The Desert Mounted Corps
Southern Branch
of the
University of California
Los Angeles
Form L I
D
5GS.7
V3^
r.
THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
LllXTKNANT-CiKNIiRAI. SlU H. O. ChALV1;1., K.C.B., K.C.M.O
Commanding the Desert .Mounted Corps.
THE
DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
AN ACCOUNT OF THE CAVALRY OPERATIONS
IN PALESTINE AND SYRIA
1917-1918
BY
LIEUT.-COLONEL
THE HON. R. M. P. PRESTON, D.S.O.
With an Introduction by
LIEUT.-GENERAL
SIR H. G. CHAUVEL, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.
BOSTON AND NEW YORK
HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY
1921
6 H9o
Printed in Oreat Britain
.' ^
T"=^,2
TO
B
DEAR LOYAL FRIEND AND PERFECT COMRADE
WITHOUT WHOSE ENCOrTRAGEMENT AND HELP
THIS BOOK WOULD NEVER HAVE
BEEN WRITTEN
4
INTRODUCTION
It gives me great pleasure to write a few words of
introduction to Lieut. -Col. Preston's History of the
Desert Mounted Corps, which I had the honour to
command. In writing this History Lieut. -Col. Preston
has done a service to his country which I am sure will
be fully appreciated, particularly, perhaps, by those
N^ who served in the Corps, and who feel that the part
N they played in the Great War is but little known to
^ the general public. As a work on Cavalry Tactics,
^^'^ I trust it will be of some value to the student of
Military History, and, if it does nothing else, it must
demonstrate to the world that the horse-soldier is
J. just as valuable in modern warfare as he ever. has
c^ been in the past. Indeed, the whole of the opera-
tions in Palestine and Syria, under General Allenby,
were text-book illustrations of the perfect combina-
tion of all arms, both in attack and defence, and the
last operations in this theatre, which led to the total
destruction of the Turkish Arms and the elimination
of Germany's Allies from the War, could not have
been undertaken without large masses of Cavalry.
Lieut. -Col. Preston is well qualified to undertake
the work. First of all in command of one of my
finest Horse Batteries, and subsequently as C.R.A.
of the Australian Mounted Division, he was often in
touch with my Staff, being constantly employed on
reconnaissance duties, in which he was peculiarly
viii THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
expert. He served throughout the whole of the
operations of which he writes, and had consider-
able previous experience in the Sinai Campaign, in
which the Horse Artillery of the Desert Column
played so conspicuous a part.
This History commences with the re-organisa-
tion of the British Troops in the Egyptian theatre
of the War, on Sir Edmund Allenby taking over
command in June 1917. The troops operating East
of the Suez Canal had hitherto been known as the
' Eastern Force,' which had been successively com-
manded by Sir Herbert Lawrence, Sir Charles Dobell
and Sir Philip Chetwode, who were again directly
under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief in
Cairo.
The advanced troops of ' Eastern Force,' viz., all
the available Cavalry, Horse Artillery and Camel
Corps, with from one to two Divisions of Infantry,
had been organised into what was called ' The Desert
Column.' Sir Edmund Allenby decided to take
command of the troops in the Eastern Field himself.
The available Infantry was formed into two Army
Corps, and the Cavalry of the Desert Column was
formed into a Cavalry Corps of three Divisions (sub-
sequently increased to four on the arrival of the
Indian Cavalry from France early in 1918). The
name of the original Desert Column was preserved
as far as possible in the title of the new Cavalry Corps,
as most of the troops composing it had fought
throughout the Sinai Campaign, and by them much
had already been accomplished. The Turk had been
driven from the vicinitv of the Suez Canal, across
INTRODUCTION ix
the Sinai Desert to the Palestine Border and beyond,
and several hard- won battles had been fought. Also,
covered by these operations, a railway and pipe line
had been constructed, without which, under modem
conditions, the further invasion of Palestine could
not have been attempted.
The Desert Mounted Corps was composed of
Australians, New Zealanders, British Yeomanry, and
Territorial Horse Artillery and Indian Cavalry, with
French Cavalry added for the last operations ; and it
says much for the loyalty of all, and the mutual
confidence in each other, that the whole worked so
harmoniously and efficiently to one end. It will be
readily understood, too, that operations of the nature
Colonel Preston describes could not have been carried
out successfully without a highly efficient staff. I
was peculiarly fortunate in the personnel of my staff
and also in my Divisional Commanders, two of whom
were Indian Cavalry Officers, one a British Cavalry
Officer, and the fourth an Officer of the New Zealand
Staff Corps.
To a leader or a student of military history the
campaign was intensely interesting, but at the same
time there were many hardships — intense heat in the
summer, with dust and insect pests inconceivable to
those who did not go through the campaign, and
cold and heavy rains in the winter. The fortitude
and endurance of the troops was beyond all praise,
but the summer of 1918 spent by the Corps in the
Jordan Valley, at about 1200 feet below sea-level,
with a temperature varying from 110 to 125 degrees,
will not be forgotten by them.
X THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
The occupation of this area was essential to the
success of General Allenby's final operations ; and
everything possible was done to alleviate the con-
ditions — with considerable success, as, though our
wastage from malaria and other diseases was heavy,
the greater bulk of the cases of malaria were con-
tracted after leaving the areas which had been
treated under the supervision of our Medical Staff.
Our most serious losses occurred after reaching
Damascus, and, on the farther advance to Aleppo,
one division was brought to a complete standstill
by the ravages of this disease.
Though drawn from such widely different quarters
of the Empire, the personnel of the Corps was well
fitted for the class of warfare it was called upon to
undertake. The horsemen of Australia and New
Zealand were accustomed to wide spaces and long
days in the saddle, and were full of initiative, self-
reliance and determination to overcome every obstacle
in their way. The Yeomanry, though not so accus-
tomed to hardships, had behind them the glorious
traditions of the British Cavalry, in the annals of
which their charges at Huj and El Mughar will live
for all time. The Horse Artillery too, drawn from
the Counties of England and Scotland and the City
of London, lived through the whole of the campaigns
in Sinai and Palestine with their comrades from
overseas, and showed themselves no whit behind-
hand in the matter of endurance. The value of
their work is best shown by the esteem in which they
were held by the other troops. The long apprentice-
ship of the Indian Cavalry to the trench warfare of
INTRODUCTION xi
the Western Front had robbed them of none of their
dash and briUiancy in the open warfare to which
they were so eminently fitted. The personnel of the
Signal Service, Engineers, Army Service Corps, Army
Ordnance Corps, Army Medical Corps, and Army
Veterinary Corps came from the same sources as the
other troops — units often being composed of mixed
personnel — and to the efficiency of these the successes
attained by the Corps were very largely due.
HARRY CHAUVEL,
Lieut. -General,
late Commayiding the Desert Mounted Corps.
Commonwealth of Australia,
Depabtment of Defence.
Office of the Inspector-General,
ord September 1920.
AUTHOR'S NOTE
As regards both the numbers engaged and the results
achieved, the campaign in Palestine and Syria ranks
as the most important ever undertaken by cavalry.
In the first series of operations our troops made a
direct advance of seventy miles into enemy territory,
and captured some 17,000 prisoners and about 120
guns. The final operations resulted in an advance
of 450 miles, the complete destruction of three
Turkish Armies, with a loss of about 90,000 prisoners
and 400 guns, and the overwhelming defeat of what
had hitherto been considered one of the first-class
Mihtary Powers.
These remarks must not be taken, in any way, as
underrating the value of tJie work of our infantry,
who, as always, bore the brunt of the fighting, while
denied much of the interest and excitement of the
long pursuits that fell to the lot of the cavalry. In
both the main series of operations, the infantry pre-
pared the way for the cavalry, and enabled them to
complete the victory won, in the first instance, by
the bayonets.
General Allenby's campaign divides itself naturally
into three phases. First, the Beersheba-Gaza battle
and the subsequent pursuit over the Philistine Plain,
culminating in the capture of Jerusalem ; secondly,
the operations in the Jordan Valley, and east of the
river Jordan ; and thirdly, the final series, resulting
in the destruction of the Turkish Armies, and the
AUTHOR'S NOTE xiii
capture of Damascus, Aleppo, etc., followed by the
capitulation of the Turkish Empire.
Though the Turks at their best are not to be com-
pared in fighting value with the troops of the first-
class fighting nations of Europe, such as the British,
French, and Germans, they generally fought well
against our infantry, attacking with vigour, and
defending their entrenched positions most stubbornly.
They were well supplied with all the appurtenances
of modern warfare, and, in the first part of the
campaign, were generally well led.
At the commencement of the operations, the
Turkish soldiers were of good morale on the whole,
their physique was excellent, and their health satis-
factory. There was a large proportion of seasoned
soldiers among them, many with the Gallipoli medal.
In the latter part of the campaign, however, their
morale had deteriorated considerably, their physique
was greatly undermined by disease, and there were
few old soldiers left, nearly all having been killed or
captured, or died of disease. Many units were full
of untrained troops, ill-disciplined and demoralised.
After the first day's fighting, there wds little resist-
ance by the enemy, except when stiffened by a large
proportion of German troops, as at Semakh and
Jisr Benat Yakub.
There were doubtless many causes for this deteri-
oration of morale among the Turkish troops, but,
unquestionably, one of the chief was the constant
friction that existed between Turkish and German
ofiicers, which spread downwards to the ranks of
both nations. The hectoring stupidity of the Prussian
was nowhere better exemplified than in his treat-
ment of his Turkish Allies. German officers openly
and constantly expressed their contempt for the
Turks, whom they compared to niggers, and numerous
xiv THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
instances came to our knowledge of German N.C.O.'s
and privates beating and kicking Turkish officers.
The three things which the Turks feared most were
a threat to their communications, a charge of cavalry,
and a heavy aerial attack. As regards the first,
there was, I believe, no instance in the campaign
when they fought on to the end after being sur-
rounded, though, on several occasions, Turkish units
continued to attack till annihilated.
The losses of the Turks were much heavier than
ours in every action of the campaign, even when they
were successful, or partially so, as in the two trans-
Jordan raids. ^ This fact was largely due to their
bad rifle shooting. While our troops were good
enough shots to pick off Turkish soldiers showing
their heads above rocks and trenches, the Turks, as
a rule, could only hit our men when standing up
during an advance. When the enemy made his
great effort to re-take Jerusalem, on the 26th of
December 1917, the number of dead Turks found
on the position after the battle was greater than our
total casualties.
As a set-off to their bad rifle shooting, the enemy
troops were suppHed with a far larger proportion
of machine guns than we were. Their machine-gun
companies, which were largely staffed by Germans,
were generally effective, and caused us the major
part of our casualties during the war.
Their field artillery work in general was slow and
inaccurate, but the heavy artillery, manned by
Germans or Austrians, was almost invariably good.
The above remarks as to morale should be borne
in mind in estimating the tactics of General Allenby.
^ Except in the two first battles of Gaza, April and May 1917, when
our losses, in comparison with the numbers engaged, were as severe as in
some of the hardest fought battles on the Western Front.
AUTHOR'S NOTE xv
It will be noticed that he took greater risks in the
latter part of the campaign than he had done at the
beginning. These risks were fully justified by the
very complete knowledge of the reduced state of the
enemy's morale which had been acquired by our
InteUigence Staff.
In spite of the indifferent morale of the enemy
troops, the campaign is of great value to the student
of cavalry tactics, being, as it is, the only instance in
modern war of cavah'y operating on a large scale. It
demonstrated once more the soundness of the prin-
ciples laid down in our training manuals, which
appear to be immutable, in spite of aircraft and other
devilish inventions of present day warfare.
The value of aeroplanes and armoured cars acting
in conjunction with cavalry was very clearly brought
out, notably in the final series of operations.
My thanks are due to Lieutenant-Colonel R. H.
Osborne, D.S.O., M.C., 20th Hussars, cavalry in-
structor at the Staff College Camberley, for very
kindly reading the manuscript, and for many valu-
able suggestions and corrections. Also to Major
A. F. Becke, R.A., in charge of the Historical Section,
W.D., for much help in studying war diaries and
maps.
My thanks are also due to the many officers, too
numerous ' to mention individually, who have very
kindly lent me their private diaries, or given me
information about obscure points. I have taken
every care to make the narrative as accurate as
possible, but, if any who read it notice inaccuracies,
I shall be very grateful if they will point them out
to me. I have also to thank those who have allowed
me to use photographs taken by them as illustra-
tions. A number of the photographs taken on the
enemy side were obtained from Mr. C. Raad, photo-
xvi THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
grapher, of Jerusalem, who had secured the original
negatives, and by whose permission they are repro-
duced in the book.
Lastly, I desire to thank Lieutenant-General Sir
H. G. Chauvel, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., Commander of the
Desert Mounted Corps throughout the campaign, for
his help and encouragement, and for having very
kindly written the preface to the book.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I
PAOR
Preliminary. Situation in the East in June 1917. Objectives of
the Palestine Campaign. The country. The opposing armies . 1
CHAPTER II
Plan of the operations. Laying the foundations. Cavalry recon-
naissances. Work of the engineers. Maps and water supply . 10
CHAPTER III
1917 The first round. The attack on Beersheba. Charge
Oct. 27th of the 4th A.L.H. Brigade. Capture of the town with
to 2000 prisoners. Destruction of the wells. First attack
Nov. 1st on the Gaza defences. German buildings in Beersheba.
Arab sheikhs and the Camel Transport Corps , . 18
CHAPTER IV
Nov. 2nd The decisive battle. Enemy counter-stroke on the
to east. Hard fighting of the cavalry and the 53rd
Nov. 7th Division. Lack of water. Capture of Tel Khuweilfeh.
And of Hareira and Sharia. Enemy's front broken.
Cavalry through the gap. Fall of Gaza ... 38
CHAPTER V
Nov. 8th The pursuit. All three cavalry divisions employed.
and 9tb Strong enemy resistance. Charge of the Yeomanry at
Huj. Water at last. Sufferings of the horses. Delay
caused by lack of water. Arak el Mensliiye and Beit
Duras ......... 50
CHAPTER VI
Nov. 10th The Cavalry Corps in line from the railway to the sea.
to Difficulties of supply. Withdrawal of aU but two
Nov. 12th infantry divisions. Great heat and lack of water causes
a slackening of the pursuit. Anzac Division seizes the
Esdud bridge. Stiffening of the enemy resistance.
The action of Balin ...... 61
b
xviii THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
CHAPTER VII
PAGE
Nov. 13th Attack on the enemy line. Charge of the 6th Mounted
to Brigade at El Mughar. Armoured cars enter Junction
Nov. 15th Station. Capture of the station. Enemy forces cut
in two. Right group driven northwards across the
River Auja, and left group into the Judsean Hills.
Occupation of Ramleh, Ludd, and JafEa. The Sidun-
Abu Shusheh position. Second charge of the 6th
Mounted Brigade ....... 77
CHAPTER VIII
Nov. 16th Necessity for reinforcements, and exhaustion of horses
and 17th causes a lull in the operations. A waterless record.
The Australian cavalry horse. Junction Station. Re-
appearance of the Corps Ammunition Column. The
Predatory Gunner. The A.P.M.'s Odyssey. A
Turkish communique ...... 93
CHAPTER IX
Nov. 18th The advance resumed. Amwas. ITie Australian
to Mounted Division withdrawn to rest. The Yeomanry
Nov. 25th Division enter the mountains. Rain. Unsuccessful
attacks on the Beitunia Ridge. Difficulties of the
country. Our infantry seize Nebi Samwil. The
Anzac Mounted Division forces the crossing of the
Nahr el Auja in the plain. And is driven back . . 101
CHAPTER X
Dec. Ist to Hard fighting and bad weather in the hills. Our corn-
Dec. 31st. munications cut. The last of the Yeomanry Division.
Winter conditions in the Philistine Plain. Rain and
mud. Floods cause breakdowns in the supply services.
A ' Merry Christmas.' Enem3' spies in the mountains.
Surrender of Jei-usalem. Final crossing of the Auja.
Results achieved by the Desert Mounted Corps during
the operations . . . . . . .112
CHAPTER XI
1918 ' Rest and Refit.' The rmns of Gaza. Decision to
Jan. Ist to extend the battle line to the Jordan. The country be-
Feb. 28th tween Jerusalem and the Dead Sea basin. The first
descent into the Jordan Valley. Occupation of Jericho.
CONTENTS xix
PAGK
A naval battle 1300 feet below the level of the ocean.
Second descent into the Valley. Our right flank
established on the river Jordan. Operations of the
Arab forces ........ 123
CHAPTER XIT
Mar. 1st The first trans-Jordan raid. Description of the trans-
to Jordan country. Bridging the Jordan. Difficulties
Apr. 2nd of the cavalry. Rain and cold. Hedjaz Railway cut
north and south of Amman. Unsuccessful attacks
on the town. Large enemy reinforcements arrive on
the scene. Floods sweep away the bridges over the
Jordan. Hard fighting at El Salt. Attack on Amman
abandoned. Withdrawal of the raiding force . . 132
CHAPTER XIII
Apr. 3rd Results of the raid. Successes of the Arab Army.
to Reorganisation of the Cavalry Corps. The second
May 4th trans- Jordan raid. Capture of EI Salt. Failure of
first attack on Shunet Nimrin. Enemy reinforcements
cross the Jordan at Jisr el Damieh, 4th A.L.H.
Brigade hard pressed. Loss of the guns. Enemy
clears the way to El Salt. The Beni Sakhr play us
false. Precarious position of our cavalry in the hills.
Failure of second attack on Shunet Nimrin. Hard
fighting at El Salt. Ammunition running out. The
raiding force withdraws across the Jordan. Results
of the raid ........ 153
CHAPTER XIV
May 5th Decision to hold the Jordan Valley during the summer,
to The Valley fine. Description of the country and
Aug. 31st climate. Enemy attacks on Abu Tellul and El Henu
repulsed. An example of ' Kultur.' Out of the Valley
of Desolation ....... 177
CHAPTER XV
Sept. 1st Preparations for the great drive. Description of the
to Turkish line and the country behind it. The opposing
Sept. 18th forces. Precautions to ensure secrecy. Plan of the
operations. Lawrence's Arabs cut the enemy railway
at Deraa junction. At the starting post . . . 190
XX THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
CHAPTER XVI
PAOiE
Sept. 19th Opening the door. Cavalry through the gap and over
to the Carmcl Range, On the Plain of Armageddon. 13th
Sept. 2l8t Cavalry Brigade captures the enemy G.H.Q. at Naza-
reth. Cavalry seize Afule, Jenin, and Beisan. Big
haul of prisoners at Jenin ..... 202
CHAPTER XVII
Sept, 19th Rolling up the enemy flank. Work of the 5th A.L.H,
to Brigade. Our infantry attack all along the line and
Sept. 22nd drive in the Turkish front. Oui" cavalry reoccupy
Nazareth. Sad fate of the ' Haifa Annexation Ex-
pedition.' Chaytor's force closes the Jisr el Damieh
road, and advances on Shunet Nimrin. Turkish
armies trapped . . . . . . .217
CHAPTER XVIII
Sept. 23rd Drawing the net. Action of Makhadet Abu Naj.
Capture of Haifa. Action at Makhadet el Masudi.
Turkish Vllth and Vlllth Armies completely destroyed.
Adventures of Chaytor's Force. Surrender of the
Hedjaz Corps. British and Turks as ' Allies ' . . 229
CHAPTER XIX
Sept. 24th Decision to advance on Damascus. The orders for
to the advance. 4th A.L.H. Brigade captures Semakh.
Sept. 27th Treachery of the Germans. Capture of Tiberias. The
race for Damascus. 4th Cavalry Division strikes at
the flank of the retreating IVth Army. And joins
hands with the Arab forces ..... 247
CHAPTER XX
Sept. 27th The action at the Bridge of Jacob's Daughters. A
and memory of Napoleon's campaign in Syria. Last cross-
Sept. 28th ing of the Jordan. Occupation of El Kuneitra. Some
undisciplined ' Allies.' 4th Cavalry Division reaches
El Mezerib. Turks massacre women and children.
The Arabs' vengeance ...... 258
CHAPTER XXI
Sept. 29th The last lap of the race to Damascus. Orders of the
to Cavalry Corps. A fight in the darkness. The action
Oct. 5th of Kaukab. 5th A.L.H. Brigade closes the Beirut
CONTENTS
XXI
road. Ouv two columns meet at Damascus, End of
the Turkish IVth Army. Capture of the city with
12,000 prisoners. Terrible condition of the enemy
troops. A record charge by Australian cavalry. Dis-
orders in Damascus ......
266
CHAPTER XXII
Oct. 5th Decision to advance to Rayak and Beirut. Sickness
to in the Corps. Occupation of Homs and Tripoli. 5th
Oct. 31st Cavalry Division ordered to advance to Aleppo. A
hunt by the armoured cars. A piece of bluff. Fall of
Aleppo. The last of the Turkish army. The Armis-
tice. Captures of the Desert Mounted Corps
282
CHAPTER XXIII
Police work. The Desert Mounted Corps administers a country
larger than Scotland. Condition of the country after the
Armistice. Pax Britannica. Co-operation of the Arabs. Work
of the Armenian Reparations Committee. Character of the
Armenians. A gamble in exchange. Sport and games. End
of the Desert Mounted Corps. Northern Syria handed over to
the French 295
CHAPTER XXIV
Horse Artillery 303
CHAPTER XXV
Horses 311
CHAPTER XXVI
Transport and Ammunition Supply
Appendix I : (a) The Desert Mounted Corps
(6) Infantry
Appendix II : Note on the Arab Movement
Appendix III : Terms of Turkish Armistice
322
331
335
337
342
ILLUSTRATIONS
Lieutenant-General Sir H. G. Chauvel, K.O.B.,
K.C.M.G.
.
. Frontispiece
TO FACE PAGE
Water at Esani
20
Country near Beersheba
20
Beersheba . . .
36
Beersheba First Train
36
Turkish Cavalry
48
Turkish Machine Guns ....
48
After the Charge at Huj
76
Marching over Philistine Plain
76
Von Falkenhayn .....
108
Austrian Howitzer .....
108
R.H.A. IN Action in Mountains
120
Reading British Proclamation in Jerusalem
120
Mosque at Gaza ....
124
German Motor Boat
152
Grain from Moab
152
River Jordan .
176
Shunet Nimrin
176
Motor Lorries ' Before ' .
212
Motor Lorries * After ' .
212
German Aircraft
228
In the Hands of the Enemy
228
Nazareth
252
Tiberias ....
252
xxiv THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
TO FACB PAOK
R.H.A. Fording River Jordan 270
Bakada Gorge, Damascus 270
Feisal's Headquarters at Damascus . . . 278
Tripoli 278
Aleppo ......... 288
Arabs and Fbisal's Soldiers 288
River Euphrates 296
AiNTAB 296
Inscription at Dog River ..... 302
LIST OF MAPS AND DIAGRAMS.
Key Map 327
Folding out.
Map A 122
„ B 246
,, G 280
„ D 294
Full page.
Diagram 1 ....... . 18
2 46
3 80
4 86
5 170
6 222
7 236
THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
AN ACCOUNT OF THE CAVALRY OPERATIONS
IN PALESTINE AND SYRIA, 1917-1918
CHAPTER I
THE COUNTRY AND THE OPPOSING FORCES
When General Allenby arrived in Egypt in June
1917, and assumed command of the Egyptian
Expeditionary Force, British prestige in the East
was at a very low ebb. The evacuation of Galhpoli
in December 1915, followed by the fall of Kut el
Amara four months later, and by our two unsuccessful
attacks on Gaza in the spring of the following year,
had invested the Turkish arms with a legend of in-
vincibility which was spreading rapidly in all Moslem
countries. For the first time in seven centuries,
sang the journalistic bards of Stamboul, the followers
of Islam had triumphed over the Infidel ; Allah was
leading the Faithful to victory ; the Empire of the
Moslems was at hand.
The fall of Baghdad in March 1917 somewhat
dashed these high hopes, it is true. But the Germans,
to whom the city was, at the moment, of no more
importance than any other dirty Eastern village, had
little difficulty in persuading the Turks that its loss
was a mere incident in the world war, which would
be more than made good in the final, and glorious,
peace terms. Nevertheless, the Turks insisted on
making an effort to recapture the place, and for this
purpose a special, picked force, known as the Yilderim,
2 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
or Lightning, Army Group, was in process of forma-
tion in northern Syria at this time. The command
of this group had been entrusted to the redoubtable
von Falkenhayn, who was at Aleppo, directing the
training and organisation of the troops.
Comforted by highly coloured accounts of the
efficiency and fighting value of this force, the Turks
rapidly recovered from the effects of the loss of
Baghdad. Bombastic articles, inspired by Potsdam,
began to make their appearance in the Turkish press,
chronicUng the doings of the ' Lightning ' armies.
They were to recapture Baghdad, drive the British
into the Persian Gulf, and then march to the ' relief '
of India. Afterwards the presumptuous little force
that had dared to oppose the Turks' advance into
their own province of Egypt would be dealt with in a
suitable manner ; Egypt would be delivered ; and
the Suez Canal, ' the jugular vein of the British
Empire,' would be severed.
Aided by such writings, and supported by German
money, Pan-Islamic emissaries were busily engaged
in every Moslem or partly Moslem country, stirring
up the Faithful to sedition and revolt. India,
Afghanistan, Persia, and Egypt were all in a state of
suppressed excitement and unrest, and it is probable
that one more British reverse in the East would have
been sufficient to set all these countries in a blaze.
The least imaginative can form some idea of the
tremendous consequences that such an upheaval
would have had upon the war in general. Yet the
newspapers of that time show clearly that there
was a considerable, and vociferous, body of public
opinion, both in England and in France, that regarded
the Syrian and Mesopotamian campaigns as useless
and extravagant ' side-shows,' and clamoured in-
sistently for the recall of the troops engaged in them.
THE ENEMY DEFENCES 3
Thus, both for the purpose of re-estabHshing our
waning prestige in the East, and of silencing the
mischievous agitation at home, it was imperative
that a signal defeat should be inflicted on the Turks
as soon as possible. The capture of Jerusalem,
which city ranks only after Mecca and Stamboul
among the holy places of Islam, would set a fitting
seal upon such a defeat, and would be certain to
create a profound impression upon Moslems the
world over.
Jerusalem, therefore, became the political objective
of the new British Commander-in-Chief. The stra-
tegical objective will be discussed later.
The situation in Palestine in the summer of 1917
was not, however, at first sight, very encouraging.
Our two abortive attempts on Gaza had shown the
German commanders the weak points in the Turkish
defences, and they had set to work, with character-
istic energy and thoroughness, to strengthen them.
' Gaza itself had been made into a strong, modern
fortress, heavily entrenched and wired, and offering
every facility for protracted defence. The remainder
of the enemy's line consisted of a series of strong
localities, viz. : the Sihan group of works, the Atawineh
group, the Abu el Hareira-Abu el Teaha trench
system (near Sharia), and, finally, the works covering
Beersheba. These groups of works were generally
from 1500 to 2000 yards apart, except that the
distance from the Hareira group to Beersheba was
about four and a half miles. . . . By the end of
October these strong localities had been joined up so
as to form a practically continuous line from the sea
to a point south of Sharia. The defensive works
round Beersheba remained a detached system, but
had been improved and extended.' ^
^ Genera,! Allenby's despatch, dated 16th December 1917.
4 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
The Turkish forces were thus on a wide front, the
distance from Gaza to Beersheba being about thirt}"-
miles, but a well-graded, metalled road, which they
had made just behind their line, connecting these
two places, afforded good lateral communication,
and any threatened point of their front could be
very quickly reinforced.
From July onwards continual reinforcements of
men, guns, and stores had arrived on the enemy's
front, and he had formed several large supply and
ammunition depots at different places behind his
lines. He had also laid two lines of railway from the
so-called Junction Station on the Jerusalem-Jaffa
line, one to Deir Sineid, just north of Gaza, and the
other to Beersheba, and beyond it to the village of
El Auja,^ on the Turko-Egyptian frontier, some
twenty-five miles south-west of Beersheba. It was
evident that the Turks intended to hold on to the
Gaza-Beersheba line at all costs, in order to cover
the concentration and despatch of the Yilderim
Force to Mesopotamia.
This Junction Station was to be the strategical
objective of our operations. From the junction a
railway ran northwards, through Tul Keram, Mes-
sudieh, Jenin and Afule, to Deraa on the Hedjaz Rail-
way, whence the latter line continued to Damascus,
Aleppo, and the Baghdad Railway. With the junction
in our hands, any enemy force in the Judsean hills,
protecting Jerusalem, would be cut off from all
railway communication to the north, and would be
compelled to rely for its supplies on the difficult
mountain road between Messudieh and Jerusalem,
or on the longer and still more difficult road from
^ The portion of the line between Beersheba and El Auja was raided by
our cavalry in May 1917, and about thirty miles of the track destroyed, in
order to prevent any attempted raid on our conununications via the latter
place.
ENEMY SPIES 5
Amman station on the Hedjaz Railway, thirty miles
east of the Jordan, via Jericho to Jerusalem.
Our own position extended from the sea at Gaza
to a point on the Wadi Ghuzze near El Gamli, some
fourteen miles south-west of Sharia and eighteen
miles west of Beersheba. The opposing lines thus
formed a rough ' V,' with its apex at Gaza, where the
lines were, in some places, only a couple of hundred
yards apart. From here they diverged to El Gamli,
which was about nine miles from the nearest part of
the Turkish positions. The intervening space was
watched by our cavalry.
The right flank of our line being thus ' in the air '
out in the desert, it was a comparatively eas}^ matter
for enemy spies, disguised as peaceful natives, to
pass round it under cover of darkness, and approach
our positions from the rear in daylight. Native
hawkers, other than those with passes from the
Intelligence Staff, were forbidden to approach our
lines, but it was impossible to control all the natives
in such a scattered area, and much can be seen, with
the aid of a pair of field-glasses, from the top of a hill
a mile away. There were also at least two very daring
Germans, who several times penetrated our Unes dis-
guised as British officers. They were both exceedingly
bold and resourceful men, and it is probable that
they obtained a good deal of useful information,
before they met the almost inevitable fate of spies.
Before the end of our time of preparation, how-
ever, methods were evolved to deal with this nuisance,
and the enemy was kept in ignorance of our move-
ments and intentions with that success which always
attended the efforts of General Allenby in this
direction. An enemy staff document, subsequently
captured by us, and dated just prior to the com-
mencement of the operations, stated that : ' An
6 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
outflanking attack on Beersheba with about one
infantry and one cavaky division is indicated, but
the main attack, as before, must be expected on
the Gaza front.' How far wrong was this apprecia-
tion of the situation will be apparent later on. The
same document also stated that we had six infantry
divisions in the Gaza sector, whereas at the time
there were only three.
The Royal Air Force was an important factor in
denying information to the enemy during the latter
part of our time of preparation. One of the first
things the Commander-in-Chief had done on his
arrival at the front, was to re-equip the force com-
pletely. Hitherto the German Flying Corps had
done what it hked in the air over our lines. For
several months on end our troops had been bombed,
almost with impunity, every day. Our own pilots,
starved alike of aeroplanes and of materials for repairs,
gingerly manoeuvring their antiquated and rickety
machines, fought gallantly but hopelessly against
the fast Taubes and Fokkers of the German airmen,
and day by day the pitiful list of casualties that
might have been so easily avoided grew longer.
In four months all this had changed. Our pilots,
equipped with new, up-to-date and fast machines,
met the Germans on level terms, and quickly began
to obtain supremacy in the air. By the end of
October this supremacy was definitely established,
and the few enemy pilots who crossed our lines at
that time flew warily, ever on the look-out for
one of our fighting machines.
The country occupied by the opposing armies
varied considerably in character. The district near
the coast consisted of a series of high dunes of loose,
shifting sand, impassable for wheeled traffic. Farther
east the ground became harder, but it was still sandy
ORGANISING A CAVALRY FORCE 7
and heavy going for transport. Eastwards again,
towards Beersheba, the country changed to a wilder-
ness of bare, rocky hills, intersected by innumerable
wadis (dry river beds). These wadis were, for the
most part, enclosed between limestone cliffs, some-
times 100 feet or more in height, and impassable
except where the few native tracks crossed them.
The whole of this part of the country was water-
less, except for three very deep wells at Khalasa
and one at Asluj (all of which had been destroyed
by the Turks), and some fairly good pools in the
Wadi Ghuzze at Esani and Shellal. In Beersheba
itself there were seven good wells.
Northwards of the enemy's positions, between the
Judsean mountains and the sea, stretched the
great plain of Philistia, a strip of rolling down-
land fifteen to twenty miles wide, admirably suited
for the employment of mounted troops.
The appointment of General AUenby, himseK a
cavalryman, to the command of the Egyptian Expedi-
tionary Force, presaged the employment of cavahy on
a much larger scale than had hitherto been attempted.
From his first study of the problem before him, the
new Commander-in-Chief realised the predominant
part that cavalry would play in the operations, and
devoted himself, with his customary energy, to or-
ganising a force suitable for the work in prospect.
For the advance across the Sinai Desert from the
Suez Canal, a special force had been organised,
under the command of Sir Philip Chetwode. This
force, which was known as the Desert Column, con-
sisted of the Australian and New Zealand Mounted
Division (which then included the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd
Australian Light Horse Brigades and the New
Zealand Mounted Brigade), the 5th Mounted Brigade
(Yeomanry), and the 42nd and 52nd Infantry Divisions.
8 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
The 2nd Mounted (Yeomanry) Division, which
had arrived in Egypt in April 1915, had been sent
to GalUpoH dismounted. After the evacuation of
the peninsula, part of this division had been re-
mounted. The 5th Mounted Brigade had taken
part in the advance across Sinai, and other units
of the division had been employed in the campaign
against the Senussi, and in the Fayoum and other
parts of Egypt. Most of these scattered units had
been collected prior to the first battle of Gaza, and
organised into two divisions of four brigades each,
including a new brigade of Australian Light Horse
(the 4th) which had been formed, partly out of Light
Horsemen who had returned from Gallipoli, and
partly out of reinforcements from Australia. General
Allenby now remounted the remainder of the Yeo-
manry in Egypt, and formed out of them two new
brigades. The ten brigades thus available were
organised as a corps of three divisions : the Australian
and New Zealand (1st and 2nd A.L.H. Brigades
and the New Zealand Brigade), generally known as
the Anzac Mounted Division ; the Australian Mounted
Division (3rd and 4th A.L.H. and 5th Mounted
Brigades) ; and the Yeomanry Division (6th, 8th,
and 22nd Mounted Brigades). The corps reserve
consisted of the 7th Mounted Brigade, and the
Imperial Camel Corps Brigade, while the (Indian)
Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade ^ formed part of
the Army troops. Only the Yeomanry Division
and the 7th Mounted and Imperial Service Cavalry
Brigades were at this time armed with swords.
It was originally intended to call this force the
2nd Cavalry Corps, but General Chauvel, who was
appointed to command it, asked that the name of
the Desert Column might be perpetuated in that
^ Raised and equipped by some of the ruling princes of India.
THE OPPOSING ARMIES 9
of the new force. It was accordingly named the
Desert Mounted Corps. ^
The infantry of the Expeditionary Force, largely
augmented by troops in Egypt, was formed into two
corps of three divisions each, the 20th under Sir Philip
Chetwode, and the 21st commanded by Lieutenant-
General Bulfin, with one other infantry division.
The 20th Corps (10th, 53rd, and 74th Divisions, with
the 60th Division attached) was in the eastern sector
of our Hne, while the 21st Corps (53rd, 54th, and
75th Divisions) held the trenches opposite Gaza.^
The Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade was attached
to the 21st Corps during the operations. This bri-
gade had not yet seen any serious service, and its
fighting quahties were rather an unknown factor.
Later on in the campaign, however, all three regi-
ments distinguished themselves greatly, and estab-
lished a fine reputation for dash.
Our total forces numbered some 76,000 fighting
men, of whom about 20,000 were mounted, with
550 guns. The enemy troops opposed to us con-
sisted of nine Turkish divisions, organised in two
armies, the Vllth and Vlllth, and one cavalry
division, a total of about 49,000 fighting men, 3000
of whom were mounted, with 360 guns.^ Our
superiority in numbers, though considerable, thus
fell short of the Napoleonic minimum for the attack
of entrenched positions, but our large preponderance
of cavalry promised great results, if we could succeed
in driving the Turks out of their fortifications.
^ See Appendix i. a. ^ See Appendix i. b.
^ The Vllth Army was commanded by the German General Kress von
Kressenstein, and the Vlllth by Fevzi Pasha. The general staff of all the
enemy formations was in the hands of the Germans, All ranks of the fly-
ing corps, heavy artillery and motor transport corps, and the officers of the
engineer and supply services and of the railway administration were also
Germans. There were a few German and Austrian infantry battalions.
CHAPTER II
THE PLAN OF OPERATIONS
The Commander-in-Chief's plan was bold and simple,
and promised great results. It depended for its
success largely on the resolution and vigour with
which the first part of the plan, the attack of Beer-
sheba, was carried out. Owing to the waterless
nature of the country, this place had to be in our
hands within twenty-four hours from the commence-
ment of the operations. If it were not, the troops
would have to be withdrawn, owing to lack of
water, the attack abandoned, and the operations
commenced anew at some later date, against an
enemy forewarned of our plans, and with the prospect
of the winter rains putting a stop to our advance
before it had weU begun.
The operations as a whole divided themselves
naturally into three main parts, in each of which the
fighting would be of a totally different character.
First, the attack and capture of the enemy's entrenched
positions from Beersheba to the sea. This was pri-
marily an infantry operation. Secondly, the pursuit
of the enemy over the plain of Philistia, culminating
in the capture of Junction Station, and the conse-
quent isolation of any enemy force endeavouring
to cover Jerusalem. This was to be the cavalry's
opportunity. And lastly, the advance through the
Judaean hills, and the capture of the Holy City.
For obvious reasons only the first part of these
THE PLAN OF OPERATIONS 11
operations could be thought out in detail beforehand.
The plan for this phase was as follows : —
1. To seize Beersheba and the high ground to the
north and north-west of it, by a combined attack of
cavalry and infantry, thus throwing open the left
flank of the main enemy position at Hareira and
Sharia. After the fall of Beersheba the cavalry
would thus all be concentrated on the right flank of
our forces, ready to pursue the enemy when driven
from the remainder of his positions. The possession
of Beersheba would, it was hoped, give us the
necessary water to enable us to maintain our
cavalry on this flank till the conclusion of the second
phase of the attack.
2. To deliver the main infantry attack against the
enemy's open left flank at Hareira, and endeavour
to roll up his line from east to west.
3. In order to deceive the enemy up to the last
moment as to the real point of our main attack, to
pin him to his positions, and to draw reinforcements
away from his left flank, an attack, preceded by a
week's bombardment, was to be launched on the
Gaza defences twenty-four to forty-eight hours pre-
vious to 2.
As the attack on Beersheba necessitated a march
of some seventy miles on the part of the cavalry,
who were to attack from the east, and of about
twenty for the infantry, over unknown country, a
great deal of preliminary work was required. The
water supply had to be developed, tracks and the
crossing places of wadis improved and marked on the
maps, and the enemy positions south and west of
Beersheba most carefully reconnoitred. It was also
very desirable that all commanders should gain some
knowledge of the country over which they were to
lead their troops.
12 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
To these ends our line was organised as follows : —
A permanent position, strongly entrenched and
wired, was constructed from the sea at Gaza to
Shellal on the Wadi Ghuzze, and held by infantry.
From Shellal a lightly entrenched line extended to
El Gamli, and this was held by one cavalry division,
which also supplied the outposts and patrols in the
wide ' no man's land ' at this end of the line. A
second cavalry division was held in support in the
neighbourhood of Abasan el Kebir, and the third
was in reserve, resting, on the seashore near Tel el
Marrakeb. These divisions relieved one another
every month.
The cavalry divisions in the line and at Abasan
lived in bivouacs made of light, wooden hurdles,
covered with grass mats, and erected over rectangular
pits dug in the ground. These bivouac shelters gave
fair cover from the sun, and the pits afforded some
protection from enemy bombs. The division on the
seashore was accommodated in tents.
The two former divisions had to be ready at all
times to move out to battle at half an hour's notice,
and much of the training was directed towards
cutting down the time taken to turn out in ' marching
order.' The division in the line had plenty of work to
do, with daily outposts, extended patrol work, and
the long reconnaissances undertaken every fortnight,
so that the training was confined to the periods spent
at Abasan.
As the operations were to take place in the late
summer, and, it was hoped, would be concluded
before the winter rains set in, no great provision
against cold and wet was called for. Blankets and
greatcoats were, therefore, not to be carried. Each
man was provided with a pair of officers' pattern
saddle-wallets, in which he carried three days'
PRELIMINARY TRAINING 13
rations (including the iron ration) of bully beef,
biscuit, and groceries, besides the few articles of
clothing he was allowed to take. Two nose-bags on
each saddle carried 19 lb. of grain (two days' forage
on the marching scale). A third day's forage was
carried in Umbered G.S. wagons, three to each
regiment. The divisions were, therefore, self-
supporting for three days, without recourse to their
divisional trains. The latter, during the subsequent
operations, did not accompany their divisions, but
acted as carriers between them and the advanced
ration dumps estabhshed by the corps' lorry column
each day. One other L.G.S. wagon was allowed per
regiment for technical stores, cooking utensils, etc.
All entrenching tools were carried on pack animals.
In order to test the mobility of the troops, it was
the custom for each divisional commander, during the
period when his division was in the Abasan area, to
issue from time to time a surprise order for the troops
to turn out ready for operations, and rendezvous by
brigades or regiments in stated places, where they
were carefully inspected. These orders were generally
issued in the early morning, and, as no hint of them
was ever given beforehand, even to the Staff, they
constituted a real test of mobility. The time taken
by each unit to turn out was noted by Staff officers,
and the keenest rivalry sprang up between the
divisions and the different units of each division
to make the best showing. Ration and store wagons
were packed each night, nose-bags filled after the last
feed and tied on the saddles, and all harness and
saddlery laid out in order behind the horses. The
men's waUets were kept packed permanently, the
rations in them being renewed from time to time,
when the old ones were consumed. The record
ultimately went to one of the Horse Artillery
14 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
batteries, which turned out complete in full marching
order, with all its ammunition, rations, and stores
correct, in eleven minutes from the receipt of the
order.
About once a fortnight the cavalry division that
was in the line made a reconnaissance towards
Beersheba, the other two divisions closing up to
Shellal and Abasan respectively. Moving out in the
afternoon, the division would march all night, and
occupy a line of posts on the high ground west of
Beersheba by dawn next morning. Behind this
line of protecting posts the infantry corps and
divisional commanders, and innumerable lesser fry,
disported themselves in motor cars and on horseback.
The senior corps commander and his staff used to be
irreverently referred to as the ' Royal Party,' a
flippant term which may be excused by the tedium
and discomfort of the operations.
After seeing the last of the infantry commanders
safely away, the cavalry used to withdraw, and
march back to Shellal during the night. The recon-
naissances thus entailed two nights and a day of
almost continual movement and watchfulness, with-
out any sleep or rest, during which time it was not
uncommon for regiments to cover seventy miles or
more. Apart from the fatigue occasioned by thirty-
six hours of constant anxiety and hard work, the
absence of water caused severe hardship to the
horses and no little discomfort to their riders. No
water for horses was available from the afternoon
of the day on which the division moved out till the
evening of the following day, when, as a rule, they
got a drink at Esani on the way back to Shellal.
The men started with full bottles, and got one refill
from the regimental water-carts.
The day was made up of a series of petty annoy-
CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCES 15
ances. The scattered squadrons were invariably
bombed by the enemy, generally with effect, and the
Turks' light guns, brought out to concealed posi-
tions, from which they had previously registered all
the high ground, wadi crossings, etc., added to the
general discomfort by their continual, galling shell
fire. Many of the crossings in this part of the
country consisted of a narrow, stony cleft in the
rock sides of the wadi, down which troops could only
move in very narrow formation, often only in single
file. When, as sometimes happened, a whole brigade
of cavalry had to cross by one of these narrow drifts,
while the bed of the wadi was being swept by shrapnel
and high explosive shell the whole time, tempers
were apt to get short. We on our side could rarely
spare an aeroplane to observe for one of our own
batteries, and so were seldom able to locate the
hostile guns. The inability to reply effectively in-
creased the exasperation caused by their fire. Many
of the surrounding natives had been armed by the
Turks and stirred up against us, and, though they
never succeeded in causing us any casualties, their
hostility added to the general insecurity, and in-
creased the need for watchfulness.
For the rest, the country was a desert of blistering
rocks and stones, the temperature ranged up to
110 degrees in the shade (of which there was none
save that cast by the bodies of men and horses), and
the flies were innumerable and persistent. It was
with a sigh of heartfelt relief that the troops saw
the last of the motor cars of the ' Royal Parties '
disappear in a cloud of dust to the north-west, and
received the welcome order to withdraw and march
back to Shellal through the cool night.
There was, however, one never-failing amusement
to be got out of these reconnaissances. This came
16 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
on the following day, when we intercepted the
Turkish wireless communique on its way to the
Berhn press. These communiques never varied in
their description of the operations. ' The enemy
made a determined attack on Beersheba with about
seventy squadrons supported by artillery.' This
was the invariable formula. ' After heavy fighting,
the hostile forces were defeated and driven right
back to their original positions, having suffered
important losses ! ' One imagines that even the
simple Berliner must have become, at last, some-
what sceptical of these regular, fortnightly victories.
The result of this series of reconnaissances to the
west and south-west of Beersheba was that every
general officer who was to lead troops over this
area gained a very thorough knowledge of the
country, which was of the highest value in the
subsequent operations. The sappers attached to
the cavalry divisions also took advantage of the
reconnaissances to reconnoitre for water at Khalasa
and Asluj, where they subsequently repaired the
wells that had been destroyed by the Turks, and to
develop the supply at Esani in the Wadi Ghuzze.
They also improved and marked many of the wadi
crossings, and made route surveys of the whole
area.
Our line of communications, at this time, con-
sisted of a broad-gauge railway, which had been
laid by the Royal Engineers across the 130 miles
of desert from Kantara on the Suez Canal to Deir el
Belah, about eight miles south of Gaza. The rail-
head of this line had followed close behind the Desert
Column during its advance across Sinai. After the
occupation of El Arish, the doubling of the railway
track had been taken in hand, and, by the end of
September 1917, the double track extended as far
THE PREPARATIONS COMPLETED 17
as Deir el Belah. During September and October
a branch line was laid from this place to Shellal,
where it was carried over the Wadi Ghuzze, here
some 800 yards wide and sixty feet deep, on a
fine trestle bridge built by British and Australian
Sappers. Work was then continued towards Karm,
whence a narrow-gauge line was to be run out to
Beersheba, as soon as that place was in our hands.
In order to relieve the railway of some of its
heavy traffic, to enable it to bring up stores for the
' Big Push,' a sea-borne supply line from Port
Said to Deir el Belah was organised by the Royal
Navy during September. All the supplies for the
21st Corps, which held the coastal sector of our
line, were then carried by sea, and landed in surf
boats on the coast. The shipping, convoying, and
landing of stores were admirably carried out by the
Navy, under great difficulties.
Towards the end of October these long and careful
preparations were completed, and the troops began
to move unobtrusively to their concentration areas,
leaving their old camps standing, in order to deceive
enemy aircraft. So well were these large troop
movements concealed, that, up to the moment
when our attack was launched, the enemy believed
that we had six infantry divisions still in the Gaza
sector and only one in the eastern sector. This
apparent disposition of our troops confirmed him in
his mistaken opinion that our main attack would
be delivered against Gaza, and caused him to con-
centrate most of his available reserves behind the
western portion of his line, a fact which contributed
materially to our success in the subsequent opera-
tions.
CHAPTER III
THE FIRST ROUND
October the 31st was the date fixed for the capture
of Beersheba, which was to be the first phase of the
operations. The plan of attack was as follows : —
The 60th and 74th Divisions were to attack the
outer defences on the west and south-west, immedi-
ately after dawn, and, having captured them, were
to hold the high ground west of the town. The
53rd Division and the Camel Corps Brigade were
directed to protect the left flank of these operations.
Meanwhile the Anzac and the AustraUan Mounted
Divisions, starting respectively from Asluj andKhalasa,
were to march during the night, south of Beersheba,
right round the enemy flank, and attack the town
from the east, where the defences were known to be
less formidable. These two divisions thus had night
marches of twenty-five and thirty-five miles respec-
tively before reaching their fii'st objectives. The
7th Mounted Brigade, marching direct from Esani,
had the task of masking the strongly entrenched
hill of Ras Ghannam, which formed the southern
end of the enemy's outer defences, and of linking
up the Australian Mounted Division and the 20th
Corps. To the cavalry thus fell the task of seizing
the town of Beersheba itself.
It will be seen that, during the attack on Beer-
sheba, there would be a gap of some seventeen miles
between the 20th Corps on the right and the 21st
Corps in the coastal sector. Our railway ran right
18
Diagram UUcstrating Ike bcsUion, of ihoofii on the 3lst cf Oct. I9IJ.
20 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
up into this gap, the railhead at Kami being actually
in front of our line, and within eight miles of the
main enemy positions about Hareira.
To cover this gap, and to deal with any attempted
counter-attack against our railhead, the Yeomanry
Division was to concentrate at, and east of, Karm,
with the 10th Division in support about Shellal. The
action of the Commander-in-Chief in thus trusting
the guarding of this wide gap to so small a force is of
particular interest as indicating his readiness to accept
a considerable risk in order to achieve victory. It
also demonstrates his complete confidence in the
success of his efforts to deceive the enemy as to our
real intentions.
The fortifications of Beersheba consisted of two
lines of defensive positions. The outer line, heavily
entrenched and wired, ran in a semicircle along the
high ground north-west, west, and south-west of the
town, from the Gaza-Beersheba road to Ras Ghannam,
at an average distance of 7000 yards from the town.
On the north-east, east, and south-east the outer
defences were not continuous, but consisted of a
series of strong posts, chief of which were Tel el
Sakaty, Tel el Saba, and two stone block-houses on
the north bank of the Wadi Saba. The inner line
ran completely round the town itself, and on its
outskirts, crossing the Wadi Saba just south of the
railway bridge. It was believed, but not with any
great degree of certainty, that the portion of this
hne on the east of the town was not protected by wire.
Beersheba is situated on the east bank of the wadi,
at the north-western end of a flat, treeless plain,
about four miles long and three miles wide, completely
surrounded by ranges of tumbled, rocky hills. To
the north-east these hills rise gradually to join the
main Judaean range, along the backbone of which
Australian engineers developing the water supply at Esani
Cavalry country ! Near Beersheba.
THE EL BUGGAR OUTPOST LINE 21
runs the road to Jerusalem, through El Dhahariyeh,
Hebron, and Bethlehem.
On the evening of the 26th of October all prelimi-
nary arrangements for the attack were complete, and
the 20th Corps was concentrating about Shellal. The
Australian Mounted Division was in the line from
Shellal to Gamli, and held a line of outposts covering
the railway construction at Karm, from El Buggar,
through points 720 and 630, nearly to the Wadi
Sharia, a distance of about fourteen miles. This out-
post hne was manned by the 8th Mounted Brigade,
which had been lent for the purpose by the Yeo-
manry Division, and which came under the orders of
the 53rd Division at midnight on the 26th. The
Yeomanry Division was concentrated in the neigh-
bourhood of Hiseia and Shellal, the Anzac Division
was at Abasan el Kebir, and the Camel Brigade at
Shellal.
At dawn on the 27th, the centre of the thinly held
cavalry outpost Hne was suddenly attacked by an
enemy force of all arms, between 3000 and 4000
strong. The post on point 630 was driven in, but
the squadron of the Middlesex Yeomanry that formed
the garrison withdrew to a cruciform trench just
below the top of the hill, which had been cleverly
sited by the general staff of the Australian Mounted
Division. In this trench, though surrounded by the
enemy and repeatedly attacked, the little garrison
held out all day with the greatest gallantry, till
relieved by a brigade of the 53rd Division at half-past
four in the afternoon.
As soon as news of the enemy attack was received,
General Hodgson, realising that it was impossible for
the infantry to reach the outpost line in time to save
the situation, despatched the 3rd A.L.H. Brigade
and the Notts Battery R.H.A. to the aid of the
22 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
Yeomanry. Before they arrived on the scene, how-
ever, the small garrison on point 720 had been
subjected to a concentrated shell fire, and over-
whelmed by a combined mounted and dismounted
attack. This was the first and last time that the
Turkish cavalry screwed themselves up to the point
of a charge. One of the only three survivors of the
garrison estimated that about seventy saddles were
emptied, but the Turks rode on like men, and galloped
right over the post.
The reserve regiment of the 8th Brigade held the
line till the arrival of the Australians, and frustrated
the enemy's attempt to break through the gap
between points 630 and 720. The enemy withdrew
at dusk, and our troops reoccupied the position.
From the large force employed by the Turks in this
operation, it appears probable that they had intended
to hold the 630-720 ridge permanently, if they suc-
ceeded in capturing it. The ridge commanded a full
view of all the country lying between it and the
Wadi Ghuzze, and, at the same time, concealed this
bit of country from direct observation from the
Turkish positions farther east.
The Anzac Mounted Division moved out from
Abasan el Kebir on the evening of the 27 th, and
reached Khalasa early next morning, where it
remained during the day.
The bombardment of Gaza commenced on this
day, and continued with gradually growing intensity
till the morning of the 2nd of November, when the
outer defences of the town were captured by the
21st Corps.
On the 28th of October the 53rd Division relieved
the Australian Mounted Division on the El Buggar
outpost line, the 8th Mounted Brigade rejoined the
Yeomanry Division, and the Australian Mounted
THE APPROACH MARCHES 23
Division moved out at dusk and marched to Khalasa,
arriving early on the morning of the 29th. The
Anzac Division marched the same night from Khalasa
to Asluj. The two divisions rested at these places
during the 29th and 30th, in preparation for the
strenuous work ahead of them. During these two
days the 60th Division marched from the Shellal
area to Bir el Esani, the advanced brigade pushing on
to a point near Ma el Mallaka. One brigade of the
74th Division moved forward to fill the gap between
the 53rd and 60th Divisions, and the 10th Division
concentrated near Shellal.
Soon after dark on the night of the 30th the troops
left their bivouacs, and commenced to move silently
on the unconscious enemy. The Anzac Mounted
Division, in the lead, was to send one brigade, via
Bir el Arara, against Bir el Hammam and Bir Salim
Abu Irgeig, the first objectives, the remainder of the
division marching via the Wadi el Shreikiye, Gebel
el Shegeib, and Iswaiwin to attack Tel el Sakaty and
Tel el Saba, and then close in on Beersheba.
The Australian Mounted Division, following the
Anzac Division along the Wadi el Shreikiye, was to
halt at a point a Httle north of Iswaiwin, and be
prepared to act either northwards, in support of the
Anzac Division, or westwards towards Beersheba, as
might be required. The 7th Mounted Brigade was
ordered to march from Esani, via Itweil el Semin,
against Ras Ghannam.
The leading of the troops, never an easy matter at
night, was rendered more troublesome by the fact
that the country beyond Asluj was quite unknown to
us, and was, besides, of a most difficult and intricate
nature. Maps, though accurate in the main, were
lacking in detail, and the employment of native guides
was too risky an experiment to be contemplated.
24 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
However, favoured by a bright moon, which rose
soon after dark, the marches were accomphshed
without mishap, and the Anzac Mounted Division
secured its first objectives without serious opposition
about eight o'clock. The 2nd A.L.H. Brigade was
now directed on Tel el Sakaty, and the New Zealanders
on Tel el Saba, the 1st A.L.H. Brigade following in
reserve.
The Headquarters of the Australian Mounted
Division reached the high hill of Khashim Zanna
about ten o'clock, and looked down upon the plain
of Beersheba and the picturesque little town, which
had to be in our hands by nightfall at all costs.
Shells from the guns of the 60th Division were bursting
all along the ridge beyond the town, and, away to the
right, the rattle of machine-gun fire told where the
Anzac Mounted Division was engaged at Tel el
Sakaty. Patrols from the Australian Mounted Divi-
sion were pushed out to the west to reconnoitre the
approaches to Beersheba, south of the Wadi Saba.
Meanwhile the 7th Mounted Brigade dismounted,
and, scrambling up the rocky steeps of Ras Ghannam,
was meeting with strong opposition from the well-
entrenched Turks on the top of the hill.
The enemy resistance soon began to increase con-
siderably, and the Anzac Division made but slow
progress across the bare open plain. The entrenched
hill of Tel el Sakaty was captured by the 2nd A.L.H.
Brigade about one o'clock, after a stiff fight, and half
an hour later this brigade got across the Jerusalem
road.
Shortly before this, a patrol of the Australian
Mounted Division had smartly rounded up and
captured a Turkish officer with a small escort. He
turned out to be the personal aide-de-camp of
Ismet Bey, the commander of the Beersheba garrison.
SUCCESS OF OUR INFANTRY 25
It appeared that Ismet had been sitting in his battle
headquarters, on a hill west of the town, since early-
morning, watching with complete equanimity the
attack of our infantry, which he believed to consist
of only one division. About eleven o'clock, happen-
ing to turn his head, he received a distinct shock on
seeing the plain behind him covered with cavalry.
He at once sent his staff officer off ventre a ierre to
find out if the cavalry intended to attack, or were
only making a demonstration. The officer received
full information on this point, but, as he was not in a
position to take it back to his chief, the latter became
uneasy, and shortly afterwards appears to have lost
his head completely, for he proceeded to fling all
his reserves into the fight on the west, before the
battle was well begun.
By half-past one our infantry had captured all
their objectives west of the town, and commenced
to consolidate on the positions won. From the
Cavalry Corps headquarters the enemy troops could
be seen retiring in an orderly manner into Beer-
sheba.
The headquarters of the two cavalry divisions were
at this time with corps headquarters, on Khashim
Zanna, which was the highest hill for miles around.
After a fight but satisfactory lunch, the three head-
quarters Staffs sat down in a long line on the very
top of the hill, with maps and field-glasses, to watch
the ' manoeuvres ' in the plain below. Observing
the irresistible target thus presented to the enemy
artillery, the gunnery staffs of the two divisions,
moved by a common impulse, faded silently into
the comparative safety of the open plain. Immedi-
ately afterwards a salvo of high-velocity shells
landed right on top of the hill, scattering maps,
field-glasses, and staff officers Hke chaff before the
26 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
wind ! Fortunately, no one was hurt, but for the
rest of the day the staff treated the enemy gunners,
always good, with the respect due to them.
Meanwhile the advance of the cavalry across the
plain di-agged slowly on. The countrj'^ was flat
and open, and there were no trees or scrub to afford
cover even to dismounted men. The whole plain
was swept by the fire of numerous machine guns
and field guns concealed in the town of Beersheba,
along the banks of the Wadi Saba, in the two block-
houses on the north bank of the wadi, and on the
strongly entrenched hill of Tel el Saba. From the
last-named position any advance across the plain
was enfiladed, and it was clear that this hill would
have to be taken before any further progress could
be made.
The New Zealand Brigade had worked along the
dry bed of the Wadi Saba for some distance, and
then, leaving the horses under cover, advanced to
attack the position on foot. The hill is steep and
rugged, and overlooks the bed of the wadi for some
400 yards to the east, where it makes a sharp bend.
The New Zealanders got as far as this bend,
but could make no farther progress, as every part
of the confined river bed in front of them was swept
by rifle and machine-gun fire. One regiment got
out of the wadi on the north side, and made a detour
to try and take the hill in rear, but could make little
headway over the exposed ground, in face of the
heavy enemy fire. About the same time the 3rd
A.L.H. Brigade and two batteries from the Australian
Mounted Division were pushed in to assist the attack
from the south.
The day was now far gone, and the advance
seemed to be at a standstill. General Chaytor then
put in his reserve brigade (the 1st), to co-operate
THE ATTACK OF TEL EL SABA 27
in the attack on Tel el Saba from the south. General
Cox, commanding the brigade, directed the 2nd
A.L.H. Regiment on the two block-houses, and the
3rd on Tel el Saba. From the shelter of a small
wadi, some three miles south of the hill, the two
regimental commanders scrutinised the open plain
in front of them in an effort to find some covered
way of approach. None could be found, so the
two commanders determined to make a dash for it
mounted, and get as near as possible before dis-
mounting to continue the attack on foot.
Deploying from the wadi, the two regiments
swung out into line of troop columns at wide inter-
val, and galloped forward over the open plain in full
view of the enemy. Several Turkish batteries at
once opened fire on them, but they were advanc-
ing so fast that the enemy gunners seemed to be
unable to get the range, and but little damage was
caused by their fire. It was not, indeed, till the
regiments came under machine-gun fire that casu-
alties began to occur, and, even then, our loss was
slight, probably owing to the comparatively steep
angle of descent of machine-gun bullets at long
ranges, and to the difficulty of finding and keeping
the range. At 1500 yards from the position, the}'
rode into a convenient depression, and here they
dismounted and continued the advance on foot.
There was no cover of any sort, and their approach
from this point was necessarily slow, in face of
the heavy fire which they encountered. Now that
they were on foot, and moving slowly, they began
to suffer severely, whereas they had advanced
mounted for over two miles with scarcely any
casualties. An intense fire fight developed, as the
two brigades closed gradually in on the enemy.
Our little thirteen-pounder Horse Artillery guns,
28 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
though pushed up boldly to close range, could make
little impression on the well-built enemy trenches
and machine-gun emplacements on Tel el Saba, and
none at all on the thick stone walls of the block-
houses. They did good service, however, in keeping
down the hostile fire.
About two o'clock, the 2nd A.L.H. Regiment
reached and stormed the block-houses, and, from
the captured positions, poured a heavy fire into
the flank of Tel el Saba. This caused some slacken-
ing of the enemy's fire, of which the New Zealanders
took prompt advantage. With a sudden, tremen-
dous rush, they charged down the bed of the wadi,
up the steep sides of the hill, and into the position,
almost before the Turks were aware of the attack.
A few minutes' sharp bayonet fighting completed
the capture of the hill, with about 120 prisoners
and a large number of machine guns. This success
removed the last obstacle to our advance on Beer-
sheba, but the town itself still held out, and there
was a wide space of open ground still to be crossed
before it could be assaulted.
Orders were issued at once for the whole of the
two divisions, less the 5th Mounted Brigade, to ad-
vance mounted, and endeavour to get close enough
to the town to make a dismounted attack before
darkness fell. This order reached the 4th A.L.H.
Brigade, which had not yet been in action, at half-
past four. It was then waiting at the south-eastern
edge of the plain, fully three miles from Beersheba,
and, as sunset was due at five o'clock, there was
no time to be lost.
Making up his mind instantly. General Grant,
commanding the brigade, collected the two regiments
he had with him, the third being engaged in recon-
naissance work, and moved rapidly forward to the
CHARGE OF THE 4TH A.L.H. BRIGADE 29
shelter of some dead ground about 3000 yards from
the enemy trenches south-east of the town. Having
sent a message to the two nearest batteries of the
division, ' A ' Battery H.A.C. and the Notts Battery
R.H.A., to be ready to support his attack, he ordered
a charge. The two batteries at once hmbered up,
and, moving rapidly forward, galloped into action in
the open, at a range of about 2500 yards, and opened
a heavy fire on the Turkish trenches and field guns
in front, and on a nest of machine guns to the left
front.
As soon as the batteries were in action, General
Grant's two regiments swept out into the open, in
column of squadrons in line, and galloped straight
at the Turkish trenches.
Seen from the rising ground on which our guns were
in action, it was a most inspiriting sight. It was
growing dark, and the enemy trenches were outlined
in fire by the flashes of their rifles. Beyond, and a
little above them, blazed the bigger, deeper flashes of
their field guns, and our own shells burst like a row
of red stars over the Turkish positions. In front the
long fines of cavalry swept forward at racing speed,
half obscured in clouds of reddish dust. Amid the
deafening noise all around, they seemed to move
silently, like some splendid, swift machine. Over
the Turks they went, leaping the two lines of deep
trenches, and, dismounting on the farther side,
flung themselves into the trenches with the bayonet. ^
The whole position was in our hands in ten minutes,
and was consolidated immediately.
It was now quite dark, so General Grant collected
his squadrons together, attended to casualties, and
rounded up his prisoners. Then, leaving a guard
^ They had charged with bayonets drawn and extended in front of
them like swords.
30 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
with the prisoners, and remounting the remainder of
his men, he sent them at a gallop into the town itself.
Through the streets they raced in the darkness,
riding down all opposition, and so hustling the
Turks that they never had a chance to rally. Before
six o'clock the town, with 1200 prisoners and 14 guns,
was in our hands. Ismet Bey escaped in a motor-car
ten minutes before the final charge.
In the interval between the capture of the trenches
and the charge into the town, the enemy had begun
to blow up the wells and ammunition depots. Huge,
mushroom-shaped columns of violet flame and smoke
shot up here and there, accompanied by sullen, heavy
explosions. Shortly afterwards, the main store and
some of the railway station buildings were set on fire,
and the flames from these burning buildings lighted
up the whole town, and, as it happened, materially
assisted our troops in their task of handling the
prisoners. These proved surly and rather truculent,
and two incidents which occurred during the early
part of the night warned us that it would be well to
get them away as soon as possible. As a body of
prisoners was being marched out of the town to a
piece of open ground on the east side, where they
were being collected and counted, some of them
suddenly halted and fired several Verey lights into
the air, evidently with the intention of signalling
to their comrades in the north. Shortly afterwards
another party of them made a sudden and determined
rush for one of the captured guns, and several had
to be shot down before the rush was stopped. The
attitude of these prisoners was in marked contrast
to that of most of the Turks whom we captured, who
generally accepted their fate stoically, if not with
satisfaction. They seemed to resent the charge
extremely, and there is no doubt that they were
CAPTURE OF BEERSHEBA 31
expecting to be able to retire quietly along the
Gaza-Beersheba road during the night, when the
sudden dash of the Australians surprised them.
Including those taken by our infantry, about 2000
prisoners were captured at Beersheba, and over 500
Turkish corpses were buried on the battle-field. The
casualties in the two regiments of the 4th Brigade,
32 killed and 32 wounded, may be considered re-
markably light, in view of the strength of the enemy.
General Grant's action forms a notable landmark
in the history of cavalry, in that it initiated that
spirit of dash which thereafter dominated the whole
campaign. When he received the orders for the
attack, he had to consider that the enemy was known
to be in strength, well posted in trenches, and
adequately supplied with guns and machine guns.
In order to reach the town itself, it would be necessary
to cross the Wadi Saba, of unknown depth, and,
possibly, with precipitous banks. The character of
the intervening country was known only in so far as
it had been revealed by field-glasses. It was not even
certain that there was no wire in front of the enemy's
position. On the other hand, the town had to be in
our hands before nightfall, or the whole plan failed.
He weighed the chances, and made up his mind
instantly to risk all in a charge, and the success he
achieved surprised even the most ardent votaries
of the white arm.
The remainder of the Australian Mounted Division
moved into Beersheba during the night, leaving the
3rd Brigade to assist the Anzac Division in holding
an outpost line north and north-east of the town,
from Bir el Hammam to the Gaza-Beersheba road.
The 7th Mounted Brigade, which had had a day of
desultory fighting, joined the division in the town
early next morning.
32 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
With the capture of Beersheba, the fii'st phase of
the operations had ended satisfactorily, and, as the
earher reports from the town as to the water supply
were favourable, it was decided to commence phase
two, the attack on Gaza, on the night of the 1st of
November. The attack was launched at 11 p.m.,
and stubborn fighting continued all night. By half-
past six on the morning of the 2nd, the whole of the
front line and support trenches, from ' Umbrella '
Hill, about the middle of the system, to Sheikh
Hassan on the sea coast, were in our hands. Sheikh
Hassan was some distance behind the enemy's front
line, and its capture therefore threatened his right
flank. The positions won were consolidated, and no
further advance was attempted, as it was considered
that the object of the attack, which was to deceive
the enemy and to retain his reserves in the coastal
sector, had been fully secured.
Preparations were at once commenced for phase
three, the main attack on the enemy's exposed left
flank about Sharia and Hareira. For this purpose
the 53rd Division made a long march on the 1st, and
occupied a line from Toweil Abu Jerwal to Khurbet el
Muweileh, with the Camel Brigade on its right. The
Anzac Mounted Division, prolonging this line from
Abu Jerwal to the Hebron road about Bir el Makruneh,
met with more opposition than had been expected,
the reason for which was to become apparent in the
course of the next few days. The division captured
about 200 prisoners and a number of machine guns
during the day.
Reports sent back from this area indicated such
a lack of water that it was clear that no more than
one cavalry division could be maintained there.
Accordingly the Australian Mounted Division was
ordered to remain in Beersheba, in general reserve,
DESCRIPTION OF BEERSHEBA 33
and was directed to endeavour to improve the water
supply there. There were a few surface pools in
the Wadi Saba, the result of a thunderstorm that
had broken a few days previously, but these were
already rapidly drying up. Of the seven good wells
in the town, five had been blown up by the Turks
on the night of the 31st, and the remaining two had
been prepared for demoHtion, but the charges had
not been fired. Our sappers were left in splendid
isolation, as they gingerly probed the debris round
these wells, and eventually located the charges and
safely removed them.
The enemy had evidently intended, in the event
of his having to abandon Beersheba, to leave nothing
but ruins behind him, for the whole place was a
nest of explosive charges, ' booby traps ' and trip
wires. By a fortunate chance the German engineer
who was responsible for the destruction of the town
was away on leave in Jerusalem at the time of its
capture. Consequently most of these trip wires
were not yet attached to their detonators. A few,
however, had been connected up before the town
was taken. The writer came across one such, while
making a rapid artillery reconnaissance round the
town at daybreak on the 1st of November. Luckily
it was noticed before the party rode over it, and,
on being cut and followed to its source, was found
to be connected to a detonator concealed in twenty
cases of gelignite in the railway station, — enough to
have laid the whole town in ruins.
Large numbers of hand grenades had been con-
cealed in stores of grain and food in different parts
of the town, and there were one or two accidents
at first among parties of too eager explorers. Sir
Philip Chetwode, commander of the 20th Corps,
moved his headquarters into Beersheba a day|;^or
34 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
two later, and occupied the house of the enemy
commander. On examining the building before he
moved in, our sappers found it packed from cellar
to garret with cases of explosives, all connected to
trip wires.
This house was one of the fine stone buildings, of
which there were a number, surrounding a large
public garden, and which had been built by the
Germans during the war. The whole of this modern
portion of the town appeared to have been built
for propaganda purposes, or like the cities of lath
and plaster which are run up in a few days for cine-
matograph productions. From time to time articles
on the war in the East appeared in the German
papers, generally synchronising with some reverse
on the Western Front. In these articles, which
were lavishly illustrated, Beersheba figured under
headings such as ' the Queen City of the Prairies.'
Apparently, in order to supply the necessary pictures,
the Germans had laid out a large public garden,
and built around it a series of imposing public build-
ings, including a Governor's house. Government
offices, hospital, barracks, mosque, and even an
hotel. The surrounding country abounds in a species
of hard white limestone admirably suited for build-
ing, and all the houses were built of this and roofed
with red tiles. They were ranged round the square,
like four rows of stiff white soldiers with red helmets,
and were so sited that any number of photographs
could be taken from various positions, each showing
a different view, and each hiding the real town be-
hind the brand new German architecture. But once
behind these houses, a shocking contrast met the
eye. Here was the real Beersheba, a miserable
collection of filthy mud hovels, huddled shrinkingly
together as though trying to hide their shabbiness
DESCRIPTION OF BEERSHEBA 35
from their gorgeous neighbours. The place, in the
centre was conspicuously labelled ' Bier Garten,'
and was laid out with a number of little paths in an
exact, geometrical pattern. The flower-beds sup-
ported a few dusty shrubs and a quantity of those
hideous ' everlastings ' so dear to the Teuton heart.
All the buildings were laid out exactly facing the
four points of the compass, except the mosque,
which, in deference to Moslem prejudices, had been
built with its mihrah turned towards Mecca, and
consequently was lamentably askew. The Huns
had taken their revenge, however, by garnishing
the windows with German stained glass of an ugli-
ness so startling that the Australians vowed their
horses shied at it !
The railway, built by the German engineer,
Meissner Pasha, of Baghdad Railway fame, was an
admirable piece of work, metalled throughout, and
carried over the numerous wadis on fine, arched
bridges of dressed stone. The bridge over the Wadi
Saba was upwards of 400 yards long. One wonders
who paid for all the work.
While we were in occupation of Beersheba, some
one in the Intelligence Branch of the staff con-
ceived the brilliant idea of trying to impress the
local Arabs, some of whom were hostile to us, with
the majesty and power of the British Empire.
Accordingly, after a good deal of trouble, a few of
the neighbouring sheikhs were induced to come into
the town, and were escorted round by an officer
who spoke Arabic. They were shown first a regi-
ment of cavalry, which left them cold, as the horses
appeared clumsy to them in comparison with their
own little Arabs. Then lines of marching infantry
were pointed out to them, and field guns, and more
cavalry, and motor lorries. All to no purpose.
36 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
An occasional grunt and a half concealed yawn
were all the response the perspuing officer received.
When a sixty-pounder gun, drawn by a ' caterpillar '
motor tractor, hove in sight, they showed some
signs of uneasiness, and eyed this new form of devil
carriage with profound distrust. But when they
found that it could only move at a walking pace,
they became reassured and lost all interest in it.
The hard-working staff officer was in despair, when,
towards evening, the first ration convoy of camels
arrived. We had at that time about 30,000 camels
in the force, and they were in magnificent condi-
tion — big, strong beasts, covered with muscle, and
free from the blemishes which so disfigure the desert
Arabs' animals.
Here was something the sheikhs could understand.
They watched the camels winding into the town,
line after line, hundred after hundred, and their
eyes grew round with wonder. The first eager
talk died away to an astonished silence. When
all the convoy, about 1000 strong, was in, and
barracked in an open space, the natives turned to
the officer with a volley of questions. Seeing the
impression made, he told them, in an off-hand
manner, that the British had more than twenty
times that number with their army. The sheikhs'
looks politely conveyed the message that they
considered him a liar. Determined to strike while
the iron was hot, he bundled them all into a couple
of motor cars, after some signs of panic on their
part, and ran them across to Shellal, where in truth
they saw more camels than they had ever dreamed
of. They spent all the afternoon visiting the camps
of the Camel Transport Corps, and watching the
departure of laden convoys and the return of empty
ones. In the evening they mounted their horses
Beersheba. From an enemy photograph taken before the completion
of the new German buildings.
Arrival of the first enemy train in Beersheba. Meissner Pasha in white helmet
and gaiters. The inscription on the coach means " Stamboul to Cairo."
(From an enemy photograph)
ARABS AND THE C.T.C. 37
again, and rode off into the darkness to rejoin their
own people. But before they left, the chief among
them, acting as spokesman for all, told our staff
officer that they were now quite convinced that
the Ingilizi were certainly the greatest tribe in the
world, and that they would advise their young
men to keep on friendly terms with us and help us
in every way. They were as good as their word,
and we had no more trouble from hostile Arabs.
S1'49t>
CHAPTER IV
THE DECISIVE BATTLE
The next five days were occupied in securing the
necessary concentration of troops for the main attack
on Sharia and Hareira, and in developing the scanty
water supply, and organising water convoys to enable
these troops to subsist in the barren country in which
they were to operate.
The Anzac Division, pushing northwards on the
2nd, astride the Hebron road and on the right of
the 53rd Division, encountered increasing resist-
ance, and made but slow progress. Very hard fighting
continued during the 3rd, 4th, and 5th, in the course
of which it became clear that the enemy had con-
centrated practically the whole of his available
reserves in this area. The 19th Turkish Division,
the remains of the 27th (the late garrison of Beer-
sheba), and part of the 16th Division, together with
the whole of the 3rd Cavalry Division, were iden-
tified in this fighting round Ain Kohleh and Tel
Khuweilfeh.
In thus throwing the whole of their available
reserves against our extreme right flank, the Turks
were committed to a bold but dangerous course.
It was evident that they hoped to compel the British
Commander-in-Chief to detach part of his force to
meet this counter-attack. Had they succeeded in
involving any considerable portion of our army in
the difficult, waterless country around Tel Khu-
weilfeh, it is probable that our main force would have
ENEMY THRUST ON THE EAST 39
been so weakened as to be unable to attack the
Sharia and Hareira positions with any chance of
success. Such a failure might well have brought
the whole of our offensive to a standstill, and enabled
the Turks to estabhsh themselves on a new line
from Sharia to the Hebron road.
On the other hand, should we succeed in holding
the enemy's counterstroke without having to weaken
our main striking force, he ran the risk of finding
his reserves immobilised at the critical moment,
and thus prevented from rendering any assistance
to the garrisons of Sharia and Hareira when those
places were attacked. This, in fact, was exactly
what happened. General Allenby refused to be
drawn to the east, and, relying on the Anzac and
53rd Divisions to hold the enemy in check at Tel
Khuweilfeh, proceeded resolutely with his prepara-
tions for the assault on the left flank of the main
Turkish position.
On the 2nd of November the 3rd A.L.H. Brigade,
less one regiment, rejoined the Australian Mounted
Division, and the 5th and 7th Mounted Brigades
were attached to the Anzac Division. The 5th
Brigade remained in Beersheba, but the 7th joined
the Anzac Division, and had a stiff day's fighting,
culminating in the seizing of the hill of Ras el Nukb,
near Tel Khuweilfeh, to which the enemy attached
great importance, and which he defended most stub-
bornly. The brigade withdrew from Ras el Nukb
at nightfall, as it was too much in advance of
our general line to be held during the night. The
Anzac Division occupied a line from about Bir el
Nettar to Deir el Hawa, and thence south-west to
EJiurbet el Likiye, whence the Camel Corps Brigade
carried on the line to the right of the 53rd Divi-
sion near Toweil Abu Jerwal.
40 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
Next day the 53rd Division attacked the heights
of Tel Khuweilfeh, but met with strong resistance
from the enemy, and by evening had gained only
a precarious footing on the south-western spur of
the hill. The cavalry were engaged throughout the
day on the right of the 53rd, towards Dhahariyeh
and east of Tel Khuweilfeh.
The fighting continued day and night during the
4th and 5th. As the time passed, and our prepara-
tions for the main attack neared completion, the
enemy, who must by this time have realised our
intention, flung his reserves more and more reck-
lessly against our weak right flank, in a desperate
endeavour to drive it in. He completely failed in
his effort, and our troops, after three days and
nights of incessant flghting, short of food and water,
and, at one time, perilously short of ammunition,
not only held their own, but drove back the Turks
inch by inch, and at last, on the morning of Novem-
ber 6th, the 53rd Division captured the ridge of
Tel Khuweilfeh. One magnificent counter-attack the
enemy made, which drove our men off the ridge
again, but it was a last despairing effort. His ex-
hausted troops were quickly dislodged from the
position, and the ridge remained in our hands.
The fine fighting and grim endurance of the 53rd
and the Anzac Mounted Divisions during these three
days played a vital part in the success of the subse-
quent operations, by engaging the enemy's principal
reserves and defeating his counterstroke, thus per-
mitting our concentration for the main attack to
proceed unhindered. The cavalry had an especially
hard time. The country was quite unsuited for
mounted work, and so all their fighting was done
on foot. But it was necessary to keep their horses
always near them in order to be in a position to
WATER DIFFICULTIES 41
pursue the enemy at once, should he give way and
endeavour to withdraw. Water was very scarce,
and the few known wells were quite inadequate
for the requirements of the division.
When our troops had first entered this region
there were a number of pools in the wadis, left by
the thunderstorm which had broken a few days
before the operations began, but these rapidly dried
up, and, by the morning of the 5th of November,
had finally given out. The horses then had to be
sent back to Beersheba to water. From theDhaha-
ri3^eh area to Beersheba and back again is twenty-
eight miles, and a record of the movements between
these two places from the 3rd to the 6th of November
will give some idea of the extra work entailed on
horses and men by the lack of water.
On the 3rd of November the 1st Brigade was
relieved by the 5th, and marched back to Beersheba
to water, their horses having then been thirty hours
without a drink. On the 4th the New Zealanders
relieved the 5th Brigade at Ras el Nukb for the
same purpose. This brigade had also been thirty
hours without water. On the 5th the New Zealanders
remained at Has el Nukb, since there was no brigade
available to relieve them, but sent all their horses
back to Beersheba during the night. They had
then been un watered for forty- eight hours. On the
6th it was the turn of the 2nd Brigade to make the
weary pilgrimage to Abraham's Well.
Thus the horses of each of these brigades had only
one really good drink during the four days they
were in this area. Some of them, it is true, picked
up a Httle water here and there, generally at night.
Indeed many units of the division spent every night
in a search for water that too often proved fruitless,
and only added to the fatigue of men and horses.
42 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
The 7th Brigade found enough water on the east
of the line to eke out a bare existence for its horses.
During all this period the cavalry were continually
engaged with the enemy, and some of the fighting
was severe. The Turks assaulted Ras el Nukb re-
peatedly on the 3rd, 4th, and 5th of November.
This hill was held in turn by the 7th Brigade, which
had captured it in the first instance, the 1st, 5th
and New Zealand Brigades, and each of these had
to withstand one or more attacks.
By the evening of the 5th of November the 20th
Corps was in readiness for the assault on the Sharia-
Hareira positions, which was to complete the defeat
of the Turks.
The situation was now slightly different from
what had been expected. The action of the enemy
in counter-attacking against our right flank had
resulted in prolonging his line to the east. The
coming operations, therefore, consisted in an attempt
to pierce his line at Sharia, instead of an attack
against his left flank, as had been anticipated. In
order to secure the troops engaged in this attempt
from molestation by the considerable body of enemy
about El Dhahariyeh, a force, known as Barrow's
Detachment,^ was formed to protect our right flank.
This force consisted of the 53rd Division, the New
Zealand Mounted Brigade, and the Camel Corps
Brigade, with the Yeomanry Division, which crossed
over to the right of our line on the night of the
4th to join the detachment. All the horses of this
division had to be sent back to Beersheba, fifteen
miles away, to water. The Australian Mounted
Division had left Beersheba on the 4th, having
nearly exhausted all the water there, and moved to
^ From its commander, jVIaj or- General Sir G. de S. Barrow, G.O.C. of
the Yeomanry Division.
THE ATTACK ON HAREIRA 43
Karm, taking up a line of observation from the Wadi
Hanafish to Hiseia.
There was now a gap some twelve miles wide
between the 21st Corps at Gaza and the 20th Corps
opposite Sharia, and it was possible, though not
very probable, that the enemy might attempt to
throw his cavalry through this gap in an endeavour
to raid our communications. It was part of the
task of the Australian Mounted Division to frus-
trate any such attempt.
At dawn on the 6th November the 10th, 60th,
and 74th Divisions attacked the south-eastern portion
of the Hareira defences, known as the Kauwukah
and Rushdi systems. The 74th, after some of the
hardest fighting of a day of hard fighting, succeeded
in capturing all its objectives by half -past one. The
10th and 60th Divisions, which were attacking on
the left of the 74th, had farther to go, and the heavy
wire of the main Kauwukah position had to be
methodically cut before the attack could be launched.
To reach its objectives, the 10th (Irish) Division
had to cross a perfectly flat, open plain, two miles
wide, which was swept from end to end by the fiire
of enemy guns of all calibres, and by machine guns
and rifles. The advance of this grand division,
marching across the fire-swept plain as steadily as
though on parade, was a sight that will never be
forgotten by those who were privileged to see it.
By haK-past two in the afternoon both the 10th
and the 60th Divisions had penetrated the enemy
lines, and captured the whole of the Kauwukah
and Rushdi systems. The 60th Division reached
Sharia station, but was unable to cross the Wadi
Sharia to capture the hill of Tel el Sharia that night.
This hill, together with the main redoubts of Hareira,
remained, therefore, for the next day's task.
44 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
During the night the Austrahan Mounted Divi-
sion marched to a concealed position three miles
south-west of Sharia, in readiness for the expected
break-through. The 5th Mounted Brigade rej oined the
division here, and the 7th went into Corps Reserve.
The role of the cavalry during the next few days
was to sweep across the plain to the north-west, in
order to cut off or pursue the retiring enemy troops,
after they had been driven out of their positions
from Sharia to the sea. In pursuance of this role,
the Anzac and Australian Mounted Divisions were
ordered to push forward, as soon as the way was
clear, the Anzac Division, on the right of the move-
ment, being directed to keep well in advance, so as
to outflank any enemy opposition. The 60th Divi-
sion was to move in support of the cavalry on the
left flank, and the Australian Mounted Division, in
the centre, was to maintain touch with the Anzacs
and the 60th. The Yeomanry Division would remain,
at first, with the 53rd Division, to carry out a special
task.
Water for the cavalry horses was an essential
prehminary to the pursuit of the enemy. The
country north of Sharia was sparsely populated,
and the few wells to be found there were of great
depth and poor supply. The only water sources on
our front which were believed to be capable of
supplying the large number of horses we had were
at Bir Jemameh, where there was reported to be a
good well with a steam pumping plant, and at Tel
el Nejile and Huj. The Anzac Division was accord-
ingly directed on the two first-named places, and
the Australian Division on Huj. The former divi-
sion had only two brigades with it, having left the
New Zealand Brigade in the Jurat el Mikreh, under
the orders of the 53rd Division.
THE ATTACK ON HAREIRA 45
The attack of our infantry was resumed early on
the 7th, and the 10th Division stormed the Hareira
positions in the morning. The 60th Division secured
the hill of Tel el Sharia in the early afternoon, but
the enemy succeeded in withdrawing in good order
to a long ridge on the north side of and overlooking
the Wadi Sharia, where he held out all the after-
noon. The approach to this ridge was up a long,
bare slope, devoid of cover, and the enemy made full
use of his many machine guns and of his heavy
artillery.^
At four o'clock in the afternoon, the 4th A.L.H.
Brigade, supported by two batteries of the AustraUan
Mounted Division, was sent across the Wadi Sharia
dismounted, in order to cover the concentration of
the 60th Division for a final assault. When the
position was carried, just before dark, it took some
time to disengage this brigade, and the division was
consequently unable to move farther that night.
The 3rd A.L.H. and the 5th Mounted Brigades,
however, were sent round the right flank of the
60th Division, to endeavour to make a mounted
attack on the retreating enemy. They had to ride
two miles to the east, before a possible crossing place
over the wadi was found, and it was then too late
to do anything more. Two regiments of the 5th
Brigade did indeed draw swords, and canter out
into the open north of the wadi, but darkness fell
before they were able to close with the enemy.
The Anzac Mounted Division, more fortunate, had
been able to push through the gap formed in the
enemy's line, by the driving in of his inner left flank,
and advanced on its first objective, the station of
^ On one occasion, the Huns, with characteristic ferocity, deliberately
turned their heavy artillery on to a convoy of ambulance camels bearing
wounded out of the fight, and utterly destroyed it.
46 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
Umm el Ameidat on the Junction Station-Beer-
sheba line, where the enemy had a large supply and
ammunition depot. The 1st Brigade, in the lead,
moved forward in open formation over the plain,
being severely shelled by enemy guns from the west
and north-west.
About 11 A.M. the advanced troops were fired
at on approaching the station. The vanguard regi-
ment at once closed up and charged, capturing the
place after a sharp fight, with about 400 prisoners
and a great quantity of ammunition and stores.
Reconnaissances pushed out at once to the north
and east located a strong enemy rearguard in posi-
tion on the hill of Tel Abu Dilakh. The 2nd Brigade
was despatched to the assistance of the 1st, and the
two brigades attacked the hill dismounted. The
position was taken just before dark, after severe
fighting, but our troops were then heavily shelled
on the hill, and the Turkish rearguard only retired
a short distance to the ridges north of the position.
The division held a battle outpost fine for the night
from Abu Dilakh to a point about two miles east
of the railway.
Scouts of the 3rd A.L.H. Brigade succeeded in
gaining touch with the Anzac Division about Abu
Dilakh late at night. No water was obtainable for
the horses of either division.
There had been an extraordinary instance in the
morning of ' counting chickens before they are
hatched.' After the attack on Beersheba, the heavy
wagon echelons of the cavalry ammunition columns
had been withdrawn from their divisions, brigaded
together, and placed under the direct command of
the Corps. The intention was to direct this Corps
column each day on a pre-arranged place, and notify
its location to the divisional ammunition columns.
Om^
48 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
which could then send their Hght, Hmbered wagons
to that place to refill. The spot chosen for the
7th of November was Tel el Sharia, and the column
was directed to report there at 11 a.m. The order
was actually issued on the morning of the 6th, the
staff officer who gave it believing that the place
would be in our hands that night, whereas it was
not taken till the following afternoon. Accordingly,
about nine o'clock on the morning of the 7th, the
ammunition column was seen marching steadily
towards the enemy, to the admiration of the spec-
tators, and the no small consternation of the staff
officer who had given the order !
Fortunately the commander of the column noticed,
as he explained afterwards, that ' there seemed to be
something wrong at Tel el Sharia, so he thought he
had better go to ground with the column till he
could find out who the beggars on the hill really were.'
While the 20th Corps was thus occupied driving in
the enemy's left flank, the 21st Corps, in the coastal
area, was administering the coup de grace to Gaza.
The bombardment had been resumed on the 3rd,
and had continued for the following three days with
growing intensity. On the 5th and 6th the Navy
joined in the fight, and plastered the town with
shells of heavy cahbre. During the night of the
6th a series of attacks carried out by our infantry
on the enemy positions met with only half-hearted
resistance, and, when a general advance was made
on the morning of the 7th, it was found that the Turks
had retired during the night.
The Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade at once went
forward, riding through the ruins of Gaza, and
reached Beit Hanun, just south of the Wadi Hesi,
early in the afternoon. At the same time two
brigades of the 52nd Division made their way along
■Sit
Turkish Cavalry- near Shari;i.
(Friim an enemy photograph.)
A Turkish cavah-^' machine-gun hattery in action near Sharia.
(I'rom an enemy piiotograph.)
ENEMY'S RIGHT FLANK TURNED 49
the seashore under cover of the cliffs, and seized the
high ground north of the Wadi Hesi, in the face of
strong resistance from the enemy.
This rapid move of the 52nd Division was of the
greatest value to us. The Turks had constructed a
strong, defensive line just north of the wadi, and
liad evidently hoped, in the event of being driven
out of Gaza, to be able to rally on this line, and hold
up our farther advance. Some of our cavalry subse-
quently took prisoner the engineer officer who had
superintended the making of this line. He expressed
keen disappointment that the Turks had been driven
out of it before they had had time to settle down,
and declared that, had they got there a few hours
sooner, all our operations would have come to a
standstill. No doubt he was biassed in favour of
his own handiwork, but there is little doubt that the
Turks would, at the least, have been able to organise
their retreat, had they succeeded in holding this line
even for a short time. Now, however, driven out of
their last entrenched position, and with their forces
disorganised and split into two widely separated
groups, they were compelled to retreat over open
country, pursued by a vigorous and successful
enemy.
D
CHAPTER V
THE PURSUIT
On the morning of the 8th of November the pursuit
began. The enemy had made the best use of the
night to put such a distance between his troops and
ours that his rearguards were able to entrench hghtly,
and thus ofifered a stm'dy resistance to our advance all
day. He well knew that, if he could keep our cavalry
away from water for another 48 hours, they would
have to be withdrawn. Once free from the harassing
menace of the mounted troops, the Turks, who could
always outmarch our infantry, would have ex-
perienced little difficulty in retiring rapidly to the
north, aided by their two railways, and would have
had time to select and entrench a strong position in
the Judaean foothills, on which to bar our farther
advance.
The cavalry, supported by the 60th Division, were
ordered to continue their advance to the north-west,
and to push on with the utmost vigour, so as to
intercept the retirement of the Gaza garrison. The
Anzac Division was directed on Bureir, some twelve
miles north-east of Gaza, with the Australian Mounted
and 60th Divisions on the left, in echelon to the rear.
The country was open, rolling down-land, devoid of
trees or scrub, and dotted with prominent hills or
' tels.' The ground surface was hard, and the whole
terrain was admirably suited for cavalry work.
The Anzac Division moved off at dawn, with the
1st and 2nd Brigades in line covering a front of some
six miles, with centre about Abu Dilakh, and in touch
THE PURSUIT BEGINS 61
with the AustraHan Mounted Division on the left. The
7th Mounted Brigade, which had joined the division
from Corps Reserve early in the morning, marched in
support.
From the commencement of the advance, the
Turks resisted strongly. Having been retiring during
the two previous nights, and pressed by our cavalry
on the intervening day, they had not had any oppor-
tunity of organising a definite line of resistance, but
bodies of them, varying from a company to several
regiments, occupied every tel or other commanding
ground along the line of our advance, and held on
tenaciously.
About nine o'clock, in order to expedite the
advance, General Chaytor pushed up the 7th Brigade
between the other two, which were encountering
strong resistance. At eleven o'clock the enemy
counter-attacked strongly against the 2nd Brigade,
which was on the right of our line, near Tel el Nejile,
and held up its advance. The 7tli Brigade, in the
centre, continued to push on, and had nearly reached
Bir el Jemameh, about one o'clock, when it was
heavily attacked by a large force of the enemy
covering the water supply there. The brigade was
forced back, and its left flank was endangered, when
the 1st Brigade came up on the west, and drove
back the Turks. Following up their advantage, the
leading troops of this brigade fought their way into
Bir el Jemameh shortly after three o'clock, capturing
the steam pumpmg plant intact and complete, even
to the engineer in charge. This individual had been
left behind to blow up the plant, but instead remained
to work it for us with great docility.
A regiment of the 1st Brigade pushed out to the
north, and secured the high ground overlooking Bir el
Jemameh, and, under cover of this regiment, the
52 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
7th Brigade and the rest of the 1st were able to water
all their horses. The enemy fell back after dark,
and the 2nd Brigade occupied Tel el Nejile. Some
water was found here in the Wadi el Hesi, but it was
not possible to water the horses of the outpost troops.
The division established a night outpost line, pro-
tecting Nejile and Jemameh.
Meanwhile the Australian Mounted Division, on
the left of the Anzacs, and with the 60th Division
in its rear and a httle farther west, pushed slowly
after the retreating enemy, engaged in continuous,
isolated troop actions throughout the day, in the
course of which a number of enemy 'guns, particu-
larly heavy howitzers, were captured. The 3rd
A.L.H. Brigade especially distinguished itself in this
form of warfare. Troops of the brigade repeatedly
stalked enemy guns during the day, and then charged
them suddenly from the rear, killing the gun crews
and capturing the guns. It became a common-
place to find an enemy 5'9-inch howitzer in a hollow
in the ground, with the detachment dead around it,
and the words ' captured by the 3rd A.L.H. Brigade '
scrawled in chalk on the chase of the gun.
Early in the afternoon, a regiment of the 4th
A.L.H. Brigade was ordered to try and gain touch
with the right of the 21st Corps, which was out of
communication with our troops in the centre. All
the afternoon, the regiment rode hard over the
plain to the north-west, avoiding the enemy troops
where possible, brushing them aside when encoun-
tered, and succeeded in linking up with the Imperial
Service Cavalry Brigade about Beit Hanun before
nightfaU. It rejoined the division at Huj next day.
About 3 P.M., as the right flank of the 60th Divi-
sion was approaching Huj, it came suddenly under
a devastating fire at close range from several con-
YEOMANRY CHARGE AT HUJ 53
cealed batteries of enemy artillery, which, with two
battalions of infantry, were covering the withdrawal
of the Vlllth Army headquarters. The country was
rather like Salisbury Plain, rolling down-land without
any cover, and our troops suffered severely from the
murderous fire, Major-General Shea, commanding
the division, finding Colonel Gray-Cheape of the
Warwick Yeomanry close by him, requested him
to charge the enemy guns at once. Colonel Cheape
collected a few troops of his own regiment that he
had with him, and some of the Worcester Yeomanry,
and led them away to the right front. Taking
advantage of a shght rise in the ground to the east
of the enemy position, he succeeded in leading his
troops to within 800 yards of the Turkish guns
unseen. He then gave the order to charge, and
the ten troops galloped over the rise, and raced down
upon the flank of the enemy guns. The Turks had
in position a battery of field and one of mountain
guns, with four machine guns on a low hill between
the two batteries, and three heavy howitzers behind.
As our cavalry appeared, thundering over the
rise, the Turks sprang to their guns and swung
them round, firing point-blank into the charging
horsemen. The infantry, leaping on the limbers,
blazed away with their rifles till they were cut
down. There was no thought of surrender ; every
man stuck to his gun or rifle to the last. The lead-
ing troops of the cavalry dashed into the first enemy
battery. The following troops, swinging to the
right, took the three heavy howitzers almost in their
stride, leaving the guns silent, the gun crews dead
or dying, and galloped round the hill, to fall upon
the mountain battery from the rear, and cut the
Turkish gunners to pieces in a few minutes. The
third wave, passing the first battery, where a fierce
54 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
sabre v. bayonet fight was going on between our
cavalry and the enemy, raced up the slope at the
machine guns. Many saddles were emptied in that
few yards, but the charge was irresistible. In a few
minutes the enemy guns were silenced, their crews
killed, and the whole position was in our hands.
Most of the Turkish infantry escaped, as our
small force of cavalry was too scattered and cut up
by the charge to be able to pursue them, but few
of the enemy gunners lived to fight again. About
seventy of them were killed outright, and a very
large number were wounded.
This was the first time that our troops had ' got
home ' properly with the modern, cavalry thrust-
ing sword, and an examination of the enemy dead
afterwards proved what a fine weapon it is. Our
losses were heavy. Of the 170 odd who took part
in the charge, seventy-five were killed and wounded,
and all within a space of ten minutes. In this
charge, as in all others during the campaign, it was
noticeable how many more horses were killed than
men. Apart from the fact that a horse presents a
much bigger target than a man, it is probably that
infantry, and especially machine gunners, when
suddenly charged by cavalry, have a tendency to
fire ' into the brown,' where the target looks thickest,
which is about the middle of the horses' bodies,
thus dropping many horses but failing to kill their
riders. A man whose horse is brought down is,
however, by no means done with, as the Turks
learnt to their cost. In this, as in subsequent
charges, many a man whose horse had been shot
under him, extricated himself from his fallen mount,
and, seizing rifle and bayonet, rushed on into the fight.
It is sad to have to relate that the gaUant officer
who led this great charge, met his death subsequently,
MOUNTED ATTACK METHODS 55
not on the field of battle as he would have wished,
but in the Mediterranean, when the transport that
was taking him and his regiment to France for the
final act of the war, was torpedoed and sunk by an
enemy submarine.^
The action was of interest as an indication of what
may be accomplished, under suitable conditions, by
even a very small force of cavahy when resolutely led.
The charge was made on the spur of the moment,
with little preliminary reconnaissance of the ground,
without fire support, and with the equivalent of
little more than one squadron of cavalry. It resulted
in the capture of eleven guns and four machine guns,
and the complete destruction of a strong point of
enemy resistance, at a cost of seventy-five casualties.
There was considerable divergence of opinion in
the cavalry as to the best method to be employed
in a mounted attack. As there were no reliable pre-
cedents in modern warfare, with its machine guns
and quick-firing artillery, brigadiers had been given a
free hand to develop the tactics they favoured, sub-
ject to the principle that fire support should always
be provided if available, and that the line of fire
and the direction of the mounted attack should be
as nearly as possible at right angles to one another.
Prior to the operations the 5th Mounted Brigade
had been practising the following method for the
attack of lightly entrenched troops. A regiment
charged in column of squadrons in line, with a dis-
tance of 150 to 200 yards between squadrons. The
leading squadron charged with the sword, and,
having passed over the enemy position, galloped
straight on to attack any supports that might be
coming up. The remainder of the regiment charged
^ The charge formed the subject of a brilHant picture by Lady Butler
painted from notes made by an eye-witness of the action.
56 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
without swords. The second squadron galloped
over the trench while the eneni)^ troops were still
in a state of confusion, dismounted on the farther
side, and attacked from the rear with the bayonet.
The third squadron dismounted before reaching the
trench, and went in with the bayonet from the front.
Two machine guns accompanied this last squadron,
and came into action on one or both flanks, as the
situation demanded, to deal with any counter-attack
that might develop. If more than one regiment
took part in the attack, the machine guns, of course,
moved on the outer flanks of the regiments.
Unfortunately this brigade never had an oppor-
tunity of putting this method to the test, but the
4th A.L.H. Brigade used it in a modified form at
Beersheba, with excellent results.
The wisdom of accompanying a mounted attack
by one or two machine guns was generally recognised,
and in most cases where a charge was made deliber-
ately and after due preparation, and the guns were
available, this method of support was employed.
Where a mounted attack had to cover a consider-
able distance of open ground before reaching charging
distance, the most usual formation was in column
of squadrons in line of troop columns. Our own
gunners were of opinion that this formation offered
the most difficult target to artillery, provided the
interval between troops was not less than 25 yards,
and the distance between squadrons not less than
100 yards. The experience of the campaign seemed
to point to the fact that cavalry also suffered less
from machine-gun fire in this formation than in any
other, at any rate at ranges beyond 1000 yards.
The Turks had their main ammunition depot at
Huj. A squadron of the Worcester Yeomanry came
upon this depot just after the charge, and found a
CAPTURE OF THE EIGHTH ARMY H.Q. 57
party of enemy cavalry engaged in setting fire to it.
The squadron commander of the Worcesters at once
decided to charge the fire instead of the enemy, and
his prompt action was the means of putting out the
fire and saving the ammunition. Later on in the
campaign we made considerable use of captured
enemy guns, especially those of heavy caHbre, and this
vast store of shells was of th^ greatest value to us.
General Ej-ess von Kressenstein and his staff, who
were still at Huj when our cavahy made this charge,
narrowly escaped capture, and had to leave every-
thing behind them in their hurried flight, even to
their wireless code book. The Turks had, of course,
abandoned all their telephone and telegraph wires,
when they were driven off their positions from Gaza
to Beersheba. During the retreat over the plain of
Philistia their units were so scattered and disorganised
that they had to rely almost entirely on gallopers for
all orders and messages. Once in the Judsean hills,
however, they re-estabhshed their wireless service,
and thereafter all orders were sent by wireless, until
the arrival of fresh telephone and telegraph equip-
ment in January 1918. Armed with their code book,
we were able to decode all their messages, and
were thus always in possession of enemy orders as
soon as they were issued. This piece of luck stood
us in good stead later on, more particularly at the
time when the Turks made their big effort to recover
Jerusalem at the end of December.
As soon as it had arrived at Huj the Australian
Mounted Division set about watering horses from the
two weUs there. These wells were each about 150
feet deep, and, as the Turks had destroyed the
winding apparatus, water could only be obtained by
the laborious process of letting down and hauling
up by hand a few small canvas buckets attached to a
58 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
length of field telephone wire. Most of the horses
had been without any water since the afternoon of the
6th, and the poor brutes were raging with thirst, and
drank inordinately. In some cases a single troop
took over an hour to water. All night long and all
the next day the weary work went on, but, on the
evening of the 9th, when the advance was resumed,
the horses of the divisional ammunition column had
not yet been watered.
The task of the Yeomanry Division on the 8th of
November was to attack the eastern group of the
enemy forces on its right flank, so as to drive it
across the front of the 53rd Division and the Camel
Corps Brigade about Tel KhuweiKeh. The Turkish
flank was located in a strong position on the high
and broken ground at Khurbet el Mujeidilat. The
8th Mounted Brigade attacked this position, but was
unable to dislodge the enemy, and, before a further
attack could be organised, orders were received to
break off the action and march to Sharia to water,
preparatory to taking part in the more important
task of pursuing the enemy forces over the coastal
plain. The 53rd Division and the Camel Corps
remained in observation of the enemy. The
Yeomanry watered at Sharia that evening, and
marched to Huj on the following day.
It was now clear that the attempt to cut off the
whole of the enemy forces had failed. Most of the
rearguards left by the troops who had been driven
out of the Sharia-Hareira positions had been disposed
of by the Anzac and Australian Mounted Divisions
during the past two days, but the sturdy resistance
offered by these rearguards, coupled with the delay
caused to our cavalry by the scarcity of water, had
afforded time for the Gaza garrison and some of the
enemy troops east of Gaza to make good their escape.
ADVANCE OF THE INFANTRY 59
The r61§ of the cavalry thus changed to a direct
pursuit of the enemy. Accordingly the Anzac Divi-
sion, which had got some water on the evening
of the 8th, and was ready to move, was ordered to
push across the plain towards the coast, with Bureir
as the first objective and El Mejdel as the second.
The Australian Mounted Division, on completing
the watering of horses at Huj, was to move to the
north on Arak el Menshiye and El Faluje, thus
coming up on the right of the Anzac Division. The
Yeomanry, when they had reached Huj, were to
push on and come into line on the right of the
Australian Division. The Corps would then be in
line across the plain, from the foothills to the sea,
and ready for the further pursuit of the enemy.
The Anzac Division started soon after daylight
on the 9th, with the 1st and 2nd Brigades in line,
each being responsible for the protection of its own
front and outer flank, and the 7th Brigade in support.
The 1st Brigade, on the left, entered Bureir about
half-past eight, after encountering some opposition.
About an hour later, the 2nd Brigade, nearing El
Huleikat, located a body of the enemy occupying
some high ground north-west of the village. The
brigade attacked dismounted, and drove off the
Turks, capturing about 600 prisoners. There was no
water available at either place.
About mid-day the 1st Brigade reached El Mejdel,
which was seized with little difficulty, the small force
of Turks there making but a feeble stand. One
hundred and seventy prisoners were taken. There
was a good well with a steam pump here, and the
brigade was able to get water for all the horses.
A message now arrived from the Corps to the
effect that the 21st Corps was marching on El Mejdel
and Julis, and that the Anzac Division was to push
60 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
on to the neighbourhood of Beit Duras. The
division accordingly wheeled to the right, and the
line of advance became north-east. The troops
pressed on as fast as their jaded horses could carry
them, and, towards evening, the 1st Brigade reached
Esdud, and the 2nd entered the villages of Suafir el
Sharkiye and Arak Suweidan. On the way the
latter brigade had captured a Turkish convoy, with
its escort of about 350 men. While these prisoners
were being sent to the rear, some enemy guns farther
north opened fire and shelled captors and captives
with a fine impartiality. This shelling of their own men
when taken prisoner was of such frequent occurrence
that it is impossible not to suspect German inspiration.
Just before dark the 2nd Brigade rounded up
another 200 Turks. The division occupied a battle
outpost line along the high ground south of the Wadi
Mejma, from near Esdud to Arak Suweidan. Just at
dusk a small body of Turks advanced with fixed
bayonets to attack the outposts of the 2nd Brigade.
When they were close up to our Une, an officer in
the brigade, who had evidently been studying the
Handbook of Turkish Military Terms, shouted in
Turkish a peremptory command to surrender. The
weary Turks, thinking that the order had been given
by one of their own officers, and being only too glad
to comply with it, obediently laid down their arms,
and were added to the bag !
The enemy troops encountered during the day,
and especially towards evening, were utterly dis-
organised, and offered little resistance to our advance.
They were quite worn out by their exertions of the
past three days. Many of them had dysentery,
and all were suffering severely from thirst.
The advanced troops of the 52nd Division, 21st
Corps, reached El Mejdel in the evening.
CHAPTER VI
OVEB THE PHILISTINE PLAIN
On the evening of the 9th of November, as the
Anzac Mounted Division was ' in the air,' it was
necessary for the other two divisions of the Desert
Mounted Corps to press on and join it as soon as
possible. The AustraUan Mounted Division, there-
fore, left Huj on the evening of the 9th, although
all its horses were not yet watered, and marched
to the north-east, the first objective being Tel el
Hesi, and the second Arak el Menshiye and El
Faluje. This was the only night march made by
the cavalry in enemy country during the pursuit.
The 3rd Brigade, with a battery attached, acted as
advance guard, being followed by the 5th and 4th.
The advance guard dropped pickets along the route
every quarter of a mile, which were picked up by
the 5th Brigade. This brigade, in turn, dropped
pickets to be picked up by the rearguard. Signallers
with lamps were sent by the two leading brigades
on to every prominent hill top during the march,
to flash the letters of the divisional signal call inter-
mittently in a south-westerly direction. These
arrangements worked well, and the division arrived
at Tel el Hesi at haK-past four in the morning, and
halted there till daylight.
There were several large pools of good water in
the Wadi Hesi, and the rest of the horses got their
fill at last, having been without water for three days
and four nights.
61
62 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
The division pushed on at once, and came up on
the right of the Anzac Division at Faluje and Arak
el Menshiye Station about eight o'clock. It was
joined, some few hours later, by the Yeomanry
Division, which had left Huj early in the morning,
after having spent all the previous night tr3dng to
water horses. This division took over Arak el
Menshiye, and extended a little farther east. Thus,
on the afternoon of the 10th, the whole of the Corps,
with the exception of the New Zealand Mounted
Brigade, was in hne from a point a little east of Arak
el Menshiye to the sea, and ready for the further
pursuit of the enemy.
The cavalry were now some thirty-five miles in
advance of railhead at Deir el Belah, and the problem
of supply became pressing. No help could be ob-
tained from the two enemy railways, as the Turks
had blown up bridges and culverts, and destroyed
portions of the hne during their retreat. Our only
means of supply was, therefore, by motor lorries
and camels along the single, narrow, ill-metalled
road from Gaza to Junction Station. Between
Gaza and Beit Hanun the road was unmetalled
and deep in sand, and lorries had great difficulty
in getting over this part, even with the light load
of one ton, which was the maximum allowed to be
carried. The marching ration of our horses was
only 9 J lbs. of grain a day, without any hay or
other bulk food, but even this small ration, when
multiplied by 25,000 (approximately the number of
horses in the Corps), worked out at over 100 tons
of forage a day. In addition to this there were the
rations for the men of the Corps, and the food and
forage for the infantry.
In order to enable the pursuit to continue, it was
clear that the greater part of the infantry would
SCARCITY OF WATER 63
have to be left behind. Accordingly, on the 9th,
the whole of the 20th Corps, with the exception of
the o3rd Division, which was still watching the right
group of the enemy forces, withdrew to railhead at
Karm. Of the 21st Corps, only the 52nd and 75th
Divisions continued the advance. The 54th, which
had remained at Gaza, gave up all its transport to
assist the other two divisions. All the available
motor lorries and camels were organised in convoys
along the Gaza-Junction Station road, from Deir
el Belah to El Mejdel, whence the supplies were
distributed to divisions by the horse-drawn wagons
of the divisional trains. These trains had heavier
work than any other part of the force. Even on
the rare occasions when the cavahy got some rest
at night, there was none for them, as they were dis-
tributing supplies from nightfall till dawn. Men
and horses got into the habit of sleeping as they
marched, and, as long as one or two men kept awake
to lead the way, the wagons always reached their
destination safely. The Divisional Ammunition
Columns were in little better case, and the Sharki^
or hot wind from the east, that commenced to blow
on the 10th, added to the sufferings of the unfortu-
nate horses.
The whole Corps was suffering from lack of water,
but the Australian Mounted Division, which was
advancing through the almost waterless country
along the edge of the Judsean range, was in an
almost desperate condition. The Anzac Division,
although operating in the better watered coastal
area, had moved farther and faster and had more
fighting than the other two, and was also in a bad
way. Moreover, owing to the rapid advance of the
last two days, forage and rations had failed to reach
this division. There was absolutely no grazing to
64 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
be found, and what little grain the Turks had left
in the villages was securely hidden. The 2nd A.L.H.
and 7th Mounted Brigades, some of the horses of
which had not had a drink for eighty-four hours,
carried on all through the night of the 9th, trying
to water with buckets from two or three deep
wells, but got little satisfaction. The depth of the
shallowest of these wells was 150 feet, and of the
deepest nearly 250 feet. It was quite clear that
these two divisions could make no further substantial
move forward till all their horses had been watered
and fed.
Had water been available in abundance through-
out the advance, there is little doubt that our cavalry
would have been able to overwhelm the retreating
Turkish armies, and the capture of Jerusalem might
then have been accomplished by a rapid raid of
mounted troops. As it was, each night was spent by
a large part of the cavalry in a heart-breaking search
for water, that too often proved fruitless, while
the enemy, moving in his own country, utihsed the
hours of darkness to put such a distance between
his troops and their pursuers as enabled him gene-
rally to entrench lightly before our cavalry came
up with him in the morning. The marching powers
of the Turks are phenomenal. Time after time,
after fighting all day, they would retire when dark-
ness feU, and march all night, and repeat this per-
formance of fighting all day and marching all night
for several days in succession. During their retreat
they systematically destroyed the water-lifting appa-
ratus of all the wells they passed, thus incidentally
depriving the native inhabitants of water.
The inevitable delay caused by the necessity of
resting our cavalry now gave the enemy the oppor-
tunity to collect his scattered forces and organise
CAPTURE OF ESDUD BRIDGE 65
some sort of line of resistance. Already, on the
10th of November, his troops could be seen digging
in along the high ground on the right bank of the
Nahr Sukereir, and aeroplane reports indicated that
he was preparing a second line farther north.
The 1st A.L.H. Brigade, reconnoitring north-
wards on the 10th, located the Turks in position
from the hill of Tel el Murre near the sea, along the
high ground on the right bank of the Nahr Sukereir,
through Burka to Kustine. Finding a small force
of Turks holding the bridge at Jisr Esdud, the 1st
A.L.H. Regiment attacked, and drove them off.
General Cox at once ordered a bridgehead to be
established on the north bank, and entrenched.
The possession of this bridge was of great value to
us during the next few days. The Nahr Sukereir,
in its lower course, runs between high, precipitous
banks, and forms a barrier to movement north and
south very difficult to pass except by this one bridge.
The enemy was well aware of this, and squandered
some of his best and freshest troops in a desperate
attack on our bridgehead, supported by heavy
artillery, but the 1st Brigade stood fast, and beat
off the attack.
The 2nd A.L.H. Brigade continued the weary
business of watering from two very deep wells at
Suafir el Sharkiye, but there were 800 prisoners here
clamouring for water, and the local inhabitants, who
had been driven from the wells by the retiring Turks,
had had none for twenty-four hours. In the middle
of the pandemonium created by this fight for water,
some enemy guns opened fire on the village, causing a
number of casualties among the Arabs and Turks.
The Arabs fled to the shelter of their houses, and the
prisoners were sent back out of the way. Later on
in the morning, some troops of the brigade returned
E
66 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
to the village to continue watering. No sooner had
they entered the place, than the enemy guns opened
fire again. A thorough search of the houses now
revealed two Turks concealed in one of them, direct-
ing the fire of the enemy guns by telephone. They
were promptly shot, and the firing at once ceased.
A more callous action than this of directing gun-fire
on to a village full of their own captured comrades
and harmless natives could hardly be imagined. It
again suggests German influence, as the Turks did
not, as a rule, do such things on their own initiative.
In the evening part of the 52nd and 74th Divisions
arrived at Esdud and Suafir el Sharkiye, and the
weary 2nd A.L.H. and 7th Mounted Brigades were
withdrawn to water and rest near Hamame. The
1st A.L.H. Brigade held an outpost line during the
night from the sea west of Jisr Esdud to a point on
the Wadi Mejma just north of Beit Duras, in touch
with the infantry on the right.
Meanwhile the AustraUan Mounted Division and
the Yeomanry Division, on the east, pushing their
tired horses slowly after the retreating Turks, ad-
vanced a few miles, and located the left half of the
enemy's line running from Kustine, roughly through
Balin and Berkusie, to the neighbourhood of Beit
Jibrin.
The headquarters of the Australian Division was
at El Faluje on the 10th and 11th. Shortly after its
arrival there, the headman of the village, which is the
seat of a Nahie,^ came to pay his respects to the
British General. After a few polite compliments, he
asked anxiously if we had any men from his village
^ Turkish provinces are divided into a number of Sanjaks, each vmder
a Mutasserif ; these in turn are divided into Kazas, each under a Kai-
makam ; and each Kaza into several Nahiea under Mudirs or headmen of
villages.
DESERTION IN THE ENEMY ARMY 67
among our prisoners. We, of course, could not tell,
as all prisoners were sent back as soon as possible
after being taken. The old man remarked sadly
that he had not had much hope of finding any of them,
as he believed they had all gone to the Caucasus.
About two years ago, he said, a Turkish battalion
had suddenly arrived at the village one morning,
and carried oft* 500 of his young men to be pressed
into the Army, and from that day no word had been
heard from any of them.
All through the campaign we heard similar accounts
of Turkish recruiting methods. The Turks always
sent then- conscripts to fight in a theatre of war as
far removed from their native country as possible,
in order to discourage desertion. In spite of this,
their soldiers were constantly deserting, either to
find a ready hiding-place in some neighbouring town
or village, or to give themselves up to us. So serious
had the question become in the Turkish Army that
there was a standing reward of £5 Turkish offered to
all natives for delivering a deserter to the Army
authorities. An organised propaganda was also
carried on by the officers, by means of lectures to
their men, the chief feature of which was a description
of the tortures and hideous deaths inflicted on their
prisoners by British soldiers. These lectures were
illustrated by pictures supplied by Berlin. Our reply
to this propaganda was to scatter from our aeroplanes
hundreds of handbills over the Turkish lines. These
sheets showed, on one side, the signed photograph of
a fat and smiling Turk, one of our prisoners, with an
autograph letter from him, inviting his friends to
join him, and, on the other side, a bill of fare of the
prisoners' camps that must have made the hungry
Turkish soldiers positively slobber !
The strange fact was that, in spite of these constant
68 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
desertions, the Turks, when brought to bay, nearly
always fought splendidly, and that not alone in
defence, but in attack also. Indeed, some of their
counter-attacks were simply heroic. Out-numbered,
out-gunned, out-manoeuvred, doomed to defeat be-
fore even the attack was launched, they yet ad-
vanced with the most reckless courage, shouting their
war cry, ' Allah ! Allah ! Allah ! ' The explanation
must probably be sought in their religious hatred
of the infidel. The Turks opposed to us in Palestine
at this time were mostly Anatolians, of fine physique,
and sturdy fighters.
The Commander-in-Chief determined to continue
the advance on the 12th, devoting the preceding day
to preparations for the attack on the enemy positions.
The delay would afford time for the 52nd and 74th
Divisions to close up and move forward to their
prehminary positions.
He decided to attack the right centre of the
Turkish fine with his infantry, and turn the right
flank with his cavalry. The Anzac Division had
now, however, only one brigade (the 1st) in a fit
state to continue the operations. Accordingly the
Yeomanry Division was ordered to march on the
11th right across from east to west, behind our line,
and relieve the 2nd and 7th Brigades on the coast.
The Australian Mounted Division was directed to
extend to the east, to a point south-west of Zeita,
so as to cover the country vacated by the Yeomanry.
Its role was to protect the right flank of our forces
during the operations, and to attract the enemy's
attention to this flank. All patrol work was to be made
as conspicuous as possible, and reconnaissances were to
be pushed forward vigorously. This work was excel-
lently carried out throughout the day, along a front
extending from near Zeita nearly to Suafir el Sharkiye.
CAPTURE OF TEL EL MURRE 69
The Yeomanry Division marched via Tel el Hesi,
in order to get water for its horses, and arrived at
El Mejdel in the evening. At the same time the New
Zealand Brigade and the Camel Corps were ordered
up from the Beersheba area, to join the cavalry force
on the left of our line. These two brigades started
on their forty-mile march on the morning of the
11th, and reached El Mejdel late on the following
afternoon.
In order to facilitate the crossing of the Nahr
Sukereir, the 1st A.L.H. Brigade was directed to
enlarge the bridgehead at Jisr Esdud. This was
found to be impossible as long as the enemy held the
hill of Tel el Murre, which commanded the country
north of the bridge. There were no troops available
to assist the 1st Brigade, but General Cox obtained
permission to attempt the capture of the hill. The
2nd A.L.H. Regiment, which was selected for the
task, reconnoitred the river west of the bridge during
the day, but found no crossing place. Undeterred
by this, the regiment concentrated in the evening
under cover of the hill of Nebi Yunus, which con-
cealed it from the Turks, and the Australians swam
their horses across the river, which was here some
fifty yards wide and ten feet deep. Moving forward
dismounted in the darkness, they completely sur-
prised the Turks, who had fancied themselves pro-
tected on that side by the river, and captured the hill
after a sharp bayonet fight. Now, with Tel el Murre
and the Esdud bridge in our hands, we had a strong
hold on the north bank of the river.
There was a good landing-place on the coast here,
and, a few days later, when our troops had pushed
farther north, the navy reopened the sea-borne
supply line, with the mouth of the Nahr Sukereir as
its terminus. The reopening of the sea route greatly
70 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
eased the supply situation, and enabled two more
infantry divisions to be brought up to the front.
During the past two days, the 10th and 11th,
there had been a noticeable stiffening of the enemy
resistance all along the line, and this fact, coupled
with the capture of prisoners from almost every
unit of the Turkish army, showed that the enemy
rearguards had been driven in on his main body,
and that we were now opposed by the whole of the
remainder of his force. It was soon apparent that
he intended to rally on a line north of the Nahr
Rubin, and make a supreme effort to hold us off
the vital Junction Station till he had been able to
steady his forces and organise his retreat.
During the past few days several new units,
portions of the much vaunted Yilderim group, had
arrived from the north. Assisted by these fresh
troops, and favoured by the delay to our cavahy
caused by lack of water, the enemy had prepared,
and partly entrenched, a defensive line, which was
located by the Royal Air Force on the 11th, running
from Kubeibe, three miles north-east of Yebnah,
through Zernuka, El Mughar, Katrah and Tel el
Turmus, to about Beit Jibrin. Each of these localities
had been prepared for defence, and was held by a
considerable force of Turks. The intervening spaces
were covered by machine-gun fire from the defended
posts. The forward positions ah'eady located by
our cavalry north of the Nahr Sukereir had evidently
been established to delay our advance long enough
to enable the main line to be entrenched and con-
solidated.
Thus, though he had been retiring to the north,
the enemy's line now ran nearly north and south.
This position was forced on him, partly by the
pressure of our advance, and partly by the lie of
CAPTURE OF BURKA • 71
the ground. The Hne ran parallel to, and about five
miles to the west of, the railway he wished to defend.
The right flank rested on a high, steep ridge connect-
ing the villages of El Mughar and Zernuka, and ex-
tending north-westwards to Kubeibe. The southern
extremity of this ridge commanded the flat country
to the west and south-west for a distance of two
miles or more.
The attack on this formidable line, originally
planned for the 12th of November, was now put
off till the next day, owing to the necessity of first
driving the enemy from his advanced positions
along the north bank of the Nahr Sukereir. The
hot east wind had continued to blow throughout
the 10th and 11th, raising clouds of suli'ocating
dust over all the country, and adding to the dis-
comforts caused by the lack of water.
In order to clear the enemy from his advanced
positions, a brigade of the 52nd Division crossed
the Esdud bridge on the morning of the 12th, and
advanced against Burka, supported on the left by
the 1st A.L.H. Brigade, and on the right by part
of the 75th Division. The Turks were well posted,
and fought stubbornly, and the village was only
taken after an hour and a half of strenuous fighting.
After its capture, our infantry advanced a short dis-
tance without further opposition, and estabhshed an
outpost hne a few miles north of the Nahr Sukereir.
The Yeomain-y Division came up in the after-
noon on the left of the infantry, and the 1st A.L.H.
Brigade withdrew to bivouac south of Esdud. The
8th Mounted Brigade had arrived in time to take
part in the capture of Burka. The New Zealand
Brigade rejoined the Anzac Division in the evening,
and the Camel Corps Brigade, on arrival, was
attached to the Yeomanry.
72 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
On the right of our Hne the Australian Mounted
Division continued its task of making a big noise,
and carried it out so effectively as to attract rather
more attention from the enemy than was altogether
pleasant.
The 5th Mounted Brigade was ordered to push
into Balin, and then make a vigorous reconnais-
sance as far north as the Wadi Dhahr, from Tel el
Safi to the Beersheba Railway. The 3rd A.L.H.
Brigade, concentrated in a concealed position at
Summeil, sent a squadron into Berkusie, and pushed
out strong, fighting patrols to the east and south-
east. The 4th A.L.H. Brigade was directed to
send a squadron to the high ground near the Deir
Sineid Railway line, about a mile south-west of Tel
el Turmus, watch the country between that point
and Balin, and force the enemy to disclose his posi-
tions.
About one o'clock the enemy suddenly flung a
force of about 5000 men against the 5th Brigade
in Balin. This was by far the heaviest counter-
attack we had experienced since the break-through
at Sharia on the 7th, and there is reason to believe
that it was directed by Marshal von Falkenhayn in
person. The attack was made by two columns,
one of which had come down the track from Junc-
tion Station to Tel el Safi, and the other by rail to
El Tine Station. Just after the attack was launched
two large motors came tearing down the road to
Tel el Safi. From one of these several officers got
out, and climbed a little way up the hill to watch
the development of the attack. One of them, from
his great height, was believed to be the Marshal,
but unfortunately the party was out of range of our
thirteen-pounders in BaHn.
The enemy attack was pressed with the greatest
THE ACTION OF BALIN 73
vigour, and the 5th Brigade was almost surrounded.
At one time it appeared likely that the guns of ' B '
Battery H.A.C., attached to the brigade, would be
lost, as the country was a mass of rocks, and it was
impossible to move them quickly. Assisted by the
magnificent fighting of the Brigade Machine Gun
Squadron, however, the battery was able to with-
draw slowly by sections, firing at point-blank range
most of the time.
The 3rd Brigade was sent up at a canter from
Summeil, followed by the remaining two batteries
of the division, and the leading regiment came up
on the right of the 5th Brigade just as the latter
had cleared BaUn. Almost immediately afterwards
the enemy turned his attention to Berkusie, now
occupied by a regiment of the 3rd Brigade. Sup-
ported by a heavy fire from several batteries, the
Turks attacked this village, and forced the regi-
ment to retire.
All the available troops of the division were now
engaged, and, as the enemy still pressed on, the
situation became somewhat anxious. The 4th Bri-
gade was strung out to the west as far as the Deir
Sineid line, and could render no effective aid to
the other two brigades. General Hodgson, there-
fore, ordered the division to withdraw slowly to
the fine Bir Summeil-Khurbet Jeladiyeh. Hardly
had the order been given when an enemy train
appeared, coming south along the Beersheba line.
It stopped west of Balin, and disgorged a fresh
force of Turks, which deployed rapidly, and advanced
against the left of the 5th Brigade. Our other two
batteries were now, however, in action on the high
ground north-west of Summeil, and they at once
engaged this force. The Turks were moving over
an open plain, in full view of our gunners, who took
74 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
full advantage of the excellent target offered by
the enemy, and made such good practice that the
attack was broken^ The enemy troops fell back a
little on this flank, and commenced to dig them-
selves in.
Fighting steadily and skilfully, the two brigades
withdrew till they reached the edge of Summeil
village. Here, favoured by the protection afforded
by the houses and walls of the village, and by the
rocky ground on either side of it, they were able to
make a stand, and the enemy's attack was finally
held.
The Turks did not attempt to renew their attack,
which was just as well, as no troops could have
been spared to assist the AustraHan Division. Our
losses had been somewhat severe, especially in the 5th
Brigade Machine Gun Squadi'on, whose fine fighting
was the chief factor in extricating the brigade from
Balin. Towards the end of the fighting there, the
Turks had got to within a few hundred yards of our
troops on three sides. A few of them even succeeded
in getting across our line of withdrawal, and several
of the battery drivers were shot from the rear while
getting the guns away. The division occupied a
battle outpost line for the night from near Arak el
Menshiye, through Summeil and along the high
ground north of the Wadi Mejma, to Khurbet
Jeladiyeh, in touch with the 75th Division on
the left.
The employment of the artillery in this action
deserves notice. In some of the cavalry divisions
it had been the custom to attach a battery of Horse
Artillery permanently to each brigade. General
Hodgson, however, elected to keep his artillery
together, and under his immediate command, only
attaching a battery to a brigade when on some
AN ARTILLERY LESSON 75
special mission, as in this case, when the 5th Brigade,
with ' B ' Battery H.A.C. attached, was sent forward
into Bahn, acting as a sort of advance guard to the
division, which was echeloned to the rear or either
side of it.
Though there may be something to be said in favour
of the principle of attaching each battery to a
brigade when, as was generally the case in these
operations, a division is moving on a very wide
front, there is little doubt that it is the sounder plan
for the divisional commander to keep at least a part
of his artillery in his own hands.
In this action General Hodgson, having his other
two batteries in hand, and well up behind the centre
of the front covered by his division, was able to throw
them at once into the fight at the critical moment,
and there is no doubt that their fire materially
assisted in the final defeat of the enemy thrust. Had
these two batteries been attached to the 3rd and
4th Brigades, one of them would probably have been
far to the south towards Zeita, and the other possibly
nearly as far west as the Deir Sineid Railway. Both
would almost certainly have been unavailable at the
moment when their services were most urgently
needed. This subject is dealt with more fully in
Chapter xxiv.
The attempt of the enemy to arrest our pursuit by
using his reserves in a bold attack against our weak
right flank deserved better success than it achieved.
It was a repetition, on a smaller scale, of his tactics
at Tel Khuweilfeh, after the battle of Beersheba.
In both instances, had his troops been as bold in
attack as they were tenacious in defence, the campaign
might well have taken a different turn.
One of General AUenby's most marked character-
istics was his capacity for gauging the fighting
76 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
qualities of his enemy. He rarely underestimated
the Turks' strength or morale, but he seemed to know,
as by instinct, the minimum force necessary to hold
any counter-thrust that might possibly be made.
In this case aeroplane and cavalry reconnaissances
had established the fact that there was a considerable
force of the enemy on our right, but the Commander-
in-Chief left the task of dealing with it, with complete
equanimity, to one cavalry division.
Hu.l. After the charge.
British Horse Artillery anj Australian Cavah-y aUvancinM
over the Philistine Plain.
CHAPTER VII
NEARING THE HILLS
Early on the morning of the 13th the attack on the
enemy positions began.
The Yeomanry Division and the Camel Corps
Brigade advanced on the left of our line, with the
52nd Division on their right. Then came the
75th Division and the Austrahan Mounted Division,
the latter covering a front of about eight miles.
The orders to this division were to watch the right
flank of our line, and attract the enemy's attention,
as on the previous two days. In view of the large
area of country to be covered, the 2nd A.L.H.
Brigade, now Corps Reserve, was stationed at
Khurbet Jeladiyeh. The 7th Mounted Brigade re-
Heved the 5th, the horses of which were exhausted.
The 2nd and 7th Brigades had only been withdrawn
from the line late on the evening of the 11th, and had
thus had but one day's complete rest. One of the
chief difficulties of the Corps Commander at this
time, and one which increased daily, lay in the fact
that one or another of his brigades was always on the
verge of coming to a standstill owing to the ex-
haustion of its horses. This fact compelled the
continual movement of brigades from one part of
the line to another, to relieve others unable to carry
on the pursuit, thus increasing the fatigue and
distress of the horses.
The country in which our troops were now operating
is an undulating, treeless plain, rising here and there
77
78 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
into isolated, rocky hills, similar in character to the
coiintr}' farther south. It is, however, much more
populous than southern Palestine, and is extensively
cultivated, though at this time of year the crops had
all been gathered, and the land was as bare as a
village common. Partly, no doubt, for purposes of
defence, and partly to avoid wasting the fertile plain
land, most of the villages are built on the tops of the
hills, where the rock, outcropping over large areas,
renders the land unsuitable for cultivation. Many
of these villages are surrounded by trees and small
enclosed gardens, and some are encircled by stout
mud walls. All of them command the surrounding
country for a wide space, and, with their walls and
cactus hedges, form admirable strong points, very
difficult to reduce without the aid of heavy artillery.
The village of El Mughar, on its high and rocky
ridge, is one of the most prominent of these hill
strongholds, and forms a notable landmark from the
flat country to the west and south of it.
The 8th Mounted Brigade, leading the Yeomanry
Division, approached Yebnah about eight in the
morning, and two troops were sent forward to gallop
into the village from either side. This was the
usual method adopted by our cavahy, when ap-
proaching villages during a rapid advance, unless
they were definitely known to be strongly held by
the enemy. If there proved to be few Turks in the
village, or none at all, these troops would signal back
to their regiment or brigade to advance. If, however,
the village proved to be strongly held, the few men
in the exploring troops, moving in extended order
and at a very fast pace, seldom sustained many
casualties, while they nearly always succeeded in
gaining a fairly accurate idea of the numbers of the
enemy, the location of his machine guns, etc.
THE EL MUGHAR-KATRAH LINE 79
In the present case Yebnah was found very lightly
held, and the 8th Brigade at once pushed through it,
and advanced to the attack of the villages of Zernuka
and Kubeibe, on which rested the extreme right
flank of the enemy's line. The Turks were found in
force in these two places, and the brigade was unable
to make any substantial progress, in the face of very
heavy machine-gun fire.
The 6th Mounted Brigade remained in divisional
reserve at Yebnah, and the 22nd was ordered to try
and push between Zernuka and El Mughar, and seize
the village of Akir, behind the enemy's line. In-
tense machine-gun fii*e from Zernuka, however, on
the flank of the line of advance, prohibited the
brigade from moving forward till this place had been
taken.
A brigade of the 52nd Division attacked the
viUage of Katrah from the south about nine o'clock,
and captured it by a fine bayonet charge, taking
600 prisoners and a large number of machine guns.
The brigade then advanced on El Mughar, and
succeeded in reaching the Wadi Jamus, about half
a mile farther north. From the wadi to El Mughar
the ground sloped gently upwards, devoid of any
cover, and traversed by no depression capable of
concealing troops. The infantry extended along
the wadi, and attempted to advance up the slope
towards El Mughar, but were checked by a tre-
mendous fire from machine guns and riflemen con-
cealed in the gardens of the village, and from field
guns in action farther north. It was soon apparent
that they could not hope to cross the wide stretch
of open ground, and they were withdrawn into the
shelter of the wadi. The 52nd Division then sent a
message to the Yeomanry, asking the latter to co-
operate by attacking El Mughar from the east.
80 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
General Barrow ordered the 6th Mounted Brigade,
which was now extended from Yebnah to ElGheyadah,
about a mile north of Beshshit, to carry out the
attack.
From his position at El Gheyadah, General Godwin
had observed that the infantry advance on El Mughar
had been held up, and was anticipating an order to
co-operate with his brigade. He had accordingly
already got one of his regiments, the Bucks Yeo-
manry, into the Wadi Jamus, at a point about a
mile south-east of Yebnah, and had sent officers'
patrols forward to reconnoitre a line of approach.
The reports of these patrols confirmed the General's
own impression that the enemy position could only
be reached by a mounted charge. The country
west of El Mughar was just as bare and open as
that to the south, over which our infantry had
found themselves unable to advance. On the other
hand, the absence of obstacles favoured a galloping
attack, and, though the distance to be traversed in
the open (over two miles) was considerable, there
appeared to be a good prospect of the enterprise
succeeding, provided it was adequately supported by
the R.H.A. and machine gunners.
Having decided on a mounted attack. General
Godwin brought up the Dorset Yeomanry, and
galloped them across the open in small parties, into
the shelter of the Wadi Jamus. This regiment was
directed on the left, or northern, end of the enemy
position, and the Bucks on a portion of the ridge to
the right of the Dorsets' objective, and immediately
north of the village itself. The Berks Yeomanry
was held in reserve, west of the wadi and near the
south end of Yebnah. The Berks Battery R.H.A.,
which was at Beshshit, and the Machine Gun Squadron
were ordered to provide covering fire from the south.
Dia^ra/ft Ulastra^g the action. oF £!L Mugkcir
82 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
The 8th Mounted Brigade, which was attacking
Zernuka, would afford protection to the left flank
of the 6th during the action.
The Berks Battery was soon in action among some
trees north of El Beshshit, registering the village of
El Mughar, and the ridge to the north of it. The
machine gunners, taking advantage of some broken
ground south-east of Yebnah, got into the Wadi
Shellal el Ghor, and worked their way along it to a
position about 1000 yards south-west of El Mughar
village.
As soon as the steady bursts of fire from the wadi
apprised General Godwin that his machine guns
were in action, he gave the order to advance, and
the two regiments scrambled up the steep sides of
the Wadi Jamus into the open, and trotted forward
over the plain in extended order, the squadrons of
each regiment following one another at a distance
of about 200 yards. Two machine guns on pack
horses accompanied each regiment, moving on the
outer flanks.
The appearance of the cavalry was the signal for
a tremendous fire on both sides. Every weapon
the enemy had in action was turned on the advancing
lines of cavalry, while the Berks Battery and the
6th Brigade Machine Gun Squadron poured an in-
tense fire on the ridge of Mughar, sweeping it from
end to end.
The regiments trotted quietly across the open till
they were some half a mile from the enemy position,
when they shook out into a fast canter, and swung
up the rocky slope at the Turks. A hundred yards
from the top the order to charge was given, and the
men sat down and rode.
The leading squadron of the Bucks went through
the Turks with the sword in ten seconds, kiUing
THE CHARGE AT EL MUGHAR 83
many of them, and galloped right over the ridge
before they could pull up. Ere the enemy troops
had time to rally, the second and third squadrons
dashed into them, completing the rout. In a few
minutes from the time when the order to charge
was given, the Bucks Yeomanry had secured their
objective, and commenced to consolidate on the
position.
The Dorset Yeomanry, on the left, encountered
more broken ground, and the leading squadron dis-
mounted and attacked with the bayonet. The
other two squadrons, however, stuck to their horses,
and reached the top first. There was not much
momentum left in the charge by the time the cavalry
met the enemy, but the long swords do not need
much pace behind them to do their work properly,
and the issue of the fight was never in doubt. Before
the dismounted squadron had gained the summit of
the ridge, the other two had cleared the position,
and the surviving Turks were in flight or had sur-
rendered. Incidentally it may be remarked that
the squadron on foot lost more heavily, both in men
and horses, than the two that had gone in with the
sword.
While the position was being cleared and con-
sohdated, a number of the enemy in the village
opened fire on our troops with machine guns, in-
flicting some loss, and interfering with the work.
Two squadrons of the Berks were sent up at a gallop,
and fought their way into the village on foot,
clearing the Turks out of it, and taking about 400
prisoners.
About 600 enemy dead were counted on the posi-
tion afterwards, and many more were killed, as they
were trying to escape, by the fire of the machine
guns which had accompanied each regiment in the
84 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
charge. In addition to those taken in Mughar
village, 1100 prisoners fell into our hands, with
three guns and a large number of machine guns.
The enemy's right was completely broken. His
troops evacuated Kubeibe and Zernuka after dark,
and fell back in considerable confusion.
Our casualties in the two regiments were 129
officers and men and 265 horses killed and wounded,
not an unduly heavy bill when compared to the
number of enemy dead, and, still more, to the great
results obtained.
The 22nd Mounted Brigade rode forward to attack
Akir, as soon as Mughar had been taken, but was
held up till nightfall by unexpectedly strong enemy
opposition. The Brigade rounded up seventy pri-
soners and a few machine guns retiring from El
Mughar, and occupied Akir next morning, the
enemy having retired during the night.
Meanwhile, in the centre, the 75th Division had
captured Mesmiye with the bayonet, taking 200
prisoners, and reached a point on the Deir Sineid
line about two miles west of Junction Station in
the evening. The Turks attacked in considerable
force during the night, but were driven off, and the
division entered Junction Station early next morning.
The AustraUan Mounted Division advanced a few
miles, covering the right flank of the 75th Divi-
sion, and seized Tel el Turmus without encountering
serious opposition. During the day the headquarters
of this division, at the village of El Jeladiyeh, three
miles east of El Suafir el Sharkiye, got into touch by
helio with the 53rd Division twenty miles away to the
east, and exchanged news. This was the first and
last communication between the two parts of our
force, from the day of the battle of Sharia, till the
7th of December, when the 10th A.L.H. Regiment
ENEMY ARMY SPLIT IN TWO 85
gained touch with the 53rd Division in the hills ten
miles south of Jerusalem, two days before the city
fell.
Next day, as soon as it was light enough to see, our
line was on the move in pursuit of the enemy.
Early in the morning a couple of armoured cars,
sent forward to reconnoitre, entered Junction Station,
and drove suddenly into a crowd of some 400 Turks
employed in setting fire to the buildings, and doing
a little private looting on their own account. The
commander of the leading car summoned these men
to surrender, and was answered by a scattering volley
from their rifles. Whereupon he shut the armoured
doors of his car, and charged down upon them, with
his machine gun going full blast. The discomfited
Turks turned and fled, pursued for two miles by the
cars. Over 200 of them were killed or wounded ;
the remainder escaped into the hills.
The 75th Division entered Junction Station shortly
afterwards, and collected 100 prisoners, a number of
guns, and a quantity of rolling stock.
The Australian Mounted Division pushed on to
the north-east, the 4th Brigade seizing El Tine
Station, on the Beersheba line, early in the morning,
where large quantities of ammunition and stores were
found intact. Continuing their move, units of the
division penetrated through the enemy front, which
was now broken at Junction Station, and reached the
railway two miles east of the station.
The Yeomanry Division, moving in advance of
the 52nd, pushed through Akir to Naane. The two
brigades which occupied the latter place were heavily
shelled by the enemy from about Abu Shusheh, some
three miles farther east, but no other opposition was
met with.
The rapidity with which the Mughar-Kutrah line
86 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
had been captured on the previous day had resulted
in the Turkish army being again broken into two
separate parts. The thrust of the Yeomanry to
Naane had now driven a wedge between these two
parts, and the operations of the next two days were
directed towards widening the gap. The larger
portion of the enemy force entered the hills to the
east, and commenced to retire along the main road
towards Jerusalem, shepherded by the Yeomanry and
Australian Mounted Divisions. The smaller portion
retired northwards over the plain, followed by the
Anzac Division. The 1st A.L.H. and New Zealand
Brigades made good Kubeibe and Zernuka early in
the morning, and then advanced on Ramleh and
Khurbet Surafend respectively, with the Camel
Corps Brigade patrolling the sand dune country on
their left. The New Zealanders encountered a force
of Turks on the high hill of Ayun Kara (Richon-le-
Zion) about two in the afternoon, and drove them
off without much difficulty. Half an hour later the
Turks emerged from the shelter of the large fruit
orchards and vineyards which surround Ayun Kara,
and launched an unexpected counter-attack on the
New Zealand Brigade. They were well supplied
with bombs, and pushed their attack fiercely right
up to our line. The New Zealanders then went in
with the bayonet, and drove them back to the bottom
of the hill, inflicting heavy losses on them. Two
squadrons from the 1st Brigade and a company of
the Camel Corps reinforced the New Zealand Brigade,
which had suffered somewhat severely, but the enemy
had had enough, and made no further attack. This
was the only serious fighting of the day.
The two brigades held an outpost line for the night
from the sea coast, through Ayun Kara to Khurbet
Deiran, in touch with the Yeomanry on their right.
88 THE DE8ERT MOUNTED CORPS
The Camel Corps Brigade occupied a support line a
short distance farther south. Tlie Yeomanry Divi-
sion remained in occupation of Akir and Naane,
watching the northern exits from the latter place,
with the 52nd Division lying behind it about El
Mughar. The 75th Division had a brigade in
Junction Station, and the remainder of the division
at Mesmiye, while the Australian Mounted Division
held an outpost line in observation of the country
to the south-east.
On the 15th the Anzac Mounted Division, moving
northwards over the plain, occupied Ramleh without
opposition, taking about 350 prisoners, and on the
following day the New Zealand Mounted Brigade
entered Jaffa, where it was received with acclama-
tion by the populace. On the 17th the division had
reached the Nahr el Auja, near its mouth, without
having yet succeeded in bringing the enemy to action.
Favoured by the hard ground on the plain, and
assisted to some extent by the railway along which
they were retreating, the Turks made the best use of
the nights during this period, and never stopped till
they had put the wide and deep channel of the river
Auja between themselves and our troops. They
were now located, entrenched along the north bank
of the river, from near the sea to about EJiurbet
Hadrah. The Anzac Division received orders to
halt opposite this line, and remain in observation of
the enemy, pending the arrival of reinforcements,
while the more important task of the advance on
Jerusalem was taken in hand.
Meanwhile the Yeomanry division was engaged
driving the right half of the enemy army into the
hills. The road from Jerusalem to Jaffa runs through
a deep and narrow valley in the mountains, which
has its outlet at Amwas, near Latron. Here the
ACTION OF ABU SHUSHEH 89
valley opens out into the Vale of Ajalon, which slopes
gently down to the level of the coastal plain. Running
north and south across the western end of the Vale,
a bold ridge stands up sharply from the plain,
between the villages of Sidun and Abu Shusheh.
The northern end of this ridge terminates at Abu
Shusheh, and the southern end at the hill of Tel
Jezer, the ancient Gezer, round which so many
battles have been fought in the past.
The enemy had posted a strong rearguard on the
northern end of the ridge, to cover the retreat of his
main body up the Jerusalem road. The Yeomanry
Division was ordered to dislodge this rearguard, and
then clear up the foothill country from Amwas, at
the eastern end of the Vale of Ajalon, to Ramleh.
The enemy's position was one of great natural
strength, and was held by a force of about 4000
Turks, well supplied with machine guns and artillery.
The greater part of this force was distributed in, and
on each side of, the village of Abu Shusheh, but a
considerable body of Turks with machine guns was
stationed some distance farther south, evidently in
order to outflank any attack on the village from the
west. The country on that side of the position was
of an undulating nature, and afforded some cover to
troops advancing over it. The ridge itself rose
abruptly from this undulating country, a forbidding-
looking mass of boulders and scrub. In places the
solid rock outcropped from the hill over large areas,
and there were a number of caves among the rocks,
in many of which the Turks had posted machine
guns.
General Barrow directed the 22nd Mounted Brigade
and the Camel Corps to attack the hill on the north-
west and north respectively, and the 6th Mounted
Brigade from the south-west. At seven o'clock the
90 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
two former brigades were in action, advancing dis-
mounted. In view of the open nature of the country
on the west side of the ridge, and the distance to
be covered. General Godwin, who had been recon-
noitring the position with his regimental commanders
since dawn, decided to repeat his tactics of the 13th.
Had he been able to obtain a nearer view of the
appalling country over which he was launching his
squadrons, it is possible that he might have decided
to make at least the final assault on foot, in which
case we should have lost a classic example of the
capabilities of cavalry when well led.
Having made up his mind to attack mounted, he
sent half of the brigade machine guns, covered by a
squadron of the Berks Yeomanry, to push forward
dismounted, taking advantage of what cover the
ground afforded, to a point west of Abu Shusheh,
and as close in as possible, from which to engage
the enemy machine guns on the ridge. The Berks
Battery R.H.A., from a position some 3500 yards
south-west of the village, assisted in this task. The
Bucks Yeomanry were ordered to charge the enemy
at Abu Shusheh, while the remainder of the Berks
charged on the left, against a spur running out to
the west of the ridge, just north of the village. The
Dorset Yeomanry were held in reserve on the right,
to protect that flank. The attack of the 22nd
Brigade protected the left flank.
As soon as the battery and the machine guns
were in action. Colonel Cripps led the Bucks Yeo-
manry out into the open, in column of squadrons
in line of troop columns, and cantered forward
towards the village, under a fairly heavy, but ill-
directed, fire. As they neared the position, the
Yeomanry came under severe enfilade fire from the
group of enemy machine guns on the southern
ACTION OF ABU SHUSHEH 91
portion of the ridge. Leading his regiment at a
gallop into the shelter of some dead ground, Colonel
Cripps halted them and signalled back for support.
The Dorset Yeomanry were at once sent off to make
a turning movement to the south, and take the
hostile machine guns in rear. Some of the guns of
the Berks Battery were also turned on to this party
of the enemy.
The appearance of the Dorsets engaged the atten-
tion of the Turkish machine gunners, and the Bucks
Yeomanry, taking advantage of the respite, emerged
from concealment, and raced at the position.
Their appearance was met by an outburst of
hysterical fire from Abu Shusheh, through which
they passed almost unscathed, and reached the foot
of the ridge. Then, catching their horses short by
the head, they put them at the slope. Slipping and
sliding, scrambling like cats among the rocks, they
galloped up, and went over the Turks with a cheer.
The two squadrons of the Berks galloped up on
the left at the same moment, and completed the
work. Once our cavalry were in the position the
enemy made but a poor fight.
Meanwhile the Dorsets took advantage of the con-
fusion caused in the enemy ranks to charge the
machine guns farther south. The charge got well
home, and most of the Turks were sabred ; the rest
surrendered.
While the three regiments were clearing the ridge
of isolated parties of the enemy who still showed
fight, a force of Turks appeared from among the
rocks farther south, and attempted a counter-attack
against the right of our troops. The Berks Battery,
however, was on the watch, and at once opened a
rapid and accurate fire on these Turks, driving them
back with heavy losses, and breaking up the counter-
92 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
attack. By nine o'clock the whole of this strong
position was in our hands, with 360 prisoners, and
all the enemy machine guns. About 400 Turks
were killed with the sword alone, and many more
were found dead on the position, as a result of our
gun and machine-gun jGLre.
Our own losses were extraordinarily light, only
thirty-seven of all ranks killed and wounded. The
Berks Battery and the Machine Gun Squadron, by
their effective covering fire, had helped materially
to keep down our casualties ; but the chief credit for
this desirable result must be given to the Turks them-
selves, whose shooting during the attack was exceed-
ingly bad, and appeared to be completely out of
control. It is probable that among the garrison
were m^.ny who had spoken with survivors from El
Mughar, and we may be sure that the story of that
charge had lost nothing in the telhng, and probably
contributed largely to the ' nerves ' of the Turks.
The action earned a generous tribute from the
Commander-in-Chief, who described it in his despatch
as a brilliant piece of cavalry work.
The 22nd Brigade pursued the enemy towards
Am was, rounding up a few prisoners, but the majority
of the Turks escaped over the rocky, inaccessible
country to the east, where our cavalry had little
chance of catching them.
CHAPTER VIII
AN ENTR'ACTE
The enemy had now been driven into a tract of
difficult mountain country, very favourable for
defensive tactics, and most unsuited for cavalry.
Reinforcements of men and guns were being hurried
southwards from Aleppo to his aid ; some had
already arrived. In order to drive the eastern
group of his forces through the mountains, and at
the same time hold the northern group on the plain,
more infantry would be required.
The Royal Navy was reorganising the sea-borne
supply line, but the landing of stores, which had to
be carried out in surf boats, depended on a con-
tinuance of fine weather, and the 20th Corps could
not, therefore, be brought up with safety until our
railway had been pushed considerably farther north.
Relays of Sappers had been working on the line day
and night since the fall of Gaza, and the railhead
was moving forward at a pace that beat all previous
records for railway construction in any part of the
world. Even under the most favourable condi-
tions, however, it would take at least a fortnight to
reach a point from which it would be possible to
supply our troops in the mountains.
The 54th Division, 21st Corps, was already under
orders to march from Gaza, but, before it could
start, its transport, which had been lent to the
52nd and 75th Divisions, had to be returned, and
this necessitated a complete rearrangement of trans-
port in the Corps.
• 93
94 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
Moreover, the operations had now continue
seventeen days practically without cessation, '<
rest was absolutely necessary, especially fo:
horses. The cavalry divisions had covered i
170 miles since the 29th of October, and their 1
had been watered, on an average, only once in
thirty-six hours during that time. The heat
had been intense, and the short ration, 9J 11
grain per day, without any bulk food, had wea.
them greatly. Indeed the hardships endure
some of the horses were almost incredible.
the batteries of the Australian Mounted Di
had only been able to water its horses three
in the past nine days, the actual intervals be
waterings being 68, 72, and 76 hours respect
Yet this battery, on its arrival at Junction
tion, had only lost eight horses from exhau
not counting those killed in action or evac
wounded.
As an indication of the reduction in the fig
strength of the cavalry, due to casualties and
ness among men and horses, it may be ment
that the G.O.C. of the 5th Mounted Brigade rep
on the 16th of November that he had, in his
regiments, only 690 men mounted and fit for
It is true that this brigade had suffered more se"\
than most of the others in the Corps, but all
much under strength in men and horses, ai
urgent need of a rest.
The majority of the horses in the Corps
Walers, and there is no doubt that these 1
Australian horses make the finest cavalry mi
in the world. For many years past the Austn
have been bujdng up the well-bred failures oi
English Turf, and buying them cheap ; no
racing purposes, but to breed saddle horses fo:
ENGLISH HORSES AND WALERS 95
ry stations. As a result of this policy, they
now got types of compact, well built, saddle
arness horses that no other part of the world
how. Rather on the light side, according to
leas, but hard as nails, and with beautifully
legs and feet, their record in this war places
far above the cavalry horses of any other
I. The Australians themselves can never under-
our partiality for the half-bred, weight-carry-
mter, which looks to them Uke a cart horse.
contention has always been that good blood
irry more weight than big bone, and the ex-
ce of this war has converted the writer, for
mtirely to their point of view. It must be
ibered that the Australian countrymen are
, heavier men than their English brothers,
formed just half the Corps, and it is probable
tiey averaged not far short of twelve stone each
3d. To this weight must be added another
nd a half stone, for saddle, ammunition, sword,
dothes and accoutrements, so that each horse
1 a weight of over twenty-one stone, all day
rery day for seventeen days, on less than half
Tmal ration of forage, and with only one drink
ry thirty-six hours !
weight-carrying English hunter had to be
I back to fitness after these operations, over
y period, while the little Australian horses,
it any special care other than good food and
of water, were soon fit to go through another
ign as arduous as the last one.
ction Station was the first place where we
unHmited, and accessible, water. Owing to
gorous action of the armoured cars, the Turks
LOt had time to destroy the steam pumping
there, and our engineers soon had rows of
96 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
drinking troughs erected, and a steady stream of
sweet clear water flowing into them. It was good
to see the horses burying their heads in the water,
and drinking their fill at last. The Anzac Mounted
Division, about the same time, found excellent
water and a steam pump at the big Zionist wine
press at Richon-le-Zion.
Everything about Junction Station spoke of the
methodical German. Solidly built, stone storehouses
and locomotive sheds, well-found machine shops,
orderly stacks of priceless timber, p3n'amids of drums
of oil and petrol ; everything in its place, and a
place for everything. Neat finger-posts and notice-
boards directed the stranger where to go, and where
not to go, and a host of the inevitable ' Verboten '
signs bristled on every side. It was noticeable
that these last were the only ones that were written
in Turkish as well as German, except the name of
the station, which the Germans called Wadi Surar.
We found in the station tw^o locomotives and a
number of railway wagons, which were of great
value to us during the ensuing few weeks, tiU our
own railway reached Ludd.
The heavy echelons of the cavalry ammunition
columns, which had last been seen at Sharia on the
7tli November, advancing boldly on the enemy,
turned up at Junction Station on the 19th. They
had been completely lost during the intervening
twelve days, and had wandered about, neglected
and forlorn, in the wake of the cavalry. During
all this time they had received no rations, and had
been maintained entirely by the predatory genius
of the gunner subaltern in command. As this officer
has now returned to civilian life, and is a respected,
and it is to be hoped respectable, member of society,
it is, perhaps, kinder to draw a veil over his methods
THE A.P.M.'S ODYSSEY 97
Suffice it to say tliat he brought his command of 600
horses and men into the Station, all fit and well,
and no questions were asked. And if, sometimes, a
battahon waited in vain for its rations ; if, now and
then, a .harried supply officer found that one of his
camel convoys had delivered its supplies during
the night to some unknown unit, owing to a mistake ;
if guards on ration dumps are notoriously vuhier-
able to cigarettes and soft words, one can only reflect
that war is a sad, stern business, in which ' dog
eats dog ' when opportunity arises.
On the same day another wanderer returned,
whose Odyssey was even more remarkable. When
the headquarters of the Australian Mounted Division
had been at KJiurbet Jeladiyeh on the 13th, the
divisional interpreter, a Greek named Theodore,
had overheard certain remarks made by a man in
the village, who was dressed as a native. The man
was arrested, and proved to be a Turkish spy.
Terrified at finding himself discovered, the miserable
wretch begged for his life, and promised, if he was
spared, to put us on the track of the man who, he
said, was the head of the native spy organisation of
the Turkish Army. He was told to say what he
knew, and we would consider whether his informa-
tion was worth his life. He then gave particulars of
the man, who, it appeared, was his own father, and
said that he believed him to be at Beit Jibrin.
Accordingly the A. P.M. of the division set off next
day with two cars of a light car patrol ^ and the
interpreter, to try and surprise the arch spy at
Beit Jibrin. The party arrived at the village about
nine o'clock in the morning, to find the bird flown.
On making inquiries, they learnt that he had gone
on — to quote the report of the A.P.M. — ' to a place
^ Unarmoured Ford vans carrying a machine gun each.
Q
98 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
called Ram Allah Rakhman, which we took to be
somewhere near Bethlehem, but subsequently dis-
covered to be the same place ! ' The enemy's
right group was at this time in the neighbourhood
of Hebron, and his left group was west of Junction
Station, so that Bethlehem was a good fifteen miles
behind his hne. But this triflmg fact did not in
any waj^ deter the pursuers. What could the Turkish
Army do against two Ford cars and two machine
guns ? They bhthely took the track to Bethlehem.
Shortly afterwards they came suddenly upon a
patrol of six Turkish cavalrymen. ' We opened
fire at once,' so runs the A.P.M.'s report, ' and
killed the men and five of the horses. The sixth
horse unluckily escaped, but we came up with it
later on and destroyed it, thus leaving no trace of
the enemy patrol ! ' A few miles farther on, they
encomitered another, and larger, body of enemy
cavalry. ' This time,' says the report, ' there were
about thirt}^ of them, but, as we came upon them
unawares, we had no difficulty in driving them off,
after killing a good few, and we then proceeded on
our way.'
Late in the afternoon the cars drove into Beth-
lehem, where our men were received with transports
of Joy by the inhabitants, nearly all of whom are
Christians. The poor people crowded round then
dehverers to kiss then' hands, shouting and weeping,
and pressmg offerings of food on them, much to
their embarrassment.
As it was getting late, and they found that their
quarry had again moved on, the hunters consented
to stay and eat with some of the notables of the
town, after which they got under way again, and
drove a short distance along the Beersheba road, to
a place where they could hide the cars for the night.
A TURKISH COMMUNIQUE 99
At dawn next morning they resumed their journey,
and motored right through the enemy force, at Hebron,
without being detected. Fortunately the Turks had
no post actually on the road, and it is probable that
a couple of cars coming from behind their Unes
attracted httle attention. The party drove quietly
on to Beersheba, where they found a canteen, and,
having loaded up with stores, returned in triumph
to Junction Station.
In the meantime Corps Headquarters had become
seriously alarmed at their long absence, and had
despatched another patrol of two cars to try and
find them. These cars got to Beit Jibrin, where
they found, and captured, the spy who was the
cause of aU the trouble, and who had doubled back
on his tracks from Bethlehem. Then, hearing that
the cars had started off with the intention of going
to Bethlehem, they gave them up for lost, and
returned to headquarters to report.
Meanwhile an aeroplane, that had also been sent
to look for the first patrol, came upon the second
one returning from Beit Jibrin, and at once flew back
to Corps Headquarters and reported that the lost
sheep were found, and were on their way back. The
second patrol came in a few hours afterwards, and
reported that there were no signs of the missing
cars, which must have been captured by the enemy.
By now the Corps was thoroughly puzzled, and
not a Httle angry. The result was that, when the
blushing Ulysses did finally arrive, instead of receiv-
ing a ' few kind words of praise ' for carrying out an
exceedingly daring reconnaissance, he got an un-
merciful dressing down for giving headquarters such
a fright !
On the 18th of November the populations of the
enemy countries received their first intimation that
100 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
all was not well in the East. Up till this date the
Tuikish papers, after chronicling each day the
many victories won in the past twenty-four hours
in France and Russia, had added gravely, ' On the
Palestine front there is no change ! ' At last the
Germans came to the conclusion that this bluff
might possibly be carried too far, so they caused to
be printed in their own papers what purported to
be an official Turkish communique, though none of
the Turkish papers received it till after it had been
published in BerUn. This precious document stated
that in Palestine ' there had been a retirement
according to plan.^ It might have been added that
the plan included leaving 12,000 prisoners and more
than 100 guns in the hands of the enemy !
CHAPTER IX
MOUNTAIN WARFARE
The advance was resumed on the 18th of November.
Durmg the preceding two days there had been no
movement of importance on the part of om* forces.
The 22nd Momited Brigade had located the Turkish
rearguard at Am was on the 16th, and had then
cleared the foothill country as far as Ramleh, without
meeting any more of the enemy. On the same day
the 8th Mounted Brigade had entered Ludd without
opposition, rounding up a few prisoners there. The
Anzac Division remained in observation of the
northern group of the Turkish forces, along the
Nahr el Auja, and the Australian Mounted Divi-
sion moved close to Amwas, in preparation for the
advance up the Jerusalem road.
In order to avoid fighting in or near the Holy
Places, the Commander-in-Chief determined to try
and isolate pJerusalem completely. In order to do
this it was necessary to gain possession of the only
road which traverses the Judsean Range from north
to south, between Nablus and Jerusalem.
The Yeomanry Division was accordingly dii'ected
to move by the old Roman road from Ludd, through
Berfilya and Beit Ur el Tahta, to Bire, pushing
through the mountains as quickly as possible. The
two available infantry divisions were to advance
up the Jerusalem road, preceded by two brigades
of the Australian Mounted Division, to about Kuryet
el Enab, whence they were to strike north-eastwards
101
102 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
towards the Nablus road. The 5th Mounted Brigade,
moving up the Wadi Surar, would protect the
right flank of the infantry during their advance.
Finally the 53rd Division, now about Hebron, was
to press on from that place, and secure the Jericho
road, east of Jerusalem.
The city would thus be cut off from all sources of
reinforcement and supply, and, it was hoped, would
capitulate without further bloodshed.
On the morning of the 18th the Austrahan
Mounted Division found a force of the enemy en-
trenched on the hill of Amwas, which stands square
in the middle of the pass, just where it debouches
into the Vale of Ajalon. The artillery of the divi-
sion, assisted by some of the guns of the 75th Divi-
sion, opened a vigorous fire on the enemy on Amwas
Hill, to which the Turks made but a feeble reply,
while the 3rd A.L.H. Brigade endeavoured to pass
through the hills to the north, round the enemy's
right flank.
All day the regiments struggled on among the
rocks, scrambhng up and down the steep hills, and
making very slow progress. By four o'clock in the
afternoon they had advanced barely five miles,
and the order was then given to return, and leave
the task to the infantry the next day. The tlireat
to their flank had, however, been enough for the
Turks, who retired during the night, abandoning
four guns, the teams of which had been kiUed by
the fire of the R.H.A.
There had been no fighting to speak of, but the
action was of great interest from the associations of
the place. From its position in the mouth of the
valley, Amwas is, and always has been, the key of
the pass to Jerusalem. Who holds this hill holds
the city. From the earliest ages, all the armies that
INTO THE HILLS 103
have sought to take Jerusalem have passed this
way, save only that of Joshua. Philistine and
Hittite, Babylonian and Assyrian, Egyptian and
Roman and Greek, Frankish Knights of the Cross,
all have passed this way, and all have watered the
hiU of Amwas with their blood.
The Australian Mounted Division handed over the
further advance to the 75th Division next day, and
withdrew to the mouth of the Nahr Sukereir, to get
grazing for its horses. Two days later the division
marched back to El Mejdel, in order to relieve the
supply situation. Our broad-gauge railway had
now nearly reached this place, and it was possible
to draw supplies direct from railhead with the divi-
sional train.
The 8th and 22nd Brigades of the Yeomanry
Division plunged into the hills on the mornmg of the
18th, and soon found themselves in difficulties. In
this mountain country, in which there were no
wheeled vehicles, and aU goods were carried on the
backs of donkeys, what was known to the natives as
a good road was usually little more than a goat
track, winding in and out among the boulders. As
far as Beit Sira there was some semblance of a road,
though, even on this portion of it, the gunners were
at work all day removing the biggest of the boulders
from the path, before their guns could pass. Beyond
Beit Sira the road was nothing but the merest foot-
path, leading straight down and up the numerous
deep and narrow ravines that intersect the country
in aU directions. Sometimes it required haK an
hour's reconnaissance to move forward half a mile.
Under such conditions, the 8th Brigade accom-
pUshed a remarkable feat in penetrating nearly as
far as Beit Ur el Tahta by nightfall. The 22nd
Brigade reached Shilta the same evening, but had to
104 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
send back all its guns and transport, owing to the
difficulties of the country. The 6th Brigade, starting
on the following morning, reached Beit Ur el Tahta
about two in the afternoon.
Cavalry, as such, were really unable to operate in
this country. They were confined to the roads, or
the tracks that did duty as roads, and, even on these,
they could often move only in single file. Conse-
quently they were exceedingly vulnerable, and their
inabihty to make effective use of flank guards, or
even to deploy quickly when attacked, increased the
dangers to which they were exposed. Horses were
little more than an encumbrance, reducing the number
of men available for dismounted fighting, largely
increasing the amount of transport required, and
adding but Httle to the mobility of the troops.
In the present case, however, there were several
reasons for attempting to push the Yeomanry through
the hills. In the first place it was known that the
enemy forces had been broken into two widely sepa-
rated groups, and there was thus little danger of any
attack from the north, for the next few days at any rate.
Moreover there was a saving of time in employing the
Yeomanry instead of the 52nd Division, as the latter
was a day's march farther west when the plan of
advance was decided upon. Finally, native reports
of the hill country had led to the belief that it was
of a much easier nature than proved to be the case.
The winter rains broke with a heavy downpour
on the 19th, and this added to the difficulties of
the cavalry, turning the vaUey bottoms into a sea
of viscid, black mud, and the beds of the ravines
into rushing torrents. The sudden drop in tempera-
ture which accompanied the rain was a severe trial
to our troops, who were dressed in light, khaki-drill
clothing, and had no blankets, greatcoats, or tents.
THE BEITUNIA RIDGE 105
During the morning of the 19th of November the
8th and 22nd Brigades struggled thi'ough the rain
and mud along the Wadi el Sunt, towards Beitunia
and Ain Arik respectively, but about mid-daj they
encountered a force of Turks which had come down
the main road from Nablus to Bire, and then marched
westwards to oppose the Yeomanry advance. Un-
able to make headway against the difficulties of the
country and the opposition of the enemy, who was in
considerable force, the brigades held their position,
and awaited the arrival of the 6th Brigade.
On the 20th the division made another effort to
get on, the 6th Brigade moving to the assistance of
the 8th. All wheels, including the guns, had to be
sent back to Itamleh, as they were unable to move,
and water for horses was scarce, despite the rain.
Strong, organised resistance was now encountered
at Beitunia, and prisoners captured from the enemy
in the course of the fighting proved to be men from
fresh, well-trained units from Aleppo, part of the
Yilderim force. Little headway was made during
the day. Rain came on again in the night, and no
supplies were able to reach the division.
Next day the Yeomanry made a final attempt to
storm the high ridge of Beitunia, which had held
up their advance for two days. The 6th and 8th
Brigades attacked the ridge itself from the west,
while the 22nd Brigade, operating farther north
towards Ram Allah, tried to turn the enemy's right
flank. The attacking brigades got to within a few
hundred yards of Beitunia village, on the top of the
ridge, when they encountered a fresh enemy force,
that outnumbered them by three to one. The
Turks had a number of field and mountain guns,
that had come from the north along the metalled
road, while our troops had only one mountain
106 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
battery. The Yeomanry made several desperate
attempts to force their way up the steep, rocky sides
of the ridge, but were unable to reach the top. Early
in the afternoon, more enemy reinforcements ar-
rived from the north, and counter-attacked strongly,
forcing our troops back into the deep ravine on the
west side of the ridge. The situation soon became
serious, and orders were given for all three brigades
to break off the action and retire to Beit Ur el Foka.
The withdrawal began after dark, and was carried
out successfully.
It is almost impossible to exaggerate the difficulties
of the cavalry. The country was a maze of high,
rocky ridges, running in all directions, and separated
by deep and narrow ravines, the sides of which were
almost precipitous, and the bottoms muddy morasses.
The ground was covered with a mass of boulders,
among which grew sparse patches of coarse scrub.
Mounted work was, of course, out of the question in
such country, and all the horses had to be kept far
back from the fighting line. A quarter of the whole
force was thus occupied in holding the horses, and,
as the division had already been considerably
weakened by the fighting of the past three weeks,
the actual number of rifles available for the advance
was hopelessly inadequate. It was clear that the
attempt of the division to reach the main road had
been definitely checked, and the only thing to be
done was to try and hold on to the positions already
gained till reinforcements could arrive. Men and
horses were short of food, owing to the great difficulty
of getting up supplies in these roadless mountains
during the rains.
While the Yeomanry Division was slowly fighting
to a standstill in the north, the 75th Division,
advancing along the main road towards Jerusalem,
CAPTURE OF NEBI SAMWIL 107
and the 52nd Division on the track north of this road,
through Beit Likia, pressed slowly forward, against
strong resistance from the enemy, to Kustul and Beit
Dukka respectively. The latter division sent a
brigade to the north on the night of the 21st, and
seized the high hiU of Nebi Samwil, the traditional
tomb of the Prophet Samuel. This hill dominates
aU the country to the east, even to Jerusalem itself,
which can be seen from its summit. It was from here
that the followers of Richard Coeur de Lion first
looked upon Jerusalem in 1192, and pointed it out to
the King. But Richard hid his face in his casque,
lest he should see it, and prayed : ' Lord ! let me
not set mine eyes upon Thy Holy City till I have
rescued it from the Infidel.'
Recognising the importance of this hill in opera-
tions against Jerusalem, the Turks next day launched
a series of determined attacks against it, but were
unable to retake it. Day after day, till within a
few days of the surrender of the city, the enemy
attacked the hill, and the fiercest and most sustained
fighting of the campaign took place round it. But
in spite of aU their efforts, it remained in our hands,
and became, at last, the key that opened to us the
gates of the Holy City.
The next four days were comparatively quiet on
the mountain front. Both sides were too exhausted
by the arduous fighting they had undergone, and
by the cold and wet, to make much effort, and
operations were confined to minor enterprises.
During this period the Yeomanry Division held a
line, running north and south, along the heights Just
east of Beit Ur el Foka, and extending for about
three miles. On the 23rd all horses had to be sent
back to Ramleh, as it was impossible any longer
to transport forage to them in the mountains. The
108 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
following day the division made a demonstration
along the whole front to assist the attack of the
infantry against El Jib, where the Turks held a
position barring our advance to the Nablus road.
The enemy, however, was found in too great force
for the attack to be pushed home, and, after being
repulsed in three desperate assaults, our infantry
had to abandon the attempt.
^?t Meanwhile, on the plain, the Anzac Division had
remained in observation of the enemy along the
Auja, and had been engaged in active patrol work
and reconnaissances for crossing places. Four possible
places had been located ; a road bridge at Khurbet
Hadrah, a ford about two miles farther east, another
at Jerisheh, and a third at the mouth of the river.
All these crossings were held by parties of the enemy.,
The average width of the river was thirty-five yards,
and the depth five to seven feet. The banks were in
most places steep, and the bottom was very muddy.
On the 24th the Division received orders to estab-
Hsh one or more bridgeheads north of the river,
with the object of inducing the enemy to beheve
that we intended to make a farther advance along
the coast. At least one of these bridgeheads was
to be retained if possible.
General Chaytor decided to force the passage of
the river by the ford at the mouth, where the bottom
was sandy, covering the crossing by demonstrations
at Hadrah and at the other two fords. The only
troops available for the enterprise were the New
Zealand Brigade and two battahons of infantry lent
by the 54th Division,^ a small enough force, in view
of the known strength of the enemy. The rest of
^ This division had arrived from Gaza on the 19th, and was holding a
line from the right of the Anzac Division to the village of ShUta, about
five miles west of the left of the Yeomanry Division.
Arrival of Marshal von Fallienhayn in Jerusalem in 1917.
(From an enemy photograph.)
9.4.S inch Austrian Howitzer on the Nahlus road,
(From an enemy photograph )
FIRST PASSAGE OF THE AUJA 109
the Anzac Division was, however, required to watch
the enemy forces on the right, about Mulebbis, and
in the foothills farther east.
The operations commenced shortly after mid-day,
the infantry advancing with much noise and display
on the bridge and upper fords, while the New Zea-
landers made for the ford at the mouth of the
river. They crossed here without much difficulty,
overpowering the small enemy post covering the
ford, and then galloped along the north bank to
Sheikh Muannis. An armoured car battery was now
pushed up to the south bank of the Auja opposite
Hadi'ah, and opened j&re on the Turks holding the
bridge there. At the same time the New Zealanders
swept down on the flank from Muannis, and drove
off the enemy. A battalion of infantry now crossed
the river, and established a bridgehead on the north
bank, with half the battahon at the bridge and half
in the village of Muannis. During the night two
squadrons of the New Zealand Brigade were posted
on the high ground north of Hadrah and Sheikh
Muannis, and a third covered the ford at the mouth
of the river. Under cover of the darkness the
divisional engineers threw a pontoon bridge across
the river at Jerisheh, which was held by the other
battalion of infantry.
Just after dawn next morning, the cavahy north
of the river were heavily attacked by a large force
of Turks, and driven back. The enemy followed up
resolutely, and attacked the bridgehead at Hadrah.
The squadron at the mouth of the river, reinforced
by another regiment, was ordered to move against
the Turkish right, while the remaining regiment of
the brigade moved up to the south bank of the
Auja at Hadrah. The Somerset Battery R,.H.A.,
the only available artillery, came into action close
110 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
by, the lire of the guns being directed by the battery
commander from a house in Sheikh Muannis, across
the river.
At half-past eight, the bridgehead at Hadrah was
driven in, and the infantry fell back across the
river. At the same time the two companies in
Sheikh Muannis, which were moving to the support
of the bridgehead, were heavUy counter-attacked,
and driven back to Jerisheh, where they crossed by
the pontoon bridge, covered by the two squadrons
of New Zealanders. The led horses of these squadrons
were sent back to the ford at the mouth of the river
at a gallop. They had to run the gauntlet of close-
range rifle and machine-gun fire, but got through
with comparatively few casualties, and crossed the
river under cover of the squadron there, which
then withdrew to the south bank.
The last man to leave Sheikh Muannis was the
battery commander. He remained, coolly direct-
ing the fire of his guns, till the Turks were in the
village, and then made a run for it, swimming the
river under fire, and got safely away. His fine work
had greatly assisted the retirement of our small
force.
As soon as the last of our troops had been safely
withdi'awn, the Anzac Division fell back to a posi-
tion on the high ground overlooking the south bank
of the Auja, from Yahudieh, through Nebi Tari, to
the sea, and hurriedly dug in, expecting an attack.
The Turks, however, seemed to be content with
having thrown our troops back across the river,
and made no further move.
The operations had shown that the enemy was in
such force that it would be impossible to maintain
a bridgehead on the right bank, without holding the
whole of the high ground two miles north of the river.
THE AUJA LINE 111
As sufficient troops were not available for this purpose,
the line south of the Auja, which commanded all
the crossing places, was entrenched and held by the
Anzac Division, supported by a brigade of infantry,
until the second, and successful, passage of the river
four weeks later.
CHAPTER X
THE FALL OF JERUSALEM
On November the 27th the enemy renewed his
activity in the hills. The Yeomanry Division was,
at the time, reduced to about 800 rifles in the line,
and was holding a position nearly four miles long
with this imposing force. To add to the sense of
security, there was a gap of about five miles between
the left flank of the division and the nearest post
of the 54th Division at Shilta. Moreover, the only
line of communications was still by the Beit Sii'a-
Berfilya-Ludd road, up which the division had
marched on its first advance. This road, along
which all ammunition and supplies had to come,
ran parallel to, and only just behind, this gap in
the line, and there seemed to be no particular reason
why the enemy should not walk through the gap
whenever he felt so inclined, and sit down on tlie
road. The ' line ' consisted of a few posts, held by
as many men as could be spared, and a number of
small, roving patrols. One of these posts, con-
sisting of three officers and sixty men, was in a small
stone building on the top of a ridge near Zeitun. It
was attacked early in the afternoon of the 27th by
a battalion of Turks with machine guns and artillery.
The fight went on till dark, when the Turks drew
ofi to nurse their wounds and get their breath for
another attack. The commander of the garrison,
now reduced to twenty-eight all ranks, sent an
apologetic signal message to the 6th Brigade head-
YEOMANRY DIVISION HARD PRESSED 113
quarters to ask if a few men could be spared to rein-
force him. The house which his men had been
holding had been destroyed by shell fire, and every
part of the top of the hill was reeking with the fumes
of high explosive shell. Two weak troops were sent
to the assistance of the garrison, though it was
realised that the provision of this reinforcement
dangerously weakened the rest of the front !
Thus strengthened and encouraged, the garrison of
the Zeiti!in post successfully held out aU night against
repeated attacks. The Turks were again reinforced
during the night, however, and next morning, as
it was clear that the little garrison could not hope
to hold out any longer, it was withdrawn. The
enemy immediately occupied the Zeitiin ridge, the
possession of which gave him command over our
positions, and necessitated a withdrawal of our
line. On the left flank the 22nd Brigade was thrown
back, covering Beit Ur el Tahta, and the line then
ran from that village, through Beit Ur el Foka, to
about El Tire. The right flank of the division was
in exiguous and intermittent touch with the 52nd
Division. The left was entirely ' in the air.'
Throughout the day Turkish troops were moving
to the north, and making their way westwards
towards the gap in our line west of Beit Ur el Tahta.
Large parties continually attacked the Yeomanry at
different points, thus preventing the division from
making any effective change of dispositions to meet
the threatened envelopment.
The 7th Mounted Brigade, which was in Corps
Reserve at Zernuka, and the Australian Mounted
Division, resting at El Mejdel, were ordered up.
Both made forced marches during the night of the
27th, and the former arrived at Beir Ur el Tahta
at five in the morning of the 28th, just in time to
H
lU THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
help the 22nd Mounted Brigade to repulse a heavy
attack from the north.
A brigade of the 52nd Division was sent to rein-
force the exposed left flank of the Yeomanry Divi-
sion, but, before it arrived there, a small party of
Turks with some machine guns walked quietly
through the gap between the Yeomanry Division
and the 54th, and took up a position overlooking
the Berfilya track. Later in the morning, a section
of the Yeomanry Divisional Ammunition Column,
coming up the road from Ramleh with sorely needed
ammunition for the division, was ambushed by the
Turks and utterly destroyed. A motor cycHst going
down to Ramleh reached the scene immediately
afterwards, and, seeing the wi^ecked wagons and
the dead men and horses on the road, swung round
his machine, and raced back again as fast as the
track would allow. The Turks opened fire with
their machine guns, but failed to hit him, and he
carried the news back to the division that the road
was cut. A detachment from the brigade of the
52nd, which had been sent up to cover this flank,
pushed ahead, and drove off this party of Turks.
The brigade then attacked the village of Suffa,
which was full of enemy troops, in order to try
and relieve the pressure on the left of the Yeomanry
Division, but the Turks were found in too great
strength to be dislodged. Fortunately, however,
they made no further attempt to penetrate through
the gap, probably because they were really unaware
of its existence. Positions on both sides were exceed-
ingly ill-defined, owing to the impossibility of digging
trenches in the solid rock, of which most of the hill
and ridge tops were composed. Very heavy fighting
continued throughout the day, but the enemy, though
continually remforced, was unable to break our line.
RELIEF OF THE YEOMANRY 115
The Australian Mounted Division arrived at Khur-
bet Deiran early in the morning, having marched
the twenty-one miles from Mejdel in one night.
The 4th A.L.H. Brigade at once pushed on into the
hills, and came into the hne in the centre, in support
of the 6th Brigade, about five in the evening. The
hard- worked 52nd Division contrived to spare another
battahon, which reinforced the 7th Brigade on the left.
The attack on this brigade was resumed at dark,
but was driven off, after prolonged and bitter fight-
ing. As an indication of the close nature of the
struggle, it may be mentioned that the headquarters
of two of the Yeomanry brigades used up all their
revolver ammunition during the day.
Next day the Yeomanry Division and the 7th
Brigade were relieved in the hne by two more brigades
of infantry from the 52nd and 74th Divisions, the
latter of which had Just arrived from the south.
These reliefs were carried out in the intervals between
repeated fierce attacks by the enemy, who flung
his troops against our line all day with the greatest
determination. Had it not been possible to reheve
the Yeomanry about this time, there is no doubt
that they would have been overwhelmed. So de-
pleted were their ranks that the substitution of two
brigades of infantry for the four cavalry brigades
meant six rifles in the line for every one that had
been there before. This increase in strength, with
the addition of the Australian Mounted Division,
sufficed to hold all the enemy attacks.
On the following morning the 3rd A.L.H. Brigade
reheved the brigade of the 52nd Division on the
left of the Yeomanry line, near El Burj, and the
headquarters and artillery of the division moved up
in the evening.
On the same day, the weary troops of the Yeo-
116 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
manry Division withdrew to Annabeli, whence they
marched to the neighbourhood of El Mughar to rest
and refit, within sight of the hill which they had
captured so brilliantly a fortnight earlier.
During their twelve days in the hills they had
been fighting continually, day and night, not only
against a vigorous and determined enemy, but
against the difficulties of a roadless mountain country.
Exposed to constant rain and cold, without tents,
blankets or greatcoats, often short of food, and
opposed at all times by greatly superior forces of
the enemy, they had set an example of dogged
courage and tenacity and of unquenchable cheer-
fulness that has never been surpassed.
These were the last operations in the East in which
they were destined to take part. In the following
spring, in response to the urgent call from France
for more troops to stem the great German attack,
the division was disbanded, and reorganised into a
number of dismounted machine gun companies.
After a short course of training, these companies
embarked for France, there to earn fresh laurels for
their old division in the last great act of the war.
Units of the division had fought in nearly every
action since the beginning of the war with Turkey,
and all had distinguished themselves. At Suvla
Bay in the Peninsula ; at Solium and Mersa Matruh
in the western desert ; at Romani, Maghdaba and
Rafa during the advance across Sinai ; in the two
first battles of Gaza ; and lastly in the great ride
over the Plains of Philistia, and the stubborn drive
into the Judsean Mountains. Everywhere the Turks
had learned to dread the long swords and the steady
rifles of the Yeomen. Their comrades of the Desert
Mounted Corps bade farewell to the gallant division
with real sorrow.
TURKISH STORM TROOPS 117
The enemy made one more attempt to break our
line at its weakest part on the night of the 30th.
About two o'clock in the morning a battahon of
picked assault troops from his 19th Division was
launched against the position held by the 3rd A.L.H.
Brigade. The Turks were well supplied with hand
grenades, which were not carried by our cavalry at
that time, and pushed their attack in the most
resolute manner. Our line was forced back a few
hundred yards, and a small, but important, hill
was lost for a time. A squadron of the Gloucester
Yeomanry (5th Mounted Brigade) and a company
of infantry from the 52nd Division reinforced the
3rd Brigade, and the Turks' attempt to break through
was finally defeated, but only after the complete
destruction of the enemy battalion. Three times
during the night, between 2 a.m. and 6 a.m., this
gallant regiment flung itself against our positions,
pressing on each time with the most reckless courage.
Each attack was repelled with heavy losses to the
enemy, and in the end the battalion was wiped
out: 172 Turks, many of them wounded, remained
in our hands as prisoners ; the rest were killed.
The 5th Mounted Brigade rejoined the Australian
Division from the 21st Corps on the 1st of December,
being replaced by the 10th A.L.H. Regiment, which
remained on the right flank of the 60th Division,
and gained touch with the 53rd Division on the
7th December.
The Australian Mounted Division remained in the
mountains till the end of December, when it was
withdrawn to Deir el Belah to rest and refit. It had
little fighting during the period spent in the hills,
but the awful weather fully made up for any lack
of activity on the part of the enemy. During the
whole time rain fell almost incessantty, and the cold
118 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
winds that swept up and down the naiTow valleys
were exceedingly trying to men who were nearly
always in wet clothes.
But, if the conditions in the hiUs were execrable,
those in the coastal plain, where all the horses of the
division were kept, were nearly as bad. The rains
broke late this year, and, when they did come, fell
with unusual violence. The plain was soon trans-
formed into a deep sea of mud. Large areas were
completely under water, and the flood carried
immense quantities of soil into the innumerable
small wadis that intersect the plain, filling them
bank full with mud. When the waters subsided a
Httle, from time to time, these wadis were indis-
tinguishable from the surrounding country, and
became very dangerous traps. There was more than
one instance of men and horses being engulfed and
drowned in their horrible black depths.
Christmas Eve and Chiistmas Day 1917 are never
likely to be forgotten by any of the troops who were
in Palestine at the time. A raging storm of rain fell
without intermission for thirty-six hours. The rail-
way was washed away in several places, wagons
and lorries were unable to move, and hundreds of
camels in the ration convoys lay down in the water
that covered the land, and died. No food or other
suppUes could be brought up to the troops.
A small party of Yeomanry, making its way north-
wards from Esdud, reached the bridge over the Nahr
Sukereir about mid-day. The men halted to feed
their horses on the bridge, which consisted of a single
high stone arch, and was comparatively dry. After
half an hour's halt, they attempted to continue their
march, but found the country to the north of the
river so deep in water and mud that they could not
get on. They then tried to go back again, but, in
NATIVE SPIES 119
the meantime, the waters had risen behind them, and
they found themselves cut off on the bridge, which
was now a smaU island in an apparently Hmitless sea
of muddy water. Marooned on their tiny island,
lashed by the rain and the bitter wind, they spent
the night and the next day (Christmas Day) huddled
miserably together, without food, fire, or shelter I
On the 26th the waters subsided a little, and they
were able to struggle back to their camp.
The horses, already thin and tired after the heavy
work and short rations of the past month, went back
rapidly in condition. They were standing always up
to their hocks in mud, wet through nearly the whole
time, and, in this treeless country, there was little or
no shelter from the biting winds. Forage, too, was
often woefully short, owing to partial breakdowns of
the supply columns. It is small wonder that, by the
end of December, when the division was relieved, they
resembled ragged scarecrows rather than horses.
Much trouble was caused in the mountains owing
to the impossibility of preventing information reach-
ing the enemy from the natives. A regulation,
prohibiting the inhabitants of the villages behind
our lines from leaving their houses during the hours
of darkness, was rigidly enforced, and any natives
found at large durmg the night were liable to be shot
at sight. Nevertheless, with a line so lightly held as
was ours, and with no regular system of trenches, it
was a comparatively easy matter for the villagers to
pass between the lines, even in daylight, and much
information undoubtedly reached the enemy in this
way.
One day a small patrol of five men of the Australian
Mounted Division was making its way cautiously
forward towards the enemy position in the village of
Deir el Kuddis. Crossing the bottom of a deep
120 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
valley, the patrol came upon a solitary Arab squatting
among the rocks in the bottom of the ravine. He
said he had come from Deir el Kuddis, and that it
had been evacuated by the enemy. Our men, one of
whom spoke a little Arabic, questioned him closely,
but he stuck to his story, and also showed them a
path which led to the village. They left him in the
ravine, and, taking the path indicated, moved warily
forward towards the village. Shortly afterwards,
they heard a jackal cry in the valley behind them,
but, as the hills were full of these beasts, whose
mournful wailing was to be heard all night long, the
men paid no attention to it at the time. Almost
immediately afterwards a concealed enemy machine
gun opened fire on them unexpectedly, killing one
man and wounding another. They withdrew, carry-
ing their dead comrade with them, and were making
their way back towards the ravine where they had
left the native, when one of them was suddenly
struck by the thought that he had never before heard
a jackal call in the daytime. After a discussion, they
came to the conclusion that the jackal cry must have
been made by the Arab they had seen, as a signal
to the enemy. One of them accordingly went to
look for the man, and found him in the same place.
As soon as he saw the soldier, the native jumped up
with a cry, and attempted to run away, but was
promptly shot dead by the Australian.
The body of this man lay unburied in the bottom of
the ravine all the time we were there, as none of the
villagers would touch it. They had taken and buried
the bodies of several other natives who had been
shot when found away from their villages after
dark, and, as they would not give the same treat-
ment to this man, it is possible that he was a Turk
in disguise.
One of our Horse Artillery batteries in action in the mountains west of Jerusaler
Note the bivouac shelters pitched among the guns as camouflage.
Reading the British Proclamation in Jerusalem, llth November. 1917.
General Allenby with Allied Representatives in the centre.
SURRENDER OF JERUSALEM 121
In the latter half of November the four infantry
divisions that had remained about Gaza and Karm
during the pursuit of the enemy commenced to move
up to the front, and, by the end of the month, were
all in the line from the sea to Nebi Samwil. At the
beginning of December the 53rd Division began its
advance up the Hebron road, and, on the early morn-
ing of the 9th, was in touch with the 60th Division,
and had one brigade fighting its way up the Mount of
Olives. The latter division, pivoting on the hill of
Nebi Samwil, had made a wonderful fighting wheel
to the left during the past three days, and had now
closed in on Jerusalem on the west and south.
At eight o'clock in the morning the keys of the
Holy City, borne by the Mayor under a flag of truce,
were handed to an officer of the 60th Division.
After six hundred years the Christian had returned.
General Allenby made his official entry into Jeru-
salem on the 11th, accompanied by representatives
of the Allied Nations. This event, and the magnifi-
cent infantry fighting that led up to it, have been
too well chronicled elsewhere to need recapitulation
in this narrative, which is concerned only with the
doings of the cavahy.
One may be permitted, however, to emphasise
once more the impressive contrast between the entry
of the Conqueror of Jerusalem and that of the crazy
mountebank who had visited it twenty years before.
The German Emperor entered on horseback, sur-
rounded by an immense retinue, in uniforms blaz-
ing with medals and decorations. General Allenby
entered on foot and almost alone, dressed in worn,
service khaki, and carrying a cane. But he went
through the Jafia Gate, which, in accordance with
ancient tradition, is opened only to a conqueror of
122 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
the Holy City ; the Kaiser entered through a breach
in the wall.
The AustraUan Mounted Division was relieved by
the 10th Infantry Division on the 1st of January, and
the 3rd and 5th Brigades withdrew from the hills
that day, and marched south for Deir el Belah, fol-
lowed a week later by the 4th Brigade. The three
days' march was carried out in continual, heavy rain,
changing to hail and sleet every now and then, and
through a country that was nearly all under water.
Once among the clean, dry sandhills of Deir el Belah,
however, all troubles were over, and soon afterwards
the weather improved, and clothes could be dried
for the first time for seven weeks. The Yeomanry
Division had moved into the same area shortly
before the Australian Division arrived.
The Anzac Division remained on the Auja till
the 7th of December, when it withdrew to rest at
Richon-le-Zion. Cavalry operations were much ham-
pered by the continual rain and deep mud, but the
division carried out a series of daring and successful
raids on the enemy, which kept him constantly on
the jump, and paved the way for the final crossing
of the Auja on the 21st and 22nd of December. Two
brigades took part in this operation, in support of the
52nd and 54th Divisions, and, as soon as our line was
consolidated on the north bank, the whole division was
withdrawn, and went into camp near the coast to rest.
Between the 31st of October and the end of
December the Desert Mounted Corps had advanced
some eighty miles, ^ fought nine general engagements,
and captured about 9500 prisoners and 80 guns.
^ The actual distances covered by the three divisions in the period
were : — Anzac Mounted Division, one hundred and seventy miles ; Yeo-
manry Division, one himdred and ninety miles; Australian Mounted
Division, two hundred and thirty miles.
-r"^--*«,--^.»-»- ^ -
.V^'^^'*-^^3fs>:=->W5r:; --^:r:~::prr:
35'
0' \
31'0'
wholly
Other tracks
Railways
Under SOOfeet
Between 500 <t WOO
.. WOO A 1500
1500 &
,, 2000 &.
.. 2500 d
Aboue 3000
CHAPTER XI
DOWN TO THE JORDAN
The advance across the Nalir el Auja at the end of
December 1917, and the infantry operations north
of Jerusalem about the same time, established our
Hne sufficiently far north of Jaffa and Jerusalem to
secure these two places from all but long-range gun
fire from the enemy. The line was then consoU-
dated, and a period of trench warfare set in, which,
with the exception of several minor operations, was
to last till the autumn of the following year.
For the first part of this period, the Desert Mounted
Corps remained in the neighbourhood of Gaza to
rest and train.
The horses were in a sorry state, and the remount
depots were empty, save for a few animals which
had been returned from veterinary hospitals, after
treatment for wounds or other injuries. Owing to
the shortage of shipping, there was no prospect of
any fresh remounts arriving in the country for an
indefinite time. Consequently all the horses of the
Corps had to be nursed back to condition before
the cavalry could take part in any further serious
work.
The divisions were all camped on deep sand,
among the coastal dunes — the Yeomanry and the
Austrahan Mounted Divisions round Gaza, the Anzac
Division farther north. The heaviest rain drained
through this sand immediately, and half an hour
of sunshine was enough to dry the surface. For the
128
124 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
first time in many weeks the horses had clean, dry
standings, and the effect of this was soon evident
in the improved condition of their legs and coats.
At the end of the first fortnight, which was a period
of rest for men as well as horses, there was an all
round improvement. Forage was plentiful again,
and of fair quality, though every one would have
given a great deal for a few tons of good oats, in
place of the eternal barley.
After the first fortnight, training recommenced,
gradually at first, so as not to check the recovery of
the horses. By the end of the month, however,
brigade and divisional schemes were in full swing.
The training was varied by salvage work on the
old trenches at Gaza, from which a great quantity
of ammunition and stores of every description was
collected. Most of the men had an opportunity of
visiting Gaza, and many were the ' cm-ios ' collected
among the ruins, to be taken home to sweethearts
and wives on that glorious ' leave,' that was always
coming, but never quite came.
At a little distance the city appeared to be intact,
except for two minarets, accidentally broken by
shell fire, the jagged stumps of which stood up con-
spicuously. This curious, undamaged appearance was
due to the great quantity of trees which grew all
over the town, and which had now put on their
spring coat of green. The kindly leaves hid the
scarred and broken skeletons of the trees, and veiled
the shapeless ruins of the houses.
Inside, however, was a scene of utter desolation.
Not a living thing was to be seen in this city, which
once held 40,000 souls, save an occasional, hungry
pariah dog, engaged in his horrible work among the
graves of the dead.
The great mosque, which had once been a noble,
Ruins of the llreat Mosque at Gaza, shuwini; one of tlic iirches
of the old Crusader Church.
THE RUINS OF GAZA 125
Christian church, was almost entirely destroyed, but
not by our guns. The Turks had used it as an
ammunition depot, with that callous disregard for
the Holy Places of their own religion which was
always so characteristic of them, and, when the city
was abandoned, they blew up the great store of shells
there, and laid the mosque in ruins. Some of the
lower arches remained, and one beautiful Norman
gateway, but all the rest was a heap of tumbled
masonry.
The German headquarters was in the north-west
corner of the town, close to the remains of a graceful
little Greek church. The house in which the officers
lived was screened from view on all sides, and, as it
was far removed from any of the enemy defences,
it had escaped serious damage. But it was satis-
factory to note that both the tennis courts, which
had been made with such evident pains, had been
visited by eight-inch shells.
The rest of the city was a mass of ruins, stark and
silent. And so it is likely to remain for all time,
an awful witness to the devastation of war. Its in-
habitants have neither the energy of the people of
Europe, nor the incentive of a bitter climate, and
they are never likely to rebuild it.
By the end of January our front had been thor-
oughly consohdated, and the infantry had recovered
from the hard fighting and cruel weather of December.
The Commander-in-Chief now determined to extend
his line to the Jordan, in order to secure his right
flank.
There were several other advantages to be gained
by securing possession of one or two crossings over
the river. The enemy was at this time obtaining
large supphes of grain from the districts round Kerak,
in the land of Moab, on the eastern and south-
126 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
eastern shores of the Dead Sea. This grain was
carried across the sea, in barges towed by motor
boats, to the north end, whence it was transported
to the Turkish front by the good metalled road
from Jericho to Jerusalem. With Jericho and the
crossings of the Jordan immediately north of the
Dead Sea in our hands, we should have control of
the sea, and all this traffic would be stopped. The
grain would then have to be brought up to Amman,
thirty miles east of the Jordan, by the Hedjaz Rail-
way, and transported from there over some fifty
miles of bad mountain track. In the extremely
disorganised state of the Turkish transport, this
would be likely to cause the enemy much inconveni-
ence and delay. The control of the river crossings
at Jericho would also facilitate raiding operations
across the Jordan, directed against the enemy's line
of communications with the Hedjaz.
The operations necessary to secure these objects
were limited to the establishment of one or more
bridgeheads on the east bank of the Jordan, and to
an advance of our line northwards as far as the
Wadi el Auja, a small, perennial stream that flows
into the Jordan some nine miles north of the point
where the latter enters the Dead Sea.
The watershed between the Mediterranean and the
deep cleft of the Jordan Valley runs roughly north
and south, through the Mount of Olives. Some
description of the difficulties of the country on the
west of the watershed has already been given. On the
east side they are very much greater. The streams
that run down from the mountains to the plain
have cut gorges through the rock, often many hun-
dreds of feet deep, which divide the eastern portion
of the range into a series of parallel ridges running
east and west. Innumerable tributaries of the main
INTO THE JORDAN VALLEY 127
watercourses run in all directions, and split these
ridges again into isolated masses of rocks. It is
only possible to cross the main wadis in a few places,
so that movement north and south on the part of
any considerable body of troops is out of the question.
Going down the road from Jerusalem to Jericho,
the general fall of the ground is gradual to Talaat el
Dumm, the Hill of Blood, above the Good Samaritan
Inn. From here the road pitches down, in a series
of zigzags and hairpin turns, to the valley floor
nearly 3000 feet below. Farther north, at Jebel
Kuruntul, the traditional Mount of Temptation, the
mountains end abruptly in a single stupendous cliff,
over 1000 feet high.
Over this country the 60th Division and the Anzac
Mounted Division, which had concentrated at Beth-
lehem on the 18th of February, were directed to
move on Jericho.
The advance began on the 19th of February, in
heavy rain. All day the infantry struggled forward,
against strong opposition from the enemy, and by
nightfall had advanced nearly three miles, to a posi-
tion about a mile west of Talaat el Dumm.
Meanwhile the cavalry, moving to the south of the
60th Division, through the Wilderness of Jeshimon,
had reached El Muntar, about seven miles from the
Dead Sea, and some four miles south of the Jericho
road.
Next day the infantry stormed Talaat el Dumm
shortly after dawn, and advanced against the high
ridge of Jebel Ekteif, about one mile farther south,
while the cavalry moved on Jebel Kalimun and Tubk
el Kuneitra. Both these places were strongly held,
and the only possible lines of approach were under
accurate shell and machine-gun fire from the hill of
Nebi Musa, a little to the north. The cavahy had
128 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
to advance in single file along a iaw goat paths,
and they suffered considerably from the enemy fire,
without being able to make any adequate reply.
Shortly after mid-day, however, two regiments of the
New Zealand Mounted Brigade, having left their
horses under cover in a ravine, made an assault on
foot against the two hills, and captured both of them
after a sharp struggle.
Meanwhile the 1st A.L.H. Brigade found a way
down, along the gorge of the Wadi Kumran, and
debouched on to the plain, on the shores of the
Dead Sea, at dusk.
At dawn on the 21st, the New Zealand Brigade,
with a battalion from the 60th Division, occupied
Nebi Musa without opposition, the enemy having
retired along his whole line during the night. The
1st A.L.H. Brigade pushed rapidly over the plain,
and entered Jericho, which was found deserted, soon
after eight in the morning. From here patrols were
sent out to the east and north, and located the enemy
holding a bridgehead on the west bank of the Jordan
at Ghoraniyeh, east of Jericho, and in position along
the Wadi el Auja to the north.
A squadron of the New Zealand Brigade, patrolling
east from Nebi Musa, reached Rujm el Bahr, at the
north-west corner of the Dead Sea, which was the
northern base for the fleet of German motor boats
engaged in towing grain barges across the sea.
Shortly afterwards some of our troops found one
of these boats alongside the jetty, and succeeded
in capturing it intact. Mounting a machine gun in
the bows, they at once set out across the sea, and,
soon afterwards, encountered another German boat.
After an exciting chase they forced the enemy to
strike his colours, and, putting a ' prize crew ' aboard,
continued their voyage. In the course of their
INTO THE VALLEY AGAIN 129
cruise they sank another boat, and drove a fourth
aground ! Later on, these captured boats were taken
over by a detachment of the Royal Navy, and did
good service patrolHng the sea, and keeping open
the communications between our forces and the
Sherifian troops. They achieved the distinction of
being the first British war vessels to be navigated
1300 feet below the level of the ocean.
As the enemy bridgehead at Ghoraniyeh was
found to be strongly held, and its capture would
have entailed heavy losses, it was decided not to
attempt an attack. Our infantry withdrew to a
position running north and south astride the Jericho
road, at Talaat el Dumm, and the Anzac Mounted
Division returned to Bethlehem, leaving one regi-
ment to patrol the valley.
Some idea of the difficulties of the country during
these operations may be gathered by the fact tPiat
a battery of field artillery, unhampered by enemy
action, took thirty-six hours to advance eight miles.
During the first half of March the 60th Division
again descended into the valley, and, after some very
stiff fighting, succeeded in establishing our fine north
of the Wadi el Auja, from the Jordan to the moun-
tains. Thereupon the Turks withdrew their bridge-
head at Ghoraniyeh, and retired to the east bank of
the river.
This operation cleared the lower Jordan Valley of
the enemy, and established a base broad enough to
enable a raid to be undertaken against the Hedjaz
Railway, the Turkish line of communications for the
force operating against the Arabs round Maan.
The Arab forces, which were under the control of
General Allenby, were based on Akaba, at the north
end of the Red Sea. They were supplied by us with
arms, ammimition and light guns, and largely led
I
130 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
by British officers, chief among whom were Lieu-
tenant-Colonels Lawrence and Joyce.
Though intolerant of anything in the nature of
discipline, and constantly at war among themselves,
many of the Arab tribes of the Hedjaz had joined the
standard of the old Sherif Hussein, moved thereto by
their hatred of the Turks. Under Hussein's energetic
son Feisal, they had carried on a successful guerilla
warfare against the scattered Turkish garrisons since
June 1916. Their operations were directed especially
against the Hedjaz Railway. Under the leadership
of the daring and beloved Lawrence, train wrecking
was elevated among the Arabs to the status of a
national sport. Many of the wrecked trains yielded
rich booty to the Sherif, and on one occasion the
haul included £20,000 in Turkish gold. Eighteen
months of this warfare had given the Arabs valuable
experience, and numerous minor successes had in-
duced many tribes who were wavering to throw in
their lot with the Sherif.
By the end of 1917 the Emir Feisal' s forces were
strong enough to undertake more serious operations.
In January 1918 he seized the high ground a few miles
south of Maan, while another force, under a local
leader, destroyed a large part of the Turkish light
railway which had been built from Kalaat Aneiza
on the Hedjaz Hne to the Hish Forest, and was used
to transport wood as fuel for locomotives. Shortly
afterwards another force raided a station on the
Hedjaz Une, some thirty miles north of Maan, destroy-
ing the station buildings and some engines and roUing
stock. In this raid the Arabs took over 200 prisoners,
and killed a large number of Turks. Farther north,
Arabs of the Huweitat tribe captured Tafile, which
is only fifteen miles south-east of the south end of
the Dead Sea. A considerable Turkish force, with
AN ARAB SUCCESS 131
guns and machine guns, which was sent, towards
the end of January, to recapture this place, was
decisively beaten by the Arabs, with a loss of 500
killed and 250 prisoners. In March a larger body
of Turkish troops, reinforced by a German battalion,
reoccupied Tafile, the Arabs withdrawing to the
south. ^
* See Appendix ii. for note on the Arab Movement.
CHAPTER XII
THE FIRST TRANS-JORDAN RAID
In view of the successes obtained by the Arabs,
General AUenby now judged the time to be ripe for a
raid by our troops on the Hedjaz Railway at Amman,
which he had long contemplated. The immediate
effect of such a raid would be to compel the enemy
to withdraw the force which had recently occupied
Tafile. It might, in addition, force him to call on
the Turkish troops at Maan for aid, thus weakening
the garrison there, and giving the Arabs an oppor-
tunity to attack the place with some prospects of
success. A further result to be expected from the
raid would be to induce the enemy to keep a large
part of his army east of the Jordan, thus correspond-
ingly weakening his forces in the Judsean hills.
The deep and difficult vaUey of the Jordan, and the
river itself, would, moreover, form a dangerous ob-
stacle to communication between the two portions of
his army, a fact which might be expected to assist
us materially in our next general advance.
Amman was the one really vulnerable point on
the Hedjaz Railway. The Arabs had frequently
destroyed portions of the line farther south, but
such raids only resulted in interrupting the traffic
for a few days at a time. Material for repair was
available at every station, and long practice had
brought the Turkish engineers to a high state of
efficiency in restoring these temporarily damaged
places. At Amman, however, the line ran over a
1S2
THE TRANS-JORDAN COUNTRY 133
viaduct, and through a considerable tunnel. If these
two works could be thoroughly destroyed, the result-
ing interruption of traffic might well be so pro-
longed as to compel the retirement of the whole of
the enemy force in the Maan area. Such a prospect
justified the acceptance of greater risks than General
Allenby proposed to incur.
The Turks were well aware that Amman was the
Achilles' heel of the Hedjaz Expeditionary Force,
and had provided for its protection as many troops
as they could spare. The town itself, which lay im-
mediately to the west of, and covering, the tunnel
and viaduct, had been garrisoned and prepared for
defence. An advanced defensive position had been
estabHshed astride the Jericho-El Salt road, ex-
tending from El Hand to Shunet Nimrin, and a
third position was in course of preparation on the
east bank of the Jordan, opposite El Ghoraniyeh.
The Anzac Mounted Division, with the Camel
Corps Brigade attached, and the 60th Division were
detailed to carry out the raid, which had as its sole
object the destruction of the viaduct and tunnel.
The town of Amman, which is the principal Circassian
settlement in Sjn^ia, lies some thirty miles east-
north-east of the north end of the Dead Sea, and is
connected with Jericho by an indifferent metalled
road, passing through El Salt, which the Turks had
constructed during the war. From the Jordan at
El Ghoraniyeh, 1200 feet below the level of the sea,
to Naaur, sixteen miles farther east, at the edge of
the plateau on which Amman lies, the ground rises
4300 feet. Nearly the whole of this rise occurs in
the last ten miles before Naaur is reached, and the
intervening country is a maze of rocky hills, inter-
sected by deep ravines, and traversed only by a
few narrow footpaths.
134 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
In the course of the ages the Jordan has cut a
deep trough through the valley, varying in width
from a few hundred yards to a mile or more, and
lying about 100 feet below the general level of the
surrounding country. The bottom of this trough is
a flat plain covered with a dense jungle of tamarisk,
and the banks are, in most places, perpendicular.
The present channel winds about down the trough,
and is only about forty yards wide in normal weather,
but the river is deep and very swift, and hable to a
rapid rise after heavy rain.
The main watercourses descend from the hills on
the east in a series of deep gorges, which traverse
the narrow strip of flat country between the foot-
hills and the old channel, and form a succession of
barriers to movement along this strip, north and
south. Many of these gorges can only be crossed
by a single track, which runs from near Beisan,
fifteen miles south of Lake Tiberias, to El Ghor-
aniyeh.
The plan was for the 60th Division to force the
passage of the river, drive the enemy from his posi-
tion at Shunet Nimrin, and then advance up to
Jericho-Amman road, as far as El Salt, which was
to be seized and held. Meanwhile the rest of the
cavalry and the Camel Brigade were to move direct
on Amman by the tracks through Naaur and Ain el
Sir. After blowing up the viaduct and tunnel at
Amman, and destroying as much of the railway hne
as they could, they were to withdraw on the 60tli
Division, and the whole force would then recross
the Jordan, leaving permanent bridgeheads on the
east bank.
The operation was thus purely a raid. Our
cavalry would again be engaged in a country that
was at least as unsuited for mounted work as was
BRIDGING THE JORDAN 135
the Judsean Range, of which we had already had
such unfavourable experience. The only informa-
tion available about the Amman hills, other than
that of natives, which was always quite unreliable,
was contained in a memorandum written for the
Commander-in-Chief by two mission fathers who had
spent many years in the country east of the Jordan
and Dead Sea. This document was an admirable
ethnographical and geographical treatise, but, from
the military point of view, which requires the utmost
detail of description as regards the terrain, it left
much to be desired. It appeared, however, that
cavahy might be expected to be able to move with
some speed up the Naaur-Ain el Sir track to Amman,
in fine weather, and thus carry out the necessary
demolition on the railway, and make good their
retreat, before the enemy should have time to rein-
force his troops east of the Jordan.
During the night of the 21st of March a party of
swimmers of the 60th Division succeeded, after many
fruitless attempts, in getting a line across the Jordan
at Makhadet Hajlah, some six miles south of El
Ghoraniyeh, and bridge building began at once. Our
infantry and engineers suffered severely from the
enemy's fire, but the bridge was completed by eight
in the morning, and by mid-day a brigade of infantry
was over the river, and forcing its way through the
dense tamarisk jungle on the east side.
Meanwhile, similar attempts to cross at El Ghor-
aniyeh during the night had been frustrated by the
strength of the current. The efforts had to be
abandoned during the daytime, owing to the activity
of the enemy, but were renewed during the night of
the 22nd. These attempts again failed, and it was
not until the morning of the 23rd that a raft was
got across here. At four o'clock in the morning a
136 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
regiment of the New Zealand Mounted Brigade
crossed the river by the pontoon bridge at Mak-
hadet Hajlah, and, galloping along the bank to the
north, cleared the enemy from the east bank opposite
Ghoraniyeh, thus facihtating the crossing of our in-
fantry at that place. By mid-day this regiment had
seized the high ground commanding El Ghoraniyeh,
capturing about seventy prisoners and several machine
guns.
They were followed across the Jordan by a regi-
ment of the 1st A.L.H. Brigade, which cleared the
enemy from the country south of Hajlah, and gained
touch with a party of infantry which had crossed
the Dead vSea in motor boats, and landed on the east
bank of the river near its mouth.
By nightfall a second pontoon bridge had been
thrown across the Jordan at Hajlah, and three more
had been completed at Ghoraniyeh. The whole
force detailed for the raid had safely crossed the
river before daylight on the 24th.
As soon as it was light enough to see, the advance
on Amman commenced. The 1st A.L.H. Brigade
moved up to El Mandesi, about three miles north of
Ghoraniyeh, to cover the left flank of the 60th Divi-
sion during the attack on the enemy positions astride
the Amman road, at El Hand and Shunet Nimrin.
El Haud was captured about three in the afternoon,
after hard fighting, and its possession enabled our
infantry to turn the right flank of the enemy, who
then retired on El Salt. A squadron of the New
Zealanders pursued the Turks, followed by our in-
fantry, but the bad state of the road, which the
enemy blew up in several places as he retired, delayed
the pui'suit. The rest of the New Zealand Brigade
moved on El Sir up the Wadi Jofet el Ghazlaniye.
At nightfall our infantry had only succeeded in
ADVANCE ON EL SIR 137
advancing about four miles from Shunet Nimrin,
and were in touch with the enemy astride the road.
Meanwhile the 2nd A.L.H. Brigade, followed by
the Camel Corps, had been floundering up the Wadi
Kef rein, south of the road, and reached Rujm el
Oshh' about half-past three in the afternoon. Here
the track, such as it was, petered out altogether, and
all wheeled transport had to be sent back, the ammuni-
tion being transferred to camels. This caused a long
delay, and it was not till half -past nine at night that
the march could be renewed. Heavy rain had fallen
for several days prior to the commencement of the
operations, and all the tracks were deep in mud.
Rain came on again during the night of the 24th,
and continued during the whole of the next three
days, accompanied by bitter cold. Under this down-
pour the tracks marked on the map revealed them-
selves for what they really were, the beds of mountain
streams. Each of them was transformed into a rush-
ing torrent, carrying down rocks and mud in its
course. Bad as they were, however, they formed
the only possible lines of advance in this mountain
country, and the cavalry had to make the best of
them.
Pushing and pulling their shivering and exhausted
animals up the track, the 2nd A.L.H. Brigade and
the Camel Corps stumbled on in the rain and dark-
ness all night. At half-past four next morning the
head of the column reached Ain el Hekr, having taken
just twenty-four hours to cover the sixteen miles
from the Jordan. The whole day was spent in
closing up the remainder of the column, and it was
not till half-past seven in the evening that the last
of the Camel Corps got in, having walked the whole
way, pulling their camels after them.
As soon as they were in, the advance was continued,
138 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
via Naaur, in pouring rain. Diuing this part of the
march the way was not so steep as in the earher part,
but the alternate deep mud and shppery rock over
which the track led caused endless delays, especially
to the camels, and the force was soon strung out
again over a length of many miles. At five on the
morning of the 26th, the head of the column met the
New Zealand Brigade at the cross tracks one mile
east of El Sir. The New Zealanders had encountered
similar difficulties of country and climate, and both
men and horses were in an exhausted condition.
General Chaytor now received orders to push on
at once, and seize Amman ! But, as his men had
been marching for three consecutive nights (includ-
ing the move to the point of assembly west of the
Jordan), under conditions of the utmost discomfort
and fatigue, he considered that they were in no state
to make an attack on a strongly held position, even
if it were possible to reach Amman before nightfall,
which was extremely unlikely. He therefore asked,
and received, permission to halt for twenty-four
hours, and march on Amman next morning. Out-
posts were placed north, east, and south of El Sir,
and strong patrols of the 2nd Brigade were sent out
to reconnoitre northwards, as far as the El Salt-
Amman road. These patrols encountered a body of
the enemy near El Sweileh, and dispersed it, taking
170 prisoners. They also destroyed thirty German
motor lorries and a car, which they found here, stuck
fast in the mud.
While the Anzac Division was struggling towards
El Sir on the 25th, the infantry of the 60th Division
had been marching up the main road from Shunet
Nimrin towards El Salt, with the 1st A.L.H. Brigade
on their left flank, on the Wadi Arseniyet track.
This brigade reached El Salt about six in the evening.
TWO RAILWAY RAIDS 139
and was joined there, some two hours later, by a
brigade of the 60th Division. A second infantry
brigade arrived at midnight. The place had been
evacuated by the enemy, in consequence of the threat
to his rear caused by the advance of our cavalry to
El Sir.
Our infantry were now quite as exhausted as the
cavalry. They had been marching or fighting con-
tinually for three days and nights, over difficult
mountain country, and in most inclement weather,
and it was necessary to give them a day's rest. The
first A.L.H. Brigade was directed to remain at El
Salt, and patrol the country to the north and north-
west of that place.
Thus, on the morning of the 27th, when the advance
was resumed, the foremost troops of the raiding force
were little more than two-thirds of the way to Amman.
The delay had been of the utmost value to the Turks,
who were hurrying up reinforcements by road and
rail.
During the previous night General Chaytor had
sent two small raiding parties, mounted on the
freshest horses available, to try and blow up the
Hedjaz Railway north and south of Amman, in order
to entrap a considerable quantity of rolling stock
which was reported to be in the station. The 2nd
A.L.H. Brigade party made for the railway north of
Amman, but encountered a body of Turkish cavalry,
and was forced to turn back. The New Zealanders,
who were directed south of the town, were more
fortunate, and succeeded in reaching the railway at
a point some seven miles south of Amman station.
Having destroyed a considerable stretch of the line,
they withdrew safely, and made their way back to
El Sir.
This march, carried out at night, in unknown and
140 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
very difficult country, without guides or reliable
maps, and into the heart of the enemy's country,
was a striking example of the special qualities of the
Australian and New Zealand Cavalry. Trained from
the cradle in the art of finding their way in un-
charted country, they have the bushman's almost
uncanny sense of direction. Tireless as the wiry
horses they breed and ride, possessed of a wonderful
keenness of vision, alert, wary and supremely self-
confident, they are the finest scouts in the world.
The advance on Amman was resumed on the 27th.
Early in the morning a light car patrol arrived at
Sweileh from El Salt, but could get no farther east,
owing to the mud. General Chaytor, therefore,
ordered the cars to remain at Sweileh, as a flank
guard to his division during the attack on Amman.
A brigade of infantry, with two mountain batteries,
set out from El Salt at five in the morning, to march
to the support of the Anzac Division. This brigade
could not be expected at Amman till late at night,
but it was hoped that the Anzac Division would be
able to take the place before then. Unfortunately
the delay to our troops caused by the rain had
afforded time to the enemy both to improve his
defence and to reinforce his garrison.
General Chaytor directed the New Zealand Brigade
to cross the Wadi Amman, south-west of the town,
and move against the high ground overlooking
the town and station from the south. One bat-
tahon of the Camel Corps Brigade, acting on the
right of the New Zealanders, was to destroy as much
of the fine as possible.
The 2nd A.L.H. Brigade was ordered to push
forward to the railway north of Amman as quickly
as possible, and cut the line, in order both to isolate
the rolling stock in the station, and to delay the
FIRST ATTACK ON AMMAN 141
arrival of possible reinforcements from the north.
The brigade was then to attack the enemy positions
from the north-west. The Camel Corps Brigade, less
one battahon, was to attack from the west.
There was no divisional reserve. It was con-
sidered that the superior mobility of our cavalry and
camehy would enable them to disengage from the
fight, should such a course become necessary, and
fall back on our infantry advancing from El Salt.
Moreover, the difficulties of the country were so
great that it was doubtful if a divisional reserve could
have reached any distant part of the Hne that was
hard pressed, in time to be of any service.
The three brigades set out from Ain el Sir at nine
o'clock. AU three were much impeded by difficulties
of terrain. Deep mud alternated with stretches of
wet and slippery rock, on which neither camels nor
horses could get secure foothold. The camels suffered
particular^ severely. Designed by nature for work
in the soft and yielding sand of the desert, they are
more unfitted than any other animal to march over
stony country, or through mud. Many of them fell
and broke their legs, and had to be shot. Many
more had aheady met the same fate during the
awful climb up to the plateau from the Jordan Valley.
In several places large morasses were encountered,
and much precious time was wasted finding a way
round these. The wadis, too, were deep and pre-
cipitous, particularly the Wadi Amman, which was
impassable save in one or two places, and then only
in single file.
The New Zealanders reached this wadi about
half-past ten in the morning, and were delayed so
long in crossing it that it was three in the afternoon
before they reached the railway.
The Camel Corps Battalion then moved south
142 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
along the line, with a demolition party, blowing up
the railway. While engaged on this work, they met
an enemy train, steaming slowly over the very
portion of the line that had been blown up by the
New Zealanders the night before ! The train was en-
gaged with machine-gun fire, and withdrew. Our men
then examined the line, and learnt a valuable lesson
in the art of temporary destruction of a railway.
It was the custom at that time for our raiding
parties, which could only carry a small quantity of
explosives, and no tools suitable for carrying out a
systematic destruction, to blow a piece out of each
rail, by means of slabs of gun-cotton placed on each
side of it. The gaps thus made were about a foot
long. A length of several miles of line, in which
each rail had a piece cut clean out of the middle, had
the appearance of having been very thoroughly
destroyed, and it was believed that the whole line
would have to be relaid with new rails before it
could be used. But the ingenious German engineers
discovered that, if a hard-wood sleeper were pushed
into each gap, with its end flush with the inner edge
of the rail, trains could be run over the line at once,
provided they were driven slowly.
As a result of this experience. Captain Brisbane,
an engineer officer of the Australian Mounted Divi-
sion, devised a better method, which consisted in
attaching one slab of gun-cotton only to the outside
of the rails at each joint. When this was detonated,
the fishplates were blown off, and the ends of the
two rails were bent sharply inwards. Demolitions
carried out by this method could only be repaired by
relaying the line completely.^
^ At a demonstration given some months later by a small party of
engineers specially trained by this officer, one mile of track was com-
pletely destroyed in ten minutes.
ANOTHER RAILWAY RAID 143
While the New Zealanders had been searching for
a crossing place over the wadi, the 2nd A.H.L.
Brigade had pushed forward on the north-west, and
got to within three miles of Amman, when it was
heavily counter-attacked, about eleven o'clock, by a
large force of the enemy, well supplied with artillery.
The attack was beaten off, after severe fighting, but
more Turks appeared to the north of the brigade,
and began to work round its left. General R3rrie
had to form a defensive flank to meet this threat,
and his advance was stopped. Meanwhile the Camel
Brigade, advancing straight on Amman astride the
Sweileh track, was held up by heavy machine-gun
fire, on reaching the open ground west of the town,
and could get no farther.
The New Zealanders fared no better. They were
very heavily attacked when attempting to seize
the high ground south of Amman, and forced to
give ground. The Turks attacked repeatedly on the
north, west and south, and in ever increasing numbers,
and our small force was hard put to it to hold its
own. It was soon obvious that no farther progress
was possible. General Chaytor, therefore, ordered
his brigades to hold their present positions as night
outposts, till the arrival of the infantry, and to keep
touch with the enemy by means of frequent patrols.
The force was strung out over a wide front, lateral
communication was very difficult, and only small,
local reserves were available. Fortunately the Turks
contented themselves with digging hard all night,
and erecting rock sangars, and made no serious
attempt to attack.
During the night a raiding party, consisting of a
few men from the 2nd A.L.H. Brigade, succeeded in
penetrating through the enemy in the dark, and blew
up a two-arch bridge near Khurbet el Raseife, seven
144 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
miles north of Amman. The gallant little party
returned safely before dawn, having done damage
sufficient to interrupt traffic from the north for at
least forty-eight hours. Before that period had
expired, it was hoped that Amman would be in our
hands.
Dawn found our weary troops cramped and stiff
with their long night's vigil in the bitter cold. They
had been marching and fighting for four days and
nights, with only one night's rest, and had been wet
through the whole time. The Turkish guns opened
the ball soon after dayhght, and shelled our positions
intermittently dm-ing the morning.
About mid-day two battalions of infantry arrived
from El Salt. They had been delayed at Sweileh,
the previous night, in consequence of having marched
into the middle of a sort of Belfast riot between the
Circassians (Moslems) of Sweileh and the Christian
Arabs of El Fuheis. With two separate wars thus
going on in the same area, the situation appeared too
obscure for farther advance, especially as both Cir-
cassians and Arabs showed a disposition to fire impar-
tially on all who came within range, quite irrespective
of their reUgion or politics. The column had, there-
fore, halted for the night.
General Chaytor had expected to be reinforced by
a brigade of infantry during the previous night, and,
in anticipation of its arrival, had issued orders for
an attack soon after daylight. Though disappointed
at receiving only two battalions, and those not till
twelve hours later than he had expected, he decided,
in view of the urgency of the situation, to attack
at once.
The infantry were pushed in between the Camel
Corps and the 2nd A.L.H. Brigade, and ordered to
advance with their right on the Sweileh- Amman
SECOND ATTACK ON AMMAN 145
road. The attack commenced at two o'clock, and
the whole line pressed forward vigorously, and got to
within 1000 yards of the enemy positions in the
centre, when a very heavy counter-attack was
launched against the 2nd A.L.H. Brigade. The
cavalry were pressed back some distance under the
weight of this attack, thus exposing the left of the
infantry. Intense machine-gun fire was now opened
on the infantry and Camel Corps, who were on the
edge of a bare, open plateau, which extends for some
distance west of the town. Our attack was brought
to a stop, and, as it was clearly impossible to make
any farther progress in face of the strong enemy re-
sistance, and as night was coming on, General Chaytor
withdrew his force a little, to positions suitable for
battle night outposts, and ordered them to hold on
till next morning, when the remainder of the in-
fantry brigade was expected up.
Desultory firing continued all night, but the enemy
made no attack. Parties of the 2nd A.L.H. and New
Zealand Brigades were active throughout the night,
patrolUng up to and across the railway, north and
south of Amman. They were assisted by friendly
Arabs, who spent the hours of darkness sniping at
parties attempting to mend the bridge which had
been blown up the previous night. Others co-
operated with a troop of the New Zealand Brigade,
to prevent any trains approaching Amman from the
south.
The rest of the infantry brigade, accompanied by
two mountain batteries, joined General Chaytor' s
force about mid-day on the 29th. We then had two
brigades of cavalry, one of infantry, and the Camel
Brigade at Amman ; a cavalry brigade and an infantry
brigade at El Salt, fifteen miles farther west ; and a
third brigade of infantry between Shunet Nimrin and
K
146 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
the bridgeheads on the Jordan. There were no troops
available to increase this force. *
During the morning, fresh enemy reinforcements
reached Amman by rail from the north, and these
troops immediately developed a strong attack against
the left flank of our line. The 2nd A.L.H. Brigade
drove off this attack, but the Turks repeatedly as-
saulted the position held by the brigade during the
day, and gave our weary troops no rest.
Meanwhile a further complication had arisen, owing
to a considerable body of the enemy from west of
the Jordan having crossed the river at Jisr el Damieh,
fifteen miles north of Ghoraniyeh, on the previous
day, and commenced to advance up the track towards
El Salt. On the morning of the 29th, the advance
guard of this force, .consisting of the Turkish 3rd
Cavalry Division and two brigades of infantry, was
beginning to make its pressure felt against our posi-
tions at El Salt. The 1st A.L.H. Brigade, supported
by some field artillery, moved out to oppose it.
The rain had continued without abatement from
the commencement of the operations, and the country
was now in an almost impassable state. To add to
our difficulties, the Jordan suddenly rose no less than
nine feet during the morning of the 29th, and the
flood water swept away all but one of our bridges.
The approaches to the remaining bridge were under
water, and it was evident that, if the river rose any
higher, it, too, would be swept away, and our force east
of the river would be cut off in the enemy's country.
It was clear that, if Amman was to be taken, there
was no time to be lost. General Chaytor had in-
tended to attack as soon as the infantry reinforce-
ments had arrived, but, in view of their exhausted
state, he decided, after consultation with the brigadier,
General Da Costa, to put off the attack till dark.
THIRD ATTACK ON AMMAN 147
Such men as could be spared from the fighting had
been set to work repairing the road beyond El Salt,
and, by the afternoon of the 29th, it was sufficiently
restored to enable a battery of Horse Artillery to
start for Amman from Shunet Nimrin.
The New Zealand Brigade, with one battalion of the
Camel Corps on its right, was directed to seize Point
3039, a high hill about a mile south-east of Amman
town, which commanded both the town and the
station. This hill was strongly held by the enemy,
who occupied two lines of entrenchments, one above
the other, on the southern slopes. The Camel Corps
Brigade and the infantry, moving respectively south
and north of the El Salt road, were to attack the
town and the old citadel. The 2nd A.L.H. Brigade
was instructed to make itself as offensive as possible
on the north flank, so as to distract the enemy's
attention from the movements of our troops farther
south.
The advance began at two o'clock in the morning.
It was very dark and raining hard, and the troops
had great difficulty in keeping in touch and main-
taining direction over the rocky ground. The New
Zealanders, very skilfully led, evaded the enemy
trenches at the bottom of the hill, and reached the
second line, higher up the slope, which they attacked
with the bayonet, and captured. When day broke
the Turks in the trenches below were forced to sur-
render without firing a shot. The New Zealanders
now got on to the top of 3039 at the southern end,
where they were held up by intense machine-gun
fire. The Turks followed up this fire with a deter-
mined counter-attack, just at dawn, which was
beaten off, but only with the greatest difficulty.
Meanwhile the Camel Brigade and the infantry,
in the centre, had met with success at first, having
148 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
captured the enemy's advanced trenches, with about
200 prisoners. About nine o'clock the Camel Brigade,
then about 800 yards west of the main enemy posi-
tion, came under heavy machine-gun fire from both
flanks, especially from the north end of 3039, which
the New Zealanders had been unable to take, and
from the old citadel on the left front. At the same
time the enemy launched a powerful counter-attack
against the left flank of our infantry, in the gap
between them and the 2nd A.L.H. Brigade. This
attack was repulsed, but the Turks maintained a
continuous and heavy pressure against this flank all
day, and our troops were barely able to hold their
ground.
Fresh enemy reinforcements arrived from the
north about ten o'clock, and immediately launched
another violent attack on the New Zealand Brigade,
which was chnging precariously to the southern edge
of Hill 3039. The attack was repulsed, but only
after prolonged and anxious fighting. The Somerset
Battery R.H.A., which had left Shunet Nimrin the
previous day, and had been marching for thirty
hours, arrived just in time to take a decisive part in
repelling this attack.
The enemy then directed an intense shell fire on
the New Zealanders, and attacked the Camel Corps
battalion on their right, with the evident intention
of outflanking our troops on the hill. This attack
was also beaten off, and, for the rest of the day, the
Turks contented themselves with shelling the hill
heavily, but did not succeed in dislodging the New
Zealand Brigade.
Early in the afternoon the persistent enemy attacks
against the left flank of our infantry ceased, pro-
bably as a result of a push forward made by the 2nd
A.L.H. Brigade farther north. The infantry took
WITHDRAWAL OF THE RAIDING FORCE 149
advantage of this respite to resume their dogged
advance on the Amman town position. They pressed
forward till they were held up by the deep fosse on
the west side of the citadel. Here they came under
a murderous machine-gun fire from both flanks. The
few mountain guns with our force were quite inade-
quate to the task of keeping down this hostile fire,
and could make no impression on the thick stone
walls of the old citadel. Our infantry had to with-
draw to shelter.
Fresh enemy troops continued to arrive from the
north, and General Chaytor now reluctantly reported
that he saw no hope of taking Amman with the force
at his disposal, and that any further attempt would
only entail useless loss of life. No reinforcements
were available ; indeed, during the day, a battalion
of infantry had been ordered back from Amman to
El Salt. This battalion was the only one that had
not been engaged, and constituted the last of our
reserves.
El Salt itself had been heavily attacked all day
long. The enemy column that had crossed the
Jordan, and advanced up the Jisr el Damieh track,
drove in our advanced post on that side during
the morning. The Turks continued to press their at-
tack with the greatest determination from the west,
north-west and north, and soon all our scanty reserves
were involved. One battalion of infantry had been
spared from the brigade that was covering the
country from the Jordan to Shunet Nimrin, and
one had been sent back from Amman, as already
stated.
At four o'clock in the afternoon, our troops at
Amman and El Salt were only just holding their own,
and it was doubtful if they could do so much longer,
in face of the constantly increasing strength of the
150 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
enemy. General Shea,^ who was in command of the
whole force, decided to withdraw. The troops at
Amman were to move first, breaking off the action
as soon as it was dark, and retiring along the Ain el
Sir tracks.
As soon as darlaiess fell the New Zealand Brigade
and the detached battalion of the Camel Corps dis-
engaged, and fell back to the west bank of the Wadi
Amman, where they held a line of posts to cover the
withdi'awal of the infantry and the Camel Corps
Brigade. The infantry marched along the El Salt
road, covered by the 2nd A.L.H. Brigade, as far as
Sweileh, where they turned off towards El Sir, to
avoid the fighting that was going on at El Salt. The
New Zealanders held their position west of the wadi
till the infantry had reached El Sir, and had a sharp
action with the Turks, who had followed up closely.
The enemy was finally repulsed at daybreak, and the
New Zealanders then fell back slowly to Ain el Sir,
which they reached in the evening. The retirement
continued through the night, in the rain and darkness.
Just as the rearguard troops of the New Zealand
Brigade were moving out of El Sir, they were treacher-
ously fired on by some of the local inhabitants. A
troop was at once sent back into the village, and
attacked a party of Arabs caught in the act of sniping
at our men. Thirty of the natives were killed in the
encounter, and this condign punishment had an
instant effect. We had no more trouble from the
local Arabs.
Meanwhile the fierce attacks on El Salt had con-
tinued all through the 31st, and it was not till eleven
o'clock at night that the Turks finally drew off
exhausted. During the night of the 1st of April,
1 Major-General Sir J. S. M. Shea, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., command-
ing the 60th Division.
TRIALS OF THE WOUNDED 151
our troops withdrew from the village unmolested,
covered by the 1st A.L.H. Brigade, having destroyed
all the enemy ammunition and stores there, and the
whole force was safely across the Jordan by the
evening of the 2nd.
The operations had lasted twelve days, and it
had rained almost the whole time. The troops were
without tents or shelter of any kind, and, for the
last ninety hours of the operations, they had been
marching and fighting continuously, without sleep
or rest. The fighting, too, had been severe, and our
casualties, about 1600 killed, wounded and missing,
sufficiently heavy, considering the small size of our
force, and the absence of any great artillery concen-
tration against us.
The wounded suffered severely. The nearest hos-
pital was at Jerusalem, separated from Amman by
more than sixty miles of bad mountain road. From
the firing line the wounded were taken in camel
cacolets ^ to a motor ambulance relay station on the
road between Amman and El Salt. The tortures of
this mode of conveyance to a wounded man have to
be experienced to be believed. When the animal,
having received its double burden, rises with its
peculiar jerk forward, it nearly pitches the patients
out of the cacolets. Thereafter, each lurching step
of the long, agonising march stretches the unhappy
victims upon a species of rack comparable to that
of a mediaeval torture chamber.
At the relay station, five miles east of El Salt,
the wounded were transferred to ambulance motor
cars, which ran them into El Salt. Here there was
an advanced dressing station, where wounds were
attended to, and then the victims were again loaded
^ Canvas hammocks, stiffened with bamhoo poles and slung one on
each side of the camel, to take a man lying down.
152 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
into ambulances, and run down to the main dressing
station at Shunet Nimrin. At this station they were
taken over by a fresh relay of cars, which carried
them as far as Jericho, if they were lucky. When the
bridges were washed away, however, it was for a
time unsafe for the cars to cross the one remaining
bridge, and the men had to be carried across the
river on stretchers, and put into cars on the west
bank. At Jericho there was an operating unit for
serious cases, and there is no doubt that this unit
saved the lives of many by an immediate operation,
who would almost certainly have died had they been
sent straight on to Jerusalem. Another change of
ears was made at Jericho, and another at Talaat el
Dumm. And then at last the long nightmare of the
journey ended in the blessed peace and comfort of a
hospital in Jerusalem.
Nearly 2000 cases, including the sick, were evacuated
in this way during the operations.
German motor boat leavinji Jerusalem for the Dead Sen
(From an enemy photograph.)
Turks loading grain from Moah for transport across the Dead Sea.
(From an enemy photograph.)
CHAPTER XIII
THE SECOND TRANS-JORDAN RAID
Though the raid on Amman had failed in its primary
object of so damaging the railway as to compel the
withdrawal of the Turkish forces in the Hedjaz, it
had succeeded in drawing northwards and retaining
not only the Turkish troops which had been operat-
ing against the Arabs, but also a portion of the
garrison of Maan and the stations farther south.
Indeed the number of enemy troops east of the
Jordan, in the Amman-El Salt-Shunet Nimrin area,
was doubled as a result of these operations.
Taking advantage of this weakening of the Turkish
forces opposed to him, the Emir Feisal renewed his
attempts on Maan, and, during the first half of April,
successfully destroyed a considerable portion of the
railway both north and south of it, and even cap-
tured an outwork of the town itself, within two miles
of the main positions.
Apart from the help given to the Arabs, the raid
had resulted in a loss to the enemy of nearly 1000
prisoners and of all his ammunition and stores at
El Salt. His losses in kiUed and wounded were
estimated to have been not less than 1700.
Moreover the bridgehead which had been estab-
lished across the Jordan at Ghoraniyeh was main-
tained and improved, and, a little later on, another
bridge was thrown over the river some four miles
farther north, at the mouth of the river Auja.
These bridges were a perpetual menace to the
Turks across the Jordan, and caused them great un-
153
154 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
easiness. On April 11th they made a determined
attack on the Ghoraniyeh bridgehead simultaneously
with an attack by German troops on our positions
west of the Jordan, north of the Wadi el Auja. The
bridgehead was held at the time by the 1st A.L.H.
Brigade, and the Auja positions by the 2nd A.L.H.
Brigade and the Camel Corps. Both attacks were
pressed vigorously throughout the day, but ended
in the complete defeat of the enemy, who left som«
500 dead on the two positions, and over 100 prisoners
in our hands.
Towards the end of April preparations were begun
for a second raid across the Jordan. After the failure
of his attack on the Ghoraniyeh bridgehead, the
enemy had largely increased his forces east of the
river, and had improved and strengthened his en-
trenched position at Shunet Nimrin. At the end of
April he had about 8000 troops occupying this position.
General Allenby determined to try to cut off and de-
stroy this force, and, if successful, to hold El Salt till
the Arab forces could advance and relieve our troops.
The great German offensive in France in March
and April resulted in the force in Palestine being
called upon to send to Europe every man and gun
that could be spared. Thus, during April, the
Yeomanry Division and two infantry divisions,
besides ten other infantry battalions and a number
of siege batteries and machine gun companies, were
withdrawn from the line, and embarked for France.
These troops were replaced by Indian regiments, the
Yeomanry by Indian cavalry from France, and the
infantry partly by the Lahore Division from Meso-
potamia, and partly by untrained native troops
from India. ^
^ See Appendix i. a for composition of Desert Mounted Corps after the
reorganisation.
THE BENI SAKHR 155
It was originally intended that the raid should
take place about the middle of May, when the re-
organisation had been completed, and the full strength
of the Desert Mounted Corps would have been avail-
able. A necessary part of the raid, however, was the
co-operation of the powerful Beni Sakhr tribe of
Arabs, numbering some 7000 fighting men, which
was at that time in the district round Madeba, about
twelve miles east of the north end of the Dead Sea.
Towards the end of April this tribe reported that
their supplies would be exhausted by the 4th of
May, and that they would then have to move to their
summer grazing grounds farther south. The Com-
mander-in-Chief therefore decided to attack at once,
without waiting for the arrival of the Indian troops,
though, in doing so, he was compelled to carry out
the operations with a considerably smaller force than
would have been the case if he had been able to wait
another fortnight.
Thus the troops available for the raid consisted
only of the Anzac and Australian Mounted Divisions,
with two brigades of the 60th Division, and the
(Indian) Imperial Service Cavalry and Infantry
Brigades.
There was good reason for the employment of
this large proportion of cavalry in an operation that
was to be carried out in country most unsuited for
mounted work.
General AUenby was always reluctant to keep his
mounted troops in the trenches, if he could avoid
doing so. Cavalry are most uneconomical troops in
trench warfare, since at least a quarter of them are
occupied caring for the horses, and consequently are
not available for the firing Une. Moreover, while
employed in the line, they are deprived of the oppor-
tunity of training for mounted work, and their horses
15G THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
generally lose condition, since there are not enough
men to look after them properly.
When, however, the three cavalry divisions were
not used in the trenches, there were barely sufficient
troops left to hold our long line securely, and very
few infantry could be spared for extraneous enter-
prises. Moreover, though he would not put his
cavalry into the line, if he could help it, the Com-
mander-in-Chief had no intention of allowing them
to grow rusty for lack of active operations. He was
a firm believer in the old prize-ring adage that the
best training for a fight is fighting.
The enemy's position ran north and south, astride
the Jericho- Amman road, just west of Shunet Nirnrin,
his left resting on the deep gorge of the Wadi
Kefrein, and his right flank thrown back in a half
circle across the Wadi Arseniyat track to El Haud.
Both flanks were protected by detachments of cavalry.
From Shunet Nimrin two roads led back to Amman ;
the metalled road through El Salt, and the more
direct track through El Sir. The former was the
only one available for wheeled traffic, but the latter
had been considerably improved by the Turks since
our last raid into Gilead. The plan was for the in-
fantry to attack this position from the west, with the
New Zealand Mounted Brigade on their right flank,
while the rest of the cavalry, moving along the east
bank of the Jordan as far as Umm el Shert and Jisr el
Damieh, turned into the hills up the tracks from
these two places, and captured El Salt, thus cutting
the road to Amman. The Beni Sakhr Arabs under-
took to hold the Ain el Sir track. With their only
two lines of reinforcement or retreat thus closed,
there appeared to be a good prospect of capturing or
destroying the enemy forces at Shunet Nimrin.
In order to prevent the enemy from transferring
THE EL DAMIEH BRIDGEHEAD 157
troops from the east to the west bank of the Jordan
at Jisr el Damieh, as he had done during the previous
raid, one brigade of cavalry, the 4th A.L.H., was
directed to seize the Turkish bridge at that place if
possible. If, however, it proved too strong to be
taken, the brigade was to take up a position cover-
ing the track to El Salt, and endeavour to prevent
the enemy crossing the river.
Our force crossed the Jordan on the night of the
29th of April, and by dawn the cavalry were through
the scrub on the east bank, and advancing up the
narrow plain between tlie river and the mountains,
led by the 4th A.L.H. Brigade. The 1st and 2nd
A.L.H. Brigades were attached to the Australian
Mounted Division during the operations.
The 5th Mounted Brigade, followed by the 2nd
A.L.H., turned off up the Umm el Shert track, and
made for El Haud, while the 3rd A.L.H. Brigade
turned up the track from Jisr el Damieh towards
El Salt.
The 4th A.L.H. Brigade, followed by the 1st, in
reserve, continued its march towards the bridge, and
was fired on, just after dawn, from a prominent hill
on the east bank about 6000 yards north-east of
Umm el Shert, known to us as Red Hill. The 1st
A.L.H. Regiment (1st Brigade) was directed against
this hill, and the 4th Brigade passed to the east of it,
and reached Jisr el Damieh about six o'clock. The
11th Regiment was at once sent forward to seize the
bridgehead, but found the Turks in great force and
strongly entrenched, and was unable to dislodge
them. A further attempt to drive in the bridgehead
also failed, and it was evident that the brigade was
not strong enough to carry out the task. Red Hill,
however, fell to the 1st Regiment about mid-day,
after some sharp fighting, and the 4tli A.L.H. Brigade
158 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
then took up a position facing north-west about
2000 5^ards west of the foothills, and covering the
Jisr el Damieh-El Salt track, from the Nahr el Zerka
to a point about half a mile south of the track,
with the 1st Regiment on Red Hill. It was sup-
ported by the three R.H.A. batteries of the Australian
Mounted Division.
Early in the afternoon, columns of enemy troops
were observed marching down to the west bank of
the Jordan. They were engaged by our batteries
and dispersed, disappearing among the broken ground
on the far side of the river. It was not known at
the time that the Turks had a pontoon bridge between
Red Hill and El Damieh. It was towards this bridge
that they were advancing, avoiding the one at El
Damieh, which they knew to be under observation
by our troops, and within range of our guns and
machine guns.
At three o'clock the 1st A.L.H. Brigade was
directed by the Corps to follow the rest of the cavalry
towards El Salt, by the Umm el Shert track, leaving
only one squadron on Red Hill.
Meanwhile our infantry had attacked the Shunet
Nimrin positions on the west, and captured the
advanced works, but were unable to make any
farther progress, in face of greatly superior numbers
of the enemy.
The 3rd A.L.H. Brigade, pushing very fast up the
track from Jisr el Damieh, approached El Salt late
in the afternoon, and was held up by fire from some
enemy works covering the town on the north-west.
The 9th and 10th Regiments attacked these works
at once, and stormed them with the bayonet after
a stiff fight. As soon as the position was taken, the
8th Regiment, which had been held in reserve under
cover, mounted and galloped into the town, which
CAPTURE OF EL SALT 159
was full of enemy troops. The Turks, surprised by
this sudden charge, fought without cohesion, and
the hustling tactics of the Australians broke up all
attempts at reorganisation. By seven in the evening
the whole place was in our hands, with some three
hundred prisoners, a large number of machine guns,
and all the papers and documents of the Turkish
IVth Army headquarters, which was located in the
town. The commander of the army, indeed, only
just made good his escape. One regiment picketed
the approaches of the town on the north, while the
position was being cleared and the prisoners collected.
A squadron of the 8th Regiment pursued the
enemy some distance down the Amman road, and
captured a considerable number of prisoners. On
its return, about eleven o'clock at night, the 10th
Regiment was sent out along the road in the dark,
to make good the junction of the Amman- Ain el
Sir roads, some seven miles east of El Salt. The
enemy was located in position astride the road at
Ain Hemar, just west of the junction, and, as it was
impossible to ascertain his strength in the darkness,
the regiment threw out pickets, and remained facing
the Turks till daylight.
The 5th Mounted and the 2nd and 1st A.L.H.
Brigades, with the headquarters of the Australian
Mounted Division and two mountain batteries, were
overtaken by night on the Umm el Shert track.
They had to lead their horses in single file up a very
steep goat path, and made but slow progress. The
head of the column reached El Salt earty in the
morning of the 1st of May, and the 2nd Brigade at
once pushed on along the Amman road to Ain Hemar,
di'ove off the small force of Turks there, and occupied
the road junction. The 3rd Brigade held an out-
post line north-west and north of El Salt, and the 1st
160 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
Brigade a similar line to the west, astride the El Shert
track. The three brigades thus formed a cordon round
El Salt on the east, north, and west. The 5th Brigade
was ordered to move down the main road towards
Shunet Nimrin, and attack the enemy's rear vigor-
ously.
Meanwhile, down in the valley, the 4th A.L.H.
Brigade was in difficulties. All night long the enemy
had been crossing the river unseen, by the pontoon
bridge mentioned above. About half-past seven in
the morning some 4000 Turkish infantry deployed
from the broken ground east of the Jordan, and
advanced in open order, with their right flank
directed on the gap between the left of the 4th
Brigade and Red Hill. When the 1st Brigade had
been withdrawn the previous evening, leaving only
one squadron on the hill. General Grant had sent a
squadron from the 11th Regiment to reinforce it,
and had ordered two armoured cars which he had
with him to watch the gap. One of these cars was
put out of action very soon by a direct hit from a
Turkish shell, but the other remained in action,
and did much to stem the first rush of the Turks,
until it was forced to retire, owing to casualties and
lack of ammunition.
Our three batteries at once opened a rapid and
accurate fire on the advancing Turks. They were
immediately engaged by enemy batteries on the west
bank of the Jordan, and heavily shelled, but con-
tinued in action, and caused severe casualties to the
enemy.
Simultaneously with the attack from the west,
about 1000 Turldsh infantry and 500 cavalry, who
had made their way up the Nahr el Zerka, debouched
from the river bed, and attacked the right flank of
the 4th Brigade. This attack was driven off, after
FOURTH BRIGADE HARD PRESSED 161
a very sharp fight, but the Turks still continued to
advance over the open ground from the west. At
nine o'clock their forward lines had been annihilated
by our fire, and they fell back a little, taking cover
in some broken ground.
For about an hour there was a lull in the fighting.
At ten o'clock a large body of the enemy, that had
evidently worked south along the bed of the Jordan,
suddenly appeared in the open, and swept over Red
Hill, overwhelming the little garrison there. The
remnants of our two squadrons withdrew to the
broken ground south and south-east of the hill.
Immediately afterwards, the Turks attacked again
along the whole line, rushing forward recklessly,
shouting ' Allah ! AUah ! Allah ! ' Our small force,
outnumbered by five to one, and hampered by its
horses in the difficult country, was gradually forced
back to the east against the hiUs, fighting desperately
every step of the way. The right flank was driven
back across the El Damieh-El Salt track, and the
enemy entered the foothills north of the track, and
began to work round to the rear. At the same time
parties of Turks began to push southwards, between
the left flank of the 4th Brigade and the remnants of
the Red Hill garrison, now clinging grimly to their
position south of the hill. Two troops, all that could
be spared, were sent out to try and check this move-
ment long enough to allow the right flank of the
brigade to be withdrawn. The brigade headquarters
and every man of ' B ' Battery H.A.C. that could be
spared from the service of the guns were also thrown
into the fight. This Httle handful of men fought
heroically, but hopelessly, against the ever advancing
waves of the enemy, and at last was pushed back
across our line of retreat to the south.
When his right flank was turned, General Grant,
L
162 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
realising the impossibility of holding on any longer in
the face of such odds, had ordered a retirement to a
shorter line farther south, covering the Umm el
Shert track. The right flank regiment was to retire
first, followed by the regiment in the centre, and the
line was to be re-formed, east and west across the
valley, just north of Red Hill.
The brigade was now, however, in a very difficult
position. Our troops had been forced back till they
were facing due west, with their backs to the tangled
maze of rocky hills, impassable for cavalry and guns.
Some of the Turks were across their line of retreat
to the south, though only in small numbers as yet.
Others were working round the right flank of the
brigade. All along the line our troops were hotly
engaged at close quarters. To withdraw to a flank
under such conditions was a very hazardous opera-
tion, but it appeared to offer the only chance of ex-
tricating the brigade from its desperate situation.
Two regiments of the New Zealand Mounted
Brigade, which had been co-operating in the attacks
on the Shunet Nimrin positions from the south, had
been despatched to the assistance of the 4th Brigade,
but they had fifteen miles of bad ground to cover,
and could not possibly arrive in time to save the
position. The most they could hope to do was to
form a rallying point for the 4th Brigade to fall back
upon.
The 4th A.L.H. Regiment, on the right flank, held
on till the enemy closed to within 200 yards, in a
desperate effort to cover the retirement of our guns.
' A ' Battery H.A.C. was in this sector of the fine,
the Notts Battery R.H.A. near the centre, and ' B '
Battery H.A.C. at the south end. The position of
the two northernmost batteries was quite hopeless.
Driven back to the verge of the impassable hills, they
LOSS OF R.H.A. GUNS 163
were in action in the open in the front line, and the
only way of retreat feasible for wheeled vehicles was
to the south, down the line of our troops, and in full
view of the enemy at a^ few hundred yards distance.
Nevertheless the two batteries fought steadily on,
attempting the impossible task of retiring by sections
to the left flank. Each time a Turkish attack broke
and melted away before their fire, the enemy dead
lay a little closer to our guns. Each time a short
retirement was made, the heavy pressure of the
enemy pushed the guns farther into the hills ; and
each time there were fewer men and horses to move
them. At last they were forced into a position from
which there was no way out, and here they made a
final stand, fighting till all their ammunition was
exhausted, and the Turks were within two or three
hundred yards on three sides of them. Even then
a last effort was made to find a way out, but the
teams were mown down by machine-gun fire, and
the guns had to be abandoned. The remaining men
and horses scrambled up the hills to the east, and
succeeded in reaching the Wadi el Retem. The
Australian troopers accompanied them, fighting grimly
and silently, as an old dog fox, run into by the
hounds, turns on his pursuers, slashing right and
left, and dies with his teeth locked in a hound.
' B ' Battery H.A.C., having a shorter distance to
go, succeeded in retiring to the south, through the
enemy, and came into action again near the Umm el
Shert track, to cover the withdrawal of the rest of
our troops. During its retirement a gun was over-
turned in the bottom of a deep wadi, and had to
be abandoned. A party of men, under an officer,
descended into the ravine, and made a fine effort
to right the gun and get it away ; but the Turks
appeared on the banks above, and opened fire on
164 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
them with machine guns, killing nearly all the horses,
and the attempt had to be abandoned.
Scrambhng hurriedly through the foothills, our
troops reassembled on the new position about mid-
day, and took up a line along the south side of a
small wadi, facing north, with Red Hill, which was
occupied by the enemy, slightly to their left rear.
General Chaytor, of the Anzac Division, now arrived
in a motor, and assumed command. He at once
decided to make a further retirement to a position
immediately north of, and covering, the Umm el
Shert track. This withdrawal was carried out suc-
cessfully, with the assistance of the two New Zealand
regiments, and a line was estabhshed along the
Wadi el Retem, from the Jordan, to the foothills.
Three times during the day the enemy attacked this
position in a most determined manner, but the line
stood fast, and each attack was repulsed with heavy
losses to the Turks. When night fell, the vital Umm
el Shert track, which was now the only way of com-
munication with El Salt, was still open. Late in
the afternoon touch was established with the 1st
A.L.H. Brigade in the hills.
While the 4th Brigade was fighting desperately to
keep open our communications with El Salt, the
infantry were heavily engaged in another attack on
the enemy's position at Shunet Nimrin. Fighting
continued all day, but very little headway was made.
Our light field guns could make no impression on
the rock-hewn trenches of the Turks, and the wire,
protected and partly concealed by the innumerable
boulders in front of the positions, could not be effec-
tively cut.
In spite of the weakness of our force, and the
strength of the enemy's position, the attack might
have been successful had the Beni Sakhr carried out
HARD FIGHTING IN THE HILLS 165
their part of the bargain. Unfortunately, either
through cowardice or treachery, they played us false,
and never put in an appearance at all. Consequently
the track through Ain el Sir remained open to the
enemy, and, towards evening, reinforcements began
to arrive at Shunet Nimrin by this road.
The 5th Mounted Brigade had set out from El
Salt, soon after dawn, to co-operate with our infantry
by attacking the enemy's rear about El Howeij. So
great were the difficulties of the country, however,
that it was not till nearly one o'clock that the brigade
got in touch with the enemy, near the road bridge
at El Howeij. The Turks were in great force, and
strongly entrenched, and the 5th Brigade was un-
able to make much headway. The 1st A.L.H.
Brigade was ordered to assist by attacking the
enemy's flank farther west, at El Haud, while still
guarding the El Shert track. Little progress was
made during the day, and, as soon as darkness fell,
the 2nd A.L.H. Brigade was withdrawn from Ain
Hemar, and sent to the assistance of the 5th. Orders
were sent to these two brigades that the 60th Divi-
sion would attack Shunet Nimrin and El Haud at
dawn on the 2nd, and that they were to co-operate
in this attack by endeavouring to seize the high
ground about Arkub el Khaluf .
In view of the precarious position of the 4th A.L.H.
Brigade, down in the valley, the 1st Brigade was
ordered to employ its whole strength in protecting
the Umm el Shert track from all directions, and to
keep touch with the 4th. These dispositions left
only the 3rd Brigade to protect El Salt on the east,
north, and north-west.
Our cavahy were now in a very precarious posi-
tion. The strong force at Shunet Nimrin barred the
main road, and the Wadi Arseniyat track, on the
166 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
south-west. The Turkish 3rd Cavalry Division and
part of an infantry division, having cleared our troops
from their Une of advance from Jisr el Damieh, were
advancing on El Salt from the north-west ; and a
tliird force was closing in on the east from Amman.
The only line of supply or retreat still open was by
the difficult Umm el Shert track.
Ammunition and food were running short, and
fresh supplies had to be sent up to El Salt before
morning. No vehicles could get up the Umm el
Shert track, and, as the journey had to be done in
the night, camels were equally out of the question.
Each of the cavalry regiments had at this time a few
donkeys, which were used by cooks and batmen, who
did not usually accompany their units into action.
About 200 of these were collected at Ghoraniyeh
in the evening, loaded with ammunition and stores,
and sent off in charge of a' subaltern of the
gunners.
Marching all night, they succeeded in reaching El
Salt, which Avas then being hotly attacked by the
enemy, on the morning of the 2nd, delivered their
sorely needed ammunition, and returned safely to
Ghoraniyeh. The distance covered on the double
journey was forty miles, over an appalling country,
and with the prospect of stumbling into the enemy
at any moment. The men of the convoy had had
no sleep for the two previous nights, and, being
cavalrymen, were unaccustomed to marching. That
they carried out their task in the face of such diffi-
culties, with no greater mishap than the loss of a
number of donkeys, which strayed from their half-
dead drivers on the way back, is a fine tribute to the
hardihood and determination of the men and the
skill of the young officer in charge.
The 60th Division began the attack before dawn.
EL SALT SURROUNDED 167
but made very slow progress up the rocky steeps of
Shunet Nimrin, in face of the strong force of Turks,
well posted on the heights above. The 5th Mounted
Brigade commenced its advance on the Turkish
right flank at El Howeij about eight o'clock, having
been delayed in coming to grips with the enemj'',
owing to the extreme difficulty of the country.
Even after the advanced troops of the brigade had
engaged, it was estimated that the attack would take
three hours to develop. At half-past ten, however,
the whole brigade was in action against the first
objective, the Howeij bridge position. The 2nd
Brigade, which had farther to go, had not yet reached
El Hand.
Early in the morning, the enemy column that had
advanced from El Damieh, after driving in the 4th
Brigade, reached El Salt, and developed a strong
attack on the position held by part of the 3rd Brigade,
north-west of the village. Under the weight of this
attack, our line was pressed back a little, and, at
eleven o'clock, a regiment from the 1st Brigade had
to be despatched to the aid of the 3rd. Half an
hour later a second regiment was withdi'awn from
the 1st Brigade, for the same purpose. The donkey
convoy, carrying 100,000 rounds of small-arm ammuni-
tion and about 300 rounds for the mountain batteries,
arrived at a most critical moment. The 3rd Brigade
machine guns, which had almost been reduced to
silence, awoke again, and the Turkish attack was
temporarily driven back.
Just at this time, the brigadiers of the 2nd and
5th Brigades telephoned to El Salt that the country
was so difficult that they saw no prospect of gain-
ing their objectives before dark. General Hodgson
directed them to push on as fast as they could, and
attack the enemy with the utmost vigour, in order
168 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
to assist our infantry in their attempt on the western
slopes of the Shunet Nimrin positions.
Half an hour later General Kelly, commanding the
5th Brigade, reported his left flank in danger from
a force of the enemy at El Fuheis, south of El Salt.
This was most disquieting news. With a large force
of Turks attacking El Salt on the north and north-
west, and another force reported advancing on the
east from Amman, General Hodgson had no troops
to spare for defence on the south side. The cavalry
were labouring under the inevitable disadvantage of
having a quarter of their number occupied in hold-
ing the horses of the remainder, since all fighting in
such country had to be done on foot. A whole brigade
of cavahy was, therefore, barely equivalent in rifle
strength to a single infantry battalion.
There was a gap of five miles of jagged, mountain
country between the small force at El Salt and the
5th Brigade, which was fully occupied at El Howeij,
and it appeared probable that the enemy troops at
El Fuheis might penetrate through this gap. In
that case the position of the 5th Brigade, and pro-
bably also of the 2nd, would be hopeless. General
Hodgson, however, could send no help. The only
chance lay in driving in the enemy's flank at El
Howeij and El Haud, and thus giving our infantry
the opportunity to assault Shunet Nimrin from the
west with some prospect of success. He ordered the
5th and 2nd Brigades to push on at all costs.
Half an hoiu* later, however, the advance of the
enemy force from Amman had become so threatening
that he telephoned to the Corps Commander, asking
if the attack of these two brigades could be stopped,
in order that he might have them in hand for the
defence of El Salt. Our infantry at this time were
closely engaged on the west of Nimrin, fighting their
FAILURE OF HOWEIJ ATTACK 169
way desperately up the hills, and there still appeared
to be a chance of carrying the position, provided the
cavalry continued to press against the enemy's right
flank. General Chauvel, therefore, decided that the
attack of the 2nd and 5th Brigades must be con-
tinued, but allowed one regiment of the 2nd to be
withdrawn for the defence of El Salt. Shortly after-
wards he consented to a second regiment being with-
drawn from this brigade. This left only the 5th
Brigade, already reduced in strength by casualties,
and one regiment of the 2nd Brigade, to carry on
the action at El Howeij.
By two o'clock these troops had progressed, with
infinite difficulty and no Uttle loss, to the edge of
a tributary of the Wadi Nimrin, just north of
El Howeij. At haK-past two the 1st Brigade was
ordered to send another regiment at once to join the
two regiments of the 2nd Brigade at El Salt, who
were hard pressed. There was now only one regi-
ment of the 1st Brigade left on the west side of the
village, and this was the only regiment of the force
in the Une not in action with the enemy. The 3rd
Brigade, holding a hne north-west and north of El
Salt, was heavily engaged all along the line. Two
regiments of the 2nd and one of the 1st Brigade were
fighting on the north-east and east, and the remain-
ing regiment of the 1st was in divisional reserve in
the village.
At haK-past four General Kelly reported that he
was unable to advance at all. A body of Turkish
cavalry was threatening his left flank and rear, and
he was anxious about his led horses. General Hodg-
son had no troops to spare, and indeed was hard put
to hold his own at El Salt. He directed General
KeUy, while protecting his flank and rear as best he
could with the 6th A.L.H. Regiment (2nd Brigade),
170 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
to put in his reserve regiment in one last attack on
El Howeij. If this attack failed, he was to remain
in contact with the enemy, and attract as much
attention as possible.
General Kelly formed a defensive left flank with
the 6th A.L.H. Regiment, and threw in his reserve
regiment to the attack. Scrambling painfully up the
steep, rocky slope, the three regiments struggled
forward* with the utmost gallantry, against a mur-
derous fire. Worn out by three days and nights of
continuous marching and fighting, reduced by casu-
alties, and with no supports to give their attack
depth, they had no chance of reaching the enemy's
position. The Turks, strong in numbers, and well
posted in trenches and behind sangars, swept the
slope with a hail of bullets, through which our little
force could make no headway. The attack failed
completely. The brigade re-formed, and took up a
fire position on the north side of the wadi, facing the
Turks.
On the west the attack of our infantry had also
failed, and, in the evening, our troops drew ofi a
little, and remained in observation of the Turks
during the night. The enemy had been greatly re-
inforced at Shunet Nimrin during the day, and it
was now clear that the operations would have to be
abandoned. The problem was how to withdraw the
cavalry from the mountains. All day long the
Turks had been closing in on El Salt from the east,
north, and north-west. From midnight onwards the
enemy's fire had been very heavy on the front of the
2nd Brigade, and, in the early hours of the morning,
his troops had worked up to within fifty yards of
the 3rd Brigade at Kefr Huda. At the first sign of
dawn on the 3rd, a squadron from this brigade made
a desperate bayonet charge on this force. The
Diagrctm, cu.a.-sLi
sbxctUiQ &Kt sOuaUon, on the ^7 rd. of Max/ 19 fS.
172 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
Australians crashed into the Turks, just as they were
massing for an assault, fighting like tigers, and drove
them back more than half a mile, killing over a
hundred of them.
This charge reheved the pressure on the north side
for a little while, but another large enemy force now
appeared on the Amman road to the east, and at
once attacked the 2nd Brigade. Our troops were
forced back by the weight of the attack, and, for a
time, it looked as if our line would be broken. The
situation was cleared by the action of Major Shannon,
commanding the 8th A.L.H. Regiment (3rd Brigade),
which was temporarily attached to the 2nd Brigade.
He despatched a single troop, all that he could spare,
with instructions to work round the Turks' right
flank, unseen by the enemy if possible, and charge
them from the rear. This desperate expedient was
completely successful. The troop succeeded in getting
behind the Turks just as they were preparing for
another attack, and charged them with the bayonet,
while the remainder of the 8th Regiment attacked
in front. There were only twenty-five men in the
troop, but they swung into the enemy with magni-
ficent dash and a great deal of noise, and the sudden
and unexpected attack from behind so disconcerted
the Turks that they were thrown into confusion.
The 8th Regiment, charging in front at the same
time, completed the discomfiture of the enemy troops,
who were driven back disorganised, and left 300
prisoners in our hands.
This success held up the enemy's offensive for
some time, but, about seven o'clock, the Turks were
seen to be again massing for an attack, and it became
necessary to withdraw the 6th A.L.H. Regiment
from El Howeij to support the 3rd Brigade. Shortly
afterwards the 5tli Brigade was called on to send a
EVACUATION OF EL SALT 173
regiment to El Salt. The remaining two regiments,
a mere handful of men, were directed to watch the
rear of our force at El Salt, and endeavour to prevent
the eneni}^ from advancing up the road from Shunet
Nimrin. Our infantry on the west assisted in this
task by keeping up a sharp fire fight.
Arrangements were now put in hand to evacuate
the wounded and such of the camel transport as
was not required with the fighting troops, down the
El Shert track, preparatory to the withdrawal of the
whole force. Camels are slow and obstinate beasts,
even in their native desert. Moving in single file
down the precipitous goat path to Umm el Shert,
they made barely half a mile an hour. Frightened
by the shppery rocks, their feet cut and bruised by
the sharp stones of the path, groaning and protesting
in the manner of camels at every step, the unwieldy
beasts lurched perilously down the track. Every
now and then one of them would stop short, blocking
the way for those behind it, and refuse obstinately to
move on. What the wounded men in the cacolets
must have suffered during this terrible journey can
sc8.rcely be imagined. It was past mid-day before
the last camel had cleared El Salt.
Since the failure of their first attacks in the morn-
ing, the enemy troops had maintained a heavy fire on
our positions east and north of the town, but had made
no further serious attempt at an assault. Parties
of them were, however, working round to the south,
and the situation was becoming increasingly grave.
At haK-past twelve a force of about 3000 Turkish
infantry was observed advancing up the El Damieh
track, the head of the column being then about three
miles from El Salt. Two hours later this force had
deployed, and was attacking the 3rd Brigade. At
the same time the enemy renewed his pressure on
174 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
the east. As the wounded were now well on their
way down to the valley, the Corps Commander
ordered General Hodgson to withdraw to a position
south-west of El Salt, covering the El Shert track.
As soon as this withdrawal began, the enemy pushed
forward, and engaged our troops most severely. One
of our posts on the north-west was driven in, but,
before any counter-attack could be organised, a
message was received from Corps Headquarters
ordering the cavalry to withdraw altogether from
the hills, if able to do so.
The 1st Brigade was now in position across the
El Shert track, south-west of El Salt, and facing
east. The remainder of the force withdiew through
this line, by regiments, after dark, and marched down
the track during the night. As they could only
move in single file, daylight found them strung out
for several miles along the path. The evacuation
of El Salt was completed by half-past two in the
morning, but the Turks did not discover this fact
till dawn. They at once pushed on through the
village to attack the 1st Brigade. At the same time
enemy guns heavily shelled the rearguard of the
brigade, and several hostile aeroplanes bombed our
troops in the defile, causing a number of casualties.
The Turks continued to press the 1st Brigade rear-
guard till it was three miles west of El Salt, when
they drew off, evidently fearing to venture farther
towards our troops in the valley.
By half-past ten the whole of our force was clear
of the hills, and moving in extended order down the
valley towards El Ghoraniyeh, covered by the 4th
A.L.H. Brigade and part of the New Zealand Brigade.
These two brigades had been in action almost con-
tinuously since they had taken up the position cover-
ing the Umm el Shert track on the 1st. They had.
WITHDRAWAL OF OUR FORCE 175
however, succeeded in repelling all attacks, with
heavy losses to the enemy. On the evening of the
3rd the Turks, abandoning the attempt to break
our line in the valley, had withdrawn to the north,
and followed their comrjades towards El Salt. The
dogged fighting of the 4th Brigade and the New
Zealanders had saved the situation. Had they
given way, the Turks would have reached the Umm
el Shert track, and the whole of our cavalry force in
the hills must then, almost certainly, have fallen
into the hands of the enemy.
By nightfall the whole of our force had withdrawn
behind a brigade of infantry which had been brought
across the Jordan from the west to form an extended
bridgehead. During the night the troops recrossed
the river, and the force was all safely on the west
bank before morning on the 5th. The Ghoraniyeh
bridgehead was restored, and the Australian Mounted
Division took over the left sector of the Jordan
Valley defences, along the river Auja, including a new
bridge and bridgehead which had been thrown across
the Jordan, at its junction with the Auja, during the
operations. The Anzac Mounted Division took over
the right sector of the valley defences, including the
Ghoraniyeh bridgehead.
Although the raid had failed in its primary object,
which was the destruction of the enemy force at
Shunet Nimrin, it had not been altogether unsuccess-
ful. In the first place the Turks had been very
roughly handled, and, besides having many of their
troops killed and wounded, had lost nearly 1000
prisoners. The really important result of the opera-
tions, however, lay in the fact that the raid finally
convinced the enemy that, in our next general
advance, our cavalry would be directed on Amman
and Deraa Junction.
176 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
Under the influence of this idea, he was led to
place practically the whole of his IVth Army east
of the Jordan, which was thus separated by the river,
with its deep and difficult channel, from the remainder
of his forces in the Judsean Hills. It was this fact
that enabled us, in the following September, to en-
velop and completely destroy the Vllth and Vlllth
Armies, before tlie IVth Army could intervene.
r-A ''-rjm» '. j!«: :^.
The River Jordan at Ghoranitseh.
Shunet Nimrin and the Amman Road. Looking east, towards the
positions held by the enemy.
CHAPTER XIV
THE VALLEY OF DESOLATION
The Commander-in-Chief had now to decide whether
or not he should hold the Jordan Valley during the
summer. Local authorities declared emphatically
that it was impossible for Europeans to exist there
during the summer months, owing to the intense
heat and the prevalence of malaria of a most virulent
type. They pointed to the fact that even the native
Arabs move out of it to the hills during the hot
weather, and that Jericho itself is deserted. The
only inhabitants of the district during the summer
are the small and miserable tribe of the Abid Miriam,
a people of negroid origin, descendants of African
slaves imported by the Arabs in former times. These
Uve about Ain el Duk, where they carry on a rude
form of irrigation by means of a few of the old,
Roman water channels that still exist.
The official military handbook of Palestine con-
firmed the local opinion by the statement that
' Nothing is known of the climate of the lower Jordan
Valley in summer time, since no civilised human
being has yet been found to spend a summer there ' !
On the other hand, there were several strong
reasons for continuing to hold the valley line if
possible. Some of these have been indicated at the
beginning of Chapter xi., but there was now another,
and stronger, reason for holding it, which was to
confirm the enemy in his belief that we intended to
strike east of the Jordan in our next big advance.
M
178 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
Moreover, since it was clear that it would be neces-
sary to occupy the valley and the river crossings,
when the next advance was commenced, it was con-
sidered less costly to continue to hold it during the
summer than to have to retake it later on.
After careful consideration, General Allenby re-
solved to hold the valley line permanently, and, as
several of the German staff documents which we had
captured assumed that we would strike in that part
of our Une near which the cavalry was stationed, it
was decided to put them there.
The line was accordingly organised in two sectors.
The left sector extended from the foot of the Judsean
mountains, along the north bank of the Wadi el
Auja, to its junction witli the Jordan, and included
the bridge and bridgehead there. A rocky ridge,
several hundred feet high, ran north and south through
this position, from Tel el Sultan, near Jericho, and
extended north of the Auja, along the hill of Abu
Tellul, ending in an abrupt bluff at Musallabeh. This
ridge was held by us, so thstt this portion of the line
resembled a fist with the first finger extended, the
finger representing the ridge, and the Wadi el Auja
the line of the knuckles. Abu Tellul and Musallabeh
overlooked a dreary expanse, part swamp, part stony
plain, covered with large patches of dense scrub, and
intersected by innumerable deep wadis. The Turks
were able to move unseen among the scrub and wadis
all round the sahent in our line, a fact which caused
us much annoyance all the time we were in occupa-
tion of the valley. It was, however, necessary to
hold Abu Tellul and Musallabeh, both to preserve
the water supply of the Auja for ourselves, and to
deny it to the enemy.
The right sector extended from the mouth of the
Auja, along the right bank of the Jordan, to the
CLIMATE OF THE JORDAN VALLEY 179
Dead Sea, and included the bridges and bridgehead
at Ghoraniyeh.
The reorganisation of the cavalry was completed
by the middle of May, and the Desert Mounted Corps
now consisted of the Anzac and Australian Mounted
Divisions and the 4th and 5th (Indian) cavalry divi-
sions.^ The valley line was held by two cavalry
divisions, one in each sector, supported by a brigade
of Indian infantry, and two battalions of the British
West Indies Regiment. This organisation permitted
of two divisions at a time being withdrawn to rest
in camps established in the cool hills near Bethlehem,
so that each cavalry division had alternatively a
month on duty in the valley, and a month at rest in
the hills. For the gunners of the Corps, however,
there was no relief, owing to the shortage of artillery
in the force, and they had to pass the whole summer
in the valley, till the end of July, an experience which
none of them is ever likely to forget.
In past ages the Dead Sea covered a much greater
area than it does at the present day. The lower
Jordan valley is, therefore, the bottom of the old
sea, and is covered with a layer of white marl, several
feet deep, which is strongly impregnated with salt.
In spring the land supports a little thin grass, but
the fierce sun of early summer scorches it in a few
days to brittle dust. Under the feet of men and
horses the marl of the valley floor soon broke up into
a white powder, as fine as flour, which lay every-
where, in places over a foot deep. Every morning,
after a breathless night, a strong hot wind arose
from the north, and swept the dust down the valley
in dense, choking clouds. About eleven o'clock in
the morning the wind used to die down as suddenl}^
as it had arisen, and for about half an hour there was
^ See Appendix i. a, for detail of cavuirjr.
180 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
a period of deathlike stillness, accompanied by the
most intense heat of the day. Then the wind recom-
menced violently, but blowing from the south, and
continued till about eight in the evening. Innumer-
able, violent air currents swept about the valley,
often carrying along ' dust devils ' of immense height.
It was no uncommon thing for one of these devils to
tear up a tent, and lift it bodily high into the air.
There was a tiny patch of green cultivation at
Ain el Duk, about five miles behind out line, and
another at Jericho, and a few dusty thorn trees grew
along the Wadi el Auja. The rest of the valley was
a barren and awful wilderness of dust, stones, and
boulders, inhabited, before we came, only by snakes
and scorpions.
The average maximum daily temperature during
July, as taken at the R.A. Headquarters on the top of
the Tel el Sultan-Abu TeUul Ridge, was 113-2° F. in
the shade. The highest reading recorded during the
month was 122° and the lowest 107°. At the foot of
the ridge the temperature was about 3° higher, and
at Ghoraniyeh it reached 130° on several occasions.
During August the temperature rose still higher,
but no daily record was then kept of the thermometer
readings. The tremendous evaporation of the Dead
Sea keeps the atmosphere moist, and adds to the
discomfort caused by the great heat, while the in-
creased air pressure, due to the depth of the valley
floor below sea level (1200 feet at Ghoraniyeh), in-
duces a feeling of lassitude against which it is difficult
to fight.
The effect of the climate on the horses was most
remarkable. After about three weeks in the valley,
they became so tired and dispirited, though they had
little or no work to do, that they could scarce drag
themselves the mile or so to water and back again.
DISEASE 181
An unceasing campaign was carried on by the
medical staff of the Corps against the malaria-bear-
ing mosquitoes which infested the valley, and this
undoubtedly did much to lessen the incidence of
malaria, especially of the malignant type, among the
troops. In spite of all efforts, however, the sick rate
was high, as it was bound to be under such conditions.
Deaths and evacuations of sick to hospital averaged
together about one per cent, of the total strength per
day, which meant that the whole force in the valley
would have to be replaced every three months.
Actually, however, the alternate month in the hills
enjoyed by the cavalry enabled many men, who had
been sent to hospital, to recover in time to do another
tour of duty in the valley. Curiously enough the
Indian troops suffered more severely than did the
British.
In this climate, and under such conditions, His
Majesty's troops, white, brown, and black, held the
line throughout the summer of 1918, and it is safe to
say that few other troops in the Great War endured
greater hardships and discomfort than did the Jordan
Valley force.
There was but one action of importance during the
summer. On the 14th July two Turkish divisions,
supported by three battalions of German infantry,
attacked our positions at Musallabeh and Abu Tellul
from the west. Under cover of darkness the German
troops, having cut our wire, penetrated between two
of our posts, and actually reached our second Hne
on the top of Abu Tellul, which was not occupied,
owing to lack of troops.
The 1st A.L.H. Brigade was holding this sector of
the line at the time, supported by a miscellaneous
collection of artillery — horse, field, mountain and siege.
The attack was preceded by a very heavy enemy
182 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
bombardment, which cut all our telephone wires. The
batteries were thus, early in the fight, out of touch
with theii* observers, and, as the latter had in some
cases to move hurriedly from their posts to avoid
capture, it was some time before communications
could be re-established. In the meantime the bat-
teries continued to fire on their S.O.S. lines.
The commanding oflEicer of the 2nd A.L.H. regi-
ment, against which the brunt of the attack fell,
narrowly escaped capture, l:>ut succeeded with his
staff in reaching a post in the second line on Abu
Tellul. In the uncertain light just before dawn, he
observed a large body of troops coming up the hill
towards him, and at first took these for some of his
own men retiring from the outer posts. When they
reached the wire, however, and began to cut it, he
realised that they were the enemy, and at once gave
the order to open rapid fire on them. This had the
effect of driving the Germans, who were ignorant of
the fact that there were only twelve men in front of
them, away to the right, where they occupied a post
near the end of Abu Tellul, known as the Bluff.
Meanwhile the artillery officer with this section of
the defence, who had had both his signallers wounded,
succeeded in getting a runner back to one of the
Horse Artillery batteries, with news of the state of
affairs. An officer at once set out from his battery
with two signallers, and, riding as far as the foot of
Abu Tellul, under very heavy shell fire, dismounted,
and set to work repairing the telephone wires. Having
got into communication with the battery, the officer
went forward on foot with his signallers, running out
a fresh wiie, and reached the top of Abu TeUul just
after daylight. Here he found two officers and twelve
men of the reserve regiment of the 1st A.L.H. Brigade,
who were on their way to counter-attack the Bluff, a
THE ACTION OF ABU TELLUL 183
strongly entrenched position in whicli there were, at
the time, some eighty German infantry ! The party
moved forward cautiously, taking advantage of the
cover afforded by the numerous rocks, but had not
gone far when an enemy shell burst among them,
kilHng and wounding six. One of the officers there-
upon went back for reinforcements, and the remain-
ing nine, including the gunners, continued their
advance. After going a short distance farther, they
observed a number of the enemy near the Bluff,
some 200 yards distant. Fortunately the telephone
line still held, so the fire of the battery was directed
on the enemy. The little 13-pounder H.E. shell
burst with excellent effect among the rocks of the
position, and the Germans very soon had enough
of them, and surrendered. They were collected, to
the number of forty, disarmed, and put in charge of
two of the Australians, while the ' counter-attack,'
now reduced to seven, moved forward again. Another
body of the enemy was soon discovered occupying
the end part of Abu Tellul. The battery opened
fire on these, and after a few minutes, believing that
they were cut off, they too put up a white flag and
laid down their arms. There were six officers and
eighty men here, and their chagrin was great on dis-
covering that they had surrendered to seven men.
However, they were told that the rest of their force
had been repulsed, and that our battery was quite
ready to open fire again, if need arose. The two
parties were quickly hustled away to the rear, being
liberally shelled by their own gunners on the way.
While this little comedy was being enacted at the
end of the Abu Tellul Ridge, daylight had come, and
the enemy's only chance of capturing the position
had passed. Our outer posts, though surrounded,
had all held out, and turned the fire of their machine
184 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
guns with good effect on the enemy on the southern
end of Abu Tellul. Some of these worked south to
the part of the ridge overlooking the Wadi el Auja,
and suddenly found themselves looking down on a
battery of mountain howitzers that were firing in the
opposite direction, at some Turks who were attempt-
ing to cross the wadi. The howitzers were immedi-
ately turned end for end in their pits, and fired up the
hill straight into the faces of the astonished Germans,
who retired discomfited, to hide among the rocks
and trenches farther north till gathered in by our
troops later on.
By now the 5th A.L.H. regiment and the New
Zealand Mounted Brigade, which had been sent up
in support, had arrived on the scene. Pushing along
both sides of the Abu Tellul Ridge, they quickly
drove out the rest of the enemy, and restored the
position.
The two Turkish divisions, which were to have
attacked on each side of the German troops, had
waited for da3dight to make their assault, with the
result that they were easily driven off. The southern
force, indeed, only attacked once, and that but half-
heartedly, but the division on the enemy's left made
three attempts on Musallabeh, only to be driven
back each time with heavy loss by a murderous
machine-gun fire. The Turks left about 200 dead
on the positions.
By ten o'clock in the morning the whole posi-
tion was completely restored, and our prisoners
(380 Germans and about 200 Turks) were on their
way back to headquarters.
At this juncture there occurred an incident so
typical of the Hun that it is worth recording. As
they were marching back, a number of the German
officers and men commenced to show evident signs
GERMAN INDISCIPLINE 185
of distress, and presently began to drop insensible
by the wayside. As they had only light field service
caps on their heads, it was thought that they had
been overcome by the sun. Ambulance carts were
sent for, and the sufferers were conveyed to a field
hospital near by, attended on the way with the most
solicitous care by their Australian escort. On arrival
at the hospital, however, it was discovered that they
were merely speechlessly drunk, whereupon the in-
censed Australians soused them unceremoniously with
water, and sent them on their way to the prisoners'
compounds without more ado. It transpired after-
wards that several small parties of Germans had been
detailed to cut our telephone wires as soon as they
had penetrated our lines. While engaged on this
work they had stumbled on a tent, pitched in a little
gully, in which were stored several cases of beer and
one or two of whisky, which had been brought up
at very great trouble for the men of the 2nd A.L.H.
regiment. Unable to resist this liquor, the Germans,
officers and men, abandoning their task of wire
cutting, fell upon the cases, and, knocking off the
heads of the bottles, poured the contents down their
throats. When they had drunk all they could hold,
they smashed the rest of the bottles, and staggered
away, to be captured disgracefully by our troops.
Had any of them been on the scene when the thirsty
Australians repaired to the tent after being relieved
from the trenches, they would undoubtedly have
shared the fate of the bottles !
During the attack on Musallabeh and Abu Tellul
the enemy was observed to be massing for an attack
east of the river Jordan, opposite El Henu ford,
about half-way between Makhadet Hajlah and the
Dead Sea. The Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade
immediately moved out from Ghoraniyeh to attack.
186 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
Taking advantage of the cover afforded by the
broken ground and scrub on the east bank, the
cavalry arrived within charging distance before they
were observed. They charged at once, and routed
the Turks, kiUing ninety with the spear, and taking
about 100 prisoners and several machine guns.
During the remainder of the period spent in the
Jordan Valley, action on both sides was confined to
artillery activity, in which the enemy, owing to the
freedom of movement he enjoyed, had the advan-
tage of us, and to patrol work, in which our troops,
more especially the Indian Cavalrj^, had it all their
own way. The only sources of water, other than the
Jordan, were the Wadi el Auja, which was used by
the troops and horses in the left sector, and the Wadi
Nueiameh, which arose at Ain el Duk, and flowed
into the Jordan at El Ghoraniyeh. The latter wadi
was used by the Headquarters of the Valley Defences
and by the field ambulances and suppty and ord-
nance troops. The east side of the Tel el Sultan-
Abu Tellul Ridge, which was only about 7000 yards
from the Jordan, was occupied by horse lines, ammu-
nition column camps, and field hospitals. Early in
July the enemj^ who had received considerable
artillery reinforcements, pushed a number of field
guns and heavy howitzers southwards, east of the
Jordan, and commenced a systematic shelling of
these troops. Camps and horse lines had to be
moved, and scattered about in sections, in most in-
convenient situations, along the bottoms of small
wadis running down from the ridge into the plain.
Some protection was obtained by these m.easures,
but there was not sufficient room in the wadis for
all the units, and those which had to remain in the
open suffered under a constant, galling shell fire, and
had to shift their camps every few days.
' JERICHO JANE ' 187
The whole of the Wadis el Auja and Nueiameh
was under the enemy's observation either from Red
Hill and other high ground east of the Jordan, or
from the foothills west and north-west of Abu Tellul.
The Turks took full advantage of this to shell our
watering parties almost every day. The drinking-
places were frequently changed, and every effort was
made to distract the enemy's attention, during the
hours when horses were being watered, by shelling
his positions vigorously. But the dense clouds of
dust raised by even the smallest parties of horses on
the move, generally gave the game away, and we
had constant trouble and numerous casualties among
men and horses.
About the same time as the Turks became aware
of the possibilities of artillery on the east bank of the
Jordan, they got a six-inch long-range gun in posi-
tion in the hills north-west of our line in the valley,
and shelled Ghoraniyeh, Jericho, and other back
areas at a range of some 20,000 yards. The gun was
nicknamed ' Jericho Jane ' by our gunners, and the
name found its way eventually into the Corps' Daily
Intelligence Report. But when the enemy brought
up two more such guns into about the same position,
and the three were referred to in the daily report
from one of the R.A. Headquarters as ' Jericho Jane
and her two wicked sisters,' the powers that were
decreed that such slang was inappropriate in official
reports !
For the first week ' Jericho Jane ' confined her un-
welcome attentions to Jericho, into which she put
about thirty shells, and to various camps and horse
lines in the neighbourhood. But, when her wicked
sisters arrived, they at once commenced to pay court
to the 13th Cavalry Brigade, which was in reserve at
the time, and was camped about Ain el Duk on the
188 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
west side of the ridge. This position had hitherto
been deemed the only safe spot in the whole horrible
valley, and it was a sad blow to the 13th Brigade,
who had a comfortable camp close to water, to
find their sanctuary invaded by these outrageous
viragoes.
The first shot hit the top of the Mount of Tempta-
tion, just above the rock-hewn hermitage of a com-
munity of Greek monks. The line of fire then moved
slowly down the mountain side, the thunderous
crashes of the bursting shells sending the good monks
to the shelter of their rock cells quicker than ever the
prayer bell had done. Meantime the cavalry were
breaking camp in record time. Before the first shell
burst in the camp, the whole brigade was mounted
and moving southwards into the Wilderness, home-
less as the Children of Israel. The ' safe ' camp, the
envy of all the valley, with its outlook over a beautiful
patch of vivid green at Ain el Duk, was abandoned
to the snake and the scorpion, and the indignant
troops had to find such shelter as was available here
and there in the bottoms of arid, dusty wadis.
The three sisters were eventually spotted by
aeroplanes, and silenced by some of our heavy
artillery in the mountain sector. In the valley itself,
it was almost impossible to locate the enemy guns.
Owing to the very broken nature of the country, the
damp atmosphere and the constant dust, our aero-
planes were unable to spot them, even when firing,
and they caused us constant annoyance, while remain-
ing almost immune from our fire. Flying over the
valley was at all times most hazardous work, owing
to the innumerable vortices and pockets in the air,
and there were many bad accidents.
The Australian Mounted Division left the valley
finally on the 1st August, followed shortly after-
OUT OF THE VALLEY 189
wards by the 5th Cavaby Division. The two divi-
sions were reHeved by the 4th and the Anzac Divi-
sions. Marching by easy stages during the night,
and remaining hidden by day among vineyards and
ohve groves, they crossed the mountains to the
coastal plain, and went into camp in the neighbour-
hood of Selmeh and Ludd.
The blessed coolness of the nights, and the clear
and comparatively bracing air of the plain, soon
began to have a good effect on the jaded troops and
horses, worn out by their long periods in the dis-
mal Valley of Desolation. Training recommenced at
once, and continued till the middle of September,
when the two divisions marched into positions of
hiding, preparatory to the Great Drive. The 4tli
Cavalry Division, having left the valley on the 11th
September, joined them on the 17th.
The Anzac Division remained sweltering by the
Jordan till after the commencement of the Septem-
ber operations, suffering greatly from sickness, but
' carrying on ' with the cheerfulness and courage
typical of the Australians.
Just before leaving the valley, the writer heard an
Australian trooper sum up the all-pervading horror
of the place in a characteristic sentence. After
gazing for some time at the hideous expanse of white
dust and blistering rocks at his feet, he remarked
slowly : ' Well, I reckon God made the Jordan
Valley, and when He seen what He done, He threw
stones at it ! '
CHAPTER XV
PREPARATIONS FOR THE GREAT DRIVE
At the end of August 1918 the 5th and AustraHan
Cavaky Divisions were encamped near Khurbet
Deiran and Ramleh respectively ; the 4th Division
and the Anzac Mounted Division were still in the
Jordan Valley. The new 5th A.L.H. Brigade, which
had only two regiments, was completed by the in-
clusion of the French ' Regiment Mixte de Cavalerie.'
This was a four-squadron unit, consisting of two
squadrons of regular French cavalry and two of
Algerian Spahis, and was commanded by Colonel Le
Bon, an officer who had had many years' experience
in the East. The Spahis, with their picturesque
half- Arab uniforms and their enormous curved sabres,
which they carried under the flaps of their saddles,
added a note of colour to the division, and caused
endless diversion to the Australians. They were
mounted on good-looking barbs, which could march
indefinitely, if allowed to go at their own rate, but
the pace of our big horses was rather too hot for
them, as was proved by the subsequent operations.
As there were only ten batteries of Horse Artillery
available, one battery (' B ' H.A.C.) was withdrawn
from the Australian Mounted Division in August,
and joined the 5th Cavalry Division. These two
divisions had thus only two batteries each.
During the first half of September preparations
for the Great Drive were pushed forward ener-
getically. Our broad-gauge railwaj^ had now been
THE ENEMY COMMUNICATIONS 191
carried forward as far north as Ludd, and the old
Turkish line from Ludd to Jerusalem had been re-
laid for broad gauge. Light railways had been built
along the coastal plain, from Ludd up to our front
line ; tracks had been improved, and roads made
behind the line in the mountain sector, and, from
Jiljulie to the sea, the gunners were working cease-
lessly, like a legion of ants, preparing positions for
the considerable force of artiUery that was to assist
in forcing the enemy defences here.
The Turkish line west of the Jordan ran east from
the coast, at a point just north of the old Crusader
fortress of Arsuf, over the coastal plain to Jiljulie,
near the railhead at Kalkili. Here it entered the
mountains, and ran a little south of east, passing
roughly through Mesha, Furkha and El Lubban,
to the Jordan at Umm el Shert.
Forty miles north of this line lie the Plain of
Esdraelon, or Armageddon, and the Valle}^ of Jezreel,
which cut a gap right through the mountain range
from the sea to the river Jordan. Esdraeloii
is sha-ped roughly like a broad-bladed arrow head,
having its point at Haifa on the sea coast, and the
extremities of its blades at Mount Tabor on the north,
and at the little town of Jenin on the south. Mid-
way between these two lies the village of Afule,
whence the Valley of Jezreel, forming the shaft of
the arrow, runs down to the Jordan at Beisan, which
is about fifteen miles south of the Sea of Galilee, and
four miles west of the Jordan.
From Deraa Junction on the Hedjaz Railway,
about thirty-five miles east of the Sea of Gahlee, a
branch line runs westwards to Semakh, at the southern
end of the lake, and thence southwards down the
Jordan Valley to Beisan. From here two roads lead
south down the valley, one on each side of the river,
192 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
and a third goes south-west through the mountains
to Nablus. Leaving Beisan, the railway continues
in a north-westerly direction up the Valley of Jezreel,
through Afule, to Haifa. From Afule a branch line
runs south to Jenin, and thence to Samaria and
Nablus ; and from Messudieh, near Samaria, another
branch winds through the mountains to Tul Keram
on the coastal plain, and thence south to Kalkili.
Thus, to quote the Commander-in-Chief's despatch : ^
' Afule, Beisan, and Deraa were the vital points on
the enemy's communications. If they could be
seized, his retreat would be cut off. Deraa was
beyond my reach, but not beyond that of mobile
detachments of the Arab Army. It was not to be
expected that these detachments could hold this
junction, but it was within their power to dislocate
all traffic'
The coastal plain, consisting of rolling downland,
is about ten miles wide at Arsuf. From this point
northwards it gradually narrows, till it is shut off
altogether at Haifa, where the Mount of Carmel, an
offshoot from the main Judsean range, falls in steep
cliffs to the sea. The only track over the Carmel Range
into the Plain of Esdraelon that is possible for wheeled
traffic is by the famous Musmus Pass, from Kerkur to
Lejjun on the river Kishon, over which Thothmes iii.
led his army, " horse behind horse and man behind
man,' to the great victory of Megiddo, in 1479 B.C.
The pass, which carries the age-old caravan road
from Egypt to Mesopotamia, leads through a narrow,
rocky defile, in steep and difficult mountain country,
and, near the top of the range, is enclosed in places
between sheer cliffs. Skilfully handled, a small body
of troops could hold it for a long time against a
greatly superior force.
1 Dated October 31, 1918.
MORALE OF THE TURKISH ARMY 193
The enemy Vllth and Vlllth Armies held the hne
from the sea to the Jordan Valley. His IVth Army
was disposed in the vaUey and east of the Jordan.
A fairly good, metalled road runs from JiljuKe,
thi'ough Tul Keram, to Nablus. From here two bad
mountain tracks lead down to the Jordan, one
through Beit Dejan, and the other by Ain Shibleh
and down the Wadi Farah. These two tracks join
one another at El Makhruk, four miles west of the
river, and then continue over the Jordan at Jisr el
Damieh, and on to El Salt. This was the enemy's
only lateral communication, and the portion between
Nablus and El Salt was so difficult that the IVth
Army was practically isolated from the rest of the
force.
The Turkish armies opposed to us, including re-
serves and lines of communication troops, numbered
some 90,000 men, of whom perhaps 5000 were cavalry,
with about 400 guns. Their Commander-in-Chief
was the German Marshal Liman von Sanders, who
had his headquarters at Nazareth. Our own troops
numbered about 120,000, including 25,000 cavalry,
with 540 guns.
The morale of the enemy troops, both Turkish and
German, was lower than it had been at any time since
the beginning of the campaign. Many of the Turkish
soldiers were ill-trained and of poor character. Dis-
heartened by a long series of successful small raids,
carried out by our infantry during the past two
months, utterly weary of a war the objects of which
they little understood, racked with disease, and im-
bued with a bitter hatred of their German masters,
who despised and buUied them, they were in no
state to withstand the onslaught that was prepar-
ing. The ill-feeling between Turks and Germans,
which had existed from the very beginning of the
N
194 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
war, had now reached an acute stage. The Germans,
with characteristic stupidity, failed to do anything
to allay the irritation caused by their overbearing
manner, and openly expressed contempt for their
allies.
Numerous documents, subsequently captured by
us at the enemy G.H.Q,, testified to the deplorable
state of internal strife and suspicion to which the
enemy army was now reduced. Indeed, with the
exception of a few senior officers, the Germans seemed
to take a delight in ill-treating and insulting the
unhappy Turks.
These factors must be borne in mind in estimating
the tactics adopted by the British Commander-in-
Chief. His plan was one of the boldest and simplest
ever conceived by a great captain, and will live in
the text-books of the soldiers of all nations, as a model
of the use of cavalry, as long as war is waged. Such
risks as he took in the carrying out of that plan, and
they were numerous, were justified by the state of
the enemy armies opposed to us, and were, in every
instance, triumphantly vindicated by the success of
the operations.
In broad outline, the plan was to concentrate an
overwhelming force of infantry and guns in the
coastal sector, together with three divisions of
cavah'y : for the infantry to attack the enemy posi-
tions from Jiljulie to the sea, and, having captured
them, to wheel to the right, pivoting on Jiljufie, and
bend back the enemy's right wing into the hills,
exactly like opening a door. Through this open
door the cavahy were to dash, and ride up the coast
and over the Musmus Pass into the Plain of Esdraelon.
Once in the plain, their task was to seize Afule, and
then ride down the Valley of Jezreel to Beisan and
the Jordan, and cut the railways at these two places.
DECEIVING THE ENEMY 195
while an Arab force cut it farther east at Deraa.
Later on Haifa was to be occupied, and thus a net
of cavalry would be drawn from the sea to the Jordan.
As soon as the cavalry were well through the gap on
the coastal plain, our infantry were to attack all along
the line in the mountain sector, while the troops that
had opened the door endeavoured to roU up the
enemy line from his right flank. Our force in the
Jordan Valley was to advance simultaneously, and
seize the bridge over the Jordan at El Damieh. The
two Turkish armies west of the Jordan would thus
be caught in a trap, with the sea on their right and
the Jordan on their left, and, with all their com-
munications cut, would be forced back into the
cavalrjT^ net behind them.
Once the crossing over the Jordan at Jisr el Damieh
was in our hands, the Turldsh IVth Army east of the
river would find itself isolated, with its communica-
tions cut (at Deraa), and exposed to the converging
attacks of our force in the valley, which would hold
the river crossings, and of the Arab forces on the east.
At the beginning of September a mobile column of
the Arab Army, accompanied by armoured cars and
a mountain battery, was assembling at Kasr el Azrak,
in the desert fifty miles east of Amman, under the
energetic direction of Lawrence.
The first essential for the success of the plan was to
conceal from the enemy the considerable concentra-
tion of troops on the coastal plain, especially that of
the three cavalry divisions.
It is doubtful if there has ever been a greater
master of the art of deception in war than the British
Commander-in-Chief. No detail was too small, no
dodge too insignificant to engage his full attention.
The two trans-Jordan raids had given the enemy the
impression that we intended to attack either up the
196 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
Jordan Valley, or east of it, at Amman and along the
Hedjaz Railway, and General Allenby now set himself
to foster this belief by every possible means.
To this end he ordered Major-General Chaytor,
who wa > in the Jordan Valley, in command of a mixed
force consisting of the Anzac Mounted Division and
eight battahons of infantry, to make a series of
demonstrations, with the object of inducing the
enemy to believe that an attack east of Jordan was
intended. The camps in the valley vacated by the
cavalry were left standing, and other camps were
pitched there, and occupied by a few men, to show
signs of movement, and to make tracks about, and
leading to, the camps, in order to deceive enemy
airmen. New bridges were thrown across the Jordan,
miles of Decauville railway were laid, and thousands
of dummy horses were erected on dummy horse lines
in the dummy camps. Every day, for some con-
siderable time, a battalion or two of infantry marched
down the Jerusalem- Jericho road from Talaat el
Dumm, and occupied one or other of these camps.
During the night they were brought back to Talaat
el Dumm, in returning empty motor lorries, ready
to march back again next day. These troops could
be plainly seen, marching down into the valley, by
the enemy at Shunet Nimrin, who was thus induced
to beheve that a considerable concentration was
taking place in the valley. This unpleasant daily
promenade fell to the lot of the British West Indies
regiments.
For the benefit of the native population, elaborate
bogus preparations were made for the removal of
G.H.Q. to Jerusalem. One of the hotels there was
cleared of its occupants, much to their disgust, and
staff officers busied themselves installing office furni-
ture and telephone equipment, and painting the
WORK OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE 197
names of a multitude of departments on the doors
of the rooms.
Lastly, lest a chance word should reach a native
enemy spy within our hnes, everjrthing was done to
further the belief among our own troops that we
were likely to attack on the east flank. The writer
remembers receiving a visit one day from his Divi-
sional General, and being told to do nothing to dis-
courage the idea that the cavalry would once again
find themselves in the Valley of Desolation. He also
remembers vividly the lurid language that arose on
all sides when this report spread about the camps !
No orders were com^mitted to paper other than
those issued by G.H.Q. and the three Corps. Secret
conferences were called in tmii at the various Divi-
sional Headquarters, when the scheme was explained
to staffs and commanders of brigades, each of whom
then prepared his scheme, and submitted it verbally
to his immediate superior.
The three cavahy divisions on the left of our line
were liidden securely from the eyes of enemy aero-
plane observers ; the Australian Mounted Division
in the immense, old olive woods round Ramleh, the
4th Cavalrj^ Division in the orange groves near
Selmeh, and the 5th Division, which had left the
Jordan Valley on September 11, in those north-west
of Sarona.
Shortly before the operations commenced, the
60th and 75th Infantry Divisions were brought
across to the coastal sector, where they remained,
unseen by the enemy, till the attack was launched.
During aU the period of concentration, the magni-
ficent work of the Royal Air Force played a dominant
part in keeping the enemy in ignorance of our move-
ments. The Commander-in-Chief paid the force a
well-deserved compliment in his despatch when he
198 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
said : ' The chief factor in the secrecy maintained
must be attributed, however, to the supremacy in
the air which had been obtained by the Royal Air
Force. The process of wearing down the enemy's
aircraft had been going on all through the summer.
During one week in June 100 hostile aeroplanes
had crossed our lines. During the last week in
August this number had decreased to eighteen. In
the next few days a number were shot down, with
the result that only four ventured to cross our lines
during the period of concentration.' ^
On the 18th of September, the day before the
attack, a large force of bombing aeroplanes was
directed over Nablus, where it was known the enemy
had his main telephone and telegraph exchange.
This was completely destroyed, a fact which played
an important part in enabhng our cavalry to reach
the Plain of Esdraelon next day, before the enemy
G.H.Q. knew they had broken through.
The striking success of these measures was after-
wards proved by captured enemy documents. Among
these was the German Intelligence Service map, issued
on the very day before our attack commenced. This
map shows thi'ee cavalry divisions still in the Jordan
Valley, and only one in the coastal sector. Only
two infantry divisions are shown in the coastal sector
instead of five, and the whole map points to an
attack in, or east of, the Jordan Valley. A German
air reconnaissance report, dated 17th of September,
and found among Liman von Sanders' papers at
Nazareth, stated that ' far from there being any
diminution in the cavalry in the Jordan VaUey, there
are evidences of twenty-three more squadrons there.'
The Turkish line on the plain consisted of two
defensive positions, well constructed and heavily
1 Despatch dated October 31, 1918.
PLAN OF THE OPERATIONS 199
wired. The first, 14,000 yards in length and 3000
in depth, ran along a sandy ridge in a north-westerly
direction from Bir Adas to the sea. It consisted of
a series of works connected by a continuous net-
work of fire trenches. The second, or El Tire system,
3000 yards in the rear, ran from the village of that
name to the mouth of the Nahr el Falik. On the
enemy's extreme right the ground, except for a
narrow strip along the coast, was marshy, and could
only be crossed in few places. The defence of the
second system did not, therefore, require a large
force.
The attack of these positions was entrusted to the
21st Corps (3rd, 7th, 54th, and 75th Divisions), to
which were also attached the 60th Division, the
French Infantry Detachment, and the 5th A.L.H.
Brigade (Australian Mounted Division), together with
a large number of heavy guns and two brigades of
mountain artillery. This force was to break through
the enemy's defences between the railway and the
sea, in order to open the door for the cavalry, and,
at the same time, to seize the foothills south-east of
Jiljulie. The Corps was then to swing to the right,
pivoting on Jiljulie, as already explained, on to the
line Hableh-Tul Keram, and advance in a north-
easterly direction, converging on Samaria and Attara
(on the Jenin- Samaria Railway about five miles north-
west of the latter place), so as to drive the enemy up
the two roads from Messudieh Junction and Samaria
to Jenin, into the arms of the cavalry on the Plain
of Esdraelon. The 5th A.L.H. Brigade was to cover
the outer (left) flank of the Corps during this turning
movement, capture Tul Keram station, and then
raid and cut the Messudieh- Jenin Railway, near Ajje.
As soon as the infantry had broken through, the
three cavahy divisions were to advance rapidly up
200 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
the plaiii, the 5th Division along the coast road,
through JMukhahd, the 4th via Tabsor and Mughair,
and the Austrahan Mounted Division following the
4th.
Tlie enemy had partially prepared an entrenched
position across the plain from about Jelameh, through
El Mejdel and Liktera, to the sea near the mouth of
the Nahr Mefju*, and this was known to be held by
a few troops. The 4th Division had orders to seize
the portion of this line between Jelameh and Liktera,
while the 5th dealt with the western haK from Liktera
to the coast.
Having made good the line of the Nahr Mefjir,
they were to turn north-east and cross the Carmel
Range, the 4th and Australian Divisions by the
Musmus Pass, and the 5th by a httle-known track
from Sindiane to Abu Shusheh, and enter the Plain
of Esdraelon. Arrived on the plain, the 4th Cavalry
Division was to seize Afule and then push rapidly
down the Valley of Jezreel to Beisan, occupy the
Jordan bridges there, and send a force to hold and,
if necessary, destroy the bridge at Jisr Mejamieh,
twelve miles farther north. This programme en-
tailed a ride of ninety-seven miles on end, and
included the crossing of a mountain range by a
difficult pass.
The 5th Division was directed on Nazareth (seventy
miles) to capture the enemy General Headquarters,
which was located there, and, if possible, Liman von
Sanders himself, and then clear the plain as far east
as Afule. The Austrahan Division was to remain on
the Plain of Esdraelon at El Lejjun, sending a force
to Jenin (sixtjT^-eight miles), to intercept the Turks
retiring from Samaria, when that place had been
captured by our infantry.
As these immense distances had to be covered in
THE ROLE of the INFANTRY 201
one ' bound,' speed was essential. The 4th and 5th
Divisions, were, therefore, ordered to move up the
coast on a wide front, and sweep over the Jelameh-
Liktera positions with the sword and lance. If un-
expectedly strong opposition was encountered there,
the Austrahan Division was available, immediately
in rear, to reinforce. The crossing of the Carmel
Range was to be carried out as rapidly as possible,
as it was recognised that our troops could only move
in very narrow columns over the mountains, especially
through the Musmus Pass, and flank guards would
be out of the question. The 5th Division was, how-
ever, directed to drop a small force on the Sindiane-
Abu Shusheh track, at the top of the range, to protect
the left flank of the other two divisions, while they
were passing through the defile.
The 20th Corps, in the hills north of Jerusalem,
was ordered to attack all along its front on the day
after the attack in the coastal plain, and drive the
enemy northwards into the arms of the cavalry, while,
in the Jordan VaUey, Chay tor's Force had first to
seize the bridge over the river at El Damieh, and then
to cross the Jordan for the third and last time, and
advance on Amman.
CHAPTER XVI
ARMAGEDDON
By the evening of the 18th of September all troops
were in readiness for the attack. The 4th, 5th, and
AustraHan Cavalry Divisions were hidden in the
orange and olive groves at Sarona, Selmeh, and Ludd
respectively. Their Horse Aitillery batteries had
moved up into the line on the night of the 17th, to
take part in the preliminary bombardment.
Before daj^hght on the 19th the three divisions
commenced their march up to the front, the 5th
Division riding along the sea shore, at the foot of the
high cUffs that fringe the coast in this part, the 4th
via JeUl and El Haram, and the Australians on
Tabsor. The two first-named divisions sent dis-
mounted pioneer parties from each brigade forward
with the infantry, to cut gaps in the wire, and to
flag passages through it for their brigades. Their
horses were led as close behind them as possible,
and liaison with their brigades was maintained by
gallopers.
At 4.30 A.M. the 400 guns concentrated on the
front of attack opened an intense fire on the Turkish
positions, and the five infantry divisions dashed
forward to the attack.
The enemy was taken completely by surprise, and
our infantry broke through the Turkish lines with
hardly a pause, the guns maintaining a creeping
baiTage in front of them till they were through the
first position. About 50,000 shells were put over
202
ADVANCE OF THE CAVALRY 203
during the short time that the bombardment and
barrage lasted. At eight minutes past five the
whole of the front line was reported taken, and by
eighteen minutes to six the whole of the first position
was in our hands, and our line began to wheel to the
right.
The 5th Cavalry Division, being sheltered from
view by the high cliffs of the sea shore, was able to
ride right on the heels of the infantry, and the 13th
Brigade, acting as advance guard, was across the
Nahr el Falik by half-past eight, and riding hard up
the plain towards Mukhalid. A strong patrol from
this brigade was sent forward to reconnoitre Liktera.
The 4th Division, being in the open, had to wait
till the El Tire-Naln- el Falik line had been cleared,
so as not to interfere with our infantry, and thus did
not cross the Falik till about ten o'clock. The 12th
Brigade led through the enemy positions, but, as
soon as they were clear of the wire, the 10th and
11th Brigades came up on the left, and the division
advanced in line of brigade columns, each finding its
own advance guard. The AustraHan Division was
then about five miles farther back, passing through
the enemy defences at Tabsor. Each division had
picked up its artillery on the way.
The advance of the infantry had been so rapid that
there had been very little time to collect prisoners,
and as the cavalry advanced they came across
numerous small parties of Turks, wandering about
disconsolate and bewildered. They were quite dis-
organised, and did not attempt to interfere with our
troops, and later on were all gathered in by ' mopping
up ' parties, and taken to the collecting cages in
rear. Farther east, disorganised parties of the enemy
were streaming across the plain towards Tul Keram,
pursued by the 5th A.L.H. Brigade, but these were
204 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
out of sight of the rest of the cavaky as they crossed
the Une. Looking at the strong defences as we
passed through them, deserted and quiet, it was hard
to beheve that, only a few hours before, these posi-
tions had been held by a numerous and well-organised
enemy.
While the 5th Division was crossing the Nahr el
Falik, the patrol which had been sent on towards
Liktera reported a small force of enemy cavalry some
two miles in front. This force at once made off in
a north-easterly direction, and was not seen again.
About the same time, a contact aeroplane reported
some enemy infantry holding a position near Birket
Ata. The 9th Hodson's Horse, which was vanguard
to the 13th Brigade, reached this position about half-
past ten, and at once charged and dispersed the
enemy, taking about 250 prisoners and four guns.
Pressing on at once, the regiment reached Liktera,
half an hour later, where the Turkish Commandant
surrendered at discretion, with his small garrison.
The first objective having thus been secured without
difficulty, the division closed up and halted on the line
of the Nahr Mefjir, to water and feed. A squadron,
supported by two armoured cars, was sent ahead to
reconnoitre the Sindiane-Abu Shusheh track.
The 4th Division, which had been somewhat
delayed finding a way through the enemy's wire,
crossed the Nahr Iskanderuneh about 11.30, and,
shortly afterwards, the leading regiment of the 11th
Brigade, the 36th Jacob's Horse, came under fire
from some Turks holding a portion of the enemy's
entrenched position, just south of Zelefe. The regi-
ment charged immediately, and the Turks broke and
fled, leaving 200 prisoners in our hands. About the
same time the 6th Cavalry, leading the 12th Brigade
on the right, encountered a smaU enemy rearguard
OVER THE CARMEL RANGE 205
near Jett. This force was likewise promptly charged
and dispersed. A marked map, found on a prisoner
captured here, indicated that the enemy intended to
hold a hne from Arara, through Kefr Kara and
Kannir to Mamas, covering both routes over the
mountains. The 10th Brigade was, therefore, sent
on at once with an armoured car battery to seize
the Musmus Pass, the rest of the division remaining
at El Mejdel and Tel el Dhrur to water and feed.
The Austrahan Mounted Division was ordered to
halt for a time near Jelil, till word was received that
the infantry, advancing to the line Hableh-Tul Keram,
were progressing satisfactorily. This information
came in about mid-day, and the division was then
directed by the Corps Commander to push on at
once towards the Nahr Iskanderuneh. The advanced
guard reached the river at ten o'clock at night,
without encountering any opposition, and the rest
of the division, with the advanced Headquarters of
the Corps, got in about an hour later. Horses were
watered and fed, and the march was resumed at one
o'clock in the morning.
The two leading divisions had marched again about
six in the evening. The patrol from the 5th Division,
which had gone ahead to reconnoitre the Sindiane
track, reported that it was unfit for wheels. The
divisional transport was, therefore, directed to cross
by the Musmus Pass, in rear of the Australian Mounted
Division, the 15th Brigade to remain at Liktera for
the night, and cross by the Sindiane track, with the
artillery of the division, the following day. The rest
of the division, led by the 13th Brigade, reached Sin-
diane long after dark, and was soon involved in a
tangle of hills, with no defined track visible, but in-
numerable, shadowy paths leading in all directions.
Our maps showed a fairly direct track, which had
206 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
been reported by natives as feasible for cavaky and
light guns. Their information was, however, merely
hearsay, as we liad not been able, before starting, to
find any natives who actually knew the track.
Fortunately the 13th Brigade had in its commander ^
an officer who had had ten years' service in the
Egyptian cavalry, and spoke Arabic fluently. From
time to time, during the night, he came across a few
Arabs from whom he was able to get some informa-
tion. His long experience of marching in uncharted
country, and a natural aptitude for finding his way,
stood him in good stead, and he successfully led the
two brigades over the range in the dark, marching in
single file most of the time. Two squadrons were
dropped at Jarak, as left flank guard for the remainder
of the Corps, while passing the Musmus defile.
The two brigades reached Abu Shusheh about half-
past two in the morning, and continued the march
across the plain in the darkness, crossing and cutting
the Afule-Haifa Railway near Warakani, about half
an hour later. The moon was nearly full, and the
light good. On arriving at the foothills, the 14th
Brigade halted till dayhght, and the 13th pushed on up
the track via Jebataand El Mujeidil, towards Nazareth.
On nearing El Mujeidil, a native guide, who had
been picked up on Mount Carmel, stated that the
place was Nazareth. Though feeling sure that he
was either mistaken or funked going any farther, the
Brigadier decided to seize the place. He directed the
18th Lancers to surround it, which they did, and,
having blocked all exits, sent a couple of troops into
the village. By now it was clear that it was much
too small a place to be Nazareth, but it was thought
1 Brigadier-General P. J. V. Kelly, C.M.G., D.S.O., 3rd Hussars. He
commanded the Egyptian troops in the brilliantly successful little Darfur
Campaign of 1916.
CAPTURE OF NAZARETH 207
worth while to search it hurriedly, as a result of which
200 sleepy Turks were dug out of a large house. The
brigade then passed on up the main road, the Glou-
cester Yeomanry taldng the lead.
Shortly afterwards the houses of Nazareth appeared
in front, gleaming white and silent in the moonhght.
The advanced guard now halted, and the troop leaders
were given their instructions. The town lies in a
cup-shaped hollow, and straggles up the steep and
rocky hills surrounding it. The principal houses, in
one of which the enemy G.H.Q. would probably be
located, are situated in the centre of the town at the
bottom of the hollow, and on the northern slopes.
The only information we had as to the exact location
of G.H.Q. was that it was near a big motor-lorry park.
Two troops were directed to make for the centre of
the town, find the lorry park, and rush any big houses
near by. Others were directed to gallop on, and
seize tactical points on the northern slope, and block
the roads leading north-east to Tiberias and north-
west to Haifa.
Just as day was breaking the regiment drew swords
and galloped into the town, causing the most inde-
scribable confusion amongst the enemy troops,
mostly German, there. Liman von Sanders himself
only just made his escape in time. His housekeeper,
whom we questioned later, declared that, at the fu'st
alarm, he dashed down the stairs of his house and
out into the street in his pyjamas, and made off in a
car along the Tiberias road.
The brigade had some hard street fighting, after the
enemy had recovered from his first consternation, but
the Germans and Turks were driven out of the town
to the north-east. Here, however, a number of them
got into some houses on the Tiberias road, and put
up a good fight.
208 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
Several machine guns, mounted in a big convent
which overlooked the centre of the town from the
nortliern slope, made things very unpleasant, and it
soon became evident that a deliberate dismounted
attack would be necessary to dislodge them. Mean-
while the troops detailed for the duty had found and
entered the enemy G.H.Q. They made a hurried
search of the premises, covered by the rest of the
regiment on the north and north-east, and by Hod-
son's Horse standing by, and seized all the more
important documents. As soon as this work was
finished, the advanced troops fell back fighting, and
the brigade withdrew down the Afule road, taking
with it 1200 prisoners. Before leaving, our troops
put out of action all the motor cars of the enemy
G.H.Q., and the lorries of the German lorry park.
These were all afterwards repaired and used by us.
On reaching the plain again, the brigade occupied
Junjar, Tel Shadud and Jebata, holding the southern
exits from Nazareth.
The 14th Brigade was occupied after dayHght clear-
ing the north-western portion of the plain of smaU
parties of enemy troops, and entered Afule later on
in the morning.
The 15th Brigade, with the guns and transport of
the division, left the Nahr Iskanderuneh soon after
dawn on the 20th, and marched by the same route
to Afule. The gunners had a very rough passage over
the mountains, and had to spend many hours making
a roadway for the guns, so that they did not reach
the station till about eleven at night.
The 4th Division left the Nahr Mefjir about the
same time as the 5th, the 10th Brigade having gone
on in advance to secure the Musmus Pass. The 2nd
Lancers and an armoured car battery, acting as van-
guard, entered the Pass, and reached Khurbet Arab
THE CHARGE AT LEJJUN 209
without encountering any opposition. They placed
outposts covering the cross roads here, and sent back
a report to the 10th Brigade. Unfortunately this
brigade had lost its way in the darkness, before moon-
rise, and was now somewhere north of Kerkur. On
learning the state of affairs, General Barrow ordered
the 12th Brigade up to the support of the 2nd Lancers,
and himself motored up to Khurbet Arab, and directed
the regiment to push on at once through the defile to
Lejjun. This place was reached without opposition
about eleven at night, the 12th Brigade arriving some
hours later. The 11th Brigade, followed by the 10th,
which had regained the road, came in at five o'clock
in the morning.
As soon as it was light enough to see, the troops
commenced to move out into the Plain of Esdraelon.
They were none too soon. As the 12th Brigade,
forming the advanced guard of the division, de-
bouched from the defile, a Turkish battalion, with
several machine guns, was deploying in the plain
below.
The 2nd Lancers were leading, accompanied by the
armoured cars. Taking in the situation at a glance.
Captain Davison, commanding the regiment, ordered
the cars to engage the enemy in front with their
machine guns, supported by one squadron of his
regiment. Taking the other two squadrons with him,
he galloped along a slight depression to the right,
and charged the Turks on their left flank. The two
squadrons went right through the enemy from left
to right, kiUing forty-six with the lance. The sur-
vivors of the battalion, about 500 in all, were taken
prisoners. The Turks fought well, firing steadily till
they were ridden down, but the rapid work of the
cavalry gave them no chance. The whole action did
not take more than five minutes, and furnished a
o
210 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
perfect little example of sound shock tactics — move-
ment and fii'e at right angles to one another.
Had our cavalry been a few hours later, this battalion
would have been at the defile at the top of the pass,
and might have caused a delay that would have been
fatal to the success of the operations. The battalion
came from Afule, and had been ordered to cross the
mountains and move down the coast to the support
of the enemy right wing. The Turks knew that their
line had been broken on the coast, but they had
absolutely no idea that our cavalry were through the
gap.
Without a pause the 12th Brigade poured out of
the pass and cantered across the plain towards Afule.
The leading troops charged into the station at eight
o'clock, capturing the place with little opposition.
A squadron from the 14th Brigade (4th Division)
rode in from the north about the same time. The
garrison of the place having just been disposed of at
Lejjun, few enemy troops were found here, but the
Germans had an aerodrome close to the station, and
this was captured intact, with three aeroplanes and
their pilots and ail the mechanical staff. A fourth
aeroplane succeeded in getting away in the general
confusion. So unconscious was the enemy of the
fact that our cavalry were on the plain, that, shortly
after this, an enemy aeroplane, returning from a
reconnaissance, actually landed on this aerodrome,
and was promptly captured intact with its pilot and
observer !
Afule proved a valuable prize. In addition to ten
locomotives and fifty railway trucks, which were
found standing in the station, there was a fully
equipped hospital, with a quantity of excellent drugs.
One of the most valuable finds was a great store of
petrol, which was discovered in an underground cave.
OCCUPATION OF BEISAN 211
While the 12th Brigade was ' mopping up,' the
armoured cars were having the time of their Uves
chasing twelve German motor lorries down the track
leaduig to Beisan. They captured them all, and
brought the drivers back to the station. Unfortu-
nately no men could be spared to guard these lorries,
and, when the 5th Division arrived shortly afterwards,
and tried to drive them back to the station, it was
found that the natives had been there in the mean-
time, and cut open every petrol tank to get the spirit.
They were afterwards repaired, however, and did good
service for us later on.
Having sent the prisoners back to Lejjun under a
small escort, the 4th Division pressed on towards
Beisan, after cutting the railway east, west, and south
of Afule.
Riding fast all day down the Valley of Jezreel, the
division reached Beisan about half-past four in the
afternoon, having rounded up another 800 prisoners
on the way. The Lancers made short work of the
small garrison they met with here, galloping over the
Turks, and taking 100 prisoners and three 5*9-inch
howitzers. These guns were in position to defend
the town against an attack from the east, an eloquent
testimony to the manner in which the enemy had
been deceived. Our troops then occupied the bridge
over the Jordan at Jisr el Sheikh Hussein, and placed
outposts south and east of Beisan.
The division had now marched eighty-five miles in
thirty-four hours, fought two skirmishes, and cap-
tured 1400 prisoners, but its day's work was not yet
quite finished. At six in the evening, after having
watered and fed, the 19th Lancers (12th Brigade)
set out in the dark, along a difiicult mountain track
west of the railway, to Jisr Mejamie, the railway
bridge over the Jordan, twelve miles north of Beisan.
212 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
Tliis they reached and seized at dawn next morning,
having covered ninety-seven miles since the com-
mencement of their march.
The AustraUans, who had left the Nahr Iskande-
runeli at one o'clock in the morning, reached Kerkur
and Beidus just after dawn, and thus made the cross-
ing of the Carmel Range in dayhght. They were
rewarded by the magnificent view from the top of the
pass, across the Plain of Esdraelon to Mount Tabor
and Nazareth, and over the Nazarene hills to the
great mass of Mount Hermon, poised against the sky
sixty miles to the north-east. Scattered along the
track were a number of derelict Turkish transport
wagons, which had been abandoned as they were
being driven over the pass, when the 4th Division
came upon them in the dark. Many of the Turks
who had accompanied these wagons, came back to
the track after daylight, preferring capture by the
British to facing the tender mercies of their invete-
rate enemies, the local Arabs. In this way the divi-
sion had collected about 100 stragglers by the time
it reached Lejjun. Near the top of the pass a large
gang of natives was discovered at work on an excel-
lently graded road, which was being built to the
village of Umm el Fahm. It appeared that the
Germans had intended to build a sanatorium there,
in connection with their hospitals at Afule and Jenin.
The natives employed making the road had gone to
work as usual that morning, all unaware that the
Germans and Turks were no longer masters in the
land. When they learned the true state of affairs,
their first thought was for their wages, which had
not been paid, and they were not at all grateful to
us for having driven their paymasters out of the
country !
The division reached Lejjun at eleven o'clock, and
Before! German motor lorries at Nazareth.
(From an enemy photograph.)
After! The same lorries near .Afule. after our armoured t;ars liael finished with thefii.
CAPTURE OF JENIN 213
got water for man and horse in the beautiful httle
Wadi el Sitt, the ' Lady's Brook,' a tributary of the
river Kishon, hard by the ruins of an old Roman
fort and aqueduct.
Shortly after mid-day the 3rd A.L.H. Brigade, with
' A ' Battery H.A.C., resumed the march to Jenin,
to intercept the enemy troops that were expected to
retire down the Dothan Pass from Nablus and its
neighbourhood. The brigade reached the town in
the early afternoon, and the leading regiment, the
10th, at once charged straight into it, galloping over
an entrenched position, and through the streets of
the town. The enemy was completely demoralised
by this unexpected attack from the rear, and made
little resistance. Such opposition as was encoun-
tered was speedily crushed, and nearly 2000 prisoners
fell into our hands. None of the troops in the place
had the faintest idea that our cavahy had even
broken through their line, much less that we were
actually in the plain. The German officers, of whom
there was a number in the place, absolutely refused
to beheve that our troops had ridden the whole way,
and declared that we must have been landed at
Haifa, covered by our ' Wonderful Navy,' as they
called it.
As soon as the prisoners had been got away, and
lodged in a little valley out of sight of the town, the
hills to the south were picketed, to prevent informa-
tion getting to the enemy at Nablus, and the remainder
of the brigade was disposed by squadrons in hollows
and folds in the ground on eeich side of the Jenin-
Afule road. The battery came into action north-
east of the town, covering the Nablus road.
As was expected, after dark the enemy began to
retire from his positions at Nablus and Samaria, and
all night long his battalions marched down the road.
214 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
through Jenin, and out on to the plain. These were
not fugitives, but formed bodies of troops, retiiing
to the Nazarene hills, where they had a partially pre-
pared defence line extending from the sea to Lake
Tiberias. It was rather an eerie experience to watch
these troops, trudging wearily along the road in the
bright moonlight, all unconscious of the keen eyes
of then' enemies on every side of them. As each
detachment got well out into the plain, at a given
signal, the waiting squadrons sprang from their
hiding places, and charged down upon it. One can
imagine the terror of the Turks, nodding with half-
closed eyes as they trudged along, when their senses
were suddenly assailed by the thunder of hoofs all
round them, and by the sight of wild horsemen,
exaggerated in size by the moonlight, charging down
upon them from every side. Small wonder that
there was Uttle resistance. Many flung themselves
on the ground, shutting eyes and ears to the horrid
nightmare, and calling on Allah to deliver them.
Others threw down their rifles and held up their
hands.
Each lot was quickly hustled out of sight, and the
squadrons returned to their lairs, to await the coming
of the next. Only one battalion, a German one,
tried to put up any fight, and succeeded in getting a
machine gun into action, but it was ridden down at
once. None of the other German troops did any
better than the Turks.
Some time during the night, information of the
state of affairs at Jenin evidently got back to the
enemy in the hills about Nablus, for the supply of
prisoners suddenly ran dry. By this time the brigade
had got over 8000, and needed help in handling
them. In response to a message sent back to the
divisional headquarters at Lejjun, the 4:th A.L.H.
BOOTY AT JENIN 215
Brigade, with a section of the Notts Battery R.H.A.,
left that place at half -past four on the morning of
September the 21st, and marched to Jenin. An
extraordinary sight met the brigade on its arrival.
The whole plain seemed to be covered with prisoners,
motor cars, lorries, wagons, animals, and stores, in
an inextricable confusion. In and out of this mass
the sorely tried AustraUan troopers pushed their
way, sweating and swearing, every now and then
riding savagely at the hordes of natives hovering on
the outskirts of the crowd like a flock of vultures,
and looting the stores that strewed the ground ; anon
pressing into the throng again, to round up a group
of straying prisoners. Over all presided the stocky
figure of the brigadier, ^ like the leader of a gigantic
school picnic, unhurried and efficient.
Jenin was the enemy's main supply and ordnance
depot for his Vllth and Vlllth Armies, and very
large quantities of valuable stores of all sorts were
captured here, together with several well-equipped
workshops and three hospitals. There were twenty-
four burnt aeroplanes, and one intact, on the aero-
drome, and a number of engines and a quantity of
rolhng stock in the station. In some caves near by
were found large stores of German beer and wine,
and a lot of excellent tinned food, and, in a wagon
abandoned on the road, there were nearly £20,000
in gold. The two troopers who were detailed to
guard this money sat on the boxes of bullion all
day, without knowing what was in them, and have
been kicking themselves ever since ! This gold was
of the greatest use to the Corps later on, when we
were Uving on the country, and had to buy all our
food and forage. Among the minor captures was a
quantity of photographic negatives belonging to the
1 Brigadier-General L. Wilson, C.M.G.. D.S.O., A.I.F.
216 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
official photographer with the German forces, one
of which depicted some of our guns which were lost
in the second Amman raid. Also a British motor
cycle, captured from us at the first battle of Gaza,
eighteen months before.
The chief medical officer of the German hospital in
the town volunteered the information that all ranks
there, German as well as Turkish, were secretly glad
to be captured. For the past ten days, he said,
British aeroplanes had hovered over the place almost
continually, and a rain of bombs had fallen all the
time on the station, aerodrome, and workshops.
Most of the troops left the town every day before
dawn, and spent the hours of dayhght in caves in
the hills. All work was practically at a standstill,
and none of the German aeroplanes had ever ventured
to leave the ground. He was very puzzled by the
fact that we had never bombed the town itself, and,
when one of our officers replied that it was not the
British custom to bomb undefended native villages,
he shrugged his shoulders and remarked that such
ideas were inadmissible in war. The Germans never
brought themselves to believe that we were serious
in our determination to observe the rules of civilised
warfare in this respect. They realised, however,
that we never bombed hospitals, a fact of which they
were not slow to take advantage. Later on, when
Nazareth was reoccupied, it was found that every
house that harboured German troops, which is to say
nearly every house of substance in the town, had a
red cross, or its Turkish equivalent a red crescent,
painted on the roof.
CHAPTER XVII
DEBACLE
While the cavalry were racing for the Plain of
Esdraelon on the 19th September the 21st Corps, con-
tinuing its wheel to the right, drove the enemy into
the hills. The 5th A.L.H. Brigade, riding on the
left flank of the Corps, and some distance in advance
of it, approached Tul Keram about mid-day.
The orders to the brigade were to seize the town,
if possible, or, failing that, to engage the enemy there,
and endeavour to prevent him withdrawing his troops
and guns till the arrival of our infantry. Knowing
the moral effect on the Turks of a threat to their
rear, General Onslow decided to throw a portion of
his brigade across the Tul Keram-Nablus road, the
only exit from the town to the east. He despatched
the 14th A.L.H. regiment and part of the brigade
machine-gun squadron, with instructions to find a
way through the hills north of the town, and descend
on to the road some two miles to the north-east.
With the remainder of his brigade he approached the
town from the north-west, and was met by a very
heavy fire from the enemy there. Tul Keram was a
railway and store depot of considerable importance.
It had been fortified, and now served the enemy as a
strong point, on which his troops, defeated in the
coastal plain, might rally, and so save his right flank.
He was, of course, stiU in ignorance of the fact that
three divisions of cavalry were already well on their
way up the coast.
817
218 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
As the 5th Brigade approached the town, the Royal
Air Force swept down out of the blue sky, and com-
menced an intense and systematic bombing of the
enemy positions around the town, and the closely
packed column of transport and guns slowly retiring
along the road to Nablus. The utmost confusion
broke out in the enemy ranks. About three [o'clock
the 14th A.L.H. Regiment, which had moved with
extraordinary rapidity, descended on the Nablus
road about two miles from Tul Keram. The Turks
were now faced simultaneously with the three things
they most feared. Their retreat was cut off ; they
were being heavily attacked from the air ; and they
were threatened on both sides with a cavalry charge.
The demoraUsation on the road was complete. Not
knowing the strength of the cavalry force which had
suddenly appeared on the road in front of them, and
evidently deceived by the volume of fire poured on
them from our machine guns and automatic rifles,
the enemy troops and transport on the road made no
attempt to break through, but turned back towards
Tul Keram. The persistent attacks of our aeroplanes
soon destroyed all semblance of discipline in the
column, and a disordered mass of fugitives streamed
back into Tul Keram, increasing the confusion there.
The Turks in the positions surrounding the town,
however, still fought on gallantly enough, and General
Onslow, unable to advance his brigade over the open
ground without encountering losses which would
not have been justified, contented himself with hold-
ing the enemy in check on the north, east and west,
and awaited the arrival of our infantry. A brigade
of the 60th Division came up about half-past five,
having marched and fought over sixteen miles of
heavy country since dawn, and rushed the town from
the south-west.
A FINE MARCH 219
General Onslow now reassembled his brigade, and
succeeded in watering all the horses, which was some-
thing of a feat, considering the darkness and confu-
sion. At two in the morning the brigade started off
for its second objective, the Messudieh-Jenin Railway
east of Ajje.
Regarded merely as a march, this expedition,
carried out in the dark and without guides, over un-
known and almost trackless mountain country, ranks
as one of the finest episodes of the campaign. Un-
able to use the road or railway, along which Turkish
reinforcements were known to be hurrying towards
Tul Keram, the brigade struck straight across the
mountains to the north-east, and. passed through
Deir el Ghusn, EUar, Kefr Ruai, and Fahme. From
the last-named place a moderate pack road led
through Ajje to the railway, which was reached at
seven in the morning by the brigade headquarters
and a demolition party, who blew up a section of the
line.
Dawn found the brigade strung out over fifteen
miles of country. Its work was done, and, as it
would have taken several hours to reassemble the
regiments at Ajje, the Brigadier at once turned back
along the track by which he had come, picking up his
scattered units on the way, and returned to Tul Keram.
It was seven o'clock in the evening before the whole
brigade was again concentrated there.
In accordance with the Commander-in-Chief's plan,
the 20th Corps had taken no part in the advance
during the first day, beyond seizing one or two tactical
points, to facilitate its operations on the following
day, but on the 20th it was thrown into the battle,
and the whole line became hotly engaged. The
enemy fought stubbornly, especially in the centre of
his line, where most of the German troops were con-
220 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
centrated. His positions were of great natural
strength, and had been excellently entrenched and
wired during the summer. By nightfall, however,
his resistance had been broken all along the front,
and our infantry had advanced as far as the line
Anebta (five miles east of Tul Keram)-Beit Lid-
Funduk-Kefr Harries-El Lubban (on the Nablus-
Jerusalem road, eleven miles south of Nablus) to
Dome. The enemy had thus been turned out of
nearly all his entrenched positions.
Owing to the breakdown of their communications,
and the virtual destruction of their air force, the
Turks had not yet realised that our cavalry were
behind them, and that all their lines of retreat to the
north were thus closed. The only way of escape
still left open for their trapped armies was by the
two difficult tracks from Nablus and Ain el Subian
(on the Nablus-Beisan road) to Jisr el Damieh.
Chaytor's Force was fighting hard in the Jordan
Valley to reach and block the lower end of these
roads.
Our infantry resumed the attack at dayhght on the
21st. The 20th Corps made rapid progress, and, by
nightfall, had estabhshed itself across the Nablus-
Jisr el Damieh track about Beit Dejan.
On the 21st Corps front, the advance was slower.
The enemy in this part of the field was not yet
demorahsed, and his rearguards put up a stubborn
fight, especially about Nablus. The 5th A.L.H.
Brigade, moving along the main road from Tul Keram,
with an armoured car battery, was usefully employed
protecting the left flank of the Corps during the day.
General Onslow turned the Turks and Germans out
of a series of strong rearguard positions astride the
road, by using his machine guns and armoured cars
on the road, to hold the enemy in front with their
CONFUSION IN THE ENEMY RANKS 221
fire, while dismounted parties from the brigade
worked round his flanks. The French regiment
particularly distinguished itself in this fighting, and
earned generous praise from the Australians.
In the early afternoon some of the guns of the 3rd
(Lahore) Division succeeded in reaching a position
overlooking Nablus from the south-west, and their
vigorous shelling, coupled with the converging attacks
of the 10th and 53rd Divisions, drove the Turkish
rearguards out of their positions. The 5th Brigade
rode into the town hard on the heels of the retreat-
ing enemy, and took 700 prisoners. One squadron
pushed on down the Jerusalem road, and gained
touch with the 20th Corps cavalry regiment, the
Worcester Yeomanry, about Balata. The following
day the brigade marched to Jenin to rejoin the
Australian Mounted Division, having accounted for
3500 prisoners during the three days.
Both at Tul Keram and in Nablus great quantities
of valuable stores, which the enemy had been unable
to remove or destroy, fell into our hands. Especially
welcome were the many railway engines and trucks
found intact at the former place, which were very
soon employed on the repaired railway, carrying
ammunition and stores to our troops. Here, too,
a troop of the 15th A.L.H. Regiment rounded up
and captured a detachment of the Turkish Field
Treasury, with about £5000 in gold and a quantity
of notes.
Throughout the day complete confusion had reigned
in the enemy rear. Camps and stores were hurriedly
abandoned or set on fire. Many heavy guns were
dropped over precipices to save them from falling
intact into the hands of the British. Driven out of
their organised positions, and unable to keep touch
with one another in this diflicult, mountain countrv.
222 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
the enemy regiments retii-ed independently. Most
of them made either for Beisan or Jisr el Damieh, but
every wadi leading down to the Jordan was con-
gested with troops. The confusion was increased by
the repeated attacks of our aeroplanes, especially
along the Nablus-Beisan road, which was packed
with a dense column of troops and transport. Part
of this column continued along the road to Beisan,
where it fell into the hands of the 4th Cavalry Divi-
sion. The greater part turned off at Ain el Subian,
and made for Jisr el Damieh, along the Wadi Farah
track. About a mile beyond Ain Shibleh, this track
passes through a deep gorge. The transport at the
head of the column was caught by our aeroplanes in
this gorge, and heavily bombed. A general panic
ensued. Drivers abandoned their vehicles, and fled
into the hills ; wagons, lorries, and guns were smashed
or overturned, and in a short time the road was com-
pletely blocked. The remainder of the column turned
off at Ain Shibleh, along a narrow track leading to
Beisan. Still harassed by our aeroplanes, it broke
up ultimately into isolated parties, which scattered
into the hills, and were gathered in by the 4th Cavalry
Division during the next two days.
Our infantry and the Royal Air Force had done
their work well, in face of great difficulties. To the
cavalry now fell the task of gathering up the rem-
nants of the two Turkish armies.
There was little cavalry movement of importance
on the 21st. The 4th Division established posts right
across the Jordan Valley, east of the river, and pushed
patrols along the roads leading south and south-west
from Beisan. Shortly after dark, the first body of
retiring enemy troops was encountered on the Nablus
road. It was at once charged in the moonhght by
the Central India Force (10th Brigade) and dispersed.
"f\
Z' ^^ \ Galittt.
/ ^
^-'^-J^ /""' \ (
^-^ r^
I °
V /
/r^'^^'^\
.
J-
1 "^
i|>-.,.,^^ ., / ^«^A/^7<f
j^^
*<
/
^,_ ,.9 A/ajrareih ry ^<i
/^^ ^
/ rf
)f-S!^»^*.
^'*^J}'''^' S —5 '^ i I ,^ ■
"-^
V.\&f
PUi.,.n V S.~ ^PJ^ if/j^ri^tjamia
\
o.„^
^twW^^'^-
tot
^v
NT
I / Herkuf p
-/p
1 •'' ■[
P Jen in, fi; ''-a L-4--'^ — *
--'■^'^
A/ahr He/jCf l/' O
—••''^
y^' S
^,— ^
1/ ^%^
^y^
V/.^-,.^-^
/f^ ■^;:j?^^^w~^
Afahm /jAant^^ru^eA^ ; \^^^
X .''■■■-'■ y. /'^^v '
,,^^ B-
StA-ALH f i I OJ '
j: >s/'"-*^'
^Vv,___^^
\ '^rfe. ,■'*' -'"'y '>t? "■»
^
1 -A"^
■^^vv^
^^^^^^^^^,4^^^5■/l^^e>tv 'A ■;
^
1 / /^
-<:
V^
NaAt-elfaUk jt^__/_.^^^ //'
^- »
^^^^^^^-SiJNl ..jJ^^ ^""^^"^^'- ^> ' * 7
^ '-
^ .•
'■ 'f'^?^,..... \ ij^ /^
-^ — c:^
Arst^f k / /4^^E
>— ^
5S^<:4
// J^^^~^^
'^*
') \ ]! '"^~'
■^-; .'■^-- ,
th/ii^' ^^ '^
"-^ 4 ^
. ^ l -'~^;:zr~vy
~"-^'/ri,5=^4""'
\
fiA ^'V^,
•— {»
i*^ ^^r\
1
Jaffa, jpivj I
loth.
/ — '"^'^ I >»,
■'
/ ^^fcr-
1 \^t£u3?^
\ CK^ylo.,X ,,
J fiam.Uk. it^
'. '-^"C^^.Sa-:^^"
^M7--
/ / ^* -v
1 ^^";J*J^^C!*\
i 1 '\
^ ''^-''^''^ .*' ^^^^ /^
'^— '^^-'~c;-.-> — — ^.^-
>
/ \ ..•■""
••^.^.^
.-.^'- -.- ' y'' yOOij-'--^.^^
f^
/ .■^^%^uneUon. JifO.
*" * itf^"^' -/ V*
)
^J^Jeru^aUm. ^^_^ ^ Dead.
1
/ .^'yi ^~-
-Jl / Sec.
)'
2ituatiort. ofx th9 e^enin^ of the SOCA. of Ncuetnben.
224 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
leaving a number of prisoners in our hands. There
was no serious fighting during the night, but the
division had very hard work, and got over 3000
prisoners before daybreak.
The 5th Cavaky Division had sent the 14th Brigade
to Jenin, at daylight, to assist the two brigades of the
Australian Mounted Division there in dealing with
the large number of prisoners, and to help protect
the captured enemy stores from the natives. By the
afternoon, however, the prisoners had been got away
under escort to Lejjun, and the brigade was able to
return to Afule. The 14th and 15th Brigades then
estabhshed a line of pickets along the railway to
near Beisan, in touch with the 4th Division.
Meanwhile the 13th Brigade, with ' B ' Battery
H.A.C., had been sent off early in the morning to
reoccupy Nazareth.
The 9th Hodson's Horse marched straight up the
Afule-Nazareth road with the guns, and entered the
town from the south. The other two regiments,
leaving the road some distance south of the town,
made their way through the hills to the Tiberias
road, and attacked from the east and north. All
thi'ee regiments attacked dismounted. There was a
good deal of fighting of a difficult nature in the narrow,
tortuous streets of the town, but most of the enemy
troops remaining after our raid of the previous day
had already evacuated the town, and those still left
were soon overpowered. By ten o'clock the 13th
Brigade had possession of the town. The roads lead-
ing west, north, and east were then picketed, and
strong patrols were pushed out as far as Seffurie and
Kefr Kenna.
Shortly after midnight a Turkish battalion, march-
ing from Haifa, attacked the outposts of the brigade
on the Acre road. The 18th Lancers promptly
RATION DIFFICULTIES 225
charged the Turks in the moonhght, and chased them
for two miles down the road, killing sixty with the
lance and taking over 300 prisoners.
The Australian Mounted Division remained in the
neighbourhood of Jenin and Lejjun during the day.
The large numbers of prisoners taken by the
cavalry during the past twenty-four hours were a
serious encumbrance, and the feeding of them became
a very difficult problem. The Corps ration convoy
that arrived at Jenin on the 21st had to hand over
all its rations to them. As our own men carried
three-days men's and two-days horses' rations on
the man and horse, they did not actually have to go
hungry, but the food question had become acute,
and, until the prisoners could be got away, no further
move forward could be contemplated. Fortunately,
on the following day, it was found possible to send
most of them back to Kakon, near Tul Keram, where
they were taken over by a brigade of the 60th Divi-
sion.
The Commander-in-Chief motored to Lejjun on the
morning of the 22nd, and met General Chauvel.
' Well, how are you getting on ? ' was his greeting.
' Pretty well. Sir, pretty well,' repUed the General ;
' we 've got 13,000 prisoners so far.'
' No . . . good to me ! ' exclaimed the Chief, with
a laugh ; ' I want 30,000 from you before you 've
done.'
He was to have over 80,000 from the Corps before
the operations ended.
The 5th Cavalry Division concentrated at Nazareth
on the 22nd, preparatory to an advance on Haifa
and Acre, its place at Afule being taken by the 3rd
A.L.H. Brigade. The 5th A.L.H. Brigade rejoined
the Australian Mounted Division at Jenin during
the day.
226 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
In the early hours of the morning an enemy column,
with transport and guns, was reported by our aero-
planes to be moving north along the Ain Shibleh-
Beisan track, its head being then nine miles south of
Beisan. This was part of the force that had been
caught and heavily bombed by our aeroplanes the
day before in the gorge of the Wadi Farah, as it was
trying to escape towards the Jordan.
The 4th Cavalry Division at once sent a force from
Beisan along the Ain Shibleh track to intercept the
column, and despatched Jacob's Horse over the bridge
of Jisr el Sheikh Hussein to push patrols down the
track which follows the Jordan on its east bank, so
as to secure any parties which might escape across
the river. At the same time the 20th Corps cavalry
regiment, the Worcester Yeomanry, was ordered to
advance northwards from Ain Shibleh, supported by
infantry, to collect stragglers, and to drive any
formed bodies into the arms of the 4th Cavalry
Division.
Our airmen then proceeded to attack the column
with bombs and machine guns, and, in a short time,
had completely broken it up. The enemy scattered
in panic into the hills in small parties, which were
rounded up by the 4th Division next day. The
Worcester Yeomanry rode as far as the gorge where
the ill-fated column had been caught by our aero-
planes, and here its farther advance was stopped,
as the track was completely blocked by overturned
vehicles and the dead bodies of men and horses. On
one stretch of the track just here, under five miles
long, eighty-seven guns and 900 motor lorries and
other vehicles were afterwards found by the infantry,
when clearing up the area.
About mid- day the 11th and 12th Light Armoured
Car Batteries were sent to occupy Haifa, which was
ADVANCE OF CHAYTOR'S FORCE 227
believed to have been evacuated by the enemy.
With them went the General commanding the artillery
of the Cavalry Corps, in a large and beautiful Rolls-
Royce car, with the Commander-in-Chiefs Union
Jack on the bonnet, and a proclamation in his pocket
to read to the peaceful inhabitants.
He met with a warm reception. As the cars
neared the town, several enemy batteries opened
fire on them, while machine guns on Mount Carmel
swept the road. The batteries had evidently regis-
tered carefully, for almost the first salvo hit the
General's car, knocking it into the ditch and smash-
ing the flag. The General himself, with his staff,
had to take cover in the same ditch, and quickly too,
and there they lay, getting the proclamation covered
with mud, till the armoured cars succeeded in retriev-
ing them. It was a shocking affair, and showed a
sad lack of respect on the part of the enemy. The
' Haifa Annexation Expedition,' as it was irreverently
called, returned to Afule in somewhat chastened mood,
but fortunately without any serious casualties.
The chief movement of the day took place in the
Jordan Valley. Early in the morning the New Zea-
land Mounted Brigade succeeded in getting astride
the Nablus- Jisr el Damieh roads at El Makhruk, after
a sharp fight, taking 500 prisoners, including a divi-
sional commander. About an hour previously the
38th Royal Fusiliers, one of the two Jewish battalions
with the force, had captured the enemy position cover-
ing the river ford at Umm el Shert, while, about half-
past ten, the New Zealand Brigade, with a West
Indies battalion, seized the bridge at Jisr el Damieh,
and crossed to the east bank. In the attack on the
bridgehead the New Zealanders and the ' coloured
gentlemen ' both charged the Turks simultaneously,
and had a severe hand-to-hand struggle before achiev-
228 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
iiig their object. The 2nd A.L.H. Brigade also crossed
the river at Ghoraniyeh, and, in conjunction with
the 20th Indian Infantry Brigade, drove in the
Turkish outposts, and, by nightfall, was facing the
main enemy position at Shunet Nimrin.
Early in the night it became clear that a general
retirement of the Turkish IVth Army had begun,
and orders were issued for the force to follow it
vigorously on the morrow.
German aircraft captured intact at Afule. Mciiint Tabor in the background.
In the hands of the enemy I Some of our Horsj Artillery guns captured
in the second trans-Jordan raid. (From an enemy photograph.)
CHAPTER XVIII
DESTRUCTION
Next day, September the 23rd, Chay tor's Force was
on the move at dayhght, following up the retreating
IVth Army east of the Jordan. The 3rd A.L.H.
Regiment (1st Brigade), with the 2nd B.W.I. Regi-
ment, had a sharp fight at the ford of Mafid Jozeleh,
haH way between El Damieh and Ghoraniyeh, where
the Turks had left a rearguard. The enemy was
dispersed, and the AustraUans crossed the river at
six o'clock. The remainder of the 1st A.L.H. Bri-
gade crossed at Umm el Shert, and moved on El
Salt up the Wadi Arseniyet track. The 2nd A.L.H.
Brigade, having crossed the Jordan at Ghoraniyeh,
pressed on up the Wadi Kefrein, and seized Kabr
Mujahid at five o'clock, rounding up the small force
there after a lively fight, and then turned north along
the very difficult mountain track towards El Sir.
Meanwhile the New Zealand Brigade, having crossed
at El Damieh, rode hard up the mountain track, and
occupied El Salt about seven in the evening. The
only opposition met with was from a small, wired-in
post on the El Damieh-El Salt track, A brigade of
Indian infantry reached Shunet Nimrin in the even-
ing, and found it evacuated by the enemy. One
battalion of the B.W.I. Regiment and one squadron
of cavahy were left at El Damieh, to gain touch
with patrols of the 4th Cavalry Division moving
down the Jordan.
Orders were issued to the force in the evening by
230 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
G.H.Q., to push on next day, harass the enemy, and
try to cut his hne of retreat to the north ; also to
gain touch with the Arab Army advancing from the
south.
The 4th Cavalry Division also had a busy day.
Early in the morning our aeroplanes reported that
the enemy had found a ford over the Jordan about
six miles south of Beisan and was crossing the river
in large numbers. The 11th Brigade, with the Hants
Battery R.H.A., was at once sent off to intercept
them, and moved south along both banks of the
Jordan. The 1/1 County of London Yeomanry and
the 29th Lancers marched along the west bank, and
Jacob's Horse east of the river. At half -past eight,
patrols of the 29th Lancers, approaching the ford of
Makhadet Abu Naj, seven miles south-east of Beisan,
were fired on by a party of Turks covering the passage
of a large force of the enemy over the river. A con-
siderable portion of this force was already across.
The 29th Lancers and part of the brigade machine-
gun squadron engaged the Turks on the north, while
the Yeomanry pushed round the left flank of the
enemy force, in order to take it in rear. The ground
was very difficult, and the Yeomanry were subjected
to a considerable fire from a low hill on the west bank,
on which the Turks had a number of machine guns.
This hill was the central point of resistance of the
enemy bridgehead.
As soon as the Yeomanry were clear of the enemy's
flank, the 29th remounted and charged the hill. The
charge was completely successful. Large numbers
of the Turks were speared, and 800 prisoners and no
less than twenty-five machine guns were taken. Like
all the work of these veteran Indian cavalry regi-
ments in the campaign, this charge was admirably
carried out, but that it succeeded in getting home in
THE ACTION AT ABU NAJ 231
the face of such a potential volume of machine-gun
and rifle fire is an indication of the state of demoralisa-
tion to which the enemy was now reduced.
Meanwhile, on the east bank, Jacob's Horse, which
was a little way behind, rode up and instantly charged
the large force of Turks on that side. This charge,
however, was held up by a deep wadi, and the in-
tense fire of the enemy compelled our troops to
retire and take cover. The regiment re-formed, and
again attempted to charge the enemy, but was again
stopped by bad ground, and suffered severe casualties.
The Hants Battery, on the west bank, coming up
just at this moment, immediately galloped into action,
and opened a rapid and accurate fire on the masses
of Turks across the river. It was at once hotly
engaged by two concealed enemy batteries on the
east bank, and in a few minutes every one of the
guns had been hit. None were put out of action,
however, and all continued firing most gallantly.
The enemy's fire was so heavy that General Gregory
ordered a troop of cavalry out into the open to try
and draw the fire of the Turkish guns, and so enable
the battery to withdraw and take up a concealed
position. Before the guns could be moved, however,
the situation was cleared by one of the Yeomanry
squadrons, which had worked its way south of the
enemy position. This squadron succeeded in cross-
ing the river at Makhadet Fath Allah, and, wading
across the river, charged and captured the enemy
guns.
Meanwhile a squadron of the 29th had been sent
across the river, a little farther north, to assist Jacob's
Horse. Thus reinforced, the regiment attacked again,
and this attack, coupled with the loss of their guns,
broke the resistance of the Turks. Most of them
surrendered. A few succeeded in escaping for the
232 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
time, amid the broken ground on both banks of the
river. 3000 prisoners, including a divisional com-
mander, ten guns, and thirty machine gims fell into
our hands.
After the action, the brigade continued its march
south, to Ras el Humeiyir, where it bivouacked for
the night, with outposts south and west, along the
Wadi el Sherar and east of the Jordan.
During the night a troop of the 29th Lancers was
sent ofE into the hills to the west, to try and gain
touch with the 20th Corps, about Khurbet Atuf . This
troop marched all night, along a very difficult foot-
path, and met the 20th Corps cavalry regiment
(Worcester Yeomanry) at Atuf early in the morning.
It rejoined the 11th Brigade near Ras Umm Zoka
during the day.
The task assigned to the 5th Cavalry Division on
the 23rd was the capture of Acre and Haifa. The
13th Brigade, with a Light Armoured Car Battery
and a light car patrol, left Nazareth at five in the
morning. Marching via SefEurie and Shefa Amr, the
force reached Acre about mid-day, and captured it
without difficulty, the small enemy garrison showing
little inclination to fight. 260 prisoners and two
guns were taken here.
The remainder of the division left Nazareth at the
same hour, and reached the Kishon railway bridge,
near El Harithie, about mid-day. The 14th Brigade
remained here, while the 15th Brigade, with ' B '
Battery H.A.C., moved on Haifa along the Afule-
Haifa road, which skirts the north-eastern edge of
the Mount Carmel Range. There were only two regi-
ments with the brigade, as the Hyderabad Lancers
were absent, escorting prisoners back from Lejjun.
They rejoined the brigade late in the afternoon, just
after Haifa had been captured.
CAPTURE OF HAIFA 233
The Mysore Lancers, advance guard to the brigade,
reached the village of Belled el Sheikh about ten
o'clock, and, on emerging from the trees that sur-
round the village, came under heavy fire from a
number of guns on Mount Carmel, and from machine
guns and rifles in the hills north-west of the village.
Patrols sent out to the north drew fire from a large
number of machine guns about Tel Abu Hawam,
and concealed among trees and shrubs near the main
road south of that place. It was evident that the
position was strongly held.
General Harbord had arrived at Belled el Sheikh,
and received the report of his advance guard. He
had a difficult task before him. South of the road
the rocky wall of Carmel rose steeply, 1500 feet
above the plain. To the north, the country was
flat and open, and afforded httle or no cover for
troops, except along that portion of the Nahr el
Mukatta (the river Kishon) which runs east and
west a mile and a haK north of Belled el Sheikh,
which was bordered with trees and scrub. The Wadi
Ashlul el Wawy is practicaUy dry at this time of
year, but the Nahr el Mukatta is a perennial stream,
the banks of which are very marshy.
The Brigadier decided that the first thing to be
done was to silence the guns on Mount Carmel. He
accordingly despatched a squadron of the Mysore
Lancers, with a couple of machine guns, to climb the
mountain by a goat path, which follows the Wadi el
Tabil from Belled el Sheikh, and joins the road
running along the backbone of the range. This
squadron was ordered to move along this road to
the north, locate the guns, and attack them. With
the remainder of his force the Brigadier decided to
make a mounted attack from the east on the enemy
positions about Tel Abu Hawam, supported by his
234 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
guns and machine guns from the south-east. ' B '
Battery H.A.C. came into action close to the road,
about half a mile north of Belled el Sheikh, and the
remainder of the machine-gun squadron, with two
squadi'ons Mysore Lancers, a little farther north,
along the Acre Railway. The 4th squadron Mysore
Lancers was sent up the road running north from
near El Harbaj, with instructions to turn westwards
at Tel El Subat, and make for the mouth of the Nahr
el Mukatta. It was then to push along the sea
shore, so as to take the enemy positions in reverse.
The Jodhpur Lancers took up a position of readiness,
about 500 yards north-east of Belled el Sheikh, pre-
paratory to making a dash for the wooded portion
of the Mukatta. They were to cross this, and then
wheel to the left, and charge the enemy on his left
flank.
These dispositions were soon completed, and the
troops then set themselves to wait until the Mysore
Lancers' squadron had dealt with the enemy guns
on Mount Carmel. Meanwhile our artillery and
machine guns searched the palm groves and scrub
about Tel Abu Huwam and along the banks of the
Mukatta. Observation was difficult, as the enemy
was well concealed.
Shortly before mid-day General Harbord received
a welcome reinforcement in the Sherwood Rangers
Yeomanry, which had been sent up from El Harithie.
He at once despatched a squadron of this regiment
to the assistance of the Mysore Lancers' squadron
on Carmel.
Desultory firing continued for the next two hours,
but there was no sign of any slackening of the enemy's
artillery activity. At last the Brigadier came to the
conclusion that his troops on Carmel had either been
unable to fulfil their task of silencing the enemy guns,
CAPTURE OF HAIFA 235
or had lost their way. Time was running on, and
he decided that he couid wait no longer. The Jodhpur
Lancers were ordered out to the attack.
Moving off in column of squadrons, in line of troop
columns, they cantered out into the open towards
the stream, coming under intense fire as they crossed
the Acre Railway. The fire, however, appeared ill-
directed, which was probably due to the vigorous
action of our artillery and machine guns supporting
the attack.
Owing to the exposed nature of the ground, it had
not been possible to reconnoitre the Mukatta before-
hand, and, when the Jodhpur Lancers reached it,
they found it quite impassable. Two ground scouts,
who jumped into the bed of the stream, disappeared
instantaneously into the quicksands. The regiment,
was, however, now committed to the attack, and it
was impossible to turn back. Changing direction
left, the four squadrons charged straight at the
enemy.
The leading squadron, ' B,' galloping over the
two branches of the Wadi Ashlul el Wawy, dashed
into the enemy machine guns, killed the crews, and
opened the defile between the Wadi Selman and the
mountain. The second squadron, 'D,' charged and
captured the enemy guns and machine guns about
Tel Abu Hawam and north of it. The remaining
two squadrons galloped through the defile, straight
on into the town. Meanwhile, after clearing the defile,
' B ' squadron made its way along the lower slopes of
Mount Carmel, and charged into the German Colony
west of Haifa, capturing several guns, and killing
large numbers of Turks and Germans. ' D ' squadi'on,
after clearing up the Tel Abu Hawam area, galloped
up the east bank of the Wadi Selman and along the
beach, entering the town on the north-east. All
236 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
four squadrons thus entered Haifa about the same
moment.
As soon as the charge got home, the two squadrons
Mysore Lancers, who had supported the attack with
their fire, mounted, and followed at a gallop into the
town. Of the two detached squadrons of this regi-
ment, that on the north had been held up about half
a mile west of El Suriyeh. This squadron now
mounted, and charged a body of the enemy in posi-
tion near the mouth of the Mukatta, capturing two
guns and 100 prisoners.
The squadron on Mount Carmel, after riding nearly
six miles over very bad country, had at last located
the enemy guns at Karmelheim, much farther north
than had been expected. Dropping his machine guns
and all his Hotchkiss rifles on the track, to provide
covering fire, the squadron leader led the remainder
of his troops away to the left to charge the guns.
Owing to casualties on the way up the range, and to
some of his men having been delayed by the diffi-
culties of the track, he found that, after providing for
his Hotchkiss rifles, he had only fifteen lances for the
charge. Nevertheless, he decided to attack at once,
rightly judging that even an unsuccessful charge
would probably divert the fire of the enemy guns long
enough to permit the Jodhpur Lancers to make their
attack in the plain. His machine guns and Hotch-
kiss rifles had got close to the guns unseen, and now
opened a sudden and accurate fire on them. The
fifteen men then galloped in from the flank, and
actually succeeded in silencing the battery. The
crews of two of the guns were killed, but the battery
escort then came up, and it might have gone hardly
with the gallant little band of cavalry had not the
squadron of the Sherwood Rangers arrived just in
the nick of time to complete the work. By a fortu-
6CALE or CH0U3H MILES
Ly-1
238 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
nate coincidence, this charge took place just as the
Jodhj^ur Lancers attacked in the plain.
1351 prisoners, seventeen guns, and eleven machine
guns were collected at Haifa after the action. The
captured artillery included two six-inch naval guns,
which the Germans had mounted on the top of Mount
Carmel, to engage our warships in the event of an
attempted landing.
The Turks had fought well, firing until they were
ridden down, but once our cavalry were through the
defile, the fight was practically over. They galloped
through the town, riding down with the lance any
bodies of the enemy who showed fight, and, in twenty
minutes, had overcome all opposition.
The Austrahan Mounted Division had a day of
comparative rest. The 3rd A.L.H. Brigade reheved
the 5th Cavalry Division at Nazareth, and the rest
of the division remained at Afule, sending patrols
eastwards as far as Beisan, to bring in the prisoners
taken on the two previous days by the 4th Cavalry
Division. Towards evening the ' bag ' began to
arrive, and, long after darkness fell, the endless
column of captives was still winding its way up the
Valley of Jezreel.
Most of these prisoners had marched over twenty
miles since their capture, and no one knows how
many more before they fell into our hands. Their
dragging feet raised a heavy cloud of dust, through
which they had trudged all the long, hot march, and
they came in raging with thirst. In. anticipation of
their arrival, several large canvas tanks had been
set up and filled with water, and elaborate arrange-
ments had been made by the capable and energetic
water officer of the Australian Division. Each man
was to file past the tanks, have a drink, fill his water
bottle, and move on to the concentration area with
' MOPPING UP ' 239
a gentle sigh of satisfaction. The water officer had
eight orderHes. There were 8000 prisoners, and, as soon
as they smelt the water, the 8000 charged the eight.
The charge was successful, and the prisoners there-
upon all tried to get into the water together. In a
few seconds the tanks were trampled down, and the
frenzied Turks struggled and fought with one another
in the darkness round the muddy ruins. Eventually
they had to be driven back at the point of the sword.
More water was procured, and the prisoners were
marched up to it in small parties under escort. It
took all night to supply them all.
The following day the 4th Cavalry Division con-
tinued its ' mopping up ' operations in the Jordan
Valley.
Early in the morning an observation post of the
London Yeomanry, who were on outpost duty,
observed a large force of the enemy making for the
ford of El Masudi. A squadron at once galloped for
the ford, but the enemy got there first, and held
it up. Another squadron, coming up in support,
several times charged the Turks debouching from
the hills, and captured a large number of them. The
Yeomen had the greatest difficulty in dealing with
their prisoners, who, after surrendering and throwing
down their rifles when charged, repeatedly picked
them up again, and went on fighting.
The Hants Battery now came up, and got into
action at close range against the enemy holding the
ford. Its rapid and accurate fire completely discon-
certed the demoralised Turks, and the 29tli Lancers
took prompt advantage of the fact to charge them.
The enemy, worn out and dispirited, made but a
poor fight of it, and the action was soon over. 4000
Turks, including Rushdi Bey, Commander of the
16th Division, were taken prisoner, and another
240 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
1000 were rounded up later on in the course of the
day. Very few escaped.
The horses of the 11th Brigade were now in a
very exhausted condition, and the ammunition of the
battery was running low. General Barrow, there-
fore, ordered the Brigadier only to continue his
southward movement as far as Ras Umm Zoka and
the Wadi Kafrinji, sending patrols along the Jordan,
to gain touch with Chaytor's Force.
This action completed the destruction of the
Vllth and Vlllth Turkish Armies. A few stragglers
escaped across the river, to wander miserably in the
barren, waterless country to the east, at the mercy
of hostile Arabs. With the exception of these, the
entile enemy force west of the Jordan had been cap-
tured or killed, and all its guns, transport, and stores
had fallen into our hands.
The IVth Army, east of Jordan, and the 2nd Corps
(Hedjaz Force) about Maan, remained to be dealt
with. Both these forces were in full retreat to the
north, the former pursued by Chaytor's Force and
the northern portion of the Arab Army, the latter
harried by the southern detachment of the Arabs.
As the Hedjaz Railway had been cut at Deraa, no
suppHes could reach these enemy forces, and they
had to depend for their food on a sparsely populated
country, already almost denuded of supplies by
Turkish requisitions, and inhabited by bitterly hostile
tribes.
As the action of Chaytor's Force formed a separate
episode in the operations, it will be convenient to
follow its fortunes to the conclusion of its work.
On the night of the 23rd, the dispositions of the
Force were as follows : —
New Zealand Brigade in El Salt. 1st A.L.H. Bri-
gade approaching El Salt, along the Wadi Arseniyet
CAPTURE OF AMMAN 241
track. 2nd A.L.H. Brigade on the Wadi Kef rein
track, a few miles west of Ain el Sir. Infantry at
Shunet Nimrin. The whole force resumed the
advance vigorously at daylight on the 24th. The
New Zealanders encountered the Turkish rearguards
at Sweileh at seven in the morning, and the 2nd
Brigade at Ain el Sir at the same hour. In both
places there was a sharp fight before the enemy
was dislodged. The Turkish IVth Army was not
yet disorganised, and was retreating in good order,
fighting every step of the way.
At night the Anzac Division held a line north and
south, a few miles east of Sweileh and Ain el Sir, and
the infantry had reached El Salt. During the night
a party from the New Zealand Brigade raided and
cut the railway near Kalaat el Zerka. At six o'clock
next morning the cavalry advanced straight on
Amman, with orders to press into the town if possible.
If unable to seize the j)lace, they were to hold the
enemy till the arrival of the infantry. At eleven
o'clock the New Zealanders made an attempt to gallop
the town from the north-west, but were held up by a
steep cliff. Two mountain batteries arrived half an
hour later, and the division then went in dismounted,
in a frontal attack. It was of the utmost import-
ance to keep fighting the Turks, so as to prevent
them from breaking off the action and retiring. For
this reason no attempt was made to outflank them,
as the necessary movement to carry out a flanking
attack would, in that very precipitous country, have
entailed much time, of which the Turks would cer-
tainly have availed themselves to disengage their
forces, and make good theu* retreat. As it was,
Amman was not captured till half-past four in the
afternoon, and the time spent in clearing up the
town precluded any possibility of a further move-
Q
242 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
ment forward that night. The place had not fallen
without a sharp fight, costing fairly heavy casualties,
but, of the opposing forces, the Turks suffered far the
more severely, and left 600 prisoners in our hands.
Covered by the good fighting of its rearguards,
the Turkish IVth Army had now got some distance
to the north of Amman. General AUenby, there-
fore, decided to leave it to the 4th Cavalry Division
and the Arab Army, and directed General Chaytor
to remain in the Amman area, and intercept the
retreat of the enemy 2nd Corps from the Hedjaz.
Our aeroplanes had located this Corps on the
evening of the 25th, some fifteen miles south of El
Kastal, hurrying north along the railway. On the
following morning. General Chaytor sent the 2nd
A.L.H. Brigade southwards, to gain touch with the
Turks, and to destroy as much of the railway as
possible. Patrols from the 5th A.L.H. Regiment got
as far as Ziza Station, about four miles south of El
Kastal, where they blew up a portion of the line.
The regiment remained at Ziza for the night, and the
rest of the brigade took up a position across the rail-
way, on some high ground north of Leben Station.
Now that Amman was in our hands, the only
water available for the enemy, between El Kastal
and Deraa Junction, was in the Wadi el Hammam,
seven miles north of Amman. The enemy had
dropped a rearguard here, from the IVth Army, to
secure the water supply for his Hedjaz Force. The
1st A.L.H. Brigade was despatched on the 26th to
dislodge this rearguard, and occupy the wadi. The
brigade had a couple of brisk fights with the Turks,
and drove them off, capturing about 400 prisoners
and several guns," and then took up a fine along the
wadi, covering the water areas.
On the morning of the 27th, therefore, the 2nd
SURRENDER OF THE HEDJAZ FORCE 243
A.L.H. Brigade was in position astride the Hedjaz
Railway, north of Leben Station, with one regiment
pushed out as far as Ziza ; the 20th Indian Infantry
Brigade was in Amman, with the New Zealand
Brigade on the Darb el Haj, east of the town ; and
the 1st A.L.H. Brigade was along the Wadi el
Hammam and at Kalaat el Zerka.
About half-past eight in the morning the head
of the enemy corps was seen approaching Ziza.
Prisoners, captured by the 5th A.L.H. Regiment
during the night, had stated that the Turkish Force
included the Maan garrison, and numbered about
8000 men. This information was subsequently found
to have been exaggerated.
Though still retaining its cohesion, the enemy force
was in a highly nervous state. During its retreat
from Maan, which had been made by forced marches,
it had been harried without cessation by the Sherifian
camelry. Not strong enough to give battle to such
a large Turkish force, the Arabs, mounted on fast
trotting camels, had contented themselves with carry-
ing out a series of raids, in which they had killed a
considerable number of Turks, and captured about
300 prisoners and twenty-five guns. The tribes of
the districts through which they passed flocked to
the standard of King Hussein, moved partly by their
hatred of the Turks, and, at least as much, by their
desire for loot. Like the men of all semi-civilised
races, the Arab prizes a good weapon above every-
thing, and the news that German Mauser rifles were
to be had in unlimited numbers at the expense of a
few casualties, soon raised the whole country. Con-
sequently, by the time the Turks reached El Kastal,
they had, in their rear and on both flanks, a formid-
able force of Arab fighting men, grown bold by
repeated minor successes.
244 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
Early in the afternoon of the 28th, General Chaytor
summoned the Turkish force, by a message dropped
from an aeroplane, to surrender by nine o'clock next
morning. It was pointed out to the enemy com-
mander, that all sources of water supply as far north
as Deraa were in our hands, and he was promised a
most unmerciful bombing unless he complied with
the order.
No reply was received to this message till the
following day, when a Turkish officer, with a small
escort, succeeded in penetrating the fringe of blood-
thirsty Arabs surrounding the force, and met Colonel
Cameron, commanding the 5th A.L.H. Regiment, to
whom he brought the surrender of the enemy com-
mander with all his force. The Turkish General
made the unusual request that his men might be
allowed to retain their arms until they arrived at
Amman, as he was convinced that the Arabs would
attempt to rush in and murder the whole of his
force if the arms were given up, and he was doubtful
if the small British force on the spot could prevent
this.
While this parley was proceeding, a deputation
arrived from the Beni Sakhr Arabs, our quondam
allies — and deserters — in the second trans-Jordan
raid. These gentry now coolly demanded that the
Turkish force should be handed over to them to
' protect,' as it was their right to deal with it. Mis-
understanding their motives. Colonel Cameron assured
them that the Turks would be well looked after by
us, whereupon the sons of Ishmael became greatly
excited, waved their weapons wildly, and uttered
the most blood-curdling threats. Colonel Cameron
temporised with them as best he could, and sent an
urgent message to hurry up the other two regi-
ments of the 2nd Brigade, which were marching
BRITISH AND TURKS AS ALLIES 245
towards Ziza. They arrived at five o'clock, and, as
the Arabs were now openly hostile to us, the Turks
were allowed to retain their arms. Under the super-
vision of our officers, they entrenched a line of out-
post positions round the station, and these positions
were then held by our men and their Turkish prisoners
side by side ! The Arabs made several attempts to
rush the lines during the night, but were driven off
by British and Turkish machine-gun and rifle fire. It
would be interesting to know if there is any previous
instance of prisoners of war assisting their captors
to hold the latter' s own allies at bay.
It is only fair to the forces of the Emir Feisal to
say that the ' allies ' whom we successfully held off
through the night were none of his men. As soon
as the enemy force had surrendered, the Arab regulars
had hurried north to rejoin their comrades pressing
after the IVth Turkish Army.
The New Zealand Brigade arrived at Ziza next
day, and remained in charge of the station, to guard
about 500 Turkish sick and wounded and a large
amount of rolling stock and captured arms and
ammunition, till the railway had been repaired. The
Arabs, frustrated in their amiable designs on the
Turkish prisoners, drew off disappointed, and followed
their compatriots towards Damascus. The2nd A.L.H.
Brigade then escorted the prisoners, just over 4000
in number, to Amman, whence they were evacuated
a few days later across the Jordan.
This ended the operations of Chaytor's Force,
which remained about Amman and El Salt to rest
and recuperate. Since the beginning of the opera-
tions the force had contributed to the bag about
11,000 prisoners, fifty-seven guns and 132 machine
guns, besides large quantities of rolling stock, ammuni-
tion, and other stores.
246 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
In the last three weeks of September the Anzac
Division had evacuated just over 3000 men from
sickness alone. 2700 of these were cases of malig-
nant malaria, a terrible scourge that was with us
all through these operations. The long period spent
in the Jordan Valley was no doubt responsible for
this heavy sick rate. The division had lost a large
number of men in the months preceding September,
and it was now reduced to considerably less than
half its war strength. Weak and reduced in numbers
as they were, and suffering from the lassitude en-
gendered by their prolonged stay in the valley, the
Australians nevertheless acted throughout the opera-
tions with the greatest energy and determination,
and set an unrivalled example of toughness and
cheerfulness.
\
-i
c
CHAPTER XIX
THE ADVANCE ON DAMASCUS
As the Turkish Vllth and Vlllth Armies and the
2nd Corps had now been entirely destroyed, and the
IVth Army was in full retreat, the Commander-in-
Chief determined to push on with his cavalry and
seize Damascus.
Apart from the moral effect likely to be produced
on the Turks by the capture of this city, its occupa-
tion by our troops was a necessary corollary to the
co-operation of King Hussein with our army. Damas-
cus is an Arab, and particularly a Bedouin, city.
From the time of Mohammed, it has been the focus
and centre of Arab political life, constantly both
reinforced and kept at the same level of civilisation
by intercourse with the tribes of the desert, till to-day
they form four-fifths of the total population.
It is an open secret that General Allenby had been
urged by the amateur strategists of Downing Street
to make a cavalry raid on the city, supported by
the forces of the Emir, but he had steadily refused
to cofnmit his cavalry to this hazardous enterprise
until he had dealt with the Turkish Army. Now,
however, the way was clear, and he determined to
push on with all speed.
The advance was to be made in two columns.
The Australian Mounted Division and the 5th
Cavalry Division were ordered to march via Nazareth
and Tiberias, crossing the upper Jordan just south
of Lake Huleh, and march up the Tiberias-Damascus
247
248 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
road, across the Hauran. The 4th Cavalry Division
was to cross the Jordan at Jisr Mejamie, north of
Beisan, and proceed via Irbid and Deraa Junction,
and thence up the Hedjaz Railway, joining hands
with the Arab Army about Deraa.
In order to increase to the utmost the mobility of
the troops, all transport, even to the regimental
water-carts, was left behind. Onty the guns and
ammunition wagons and a few light motor ambulances
per division accompanied the force. The arrange-
ments as to food and forage carried on the man and
horse were the same as in the 1917 campaign. When
this two days' supply was exhausted, the cavalry
were to live on the country. Later on, after the
capture of Damascus, and when our line of com-
munications had been organised, tea, milk, and sugar
were sent up by lorry to Damascus, or by sea to
Beirut and Tripoli, but, except for this, the Corps
subsisted entirety on the local resources of the country
from the 25th September till the administration of
the conquered territory was finally handed over to
the French more than a yeai* later.
The orders for the advance were received on the
25th of September, but certain preliminary move-
ments had taken place on the previous day. Thus
the 7th Infantry Division arrived at Jenin on the
24th, preparatory to taking over Afule, Nazareth,
and Haifa from the cavalry. The 4th A.L.H.
Brigade, with one regiment of the 5th Brigade, left
Afule on the evening of the same day to march via
Beisan to the village of Semakh, at the southern end
of the Sea of Gahlee. The enemy had a small force
here, engaged in evacuating the considerable quan-
tities of stores at Deraa. These were sent by rail
to Semakh, and thence by boat to Tiberias, where
lorry columns awaited them, and shipped them on
THE ACTION AT SEMAKH 249
to Damascus along the Hauran road. The Central
India Horse (10th Brigade), who had relieved the
19th Lancers at Jisr Mejamie on the 23rd, had recon-
noitred the village on the following day, and found it
strongly held. The 4th A.L.H. Brigade was ordered
to capture the place, and then rejoin the Australian
Division at Tiberias.
On the 25th of September the 4th Cavahy Divi-
sion concentrated at Beisan, with the 10th Brigade
at Jisr Mejamie. The Australian Mounted Divi-
sion, less the 4th Brigade, left Afule early in the
afternoon, and had concentrated at Kefr Kenna,
some five miles east of Nazareth, about ten o'clock
that night. A regiment of the 3rd A.L.H. Brigade,
supported by two armoured cars, was sent ahead
along the Tiberias road to reconnoitre the town. The
5th Cavalry Division, which was not relieved at
Haifa by the infantry till early the next morning,
left that place at once, and reached Kefr Kenna
about five in the evening.
The 4th A.L.H. Brigade, having bivouacked at
Jisr Mejamie on the night of the 24th, approached
Semakh just at daylight on the following day. At
half-past four the advance guard, consisting of the
1 1th Regiment and the brigade machine-gun squa-
dron, came under heavy machine-gun and rifle fire
from the railway station. Patrols from the regi-
ment located the enemy holding an entrenched
position south of the village (which Ues on a bare,
flat plain), with posts extending across this plain to
the hills on either side.
General Grant decided to attack at once, and
ordered the remainder of his brigade to close up.
The machine guns and one squadron of the 11th
Regiment at once came into action south of the
town, and opened a hot fire on the enemy positions.
250 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
particularly on a sort of fort that had been built by
the Germans out of railway material. The other two
squadrons of the 11th charged from the east, one on
each side of the railway. The charge was driven
home, over the enemy positions and into the village,
where the Australians dismounted, and went in with
the bayonet.
On the arrival of the rest of the brigade, the 4th
Regiment was sent in mounted on the west. After
charging into the town, these troops also dismounted,
and continued the fight on foot.
The enemy, stiffened by the large number of
German troops, resisted desperately, and some of
the fiercest hand-to-hand fighting of the campaign
took place in this village. We learnt afterwards
that Liman von Sanders had paid a hurried visit to
the place in a car, after flying from Nazareth, and
had given orders that it was to be held to the last
man, so as to clear the ammunition and stores from
Deraa for the defence of Damascus.
Gradually the defenders were driven back through
the narrow streets of the village, till only the railway
' fort ' still held out. This was garrisoned chiefly by
Germans, who had a number of machine guns cover-
ing all approaches. One of these guns was located
in a railway culvert, and, as a troop of the 12th
Regiment was working towards it, the crew suddenly
stood up and held up their hands, shouting out :
' We surrender ! ' Being unaccustomed to the ways
of the Hun, our men got up and walked towards the
gun in the open. When they were about fifty yards
away, the crew dropped to their knees, at a given
signal, and opened a murderous fire on our men,
killing or wounding nearly all of them. The few who
escaped worked round to the other side of the rail-
way, and, crawling through the culvert, fell upon
GERMAN TREACHERY 251
the treacherous crew from behind, and killed
them all.
About the same time, another troop of the same
regiment encountered a German machine gun in
charge of an officer. As our men approached, the
officer stood up and waved a white handkerchief,
whereupon the subaltern in command of the troop
went up to him unsuspectingly. When he was about
two paces away, the German pulled out his automatic
and deUberately shot the unfortunate officer dead.
These two pieces of treachery met with a just
retribution. The enraged Australians stormed into
the fort, deaf now to all offers of surrender, and
bayoneted the defenders almost to a man. About
150 Germans and several hundred Turkish prisoners
were taken in the action, and some 200 corpses,
mostly those of Germans, were left on the position
to be looted by the natives. None of our men would
put spade to the ground to bury them.
Two motor boats were lying at the pier when our
troops attacked. One of these succeeded in escaping
to Tiberias, where it was abandoned by the crew,
and burnt. The other was set on fire by Hotchkiss
rifle fire, and blew up.
As soon as the action was over, a squadron from
the brigade was sent forward along the lake road
towards Tiberias. This squadron gained touch with
the regiment of the Australian Division advancing
from Nazareth, and the two detachments captured
Tiberias, which was lightly held, before dark, with
about 120 prisoners.
The operations now resolved themselves into a
race for Damascus between our cavalry and the
Turkish IVth Army. The country about ten miles
south of Damascus is favourable for defence against
a force advancing from that direction, and the enemy
252 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
command hoped, if the IVth Army could reach this
position first, to be able to delay our troops long
enough for help to arrive from Aleppo, and thus
save Damascus.
The survivors of the German G.H.Q. troops and
garrison of Nazareth had retired, via Tiberias, to the
Jordan at Jisr Benat Yakub, just south of Lake
Huleh. Crossing the river here, they blew up the
bridge behind them, and took up a strong position
on the east bank, overlooking the only known fords.
They were joined, on the morning of the 26th, by a
few hundred Turkish troops who had been hurriedly
collected in Damascus, and sent down in motor
lorries across the Hauran. If this force could hold
the crossing for twenty-four hours, there was a
chance of the Turks winning the race to Damascus.
The Australian Mounted Division left Kefr Kenna
at midnight on the 25th, and, marching all night,
reached the hill of Tel Madli, overlooking Tiberias,
at dawn. Continuing the march, after a short halt
to water and feed, the division arrived at El Mejdel,
on the lake shore four miles north of Tiberias, in
the early afternoon. In order to give time for the
5th Division to close up, and for the 4th A.L.H.
Brigade to rejoin from Semakh, the Austrahans
bivouacked here for the night. Patrols were sent
forward as far as Jisr Benat Yakub, and the rest of
the men spent the afternoon bathing in the lake.
Meanwhile, the 4th Cavalry Division, having
crossed the Jordan at Jisr Mejamie, on the morning
of the 26th, sent the 10th Brigade ahead as advance
guard, with orders to push on towards Deraa as
fast as the difficult nature of the ground would
allow. The remainder of the division followed at a
considerable distance.
After the fall of Amman, the enemy IVth Army
Nazareth, from the north.
Note the Red Crescents on the roofs of the houses.
Horse Artillery enterin^ Tiberias, on the race for Damascus
AN UNSUCCESSFUL CHARGE 253
had hurried northwards along the Hedjaz Railway,
and, by the morning of the 26th, was passing through
El Remte, with a strong flank guard thrown out to
the west. Late in the afternoon the 10th Brigade
located this flank guard holding a position astride
the Beisan-Deraa road, along a ridge from Beit Ras,
through Irbid, to Zebda. The country was very
difficult and broken, and intersected with wadis.
A reconnaissance carried out by the 2nd Lancers,
the vanguard regiment, indicated that Irbid was held
in strength, while Beit Ras and Zebda were occupied
to protect the central portion of the enemy posi-
tion, and were not so strongly held. The Brigadier
decided to encircle Irbid from both flanks. He
directed the 2nd Lancers to work round to the north
of the town, between it and Beit Ras, which latter
place was apparently very lightly held, and the
Central India Horse to seize Zebda, and then
endeavour to get astride the Deraa road behind
the enemy position. The Berks Battery R.H.A.
came into action just off the road, some two miles
west of Irbid, with the Dorset Yeomanry in reserve
behind it.
The regiments moved off at once, and commenced
to work round the enemy's flanks. Half an hour
later, a squadron of the 2nd Lancers attempted to
charge the Irbid position from the north-west. Night
was approaching, and the officer in command doubt-
less considered himself justified in taking the risk of
a charge, in the hope of breaking the Turks' resist-
ance before the coming of darkness enabled them to
retire. But the horses were very tired, the country
was broken and stony, and no previous reconnaissance
of the ground was possible. The charge was met
by the enemy with very heavy machine-gun fire,
and was brought to a stop. The squadron suft'ered
254 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
severety, two troops being practically wiped oat
before it reached cover again.
The Turks at Irbid had been retreating rapidly
for three days, harassed by the Arabs, and their
morale was not high. But they had not, as yet,
suffered any severe defeat, and they were in con-
siderably better case than the miserable remnants
of the Vllth and Vlllth Armies, with which our
cavalry had been engaged since the 20th of September.
This fact would seem to have been overlooked by
the 2nd Lancers. Moreover the enemy was in con-
siderable strength. Natives reported on the follow-
ing day that there had been not less than 5000
Turks at Irbid. This was manifestly an exaggera-
tion, but the mere mention of such a number indicated
that there had been, at any rate, a large body of
them there. The failure of the charge taught a
lesson that is liable to be forgotten by cavalry when
pursuing a broken and demoralised foe ; namely,
that, for a small body of horse to charge an enemy
force of unknown strength, without previous recon-
naissance of the ground, and without any fire support,
is to court disaster.
The rest of the regiment continued to work gradually
round the enemy's right flank. Nightfall found them
some distance to the north-east of the village, where
they put out pickets and remained during the night.
Meanwhile the Central India Horse, advancing
more warily, occupied Zebda, after some sharp fight-
ing, and then attempted to penetrate Irbid dis-
mounted from the south-west. The attack was
driven back by the enemy with some loss, and the
regiment took up a position south of the village, and
engaged the Turks with machine-gun and rifle fire.
One squadron continued to work eastwards, and, by
the time darkness descended, had nearly reached
WORK OF THE ARAB CAMEL CORPS 255
the Deraa road. This squadron formed a defensive
post near the road, and stood to till daylight.
The 12th Brigade spent the night at El Shuni,
on the Wadi el Arab, six miles east of the Jordan,
and the rest of the division at Jisr Mejamie.
From the summit of the ridge near Beit Ras, just
before sunset, our troops had seen the Arab Army,
twenty miles away, on the far side of Deraa. After
their raids on the railway at this place, between the
16th and 18th of September, the Arabs had moved
east into the wild fastnesses of the Hauran. From
here they had made several raids on the IVth Army,
harassing the Turks' right flank, and forcing them
to abandon much of their transport and artillery.
On the day and night of the 26th, the Arab camelry,
led by Lawrence, pushed rapidly northwards, cutting
the railway at Ghazale and Ezra, ten and twenty
miles north of Deraa, and reached Sheikh Saad,
fifteen miles west of Ezra, on the morning of the
27th. Here they engaged and defeated an advanced
detachment of the IVth Army, capturing 500 Turks
and a number of German officers, and then en-
trenched themselves astride the Damascus road to
await the coming of the remainder of the army.
At daylight on the 27th, Irbid was found to have
been evacuated during the night. The 10th Brigade
at once pushed on towards El Remte, with the
Dorset Yeomanry as advance guard. At half-past
ten, patrols from this regiment encountered the
enemy in position astride the road, just west of EI
Remte. The position was not so strong as that at
Irbid, and the country was more open.
A quarter of an hour later, the Dorsets reported
the enemy to be retiring from the position to the
south-east. The Brigadier directed the regiment to
occupy the ridges on the left bank of the Wadi
256 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
Ratam, overlooking the village from the south-west,
and to make a demonstration against the enemy, in
order to cover the assembly of the remainder of the
brigade, which was to advance under cover of the
high ground immediately north of El Remte, and
cut off the enemy's retreat to Deraa. The Berks
Battery came into action west of the village, to
support this move, and to take advantage of such
targets as offered.
While these movements were taking place, the
Yeomanry were heavily counter-attacked by the
enemy troops that they had supposed to be retiring.
The attack was pressed vigorously, and the Dorsets
were forced back some distance. A signal message
was sent to brigade headquarters asking for assist-
ance, but, before the message could be acted upon,
Lieutenant Mason, skilfully withdrawing his squadron
in the advanced firing line, mounted it, and charged
the counter-attack. The Turks were utterly sur-
prised by this sudden charge. A number of them
were killed with the sword, and the rest driven back
in confusion into the village. The Dorsets then
continued to work round to the south, but were held
up shortly afterwards by heavy machine-gun fire
from a fortified stone house.
Just at this moment, a body of enemy cavalry
was observed galloping away from the village to
the east. The Yeomanry were unable to pursue
them, but they were effectively shelled by the Berks
Battery, and dispersed.
The Central India Horse had by now reached a
point north-east of the village, from where they
espied the Turkish infantry retiring in some dis-
order. Charging instantly, they went through the
Turks, killing many with the lance, and rounding up
200 prisoners. This charge completed the rout of
DERAA 257
the enemy force, the survivors of which scattered
in all directions.
The 10th Brigade now received orders to await the
arrival of the rest of the division at El Remte. The
12th Brigade came up about half -past five in the
evening, and the 11th some two hours later. Patrols
from the 2nd Lancers, on outpost duty, gained touch
with the Arab Army during the night.
At dawn on the 28th, the brigade moved out to
the hills east of El Remte to cover the assembly of
the division, which then marched to Deraa. The
advanced troops reached the town at seven in the
morning, and were met by Lawrence and Sherif
Nasir. The Arab troops had arrived there about
midnight, and found the place evacuated and in
flames. They at once sent mounted scouts to the
north, who located the main body of the enemy
forces retiring towards Mezerib, ten miles north-
west of Deraa. The road from Mezerib to Damascus
runs through Sheikh Saad, where Lawrence's camel
corps was lying in wait for them.
B
CHAPTER XX
THE ADVANCE ON DAMASCUS (Continued)
While the 4th Cavalry Division was treading on the
heels of the enemy east of the Jordan, the Australians
had not been idle. Leaving El Mejdel soon after
daylight on the 27th, they reached the Jordan at
Jisr Benat Yakub about mid-day. The news that
the bridge had been destroyed, and that the crossing
was held by the enemy, had been brought back by
the patrols that had reconnoitred as far as the river
the night before.
The division had no easy task before it. Napoleon
rated the forcing of a river crossing as one of the
most difficult operations in war. In this case the
difficulties were increased by several factors. West
of the river the ground sloped gently upwards for
about 3000 yards, in a wide expanse of plough and
grass land, unbroken by a single tree or bush. On
the east the ground was much steeper, thus giving
good command of the river, and was thickly covered
with scrub and innumerable big boulders, which
afforded excellent protection to the enemy. The
river was deep and very swift, and the only known
ford, some few hundred yards south of the bridge,
was commanded by the fire of numbers of enemy
machine guns. The only cover on the west bank
was afforded by a small group of buildings close to
the bridge, and by the insignificant ruins of the castle
of Baldwin ii. (Kusr Atra), a few hundred yards
farther down stream.
ACTION OF JISR BENAT YAKUB 259
A local native stated that he thought the south
end of Lake Huleh was shallow enough to be waded
by mounted men, and it was accordingly decided to
send the 3rd Brigade, by a long detour, to attempt
a passage here. To the French troops was assigned
the task of endeavouring to reach the buildings at
the west end of the bridge, from where they could
engage the enemy with rifle and machine-gun fire,
and, possibly, force a passage over the river. The
remainder of the 5th Brigade was to reconnoitre for
a ford farther south, and, if successful in finding one,
to cross the river, and get astride the enemy's line
of retreat. One regiment of the 4th Brigade, which
had rejoined the division at El Mejdel, accompanied
the 5th Brigade. The rest of the 4th did not arrive
till the evening.
While the two brigades were moving to the north
and south, the two batteries of the division, in action
due west of the bridge, amused themselves by knock-
ing out the enemy guns. Having silenced these,
they turned their attention to a column of motor
lorries that had brought some of the Turks from
Damascus, and were now waiting to take the Germans
back again, when they judged it expedient to retire,
and leave their allies to be captured. Two of the
lorries were knocked out, and the remainder chased
out of range. Our guns were then occupied with the
more serious business of registering such of the
enemy machine guns as had been located.
While thus engaged, the two batteries received
orders to report to the 3rd and 5th Brigades respec-
tively. Following instructions from the brigadiers
concerned, they Umbered up, and moved off to
accompany the brigades moving north and south.
Owing to the difficulties of the country over which
they had to move, and the long distance they were
260 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
required to go, it was nearly two hours before they
were in action again.
The French regiment, moving over the open, dis-
mounted and widely extended, reached the buildings
with some loss, but was unable to attempt the ford,
in face of the very heavy fire from the east bank.
No artillery support was available, as our batteries
were on the move.
The 3rd Brigade scouts found Lake Huleh quite
unfordable, but one regiment succeeded in workmg
its way dismounted down to the river bank south of
the lake. It came under very heavy fire here — indeed
the water in the river was bubbling with machine-
gun bullets — but the men gradually worked south
by twos and threes, towards what looked like a
possible crossing just north of the bridge.
Meanwhile the regiments with the 5th Brigade,
after riding for two miles south of the bridge, without
finding any sign of a ford, waded boldly into the
river at a hkely looking place, and succeeded in
struggling across. Arrived on the other side, they
found themselves involved in a perfect maze of pre-
cipitous wadis running in every direction, in a forma-
tion of old lava, broken into huge, jagged boulders.
They wandered about in this wilderness for the rest
of the afternoon and evening, and only gained the
Damascus road after dark, too late to intercept the
retiring enemy. The threat to their communica-
tions, however, had had its invariable effect on the
Turks, and, as soon as darkness fell, they retreated
hurriedly. All the Germans, and as many Turks as
could find room, piled themselves on to the lorries.
The rest of the Turks had to walk.
At dusk the regiment of the 3rd Brigade on the
river bank, taking advantage of the failing light,
plunged into the river, and swam across. The cold
A MEMORY OF NAPOLEON 261
plunge, and the prospect of a night in their wet
clothes, induced in the men a suitable frame of mind
for dealing efficiently with any Turks they might
meet, and, in the ensuing bayonet fight on the east
bank, they killed a large number of the enemy and
took eighty-five prisoners. They then pushed on up
the road as far as Deir el Saras, where they met
patrols of the 5th Brigade.
Just before dark a German aeroplane flew over
our troops at a great height, and dropped a couple
of bombs, which did no harm. This was the first
enemy aeroplane seen in the air by our cavalry
since the commencement of the operations, a fine
tribute to the work of the Royal Air Force.
The name Jisr Benat Yakub means the Bridge of
the Daughters of Jacob. The bridge carries on its
grey, old arches the oldest known road in the world,
the caravan way from Egypt to Mesopotamia. All
the armies of time have trod this trail. Egyptian,
Ass3^ian, Hittite, Jew ; Saracen Arab and Christian
Knight ; Turkish Janissary and soldier of Napoleon —
all have crossed the sacred river at this point. So
it is conceivable that the name really comes, as the
Arabs aver, from the daughters of the patriarch,
though a local tradition ascribes it to a massacre
of some Jacobin nuns, which took place here in the
tweKth century. The bridge marks the northern
limit of Napoleon's advance through Syria, and it was
a strange turn of the wheel of fate that again brought
French soldiers here fighting the Turks, a hundred
and twenty years later, but this time as allies of the
English.
The action had delayed the division for the better
part of a day, thus increasing the chance of the enemy
army reaching Damascus first. Indeed, had it not been
for the vigorous and effective action of Lawrence's
262 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
camel corps on the following day, it is just possible
that the Turks might have won the race.
The delay had, however, permitted the 5th Cavalry
Division, which had left Kefr Kenna at dawn, to
close up, and it lay that night near Rosh Pina, a
Jewish village about eight miles west of the Jordan.
The Corps bridging train came up during the night,
and the Sappers set to work repairing the bridge.
This proved a big task, as one of the four arches had
been completely demolished. At daylight on the
28th, as the work was still far from finished, the rest
of the Australian Mounted Division forded the river,
and at once pressed on up the road towards El
Kuneitra. The passage of the guns was very arduous.
The river was only about four feet deep at the ford,
but there v/ere deep holes on either side, and the
current was torrential. The ground on the other
side proved to be a marsh, covered with a tangle of
high, stiff scrub, and interspersed with large boulders.
A road had to be cut through this scrub, boggy places
filled in with tree trunks nnd bushes, and the ford
improved. All this took time, and it was nine
o'clock before the first gun was across the ford, and
safely on the road.
For the first two miles from the Jordan, the road
climbs out of the valley in a series of steep zigzags,
and the surface was atrocious. Once out of the
valley, however, an excellent, metalled road stretched
ahead all the way to Damascus. Four Turkish guns,
three of them destroyed by direct hits from our
artillery, two motor lorries, and a number of machine
guns were found on the east bank.
The division made good progress, and the advanced
troops reached the Circassian village of El Kuneitra,
at the top of the watershed, about one o'clock. The
5th Division got in about five hours later, and the
CIRCASSIANS AND DRUSES 263
two divisions bivouacked for the night east and west
of the village.
The cavalry were now over sixty miles from
Nazareth, the nearest post held by our infantry, and
Damascus was forty miles farther on. The whole
country was, very naturally, in a most disturbed
state. Bands of marauding Arabs and Druses
patrolled the Hauran, ostensibly at war with the
Turks, but always ready to fall on and plunder any
weakly-guarded convoy. To protect our communi-
cations, therefore. General Grant, with the head-
quarters of the 4th A.L.H. Brigade and the 11th
Regiment, was stationed at Kuneitra. The Hyder-
abad Lancers, who had been left at the Jordan,
near Jisr Benat Yakub, were also placed under his
command.
Kuneitra is the seat of government of a Kaza, and
one of the most important of the Circassian villages
that are found scattered throughout the Hauran,
and as far south as Amman. Their origin dates
back to the annexation by Russia of the Turkish
provinces of Kars, Batoum, and Ardahan in 1877.
The Circassians, being Moslems, left the annexed
provinces in considerable numbers, and were planted
by the Turks along the fringe of the desert, to act
as a check on the turbulent Arab tribes. They were
given land and favoured in other ways by the Turks,
and are consequently cordially hated by the local
Arab population. Our cavalry had encountered
them before, during the Amman raids. They used
to enlist freely in the Turkish cavalry, and should
make good soldiers if properly trained. Now, how-
ever, the defeat of their protectors laid them open
to the vengeance of the Arabs, whom they had
always despised and insulted, and they were com-
pletely cowed. On the afternoon of the 26tli, our
264 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
aircraft had reported a force of enemy cavalry,
estimated at 3000, in the neighbourhood of El
Kuneitra. This large force made no attempt to
assist in holding the passage of the Jordan, and, by
the time our troops reached El Kuneitra, it had all
melted away. Arms were buried or hidden, uniforms
thrown away, and the big, sturdy, fair-haired louts
were all wandering about their villages, with their
hands in the pockets of their baggy breeches, trying
to look as much like peaceful agriculturists as possible.
A party of Hauran Druses had looted the village
before our troops arrived. Some of them were
rounded up near by and questioned, but, as they
were fighting with the Arabs, and were thus our
' allies,' albeit their methods were not ours, they had
to be set free again.
While the Australians and the ^5th Cavalry Divi-
sion were advancing on El Kuneitra, the 4th Cavalry
Division passed through Deraa, and pressed on to
El Mezerib and Tafas, with the Arabs on its right
flank, harassing the rear of the retreating IVth
Army. The main Turkish force had got some dis-
tance farther north, but it had been delayed for
many hours on the previous day at Sheikh Saad,
by the skilful fighting of Lawrence's Arabs. It was
this delay that finally decided the fate of the Turks
in the race for Damascus. The remnants of the
IVth Army did, in fact, reach the city, but our
troops were close on their heels, and they got no
farther. Of the units that left Deraa on the 27th,
however, not one man lived to reach Damascus.
Passing through Tafas on the afternoon of that day,
they seized eighty Arab women and children, and
butchered them in cold blood, with every refinement
of torture and outrage that the bestial mind of the
Turk could conceive. For this deed the Arabs
ARAB VENGEANCE 265
exacted vengeance to the last man. Not only was
every man of the Turkish rearguard killed, but two
trains full of sick and wounded, which were captured
by the Arabs on the railway farther north, were set
on fire, and burnt with their human freight. It was
a terrible vengeance, but characteristic of the Arabs,
and one can hardly blame them. It is to be noted
that the Turks who perpetrated this horrible massacre
were accompanied by a number of German officers,
who appear to have made no effort to stop the
hideous work.
CHAPTER XXI
THE FALL OF DAMASCUS
At two o'clock on the afternoon of the 29th, the
Austrahan Mounted Division started on the last lap
of the race to Damascus. The 5th Cavalry Division
followed a few miles in rear of the Australians. The
distance to be covered was about forty miles, and it
was hoped that, if the two divisions marched all
night, they would be able to surround the city soon
after dawn on the 30th.
It was arranged that the Australian Mounted Divi-
sion should send two brigades along the foot of the
hills west of Damascus, to close the two roads lead-
ing north-west to Beirut, and north-east to Horns.
The 5th Division was to send one brigade round the
east side of the city, to gain touch with the Australians
on the Horns road, and place the remainder of the
division astride the Deraa-Damascus road, at or
near Kiswe, to receive the remnants of the Turkish
IVth Army, which was to be driven into their wel-
coming arms by the 4th Division.
It must be explained that the only available maps
were very inaccurate and greatly lacking in detail.
Thus, there was no indication that the steep and
rocky hiUs, which press right on to Damascus on the
west, were almost impassable for cavalry ; or that
the Beirut road runs along the bottom of a deep,
precipitous gorge, into which it was impossible for
cavalry to descend ; or that, to reach the Homs
road, it would be necessary to pass through the
268
THE ACTION AT SASA 267
western suburbs of the city, always a difficult and
dangerous operation in a hostile country, and doubly
so for mounted troops.
For political reasons, strict orders had been given
that no British troops were to enter Damascus, and
these orders considerably hampered our subsequent
operations, and made our task more difficult.
In the end, however, it was the action of the enemy
that was the chief cause of our delay. A couple of
armoured cars went ahead of the Australian Division
to reconnoitre, and returned, shortly after the division
had started, with the information that the enemy
was holding a position astride the road, near the
village of Sasa, a little north of the Nahr Mughaniye.
The cars had drawn a considerable fire from guns
and machine guns. Patrols of the 3rd A.L.H.
Brigade crossed the river just before dark, and had
located the enemy's position fairly accurately by
the time the rest of the brigade arrived. The posi-
tion had been well sited by the enemy, on a rocky
ridge running about east and west. An impassable
morass of unknown extent protected his right flank,
north of the road, and the country to the south was
a wilderness of broken lava boulders, most difficult
even for infantry and in the daylight.
The 8th and 9th A.L.H. Regiments dismounted,
and advanced in pitch darkness against the pre-
sumed position of the enemy's left flank. The going
was so bad that it was nearly two in the morning
before they got to grips with the Turks. There was
a half -hour's very confused bayonet fighting among
the rocks in the darkness, during which it was almost
impossible to distinguish friend from foe. The Turks
then broke, most of them making for the road. A
pre-arranged signal of Verey lights, sent up by the
attackers, apprised the division of this, and, immedi-
268 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
ately it was seen, a squadron of the 10th A.L.H.
Regiment, which had been held in readiness, galloped
straight down the road in the dark, to get ahead of
the retreating Turks and cut them off. It verj''
nearly came to grief over one of the enemy guns
which had been abandoned on the road, but fortu-
nately the leading horses saw it, and swerved aside
just in time. The squadron was followed, at a more
sober pace, by the 4th and 12th Regiments of the 4th
Brigade, which now took the lead.
About 100 prisoners, three guns, and a number of
machine guns were captured on the position, and,
after daylight, about 250 more stragglers were gathered
in, including a party of 150 Germans, who had retired
before the 10th Regiment charged down the road.
Our casualties had been rather heavy for so small an
affair, and, by some strange chance, the Turks cap-
tured and carried off with them in their retreat eight
of our men. These we came upon and rescued near
the village of Sasa, shortly after daybreak.
The net result of this action was that, instead of
being on the outskirts of Damascus at dawn on the
30th, our troops were still nearly twenty miles away.
Pressing on as fast as possible, the division reached
Kaukab about ten o'clock, and here encountered the
enemy again. At some time or other the Turks had
constructed a long line of entrenchments stretching
from near Katana (north of the El Kuneitra road)
across the road at Kaukab, along the high ridge of
the Jebel el Aswad, over the Deraa road north of
Kiswe, and thence over the Jebel el Mania to near
Deir Ali. It was the western portion of this hne,
astride the El Kuneitra road, that they were now
holding. The position looked strong, and, had the
Turks put up a determined fight here, they might
have saved many of their friends in Damascus, to
THE ACTION AT KAUKAB 269
say nothing of their masters the Germans, from
capture.
' A ' Battery H.A.C. and the Notts Battery R.H.A.,
which were marching near the head of the advance
guard, came into action at once, and opened a rapid
and effective fire on the enemy position. After a
few minutes' bombardment, the 4th A.L.H. Regiment
was launched at the village of Kaukab, and the 12th
at a spur of the Jebel el Aswad, against the enemy's
left flank. The going here was good, and the cavalry
were able to gallop right on to the position, which
they proceeded to do, covered by the fire of the guns.
The combination of gun fire and charging cavalry
was too much for the shattered nerves of the Turks,
who broke and fled, pursued by the Australians.
The whole force was killed or captured.
The 5th Brigade now took the lead, and rode hard
up the road towards Damascus, followed by the 3rd
Brigade, which had rejoined from Sasa just after the
action. The leading troops came under fire from
the houses and gardens of the suburb of El Mezze.
The Notts Battery came into action, and shelled the
enemy satisfactorily, while the 5th Brigade plunged
into the maze of hills north of the road, and made
for the Beirut road. Seeing their right threatened,
the Turks retired into the town, and the 3rd Brigade
was free to move on. Patrols from this brigade
then found that it was impossible to reach the Homs
road, except by going right through the town, as
the river Barada, running between rock chffs, barred
their path farther west. As the orders against enter-
ing the town were peremptory, there was nothing
to be done but send back word of the state of
affairs, and wait for permission to advance. This
permission was not received till late at night, when
it was impossible for the brigade to make its way
270 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
through the narrov/, tortuous streets of the town,
which was still full of enemy troops.
Meanwhile the 5th Brigade was encountering great
difficulties in the bare, rocky hills west and north of
El Mezze, but the advanced troops reached the
gorge of the Barada, above El Rabue, about five in
the evening. Here they found themselves on the
top of a cliff about 200 feet high, overhanging the
road and railway to Beirut, and looked down upon
an extraordinary sight. The whole of the bottom
of the gorge, from side to side, was packed with a
strugghng mass of fugitives, on horse and afoot, in
motors, cabs and carts, surging along like a tidal
wave. There was a train on the line, packed with
Germans, but it was completely blocked by the mass
of people who struggled and fought along the rail-
way, and the engine driver had long since been sub-
merged in the tide of frenzied Turks. Even the
river was full of men and horses.
There was no possible way of getting down on to
the road from the top of the cliffs, but the fugitives
had to be stopped somehow. A few machine guns
were brought into action, and ordered to open fire
on the head of the column below. General Onslow,
who commanded the brigade, told the writer after-
wards that he had never given an order with greater
reluctance and horror. With a view to minimising
the inevitable slaughter, he instructed his machine
gunners to concentrate their fire as much as possible
on the vehicles at the head of the column, in order
to disable them and so block the road. When the
firing commenced, the Turks in front tried to turn
back towards the city, but the pressure behind them
was so great that they were constantly pushed along
into the zone of the bullets. At last, however, the
growing pile of corpses and broken vehicles at the
•*^ >,>>r^'*i«r1
Royal Horse Artillery f'ordinji the Jonlan at Jisr Benat \'akub
The Beiriit road in the (Jorge of the River Barada. 1st October, 1918.
MARCH OF THE 4TH CAVALRY DIVISION 271
head of the column completely blocked the gorge,
and the Turks realised that then: escape was barred.
They turned and streamed miserably back towards
the city. Part of the crowd was intercepted by
troops of the 3rd Brigade, who took about 5000
prisoners. The rest reached the city, and were
collected next day. How many perished in the
defile will never be known, but it took a large force
of German prisoners ten days to dispose of the bodies.
It was fitting that they, who by their insane ambi-
tion had brought the Turks to this sorry end, should
have had the task of burying the victims of their
lust for power.
Before dark, the 5th Brigade got a small party
down on to the road, and picketed it during the
night.
While the Australian Mounted Division had been
pushing round west of Damascus, the 4th and 5th
Cavalry Divisions had been slowly closing in on the
city. The former had pursued the retreating IVth
Army relentlessly all through the 29th of September,
and, on the morning of the 30th, the 11th Brigade,
which was acting as advance guard, reached El
Ghabaghib Station, on the old French railway from
Damascus to Mezerib, about thirty miles south of
Damascus.
The main body of the enemy, which had been
marching hard all night, was now some distance
ahead of the division, but its retreat was constantly
harassed by Lawrence's Arabs, who made repeated
raids on the right flank of the Turks, and had by
now reduced them to a state of extreme disorganisa-
tion. It must be remembered that the 4th Cavalry
Division had about thirty miles farther to go before
reaching Damascus than the other two divisions.
Moreover, although there had been no opposition
272 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
from the enemy after the action at El Remte, the
division had been much delayed by the bad road
fi-om Deraa to Damascus, across the southern Hauran.
The whole of this area is overlaid with the debris of
extinct volcanoes, mostly in the form of huge boulders
of black basalt, which ever^'^where cover the ground.
Much time was spent in clearing away these boulders,
to make a passage for the guns and transport of the
division. The whole country from Deraa to Damascus
was strewn with the bodies of Turks that had died
from exhaustion. Dead horses, broken-down vehicles,
and abandoned guns were scattered everywhere. It
was estimated that 2000 enemy dead were passed on
the march, and many more than that number of
dead animals. The hot sun, beating down on the
black rocks, burnt like the blast from a furnace, and
the heavy air, poisoned by the unburied corpses of
men and beasts, hung like a pall over the land. There
is little water to be found in the Hauran in summer,
and less food, and not a single tree and scarce a
human habitation soften the desolation of this hor-
rible region.
The 5th Cavalry Division reached Sasa at about
eight on the morning of the 30th, and there received
a message from an aeroplane that a large body of
the enemy, which was, in fact, the leading portion of
the IVth Army, was approaching Kiswe, along the
Deraa-Damascus road. The 13th Brigade, followed
by the Mth, was at once despatched to try and inter-
cept this force. Before they moved off. General
MacAndrew ^ issued the following characteristic
order to his brigades : ' Push on ! Kill or capture
all you can, and seize Damascus.''
This day marked the end of the Turkish IVth
^ Major-General Sir H. J. M. MacAndrew, K.C.B., Indian Army. He
died from burns received in an accident at Aleppo in July 1919.
END OF THE TURKISH FOURTH ARMY 273
Army, but, as it split up into a number of detached
groups, which were attacked throughout the day by
brigades, regiments, and even single squadrons of
the 4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions, it is impossible
to give any very concise account of its destruction.
It is clear, however, that, on the morning of the 30th,
the army was marching in two main bodies. The
leading portion, that which had been seen and re-
ported by our aircraft, consisted of the remains of
the Turldsh 3rd Cavalry Division, with such of the
infantry as had been able to keep up with the mounted
troops. The following portion, evidently much more
disorganised, was marching some eight to ten miles
in rear.
The 13th Brigade, moving along the south bank of
the Wadi el Zabirani, encountered some opposition
on the ridge of the Jebel el Aswad, north of Deir
Khabiye, from enemy troops occupying a portion
of the entrenched position that has been mentioned
above. By mid-day, however, the brigade had suc-
ceeded in dispersing the enemy, taking some 700
prisoners. Meanwhile the 14th Brigade had got
astride the Deraa-Damascus road, north of Kiswe.
It was just in time to intercept the leading portion
of the Turkish force, the advanced elements of which
had cleared Kiswe, and were hurrying up the road
over the Jebel el Aswad towards Damascus.
In the somewhat confused fighting which followed
the encounter, the greater part of what was left of
the Turkish 3rd Cavalry Division, including the
divisional commander and his staff, fell into our
hands. The remainder of the force was driven back,
completely broken, to Kiswe.
At this time the 15th Brigade was in divisional
reserve a little east of Khan el Shiha.
Shortly afterwards, about four in the afternoon,
274 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
the second portion of the Turkish army was seen
aj^proaching Kiswe, followed by the 11th Brigade
of the 4th Cavalry Division. This brigade had been
checked for a time at Khiyara Chiftlik, about six
miles south of Kiswe, by a body of the enemy who
took up a position behind the mud walls of a farm
there. The brigade was rather heavily shelled from
the direction of Kalaat el Nuhas at the same time.
The farm was cleared by a mounted charge, and the
Turks dispersed. Some escaped up the steep slopes
of the Jebel el Mania to the east, but the bulk of
them continued along the main road to Kiswe. On
their arrival there, they joined the demoralised
remnants of the leading portion of their force, that
had escaped the onslaught of the 14th Brigade.
Here they learnt that the road to Damascus was
barred, and, looking backwards, saw the lances of
the 4th Cavalry Division approaching. Caught be-
tween the two forces, they made a last despairing
attempt to break through. There appears to have
been a general sauve qui pent. Some attempted the
Damascus road, and were ridden down and captured
by the 14th Brigade. Others made their way north-
east up the Nahr el Awaj, and attempted a counter-
attack against the left flank of this brigade, but
were broken up by the fire of the Essex Battery.
They split up into small groups, and disappeared
among the gardens of the Damascus plain east of
the city, where the majority of them were almost
certainly murdered by the natives. The largest
body broke out to the north-west, and fell into the
arms of the 13th Brigade near Sahnaya, where about
1500 prisoners were taken, and many were killed.
Others again were observed trying to escape to the
east. The Ajrrshire Battery, attached to the 11th
Brigade, galloped forward, supported by two machine
THE LIBERATION OF DAMASCUS 275
guns and a few Hotchkiss rifles, and came into action
at close range, causing the Turks to scatter wildly.
The 29th Lancers pursued these disorganised parties
up the slopes of the Jebel el Mania, and had rounded
up large numbers of them before darkness put an
end to the pursuit. Finally, a number remained in
Kiswe, and tried to organise some sort of resistance
there. At five o'clock, however, the 13th Brigade
swept suddenly down upon the village and captured
it, with about 700 prisoners and several guns.
It was now nearly dark, and nothing further could
be done that day. The 5th Division remained for
the night along a line north of the Wadi el Zabii'ani,
from the Kuneitra-Damascus road to a few miles
north-east of Kiswe. The 4th Division concentrated
south of Kiswe.
Two troops of the Gloucester Yeomanry, 13th
Brigade, and a troop of the 12th Regiment, 4th
A.L.H. Brigade, starting from south and west of
the town respectively, attempted to reach the big
German wireless installation at Kadem Station in
the southern suburb. The wireless plant had, how-
ever, been prepared for demolition, and was blown
up before our troops reached it. Both parties had
a warm time, and were continually sniped at by
wandering bodies of the enemy from the houses and
wooded gardens. Eventually they came upon a
number of large ammunition dumps, which had
been set on fii'e and were going off like a monstrous
Brock's Benefit, and they had to beat a hurried
retreat. All through the early part of the night
tremendous explosions shook the air, as the fire
reached fresh stacks of shells. Kadem railway
station and all the houses round it were completely
destroyed, but there was little other damage in the
city. The Turks were too dispirited and worn out
276 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
for deeds of frightfulness, and the Germans too
intent on trying to make good their escape. The
independence of the city from Turkish rule was
actually publicly proclaimed in the Serai early on
the afternoon of September the 30th, without any
opposition from the Turks, although there were at
the time some 15,000 Turkish and German soldiers
in the town, including Jemal Pasha, the commander
of the IVth Army. A number of these troops had
come from Aleppo and Beirut, and the remainder
were stragglers who had made their way in, by rail
and road, from the south, after the debdcle of Sep-
tember the 19th and succeeding days. Nearly all
of them were half starved and worn out by continual
marching, and their morale had sunk so low that they
made no protest when the whole city broke out in a
blaze of Sherifian flags. Insulted and beaten by the
people, who refused to give or sell them food, aban-
doned by their German masters in the most callous
manner, diseased and starving, many of the poor
wretches died in the streets that night. Many others,
less fortunate, met a brutal death at the hands of
the populace. Several thousand dragged themselves
to the Turkish barracks, which they filled, and over-
flowed into the parade ground, where some 300
perished during the night. Two considerable bodies
did indeed attempt to escape, one along the Beirut
road, and the other towards Homs. The fate of the
former has already been told. The latter body,
which consisted of fresher troops, from Aleppo and
Beirut, got out of the town on the north-east, and
marched all night along the Homs road.
The next day, October the 1st, as soon as it was
light, the 5th Cavalry Division concentrated and
moved round to the east of the city, pushing the
13th Brigade as far north as the Homs road, where
WORK OF THE 3RD A.L.H. BRIGADE 277
it got into touch with the 3rd A.L.H. Brigade of the
Austrahan Mounted Division. This brigade passed
through the city at dawn, patrols of the 10th A.L.H.
Regiment reaching the Serai square about six in the
morning, and being thus actually the first troops to
enter the city. Passing the Baramkie railway station
on the way, they found there a train just about to
start for Bekut, the troops in it being ignorant of
the fact that the railway had been cut (by the 5th
A.L.H. Brigade) the previous night. They were
speedily undeceived, and about 500 prisoners and
a number of guns and machine guns were taken
from the train, and handed over to the 4th and 12th
Regiments of the 4th Brigade, which marched to the
station later in the morning.
Hurrying through the town, the 3rd Brigade
reached the Homs road, and pressed along it on the
track of the enemy force that had escaped that way
the previous evening. The 10th Regiment came up
with part of this force about nine o'clock in the
morning, on the Wadi Maraba, near Harista el Basal,
and promptly charged it, killing many with the sword,
and capturing about 600 prisoners and some forty
machine guns. Continuing the pursuit, the cavalry
came upon more of the enemy near Duma, and again
at Khan Kusseir, twelve miles from Damascus, in
the evening. They were engaged in continual skir-
mishing throughout the day, and the action at Khan
Kusseir, where they were opposed by Germans,
though short, was severe. The enemy troops had
a number of machine guns, and put up a good fight,
but were broken by a charge delivered from the
cover of some vineyards and olive groves on their
right flank, and all of them were killed or captured.
The brigade remained at Duma for the night.
The advance troops of the Arab Army, under
278 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
Lawrence, reached Damascus about half-past eight
in the morning, and estabUshed their headquarters
in the Government buildings.
Meanwhile the two regiments of the 4th A.L.H.
Brigade were at work collecting prisoners in the
town, and evacuating them to a concentration area
near Daraya. All day long the sorry business con-
tinued, and by evening nearly 12,000 had been
collected. They were in a pitiable state. Many of
them, the remnants of the IVth Army, had been
chased for 150 miles by our cavalry and by the Arab
forces. Constantly bombed by our aircraft, harassed
day and night by the Arab Camel Corps and the
hostile population of the country through which
they passed, denied all food, and often short of water,
it is one of the marvels of war that they had struggled
so far. The task of getting them out of the city was
a horrible one. Many fell by the wayside, and all
the efforts of our cavahy failed to get them on their
feet again, and they had to be left to die. All night
long our over-worked ambulances toiled among them,
bringing water and food and what medical assistance
was possible, but they were utterly unable to cope
with the numbers, and by morning over 600 were
dead.
For the first fortnight, and until the rest and good
food had had time to take effect, the mortality in the
prisoners' camp, though decreasing daily, averaged
over a hundred a day.
The whole Turkish force was riddled with disease.
Nearly all were suffering from either malaria or
dysentery, and there were several cases of smallpox.
Venereal disease is endemic among the Turks, and,
in normal times, seems to have little effect upon their
general health ; but, in the exhausted and weakened
condition in which they now were, it laid hold on
The Emir Feisals' Headquarters at Damascus.
Note the Sheritian standards on tlie balcony.
Tripoli. The old Crusader Citadel.
A RECORD CAVALRY CHARGE 279
them virulently, and took a heavy toll of lives. An
indication of the spread of this disease among the
Germans was afforded by a room in the hospital at
Afule, which was filled with boxes of salvarsan.
This drug, we were informed by German medical
officers, was reserved exclusively for the use of
German troops.
The operations closed on the 2nd October with an
extraordinary charge by the 3rd A.L.H. Brigade.
Early in the morning, a column of the enemy was
seen moving north, parallel to the Homs road, and
some miles to the east. This column had evidently
hoped, by avoiding the road, to make its way unseen
to Khan Ayash, where it would have entered the
hills, and probably then made its escape.
The whole brigade immediately mounted, galloped
six miles over the open plain, and charged the enemy
with the sword. The Turks had with them a few
guns and a number of machine guns, which they
brought into action and fought to the last. The
brigade galloped on, through a hot fire, and charged
clean through the enemy force, killing a large number
of them, and capturing 1500 prisoners, including a
divisional commander, three guns, and twenty-six
machine guns. In point of distance this must be a
record cavalry charge.
On the same day, detachments from each brigade
of the Corps and some of the guns paraded at the
village of Sbeine, south of Damascus, and marched
through the city from end to end, led by the Corps
Commander. This was not intended as a triumphal
march, but was a necessary display of force, to
overawe the turbulent elements in the town, who
threatened to create a state of absolute anarchy.
For political reasons the city was supposed to be
in charge of the Arab forces, and an Arab Governor
280 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
was actually appointed. But, v/ith the best inten-
tions in the world, the small force of so-called
' regular ' Arab soldiers could do little or nothing to
keep order. The irregular — higlily irregular — forces
of King Hussein far outnumbered the Arab Army.
Dming the advance on the city, hordes of nomad
Arabs had joined his standard, drawn thereto partly,
no doubt, by their genuine and deep-rooted hatred
of the Turks, but also, and far more strongly, by
their equally genuine and deep-rooted love of plunder.
Till they reached Damascus, the loot had consisted
almost entirely of rifles and ammunition, best of all
loot from the desert Arab's point of view, but now
that "each son of Ishmael was in possession of at
least two good rifles, and was festooned with machine
gun belts full of cartridges, he felt that he could toy
with some more fancy trifles, should they come his
way. So it was not surprising that, as soon as they
entered the city, they all set to work at once to
collect what Thomas Atkins would call ' souvenirs.'
They were perfectly good-tempered about it, and
only killed a few shopkeepers who made an un-
conscionable fuss about having their booths looted.
No mercy was shown to the Turks, however. They
were hunted down and killed remorselessly where-
ever found. Some of the Arabs even broke into the
Turkish hospital, and set about murdering the mori-
bund wretches whom they found there, till driven
away by our troops.
The desert-bred Arabs are probably the most inde-
pendent of mankind. They acknowledge no authority,
and will take orders only from those who are able to
exact obedience by force of arms. This the Emir
Feisal was quite unable to do, even had he been
wilhng, which is doubtful. His attitude seemed to
be that boys will be bo\^s, and it would be a shame
Sou I r-: - K-^ti
BNIVEF^SH uf ^ALifORNlS
LIE^RARY
LOS ANGELES. CAUF]
#
DISORDERS IN THE CITY 281
to interfere with their simple pleasures, after the
hard time they had had. One of the first things the
' Boys ' did was to open the jail and release all the
ruffians therein, who added to the liveliness of the
city.
After two days of something like pandemonium,
the powers that were recognised the necessity of im-
posing some sort of restraint on the lawless elements,
and two regiments of the Australian Mounted Divi-
sion were stationed in the city for police duties. The
Australian troopers speedily had the situation in
hand, and the normal life of Damascus was resumed
within forty-eight hours.
CHAPTER XXII
THE LAST PHASE
Arabian Syria extends northwards a little beyond
Aleppo. A study of the place-names on the map
will establish a fairly well-defined line, running from
about Jerablus on the Euphrates to the sea near
Antioch, north of which the Arabic names give place
to Turkish. From the political point of view it
was highly desirable that all the country south of
this line should be in our hands before the Turks
should have had enough, and ask for a cessation of
hostilities. But Aleppo is a far cry from Damascus,
230 miles by the Rayak road, and it is doubtful
whether the Commander-in-Chief had in his mind at
this date so extended an enterprise as the capture
of that city.
Strategically, however, an advance as far as Rayak
and Beirut offered several advantages. The posses-
sion of Beirut would give us a good, if small, port,
connected by rail and road with Damascus, thus
greatly shortening our line of supply. And, with
Rayak Junction in our hands, we should control the
important broad-gauge line that runs northwards
from this place, through Horns, Hama, and Aleppo,
to join the Baghdad line at Muslimie.
The total destruction of the Turkish armies had
ensured us freedom of movement at least as far as
the line Rayak-Beirut, and the only obstacle to an
advance lay in the weak and reduced condition of
the Corps.
SICKNESS IN THE CORPS 283
In the twelve days from the 19th to the 30th of
September inclusive, the three cavalry divisions had
marched over 200 miles, fought a number of minor
actions, and captured more than 60,000 prisoners,
140 guns, and 500 machine guns.
Long marches, especially at night, and half rations
during the whole period, had rendered the horses
thin and tired, and they were in urgent need of a
rest. The men were in considerably worse case. In
the course of the operations, the Australian Mounted
Division had lain one night beside the Jordan at
Jisr Benat Yakub, and the 4th Cavalry Division had
spent several nights in the neighbourhood of Beisan.
In both places the men were exposed to the attacks
of swarms of malaria-bearing mosquitoes. Though
the outbreak of malignant malaria, which was the
fruit of these nights, did not begin to make its appear-
ance till about the 5th of October, the day on which
the advance was resumed, there were many cases
of influenza in the Corps, and the hospitals were full
of sick men, especially Indians. The 5th Division,
which had not been in the mosquito districts, suffered
less severely from malaria, and was thus able to
continue the advance later on, at a time when the
other two divisions were so weakened by the disease
as to be almost incapable of moving.
After weighing all the factors of the situation,
however, the Commander-in-Chief decided that the
advantages to be gained by securing the port of
Beirut and the railway to Damascus, justified a
farther advance, and he determined to push on with
his cavalry at least as far as the Rayak-Beirut line.
The 4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions were detailed
for this task, the Australian Division remaining in
and around Damascus, to keep order in the city and
throughout the surrounding country.
284 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
The two divisions started on tlie morning of the
5th of October. At Khan Meizelun, eighteen miles
from Damascus, their roads parted, the 4th Division
moving on Zebdani, on the railway between Damascus
and Rayak, the 5th making for Rayak by the main
road through Shtora. Both objectives were reached
without difficulty the following afternoon. In the
course of the advance the 14th Brigade entered Zahle,
capturing 177 prisoners and a few guns. Thirty
burnt aeroplanes were found on the aerodrome at
Rayak, and in the station a quantity of rolling
stock and a number of engines of both the broad and
the narrow gauge. Though damaged, most of these
were subsequently repaired and put into use.
On the next day (the 7th) the armoured cars
attached to the 5th Cavalry Division made a re-
connaissance to Beirut, which they entered without
opposition about mid-day. The townspeople received
them with acclamation, and showed with pride a
party of about 600 Turkish soldiers whom they had
collected and disarmed. The 7th Indian Infantry
Division, which had left Haifa on October the 3rd,
reached Beirut on the 8th, and took over these
prisoners.
On the 10th the cars reconnoitred northwards as
far as Baalbek, without encountering any of the
enemy, and the Commander-in-Chief thereupon de-
cided to make a farther advance as far as Homs.
Unfortunately malaria had b}^ now laid such a
hold upon the men of the 4th Division, that the
surviving hale scarce sufficed to carry on the ordinary
duties of camp, and anj^ further work by this divi-
sion was out of the question. This left only the 5th
Division, itself much reduced in numbers, to carry
on the advance.
The 7th Infantry Division was directed to send a
OCCUPATION OF HOMS 285
brigade to Tripoli, where there was a small port,
with jetties suitable for landing stores in fine weather,
and a fairly good, metalled road running inland to
Horns, which would facilitate the sending of supplies
to the cavalry at the latter place. The 5th Divi-
sion was then ordered to occupy Homs as soon as
possible, the 4th remaining in the Zahle-Rayak-
Baalbek area.
The 13th Brigade entered Baalbek on the 11th of
October, and collected 500 Turks who had sur-
rendered to the inhabitants, and who had been
' offered ' to the armoured cars the previous day.
The railway from Aleppo to Rayak was in working
order, and it was quite possible for the enemy to
send troops south to delay our advance. It was
very important, therefore, that any further move
forward, once decided upon, should be carried out
as rapidly as possible.
To this end General MacAndrew organised his
division at Baalbek in two columns. Column ^A,'
which was to lead the advance, consisted of the divi-
sional headquarters, three batteries of armoured cars,
and three light car patrols, supported by the 15th
Brigade. This brigade had only two regiments, the
Hyderabad Lancers being still on the line of com-
munications. The remainder of the division formed
Column * B.' It will be apparent that Column * A ' was
little more than a raiding force, but it was considered
that the heavy volume of machine-gun fire provided
by the twenty-four cars would be sufficient to dis-
perse, or at least to break up and disorganise, any
body of the enemy that might be encountered. The
country was very suitable for the employment of
armoured cars, being open and fairly flat, with a
hard surface.
A wing of the Royal Air Force was attached to the
286 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
division for reconnaissance purposes. Throughout
the campaign, the close co-operation between our
aeroplanes and the cavalry had given most excel-
lent results. During the advance on Damascus, Air
Force motor cars had accompanied the advanced
headquarters of the Corps, carrying a party who
selected and marked landing grounds at each halting
place. Lorries carrying petrol and stores followed
a few miles in rear. These arrangements resulted
in maintaining that close personal contact between
the two forces without which satisfactory work is
impossible. Moreover, the provision of a landing
ground beside the advanced Corps headquarters
meant that there was always an aeroplane ready at
hand for instant use, if any special work was required.
Similar arrangements were now made with the
5th Division, and the subsequent assistance of the wing
attached to the division was of the highest value.
At this time no orders had been received as to
Aleppo, but it is evident that General MacAndrew
had in his mind the probability of an advance to
seize that city. At any rate, this organisation of
his division enabled him to do so when the time
came, and by a piece of sheer bluff.
The march proceeded without incident up the
valley of the Orontes, and the armoured cars of
Column 'A' entered Homs unopposed on the 15th,
where they met a force of Sherifian troops, under
Sherif Nasir, who had marched from Damascus by
the direct north road. Two days previously the
20th Corps cavalry regiment had occupied Tripoli,
where it was joined a few days later by part of the
7th Infantry Division, and arrangements were at
once put in hand to land stores at the little port,
and send them up by road to Homs. Column * B '
arrived on the 16th.
ADVANCE ON ALEPPO 287
The Commander-in-Chief now determined to com-
plete the poUtical part of the campaign by seizing
Aleppo, and occupying all the Arab-speaking country
from the sea to the Euphrates.
The only troops available for the enterprise were
the 5th Cavalry Division and the armoured cars.
The Australian Division was at Damascus, over
100 miles away, and could not be brought up in
time. The 4th Division, reduced in strength and
exhausted by disease, was incapable of any work
till men and horses had been given a thorough rest
and time to recover from sickness. This division
and the Australian Division had suffered some 300
deaths from disease since reaching Damascus, a
fortnight before. Even the 5th Division, which had
suffered far less severely than the other two, was
in a deplorable state. The whole division hardly
mustered 1500 sabres. The two R.H.A. batteries
with the division numbered between them but four
officers and eighty men.
It was known that there were about 20,000 Turks
and Germans at Aleppo, or south of that place, and
it was believed that about half of these were com-
batants, though probably ill-armed and disorganised.
Aleppo is over 100 miles from Homs, and 180 from
Tripoli or Baalbek, the two nearest points from
which any possible reinforcements could be sent.
In the face of these facts, the boldest of commanders
might well have been excused for deciding to call a
halt. But the political and moral advantages to be
gained by a farther advance into the enemy's country
appeared so great that General Allenby determined
to accept the risk. On the 19th of October he
directed General MacAndrew to advance to Aleppo.
The divisional field squadron Royal Engineers,
covered by the 15th Brigade, at once moved out to
288 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
El Rastan, to repair the bridge over the Orontes at
that place, which had been blown up by the Turks
during their retreat. The following day the divi-
sional headquarters and the cars joined the 15th
Brigade at El Rastan, and, on the morning of the
21st, Column 'A' crossed the repaired bridge, and,
making a long march, reached Zor Defai, five miles
north of Hama, that evening. No opposition was
encountered during the march.
Next morning the cars pushed off early on
an extended reconnaissance. Reaching Ma'arit el
Na'aman, thirty-five miles distant, about mid-day,
without meeting any of the enemy, they made a
short halt, and then started off again towards Aleppo.
Seven miles farther north, near Khan Sebil, they
sighted some enemy armoured cars and armed motor
lorries. These at once turned and fled, pursued by
our cars, and a nice little hunt ensued. Hounds were
stopped after a fifteen mile point, as it was getting
late, but not before a German armoured car, two
armed lorries, and thirty-seven prisoners had been
captured. Just as our cars drew off, two enemy
aeroplanes appeared, and, evidently mistaking the
German lorries for our troops, promptly dived, and
machine-gunned them vigorously ! The armoured
cars had reached a point fifty-five miles from Zor
Defai, and only twenty miles south of Aleppo, before
they turned back. They withdrew to a point four
miles north of Seraikin, where they bivouacked for
the night, finding their own outposts. The 15th
Brigade reached Khan Shaikhun late in the after-
noon.
On the 23rd the cars pushed on again, and encoun-
tered some enemy cavalry at Khan Tuman, about
ten miles south of Aleppo. These they brushed
aside without much difficulty, and proceeded along
f^'tmrnktSm.
Aleppo. TliL' old citadel.
r^'
Bedouin iind Sheiitian soklieis. Near the Euphrates.
A FLAG OF TRUCE 289
the road. Some miles farther on, however, they
were held up by strong Turkish rearguards holding
an entrenched position astride the road, through El
Ansarie and Sheikh Said. A reconnaissance of this
position, carried out by the cars and some aeroplanes,
indicated that it was held by a force of 2000 to 3000
infantry. It was reported locally that there were
six or seven thousand more in Aleppo.
General MacAndrew thereupon determined to try
and bluff the enemy into surrendering, and, to this
end, sent an officer with a flag of truce into Aleppo
in a car, to demand the capitulation of the city. The
Turks took this officer through their defences without
blindfolding him, apparently in order to show him
that the position was a strong one, which it was,
and adequately held. Having done so, they enter-
tained him most courteously with cigarettes, coffee,
and small talk for half an hour or so, and then handed
him a reply to take back to the British General.
The officer got back to Divisional Headquarters about
four in the afternoon, and delivered his letter, which
proved brief and to the point. ' The Commander of
the Turkish garrison of Aleppo,' it ran, ' does not find
it necessary to answer your note.' Fortunately for
us, however, the Turkish Commander, after making
this bold reply, began to get uneasy, and, in the
course of the next three days, evidently came to the
conclusion that discretion was the better part of
valour. During the night of the 25th he commenced
to withdraw his forces to the north.
At seven o'clock the cars were withdrawn into
bivouac on the open plain south of Khan Tuman, so
as to give them freedom of movement if attacked
during the night.
The 24th was occupied in further reconnaissance
of the enemy positions. The Turks were found in
290 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
occupation of the same trenches, with cavalry out-
posts pushed forward on to the hills north of Khan
Tuman. Some of the cars were sent off in a north-
westerly direction, with the object of discovering a
practicable way through the rocky hills south-west
of Aleppo, to the Alexandretta road. They were
unable, however, to find any track that was possible
for cars.
Further reconnaissances on the 25th disclosed the
enemy positions more fully, and drew considerable fire
from guns, machine guns, and rifles all along the
Hne. The 15th Brigade came up in the evening,
and relieved the cars on outpost duty that night.
Sherif Nasir's Arabs, who had been marching at a
great pace along the railway, had arrived earlier in
the day, and moved east towards Tel Hasil, to attack
the city from that side.
Column ' B,' which had been steadily plodding
along, a day's march in rear of Column ' A,' reached
Seraikin the same evening.
With the arrival of the 15th Brigade and the Arabs,
General MacAndrew deemed himself strong enough
to take Aleppo. He ordered the 15th to advance
early next morning, through the hills west of Aleppo,
via Turmanin, and get astride the Aleppo-Alexan-
dretta road, while the Arabs and the armoured cars
attacked from the east and south respectively. During
the night of the 25th, however, the Arabs, assisted
by friends in Aleppo, succeeded in entering the city.
They enjoyed a first-rate, old-fashioned, hand-to-
hand fight with the Turks, and beat them decisively.
By ten o'clock in the morning the city was in their
hands, and General MacAndrew motored in with the
armoured cars. Sherif Nasir had lost about sixty
killed, but he had inflicted far heavier casualties on his
enemies, and driven them out of Aleppo full speed.
FALL OF ALEPPO 291
Meanwhile the 15th Brigade had started at seven
in the morning, and reached the Alexandretta road,
without opposition, about ten o'clock. The only-
definite information the brigade had received at this
time, was that about 300 Turkish cavalry were on
the road, eight miles north of Aleppo. Shortly after-
wards a verbal message was brought in by a car, to
the effect that about a thousand ' scalljrwags ' of all
descriptions, with two field guns, had left Aleppo,
going north, about half -past seven in the morning.
The brigade proceeded along the road, and, about
eleven o'clock, two squadrons of the Jodhpur Lancers,
who were acting as advanced guard, topped the ridge
overlooking the village of Haritan from the south-
east, and about a mile and a half distant. They imme-
diately came under heavy rifle fire from the village,
and took up a dismounted position on the ridge.
Rightly deeming that instant action was all
important, and relying on the information he had
received as to the strength and composition of the
enemy force in front of him. General Harbord
decided to attack at once. He ordered the Mysore
Lancers to move out to the east, and endeavour to
charge the enemy on his left flank. Two squadrons
of the Jodhpur Lancers were directed to move in
support of the Mysores, as a ' mopping up ' party,
while the remainder of this regiment, with the
machine gun squadron, held the Turks in front, with
fire directed from the ridge on which the advance
guard had first taken up its position.
Just after the Mysore Lancers commenced their
move eastwards. General Harbord was reinforced by
a battery of armoured cars, which had been sent out
from Aleppo to join him. He directed these cars
to approach the enemy positions along the road, and
assist the attack with their machine-gun fire. Un-
292 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
fortunately something went wrong with the battery
leader's car, and it was withdrawn and driven back
to Aleppo. The remaining tliree cars, through some
misunderstanding, followed it, and the brigade was
thus deprived of their support.
Meanwhile the Mysore Lancers, finding that the
enemy's position extended farther than was expected,
moved more to the east to gain the flank. At twelve
o'clock, Major Lambert, finding himself in a favour-
able position, ordered a charge. The ground was
rather rocky, and gave some trouble to the horses,
but the charge was driven well home, and a con-
siderable number of the enemy was killed. The
Turks, however, were to be found in much greater
strength than had been expected, and, after driving
through their flank, the Lancers were heavily fired
on by Turks farther west. Many of those who had
been ridden over, and had thrown down their arms,
now picked them up again, and continued the fight.
Seeing that his regiment had not sufficient weight
to charge through the large body of Turks farther
west. Major Lambert rallied his squadrons behind
the Turkish line, and took up a dismounted position
on the left rear of the enemy, where the two squadrons
of the Jodhpur Lancers joined him.
The charge had compelled the Turks to reveal
their full strength, which turned out to be about
3000 infantry and 400 cavalry, with ten or twelve
guns and about thirty-five machine guns. Seeing
the smallness of the force opposed to them, they
now advanced boldly to the attack, but, when about
800 yards away, thought better of it, and began to
dig themselves in.
The 15th Brigade remained in observation of the
Turks, and desultory firing continued till about nine
o'clock at night, when the enemy faded gradually
THE ARMISTICE 293
and silently away. Two hours later the 14th Cavalry
Brigade, which had reached Aleppo with Column * B '
late in the evening, arrived on the scene, and re-
lieved the 15th Brigade. The casualties in the latter
brigade totalled sixty-three killed, wounded, and
missing, which comparatively Ught bill might have
been very much heavier had the Turks showed any
real disposition to fight. They outnumbered our
men by at least seven to one, and were well supplied
with artiUery and machine guns, but their morale
had sunk so low that it was only surprising that they
did not all surrender, or break into helpless flight,
when charged. We learnt afterwards that the
Turkish Commander in Aleppo had been completely
deceived by General MacAndrew, whose boldness in
detaching the whole of his cavalry to cut the Alexan-
dretta road led him to believe that we had a much
larger force at our disposal than was actually the
case.
On the 28th the Arab forces seized Muslimie Junc-
tion, on the Baghdad Railway twelve miles north of
Aleppo, dislodging a small Turkish rearguard there,
and this inglorious little action ended the war for
Turkey. The few surviving Turks retired rapidly
in the general direction of Constantinople, and that
was the last seen of their army. The Armistice ^
came into operation at noon on the 31st of October.
In the thirty-eight days since the commencement
of the operations, the 5th Cavalry Division had
marched 567 miles, fought six actions, and taken
over 11,000 prisoners and fifty-eight guns. The
total captures of the Desert Mounted Corps in the
same period were 83,700 prisoners and about 160
guns.
The Australian Mounted Division left Damascus
* See Appendix m. for terms uf Armistice.
294 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
on October the 27th to march to Aleppo, a distance
of rather over 200 miles. Marching by the direct
road to Homs, which runs almost due north from
Damascus, the division reached the small village of
Jendar, eighteen miles south of Homs, at nine o'clock
on the night of the 31st. Here the news of the
Armistice was received by wireless, but, as there
was no water available in the neighbourhood, the
Australians continued the march the same night,
and arrived at Homs at eight o'clock on the morning
of the 1st of November. Three days later they
moved down to Tripoh, on the coast, where they
remained until sent to Egypt, en route for Australia,
at the end of Februar}^ 1919.
The Commander-in-Chief made his official entry
into Aleppo on the 12th of December. As at Damas-
cus, we had installed an Arab Governor here,
but, in view of the disorders that had occurred at
the former place, his powers were restricted to
giving advice, and the whole of the policing of the
city was in the hands of our troops. The ' Chief '
took the occasion to give him some good advice,
couched in the vigorous language for which he was
famous.
One of the first things General Allenby did, when
order had been restored in the country, was to direct
that a day should be set aside to be observed through-
out the force as one of thanksgiving for victory.
Tuesday, December the 16th, was selected for the
purpose, and was celebrated by the holding of reli-
gious services in the morning by all the many reh-
gions and denominations in the Corps. The afternoon
was spent in such games and sports as could be
organised.
CHAPTER XXIII
POLICE WORK
The cavalry had reached their final goal, and their
fighting work was over. But there was still much
to be done. The Desert Mounted Corps took over
the administration of the conquered country from
Damascus in the south to Marash, in Cilicia, 120
miles north of Aleppo ; and from the sea coast to
Ras el Ain, 120 miles east of the Euphrates, an area
of about 35,000 square miles. Corps headquarters
was established at Homs. The 5th Cavalry Division,
at Aleppo, had a brigade at Aintab, eighty miles
farther north, and detachments at Alexandretta,
Islahie, Marash, Arab Punar and Jerablus on the
Euphrates. Later on, infantry, attached to the
Corps, occupied Alexandretta, Adana, Tarsus, Smyrna,
and other towns on or near the coast. The 4th
Cavalry Division remained at Beirut and in the
neighbourhood, and the Australian Division at
Tripoli, with a brigade at Baalbek, and detachments at
Shtora, Lebwe, and Rayak. At the end of February
1919, when the Australians returned to Egjrpt, the
4th Division handed over Beirut to the French,
and was quartered at Homs, Baalbek, Rayak, and
Deraa.
As was only to be expected after the events of the
past four years, the country was in a most unsettled
state. The crops and live stock had been merci-
lessly requisitioned by the Turks over large areas,
and many of the peasants, left callously to starve,
295
296 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
had taken to a life of brigandage. The whole
countiy was infested with robber bands. Even
large parties dared not travel at night, and indeed
few ventured to travel at all. Those whose busi-
ness or duty took them about the country crept
from village to village by unfrequented bye-paths,
avoiding the roads. Merchants and shopkeepers
buried most of their wares, displaying in their places
of business only a few miserable samples.
The direct road from Damascus to Homs was so
overrun with robbers that even considerable bodies
of Turkish soldiers marching along it had been
attacked and massacred ; so that it had been, at
last, altogether abandoned as a line of communica-
tions in favour of the longer, and far worse, road
through Baalbek.
Within three weeks of the signing of the Armistice,
unarmed pedestrians travelled alone and unafraid
through all the land. On every road were to be
seen throngs of refugees returning to their ravished
homes, accompanied by carts piled high with house-
hold goods. When night came on, these people
pulled off the road, and slept in peace and safety
till morning. Merchants brought out their wares
from secret places, and buyers crowded into the
cities in thousands.
During the whole time the British forces were in
occupation of the country, from the end of October
1918 till November 1919, there were only two attempts
to disturb the peace, and both of these were nipped
in the bud at once. The j&rst occurred on the night
of November the 30th, 1918, when a notorious robber
chief, who lived in an almost inaccessible village up
in the Anti-Lebanon, attempted to raid one of our
ammunition and store depots at Rayak. The robbers
were driven off, with the loss of six men killed and
Within the jurisdiction of the Desert Mounted Corps.
The River Euphrates at Ralil;a.
GOOD WORK OF THE ARAB ARMY 297
twenty prisoners, and we had no more trouble of
that sort.
The second attempt took place at Aleppo on the
23rd February 1919. A plot was engineered by
Turkish ex-officers and local Arabs, to bring about a
massacre of the hated Armenians in the city. The
disturbance was quickly put down, but not before a
few persons on both sides had been killed. Several
prominent natives were arrested in connection with
the plot, and tried by a mixed court of British and
Arab officers. Those of the conspirators who were
proved actually to have taken life were executed, and
others were sentenced to various terms of imprison-
ment. These sentences had a most salutary effect,
and there was no further effort to disturb the peace.
There was a detachment of the Arab Army, about
200 strong, at Aleppo, and one or two soldiers were
quartered in all outlying villages of any importance.
It is pleasant to be able to record that the Arab
Government made a genuine, and successful, effort
to assist in maintaining law and order in the country,
and the Arab Governor of Aleppo was always on the
best of terms with our officials. The Governor at
this time was Gafar Pasha, who had been a general
in the Turkish Army, and had fought against us in
the Senussi Campaign, where he was taken prisoner,
and sent to Cairo to be interned. He was liberated,
at his own request, in order to join the Arab Army,
in which he commanded a division with distinction
from the latter part of 1917 till the end of the war.
One of the most difficult tasks carried out by the
Corps was that of restoring to the Armenians their
houses and property. A Reparation Committee was
formed in Aleppo, with representatives at Aintab
and Marash, and much useful work was done. All
houses that formerly belonged to Armenians were
298 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
evacuated by their Moslem occupiers, and, as far as
possible, restored to their rightful owners. Very
many of these had, however, been killed or had
disappeared. Others, attracted by tales of the
fabulous sums to be made in Aleppo by trading with
the British, flocked into the city, and refused to return
to their own homes. Many Armenian women had
entered the harems of Turks or Arabs, and a number
of these did not now wish to leave. They were well
treated there, and protected, and they preferred the
comfort of the harem to the prospect of starting
again in the cold world outside.
The difficulties of the Reparations Committee were
much increased by the intrigues and lies of the
members of local branches of the Turkish Committee
of Union and Progress. These people had been the
chief offenders in the persecution of the unhappy
Armenians, and they, more than any others, had
grown fat on the plundered property. Now that
their power was broken, they feared not only the
confiscation of their ill-gotten goods, but drastic
punishment, possibly even death, for the many
murders they had committed. It was not to be
wondered at, therefore, that they should seize every
opportunity to hamper and embarrass our officials
in their investigations. More than one prominent
local member of the C.U.P. had to be removed from
his position as headman of a village, in consequence
of his obstructive tactics.
Notwithstanding all these difficulties, very large
numbers of Armenians were restored to their houses,
furniture and effects were recovered or made good,
and families were re-united. Some 3000, who were
awaiting repatriation, were housed in the barracks
at Aleppo, fed by the British, and given work at
high wages.
GAMBLES IN EXCHANGE 299
It must be confessed that the Armenians are, as
a nation, a very unpleasant people. That this is
largely due to the treatment they have received in
the past does not alter the fact. Deprived of their
land many centuries ago, and debarred, to a great
extent, from engaging in industry, they have become
moneylenders, as have the Jews in similar circum-
stances. Usurers in all countries are a detested
class, and the Armenians are no exception to the
rule. They are the usurers of Turkey, grasping and
avaricious, the holders of mortgages on the peasants'
land, the speculators in food, hated and despised by
all classes. Small wonder that the Turk, blood-
thirsty as he is by nature, needs little encouragement
to start a massacre of them, whenever he has the
chance.
Another important task undertaken by the Corps
was the stabilising of the exchange. At the time
when we first occupied Aintab, shortly after the
Armistice, Turkish 100 piastre notes were worth
about 4s. 6d. in Aleppo. The ten piastre notes had
practically no value, and most of the merchants
refused to accept them. All the Egyptian notes
were accepted at about their face value. In Aintab,
on the other hand, which was only eighty miles away,
traders were suspicious of the Turkish 100 piastre
notes, but those of ten piastres were readily accepted,
and were worth nearly twice as much as the equiva-
lent Egyptian note. Similar apparently unreasonable
anomalies were to be observed in other places. A
good example occurred at the beginning of February.
One day a merchant of Aleppo came to General
Mac Andrew, and stated that he had just heard that
his business in Baghdad, which was his principal
source of livelihood, had been nearly ruined by an
enemy. If, said he, he could get there at once, he
300 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
could save it, but it was a matter of days, almost of
hours. Under the circumstances, would his Excel-
lency permit him to ride to Baghdad and back in
one of the British aeroplanes, for which he would
pay any sum that was demanded. He was turned
over to the Intelligence Branch, who, after making
inquiries, reported that he was a man of substance,
much respected in Aleppo, and with considerable
local influence, which might be useful to us. His
request was accordingly granted, and he was taken
to Baghdad in one of our aeroplanes. He only
remained there twenty-four hours, and then flew
back to Aleppo. He paid £160 for the trip, and
seemed to think his journey cheap. A few days
later the General's headquarters were besieged by a
crowd of applicants, each of whom had a business
in Baghdad which was on the point of being ruined
by an enemy ! Further inquiries by the Intelli-
gence Branch ehcited the facts of the case. It
appeared that the Russian one-rouble note was worth
about half its face value in Aleppo. In Baghdad,
where there was a large number of them, they were
not worth the paper on which they were printed.
The astute merchant, hearing of this, and reaUsing
that such a state of affairs could not last an hour,
once telegraphic communication was estabUshed be-
tween the two places, determined to bring as many
of the notes as he could' to Aleppo at once. There
was no time to be lost, as the telegraph line was
nearly through, so he hit upon the plan of hiring an
aeroplane, and cleared, according to repute, nearly
£40,000 as the reward of his initiative !
This was the last and greatest of the many gambles
in exchange that enlivened the days of the merchants
of Aleppo during the early period of our occupation
of the place. Gradually, by means of a vigorous
• SPORTS AND GAMES 301
publicity campaign, and by selling surplus enemy
stores for Egyptian money only, the monetary posi-
tion was stabilised, and, by the end of May, Egyptian
paper was generally accepted all over the country.
It must not be supposed that the life of the Corps
was all work and no play. At Beirut and Tripoli
racecourses were laid out very soon after the cavalry
occupied those places, and several capital little
meetings were held. Later on an excellent course
was made at Aleppo, with two grand stands, paddock,
judge's box, parade ring, and everything complete,
even to a fully equipped totalisator (run by the
Corps cashier). Races were held every fortnight,
and the social amenities were provided for by a
tastefully laid out ' lawn,' and first-rate catering
arrangements ! Aleppo also boasted a really good
polo ground and several football and cricket grounds.
Both the racing and the polo were considerably
better than were to be had in Cairo or Alexandretta.
There was also a pack of ' fox hounds ' at Aleppo
and another at Tripoli. The ' Lebanon Hounds,' at
the latter place, showed some quite good sport over
the comparatively flat country near the coast, but
the ' Aleppo Hunt ' was handicapped by the rocky
nature of the country, and by the fact that most of
the ' earths ' were holes in solid rock, out of which
it was impossible to dig a fox that had got to ground.
Moreover, as they met at five o'clock on Sunday
mornings only, the fields were never very large !
The 13th Brigade, at Aintab, held a series of point-
to-point meetings in the vale of the Kuwaik Su, and
the regiment at Marash organised a pig-sticking
club, which met once or twice near the Ak Su lakes.
There was not much sport, as the pigs came from the
hills, which were unridable, and to which they speedily
retired, as soon as they were disturbed.
302 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
Expeditions to the ruins of the Hittite City of
Carchemish, near Jerablus, to the summer palace of
Haroun al Rashid at Rakka on the Euphrates, 150
miles east of Aleppo, to Palmyra, the city of Zenobia,
in the desert eighty miles east of Homs, and to various
other historical remains, added interest to life, and,
at the same time, served to give officers and men a
knowledge of the country that they could have
obtained in no other way.
The Anzac and Australian Mounted Divisions left
for Egypt in the spring of 1919, and on the 7th
June the Desert Mounted Corps was broken up. The
administration of the conquered territory was taken
over by the newly-created ' Northforce,' which con-
sisted of the 4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions and two
divisions of Infantry, the whole under the command
of Major-General Barrow. This force found garrisons
for places up the coast as far as Smyrna, and also
took over the administration of the Baghdad Railway
from Constantinople to the railhead east of Nisibin
in Mesopotamia.
In November of the same year the administration
of northern Syria was finally handed over to our
French Allies, and the last of the British and Indian
Cavalry marched out of the country they had con-
quered and held for over a year.
vIlH^ BriLis'b D^-'.erLiI.L,u[,( (IGorps
aided by
Eb^rabBoreos of KinO R^isse'm.
capUired
Damascus Roms andj^^ppo.
Ocbberl918.
Inscription cut on the rock cliffs of tlie Dog River, near Beirut, amongst those
of Rameses II, Nebuchadnezar, Senacherib and other early conquerors of Syria.
CHAPTER XXIV
HORSE ARTILLERY
Command. — Of all the matters concerning the employ-
ment of horse artillery which came under discussion
during the campaign, none was more important than
the vexed question of command.
The cavalry brigadier is naturally eager to have
a battery attached to him permanently, and con-
sidered as part of his brigade. Apart from the con-
viction that a battery always on hand and under his
own orders will be of more value to him than one
over which he has no direct control, there is the feel-
ing that the battery rounds off his command, and
makes it, in effect, a miniature army, complete with
all modern conveniences. If the powers that be
would only throw in a couple of armoured cars and
a private aeroplane, the cavalry brigadier would be
the happiest man on earth !
Most R.H.A. battery commanders will agree with
the brigadiers. Attached to a brigade, the battery
commander is freer and more independent, and gets,
perhaps, more of the ' fun of the fair ' and less of
the drudgery than he does when acting as a divi-
sional unit.
In spite of these opinions, however, the hard facts
of this campaign go to prove that our guns invariably
rendered more efficient aid to the cavalry they were
supporting when employed under the orders of the
divisional commander than when attached to brigades.
The divisional commander must always know more
303
304 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
of the fortunes of the battle than any of his brigadiers,
and is thus generally in the better position to decide
where artillery support is most needed. Moreover,
if each battery is attached to a brigade, and acting
under the orders of a brigadier, each brigade can
only receive the support of one battery. But there
are occasions, in most engagements, when one bri-
gade needs all the artillery support available, while
another, in reserve, or not yet heavily engaged,
requires none. If the control of the artillery is left
to one individual, fire can be concentrated quickly
in support of those brigades or regiments that are
most in need of it, and no gun is ever idle. There
were one or two lamentable instances, in the 1917
operations, of a brigade remaining in reserve all day
with its attached battery sleeping peacefully beside it.
The actions of Summeil in the 1917 operations and
of Kaukab in 1918 may be taken as fair illustrations
of the employment of artillery as a divisional unit.
That of Jisr Benat Yakub in 1918 was an example of
the principle of attaching each battery to a brigade.
With the small, three-brigade cavalry division of
the present day the former arrangement will prac-
tically always yield better results than the latter.
Direct artillery liaison should, of course, be main-
tained between the divisional artillery commander
and each brigade, if it is at all possible to do so.
Reserves, — There were, in the early days of the cam-
paign, indications of an idea on the part of.^ome
commanders that a certain proportion of the artillery
should be held in reserve, in the same way as a
brigade or regiment. This idea probably arose from
the fact that one of the essential differences between
artillery and other arms had been overlooked. When
once a brigade or regiment has been committed to an
attack, in a moving battle, and is in contact with
HORSE ARTILLERY 305
the enemy, it can seldom be easily withdrawn in
order to be transferred to another part of the field.
Guns, on the other hand, do not come into direct
contact with the enemy^ — at least the gunners try
their best to avoid doing so ! They can, therefore,
as a rule, be withdrawn without dijBficulty, if their
services are required elsewhere. All guns in action
may thus, in a sense, be said to be in reserve, since
they can readily be moved to another part of the
field if required. Except, therefore, for the purposes
of conserving ammunition, guns sliould rarely be
unemployed during the progress of an action.
Artillery with Advance and Rearguards.— At the
beginning of the campaign, most divisional com-
manders, when moving with one brigade as
advance guard, allotted one battery to it. As the
operations progressed, however, the view that a
larger force of artillery might profitably accompany
the advance guard began to gain ground. The ex-
perience of the whole campaign points to the con-
clusion that, in view of the small number of guns
available in a cavalry division, two of the three
batteries should normally accompany the advance
guard brigade. The practice may be open to the
objections that it makes the advance guard column
unduly long, and that some risk is involved in leaving
the main body so short of artillery. Both these
objections appear, however, to be outweighed by
the advantages of having a large proportion of the
artillery in front. Whether the enemy's resistance
is stubborn or feeble, artillery fire can assist in
breaking it, and the greater the number of guns
available, the quicker will that object be achieved,
and the less delay will there be to the advance of
the main body.
The battery or batteries with the advance guard
u
306 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
should, of course, march as far forward as is com-
patible with safety. Guns must always take longer
than cavalry to move a given distance, and, if they
are well to the front, no time will be lost in getting
them into the only formation in which they are of
any use, i.e. in action.
The divisional artillery commander should accom-
pany the vanguard commander. When contact is
established with the enemy, he is then on the spot,
and able to make a personal reconnaissance at once,
and decide, subject to the orders of the advance
guard commander, how his guns can best and most
quickly assist the cavalry. No time will then be
lost in getting the guns into action. In the final
series of operations, the enemy was in too demoralised
a state for his action to form a very reliable guide in
future wars, but it was found that vigorous artillery
fire, delivered immediately after the first coritact of our
cavalry with his rearguards, invariably exercised a
powerfully adverse effect on his morale. The little
action of Kaukab well exemplifies this fact.
The above remarks as to artillery with the advance
guard apply with equal force, mutatis mutandis, to
the artillery of a rearguard during a retirement.
Escorts. — The campaign afforded few opportunities
on our side to test the efficacy of artillery escorts.
The action at Huj, however, in November 1917, was an
excellent example of bad escort work on the part of
the enemy. Our gunners have always maintained
that the role of an escort is to obtain information
rather than to afford protection. Guns on the march
are vulnerable to a sudden attack, especially from
cavalry ; in action they are, or should be, well able
to take care of themselves. If this contention is
right, it follows that escorts need not be large, and
should not be kept near the guns, but should patrol
HORSE ARTILLERY 307
the country in any quarter from which attack may
be expected, search dead ground, woods, etc., and
give early information to the guns of the approach
of the enemy.
At Huj the enemy had two battahons of infantry
and several machine guns disposed about his batteries,
but he had not a single patrol pushed out to the east.
Our cavalry were thus able to approach to within
800 yards of the position of the guns unseen and
unsuspected. The result of the Turks' negUgence
was a severe disaster, and it is to be hoped that the
lesson will not be thrown away on future commanders
of artillery escorts in the British Army. The escort
work in our cavahy in Palestine and Syria was
almost invariably very good, especially amongst the
Australians.
R.H.A, Howitzers. — Most officers, both of the
R.H.A. and the cavalry, who served in Syria,
agreed as to the desirability of having a few light
howitzers attached to each cavalry division. Such
a gun as the 3 '7 -inch mountain howitzer, if
it could be mounted on a suitable field carriage,
would be admirably adapted for use with cavalry.
Had a few howitzers been available during the
attack on Beersheba, the stone block-houses and
the rocky sangars of Tel el Saba would soon have
been rendered untenable by the enemy, and would
not have delayed our advance as they did.
As to whether two guns in each six-gun battery
should be replaced by howitzers, or a separate battery
of four howitzers should be provided for each divi-
sion, opinion varied amongst the gunners on the
spot. The writer is strongly in favour of the latter
alternative, as being simpler, and in conformity with
the existing practice in field artillery.
Shrapnel and H.E. — The question of the best
308 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
proportions of shrapnel and high explosive shell
to be carried in a horse artillery battery came
under discussion at various times during the
campaign, and opinions varied according to the
nature of fighting in progress at the time. Amongst
the rocks of the hill country, most battery com-
manders preferred a large preponderance of H.E.,
while, in open country, they wanted more shrapnel.
One thing certain is that the Turks themselves
di'eaded the former far more than the latter. On
several occasions enemy officer prisoners told the
writer that they always had greater difficulty in
getting their men to attack through H.E. shell fire
than through shrapnel, even though, as they averred,
the latter invariably caused them more casualties
than the former. As before remarked, the behaviour
of the Tm^ks was not a very reliable guide for future
wars, but it is to be noted that the same aversion
to H.E. shell was observed amongst the Germans,
and even amongst our own troops.
There seems little doubt, therefore, that the moral
effect of H.E. is much greater than that of shrapnel.
If this be so, R.H.A. 13-pounder guns, whose lethal
effect is so comparatively small, should be provided
with a large proportion of it. The writer suggests,
on the experience of this campaign, that the due
proportion lies somewhere between 50 and 75 per
cent, of the total ammunition carried.
General. — The batteries serving with the Desert
Mounted Corps, being Territorial units, had each only
four guns. There is no doubt that cavalry divisions
with four-gun batteries are seriously under-gunned,
and it is satisfactory to note that, under the new
Territorial War Estabhshments, all R.H.A. batteries
are to have six guns.
Before leaving the subject of artillery, the writer
HORSE ARTILLERY 309
would draw attention to a fact that is often over-
looked by cavalrymen. It is that, with the best
will in the world, and the best of horsemanship and
driving, guns cannot move as fast as cavalry. There
were several instances during the campaign where a
brigade, detached with a battery on some special
duty, pushed along very fast for several miles,
clashed with the enemy, and then reproached the
gunners for not being on the spot to help. It is
often forgotten that the artillery draught horse has
to carry nearly the same weight as a cavalryman's
and, at the same time, do his share in dragging along,
' over hill over dale, thorough bush, thorough briar,' a
clumsy mass of steel weighing a ton and a half.
A consideration of this fact leads to the conclu-
sion that, if guns are to keep up with cavalry when
moving fast and far, certain advantages must be
allowed them.
In the first place orders should reach the artillery
early, in order to enable it to get on the move before
the cavalry start, when the situation allows.
On the move, guns should march close to the head
of the column. This order of march is also desirable
from the fighting point of view, as has been pointed
out above. The advisability of keeping the guns
well to the front was generally recognised towards
the end of the campaign, but, in the early days,
there was a tendency to keep them too far back.
If there is a shortage of water or forage, the
artillery horses should be the last to suffer from it.
Though the writer happens to be a gunner, these
remarks are not set down as a special appeal on
behalf of the artillery, but in the belief that, only by
giving to the guns some such special privileges, will
they be able to do the work that is required of them.
Horse guns are the servants of cavalry as field guns
310 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
are of infantry, but, unless the servant is adequately
fed and looked after, he cannot serve his master
properly.
Needless to say, if a cavalry commander con-
siders that he can carry out the task assigned to him
without the help of his guns, and time presses, he is
perfectty justified in pushing on at once with his
cavalry, and leaving the guns to follow as best they
can, as was done, quite properly, by the 5th Cavalry
Division when crossing the Carmel Range in Sep-
tember 1918.
CHAPTER XXV
HORSES
One of the greatest difficulties with which the cavalry-
had to contend throughout the operations arose
from the constant struggle to keep the horses suffi-
ciently fit to carry on. This is, of course, always the
case in war time, but the difficulties in the Syrian
campaign were probably greater than in any previous
one in which the British Army had taken part.
Climate. — To begin with, the climate encountered
included every extreme of heat, cold, drought, and
rain. For the first three weeks from the commence-
ment of the 1917 campaign, the weather was extremely
hot, the temperature running up to 110° in the shade.
For two days, November the 10th and 11th, matters
were rendered worse by a burning hot east wind,
which raised clouds of suffocating dust. Then the
rains broke, and, for the next six weeks, constant
wet, deep mud and piercing cold winds were the
order of the day. After a short period of good
weather, the cavalry moved to the Jordan Valley,
where they spent the summer of 1918, under condi-
tions of heat and discomfort which have already
been described. Finally, in the following winter,
the horses found themselves sometimes standing in
six inches of snow.^
Condition. — In the second place, the health of the
^ Snow lay on the ground in the Baalbek-Rayak area for a considerable
part of the winter, and on the western side of the Lebanon, in the
Beirut-Tripoli area, for short periods from time to time.
311
312 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
horses was in an unsatisfactory state when the
cavahy operations commenced.
Whatever their outward appearance might have
been, and it varied considerably in different units,
their internal condition was by no means good. The
great bulk of them liad taken part in the advance
across Sinai, and had been in Egypt for a long time
prior to that. Two years of unaccustomed and in-
different forage, added to the large quantities of
sand they had consumed in their food while in the
desert, had more or less permanently injured their
digestive organs. It is true that sand cohc, that
scourge of the desert, had almost ceased to trouble
the force by the end of the summer of 1917, but the
dire effects of the sand were evident in every post-
mortem. In a large number of cases the membrane
of the stomach and intestines was freely marked with
the scars of old ulcers, and in some instances large
portions of it had sloughed away. Sand muzzles
were almost universally employed up to the com-
mencement of the advance on Beersheba, but it was
impossible to prevent sand getting into the forage ;
indeed quantities of it had been purposely placed
there by the dishonest native merchants, in order
to increase the weight of bales and sacks.
It is probable that 90 per cent, of the draught
horses of the artillery and transport had strained
their hearts to some extent during the terrible work
in the heavy sands of the desert. The writer carried
out, or was present at, upwards of twenty post-
mortems on draught horses that died during the
advance across Sinai, and, in every case, found an
enlargement of the heart greater than could possibly
be accounted for by the age of the horse. In one
instance, the wall of the heart was ruptured right
through. This horse had been led four miles back
HORSES 313
to camp after first showing signs of extreme distress.
On arriving in camp he drank well, ate a bran mash,
and lived for six hours afterwards, a wonderful
example of endurance.
The experience of the campaign proved that horses
cannot be in too ' big ' condition at the commence-
ment of operations, provided they have been kept
adequately exercised while being conditioned. The
really fat, round horses finished both series of opera-
tions in better condition than those which had looked
harder and more muscular, but not so fat, at the
beginning. This was especially the case in the first
series, during which the shortage of water was so
acute.
Forage. — During both campaigns the forage was
of very poor quality and woefully scanty. Up to
the commencement of the 1917 operations, the daily
issue had consisted of 10 lb. of barley, gram or maize
and 10 lb. of tibben (chopped barley straw) and
bursym (a kind of hay made of a coarse species of
lucerne, of good feeding value and much liked by
the horses). The food value of the whole daily ration
was about 23 per cent, below that of an average
horse in England doing the same work. The barley
and tibben, being produced in Egypt, were very
dusty, and contained a large proportion of earth and
small stones. The gram and maize were of fair
quahty, but the latter was sometimes issued whole,
and, when issued crushed, was often very dusty.
The daily ration during operations in both campaigns
was 9J lb. of grain per day, and nothing else. So
that the horses were called upon to do very much
harder work on less than haK the amount of food to
which they had been accustomed, and only about
36 per cent, of the normal ration for such horses in
England.
314 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
For the first month of the 1917 campaign this ration
was exclusively gram. As the horses had previously
only been accustomed to a small proportion of this
grain in their daily feeds, it caused them to scour
badl}^ thus increasing the weakness engendered by
hard work and starvation. It is difficult to under-
stand why gram was decided upon in preference to
barley, of which there was plenty available, but,
at all events, the lesson was taken to heart, and, for
the remainder of the campaign, the marching ration
was always barley.
From the 25th September 1918 till the cavalry
left the country in November 1919, all forage was
bought locaUy. It was generally of good quality,
and there was a certain amount of grazing available.
Water. — The water difficulties during* the 1917
operations have been referred to before. Prior to
this campaign it was generally accepted that cavalry
horses could continue to work for a maximum period
of about sixty hours without water, after which it
would be necessary to give them some days' rest;
Arab ponies were thought to be able to last about
ten hours longer. During the Darfur Campaign,
KeUy Pasha ^ marched ninety miles in three nights
and two days with a mounted infantry regiment
equipped with the hardy little mules of Abyssinia.
All these estimates were proved to have been erroneous.
It has already been pointed out that one battery of
the Corps marched and fought for nine consecutive
days, during which period its horses were only watered
three times,- and this was no isolated example. Even
when water was obtainable, the difficulty of raising
1 Brigadier-General P. J. V. KeUy, C.M.G., D.S.O., commanded
oth Mounted Brigade in 1917 operations and 13th Cavalry Brigade in
1918
- See p. 94.
HORSES 315
it from very deep wells, and the pressing need for
haste, often resulted in many horses being unable
to drink their fill.
During the advance across the Sinai desert a
number of experiments had been carried out, both
by the Royal Army Veterinary Corps and by the
commanders of different units, with a view to ascer-
taining whether horses would do better, under the
existing conditions, with two drinks a day or three.
The usual plan was to select a large number of horses
of the same type and of about equal condition, and
put half of these on two waterings and half on three.
The result of these experiments was conclusively in
favour of the two drinks a day. Not only did the
horses on this regime improve in condition quicker
than those which were watered three times, but it
was proved by actual measurement that they drank
more water in the day. By the time the force
arrived at El Arish, watering twice a day was gene-
rally accepted as the standard.
Later on, during the period between the second
battle of Gaza and the commencement of General
AUenby's operations (May to October 1917 inclu-
sive) many of the horses of the cavalry division in
the line had so far to go for water that they could
only be watered once a day. It is probable that
this resulted in some loss of condition, though, as
there were other contributory causes, such as the
periodical long reconnaissances, the heat, dust and
flies, it is not possible to apportion the blame exactly.
During operations, so long as the horses got water
once a day, they kept fairly fit, and, given anything
in the nature of bulk food, such as might be got in
many countries by grazing, there seemed no reason
why they should not have been able to continue
indefinitely on this regime. During the Beersheba-
316 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
Jerusalem operations, however, the average number
of waterings per horse in the Corps was only one
every thirty-six hours.
During the 1918 campaign there was no lack of
water, except for the few days during which the
4th Cavalry Division was advancing on Damascus
east of the Jordan. At all other times, water was
always available for horses at least once a day.
When marching in waterless country, the writer
used to have a large biscuit tin full of water (or,
better still, a petrol tin, when it could be ' acquired ')
carried on the dash-board of every gun and wagon.
At each hourly halt the horses' mouths, nostrils, and
eyes used to be wiped with a wet — not merely damp —
cloth, and this always seemed to refresh them greatly,
and to relieve the symptoms of distress due to thirst.
A little water was also mixed with the feeds, and,
when the grain was crushed, or there was any bran
available, it was found that horses which were off
their feed owing to exhaustion would often eat well
if fed by hand with small balls made of grain shghtly
moistened with water. This plan was suggested to
the writer by the late Brigadier-General Paul Kenna,
V.C., 21st Lancers, who had used it successfully in
the Sudan Campaign.
Much has been said and written about the ability
of horses to scent water afar off. The experience of
this campaign seems to prove that this ability does
not extend to water in deep wells, even when the
supply is plentiful. There were many instances of
horses, which had been without water for a long
period, passing quite close to wells, without evincing
any signs of knowledge of the proximity of water.
That they can, and do, scent water lying in large
pools or rivers was made clear on several occasions,
but this power was shared by many of the Australian
HORSES 317
soldiers and by a few Englishmen. Brigadier-General
Grant, Commanding the 4th A.L.H. Brigade, a noted
' bushman,' had this useful sense highly developed.
The ' sensation ' of water, once experienced, is quite
unmistakable, though it is difficult to describe. The
sense of smell undoubtedly plays a part, but the
sensation is more one of a sudden freshness and sweet-
ness of the atmosphere than a scent. It is notice-
able particularly just after sunset, when the pre-
sence of water lying in pools may often be detected
several miles away. Unfortunately, damp ground,
from which water has recently evaporated, produces
the same sensation, and frequently deceived horses
as well as men.
Remounts. — The last horses shipped to Egypt
arrived in May or June 1917, and most of these were
issued to units before the commencement of the
Beersheba-Gaza operations. From that date till the
end of the war, no more horses arrived in the country ;
8000 remounts, which had been bought by the
British Government in Australia, could never be
moved, owing to the shortage of shipping. When
the stock of remounts in Palestine was exhausted,
casualties were replaced by horses that had already
seen service, and had been sent, sick or wounded, to
remount hospitals, and reissued as soon as the}^
were reasonably fit for further work. At the com-
mencement of the advance in September 1918 the
remount depots were emptied, and there was scarcely
a single fit horse left behind the fighting troops.
Such remounts as reached the country, nearly all
from Australia or Canada, were of a good type, sound
and reliable. The depots were admirably managed,
and the whole remount service was a model of effici-
ency.
Some 1500 Arab ponies and a considerable number
318 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
of mules and camels were captured from the Turks
in 1917. They were nearly all in wretched condi-
tion and covered with galls, but, after being well
fed and looked after for a few weeks, fetched the
most astonishing prices. £50 was the average price
paid at Jerusalem for a pony, £40 for a small mule,
and £35 for a camel. We were able to make use of
the camels, and a few of the stouter ponies were
issued to the infantry as ' cobs,' but the great majority
of ponies and mules were of no use to us. During
the 1918 operations about 2000 enemy animals fell
into our hands, and these realised even higher prices
in northern S3iTia and the Lebanon.
Horsemastership. — In the early days in Egypt the
standard of horsemastership was not high. Among
the English troops there was a large proportion in
the mounted branches, both of officers and men, who
had had little previous experience of horses, and
none at all under the severe conditions of active
service. The Australian Light Horsemen, though
fine riders and thoroughly experienced with horses,
were unaccustomed to having to use the same horse
day after day, and did not at first realise the necessity
of saving their mounts in every possible way, e.g. by
dismounting at every halt, however short, off-
saddling whenever possible, etc. But they have the
same, almost instinctive, love of horses as the Irish,
and they very soon realised the difference between
active service conditions and those in their own
country. The Territorials, too, gained valuable ex-
perience during the advance across Sinai and in the
Western Desert, and, by the time General AUenby
arrived in Egjrpt, the standard of horsemastership
in the force had reached a high level. As an indica-
tion of this fact, it may be mentioned that, at the
end of each series of operations, there was hardly a
HORSES 319
sore back in the force. A striking contrast to this
record was afforded by the French cavalry regi-
ment which took part in the 1918 operations. On
arrival at Damascus, nearly every horse in the regi-
ment had a sore back. The Frenchmen carried an
astonishing quantity of kit on their saddles, and,
though it was all put on in a very neat and soldier-
like manner, the weight was undoubtedly far too
great. Owing to the difficulty of removing the
saddle without taking off all this kit, the horses
were scarcely ever off-saddled. The men, too, were
far too prone to remain mounted when halted.
Type. — Some remarks on type have already been
made in Chapter viii. The experience of the latter
part of the campaign served but to confirm the
conclusion as to the superiority of well-bred, fairly
lightly-built horses over those of coarser fibre. Well-
bred horses will go farther and faster, eat less, and
recover condition more quickly than the coarse-bred
ones. In this connection, when is the dismal prac-
tice of subdividing the horses of a battery into
' Riders ' and ' Draught Horses ' going to be aban-
doned ? Every gunner wants to have practically
nothing but light draught horses, so that every
horse in the battery shall be capable of taking its
turn in a gun team if necessary. The result of
classifying nearly half the horses in a horse artillery
battery as ' riders ' too often results in all the weedy,
fifteen hand ponies in the remount depots being
issued to the gunners. Such horses are even more
useless in a battery than they would be in a cavalry
regiment. In the latter they might carry a trumpeter ;
in the former even the trumpeter's horse is expected
to be able to take his turn in draught. On more
than one occasion in 1917 even officers' chargers
were used in the teams.
320 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
Diseases. — The horses of the Corps were remark-
ably free from disease. In the summer of 1918 there
were a few sporadic cases of anthrax. The disease is
found here and there among the native horses and
cattle all over Palestine. The spores are deposited
on the ground by the infected animals, with the result
that there is always a danger of picking it up. Prompt
destruction of all horses affected with the disease,
and the removal to a fresh piece of ground of the
unit in which the case occurred, leaving the old
ground clearly labelled as ' unclean,' prevented any
outbreak of the disease. Except for these few cases,
there was an almost entire absence of disease through-
out the campaign, which may be considered some-
what remarkable, in view of the fact that glanders,
antlirax, lymphangitis, and other diseases are rife
among the beasts of the native population. Our
immunity from these scourges may be attributed to
the facts that our horses were seldom camped for
long in the same place ; that they were never camped
near villages if it could be avoided ; and that no
native animals were ever allowed in or near our
camps, or to drink where our horses drank.
The 5th Cavalry Division suffered somewhat from
laminitis in September 1918, as a result of the rather
unnecessarily fast pace the division had set on the
morning of the 19th. Thirty or forty horses had
to be destroyed on the following day. Neither of
the other two divisions, however, had any trouble
of this sort.
Equipment. — Leather muzzles proved a necessity
in all units whose horses were picketed on ropes
stretched between wagon wheels instead of on
ground lines. Otherwise the hungry brutes ate the
woodwork of the wheels voraciously. It was only
necessary to muzzle the two or three horses picketed
HORSES 321
next to the wheels. The nostril holes of the service
pattern muzzle are much too small, and should be
enlarged downwards and outwards to an oval shape
at least tln-ee inches long.
The steel wire picketing ropes issued toi the
artillery were very much superior in every way to
the old pattern hemp ropes, whether 5 feet 9 inch
or 66 feet. It is suggested that the 5 feet 9 inch
ropes, with loop and toggle, and the heel peg ropes
might also in future be made of wire instead of hemp.
The wire rope is much stronger and no heavier, and
is not so hkely to gall horses that get their feet over
it. The great objection to it is, of course, its high
initial cost, but against this may be set the fact that
it is practically indestructible, and lasts indefinitely.
Active service head ropes might also be made of wire
with a spring hook at each end. A few raw hide
head ropes were issued at one time, and these were
excellent, except for the fact that the horses ate them
wholesale when really hungry.
In the Australian Light Horse regiments neither
manes nor tails were ever cut or pulled. During
operations there was little time to care for manes
and tails, and they looked somewhat untidy, but
there is no doubt that in a hot country, it is prefer-
able to let them grow freely. Not only does a mane
assist the horse to rid itself of flies, but it appears to
give some protection from the fierce rays of the sun,
and a long thick tail is unquestionably a very great
blessing to a horse in a fly country.
CHAPTER XXVI
TRANSPORT AND AMMUNITION SUPPLY
The advance to Damascus and Aleppo in September
and October 1918 proved with what a small amount
of transport cavalry can operate, when local supplies
are available. As already explained, during this
advance no transport accompanied the divisions,
except ammunition wagons and a few motor ambu-
lance cars.
The opportunities for cavalry making a raid such
a great distance into enemy country have seldom
occurred in the past, and are hkely to become even
more rare in the future. When they do occur,
however, the experience of this campaign points to
the conclusion that there can be few countries in
which cavalry can operate as such effectively, where
they would not be able to dispense almost entirely
with transport. The fact that mounted troops
can move freely, denotes that the country is not
excessively mountainous, and is, therefore (excluding
desert land), more or less cultivated, thus providing
food for man and horse. It must be remembered
that much of the country through which the cavalry
passed between the 25th of September and the 28th
of October is poorly cultivated, and all of it had been
mercilessly laid under requisition by the Turks and
Germans for the supply of their armies. Yet it was
found possible to secure food and forage for three
cavalry divisions, a total of nearly 20,000 men and
322
TRANSPORT AND AMMUNITION SUPPLY 323
a similar number of horses, without extreme diffi-
culty, and without in any way depriving the in-
habitants of essential food.
If, however, the country through which it is pro-
posed to advance is incapable of supporting the force,
sufficient transport must be taken to carry supplies
for such a number of days as may be requisite. The
pace of the cavalry will then be, to a great extent,
Umited by the pace of their transport, and for this
reason every effort should be made to increase the
mobiUty of cavalry transport vehicles.
Vehicles. — At the beginning of the 1917 operations
the cavalry ammunition columns and supply trains
were equipped partly with G.S. and partly with
limbered G.S. wagons. During the subsequent opera-
tions, both at the beginning, when movement took
place over a sandy or dusty plain, and later on, when
the whole country was a sea of mud, and vast areas
were under water, the G.S. wagons were constantly
in trouble. The experience of the whole campaign
was overwhelmingly in favour of the L.G.S. wagon.
The sole advantage of the G.S. wagon Ues in its greater
capacity for carrying bulky loads. For this reason
it is very suitable for use in barracks or standing
camps, where such stuff as hay, straw, etc., have to
be carried. As regards weight, however, the L.G.S.
wagon holds its own against the G.S. on roads, and
is superior in roadless or hilly country. That is to
say, the L.G.S. wagon, with two men and four horses,
can, in such country, carry more than two-thirds of
the load possible for the G.S. wagon, with its three
drivers and six horses. Further, the lower centre
of gravity, four large wheels and much greater lock
angle of the former, enables it to cross country over
which the latter cannot move at all. One advan-
tage claimed for the G.S. type is that the wagon body
324 THE DESEUT MOUNTED CORPS
is supposed to be capable of being used as a pontoon.
The writer has tried it as such, in peace time, and
his experience has decided him that he would rather
swim.
The above remarks are, of course, to be taken as
applying to cavalry transport only.
There is one weakness in the L.G.S. wagon which
is commended to the notice of the Royal Ordnance
Corps. The bolt which fastens the wagon body on
to the carriage passes through the axle. Towards
the end of the campaign, after several years' hard
and continuous work, a number of these axles began
to break, and always at tlie place where the bolt
passed through them. It is suggested that, in
future manufacture, the fastening might consist of
a steel collar over the axle, instead of a bolt
through it.
Horses. — The remarks on type, which have been
made with regard to the cavalry riding horse, apply
with equal force to the cavahy draught horse. Many
of our English draught animals were of far too heavy
a type, either for horse artillery or for cavalry trans-
port. It is sometimes argued that a proportion of
heavy horses is very useful when wagons begin to
get stuck in boggy places. But it is not much use
having these equine Samsons at all, if they are not
available at the time their services are required. And
this is what invariably happens. Nothing in the
nature of a cart horse can Hve with cavalry in a
march of forty miles, and, in this campaign, there
was one of over ninety miles on end, and marches of
forty, fifty and sixty miles were comparatively
common. If heavy horses are forced to keep up
with cavalry over such distances, they very soon
give up the unequal fight and die ; if they are allowed
to go their own pace, they are a day's march in rear
t
«^l
TRANSPORT AND AMMUNITION SUPPLY 325
at the end of twenty-four hours, and the transport
thus requu*es an escort of a size that can ill be spared
from the fighting forces.
Another advantage of having a lighter-built, better-
bred type of horse for transport, is that they then
form a reserve for the cavahy. In the artillery it is
the rule for riding and draught horses to change
places frequently, thus resting both kinds in turn.
This custom might profitably be employed occasion-
ally in the cavalry.
The Austrahans have an admirable type of cavalry
draught horse : 15 to 15.2 hands high, short-backed,
well-coupled, and showing a good deal of breeding.
The disappearance from our English roads first of
the coaches and then of the horse-drawn buses,
has deprived us almost entirely of our once fine type
of light draught horse, and it seems as if we shaU, in
the future, have to depend more and more on the
Dominions for our supply of such horses. There
were a certain number of Canadian horses in the
Corps transport. They were hard and sound, but
of a coarser type, with heavier shoulders and less
handy than those from Australia.
Other transport ayiimals. — At different times, camels,
mules, and donkeys were used by the cavalry for
transport purposes. The first named are, of course,
entirely unsuitable, except for work in the desert,
but, as we had some 30,000 of them in our posses-
sion in 1917, a legacy from Sinai, and there was a
shortage of other transport, they were largely used
during the 1917 operations. No attempt was made
to keep up, or even near, the cavahy on the march,
but the camels worked in a system of convoys along
defined routes, forming dumps behind the advancing
line of cavahy, from which the divisional trains drew
supphes. The uselessness and danger of camels in
»
326 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
mountainous country was convincingly demonstrated
in the mountains of Judaea and in the two trans-
Jordan raids, and, after the second of these, the
Imperial Camel Corps Brigade was disbanded, and
the cavalry saw no more of the patient but unlovable
beasts that had worked for them for more than two
years.
Mules were in use in the transport to a certain
extent all through the campaign, but the experience
of the 1917 operations led to their being replaced
by horses in all transport that was required to keep
up with the cavalry. Their hardihood, soundness,
and remarkable freedom from disease, no less than
their patience and docility, render them admirable
for infantry transport, and even, possibly, for field
artillery, but they suffer from the serious disability,
from the cavalry or horse artillery point of view,
that they cannot go the pace. Left to themselves,
they can march indefinitely, but, if pushed along
faster than their natural gait, they rapidly lose con-
dition, and soon become so debihtated as to be well-
nigh useless. As this natural pace is slower than
that of horses, they must always be pushed when
acting with cavalry, and this fact renders them un-
suitable for use with mounted troops.
Donkeys were first used in supply convoys in the
Judsean Hills in the winter of 1917, some 400 being
sent up from Egypt for this purpose. They did most
excellent work, supplying the troops in the fine at
a time when there were no roads available. They
are admirably adapted for such special work, being
small, hardy, and easily handled, and requiring no
attention. For any other purpose they are, of
course, not to be seriously considered. Owing to
the chronic shortage of horses in the country, those
details of regiments who did not usually accompany
«
TRANSPORT AND AMMUNITION SUPPLY 327
their units into action were, in 1917, given donkeys
to ride. There were about half a dozen in each
cavah-y regiment or similar unit. Most of these
were gradually exchanged for Arab ponies captured
from the enemy, but a few carried on right through
the campaign, up to the capture of Aleppo. How
they kept up through some of the long marches of
%
328 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
1918, carrying a heavy man and all his kit, is a
mystery, but they contrived to do so somehow.
Ammunitioyi. — Prior to the commencement of the
1917 operations in Palestine, the amount of small
arm ammunition laid down to be carried in a cavalry
divisional ammunition column was 250,000 rounds
per brigade, or 1,000,000 in the column for the four-
brigade divisions of that time. This was a ridicu-
lously over-large amount. On the other hand, the
amount of gun ammunition was very small. Indeed
the divisional column commander who said that he
carried in his column three weeks' supply for the
small arms and three hours' for the guns, can scarcely
be accused of hyperbole.
After the second battle of Gaza, during which the
cavalry were engaged all daj^ long dismounted, in a
very heavy fire fight, it was found that, after replenish-
ing the regimental reserves, only about one-sixth of
the small arm ammunition in the divisional ammuni-
tion columns had been issued. The guns, on the
other hand, had expended nearly three times the
total quantity of ammunition carried in the column.
As a result of this action, the whole question of
ammunition supply was considered afresh, and the
columns were reorganised with an establishment of
200 rounds of shell per gun, and 120,000 of small arm
ammunition per brigade, calculated as to 84,000
rounds for the machine gun squadron and 12,000
rounds for each regiment. These proportions worked
satisfactorily, though the gun ammunition might
still be somewhat increased, even at the expense of
the small arms. The result of the whole series of
operations seems to point to the fact that an estab-
Hshment of 100,000 rounds of small arm ammunition
per brigade, or 300,000 per division, and 250 rounds
of gun ammunition per gun, or 4500 for a division,
J"
TRANSPORT AND AMMUNITION SUPPLY 329
would form the best proportion. This would give
a total of 442 rounds of shell per gun, carried in the
field, not an unduly large amount for a modern,
quick-firing gun, when it is remembered that Napoleon
considered that the muzzle-loading, slow-firing field
pieces of his day should be suppUed with not less
than 300 rounds apiece.
Loads. — The weights laid down in the 1914 War
Establishments to be carried both in G.S. and L.G.S.
wagons were found to be only suitable for transport
accompanying infantry along well-metalled roads.
After the second battle of Gaza, a new load table
was drawn up empirically. A series of experi-
ments, carried out just prior to the commencement
of the Beersheba operations, demonstrated that even
these reduced loads were far too heavy for G.S.
wagons in such country. Unfortunately these experi-
ments were ignored, and the G.S. wagons started the
operations with the loads as laid down in the new
tables. The result was that, during the march from
the Shellal area to Khalasa, the G.S. wagons were
strewn over twenty miles of country, and some 200
camels had to be requisitioned at short notice from
the supply columns to lighten the wagons.
After the fall of Beersheba, the G.S. wagons of the
divisional ammunition column were taken over by
the Corps, as already narrated, and they took no
further part in the operations until they rejoined
their respective divisions on the 19th November.
As a result of the 1917 series of operations, the
load question was again reviewed, and the following
loads were decided upon.
G.S. wagons, 23 boxes of 13-pounder gun ammuni-
tion or 26 boxes of smaU arm ammunition, a total
load behind the 6 horses of about 35 cwt.
L.G.S. wagons, 16 boxes of gun or 18 boxes of
330 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
small arm ammunition, a total load behind the 4
horses of about 24 cwt.
These loads were proved by considerable subse-
quent experience to be the maximum with which
wagons could operate efficiently with cavahy in
such country. It is to be remarked that practically
no sandy country was encountered after the fall of
Beersheba, but the unmetalled tracks along which
the transport had to march were, in the winters of
1917 and 1918, often almost impassable owing to the
mud.
Before leaving the subject of ammunition supply,
attention should be drawn to the vital necessity of
cavah-y regiments replenishing their regimental reserve
of small arm ammunition from the ammunition
column every clay. Obvious as this duty may appear,
it is one that is frequently neglected, especially
during a time of long marches. It frequently
happened that, in spite of repeated applications, the
ammunition column commanders could not get in-
dents from the regiments for days at a time. Such
delays were often followed by sudden demands for
the immediate supply of a large quantity of ammuni-
tion, which, perhaps, was not all available at the
moment. There ensued mutual recriminations, and
much extra work for the tired horses of both the
columns and the regimental ammunition wagons, all
of which might have been avoided by more fore-
thought and attention to detail.
APPENDIX I
(a) THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
When the Desert Mounted Corps officially came into
being, it was constituted as follows : —
Commander : Lieutenant-Greneral Sir Harry Chauvel, K.C.B.,
K.C.M.G., Australian Imperial Forces.
AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED
DIVISION (ANZAC).
Commander : Major-General Sir E. W. C. Chaytor, K.C.M.G.,
C.B,, p.s.c, A.D.C., New Zealand Imperial
Forces.
1st Australian Light Horse Brigade.
Commander : Brigadier-Greneral C. F. Cox, C.B., C.M.G.,
D.S.O., A.I.F.
1st, 2nd, and 3rd Regiments Australian light Horse.
2nd x4lustratjan Light Horse Brigade.
Commander : Brigadier-General G. de L. Ryrie, C.B., C.M.G.,
A.I.F.
5th, 6th, and 7th Regiments AustraUan Light Horse.
New Zealand Mounted Brigade.
Commander : Brigadier-GeneralW.Meldrum,C.M.G.,D.S.O.,
N.Z.I.F.
Auckland, Canterbury, and Wellington Regiments of
Mounted Rifles.
ARTILLERY.
18th Brigade R.HA. (Inverness, Ayrshire, and
Somerset Batteries) and Divisional Ammunition
Column.
?3l
332 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
YEOMANRY DIVISION.
Commander : Major-General Sir G. de S. Barrow, K.C.M.G.,
C.B., p.s.c, Indian Army.
6th Mounted Brigade.
Commander : Brigadier-General C.A.C. Godwin, D.S.O., I.A.
Dorset, Bucks, and Berks Yeomanry Regiments.
8th Mounted Brigade.
Commander : Brigadier-Greneral C. S. Rome, D.S.O.
1st City of London and 1st and 3rd County of London
Yeomanry Regiments.
22nd Mounted Brigade.
Commander : Brigadier-General F. A. B. Fryer (relinquished
command December 1917).
Brigadier-General P. D. FitzGerald, D.S.O,,
p.s.c.
Stafford, Lincoln, and East Riding Yeomanry Regiments.
ARTILLERY.
20th Brigade R.H.A. (Berks, Hants, and Leicester
Batteries) and Divisional Ammunition Column.
AUSTRALIAN MOUNTED DIVISION.
Commander : Major-General Sir H. W. Hodgson, K.C.M.G.,
C.V.O., C.B.
3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade.
Commander : Brigadier-General L. C. Wilson, C.M.G.,
D.S.O., A.I.F.
8th, 9th, and 10th Regiments Australian Light Horse.
4th Australian Light Horse Brigade.
Commander : Brigadier-General W. Grant, C.M.G., D.S.O.,
A.I.F.
4th, 11th, and 12th Regiments AustraUan Light Horse.
APPENDIX I 333
5th MotnsTTED Brigade.
Commander : Brigadier-General P. D. Fitzgerald, D.S.O.,
p. s.c. (relinquished command November 1917).
Brigadier-General P. J. V. KeUy, C.M.G.,
D.S.O.
ARTILLERY.
19th Brigade R.H.A. (' A ' and ' B ' Batteries Honour-
able Artillery Company, and Notts Battery R.H A.)
and Divisional Ammunition Column.
CORPS RESERVE.
7th Mounted Brigade.
Commander : Brigadier-General J. T. Wigan, C.M.G., D.S.O.,
(rehnquished command December 1917).
Brigadier-General G. V. Clarke, D.S.O,
Sherwood Rangers, South Notts and Herts Yeomanry
Regiments, with Essex Battery R.H .A., and Brigade
Ammunition Column.
Imperial Camel Corps Brigade.
Commander : Brigadier-General S. Smith, F.C, D.S.O.
Two Austrahan and one British Camel BattaUons,
with the Hongkong and Singapore Mountain Battery
R.G.A.
After the reorganisation consequent on the despatch
of many of the Yeomanry regiments to France, in
April and May 1918, and the arrival of Indian Cavalry
Regiments from Europe, the Corps was expanded
into four divisions as foUows : —
4th CAVALRY DIVISION.
Commander : Major-General Sir G. de S. Barrow,
K.C.M.G., etc.
10th Cavalry Brigade.
Commander : Brigadier-General W. G. K. Green, D.S.O.,
I.A.
Dorset Yeomanry, 2nd Lancers, 38th Central India
Horse.
334 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
11th Cavalry Brigade.
Commander : Brigadier-Greneral C.L.Gregory, C.B.,p.s.c.,I.A.
1st County of London Yeomanry, 29th Lancers, 36th
Jacob's Horse.
12th Cavalry Brigade.
Commander : Brigadier-General J. T. Wigan, C.M.G., D.S.O.
Stafford Yeomanry, 6th Cavalry, 1 9th Lancers.
ARTILLERY.
20th Brigade R.H.A. and Divisional Ammunition
Column.
5th CAVALRY DIVISION.
Commander : Major-General Sir H, J. M. MacAndrew,
K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., Indian Army.
13th Cavalry Brigade.
Commander : Brigadier-General P. J. V. KeUy, C.M.G.,
D.S.O. (relinquished command September
1918).
Brigadier-General G. A. Weir, D.S.O.
Gloucester Yeomanry, 9th Hodson's Horse, 1 8th
Lancers .
14th Cavalry Brigade.
Commander : Brigadier-General G. V. Clarke, D.S.O.
Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry, 20th Deccan Horse, 34th
Poona Horse.
15th (Imperial Service) Cavalry Brigade.
Commander : Brigadier-General C. R. Harbord, D.S.O., LA.
Jodhpur, Mysore and 1st Hyderabad Lancers.^
ARTILLERY.
' B ' Battery H.A.C. and Essex Battery R.H.A.,
with Divisional Ammunition Column.
The Anzac and the Australian Mounted Divisions
remained the same, except that the 5th Mounted
* These regiments were all maintained by the Ruling Princes of their
respective States in India.
i
APPENDIX I
335
Brigade was replaced in the latter by the 5th A.L.H.
Brigade, which consisted of the 14th and 15th Regi-
ments A.L.H. (composed of men of the Camel Corps
Brigade, which had been disbanded after the second
trans- Jordan raid), and the French Regiment Mixte
de Ca valeric. Swords were issued to the Australian
Mounted Division at the beginning of August 1918,
and the men had about six weeks' training in the
use of them before the operations commenced. The
Australian troopers took to their new weapon en-
thusiastically, and showed, later on, that they knew
how to use it.
(b) INFANTRY
During the 1917 operations, the infantry were
organised as follows : —
20th corps.
Commander : Lieutenant -General Sir Philip Chetwode, Bart.,
K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.
10th Division.
Commander : Major-Greneral J. R. Longley, C.B., C.M.G.
53rd Division.
Commander : Major-General S. F. Mott, C.B., p.s.c.
60th Division.
Commander : Major-General Sir J. S. M. Shea, K C M G
D.S.O., p.s.c., LA.
74th Division.
Commander : Major-General E. S. Girdwood, C.B.
21sT CORPS.
Commander : Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Bulfin K C B
C.V.O. ' • • ♦.
336 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
52nd Division.
Commander : Major-General J. Hill, C.B., D.S.O.
I.A.
a.HB.OD.,
54th Division.
Commander : Major-General S. W. Hare, C.B.
75th Division.
Commander : Major-General P. C. Palin, C.B., C.M.G., I.A.
On the reorganisation of the infantry in the
spring of 1918, the 3rd (Lahore) and 7th (Meerut)
Divisions replaced the 52nd and 74th Divisions, which
were sent to France. The 3rd was commanded by
Major-General A. R. Hoskins, C.M.G., D.S.O., p.s.c,
and the 7tli by Major-General Sir V. B. Fane,
K.C.LE., C.B.
Three-quarters of the British troops in all divi-
sions except the 54th were replaced by Indians.
APPENDIX II
NOTE ON THE ARAB MOVEMENT
A SHERiF (plur. Ashraf) is one who claims descent
direct from the Prophet Mohammed, through his
daughter Fatima, wife of AH, the third Khahf. These
Ashraf are found all over the Arabic-speaking world,
but only those whose pedigrees are inscribed in the
Register of Mecca are universally accepted as true
descendants of the Prophet. This register has been
kept with extraordinary care, and it is probable that
it dates back to the time of Mohammed himseK.
There are in the Hedjaz several families of these
true Ashraf, who form the aristocracy of the Arab
world, live under a law of their own, and enjoy a
number of special privileges.
For the first four centuries after the death of the
Prophet, the Ashraf, though regarded with venera-
tion and respect by the Arabs, held no temporal
power. At the end of the tenth century, however, a
Sherif of Mecca proclaimed himseK Emir of the
Ashraf, and succeeded in establishing his dynasty as
the temporal chiefs (under the Khalif) of the Hedjaz.
The ruling prince of the Ashraf of Mecca was known
for centuries in Europe as ' The Grand Sherif of
Mecca,' and, in former times, when the city was not
as jealously guarded as it now is, more than one
Christian sovereign sent an embassy to him there.
During the succeeding five hundred years, inter-
necine strife, resulting in frequent changes of djmasty,
weakened the temporal power of the Emirs of Mecca,
and correspondingly increased the ascendancy of the
Turks. In the sixteenth century, however, the Emir
Katada, by a series of conquests of rival claimants,
possessed himself of the chief power in the Hedjaz,
338 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
and established his own family as the head of the
Ashraf.
Slierif Hussein, a lineal descendant of Katada,
succeeded to the Emirate in 1908. A man of power-
ful will and strong ambitions, Hussein began almost
at once to consider the possibility of securing the
independence of the Hedjaz, and possibly even of all
the Arabs, from Turkish dominion. His task was an
exceedingly difficult one. The Sultan of Turkey,
as Khalif of Islam, was regarded as the spmtual head
of all Moslems, and any open action against him
would be likely to meet with strong opposition in
all Moslem countries outside Arabia. A Turkish
Army Corps, with its headquarters at Sanah, near
Aden, garrisoned and controlled the country ; and
the Emir's own people, split up into innumerable
tribes and clans, were torn by bitter inter-tribal
feuds, many of which dated back for centuries.
The ease with which the Sultan Abdul Hamid was
overthrown by the Committee of Union and Progress
at the time of the Turkish Revolution, encouraged
the Sherif in his dream of establishing an independent
Arab State. He became the representative of the
Hedjaz in the Turkish Parliament, and for a time
lived in Constantinople. Very soon, however, dis-
gusted with the intrigues and jealousies of the C.U.P.,
and realising that he had nothing to hope for from this
body of needy adventurers, he retired from his posi-
tion, and went back into the desert, where for the
next four or five years he hved the rigorous life of a
patriarchal desert Sheikh, preparing his four sons for
the struggle to come, and gathering round him a
small number of chiefs pledged to the cause of
Arabian independence.
The declaration of war by Turkey on Great Britain
furnished the Emir with the chance which he had
long awaited, and the atrocities committed by the
Turks in Syi'ia at the beginning of the war caused the
oppressed Arabs to turn to him as then- national
champion. He at once threw in his lot with the
APPENDIX II 339
British, though not openly at first, and set to work,
with the fierce energy characteristic of him, to stir
up the tribes of the Hedjaz against the Turks.
The outbreak of the rebellion was precipitated by
the arrival at Medina in May 1916 of a large Turkish
force, charged with the task of re-establishing the
waning authority of the Sultan in the Hedjaz. The
Emir himself, though as fuU of energy and deter-
mination as ever, was now too old to bear the rigours
of a desert campaign, and accordingly placed the
command of his Bedouin followers in the hands of
his three eldest sons Ali, Abdullah, and Feisal. Of
Ah we know little, though he was active in the sum-
mer of 1918 and in the early part of 1917. Abdullah,
the second son, was of a retiring disposition, a theo-
logian and philosopher, and a deep student of the
Koran. Feisal alone inherited his father's energy and
power of command, without, however, the old man's
ungovernable temper. The youngest son, Zeid, was
stiU only a boy.
A line of Arab pickets was established round
Medina, under the command of Feisal, and the rail-
way north of the town was cut in several places.
But the Arabs, not being provided at this time with
explosives, and being ignorant of modern methods
of demolition, did not effect enough before being
driven off by relief parties with machine guns, to
interrupt seriously the communication of Medina
with the north, and the besieging force, short of arms
and supplies, and without artillery, could do little
more than watch the city from afar. Jiddah, how-
ever, the port of Mecca, which was attacked on June
9th, held out barely a week. Cut off from Mecca by
the loss of the military blockhouses on the road, and
bombarded by British warships and aeroplanes, the
Turkish garrison surrendered on the 16th June. The
fall of Mecca followed a month later, and an Arab
force under Sherif Abdullah then proceeded to
blockade the hill town of Taif , where the bulk of the
Turkish forces, outside Medina, was established in
340 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
summer quarters. This place held out till near the
end of September, when Ghahb Pasha, the G.O.C.,
despairing of help, and cut off by the Arabs from all
sources of supply, surrendered with the garrison of
2000 men.
By the end of the year all the small Turkish posts
scattered throughout the Hedjaz had fallen to the
Arabs. Medina still held out, and it was clear that
the Arab forces, indifferently armed, and inexperi-
enced in modern siege warfare, could not hope to
reduce this city. The Turkish garrison, with the
Hues of communication troops along the railway to
the north, numbered some 15,000 men, well-armed
and equipped, and in all respects capable of prolonged
resistance.
Acting on the advice of the British officers with
them, the Arabs, therefore, abandoned for the time
being all attempts on Medina, and concentrated all
their efforts on a systematic attack on the Hedjaz
Railway north of the town. During the first six
months of 1917 a constant succession of raids so
interrupted the traffic on the railway that the Turks
could with difficulty keep open their communica-
tions between Medina and Damascus.
In July 1917 the Emir Feisal seized Akaba, at the
north end of the Red Sea, and made this place his
base for further raiding operations on the railway as
far north as Maan.
In January 1918 he succeeded in destroying the
branch line to the Hish Forest, from which the
Turkish locomotives were drawing their fuel, and
then attacked Maan itself (see p. 153.) Though
unable to capture the town, the Arabs estabhshed
themselves across the railway two miles farther
south, and, in the course of the succeeding three
months, destroyed seventy miles of the hne. Medina
was thus finally isolated, and the garrison was faced
with the two alternatives of holding out in the town
till the end of the war, or of attempting to cut a
way out to the north. As the latter alternative
APPENDIX II 341
meant almost certain destruction, the Turks decided
to stay where they were. They remained in Medina
tiE they were compelled to surrender, under the
terms of the Ai^mistice of the 31st October 1918.
The strong position taken up by the Turkish IVth
Army east of the Jordan during the summer of 1918,
prevented the Emir from making any further move
northwards. He remained about Maan, collecting
his resources for the coming struggle, and carrying
on a vigorous propaganda among the surrounding
tribes, till the British advance in September caused
the IVth Army to retire, and gave the Arabs the
opportunity of completing the task to which they
had set themselves in 1916.
APPENDIX III
SUMMARY OF TERMS OF THE TURKISH ARMISTICE
WHICH CAME INTO FORCE ON OCTOBER 31, 1918.
Art. 1. — Opening of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus and
access to the Black Sea. The AlUed occupation of the
Dardanelles and Bosphorus forts.
Art. 2. — The position of all minefields, torpedo tubes, and
other obstructions in Turkish waters to be indicated, and
assistance to be given to sweep or remove them as may be
required.
Art 3. — All available information regarding the mines in
the Black Sea to be communicated.
Art. 4. — All Allied prisoners and Armenians interned to
be collected in Constantinople, and handed over uncondi-
tionally to the AUies.
Art. 5. — ^The immediate demobiUsation of the army except
troops required for the surveillance of the frontier and
maintenance of internal order, their number and disposal to
be determined later by the AUies, after consultation with
the Turkish Government.
Art. 6. — The surrender of all war vessels in Turkish waters
or the waters occupied by Turkey. These ships to be in-
terned at such Turkish port or ports, as may be directed,
except such small vessels as are required for poUce or similar
purposes in Turkish territorial waters.
Art. 7. — The Allies to have the right to occupy any
strategic points, in the event of any situation arising which
threatens the security of the AUies.
Art. 8. — ^The free use by AUied ships of all ports and
anchorages now in Turkish occupation, and the denial of
their use to the enemy. Similar conditions to apply to
312
APPENDIX III 343
Turkish mercantile shipping in Turkish waters, for the
purposes of trade and the demobiUsation of the army.
Art. 9. — The use of all ship-repairing facihties at all
Turkish ports and arsenals.
Art. 10. — AUied occupation of the Taurus tunnel system.
Art. 11. — Withdrawal of Turkish troops from north-
western Persia. Part of Trans -Caucasia to be evacuated ;
the remainder to be evacuated if the Allies require, after
they study the situation there.
Art. 12. — ^Wireless and cable stations to be under Allied
control ; Turkish Government messages excepted.
Art. 13. — Prohibition of the destruction of any naval,
military, or commercial material by the Turks.
Art. 14. — Facihties to be given for the purchase of coal,
oil-fuel, and naval material from Turkish sources, after the
requirements of the country have been met. None of the
above material to be exported.
Art. 15. — ^AUied control of all railways, and AUied occupa-
tion of Batoum. Turkey not to object to the AUied occupa-
tion of Baku.
Art. 16. — The surrender of the garrisons of the Hedjaz,
Asir, Yemen, Syria, and Mesopotamia, and the withdrawal
of troops from CiHcia, except those maintaining order, as
determined under Clause 5. The surrender of all ports in
CiUcia,
Art. 17. — The surrender of aU Turkish officers in Tripoh-
tania and Cyrenaica to the nearest Itahan garrison. Turkey
to guarantee to stop supphes to, and communication with,
these officers, if they do not obey the order of surrender.
Art. 18. — The surrender of aU ports occupied in TripoH-
tania and Cyrenaica, including Misurata, to the nearest
AUied garrison.
Art. 19. — AU Germans and Austrians, naval, miUtary, and
civihan, to quit Turkey within a month. Those in remote
districts to do so as soon as possible thereafter.
Art. 20. — CompHance with the AUies' orders as regards
the disposal of arms and the transport of the demobiUsed,
under Clause 5.
344 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
Art. 21. — An Allied representative to be attached to the
Turkish Ministry of SuppHes, to safeguard AUied interests.
Art. 22. — Turkish prisoners to be kept at the disposal of
the Alhes. The release of Turkish civlUan prisoners and
prisoners over mihtary age to be considered.
Art. 23. — Turkey to cease all relations with the Central
Powers.
Art. 24, — In case of disorder in the six Armenian vilayets
the AUies reserve the right to occupy any of them.
INDEX
Abasajst el Kebib, 12.
Abdullah, Emir, 339.
Abid Miriam, 177.
Abraham's Well, 41.
Abu el Teaha, 3.
Jei-wal, 32.
— Shusheh (Plain of Philistia).
85, 89.
(Plain of Esdraelon), 200,
206.
Tellul, 178.
Action of, 181, 185.
el Hareira, 3.
Acre, capture of, 232.
Adana, 295.
Administration of Enemy Territory.
See Enemy Territory.
Advance Guards, 252-257, 267-269,
285-289.
Artillery with, 305, 306.
Afghanistan, 2.
Afule, 4, 191, 192.
capture of, 210.
Ain Arik. 105.
el Duk, 177, 180.
el Hekr, 137.
el Sir, 135, 241.
el Subian, 222.
Hemar, 159.
Kohleh, 38.
Shibleh, 193, 222.
Aintab, 295, 301.
Aircraft, British, xv, 15, 188, 197,
198, 204.
superiority of, 6, 261.
co-operation with cavalry,
285, 286.
bombing operations, 198,
216, 218, 222, 226.
Enemy, 6, 9, 15, 174, 210, 216,
261, 288.
Ajalon, Vale of, 89, 102.
Ajje, 199, 219.
Akaba, 129, 340.
Akir, 79, 84.
Ak Su Lakes, 301.
Aleppo, 4, 282, 295.
advance on, 287, 288, 289.
capture of, 290.
riots in, 297.
' Aleppo Hunt,' 301.
Alexandretta, 295.
Ali, Emir, 339.
Allenby, Field-Marshal Viscount, 1,
7, 247.
tactics of, xiv, xv, 20, 39,
194.
success in deceiving
enemy, 5, 17, 195.
good judgment of, 39, 76.
meeting with General
Chauvel, 226.
Amman, 5, 126, 132.
unsuccessful attacks on, 143,
145, 147-149.
capture of, 241.
Ammunition —
Captured enemy, 56, 85.
Columns, 46, 48, 63, 96, 328, 329,
330.
Gun, 328, 329, 330.
Loads of, for wagons, 329^ 330.
Replenishment of, 46, 330.
Sent up to El Salt, 166, 167.
SmaU arm, 328, 329, 330.
Supply, 328, 329, 330.
Amwas, 88, 102.
Anatolians, 68.
Anebta, 220.
Ansarie, 289.
Anthrax, 320.
Anti-Lebanon Mountains, 296.
Antioch, 282.
Anzac Mounted Division, 7, 8, 24,
38, 40, 45, 122, 127, 133, 155, 175,
179, 190, 241, 302, App. i. a.
A.P.M., adventure of the, 97-99.
Arab Movement. Appendix n.
Arab ponies. See Horses.
Arab Punar, 295.
345
346 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
Arabs —
Beni Sakhr Tribe, 155, 156, 165,
244, 245.
Butchered by Turks, 264,
Character of, 130, 280.
Christian, 98, 144.
Friendly, 37, 145.
Guides, 23, 206.
Hostile to British, 15, 35, 150,
244, 245.
Hostile to Turks, 212, 240, 243,
244, 245, 275, 280.
Huweitat Tribe, 130.
Intertribal feuds among, 130, 144,
338.
Looting by, 211, 243, 280, 281.
Regular army of. Sec Shcrifian
Army.
Spies, 5, 119.
Unreliable information of, 104,
135, 206, 259, 260.
Vengeance of, 265.
Ardahan, 263.
Arak el Menshiye, 59, 61, 62, 74.
Suweidan, 60.
Arara, 205.
Arish, 16.
Arkub el Khaluf, 165.
Armageddon, 191.
Armenians, character of, 299.
attempt to massacre, 297.
Armenian refugees, 296.
Reparations Committee, 297,
298.
Armistice, 293.
terms of, 342.
Armoured cars, xv, 85, 109, 160,
195, 204, 205, 208, 209, 211, 220,
226, 232, 249, 267, 284.
in advance on Aleppo,
285-292.
Enemy, 288.
Arsuf, 191.
Artillery, Royal Horse. See Horse
Artillery.
loss of. See Guns,
loss of.
shortage of, 179, 190.
Enemy field, xiv, 26, 186.
heavy, xiv, 9, 45, 186,
187, 188.
66, 183.
Asluj, 7.
shelling own troops, 60,
Atawineh, 3.
Attara, 199.
Auja, 4.
Australian and New Zealand
Mounted Division. See Anzac
Mounted Division.
Australian Light Horse Brigades — ■
1st, 7, 8, 24, 45, 51, 59, 65, b9, 71,
128, 136, 154, 157, 165, 174, 181,
229, 240, 243.
2nd, 7, 8, 24, 45, 51, 59, 137, 154,
157, 165, 228, 229, 241, 242.
3rd, 7, 8, 21, 26, 52, 72, 102, 115,
117, 157, 165, 213, 249, 259,
267, 277, 279.
4th, 8, 28, 31, 45, 52, 56, 72, 115,
157, 160, 175, 248, 249, 268.
5th, 190, 199, 217, 220, 259, 269.
Australian Light Horse Regiments —
1st, 157.
2nd, 27, 28, 69, 182.
3rd, 28, 229.
4th, 162, 250, 268, 269.
5th, 184, 242.
6th, 170.
8th, 158, 159, 172, 267.
9th, 158, 267.
10th, 158, 159, 213, 268, 277.
nth, 157, 160, 249, 263.
12th, 250, 268, 269, 275.
14th, 217.
15th, 221.
Austrahan Mounted Division, 8, 24,
26, 72, 102, 113, 155, 175, 179,
190, 197, 200, 202, 212, 247, 249,
252, 258, 266, 293, 296, 302, App.
I, a.
Australians as scouts, 140.
weight of, 95.
Austrians, 9.
Ayun Kara, 86.
Baalbek, 284, 285, 287, 295.
Baghdad, 1.
Balata, 221.
Baldwin ii.. Castle of, 258.
Balin, 66, 72.
Barada, River, 269.
Baramkie Station, 277.
Barley, 313, 314.
Barrow, Major- General Sir G. de S.,
42, 80, 89, 209, 240, 302.
Barrow's Detachment, 42.
Batoum, 263.
INDEX
347
Bayonets, used in cavalry charge,
29, 56.
Becke, Major A. F., xv.
Beersheba, Arabs in, 36, 37, 38.
capture of, 30.
defences of, 3, 20.
description of, 20, 33, 34,
35.
Railway, 4.
Beirut, 282. 284, 295.
Beisan, 134, 191, 211.
Beit Dejan, 19, 220.
Dukka, 107.
Duras, 60.
Hanun, 48, 52.
Jibrin, 66, 70, 97.
— Lid, 220.
Likia, 107.
Ras, 253.
Sira, 103.
Ur el Foka, 106, 113.
Ur el Tahta, 101, 103, 113.
Beitunia, 105.
BeUed el Sheikh, 233.
Berfilya, 101.
Berkusie, 66, 72.
Beshshit, 80.
Bethlehem, 98.
Bire, 101.
Bir Adas, 199.
el Arara, 23.
el Hammam, 23.
el Makruneh, 32.
el Nettar, 39.
Jemameh, 44, 51.
SaUm Abu Irgeig, 23.
Birket Ata, 204.
Bivouac shelters, 12.
Blockhouses, 20, 27, 28, 256.
Bluff, the, 182, 183.
Bridges, and bridgeheads —
Beersheba, 35.
Benat Yakub, 258.
El Rastan, 288.
Enemy, 128, 129, 157, 158.
Esdud, 65, 69, 118.
Jordan, 128, 129, 135, 136, 146,
153, 157, 158, 175.
Nahr el Auja, 108, 109, 110.
SheUal, 17.
Brigandage, 296.
Brisbane, Captain, 142.
British Forces. See Troops, British.
Buggar, 21.
Bulfin, Lieutenant-General Sir Ed-
ward, 9.
Bureir, 50, 59.
Burj, 115.
Burka, 65, 71.'j:^
Bursym, 313. -.
Butler, Lady, 55.
Cacolets, 151, 173.
Camel Corps Brigade, 8, 69, 133,
137, 154, App. I. a.
Camel Transport Corps, 36, 62, 63.
Camels, 36, 63, 325.
Arabs impressed by British, 36.
prices reahsed by captured, 318.
unsuitability of, in hill country,
141, 173, 325, 326.
Cameron, Lieutenant-Colonel, 244.
Carchemish, 302.
Carmel, Mount, 192, 212, 233.
Casualties, British, 31, 54, 84, 92, 94,
114, 151, 152, 181, 268, 287, 293.
Enemy, 31, 54, 83, 85, 92, 117,
153, 154, 184, 251, 272, 276, 278.
Cavalry —
Detail of, 8, App. i. a.
Disease amongst. See Disease.
Enemy. See Turks.
French, ix, 190, 221, 259, 319.
in mountain country, 102, 104-108,
112-122, 127, 128, 136-151, 165-
175, 219.
in trenches, 155, 156.
Organisation for the advance on
Aleppo, 285.
Reorganisation of, 154, 179, App.
I. a.
Training, 12, 13, 14, 55.
Withdrawal of, from Syria, 302.
Charges of Cavalry —
Abu Naj, 230, 231.
Abu Shusheh, 90.
Beersheba, 29.
Haifa, 235, 236.
Haritan, 292.
Henu Ford, 185, 186.
Huj, 53.
bbid, 253.
Kaukab, 269.
Khan Ayash, 279.
Remte, 256.
training for, 55, 56.
unsuccessful, 230, 253, 254, 292.
of Turkish Cavalry, 22.
348 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
Chauvel, Ldeutenant-General Sir
H. G., K.C.B., K.C.M.G., xvi, 8,
169, 279.
Chaytor, Major-General Sir E. W. C,
108, 138, 143, 149, 164.
Chaytor's Force, 196, 201, 220, 227,
229, 240-246.
Chetwode, Lieutenant-General Sir
Philip, Bart., viii, 7, 9, 33.
Christians, 98, 144.
Cihcia, 295.
Circassians, 144, 263, 264.
Climate, 15, 63, 104, 117, 177, 179,
180, 189, 311.
Cold, 104, 118, 119, 137, 144.
Committee of Union and Progress,
298.
Communications, British, 16, 17,
112, 129, 164, 263.
Enemy, 4, 129, 191, 192, 193.
Communiques, Enemy, 16, 100.
Counter-attacks, Enemy —
Balin, 72, 73, 74.
El Burj, 117.
Jisr el Damieh, 160.
Khuweilfeh, 38, 39, 40.
Nebi Samwil, 107.
Richon-le-Zion, 86.
Country, description of. See Topo-
graphy.
Cox, Brigadier-General, 27, 65.
Cripps, Lieutenant-Colonel, 90.
Crusaders, 103.
Damascus, 4.
capture of, 275, 279.
disorders in, 280, 281.
importance of, 247.
the race for, 251-275.
Daraya, 278.
Darb el Haj, 243.
Darfur campaign, 314.
Davison, Captain, 209.
Dead Sea, 126, 179, 180.
Deceiving the enemy, 5, 17, 175,
176, 177, 195, 196, 197, 210, 211,
213, 214, 293.
Defences, British —
Gaza-Beersheba, 5, 12.
Jaffa- Jerusalem, 114.
Jordan Valley, 175, 178, 179.
Defences, Turkish —
Gaza-Beersheba, 3, 20.
Damascus, 268.
Defences, Turkish —
Jaffa- Jerusalem, 114.
On 19th September 1918, 191, 193,
199, 200, 220.
Nazareth, 214.
Trans-Jordan, 133, 156.
Nahr Rubin, 70, 71.
Aleppo, 289.
Deir Ah, 268.
el Belah, 16, 17.
el Ghusn, 219.
el Hawa, 39.
elKuddis, 119.
el Saras, 261.
Khabiye, 273.
Sineid, 4.
Deraa Junction, 4, 191, 192, 248,
252, 257, 264, 295.
Desert Column, the, viii, 7, 16.
Desert Mounted Corps, ix, 9, 293.
detail of, 8, App. i.
reorganisation of,
179, App. I. a.
adminietration of
Syria by, 295-301.
■ disbandment of, 302.
Dhahariyeh, 21.
Disease, among British troops, x,
181, 246, 283, 284, 287.
Enemy, 60, 276, 278, 279.
Dobell, Major-General Sir C, viii.
Documents, captured enemy, 5, 57,
178, 194, 198, 208.
Dome, 220.
Donkeys, 166, 325, 326, 327.
Dothan Pass, 213.
Druses, 263, 264.
Duma, 277.
Dust, 71, 179, 180, 187, 311.
Dysentery, 60, 278.
Easteen Force, viii.
Egypt, 2.
Egyptian Expeditionary Force, 1, 7.
Enemy Territory, advances into,
122, 293.
administration of, 295-
301.
disorder in, 296, 297.
Engineers, Royal, 16, 17, 287, 288.
Australian, 16, 17.
Enemy, 49, 132.
Entrenching tools, 13.
Ellar, 219.
INDEX
349
Equipment, 12, 13, 320, 321.
weight of, 95.
Esani, 7.
Escorts. See Horse Artillery.
Esdraelon, Plain of, 191, 209.
Esdud, 60, 118.
Euphrates, River, 282.
Exchange, stabilisation of, 299, 301.
gambles in, 299, 300.
Ezra, 255.
Fahme, 219.
FalkenhajTi, Marshal von, 2, 72.
Faluje, 59, 61, 62, 66.
Feisal, Emir, 130, 153, 280, 281, 339,
340, 341.
Fevzi Pasha, 9.
Fire support, 29, 55, 82, 90, 209,
254, 260, 269, 291, 304, 305.
Flag of truce, 289.
Forage, 13, 62, 248, 313, 314.
local, 248, 314.
Fox hounds, 301.
Fuheis, 144, 168.
Funduk, 220.
Furkha, 191.
Gafar Pasha, 297.
Galilee, Sea of, 134, 191.
Gallipolis 1.
Games, 301.
Gamli, 5.
Gaza, defences of, 3.
attack of, 22, 32.
capture of, 48.
description of, 124, 125.
Gebel el Shegeib, 23.
Grerman Emperor, 121.
Germans, 9, 154, 181, 214, 219, 250,
251.
ill-treatment of Turks by, xiii,
xiv, 193, 194, 260, 276.
breaches of laws of war by,
216, 250, 251.
drunkenness, 185.
venereal disease among, 279.
indifference to Turkish bru-
tality, 265.
spies, 5.
Gezer, 89.
Ghabaghib, 271.
Ghalib Pasha, 340.
Ghazale, 255.
Gheyadah, 80.
Ghoraniyeh, 128, 133, 135, 153, 228.
Enemy attack on, 154.
Glanders, 320.
Godwin, Brigadier General C. A., 80,
90.
Good Samaritan Inn, 127.
Gram, 313, 314.
Grant, Brigadier- General W., 28, 29,
31, 161, 249, 263, 317.
Gray-Cheape, Lieut. -Colonel H., 53.
Gregory, Brigadier- General, 231.
Grenades, 117.
Guns, captured, xii, 30, 52, 55, 85,
100, 102, 122, 205, 211, 226, 232,
238, 245, 262, 268, 279, 283, 293.
loss of R.H.A., 163.
Hableh, 199.
Haifa, 191, 192, 232.
capture of, 232-238.
annexation expedition, 227.
Hama, 282, 288.
Hamame, 66.
Haram, 202.
Harbaj, 234.
Harbord,Brigadier-General,233,291.
Hareira, 43.
Harista el Basal, 277.
Haritan, action of, 291.
Harithie, 232.
Haroun al Rashid, 302.
Hand, 133, 136, 157, 165.
Hauran, 248, 263, 272.
Head ropes. See Picketing gear.
Heat, 15, 63, 177, 179, 180, 311.
Hebron, 21.
Hedjaz, 126, 337.
Force, 129, 130, 131, 133, 153,
240, 242, 243.
— — surrender of, 244, 245.
King of. See Hussein.
Heel ropes. See Picketing gear.
Henu Ford, 185.
Hermon, Mount, 212.
Hills. See Topography.
Hiseia, 21.
Hish Forest, 130, 340.
Hodgson, Major- General Sir H. W.,
21, 73, 74, 75, 167, 169.
Horns, 282, 286, 287, 294, 295.
Horse Artillery, 27.
Ammunition, 308, 309, 328, 329.
Command, 303, 304.
Detail of, App. i. a.
350 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
Horse Artillery —
Employment of, 74, 75, 259, 260,
269.
Escorts for, 306, 307.
Horses for, 319.
Howitzers, 307.
Reserve^ 304, 305.
Special requirements of, 309.
With advance guard, 269, 305, 306.
See also R.H.A. Batteries.
Horsemastership, 318, 319.
Horses —
Arab, 314, 317, 318.
Australian, 94, 95, 325.
Barb, 190.
Canadian, 317, 325.
Condition, 119. 123, 180, 240, 283,
312, 313.
Detecting presence of water, 316.
Disease amongst, 312, 320.
Draught, 319, 324.
English, 95, 317.
Hardships of, 58, 61, 63, 77, 94,
119.
in waterless country, 316.
Manes and tails of, 321.
Muzzles for, 312, 320, 321.
Pack, 13, 82.
Remounts, 123, 317.
Type, 319, 324, 325.
Watering of, 58, 61, 64, 94, 314,
315, 316.
Weight carried by, 95.
Hotchkiss rifles, 236, 274.
Howeij, 165.
Howitzers. See Horse Artillery.
Huj, 44, 52, 53, 54.
Huleh, Lake, 247, 259.
Huleikat, 59.
Hunting, 301.
Hussein, Sherif, 130, 247, 338, 339.
Character of, 338.
India, 2.
Indian Cavalry Divisions —
4th, 179. 190, 197, 200, 202, 222,
226, 230, 239, 248, 249, 252,
264, 271, 284, 287, 295, 302,
App. I. a.
5th, 179, 190, 197, 200, 202, 224,
232, 247, 249, 262. 266, 272,
284, 287, 293, 295, 302, 320,
App. I. a.
Organisation of, for Aleppo, 285.
Indian Cavalry Brigades —
10th, 208, 252, 255.
nth, 230, 239, 240, 271, 274.
12th, 209.
13th, 187, 224, 232, 272, 274, 275,
285, 301.
14th, 210, 272, 274, 293.
15th (Imperial Service), 8, 9, 48,
155, 185, 232, 285, 290, 291.
Indian Cavalry Regiments —
Central India Horse, 222, 249,
253, 256.
Hodson's Horse (9th), 204, 224.
18th Lancers, 206, 224.
2nd Lancers, 208, 209, 253.
Jacob's Horse (36th), 204, 226,
230.
Mysore Lancers, 233, 291.
Hyderabad Lancers, 232, 263,
285.
Jodhpur Lancers, 234, 291.
29th Lancers, 230, 232, 239, 275.
6th Cavalry, 204.
19th Lancers, 211, 249.
Infantry, British —
Detail of, 9, App. i. h.
Reorganisation of, 154, App. i. h.
Infantry, Enemy. See Turks.
French, 199.
Infantry Corps, British —
20th, 9, 42, 43, 63, 201, 219, 220,
App. I. h.
21st, 9, 43, 48, 59, 63, 199, 217,
220, App. I. h.
Infantry Divisions, British —
3rd, 199, 221, App. i. 6.
7th, 199, 248, App. i. 6.
10th, 9, 43, 45, 122, 221, App. i. 6.
42nd, 7, 284, 286, App. i. 6.
52nd, 7, 48, 49, 60, 63, 71, 107,
114, App. I. h.
53rd, 9, 40, 63, 84, 121, 221,
App. I. h.
54th, 9, 63, 199, App. i. 6.
60th, 9, 24, 43, 45, 121, 127, 129,
133, 155. 197, 199, 218, App. 1.6.
74th, 9, 43, 115, App. i. h.
75th, 9, 63, 84, 106, 197, 199,
App. I. h.
Influenza, 283.
Intelligence, British, xv, 36.
Enemy, 5, 6, 57, 178, 194, 198.
Irbid, 248, 253.
Islahie, 295.
INDEX
351
Ismet Bey, 24, 30.
Iswaiwin, 23.
Itweil el Semin, 23.
Jackals, 120.
Jaffa, 88.
Gate, 121.
Jarak, 206.
Jebata, 206.
Jebel Ekteif, 127.
el Aswad, 268, 273, 275.
el Mania, 269.
Kalimun, 127.
Kuruntul, 127.
Jelameh, 200.
Jelil, 202.
Jemal Pasha, 276.
Jendar, 294.
Jenin, 4, 191, 192.
capture of, 213, 214, 215.
Jerablus, 282, 295.
Jericho, 5, 126, 127, 128, 177, 180,
187.
' Jericho Jane,' 187.
Jerisheh, 108.
Jerusalem, 3, 4, 5, 21.
surrender of, 121.
Jeshimon, Wilderness of, 127.
Jett, 205.
Jezreel, Valley of, 191.
Jib, 108.
Jiddah, 339.
Jiljulie, 191.
Jisr Benat Yakub, 252, 261.
action of, 258-261.
Esdud, 65.
el Damieh, 146, 157.
el Sheikh Hussein, 211.
Mejamieh, 200, 211, 248, 252.
Jordan River, 125, 134, 146, 211.
raids across, 135-152,
154-176.
VaUey, 128, 129, 177, 227.
cUmate, 177, 179, 180.
defences. See Defences,
British.
description of, ix, 189.
Joyce, Lieut. -Colonel, 130.
Julis, 59.
Junction Station, importance of, 4.
capture of, 85.
description of, 96.
Junjar, 208.
Jurat el Mikreh, 44.
Kabb Mujahid, 229.
Kadem Station, 275.
Kaimakam, 66.
Kakon, 225.
Kalaat Aneiza, 130.
el Zerka, 241.
el Nuhas, 274.
Kaikili, 191, 192.
Kannir, 205.
Kantara, 16.
Kami, 17.
Karmelheim, 236.
Kars, 263.
Kasr el Azrak, 195.
Kastal, 242.
Katada, Emir, 337.
Katana, 268.
Katrah, 70, 79.
Kaukab, action of, 268, 269.
Kauwukah, 43.
Kaza, 66.
Kefr Harris, 220.
Kara, 205.
Kenna, 224.
• Ruai, 219.
Kelly, Brigadier- General P. J. V.,
168, 169, 170, 206, 314.
Kenna, Brigadier-General Paul,
V.C, 316.
Kerak, 125.
Kerkur, 192.
Khalasa, 7.
Khan Ayash, 279.
el Shiha, 273.
—— Kusseir, 277.
Meizelun, 284.
Sebil, 288.
Shaikhun, 288.
— Tuman, 289.
Khashim Zanna, 24, 25.
Khiyara ChiftUk, 274.
Khurbet Arab, 208.
Atuf , 232.
Deiran, 86.
el Likiye, 39.
■ el Mujeidilat, 58.
el Muweileh, 32.
el Raseife, 143.
Hadrah, 88, 108.
Jeladiyeh, 73.
Kauwukah, 43.
Surafend, 86.
Kishon, River. 192, 213, 233.
Kiswe, 266, 268, 275.
352 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
Kress von Kressenstein, Greneral, 9,
57.
Kubeibe, 70, 79, 84.
Kuneitra, 262.
Kuryet el Enab, 101.
Kusr Atra, 258.
Kustine, 65.
KustuI, 107.
Kut el Amara, 1.
Kuwaik Su, 301.
Lady's Brook, the, 213.
Lambert, Major, 292.
Laminitis, 320.
Latron, 88.
Lawrence, Lieutenant-Colonel, 130,
195, 255, 257, 278.
Lawrence, Lieut. -General the Hon.
Sir H., viii.
' Lebanon Hounds,' 301.
Lebanon Mountains, 311.
Leben Station, 242.
Lebon, Colonel, 190.
Lebwe, 295.
Lejjun, 192.
Light Car Patrols, 97, 232.
in advance on
Aleppo, 285-292.
Liktera, 200, 204.
Liman von Sanders, 193, 207, 250.
Lorries, British, 13, 63, 64.
Enemy, 208, 211, 288.
Lubban, 191, 220.
Ludd, 101, 189.
Lymphangitis, 320.
Maan, 129, 130, 153, 340.
Ma'arit el Na'aman, 288.
Mac Andrew, Major - General Sir
H. J. M., 272.
orders to 5th Cavalry
Division at Damascus, 272.
captures Aleppo, 290.
Machine guns, British, 56, 82, 90,
220, 274, 285.
— — ammunition for, 328.
Enemy, xiv, 27, 91.
Ma el Mallaka, 23.
Mafid Jozeleh, 229.
Makhadet Hajlah, 135.
■ Abu Naj, 230.
- — - Fath Allah, 231.
Makhi-uk, 193, 227.
Malaria,x,177,181, 246,278,283,284. | 209,212.
Mamas, 205. { Mutasserif , 66.
Mandesi, 136. >
Maps, 23, 266.
Marash, 295, 301.
Marches, xii, 11, 18, 94, 139, 148,
166, 200, 211, 212, 219, 266, 283.
night, 23, 61.
Mason, Lieutenant, 256.
Masudi, action of, 239.
Mecca, 3, 339.
Register of Ashraf at, 337.
Grand Sherif of, 337.
Medina, 339, 340, 341.
Megiddo, 192.
Meissner Pasha, 35.
Mejdel (Plain of Philistia), 59, 60.
(Plain of Sharon), 200.
(Sea of GalUee), 252, 259.
Merchants, native, 296, 299, 300.
Mesha, 191.
Mesmiye, 84.
Mesopotamia, 261.
Messudieh Junction, 4, 192.
Mezerib, 257, 264.
Mezze, 269.
Moab, 125.
Money, stabilisation of exchange.
See Exchange.
Morale. See Turks.
Mosques, Beersheba, 35.
Gaza, 125.
Motor Boats, German, 126, 128,
129, 251.
used by British, 129,
136.
Mountains. See Topography.
Mounted attacks, methods employed
in, 55, 56.
Mud, 104, 118, 119, 138, 140, 311.
Mudir, 66.
Mughar, 70.
action of, 78.
Mughair, 200.
Mujeidil, 206.
Mukhalid, 200.
Mulebbis, 109.
Mules, 318, 325, 326.
prices realised by captured, 318.
Muntar, 127.
Musallabeh, 178, 181.
Muslimie Junction, 282, 293.
Musmus Pass, 192.
crossing of, 205, 206, 208,
INDEX
353
Naane, 86.
Xaaur, 133.
Nablus, 101, 192, 198.
capture of, 221.
Nahie, 66.
Nahr e] Auja, 88.
first crossing of, 108,
109, 110.
second crossing of,
122.
el Awaj, 274.
el Falik, 199, 203.
el Mukatta, 233.
el Zerka, 158, 160.
Iskanderuneh, 204.
Mef jir, 200.
Mughaniye, 267.
Rubin, 70.
Sukereir, 65.
Napoleon, a memory of, 261.
Nasir, Sherif, 257, 286.
seizes Aleppo, 290.
Natives. See Arabs.
Navy, the Royal, 17, 48, 69, 93, 129,
213.
Nazareth, 193, 208.
capture of, 207, 224.
Nebi Samwil, 107.
Tari, 110.
Musa, 127.
New Zealand Mounted Brigade, 7,
24, 26, 28, 69, 86, 88, 128, 136,
175, 184, 227, 229, 240, 243.
Night Marches. See Marches.
Nisibin, 302.
Northforce, 302.
Nose bags, 13.
Olives, Mount of, 121.
Onslow, Brigadier-General, 217, 219,
220, 270.
Operating Unit, 152.
Orontes, River, 286.
Osborne, Lieut.-Col. R. H., xv.
Pack AnimjVls, 13, 82.
Palestine, description of. See Topo-
graphy.
Palmyra, 302.
Paper money, values of. See Ex-
change.
Persia, 2.
Philiatia, Plain of, 7.
Picketing gear, 321.
Pig-sticking, 301.
Plans of Major Operations —
Gaza-Beersheba, 10-11, 18,20,42.
Jerusalem, 101.
1st Trans-Jordan Raid, 132, 133,
134.
2nd Trans- Jordan Raid. 154, 155,
156, 157.
Esdraelon, 194, 195, 199, 200, 201.
Relief of Damascus, 247, 248.
Political objectives, 3, 247, 282.
Polo, 301.
Ponies, Arab. See Horses.
Port Said, 17.
Prisoners —
As aUies of British, 245.
Attitude of, 30, 60.
Difficulty of feeding, 225.
Mortality amongst, 278.
Numbers taken, xii, 30, 31. 32,
59, 60, 83, 84, 88, 92, 100, 117,
122, 153, 154. 172, 175, 184,
186, 204, 207, 208, 209, 211,
213, 214, 215, 221, 224, 225,
227, 230, 232, 236, 238, 239,
242, 245, 251, 256, 268, 271,
273, 274, 275, 277, 278, 279,
283, 284, 285, 293.
Water for, 65, 238, 239.
Protection on march, 61, 201, 206.
Raad, Mr. C, XV.
Rabue, 270.
Racing, 301.
Railways —
British, 16, 93.
British, construction of, 16, 93,
103, 191, 196.
Demolition of enemy, 4, 62, 130,
139, 142, 143, 153, 206, 219,
241, 242, 339, 340.
Hedjaz, 4, 129, 130, 131, 191, 240,
339, 340.
Northern Palestine, 191, 192.
Southern Palestine, 4, 16, 17, 18,35.
Syrian, 271, 282.
Rain, 104, 117, 118, 119, 122, 127,
137, 138, 146, 147, 151, 311.
Rakka, 302.
Ram Allah, 105.
Ram AUah Rakhman, 98.
Ramleh, 86, 197.
Ras el Ain, 295.
el Humeiyir, 232.
354 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
Ras el Nukb, 39, 42.
Ghannara, 18, 20.
Umm Zoka, 232, 240.
Rastan, 288.
Rations, 13, 225, 248.
Rayak, 282, 284, 295.
attempted raid on, 296.
Rearguard actions, Amman, 150, 151.
El Salt, 173, 174, 175.
Reconnaissance, 14, 15, 16, 235, 254.
method of, of villages, 78.
Red Hill, 157, 160, 161, 187.
Red Sea, 129.
Remounts. See Horses.
Remte, 253, 255.
Reserves, British, 8, 141.
See also Horse Artillery.
Enemy, 17.
R.H.A. Batteries —
' A ' Battery, H. A.C., 29, 162, 213,
269.
' B ' Battery, H.A.C., 72, 161,
163, 190,*224, 232.
Ayrshire Battery, R.H.A., 274.
Berks Batterv, R.H.A., 80, 90, 91,
253, 256.
Essex Battery, R.H.A., 274.
Hants Battery, R.H.A., 230, 239.
Notts Battery,R.H.A., 21, 29, 162,
215, 269.
Somerset Battery, R.H.A., 109,
148.
Richard Coeur de Lion, 107.
Richon-le-Zion, 86, 96.
Rivers, passage of, Auja, 108, 109,
110, 122.
Jordan (Ghorani-
yeh), 134, 135, 136, 157.
(Benat Yakub), 258-
261, 262.
Roads —
Northern Palestine, 191, 192, 193,
205.
Southern Palestine, 4, 21, 62,
101, 103, 127.
Syria, 261, 262, 266, 272, 282, 285,
294, 296.
Trans-Jordan, 126, 133, 134, 137,
156, 159.
Robbers. See Brigandage.
Rosh Pina, 262.
Royal Air Force. See Aircraft.
Rujm el Bahr. 128.
el Oshir, 137.
Rushdi, 43.
Rushdi Bey, 239.
Russian notes, 300.
Ryrie, Brigadier-Greneral, 143.
SADDLE-WiVIxLETS, 12.
Sahnaya, 274.
Salt, 133, 146, 149, 157, 167. 170.
229.
first capture of, 139.
withdrawal from, 150, 151.
second capture of, 158, 159.
• withdrawal from, 174, 176.
Samaria, 192.
Sanah, 338.
Sand, 6.
colic, 312.
Sanjak, 66.
Sarona, 197.
Sasa, 267.
Sbeine, 279.
Sea traffic, 17, 69, 93, 248.
Second Mounted Division, 8.
Seffurie, 224.
Selmeh, 189, 197.
Semakh, 191, 248, 249.
capture of, 250, 251.
Senussi Campaign, 8, 297.
Seraikin, 288.
720 Point, 21.
Shannon, Major, 172.
Shea, Major-General Sir J. M., 53.
Shefa Amr, 232.
Sheikh Hassan, 32.
Muannis, 109.
Saad, 255, 257, 264.
Said, 289.
Shellal, 7.
Sherif, 337.
Sherifian Army, 129, 130, 192, 195,
240, 243, 245, 255, 264, 271, 277,
279, 280, 286, 290, 293, 294.
police work of, 297.
History of, App. ii.
Shilta, 103.
Shtora, 284, 295.
Shunet Nimrin, 133, 170, 228.
unsuccessful attack of,
158 ef seq.
Shuni, 255.
Sidun, 89.
Sihan, 3.
Sinai Desert, 7, 16.
Sindiane, 200.
INDEX
355
630 Point, 21.
Smallpox, 278.
Smyrna, 295, 302.
Snow, 311.
Spahis, 190.
Spies, enemy, 5, 97, 119, 120.
Sport, 301, 302.
Stamboul, 3.
Strategical objectives, 4, 192, 282.
Suafir el Sharkiye, 60.
Suez Canal, 2, 7, 16.
SufEa, 114.
Summeil, 72.
Supply, difficulties of, 62, 63, 105,
107, 118, 225.
drawn from country, 248, 322,
323.
Suriyeh, 236.
SweHeh, 140, 144, 241.
Swords, cavalry, 8, 54, 83, 92.
Australian Mounted Divi-
sion armed with, App. i. a.
Tabor, Mount, 191, 212.
Tabsor, 200.
Tactics, General AUenby's. See
Allenby.
Cavalry, 55, 56, 78, 90-92, 235,
236, 253, 254. 256, 269, 292.
Tafas, 264.
Tafile, 130.
Taif, 339.
Talaat el Dumm, 127.
Tarsus, 295.
Tel Abu Dilakb, 46.
Hawam, 233.
el Dhrur, 205.
el Hesi, 61.
el Marrakeb, 12.
el Murre, 65, 69. ~
el Nejile, 44, 51, 52.
el Saba, 20, 23, 24, 27.
capture of, 28.
el Safi, 72.
el Sakaty, 20, 23, 24.
el Sharia, 3, 45.
el Subat, 234.
el Sultan, 178.
el Turmus, 70, 84.
Hasil, 290.
Jezer, 89.
Khuweilfeh, 38, 39, 58.
capture of, 40.
Madh, 252.
Tel Shadud, 208.
Temptation, Mount of, 127, 188.
Thothmes m., 192.
3039 Point, 147, 148.
Tibben, 313.
Tiberias, 249, 251, 252.
Lake, 134, 191.
Tine Station, 72, 85.
Tire (Philistia), 113.
(Sharon), 199.
Topography —
Northern Palestine, 191, 192.
Southern Palestine, 6, 7, 20, 50,
78, 89, 106, 126, 127.
Syria, 260, 266, 272, 285, 290.
Trans-Jordan, 133, 134.
Training. See Cavalry.
Trains, Divisional, 63.
Transport, 62, 63, 248, 323-330.
Trench warfare, 3-5, 123.
unsuitability of cavalry
for, 155, 156.
Tripoli, 285, 286, 287, 294, 295.
Troops, British —
Disease among, x, 181, 246, 283,
284, 287.
Reorganisation of, 154, 179, App.
I. a, I. 6.
Strength of, 9, 193.
Tubk el Kaneitra, 127.
Tul Keram, 4, 192, 217, 218, 221.
Turks—
As allies of British, 245.
Bad shooting of, xiv.
Cavaky, 22, 264.
Committee of Union and Pro-
gress, 298.
Desertion, 67.
Dread of high explosive shells,
308.
Fighting value of, xiii, 68.
Health, xiii, 60.
Ill-treatment of. by Germans,
xiii, xiv, 193, 194, 260.
Marching powers of, 50, 64.
Morale, xiii, 60, 92, 193. 216, 231,
254, 270, 271, 273, 274, 276,
293 306.
Numbers, 9, 154, 193.
Recruiting methods of, 66.
Spies, 97, 120.
Treatment of Arabs by, 264, 338.
Three things feared by, xiv, 218.
Turmanin, 290.
356 THE DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
Umbeella Hill, 32.
Um el Ameidat, 46.
el Fahm, 212.
el Shert, 156, 164, 191, 227,
229.
Venereal Disease, 278, 279.
Villages, description of, 78.
method of reconnoitring, 78.
Wadi Amman, 141.
Arseniyet, 138.
Aslilul el Wawy, 233.
Dhahr, 72,
el Arab, 255.
el Auja, 126, 129, 153, 178, 186.
el Hammam, 242.
el Retem, 163, 164.
el Shreikiye, 23.
el Sitt, 213.
el Sunt, 105.
el Tabil, 233.
el Zabirani, 273.
Farah, 193, 222.
Ghuzze, 7.
Hanafish 43.
Hesi, 48, 52, 61.
Jamus, 79.
Jofet el Ghazlaniye, 137.
Kafrinji, 240.
Kef rein, 137.
Kumran, 128.
Maraba, 277.
Mejma, 60.
Nueiameh, 186, 187.
Ratam, 256.
Saba, 20.
• Selman, 235.
Sharia, 21, 45.
SheUal el Ghor, 82.
Sherar, 232.
Surar, 102.
Wagons, 13, 323.
loads of, 329, 330.
G.S. and L.G.S. compared,
323, 324.
Warakani, 206.
Water, detecting presence of, 317.
supply, 16, 33, 38, 52, 61, 95,
96, 178, 186, 244.
Water, shortage of, 7, 14, 32, 33, 41,
44, 58, 63, 64, 94, 105, 314, 315,
316, 317.
Water-carts, 14, 248.
Weather, 63, 104, 117, 311.
Wells, destruction of, 7, 30, 33, 57,
64.
depth of, 44, 57, 64.
pumping plant, 44, 51, 59, 95,
96.
West Indies Regiment, 179, 227,
229.
Wilson, Brigadier- General L., 215.
Wind, 63, 71, 118, 119, 179, 180, 311.
Wounded, Evacuation of, 151, 152,
173.
Yahudieh, 110.
Yebnah, 78.
Yeomanry Division, 8, 58, 85, 103,
112, 115, App. I. a.
disbandment of, 116, 154.
Yeomanry Brigades —
5th, 7, 8, 55, 72, 94, 157, 165.
6th, 8, 79, 89, 104, 112.
7th, 8, 24, 39, 51, 113.
8th, 8, 21, 22, 58, 78, 103.
22nd, 8, 79, 103, 113.
Yeomanry Regiments —
Berks, 80, 90.
Bucks, 80, 90.
Dorsets, 80, 90, 253, 255.
Gloucester, 117, 207, 275.
Middlesex, 21, 22, 230, 239.
Sherwood Rangers, 234.
Warwick, 53.
Worcester, 53, 221, 226, 232.
Yilderim Army Group, 1, 4, 70, 105.
Zahle, 284.
Zebda, 253.
Zebdani, 284.
Zeid, Emir, 339.
Zeita, 68.
Zeitun, 112.
Zelefe, 204.
Zenobia, 302.
Zernuka, 70, 79, 84.
Ziza Station, 242.
Zor Defai, 288.
Edinburgh : Printed by T. and A. Constable Ltd.
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY
Los Angeles
This book is DUE on the last date stamped below.
KC'O io"«'-
npf -^ ? 1X1
DJiiC'
^ Iiic2'^l980
BSgj -WOS m :
-'R 13 1998
4Vji^i\u
Form L9-Series 444
^""''!3F
/!7l
3 1158 00040 9234
UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY
AA 001 258 790 3
