following is an vmofficial English translation 
of the note handed on Octoher 3 to John M. Mc- 
Sweeney, Counselor of the American Etnbassy at 
Moscow, hy Andrei Vyshinshy, Scmiet Foreign 
Minister, regtiesting the recall of Ambassador 
Kennan: 

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics has the honor to in- 
form the Government of the United States of 
America of the following : 

As is known, the Ambassador of the United 
States of America in the U.S.S.R., Mr. Kennan, 
on September 19 at Tempelhof Airport in Ber- 
lin made a statement before representatives of 
the West Berlin press and American correspond- 
ents in which he made slanderous attacks hostile 
to the Soviet Union in a rude violation of generally 
recognized norms of international law. In this 
statement, published in a number of West Ger- 
man papers, Mr. Kennan allowed himself to com- 
pare the situation of Americans in Moscow with 
that which he allegedly experienced when in 1941- 
1942 he was interned by Nazis in Germany, and 
stated that "if the Nazis had permitted us to walk 
along the streets without the right to converse 
with any kind of German that would have been 
exactly the same situation in which we must live 
today in Moscow." 

This statement of Mr. Kennan is completely 
false and hostile to the Soviet Union. 

In view of the foregoing the Soviet Govern- 
ment considers it necessary to state that it con- 
siders Mr. Kennan as persona non grata and in- 
sists on Mr. Kennan's immediate recall from the 
post of the Ambassador of the United States of 
America in the Union of Soviet Socialist Re- 
publics. 

557 



Understanding Today's World 



hy Howland H. Sargeant 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs ^ 



I am very happy to be here today. For the 
theme of this Institute is as crucial as it is timely. 

I regret that I am not better qualified to discuss 
military matters as such. I am not a professional 
soldier. And I make no pretense at being able to 
carry on a highly technical discussion of the mili- 
tary factors in American foreign policy. 

However, I can give you some general ideas on 
the relationship between a sound military defense 
and a sound foreign policy. I can try to put mili- 
tary considerations in their pi-oper focus in the 
making and carrying through of foreign policy. 
And I i^articularly want to pinpoint the relation- 
ship between American foreign policy and a spe- 
cific military action — the action in Korea. 

But before we get into any of these things, it 
would be wise to dispose of one or two popular 
misconceptions as to the process by which foreign 
policy is made. 

There is a widely held belief that American 
foreign policy should be able to find the solution 
to any problem with the instinct of a homing 
jDigeon or the precision of a radar-controlled 
rocket. Those who hold this belief assume that 
foreign policy can be fixed with mathematical cer- 
tainty. 

They assume that we can control all the factors 
which determine our foreign policy or that we can 
anticipate every move another nation is going to 
make. 

Such is not the case. 

The objectives of American foreign policy can 
be determined. They are determined. They are 
realistic. And they are the product of the closest 
kind of teamwork at the Cabinet level. 

But the prohlems of foreign policy are not and 
cannot be solved with a calculator. Our friends 
abroad — even our best fi'iends — neither jump nor 
want to jump every time Washington sneezes. 

Foreign policy is a highly complex thing and 



' Address made before the Institute of Military Factors 
in U.S. Foreign Policy conducted by tbe University of 
Minnesota at Minneapolis on Sept. 29 (press release 759 
dated Sept. 26). 



international politics a highly complex business. 

Hand in hand with the mistaken impression 
that foreign policy is a simple matter goes the 
habit of using words like "peace," "unity," 
"strength," and "understanding" as if we had but 
to press a button to achieve all four. These words 
make excellent slogans. They also happen to be 
descriptive of things America wants and is ac- 
tively seeking. They are among our most vital 
objectives. 

The road ahead of us remains hard, long, and 
treacherous — if we are truly to achieve the best 
of what each of those objectives implies. 

Let us look at each of them — at "peace," "unity," 
"strength," and "understanding." Let us look at 
them closely. In the process, I think, we will be- 
gin to see the role military factors can and must 
play in carrying out American foreign policy. We 
will also begin to see that the power that America 
and the entire free world must have to meet the 
menace facing us is more than a purely material 
thing. 



Peace Necessary to Progress 

Take peace. Peace is not a luxury. It is a 
necessity if we are to continue to progi-ess. 

No less a soldier than Gen. Douglas MacArthur 
made that clear in a recent speech when he said: 
"War is outmoded as an instrument of political 
policy" and then went on to refer to global war 
as "national suicide." 

America's basic foreign-policy aim is a decent 
and just peace. America can be secure only with 
such a peace. We cannot achieve a just peace by 
dropping atomic bombs on everybody who dis- 
agrees with us. Nor can we produce such a peace 
by launching a preventive war. That is clear. 

With conditions as they are, we must think in 
terms of military power and a sound defense. We 
have no alternative if we are to preserve our free- 
dom. And we are thinking in these terms. But 
we must never forget that military strength is a 
means to an end — not an end in itself. 



558 



Department of State Bulletin 



The Communists would like nothing better than 
o convince the world that America does not dis- 
inguish between end and means. They have gone 
ill out to try to do that very thing. 

Communist propagandists seek to obscure the 
hreat posed by Soviet imperialism by perpetually 
•ailing us names. They constantly refer to our 
lefense effort as "warmongering" and regularly 
;harge us with "preparations for a global war." 
ractics such as these— the use of outright lies — 
ire standard equipment of the Communists' world- 
Nide propaganda machine. They make up the 
nask behind which the Soviets seek to hide their 
iggi-essive intentions. 

Just saying "it isn't so" hardly solves the prob- 
em posed by Communist lies. And it certainly 
ices not begin to answer the "Hate America" cam- 
paign which has recently become a central theme 
Df Communist propaganda. 

The Communists have tried to foment hatred 
igainst us before but never on the scale of the 
present. Their current drive is a strenuous effort 
to develop hatred for the American people as well 
IS for the United States as a nation. 

I will not here go into detail on this venomous 
hatred campaign. I want only to make the point 
that hatred — when coupled with the traditional 
Soviet "Big Lie" technique — can become a most 
effective propaganda weapon if it is not quickly 
and effectively countered. 

The fact that Communist imperialism is itself 
the greatest threat to peace makes it no easier for 
us. Many peoples — so desperately hoping for a 
lasting peace — are inclined to overlook the deeds 
of the Soviet ogre when he points his finger else- 
where and insists that his only aim is peace. 

Tliere are people in Western Europe — people 
who are friendly to America and Americans — who 
have paused to "listen to what the Communists are 
saying. Some of these people are concerned lest 
our defense measures lead down the road to war. 

Let us face it. The Western Europeans have 
but emerged from the most devastating war in 
modern history. They have seen their nations 
serve as battlefields, their homes destroyed, their 
democracy temporarily trampled. 

Today, they live almost beneath the muzzles of 
Soviet guns. Should war come, they believe their 
homelands would be the immediate targets of 
atomic weapons. Can they be blamed if they fear 
that we — through some error in political judg- 
ment — might act so as to endanger their security ? 
Consider the peoples of the Near and Far East. 
They are not without admiration for our accom- 
plishments. But many of them have just won 
their independence or are in the process of doing 
so. Theirs is the new nationalism. 

Is it any wonder that these peoples question 
some of the steps we are taking to strengthen our 
ties with those very Western nations which have 
been colonial powers ? Is it easy for them to forget 
that among our closest allies are the countries who 

October 13, J 952 



have wielded great influence in the Near and Far 

East? 

It is not. 

We Americans want peace. Our entire foreign 
policy is geared to achieving a peace of justice and 
decency. 

But we dare not forget that there are millions 
of people throughout the world who must be con- 
stantly assured that we are indeed motivated by 
peace." We must not only talk peace. We must — 
by our actions — demonstrate that we seek the kind 
of peace other peoples want and need to share. 

The Problem of Unity 

And that brings me to the second problem — the 
problem of unity. 

We have learned the hard way that peace and 
security can be achieved only if we are willing 
and able to work with others for the common 
good. America cannot "go it alone." We are 
strong. But not that strong. 

Those who would have us seek refuge behind 
our two gi-eat oceans are looking through the wrong 
end of the telescope. America is no longer an 
island — if indeed it ever was. Our oceans are 
mere puddles. Our greatest cities are 12 hours by 
air from Moscow. 

Technology has indeed made this "one world." 
And the menace of Communist imperialism has 
made it imperative that we join with other nations 
in preserving our common heritage of freedom, 
liberty, and individual dignity. To use the jar- 
gon of the political scientists, power in today's 
world is polarized. That is, there are only two 
major centers of power. The Soviet Union and its 
satellites. We and our free world allies. 

This means that any gain made by interna- 
tional communism anywhert is a loss to free men 
everywhere. 

From our own point of view, it means that we 
must be as concerned with events in the Far East, 
the Near East, and South America as we are with 
those in Western Europe. 

There is no question but that our mutual rela- 
tionships with Western Europe are of the highest 
importance — for cultural as well as for political, 
economic, and strategic reasons. But our efforts 
to help deter aggression in Europe will be fruit- 
less if — in the process — we stand idly by while 
other areas of the free world are gobbled up by the 
Kremlin. We can truly foster freedom, stability, 
and security in the United States only if we are 
willing to help foster it everywhere else. 

Creating Strength for the Free World 

And that brings me to the third of these key 
words or symbols — strength. 

Strength means different things to different peo- 
ple. What do we mean when we say the United 

559 



States seeks strength for the free world? Mili- 
tary strength ? Certainly. 

We have no recourse but to build our own de- 
fenses and to work with others to develop the 
power with which to contain the Kremlin. 

You will note that I have used the word "con- 
tain." I should like to look briefly at just what 
that term implies. Now, there are those who say 
that containment is purely negative. I admit that 
the word "containment" can leave you with that 
imjjression. But America's "containment policy" 
as such is anything but negative. It is and al- 
ways has been positive. It is not only designed 
to be against something — against Soviet expan- 
sionism. It is also for something — for a secure 
America in a decent, stable world. 

The containment policy is concerned with cre- 
ating strength — strength for ourselves and the en- 
tire free world. Consider some of the accomplish- 
ments that are firmly rooted in the containment 
policy. 

Take Western Europe. In keeping with the 
United Nations Charter, we have helped the Euro- 
peans to build economic and political stability and 
to make their own way along the path toward gen- 
uine unity. The Marshall Plan, the Mutual Secu- 
rity Program, the North Atlantic Treaty Organi- 
zation — these are some of the means through 
which we have cooperated and are cooperating 
with the Western Europeans in defending their 
security and ours against communism. 

The Schuman Plan, the European Defense 
Community, the Council of Europe — these are 
some of the achievements of a cooperating free Eu- 
rope willing and able to work with us for the 
common good of the free peoples. 

Take Greece and Turkey. Both were threat- 
ened by Stalinist ambitions at the close of World 
War II. Has not our aid to these two nations 
helped to create a bastion of strength in the north- 
ern Mediterranean for the entire free world ? 

We have further strengthened our security ties 
in the Western Hemisphere by far-reaching mu- 
tual defense agreements with our Canadian and 
Latin iVmerican neighbors. 

In the Pacific, we have worked out a pattern of 
security in cooperation with Australia and New 
Zealand, with the Philippines, and with Japan. 
And we have joined our allies in resisting aggres- 
sion on the Asian Continent. 

The Point Four Program is helping the peo- 
ples of underdeveloped areas to strengthen and 
modernize their economies. We are thus open- 
ing the road to a decent standard of living to mil- 
lions who have never before had it. We are help- 
ing to tackle the age-old scourges of disease, il- 
literacy, and hunger. In the process, we are 
making friends. And those friends are achieving 
the stability and the stamina to withstand the 
threat of Communist aggression. 

These, then, are some of the accomplishments 
to which the containment policy has led us. I am 



sure that you will agree that these are positive 
rather than negative. 

I am equally certain that you can see why mili- 
tary power is not the only measure of strength. 
There is a very real relationship between a na- 
tion's ability to defend itself and its standard of 
living, its morale, and the stability of its gov- 
ernment. This we cannot — dare not — forget. 

To expect a friendly European nation to do its 
part in bearing the mutual burden of military de- 
fense while its economy is tottering or its govern- 
ment is paralyzed is to expect the impossible. We 
may carp about the failure of some of our friends 
to keep up with us in terms of military production 
or the number of divisions in the field. That is 
only natural. The American taxpayer is carrying 
a heavy load. But the fact is that, proportionately 
speaking, his load is not nearly so heavy as that 
in several European countries where the standard 
of living is far below our own. 

Yes, America seeks strength — strength for her- 
self and for the entire free world. But we Amer- 
icans must be realistic. We must bear in mind 
that strength is not purely material. It must have 
a solid moral and spiritual foundation. 

The Need for Mutual Understanding 

And that brings me to the fourth of our slo- 
gans — unde rs tanding. 

We — the peoples of the fi-ee world — will have 
neither peace nor unity nor genuine strength un- 
less we also have mutual understanding. We can 
work effectively for peace and against tyranny 
only if we know each other. We can reach our 
objectives only if we are as tolerant of each other's 
differences as we are certain of our agreement on 
basic principles. 

America and her friends must continue to share 
their common belief in individual dignity, free- 
dom of expression, and the other basic liberties 
which characterize democracy. We must never 
lose sight of those ideals which distinguish us 
from the brutal, enslaving soul-destruction of 
Communist totalitarianism. 

America must never forget that it is under the 
greatest pressure to foster mutual understanding, 
if only because its position of leadership demands 
it. What does this mean? It means that all of 
us — private individuals as well as government 
officials — must learn to avoid making irresponsible 
statements which add nothing to America's se- 
curity and serve only to alienate our friends over- 
seas. 

It is one thing to take a fh-m position against ag- 
gression or the threat of aggression. It is quite 
another to make empty, threatening gestures 
which create grist for the Soviet propaganda mill 
and add to the fears and tensions of those friendly 
nations that live under the immediate shadow of 
Soviet power. 

The proposal that America use force to liberate 



560 



Department of State Bulletin 



the peoples behind the Iron Curtain is a case in 
point. 

Of these enslaved peoples, President Truman 
has said : "We shall never forget these people. We 
shall never cease working to help these people gain 
their rightful chance for freedom." However— as 
the President went on to point out — the liberation- 
by-force proposal would not benefit the Eastern 
Europeans nor would it improve our relations with 
our free allies. 

If pursued, the proposal would simply raise false 
hopes among the Eastern Europeans and might 
well lead to even greater repression by their Com- 
munist rulers. It might also foster fruitless blood- 
shed by inciting revolt against regimes which have 
the power to crush such revolt with comparative 
ease. 

Inasmuch as liberation by force implies the use 
of military power, our friends in Western Europe 
could hardly continue to see us as a peaceful nation 
if the proposal were kept alive. Our allies could 
not help but feel that we were being hypocritical 
in urging peace on one hand while, on the other, 
some of our well-known citizens were advocating 
the use of force in Eastern Europe. 

I am happy to state that the liberation-by-force 
proposal seems to be fading from the scene. But 
I want to repeat that we have not forgotten the 
people behind the Iron Curtain. Nor will we for- 
get them. These peoples will regain their freedom. 
I am convinced of that. For I am confident that 
Soviet tyranny cannot stand up to the free way of 
life in the long run. 

We can best meet our obligation to those behind 
the Iron Curtain by building and maintaining our 
own strength. Given that strength, the powerful 
attraction that freedom can hold for all peoples 
will inevitably force the Communists to release 
their grip on those whom they have enslaved. 

Practicing What We Preach 

Another obligation is that we practice what we 
preach. 

This is as true in the economic field as it is in 
others. We dare not proclaim our desires for pro- 
gressive freeing of trade on one hand while erect- 
ing unnecessarily stiff tariff barriers on the other. 
We dare not promise to purchase thus-and-so in 
other countries, if, at the same time, we are giving 
in to selfish domestic pressure exerted in the inter- 
est of excessive profits. 

Obviously we can and should look out for the 
reasonable needs of our domestic industries. But 
we must understand that we can do so most effec- 
tively in the long run only if we recognize the needs 
of other countries as well. We would do well to re- 
member that the day when one could measure good 
will exclusively in dollars and cents is behind us. 

We cannot afford to think like the General who, 
when told that all of his artillery had been cap- 
tured by the enemy, responded : "Oh, well, it hasn't 
been paid for!" 

October 13, 1952 



The battle between freedom and Communist to- 
talitarianism is a global one. And it is being 
fought at every level. Ideas are as important as 
bullets in this battle. And we can win only if we 
can continue to show other peoples that it is to their 
own best interest to work with us. We can win 
only if we are able to project an honest image of 
a decent America into the minds of those many 
millions who now have false or inadequate impres- 
sions of us. 

Our international information program is rnak- 
ing great progress toward both of these objectives. 
It is getting results. But the program is a young 
one. We would be deluding ourselves if we were 
to assume that the job were done or nearly done. 
We have only begun it. 

Yes, we must have genuine understanding. And 
we must be willing to give it to others. How does 
this need for understanding fit in with the military 
considerations with which this Institute is con- 
cerned ? 

Wise Use of Power 

Let me give you a brief summary. 

Military factors do play a crucial role in the 
determination of how our foreign policy is to 
operate in a given situation. Military power is one 
major factor in our efforts to build situations of 
strength at strategic points where the free world 
and the slave world meet. We have tried to pursue 
a policy consistent with our capacities. We have 
soughtto avoid political commitments which are 
beyond our material power to discharge. We do 
realize that power — material power — affects deci- 
sions in the field of international politics. 

At the same time, we try to heed the advice of 
the Roman, Seneca, who said : "He who has great 
power should use it lightly." 

Our great power in today's world is beneficial 
only to the extent that we use it wisely. And 
wisdom demands that we work with others in the 
common interest of peace and democracy. If we 
can continue to use our power wisely, we can win 
the respect and the confidence of other nations. 
We nnist have that respect and that confidence if 
we are to be secure. 

Did we use our power wisely in Korea? Were 
we right in supporting the U.N. action there? 

These are vital and immediate questions. For 
Korea is not only a crucial "military factor" in 
American foreign policy. Korea is of direct 
human concern to every American family with 
a son, a brotlier, or a husband fighting there. 
Korea is a tragic personal thing for many thou- 
sands of American homes. 

But Korea also holds real meaning for the 
security of America and for everything we hold 
dear. The charges that American diplomacy 
gave North Koi'ea to the Communists or that 
we failed to help the Republic of South Korea 
to prepare its defenses are false. Tliey are also 

561 



dangerous. They strike at our well-beinji; if only 
because they tend to obscure the facts about Korea 
that every thinking American has a right to know 
and understand. 

One fact that is particularly obscure for many 
people is %rhy we went into Korea. The simple 
truth is that we went in to help stop aggi'ession. 
Not only have we stopped it, but we have also 
driven the aggi'essor back along most of the battle 
line to the point from which his aggression was 
launched. 

Accomplishments in Korea 

But let us look at specifics. 'WHiat have we 
accomplished by halting the brutal, unprovoked, 
carefully planned assault which the Communists 
launched in June of 1950 ? 

We have taken part in modern history's first 
successful containment of aggression by collec- 
tive security. We have helped the United Nations 
to maintain and sti'engthen its position as man- 
kind's best hope for peace. We have kept an 
independent Republic from being overrun by com- 
munism, and thus have preserved an ally for the 
free world in Asia. We have shattered the myth 
of Communist invincibility and given new heart 
to the forces fighting communism in Asia and 
elsewhere. We have undoubtedly deterred the 
Communists fi"om launching other aggressions 
elsewhere. 

We have localized a conflict that might well 
have spread into global war. We have fought 
in Korea so that we would not have to fight with 
our backs to our own walls. By the forthright 
action in Korea, the free nations have an added 
respect for the United States and renewed con- 
fidence in our aims. The United Nations has 
likewise gained prestige. 

A few of the achievements I have listed may 
seem relatively unimportant to some people. 
After all, Korea is thousands of miles away from 
Minneapolis or Portland or Cleveland. But dis- 
tance does not change the fact that our very exist- 
ence has been at stake in Korea. Let me quote 
a few sentences from an intelligence report which 
was made public some months ago. It concerns 
a statement a Communist officer in the Far East 
made to his men shortly before the invasion of 
Korea. This is what the officer said: 

In order to successfully undertake the long-awaited 
world revolution, we must first unify Asia. . . . Java, 
Indochina, Malaya, India, Tibet, Thailand, the Philip- 
pines, and Japan are ultimate targets. . . . The United 
States is the only obstacle on our road for the liberation 
of all countries in southeast Asia. In other words, we 
must unify the people of Asia and crush the United 
States. 

Let me repeat those words: "We must . . . 
crush the United States." Does that look as if 
the United States can afford to be unconcerned 
with what happens in Korea — or, for that mat- 



ter, with what happens anywhere in Asia? No. 
The Communists launched their aggression in 
Korea with every intention of making it a step 
toward swallowing Asia and ultimately the world. 
We had no alternative but to act as we did. 

The cold-blooded Communist aggression in 
Korea has alerted the free world to tTie need for 
stepping up its defense efforts, and the U.N. op- 
erations in Korea have given us the time and 
the impetus to do so. Now, one thing that par- 
ticularly concerns most Americans today is the 
fact that the Korean truce negotiations have been 
dragging along for some 15 months. There is 
an understandable impatience — a feeling that per- 
haps we ought to adopt certain additional drastic 
measures to force the Communists to come to an 
agreement. There is, for example, the school of 
thought wliich holds that we ought to extend the 
Korean conflict to the Chinese mainland. 

Truce Negotiations 

Now, I will agree that the negotiations have 
lasted a long time. Admittedly, the going in the 
truce tent at Panmunjom has not been easy. But 
there are several very vital facts that we ought 
to bear in mind before we allow our impatience 
to get the best of our good judgment. In the first 
place, the truce negotiations have not been fruit- 
less. Only a single issue — that of the prisoners 
of war — stands between the negotiators and full 
agreement. The Communists are demanding that 
we forcibly repatriate all prisoners in our hands. 
Thousands of these prisoners have said that they 
do not want to return to Comminiist control be- 
cause they fear that they will be tortured or shot 
if they do so. 

We have refused to force these prisoners of war 
to return. As President Truman has pointed out, 
we have no intention of going back on the very 
morality which distinguishes our freedom from 
Communist tyranny. We have no intention of 
sending prisoners of war to their death. 

We have no intention of sacrificing principle for 
expediency. 

A second point that needs to be borne in mind 
is that a primary consideration in Korea is the 
security of our troops there. Prior to the Com- 
munist request for truce negotiations, we had in- 
flicted heavy casualties upon the aggressor. We 
have not been allowing him to relax during the 
negotiations. He has continued to suffer heavy 
losses. His defense industries and military sup- 
ply lines in North Korea have been subjected to a 
constant and heavy pounding by our bombers. 
Many of his key sources of power — electric 
power, in particular — have been knocked out. 

It has been suggested that the truce negotiations 
have given the Communists a chance to build up 
their forces. The fact is that we have not been 
sitting still either. General Van Fleet pointed out 
only a few weeks ago that we are in position to 



562 



Department of State Bulletin 



take anything the Communists can throw at us. 
The General also stated that the morale, equip- 
ment, and general level of readiness of U.N. forces 
in Korea are excellent. 

A third point about the current situation in 
Korea — and a very crucial point it is — concerns 
the proposal that we expand the conflict there. 
Expansion of the conflict would not necessarily 
solve our problem. It would certainly increase 
the danger of an all-out global war. Gen. Omar 
Bradley, speaking for our Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
of which he is Chairman, had this to say to Con- 
gi'ess. I quote him : 

Enlargement of the war in Korea to include Red China 
would probably delight the Kremlin more than anything 
else we could do. It would necessarily tie down addi- 
tional forceps, especially our sea power and our air power, 
while the Soviet Union would not be obligated to put a 
single man into the conflict. 

That was the view of General Bradley, a view 
shared by all of the Joint Chiefs. As I have said, 
I personally do not know much about military 
science. But our Joint Chiefs of Staff do know. 
Like an overwhelming majority of Americans, I 
have great confidence in their understanding and 
judgment. 

I know that no matter how the truce negotia- 
tions in Korea come out we will not unnecessarily 
endanger the security of our forces there. We 
will certainly not go back on the principles by 
which we live. We will not abandon those who 
look to us to stand firm on our convictions. The 
U.N. military objective in Korea was to stop ag- 
gression. I repeat — that objective has been 
achieved. 

It is to our best interest to bear that in mind 
as we consider our future course of action. It is 
to our best interest to remember that the United 
States is not the only nation fighting in Korea. 
We must recognize that any decision we may make 
on Korea will affect our free-world allies. We 
must painstakingly measure any contemplated 
steps against any loss that we may suffer in the 
unity, the strength, and the trust we share with 
other peoples. 

The military action in Korea has had and will 
continue to have a strong psychological impact 
upon other nations, whether they are directly con- 
cerned or not. 

The Korean conflict is limited. But it is not 
isolated. 

I do not presume to know what no man can — 
except perhaps the Communist leaders who are 
blocking settlement in Korea. I cannot tell you 
when we are going to reach a settlement. Nor can 
I tell you that there is any easy road to a Korean 
solution. There is none. 

But I can tell you this — as long as we hold to 
our ideals, our self-confidence, and our willing- 
ness to work for better understanding with other 
peoples, we can be confident that we will achieve 
our objectives. 



Broadcast by Rumanian Escapee 

Press release 770 dated October 1 

Panait Calcai, escaped Rumanian Olympics 
athlete, warned his fellow countrymen in a Voice 
of America broadcast on October 1 not to be de- 
ceived by the Communists. The 28-year-old Ru- 
manian marksmanship champion, who fled to free- 
dom during the recent Olympics in Helsinki, is 
now in Western Germany. In a statement pre- 
recorded for the Voice of America broadcast to 
Rumania, Calcai said : 

I am filled with deep emotion in speaking to those in 
my country from this radio station which I myself have 
listened to for years with hope and confidence. 

The statement, which was released simultane- 
ously at a news conference in Frankfort, said that 
the lies and falsities of the Communist regime in 
Rumania came into striking focus as soon as he 
reached the free world. 

"It is this unmasking of their deception," Calcai 
continued, "that the Communists are most afraid 
of. For it is this knowledge which gives the lie 
most effectively to Communist propaganda and 
which will most strengthen the captive people's 
will to resist." 

Calcai made his escape as the Rumanian team 
was waiting at the Helsinki railroad station after 
the end of the Olympics. He claimed that he had 
forgotten his knapsack and then started an alter- 
cation with the guard who accompanied him to get 
the knapsack. The guard disappeared when po- 
lice and a crowd were attracted by the struggle and 
he was permitted to go his own way. 

"I could not return to my country," he declared, 
"and permit my further use as an instrument of a 
regime which wants its athletes to defame Western 
Europeans and Western achievements. I prefer 
to do what any honest Rumanian would have done 
in my place." 

The Communi.sts imagine they can muffle the love of 
freedom and the attachment of the entire Rumauian peo- 
ple toward the free world. But the Communists cannot 
make fools of honest Rumanians — of Rumanians who 
know and value freedom as much as their own life. 

Calcai told his fellow countrymen that the 
tragedy of those behind the Iron Curtain is fully 
understood by free peoples everywhere. He 
added : 

My countrymen in Rumania, it is your duty to main- 
tain your confidence. Do not allow yourselves to be de- 
ceived by the Communists. 

Current Legislation on Foreign Policy 

Approving Puerto Rican Constitution. Hearings Before 
the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 
United States Senate, 82d Cong., 2d sess. on S.J. 
Res. 151, A Joint Resolution Approving the Constitu- 
tion of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Which 
Was Adopted by the People of Puerto Rico on March 
3, 1952. Apr. 29 and May 6, 1952. Committee print. 
126 pp. 



October 13, J 952 



563 



Private Enterprise in Turitisii-American Relations 



hy George C. McGhee ^ 
Ambassador to Turkey 



The success of private commercial enterprise, 
which I count as the principal force in the eco- 
nomic relations between free nations, is dependent 
upon a broad base of cooperation and understand- 
ing between the peoples and the countries con- 
cerned. Such success depends upon the existence 
of certain common standards of business conduct 
and ethics and upon the acceptance of common 
commercial procedures. It also depends upon 
broad agreement between the countries concerned 
on basic political and economic policy. Even 
though trade is possible between governments per- 
mitting private trading and those engaged in to- 
talitarian state trading, it is no coincidence that 
healthy economic relations have, in fact, never de- 
veloped between such nations. I would like, there- 
fore, to preface my remarks by commenting on 
the understanding between the Turkish and 
American Governments which makes your business 
enterprise possible. 

I believe it accurate to state that never in history 
have Turkish-American relations been so close. 
In remarks which I made some weeks ago before 
another distinguished group here in Istanbul, I 
ventured to refer to our relations as a partner- 
ship — a Turkish-American partnership.^ I con- 
sider the term partnership, which connotes mutual 
confidence and trust between equals, a term pe- 
culiarly applicable to the happy relationship 
which has developed between our two countries 
in the postwar period. 

This partnership was strongly cemented by the 
Truman Doctrine, enunciated in March 1947. 
That Doctrine, as you will recall, was the Ameri- 
can answer to Soviet-inspired pressures upon Tur- 
key and Greece. Pursuant to that policy, the 
United States has been able to extend to Turkey 
military and economic aid in an aggregate of over 

' Address made before the Propeller Club of the United 
States of the Port of Istanbul at Istanbul, Turkey, on 
Sept. 9. 

' BuLLBnN of May 19, 19.^2, p. 774. 



1 billion dollars. The Turkish people have 
matched this American aid in true partnership 
fashion with a remarkable national effort. Tur- 
key has clearly demonstrated her determination 
to stand firm. We regard her as one of our 
staunchest allies. We share her pride in her 
magnificent record in Korea. We are gratified 
that Turkey's position in the Western community 
has been further solidified by her adherence to the 
North Atlantic Treaty. We welcome the accu- 
mulated wisdom of Turkish statecraft which will 
be brought to bear on Nato decisions and in de- 
liberations affecting the creation of the proposed 
Middle East Defense Organization. 

During the 5 years in which our Turkish-Amer- 
ican partnership has taken on strength, there has 
been concomitantly a marked degree of economic 
progress in Turkey. Increases in agricultural 
production — especially cereals and cotton — have 
been spectacular. Starting from an import posi- 
tion in wheat, Turkey last year exported 800,000 
tons, and this year expects to export 1,500,000 tons. 
There has been a steady expansion in industrial 
output and power facilities. Coal, chrome, man- 
ganese, and copper have been coming out of Turk- 
ish mines at an accelerated rate. The Turkish 
road system has been greatly expanded and trans- 
port substantially improved. 

These are generalized statements of improve- 
ments which all of us have witnessed. The Turk- 
ish people deserve full credit for this progress. 
They have worked hard indeed to take advantage 
of the economic potentialities of their country. 
We are proud, however, that our economic mission 
has been able to assist Turkey during this period 
of progress. We are most happy that American 
equipment, supplies and technical assistance, fur- 
nished under our aid programs, have made an im- 
portant contribution. 

I hope that my Turkish friends share my convic- 
tion that the Turkish- American partnership, with 
its manifest solidarity in the military, economic, 
and cultural fields, stands on a very firm and broad 



564 



Department of State Bulletin 



foundation. It is because of this fundamental 
strength that you gentlemen, interested in 
Turkish-American commercial relationships and 
sparked by the concept of private enterprise, can 
chart your future course in relative security. 

American Clipper Ships in Early Trading 

And now let us go back to the central theme of 
private enterprise in Turkish- American relations. 
As Propeller Club members, with a basic interest 
in maritime matters, you know that the American 
clipper ships of the early 1800"s ranked foremost 
of all vessels afloat. They were swift, smart, strong 
of construction, and were navigated with pluck. 
These vessels, their skippers and their crews I'epre- 
sented early American private initiative at its best. 
These clipper ships, while by no means the first 
American ships to call at Turkish ports, were re- 
sponsible for an expanded Turkish-American 
trade with cargoes valued in excess of a million 
dollars yearly from 1811 on. 

Most of this early trade was with Izmir. The 
first American vessel that ever penetrated the 
Black Sea was the brig Calwmet, of Boston, in 
1810. Trade with Istanbul, however, was not un- 
dertaken on any appreciable basis until after the 
conclusion of the Turkish-American Treaty of 
1830, through which the U. S. Government ob- 
tained for its citizens in Turkey rights equal to 
those enjoyed by the citizens of the most favored 
nations. Thus the Black Sea was permanently 
opened to American commerce and navigation. 
With diplomatic relations established between the 
U.S. Government and the Sublime Porte, a num- 
ber of Americans settled in Turkish port cities. 
Some of their descendants continue to play a part 
in Turkey's business life. 

There are three particular side lights which m^y 
interest you in connection with the Turkish-Amer- 
ican Treaty of 1830 : Ratifications were exchanged 
in Kandilli on the Bosphorus (opposite the present 
site of Robert College), where the Reis Effendi, or 
Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, resided. Of 
the three U. S. representatives who conducted the 
lengthy negotiations which led to the treaty of 
1830, two were businessmen — Charles Rhind, a 
New York merchant long interested in trade in the 
Levant, and David Offley, an Izmir trader who 
afterward became the first American Consul in 
Turkey under the treaty. It was an American 
clipper ship, and the private ingenuity which it 
embodied, that attracted the Sublime Porte and 
laid the ground work for formalized Turkish- 
American trade relations. 

Basis of Commercial Intercourse 

Present-day Turkish-American commercial in- 
tercourse is conducted within the framework of 
tliree formal agreements: The Commerce and 
Navigation Treaty of October 1, 1929 ; the Estab- 

Ocfober J 3, J 952 



lishment and Sojourn Treaty of October 28, 1931 ; 
and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 

The Commerce and Navigation Treaty mutually 
guarantees to Turkish and American foreign 
traders unconditional most-favored-nation treat- 
ment with respect to their imports and exports. In 
addition, it accords reciprocally to Turkish vessels 
in the United States and U. S. vessels in Turkey 
much of the same treatment accorded national 
vessels. 

The Establishment and Sojourn Treaty mu- 
tually guarantees to the nationals and corporations 
of either country in the territories of the other, 
most-favored-nation treatment as concerns matters 
implicit in the treaty title — establishment and so- 
journ. 

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade — 
generally referred to as Gatt — is a multilateral in- 
strument to which both the United States and 
Turkey are now parties. Turkey's accession oc- 
curred on Septemtjer 17, 1951. Trade concessions 
which the United States and Turkey negotiated 
within the Gatt framework at Torquay, Eng- 
land, during the summer of 1951, went into effect 
on October 17, 1951. The bilateral trade conces- 
sions, benefits of which accrue to all Gatt part- 
ners, represent a further liberalization of the tariff 
ti-eatment previously accorded Turkish and U. S. 
products and supersede the provisions of the Re- 
ciprocal Trade Agi-eement between Turkey and the 
United States of April 1, 1939. 

The three agreements which I have just men- 
tioned constitute the legal basis on which AJner- 
icans can do business in Turkey and Turks can do 
business in the United States. Those of you Amer- 
icans who have interests in Turkey and those of 
you Turks who have such interests in the United 
States have been able to establish and maintain 
them by virtue of the Establishment and Sojourn 
Treaty. Because of it, private Americans have 
made investments in Turkey and have established 
themselves here for both commercial and philan- 
thropic purposes with reasonable assurance of pro- 
tection and continuity. 

U.S. -Turkish Trade Flourishing 

It should, of course, be the objective of our two 
countries continuously to consider means by which 
the basis of fruitful trade can be expanded and 
improved, and it is my hope that progress in this 
direction can be made in bringing our treaty struc- 
ture up to date. In the meantime, however, trade 
and investment between Turkey and the United 
States has flourished. American investments in 
Turkey are substantial. They exceed 33 million 
dollars. Of this amount, approximately 11 mil- 
lion dollars is invested in oil distribution facilities, 
8 million dollars in American-sponsored schools 
and hospitals, and 6 million dollars in tobacco 
processing installations. In this latter connection 
you might be interested to know that the tobacco 

565 



plants shipped 32 million dollars worth of Turk- 
ish tobacco to the United States in 1951. Other 
fields of activity involving considerable Ameri- 
can investments include sewing machine distribu- 
tion, electric light bulb production, licorice proc- 
essing, pharmaceutical manufacture, and the dis- 
tribution of photographic equipment. 

Total trade between the United States and Tur- 
key amounted in 1951 to 60 million dollars in 
Turkish imports and 67 million dollars in Turkish 
exports. In addition to tobacco, America has 
emerged as the major purchaser of other Turkish 
products. Last year, for example, the United 
States bought about 70 percent of Turkish chrome 
output, which was 59 percent by value of total 
Ajnerican impoi'ts of metallurgical grade of this 
vital commodity. The United States is also pur- 
chasing increasing amounts of manganese. The 
United States exhibit at the current Izmir Trade 
Fair, which I recently had the honor of attend- 
ing to open the American Pavilion, is evidence of 
interest in maintaining trade between the two 
countries on a solid and enduring basis. 

Promotion of Domestic Investment 

While I have no comparable data to offer on 
Turkish activity in my country, there are a num- 
ber of Turkish nationals whom we regard as 
"treaty merchants" and who are associated with 
very active commercial establishments in the 
United States. Some of these are doing most 
creditable service in the procurement of essential 
ores, such as chrome and manganese, from Turkey. 
There are other Turks who have chosen to make 
the United States their permanent home. They 
have joined the other elements of the American 
population in helping make our country the land 
of economic accomplishment that it is. 

I am often asked why there is not more foreign 
private investment in Turkey. With about the 
same frequency I am asked why there is not more 
domestic private investment in Turkey. The sec- 
ond question should obviously come first because, 
generally speaking, a climate which is conducive 
to domestic private investment tends to attract 
outside capital. 

As concerns Turkey, I believe it important to 
stress that evolution in the direction of domestic 
private investment has been occurring in progi-es- 
sive stages since the formation of the Turkish 
Republic in 1923. Those who undei-stand the eco- 
nomic problems which faced Ataturk and the 
Grand National Assembly in those early days un- 
derstand why it was considered necessary to in- 
ject a sti'ong element of state planning and state 
enterprise into the economic life of the country as 
the first phase of Turkey's modern economic de- 
velopment. Turkey, both as a country and as a 
composite of individuals, lacked capital. If the 
industrial base required for a modern state was 
to be ci'eated upon the existing agricultural econ- 

566 



omy, it was considered necessary for the state it- 
self to take the initiative. In recent years Turkey 
has swung into a new phase of economic develop- 
ment: the phase of inci'eased economic freedom 
and intensified economic effoi't. I have heard it 
argued effectively that this phase could never 
have come about in Turkey without the steps 
which jjreceded it. 

Tlie important point is that Turkey today is 
one of the few countries in the world whose policy 
calls for diminishing rather than broadening state 
control of industry, business, and banking. By 
delimiting the future role of state enterprise, the 
Turkish Government recognizes the contribution 
that the spirit of private initiative can, as it did 
in our country, make toward the development of 
Turkey's great natural resources. 

I see widespread evidence that the Turkish Gov- 
ernment wishes to promote domestic private enter- 
prise and investment. Let me cite a few examples : 
The state match monopoly has been lifted, making 
possible the private import, sale, and domestic 
production of matches. Salt production for ex- 
port has been opened up to private interests. 
Sugar beet growers are able to buy shares in here- 
tofore fully state-owned sugar factories, and 
three new sugar factories are projected on a wholly 
private capital basis. Many millions of lira have 
been contributed by businessmen and other resi- 
dents of the Adana area to help finance the Seyhan 
Dam. The Turkish Government has authorized 
the creation of the Industrial Development Bank 
of Turkey, which was sponsored by the Interna- 
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
The express three-fold purpose of the Develop- 
ment bank is to stimulate and assist the establish- 
ment of more private industi-y in Turkey, to en- 
courage the investment of private capital as such, 
and to pi'omote and encourage individual owner- 
ship of security holdings. 

And now let us pick up the thread of foreign 
private investment which we dropped a little ear- 
lier. The highly encouraging signs in the domes- 
tic picture find their counterijart in action by the 
Turkish Goveruinent to encourage foreign private 
investment. A great step forward in creating 
favorable conditions for foreign investment was 
taken by the passage of a law designed for this spe- 
cific purpose. While it does not fully match the 
provisions of laws in those countries which have 
attracted large sums of foreign capital, it neverthe- 
less is a splendid start and should go far in improv- 
ing the investment climate of Turkey. The law 
provides special opportunities for foreign invest- 
ment in the fields of economic development which 
are open to private Turkish capital. A guaranty 
is provided within certain limits for the transfer 
abroad of earnings. It also provides for repatri- 
ation of capital after liquidation. Relaxation in 
favor of foreign capital of statutes which restrict 
certain crafts and mine investment to Turkish 
citizens is permissive. 

Depariment of State Bulletin 



U. S. Encourages Private Investment 

Our Government luis also taken steps to en- 
courage foi'eign private investment. As Turkey 
is a participating country under the Economic 
Cooperation Act of 1948, private American inves- 
tors have been able to obtain additional U.S. Gov- 
ernment guaranties for the reconversion into dol- 
lars of their Turkish investment, profits, and earn- 
ings. These guaranties constitute one of the in- 
centives which the U.S. Government offers to 
American investors willino; to make investments 
in countries participating in the Mutual Security 
Progi'am. The incentives which our Government 
offers American investors abroad are the natural 
product of the strong emphasis which is placed 
on private investment as a matter of basic U.S. 
economic policy. The real significance of our pri- 
vate investment abroad is that it does not leave 
home alone. It has a very effective traveling part- 
ner — managerial experience and technical know- 
how. 

It is no secret that I am highly enthusiastic 
about the future of Turkey. I am enthusiastic 
about it for many reasons which need not be elab- 
orated here. But within the context of my present 
remarks I am enthusiastic about this country be- 
cause it has a basic economic soundness which 
should appeal strongly to foreign investors. This 
basic economic soundness is composed of many 
elements and I mention but a few. 

First, the Turks are an intelligent and hard- 
working people ; they are sound of mind and body, 
they are honest, they have keen perception, and 
even the most modest farmer has the enviable 
qualities of strong pride and intuitive good judg- 
ment. Modern Turkey is a true democracy, which, 
representing a united people, possesses a high de- 
gree of political stability. 

Second, Turkey is wealthy in natural resources. 
Only 30 percent of her vast expanse of arable land 
is under cultivation. Her water resources are 
scarcely touched, and the nature of the country's 
watersheds suggests large accumulations of under- 
ground water. Turkey has already developed sub- 
stantial production of important minerals. Un- 
questionably there are even larger hidden reserves 
which await discovery through intensified geologi- 
cal exploration. The prospects for production of 
petroleum are good. All these and other resources 
await development in a country whose ratio of 
resources to population is among the highest in 
the world. Turkey offers substantial availability 
of raw materials for many processing industries. 
This is true of animal and vegetable fibers, oil 
seeds, fruits and vegetables, as well as minerals 
for smelting. 

Third, the economy of Turkey is dynamic. 
There is a normal healthy growth in population of 
about 2 percent per year. Using 1948 prices as a 
base, national income is increasing at a rate of 
about 7 percent per annum — with a jump to 14 



percent from 1950 to 1951. This rate of increase 
would be exceedingly high anywhere. The 1950- 
51 increase is comparable to the current rate in the 
United States, where we are in a more mature stage 
of our economic development and have under way 
a vast defense program. There is no reason, how- 
ever, to suspect that it cannot continue in Turkey. 
The combination of growing population and in- 
creasing national income clearly indicates an ex- 
panding economy. 

Turkey's Standing High With U. S. Businessmen 

It is my pleasure to see many American business- 
men who come to Turkey. I am glad to say that 
they are coming here in ever-increasing numbers. 
Recently we had the visit of representatives of a 
well-known American corporation which is look- 
ing for countries holding promise for establish- 
ing manufacturing operations. Their study of the 
economic potentialities of Turkey was one of the 
many similar studies which the same representa- 
tives have been making for the same company 
around the world. Their conclusion will interest 
you. They concluded in their survey that, from 
their standpoint, Turkey is today the best foreign 
country in the world in which to invest. They 
maintained that with one exception it far sur- 
passed in potential the six foreign countries in 
which the company already has plants. 

You and I, and businessmen like those I have 
just mentioned, are looking into Turkey's future. 
Present trends point to the growth of the Turkish 
nation to a population of 50,000,000 — a population 
whicli Turkey's national resources when developed 
will have no difficulty in supporting. At that 
point Turkey will rank high among the great pro- 
duction and trading nations in the world. A 
country which offers an expanding market for an 
estimated 70 years to come is certainly a first-class 
place in which to invest. 

I believe Turkey merits high praise for the saga- 
cious evaluation of her future economics. She has 
made a sound choice — a choice which but few coun- 
tries in the world have had the wisdom to make — 
in deciding to retrench state control of production 
facilities and investment and to give private initia- 
tive and capital, both domestic and foreign, scope 
within which to operate and develop. It is only 
necessary for Turkey to proceed in her develop- 
ment in an orderly way, to maintain the sound- 
ness of her currency and her international credit, 
and to maintain her reputation for fair and busi- 
nesslike relations by scrupulously fulfilling all 
commitments and obligations to those who have 
shown their confidence in the future of Turkey 
by trading or investing here. 

Turkey's new economic era, now that it is pos- 
sible for her to turn more to private enterprise, 
heralds great benefits for her. It heralds great 
benefits for those individuals — Turks and foreign- 



Ocfober 73, J 952 



567 



ers — who participate in the expansion of private 
enterprise in Turkey. Private enterprise provides 
the necessary driving force, a force for economic 
development which can at the same time be har- 
nessed and made socially responsible. Where it 
can be employed, it has no equal in the develop- 
ment of an expanding economy. Private enter- 
prise in trade and industry, like the private hold- 
ing of land, is one of the bulwarks of civilization. 
It is productive, creative, and imaginative. The 
state benefits in many ways, including higher tax 
returns on an expanding volume of production. 
The state has adequate means at its disposal to 
assure protection of its own interests, and those 
of the worker and the consumer. Productive pri- 
vate investment, whether domestic or foreign, is 
first and foremost an asset to the country in which 
it is invested. 

Private enterprise and foreign investment went 
hand in hand in the development of the United 
States. We remember that our economic progress 
was made possible by monetary aid and technical 
assistance which came originally from abroad. 
Many were the investors in Europe who supplied 
the capital which built our railroads, founded our 
heavy industry, and mined our resources. Many 
were the inventors and artisans of the Old World 
who came to our country and brought with them 
their crafts and skills to be passed on to those 
unacquainted with new techniques. Our Nation 
is peopled by the descendants of Old World im- 
migrants, and we remember the benefits given us 
by them. 

We stand ready to give in much the same man- 
ner what we received. American capital and its 
accompanying technical skills can undertake in 
Turkey on an increased scale what you gentlemen 
are already doing. The Turkish Government has 
wisely laid the fundamental ground work for the 
era in which private enterprise will play an out- 
standing role in the relationship between Turkey 
and the United States. 



Point Four and World Peace 

Remarks hy the President ^ 

White House presa release dated September 26 

It is a pleasure indeed to have you come to Wash- 
ington and to pay a visit to the White House. I 
am vitally interested in the work which you have 
been studying. I am more than vitally interested 
in the .successful operation of what we call the 
Point Four Program. It is a program to help 
people to help themselves. It is a program to help 



' Made at the White House on Sept. 26 before delegates 
to the International Conference on Agricultural and Co- 
operative Credit, who conferred with Washington officials 
after the close of sessions held at the TJ. of Calif., Berke- 
ley, from Aug. 4 to Sept. 13. For an article on the Con- 
ference, see Bulletin of Sept. 22, 1952, p. 453. 



the development of the natural resources of all 
these great countries for the benefit of the people 
themselves who live in the countries who own the 
resources. 

It has wonderful implications, in that if it can 
be successfully operated all around the globe, the 
improvement of the living standards and condi- 
tions of all the people in the world will be affected. 

And if that is done, our objective will be at- 
tained, because that will be the greatest contribu- 
tion that we can make to peace in the world. ", 

It is starving people and people who have griev- 
ances against their overlords that cause revolutions 
and that contribute to the Communist movement, 
which in the long run is the greatest totalitarian 
force in existence in the world today — the greatest 
force for evil that ever has been in existence. 

There isn't any difference between the manner in 
which the totalitarian so-called Communist states 
treat their inhabitants and the way in which Hit- 
ler treated his people. They are exactly parallel 
in the way they manage things, only they call them 
by different names. 

What we are trying to do is get the free peo- 
ples of the world to understand that freedom of 
action, and freedom of approach — such as you 
have been studying here today — is much the better 
way to f "t prosperity and a better standard of 
living in the world. 

I am more than happy that you have had a 
session at the University of California, one of 
our great universities; and I sincerely hope that 
these meetings and these instructive conferences 
can be continued over the years. 

You see, I am going to be out of a job on the 20th 
of January, but I don't want this Program which 
was inaugurated under the good Doctor Bennett 
to be stopped on that account. And I don't think 
it will because you people can keep it going. 

And I want to say to you that this country has 
no ambitions territorially to dominate any country 
in the world. We have all we can do to take care 
of our own country. 

I want to call your attention to one thing in 
particular. We have neighbors on the south of us. 
We have neighbors on the north of us. You won't 
find those neighbors in any way alarmed or afraid 
of the great Republic of the United States. We 
are their friends and they know we are their 
friends. They know we have no ulterior motives 
on their resources or their peoples or their political 
setup. 

Now if we could get the whole world to feel that 
way, if we could get the neighbors of the Soviet 
Republic to feel that way, if the Soviet Republic 
would act to its neighbors as we act to ours, I don't 
think there would be any chance for a third world 
war. 

Peace is what I want. And I think this organi- 
zation, and this Program, will make a greater con- 
tribution to peace than any other one thing that 
could happen in the world. 



568 



Department of Sfafe Bulletin 



Proposals to Iran Clarified 

Press release 780 dated October 5 

Following is the text of a note from Secretary 
Acheson to Prime Minister Mossadegh of Iran^ 
delivered on October 5 iy Ambassador toy W. 
Henderson: 

I have been in touch with the President since 
he received your message of September 24, 1952,^ 
and, since he is away from the Capital at this time, 
he has authorized me to acknowledge your letter. 
He is disappointed to learn from it that you have 
found unacceptable the proposals which were put 
forward on August 30, 1952.^ 

It had been our understanding that the Iranian 
Government's position was that negotiation for 
settlement of the oil dispute must take into ac- 
count: (a) the fact of nationalization, (b) the 
complete independence of Iran in the operation of 
its oil industry, and (c) the freedom of Iran to 
sell its oil on other than a monopoly basis. 

It was and is our sincere belief tliat the pro- 
posals which were put forwaid on August 30 met 
these points. These proposals clearly recognized 
the fact of nationalization and did not seek to re- 
vive the 1933 Concession, or any concession. For- 
eign management of the industry was not put for- 
ward as a condition, or even suggested. There 
was no intent to propose a monopoly of the pur- 
chase of Iranian oil. 

As regards claim for compensation by the Com- 
pany and the counter claims by Iran, we suggested 
a method of settlement of all claims by impartial 
adjudication. There are doubtless other equitable 
methods. In regard to the question of the price 
to be paid for Iranian oil, we suggested that this 
should be worked out between purchaser and seller 
ratlier than by Governments. 

Regardless of the acceptability of the proposals 
of August 30, it is a matter of regret to us that 
their meaning should have been misunderstood. 
We have tried to correct this because of the real 
importance which attaches to our words being 
understood by you as they were meant by us. 



import Fees Imposed on Almonds 

A PROCLAMATION' 

1. Whereas, pursuant to section 22 of the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act, as added by section 31 of the act of 
August 24, 1935, 49 Stat. 773, reeuacted by section 1 of 
the act of June 3, 1937, 50 Stat. 246, and amended by sec- 
tion 3 of the act of July 3, 1948, 62 Stat. 1248, and section 
3 of the act of June 28, 1950, 64 Stat. 261 (7 U. S. C. 624), 
I caused the United States Tarift' Commission to malie an 



■ Bulletin of Oct. 6, 1952, p. 532. 

'ma., Sept. 8, 1952, p. 360. For a press conference 
statement by Secretary Acheson on the joint U.S.-U.K. 
proposals of Aug. 30, see ihid., Sept. 15, 1952, p. 405. 

' No. 2991 ; 17 Fed. Reg. SG45. 

Ocfofaer J 3, 7952 

225150—52 3 



investigation to determine whether certain tree nuts are 
being or are practically certain to be imported into the 
United States under such conditions and in such quan- 
tities as to render or tend to render ineffective, or material- 
ly interfere with, certain programs or operations under- 
talien by the Department of Agriculture with respect to 
such nuts, or to reduce substantially the amount of any 
product processed in the United States from such nuts 
with respect to which any such program or operation 
is being undertaken ; and 

2. Whekeas the Commission instituted such investiga- 
tion on April 13, 1950, and on November 24, 1950 reported 
to me that there was at that time no basis for any action 
under the said section 22 with respect to imports of such 
nuts, but that it was continuing the investigation ; and 

3. Whekeas, after further investigation, including a 
public hearing, the Commission, on November 28, 1951, 
reported to me regarding the need for action under the said 
section 22 in order to protect the programs of the United 
States Department of Agriculture for the crop year 1951- 
52 with resi)ect to almonds, pecans, Alberts, and walnuts, 
in which report the Commission found that the imposi- 
tion of a specified fee on imports of shelled almonds and 
of blanched, roasted, or otherwise prejjared or preserved 
almonds (not including almond paste) entered, or with- 
drawn from warehouse, for consumption during the period 
October 1, 1951 to September 30, 1952, inclusive, in ex- 
cess of a specified aggregate quantity, was necessary to 
prevent imports of such almonds from rendering inef- 
fective or materially interfering with the program under- 
talien by the Department of Agriculture with respect to 
almonds ; and 

4. Whekeas, in accordance with the Commission's rec- 
ommendation in the said report of November 28, 1951, on 
December 10, 1951 I issued a proclamation pursuant to the 
said section 22 imposing a fee on imports of shelled al- 
monds and on blanched, roasted, or otherwise prepared or 
preserved almonds entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, 
for consumption during the period October 1, 1951 to Sep- 
tember 30, 1952, inclusive, in excess of a certain aggregate 
quantity, as specified in the Commission's recommenda- 
tion ; and 

5. Whekeas the Commission continued the said investi- 
gation for the purpose of reporting to the President re- 
garding any later action which might be found to be 
necessary to carry out the purposes of the said section 22 ; ■ 
and 

6. Whereas, after further investigation, including a 
hearing, for the purpose of determining what action, if 
any, should be taken under the said section 22 with respect 
to imports of certain tree nuts, to prevent imports of such 
nuts from entering during the 1952-53 crop year under 
such conditions and in such quantities as to render or 
tend to render ineffective, or materially interfere with, 
programs undertaken by the Department of Agriculture 
with respect to almonds, filberts, walnuts, or pecans, or 
to reduce substantially tlie amount of any product proc- 
essed in the United States from domestic almonds, filberts, 
walnuts, or pecans, the Commission reported to me on 
September 25, 1952 its findings resulting from such in- 
vestigation ; and 

7. Whereas, on the basis of such further investigation 
and report of the Commission, I find that shelled almonds, 
blanched, roasted, or otiierwise prepared or preserved al- 
monds (not including almond paste) are practically cer- 
tain to be imported into the United States during the 
period October 1, 1952 to September 30, 1953, both dates 
inclusive, under such conditions and in such quantities 
as to render or tend to render ineffective, or materially 
interfere with the program undertaken by the Department 
of Agriculture with respect to almonds pursuant to the 
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, as 
amended ; and 

8. Whereas, I find and declare that the imposition of 
the fees hereinafter proclaimed are shown by such in- 
vestigation of the Commission to be necessary in order 
that the entry of imported shelled almonds, blanched, 

569 



roasted, or otherwise prepared or preserved almonds ( not 
including almond paste) will not render or tend to render 
ineffective, or materially interfere with, the said program 
undertalien by the Department of Agriculture with respect 
to almonds : 

Xow THEREFORE, I, Harry S. Truman, President of the 
United States of America, acting under and by virtue of 
the authority vested in me by the said section 22 of the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, do hereby pro- 
claim : 

That a fee of 5 cents per pound shall be imposed upon 
shelled almonds and blanched, roasted, or otherwise pre- 
pared or preserved almonds (not including almond paste) 
entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption 
during the period October 1, 1952 to Septemlier 30, 1953, 
both dates inclusive, until an aggregate quantity of 7,000,- 
000 pounds of such almonds have been so entered or with- 
drawn during such period, and a fee of 10 cents per xwund 
shall be imposed upon such almonds entered, or withdrawn 
from warehouse, for consumption during such period in 
excess of an aggregate quantity of 7,000,000 pounds : Pro- 
vided. That in neither case shall the fee be in excess of 
50 per centum ad valorem. 

The fees imposed by this proclamation shall be In addi- 
tion to any other duties imposed on the importation of the 
articles subject to such fees. 

In witness whereof. I have hereunto set my hand and 
caused the seal of the United States of America to be 
affixed. 

Done at the City of Washington this 27th day of Sep- 
tember in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred 

[seal] and fifty-two, and of the Independence of the 
United States of America the one hundred and 
seventy-seventh. 




By the President : 
Dean Acheson 

Secretary of State. 

Press Conference Statements 
by Secretary Acheson 

The Secretary made the following extempo- 
raneous remarks in reply to questions at his press 
conference on Octoher 1 {press releases 771, 772, 
and 773) : 

Peiping "Peace Conference" 

Tliis conference is, of course, an obvious propa- 
ganda operation in wliicli the Chinese Communists, 
while taking an active part in defying the United 
Nations and carrying the war into Korea and 
while joining with the Soviet Government in its 
violent "hate campaign," are continuing to hold 
"peace conferences." I think this deceives no- 
body. 

In regard to your other question about the 
Americans, we have heard reports that certain 
American citizens wei-e attending. From the 
reports that we have gotten, we think we have 
about 15 of these iVmericans identified. Now, 
some of them were in China already. However, 
no persons have been issued passports to attend 
this conference or have asked for passports to 
attend the conference. 



All passports have been stamped since May ], 
"Not valid for travel to . . . China . . ." 
We are now making efforts to find out whether 
any of the people that we have identified have 
obtained passports on false information furnished 
to the Department or whether they have violated 
the instruction which is on the passport. That is 
stamped on it as I have said, and there are appro- 
priate statutes which cover both of these cases. 

Austrian State Treaty 

Well, the Kussians did again exactly what they 
did last January. We asked them to come to a 
meeting of the deputies in London and set the 
date. The other three deputies arrived and no 
Russia. Instead of telling anyone in advance 
what they would do, or appearing, they again 
sent around a message as they did in January rais- 
ing all these extraneous issues which are quite 
outside the field of the Austrian peace treaty. 

I think if anyone had any additional proof 
that the Russians do not want to have a peace 
treaty, you have it here. Now% we and our British 
and French associates are determined to go ahead 
and do our very best to carry out the pledge 
which was made to the Austrian people in 1943, 
and therefore we shall continue our efforts to 
advance a peace treaty. 

Korean Question in U.N. 

Any rumor or report that the Government has 
decided to produce some new plan or has decided 
on any plan in regard to Korea in the General As- 
sembly is quite untrue. 

We are conducting, through our military rep- 
resentatives in Korea, the negotiations looking 
toward an armistice and you are familiar with 
what General Harrison has done there in the last 
few days." Whether there will be an armistice or 
whether there will not be an armistice, I cannot 
tell you and I doubt whether anybody can tell you 
now except the people on the other side and they'll 
not do so, I take it, until the next meeting. 

What happens in the negotiations will of course 
affect very largely what happens in the General 
Assembly. What we have been doing is exploring 
the situation with a great many delegations and 
working out various contingencies, various stands 
that we might take on various contingencies. 
Nothing has been firmed up and nothing can be 
in the nature of the situation. 

I think this is what has given rise to the respec- 
tive rumors lately. 

What I am pointing out is that any report that 
we had crystallized our position or that we had 
come to conclusions as to what should be done is 
not correct. 



' For Lt. Gen. William K. Harrison's proposals for set- 
tling the Korean prisoner-of-war issue, see Bitlletin of 
Oct. 6, 1952, p. 549. 



570 



Department of State Bulletin 



The Problem of Dependent Peoples 



hy Philip C. Jessuf 
Ambassador at Large ^ 



The very natural, human impulse to try to 
simplify a complex problem almost inevitably 
leads to oversimplification. In thinking about 
international affairs, people tend to assume that 
the whole problem can be summed up in terms of 
conflict between the Soviet Union and the United 
States. This, of course, is not true. One of the 
great fallacies in it is the revelation of the line of 
thought that we have a situation today compara- 
ble to' that which was familiar to Europe prior to 
World War I in which the international situation 
was analyzed in terms of the balance of power 
and rivalries between two or more great powers 
or alliances of powers. The actual conflict today 
is between the Soviet Union and its satellites on 
the one hand, and the free world on the other. 
It is true that, because of its power, the United 
States is that country of the free world on which 
the Soviets tend to concentrate their attacks and 
pour out their venom. So far as we are concerned 
in the United States, we have no feeling of being 
alone in our resistance to the Soviet effort to 
obtain world domination by the use of its Com- 
munist parties backed by large armed forces. 

The fact that there is diversity rather than rigid 
uniformity in the relations between various coun- 
tries in the free world may well seem to the plan- 
ners in the Kremlin to be an element of weakness. 
Actually, it is an illustration of the strength of 
a system which depends upon a cooperation of 
equals instead of on domination. 

Canada and the United States are joined with 
12 countries across the Atlantic in the North At- 
lantic Treaty Organization. As Mr. Pearson, 
your Minister of External Affairs, has said, Can- 
ada is no "yes-man" to the United States. To this 
we say, "Amen." Canada is connected with a 
number of other countries inside the flexible 
framework of the Commonwealth. The United 



' Address made before the Ottawa Women's Canadian 
Club at Ottawa on Sept. 25 (press release 749 dated Sept. 
24). 

Ocfober 13, 1952 



States has a close and long-established tie with the 
other republics of the Western Hemisphere, a tie 
that is formalized in the Organization of Ameri- 
can States. We also have other special relation- 
ships including our recently concluded security 
treaties with the Philippines, Japan, and Aus- 
tralia and New Zealand. There are, however, 
many other countries with which we have close 
and friendly relations even though these are not 
expressed in the form of any special treaty. 

Disagreements or controversies exist between 
and among a number of countries whom we count 
as our friends. These are disputes to which we are 
not a party. We do have, however, a very in- 
tense interest in seeing them settled. The interest 
arises not only out of the fact that we are a mem- 
ber of the United Nations and as such are inter- 
ested in the peaceful settlement of all disputes. It 
arises also from that same reaction which any one 
of you as an individual feels when two of your 
friends are quarreling. 

These disagreements among our friends include 
prominently the very difficult question of the re- 
lationship between states exercising the responsi- 
bility of governing other peoples and the peoples 
whom they govern. This is not by any means a 
new problem. Throughout recorded history, this 
kind of conflict has existed. Historically, the 
handling of the problem has been marked by self- 
ishness, greed, and cruelty, and also by idealism 
and farsighted statesmanship. Peoples have not 
been hesitant to criticize their own government for 
its discharge of responsibilities to dependent peo- 
ples, and they have not been hesitant to criticize 
other governments. 

Review of Dealings Witli Dependent Peoples 

The United Kingdom has a long history of 
dealing with dependent peoples. A distinguished 
British colonial administrator. Sir Gordon 
Lethem, expressed the highest standard for dis- 
charging responsibilities in this field when he said : 

571 



Unless there is realized the need of meetiug the human 
sentiments and ambitions and ideas for the future, even 
the i^rejudices and weaknesses, of the peoples concerned, 
and the adequate meetiuji' of them made a very important 
criterion in planning, many of the schemes, no matter 
how well-conceived in themselves will fade to failure in 
the shimmer and mirage of the tropic sunshine. 

T^Hien the United States took on the responsi- 
bility for administering the Philippines, I am 
proud to say that its Government was inspired 
by the same general thought. In the instructions 
to the first Philippine Commission, written by 
Elihu Eoot, as Secretary of War, and signed by 
President McKinley on April 7, 1900, the follow- 
ing standard was laid down : 

In all the forms of government and administrative pro- 
visions which they are authorized to prescribe, the com- 
mission should bear in mind that the government which 
they are establishing is designed, not for our satisfac- 
tion or for the expression of our theoretical views, but 
for the happiness, peace and prosperity of the people of 
the Philippine Islands, and the measures adopted should 
be made to conform to their customs, their habits, and 
even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with 
the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just 
and effective government. 

Upon all officers and employees of the United States, 
both civil and military, should be impressed a sense of 
duty to serve not merely the material but the personal 
and .social rights of the people of the islands, and to treat 
them with the same courtesy and respect for their per- 
sonal dignity which the people of the United States are 
accustomed to require from each other. 

France has equally expressed the French atti- 
tude toward these problems through the provision 
incorporated in tlie French Constitution of 1946 
which declares : 

Faithful to lier traditional mission, France proposes 
to guide the peoples for whom she has assumed responsi- 
bility toward freedom to govern themselves and demo- 
cratically to manage their own affair.s ; putting aside all 
systems of colonization founded on arbitrary power, she 
guarantees to all access to public office and the exercise 
of the individual or collective rights and liberties 
which are conferred upon all Frenclimen by the Preamble 
to the Constitution. 



Statesmanship Seeks a Steady Course 

Secretary Acheson has frequently called atten- 
tion to the fact that there is now a great surge 
of feeling through the world which gives expres- 
sion to the national aspirations of many peoples 
who do not now liave full control of their own 
affairs. 

The United States supports the nationalist as- 
pirations of those peoples who are progressively 
advancing toward the United Nations Charter's 
goal of selfgovernment or independence. It is 
the policy of our Government to use the full meas- 
ure of its influence to support the attainment of 
greater freedom by all peoples who, by their acts, 
show themselves worthy of it and ready for it. 
We appreciate the advantages flowing from a 
transfer of authority which is based upon mutual 
accommodation. We recognize the farsighted 
statesmanship of those who transfer authority 



and the sense of deep responsibility with which 
those who take authority assume the burdens of 
government. 

There will always be the impatient ones who 
consider measured progress too slow, and the in- 
flexibles who think that any step is taken too soon 
and goes too far. It is the part of statesmanship 
to steer a steady course between the "Scylla" of 
impatience and the "Charybdis" of inflexibility. 
It is the part of the United Nations, not to try 
to blast out the rocks on either side of the channel, 
but like some deus ex machina to disperse the 
storm clouds and provide favoring winds. Those 
who advocate particular courses of action must 
ask themselves in all honesty, "Will such pro- 
posals really contribute to the improvement of 
the given situation or are tliey merely for 'our 
satisfaction or for the expression of our theoreti- 
cal views'?" 

The record of many countries in the free world, 
particularly since the end of the last war, is some- 
thing in which they properly take pride. In ac- 
cordance with our promises, the Philippines has 
become an independent state. Following the de- 
velopment of the British Commonwealth, full 
freedom has been granted to India, Pakistan, Cey- 
lon, and Burma, of which the first three remain 
within the Commonwealth. Independent Indo- 
nesia, as a member of the Netherlands-Indonesian 
Union, has also become a separate member of the 
United Nations where it shares with other mem- 
bers the position of "sovereign equality." The 
Associated States of Vietnam, Laos, and Cam- 
bodia have attained their independence within the 
French Union, and would today be members of 
tlie United Nations in their own right if their ap- 
plications like tliat of Ceylon had not suffered 
the Soviet veto. 

On the other hand, no territory which was 
under Russian domination has been voluntarily 
released. On the contrary, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Estonia have been overrun and absorbed. The 
formerly independent states of Rumania, Bul- 
garia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Albania, and 
Poland, while maintaining the trappings of sep- 
arate existence, have lost their independence. 
Bj'elorussia and the Ukraine, the two constituent 
members of the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub- 
lics which are separate members of the United 
Nations, do not even have any contact with the 
outside world. Under Soviet regidations promul- 
gated last January, their capitals are actually in- 
cluded in districts which the Soviet Government 
has closed to the entry of any foreigner. 

Inside the U. S. S. R., the Volga German auton- 
omous Soviet Socialist Republic was abolished 
in 1940 and some 400,000 Volga Germans were 
deported en masse to Siberia. In 1946 the Che- 
chen-Ingush A. S. S. R. was dissolved and the 
Crimean A. S. S. R. reorganized into a county. 
Some 650,000 Chechens and Crimean Tatars were 
"resettled," in the euphemistic term used by the 



572 



Department of State Bulletin 



Government. The official reason stated was that 
during the war the "main mass" of the people in 
these two "autonomous republics" had been guilty 
of disloyal acts. 

Continued Imperialistic Expansion by U. S. S. R. 

In Asia, the Soviets have continued the impe- 
rialist expansion which was begun under the Czars. 
In 1871, Russian military forces occupied large 
areas of China's Sinkiang Province and retained 
control for 10 years. Withdrawal of these forces 
was secured only at the price of preferential treat- 
ment for Russian commerce. This same technique 
marked Sinkiang's relations with the Soviet Union 
from 1920 through 1933. Despite the fact that it 
recognized the Chinese Government in Peking, the 
Soviet Union pursued a dismemberment policy by 
negotiating directly with the Governor of the 
Pi-ovince. From 1933 onward, Soviet control of 
Sinkiang was increasingly overt until the Euro- 
pean war obliged the Soviet Union to withdraw its 
official and garrison forces. But the retreat was 
only temporary. Soviet-oriented elements soon 
gained control of the western part of the Province. 
Chinese Communist forces progressively extended 
their authority until, in 1949, the process of remov- 
ing Sinkiang from the effective control of the 
Nationalist Government of China was completed. 
In Mongolia, a similar pattern has prevailed. 
Even the division of this huge area into Outer 
Mongolia and Inner Mongolia was the product of 
the secret treaty between the Russian and Japanese 
Governments in 1907. Following the Chinese 
revolution in 1911 and the proclamation of Outer 
Mongolian independence, Russia demanded that 
no Chinese units be stationed in Outer Mongolia, 
but continued to keep its own troops there. 

Beginning with the occupation of Outer Mon- 
golia's capital city by the Red army in 1921, the 
Soviet Union has clearly established that it is no 
less determined than the Czars to maintain an im- 
perialistic sphere of influence in this region. Al- 
though pledged to treat Outer Mongolia "as an 
integral part of the Republic of China," the Soviet 
Government ignored the authority of the National- 
ist Govermnent even to the extent of exercising 
consular functions abroad on behalf of Outer Mon- 
golia. Today, although Outer Mongolia is allowed 
to have even less contact with the world than the 
Ukraine and Byelorussia, the Soviets block the ad- 
mission to the United Nations of such states as 
Italy, Japan, and Ceylon until Outer Mongolia is 
also admitted. 

The fate of Tannu Tuva may indicate what is in 
st,ore for Outer Mongolia. In 1921, Tannu Tuva 
declared itself independent. But in October 1944, 
its independence disappeared and it was annnexed 
to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government did 
not even bother to announce that the annexation 
had taken place until 2 years later. 

The fate of Outer Mongolia and Tannu Tuva is 

Ocfofaer 13, J 952 



suggestive of the plans the Kremlin has in mind 
for other peoples whom it hopes to ensnare with its 
special brand of "national independence." The 
spider is hungry and alert to snare and devour the 
unwary. The blueprint of the Soviet plan for per- 
verting noble causes was stated quite blandly in an 
article in the Moscow University Herald of De- 
cember 9, 1951 : 

First, incite nationalism, which is inherent in all races. 

Second, promote a national "united front" including if 
necessary vacillating bours;eois political parties. 

Third, let the working class and its political party, the 
Communist Party, seize leadership of the United Front. 

Fourth, form an alliance of the working class and the 
peasantry, led by the Communist Party. 

Fifth, the Communist Party takes complete control, oust- 
ing the others. 

Sixth, remember that true national independence can 
be achieved only in unity with the Soviet Union. There is 
no third, middle, or neutral road. The choice is between 
the camp of imperialism on the one hand and the camp 
of socialism and democracy on the other hand. 

Seventh, form powerful "Peoples' Liberation Armies" 
under the leadership of the Communist Party. Identify 
the struggle of the masses with the armed struggle which 
is the chief activity in "colonial" national liberation move- 
ments. 



The Kremlin's Subjugation Plan 

There is nothing new in the tedious Communist 
program which I have just quoted. The Kremlin's 
plan for the subjugation of dependent peoples — 
and particularly Asiatic peoples— goes back at 
least as far as Stalin's famous formulation in his 
book on the problems of Leninism. There, as we 
will do well to remember, Stalin pointed out that 
the first task of the Communist movement in Asia 
was to promote nationalism in order to throw out 
the old colonial powers; when nationalism had 
iDeen pushed to the point of ousting the responsible 
goverimients, the theme would then shift to inter- 
nationalism in the sense of the Communist Interna- 
tional and "unity" with the Soviet Union. But the 
history of responsible nationalism in India, Indo- 
nesia, Vietnam, and elsewhere proves that the 
Communist plot has not succeeded in its calculated 
deceit. 

Thus, while in recent years other great powers 
have helped dependent peoples along the path to 
self-government, the Soviet Union has concen- 
trated on absorbing its neighbors into this, mono- 
lithic Soviet hegemony. Westward through Eu- 
rope and eastward through Asia, Soviet imperial- 
ism has pushed its way — "liberating" nations from 
the cares and responsibilities of freedom. 

It is interesting to note that the Soviets, in 
welding together their vast land empire, have 
tried to make a virtue of necessity by promul- 
gating the theory that there is something evil 
about any control which extends over a gi-eat body 
of water. They seem to think there is some magic 
interrestrial contact. Like other Marxist-Lenin- 
ist dogma which outlive their usefulness, this no- 
tion would, of course, immediately be a prohibited 

573 



bourgeois thought if the Soviets could get their 
hands on any overseas teiTitories. Although there 
was no competition in this sport at the Olympic 
Games, the Soviets could enter an unbeatable team 
in the mental gymnastics of shifting from such 
positions as antinazism to the Molotov-Eibbentrop 
pact and from anguished complaints about the 
"remilitarization" of Germany to the proposal of 
March 10, 1952, for a German national army. 

The peoples of the world which have not yet at- 
tained tlie full measure of self-government vary 
widely in their geography, their population, their 
advancement in the art of self-government, and 
their desire for freedom. This is recognized in 
chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations 
which calls upon those exercising responsibility in 
developing self-government "to take due account 
of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to 
assist them in the progressive development of their 
free political institutions, according to the par- 
ticular circumstances of each territory and its peo- 
ples and their varying stages of advancement." 
Furthermore, in chapter XII of the Charter, which 
lays the basis for the international trusteeship 
system, it is recognized that some territories may 
develop local self-government and that other ter- 
ritories may eventually achieve full independence. 

U.S.-U.N. Approach 

The U. N. General Assembly realized the exist- 
ence of such differences when it came to discharge 
the responsibility given to it under the Italian 
peace treaty, to determine the future of the former 
Italian Colonies in North Africa. These colonies 
were three in number: Libya, Eritrea, and Italian 
Somaliland. In each place there were individuals 
and groups who aspired to immediate independ- 
ence and these asijirants had their supporters 
among other peoples of the world. However, in 
the course of long debates extending over three 
sessions of the General Assembly, the United Na- 
tions reached differing decisions with respect to 
the three different situations confronting it. In 
the case of Libya, it was agreed that Libya should 
be independent no later than January 1, 1952, and 
that meanwhile a U. N. commission and com- 
missioner would assist the administering powers in 
preparing for transition. In the case of Somali- 
land, it was decided that the people were further 
away from the stage at which they could assume 
responsibility for the complete control of their own 
affairs, and the territory was put under trustee- 
ship with a promise of independence at the end 
of 10 years. In the case of Eritrea, it was finally 
determined that Eritrea and Ethiopia would form 
a federation under the Ethiopian Crown. 

We in the United States have had our own ex- 
perience with these problems. At tlie end of the 
Spanish-American War, we found ourselves in 
actual control of three places which had been ruled 
by Spain — Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. 



In the case of Cuba, we followed the congressional 
declaration made at the outset of the war "that 
the people of the Island of Cuba are and of right 
ought to be free and independent." Our Army 
was withdrawn as soon as the Cubans had time 
to call a constitutional convention, frame their 
constitution and set up their Government. In the 
case of the Philippines, full independence would 
have been ^iven in 1944 had it not been for the 
war with Japan, which required the posti^one- 
ment of liberation until July 4, 1946, when the 
free and indeiDendent Philippine Eepublic was 
established. 

In the case of Puerto Rico, military government 
was rapidly replaced by civil government with the 
Governor and other major officers appointed by 
the President of the United States. In 1917, the 
Puerto Ricans were permitted to select their own 
legislature which could transmit to the President 
of the United States any bill vetoed by the Gov- 
ernor. In 1947, Congress passed further legisla- 
tion permitting the Puerto Ricans to elect their 
own Governor, and a Puerto Rican Governor was 
so elected in 1948. In 1950, Congress adopted 
another law which they said was "in the nature 
of a compact" between the Congress and the peo- 
ple of Puerto Rico. Under this act, the Puerto 
Ricans were to draw up their own constitution and 
organize their own Government. This proposal 
was by its own terms submitted to a referendum of 
the Puerto Rican people and was approved. Ac- 
cordingly, the Puerto Ricans in 1951 held a con- 
stitutional convention and drew up a constitution 
providing for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 
which now exists. In this constitution the people 
of Puerto Rico say that they created this Com- 
monwealth "within our union with the United 
States of America." 

The United States also has responsibility oA'er 
other peoples who are not so far advanced in terms 
of capabilities for full autonomy. In connection 
with the improvement of the conditions of these 
peoples and the process of leading them toward 
a fuller capacity and better life, we have joined 
in the work of international commissions. In re- 
gard to tlie Virgin Islands, we are members of the 
Caribbean Commission to which Great Britain, 
France, and the Netherlands also belong. We join 
with representatives of those countries in studying 
the problems of the people of the area. In the 
Pacific area, wliere we are in charge of American 
Samoa, Guam, and the Trust Territories of the 
Pacific Islands, we work in the South Pacific 
Commission in which also Great Britain, France, 
and the Netherlands participate along with Aus- 
tralia and New Zealand. 



Pending Problems at Next U.N. Session 

The General Assembly of the United Nations 
will be called upon in its session which begins next 
month to deal with problems of the kind which 



574 



Department of State Bulletin 



I have been describing. The considerations noted 
above might well be kept in mind by the various 
delegations who will surely wish to approach these 
subjects with a deep sense of responsibility and 
with a desire to contribute to tlie real achievement 
of progi'ess in the development of peoples for 
whom they have a feeling of concern. 

There are legitimate causes for complaint 
against governmental treatment of persons within 
its power. The Department of State has recently 
issued a pamphlet,^ in which it exposes in detail 
the system of concentration camps and forced 
labor which prevail in the Soviet Union and which 
are the fate of many non-Soviet peoples over 
whom the Soviets have secured control by the use 
of force. The constant effort, fortunately often 
successful, of thousands of persons who escape 
from the Soviet Union and its satellites, is further 
evidence of the conditions prevailing in the 
U. S. S. R. One has only to remember the mil- 
lions who fled from the Soviet area in North Korea 
to South Korea even before the Communist ag- 
gression began in 1950. One recalls also that 
thei-e has been a steady flow of refugees from the 
Eastern European satellites and from Eastern 
Germany into the free West. When the Soviets 
began their recent progi^am of further isolating 
East Germany from the rest of Germany, people 
poured across the frontier at the rate of over a 
thousand a day. The evil of the situation is clearly 
established in spite of the Iron Curtain which at- 
tempts to conceal it. 

The totalitarian Communist system with its to- 
tal disregard of moral standards and respect for 
the rights of the individual is responsible for the 
situation behind the Iron Curtain. In the free 
world, where government exists for the benefit of 
the governed, it has been proved that a govern- 
ment can exercise responsibility for the develop- 
ment of a minority gi'oup under its control without 
such abuses. Therefore, the mere existence of 
such a relationship between those who govern and 
those who are governed is not ^n and of itself 
proof that the government is evil. One cannot 
start in considering any such case with a glib as- 
sumption that such peoples should immediately 
be established as a separate independent state, or 
even that they are in a position fully to adminis- 
ter their own affairs. There are, for instance, 
American Indians and Eskimos under the juris- 
diction of your country and of mine and large 
American Indian communities in many Latin 
American countries. There are several millions 
of primitive tribesmen in India. The Kurds in 
Iran and Iraq have for decades had leaders argu- 
ing for their independence. There are such peo- 



" Forced Labor in the Soviet Union, Department of State 
publication 4716 (for excerpts, see Bulletin of Sept. 22, 
19.52, p. 428). 



pies in the Philippines as the Igorots and Negri- 
tos. There are the Nagas in Burma. 

The fact that such peoples are racially differ- 
ent from the predominant group in the states does 
not of itself mean that they should be separated 
from those states and set up as independent coun- 
tries. Self-determination in the international 
area, like individualism in the national area, is a 
useful principle but not an absolute one. Carried 
to extremes, it invites chaos. 

The United Nations, through the discussions in 
its Trusteeship Council and in the Commission on 
Dependent Territories, has the regular — al- 
though not the exclusive — machinery for the 
study of problems such as these. Cases may exist 
or may arise in which the General Assembly can 
make a contribution by considering dispassion- 
ately and on the merits particular situations. In 
doing so, however, the Assembly must consider 
under all of the circumstances in each case whether 
its action will be actually helpful or harmful to 
the people concerned. 

This is not the occasion for discussing in detail 
particidar items which have been proposed for 
inclusion on the agenda of the pending session of 
the General Assembly. The U.S. position on 
these items will, of course, be stated at the appro- 
priate time. What I have tried to do today is to 
explain some of the problems with which foreign 
policy must deal and to indicate what I believe 
to be some of the underlying considerations to be 
taken into account in determining policies. 

These problems which I have discussed are 
merely illustrative of the general proposition with 
which I started. There are strains and stresses 
in the world today. There are conflicts and jeal- 
ousies between and among many groups of states. 
The real purpose of the United Nations, I repeat, 
is to try to provide an atmosphere of tranquility 
in which the solutions of these problems can be 
sought without prejudice and without passion. 

Letters of Credence 

Giuiteinala 

The newly appointed Ambassador of Guate- 
mala, Guillermo Toriello, presented his credentials 
to the President on September 24. For text of the 
Ambassador's remarks and of the President's re- 
ply, see Department of State press release 751 of 
September 24. 

Iran 

The newly appointed Ambassador of Iran, Al- 
lah- Yar Saleli, presented his credentials to the 
President on September 24. For text of the Am- 
bassador's remarks and of the President's reply, 
see Department of State press release 752 of Sep- 
tember 24. 



October ?3, 1952 



575 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



First Caribbean Conference on Home Economics 
and Education in Nutrition 



by Lydia J. Roberts 



A recent conference held in Trinidad, B. W. I., 
illustrated the gi'owing and continuing intei'est 
in home economics and education in nutrition 
throughout the Caribbean area, and the recogni- 
tion there of the importance of work in this field 
for the improvement of home and family life. 

From June 30 to July 5, 1952, at Port-of-Spain, 
Trinidad, under the joint sponsorship of the 
Caribbean Commission and the Food and Agri- 
culture Organization of the United Nations 
(Fag), specialists in agriculture, education, 
health, and social welfare met for the first inter- 
national conference on problems and developments 
in the Caribbean with respect to home economics 
and education in nutrition. The purpose of the 
conference was to promote an exchange of in- 
formation and ideas, explore ways in which par- 
ticipating countries and territories might be of 
mutual assistance, and obtain advice on how the 
sponsoring agencies might be of gi'eatest service 
in promoting sound programs of home economics 
and nutrition in the area. The careful prepara- 
tions for this conference by the Commission and 
Fao reflected the growing recognition by govern- 
ments members of Fao that more attention should 
be paid to home economics and nutrition both as 
a means of promoting the better utilization of 
food and raising living standards. 

The conference was attended by 36 delegates and 
observers. OiEcial participants came from Bar- 
bados, British Guiana, Dominican Kepublic, the 
French Caribbean Departments, Jamaica, the 
Netherlands Antilles, Puerto Eico, Surinam, 
Trinidad and Tobago, the Virgin Islands, and the 
Windward Islands; the Governments of France, 
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States ; the Holy See ; and the United Na- 
tions, the World Health Organization, and the 
two sponsoring agencies. 

The U.S. delegation was composed of Lydia J. 
Roberts, head of the Home Economics Depart- 



ment, University of Puerto Rico, who was chair- 
man of the delegation and also served as chairman 
of the conference; Miss Ata Lee, Program Spe- 
cialist, Home Economics Education, Office of 
Education. Federal Security Agency; and Dr. 
Esther Seijo de Zayas, Director of the Bureau of 
Nutrition and Dietetics, Department of Health of 
Puerto Rico. All members of the delegation par- 
ticipated actively in the work of the conference, 
and the three from Puerto Rico presented a sym- 
posium on home improvement programs in Puerto 
Rico. 

Since home economics in the Caribbean is in its 
early stages of development (except in Puerto 
Rico) and was of concern to the workers in all 
fields represented at the conference, the group met 
as a whole in order that all participants might de- 
rive maximum benefit from the discussions on the 
diiferent specialties. 

As a first step, the conference clarified its con- 
ception of home economics as education for family 
living. Home economics is now becoming more 
and more concerned with the broad aspects of 
family and home life — nutrition, meal planning 
and food preparation, housing, adequate and safe 
water supply and sanitary facilities, home manage- 
ment, clothing for the family, care of children, 
relations of members within the family and in the 
community, and other problems related to the well- 
being of the family — in contrast to the earlier con- 
ception of this field as being limited to methods of 
performing household tasks. 

The conference considered the extent and type of 
training being offered in the field of family-life 
education in the Caribbean, the problems en- 
countered, and ways in which more effective pro- 
grams can be promoted. Attention was centered 
on education in family betterment through exten- 
sion work, through the schools and school-feeding 
programs, and through health, social welfare, and 
voluntary organizations. The need for coopera- 



576 



Department of State Bulletin 



tion among these agencies was stressed, and special 
emphasis was given to the need for more and better 
trained workers in this field. 

The conference formulated 35 specific recom- 
mendations for extending and improving work in 
this important field on family living. Comment 
on some of the major discussions and their out- 
comes follows. 

Extension 

The term "extension" is applied to the process 
by which knowledge is passed on to families and 
community groups through informal teaching. 
Through common usage, the term has become asso- 
ciated chiefly with education in rural areas through 
agricultural agencies. Extension in home econom- 
ics, however, should not be confined to agricultural 
education, but should include instruction given by 
any agency concerned with better family living. 

Most of the countries represented at the confer- 
ence have at least the beginnings of an agricul- 
tural extension program. In most cases, however, 
the only persons employed are men agents who 
work on problems of soil, crops, livestock raising, 
and on other problems of farm management, so 
that the home making and home improvement as- 
pects of a rural betterment program are neglected. 
The conference stressed that a joint program for 
both farm and home improvement is essential if 
real success is to be attamed in improving living 
conditions of rural families. It recommended that 
trained home economists be employed along with 
agricultural agents to work with the families on 
problems of the home, and that the training of 
both men and women agents be broadened to 
include certain aspects of the other's field so that 
they can render maximum service to families with 
whom they come in contact. 

For example, it was pointed out that if men 
agents had some training in simple carpentry, they 
could help the families in various phases of home 
improvement such as building cupboards, shelves, 
and smokeless fireplaces and makang simple home 
repairs. With an elementary knowledge of nutri- 
tion they could emphasize the need for providing 
a milk supply for the family, the importance of a 
home vegetable garden, and the best types of 
vegetables to grow. Similarly, the woman agent 
with some training in agronomy could help to pro- 
mote and teach home gardening, and the care of 
chickens, pigs, and rabbits as a means of providing 
better nutrition for the family. Such broadened 
training of the workers would extend and 
strengthen the program, especially until such time 
as an adequate number of both farm and home 
agents is supplied. 

Recognition was given in the discussions to the 
valuable service that can be rendered in family- 
life education by workers from various agencies 
who have contact with the homes in some capacity. 
Among these are social welfare workers, nurses, 

October 13, J 952 

225150 — 52 1 



health officers, and workers in a variety of volun- 
tary organizations. Each of these touches some 
aspect of family life and could, with a broader 
training and outlook, render a valuable contribu- 
tion to education for better home living. The con- 
ference recommended that every effort be made to 
encourage, train, and utilize such workers in pro- 
moting programs in family life. 

Home economics in some form and to some ex- 
tent is included in the school curriculum in all the 
countries represented. Its scope, however, varies 
widely. Most commonly it is limited to the teach 
ing of cooking, sewing, laundry, and housewifery. 
Yet the teaching of even these subjects is often un- 
realistic and unrelated to the pupil's needs. More- 
over, only a small proportion of the school popu- 
lation is reached. Even in schools where the sub- 
ject is taught, many pupils receive no training in 
it since it is offered only to girls 11 years of age 
and over and many leave school at a younger age. 

Home Economics in the Schools 

As remedies for this situation, the conference 
suggested : That home economics be taught in all 
schools, elementary and secondary, and be made 
available to all pupils regardless of sex or aca- 
demic proficiency; that a broader interpretation 
be given to the subject so as to include the more 
important aspects of family living, especially nu- 
trition, child development, and family relation- 
ships ; that every effort be made to teach all boys 
the use of simple tools, and that manual training 
include the production of articles which could be 
used for improving their own homes and the mak- 
ing of simple home repairs ; that the work in home 
economics begin at a lower age level in order to 
reach students before they leave school ; and that 
late afternoon and evening classes in home eco- 
nomics be given for the benefit of girls who have 
left school and also for adults. 

It is not enough merely to provide for training 
in home economics. It is important to insure that 
the training will be realistic in relation to the 
needs of the homes from which the pupils come. 
The teacher, through home visits, should become 
familiar with these needs and should plan her 
teaching to make the maximum contribution 
toward filling them. To this end the equipment 
for teaching in the school should bear some rela- 
tionship to that found in tlie homes, and the foods 
and other materials used should be ones that are 
familiar and are available to the families. Super- 
vised home projects should also help to carry over 
the school's teaching into practical home better- 
ment. 



Education in Nutrition 

The need for strengthening the program of 
nutrition and making it more effective in terms of 
the needs of the people was emphasized through- 

577 



out the discussions. Greater effort, it was believed, 
should be made to base nutrition teaching on the 
needs of the people as revealed by a study of their 
diets, their food customs, their facilities for pre- 
paring food, and their resources. 

School Gardens — Although school gardens are 
fairly common in the Caribbean area, too often 
they are used solely for show and in competition 
for prizes. They have little or no influence in 
stimulating home gardens or in education in nu- 
trition. Yet the school garden if effectively util- 
ized could be valuable in improving the nutrition 
of the community. The vegetables grown in them 
should be those that contribute most to good nu- 
trition ; the foods produced in the garden should 
be used in the homes and/or in school-feeding 
programs ; tlie pupils should be encouraged to cul- 
tivate plots at home under the school's supervi- 
sion; and the students and their parents should 
be taught the value of the vegetable garden in 
promoting better health for the family. The 
school garden for winning of prizes should be dis- 
couraged. 

School Feeding Programs — All territories in 
the area have some form of school or community 
feeding, but there is great variety in total cover- 
age and in pi'ocedures. In some only 5 percent 
of the school population is reached, in others the 
large majority. The food served varies from a 
complete meal to a snack consisting of milk only, 
or of milk and biscuits, which in some cases are 
fortified with food yeast. Requirements for ad- 
mission to the programs also vary. Some pro- 
grams are limited to the most needy children ; in 
others, factors such as distance from school may 
also be considered. In some places, contributions 
from the children are required or encouraged, 
either in money, food, or fuel; in others, the 
lunches are entirely free. 

In practically all cases the limited funds avail- 
able make it difficult to provide a balanced meal 
for any considerable number of children. Fre- 
quently, too, the funds available are not used to 
best advantage. Too gi-eat a use is often made of 
canned foods and vitamin tablets when the needs 
could be better and more economically supplied 
by locally produced foods. The educational value 
of the feeding program is not adequately utilized. 

The conference recommended that when funds 
are limited it is preferable to give a nutritious 
snack that supplements home meals to a larger 
number of children rather than to serve a com- 
plete meal to a few ; that the greatest possible use 
be made of fresh vegetables and fruits in prefer- 
ence to imported canned or synthetic substitutes; 
that when there is an insufficient supply of fresh 
milk at reasonable price, efforts be made to utilize 
dry skim milk as it is a low cost food of high nutri- 
tional value ; and that the educational value, both 
nutritional and social, of any feeding program be 
fully utilized. 



Joint Action in Home Improvement Programs 

There is need for joint action of school, home, 
and community in promoting home-improvement 
programs. Families, teachers, community groups, 
and agencies should plan together if maximum 
benefit is to be derived from their efforts. All of 
the government agencies, voluntary organizations, 
and religious groups engaged in activities affect- 
ing some aspect of home life are hampered by lack 
of adequate trained personnel, space, equipment, 
funds, or other resources. 

The conference stressed the fact that far more 
could be accomplished in raising the standards of 
family living, even with the present workers and 
facilities, if there were joint planning and effective 
cooperation among these agencies. Although it is 
the policy of these gi'oups to cooperate in carrying 
out their programs, coordination is usually infre- 
quent and ineffective, since the initiation of co- 
operative effort is left to the individual agencies. 
It was the belief of the conference that to be ef- 
fective such cooperation should be provided for at 
the policy-making levels of the governments of the 
territories in the area. It therefore recommended 
that governments take steps to facilitate such co- 
ordination at the appropriate governmental level. 

Publications and Otiier Teaching Aids 

The need for books and other teaching aids for 
home improvement programs was pointed out. 
Pamphlets and leaflets dealing in simple language 
with home problems are especially needed. Movies, 
filmstrips, and slides are also useful adjuncts. 
There is a special need for a textbook on home eco- 
nomics for elementary schools suited to West In- 
dian conditions and customs. 

In some territories no funds are available for 
such teaching materials ; in most they are limited. 
Since conditions and needs are similar in the vari- 
ous territories, maximum use could be made of 
available materials by providing for their ex- 
change. The conference therefore recommended 
that the Caribbean Commission be requested to 
serve as a clearinghouse for the interchange of 
teaching materials and aids among the territories, 
and that all governments be asked to send copies 
of selected materials published in their respective 
countries which might be useful to others. 

Training of Workers 

Throughout the conference the need for more 
and better-trained workers was repeatedly voiced. 
It was recognized that the level of work can never 
rise above the level of training of the workers. 
Few opportunities exist in the Caribbean for train- 
ing of home economics workers at college level ex- 
cept in Puerto Rico where the University offei-s 
a 4-year course leading to a B. Sc. degree. In other 
territories limited training in domestic subjects is 



578 



Department of State Bulletin 



given in some training institutions ; some students 
attend colleges outside the area. 

The conference made several suggestions for im- 
proving the situation. It recommended that, until 
further facilities are available, the University of 
Puerto Rico be utilized for the preparation of 
workers in home economics for the whole area; 
that its assistance be especially sought in develop- 
ing regional training by offering short courses to 
workers in the area ; and that the Caribbean Com- 
mission approach the University regarding the 
possibility of a 3-month course to be offered dur- 
ing 1953, and request Fao to grant fellowships 
for the proposed training course. The conference 
also suggested that one or more centers be estab- 
lished in the area to offer 1-year courses in home 
economics, and that the Univei-sity College of the 
West Indies be invited to formulate a long-term 
policy looking toward the establishment of degree 
courses in home economics and postgraduate 
courses in nutrition. 

Technical Cooperation and Coordination 

The conference noted that although many in- 
ternational, national, and private organizations 
offer various types of technical assistance, such 
services are not widely used in the Caribbean. 
Many problems confronting the area, such as the 
need' for public education in all matters affecting 
the child and the parent-child relationship, data 
on the nutritional value of foods produced and 
consumed, improvement of the limited food and 
agricultural resources available, and the coordina- 
tion and development of a sound home-economics 
program, could be attacked cooperatively if the 
available technical assistance were utilized. Ac- 
cordingly, the conference recommended that the 
attention of o;overimients be called to the technical 
assistance offered by international and other or- 
ganizations, and specified several projects for 
which the Caribbean Commission should request 
help now in order to further the improvement of 
family and home life in the area. 

There was general agreement among the partici- 
pants that the Conference was a fruitful one. The 
conference voiced its belief that such meetings of 
technical workers are valuable in enabling work- 
ers to exchange views and experiences and so de- 
rive a better understanding of the problems in the 
entire area, to keep abreast of progress in such 
matters as are continually under review, to ascer- 
tain to what extent the several proposals put for- 
ward are being implemented or are capable of 
achievement, and, in the light of the findings, to 
determine the next course of action. The confer- 
ence unanimously recommended that a similar 
conference on home economics and nutrition be 
held in the Caribbean every 3 years. 



International IVPaterials Conference 

Pulp-Paper Committee Ends Work 

The Pulp-Paper Committee of the International 
Materials Conference announced on September 23 
that its member governments have accepted a 
recommendation that it be dissolved forthwith. 

This action was based upon further evidence of 
improvement in the supply position of dissolving 
wood pulp and newsprint in the free countries of 
the world, since its last appraisal in July. 

Specifically, the Committee reported : 

1. A record level of North American production 
for January--July 1952, which shows an increase 
of almost 4 percent over the corresponding period 
of 1951. 

2. An encouraging increase in exports from 
North American sources to other parts of the 
world despite the sustained high level of North 
American consmnption. 

3. Lack of requests for emergency supplies of 
newsprint. 

4. A continued satisfactory newsprint supply 
situation in Europe. 

5. Increased inventories in some consuming 
countries and notably in the United States. 

The Pulp-Paper Committee has been in exist- 
ence since April 30, 1951, and was set up to exam- 
ine and I'ecommend action on newsprint and wood- 
pulp supply problems. A number of emergency 
allocations of newsprint were made in 1951 and 
early 1952 to 18 countries in all. The Committee 
did not find it necessary at any stage to recom- 
mend allocations of wood pulp. 

Fifteen countries were represented on the Pulp- 
Paper Committee. They were Austi'alia, Austi'ia, 
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, the Federal Re- 
public of Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United King- 
dom, and the United States. 

Distribution of Primary Copper 

The Copper-Zinc-Lead Committee of the Inter- 
national Materials Conference (Imc) on Septem- 
ber 30 announced that its member governments 
have accepted its proposals for the allocation of 
copper for the fourth quarter of 1952. 

The Committee has noted a steady improve- 
ment in the supply position during the year and 
certain indications that the market is easing. 
Nevertheless, requirements for defense and essen- 
tial civilian purposes, as stated by Governments, 
continue at a level which, in the view of the Com- 
mittee, does not justify the discontinuance of al- 
location at this time. 

The Committee again agreed to make arrange- 
ments whereby domestic users in the United States 
or in other countries would have the opportunity 



Ocfober 13, 1952 



579 



to purchase any copper allocated to other coun- 
tries participating in the International Materials 
Conference and not used by them. 

In accepting the Committee's recommendations, 
the Chilean Government made a reservation by 
which, without reference to the distribution plan, 
it may dispose of a limited tonnage of its copper. 
Notwithstanding this reservation, the Chilean 
Government has stated its desire to take into ac- 
count the recommendations of the Committee and 
to consider them whenever possible. 

The Committee has recommended a plan of dis- 
tribution 1 of 747,655 metric tons of copper in the 
fourth quarter, as compared with 744,290 metric 
tons for the third quarter. Direct defense needs 
have again been given priority. 

The allocation to each counti-y is based upon its 
requirements for defense and essential civilian 
production. The U. S. allocation of 362,000 tons 
includes, however, provision for direct defense 
needs, essential civilian production, and stockpil- 
ing. Furthermore, the United States is authorized 
to purchase an additional 16,000 tons specifically 
for strategic stockpiling. 

Primary copper only (blister and refined) is in- 
cluded in the plan. As in previous quarters, semi- 
fabricated products have not been allocated, but 
all exporting countries are again asked to maintain 
their exports of such semis at a level commensurate 
with their allocations of primary metal for civilian 
consumption, in accordance with normal patterns 
of trade. 

Twelve countries are represented on the Com- 
mittee. They are Australia, Belgium (represent- 
ing Benelux), Canada, Chile, France, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Italy, Mexico, Norway, 
Peru, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
The plan of distribution has been forwarded also 
to the governments of 26 other countries, not repre- 
sented on the Committee, for which allocations 
have been recommended. 

Wool Committee of IMC To Be Dissolved 

The Wool Committee of the International Ma- 
terials Conference (Imc) announced on Septem- 
ber 29 that its member governments have agreed 
that it be dissolved at this time. 

This action was based on evidence that wool is 
no longer in short supply in the free countries of 
the world. 

The Committee has been in existence since April 
2, 1951, and was set up by the member governments 
"to consider and recommend or report to govern- 
ments concerning specific action which should be 
taken in the case of wool in order to expand pro- 
duction, increase availability, conserve supplies, 
and arrive at the most effective distribution and 



utilization of supplies among consuming coun- 
tries." In accordance with these terms of refer- 
ence the Committee kept the statistical position of 
wool under continuous review but never decided to 
recommend allocation or other international action 
regarding distribution of wool supply. 

Eleven countries were represented on the Com- 
mittee: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, France, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, New 
Zealand, the Union of South Africa, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay. 

Distribution of Nickel and Cobalt 

The Manganese-Nickel-Cobalt Committee of the 
International Materials Conference (Imc) on 
September 30 announced its recommended distri- 
bution of nickel and cobalt for the fourth quarter 
of 1952. The countries represented on the Com- 
mittee are Belgium (for Benelux), Brazil, Can- 
ada, Cuba, France, the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, India, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the 
Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States. 

All of the 14 member governments have agreed 
to comply with both plans of distribution,^ which 
have been forwarded to other interested govern- 
ments for implementation. 

As in the tliird quarter, the Committee agreed 
to make arrangements whereby domestic consum- 
ers in the United States, or in other countries, 
would have the opportunity to purchase any nickel 
or cobalt allocated to countries participating in the 
Imc and not used by any such participating coun- 
try. 

The nickel distribution covers all primary forms 
of metal and oxides, but has not included salts 
since December 31, 1951. The availabilities for 
this quarter have been estimated at 37,060 metric 
tons of nickel content, against an amount of 36,- 
580 tons in the third quarter. Although this repre- 
sents an anticipated increase of some 480 tons over 
the third quarter, the essential needs of the free 
world continue to increase at the same time, due 
mainly to growing demands for defense. It is in- 
evitable, therefore, that the allocations recom- 
mended will be insufficient to meet the full require- 
ments of most countries. 

The total quantity of cobalt available for dis- 
tribution, which includes primary metal, oxides 
and salts, amounts to 2,890 tons of cobalt con- 
tent for this quarter, while estimates for the third 
quarter showed total availabilities at 2,475 tons. 
In view of this improvement in the supply posi- 
tion, which is likely to develop further in the first 
part of 1953, the Committee will consider, before 
the end of the present year, whether or not the 
international distribution of cobalt should be con- 
tinued beyond December 31, 1952. 



' Not printed here; see Imc press release dated Sept. 29. 
580 



' Not printed here ; see Imc press release of Sept. 30. 
Department of State Bulletin 



U.S. Delegations to 
International Conferences 

South Pacific Commission 

The Department of State announced on October 
3 (press release 779) that the U.S. delegation at 
the tenth session of the South Pacific Commission, 
to be convened at Noumea, New Caledonia, on 
October 6, 1952, will be as follows : 

Senior Commissioner 

Felix M. Keeslng, Professor of Anthropology, Stanford 
University 

Acting Commissimier 

Kobert R. Robbins, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, 
Department of State 

Advisers 

Philip E. Haring, American Consul, Noumea 
John C. Elliott, Governor, American Samona 

The South Pacific Commission was created in 
1948 by the Governments of Australia, France, 
the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kmg- 
dom, and the United States to serve as a consulta- 
tive and advisory body to those Governments m 
matters affecting the welfare and advancement of 
the peoples of the 17 non-self-governing terri- 
tories within the scope of the Commission. The 
ninth session of the Commission, which holds two 
regular sessions each year, was held at Noumea, 
New Caledonia, April 28-May 7, 1952. Com- 
missioners and advisers from the six member gov- 
ernments attend the sessions. 

The general purpose of the forthcoming meet- 
ing is to further cooperation among the partici- 
pating Governments in promoting economic and 
social development in the territories of the region. 
The principal items to be considered at this ses- 
sion are the progress of work projects, including 
reports on the South Pacific Fisheries Conference 
(Noumea, May 1952), coral atoll development, 
the establishment of the Central "Vocational 
Training Institute, housing, and nutrition; prep- 
arations for the second South Pacific Conference 
(1953) ; report of the fourth meeting of the South 
Pacific Research Council, together with the ap- 
pointment of members of that body for 1953; 
appointment of an executive officer for economic 
development; the 1953 budget; and publications. 
Other related administrative and financial mat- 
ters will also be discussed. 



Plenipotentiary Conference of ITU 

The Department of State announced on October 
1 (press release 774) that the U.S. delegation to 
the International Telecommunication Union 
(Itu) International Plenipotentiary Conference, 
scheduled to begin at Buenos Aires, October 1, 
1952, will be as follows : 

Oc/ober 13, J 952 



Chairman 

Francis Colt de Wolf, Chief, Telecommunications Policy 
Staff, Department of State 

Vice Chairman 

Harvey B. Otterman, Associate Chief, Telecommunica- 
tions Policy Staff, Department of State 

Members 

E. E. Berthold, Captain, U.S.N., Director of Communica- 
tions, Western Sea Frontier, Department of Defense 

Sidney Cummins, International Administration Officer, 
IJivision of International Administration, Depart- 
ment of State 

Louis E. DeLaFleur, Assistant Chief. Frequency Alloca- 
tion and Treaty Division, Federal Communications 
Commission 

Mucio F. Delgado, Special Assistant to the Chief, Office 
of International Broadcasting, International Infor- 
mation Administration, Department of State 

John D. Tomlin;3on, Adviser, Office of United Nations 
Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State 

Florence A. Trail, Telecommunications Policy Staff, De- 
partment of State 

Adviser 

Philip F. Siling, Engineer-in-Charge, RCA Frequency 
Bureau, Radio Corporation of America 

The Plenipotentiary Conference is the supreme 
organ of the Iru, an organization which for more 
than 85 years has assured the international regu- 
lation of telegraphs and telephones (first by wire 
and later by both wire and radio) so well that most 
people are not aware of its existence, merely as- 
suming that their telegrams and telephone calls 
to points abroad will go forward without inter- 
ruption, that their planes and ships will be guided 
by radio in perfect safety, and that they can watch 
or listen to their favorite television or radio pro- 
gram without interference. 

Under the terms of the International Telecom- 
munication Convention of October 2, 1947, the 
Plenipotentiary Conference, which meets once 
every 5 years, is required to consider the report of 
the Administrative Council of Itu on the activi- 
ties of the Union ; establish the basis for the budget 
of the Union for the next 5 years ; finally approve 
the accounts of the Union ; elect the members of 
the Itu Administrative Council; revise the con- 
vention if it considers this necessary ; if necessary, 
enter into any formal agreement or revise any ex- 
isting formal agreement between the Union and 
any other international body ; and deal with such 
other telecommunication ques-tions as may be 
necessary. The principal purpose of the forth- 
coming conference is to consider such revisions of 
the convention as have been proposed. 

The United States has taken an active role in 
this organization in keeping with its outstanding 
communications interests. This Government is 
among the Itu member states which have sub- 
mitted proposals for revision of the convention 
and its annexes. 

581 



Contracting Parties to GATT 

The Department of State announced on October 
3 (press release 775) that the U.S. delegation to 
the seventh session of the contracting parties to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Gatp), 
which convened at Geneva on October 2, 1952 is as 
follows : 

Chairman 

Willard L. Thorp, Assistant Secretary for Econiomie 
Affairs, Department of State 

Vice Chairman 

Raymond Vernon, Deputy Director, Office of Economic 
Defense and Trade Policy, Department of State 

Special Adviser to Chairman 

J. Tliomas Schneider, Assistant Secretary for Interna- 
tional Affairs, Department of Commerce 

Advisers 

Louis C. Boochever, Jr., Office of European Regional Af- 
fairs, Department of State 

George Bronz, Special Assistant to the General Counsel, 
Department of the Treasury 

John J. Czyzak, Office of Legal Adviser for Economic Af- 
fairs, Department of State 

Mortimer D. Goldstein, Assistant Chief, Exchange Restric- 
tions and Payments Agreements, Monetary Affairs 
Staff, Department of State 

Joseph A. Greenwald, Economic Officer, American Con- 
sulate General, Geneva 

John W. Hight, Economic Specialist, Office of the Special 
Representative in Europe, Mutual Security Agency, 
Paris 

W. E. Higman, Chief, Division of Classification, Entry, 
and Value, Bureau of Customs, Department of the 
Treasury 

Florence Kirlin, Special Assistant, Congressional Rela- 
tions, Department of State 

Roliert B. Schwenger, Chief, Regional Investigation 
Branch, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, 
Department of Agriculture 

William O. Shofner, Staff Assistant, Office of Price, Pro- 
duction and Marketing Administration, Department 
of Agriculture 

Clarence S. Siegel, Assistant Director, European Division, 
Office of International Trade, Department of Com- 
merce 

Executive Secretary 

Henry F. Nichol, Conference Attach^, American Consulate 
General, Geneva 

Technical Secretary 

Ruth S. Donahue, Office of Economic Affairs, Department 
of State 

Members of Staff 

Angelina G. Agin, American Consulate General, Geneva 

Alexander E. Giffin, Office of Financial and Development 
Policy, Department of State 

Eleanor J. Hockman, Office of Economic Affairs, Depart- 
ment of State 

Audrey Maefarland, Geneva 

Vivian Morrison, Office of Economic Defense and Trade 
Policy, Department of State 

Pursuant to a recommendation of the Prepara- 
tory Committee of the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Employment, negotiations in which 



23 countries participated were carried on at 
Creneva in 1947 for the purpose of effecting a re- 
duction of tariffs and other trade barriers and of 
eliminating preferences on a reciprocal and mutu- 
ally advantageous basis. Those negotiations re- I 
suited in the formulation of the General Agree- 
ment and of a protocol of provisional application 
of that agreement. Further tariff negotiations 
have taken place and the number of contracting 
states is now thirty-four. 

The General Agreement provides that repre- 
sentatives of the contracting parties shall meet 
from time to time for the purpose of facilitating 
the operation and furthering the objectives of the 
agreement. The sixth session was held at Geneva, 
September l7-October 26, 1951. 



Worthing Party on Mobilization of 
Domestic Capital (ECAFE) 

The Department of State announced on Sep- 
tember 22 (press release 743) that the U.S. delega- 
tion to the second meeting of the Working Party 
of E.xperts on the Mobilization of Domestic Capi- 
tal, sponsored by the U.N. Economic Commis- 
sion for Asia and the Far East (Ecafe) , to be held 
at Bangkok, September 22-27, 1952, is as follows : 

Chairnwn 

George Springsteen, Jr., Investment and Economic De- 
velopment Staff", Department of State 

Members 

Konrad Bekker, Economic Officer and Attach^, American 

Embassy, New Delhi 
Flournoy H. Coles, Jr., Economist, Mutual Security 

Agency Mission, Bangkok 
Herliert K. May, Treasury Attach^, American Embassy, 

Manila 
Lynn Olson, Vice Consul, American Embassy, Bangkok 

The United States was active in stimulating the 
organization of the first meeting of the Woi-king 
Party, held at Bangkok in November of 1951, 
which made certain specific and practical sugges- 
tions looking toward the increased use of domestic 
capital resources in the economic development of 
the countries of the Ecafe region. It is believed 
that successful implementation of those proposals 
would lead to better marshaling of internal capi- 
tal for developmental purposes thus strengthening 
Far Eastern economies. 

A number of studies which have been under- 
taken by participating governments and the sec- 
retariat in accordance with the work program ap- 
proved by Ecafe will be submitted to the Work- 
ing Party. Participants in the meeting will dis- 
cuss (1) measures being taken and experience of 
countries in encouraging the mobilization of do- 
mestic capital, including institutional and other 
developments, and the relation of tax and fiscal 
policies to the mobilization of private capital ; (2) 
industrial and agricultural development and fi- 
nance corporations; (3) relation between foreign 



582 



Department of State Bulletin 



capital and mobilization of domestic capital; and 
(4) the work program of the Ecafe secretariat in 
the field of finance. 

The first meeting of the Working Party was 
attended by representatives of 11 member govern- 
ments and 6 associate member governments of 
Ecafe, besides observers from the Food and Agri- 
culture Organization of the United Nations, the 



International Monetary Fund, and tlie Supreme 
Commander of the Allied Powers (on behalf of 
Japan). Several officials from the ministries of 
finance, central banks, and cooperative and other 
savings institutions of the countries of the region 
were among the I'epresentatives. Attendance at 
the forthcoming meeting is open to the 14 mem- 
bers and the 10 associate members of Ecafe. 



The United States in the United Nations 



[Oct. 6-10, 1952] 

General Assembly 

Collective Measures Committee. — Harding Ban- 
croft (U.S.), on October 6, made the following 
statement : 

I should like to pay tribute to you, Mr. Chairman, for 
the continued constructive guidance you have given to the 
Committee in its second year of work. We have, I think, 
added a useful supplement to tlie foundations laid in our 
first report. 

Lists have been prepared which are now available for 
use when the Security Council or General Assembly de- 
cides upon or recommends a selective eml>argo on exports 
to an aggressor or to a state which threatens international 
peace. 

Further consideration has been given to the role of the 
siJecialized agencies. They, as well as other international 
agencies and arrangements, are part of the fabric of col- 
lective peace. . . . 

Further work has been done on the question of equitable 
sharing of the burdens involved in collective action, and 
we have suggested the need for some machinery to deal 
with this problem when it arises. 

The committee has studied tlie important sub.iect of 
obtaining the maximum contribution from states in sup- 
port of collective action and has suggested the possibility, 
and outlined the functions, of a negotiating committee to 
deal directly with nations for this purpose. . . . 

We have tried by appropriate letters to states to con- 
tinue to encourage them to take the preparatory steps 
recommended by the Assembly in the Uniting for Peace 
resolution and in the resolution adopted in Paris in Janu- 
ary of this year. . . . There is no time when it can be 
said that the United Nations has a perfected system of col- 
lective security. It is a long term enterprise. Our recom- 
mendations suggest the methods and the machinery for 
carrying forward the momentum under the principles of 
the Charter. 



Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 

Siibcom,viission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minonties. — Except for its draft 
report, the Subcommission completed its 5th ses- 
sion on October 7 with adoption by a vote of 9-2 
(U.K., Belgium) of a comprehensive resolution 
on its future work program. 

The text of this resolution — a compromise be- 
tween the tripartite proposal of Mr. Masani 
(India), Mr. Meneses-Pallares (Ecuador), and 
Mr. Shafaq (Iran) and an amendment by Mr. 
Daniels (U.S.) — was rejected by Mr. Nisot (Bel- 
gium) and Mr. Hiscocks (U.K.) because of the 
retention of two subparagraphs providing "espe- 
cially" that information on non-self-governing 
and trust territories should be analyzed and sup- 
plied to the Subconunission. Mr. Hiscocks ex- 
plained that he favored most of the resolution but 
saw no reason to single out voluntary reports on 
dependent areas for study while less readily avail- 
able data on discrimination in other parts of the 
world was neglected. These passages were re- 
tained by a vote of 5-4 (U.S.) -2 (Ecuador, Iran). 

The adopted resolution provides for appoint- 
ment of a special rapporteur to initiate a study of 
discrimination in the field of education immedi- 
ately, and to perform certain other tasks. It also 
calls for study of measures to combat discrimina- 
tion in additional fields, and schedules a discussion 
at the 6th session on the variety and scope of the 
problem of protecting minority rights. 



Ocfober 13, 1952 



583 



Foreign Policy Legislation in the 82d Congress 



As is customary, the Committee on Foreign Re- 
lations of the Seriate and the Convmittee on For- 
eign Affairs of the House of Representatives have 
prepared summaries of their activities dwring the 
two sessions of the 82d Congress, which began 
Jamfuary S, 1951 and ended July 7, 1958} Both 
docinnents are valuable sources of inforrnation on 
foreign policy. 

Printed helom are the introduction to the For- 
eign Relatione C ommvittee'' s Legislative History, 
the sections dealing with Mlateral treaties and 
international conventions of a commercial and 
financial nature, and an appendix summarizing 
Senate action on treaties. 

SUMMARY 

Collective security was the theme of much of the 
activity of the Foreign Relations Committee dur- 
ing the Eighty-second Congress. 

The 2-year period of 1951-52 was one in which 
existing security arrangements were strengthened 
and new ones established. 

The political face of the world as the Eighty- 
second Congress adjourned in July 1952 was not 
OTeatly different from what it had been when the 
Congress met in January 1951. These IS months 
had been full of turmoil abroad ; yet, developments 
abroad were marked by a growing strength and 
unity among the free nations, and at home every 
important foreign-policy measure on which the 
Senate acted was approved by a large bipartisan 
vote as noted below. 

Summary of votes in Senate on major items of foreign 
relations 



Measure 

Connally-Russell Resolution (S. Res. 99) 

Mutual Security Act, 19.51 

Mutual Security Act, 1952 

Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act 
(Battle Act). 



Senate 
vote 

69-21. 
61-5. 
64-10. 
55-16. 



' Copies of the Legislative History of the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-Second 
Congress (S. doc. 161) may be obtained from the Superin- 
tendent of Documents, Government Printing Office. For 
copies of the Survey of Activities of the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Bouse of Representatives, write to the 
Committee itself. 



Senate 
vote 

73-2. 

77-5. 

72-5. 

66-10. 
Voice vote. 
Voice vote. 

58-9. 



Measure 
Extension of North Atlantic Treaty to 

Greece and Turkey. 

Convention on Relations with Germany 

Extension of North Atlantic Treaty to 

European Defense Community. 

Japanese Peace Treaty 

Mutual Defense Treaty with Philippines 

Mutual Defense Treaty with Australia, 

New Zealand. 
Security Treaty with Japan 

As the Eighty-second Congress convened in Jan- 
uary 1951, the Chinese Communists were threaten- 
ing to drive the United Nations forces off the Ko- 
rean Peninsula and were putting the principle of 
collective security to its severest test. As the 
Eighty-second Congress adjourned in July 1952, 
one of the Senate's last acts was to ratify the agree- 
ments with Germany and with the European De- 
fense Community, agreements which, if properly 
executed, should mark the greatest advance in 
hundreds of years toward the unification of Eu- 
rope and a great boost for collective security. 

During these 18 months, the committee had be- 
fore it more measures relating to national and col- 
lective security than during any other comparable 
postwar period. It had more meetings and spent 
more hours considering these measures than at any 
other time since the war. 

The committee took three main steps to 
strengthen and expand existing security arrange- 
ments and to clarify the United States' commit- 
ments to her i^artners in the free world. 

The first of these steps was the long series of 
hearings on the question of sending additional 
divisions of American ground troops to Europe as 
a part of the United States contribution to the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization armies, which 
were just coming' into being in early 1951 under 
the command of General Eisenhower. These hear- 
ings, in which the Foreign Relations and Armed 
Services Committees sat jointly, resulted in pas- 
sage of the Connally-Russell resolution approving 
the plans of the President to send four more 
United States divisions to General Eisenhower's 
command but calling for congressional approval 
in the event additional ground forces are sent. 

The second step was the Mutual Security Pro- 
gram, authorized by the Mutual Security Act of 



584 



Department of State Bulletin 



1951 and continued by the Mutual Security Act 
of 1952. These acts consolidated and expanded 
United States foreign-assistance pi'ograms, which 
had been authorized in separate legislation by 
previous Congresses, and shifted the emphasis 
from economic to military aid. They marked the 
end of Marshall-plan aid to Europe and a rapid 
acceleration in Nato rearmament. During the 2 
years, a total of about $14 billion was authorized 
for mutual aid, compared with about $10 billion 
authorized during the Eighty-first Congress. 

These large expenditures abroad, the increasing 
military emphasis of the program, and partic- 
ularly the Chinese Commimist intervention in Ko- 
rea, aroused concern that no American assistance 
should find its way, directly or indirectly, behind 
the iron curtain and thereby increase the war- 
making potential of the Soviet Union or its satel- 
lites. In an effort to cope with this problem real- 
istically, the Congress passed the Mutual Defense 
Assistance Control Act of 1951 (the Battle Act), 
which established certain controls with respect to 
east-west trade. 

The third step in the effort to expand existing 
security arrangements was the broadening of the 
North Atlantic defense system to include Greece, 
Turkey, and Western Germany. 

The Eighty-second Congi-ess was also marked 
by a stepped-up campaign to liquidate the legal 
and political vestiges of World War II and to 
transform former enemies into friends and allies. 
Treaties of peace with Hungary, Bulgaria, Ku- 
mania, and Italy had been ratified in the Eight- 
ieth Congress, and Italy had been brought into the 
western defensive alliance through the North At- 
lantic Treaty approved by the Eighty-fii-st Con- 
gress. The Eighty-second Congress ratified a 
peace treaty with Japan and passed a joint resolu- 
tion ending the state of war with Geniiany. 

In each case arrangements were made to inte- 
grate these former enemy states into the defensive 
system of the free world. In the Pacific, as a part 
of the Japanese settlement, the United States en- 
tered into mutual defense treaties with Australia 
and New Zealand and with the Philippines. A 
bilateral defense treaty was also negotiated with 
Japan, supplementing the peace treaty. 

In Europe, the unilateral declaration terminat- 
ing the state of war with Germany was followed 
up by the negotiation of a convention on relations 
between France, Great Britain, and the United 
States, on the one hand, and the Federal Republic 
of Germany, on the other. A significant part of 
the European settlement was the formation of the 
European Defense Community (Edc) and an in- 
ternational army. Besides Western Germany, 
members of the community are Belgium, Luxem- 
burg, the Netherlands, France, and Italy. The 
Edc and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
exchanged reciprocal security guaranties of the 
kind contained in the North Atlantic Treaty. 

The problems of collective security, and more 



particularly of conducting coalition warfare, were 
also at the heart of the long hearings which the 
Foreign Relations and Armed Services Commit- 
tees conducted jointly on the military and political 
situation in the Far East. The investigation was 
touched off by the President's recall of Gen. Doug- 
las MacArthur from his Far East commands in 
April 1951, and by the time it was concluded in 
the following July it had filled five volumes with 
testimony. No formal report or other legislative 
action resulted from the investigation. 

Besides these broad trends developing out of the 
international situation, the committee's record 
during the Eighty-second Congress is remarkable 
in several respects which deserve special mention. 
One of these was the unusual number of treaties 
approved. 

During this Congress, the Senate received 39 
treaties which together with the 34 held over from 
previous Congi'esses made a total of 73 treaties 
before the committee. Of these, the Senate gave 
its advice and consent to the ratification of 39, and 
consented to the withdrawal of 4 by the President. 
This record compares to 25 treaties approved by 
both the Eightieth and Eighty-first Congresses. 
It is interesting to note that 24 of the treaties 
approved were bilateral and that 10 others (such 
as the Japanese Peace Treaty, the German con- 
tractual agreements, and the Nato protocols) had 
among their signatories only nations of the free 
world. The only treaty approved to which the 
Soviet Union was a party was the amendment to 
the International Load-Line Convention. Some 
of its satellites, however, were signatories to the 
four International Labor Conventions approved 
during this Congress. 

Notable also was the far-reaching utilization of 
the consultative subcommittee system established 
during the Eighty-first Congress and continued 
during the Eighty-second. Consultation between 
officials of the Department of State and members 
of the committee through these seven subcom- 
mittees reached a new high both in number of 
meetings and importance of these meetings. This 
development, more fully described below, shows 
a commendable effort on the part of both the legis- 
lative and executive branches to shape foreign 
policy on a partnership basis. 

Another notable feature of the committee's 
record during the Eighty-second Congress was the 
number of hearings held. Tlie extensive hearings 
on the "troops to Europe" issue and the situation 
in the Far East arising out of the dismissal of 
General MacArthur have already been referred to. 
In addition, the committee held long hearings on 
the Mutual Security Acts of 1951 and 1952, the 
nomination of Philip C. Jessup, as a delegate to 
the U. N. General Assembly, the St. Lawrence sea- 
way, the Japanese Peace Treaty and related se- 
curity pacts, the German contractual agreements, 
and other matters. While the committee during 
the Eighty-first Congress spent only 70 days in 



October 13, J 952 



585 



hearings, durinp: the Eighty-second Congress it 
spent 1'23 days — almost double the number. These 
hearings filled 10.010 pages, a new record in the 
committee's history. 

As usual, the committee handled a wide diver- 
sity of matters — from North Pacific fisheries to the 
use of highways in Panama, from extradition to 
sanitation, from children to widows, from wheat 
to sugar. These activities, summarized below, 
show the wide scope of the international activities 
of the United States and the responsibilities of the 
committee. 

For the statistical record, the committee had 
referred to it and took action on fewer measures 
(excluding treaties already referred to above) 
than during the previous Congress. 

It had on its calendar 30 bills (23 Senate and 7 
House bills) and Tfi resolutions (71 Senate and 5 
House). This total of 106 measures compares to 
1.50 measures before the committee during the 
Eighty-first Congress. Of these, 13 were enacted 
into law, compared to 3(> for the previous Con- 
gress. It must he remembered in this connection, 
however, that the Mutual Security Acts included 
nine programs separately authorized in the 
Eighty-first Congress. An additional 11 resolu- 
tions, seven of them simple Senate resolutions and 
four concurrent, were approved by the committee 
and passed by the Senate, and all but one of the 
concurrent resolutions passed the House. And, 
finally, two bills were reported by the committee 
but not passed by the Senate. 

Although the volume of business before the 
committee (in terms of the actual number of bills 
passed) decreased somewhat during this Congress, 
the importance of its business did not. This is re- 
flected in the number of meetings held by the 
committee. The committee and its legislative 
subcommittees met 251 times during these 2 years, 
compared to 175 times during the Eighty-first 
Congress. One hundred and eighty-eight of 
these were executive sessions, of which the tran- 
scripts of 84 were subsequently made public, and 
63 were public meetings. The fact that 96 of the 
executive se.ssions were held jointly with the 
Armed Services Committee of the Senate under- 
lines the close relationship between the foreign 
policy of this Nation and its national security. 



COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL MATTERS: 
BILATERAL TREATIES 

Most civilized nations regulate their normal 
commercial relations with each other by bilateral 
treaties and conventions covering various types of 
activities. The United States, for instance, has 
treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation, 
and consular conventions, with practically all 
states of the world. Some of these treaties date 
back to the early days of the Republic. The De- 
partment of State is constantly revising the old 



conventions, negotiating new ones with states 
newly emerging or previously not covered, and 
devising solutions to new problems arising out of 
modern conditions, such as double taxation. The 
Eighty-second Congress had an unusual number 
of such treaties before it: 18 double-taxation con- 
ventions, all but one of which were approved; 3 
consular conventions, which were approved ; and 6 
commercial treaties on which no final action was 
taken. 

Double-Taxation Conventions 

Background. — Double taxation arises, in the ab- 
sence of reciprocal conventions, from the fact that 
the various governments assume and exercise broad 
and frequently overlapping taxing jurisdictions. 
Several years ago, the United States embarked on 
a program of negotiating conventions to eliminate 
double taxation on its citizens residing, deriving 
an income, or inheriting an estate in a foreign 
state. 

SeTwte a-ction. — (1) The 14 conventions: In 
January 1951, a subcommittee with Senator 
George as chfiirman and Senators Gillette, Smith 
of New Jersey, and Hickenlooper as members was 
appointed to consider the 13 double-taxation con- 
ventions then pending before the committee and 1 
other transmitted to the Senate during the course 
of the subcommittee's deliberations. The subcom- 
mittee held 2 days of public hearings in April and 
on June 1, 1951, the subcommittee agreed to report 
the 14 conventions favorably to the full committee 
with certain reservations to several of them. The 
full committee promptly endorsed the subcommit- 
tee's recommendations and the Senate ratified 
them in due course. These were the conventions 
ratified and the reservations thereto : 

1. Convention with the Union of South Africa relating 
to income taxes, .signed at Pretoria, December 13, 1946 
(Executive O, 80th Cong., 1st sess.) : Approved with an 
understanding relative to the collection provisions of 
article XV. 

2. Convention with the Union of South Africa relating 
to estate taxes, signed at Capetown, April 10, 1947 (Ex- 
ecutive FF, SOth Cong., 1st sess.) : Approved with an 
understanding relative to the collection jsrovisions of 
article VIII. 

3. Convention with New Zealand relating to income 
taxes, signed at Washington, March 16, 1948 (Executive 
J, 80th Cong., 2d sess.) : Approved subject to a reserva- 
tion relative to taxes collectible from public entertainers. 

4. Convention with Norway relating to income taxes, 
signed at Washington, .Tune 13, 1949 (Executive Q, 81st 
Cong., 1st sess.) : Approved subject to an understanding 
relative to the collection provisions of article XVII. 

5. Convention with Norway relating to estate taxes, 
signed at Washington, June 13, 1949 (Executive R, 81st 
Cong., 1st sess.) : Approved subject to a reservation re- 
specting the collection provisions of article IX. 

6. Convention with Ireland relating to estate taxes, 
signed at Dublin, September 13, 1949 (Executive E, 81st 
Cong,, 2d sess.) : Approved subject to no reservations or 
understandings. 

7. Convention with Ireland relating to income taxes, 
signed at Dublin, September 13, 1949 (Executive F, 81st 
Cong., 2d sess.) : Approved subject to reservations rela- 



586 



Department of State Bulletin 



:ive to the capital-gains provisions of article XIV and 
he accumulated-earnings provisions of article XVI. 

8. Convention with Greece relating to estate taxes, 
signed at Athens, February 20, 1950 (Executive K, 81st 
3ong., 2d sess.) : Approved subject to a reservation re- 
jarding the collection provisions of article IX. 

9. Convention with Greece relating to income taxes, 
signed at Athens, February 20, 1950 (Executive L, 81st 
::;ong., 2d sess.) : Approved subject to an understanding 
Nith respect to the collection provisions of article XIX. 

10. Convention with Canada relating to income taxes, 
signed at Ottawa, June 12, 1950 (Executive R, 81st Cong., 
Id sess.) : Approved subject to a reservation relating to 
:he professional earnings of public entertainers. 

11. Convention with Canada relating to estate taxes, 
signed at Ottawa, June 12, 1950 (Executive S, 81st Cong., 
>d sess.) : Approved subject to no reservations or 
inderstandings. 

12. Protocol with the Union of South Africa, relating 
:o estate taxes, signed at Pretoria, July 14, 19o0 (Execu- 
;ive T, 81st Cong., 2d sess.) : Approved subject to an 
jnderstanding relative to the collection provision re- 
ferred to above under Executive FF. 

13. Protocol with the Union of South Africa, relating to 
income taxes, signed at Pretoria, July 14, 1950 (Execu- 
tive U, 81st Cong., 2d sess.) : Approved subject to a res- 
ervation relating to the profits of public entertainers and 
the understanding referred to under Executive O above. 

14. Convention with Switzerland, relating to income 
taxes, signed at Washington, May 24, 1951 (Executive N, 
^2d Cong., 1st sess.) : Approved subject to reservation 
regarding profits of public entertainers. 

(2) The three conventions: Toward the close 
of tlie second session, three additional conventions 
on double taxation, referred to the committee 
since its consideration of the previous 14, were 
considered by Senator George as a subcommittee 
of 1. His recommendation for approval was ac- 
cepted by the full committee on June 23, 1952 and 
by the Senate a few days later. The conventions, 
ratified without reservations, were the following: 

1. Convention with Finland relating to estate taxes, 
signed at Washington, March 3, 1952 (Executive K, S2d 
Cong., 2d sess.). 

2. Convention with Finland relating to income taxes, 
signed at Washington, March 3, 1952 (Executive L, 82d 
Cong., 2d sess.). 

3. Convention with Switzerland relating to estate taxes, 
signed at Washington, July 9, 1951 (Executive P, 82d 
Cong., 1st sess.). 

Provisions. The conventions and protocols 
listed above fall into two groups, nine dealing 
with taxes on income and eight dealing with taxes 
on the estates of deceased persons. In general 
they follow the postwar pattern of the conven- 
tions with the United Kingdom, France, the 
Netherlands, and Denmark. 

The income tax conventions are designed to 
eliminate double taxation with respect to income, 
either by exemption in one of the countries or by 
granting appropriate credit for taxes paid, or 
both. They also establish a system of reciprocal 
administrative assistance between the tax authori- 
ties of the signatories. They contain provisions 
relating to business income, dividends and in- 
terest, compensation for personal services, govern- 
ment salaries, private pensions and annuities, 
professors, teachers, students and business ap- 



prentices, religious, charitable and similar or- 
ganizations, ships and aircraft, rentals and 
royalties, capital gains, accumulated earnings and 
profits, etc. . 

The conventions on estate taxes seek to eliminate 
double taxation, principally by a credit system 
with respect to the estates inherited by nationals 
of one country in the territory of the other. They 
also set up a system for exchange of information 
and administrative assistance. The provisions 
are essentially the same as those of previous 
conventions. 

The reservations adopted by the Sena,te on the 
estate tax conventions apply to provisions on 
nuitual assistance in the collection of taxes. The 
committee felt that these were too broad and rec- 
ommended that they be omitted entirely. This 
reservation was adopted by the Senate. 

The reservations adopted by the Senate to the 
various income tax conventions all relate to the 
same provision, which exempted public enter- 
tainers from the tax relief for personal services 
extended to residents of one State temporarily 
within the taxing State. This was deemed by the 
committee and the Senate to discriminate unfairly 
against a particular occupational group, and 
reservations were adopted withholding Senate ad- 
vice and consent from that provision. 

Daics Documents 

(1) THE FODETEEN CONVENTIONS 

Subcommittee appointed, 

January 22, 1951. 
Subcommittee hearings, Printed hearings. 

April 12 and 13, 1951. 
Subcommittee report, June Executive transcript. 

Reported to Senate, August Senate Executive Report 1, 
g 1951. Eighty-tir.st Congress, 

first session. 

Approved, September 17, Congressional Record, same 
1951. date. 

(2) THE THREE CONVENTIONS 

Subcommittee appointed. 

May 19, 1952. . ^ ^ _ 

Reported to full committee Executive Report 1,5, 

and Senate, June 23, 1952. Eighty-second Congress, 

second session. 

Approved, July 4, 1952 Congressional Record, same 

date. 



Consular Conventions 

The United States has consular conventions 
with most nations of the world. The genei-al 
nature of these treaties has been described by 
the committee as follows: 

Consular conventions are bilateral agreements whereby 
the parties agree that they will reciprocally grant con- 
sular establishments and consular officers and employees 
certain privileges and rights within each country. These 
privileges and rights are given in order to enable the 
countries party to the conventions to assist and protect 
their nationals while in the territory of the other party 
to the convention. 



October ?3, J 952 



587 



In recent years, the Department of State has 
negotiated consulai* conventions to complete this 
network. The President in 1950 sent to the 
Senate consular conventions with Ireland and the 
United Kingdom. An article in these two con- 
ventions relating to the appointment of adminis- 
trators of decedent's estates, however, raised 
certain questions which persuaded the Department 
of State to withdraw the United Kingdom con- 
vention and submit a new one, and to negotiate 
a protocol to the Irish convention. A subcommit- 
tee of Senators Sparkman (chairman), Ful- 
bright, and Hickenlooper held public hearings on 
these three conventions — the new United King- 
dom convention, the Irish convention, and the pro- 
tocol thereto — and reported them favorably to 
the committee. Both the full committee and the 
Senate approved them. 

The conventions with Ireland and the United 
Kingdom are the first such instruments signed 
between the United States and tliose two nations. 
They follow closely the pattern of the only other 
postwar consular conventions entered into by the 
United States — those with the Philippines (1947) 
and Costa Rica (1948). They concern — 

the status of consular establishments, the rights, privi- 
leges, and immunities of consular officers, and the duties 
and functions of consular officers stationed in the terri- 
tories of the parties to the convention (Ex. Kept. 8, 82d 
Cong., 2d sess.). 



Dates 

First United Kingdom con- 
vention signed, February 
16, 1949. 

Transmitted to Senate, Jan- 
uary 9, 1950. 

Withdrawn, October 16, 1951- 

Second United Kingdom con- 
vention signed June 6, 1951. 

Transmitted to Senate, June 
20, 1951. 

Irish convention signed. May 

1, 1950. 
Transmitted to Senate, June 

7, 1050. 

Protocol to Irish convention 
signed March 3, 1952. 

Transmitted to Senate, March 
28, 1952. 

Public hearings. May 9, 1952- 



Eeported to 
21, 1952. 



Senate, May 
Approved, June 13, 1952 



Documents 



Executive A, Eighty- 
first Congress, second 
session. 

Congressional Record, 
same date. 



Executive O, Eighty- 
second Congress, first 
session. 



Executive P, Eighty- 
first Congress, second 
session. 



Executive N, Eighty- 
second Congress, sec- 
ond session. 

Printed as appendix to 
Executive Keport 8, 
Elghty-s e c o n d Con- 
gress, second session. 

Executive Report 8, 
Eighty-s e e o n d Con- 
gress, second session. 

Congressional Record, 
same date. 



Commercial Treaties 



the same subcommittee that considered the con- 
sular conventions. The six commercial treaties 
studied were those between the United States on 
the one hand and Colombia, Israel, Ethiopia, 
Italy, Denmark, and Greece. In most respects 
these treaties follow the general pattern of pre- 
vious treaties although there were many improve- 
ments in language. The treaties covered such 
matters as the protection of nationals and their 
property in tlie territory of the contracting par- 
ties, the promotion of trade, the reduction of dis- 
crimination based on nationality, and similar 
matters. One provision relating to the extension 
of national treatment to nationals of contracting 
parties engaged in the professions raised several 
questions which were still under consideration 
when the Eighty-second Congress ended and it 
was not possible to conclude the subcommittee's 
study of the conventions. 

Dates Documents 

Signed : 

Colombia. April 26, 1951__^ 

Israel, August 23, 1951 

Ethiopia, September 7, 1951 _ 

Italy, September 26, 1951— 

Denmark, October 1, 1951 

Greece, August 3, 1951 

Transmitted : 

Colombia, June 13, 1951_ 



Israel, October 18, 1951 

Ethiopia, January 14, 1952- 

Italy, January 29, 1952 

Denmark, January 29, 1952_ 

Greece, January 30, 1952_-_ 

Public hearings, May 9, 1952_ 



Executive M, Eighty- 
second Congress, first 
session. 

Executive R, Eighty- 
second Congress, first 
session. 

Etxecutive F, Eighty- 
second Congress, sec- 
ond session. 

Executive H, Eighty- 
second Congress, sec- 
ond session. 

Executive I, Eighty- 
second Congress, sec- 
ond session. 

Executive J, Eighty- 
second Congress, sec- 
ond session. 

Printed hearings. 



Although the commercial treaties were not re- 

Eorted by the committee, they deserve mention 
ecause they were considered at some length by 



COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL MATTERS: 
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS 

Certain problems by their nature cannot be 
solved on a bilateral basis, as those discussed 
above, but must be settled for greater effectiveness 
on a multilateral basis. Among these are inter- 
national commodity, conservation, transportation, 
and communications problems. The committee 
during this Congress had before it several such 
multilateral conventions designed to eliminate 
specific problems, two protocols to the interna- 
tional agreement on the regulation of production 
and marketing of sugar, a number of international 
labor conventions, and an amendment to the In- 
ternational Load Line Convention. These are de- 
scribed below. 



588 



Department of State Bulletin 



>rotocols to the International Convention on the 
Regulation of Production and Marlteting of Sugar 

Since 1944, the Senate has each year extended, 
jy means of approving a protocol, the interna- 
tional agreement regarding the regulation of pro- 
iuction and marketing of sugar of 1937. Such 
extension has served to keep alive the framework, 
3ut not the operative chapters, of that agreement 
Eor possible future revision. The 1951 protocol 
rt'as approved along with the 1952 protocol toward 
:he end of the 1952 session. 



Dates 
Signed August 31, 1950, aud 

August 31, 1951. 
rransmitted to the Senate, 

June 7, 1951, and April 1, 

1952. 

Reported to Senate, May 19, 
1952. 

Approved, July 4, 1952 



Documents 



Executives I, Eighty-second 
Congress, first session, 
and O, Eighty-second 
Congress, second session. 

Executive Report 7, Eighty- 
second Congress, second 
session. 

Congressional Record, same 
date. 



International Labor Conventions 

The United States has been a member of the 
Ilo since 1934 and has taken a very active part in 
the organization. Ilo conventions and reconamen- 
dations, however, have not been particularly ap- 
plicable in the United States because labor stand- 
ards on the whole in the United States are higher 
than those advocated in these instruments. Sen- 
ate action has not been pressed on a number of 
conventions and recommendations referred to it 
over the course of the years. During this Con- 
gress a special effort was made to secure action on 
some of these instruments. 

The conventions acted upon by the committee 
were four (Nos. 68, 69, 73, and 74) adopted at 
Seattle in 1946, all relating to minimum working 
standards for seamen. Ilo Convention No. 68 
concerns food and catering for crews on seagoing 
vessels, No. 69 concerns ships' cooks, No. 73 medi- 
cal examination of seafarers, and No. 74 the cer- 
tification of able-bodied seamen. These four con- 
ventions deal with conditions of work for maritime 
employees. The committee report states that the 
adherence of the United States to the four con- 
ventions- 
will serve to protect the standards of the nio.st advanced 
countries, such as the United States, from the lower 
standards of countries that lag behind. 

A subcommittee of Senators Green (chairman), 
Sparkman, and Tobey held hearings on the four 
conventions and reported them favorably with 
several understandings. The purpose of these un- 
derstandings was to make the conventions — as was 
intended by the framers — apply only to vessels 
plying the high seas and to exclude them from 
application to inland, coastal, or Great Lakes 
waters. The full committee adopted the subcom- 



mittee's recommendations and report, which in 
turn were adopted by the Senate. 

Dates Documents 

Signed, June 29, 1946 

Transmitted to Senate, June Executives R, S, T, and Z, 
23, 1947. Eightieth Congress, first 

session. 
Public hearings, January 21 Typed transcript. 

and 23, 1952. 
Reported to Senate, June 9, Executive Report 11, 
1952. Eighty-second Congress, 

second session. 

Approved, July 4, 1952 Congressional Record, same 

date. 



Amendment to International Load Line Convention 

Background. — In its report on this convention, 
the committee stated the background of the Inter- 
national Load Line Convention as follows : 

The International Load Line Convention, which was 
negotiated in 1930, approved by the Senate on February 
27, 1931, and proclaimed by the President on January 5, 
1933, prescribes the depths to which ships engaged In 
international commerce may be loaded. It requires that 
ships of participating nations engaged in International 
voyages shall be surveyed and marked with load lines in 
accordance with the convention's terms. Load lines are 
placed on ships to mark the point beyond which a vessel 
may not be safely submerged by reason of the load it 
carries. The convention recognizes that the load line may 
with full regard to safety differ at varying seasons of the 
year and in different parts of the oceans of the world and 
therefore fixes zones and seasons in which and during 
which different rules for fixing the load lines apply. 

Both Australia and Canada proposed modifica- 
tions to the original conventions, which were ap- 
proved by the interested authorities and shipping 
concerns in the United States. The Canadian 
modification consisted of including the port of 
Prince Ruppert, British Columbia, in the "sum- 
mer" zone instead of the "winter seasonal" zone, 
thereby permitting more deeply laden vessels to 
operate there. The Australian modification pro- 
posed to permit ships to remain in the "summer" 
zone on voyages between the Indian Ocean and 
ports of southern and eastern Australia, thereby 
again facilitating the carriage of lieavier loads. 
Since both modifications involved no lowering of 
safety standards and were supported by all in- 
terested parties, the committee and Senate took 
favorable action. 



Dates 
Submitted to the Senate, Oc- 
tober 3, 1951. 

Reported, March 7, 1952 



Documenta 
Senate Executive Q, 
Eighty-second Congress, 
first session. 
Senate Executive Report 
4, Eighty-second Con- 
gress, second session. 

Approved, April 1, 1952 Congressional Record, 

same date. 



ACTION ON TREATIES 

Suvimary. — During the Eighty-second Con- 
gress, the Senate received 39 treaties, which in ad- 
dition to the 34 still pending from previous ses- 



Ocfober 13, J 952 



589 



sions made 
committee. 



a total of 
Of these 4 



73 treaties before the 
were withdrawn at the 



request of the President of the United States and 
39 were approved by the Senate for ratification. 



Document 




Ex. O, 80th, 1st. 



Ex. R, S, Y, and Z, 80th, 1st.. 



Ex. FF, 80th, lst_ 



Ex. J, 80th, 2d. 

Ex. Q, 81st, 1st 
Ex. R, 81st, 1st 

Ex. E, 81st, 2d_ 

Ex. F, 81st, 2d. 
Ex. K, 81st, 2d. 

Ex. L, 81st, 2d. 

Ex. P, 81st, 2d. 
Ex. R, 81st, 2d_ 

Ex. S, 81st, 2d. 



Ex. T, 81st, 2d_ 



Ex. U, 81st, 2d- 



Ex. W, 81st, 2d 
Ex. C, 82d, 1st. 

Ex. I, 82d, 1st.. 



Convention between the United States of America and the Union of South 
Africa, signed at Pretoria on Dec. 13, 1946, in the English and Afrikaans 
languages, for the avoidance of double taxation for establishing rules of 
reciprocal administrative assistance with respect to taxes on income. 

4 conventions, formulated at the twenty-eighth (maritime) session of the 
International Labor Conference, held at Seattle, Wash., June 6-29, 
1946, which were transmitted to the Senate by the President on June 
23 1947. 

Convention between the United States of America and the Union of South 
Africa, signed at Capetown on Apr. 10, 1947, in the English and Afri- 
kaans languages, for the avoidance of double taxation and the preven- 
tion of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on the estates of deceased 
persons. 

The convention between the United States of America and New Zealand, 
signed at Washington on Mar. 16, 1948, for the avoidance of double tax- 
ation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on 
income. 

A convention between the United States of America and Norway for the 
avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with 
respect to taxes on income, signed at Washington, June 13, 1949. 

A convention between the United States of America and Norway for the 
avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with 
respect to taxes on estates and inheritances, signed at Washington on 
June 13, 1949. 

A convention between the United States of America and Ireland, signed 
at Dublin on Sept. 13, 1949, for the avoidance of double taxation and 
the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on the estates of 
deceased persons. 

A convention between the United States of America and IreLand, signed 
at Dublin on Sept. 13, 1949, for the avoidance of double taxation and 
the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income. 

A convention between the United States of America and Greece, signed 
at Athens on Feb. 20, 1950, for the avoidance of double taxation and 
the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on the estates of 
deceased persons. 

A convention with Greece, signed at Athens on Feb. 20, 1950, for the 
avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with 
respect to taxes on income. 

A consular convention between the United States of America and Ireland, 
signed at Dublin on May 1, 1950. 

Convention between the United States of America and Canada, signed 
at Ottawa on June 12, 1950, modifying and supplementing in certain 
respects the convention and accompanying protocol for the avoidance 
of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion in the case of 
income taxes, signed at Washington on Mar. 4, 1942. 

Convention between the United States of America and Canada, signed 
at Ottawa on June 12, 1950, modifying and supplementing in certain 
respects the convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the 
prevention of fiscal evasion in the case of estate taxes and succession 
duties, signed at Ottawa on June 8, 1944. 

A protocol between the United States of America and the Union of South 
Africa, signed at Pretoria on July 14, 1950, supplementing the conven- 
tion for the avoidance of double taxation and for establishing rules of 
reciprocal administrative assistance with respect to taxes on the estates 
of deceased persons, which was signed at Cape Town on Apr. 10, 1947. 

A protocol between the United States of America and the Union of South 
Africa, signed at Pretoria on July 14, 1950, supplementing the conven- 
tion for the avoidance of double taxation and for establishing rules of 
reciprocal administrative assistance with respect to taxes on income, 
which was signed at Pretoria on Dec. 13, 1946. 

A highway convention between the United States of America and the 
Republic of Panama, signed at Panama on Sept. 14, 1950. 

A convention between the United States of America and Canada, relat- 
ing to the operation by citizens of either country of certain radio equip- 
ment or stations in the other country, signed at Ottawa, on Feb. 8, 1951. 

A certified copy of a protocol dated in London Aug. 31, 1950, prolonging 
for 1 year after Aug. 31, 1950, the international agreement regarding 
the regulation of production and marketing of sugar, signed at London 
on May 6, 1937. 



Sept. 7, 1951 
July 4, 1952 
Sept. 17, 1951 

Do. 

Do. 
Do. 

Do. 

Do. 
Do. 

Do. 

June 13, 1952 
Sept. 17, 1951 

Sept. 17, 1951 

Do. 

Do. 



July 4, 1952 
Apr. 1, 1952 

July 4, 1952 



590 



Department of State Bulletin 




Ex. N, 82d, 1st 

Ex. O, 82d, 1st 

Ex. P, 82d, 1st 

Ex. Q, 82d, 1st 

Ex. A, B, C, andD, 82d, 2d. 



Ex. E, 82d, 2d 

Ex. G, 82d, 2d 

Ex. K, 82d, 2d 

Ex. L, 82d, 2d 

Ex. M, 82d, 2d 

Ex. N, 82d, 2d 

Ex. O, 82d, 2d 

Ex. Q and R, 82d, 2d 
Ex. S, 82d, 2d 



A convention between the United States of America and Switzerland, 
signed at Washington on May 24, 1951, for the avoidance of double 
taxation with respect to taxes on income. 

A consular convention and an accompanying protocol of signature be- 
tween the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, signed at Washington on June 6, 1951. 

Convention between the United States of America and Switzerland, 
signed at Washington on July 9, 1951, for the avoidance of double tax- 
ation with respect to taxes on estates and inheritances. 

Texts of a proposal by the Government of Canada and a proposal by the 
Government of Australia relating to seasonal zones established in an- 
nex II of the international load line convention, signed at London on 
July 5, 1930. 

Treaty of peace with Japan, signed at San Francisco on Sept. 8, 1951; 
mutual defense treaty between the United States of America and the 
Republic of the Philippines, signed at Washington on Aug. 30, 1951; 
security treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United 
States of America, signed at San Francisco on Sept. 1, 1951; security 
treaty between the United States of America and Japan, signed at San 
Francisco on Sept. 8, 1951. 

A protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and 
Turkey, which was opened for signature at London on Oct. 17, 1951, 
and had been signed on behalf of the United States of America and the 
other parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. 

A supplementary extradition convention between the United States of 
America and Canada, signed at Ottawa on Oct. 26, 1951. 

A convention between the United States of America and the Republic of 
Finland, signed at Washington on Mar. 3, 1952, for the avoidance of 
double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to 
taxes on estates and inheritances. 

A convention between the United States of America and the Republic of 
Finland, signed at Washington on Mar. 3, 1952, for the avoidance of 
double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to 
taxes on income. 

An agreement between the United States of America and Canada, signed 
at Ottawa on Feb. 21, 1952, for promotion of safety on the Great Lakes 
by means of radio. 

A protocol between the United States of America and Ireland, signed at 
Dublin on Mar. 3, 1952, supplementary to the consular convention, 
signed at Dublin on May 1, 1950. 

A protocol dated in London Aug. 31, 1952, prolonging for 1 year after 
Aug. 31, 1951, the international agreement regarding the regulation of 
production and marketing of sugar, signed at London on May 6, 1937. 

Convention on relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Re- 
jHiblic of Germany, signed at Bonn on May 26, 1952, and a protocol to 
the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Paris on May 27, 1952. 

An international convention for the high-seas fisheries of the North Pacific 
Ocean, together with a protocol relating thereto, signed at Tokyo, 
May 9, 1952, on behalf of the United States, Canada, and Japan. 



Sept. 17, 1951 
June 13, 1952 
July 4, 1952 
Apr. 1, 1952 

Mar. 20, 1952 

Feb. 7, 1952 

Apr. 1, 1952 
July 4, 1952 

Do. 

Do. 
June 13, 1952 
July 4, 1952 
July 1, 1952 
July 4, 1952 



PUBLICATIONS 



Recent Releases 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Oovern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address re- 
quests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except 
in the case of free publications, which may be obtained 
from the Department of State. 

Repatriation and Liberation of German Prisoners of War. 

Treaties and Other International Acts Series 240,j. Pub. 
40O0. 12 pp. 5^. 

Understanding between the United 'States and 
France — Dated at Paris Mar. 11 and 13, 1947 ; en- 
tered into force Mar. 13, 1947 with annex dated Mar. 
7, 1947. 



Health and Sanitation, Cooperative Program in Paraguay. 

Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2423. Pub. 
4601. 5 pp. 5(J. 

Agreement between the United States and Paraguay 
supplementing agreement of Sept. 18 and Nov. 11, 
1950 — Signed at Asuncion Nov. 5 and Dec. 7, 1951 ; 
entered into force Dee. 13, 1951. 

Aviation, Establishment of Customs, Public Health, and 
Police Controls at Payne Field. Treaties and Other In- 
ternational Acts Series 2410. Pub. 4005. 5 pp. 5^. 

Agreement between the United States and Egypt — 
Signed at Cairo Jan. 5, 1946 ; entered into force Jan. 
5, 1946. 

Prosecution of the War, Portuguese Timor Air Base on 
Santa Maria Island. Treaties and Other International 
Acts Series 2338. Pub. 4611. 9 pp. 50. 

Agreement between the United States and Portugal — 
Signed at Lisbon Nov. 28, 1944; entered into force 
Nov. 28, 1944. 



October 73, 1952 



591 



October 13, 1952 



Index 



Vol. XXVII, No. 694 



American Principles 

Role of the Bible In our national life (Acheson) . 555 

Problem of dependent peoples (Jessup) . . . 571 

Understanding today's world (Sargeant) . . 558 

American Republics 

GUATEMALA: Letter of credence 575 

Asia 

CHINA: Press conference statements by Secre- 
tary Acheson 570 

KOREA: Understanding today's world (Sar- 
geant) 558 

Korean question In the U.N 570 

Caribbean Commission 

First Caribbean conference on home economics 

and education In nutrition (Roberts) . . 576 

Communism 

Broadcast by Riunanlan escapee 563 

Congress 

Current legislation on foreign policy .... 563 
Foreign policy legislation in the 82d Congress 584 

Education 

First Caribbean conference on home economics 

and education in nutrition (Roberts) 576 

Europe 

AUSTRIA: Press conference statements by Sec- 
retary Acheson 570 

RUMANIA: Broadcast by Rumanian escapee 563 

U. S. S. R.: Requests recall of Ambassador 

Kennan; text of note 557 

Finance 

Working party on mobilization of domestic cap- 
ital (ECAFE) 582 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: Sept. 29-Oct. 5, 1952 

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the 
Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of 
State, Washington 25, D.C. 

Press releases issued prior to Sept. 29 which ap- 
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 743 of 
Sept. 22, 749 of Sept. 24, 751 of Sept. 24, 752 of Sept. 
24, and 759 of Sept. 26. 



No. 



Sabject 

Acheson : New translation of Bible 
Point 4 technicians assigned 
Award to newsman 
Exchange of persons 
VOA broadcast by escapee 
Acheson ; Peiping peace conference 
Acheson : Austrian State Treaty 
Acheson : Korean question in U.N. 
Telecommunications conference 
Contracting parties to Gatt 
U.S. treaty rights in Morocco 
Acheson : Recall of Kennan 
Soviet note on recall of Kennan 
South I'acific Commission 
Acheson : Note to Iran 



tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 
*Not printed. 



7(56 


9/29 


*767 


9/30 


*7f)8 


9/30 


*7W 


9/30 


770 


10/1 


771 


10/1 


772 


10/1 


773 


10/1 


774 


10/1 


775 


10/3 


t77«5 


10/3 


777 


10/3 


778 


10/3 


779 


10/3 


780 


10/5 



Human Rights 

Problem of dependent peoples (Jessup) . . . 571 

International Meetings 

IMC Pulp Paper Committee ends work . . . 579 

U. S. DELEGATIONS: 

Contracting parties to Gatt 582 

Plenipotentiary conference of ITO .... 581 

South Pacific Commission 581 

Working party on mobilization of domestic 

capital (ECAFE) 582 

Near and Middle East 

IRAN: 

Letters of credence 575 

Proposals clarified; text of U.S. note .... 569 

TURKEY: Private enterprise In Turkish- Ameri- 
can relations (McGhee) 564 

Presidential Proclamations 

Import fees Imposed on almonds 569 

Publications 

Foreign policy legislation In the 82d Congress . 584 

Recent releases 591 

Strategic Materials 

Distribution of nickel and cobalt 580 

Distribution of primary copper 579 

Pulp-Paper Committee ends work 579 

Wool committee of Imc to be dissolved . . . 580 

Technical Cooperation and Development 

POINT FOUR: Point Four and world peace 

(Truman) 568 

Telecommunications 

Plenipotentiary conference of iTU 581 

Trade 

Contracting parties to Gatt 582 

Import fees imposed on almonds (Presidential 

proclamation) 569 

Private enterprise in Turkish-American Rela- 
tions (McGhee) 564 

Treaty Information 

AUSTRIA: Press conference statements by Secre- 
tary Acheson 570 

Trust Territories 

Problem of dependent peoples (Jessup) . . . 571 

United Nations 

Problem of dependent peoples 571 

The U.S. In the U.N 583 

Name Index 

Acheson, Secretary 555, 557, 569, 570 

Calcai. Panait 563 

de Wolf, Francis Colt 581 

Jessup, Philip C 571 

Keesing, Felix M 581 

Kennan, George F 557 

McGhee, George C 564 

Otterraan, Harvey B 581 

Robbins. Robert R 581 

Roberts, Lydia J 576 

Saleh, Allah-Yar 575 

Sargeant, Rowland H 558 

Springsteen, George, Jr 582 

Thorp, Willard L 582 

Torlello, GulUermo 575 

Truman, President 568. 569 

Vernon, Raymond 582 

U. S- GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFrCE: 1952 



* "|6t>5» I ^^ -'^ 



iJ/ie/ zlleha/yi7yien(/ xw C/taie^ 





^ol. XXVII, No. 695 
October 20, 1952 



^bnt oj^ 




*'"ATE» O* 



SOVIET REACTION TO FREE WORLD'S GROWING 

STRENGTH • Address by Secretary Acheson 595 

KOREAN ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS SUSPENDED 

• Statements by Secretary Acheson, General Clark, and 
General Harrison 600 

PAVING A ROAD TO PEACE • by Wilson Compton ... 604 

A BASIC DECISION FOR THE U.S. : TRADE OR AID 

• by Eugenie Anderson ............... 614 

VALIDATION OF GERMAN DOLLAR BONDS • ArtUle 

by Roland F. Moores 608 

TREATY RIGHTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN 

MOROCCO • Article by Joseph M. Sweeney 620 



For index see back cover 



X 



U. S. SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS 

NOV 4 1952 




I 



fj/ie ~2^€ft€t/itlm.ent /}^ c/utte 



bulletin 

Vol. XXVII, No. 695 • Publication 4754 
October 20, 1952 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Qovemment Printing OBice 

Washington 25, D.C. 

Price: 

62 Issues, domestic $7.60, foreign $10.25 

Single copy, 20 cents 

The printing of this publication has 
been approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget (January 22, 1962). 
Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may 
be reprinted. Citation of the Depaetment 
or State Bulletin as the source will be 
appreciated. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication compiled and 
edited in the Division of Publications, 
Office of Public Affairs, provides the 
public and interested agencies of 
the Government with information on 
developments in the field of foreign 
relations and on the work of the De- 
partment of State and the Foreign 
Service. The BULLETIN includes 
selected press releases on foreign pol- 
icy issued by the White House and 
the Department, and statements and 
addresses made by the President and 
by the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the func- 
tions of the Department. Informa- 
tion is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to 
which the United States is or may 
become a party and treaties of gen- 
eral international interest. 

Publications of the Department, as 
well as legislative material in the field 
of international relations, are listed 
currently. 



Soviet Reaction to Free World's Growing Strengtii 



Address hy Secretary Acheson ^ 



I have come here to pay my respects to a fighting 
union. 

To look around this room, at this great and 
vigorous convention of a union less than 3 years 
old and already one of America's most important 
labor organizations, is to find proof enough of 
what courage and determination can do. 

This convention is a tribute to the hard work 
of your rank and file, your officers, and especially 
to the fighting spirit of your brilliant young presi- 
dent, Jim Carey. 

The battle you have been carrying on during 
these 3 years is far more important than the 
question of who is to represent the electrical work- 
ers of this country. Every American citizen has 
a stake in your fight against communism in the 
American labor movement. For this fight of yours 
is part of the great world struggle between free- 
dom and tyranny. 

I say this, not only because it has loosened the 
grip of a Communist-dominated union upon one 
of America's defense industries, but even more 
because working men and women in every indus- 
trial country are prime targets for the Commu- 
nists. The outcome of this world-wide struggle 
may hang almost as much upon the success or 
failure of the Communist effort to capture the 
labor movement as upon our strengtii of arms. 
That is why it is significant that you have shown 
the world how free trade unionists can hand a 
smashing and decisive defeat to what the Cio has 
called "the Communist Party masquerading as a 
labor union." 

We in the State Department have sent to Euro- 
pean labor leaders thousands of copies of the re- 
ports of your officers, describing how you have 
been fighting and winning this battle. We have 
carried on the Voice of America your radio pro- 
gram, "American Labor Answers Radio Moscow." 
This public-service program has been most effec- 

' Made before the International Union of Electrical, 
Radio, and Machine Workers (Cio) at Pittsburgh, Oct. 6 
(press release 781). 



five in exposing the myths and lies spread by the 
Communists about American working men and 
women. It is proof of the effectiveness of this 
program that Jim Carey has had the honor re- 
cently of receiving several blasts from Radio 
Moscow. 

There is another reason why I think your fight 
has meaning that goes far beyond yourselves. 
And that is because there is a right way and a 
wrong way to fight communism. You have been 
demonstrating to the American people how to go 
about it the right way, the effective way. 

Some who call themselves "anti-Communist" 
seem to believe that their best weapons are a strong 
voice and a weak conscience. 

But indiscriminate denunciations and character 
assassination are not the way to defend democracy 
from communism. The people who use these 
weapons do not know what democracy is. 

You know that the people who attack legitimate 
labor organizers as "Bolsheviks" make it harder, 
not easier, to fight the real Bolsheviks. 

And those who call themselves "anti-Commu- 
nist" only confuse the issue and hinder the real 
fight against commimism, when they attack as a 
traitor one of our greatest living patriots. Gen. 
George C. Marshall. 

You have shown that the effective fight against 
communism can and must be carried on by demo- 
cratic means. The reports of the trial committees 
designated by the Cio to hear and decide charges 
of Communist domination against some of its affil- 
iates were published by a Committee of the United 
States Senate - because it believed them of consum- 
ing interest to the Senate and to the American 
people. The Senate Committee pointed out that 
these reports threw a flood of light upon the strat- 
egy used by the Communist conspirators in their 
efforts to subvert unions as democratic institu- 
tions. The Committee pointed out something else 
equally and perhaps even more important. "They 

^ Communist Domination of Certain Unions, S. doc. 89, 
82d Cong., 1st sess. 



Ocfober 20, J 952 



595 



demonstrate," said the Chairman, Senator Hura- 
phreyj "how an alert and democratically governed 
organization destroyed Communist infiltration by 
due process." 

To defend democracy by antidemocratic 
means — by the Big Lie, by the smear, by indis- 
criminate accusations — will destroy democracy. 

There is another good lesson for all of us in your 
experience, and this has special application to our 
foreign policy. For you have been fighting the 
Communists with all your might, and at the same 
time, you have been striving vigorously and suc- 
cessfully to improve the conditions of the workers 
and in this way taking from the Communists the 
arguments and claims which form their chief ap- 
peal to the unsuspecting. 

As Jim Carey has said on many occasions, it 
isn't enough to be anti-Communist; you have to 
lick them with a positive program of your own. 
And this, in a nutshell, is the basic idea of our for- 
eign policy. 

It is no accident that the man who has done most 
to stiffen the backbone of the free world against 
communism has also cared more about, and done 
more about, human needs at home and abroad than 
anyone else. 

That man is the President of the United States, 
Harry S. Truman. 

The President has fought, not only for the de- 
fense of democracy but for the affirmation of de- 
mocracy. His programs have been built upon the 
faith that free men can create and sustain strength 
of arms while they demonstrate that democracy 
more truly provides the way toward genuine 
progress. 

He has held to that faith, with courage and con- 
sistency, against both the reckless and the faint- 
hearted. He has been unmoved by those who were 
ready to throw off restraint and plunge into ever- 
widening warfare. He was unmoved by others 
who would have held back the building of strength 
and of collective security against the Communist 
challenge. The President has held to a steady 
course. 

Communists Forced To Change Tactics 

I have no worry about the final judgment which 
history will pass on what has been done. It is of 
more concern to us now to note the significance of 
some recent events. These events, I believe, show 
that tlie Communist world is being forced to ad- 
just its tactics to the new situation created by the 
growing strength of the free world. 

Just how the Kremlin will adjust its tactics is 
not yet clear. It will become clear only from the 
actions of the Communist world, not from words — 
not even the words of Stalin or the resolutions of 
a Party Congress. 

But this much, I think, can be said on the basis 
of the evidence now available. The expectation 
that has apparently dominated Soviet policy since 

596 



the end of the war was clearly evident at the time 
of the founding of the Cominform in September 
1947. It was that all Europe and all Asia were 
ready to crumble before Soviet pressure and, if 
necessary, Soviet force. This expectation has been 
frustrated. The Communist world made impor- 
tant gains in the earlier part of this period, in 
China and in Czechoslovakia, while power factors 
were greatly in their favor. But as the strength 
and the spirit of resistance grew in the free world, 
the Soviet high hopes for easy conquest were dis- 
appointed. 

The measures responsible for the rise in con- 
fidence and strength of the free world are familiar 
to you : the staunch resistance of Iran in 1946, the 
Greek-Turkish aid programs and the Marshall 
Plan in 1947, the Vandenberg Resolution in 1948, 
the North Atlantic Treaty, the military-aid pro- 
gram and the Point Four Program, both inaugu- 
rated in 1949, and more than any other single act, 
I believe, the resolute response by the United Na- 
tions against aggi-ession in Korea in 1950. Then, 
add to this, in the past 2 years, the Japanese peace 
treaty, the contractual agreements with the Ger- 
man Federal Republic, the Schuman Plan, the 
European Defense Community, the treaties with 
the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, and 
the growing strength and confidence of the United 
States itself. 

The central purpose of these measures was to 
deter war, to create a realization in Moscow that 
a course of aggression would be doomed to defeat. 
I believe that tliis policy is succeeding, that this 
realization has begun to sink in. 

The failure of previous Communist tactics in 
several parts of the world is leading the Commu- 
nists to search for new ways of gaining their ends. 

In France, the serious set-backs suffered by the 
Communists have apparently led them to modify 
their line of militant action. Since 1947, the cir- 
culation of the leading French Communist news- 
paper has dropped from 000,000 to less than 200,- 
000. In the same period, membership in Com- 
munist-controlled labor unions has dropped from 
5,500,000 to 1,500,000. In May, when General 
Ridgwav arrived in Paris to take over the Su- 
preme Command of the North Atlantic Treaty 
forces, the Communists attempted widespread 
riots throughout the country, aimed at the au- 
thority of the Government. These attempts ended 
in dismal failure. Only the militant hard core 
attempted to defy the police, and in so doing 
brought about the arrest of Jacques Duclos, the 
Acting Secretary General of the Communist Party. 
Strikes called by the Communists to protest the 
arrest of Duclos also ended in failure. By the 
middle of June, the French Communists were 
giving up violence and attempting to create a 
united national front under the guise of joining 
with others for peace and for economic and social 
progress. They have now thrown overboard two 
of their most militant old-time leaders and are 

Department of State Bulletin 



pressing hard and insidiously for a united front, 
particularly with the Socialists and the non-Com- 
munist labor unions. 

This move is an old one, a familiar one, and 
one which counts on the people of France having 
a short memory. It is quite as dangerous as, 
perhaps more dangerous than, violence. But it 
does demonstrate that violence ended in failure. 

In Japan, too, Communist violence has proved 
a fiasco, and the decline in Communist strength 
has been spectacular. Before the recent election 
in Japan, the Communists made a desperate effort 
to switch from a "hard" line to one of broad co- 
operation. They offered a united front to the 
Left-wing Socialists. But the Socialists refused 
to be taken in. 

Smashing Defeat in Japan 

As a result, the Communists suffered a smash- 
ing defeat in the election. From a popular vote 
of almost three million in January 1949, the Com- 
munist vote dropped to about 350,000. Starting 
with 35 seats in the Japanese Lower House in 1949, 
they now have none. 

In the Federal Republic of Germany, in Sweden, 
in the Netherlands, and elsewhere, there are sim- 
ilar reports of the decline of Communist power 
and influence. In the Philippines, the Commu- 
nist Huk forces, diminished and on the defensive, 
no longer threaten the security of the Govern- 
ment. In Burma, the Communist insurgents have 
lost control over one area after another and are 
trying to draw other insurgent groups into a 
"united front." 

Such local actions as these could foreshadow 
a considerable change in Soviet tactics. If they 
do, it will be due to our steady program of re- 
enforcing the free world. 

Don't misunderstand me. The evidence is by 
no means clear that such a change is already under 
way. Nor do I mean that, even should the Soviet 
Union turn from the general method of violence 
to the more insidious "united front," "boring- 
from-within" method, all its actions would be of 
this type. There would still be the kidnapings, 
the bullying and blustering notes to Nato gov- 
ernments, the aggressive assertions that Nato is 
designed and operated for war. And, most of all, 
there would doubtless still be particular singling 
out of the United States for abuse and hostility, 
for reasons to which I shall refer in a moment. 
Wliat I am suggesting is that there are indications 
of a change in the Kremlin method of under- 
mining our friends in the free world. 

And if subsequent events make it clear that the 
Kremlin is in fact silencing the rattling of the 
sabers and is beginning to talk soothingly of stabi- 
lization, of "broad fronts," of "peaceful coexist- 
ence," there are several points which we shall have 
to keep in mind. 

One is that we must not confuse a shift in 



method with a change in underlying purpose. 
The international Communist movement has been 
through many shifts in method, without the slight- 
est change in its fundamentally hostile purpose 
against the rest of the world. 

A second point is that if such a shift does come 
about, it will be only because of the rebuilding of 
Western strength and the repeated demonstration 
of the free world's will to defend its freedom. We 
can be sure that the method of open aggression 
would be instantly renewed if the non-Communist 
world were to be lulled into complacency, into the 
slightest relaxation of its defensive efforts. 

A third point for us to keep in mind is that a 
genuine reduction in tensions will require more 
than a few pronouncements by Soviet leaders about 
"peaceful coexistence." It will take action. One 
such opportunity for action will come within the 
next 48 hours. The Communist delegates are to 
return to the truce table at Panmunjom to give 
their reply to the recent proposals concerning pris- 
oners of war made by General Harrison.^ 

Patience and Ingenuity at Panmunjom 

I do not need to repeat to you the fact which is 
clear to everybody — that throughout the many 
months of armistice negotiations we have drawn 
on every i-esource of patience and ingenuity in 
order to reach an honorable settlement. We will 
not compromise with the basic principle that no 
prisoner shall be forced against his will to return 
to the Communists. 

The proposals which General Harrison made, 
and which the Communists are now to answer, 
seem to me to make every reasonable effort to an- 
swer the objections they have brought up in the 
negotiations. They have claimed that the United 
Nations was trying to force prisoners to say they 
would resist being returned. To meet this. Gen- 
eral Harrison's proposals even include the ingen- 
ious device that prisoners should be taken in small 
groups into a neutral area and there, free of con- 
trol by anyone, should be allowed to walk north 
or south. It does not seem possible to offer any- 
thing more reasonable or more fair. The world 
will be watching to see what the Communists do 
about it. Action, rather than argument and quib- 
bling, is what the world expects of them if their 
talk about peace has any relation to their inten- 
tions. 

There is also opportunity for Soviet action for 
peace in Germany and Austria and all the other 
places around the world where the Communist 
forces are now engaged either in violence or in the 
obstruction of peace. 

Finally, and most importantly, there is this 
point for us to think about. Although we would 
welcome any step by the Soviets — even a tactical 
one — that reduced the danger of hostilities, we 

' For text of the proposals, see Bulletin of Oct. 6, 1952, 
p. 549. 



Ocfober 20, 1952 



597 



must not delude ourselves that our task will be any 
easier than it has been. Even though this shift, 
if it occurs, would represent a response to the suc- 
cess of our previous efforts, we can't waste time in 
congratulating ourselves. The hostility of pur- 
pose on the part of the international Communist 
movement will still be there. The steady increase 
of Soviet military strength will continue, even 
though it moves on carpet slippers instead of hob- 
nailed boots. We can expect continued, and even 
intensified, efforts to subvert, to drive wedges be- 
tween the free nations, to exploit the real ctifRcul- 
ties with which the free nations are confronted. 
Indeed, this is the clear warning to us of the most 
recent statement by Stalin and of the pronounce- 
ments at the Soviet Party Congi'ess which opened 
yesterday in Moscow. 

Soviet Efforts To Isolate U.S. 

The tasks of diplomacy in the period ahead may, 
if anything, be <jreater than those in the period 
through which we have just passed. We should, 
and I believe that we shall, be quick to discuss any 
problems about which the Soviet Union wishes 
sincerely and honestly to negotiate. Unhappily, 
the Soviet Government has shown no such sincere 
and honest desire. As the recent exchange of 
notes with them regarding Germany ^ has so clear- 
ly shown, their desire to meet with us was not for 
the purpose of solving the problems involved but 
to use the meeting as a forum for propaganda to 
defeat treaties now pending before Western Euro- 
pean Parliaments. In this situation, we shall 
have to continue our vigilance and our efforts to 
build strength against aggression; and we shall 
have to grapple with the tough and complicated 
problems within the free world. Recently, in 
talking to the machinists,^ I pointed out — and I 
think this is even clearer now than it was then — 
how great is the emphasis placed by the Soviets 
on the possibility of political and economic disin- 
tegration, in Europe, in Asia, and in Africa, and 
especially among the former colonial territories. 

Disintegration and division — these may become 
the principal reliances of the Soviet Union in the 
period ahead. This is one of the indications of 
the unwarranted and invalid charges made by the 
Soviet Government last week against our Ambas- 
sador, George Kennan. Whatever else may lie 
behind the Soviet attack on Ambassador Kennan, 
it is abundantly clear that his wide knowledge of 
the Soviet Union, of its history, of its peoples, and 
of the Russian language worries and disturbs the 
Soviet rulers. The Iron Curtain is to remain 
tightly closed. But it is also clear from this 
action, and from the continuation of the violent 
and vicious "Hate America" propaganda, that the 
Soviet rulers, even though they may turn a sunny 
smile on the rest of the world, are prepared to 

* Ibid., Oct. 6, 1952, p. 517. 
" Ibid., Sept. 22, 1952, p. 423. 



continue their expressions of hostility toward the 
people of the United States in an effort to isolate 
us, to divide us from our allies. 

We can face this challenge with confidence. 
The cause of freedom has infinite resources of will 
and of strength. We have no reason to doubt that 
whatever hoj^e and expectation the Kremlin has 
for disintegration and division will prove to be as 
vain as its hopes and expectations for the crumb- 
ling of Western resistance. 

But the outcome is not automatic. It depends 
upon what we do. 

These developments which I have been discuss- 
ing come at a time wlien the people of the United 
States are faced with a fateful choice, a choice 
between two attitudes toward the world situation, 
a choice between two courses of action. 

One course which has been offered to the Ameri- 
can people means facing up to our responsibilities 
seriously and honestly, without any sugar-coating, 
without trying to deceive ourselves about how 
hard and how long the road ahead may be. Tliis 
course means facing the hard responsibilities, as 
well as the benefits, of the defense of Korea; it 
means facing sc|uarely up to the costs of our de- 
fense programs, and what this means in military 
service and in taxes. 

The other course offers escape from responsibil- 
ity. It offers a return to the days when our prob- 
lems were simpler. It offers short cuts and tax 
cuts. It promises to bring the boys home (and 
how familiar that sounds). This course appeals 
to all our natural reactions to the burdens and 
anxieties of the job before us. This course fulfills 
the wish we all share, that our problems were 
simpler and easier than, in fact, they are. This 
course is made to appear short and easy. But 
around the corner, it comes to an abrupt end, at 
the edge of the cliff of disaster. 

Many of us, obeying a natural human instinct, 
have the feeling tliat, after all, we occupy a fa- 
vored position with destiny and that there can be 
no other outcome than a happy one to our prob- 
lems. This has not, however, been the judgment 
of history on nations that failed to meet the prob- 
lems of their times. 

The span of some states is long and of others, 
short. One of the lessons of history is that the 
length of that sjDan depends, not merely on natural 
and human resources, but also on the capacity and 
willingness of people to appraise intelligently the 
dangers amid which they live and to act with 
vigor, reason, and character. 

The Empires of Babylon and of Assyria, each 
of which dominated for several hundred years that 
vital center of civilization in the Middle East 
spreading out from the valley of the Tigris and 
the Euphrates, appeared to be immune to decay or 
conquest. Each of them in turn gave way before 
invading hordes of more vigorous people. 

The individual city states of ancient Greece, in 
which the lamp of civilization burned so brightly 



598 



Deparfment of State Bulletin 



for many generations and to which we are so heav- 
ily indeoted, were increasingly torn with internal 
dissensions and were fatally weakened by persist- 
ent rivalries and recurrent wars among them- 
selves. Our word "demagogue" comes down to us 
from the men of Athens who induced their fellow 
citizens to destroy the alliance of the Greeks, of 
which Athens had been the leader. When this 
mutual security alliance had been destroyed, the 
Greek states were overcome by the less civilized 
but more disciplined power of Macedon. 

High Price of Irresolution 

However great our power and our prestige 
among nations, we are not immune to the conse- 
quences of weakness or error. We no longer have 
a cushion of time and a cushion of space to protect 
us, and the price of irresolution or self-deception 
may not only be the loss of our privileged position 
but the submergence of our civilization in a new 
age of darkness. 

But this Nation has not weathered the ordeals of 
Valley Forge and Gettysburg and Guadalcanal to 
fall prey now to a weakness of will. The outward 
aspect of our national life may now be riven with 
faction and dispute, but beneath the surface the 
pulse is strong and sure. The American people 
have not lost the honesty and courage to face with- 
out flinching this generation's hard trial. 

The course we are on, though it offers no easy 
promises, though it may be hard and it may be 
long, is not a bleak one for those who really believe 
in freedom and in the power of freedom. 

The mark of that power may be seen in the dis- 
tance we have already come in strengthening the 
free world and in thwarting the Communist dream 
of easy conquest. 

Even more, the mark of that power may be seen 
in the incredible lengths to which the Communists 
have gone to keep their people from escaping. 

In the satellite countries bordering on the West- 
ern democracies, along many parts of the border, 
strips of land more than 50 yards wide have been 



completely cleared of trees, bushes, even tree 
stumps and structures of any kind which could 
provide concealment. Observation towers have 
been erected, spaced from 800 yards to 1,000 yards 
apart. Rows of barbed-wire fences charged with 
electricity parallel the border in places and are 
interspersed with land mines and signal rockets 
which explode on contact. There are slit trenches 
manned by guards equipped with searchlights and 
high-powered rifles with telescoj^ic sights. In 
some areas, double patrols assisted by police dogs 
are constantly on the move. Where there are 
rivers, the police unceasingly patrol by boat. 

Why do they do this? Is it to keep the outside 
world from flocking to their new paradise? 

You know that it isn't. The barbed wire and 
the machine guns are attempts to keep the knowl- 
edge of freedom out, and those who, despite all 
suppression, have that knowledge, in. But de- 
spite the barriers, despite the threats of punish- 
ment and reprisals, the number of people who 
manage to escape through the Iron Curtain into 
Western Europe is still between 400 and 500 a 
month. And in Germany, where the barriers have 
not yet been completed, the number of Germans 
who flee the Soviet zone into Free Germany aver- 
ages between 600 and 700 a day. 

There is no greater force on the face of the earth 
than man's desire to be free. 

Freedom is our cause. It is what we are striv- 
ing with all our might to defend, and it is our 
gi-eatest source of strength. 

This has been true from the very beginning of 
America. Is it still true of Americans? Think 
this over; and remember that we have always had 
patriots who had no heart for the long pull. They 
were vocal in 1787, and 1863, and they're still 
vocal. Is freedom worth 1 or 2 years of high taxes 
and meeting force with force, but not 4 years, 
or 10, or 20? Is there a new American principle 
that after a good try at defending our freedom 
and all that one word means, we give up, sell 
America short, and get taxes down? Think it 
over. It's worth a lot of thought. 



Ocfober 20, 7952 



599 



Korean Armistice Negotiations Suspended 



PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENT BY 
SECRETARY ACHESON 

Press release 786 dated October 8 

As was made clear by General Clark's statement, 
the armistice negotiations at Panmunjom are not 
terminated. After the Communists rejected all 
of the latest proposals made by the U.N. Com- 
mand delegation, General Harrison called a re- 
cess. The duration of the recess is entirely up to 
the Communists. General Harrison made it clear 
that the U.N. Command delegation continues 
ready to negotiate and will again meet with the 
Communist delegation whenever they are ready 
to accept any one of our numerous proposals or 
make a constructive proposal of their own for an 
honest settlement of the prisoner-of-war question. 
However, the U.N. Command delegation will not 
continue to go to Panmunjom merely to be sub- 
jected to Communist abuse and propaganda 
harangues. 

For many months we have been attempting to 
negotiate an honorable amiistice with patience 
and sincerity. The three alternative proposals 
which General Harrison presented on September 
28 ^ represented a further earnest effort by the 
United Nations to find an acceptable solution to 
the prisoner-of-war question. All three of those 
proposals preserve the humanitarian principles 
of nonforcible repatriation. Any one of these pro- 
posals could lead to an armistice. 

The Communists have claimed that the U.N. 
Command has forced prisoners to say they would 
resist repatriation, although, in fact, the opposite 
was the case. The U.N. Command pointed out 
to each prisoner the possibilities that his family 
might be persecuted if he refused repatriation and 
that the U.N. Command could make no promise 
whatever as to the ultimate fate of those who re- 
fused to go home. General Harrison's proposals 
even included the device that the prisoners should 
be taken in small groups to a neutral area and 
there be released to walk north or south. Cer- 
tainly, nothing could be more fair or reasonable. 
If the Communists want to settle this issue, our 
latest proposals point the way. 

We have submitted numerous proposals 
throughout the negotiations and have thoroughly 

' BuuLETiN of Oct 6, 1952, p. 549. 



explored every possible solution, while the Com- 
munist negotiators have utilized the negotiating 
table as a sounding board for false and vicious 
propaganda. We have tried everything we can 
think of to meet the considerations raised by the 
Communists. 

We have said and will continue to say that we 
shall not compromise on the principle that a pris- 
oner should not be forced to return against his 
will. For us to weaken in our resolve would con- 
stitute an abandonment of the principles funda- 
mental to this country and the United Nations. 
We shall not trade in the lives of men. We shall 
not forcibly deliver human beings into Commu- 
nist hands. 

General Harrison's action last night does not 
represent a loss of hope in an armistice; we be- 
lieve that it is an affirmative step toward obtaining 
an armistice. The Communists must now recog- 
nize that the position of the U.N. Command is 
firm as well as right. The Communists must now 
recognize that they cannot continue to toy with 
the hopes of the world for a Korean peace. We 
continue to believe that a himianitarian solution 
to the prisoner-of-war question can be found, and 
that this can be done at Panmunjom. 

As General Clark said this morning, we remain 
ready at any time to conclude an armistice accepta- 
ble to the conscience of free peoples. It is up to 
the Communists to show whether they too want 
such an armistice. 



STATEMENT BY GENERAL MARK CLARK, 
UNITED NATIONS COMMANDER IN KOREA^ 

Telegraphic text 

1. The United Nations Command [Unc] has 
striven earnestly and patiently for 15 months to 
end grievous costs in Korea. Guided by those 
basic ideals of mankind which are the foundation 
of the United Nations, it has sought to persuade 
the Communists to join in an armistice both rea- 
sonable and honorable as a step toward restoration 
of peace and stability to the Korean people. 

2. However, representatives of the North Korea 
Communist regime and the Chinese Communist 
forces who entered the conflict from Red China 
refuse to allow the issue of prisoners of war to be 

' Made at Tokyo on Oct. 8. 



600 



Department of Stale Bulletin 



resolved in accord with moral dictates which most 
of humanity holds to be fundamental. They, and 
presumably those who stand behind them, refuse 
to recognize that the individual has certain in- 
alienable rights. They refuse to acknowledge that 
many of their men now in our hands would resist 
to the death any effort to return them to Commu- 
nist tyranny. 

3. The United Nations Command has made re- 
peated and earnest efforts to settle this question. 
We have offered a number of proposals any one of 
which would lead to an early and honorable armi- 
stice. On September 28 the Unc delegation of- 
fered three new proposals. This presentation cul- 
minated 8 months of constant enort to solve the 
prisoner-of-war question. 

4. Today the Communists rejected these pro- 
posals. They have still made no constructive pro- 
posal of their own and have again continued to use 
meetings at Panmimjom solely for vilification and 
false propaganda. By doing so they showed 
clearly that they have no interest in an honorable 
solution to the prisoner-of-war question. They 
showed that they are without compunction in vio- 
lating fundamental human rights if they affect the 
fragile prestige of the Communist creed. I can 
only conclude that they do not sincerely desire 
an armistice. 

5. After the Communists clearly rejected our 
latest proposals (and again launched a propa- 
ganda attack). General Harrison, in accord with 
instructions, informed the Communists that the 
Unc delegation will not continue to go to Pan- 
munjom merely to be subjected to abuse and prop- 
aganda harangues. He told the Communists that 
the Unc delegation continues ready to negotiate 
in good faith. The numerous proposals that the 
Unc has offered remain open. The Unc delega- 
tion told the Communists that it stands ready to 
meet with them when they are ready to accept any 
one of our numerous proposals or to make in writ- 
ing a constructive proposal of their own for honest 
settlement of the prisoner-of-war question. Mean- 
while, liaison officers will remain available for 
consultation at any time. 

6. We continue ready to conclude an armistice 
acceptable to the conscience of free peoples. It is 
up to the Communists to show whether they want 
such an armistice. 



STATEMENT BY GENERAL HARRISON, 
CHIEF U.N. NEGOTIATORS 

Telegraphic text 

1. On September 28 the Unc delegation re- 
viewed proposals that our side had previously of- 
fered you and, in addition, submitted three new 
proposals for your consideration. It is clear that 
you have categorically rejected our proposals. 

2. On 25 June 1950 the North Korean Army 



' Made at Panmunjom on Oct 8. 
Ocfober 20, 1952 



invaded the Republic of Korea. These facts were 
attested to by the U.N. Commission in Korea at 
that time, a commission composed of representa- 
tives from Australia, China, El Salvador, France, 
India, the Philippines, and Turkey. 

3. With the sole objective of repelling the armed 
attack and restoring internal peace and security in 
Korea and thereby removing real danger to the 
peace and security of the world, the U.N. came to 
the assistance of the Republic of Korea and op- 
posed you on the battlefield. It is with this same 
objective of restoring peace that Unc has ever since 
10 July 1951 made every sincere effort toward an 
honorable armistice which would bring an end to 
hostilities in Korea. 

4. On 28 April the Unc offered a proposal to fa- 
cilitate resolution of outstanding issues preventing 
armistice. By this proposal the Unc offered to 
give up its very reasonable insistence that there 
should be no rehabilitation and construction of 
military airfields if, and only if, you would accept 
the humanitarian position of the Unc on prison- 
ers of war. You have, however, continued to in- 
sist that the Unc must use force to drive unwilling 
prisoners of war back to your control. It shoulcl 
by now be clear that the Unc will never agree to 
any proposition which violates its basic principle 
of no forced repatriation. Consistent with the 
principle of no forced repatriation, the Unc has 
offered you numerous alternative proposals, any 
one of which would provide a humane and hon- 
orable agreement. You have rejected all these 
proposals. 

5. Free peoples of the world, whom the Unc 
represents, respect human rights and insist on the 
individual enjoying the fundamental freedoms. 
Your side apparently considers that the indi- 
vidual is the property of the state, as though he 
were an inanimate and inarticulate possession. 
Although you have described your position as ad- 
herence to a principle, it is illogical to call your 
position a principle, for yours is a wholly un- 
principled, cruel, and oppressive position. In 
fact, only a short while ago you clearly indicated 
that if the numbers of prisoners of war to be 
returned to your control were sufficiently large you 
would be willing to accept an armistice, even 
though there should remain numbers of your peo- 
ple who would not be returned. Evidently you 
were willing to bargain and haggle over the num- 
ber of men to be returned to you, as though they 
were so many sheep. You completely ignored 
their rights as men. It would appear that your 
so-called "principle" is only a convenient inven- 
tion. On the other hand, the concept of the dig- 
nity and worth of tlie individual which underlies 
the position of the Unc is a fundamental ideal and 
principle upon which the U.N. was founded and 
which cannot be surrendered for the mere sake of 
temporary expediency. This is a truth that you 
seem totally unable to comprehend. 

6. Your objections to our principle of no forced 

601 



repatriation have never been consistent. At one 
time you appeared to have agreed to our use of 
the principle when you supplied us with an am- 
nesty declaration to be read to prisoners of war 
in our custody prior to screening. As you know, 
we used your amnesty declaration and conducted 
screening in such a manner as to encourage the 
maximiun number of your personnel to return to 
your side. When results of the screening were 
announced, and it became apparent to you that 
the riots which you inspired in our prisoner-of- 
war camps did not deter large numbers of your 
former personnel from renouncing commmiism, 
you contended that the screening was not fairly 
conducted. 

When we offered to conduct rescreening and let 
you observe the jirocess, or have it conducted by 
impartial nations, you suddenly announced that 
you would not agree to any type of screening by 
anybody, anywhere, or under any circumstances. 
Thus you have completely reversed your previous 
position and you denounce our humane policy as 
one of "forced retention" of jirisoners of war. It 
is apparent that you have changed your position 
because you are not willing to admit the incon- 
trovertible fact that large numbers of your for- 
mer personnel violently oppose returning to your 
side. Free peoples eveiywhere recognize this fact. 
They also recognize that the Unc has no desire to 
retain or to make any particular disposition of any 
prisoner of war unwilling to be repatriated. 

7. You have attempted to camouflage the un- 
reasonableness of your stand by associating it with 
the Geneva convention of 1949. In fact, it is the 
position of the Unc which is consistent with the 
principles of the Geneva convention, and with its 
primary concern for the rights of the individual 
prisoner of war. You, however, have tried to de- 
ceive the world into believing that you are con- 
cerned with the rights and welfare of individuals. 
You have used these conferences as a forum for the 
most vicious types of propaganda. You have not 
hesitated to use lies, half truths, and distortion to 
further your ends. 

8. In contrast to what you would have the world 
believe, that you are champions of the Geneva con- 
vention, your actions belie your words. From the 
beginning of these conferences you have obsti- 
nately and inhumanely refused to agree to imme- 
diate exchange of seriously sick and wounded pris- 
oners of war. You have consistently placed your 
prisoner-of-war camps close to military targets. 
You have refused to turn over the names of cap- 
tured Unc personnel to the International Commit- 
tee of the Red Cross, and you refuse to allow the 
IcRC or other impartial visitors to your prisoner- 
of-war camps. You will not even agree to the hu- 
mane action of allowing prisoners of war to re- 
ceive relief packages. 

This is your record. You have talked loudly 



about humane treatment of prisoners of war but 
you have not put any of this fine talk into practice. 
Yet you are well aware that the Geneva conven- 
tion expressly provides for each of these measures 
which you have ignored, measures designed solely 
for the relief and well-being of prisoners of war 
held by both sides. 

9. The greatest contradiction of all is your in- 
sistence that all prisoners of war in our custody 
must be returned to you regardless of their own 
desires, whereas you admit that many thousands 
of our personnel whom you boasted of having cap- 
tured early in the war were incorporated in your 
armed forces. In view of your record, it is fraudu- 
lent for you to insist that you are holding out for 
an armistice based on the Geneva convention. 

10. Another example of your inconsistency is 
your insistence that Cliinese soldiers fighting in 
Korea are volunteers. You strongly support the 
right of these individuals to volunteer in the 
North Korean venture, but now you adopt the 
inconsistent position that these same individuals 
in custody of the Unc have not the right to refuse 
to return to your control. 

11. Unc has made honest efforts to achieve an 
armistice. We have offered to exchange the ap- 
proximately 83.000 of your former personnel held 
by our side whom we can repatriate for Unc pris- 
oners of war held by your side. Moreover, we 
have offered to agree to any one of many possible 
arrangements for impartially determining the at- 
titudes of prisoners of war on repatriation. We 
have indicated our willingness to send to your side 
all additional prisoners of war who may change 
their minds and accept repatriation. We have 
presented to you every possible means for solving 
this question honorably. 

12. The Unc has no further proposals to make. 
The proposals we have made remain open. The 
Unc delegation will not come here merely to listen 
to abuse and false propaganda. The Unc is there- 
fore calling a recess. We are not terminating 
these armistice negotiations; we are merely reces- 
sing them. We are willing to meet with you again 
at any time that you are ready to accept one of 
our proposals or to make a constructive proposal 
of your own in writing which could lead to an 
honorable armistice. Our liaison officers will be 
available for consultation and for transaction of 
their customary duties. 

13. I say again that it remains the sincere hope 
of the Unc that an honorable armistice can be 
realized. We will meet with you whenever you 
indicate that you are willing to accept one of our 
proposals or have presented in writing the text 
of any constructive proposals designed to achieve 
an armistice which you desire to make. 

14. I have nothing more to say. Since you have 
offered nothing constructive, we stand in recess. 



602 



Departmenf of State Bulletin 



U.S. Rejects Soviet Charges 
Against Ambassador Kennan 

Text of U.S. Note of October 8 > 

Press release 700 dated October S 

The receipt is acknowledged of the note of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of October 3 - inform- 
ing the United States Government that the Soviet 
Government considers Ambassador George F. 
Kennan as persona non grata and requesting Mr. 
Kennan's immediate recalL Tlie Soviet Govern- 
ment in its note bases its attitude on statements 
made on September 19 by Ambassador Kennan 
in Berlin to representatives of the press which the 
Soviet Government characterizes as "slanderous 
attacks hostile to the Soviet Union in gross viola- 
tion of generally recognized norms of interna- 
tional law." 

Ambassador Kennan's statement accurately and 
in moderate language described the position of 
foreign diplomats accredited to the Soviet Gov- 
ernment. It is this treatment of diplomatic rep- 
resentatives, systematically applied over a period 
of years by the Soviet Government, which grossly 
violates the traditions and customs in interna- 
tional intercourse developed over generations. 

In tlie light of the above, the United States Gov- 
ernment cannot accept the charges made by the 
Soviet Government as constituting valid reasons 
for acceding to the request for the recall of Am- 
bassador Kennan. 



Correspondence With Senator Knowland of 
California 

Senator Knowland to Secretary Acheson, 
October 4 

Telegraphic text 

In view of Soviet action relative to Ambassador 
Kennan strongly urge that the Soviet Ambassador 
be sent home and recognition of uncivilized Com- 
munist regime supplying arms and equipment to 
Communist aggressors in Korea be withdrawn. 
This action will lessen espionage and fifth column 
activities of Communists in the United States. 
William F. Knowland 

United States Senator 

Secretary Acheson to Senator Knowland, 
October 7 

Press release 789 dated October 8 

I have received your telegram of October 4 urg- 
ing that in retaliation for demanding the recall of 
Ambassador Kennan, the United States Govern- 
ment take similar action with respect to the Soviet 

^ Delivered to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs by 
the American Embassy at Moscow. 
= Bulletin of Oct. 13, 1952, p. 557. 



Ambassador here and "withdraw recognition" of 
the Soviet Government. 

I assume that what you have in mind is breaking 
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. 

You will, of course, recognize that the breaking 
of dii)lomatic relations would be a step of the ut- 
most seriousness with world-wide consequences 
and that many factors other than those cited in 
your telegram would have to be carefully consid- 
ered in connection with a decision of this kind. I 
am sure you will agree that the United States na- 
tional interest and the interest of those who look to 
us for wise and calm judgment must govern our 
actions. 

We are continuing to examine all aspects of our 
relations with the Soviet Government and your 
recommendations will be borne in mind. Mean- 
while, you will have noted that on October 3 I 
stated ^ that the Government of the United States 
does not accept as valid the charges made by the 
Soviet Government against Ambassador Kennan 
and that the factual statement he made in Berlin 
will be recognized generally as accurately reflect- 
ing the treatment accorded foreigners by the So- 
viet Government in direct contravention of 
established international usage. 



Departure of Sir Oliver Franks 

Statement by Secretary Acheson 

Press release 782 dated October 3 

It is with real and deep regret that we have 
learned that Sir Oliver Franks will leave his post 
as British Ambassador to the United States which 
he has filled so ably since 1948. I have greatly en- 
joyed working with him. His great ability, his 
keen perception and knowledge of the United 
States and its people have enabled him to carry 
out his responsibilities with outstanding success. 
We shall miss him as a warm friend and as a dis- 
tinguished representative of his country. 

I know that the countless friends of Sir Oliver 
and Lady Franks in Washington as well as those 
who have met them on their many tours through- 
out the country will join me in regi-etting their 
departure and in extending to them all good wishes 
for the future. 

Sir Koger Makins, who has been named to 
succeed Sir Oliver, will find a hearty welcome on 
his return to tliis country. The knowledge gained 
during his earlier tours of duty in Washington 
and his recent assignment as Deputy Under Secre- 
tary of State, Foreign Office, particularly qualify 
Sir Roger for his future duties. He will find 
many old friends to welcome him back to Wash- 
ington. 



Oc/ober 20, 1952 



603 






Paving a Road to Peace 



iy Wilson Compton 

Administrator, International Information Administration ^ 



You have invited me to speak to you about the 
United States International Information Pro- 
gram. As leaders in public affairs in this country, 
you should have the means of knowing where our 
country stands on issues vital to our national se- 
curity and vital to our effort for peace. No group 
of citizens is better able to help find the road to 
peace than men who have themselves been in w^ar. 
You do not want generalities. You want facts, 
not merely statistics. 

The world-wide battle of ideas in which we are 
engaged is for the most part forced upon us by the 
aggressive policies and tactics of international 
communism. As you see, the propaganda with 
which we are contending represents an unprece- 
dented low level of political unmorality stemming 
from the Kremlin. It is not a "featherdustei- 
campaign. The U.S. Government knows it. You 
know it. Many of our citizens do not fully com- 
prehend it — or else think that the sole answer to it 
is either bigger armaments and armies or that we 
hide behind our seas and our mountains. This is 
all a part of the problem of our overseas infor- 
mation program. 

The International Information Administration 
(Iia) is an information and propaganda agency. 
It is not a propaganda agency in the "cloak-and- 
dagger" sense. Its activities are overt. It is not 
responsible for the formulation of U.S. foreign 
policy. That is a responsibility of the Congress, 
the President, and the Secretary of State. It must, 
of course, operate within the framework of U.S. 
foreign policy but it has its own specific objectives. 

We are charged with the duty of promoting mu- 
tual understanding between the Government and 
people of the United States and the governments 
and peoples of other countries. We seek to fortify 
the deterrents to the spread of international com- 
munism. We seek to encourage the spirit of con- 
fidence and hope and to strengthen the sense of 

'Address made before the American Legion National 
Eixecutive Committee at Indianapolis, October 11 (press 
release 797). For text of address as actually delivered, 
see Department of State publication 4757. 



determination and interdependence amongst the 
peoples of the world who are free or who seek 
freedom. This means exposing deceptions, dis- 
tortions, and lies about the United States as well 
as promoting a better understanding of American 
life and institutions and of the American peoples' 
earnest desire for peace. We seek the support of 
peoples everywhere for the policies and programs 
which the United States considers vital to its 
security. This, gentlemen, is a rather formidable 
assignment. 

In this battle of ideas we have both advantages 
and disadvantages. One of our major disadvan- 
tages is psychological. We are trying to build 
something. International communism is trying to 
destroy something. Construction is a slower proc- 
ess tlian destruction. It takes patience as well as 
resourcefulness; and we Americans are not a pa- 
tient people. We get "hot and bothered" when we 
can't knock out at one blow something that we 
don't like. But we can't knock out ideas that way. 

I have often been asked : "How long will this 
propaganda war last?" That is a natural and a 
sensible question. But no one knows the answer. 
No one can honestly say how long it will last. It 
may last indefinitely. I should think it would at 
least be sensible for the American people to act 
on that assumption — and not be caught off guard. 

Psychological warfare is not like military war- 
fare. We are dealing with intangibles. We can- 
not, through sheer might, force a quick result. 
We must work for strategic positions. The inter- 
national Communists are playing their game of 
power politics with chess-like strategy. They ad- 
vance when situations are favorable, retreat when 
they are unfavorable. But always tliey keep at it. 
No fertile propaganda issue is ever "dead," as 
witness their revival a third time of the "germ 
warfare" propaganda attack which never from 
first to last had any basis in fact. 

We will of course eventually win this war of 
ideas. But the sooner we learn to look at it 
through the eyes of a chess player the sooner we 
will get ahead. We must be prepared to meet 



604 



Department of %taie Bulletin 



fantastic propaganda wherever it breaks out. This 
is not easy. In fact it is very difficult for Ameri- 
cans to comprehend the unprecedented low levels 
of political unmorality which nowadays motivate 
and largely activate the international Communist 
propaganda. It is even more important that we 
find the basis and the means of positive attack. 
In the war of ideas — as in the war of guns — a good 
offense is a better defense than a good defense. 
We must leai'n that. 

As a society of free people, we are dedicated to 
the proposition that the State is the servant of 
the mdividual, not the individual the servant of 
the State. Our concept of freedom has deep 
spiritual and moral roots. 

As a people we believe in God; we believe in 
the dignity of the individual ; we believe in truth, 
in justice, in humaneness. By and large we are 
"good neighbors." 

These you may say are our ideals and so they 
are. Yet they are the source of our strength as 
a nation. We do have ideals and we do try to 
live by them. In the force and jiower of this fact 
lies our great advantage over the Kremlin. It 
is less expensive to maintain a "big truth" than to 
establish a "big lie." 

The contradiction between what the Soviets 
say and what they do is becoming increasingly 
apparent, even behind the Iron Curtain. Here 
is one example : Only a few days ago a Rumanian 
Olympic athlete, who fled the Iron Curtain during 
the recent games in Helsinki and is now in West- 
ern Germany, told his people in a VOA broad- 
cast : ^ 

I am filled with deep emotion in speaking to those in 
my country from this radio station which I myself have 
listened to for years with hope and con fidence. . . . 
It is this unmasliins of their deception that the Com- 
munists are most afraid of. For it is this I^nowledge 
wiiich gives the lie most effectively to Communist propa- 
ganda and which will most strengthen the captive peo- 
ple's will to resist. 

Weapons To Combat the Big Lie 

Within the framework of our governmental 

Purposes and our American principles, how is the 
nternational Information Administration going 
about its task of combatting the Big Lie, building 
unity and strength in the free world, and promot- 
ing the security of the United States? 

What are the tools we are using ? They include 
about every means of communication. 

The International Broadcasting Service, popu- 
larly known as the "Voice of America," broadcasts 
programs in 45 languages on an around-the-clock 
schedule for a daily total of over 50 program 
hours to a potential overseas audience of 300 mil- 
lion persons. 

The International Press Service provides a daily 
Wireless Bulletin to 10,000 foreign newspapers 
with a reading audience of 100 million in 88 coun- 



' Bulletin of Oct. 13, 1952, p. 563. 



tries. Last year it distributed about 200 million 
pamphlets prepared here or overseas to fit specific 
groups in specific areas. 

The International Motion Picture Service pro- 
duces films in 42 languages which are exhibited in 
87 countries to approximately 250 million persons 
annually. 

We maintain overseas 195 "information centers" 
in 62 countries. These provide information on all 
aspects of American life. 

We provide selected persons from overseas an 
opportunity for first-hand knowledge of America 
and Americans through the exchange-of-persons 
program. Last year the U.S. Government spon- 
sored 7,300 educational-exchange grants. Several 
thousand more educators, students, teachers, gov- 
ernment and labor leaders, and business and pro- 
fessional men visited the United States under the 
sponsorship of more than 500 private organiza- 
tions. 

Each of these tools has its unique advantages 
in reaching particular types of audience, or to 
convey a particular type of message. Their use 
requires study, careful planning, constant experi- 
ment, and constructive imagination. We are seek- 
ing constantly to improve their use. Also grad- 
ually we are getting better guidance. 

To pull together Iia's activities and the other 
programs with which the United States is fighting 
the cold war, a Psychological Strategy Board has 
been set up to determine over-all strategic poli- 
cies, objectives, and programs. This board in- 
cludes representatives of the Departments of State 
and Defense and the Director of the Central Intel- 
ligence Agency. The Iia uses its guidances. 

To facilitate the accomplishment of these objec- 
tives overseas, the widest reasonable latitude is 
now being given our overseas missions and their 
staffs of information officers. Our world-wide in- 
formation program is now a composite of 89 indi- 
vidual country plans. These programs are under 
constant review. We are gradually getting more 
objective appraisals of our own work. We are not 
yet hitting the target everywhere. But we have a 
good plan ; on the whole we have a good staff ; and 
the operations, although still ineffective in some 
respects, are improving. 

This year we are trying an experiment in four 
selected countries, Italy, India, Siam, and Ven- 
ezuela. In each of these countries our overseas 
staff is determining its own program, subject only 
to general policy supervision from Washington. 
In effect we are asking the field to "tell" Washing- 
ton instead of Washington "telling" the field. If 
this experiment proves successful, we will try it 
more generally. 

Enlisting Aid of Local Groups 

We are trying, of course, to get close to the 
people whom we are trying to reach and influence. 
We are trying, with considerable success, to en- 
courage local groups overseas to spread our mes- 



Oc/ober 20, 7952 



605 



sage for us. As you pointed out in your resolution 
regarding psychological warfare adopted at your 
recent national convention, ''More and more of the 
propaganda tasks [should] be entrusied to for- 
eign nationals. . . . These people will be under- 
stood and believed, where Americans sometimes 
meet with skepticism." 

If you were to project in graphic form the suc- 
cesses and reverses of the contest of ideas or the 
"propaganda war," it would show an irregular line 
moving gradually but steadily upward. 

In Western Europe, the Soviet objective has 
been to tear down, confuse, and divide; our objec- 
tive is to expose the Soviet lies and distortions 
about tlie United States and its intentions and 
to encourage strength through unity, peace 
through order, and economic security through 
productivity. 

In IDifi and 1947, conditions in Western Europe 
were as the Soviets would like. The European 
economy had been losing its fertility, had become 
progressively less productive. The spirit of Eu- 
rope was broken. People were hungry. Thou- 
sands in misguided desperation were joining the 
Communist Party. Today the picture is brighter. 
In France, for example, the circulation of the Com- 
munist newspapers has dropped enormously. 
UHmnanitc, the leading French Communist daily 
which had a circulation of 600,000 in 1947, now has 
a circulation of less than 200,000. Membership in 
Communist-controlled labor unions has fallen even 
more— from 5,500,000 in 1947 to 1,500,000 in 1952. 
Through Nato and the European Defense Com- 
munity, the militai-y integration of Western Eu- 
rope is on the way to realization. The economists' 
dream of a solvent Europe is gradually material- 
izing through the Schuman Plan and the Organi- 
zation for European Economic Cooperation. 

The Kremlin understands as we do the impor- 
tance of European integration to the free world. 
As Europeans, encouraged by our words and 
deeds — and our financial help — began to throw off 
despair and apathy for hope and faith in Europe's 
free future, the international Communists have re- 
doubled their propaganda efforts. Wlien they 
found themselves on the defensive, they launched 
their fantastic "Hate America" campaign. That 
is where we now stand. 

In 1951, according to reliable estimates, the 
Soviets spent the equivalent of 150 million dollars 
in France alone in an effort to break down what 
we had built up. This is more than the United 
States silent last year on all of its world-wide in- 
formation programs. Before General Ridgway 
arrived in Paris to take over the Nato Command, 
the Communists laid down a barrage of lies, criss- 
crossing France in a vicious propaganda effort to 
drive General Ridgway and all American troops 
from the Continent of Europe. The U.S. Inter- 
national Information Administration at the same 
time, in cooperation with the Mutual Security Ad- 
ministration, was working to promote sup^xirt 



among Europeans for General Ridgway and the 
goal of mutual security which he personified. We 
answered the Red propaganda with the simple 
facts. We were merely fortifying our "Campaign 
of Truth." 

Our Campaimi of Truth in Europe was a suc- 
cess. General Ridgway is still in France. The 
promised Communist demonstrations were a fail- 
ure. The chain of events which followed Gen- 
eral Ridgway's arrival in Europe so discredited 
the Communists that a few weeks thereafter the 
Central Committee of the French Communist 
Party met for a session of self-criticism and analy- 
sis of what it called the Party's "past mistakes and 
weaknesses." 



Left-handed Praise from the Soviets 

Our propaganda activities in Western Europe 
have come in for considerable, shall we say, 
hfi-lianded praise from the Soviets themselves. 
La Nouvelle Critique, a French Communist 
magazine, devoted 28 pages to a description 
of the International Information Administra- 
tion's program in France. Under the title, "The 
American Occupation in France is also an Ideol- 
ogical Occupation," this spokesman of interna- 
tional communism wrote in part : 

... As early as 1948 the American services organized 
sessions of studies for professors of English in the Lyon 
area. Tliese meetings were described as cultured mani- 
festations — but in the end, they were crafty means of 
propaganda. A complete program of seduction was put 
in order, contacts in person and in small gatherings, invi- 
tations l)y the American services . . . 

Western Europe is only one battle front. "Wliat 
are we doin^ in other parts of the world? Our 
problem in Eastern Europe has been technical as 
well as psychological. The captive states and the 
Soviet Union are reached through the Voice of 
America. At present, radio is not only our best 
means of reaching behind the Iron Curtain; it 
is our only means. We have had to build new 
facilities powerful enough to overcome Soviet 
jamming. Our Munich Radio Center, which went 
into operation last October, and the radio ship 
Courier^ broadcasting from Mediterranean waters 
since August, have improved our technical posi- 
tion in the Soviet-dominated world. But we still 
have a long way to go. Despite hundreds of ex- 
pensive jamming devices used by the U. S. S. R., 
the Voice of America is penetrating the Iron Cur- 
tain, about 20 percent in the large urban centers 
of the Soviet Union and about 75 percent in the 
more remote communities. 

The Soviet Union's grip on its captive states has 
tightened. Experts seem to agree that the feas- 
ibility of local uprisings in Eastern Europe at 
present is remote. So, our message of hope stresses 

' For an article on the Courier see Fieli Reporter for 
September-October 1952, Department of State publica- 
tion 4714, p. 27. 



606 



Department of Slate Bulletin 



the steadily growing strength of the free peoples, 
U. S. rearmament for security, the American pub- 
lic recognition of the evils of communism, its 
threat to the security of the free world, and the 
profound wish of the American people to live at 
peace. 

In our feature broadcasts, we try to influence 
the youth of Eastern Europe. Under the Soviet 
system of education, the young people of these 
countries are taught a twisted version of their own 
national heritage and little knowledge of the great 
works of their own culture. They hardly know 
the standards of good usage of their own national 
languages, for a part of the Soviet system is to 
debase the language of a conquered country and 
thus gradually to weaken the sense and the pride 
of nationality. 

But the most potent resistance to Communist 
domination in Eastern Europe is in its deep-seated 
religious interest. Religion is an integral part 
of the national history of these countries. Yet 
today most Eastern Europeans are unable to join 
in their chosen worship of God. The Communists, 
with their inveterate mistrust of all religion, have 
destroyed their churches and jailed their priests. 
So we try to fill a spiritual need of these people, 
to make life in the present more tolerable, and to 
encourage faith and hope for the future. 

The Mecca Airlift 

In the Near East, Africa, South Asia, and the 
Far East are the great underdeveloped nations of 
the world and most of the nations which have 
recently achieved independence. A great number 
of them are rich in natural resources. This is not 
an unmixed blessing. Years of colonial status 
have made these countries, if not unfriendly, at 
least suspicious of the West. All phases of our 
relations with these countries require particular 
understanding and tact. Our gi-eatest psychologi- 
cal gain in the Arab world in many years was the 
recent "Magic Carpet" of the U.S. Air Force, a 
gigantic airlift which enabled 3,.500 devout Arabs 
to get to Mecca in the great Moslem pilgi-image 
this year. During the "hadj" or annual spiritual 
gathering of Moslems in Mecca, the Voice of 
America broadcast : 

The open road to Mecca — the road from free countries — 
was packed to capacity last week with sincere men and 
women of the Moslem world. . . . Free governments of 
the world helped pilgrims reach Mecca in time . . . the 
road from 8talin-land to Mecca has been blocked for the 
last .30 years when Jlarxist godlessness endeavored 
to . . . make the world unsafe for the devout . . . Mos- 
lems remember . . . that the Kremlin had . . . the eflSgy 
of Prophet Mohammed burned at the hands of the Soviet 
League of Militant Atheists. . . . 

Today, in these areas, we are demonstrating 
modern solutions of age-old problems. Our help 
with irrigation, water supply, agriculture, public 
health, and sanitation has again created in the 
countries of this vast area the knowledge that the 



United States is not the imperialist warmongering 
monster which the Soviets have been charging. 

In India suspicion of the West still runs deep 
and the promises of international communism are 
inviting. The job of the Iia has been slow and 
tedious. 

A few years ago the Indian press was highly 
critical of every move we made. But today we 
find fi-iendly editorials in the Indian press, such 
as this one in Urdu Milap. Referring to Am- 
bassador Bowles' statement that the United States 
is anxious that the great experiment in democracy 
in India should not fail, the paper said : 

This is precisely the aim of U.S. aid. Neither more 
nor less. And anyone witliin his senses can say that 
there is nothing wrong with this American olyective. . . . 
If we want to have Communist dictatorship in India, 
if we want to destroy the individual's freedom, if we 
want to oppose democracy, we must certainly refuse to 
accept U.S. aid. But if we do not want to do that, it 
becomes our duty not only to accept the aid imtli thanks 
but make our country financially, industrially, and agri- 
culturally so strong as to become the defender of other 
democratic countries. 

A news story in the New York Herald Tribune 
datelined Tokyo, October 2, said : 

Premier Shl.geru Yoshida's Liberal party, which is 
strongly pro-American, piled up a commanding lead today 
in early unofficial returns from yesterday's elections. . . . 
The Communists, who held 23 seats in the recently dis- 
solved Diet, suffered a smashing setback. . . . not a single 
Communist had been elected to the 466-member House. 

In the Philippines, during the 6-month period 
from December to June, the Communist party was 
condemning itself for having as it said "lost touch 
with the masses." 

Our good neighbors to the South, despite politi- 
cal differences in some of the Latin American Re- 
publics, have joined with us and have stood by us 
in the Rio Pact for hemisphere defense and the 
Organization of American States. 

Gentlemen, there are many discouragements in 
the world today. Also there are many encourage- 
ments and they rarely happen by accident. 

The Campaign of Truth is of course an under- 
taking of the U. S. Government, but the Govern- 
ment alone will never win a war of ideas. If we 
are to succeed, we must have the help of interested 
citizens throughout the United States and the ac- 
tive support of patriotic organizations, such as the 
American Legion, who know that winning a war 
does not mean winning a peace. 

I have read with interest the resolutions adopted 
by the American Legion at your recent national 
convention expressing your views on our psycho- 
logical war with the Soviet Union. I am heart- 
ened to see that you have so clearly seen the nature 
of the contest, a gigantic struggle between world 
faith and world fear. 

I have spoken to you today of one of the most 
important enterprises of your Government — an 
enterprise which with the help of American citi- 
zens like yourselves and those for whom you speak. 



Ocfober 20, 1952 



607 



may be a beacon on the road to world peace. I am 
not a professional publicist, nor a professional 
diplomat, nor a politician. I am not even a mem- 
ber of the Admniistration party in the Govern- 
ment which I serve. I am merely an American 
citizen proud of his country and wishing to help 
preserve for his grandchildren and yours the 
"promise of American life." We need guns ! Yes, 



and we are getting guns. Armaments may win 
wars, but arms alone will never win a peace. Peace 
like freedom is everybody's business. Ideas in the 
loiig run are more powerful than guns. 

Gentlemen of the American Legion, you will do 
a further great service to your country if you will 
again shoulder arms, this time in the world-wide 
crusade of ideas which is the only road to peace. 



Validation of German Dollar Bonds 



iy Roland F. Moores 



On August 25, 1952, the Federal Republic of 
Germany enacted a law whicli will affect every 
American citizen or resident who holds German 
dollar bonds. The legislation is entitled the Law 
Concerning the Validation of German Foreign 
Currency Bonds, popularly known as the Valida- 
tion Law.^ It is a complex act which, like most 
postwar social and economic laws of Western Ger- 
many, finds its motivating force in the conditions 
arising out of the war. 

The war left Germany's financial structure in an 
imprecedented state of chaos. Securities were lost 
and destroyed by war action. They were also un- 
lawfully acquired and looted. The matter of loot- 
ing, particularly, raised problems of such impor- 
tance for the Federal Republic of Germany that 
it considered their solution to be a matter of na- 
tional interest. A large number of Gei'man for- 
eign-currency bonds had been reacquired by the 
issuers for amortization but had not been pre- 
sented to the trustees or paying agents for cancel- 
lation. These bonds were for the most part lying 
in the vaults in Berlin when the Russian armed 
forces invested the city. They were never recov- 
ered, and nothing is known (although much is 
suspected) concerning their whereabouts. 

The remarkable recovery which has taken place 

' Copies of an English translation of tlie text of the law 
may be obtained by writing the Bureau of German Affairs, 
Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. Relevant por- 
tions of the schedule which is annexed to the law are 
printed at the end of this article. 



since currency reform in 1948 provides a striking 
demonstration of West Germany's basic economic 
potential. Full realization of that potential can- 
not be achieved, however, without Germany's par- 
ticipation in international trade and finance on a 
normal basis. Settlement of the public and pri- 
vate prewar external debts of the former Reich to 
the extent possible under the present circumstance 
of a divided Germany is thus a matter of singular 
imjDortance, opening the way for the development 
of normal financial relations between the Federal 
Republic and other free-world countries. The 
Conference on German External Debts met at 
London from February to August 1952 to work out 
this settlement.^ The recommendation of this 
conference will be embodied in a debt agreement 
which is now in the course of preparation and 
wliich will be submitted to the interested govern- 
ments for their approval. However, before the 
process of resuming payments by German debtors 
under the terms of tliis debt agreement can begin, 
it is necessary to separate the obligations which 
are valid from those whicli are not. This is the 
function of the Validation Law. It will not of 
itself insure payment on German dollar bonds. 

The aggregate of principal and accrued interest 
due on the outstanding dollar bonded indebtedness 
of German corporate and public entities is approx- 

■ For text of the communique issued at the close of the 
conference and portions of its final report, see Bulletin 
of Aug. IS, 1952, p. 252. 



608 



Department of Stale Bulletin 



imately 510 million dollars. The Validation Law 
ultimately will determine what portion of this sum 
is represented by the looted securities; German 
officials believe that it will be quite substantial. 
From the standpoint of the American holder, the 
Validation Law should find a welcome response, 
since it will insure that the German Government's 
dollar resources will be conserved to service only 
valid obligations. 

Jurisdictional Limitations of Law 

The Validation Law has jurisdictional, as well 
as substantive, limitations. It does not apply to 
dollar bonds issued by public or corporate entities 
having their seat in that part of Germany which 
is under Soviet control or under Polish adminis- 
tration. Moreover, the law will deal only with 
those bonds which are listed in the schedule of the 
law. Accordingly, outstanding bonds of issuers 
located in Western Germany and the Western sec- 
tors of Berlin, which are not so listed, are not 
affected by the law and need not be validated. 
The bonds are identified in the schedule by issue, 
not by individual serial number, since information 
regarding the serial numbers of looted bonds is 
fragmentary and inconclusive. The law is inter- 
nal German legislation. In order that it may be 
given effect in the United States, an agreement will 
be concluded between the two Governments. This, 
together with a regulation to be issued under the 
Validation Law, will establish the validation pro- 
cedure which will be introduced in the United 
States. Negotiations with the German Govern- 
ment on these supporting measures will be con- 
cluded in the near future. 

The Validation Law provides that foreign cur- 
rency bonds listed in the schedule remain valid 
only if they are validated in the manner prescriljed 
in the law. There are a number of ways in which 
this may be accomplished. However, the valida- 
tion procedure which most American holders will 
be invited to follow is concerned with only one of 
these methods. 

A dollar bond of an issue listed in the schedule 
which was outside Gennany on January 1, 1945, is 
by that circumstance alone eligible for validation. 
A bond which is shown to have been outside Ger- 
many on this key date automatically qualifies for 
validation. This is the principle upon which the 
procedure in the United States will be based. The 
effectiveness as well as the practicability of this 
simple test becomes apparent when the circum- 
stances surrounding the trading in German securi- 
ties in the United States exchanges during the war 
and postwar period are reviewed. 

On December 9, 1941, the securities exchanges 



in the United States, at the request of the Secu- 
rities and Exchange Commission (suspended deal- 
ino;s in listed securities of German origin. Brokers 
and dealers were likewise requested to cooperate 
by refraining from effecting transactions in such 
secui'ities. The Securities and Exchange Com- 
mission has not withdrawn its request, and the 
suspension of trading continues. It thus becomes 
readily apparent that most American holders, or 
their successors in interest, will have no difficulty 
showing that they held their bonds outside Ger- 
many prior to January 1, 1945, the date specified 
in the Validation Law. 

The conclusion of the London Conference on 
German External Debts has stimulated an active 
interest in German bonds, and numerous inquiries 
are being received as to when trading will be 
resumed. On September 9, 1952, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission reminded the public 
that it was not prepared to withdraw its request 
until the validation procedure had been placed in 
operation.^ The Commission pointed out that 
only through this means could assurances be given 
to investors that no bonds except those which 
would constitute good delivery would be afforded 
a market in the United States. 

Validation Procedures 

As stated above, the agreement and the regula- 
tion under the Validation Law will determine the 
procedure to be followed. The principal elements 
of the procedure will consist of the following: 
(1) the appointment of a foreign representative 
with whom applications for validation may be 
filed; (2) the creation of a Validation Board which 
will decide the question of validation in each case; 
(3) the designation of depositary banks where 
holders may take or send their bonds ; (4) the form 
for the submission of information and evidence; 
(5) the giving of appropriate notice to the public; 
and (6) an arbitration procedure. The Valida- 
tion Law provides for a 6-month period to deal 
with these and other problems. This period will 
expire on March 1, 1953, at which time, but not 
prior thereto, applications for validation will be 
,received. The details of the procedure which 
bondholders will be invited to follow will be ex- 
amined in a subsequent article at the time the 
agreement and the regulation ai'e published. 

• Mr. Moores, author of the above article, is an 
officer in the Bureau of German Affairs. 



' Securities and Exchange Commission press release 
No. 4749 of Sept. 9, 1952. 



Ocfofaer 20, 1952 

226082—52 3 



609 



SCHEDULE OF THE LAW FOR THE VALIDATION OF GERMAN FOREIGN CURRENCY BONDS 

A. Bonds of the German Reich and the Former State of Prussia 

(U.S. dollars (mly) 



No. 


Title 


Currency 


Country of offering 


1 


German External Loan, 1924 (Dawes Loan). 








(i) 7% Gold Loan (Total issue in the U.S.A. $110,000,000) . . . 


$ 


U.S.A. 


3 


International 5]i% Loan of the German Reich, 1930 (Yoimg Loan). 








(i) 5}^% Gold Bonds (Total amount issued in the U.S.A. 


$ 


U.S.A. 




$98,250,000). 






4 


6H% Prussian External Loan, 1926. The Free State of Prussia— 
6H% sinking fund gold bonds — External Loan, 1926. 


$ 


U.S.A. 


5 


6% Prussian External Loan, 1927. The Free State of Prussia — 
6% sinking fund gold bonds — External Loan, 1927. 


$ 


U.S.A. 



B. Bonds of the Konvbrsionskasse (Conversion Office for German Foreion Debts) 

(U.S. dollars only) 



No. 


Interest 
rate 


Currency 


Description 


Date of issue 


Country of offering 


11 
12 


Percent 
3 
3 


$ 
$ 


Old issue 

New issue 


July 1, 1930 
June 1, 1937 


U.S.A. 
USA. 









Part IV. Country of Offering: United States of America 
(All issues denominated in dollars) 





ISSUER 




Origi- 












nal 
interest 


Description 


Year of 








issue 




German title 


American title 


rate 












Percent 






1 


AUgemeine Elektricitats-Gesell- 


General Electric Co., 


7 


Twenty-year sinking fund gold 


1925 




schaft (AEG). 


Germany. 




debentures — due January 15, 
1945. 
Fifteen-year gold sinking fund 




2 


Allgemeine Elektricitats-Gesell- 


General Electric Co., 


6H 


1925 




schaft (AEG). 


Germany. 




debentures — due December 1, 
1940. 
Twenty-year sinking fund gold 




3 


Allgemeine Elektricitats-Gesell- 


General Electric Co., 


6 


1928 




schaft (AEG). 


Germany. 




debentures — due May 1, 1948. 




4 


Bayerisch-Pfalzische Stadte . . . 


Bavarian Palatinate 
Consolidated Cities, 
Germany. 

Free State of Bavaria . . 


7 


External serial gold bonds . . . 


1926 


5 


Bayern, Freistaat 


6H 


Serial gold bonds 


1925 


6 


Bayem, Freistaat 


Free State of Bavaria . . 


6H 


E.xternal twenty-year sinking 
fund gold bonds — due August 
1, 1945. 


1925 


7 


Berlin, Stadt 


City of Berlin 


6H 


Twenty-five year sinking fund 
gold bonds — due April 1, 
1950. 


1925 


8 


Berlin, Stadt 


City of Berlin 


6 


Thirty-year external sinking 
fund gold bonds — due June 
15, 1958. 


1928 


9 


Berliner Stadtische Elektrizitats- 


Berlin City Electric Co., 


6H 


Twenty-five year sinking fund 


1926 




werke Akt.-Ges. (jetzt: Berliner 


Inc. 




debentures — due December 






Kraft- und Licht (Bewag)- 






1,1951. 






Aktiengesellschaft) . 










10 


Berliner Stadtische Elektrizitats- 


Berlin City Electric Co., 


6/2 


Thirty-year sinking fund deben- 


1929 




werke Akt.-Ges. (jetzt: Berlin- 


Inc. 




tures^-due February 1, 1959. 






er Kraft- und Licht (Bewag)- 












Aktiengesellschaft) . 










11 


Berliner Stadtische Elektrizitats- 


Berlin City Electric Co., 


6 


Twenty-five year debentures — 


1930 




werke Akt.-Ges. (jetzt: Berliner 


Inc. 




due April 1, 1955. 






Kraft- und Licht (Bewag)- 












Aktiengesellschaf t) . 










12 


Bezirksverband Oberschwabische 


Consolidated Hydroelec- 


7 


First mortgage thirty-year sink- 


1926 




Elektrizitatswerke. 


tric Works of Upper 
Wurttemberg. 




ing fund gold bonds — due 
January 15, 1956. 





610 



Department of Slate Bulletin 





ISSUER 




Origi- 






No. 






nal 
interest 


Description 


Year of 






issue 




German titlo 


American title 


rate 












Perrent. 






13 


Braunkohlen-Industrie-Aktienge- 


Brown Coal Industrial 


6K2 


Sinking fund mortgage gold 


1928 




sellschaft, Zukunft. 


Corp., Zukunft. 




bonds, Series A — due April 1, 
1953. 
Ten-year external loan gold 




14 


Bremen, Freie Hansestadt .... 


State of Bremen (Free 


7 


1925 






Hanseatic City of 




bonds — due September 1, 








Bremen). 




1935. 




15 


Central-Ausschuss fur die Innere 


(Protestant Church in 


7 


Twenty-year secured sinking 


1926 




Mission der Deutschen Evange- 


Germany Welfare Insti- 




fund gold bonds. 






lischen Kirche. 


tution Loan). 








16 


Deutsch-Atlantische Telegraphen- 


German Atlantic Cable 


7 


First mortgage twenty-year 


1925 




gesellschaft. 


Co. 




sinking fund gold dollar bonds 
—due April 1, 1945. 




17 


Deutsche Landesbankenzentrale 


Central Bank of German 


6 


First mortgage secured gold 


1927 




Aktiengesellschaft. 


State & Provincial 
Banks, Inc. 




sinking fund bonds Series A — 
due August 1, 1952. 




18 


Deutsche Landesbankenzentrale 


Central Bank of German 


6 


Mortgage secured gold sinking 


1927 




Aktiengesellschaft. 


State & Provincial 
Banks, Inc. 




fund bonds Series B — due 
October 1, 1951. 




19 


Deutsche Landesbankenzentrale 


Central Bank of German 


6K 


German provincial and com- 


1928 




Aktiengesellschaft als Zentral- 


State & Provincial 




munal banks consolidated 






agent fur: 


Banks, Inc. 




agricultural loan — secured 
sinking fund gold bonds Series 






Hannoversche Landeskredit-Ans- 

talt, 
Landesbank der Provinz Schles- 






A— due June 1, 1958. 
















wig-Holstein, 












Brandenburgische Provinzialbank 












und Giro-Zentrale, Landesbank 












der Rheinprovinz, 












Landesbank der Provinz West- 












falen, 












Nassauische Landesbank, Badis- 












chen Sparkassen- und Girover- 












band, 












Badische Girozentrale, Wurttom- 












bergischen Sparkassen- und Gir- 












overband und Andere Kommun- 












albanken Mittel- und Ost- 












deutschlands. 










20 


Deutsche Rentenbank-Kreditan- 


German Central Bank for 


7 


First lien gold farm loan sinking 


1925 




stalt Landwirtschaftliche Zen- 


Agriculture. 




fund bonds — due September 






tralbank. 






15, 1950. 




21 


Deutsche Rentenbank-Kieditan- 


German Central Bank for 


6 


Farm loan secured gold sinking 


1927 




stalt Landwirtschaftliche Zen- 


Agriculture. 




fund bonds — due July 15, 






tralbank. 






1960. 




22 


Deutsche Rentenbank-Kreditan- 


German Central Bank for 


6 


Farm loan secured gold sinking 


1927 




stalt Landwirtschaftliche Zen- 


Agriculture. 




fund bonds — second series of 






tralbank. 






1927— due October 15, _ 1960. 




23 


Deutsche Rentenbank-Kreditan- 


German Central Bank for 


6 


Farm loan secured gold sinking 


1928 




stalt Landwirtschaftliche Zen- 


Agriculture. 




fund bonds — Series A of 






tralbank. 






1928— due April 15, 1938. 




24 


Deutscher Sparkassen und- Giro- 


German Savings Bank 


7 


German consolidated municipal 


1926 




verband. 


and Clearing Assoc. 




loan — sinking fund secured 
gold bonds — series of 1926 
due 1947 — due February 1, 
1947. 




25 


Deutscher Sparkassen und- Giro- 


German Savings Bank 


6 


German consolidated municipal 


1928 




verband. 


and Clearing Assoc. 




loan — sinking fund secured 
gold bonds — series due 1947. 




26 


Dortmunder Wasserwerksgesell- 


Dortmund Municipal 


6K 


Twenty-year sinking fund 


1928 




schaft m. b. H., Dortmunder 


Utilities. 




mortgage gold bonds — due 






Aktiengesellschaft fur Gasbe- 






October 1, 1948. 






leuchtung, Dortmunder Strass- 












enbahnen G.m.b.H. (jetzt: 












Dortmunder Stadtwerke Aktien- 












gesellschaft) . 










27 


Dusseldorf, Stadt 


City of Duesseldorf. . . 


7 


External serial gold bonds . . . 


1925 


28 


Duisburg, Stadt 


City of Duisburg. . . . 


7 


Serial gold bonds 


1925 


29 


Elektrizitatswerk Unterelbe, 


Unterelbe Power & Light 


6 


Twenty-five year sinking fund 


1928 




Aktiengesellschaft. 


Co. 




mortgage gold bonds, Series 
A— due April 1, 1953. 





October 20, 1952 



611 





ISSUER 




Origi- 












nal 

interest 


Description 


Year of 


No. 






issue 




German title 


American title 


rate 












Percent 






30 


Elektrowerke Aktiengesellschaft. . 


Electric Power Corp. . . 


6H 


First mortgage sinking fund 
gold bonds series — due 1950. 


1925 


31 


Elektrowerke Aktiengesellschaft. . 


Electric Power Corp. . . 


6>^ 


First mortgage sinking fund 
gold bonds series — due 1953. 


1928 


32 


Frankfurt am Main, Stadt. . . . 


City of Frankfort-on- 
Main. 


7 


Serial gold bonds external loan 
of 1925. 


1925 


33 


Frankfurt am Main, Stadt. . . . 


City of Frankfort-on- 

Main. 


6H 


Twenty-five year sinking fund 
gold bonds municipal ex- 
ternal loan of 1928— due 
May 1, 1953. 


1928 


34 


Gas- und Eltwerke kommunale 


Municipal Gas and Elec- 


7 


First mortgage twenty-year 


1927 




Aktiengesellschaft Reckling- 


tric Corp., Reckling- 




sinking fund gold bonds — due 






hausen. 


hausen. 




December 1, 1947. 




35 


Gesamtverband der acht bayer- 


Roman Catholic Church 


6H 


Twenty-year sinking fund 


1926 




ischen Diozesen. 


in Bavaria. 




gold bonds, Series A — due 
March 1, 1946. 




36 


Gesellschaft fur elektrische Hooh- 


Berlin Electric Elevated 


6K2 


Thirty-year first mortgage 


1926 




und Untergrundbahnen in Ber- 


and Underground Rail- 




sinking fund gold bonds — due 






lin — (jetzt: IBerliner Verkehrs- 


ways Co. 




October 1, 1956. 






Betriebe [BVG]) 










37 


Gesfurel (Gesellschaft fur Elek- 
trische Unternehmungen). 


Gesfurel 


6 


Sinking fund gold debentures — 
due June 1, 1953. 


1928 


38 


Gropskraftwerk Mannheim Aktien- 


Mannheim and Palatinate 


7 


Fifteen-year sinking fund mort- 


1926 




Gcsellschaft, Pfalzwerke Aktien- 


Electric Cos. 




gage gold bonds — due June 1, 






Gcsellschaft. 






1941. 




39 


GutehoflFnungshutte, Aktienverein 


Good Hope Stool and 


7 


Twenty-year sinking fund mort- 


1925 




fur Bergbau und Huttenbetrieb; 


Iron Works. 




gage gold bonds — due Octo- 






GutehofiFnungshutte Oberhausen 






ber 15, 1945. 






Aktiengesellschaft. 










40 


Hamburger Hochbahn Aktienge- 


Hamburg Elevated Un- 


5H 


Ten-vear gold loan — due June 1, 


1928 




sellschaft. 


derground and Street 
Railways Co. 




1938. 




41 


Hamburger Staat (Freie und 


State of Hamburg (Free 


6 


Twentv-year gold bonds — due 


1926 




Hansestadt Hamburg). 


and Hansoatic City of 
Hamburg). 




October 1, 1946. 




42 


Hannover, Stadt 


City of Hanover .... 


7 


Ten-year external convertible 
gold bonds — due November 1, 
1939. 


1929 


43 


Hannover, Stadt 


City of Hanover .... 


7 


External sinking fund gold bonds — 
due November 1, 1959. 


1929 


44 


Harpener Bergbau-Aktiengesell- 
schaft. 


Harpen Mining Corp . . 


6 


Gold mortgage bonds, series of 
1929— due January 1, 1949. 


1927 


45 


Harzwasserwerke der Provinz 


Province of Hanover 


6 


Sinking fund gold bonds, first 


1927 




Hannover. 


Harz Water Works. 




series — due August 1, 1957. 




46 


Harzwasserwerke der Provinz 


Province of Hanover 


6}^ 


Sinking fund gold bonds, second 


1929 




Hannover. 


Harz Water Works. 




series — due February 1, 1949. 




47 


IlsederHutte 


Ilgeder Steel Corp .... 


6 


Gold mortgage bonds, series of 
1928— due August 1, 1948. 


1928 










48 


Rudolph Karstadt Aktiengesell- 
schaft. 


Rudolph Karstadt, Inc . 


6 


First mortgage collateral sinking 
fund bonds — due November 
1, 1943. 


1928 


49 


Koln, Stadt 


City of Cologne .... 


6/2 


Twenty-five year sinking fund 
gold bonds — due March 15, 
1950. 


1925 


50 


Konigsberger Zellstoff-Fabriken 
und Chemische Werke Koholyt 
Aktiengesellschaft. 


Koholyt Corp 


6K 


First (closed) mortgage sinking 
fund gold bonds. 


1928 


51 


Kommunale Landesbank in Darm- 
stadt. 


Municipal Bank of the 
State of Hossen. 


7 


Serial gold bonds 


1925 


52 


Luneburger Kraft', Licht-und Was- 


Luneburg Power, Light 


7 


First mortgage twenty-year 


1928 




serwerke Gesellschaft mit be- 


and Waterworks, Ltd. 




sinking fund gold bonds — 






schrankter Haftung. 






due May 1, 1948. 




53 


Mansfeld Aktiengesellschaft fur 


Mansfeld Mining and 


7 


Fifteen-year (closed) mortgage 


1926 




Bergbau und Huttenbetrieb. 


Smelting Co. 




sinking fund gold bonds — 
due May 1, 1941. 




54 


"Miag" Muhlenbau und Indus- 


Miag Mill Machinery 


7 


Closed first mortgage thirty- 


1926 




trie-Aktiengesellschaft (jetzt: 


Co. 




year sinking fimd gold bonds — 






G. m. b. H.). 






due June 1, 1956. 




55 


Munchen, Stadt 


City of Munich 


7 


Serial gold bonds 


1925 


56 


Norddeutscher Lloyd (Bremen). . 


North German Lloyd, 
Bremen. 


6 


Twenty-year sinking fund gold 
bonds — due November 1, 
1947. 


1927 



612 



Department of State Bulletin 





ISSUER 




Origi- 












nal 
interest 


Description 


Year of 


No. 






issue 




German title 


American title 


rate 






57 


Norddeutscher Lloyd (Bremen). . 


North German Lloyd, 
Bremen. 


Percent 
4 


Sinking fund bonds of 1933— 
due November 1, 1947. 


1933 


58 


Nurnberg, Stadt 


City of Nuremberg . . . 


6 


External twenty-five year sink- 
ing fund gold bonds — due 
August 1, 1952. 


1927 


59 


Oberpfalzwerke Aktiengesellsehaft 


Oberpfalz Electric Power 


7 


First mortgage sinking fund 


1926 




fur Elektrizitatsversorgung 


Corp. 




gold bonds. 






(jetzt: Energieversorgung Ost- 










60 
61 

RO 


bayern Aktiengesellsehaft). 

Oldenburg, Freistaat 

Pfalzische Stadte: siehe Bayerisch- 

Pfalzische Stadte. 


Free State of Oldenburg. 


7 


External serial gold bonds . . . 


1925 










K3Z 


siehe Grosskraftwerk Mann- 
heim. 
Preussische Elektrizitats-Aktien- 










63 


Prussian Electric Co. . . 


6 


Sinking fund gold debentures — 


1929 




gesellschaft (Preussenelektra). 






due February 1, 1954. 




64 


Rhein-EIbe Union 


Rheinelbe Union . . . 


7 


Twenty-year sinking fund mort- 
gage gold bonds — due Janu- 
ary 1, 1946. 


1926 


65 


Rheinisch-Westfalisches Elektrizi- 


Rhine-Westphalia Elec- 


7 


Direct mortgage gold bonds — 


1925 




tatswerk Aktien-Gesellschaft. 


tric Power Corp. 




due November 1, 1950. 




66 


Rheinisch-Westfalisches Elektrizi- 


Rhine- Westphalia Elec- 


6 


Direct mortgage gold bonds — 


1927 




tatswerk Aktien-Gesellschaft. 


tric Power Corp. 




due May 1, 1952. 




67 


Rheinisch-Westfalisches Elektri- 


Rhine- Westphalia Electric 


6 


Consolidated mortgage gold 


1928 




zitatswerk Aktien-Gesellschaft 


Power Cor 3. 




bonds — due August 1, 1953 




68 


Rheinisch-Westfalisches Elektrizi- 


Rhine- Westp lalia Electric 


6 


Consolidated mortgage gold 


1930 




tatswerk Aktien-Gesellschaft 


Power Corp. 




bonds — due April 1, 1955 




69 


Rhein-Main Donau Aktiengesell- 
sehaft 


Rhine-Main Danube Corp . 


7 


Sinking fund gold debentures, 
Series A — due September 1, 
1950 


1925 


70 


Romlsch-I&tholische kirchlich Weohl- 


Roman Catholic Church 


7 


Twenty-year secured sinking 


1926-28 




fahrteinriehtungen in Deutsch- 


Welfare Institutions in 




fund gold bonds 






land (Der Deutsche Caritas- 


Germany 










verband Eingetragener Verein, 












Die Katholische Schulorganisa- 












tion Deutsehlands (Landesaus- 












schiiss Preussen) Eingetragener 












Verein und Der Reichsverband 












der Katholischen Gesellenhau- 












ser, Lehrlings- und Ledigen- 












heime Eingetragener Verein) 










71 


Ruhrchemie Aktiengesellsehaft . . 


Ruhr Chemical Corp . . 


6 


Sinking fund mortgage bonds. 
Series A — due April 1, 1948 


1928 


72 


Ruhrgas Aktiengesellsehaft . . . 


Ruhr Gas Corp .... 


e}i 


Secured sinking fund bonds, 
Series A— due October 1, 1953 


1928 


73 


Ruhrwohnungsbau-Aktiengesell- 

schaft. 


Ruhr Housing Corp . . 


6K 


First mortgage sinking fund 
bonds — due November 1, 1958 


1928 


74 


Leonhard Tietz Aktiengesellsehaft 
(jetzt: Westdeutsehe Kaufhof 
Aktiengesellsehaft) . 


Leonhard Tietz, Inc . . 


7}i 


Twenty-year mortgage gold 
bonds 


1926 


75 


Vereinigte Badische Stadte . . . 


Consolidated Municipali- 


7 


External sinking fund gold 


1926 






ties of Baden 




bonds — due .January 1, 1951 


ff, 


76 


Vereinigte Elektrizitatswerke West- 


Westphalia United Elec- 


6 


First mortgage sinking fund gold 


1928 




falen G. m. b. H. (jetzt: Aktien- 


tric Power Corp. 




bonds, Series A — due January 






gesellsehaft). 






1, 1953 




77 


Vereinigte Industrieunternehmun- 


United Industrial Corp. 


6 


Hydroelectric first (closed) mort- 


1925 




gen Aktiengesellsehaft (Viag). 


(Viag) 




gage sinking fund gold bonds 




78 


Vereinigte Industrieunternehmvin- 
gen Aktiengesellsehaft (Viag). 


United Industrial Corp. 
(Viag) 


6V2 


Sinking fund gold debentures . . 


1926 


79 


Vereinigte Stahlwerke Aktiengesell- 
sehaft. 


United Steel Works Corp. 


6K 


Twenty-five-year sinking fund 
mortgage gold bonds. Series 
A— due June 1, 1951 


1926 


80 


Vereinigte Stahlwerke Aktienge- 
sellsehaft. 


United Steel Works Corp. 


6K 


Twenty-five-year sinking fund 
mortgage gold bonds. Series 
C— due June 1, 1951. 


1926 


81 


Vereinigte Stahlwerke Aktienge- 
sellsehaft. 


United Steel Works Corp. 


6H 


Twenty-year sinking fund de- 
bentures. Series A — due July 
1, 1947. 


1927 



October 20, J 952 



613 



No. 


ISSUER 


Origi- 
nal 
interest 
rate 


Description 


YearoJ 


German title 


American title 


issue 


82 

83 

84 
85 


Vestische Kleinbahnen Gesell- 
schaft mit beschrankter Haf- 
tung (Vestische Strassenbahn 
G. m. b. H.). 

Wasserwirtschaft im Rheinisch- 
Westfalischen Industriegebiet 
(Ruhrkohlenbezirk), G. m. b. 
H. 

Wohnhaus -Grundstucks - Verwer- 
tungs- Aktiengesellschaft am 
Lehniner Platz. 

Wurttembergische Stadte und 
Gemeinden. 


Vesten Electric Railways 
Co. 

Rhine-Ruhr Water Serv- 
ice Union. 

Housing and Realty Im- 
provement Co., ijerlin 

(State of Wurttemberg 
Consolidated Municipal 
External Loan of 1925.) 


Percent 
7 

6 

7 
7 


First mortgage twenty-year 
sinking fund gold bonds — due 
December 1, 1947. 

Twenty-five-year sinking fund 
external gold debentures — due 
January 1, 1953. 

First (closed) mortgage twenty- 
year sinking fund gold bonds. 

Serial gold bonds 


1927 

1928 

1926 
1925 



A Basic Decision for the U. S.: Trade or Aid 



bi/ Eugenie Anderson 
Atnhassador to Denmark '■ 



I am delighted to have this opportunity to speak 
to so many of Philadelphia's world-minded citi- 
zens. Having been back in the States only 2 days, 
my mind is still full of European problems. It 
is to a few of those problems that I will address 
myself today. I especially want to discuss some 
economic considerations. One does not need to be 
an American representative in Europe for several 
years in order to be convinced that economic diffi- 
culties lie at the root of many of our other prob- 
lems. Nevertheless, as an Ajiierican Ambassador 
abroad, I have had an unusual opportunity of 
studying the relationship of economic problems 
to our foreign policy in general. We speak often 
these days of our pressing defense concerns, and 
so we should. But we need to remember also that 
military strength rests on economic, social, and 
moral strength. And we need constantly to con- 
sider the ways in which our own economic affairs 
affect those of our European allies. 

"While my experience of the past 3 years has been 
largely in Denmark, I have learned that Danish 
economic problems are similar to those of Western 
Europe as a whole. If I shall use Denmark as 
an example in the course of my remarks, it is also 

' Excerpts from an address made before the World 
Affairs Council at Philadelphia on Oct. 10 (press re- 
lease 796). 



a fairly typical example as regards European 
economic problems today. 

This is an election year. It is inevitable that 
in the heat of the political campaign many things 
are said that give a distorted picture of the situa- 
tions we face and what we have been doing about 
them. It is therefore appropriate to give sober 
consideration to some of the basic problems with 
which we are confronted. For the new adminis- 
tration which takes office in January, whether Re- 
publican or Democratic, will have to deal with 
these problems. They are difficult and serious. 
Many of them are economic problems. To deal 
with them effectively, it is of major importance 
to develop the broadest possible basis of public 
understanding and support. 

Size and Strength of the Soviet State 

The most significant and most serious fact for 
America and for all the free world is the existence 
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Here 
is a nation occupying over one-sixth of the world's 
land mass. It dominates today not only its own 
large population but millions of people of many 
other nations which once were free. The Soviet 
state today controls approximately 35 percent of 
the people of the world, over 800 million persons. 

It is not, of course, merely the size and popu- 



614 



Department of State Bulletin 



lation of the Soviet realm which is significant. 
This massive bloc is governed by a small group 
of 14 men. They maintain as tyrannical and com- 
plete a dictatorship as the world has ever known. 
This is a dictatorship dedicated to its own preser- 
vation and extension by force. Its contempt for 
human liberty and the rights of man is utter and 
complete. In the Soviet world the individual 
exists only as long as he does serve the State. So- 
viet dictatorship is based upon a ruthless and com- 
plete suppression of individual freedom. 

The men in the Kremlin have not disguised their 
ultimate objective. Just as Hitler in Me in Kmnpf 
outlined his plans for power, so have the Soviet 
leaders clearly enunciated the course they will 
pursue. World domination is their openly stated 
purpose. 

It is in the context of this threat to their lib- 
erties that the peoples of the non-Soviet world 
must live. The reality of this threat cannot be 
lost sight of. Its existence complicates and ren- 
ders infinitely more difficult the solution of the 
many other problems with which the free world 
must deal. 

Powerful Forces Unleashed by World War II 

For while the fact of an aggressive imperialist 
Soviet Russia is in itself the most serious prob- 
lem with which the free world must deal, if it 
is to survive, it would be a very grave error to 
assume that the removal of this problem would 
leave us without others. Essentially the free world 
must not only find ways and means of success- 
fully resisting the spread of Communist power but 
must, at the same time, find ways and means of 
solving those other political and economic prob- 
lems with which it is beset. The end of World 
War II found a vastly different world than existed 
when it began. We are only beginning to appre- 
ciate the extent to which the war marked the un- 
leashing of powerful social and economic forces. 
They have already drastically changed the polit- 
ical character and structure of much of the world. 
The extent to which these powerful forces can be 
channeled to improve, rather than to destroy, the 
woi'ld depends very greatly on our ability to un- 
derstand their causes and to adjust ourselves to 
their existence. 

The United States was certainly not the coun- 
try least affected by these developments. The 
same cataclysm which caused such vast changes 
in the world thrust the United States into a posi- 
tion of power and affluence greater than it had 
ever known. For the fact is that World War II 
left the United States as the most powerful na- 
tion in the world and, most important, as the only 
really powerful nation in the free world. These 
tides caused the near bankruptcy of the British 
Empire. They brought about the economic and 
political devastation of Europe. They created 
revolutionary chaos in much of Asia. And they 



left the United States richer and stronger in both 
absolute and relative terms. 

This wholly unsought and unexpected position 
of power for the United States inevitably carries 
with it grave and heavy responsibility. The 
change in our relative power necessarily increasee 
the significance to other countries and to other 
peoples of all of our actions, whether large or 
small. 

The development of transportation, especially 
air transport, and of communications, which was 
vastly accelerated by the pressures of military 
needs during the war, also affected the United 
States. The speed with which people can now 
move or communicate with each other means es- 
sentially that the world has shrunk. What takes 
place in one part of the world quickly becomes 
known in the other areas. The effects of actions 
by the United States are not only greater because 
of our greater power but because the speed with 
which these effects are felt and produce results is 
so much greater. 

Clearly the United States today stands in a po- 
sition of great power and awesome responsibility. 
It is the United States which must lead and on 
which the free nations of the world must depend. 
With intelligent and responsible U.S. leadership, 
the free peoples of the world can contribute much 
to the solving of our mutual problems. Without 
such leadership, or in the event of a U.S. retreat 
into isolation, the free world will flounder and 
inevitably fall under aggressive Communist forces. 

These are the facts with which we must deal. 
This is not a situation which we sought nor one 
which we like, but it is the world in which we live. 

We may be both grateful and proud that up to 
now the United States has met the challenge of 
these facts with humility, with courage, with intel- 
ligence, and with success. We have not, we fully 
realize, been free from error nor have we solved all 
of our problems. But we have made progress. 

Preserving Europe From Soviet Control 

One of the gi-eatest problems with which we 
wei-e confronted was that of Europe. The end of 
the war left Europe in virtual chaos. Ravaged by 
war, numbed by the tei-rors of Occupation, the peo- 
ples and nations of Europe emerged from war 
weak and disorganized. Governments were con- 
fused and bewilclered by the gigantic task of po- 
litical and economic rehabilitation and reconstruc- 
tion. Their peoples, weary and fearful, lacked 
confidence either in themselves or in their leadei'S. 
This was a situation made to order for communism, 
which tends to flourish where people have lost both 
means and hope. 

That the problem of Europe was a problem for 
the United States was clear. Europe was and is 
of great importance to us. This is not just be- 
cause it is the source from which most of our 



Ocfofaer 20, 1952 



615 



people come. Nor is it just because we have a 
great common heritage, share common ideals and 
culture. Besides these important factors, thei-e is 
another basic fact and that is that the security of 
Europe is a part of our security and essential to it. 

Europe is a source of power. The population 
of free Europe is greater than that of either the 
United States or the Soviet Union. The produc- 
tion potential of Europe, free Europe, is great. 
It exceeds that of the Soviet Union ; it compares 
favorably with our own. Europe has a skilled and 
intelligent manpower, experienced in the technics 
and arts of modern industrial civilization. 

We cannot afford to permit these power sources 
to be added to the existing strength of the Soviet 
Union. Sucli an addition would mean that over 
1 billion people would be under Soviet control. 
Such a unit would equal us in steel capacity, ex- 
ceed us in coal production, and rival us in the 
output of electric energy. The Soviet system, 
with Europe added, would equal us in production 
capacity and exceed us in manpower seven times. 

That the significance of preserving Europe from 
Soviet control has been fully appreciated by our 
Government and by our people is reflected in the 
course of our foreign policy over the past several 
years. Under the leadership of the Administra- 
tion, bold and imaginative measures have been 
taken. The European Recovery Progi-am, the 
North Atlantic Treaty, the Mutual Defense As- 
sistance Program are all milestones on the road 
to securing prosperity and preserving peace and 
security in this part of the free world. 

The objectives of our policy neither are, nor 
should they be, confined to the forestalling of ag- 
gression by the Soviet Union. So long as the 
threat of such aggression exists we must, of course, 
be concerned with it. We must continue vigi- 
lantly to construct and maintain defensive strength 
adequate to deter it. But we must also concern 
ourselves with the solution of basic economic and 
social problems. 

Accomplishments in European Recovery 

The European Recovery Program was the first 
great measure directed toward the solving of the 
basic economic problems in Europe. The accom- 
plishments of this program are indeed magnifi- 
cent. This Program brought order out of the 
chaotic economic situation which existed in Europe 
following the war. There had been a tremendous 
loss of financial, industrial, and productive re- 
sources. 

The final press statement issued by the Economic 
Cooperation Administration ^ lists many positive 
acliievements, constituting a most impressive rec- 
ord. It is a record without parallel in history. 
Following tlie First World War, when we did not 
have the awful destruction of strategic air bom- 
bardment and when a major part of Western Eu- 



' Bdli^tin of Jan. 14, 1952, p. 43. 



616 



rope was free from Occupation, it took 7 years 
to regain the prewar level of production. Under 
the Marshall Plan, industrial production in West- 
ern Europe was increased 64 percent in 3 years. 
By the end of 1951, it was over 40 percent higher 
than before the war. Steel production was dou- 
bled in 3 years and was more than 20 percent 
greater than before the war. In 1951 Western 
Europe's steel production was CO million tons as 
compared with 35 million tons produced in the 
Soviet system. Petroleum products were four 
times more than before the war. Electric energy 
output was double prewar levels. Transport had 
been rehabilitated. 

In the field of agriculture similar striking gains 
have been made. The total agricultural produc- 
tion at the end of 1951 was nearly 10 percent more 
than prewar and 25 percent above 1947. Potatoes, 
sugar, milk, and oils are above prewar levels; 
cereals, grains, and meat are back up to prewar 
volume. 

Exfjressed in terms of total production of goods 
and services, an economic level 15 percent better 
than before the war had been achieved. There 
was a gain of 25 percent in less than 4 years. 

These are indeed real and significant accom- 
plishments. Much credit must be given for achiev- 
ing these results to those who conceived and exe- 
cuted the program. Equal credit belongs to the 
courageous and vigorous efforts of the govern- 
ments and peoples of Western Europe working 
together in free cooperation. 

It in no way dims the luster of this performance 
to point out that, despite these imj^ressive gains, 
we are still faced with difficult and serious eco- 
nomic problems in Western Europe. 

One of the major reasons for the continued exist- 
ence of economic problems is the effect of the war 
in Korea. And here I want to digress for a mo- 
ment to say that Korea has also been of decisive 
actual and moral strength to our allies in Europe. 
Korea has proved to our friends — as well as to the 
Communists — that we would resist aggression. 
Korea has once more demonstrated our militaiy 
superiority. It iias stayed aggression in South- 
east Asia. It has also been a forceful proof of our 
determination to prevent a world conflagration. 
It has given new strength to the United Nations. 
It has brought a new security against Communist 
aggression in Europe. We are paying a high and 
a terrible price in Korea — but we Americans need 
to remember that our sacrifices have not been in 
vain. 

Nevertheless it was true that the brazen use of 
military force by a Soviet satellite came as a shock 
to the free world. It served to emphasize the need 
for effective and adequate defensive militai-y 
strength. Korea proved to the governments of 
Western Eui'ope, just as to us Americans, that the 
defense build-up must be accelerated. We were 
determined to reduce the danger of another Korea 
elsewhere along the Soviet front. The economic 

Department of State Bulletin 



improvement resulting from the European Recov- 
ery Program stood the people of Europe in good 
stead. These gains made possible a military eifort 
wliich could not have been even contemplated a 
few short years before. 

I cannot today recite the many accomplishments 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. But 
believe me, they are impressive. Two million men 
are today under arms in Europe. There has been 
an increase of over 500,000 European troops since 
1949. Military budgets have nearly doubled. 
Training periods have been greatly increased. De- 
fense plans have been coordinated. Military re- 
sources have been combined. Morale has been 
lifted. Self-confidence and determination have 
replaced defeatism and despair. Military produc- 
tion has been dramatically increased — more than 
four times over its 1949 level. A steadily increas- 
ing jiroportion of eifort and resources is being 
devoted to achieving an adequate defense. 

Some Effects of an Expanding Defense Economy 

The increased application of resources to meet 
the requirements of defense cannot of course be 
painless. Nations, like families, must budget their 
incomes. Choices must be made between expendi- 
tures for defense and those for such other essential 
and desirable purposes as housing, schools, public 
health, and the general welfare. There are limits 
to the revenue to be acquired through taxation or 
borrowing. The inevitable effect of higher taxa- 
tion and greater expenditures for defense must be 
to retard improvement in the standard of living or 
even to decrease it. 

Thus there are difficult decisions to make. The 
U.S. Government agi-ees with the European gov- 
ernments that it would be most unwise to under- 
take levels of military expenditure and of taxation 
which would result in losing the gains which have 
been made. If the lot of tiie average citizen be- 
comes again one of misery and despair, if freedom 
and democracy become synonymous with hunger 
and hopelessness, they cannot survive. 

The level of consumption in Western Europe is 
perhaps a better index of the lot of the ordinary 
citizen than any other economic symbol. This is 
on the average still lower than before the war, 
although slightly higher in most of the European 
countries. A major task of any responsible demo- 
cratic government must be to improve the standard 
of living of its citizens. In planning defense pro- 
grams, care must be taken to insure as an absolute 
minimum that there is not a decline which will lose 
all that has been achieved in the fight against 
communism. 

Another and most serious effect of the war in 
Korea was its impact on the prices of raw mate- 
rials. The tremendous increase in demand for 
basic supplies, stimulated in large part by heavy 
U.S. purchases, caused rapid and sizable increases 
in the prices for such goods. The result for Eu- 
rope was indeed serious. Euroi^e is an industrial 



economy, which is in large measure dependent 
upon imports of raw materials which it processes 
and in turn sells to the rest of the world. The 
sudden increase in costs of materials which Europe 
had to buy was not, of course, matched by a similar 
increase in demand and consequently in price for 
the things Europe had to sell. In economic jargon, 
there was an alarming deterioration in the terms 
of trade for Europe. In simplest terms, costs went 
up while income remained stable. 

To some degree, of course, it is inevitable that 
increased demands for raw materials must bring 
these consequences. However, much can be done 
by a greater measure of international planning 
and cooperation in both the acquisition and use of 
basic supplies. The U.S. Government and others 
of the major producing and consuming countries 
are presently engaged in efforts to alleviate these 
strains. Much remains to be done if there is to 
be an assurance of an adequate and intelligent 
development and utilization of the basic resources 
of the world. No one country, not even the United 
States, is possessed of an inexhaustible and plen- 
tiful supply of all basic materials. This is a field 
in which international cooperation is most obvi- 
ously essential. 

Problems of Trade Within Europe 

These are not the only problems involved in the 
rehabilitation of Europe's economy and in the con- 
struction of a stable international situation. To 
revert a moment to the European Recovery Pro- 
gram, mention should be made of the problems of 
trade within Europe. It was obvious that the 
existence of multiple national barriers to the free 
movement of goods and services was itself a bar- 
rier to sound economic development. If efficient 
use of European resources was to be made, it was 
essential to reduce these barriers to trade. Yet 
equally clear, indiscriminate and precipitate lev- 
eling of such controls would also do serious 
injury to many established interests. The social 
and economic results of such action had to be 
considered. Nevertheless, a great deal has been 
accomplished. By cooperative effort a goal of 
liberalization of trade has been established. For 
the first time in modei-n European history there is 
free trade in a large number of categories of goods. 
Substantial progress is being made. 

In this connection a most significant develop- 
ment is the Schuman Plan. Today the coal and 
steel production of six European countries is 
operating under a single system of economic and 
political control rather than under six. 

However, even if a completely efficient use of 
Europe's economic resources is achieved, it is still 
a basic fact that Europe must import raw ma- 
terials and food and export finished goods. One 
is closely tied to the other. Exports must pay for 
imports. The European Recovery Program es- 
sentially represented a financing by the United 
States of the imports required by Europe from 



Ocfober 20, 1952 



617 



the dollar area. This was to provide Europe with 
an opportunity to rehabilitate and develop its pro- 
ductive capacity in order to export enough goods 
to pay for its imports. As I have pointed out, 
productive capacity in Europe has largely been 
restored and increased. This is, of course, to no 
avail if there are not markets for the production. 
For if Europe cannot sell, it cannot buy, and if 
it can neither buy nor sell, it cannot live by its 
own efforts. 

It would be an oversimplification of the prob- 
lem of the basic maladjustment of world trade to 
say that European stability depends on selling 
more to the United States. Yet it is not an exag- 
geration to say that it is of major importance. 
Most of the billions of dollars spent by the U. S. 
Government under the European Recovery Pro- 
gram were spent in the United States, not in Eu- 
rope. They went to pay U. S. farmers, U. S. 
factories, U. S. labor, U. S. businessmen for U. S. 
goods and supplies. These funds came from 
taxes. To the extent that European farmers, la- 
borers, factories, and businesses sell goods in the 
United States, they can earn the dollars which are 
needed to buy these U. S. goods and supplies. Of 
course, to sell in the United States, Europeans 
must make things we want. They must make 
them as good or better than our local products, 
or they must supply things we do not make our- 
selves. They must learn how to package, how to 
advertise, how to satisfy the American consumer. 
This they are willing to do and in many cases 
can do. But these things are in turn futile if 
we insist on excluding European goods from our 
markets. 

A Story About Danish Blue Cheese 

I'd like to tell you a little story in this con- 
nection. It is a story about cheese. It is a story 
about blue cheese, Danish blue cheese. Probably 
many of you never saw or even heard of Dan- 
ish blue cheese. But you would have if you had 
been in Denmark. Denmark is an agi'icultural 
country. It is a small country of 4 million peo- 
ple, with very little in the way of natural re- 
sources. It must import almost everything. Coal, 
machinery, minerals, protein foods for cattle, fer- 
tilizers, cotton — all must be bought from abroad. 
Much of this need can only be met by purchases 
from the United States. 

Now the Danes are proud, hard-working and 
self-respecting people. They prefer to earn their 
Avay. They would vastly rather trade goods 
for dollars than accept them as gifts from the 
United States. The American Government shares 
this preference. So we worked together with the 
Danes. We tried to help them put before the 
American consumer a product he would want and 
would buy. The Danes make very fine cheese. 
They make a very fine blue cheese. This cheese 
they decided to try to sell in the United States. 



They packaged it to suit American tastes. They 
marketed it in American style. And they sold 
it in the States. In a short time the Danes began 
to earn the dollars they needed. The need for 
our dollar gifts decreased. The American con- 
sumer was getting a cheese he liked better, and 
he was getting it cheaper. His cheese bill was 
less and his bill for taxes for foreign aid was 
on the way to being reduced. Both the Danish 
and American Governments were pleased. But 
what happened? Suddenly the Danes found 
themselves barred from meeting the demands of 
U. S. consumers for blue cheese because of a new 
American law. The American cheese buyer sud- 
denly found he could no longer get the cheaper, 
better Danish cheese. ^Vliy? Because a rider 
had been attached to a defense production bill, 
restricting the import of cheese into the United 
States. This rider was introduced to protect a 
small new group of cheese producers from the 
competition of Danish cheese. So the taxpayer 
not only gets no reduction in his foreign-aid costs, 
not only pays more for his cheese, but in the 
process subsidizes a few selected American cheese 
producers. 

Europe's Need for Imports 

Now the quantity of cheese involved in this story 
and the costs mentioned are not in themselves of 
major economic significance to the United States. 
But to the Danes it is significant. Not only was 
there a loss of investment and a loss of income, 
but there was a blow to morale. Of what use to 
try to earn dollars in fair competition if success 
meant the erection of new and artificial barriers 
to trade which made it impossible. Similar effects 
were felt all over Europe. The psychological im- 
pact of the Cheese Amendment — Section lOi of 
the Defense Production Act — was widespread. 

The European countries, as I have said, must 
trade to live. Trade with Eastern Europe pre- 
sents many difficulties. In the first place such 
trade never represented the major part of Western 
Europe's trade. Less than 6 percent of Western 
Europe's total external trade is conducted with 
the Soviet Union and its sat-ellites. Furthermore, 
the free European countries, like ourselves, are 
keenly aware of the undesirability of a trade with 
the Soviet system which provides that system with 
items which increase its potential for military 
aggression. They also are aware of the fact that 
trade for the Soviet system is not an objective 
in itself but an instrument of national policy to 
be used to further Soviet political objectives. 
Such trade is undependable and risky. The free 
European countries maintain controls over trade 
with the Soviet bloc to assure that such trade as 
does take place is of net advantage to the Western 
nations. 

Nevertheless, the need of Europe for imports 
creates a pressure which makes it difficult indeed 
to deal with the problem of trade with the Soviet 



618 



Department of State Bulletin 



system. A primary example is in the case of coal. 
Although European production of coal is above 
prewar levels, it has not increased in proportion 
to the increase in industrial consumption of coal. 
"VVliile efforts to increase coal production continue 
and promise ultimate success, it is still a fact that 
for some years yet Western Europe must import 
coal. Now there are two principal sources for 
these imports — one is the United States and the 
other is Poland. To get coal from the United 
States requires dollars, earned dollars or gift dol- 
lars. To get coal from Poland requires providing 
Poland with goods she wants. Under the control 
of the men from the Ki'emlin, Polish demands 
increasingly include goods of strategic impor- 
tance, items of military value. 

It is a matter of record that the Western Euro- 
pean nations have courageously resisted these de- 
mands. To date they have succeeded in negotiat- 
ing for essential imports without providing stra- 
tegic goods of comparable significance and value. 
This is not to say that no items of strategic impor- 
tance have been exported. It does mean that we 
believe the West has had the best of these deals. 

The problem of coal is but a part of the general 
problem of essential imports with which Europe 
is confronted. Again I want to emphasize that 
Europe must trade to live. If, as I believe we 
are agreed, the survival of Europe is of funda- 
mental importance to us, we must concern our- 
selves with European trade. If Europe is to obtain 
the goods she needs from us, she must acquire 
the dollars to buy them. Neither we nor the Euro- 
peans wish to continue indefinitely with aid pro- 
grams. To do so is not good for either the one 
who gives nor the one who receives. An alterna- 
tive is open to us — an alternative which is mutually 
beneficial, economically sound, and consistent with 
the interests of both America and Europe. Briefly, 
there is an important choice to be made. Trade 
or aid? You must make the decision. 

The economic problems of Europe which I have 
sketched are, of course, not our only international 
problems. Nor are they unrelated to the prob- 
lems of economic and political development in 
other world areas. All over the free world, at 
home and abroad, we have problems to solve, work 
to be done. The free nations of the world working 
together must find answers, must provide solu- 
tions. I believe that they can and I believe that 
they will. 

This faith rests on what I know we have done so 
far. Looking back over the past 4 years, we can 
be deeply encouraged by what we have accom- 
plished up to now. We are facing our immense 
problems with realism and courage. We have our 
eyes wide open. We need not be afraid. We are 



acting in our own self-interest. We are adhering 
also to basic American traditions. We have been 
building steadily on sound democratic principles. 
International cooperation and voluntary mutual 
assistance : these are the solid pillars of free-world 
strength and unity. 

I have faith in the basic capacity of free men 
to face their problems and to solve them. And I 
believe tliat we will select our next government 
in the light of the great issues before us. We know 
that our future depends on choosing those leaders 
who understand the deep needs of our times. We 
are agreed on our basic goals. We seek peace, 
human welfare, and human freedom. We know 
that they cannot be won in a day. 

But we will continue our progress along the 
great, bold lines we have started. Our goals are 
clear. They are noble. 

In Secretary Acheson's words, "our aim is to 
create a world in which each liuman being shall 
have the opportunity to fulfill his creative possi- 
bilities in harmony with all. . . . We must al- 
ways go forward under the banner of liberty. Our 
faith and our strength are rooted in free institu- 
tions and the rights of man." 



Resignation of Miss Lenroot 

The President has accepted the resignation of 
Katharine F. Lenroot as U.S. representative on 
the Executive Board of the United Nations Inter- 
national Children's Emergency Fund and ap- 
pointed as her successor Martha M. Eliot, M. D., 
Chief of the Children's Bureau of the Federal 
Security Agency.^ 



Corrections 

Bltlletin of Sept. 22, 1952, p. 460, bottom of first 
column, "International Labor Office" should read 
"International Labor Organization." In the same 
issue, p. 464, delete footnote 1. 

Bulletin of Sept. 29, 19.52, p. 491. Third para- 
graph, second line should read : "shipments from the 
United States under intra-European aid." 

In the index to the same issue, the last two items 
in the first column should read : 

Iceland 

MSA allotments for Iceland. 

Immigration 

Executive director of Immigration and Naturaliza- 
tion Commission appointed. 



' For texts of Miss Lenroot's letter of resignation and 
the President's reply, see press release 762 dated Sept. 26. 



October 20, 1952 



619 



Treaty Rights of the United States in Morocco 



INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE RULING OF AUGUST 27, 1952 



hy Joseph M. Sweeney 



The case of the Rights of Nationals of the 
United States of A7nenca in Morocco recently 
decided by the International Court of Justice was 
the first contentious proceeding of the United 
States before the World Court. The litigation 
concerned legislation enacted in the French zone 
of Moi'occo on December 30, 1948, putting into 
effect a system of import controls which pro- 
hibited American nationals from importing into 
Morocco except as permitted by licenses issued by 
the Protectorate. 

The United States contended that the decree 
contravened its treaty rights and thus should not 
have been applied to American importers without 
the prior consent of this Government. France 
denied that the United States had any such treaty 
rights. When the modus vivendi negotiated be- 
tween the parties failed to provide a stable solu- 
tion to the controversy as a result of congressional 
action refusing foreign aid to any nation which, 
in the opinion of the President, failed to comply 
with the treaty rights of the United States,' 
France brought the dispute to the Court. 

Upon notification from the Court of the filing 
by the French Government of the application in- 
stituting the proceedings on October 28, 1950,^ the 
United States appointed as its agent, Adrian S. 
Fisher, Legal Adviser, Department of State. The 
Court, having ascertained the views of both agents 
regarding time limits for the filing of their writ- 
ten pleadings, issued on November 22, 1950, an 
order pursuant to which the French Government 
filed its first written pleading, or memorial, on 
March 1, 1951. 

After the registrar of the Court dii-ected the at- 
tention of the United States to the practice of the 
Court of regarding the pleadings of the parties to 
a case as having a confidential character,the Amer- 



ican agent filed with the Court a request for imme- 
diate release of the documents in the case under 
article 44, paragraph 3, of the rules of court. The 
French Government declined to give its consent, 
and the Court decided that the pleadings of the 
parties should not be made accessible to the public 
befoi'e the termination of the case. 

Before going into the case on the merits by filing 
its counter-memorial, the United States filed on 
June 21, 1951, a preliminary objection under ar- 
ticle 62 of the rules of court, citing the failure of 
the French Government to sjjecify in its pleadings 
whether it was acting on its own behalf or as pro- 
tector of Morocco, or both.^ Following exchanges 
of written observations and a waiver of oral hear- 
ings by the agents, the Court requested the French 
Government on October 4, 1951, to clarify its 
capacity in the case. The French Government 
complied on October 6, 1951, by stating that it was 
acting both on its own behalf and as the protecting 
power of Morocco, and the preliminary objection 
was withdrawn.* 

Pursuant to the order of the Court of October 
31, 1951, the United States filed its counter-memo- 
rial on December 20, 1951. The French Govern- 
ment thereupon filed its reply on February 15, 
1952, and the United States a rejoinder on April 
18, 1952. The public hearings took place at The 
Hague from July 15 to July 26, 1952. The Court 
rendered its decision in the case on August 27, 1952. 

"Economic Liberty Witliout Any Inequality" 

The first point involved in the proceeding was 
the French contention that the decree of December 
30, 1948, did not contravene the economic rights 
of the United States in Morocco. The treaty 
rights of the United States in the matter were 



^ General Appropriations Act for 1951, chap. 11, Title 1. 
2 Bulletin of Dec. 11, 1950, p. 950. 



' lUd., July 30, 1951, p. 179. 
* lUd., Dec. 17, 1951, p. 978. 



620 



Department of State Bulletin 



based on its treaty of September 16, 1836, which 
contained a most-favored-nation clause securing 
for the United States the right to freedom of im- 
ports later granted by Morocco to other nations 
such as Great Britain and Spain. The U.S. treaty 
rights were predicated as well upon the Act of Al- 
geciras of April 7, 1906, an international instru- 
ment including France and Morocco, among other 
parties, and pledging them to "the principle of 
economic liberty without any inequality." 

According to the French argument, neither 
Great Britain nor Spain, nor other nations, 
claimed in Morocco the freedom of imports once 
granted to them by treaties. Hence, the United 
States could not claim such freedom through its 
most-favored-nation clause. As to the Act of Al- 
geciras, the principle of economic liberty without 
inequality was too vague and general to incorpo- 
rate a specific bar against prohibitions of imports. 
Moreover, the issue was really one of enforcement 
of exchange controls. Exchange controls were in 
force in the Fi-ench zone of Morocco with the con- 
sent of the United States, but importers who did 
not request an allocation of foreign exchange from 
the protectorate to finance their operations re- 
mained free to import. The proceeds of these im- 
ports found their way illegally to markets where 
they were converted into dollars and adversely af- 
fected the position of the franc. Control of im- 
ports was, therefore, necessary. Far from being 
prevented from imposing such controls by the Act 
of Algeciras, France had a duty as protecting 
power to impose controls designed to safeguard the 
financial and economic position of Morocco. The 
United States had recognized the responsibility of 
France in the matter by its formal recognition of 
the protectorate and by adhering to modern inter- 
national instruments which reflected a common de- 
sign on the part of the community of nations to 
consider control of exchange and imports as legiti- 
mate measures. 

The U.S. argument attacked the discriminatory 
character of the legislation of December 30, 1948, 
under which French goods were excepted from 
the requirement of an import license and thus from 
the prohibition to import. The United States was 
entitled to an equal position with France by virtue 
of the most-favored-nation clause in its treaty of 
1836. Moreover, the import-control legislation at 
issue was precisely what the framers of the Act 
of Algeciras had intended to prevent, by making 
the principle of economic liberty without any in- 
equality the controlling principle of the Act. 
Commerce with Morocco at the time was free and 
all nations had a right to import freely. As a part 
of its plans for ultimate control of Morocco, 
France was suggesting to the Sultan a reorganiza- 
tion of his customs and finance administration. 
Aware of the implicit threat of elimination of 
their own commercial rights, the other interested 
states had adopted the Act of Algeciras to guard 
against it. Neither the establishment of the pro- 
tectorate, nor its recognition, could be relied upon 



by France in the circumstances to justify a de- 
parture from the commercial rights guaranteed by 
the treaties. 

With respect to the theory that France could, 
irrespective of treaty rights, take any measure 
necessary to protect the financial and economic 
interests of Morocco, there was no support in 
fact or in law for such a position. The evidence 
offered by the French Government did not show 
a correlation between the variations in strength 
of the French franc and the volume of imports 
into Morocco financed without allocation of ex- 
change, either before or after the enactment of 
the decree of December 30, 1948. Moreover, the 
French authorities could have exercised their au- 
thority to stamp out the black markets where the 
proceeds of such free imports were allegedly con- 
verted. Hence the fluctuations in the value of the 
franc afforded no proof of the necessity of con- 
trolling imports upon which the French theory 
was based. As to the law, modern treaties, while 
recognizing import and exchange controls as tem- 
porary exceptions to free trade, showed a policy 
of establishing safeguards designed precisely to 
prevent the parties from asserting a unilateral 
and arbitrary right to their imposition and use 
of such controls. 

The Court ruled unanimously that, in view of 
the circumstances preceding the Act of Algeciras, 
the principle of economic liberty without any in- 
equality in the preamble of the Act was intended 
to be of a binding character and not merely an 
empty phrase. The establishment of the protec- 
torate of France over Morocco had not changed 
the situation. In economic matters France was 
accorded no privileged position in Morocco. The 
provisions of the decree of December 30, 1948, con- 
travened the rights of the United States under the 
Act of Algeciras because they discriminated be- 
tween imports from France and imports from the 
United States, France being exempt from control 
of imports without allocation of currency and the 
United States being subject to such control. The 
same conclusion could be predicated on the right 
of the United States to equality of treatment un- 
der its treaty of 1836. The Court, having decided 
the point on these grounds, considered it unneces- 
sary to pass upon the other grounds on which the 
parties had based their contentions. 

Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 

The next points concerned the French conten- 
tion that the decree of December 30, 1948, was 
applicable to American nationals without the 
prior assent of the United States. The rights 
claimed by the United States in this matter were 
based upon an express provision of its treaty of 
1836 gi'anting extraterritorial jurisdiction to de- 
cide "disputes" arising between American citizens. 
By virtue of the most-favored-nation clause, the 
United States claimed the broader right later 
granted to other nations such as Great Britain 



Ocfofaer 20, 7952 



621 



and Spain to exercise jurisdiction in any case 
where an American national was defendant, irre- 
spective of the nationality of the plaintiff. As a 
corollary of such jurisdiction, the United States 
claimed the right to require that Moroccan legisla- 
tion be submitted for its assent before it could 
become applicable to its nationals. The United 
States was the only state exercising such rights in 
the French zone of Morocco at the time of the 
dispute. 

France argued with respect to the question of 
jurisdiction that the word "dispute" in the treaty 
of ISSfi was confined to civil disputes, and that 
crimes are offenses against the state and not dis- 
putes between private individuals. In addition, 
all other states, including Spain and Great Brit- 
ain, had surrendered their rights of jurisdiction. 
Hence the United States could claim no rights 
of jurisdiction by virtue of the most -favored-na- 
tion clause and could exercise in Morocco only 
the rights of jurisdiction expressly acquired in the 
treaty of 1836. 

On this point, the Court ruled unanimously that 
the word "dispute" cleai-ly covered both civil and 
criminal disputes at the time of the conclusion of 
the treaty, and thus gave to the United States ju- 
risdiction over civil and criminal cases arising be- 
tween its citizens. By a vote of 6 to 5 the Court 
ruled that the claim of the United States to the 
broader rights of jurisdiction granted to Spain 
and Great Britain came to an end with the surren- 
der of such rights by Spain and Great Britain. To 
hold otherwise would be contrary to the intention 
of the most-favored-nation clauseto maintain atall 
times fundamental equality between the countries 
concerned, and there was not sufficient evidence 
to enable the Court to reach a conclusion that the 
United States could justify its claim on an alter- 
nate ground of custom or usage. But the Court 
ruled by 10 to 1 that the United States could con- 
tinue to exercise jurisdiction in civil and criminal 
cases brought against an American national by 
a party other than an American to the extent re- 
quired by the ]irovisions of the Act of Algeciras 
providing for the exercise of this type of juris- 
diction. 

On the corollary point of the right of assent, 
the Court unanimously denied the claim of the 
United States that the application of Moroccan 
laws to its nationals always required its previous 
assent. The claim was linked with the extrater- 
ritorial jurisdiction claimed by the United States 
and subject to the same objections. Moreover, 
there was no provision in any of the treaties in- 
volved conferring upon the United States any such 
right. 

Taxation and Customs Valuation 

The remaining points concerned the question 
of taxation and the question of customs valuation. 
Both issues had been involved in the course of the 
controversy over the application of the import- 



control legislation of December 30, 1948, and were 
submitted to the Court as counterclaims. m 

The United States, while claiming immunity \ 
from taxes for its nationals under the treaties, ex- 
cept as otherwise and specifically provided in such 
treaties, had followed a constant policy of assent- 
ing to the application of Moroccan taxes to its 
nationals, unless they were discriminatory or 
aimed at the system of economic liberty estab- 
lished by the Act of Algeciras. The consumption 
taxes enacted by the protectorate in 1948 affected 
numerous imported products and thus raised a 
question whether they were not calculated to oper- 
ate against imports by evading in effect the maxi- 
mum rate of customs duties on imports of 121/2 
percent presci'ibed by the Act of Algeciras. 

By a vote of 6 to 5 the Court ruled that the fiscal 
immunity granted by treaty to other states could 
not be claimed by the United States once these 
other states had surrendered their fiscal privileges. 
The provisions referring to tax immunity in a 
multilateral agreement such as the Convention of 
Madrid of 1880 merely presupposed the existence 
of the principle of tax immunity without provid- 
ing a new and independent ground for claiming 
it. The Court further rejected, by a vote of 7 to 
4, the claims of the United States with respect to 
the consumption taxes of 1948, since the mere fact 
that it was convenient to collect the consumption 
taxes on imports at the customs did not alter 
their essential character as a tax levied upon all 
goods. 

The question of customs valuation turned upon 
the interpretation to be given of article 95 of 
the Act of Algeciras providing "The ad valorem 
duties shall be liquidated according to the cash 
wholesale value of the merchandise delivered in 
the custom-house and free from customs duties 
and storage dues." According to the French argu- 
ment, this value was the value of the merchandise 
after its passage through the customs and thus 
its value on the local Moroccan market. Accord- 
ing to tlie argument of the United States, this 
value was the value of the merchandise before it 
passed thi'ough tlie customs and thus its value in 
the country of origin plus the expenses necessary 
for transportation to the customs in Morocco. 

In the view of the United States the method 
of vahuition which it supported would avoid the 
possibility of arbitrary and discriminatory prac- 
tices which had given rise to the complaints of 
American importers in 1948. 

By a vote of 6 to 5 the Court ruled that article 
95 laid down no strict rule on the issue in dispute 
and, in view of the past practice, required an in- 
terpretation more flexible than either of those for 
which the two parties contended. The customs 
authorities in the French zone of ]\Iorocco should 
fix the valuation of imported goods for customs 
purposes by taking into account all relevant fac- 
tors, including the value in the country of origin 
and in the market of the French zone. The same 
methods, however, must be applied without dis- 



622 



Department of State Bulletin 



crimination to all importations, regardless of the 
origin of the goods or the nationality of the im- 
porter, and the power to make such valuations 
should be exercised reasonably and in good faith. 

Judges Hackworth (U.S.), Badawai (Egypt), 
Carneiro (Brazil), and Rau (India) dissented in 
a separate opinion from the conclusions of the 
Court on jurisdiction, fiscal immunity, and cus- 
toms valuation. 

As a result of the Court decision, and in view 
of the statutory provisions vesting the ministers 
and consuls of the United States with judicial au- 
thority so far as allowed by treaty, the U.S. Gov- 
ernment notified the French Resident General in 
Morocco on September 12, 1952, that all cases 
pending on August 27, 1952, in its consular court 
in the French zone of Morocco, and not within its 
jurisdiction by the terms of the decision of the 
International Court of Justice, were being dis- 
missed. 

The Court decision is expected to have an im- 
portant effect upon the economic relations between 
Morocco and the United States as well as all other 
parties concerned under the Act of Algeciras. 

• Mr. Sweeney, author of the above article, is 
assistant to the Legal Adviser, Department of 
State. He was counsel to the agent of the United 
States in the proceedings before the International 
Caivrt of Justice. 



Morocco Lifts Restrictions 
on Imports 

Press release 776 dated October 3 

In its opinion of August ^7, 1952, in the case 
between France and the United States to deter- 
mine the nature and extent of U. S. treaty rights 
in Morocco, the International Co^irt of Justice at 
The Hague, among other things, ruled that a 
Moroccan decree of December 30, 1948, putting 
into effect import license requirements on imports 
from all monetary zones including the United 
States but not on imports from France and the 
franc area, contravened the treaty nghts of the^ 
United States in Morocco because it discriminated 
between imports from France and imports from 
the United States. 

The French Resident General at Rabat, Moroc- 
co, in a note delivered to the American Charge 
d ''Affaires at Tangier on October 2, 1952, set forth 
the action which the French Protectorate Govern- 
ment is taking to iinplem.ent the decision of the 
International Court of Justice regarding import 
controls in the French zone of Morocco. The text 
of the note is as follows: 



After consultation with representatives of 
elected bodies in Morocco and examination of the 
question by the competent administrations in Ra- 
bat and Paris, a series of measures designed to 
give full effect to the provisions of the judgment 
of August 27, 1952 of the International Court of 
Justice with respect to imports into Morocco has 
just been adopted. 

The principal characteristics of the new import 
regime which has just been established at Rabat are 
the following: 

The Residential decrees of March 11, 1948 and 
December 30, 1918 as well as all of the texts in 
application thereof are rescinded. 

As a result of this fact and as a general rule, all 
merchandise regardless of origin and source, ac- 
quired without an official allocation of foreign 
exchange, can be imported without authorization. 
This decision applies equally to imports of goods 
from outside of the franc area and goods originat- 
ing within the franc area. Consequently, both 
categories of imports will benefit from the same 
exemption. Thus, the principles established by 
the Act of Algeciras and referred to by the Hague 
Court are being rigorously observed. The pi-es- 
ent pi'ocedures followed by the Moroccan adminis- 
tration in allocating foreign exchange for the pay- 
ment of merchandise essential to the country 
remain in effect notwithstanding the lifting of 
controls on imports without exchange. 

As concerns the imports of certain merchandise 
regardless of origin (principally arms, narcotics, 
wines, cereals and their derivatives, oleaginous 
products), restrictions remain in effect. If in 
the future similar measures become necessary for 
other merchandise as a result of changes in the 
economic and social situation in Morocco, such 
measures likewise shall not be discriminatory in 
any way regardless of the exporting country. 

Since experience has shown that imports with- 
out allocation of exchange often give rise to illegal 
purchase of foreign exchange which are detri- 
mental to the currency, appropriate provisions 
make it possible to assure that such operations con- 
form to exchange control legislation. As a coun- 
teriDart to the lifting of restrictions on imports not 
requiring an official allocation of foreign ex- 
change, importers carrying out such operations 
are obliged, when so requested by competent au- 
thorities, to describe the use of funds from the sale 
or utilization of imported merchandise. 

Regarding economic relations between the In- 
ternational Zone of Tangier and the French Zone 
of Morocco, certain new provisions are envisaged. 

This series of measures, compatible with the in- 
terests of the Moroccan economy, will make it pos- 
sible for all to participate in the development of 
this economy under conditions of liberty which 
conform to the spirit of equality of the General 
Act of Algeciras. 



Oc/ober 20, 7952 



623 



Iran Willing To Begin Negotiations 
If U. K. Pays 20 Million Pounds 

Press release 787 dated October 8 

The Iranian Prime Minister to Secretary Acheson 

Following is an English translation of a letter 
addressed to Secretary Acheson from the Prime 
Minister of Iran, delivered to Ambassador Loy W. 
Henderson at Tehran on Octoher 7, together with 
a translation of the enclosure, a letter of the same 
date from Dr. Mossadegh to Foreign Secretary 
Anthony Eden: 

I have received the reply to my counterproposals 
which was sent on behalf of His Excellency, the 
President of the United States of America, 
through the Honorable, the American Ambassador 
in Tehran.^ 

I have gratefully examined the explanations 
which were furnished with a view to removing 
the ambiguity of the joint message dated August 
30, 1952 (Shahriva 8, 1331). I am most grateful 
for the efforts exerted by the respected authority 
of Your Excellency's Government toward the set- 
tlement of current disputes. However, as to the 
statement that "he is disappointed to learn from 
it that you have found unacceptable the proposals 
which were put forward on August 30, 1952," I 
think that in my counterproposals dated Septem- 
ber 24, 1952, the reasons for the nonacceptance of 
the joint message were sufficiently explained. It 
is possible that His Excellency, the President, does 
not remember that 19 months have elapsed since 
the date of the nationalization of the oil industry 
throughout Iran, while in the meantime nothing 
useful has been accomplished toward this element 
of differences, and the question of determination 
of compensation has been entirely left to corre- 
spondence and procrastination. 

The Iranian Government and nation have every 
day been faced with new social and economic diffi- 
culties arising from the economic blockade of Her 
Britannic Majesty's Government. 

The greatest good will was shown and maximum 
possible concessions for the settlement of this 
question were made in my counterproposals. In 
order that this good will and earnest desire to 
bring this matter to an end may even more be 
fully evinced, I have, in reply to the message from 
His Excellency, Mr. Eden, Her Britannic Majes- 
ty's Foreign Secretary, made a proposal, a copy 
of which is enclosed for Your Excellency's infor- 
mation, to the effect that plenipotentiary repre- 
sentatives of the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Com- 



' For text of Dr. Mossadegh's counterproposals of Sept. 
24, see Bulletin of Oct. 6, 19.52, p. 5S2; for Secretary 
Acheson's reply of Oct. 5, see iUd., Oct. 13, 1952, p. 569 ; 
for the joint U. S.-U. K. proposals to Iran, see ihid., Sept. 
8, 1952, p. 360. 



pany be sent to Tehran to discuss the terms of the 
counterproposals dated September 24, 1952. With 
a view to alleviating the economic and financial 
situation of Iran, and also in order that the former 
company may provide a token for the fulfillment 
of obligations assumed by it in the past, it has 
been added to the said proposal that prior to the 
departure of the plenipotentiary representatives 
of the company, which will be one week from this 
date, it should place at the disposal of the Imperial 
Ministry of Finance a sum of 20 million pounds 
sterling on account convertible into dollars (out 
of the 49 million pounds), and arrange for the 
payment of the balance thereof upon the termina- 
tion of negotiations which are anticipated to last 
3 weeks. 

It is not necessary to explain that during the 
last year and a half the Iranian Government and 
nation have suffered huge losses as a result of pro- 
crastination and exchange of notes and corre- 
spondence, in such a way that no fair-minded and 
unbiased individual would hold the Iranian Gov- 
ernment and nation responsible for any sinister 
consequence and unfortunate development which 
may result from the maintenance of this policy. 

I wish to invite Your Excellency's careful per- 
sonal attention to the serious and basic implica- 
tion of the preceding sentence and to existing con- 
ditions. I am certain you will agree that the 
prompt and immediate settlement of this matter 
would be a great and important contribution to- 
ward insuring the peace and public security of one 
of the sensitive areas of the world. 

I request you to convey to His Excellency, the 
President, the expression of my highest considera- 
tion and to accept my sincere appreciation of the 
efforts he has exerted and is still exerting to find a 
solution for the existing differences. 

Dr. Mohammad Mosadeq, 

Prime Minister. 

Octoher 7, 1952 
(Mehrmah 15, 1331) 



The Iranian Prime Minister to the British Foreign 
Secretary 

Your note dated 5 October 1952 ^ which recog- 
nized in its entirety the action of the Iranian Gov- 
ernment in nationalizing its oil industry, and 
stated that it did not intend to revive the invalid 
1933 concession agreement, nor to interfere in the 
administration of the Iranian oil industry and 
recognized the Iranian Government's freedom to 
sell its oil products was handed to me by the Brit- 
ish Charge d'Affaires in Tehran. 

With due regard to the fact that the contents 

^ Not printed. Mr. Eden's note to Dr. Mossadegh was 
similar in content to that sent by Secretary Acheson on 
the same date. 



624 



Department of State Bulletin 



of the message in question in the parts mentioned 
above are in accordance with the indisputable 
rights of the Iranian nation, I take cognizance 
of the foregoing and at the same time regret that 
in this message, which was in answer to my mes- 
sage of 2 Mehr 1331 (24 September 1952), you 
did not make any reference to tlie counterpro- 
posals dated 2 Mehr 1331 (24 September 1952). 
I find it necessary to inform you again that the 
object of my counterproposals was to avoid wast- 
ing time and to find an equitable way of investi- 
gating tlie claims of the former oil company and 
the counterclaims of the Iranian Government. 

Now I once again with the same object in view 
declare my readiness for discussion and settlement 
of this question. In order that the dispute may 
be definitely and clearly disposed of as soon as pos- 
sible, representatives of the former Aioc [Anglo- 
Iranian Oil Company], in\«sted with full powers, 
are invited to leave for Tehran within a week as 
from today's date, for the purpose of necessary 
discussions within the limits of the Iranian Gov- 
ernment's counterproposals. Taking into consid- 
eration the several years delay by the former com- 
pany in paying its debts to the Iranian Govern- 
ment and also the Iranian Government's need for 
immediate aid, before the departure of its repre- 
sentatives for Iran the former oil company should 
put at the disposal of the Iranian Ministry of 
Finance the sum of 20 million pounds convertible 
into dollars, out of the 49 million pounds men- 
tioned in Article 4 of my counterproposals dated 
the 2nd Mehr 1331 (24 September 1952). The 
remainder of the above-mentioned sum should be 
placed to the credit of the Iranian Government 
at the end of negotiations, for which a maximum 
period of 3 weeks is envisaged. 

In conclusion it is expected that the complete 
good will of the Iranian Government toward a 
just solution of differences which has been reaf- 
firmed in this note, will be well received and made 
use of. Your Excellency's attention is particu- 
larly drawn to the point that the Iranian Gov- 
ernment has always indicated the serious conse- 
quences of procrastination and delay in reaching 
agreed and definitive solution of the differences. 
I once again remind you of the impossibility of 
the continuation of this state of affairs and any 
eventuality arising from pursuit of this policy is 
not tlie responsibility of the Iranian Government. 

Dl-. MOH.^MMAD MOSADEQ, 

Prime Minister. 
IJ) Mehr 1331. 



U.S. Charge d'Affaires 
Visits William Oatis 

Press Conference Statement by Secretary Acheson 

Press release 785 dated October 8 

I wish to tell you that our charge d'affaires at 
Prague, Nat B. King, visited William Oatis yester- 
day at Prague Police Headquarters. The Em- 
bassy's telegram on the meeting indicated that Mr. 
Oatis appeared in about the same physical and 
mental condition as when he was last seen by Am- 
bassador Briggs. Oatis said he had not been in 
ill health and medical and dental care were avail- 
able when necessary. He was permitted to read 
and write and had adequate exercise. He was 
benefiting from the funds deposited to his account 
by the Embassy for cigarettes and articles of com- 
fort. He replied in the negative to the question 
whether the Embassy could supply any sjjecific 
items such as cigarettes, clothing, or extra food. 
He said he had received the volume of Shakespeare 
and books on harmony and composition which had 
been sent him ( as he requested in his meeting with 
Ambassador Briggs on April 30) and asked to 
thank Ambassador Briggs for them. He expressed 
a desire for books on the technical side of play pro- 
duction in New York, on musical instruments and 
their capabilities, on forms of musical composi- 
tion, and on geology, meteorology, or other fields 
of natural science. These books will be provided 
and it is expected that they will be transmitted to 
him through the Czechoslovak Foreign Office as 
before. 

The charge d'affaires conveyed messages to 
Oatis from his wife and received messages for her. 
The regard and assurances of Ambassador Briggs 
were communicated. Mr. King said that Ambas- 
sador and Mrs. Briggs had seen Mrs. Oatis in 
June and that she was well and waiting for him. 
He inquired about the health of other members 
of his family. Mr. King informed Oatis of a spe- 
cial citation to be awarded him this month by 
DePauw University in a ceremony honoring a 
number of outstanding alumni. Oatis expressed 
his appreciation for the messages and informa- 
tion. He said that he was glad to see Mr. King and 
hoped to be able to see him more often. The 
charge d'affaires reiterated with emphasis that 
Oatis had not been foi-gotten and that efforts to 
obtain his release were continuing and would con- 
tinue unabated. 

The Undersecretary called Mrs. Oatis as soon 
as this telegram was received and informed her of 
the report. 



Ocfober 20, 7952 



625 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



Demilitarization of Jammu and KasFimir 



FOURTH REPORT BY FRANK P. GRAHAM, U. N. REPRESENTATIVE 
FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN 



U.N. doc. S/27S3 
Dated Sept. 19, 1952 

[Excerpts] 

In accordance with his letters of 29 May and 30 July 
1952 to the President of the Security Council ' the United 
Nations Representative for India and Pakistan wishes to 
inform the Security Council (a) regarding negotiations 
carried out in agreement with the Governments of India 
and Pakistan from 29 May to 16 July 1952 in New York, 
and (b) regarding the Conference held at Ministerial 
Level from 26 August to 10 September 1952 in Geneva. 

This report should be read in connexion with the first, 
second and third reports of the United Nations Repre- 
sentative.^ 

This report is divided into three parts. Part I deals 
with the negotiations held in New York in United Na- 
tions Headquarters from 29 May to 16 July 1952. Part 
II deals with the Conference held in Geneva in the Euro- 
pean OflBce of the United Nations, from 26 August to 10 
September 1952. Part III sets forth certain conclusions. 



CONFERENCE IN GENEVA FROM 
26 AUGUST TO 10 SEPTEMBER 1952 

The Conference took place in the European OflBce of 
the United Nations in Geneva from 26 August to 10 Sep- 
tember 1952. 

The delegations of India and Pakistan were composed 
as follows : 



India: Mr. Gopalaswaml Ay- Leader 
yangar, Minister for De- 
fence, Leader of the Upper 
House 



' U.N. docs. S/2649 and S/2727. 

' For excerpts from Mr. Graham's previous reiwrts to 
the Security Council, see Bulletin of Nov. 5, 1951, p. 738; 
Jan. 14, 1952, p. 52 ; and May 5, 1952, p. 712. 



Mr. D. P. Dhar, Deputy Minis- 
ter, Government of Jammu 
and Kashmir 

Major General K. S. Thimayya 

Mr. V. Shankar, Joint Secre- 
tary, Ministry of Defence 

Mr. B. L. Sharma, Principal In- 
formation OflScer 

Pakistan: Sir Mohammad Zaf- 
rulla Khan, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs 

Mr. M. Ayub 

Major General K. M. Sheikh 

Brigadier Altaf Quadir 

Lt. Colonel M. Iqbal Khan 



Adviser 



Military Adviser 
Adviser 

Adviser 

Leader 



Secretary -General 
Senior Military Adviser 
Adviser 
Adviser 



Revised Proposals of 16 July and 2 September 1952 

The Conference may be divided into two different 
stages. The first stage began with the opening state- 
ment by the United Nations Representative' and the sub- 
sequent discussion of the revised proposals.* Paragraph 
7 of these proposals suggested brackets of 3,000 to 6,000 
armed forces on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line 
and an Indian army force of 12,000 to 18,000 on the In- 
dian side of the cease-fire line. Tlie United Nations Rep- 
resentative suggested that an effort be made to reach 
agreement within these brackets, on the number of forces 
to remain on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of 
the period of demilitarization. Joint meetings and sep- 
arate conversations took place at the representative and 
advisory level. 

As a result of these meetin.ns and conversations, in a 
joint meeting on 2 September the United Nations Rep- 



' Annex IV (Not printed here). 
'Annex HI (Not printed here). 



626 



Department of State Bulletin 



resentative submitted a new draft of his proposals' sug- 
gesting in paragrapli 7 A (iii) and B (ii) a minimum 
force of 6,000 on the Paltistan side of the cease-fire line 
and of 18,000 on the Indian side. The United Nations 
Representative made it clear that in this draft, as in the 
draft of 16 July 1952, these figiires did not include the 
Gllgit and Northern Scouts on the Pakistan side of the 
cease-fire line, and the State militia on the Indian side of 
the cease-fire line. 

In addition to suggesting definite minimum figures, this 
draft, in a provisional clause attempted to accommodate 
the concern expressed during the conversations that the 
agreement should not come into effect until the programme 
(schedule) of demilitarization had been agreed upon in a 
subsequent meeting between Representatives of India and 
Pakistan and approved by the two Governments. 

On 3 September it appeared that no agreement could be 
secured on the basis of the figures proposed, either within 
the brackets suggested for discussion in the 16 July 1952 
proposals, or on definite numbers as in the 2 September 
1952 proposals. 

The position of the Two Governments on the main issues 
as stated by their Representatives was set forth in memo- 
randa submitted to the United Nations Representative 
(see Annexes V and VI)' and can be summarized as 
follows : 

A. Character and quantwin of forces to remain on, 
each side of the cease-fire line 

The character and quantum of forces should be con- 
sidered in connexion with paragraphs 7 A (iii) and B (ii) 
and paragrai)h 11 of the revised proposals submitted by 
the United Nations Representative to the Governments of 
India and Pakistan on 16 July and 2 September 1952. 

Position of India 

(a) On the Indian side of the cease-fire line 

(i) The Government of India maintain that they are 
constitutionally responsible for the defence of the State of 
Jammu and Kashmir which includes aid to the civil power ; 
(ii) According to paragraph 4 (a) of part II of the 
Uncip [United Nations Commission for India and Pakis- 
tan] resolution of 13 August 1948,' the Government of 
India must have the minimum forces required to assist the 
local authorities i.e. the Government of Jammu and Kash- 
mir, on the Indian side of the cease-fire line, in the mainte- 
nance of law and order. India considers that Uncip itself 
interpreted this to include adequate defence. Under para- 
graph 4 (a) of the Uncip resolution of 5 January 1949' 
the disposal of Indian and State armed forces on the In- 
dian side of the cease-fire line has to be with due regard to 
security, \^iiich, according to the Government of India has 
a wider significance than law and order. 

( iii) Having regard to these commitments of internal 
and external security, the responsibilities imder the cease- 
fire agreement and the fact that Pakistan would be free 



'Annex VII (See below). 
' Not printed here. 
' U.N. doc. S/1100. 
' U. N. doc. S/1196. 

October 20, 1952 



to locate its forces as it likes within its own borders, which 
for some length are common with the borders of the 
Jammu and Kashmir State and for a still greater length 
within practically striking distance of the cease-fire line 
and important areas of the Jammu and Kashmir State, the 
Government of India consider that a minimum force of 
28,000 is required. 

(iv) However, on complete disbandment and disarma- 
ment of the Azad Kashmir forces and as a further gesture 
towards a settlement they are prepared to effect a further 
reduction of 7,000 but it is impossible to reduce this abso- 
lute minimum figure of 21,000. The Government of India 
will under no circumstances he prepared to include the 
militia in these calculations. The militia is a special armed 
police force which is under the administration of the 
Jammu and Kashmir Government for its normal law and 
order responsibilities and is only temporarily, for the pe- 
riod of emergency, under the operational control of the 
Indian Army. 

(b) On the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line 

(i) The Government of India maintains that the ad- 
ministration of this area would, under para. 3 of Part II 
of the Resolution of 13 August 1949 [1948], vest in local 
authorities to be established or recognized for the purpose ; 
to these local authorities under the same resolution only 
local administrative functions have been assigned. In the 
very nature of things such authorities can be in charge 
only of local law and order whether in the area or with 
reference to the cease-fire line. To give them any armed 
force equivalent to troops would not be consistent either 
with their status or with their functions and would be a 
violation of the sovereignty of the Union of India and the 
Jammu and Kashmir State. In the very nature of things, 
therefore, these local authorities can be entrusted only 
with a civil armed force. 

(ii) The Government of India consider that a civil 
armed force of 4,000 would be on the liberal side consider- 
ing the pre-aggression strength of forces policing this area. 
However, they would be prepared to consider an appro- 
priate increase to provide for the needs of the Northern 
areas or should the United Nations Representative, under 
whose surveillance these forces would be operating, make 
out a case that this strength is inadequate. 

(iii) Having regard to the functions these forces are 
to discharge and the conditions of a fair and impartial 
plebiscite, these forces should consist of an equal propor- 
tion of Azad Kashmir and other elements. The Govern- 
ment of India would be prepared to agree to a suitable re- 
adjustment of the armed and unarmed portion of this 
force. 

(iv) The civil armed force should be under neutral 
and local officers. 

Position of Pakistan 

(i) The Government of Pakistan maintain that secu- 
rity on each side of the cease-fire line has to be ensured 
and neither side should be able to steal a march against 
the other, but the over-riding consideration is that neither 
India nor Pakistan should be placed in a position to in- 
timidate the population and influence their vote in the 
plebiscite. India cannot be the sole judge of the steps 

627 



needed to ensure the security of the State. During the 
plebiscite stage, the United Nations Representative and 
the Plebiscite Administrator, in accordance with the 5 
January 1949 resolution, have the right to determine, in 
consultation with the authorities concerned, the final dis- 
posal of all the forces remaining in the State of Jammu 
and Kashmir, "such disposal to be with due regard to 
the Security of the State and the freedom of the plebis- 
cite." 

(ii) The Government of Pakistan consider that after 
the processes outlined in clause 7 of the United Nations 
Representative's proposals of 16 July 1952 have been car- 
ried out, there should remain on each side of the cease- 
fire line only the minimum forces necessary for the 
maintenance of law and order and the preservation of 
the cease-fire line. The character of the forces must be 
the same on both sides of the cease-fire line. 

(ill) In regard to the figures established by the United 
Nations Representative in clause 7 of his proposals of 2 
September 1052 the Government of Pakistan consider 
that it leaves too many soldiers in the State. Before 
partition, they add, the Maharaja's Government managed 
with less than a quarter of the forces suggested by the 
United Nations Representative — 8,000 as against 33,500.' 
The ratio of the forces proposed is also unfair to Pakis- 
tan considering the ratio on the date of the cease-fire." 

(iv) Subject to these observations, the Pakistan dele- 
gation was prepared to accept the proposals of 2 Septem- 
ber 1952 of the United Nations Representative. 

B. Final disposal of forces 

Connected with the character and quantum of forces 
is the question of the functions and responsibilities of 
the United Nations Representative and the Plebiscite Ad- 
ministrator with regard to the final disposal of forces as 
set out in paragraph 4(a) and (b) of the Uncip resolu- 
tion of 5 January 1949. 

Position of India 

The Government of India contend that the term final dis- 
posal in paragraph 4(a) of the resolution of 5 January 
1949 means only disposition. Moreover, once it is ac- 
cepted in principle that the demilitarization contemplated 
under the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 
1949, should be effected in a single continuous process, no 
interference with the strength of forces in the State is 
possible at the plebiscite stage. Furthermore, if the 
matter of the reduction or withdrawal of forces at the 
plebiscite stage (according to the Pakistan Government's 
interpretation of 4(a) and (b) of the resolution of 5 Janu- 
ary 1949) is brought into the demilitarization stage, the 
process of demilitarization must be deemed to have ex- 
hausted itself and the United Nations Representative and 



'This figure includes 18,000 Indian and State armed 
forces plus 6,000 State Militia on the Indian side and 
6,000 armed forces plus 3,500 Gilgit and Northern Scouts 
on the Pakistan side. 

"India estimates that at the time of the cease-fire 
she had 130,000 troops in the State. Pakistan estimates 
that at the same time she bad 81,000 troops in the State. 

628 



the Plebiscite Administrator can in the plebiscite stage 
deal only with the question of disposition. 

Position of Pakistan 

The Government of Pakistan maintain that the term 
"final disposal" covers reduction by withdrawal or dis- 
bandment as well as location or stationing of the armed 
forces concerned. If it is contended that "final dis- 
posal" means only the location or stationing of the forces 
then there is by the same token no provision in the Uncip 
resolutions for the reduction or disbandment of the Azad 
Kashmir forces. 

C. Induction Into Office of the Pleiiscite Admin- 
istrator 

Position of India 

The Government of India's view is that the Plebiscite 
Administrator can properly function only after (i) the 
process of demilitarization is completed and the United 
Nations Representative is satisfied that peaceful condi- 
tions have been restored and (ii) the local authorities 
are recognized and are functioning on the Pakistan side 
of the cease-fire line under the surveillance of the United 
Nations Representative. In the interests of agreement, 
however, the Government of India would be prepared to 
agree to his induction on the last day of the period of 
demilitarization provided that it is completed according 
to plan and is exhaustive so that the Plebiscite Admini- 
strator would, as regards the forces remaining in the 
State after demilitarization is fully implemented, be con- 
cerned only with their disposition. 

Position of Pakistan 

Under the Uncip resolution of 5 January 1949, the Plebi- 
scite Administrator has to be inducted into ofiice as soon 
as the tribesmen, Pakistan volunteers and the Pakistan 
army and the bulk of the Indian army have withdrawn. 
The proposal of the United Nations Representative that 
the Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed not later 
than the last day of the demilitarization programme 
represents in the opinion of the Government of Pakistan 
a big concession to the Indian point of view. Neverthe- 
less, Pakistan is prepared to accept it as part of the 
twelve truce proposals suggested by the United Nations 
Representative. 

Draft Proposals of 4 September 1952 

The second stage of the Conference began on 4 Sep- 
tember 1952. The United Nations Representative was 
faced with the objections of the two Governments to essen- 
tial parts of his proposals as revised on 16 July and 2 
September. As he had stated before, these' objections 
derived mainly from the different conceptions that the 
Governments of India and Pakistan had of their status in 
the State of Jammu and Kashmir," as well as the differ- 
ent interpretations that they give to the Uncip resolu- 
tions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. As it was not 



" For a summary of these conceptions, see Mr. Graham's 
first report (U. N. doc. S/2375, paragraphs 33-35 inclusive; 
Bulletin of Nov. 5, 1951, p. 739) . 

Department of State Bulletin 



possible under the circumstances to secure agreement on 
the minimum forces to be left on each side of the cease- 
fire line, the Representative thought it might be possible 
for the two Governments to agree on some principles 
based on the requirements of each side of the cease-fire 
line. These principles could then serve as the criteria for 
fixing the quantum of forces in the Conference of civil and 
military representatives contemplated in the provisional 
clause of the revised proposals of 2 September. 

The United Nations Representative accordingly sub- 
mitted a new draft proposal " in a joint meeting on 4 
September 1952. Paragraph 7 of these proposals reads as 
follows : 

"Agree that the demilitarization shall be carried out in 
such a way that at the end of the period referred to in 
paragraph 6 above the situation will be : 

A. On the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line: 

(i) the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally 
resident therein who had entered the State for the pur- 
pose of fighting will have been withdrawn ; 

(ii) the Pakistan troops will have been withdrawn from 
the State; 

(iii) large-scale disbanding and disarmament of the 
Azad Kashmir forces will have taken place ; so that at 
the end of the period of demilitarization there shall be 
the minimum number of forces that are required for the 
maintenance of law and order and of the cease-fire agree- 
ment with due regard to the freedom of the plebiscite ; 

B. On the Indian side of the cease-fire line: 

(i) the bulk of the Indian forces in the State will have 
been withdrawn ; 

(ii) further withdrawals or reductions, as the case may 
be, of the Indian and State armed forces remaining in 
the State after the completion of the operation referred 
to in B (i) above will have been carried out; so that at 
the end of the period of demilitarization there shall be the 
minimum number of Indian forces fjnd State armed forces 
that are required for the maintenance of law and order 
and the cease-fire agreement, with due regard to the se- 
curity of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite." 

The responses of the representatives of India and Pakis- 
tan were as follows : 

Position of India * 

The Government of India, consider that "the principles 
enumerated in j)aragraphsv 7 A (iii) and B (ii) of the 
proposals of 4 September 1952 were conceived in the 
right spirit having regard to the two Uncip resolutions. 
As a basis for the evolution of a suitable definition of 
functions of forces on both sides of the cease-fire line 
they contained the germs of a settlement." The Gov- 
ernment of India maintain that they cannot accept any 
equation of their responsibilities with the local author- 
ities on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line or agree 
to anything more than a local character to the mainte- 
nance of public order in that area by the local authorities. 
Constitutionally the defence of the entire State of Jammu 
and Kashmir is the concern of the Government of India 
and they alone are entitled to maintain a military armed 
force for the purpose. India maintains that this is the 
only position consistent with the assurance given by the 
Commission and the practice observed hitherto by the 
United Nations authorities of giving recognition to the 



sovereignty of the Indian Union and the State which de- 
rived originally from the Instrument of Accession and has 
since been embodied in the Constitution of India. 

Position of Pakistan 

Tlie Government of Pakistan fully agreed with the 
United Nations Representative that every effort should 
be made at the Geneva Conference itself to agree on the 
number and character of forces which should remain on 
each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the de- 
militarization programme. Failing this, the Conference 
should at least agree on the guiding principles for de- 
termining the number and character of forces. The 
Pakistan delegation felt that the words "with due regard 
to the freedom of the plebiscite" used in sub-clause 7 A 
(iii) and the phrase "with due regard to the security 
of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite" used in 
sub-clause 7 B (ii) of the draft proposals should be 
deleted. The object of this amendment was to avoid the 
recurrence in the Military Sub-Committee of the political 
controversies which had held up progress in the main 
Conference itself. If this proposal had been accepted, 
Pakistan would not have insisted on further reduction 
of forces under paragraph 4(a) and (b) of the 5 January 
1949 resolution, and would have been satisfied with the 
disposition of all remaining forces by the United Nations 
Representatives and the Plebiscite Administrator, in con- 
sultation with the respective authorities, and with due 
regard to the security of the State and the freedom of 
the plebiscite. 

Subject to the above observations, and some drafting 
changes, the Pakistan delegation was prepared to accept 
the United Nations Representative's draft proposals of 4 
September 1952. 

The revised proposals of 4 September were agreed uixm 
by the Representatives of India and Pakistan to the fol- 
lowing extent: 

(i) Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 A (i) and (ii),7B (1), 
8, 9, 10, 12 and the provisional clause ; with the redrafting 
of paragraphs 5, 6 and 9 as follows : 

"5. Agree that the demilitarization of Jammu and 
Kashmir contemplated in the United Nations resolutions 
of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 shall be effected 
in a single continuous process ; 

"6. Agree that this process of demilitarization shall 
be completed during a period of 90 days, starting from 
the date on which the programme of demilitarization 
referred to in paragraph 7 below is approved by the 
Governments of India and Pakistan, unless another period 
is decided upon by the two Governments. 

"9. Agree that pending a final solution the territory 
evacuated by Pakistan troops will be administered by the 
local authorities under the surveillance of the United 
Nations. Effect shall be given to this by the time the 
process of demilitarization mentioned in paragraph 6 has 
been completed on both sides of the cease-fire line." 

(ii) Concerning paragraph 12 the Representative of 
India accepted it with the understanding that the differ- 
ences referred to the United Nations Representative should 
be only on technical details referring to the actual imple- 
mentation of the agreed programme." 

(iii) In regard to paragraphs 7 A (ill) and 7 B (ii) 



"Annex VIII (see below). 
Ocfober 20, 1952 



" See also U.N. doc. S/2448, paragraph 28. 



629 



the remaining difference in position of the Representatives 
has been stated in paragraph 25. 

(Iv) Paragraph 11 of the proposals was deleted to be 
substituted with another one to be agreed uijon by the 
two Representatives, connected with the definite wording 
of paragraph 7 and with the functions and responsibilities 
of the United Nations Representative and the Plebiscite 
Administrator in accordance with paragraph 4 (a) and 
(b) of the Uncip resolution of 5 January 1949. 



111. CONCLUSIONS 

In his third report, submitted on 22 April 1952, the 
United Nations Representative recommended " that the 
negotiations with the Governments of India and Pakistan 
be continued with a view to : 

"(a) Resolving the remaining differences on the twelve 
proposals, with a special reference to the quantum of 
forces to be left on each side of tlie cease-fire line at the 
end of the period of demilitarization, and 

"(b) The general implementation of the resolutions of 
Uncip of 1.S August 1948 and 5 January 1949." 

The agenda of the Geneva Conference was the imple- 
mentation of the Uncip resolutions of 13 August 1948 
and 5 January 1949. The meetings began with the ex- 
amination of the revised draft proposals of 16 July 1952 
and continued with discussion of the subsequent redrafts. 

After two weeks of discussion it was evident that 
agreement could not be reached at this Conference on 
any of the revised drafts presented for consideration. 
The positions of the two Governments on the main issues 
were such that the contemplated examination of the 
resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, resolu- 
tion by resolution and paragraph by paragraph, did not 
appear to be a useful further line of approach. The 
possibility envisaged by the United Nations Representa- 
tive, in his statement of 16 July 19.52," of discussion of 
any further suggestions that the representatives of the 
two Governments might wish to make did not arise during 
the Conference and no alternative suggestions were made. 

The United Nations Representative, on his part, has 
limited himself to carry out his mediatory functions under 
the terms of reference " given him by the Security Council. 

The Security Council is familiar with the dispute be- 
tween India and Pakistan on the State of Jammu and 
Kashmir. It has been before the Security Council since 
January 1948. The present positions of the two Govern- 
ments are derived from their differing conception of their 
status in the State. This more than anything else is the 
origin of their different interpretations with regard to 
their commitments. 

These conceptions have been stated repeatedly by both 
Governments during the discussions in the Security Coun- 
cil and during the negotiations with the Uncip, with Gen- 



eral A. G. L. McNaughton and with Sir Owen Dixon. 

Growing out of the basic difference in the interpretation 
of the two Governments regarding their status and com- 
mitments under the 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 
resolutions of the Uncip, is their difference over the char- 
acter and number of forces to be left on each side of the 
cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization. 

Demilitarization, as a condition for the induction into 
office of the Plebiscite Administrator," is but one of the 
Important steps necessary in the preparation for the pleb- 
iscite. 

The heart of the integrated programme for demilitariza- 
tion and the plebiscite, is the induction into oflBce of the 
Plebiscite Administrator. This was made a central part 
of the twelve proposals," original and revised. 

The preparations for, and the holding of, the plebiscite 
follow upon the induction into office of the Plebiscite Ad- 
ministrator. His induction into office follows upon the 
solution of the crucial problem of the character and num- 
ber of forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line 
at the end of the period of demilitarization. For the solu- 
tion of this problem the United Nations Representative, 
after submitting brackets of figures within which discus- 
sion might proceed, later suggested to the parties in the 
Geneva Conference definite figures. Then, alternatively, 
he suggested criteria for establishing definite figures on 
the basis of the functions and requirements on each side 
of the cease-fire line. 

The present Representative has been instructed to se- 
cure an agreement on a plan of demilitarization under the 
two resolutions, and, in case of no agreement, to report 
the remaining differences thereon to the Council. He has 
made three reports to the Council which have narrowed 
the problem down to what appears to be the prerequisite 
for an agreement on a plan of demilitarization, namely, 
agreement on the number and character of forces to re- 
main on each side of tlie cease-fire line at the end of the 
period of demilitarization. 

The representative holds the view that for reaching an 
agreement on a plan of demilitarization it is necessary 
either : 

(a ) to establish the character and number of forces to be 
left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the 
period of demilitarization; or 

(b) to declare that the forces to remain on each side of 
the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitariza- 
tion should be determined in accordance with the require- 
ments of each area, and, accordingly, principles or criteria 
should be established which would serve as guidance for 
the civil and military representatives of the Governments 
of India and Pakistan in the meeting contemplated in the 
Provisional Clause of the revised proposals. 



' Bui.LETiN of May 5, 19.52, p. 713. 
'Annex II (not printed here). 
■ Bulletin of Nov. 5, 1951, p. 7,'i8. 



" Admiral Chester Nimitz has been designated for this 
position. 

" For text of Mr. Graham's original 12 propo.sals and 
of his Oct. 18, 1951 statement before the Security Council 
analyzing them, see Bulletin of Nov. 5, 1951, p. 740. 



630 



Department of State Bulletin 



ANNEX VII 

2 September 1952 
Proposal of United Nations Representative based 
upon his twelve proposals 

The Oorernments of India and of Pakistan 

1. Reaffirm their determination not to resort to force 
and to adliere to peaceful procedures and specifically 
pledge themselves that they will not commit aggression 
or make war. the one against the other, with regard to the 
question of .Tammu and Kashmir ; 

2. Agree that each Government, on its part, will instruct 
its official spokesmen and will urge all Its citizens, or- 
ganizations, publications and radio stations not to make 
warlike statements or statements calculated to incite 
the people of either nation to make war against the other 
with regard to the question of Jammu and Kashmir ; 

3. Reaffirm their will to observe the cease-fire effective 
from 1 January 1949 and the Karachi Agreement of 27 
July 1949 ; 

4. Reaffirm their acceptance of the principle that the 
question of the accession of the State of Jammu and 
Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through 
the democratic method of a free and impartial plebi- 
scite under the auspices of the United Nations ; 

5. Agree that subject to the provisions of paragraph 11 
below the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and 
Kashmir contemplated in the Uncip resolutions of 13 
August 1948 and 5 January 1949 shall be effected in a sin- 
gle, continuous process; 

6. Agree that this process of demilitarization shall be 
completed during a period of 90 days, starting from the 
date of the entrance into effect of this agreement, unless 
another period is decided upon by the Governments of 
India and Pakistan ; 

7. Agree that the demilitarization shall be carried out in 
such a way that at the end of the period referred to in 
paragrapli 6 above the situation will be : 

A. On the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line: 

(i) the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally 
resident therein who had entered the State for the pur- 
pose of fighting will have been withdrawn ; 

(ii) the Pakistan troops will have been withdrawn 
from the State ; 

(ill) large-scale disbanding and disarmament of the 
Azad Kashmir forces will have taken place ; so that at 
the end of the period of demilitarization there shall be 
an armed force of 6,000 ; 

B. On the Indian side of the cease-fire line: 

( i ) the bulk of the Indian forces in the State will have 
been withdrawn ; 

(ii) further withdrawals or reductions, as the case 
may l)e. of the Indian and State armed forces remaining 
in the State after the completion of the operation referred 
to in B (i) above will have been carried out; so that at 
the end of the period of demilitarization there shall be 
an Indian Army force of 18,000 Including State armed 
forces. 

8. Agree that the demilitarization shall be carried out 
in such a way as to involve no threat to the cease-fire 
agreement either during or after the period referred to in 
paragraph 6 above ; 

9. Pending a final solution the territory evacuated by the 
Pakistan troops will be administered by the local au- 
thorities under the surveillance of the United Nations. 
The local authorities shall undertake the fulfillment of 
such duties as are necessary for the observance within 
that territory of the provisions of the Karachi Agree- 
ment of 27 July 1949 ; 

10. Agree that the Government of India shall cause the 
Plebiscite Administrator to be formally appointed to 
office not later than the final day of the demilitarization 
period referred to in paragraph (j above ; 

11. Agree that the completion of the programme of de- 



militarization referred to in the provisional clause below 
will be without prejudice to the functions and responsi- 
bilities of the United Nations Representative and the 
Plebiscite Administrator with regard to the final dis- 
posal of forces as set forth in paragraph 4 (a) and 
(b) of the 5 January 1949 resolution ; 
12. Agree that any differences regarding the programme 
of demilitarization contemplated in the provisional clause 
will be referred to the Military Adviser of the United 
Nations Representative, and, if disagreement continues, 
to the United Nations Representative, whose decision 
shall be final. 

PROVISIONAL CLAUSE 

This agreement shall enter into effect when the Gov- 
ernments of India and Pakistan have approved a pro 
gramme of demilitarization in conformity with para- 
graphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 above, the draft of such programme 
to be drawn up in meetings between the representatives 
of the Governments of India and of Pakistan assisted 
by their Military Advisers under the auspices of the 
United Nations. The first meeting shall take place within 
two weeks after the signature of the above agreement. 



ANNEX VIII 



4 September 1952 



Proposal of United Nations Representative based 
upon his twelve points 

The Governments of India and Pakistan 

1. Reaffirm their determination not to resort to force 
and to adhere to peaceful procedures and specifically 
pledge themselves that they will not commit aggression 
or make war, the one against the other, with regard 
to the question of Jammu and Kashmir ; 

2. Agree that each Government, on its part, will in- 
struct its official spokesmen and will urge all its citizens, 
organizations, publications and radio stations not to 
make warlike statements or statements calculated to in- 
cite the people of either nation to make war against the 
other with re.gard to the question of Jammu and Ka.shmir ; 

3. Reaffirm their will to observe the cease-fire effective 
from 1 January 1949 and the Karachi Agreement of 27 
July 1949 ; 

4. Reaffirm their acceptance of the principle that the 
question of the accession of the State of Jammu and 
Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through the 
democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite 
under the auspices of the United Nations ; 

5. Agree that the demilitarization of the State of Jam- 
mu and Kashmir contemplated in the Uncip resolutions 
of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 as set forth in 
paragraph 7 below, shall be effected in a single contin- 
uous process ; 

6. Agree that this process of demilitarization shall be 
completed during a period of 90 days, starting from the 
date of the entrance into effect of this agreement, unless 
another period is decided upon by the Governments of 
India and of Pakistan ; 

7. Agree that the demilitarization .shall be carried out 
in such a way that at the end of the period referred to 
in paragraph 6 above the situation will be : 

A. On the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line: 

(i) the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally 
resident therein who had entered the State for the 
purpose of fighting will have been withdrawn ; 

(ii) the Pakistan troops will have been withdrawn 
from the State ; 

(iii) large-scale disbanding and disarmament of the 
Azad Kashmir forces will have taken place ; so that at 
the end of the period of demilitarization there shall be 
the minimum number of forces that are required for the 
maintenance of law and order and of the cease-fire agree- 
ment, with due regard to the freedom of the plebiscite; 



Ocfober 20, 1952 



631 



1 



B. On the Indian side of the cease-fire line: 

(1) the bulk of the Indian forces in the State will have 
been withdrawn ; 

(ii) further withdrawals or reductions, as the case may 
be, of the Indian and State armed forces remaining in the 
State after the completion of the operation referred to 
In B (i) above will have been carried out; so that at the 
end of the period of demilitarization there shall be the 
minimum number of Indian forces and State armed forces 
that are required for the maintenance of law and order 
and of the cease-fire agreement, with due regard to the 
security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite. 

8. Agree that the demilitarization shall be carried out 
in such a way as to involve no threat to the cease-fire 
agreement either during or after the period referred to in 
paragraph 6 above ; 

9. Agree that pending a final solution the territory 
evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by 
the local authorities under the surveillance of the United 
Nations ; 

10. Agree that the Government of India shall cause the 
Plebiscite Administrator to be formally appointed to of- 
fice not later than the final day of the demilitarization 
period referred to in paragraph 6 above ; 

11. Agree that arrangements for the plebiscite shall be 
completed after the United Nations Representative de- 
clares that he is satisfied that peaceful conditions have 
been restored in the State ; 

12. Agree that any differences regarding the programme 
of demilitarization contemplated in the provisional clause 
will be referred to the Military Adviser of the United 
Nations Representative, and, if disagreement continues, 
to the United Nations Representative, whose decision 
shall be final. 

PROVISIONAL CLAUSE 

This agreement shall enter into effect when the Gov- 
ernments of India and Pakistan have approved a pro- 
gramme of demilitarization in conformity with para- 
graphs 5, G, 7 and 8 above, the draft of such programme 
to be drawn up in meetings between the representatives 
of the Governments of India and of Pakistan assisted 
by their Military Advisers under the auspices of the 
United Nations. The first meeting shall take place with- 
in two weeks after the signature of the above agreement. 



5. The Conciliation Commission for Palestine and its 
work in the light of the resolutions of the United Na- 
tions : item proposed by Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria and Yemen. 

6. Violation by Arab States of their obligations under 
the Charter, United Nations resolutions and specific pro- 
visions of the General Armistice Agi-eements concluded 
with Israel, requiring them to desist from policies and 
practices of hostility and to seek agreement by negotia- 
tion for the establishment of peaceful relations with 
Israel : item proposed by Israel. 

7. Administration of the United Nations: item pro- 
posed by the Secretary-General. 



U.S. Delegations 

to International Conferences 

Petroleum Committee (ILO) 

The Department of State announced on October 
10 (press release 798) that the U.S. delegation to 
the fourth session of the Petroleum Committee of 
the International Labor Organization (Ilo), 
which will be held at Scheveningen, Netherlands, 
October 14^25, 1952, will be as follows: 

Representing the Government of the United States 
Delegates 

John Edward Brantly, Assistant Deputy Administrator 
for Foreign Petroleum Operations, Department of the 
Interior 

Robert R. Behlow, Regional Director, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Department of Labor, New York 

Adviser 

John W. Piercey, Labor Attach^, American Embassy, The 
Hague, Netherlands 



Supplementary Agenda Items 
for Seventh General Assembly' 

U.N, doc. A/2193 
Dated Sept. 24, 1952 

1. Question of an appeal to the Powers signatories to 
the Moscow Declaration of 1 November 1943, for an early 
fulfillment of their pledges toward Austria : item proposed 
by Brazil. 

2. Application of Japan for membership in the Inter- 
national Civil Aviation Organization : item proposed by 
the Secretary-General. 

3. The question of Morocco : item proposed by Afghani- 
stan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, 
Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen. 

4. The question of race conflict in South Africa re- 
sulting from the policies of apartheid of the Government 
of the Union of South Africa : item proposed by Afghani- 
stan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, 
Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria and 
Yemen. 



' For the Provisional Agenda, see BtnxErnN of Sept. 1, 
1952, p. 334. 



Representing the Employers of the United States 
Delegates 

John C. Quilty, Manager, Industrial Relations Depart- 
ment, Shell Oil Company, New York 

H. W. Jones, Manager, Industrial Relations Department, 
Atlantic Refining Co., Philadelphia 

Advisers 

C. Francis Beatty, Director, Socony- Vacuum Oil Company, 

Inc., New York 
M. H. Diaz, Legal Staff, Gulf Oil Corp., Tampas, Mexico 
W. M. Roberts, Director, Industrial Relations, Standard 

Oil Company of California, San Francisco 

Representing the Workers of the United States 
Delegates 

Lloyd A. Haskins, International Representative, Oil 
Workers International Union, Congress of Industrial 
Organizations, District No. 5, Alexandria 

James A. Garrett, International Union of Ojierating Engi- 
neers, Local 351, American Federation of Labor, 
Phillips, Tex. 



632 



DeparlmenI of State Bulletin 



The Petroleum Committee is one of eight indus- 
trial committees established by Ilo to give con- 
tinuing and close attention to economic and social 
problems in certain industries. The other indus- 
trial committees are concerned with building, civil 
engineering, and public works; chemicals; coal 
mines; inland transport; iron and steel; metal 
trades; and textiles. The United States is repre- 
sented on each of these committees. 

Delegates to the forthcoming session of the 
Petroleum Committee will consider (1) a general 
report on the actions taken in various countries in 



the light of the conclusions reached at the first 
three sessions; (2) principles and methods used in 
determining wages in the petroleum industry ; and 
(3) social services in the industry. Among the 
technical subjects with which the Committee has 
dealt at its previous sessions (February 3-12, 1947, 
held at Los Angeles; November 10-19, 1948, at 
Geneva; and October 24-November 3, 1950, at 
Geneva) have been the recruitment and training 
of employees for the petroleum industry, safety in 
the petroleum industry, industrial relations, and 
social conditions in the petroleum industry. 



The United States in the United Nations 



[October 14-18, 1952] 

The seventh session of the General Assembly 
opened on October 14 in the new United Nations 
Headquarters buildings. After Luis Padilla 
Nervo (Mexico), President of the sixth session, 
called the members to order, Mayor Vincent R. 
Impelleteri of New York City made a welcoming 
address. He said in part : 

I assure you that the people of this city have a deep- 
seated faith in the ability of men of all nations, all 
creeds, and all walks of life to reach a common under- 
standing — without subsequent rancor, recrimination, or 
resort to force of arms. 

It was this kind of faith which prompted us to urge 
upon you the selection of our great metropolis as your 
permanent home. ... As we view the spacious and 
imposing panorama that has emerged from the welter 
of 3 years' construction work, we feel well rewarded. 

Ambassador Warren R. Austin (U.S.), chair- 
man of the Headquarters Advisory Committee, 
paid tribute to tlie craftsmen wlio had planned 
and built the "noble Capitol for Universal Peace." 
(Excerj^ts from his statement will appear in the 
Bulletin of October 27.) 

After a welcome by Secretary-General Trygve 
Lie, Dr. Padilla Nervo addressed the delegates in 
his capacity as temporary chairman. The value 
of the United Nations had been proved in the 
social and economic fields, and by its activities 
in bettering human existence it was "sowing the 
seeds of a peace that will arise one day from 
human welfare and wisdom." But in the field of 
political accomplishment, the credit side this year 
was "not very heartening." All the great ques- 
tions pending before the Assembly had either be- 
come acute or were "hopeless of immediate 
solution." After the longest and most patient 



negotiations recorded in history, the Korean ques- 
tion was again being "debated by guns." Ger- 
man unification and the treaty with Austria were 
"in suspense." 

If only the capitalist world and the Communist world 
could convince each other of one thing, that neither of 
the two plans the destruction of the other, the suspicioa 
that divides them would be eliminated. 

In the balloting for President of the seventh 
session, Lester B. Pearson (Canada) received 51 
votes and was declared elected. 

During the afternoon session the General As- 
sembly elected chairmen of the six main commit- 
tees and the Ad Hoc Political Committee, as 
follows : 

First (Political and Security) Committee — Joao 

Carlos Muniz (Brazil) 
Ad Hoc Political Committee — Alexis Kyrou 

(Greece) 
Second (Economic and Financial) Committee — 

Jiri Nosek (Czechoslovakia) 
Third (Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural) 

Committee — Amjad Ali (Pakistan) 
Fourth (Trusteeship) Committee — Rodolfo 

Munoz (Argentina) 
Fifth (Administrative and Budgetary) Commit- 
tee — Carlos P. Romulo (Philippines) 
Sixth (Legal) Committee — Wan Waithayakon 

(Thailand) 

Secretary Acheson's Address 

Secretary Acheson delivered his opening ad- 
dress as chairman of the United States delegation 
when general debate began on October 16. (The 
complete text will appear in the Bulletin of 



Oc/ober 20, 7952 



633 



October 27.) He outlined three gi-oups of prob- 
lems confronting the Assembly : those concerning 
security, the fulfillment of national and individ- 
ual aspirations, and the economic progress of both 
individuals and communities. On the first, he 
asserted that the solidarity of the nations sup- 
porting the Charter was absolutely essential in 
the field of collective security. The responsibility 
to cooperate should be reflected not only in 
readiness to participate in United Nations action 
but also in other ways, such as regional and col- 
lective self-defense arrangements, sanctioned by 
the Charter, he said. 

It i.s in Korea that our whole structure of collective 
security is meeting its supreme test. It will stand or fall 
upon what we do there. 

The United Nations fight in Korea is the fight of ever.v 
nation and every individual who values freedom. Had 
our nerve failed at the time of this ruthless act of ag- 
gression, these new buildings in which we meet today 
might already be the empty husks of our defeated hopes 
for this organization. . . . Had the Republic of Korea 
been allowed to fall to the aggressor, the Delegates to 
the.se Assemblies would now be looking to their left 
and to their right and asking which would be the next 
victim on the aggressor's list. 

Korea is a test, not only of our courage at the initial 
moment of decision, but even more of the firmness of our 
will, the endurance of our courage. The aggressor, 
having defied the United Nations and lost, having found 
himself pushed back behind his initial line of attack, 
now counts for victory upon those of faint heart who 
would grow weary of the struggle. . . . 

We must convince the aggressor that continued fighting 
in Korea will cost him more than he can gain. This 
means the training and commitment of troops ; it means 
food, clothing, materiel, money. I urge every memlier of 
the United Nations to look to its responsibility to support 
the common action in Korea and to participate in the 
reconstruction of that unhappy land. 

The Assembly, he said, would have the oppor- 
tunity to review the record of the armistice nego- 
tiations and, by action, to demonstrate to the 
aggressor that "we are united in purpose and 
firm in resolve." 



Soviet Delegate Speaks 

Andrei Vyshinsky (U.S.S.R.) addressed the 
delegates on October 18. Excerpts from his state- 
ments follow : 

. . . On Thursday, Mr. Acheson attempted to de- 
scribe United States intervention in Korea as a fight of 
the United iNations against aggression. He repeated the 
fully discredited version that the war imposed by the 
American interventionists on the Koi'ean people was de- 
fensive and did not, he said, pursue any aggressive pur- 
poses. In truth, it does pursue aggressive objectives. 

As regards tlie question how long the war in Korea will 
continue, Mr. Acheson answered, "we must figlit as long 
as it will be necessary to put an end to aggression and to 
restore peace and security in Korea." . . . 

All the terms that have so far been offered by the 
United States Command in Korea . . . can only be 
called a flagrant violation of all the rules of fairness and 
equity. . . . 

This applies to the United States demand for the so- 
called screening of war prisoners and the placing of them 
in categories, witli some to be sent home by the 

634 



United States Command and others to be retained in 
captivity. . . . 

It is clear that the United States ruling circles are 
working against any armistice ... as their purpose 
is to stall these negotiations in endless talk so as to 
prevent the conclusion of an armi.stice in Korea. They 
have fished out a pretext, the question of the exchange of 
war prisoners. . . . 

They did not shrink from the flagrant violation of the 
Geneva Convention of 1949, particularly Articles 118 and 
119, which call upon all warring parties without any 
reservations to ensure the return to their homeland of 
all war prisoners except tho.se who are sub judice for 
alleged war crimes. 

Although the convention is signed by the United States 
representative . . . they did not hesitate to use any 
measures and all forms of pressure and force calling for 
the so-called screening of war prisoners, forcing them 
to make statements about their unwillingness to go home. 
The protests of the Korean and Chine.se war prisoners 
against such willful and illegal action of the United States 
command have been suppres.sed, as happened in the Koje 
Island camp. The suppression in Koje Island took place 
by way of extermination and this is still going on every 
day in United States camps for war prisoners . . . 
the task of solving the Korean question stands squarely 
on the agenda of the peace-loving peoples of the 
world. . . . They demand that imperialistic aggressora 
should be curbed, and they are standing up to the United 
States' aggressive policy. . . . 

We are warmly in favor of the proposal of our Polish 
colleague, which calls upon the General Assembly to rec- 
ommend to the warring parties that they put an end to 
military activities on land, at sea and in the air. We 
warmly support the proposal of the Polish delegation for 
the repatriation of all war prisoners in accordance with 
established international stipulations. 

We warmly support the proposal of the Polish delega- 
tion for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea, 
including the Chinese volunteers, this to be done within 
a period of two or three months. We warmly support the 
Polish proposal for the peaceful settlement of the Korean 
question on the principle of the unification of Korea, to 
be carried out by the Koreans themselves under the 
supervision of a commission on which the parties directly 
concerned and also other states that did not participate 
in the Korean war will be represented. . . . 

The United States aggressor has sought to utilize 
Korea as a proving ground for the effectiveness of death- 
dealing bacteria. Thus, the Soviet Union delegation 
deems it essential to stress in particular the significance 
of the Polish proposal which calls upon all states which 
have so far failed to adhere to the Geneva protocol of 
192.5, or to ratify that protocol, to so do. That applies 
first and foremost to the United States of America, 
which still obstinately refuses to ratify the Geneva 
Protocol. . . . 

. . . If one examines the work of the so-called Dis- 
armament Commission, created at the sixth session of 
the General Assembly, one cannot fail to note that, far 
from bending its efforts toward the reduction of arma- 
ments and prohibition of the atomic weapon, the delega- 
tion of the United States bent every effort toward 
legalizing the further increase of armaments and toward 
furthering, in the interests of the United States, the 
stockpiling of atomic bombs. . . . 

The Soviet Union struggles for peace by its methods 
which are based on the principle of respect for independ- 
ence ; sovereignty ; the equality of states ; mutual support 
of effective mutual assistance without ulterior motives 
for the purpose of attaining new achievements in the 
cause of strengthening new regimes of peace, democracy 
and socialism ; for a sincere, honest and decent peaceful 
co-operation ; and for mutual defense of the interests of 
all countries and peoples of the Soviet Union, which 
interests are indistinguishable from tlie interests of all 
people of the world. . . . 

Deparfmenf of Sfa/e Bulletin 



PUBLICATIONS 



Recent Releases 

Foi- sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government 
Printing Office, 'Washington 25, D. C. Address requests 
direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the 
case of free publications, ivhich mau be obtained from the 
Department of State. 

Technical Cooperation. Treaties and Other International 
Acts Series 2409. Pub. 4572. 9 pp. 50. 

Agreement between the United States and Chile — 
Signed at Santiago Jan. 16, 1951 ; entered into force 
July 27, 1951. 

Technical Cooperation. Treaties and Other International 
Acts Series 2413. Pub. 4592. 4 pp. Si*. 

Agreement between the United States and Iraq — 
Signed at Baghdad Apr. 10, 1951 ; entered into force 
June 2, 1951. 

Treaty of Peace With Japan. Treaties and Other Inter- 
national Acts Series 2490. Pub. 4613. 173 pp. 40^. 

Signed at San Francisco Sept. 8, 1951; entered into 
force Apr. 28, 19.52. 

Health and Sanitation, Cooperative Program in Uruguay. 

Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2408. Pub. 
4620. 5 pp. 54. ■ 

Agreement between the United States and Uruguay — 
Signed at Montevideo July 21, 26, and 27, 1949; en- 
tered into force July 27, 1949. 

Unemployment Insurance Benefits. Treaties and Other 
International Acts Series 2452. Pub. 4621. 4 pp. Sff. 

Agreement between the United States and Canada — 
Signed at Ottawa July 31 and Sept. 11, 1951 ; entered 
into force Sept. 11, 1951 ; operative retroactively from 
Apr. 1, 1951. 

Telecommunications, Operation of Certain Radio Equip- 
ment or Stations. Treaties and Other International Acts 
Series 2508. Pub. 4622. 6 pp. 54. 

Convention between the United States and Canada — • 
Signed at Ottawa Feb. 8, 1951 ; entered into force 
May 15, 1952. 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Its Development 
and Significance. General Foreign Policy Series 75. Pub. 
4630. 50 pp. 200. 

Pamphlet giving the origin and organization of Nato; 
questions and answers pertaining to Nato and the 
text of the treaty. 

Claims, Operation of Smelter at Trail, British Columbia. 

Treaties and Other International Acts 'Series 2412. Pub. 
4635. 2 pp. 50. 

Agreement between the United States and Canada — 
Signed at Washington Nov. 17, 1949, and Jan. 24, 
1950 ; entered into force Jan. 24, 1950. 

Technical Cooperation. Treaties and Other International 
Acts Series 2414. Pub. 4636. 7 pp. 50. 

Agreement between the United States and Haiti — 
Signed at Port-au-Prince May 2, 1951; entered into 
force May 2, 1951. 



Technical Cooperation, Cooperative Program of Agricul- 
ture and Livestock. Treaties and Other International 
Acts Series 2430. Pub. 4640. 14 pp. 50. 

Agreement between the United States and Chile — 
Signed at Santiago Jan. 16, 1951 ; entered into force 
Jan. 16, 1951. 

Teaching About the United Nations in the Schools and 
Colleges of the United States in 1950 and 1951. Interna- 
tional Organization and Conference Series III, 83. Pub. 
4649. 29 pp. 100. 

A report prepared for the U. S. National Commission 
for UNESCO by the U. S. OlSce of Education, Federal 
Security Agency. 

Guide to the United States and the United Nations. 

International Organization and Conference Series III, 84. 
Pub. 4653. 21 pp. 150. 

Chronology of the United states and the United 
Nations from 1941 up to June 26, 1952. 



THE FOREIGN SERVICE 



Appointment of Officers 

Harold Shantz as Minister to Rumania, effective Sep- 
tember 27. 

George Wadsworth as Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, 
effective October 8. 



Checit List of Department of State 


Press Releases: Oct. 6-10, 1952 


Rel 


ea.ses may be obtained from the Office of the 


Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of | 


State 


Washington 25, D.C. 


Press releases issued prior to Oct. 6 which appear | 


in this issue 


of the Bulletin are Nos. 762 of Sept. 


26 an 


d 776 of Oct. 3. 


No. 


Date 


Subject 


781 


10/6 


Acheson : New Soviet tactics 


782 


10/3 


Departure of Sir Oliver Franks 


*7S3 


10/7 


Exchange of persons 


t7S4 


10/7 


Seminar for foreign students 


785 


10/8 


Acheson : Oatis case 


786 


10/8 


Acheson : Armistice negotiations 


787 


10/8 


Letter to Acheson from Mossadegh 


*788 


10/8 


Acheson : Koreans for front lines 


789 


10/8 


Acheson : Reply to Sen. Knowland 


790 


10/8 


U.S. note to U.S.S.R. on Kennan 


791 


10/9 


Wadsworth : Amb. to Czechoslovakia 


t792 


10/9 


Burma : Point Four Program 


t793 


10/9 


Andrews : Farmer in world picture 


t794 


10/9 


Japanese war criminals board 


*795 


10/9 


Thorp: Chairman of Gatt delegation 


796 


10/10 


Anderson: European problems 


797 


10/10 


Compton : Paving a road to peace 


798 


10/10 


Petroleum committee (Ilo) 


*799 


10/10 


Awards to newsmen 


tsoo 


10/10 


U.S.-Japan: Alaskan fore-st products 


t801 


10/10 


Netherlands transfer of accounts 


t802 


10/10 


Movement of migrants 


tHeld for 


a later issue of the Bulletin. 


*Not printed. 



Ocfofaer 20, J 952 



635 



October 20, 1952 



Ind 



ex 



Vol. XXVII No. 695 



American Principles 

Paving a road to peace 604 

Asia 

JAMMU and KASHMIR: Demilitarization of . . 626 
KOREA: Armistice negotiations suspended . . . 600 

Communism 

Soviet reaction to free world's growing strength 

(Acheson) 595 

Europe 

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: U.S. Charg6 d'affaires visits 

William Oatls 625 

DENMARK: A basic decision for ttie U.S.: trade 

or aid (Anderson) 614 

GERMANY: Validation of German dollar 

bonds 608 

U.K.: 

Departure of Sir Oliver Franks 603 

Iran willing to negotiate If U.K. pays 20 mil- 
lion pounds 624 

U.S.SJI.: 

Soviet reaction to free world's growing 

strength (Acheson) 595 

U.S. rejects Soviet charges against Ambassador 
Kennan, texts of U.S. note, and Knowland 
and Acheson correspondence 603 

Finance 

Validation of German dollar bonds 608 

Foreign Service 

Appointments 635 

International Information 

Paying a road to peace 604 

International Meetings 

Supplementary agenda items for seventh Gen- 
eral Assembly 632 

U.S. DELEGAIION: 

Petroleum Committee (Ilo) 632 

Near East 

IRAN: Willing to negotiate If U.K. pays 20 

million pounds 624 

MOROCCO: 

Lifts restrictions on Imports, text of note . . . 623 
Treaty rights of the United States in 

(Sweeney) 620 



Protection of U. S. Nationals and Property 

U.S. charge d'affaires visits William Oatls .... 625 

Publications 

Recent releases 635 

Strategic Materials 

Iran willing to negotiate If U.K. pays 20 million 

pounds 624 

Trade 

A basic decision for the U.S.: trade or aid 

(Anderson) 614 

Morocco lifts restrictions on Imports, text of 

note 623 

Treaty Information 

Treaty rights of the United States In Morocco . . 620 

United Nations 

Demilitarization of Jammu and Kashmir 626 

GENERAL ASSEMBLY: Supplementary agenda 

items for seventh session 632 

Korean armistice negotiations suspended 600 

U.S. in U.N 633 

NaTne Index 

Acheson, Secretary 695, 600, 603 

Anderson, Eugenie 614 

Behlow, Robert R 632 

Brantley, John E 632 

Clark, Gen 600 

Compton, Wilson 604 

Franks, Sir Oliver 603 

Graham, Frank P 626 

Harrison, Gen 600 

Kennan, George F 603 

Knowland, William F 603 

Lenroot, Katharine P 619 

Moores, Roland F 608 

Mossadegh, Prime Minister 624 

Oatls, William 625 

Shantz, Wadsworth 635 

Sweeney, Joseph M 620 

Wadsworth, George 635 



U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: I9BZ 






Ai) 



o 



tyAe' ^e^{M^i77ten(/ ,m t/tate^ 




Vol. XXVII, No. 696 
October 27, 1952 




U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY OPENS SEVENTH 
SESSION: 

Achieving the Goals of the Charter • Address by- 
Secretary Acheson 639 

Problems Facing the Assembly • Address by John D. 

Hickerson 645 

TOWARD EUROPEAN AND ATLANTIC UNITY • by 

tf'illiani H. Draper, Jr 650 

JAPANESE EDUCATION IN REVIEW • Article by Jane 

M. AUlen 654 

THE KASHMIR DISPUTE: 

Values at Stake in Its Settlement • Statement by Frank 

P. Graham 661 

Recent Developments • Article by Frank D. Collins . . 663 



For index see back cover 



coajwEW"^ 



y"^:--. 




*.^vww^y.. bulletin 



Vol. XXVII, No. 696 • Publication 4759 
October 27, 1952 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Oovernmenl Printing Office 

Washington 25, D.O. 

Price: 

62 Issues, domestic $7.50, foreign $10.25 

Single copy, 20 cents 

The printing of this publication has 
been approved by the Director of the 
Btu-eau of the Budget (January 22, 1952). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and Items contained herein may 
be reprinted. Citation of the Department 
OF State Bulletin as the source will be 
appreciated. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication compiled and 
edited in the Division of Publications, 
Office of Public Affairs, provides the 
public and interested agencies of 
the Government with information on 
developments in the field of foreign 
relations and on the work of the De- 
partment of State and the Foreign 
Service. The BULLETIN includes 
selected press releases on foreign pol- 
icy issued by the White House and 
the Department, and statetnents and 
addresses made by the President and 
by the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the func- 
tions of the Department. Informa- 
tion is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to 
which the United States is or may 
become a party and treaties of gen- 
eral international interest. 

Publications of the Department, as 
well as legislative material in the field 
of international relations, are listed 
currently. 



Achieving the Goals of the Charter 



Address hy Secretary Acheson ^ 



This is our first meeting in the new home of 
the United Nations. We join in our congratula- 
tions and gratitude to all of those who have had 
a part in tlie completion of this work. The result 
of their efforts is an enduring symbol of accom- 
plishment and of aspiration. 

We meet here to take up our labors to bring 
together and to harmonize the hopes and desires 
of the people of the United Nations. This is a 
never-ending task for each Assembly in its turn. 

This year marks the seventh anniversary of the 
ratification of the Charter. These 7 years have 
demonstrated that the role of the United Nations 
in the community of nations is an essential one and 
one that will continue to increase in influence and 
importance in the years ahead. 

The importance and influence of the United 
Nations is reflected in the problems that come be- 
fore it. They indicate the powerful currents that 
make our period in history one of turbulence and 
change. Many of these problems will be with us 
for years to come. We cannot shy away from 
them even if we wish to do so. Our task is to face 
them squarely and realistically, with good faith 
and good sense, in the light of our joint and several 
responsibilities under the Charter. 

Moreover, there is an interdependence between 
these problems. Each is made more difficult of 
solution by the existence of the others. We cannot 
solve them all at once. But we can solve some; 
we can chip away at others; and we can use all 
the resources of the United Nations to prepare the 
way for more effective cooperation between 
nations. 

One of the most important of these resources 
is the General Assembly. There is no more rep- 
resentative or more influential international in- 
stitution than the one in which we are now par- 
ticipating. The Charter entrusts the Assembly 
with a wide variety of tasks and an equal variety 

' Made before the U.N. General Assembly at New York 
on Oct. IG (press release 814). Secretary Acheson is 
Chairman of the U.S. delegation to the seventh session of 
the General Assembly, which opened Oct. 14. 



of methods which it can employ. Three groups 
of problems lie before us : first, those that concern 
security; second, those that relate to the fulfill- 
ment of national and individual aspirations; and 
third, the problems that have to do with economic 
progress of both individuals and communities. 

The chief lesson of our experience in the field 
of collective security is that the solidarity of the 
nations which support the Charter is absolutely 
essential. The alternative to this solidarity is the 
disintegration of the United Nations and the 
triumph of lawlessness in the world. 

The program which started in 1950 with the 
Uniting for Peace Resolution constitutes General 
Assembly recognition that members of the United 
Nations must, by virtue of their membership, 
stand together and act together for the mainte- 
nance of peace. 

To make this work, wholehearted cooperation 
is essential. The institution of the United Nations 
can be no stronger than its members. It is the 
governments and peoples of all member nations 
who have the responsibility to be physically pre- 
pared and to be morally resolute to concert their 
strength for the cause of peace. 

This responsibility to cooperate must be reflected 
not only in readiness to participate in action un- 
dertaken by the United Nations itself but also in 
other ways recognized and sanctioned by the 
Charter. Regional and collective self-defense ar- 
rangements, entered into and developed in accord- 
ance with the Charter, are an integral part of a 
universal collective-security system. When in- 
dividual strength and collective strength are all 
dedicated to the cause of peace and the purposes 
of the Charter, the structure of security becomes 
a reality. 

The Secretary-General put this matter force- 
fully in his report to this Assembly.^ "The final 
test of effective collective security," he said, "will 
always be that a sufficient number of member gov- 
ernments are firmly committed in their policies to 

' U.N. docs. A/2141, Ay2141/Add. 1. 



October 27, 1952 



639 



join in i-esisting armed aggi-ession wherever it oc- 
curs and that they have at their disposal military 
power strong enough to strike back with punish- 
ing effect against any aggressor nation." 

This is the lesson of the past 7 years. It would 
be folly for us to lose sight of it. 

The Supreme Test in Korea 

It is in Korea that our whole structure of collec- 
tive security is meeting its supreme test. It will 
stand or fall upon what we do there. 

The U.N. fight in Korea is the fight of every 
nation and every individual who values freedom. 
Had our nerve failed at the time of this ruthless 
act of aggression, these new buildings in which 
we meet today might already be the empty husks 
of our defeated hoj^es for this organization. Had 
Korea been allowed to fall to the aggi'essor, the 
words of John Donne would have applied to each 
one of us : 

"Never send to know for whom the bell tolls ; 

It tolls for thee . . ." 
Had the Eepublic of Korea been allowed to fall 
to the aggressor, the delegates to these Assemblies 
would now be looking to their left and to their 
right and asking which would be the next victim 
on the aggressor's list. 

Korea is a test not only of our courage at the 
initial moment of decision but even more of the 
firmness of our will, the endurance of our courage. 
The aggressor, having defied the United Nations 
and lost, having found himself pushed back be- 
hind his initial line of attack, now counts for vic- 
tory upon those of faint heart who would grow 
weary of the struggle. 

Tliere are moments in history when determined 
will through dark hours brought victory. My 
country's trials came at the very outset of its his- 
tory. The darkest moment for the United Nations 
in Korea came at Pusan. We met and overcame 
that trial and now face the test of staying power. 
Ours must be the determination and the will to 
sustain this crucial test. I will not pretend that 
the burden is light. My coiuitrymen, like those of 
many of you, regard with anxiety and grief its 
human cost. But to the question : How long shall 
this be? We must answer: We sliall fight on as 
long as is necessary to stop the aggression and to 
restore peace and security to Korea. We shall stop 
fighting when an armistice on just tei-ms has been 
achieved. And we shall not allow faint-hearted- 
ness or recklessness to defeat our cause, wliich is to 
defend peace. 

We must convince the aggressor that continued 
fighting in Korea will cost him more than he can 
gain. This means the training and commitment of 
troops; it means food, clothing, materiel, money. 
I urge every member of the United Nations to look 
to its responsibility to support the common action 



The Capitol of Peace 

. . . In theso heailiiiiarters of the United Nations 
tliere are combined stone, glass, metal, wood, and 
textiles, with elements of the human heritage which 
the Charter promotes. Thus, "we, the peoples of the 
United Nations" animate our symbols with soul- 
stirring desire for supremacy of morality, law, and 
order. 

These buildings are grounded physically on the 
rock of Manhattan ; but they are established in 
venerable aspirations of men — Hearers and Doers 
of the Word — men, likened to "a wise man, who built 
his house ujMjn a rock." They are founded upon the 
sacrifice of those who have died for the United 
Nations in Korea, and in the selflessness of others 
who, like Count Bernadotte, have given their lives 
to the ideal of peaceful settlement of disputes. 

These buildings symbolize our faith, and our 
collective determination to defend human lives and 
extend human freedom. But these great structures 
would remain inert, "without works." Aggression 
could crush the craftsmen who have lifted these 
buildings of peace. Power to destroy has grown to 
include power to sear the cultural resources which 
collectively gave rise to these buildings. 

However, resources of moral iwwer can be 
achieved and magnificently strengthened through 
deeds and the spirit of the word. Better under- 
standing of men and women in all nations is the vital 
necessity for unity and cooperation to maintain 
international peace and security through these 
United Nations Headquarters. 

As we take our places in the General Assembly, 
and at the Council meetings, let us begin all our work 
in the name of (!od, for the solution of all our prob- 
lems is a spiritual one. 

Our collective practice of truth, justice, and friend- 
ship among nations can radiate the beam of history 
int(i every region among all peoples. 

Thus, to craftsmanship we shall add statesman- 
ship in the Capitol of Peace. 

— Remarks made on Oct. H by Am- 
bassador Warren R. Austhi, U.S. 
Representatwe to the U.N., on the 
convening of the seventh session 
of the General Assembly in the 
neiu U.N. Headquarters Buildings. 



in Korea and to participate in the reconstruction 
of that unhappy land. 

The United Nations went into Korea to repel 
aggression and to restore peace and security. Ag- 
gression has been stopped. But despite patient 
and sincei'e efforts of U.N. negotiators, the Com- 
munists have so far rejected reasonable terms for 
an armistice. 

This Assembly will have the opportunity to re- 
view the record of the armistice negotiations which 
have been proceeding over the past 15 months. The 
record shows that the U.N. representatives have 
been patient, flexible, and resourceful, always de- 
fending the principles of the Charter. We shall 
have an opportunity, by action at this Assembly, to 
demonstrate to the aggressor that we are united 
in purpose and firm in resolve ; that we are as one 
in desire for a just peace and in determination to 
achieve it. 



640 



Department of State Bulletin 



A Specific Disarmament Pledge 

No consideration of security can overlook the 
importance of the work \Yliich has been done since 
our hist Assembly in the field of disarmament. 
For, even though we are no closer to a universal 
agreement, the Disarmament Commission set up 
last year has shown by its work that the obstacle 
to disarmament is not technical but a matter of 
will. Practical methods are at hand by which the 
possibility of aggressive warfare can be reduced 
and ultimately erased. 

Those practical methods are not based on the fal- 
lacious idea that our safety will be insured by 
piecemeal pledges not to use this weapon or that 
weapon. All members of the United Nations have 
made a solemn commitment to "refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Na- 
tions." Tliis commitment is a pledge against ag- 
gression, in any form or with any weapon, against 
the use of armed force "save in the common in- 
terest." On behalf of my Government, I reaffirm 
this pledge. 

We can make that pledge absolutely specific : We 
will not commit aggression with rifles or machine 
guns or tanks. We will not commit aggression 
with atomic bombs or any other kind of bombs. 
We will not commit aggression with chemical 
weapons or bacteriological weapons, which we 
have been falsely and slanderously accused of 
using. We will not commit aggression with any 
weapons or by any means. We reaffirm for all the 
world to hear that, pursuant to our solemn com- 
mitment under the Charter, we pledge — not just 
that we will avoid the use of one weapon or an- 
other — but that we will not use any form of force 
contrary to the Charter. 

We reaffirm our Charter obligations to settle 
"international disputes by peaceful means in such 
a manner that international peace and security, 
and justice, are not endangered." 

Nations committed under the Charter not to use 
force to impose their will on other nations should 
not have to maintain huge armaments to protect 
themselves from one another. The maintenance 
of huge armaments itself constitutes a danger to 
peace. But disarmament cannot be achieved uni- 
laterally. It cannot be achieved by denunciation 
in a battle of epithets. It can be achieved only by 
international agreements under effective safe- 
guards which will protect law-abiding states from 
the hazards of violations and evasions. Until all 
states with substantial armaments are willing to 
cooperate in eifective, guaranteed disarmament, 
the free, law-abiding nations of the world must 
arm and remain armed in self-defense. But we 
will continue to work to achieve the fourth of the 
four freedoms of President Roosevelt — freedom 
from fear. 



The United States with other members of the 
Disarmament Commission has sought to outline 
a comprehensive disarmament program with a 
view to redvicing the possibility and fear of war. 
The program seeks not only the elimination of all 
major weapons of mass destruction, including the 
atomic and bacteriological, but the elimination of 
large mass armies. The program calls for a re- 
duction of well over 50 percent in the armed forces 
of the United States and the Soviet Union and for 
comparable limitation on the armed forces of all 
other states. The program provides for the ef- 
fective control of atomic energy to insure its use 
for peaceful purposes only. It provides effective 
safeguards to insui-e an open world with no secret 
armies and no secret weapons. 

In submitting this pi'ogram, we gave outlines, 
not details; we did not insist that ours wei-e the 
only proposals that could carry out the General 
Assembly resolution. We submitted them for dis- 
cussion and genuine negotiation. Out of negotia- 
tion, done in good faith, the General Assembly 
resolution could be achieved and the maximum re- 
duction of all armed forces and armaments con- 
sistent with the avoidance of any imbalance of 
power dangerous to international peace in any 
part of the world can be made. The United 
States is ready to carry out such a program. We 
will continue earnestly and in good faith to in- 
duce others to join us toward that end. We will 
apply all the ingenuity and resourcefulness we 
can muster. If other states do the same, we 
can succeed. 



Aspirations of Dependent Peoples 

A second group of issues lies before us — those 
which gi'ow out of the legitimate aspiration of de- 
pendent peoples for a determining voice in their 
own affairs. 

It is important to note at the outset that these 
matters are not issues in the sense that anyone dis- 
putes the right of a dependent people to ultimate 
self-government. The right is enshrined in the 
Charter, and the obligation to help fulfill that 
right rests with each of us, including each of the 
aclministering states. These states recognize that 
the peoples under their control must some day de- 
termine their own destinies. These states are 
working toward that end, just as the dependent 
peoples are preparing themselves for the responsi- 
bilities of self-government. 

This is, I think, illustrated by the following 
facts : Of the 800 million people in the free world 
who were in the dependent category 10 years ago, 
some 600 million have already attained full inde- 
pendence. In this period a dozen new nations have 
emerged, and most of them are now playing an im- 
portant role in the United Nations. Furthermore, 
rapid progress has been and is being made toward 
self-covernment for the 200 million others who 



October 27, 1952 



641 



still remain in varying stages of dependency. 
What these facts suggest is that the differences 
confronting us are not differences of purpose ; they 
are differences of method and of timing, and they 
can be solved through wise statesmanship. 

Over 175 years ago the American people asserted 
and established their right to their own national 
life. Surely we can and do understand the similar 
aspirations of other people. Indeed, our record 
establishes this far more conclusively than any 
assertion I could make. Our own experience and 
responsibilities have also taught us the necessity 
for wisdom and understanding between adminis- 
tering powers and dependent people. For it re- 
quires understanding on both sides to solve the 
complicated problems which arise in preparing a 
people for a stable and viable self-government in 
the complex world of today. The result of this 
kind of understanding is reflected in the presence 
among us in this gi-eat Assembly of our colleagues 
from the Philippines, India, Pakistan, Burma, and 
Indonesia. And there is a place in this Assembly 
for others. 

But, in the nature of things, it is not enough that 
the states comprising the United Nations agree on 
the abstract principle of self-determination and 
the desirability of the evolution of dependent peo- 
ples toward self-government. For we are con- 
cerned with specific situations involving the as- 
pirations of present and future generations. In 
examining these situations it will inevitably ap- 
pear to some that the process of fulfilling those 
aspirations is too long, too tortuous. By the same 
token, it will seem to others that the transfer of 
powers is going forward at too rapid a rate — that 
people are being called upon to govern themselves 
before they have attained adequate political ex- 
perience and before there exists a sound economic, 
social, and educational basis for lasting self- 
government. 

If the sole question were whether it was going 
too fast or too slow, the answer undoubtedly in 
most cases would be to try to find some accommoda- 
tion between these two sides. This would not, of 
course, wholly satisfy either one. But this is the 
way things have to be done in reconciling conflict- 
ing views. 

But in many situations this is not the only point. 
There is another point which is very often lost 
sight of in the assertions of absolutes in regard to 
the right to self-rule. The fact we are apt to over- 
look is the deep economic interdependence between 
the parties. It would be utterly destructive to the 
interests of both if the solution were made on the 
basis of theoretical absolutes. If people can har- 
monize their views and then work a little faster 
or a little slower together, then their mutual de- 
pendence becomes a factor which helps to bring the 
matter to solution. 

This fact is reflected in the evolution of formerly 
non-self-governing peoples. While some have 
chosen to move toward complete indeiiendence, 



many others have chosen an independent position 
within a commonwealth or union, and still others 
have chosen to identify themselves in some other 
form of association with another state or group of 
states. 

What is the proper role of the United Nations 
in these matters? When specific disagreements 
arise as to the adequacy of the progress being 
made by a dependent people toward self-gov- 
ernment, the responsibility for settling such mat- 
ters lies in the first instance with those im- 
mediately concerned. This is not to say, however, 
that the United Nations is without responsibility 
to assist in the achievement of peaceful solutions. 
On the contrary, the United Nations would be dere- 
lict in its duty if it failed to be concerned with the 
rate of progress toward the Charter goals being 
made by those states — including the United 
States — which hold in trust the futures of de- 
pendent peoples. 

But it follows from what I have said before that 
the role to be played by the General Assembly 
should in most situations of this kind be one of 
accommodation. These are not cases in which it 
is the function of the General Assembly to im- 
pose settlements upon the parties involved. Here 
it is rather the primary function of the United 
Nations to create an atmosphere favorable to set- 
tlements which accord with Charter principles 
but which should be worked out by the parties 
directly concerned. 

Various articles of the Charter employ different 
terms to indicate the type of action which the 
General Assembly may take — it may "discuss," 
"consider," "recommend," or "decide." As we re- 
view our 7 years of experience, it sometimes seems 
that we have felt that we are bound to "recom- 
mend" whenever we "consider" or "discuss." But 
the Charter does not assume this to be true, nor 
should we do so. We must always seek solutions 
but not necessarily resolutions. Calm and dis- 
passionate consideration and discussion may in 
such matters as these be the Assembly's most use- 
ful contribution toward a solution. 

The United Nations has a twofold interest in 
encouraging and assisting peaceful and orderly 
transition toward self-government. First, it 
serves to assure that the aspirations of the 
people involved will find constructive and genuine 
fulfillment. Second, it represents the general in- 
terest of the rest of the world in peaceful settle- 
ments and orderly progress — all except those who 
are more interested in the exploitation of differ- 
ences than in genuine solutions. 

The unfortunate fact is that we cannot approach 
this problem, or indeed any other problem before 
this Assembly, without being mindful of the events 
that are taking place in another part of the world. 
There, whole nations have been swallowed up and 
submerged by a new colonialism. Others have 
been reduced to a state of servile dependence. 
The tragic events behind this dark boundary not 



642 



Department of State Bulletin 



only are in stark contrast with the evohitionary 

Erocess toward self-government which we have 
een discussing, but they are so fraught with 
danger to all of us that we can never afford to 
forget them. 

I have touched briefly upon the role of the 
United Nations with respect to the conflicts which 
inevitably arise in the evolution of dependent peo- 
ples toward full self-government. But much of 
what I have said is equally applicable in my judg- 
ment to other problems of great moment and great 
delicacy with which the Assembly is currently 
confronted. 



U.N. Promotion of Individual Human Rights 

I refer particularly to the role to be played by 
the United Nations — and especially the General 
Assembly — in the promotion of those individual 
human rights recognized by the Charter. 

Our starting point is the Charter obligation 
assumed by all of us, as individual states and as 
participants in tlie work of the United Nations, 
to promote the fundamental rights of those within 
our jurisdiction. 

To carry out this obligation faithfully means 
several things. It means, first of all, that we must 
look facts in the face. It means that we must 
examine our own conduct and that of other states 
with candor and tl\at we cannot condone deeds 
which do not square with the articles of demo- 
cratic faith embodied in our Cliarter. I venture 
to suggest that in the field of human rights no 
state represented here is wholly without fault. In 
our closets each of us can find the skeletons of 
racial, class, or religious discrimination. If tliis 
is so, it neither justifies being sanctimonious about 
our neighbors' faults nor being tolerant of viola- 
tions of Charter obligations. We must approach 
these problems soberly and without hypocrisy, 
mindful of our human weaknesses but unremitting 
in our determination to fulfill our promises. 

If our first job is to be honest about the facts, 
our second job is to be honest about the remedies 
available to us. The teachings of Confucius and 
Mohammed, of Moses, of Buddha, and of Christ 
will not gain instant and universal acceptance 
merely because they are echoed in our official pro- 
nouncements. 

But the fact that we are limited in what we 
can accomplish does not mean we can abdicate the 
field. On the contrary, we would betray the basic 
tenets of human decency if we came to regard 
the human-rights provisions of the Charter as 
pious hopes which feed the eye but starve the 
spirit. To give reality to the Charter provisions, 
we must concentrate upon doing those things 
which are in the realm of practical statesmanship. 

Our aim in this most delicate of fields must be 
the aim provided in the Charter itself. By chapter 
IX, all members pledge themselves to take joint 
and separate action in cooperation with the 



United Nations to promote, among other things, 
universal respect for, and observance of, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. 
Our actions must be responsive to that pledge. 
We must work with patience and with honesty 
toward achievement of the Charter goals. 

Finally, I turn to a third group of problems be- 
fore this session of the General Assembly, prob- 
lems that have to do with the improvement of 
living conditions. In looking back over the record 
of the past 7 years, it is in this field of economic 
cooperation that we find the most hopeful and 

Sromising aspect of the work of the United 
ations. 

The beginnings that have been made in this work 
of economic and social cooperation through the 
United Nations are greatly encouraging to all who 
have participated in it. This is a new force in 
international relations. It expresses a growing 
sense of international responsibility for the needs 
and hopes of individual human beings. Behind 
this work lies a growing awareness that, in the 
twentieth century, international cooperation must 
mean not only treaties and conferences but people 
of many nations working alongside each other to 
grow more food, to wipe out illiteracy and disease, 
to increase production and trade. 

The key to economic progress, to the expand- 
ing world economy for whicli we are all striving, 
is found in cooperative action to enable the world 
to increase its output of agricultural and indus- 
trial products. This is the heart of the matter. 
We are only beginning to appreciate the tremen- 
dous possibilities of the less-developed areas for 
this kind of expansion with the creation of basic 
economic facilities, particularly power and 
transport. 

As the technical-assistance programs of the 
United Nations and its agencies continue to work 
their transformations in the economic and social 
fields, I am confident that we shall see an accelera- 
tion of private investment, both domestic and for- 
eign. This is a process that may take many years 
of work, but in no other field of action, I believe, 
will we find that our efforts have so multiplied an 
effect as in the field of technical assistance. 

There is no greater challenge to our ingenuity 
than that whicli is to be found in the stark contrast 
between present levels of production of food and 
industrial products and the knowledge available 
to us by which that production could be multiplied 
many times over. 

The tragedy is that, in spite of tremendous 
progress in agricultural science, over half the 
world's people still suffer from malnutrition and 
many live on the verge of starvation. Despite 
progress in food production in many parts of the 
world, the fact is that world food output is in- 
creasing at a slower rate than is world population, 
and the world today has less food per person than 
it did before the war. 



Ocfober 27, 1952 



643 



There are several active profframs in this field 
that are deserving of more widespread attention 
and support. A good beginning has been made by 
the membere of the Food and Agriculture Organi- 
zation, who have pledged themselves to increase 
agricultural production in their countries over 
the next 5 years, so that there will be an increase 
of food production over population growth 
amounting to one or two percent each year. 

At this session of the General Assembly we shall 
have an opportunity to review some of the promis- 
ing work that has been done by member govern- 
ments and the agencies of the United Nations in 
the vital field of land reform. This is, in my 
opinion, central to the whole problem of increasing 
food supply. 

Two years ago, before this body, I expressed 
the conviction that common efforts to apply exist- 
ing knowledge to the use and ownership of land 
could have a tremendous effect in relieving the 
misery and suffering of millions of people.^ I 
spoke of the "vast opportunity (that) awaits us 
to bring, by such means as the United Nations has 
been developing, new hope to millions whose most 
urgent needs ai-e for food, land, and human dig- 
nity." Since that time, much progress has been 
made in dealing with this problem and this oppor- 
tunity. Programs of land reform have been 
launched in a number of countries in Asia and the 
Near East — programs which are already bringing 
new hope to the people of these lands. Universi- 
ties and governments have cooperated in regional 
seminars for the exchange of information on land 
use and tenure. We shall, I believe, find gi'eat en- 
couragement in hearing the reports of this 
progress. 

This Assembly will also have an opportunity to 
consider the steps that have been taken to stimu- 
late increased productivity in other fields. It is 
clear from the report submitted by the Secretary- 
General to the Economic and Social Council that 
methods are available by which marked increases 
in productivity could be achieved immediately. 
These methods would differ greatly from country 
to country according to local conditions, but the 
essential fact is that considerable increases can 
be achieved by the covnitries themselves through 
technical assistance and better utilization of ex- 
isting tools and equipment. 

Increases in productivity by such methods can 
result — and indeed, in many places they have re- 
sulted — in direct and immediate improvements in 
standards of living. And, as I have remarked 
before, the best guaranty of increased investment, 
both public and private, is such increases in pro- 
ductivity. It is imperative, of course, that such 
increased output be fairly distributed in the form 
of better incomes for workers and lower prices to 
consumers. 



'For text of the Secretary's address, see Bulletin of 
Oct. 2, 1950, p. 523. 



These activities demonstrate the vitality and 
inventiveness with which many nations are work- 
ing together to improve living standards, even 
now in the midst of world attention. 

It is tragic that forces should exist in the world 
whose concept of their interests requires them to 
hinder and obstruct international action by all 
the rest of the world toward better conditions of 
life. 

There are some schools of thought which doubt 
the capacity of free nations to meet the problems 
of a changing world without falling into eco- 
nomic catastrophe. To them I would say that 
such expectations are based upon an analysis 
which events have shown to be faulty — and, at 
best, out of date. 

The free nations reject any notion that man is 
incapable of influencing events, that he is a help- 
less puppet in the face of determining forces, that 
crisis is inevitable. 



The Free Nations' Record 

The record, I think, will bear me out when I 
say that the economies of the free nations have 
shown gi'eat capacity for growth and adaptation. 
It will show that despite the burdens we have 
inherited from World Wars I and II, despite the 
burdens we are now assuming to avert a third 
such catastrophe, the free nations have not been 
inhibited by doctrine or dogma from adaptability 
and ingenuity in meeting their economic prob- 
lems. As a result, and despite the dire prophecies 
to the contrary, there has lieen a long-term rise in 
living standards among the industrially advanced 
nations. And this rise has been accompanied by 
an ever broader distribution of income. In the 
United States, for example, the real income in 
terms of purchasing power of the average Ameri- 
can citizen has risen at least 40 percent since 1929. 
And this improvement, reflected in higher living 
standards, has been greatest among people in the 
middle and lower parts of the income scale. 

The record will also show that the free nations 
have learned a great deal since the depression of 
the 1930's and that this learning has been applied 
in a whole sei'ies of measures which offer protection 
against a recurrence of that experience. We have 
built into our economies a series of stabilizers to 
protect our living standards and to encourage the 
productivity which makes them possible. Our so- 
cial-security programs, price supports against se- 
vere declines in farm incomes, bank deposit insur- 
ance, modernized flexible banking and credit poli- 
cies, as well as the tremendous accumulated de- 
mand for housing and public works — all of these 
are but a few of the stabilizers which would oper- 
ate to counterbalance any substantial changes in 
economic conditions. 

So much for the ability of the free economies to 
handle their domestic problems with skill and 



644 



Department of Sfafe Bulletin 



flexibility. But what of their ability to work to- 
gether in coping with forces tliat threaten eco- 
nomic stability? Here too, I think, the postwar 
record will show that the fi'ee nations are able to 
get together to create machinery to solve mutual 
economic problems. Consider the instruments that 
have been developed ]ust in recent years to meet 
problems of international cooperation — such in- 
struments as the International Bank, the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund, the Regional Economic 
Commissions for Europe, Asia, and Latin Amer- 
ica, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
the Schuman Plan, and many others. 

These instruments, together with many other 
worlis, have been put together in the face of the 
tremendous burdens we have inherited from pre- 
vious wars and also in the face of the burdens we 
now bear to prevent future wars. 

We look forward with confidence to the oppor- 
tunities for further growth and expansion which 
will open to us and to all free nations whenever 
the threat to our freedom and independence sub- 



sides and we can safely x'elease our great creative 
energies from the burden of armaments. 

We all have a transcending common interest in 
this interdependent world in expanding freedom 
and increased well-being. We all have much to 
gain by cooperating together to advance this com- 
mon interest in "better standards of life in larger 
freedom." 

Our differing ways of life may impel us to pur- 
sue our objectives in various ways. But if we have 
confidence in our own particular ways we should 
be willing to submit them to the test of experience. 
We should be willing to be judged by the results 
of our works rather than by the prowess of our 
arms. 

Let us then work to banish force and the threat 
of force as an instrument of national or ideological 
policy. Let us in this interdependent world share 
freedom with all men and all nations. Let us vie 
with one another, not in the arts of war but in the 
ways of peace, in the ways of building a world 
of expanding freedom and increased well-being for 
all mankind. 



Problems Facing the Seventh General Assembly 



by John D. Ilickerson 

Assistant Secretary for United Nation Affairs '■ 



It is good to be back with you again at this an- 
nual reception to our delegates to the United Na- 
tions. 

This year, perhaps by accident or perhaps by 
design, you are meeting midway between the open- 
ing of the seventh session of the General Assembly 
and the celebration of the seventh anniversary of 
the ratification of the Charter. This is a good oc- 
casion to talk about some of the problems facing 
the General Assembly and the pait we Americans 
can play in helping to find solutions. 

We all know that the United Nations has not 
transformed the world in the first 7 years of its 
history. That, we can freely admit without deny- 
ing the validiliy of the ideals expressed at San 
Francisco or the value of the organization in these 
7 years. 

We have found that peace, real peace, has not 



' Address made before the American Association for the 
United Nations at New York on Oct. 19 (press release 818). 



been as easy to achieve as all of us had hoped in 
1945. But we are still guided and inspired by the 
goals of the Charter — to maintain international 
peace and security, to develop friendly relations 
among nations, and to achieve international co- 
operation. The obstacles to these goals have made 
us more determined than ever to make the United 
Nations work. This is not easy, but we believe that 
it can be done and must be done. It can be done 
if we marshal all our ingenuity, all our energy, all 
our powers of persuasion and leadership in get- 
ting all freedom-loving members of the United 
Nations to assume and carry out their responsibili- 
ties tmder the Charter. This is the task before us 
every day in the year. It is especially challenging 
as we face the iiroblems of the seventh session of 
the General Assembly. 

When people talk abotit the United Nations, 
they often do not distinguish between the Security 
Council, the General Assembly, or other organs of 
the United Nations. However, it is important to 



Ocfober 27, ?952 



645 



make these distinctions and to keep them clearly 
in mind, because of the fundamental differences 
in the responsibilities given them under the Char- 
ter. One of the main reasons the General As- 
sembly has such a great variety of difficult prob- 
lems on its agenda is this: The 55 Soviet vetoes 
in the Security Council have demonstrated that the 
Security Council can act effectively only when the 
U.S.S.R. wants it to. Inevitably, the other mem- 
bers of the United Nations have turned to the Gen- 
eral Assembly as an action body. Admittedly, it 
is far from ideally suited to this role. But it is the 
best we have available. Since it was not expected 
to handle many of the problems now given to it, 
it has a special responsibility to consider them 
soberly and responsibly. 

Continuing Crisis Atmospliere 

There has been talk about the highly charged 
atmosphere of this General Assembly session. We 
shouldn't let that bother us too much. We ou";ht 
to be getting used to it. Just about every Assembly 
session opens against a background of tension and 
frustration. That's due to the state of the world, 
not the state of the General Assembly. This is the 
third session of the General Assembly while men 
are dying for the United Nations in Korea. Just 
as all of us have had to harden ourselves to live in 
a continuing crisis atmosphere, the General Assem- 
bly has had to accustom itself to meeting against a 
background of crisis. As realists, we don't expect 
the General Assembly to find adequate solutions to 
all the problems before it this year. We do expect 
to play our part in assisting the General Assembly 
to consider carefully the issues before it and, where 
possible, to contribute to their solution. 

It seems to me that a simple test should be ap- 
plied to each issue that confronts the General As- 
sembly : What can the Assembly do to improve the 
prospects for settlement of that issue ? The answer 
in each case must take into account many factors : 
What are the direct responsibilities of the parties 
concerned? Are they carrying out their obliga- 
tions under the Charter? If not, what is the most 
effective way of getting them to do so? 

Under the Charter, the General Assembly is 
given many types of responsibility and is equipped 
with a wide variety of powers. For example, it 
can be a forum to hear grievances. It can be a 
meeting place for important diplomatic conversa- 
tions. It can make or review reports and studies. 
Or it can take specific action in vital matters of col- 
lective defense against aggression. There may be 
instances where doubt arises as to the legal author- 
ity of the General Assembly to take particular ac- 
tion. But usually the most important question in 
each instance is whether the proposed action would 
be wise and practical. 

The application of wisdom and practical states- 
manship to each of the issues before the Assembly 
will be difficult enough in the face of honest differ- 
ences of opinion and strong national emotions. 



The difficulty is intensified by the efforts of the 
Soviet bloc to exploit every disagreement, actual or 
potential, to its own advantage. We may look for- 
vrard to efforts to inflame passions, to stir up trou- 
ble, to threaten, to deceive — to do anything in fact, 
which will tend to impede the settlement of prob- 
lems in accordance with the Charter or which will 
further the Soviet foreign policy of splitting us 
from our allies and other friends. 

We had a good sample of this yesterday when 
Mr. Vyshinsky disappointed those who had hoped 
against hope that he would modify, if only slightly, 
his typical vitriolic performance.- Instead he 
played again his same old worn-out phonograph 
record of lies and hate. Of course, this refusal to 
carry out the obligations of the Charter will com- 
plicate the solution of problems. Nevertheless, we 
believe that the other representatives in the United 
Nations now understand the nature and purpose of 
Soviet tactics and that they will join with us in 
frustrating them. We must therefore not become 
so discouraged by cynical Soviet tactics that we 
unwittingly further their objectives by ourselves 
abandoning hopes and efforts to deal with the is- 
sues before us. 

The most important issue before the General 
Assembly is Koi'ea. As Secretary Acheson said 
last Thursday, "The United Nations fight in Korea 
is the fight of every nation and every individual 
who values freedom." 

We come to this Assembly with a record in 
Korea which every American can be proud of. In 
28 months of fighting, the Communist aggressors 
have been thrown back beyond the starting point 
of their aggression. They have suffered terrible 
losses in men, materiel, and prestige. The plain 
fact is that they failed in their first overt aggres- 
sion. Hitler did not fail until his last. 

Proportionate Siiaring of tlie Korean Burden 

Along with the gallant South Koreans, whose 
losses have exceeded ours, we have borne a dis- 
proportionate share of the military burden in 
Korea. We have had fighting with us 15 other 
forces of U.N. members. They have fought well — 
sensationally well. But there should be more 
troops there now, ready to continue the fighting as 
long as necessary. We intend to press hard in the 
General Assembly to get as manj' U.N. members 
as possible, who have not done so, to face up to 
their responsibilities in Korea. We have shown 
the aggressors that we will not flinch at the time of 
attack. We must also show them that they can- 
not wear us down. We have the moral and physi- 
cal stamina to outlast them. 

In Korea, we were entrusted by the United Na- 
tions with the conduct of the military operations, 
including the armistice negotiations. We have 



' For excerpts from Andrei Vyshinsky's Oct. 18 state- 
ment in the General Assembly, see Bulletin of Oct. 20, 
1952, p. 634. 



646 



Department of State Bulletin 



never lost sight of our goals — to achieve peace 
on terms consistent with the Charter and to avoid 
World War III. Yesterday we sent the Secre- 
tary-General a special report for the members of 
the United Nations on our stewardship.^ I be- 
lieve that it will show that the Unified Command 
has been worthy of the trust reposed in it. 

I want to say a few words about the armistice 
negotiations. For almost 15 months we have 
been negotiating with the Communists on behalf 
of the United Nations. This has been an incred- 
ibly difficult task. In spite of every conceivable 
frustration and obstacle, our negotiators have 
dealt with the Communists with firmness, skill, 
and infinite patience. We have sincerely made 
every effort to achieve an honorable armistice. 
Only one issue remains unsettled: Should pris- 
oners of war who resist repatriation be returned 
to the Communists at the point of a bayonet? On 
this matter of principle, we have said that we can- 
not and will not yield. We have made many al- 
ternative proposals to settle the question, but all 
of them have been categorically rejected by the 
Communists. They have not yet come forward 
with a single constructive proposal. By "con- 
structive" we do not mean warmed-over versions, 
such as mentioned yesterday by Mr. Vyshinsky, 
of the same old Communist insistence on repatria- 
tion by force. It has been made clear that the 
responsibility for continuing the hostilities rests 
with the Communist aggressors. Yet we have not 
given up, nor will we give up, our hope or our 
efforts for peace. We have not broken off the 
negotiations. Our proposals remain open to the 
Communists. The duration of the present recess 
in the truce talks is up to them. As General 
Clark said on October 8, "We continue ready to 
conclude an armistice acceptable to the conscience 
of free peoples. It is up to the Communists to 
show whether they too want such an armistice." * 

There will be nothing in our Korean proposals 
to the General Assembly suggesting that the truce 
negotiations be transferred to New York. That 
would solve nothing. Our program on Korea in 
the General Assembly will have one central objec- 
tive — to demonstrate to the Communist aggressors 
in every possible way that on this issue — collective 
resistance to aggression — the free nations stand 
solidly together. The best chance for an armistice 
is for the United Nations to show that it is united 
and resolute. 

In addition to mobilizing support for the U.N. 
action in Korea, the General Assembly must go 
forward with its long-range efforts to build a sound 
structure of collective security. There are many 
lessons to be learned from the Korean experience. 
The Assembly should frankly recognize that the 
recoi'd of performance in Korea is not good enough 
for a permanent system of collective resistance to 

'See U.S./U.N. press release (No. 1554) dated Oct. 18, 
1952. 

' Bdlletin of Oct. 20, 1952, p. 600. 



aggression. There must be no free rides. Every 
nation desiring the protection of such a system 
must be prepared to share proportionately in the 
sacrifices and the risks. Each must be willing to 
make the most precious contribution that can be 
made — manpower, human lives. We have amply 
demonstrated that we are willing to do our share — 
more than our share — but we are entitled to point 
out that while we may have the greatest per capita 
income in the world, our population per capita is 
the same as any other country. If the United 
Nations is to succeed, these patient efforts must 
continue from Assembly to Assembly. 

Disarmament Program Outlined 

There is another record we Americans can be 
proud of as the General Assembly meets — our ef- 
forts in the field of disarmament. We have not 
yet succeeded in these efforts and Mr. Vyshinsky 
made it clear again yesterday that there is no im- 
mediate prospect that we will. But, together with 
our British and French colleagues, we have set 
forth the broad outline of a possible and workable 
disarmament program. We have proposed great 
reductions in all armed forces, over 50 percent in 
the case of the United States and the U.S.S.R. We 
have suggested procedures to reduce armaments. 
We have given our ideas on the broad relationship 
between the principal elements in a disarmament 
program. We have shown that effective safe- 
guards can be devised. We have shown that we 
do have a genuine and serious will to reduce armed 
forces and armaments to the point where aggres- 
sion will be unlikely. I think our record on dis- 
armament has strengthened our relations with 
other free nations in the United Nations because 
it is a demonstration of our will to peace. We 
shall review that record in the current General 
Assembly. We feel that despite Soviet obstruc- 
tion, the efforts of the Disarmament Commission 
should continue. But, as the Secretary said in 
addressing the Assembly, "Until all states with 
substantial armaments are willing to cooperate in 
effective, guaranteed disarmament, the free law- 
abiding nations of the world must arm and remain 
armed in self-defense." 

There is another type of problem confronting 
the General Assembly — that which grows out of 
the aspirations of peoples for a determining voice 
in their own affairs. Here is an area where the 
General Assembly must grope slowly and care- 
fully with baflSing and sensitive issues. Here is an 
area where the United States must play the cau- 
tious, thankless role of moderator. Our own his- 
tory and our present responsibilities make it in- 
evitable that this be our role. 

We have listened to both sides and their friends 
on each of the disputed issues. We have learned 
to understand and appreciate the depth of feeling 
of each of the parties. There are honest differences 
of opinion as to what role the General Assembly 
should play in settling each of these issues. Thei'e 



Ocfofaer 27, 1952 



647 



is only one clear conclusion : No magic formula 
exists to solve these problems. Each issue must 
be handled from beginning to end with the utmost 
care so that the situation is improved and not 
worsened. Those of us who are not directly in- 
volved in these controversies, but have the confi- 
dence of all of the parties, have a special responsi- 
bility to assist the parties to come nearer to a solu- 
tion. That's what we're trying to do. 

In the nature of things, we should not expect 
to succeed fully. In spite of earnest efforts to pro- 
mote sober and temperate discussion, there may 
well be some bitter words, some inflamed tempers — 
perhaps even some action we consider ill-advised. 
But these will not be the only tests of success in 
this field. The real test will be whether, by the 
end of the session, some progress has been made 



in bringing the parties closer together and in ad- 
vancing the goals of the Charter. Measured by 
this yardstick, rather than by the daily headlines, 
I am not pessimistic about the prospects for 
success. 

Let me say a little more about these headlines. 
The United Nations is always competing for space 
with many dramatic world events, not the least 
of which at this time is our own election campaigii. 
It is only natural that many stories about the Gen- 
eral Assembly should feature "clashes," "crises," 
"splits," "bitterness," et cetera — in fact, that some 
should at times even reflect almost contemptuous 
impatience with the slowness of the whole process. 
Remember, though, when you see the headlines 
and the spicy stories, that we are dealing with 
problems which cannot be solved overnight and 



Summary of Proposals Made to the 
Disarmament Commission 

The Disarmament Commission established by the 
sixth session of the General Assembly (U.N. doc. 
A/L.2.'5, dated January 12, 19.52 ; Bulletin of March 
31, 1952, p. 507) began work on March 14, at the 
U.N. Headquarters in New York. On that date the 
United States presented a proposed plan of work 
(U.N. doc. DC/3 ; Buixetin of March 31, p. 503) sug- 
gesting five major subjects for consideration : 

1. A verified census of all troops and arms, includ- 
ing atomic weapons ; 

2. Limitation of armaments, and elimination of 
atomic weapons and all instruments adaptable to 
mass destruction ; 

3. Negotiation of agreements on troops and arms 
permitted each state ; 

4. Enforcements and safeguards ; 

5. Procedure and timing of program. 

On April 5 the United States presented as a basis 
for discussion a working paper proposing an arma- 
ments-and-armed-forces census to be carried out in 
five successive stages, beginning with a count of less 
secret armaments and progressing to the "detailed 
disclosure of stockpiles of novel [i.e., post-World 
War II] armaments including atomic" (U.N. doc. 
DC/Comm.2/1; Bulletin of Apr. 14, 10.52, p. 586). 

For the purpose of seeking advance agreement on 
the objectives which should guide the Commission, 
the United States, on April 24, listed six principles 
which it considered essential lo an effective disarm- 
ament program (U.N. doc. DC/C.l/l : Bulletin of 
May 12, 1952, p. 752) : 

(1) The goal of disarmament is not to regulate 
but to prevent war by relaxing tensions and fears 
created by armaments and by making war im- 
possible. 

(2) To achieve this goal, all states must cooperate 
in reducing armed forces and armaments so that 
none will lie able to prepare for war openly or 
secretly. 

(3) All states must join in international agree- 
ments restricting arms to types and quantities 
needed for internal security, and to carry out their 
obligations under the U.N. Charter. 

(4) These agreements must insure the progressive 
and balanced reduction of arms and armies, and the 



elimination of all weapons adaptable to mass 
destruction. 

(5) There must be effective safeguards provided 
for all phases of the disarmament program. Pro- 
hibition of atomic weapons must be accompanied 
by an effective system of international control of 
atomic energy to insure that atomic energy Is used 
for peaceful purposes only. 

(6) The agreements must provide for an effective 
system of progressive and continuing disclosure and 
verification of all armed forces and armaments, in- 
cluding atomic. 

On May 28 the United States joined the United 
Kingdom and France in presenting the first of two 
proposals for setting up limitations on armed forces 
(U.N. doc. DC/10; Bulletin of June 9, 19.52, p. 910). 
The tripartite working paper suggested that the 
U.S., the U.S.S.R., and China might limit their mili- 
tary forces to a maximum of, say, between 1,000,000 
and l.ijOO.OOO men each ; the U.K. and France, to a 
maximum of, say, between 700,000 and 800,000 ; and 
all other countries with substantial armed strength 
to less than 1 percent of their populations except in 
unusual circumstances. A supplement to this pro- 
posal for numerical ceilings was presented to the 
Commission by the three powers on August 12 (U.N. 
doc. DC/12; Bulletin of August 25, 1952, p. 292). 
The .supplementary working paper calls for limit- 
ing armaments in types and quantities to those nec- 
essary to support ix'rmitted armed forces; suggests 
that the five permanent members of the Security 
Council hold a conference to negotiate tentative 
agreement among themselves as to the bases for 
establishing numerical ceilings and the distribution 
of permitted armed forces among national military 
services : and outlines the correlation between the 
major elements of a disarmament program. 

«»n August 15, 1952, the United States gave its 
views favoring the elimination of bacterial weapons 
as part of a comprehensive disarmament program, 
emphasizing the necessity for safeguards in which 
the disclosure and verification proposals played an 
important role. These views were summarized on 
September 4 in a U.S. working paper presented to 
the Commission ( U.N. doc. DC/15 ; for text see 
p. 671). 

For an analysis of the tripartite disarmament 
program by Durward V. Sandifer, Deputy Assistant 
Secretarv for U.N. Affairs, see BuiximN of Septem- 
ber 29, 1952, p. 478. 



648 



Department of Sfafe Bulletin 



which usually cannot be solved in terms of "vic- 
tory." Remember, too, that the main achieve- 
ments of the United Nations are rarely reflected 
in headlines or news stories. How often do you 
see a headline or story about Dr. Frank Graham's 
patient eiforts to bring India and Pakistan closer 
to agreement on the Kashmir problem ; about the 
AVorld Health Organization's campaign against 
malaria; about improving living standards 
through technical assistance ; about making inter- 
national air travel safer; about developing and 
exchanging statistics on trade, commerce, produc- 
tion — so important to the emerging countries of 
the Middle and Far East ; about the thousands of 
other daily activities of the United Nations and 
its specialized agencies? These are true measures 
of success. I hope that you who know about them 
will see that they become better and more widely 
known. 

Finally, may I share with you a few thoughts 
about our role of responsible leadership in the 
United Nations? How can we exercise that lead- 
ership most wisely and effectively? First of all, 
the positions we take must be sound and morally 
right. They must, of course, be truly representa- 
tive of the American public. I believe that we 
come as close as possible to meeting this require- 
ment by reason of the bipartisan nature of our 
delegation and our constant consultation with 
American leaders and groups. 

The second test of our leadership is whether we 



can count on the firm support of our allies. This 
means that we must have a true partnership with 
them. We must consult them. We must take into 
account their viewpoint and their problems. In- 
cidentally, sometimes our allies get blamed for 
things which never happened or aren't their fault. 
For instance, a few days ago a story made the 
rounds that Secretary Acheson had "watered 
down" his opening address because of pressure 
from certain friendly delegations. There was no 
basis for the stoi'y at all. Not only had no drafts 
been discussed with them, but there had been no 
"watering down" in successive drafts. 

Third, in order to obtain the support of the 
other non-Soviet membei-s of the United Nations 
we must be able to persuade them of the essential 
correctness of our position. To do this effectively, 
we must understand their doubts and answer them 
patiently and convincingly in terms of their own 
self interest. We must welcome their construc- 
tive suggestions. We must seek to lead and not 
to dominate. This means that we cannot always 
act as quickly or as decisively as we would some- 
times like. But the end result will be worth the 
trouble. 

These are the elements of responsible leader- 
ship wliich your delegation will bear in mind as it 
approaches the issues of the seventh General As- 
sembly. With your support and understanding, 
we shall do our utmost to help the Assembly make 
a real contribution to peace. 



U.S.S.R. Charged with Misrepresenting'Facts in Bomber Incident 



On Octoher 12 Deputy Foreign Minister Push- 
kin of the Soviet Union handed to the U.S. Charge 
at Moscow, Elim O^Shaughnessy, a note charging 
that on Octoher 7 a U.S. B-29 homher violated So- 
viet frontiers in the area of Yuri Island. The 
note further charged, that the aircraft opened fre 
on two Soviet fighter planes, which returned the 
fire, and that the American aircraft then disap- 
peared in the direction of the sea. On Octoher 
17 the A?nerican Emhassy at Moscow delivered to 
the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs the U.S. 
reply of protest against this unprovoked Soviet 
attack on an American plane. 

Printed helow are texts of the Soviet note of 
Octoher 12 and the U.S. reply of Octoher 17. 



SOVIET NOTE OF OCTOBER 12 

Telegraphic text 

The Government of the U.S.S.R. considers it 
necessary to state the following to the Govern- 
ment of the U.S.A. 

According to a verified report from competent 
Soviet agencies on October 7, 1952, at about 15 
hours 30 minutes, Vladivostok time, a four- 
motored B-29 bomber with U.S.A. identification 
signs violated the state frontier of the U.S.S.R. 
in the area of the Yuri Island. Two Soviet fighters 
which had taken off demanded that the American 
bomber follow them for landing at the nearest air 
drome. Instead of fulfilling the legitimate de- 
mand of Soviet fighters, the violating airplane 



Ocfober 27, 1952 



649 



opened fire on them. After returning the fire of 
the Soviet fighters, tiie American bomber went off 
in tlie direction of the sea. 

Tlie Soviet Government expresses decisive pro- 
test against this new case of violation of the state 
frontier of the U.S.S.E. by American military 
airplane and insists that the U.S. Government take 
measures for prohibition of violations of the state 
frontiers of the U.S.S.R. by American airplanes. 

U.S. REPLY OF OCTOBER 17 

Press release 816 dated October 17 

The Embassy of the United States of America 
acknowledges the receipt of the Ministry's note 
of October 12, 1952, and upon instructions from 
its Government, states the following : 

In its note, the Ministry asserts that on October 
7, 1952, at apiDroximately 15 hours 30 minutes, 
Vladivostok time, a U.S. B-29 bomber aircraft 
violated the state frontier of the Soviet Union in 
the area of Yuri Island, that this aircraft opened 
fire on two Soviet fighter planes, and that the 
Soviet fighter planes then returned fire after which 
the U.S. aircraft went off in the direction of the 
sea. 

The American aircraft referred to in the Min- 
istry's note was a U.S. Air Force plane with a 
crew of eight officers and men on a routine flight 
over Japan from which it did not return. The 
plane was not equipped for combat operations of 
any kind. It carried no bombs and its guns were 
inoperative. Its officers were under explicit in- 
structions to remain within Japanese territory at 
all times. 

A thorough investigation by U.S. authorities 
has established that the U.S. Air Force plane did 
not, as alleged, violate any Soviet state frontier 
and that it did not at any time fly over Yuri Island. 
In fact, the radar plot of the tracks of the U.S. 
and Soviet aircraft shows conclusively that the 
interception by the Soviet fighter aircraft occurred 
32 miles from Yuri Island and approximately 
6 miles from the Island of Hokkaido. 

Moreover, the question of a violation of the 
Soviet state frontier could not arise in any case 
since the island of Yuri is not Soviet territory, 
but as an island of the Habomai Group is Jap- 
anese territory under Japanese sovereignty. 

By its calculated misrepresentation of the facts 
of this incident the Soviet Government has sought, 
not for the first time, to evade responsibility for 
a wanton and unjustifiable attack carried out on 
an undefended plane by fighter planes of its air 
force. This responsibility must be borne by the 
Soviet Government, however, and the U.S. Gov- 
ernment would urge the Soviet Government seri- 
ously to consider the grave consequences which 
can flow from its reckless practice, if persisted in, 
of attacking without provocation the aircraft of 
other states. 



Accordingly, the Embassy has been instructed 
to reject the Ministry's note of October 12 as being 
without foundation in fact, to protest in the strong- 
est terms against the unprovoked shooting down 
of the U.S. plane, and to request the payment of 
appropriate compensation for the loss of this air- 
craft and the lives of any of its crew who may 
have perished. 

The Soviet Government is further requested to 
furnish an immediate report on the results of the 
search operation which, on the basis of an eye- 
witness account reported in the investigation con- 
ducted by the U.S. Government, is believed to 
have been carried out by a Soviet patrol boat oper- 
ating from Suisho-To Island, and to provide full 
information on the whereabouts and welfare of 
any crew members who may have survived with 
a view to their prompt repatriation to the United 
States. 



Toward European and Atlantic Unity 

hy Ambassador William H. Draper, Jr. 
JJ. S. Special Representative in Europe ^ 

Powerful forces are driving the countries of the 
Western World to change the political patterns 
of centuries and to move toward new forms of as- 
sociation. Aggressive dictatorship in this twen- 
tieth century leaves free peoples of the West only 
this choice : Unity in freedom or unity in slavery. 
We are choosing unity in fi'eedom. 

Within the past few months events have been 
taking place in Europe which will stand out 
sharply in the perspective of history. Six na- 
tions in the heart of continental Europe have taken 
important steps toward the merger of their sov- 
ereignties in a single community. On a broader 
front we have just witnessed a great surge of ac- 
tivity by the 16 nations in the Council of Europe. 
In Paris, the Organization for European Eco- 
nomic Cooperation continues its vital work di- 
rected toward creating a single market in Europe 
that is both wide and deep. 

The European Coal and Steel Community — the 
so-called Schuman Plan — merging the basic re- 
sources of six countries, has come into being. 

Other important European projects are in the 
wind. A new spirit is growing in Europe today — 
a European spirit — and with it the hope that ade- 
quate security, economic well-being, and a life of 
dignity, so uncertain on a national scale, can be 
found in a wider context. 

The pressures and incentives that favor Euro- 
pean unification are plain. Clearly, the free coun- 



' Address made before the New York Herald Tribune 
Forum at New York City, Oct. 20 (press release 811 dated 
Oct. 16). 



650 



Department of State Bulletin 



tries of Europe are in danger, if separate, of fall- 
ing one by one under Soviet domination. 

But the Soviet threat is not the only force driv- 
ing Western Europe toward unification. Let us 
not forget, for Europe certainly does not, that na- 
tionalist aggression originating in Germany caused 
two world wars that brought the civilized world 
to the brinli of destruction. During the long 
agony of World War II there was born a grim 
determination among people in many countries of 
Europe, including Germany, that nationalist ag- 
gression must never happen again. This deter- 
mination sustains the statesmen of continental 
Western Europe as they fashion an integrated Eu- 
I'opean army to prevent aggression by one country 
against the other, while building the defensive 
strength of all against outside aggression from the 
East. 

Economic and political necessities likewise drive 
Europe toward unity. Insuflicient production and 
narrow markets; national barriers to commerce, 
transport, and movement of labor ; low productiv- 
ity — these have hindered its economic progress and 
its resistance to Communist subversion. It has 
become increasingly evident to the people of 
Western Europe that they can survive in freedom 
and economic decency only with wider groupings 
of political and economic power, capable not only 
of solving more of Europe's basic problems with- 
out outside aid but also of playing a more in- 
fluential role in world affairs. 

European Unification: An Attainable Goal 

Today, European unification is no longer a re- 
mote ideal but an attainable objective. 

It is an attainable objective provided — and to 
my mind this proviso is crucial — provided the 
movement toward unity in Europe continues to 
take place as a part of the growing unity of the 
Atlantic community. 

If you chart the growth of European institu- 
tions in the last few years you have also to chart 
the growth of the Atlantic community. And you 
have to trace initiative, action, and interaction 
back and forth endlessly across the Atlantic. For 
European unity has grown only within the frame- 
work of a developing Atlantic community. And 
European and Atlantic institutions are inter- 
twined and interdependent. 

It was General Marshall's initiative in 1947, in 
response to Europe's manifest need, that called 
into being the Committee for European Economic 
Cooperation. In turn, it was the Brussels Pact of 
1948 that was the progenitor of the North Atlantic 
Pact of 1949 and that kd directly to the creation 
of the Council of Europe. It was in the Council 
of Europe that a European defense force was 
first proposed and debated ; but it was a decision 
of the North Atlantic Council regarding a Ger- 
man defense contribution that called forth the 
proposal for a European army from Mr. Pleven, 



then Prime Minister of France. The treaty for 
a European defense community was brought to 
signature primarily by great European states- 
manship, l)ut with the strong encouragement of 
the United States as essential to the security and 
well-being of the Atlantic community. 

It is not by chance that the growth of unity in 
Western Europe in the past 5 years has been paral- 
leled by the growth of the Atlantic community. 
It is not mere coincidence that continental Eu- 
rope has created organs of unity step by step with 
the commitment of U.S., British, and Canadian 
resources and power to the defense and economic 
well-being of Europe as part of the Atlantic com- 
munity. 

These parallel developments — toward European 
unity and toward Atlantic unity — are impelled 
by the same hopes, fears, and pressures. 

Soviet imperialism threatens Western Europe, 
but it threatens no less the United States. And it 
is clear beyond question that Europe alone, no mat- 
ter how organized, cannot within the foreseeable 
future successfully defend itself against Soviet 
attack. Nor can the United States afford to be 
without allies. Both Europe and we ourselves 
need a gi'eater coalition of strength — the Atlantic 
coalition. 

The revival of German or other aggression in 
Western Europe itself is a danger that the coun- 
tries there must guard against as must we in the 
United States. This, at least, we have learned 
from two world wars in our time. This threat 
can be partially guarded against by a continental 
Europe so organized — with national military 
power and resources so merged — as to make 
nationalist aggression difficult. But the full 
guaranty lies in Atlantic community organiza- 
tion, with European defense forces merged into a 
Nato army. 

Likewise, continental Europe's basic economic 
and social problems can be partially solved by 
purely European action to create a single market 
and to rationalize and expand production over a 
a wider area. But their solution is also dependent 
upon the tariff rates, foreign-investment prac- 
tices, and raw-materials policies of the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and Canada — and 
upon the level of economic activity in the United 
States. 

It is highly significant, I think, that progress 
toward greater economic cooperation and integra- 
tion in Europe in the past 5 years has been made 
within the context of large-scale U.S. economic 
aid which has relieved external balance-of-pay- 
ments difficulties. Long-range progress is likely 
in the future only if Europe finds means of earn- 
ing its way in the world and of assuring a decent 
standard of living to its people without large- 
scale outside aid. 

We have made great strides the past 2 years in 
strengthening our military defenses. But Gen- 
eral Eidgway, the Supreme Commander, has 



Ocfober 27, 1952 



651 



given clear warning that we have not done 
enough — that we must build greater and greater 
strength in the face of today's danger. He is 
right. We must hold to our course. Mutual 
security must come first. 

But we in the United States have not, as yet, 
faced frontally and frankly the fact that sound 
businesslike economic foundations for the At- 
lantic community must also be built and main- 
tained. Instead we have kept standing a 
veritable Chinese Wall of customs barriers and 
procedures. With too little trade we have been 
shoring up the community with grants of aid. 
Neither do I think the other members of the At- 
lantic community have faced up to their side of 
the same problem. In my opinion, Europe must 
prodiu-e much more.^ and we must huy much more 
from Europe. Unless we import more, the exist- 
ing dollar gap threatens our own expoit trade 
and may unfavorably affect our mutual defense 
effort. We must consider together the longer 
range economic and social problems of the At- 
lantic connnunity — as a community — and move 
toward sound solutions and closer association. 

If the North Atlantic Treaty nations are to 
build and maintain common defenses over a long 
period — military defenses, economic defenses, 
political defenses — it will be necessary to reach 
clear understandings, to hammer out common 
policies, and to reach rapid agreement on the 
tactics of mobile defense. We are 14 sovereign 
nations with a common purpose and a common 
objective. Differences in points of view — and 
they will of course continue to arise — must and 
can be resolved in a spirit of mutual good will 
and of full equality. 

Soviet Blueprint for Power and Conquest 

Institutional unity in the North Atlantic area is 
growing today, as we have seen, in several concen- 
tric circles. There is the developing federal struc- 
ture of the six continental nations; there is the 
wider association of Western P^urope as a whole, 
of which the Community of Six is an inescapable 
part; and there is the still wider Atlantic com- 
munity. All are interdependent ; each requires for 
its most effective operation the successful operation 
of the other. Each, at its level, is capable of solv- 
ing certain problems. Each is incapable of dealing 
with problems all across the board. The great 
challenge to statesmanship in the period ahead is 
to make certain that the growing unities of the 
West develop in harmonious relation among tliem- 
selves and also with the free world as a whole. 

It is just such unity and harmony in the West 
that the Kremlin most fears. For more than 2 
weeks we have witnessed the public spectacle of 
Stalin, Malenkov, and others of the Soviet oli- 
garchy sharpening their ideological weapons for a 
renewed assault upon freedom and pointing out 
just where, for fullest effect, the main blows are to 
be delivered. 



And where are those most vital spots? Pre- 
cisely those points at which free peoples are draw- 
ing together and presenting a united front. The 
tremendous power of the Soviet Empire — its prop- 
aganda, its diplomacy, its economy, its world-wide 
subversive apparatus — is to be concentrated upon 
disrupting the growing solidarity of the free 
world, to prevent the unification of Europe, and 
to break up the Atlantic alliance. Stalin predicts 
our economic collapse. Moreover, he even openly 
predicts that he will not need to attack us because 
we will attack and destroy each other. 

It was not very long ago that Hitler described 
in Mein Kampf the means by which he expected 
to rise to power in Germany and how he proposed 
to use that power to dominate the Eurasian Conti- 
nent. Many people who should have known better 
persisted, right up to the end, in disbelieving and 
ignoring his blueprint for power aTid conquest. 

Today, Stalin's plan of action for the period 
ahead is in print — right before our eyes. We, the 
free world, can checkmate that plan. Let us, this 
time, use our knowledge wisely and well. Let us 
unite now in political, economic, and military 
defense. 



First Report to Congress on 
Battle Act of 1951 

W. Aveiell Harriman, Director for Mutual 
Security, in his capacity as Administrator of the 
Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, 
on October 15 released his first semiannual report 
to the Congress on security controls over exports 
to the Soviet bloc, commonly known as the Battle 
Act. 

A companion law to the Mutual Security Act of 
1951, the Battle Act was enacted by the Congress 
to support, extend, and strengthen the controls 
exercised by the free nations over the export of 
strategic materials to the Soviet bloc. 

In presenting the report, Mr. Harriman stated 
that "substantial progress had been made in con- 
trolling strategic trade in such a way as to rein- 
force our total security." 

The report certifies that for several years, the 
important free world nations "have refused with- 
out any exception, the shipment to the Soviet bloc 
of arms, ammunition, implements of war, or atomic 
energy materials." 

These nations also deny the Soviet bloc a large 
range of other strategic products and control 
shipments, in quantity, of still other export mate- 
rials. 

Export licensing systems have been strength- 
ened and illegal trade cut down, the report points 
out. 

In addition, stricter measures have been in- 
voked by the free nations against Communist 
China after the United Nations recommended in 



652 



Department of %tate Bulletin 



May 1951 a strategic embargo on exports to that 
aggressor nation. 

In his letter of transmittal to the Congress, 
Mr. Harriman, while emphasizing the necessity for 
preventing highly strategic goods from falling 
into Soviet hands, pointed out that at the present 
time '"cutting off trade entirely would harm our 
common defense effort more than it harms the 
potential aggressor." 

"Other free nations," he said, "obtain com- 
modities from the Soviet bloc that are extremely 
valuable to their own defense efforts and the 
economic stability on which their defense is based." 

The most effective control system at this time, 
he asserted, is a selective one, which stops highly 
strategic exports to the Soviet bloc at the same 
time as it allows the flow of other exports in re- 
turn for commodities which the free world needs. 

The report traces the history of joint controls 
since 1948, when Soviet actions made necessary 
a series of defensive measures in both the military 
and economic field in order to insure the survival 
of the West. 

It tells the story of an informal committee set 
up by the free nations to deal with the security 
aspects of their trade with the East and to deter- 
mine the areas for which common controls were 
necessary. 

The report warns that Kremlin policy is di- 
rected toward making trade controls an issue 
which will "stir up resentment and disagreement 
for the purpose of splitting the United States from 
its allies and destroying our mutual defense sys- 
tem." Under the Battle Act 2:)rogram, which be- 
came operative early this year, the Administrator, 
after consultation with technical and other experts 
in many U.S. agencies, listed for complete em- 
bargo a comprehensive group of military and in- 
dustrial ])roducts. Most of these items wei-e al- 
ready embargoed by other friendly nations. 

The Battle Act provides that in the event a 
nation receiving aid from the United States 
"knowingly permits" shipment of embargo mate- 
rials, such aid shall be terminated unless the Presi- 
dent determines that cessation of aid would be 



"clearly detrimental to the security of the United 
States." In a few cases, embargoed items have 
been shipped in fulfillment of contracts concluded 
before the enactment of the Battle Act. The Ad- 
ministrator's report sets forth Presidential deter- 
minations in these cases. 

The report also reviews the levels of control 
established over "lesser" strategic items, whose 
importance is primarily related to quantities 
shipped. It points out the manner in which goods 
are added to or deleted from control lists in the 
light of technical and other information which 
becomes available. This jirocedure is roughly 
similar to the continually changing "priority 
lists" set up by this Government for a different 
l^urpose — to make available rather than deny vital 
materials to our defense industries. 

The latter part of the re])ort deals with the 
particidar problems posed in Western Europe and 
other free-world areas in terms of the imports 
they continue to require from the Communist coun- 
tries. Measures taken to provide alternate mar- 
kets and sources of supply and to increase domes- 
tic production, the document states, are directly 
related to the success of security controls. Special 
attention is paid to the problem of the dollar gap 
which, if unsolved, increases the economic pres- 
sure on Euroiiean and Asiatic fi'ee nations to trade 
with the Soviet bloc in order to acquire commodi- 
ties for which they are unable to pay in dollars. 
_The report explains that, since the Soviet bloc 
is relatively self-sufficient in most basic raw ma- 
terials and already possesses basic armament in- 
dustries, no amount of controls can stop Soviet 
war production. It is possible, however, to slow 
down that war production, and the report states 
that there is evidence that security controls are 
succeeding in this objective. 

Keemphasizing the dual Battle Act objectives of 
building free-world strength and impeding Soviet 
war potential, the report concludes that these can 
continue to succeed "if the free nations preserve 
their unity of purpose in the face of Soviet at- 
tempts to divide us." 



Ocfofaer 27, 1952 

227020—52 3 



653 



Japanese Education in Review 



by Jane M. Alden 



The history of modern Japanese education dates 
from the Meiji Restoration in 1868. The transfer 
of political power from the Shogun to the Em- 
peror was preceded by the reopening of Japan to 
Western influence. The aim of the leaders of the 
Restoration was to develop, as rapidly as possible, 
a strong, homogeneous state, modern in the West- 
ern sense, capable of resisting the encroachments 
of the Western Powers. Education was immedi- 
ately recognized as a primary means to achieve 
these goals. 

The formative years for the educational system 
coincided with the period when Jaj^an was formu- 
lating a system of modern government and society. 
At the outset there was a marked tendency toward 
indiscriminate acceptance of everything Western 
which eventually precipitated a conflict between 
Western materialism and traditional Japanese 
values. The system of government which finally 
emerged in the Constitution of 1889 was authori- 
tarian, centralized, and modern. The develoiD- 
ment of the Japanese educational system, proceed- 
ing as it did concurrently with the development of 
a modern governmental system, was subject to the 
same influences, conflicts, and pressures. It was 
inevitable that the educational system that finally 
emerged would bear a direct relationship to the 
system and theory of govermnent which the 
Japanese adopted. 

Early Development of the Educational System 

The Ministry of Education was established in 
1871, and the following year it inaugurated a mod- 
ern, centralized educational system. During the 
initial period of development, from 1872 to 1886, 
the philosophy of utilitarianism dominated Japa- 
nese education at the expense of classical learning 
and traditional Japanese moral and cultural val- 
ues. The influence of Ainerican, British, and 
French educational policies and practices was con- 
siderable during this period. Those Japanese ed- 
ucational leaders who were most influenced by 
these contacts opposed centralization and stand- 



ardization and sought to establish, especially in the 
private schools, a tradition of independent 
thought. The growing emphasis on Western 
materialism and the perceptible, but far lesser, 
inroads made by Western educational philosophy 
only served to sharpen the conflict within Japanese 
society and to increase the fears of the dominant 
leadership group. 

By 1886 a strong reaction to the "over West- 
ernization" of the educational system set in. An 
Imperial Ordinance in that year defined the func- 
tion of the Imperial University as providing edu- 
cation to meet the needs of the state. Instruction 
in morals, national language, and classics was rein- 
stated and increasingly emphasized at all levels in 
the school system. In 1890 the Imperial Rescript 
on Education was issued, which defined for the 
succeeding 60 years the role of Japanese educa- 
tion : to prepare Japanese youth for service to the 
state. The Rescript set forth the broad ethical 
principles which Mould henceforth govern pupils 
and teachers and paved the way for nationalist 
indoctrination through the educational system. 
During this period the ascendancy of Prussian in- 
fluence on Japanese education as well as govern- 
ment was apparent. As contrasted with other 
Western influences, it proved to be more compat- 
ible with traditional Japanese values. 

The development and expansion of the educa- 
tional system was rapid during the period from 
1890 through the early 1920's. By the late 1920's 
the tempo of expansion had slowed and attention 
was concentrated on the inculcation of the na- 
tional spirit through the educational system. This 
renewed emphasis on education as the means of 
advancing national policies was a direct outgrowth 
of the rise to power of the military and ultra- 
nationalist groups at home and a renewal of ag- 
gressive conquests abroad. This situation called 
for complete national acceptance and support for 
national policies. The educational system was 
again a primary means to achieve the goals of 
the dominant political leadership. 



654 



Department of State Bulletin 



Education Before World War II 

A brief discussion of the educational sj'steni as 
it existed just prior to the outbreak of the Pacific 
War will serve as a basis for evaluating the 
changes in its organization and philosophy which 
were brought about by the occupation during the 
jjostwar period. 

The progress from elementary schools to a imi- 
versity degree required 17 years. Progression 
from one level to the next was determined by abil- 
ity to pass the entrance examinations and financial 
ability to meet the tuition fees. Only about one- 
half of one percent of the students who entered 
elementary schools ultimately managed to obtain 
a bachelor's degi'ee. This educational system was 
characterized by the acquiring of factual knowl- 
edge (necessary to pass entrance examinations), 
increasing competition because of the prestige of 
a few schools as a student fought his way up the 
educational pyramid, a minimum of student ex- 
pression, and a maximum of standardization of 
subject matter. Throughout his passage through 
the educational system the student was imbued 
with a sense of loyalty and duty to the state, of 
obedience to higher authority, and conformity to 
the accepted social pattern. Only in the private 
schools could the student escape the full impact 
of these forces, but in the years immediately pre- 
ceding the war this relative freedom enjoyed by 
private educational institutions was all but 
extinguished. 

In 1940 there were 52,474 schools throughout 
Japan with 494,538 teachers and 17.4 million stu- 
dents. Compulsory education extended for the 
first 6 years of the elementary school, and although 
this period was extended to 8 years in 1941, the war 
prevented the carrying out of this regulation. 

Elementary schools provided 6 yeai"s of com- 
pulsory education. There were nearly 2r>,000 
elementaiy schools in 1940, almost all of which 
were public. Nearly three-fourths of all students 
were enrolled in these schools. The curriculum 
included the Japanese language, arithmetic, 
science, physical education, geography, and his- 
tory. Boys received training in military arts and 
girls in sewing. Textbooks were either compiled 
by the Mini-stry or approved by it. Standard- 
ization of teaching methods and subject matter 
and learning by rote characterized elementary 
schooling. 

Students proceeded from the elementary schools 
either to attend higher elementary schools for 2 
or 3 years, after which their education terminated, 
or to enter secondary schools. A relatively small 
number of students received no schooling beyond 
the compulsory 6 years in the elementary grades. 

Entrance into secondary or middle schools was 
by written entrance examinations until 1939, when 
oral examinations were substituted in many cases. 
Tuition fees were charged. Approximately 25 
percent of the elementary-school graduates en- 
tered secondary schools each year. The course 



was for 5 years. Boys and girls attended sepa- 
rate schools with different curricukuns, and the 
standards in girls' schools tended to be lower than 
those in boys' schools. 

Teachers in secondary schools had little free- 
dom to experiment in teaching methods or to vary 
subject content. Pupil discussion was not en- 
couraged and conformity rather than individual- 
ity was emi^hasized. Organized military training 
by military officers was given in boys' schools. 

In the boys' schools the entire curriculum was 
designed primarily to prepare the student for the 
entrance examinations for the higher schools; in 
the girls' schools the curriculum was directed 
toward preparing them for their place in society 
since, for most of the students, formal education 
ended at this level. 

The Ministry of Education controlled directly 
or indirectly this vast educational system. There 
were three types of schools : ( 1 ) government or 
national schools, which were established and di- 
rectly controlled by the Ministry; (2) public 
schools established by prefectural and municipal 
governments, and only indirectly controlled by 
the Ministry through the prefectural government; 
and (3) private schools established by individuals 
and organizations which were licensed by the Min- 
istry but had some degi-ee of freedom within the 
general framework of regulations. The national 
government bore the full costs of the national 
schools, while the public schools were supported 
by the national, prefectural, and municipal gov- 
ernments, the latter providing buildings and main- 
tenance. Small tuition fees were also paid by 
the students, even in the compulsory elementary 
grades, and private gifts, often raised by associa- 
tions formed to support the schools, contributed 
to school revenue. 

Following graduation from secondary schools, 
students entered either colleges or normal schools 
where their education was completed, or entered 
the higher schools for a 3-year university prepara- 
tory course. Entrance into all three types of 
schools was by written examination. 

The universities offered a 3-year course leading 
to a bachelor's degree. Postgraduate work from 2 
to 5 years was also offered. In 1940 there were 47 
universities in Japan, 22 of which were located in 
Tokyo. Greatest prestige was attached to gradua- 
tion from one of the nine imperial universities, 
especially from Tokyo Imperial. Instruction in 
the universities was by lectures and from texts 
chosen by the professor. Emphasis was on careful 
memorization of both lectures and texts, and class 
discussion was not encouraged. The freedom of 
the professor to express views that differed radi- 
cally from the prevailing policies of the govern- 
ment or the basic tenets of Japanese society became 
increasingly dangerous as the government intensi- 
fied its jDurge of so-called liberal professors in the 
1930's. Extracurricular student activities were 



October 27, 1952 



655 



carefully organized and supei'vised by the Minis- 
try of Education and the school administration. 

Although the disadvantages from a Western 
point of view of this educational system are most 
often emphasized, the accomplishments should not 
be overlooked. In the short space of 60 years the 
Japanese developed a system which jirovided mass 
education, to which the high literacy rate bears 
M'itness, and this system provided a body of techni- 
cally competent professional people capable of as- 
suming the leadership of a modern industrial 
society. The Japanese have long had a high re- 
gard for education, and continuous efforts were 
made to improve the caliber of education j^rovided. 
The fact that this educational system tended to re- 
inforce the autlioritarian character of the state 
and Japanese society, that it discouraged inde- 
pendence of thought and individual initiative, was 
primarily because this was the purpose it was 
designed to serve. 

Educational Reforms Under the Occupation 

The magnitude of the task wliich the Occupa- 
tion undertook in the field of education is evident 
when the basic philosopliy laid down in the Im- 
perial Rescript on Education of 1890 is compared 
with the philosophy which the Occupation sought 
to introduce. This new philosophy of education 
is perhaps best stated in the directive of the Far 
Eastern Commission to the Supreme Commander 
for the Allied Powers (Scap), dated March 27, 
19i7,^ which reads in part: 

Education should he looked upon as the pursuit of 
truth, as a preparation for life in a democratic nation, 
and as a training for the social and political responsi- 
bilities which freedom entails. Emphasis should be placed 
on the dignity and worth of the individual, on independent 
thought and initiative, and on developing a spirit of 
inquiry. 

The Occujiation policies in respect to education 
can be divided into two general categories: (1) 
on the negative side, to eliminate from the schools 
militaristic and ultranationalist ideology and its 
exponents, and (2) on the positive side, to estab- 
lish an educational system and ideology which 
would further the development of a representative 
government and a society based on the freedom 
and dignity of the individual. The negative task 
was undertaken immediately after the surrender 
despite the dislocation of the school system at the 
end of the war and the urgency of reopening the 
schools to maintain law and order. 

In October 1945 the Japanese Government was 
directed bj' Sc.\p to eliminate from the educational 
system those teachers and school officials who were 
known to be "'militaristic, ultranationalistic or an- 
tagonistic to the objectives and policies of the 
Occupation." These individuals were removed 
and/or barred from occupying any position in 
the educational system. Further, no one who 

• BciLETiN of Apr. 27, 1947, p. 746. 



served in the military was eligible to serve in the 
school system. The Japanese Government set up 
an elaborate screening process to eliminate such 
persons, in accordance with standards drawn up 
by Scap and subject to Scap review. The entire 
purge program was under continuing review by 
Scap officials. 

Other negative actions followed in quick suc- 
cession. The Japanese Government was directed 
to eliminate the dissemination of Shinto doctrines 
by the educational institutions supported in whole 
or in part by public funds. Military education 
was eliminated from the schools. Courses in 
morals, Japanese history, and geography were 
suspended until their content could be reviewed 
and revised and new textbooks prepared. All text- 
books and teachers' manuals relating to these sub- 
jects were withdrawn from the schools. 

On the positive side, the new Constitution which 
came into force in May 1947 and the Fundamental 
Law of Education of 1947 provide the frame- 
work for the new educational system. The Con- 
stitution specifically guarantees academic freedom 
and accords to all people "the right to receive an 
equal education correspondent to their ability." 
Compulsory education is free, and all persons hav- 
ing children under their protection are obligated 
to see that they receive such education. The Fun- 
damental Law of Education outlines the basic 
aims of the new educational system such as aca- , ■ 
demic freedom, equal opportunity in education, ■ 
9 years of free, compulsory education. Further- 
more, coeducation is recognized, religious teaching 
in the public schools is prohibited, and political 
education or activity for or against any specific 
political party is prohibited. 

The New School System 

The school system was completely revised by 
the School Education Law of 1947 which estab- 
lished the 6-3-3-4 system, i. e. 6 years of elemen- 
tary school, 3 years of junior high school, 3 years 
of senior high school, and a 4-year university 
course. Compulsory education was extended to 
9 years, to become fully effective in 1949. At least 
one government university was established in each 
prefecture in order to provide greater educational 
opportunities. 

Within this new educational system far greater 
freedom is permitted both teachers and pupils. 
Textbooks are no longer compiled by the Ministry 
of Education ; teachers and local school authorities 
are permitted to select books from a list of au- 
thorized texts. Coeducation has been accepted, 
although not uniformly throughout the country. 
Generally, however, boys and girls receive equal 
education, and the opportunities for women to 
advance through the educational system have been 
greatly increased. In the classroom the former 
emphasis on teaching by rote has been replaced by 
methods designed to encourage individual expres- 
sion and initiative. 



656 



Department of State Bulletin 



The decentralization of control over the educa- 
tional system is one of the most important changes 
introduced by the Occupation. In place of the 
highly centralized prewar system, control over 
education is legally divided between (1) the Min- 
istry; (2) the prefectural boards of education, 
governors, and assemblies; and (3) the local 
boards of education, mayors, and local assemblies. 
Tlie role of each is defined by law. The Minis- 
try's primary functions are to provide professional 
and technical guidance and advice, to prepare 
draft legislation on minimum educational stand- 
ards for submission to the national Diet, and to 
compile and administer the national education 
budget. 

On the prefectural and local levels popularly 
elected boards of education - were created to ad- 
minister education in all local public schools. Uni- 
versities were excluded fi'om the jurisdiction of 
these boards. 

The prefectural boards of education are respon- 
sible for certifying teachers, appointing superin- 
tendents of education, approving textbooks and 
curriculums, and advising local boards of educa- 
tion. Tliere is some oveiTapping of functions be- 
tween the jjrefectural and local boards. Local 
boards of education are required to establish ade- 
quate schools to provide 9 years of compulsory 
education. Schools are controlled and operated 
by the local boards, which determine curriculum, 
select textbooks from the lists approved by the 
prefectural boards, appoint and dismiss teachers 
and principals, and perform other functions that 
relate to operation and management of the local 
school system. The boards of education do not 
control the school budget. They draw up the 
budgets for presentation to the local and prefec- 
tural assemblies, but the latter are free to act as 
they see fit on the draft budget. The Diet deter- 
mines the size of the national contribution to local 
education. 

On the university level, the Ministry of Educa- 
tion has primary jurisdiction over all universities, 
whether public or private, although this power 
is greatly circumscribed compared to the prewar 
period. Each university is semiautonomous, and 
the administration and faculty have considerable 
control over internal university affairs. The 
Ministry retains the authority to set the standards 
that must be met for the creation of universities. 
In the postwar period the number of universities 
lias risen from 47 in 1940 to 221 in 1951. 

In 1951 there were 20,000,000 students, 708,000 
teachers, and 45,000 schools of all levels through- 
out Japan. This represents an increase in the 
number of students and teachers but a decrease 
of about 7,500 in the number of schools. War 
damage is the primary reason for this decrease. 

' Six of the seven members of the prefectural boards and 
four of the five members of the local boards are elected ; 
one member on each board is selected by and from the 
prefectural and local assemblies, respectively. 



Outlook for the Post-Treaty Period 

The future development of the Japanese edu- 
cational system has been profoundly affected by 
the impact of Occupation-sponsored reforms upon 
a well developed, centralized, educational system. 
When the Japanese peace treaty became effective 
on April 28, 1952, the Japanese were free for the 
first time to review and modify their new educa- 
tional system. There can be little doubt that the 
Japanese will undertake some modifications. The 
key question is the extent and nature of these 
modifications and whether they will be confined to 
the organization of the school system or whether 
they will affect the basic philosophy which was 
the goal of the reforms. 

In assessing the importance of future modifica- 
tions in Japanese education, it is well to keep in 
mind that the Occupation utilized American con- 
cepts, practices, and philosophy as the basis for 
remodeling the Japanese educational system. 
Prior to the Occupation, Japanese education dif- 
fered from its American counteii^art not only in 
its organization and structure but more impor- 
tantly in its aims and philosophy. Although 
these two aspects are closely related, it is possible 
to maintain the basic philosophic concepts of 
American education without adhering to the 
American system of organization in its entirety. 

The present and future status of the educational 
system is a matter of great concern to Japanese 
leadership and there is considerable divergence of 
views on its future role and development. At the 
present time attention is centered on modifications 
and adjustments in the organization of the educa- 
tional system, leaving the larger question of edu- 
cational philosophy for future consideration 

It is qiiite possible that the 6-3-3-4 system will 
be modified. The economic situation has limited, 
and will continue to limit, the funds that can be 
devoted to erecting new school buildings and ren- 
ovating damaged ones, and a shortage of trained 
teachers will continue to hamper the creation of 
new schools. Moreover there is some inclination 
on the part of some Japanese educators to favor a 
return to the more familiar pattern of school or- 
ganization, although not necessarily to the older 
system of centralized control and standardization. 
A reduction in the compulsory school period, at 
least temporarily, may be another result of the 
stringent financial situation and of the shortage of 
school buildings and teachers. 



Problems of the Decentralized System 

Of far greater significance to the fundamental 
concept of democratic education is the future of 
the decentralization of control over the school sys- 
tem. The operation of the boards of education has 
proved to be the weakest link in the present decen- 
tralized system. There is pressure for the elimi- 
nation of popular election and the substitution of 
appointment as the means for selecting board 



Ocfober 27, 1952 



657 



members. This pressure has been particularly 
evident, since the establishment of municipal, 
town, and village boards of education by popular 
election is scheduled for this fall. This election 
will bring the number of boards of education in 
Japan up to about 10,500. Moreover teachers are 
eligible to be members of the boards and they, or 
their representatives, have been elected in signifi- 
cant numbers. There is a tendency for the teach- 
ers to be the more active members of the boards 
and as a result there is opposition to this teacher 
domination of the school system. Another major 
problem of the board-of-education system is the 
board's lack of control over school budgets. 

These problems are capable of solution short of 
eliminating the boards themselves. Teachers can 
be made ineligible for board membership, or their 
representation limited in proportion to the non- 
teacher elements on the boards. Present school 
districts can be consolidated, thus decreasing the 
number of boards of education. 

Although it is probably not desirable, for rea- 
sons quite apart from education, to circumscribe 
the financial power of the local and prefectural 
assemblies, it is possible to limit their considera- 
tion of the education budget to the size of the 
budget and to major policy decisions concerning 
expenditure of the allocated funds. This would 
curtail the current practice of detailed review and 
recommendation by the assemblies. Such a step 
would at least increase the ability of the boards 
to determine educational policy and development 
through budget administration. Whether the 
Japanese will adopt this course or will abolish the 
boards is not evident at present. Abolition of the 
boards will not necessarily destroy the system of 
decentralized control over education since, assum- 
ing a continuation of local autonomy, control could 
remain at the prefectural and local levels with the 
popularly elected executives and assemblies. Such 
a solution would not be without its disadvantages, 
notably in terms of involving local politics more 
closely in educational aflFairs. 

The extent to which the new basic aims of the 
educational system will remain unchanged is far 
more difficult to assess. No one would contend 
that the old attitudes and concepts have been eradi- 
cated either in relation to education specifically or 
in the bi'oader field of social organization and gov- 
ernment. The future of these educational reforms 
is to a considerable extent dependent upon the 
survival of the social and legal reforms just as in 
the eai'lier period the development of Japanese 
education and the form of government and the 
organization of society finally adopted were inter- 
related. "While progress was made during the Oc- 
cupation in creating a vested interest among broad 
segments of the body politic in the survival of a 
free educational system, it is equally true that older 
ideas and their exponents still have a considerable 
influence. This situation will undoubtedly give 
rise to a modification in the philosophy of educa- 



tion, but beyond this it is still too early in the 
post-Occupation period to speculate on the final 
role of education. 

• Mrs. AJden, author of the above article, is a 
special assistant in the Office of Field Programs of 
The International Information Administration. 



U.S., Japan Consider Alaskan 
Forest Products Market 

Press release 800 dated October 10 ■ 

A mission representing the Japanese Govern- 
ment and Japanese pulp and timber industries is 
now in Washington exploring with U.S. authori- 
ties the possibility of obtaining forest products 
from Alaska. 

The mission, headed by Junichiro Kobayashi, 
Director General, Council of Japanese Forest Ee- 
sources, outlined to American authorities Japan's 
long-term requirements for forest products and 
the reasons for Japanese interest in the establish- 
ment of an American corporation to secure sup- 
plies from Alaska. Mr. Kobayashi pointed out 
that at the present rate of cutting, Japan's soft- 
wood resources will be virtually eliminated within 
approximately 15 years. He stated that Japan 
cannot reduce its present rate of cutting because 
of its heavy requirements, which include supplies 
to the U.N. forces in Japan. It was imperative, 
therefore, he said, that Japan find a supplemen- 
tary source of supply of forest products for essen- 
tial construction and other needs. Mr. Kobayashi 
pointed out that since softwoods are not available 
to Japan from nearby East Asiatic areas, Alaska 
is the closest major source of undeveloped forest 
resources in the free world. Mr. Kobayashi cited 
the fact that before World War II Japan obtained 
large quantities of forest products from Sakhalin 
and Siberia. He stressed that Japan's interest in 
Alaskan timber is not motivated by speculative 
considerations but by the need to meet Japan's 
serious deficit in these products. 

The mission's immediate goal is to determine 
the feasibility of establishing a sawmill in Alaska 
from which substantial quantities of sawn lumber 
could be exported to Japan. Consideration has 
also been given by the mission to the possibility 
of the establishment in Alaska at a later date of 
an integrated pulp mill to meet Japan's pulp , 
requirements. Mr. Kobayashi also explored with j 
American authorities the possibility of utilizing ' 
Jajianese labor in Alaska should it prove feasible 
to establish a sawmill and pulpmill there. 

The restrictions of the immigration laws cover- 
ing the migration of foreign workers into the 
United States were carefully reviewed. It ap- 
peared that it would be extremely difficult under 
the law to permit foreign workers to enter the 
country to participate in the cutting and produc- 



658 



Oeparfmenf of Sfafe Bu//ef/n 



tion of wood products in Alaska. It was explained 
the employment opportunities involved in any 
such project would have to be filled by available 
American labor before consideration could be 
given to use of workers from any other country. 
It appears that American manpower would in 
fact be available for labor demands that might 
emerge from the project under discussion. 

The Forest Service lias outlined to the Japa- 
nese mission the conditions under which timber 
is sold from the Tongass National Forest in South- 
east Alaska and the possibilities for expansion in 
the production of various classes of forest prod- 
ucts. The opportunities for procurement of lum- 
ber from the mills now established in Alaska were 
outlined. It was made clear that all exploration 
by the Japanese of the possibilities of obtaining 
forest products from Alaska should be made on 
the premise that any new enterprise must be fitted 
into established Forest Service timber-sale poli- 
cies for building up the cut of the Tongass Na- 
tional Forest to sustained yield-cutting capacity 
and for support of the economic development of 
the Territory. This would include compliance 
with the regulations of the Secretai'y of Agricul- 
ture which require that Alaskan national forest 
timber be given primary processing within the 
Territory. 

It was pointed out to the mission that an enter- 
prise sponsored by the Japanese for manufacture 
of forest products in Alaska for shipment to Japan 
would have to be incorporated luider American 
laws, bid successfully for national forest timber, 
and conform to all the applicable laws, regula- 
tions, and contract terms in the same manner as its 
possible competitors. 

The Japanese have indicated that they propose 
to send a technical mission to Alaska in the near 
future to make detailed investigations of the ad- 
visability of organizing a sawmill enterprise to 
operate under the conditions outlined by the For- 
est Service. Although the mission expressed an 
interest in the possibility of establishing a pulp- 
mill in Alaska, it indicated that the large invest- 
ment required for a pulp-production project 
would be deferred until it has obtained satisfac- 
tory experience in Alaskan timber through a saw- 
mill enterprise. 

Members of the Japanese mission now in Wash- 
ington other than Mr. Kobayashi are Shinichi 
Tanaka, Executive Director, Council for Inte- 
grated Countermeasures for Forest Resources, and 
Dr. Koichi Aki, Vice Director, Resources Council, 
Prime Minister's Office, Tokyo. 

The mission's discussions have been with officials 
of the State, Labor, and Interior Departments, 
with the Forest Service of the Department of 
Agriculture, and other agencies. 



Japanese War Criminals Board 

Press release 794 dated October 9 

The Board of Clemency and Parole for War 
Criminals set up by the President on September 4, 
1952, by Executive Order 10393,^ is organized and 
in operation. The Board consists of Conrad E. 
Snow, Assistant Legal Adviser in the Department 
of State, Chairman; James V. Bennett, Director 
of the United States Bureau of Prisons, Depart- 
ment of Justice, and Roger Kent, General Counsel, 
Department of Defense. 

The Board meets weekly at the office of the 
Chairman in the Department of State and is pres- 
ently considering recommendations which have 
been received from the Government of Japan for 
clemency for, or parole of Japanese war criminals. 
The Board is authorized by Executive Order 10393 
to make the necessary investigations in, and advise 
the President with respect to, such recommenda- 
tions. In making its investigations the Board 
may examine witnesses and take testimony to the 
extent deemed necessary or advisable. The Board 
will be ready now to consider the views of anyone 
interested in the subject. 

The Board will have before it recommendations 
made by the Japanese Government, under the au- 
thority of the Treaty of Peace, for clemency or 
parole for Japanese war criminals who are now 
in prison in Japan. Under the treaty, Japan has 
agreed to carry out the sentences imposed upon 
these Japanese nationals by the United States, and 
the power to grant clemency and to parole may not 
be exercised except on decision of the U.S. Gov- 
ernment and on the recommendation of Japan. 
The Board of Clemency and Parole for War Crim- 
inals appointed by the President will recommend 
to the President the action which should be taken 
on each Japanese recommendation. 

The Board now has before it Japanese recom- 
mendations for parole in 72 cases of Japanese of- 
ficers, soldiers, and civilians who are serving sen- 
tences in Sugamo Prison of from 8 to 25 years each 
for mistreatment of prisoners of war or other 
atrocities during World War II. Most of the 
cases recommended have now served 6 or 7 years 
of their sentences and all of them are eligible for 
parole under the parole system set up by General 
MacArthur while he was Supreme Commander 
for the Allied Powers in Japan. Prior to the 
coming into effect of the Treaty of Peace, some 
300 war criminals convicted by the United States 
after serving one-third of their sentence had been 
released on parole under General MacArthur's 
parole system. None have been released since the 
termination of the occupation, although Japanese 
law, subject to U.S. approval, has provided a 
parole system identical with that of General Mac- 
Arthur's. 



' BuiXETiN of Sept. 15, 1952, p. 409. 



OcJofaer 27, J 952 



659 



Economic Development Program 
in Burma 

Press release 792 dated October 9 

Frank N. Trager of New York City has been 
appointed as Director of the Point Four Program 
in Burma, the Department of State announced on 
October 9. Mr. Trager took his oath of office on 
that date. 

Mr. Trager went to Burma in October 1951 as 
deputy chief of the economic-assistance program 
then administered by the Economic Coopera- 
tion Administration (now the Mutual Security 
Agency). At the direction of Congress, Msa 
transferred responsibility for the Burma program 
to the Technical Cooperation Administration 
(Tca) on July 1, 1952. Mr. Trager has been act- 
ing as country director since then. He has been 
in Washington for the past few weeks for consul- 
tations with TcA officials and will return to Kan- 
goon this month. 

The Point Four Program in Burma is being 
geared into Burma's own 8-year economic pro- 
gram for self-sufficiency. First elements of the 
Burmese program were announced by Prime Min- 
ister U Nu in August. The program was drafted 
with the help of jirivate American engineering 
consultants. It calls for a level of national output 
by 1959 about 100 percent above the present level 
and about 20 percent above the level of 1938-39. 
In terms of 1951-52 dollars, Burma's gross na- 
tional product in 1938-39 would have been aj)- 
proximately 1.1 billion dollars. Now it is only 
700 million dollars. The development progi'am 
seeks a gross national product by 1959, in terms of 
1951-52 dollars, of about 1.5 billion dollars. 

The cost of the Burma development program is 
estimated at 1.5 billion dollars of which Bumia 
expects to be able to provide at least 1.1 billion 
from its own resources. The remaining 400 mil- 
lion dollars would come from private investments, 
loans, and grants. The plan contemplates the 
restoration, modernization, and expansion of 
agricultural and forest production; the develop- 
ment of new industry using domestic agricultural, 
forest, and mineral resources; and the improve- 
ment of health and education on a Nation-wide 
basis. 

The Eca/Msa program in fiscal years 1951 and 
1952 made available to Burma approximately 24 
million dollars. Most of this was earmarked for 
the rehabilitation of devastated ports and irri- 
gation systems and for the purchase of capital 
and consumer goods needed in a war-torn society. 
Approximately 14 million dollars of the Eca/Msa 



funds were spent for goods and services to be de- 
livered during this fiscal year, so that the supply 
pipeline will be full for some time, even though 
the Point Four budget for the present fiscal year 
amounts to only 7 million dollars. 

A 12-man technical mission under M. A. Ras- 
chid. Minister of Housing and Labor, is in Wash- 
ington conferring with Point Four Administra- 
tor Stanley Andrews and other U.S. Government 
officials on the ways in which Point Four can sup- 
port Burma's program most effectively. 

Burma's major objective in agriculture is to 
restore, in the next 5 years, its prewar level of 
rice exports of 3.5 million tons. Rice production 
now permits exports of approximately 1.5 mil- 
lion tons. Burma proposes to reclaim for cul- 
tivation 2.5 million acres of land lost to weeds 
and jungle during the war and to open up to cul- 
tivation for the first time 1.4 million acres of new 
land. This will require mechanization for land 
clearing as well as cultivation. Along with this 
program will go land resettlement, farm credit, 
agricultural research and extension, rural health, 
and education. Point Four is prepared to supply 
technicians and some equipment for training and 
demonstration purposes. 

Burma's teak production is less than 25 per- 
cent of the 23rewar level and the country has many 
other species of commercially valuable timber. 
To rebuild the forest-products industi-y will also 
require mechanization. Burma lost two-thirds of 
its elephant power during World War II, and it 
takes 18 years to raise and train a logging ele- 
phant. Point Four is prepared to help Burma 
build up a skilled timber-industry labor force by 
demonstration and training in the use of modern 
logging and processing equipment. 

It has been estimated that as many as half of 
Burma's 18 million people suffer from malaria. 
Point Four is carrying on work begun by Eca/Msa 
in malaria control, supplying DDT and training 
public-health teams for campaigns throughout the 
country. Point Four has also joined the Burman 
Government in pi'ograms to improve village sani- 
tation, restore hospitals, and train public-health 
and professional medical personnel. 

At present Burma lacks a sufficient number of 
skilled men to carry out its own development pro- 
gram. At Burma's request Point Four is partici- 
pating in a broad and varied education program 
which includes the training of teachers for ele- 
mentary and secondary education, particularly in 
vocational fields ; the training of agricultural tech- 
nicians, engineers, and industrial supervisors; and 
adult education. 



660 



Department of State Bulletin 



Values at Stake in Settlement of Kashmir's Status 



Statement hy Franh P. Graham 

U. N. Representative for India and Paki'<tan ^ 



The Secwity Ccmncil discussions on Kashmir were resumed in New York 
on October 10. At the ofening meeting Franh P. Graham made an intro- 
ductory statement in which he explained his efforts at negotiation over th-e 
last 18 months and appealed to the parties to reach a fnal settlement of this 
long-standing dispute. The Pakistan represeiitative thanked Dr. Graham 
for his recent efforts and suggested that the Council recess for a few days to 
consider his statement. No other speeches were made; the President of the 
Council announced he would confer with the members and the parties on a 
date far a future meeting. 



U.N. doc. S/PV.605 
Dated October 10 

[ExciTptsJ 

In seeking to carry out the responsibilities en- 
trusted to him by the Security Council, namely, to 
aid the parties in reaching an agreement on a plan 
of demilitarization, tlie United Nations reiDresenta- 
tive proposed a 12 point programme of demilitari- 
zation as one step in the solution of a complex 
problem. He wishes to make clear to the Mem- 
bers of the Council that the narrowing of the dif- 
ferences on the twelve point programme to one 
main point, upon which the whok^, plan depends, 
emphasizes the depth of the diilerence on this 
point. As we have sought to remove many ob- 
stacles, surmount boulders, and to narrow and 
more precisely to define the diffei'ences, the remain- 
ing difference on tlie issue of the number and char- 
acter of forces is still deep. It is related to the 
differing conceptions of the two Governments, 
often set forth — and I cite the Uncip Interim Re- 
port, Security Council Records, Fourth Year, Spe- 
cial Supplement 7, S/1430/Rev. 1, pp. 37-39 ; and 
Unrip Report to Security Council, 15 October 1951, 
par. 35 — relating to (1) the status of the State of 

' Made before the Security Council on Oct. 10 as a sup- 
plement to his fourth report to the Council. For excerpts 
from the report, submitted Sept. 16, see Bulletin of Oct. 
20, 1952, p. 626. 



Jammu and Kashmir, (2) the nature of the respon- 
sibilities of the appropriate authorities on each 
side of the cease-fire line after demilitarization, 
and (3) the obligations of the two Governments 
under the two agreed Resolutions of 13 August 
1948 and of 5 January 1949 with its provisions for 
a plebiscite. Upon the acceptance of definite pro- 
visions for a plebiscite came the cessation of fight- 
ing. Under the two resolutions of 13 August 1948 
and 5 January 1949 the consideration of tlie con- 
ditions and requirements for a free, fair and secure 
plebiscite would proceed in part from the studies 
of the Plebiscite Administrator. 

Toward reaching an agreement on the remain- 
ing difference on Proposal 7 the United Nations 
representative made his suggestion for alternative 
approaches either (1) tlirough the establishment 
of the number and character of forces to be left 
on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the 
period of demilitarization or (2) through the de- 
clared policy that the number and character of 
such forces should be determined in accordance 
with the requirements of each area and, accord- 
ingly, that principles or criteria should be estab- 
lished which would serve as guidance for the civil 
and military representatives of the Governments 
of India and Pakistan in the meeting contem- 
plated in the Provisional Clause of the revised 
proposals. 



Ocfober 27, 7952 



661 



Tlie settlement of the Kashmir dispute involves 
the preservation of the existing cease-fire line, a 
proposed agreement on demilitarization, and cer- 
tainly not less important, the requirements and 
conditions for holding the plebiscite. The peace- 
ful settlement of the whole complex Kashmir prob- 
lem is important for the State, for both nations, 
and for all nations. 

To fail to solve the Kashmir problem rather 
than to bridge present differences is inconceiv- 
able as a practical policy in the face of a situa- 
tion heavily charged with long-accumulated high 
potentials. The peoples of the subcontinent have 
the opportunity to challenge the peoples of the 
world with their own adventurous programmes 
for both individual freedom and the general wel- 
fare, for both national security and world peace. 
For the peoples of the subcontinent to fail to solve 
peacefully the Kashmir problem and to drift or 
stumble into greatly increased danger rather than 
bridge the chasm which divides them would be a 
tragedy for the two nations and for the people 
of the world who look with hope to the humane 
leadership of two great peoples. Programmes 
■which now provide sustenance, freedom and hope 
for hundreds of millions of people might give way 
to violence. At this important and critical time 
in the history of the subcontinent, an agreement 
on Kashmir could be a great demonstration for 
peace by peace-minded leaders, whose position for 
peace would be re-enforced by an agreement. In 
case of conflict and destruction, fear and hunger 
might stalk the villages where the people mainly 
live in the hoijeful lands between the mountains 
and the seas. Violence and then tyranny might 
seek to feed on hunger and hate while humane 
programmes were engulfed in the deep catas- 
trophe. 

The values of an early settlement of this dis- 
pute would, in my view, be tremendous for (1) the 
four million people of the State, (2) tlie four 
hundred million people of the two nations in- 
volved, and (3) the people of the world. 

A settlement of this dispute would mean that 
the status of the people of the State would be 
finally determined not by the sovereignty of 
princes but by the sovereignty of the people, not 
by the might of armies but by the will of the peo- 
ple, not by bullets but by ballots, through self- 
determination of peoples by the democratic method 
of an impartial plebiscite conducted with due re- 
gard for the security of the State and the free- 
dom of the plebiscite under the auspices of the 
United Nations. 

A settlement of this dispute might help to settle 
the dispute over evacuee property. It might thus 
help bring adjustment of the claim of the hosts of 
refugees who, in their tragic trek and counter-trek 



from one country to the other, left behind their 
homes and their property and yet carried in their 
minds and hearts the horrors of communal 
slaughter. These adjustments in belated justice 
would assuage some of the pain of their losses and 
memories and contribute much to the morale and 
productive energies of millions of people in both 
nations. 

Moreover, the settlement of the Kashmir dis- 
pute would contribute much to the relief of the 
fears and tensions over canals and rivers from 
which come the waters for the fields, and the hopes 
of food and opportunity for millions of people. 
A settled basis for the co-operative development 
of the natural resources of the rivers and their 
wide valleys would make more promptly and 
broadly possible the connecting of the engines of 
production, transportation, and comminiication 
with nature's ceaseless cycle of mighty but un- 
harnessed power between the sun and the seas, be- 
tween the mountains, the snows, the rains and the 
rivers, between the clouds and the lands of the 
vast subcontinent. 

Food and freedom, goods and equal oppor- 
tunity, health and education, dynamic hope and 
the liberation of the human spirit for the good 
life of these great, free societies can thus become 
the way of life for the peoples of India and 
Pakistan with all their meaning to the peoples of 
the world. 

The co-operation of India and Pakistan in the 
demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kash- 
mir, in the self-determination of the people of 
the State, and in the larger release of budgets into 
constructive programmes, might become one of the 
turning points in the history of our times toward 
the co-operation of all nations for the larger self- 
determination of all peoples ; toward universal dis- 
armament and the harnessing of atomic power for 
the moral equivalent of war in the campaigns 
against poverty, illiteracy and disease ; and toward 
the more effective co-ordination of the national 
programmes, the point IV jDrogramme, the Co- 
lombo Plan and the United Nations Technical 
Assistance programme for advances in agriculture 
and industry, liealth and education, freedom and 
peace, for all people. 

On the subcontinent of Asia is a juncture of the 
forces of strategic geography, historic peoples, 
high traditions, ancient religions, humane leader- 
ship, fresh currents of national freedom and 
democratic power of high potential for peace or 
conflict, weal or woe, in the present world. May 
the prompt, fair and peaceful settlement of the 
Kashmir dispute by the Governments of India and 
of Pakistan set the example, provide the leader- 
ship and point the way from fear and conflict to 
peace and hope for the peoples of the earth. 



662 



Deparfment of State Bulletin 



Recent Developments in the Kashmir Dispute 



hy Frank D. Collins 



On September 16 Frank P. Graham, U.N. repre- 
sentative for India and Pakistan, submitted his 
fourth report to the Security Council covering the 
results of his negotiations with India and Pakis- 
tan at New York from May 29 to July 30 and at 
Geneva from August 26 to September 10.^ 

Fi-om his appointment on April 30, 1951, to the 
conclusion of the recent Geneva talks, Dr. Graham 
has concentrated his efforts on bridging the differ- 
ences between India and Pakistan over the question 
of the demilitarization of Kashmir preparatory to 
the holding of a plebiscite under the auspices of 
the United Nations. 

When India and Pakistan attained independ- 
ence and dominion status on August 15, 1947, the 
princely state of Jammu and Kashmir was one of 
about 560 such states whose status was left unde- 
termined. Under the Indian Independence Act, 
these states could decide whether to join India or 
Pakistan. For most of these states, geographical 
proximity to one of the dominions, as well as pre- 
ponderance of either Hindu or Moslem popula- 
tion, made the decision relatively easy. Since 
Kashmir lies between India and Pakistan and has 
a mixed population, it became the scene of armed 
conflict soon after partition. 

In January 1948 the dispute was brought before 
the Security Council and in this month the Council 
established the United Nations Commission for 
India and Pakistan (Uncip) . A year later Uncip 
succeeded in obtaining the agreement of both 
India and Pakistan to a cease-fire and to the 
general principles under which a truce (i.e., a plan 
for the withdrawal of the armed forces from the 
area) and a plebiscite under U.N. auspices might 
be carried out. This agreement was formalized in 
the "Uncip resolution" of January 5, 1949. On 
March 21, 1949, the U.N. Secretary-General named 
Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz as administra- 
tor of the projected plebiscite to be held under the 
terms of the January 5 resolution. 

' U.N., doc. S/27S3 dated Sept. 19 ; for excerpts, see Bul- 
letin of Oct. 20, p. 626. 

October 27, 7952 



During 1949 and 1950 Uncip, Gen. Andrew 
G. L. McNaughton of Canada, acting under 
special temporary authorization of the Security 
Council, and Sir Owen Dixon of Australia, 
designated as successor to Uncip, tried unsuccess- 
fully to bring about a settlement. In January 
1951 efforts of the London Conference of Com- 
monwealth Prime Ministers failed to break 
the impasse on demilitarization. When the Se- 
curity Council met on February 21, 1951, the 
United States joined the United Kingdom in sub- 
mitting a joint draft resolution.- The resolution 
provided for the appointment of another U.N. 
representative to succeed Sir Owen Dixon and 
instructed liim to effect demilitarization on the 
basis of the proposals made by S-ir Owen, with 
appropriate modifications, and to present to India 
and Pakistan detailed plans for carrying out a 
plebiscite. The representative was directed to re- 
port to the Security Council 3 months after under- 
taking negotiations with the governments on the 
subcontinent. 

To accomplish this task the draft resolution au- 
thorized the new representative to take into ac- 
count such possibilities as (1) the provision of 
U.N. Forces to facilitate demilitarization and the 
holding of a plebiscite; (2) the assignment to the 
loser in the plebiscite of local areas, contiguous to 
its frontier, in which the vote had been overwhelm- 
ingly in the loser's favor; (3) different degreas of 
supervision as might be appropriate in different 
areas. Finally, the resolution called upon both 
India and Pakistan to accept arbitration on all 
unresolved points which remained after their dis- 
cussions with the U.N. representative and which 
the latter designated as points of difference. 

Both parties objected to certain parts of the 
resolution. Pakistan objected to the clause con- 
cerning boundary adjustments because it could 
rnean a partial partition and was, in Pakistan's 
view, a contravention of the January 5, 1949, agree- 

" For Ernest A. Gross' statement on that occasion see 
ibid.. Mar. 5, 1951, p. 394. 



663 



ment. India took exception to a number of as- 
pects of the resolution, particularly the provisioiis 
for arbitration and for the possible entry of U.N. 
troops. As a result of the objections by both sides, 
the United States and the United Kingdom pre- 
sented on March 21 a revised resolution which 
directed the U.N. representative to effect demili- 
tarization on the basis of the January 5, 1949 
resolution to which both parties had agreed. 
This new draft, however, retained in its preamble 
the original reference to the Kashmir Constituent 
Assembly and also included the arbitration pro- 
vision. Pakistan accepted the resolution, but 
India rejected it. The Security Council approved 
the resolution (S/2017/Rev. 1) on March 30, 1951, 
by a vote of 8 to with three abstentions (India, 
Soviet Union, Yugoslavia) .^ 

On April 30 the Council appointed Dr. Graham, 
former U.S. Senator from North Carolina, as U.N. 
representative for India and Pakistan. Thus be- 
gan the most recent phase of the Kashmir nego- 
tiations. These negotiations fall into four periods, 
at the end of each of which Dr. Graham reported 
to the Security Council. 

First Report, July-October 1951 

On October 15 Dr. Graham submitted his first 
report to the Security Council.* When he arrived 
on the subcontinent in July, he reported, he found 
an atmosphere of hostility. The press in both 
India and Pakistan had begun a barrage of charges 
and countercharges which had given rise to con- 
siderable tension. Dr. Graham decided to adopt 
the procedure of separate, informal conversations 
with officials of the two governments. On Sep- 
tember 7 he submitted a 12-point draft proposal 
on demilitarization to the governments and re- 
quested their comments. He was able to obtain 
the agreement of the parties to four of the 12 
points. (It should be mentioned that both parties 
had previously committed themselves to these four 
points under the January 5, 1949 agree- 
ment.) In addition to reaffirming their determi- 
nation not to resort to force, to avoid warlike 
statements, and to observe the cease-fire the parties 
reaffirmed their acceptance of the principle that 
the question of the accession of the state of Jamnui 
and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be de- 
cided through the democratic method of a free 
and impartial plebiscite under U.N. auspices. The 
points of difference under the remaining eight 
proposals, according to Dr. Graham, centered 
around the period of demilitarization, the with- 
drawal of troops, the size of the forces to remain 
on each side of the cease-fire line, and the question 
of whether a date should be set for the formal in- 
duction of the Plebiscite Administrator. Dr. 
Graham reported that because of the situation pre 

' For text, see ibid., May 5, 19.52, p. 713. 
' U.N. doc. S/2.375 ; for excerpts, see ibid., Nov. 5, 1951, 
p. 738. 



vailing on the subcontinent, he had not been able 
to effect demilitarization within the prescribed 
time limit. He added, however, that agreement 
was still possible, and suggested that the Security 
Council consider instructing him to implement 
its decision by continuing the negotiations with 
the two governments, such negotiations to be car- 
ried out at the seat of the Council. Dr. Graham 
suggested that he be instructed to report to the 
Security Council again within 6 weeks from the 
time negotiations were resumed. 

On October IS Dr. Graham made a statement to 
the Security Council ^ explaining his report and 
paying high tribute to the late Pakistan Prime 
Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, who had been 
assassinated 2 days earlier at Rawalpindi, Pakis- 
tan. Later in the month the Security Council 
moved to Paris, where discussions were resumed 
on November 10. At this meeting the United 
States joined the United Kingdom in sponsoring 
a resolution " which noted with approval the basis 
for a program of demilitarization put forward 
by Dr. Graham, and instructed him to continue 
his efforts to obtain agreement on a demilitariza- 
tion plan. In addition, the resolution instructed 
Dr. Graham to report to the Security Council 
within 6 weeks, giving his views on the problems 
confided to him. The resolution was approved by 
a vote of 9 to with two abstentions (India and 
U.S.S.R.). 

Second Report, November — December 1951 

On December 18 Dr. Graham reported the re- 
sults of his 6-week negotiations at Paris.' He 
stated that his procedure had been, first, to try to 
reach an agreement between the parties on his 
12-point profjosals of September 7, 1951. Fail- 
ing this, he hoped to obtain each party's plans for 
demilitarization under the Uncip resolutions of 
August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949, in order to 
establish the points of difference in interpretation 
and execution of those resolutions that must be re- 
solved before such demilitarization could be car- 
ried out. 

Under the first point of that procedure Dr. 
Graham had endeavored to narrow the differences 
to two fundamental issues : 

(1) the minimum number of forces to be left 
on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the 
demilitarization period ; 

(2) the date on which the Government of India 
would cause the Plebiscite Administrator to be in- 
ducted into office. 

On December 7 Dr. Graham presented to the 
parties a statement and questionnaires relating to 
these issues. Informal conversations were held 



" TI.N. doc. S/PV .564 ; for excerpts, .see ibid., p. 740. 

MI.N. doc. S/2.390; for text, see ibid., Dec. 10, 1951, 
p. 959. 

' U.N. doc. S/2448; for excerpts, see ibid., Jan. 14, 1952, 
p. 52. 



664 



Deparfment of State Bulletin 



U. S. S. R 






\ 



^ 1 S T A NM 



CHINA 



^^ 



\ ../ ,/ •••••••• 



\ 



\ 



r-" 



\. 



GILGIT 

AND 
AGENCY 



-^ 



•'V- 



"1 





f--^ 






L, lAMML 
5 / .S... 


i> KASHMIR 
1.. d..r-«l 


A^ 




/^ V^P" 


^ \:; 


bT^r/ 


-^ 


'V^ 


INDIA 




V 


A ft An /AN 


vT 


Of •' 


K 


sf:A 


^0 


riENGAL 


KV ' 








^ 



v^~^ 



Gilgit 






\ 



^ 



^ 



V, 



^ 

> 












:■ ^Y 


1 


7^ 




>-n K A S'^H M ! R 


<— 






';_ ' '-\ — ^L, SrTnagar°^ 




r-^ 




{ r^\ \, 


; 1 




Rawalpindi 


I 7 W^^^x / 






^ 


'■> 




^ 


X X J A M M 


u 



-7^ 



-f- 



^ 



Leh 



/ 



A^ 



/) 



Jammu 



^A 



4> 



The interna t Id n4 1 boundants tbown on thii map do not 
neteiMdVy (aneipond m ell c«i«i ro the bound»iiei lacog- 

'^■red by ihf a 5 Go.emmM( 



/ 



.y' 



— ■•-^••— International boundary, demarcated 

— « — « — International boundary, undennarcated 

— — ^ International boundary, indefinite 

Jammu and Kashmir boundary 

Provincial boundary 



12456 10.52 



\ 



V-^^"-~\ 



N 



/ 
\ 



/ 



/ 



/ 



^ 



\_ 



/ 



\ 



/ 
I 



TIBET 



•N 



\ 



) 




1 


/ 



V, 



me 

pec 

for 

tro 

the 

sen 

dir 

tar 

res 

Th 

the 

Ass 

vis; 

Inc 

the 

( 

for 
rep 
gai 
tial 
at 1 
to 



Fir 

( 

rej 

on 

an 

In. 

an( 

sid 

the 

wii 

ten 

on 

qu4 

the 

poi 

ha< 

po 

me 

nal 

sta 

re£ 

the 

an< 

cid 

am 

poi 

pri 

arc 

dri 

on 

of 

du. 

Gr 



66' 



separately with the two delegations by Gen. Jacob 
Devers, U.N. military adviser to L)r. Graham. 
f Dr. Graham reported that the disparity between 
the number and character of the forces which 
each party proposed should be left at the end of 
the demilitarization period had been so wide that 
agreement on the whole plan could not be reached 
at that stage. In addition, agreement on the im- 
portant question concerning the date of induction 
of the Plebiscite Administrator could not be ob- 
tained. The Indian Government had insisted 
that the Plebiscite Administrator should be 
appointed as soon as conditions in the state per- 
mitted of a start being made with the arrangements 
for carrying out a plebiscite. The Pakistan Gov- 
ernment had attached nnich importance to the ap- 
^ pointment of the Plebiscite Administrator to 
office "as much in advance of the final day of de- 
militarization as possilile." 

Dr. Graham pointed out that agreement had 
been obtained on 4 moi-e of his 12 demilitarization 
proposals of September 7, 1951, and suggested 
some revisions of the 4 remaining points, i. e., 
proposals 5, 6, 7, and 10. Of these the most signifi- 
cant was his revision of proposal 7 on troop num- 
bers; he suggested that ". . . there will re- 
main on each side of the cease-fire line the lowest 
possible number of armed forces based in propor- 
tion on the number of armed foi-ces existing on 
each side of the cease-fire line on January 1, 1949." 

The Security Council resumed its hearings on 
January 17, 1952. On that date Dr. Graham 
formally submitted his report and after discussing 
his negotiations made a strong plea to India and 
Pakistan to arrive at a settlement of this long 
standing dispute. He stated his view that agree- 
ment on proposals 7 and 10 (troop numbers and 
date of appointment of the Plebiscite Administra- 
tor) would be the linchpin binding all 12 pro- 
posals together in an effectively integrated pro- 
gram and would prepare the way for the plebiscite. 
"The plebiscite," Dr. Graham stated, "would keep 
the promise made to the people of Jammu and 
Kashmir, who are worthy of the right of their 
own self-determination through a free, secure, and 
impartial plebiscite." (U.N. doc. S/PV 570.) 
He remarked further : 

The people of .lamniu ami Kashmir through a free and 
impartial plebiscite wonkl sifnial through the darkness 
of these times a ray of hope that not by bullets but by 
ballots, not through the conflict of armies but through 
cooperation of peoples, is the enduring way for people 
to determine their own destiny and way of life . . . 
On the subcontinent of India and Pakistan today, the 
place, the time, the opportunity and the leadership have 
met in one of tlie great junctures of human history, for 
the possible weal or woe of the peoples of the world. 

Immediately following the introductory state- 
ment by Dr. Graham, Jacob Malik, the U.S.S.R. 
representative, indicated he would like to speak 
briefly. His statement came after the Soviet 
Union had maintained a virtual silence for 4 years 
in the Security Council on the Kashmir question. 



After noting that the United States and the 
United Kiiigdoin had been particularly active in 
the Council's consideration of the Kaslunir issue, 
Mr. Malik stated : 

What is the reason why the Kashmir question is still 
unsettled and why the plans put forward by the United 
States of America and the United Kingdom in connec- 
tion with Kashmir have proved fruitless from the point 
of view of a settlement of the Kashmir question? It is 
not difficult to understand that the explanation of this 
is chiefly and above all that these plans in connection 
with Kashmir are of an annexationist, imperialist nature, 
because they are not based on the effort to achieve a 
real settlement. The purpose of these plans is interfer- 
ence by the United States of America and the United 
Kingdom in the internal affairs of Kashmir, the pro- 
longation of the dispute between India and Pakistan on 
the question of Kashmir and the conversion of Kashmir 
into a protectorate of the United States of America and 
the United Kingdom under the pretext of rendering it 
"assistance through the United Nations." Finally, the 
purpose of these plans in connection with Kashmir is to 
secure the introduction of Anglo-American troops into 
the territory of Kashmir and convert Kashmir into an 
Anglo-American colony and a military and strategic 
base. . . . 

The United States of America and the United Kingdom 
are taking all steps to exclude a settlement of the ques- 
tion of the status of Kashmir by means of a free and un- 
constrained declaration by the people of Kashmir them- 
selves. When in October 1950 it became known that the 
General Council of the "All Jammu and Kashmir Na- 
tional Conference" had adopted a resolution reconuncnd- 
ing the convening of a Constituent Assembly for the pur- 
pose of determining the future shape and affiliations of 
the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the United States of 
America and the United Kingdom immediately interfered 
in the matter so as not to allow the people of Kaslimir 
to decide their own future and determine the affiliations 
of their country independently. They hastened to foist 
upon the Security Council a resolution in which it was 
stated that the convening of a Constituent Assembly in 
Kashmir and any action that Assembly might attempt to 
take to determine the future shape and affiliation of 
Kashmir or any part thereof would not constitute a dis- 
position of Kashmir. . . . 

Tlie U. S. S. R. representative concluded by pro- 
jjosing the following solution: 

The U.S.S.R. Government considers that the Kashmir 
question can he resolved successfully only by giving the 
people of Kashmir an opportunity to decide the question of 
Kashmir's constitutional status by themselves, without 
outside interference. This can be achieved if that status Is 
determined by a Constituent Assembly democratically 
elected by the Kashmir people. . . . 

Both the U.S. and U.K. representatives chal- 
lenged the Soviet charges. Sir Gladwyn Jebb, the 
U.K. representative, stated: 

I should merely like to say that the really extraordinary 
fantasies apparently entertained by our Soviet friend and 
colleague in regard to the Kashmir dispute are typical, as 
I think, of the whole Soviet approach to international 
problems. Whatever the dispute before us, the first thing 
to do is, it seems, to discover how and why it is part of an 
anti-Soviet plot designed merely to advance the cause of 
the ruling circles of the United States and of the United 
Kingdom with the object of clamping down an Anglo-Amer- 
ican domination or dictatorship on a suffering world. Any 
attempt by the Security Council to deal with the dispute 
by applying principles of reason must, unless, of course, it 
is concurred in by the Soviet Government, be viewed in the 



Ocfober 27, 1952 



665 



light of those general principles ; and it is by such a process 
of reasoning, if it can indeed be so termed, that the Soviet 
Government comes to the conclusion that, for instance, the 
Kashmir dispute has been invented and subsequently care- 
fully fostered by the diabolical Anglo-Americans for the 
one end of turning Kashmir into an Anglo-American armed 
camp full of imperialistic troops destined for an eventual 
invasion of the Soviet Union. 

No doubt there are people who can be persuaded to be- 
lieve this, just as there are people who could believe that, 
for instance, a United Nations mission to Antarctica to 
study the habit of penguins could only be an indirect 
slander on totalitarianism or on a Marxist society. It is 
possible to believe that ; and people, indeed, can always 
be found who will believe anything. But when it comes 
to accusing our friend, Mr. Graham, of being the secret 
agent of the Pentagon — well, that should, I think, cause 
even the most ingenuous to sit up and think and 
think. . . . 

Surely the Kashmir dispute Is capable of being consid- 
ered with some degree of objectivity, and surely the dic- 
tates of reason, if they are firmly and consistently fostered 
by this Council, will, one day, succeed in enabling the two 
great nations involved to agree on a settlement which will 
be satisfactory to both and which will, or which may, re- 
lieve even the Soviet Union of the nightmares which now 
seem to surround its contemplation of this long-standing 
dispute. . . . 

The U.S. representative, Ambassador Ernest A. 
Gro^ss, associated himself with the remarks of the 
U.K. representative and further observed : 

The attacks on Mr. Graham do not merit a reply and do 
not require a denial. The dispute between India and 
Pakistan regarding Kashmir is one which my government 
earnestly hopes to see settled in accordance with United 
Nations principles and in accordance with agreements 
already reached between the parties. I think it would 
serve no useful purpose to continue the debate at this 
time. The business before the Security Council, as the 
representative of the United Kingdom has already said, is 
to give the most careful and respectful consideration to 
the report which has just been given to us by the repre- 
sentative of the Council. My Government will give it the 
attention which it deserves. 

At the meetin<r of the Security Council on Janu- 
ary 30 Sir Zafrullah Khan, Pakistan's Foreign 
Minister, spoke in part as follows : 

At the meeting of the Security Council held on January 
17, 1952, a representative of the U.S.S.R. referred to cer- 
tain press reports relating to the granting of military 
bases in Kashmir to the United States. I wish to state 
clearly and with authority that these reports relied upon 
by him for his statement are utterly false and without any 
foundation whatsoever. We have neither been asked for, 
nor have we offered, any military or other bases to the 
U.S. or any other power. . . . 

Throughout this controversy, India, Pakistan, and the 
Security Council have been agreed that the question of the 
accession of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan or India 
should be decided tlirough the democratic method of a free 
and impartial plebiscite. This fundamental principle is 
embodied in the preamble to the Security Council Resolu- 
tion of April 21, 1948, and in clause I of the Commission's 
Resolution of January 5, 1919. (U.N. doc. S/PV 571.) 

Sir (iladwyn then stated his Government's view 
that Dr. Graham should pay a further visit to the 
subcontinent to attempt to brino; about a solution 
of the two outstanding points of difference. Am- 



bassador Gross supported this suggestion, as did 
the majority of the Security Council members. 
Tlie following day, the Indian representative, 
Mr. Motilal Setalvad, expressed India's willing- 
ness to continue the discussions under Dr. Gra- 
ham's direction and stated: 

I have already declared that India is anxious to settle ' 
the Ka.shniir dispute quickly and peacefully. This is 
so not only because India is anxious that the people of 
Jammu and Kashmir should have an opportunity, with- 
out further delay, to determine freely their own future, \ 
but also because we most earnestly desire to prepare the 
way for firm and lasting friendship with our neighbor, 
Pakistan. It is no less to our interest than to the in- 
terest of Pakistan, and to the Interest of the world, 
that these two countries which have so much in common 
should live side by side in complete amity, each fully i 
sovereign but both fully and wholeheartedly in coopera- ' 
tion in the pursuit of the common task of peace and 
progress. This is no language of convention but the 
free expression of a deep and sincere sentiment. It 
seems to be the sense of the Council that the negotiations 
should be continued under the auspices of the U.N. 
representative to find a settlement of the differences that \ 
still divide India and Pakistan over certain parts of 
Mr. Graham's plan. India has no objection to this course 
and would cooperate in finding a settlement in the spirit 
that I have just described. (U.N. doc. S/PV 572.) 

The President of the Security Council, Jean 
Chauvel, speaking as the representative of France, 
stated that "it was the sense" of the Security Coun- 
cil that the U.N. representative, acting under the 
resolutions of March 30, 1951, and November 10, 
1951, was authorized without any new decision by 
the Council to continue his efforts to fulfill his mis- 
sion and submit his report, which the Council 
hoped would be final within 2 months. The So- 
viet representative objected to this decision and 
indicated that "if such a proposal or conclusion 
is submitted to a vote the delegation of the Soviet 
Union will abstain." 



Third Report, December 1951~April 1952 

Following this Security Council debate and 
some discussions in Paris with the parties, Dr. 
Graham departed for New Delhi, where he ar- 
rived on February 29 and remained until March 25. 
His third report was submitted to the Security 
Council on April 22, 1951.^ 

At New Delhi Dr. Graham continued his pre- 
vious procedure of separate negotiations with the 
parties, having concluded that a meeting with rep- 
resentatives of the two Governments was inadvis- 
able before sufficient preliminary agreement had 
been reached to insure positive results from a joint 
conference. This round of negotiations had two 
purposes: To assist the parties in removing the 
obstacles still blocking agreement on the proposals 
submitted to them and to obtain, if possible, fur- 
ther withdrawals of troops from the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir on both sides of the cease- 
fire line. 

" U.N. doc. S/2611 ; for excerpts, see ibid.. May 5, 1952, 
p. 712. 



666 



Department of State Bulletin 



He reported that the Government of India 
maintained its position concerning the minimum 
number of forces to be left on each side of the 
cease-fire line at the end of the period of demili- 
tarization, i. e., 21,000 regular Indian army forces 
plus 6,000 state militia, on the Indian side and, on 
the Pakistan side, a force of 4,000 men normally 
resident in Azad Kashmir territory, half of whom 
should be followers of Azad Kashmir. The In- 
dian Government, Dr. Graham stated, considered 
that the questions of a definite period for demili- 
tarization and of a date for the induction into 
office of the Plebiscite Administrator could be set- 
tled without difficulty, provided agreement was 
reached on the scope of demilitarization and the 
number of forces to remain at the end of the 
demilitarization period. 

Pakistan, Dr. (haham stated, accepted the four 
remaining points of his 12-point demilitarization 
proposals, i. e., 5, 6, 7, and 10, with certain qualifi- 
cations regarding the character of the forces to be 
demilitarized. In his view the demilitarization of 
the state had reached a stage at which further re- 
ductions of troops were directly related to the 
preparation of a plebiscite. Accordingly, he 
deemed it necessary that the Plebiscite Adminis- 
trator-designate should be associated with him 
in his studies and the consideration of common 
problems. Dr. Graham recommended that both 
parties should undertake to reduce the forces under 
their control in the state and that the U.N. repre- 
sentative's negotiations with the two Governments 
should be continued with a view to 

(o) resolving the remaining difficulties on the 12 pro- 
posals subraitted to the parties, with special reference to 
the number of forces to be left on each side of the cease- 
fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization, and 

( b ) the general implementation of the Uncip resolutions 
of August 13, 1»18, and January 5, 1949. 

Fourth Report, May-September 1952 

Dr. Graham, in a letter dated May 29, 1952, in- 
foi'med the President of the Security Council that, 
in agreement with the Governments of India and 
Pakistan, the negotiations on the question of the 
state of Jammu and Kashmir had been renewed 
and that at the appropriate moment he would re- 
port to the Council on the outcome of that phase 
of negotiations. 

His fourth report, submitted on September 16, 
detailed the recent round of negotiations held at 
New York and Geneva. He had first attempted to 
bridge the remaining differences between the par- 
ties by proposing bracketed figures of 3,000 to 6,000 
armed forces on Pakistan's side and 12,000 to 
18,000 on the Indian side to break the deadlock on 
the number of troops. As he was unable to obtain 
agreement on this suggestion, he submitted another 



draft proposal on September 2 which fixed the 
figures at 6,000 and 18,000 excluding Gilgit and 
Northern Scouts on the Pakistan side and the state 
militia on the Indian side. Pakistan accepted this 
proposal, with certain reservations; India did not. 

Concluding that he could not obtain agreement 
on fixed figures. Dr. Graham decided it might be 
possible for the two Governments to agree on 
certain principles which could serve as criteria 
for fixing the number of forces in a conference of 
civil and military representatives of both sides. 
Instead of including a fixed troop quantum, his 
new proposal, presented on September 4, provided 
that the minimum number of forces to be main- 
tained on each side of the cease-fire line be defined 
as those "required for the maintenance of law and 
order and of the cease-fire agreement with due 
regard to the freedom of the plebiscite." In the 
case of India, the proposal added the phrase "with 
due regard to the security of the state" and ex- 
panded the term "forces" to include "Indian 
forces and state armed forces." 

Dr. Graham reported the following reaction of 
the parties to this proposal: India, although it 
believed that the proposal contained "the germs 
of a settlement," indicated it could not accept any 
equation of its responsibilities with those of the 
local authorities on the Pakistan side of the cease- 
fire line and insisted that the defense of the entire 
state is the concern of India. Pakistan objected 
to certain clauses in the proposals which it sug- 
gested should be eliminated to avoid the recur- 
rence of political controversies. 

Dr. Graham stated that it was evident after 2 
weeks of discussion at Geneva that agreement 
could not be reached on any of the revised drafts 
he presented. He attributed the differences in the 
positions of the parties to their differing concepts 
of their status in the state and stressed the im- 
portance of the induction into office of the Plebi- 
scite Administrator, a matter which he termed 
"the heart of the integrated program for de- 
militarization and a plebiscite. He concluded 
by expressing the view that to reach an agreement 
on a plan of demilitarization it is necessary 
either : 

(a) to establish the character and number of forces to 
be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of 
the period of demilitarization; or 

(6) to declare that the forces to remain on each side 
of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of de- 
militarization should be determined in accordance with 
the requirements of each area, and, accordingly, principles 
or criteria should be established which would serve as 
guidance for the civil and military representatives of the 
Governments of India and I'akistan in the meeting con- 
templated in the Provisional Clause of the revised pro- 
posals. 

• Mr. Collins, author of the aio-ve article, is an 
officer in the Office of South Asian Affairs. 



October 27, J 952 



667 



Report of U. N. Command Operations in Korea 



FORTY-SEVENTH REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD JUNE 1-15, 1952 < 



U.N. doc. S/2774 
Transmitted Sept. 15, 1952 

I herewith submit report number 47 of tlie United 
Nations Command Operations in Korea for tlie period 1-15 
June 1952, inclusive. United Nations Command com- 
muniques numbers 1282-1296 provide detailed accounts of 
these operations. 

Plenary sessions of the Military Armistice Conferences 
met daily with the exception of a three-day recess from 
June 8th through the 10th. These meetings were again 
characterized by an endless repetition of Communist prop- 
aganda themes. For this reason the senior United Na- 
tions Command delegate recessed the conferences for three 
days with the hope that the Communists would seriously 
consider and accept the United Nations Command package 
proposal designed to attain an honourable armistice. Un- 
fortunately the Communists returned to the conferences 
repeating their violent propaganda themes. In refutation 
of the Communist propaganda blast and to attempt to keep 
the discussion on germane topics, there follow fair ex- 
amples of statements made by the senior United Nations 
Command Delegate. 

From the proceedings of June 14th : 

After days, weeks and months of negotiating terms for 
an armistice, the end of April saw only three remaining 
Lssues to be resolved — namely, the questions of reliabilita- 
tion of airfields, the composition of the Neutral Nations 
Supervisory Commis.sion and the exchange of prisoners of 
war. In an honest and sincere effort to effect an early 
cessation of hostilities, the United Nations Command made 
its compromise proposal of 2S April. The concessions 
made by our side in this final offer were of great magni- 
tude, and we stated clearly and specifically that no sub- 
stantive changes would be made thereto. The current 



' Transmitted to the Security Council by the representa- 
tive of the U.S. to the U.N. on September 15. Texts of the 
30th, 31st and 32d reports appear in tlie Bulletin of 
Feb. 18, 19.52, p. 26G ; the 33d report, iUd., Mar. 10, 10.52, 
p. .395 ; the 34th report, Hid., Mar. 17, 19.52, p. 430 ; the 35th 
report, Hid., Mar. 31, 1952, p. 512; the SGth and 37th 
reports, ibid., Apr. 14, 1952, p. .594 ; the 3Sth report, iVid., 
May 5, 1952, p. 715 ; tlie 39th report, ibid.. May 10, 19.52, 
p. 788 ; the 40th reiiort, ibid., June 23, 19.52, p. 998 : the 41st 
report, ibid., June 30, 10,52, p. 1038 ; tlie 42(1 report, ibid., 
July 21, 19.52, p. 114; the 43d report, ibid.., Aug. 4, 1952, p. 
194 ; the 44th report, ibid., Aug. 11, 1952, p. 231 ; the 45th 
report, ibid., Aug. IS, 1952, p. 272 ; and the 46th report, 
ibid.. Sept. 29, 19.52, p. 49.5. 



deadlock in the armistice talks has been brought about by 
your inhuman and truculent demands on the prisoners of 
war issue. 

During the sessions in this tent, our side has patiently 
and carefully explained its fair and humane position on 
the exchange of prisoners. We have pointed out repeat- 
edly tliat it was with your acquiescence that our side 
screened the prisoners of war in its custody in order to 
determine the number who would not forcibly resist re- 
patriation to your side. The result of this screening, 
wliich neither side could predetermine, was obviously a 
disappointment to you. Consequently, by using false alle- 
gations and distortions you have fruitlessly attejnpted to 
discredit the fairness of the screening procedures. 

As further evidence of our sincere desire for peace, we 
have offered to pennit a rescreening of prisoners of war 
by an international, neutral body in the demilitarized zone 
and witnessed by representatives of your side. Your ac- 
ceptance and adherence to the results of this proposal 
would make possible the final settlement of these negotia- 
tions. The future welfare and happiness of thousands of 
soldiers and their families on both sides will be directly 
affected by your decision. You are charged with full re- 
sponsibility for the delay in these negotiations. You can- 
not escape or evade this responsibility. 

Our final compromise proposal is as firm and unalterable 
now as it was on 28 April. We will never agree to any 
substantive change, but at any time our side will gladly 
explain and clarify any provisions of this offer. If your 
siile is ready to accept our proposal, we can proceed with 
the final arrangements for the signing of the Armistice ; 
otherwise I suggest that we recess. 

From the proceedings of June 7th : 

The record of the staff officer meetings showing when 
and how the decision to screen the Prisoners of War was 
taken has lieen cited in these meetings. That record es- 
tablislies clearly the full acquiescence of your side in that 
step. Thus the .screening was undertaken in good faith 
and the procedure employed was scrupulously fair. What- 
ever the results they would have been accepted by the 
United Nations Command. But not so with your side. Be- 
cause the results were found to be less favorable than 
you might have hoiied, you have attempted to deny your 
participation in the decision to effect the screening of 
the prisoners of war. It is a futile effort. Prisoners were 
screened with your acquiescence. Once screened they had 
to be segregated according to their determination. 

You are now attempting to compel our side to abandon 
these persons who with your acquiescence manifested 
their strong opposition to return to your side. You are 
seeking to compel the United Nations Command to place 
the lives of these persons in jeopardy by insisting that 
they be delivered to you t).v force and violence. You are 
motivated not by consideration of the welfare of these per- 



668 



Department of Sfafe Bulletin 



sons but by a desire to punish those who prefer death to 
return to your control. The United Nations Command 
will never force them to return to your control. If your 
refusal to recoijnize this results in delay in the attainment 
of an armistice the responsibility for such delay is yours. 

On the other hand the United Nations Command does 
not seek to retain any prisoners of war. In order that 
your side may be assured that all prisoners except those 
who violently oppose repatriation will in fact be re- 
patriated, our side has proposed an impartial resereening 
at the prisoner of war exchange points. Your refusal to 
accept this completely reasonable offer shows only that 
you fear to confirm what the worlil alread.v knows, that 
thousands of your personnel absolutely will not return to 
your control. Wliile the United Nations Command does 
not seek to detain any prisoners of war it will not par- 
ticipate in the forced deliver.v of those persons who 
strongly refuse to be repatriated to your side. 

Since we have been meeting here almost daily since the 
2nd of May your side must by now be fully aware that 
there is no possibility that this stand of the United Na- 
tions Command will be altered. What purpose you seek 
to achieve by the daily reiteration of the arguments you 
have used since early December to oppose the United Na- 
tions Command stand of no forced repatriation is not 
known to our side. However, we can assure you that the 
continued repetition of these well known arguments will 
not serve to alter our position in any respect. 

Tlie bold and unscrupulous attempt of Communist 
Prisoner of War leaders to embarrass the United Nations 
Command by their capture of General Dodd served as a 
clear indication of the extreme limits to which they would 
go if given the opportunity. The rebellious and arrogant 
hard-core Communists had created a situation in which 
it was impossible for the United Nations Command prop- 
erly to discharge its duties toward the prisoners of war in 
its custody without using forceful measures. Accord- 
ingly, the Commanding General, Eighth Army, was di- 
rected to take necessary steps to insure the attainment 
of uncontested control of all prisoners of war at Koje-do. 

Careful and detailed plans were made to reduce the 
density of the Prisoner of War population at Koje-do by 
spreading Prisoners of War into smaller, more separated 
compounds. On 10 June this operation started in Com- 
pound seventy-six, one of the most violent of the Com- 
munist installations. Beginning at 0545, and continuing 
until United Nations Command troops entered the com- 
pound at 0615, messages were broadcast over a public ad- 
dress system to all prisoners advising them of the plan to 
move them to new areas and emphasizing that they would 
not be harmed if they cooperated. When it became ap- 
parent that the inmates were not going to obey the order 
to form into groups preparatory to movement, but instead 
were openly arming themselves with sharpened spears and 
improvised knives, troops moved in with a show of force 
to begin segregation. 

Using tear gas, United Nations Command forces ad- 
vanced to a position midway in the compound. Most of 
the prisoners were evacuated without difficulty, but in one 
corner of the compound more than 1,500 had gathered in a 
group. Efforts to move them were met with stubborn and 
fanatical resistance. By the use of tear gas and concus- 
sion grenades alone, the mob was finally broiight under 
control. No shots were fired. Throughout the entire 
operation, the discipline and self-control exercised by 
United Nations Command troops were outstanding. Sev- 
eral of the Prisoner of War ringleaders who had instigated 



previous riots were apprehended and segregated. By 0845 
the compound was cleared. Total casualties included one 
U.S. enlisted man killed and fourteen others wounded ; 
thirty-one Prisoners of War were killed and 139 wounded. 
It is significant to note that in the heat of the action some 
prisoners were seen attacking fellow prisoners. 

The Commanding General, United Nations Prisoner of 
War Camp Number One, in a personal report to higher 
headquarters, stressed that he himself had given both writ- 
ten and oral orders to Colonel Lee Hak Koo, North Korean 
Communist Prisoner of War leader, to form his people in 
grouixs of 150. This order was ignored. After the com- 
pound was subdued, Lee and other leaders were segre- 
gated. A complete plan was found for Prisoner of War 
resistance which had been followed during the operation. 
Following the fall of Compound seventy-six, the remainder 
of the strong pro-Communist compounds were segregated 
and moved without resistance. 

As an indication of the ruthlessness and premeditated 
violence which had been planned, a survey of Compound 
seventy-six, which held about 6,000 prisoners, revealed the 
following : 

Prisoners were armed with about 3,000 spears, 1,000 
gasoline grenades, 4,500 knives and an undetermined num- 
ber of clubs, hatchets, hammers and barbed wire flails. 
These weapons had been covertly fashioned from scrap 
materials and metal-tipped tent poles over a long period 
of time in preparation for armed resistance. 

One tunnel was under construction from Compound 
seventy-six to seventy-seven. 

Entrenchments around each hut were connected from 
one building to another. 

In Compound seventy-seven the bodies of sixteen mur- 
dered prisoners were found. This was the compound in 
which, the day prior to movement, the comiwund leader 
had assured the Camp Commander that he would insure 
cooperation. 

As a further measure to insure adequate control, plans 
were being formulated for the construction of additional 
camps away from Koje-do to house Communist prisoners 
who have already been segregated for return to Communist 
control at such time as an exchange takes place. 

Enemy action along the 140 mile battle line consisted 
generally of small scale attacks launched for the purpose 
of eliminating United Nations Command outposts or gain- 
ing intelligence. These probing efforts were unsuccessful 
and generally of minor significance. Toward the end of 
the period these attacks increased in frequency on the 
western front where on one occasion a battalion strength 
attack against United Nations Command outpost positions 
was repulsed only after bitter hand-to-hand fighting. This 
increased enemy aggressiveness was attributable to earlier 
United Nations Command local attacks which had wrested 
several forward positions from stubbornly defending 
enemy units. Indicative of the enemy's steadily increasing 
combat capabilities was the employment of over 5,000 
rounds of artillery fire against elements of a United Na- 
tions Command division on the western front during a 
twenty-four-hour period. The enemy recently concluded 
the relief of two frontline Chinese Communist armies on 
the western front. On the central front prisoners indicate 
the relief of an additional Chinese Communist army. 



October 27, 7952 



669 



These reliefs appear to be in conformity with the enemy's 
policy of rotating his units on line. Except for these reliefs 
hostile troop dispositions and front lines remained un- 
changed. In South Korea, the visorous pursuit and elimi- 
nation of dissident elements continued. As a result, the 
estimated strength of dissident elements has declined 
steadily. The present strength of these elements, 2,400, is 
now lower than at any time since the North Korean 
invasion. 

The western front was the scene of the most frequent 
enemy contact for the period. The majority of the clashes 
occurred in the Mabang and Sangnyong areas where, be- 
ginning on 7 June, United Nations Command elements 
seized four hill masses from stubbornly defending enemy 
units. The enemy reacted swiftly to his losses. For sev- 
eral successive days, usually during the hours of dark- 
ness, the enemy launched attacks up to company size in 
an unsuccessful effort to retake the lost positions. The 
largest enemy effort was made on 11 June when hostile 
units, totaling a battalion, launched a three-pronged at- 
tack in the Sangnyong area. These attacks were all re- 
pulsed despite the unusually liberal quantities of artillery 
and mortar fire expended to support these hostile attacks. 

Enemy action along the central and eastern fronts con- 
sisted of scattered probing efforts and determined counter- 
action to United Nations Command patrols and raiding 
elements. On 12 June United Nation Command elements, 
in a local attack, seized a position in the Kumsong area 
against determined enemy opposition. During the two 
following nights the enemy launched repeated attacks, 
in rapid succession, in a costly and futile attempt to re- 
gain the positions. The Yuusil area on the eastern front 
was the only other site of any appreciable enemy aggres- 
siveness. In this area the enemy launched attacks of 
company and battalion strength on 10 and 12 June re- 
spectively. Both of these attacks terminated with thS 
withdrawal of the hostile units. 

Prisoner of war statements, hostile vehicle movement, 
and the steadily improving combat effectiveness demon- 
strated by forward enemy units make it unmistakably 
clear that the enemy is prepared for a continuation of 
hostilities. The enemy, however, has shown no definite 
inclination to exercise his capability for launching a major 
offensive. Prisoners of war still make vague references 
to a future hostile offensive. But as yet, there is no evi- 
dence as to when the enemy may initiate such an opera- 
tion. 

United Nations Command fast carriers, operating in the 
Sea of Japan, launched attacks against North Korean 
transportation facilities and supply routes. The attacks, 
flown by jet and propeller driven aircraft, were concen- 
trated on enemy rail lines along the Korean east coast 
where numerous cuts were made. In addition, the enemy 
suffered destruction and damage to installations and ma- 
terial including railway bridges, locomotives, rail cars, 
military buildings, trucks, guns, highway bridges, and 
sampans. 

United Nations Command carriers operating in tlie Tel- 
low Sea furnished cover and air spot for the surface units 
on blockade patrols and anti-invasion stations. They 
also flew reconnaissance missions and offensive strikes 
as far north as Hanchon and into the Chinnanipo area. 



the Hwanghae Province and in close support of the front 
line troops. The bulk of the damage inflicted was on 
military structures. Additional destruction and damage 
included numerous supplies, bridges, gun positions, ware- 
houses, boats, oxcarts and pack animals. 

United Nations Command naval aircraft based ashore 
in Korea flew in support of friendly front line units. 
These missions resulted in the destruction of numerous 
bunkers, mortar and gun positions, personnel and supply 
shelters, and trucks and rails were cut in many places. 
One enemy fighter, of the conventional type, was shot 
down. 

Patrol planes based in Japan conducted daylight recon- 
naissance missions over the Sea of Japan, the Yellow 
Sea and the Tsushima Straits. They also flew day and 
night anti-submarine patrols and weather reconnaissance 
missions for surface units in the Japan and Yellow Seas. 

The naval blockade along the Korean east coast con- 
tinued from the bombline to Chongjin with surface units 
making day and night coastal patrols firing on key rail 
targets along the coastal main supply route daily. The 
siege by surface vessels continued at the major ports of 
Wonsan, Hungnam, and Songjin, subjecting the enemy 
forces at these ports to day and night fire. 

Destruction along the east coast at Wonsan and to the 
north, as reported by spotting aircraft, shore fire control 
parties, and the firing vessels themselves, included enemy 
casualties, rail cars, military structures, boats, and many 
guns, bunkers and warehouses. Damage was extensive 
and rails were cut in many places. 

Fire support vessels at the bombline provided gunfire on 
call for the front line troops. Destruction included bunk- 
ers, military structures, gun and mortar positions, and 
troop and supply shelters. 

On the night of 2 June, a United Nations Command 
armed patrol boat encountered two enemy armed picket 
sampans at Hon Wan Roads. The enemy crews used false 
surrender tactics, and as the sampans were being made fast 
for towing, a concealed man tossed a grenade into the 
friendly boat. Friendly casualties were one killed and 
two wounded. Of the ten enemy there were no survivors. 

Enemy shore batteries were active almost daily against 
the blockading vessels and minesweepers all along the 
coast. In many instances friendly units were straddled 
but there were no hits or casualties reported. In each 
instance the battery was taken under counter fire with 
several guns destroyed and damaged. Minesweepers op- 
erating close inshore received machine gun and small arms 
fire. There were no reports of damage or casualties. 

On the Korean west coast, the United Nations surface 
units manned blockade and anti-invasion stations along 
the coast from Chinnampo to the Han River Estuary, in 
support of the friendly islands north of the battle line. 
Daylight firing into enemy positions started many fires 
and secondary explosions, inflicted enemy casualties and 
destroyed numerous military shelters. Patrols into the 
Yalu gulf netted several sail junks destroyed and prison- 
ers taken. 

On the night of 11 June, enemy forces attacked the 
friendly island of Yongmae-do in the Haeju approaches, 
after subjecting it to artillery and mortar flre the night 
of 10 June. The attackers, coming across the mud flats 



670 



Department of State Bulletin 



at low tide, were repulsed with the help of United Na- 
tions Command vessels which illuminated and fired on 
the attacking troops and fired on their mainland bases. 
A United Nations Command air force strike was called 
and planes were credited with many enemy casualties. 

Vessels of the Republic of Korea Navy conducted close 
inshore patrols and blockade along both coasts and as- 
sisted United Nations Command naval forces in mine- 
sweeping duties. 

United Nations Command minesweepers continued op- 
erations to keep the channels, gunfire support areas, and 
anchorages free of mines of all types. Sweepers also 
enlarged areas and swept close inshore as needed by the 
operating forces. 

United Nations Command naval auxiliary vessels, Mili- 
tary Sea Transportation Service, and merchant vessels 
under contract continued to provide personnel lifts and 
logistic support for the United Nations Command naval, 
air and ground forces in Japan and Korea. 

The pattern of air activity remained relatively un- 
changed during the period with United Nations Command 
air force fighter interceptors holding the upper hand in 
North Korea, fighter bombers continuing large scale rail 
cutting missions and close support sorties, light bombers 
making night armed reconnaissance of the enemy's main 
supply routes and medium bombers hitting key rail 
bridges. Combat cargo units performed their regular 
transport mission. 

The fighter interceptors engaged enemy jets on five 
days, destroying thirteen of the Communist aircraft and 
damaging four otliers before they were able to return 
to their bases across the Yalu River. No United Nations 
Command aircraft were lost in the engagements. United 
Nations Command flzhter interceptors are continuing to 
destroy Communist jets at a ratio of more than eight to 
one. The MIGs appeared in formations of two to ten 
aircraft and friendly pilots continued to observe a de- 
crease in the number of enemy sorties. The MIG pilots 
again showed aggressiveness when attacking the fighter 
bombers, but generally broke off the fight when fighter 
interceptors entered the engagement. The enemy attacks 
were, for the most part, timed to catch the fighter bomb- 
ers as they completed their bomb runs. During the early 
part of the period they showed some aggressiveness 
against the fighter interceptors. There was some indi- 
cation that the MIGs were being directed by radar sta- 
tions since some of their attacks were made out of the 
overcast. 

The United Nations Command fighter bombers flew an 
increasing number of sorties in support of the United Na- 
tions Command ground forces. The attacks by these air- 
craft destroyed numerous gun positions and bunkers and 
Inflicted heavy casualties on enemy troops. 

The fighter bomber aircraft hit rail lines within a few 
miles of the Manehurian border with hundreds of air- 
craft attacking a short section of the track. The pilots' 
claims of numerous separate rail cuts were confirmed by 
photographs which showed damage which would require 
major repairs or the construction of by-passes. 

Light bomber aircraft continued their night combat pa- 
trols over the main supply routes in North Korea to de- 
stroy truck convoys and trains and to harass repair crews 



working on rail lines where fighter bombers had attacked. 
A new attack program was launched which concentrates 
the light bomber effort on only three or four main routes 
each night. The program is flexible and permits imme- 
diate diversion of aircraft to any routes where heavy 
traffic is reported. 

The medium bombers were again scheduled primarily 
against key rail bridges on the line from Sinuiju to 
Sinanju and the route from Kanggye to Kunuri. Bridges 
on these routes were hit repeatedly, with excellent results 
reported. Enemy night fighters were sighted on several 
occasions and on the night of 10/11 June made con- 
centrated attacks on the medium bombers but were un- 
able to prevent them from knocking out the Kwaksan 
bridge. 

The regular close support effort by the medium bombers 
each night was continued and one medium bomber was 
scheduled nightly to drop leaflets over North Korean 
cities. 

United Nations Command transport aircraft were used 
on air evacuation missions and regular cargo runs trans- 
porting supplies and special equipment to United Nations 
Command naval, air and ground units in Korea. Joint air 
transportability exercises were conducted in Japan. 

United Nations Command reconnaissance units contin- 
ued to conduct visual and photographic reconnaissance 
along the enemy's main line of resistance, rear area troop 
and supply locations, main supply routes, airfields, and 
communication centers, obtaining Bomb Damage Assess- 
ment and Surveillance photograpliy of these targets. 

United Nations Command leaflets, radio broadcasts, and 
loudspeaker broadcasts continued to report the determined 
opposition of thousands of Cliinese and North Korean 
prisoners to Communist demands that they be forcibly 
repatriated to face slavery or death at the hands of their 
former masters. Accounts by these prisoners, together 
with information contained in the Communists' own broad- 
casts, have been used to expose the conditions in Commu- 
nist territory which have caused these prisoners to resist 
repatriation at all costs. On the basis of these reports, 
United Nations Command media have described the cor- 
ruption, negligence, and incompetence of the Communist 
puppet regimes in China and North Korea, and the oppres- 
sive tyranny which they have imposed upon the people 
in the guise of fallacious reforms. 



U.S. Proposals for Elimination 
of Bacterial Weapons 

U.N. doc. DC/15 
Dated Sept. 4, 1952 

United States of America: worhing -paper setting 
forth a summary of proposals, made hy the 
United. States representative in the Disarma- 
ment Coinmission on 15 August 1952, for elim- 
ination of bacterial weapons in connexion 
with elimination of all major weapons adapt- 
able to mass destruction 

1. A comprehensive programme for the regula- 
tion, limitation and balanced reduction of all 



Ocfofaer 27, 1952 



671 



armed forces and armaments should provide for 
the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to 
mass destruction, including bacterial, and for the 
effective international control of atomic energy to 
ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the 
use of atomic energy for peaceful puiposes only. 

2. Bearing in mind that all Members of the 
United Nations have agi-eed to refrain not only 
from the use of germ warfare but from the use of 
force of any kind contrary to the law of the Char- 
ter, the programme envisaged in paragraph 1 must 
be approached from the point of view of prevent- 
ing war and not from the point of view of regu- 
lating the armaments used in war or of codifying 
the laws of war. The programme as a whole 
should ensure that armed forces and armaments 
are reduced to such a point and in such a thorough 
fashion that: 

(a) No State will be in a position of armed 
preparedness to start a war ; 

(b) No State shall be in a position to under- 
take preparations for war without other states 
having knowledge of such preparations long 
before the offending State could start a war. 

3. Safeguards must be devised to ensure the 
elimination of bacterial weapons and facilities and 
appliances for their production and use along with 
the elimination of all armed forces and armaments 
not expressly permitted to States to maintain pub- 
lic order and to meet their Charter responsibili- 
ties. The principal safeguards to ensure the elim- 
ination of bacterial weapons are to be found in 
an effective and continuous system of disclosure 
and verification of all armed forces and armaments 
such as that suggested in the working paper sub- 
mitted by the representative of the United States 
on 5 April 1952, entitled "Proposals for progressive 
and continuing disclosure and verification of 
armed forces and armaments" (DC/C.2/1). It is 
proposed that at appropriate stages in an effective 
system of disclosure and verification agreed meas- 
ures should become effective providing for the 
progressive curtailment of pi'oduction, the pro- 
gressive dismantling of plants, and the progressive 
destruction of stockpiles of bacterial weapons and 
related appliances. Under this programme, with 
co-operation in good faith by the principal States 
concerned, all bacterial weapons and all facilities 
and appliances connected therewith should be 
completely eliminated from national armaments 
and their use prohibited. 



International Bank Activities 

Economic Mission to Japan 

The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development is sending an economic mission to 
Japan in response to a request from the Japanese 
Government, it was announced on October 20. The 
mission is expected to arrive in Tokyo on October 



21 and will remain in Japan for approximately 2 
months. 

The mission consists of John C. de Wilde, eco- 
nomic adviser to the Bank's Department of Opera- 
tions for Asia and the Middle East, who will head 
the mission, and William M. Gilmartin of the 
same Department. Japan is one of the Bank's 
newest member countries and this will be the first 
visit of Bank officials. 

The mission will not consider or discuss any 
specific projects which may be submitted for 
financing by the Bank. As a normal preliminary 
to any subsequent consideration of lending opera- 
tions, the mission will make a general appraisal 
of the Japanese economy. It will collect pertinent 
economic and financial information bearing on 
Japan's economic prospects and her capacity to 
service present and additional indebtedness. The 
mission will survey industrial and agricultural 
production and study the principal economic and 
financial problems which will affect the future re- 
construction and development of Japan. 

Report on Mexican Economy 

A report entitled The Major Long-Term Trends 
in the Mexican Economy^ prepared by a group of 
economists from the Mexican Government and 
the International Bank, is to be published within 
the next few months in Spanish by the Mexican 
Government and in English by the International 
Bank, it was announced on October 17. 

This study stems from a projiosal made in Feb- 
ruaiy 1951 by the Nacional Financiera, an offi- 
cial financing agency of the Mexican Govei-nment, 
that the Mexican Government and the Interna- 
tional Bank set up a combined working party to 
assess the major long-term trends in the Mexican 
economy with particular reference to Mexico's ca- 
jJacity to absorb additional foreign investments. 
The Combined Mexican Working Party held its 
first meeting in April 1951, and work on the project 
continued for more than a year. 

The report reviews the course and effects of 
investment in Mexico from 1939 to 1950 and 
makes an assessment of the prospects for changes 
in the national income and the balance of pay- 
ments over the next 10 years. The data contained 
in the report and the conclusions drawn are the 
responsibility of the members of the Working 
Party as technical experts and are in no way bind- 
ing on the Mexican Govei'nment and the Bank. 

The study covers every segment of the Mexican 
economy including agriculture, mining, petro- 
leum, electric power, industry, and transportation 
and conununications, as well as education, public 
health and welfare, and public finance. Much of 
the data on public finance, external debt, the 
balance of payments, and the estimates of national 
income, gross national product, consumption, and 
public and private investment is new and appeara 
for the first time in this report. 



672 



Deparfmenf of Sfafe Bulletin 



The United States in the United Nations 



Ceneral Assembly 

Additional Agenda Items — At its plenary meet- 
ing on October 21, the General Assembly decided, 
on the recommendation of the General (Steering) 
Committee, to include the following additional 
items in the agenda of its seventh session : 

72. Measures to avert the threat of a new world war and 
measures to strengthen peace and friendship among 
the nations. 

73. Question of impartial investigation of charges of use 
by United Nations Forces of bacteriological warfare. 

The latter item was requested by the United 
States. The Soviet Union in June had vetoed a 
Security Council resolution for impartial investi- 
gation of germ warfare charges. As was the case 
during the Security Council discussions, the 
Soviet representative now proposed simultaneous 
adoption of a resolution inviting representatives 
of the Chinese Communists and the North Ko- 
reans to participate in the General Assembly's 
consideration of the item. Selwyn Lloyd (U.K.) 
spoke in opposition to the Soviet proposal; 
Ernest A. Gro.ss (U.S.) then declared: 

... It is our position, as the representative of the 
United Kingdom has brought out, that the question of 
inviting the Chinese Communists or the North Koi'enns 
to participate in the consideration of this question is a 
problem which cannot and .should not logically be raised 
and decided in this body, in the General Assembly. It 
is a question which should be left for consideration and 
decision in the First Committee when this item is reached 
for debate in that Committee. ... I cannot conclude 
without pointing out that the essence of the charge against 
the United Nations forces in Korea, the repetition of the 
charges, has centered in Moscow, has been deliberately 
planned, staged, and developed from that source, and the 
question which will be before the First Committee is : 
Who is the instigator of this false charge; whose is the 
responsibility for the constant attempt to poison the 
atmosphere, to divide, to confuse the free world and to 
discredit the United Nations action in Korea? 

The Soviet proposal was defeated by a vote of 
46-5 (Soviet bloc) -7. The Members abstaining 
were Argentina, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, 
Yemen, and Burma. 

On the United States request the vote was 53-5 
(Soviet bloc). 

The Polish request to include item 72 to the 
agenda was approved mianimously. The proposal 



calls for an end of the Korean war, an exchange of 
all prisoners, withdrawal of foreign troops from 
Korea, the reduction by one-third of the armed 
forces of the great powers, imconditional prohibi- 
tion of atomic weapons, condemnation of Nato, 
a live-power peace pact, and ratification of the 
Geneva Protocol, hiter alia. The U.S. delegation 
did not oppose placing the proposal on the agenda, 
since, as Ambassador Gross pointed out, ". . . we 
feel that the best way to expose a fraud is to bring 
it out into the market place of ideas, and men who 
are free to think for themselves will soon enough 
see the truth." He declared that : 

The resolution ... is a scrap heap of discarded ideas. 
. . . Each subject it refers to is more appropriately dis- 
cussed under some other item on our agenda. The 
resolution is as unnecessary and stale as it is unproductive. 

Committee I {Political and Security) — On Octo- 
ber 23 the Committee voted unanimously to place 
tlic Korean item first on its agenda. It also voted 
(."4-20-(;) to give second and third places re- 
si)ectively to the questions of Tunisia and Morocco. 

The opening debate on the Korean question on 
October 23 was marked by a lengthy discussion as 
to vvhether the North Korean government should 
be invited to participate. A Soviet resolution in 
favor of such an invitation was rejected by a vote 
of 38-11-8 (U.S.S.R., Soviet bloc, Burma, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, Yemen). The Com- 
mittee decided (54—5-1) to invite the Kepublic 
of Korea to send a representative. 

In a major statement on October 24 (the text 
of which will be printed in the issues of November 
3 and November 10) Secretary Acheson traced 
the Korean question from tiie Cairo Conference in 
December 1943 through the recent breakdown in 
armistice negotiations and presented a 21-power 
draft resolution calling on the Chinese Commu- 
nists and North Koreans to agree to an armistice 
based on voluntary repatriation of prisoners of 
war. Following is a summary of his statement: 

At Cairo in 1943, the Secretary pointed out, 
representatives of China, the United States, and 
tlie United Kingdom pledged tliat, in due course, 
Korea should become free and independent. At 
Potsdam on July 26, 1945, the same three powers 
repeated that pledge. The Soviet Union, upon 
its entry into the war against Japan, adhered to 



Oc/ofaer 27, 7952 



673 



the Potsdam Declaration; it stated on August 8, 
1945: 

Loyal to its Allied duty, tbe Soviet Government has 
accepted the proposal of the Allies and has joined in the 
Declaration of the Allied Powers of 26 July. 

At Moscow on December 27, 1945, the Foreign 
Ministers of the U.S., the U.K., and the U.S.S.R. 
agreed that a provisional government should be 
set up for all Korea with a view to the re-estab- 
lishment of Korea as an independent state. 

When the Japanese surrendered in September 
1945, it was necessary to arrange for the accept- 
ance of the surrender of the Japanese forces in 
Korea. The Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers ordered that the surrender of the Japanese 
troops should be accepted by the U.S. military 
forces south of the 38th parallel and by the Soviet 
military forces north of the 38th parallel. 

The sole purpose of that Order was to divide the 
area in which the surrender of defeated Japanese 
troops should be made to one group of officers or 
to another. 

Immediately after the surrender, the American 
Military Command in Korea approached the 
Soviet commander and asked him to develop with 
the American commander a joint policy for the 
administration of the area as a whole as a first step 
in the creation of a government for all Korea and 
the orderly transfer of power to that Government. 
The Soviet commander north of the SSth parallel 
rejected this approach. 

At the Council of Foreign Ministers at Moscow 
in December 1945, an agreement was reached to 
create a joint commission of the United States and 
the Soviet Union, and a joint conference of the 
two powers. 

U.S. Proposals in 19^6. — The Joint Conference 
met in January 1946, and the U.S. proposed a 
series of measures to advance the economic and 
admini-strative coordination of all of Korea. They 
provided for uniting the key public utilities 
creating uniform fiscal policies. Tlie Soviet 
Union rejected all these proposals. 

The Joint Conference met disaster earl}' in 1946. 
The Joint Commission, which met in March 1946, 
suffered a similar fate. After it had held 24 ses- 
sions without accomplishing anything, Secretary 
Marshall took the matter up directly with Foreign 
Minister Molotov and corresponded with him 
about reassembling the Joint Commission. Sub- 
sequently the Commission was reconvened on the 
basis that there should be the broadest possible 
consultation with Korean groups and that no 
group or individual could be excluded from con- 
sultation except by mutual agreement between the 
U.S.S.R. and the United States. 

When the Joint Commission met, however, the 
U.S.S.R. representatives repudiated Mr. Molo- 
tov's agreement and went back to their original 
position in 1946, insisting that nobody could be 

674 



consulted unless he had agreed to the trusteeship 
provisions. 

On August 26, 1947, Robert Lovett, the Acting 
Secretary of State, made another effoi't to carry 
out the Moscow Agreement and the pledge made 
at Cairo and Potsdam. He wrote a letter to the 
Governments of the U.K., China, and the U.S.S.R., 
proposing a Four-Power conference. 

Tlie Soviet Union rejected this proposal. Since 
it was clear that nothing could be hoped for from 
bilateral discussions with the U.S.S.R., the U.S. 
brought the matter to the United Nations. Dur- 
ing its second session in 1947 the General Assembly 
considered resolutions put forward by the Soviet 
Union and by the U.S., and finally adopted a reso- 
lution providing for elections for a national as- 
sembly which was to establish a national govern- 
ment throughout all of Korea, for subsequent 
withdrawal of all occupying troops, and for the 
establishment of a commission to carry out the 
U.N.'s intentions. 

The U.N. Commission was set up and went to 
Korea. U.S. military officers who were in com- 
mand south of the 38th parallel put everything 
at its disposal, but it was not permitted to carry 
out its functions in North Korea. 

Election in South Korea. — On May 10, 1948, 
Korea's first democratic election took place, with 
75 percent of the eligible voters south of the SSth 
parallel voting. 

A Constituent Assembly was set up ; a Constitu- 
tion was worked out; elections were held for the 
executive officers of the Government; and on 
August 25 the Government of the Republic of 
Korea was inaugurated. By September 11, 1948, 
the U.S. had transferred all authority to that Gov- 
ernment. 

In accordance with the will of the General As- 
sembly, the withdrawal of U.S. troops was com- 
pleted on June 29, 1949. 

The U.S.S.R. withdrew its occupying forces in 
1948 but continued to exercise control in North 
Korea through its official representatives there, 
through North Korean leaders who were either 
citizens or one-time residents of the Soviet Union, 
and by the tradition of subservience inculcated 
during the occupation. 

Efforts to subvert South Korea were carried on 
through political and guerrilla warfare, military 
pressure on the border, and ceaseless propaganda. 
Overt political activity ended in 1947, with the 
suppression of the Communist Party in South 
Korea. 

Covert activities were continued by guerrilla 
forces which infiltrated into the South. In the 
beginning these forces were made up of South 
Korean Communists, but soon considerable num- 
bers of armed North Korean Communists infil- 
trated into South Korea and kept up constant pres- 

Depariment of Sfafe Bulletin 



sure on the Korean Government. Secretary 
Acheson explained: 

There were three main purposes in this activity. One 
was to lay the basis for a future attempt at an internal 
coup. The second was to harrass the South Korean 
Government and not to give it an opportunity to get on 
with the pressing problems of organization in the country. 
The third was to give the impression to the outside world 
of mass discontent in South Korea. 

Unprovoked military incidents along the border 
occurred almost daily, and at least four major 
military operations took place before that of June 
25, 1950. 

In the field of propaganda, efforts to subvert the 
Government of South Korea took the form of 
appeals to South Koreans to rise up against their 
Government and overthrow it, and of "proposals 
for the peaceful unification of Korea", i. e. by the 
Communists. 

All these efforts were completely defeated in South 
Korea, with the result that in the late spring of 1950, 
the South Korean Government, the Government of the 
Kepuhlic of Korea, presented the strongest attitude to 
the world which they had ever presented. It had defeated 
the Communists who had infiltrated from the north and 
cleaned up these pockets of rebellion within its own coun- 
try. It had solidified the loyalty of its own people and 
established the basis of its own democratic control. It 
had met every attempt to invade it over its border and 
thrown them back. It had met all this propaganda. It is 
quite significant that after all these efforts had been de- 
feated, it was only a few weeks later that the attack 
occurred. 

According to a report of the United Nations 
Commission on June 25, 1950, the armed forces of 
the Republic of Korea consisted of 100,000 men 
organized into eight divisions but not armed for 
offensive combat. 

On June 24 one day before the aggression began, 
the U.N. Commission had received a report from 
field observers who had made a coinplete inspec- 
tion of the entire Thirty-eighth Parallel. This 
inspection began on June 9 and ended on June 23. 



During their tour the observers were given an 
opportunity to see everything in South Korea 
along the parallel. They said that they had ob- 
tained a clear picture of the deployment, on a 
defensive basis, of the South Korean forces. The 
Commission said that on the basis of this report 
and of its knowledge of the general military situ- 
ation, 

the Commission is unanimously of the opinion that no 
offensive could possibly have been launclied across the 
Parallel by the Republic of Korea on 25 June 1950. 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: Oct. 10-18, 1952 

Releases may be obtained from the OflSce of the 
Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department 
of State, Washington 25, D.C. 

Press releases issued prior to Oct. 10 which ap- 
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 784 of 
Oct. 7, 792 of Oct. 9, 794 of Oct. 9, 800 of Oct. 10, and 
802 of Oct. 10. 

No. Date Subject 

Consultation on cartography 
Death of Willard, Chief of 10 
Anderson : Human welfare 
Miller: Latin American relations 
7th sess. General Assembly 
Exchange of persons 
Smith : Tca director, Haiti 
Forestry & products commission 
Draper : Unification of Europe 
Exchange of persons 
Swiss-German property agmt. 
Acheson : General Assembly 
For. Ser. 1952 selection boards 
U.N. note on Soviet attack of U.S. 

plane 
Congress of architects 
Hickerson : Problems of the 7th Gen- 
eral Assembly. 
Bruce : Death of Matthews 

*Not printed. 

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



t803 


10/10 


*804 


10/13 


t805 


10/13 


t806 


10/14 


t807 


10/14 


*808 


10/14 


t809 


10/15 


t810 


10/15 


SU 


10/16 


*812 


10/16 


t813 


10/16 


814 


10/16 


*815 


10/16 


81C 


10/17 


817 


10/17 


818 


10/18 


*819 


10/18 



October 27, 1952 



675 



October 27, 1952 



Index 



Vol. XXVII, No. 696 



Alaska 

U.S., Japan consider Alaskan forest products 

market 658 

American Republics 

MEXICO: Report on economy 672 

Arms and Armed Forces 

U.S. proposals for elimination of bacterial 

weapons 671 

Asia 

BURMA: Economic development program . . 660 

JAPAN: 

Economic mission to Japan 672 

Education in review (Alden) 654 

U.S., Japan consider Alaskan forest products 

market 658 

War criminals board organized 659 

KASHMIR: 

Recent developments in the Kashmir dispute: 

map (Collins) 663 

Values at stake in settlement of Kashmir's 

status (Graham) 661 

KOREA: Report of U.N. Command operations 

in Korea, 47th report 668 

Aviation 

U.S.S.R. charged with misrepresenting facts in 
bomber incident (texts of Soviet and U.S. 
notes) 649 

Congress 

First report to Congress on Battle Act of 1951 . . 652 

Disarmament Commission 

Summary of proposals made 648 

Education 

Japanese education in review (Alden) .... 654 

Europe 

Toward European and Atlantic unity (Draper) . 650 
U.S.S.R.: Charged with misrepresenting facts 

In bomber Incident (texts of Soviet and U.S. 

notes) 649 



Finance 

International Bank activities re Japan and 

Mexico 672 

Mutual Security 

Economic development program in Burma . . 660 

First report to Congress on Battle Act of 1951 . . 652 

Toward European and Atlantic unity (Draper) . 650 

Protection of U.S. Nationals and Property 

U.S.S.R. charged with misrepresenting facts in 
bomber incident (texts of Soviet and U.S. 
notes) 649 

Technical Cooperation and Development 

Economic development program in Burma . . 660 

United Nations 

Achieving the goals of the Charter (Acheson); 

Austin statement 639 

Problems facing the Seventh General Assembly 

(Hickerson) 645 

Recent developments in the Kashmir dispute; 

map (Collins) 663 

Report of Command operations in Korea, 47th 

report 668 

U.S. in the U.N 674 

U.S. proposals for elimination of bacterial 

weapons 671 

Values at stake in settlement of Kashmir's 

status (Graham) 661 

Name Index 

Acheson, Secretary 639 

Alden, Jame M 654 

Austin, Warren R 639 

Collins, Frank D 663 

Draper, William H, Jr 650 

Graham, Frank P 661,663 

Harriman, W. Averell 652 

Hickerson, John D 645 

Kobayashl, Junichiro 658 

Snow, Conrad E 659 

Trager, Frank N 660 



1. S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE I9S2 



"'I^!i'2>. ' 



113 



tJ/v€/ u)eha/}^wieni/ xw t/taie^ 




'-ol. XXVII, No. 697 
November 3, 1952 





THE PROBLEM OF PEACE IN KOREA: 

General Assembly Statement by Secretary Acheson . 679 
Address by Assistant Secretary Hickerson 692 

UNITED NATIONS DAY, 1952 • by Assistant Secretary 

Sargeant 698 

ACHIEVEMENTS OF INTER-AMERICAN COOPERA- 
TION • by Assistant Secretary Miller 702 

THE AMERICAN FARMER IN THE WORLD 

PICTURE • By Stanley Andrews 708 

STRENGTHENING THE U.N. COLLECTIVE SECU- 
RITY SYSTEM • Article by Joseph J. Sisco .... 717 



For index see back cover 



^V»«*''*' Of 



0. S. SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS' 



NOV 24 1952 



M 



e 




•'^r,. «>» ' 



^e/i^/me^ ^/SL/e JOllllGiin 



Vol. XXVII, No. 697 • Publication 4770 
November 3, 1952 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Qoverament Printing Office 

Washington 25, D.C. 

Peice: 

52 issues, domestic $7.50. foreign $10.25 

Single copy, 20 cents 

The printing of this publication has 
been approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget (January 22, 1952). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may 
be reprinted. Citation of the Department 
OF State Bulletls as the source will be 
appreciated. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication compiled and 
edited in the Division of Publications, 
Office of Public Affairs, provides the 
public and interested agencies of 
the Government with information on 
developments in the field of foreign 
relations and on the work of the De- 
partment of State and the Foreign 
Service. The BULLETIN includes 
selected press releases on foreign pol- 
icy issued by the White House and 
the Department, and statements and 
addresses made by the President and 
by the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the func- 
tions of the Department. Informa- 
tion is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to 
which the United States is or may 
become a party and treaties of gen- 
eral international interest. 

Publications of the Department, as 
well as legislative material in the field 
of internatioruil relations, are listed 
currently. 



The Problem of Peace in Korea 



STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ACHESON > 

[Excerpts] 

As I suggested yesterday, in considering the 
last two Commission reports before us [i. e. those 
presented to the General Assembly by the U.N. 
Commission for the Unification and Eehabilita- 
tion of Korea in 1950 and 1952] it seems necessary 
that we should take a long and broad look at the 
whole Korean question, stai'ting with the begin- 
ning of this matter and following it through to 
the present day. 

There are many things which we are likely to 
lose sight of, things which should be present in our 
minds when we are considering the questions be- 
fore us. My Government has thought it important 
to report very fully to the United Nations on all 
that we have done in your behalf — all that we 
have done as the United Nations Command, or- 
ganized by us at your request in accordance with 
the resolution of July 1950. 

We have had many reports; biweekly reports 
are filed. On October 18 a longer report was filed 
by the Unified Command.^ Now I propose to sup- 
plement that by a very full oral report and review 
of the Korean question. 

This will require looking at some history. It 
will require going back to the early days and re- 
calling, as I shall do in more detail, the early hopes 
which were held by all of us for a free and unified 

^ Made before Committee I (Political and Security) of 
the General Assembly on Oct. 24 and released to the press 
on that date by the U.S. delegation to the General As- 
sembly. The comijlete text is available as Department of 
State publication 4771. 

^ This report (U.N. doc A/2228) summarizing the present 
status of the military action and the armistice negotia- 
tions in Korea was transmitted to the Secretary-General 
by Ambassador Warren R. Austin. It is not printed here 
since it contains material already presented in detail in 
the biweekly reports of the Unified Command. For texts 
of recent reports, see Bulletin of Feb. 18, 1952, p. 266; 
Mar. 10, 1952, p. 395 ; Mar. 17, 19.52, p. 430 ; Mar. 31, 19.52, 
p. 512 ; Apr. 14, 1952, p. .594 ; May 5, 1952, p. 715 ; May 19, 
1952, p. 788 ; June 23, 1952, p. 998 ; June 30, 1952, p. 1038 ; 
July 21, 1952, p. 114; Aug. 4, 1952, p. 194; Aug. 11, 1952, 
p. 231 ; Aug. 18, 1952, p. 272 ; Sept. 29, 1952, p. 495, and 
Oct. 27, 1952, p. 668. 



democratic Korea. We shall have to recall the 
frustration of those hopes. We shall have to re- 
call the persistent efforts by the United Nations to 
bring those hopes into being. We shall have to 
recall the establishment of the Republic of Korea 
and its Government. We shall have to recall the 
attempts to subvert that Government. Then we 
shall come to the actual aggression by force upon 
the Republic of Korea, and we shall have to recall 
again the role of the United Nations, making it 
very clear that the role of the United Nations from 
the very beginning was to brand as aggression 
what was aggression, to unify the world so far as 
it could to resist aggression, and never at any mo- 
ment to lose sight of the possibility that efforts 
other than military efforts might be able to restore 
peace and security in Korea. 

We shall have to recall this afternoon the hero- 
ism of the few who have been fighting in support 
of the principles of the Charter against the many 
who have been fighting against the principles of 
the Charter. We shall have to recall the many na- 
tions which have supported this effort and those 
fewer nations which have borne the chief brunt 
of it. And we shall also have to recall, because we 
must, that the aggressor has friends — the aggres- 
sor has friends in the Assembly and in this Com- 
mittee. And we shall have to recall the activities 
of those friends. 

We do this not merely because this is history but 
because these are the facts that face us and we must 
face those facts. 

We shall also want to examine the course of ac- 
tion which has been followed since the aggression 
began. As we examine in detail what has hap- 
pened, we must not be too self-deprecating. I 
think we shall conclude that the United Nations 
has done all that is possible to try to bring about 
peace and that the aggressor and those who sup- 
Ijort him have done nothing to bring about peace 
and everything to impede it. 

I shall want to set out in full before you the 
armistice negotiations, the issue which now re- 
mains open, and I should also like to examine the 
observations with resj^ect to those issues which 



November 3, 1952 



679 



were made yesterday in this Committee and last 
week in the plenary meetings by the Soviet Union 
representative. 

Does the Aggressor Want an Armistice? 

This is a broad outline of what I wish to lay be- 
fore you this afternoon. I do so because this Com- 
mittee and the Assembly must come to some con- 
clusion as to whether the aggressor really wants an 
armistice. If there is an honest armistice which is 
wanted in accordance with the principles of the 
United Nations, then my Government, and I am 
sure most of the other Governments here, will do 
everything in their power to achieve it. But if 
that is not the case and if the resistance must go on, 
then we shall have to examine our positions and 
our ability to carry that resistance forward. If, 
in the words of the psalmist, "I am for peace but 
when I speak they are for war," we must know that 
and we must prepare ourselves to meet it. 

There must be always present in our delibera- 
tions the thought of those who are suffering by 
reason of this wanton act of aggression. We must 
think of the homes in many countries represented 
here and in Korea where loved ones are missing — 
in some cases because they are dead and in other 
cases because they are absent supporting the prin- 
ciples of the United Nations in a distant land to 
many of them and with superb courage. We must 
think of the suffering which is being brought to 
Korea, to those who are supporting Korea, and 
also to the aggressor. It is a sad thing that a mil- 
lion and a half of the men of the aggressor have 
been killed or wounded in this vicious and illegal 
act. To them, it is just as sad that they are killed 
in that sort of act as in a good one because I sup- 
pose that they have very little volition in the mat- 
ter. But we must think about our own men and 
our own responsibility to them. I can assure you 
that those who have the burden of conducting the 
effort and making the decisions in the Unified 
Command never for one moment forget that re- 
sponsibility and their duty. 

The Cairo Conference, December 1943 

Our story begins on December 1, 1943, at Cairo. 
At that time, the representatives of China, the 
United States, and the United Kingdom pledged 
themselves as being determined that, in due course, 
Korea shall become free and independent. That 
pledge at Cairo was repeated by the same three 
powers at Potsdam on July 26, 1945. There, it 
was agreed that the terms of the Cairo Declara- 
tion shall be carried out. And upon its entry into 
the war against Japan, the Soviet Union adhei-ed 
to the Potsdam Declaration, stating on August 8, 
1945 — and these were the words used by the Soviet 
Government — 

Loyal to its Allied duty, the Soviet Governmeut has 
accepted the proposal of the Allies and has joined in the 
Declaration of the Allied Powers of 26 July. 



This pledge was reaffirmed at Moscow on De- 
cember 27, 1945. At that time, the Foreign Minis- 
ters of the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and the Soviet Union agreed that a provisional 
Korean democratic government should be set up 
for all Korea with a view to the reestablishment 
of Korea as an independent state. Those were the 
promises. Those are the principles accepted by 



Draft Resolution on Korea* 

U.N. doc. A/C. 1/725 
Dated Oct. 24, 1952 

The General Assembly, 

1. Having received the special report of the Uni- 
fied Command of IS October 1952 on the status of 
military action and the armistice negotiations in 
Korea, 

2. Noting with approval the efforts of the United 
Nations negotiators to achieve a just and honour- 
able armistice to bring an end to the fighting in 
Korea in accordance with United Nations principles. 

3. Noting further that disagreement on one re- 
maining issue has prevented the achievement of such 
an armistice, 

4. Reaffirms the earnest intention of the United 
Nations to reach a just and honourable settlement 
of the Korean conflict; 

5. Notes with approval the tentative agreements 
which the United Nations Command has reached on 
behalf of the United Nations ; 

C. Notes with approval the principle followed 
by the United Nations Command with regard to the 
question of repatriation of prisoners of war, and the 
numerous proposals which the United J\^ations Com- 
mand has made to solve the questions in accordance 
with this humanitarian principle : 

7. Notes further that other suggestions consist- 
ent with the basic humanitarian position of the 
United Nations Command have been made by vari- 
ous Members of the United Nations ; 

S. Calls upon the Central People's Government 
of the People's Repulilic of China and upon the 
North Korean authorities to avert further blood- 
shed by having their negotiators agree to an armi- 
stice which recognizes the rights of all prisoners of 
war to an unrestricted opportunity to be repatriated 
and avoids the use of force in their repatriation ; 

0. Requests the President of the General Assem- 
bly to transmit this resolution to the Central Peo- 
ple's Government of the People's Republic of China 
and to the North Korean authorities, and to make 
a report to the General Assembly as soon as he deems 
appropriate during the present session on the result 
of his action. 

*Sponsored by Australia, Belgium, Canada, Co- 
lombia, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Hon- 
duras, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, the Philippines, Thai- 
land, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, and 
Uruguay. 



the Governments of China, of the United States, 
of the United Kingdom, and of the Soviet Union; 
namely, that Korea should be united, free, and 
independent. 

We must now go into the record of the various 
Governments in the fulfillment or nonfulfillment 
of those promises. When the Japanese surren- 
dered in September 1945, it was necessary to ar- 



680 



Department of State Bulletin 



range for the acceptance of the surrender of the 
Japanese forces in Korea. In order to effectuate 
that, the Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers issued General Order No. 1. This order 
pi-ovided that the surrender of the Japanese troops 
should be accepted by U.S. military forces south 
of the 3Sth parallel and by Soviet military forces 
north of tlie 38th parallel. There was no inten- 
tion to have any provision for zones of occupation. 
The pledge was that Korea should be united, should 
be free, and should be independent. The 38th 
parallel had the significance only of dividing the 
area in which the surrender of defeated Japanese 
troops should be made to one group of oihcers or 
to another. That was the sole purpose of General 
Order No. 1. 

Immediately after the surrender in the fall of 
1945, and in accordance with tlie obligations wliich 
my Government had undertaken, as I have just 
stated to you, the American Military Command 
in Korea approached tlie Soviet Commander and 
asked him to develop with the American Com- 
mander a joint policy for the administration of 
the area as a whole. He stated that this was in- 
tended as a first step in the creation of a govern- 
ment for all Korea and the orderly transfer of 
power to that government. This ajsproach was 
rejected by the Soviet Commander north of tlie 
38th parallel. 

Decisions at Moscow, December 1945 

We then turn to a meeting of Foreign Ministers 
a few weeks later in Moscow in December 19-i5. 
At that time, this whole matter was taken up by 
Secretary of State Byrnes, and an agreement was 
reached to create two institutions. One was a 
Joint Connnission of the United States and the 
Soviet Union ; and the other was a Joint Confer- 
ence of the two powers. The Joint Commission 
was set up to work out the long-range poUtical 
and economic problems, including the establish- 
ment of a provisional democratic structure for all 
of Korea and tlie negotiation of a four-power 
trusteesliip agreement. That was the duty of the 
Joint Commission — a long-range effort to create 
a government. At that time, it was considered 
that the government would be placed under trus- 
teeship in order to deal with the basic economic 
problems. The Joint Conference, on the other 
hand, was set up to deal with immediate and press- 
ing questions. These had to do with the adminis- 
trative and economic problems then existing in 
Korea. It was thought that by the joint eit'orts of 
the military authorities of the United States and 
tlie Soviet Union, those pressing immediate eco- 
nomic and administrative questions could be 
solved. 

The Joint Conference met in January 1946, and 
the United States proposed a series of measures 
to advance the economic and administrative coor- 
dination of all of Korea. These were very prac- 
tical, possible, and important steps. They were 

November 3, J 952 



to unite the key public utilities, something which 
obviously should be done in a country which was 
about to be unified; and to create uniform fiscal 
policies, obviously very necessary to provide for 
the free flow of commodities back and forth 
throughout Korea. All of these proposals were 
rejected by the Soviet Union. Without going into 
the reasons given for each rejection, one reason 
is sufficient to give you an idea of what was in 
process of evolution in tlie North. 

The U.S. proposal to unify the key utilities 
throughout Korea was rejected on the ground that 
to do so would impinge upon the absolute authority 
of the Soviet Union in the Northern zone. That 
is the first time that we were told clearly tliat there 
was such a thing as the absolute authority of the 
Soviet Union north of the 38th parallel. It had 
not been the idea of anybody up to that time that 
any one had absolute authority in Korea except 
the Government of tlie Korean people which we 
were pledged to set up. But here our proposals 
were rejected because they would interfere with 
the absolute authority of the Soviet Union north 
of the 38th parallel. As a result, the Joint Con- 
ference accomplished almost nothing. There was 
an agi-eement — limited agreement — on the ex- 
change of mail, radio frequencies, and offices rep- 
resenting the two commands and some small agree- 
ment on rail, motor, and water-borne transporta- 
tion. However, when we came to carry out even 
these limited agreements, that proved to be impos- 
sible, with the exception that for some time, a 
short time, there was a limited exchange of mail 
between the areas north and south of the 38th 
parallel. 

Therefore, this Joint Conference which was to 
deal with the immediate and urgent questions met 
disaster in the very early days of 1946. The Joint 
Commission suffered a similar fate 3 months later. 
That met in March 1946. It held 24 sessions and 
accomplished exactly nothing. The whole diffi- 
culty arose over a provision of the Moscow Agree- 
ment which was that political and social groups in 
Korea should be consulted by the Joint Commis- 
sion, so that the Koi-ean people would have a voice 
in the Provisional Government which was set up. 
The U.S. representatives said quite clearly that 
there should be the broadest possible consultation 
with the Korean democratic parties and social 
organizations. But the Soviet Union said that 
there should be no consultation with any Korean 
group or party which at any time — whatever it 
was doing then — had voiced opposition to the trus- 
teeship provided for in the Moscow Agreement. 

Since everybody in Korea at one time or another 
had objected to the trusteeship agreement, except 
the Communists, what this meant was that the 
Joint Commission could not consult with any one 
except Communist groups and, of course, that was 
not acceptable to the U.S. delegation, since they 
completely denied the right of free expi-ession by 
the people in the country as to the most important 
thing that was going to happen, and that was the 

681 



evolution of their own government of their own 
country. 

In this state of affairs, after the 24 meetings and 
no progress of any sort, Secretary Marsliall took 
the matter up directly with Foreign Minister 
Molotov and corresponded with him on the basis 
of reassembling the Joint Commission for the pur- 
pose of getting on with its work. The result of 
that was an exchange of letters and the reconven- 
ing of the Commission on the basis, so it was 
thought and so it was said in the letters, of the 
view which the U.S. representatives had taken — 
that is, that there should be the broadest possible 
consultation with Korean groups, and it was ex- 
pressly provided that no group or individual could 
be excluded from consultation except by mutual 
agreement between the Soviet Union and our- 
selves. In other words, there was not a veto right 
of exclusion. The only people who could be ex- 
cluded were those people who we both agreed 
should be excluded. 

With that very hopeful charter, the Joint Com- 
mission met, and it immediately discovered that it 
was right back where it started from. The Soviet 
Union representatives on the Joint Commission 
wholly repudiated Mr. Molotov's agreement, his 
written letter and word, and went right back to 
their original position in 1946, insisting that no- 
body could be consulted unless he had agreed to 
the trusteeship provisions. Finally, the Soviet 
Union representatives proposed that the whole 
business should be dissolved — that is, the whole 
Joint Commission should be dissolved — and that 
effort given up and that there should be an imme- 
diate Provisional Assembly set up on the basis of 
equal representation from the North and South. 
That is, there should be equal numbers from north 
of the parallel and south of the parallel of those 
parties which fully supported the Moscow Agree- 
ment. 



End of the Joint Commission in 1947 

That was a very interesting pi'oposal because, 
of the 30,000,000 people in Korea, 20,000,000 live 
south and 10,000,000 live north of the 38th parallel 
and, therefore, it was suggested that there should 
be equal numbers. That would not occur to you 
as being the normal thing that would come into 
your mind. If two-thirds of the population lives 
south and one-third north, that ought to be the 
general area of representation. However, it was 
said to be equal, and equal representatives of what ? 
Not of the people who lived north and south but 
of those political groups north and south who fully 
supported the Moscow Declaration, i.e. the Com- 
munists. So an equal number of Communists from 
the North and an equal number of Communists 
from the South were to come together to form the 
Provisional Government of Korea. That was the 
Soviet Union Government's pi'oposal in 1946 and 
that, of course, was not satisfactory. In 1947, that 
effort, through the Joint Commission, ended after 



almost 2 years of utter and complete frustration. 

However, the U.S. State Department was not 
wholly discouraged. On August 26, 1947, Mr. 
Eobert Lovett, who was then Acting Secretary of 
State, went and made one more effort to carry out 
the Moscow Agreement and the pledge made at 
Cairo and Potsdam. Mr. Lovett wrote a letter to 
the Governments of the United Kingdom, China, 
and the Soviet Union pi'oposing a four-power con- 
ference, and I particularly invite your attention to 
this effort, because yesterday I heard quite a little 
said about the importance of having four or five 
or other power conferences on Korea. 

This will be an instructive bit of history on that 
point. Mr. Lovett on August 26 sent a letter to 
the Governments of the United Kingdom, China, 
and the Soviet Union proposing a four-power con- 
ference to consider the speedy implementation of 
the Moscow Agreement on Korea. Accompanying 
the letter, he included some proposals for discus- 
sion at that conference. These proposals were very 
simple and quite practicable. They provided, first 
of all, that there should be elections in North and 
South Korea which should be observed by the 
United Nations for the purpose of establishing 
zonal legislatures. That is, there would be a leg- 
islature elected by an election supervised by the 
United Nations north of the parallel and a legis- 
lature set up by a similar election south of the 
parallel. 

The Korean Provisional Government and the 
representatives — first of all, the representatives 
of these two legislatures — should then work out a 
national provisional legislature charged with the 
duty of setting up a provisional government. In 
other words, you would have a legislative group — 
a provisional one in the North and one in the 
South. They should get together and set up a pro- 
visional government for all of Korea. Second, 
that provisional government and the four powers 
should then work out measures to aid in the estab- 
lishment of a firm and enduring Korean independ- 
ence. It was obviously not enough merely to estab- 
lish a provisional government. There should be a 
permanent government. There were grave eco- 
nomic problems to be solved, and that was to be 
done by the four powers with the Provisional Ko- 
rean Government. It was also proposed that the 
four-power conference with the Provisional Ko- 
rean Government should agree upon a date for the 
withdrawal of all occupying forces. That was a 
demand about which you heard a great deal in the 
past and you undoubtedly will hear about it in 
this debate. It was proposed by Mr. Lovett in 
August 1947 that a four-power conference should 
be lield for establishing that date as well as the 
other things which I have mentioned. 

This proposal of Mr. Lovett was rejected com- 
pletely by the Soviet Union. Not only was the 
proposal for a four-power meeting rejected, but 
the proposals which had been included in the let- 
ter were also rejected. 



682 



Department of State Bulletin 



First U.N. Action, November 1947 

At this point it became clear to the representa- 
tives of the United States tliat nothing further 
could be hoped for from bilateral discussions with 
the Soviet Union. We concluded that we had done 
all we could think of to redeem the pledges made, 
but we had absolutely no response of any sort from 
the other side. Therefore, the matter was brought 
by the U.S. Government to the United Nations. 
That was done during the second session of the 
Genei-al Assembly in 1947. The U.N. General As- 
sembly considered this matter; it considered reso- 
lutions put forward by the Soviet Union and by 
the United States; it heard suggestions of modi- 
fication by others ; and finally adopted, by a vote 
of 43 to none, with 6 abstentions, the resolution of 
November 14, 1947.^ 

That resolution provided for the holding of elec- 
tions for a national assembly which was to estab- 
lish a national government throughout all of 
Korea. It provided that there should be elec- 
tions throughout the whole country to establish 
a national assembly, to establish a national gov- 
ernment. It provided that all occupying troops 
should be withdrawn as soon as the national gov- 
ernment created its own forces and took over au- 
thority from the military repi-esentatives of the 
United States and the U.S.S.K. It provided for 
the establishment of a nine-nation Temporary 
Commission on Korea to facilitate and expedite 
the fulfillment of the program as worked out by 
the United Nations. In the words of the resolu- 
tion, it recognized "the urgent and rightful claims 
to independence of the people of Korea," and it 
laid down the principle of the participation of 
Korean representatives in the discussion of the 
problem. 

This seemed to the U.N. General Assembly to 
be a very fair and very constructive resolution. 
However, the Soviet Union representative de- 
clared, before the vote was taken, that the Soviet 
Union would not take any part in the work of the 
Commission and would not vote on the resolution. 
The resolution was passed, however, by 43 votes 
to none. The Commission was set up and went to 
Korea. It immediately got in toucli with the U.S. 
military officers who were in command south of 
tlie 38th parallel, and who put everytliing at the 
disposal of the Commission, and the Commission 
went to work in that area. It was not permitted 
to carry out its functions in tlie north of Korea 
and, therefore, the Commission immediately 
turned to the Interim Committee of the United 
Nations to know what to do. 

It had been sent out under a resolution which 
told it to observe elections throughout all of Korea 
and to set up an all-Korean legislature. It was 
not permitted to go into the North; it was not per- 
mitted to hold or observe elections; what should 
it do? The Interim Committee of the United 



Nations considered this problem and then advised 
the Commission in Korea that it should do as much 
as it could of what the General Assembly told it 
to do. In other words, if it could not supervise 
elections throughout Korea, it should supervise 
them where it could. Since it could do that in 
South Korea where two-thirds of the people live, 
the Interim Committee thought that was most 
desirable. 

The Commission on Korea did exactly that. 
On May 10, 1948, it held the first democratic elec- 
tion ever held in Korea. Seventy-five percent of 
the eligible voters south of the 38th parallel voted 
in the election, and the election was universally 
acclaimed in the South as a great step in the direc- 
tion of Koi'ean independence. The Commission 
observed the elections from April 5 to May 11. 
After the results were known and after this ob- 
servation period ended, the Commission adopted 
a resolution — the resolution of June 25 — in which 
it found that the elections were — 

a valid expression of the free will of the electorate in 
those parts of Korea which were accessible to the Com- 
mission and in which the inhabitants constitute approxi- 
mately two-thirds of the people of all Korea. 

Establisliment of tlie Republic, August 1948 

As a result of those elections, there was set up a 
Constituent Assembly ; a constitution was worked 
out ; elections were held for the executive officers of 
the Government, and on August 25 the Govern- 
ment of the Republic of Korea was inaugurated. 

Immediately, the United States set about trans- 
ferring authority to that Government, and this 
transfer of authority was completed by September 
11, 1948. But one very ugly fact remained, and 
that was that Korea was still divided. This fact 
was brought to the attention of the General As- 
sembly by the Commission on Korea in its report, 
in that form. The third session of the General 
Assembly was informed by the Commission that 
all developments in South Korea were overshad- 
owed by the grim reality of a divided Korea. 
"All Koreans are united in their condemnation 
of this disunity," the Commission said. It then 
reported tlie following situation to be true in 
Korea : 

On the one hand, there is a People's Republic in the north 
set up arbitrarily by steps which were not under inter- 
national observation; on the other hand, there is a Gov- 
ernment of the Republic of Korea, established in the 
south as a result of elections observed by the Commission. 

The General Assembly considered this subject 
again in the following year, in 1948. At that time 
it passed another resolution,* following the report 
of the Commission. It approved the conclusions 
of the Commission. It established a permanent 
Commission on Korea to take the place of the 
temporary one. The resolution then contained 
these major provisions: fir.st, that member states 
"refrain from any acts derogatory to the results 



= Bulletin of Xov. 30, 19-17, p. 1031. 
November 3, J 952 



'Ibid., Dec. 19, 1948/ p. 760. 



683 



achieved and to be achieved by the United Nations 
in bringing about the complete independence and 
unity of Korea"; and second, that the Govern- 
ment of Korea was established as a lawful Govern- 
ment having effective control and jurisdiction over 
South Korea, and that this Government "is based 
on elections which were a valid expression of the 
free will of the electorate," and that this was the 
only such Government in Korea. The resolution 
urged the withdrawal of the occupying forces as 
early as practicable. The Commission was asked 
to seek the unification of Korea and to observe the 
withdrawal of the forces. 

This resolution was adopted by a vote of 48 to 6, 
with 1 abstention. 

At the same session, the Soviet Union Govern- 
ment introduced a draft resolution which pro- 
vided only for abolishing the U.N. Temporary 
Commission on Korea. That was defeated by a 
vote of 46 to 6. 



Withdrawal of U. S. Troops, June 1949 

In accordance with the resolution whicli I have 
just described, the United States announced its 
intention of withdrawing its occupation forces, in 
accordance with the will of the General Assembly, 
not later than June 30, 1949. The troop with- 
drawal was completed on June 29, 1949, and was 
verified by the U.N. Commission on Korea. 

Tlie Soviet Union announced tliat its complete 
troop witJidrawal took jilace on December 25, 1948. 
This withdrawal could not be and was not verified 
by anyone. However, we believe that it did take 
place sometime about those dates given, and that 
all that was retained in North Korea of a strictly 
military nature was the military mission. A 
similar military mission was retained in South 
Korea at the request of the South Korean 
Government. 

As the Soviet Union moved out of North Korea, 
it left North Korean armed forces consisting of 
between 50,000 and 60,000 people, exclusive of 
paramilitary border con.stabulary and railroad 
guards armed with weapons given to them by the 
Soviet Union Government. These troops had 
been under training since 1946. 

In 1949, at its fourth session, the General As- 
sembly took note of the fact that its objective, the 
imification of Korea, had not been achieved.^ It 
also noted the withdrawal of the U.S. occupying 
forces. It continued the Commission in order to 
bring about the unification of Korea and to verify, 
if it could, the withdrawal of Soviet forces, and 
to observe and report any developments which 
might lead to or otherwise involve military con- 
flict in Korea. The Commission, being thus in- 
structed and its continuation being provided for, 
again went to Korea and again souglit contact 
witli the authorities in North Korea. The mem- 
bers of the Commission were not only denied any 

'Ibid., Nov. 7, 1949, p. 695. 



access, they were not only rebuffed in private, but 
Radio Pyongyang took to the air with a bitter 
denunciation of the United Nations and of its 
Commission. They were never permitted in 
North Korea. 

Consequences of the Division 

I should like to pause from my purely chrono- 
logical recitation at this moment to point out some 
of the consequences of this division of Korea 
which had been brought about as I have described 
and had continued over the years which I have 
mentioned. It liad two very severe results. One 
was to create great tension throughout Korea. 
The Korean people, as the U.N. Commission has 
recorded, were deeply preoccupied with the unifi- 
cation of their country and they believed that 
Korea could not be free and independent unless it 
was united. This formed the major preoccupa- 
tion in the political life of Korea. And since 
there was the opposite idea being promulgated in 
the North and since there were bitterly antagonis- 
tic philosophical ideas in the two areas, the ten- 
sions grew and grew. 

The other consequence of the division of Korea 
was an economic one. Although, as I have 
pointed out, two-thirds of the people lived in 
South Korea and only one-third in North Korea, 
the resources of the country were very inequitably 
divided. North of the parallel were the major 
industrial facilities — the iron industry and the 
steel industry of Korea. There was also the chem- 
ical industry, which produced the fertilizers very 
largely usecl in the agricultural South. All these 
facilities were situated in the North. Almost 
every hydroelectric project was situated in the 
North. Furthermore, the North, by the policy 
which it was conducting, sent 2,000,000 refugees 
into the already crowded South and, by thus thin- 
ning out its population, was able to be self- 
sustaining in food whereas tlie South was not. 
Finally, all the basic minerals were in the North, 
so that it was impossible for the South to begin 
industries to take the place of those to which 
they were denied access in the North. 

As a result of this, the burdens imposed upon 
the South were that they were left without essen- 
tial fertilizers, Avithout hydroelectric power equip- 
ment, without the industrial plants necessary to 
provide for their wants, and without sufficient 
mineral resources to develop new industry. And 
all of these burdens were added over and above 
the liurdens remaining from the war. 

Now, to continue our story : We have seen how 
there was established this Government in the 
South. We have seen its problems. What I now 
wish to bring l>efore you is an account of the Com- 
munists' efforts to subvert and destroy tlie Gov- 
ernment in the South of Korea. So far, it has 
appeared that the efforts of the Soviet ITnion were 
purely negative, that they were purely obstruc- 
tive. It would indeed have been happy if that 



684 



Deporfmenf of Sfofe Bullefin 



had been so — because we now come to a chapter in 
which their activities are only too positive. 

Let us first look at the Government, so-called, of 
North Korea. In 19J:9, the U.N. Commission 
gave the following description of it : 

The Northern regime is the creature of the miUtary 
occupant and rules by right of a mere transfer of power 
from that Government. It has never been v^'illing to 
give its .subjects an unfettered opportunity, under the 
scrutiny of an impartial international agency, to pass upon 
its claim to rule. Tlie claims to be a people's democracy 
and its expressions of concern for the general welfare 
are falsified by this unwillingness to account for the exer- 
cise of power to those against whom it is employed. 

Since the time of that report, we have acquired 
a good deal of information about what went on in 
North Korea. This was acquired from prisoners, 
from deserters, from the masses of refugees who 
poured into the South, and also from the U.N. 
military forces when they were in occupation of 
very large parts of North Korea. . . .^ 

In many resjiects, the information which we 
have obtained on North Korea makes it appear 
to be almost the model satellite. I say "model" 
because it represented a form of "people's democ- 
racy" in which local institutions played no part 
whatever. It represented the pure doctrine. And 
Soviet domination of the Government in North 
Korea continued. 

When the Soviet Union withdrew its occiq^ying 
forces from the North, it left embedded there a 
mechanism of covert Soviet controls, which meant 
that the only change that really occurred was the 
change of headquarters, when the troops with- 
drew, from military headquarters to the Soviet 
Embassy at Pyongyang. 

This control was exercised in these ways : first, 
through the Soviet Government agencies and offi- 
cial representatives in North Korea; second, 
through North Korean leaders who were either 
citizens of the Soviet Union or one-time residents 
of the Soviet Union and who dominated the key 
jjositions of authority in the North Korean Gov- 
ernment ; and, third, by a tradition of subservience 
which had been inculcated in North Korea during 
the occupation. 

In order to help these controls, the Soviet Union 
Government retained a near monopoly of trade 
and conduct of foreign affairs for North Korea. 
It played a direct and major role in the industrial 
activities in North Korea. It trained the future 
leadership of North Korea in the Soviet Union, 
and it imposed on North Korea a cultural con- 
formity to the Soviet patterns on the grounds of 
absorbing the superior Soviet culture. . . . 

Soviet Efforts To Subvert Soutfi Korea 

Those are the methods of control which were set 
up in North Korea. Now, what about the efforts 



" For a description of life in the town of Yangyang, 
North Korea, under the Communist regime, see ibid., Dec. 
10, 19.51. p. 92S. 



to subvert South Korea? How was it done? 
These efforts were carried on in three particular 
and most important ways. In the first place, there 
was political and guerrilla warfare. That is a way 
which I shall describe in a moment. Secondly, 
there was military pressure on the border, and 
I shall go into that; and, third, there was ceaseless 
propaganda. 

Political and guerrilla warfare — Turning to the 
political and guerrilla warfare, in the period from 
1945 to 1947, two operations were carried on. One 
was an overt operation and one was a covert opera- 
tion. The overt oi:)eration was the organization 
of the Labor Party in South Korea and activities 
taken in the open by that Party. That overt ac- 
tivity ended in 1947, with the suppression of the 
Communist Party in Korea. The covert activi- 
ties, which began early and continued afterward, 
were the infiltration of guerrilla forces into the 
South, and the keeping up of constant pressure 
upon the Government. In the beginning, tliese 
forces were made up of South Korean Communists. 
That was the beginning of the thing, but very soon 
they became of minor importance in it and con- 
siderable numbers of North Korean Conununists 
were infiltrated into South Korea. They went 
into the mountains, they were armed, and they 
kept up that constant jaressure on the Korean 
(iovernment. 

There were three main purposes in this activity. 
One was to lay the basis for a future attempt at an 
intei'ual coup. The second was to harass the South 
Korean Government and not to give it an opportu- 
nity to get on with the pressing problems of or- 
ganization in the country. The third was to give 
the impression to the outside world of mass dis- 
content in Soutli Korea. I think it is fair to say 
from all the information which we have, and it is a 
great deal, that after 1948 the guerrilla forces were 
led, were manned, were financed, were equipped, 
and were directed from the North. From the time 
these activities began until the overt attack in 
1950, the principal activity, which took almost all 
the energy and funds of the South Korean Gov- 
ernment, was the suppression of these guerrilla 
forces. The U.N. Commission in Korea reported 
in 1950,' in a very detailed manner, on the training 
of these forces and — this is one of the things the 
Commission said — "on the carefully planned cam- 
paign to infiltrate thousands of guerrillas and po- 
litical agents into tlte South." 

Military Pressure on the Border — That was the 
method of political and guerrilla warfare. The 
second attempt to subvert, which went on contem- 
poraneously, was through military pressure on the 
border. Almost daily, there were unprovoked mil- 
itary incidents along this border, and there were 
at least four major military operations before that 
of June 25, 1950. In June and again in August of 

' For a summary of this report, including excerpts, see 
iUa., Oct. 2, 1950, p. 540. 



tioy^mb&t 3, 1952 



685 



1949, North Korean forces launched large-scale 
attacks on the Republic of South Korea in the 
Onjin Peninsula. Twice in one year, large-scale 
attacks from across the border were made into that 
part of the Onjin Peninsula which, as is known, is 
on the west coast of Korea and is not now under 
U.N. control. That was attacked twice from the 
North in 1949. Again in 1949, the city of Kaesong 
was attacked. On July 5, 1949, it was attacked by 
infantry and artillery upon a large scale, and on 
April 29, 1950, not long before the final attack, it 
was subjected to a severe artillery barrage. 

The U.N. Commission in its 1950 report stated 
that it was of the opinion that the objective of 
this activity of the North Koreans along the par- 
allel was to play upon the apprehensions of the 
Government of the Republic of Korea and, at the 
same time, to test the strength of the forces ar- 
rayed against them. 

Ceaseless Propaganda — The third effort was in the 
field of propaganda. This third effort to subvert 
the Government of South Korea by propaganda 
took two main forms. One form was the appeal 
to South Koreans to rise up against their Govern- 
ment and overthrow it. That went on constantly. 
The other form was the making of what were 
called "proposals for the peaceful unification of 
Korea," all of which were of the nature I have de- 
scribed earlier, whereby there would be a unifica- 
tion of Communists. Those two main themes of 
propaganda were endlessly repeated, and I may 
say that it is of some significance that the final at- 
tack on June 25, 1950. was preceded by two of 
these so-called "peaceful proposals for unifica- 
tion." 

All these efforts were completely defeated in 
South Korea, with the result that in the late spring 
of 1950, the South Korean Government, the Gov- 
ernment of the Republic of Korea, presented the 
strongest attitude to the world which they had 
ever presented. It had defeated the Communists 
who had infiltrated from the North and cleaned up 
these pockets of rebellion within its own country. 
It had solidified the loyalty of its own people and 
established the basis of its own democratic con- 
trol. It had met every attempt to invade it over its 
border and thrown them back. It had met all this 
propaganda. It is quite significant that after all 
these efforts had been defeated, it was only a few 
weeks later that the attack occurred. 

Communist Preparation for Aggression 

The next chapter in this report which I wish 
to make to you is the Communist preparation for 
aggression. This, again, is from information ac- 
quired very largely after the aggression started 
from deserters and prisoners and from U.N. per- 
sonnel in Korea. 

I turn first of all to the training and expansion 
of the North Korean Army. This began in the 
latter part of 1945. At that time the Soviet 
Union recruited 10,000 young Koreans and sent 



them to Soviet Siberia for training. In 1946, the 
training of the North Korean Army proper began 
in North Korea. By 1948, this force numbered 
some 50,000 to 60,000 men and it was equipped with 
weapons given to the Army by the Soviet Union 
Government. In 1949, the military force in Noith 
Korea was doubled in strength. This was done by 
adding to it between 30,000 and 40,000 conscripts. 
There were returned from the Soviet Union the 
10,000 trainees referred to a moment ago who had 
now been equipped and trained to handle tanks and 
aircraft. At this time also there were moved 
from Communist China two divisions of former 
Korean volunteer gi'oups — that is, persons of Ko- 
rean origin who were organized into divisions and 
were in the Chinese Communist Army were moved 
at this time into North Korea. It was these addi- 
tions that formed the corps of the North Korean 
Army. 

In the late summer of 1949, obviously in prepara- 
tion for something, the North Korean Labor 
Party — that is, the Communist Party — was purged 
and secretly absorbed the South Korean Labor 
Party, which was the South Korean Communist 
Party, and finally, at the end of 1949, divisional 
training was undertaken in North Korea. In the 
early months of 1950, steps were taken to bring 
about the mobilization of North Korea. The Army 
was again expanded to 150,000 to 180,000 men- 
something in that neighborhood — with additional 
conscripts, with the return of further persons who 
were being trained in the Soviet Union, and with 
10,000 more veterans from the Chinese Communist 
Army. 

In the spring of 1950, all civilians in North Ko- 
rea were given basic militaiy training. In April 
and May of 1950, the heavy equipment for which 
the North Korean Army had been waiting was 
sent in from the Soviet Union. Some of it came 
directly across the border, some of it came through 
Manchuria, and both the army and the air force 
were equipped with it. It included heavy artil- 
lery, trucks, tanks, automatic weapons, and new 
propeller-driven airci'aft. 

At this time also, Soviet military advisers were 
attached at every grade in the North Korean Army, 
beginning with the battalion level and including 
General Headquarters where the plans for the in- 
vasion of South Korea were worked out, as I shall 
23oint out in a moment. 

Thus there was created over this period of time 
in North Korea a large army. It was raised, 
trained, heavily equipped, and tactically and stra- 
tegically advised by the Soviet Union Government. 
In June 1950, the population in North Korea was 
ready, and it was given its last psychological 
preparation by the unification proposals to which 
I referred just now. 

At this point the transportation system was 
mobilized. The main part of the army was moved 
secretly down to the border at the 3Sth parallel, 
and finally the operational plan for the invasion 
of South Korea was distributed to the com- 



686 



Department of State Bulletin 



manders. On May 2, 1951, the representative of 
the United States to the United Nations forwarded 
to the Secretary-General the documents which I 
have mentioned. These documents were the cap- 
tured plan to invade South Korea, several copies 
of which were taken by U.N. Forces when they 
went north of the parallel, and they are here in 
the custody of the United Nations at "this moment.* 

Below the 38th parallel, the situation was far 
different. According to the report of the U.N. 
Commission, on June 25, 1950, the armed forces 
of the Republic of Korea consisted of 100,000 men 
organized into eight divisions and only lightly 
armed. They were not armed, according to the 
Commission's report, for offensive combat. 

It so happened that on June 24, one day before 
the aggression began, the U.N. Commission had 
received a report from its field observers who had 
made a complete inspection of the entire 38th 
parallel.^ This inspection began on June 9 and 
ended on June 23. The report was given to the 
Commission on the 24th and the aggression took 
place on the 25th, so that obviously this report is 
one of very gi-eat importance. 

During their tour the observers were given every 
opjDortunity to see everything in South Korea 
along the parallel. They said that they obtained 
a clear picture of the deployment, on a defensive 
basis, of the South Korean forces. The Commis- 
sion said that on the basis of this report — that is, 
the report of its observers who had been there 2 
days before the attack — and of its knowledge of 
the general military situation, "the Commission is 
unanimously of the opinion that no offensive could 
possibly have been launched across the parallel by 
the Eepublic of Korea on 25 June 1950." 

Who Is Resisting and Who Is Aiding Aggression? 

I shall, in a minute, read some more from that 
report, but I wish to ask the Committee to listen 
with particular care to this. It is the findings of 
the United Nations' own Commission, the finclings 
of men who were on the spot up until 2 days be- 
fore this attack took place. I ask representatives 
to listen to it because they heard again yesterday 
what I am sure they will hear throughout this 
debate — the noisy repetition of the charge that the 
United States is the aggressor, that tlie United 
States, in some way as yet undisclosed, made an 
attack across the 38th parallel or instigated one. 



'For texts, see ibid.. May 21, 1951, p. 828, and The 
Conflict in Korea, Department of State publication 4266, 
p. 26. This pamplilet also contains a summary and 
chronology of events relating to Korea from Dec. 1, 1943, 
to June 2.5, 1950. A chronology of the period from the 
latter date to Feb. 1, 1951, is printed in United States 
Policy in the Korean Conflict, Juhj 1950-Februarii 1951, 
Department of State publication 4263. 

' For the test of this report as transmitted to tbe Secu- 
rity Council on June 29, 1950, see United States Policy in 
the Korean Crisis, Department of State publication 3922, 
p. 22. 



The answer to that is, "What do you believe? 
Who attacked whom ?" Once one knows that, one 
does not have any trouble with this noise. And, 
second, who is resisting aggi'ession and who is 
aiding aggression ? If we just get those ideas per- 
fectly clear in our minds, then we shall not be 
disturbed by anything that is said. 

The attack, as I stated, was launched from North 
Korea on June 25, 1950. I shall not go in detail 
into the military operations, but I think that it 
is important to recall that from the very begin- 
ning the United Nations has been clear about who 
was the aggressor. It has been very clear about 
its own role in this matter. This is not just a 
fight between two people. This is the United 
Nations resisting aggression, and that has been 
the role of the United Nations from the beginning. 
It has been common action. That situation is in 
no way changed by the intervention of the Chinese 
Communists. They merely compounded the origi- 
nal felony by engaging in another of their own. 
They added very greatly to the problems and dif- 
ficulties of the United Nations and, of course, to 
our problems in resisting aggression. 

Now let me come to the findings of the Com- 
mission again. I read a little from those reports; 
I should like to come back to them again. The 
U.N. Commission was made up at that time of the 
Chairman (India), Australia, China, El Salvador 
France, the Philippines, and Turkey. The repre- 
sentatives of those countries are the ones who made 
these reports. 

It reported immediately after June 25 to the 
United Nations, and it expressed unanimous grat- 
ification at the prompt reply which had been given 
to the Security Council's action. This is what the 
Commission said to the United Nations in its 
report : 

On the basis of this report and of its knowledge of the 
general military situation, the Commission is unanimously 
of the opinion that no offensive could possibly have been 
launched across the parallel by the Republic of Korea on 
25 June 1950. 

The invasion launched by the North Korean forces on 
25 June cannot have been the result of a decision taken 
suddenly in order to repel a mere border attack or in 
retaliation for such an attack. Such an invasion, involv- 
ing amphibious landings and the use of considerable num- 
bers of troops carefully trained for aggressive action and, 
in relation to the area, of great quantity of weapons and 
other war material, presupposes a long-premeditated, well- 
prepared and well-timed plan of aggression. The subse- 
quent steady advance of the North Korean forces supplies 
further evidence, if further evidence is needed, of the ex- 
tensive nature of the planning and preparation for the 
aggression. 

It is the considered opinion of the Commission that this 
planning and preparation were deliberate, and an essen- 
tial part of the policy of the North Korean authoritie.s. 
The objective of this policy was to secure by force what 
could not be gained by any other means. In furtherance 
of this policy the North Korean authorities, on 25 June 
1950, initiated a war of aggression, without provocation 
and without warning. 

That is the verdict which was given by the 
United Nations Commission and which has been 



November 3, 1952 



687 



sustained by the Security Council and by the Gen- 
eral Assembly on many occasions, as I shall cite. 
The verdict was true then ; it is true now. 

Verdict of the Security Council 

The Security Council met on June 25 and con- 
firmed this verdict. It recognized that the North 
Koreans had committed an ai'med attack against 
the Kepublic of Korea and called for the imme- 
diate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal by 
North Koreans. The resolution also called upon 
all members to render every assistance to the 
United Nations in the execution of this resolution, 
and to refrain from giving assistance to the North 
Korean authorities.'" 

The response to this resolution was immediate 
on the part of the United States. We gave im- 
mediate assistance to the Republic of Korea, and 
other nations followed not long after. But the 
aggressors paid no attention to the resolution and 
pursued their aggression. 

In the face of this continuing attack, on June 
27 the Security Council noted from the report 
that the Communists had disregarded the I'esolu- 
tion of June 25 and that urgent military measures 
were required to restore international peace and 
security. It recommended that the members of 
the United Nations furnish such assistance to the 
Eepublic of Korea as may be necessary to repel 
the armed attack and to restore international 
peace and security in the area." The Secretary- 
General sent word of this resolution and a copy 
of it to all members of the United Nations. Fifty- 
three responded supporting the resolution of the 
Security Council, and only three attacked it. 
Those three were Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the 
Soviet Union. 

On July 7 the Security Council met again. It 
welcomed the prompt and vigorous support evoked 
by its previous resolutions and recommended that 
forces and assistance from all Governments be 
made available to a Unified Command and asked 
that the United States Government should set up 
that Unified Command and designate the com- 
mander for the forces.'- 

At the time of these resolutions, the Soviet 
Union was not attending meetings of the Secu- 
rity Council. It returned to those meetings in 
August and, innnediately upon returning, it pub- 
licly supported the aggressor and prevented fur- 
ther Security Council action to meet the aggres- 
sion. 

Let us turn for a moment to the actions of the 
General Assembly. We have been considering up 
to now the Security Council. On October 7, 1950, 



" Bulletin of July 3, IG.'iO, p. 4. The text of this and 
of .subsequent resnliitinns referred to al.so are available in 
United Stiitea Policu in the Koiimi. Crisis and lu United 
States Poliey in the Korean Conjlict. 

" Bulletin of .July 3, 1950, p. 7. 

" Itiid.. July 17, 1'.).".0, i). 83. 



the General Assembly turned its attention to the 
Korean aggression. It recognized the desirabil- 
ity of having U.N. Forces take all appi-opriate 
steps to insure conditions of stability throughout 
Korea. It established a U.N. Commission for 
the Unification and Rehabilitation of Koi'ea and 
directed it to seek to bring about a unified, inde- 
pendent, and democratic government for the whole 
country." 

On Februai-y 1. 1951, after the Chinese inter- 
vention and after efforts to achieve a peaceful set- 
tlement of the Korean question had been rejected 
by the Communists, the General Assembly found 
that the Chinese Communists and the North Ko- 
reans had engaged in aggression in Korea. It 
called upon the Chinese Communists to withdraw 
their forces and tlieir nationals from Korea. It 
reaffirmed tlie U.N. determination to continue the 
action to meet the aggression. It called upon all 
States and authorities to continue every assist- 
ance to the U.N. action and to refrain from giv- 
ing assistance to the aggressors. It again con- 
firmed that it continues to be the policy of the 
United Nations to bring about the cessation of 
hostilities and the achievement of U.N. objectives 
by peaceful means." 

C)n May 18, 1951, after the Communists had re- 
jected all efforts to achieve a peaceful settle- 
ment, the General Assembly recommended an 
embargo upon war munitions and strategic ma- 
terials. . . }^ 

.\t this point Secretary Acheson summarized Soviet 
tactics in the Security Council from August through No- 
vember 19.50. 

The Military Action 

We come now to military action in Korea. The 
details of this are reported on by the U.N. Com- 
mand in its biweekly reports. They are well 
Imown to all of us here and I shall not undertake 
to review the military operations as such. How- 
ever, I wish to imderline certain aspects of them. 

The first aspect is that the aggression has been 
halted. That was the purpose of the intervention 
by the United Nations and that has been achieved. 
It has been halted and it has been thrown back 
beyond the line from which it started. A moment 
ago I spoke of the human cost in lives and suffer- 
ing, which is vast. We must again pause to think 
of that with sympathy for those who have met 
witli this sorrow but also with honor for them. 

The next aspect is with regard to the participa- 
tion by member nations in the military operations. 
Sixteen members of the United Nations, a very 
considerable number, are contributing to the fight- 
injr itself and otlter members of the United Nations 



" md.. Oct. 23, 1950, p. 648. 

" United ^States Policy in the Korean Confiiet, p. 37. 

'"Bulletin of May 28, 1951, p. 849. 



688 



Department of State Bulletin 



are assisting in this operation. Tlie Unified Com- 
mand in its report communicated on October 18 
has set fortli in full the contribution of member 
nations and I draw that to your attention. 

I now wish to underline the fact that the United 
Nations, although it is opposed by Communists 
who are operating from outside of Korea, has 
limited the conflict to Korea itself. There have 
been many difficulties and vast provocation but the 
conflict has been limited to Korea itself ; and it is 
the intention of the U.N. Command to continue 
that limitation. 

I wish to comment on the efforts of the U.N. 
Command to protect civilians. Befoi'e conducting 
bombing operations it has repeatedly warned civil- 
ians where and approximately when they were to 
take place, although this carried with it very great 
risks to the operations and to the personnel en- 
gaged in them. This warning has been given in 
advance of the intended bombings. 

I wish to call attention to the charges of the use 
of biological, bacterial, and gas warfare which 
have been made against the U.N. Command. These 
charges will perhaps be discussed under another 
item or even under this one. . . . 

I also wish to emphasize that there have been 
Communist atrocities, unfortunately, committed 
against the prisoners of war of the United Nations, 
botli directly against individuals and, on a larger 
scale, against the prisoners as a whole. They con- 
sist of not marking the prisoner-of-war camps so 
that they cannot be seen from the air in bombing 
operations; and also, in violation of international 
morality and convention, locating these prisoner- 
of-war camps beside important military targets. 

Let me turn from the military operations and 
speak for a few moments on the efforts to obtain 
U.N. objectives by negotiation and by peaceful 
means. First of all, let us take up the efforts with 
respect to negotiations by the United Nations 
itself. The Security Council, in its resolution of 
June 25, to which I have referred, called on the 
Communists to desist from their effort. They 
paid no attention to that. The Security Council 
draft resolution of November 10 ^^ would have 
called on the Chinese Communists to withdraw 
from Korea and sought to assure them that their 
frontiers would be inviolate. They paid no atten- 
tion to this and the Soviet Union vetoed the reso- 
lution. The General Assembly, on December 14, 
1!)50,'' expressed itself as — 

Anxiou-s that immediate steps should be taken to prevent 
the conflict in Korea spreading to other areas and to 
put an end to the fighting in Korea Itself and that further 
steps shoulfl then be taken for a peaceful settlement of 
existing issues in accordance with the purposes and prin- 
ciples of the United Nations. 

To do that, it set up the Cease-Fire Committee. 
The Cease-Fire Committee was to consist of the 



" U.S. Policy in the Korean Conflict, p. 22. 
" Bulletin of Dec. 25, 1950, p. 1005. 



President of the General Assembly, and the two 
members chosen by him. The Unified Command 
offered every cooperation to that group. The 
Communists rejected every effort to communicate 
with them. The Cease-Fire Committee promul- 
gated five principles on the basis of which the 
fighting should end. The Unified Command ac- 
ce])ted these in principle; the Communists flatly 
rejected them. 

The resolution of February 1, 1951, reaffirmed 
the determination of the United Nations but it 
contained this paragraph as well — 

The General Assembly, 

Afiirms that it continues to be the policy of the United 
Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea 
and the achievement of United Nations objectives in 
Korea by peaceful means, and requests the President of 
the General Assembly to designate forthwith two persons 
who would meet with liim at any suitable opportunity 
to use their good offices to this end. 

This was the second group which was sent out 
and was called the Good Offices Committee. Three 
men attempted to bring about negotiations. The 
Unified Command cooperated in every way. The 
Communist authorities did not even reply to the 
letter sent by the Good Offices Committee. 

Again the General Assembly, in its resolution 
of May 18, 1951, stated: 

Reaffirms that it continues to be the policy of the 
United Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities in 
Korea, and the achievement of United Nations objectives 
in Korea by peaceful means, and requests the Good Offices 
Committee to continue its good offices. 

The Good Offices Committee renewed its efforts 
and again it was rejected by the Communists. 



Diplomatic Efforts 

The U.N. Command itself on October 1, 1950, 
October 9, 1950, and March 24, 1951, called on the 
Communists to cease their aggression but they paid 
no heed to that. We have had diplomatic efforts 
from the beginning. They have been made by 
the U.S. Government, by other governments par- 
ticipating in the fighting in Korea, and by gov- 
ernments not participating in the fighting. 

Let us run over some of these efforts. On June 
27, 1950, the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow called 
to the attention of the Soviet Govenmient the 
North Korean attack and used these words — 

In view of the universally known fact of the close rela- 
tions between the U.S.S.R. and the North Korean regime, 
the United States Government asks assurance that the 
U.S.S.R. disavows responsibility for this unprovoked and 
unwarranted attack and that it will use its influence with 
the North Korean authorities to withdraw their invading 
forces immediately. 

That would seem like a pretty reasonable request 
to make. It was met by the Soviet Union Govern- 
ment with an answer that it was the South Koreans 
who were attacking the North Koreans and that 
they would have nothing to do with the matter at 



November 3, 7952 



689 



all. Shortly after that, His Majesty's Govern- 
ment in the United Kingdom made a similar ap- 
proach in Moscow and was given a similar answer. 

On December 8, 1950, Mr. Attlee, then Prime 
Minister of the United Kingdom, and Mr. Tru- 
man, President of the United States, met in Wash- 
ington. They put out a communique on Decem- 
ber 8, in which they expressed the readiness of 
their two Governments participating in U.N. ac- 
tion to join in settling the Korean question by 
peaceful means.^^ There was no response to this 
whatever. 

On December 5, 1950, 13 Asian nations made 
an appeal to the Communists not to pursue their 
aggression again across the 38th parallel. This 
was totally and wholly disregarded. 

In December 1950 several U.N. members tried 
to get the Chinese Communists to consider peace. 
Their efforts were entirely rebuffed, and General 
Wu, who was here in New York representing Com- 
munist China, rebuffed and attacked the General 
Assembly's efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement. 

In talks with Ambassador Kirk, the U.S. Am- 
bassador, during October 1951. Mr. Vyshinsky, the 
Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, endorsed 
the Communist position on the demilitarization 
line to which I referred — this has to do with the 
discussions for an armistice — and he was against 
moving the talks away from Kaesong. He re- 
fused to intercede to lareak the deadlock in the 
negotiations. 

Informal approaches by U.S. representatives 
and by representatives of other countries to the 
Soviet Union representatives here in New York 
have been wholly unproductive. 



The Armistice Negotiations 

This brings me to the armistice negotiations. 
On June 23, 1951, Jacob Malik, who was then 
Soviet representative on the Security Council, 
made a radio address here in New York. In the 
course of it he said this — 

The Soviet peoples believe that the most acute problem 
of the present day, the problem of the armed conflict in 
Korea, could also be settled. The Soviet peoples believe 
that, as a first step, discussions should lie started between 
the belligerents for a cease-fire and an armistice providing 
for the mutual withdrawal of forces from the 38th parallel. 

That seemed to be a pretty important announce- 
ment by a power which had a pretty direct relation 
to this matter in Korea and, of course, a great deal 
of attention was paid to it. Immediately, the 
U.S. Ambassador in Moscow called upon Mr. 
Gromyko and asked for clarification of this state- 
ment by Mr. Malik. Mr. Gromyko explained 
that, in his view, the armistice should, in the first 
place, include a cease-fire and, second, should be 
limited to strictly military questions without in- 
volving any political or territorial matters. That 



' Ihid., Dec. 18, 1950, p. 959. 



seemed to be pretty hopeful; that seemed to be a 
sensible way of getting at the matter. So General 
Ridgway immediately established contact with 
the Communist Command and arrangements were 
made to initiate the negotiations. . . . 

I shall only talk about the actual steps in the 
negotiations. These have been so involved and 
have gone on over so long a time that it is quite 
important to try to see what the U.N. Command 
was attempting to do. What were its objectives 
here? What are the main principles? It had 
three main purposes in mind. The first one was 
to bring an end to the fighting on a basis which 
achieves the purpose of repelling the aggression. 
That was essential. 

Secondly, the purpose was to get the maximum 
possible assurance against a renewal of the fight- 
ing. Again, that is an essential element in any 
armistice. 

Thirdly, the purpose was to bring about a fair 
exchange of prisoners. 

Those were the big objectives here of the U.N. 
Command. Let us go over the position taken on 
some of these points. In the first place, it took 
2 days more than 2 weeks to obtain an agenda. 
Anybody who has conducted negotiations with 
the Communists knows that the business of the 
agenda is, for some reason or another, very, very^ 
important. In this case, it took 2 weeks and 2 
days to get the agenda, and here it was: Item 1 
was the fixing of a military demarcation line be- 
tween both sides so as to establish a demilitarized 
zone as a basic condition for a cessation of hostili- 
ties in Korea. This is a very important thing to 
do. But you would not think you would have 
to talk so long to do it. 

The second item was: Concrete arrangements 
for the realization of a cease-fire and an armistice 
in Korea including the composition, authority, 
and functions of a supervising organization. 
That is an essential thing to add to an agenda. 
Why take 2 weeks to say so? 

Then there were arrangements relating to pris- 
oners of war. Finally, there were recommenda- 
tions to the Governments of the countries con- 
cerned on both sides. That was the agenda. 

On the military demarcation line, it took 4 
months to get agreement. The Communist atti- 
tude was that the demarcation line should be the 
38th parallel, although they had previously stated 
that the 38th parallel ceased to exist, although 
Mr. Gromyko had said that purely military and 
not political questions ought to be involved in this. 
Nevertheless, the Communists spent 4 months 
arguing that it should be the 38th parallel. The 
U.N. Command took the view that the 38th paral- 
lel had no military significance whatever; that the 
line must be based on the actual military situation 
and that it must be a line which left both sides in 
a defensible position. Finally, this was agreed to 
on November 27, 1951. 

There was a great deal of discussion about this 



690 



Department of State Bulletin 



recommendation to the governments. All sorts 
of political questions were introduced by the Com- 
munists into that area. The U.N. Command took 
the position that it was not able to discuss political 
questions of any sort. Finally, after a great 
effort, the agreement was on a recommendation 
that a political conference on a higher level of 
both sides be held 3 months after an armistice was 
to become effective to settle through negotiations 
the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign 
forces from Korea, tlie peaceful settlement of tlie 
Korean question, et cetera. In agreeing to this 
recommendation, the U.N. Command negotiator 
stated that so far as that Command was concerned, 
the recommendation is directed to the United Na- 
tions as well as to the Republic of Korea ; that is, 
that tlie United Nations has a stake in the future 
settlement of these questions ; that "foreign forces" 
meant all non-Korean forces, and finally, that the 
mystic word "et cetera" should not be construed 
to relate to matters outside of Korea. Tliey then 
took up the arrangements for a cease fire and for 
the supervision of a cease fii'e; and wliereas the 
demarcation-zone discussion had taken 4 months, 
this one took 5 months. 

The only purpose of the U.N. Command under 
this item, was to get the maximum assurance 
against a renewal of aggression. Therefore, at 
all times the U.N. negotiators stood by these prin- 
ciples. In the first place, they were quite willing 
to have the same supervisions, the same restric- 
tions imposed on them as they asked should be 
imposed on the other side. There was never a de- 
parture from complete reciprocity of treatment. 
Therefore, the same limitations and arrangements 
behind the U.N. lines were to be accepted as on the 
other side. Secondly, they insisted that there 
should be no increase in the strength of tlie armed 
forces on either side, but that there should be 
provision for the rotation of personnel. You 
could not add to the strength, but you could change 
people, so that people who had been there a long 
time would not have to remain thei'e indefinitely, 
and their places could be taken by otliers. 

In the third place, they insisted, on the U.N. 
Command's side, that the impartial commission 
must have free access to the territory of both sides 
to observe how the armistice was being observed. 
They were not willing to take the word of the 
other side. This had to be observed by impartial 
observers. 

The Communists continually referred to prin- 
ciples which caused a great deal of trouble. One 
of these principles was the freedom of their in- 
ternal affairs from interference, which came up 
every time anybody suggested that anything 
should be done behind their lines, or that there 
should be inspection, or that there should be any- 
thing else. That was claimed by them to be an 
interference in the internal affairs of their coun- 
try — whether it was that the airfields should not 



be repaired, or what not. That principle, of 
course, was a very troublesome one. 

They refused to agree that the airfields should 
not be reconstructed and rehabilitated. Another 
matter which took a vei"y long time was that it had 
been agreed that there might be impartial nations 
nominated by each side on this inspection com- 
mission, provided that no side had a right to 
nominate a country which was offensive or not re- 
garded as impartial by the other side. Therefore, 
when the United States suggested that Sweden, 
Switzerland, and Norway would be impartial na- 
tions satisfactory to it, the Communists named Po- 
land, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union. The 
presence of any of those nations as impartial ones 
was of course ridiculous, but the presence of the 
Soviet Union which, as I pointed out, had or- 
ganized, equipped, advised, directed, trained, and 
maintained this aggression, on a group of impar- 
tial observers was intolerable, and that could not 
be accepted. 

Negotiations Come Down to Tliree Points 

Finally, the negotiations got down to three 
points : The airfields, the question of the impartial 
nations, and the treatment of prisoners. At that 
point the U.N. Command put forward what was 
called a package proposal ; that is, a proposal which 
would settle all three of these things at once.^^ The 
proposal was that the U.N. Command would give 
up its insistence that the airfields should not be re- 
habilitated. It would withdraw that position, pro- 
vided it was agreed on the other side that the im- 
partial gi'oup, so-called — or the supervision group, 
which is a better name for it — should be Sweden, 
Switzerland, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, and that 
the U.N. position on prisoners of war should be 
accepted. That was the package proposal which 
was put forward, and it was rejected. 

From that time on the discussion revolved 
around the prisoner-of-war question. But I wish 
to bring the Committee back to the fact that the 
prisoner-of-war question is part of a 3-point pro- 
posal, where it was said that all the three points 
would be settled on that basis which I have men- 
tioned : One, that we should withdraw objection to 
the rehabilitation of airfields unconditionally ; two, 
that the supervisory group should be the four na- 
tions named; and that the U.N. view should be 
taken on prisoners. That remains. But the dis- 
cussion has been on the prisoner-of-war question. 

I should like to make a few general observa- 
tions on this prisoner-of-war matter. In the first 
place, it was a wholly unexpected issue to the U.N. 
Command. It never occurred to the U.N. negotia- 
tors that this would be an issue, or that it would 
take the time that it has taken. It was quite a 
surprising one. The second thing that I should 



'lUd., Aug. 18, 1952, p. 272. 



November 3, 7952 



691 



like to make very clear, is that the U.N. Command 
would have been quite satisfied to have all prison- 
ers returned, provided no humanitarian considera- 
tions entered into the matter. There is no desire 
on the part of the U.N. Command to keep one 
prisoner — not one. We have no desire whatever 
to keep any prisoner or to return any prisoner to 
any particular place. We would be perfectly 
happy if there were not other considerations, no 
humanitarian considerations, simply to exchange 
prisoners and forget about them. I also want to 
make it clear that the U.N. Command at all times 
has said that it would consider any plan or pro- 
posal which accepted the U.N. view that prisoners 
should not be made by force to return to the other 
side. We have asked for suggestions; we invite 
proposals; we welcome all the proposals which 
have been made. Proposals have been made by 
the Government of Me.xico -^ and many others 
which are useful and helpful. All of these we wel- 
come. All of these come to grief upon the insist- 
ence on the Communist side that prisoners must be 
forced to return. . . . 

The present status of the armistice negotiations 
is that they have been recessed. They can be re- 
convened at any time whenever the Communists 
will either accept any one of the propositions 
which has been made or make one of their own in 
good faith. We remain ready to solve this ques- 
tion of the prisoners of war upon any basis what- 
ever that anybody can suggest which preserves the 
fundamental principle of nonforcible return. It 
remains our sincere hope that the Communists will 
give us an indication at an early moment that they 
intend to do that. 

In order to perform what seems to us and to 
some of our associates in the United Nations to be 
one of the preliminary steps in the consideration 
of this Korean question — that is, to find out fur- 
ther, if we can, whether the Communists really 
wish to have an lionest armistice in North Korea — 
it seems to us that it would be wise, necessary, and 
helpful to have this General Assembly through 
this Committee, affirm the principle of nonforcible 
repatriation as representing the will of this body. 
To that end, we have joined with the delegations 
of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Den- 
mark, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Honduras, Ice- 
land, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, 
New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Thailand, 
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and Uruguay in 
presenting the following draft resolution to this 
Committee. 

[The Secretary then read document A/C. 1/725. For 
text see p. 6S0.] 

This session of the General Assembly has a great 
responsibility in facing the grave question of 



peace in Korea. We all share a deep yearning for 
that peace. The whole object and purpose of all 
that we do here is to further the cause of peace, 
and we shall continue these efforts with all of our 
strength. But we must not and we cannot buy 
peace at the price of honor. Great sacrifices have 
been made and are being made by the members of 
the United Nations and by the men of the United 
Nations in order that the i^rinciples on which this 
Organization is based may be preserved against 
attack. These sacrifices have a place of honor in 
the record of mankincrs struggle for a world of 
law and order in which decency and freedom may 
survive and flourish. Let no act of ours weaken or 
destroy the noble purpose of those sacrifices. 

ADDRESS BY JOHN D. HICKERSON ' 

[Excerpt] 



What has been accomplished in Korea so far? 
Our losses have been grievous and we have borne 
too much of the burden. But I think every Amer- 
ican can take pride in the results. 

We have proved to the Communists that we 
and the other free nations have the courage, deter- 
mination, and ability to stand up to aggressors. 
We have shown them that there is real and grow- 
ing stren^h in the free world and have given 
notice that aggression will not succeed. We have 
made it clear that the free nations will not appease 
aggressors or allow them to keep the fruits of 
aggression. We have shown them that aggression 
does not pay. 

We have proved that if we build our strength 
and show the Communist aggressors that they can- 
not succeed in their aggression, war can be ended 
or avoided and negotiation and peace become pos- 
sible. With armed strength and patience and 
courage and responsible leadership, little aggres- 
sions can be stopped and world war prevented. 

For the first time in man's history, nations have 
successfully joined and fought through an inter- 
national organization for the principle of main- 
taining peace. We have proved to the nations of 
the world that collective security can be made to 
work; that when the free nations, large and small, 
stand together determined to maintain their inde- 
pendence and their freedom, they are a match for 
any aggressors. We have given tlie nations of the 
world new courage, new hope, and new determina- 
tion to resist aggression. 

We have proved to the peoples of the world that 
the Communists are far from invincible and that 
small nations need not, therefore, be afraid to 
stand up for their independence. 

We have shown that the LTnited States and the 



" See p. 696. 

The remainder of Secretary Acheson's review of the 
pris(mer-of-war question will appear in the Bulletin of 
Nov. 10. 



' Jlade before the Business and Professional Women's 
Clubs of Wisconsin at Milwauljee on Oct. 2-1 (pross release 
S.S(1). Mr. Hickerson is Assistant Secretary for U.N. 
Affairs. 



692 



Department of State Bulletin 



United Nations live up to their obligations and 
their commitments; that our friends can rely on 
us to help them defend themselves. 

We have shown the world that the United States 
is not bent on aggression or conquest; we have 
proved the justice and the morality of our cause 
and the responsibility of our leadership. We have 
shown that we want peace, not war. 

We have shown the people of the world that they 
must not be fooled by Soviet lies ; that the Kremlin 
is for war though it hides behind talk about peace. 
We have shown the people in the Communist coun- 
tries, especially the people of China, that their 
leaders have fooled them and tricked them into 
aggression which has brought only death and 
suffering to them. 

We have shown that the free world is stronger 
in its determination, in its staying power, in its 
human resources, in its spiritual forces, than any 
slave state. We have shown that the U.S. soldiers, 
and the soldiers of other free nations, are mag- 
nificent and are more than a match for soldiers 
who are treated as slaves. Above all, in doing all 
of these things, we have directly strengthened the 
defense and security of the United States of 
America. 

All this has been accomplished in spite of the 
fact that fighting is still going on and the truce 
negotiations are stalled. 

We can get some idea of how much has been 
accomplished if we try to imagine what would 
have happened if the United Nations had failed. 
If we had flinched from the duty of standing by 
our commitments under the U.N. Charter our own 
national security would have been gravely jeop- 
ardized. 

Within a few weeks at most, the North Koreans 
would have been established at Pusan, on the door- 
step of Japan, which is a vital link in the defense 
of the Pacific and tlie United States. The Soviets 
would have hailed the unification of Korea under 
a so-called People's Democracy, and would have 
called on all outsiders to keep hands off. The 
United Nations would have been revealed to be a 
hollow sliell — destined to go the way of the League 
of Nations. 

With the collapse of the United Nations the free 
world would have started to ravel out all along the 
borders. 

All that was needed on June 25, 1950, to over- 
throw the confidence and loyalty of the free na- 
tions would have been for the United Nations to 
side-step the challenge of Korea. In every free 
nation the isolationists, the neutralists, the faint- 
hearted, and the Communists would have set up 
great debates. They would have proclaimed that 
the United States was controlled by isolationists, 
that the United States was neutral, and that there 
could be no hope of resisting the Soviet wave of 
the future. The border states might soon have 
fallen. The free countries of Southeast Asia, the 
Turks and the Greeks, the Yugoslavs and West 



Germans, the Swedes and Finns — all would have 
been placed in dire peril. All these brave people 
who have stood firm under the very mouths of 
Soviet cannon miglit have had to make what terms 
they could with the conqueror. 

If we have accomplished so much, why, then, 
are we still in Korea? The plain answer is that 
the job is not yet finished. The U.N. Forces have 
repelled the aggression in Korea, but they have 
not yet brought peace and security to the area. 
Whether this will be done through more fighting 
or through a successful conclusion of the armistice 
negotiations remains to be seen. But one thing is 
clear: If we don't stick it out, all these achieve- 
ments will be undone; all that we have already 
sacrificed will have been in vain. 

Now let me be frank with you about the armi- 
stice negotiations. We went into the negotiations 
with our eyes open. Of course, we were aware of 
the possibility that the Communists might just be 
using the negotiations as a stalling device to re- 
place their losses or that they hoped to achieve at 
the conference table what they had been unable 
to win on the battlefield. Of course, we realized 
that they might deliberately prolong and compli- 
cate the negotiations so as to try to wear us down. 
But as long as there was a possibility that the 
Communists might be serious about wanting an. 
armistice, we had an obligation to test them out 
by actual negotiation. I know of no responsible 
person who questioned this decision at that time. 

These difficult, frustrating negotiations have 
been in progress over the past 15 months. During 
this period the Communists have considerably in- 
creased their military strength. But so have we. 



Training and Equipping of ROK Troops 

We have, among other things, used this time 
for a great program of training and equipping 
the South Korean forces. When we removed our 
troops from Korea in 1949, pursuant to the Gen- 
eral Assembly resolution, we left behind a train- 
ing mission of 500 men to help the Koreans build 
tlieir own army. Unfortunately, the brave Korean 
Army was slashed to pieces by the Communist 
onslaught in the summer of 1950. Due to short- 
ages in personnel and materiel, significant further 
progress could not be made until after the lines 
had been stabilized again in the following spring. 
Compared to a Korean force of less than 100,000 
at the time of the attack, we are today supporting 
Eepublic of Korea military forces totaling ap- 
proximately 400,000 splendid soldiers as well as 
a Korean service corps which perfonns vital 
service functions for both Korean and U.S. troops. 
The Koreans' carefully developed training and 
replacement system is now feeding hundreds of 
trained men into the Republic of Korea forces 
each day. 

To provide the training and leadership, a vigor- 



November 3, 1952 

227940—52 3 



693 



ous military-training system, patterned after the 
U.S. Army model, has been initiated in Korea. 
This system includes infantry replacement train- 
ing centers, schools for artillery and combined 
arms, officer candidate schools (and advanced 
officers school), as well as numerous technical 
schools for the development of specialists. A 
highly qualified and experienced instructor staff, 
in wliich Koreans outnumber Americans by ap- 
proximately 6 to 1, is utilized in conducting this 
training. Throughout the training period the 
young RoK soldiers have demonstrated a great 
"desire to learn. General Clark and General Van 
Fleet, who, along with General Ridgway, have de- 
voted so much thought and time to the swift de- 
velopment of the Korean school system, are en- 
thusiastic about its progress and product. 

To supplement this Korean school system, the 
Army has made available the resources of its 
school system in the United States. Nearly 600 
selected Rok officers received instruction in U.S. 
Army schools during the last fiscal year and an 
even larger number is projected for the current 
fiscal year. Rok officers, despite language diffi- 
culties, have consistently done well in their classes 
in TT.S. Army schools. 

The most recent evidence of our success in build- 
ing a capable army of Koreans was the great bat- 
tle of White Horse Hill where Rok troops showed 
not only desperate valor but skill and discipline 
equal to any soldier on earth. The free world can 
draw real inspiration from the magnificent mili- 
tarv performance of the Rok Army. 

"Wlien the armistice negotiations began it was 
specifically agreed that military operations would 
not cease until after an armistice had actually been 
concluded. Throughout these negotiations we 
have taken substantially the same military action 
we would have taken had the armistice negotia- 
tions not been in progress. Wliatever build-up of 
Communist forces has taken place has been in 
spite of our military counteraction. I think it is 
fair to say that there is no basis for any specula- 
tion that we have been put at a military disadvan- 
tage because of the negotiations. 

Our armistice negotiators have been men of 
great skill and infinite patience. Thej' have been 
more than a match for the Communists during the 
long, weary months of negotiating. They have 
succeeded in narrowing the issues down to one : 
Shall we drive back to the Communists, at the 
point of a bayonet, those prisoners of war who 
would forcibly resist repatriation? 

Let us not minimize the gravity of this issue. 
It means much to the Communists, and much to 
us too. To them it has revealed an escape hatch 
from the slave world; they are determined to close 
it. The Communists know well that vast num- 
bers of their drafted soldiers — including the 
so-called Chinese "volunteers" — hate them and all 
their works. They can drive the reluctant sol- 
dier into battle with a bayonet pointing at his 



back. But what if he escapes by running forward 
into our lines? Wliat the Communist rulers 
desperately want is for us to drive him back with 
our bayonets. This we will not do. We believe 
that such a course would be morally indefensible. 
It would be a body blow to the hopes of the people 
who now suffer under Soviet tyranny. Moreover, 
if we hold on until the Communists are forced to 
accept an armistice without getting the anti-Com- 
munist prisoners back. Communist rulers will have 
good reason to worry about the loyalty of their 
troops should they again think of pitting them 
against U.N. forces. This in itself might be a 
powerful deterrent to future Communist aggres- 
sion. 

Moral Principle Behind U.N. Stand 

I am sometimes asked how it is that we allowed 
this to become an issue at Panmunjom. "^^Hiy did 
we not simply provide for mutual repatriation of 
prisoners of war and not raise the issue of prin- 
ciple ? I'll tell you why. Because the issue raised 
itself. It raised itself in the form of over 86,000 
human beings in our custody who renounced com- 
munism, denounced its leaders, pleaded with us not 
to return them to their masters, and swore they 
would kill themselves or resist unto the death if 
we tried to return them. 

Now I grant you, it's very hard for an American 
mother, whose son is a prisoner of war of the Com- 
munists, to understand why we should not get her 
son back even if we have to use force to exchange 
some former Communist soldiers for her son. It 
was having her and others like her in mind that 
made this decision such a hard one. I must make 
one thing clear: We have in no way bargained 
these Communist .prisoners of war off against our 
own boys. We have made it absolutely clear that 
we shall insist upon the return of every single 
U.N. prisoner of war upon the conclusion of an 
armistice. But we feel that the decision to iqjhold 
nonforcible repatriation is the right one, and in 
the long run it will save more American lives than 
if we capitulated to the Communist demand. 

Now, you may ask, what guaranty do we have 
that the Communists will agree to our position? 
There are no guaranties in Korea. The U.N. Com- 
mand has made it clear to the Communist negotia- 
tors that, while we remain firm on the question of 
nonforcible repatriation, we are willing to con- 
sider any reasonable suggestion for resolving the 
deadlock. We remain confident that when the 
Communists come to realize that the cost of con- 
tinuing is too high for them, they will accommo- 
date themselves to a formula recognizing the reali- 
ties of the situation. 

We are all quite naturally restive about our fu- 
ture course of action in Korea. We are impatient. 
We are frustrated. But let us soberly consider the 
alternatives. None will be to our liking, but a 



694 



Deporfmenf of Sfofe Bulletin 



choice must be made. May I repeat, let us consider 
these alternatives soberly — for much is at stake. 
Any time anyone complains to you about the inter- 
minable Korean conflict, I hope you will ask him 
•what he would do if he were in charge. So far, I 
regret to say, the field of ideas expressed to us pri- 
vately has been a narrow one. And the public 
"Monday morning quarterbacking," while per- 
fectly' proper in a democracy such as ours, tends to 
make a truce more difficult by leading the Kremlin 
to believe that we are torn by dissension and un- 
able to stick it out in Korea much longer. 

What are the alternatives? We could pull out 
of Korea. That would make a mockery of the sac- 
rifices we have already made. Such a course might 
be understandable if we were about to be forced 
into the sea. But to abandon our hard-earned and 
well-prepared positions voluntarily is to me in- 
conceivable. 

We could extend the conflict. Our combined 
military and political judgment is that such a 
course would in all likelihood not end the fighting 
in Korea but, rather, spread it elsewhere as well. 
We would get much more deeply involved than 
we are now. That certainly is no solution to the 
problem in Korea. 

The Only Realistic Alternative 

Let's face it. The only realistic alternative open 
to us is to hold on in Korea, inflicting heavy losses 
upon the enemy while keeping those of ours as low 
as possible. "Holding" until what? Holding as 
long as necessary to bring an honorable armistice. 
Meanwhile, we should continue to build up Our 
strength and to help our allies build up theirs. 
Don't think for a minute that this will not affect 
the problem of an armistice in Korea. 

Let us not minimize either the magnitude of the 
resources of the free world or the difficulties in de- 
veloping them. 

One resource of the free world is moral, and it 
is an important one. We know that we are doing 
the right thing in Korea, and that is worth many 
divisions. The United Nations represents the 
moral judgment of organized mankind. It has 
condemned the Communists as aggressors, and it 
did so by overwhelming votes. This in itself 
took coui'age for some countries in the face of 
bitter Soviet opposition. The current session of 
the General Assembly will have an opportunity 
to take further steps. We have made a special 
report to the General Assembly on the present 
status of the military action and the armistice 
negotiations in Korea. We are asking the Gen- 
eral Assembly to endorse the stand that we have 
taken. Many speakers to the Assembly have 
already done so but we believe that a formal reso- 
lution is necessary. To those who are dubious of 
the 250ssible effect of such an action on the Com- 
munists, I would only call attention to the tre- 
mendous lengths to which the Communists go in 



order to split us from our allies and friends. If 
we can continue to maintain unity and solidarity 
on these great issues, we can have a major impact 
on the Communists. 

Second, we must have more military assistance 
in Korea from other U.N. members. Along with 
the gallant South Koreans, whose losses have ex- 
ceeded even ours, we have borne a disproportion- 
ate share of the military burden in Korea. We 
have had fighting with us 15 other forces of the 
U.N. members. They, too, have fought magnifi- 
cently. But there should be more troojos there now 
I'eady to continue the fighting as long as neces- 
sai'y. We intend to press hard in the General 
Assembly to get as many U.N. members as pos- 
sible who have not done so to face up to their 
responsibilities in Korea. I say this in full reali- 
zation that some of our allies have not received 
their just due for their fight against Communist 
armed subversion elsewhere — e. g., the French in 
Indochina and the British in Malaya. 

But the General Assembly should frankly rec- 
ognize that the record of performance in Korea 
is not good enough for the kind of military pres- 
sure that is needed in Korea, and it is not good 
enough for a permanent system of collective re- 
sistance to aggression. There must be no free 
rides. Every nation desiring the protection of 
such a system must be prepared to sliare propor- 
tionately in the sacrifices and the risks. Each 
must be willing to make the most precious contri- 
bution that can be made — manpower, human lives. 
We have amply demonstrated that we are willing 
to do our share — more than our share — but we are 
entitled to point out that while we may have the 
greatest fer capita income in the world, our pop- 
ulation per capita is the same as any other country. 

Our third pressure point against Communist 
activities in Korea is in the economic field. This 
takes two forms : Denying strategic materials to 
the aggressors and providing relief and recon- 
struction assistance to the Kepublic of Korea. 
Under U.N. auspices, there is already in effect a 
comprehensive strategic embargo against the 
North Korean and Chinese Communists. Frankly, 
we recognize that the United Nations is at a dis- 
advantage because of the proximity of the 
U.S.S.R. to the aggressors. Nevertheless, we must 
continue to find methods of shutting off from the 
aggressors every possible source of material they 
need. 

On the positive side, we must do as much as we 
can to meet the economic needs of the Republic of 
Korea. We have already done a tremendous 
amount under the U.N. Civil Assistance Program. 
Other members of the United Nations have also 
contributed substantially, and many specialized 
agencies of the United Nations have been doing 
fine work. The U.N. Korean Reconstruction 
Agency (known as Unkra) has just announced 
an important new operating program of 70 mil- 
lion dollars in coordination with the U.N. mili- 



Novembet 3, 1952 



695 



tary command. This program should do a good 
deal toward maintaining civilian morale while the 
military operations continue. 

Finally, we must have staying power. This is 
the guts of the matter. Apparently the Commu- 
nists, having suffered a military defeat, think they 
can outlast us in Korea. They think they can 
wear us down. They regard us as spoiled and 
decadent and weak, incapable of sticking to a 
grueling task very long. Hitler made the same 
mistake about the British and ourselves. Dicta- 
tors never seem to learn that the free can argue 
and gripe among themselves, that they can even 
extravagantly criticize their allies, but they do not 
knuckle down to tyranny. They would surely 
learn this lesson some day, as Hitler did, but our 
job is to try to see that they learn it sooner, without 
another world war. 



Mexican Proposal for Settling Korean 
Prisoner of War Issue 

Ambassador Padilla Nervo to the 
Secretary-General of the U.N. 

Following is an English translation of a letter, 
dated September S, 1952, to Secretary-General 
Trygve Lie from. Ambassador Luis Padilla Nervo, 
Permanent Representative of Mexico to the 
United Nations: 

I have the honor to inform you that His Excel- 
lency Miguel Aleman, President of the United 
Mexican States, voicing the sentiments of the peo- 
ple of Mexico, who deplore the necessity of pro- 
longing the military campaign in Korea, has in- 
structed me through the Ministry of Foreign Af- 
fairs, to transmit to you a plan which in the view 
of my Government may contribute to remove an 
issue that, so far as we have been able to determine, 
is the obstacle to the signing of a truce in that 
region, namely, the excliange of prisoners of war. 

My Government's proposal, reduced to its es- 
sential terms but susceptible of being modified in 
tlie light of the opinions of the other members of 
the United Nations might follow the general lines 
set forth below: 

The prisoners of war, held by either party, who 
may have voluntarily expressed their wish to be 
repatriated would be exchanged without delay. 

As regards the others, each member of the 
United Nations that signifies its approval of this 
plan would pledge itself to receive in its territory 
a number of said prisoners in the ratio that might 
be agreed upon with the understanding that, once 
in the country of temporary asylum, the corre- 
sponding authorities would grant them an immi- 
gration status that would allow them to find work 
so as not to become public charges. 



As soon as normalcy returns to said part of the 
Asiatic Continent, the Government of their re- 
spective countries of origin would grant the pris- 
oners the facilities and assurances that might be 
required for their immediate repatriation. Said 
Governments would proceed in a similar way in 
the case of those prisoners that, without the fulfill- 
ment of the condition stated above, would later 
express their willingness to return to their coun- 
tries of origin, in which case the United Nations 
would afford them the necessary means to carry 
out their wishes. 

The Mexican Government is not unmindful of 
the fact that should this plan be accepted, the 
states approving it would bind themselves to make 
certain sacrifices ; but these certainly would not be 
excessive if, through them, a firm step could be 
taken to facilitate the suspension of hostilities. 

To the foregoing objectives, which by them- 
selves are sufficiently important to warrant their 
careful consideration, another should be added, 
namely, that of raising the social status of the 
prisoners by restoring to them the dignity that 
only free labor can bestow. At the same time, a 
contribution to the progress of international law 
might be made by reaffirming the principle that 
prisoners of war are not to be treated as just a 
conglomeration of human beings whose fate the 
authorities may decide at will, but on the con- 
trary, that man's inalienable right to freely work 
out his own destiny should prevail. Finally, if 
the plan herein submitted leads to an effective 
agreement, it would strengthen the confidence of 
the peoples of the world — including the prisoners 
of war in Korea who have refused repatriation — 
in the universal scope of tlie cause of the United 
Nations and in the solidarity of the members of 
this Organization. 

I shall, therefore, sincerely appreciate your 
transmitting this plan to the competent organ of 
the United Nations. 

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to 
you, Mr. Secretary General, the assurances of my 
high and distinguished consideration. 

Ambassador Luis Padilla Nervo, 
Permanent Representative of Mexico 
to the United Nations. 



Ambassador Austin to the 
Secretary-General of the U.N. 

U.N. press release dated Oct. 7, 1952 

Following is a letter, dated October 6, 1952, to 
Secretary -General Trygve Lie from, Ambassador 
'Warren R. Aiistin, Permanent Representative of 
the United States to the United Nations: 

Excellency, 

I have the honor to refer again to your Excel- 
lency's note of September 2, 1952, transmitting a 
communication from the Permanent Representa- 



696 



Department of State Bulletin 



tive of Mexico to the United Nations concerning 
a proposal by His Excellency Miguel Aleman, 
President of the United Mexican States, regarding 
the disposition of prisoners of war captured by 
the United Nations Forces in Korea who have in- 
dicated they would forcibly resist repatriation. 

The United Nations Command has made numer- 
ous efforts to achieve agreement with the Commu- 
nists on the prisoner-of-war question. The 
United Nations Command has made it clear that 
it is willing that all prisoners of war captured by 
United Nations Forces be returned, but that it will 
not use force to return any prisoners of war who 
resist repatriation. 

This basic position has been fully supported by 
the other United Nations Members with troops in 
Korea as well as, we believe, by non-Communist 
Governments and people generally. The United 
Nations Command has also made it clear that it 
has no desire to retain or to make any particular 
disposition of any prisoner of war unwilling to 
be repatriated. Within the basic principle that 
it will not use force to repatriate any resisting 
prisoner of war, the United Nations Command has 
made numerous etforts and has offered numerous 
proposals to settle the prisoner-of-war question. 
Although the Chinese Communists and North Ko- 
reans state that they hold in prisoner-of-war 
status and are able to return only about twelve 
thousand, the United Nations Command has stated 
that it will return all prisoners of war not resist- 
ing return, and that this number would be ap- 
proximately eighty-three thousand. The United 
Nations Command also agreed, on April 28, 1952, 
to give up its very reasonable insistence that there 
should be no rehabilitation and construction of 
airfields, if the Communists accepted the enlight- 
ened and humanitarian position of the United 
Nations Command on prisoners of war. 

The proposals which the United Nations Com- 
mand has made for solving the prisoner-of-war 



question also include no less than five different 
plans, any one of which if accepted by the Com- 
munists could lead to an immediate armistice in 
Korea : three different alternatives have been of- 
fered at the meeting on September 28. Unfor- 
tunately, the Communists have thus far rejected 
all the efforts of the United Nations Command, 
have offered no constructive proposal, and con- 
tinue to insist that the United Nations Command 
use force to return to Communist hands prisoners 
of war who resist repatriation. 

As indicated in my communication to you of 
September 19, the United States Government has 
welcomed the Mexican proposal.^ It has carefully 
considered it in light of the history of the nego- 
tiations on prisoners of war and the present status 
of tliese negotiations. The United States Gov- 
ernment is pleased to note that this proposal is 
fully consistent with the basic principle of non- 
forcible repatriation and believes the suggestion 
to be very useful. Of course, this proposal as- 
sumes Communist agreement in principle that 
prisoners of war should not be forcibly repatri- 
ated, agreement which unfortunately has not yet 
been forthcoming. If the Chinese Communists 
and North Korean representatives are prepared 
to accept any of our proposals, all of which in- 
volve the principle that there should be no forcible 
repatriation, the suggestion made by His Excel- 
lency the President of the United Mexican States 
could well provide a basis for determining the 
disposition of prisoners not returned, in particular 
those of non -Korean origin. 

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of 
my highest consideration. 

Wakren E. AtrsTiN. 



■Ambassador Austin's letter further stated: "The 
United States Government is giving this proposal careful 
consideration with a view to determining the most effec- 
tive way of utilizing this and other suggestions in a 
manner most likely to bring about peace in Korea." 



November 3, 7952 



697 



United Nations Day, 1952 



iy Howland H. Sargeant 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs ^ 



Seven years ago today the Charter of the United 
Nations went into effect. Fifty-one nations had 
signed that Charter. Our own Senate had ratified 
it, 89 to 2. The people of a world still at war had 
declared for peace. The end of World War II 
was in sight, but few of the people of the world 
had the heart for celebrating. We were glad, des- 
perately glad, that the bloody, bitter business was 
over, but we sensed that there would be no victory 
for any of us. 

The mood of our own people — the people of the 
United States — was vastly different from that of 
1918. Someone once said that Woodrow Wilson 
had gone into World War I with the attitude of 
a policeman breaking up a barroom brawl. That 
was the attitude of most Americans in World War 
II. In 1945 we were glad that the brawl had been 
broken up, that the hoodlums had been thrown out. 
But we were in no mood for dancing in the streets. 

Those who remembered looked back to 1918. 
They thought of the League of Nations. They 
saw its ti'agic failure as the world's failure. As 
that grand old man of South Africa, Jan Smuts, 
once said : "Not Wilson, but humanity failed at 
Paris." 

In 1945 it looked as though humanity had been 
given another chance. And we, the jDeace-loving 
peoples of the world, determined to seize that 
chance. We resolved that this time there should 
be no failure. 

The United Nations was born of that resolve. 

Today, 7 j'ears later, that resolution is un- 
changed. 

There have been discouragements. There have 
been set-backs. There have been, yes, failures, if 
we judge these 7 years against the bright hopes 
so many cherished as the great adventure was 
launched. But there were those, even then, who 
realized that the world could not be remade in a 
day. They did not expect miracles. They knew 



that only persistence, hard work, and, above all, 
faith could accomplish the objectives the United 
Nations had set. 

The dedicated men and women who have worked 
in the United Nations these 7 years have had faith. 
They have persisted. 

They have maintained that faith in the face of 
betrayal by some of their own number. The 
Soviets, remember, had signed that Charter. 



Statement by Secretary Acheson 

Press release 840 dated October 24 

Today on the 7th anniversary of the United 
Nations, more Americans than ever before are join- 
ing with peoples of other lands in community cele- 
brations of United Nations Day. 

On this day, we express our continuing faith in 
the principles of peace which "we, the peoples of 
the United Nations" wrote into the Charter at San 
Francisco. This faith which brought the United 
Nations into being out of the waste and sorrow of 
the Second World War is now reinforced by a 
record of achievement through 7 of the most diffi- 
cult and dangerous years in the history of the 
modern world. 

I hope the observance of this day will bring wide 
attention to the long roster of United Nations' con- 
structive actions against the ancient enemies of 
mankind : hunger and violence, ignorance and 
disease. 

JIany perils still lie ahead before the purposes of 
the Charter can be fulfilled. We face them with 
courage and hope because we approach them with 
increased wisdom and strength that we have gained 
in 7 years of collective effort on behalf of a just and 
lasting peace. 



' Address made at the University of Washington, Seattle, 
Wa.sh., on Oct. 24 (press release S23 dated Oct. 20). 



They had shared that glorious time in San Fran- 
cisco. That they had done so with betrayal in 
their hearts seems, even now, almost unbelievable. 
But they had done just that. No one today can 
doubt it. 

But the men and women of the United Nations 
have persisted. They have maintained the faith. 



698 



Department of State Bulletin 



Understand me, I do not think that they could 
have done so alone. But they were backed, and 
tliey knew it, by all people of good will through- 
out the world. They were backed, and actively 
supported, by groups such as yours, the American 
Associations for the United Nations. They were 
backed by tlie private citizen on the street. The}^ 
were backed by you and me, all of us, who believe 
in the United Nations' objectives. 



Korea and the Myth of Communist Invincibility 

Today, on this seventh anniversary of the 
United Nations, those U.N. pioneers can look back 
on their work with pride. Look at the record. 
The greatest test of the United Nations has been 
Korea. Two years ago, when the armies of Com- 
munist North Korea swept across the borders of 
South Korea, the United Nations acted promptly, 
decisively. 

Mussolini once confessed that, had the League 
of Nations acted at the time he sent his legions 
into Ethiopia, lie would have had to back down. 
He would not have had, for one thing, the oil 
to carry out his plans. Hitler, it is said, waited 
trembling the night of tlie reoccupation of the 
Eliineland, waited to see what the world would do. 

Had it been possible for the League to have 
acted, as the United Nations did in Korea, the his- 
tory of the past two decades might well have been 
vastly different. The world situation today 
miglit be different. But the League did nothing. 
The United Nations has profited by that mistake. 
The Korea conflict, to be sure, is unresolved. The 
truce talks have not brought peace. But the Com- 
munists have failed to achieve their objective, 
both on the battlefield and at the peace table. 

They have gained nothing by their costly ven- 
ture — costly in both blood and resources — and lost 
much. Tliey have failed to add the Republic of 
Korea to their string of docile satellites. An ally 
has been preserved for the free world. With Ko- 
rea, the myth of Communist invincibility has been 
shattered. New heart has been given those forces 
fighting communism elsewhere. 

The free nations, too, have lost, but they have 
also gained. They have gained, perhaps above 
all, awareness of their danger. With the attack 
on South Korea, the Communist mask came off. 
Only the persistently deluded now believe the 
Communist so-called peace campaign. The pur- 
pose of the Kremlin is clear. The importance of 
Korea to the plans of the Communists has been 
clearly stated by the Communists themselves. 

President Truman has quoted an intelligence 
report of a talk by a Red army officer to North 
Korean troops a few weeks before the invasion. 
This officer said 

In order to successfully undertake the long-awaited 
world revolution we must first unify Asia . . . Java, 
Indochina, Malaya, Tibet, Thailand, the Philippines, and 
Japan are our ultimate targets ... the United States 



is the only obstacle in our path ... we must crush 
the United States. 

About the same time another North Korean offi- 
cer told a group of Communist spies and saboteurs 
". . . the attack fon South Korea] marks the first 
step toward the liberation of Asia." 

Note the Cominunist double talk. Ask the peo- 
ple of Rumania, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, any of the satellites, what their 
"liberation" by the Communists has meant. 

But the United Nations acted. That "first step" 
failed. Admittedly, complete unity of action be- 
tween the U.N. nations was not immediately at- 
tained. It has not been, in fact, even yet. There 
were, and are, differences of opinion, which is to 
be expected when so many peoples are involved. 

But there was action — decisive action. Today 
17 nations have contributed military forces to the 
campaign in Korea — among them both the United 
Kingdom and France, ancl these two are, at the 
same time, fighting Communists in Malaya and 
Indochina. 

For the free nations, "collective security" be- 
came a fact in Korea. Furthermore, the United 
Nations has so far been successful in its efforts to 
confine the conflict to Korea. It has not exploded 
into general war. The action in Korea, too, seems 
to have somewhat cooled Communist enthusiasm 
for such ventures. A Red assault on Indochina, 
for example, had been almost hourly expected. It 
has not occurred. 

Let them who will call this failure for the 
United Nations. History, I am confident, will 
give it another name. 

Kashmir, Palestine, Indonesia, Iran — each has 
presented the United Nations with a crisis. Each 
carried a threat of war that might have spread to 
include us all. In each case the United Nations 
acted. War was averted. The disputants are set- 
tling their differences around a conference table. 



The Disarmament Question 

The United Nations has taken the lead in tack- 
ling the tough question of disarmament. In a 
world engaged in the most deadly armament race 
in history this may sound impractical, unreal. 

But is it? Benjamin V. Cohen, deputy U.S. 
representative to the U.N. Disarmament Commis- 
sion, said recently : ^ 

If the effective outlawing of international war and of 
national armaments is too visionary and impractical an 
idea for our generation, it is not inconceivable that the 
wheel of history will whirl back and future generations 
will have to struggle again to outlaw private wars. 

It is true that in the past all efforts toward dis- 
armament have failed. But to quote Mr. Cohen 
again : 

. . . there is much reason to suspect that the failures in 
the past were caused by the unwillingness of men and 



' Bulletin of May 26, 1952, p. 837. 



November 3, 1952 



699 



nations to go far enough — by tbe lack of vision rather than 
visionary ideas. 

The United Nations refuses to be defeated by 
the faikires of the past. It refuses to be defeated 
by the "unwillingness" of certain nations and cer- 
tain men to accept today a joint solution of the 
problem. It is going ahead. 

True enough, as long as the Soviet Union and its 
satellites persist in their present course, a satis- 
factory and acceptable solution to the problem of 
disarmament has little chance of being put into 
operation. But, as President Truman has said, 
when we are strong enough, there will come a day 
when we can hope that the Soviet Union, seeing 
that it cannot make aggression and subversion 
work, will modify its policies, when it will permit 
the nations of the world to live together in peace. 

The Disarmament Commission of the United 
Nations has before it proposals submitted by the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and France.' 
These proposals could be the first step toward 
lightening the burden of national armaments for 
the sorely pressed nations of the world. To doitbt 
that someday some such proposal will be accepted 
is to doubt reason. 

In the meanwhile, the United Nations remains 
a world-wide forum in which these proposals, as 
well as others, can be discussed. Through the 
United Nations, the world tests the sincerity of all 
nations on the subject. The Soviets' unwilling- 
ness to cooperate becomes increasingly clear under 
the U.N. spotlight. 

United'Action on Hunger, Disease, and Ignorance 

The United Nations has proved that it can act 
in emergencies. It has proved, also, that it can 
act on long-range problems. 

Those who drafted the Charter of the United 
Nations recognized fully that they must put a stop 
not only to war but to the causes of war. Digging 
deeply into history, they saw those causes, not 
infrequently, in terms of man's age-old miseries — 
hunger, disease, ignorance — the ancient enemies of 
mankind, as President Truman has put it. 

The United Nations has recognized that no one 
nation, no matter how wealthy, how powerful, can 
hope to solve these problems alone. True to its 
basic philosophy, it has called for united action 
against all three. And it has not called in vain. 
Let me give you a few examples. 

Take Lee Vee, U.S. soil conservationist, working 
in Pakistan to push back the desert and bring 
water — and with water, food — to the farmers of 
the Sind. 

There is Plymouth-born Olive Warren and her 
aide, Hulda Wenger, a Swiss, who are teaching 
Bornean girls how to work as nurses among their 
fellow women. 

Dr. G. Sambasivan, an Indian malariologist, is 

' For a summary of these proposals, see ibid., Oct. 27, 
1952, p. 648. 

700 



heading a U.N. mission in the "Humming Swamp" 
of Northern Thailand fighting the deadly, malaria- 
carrying mosquito. 

A Norwegian engineer, Inge Lyso, has joined 
the faculty of a new Indian engineering school 
near Calcutta. These are task forces sent out by 
specialized agencies of the United Nations. Their 
objective — a better world, better fed, healthier, 
and wiser. 

With the skills and resources of the entire free 
world at its disposal, the United Nations recog- 
nizes no problem as beyond the ability of men to 
solve. 

Let us take the matter of hunger. As I speak to 
you, two out of every three people in the world 
will go to bed hungry tonight. Millions face an 
early death either through outright starvation or 
undei'nourishment. And yet the world could feed 
its people, if the skills and resources of the world 
were tapped. The United Nations has created a 
world Food and Agriculture Organization (Fag) 
to tackle the job. 

World food production, Fao declares, can be 
increased 110 percent in the next 25 years. Ad- 
mittedly, this is a tremendous task. But it can 
be done. It must be done. The Director General 
of Fao told the General Assembly of the United 
Nations : 

I asl£ your leave to speals for a few minutes about such 
homely things as a loaf of bread, a bowl of rice, a cup 
of millv in a child's hands. Reduced to such simplicities, 
the subject may seem scarcely worth the attention of this 
globe-encircling body. 

Yet every other crisis which so stirs our anxiety would 
be forgotten instantly if this assembly were convinced 
that there would be no bread for the world's breakfast 
tomorrow. 

Fao's job is to see to it that the world has bread. 
Fao is working on that job, and its work is show- 
ing results. For example. I recall a story told me 
by a friend who had visited the tombs of the 
Fliaraohs. He was interested in the murals on 
the walls of one of the inner enclosures. He noted 
particularly the type of hoe being used. Outside 
the tomb he passed a field. The hoes used by the 
farmers, he told us, were identical with those he 
had just seen inside. The handle was short and 
the blade narrow. The farmers handled them 
with difficulty. 

Fao specialists have introduced in this area hoes 
with double-sized blades, with double-sized han- 
dles. Farmers using these hoes are today pro- 
ducing just twice as much food as formerly. 

In Asia and Africa, for centuries 9 cows out of 
10 have died in periodic rinderpest epidemics. 
Fao launched a world-wide campaign to stamp 
out the disease. In one country, Thailand, it has 
been practically eliminated. In others, losses are 
being reduced to a minimum. There are other 
examples. In each case the objective is more 
food — more bread, rice, milk, and meat. 

The U.N. World Health Organization (Wiio) 
has undertaken the job of bettering the world's 
health. This, again, is a world campaign. It is 

Department of State Bulletin 



as important to me or to you as it is to the inhab- 
itants of some remote African village. Germs 
recognize no frontiers. Let me illustrate. Last 
year a "flu" epidemic broke out in England. 
Through Who, the United States was able to pre- 
pare fully against the danger should the epidemic 
cross the Atlantic. It was checked in England 
and stopped at her shoreline. 

In 1947 a cholera epidemic in Egypt was 
brought under control in 5 weeks. Who's warn- 
ing service alerted neighboring countries, and the 
epidemic was confined to the area in which it had 
first appeared. 

In Afghanistan Who is fighting typhus; in 
South America yellow fever; in India polio. 

The 'Who campaign is, at this point, directed 
primarily against malaria, tuberculosis, and vene- 
real disease — killers which destroy an estimated 
10 million persons a year. 

These killers are not invincible. It is not im- 
probable that they can, in time, be stamped out 
completely. But the attack must be world-wide. 
It demands the united efforts of all nations. 
Hunger and disease, the United Nations is fight- 
ing on both fronts. The main enemy, however — 
and this the United Nations recognizes — is the 
incredibly low-living standards of many areas of 
the world. 

To raise the living standards of the world is, 
admittedly, a difficult task. But, and this the 
United Nations believes, it is not an impossible 
one. 

The United Nations has set up programs of 
technical assistance. It is giving financial aid 
througli the International Bank for Reconstruc- 
tion and Development. All of these programs op- 
erate on a long-range basis. They clo not antici- 
pate remaking the world overnight. They are 
premised on the theory, however, that with hard 
work, persistence, and faith the job can be done. 

The United Nations has tackled problems of 
trade, transportation, and communication. It has 
concerned itself with the drug traffic, prostitution. 
It has set up programs for refugees, children. 

The United Nations' primary objective is peace. 
But it knows that peace, if it is to endure, must 
have a solid foundation of shared well-being 
among the peoples of the earth. 

In every case collective action is the keynote 
of the attack. The United Nations, it must be re- 
membered, is not a world government. It does not 
seek to be. It is, as it was planned, a voluntary, 
democratic society of sovereign nations. It can 
settle disputes, develop collective security, promote 
social and economic progress, only through the 
free consent of the nations concerned. The job 
of building the will to collective action is the 
United Nations' greatest challenge. 

UNESCO'S Assignment 

Each of the specialized agencies contributes to 
the building of this will. It is the special assign- 



ment of the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cul- 
tural Organization — Unesco. The purpose of 
UNESCO, as defined in its constitution, is to : 

. . . contribute to peace and security by promoting 
collaboration among the nations through education, sci- 
ence and culture. 

Education, Unesco believes, is fundamental. 
"If we want to live in a united world," says Jaime 
Torres-Bodet, Director General of Unesco, "we 
must not allow the most unjust of all frontiers to 
go on existing — the frontier that divides those who 
can read and write from those who cannot." 

It is difficult for us in the United States to un- 
derstand the importance of just being able to read 
and write. We accept both as verities of existence. 
It is not so in many other lands. I was reading 
the other day the story of an American who 
traveled to a remote little village of India. He 
asked the village headman : 

"What do you thinly of Korea?" 
"What is Korea?" aslied the man. 
Slightly baffled, the visitor asked : 
"How about the rice sent by America?" 
"Where's America?" came the answer. 

I am not vouching for any of this story, but ac- 
cording to the tale, the American then asked: 

"Are you better off since the British left?" 

"Were they here?" countered the headman in surprise. 

The story may be exaggerated but I have heard 
tales almost as incredible. 

To tackle this problem Unesco has launched a 
world-wide fundamental-educational program. 
It got off to a good start last year with the open- 
ing of a teacher-training center in Mexico where 
the emphasis was upon fundamental education. 
A network of such centers is on Unesco's agenda — 
for Southeast Asia, Equatorial Africa, the Far 
and Near East. 

It takes some imagination to make the jump 
from programs designed for education at this level 
to a Unesco project in Pakistan where a 4-man 
team is taking what amounts to a new inventory 
of the land, below and above. The Pakistan 
Meteorological Department wants to know why 
certain areas in the country are periodically dis- 
turbed by earthquakes, and what can be done 
about them. Or to a 140-boy trade school in Cha 
Choeng Sao, Thailand, where a group of bright- 
eyed lads are learning under Unesco instructors 
to handle power tools, preparatory to careers in 
the building trades. Or — but the list is almost 
endless. Unesco's educational projects circle the 
free world. 

To break down the barriers of ignorance, to 
raise the level of understanding, that is Unesco's 
job. The individual is all-important in all of 
the U.N. program. And it is to the individual 
that the United Nations must always look for its 
hope of success. I would like you to remember — 
now as I talk to you and later — that these pro- 
grams I have discussed are yours. You have a 



November 3, J 952 



701 



part in their operation. You have a tremendous 
stake in their success. 

The New York Times ran an editorial several 
years ago which comes to my mind in this con- 
nection. It said : 

The common man may protest if told the responsi- 
bility for making history rests upon him, that he does 
not know how to make history. He thinks he is waiting 
for some third person, singular or plural, some elected 
or appointed "he" or "they" to attend to history making. 

But he is mistaken. A President is not 150 million 
times as wise as another American. A member of Con- 
gress is not 300,000 times as wise. . . . each must 
answer to the surge and flow of popular desire. 

That is true, too, of the United Nations. It, too, 
must answer to the "surge and flow of popuhir 
desire." That desire, 7 years ago, was for peace. 
I am convinced it remains strong. 

But the individual American has a job to do 



if the United Nations is to go on and if the U.N. 
objectives are to be attained. That job is rela- 
tively simple. Mrs. Eoosevelt, I think, made the 
point crystal-clear in a recent speech. She said: 

We should remember that the U.N. is not a cure-all. It 
is only an instrument capable of effective action when 
its members have a will to make it work. It cannot be 
better than the individual nations are. 

Make your country the best possible country for all its 
citizens to live in and it will become a valuable member 
of the Neighborhood of Nations. 

And the "Neighborhood of Nations" is the 
United Nations. 

I tlaink that is the right note with which to con- 
clude this seventh anniversary of the United Na- 
tions. Be a good neighbor, help to make your 
country a good neighbor, and the neighborhood 
of nations cannot fail. 



Achievements of Inter-American Cooperation 

hy Edward G. Miller^ Jr. 

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs ^ 



The postwar period has marked a transition into 
a new pliase in our inter-American relations. For 
some 60 years prior to 1948 the statesmen of our 
countries worked hard on the structure of the in- 
ter-American system. Today this system is based 
upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance signed 
at Rio de Janeiro in 1947 and the Charter of the 
Organization of American States signed the next 
year at Bogota. The first provides that an attack 
on one country is an attack on all. The second 
spells out the structure of the Inter-American Or- 
ganization. Wlien these treaties came into effect, 
the organizational period in our inter- American 
system had come to an end. And I might point out 
that this was the first regional arrangement for 
collective security tliat our country joined. We 
quite logically gave Latin America first priority in 
this regard since it is contiguous to us and we are 
in effect all in the same boat. 

One of the main points that had been agreed 
upon by 1948 was that each country would never 
intervene in the affairs of other countries. This is 
the basis of the mutual confidence which is the es- 



' Excerpts from an address made before the Third Ken- 
tucky World Trade Conference at Louisville, Oct. 14 
(press release 80C). 



sence of the inter-American system. From the 
standpoint of the Latin Americans tliis meant that 
the Big Stick policy of earlier days had been 
replaced by the Good Neighbor policy. 

We are now in a different phase of inter- Ameri- 
can relations. It is not enough to sign treaties and 
create organizations. We must give substance 
and vigor to these relationships — we must put 
meat on the bones of inter- American cooperation. 
This is what we have been doing since the end of 
World War II. It is a job that encompasses all 
phases of our relations with Latin America — 
political, military, and economic. The things we 
do are not as spectacular as the debates in the 
conferences of the '20's, the '30's, and the '40's, when 
the inter-American system was being evolved. 
Someone once said that "becoming" is more dra- 
matic than "being," and I think that this applies 
to inter- American relations. Nevertheless, I think 
that the sum total of what we have been doing in 
recent years is impressive. 

Our regional agencies are operating effectively. 
Disputes in the Caribbean which threatened the 
peace have been effectively smoothed over on more 
than one occasion. 

The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign 
Ministers at Washington in March and April of 



702 



Department of State Bulletin 



1951 was described as one of the most successful 
ever held. The Inter-American Economic and 
Social Council sits regularly in Washington, as 
does the Inter- American Defense Board, and both 
are now a permanent part of our community. The 
Committee for Cultural Action of the Inter- 
American Cultural Council sits regularly in Mex- 
ico City. Ten years ago none of these agencies 
existed. 

Our entire community can be deeply thankful 
that we have as Secretary General of the Organi- 
zation of American States one of the finest citizens 
of this hemisphere, Dr. Alberto Lleras, the dis- 
tinguished former President and Foi'eign Minister 
of Colombia, who has made a contribution to 
inter-American harmony that can never be 
measured. 

The United Nations and its agencies also are 
conti'ibuting greatly through their technical assist- 
ance and other programs. 

And on a bilateral basis we are doing things 
undreamed of a few years ago. 

Improved Relations With Mexico 

Let us take Mexico, for example. This great 
country long was suspicious of the United States. 
Yet President Aleman recently said that rela- 
tions between Mexico and the United States are 
better now than ever. This is a tribute to a unique 
record of cooperation. 

We have projects such as the vast Falcon Dam 
which is being built on the Kio Grande and in 
which both Governments participate financially 
and administratively. This and many other co- 
operative power and irrigation works which are 
being built in Mexico will permit Mexico to raise 
more food, to pay higher wages to its citizens, 
and to have more dollars to buy goods in the 
United States and elsewhere. 

Then there has been the campaign to eliminate 
hoof and mouth disease. This terrible scourge hit 
Mexican herds about 6 years ago, and it was a 
matter of vital concern to every cattleman in this 
country. We closed our border with Mexico to 
cattle movements, and both countries moved in 
with a drastic program executed by a joint U.S.- 
Mexican commission which eradicated the disease 
after a combined expenditure of 250 million dol- 
lars and the tragic but essential slaughter of some 
990,000 head of Mexican livestock. Today Mexico 
is free of hoof and mouth disease; its herds are 
back to normal size; the border was reopened last 
month; and badly needed Mexican meat is once 
again moving into our country. 

A sore spot in our relations with Mexico has 
been the problem of migrant labor coming across 
the border from Mexico into Texas and the other 
States in the Southwest — a problem which con- 
cerns American workers who worry about this 
type of competition; which concerns the Mexican 
(jovernment because of its desire to see its citizens 



protected in this country and to be free of any 
kind of discriminatory treatment ; which concerns 
farmers in the Southwest who badly need labor on 
a seasonal or regular basis to pick their crops ; and 
which has concerned our Government because of 
the frequent illegal entry of migrant workers 
across the border. Today after months, indeed 
years, of laborious and painstaking negotiation 
with the Mexican Government on the part of my 
Department and the Department of Labor in con- 
junction with representatives of labor and of em- 
ployer groups in the Southwest, we have worked 
out with Mexico an agreement sanctioned by our 
Congress which regularizes the problem of recruit- 
ment, entry, and working conditions in the United 
States of these migrant workers from across the 
border. 

Through the International Bank and the Ex- 
port-Import Bank, we are cooperating with Mex- 
ico in vast programs to place the Mexican economy 
on a sounder footing. Some of the things which 
we have done or are cloing include : the moderniza- 
tion of the entire Mexican railway system ; the in- 
crease of Mexico's electric power by a projected 
total of about one million kilowatt-hours in 7 
years; the expansion of Mexico's steel capacity; 
the development of badly needed sulfur deposits 
as well as coal mines, sugar mills, slaughter houses, 
and other industries. Today Mexico is buying 
goods from us at an annual rate of about 800 mil- 
lion dollars per year; its currency is stable as a 
result of economic growth and a tremendous tour- 
ist travel involving nearly 200 million dollars a 
year ; and its people are getting more of the good 
things of life. 

It can truly be said of Mexico today that it 
is well along the road to fulfilling the great aspira- 
tion of the Latin American peoples, namely, to 
achieve economic stability and to improve the lot 
of the common man. Since these were likewise 
the ideals of Jefferson and Lincoln, it is only natu- 
ral that we should applaud the progress of our 
sister Republic and that we should be proud that 
through our cooperative programs we have helped 
in this great cause. 



Panama and Canal Zone Problems 

Panama is of concern to every American be- 
cause it is the link between the two continents of 
the hemisphere and between the two great oceans 
which our continents divide. Panama is a small 
country whose economy has always depended upon 
transit across the Isthmus. Our occupation of the 
Canal Zone creates problems in our relations with 
Panama which are of great variety and complex- 
ity. I was in Panama only 2 weeks ago for the 
inauguration of the new President of that country, 
and I have returned convinced that we have a 
unique opportunity to move ahead on many of 
these problems. On some we are already making 
progress. 



November 3, 1952 



703 



The Panamanians naturally look to the Canal 
Zone and the military establishment based there 
as a market for their products so that industries 
and commerce can develop there. We have been 
working hard on this problem, helping the Pan- 
amanians to produce goods which we need in the 
Canal Zone. This malces sense because it will re- 
duce the zone's dependence upon overseas sources 
of supply in times of war. But many Panaman- 
ians realize that the future of their country lies 
not simply in trade with the zone but in con- 
centrating on Panama's agricultural resources. 

Panama needs roads to tap virgin farm land. 
Through our participation in building the Inter- 
American Highway we are moving constantly in- 
land toward the Costa Rican border — a truly 
pioneering venture. Next, the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development is studying 
means to extend rural credit to farmers. 

Meanwhile, under the Point Four Program, 
a mission which we have contracted for from the 
University of Arkansas is actively at work in 
the interior conducting agricultural experimenta- 
tion and helping the Panamanian farmer through 
the kind of rural extension work that has con- 
tributed so greatly to agriculture in this coun- 
try. 

In Panama our relations have been troubled by 
charges of discrimination against locally recruited 
labor in the Canal Zone. The wise policies of the 
present farsighted administration of the zone are 
doing much to improve working conditions and 
housing for locally recruited lajjor and to prove 
that the relations between the United States and 
Panama in regard to this waterway so vital to 
world commerce can constitute a model working 
partnership in international democracy. 

Progress on the South American Continent 

Peru is a singularly fortunate country in the 
hemisphere because of the great diversification of 
its economy. Cotton, sugar, minerals, and petro- 
leum form the base of the growth of a country 
which is today making great progress and which 
because of its recently adopted liberal petroleum 
and mining legislation will be even better off 5 
years from now. Our relations with Peru are ex- 
ceptionally favorable today, although they were 
threatened last year by a proposal in Congi-ess to 
impose a substantial import duty on fresh and 
frozen tuna fish, a tax which would have done 
damage to a new and growing industry in Peru — 
the fifth in importance in that country. For- 
tunately the proposal was defeated by 43 to 32 
votes in the Senate. Both as consumers and as 
exporters, groups such as those represented here 
must be aware of the implications to your own self- 
interest of proposals of this kind. I am glad that 
both Kentucky Senators voted to defeat this meas- 
ure. 

Nowhere in the world is our Point Four Pro- 



gram so diversified as in Peru, and nowhere has 
the participation of the other Government been 
more effective. These are truly cooperative pro- 
grams administered through binational agencies 
to which the Peruvian Government contributes 
around four times more than we do. In agricul- 
ture, our technical assistance ranges from crop 
experimentation, especially in the Amazon jungle 
region, to assistance in farm irrigation, soil con- 
servation, farm-machinery operation, and demon- 
stration farms. The dissemination of information 
on fertilizers, new seeds, and insecticides has 
raised yields of particular crops up to 400 per- 
cent. Our health and sanitation service operates 
in the Peruvian jungle and northern coastal area, 
its activities ranging from sewage disposal and 
water-supply projects to the administration of 
hospital and aid stations. One mobile dispensary 
alone in the jungle region, for example, treated 
nearly 12,000 patients in the first 18 months of its 
operation. 

In the case of Venezuela we were faced recently 
with a problem of a very different kind. Venezuela 
is a country which is friendly to us and of which 
Americans are sincere friends. Many of our citi- 
zens live there, and there is a feeling of mutual re- 
spect and liking between them and the Venezuelans. 

This great country produces about 1,800 million 
barrels of oil a day, a staggering amount which is 
nearly three times the maximum output ever at- 
tained in Iran, of which we read so much. The 
Venezuelans asked us to revise our trade agree- 
ment with them and to reduce the import duty on 
petroleum products. This presented difficulties to 
us since the Tariff Commission, under the peril- 
point amendment to the last extension of the Trade 
Agreements Act, found that the peril point for pe- 
troleum imports was higher than the level to which 
the Venezuelans hoped that we could reduce this 
duty. We had to find a compromise which would 
protect the interests of domestic oil and coal pro- 
ducers and meet the legitimate aspirations of our 
Venezuelan friends. We also wanted to get from 
them concessions on some of our exports, and our 
demands presented difficulties for them. Our 
trade with Venezuela is running at an annual rate 
of exports to that country of about 500 million 
dollars, and this is a market to which exporters 
would want us to give special attention. The nego- 
tiations lasted 2 years. It was at times a nerve- 
wracking task. However, as a result of patience on 
both sides and in part because of the personal 
friendship and trust which existed between the 
Venezuelan Foreign Office and my own Depart- 
ment, we concluded these negotiations last month, 
and the new tariff schedules have just gone into 
effect.^ While we have not achieved as much as 
either side wanted, we have a good sound agree- 



' For text of the Supplementary Trade Agreement with 
Venezuela signed Aug. 28, see Bui.letin of Sept. 2!), 1952, 
p. 487 ; for a statement by the President see ibid., Sept. 15, 
1952, p. 401. 



704 



Department of State Bulletin 



ment. I predict that as a result of the trade agree- 
ment and of new developments in Venezuela, par- 
ticularly the tremendous investment now going 
into the production of iron ore, our export trade 
with that country will increase substantially in 
the next few years. 

Chile is a country with which we have had espe- 
cially friendly relations for many years. Many of 
our problems with Chile revolve around the ex- 
portation of Chilean copper, which constitutes an 
important part of our total consumption in this 
country. When I took over as Assistant Secretary 
of State in 1949, the price of copper had fallen to 
16 cents a pound. In order to enable the Chileans 
to proceed with development programs of great 
urgency, we consented to the unusual device of 
making the Chileans a 25 million dollar balance- 
of-payments loan — unusual because Export-Im- 
port Bank loans are generally made only for spe- 
cific construction projects. By the time of Korea 
the price of copper was 24% cents, and it was at 
this price that the Ops ceiling was imposed. How- 
ever, since the price of copper had not risen to the 
same extent as other commodity prices, the Chile- 
ans in 1951 asked for a price increase, and the ceil- 
ing was moved up to 271/2 cents for imported cop- 
per, although the domestic price was not increased. 
Last spring the Chileans became dissatisfied with 
the agreement largely because the world market 
price was higher than the U.S. ceiling price for 
copper imports. United States buyers were unable 
to obtain the quantities of copper allocated for 
U.S. use. Consequently, we agreed to the termina- 
tion of the agreement, and the U.S. Government 
amended U.S. price regulations so as to permit the 
import of copper at world prices. Copper con- 
tinues today to be extremely important to our re- 
armament effort. Our Communist enemies talk 
about unfair treatment by our country of Latin 
American commodities, but the price ceiling on 
domestic copper is still 241/0 cents a pound today 
whereas Chile is receiving 361/2 cents for its cop- 
I^er. The only concern which a true friend of Chile 
need have as to the price of copper is that the 
Chileans exercise I'estraint lest they prejudice their 
position as a principal supplier of copper in the 
world market, a mistake which is not without 
precedent in the history of Latin American 
commodities. 

The friendly relations between Chile and the 
United States have been marked in recent years by 
joint programs which have resulted in the con- 
struction of a large steel mill, from which Chile is 
actually exporting steel to neighboring countries; 
the planned increase of Chile's electric-energy out- 
put by about 40 percent in less than 10 years 
through the construction of some six major hydro- 
electric plants; the development of industries for 
the fabrication of copper and the production of 
cement, cellulose, pulp and paper, and rayon; the 
expansion of a ferromanganese plant; and irriga- 
tion and land-clearance programs. This coopera- 



tion has furnished the illustrious Chilean Navy 
with two first-rate heavy cruisers which were 
transferred last year under the Mutual Security 
Program at prices which Chile could afford. It 
has meant that our Department of Commerce has 
accorded high priority ratings for materials in 
short supply so that the needs of our rearmament 
effort would not impede Chile from building its 
first oil refinery and pipeline, so that Chile could 
expand its new steel mill, and so that it could build 
roads and improve its railways. A new adminis- 
tration will come into office in Chile in November. 
We trust that the same cooperative attitude will 
continue between Chile and our country which has 
brought so much benefit to the people of that great 
country. 

Last summer I had the honor of accompanying 
our Secretary of State on his visit to Brazil. He 
described himself as being staggered by that great 
country — by its vastness, its actual and potential 
wealth, and by the dynamic spirit of the Brazilians 
whom he saw both in Rio de Janeiro and in the 
great industrial city of Siio Paulo, one of the fast- 
est gi'owing cities in the world today and one of 
the most beautiful.^ The tempo of our relations 
with Brazil has reached the point where during 
September and October we shall have had the priv- 
ilege of welcoming to our country the Brazilian 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Finance, the 
Ministers of War and of the Navy, and the Chief 
of Staff of the Brazilian Air Force. All will have 
come as friends, and our business with them will 
be done as it always is between allies. As ex- 
portei's, you will be glad to know that when Dr. 
Lafer, the Brazilian Finance Minister, was with 
us last month he talked frankly with us about the 
steps which he is taking and intends to take about 
Brazil's commercial indebtedness — a problem 
which we can hope is of only a transitory nature. 
On his return to Rio, Dr. Lafer stated to the press 
that Brazilian relations with the United States 
"have never been on a higher level than at pres- 
ent." 

With Brazil we have two kinds of experiments 
in international cooperation which are ideally 
adapted to the special relationship between coun- 
tries of the size and complementary character of 
Brazil and the United States. One is the first 
Joint Commission for Economic Development 
which was created last year under the Point Four 
legislation. To that commission both Govern- 
ments have contributed outstanding leaders and 
technical experts to work on plans for enabling 
Brazil more promptly to realize its tremendous 
economic potential. When we met with the Joint 
Commission last July, we were deeply impressed 
by the scope of its programs which are now being 
turned into specific projects for the rehabilitation 

' For texts of addresses made by Secretary Acheson in 
Brazil, see ibid., July 14, 1952, p. 47, and July 21, 1952, p. 

87. 



November 3, 7952 



705 



of port works and railroad transportation, the 
improvement of agriculture, and the development 
and diversification of the country's electric-power 
resources. Added to what already has been accom- 
plished through cooperative progi-ams in Brazil, 
the work of this commission will accelerate the 
realization by Brazil of its full economic potential. 

In the military field we have had since 1942 two 
joint U.S.-Brazilian military commissions, one 
in Rio and one in AVashington. These two com- 
missions have been active for more than 10 years, 
including the period of our great wartime col- 
laboration, in planning the cooperative activities 
of Brazil and the United States to protect the 
vital strategic points, to guard the trade routes, 
and to render secure against aggression the popu- 
lations of the hemisphere in which we live. Mili- 
tary talks in Rio de Janeiro last month have pro- 
vided for streamlining and coordinating the work 
of these commissions. Never have military talks 
between two countries been held on a more 
friendly basis. 

We have also recently negotiated with Brazil, 
as well as with certain other countries in the 
hemisphere, bilateral militaiy agreements under 
which the United States will furnish military 
equipment free of charge in return for the agree- 
ment of the other countries to carry out specified 
tasks related to the defense of the hemispliere in 
the event of war, under plans worked out by the 
Inter-American Defense Board. This program is 
our contribution to making effective the inter- 
American understandings with regard to collec- 
tive defense. The Communists, with their usual 
divisive tactics, have spread confusion about these 
agreements. The fact that they have tried so 
hard to do this is, of course, another demonstra- 
tion that they don't like to see our hemispheric 
arrangements becoming more effective. I wish to 
make it clear once and for all that these agree- 
ments have no aggressive design; that they have 
nothing to do, as the Communists have charged, 
with making raw materials available to us at low 
prices; and that there is nothing in them which 
impairs the sovereignty of the other countries 
concerned. On the positive side, they will help 
other countries to defend themselves and the 
hemisphere if war should come. 

Communist Efforts To Divide tlie Hemispliere 

"While on the subject of Communist efforts to 
divide our hemisphere, I might point out one 
great difference between the United States in this 
part of the world and Russia. In this hemisphere 
the United States has a position of great respon- 
sibility. It is a position which has steadily in- 
creased in the last decade not only because of our 
emergence as a great world power but also because 
of the decline in importance of certain European 
countries and Japan, which formerly had much 
larger investment and trade interests in Latin 



America than they now have. These countries 
were in a sense competitors of specific U.S. in- 
terests in the economic field. But, at the same 
time, they helped to discharge certain of the re- 
sponsibilities which now devolve more completely 
upon this country as a whole in regard to such 
factors as furnishing capital for development, 
supplying a market for their raw materials, and 
providing scarce manufactured goods. I do not 
believe that, in appraising our Latin American 
relations, account is taken sufficiently of the tre- 
mendous responsibilities that now devolve upon 
the United States in this area — politicallj', eco- 
nomically, and militarily. In the American 
family of nations there is a tendency to take the 
United States for granted, just as families of in- 
dividuals take a particular member for granted. 
On the other hand, Russia has never had any im- 
portant ties with Latin America either commer- 
cially, through investment, through immigration, 
or through religious or cultural affinity. It is thus 
in a iJosition of total irresponsibility. Its only 
interest in Latin America is to keep it weak and 
to divide our community by sowing suspicion and 
playing upon discontent. The propaganda line 
of the Soviet Union can be changed at will at any 
time to suit its advantage as day-to-day tactics 
may require, but the long-range strategy of 
aggression remains the same. 

The U.S. Government has no propaganda line. 
We do not say one thing one day and another thing 
the next. Through the U.S. Information Service 
we tell the truth about the United States and our 
efforts to save freedom throughout the world. 
Through our Educational Exchange Program we 
help to further inter-American understanding. 
One interesting new departure in this program has 
been to invite to the United States groups from 
different labor organizations so that they can have 
direct contact with our own labor groups. There 
are in this country at this time groups of labor 
leaders from Mexico, Colombia, and Nicaragua. 
Respecting the complete integrity and independ- 
ence of the organized labor movement in this 
country, we nevertheless have regular exchanges 
of views with U.S. labor leaders on Latin Ameri- 
can relations. We also have had very fruitful 
consultations with business groups through the 
Latin American Committee of the Business Ad- 
visory Council of the Department of Commerce. 

During the period that I have been in office I 
have visited all of the 20 countries of Latin 
America at least once. Dui-ing this period I have 
traveled over 100,000 miles. "VVlien I visited Hon- 
duras in 1950, I was told that I was the highest 
ranking official of our Government to go to that 
country since 1911, the year that I was born. 
When I went to Paraguay that same year, I was 
the highest ranking official of our Government 
ever to visit that country. I wish that I could 
speak more in detail about some of the things that 



I 



706 



Department of State Bulletin 



I have seen. I shall never forget, for example, the 
visits which I made to the gallant and progressive 
country of Uruguay, which is a staunch friend of 
the United States and of democracy and which all 
Americans who have been there love forevermore. 
Nor shall I forget my visits to that other great 
democracy of Costa Rica, whose Government is 
giving its people an administration of the highest 
degree of competence in fiscal matters and, at the 
same time, living up with complete fidelity to the 
democratic ideals and traditions of that beautiful 
and progressive country wiiich is known through- 
out the world for its democracy. 

I wish I could speak in detail about the gallant 
troops from the Republic of Colombia who are 
fighting side by side with our own men in that 
great test of whether or not we shall let aggression 
run rampant again as it did in the late '30's. Gen- 
eral Lemnitzer, who commanded the U.S. Seventh 
Division in Korea, said of the Colombian troops 
that no country had a better right than Colombia 
to feel proud of its troops and that "Operation 
Climber" (the name given the attack carried out 
by the Colombian Battalion) was, in small scale, 
the most successful military action that he had 
witnessed in two wars. 

International relations today consist of a com- 
plex of all kinds of relations in all sorts of differ- 
ent levels. We in the Department of State have 
a function which, though it is important and must 
be exercised with the highest degree of public ac- 
countability, is nevertheless only one factor in the 
totality of our relations. Our efforts can never 
rise above the standards fashioned by our country 
as a whole. A single American corporation in a 
foreign country can have a greater impact — and 
I mean an impact for either good or bad — than 
all the efforts that we in the Government can 
make. The petroleum companies in Venezuela, 
for example, have pursued policies of such en- 
lightened self-interest that they are a credit to this 
country as a whole. American tourists or Amer- 
ican families who reside abroad are, in the eyes of 
the people among whom they travel and live, the 
image of our country. An American leader or an 
American newspaperman who comments on our 
international relations often has, depending upon 
the degree of his prestige (or, unfortunately on 
occasion, upon the degree of his inaccuracy), an 
impact greater than the impact, if any, of the 
words uttered here tonight by the official directlj' 
entrusted with the conduct of our governmental 
relations with this part of the world. 

And I wish to carry this theme of responsibility 



for international relations one step further. This 
responsibility lies not only on all the people of this 
country, but our relations with any other country 
of the world at any given moment depend just as 
much upon the government and people of the 
other country concerned. I frankly become im- 
patient when I read continually allegations that 
our Government is responsible for a deterioration 
in relations with another country, whereas I sel- 
dom read about another government's responsi- 
bility to maintain good relations with the United 
States. I am impatient because the state of our 
relations can never be any better than the people 
and officials of the other country wish them to be. 
International cooperation is a two-way street. 
Like human friendship it is up to both sicles. To- 
day one of the great factors in our relations with 
Latin America is the growth which occurs in some 
countries more than in others of nationalism. 
Now nationalism is something which is not inher- 
ently bad. We have some of it ourselves. Na- 
tionalism is only bad when it hurts the interests 
of the country concerned. It is especially bad 
where, as all too often happens, what is taken for 
nationalism is merely the effort of a public official 
or a citizen in another country to exculpate him- 
self for failure or to divert attention from that 
failure. The readiness of the United States to 
help another country should never be confused 
with willingness on our part to accept responsi- 
bility for other peoples' negligence or inaction. 

I believe that we can look forward to a long 
period of mutually profitable relations with our 
sister Republics in the hemisphere, relations based 
upon respect for human dignity and for the na- 
tional sovereignty of other countries. Democracy 
is still a goal rather than a reality in many parts of 
this hemisphere. The pendulum has swung one 
way and then the other ; democracy has had its ups 
and downs. Yet we must never have faint hearts. 
We must not tire in the struggle and confuse a 
temporary set-back with permanent disaster. We 
must never lose sight of the goal of democracy even 
though reality may be yet to come. And we in 
this country with our Anglo-Saxon traditions 
must never judge others by ourselves; we must 
never forget that our neighbors to the south are 
people who are intensely proud of themselves and 
of their traditions and their cultures. If we can 
work together with patience and understanding, 
we can look forward to a community of nations 
which will be stronger and more closely Imit and 
where the interests of the individual will always 
be better served. 



November 3, 1952 



707 



The American Farmer in tFie World Picture 



iy Stanley Andrews 

Administrator, Technical Cooperation Administration ^ 



The remarks which I shall make revolve around 
three principal points, briefly as follows: (1) 
the role that farmers played in helping to win 
World War II; (2) the international factors be- 
hind the rather extraordinary demand for the 
products of American farms since 1945, with a dis- 
cussion of some of the factors in that demand, as 
well as some of the danger signals that may be 
looming over the horizon; (3) the impact and ob- 
jectives of the Point Four Program in today's 
world agricultural picture. 

I do not think I need to dwell very long on the 
first point in this discussion, that is, the farmers' 
role in war, because this group of bankers from all 
over Missouri can hardly have escaped the full 
realization of the importance that American farm 
production played in the last war. 

It is no exaggeration to say that, without this 
extraordinary farm production from America, we 
could not have won the war, and the disorganized, 
disturbed, and hungry people that grew up behind 
the armies as we rolled from Africa to Berlin lit- 
erally would have exploded into chaos without the 
foods which came from America, often on the same 
ship carrying the munitions of war. American 
agricultural production, to meet the challenge of 
the times, was kept at a peak rate with the smallest 
number of men and women employed and pro- 
duced more and achieved a greater degree of effi- 
ciency than any nation had ever before achieved. 

With just about 15 percent of the employed peo- 
ple in America engaged in agriculture, production 
was increased over tlie 10 years between about 1940 
and 1950 by a little better than 40 percent. A 
great part of this increase was achieved during tlie 
war years and represented the largest production 
per man employed in any country in the world. 

I do not think we ought to pass this off as a mere 
patriotic gesture or even a more than ordinary de- 
sire of American farmers to help out in the war. 



' Summary of remarks made before the Missouri Bankers 
Association Agricultural Short Course, Columbia, Mo., 
Oct. 9 (press release 793). 



Certainly farmers are no more or no less patriotic 
than those from other walks of life. Let's give a 
little credit to the wartime agriculture policy in 
this country; namely, we wanted production and 
we paid handsomely for it. Farmers, like anyone 
else, respond to price. So much then for Ameri- 
can agriculture up to the end of the fighting in 
1945. 

Many people were freely predicting an agricul- 
tural slump in about 194C or 1947 very similar to 
what occurred after World War I and it was a safe 
assumption to make that prediction if we looked at 
the historical factors, and if we looked only at the 
then position of American agriculture and disre- 
garded things that happened in the windup of the 
little peace we did achieve. 

Dislocation of Agriculture by War 

The first fact that was vitally important in this 
picture was that this war had dislocated people 
and wreaked havoc and destruction more com- 
pletely and over a greater area than any other war 
in the history of the world. Production capacity, 
from agriculture to electronics, was badly disor- 
ganized and the materials and the manpower and 
the tools for production were woefully lacking. 
Even those thin.gs were rather rapidly overcome 
and in a period of some 4 or 5 years after the war 
Western Europe, particularly, was well on the 
way to its postwar production. Something else 
happened when victorious allies sat down at Pots- 
dam to devise and work out a mechanism of organ- 
izing the peace. 

Because of the position of the battle lines at the 
end of the war, the Russians came out in control 
of practically every surplus food-producing area 
in Europe, while the Western Allies controlled the 
Western European industrial plant. In other 
words, the great eastern plain of Germany be- 
came the Russian zone; the great bread basket of 
Poland became a responsibility of Russia and later 
a satellite; the Danube Basin countries of Czecho- 
slovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, which 



708 



Department of State Bulletin 



once literally fed the hungry mouths of Western 
Europe, fell into Russian hands. Even the single 
small area in the Danube Basin in the little coun- 
try of Austria, the only area in that unfortunate 
land whicli has a surplus of wheat and potato 
production, was taken over by the Russians and 
for a period up to the close of the Greek War, the 
Macedonian Plain, about the only area in Greece 
which could produce surplus food, was in the 
hands of insurrectionists. All of these areas in 
normal times shipped from 3 to as high in some 
years as 11 million tons of food into the Scandi- 
navian countries, into France, into England, into 
Italy, and in a general way helped supply that 
extra 30 percent of food and raw materials which 
Western Europe must get from somewhere else 
if it survives. But that was not the total picture. 
In the Far East, where you recall there was also 
a war, a war which America and her allies won, 
we conquered Japan, a nation of 75 million peo- 
ple, but it was a liability from the standiioint of 
food rather than an asset. Japan, in the years 
before Pearl Harbor, had developed a food supply 
in Formosa, in Korea, and in the islands of the 
Pacific. What little extra food she needed, she 
traded with the United States for that food. The 
great rice bowl of Asia — Burma, Indochina and 
Siam — was torn with the bitterest kind of internal 
strife and political revolution. Only Siam was 
able to organize itself very quickly and get back to 
something like a normal production of rice, which 
is the lifeblood and the life line of the great masses 
of the Orient. China, of course, in the years that 
followed the signing of the peace, fell into a revo- 
lution and is now little more than a Russian 
satellite, and there is an Iron Curtain across what- 
ever supplies used to come from that part of the 
world. Burma, now a new and sovereign state, is 
beset with internal difficulties, and an area which 
was once used to moving as high as 3 million tons 
of rice into the channels of international ti'ade, 
does well to move 1 million tons. Indochina, 
which befoi'e the war moved from 500,000 to II/2 
million tons of rice into international trade now 
does well to move 200.000 to 500,000 tons. Almost 
parallel with all of this has been a decline in the 
food-production potential of countries like Argen- 
tina. Further, rising domestic consumption is 
reducing the exportable supplies of countries like 
Australia. Only Canada and the United States 
have i-emained in the column of major surplus 
cereal-producing countries on a large and con- 
sistent scale. 

Rising Food Demand 

In the years which followed 1945, right up until 
the present hour, the United States of America has 
taken from American farms something like an 
average of 15 million tons of principally wheat, 
rice, and corn and shipped it to various parts of 
the world to plug up the gap to keep people off the 
starvation line in the countries I have mentioned. 



Possibly the greatest single danger to the Far East 
in the present difficult and uneasy situation is the 
possibility that Russia may sooner or later cause 
the Chinese Communists to march again, and 
Burma and Siam on the borders of Communist 
China, where an army of untold thousands stands 
poised, will be enveloped. They could close off 
that vital rice bowl from the millions in the Orient 
and that would mean that something near 750 
million people in the Far East would have to turn 
to the West again for something like 15 to 30 per- 
cent of their food supply. So you see there has 
been a demand, there has been a market, there have 
been hungry millions who have demanded, needed, 
and consumed this extra food which America has 
produced. 

There is another factor which is very important 
in this picture and something we should take ac- 
count of when we survey the future possible needs 
for food production and fiber production. The 
world population has increased in the 10 years 
since 1939 by something like 230 million people. 
A good part of that increase has been in the Orient 
where food production is still far behind the post- 
war period. There has been a measurable increase 
in Western Europe and of course here in the 
United States. Two hundred and thirty million 
additional peoiDle — a population equal" to Rus- 
sia's — must be clothed and fed. 

That is the challenge of this hour not only for 
America but, more important, a challenge to the 
people of the world to increase their production 
and at least try to keep pace with the rising food 
demand. If you want to put it another way, food 
production in the last 10 years has increased by 9 
percent world-wide; the population has increased 
by 13 percent. 

Wide Exchange of Products Required 

There is another extraordinary factor in this 
world food picture, and that is the fact that the 
United States through military aid, through 
Marshall Plan aid, tlirough Unrra, and other 
means has financed from the Treasury of the 
United States about half of all this food which 
has been shipped abroad in the years from 1945 
to this date. That simply means that the Ameri- 
can taxjjayers have voted money and have given 
it to these countries and they, in turn, have used 
our money to buy our food. I would be the last 
to suggest that we should not have done this. As 
a matter of fact, I can bear testimony to the fact 
that without this aid and without this food, West- 
ern Europe certainly would have gone down in 
chaos, and I am not so sure that Japan today 
would not be behind the Iron Curtain if we liad 
not played the role of a generous conqueror and 
helped that beaten nation back on its feet ancl kept 
it from starving, and starve it most certainly 
would have without the wheat, rice, fats, and oils 
which came from this country. Thus, we stand in 
the last quarter of 1952. In the current crop year 



November 3, 7952 



709 



■we have in America probably the second largest 
crop in our history. Our sister country to the 
north, Canada, has one of its largest wheat crops, 
some 650 million bushels. The return of cotton, 
tobacco, and rice production in some areas leads 
some to believe that possibly we may begin enter- 
ing an era of American surpluses. This can hard- 
ly be true of rice because right at this time America, 
which is not supposed to be a great rice producing 
area, is rationing what supplies it has among the 
claimants of the world. 

So we do not know just what the answer is or 
should be. But certainly the assured market which 
we have been enjoying in recent years, primarily 
through aid which we have pumped into the other 
countries, is not as sure as it has been in years past. 
As a matter of fact, American aid to European 
countries is on the decline and food is only bought 
tvith American aid when it supplements the de- 
fense effort or releases funds to be used in defense 
that would otherwise have to go for food. So 
without another increased aid program along these 
lines, the chances are there will be some decline in 
American exports. There is another danger signal 
on the horizon which, in my opinion, may vitally 
affect the whole course of America's world rela- 
tions and America's role in the present tremen- 
dously critical international situation. I refer to 
the rising cry for protectionism not only among 
certain industries in the United States but among 
farm groups. Surely we should realize that we 
cannot sell our surplus products such as wheat, 
fats and oils, corn, cotton, tobacco, and even cer- 
tain fruits and other exotic food unless the coun- 
tries which normally need our food have some- 
thing with which to buy. Unless those countries 
have an opportunity to sell in the American mar- 
ket those products wliich they can produce most 
efficiently and which they have in surplus and 
which they can sell, America is closing the door 
in the face of its friends. I will not go into de- 
tails here, but I can relate to j'ou by the hour the 
foolish, insignificant laws or administrative rul- 
ings devised to protect some small favored group 
in this country, the result of which is literally to 
destroy friends and discourage commerce and 
trade faster than all of our efforts can build it. 

A third danger signal is the rising restriction 
not only in our country against freer and larger 
trade between the United States and the free 
world but the rising restriction upon the part of 
countries themselves outside the United States area 
who are trying to achieve everything at once and 
feel they can achieve certain industrial and other 
developments by the simple process of an Iron 
Curtain type of economic diplomacy which re- 
stricts the normal flow of goods and services. The 
United States is not the only big bad wolf in this 
field. Only through the widest possible exchange 
of products over the world can there be anything 
resembling this so-called expanding world econ- 
omy which is the lifeblood of trade and the life- 
blood of human progi-ess. 

710 



The Meaning of Point Four 

I come now to ray last point in this discussion — 
the Point Four Program and its meaning to the 
world. I do not think I need to go into the 
details of how this program, which represents one 
of the many points or facets of our American 
foreign policy, came into being. It is another 
attempt to carry on our responsibilities which 
have either been thrust upon us or at least which 
we have assumed. This program, designed pri- 
marily to pass on technical skills we may have 
acquired here in the United States to the less for- 
tunate countries of the world, is now operating 
in some 35 countries. /There are something over 
1,500 Americans who have given up their jobs and 
their associations in their communities here in the 
States, and are out on the frontiers in these coun- 
tries, which stretch from far-away Afghanistan to 
the tip of South America, in an attempt as indi- 
viduals to meet and work with other individuals 
to the end that total production, agricultural and 
industrial, may be increased and thus the stand- 
ard of living of the underprivileged people raised 
just a little bit. 

I want to repeat to this group that this is not 
a hand-out program. We are not setting up a 
global Wpa to give everybody a tile bathtub or a 
quart of milk. 

If you had been with me in recent weeks in 
two widely separated portions of the world — far- 
away Indonesia and Burma and close-at-home El 
Salvador and Brazil — and if you had met the 
Americans there, I think you would have got the 
idea that they were not out with a checkbook and 
a hand-out, but wei'e there with whatever skill 
they possessed and with a willingness and a sin- 
cerity to walk beside their counterparts in these 
countries and attempt an attack on some of the 
difficult problems that multiply by the hour in 
these countries. 

These men and women are working as public- 
health people, along with their counterparts in 
these countries; they are working as skilled indus- 
trial engineers ; they are working as county agents ; 
they are working as educators, transportation ex- 
perts, administration experts, and what have you. 
Things are being achieved — nonspectacular things 
to be sure but that is the only way you can do 
very much with very little. That is, we must 
multiply the effort — the small effort of many peo- 
ple if we are going to achieve the things that the 
present situation in the world demands. I am 
not one who is