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26  8,28TREM0NTST8. 
3OC0URTSQ..B0STON.I 


CAMPAIGNS    1859-71. 


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G.P.  Patnams  Soiis,^ewTbrk. 


Stanfords  Geo  graphical' Estah^ 


The  Development 


OF 


The  European  Nations 

1870-1900 


BY 


J.-  HOLLAND  ROSE,  Litt.D. 

I^ate  Scholar  of  Christ's  College,  Cambridge;  Author  of  "The  I^ife  of 
Napoleon  I,"  etc. 


Felix  qaiyoiuit  rerum  tognoscers  i-ausas'"^  \ 


f;,^i  ,'\     WITH  MARS  ;,>'> 


IN  TIVO  I^OLUMES 
VOLUME  ONE 


G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 

NEW  YORK  AND  LONDON 

Ube  1RnicJ?erbocF?er  press 

1905 


Copyright,  1905 

BV 

J.  HOLLAND  ROSE 


•2  2  0^.  ^"2. 


Ube  Ikniclierbocfecr  ipress,  flew  Jtjocft 


vsrtTT 


TO 

MY  WIFE 

WITHOUT  WHOSE   HELP 

THIS   WORK 

COULD  NOT  HAVE  BEEN  COMPLETED 


PREFACE 

THE  line  of  Virgil  quoted  on  the  title-page  represents  in 
the  present  case  a  sigh  of  aspiration,  not  a  paean  of 
achievement.  No  historical  student,  surely,  can  ever  feel 
the  conviction  that  he  has  fathomed  the  depths  of  that 
well  where  Truth  is  said  to  lie  hid.  What,  then,  must  be 
the  feelings  of  one  who  ventures  into  the  mazy  domain  of 
recent  annals,  and  essays  to  pick  his  way  through  thickets 
all  but  untrodden?  More  than  once  I  have  been  tempted 
to  give  up  the  quest  and  turn  aside  to  paths  where  pioneers 
have  cleared  the  way.  There,  at  least,  the  whereabouts 
of  that  fabulous  well  is  known  and  the  plummet  is  ready  to 
hand.  Nevertheless,  I  resolved  to  struggle  through  with 
my  task,  in  the  consciousness  that  the  work  of  a  pioneer 
may  be  helpful,  provided  that  he  carefully  notches  the 
track  and  thereby  enables  those  who  come  after  him  to 
know  what  to  seek  and  what  to  avoid. 

After  all,  there  is  no  lack  of  guides  in  the  present  age. 
The  number  of  memoir-writers  and  newspaper  correspond- 
ents is  legion;  and  I  have  come  to  believe  that  they  are 
fully  as  trustworthy  as  similar  witnesses  have  been  in  any 
age.  The  very  keenness  of  their  rivalry  is  some  guarantee 
for  truth.  Doubtless  competition  for  good  "copy"  occa- 
sionally leads  to  artful  embroidering  on  humdrum  actu- 
ality, but,  after  spending  much  time  in  scanning  similar 
embroidery  in  the  literature  of  the  Napoleonic  era,  I  \m- 


vi  Preface 

hesitatingly  place  the  work  of  Archibald  Forbes,  and  that 
of  several  knights  of  the  pen  still  living,  far  above  the 
delusive  tinsel  of  Marbot,  Thiebault,  and  Segur.  I  will 
go  farther  and  say  that,  if  we  could  find  out  what  were  the 
sources  used  by  Thucydides,  we  should  notice  qualms  of 
misgiving  shoot  through  the  circles  of  scientific  historians 
as  they  contemplated  his  majestic  work.  In  any  case,  I 
may  appeal  to  the  example  of  the  great  Athenian  in  sup- 
port of  the  thesis  that  to  tindertake  to  write  contemporary 
history  is  no  vain  thing. 

Above  and  beyond  the  accounts  of  memoir-writers  and 
newspaper  correspondents  there  are  Blue  Books.  I  am 
well  aware  that  they  do  not  always  contain  the  whole 
truth.  Sometimes  the  most  important  items  are  of  neces- 
sity omitted.  But  the  information  which  they  contain  is 
enormous ;  and,  seeing  that  the  rules  of  the  public  service 
keep  the  original  records  in  Great  Britain  closed  for  well- 
nigh  a  century,  only  the  most  fastidious  can  object  to  the 
use  of  the  wealth  of  materials  given  to  the  world  in  Par- 
liamentary Papers. 

Besides  these  published  sources  there  is  the  fund  of 
information  possessed  by  public  men  and  the  "well- 
informed"  of  various  grades.  Unfortunately  this  is  rarely 
accessible,  or  only  under  conventional  restrictions.  Here 
and  there  I  have  been  able  to  make  use  of  it  without  any 
breach  of  trust;  and  to  those  who  have  enlightened  my 
darkness  I  am  very  grateful.  The  illumination,  I  know, 
is  only  partial;  but  I  hope  that  its  effect,  in  respect  to  the 
twilight  of  diplomacy,  may  be  compared  to  that  of  the 
Aurora  Borealis  lights. 

After  working  at  my  subject  for  some  time,  I  found  it 
desirable   to   limit    it   to    events   which   had    a   distinctly 


Preface  vii 

formative  influence  on  the  development  of  European 
States.  On  questions  of  motive  and  policy  I  have  gener- 
ally refrained  from  expressing  a  decided  verdict,  seeing 
that  these  are  always  the  most  difficult  to  probe;  and 
facile  dogmatism  on  them  is  better  fitted  to  omniscient 
leaderettes  than  to  the  pages  of  an  historical  work.  At 
the  same  time,  I  have  not  hesitated  to  pronounce  a  judg- 
ment on  these  questions,  and  to  differ  from  other  writers, 
where  the  evidence  has  seemed  to  me  decisive.  To  quote 
one  instance,  I  reject  the  verdict  of  most  authorities  on 
the  question  of  Bismarck's  treatment  of  the  Ems  telegram, 
and  of  its  effect  in  the  negotiations  with  France  in  July, 
1870. 

For  the  most  part,  however,  I  have  dealt  only  with  ex- 
ternal events,  pointing  out  now  and  again  the  part  which 
they  have  played  in  the  great  drama  of  human  action  still 
going  on  around  us.  This  limitation  of  aim  has  enabled 
me  to  take  only  specific  topics,  and  to  treat  them  far  more 
fully  than  is  done  in  the  brief  chronicle  of  facts  presented 
by  MM.  Lavisse  and  Rambaud  in  the  concluding  volume 
of  their  Histoire  Generate.  Where  a  series  of  events  began 
in  the  year  1899  or  1900,  and  did  not  conclude  before  the 
time  with  which  this  narrative  closes,  I  have  left  it  on  one 
side.  Obviously  the  Boer  War  falls  under  this  head. 
Owing  to  lack  of  space  my  references  to  the  domestic  con- 
cerns of  the  United  Kingdom  have  been  brief.  I  have 
regretfully  omitted  one  imperial  event  of  great  importance, 
the  formation  of  the  Australian  Commonwealth.  After 
all,  that  concerned  only  the  British  race;  and  in  my  survey 
of  the  affairs  of  the  Empire  I  have  treated  only  those  which 
directly  affected  other  nations  as  well,  namely  the  Afghan 
and  Egyptian  questions  and  the  Partition  of  Africa.     Here 


viii  Preface 

I  have  sought  to  show  the  connection  with  "world  poli- 
tics," and  I  trust  that  even  specialists  will  find  something 
new  and  suggestive  in  this  method  of  treatment. 

In  attempting  to  write  a  history  of  contemporary  affairs, 
I  regard  it  as  essential  to  refer  to  the  original  authority,  or 
authorities,  in  the  case  of  every  important  statement.  I 
have  sought  to  carry  out  this  rule  (though  at  the  cost  of 
great  additional  toil)  because  it  enables  the  reader  to 
check  the  accuracy  of  the  narrative  and  to  gain  hints  for 
further  reading.  To  compile  bibliographies,  where  many 
new  books  are  coming  out  every  year,  is  a  useless  task; 
but  exact  references  to  the  sources  of  information  never 
lose  their  value. 

My  thanks  are  due  to  many  who  have  helped  me  in  this 
undertaking.  Among  them  I  may  name  Sir  Charles  Dilke, 
M.P.,  Mr.  James  Bryce,  M.P.,  and  Mr.  Chedo  Mijatovich, 
who  have  given  me  valuable  advice  on  special  topics.  My 
obligations  are  also  due  to  a  subject  of  the  Czar,  who  has 
placed  his  knowledge  at  my  service,  but  for  obvious  reasons 
does  not  wish  his  name  to  be  known.  Mr.  Bernard  Pares, 
M.A.,  of  the  University  of  Liverpool,  has  very  kindly  read 
over  the  proofs  of  the  early  chapters,  and  has  offered 
most  helpful  suggestions.  Messrs.  G.  Bell  &  Sons  have 
granted  me  permission  to  make  use  of  the  plans  of  the 
chief  battles  of  the  Franco-German  War  from  Mr.  Hooper's 
work,  Sedan  and  the  Downfall  of  the  Second  Empire,  pub- 
lished by  them.  To  Mr.  H.  W.  Wilson,  author  of  Iron- 
clads in  Action,  my  thanks  are  also  due  for  permission  to 
make  use  of  the  plan  illustrating  the  fighting  at  Alexandria 
in  1882. 

J.  H.  R. 

July,  1905. 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

Introduction         ........".         i 


CHAPTER  I 
The  Causes  of  the  Franco-German  War  ....       28 

CHAPTER  II 
From  Worth  to  Gravelotte        ......        58 

CHAPTER  III 
Sedan 85 

CHAPTER  IV 
The  Founding  of  the  French  Republic     ....     109 

CHAPTER  V 
The  Founding  of  the  French  Republic  {Continued)  .      135 

CHAPTER  VI 
The  German  Empire     ....... 


153 


CHAPTER  VII 
The  Eastern  Question 184 


X  Contents 

CHAPTER  VIII 

PAGE 

The  Russo-Turkish  War 225 

CHAPTER  IX 
The  Balkan  Settlement 264 

CHAPTER  X 
The  Making  of  Bulgaria 299 

CHAPTER  XI 

Nihilism  and  Absolutism  in  Russia  .        .        .        .344 


MAPS    AND    PLANS 

PAGE 

Map  of  the  Campaigns  of  1859-71       .         .         Frontispiece 

Sketch   Map   of   the   District    between    Metz    and    the 

Rhine     ..........        63 

Plan  of  the  Battle  of  Worth    .  .         .         .         ..         .70 

Plan  of  the  Battles  of  Rezonville  and  Gravelotte        .  81 

Plan  of  the  Battle  of  Sedan      ......  94 

Map  of  Bulgaria           ........  231 

Plan  of  Plevna    .........  253 

Map  of  the  Treaties  of  Berlin  and  Stefano     .         .          .  285 

Map  of  Thessaly            ........  296 


THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF 
THE   EUROPEAN   NATIONS 


INTRODUCTION 

"The  movements  in  the  masses  of  European  peoples  are  divided 
and  slow,  and  their  progress  interrupted  and  impeded,  because  they 
are  such  great  and  unequally  formed  masses;  but  the  preparation 
for  the  future  is  widely  diffused,  and  .  .  .  the  promises  of  the 
age  are  so  great  that  even  the  most  faint-hearted  rouse  themselves 
to  the  belief  that  a  time  has  arrived  in  which  it  is  a  privilege  to 
live." — Gervinus,  1853. 

THE  Roman  poet  Lucretius  in  an  oft-quoted  passage 
describes  the  satisfaction  that  naturally  fills  the  mind 
when  from  some  safe  vantage-ground  one  looks  forth  on 
travellers  tossed  about  on  the  stormy  deep.  We  may  per- 
haps use  the  poet's  not  very  altruistic  words  as  symbolising 
many  of  the  feelings  with  which,  at  the  dawn  of  the  twen- 
tieth century,  we  look  back  over  the  stormy  waters  of 
tne  century  that  has  passed  away.  Some  congratulation 
on  this  score  is  justifiable,  especially  as  those  wars  and 
revolutions  have  served  to  build  up  States  that  are  far 
stronger  than  their  predecessors,  in  proportion  as  they 
correspond  more  nearly  with  the  desires  of  the  nations  that 
compose  them. 

As  we  gaze  at  the  revolutions  and  wars  that  form  the 
storm-centres  of  the  past  century,  we  can  now  see  some  of 

VOL.    I. 1. 


2  The  European  Nations 

the  causes  that  brought  about  those  storms.  If  we  survey 
them  with  discerning  eye,  we  soon  begin  to  see  that,  in  the 
main,  the  cyclonic  disturbances  had  their  origins  in  two 
great  natural  impulses  of  the  civilised  races  of  mankind. 
The  first  of  these  forces  is  that  great  impulse  towards  indi- 
vidual liberty,  which  we  name  Democracy;  the  second  is 
that  impulse,  scarcely  less  mighty  and  elemental,  that 
prompts  men  to  effect  a  close  union  with  their  kith  and 
kin;  this  we  may  term  Nationality. 

Now,  it  is  true  that  these  two  forces  have  not  led  up  to 
the  last  and  crowning  phase  of  human  development,  as 
their  enthusiastic  champions  at  one  time  asserted  that  they 
would;  far  from  that,  they  are  accountable,  especially  so 
the  force  of  Nationality,  for  numerous  defects  in  the  life  of 
the  several  peoples;  and  the  national  principle  is  at  this 
very  time  producing  great  and  needless  friction  in  the  deal- 
ings of  nations.  Yet,  granting  all  this,  it  still  remains 
true  that  Democracy  and  Nationality  have  been  the  two 
chief  formative  influences  in  the  political  development  of 
Europe  during  the  nineteenth  century. 

In  no  age  of  the  world's  history  have  these  two  impulses 
worked  with  so  triumphant  an  activity.  They  have  not 
always  been  endowed  with  living  force.  Among  many 
peoples  they  lay  dormant  for  ages  and  were  only  called  to 
life  by  some  great  event,  such  as  the  intolerable  oppression 
of  a  despot  or  of  a  governing  caste  that  crushed  the  liberties 
of  the  individual,  or  the  domination  of  an  alien  people  over 
one  that  obstinately  refused  to  be  assimilated.  Some- 
times the  spark  that  kindled  vital  consciousness  was  the 
flash  of  a  poet's  genius,  or  the  heroism  of  some  sturdy  son 
of  the  soil.  The  causes  of  awakening  have  been  infinitely 
various,  and  have  never  wholly  died  away;    but  it  is  the 


Introduction  3 

special  glory  of  the  nineteenth  century  that  races  which 
had  hitherto  lain  helpless  and  well-nigh  dead  rose  to  man- 
hood as  if  by  magic,  and  shed  their  blood  like  water  in  the 
effort  to  secure  a  free  and  unfettered  existence  both  for  the 
individual  and  the  nation.  It  is  a  true  saying  of  the  Ger- 
man historian,  Gervinus,  "The  history  of  this  age  will  no 
longer  be  only  a  relation  of  the  lives  of  great  men  and  of 
princes,  but  a  biography  of  nations." 

At  first  sight,  this  illuminating  statement  seems  to  leave 
out  of  count  the  career  of  the  mighty  Napoleon.  But  it 
does  not.  The  great  Emperor  unconsciously  called  into 
vigorous  life  the  forces  of  Democracy  and  Nationality  both 
in  Germany  and  in  Italy  where  there  had  been  naught  but 
servility  and  disunion.  His  career,  if  viewed  from  our  pres- 
ent standpoint,  falls  into  two  portions:  first,  that  in  which 
he  figured  as  the  champion  of  Revolutionary  France  and 
the  liberator  of  Italy  from  foreign  and  domestic  tyrants ; 
and,  secondly,  as  the  imperial  autocrat  who  conquered 
and  held  down  a  great  part  of  Europe  in  his  attempt  to 
ruin  British  commerce.  In  the  former  of  these  enterprises 
he  had  the  new  forces  of  the  age  acting  with  him  and  en- 
dowing him  with  seemingly  resistless  might;  in  the  latter 
part  of  his  life  he  mistook  his  place  in  the  economy  of 
Nature,  and  by  his  violation  of  the  principles  of  individual 
liberty  and  racial  kinship  in  Spain  and  Central  Europe, 
assured  his  own  downfall. 

The  greatest  battle  of  the  century  was  the  tremendous 
strife  that  for  three  days  surged  to  and  fro  around  Leipzig 
in  the  month  of  October,  1813,  when  Russians,  Prussians, 
Austrians,  Swedes,  together  with  a  few  Britons,  Hanover- 
ians, and  finally  his  own  Saxon  allies,  combined  to  shake 
the  imperial  yoke  from  the  neck  of  the  Germanic  peoples. 


4  The  European  Nations 

This  Volkerschlacht  (Battle  of  the  Peoples),  as  the  Germans 
term  it,  decided  that  the  future  of  Europe  was  not  to  be 
moulded  by  the  imperial  autocrat,  but  by  the  will  of  the 
princes  and  nations  whom  his  obstinacy  had  embattled 
against  him.  Far  from  recognising  the  verdict,  the  great 
man  struggled  on  until  the  pertinacity  of  the  allies  finally 
drove  him  from  power  and  assigned  to  France  practically 
the  same  boundaries  that  she  had  had  in  1791,  before  the 
time  of  her  mighty  expansion.  That  is  to  say,  the  nation 
which  in  its  purely  democratic  form  had  easily  overrun 
and  subdued  the  neighbouring  States  in  the  time  of  their 
old,  inert,  semi-feudal  existence,  was  overthrown  by  them 
when  their  national  consciousness  had  been  trampled  into 
being  by  the  legions  of  the  great  Emperor. 

In  18 14,  and  again  after  Waterloo,  France  was  driven  in 
on  herself,  and  resumed  something  like  her  old  position  in 
Europe,  save  that  the  throne  of  the  Bourbons  never  ac- 
quired any  solidity — the  older  branch  of  that  family  being 
unseated  by  the  Revolution  of  1830.  In  the  centre  of  the 
Continent,  the  old  dynasties  had  made  common  cause  with 
the  peoples  in  the  national  struggles  of  1813-14,  and  there- 
fore enjoyed  more  consideration — a  fact  which  enabled 
them  for  a  time  to  repress  popular  aspirations  for  con- 
stitutional rule  and  national  unity. 

Nevertheless,  by  the  Treaties  of  Vienna  (181 4- 15)  the 
centre  of  Europe  was  more  solidly  organised  than  ever 
before.  In  place  of  the  efEete  institution  known  as  the 
Holy  Roman  Empire,  which  Napoleon  swept  away  in  1806, 
the  Central  States  were  reorganised  in  the  German  Con- 
federation— a  cumbrous  and  ineffective  league  in  which 
Austria  held  the  presidency.  Austria  also  gained  Venetia 
and  Lombardy  in  Italy.     The  acquisition  of  the  fertile 


Introduction  5 

Rhine  Province  by  Prussia  brought  that  vigorous  State  up 
to  the  bounds  of  Lorraine  and  made  her  the  natural  pro- 
tectress of  Germany  against  France.  Russia  acquired 
complete  control  over  nearly  the  whole  of  the  former  king- 
dom of  Poland.  Thus,  the  Powers  that  had  been  foremost 
in  the  struggle  against  Napoleon  now  gained  most  largely 
in  the  redistribution  of  lands  in  i8 14-15,  while  the  States 
that  had  been  friendly  to  him  now  suffered  for  their  devo- 
tion. Italy  was  split  up  into  a  mosaic  of  States;  Saxony 
ceded  nearly  the  half  of  her  lands  to  Prussia;  Denmark 
yielded  up  her  ancient  possession,  Norway,  to  the  Swedish 
Crown. 

In  some  respects  the  triumph  of  the  national  principle, 
which  had  brought  victory  to  the  old  dynasties,  strength- 
ened the  European  fabric.  The  Treaties  of  Vienna  brought 
the  boundaries  of  States  more  nearly  into  accord  with 
racial  interests  and  sentiments  than  had  been  the  case 
before ;  but  in  several  instances  those  interests  and  feelings 
were  chafed  or  violated  by  designing  or  short-sighted 
statesmen.  The  Germans,  who  had  longed  for  an  effective 
national  union,  saw  with  indignation  that  the  constitution 
of  the  new  Germanic  Confederation  left  them  under  the 
control  of  the  rulers  of  the  component  States  and  of  the 
very  real  headship  exercised  by  Austria,  which  was  always 
used  to  repress  popular  movements.  The  Italians,  who 
had  also  learned  from  Napoleon  the  secret  that  they  were 
in  all  essentials  a  nation,  deeply  resented  the  domination 
of  Austria  in  Lombardy-Venetia  and  the  parcelling  out 
of  the  rest  of  the  peninsula  between  reactionary  kings, 
somnolent  dukes,  and  obscurantist  clergy.  The  Belgians 
likewise  protested  against  the  enforced  union  with  Hol- 
land in  what  was  then  called  the  Kingdom  of  the  United 


6  The  European  Nations 

Netherlands  (1815-30).  In  the  east  of  Europe  the  Poles 
struggled  in  vain  against  the  fate  which  once  more  parti- 
tioned them  between  Russia,  Austria,  and  Prussia.  The 
Germans  of  Holstein,  Schleswig,  and  Lauenburg  submitted 
uneasil}^  to  the  Danish  rule;  and  only  under  the  stress  of 
demonstrations  by  the  allies  did  the  Norwegians  accept 
the  union  with  Sweden. 

It  should  be  carefully  noted  that  these  were  the  very 
cases  which  caused  most  of  the  political  troubles  in  the 
following  period.  In  fact,  most  of  the  political  occurrences 
on  the  Continent  in  the  years  181 5  to  1870 — the  revolts, 
revolutions,  and  wars,  that  give  a  special  character  to  the 
history  of  the  century — resulted  directly  from  the  bad  or 
imperfect  arrangements  of  the  Congress  of  Vienna  and  of 
the  so-called  Holy  Alliance  of  the  monarchs  who  sought  to 
perpetuate  them.  The  effect  of  this  widespread  discontent 
was  not  felt  at  once.  The  peoples  were  too  exhausted  by 
the  terrific  strain  of  the  Napoleonic  wars  to  do  much  for  a 
generation  or  more,  save  in  times  of  popular  excitement. 
Except  in  the  south-east  of  Europe,  where  Greece,  with  the 
aid  of  Russia,  Britain,  and  France,  wrested  her  political 
independence  from  the  grasp  of  the  Sultan  (1827),  ^^^ 
forty  years  that  succeeded  Waterloo  were  broken  by  no 
important  war;  but  they  were  marked  by  oft-recurring 
unrest  and  sedition.  Thus,  when  the  French  Revolution 
of  1830  overthrew  the  reactionary  dynasty  of  the  elder 
Bourbons,  the  universal  excitement  caused  by  this  event 
endowed  the  Belgians  with  strength  sufficient  to  shake  off 
the  heavy  yoke  of  the  Dutch;  while  in  Italy,  Germany, 
and  Poland  the  democrats  and  nationalists  (now  working 
generally  in  accord)  made  valiant  but  unsuccessful  efforts 
to  achieve  their  ideals. 


Introduction  7 

The  same  was  the  case  in  1848.  The  excitement,  which 
this  time  originated  in  Italy,  spread  to  France,  overthrew 
the  throne  of  Lotiis  Philippe  (of  the  younger  branch  of  the 
French  Bourbons),  and  bade  fair  to  roll  half  of  the  crowns 
of  Europe  into  the  gutter.  But  these  spasmodic  efforts  of 
the  democrats  speedily  failed.  Inexperience,  disunion,  and 
jealousy  paralysed  their  actions  and  yielded  the  victory  to 
the  old  Governments.  Frenchmen,  in  dismay  at  the  seem- 
ing approach  of  communism  and  anarchy,  fell  back  upon 
the  odd  expedient  of  a  Napoleonic  Republic,  which  in 
1852  was  easily  changed  by  Louis  Napoleon  into  an  Em- 
pire modelled  on  that  of  his  far  greater  uncle.  The  demo- 
crats of  Germany  achieved  some  startling  successes  over 
their  repressive  Governments  in  the  spring  of  the  year 
1848,  only  to  find  that  they  could  not  devise  a  working 
constitution  for  the  Fatherland ;  and  the  deputies  who  met 
at  the  federal  capital,  Frankfurt,  to  unify  Germany  "by 
speechifying  and  majorities,"  saw  power  slip  back  little  by 
little  into  the  hands  of  the  monarchs  and  princes.  In  the 
Austrian  Empire  nationalist  claims  and  strivings  led  to  a 
very  Babel  of  discordant  talk  and  action,  amidst  which  the 
young  Hapsburg  ruler,  Francis  Joseph,  thanks  to  Russian 
military  aid,  was  able  to  triumph  over  the  valour  of  the 
Hungarians  and  the  devotion  of  their  champion,  Kossuth, 

In  Italy  the  same  sad  tale  was  told.  In  the  spring  of 
that  year  of  revolutions,  1848,  the  rulers  in  quick  succes- 
sion granted  constitutions  to  their  subjects.  The  reform- 
ing Pope,  Pius  IX.,  and  the  patriotic  King  of  Sardinia, 
Charles  Albert,  also  made  common  cause  with  their  peoples 
in  the  effort  to  drive  out  the  Austrians  from  Lombardy- 
Venetia;  but  the  Pope  and  all  the  potentates  except 
Charles  Albert  speedily  deserted  the  popular  cause ;  friction 


8  The  European  Nations 

between  the  King  and  the  repubUcan  leaders,  Mazzini 
and  Garibaldi,  further  weakened  the  nationalists,  and  the 
Austrians  had  little  difficulty  in  crushing  Charles  Albert's 
forces,  whereupon  he  abdicated  in  favour  of  his  son,  Victor 
Emmanuel  II.  (1849).  The  Republics  set  up  at  Rome  and 
Venice  struggled  valiantly  for  a  time  against  great  odds, 
Mazzini,  Garibaldi,  and  their  volunteers  being  finally  over- 
borne at  the  Eternal  City  by  the  French  troops  whom 
Louis  Napoleon  sent  to  restore  the  Pope  (June,  1849); 
while,  two  months  later,  Venice  surrendered  to  the  Aus- 
trians whom  she  had  long  held  at  bay.  The  Queen  of  the 
Adriatic  under  the  inspiring  dictatorship  of  Manin  had 
given  a  remarkable  example  of  orderly  constitutional  gov- 
ernment in  time  of  siege. 

It  seemed  to  be  the  lot  of  the  nationalists  and  democrats 
to  produce  leaders  who  could  thrill  the  imagination  of  men 
by  lofty  teachings  and  sublime  heroism;  who  could,  in  a 
word,  achieve  everything  but  success.  A  poetess,  who 
looked  forth  from  Casa  Guidi  windows  upon  the  tragi- 
comedy of  Florentine  failure  in  those  years,  wrote  that 
what  was  needed  was  a  firmer  union,  a  more  practical  and 
intelligent  activity,  on  the  part  both  of  the  people  and  of 
the  future  leader: 

A  land's  brotherhood 
Is  most  puissant:  men,  upon  the  whole. 

Are  what  they  can  be, — nations,  what  they  would. 

Will  therefore  to  be  strong,  thou  Italy! 

Will  to  be  noble !     Austrian  Metternich 
Can  fix  no  yoke  unless  the  neck  agree. 

Whatever  hand  shall  grasp  this  oriflamme, 
Whatever  man  (last  peasant  or  first  Pope 

Seeking  to  free  his  country)  shall  appear, 
Teach,  lead,  strike  fire  into  the  masses,  fill 


Introduction  9 

These  empty  bladders  with  fine  air,  insphere 
These  wills  into  a  unity  of  will, 

And  make  of  Italy  a  nation — dear 
And  blessed  be  that  man ! 

When  Elizabeth  Barrett  Browning  penned  those  lines 
she  cannot  have  surmised  that  two  men  were  working  their 
way  up  the  rungs  of  the  political  ladder  in  Piedmont  and 
Prussia,  whose  keen  intellects  and  masterful  wills  were  to 
weld  their  Fatherlands  into  indissoluble  union  within  the 
space  of  one  momentous  decade.  These  men  were  Cavour 
and  Bismarck. 

It  would  far  exceed  the  limits  of  space  of  this  brief  In- 
troduction to  tell,  except  in  the  briefest  outline,  the  story 
of  the  plodding  preparation  and  far-seeing  diplomacy  by 
which  these  statesmen  raised  their  respective  countries 
from  depths  of  humiliation  to  undreamt-of  heights  of 
triumph.  The  first  thing  was  to  restore  the  prestige  of 
their  States.  No  people  can  be  strong  in  action  that  has 
lost  belief  in  its  own  powers  and  has  allowed  its  neighbours 
openly  to  flout  it.  The  history  of  the  world  has  shown 
again  and  again  that  politicians  who  allow  their  country 
to  be  regarded  as  une  quantite  negligeable  bequeath  to  some 
able  successor  a  heritage  of  struggle  and  war — struggle  for 
the  nation  to  recover  its  self-respect,  and  war  to  regain 
consideration  and  fair  treatment  from  others.  However 
much  frothy  talkers  in  their  clubs  may  decry  the  claims  of 
national  prestige,  no  great  statesman  has  ever  underrated 
their  importance.  Certainly  the  first  aim  both  of  Cavour 
and  Bismarck  was  to  restore  self-respect  and  confidence  to 
their  States  after  the  humiliations  and  the  dreary  isolation 
of  those  dark  years,  1848-51.  We  will  glance,  first,  at  the 
resurrection  (risorgimento)  of  the  little  Kingdom  of  Sar- 
dinia, which  was  destined  to  unify  Italy. 


lo  The  European  Nations 

Charles  Albert's  abdication  immediately  after  his  defeat 
by  the  Austrians  left  no  alternative  to  his  son  and  successor, 
Victor  Emmanuel  II.,  but  that  of  signing  a  disastrous  peace 
with  Austria.  In  a  short  time  the  stout-hearted  young 
King  called  to  his  councils  Count  Cavour,  the  second  son 
of  a  noble  Piedmontese  family,  but  of  firmly  Liberal  prin- 
ciples, who  resolved  to  make  the  little  kingdom  the  centre 
of  enlightenment  and  hope  for  despairing  Italy.  He 
strengthened  the  constitution  (the  only  one  out  of  many 
granted  in  1848  that  survived  the  time  of  reaction);  he 
reformed  the  tariff  in  the  direction  of  Free  Trade;  and 
during  the  course  of  the  Crimean  War  he  persuaded  his 
sovereign  to  make  an  active  alliance  with  France  and 
England,  so  as  to  bind  them  by  all  the  claims  of  honour 
to  help  Sardinia  in  the  future  against  Austria.  The  occa- 
sion was  most  opportune;  for  Austria  was  then  suspected 
and  disliked  both  by  Russia  and  the  Western  Powers  owing 
to  her  policy  of  armed  neutrality.  Nevertheless  the  re- 
ward of  Cavour's  diplomacy  came  slowly  and  incompletely. 
By  skilfully  vague  promises  (never  reduced  to  writing) 
Cavour  induced  Napoleon  III.  to  take  up  arms  against 
Austria;  but,  after  the  great  victory  of  Solferino  (June  24, 
1859),  the  French  Emperor  enraged  the  Italians  by  break- 
ing off  the  struggle  before  the  allies  recovered  the  great 
province  of  Venetia,  which  he  had  pledged  himself  to  do. 
Worse  still,  he  required  the  cession  of  Savoy  and  Nice  to 
France,  if  the  Central  Duchies  and  the  northern  part  of  the 
Papal  States  joined  the  Kingdom  of  Sardinia,  as  they  now 
did.  Thus,  the  net  result  of  Napoleon's  intervention  in 
Italy  was  his  acquisition  of  Savoy  and  Nice  (at  the  price  of 
Italian  hatred),  and  the  gain  of  Lombardy  and  the  central 
districts  for  the  national  cause  (1859-60). 


Introduction  1 1 

The  agony  of  mind  caused  by  this  comparative  failure 
tmdermined  Cavour's  health ;  but  in  the  last  months  of  his 
life  he  helped  to  impel  and  guide  the  revolutionary  ele- 
ments in  Italy  to  an  enterprise  that  ended  in  a  startling  and 
momentous  triumph.  This  was  nothing  less  than  the  over- 
throw of  Bourbon  rule  in  Sicily  and  Southern  Italy  by 
Garibaldi.  Thanks  to  Cavour's  connivance,  this  dashing  re- 
publican organised  an  expedition  of  about  one  thousand 
volunteers  near  Genoa,  set  sail  for  Sicily,  and  by  a  few 
blows  shivered  the  chains  of  tyranny  in  that  island.  It  is 
noteworthy  that  British  war-ships  lent  him  covert  but  most 
important  help  at  Palermo  and  again  in  his  crossing  to  the 
mainland;  this  timely  aid  and  the  presence  of  a  band  of 
Britons  in  his  ranks  laid  the  foundation  of  that  friendship 
which  has  ever  since  united  the  two  nations.  In  Calabria 
the  hero  met  with  the  feeblest  resistance  from  the  Bourbon 
troops  and  the  wildest  of  welcomes  from  the  populace.  At 
Salerno  he  took  tickets  for  Naples  and  entered  the  enemy's 
capital  by  railway  train  (September  7th).  Then  he  pur- 
posed, after  routing  the  Bourbon  force  north  of  the  city,  to 
go  on  and  attack  the  French  at  Rome  and  proclaim  a 
united  Italy. 

Cavour  took  care  that  he  should  do  no  such  thing.  The 
Piedmontese  statesman  knew  when  to  march  onwards  and 
when  to  halt.  As  his  compatriot,  Manzoni,  said  of  him, 
"Cavour  has  all  the  prudence  and  all  the  imprudence  of 
the  true  statesman."  He  had  dared  and  won  in  1855-59, 
and  again  in  secretly  encouraging  Garibaldi's  venture. 
Now  it  was  time  to  stop  in  order  to  consolidate  the  gains 
to  the  national  cause. 

The  leader  of  the  red-shirts,  having  done  what  no  king 
could  do.  was  thenceforth  to  be  controlled  by  the  monarchy 


12  The  European  Nations 

of  the  north.  Victor  Emmanuel  came  in  as  the  deus  ex 
machina;  his  troops  pressed  southwards,  occupying  the 
eastern  part  of  the  Papal  States  in  their  march,  and  joined 
hands  with  the  Garibaldians  to  the  north  of  Naples,  thus 
preventing  the  collision  with  France  which  the  irregulars 
would  have  brought  about.  Even  as  it  was,  Cavour  had 
hard  work  to  persuade  Napoleon  that  this  was  the  only  way 
of  curbing  Garibaldi  and  preventing  the  erection  of  a  South 
Italian  Republic;  but  finally  the  French  Emperor  looked 
on  uneasily  while  the  Pope's  eastern  territories  were  vio- 
lated, and  while  the  cause  of  Italian  Unity  was  assured  at 
the  expense  of  the  Pontiff  whom  France  was  officially  sup- 
porting in  Rome.  A  plebiscite,  or  mass  vote,  of  the  people 
of  Sicily,  South  Italy,  and  the  eastern  and  central  parts  of 
the  Papal  States,  was  resorted  to  by  Cavour  in  order  to 
throw  a  cloak  of  legality  over  these  irregular  proceedings. 
The  device  pleased  Napoleon,  and  it  resulted  in  an  over- 
whelming vote  in  favour  of  annexation  to  Victor  Emman- 
uel's kingdom.  Thus,  in  March,  1861,  the  soldier-king  was 
able  amidst  universal  acclaim  to  take  the  title  of  King  of 
Italy.  Florence  was  declared  to  be  the  capital  of  the  new 
realm,  which  embraced  all  parts  of  Italy  except  the  pro- 
vince of  Venetia,  pertaining  to  Austria,  and  the  "Patri- 
monium  Petri,"  that  is,  Rome  and  its  vicinity,  still  held  by 
the  Pope  and  garrisoned  by  the  French.  The  former  of 
these  was  to  be  regained  for  la  patria  in  1866,  the  latter  in 
1870,  in  consequence  of  the  mighty  triumphs  then  achieved 
by  the  principle  of  nationality  in  Prussia  and  Germany. 
To  these  triumphs  we  must  now  briefly  advert. 

No  one  who  looked  at  the  state  of  European  politics  in 
186 1  could  have  imagined  that  in  less  than  ten  years  Prussia 
would  have  waged  three  wars  and  humbled  the  might  of 


Introduction  13 

Austria  and  France.  At  that  time  she  showed  no  signs  of 
exceptional  vigour;  she  had  as  yet  produced  no  leaders  so 
inspiring  as  Mazzini  and  Garibaldi,  no  statesman  so  able  as 
Cavour.  Her  new  king,  William,  far  from  arousing  the 
feelings  of  growing  enthusiasm  that  centred  in  Victor 
Emmanuel,  was  more  and  more  distrusted  and  disliked  by- 
Liberals  for  the  policy  of  militarism  on  which  he  had  just 
embarked.  In  fact,  the  Hohenzollem  dynasty  was  passing 
into  a  "conflict  time"  with  its  Parliament  which  threat- 
ened to  impair  the  influence  of  Prussia  abroad  and  to  retard 
her  recovery  from  the  period  of  humiliations  through  which 
she  had  recently  passed. 

A  brief  recital  of  those  humiliations  is  desirable  as  show- 
ing, firstly,  the  suddenness  with  which  the  affairs  of  a  nation 
may  go  to  ruin  in  slack  and  imskilful  hands,  and,  secondly, 
the  immense  results  that  can  be  achieved  in  a  few  years  by 
a  small  band  of  able  men  who  throw  their  whole  heart  into 
the  work  of  national  regeneration. 

The  previous  ruler,  Frederick  William  IV.,  was  a  gifted 
and  learned  man,  but  he  lacked  soundness  of  judgment 
and  strength  of  will — qualities  which  are  of  more  worth  in 
governing  than  graces  of  the  intellect.  At  the  time  of  the 
revolutionary  outbreaks  of  1848  he  capitulated  to  the  Ber- 
lin mob  and  declared  for  a  constitutional  regime  in  which 
Prussia  should  merge  herself  in  Germany;  but  when  the 
excesses  of  the  democrats  had  weakened  their  authority, 
he  put  them  down  by  military  force,  refused  the  German 
Crown  offered  him  by  the  popularly  elected  German  Parlia- 
ment assembled  at  Frankfurt-on-the-Main  (April,  1849); 
and  thereupon  attempted  to  form  a  smaller  union  of  States, 
namely,  Prussia,  Saxony,  and  Hanover.  This  Three  Kings' 
League,  as  it  was  called,  soon  came  to  an  end;  for  it  did  not 


14  The  European  Nations 

satisfy  the  nationalists  who  wished  to  see  Germany  united, 
the  constitutionaHsts  who  aimed  at  the  supremacy  of  Par- 
liament, or  the  friends  of  the  old  order  of  things.  The 
vacillations  of  Frederick  William  and  the  unpractical 
theorisings  of  the  German  Parliament  at  Frankfurt  having 
aroused  general  disgust,  Austria  found  little  difficulty  in 
restoring  the  power  of  the  old  Germanic  Confederation  in 
September,  1850.  Strong  in  her  alliance  with  Russia,  she 
next  compelled  Frederick  William  to  sign  the  Convention 
of  Olmiitz  (November,  1850).  By  this  humiliating  com- 
pact he  agreed  to  forbear  helping  the  German  nationalists 
in  Schleswig-Holstein  to  shake  off  the  oppressive  rule  of 
the  Danes ;  to  withdraw  Prussian  troops  from  Hesse-Cassel 
and  Baden,  where  strifes  had  broken  out;  and  to  acknow- 
ledge the  supremacy  of  the  old  Federal  Diet  under  the 
headship  of  Austria.  Thus,  it  seemed  that  the  Prussian 
monarchy  was  a  source  of  weakness  and  disunion  for  North 
Germany,  and  that  Austria,  backed  up  by  the  might  of 
Russia,  must  long  continue  to  lord  it  over  the  cumbrous 
Germanic  Confederation. 

But  a  young  country  squire,  named  Bismarck,  even  then 
resolved  that  the  Prussian  monarchy  should  be  the  means 
of  strengthening  and  binding  together  the  Fatherland. 
The  resolve  bespoke  the  patriotism  of  a  sturdy,  hopeful 
nature ;  and  the  young  Bismarck  was  nothing  if  not  patri- 
otic, sturdy,  and  hopeful.  The  son  of  an  ancient  family  in 
the  Mark  of  Brandenburg,  he  brought  to  his  life-work 
powers  inherited  from  a  line  of  fighting  ancestors ;  and  his 
mind  was  no  less  robust  than  his  body.  Quick  at  mastering 
a  mass  of  details,  he  soon  saw  into  the  heart  of  a  problem, 
and  his  solution  of  it  was  marked  both  by  unfailing  skill 
and  bv  sound  common-sense  as  to  the  choice  of  men  and 


Introduction    '  15 

means.  In  some  respects  he  resembles  Napoleon  the  Great. 
Granted  that  he  was  his  inferior  in  the  width  of  vision  and 
the  versatility  of  gifts  that  mark  a  world-genius,  yet  he 
was  his  equal  in  diplomatic  resourcefulness  and  in  the  power 
of  dealing  lightning  strokes;  while  his  possession  of  the 
priceless  gift  of  moderation  endowed  his  greatest  political 
achievements  with  a  soundness  and  solidity  never  possessed 
by  those  of  the  mighty  conqueror  who  "sought  to  give  the 
mot  d'ordre  to  the  universe."  If  the  figure  of  the  Prussian 
does  not  loom  so  large  on  the  canvas  of  universal  history 
as  that  of  the  Corsican — if  he  did  not  tame  a  Revolution, 
remodel  society,  and  reorganise  a  continent — be  it  remem- 
bered that  he  made  a  United  Germany,  while  Napoleon  the 
Great  left  France  smaller  and  weaker  than  he  found  her. 

Bismarck's  first  efforts,  like  those  of  Cavour  for  Sardinia, 
were  directed  to  the  task  of  restoring  the  prestige  of  his 
State.  Early  in  his  official  career,  the  Prussian  patriot 
urged  the  expediency  of  befriending  Russia  during  the 
Crimean  War,  and  he  thus  helped  on  that  rapprochement 
between  Berlin  and  St.  Petersburg  which  brought  the 
mighty  triumphs  of  1866  and  1870  within  the  range  of 
possibility.  In  1857  Frederick  William  became  insane; 
and  his  brother  William  took  the  reins  of  Government  as 
Regent,  and  early  in  1861  as  King.  The  new  ruler  was  less 
gifted  than  his  unfortunate  brother;  but  his  homely 
common-sense  and  tenacious  will  strengthened  Prussian 
policy  where  it  had  been  weakest.  He  soon  saw  the 
worth  of  Bismarck,  employed  him  in  high  diplomatic 
positions,  and  when  the  royal  proposals  for  strengthening 
the  army  were  decisively  rejected  by  the  Prussian  House 
of  Representatives,  he  speedily  sent  for  Bismarck  to  act 
as  Minister-President  (Prime  Minister)    and  "tame"  the 


1 6  The  European  Nations 

refractory  Parliament.  The  constitutional  crisis  was  be- 
coming more  and  more  acute  when  a  great  national 
question  came  into  prominence  owing  to  the  action  of 
the  Danes  in  Schleswig-Holstein  affairs. 

Without  entering  into  the  very  tangled  web  of  customs, 
treaties,  and  dynastic  claims  that  made  up  the  Schleswig- 
Holstein  question,  we  may  here  state  that  those  Duchies 
were  by  ancient  law  very  closely  connected  together,  that 
the  King  of  Denmark  was  only  Duke  of  Schleswig-Holstein, 
and  that  the  latter  duchy,  wholly  German  in  population, 
formed  part  of  the  Germanic  Confederation.  Latterly  the 
fervent  nationalists  in  Denmark,  while  leaving  Holstein  to 
its  German  connections,  had  resolved  thoroughly  to 
"Danify"  Schleswig,  the  northern  half  of  which  was 
wholly  Danish,  and  they  pressed  on  this  policy  by  harsh 
and  intolerant  measures,  making  it  difficult  or  well-nigh 
impossible  for  the  Germans  to  have  public  worship  in  their 
own  tongue  and  to  secure  German  teachers  for  their  chil- 
dren in  the  schools.  Matters  were  already  in  a  very 
strained  state,  when,  shortly  before  the  death  of  King 
Frederick  VII.  of  Denmark  (November,  1863),  the  Rigsraad 
at  Copenhagen  sanctioned  a  constitution  for  Schleswig 
which  would  practically  have  made  it  a  part  of  the  Danish 
monarchy.  The  King  gave  his  assent  to  it,  an  act  which 
his  successor.  Christian  IX.,  ratified. 

Now,  this  action  violated  the  last  treaty,  that  signed  by 
the  Powers  at  London  in  1852,  which  settled  the  affairs  of 
the  Duchies;  and  Bismarck  therefore  had  strong  ground 
for  appealing  to  the  Powers  concerned,  as  also  to  the  Ger- 
man Confederation,  against  this  breach  of  treaty  obliga- 
tions. The  Powers,  especially  England  and  France,  sought 
to  set  things  straight,  but  the  efforts  of  our  Foreign  Minis- 


Introduction  17 

ter,  Lord  John  Russell,  had  no  effect.  The  German  Con- 
federation also  refused  to  take  any  steps  about  Schleswig 
as  being  outside  its  jurisdiction.  Bismarck  next  persuaded 
Austria  to  help  Prussia  in  defeating  Danish  designs  on  that 
duchy.  The  Danes,  on  the  other  hand,  counted  on  the  un- 
official expressions  of  sympathy  which  came  from  the 
people  of  Great  Britain  and  France  at  sight  of  a  small  State 
menaced  by  two  powerful  monarchies.  In  fact,  the  whole 
situation  was  complicated  by  this  explosion  of  feeling, 
which  seemed  to  the  Danes  to  portend  the  armed  interven- 
tion of  the  Western  States,  especially  England,  on  their 
behalf.  As  far  as  is  known,  no  official  assurance  to  that 
effect  ever  went  forth  from  London.  In  fact,  it  is  certain 
that  Queen  Victoria  absolutely  forbade  any  such  step ;  but 
the  mischief  done  by  sentimental  orators,  heedless  news- 
paper editors,  and  factious  busy  bodies,  could  not  be  un- 
done. As  Lord  John  Russell  afterwards  stated  in  a  short 
Essay  on  the  Policy  of  England:  "It  pleased  some  English 
advisers  of  great  influence  to  meddle  in  this  affair;  they 
were  successful  in  thwarting  the  British  Government,  and 
in  the  end,  with  the  professed  view,  and  perhaps  the  real 
intention,  of  helping  Denmark,  their  friendship  tended  to 
deprive  her  of  Holstein  and  Schleswig  altogether."  This 
final  judgment  of  a  veteran  statesman  is  worth  quoting  as 
showing  his  sense  of  the  mischief  done  by  well-meant  but 
misguided  sympathy,  which  pushed  the  Danes  on  to  ruin 
and  embittered  our  relations  with  Prussia  for  many  years. 
Not  that  the  conduct  of  the  German  Powers  was  flawless. 
On  January  i6,  1864,  they  sent  to  Copenhagen  a  demand 
for  the  withdrawal  of  the  constitution  for  Schleswig  within 
two  days.  The  Danish  Foreign  Minister  pointed  out  that, 
as  the  Rigsraad  was  not  in  session,  this  could  not  possibly 

VOL.  I. — 2. 


i8  The  European  Nations 

be  done  within  two  days.  In  this  last  step,  then,  the 
German  Powers  were  undoubtedly  the  aggressors. i  The 
Prussian  troops  were  ready  near  the  River  Eider,  and  at 
once  invaded  Schleswig.  The  Danes  were  soon  beaten  on 
the  mainland;  then  a  pause  occurred,  during  which  a 
conference  of  the  Powers  concerned  was  held  at  London. 
It  has  been  proved  by  the  German  historian,  von  Sybel, 
that  the  first  serious  suggestion  to  Prussia  that  she  should 
take  both  the  Duchies  came  secretly  from  Napoleon  III. 
It  was  in  vain  that  Lord  John  Russell  suggested  a  sensible 
compromise,  namely,  the  partition  of  Schleswig  between 
Denmark  and  Germany  according  to  the  language-frontier 
inside  the  Duchy.  To  this  the  belligerents  demurred  on 
points  of  detail,  the  Prussian  representative  asserting  that 
he  would  not  leave  a  single  German  under  Danish  rule. 
The  war  was  therefore  resumed,  and  ended  in  a  complete 
defeat  for  the  weaker  State,  which  finally  surrendered  both 
Duchies  to  Austria  and  Prussia  (1864). 2 

The  question  of  the  sharing  of  the  Duchies  now  formed 
one  of  the  causes  of  the  far  greater  war  between  the  victors ; 
but,  in  truth,  it  was  only  part  of  the  much  larger  question, 

*  Lord  Wodehouse  (afterwards  Earl  of  Kimberley)  was  at  that 
time  sent  on  a  special  mission  to  Copenhagen.  When  his  official 
correspondence  is  published,  it  will  probably  throw  light  on  many 
points. 

2  Sybel,  Die  Begrundung  des  deutschen  Reiches,  iii.,  pp.  299-344; 
D^bidour,  Hist,  diplomatique  de  I'Europe,  ii.,  pp.  261-273;  Lowe, 
Life  of  Bismarck,  i.,  chap.  vi. ;  Headlam,  Bismarck,  chap.  viii.  •. 
Lord  Malmesbury,  Memoirs  of  an  ex-Minister,  pp.  584-593  (small 
edition);   Spencer  Walpole,  Life  of  Lord  J.  Russell,  ii.,  pp.  396-411. 

In  several  respects  the  cause  of  ruin  to  Denmark  in  1863-64 
bears  a  remarkable  resemblance  to  that  which  produced  war  in 
South  Africa  in  1899,  viz. ,  high-handed  action  of  a  minority  towards 
men  whom  they  treated  as  Outlanders,  the  stiff-necked  obstinacy 
of  the  smaller  State,  and  reliance  on  the  vehement  but  (probably) 
unofficial  offers  of  help  or  intervention  by  other  nations. 


Introduction  19 

which  had  agitated  Germany  for  centuries,  whether  the 
balance  of  power  should  belong  to  the  North  or  the  South. 
Bismarck  also  saw  that  the  time  was  nearly  ripe  for  settling 
this  matter  once  for  all  in  favour  of  Prussia;  but  he  had 
hard  work  even  to  persuade  his  own  sovereign;  while  the 
Prussian  Parliament,  as  well  as  public  opinion  throughout 
Germany,  was  violently  hostile  to  his  schemes  and  favoured 
the  claims  of  the  young  Duke  of  Augustenburg  to  the 
Duchies — claims  that  had  much  show  of  right.  Matters 
were  patched  up  for  a  time  between  the  two  German  States 
by  the  Convention  of  Gastein  (August,  1865),  while  in 
reality  each  prepared  for  war  and  sought  to  gain  allies. 

Here  again  Bismarck  was  successful.  After  vainly  seek- 
ing to  buy  Venetia  from  the  Austrian  Court,  Italy  agreed 
to  side  with  Prussia  against  that  Power  in  order  to  wrest  by 
force  a  province  which  she  could  not  hope  to  gain  peaceably. 
Russia,  too,  was  friendly  to  the  Court  of  Berlin,  owing  to  the 
help  which  the  latter  had  given  her  in  crushing  the  formida- 
ble revolt  of  the  Poles  in  1863.  It  remained  to  keep  France 
quiet.  In  this  Bismarck  thought  he  had  succeeded  by 
means  of  interviews  which  he  held  with  Napoleon  III.  at 
Biarritz  (November,  1865).  What  there  transpired  is  not 
clearly  known.  That  Bismarck  played  on  the  Emperor's 
foible  for  oppressed  nationalities,  in  the  case  of  Italy,  is 
fairly  certain;  that  he  fed  him  with  hopes  of  gaining  Bel- 
gium, or  a  slice  of  German  land,  is  highly  probable,  and 
none  the  less  so  because  he  later  on  indignantly  denied  in 
the  Reichstag  that  he  ever  "held  out  the  prospect  to  any- 
body of  ceding  a  single  German  village,  or  even  as  much  as 
a  clover-field."  In  any  case  Napoleon  seems  to  have  pro- 
mised to  observe  neutrality — not  because  he  loved  Prussia, 
but  because  he  expected  the  German  Powers  to  wear  one 


20  The  European  Nations 

another  out  and  thus  leave  him  master  of  the  situation. 
In  common  with  most  of  the  wiseacres  of  those  days  he 
believed  that  Prussia  and  Italy  would  ultimately  fall  before 
the  combined  weight  of  Austria  and  of  the  German  States, 
which  closely  followed  her  in  the  Confederation ;  whereupon 
he  could  step  in  and  dictate  his  own  terms. ^ 

Bismarck  and  the  leaders  of  the  Prussian  army  had  few 
doubts  as  to  the  result.  They  were  determined  to  force  on 
the  war,  and  early  in  June,  1866,  brought  forward  proposals 
at  the  Frankfurt  Diet  for  the  "reform"  of  the  German 
Confederation,  the  chief  of  them  being  the  exclusion  of 
Austria,  the  establishment  of  a  German  Parliament  elected 
by  manhood  suffrage,  and  the  formation  of  a  North  Ger- 
man army  commanded  by  the  King  of  Prussia. 

A  great  majority  of  the  Federal  Diet  rejected  these 
proposals,  and  war  speedily  broke  out,  Austria  being  sup- 
ported by  nearly  all  the  German  States  except  the  two 
Mecklenburgs. 

The  weight  of  numbers  was  against  Prussia,  even  though 
she  had  the  help  of  the  Italians  operating  against  Venetia. 
On  that  side  Austria  was  completely  successful,  as  also  in 
a  sea-fight  near  Lissa  in  the  Adriatic ;  but  in  the  north  the 
Hapsburgs  and  their  German  allies  soon  found  out  that 

»  Busch,  Our  Chancellor,  ii.,  p.  17  (Eng.  edit.);  D^bidour,  His- 
toire  diplomatique  de  I'Europe  (1814-1878),  ii.,  pp.  291-293.  Lord 
Loftus  in  his  Diplomatic  Reminiscences  (ii.,  p.  280)  says:  "So  satis- 
fied was  Bismarck  that  he  could  count  on  the  neutrality  of  France, 
that  no  defensive  military  measures  were  taken  on  the  Rhine  and 
western  frontier.  He  had  no  fears  of  Russia  on  the  eastern  frontier, 
and  was  therefore  able  to  concentrate  the  military  might  of  Prussia 
against  Austria  and  her  South  German  allies." 

Light  has  been  thrown  on  the  bargainings  between  Italy  and 
Prussia  by  the  Memoirs  of  General  Govone,  who  found  Bismarck  a 
hard  bargainer. 


Introduction  2 1 

organisation,  armament,  and  genius  count  for  more  than 
numbers.  The  great  organiser,  von  Roon,  had  brought 
Prussia's  citizen  army  to  a  degree  of  efficiency  that  sur- 
prised every  one;  and  the  quick-firing  "needle-gun"  dealt 
havoc  and  terror  among  the  enemy.  Using  to  the  full  the 
advantage  of  her  central  position  against  the  German  States, 
Prussia  speedily  worsted  their  isolated  and  badly  handled 
forces,  while  her  chief  armies  overthrew  those  of  Austria  and 
Saxony  in  Bohemia.  The  Austrian  plan  of  campaign  had 
been  to  invade  Prussia  by  two  armies — a  comparatively 
small  force  advancing  from  Cracow  as  a  base  into  Silesia, 
while  another,  acting  from  Olmiitz,  advanced  through 
Bohemia  to  join  the  Saxons  and  march  on  Berlin,  some 
50,000  Bavarians  joining  them  in  Bohemia  for  the  same 
enterprise.  This  design  speedily  broke  down  owing  to  the 
short-sighted  timidity  of  the  Bavarian  Government,  which 
refused  to  let  its  forces  leave  their  own  territory ;  the  lack 
of  railway  facilities  in  the  Austrian  Empire  also  hampered 
the  moving  of  two  large  armies  to  the  northern  frontier. 
Above  all,  the  swift  and  decisive  movements  of  the  Prus- 
sians speedily  drove  the  allies  to  act  on  the  defensive — it- 
self a  grave  misfortune  in  war. 

Meanwhile  the  Prussian  strategist,  von  Moltke,  was 
carrying  out  a  far  more  incisive  plan  of  operations,  that  of 
sending  three  Prussian  armies  into  the  middle  of  Bohemia, 
and  there  forming  a  great  mass  which  would  sweep  away 
all  obstacles  from  the  road  to  Vienna.  This  design  received 
prompt  and  skilful  execution.  Saxony  was  quickly  over- 
run, and  the  irruption  of  three  great  armies  into  Bohemia 
compelled  the  Austrians  and  their  Saxon  allies  hurriedly  to 
alter  their  plans.  After  suffering  several  reverses  in  the 
north  of  Bohemia,  their  chief  array  under  Benedek  barred 


2  2  The  European  Nations 

the  way  of  the  two  northern  Prussian  arimes  on  the  heights 
north  of  the  town  of  Koniggratz.  On  the  morning  of  July 
3rd  the  defenders  long  beat  off  all  frontal  attacks  with 
heavy  loss;  but  about  2  p.m.  the  Army  of  Silesia,  under  the 
Crown  Prince  Frederick  of  Prussia,  after  a  forced  march 
of  twelve  miles,  threw  itself  on  their  right  flank,  where 
Benedek  expected  no  very  serious  onset.  After  desperate 
fighting  the  Army  of  Silesia  carried  the  village  of  Chlum  in 
the  heart  of  the  Austrian  position,  and  compelled  Austrians 
and  Saxons  to  a  hurried  retreat  over  the  Elbe.  In  this  the 
Austrian  infantry  was  saved  from  destruction  by  the  heroic 
stand  made  by  the  artillery.  Even  so,  the  allies  lost  more 
than  13,000  killed  and  wounded,  22,000  prisoners,  and  187 
guns.i 

Koniggratz  (or  Sadowa,  as  it  is  often  called)  decided  the 
whole  campaign.  The  invaders  now  advanced  rapidly 
towards  Vienna,  and  at  the  town  of  Nikolsburg  conclud- 
ed the  Preliminaries  of  Peace  with  Austria  (July  26th), 
whereupon  a  mandate  came  from  Paris,  bidding  them  stop. 
In  fact,  the  Emperor  of  the  French  offered  his  intervention 
in  a  manner  most  threatening  to  the  victors.  He  sought 
to  detach  Italy  from  the  Prussian  alliance  by  the  offer  of 
Venetia  as  a  left-handed  present  from  himself — an  offer 
which  the  Italian  Government  subsequently  refused. 

To  understand  how  Napoleon  III.  came  to  change  front 
and  belie  his  earlier  promises,  one  must  look  behind  the 
scenes.  Enough  is  already  known  to  show  that  the  Em- 
peror's hand  was  forced  by  his  Ministers  and  by  the  Parisian 
Press,  probably  also  by  the  Empress  Eugenie.     Though 

1  Sybel,  Die  Begrtindung  des  deutschen  Retches,  v.,  pp.  174-205; 
Journals  of  Field  Marshal  Count  von  Blumenthal  for  1866  and  1871 
(Eng.  edit.),  pp.  37-44- 


Introduction  23 

desirous,  apparently,  of  befriending  Prussia,  he  had  already 
yielded  to  their  persistent  pleas  urging  him  to  stay  the 
growth  of  the  Protestant  Power  of  North  Germany.  On 
June  loth,  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  he  secretly  concluded 
a  treaty  with  Austria,  holding  out  to  her  the  prospect  of 
recovering  the  great  province  of  Silesia  (torn  from  her  by 
Frederick  the  Great  in  1740)  in  return  for  a  magnanimous 
cession  of  Venetia  to  Italy.  The  news  of  Koniggratz  led 
to  a  violent  outburst  of  anti- Prussian  feeling ;  but  Napoleon 
refused  to  take  action  at  once,  when  it  might  have  been 
very  effective. 

The  best  plan  for  the  French  Government  would  have 
been  to  send  to  the  Rhine  all  the  seasoned  troops  left  avail- 
able by  Napoleon  III.'s  ill-starred  Mexican  enterprise,  so 
as  to  help  the  hard-pressed  South  German  forces,  offering 
also  the  armed  mediation  of  France  to  the  combatants. 
In  that  case  Prussia  must  have  drawn  back,  and  Napoleon 
III.  cotdd  have  dictated  his  own  terms  to  Central  Europe. 
But  his  earlier  leanings  towards  Prussia  and  Italy,  the  ad- 
vice of  Prince  Napoleon  ("  Plon-Plon")  and  Lavalette,  and 
the  wheedlings  of  the  Prussian  ambassador  as  to  compensa- 
tions which  France  might  gain  as  a  set-off  to  Prussia's 
aggrandisement,  told  on  the  French  Emperor's  nature, 
always  some  what  sluggish  and  then  prostrated  by  severe 
internal  pain;  with  the  result  that  he  sent  his  proposals 
for  a  settlement  of  the  points  in  dispute,  but  took  no  steps 
towards  enforcing  them.  A  fortnight  thus  slipped  away, 
during  which  the  Prussians  reaped  the  full  fruits  of  their 
triumph  at  Koniggratz;  and  it  was  not  until  July  29th, 
three  days  after  the  preliminaries  of  peace  were  signed, 
that  the  French  Foreign  Minister,  Drouyn  de  Lhuys, 
worried  his  master,  then  prostrate  with  pain  at  Vichy,  into 


24  The  European  Nations 

sanctioning  the  following  demands  from  victorious  Prussia: 
the  cession  to  France  of  the  Rhenish  Palatinate  (belonging 
to  Bavaria),  the  south-western  part  of  Hesse  Darmstadt, 
and  that  part  of  Prussia's  Rhine-Province  lying  in  the 
valley  of  the  Saar  which  she  had  acquired  after  Waterloo. 
This  would  have  brought  within  the  French  frontier  the 
great  fortress  of  Mainz  (Mayence);  but  the  great  mass  of 
these  gains,  it  will  be  observed,  would  have  been  at  the 
expense  of  South  German  States,  whose  cause  France  pro- 
claimed her  earnest  desire  to  uphold  against  the  encroach- 
ing power  of  Prussia. 

Bismarck  took  care  to  have  an  official  copy  of  these  de- 
mands in  writing,  the  use  of  which  will  shortly  appear;  and 
having  procured  this  precious  document,  he  defied  the 
French  envoy,  telling  him  that  King  William,  rather  than 
agree  to  such  a  surrender  of  German  land,  would  make 
peace  with  Austria  and  the  German  States  on  any  terms, 
and  invade  France  at  the  head  of  the  forces  of  a  united 
Germany.  This  reply  caused  another  change  of  front  at 
Naj)oleon's  Court.  The  demands  were  disavowed  and  the 
Foreign  Minister,  Drouyn  de  Lhuys,  resigned. i 

The  completeness  of  Prussia's  triumph  over  Austria  and 
her  German  allies,  together  with  the  preparations  of  the 
Hungarians  for  revolt,  decided  the  Court  of  Vienna  to 
accept  the  Prussian  terms  which  were  embodied  in  the 
Treaty  of  Prague  (August  a-3rd) ;  they  were,  the  direct 
cession  of  Venetia  to  Italy ;  the  exclusion  of  Austria  from 
German  affairs  and  her  acceptance  of  the  changes  there 
pending ;  the  cession  to  Prussia  of  Sehleswig-Holstein ;  and 

'  Sybol,  op.  cil.,  v.,  pp.  365-374.  D6bidour,  op.  cit.,  ii.,  pp.  3  15- 
318.  Sec,  too,  volume  viii.  of  Ollivicr's  work,  L' Empire  liberal, 
published  in  1904;  and  M.  dc  la  Gorce's  work,  Histoire  du  second 
Empire,  vi.  (Paris,  1903). 


Introduction  25 

the  payment  of  20,000,000  thalcrs  (about  ;^3,ooo,ooo)  as 
war  indemnity.  The  lenience  of  these  conditions  was  to 
have  a  very  noteworthy  result,  namely,  the  speedy  recon- 
ciliation of  the  two  Powers :  within  twenty  years  they  were 
firmly  united  in  the  Triple  Alliance  with  Italy  (see  Chap- 
ter X.). 

Some  difficulties  stood  in  the  way  of  peace  between 
Prussia  and  her  late  enemies  in  the  German  Confederation, 
especially  Bavaria.  These  last  were  removed  when  Bis- 
marck privately  disclosed  to  the  Bavarian  Foreign  Minister 
the  secret  demand  made  by  France  for  the  cession  of  the 
Bavarian  Palatinate.  In  the  month  of  August,  the  South 
German  States,  Bavaria,  Wtirtemberg,  and  Baden,  ac- 
cepted Prussia's  terms;  whereby  they  paid  small  war  in- 
demnities and  recognised  the  new  constitution  of  Germany. 
Outwardly  they  formed  a  South  German  Confederation; 
but  this  had  a  very  shadowy  existence ;  and  the  three  States 
by  secret  treaties  with  Prussia  agreed  to  place  their  armies 
and  all  military  arrangements,  in  case  of  war,  under  the 
control  of  the  King  of  Prussia.  Thus  within  a  month 
from  the  close  of  "the  Seven  Weeks'  War,"  the  whole  of 
Germany  was  quietly  but  firmly  bound  to  common  action 
in  military  matters;  and  the  actions  of  France  left  little 
doubt  as  to  the  need  of  these  timely  precautions. 

On  those  German  Satets  which  stood  in  the  way  of 
Prussia's  territorial  develo7)ment  and  had  shown  marked 
hostility,  Bismarck  bore  hard.  The  Kingdom  of  Hanover, 
Electoral  Hesse  (Hesse-Cassel),  the  Duchy  of  Nassau,  and 
the  Free  City  of  Frankfurt  were  annexed  outright,  Prussia 
thereby  gaining  direct  contact  with  her  Westphalian  and 
Rhenish  Provinces.  The  absorption  of  Frankfurt-on-the- 
Main,  and  the  formation  of  a  new  league,  the  North  German 


26  The  European  Nations 

Confederation,  swept  away  all  the  old  federal  machinery, 
and  marked  out  Berlin,  not  Vienna  or  Frankfurt,  as  the 
future  governing  centre  of  the  Fatherland.  It  was  doubt- 
less a  perception  of  the  vast  gains  to  the  national  cause 
which  prompted  the  Prussian  Parliament  to  pass  a  Bill  of 
Indemnity  exonerating  the  King's  Ministers  for  the  illegal 
acts  committed  by  them  during  the  "conflict  time"  (1861- 
66) — acts  which  saved  Prussia  in  spite  of  her  Parliament. 

Constitutional  freedom  likewise  benefited  largely  by  the 
results  of  the  war.  The  new  North  German  Confederation 
was  based  avowedly  on  manhood  suffrage,  not  because 
either  King  William  or  Bismarck  loved  democracy,  but 
because,  after  lately  pledging  themselves  to  it  as  the  ground- 
work of  reform  of  the  old  Confederation,  they  could  not 
draw  back  in  the  hour  of  triumph.  As  Bismarck  after- 
wards confessed  to  his  Secretary,  Dr.  Busch,  "I  accepted 
imiversal  suffrage,  but  with  reluctance,  as  a  Frankfurt 
tradition  "  (i.  e.,  of  the  democratic  Parliament  of  Frank- 
furt in  1848).^  All  the  lands,  therefore,  between  the 
Niemen  and  the  Main  were  bound  together  in  a  Confedera- 
tion based  on  constitutional  principles,  though  the  govern- 
ing powers  of  the  King  and  his  Ministers  continued  to  be 
far  larger  than  is  the  case  in  Great  Britain.  To  this  matter 
we  shall  recur  when  we  treat  of  the  German  Empire, 
formed  by  the  union  of  the  North  and  South  German  Con- 
federations of  1866. 

Austria  also  was  soon  compelled  to  give  way  before  the 
persistent  demands  of  the  Hungarian  patriots  for  their 
ancient  constitution,  which  happily  blended  monarchy  and 
democracy.  Accordingly,  the  centralised  Hapsburg  mon- 
archy was  remodelled  by  the  Ausgleich  (compromise)  of 

>  Busch,  O^ir  Chancellor,  ii.,  p.  196  (English  edit.). 


Introduction  27 

1867,  and  became  the  Dual  Monarchy  of  Austria-Hungary, 
the  two  parts  of  the  realm  being  ruled  quite  separately  for 
most  purposes  of  government,  and  united  only  for  those 
of  army  organisation,  foreign  policy,  and  finance.  Parlia- 
mentary control  became  dominant  in  each  part  of  the 
Empire;  and  the  grievances  resulting  from  autocratic  or 
bureaucratic  rule  vanished  from  Hungary.  They  disap- 
peared also  from  Hanover  and  Hesse-Cassel,  where  the 
Guelf  sovereigns  and  Electors  had  generally  repressed 
popular  movements. 

Greatest  of  all  the  results  of  the  war  of  1866,  however, 
was  the  gain  to  the  national  cause  in  Germany  and  Italy. 
Peoples  that  had  long  been  divided  were  now  in  the  brief 
space  of  three  months  brought  within  sight  of  the  long- 
wished-for  unity.  The  rush  of  these  events  blinded  men 
to  their  enduring  import  and  produced  an  impression  that 
the  Prussian  triumph  was  like  that  of  Napoleon  I.,  too 
sudden  and  brilliant  to  last.  Those  who  hazarded  this 
verdict  forgot  that  his  political  arrangements  for  Europe 
violated  every  instinct  of  national  solidarity;  while  those 
of  1866  served  to  group  the  hitherto  divided  peoples  of 
North  Germany  and  Italy  around  the  monarchies  that  had 
proved  to  be  the  only  possible  rallying  points  in  their  re- 
spective countries.  It  was  this  harmonising  of  the  claims 
and  aspirations  of  monarchy,  nationality,  and  democracy 
that  gave  to  the  settlement  of  1866  its  abiding  importance, 
and  fitted  the  two  peoples  for  the  crowning  triumph  of 
1870. 


CHAPTER  I 

THE    CAUSES    OF    THE    FRANCO-GERMAN    WAR 

"After  the  fatal  year  1866,  the  Empire  was  in  a  state  of  decad- 
ence."— L.  Gregoire,  Histoire  de  France. 

THE  irony  of  history  is  nowhere  more  manifest  than  in 
the  curious  destiny  which  called  a  Napoleon  III.  to 
the  place  once  occupied  by  Napoleon  I.,  and  at  the  very 
time  when  the  national  movements,  unwittingly  called  to 
vigorous  life  by  the  great  warrior,  were  attaining  to  the 
full  strength  of  manhood.  Napoleon  III.  was  in  many 
ways  a  well-meaning  dreamer,  who,  unluckily  for  himself, 
allowed  his  dreams  to  encroach  on  his  waking  moments. 
In  truth,  his  sluggish  but  very  persistent  mind  never  saw 
quite  clearly  where  dreams  must  give  way  to  realities;  or, 
as  M.  de  Falloux  phrased  it,  "He  does  not  know  the  differ- 
ence between  dreaming  and  thinking."  1  Thus  his  policy 
showed  an  odd  mixture  of  generous  haziness  and  belated 
practicality 

Long  study  of  his  uncle's  policy  showed  him,  rightly 
enough,  that  it  erred  in  trampling  down  the  feeling  of 
nationality  in  Germany  and  elsewhere.  The  nephew  re- 
solved to  avoid  this  mistake  and  to  pose  as  the  champion 
of  the  oppressed  and  divided  peoples  of  Italy,  Germany, 
Poland,    and  the   Balkan   Peninsula — a  programme   that 

1  Notes  from  a  Diary,  1851-72,  by  Sir  M.  E.  Grant  Duff,  i.,  p. 
120. 

28 


Causes  of  the  Franco-German  War      29 

promised  to  appeal  to  the  ideal  aspirations  of  the  French, 
to  embarrass  the  dynasties  that  had  overthrown  the  first 
Napoleon,  and  to  yield  substantial  gains  for  his  nephew. 
Certainly  it  did  so  in  the  case  of  Italy;  his  championship 
of  the  Roumanians  also  helped  on  the  making  of  that  in- 
teresting principality  (1861)  and  gained  the  good-will  of 
Russia;  but  he  speedily  forfeited  this  by  his  wholly  in- 
effective efforts  on  behalf  of  the  Poles  in  1863.  His  great 
mistakes,  however,  were  committed  in  and  after  the  year 
1863,  when  he  plunged  into  Mexican  politics  with  the 
chimerical  aim  of  founding  a  Roman  Catholic  Empire  in 
Central  America,  and  favoured  the  rise  of  Prussia  in  con- 
nection with  the  Schleswig-Holstein  question.  By  the 
former  of  these  he  locked  up  no  small  part  of  his  army  in 
Mexico  when  he  greatly  needed  it  on  the  Rhine;  by  the 
latter  he  helped  on  the  rise  of  the  vigorous  North  German 
Power. 

As  we  have  seen,  he  secretly  advised  Prussia  to  take 
both  Schleswig  and  Holstein,  thereby  announcing  his  wish 
for  the  effective  union  of  Germans  with  the  one  great  State 
composed  almost  solely  of  Germans.  "I  shall  always  be 
consistent  in  my  conduct,"  he  said.  "If  I  have  fought  for 
the  independence  of  Italy,  if  I  have  lifted  up  my  voice 
for  Polish  nationality,  I  cannot  have  other  sentiments  in 
Germany,  or  obey  other  principles."  This  declaration  be- 
spoke the  doctrinaire  rather  than  the  statesman.  Un- 
taught by  the  clamour  which  French  Chauvinists  and 
ardent  Catholics  had  raised  against  his  armed  support  of 
the  Italian  national  cause  in  1859,  he  now  proposed  to 
further  the  aggrandisement  of  the  Protestant  North  Ger- 
man Power  which  had  sought  to  partition  France  in  181 5. 

The  clamour  aroused  by  his  leanings  towards  Prussia  in 


30  The  European  Nations 

1864-66  was  naturally  far  more  violent,  in  proportion  as 
the  interests  of  France  were  more  closely  at  stake.  Prussia 
held  the  Rhine  Province;  and  French  patriots,  who  clung 
to  the  doctrine  of  the  "natural  frontiers" — the  Ocean, 
Pyrenees,  Alps,  and  Rhine — looked  on  her  as  the  natural 
enemy.  They  pointed  out  that  millions  of  Frenchmen 
had  shed  their  blood  in  the  Revolutionary  and  Napoleonic 
wars  to  win  and  to  keep  the  Rhine  boundary;  and  their 
most  eloquent  spokesman,  M.  Thiers,  who  had  devoted  his 
historical  gifts  to  glorifying  those  great  days,  passionately 
declaimed  against  the  policy  of  helping  on  the  growth  of 
the  hereditary  foe. 

We  have  already  seen  the  results  of  this  strife  between 
the  pro-Prussian  foibles  of  the  Emperor  and  the  eager 
prejudices  of  Frenchmen,  whose  love  of  oppressed  and 
divided  nations  grew  in  proportion  to  their  distance  from 
France,  and  changed  to  suspicion  or  hatred  in  the  case 
of  her  neighbours.  In  1866,  under  the  breath  of  minister- 
ial arguments  and  oratorical  onslaughts  Napoleon  III.'s 
policy  weakly  wavered,  thereby  giving  to  Bismarck's 
statecraft  a  decisive  triumph  all  along  the  line.  In  vain 
did  he  in  the  latter  part  of  that  year  remind  the  Prussian 
statesman  of  his  earlier  promises  (always  discreetly  vague) 
of  compensation  for  France,  and  throw  out  diplomatic 
feelers  for  Belgium,  or  at  any  rate  Luxemburg. 1  In  vain 
did  M.  Thiers  declare  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  that 
France,  while  recognising  accomplished  facts  in  Grermany, 

«  In  1867  Bismarck's  promises  went  so  far  as  the  framing  of  a 
secret  compact  with  France,  one  article  of  which  stated  that 
Prussia  would  not  object  to  the  annexation  of  Belgium  by  France. 
The  agreement  was  first  published  by  the  Times  on  July  25,  1870, 
Bismarck  then  divulging  the  secret  so  as  to  inflame  public  opinion 
against  France. 


Causes  of  the  Franco-German  War      3 1 

ought  ' '  firmly  to  declare  that  he  will  not  allow  them  to  go 
further"  (March  14,  1867).  Bismarck  replied  to  this  chal- 
lenge of  the  French  orator  by  publishing  five  days  later  the 
hitherto  secret  military  alliances  concluded  with  the  South 
German  States  in  August,  1866.  Thenceforth  France 
knew  that  a  war  with  Prussia  would  be  a  war  with  united 
Germany. 

In  the  following  year  the  ZoUverein,  or  German  Customs 
Union  (which  had  been  gradually  growing  since  1833), 
took  a  definitely  national  form  in  a  Customs  Parliament 
which  assembled  in  April,  1868,  thus  unifying  Germany 
for  purposes  of  trade  as  well  as  those  of  war.  This  sharp 
rebuff  came  at  a  time  when  Napoleon's  throne  was  tottering 
from  the  utter  collapse  of  his  Mexican  expedition;  when 
too,  he  more  than  ever  needed  popular  support  in  France 
for  the  beginnings  of  a  more  constitutional  rule.  Early  in 
1867  he  sought  to  buy  Luxemburg  from  Holland.  This 
action  aroused  a  storm  of  wrath  in  Prussia,  which  had 
the  right  to  garrison  Luxemburg;  but  the  question  was 
patched  up  by  a  conference  of  the  Powers  at  London,  the 
Duchy  being  declared  neutral  territory  under  the  guarantee 
of  Europe;  the  fortifications  of  its  capital  were  also  to  be 
demolished,  and  the  Prussian  garrison  withdrawn.  This 
success  for  French  diplomacy  was  repeated  in  Italy,  where 
the  French  troops  supporting  the  Pope  crushed  the  efforts 
of  Garibaldi  and  his  irregulars  to  capture  Rome,  at  the 
sanguinary  fight  of  Mentana  (November  3,  1867).  The 
official  despatch,  stating  that  the  new  French  rifle,  the 
chassepot,  "had  done  wonders,"  spread  jubilation  through 
France  and  a  sharp  anti-Gallic  sentiment  throughout 
Italy. 

And  while  Italy  heaved  with  longings  for  her  natural 


32  The  European  Nations 

capital,  popular  feeling  in  France  and  North  Germany- 
made  steadily  for  war. 

Before  entering  upon  the  final  stages  of  the  dispute,  it 
may  be  well  to  take  a  bird's-eye  view  of  the  condition  of 
the  chief  Powers  in  so  far  as  it  explains  their  attitude 
towards  the  great  struggle. 

The  condition  of  French  politics  was  strangely  complex. 
The  Emperor  had  always  professed  that  he  was  the  elect 
of  France,  and  would  ultimately  crown  his  political  edifice 
with  the  corner-stone  of  constitutional  liberty.  Had  he 
done  so  in  the  successful  years  1855-61,  possibly  his  dy- 
nasty might  have  taken  root.  He  deferred  action,  how- 
ever, until  the  darker  years  that  came  after  1866.  In  1868 
greater  freedom  was  allowed  to  the  Press  and  in  the  case  of 
public  meetings.  The  General  Election  of  the  spring  of 
1869  showed  large  gains  to  the  Opposition,  and  decided  the 
Emperor  to  grant  to  the  Corps  L^gislatif  the  right  of  in- 
itiating laws  concurrently  with  himself,  and  he  declared 
that  Ministers  should  be  responsible  to  it  (September, 
1869). 

These  and  a  few  other  changes  marked  the  transition 
from  autocracy  to  the  "Liberal  Empire."  One  of  the 
champions  of  constitutional  principles,  M.  Emile  Ollivier, 
formed  a  Cabinet  to  give  effect  to  the  new  policy,  and 
the  Emperor,  deeming  the  time  ripe  for  consolidating  his 
power  on  a  democratic  basis,  consulted  the  country  in  a 
plebiscite,  or  mass  vote,  primarily  as  to  their  judgment  on 
the  recent  changes,  but  implicitly  as  to  their  confidence  in 
the  imperial  system  as  a  whole.  His  skill  in  joining  to- 
gether two  topics  that  were  really  distinct,  gained  him  a 
tactical  victory.  More  than  7,350,000  affirmative  votes 
were  given,  as  against  1,572,000  negatives;  while  1,900,000 


Causes  of  the  Franco-German  War      33 

voters  registered  no  vote.  This  success  at  the  polls  em- 
boldened the  supporters  of  the  Empire ;  and  very  many  of 
them,  especially,  it  is  thought,  the  Empress  Eugenie,  be- 
lieved that  only  one  thing  remained  in  order  to  place  the 
Napoleonic  dynasty  on  a  lasting  basis ;  that  was  a  successful 
war. 

Champions  of  autocracy  pointed  out  that  the  growth  of 
Radicalism  coincided  with  the  period  of  military  failures 
and  diplomatic  slights.  Let  Napoleon  III.,  they  said  in 
effect,  imitate  the  policy  of  his  uncle,  who,  as  long  as  he 
dazzled  France  by  triumphs,  could  afford  to  laugh  at  the 
efforts  of  constitution-mongers.  The  big  towns  might 
prate  of  liberty;  but  what  France  wanted  was  glory  and 
strong  government.  Such  were  their  pleas:  there  was 
much  in  the  past  history  of  France  to  support  them.  The 
responsible  advisers  of  the  Emperor  determined  to  take  a 
stronger  tone  in  foreign  affairs,  while  the  out-and-out 
Bonapartists  jealously  looked  for  any  signs  of  official  weak- 
ness so  that  they  might  undermine  the  Ollivier  Ministry 
and  hark  back  to  absolutism.  When  two  great  parties  in 
a  State  make  national  prestige  a  catchword  of  the  political 
game,  peace  cannot  be  secure;  that  was  the  position  of 
France  in  the  early  part  of  1870.1 

The  eve  of  the  Franco-German  War  was  a  time  of  great 
importance  for  the  United  Kingdom.  The  Reform  Bill  of 
1867  gave  a  great  accession  of  power  to  the  Liberal  Party; 
and  the  General  Election  of  November,  1868,  speedily  led 
to  the  resignation  of  the  Disraeli  Cabinet  and  the  accession 
of  the  Gladstone  Ministry  to  power.  This  portended 
change  in  other  directions  than  home  affairs.     The  tradition 

>  See  Ollivier's  great  work,  L' Empire  liberal,  for  full  details  of  this 
time. 


34  The  European  Nations 

of  a  spirited  foreign  policy  died  with  Lord  Palmerston  in 
1865.  With  the  entry  of  John  Bright  to  the  new  Cabinet 
peace  at  all  costs  became  the  dominant  note  of  British 
statesmanship.  There  was  much  to  be  said  in  favour  of 
this.  England  needed  a  time  of  rest  in  order  to  cope  with 
the  discontent  of  Ireland  and  the  problems  brought  about 
by  the  growth  of  democracy  and  commercialism  in  the 
larger  island.  The  disestablishment  and  partial  disendow- 
ment  of  the  Protestant  Church  in  Ireland  Quly,  1869),  the 
Irish  Land  Act  (August,  1870),  and  the  Education  Act  of 
1870,  showed  the  preoccupation  of  the  Ministry  for  home 
affairs;  while  the  readiness  with  which,  a  little  later,  they 
complied  with  all  the  wishes  of  the  United  States  in  the 
Alabama  case,  equally  proclaimed  their  pacific  intentions. 
England,  which  in  i860  had  exercised  so  powerful  an  influ- 
ence on  the  Italian  national  question,  was  for  five  years  a 
factor  of  small  account  in  European  affairs.  Far  from 
pleasing  the  combatants,  our  neutrality  annoyed  both  of 
them.  The  French  accused  England  of  "deserting"  Na- 
poleon III.  in  his  time  of  need — a  charge  that  has  lately 
been  revived  by  M.  Hanotaux.  To  this  it  is  only  needful 
to  reply  that  the  French  Emperor  entered  into  alliance 
with  us  at  the  time  of  the  Crimean  War  merely  for 
his  own  objects,  and  allowed  all  friendly  feeling  to  be 
ended  by  French  threats  of  an  invasion  of  England  in 
1858  and  his  shabby  treatment  of  Italy  in  the  matter  of 
Savoy  and  Nice  a  year  later.  On  his  side,  Bismarck  also 
complained  that  our  feeling  for  the  German  cause  went 
no  further  than  "theoretical  sympathy,"  and  that  "dur- 
ing the  war  England  never  compromised  herself  so  far  in 
our  favour  as  to  endanger  her  friendship  with  France." 
These  vague  and  enigmatic  charges  at  bottom  only  express 


Causes  of  the  Franco-German  War      35 

the  annoyance  of  the  combatants  at  their  failure  to  draw 
neutrals  into  the  strife.^ 

The  traditions  of  the  United  States,  of  course,  forbade 
their  intervention  in  the  Franco-Prussian  dispute.  By  an 
article  of  their  political  creed  termed  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
they  asserted  their  resolve  not  to  interfere  in  European 
affairs  and  to  prevent  the  interference  of  any  strictly 
European  State  in  those  of  the  New  World.  It  was  on  this 
rather  vague  doctrine  that  they  cried  "hands  off"  from 
Mexico  to  the  French  Emperor;  and  the  abandonment  of 
his  protege,  the  so-called  Emperor  Maximilian,  by  French 
troops,  brought  about  the  death  of  that  unhappy  prince  and 
a  sensible  decline  in  the  prestige  of  his  patron  (June,  1867). 

Russia  likewise  remembered  Napoleon  III.'s  champion- 
ship of  the  Poles  in  1863,  which,  however  Platonic  in  its 
nature,  caused  the  Czar  some  embarrassment.  Moreover, 
King  William  of  Prussia  had  soothed  the  Czar's  feelings, 
ruffled  by  the  dethroning  of  three  German  dynasties  in 
1866,  by  a  skilful  reply  which  alluded  to  his  (King  William's) 
desire  to  be  of  service  to  Russian  interests  elsewhere — a 
hint  which  the  diplomatists  of  St.  Petersburg  remembered 
in  1870  to  some  effect. 

For  the  rest,  the  Czar  Alexander  11.  (1855-81)  and  his 
Ministers  were  still  absorbed  in  the  internal  policy  of  re- 
form, which  in  the  sixties  freed  the  serfs  and  gave  Russia 
new  judicial  and  local  institutions,  doomed  to  be  swept  away 
in  the  reaction  following  the  murder  of  that  enlightened 

J  Hanotaux,  Contemporary  France,  i.,  p.  9  (Eng.  ed.);  Bismarck: 
his  Reflections  and  Reminiscences,  ii.,  p.  61.  The  popular  Prussian 
view  about  England  found  expression  in  the  comic  paper  Kladder- 
datsch: 

Deutschland  beziehe  billige  Sympathien 
Und  Frankreich  theures  Kriegsmateriel. 


36  The  European  Nations 

ruler.  The  Russian  Government  therefore  pledged  itself 
to  neutrality,  but  in  a  sense  favourable  to  Prussia.  The 
Czar  ascribed  the  Crimean  War  to  the  ambition  of  Na- 
poleon III.,  and  remembered  the  friendship  of  Prussia 
at  that  time,  as  also  in  the  Polish  Revolt  of  1863.1  Bis- 
marck's policy  now  brought  its  reward. 

The  neutrality  of  Russia  is  always  a  matter  of  the  utmost 
moment  for  the  Central  Powers  in  any  war  on  their  western 
frontiers.  Their  efforts  against  revolutionary  France  in 
1792-94  failed  chiefly  because  of  the  ambiguous  attitude 
of  the  Czarina  Catherine  II.;  and  the  collapse  of  Frederick 
William  IV. 's  policy  in  1848-51  was  due  to  the  hostility  of 
his  eastern  neighbour.  In  fact,  the  removal  of  anxiety 
about  her  open  frontier  on  the  east  was  now  worth  a 
quarter  of  a  million  of  men  to  Prussia. 

But  the  Czar's  neutrality  was  in  one  matter  distinctly 
friendly  to  his  uncle.  King  William  of  Prussia.  It  is  an 
open  secret  that  unmistakable  hints  went  from  St.  Peters- 
burg to  Vienna  to  the  effect  that,  if  Austria  drew  the  sword 
for  Napoleon  III.  she  would  have  to  reckon  with  an  irruption 
of  the  Russians  into  her  open  Galician  frontier.  Probably 
this  accounts  for  the  conduct  of  the  Hapsburg  Power, 
which  otherwise  is  inexplicable.  A  war  of  revenge  against 
Prussia  seemed  to  be  the  natural  step  to  take.  True,  the 
Emperor  Francis  Joseph  had  small  cause  to  like  Napoleon 
III.  The  loss  of  Lombardy  in  1859  still  rankled  in  the 
breast  of  every  patriotic  Austrian;  and  the  suspicions 
which  that  enigmatical  ruler  managed  to  arouse  prevented 
any  definite  agreement  resulting  from  the  meeting  of  the 
two  sovereigns  at  Salzburg  in  1867. 

>  See  Sir  H.  Rumbold's  Recollections  of  a  Diplomatist  (First  Se- 
ries), ii.,  p.  292,  for  the  Czar's  hostility  to  France  in  1870. 


Causes  of  the  Franco-German  War      37 

The  relations  of  France  and  Austria  were  still  in  the  same 
uncertain  state  before  the  War  of  1870.  The  foreign  policy 
of  Austria  was  in  the  hands  of  Count  Beust,  a  bitter  foe  of 
Prussia;  but  after  the  concession  of  constitutional  rule  to 
Hungary  by  the  compromise  (Ausgleich)  of  1867,  the  Dual 
Monarchy  urgently  needed  rest,  especially  as  its  army  was 
undergoing  many  changes.  The  Chancellor's  action  was 
therefore  clogged  on  all  sides.  Nevertheless,  when  the 
Luxemburg  affair  of  1867  brought  France  and  Prussia  near 
to  war,  Napoleon  began  to  make  advances  to  the  Court  of 
Vienna.  How  far  they  went  is  not  known.  Beust  has 
asserted  in  his  correspondence  with  the  French  Foreign 
Minister,  the  Due  de  Gramont  (formerly  Ambassador  at 
Vienna),  that  they  never  were  more  than  discussions,  and 
that  they  ended  in  1869  without  any  written  agreement. 
The  sole  understanding  was  to  the  effect  that  the  policy  of 
both  States  should  be  friendly  and  pacific,  Austria  reserving 
the  right  to  remain  neutral  if  France  were  compelled  to 
make  war.  The  two  Empires  further  promised  not  to 
make  any  engagement  with  a  third  Power  without  inform- 
ing the  other. 

This  statement  is  not  very  convincing.  States  do  not 
usually  bind  themselves  in  the  way  just  described,  unless 
they  have  some  advantageous  agreement  with  the  Power 
which  has  the  first  claim  on  their  alliance.  It  is  note- 
worthy, however,  that  the  Due  de  Gramont,  in  the  corre- 
spondence alluded  to  above,  admits  that,  as  Ambassador 
and  as  Foreign  Minister  of  France,  he  never  had  to  claim 
the  support  of  Austria  in  the  war  with  Prussia.^ 

How  are  we  to  reconcile  these  statements  with  the  un- 

^  Memoirs  of  Count  Beust,  ii.,  pp.  358-359  (Appendix  D,  Eng. 
edit.). 


SS  The  European  Nations 

doubted  fact  that  the  Emperor  Napoleon  certainly  expected 
help  from  Austria  and  also  from  Italy?  The  solution  of 
the  riddle  seems  to  be  that  Napoleon,  as  also  Francis 
Joseph  and  Victor  Emmanuel,  kept  their  Foreign  Ministers 
in  the  dark  on  many  questions  of  high  policy,  which  they 
transacted  either  by  private  letters  among  themselves,  or 
through  military  men  who  had  their  confidence.  The 
French  and  Italian  sovereigns  certainly  employed  these 
methods,  the  latter  because  he  was  far  more  French  in 
sympathy  than  his  Ministers. 

As  far  back  as  the  year  1868,  Victor  Emmanuel  made 
overtures  to  Napoelon  with  a  view  to  alliance,  the  chief  aim 
of  which,  from  his  standpoint,  was  to  secure  the  evacua- 
tion of  Rome  by  the  French  troops,  and  the  gain  of  the 
Eternal  City  for  the  national  cause.  Prince  Napoleon  lent 
his  support  to  this  scheme,  and  from  an  article  written  by 
him  we  know  that  the  two  sovereigns  discussed  the  matter 
almost  entirely  by  means  of  confidential  letters.^  These 
discussions  went  on  up  to  the  month  of  June,  1869.  Francis 
Joseph,  on  hearing  of  them,  urged  the  French  Emperor  to 
satisfy  Italy,  and  thus  pave  the  way  for  an  alliance  between 
the  three  Powers  against  Prussia.  Nothing  definite  came 
of  the  affair,  and  chiefly,  it  would  seem,  owing  to  the  in- 
fluence of  the  Empress  Eugenie  and  the  French  clerics. 
She  is  said  to  have  remarked:  "Better  the  Prussians  in 
Paris  than  the  Italian  troops  in  Rome."  The  diplomatic 
situation  therefore  remained  vague,  though  in  the  second 
week  of  July,  1870,  the  Emperor  again  took  up  the  threads 
which,  with  greater  firmness  and  foresight,  he  might  have 
woven  into  a  firm  design. 

The  understanding  between  the  three  Powers  advanced 
^  Revue  des  deux  Mondes  for  April  i,  1878. 


Causes  of  the  Franco-German  War      39 

only  in  regard  to  military  preparations.  The  Austrian 
Archduke  Albrecht,  the  victor  of  Custoza,  burned  to  avenge 
the  defeat  of  Koniggratz,  and  with  this  aim  in  view  visited 
Paris  in  February  to  March,  1870.  He  then  proposed  to 
Napoleon  an  invasion  of  North  Germany  by  the  armies  of 
France,  Austria,  and  Italy.  The  French  Emperor  de- 
veloped the  plan  by  more  specific  overtures  which  he  made 
in  the  month  of  June ;  but  his  Ministers  were  so  far  in  the 
dark  as  to  these  military  proposals  that  they  were  then 
suggesting  the  reduction  of  the  French  army  by  ten  thou- 
sand men,  while  Ollivier,  the  Prime  Minister,  on  June  30th 
declared  to  the  French  Chamber  that  peace  had  never  been 
better  assured.^ 

And  yet  on  that  same  day  General  Lebrun,  aide-de-camp 
to  the  Emperor,  was  drawing  up  at  Paris  a  confidential 
report  of  the  mission  with  which  he  lately  been  entrusted 
to  the  Austrian  military  authorities.  From  that  report 
we  take  the  following  particulars:  On  arriving  at  Vienna, 
he  had  three  private  interviews  with  the  Archduke  Al- 
brecht, and  set  before  him  the  desirability  of  a  joint  in- 
vasion of  North  Germany  in  the  autumn  of  that  year.  To 
this  the  Archduke  demurred,  on  the  ground  that  such  a 
campaign  ought  to  begin  in  the  spring  if  the  full  fruits  of 
victory  were  to  be  gathered  in  before  the  short  days  came. 
Austria  and  Italy,  he  said,  could  not  place  adequate  forces 
in  the  field  in  less  than  six  weeks  owing  to  lack  of  railways.^ 

Developing  his  own  views,  the  Archduke  then  suggested 

»  Seignobos,  A  Political  History  of  Contemporary  Europe,  ii.,  pp. 
806-807  (Eng.  edit.).  Oncken,  Zeitalter  des  Kaisers  Wilhelm  (i.,  pp. 
720-740),  tries  to  prove  that  there  was  a  deep  conspiracy  against 
Prussia.     1  am  not  convinced  by  his  evidence. 

2  Souvenirs  militaires,  by  General  B.  L.  J.  Lebrun  (Paris,  1895), 
pp.  95-148. 


40 


The  European  Nations 


that  it  would  be  desirable  for  France  to  undertake  the 
war  against  North  Germany  not  later  than  the  middle  of 
March,  1871,  Austria  and  Italy  at  the  same  time  beginning 
their  mobilisations,  though  not  declaring  war  until  their 
armies  were  ready  at  the  end  of  six  weeks.  Two  French 
armies  should  in  the  meantime  cross  the  Rhine  in  order  to 
sever  the  South  Germans  from  the  Confederation  of  the 
North,  one  of  them  marching  towards  Nuremberg,  where 
it  would  be  joined  by  the  western  army  of  Austria  and  the 
Italian  forces  sent  through  Tyrol.  The  other  Austrian 
army  would  then  invade  Saxony  or  Lusatia  in  order  to 
strike  at  Berlin.  He  estim.ated  the  forces  of  the  States 
hostile  to  Prussia  as  follows : 


Men. 

Horses. 

Cannon. 

France 

Austria  (exclusive 
of  reserve) 

Italy 

Denmark 

309,000 

360,000 
68,000 
260,000  (?) 

35.000 

27,000 
5,000 
2,000 

972 

1,128 
180 

72 

He  thus  reckoned  the  forces  of  the  two  German  Con- 
federations : 


Men. 

Horses. 

Cannon. 

North 

377,000 
97,000 

48,000 
10,000 

1,284 
288 

South 

but  the  support  of  the  latter  might  be  hoped  for.     Lebrun 
again  urged  the  desirability  of  a  campaign  in  the  autumn, 


Causes  of  the  Franco-German  War     41 

but  the  Archduke  repeated  that  it  must  begin  in  the 
spring.  In  that  condition,  as  in  his  eariier  statement 
that  France  must  declare  war  first,  while  her  allies  pre- 
pared for  war,  we  may  discern  a  deep-rooted  distrust  of 
Napoleon  III. 

On  June  14th  the  Archduke  introduced  Lebrun  to  the 
Emperor  Francis  Joseph,  who  informed  him  that  he 
wanted  peace;  but,  he  added,  "if  I  make  war,  I  must  be 
forced  to  it."  In  case  of  war  Prussia  might  exploit  the 
national  German  sentiment  existing  in  South  Grermany 
and  Austria.  He  concluded  with  these  words:  "But  if 
the  Emperor  Napoleon,  compelled  to  accept  or  to  declare 
war,  came  with  his  armies  into  South  Germany,  not  as  an 
enemy  but  as  a  liberator,  I  should  be  forced  on  my  side  to 
declare  that  I  [would]  make  common  cause  with  him.  In 
the  eyes  of  my  people  I  could  do  no  other  than  join  my 
armies  to  those  of  France.  That  is  what  I  pray  you  to  say 
for  me  to  the  Emperor  Napoleon;  I  hope  that  he  will  see, 
as  I  do,  my  situation  both  in  home  and  foreign  affairs." 
Such  was  the  report  which  Lebrun  drew  up  for  Napoleon 
III.  on  June  30th.  It  certainly  led  that  sovereign  to  believe 
in  the  probability  of  Austrian  help  in  the  spring  of  187 1, 
but  not  before  that  time. 

The  question  now  arises  whether  Bismarck  was  aware  of 
these  proposals.  If  warlike  counsels  prevailed  at  Vienna, 
it  is  probable  that  some  preparations  would  be  made,  and 
the  secret  may  have  leaked  out  in  this  way,  or  possibly 
through  the  Hungarian  administration.  In  any  case,  Bis- 
marck knew  that  the  Austrian  Chancellor,  Count  Beust, 
thirsted  for  revenge  for  the  events  of  1866.*  If  he  heard 
any  whispers  of  an  approaching  league  against  Prussia,  he 
*  Bismarck:  his  Reflections  and  Reminiscences,  ii.,  p.  58. 


42  The  European  Nations 

wotild  naturally  see  the  advantage  of  pressing  on  war  at 
once,  before  Austria  and  Italy  were  ready  to  enter  the 
lists.  Probably  in  this  fact  will  be  found  one  explanation 
of  the  origin  of  the  Franco-German  War. 

Before  adverting  to  the  proximate  cause  of  the  rupture, 
we  may  note  that  Beust's  despatch  of  July  ii,  1870,  to 
Prince  Metternich,  Austrian  Ambassador  at  Paris,  displayed 
genuine  fear  lest  France  should  rush  blindly  into  war  with 
Prussia;  and  he  charged  Metternich  tactfully  to  warn  the 
French  Grovemment  against  such  a  course  of  action,  which 
would  ' '  be  contrary  to  all  that  we  have  agreed  upon.  .  .  . 
Even  if  we  wished,  we  could  not  suddenly  equip  a  respect- 
ably large  force.  .  .  .  Our  services  are  gained  to  a 
certain  extent  [by  France] ;  but  we  shall  not  go  further 
unless  events  carry  us  on ;  and  we  do  not  dream  of  plunging 
into  war  because  it  might  suit  France  to  do  so." 

Again,  however,  the  military  men  seem  to  have  pushed 
on  the  diplomatists.  The  Archduke  Albrecht  and  Count 
Vitzthum  went  to  Paris  charged  with  some  promises  of 
support  to  France  in  case  of  war.  Thereafter,  Count  Beust 
gave  the  assurance  at  Vienna  that  the  Austrians  would  be 
"faithful  to  our  engagements,  as  they  have  been  recorded 
in  the  letters  exchanged  last  year  between  the  two  sover- 
eigns. We  consider  the  cause  of  France  as  ours,  and  we 
will  contribute  to  the  success  of  her  arms  to  the  utmost  of 
our  power."  ' 

In  the  midst  of  this  maze  of  cross-purposes  this  much  is 
clear:  that  both  Emperors  had  gone  to  work  behind  the 
backs  of  their  Ministers,  and  that  the  military  chiefs  of 
France  and  Austria  brought  their  States  to  the  brink  of 

»  Memoirs  of  Count  Beust,  ii.,  p.  359;  The  Present  Position  of 
European  Politics,  p.  366  (1887),  by  the  author  of  Greater  Britain. 


Causes  of  the  Franco-German  War     43 

war  while  their  Ministers  and  diplomatists  were  unaware 
of  the  nearness  of  danger. 

As  we  have  seen,  King  Victor  Emmanuel  11.  longed  to 
draw  the  sword  for  Napoleon  III.,  whose  help  to  Italy  in 
1859-60  he  so  curiously  overrated.  Fortunately  for  Italy, 
his  Ministers  took  a  more  practical  view  of  the  situation; 
but  probably  they,  too,  would  have  made  common  cause 
"with  France  had  they  received  a  definite  promise  of  the  with- 
drawal of  French  troops  from  Rome  and  the  satisfac- 
tion of  Italian  desires  for  the  Eternal  City  as  the  national 
capital.  This  promise,  even  after  the  outbreak  ot  the  war, 
the  French  Emperor  declined  to  give,  though  his  cousin. 
Prince  Napoleon,  urged  him  vehemently  to  give  way  on 
that  point.i 

In  truth,  the  Emperor  could  not  well  give  way.  An 
(Ecumenical  Council  sat  at  Rome  from  December,  1869,  to 
July,  1870;  its  Ultramontane  tendencies  were  throughout 
strongly  marked,  as  against  the  "Old  Catholic"  views; 
and  it  was  a  foregone  conclusion  that  the  Council  would 
vote  the  dogma  of  the  infallibility  of  the  Pope  in  matters 
of  religion — as  it  did  on  the  day  before  France  declared 
war  against  Prussia.  How,  then,  could  the  Emperor,  the 
"eldest  son  of  the  Church,"  as  French  monarchs  have 
proudly  styled  themselves,  bargain  away  Rome  to  the 
Italian  Government,  already  stained  by  sacrilege,  when  this 
crowning  aureole  of  grace  was  about  to  encircle  the  visible 
Head  of  the  Church?  There  was  no  escape  from  the 
dilemma.  Either  Napoleon  must  go  into  war  with  shouts 
of  "Judas  !  "  hurled  at  him  by  all  pious  Roman  Catholics, 

«  See  the  Rev.  des  deux  Mondes  for  April  i,  1878,  and  "  Chronqiue  " 
of  the  Revue  d'Histoire  diplomatique  for  1905,  p.  298;  also  W.  H. 
Stillman,  The  Union  of  Italy,  1815-1895,  p.  348. 


44  The  European  Nations 

or  he  must  try  his  fortunes  without  the  much-coveted  help 
of  Austria  and  Italy.  He  chose  the  latter  alternative, 
largely,  it  would  seem,  owing  to  the  influence  of  his  ve- 
hemently Catholic  Empress.^  After  the  first  defeats  he 
sought  to  open  negotiations,  but  then  it  was  too  late. 
Prince  Napoleon  went  to  Florence  and  arrived  there  on 
August  2oth;  but  his  utmost  efforts  failed  to  move  the 
Italian  Cabinet  from  neutrality. 

Even  this  brief  survey  of  international  relations  shows 
that  Napoleon  III.  was  a  source  of  weakness  to  France. 
Having  seized  on  power  by  perfidious  means,  he  through- 
out his  whole  reign  strove  to  dazzle  the  French  by  a  series 
of  adventures,  which  indeed  pleased  the  Parisians  for  the 
time,  but  at  the  cost  of  lasting  distrust  among  the  Powers. 
Generous  in  his  aims,  he  at  first  befriended  the  German  and 
Italian  national  movements,  but  forfeited  all  the  fruits  of 
those  actions  by  his  pettifogging  conduct  about  Savoy  and 
Nice,  the  Rhineland  and  Belgium;  while  his  final  efforts 
to  please  French  Clericals  and  Chauvinists  ^  by  supporting 
the  Pope  at  Rome  lost  him  the  support  of  States  that 
might  have  retrieved  the  earlier  blunders.  In  brief,  by 
helping  on  the  Nationalists  of  North  Germany  and  Italy 
he  offended  French  public  opinion;  and  his  belated  and 
spasmodic  efforts  to  regain  popularity  at  home  aroused 
against  him  the  distrust  of  all  the  Powers.     Their  feelings 

1  For  the  relations  of  France  to  the  Vatican,  see  Histoire  du 
second  Empire,  by  M.  de  la  Gorce,  vi.  (Paris,  1903);  also  Histoire 
Contemporaine  (i.  e.,  of  France  in  1869-75),  by  M.  Samuel  Denis, 
4  vols.  The  Empress  Eugenie  once  said  that  she  was  "deux  fois 
Catholique,"  as  a  Spaniard  and  as  French  Empress.  (Sir  M.  E. 
Grant  Duff,  Notes  from  a  Diary,  1851-1872,  i.,  p.  125.) 

2  Chauvinist  is  a  term  corresponding  to  our  "Jingo."  It  is  de- 
rived from  a  man  named  Chauvin,  who  lauded  Napoleon  I.  and 
French  glory  to  the  skies. 


Causes  of  the  Franco-German  War     45 

about  him  may  be  summarised  in  the  mot  of  a  diplomatist, 
"Scratch  the  Emperor  and  you  will  find  the  political 
refugee." 

How  different  were  the  careers  of  Napoleon  III.  and  of 
Bismarck  !  By  resolutely  keeping  before  him  the  national 
aim,  and  that  only,  the  Prussian  statesman  had  reduced 
the  tangle  of  Grerman  affairs  to  simplicity  and  now  made 
ready  for  the  crowning  work  of  all.  In  his  Reminiscences 
he  avows  his  belief,  as  early  as  1866:  "That  a  war  with 
France  would  succeed  the  war  with  Austria  lay  in  the  logic 
of  history";  and  again:  "I  did  not  doubt  that  a  Franco- 
German  War  must  take  place  before  the  construction  of  a 
United  Grermany  could  take  place."  ^  War  would  doubtless 
have  broken  out  in  1867  over  the  Luxemburg  question,  had 
he  not  seen  the  need  of  delay  for  strengthening  the  bonds 
of  union  with  South  Germany  and  assuring  the  increase  of 
the  armies  of  the  Fatherland  by  the  adoption  of  Prussian 
methods;  or,  as  he  phrased  it,  "each  year's  postponement 
of  the  war  would  add  one  hundred  thousand  trained  soldiers 
to  our  army.  "2  In  1870  little  was  to  be  gained  by  delay. 
In  fact,  the  imionist  movement  in  Germany  then  showed 
ominous  signs  of  slackening.  In  the  South  the  Parliaments 
opposed  any  further  approach  to  union  with  the  North; 
and  the  voting  of  the  military  budget  in  the  North  for  that 
year  was  likely  to  lead  to  strong  opposition  in  the  interests 
of  the  over-taxed  people.  A  war  might  solve  the  unionist 
problem  which  was  insoluble  in  time  of  peace ;  and  a  casus 
belli  was  at  hand. 

Early  in  July,  1870,  the  news  leaked  out  that  Prince  Leo- 
pold of  Hohenzollem  was  the  officially  accepted  candidate 

1  Bismarck,  Reminiscences,  ii.,  pp.  41,  57  (Eng.  edit.). 

2  lb.,  p.  58. 


46  The  European  Nations 

for  the  throne  of  Spain,  left  vacant  since  the  revolution 
which  drove  Queen  Isabella  into  exile  in  1868.1  At  once  a 
thrill  of  rage  shot  through  France ;  and  the  Due  de  Gramont, 
Foreign  Minister  of  the  new  Ollivier  Ministry,  gave  ex- 
pression to  the  prevailing  feeling  in  his  answer  to  a  question 
on  the  subject  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  (July  6th) : 

"We  do  not  think  that  respect  for  the  rights  of  a  neigh- 
bouring people  [Spain]  obliges  us  to  allow  an  alien  Power 
[Prussia],  by  placing  one  of  its  princes  on  the  throne  of 
Charles  V.,  to  succeed  in  upsetting  to  our  disadvantage  the 
present  equilibrium  of  forces  in  Europe,  and  imperil  the 
interests  and  honour  of  France.  We  have  the  firm  hope 
that  this  eventuality  will  not  be  realised.  To  hinder  it, 
we  count  both  on  the  wisdom  of  the  German  people  and 
on  the  friendship  of  the  Spanish  people.  If  that  should 
not  be  so,  strong  in  your  support  and  in  that  of  the  nation, 
we  shall  know  how  to  fulfil  our  duty  without  hesitation  and 
without  weakness."  ^ 

The  opening  phrases  were  inaccurate.  The  prince  in 
question  was  Prince  Leopold  of  the  Swabian  and  Roman 
Catholic  branch  of  the  Hohenzollem  family,  who,  as  the 
Due  de  Gramont  knew,  could  by  no  possibility  recall  the 
days  when  Charles  V.  reigned  as  Emperor  in  Germany  and 
monarch  in  Spain.  This  misstatement  showed  the  in- 
tention of  the  French  Ministry  to  throw  down  the  glove  to 
Prussia — as  is  also  clear  from  this  statement  in  Gramont's 
despatch  of  July  loth  to  Benedetti:  "If  the  King  will  not 
advise  the  Prince  of  Hohenzollem  to  withdraw,  well,  it  is 
war  forthwith,  and  in  a  few  days  we  are  at  the  Rhine."  ^ 

»  The  ex-Queen  Isabella  died  in  Paris  in  April,  1904. 
2  Sorel,  Hist,  diplomatique  de  la  Guerre  Franco- Alletnande,  i.,  p.  77. 
»  Benedetti,  Ma  Mission  en  Prusse,  p.  34.     This  work  contains 
the  French  despatches  on  the  whole  affair. 


Causes  of  the  Franco-German  War     47 

Nevertheless,  those  who  were  behind  the  scenes  had 
just  cause  for  anger  against  Bismarck.  The  revelations 
of  Benedetti,  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  as  well  as 
the  Memoirs  of  the  King  of  Roumania  (brother  to  Prince 
Leopold  of  Hohenzollem)  leave  no  doubt  that  the  candi- 
dature of  the  latter  was  privately  and  unofficially  mooted 
in  1868,  and  again  in  the  spring  of  1869  through  a  Prussian 
diplomatist,  Werthem,  and  that  it  met  with  no  encour- 
agement whatever  from  the  Prussian  monarch  or  the  Prince 
himself.  But  early  in  1870  it  was  renewed  in  an  official 
manner  by  the  provisional  Government  of  Spain,  and  (as 
seems  certain)  at  the  instigation  of  Bismarck,  who,  in  May- 
June,  succeeded  in  overcoming  the  reluctance  of  the  Prince 
and  of  King  William.  Bismarck  even  sought  to  hurry  the 
matter  through  the  Spanish  Cortes  so  as  to  commit  Spain 
to  the  plan ;  but  this  failed  owing  to  the  misinterpretation 
of  a  ciphered  telegram  from  Berlin  at  Madrid.  1 

Such  was  the  state  of  the  case  when  the  affair  became 
known  to  the  Ollivier  Ministry.  Though  not  aware,  seem- 
ingly, of  all  these  details,  Napoleon's  advisers  were  justified 
in  treating  the  matter,  not  as  a  private  affair  between  the 
Hohenzollems  and  Spain  (as  Germans  then  maintained  it 
was),  but  as  an  attempt  of  the  Prussian  Government  to 
place  on  the  Spanish  throne  a  prince  who  could  not  but 
be  friendly  to  the  North  German  Power.  In  fact,  the 
French  saw  in  it  a  challenge  to  war;  and,  putting  together 
all  the  facts  as  now  known,  we  must  pronounce  that  they 
were  almost  certainly  right.    Bismarck  undoubtedly  wanted 

>  In  a  recent  work.  Kaiser  Wilhelm  und  die  Begriindung  des 
Reiches,  1866-1871,  Dr.  Lorenz  tries  to  absolve  Bismarck  from  com- 
plicity in  these  intrigues,  but  without  success.  See  Reminiscences 
of  the  King  of  Roumania  (edited  by  S.  Whitman),  pp.  70,  86-87, 
92-95;  also  Headlam's  Bismarck,  p.  327. 


48  The  European  Nations 

war;  and  it  is  impossible  to  think  that  he  did  not  intend 
to  use  this  candidature  as  a  means  of  exasperating  the 
French.  The  man  who  afterwards  declared  that,  at  the 
beginning  of  the  Danish  disputes  in  1863,  he  made  up  his 
mind  to  have  Schleswig-Holstein  for  Prussia, 1  certainly 
saw  in  the  Hohenzollem  candidature  a  step  towards  a 
Prusso-Spanish  alliance  or  a  war  with  France  that  might 
cement  German  unity. 

In  any  case,  that  was  the  outcome  of  events.  The 
French  papers  at  once  declaimed  against  the  candidature 
in  a  way  that  aroused  no  less  passion  on  the  other  side  of 
the  Rhine.  For  a  brief  space,  however,  matters  seemed 
to  be  smoothed  over  by  the  calm  good  sense  of  the  Prussian 
monarch  and  his  nephew.  The  King  was  then  at  Ems, 
taking  the  waters,  when  Benedetti,  the  French  ambassador, 
waited  on  him  and  pressed  him  most  urgently  to  request 
Prince  Leopold  to  withdraw  from  the  candidature  to  the 
Spanish  crown.  This  the  King  declined  to  do  in  the  way 
that  was  pointed  out  to  him,  rightly  considering  that  such 
a  course  would  play  into  the  hands  of  the  French  by  lower- 
ing his  own  dignity  and  the  prestige  of  Prussia.  Moreover, 
he,  rather  illogically,  held  the  whole  matter  to  be  primarily 
one  that  affected  the  Hohenzollem  family  and  Spain.  The 
young  Prince,  however,  on  hearing  of  the  drift  of  events, 
solved  the  problem  by  declaring  his  intention  not  to  accept 
the  crown  of  Spain  (July  12  th).  The  action  was  spontane- 
ous, emanating  from  Prince  Leopold  and  his  father,  Prince 
Antony,  not  from  the  Prussian  monarch,  though,  on  hear- 
ing of  their  decision,  he  informed  Benedetti  that  he  en- 
tirely approved  it. 

If  the  French  Government  had  really  wished  for  peace,  it 
>  Busch,  Our  Chancellor,  i.,  p.  367. 


Causes  of  the  Franco-German  War     49 

would  have  let  the  matter  end  there.  But  it  did  not  do  so. 
The  extreme  Bonapartists — plus  royalistes  que  le  roi — all 
along  wished  to  gain  prestige  for  their  sovereign  by  in- 
flicting an  open  humiliation  on  King  William  and  through 
him  on  Prussia.  They  were  angry  that  he  had  evaded  the 
snare,  and  now  brought  Prussia  to  bear  on  the  Ministry,  es- 
pecially the  Due  de  Gramont,  so  that  at  7  p.m.  of  that  same 
day  (July  12th)  he  sent  a  telegram  to  Benedetti  at  Ems  di- 
recting him  to  see  King  William  and  press  him  to  declare 
that  he  ' '  would  not  again  authorise  this  candidature. ' '  The 
Minister  added :  ' '  The  effervescence  of  spirits  [at  Paris]  is 
such  that  we  do  not  know  whether  we  shall  succeed  in  mas- 
tering it."  This  was  true.  Paris  was  almost  beside  herself. 
As  M.  Sorel  says:  "The  warm  July  evening  drove  into  the 
streets  a  populace  greedy  of  shows  and  excitements,  whose 
imagination  was  spoiled  by  the  custom  of  political  quack- 
ery, for  whom  war  was  but  a  drama  and  history  a  romance."  ^ 
Such  was  the  impulse  which  led  to  Gramont's  new  demand, 
and  it  was  made  in  spite  of  the  remonstrances  of  the  British 
ambassador,  Lord  Lyons. 

Viewing  that  demand  in  the  clearer  light  of  the  present 
time,  we  must  say  that  it  was  not  imreasonable  in  itself; 
but  it  was  presented  in  so  insistent  a  way  that  King 
William  declined  to  entertain  it.  Again  Gramont  pressed 
Benedetti  to  urge  the  matter;  but  the  utmost  that  the 
King  would  do  was  to  state:  "He  gives  his  approbation 
entirely   and  without  reserve  to   the  withdrawal  of  the 

»  Sorel,  Hist,  diplomatique  de  la  Guerre  Franco- AUemande,  i., 
chap.  iv. ;  also  for  the  tone  of  the  French  press,  Giraudeau,  La 
VeritS  sur  la  Campagne  de  i8yo,  pp.  46-60. 

QUivier  tried  to  persuade  Sir  M.  E.  Grant  Duff  {Notes  from  a 
Diary,  1873-1881,  i.,  p.  45)  that  the  French  demand  from  King 
William  was  quite  friendly  and  natural. 

VOL.   I. — 4 


50  The  European  Nations 

Prince  of  Hohenzollem:  he  cannot  do  more."  He  refused 
to  see  the  ambassador  further  on  this  subject;  but  on 
setting  out  to  return  to  BerHn — a  step  necessitated  by  the 
growing  excitement  throughout  Germany — he  took  leave 
of  Benedetti  with  perfect  cordiaHty  (July  14th).  The  am- 
bassador thereupon  returned  to  Paris. 

Meanwhile,  however,  Bismarck  had  given  the  last  flick 
to  the  restive  coursers  of  the  press  on  both  sides  of  the 
Rhine.  In  his  Reminiscences  he  has  described  his  de- 
pression of  spirits  on  hearing  the  news  of  the  withdrawal 
of  Prince  Leopold's  candidature  and  of  his  nearly  formed 
resolve  to  resign  as  a  protest  against  so  tame  a  retreat 
before  French  demands.  But  while  Moltke,  Roon,  and 
he  were  dining  together,  a  telegram  reached  him  from  the 
King  at  Ems,  dated  July  13th,  3.50  p.m.,  which  gave  him 
leave  to  inform  the  ambassadors  and  the  press  of  the 
present  state  of  affairs.  Bismarck  saw  his  chance.  The 
telegram  could  be  cut  down  so  as  to  give  a  more  resolute 
look  to  the  whole  affair.  And,  after  gaining  Moltke's  as- 
surance that  everything  was  ready  for  war,  he  proceeded 
to  condense  it.  The  facts  here  can  only  be  understood  by 
a  comparison  of  the  two  versions.  We  therefore  give  the 
original  as  sent  to  Bismarck  by  Abeken,  Secretary  to  the 
Foreign  Office,  who  was  then  at  Ems: 

"His  Majesty  writes  to  me:  'Count  Benedetti  spoke  to 
me  on  the  promenade,  in  order  to  demand  from  me, 
finally  in  a  very  importunate  manner,  that  I  should 
authorise  him  to  telegraph  at  once  that  I  bound  myself 
for  all  future  time  never  again  to  give  my  consent  if  the 
Hohenzollems  should  renew  their  candidature.  I  refused 
at  last  somewhat  sternly,  as  it  is  neither  right  nor  possi- 
ble to  undertake  engagements  of  this  kind  a  tout  jamais. 


Causes  of  the  Franco-German  War     51 

Naturally  I  told  him  that  I  had  as  yet  received  no  news, 
and  as  he  was  earlier  informed  about  Paris  and  Madrid 
than  myself,  he  could  see  clearly  that  my  Government  once 
more  had  no  hand  in  the  matter.'  His  Majesty  has  since 
received  a  letter  from  the  Prince.  His  Majesty,  having 
told  Count  Benedetti  that  he  was  awaiting  news  from  the 
Prince,  has  decided,  with  reference  to  the  above  demand, 
upon  the  representation  of  Count  Eulenburg  and  myself, 
not  to  receive  Count  Benedetti  again,  but  only  to  let  him 
be  informed  through  an  aide-de-camp:  'That  his  Majesty 
had  now  received  from  the  Prince  confirmation  of  the  news 
which  Benedetti  had  already  received  from  Paris,  and  had 
nothing  further  to  say  to  the  ambassador.'  His  Majesty 
leaves  it  to  your  Excellency  whether  Benedetti's  fresh 
demand  and  its  rejection  should  not  be  at  once  communi- 
cated both  to  our  ambassadors  and  to  the  press." 

Bismarck  cut  this  down  to  the  following: 

"After  the  news  of  the  renunciation  of  the  hereditary 
Prince  of  Hohenzollem  had  been  officially  communicated 
to  the  Imperial  Grovemment  of  France  by  the  Royal 
Government  of  Spain,  the  French  ambassador  at  Ems 
further  demanded  of  his  Majesty  the  King  that  he  would 
authorise  him  to  telegraph  to  Paris  that  his  Majesty  the 
King  bound  himself  for  all  future  time  never  again  to  give 
his  consent  if  the  Hohenzollems  should  renew  their  can- 
didature. His  Majesty  the  King  thereupon  decided  not 
to  receive  the  French  ambassador  again,  and  sent  to  tell 
him  through  the  aide-de-camp  on  duty  that  his  Majesty 
had  nothing  further  to  communicate  to  the  ambassador." 

Efforts  have  been  made  to  represent  Bismarck's  "edit- 
ing" of  the  Ems  telegram  as  the  decisive  step  leading  to 
war;  and  in  his  closing  years,  when  seized  with  the  morbid 


52  The  European  Nations 

desire  of  a  partly  discredited  statesman  to  exaggerate  his 
influence  on  events,  he  himself  sought  to  perpetuate  this 
version.  He  claims  that  the  telegram,  as  it  came  from 
Ems,  described  the  incident  there  "as  a  fragment  of  a 
negotiation  still  pending,  and  to  be  continued  at  Berlin." 
This  claim  is  quite  untenable.  A  careful  perusal  of  the 
original  despatch  from  Ems  shows  that  the  negotiation, 
far  from  being  "still  pending,"  was  clearly  described  as 
having  been  closed  on  that  matter.  That  Benedetti  so 
regarded  it  is  proved  by  his  returning  at  once  to  Paris.  If 
it  could  have  been  "continued  at  Berlin,"  he  most  cer- 
tainly would  have  proceeded  thither.  Finally,  the  words 
in  the  original  as  to  the  King's  refusing  Benedetti  "some- 
what sternly"  were  omitted,  and  very  properly  omitted, 
by  Bismarck  in  his  abbreviated  version.  Had  he  included 
those  words,  he  might  have  claimed  to  be  the  final  cause 
of  the  War  of  1870.  As  it  is,  his  claim  must  be  set  aside  as 
the  offspring  of  senile  vanity.  His  version  of  the  original 
Ems  despatch  did  not  contain  a  single  offensive  word, 
neither  did  it  alter  any  statement.  Abeken  also  admitted 
that  his  original  telegram  was  far  too  long,  and  that  Bis- 
marck was  quite  justified  in  abbreviating  it  as  he  did.^ 

If  we  pay  attention,  not  to  the  present  more  complete 
knowledge  of  the  whole  affair,  but  to  the  imperfect  in- 
formation then  open  to  the  German  public,  war  was  the 

1  Heinrich  Abeken,  by  Hedwig  Abeken,  p.  375.  Bismarck's 
successor  in  the  Chancellory,  Count  Caprivi,  set  matters  in  their 
true  light  in  a  speech  in  the  Reichstag  shortly  after  the  publication 
of  Bismarck's  Reminiscences. 

I  dissent  from  the  views  expressed  by  the  well-informed  reviewer 
of  Ollivier's  L'Empire  liberal  (viii.)  in  the  Times  of  May  27,  1904, 
who  pins  his  faith  to  an  interview  of  Bismarck  with  Lord  Loftus 
on  July  13,  1870.  Bismarck,  of  course,  wanted  war;  but  so  did 
Gramont,  and  I  hold  that  the  latter  brought  it  about. 


Causes  of  the  Franco-German  War     53 

natural  restdt  of  the  second  and  very  urgent  demand  that 
came  from  Paris.  The  Due  de  Gramont  in  despatching  it 
must  have  known  that  he  was  playing  a  desperate  game. 
Either  Prussia  would  give  way  and  France  would  score  a 
diplomatic  triumph  over  a  hated  rival,  or  Prussia  would 
fight.  The  friends  of  peace  in  France  thought  matters 
hopeless  when  that  demand  was  sent  in  so  insistent  a 
manner.  As  soon  as  Gladstone  heard  of  the  second  de- 
mand of  the  Ollivier  Ministry,  he  wrote  to  Lord  Granville, 
then  Foreign  Minister:  "It  is  our  duty  to  represent  the 
immense  responsibility  which  will  rest  upon  France,  if  she 
does  not  at  once  accept  as  satisfactory  and  conclusive  the 
withdrawal  of  the  candidature  of  Prince  Leopold."  i 

On  the  other  hand,  we  must  note  that  the  conduct  of  the 
German  press  at  this  crisis  was  certainly  provocative  of 
war.  The  morning  on  which  Bismarck's  telegram  appeared 
in  the  official  North  German  Gazette  saw  a  host  of  violent 
articles  against  France,  and  gleeful  accounts  of  imaginary 
insults  inflicted  by  the  King  on  Benedetti.  All  this  was  to 
be  expected  after  the  taunts  of  cowardice  freely  levelled  by 
the  Parisian  papers  against  Prussia  for  the  last  two  days; 
but  whether  Bismarck  directly  inspired  the  many  sensa- 
tional versions  of  the  Ems  affair  that  appeared  in  North 
German  papers  on  July  14th  is  not  yet  proven. 

However  that  may  be,  the  French  Government  looked 
on  the  refusal  of  its  last  demand,  the  publication  of  Bis- 
marck's telegram,  and  the  insults  of  the  German  press  as  a 
casus  belli.  The  details  of  the  sitting  of  the  Emperor's 
Council  at  10  p.m.  on  Jul}'-  14th,  at  which  it  was  decided  to 
call  out  the  French  reserves;,  are  not  yet  known.  Ollivier 
was  not  present.  There  had  been  a  few  hours  of  wavering 
>  J.  Morley,  Life  of  Gladstone,  ii.,  p.  328. 


54  The  European  Nations 

on  this  question;  but  the  tone  of  the  Parisian  evening 
papers — it  was  the  French  national  day — the  loud  cries  of 
the  rabble  for  war,  and  their  smashing  the  windows  of  the 
Prussian  embassy,  seem  to  have  convinced  the  Emperor 
and  his  advisers  that  to  draw  back  now  would  involve 
the  fall  of  the  dynasty.  Report  has  uniformly  pointed  to 
the  Empress  as  pressing  these  ideas  on  her  consort,  and  the 
account  which  the  Due  de  Gramont  later  on  gave  to  Lord 
Malmesbury  of  her  words  at  that  momentous  Council- 
meeting  support  a  popular  rumour.     It  is  as  follows: 

"Before  the  final  resolve  to  declare  war  the  Emperor, 
Empress,  and  Ministers  went  to  St.  Cloud.  After  some 
discussion  Gramont  told  me  that  the  Empress,  a  high- 
spirited  and  impressionable  woman,  made  a  strong  and 
most  excited  address,  declaring  that  'war  was  inevitable 
if  the  honour  of  France  was  to  be  sustained.'  She  was 
immediately  followed  by  Marshal  Lebceuf,  who,  in  the 
most  violent  tone,  threw  down  his  portfolio  and  swore  that 
if  war  was  not  declared  he  would  give  it  up  and  renounce 
his  military  rank.  The  Emperor  gave  way,  and  Gramont 
went  straight  to  the  Chamber  to  announce  the  fatal  news.^ 

On  the  morrow  Quly  15th)  the  Chamber  of  Deputies 
appointed    a    Commission,  which   hastily   examined    the 

»  This  version  has,  I  believe,  not  been  refuted.  Still,  I  must 
look  on  it  with  suspicion.  No  Minister  who  had  done  so  much 
to  stir  up  the  war-feeling  ought  to  have  made  any  such  confession 
— least  of  all  against  a  lady,  who  could  not  answer  it.  M.  Seignobos. 
in  his  Political  History  of  Contemporary  Europe,  i.,  chap,  vi.,  p.  184 
(Eng.  edit.),  says  of  Gramont:  "  He  it  was  who  embroiled  France  in 
the  war  with  Prussia."  In  the  course  of  the  parliamentary  inquiry 
of  1872  Gramont  convicted  himself  and  his  Cabinet  of  folly  in  1870 
by  using  these  words:  "Je  crois  pouvoir  declarer  que  si  on  avait 
eu  un  doute,  un  seule  doute,  sur  notre  aptitude  a  la  guerre,  on  eiit 
immediatement  arr^te  la  negociation"  {Enquete  parlementaire,  I., 
i.,  p.  108). 


Causes  of  the  Franco-German  War      55 

diplomatic  documents  and  reported  in  a  sense  favourable  to 
the  Ollivier  Ministry.  The  subsequent  debate  made  strongly 
for  a  rupture ;  and  it  is  important  to  note  that  Ollivier  and 
Gramont  based  the  demand  for  warlike  preparations  on 
the  fact  that  King  William  had  refused  to  see  the  French 
ambassador,  and  held  that  that  alone  was  a  sufficient  in- 
sult. In  vain  did  Thiers  protest  against  the  war  as  in- 
opportune, and  demand  to  see  all  the  necessary  documents. 
The  Chamber  passed  the  war  supplies  by  246  votes  to  10; 
and  Thiers  had  his  windows  broken.  Late  on  that  night 
Gramont  set  aside  a  last  attempt  of  Lord  Granville  to  ofEer 
the  mediation  of  England  in  the  cause  of  peace,  on  the 
ground  that  this  would  be  to  the  harm  of  France — "unless 
means  were  found  to  stop  the  rapid  mobilisation  of  the 
Prussian  armies  which  were  approaching  our  frontier."^ 
In  this  connection  it  is  needful  to  state  that  the  order  for 
mobilising  the  North  German  troops  was  not  given  by  the 
King  of  Prussia  until  late  on  July  15th,  when  the  war  votes 
of  the  French  Chambers  were  known  at  Berlin. 

Benedetti,  in  his  review  of  the  whole  question,  passes  the 
following  very  noteworthy  and  sensible  verdict:  "It  was 
public  opinion  which  forced  the  [French]  Government  to 
draw  the  sword,  and  by  an  irresistible  onset  dictated  its 
resolutions."  2  This  is  certainly  true  for  the  public  opin- 
ion of  Paris,  though  not  of  France  as  a  whole.  The  rural 
districts,  which  form  the  real  strength  of  France,  nearly 
always  cling  to  peace.  It  is  significant  that  the  Prefects 
of  French  Departments  reported  that  only  sixteen  declared 
in  favour  of  war,  while  thirty-seven  were  in  doubt  on  the 
matter,  and  thirty-four  accepted  war  with  regret.     This  is 

>  Quoted  by  Sorel,  op.  cit.,  i.,  196. 

2  Benedetti,  Ma  Mission  en  Prusse,  p.  411. 


56  The  European  Nations 

what  might  be  expected  from  a  people  which  in  the  Prov- 
inces is  marked  by  prudence  and  thrift. 

In  truth,  the  people  of  modem  Europe  have  settled  down 
to  a  life  of  peaceful  industry,  in  which  war  is  the  most  hate- 
ful of  evils.  On  the  other  hand,  the  massing  of  mankind 
in  great  cities,  where  thought  is  superficial  and  feelings 
can  quickly  be  stirred  by  a  sensation-mongering  press,  has 
imdoubtedly  helped  to  feed  political  passions  and  national 
hatred.  A  rural  population  is  not  deeply  stirred  by  stories 
of  slights  to  ambassadors.  The  peasant  of  Brittany  had  no 
active  dislike  for  the  peasant  of  Brandenburg.  Each  only 
asked  to  be  left  to  till  his  fields  in  peace  and  safety.  But 
the  crowds  on  the  Parisian  boulevards  and  in  Unter  den 
Linden  took  (and  seemingly  always  will  take)  a  very 
different  view  of  life.  To  them  the  news  of  the  humiliation 
of  the  rival  beyond  the  Rhine  was  the  greatest  and  there- 
fore the  most  welcome  of  sensations;  and,  unfortunately, 
the  papers  which  pandered  to  their  taste  set  the  tone  of 
thought  for  no  small  part  of  France  and  Germany,  and 
exerted  on  national  policy  an  influence  out  of  all  propor- 
tion to  its  real  weight. 

The  story  of  the  Franco-German  dispute  is  one  of  national 
jealousy,  carefully  fanned  for  four  years  by  newspaper 
editors  and  popular  speakers  until  a  spark  sufficed  to  set 
Western  Europe  in  a  blaze.  The  spark  was  the  Hohen- 
zollem  candidature,  which  would  have  fallen  harmless  had 
not  the  tinder  been  prepared  since  Koniggratz  by  journal- 
ists at  Paris  and  Berlin.  The  resulting  conflagration  may 
justly  be  described  as  due  partly  to  national  friction  and 
partly  to  the  supposed  interests  of  the  Napoleonic  dynasty, 
but  also  to  the  heat  engendered  by  a  sensational  press. 

It  is  well  that  one  of  the  chief  dangers  to  the  peace  of  the 


Causes  of  the  Franco-German  War     57 

modem  world  should  be  clearly  recognised.  The  central- 
isation of  governments  and  of  population  may  have  its 
advantages;  but  over  against  them  we  must  set  grave 
drawbacks;  among  those  of  a  political  kind  the  worst  are 
the  growth  of  nervousness  and  excitability,  and  the  craving 
for  sensation — qualities  which  undoubtedly  tend  to  em- 
bitter national  jealousies  at  all  times,  and  in  the  last  case 
to  drive  weak  dynasties  or  cabinets  on  to  war.  Certainly 
Bismarck's  clever  shifts  to  bring  about  a  rupture  in  1870 
would  have  failed  had  not  the  atmosphere  both  at  Paris 
and  Berlin  been  charged  with  electricity,^ 

»  Prince  Leopold  of  Hohenzollern  died  at  BerKn  on  June  8,  1905. 
He  was  born  in  1835  and  in  1861  married  the  Infanta  of  Portugal. 


CHAPTER  II 

FROM    WORTH    TO    GRAVELOTTE 

"The  Chief  of  the  General  StafE  had  his  eye  fixed  from  the  first 
upon  the  capture  of  the  enemy's  capital,  the  possession  of  which 
is  of  more  importance  in  France  than  in  other  countries. 
It  is  a  delusion  to  believe  that  a  plan  of  war  may  be  laid  for  a  pro- 
longed period  and  carried  out  in  every  point." — Von  Moltke,  The 
Franco-German  War. 

IN  olden  times,  before  the  invention  of  long-range  arms 
of  precision,  warfare  was  decided  mainly  by  indi- 
vidual bravery  and  strength.  In  the  modem  world  victory 
has  inclined  more  and  more  to  that  side  which  carefully 
prepares  beforehand  to  throw  a  force,  superior  alike  in 
armament  and  numbers,  against  the  vitals  of  its  enemy. 
Assuming  that  the  combatants  are  fairly  equal  in  physical 
qualities — and  the  spread  of  liberty  has  undoubtedly 
lessened  the  great  differences  that  once  were  observable  in 
this  respect  among  European  peoples — war  becomes  largely 
an  affair  of  preliminary  organisation.  That  is  to  say,  it  is 
now  a  matter  of  brain  rather  than  muscle.  Writers  of  the 
school  of  Carlyle  may  protest  that  all  modem  warfare  is 
tame  when  compared  with  the  splendidly  rampant  animal- 
ism of  the  Homeric  fights.  In  the  interests  of  humanity 
it  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  change  will  go  on  until  war  be- 
comes wholly  scientific  and  utterly  unattractive.  Mean- 
while, the  soldier-caste,  the  politician,  and  the  tax-payer 
have  to  face  the  fact  that  the  fortunes  of  war  are  very 

58 


From  Worth  to  Gravelotte  59 

largely  decided  by  humdrum  costly  preparations  in  time 
of  peace. 

The  last  chapter  set  forth  the  causes  that  led  to  war  in 
1870.  That  event  found  Germany  fully  prepared.  The 
lessons  of  the  campaign  of  1866  had  not  been  lost  upon  the 
Prussian  General  Staff.  The  artillery  was  improved  alike 
in  materiel  and  in  drill  tactics,  Napoleon  I.'s  plan  of  bring- 
ing massed  batteries  to  bear  on  decisive  points  being  de- 
veloped with  Prussian  thoroughness.  The  cavalry  learnt 
to  scout  effectively  and  act  as  "the  eyes  and  ears  of  an 
army,"  as  well  as  to  charge  in  brigades  on  a  wavering  foe. 
Universal  military  service  had  been  compulsory  in  Prussia 
since  18 13;  but  the  organisation  of  territorial  army  corps 
now  received  fuller  development,  so  that  each  part  of 
Prussia,  including,  too,  most  of  the  North  German  Con- 
federation, had  its  own  small  army  complete  in  all  arms, 
and  reinforced  from  the  reserve,  and,  at  need,  from  the 
Landwehrr}  By  virtue  of  the  military  conventions  of 
1866,  the  other  German  States  adopted  a  similar  system, 
save  that  while  Prussians  served  for  three  years  (with  few 
exceptions  in  the  case  of  successful  examinees),  the  South 
Germans  served  with  the  colours  for  a  shorter  period. 
Those  conventions  also  secured  uniformity,  or  harmony, 
in  the  railway  arrangements  for  the  transport  of  troops. 

The  general  staff  of  the  North  German  army  had  used 
these  advantages  to  the  utmost,  by  preparing  a  most  com- 
plete plan  of  mobilisation,  so  complete,  in  fact,  that  the 

1  By  the  Prussian  law  of  November  9,  1867,  soldiers  had  to  serve 
three  years  with  the  colours,  four  in  the  reserve,  and  five  in  the 
Landwehr.  Three  new  army  corps  (9th,  loth,  and  nth)  were 
formed  in  the  newly  annexed  or  confederated  lands — Hanover, 
Hesse-Cassel,  Saxony,  etc.  (Maurice,  The  Franco-German  War, 
1900). 


6o  The  European  Nations 

myriad  orders  had  only  to  be  drawn  from  their  pigeon- 
holes and  dated  in  the  last  hours  of  Jtdy  15th.  Forthwith 
the  whole  of  the  vast  machinery  started  in  swift  but 
smooth  working.  Reservists  speedily  appeared  at  their 
regimental  depots,  there  found  their  equipment,  and 
speedily  brought  their  regiments  up  to  the  war  footing; 
trains  were  ready,  timed  according  to  an  elaborate  plan, 
to  carry  them  Rhinewards;  provisions  and  stores  were 
sent  forward,  ohne  Hast,  ohne  Rast,  as  the  Germans  say ; 
and  so  perfect  were  the  plans  on  rail,  river,  and  road  that 
none  of  those  blocks  occurred  which  frequently  upset  the 
plans  of  the  French.  Thus,  by  dint  of  plodding  prepara- 
tion, a  group  of  federal  States  gained  a  decisive  advantage 
over  a  centralised  Empire  which  left  too  many  things  to 
be  arranged  in  the  last  few  hours. 

Herein  lies  the  true  significance  of  the  War  of  1870.  All 
Governments  that  were  not  content  to  jog  along  in  the  old 
military  ruts  saw  the  need  of  careful  organisation,  including 
the  eventual  control  of  all  needful  means  of  transport ;  and 
all  that  were  wise  hastened  to  adapt  their  system  to  the 
new  order  of  things,  which  aimed  at  assuring  the  swift, 
orderly  movement  of  great  masses  of  men  by  all  the  re- 
sources of  mechanical  science.  Most  of  the  civilised  States 
soon  responded  to  the  new  needs  of  the  age;  but  a  few 
(among  them  Great  Britain)  were  content  to  make  one  or 
two  superficial  changes  and  slightly  increase  the  number 
of  troops,  while  leaving  the  all-important  matter  of  or- 
ganisation almost  untouched;  and  that,  too,  despite  the 
vivid  contrast  which  every  one  could  see  between  the 
machine-like  regularity  of  the  German  mobilisation  and 
the  chaos  that  reigned  on  the  French  side. 

Outwardly,  the  French  army  appeared  to  be  beyond  the 


From  Worth  to  Gravelotte  6i 

reach  of  criticism.  The  troops  had  in  large  measure  seen 
active  service  in  the  various  wars  whereby  Napoleon  III. 
fulfilled  his  promise  of  1852 — "The  Empire  is  peace";  and 
their  successes  in  the  Crimea,  Lombardy,  Syria,  and  China, 
everywhere,  in  fact,  but  Mexico,  filled  them  with  warlike 
pride.  Armed  with  the  chassepot,  a  newer  and  better 
rifle  than  the  needle-gun,  while  their  artillery  (admittedly 
rather  weak)  was  strengthened  by  the  mitrailleuse,  they 
claimed  to  be  the  best  in  the  world,  and  burned  to  measure 
swords  with  the  upstart  forces  of  Prussia. 

But  there  was  a  sombre  reverse  to  this  bright  side.  All 
thinking  Frenchmen,  including  the  Emperor,  were  aware 
of  grave  defects — the  lack  of  training  of  the  officers,  ^  and 
the  want  of  adaptability  in  the  general  staff,  which  had 
little  of  that  practical  knowledge  that  the  German  staff 
secured  by  periods  of  service  with  the  troops.  Add  to  this 
the  leaven  of  republicanism  working  strongly  in  the  army 
as  in  the  State,  and  producing  distrust  between  officers  and 
men;  above  all,  the  lack  of  men  and  materials;  and  the 
outlook  was  not  reassuring  to  those  who  knew  the  whole 
truth.  Inclusive  of  the  levies  of  the  year  1869,  which  were 
not  quite  ready  for  active  service,  France  would  have  by 
August  I,  1870,  as  many  as  567,000  men  in  her  regular 
army;  but,  of  these,  colonial,  garrison,  and  other  duties 
claimed  as  many  as  230,000,  a  figure  which  seems  designed 
to  include  the  troops  that  existed  only  on  paper.  Not 
only  the  personnel  but  the  materiel  came  far  below  what 

»  M.  de  la  Gorce,  in  his  Histoire  du  Second  Kvnpire,  vi.,  tells  how 
the  French  officers  scouted  study  of  the  art  of  war,  while  most  of 
them  looked  on  favouritism  as  the  only  means  of  promotion.  The 
warnings  of  Colonel  Stoffel,  French  Military  Attache  at  Berlin,  were 
passed  over  as  those  of  "a  Prussomane,  whom  Bismarck  had 
fascinated." 


62  The  European  Nations 

was  expected.  General  Leboeuf,  the  War  Minister,  ven- 
tured to  declare  that  all  was  ready,  even  to  the  last  button 
on  the  gaiters;  but  his  boast  at  once  rang  false  when  at 
scores  of  military  depots  neither  gaiters,  boots,  nor  uni- 
forms were  ready  for  the  reservists  who  needed  them. 

Even  where  the  organisation  worked  at  its  best,  that 
best  was  slow  and  confused.  There  were  no  territorial 
army  corps  in  time  of  peace ;  and  the  lack  of  this  organisa- 
tion led  to  a  grievous  waste  of  time  and  energy.  Regiments 
were  frequently  far  away  from  the  depots  which  contained 
the  reservists'  equipment;  and  when  these  had  found  their 
equipment,  they  often  wandered  widely  before  finding 
their  regiments  on  the  way  to  the  frontier.  One  general 
officer  hunted  about  on  the  frontier  for  a  command  which 
did  not  exist.  As  a  result  of  this  lack  of  organisation,  and 
of  that  control  over  the  railways  which  the  Germans  had 
methodically  enforced,  France  lost  the  many  advantages 
which  her  compact  territory  and  excellent  railway  system 
ought  to  have  ensured  over  her  more  straggling  and  poorer 
rival. 

The  loss  of  time  was  as  fatal  as  it  was  singular  under  the 
rule  of  a  Napoleon  whose  uncle  had  so  often  shattered  his 
foes  by  swift  movements  of  troops.  In  1870  Napoleonic 
France  had  nothing  but  speed  and  dash  on  which  to  count. 
Numbers  were  against  her.  In  1869  Marshal  Leboeuf  had 
done  away  with  the  Garde  Mobile,  a  sort  of  militia  which 
had  involved  only  fifteen  days'  drill  in  the  year;  and  the 
Garde  Nationale  of  the  towns  was  less  fit  for  campaigning 
than  the  re-formed  Mobiles  proved  to  be  later  on  in  the 
war.  Thus  France  had  no  reserves:  everything  rested  on 
the  330,000  men  struggling  towards  the  frontiers.  It  is 
doubtful  whether  there  were  more  than  220,000  men  in  the 


63 


64  The  European  Nations 

first  line  by  August  6th,  with  some  50,000  more  in  reserve 
at  Metz,  etc. 

Against  them  Germany  could  at  once  put  into  the  field 
460,000  infantry,  56,000  cavalry,  with  1,584  cannon;  and 
she  could  raise  these  forces  to  some  1,180,000  men  by 
calling  out  all  the  reserves  and  the  Landwehr.  These  last 
were  men  who  had  served  their  time  and  had  not,  as  a  rule, 
lost  their  soldierly  qualities  in  civil  life.  Nearly  400,000 
highly  trained  troops  were  ready  to  invade  France  early  in 
August. 

In  view  of  these  facts  it  seems  incredible  that  Ollivier, 
the  French  Prime  Minister,  could  have  publicly  stated  that 
he  entered  on  war  with  a  light  heart.  Doubtless  Ministers 
counted  on  help  from  Austria  or  Italy,  perhaps  from  both; 
but,  as  it  proved,  they  judged  too  hastily.  As  was  stated 
in  Chapter  I.  of  this  work,  Austria  was  not  likely  to  move 
so  long  as  Russia  favoured  the  cause  of  Prussia;  for  any 
threatening  pressure  of  the  Muscovites  on  the  open  flank 
of  the  Hapsburg  States,  Galicia,  has  sufficed  to  keep  them 
from  embarking  on  a  campaign  in  the  West.  In  this  case, 
the  statesmen  of  Vienna  are  said  to  have  known  by  July 
20th  that  Russia  would  quietly  help  Prussia;  she  informed 
the  Hapsburg  Government  that  any  increase  in  its  arma- 
ments would  be  met  by  a  corresponding  increase  in  those 
of  Russia.  The  meaning  of  such  a  hint  was  clear;  and 
Austria  decided  not  to  seek  revenge  for  Koniggratz  unless 
the  French  triumph  proved  to  be  overwhelming.  As  for 
Italy,  her  alliance  with  France  alone  was  very  improbable, 
for  the  reasons  previously  stated. 

Another  will-o'-the-wisp  which  flitted  before  the  ardent 
Bonapartists  who  pushed  on  the  Emperor  to  war  was  that 
the  South  German  States  would  forsake  the  North  and 


From  Worth  to  Gravelotte  65 

range  their  troops  under  the  French  eagles,  as  they  had 
done  in  the  years  1805-12.  The  first  plan  of  campaign 
drawn  up  at  Paris  aimed  at  driving  a  solid  wedge  of  French 
troops  between  the  two  Confederations  and  inducing  or 
compelling  the  South  to  join  France;  it  was  hoped  that 
Saxony  would  follow.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  very  many  of 
the  South  Germans  and  Saxons  disliked  Prussian  suprem- 
acy; Catholic  Bavaria  looked  askance  at  the  growing  power 
of  Protestant  Prussia.  Wiirtemberg  was  Protestant,  but 
far  too  democratic  to  wish  for  the  control  of  the  cast-iron 
bureaucrats  of  Berlin.  The  same  was  even  more  true  of 
Saxony,  where  hostility  to  Prussia  was  a  deep-rooted  tra- 
dition; some  of  the  Saxon  troops  on  leaving  their  towns 
even  shouted,  "Napoleon  soil  leben!"^  It  is  therefore 
quite  possible  that,  had  France  struck  quickly  at  the 
valleys  of  the  Neckar  and  Main,  she  might  have  reduced 
the  South  German  States  to  neutrality.  Alliance  perhaps 
was  out  of  the  question  save  under  overwhelming  com- 
pulsion ;  for  France  had  alienated  the  Bavarian  and  Hessian 
Governments  by  her  claims  in  1866,  and  the  South  German 
people  by  her  recent  offensive  treatment  of  the  Hohen- 
zollem  candidature.  It  is,  however,  safe  to  assert  that 
if  Napoleon  I.  had  ordered  French  affairs  he  would  have 
swept  the  South  Germans  into  his  net  a  month  after  the 
outbreak  of  war,  as  he  had  done  in  1805.  But  nature  had 
not  bestowed  warlike  gifts  on  the  nephew,  who  took  com- 
mand of  the  French  army  at  Metz  at  the  close  of  July, 
1870.  His  feeble  health,  alternating  with  periods  of  severe 
pain,  took  from  him  all  that  buoyancy  which  lends  life  ta 
an  army  and  vigour  to  the  headquarters;   and  his  chief  of 

^I.e.,  "Long  live    Napoleon!"     The  author  had  tliis  from  an 
Englishman  who  was  then  living  in  Saxony. 

VOL.  I. — 5. 


66  The  European  Nations 

staff,  Leboeui,  did  not  make  good  the  lack  of  these  qual- 
ities in  the  nominal  chief. 

All  the  initiative  and  vigour  were  on  the  east  of  the 
Rhine.  The  spread  of  the  national  principle  to  Central 
and  South  Germany  had  recently  met  with  several  checks ; 
but  the  diplomatic  blunders  of  the  French  Government, 
the  threats  of  their  press  that  the  Napoleonic  troops  would 
repeat  the  wonders  of  1805;  above  all,  admiration  of  the 
dignified  conduct  of  King  William  under  what  were  thought 
to  be  gratuitous  insults  from  France,  began  to  kindle  the 
flame  of  German  patriotism  even  in  the  particularists  of 
the  South.  The  news  that  the  deservedly  popular  Crown 
Prince  of  Prussia,  Frederick  William,  would  command  the 
army  now  mustering  in  the  Palatinate,  largely  composed 
of  South  Germans,  sent  a  thrill  of  joy  through  those  States. 
Taught  by  the  folly  of  her  stay-at-home  strategy  in  1866, 
Bavaria  readily  sent  her  large  contingent  beyond  the 
Rhine;  and  all  danger  of  a  French  irruption  into  South 
Germany  was  ended  by  the  speedy  massing  of  the  Third 
German  army,  some  200,000  strong  in  all,  on  the  north  of 
Alsace.  For  the  French  to  cross  the  Rhine  at  Speyer,  or 
even  at  Kehl,  in  front  of  a  greatly  superior  army  (though 
as  yet  they  knew  not  its  actual  strength)  was  clearly  im- 
possible ;  and  in  the  closing  hours  of  July  the  French  head- 
quarters fell  back  on  other  plans,  which,  speaking  generally, 
were  to  defend  the  French  frontier  from  the  Moselle  to  the 
Rhine  by  striking  at  the  advanced  German  troops.  At 
least,  that  seems  to  be  the  most  natural  explanation  of  the 
sudden  and  rather  flurried  changes  then  made. 

It  was  wise  to  hide  this  change  to  a  strategic  defensive 
by  assuming  a  tactical  offensive;  and  on  August  2nd  two 
divisions  of  Frossard's  corps  attacked  and  drove  back  the 


From  Worth  to  Gravelotte  67 

advanced  troops  of  the  Second  German  army  from  Saar- 
briicken.  The  affair  was  unimportant:  it  could  lead  to 
nothing,  unless  the  French  had  the  means  of  following  up 
the  success.  This  they  had  not;  and  the  advance  of  the 
First  and  Second  German  armies,  commanded  by  General 
Steinmetz  and  Prince  Frederick  Charles,  was  soon  to  de- 
prive them  of  this  position. 

Meanwhile  the  Germans  were  making  ready  a  weightier 
enterprise.  The  muster  of  the  huge  Third  army  to  the 
north  of  Alsace  enabled  their  general  staff  to  fix  August 
4th  for  a  general  advance  against  that  frontier.  It  fell  to 
this  army,  under  the  Crown  Prince  of  Prussia,  Frederick 
William,  to  strike  the  first  great  blow.  Early  on  August 
4th  a  strong  Bavarian  division  advanced  against  the  small 
fortified  town  of  Weissenburg,  which  lies  deep  down  in  the 
valley  of  the  Lauter,  surrounded  by  lofty  hills.  There  it 
surprised  a  weak  French  division,  the  vanguard  of  Mac- 
Mahon's  army,  commanded  by  General  Abel  Douay,  whose 
scouts  had  found  no  trace  of  the  advancing  enemy.  About 
10  A.M.  Douay  fell,  mortally  wounded;  another  German 
division,  working  round  the  town  to  the  east,  carried  the 
strong  position  of  the  Geisberg;  and  these  combined  ef- 
forts, frontal  and  on  the  flank,  forced  the  French  hastily 
to  retreat  westwards  over  the  hills  to  Worth,  after  losing 
more  than  two  thousand  men. 

The  news  of  this  reverse  and  of  the  large  German  forces 
ready  to  pour  into  the  north  of  Alsace  led  the  Emperor  to 
order  the  yth  French  corps  at  Belfort,  and  the  5th  in  and 
around  Bitsch,  to  send  reinforcements  to  MacMahon,  whose 
main  force  held  the  steep  and  wooded  hills  between  the 
villages  of  Worth,  Froschweiler,  and  Reichshofen.  The 
line  of  railway  between   Strassburg  and   Bitsch  touches 


68  The  European  Nations 

Reichshofen ;  but,  for  some  reason  that  has  never  been 
satisfactorily  explained,  MacMahon  was  able  to  draw  up 
only  one  division  from  the  side  of  Strassburg  and  Belfort, 
and  not  one  from  Bitsch,  which  was  within  an  easy  march. 
The  fact  seems  to  be  that  de  Failly,  in  command  at  Bitsch, 
was  a  prey  to  conflicting  orders  from  Metz,  and  therefore 
failed  to  bring  up  the  5th  corps  as  he  should  have  done. 
MacMahon's  cavalry  was  also  very  defective  in  scouting, 
and  he  knew  nothing  as  to  the  strength  of  the  forces 
rapidly  drawing  near  from  Weissenburg  and  the  east. 

Certainly  his  position  at  Worth  was  very  strong.  The 
French  lines  were  ranged  along  the  steep  wooded  slope 
running  north  and  south,  with  buttress-like  projections, 
intersected  by  gullies,  the  whole  leading  up  to  a  plateau  on 
which  stand  the  village  of  Froschweiler  and  the  hamlet  of 
Elsasshausen.  Behind  is  the  wood  called  the  Grosser 
Wald,  while  the  hamlet  is  flanked  on  the  south  and  in 
front  by  an  outlying  wood,  the  Niederwald.  Behind  the 
Grosser  Wald  the  ground  sinks  away  to  the  valley  in  which 
runs  the  Bitsch-Reichshofen  railway.  In  front  of  Mac- 
Mahon's position  lay  the  village  of  Worth,  deep  in  the 
valley  of  the  Sauerbach.  The  invader  would  therefore 
have  to  carry  this  village,  or  cross  the  stream  and  press  up 
the  long,  open  slopes  on  which  were  ranged  the  French 
troops  and  batteries,  with  all  the  advantages  of  cover  and 
elevation  on  their  side.  A  poor  general,  having  forces 
smaller  than  those  of  his  enemy,  might  hope  to  hold  such 
a  position.  But  there  was  one  great  defect.  Owing  to  de 
Failly's  absence  MacMahon  had  not  enough  men  to  hold 
the  whole  of  the  position  marked  out  by  nature  for  defence. 

Conscious  of  its  strength,  the  Prussian  Crown  Prince 
ordered  the    leaders  of  his  vanguard  not  to  bring  on  a 


From  Worth  to  Gravelotte  69 

general  engagement  on  August  6th,  when  the  invading  army 
had  not  at  hand  its  full  striking  strength.^  But  orders 
failed  to  hold  in  the  ardour  of  the  Germans  under  the 
attacks  of  the  French.  Affairs  of  outposts  along  the 
Sauerbach  early  on  that  morning  brought  on  a  serious 
fight,  which  up  to  noon  went  against  the  invaders.  At 
that  time  the  Crown  Prince  galloped  to  the  front,  and 
ordered  an  attack  with  all  available  forces.  The  fighting, 
hitherto  fierce  but  spasmodic  between  division  and  division, 
was  now  fed  by  a  steady  stream  of  German  reinforcements, 
until  87,000  of  the  invaders  sought  to  wrest  from  Mac- 
Mahon  the  heights,  with  their  woods  and  villages,  which 
he  had  but  54,000  to  defend.  The  superiority  of  numbers 
soon  made  itself  felt.  Pursuant  to  the  Crown  Prince's 
orders,  parts  of  two  Bavarian  corps  began  to  work  their 
way  (but  with  one  strangely  long  interval  of  inaction) 
through  the  wood  to  the  north  of  the  French  left  wing ;  on 
the  Prussian  nth  corps  fell  the  severer  task  of  winning 
their  way  up  the  slopes  south  of  Worth,  and  thence  up  to 
the  Niederwald  and  Elsasshausen.  When  these  woods  were 
won,  the  5th  corps  was  to  make  its  frontal  attack  from 
Worth  against  Froschweiler.  Despite  the  desperate  efforts 
of  the  French  and  their  Turco  regiments,  and  a  splendid 
but  hopeless  charge  of  two  regiments  of  Cuirassiers  and  one 
of  Lancers  against  the  German  infantry,  the  Niederwald 
and  Elsasshausen  were  won;  and  about  four  o'clock  the 
sustained  fire  of  fifteen  German  batteries  against  Frosch- 
weiler enabled  the  5th  corps  to  struggle  up  that  deadly 
glacis  in  spite  of  desperate  charges  by  the  defenders. 

1  See  von  Blumenthal's  Journals,  p.  87  (Eng.  edit.):  "The  battle 
which  I  had  expected  to  take  place  on  the  7th,  and  for  which  I 
had  prepared  a  good  scheme  for  turning  the  enemy's  right  flank, 
came  on  of  itself  to-day." 


JO  The  European  Nations 

Throughout  the  day  the  French  showed  their  usual  dash 
and  devotion,  some  regiments  being  cut  to  pieces  rather 
than  retire.  But  by  five  o'clock  the  defence  was  out- 
flanked on  the  two  wings  and  crushed  at  the  centre; 
human  nature  cotdd  stand  no  more  after  eight  hours' 
fighting;  and  after  a  final  despairing  effort  of  the  French 
Cuirassiers  all  their  line  gave  way  in  a  general  rout  down 
the  slopes  to  Reichshofen  and  towards  Saveme.  Apart 
from  the  Wiirtembergers  held  in  reserve,  few  of  the  Ger- 
mans were  in  a  condition  to  press  the  pursuit.  Never- 
theless the  fruits  of  victory  were  very  great:  ten  thousand 
Frenchmen  lay  dead  or  wounded ;  six  thousand  unwounded 
prisoners  were  taken,  with  twenty -eight  cannon  and  five 
mitrailleuses.  Above  all,  MacMahon's  fine  army  was  utterly 
broken,  and  made  no  attempt  to  defend  any  of  the  po- 
sitions on  the  north  of  the  Vosges.  Not  even  a  tiumel 
was  there  blown  up  to  delay  the  advance  of  the  Germans. 
Hastily  gathering  up  the  5th  corps  from  Bitsch, — the  corps 
which  ought  to  have  been  at  Worth, — that  gallant  but 
unfortunate  general  struck  out  to  the  south-west  for  the 
great  camp  at  Chalons.  The  triumph,  however,  cost  the 
Germans  dear.  As  many  as  10,600  men  were  killed  or 
woiuided,  the  5th  Prussian  corps  alone  losing  more  than 
half  that  number.  Their  cavalry  failed  to  keep  touch 
with  the  retreating  French. 

On  that  same  day  (August  6th)  a  disaster  scarcely  less 
serious  overtook  the  French  2nd  corps,  which  had  been 
holding  Saarbrticken.  Convinced  that  that  post  was  too 
advanced  and  too  weak  in  presence  of  the  foremost  divi- 
sions of  the  First  and  Second  German  armies  now  advanc- 
ing rapidly  against  it.  General  Frossard  drew  back  his 
vanguard  some  mile  and  a  half  to  the  line  of  steep  hills 


BATTLE    OF    WOERTH_ABOUTNOON. 


Plan  in. 


G.P.  Fataams  Soiis,JSew^rt. 


StanfbnVs  Geo^IjtaJ' 


From  Worth  to  Gravelotte  71 

between  Spicheren  and  Forbach,  just  within  the  French 
frontier.  This  retreat,  as  it  seemed,  tempted  General 
Kameke  to  attack  with  a  single  division,  as  he  was  justified 
in  doing  in  order  to  find  the  direction  and  strength  of  the 
retiring  force.  The  attack,  when  pushed  home,  showed 
that  the  French  were  bent  on  making  a  stand  on  their 
commanding  heights;  and  an  onset  on  the  Rothe  Berg  was 
stoutly  beaten  off  about  noon. 

But  now  the  speedy  advance  and  intelligent  co-operation 
of  other  Grerman  columns  was  instrumental  in  turning  an 
inconsiderable  repulse  into  an  important  victory.  General 
Goben  was  not  far  off,  and,  marching  towards  the  firing, 
sent  to  offer  his  help  with  the  8th  corps.  General  von 
Alvensleben,  also,  with  the  3rd  corps  had  reached  Neun- 
kirchen  when  the  soimd  of  firing  near  Saarbriicken  led  him 
to  push  on  for  that  place  with  the  utmost  speed.  He  en- 
trained part  of  his  corps  and  brought  it  up  in  time  to 
strengthen  the  attack  on  the  Rothe  Berg  and  other  heights 
nearer  to  Forbach.  Each  battalion  as  it  arrived  was 
hurled  forward,  and  General  von  Frangois,  charging  with 
his  regiment,  gained  a  lodgment  half-way  up  the  broken 
slope  of  the  Rothe  Berg,  which  was  stoutly  maintained 
even  when  he  fell  mortally  wounded.  Elsewhere  the 
onsets  were  repelled  by  the  French,  who,  despite  their 
smaller  numbers,  kept  up  a  sturdy  resistance  on  the  line 
of  hills  in  the  woods  behind,  and  in  the  iron- works  in  front 
of  Forbach.  Even  when  the  Germans  carried  the  top  of 
the  Rothe  Berg,  their  ranks  were  riddled  by  a  cross-fire ; 
but  by  incredible  exertions  they  managed  to  bring  guns  to 
the  summit  and  retaliate  with  effect.^ 

»  For  these  details  about  the  fighting  at  the  Rothe  Berg  I  am 
largely  indebted  to  my  friend  Mr.  Bernard  Pares,  M.A.,  who  has 


72  The  European  Nations 

This,  together  with  the  outflanking  movement  which 
their  increasing  numbers  enabled  them  to  carry  out  against 
the  French  left  wing  at  Forbach,  decided  the  day,  and 
Frossard's  corps  fell  back,  shattered,  towards  the  corps  of 
Bazaine.  It  is  noteworthy  that  this  was  but  nine  or  ten 
miles  to  the  rear.  Bazaine  had  ordered  three  divisions  to 
march  toward  the  firing:  one  made  for  a  wrong  point  and 
returned;  the  others  made  half-hearted  efforts,  and  thus 
left  Frossard  to  be  overborne  by  numbers.  The  result  of 
these  disjointed  movements  was  that  both  Frossard  and 
Bazaine  hurriedly  retired  towards  Metz,  while  the  First 
and  Second  German  armies  now  gathered  up  all  their 
strength  with  the  aim  of  shutting  up  the  French  in  that 
fortress.  To  this  end  the  First  army  made  for  Colombey, 
east  of  Metz,  while  the  leading  part  of  the  Second  army 
purposed  to  cross  the  Moselle  south  of  Metz  and  circle 
round  that  stronghold  on  the  west. 

It  is  now  time  to  turn  to  the  French  headquarters. 
These  two  crushing  defeats  on  a  single  day  utterly  dashed 
Napoleon's  plan  of  a  spirited  defence  of  the  north-east 
frontier  until  such  time  as  the  levies  of  1869  should  be 
ready,  or  Austria  and  Italy  should  draw  the  sword.  On 
July  26th  the  Austrian  ambassador  assured  the  French 
Ministry  that  Austria  was  pushing  on  her  preparations. 
Victor  Emmanuel  was  with  difficulty  restrained  by  his 
ministers  from  openly  taking  the  side  of  France.  On  the 
night  of  August  6th  he  received  telegraphic  news  of  the 
battles  of  Worth  and  Forbach,  whereupon  he  exclaimed, 
"Poor  Emperor!  I  pity  him,  but  I  have  had  a  lucky 
escape."     Austria  also  drew  back,  and  thus  left  France 

made  a  careful  study  of  the  ground  there,  as  also  at  W6rth  and 
Sedan. 


From  Worth  to  Gravelotte  73 

face  to  face  with  the  naked  truth  that  she  stood  alone  and 
unready  before  a  imited  and  triumphant  Grermany,  able 
to  pour  treble  her  own  forces  through  the  open  portals  of 
Lorraine  and  Northern  Alsace. 

Napoleon  III.,  to  do  him  justice,  had  never  cherished  the 
wild  dreams  that  haunted  the  minds  of  his  consort  and  of 
the  frothy  "mamelukes"  lately  in  favour  at  Court;  still 
less  did  the  "silent  man  of  destiny"  indulge  in  the  idle 
boasts  that  had  helped  to  alienate  the  sympathy  of  Europe 
and  to  weld  together  Germany  to  withstand  the  blows  of 
a  second  Napoleonic  invasion.  The  nephew  knew  full  well 
that  he  was  not  the  Great  Napoleon — he  knew  it  before 
Victor  Hugo  in  spiteftd  verse  vainly  sought  to  dub  him  the 
Little.  True,  his  statesmanship  proved  to  be  mere  dreamy 
philosophising  about  nationalities;  his  administrative 
powers,  small  at  the  best,  were  ever  clogged  by  his  too 
generous  desire  to  reward  his  fellow-conspirators  of  the 
coup  d'etat  of  1851;  and  his  gifts  for  war  were  scarcely 
greater  than  those  of  the  other  NapoUonides,  Joseph  and 
Jerome.  Nevertheless  the  reverses  of  his  early  life  had 
strengthened  that  fund  of  quiet  stoicism,  that  energy  to  resist 
if  not  to  dare,  which  formed  the  backbone  of  an  otherwise 
somewhat  weak,  shadowy,  and  uninspiring  character.  And 
now,  in  the  rapid  fall  of  his  fortunes,  the  greatest  adventurer 
of  the  nineteenth  century  showed  to  the  full  those  qualities 
of  toughness  and  dignified  reserve  which  for  twenty  years 
had  puzzled  and  imposed  on  that  lively,  emotional  people. 
By  the  side  of  the  downcast  braggarts  of  the  Court  and  the 
imstrung  screamers  of  the  Parisian  press,  his  mien  had 
something  of  the  heroic.  Tout  peut  se  retablir, — ' '  All  may  yet 
be  set  right," — such  was  the  vague  but  dignified  phrase  in 
which  he  summarised  the  results  of  August  6th  to  his  people. 


74  The  European  Nations 

The  military  situation  now  required  a  prompt  retire- 
ment beyond  the  Moselle.  The  southerly  line  of  retreat 
which  MacMahon  and  de  Failly  had  been  driven  to  take 
forbade  the  hope  of  their  junction  with  the  main  army  at 
Metz  in  time  to  oppose  a  united  front  to  the  enemy.  And 
it  was  soon  known  that  their  flight  could  not  be  stayed  at 
Nancy  or  even  at  Toul.  During  the  agony  of  suspense  as 
to  their  movements  and  those  of  their  German  pursuers, 
the  Emperor  daily  changed  his  plans.  First,  he  and 
Leboeuf  planned  a  retreat  beyond  the  Moselle  and  Meuse; 
next,  political  considerations  bade  them  stand  firm  on  the 
banks  of  the  Nied,  some  twelve  miles  east  of  Metz;  and^ 
when  this  position  seemed  unsafe,  they  ended  the  march- 
ings and  counter-marchings  of  their  troops  by  taking  up 
a  position  at  Colombey,  nearer  to  Metz. 

Meanwhile  at  Paris  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  had  over- 
thrown the  Ollivier  Ministry,  and  the  Empress  Regent 
installed  in  office  Count  Palikao.  There  was  a  general  out- 
cry against  Leboeuf,  and  on  the  12th  the  Emperor  resigned 
the  command  to  Marshal  Bazaine  (Lebrun  now  acting  as 
chief  of  staff),  with  the  injunction  to  retreat  to  Verdun. 
For  the  Emperor  to  order  such  a  retreat  in  his  own 
name  was  thought  to  be  inopportune,  Bazaine  was  a 
convenient  scapegoat,  and  he  himself  knew  it.  Had  he 
thrown  an  army  corps  into  Metz  and  obeyed  the  Em- 
peror's orders  by  retreating  on  Verdun,  things  would 
certainly  have  gone  better  than  was  now  to  be  the 
case.  In  his  printed  defence  Bazaine  has  urged  that 
the  army  had  not  enough  provisions  for  the  march, 
and,  further,  that  the  outlying  forts  of  Metz  were  not 
yet  ready  to  withstand  a  siege — a  circumstance  which, 
if   true,   partly   explains    Bazaine's    reluctance    to    leave 


From  Worth  to  Gravelotte  75 

the  "virgin  city."  ^  Napoleon  III.  quitted  it  early  on  the 
1 6th:  he  and  his  escort  were  the  last  Frenchmen  to  get 
free  of  that  death-trap  for  many  a  week. 

While  Metz  exercised  this  fatal  fascination  over  the 
protecting  army,  the  First  and  Second  German  armies 
were  striding  westwards  to  envelop  both  the  city  and  its 
guardians.  Moltke's  aim  was  to  hold  many  of  the  French 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  fortress,  while  his  left  wing 
swung  round  it  on  the  south.  The  result  was  the  battle  of 
Colombey  on  the  east  of  Metz  (August  14th).  It  was  a 
stubborn  fight,  costing  the  Germans  some  five  thousand 
men,  while  the  French  with  smaller  losses  finally  withdrew 
imder  the  eastern  walls  of  Metz.  But  that  heavy  loss 
meant  a  great  ultimate  gain  to  Germany.  The  vacillations 
of  Bazaine,  whose  strategy  was  far  more  faulty  than  that  of 
Napoleon  III.  had  been,  together  with  the  delay  caused  by 
the  defiling  of  a  great  part  of  the  army  through  the  narrow 
streets  of  Metz,  gave  the  Germans  an  opportunity  such  as 
had  not  occurred  since  the  year  1805,  when  Napoleon  I. 
shut  up  an  Austrian  army  in  Ulm. 

The  man  who  now  saw  the  splendid  chance  of  which 
Fortune  vouchsafed  a  glimpse,  was  Lieutenant-General  von 
Alvensleben,  commander  of  the  3rd  corps,  whose  activity 
and  resource  had  so  largely  contributed  to  the  victory  of 
Spicheren-Forbach.  Though  the  orders  of  his  Commander- 
in-Chief,  Prince  Frederick  Charles,  forbade  an  advance 
until  the  situation  in  front  was  more  fully  known,  the 
General  heard  enough  to  convince  himself  that  a  rapid 

>  Bazaine  gave  this  excuse  in  his  Rapport  sommaire  sur  les  Opera- 
tions de  V Armee  du  Rhin;  but  as  a  staff  officer  pointed  out  in  his 
incisive  Reponse,  this  reason  must  have  been  equally  cogent  when 
Napoleon  (August  12th)  ordered  him  to  retreat;  and  he  was  still 
bound  to  obey  the  Emperor's  orders. 


76  The  European  Nations 

advance  southwards  to  and  over  the  Moselle  might  enable 
him  to  intercept  the  French  retreat  on  Verdun,  which 
might  now  be  looked  on  as  certain.  Reporting  his  con- 
viction to  his  chief,  as  also  to  the  royal  headquarters,  he 
struck  out  with  all  speed  on  the  15th,  quietly  threw  a 
bridge  over  the  river,  and  sent  on  his  advanced  guard  as 
far  as  Pagny  near  Gorze,  while  all  his  corps,  about  33,000 
strong,  crossed  the  river  about  midnight.  Soon  after 
dawn,  he  pushed  on  towards  Gorze,  knowing  by  this  time 
that  the  other  corps  of  the  Second  army  were  following 
him,  while  the  7th  and  8th  corps  of  the  First  army  were 
about  to  cross  the  river  nearly  opposite  that  town. 

This  bold  movement,  which  would  have  drawn  on  him 
sharp  censure  in  case  of  overthrow,  was  more  than  justifi- 
able seeing  the  discouraged  state  of  the  French  troops,  the 
supreme  need  of  finding  their  line  of  retreat,  and  the 
splendid  results  that  must  follow  on  the  interception  of 
that  retreat.  The  operations  of  war  must  always  be  at- 
tended with  risk,  and  the  great  commander  is  he  whose 
knowledge  of  the  principles  of  strategy  enables  him  quickly 
to  see  when  the  final  gain  warrants  the  running  of  risks 
and  how  they  may  be  met  with  the  least  likelihood  of 
disaster. 

Alvensleben's  advance  was  in  accordance  with  Moltke's 
general  plan  of  operations;  but  that  corps  leader,  finding 
the  French  to  be  in  force  between  him  and  Metz,  deter- 
mined to  attack  them  in  order  to  delay  their  retreat.  The 
result  was  the  battle  of  August  i6th,  variously  known  as 
Vionville,  Rezonville,  or  Mars-la-Tour — a  battle  that  de- 
fies brief  description,  inasmuch  as  it  represented  the  effort 
of  the  3rd,  or  Brandenburg,  corps,  with  little  help  at 
first  from  others,  to  hold  its  ground  against  the  onsets  of 


From  Worth  to  Gravelotte  "]"] 

two  French  corps.  Early  in  the  fight  Bazaine  galloped 
up,  but  he  did  not  bring  forward  the  masses  in  his  rear, 
probably  because  he  feared  to  be  cut  off  from  Metz.  Even 
so,  all  through  the  forenoon,  it  seemed  that  the  gathering 
forces  of  the  French  must  break  through  the  thin  lines 
audaciously  thrust  into  that  almost  open  plain  on  the 
flank  of  their  line  of  march.  But  Alvensleben  and  his 
men  held  their  ground  with  a  dogged  will  that  nothing 
could  shatter.  In  one  sense  their  audacity  saved  them. 
Bazaine  for  a  long  time  could  not  believe  that  a  single 
corps  would  throw  itself  against  one  of  the  two  roads  by 
which  his  great  army  was  about  to  retreat.  He  believed 
that  the  northern  road  might  also  be  in  danger,  and  there- 
fore did  not  laimch  at  Alvensleben  the  solid  masses  that 
must  have  swept  him  back  towards  the  Meuse.  At  noon 
four  battalions  of  the  German  loth  corps  struggled  up 
from  the  south  and  took  their  share  of  the  hitherto  unequal 
fight. 

But  the  crisis  of  the  fight  came  a  little  later.  It  was 
marked  by  one  of  the  most  daring  and  effective  strokes 
ever  dealt  in  modem  warfare.  At  two  o'clock,  when  the 
advance  of  Canrobert's  6th  corps  towards  Vionville 
threatened  to  sweep  away  the  wearied  Brandenburgers,  six 
squadrons  of  the  7th  regiment  of  Cuirassiers  with  a  few 
Uhlans  flung  themselves  on  the  new  lines  of  foemen,  not 
to  overpower  them — that  was  impossible — but  to  delay 
their  advance  and  weaken  their  impact.  Only  half  of  the 
brave  horsemen  returned  from  that  ride  of  death,  but  they 
gained  their  end. 

The  mad  charge  drove  deep  into  the  French  array  about 
Rezonville,  and  gave  their  leaders  pause  in  the  belief  that 
it  was  but  the  first  of  a  series  of  systematic  attacks  on 


78  The  European  Nations 

the  French  left.  System  rather  than  dash  was  supposed 
to  characterise  German  tactics;  and  the  daring  of  their 
enemies  for  once  made  the  French  too  methodical.  Ba- 
zaine  scarcely  brought  the  3rd  corps  and  the  Guard  into 
action  at  all,  but  kept  them  in  reserve.  As  the  afternoon 
sun  waned,  the  whole  weight  of  the  German  loth  corps  was 
thrown  into  the  fight  about  Vionville,  and  the  vanguards 
of  the  8th  and  9th  came  up  from  Gorze  to  threaten  the 
French  left.  Fearing  that  he  might  be  cut  off  from  Metz 
on  the  south — a  fear  which  had  unaccountably  haunted  him 
all  the  day — Bazaine  continued  to  feed  that  part  of  his 
lines;  and  thus  Alvensleben  was  able  to  hold  the  positions 
near  the  southern  road  to  Verdun,  which  he  had  seized  in 
the  morning.  The  day  closed  with  a  great  cavalry  com- 
bat on  the  German  left  wing  in  which  the  French  had  to 
give  way.  Darkness  alone  put  an  end  to  the  deadly 
strife.  Little  more  than  two  German  corps  had  sufficed 
to  stay  the  march  of  an  army  which  potentially  numbered 
in  all  more  than  170,000  men. 

On  both  sides  the  losses  were  enormous,  namely,  some 
16,000  killed  and  wounded.  No  cannon,  standards,  or 
prisoners  were  taken;  but  on  that  day  the  army  of  Prince 
Frederick  Charles  practically  captured  the  whole  of  Ba- 
zaine's  army.  The  statement  may  seem  overdrawn,  but 
it  is  none  the  less  true.  The  advance  of  other  German 
troops  on  that  night  made  Bazaine 's  escape  from  Metz 
far  more  difficult  than  before,  and  very  early  on  the 
morrow  he  drew  back  his  lines  through  Gravelotte  to  a 
strong  position  nearer  Metz,  Thus,  a  battle,  which  in  a 
tactical  sense  seemed  to  be  inconclusive,  became,  when 
viewed  in  the  light  of  strategy,  the  most  decisive  of  the 
war.     Had  Bazaine  used  even  the  forces  which  he  had  in 


From  Worth  to  Gravelotte  79 

the  field  ready  to  hand  he  must  have  overborne  Alvens- 
leben;  and  the  arrival  of  170,000  good  troops  at  Verdun  or 
Chalons  would  have  changed  the  whole  course  of  the  war. 
The  campaign  would  probably  have  followed  the  course 
of  the  many  campaigns  waged  in  the  valleys  of  the  Meuse 
and  Mame ;  and  Metz,  held  by  a  garrison  of  suitable  size, 
might  have  defied  the  efforts  of  a  large  besieging  army 
for  ftdly  six  months.  These  conjectures  are  not  fanciful. 
The  duration  of  the  food-supply  of  a  garrison  cut  off  from 
the  outside  world  varies  inversely  with  the  size  of  that 
garrison.  The  experiences  of  armies  invading  and  defend- 
ing the  east  of  France  also  show  with  general  accuracy 
what  might  have  been  expected  if  the  rules  of  sound 
strategy  had  been  observed.  It  was  the  actual  course  of 
events  which  transcended  experience  and  set  all  proba- 
bilities at  defiance. 

The  battle  of  Gravelotte,  or  St.  Privat,  on  the  i8th,  com- 
pleted the  work  so  hardily  begun  by  the  3rd  German  corps 
on  the  1 6th.  The  need  of  driving  back  Bazaine's  army 
upon  Metz  was  pressing,  and  his  inaction  on  the  17th  gave 
time  for  nearly  all  the  forces  of  the  First  and  Second  Ger- 
man armies  to  be  brought  up  to  the  German  positions, 
some  nine  miles  west  of  Metz,  though  one  corps  was  left 
to  the  east  of  that  fortress  to  hinder  any  attempt  of  the 
French  to  break  out  on  that  side.  Bazaine,  however, 
massed  his  great  army  on  the  west  along  a  ridge  stretching 
north  and  south,  and  presenting,  especially  in  the  southern 
half,  steep  slopes  to  the  assailants.  It  also  sloped  away 
to  the  rear,  thus  enabling  the  defenders  (as  was  the  case 
with  Wellington  at  Waterloo)  secretly  to  reinforce  any 
part  of  the  line.  On  the  French  left  wing,  too,  the  slopes 
curved  inward,  thus  giving  the  defenders  ample  advantage 


8o  The  European  Nations 

against  any  flanking  movements  on  that  side.  On  the 
north,  between  Amanvillers  and  Ste.  Marie-aux-Chenes, 
the  defence  had  fewer  strong  points  except  those  villages, 
the  Jaumont  Wood,  and  the  gradual  slope  of  the  grotmd 
away  to  the  little  River  Ome,  which  formed  an  open  glacis. 
Bazaine  massed  his  reserves  on  the  plateau  of  Plappeville 
and  to  the  rear  of  his  left  wing;  but  this  cardinal  fault  in 
his  dispositions — due  to  his  hatmting  fear  of  being  cut  off 
from  Metz — was  long  hidden  by  the  woods  and  slopes  in 
the  rear  of  his  centre.  The  position  here  and  on  the  French 
left  was  very  strong,  and  at  several  points  so  far  concealed 
the  troops  that  up  to  ii  a.m.  the  advancing  Germans  were 
in  doubt  whether  the  French  would  not  seek  to  break 
away  towards  the  north-west.  That  so  great  an  army 
woidd  remain  merely  on  the  defensive,  a  course  so  repug- 
nant to  the  ardour  of  the  French  nature  and  the  tradi- 
tions of  their  army,  entered  into  the  thoughts  of  few. 

Yet  such  was  the  case.  The  solution  of  the  riddle  is  to 
be  found  in  Bazaine's  despatch  of  August  17th  to  the  Minis- 
ter of  War:  "We  are  going  to  put  forth  every  effort  to 
make  good  our  supplies  of  all  kinds  in  order  to  resume  our 
march  in  two  days  if  that  is  possible."  ^  That  the  army 
was  badly  hampered  by  lack  of  stores  is  certain;  but  to 
postpone  even  for  a  single  day  the  march  to  Verdun  by  the 
northern  road,  that  by  way  of  Briey,  was  fatal.  Possibly, 
however,  he  hoped  to  deal  the  Germans  so  serious  a  blow 
if  they  attacked  him  on  the  i8th,  as  to  lighten  the  heavy 
task  of  cutting  his  way  out  on  the  19th. 

If  so,  he  nearly  succeeded.     The  Germans  were  quite 

«  Bazaine,  Rapport  sommaire,  etc.  The  sentence  quoted  above 
is  decisive.  The  defence  which  Bazaine  and  his  few  defenders 
later  on  put  forward,  as  well  as  the  attacks  of  his  foes,  are  of  course 
mixed  up  with  theories  evolved  after  the  event. 


82  The  European  Nations 

taken  aback  by  the  extent  and  strength  of  his  lines.  Their 
intention  was  to  outflank  his  right  wing,  which  was  be- 
lieved to  stretch  no  farther  north  than  Amanvillers ;  but 
the  rather  premature  advance  of  Manstein's  gth  corps 
soon  drew  a  deadly  fire  from  that  village  and  the  heights 
on  either  side,  which  crushed  the  artillery  of  that  corps. 
Soon  the  Prussian  Guards  and  the  12  th  corps  began  to 
suffer  from  the  fire  poured  in  from  the  trenches  that 
crowned  the  hill.  On  the  German  right,  General  Stein- 
metz,  instead  of  waiting  for  the  hoped-for  flank  attack  on 
the  north  to  take  effect,  sent  the  columns  of  the  First 
Army  to  almost  certain  death  in  the  defile  in  front  of 
Gravelotte,  and  he  persisted  in  these  costly  efforts  even 
when  the  strength  of  the  French  position  on  that  side  was 
patent  to  all.  For  this  the  tough  old  soldier  met  with 
severe  censure  and  ultimate  disgrace.  In  his  defence, 
however,  it  may  be  urged  that  when  a  great  battle  is  raging 
with  doubtful  fortunes,  the  duty  of  a  commander  on  the 
attacking  side  is  to  busy  the  enemy  at  as  many  points  as 
possible,  so  that  the  final  blow  may  be  dealt  with  telling 
effect  on  a  vital  point  where  he  cannot  be  adequately  re- 
inforced; and  the  bulldog  tactics  of  Steinmetz  in  front  of 
Gravelotte,  which  cost  the  assailants  many  thousands  of 
men,  at  any  rate  served  to  keep  the  French  reserves  on 
that  side,  and  thereby  weaken  the  support  available  for  a 
more  important  point  at  the  crisis  of  the  fight.  It  so 
happened,  too,  that  the  action  of  Steinmetz  strengthened 
the  strange  misconception  of  Bazaine  that  the  Germans 
were  striving  to  cut  him  off  from  Metz  on  the  south. 

The  real  aim  of  the  Germans  was  exactly  the  contrary, 
namely,  to  pin  his  whole  army  to  Metz  by  swinging  round 
their  right  flank  on  the  villages  of  St.  Privat  and  Raucourt. 


From  Worth  to  Gravelotte  83 

Having  some  40,000  men  under  Canrobert  in  and  between 
these  villages,  whose  solid  buildings  gave  the  defence  the 
best  of  cover,  Bazaine  had  latterly  taken  little  thought  for 
that  part  of  his  lines,  though  it  was  dangerously  far  re- 
moved from  his  reserves.  These  he  kept  on  the  south, 
tmder  the  misconception  which  clung  to  him  here  as  at 
Rezonville. 

The  mistake  was  to  prove  fatal.  As  we  have  said,  the 
German  plan  was  to  turn  the  French  right  wing  in  the  more 
open  country  on  the  north.  To  this  end  the  Prussian 
Guards  and  the  Saxons,  after  driving  the  French  outposts 
from  Ste.  Marie-aux-Chenes,  brought  all  their  strength  to 
the  task  of  crushing  the  French  at  their  chief  stronghold 
on  the  right,  St.  Privat.  The  struggle  of  the  Prussian 
Guards  up  the  open  slope  between  that  village  and  Aman- 
villers  left  them  a  mere  shadow  of  their  splendid  array ;  but 
the  efforts  of  the  German  artillery  cost  the  defenders  dear: 
by  seven  o'clock  St.  Privat  was  in  flames,  and  as  the 
Saxons  (the  12th  corps),  wheeling  round  from  the  north 
after  a  long  flank-march,  closed  in  on  the  outlying  village 
of  Raucourt,  Canrobert  saw  that  the  day  was  lost  unless 
he  received  prompt  aid  from  the  Imperial  Guard.  Bour- 
baki,  however,  brought  up  only  some  three  thousand  of 
these  choice  troops,  and  that  too  late  to  save  St.  Privat 
from  the  persistent  fury  of  the  German  onset. 

As  dusk  fell  over  the  scene  of  carnage  the  French  right 
fell  back  in  some  disorder,  even  from  part  of  Amanvillers. 
Farther  south,  they  held  their  ground.  On  the  whole, 
they  had  dealt  to  their  foes  a  loss  of  20,159  men,  or  nearly 
a  tenth  of  their  total.  Of  the  French  forces  engaged,  some 
150,000  in  number,  7853  were  killed  and  wounded,  and 
4419    were    taken   prisoners.      This   disproportion   in    the 


84  The  European  Nations 

losses  shows  the  toughness  of  the  French  defence  and  the 
(in  part)  unskilful  character  of  the  Grerman  attack.  On 
this  latter  point  the  recently  published  Journals  of  Field 
Marshal  Count  von  Blumenthal  supply  some  piquant  de- 
tails. He  describes  the  indignation  of  King  William  at 
the  wastefulness  of  the  German  tactics  at  Gravelotte:  "  He 
complained  bitterly  that  the  officers  of  the  higher  grades 
appeared  to  have  forgotten  all  that  had  been  so  carefully 
taught  them  at  manoeuvres,  and  had  apparently  all  lost 
their  heads."  The  same  authority  supplies  what  may  be 
in  part  an  explanation  of  this  in  his  comment,  written 
shortly  before  Gravelotte,  that  he  believed  there  might 
not  be  another  battle  in  the  whole  war — a  remark  which 
savours  of  presumption  and  folly.  Gravelotte,  therefore, 
cannot  be  considered  as  wholly  creditable  to  the  victors. 
Still,  the  result  was  that  some  180,000  French  troops  were 
shut  up  within  the  outworks  of  Metz.i 

>  For  fuller  details  of  these  battles  the  student  should  consult 
the  two  great  works  on  the  subject — the  staff  histories  of  the  war, 
issued  by  the  French  and  German  general  staffs;  Bazaine,  U Armee 
du  Rhin  and  Episodes  de  la  Guerre;  General  Blumenthal's  Journals; 
Aus  drei  Kriegen,  by  General  von  Lignitz;  Maurice,  The  Franco- 
German  War;  Hooper,  The  Campaign  of  Sedan;  the  war  corre- 
spondence of  the  Times  and  the  Daily  News,  published  in  book  form- 


CHAPTER  III 


SEDAN 


"Nothing  is  more  rash  and  contrary  to  the  principles  of  war 
than  to  make  a  flank  march  before  an  army  in  position,  especially 
when  this  army  occupies  heights  before  which  it  is  necessary  to 
defile." — Napoleon  I. 

THE  success  of  the  German  operations  to  the  south  and 
west  of  Metz  virtually  decided  the  whole  of  the  cam- 
paign. The  Germans  could  now  draw  on  their  vast  re- 
serves ever  coming  on  from  the  Rhine,  throw  an  iron  ring 
arotmd  that  fortress,  and  thereby  deprive  France  of  her 
only  great  force  of  regular  troops.  The  throwing  up  of 
field-works  and  barricades  went  on  with  such  speed  that 
the  blockading  forces  were  able  in  a  few  days  to  detach  a 
strong  column  towards  Chalons-sur-Mame  in  order  to  help 
the  army  of  the  Crown  Prince  of  Prussia.  That  army  in 
the  meantime  was  in  pursuit  of  MacMahon  by  way  of 
Nancy,  and  strained  every  nerve  so  as  to  be  able  to  strike 
at  the  southern  railway  lines  out  of  Paris.  It  was,  how- 
ever, diverted  to  the  north-west  by  events  soon  to  be 
described. 

The  German  force  detached  from  the  neighbourhood  of 
Metz  consisted  of  the  Prussian  Guards,  the  4th  and  12  th 
corps,  and  two  cavalry  divisions.     This  army,  known  as 

85 


86  The  European  Nations 

the  Army  of  the  Meuse,  was  placed  under  the  command  of 
the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony.  Its  aim  was,  in  common 
with  the  Third  German  army  (that  of  the  Crown  Prince  of 
Prussia),  to  strike  at  MacMahon  before  he  received  rein- 
forcements. The  screen  of  cavalry  which  preceded  the 
Army  of  the  Meuse  passed  that  river  on  the  22nd,  when  the 
bulk  of  the  forces  of  the  Crown  Prince  of  Prussia  crossed 
not  many  miles  farther  to  the  south.  The  two  armies 
swept  on  westwards  within  easy  distance  of  one  another; 
and  on  the  23rd  their  cavalry  gleaned  news  of  priceless 
value,  namely,  that  MacMahon's  army  had  left  Chalons. 
On  the  next  day  the  great  camp  was  found  deserted. 

In  fact,  MacMahon  had  undertaken  a  task  of  terrible 
difficulty.  On  taking  over  the  command  at  Chalons, 
where  Napoleon  III.  arrived  from  Metz  on  the  i6th,  he 
found  hopeless  disorder  not  only  among  his  own  beaten 
troops,  but  among  many  of  the  newcomers;  the  worst  were 
the  Garde  Mobile,  many  regiments  of  whom  greeted  the 
Emperor  with  shouts  of  "A  Paris!''  To  meet  the  Germans 
in  the  open  plains  of  Champagne  with  forces  so  incoherent 
and  dispirited  was  sheer  madness ;  and  a  council  of  war  on 
the  17th  came  to  the  conclusion  to  fall  back  on  the  capital 
and  operate  within  its  outer  forts — a  step  which  might 
enable  the  army  to  regain  confidence,  repress  any  rising  in 
the  capital,  and  perhaps  inflict  checks  on  the  Germans, 
until  the  provinces  rose  en  masse  against  the  invaders. 
But  at  this  very  time  the  Empress-Regent  and  the  Palikoa 
Ministry  at  Paris  came  to  an  exactly  contrary  decision,  on 
the  ground  that  the  return  of  the  Emperor  with  MacMahon's 
army  would  look  like  personal  cowardice  and  a  mean  de- 
sertion of  Bazaine  at  Metz.  The  Empress  was  for  fighting 
a  outrance,  and  her  Government  issued  orders  for  a  national 


Sedan  87 

rising   and   the   enrolling   of   bodies   of   francs-tireurs,   or 
irregulars,  to  harass  the  Germans. i 

Their  decision  was  telegraphed  to  Napoleon  III.  at 
Chalons.  Against  his  own  better  judgment  the  Emperor 
yielded  to  political  considerations — that  millstone  around 
the  neck  of  the  French  army  in  1870 — and  decided  to 
strike  out  to  the  north  with  MacMahon's  army,  and  by 
way  of  Montmedy  stretch  a  hand  to  Bazaine,  who,  on  his 
side,  was  expected  to  make  for  that  rendezvous.  On  the 
2ist,  therefore,  they  marched  to  Reims.  There  the  Em- 
peror received  a  despatch  which  Bazaine  had  been  able  to 
get  through  the  enemies'  lines  on  the  19th,  stating  that  the 
Germans  were  making  their  way  in  on  Metz,  but  that  he 
(Bazaine)  hoped  to  break  away  towards  Montmedy  and 
so  join  MacMahon's  army.  (This,  it  will  be  observed,  was 
after  Gravelotte  had  been  lost.)  Napoleon  III.  thereupon 
replied:  "Received  yours  of  the  19th  at  Reims;  am  going 
towards  Montmedy ;  shall  be  on  the  Aisne  the  day  after  to- 
morrow, and  there  will  act  according  to  circumstances  to 
come  to  your  aid."  Bazaine  did  not  receive  this  message 
until  August  30th,  and  then  made  only  two  weak  efforts  to 
break  out  on  the  north  (August  3ist-September  ist).  The 
Marshal's  action  in  sending  that  message  must  be  pro- 
noiuiced  one  of  the  most  fatal  in  the  whole  war.  It  led  the 
Emperor  and  MacMahon  to  a  false  belief  as  to  the  position 
at  Metz,  and  furnished  a  potent  argument  to  the  Empress 

1  See  General  Lebrun's  Guerre  de  1870:  Bazeilles-Sedan,  for  an 
account  of  his  corps  of  MacMahon's  army. 

In  view  of  the  events  of  the  late  Boer  War,  it  is  worth  noting 
that  the  Germans  never  acknowledged  the  francs-tireurs  as  soldiers, 
and  forthwith  issued  an  order  ending  with  the  words,  "They  are 
amenable  to  martial  law  and  liable  to  be  sentenced  to  death"  (Mau- 
rice, Franco-German  War,  p.  215). 


88  The  European  Nations 

and  Palikao  at  Paris  to  urge  a  march  towards  Montm^dy 
at  all  costs. 

Doubtfully  MacMahon  led  his  straggling  array  from 
Reims  in  a  north-easterly  direction  towards  Stenay  on  the 
Meuse,  Rain  checked  his  progress,  and  dispirited  the 
troops ;  but  on  the  27th  of  August,  while  about  half-way  be- 
tween the  Aisne  and  the  Meuse,  his  outposts  touched  those 
of  the  enemy.  They  were,  in  fact,  those  of  the  Prussian 
Crown  Prince,  whose  army  was  about  to  cross  the  north- 
ern roads  over  the  Argonne,  the  line  of  hills  that  saw  the 
French  stem  the  Prussian  invasion  in  1792.  Far  different 
was  the  state  of  affairs  now.  National  enthusiasm,  or- 
ganisation, enterprise — all  were  on  the  side  of  the  invaders. 
As  has  been  pointed  out,  their  horsemen  found  out  on  the 
23rd  that  the  Chalons  camp  was  deserted;  on  the  next  day 
their  scouts  found  out  from  a  Parisian  newspaper  that 
MacMahon  was  at  Reims;  and,  on  the  day  following,  news- 
paper tidings  that  had  come  round  by  way  of  London  re- 
vealed the  secret  that  MacMahon  was  striving  to  reach 
Bazaine. 

How  it  came  about  that  this  news  escaped  the  eye  of 
the  censor  has  not  been  explained.  If  it  was  the  work  of 
an  English  journalist,  that  does  not  absolve  the  official 
censorship  from  the  charge  of  gross  carelessness  in  leaving 
even  a  loophole  for  the  transmission  of  important  secrets. 
Newspaper  correspondents,  of  course,  are  the  natural 
enemies  of  governments  in  time  of  war ;  and  the  experience 
of  the  year  1870  shows  that  the  fate  of  empires  may  depend 
on  the  efficacy  of  the  arrangements  for  controlling  them. 
As  a  proof  of  the  superiority  of  the  German  organisation, 
or  of  the  higher  patriotism  of  their  newspapers,  we  may 
mention  that  no  tidings  of  urgent  importance  leaked  out 


Sedan  89 

through  the  German  press.  This  may  have  been  due  to 
a  solemn  declaration  made  by  German  newspaper  editors 
and  correspondents  that  they  would  never  reveal  such 
secrets ;  but,  from  what  we  know  of  the  fierce  competition 
of  newspapers  for  priority  of  news,  it  is  reasonable  to  sup- 
pose that  the  German  Government  took  very  good  care 
that  none  came  in  their  way. 

As  a  result  of  the  excellent  scouting  of  their  cavalry  and 
of  the  slipshod  press  arrangements  of  the  French  Govern- 
ment, the  German  Army  of  the  Meuse,  on  the  26th,  took  a 
general  turn  towards  the  north-west.  This  movement 
brought  its  outposts  near  to  the  southernmost  divisions  of 
MacMahon,  and  sent  through  that  Marshal's  staff  the  fore- 
boding thrill  felt  by  the  commander  of  an  unseaworthy 
craft  at  the  oncoming  of  the  first  gust  of  a  cyclone.  He 
saw  the  madness  of  holding  on  his  present  course  and 
issued  orders  for  a  retreat  to  Mdzieres,  a  fortress  on  the 
Meuse  below  Sedan.  Once  more,  however,  the  Palikao 
Ministry  intervened  to  forbid  this  salutary  move, — the  only 
way  out  of  imminent  danger, — and  ordered  him  to  march 
to  the  relief  of  Bazaine.  At  this  crisis  Napoleon  III. 
showed  the  good  sense  which  seemed  to  have  deserted  the 
French  politicians:  he  advised  the  Marshal  not  to  obey 
this  order  if  he  thought  it  dangerous.  Nevertheless  Mac- 
Mahon decided  to  yield  to  the  supposed  interests  of  the 
dynasty,  which  the  Emperor  was  ready  to  sacrifice  to  the 
higher  claims  of  the  safety  of  France.  Their  roles  were 
thus  curiously  reversed.  The  Emperor  reasoned  as  a  sound 
patriot  and  a  good  strategist.  MacMahon  must  have  felt 
the  same  promptings,  but  obedience  to  the  Empress  and 
the  Ministry,  or  chivalrous  regard  for  Bazaine,  overcame 
his  scruples.     He  decided  to  plod  on  towards  the  Meuse. 


90  The  European  Nations 

The  Germans  were  now  on  the  alert  to  entrap  this  army 
that  exposed  its  flank  in  a  long  line  of  march  near  to  the 
Belgian  frontier.  Their  ubiquitous  horsemen  captured 
French  despatches  which  showed  them  the  intended  moves 
in  MacMahon's  desperate  game;  Moltke  hurried  up  every 
available  division;  and  the  elder  of  the  two  Alvenslebens 
had  the  honour  of  surprising  de  Failly's  corps  amidst  the 
woods  of  the  Ardennes  near  Beaumont,  as  they  were  in  the 
midst  of  a  meal.  The  French  rallied  and  offered  a  brisk 
defence,  but  finally  fell  back  in  confusion  northwards  on 
Mouzon,  with  the  loss  of  2000  prisoners  and  42  guns 
(August  30th). 

This  mishap,  the  lack  of  provisions,  and  the  fatigue  and 
demoralisation  of  his  troops,  caused  MacMahon  on  the 
31st,  to  fall  back  on  Sedan,  a  little  town  in  the  valley  of 
the  Meuse.  It  is  surrounded  by  ramparts  planned  by  the 
great  Vauban,  but,  being  commanded  by  wooded  heights, 
it  no  longer  has  the  importance  that  it  possessed  before  the 
age  of  long-range  guns  of  precision.  The  chief  strength  of 
the  position  for  defence  lay  in  the  deep  loop  of  the  river 
below  the  town,  the  dense  Garenne  Wood  to  the  north- 
east, and  the  hollow  formed  by  the  Givonne  brook  on  the 
east,  with  the  important  village  of  Bazeilles.  It  is  there- 
fore not  surprising  that  von  Moltke,  on  seeing  the  French 
forces  concentrating  in  this  hollow,  remarked  to  von 
Blumenthal,  chief  of  the  staff:  "Now  we  have  them  in  a 
trap;  to-morrow  we  must  cross  over  the  Meuse  early  in 
the  morning." 

The  Emperor  and  MacMahon  seem  even  then,  on  the 
afternoon  of  the  31st,  to  have  hoped  to  give  their  weary 
troops  a  brief  rest,  supply  them  with  provisions  and  stores 
from  the  fortress,  and  on  the  morrow,  or  the  2nd,  make  their 


Sedan  9^ 

escape  by  way  of  Mezieres.  Possibly  they  might  have  done 
so  on  that  night,  and  certainly  they  could  have  reached 
the  Belgian  frontier,  only  some  six  miles  distant,  and  there 
laid  down  their  arms  to  the  Belgian  troops  whom  the  re- 
sourceful Bismarck  had  set  on  the  qui  vive.  To  remain 
quiet  even  for  a  day  in  Sedan  was  to  court  disaster;  yet 
passivity  characterised  the  French  headquarters  and  the 
whole  army  on  that  afternoon  and  evening.  True,  Mac- 
Mahon  gave  orders  for  the  bridge  over  the  Meuse  at  Don- 
chery  to  be  blown  up,  but  the  engine-driver  who  took  the 
engineers  charged  with  this  important  task  lost  his  nerve 
when  German  shells  whizzed  about  his  engine,  and  drove 
off  before  the  powder  and  tools  could  be  deposited.  A 
second  party,  sent  later  on,  found  that  bridge  in  the  pos- 
session of  the  enemy.  On  the  east  side,  above  Sedan, 
the  Bavarians  seized  the  railway  bridge  south  of  Bazeilles, 
driving  off  the  French  who  sought  to  blow  it  up.^ 

Over  the  Donchery  bridge  and  two  pontoon  bridges  con- 
stucted  below  that  village  the  Germans  poured  their  troops 
before  dawn  of  September  ist,  and  as  the  morning  fog  of 
that  day  slowly  lifted,  their  columns  were  seen  working 
round  the  north  of  the  deep  loop  of  the  Meuse,  thus  cutting 
off  escape  on  the  west  and  north-west.  Meanwhile,  on  the 
other  side  of  the  town,  von  der  Tann's  Bavarians  had  begun 
the  fight.  Pressing  in  on  Bazeilles  so  as  to  hinder  the 
retreat  of  the  enemy  (as  had  been  so  effectively  done  at 
Colombey,  on  the  east  of  Metz),  they  at  first  surprised  the 
sleeping  French,  but  quickly  drew  on  themselves  a  sharp 
and  sustained  counter-attack  from  the  marines  attached 
to  the  12th  French  corps. 

1  Moltke,  The  Franco-German  War,  i.,  p.  114;  Hooper,  The  Cam- 
paign of  Sedan,  p.  296. 


92  The  European  Nations 

In  order  to  understand  the  persistent  vigour  of  the 
French  on  this  side,  we  must  note  the  decisions  formed  by 
their  headquarters  on  August  31st  and  early  on  September 
ist.  At  a  council  of  war  held  on  the  afternoon  of  the  31st 
no  decision  was  reached,  probably  because  the  exhaustion  of 
the  5th  and  7th  corps  and  the  attack  of  the  Bavarians  on 
the  12th  corps  at  Bazeilles  rendered  any  decided  move- 
ment very  difficult.  The  general  conclusion  was  that  the 
army  must  have  some  repose;  and  Germans  afterwards 
found  on  the  battlefield  a  French  order — ' '  Rest  to-day  for 
the  whole  army."  But  already,  on  the  30th,  an  officer  had 
come  from  Paris  determined  to  restore  the  morale  of  the 
army  and  break  through  towards  Bazaine.  This  was 
General  de  Wimpffen,  who  had  gained  distinction  in  pre- 
vious wars,  and,  coming  lately  from  Algeria  to  Paris,  was 
there  appointed  to  supersede  de  Failly  in  command  of  the 
5th  corps.  Nor  was  this  all.  The  Palikao  Ministry  ap- 
parently had  some  doubts  as  to  MacMahon's  energy,  and 
feared  that  the  Emperor  himself  hampered  the  operations. 
De  Wimpffen  therefore  received  an  unofficial  mandate  to 
infuse  vigour  into  the  counsels  at  headquarters,  and  was 
entrusted  with  a  secret  written  order  to  take  over  the 
supreme  command  if  anything  were  to  happen  to  Mac- 
Mahon.  On  taking  command  of  the  5th  corps  on  the 
30th,  de  Wimpffen  found  it  demoralised  by  the  hurried 
retreat  through  Mouzon ;  but  neither  this  fact  nor  the  ex- 
haustion of  the  whole  army  abated  the  determination  of 
this  stalwart  soldier  to  break  through  towards  Metz. 

Early  on  September  ist  the  positions  held  by  the  French 
formed,  roughly  speaking,  a  triangle  resting  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  Meuse  from  near  Bazeilles  to  Sedan  and  Glaire. 
Damming  operations  and  the  heavy  rains  of  previous  days 


Sedan  93 

had  spread  the  river  over  the  low-lying  meadows,  thus 
rendering  it  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  for  an  enemy  to 
cross  under  fire;  but  this  same  fact  lessened  the  space 
by  which  the  French  could  endeavour  to  break  through. 
Accordingly  they  deployed  their  forces  almost  wholly 
along  the  inner  slopes  of  the  Givonne  brook  and  of  the 
smaller  stream  that  flows  from  the  high  land  about  Illy 
down  to  the  village  of  Floing  and  thence  to  the  Meuse. 
The  heights  of  Illy,  crowned  by  the  Calvaire,  formed  the 
apex  of  the  French  position,  while  Floing  and  Bazeilles 
formed  the  other  comers  of  what  was  in  many  respects 
good  fighting-ground.  Their  strength  was  about  120,000 
men,  though  many  of  these  were  disabled  or  almost  help- 
less from  fatigue ;  that  of  the  Germans  was  greater  on  the 
whole,  but  three  of  their  corps  could  not  reach  the  scene 
of  action  before  i  p.m.  owing  to  the  heaviness  of  the  roads.i 
At  first,  then,  the  French  had  a  superiority  of  force  and 
far  more  compact  position,  as  will  be  seen  by  the  plan  on 
page  94. 

We  now  resume  the  account  of  the  battle.  The  fighting 
in  and  around  Bazeilles  speedily  led  to  one  very  important 
result.  At  6  a.m.  a  splinter  of  a  shell  fired  by  the  as- 
sailants from  the  hills  north-east  of  that  village  severely 
wounded  Marshal  MacMahon  as  he  watched  the  conflict 
from  a  point  in  front  of  the  village  of  Balan.  Thereupon 
he  named  General  Ducrot  as  his  successor,  passing  over 
the  claims  of  two  generals  senior  to  him.  Ducrot,  realising 
the  seriousness  of  the  position,  prepared  to  draw  off  the 
troops  towards  the  Calvaire  of  Illy  preparatory  to  a  retreat 
on  Mezieres  by  way  of  St.  Menges.  The  news  of  this  im- 
pending retreat,  which  must  be  conducted  under  the  hot 
»  Maurice,  The  Franco-German  War,  p.  235. 


94  The  European  Nations 

fire  of  the  Germans  now  threatening  the  line  of  the  Givonne, 
cut  de  WimpfTen  to  the  quick.  He  knew  that  the  Crown 
Prince  held  a  force  to  the  south-west  of  Sedan,  ready  to 
fall  on  the  flank  of  any  force  that  sought  to  break  away 
to  Mezieres;  and  a  temporary  success  of  his  own  5th  corps 
against  the  Saxons  in  La  Moncelle  strengthened  his  pre- 
possession in  favour  of  a  combined  move  eastwards  towards 
Carignan  and  Metz.  Accordingly,  about  nine  o'clock  he 
produced  the  secret  order  empowering  him  to  succeed 
MacMahon  should  the  latter  be  incapacitated.  Ducrot  at 
once  yielded  to  the  ministerial  ukase ;  the  Emperor  sought 
to  intervene  in  favour  of  Ducrot,  only  to  be  waved  aside 
by  the  confident  de  Wimpffen;  and  thus  the  long  conflict 
between  MacMahon  and  the  Palikao  Ministry  ended  in 
victory  for  the  latter — and  disaster  for  France. ^ 

In  hazarding  this  last  statement  we  do  not  mean  to  im- 
ply that  a  retreat  on  Mezieres  would  then  have  saved  the 
whole  army.  It  might,  however,  have  enabled  part  of  it  to 
break  through  either  to  Mezieres  or  the  Belgian  boundary ; 
and  it  is  possible  that  Ducrot  had  the  latter  objective  in 
view  when  he  ordered  the  concentration  at  Illy.  In  any 
case,  that  move  was  now  countermanded  in  favour  of  a 
desperate  attack  on  the  eastern  assailants.  It  need  hardly 
be  said  that  the  result  of  these  vacillations  was  deplorable, 
unsteady ing  the  defenders,  and  giving  the  assailants  time 
to  bring  up  troops  and  cannon,  and  thereby  strengthen 
their  grip  on  every  important  point.  Especially  valuable 
was  the  approach  of  the  2nd  Bavarian  corps;  setting  out 
from  Raucourt  at  4  a.m.  it  reached  the  hills  south  of  Sedan 
about  9,  and  its  artillery  posted  near  Fr^nois  began  a 
terrible  fire  on  the  town  and  the  French  troops  near  it. 

»  See  Lebrun's  Guerre  de  i8jo:  Bazeilles-Sedan,  for  these  disputes. 


S   EDAN_    ABOUT   10  A.M. 


HanV. 


G-ernuxjx. , 
FrericTi     i 


B   E  I-   G    I   U  ]vr 


G-RPatiiains  Sons, J:few York. 


Stanfofd^  G€og\  Estnh'^ 


Sedan  95 

About  the  same  time  the  second  division  of  the  Saxons 
reinforced  their  hard-pressed  comrades  to  the  north  of  La 
Moncelle,  where,  on  de  Wimpffen's  orders,  the  French  were 
making  a  strong  forward  move.  The  opportune  arrival  of 
these  new  German  troops  saved  their  artillery,  which  had 
been  doing  splendid  service.  The  French  were  driven  back 
across  the  Givonne  with  heavy  loss,  and  the  massed  battery 
of  one  hundred  guns  crushed  all  further  efforts  at  advance 
on  this  side.  Meanwhile  at  Bazeilles  the  marines  had 
worthily  upheld  the  honour  of  the  French  arms.  Despite 
the  terrible  artillery  fire  now  concentrated  on  the  village, 
they  pushed  the  German  footmen  back,  but  never  quite 
drove  them  out.  These,  when  reinforced,  renewed  the 
fight  with  equal  obstinacy;  the  inhabitants  themselves 
joined  in  with  whatever  weapons  fury  suggested  to  them; 
and  as  that  merciless  strife  swayed  to  and  fro  amidst  the 
roar  of  artillery,  the  crash  of  walls,  and  the  hiss  of  flame, 
war  was  seen  in  all  its  naked  ferocity. 

Yet  here  again,  as  at  all  points,  the  defence  was  gradually 
overborne  by  the  superiority  of  the  German  artillery. 
About  eleven  o'clock  the  French,  despite  their  superhuman 
efforts,  were  outflanked  by  the  Bavarians  and  Saxons  on 
the  north  of  the  village.  Even  then,  when  the  regulars 
fell  back,  some  of  the  inhabitants  went  on  with  their  mad 
resistance;  a  great  part  of  the  village  was  now  in  flames, 
but  whether  they  were  kindled  by  the  Germans,  or  by  the 
retiring  French  so  as  to  delay  the  victors,  has  never  been 
cleared  up.  In  either  case,  several  of  the  inhabitants 
perished  in  the  flames;  and  it  is  admitted  that  the  Ba- 
varians burnt  some  of  the  villagers  for  firing  on  them  from 
the  windows.  1 

1  M.  Busch,  Bismarck  in  the  Franco-German  War,  i.,  p.  114. 


96  The  European  Nations 

In  the  defence  of  Bazeilles  the  French  infantry  showed 
its  usual  courage  and  tenacity.  Elsewhere  the  weary  and 
dispirited  columns  were  speedily  becoming  demoralised 
under  the  terrific  artillery  fire  which  the  Germans  poured 
in  from  many  points  of  vantage.  The  Prussian  Guards 
coming  up  from  Villers  Cemay  about  lo  a.m.  planted  their 
formidable  batteries  so  as  to  sweep  the  Bois  de  Garenne 
and  the  ground  about  the  Calvaire  d'llly  from  the  east- 
ward; and  about  that  time  the  guns  of  the  5th  and  nth 
German  corps,  that  had  early  crossed  the  Meuse  below 
Sedan,  were  brought  to  bear  on  the  west  front  of  that 
part  of  the  French  position.  The  apex  of  the  defenders' 
triangle  was  thus  severely  searched  by  some  200  guns; 
and  their  discharges,  soon  supported  by  the  fire  of  skir- 
mishers and  volleys  from  the  troops,  broke  all  forward 
movements  of  the  French  on  that  side.  On  the  south  and 
south-east  as  many  cannon  svv^ept  the  French  lines,  but 
from  a  greater  distance. 

Up  to  nearly  noon  there  seemed  some  chance  of  the 
French  bursting  through  on  the  north,  and  some  of  them 
did  escape.  Yet  no  well-sustained  effort  took  place  on 
that  side,  apparently  because,  even  after  the  loss  of  Bazeilles 
at  eleven  o'clock,  de  Wimffpen  clung  to  the  belief  that  he 
could  cut  his  way  out  towards  Carignan,  if  not  by  Bazeilles, 
then  perhaps  by  some  other  way,  as  Daigny  or  La  Moncelle. 
The  reasoning  by  which  he  convinced  himself  is  hard  to 
follow;  for  the  only  road  to  Carignan  on  that  side  runs 
through  Bazeilles.  Perhaps  we  ought  to  say  that  he  did 
not  reason,  but  was  haunted  by  one  fixed  notion;  and  the 
history  of  war  from  the  time  of  the  Roman  Varro  down  to 
the  age  of  the  Austrian  Mack  and  the  French  de  Wimp- 
ffen  shows  that  men  whose  brains  work  in  grooves  and  take 


Sedan  97 

no  account  of  what  is  on  the  right  hand  and  the  left,  are 
not  fit  to  command  armies ;  they  only  yield  easy  triumphs 
to  the  great  masters  of  warfare, — Hannibal,  Napoleon  the 
Great,  and  von  Moltke. 

De  Wimp ff en,  we  say,  paid  little  heed  to  the  remon- 
strances of  Generals  Douay  and  Ducrot  at  leaving  the 
northern  apex  and  the  north-western  front  of  the  defence 
to  be  crushed  by  weight  of  metal  and  of  numbers.  He 
rode  off  towards  Balan,  near  which  village  the  former  de- 
fenders of  Bazeilles  were  making  a  gallant  and  partly  suc- 
cesstul  stand,  and  no  reinforcements  were  sent  to  the  hills 
on  the  north.  The  villages  of  Illy  and  Floing  were  lost; 
then  the  French  columns  gave  ground  even  up  the  higher 
ground  behind  them,  so  great  was  the  pressure  of  the 
German  converging  advance.  Worst  of  all,  skulkers  began 
to  hurry  from  the  ranks  and  seek  shelter  in  the  woods,  or 
even  under  the  ramparts  of  Sedan  far  in  the  rear.  The 
French  gunners  still  plied  their  guns  with  steady  devotion, 
though  hopelessly  outmatched  at  all  points,  but  it  was 
clear  that  only  a  great  forward  dash  could  save  the  day. 
Ducrot  therefore  ordered  General  Margueritte  with  three 
choice  cavalry. regiments  (Chasseurs  d'Afrique)  and  several 
squadrons  of  Lancers  to  charge  the  advancing  lines.  Mov- 
ing forward  from  the  northern  edge  of  the  Bois  de  Garenne 
to  judge  his  ground,  Margueritte  fell  mortally  wounded. 
De  Bauffremont  took  his  place,  and  those  brave  horsemen 
swept  forward  on  a  task  as  hopeless  as  that  of  the  Light 
Brigade  at  Balaclava,  or  that  of  the  French  Cuirassiers  at 
Worth. 1     Their  conduct  was  as  glorious;   but  the  terrible 

>  Lebrun  {op.  cit.,  pp.  126-127;  also  Appendix  D)  maintains  that 
de  Bauffremont  then  led  the  charge,  de  Gallifet  leading  only  the 
3rd  Chasseurs  d'Afrique. 


9S  The  European  Nations 

power  of  the  modem  rifle  was  once  more  revealed.  The 
pounding  of  distant  batteries  they  could  brave ;  disordered 
but  defiant  they  swept  on  towards  the  German  lines,  but 
when  the  German  infantry  opened  fire  almost  at  pistol 
range,  rank  after  rank  of  the  horsemen  went  down  as  grass 
before  the  scythe.  Here  and  there  small  bands  of  horse- 
men charged  the  footmen  on  the  flank,  even  in  a  few  cases 
on  their  rear,  it  is  said;  but  the  charge,  though  bravely 
renewed,  did  little  except  to  delay  the  German  triumph 
and  retrieve  the  honour  of  France. 

B}^  about  two  o'clock  the  French  cavalry  was  practically 
disabled,  and  there  now  remained  no  Imperial  Guard,  as  at 
Waterloo,  to  shed  some  rays  of  glory  over  the  disaster. 
Meanwhile,  however,  de  Wimp ff en  had  resolved  to  make 
one  more  effort.  Gathering  about  him  a  few  of  the  best 
infantry  battalions  in  and  about  Sedan,  he  besought  the 
Emperor  to  join  him  in  cutting  a  way  out  towards  the  east. 
The  Emperor  sent  no  answer  to  this  appeal;  he  judged 
that  too  much  blood  had  already  been  needlessly  shed. 
Still  de  Wimpffen  persisted  in  his  mad  endeavour:  burst- 
ing upon  the  Bavarians  in  the  village  of  Balan,  he  drove 
them  back  for  a  space  until  his  men,  disordered  by  the 
rush,  fell  before  the  stubborn  rally  of  the  Bavarians  and 
Saxons.  With  the  collapse  of  this  effort  and  the  cutting 
up  of  the  French  cavalry  behind  Floing,  the  last  frail 
barriers  to  the  enemy's  advance  gave  way.  The  roads  to 
Sedan  were  now  thronged  with  masses  of  fugitives,  whose 
struggles  to  pass  the  drawbridges  into  the  little  fortress 
resembled  an  African  battue;  for  King  William  and  his 
staff,  in  order  to  hurry  on  the  inevitable  surrender,  bade  the 
two  hundred  or  more  pieces  on  the  southern  heights  play 
upon  the  town.     Still  de  Wimpffen  refused  to  surrender, 


Sedan  99 

and,  despite  the  orders  of  his  sovereign,  continued  the  hope- 
less struggle.  At  length,  to  stay  the  frightful  carnage,  the 
Emperor  himself  ordered  the  white  flag  to  be  hoisted.  ^ 
A  German  officer  went  down  to  arrange  preliminaries,  and 
to  his  astonishment  was  ushered  into  the  presence  of  the 
Emperor.  The  German  staff  had  no  knowledge  of  his 
whereabouts.  On  hearing  the  news.  King  William,  who 
throughout  the  day  sat  on  horseback  at  the  top  of  the 
slope  behind  Frenois,  said  to  his  son,  the  Crown  Prince, 
' '  This  is  indeed  a  great  success ;  and  I  thank  thee  that  thou 
hast  contributed  to  it."  He  gave  his  hand  to  his  son,  who 
kissed  it,  and  then,  in  turn,  to  Moltke  and  to  Bismarck, 
who  kissed  it  also.  In  a  short  time,  the  French  General 
Reille  brought  to  the  King  the  following  autograph  letter: 

"Monsieur  mon  Frere — N'ayant  pu  mourir  au  milieu 
de  mes  troupes,  il  ne  me  reste  qu'k  remettre  mon  epee  entre 
les  mains  de  Votre  Majeste. — ^Je  suis  de  Votre  Majeste  le 
bon  Frere 

"  Napoleon. 

•  Sedan,  le  i'^'  Septembre,  1870. 

The  King  named  von  Moltke  to  arrange  the  terms  and 
then  rode  away  to  a  village  farther  south,  it  being  ar- 
ranged, probably  at  Bismarck's  suggestion,  that  he  should 
not  see  the  Emperor  until  all  was  settled.  Meanwhile  de 
Wimpffen  and  other  French  generals,  in  conference  with 
von  Moltke,  Bismarck,  and  Blumenthal,  at  the  village  of 
Donchery,  sought  to  gain  easy  terms  by  appealing  to  their 
generosity  and  by  arguing  that  this  would  end  the  war  and 
earn  the  gratitude  of  France.  To  all  appeals  for  permis- 
sion to  let  the  captive  army  go  to  Algeria,  or  to  lay  down 
its  arms  in   Belgium,  the    Germans  were   deaf,  Bismarck 

>  Lebrun.  op.  cit.,  pp.  130  et  seq.,  for  the  disputes  about  surrender. 


loo  The  European  Nations 

at  length  plainly  saying  that  the  French  were  an  envi- 
ous and  jealous  people  on  whose  gratitude  it  would  be 
idle  to  count.  De  Wimpffen  then  threatened  to  renew  the 
fight  rather  than  surrender,  to  which  von  Moltke  grimly 
assented,  but  Bismarck  again  interposed  to  bring  about  a 
prolongation  of  the  truce.  Early  on  the  morrow,  Napoleon 
himself  drove  out  to  Donchery  in  the  hope  of  seeing  the 
King.  The  Bismarckian  Boswell  has  given  us  a  glimpse 
of  him  as  he  then  appeared:  "The  look  in  his  light  grey 
eyes  was  somewhat  soft  and  dreamy,  like  that  of  people 
who  have  lived  too  fast."  [In  his  case,  we  may  remark, 
this  was  induced  by  the  painful  disease  which  never  left 
him  all  through  the  campaign,  and  carried  him  off  three 
years  later.]  "He  wore  his  cap  a  little  on  the  right,  to 
which  side  his  head  also  inclined.  His  short  legs  were  out 
of  proportion  to  the  long  upper  body.  His  whole  ap- 
pearance was  a  little  unsoldier-like.  The  man  looked  too 
soft,  I  might  say  too  spongy,  for  the  uniform  he  wore." 

Bismarck,  the  stalwart  Teuton  who  had  wrecked  his 
policy  at  all  points,  met  him  at  Donchery  and  foiled  his 
wish  to  see  the  King,  declaring  this  to  be  impossible  until 
the  terms  of  the  capitulation  were  settled.  The  Emperor 
then  had  a  conversation  with  the  Chancellor  in  a  little 
cottage  belonging  to  a  weaver.  Seating  themselves  on 
two  rush-bottomed  chairs  beside  the  one  deal  table,  they 
conversed  on  the  greatest  affairs  of  State.  The  Emperor 
said  he  had  not  sought  this  war — "he  had  been  driven  into 
it  by  the  pressure  of  public  opinion.  I  replied"  (wrote 
Bismarck)  "that  neither  had  any  one  with  us  wished  for 
war — the  King  least  of  all."  ^     Napoleon  then  pleaded  for 

'  Busch,  Bismarck  on  the  Franco-German  War,  i.,  p.  109.  Con- 
trast this  statement  with  his  later  efforts  (^Reminiscences,  ii.,  pp. 
95-100)  to  prove  that  he  helped  to  bring  on  war. 


Sedan  lor 

generous  terms,  but  admitted  that  he,  as  a  prisoner,  could 
not  fix  them;  they  must  be  arranged  with  de  Wimpffen. 
About  ten  o'clock  the  latter  agreed  to  an  unconditional 
surrender  for  the  rank  and  file  of  the  French  army,  but 
those  officers  who  boimd  themselves  by  their  word  of 
honour  (in  writing)  not  to  fight  again  during  the  present 
war  were  to  be  set  free.  Napoleon  then  had  an  interview 
with  the  King.  What  transpired  is  not  known,  but  when 
the  Emperor  came  out  "his  eyes,"  wrote  Bismarck, 
"were  full  of  tears." 

The  fallen  monarch  accepted  the  King's  offer  of  the 
castle  of  Wilhelmshohe  near  Cassel  for  his  residence  up  to 
the  end  of  the  war;  it  was  the  abode  on  which  Jerome 
Bonaparte  had  spent  millions  of  thalers,  wrung  from 
Westphalian  burghers,  during  his  brief  sovereignty  in 
1807-13.  Thither  his  nephew  set  out  two  days  after 
the  catastrophe  of  Sedan.  And  this,  as  it  seems,  was  the 
end  of  a  dynasty  whose  rise  to  power  dated  from  the 
thrilling  events  of  the  Bridge  of  Lodi,  Areola,  Rivoli,  and 
the  Pyramids.  The  French  losses  on  September  ist  were 
about  3000  killed,  14,000  wounded,  and  21,000  prisoners. 
On  the  next  day  there  surrendered  83,000  prisoners  by 
virtue  of  the  capitulation,  along  with  419  field-pieces  and 
139  cannon  of  the  fortress.  Some  3000  had  escaped, 
through  the  gap  in  the  German  lines  on  the  north-east,  to 
the  Belgian  frontier,  and  there  laid  down  their  arms. 

The  news  of  this  unparalleled  disaster  began  to  leak  out 
at  Paris  late  on  the  2nd ;  and  on  the  morrow,  when  details 
were  known,  crowds  thronged  into  the  streets  shouting, 
' '  Down  with  the  Empire !  Long  live  the  Republic ! ' '  Power 
still  remained  with  the  Empress-Regent  and  the  Palikao 


I02  The  European  Nations 

Ministry.  All  must  admit  that  the  Empress  Eugenie  did 
what  was  possible  in  this  hopeless  position.  She  appealed 
to  that  charming  literary  man,  M.  Prosper  Merimee,  to 
go  to  his  friend,  M.  Thiers  (at  whom  we  shall  glance 
presently),  and  beg  him  to  form  a  Ministry  that  would 
save  the  Empire  for  the  young  Prince  Imperial.  M. 
Thiers  politely  but  firmly  refused  to  give  a  helping  hand 
to  the  dynasty  which  he  looked  on  as  the  author  of  his 
country's  ruin. 

On  that  day  the  Empress  also  summoned  the  Chambers 
— the  Senate  and  the  Corps  Legislatif — a  vain  expedient, 
for  in  times  of  crisis  the  French  look  to  a  man,  not  to 
Chambers.  The  Empire  had  no  man  at  hand.  General 
Trochu,  Governor  of  Paris,  was  suspected  of  being  a 
republican — at  any  rate  he  let  matters  take  their  course. 
On  the  4th,  vast  crowds  filled  the  streets ;  a  rush  was  made 
to  the  Chamber,  where  various  compromises  were  being 
discussed;  the  doors  were  forced,  and  amid  wild  excite- 
ment a  proposal  to  dethrone  the  Napoleonic  dynasty  was 
put.  Two  republican  deputies,  Gambetta  and  Jules  Favre, 
declared  that  the  Hotel  de  Ville  was  the  fit  place  to  declare 
the  Republic.  There,  accordingly,  it  was  proclaimed,  the 
deputies  for  the  city  of  Paris  taking  oflEice  as  the  Govern- 
ment of  National  Defence.  They  were  just  in  time  to 
prevent  socialists  like  Blanqui,  Flourens,  and  Henri 
Rochefort  from  installing  the  "Commune"  in  power. 
The  Empress  and  the  Prince  Imperial  at  once  fled,  and, 
apart  from  a  protest  by  the  Senate,  no  voice  was  raised  in 
defence  of  the  Empire.  Jules  Favre,  who  took  up  the 
burden  of  Foreign  Affairs  in  the  new  Government  of 
National  Defence,  was  able  to  say  in  his  circular  note  of 
September  6th  that  "the  revolution  of  September  4th  took 


Sedan  103 

place  without  the  shedding  of  a  drop  of  blood  or  the  loss 
of  liberty  to  a  single  person."  ^ 

That  fact  shows  the  unreality  of  Bonapartist  rule  in 
France.  At  bottom  Napoleon  III.'s  ascendancy  was  due 
to  several  causes  that  told  against  possible  rivals  rather 
than  directly  in  his  favour.  Hatred  of  the  socialists,  whose 
rash  political  experiments  had  led  to  the  bloody  days  of 
street  fighting  in  Paris  in  June,  1848,  counted  for  much. 
Added  to  this  was  the  unpopularity  of  the  House  of  Or- 
leans after  the  sordid  and  uninteresting  rule  of  Louis 
Philippe  (1830-48).  The  antiquated  royalism  of  the 
elder  or  Legitimist  branch  of  that  ill-starred  dynasty  made 
it  equally  an  impossibility.  Louis  Napoleon  promised  to 
do  what  his  predecessors,  monarchical  and  republican,  had 
signally  failed  to  do,  namely,  to  reconcile  the  claims  of 
liberty  and  order  at  home  and  uphold  the  prestige  of 
France  abroad.  For  the  first  ten  years  the  glamour  of  his 
name,  the  skill  with  which  he  promoted  the  material 
prosperity  of  France,  and  the  successes  of  his  early  wars, 
promised  to  build  up  a  lasting  power.  But  then  came  the 
days  of  failing  health  and  tottering  prestige — of  financial 
scandals,  of  the  Mexican  blunder,  of  the  humiliation  before, 
the  rising  power  of  Prussia.  To  retrieve  matters  he  toyed 
with  democracy  in  France,  and  finally  allowed  his  ministers 
to  throw  down  a  challenge  to  Prussia ;  for,  in  the  words  of 
a  French  historian,  the  conditions  on  which  he  held  power 
"condemned  him  to  be  brilliant."  ^ 

Failing  at  Sedan,  he  lost  all;  and  he  knew  it.  His 
reign,    in    fact,   was   one  long    disaster  for   France.      The 

>  Gabriel    Hanotaux,  Contemporary  France,  {.,  p.  14  (Eng.  edit.). 
2  Said  in   1852  by  an  eminent  Frenchman  to  our  countryman, 
Nassau  Senior  (Journals,  ii.,  ad  fin.). 


104  The  European  Nations 

canker  of  moral  corruption  began  to  weaken  her  public  life 
when  the  creatures  of  whom  he  made  use  in  the  coup 
d'etat  of  185 1  crept  into  place  and  power.  The  flashy 
sensationalism  of  his  policy,  setting  the  tone  for  Parisian 
society,  was  fatal  to  the  honest,  unseen  drudgery  which 
builds  up  a  solid  edifice  alike  in  public  and  in  private  life. 
Even  the  better  qualities  of  his  nature  told  against  ultimate 
success.  As  has  been  shown,  his  vague  but  generous  ideas 
on  nationality  drew  French  policy  away  from  the  paths 
of  obvious  self-interest  after  the  year  1864,  and  gave  an 
easy  victory  to  the  keen  and  objective  statecraft  of  Bis- 
marck. That  he  loved  France  as  sincerely  as  he  believed 
in  the  power  of  the  Bonapartist  tradition  to  help  her  can 
scarcely  admit  of  doubt.  His  conduct  during  the  War  of 
1870  showed  him  to  be  disinterested,  while  his  vision  was 
clearer  than  that  of  the  generals  about  him.  But  in  the 
field  of  high  policy,  as  in  the  moral  events  that  make  or 
mar  a  nation's  life,  his  influence  told  heavily  against  the 
welfare  of  France ;  and  he  must  have  carried  into  exile  the 
consciousness  that  his  complex  nature  and  ill-matched 
strivings  had  but  served  to  bring  his  dynasty  and  his 
country  to  an  unexampled  overthrow. 

It  may  be  well  to  notice  here  an  event  of  world-wide 
importance,  which  came  as  a  sequel  to  the  military  collapse 
of  France.  Italians  had  always  looked  to  the  day  when 
Rome  would  be  the  national  capital.  The  great  Napoleon 
during  his  time  of  exile  at  St.  Helena  had  uttered  the  pro- 
phetic words:  "Italy  isolated  between  her  natural  limits 
is  destined  to  form  a  great  and  powerful  nation. 
Rome  will  without  doubt  be  chosen  by  the  Italians  as  their 
capital."     The  political  and  economic  needs  of  the  present 


Sedan  105 

coinciding  herein  with  the  voice  of  tradition,  always  so 
strong  in  Italian  hearts,  pointed  imperiously  to  Rome  as 
the  only  possible  centre  of  national  life. 

As  was  pointed  out  in  the  Introduction,  Pius  IX.  after 
the  years  of  revolution,  1848-49,  felt  the  need  of  French 
troops  in  his  capital,  and  his  harsh  and  reactionary  policy 
(or  rather,  that  of  his  masterful  Secretary  of  State,  An- 
tonelli)  before  long  completely  alienated  the  feelings  of  his 
subjects. 

After  the  master-mind  of  Cavour  was  removed  by  death, 
Qune,  186 1),  the  patriots  struggled  desperately,  but  in 
vain,  to  rid  Rome  of  the  presence  of  foreign  troops  and  win 
her  for  the  national  cause.  Garibaldi's  raids  of  1862  and 
1867  were  foiled,  the  one  by  Italian,  the  other  by  French 
troops;  and  the  latter  case,  which  led  to  the  sharp  fight  of 
Mentana,  effaced  any  feelings  of  gratitude  to  Napoleon  III. 
for  his  earlier  help,  which  survived  after  his  appropriation 
of  Savoy  and  Nice.  Thus  matters  remained  in  1867-70, 
the  Pope  relying  on  the  support  of  French  bayonets  to 
coerce  his  own  subjects.  Clearly  this  was  a  state  of  things 
which  could  not  continue.  The  first  great  shock  must 
always  bring  down  a  political  edifice  which  rests  not  on  its 
own  foundations,  but  on  external  buttresses.  These  were 
suddenly  withdrawn  by  the  War  of  1870.  Early  in  August, 
Napoleon  ordered  all  his  troops  to  leave  the  Papal  States; 
and  the  downfall  of  his  power  a  month  later  absolved 
Victor  Emmanuel  from  the  claims  of  gratitude  which  he 
still  felt  towards  his  ally  of  1859. 

At  once  the  forward  wing  of  the  Italian  national  party 
took  action  in  a  way  that  either  forced,  or  more  probably 
encouraged,  Victor  Emmanuel's  Government  to  step  in 
under  the  pretext  of  preventing  the  creation  of  a  Roman 


io6  The  European  Nations 

Republic.  The  King  invited  Pius  IX.  to  assent  to  the 
peaceful  occupation  of  Rome  by  the  royal  troops,  and,  on 
receiving  the  expected  refusal,  moved  forward  35,000  sol- 
diers. The  resistance  of  the  11,000  Papal  troops  proved 
to  be  mainly  a  matter  of  form.  The  wall  near  the  Porta 
Pia  soon  crumbled  before  the  Italian  cannon,  and  after 
a  brief  struggle  at  the  breach  the  white  flag  was  hoisted 
at  the  bidding  of  the  Pope  (September  20th). 

Thus  fell  the  temporal  power  of  the  Papacy.  The  event 
aroused  comparatively  little  notice  in  that  year  of  marvels, 
but  its  results  have  been  momentous.  At  the  time  there 
was  a  general  sense  of  relief,  if  not  of  joy,  in  Italy,  that 
the  national  movement  had  reached  its  goal,  albeit  in  so 
tame  and  uninspiring  a  manner.  Rome  had  long  been 
a  prey  to  political  reaction,  accompanied  by  police  super- 
vision of  the  most  exasperating  kind.  The  plebiscite  as  to 
the  future  government  gave  133,681  votes  for  Victor  Em- 
manuel's rule,  and  only  1507  negative  votes. ^ 

Now,  for  the  first  time  since  the  days  of  Napoleon  I. 
and  of  the  short-lived  Republic  for  which  Mazzini  and 
Garibaldi  worked  and  fought  so  nobly  in  1849,  the  Eternal 
City  began  to  experience  the  benefits  of  progressive  rule. 
The  royal  Government  soon  proved  to  be  very  far  from 
perfect.  Favouritism,  the  multiplication  of  sinecures, 
municipal  corruption,  and  the  prosaic  inroads  of  builders 
and  speculators  soon  helped  to  mar  the  work  of  political 
reconstruction,  and  began  to  arouse  a  certain  amount  of 
regret  for  the  more  picturesque  times  of  the  Papal  rule.  A 
sentimental  reaction  of  this  kind  is  certain  to  occur  in  all 
cases  of  political  change,  especially  in  a  city  where  tradition 
and  emotion  so  long  held  sway. 

»  Countess  Cesaresco,  The  Liberation  of  Italy,  p.  411. 


Sedan  ^oj 

The  consciences  of  the  faithful  were  also  troubled  when 
the  -fiat  of  the  Pope  went  forth  excommunicating  the 
robber-king  and  all  his  chief  abettors  in  the  work  of  sacri- 
lege. Sons  of  the  Church  throughout  Italy  were  bidden 
to  hold  no  intercourse  with  the  interlopers  and  to  take  no 
part  in  elections  to  the  Italian  Parliament  which  thence- 
forth met  in  Rome.  The  schism  between  the  Vatican  and 
the  King's  Court  and  Government  was  never  to  be  bridged 
over;  and  even  to-day  it  constitutes  one  of  the  most  per- 
plexing problems  of  Italy. 

Despite  the  fact  that  Rome  and  Italy  gained  little  of 
that  mental  and  moral  stimulus  which  might  have  resulted 
from  the  completion  of  the  national  movement  solely  by 
the  action  of  the  people  themselves,  the  fact  nevertheless 
remains  that  Rome  needed  Italy  and  Italy  needed  Rome. 
The  disappointment  loudly  expressed  by  idealists,  senti- 
mentalists, and  reactionaries  must  not  blind  us  to  the  fact 
that  the  Italians,  and  above  all  the  Romans,  have  benefited 
by  the  advent  of  unity,  political  freedom,  and  civic  re- 
sponsibility. It  may  well  be  that,  in  acting  as  the  leader 
of  a  constitutional  people,  the  Eternal  City  will,  little  by 
little,  develop  higher  gifts  than  those  nurtured  under  Papal 
tutelage,  and  perhaps  as  beneficent  to  humanity  as  those 
which  in  the  ancient  world  bestowed  laws  on  Europe. 

As  Mazzini  always  insisted,  political  progress,  to  be 
sound,  must  be  based  ultimately  on  moral  progress.  It  is, 
of  its  very  nature,  slow,  and  is  therefore  apt  to  escape  the 
eyes  of  the  moralist  or  cynic  who  dwells  on  the  untoward 
signs  of  the  present.  But  the  Rome  for  which  Mazzini 
and  his  compatriots  yearned  and  struggled  can  hardly  fail 
ultimately  to  rise  to  the  height  of  her  ancient  traditions 
and  of  that  noble  prophecy  of  Dante:    ''There  is  the  seat 


io8  The  European  Nations 

of  empire.  There  never  was,  and  there  never  will  be,  a 
people  endowed  with  such  capacity  to  acquire  command, 
with  more  vigour  to  maintain  it,  and  more  gentleness  in 
its  exercise,  than  the  Italian  nation,  and  especially  the 
Holy  Roman  people."  The  lines  with  which  Mr.  Swin- 
burne closed  his  "Dedication"  of  Songs  before  Sunrise  to 
Joseph  Mazzini  are  worthy  of  finding  a  place  side  by  side 
with  the  words  of  the  mediaeval  seer: 

Yea,  even  she  as  at  first, 

Yea,  she  alone  and  none  other, 

Shall  cast  down,  shall  build  up,  shall  bring  home, 

Slake  earth's  hunger  and  thirst. 

Lighten,  and  lead  as  a  mother; 

First  name  of  the  world's  names,  Rome. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  FOUNDING  OF  THE  FRENCH  REPUBLIC 

"  iyiyvfTO  re  Koyut  iJ.ev  SrjfjLOKpaTia,  epycu  5e  vnb  Tov  jrpioTOu  ai'Jpos  dpx»)." 

"Thus  Athens,  though  still  in  name  a  democracy,  was  in  fact 
ruled  by  her  greatest  man." — Thucydides,  II.,  Ixv. 

THE  aim  of  this  work  being  to  trace  the  outlines  only 
of  those  outstanding  events  which  made  the  chief 
States  of  the  world  what  they  are  to-day,  we  can  give  only 
the  briefest  glance  at  the  remaining  events  of  the  Franco- 
German  War  and  the  splendid  though  hopeless  rally  at- 
tempted by  the  newly  installed  Government  of  National 
Defence.  Few  facts  in  recent  history  have  a  more  thrilling 
interest  than  the  details  of  the  valiant  efforts  made  by  the 
young  Republic  against  the  invaders.  The  spirit  in  which 
they  were  made  breathed  through  the  words  of  M.  Picard's 
proclamation  on  September  4th:  "The  Republic  saved  us 
from  the  invasion  of  1792.  The  Republic  is  proclaimed." 
Inspiring  as  was  this  reference  to  the  great  and  successful 
effort  of  the  First  Republic  against  the  troops  of  Central 
Europe  in  1792,  it  was  misleading.  At  that  time  Prussia 
had  lapsed  into  a  state  of  weakness  through  the  double 
evils  of  favouritism  and  a  facing-both-ways  policy.  Now 
she  felt  the  strength  bom  of  sturdy  championship  of  a 
great  principle,  that  of  Nationality,  which  had  ranged 
nearly  the  whole  of  the  German  race  on  her  side.     France, 

109 


Tio  The  European  Nations 

on  the  other  hand,  owing  to  the  shocking  blunders  of  her 
politicians  and  generals  during  the  war,  had  but  one  army 
corps  free,  that  of  General  Vinoy,  which  hastily  retreated 
from  the  neighbourhood  of  Mezieres  towards  Paris  on 
September  2nd  to  4th.  She  therefore  had  to  count  almost 
entirely  on  the  Garde  Mobile,  the  Garde  Nationale,  and 
franc s-tireurs;  but  bitter  experience  was  to  show  that 
this  raw  material  could  not  be  organised  in  a  few  weeks  to 
withstand  the  trained  and  triumphant  legions  of  Germany. 

Nevertheless  there  was  no  thought  of  making  peace  with 
the  invaders.  The  last  message  of  Count  Palikao  to  the 
Chambers  had  been  one  of  defiance  to  the  enemy ;  and  the 
Parisian  deputies,  nearly  all  of  them  Republicans,  who 
formed  the  Government  of  National  Defence,  scouted  all 
faint-hearted  proposals.  Their  policy  took  form  in  the 
famous  phrase  of  Jules  Favre,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs: 
"We  will  give  up  neither  an  inch  of  our  territory  nor  a 
stone  of  our  fortresses."  This  being  so,  all  hope  of 
compromise  with  the  Germane  was  vain.  Favre  had  inter- 
views with  Bismarck  at  the  Chateau  de  Ferrieres  (Septem- 
ber 19th);  but  his  fine  oratory,  even  his  tears,  made  no 
impression  on  the  Iron  Chancellor,  who  declared  that  in 
no  case  would  an  armistice  be  granted,  not  even  for  the 
election  of  a  National  Assembly,  unless  France  agreed  to 
give  up  Alsace  and  a  part  of  Lorraine,  allowing  the  German 
troops  also  to  hold,  among  other  places,  Strassburg  and  Toul. 

Obviously,  a  self -constituted  body  like  the  provisional 
government  at  Paris  could  not  accept  these  terms,  which 
most  deeply  concerned  the  nation  at  large.  In  the  ex- 
isting temper  of  Paris  and  France,  the  mention  of  such 
terms  meant  war  to  the  knife,  as  Bismarck  must  have 
known.     On  their  side,  Frenchmen  could  not  believe  that 


Founding  of  the  French  RepubHc     1 1 1 

their  great  capital,  with  its  bulwarks  and  ring  of  outer 
forts,  could  be  taken;  while  the  Germans — so  it  seems 
from  the  Diary  of  General  von  Blumenthal — looked  for- 
ward to  its  speedy  capitulation.  One  man  there  was  who 
saw  the  pressing  need  of  foreign  aid.  M.  Thiers  (whose 
personality  will  concern  us  a  little  later)  undertook  to  go 
on  a  mission  to  the  chief  Powers  of  Europe  in  the  hope  of 
urging  one  or  more  of  them  to  intervene  on  behalf  of  France. 
The  details  of  that  mission  are,  of  course,  not  fully 
known.  We  can  only  state  here  that  Russia  now  repaid 
Prussia's  help  in  crushing  the  Polish  rebellion  of  1863  by 
neutrality,  albeit  tinged  with  a  certain  jealousy  of  Ger- 
man success.  Bismarck  had  been  careful  to  dull  that 
feeling  by  suggesting  that  she  (Russia)  should  take  the 
present  opportunity  of  annulling  the  provision,  made  after 
the  Crimean  War,  which  prevented  her  from  sending  war- 
ships on  to  the  Black  Sea;  and  this  was  subsequently 
done,  under  a  thin  diplomatic  disguise,  at  the  Congress 
of  London  (March,  187 1).  Bismarck's  astuteness  in  sup- 
porting Russia  at  this  time,  therefore,  kept  that  Power 
quiet.  As  for  Austria,  she  undoubtedly  wished  to  inter- 
vene, but  did  not  choose  to  risk  a  war  with  Russia,  which 
would  probably  have  brought  another  overthrow.  Italy 
would  not  unsheathe  her  sword  for  France  unless  the  latter 
recognised  her  right  to  Rome  (which  the  Italian  troops 
entered  on  September  20th).  To  this  the  young  French 
Republic  demurred.  Great  Britain,  of  course,  adhered  to 
the  policy  of  neutrality  which  she  at  first  declared.^ 

'.See  D6bidour,  Histoire  diplomatique  de  VEurope,  ii.,  pp.  412- 
415.  For  Bismarck's  fears  of  intervention,  especially  that  of 
Austria,  see  his  Reminiscences,  ii.,  p.  109  (Eng.  edit.) ;  Count  Beust's 
Aus  drei  Viertel-Jahrhunderten,  pt.  ii.,  pp.  361,  395;  for  Thiers's 
efforts  see  his  Notes  on  the  years  1870-73  (Paris,  1904). 


112  The  European  Nations 

Accordingly,  France  had  to  rely  on  her  own  efforts. 
They  were  surprisingly  great.  Before  the  complete  in- 
vestment of  Paris  (September  20th),  a  delegation  of  the 
Government  of  National  Defence  had  gone  forth  to  Tours 
with  the  aim  of  stirring  up  the  provinces  to  the  succour  of 
the  besieged  capital.  Probably  the  whole  of  the  Govern- 
ment ought  to  have  gone  there ;  for,  shut  up  in  the  capital, 
it  lost  touch  with  the  provinces,  save  when  balloons  and 
carrier-pigeons  eluded  the  German  sharpshooters  and 
brought  precious  news.^  The  mistake  was  seen  in  time  to 
enable  a  man  of  wondrous  energy  to  leave  Paris  by  balloon 
on  October  7  th,  to  descend  as  a  veritable  deus  ex  machind 
on  the  faltering  Delegation  at  Tours,  and  to  stir  the  blood  of 
France  by  his  invective.  There  was  a  touch  of  the  melo- 
dramatic not  only  in  his  apparition  but  in  his  speeches. 
Frenchmen,  however,  follow  a  leader  all  the  better  if  he  is 
a  good  stage-manager  and  a  clever  actor.  The  new  leader 
was  both;  but  he  was  something  more. 

Leon  Gambetta  had  leaped  to  the  front  rank  at  the  bar 

in  the  closing  days  of  1868  by  a  passionate  outburst  against 

the  coup  d'etat,  uttered,  to  the  astonishment  of  all,  in  a 

small  Court  of  Correctional  Police,  over  a  petty  case  of 

State  prosecution  of  a  small  Parisian  paper.     Rejecting 

the  ordinary  methods  of  defence,  the  young  barrister  flung 

defiance  at  Napoleon  III.  as  the  author  of  the  coup  d'etat 

and  of  all  the  present  degradation  of  France.     The  daring 

of  the  young  man,  who  thus  turned  the  tables  on  the 

1  M.  Gr^goire,  in  his  Histoire  de  France,  iv.,  p.  647,  states  that 
64  balloons  left  Paris  during  the  siege,  5  were  captured,  and  2  lost 
in  the  sea;  363  carrier-pigeons  left  the  city  and  57  came  in.  For 
details  of  the  French  efforts,  see  Les  Responsibilites  de  la  Defense 
nationale,  by  H.  Genevois;  also  The  People's  War  in  France,  i8yo- 
1871,  by  Colonel  L.  Hale  (The  Pall  Mall  Military  Series,  1904), 
fovmded  on  Honig's  Der  Volkskrieg  an  der  Loire. 


Founding  of  the  French  Republic     113 

authorities  and  impeached  the  head  of  the  State,  made  a 
profound  impression;  it  was  redoubled  by  the  southern 
intensity  of  his  thought  and  expression.  Disdaining  all 
forms  of  rhetoric,  he  poured  forth  a  torrent  of  ideas, 
clothing  them  in  the  first  words  that  came  to  his  facile 
tongue,  enforcing  them  by  blows  of  the  fist  or  the  most 
violent  gestures,  and  yet,  again,  modulating  the  roar  of 
passion  to  the  falsetto  of  satire  or  the  whisper  of  emotion. 
His  short,  thick-set  frame,  vibrating  with  strength,  doubled 
the  force  of  all  his  utterances.  Nor  did  they  lack  the 
glamour  of  poetry  and  romance  that  might  be  expected 
from  his  Italian  ancestry.  He  came  of  a  Genoese  stock 
that  had  for  some  time  settled  in  the  south  of  France. 
Strange  fate,  that  called  him  now  to  the  front  with  the 
aim  of  repairing  the  ills  wrought  to  France  by  another 
Italian  House!  In  time  of  peace  his  power  over  men 
would  have  raised  him  to  the  highest  positions  had  his 
Bohemian  exuberance  of  thought  and  speech  been  tam- 
able. It  was  not.  He  scorned  prudence  and  moderation 
at  all  times,  and  his  behaviour,  when  the  wave  of  revolu- 
tion at  last  carried  him  to  power,  gave  point  to  the  taunt 
of  Thiers, — "C'est  un  fou  furieux."  Such  was  the  man 
who  now  brought  the  quenchless  ardour  of  his  patriotism 
to  the  task  of  rousing  France.  So  far  as  words  and  energy 
could  call  forth  armies,  he  succeeded;  but  as  he  lacked  all 
military  knowledge,  his  blind  self-confidence  was  to  cost 
France  dear. 

Possibly  the  new  levies  of  the  Republic  might  at  some 
point  have  pierced  the  immense  circle  of  the  German  lines 
around  Paris  (for  at  first  the  besieging  forces  were  less 
numerous  than  the  besieged),  had  not  the  assailants  been 
strengthened  by  the  fall  of  Metz  (October  27).     This  is  not 


114  The  European  Nations 

the  place  to  discuss  the  culpabiHty  of  Bazaine  for  the  soft- 
ness shown  in  the  defence.  The  voluminous  evidence 
taken  at  his  trial  shows  that  he  was  very  slack  in  the 
critical  days  at  the  close  of  August;  it  is  also  certain  that 
Bismarck  duped  him  under  the  pretence  that,  on  certain 
conditions  to  be  arranged  with  the  Empress  Eugenie,  his 
army  might  be  kept  intact  for  the  sake  of  re-establishing 
the  Empire.  1  The  whole  scheme  was  merely  a  device  to 
gain  time  and  keep  Bazaine  idle,  and  the  German  Chan- 
cellor succeeded  here  as  at  all  points  in  his  great  game. 
On  October  27th,  then,  6000  officers,  173,000  rank  and  file, 
were  constrained  by  famine  to  surrender,  along  with  541 
field-pieces  and  800  siege  guns. 

This  capitulation,  the  greatest  recorded  in  the  history 
of  civilised  nations,  dealt  a  death-blow  to  the  hopes  of 
France.  Strassburg  had  hoisted  the  white  flag  a  month 
earlier;  and  the  besiegers  of  these  fortresses  were  free  to 
march  westward  and  overwhelm  the  new  levies.  After 
gaining  a  success  at  Coulommiers,  near  Orleans  (November 
9th),  the  French  were  speedily  driven  down  the  valley  of  the 
Loire  and  thence  as  far  west  as  Le  Mans.  In  the  North, 
at  St.  Quentin,  the  Germans  were  equally  successful,  as 
also  in  Burgundy  against  that  once  effective  free  lance, 
Garibaldi,   who  came  with  his  sons  to  fight  for  the  Re- 

>  Bazaine  gives  the  details  from  his  point  of  view  in  his  Episodes 
de  la  Guerre  de  iSyo  et  le  Blocus  de  Metz  (Madrid,  1883).  One  of 
the  go-betweens  was  a  man  Regnier,  who  pretended  to  come  from 
the  Empress  Eugenie,  then  at  Hastings;  but  Bismarck  seems  to 
have  distrusted  him  and  to  have  dismissed  him  curtly.  The  ad- 
venturess, Mme.  Humbert,  recently  claimed  that  she  had  her 
"millions"  from  this  Regnier.  A  sharp  criticism  on  Bazaine's 
conduct  at  Metz  is  given  in  a  pamphlet,  Reponse  ati  Rapport  som- 
maire  sur  les  Operations  de  I'Armee  du  Rhin,  by  one  of  his  staflE 
officers.  See,  too,  M.  Samuel  Denis  in  his  recent  work,  Histoire 
contemporaine  (de  France). 


Founding  of  the  French  RepubHc     115 

public.  The  last  effort  was  made  by  Bourbaki  and  a  large 
but  ill-compacted  army  against  the  enemy's  communica- 
tions in  Alsace.  By  a  speedy  concentration  the  Germans 
at  Hericourt,  near  Belfort,  defeated  this  daring  move 
(imposed  by  the  Government  of  National  Defence  on 
Bourbaki  against  his  better  judgment),  and  compelled 
him  and  his  hard-pressed  followers  to  pass  over  into 
Switzerland  (January  30,  187 1). 

Meanwhile  Paris  had  already  surrendered.  During  130 
days,  and  that,  too,  in  a  winter  of  unusual  severity,  the 
great  city  had  held  out  with  a  courage  that  neither  defeats, 
schisms,  dearth  of  food,  nor  the  bombardment  directed 
against  its  southern  quarters  could  overcome.  Towards 
the  close  of  January  famine  stared  the  defenders  in  the 
face,  and  on  the  28th  an  armistice  was  concluded,  which 
put  an  end  to  the  war  except  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Belfort.  That  exception  was  due  to  the  determination  of 
the  Germans  to  press  Bourbaki  hard,  while  the  French 
negotiators  were  not  aware  of  his  plight.  The  garrison  of 
Paris,  except  12,000  men  charged  with  the  duty  of  keeping 
order,  surrendered;  the  forts  were  placed  in  the  besiegers' 
hands.  When  that  was  done  the  city  was  to  be  revictualled 
and  thereafter  pay  a  war  contribution  of  200,000,000 
francs  (;£8,ooo,ooo).  A  National  Assembly  was  to  be 
freely  elected  and  meet  at  Bordeaux  to  discuss  the  question 
of  peace.  The  National  Guards  retained  their  arms,  Favre 
maintaining  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  disarm  them; 
for  this  mistaken  weakness  he  afterwards  expressed  his 
profound  sorrow.^ 

•  It  of  course  led  up  to  the  Communist  revolt.  Bismarck's  rela- 
tions to  the  disorderly  elements  in  Paris  are  not  fully  known;  but 
he  warned  Favre  on  January  26th  to  "provoke  an  enietUe  while  you 


ii6  The  European  Nations 

Despite  the  very  natural  protests  of  Gambetta  and  many 
others  against  the  virtual  ending  of  the  war  at  the  dictation 
of  the  Parisian  authorities,  the  voice  of  France  ratified 
their  action.  An  overwhelming  majority  declared  for 
peace.  The  young  Republic  had  done  wonders  in  reviving 
the  national  spirit:  Frenchmen  could  once  more  feel  the 
self-confidence  which  had  been  damped  by  the  surrenders 
of  Sedan  and  Metz;  but  the  instinct  of  self-preservation 
now  called  imperiously  for  the  ending  of  the  hopeless 
struggle.  In  the  hurried  preparations  for  the  elections 
held  on  February  8th,  few  questions  were  asked  of  the 
candidates  except  that  of  peace  or  war;  and  it  soon  ap- 
peared that  a  great  majority  were  in  favour  of  peace,  even 
at  the  cost  of  part  of  the  eastern  provinces. 

Of  the  630  deputies  who  met  at  Bordeaux  on  February 
12th,  fully  400  were  Monarchists,  nearly  evenly  divided 
between  the  Legitimists  and  Orleanists;  200  were  pro- 
fessed Republicans;  but  only  30  Bonapartists  were  re- 
turned. It  is  not  surprising  that  the  Assembly,  which 
met  in  the  middle  of  February,  should  soon  have  declared 
that  the  Napoleonic  Empire  had  ceased  to  exist,  as  being 
"responsible  for  the  ruin,  invasion,  and  dismemberment 
of  the  country"  (March  ist).  These  rather  exaggerated 
charges  (against  which  Napoleon  III.  protested  from  his 
place  of  exile,  Chiselhurst)  were  natural  in  the  then  de- 
plorable condition  of  France.  What  is  surprising  and 
needs  a  brief  explanation  here,  is  the  fact  that  a  mon- 
archical Assembly  should  have  allowed  the  Republic  to  be 
founded. 

This  paradoxical  result  sprang  from  several  causes,  some 

have  an  army  to  suppress  it  with"  {Bismarck  in  the  Frav/:o-German 
War,  ii.,  p.  265). 


Founding  of  the  French  Republic     117 

of  them  of  a  general  nature,  others  due  to  party  con- 
siderations, while  the  personal  influence  of  one  man  perhaps 
turned  the  balance  at  this  crisis  in  the  history  of  France. 
We  will  consider  them  in  the  order  here  named. 

Stating  the  matter  broadly,  we  may  say  that  the  present 
Assembly  was  not  competent  to  decide  on  the  future  con- 
stitution of  France ;  and  that  vague  but  powerful  instinct, 
which  guides  representative  bodies  in  such  cases,  told 
against  any  avowedly  partisan  effort  in  that  direction. 
The  deputies  were  fully  aware  that  they  were  elected  to 
decide  the  urgent  question  of  peace  or  war ;  either  to  rescue 
France  from  her  long  agony  or  to  pledge  the  last  drops  of 
her  life-blood  in  an  affair  of  honour.  By  an  instinct  of 
self-preservation,  the  electors,  especially  in  the  country 
districts,  turned  to  the  men  of  property  and  local  influence 
as  those  who  were  most  likely  to  save  them  from  the  frothy 
followers  of  Gambetta.  Accordingly,  local  magnates  were 
preferred  to  the  barristers  and  pressmen  whose  oratorical 
and  literary  gifts  usually  carry  the  day  in  France;  and 
more  than  two  hundred  noblemen  were  elected.  They  were 
not  chosen  on  account  of  their  nobility  and  royalism,  but 
because  they  were  certain  to  vote  against  the  fou  furieux. 

Then,  too,  the  royalists  knew  very  well  that  time  would 
be  required  to  accustom  France  to  the  idea  of  a  King,  and 
to  adjust  the  keen  rivalries  between  the  older  and  the 
younger  branches  of  the  Bourbon  House.  Furthermore, 
they  were  anxious  that  the  odium  of  signing  a  disastrous 
peace  should  fall  on  the  yotmg  Republic,  not  on  the 
monarch  of  the  future.  Just  as  the  great  Napoleon  in 
1804  was  undoubtedly  glad  that  the  giving  up  of  Belgium 
and  the  Rhine  boundary  should  devolve  on  his  successor, 
Louis  XVIII.,  and  counted  on  that  as  one  of  the  causes 


ii8  The  European  Nations 

undermining  the  restored  monarchy,  so  now  the  royaHsts 
intended  to  leave  the  disagreeable  duty  of  ceding  the 
eastern  districts  of  France  to  the  Republicans  who  had  so 
persistently  prolonged  the  struggle.  The  clamour  of  no 
small  section  of  the  Republican  party  for  war  a  outrance 
still  played  into  the  hands  of  the  royalists  and  partly 
justified  this  narrow  partisanship.  Events,  however,  were 
to  prove  here,  as  in  so  many  cases,  that  the  party  which 
undertook  a  pressing  duty  and  discharged  it  manfully 
gained  more  in  the  end  than  those  who  shirked  responsi- 
bility and  left  the  conduct  of  affairs  to  their  opponents. 
Men  admire  those  who  dauntlessly  pluck  the  flower  safety 
out  of  the  nettle  danger. 

Finally,  the  influence  of  one  commanding  personality 
was  ultimately  to  be  given  to  the  cause  of  the  Republic. 
That  strange  instinct  which  in  times  of  crisis  turns  the 
gaze  of  a  people  towards  the  one  necessary  man,  now  singled 
out  M.  Thiers.  The  veteran  statesman  was  elected  in 
twenty-six  departments.  Gambetta  and  General  Trochu, 
Governor  of  Paris,  were  each  elected  nine  times  over.  It 
was  clear  that  the  popular  voice  was  for  the  policy  of  states- 
manlike moderation  which  Thiers  now  summed  up  in  his 
person ;  and  Gambetta  for  a  time  retired  to  Spain. 

The  name  of  Thiers  had  not  always  stood  for  moderation. 
From  the  time  of  his  youth,  when  his  journalistic  criticisms 
on  the  politics,  literature,  art,  and  drama  of  the  Restora- 
tion period  set  all  tongues  wagging,  to  the  day  when  his 
many-sided  gifts  bore  him  to  power  under  Louis  Philippe, 
he  stood  for  all  that  is  most  beloved  by  the  vivacious  sons 
of  France.  His  early  work.  The  History  of  the  French 
Revolution,  had  endeared  him  to  the  survivors  of  the  old 
Jacobin  and  Girondin  parties,  and  his  eager  hostility  to 


Founding  of  the  French  Republic     119 

England  during  his  term  of  office  flattered  the  Chauvinist 
feelings  that  steadily  grew  in  volume  during  the  otherwise 
dull  reign  of  Louis  Philippe.  In  the  main,  Thiers  was  an 
upholder  of  the  Orleans  dynasty,  yet  his  devotion  to  con- 
stitutional principles,  the  ardour  of  his  southern  tempera- 
ment— he  was  a  Marseillais  by  birth — and  the  vivacious 
egotism  that  never  brooked  contradiction,  often  caused 
sharp  friction  with  the  King  and  the  King's  friends.  He 
seemed  bom  for  opposition  and  criticism.  Thereafter,  his 
conduct  of  affairs  helped  to  tmdermine  the  fabric  of  the 
Second  Republic  (1848-51).  Flung  into  prison  by  the 
minions  of  Louis  Napoleon  at  the  time  of  the  coup  d'etat, 
he  emerged  buoyant  as  ever,  and  took  up  again  the  role 
that  he  loved  so  well. 

Nevertheless,  amidst  all  the  seeming  vagaries  of  Thiers's 
conduct  there  emerge  two  governing  principles — a  passion- 
ate love  of  France,  and  a  sincere  attachment  to  reasoned 
liberty.  The  first  was  absolute  and  unchangeable;  the 
second  admitted  of  some  variations  if  the  ruler  did  not 
enhance  the  glory  of  France,  and  also  (as  some  cynics  said) 
recognise  the  greatness  of  M.  Thiers.  For  the  many  gibes 
to  which  his  lively  talents  and  successful  career  exposed 
him,  he  had  his  revenge.  His  keen  glance  and  incisive 
reasoning  generally  warned  him  of  the  probable  fate  of 
dynasties  and  ministries.  Like  Talleyrand,  whom  he 
somewhat  resembled  in  versatility,  opportunism,  and  un- 
dying love  of  France,  he  might  have  said  that  he  never 
deserted  a  government  before  it  deserted  itself.  He  fore- 
told the  fall  of  Louis  Philippe  under  the  reactionary 
Guizot  Ministry  as,  later  on,  he  foretold  the  fall  of  Napoleon 
III.  He  blamed  the  Emperor  for  not  making  war  on 
Prussia  in    1866  with  the  same  unanswerable   logic   that 


I20  The  European  Nations 

marked  his  opposition  to  the  mad  rush  for  war  in  1870. 
And  yet  the  war  spirit  had  been  in  some  sense  strengthened 
by  his  own  writings.  His  great  work,  The  History  of  the 
Consulate  and  Empire,  which  appeared  from  1845  to  1862, 
— the  last  eight  volumes  came  out  during  the  Second 
Empire, — was  in  the  main  a  glorification  of  the  first 
Napoleon.  Men  therefore  asked  with  some  impatience 
why  the  panegyrist  of  the  uncle  should  oppose  the  suprem- 
acy of  the  nephew ;  and  the  action  of  the  crowd  in  smashing 
the  historian's  windows  after  his  great  speech  against  the 
War  of  1870  cannot  be  called  wholly  illogical,  even  if  it 
erred  on  the  side  of  Gallic  vivacity. 

In  the  feverish  drama  of  French  politics  Time  sometimes 
brings  an  appropriate  Nemesis.  It  was  so  now.  The  man 
who  had  divided  the  energies  of  his  manhood  between 
parliamentary  opposition  of  a  somewhat  factious  type  and 
the  literary  cultivation  of  the  Napoleonic  legend,  was  now, 
in  the  evening  of  his  days,  called  upon  to  bear  a  crushing 
load  of  responsibility  in  struggling  to  win  the  best  possible 
terms  of  peace  from  the  victorious  Teuton,  in  mediating 
between  contending  factions  at  Bordeaux  and  Paris,  and 
finally,  in  founding  a  form  of  government  which  never 
enlisted  his  whole-hearted  sympathy,  save  as  the  least 
objectionable  expedient  then  open  to  France. 

For  the  present,  the  great  thing  was  to  gain  peace  with 
the  minimum  of  sacrifice  for  France.  Who  could  drive  a 
better  bargain  than  Thiers,  the  man  who  knew  France  so 
well,  and  had  recently  felt  the  pulse  of  the  Governments  of 
Europe?  Accordingly,  on  the  17th  of  February,  the  As- 
sembly named  him  head  of  the  executive  power  "until 
it  is  based  upon  the  French  constitution."  He  declined 
to  accept  this  post  until  the  words  "of  the  French  Repub- 


Founding  of  the  French  Republic      121 

lie"  were  substituted  for  the  latter  clause.  He  had  every 
reason  for  urging  this  demand.  Unlike  the  Republic  of 
1848,  the  strength  of  which  was  chiefly,  or  almost  solely, 
in  Paris,  the  Republic  was  proclaimed  at  Lyons,  Marseilles, 
and  Bordeaux,  before  any  news  came  of  the  overthrow  of 
the  Napoleonic  dynasty  at  the  capital.^ 

He  now  entrusted  three  important  portfolios,  those  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  Home  Affairs,  and  Public  Instruction,  to 
pronounced  Republicans — Jules  Favre,  Picard,  and  Jules 
Simon.  Having  pacified  the  monarchical  majority  by 
appealing  to  them  to  defer  all  questions  respecting  the 
future  constitution  until  affairs  were  more  settled,  he  set 
out  to  meet  Bismarck  at  Versailles. 

A  disadvantage  which  almost  necessarily  besets  parlia- 
mentary institutions  had  weakened  the  French  case  before 
the  negotiations  began.  The  composition  of  the  Assembly 
implied  a  strong  desire  for  peace,  a  fact  which  Thiers  had 
needlessly  emphasised  before  he  left  Bordeaux.  On  the 
other  hand,  Bismarck  was  anxious  to  end  the  war.  He 
knew  enough  to  be  uneasy  at  the  attitude  of  the  neutral 
States;  for  public  opinion  was  veering  round  in  England, 
Austria,  and  Italy  to  a  feeling  of  keen  sympathy  for 
France,  and  even  Russia  was  restless  at  the  sight  of  the 
great  military  Empire  that  had  sprung  into  being  on  her 
flank.  The  recent  proclamation  of  the  German  Empire 
at  Versailles — an  event  that  will  be  treated  in  a  later 
chapter — opened  up  a  vista  of  great  developments  for  the 
Fatherland,  not  unmixed  with  difficulties  and  dangers. 
Above  all,  sharp  differences  had  arisen  between  him  and 
the  military  men  at  the  German  headquarters,  who  wished 

>  Seignobos,  A  Political  History  of  Contemporary  Europe,  i.,  p.  187 
(Eng.  edit.). 


122  The  European  Nations 

to  "bleed  France  white"  by  taking  a  large  portion  of 
French  Lorraine  (including  its  capital,  Nancy),  a  few 
colonies,  and  part  of  her  fleet.  It  is  now  known  that  Bis- 
marck, with  the  same  moderation  that  he  displayed  after 
Koniggratz,  opposed  these  extreme  claims,  and  he  even 
doubted  the  advisability  of  keeping  Metz,  with  its  large 
French  population.  The  words  in  which  he  let  fall  these 
thoughts  while  at  dinner  with  Busch  on  February  21st  de- 
serve to  be  quoted: 

"If  they  [the  French]  gave  us  a  milliard^  more  (;;^4o,ooo,- 
000)  we  might  perhaps  let  them  have  Metz.  We  would 
then  take  800,000,000  francs,  and  build  ourselves  a  fort- 
ress a  few  miles  farther  back,  somewhere  about  Falkenberg 
or  Saarbriick — there  must  be  some  suitable  spot  there- 
abouts. We  should  thus  make  a  clear  profit  of  200,000,- 
000  francs.  I  do  not  like  so  many  Frenchmen  being  in 
our  house  against  their  will.  It  is  just  the  same  with 
Belfort.  It  is  all  French  there,  too.  The  military  men, 
however,  will  not  be  willing  to  let  Metz  slip,  and  perhaps 
they  are  right."  ^ 

A  sharp  difference  of  opinion  had  arisen  between  Bis- 
marck and  Moltke  on  this  question,  and  Emperor  Wil- 
helm  intervened  in  favour  of  Moltke.  That  decided  the 
question  of  Metz  against  Thiers  despite  his  threat  that  this 
might  lead  to  a  renewal  of  war.  For  Belfort,  however,  the 
French  statesman  made  a  supreme  effort.  That  fortress 
holds  a  most  important  position.  Strong  in  itself,  it 
stands  as  sentinel  guarding  the  gap  of  nearly  level  ground 
between  the  spurs  of  the  Vosges  and  those  of  the  Jura.  If 
that  virgin  stronghold  were  handed  over  to  Germany,  she 

»  A  milliard  =  1,000,000,000  francs. 

2  Busch,  Bismarck  in  the  Franco-German  War,  ii.,  341. 


Founding  of  the  French  RepubJic      123 

would  be  able  easily  to  pour  her  legions  down  the  valley 
of  the  Doubs  and  dominate  the  rich  districts  of  Burgundy 
and  the  Lyonnais.  Besides,  military  honour  required 
France  to  keep  a  fortress  that  had  kept  the  tricolour 
flying.  Metz  the  Germans  held,  and  it  was  impossible  to 
turn  them  out.  Obviously  the  case  of  Belfort  was  on  a 
different  footing.  In  his  conference  of  February  24th, 
Thiers  at  last  defied  Bismarck  in  these  words:  "No;  I 
will  never  yield  Belfort  and  Metz  in  the  same  breath.  You 
wish  to  ruin  France  in  her  finances,  in  her  frontiers.  Well! 
Take  her.  Conduct  her  administration,  collect  her  rev- 
enues, and  you  will  have  to  govern  her  in  the  face  of 
Europe — if  Europe  permits."  1 

Probably  this  defiance  had  less  weight  with  the  Iron 
Chancellor  than  his  conviction,  noticed  above,  that  to  bring 
two  entirely  French  towns  within  the  German  Empire 
would  prove  a  source  of  weakness;  beside  which,  his  own 
motto,  Beati  possidentes,  told  with  effect  in  the  case  of 
Belfort.  That  stronghold  was  accordingly  saved  for 
France.  Thiers  also  obtained  a  reduction  of  a  milliard 
from  the  impossible  sum  of  six  milliards  first  named  for  the 
war  indemnity  due  to  Germany ;  in  this  matter  Jules  Favre 
states  that  British  mediation  had  been  of  some  avail.  If 
so,  it  partly  accounts  for  the  hatred  of  England  which 
Bismarck  displayed  in  his  later  years.  The  preliminaries 
of  peace  were  signed  at  Versailles  on  February  26th. 

One  other  matter  remained.     The  Germans  insisted  that, 

if  Belfort  remained  to  France,  part  of  their  army  should 

enter  Paris.     In  vain  did  Thiers  and  Jules  Favre  point  out 

1  G.  Hanotaux,  Contemporary  France,  i.,  p.  124  (Eng.  edit.). 
This  work  is  the  most  detailed  and  authoritative  that  has  yet 
appeared  on  these  topics.  See,  too,  M.  Samuel  Denis's  work, 
Histoire  contemporaine. 


124  The  European  Nations 

the  irritation  that  this  would  cause  and  the  possible  en- 
suing danger.  The  German  Emperor  and  his  staff  made 
it  a  point  of  honour,  and  30,000  of  their  troops  accordingly 
marched  in  and  occupied  for  a  brief  space  the  district  of 
the  Champs  Ely  sees.  The  terms  of  peace  were  finally 
ratified  in  the  Treaty  of  Frankfurt  (May  10,  187 1),  whereby 
France  ceded  Alsace  and  part  of  Lorraine,  with  a  popula- 
tion of  some  1,600,000  souls,  and  underwent  the  other 
losses  noted  above.  Last  but  not  least  was  the  burden  of 
supporting  the  German  army  of  occupation  that  kept  its 
grip  on  the  north-east  of  France  until,  as  the  instalments 
came  in,  the  foreign  troops  were  proportionately  drawn 
away  eastwards.  The  magnitude  of  these  losses  and  bur- 
dens had  already  aroused  cries  of  anguish  in  France. 
The  National  Assembly  at  Bordeaux,  on  first  hearing  the 
terms,  passionately  confirmed  the  deposition  of  Napoleon 
III. ;  while  the  deputies  from  the  ceded  districts  lodged  a 
solemn  protest  against  their  expatriation  (March  ist). 
Some  of  the  advanced  Republican  deputies,  refusing  to 
acknowledge  the  cession  of  territory,  resigned  their  seats 
in  the  Assembly.  Thus  there  began  a  schism  between  the 
Radicals,  especially  those  of  Paris,  and  the  Assembly 
which  was  destined  to  widen  into  an  impassable  gulf. 
Matters  were  made  worse  by  the  decision  of  the  Assembly 
to  sit,  not  at  the  capital,  but  at  Versailles,  where  it  would 
be  free  from  the  commotions  of  the  great  city.  Thiers 
himself  declared  in  favour  of  Versailles;  there  the  Assem- 
bly met  on  March  20,  187 1. 

A  conflict  between  this  monarchical  assembly  and  the 
eager  Radicals  of  Paris  perhaps  lay  in  the  nature  of  things. 
The  majority  of  the  deputies  looked  forward  to  the  return 
of  the  King  (whether  the  Comte  de  Chambord  of  the  elder 


Founding  of  the  French  Republic      125 

Bourbons,  or  the  Comte  de  Paris  of  the  House  of  Orleans) 
as  soon  as  France  should  be  freed  from  the  German  armies 
of  occupation  and  the  spectre  of  the  Red  Terror.  Some  of 
their  more  impatient  members  openly  showed  their  hand, 
and  while  at  Bordeaux  began  to  upbraid  Thiers  for  his 
obstinate  neutrality  on  this  question.  For  his  part,  the 
wise  old  man  had  early  seen  the  need  of  keeping  the  parties 
in  check.  On  February  17th  he  begged  them  to  defer 
questions  as  to  the  future  form  of  government,  working 
meanwhile  solely  for  the  present  needs  of  France,  and 
allowing  future  victory  to  be  the  meed  of  that  party  which 
showed  itself  most  worthy  of  trust.  "Can  there  be  any 
man,"  he  exclaimed,  "who  would  dare  learnedly  to  dis- 
cuss the  articles  of  the  Constitution,  while  our  prisoners 
are  dying  of  misery  far  away,  or  while  our  people,  perishing 
of  hunger,  are  obliged  to  give  their  last  crust  to  the  foreign 
soldiers?"  A  similar  appeal  in  March  led  to  the  informal 
truce  on  constitutional  questions  known  as  the  Compact 
of  Bordeaux.  It  was  at  best  an  uncertain  truce,  certain 
to  be  broken  at  the  first  sign  of  activity  on  the  Republican 
side. 

That  activity  was  now  put  forth  by  the  "reds"  of  Paris. 
It  would  take  us  far  too  long  to  describe  the  origins  of  the 
municipal  socialism  which  took  form  in  the  Parisian  Com- 
mune of  1 87 1.  The  first  seeds  of  that  movement  had  been 
sown  by  its  prototype  of  1792-93,  which  summed  up  all 
the  daring  and  vigour  of  the  revolutionary  socialism  of 
that  age.  The  idea  had  been  kept  alive  by  the  "National 
Workshops"  of  1848,  whose  institution  and  final  sup- 
pression by  the  young  Republic  of  that  year  had  been  its 
own  undoing. 

History  shows,  then,  that  Paris,  as  the  head  of  France, 


126  The  European  Nations 

was  accustomed  to  think  and  act  vigorously  for  herself  in 
time  of  revolution.  But  experience  proved  no  less  plainly 
that  the  limbs,  that  is,  the  country  districts,  generally 
refused  to  follow  the  head  in  these  fantastic  movements. 
Hence,  after  a  short  spell  of  St.  Vitus'  activity,  there 
always  came  a  time  of  strife,  followed  only  too  often  by 
torpor,  when  the  body  reduced  the  head  to  a  state  of 
benumbed  subjection.  The  triumph  of  rural  notions  ac- 
counts for  the  reactions  of  1831-47,  and  1851-70.  Paris, 
having  once  more  regained  freedom  of  movement  by  the 
fall  of  the  Second  Empire  on  September  4th,  at  once  sought 
to  begin  her  politico-social  experiments,  and,  as  we  pointed 
out,  only  the  promptitude  of  the  "moderates,"  when  face 
to  face  with  the  advancing  Germans,  averted  the  catas- 
trophe of  a  socialistic  regime  in  Paris  during  the  siege. 
Even  so,  the  Communists  made  two  determined  efforts  to 
gain  power:  the  former  of  these,  on  October  31st,  nearly 
succeeded.  Other  towns  in  the  Centre  and  South,  notably 
Lyons,  were  also  on  the  brink  of  revolutionary  socialism, 
and  the  success  of  the  movement  in  Paris  might  con- 
ceivably have  led  to  a  widespread  trial  of  the  communal 
experiment.  The  war  helped  to  keep  matters  in  the  old 
lines. 

But  now,  the  feelings  of  rage  at  the  surrender  of  Paris 
and  the  cession  of  the  eastern  districts  of  France,  together 
with  hatred  of  the  monarchical  assembly,  that  flouted  the 
capital  by  sitting  at  the  abode  of  the  old  Kings  of  France, 
served  to  raise  popular  passion  to  fever  heat.  The  As- 
sembly undoubtedly  made  many  mistakes:  it  authorised 
the  payment  of  rents  and  all  other  obligations  in  the 
capital  for  the  period  of  siege  as  if  in  ordinary  times,  and 
it  appointed  an  unpopular  man  to  command  the  National 


Founding  of  the  French  Republic      127 

Guards  of  Paris.  At  the  close  of  February  the  National 
Guards  formed  a  central  committee  to  look  after  their 
interests  and  those  of  the  capital ;  and  when  the  Executive 
of  the  State  sent  troops  of  the  line  to  seize  their  guns 
parked  on  Montmartre,  the  Nationals  and  the  rabble 
turned  out  in  force.  The  troops  refused  to  act  against  the 
National  Guards,  and  these  murdered  two  Generals,  Le- 
comte  and  Thomas  (March  i8th).  Thiers  and  his  ministers 
thereupon  rather  tamely  retired  to  Versailles,  and  the 
capital  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Communists.  Greater 
firmness  at  the  outset  might  have  averted  the  horrors  that 
followed. 

The  Communists  speedily  consulted  the  voice  of  the 
people  by  elections  conducted  in  the  most  democratic 
spirit.  In  many  respects  their  programme  of  municipal 
reforms  marked  a  great  improvement  on  the  type  of  town- 
government  prevalent  during  the  Empire.  That  was, 
practically,  under  the  control  of  the  imperial  prefets.  The 
Communists  now  asserted  the  right  of  each  town  to  com- 
plete self-government,  with  the  control  of  its  officials, 
magistrates,  National  Guards,  and  police,  as  well  as  of 
taxation,  education,  and  many  other  spheres  of  activity. 
The  more  ambitious  minds  looked  forward  to  a  time  when 
France  would  form  a  federation  of  self-governing  Com- 
munes, whose  delegates,  deciding  matters  of  national 
concern,  would  reduce  the  executive  power  to  complete 
subservience.  At  bottom  this  communal  federalism  was 
the  ideal  of  Rousseau  and  of  his  ideal  Cantonal  State. 

By  such  means,  they  hoped,  the  brain  of  France  would 
control  the  body,  the  rural  population  inevitably  taking 
the  position  of  hewers  of  wood  and  drawers  of  water,  both 
in  a  political  and  material  sense.     Undoubtedly  the  Paris 


128  The  European  Nations 

Commune  made  some  intelligent  changes  which  pointed 
the  way  to  reforms  of  lasting  benefit;  but  it  is  very  ques- 
tionable whether  its  aims  could  have  achieved  permanence 
in  a  land  so  very  largely  agricultural  as  France  then  was. 
Certainly  it  started  its  experiment  in  the  worst  possible 
way,  namely,  by  defying  the  constituted  authorities  of  the 
nation  at  large,  and  by  adopting  the  old  revolutionary 
calendar  and  the  red  flag,  the  symbol  of  social  revolution. 
Thenceforth  it  was  an  affair  of  war  to  the  knife. 

The  National  Government,  sitting  at  Versailles,  could, 
not  at  first  act  with  much  vigour.  Many  of  the  line 
regiments  sympathised  with  the  National  Guards  of  Paris: 
these  were  200,000  strong,  and  had  command  of  the  walls 
and  some  of  the  posts  to  the  south-west  of  Paris.  The 
Germans  still  held  the  forts  to  the  north  and  east  of  the 
capital,  and  refused  to  allow  any  attack  on  that  side.  It- 
has  even  been  stated  that  Bismarck  favoured  the  Com- 
munists; but  this  is  said  to  have  resulted  from  their  mis- 
reading of  his  promise  to  maintain  a  friedlich  (peaceful) 
attitude  as  if  it  were  freundlich  (friendly).^  The  full 
truth  as  to  Bismarck's  relations  to  the  Commune  is  not 
known.  The  Germans,  however,  sent  back  a  force  of 
French  prisoners,  and  these  with  other  troops,  after  beating 
back  the  Communist  sortie  of  April  3rd,  began  to  threaten 
the  defences  of  the  city.  The  strife  at  once  took  on  a 
savage  character,  as  was  inevitable  after  the  murder  of 
two  Generals  in  Paris.  The  Versailles  troops,  treating  the 
Communists  as  mere  rebels,  shot  their  chief  officers. 
Thereupon  the  Commune  retaliated  by  ordering  the  cap- 
ture of  hostages,  and  by  seizing  the  Archbishop  of  Paris, 
and  several  other  ecclesiastics  (April  5th).     It  also  decreed 

»  Debidour,  Histoire  diplomatique  de  VEiirope,  ii.,  pp.  438-440. 


Founding  of  the  French  Republic      1 29 

the  abolition  of  the  budget  for  pubHc  worship  and  the 
confiscation  of  clerical  and  monastic  property  throughout 
France — a  proposal  which  aroused  ridicule  and  contempt. 

It  would  be  tedious  to  dwell  on  the  details  of  this  terri- 
ble strife.  Gradually  the  regular  forces  overpowered  the 
National  Guards  of  Paris,  drove  them  from  the  southern 
forts,  and  finally  (May  21st)  gained  a  lodgment  within  the 
walls  of  Paris  at  the  Auteuil  gate.  Then  followed  a  week 
of  street-fighting  and  madness  such  as  Europe  had  not  seen 
since  the  Peninsular  War.  "Room  for  the  people,  for  the 
bare-armed  fighting  men.  The  hour  of  the  revolutionary 
war  has  struck."  This  was  the  placard  posted  throughout 
Paris  on  the  22nd,  by  order  of  the  Communist  chief,  Deles- 
cluze.  And  again,  "After  the  barricades,  our  houses; 
after  our  houses,  our  ruins."  Preparations  were  made  to 
burn  down  a  part  of  Central  Paris  to  delay  the  progress 
of  the  Versaillese.  Rumour  magnified  this  into  a  plan 
of  wholesale  incendiarism,  and  wild  stories  were  told  of 
petroleuses  flinging  oil  over  buildings,  and  of  Communist 
firemen  ready  to  pump  petroleum.  A  squad  of  infuriated 
"reds"  rushed  ofif  and  massacred  the  Archbishop  of  Paris 
and  six  other  hostages,  while  elsewhere  Dominican  friars, 
captured  regulars,  and  police  agents  fell  victims  to  the 
rage  of  the  worsted  party. 

Madness  seemed  to  have  seized  on  the  women  of  Paris. 
Even  when  the  men  were  driven  from  barricades  by  weight 
of  numbers  or  by  the  capture  of  houses  on  their  flank,  these 
creatures  fought  on  with  the  fury  of  despair  till  they  met 
the  death  which  the  enraged  linesmen  dealt  out  to  all  who 
fought,  or  seemed  to  have  fought.  Simpson,  the  British 
war  correspondent,  tells  how  he  saw  a  brutal  officer  tear 
the  red  cross   off   the  arm  of  a  nurse   who   tended   the 


130  The  European  Nations 

Communist  wounded,  so  that  she  might  be  done  to  death  as 
a  fighter.^  Both  sides,  in  truth,  were  infuriated  by  the  long 
and  murderous  struggle,  which  showed  once  again  that  no 
strife  is  so  horrible  as  that  of  civil  war.  On  Sunday,  May 
28th,  the  last  desperate  band  was  cut  down  at  the  Cemetery 
Pere-Lachaise,  and  fighting  gave  way  to  fusillades.  Most 
of  the  chiefs  perished  without  the  pretence  of  trial,  and  the 
same  fate  befell  thousands  of  National  Guards,  who  were 
mown  down  in  swathes  and  cast  into  trenches.  In  the  last 
day  of  fighting,  and  the  terrible  time  that  followed,  17,000 
Parisians  are  said  to  have  perished. 2  Little  by  little,  law 
reasserted  her  sway,  but  only  to  doom  9600  persons  to 
heavy  punishment.  Not  until  1879  did  feelings  of  mercy 
prevail,  and  then,  owing  to  Gambetta's  powerful  pleading, 
an  amnesty  was  passed  for  the  surviving  Communist 
prisoners. 

The  Paris  Commune  affords  the  last  important  instance 
of  a  determined  rising  in  Europe  against  a  civilised  Govern- 
ment. From  this  statement  we  of  course  except  the  fitful 
efforts  of  the  Carlists  in  Spain;  and  it  is  needless  to  say 
that  the  risings  of  the  Bulgarians  and  other  Slavs  against 
Turkish  rule  have  been  directed  against  an  uncivilised 
Government.  The  absence  of  revolts  in  the  present  age 
marks  it  off  from  all  that  have  preceded,  and  seems  to  call 
for  a  brief  explanation.  Obviously,  there  is  no  lack  of  dis- 
content, as  the  sequel  will  show.  Finland,  portions  of 
Caucasia,  and  all  the  parts  of  the  once  mighty  realm  of 
Poland  which  have  fallen  to  Russia  and  Prussia,  now  and 

1  The  Autobiography  of  William  Simpson  (London,  1903),  p.  261. 

2  G.  Hanotaux,  Contemporary  France,  p.  225.  For  further  details 
see  Lissagaray's  History  of  the  Commune;  also  personal  details  in 
Washbume's  Recollections  of  a  Minister  to  France,  1869-77,  ii., 
chaps,  ii.-vii. 


Founding  of  the  French  Republic      131 

again  heave  with  anger  and  resentment.  But  these  feel- 
ings are  suppressed.  They  do  not  flame  forth,  as  was  the 
case  of  Poland  as  late  as  the  year  1863.  What  is  the  reason 
for  this?  Mainly,  it  would  seem,  the  enormous  powers 
given  to  the  modern  organised  State  by  the  discoveries  of 
mechanical  science  and  the  triumphs  of  the  engineer. 
Telegraphy  now  flashes  to  the  capital  the  news  of  a  threat- 
ening revolt  in  the  hundredth  part  of  the  time  formerly 
taken  by  couriers  with  their  relays  of  horses.  Fully  as 
great  is  the  saving  of  time  in  the  transport  of  large  bodies 
of  troops  to  the  disaffected  districts.  Thus,  the  all-im- 
portant factors  that  make  for  success — force,  skill,  and 
time — are  all  on  the  side  of  the  central  Governments.! 

The  spread  of  constitutional  rule  has  also  helped  to 
dispel  discontent — or,  at  least,  has  altered  its  character. 
Representative  government  has  tended  to  withdraw  dis- 
affection from  the  market-place,  the  purlieus  of  the  poor, 
and  the  fastnesses  of  the  forest,  and  to  focus  it  noisily  but 
peacefully  in  the  columns  of  the  Press  and  the  arena  of 
Parliament.  The  appeal  now  is  not  so  much  to  arms  as  to 
argument;  and  in  this  new  sphere  a  minority,  provided 
that  it  is  well  organised  and  persistent,  may  generally  hope 
to  attain  its  ends.  Revolt,  even  if  it  take  the  form  of  a 
refusal  to  pay  taxes,  is  therefore  an  anachronism  tmder  a 
democracy;  unless,  as  in  the  case  of  the  American  Civil 
War,  two  great  sections  of  the  country  are  irreconcilably 
opposed. 

The  fact,  however,  that  there  has  been  no  widespread 
revolt  in  Russia  since  the  year  1863,  shows  that  democracy 

>  See  Turkey  in  Europe,  by  "Odysseus"  (p.  130),  for  the  parallel 
instance  of  the  enhanced  power  of  the  Sultan  Abdul  Hamid  owing 
to  the  same  causes. 


132  The  European  Nations 

has  not  been  the  chief  influence  tending  to  dissolve  or 
suppress  discontent.  As  we  shall  see  in  a  later  chapter, 
Russia  has  defied  constitutionalism  and  ground  down  alien 
races  and  creeds;  yet  (up  to  the  year  1904)  no  great  rising 
has  shaken  her  autocratic  system  to  its  base.  This  seems 
to  prove  that  the  immunity  of  the  present  age  in  regard  to 
insurrections  is  due  rather  to  the  triumphs  of  mechanical 
science  than  to  the  progress  of  democracy.  The  fact  is  not 
pleasing  to  contemplate;  but  it  must  be  faced.  So  also 
must  its  natural  corollary  that  the  minority,  if  rendered 
desperate,  may  be  driven  to  arm  itself  with  new  and  terrible 
engines  of  destruction  in  order  to  shatter  that  superiority 
of  force  with  which  science  has  endowed  the  centralised 
Governments  of  to-day. 

Certain  it  is  that  desperation,  perhaps  brought  about  by 
a  sense  of  helplessness  in  face  of  an  armed  nation,  was  one 
of  the  characteristics  of  the  Paris  Commune,  as  it  was  also 
of  Nihilism  in  Russia.  In  fact  the  Communist  effort  of 
187 1  may  be  termed  a  belated  attempt  on  the  part  of  a 
daring  minority  to  dominate  France  by  seizing  the  ma- 
chinery of  government  at  Paris.  The  success  of  the  Ex- 
tremists of  1793  and  1848  in  similar  experiments — not  to 
speak  of  the  communistic  rising  of  Babeuf  in  1797 — was 
only  temporary;  but  doubtless  it  encouraged  the  "reds" 
of  1 781  to  make  their  mad  bid  for  power.  Now,  however, 
the  case  was  very  different.  France  was  no  longer  a  lethar- 
gic mass,  dominated  solely  by  the  eager  brain  of  Paris. 
The  whole  country  thrilled  with  political  life.  For  the 
time,  the  Provinces  held  the  directing  power,  which  had 
been  necessarily  removed  from  the  capital;  and — most 
powerful  motive  of  all — they  looked  on  the  Parisian  ex- 
periment as  gross  treason  to  la  patrie,  while  she  lay  at  the 


Founding  of  the  French  Republic      133 

feet  of  the  Germans.  Thus,  the  very  motives  which  for  a 
space  lent  such  prestige  and  power  to  the  Communistic 
Jacobins  of  1793  told  against  their  imitators  in  187 1. 

The  inmost  details  of  their  attempt  will  perhaps  never  be 
fully  known;  for  too  many  of  the  actors  died  under  the 
ruins  of  the  building  they  had  so  heedlessly  reared.  Never- 
theless, it  is  clear  that  the  Commune  was  far  from  being 
the  causeless  outburst  that  it  has  often  been  represented. 
In  part  it  resulted  from  the  determination  of  the  capital 
to  free  herself  from  the  control  of  the  "rurals"  who  domin- 
ated the  National  Assembly;  and  in  that  respect  it  fore- 
shadowed, however  crudely,  what  will  probably  be  the 
political  future  of  all  great  States,  wherein  the  urban 
population  promises  altogether  to  outweigh  and  control 
that  of  the  country.  Further,  it  should  be  remembered 
that  the  experimenters  of  187 1  believed  the  Assembly  to 
have  betrayed  the  cause  of  France  by  ceding  her  eastern 
districts,  and  to  be  on  the  point  of  handing  over  the 
Republic  to  the  monarchists.  A  fit  of  hysteria,  or  hypo- 
chondria, brought  on  by  the  exhausting  siege  and  by 
exasperation  at  the  triumphal  entry  of  the  Germans, 
added  the  touch  of  fury  which  enabled  the  Radicals  of 
Paris  to  challenge  the  national  authorities  and  there- 
after to  persist  in  their  defiance  with  French  logicality 
and  ardour. 

France,  on  the  other  hand,  looked  on  the  Communist 
movement  at  Paris  and  in  the  southern  towns  as  treason 
to  the  cause  of  national  unity,  when  there  was  the  utmost 
need  of  concord.  Thus  on  both  sides  there  were  deplor- 
able misunderstandings.  In  ordinary  times  they  might 
have  been  cleared  away  by  frank  explanations  between 
the  more  moderate  leaders;   but  the  feverish  state  of  the 


134  The  European  Nations 

public  mind  forbade  all  thoughts  of  compromise,  and  the 
very  weakness  brought  on  by  the  war  sharpened  the  fit 
of  delirium  which  will  render  the  spring  months  of  the 
year  187 1  for  ever  memorable  even  in  the  thrilling  annals 
of  Paris. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE    FOUNDING   OF   THE    FRENCH    REPUBLIC    {continued) 

THE  seemingly  suicidal  energy  shown  in  the  civil  strifes 
at  Paris  served  still  further  to  depress  the  fortunes 
of  France.  On  the  very  day  when  the  Versailles  troops 
entered  the  walls  of  Paris,  Thiers  and  Favre  signed  the 
treaty  of  peace  at  Frankfurt.  The  terms  were  substan- 
tially those  agreed  on  in  the  preliminaries  of  February, 
but  the  conditions  of  payment  of  the  indemnity  were 
harder  than  before.  Resistance  was  hopeless.  In  truth, 
the  Iron  Chancellor  had  recently  used  very  threatening 
language:  he  accused  the  French  Government  of  bad  faith 
in  procuring  the  release  of  a  large  force  of  French  prisoners, 
ostensibly  for  the  overthrow  of  the  Commune,  but  really  in 
order  to  patch  up  matters  with  the  "reds"  of  Paris  and 
renew  the  war  with  Germany.  Misrepresentations  and 
threats  like  these  induced  Thiers  and  Favre  to  agree  to  the 
German  demands,  which  took  form  in  the  Treaty  of 
Frankfurt  (May  lo,  187 1). 

Peace  having  been  duly  ratified  on  those  hard  terms, ^  it 

1  They  included  the  right  to  hold  four  more  Departments  until 
the  third  half-milliard  (;g20,ooo,ooo,  that  is,  ;;g6o,ooo,ooo  in  all) 
had  been  paid.  A  commercial  treaty  on  favourable  terms,  those 
of  the  "most  favoured  nation,"  was  arranged,  as  also  an  exchange 
of  frontier  strips  near  Luxemburg  and  Belfort.  Germany  acquired 
Elsass  (Alsace)  and  part  of  Lorraine,  free  of  all  their  debts. 

We  may  note  here  that  the  Anglo-French  Treaty  of  Commerce, 

135 


13^  The  European  Nations 

remained  to  build  up  France  almost  de  novo.  Nearly 
everything  was  wanting.  The  treasury  was  nearly  empty, 
and  that  too  in  face  of  the  enormous  demands  made  by 
Germany.  It  is  said  that  in  February,  187 1,  the  unhappy 
man  who  took  up  the  Ministry  of  Finance,  carried  away 
all  the  funds  of  the  national  exchequer  in  his  hat.  As 
Thiers  confessed  to  the  Assembly,  he  had,  for  very  patriot- 
ism, to  close  his  eyes  to  the  future  and  grapple  with  the 
problems  of  every  day  as  they  arose.  But  he  had  faith  in 
France,  and  France  had  faith  in  him.  The  French  people 
can  perform  wonders  when  they  thoroughly  trust  their 
rulers.  The  inexhaustible  wealth  inherent  in  their  soil, 
the  thrift  of  the  peasantry,  and  the  self-sacrificing  ardour 
shown  by  the  nation  when  nerved  by  a  high  ideal,  con- 
stituted an  asset  of  unsuspected  strength  in  face  of  the 
staggering  blows  dealt  to  French  wealth  and  credit.  The 
losses  caused  by  the  war,  the  Commune,  and  the  cession 
of  the  eastern  districts,  involved  losses  that  have  been 
reckoned  at  more  than  ;;^6 14,000,000.  Apart  from  the 
1,597,000  inhabitants  transferred  to  German  rule,  the  loss 
of  population  due  to  the  war  and  the  civil  strifes  has  been 
put  as  high  as  491,000  souls. ^ 

Yet  France  flung  herself  with  triumphant  energy  into 
the  task  of  paying  off  the  invaders.  At  the  close  of  June, 
187 1,  a  loan  for  two  milliards  and  a  quarter  (;^9o,ooo,ooo) 
was  opened  for  subscription,  and  proved  to  be  an  immense 

arranged  in  i860  with  Napoleon  largely  by  the  aid  of  Cobden,  was 
not  renewed  by  the  French  Republic,  which  thereafter  began  to 
exclude  British  goods.  Bismarck  forced  France  at  Frankfurt  to 
concede  favourable  terms  to  German  products.  England  was  help- 
less.    For  this  subject,  see  Protection  in  France,  by  H.  O.  Meredith 

(1905)- 

1  Quoted  by  M.  Hanotaux,  Contemporary  France,  i.,  pp.  323-327. 


Founding  of  the  French  Republic      i37 

success.  The  required  amount  was  more  than  doubled. 
By  means  of  the  help  of  international  banks,  the  first  half 
milliard  of  the  debt  was  paid  off  in  July,  1871,  and  Nor- 
mandy was  freed  from  the  burden  of  German  occupation. 
We  need  not  detail  the  dates  of  the  successive  payments. 
They  revealed  the  unsuspected  vitality  of  France  and  the 
energy  of  her  Government  and  financiers.  In  March, 
1873,  the  arrangements  for  the  payment  of  the  last  instal- 
ment were  made,  and  in  the  autumn  of  that  year  the  last 
German  troops  left  Verdun  and  Belfort.  For  his  great 
services  in  bending  all  the  powers  of  France  to  this  great 
financial  feat,  Thiers  was  universally  acclaimed  as  the 
Liberator  of  the  Territory. 

Yet  that  very  same  period  saw  him  overthrown.  To 
read  this  riddle  aright,  we  must  review  the  outlines  of 
French  internal  politics.  We  have  already  referred  to 
the  causes  that  sent  up  a  monarchical  .majority  to  the 
National  Assembly,  the  schisms  that  weakened  the  action 
of  that  majority,  and  the  peculiar  position  held  by  M. 
Thiers,  an  Orleanist  in  theory,  but  the  chief  magistrate  of 
the  French  Republic.  No  more  paradoxical  situation  has 
ever  existed;  and  its  oddity  was  enhanced  by  the  usually 
clear-cut  logicality  of  French  political  thought.  Now, 
after  the  war  and  the  Commune,  the  outlook  was  dim, 
even  to  the  keenest  sight.  One  thing  alone  was  clear,  the 
duty  of  all  citizens  to  defer  raising  any  burning  question 
until  law,  order,  and  the  national  finances  were  re-estab- 
lished. It  was  the  perception  of  this  truth  that  led  to  the 
provisional  truce  between  the  parties  known  as  the  Com- 
pact of  Bordeaux.  Flagrantly  broken  by  the  "reds"  of 
Paris  in  the  spring  of  1871,  that  agreement  seemed  doomed. 
The  Republic  itself  was  in  danger  of  perishing  as  it  did 


138  The  European  Nations 

after  the  socialistic  extravagances  of  the  Revolution  of 
1848.  But  Thiers  at  once  disappointed  the  monarchists 
by  stoutly  declaring  that  he  would  not  abet  the  overthrow 
of  the  Republic:  "We  found  the  Republic  established,  as 
a  fact  of  which  we  are  not  the  authors;  but  I  will  not  de- 
stroy the  form  of  government  which  I  am  now  using  to 
restore  order.  ,  .  .  When  all  is  settled,  the  cotuitry 
will  have  the  liberty  to  choose  as  it  pleases  in  what  con- 
cerns its  future  destinies."  ^  Skilfully  pointing  the  fac- 
tions to  the  future  as  offering  a  final  reward  for  their 
virtuous  self-restraint,  this  masterly  tactician  gained  time 
in  which  to  heal  the  worst  wounds  dealt  by  the  war. 

But  it  was  amidst  unending  difficulties.  The  mon- 
archists, eager  to  emphasise  the  political  reaction  set  in 
motion  by  the  extravagances  of  the  Paris  Commtme, 
wished  to  rid  themselves  at  the  earliest  possible  time  of 
this  self-confident  little  bourgeois  who  alone  seemed  to  stand 
between  them  and  the  realisation  of  their  hopes.  Their 
more  unscrupulous  members  belittled  his  services  and 
hinted  that  love  of  power  alone  led  him  to  cling  to  the 
Republic,  and  thus  belie  his  political  past.  Then,  too,  the 
Orleans  princes,  the  Due  d'Aumale  and  the  Prince  de 
Joinville,  the  surviving  sons  of  King  Louis  Philippe,  took 
their  seats  as  deputies  for  the  Oise  and  Haute-Mame  De- 
partments, thus  keeping  the  monarchical  ideal  steadily 
before  the  eye  of  France.  True,  the  Due  d'Aumale  had 
declared  to  the  electorate  that  he  was  ready  to  bow  before 
the  will  of  France  whether  it  decided  for  a  Constitutional 
Monarchy  or  a  Liberal  Republic ;  and  the  loyalty  with 
which  he  served  his  country  was  destined  to  set  the  seal  of 
honesty  on  a  singularly  interesting  career.  But  there  was 
'  Speech  of  March  27,  187 1. 


Founding  of  the  French  Republic     ^39 

no  guarantee  that  the  Chamber  would  not  take  upon  itself 
to  interpret  the  will  of  France  and  call  from  his  place  of 
exile  in  London  the  Comte  de  Paris,  son  of  the  eldest  de- 
scendant of  Louis  Philippe,  around  whom  the  hopes  of  the 
Orleanists  centred. 

Had  Thiers  followed  his  earlier  convictions  and  declared 
for  such  a  Restoration,  it  might  quite  conceivably  have 
come  about  without  very  much  resistance.  But  early  in 
the  year  187 1,  or  perhaps  after  the  fall  of  the  Empire,  he 
became  convinced  that  France  could  not  heal  her  grievous 
wounds  except  under  a  government  that  had  its  roots 
deep  in  the  people's  life.  Now,  the  cause  of  monarchy  in 
France  was  hopelessly  weakened  by  schisms.  Legitimists 
and  Orleanists  were  at  feud  ever  since,  in  1830,  Louis 
Philippe,  so  the  former  said,  cozened  the  rightful  heir  out 
of  his  inheritance;  and  the  efforts  now  made  to  fuse  the 
claims  of  the  two  rival  branches  remained  without  result 
owing  to  the  stiff  and  dogmatic  attitude  of  the  Comte  de 
Chambord,  heir  to  the  traditions  of  the  elder  branch.  A 
Bonapartist  Restoration  was  out  of  the  question.  Yet  all 
three  sections  began  more  and  more  to  urge  their  claims. 
Thiers  met  them  with  consummate  skill.  Occasionally 
they  had  reason  to  resent  his  tactics  as  showing  unworthy 
finesse ;  but  oftener  they  quailed  before  the  startling  bold- 
ness of  his  reminders  that,  as  they  constituted  the  majority 
of  the  deputies  of  France,  they  might  at  once  undertake  to 
restore  the  monarchy — if  they  could.  "You  do  not,  and 
you  cannot,  do  so.  There  is  only  one  throne  and  it  cannot 
have  three  occupants."  ^     Or,  again,  he  cowed  them  by 

»  De  Mazade,  Thiers,  p.  467.  For  a  sharp  criticism  of  Thiers, 
see  Samuel  Denis's  Histoire  Contentporaine  (written  from  the  royal- 
ist standpoint). 


I40  The  European  Nations 

the  sheer  force  of  his  personaHty:  "If  I  were  a  weak  man, 
I  would  flatter  you,"  he  once  exclaimed.  In  the  last  re- 
sort he  replied  to  their  hints  of  his  ambition  and  self-seeking 
by  offering  his  resignation.  Here  again  the  logic  of  facts 
was  with  him.  For  many  months  he  was  the  necessary 
man,  and  he  and  they  knew  it. 

But,  as  we  have  seen,  there  came  a  time  when  the  last 
hard  bargains  with  Bismarck  as  to  the  payment  of  the  war 
debt  neared  their  end;  and  the  rapier-play  between  the 
Liberator  of  the  Territory  and  the  parties  of  the  Assembly 
also  drew  to  a  close.  In  one  matter  he  had  given  them 
just  cause  for  complaint.  As  far  back  as  November  13, 
1872  (that  is,  before  the  financial  problem  was  solved),  he 
suddenly  and  without  provocation  declared  from  the 
tribune  of  the  National  Assembly  that  it  was  time  to 
establish  the  Republic.  The  proposal  was  adjourned,  but 
Thiers  had  damaged  his  influence.  He  had  broken  the 
Compact  of  Bordeaux  and  had  shown  his  hand.  The 
Assembly  now  knew  that  he  was  a  Republican.  Finally, 
he  made  a  dignified  speech  to  the  Assembly,  justifying  his 
conduct  in  the  past,  appealing  from  the  verdict  of  parties 
to  the  impartial  tribunal  of  History,  and  prophesying  that 
the  welfare  of  France  was  bound  up  with  the  maintenance 
of  the  conservative  Republic.  The  Assembly  by  a  ma- 
jority of  fourteen  decided  on  a  course  of  action  that  he 
disapproved,  and  he  therefore  resigned  (May  24,  1873). 

It  seems  that  History  will  justify  his  appeal  to  her 
tribunal.  Looking,  not  at  the  occasional  shifts  that  he 
used  in  order  to  disunite  his  opponents,  but  rather  at  the 
underlying  motives  that  prompted  his  resolve  to  maintain 
that  form  of  government  which  least  divided  his  country- 
men, posterity  has  praised  his  conduct  as  evincing  keen 


Founding  of  the  French  Republic      141 

insight  into  the  situation,  a  glowing  love  for  France  before 
which  all  his  earliest  predilections  vanished,  and  a  masterly 
skill  in  guiding  her  from  the  abyss  of  anarchy,  civil  war, 
and  bankruptcy  that  had  but  recently  yawned  at  her  feet. 
Having  set  her  upon  the  path  of  safety,  he  now  betook 
himself  once  more  to  those  historical  and  artistic  studies 
which  he  loved  better  than  power  and  office.  It  is  given  to 
few  men  not  only  to  write  history  but  also  to  make  history ; 
yet  in  both  spheres  Thiers  achieved  signal  success.  Some 
one  has  dubbed  him  "the  greatest  little  man  known  to 
history."  Granting  even  that  the  paradox  is  tenable,  we 
may  still  assert  that  his  influence  on  the  life  of  France  ex- 
ceeded that  of  many  of  her  so-called  heroes. 

In  fact,  it  would  be  difficult  to  point  out  in  any  country 
during  the  nineteenth  century,  since  the  time  of  Bona- 
parte's Consulate,  a  work  of  political,  economic,  and  social 
renovation  greater  than  that  which  went  on  in  the  two 
years  during  which  Thiers  held  the  reins  of  power.  Apart 
from  the  unparalleled  feat  of  paying  off  the  Germans,  the 
Chief  of  the  Executive  breathed  new  vigour  into  the  public 
service,  revived  national  spirit  in  so  noteworthy  a  way  as 
to  bring  down  threats  of  war  from  German  military  circles 
in  1872  (to  be  repeated  more  seriously  in  1875),  and  placed 
on  the  Statute  Book  two  measures  of  paramount  import- 
ance. These  were  the  reform  of  Local  Government  and 
the  Army  Bill. 

These  measures  claim  a  brief  notice.  The  former  of 
them  naturally  falls  into  two  parts,  dealing  severally 
with  the  Commune  and  the  Department.  These  are  the 
two  all-important  areas  in  French  life.  In  rural  districts 
the  Commune  corresponds  to  the  English  parish;  it  is 
the  oldest  and  best-defined  of  all  local  areas.     In  urban 


142  The  European  Nations 

districts  it  corresponds  with  the  municipahty  or  township. 
The  Revolutionists  of  1790  and  1848  had  sought  to  apply 
the  principle  of  manhood  suffrage  to  communal  govern- 
ment; but  their  plans  were  swept  away  by  the  ensuing 
reactions,  and  the  dawn  of  the  Third  Republic  found  the 
Communes,  both  rural  and  urban,  under  the  control  of  the 
pre  jets  and  their  subordinates.  We  must  note  here  that 
the  office  of  pre  jet,  instituted  by  Bonaparte  in  1800,  was 
designed  to  link  the  local  government  of  the  Departments 
closely  to  the  central  power:  this  magistrate,  appointed  by 
the  Executive  at  Paris,  having  almost  unlimited  control 
over  local  affairs  throughout  the  several  Departments. 
Indeed,  it  was  against  the  excessive  centralisation  of  the 
prefectorial  system  that  the  Parisian  Communists  made 
their  heedless  and  unmeasured  protest.  The  question 
having  thus  been  thrust  to  the  front,  the  Assembly  brought 
forward  (April,  187 1)  a  measure  authorising  the  election 
of  Communal  Councils  elected  by  every  adult  man  who 
had  resided  for  a  year  in  the  Commune.  A  majority  of 
the  Assembly  wished  that  the  right  of  choosing  mayors 
should  rest  with  the  Communal  Councils,  but  Thiers,  brow- 
beating the  deputies  by  his  favourite  device  of  threatening 
to  resign,  carried  an  amendment  limiting  this  right  to 
towns  of  less  than  20,000  inhabitants.  In  the  larger  towns 
and  in  all  capitals  of  Departments,  the  mayors  were  to  be 
appointed  by  the  central  power.  Thus  the  Napoleonic 
tradition  in  favour  of  keeping  local  government  under  the 
oversight  of  officials  nominated  from  Paris  was  to  some  ex- 
tent perpetuated  even  in  an  avowedly  democratic  measure. 

Paris  was  to  have  a  Municipal  Council  composed  of  eighty 
members  elected  by  manhood  suffrage  from  each  ward; 
but  the  mayors  of  the  twenty  arrondissements ,  into  which 


Founding  of  the  French  RepubHc      143 

Paris  is  divided,  were,  and  still  are,  appointed  by  the  State; 
and  here  again  the  control  of  the  police  and  other  extensive 
powers  are  vested  in  the  prefet  of  the  Department  of  the 
Seine,  not  in  the  mayors  of  the  arrondissements  or  the 
Municipal  Council.  The  Municipal  or  Communal  Act  of 
187 1,  then,  is  a  compromise,  on  the  whole  a  good  working 
compromise,  between  the  extreme  demands  for  local  self- 
government  and  the  Napoleonic  tradition,  now  become  an 
instinct  with  most  Frenchmen  in  favour  of  central  control 
over  matters  affecting  public  order. ^ 

The  matter  of  Army  Reform  was  equally  pressing. 
Here,  again,  Thiers  had  the  ground  cleared  before  him  by 
a  great  overturn,  like  that  which  enabled  Bonaparte  in  his 
day  to  remodel  France,  and  the  builders  of  modem  Prussia, 
— Stein,  Schamhorst,  and  Hardenberg, — to  build  up  their 
State  from  its  ruins.  In  particular,  the  inefficiency  of  the 
National  Guards  and  of  the  Garde  Mobile  made  it  easy  to 
reconstruct  the  French  army  on  the  system  of  universal 
conscription  in  a  regular  army,  the  efficiency  of  which 
Prussia  had  so  startlingly  displayed  in  the  campaigns  of 
Koniggratz  (Sadowa)  and  Sedan.  Thiers,  however,  had  no 
belief  in  a  short -service  system  with  its  result  of  a  huge 
force  of  imperfectly  trained  troops:  he  clung  to  the  old 
professional  army;  and  when  that  was  shown  to  be  in- 
adequate to  the  needs  of  the  new  age,  he  pleaded  that  the 
period  of  compulsory  service  should  be,  not  three,  but  five 
years.  On  the  Assembly  demurring  to  the  expense  and 
vital  strain  for  the  people  which  this  implied,  he  declared 
with  passionate  emphasis  that  he  would  resign  unless  the 

1  On  the  strength  of  this  instinct  see  Mr.  Bodley's  excellent  work, 
France,  i.,  pp.  32-42,  etc.  For  the  Act,  see  Hanotaux,  op.  cit.,  pp. 
236-238. 


144  The  European  Nations 

five  years  were  voted.  They  were  voted  (June  lo,  1872), 
At  the  same  time,  the  exemptions,  so  numerous  during  the 
Second  Empire,  were  curtailed  and  the  right  of  buying  a 
substitute  was  swept  away.  After  five  years'  service  with 
the  active  army,  were  to  come  four  years  with  the  reserve  of 
the  active  army,  followed  by  further  terms  in  the  territorial 
army.  The  favour  of  one  year's  service  instead  of  five 
was  to  be  accorded  in  certain  well-defined  cases,  as,  for 
instance,  to  those  who  had  distinguished  themselves  at  the 
lycees,  or  highest  grade  public  schools.  Such  was  the  law 
which  was  published  on  July  27,  1872.1 

The  sight  of  a  nation  taking  on  itself  this  heavy  blood-tax 
(heavier  than  that  of  Germany,  where  the  time  of  service 
with  the  colours  was  only  for  three  years) ,  aroused  universal 
surprise,  which  beyond  the  Rhine  took  the  form  of  sus- 
picion that  France  was  planning  a  war  of  revenge.  That 
feeling  grew  in  intensity  in  military  circles  in  Berlin  three 
years  later,  as  the  sequel  will  show.  Undaunted  by  the 
thinly  veiled  threats  that  came  from  Germany,  France 
proceeded  with  the  tasks  of  paying  off  her  conquerors  and 
reorganising  her  own  forces;  so  that  Thiers  on  his  retire- 
ment from  office  could  proudly  point  to  the  recovery  of 
French  credit  and  prestige  after  an  unexampled  overthrow. 

In  feverish  haste,  the  monarchical  majority  of  the 
National  Assembly  appointed  Marshal  MacMahon  to  the 
Presidency  (May  24,  1873).  They  soon  found  out,  how- 
ever, the  impossibility  of  founding  a  monarchy.  The 
Comte  de  Paris,  in  whom  the  hopes  of  the  Orleanists 
centred,  went  to  the  extreme  of  self-sacrifice,  by  visiting  the 
Comte  de  Chambord,  the  Legitimist  " King"  of  France,  and 
recognising  the  validity  of  his  claims  to  the  throne.  But 
1  Hanotaux,  op.  cit.,  pp.  452-465. 


Founding  of  the  French  Republic      145 

this  amiable  pliability,  while  angering  very  many  of  the 
Orleanists,  failed  to  move  the  monarch-designate  by  one 
hair's  breadth  from  those  principles  of  divine  right  against 
which  the  more  liberal  monarchists  always  protested. 
"  Henri  V."  soon  declared  that  he  would  neither  accept  any 
condition  nor  grant  a  single  guarantee  as  to  the  character 
of  his  future  rule.  Above  all,  he  declared  that  he  would 
never  give  up  the  white  flag  of  the  ancien  regime.  In  his 
eyes  the  tricolour,  which  shortly  after  the  fall  of  the  Bas- 
tile  Louis  XVI .  had  recognised  as  the  flag  of  France,  re- 
presented the  spirit  of  the  great  Revolution,  and  for  that 
great  event  he  had  the  deepest  loathing.  As  if  still  further 
to  ruin  his  cause,  the  Count  announced  his  intention  of 
striving  with  all  his  might  for  the  restoration  of  the  Tem- 
poral Power  of  the  Pope.  It  is  said  that  the  able  Bishop 
of  Orleans,  Mgr.  Dupanloup,  on  reading  one  of  the  letters 
by  which  the  Comte  de  Chambord  nailed  the  white  flag  to 
the  mast,  was  driven  to  exclaim,  "There!  That  makes  the 
Republic!     Poor  France!     All  is  lost." 

Thus  the  attempts  at  fusion  of  the  two  monarchical 
parties  had  only  served  to  expose  the  weaknesses  of  their 
position  and  to  warn  France  of  the  probable  results  of  a 
monarchical  restoration.  That  the  country  had  well  learned 
the  lesson  appeared  in  the  bye-elections,  which  in  nearly 
every  case  went  in  favour  of  Republican  candidates. 
Another  event  that  happened  early  in  1873  further  served 
to  justify  Thiers 's  contention  that  the  Republic  was  the  only 
possible  form  of  government.  On  January  9th,  Napoleon 
III.  died  of  the  internal  disease  which  for  seven  years  past 
had  been  undermining  his  strength.  His  son,  the  Prince 
Imperial,  was  at  present  far  too  young  to  figure  as  a 
claimant  to  the  throne. 


146  The  European  Nations 

It  is  also  an  open  secret  that  Bismarck  worked  hard  to 
prevent  all  possibility  of  a  royalist  restoration ;  and  when 
the  German  Ambassador  at  Paris,  Count  Amim,  opposed 
his  wishes  in  this  matter,  he  procured  his  recall  and  sub- 
jected him  to  a  State  prosecution.  In  fact,  Bismarck  be- 
lieved that  under  a  Republic  France  would  be  powerless 
in  war,  and,  further,  that  she  could  never  form  that  alliance 
with  Russia  which  was  the  bugbear  of  his  later  days.  A 
Russian  diplomatist  once  told  the  Due  de  Broglie  that  the 
kind  of  Republic  which  Bismarck  wanted  to  see  in  France 
was  une  Republique  dissolvante. 

Everything  therefore  concurred  to  postpone  the  mon- 
archical question,  and  to  prolong  the  informal  truce  which 
Thiers  had  been  the  first  to  bring  about.  Accordingly,  in 
the  month  of  November,  the  Assembly  extended  the 
Presidency  of  Marshal  MacMahon  to  seven  years — a  period 
therefore  known  as  the  Septennate. 

Having  now  briefly  shown  the  causes  of  the  helplessness 
of  the  monarchical  majority  in  the  matter  that  it  had  most 
nearly  at  heart,  we  must  pass  over  subsequent  events  save 
as  they  refer  to  that  crowning  paradox— the  establishment 
of  a  Republican  Constitution.  This  was  due  to  the  despair 
felt  by  many  of  the  Orleanists  of  seeing  a  restoration  during 
the  lifetime  of  the  Comte  de  Chambord,  and  to  the  alarm 
felt  by  all  sections  of  the  monarchists  at  the  activity  and 
partial  success  of  the  Bonapartists,  who  in  the  latter  part 
of  1874  captured  a  few  seats.  Seeking  above  all  things  to 
keep  out  a  Bonaparte,  they  did  little  to  hinder  the  forma- 
tion of  a  Constitution  which  all  of  them  looked  on  as  pro- 
visional. In  fact,  they  adopted  the  policy  of  marking 
time  until  the  death  of  the  Comte  de  Chambord — whose 


Founding  of  the  French  RepubHc     i47 

hold  on  life  proved  to  be  no  less  tenacious  than  on  his 
creed — should  clear  up  the  situation.  Accordingly,  after 
many  diplomatic  delays,  the  Committee  which  in  1873  had 
been  charged  to  draw  up  the  Constitution,  presented  its 
plan,  which  took  form  in  the  organic  laws  of  February  25, 
1875.     They  may  be  thus  summarised: 

The  Legislature  consists  of  two  Assemblies — the  Chamber 
of  Deputies  and  the  Senate,  the  former  being  elected  by 
"universal"  (or,  more  properly,  manhood)  suffrage.  The 
composition  of  the  Senate,  as  determined  by  a  later  law, 
lies  with  electoral  bodies  in  each  of  the  Departments; 
these  bodies  consist  of  the  national  deputies  for  that  De- 
partment, the  members  of  their  General  Councils  and  Dis- 
trict Councils,  and  delegates  from  the  Municipal  Councils. 
Senators  are  elected  for  nine  years ;  deputies  to  the  Cham- 
ber of  Deputies  for  four  years.  The  President  of  the  Re- 
public is  chosen  by  the  Senate  and  the  Chamber  of  Deputies 
sitting  together  for  that  purpose.  He  is  chosen  for  seven 
years  and  is  eligible  for  re-election ;  he  is  responsible  to  the 
Chambers  only  in  case  of  high  treason;  he  enjoys,  con- 
jointly with  the  members  of  the  two  Chambers,  the  right 
of  proposing  laws;  he  promulgates  them  when  passed  and 
supervises  their  execution ;  he  disposes  of  the  armed  forces 
of  France  and  has  the  right  of  pardon  formerly  vested  in 
the  Kings  of  France.  Conformably  to  the  advice  of  the 
Senate  he  may  dissolve  the  Chamber  of  Deputies.  Each 
Chamber  may  initiate  proposals  for  laws,  save  that 
financial  measures  rest  solely  with  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies. 

The  Chambers  may  decide  that  the  Constitution  shall 
be  revised.  In  that  case,  they  meet  together,  as  a  National 
Assembly,  to  carry  out  such  revision,  which  is  determined 


148  The  European  Nations 

by  the  bare  majority.  Each  arrondissement,  or  district  of 
a  Department,  elects  one  deputy.  From  1885  to  1889  the 
elections  were  decided  by  each  Department  on  a  list,  but 
since  that  time  the  earlier  plan  has  been  revived.  We 
may  also  add  that  the  seat  of  government  was  fixed  at 
Versailles;  four  years  later  this  was  altered  in  favour 
of  Paris,  but  certain  of  the  most  important  functions, 
such  as  the  election  of  a  new  President,  take  place  at 
Versailles. 

Taken  as  a  whole,  this  Constitution  was  a  clever  com- 
promise between  the  democratic  and  autocratic  principles 
of  government.  Having  its  roots  in  manhood  suffrage,  it 
delegated  very  extensive  powers  to  the  head  of  the  State. 
These  powers  are  especially  noteworthy  if  we  compare  them 
with  those  of  the  Ministry.  The  President  commissions 
such  and  such  a  senator  or  deputy  to  form  a  Ministry  (not 
necessarily  representing  the  opinions  of  the  majority  of  the 
Chambers) ;  and  that  Ministry  is  responsible  to  the  Cham- 
bers for  the  execution  of  laws  and  the  general  policy  of  the 
Grovemment;  but  the  President  is  not  responsible  to  the 
Chambers,  save  in  the  single  and  very  exceptional  case 
of  high  treason  to  the  State.  Obviously,  the  Assembly 
wished  to  keep  up  the  autocratic  traditions  of  the  past  as 
well  as  to  leave  open  the  door  for  a  revision  of  the  Consti- 
tution in  a  sense  favourable  to  the  monarchical  cause. 
That  this  Constitution  did  not  pave  the  way  for  the  mon- 
archy was  due  to  several  causes.  Some  we  have  named 
above. 

Another  and  perhaps  a  final  cause  was  the  unwillingness 
or  inability  of  Marshal  MacMahon  to  bring  matters  to  the 
test  of  force.  Actuated,  perhaps,  by  motives  similar  to 
those  which  kept  the  Duke  of  Wellington  from  pushing 


Founding  of  the  French  Republic     149 

matters  to  an  extreme  in  England  in  1831,  the  Marshal 
refused  to  carry  out  a  coup  d'etat  against  the  Republican 
majority  sent  up  to  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  by  the 
General  Election  of  January,  1876.  Once  or  twice  he 
seemed  on  the  point  of  using  force.  Thus,  in  May,  1877, 
he  ventured  to  dissolve  the  Chamber  of  Deputies ;  but  the 
Republican  party,  led  by  the  impetuous  Gambetta,  ap- 
pealed to  the  country  with  decisive  resvdts.  That  orator's 
defiant  challenge  to  the  Marshal,  either  to  submit  or  to 
resign  (se  soumettre  ou  se  demettre)  was  taken  up  by  France, 
with  the  result  that  nearly  all  the  Republican  deputies 
were  re-elected.  The  President  recognised  the  inevitable, 
and  in  December  of  that  year  charged  M.  Dufaure  to  form 
a  Ministry  that  represented  the  Republican  majority.  In 
January,  1879,  even,  some  senatorial  elections  went  against 
the  President,  and  he  accordingly  resigned  (January  30, 
1879). 

In  the  year  1887  the  Republic  seemed  for  a  time  to  be 
in  danger  owing  to  the  intrigues  of  the  Minister  for  War, 
General  Boulanger.  Making  capital  out  of  the  difficulties 
of  France,  the  financial  scandals  brought  home  to  President 
Gr6vy,  and  his  own  popularity  with  the  army,  the  General 
seemed  to  be  preparing  a  coup  d'etat.  The  danger  increased 
when  the  Ministry  had  to  resign  office  (May,  1887).  A 
"National  party"  was  formed,  consisting  of  monarchists, 
Bonapartists,  clericals,  and  even  some  crotchety  socialists 
— in  fact,  of  all  who  hoped  to  make  capital  out  of  the  fall 
of  the  parliamentary  regime.  The  malcontents  called  for 
a  plebiscite  as  to  the  form  of  government,  hoping  by  these 
means  to  thrust  in  Boulanger  as  dictator  to  pave  the  way 
for  the  Comte  de  Paris  up  to  the  throne  of  France.  After 
a  prolonged  crisis,  the  scheme  ignominiously  collapsed  at 


150  The  European  Nations 

the  first  show  of  vigour  on  the  Republican  side.  When 
the  new  Floquet  Ministry  summoned  Boulanger  to  appear 
before  the  High  Court  of  Justice,  he  fled  to  Belgium,  and 
shortly  afterwards  committed  suicide. 

The  chief  feature  of  French  political  life,  if  one  reviews 
it  in  its  broad  outlines,  is  the  increase  of  stability.  When 
we  remember  that  that  veteran  opportunist,  Talleyrand, 
on  taking  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  new  Constitution  of 
1830,  could  say:  "It  is  the  thirteenth,"  and  that  no 
regime  after  that  period  lasted  longer  than  eighteen  years, 
we  shall  be  chary  of  foretelling  the  speedy  overthrow  of  the 
Third  Republic  at  any  and  every  period  of  ministerial 
crisis  or  political  ferment.  Certainly  the  Republic  has 
seen  Ministries  made  and  unmade  in  bewilderingly  quick 
succession;  but  these  are  at  most  superficial  changes — 
the  real  work  of  administration  being  done  by  the  hier- 
archy of  permanent  officials  first  established  by  the  great 
Napoleon.  Even  so  terrible  an  event  as  the  murder  of 
President  Sadi  Camot  (June,  1894)  produced  none  of  the 
fatal  events  that  British  alarmists  confidently  predicted. 
M.  Casimir  Perier  was  quietly  elected  and  ruled  firmly. 
The  same  may  be  said  of  his  successors,  MM.  Faure  and  Lou- 
bet.  Sensible,  business-like  men  of  bourgeois  origin,  they 
typify  the  new  France  that  has  grown  up  since  the  age  when 
military  adventurers  could  keep  their  heels  on  her  neck 
provided  that  they  crowned  her  brow  with  laurels.  That 
age  woiild  seem  to  have  passed  for  ever  away.  A  well- 
known  adage  says:  "It  is  the  unexpected  that  happens 
in  French  politics."  To  forecast  their  course  is  notoriously 
unsafe  in  that  land  of  all  lands.  That  careful  and  sagacious 
student  of  French  life,  Mr.  Bodley,  believes  that  the  nation 
at  heart  dislikes  the  prudent  tameness  of  Parliamentary 


Founding  of  the  French  Republic      151 

rule,  and  that  "the  day  will  come  when  no  power  will  pre- 
vent France  from  hailing  a  hero  of  her  choice."  ^ 

Doubtless  the  advent  of  a  Napoleon  the  Great  would 
severely  test  the  qualities  of  prudence  and  patience  that 
have  gained  strength  under  the  shelter  of  democratic  in- 
stitutions. Yet  it  must  always  be  remembered  that 
Democracy  has  until  now  never  had  a  fair  chance  in 
France.  The  bright  hopes  of  1789  faded  away  ten  years 
later  amidst  the  glamour  of  military  glory.  As  for  the 
Republic  of  1848,  it  scarcely  outlived  the  troubles  of 
infancy.  The  Third  Republic,  on  the  other  hand,  has 
attained  to  manhood.  It  has  met  and  overcome  very 
many  difficulties;  at  the  outset  parts  of  two  valued 
provinces  and  a  vast  sum  of  treasure  were  torn  away.  In 
those  early  days  of  weakness  it  also  cTrushed  a  serious 
revolt.  The  intrigues  of  monarchists  and  Bonapartists 
were  foiled.  Hardest  task  of  all,  the  natural  irritation  of 
Frenchmen  at  playing  a  far  smaller  part  in  the  world  was 
little  by  little  allayed. 

In  spite  of  these  difficulties,  the  Third  Republic  has  now 
lasted  a  quarter  of  a  century.  That  is  to  say,  it  rests  on 
the  support  of  a  generation  which  has  gradually  become 
accustomed  to  representative  institutions — an  advantage 
which  its  two  predecessors  did  not  enjoy.  The  success  of 
institutions  depends  in  the  last  resort  on  the  character  of 
those  who  work  them;  and  the  testimony  of  all  observers 
is  that  the  character  of  Frenchmen  has  slowly  but  surely 
changed  in  the  direction  which  Thiers  pointed  out  in  the 
dark  days  of  February,  1871,  as  offering  the  only  means  of  a 
sound  national  revival — "Yes:  I  believe  in  the  future  of 
France:  I  believe  in  it,  but  on  condition  that  we  have  good 
1  Mr.  Bodley,  France,  i.,  ad  fin. 


152  The  European  Nations 

sense;  that  we  no  longer  use  mere  words  as  the  current 
coin  of  our  speech,  but  that  under  words  we  place  realities; 
that  we  have  not  only  good  sense,  but  good  sense  endowed 
with  courage." 

These  are  the  qualities  that  have  built  up  the  France  of 
to-day.  The  toil  has  been  enormous,  and  it  has  been 
doubled  by  the  worries  and  disappointments  incident  to 
parliamentarism  when  grafted  on  to  a  semi-military 
bureaucracy;  but  the  toil  and  the  disappointments  have 
played  their  part  in  purging  the  French  nature  of  the 
frothy  sensationalism  and  eager  irresponsibility  that 
naturally  resulted  from  the  imperialism  of  the  two  Na- 
poleons. France  seems  to  be  outgrowing  the  stage  of 
hobbledehoy ish  ventures,  military  or  communistic,  and 
to  have  taken  on  the  staid,  sober,  and  self-respecting  mien 
of  manhood — a  process  helped  on  by  the  burdens  of  debt 
and  conscription  resulting  from  her  juvenile  escapades. 
In  a  word,  she  has  attained  to  a  full  sense  of  responsibility. 
No  longer  are  her  constructive  powers  hopelessly  out- 
matched by  her  critical  powers.  In  the  political  sphere  she 
has  found  a  due  balance  between  the  brain  and  the  hand. 
From  analysis  she  has  worked  her  way  to  synthesis. 


CHAPTER  VI 


THE    GERMAN    EMPIRE 


"From  the  very  beginning  of  my  career  my  sole  guiding-star  has 
"been  how  to  unify  Germany,  and,  that  being  achieved,  how  to 
strengthen,  complete,  and  so  constitute  her  unification  that  it  may 
be  preserved  enduringly  and  with  the  goodwill  of  all  concerned  in 
it." — Bismarck:  Speech  in  the  North  German  Reichstag,  July  9, 
1869. 

ON  the  i8th  of  January,  187 1,  while  the  German  cannon 
were  still  thundering  against  Paris,  a  ceremony  of 
world-wide  import  occurred  in  the  palace  of  the  Kings  of 
France  at  Versailles.  King  WilHam  of  Prussia  was  pro- 
claimed German  Emperor.  The  scene  lacked  no  element 
that  could  appeal  to  the  historic  imagination.  It  took 
place  in  the  Mirror  Hall,  where  all  that  was  brilliant  in  the 
life  of  the  old  French  monarchy  used  to  encircle  the  person 
of  Louis  XIV.  And  now,  long  after  that  dynasty  had 
passed  away,  and  when  the  crown  of  the  last  of  the  Corsican 
adventurers  had  but  recently  fallen  beneath  the  feet  of  the 
Parisians,  the  descendant  of  the  Prussian  Hohenzollems 
celebrated  the  advent  to  the  German  people  of  that  tinity 
for  which  their  patriots  had  vainly  struggled  for  centuries. 
The  men  who  had  won  this  long-deferred  boon  were  of  no 
common  stamp.  King  William  himself,  as  is  now  shown 
by  the  publication  of  many  of  his  letters  to  Bismarck,  had 
played  a  far  larger  share  in  the  making  of  a  united  Germany 

153 


154  The  European  Nations 

than  was  formerly  believed.  His  plain  good  sense  and 
unswerving  fortitude  had  many  times  marked  out  the  path 
of  safety  and  kept  his  country  therein.  The  policy  of  the 
Army  Bill  of  i860,  which  brought  salvation  to  Prussia 
in  spite  of  her  Parliament,  was  wholly  his.  Bismarck's 
masterful  grip  of  the  helm  of  State  in  and  after  1862 
helped  to  carry  out  that  policy,  just  as  von  Roon's  organis- 
ing ability  perfected  the  resulting  military  machine;  but 
its  prime  author  was  the  King  who  now  stood  triumphant 
in  the  hall  of  his  ancestral  foes.  Beside  and  behind  him 
on  the  dais,  in  front  of  the  colours  of  all  the  German  States, 
were  the  chief  princes  of  Germany — witnesses  to  the 
strength  of  the  national  sentiment  which  the  wars  against 
the  First  Napoleon  had  called  forth  and  the  struggle  with 
the  nephew  had  now  brought  to  maturity.  Among  their 
figures  one  might  note  the  stalwart  form  of  the  Crown 
Prince,  along  with  other  members  of  the  House  of  Prussia; 
the  Grand  Duke  of  Baden,  son-in-law  of  the  Prussian 
King;  the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony,  and  representatives  of 
every  reigning  family  of  Germany.  Still  more  remarkable 
were  some  of  the  men  grouped  before  the  King  and  princes. 
There  was  the  thin  war-worn  face  of  Moltke;  there,  too,  the 
sturdy  figure  of  Bismarck:  the  latter,  wrote  Dr.  Russell, 
"looking  pale,  but  calm  and  self-possessed,  elevated,  as  it 
were,  by  some  internal  force."  ^ 

The  King  announced  the  re-establishment  of  the  German 
Empire;  and  those  around  must  have  remembered  that 
that  venerable  institution  (which  differed  so  widely  from 
the  present  one  that  the  word  "re-establishment"  was 
really  misleading)  had  vanished  but  sixty-four  years  before 
at  the  behests  of  the  First  Napoleon.  Next,  Bismarck  read 
1  Quoted  by  C.  Lowe,  Life  of  Bismarck,  i.,  p.  615. 


The  German  Empire  155 

the  Kaiser's  proclamation,  stating  his  sense  of  duty  to  the 
German  nation  and  his  hope  that,  within  new  and  stronger 
boundaries,  which  would  guarantee  them  against  attacks 
from  France,  they  would  enjoy  peace  and  prosperity. 
The  Grand  Duke  of  Baden  then  called  for  three  cheers  for 
the  Emperor,  which  were  given  with  wild  enthusiasm,  and 
were  taken  up  by  the  troops  far  round  the  iron  ring  that 
encircled  Paris. 

Few  events  in  history  so  much  impress  one,  at  first  sight, 
with  a  sense  of  strength,  spontaneity,  and  inevitableness. 
And  yet,  as  more  is  known  of  the  steps  that  led  up  to  the 
closer  union  of  the  German  States,  that  feeling  is  dis- 
agreeably warped.  Even  then  it  was  known  that  Bavaria 
and  Wurtemberg  strongly  objected  to  the  closer  form  of 
union  desired  by  the  Northern  patriots,  which  would  have 
reduced  the  secondary  States  to  complete  dependence  on 
the  Federal  Government.  Owing  to  the  great  reluctance 
of  the  Bavarian  Government  and  people  to  give  up  the 
control  of  their  railways,  posts,  and  telegraphs,  these  were 
left  at  their  disposal,  the  two  other  Southern  States  keep- 
ing the  direction  of  the  postal  and  telegraphic  services  in 
time  of  peace.  Bavaria  and  Wurtemberg  likewise  re- 
served the  control  of  their  armed  forces,  though  in  case  of 
war  they  were  to  be  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  Emperor 
— arrangements  which  also  hold  good  for  the  Saxon  forces. 
In  certain  legal  and  fiscal  matters  Bavaria  also  bargained 
for  freedom  of  action. 

What  was  not  known  then,  and  has  leaked  out  in  more  or 
less  authentic  wa5^s,  was  the  dislike,  not  only  of  most  of  the 
Bavarian  people,  but  also  of  its  Government,  to  the  whole 
scheme  of  Imperial  union.  It  is  certain  that  the  letter 
which  King  Louis  finally  wrote  to  his  brother  princes  to 


156  The  European  Nations 

propose  that  union  was  originally  drafted  by  Bismarck; 
and  rumour  asserts,  on  grounds  not  to  be  lightly  dismissed, 
that  the  opposition  of  King  Louis  was  not  withdrawn  until 
the  Bavarian  Court  favourite,  Count  Holstein,  came  to 
Versailles  and  left  it,  not  only  with  Bismarck's  letter,  but 
also  with  a  considerable  sum  of  money  for  his  royal  master 
and  himself.  Probably,  however,  the  assent  of  the  Bava- 
rian monarch,  who  not  many  years  after  became  insane, 
was  helped  by  the  knowledge  that  if  he  did  not  take  the 
initiative,  it  would  pass  to  the  Grand  Duke  of  Baden,  an 
ardent  champion  of  German  unity. 

Whatever  may  be  the  truth  as  to  this,  there  can  be  no 
doubt  as  to  the  annoyance  felt  by  Roman  Catholic  Bavaria 
and  Protestant  democratic  Wiirtemberg  at  accepting  the 
supremacy  of  the  Prussian  bureaucracy.  This  doubtless 
explains  why  Bismarck  was  so  anxious  to  hurry  through 
the  negotiations,  first,  for  the  imperial  union,  and  thereafter 
for  the  conclusion  of  peace  with  France. 

Even  in  a  seemingly  small  matter  he  had  met  with  much 
opposition,  this  time  from  his  master.  The  aged  monarch 
clung  to  the  title  King  of  Prussia;  but  if  the  title  of  Em- 
peror was  a  political  necessity,  he  preferred  the  title  "Em- 
peror of  Germany";  nevertheless,  the  Chancellor  tactfully 
but  firmly  pointed  out  that  this  would  imply  a  kind  of 
feudal  over-lordship  of  all  German  lands,  and  that  the 
title  "German  Emperor,"  as  that  of  chief  of  the  nation, 
was  far  preferable.  In  the  end  the  King  yielded,  but  he 
retained  a  sore  feeling  against  his  trusted  servant  for  some 
time  on  this  matter.  It  seems  that  at  one  time  he  even 
thought  of  abdicating  in  favour  of  his  son  rather  than 
"see  the  Prussian  title  supplanted."  ^     However,  he  soon 

»  E.  Marcks,  Kaiser  Wilhelm  I.  (Leipzig,  1900),  pp.  337-343. 


The  German  Empire  157 

showed  his  gratitude  for  the  immense  services  rendered 
by  Bismarck  to  the  Fatherland.  On  his  next  birthday 
(March  22)  he  raised  the  Chancehor  to  the  rank  of  Prince 
and  appointed  him  Chancellor  of  the  Empire. 

It  will  be  well  to  give  here  an  outline  of  the  Imperial 
Constitution.  In  all  essentials  it  was  an  extension,  with 
few  changes,  of  the  North  German  federal  compact  of  the 
year  1866.  It  applied  to  the  twenty-five  States  of  Ger- 
many— inclusive,  that  is,  of  Hamburg,  Bremen,  and  Lu- 
beck,  but  exclusive  for  the  present,  of  Elsass-Lothringen 
(Alsace-Lorraine).  In  those  areas  Imperial  law  takes  pre- 
cedence of  local  law  (save  in  a  few  specially  reserved  cases 
for  Bavaria  and  the  Free  Cities).  The  same  laws  of 
citizenship  hold  good  in  all  parts  of  the  Empire.  The 
Empire  controls  these  laws,  the  issuing  of  passports,  sur- 
veillance of  foreigners  and  of  manufactures,  likewise 
matters  relating  to  emigration  and  colonisation.  Com- 
merce, customs  dues,  weights  and  measures,  coinage,  bank- 
ing regulations,  patents,  the  consular  service  abroad,  and 
matters  relating  to  navigation  also  fall  under  its  control. 
Railways,  posts,  and  telegraphs  (with  the  exceptions  noted 
above)  are  subject  to  imperial  supervision,  the  importance 
of  which  during  the  war  had  been  so  abundantly  manifested. 

The  King  of  Prussia  is  ipso  facto  German  Emperor.  He 
represents  the  Empire  among  foreign  nations;  he  has  the 
right  to  declare  war,  conclude  peace,  and  frame  alliances; 
but  the  consent  of  the  Federal  Coimcil  (Bundesrath)  is 
needed  for  the  declaration  of  war  in  the  name  of  the 
Empire.  The  Emperor  convenes,  adjourns,  and  closes  the 
sessions  of  the  Federal  Council  and  the  Imperial  Diet 
(Reichstag).  They  are  convened  every  year.  The  Chan- 
cellor of  the  Empire  presides  in  the  Federal  Council  and 


158  The  European  Nations 

supervises  the  conduct  of  its  business.  Proposals  of  laws 
are  laid  before  the  Reichstag  in  accordance  with  the 
resolutions  of  the  Federal  Council  and  are  supported  by 
members  of  that  Council.  To  the  Emperor  belongs  the 
right  of  preparing  and  publishing  the  laws  of  the  Empire: 
they  must  be  passed  by  the  Bundesrath  and  Reichstag, 
and  then  receive  the  assent  of  the  Kaiser.  They  are  then 
countersigned  by  the  Chancellor,  who  thereby  becomes 
responsible  for  their  due  execution. 

The  members  of  the  Bundesrath  are  appointed  by  the 
Federal  Governments:  they  are  sixty-two  in  number,  and 
now  include  those  from  the  Reichstand  of  Elsass-Loth- 
ringen  (Alsace-Lorraine).^ 

The  Prussian  Government  nominates  seventeen  mem- 
bers; Bavaria  six;  Saxony  and  Wiirtemberg  and  Alsace- 
Lorraine  four  each;  and  so  on.  The  Btindesrath  is  presided 
over  by  the  Imperial  Chancellor.  At  the  beginning  of 
each  yearly  session  it  appoints  eleven  standing  commit- 
tees to  deal  with  the  following  matters:  (i)  army  and 
fortifications;  (2)  the  navy;  (3)  tariff,  excise,  and  taxes; 
(4)  commerce  and  trade;  (5)  railways,  posts,  and  tele- 
graphs; (6)  civil  and  criminal  law;  (7)  financial  accounts; 
(8)  foreign  affairs;  (9)  Alsace-Lorraine;  (10)  the  Imperial 
Constitution;  (11)  Standing  Orders.  Each  committee  is 
presided  over  by  a  chairman.  In  each  committee  at  least 
four  States  of  the  Empire  must  be  represented,  and  each 

>  Up  to  1874  the  government  of  Alsace-Lorraine  was  vested 
solely  in  the  Emperor  and  Chancellor.  In  1874  the  conquered 
lands  rettimed  deputies  to  the  Reichstag.  In  October,  1879,  they 
gained  local  representative  institutions,  but  under  the  strict  con- 
trol of  the  Governor,  Marshal  von  Manteuffel.  This  control  has 
since  been  relaxed,  the  present  administration  being  quasi-con- 
stitutional. 


The  German  Empire  159 

State  is  entitled  to  only  one  vote.  To  this  rule  there  are 
two  modifications  in  the  case  of  the  committees  on  the 
army  and  on  foreign  affairs.  In  the  former  of  these  Bavaria 
has  a  permanent  seat,  while  the  Emperor  appoints  the  other 
three  members  from  as  many  States:  in  the  latter  case, 
Prussia,  Bavaria,  Saxony,  and  Wtirtemberg  only  are 
represented.  The  Bundesrath  takes  action  on  the  meas- 
ures to  be  proposed  to  the  Reichstag  and  the  resolutions 
passed  by  that  body ;  it  also  supervises  the  execution  of 
laws,  and  may  point  out  any  defects  in  the  laws  or  in  their 
execution. 

The  members  of  the  Reichstag,  or  Diet,  are  elected  by 
universal  (more  properly  manhood)  suffrage  and  by  direct 
secret  ballot,  in  proportion  to  the  population  of  the  several 
States.^  On  the  average,  each  of  the  397  members  repre- 
sents rather  more  than  one  hundred  thousand  of  the  popula- 
tion. The  proceedings  of  the  Reichstag  are  public;  it  has 
the  right  (concurrently  with  those  wielded  by  the  Emperor 
and  the  Bundesrath)  to  propose  laws  for  the  Empire. 
It  sits  for  three  years,  but  may  be  dissolved  by  a  resolu- 
tion of  the  Bundesrath,  with  the  consent  of  the  Emperor. 
Deputies  may  not  be  bound  by  orders  and  instructions 
issued  by  their  constituents.     They  are  not  paid. 

As  has  been  noted  above,  important  matters  such  as 
railway  management,  so  far  as  it  relates  to  the  harmonious 
and  effective  working  of  the  existing  systems,  and  the  con- 
struction of  new  lines  needful  for  the  welfare  and  the  de- 
fence of  Germany,  are  under  the  control  of  the  Empire — 
except  in  the  case  of  Bavaria.     The  same  holds  good  of 

»  Bismarck  said  in  a  speech  to  the  Reichstag,  on  September  16, 
1878:  "I  accepted  universal  suffrage,  but  with  repugnance,  as  a 
Frankfurt  tradition." 


i6o  The  European  Nations 

posts  and  telegraphs  except  in  the  Southern  States.  Rail- 
way companies  are  bound  to  convey  troops  and  warlike 
stores  at  uniform  reduced  rates.  In  fact,  the  Imperial 
Government  controls  the  fares  of  all  lines  subject  to  its 
supervision,  and  has  ordered  the  reduction  of  freightage 
for  coal,  coke,  minerals,  wood,  stone,  manure,  etc.,  for 
long  distances,  "as  demanded  by  the  interests  of  agri- 
culture and  industry."  In  case  of  dearth,  the  railway 
companies  can  be  compelled  to  forward  food  supplies  at 
specially  low  rates. 

Further,  with  respect  to  military  affairs,  the  central 
authority  exercises  a  very  large  measure  of  control  over 
the  federated  States.  All  German  troops  swear  the  oath 
of  allegiance  to  the  Emperor.  He  appoints  all  com- 
manders of  fortresses;  the  power  of  building  fortresses 
within  the  Empire  is  also  vested  in  him ;  he  determines  the 
strength  of  the  contingents  of  the  federated  States,  and  in 
the  last  case  may  appoint  their  commanding  officers;  he 
may  even  proclaim  martial  law  in  any  portion  of  the  Em- 
pire, if  public  security  demands  it.  The  Prussian  military 
code  applies  to  all  parts  of  the  Empire  (save  to  Bavaria, 
Wiirtemberg,  and  Saxony  in  time  of  peace);  and  the 
military  organisation  is  everywhere  of  the  same  general 
description,  especially  as  regards  length  of  service,  char- 
acter of  the  drill,  and  organisation  in  corps  and  regiments. 
Every  German,  unless  physically  unfit,  is  subject  to  mili- 
tary duty  and  cannot  shift  the  burden  on  a  substitute. 
He  must  serve  for  seven  years  in  the  standing  army :  that 
is,  three  years  in  the  field  army  and  four  in  the  reserve; 
thereafter  he  takes  his  place  in  the  landwehr.^ 

'  The  three  years  are  shortened  to  one  year  for  those  who  have 
taken  a  high  place  in  the  Gymnasia  (highest  of  the  public  schools) ; 


The  German  Empire  i6t 

The  secondary  States  are  protected  in  one  important 
respect.  The  last  proviso  of  the  Imperial  Constitution 
stipulates  that  any  proposal  to  modify  it  shall  fail  if  four- 
teen, or  more,  votes  are  cast  against  it  in  the  Federal 
Council.  This  implies  that  Bavaria,  Wurtemberg,  and 
Saxony,  if  they  vote  together,  can  prevent  any  change 
detrimental  to  their  interests.  On  the  whole,  the  new 
system  is  less  centralised  than  that  of  the  North  German 
Confederation  had  been;  and  many  of  the  Prussian  Liber- 
als, with  whom  the  Crown  Prince  of  Prussia  very  decidedly 
ranged  himself  on  this  question,  complained  that  the 
Government  was  more  federal  than  ever,  and  that  far  too 
much  had  been  granted  to  the  particularist  prejudices  of 
the  Southern  States.^  To  all  these  objections  Bismarck 
could  unanswerably  reply  that  it  was  far  better  to  gain 
this  great  end  without  bitterness,  even  if  the  resulting 
compact  were  in  some  respects  faulty,  than  to  force  on  the 
Southern  States  a  more  logically  perfect  system  that  would 
perpetuate  the  sore  feeling  of  the  past. 

Such  in  its  main  outlines  is  the  new  Constitution  of  Ger- 
many. On  the  whole,  it  has  worked  well.  That  it  has  not 
fulfilled  all  the  expectations  aroused  in  that  year  of  triumph 
and  jubilation  will  surprise  no  one  who  knows  that  absolute 
and  lasting  success  is  attained  only  in  Utopias,  never  in 
practical  politics.  In  truth,  the  suddenness  with  which 
German  unity  was  finally  achieved  was  in  itself  a  danger. 

The  English  reader  will  perhaps  find  it  hard  to  realise 
this  until  he  remembers  that  the  whole  course  of  recorded 

they  feed  and  equip  themselves  and  are  termed  "volunteers."  Con- 
scription is  the  rule  on  the  coasts  for  service  in  the  German  navy. 
For  the  text  of  the  Imperial  Constitution,  see  Lowe,  Life  of  Bis- 
marck, ii.,  App.  F. 

»  J.  W.  Headlam,  Bismarck,  p.  367. 


1 62  The  European  Nations 

history  shows  us  the  Germans  poHtically  disunited  or  for 
the  most  part  engaged  in  fratricidal  strifes.  When  they 
first  came  within  the  ken  of  the  historians  of  ancient  Rome, 
they  were  a  set  of  warring  tribes  who  banded  together  only 
under  the  pressure  of  overwhelming  danger ;  and  such  was 
to  be  their  fate  for  well-nigh  two  thousand  years.  Their 
union  under  the  vigorous  rule  of  the  great  Prankish  chief 
whom  the  French  call  Charlemagne,  was  at  best  nominal 
and  partial.  The  Holy  Roman  Empire,  which  he  founded 
in  the  year  800  by  a  mystically  vague  compact  with  the 
Pope,  was  never  a  close  bond  of  union,  even  in  his  stem 
and  able  hands.  Under  his  weak  successors  that  imposing 
league  rarely  promoted  peace  among  its  peoples,  while  the 
splendour  of  its  chief  elective  dignity  not  seldom  conduced 
to  war.  Next,  feudalism  came  in  as  a  strong  political 
solvent,  and  thus  for  centuries  Germany  crumbled  and 
mouldered  away,  until  disunion  seemed  to  be  the  fate  of 
her  richest  lands,  and  particularism  became  a  rooted  in- 
stinct of  her  princes,  burghers,  and  peasants.  Then  again, 
South  was  arrayed  against  N.orth  during  and  long  after  the 
time  of  the  Reformation;  when  the  strife  of  creeds  was 
stayed,  the  rivalry  of  the  Houses  of  Hapsburg  and  Hohen- 
zollem  added  another  cause  of  hatred. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  was  reserved  for  the  two  Na- 
poleons, uncle  and  nephew,  to  force  those  divided  peoples 
to  comradeship  in  arms.  The  close  of  the  campaign  of 
1813  and  that  of  1814  saw  North  and  South,  Prussians  and 
Austrians,  for  the  first  time  fighting  heartily  shoulder  to 
shoulder  in  a  great  war — for  that  of  1792-94  had  only 
served  to  show  their  rooted  suspicion  and  inner  hostility. 
Owing  to  reasons  that  cannot  be  stated  here,  the  peace  of 
18 1 4-1 5  led  up  to  no  effective  union:  it  even  perpetuated 


The  German  Empire  163 

the  old  dualism  of  interests.  But  once  more  the  hostility 
of  France  tmder  a  Napoleon  strengthened  the  impulse  to 
German  consolidation  and  on  this  occasion  there  was  at 
hand  a  man  who  had  carefully  prepared  the  way  for  an 
abiding  form  of  political  union;  his  diplomatic  campaign 
of  the  last  seven  years  had  secured  Russia's  friendship  and 
consequently  Austria's  reluctant  neutrality;  as  for  the 
dislike  of  the  Southern  States  to  unite  with  the  North, 
that  feeling  waned  for  a  few  weeks  amidst  the  enthusiasm 
caused  by  the  German  triumphs.  The  opportunity  was 
imexampled:  it  had  not  occurred  even  in  1 8 14;  it  might 
never  occur  again;  and  it  was  certain  to  pass  away  when 
the  war  fever  passed  by.  How  wise,  then,  to  strike  while 
the  iron  was  hot!  The  smaller  details  of  the  welding 
process  were  infinitely  less  important  than  the  welding 
itself. 

One  last  consideration  remains.  If  the  opportunity 
was  unexampled,  so  also  were  the  statesmanlike  qualities 
of  the  man  who  seized  it.  The  more  that  we  know  con- 
cerning the  narrowly  Prussian  feelings  of  King  William, 
the  centralising  pedantry  of  the  Crown  Prince  of  Prussia, 
and  tt  3  petty  particularism  of  the  Governments  of  Bavaria 
and  Wiirtemberg,  the  more  does  the  figure  of  Bismarck 
stand  out  as  that  of  the  one  great  statesman  of  his  country 
and  era.  However  censurable  much  of  his  conduct  may 
be,  his  action  in  working  up  to  and  finally  consummating 
German  unity  at  the  right  psychological  moment  stands 
out  as  one  of  the  greatest  feats  of  statesmanship  which 
history  records. 

But  obviously  a  wedded  life  which  had  been  preceded  by 
no  wooing,  over  whose  nuptials  Mars  shed  more  influence 
than  Venus,  could  not  be  expected  to  run  a  wholly  smooth 


1 64  The  European  Nations 

course.  In  fact,  this  latest  instance  in  ethnical  lore  of 
marriage  by  capture  has  on  the  whole  led  to  a  more  har- 
monious result  than  was  to  be  expected.  Possibly,  if  we 
could  lift  the  veil  of  secrecy  which  is  wisely  kept  drawn 
over  the  weightiest  proceedings  of  the  Bundesrath  and  its 
committees,  the  scene  would  appear  somewhat  different. 
As  it  is,  we  can  refer  here  only  to  some  questions  of  out- 
standing importance  the  details  of  which  are  fairly  well 
known. 

The  first  of  these  which  subjected  the  new  Empire  to  any 
serious  strain  was  a  sharp  religious  struggle  against  the 
new  claims  of  the  Roman  Catholic  hierarchy.  Without 
detailing  the  many  causes  of  friction  that  sprang  up  be- 
tween the  new  Empire  and  the  Roman  Catholic  Church, 
we  may  state  that  most  of  them  had  their  roots  in  the 
activity  shown  by  that  Church  among  the  Poles  of  Prussian 
Poland  (Posen),  and  also  in  the  dogma  of  papal  infallibility. 
Decreed  by  the  CEcumenical  Council  at  Rome  on  the  very 
eve  of  the  outbreak  of  the  Franco-German  War,  it  seemed 
to  be  part  and  parcel  of  that  forward  Jesuit  policy  which 
was  working  for  the  overthrow  of  the  chief  Protestant 
States.  Many  persons — among  them  Bismarck  ^ — claimed 
that  the  Empress  Eugenie's  hatred  of  Prussia  and  the  war- 
like influence  which  she  is  said  to  have  exerted  on  Napoleon 
III.  on  that  critical  day,  July  14,  1870,  were  prompted  by 
Jesuitical  intrigues.  However  that  may  be  (and  it  is  a 
matter  on  which  no  fair-minded  man  will  dogmatise  until 
her  confidential  papers  see  the  light),  there  is  little  doubt 
that  the  Pope  at  Rome  and  the  Roman  hierarchy  among 

>  Busch,  Our  Chancellor,  i.,  p.  139,  where  he  quotes  a  conversa- 
tion of  Bismarck  of  November,  1883.  On  the  Roman  Catholic 
policy  in  Posen,  see  ibid.,  pp.  143-145. 


The  German  Empire  165 

the  Catholics  of  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  did  their  best 
to  prevent  German  unity  and  to  introduce  elements  of 
discord.  The  dogma  of  the  infallibility  of  the  Pope  in 
matters  of  faith  and  doctrine  was  itself  a  cause  of  strife. 
Many  of  the  more  learned  and  moderate  of  the  German 
Catholics  had  protested  against  the  new  dogma,  and  some 
of  these  "  Old  Catholics,"  as  they  were  called,  tried  to  avoid 
teaching  it  in  the  universities  and  schools.  Their  bishops, 
however,  insisted  that  it  should  be  taught,  placed  some 
recalcitrants  under  the  lesser  ban,  and  deprived  them  of 
their  posts. 

When  these  high-handed  proceedings  were  extended 
even  to  the  schools,  the  Prussian  Government  intervened, 
and  early  in  1872  passed  a  law  ordaining  that  all  school 
inspectors  should  be  appointed  by  the  King's  Government 
at  Berlin.  This  greatly  irritated  the  Roman  Catholic 
hierarchy  and  led  to  aggressive  acts  on  both  sides,  the 
German  Reichstag  taking  up  the  matter  and  decreeing  the 
exclusion  of  the  Jesuits  from  all  priestly  and  scholastic 
duties  of  whatever  kind  within  the  Empire  (July,  1872). 
The  strife  waxed  ever  fiercer.  When  the  Roman  Catholic 
bishops  of  Germany  persisted  in  depriving  "Old  Catholics" 
of  professorial  and  other  charges,  the  central  Government 
retorted  by  the  famous  "May  Laws"  of  1873.  The  first 
of  these  forbade  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  to  intervene 
in  civil  affairs  in  any  way,  or  to  coerce  officials  and  citizens 
of  the  Empire.  The  second  required  of  all  ministers  of  re- 
ligion that  they  should  have  passed  the  final  examination 
at  a  high  school  and  also  should  have  studied  theology  for 
three  years  at  a  German  university:  it  further  subjected  all 
seminaries  to  State  inspection.  The  third  accorded  fuller 
legal  protection  to  dissidents  from  the  various  creeds. 


1 66  The  European  Nations 

This  anti-clerical  policy  is  known  as  the  "Kultur- 
Kampf,"  a  term  that  denotes  a  struggle  for  civilisation 
against  the  forces  of  reaction.  For  some  years  the  strife 
was  of  the  sharpest  kind.  The  Roman  Catholic  bishops 
continued  to  ban  the  "Old  Catholics,"  while  the  State  re- 
fused to  recognise  any  act  of  marriage  or  christening  per- 
formed by  clerics  who  disobeyed  the  new  laws.  The  logical 
sequel  to  this  was  obvious,  namely,  that  the  State  should 
insist  on  the  religious  ceremony  of  marriage  being  supple- 
mented by  a  civil  contract.^  Acts  to  render  this  com- 
pulsory were  first  passed  by  the  Prussian  Landtag  late  in 
1873  and  by  the  German  Reichstag  in  1875. 

It  would  be  alike  needless  and  tedious  to  detail  the  fur- 
ther stages  of  this  bitter  controversy,  especially  as  several 
of  the  later  "May  Laws"  have  been  repealed.  We  may, 
however,  note  its  significance  in  the  development  of  parties. 
Many  of  the  Prussian  nobles  and  squires  Qunkers  the 
latter  were  called)  joined  issue  with  Bismarck  on  the 
Civil  Marriage  Act,  and  this  schism  weakened  Bismarck's 
long  alliance  with  the  Conservative  party.  He  enjoyed, 
however,  the  enthusiastic  support  of  the  powerful  National 
Liberal  party,  as  well  as  the  Imperialist  and  Progressive 
groups.  Differing  on  many  points  of  detail,  these  parties 
aimed  at  strengthening  the  fabric  of  the  central  power,  and 
it  was  with  their  aid  in  the  Reichstag  that  the  new  institu- 
tions of  Germany  were  planted  and  took  root.  The 
general  election  of  1874  sent  up  as  many  as  155  National 
Liberals,  and  they,  with  the  other  groups  just  named,  gave 
the  Government  a  force  of  240  votes — a  good  working 
majority  as  long  as  Bismarck's  aims  were  of  a  moderately 
Liberal  character.  This,  however,  was  not  always  the 
'  Lowe,  Life  of  Bismarck,  ii.,  p.  336,  note. 


The  German  Empire  167 

case  even  in  1874-79  when  he  needed  their  alliance.  His 
demand  for  a  permanently  large  military  establishment 
alienated  his  allies  in  1874,  and  they  found  it  hard  to  sat- 
isfy the  requirements  of  his  exacting  and  rigorous  nature. 
The  harshness  of  the  "May  Laws"  also  caused  endless 
friction.  Out  of  some  10,000  Roman  Catholic  priests  in 
Prussia  (to  which  kingdom  alone  the  severest  of  these  laws 
applied)  only  about  thirty  bowed  the  knee  to  the  State. 
In  800  parishes  the  strife  went  so  far  that  all  religious 
services  came  to  an  end.  In  the  year  1875,  fines  amount- 
ing to  28,000  marks  (;^i4oo)  were  imposed,  and  103 
clerics  or  their  supporters  were  expelled  from  the  Empire.^ 
Clearly  this  state  of  things  could  not  continue  without 
grave  danger  to  the  Empire;  for  the  Church  held  on  her 
way  with  her  usual  doggedness,  strengthened  by  the  "pro- 
testing" deputies  from  the  Reichsland  on  the  south-west, 
from  Hanover  (where  the  Guelph  feeling  was  still  upper- 
most), as  well  as  those  from  Polish  Posen  and  Danish 
Schleswig.  Bismarck  and  the  anti-clerical  majority  of 
the  Reichstag  scorned  any  thoughts  of  surrender.  Yet, 
slowly  but  surely,  events  at  the  Vatican  and  in  Germany 
alike  made  for  compromise.  In  February,  1878,  Pope 
Pius  IX.  passed  away.  That  unfortunate  pontiff  had 
never  ceased  to  work  against  the  interests  of  Prussia  and 
Germany,  while  his  encyclicals  since  1873  mingled  threats 
of  defiance  of  the  May  Laws  with  insults  against  Prince 

1  Busch,  Our  Chancellor,  i.,  p.  122,  quotes  speeches  of  his  hero 
to  prove  that  Bismarck  himself  disliked  this  Civil  Marriage  Law. 
"From  the  political  point  of  view  I  have  convinced  myself  that  the 
State  ...  is  constrained  by  the  dictates  of  self-defence  to 
enact  this  law  in  order  to  avert  from  a  portion  of  His  Majesty's 
subjects  the  evils  with  which  they  are  menaced  by  the  Bishops' 
rebellion  against  the  laws  and  the  State"  (speech  of  January  17, 
■^873).     In  1849  he  had  opposed  civil  marriage. 


1 68  The  European  Nations 

Bismarck.  His  successor,  Leo  XIII.  (1878-1903),  showed 
rather  more  disposition  to  come  to  a  compromise,  and 
that,  too,  at  a  time  when  Bismarck's  new  commercial 
poHcy  made  the  support  of  the  Clerical  Centre  in  the 
Reichstag  peculiarly  acceptable. 

Bismarck's  resolve  to  give  up  the  system  of  Free  Trade, 
or  rather  of  light  customs  dues,  adopted  by  Prussia  and  the 
German  Zollverein  in  1865,  is  so  momentous  a  fact  in  the 
economic  history  of  the  modem  world,  that  we  must  here 
give  a  few  facts  which  will  enable  the  reader  to  understand 
the  conditions  attending  German  commerce  up  to  the 
years  1878-79,  when  the  great  change  came.  The  old 
order  of  things  in  Prussia,  as  in  all  Geraian  States,  was 
strongly  protective — in  fact,  to  such  an  extent  as  often  to 
prevent  the  passing  of  the  necessaries  of  life  from  one  little 
State  to  its  Lilliputian  neighbours.  The  rise  of  the 
national  idea  in  Germany  during  the  wars  against  the 
great  Napoleon  led  to  a  more  enlightened  system,  es- 
pecially for  Prussia.  The  Prussian  law  of  18 18  asserted 
the  principle  of  imposing  customs  dues  for  revenue  pur- 
poses, but  taxed  foreign  products  to  a  moderate  extent. 
On  this  basis  she  induced  neighbouring  small  German 
States  to  join  her  in  a  Customs  Union  (Zollverein),  which 
gradually  extended,  until  by  1836  it  included  all  the  States 
of  the  present  Empire  except  the  two  Mecklenburgs,  the 
Elbe  Duchies,  and  the  three  Free  Cities  of  Hamburg, 
Bremen,  and  Lubeck.  That  is  to  say,  the  attractive  force 
of  the  highly  developed  Prussian  State  practically  unified 
Germany  for  purposes  of  trade  and  commerce,  and  that, 
too,  thirty-five  years  before  political  union  was  achieved. 

This,  be  it  observed,  was  on  condition  of  internal  Free 


The  German  Empire  169 

Trade  but  of  moderate  duties  being  levied  on  foreign 
products.  Up  to  1840  these  import  duties  were  on  the 
whole  reduced;  after  that  date  a  protectionist  reaction 
set  in;  it  was  checked,  however,  by  the  strong  wave  of 
Free-Trade  feeling  which  swept  over  Europe  after  the 
victory  of  that  principle  in  England  in  1846-49.  Of  the 
new  champions  of  Free  Trade  on  the  Continent,  the  fore- 
most in  point  of  time  was  Cavour,  for  that  kingdom  of 
Sardinia  on  which  he  built  the  foundations  of  a  regenerated 
and  united  Italy.  Far  more  important,  however,  was 
the  victory  which  Cobden  won  in  1859-60  by  inducing 
Napoleon  III.  to  depart  from  the  almost  prohibitive 
system  then  in  vogue  in  France.  The  Anglo-French 
Commercial  Treaty  of  January,  i860,  seemed  to  betoken 
the  speedy  conversion  of  the  world  to  the  enlightened 
policy  of  unfettered  exchange  of  all  its  products.  In  1862 
and  1865  the  German  Zollverein  followed  suit,  relaxing 
duties  on  imported  articles  and  manufactured  goods — a 
process  continued  in  the  commercial  treaties  and  tariff 
changes  of  the  years  1868  and  1869. 

At  this  time  Bismarck's  opinions  on  fiscal  matters  were 
somewhat  vague.  He  afterwards  declared  that  he  held 
Free  Trade  to  be  altogether  false.  But  in  this  as  in  other 
matters  he  certainly  let  his  convictions  be  shaped  by  ex- 
pediency. Just  before  the  conclusion  of  peace  with  France 
he  so  far  approximated  to  Free  Trade  as  to  insist  that  the 
Franco-German  Commercial  Treaty  of  1862,^  which  the 
war  had  of  course  abrogated — war  puts  an  end  to  all 
treaties  between  the  States  directly  engaged — should  now 

«  For  that  treaty,  and  Austria's  desire  in  1862  to  enter  the  Ger- 
man Zollverein,  see  The  Diplomatic  Reminiscences  of  Lord  A 
Loftus,  ii.,  pp.  250-251. 


I70  The  European  Nations 

be  again  regarded  as  in  force  and  as  holding  good  up  to  the 
year  1887.  He  even  stated  that  he  "would  rather  begin 
again  the  war  of  cannon-balls  than  expose  himself  to  a 
war  of  tariffs."  France  and  Germany,  therefore,  agreed 
to  place  one  another  permanently  on  "the  most  favoured 
nation"  footing.  Yet  this  same  man,  who  so  much  de- 
sired to  keep  down  the  Franco-German  tariff,  was  destined 
eight  years  later  to  initiate  a  protectionist  policy  which 
set  back  the  cause  of  Free  Trade  for  at  least  a  generation. 
What  brought  about  this  momentous  change?  To 
answer  this  fully  would  take  up  a  long  chapter.  We  can 
only  glance  at  the  chief  forces  then  at  work.  Firstly, 
Germany,  after  the  year  1873,  passed  through  a  severe  and 
prolonged  economic  crisis.  It  was  largely  due  to  the 
fever  of  speculation  induced  by  the  incoming  of  the  French 
milliards  into  a  land  where  gold  had  been  none  too  plenti- 
ful. Despite  the  efforts  of  the  German  Government  to 
hold  back  a  large  part  of  the  war  indemnity  for  purposes  of 
military  defence  and  substantial  enterprises,  the  people 
imagined  themselves  to  be  suddenly  rich.  Prices  rapidly 
rose,  extravagant  habits  spread  in  all  directions,  and  in 
the  years  1872-73  company -promoting  attained  to  the 
rank  of  a  fine  art,  with  the  result  that  sober,  hard-working 
Germany  seemed  to  be  almost  another  England  at  the 
time  of  the  South  Sea  Bubble.  Alluding  to  this  time, 
Busch  said  to  Bismarck  early  in  1887:  "In  the  long-run 
the  [French]  milliards  were  no  blessing,  at  least  not  for  our 
manufacturers,  as  they  led  to  over-production.  It  was 
merely  the  bankers  who  benefited,  and  of  these  only  the 
big  ones."  1 

1  Bismarck:   Some  Secret  Pages  of  his  History,  by  M.  Busch,  iii., 
p.  161  (Eng.  edit.). 


The  German  Empire 


I7i 


The  result  happened  that  always  happens  when  a  nation 
mistakes  money,  the  means  of  commercial  exchange,  for 
the  ultimate  source  of  wealth.  After  a  time  of  inflation 
came  the  inevitable  collapse.  The  unsound  companies 
went  by  the  board;  even  sound  ventures  were  in  some 
cases  overturned.  How  grievously  public  credit  suffered, 
may  be  seen  by  the  later  official  admission,  that  liquidation 
and  bankruptcies  of  public  companies  in  the  following  ten 
years  inflicted  on  shareholders  a  total  loss  of  more  than 
345,000,000  marks  (;£i7,25o,ooo).^ 

Now,  it  was  in  the  years  1876-77,  while  the  nation  lay 
deep  in  the  trough  of  economic  depression,  that  the  de- 
mand foF  "protection  for  home  industries"  grew  loud  and 
persistent.  Whether  it  would  not  have  been  raised  even 
if  German  finance  and  industry  had  held  on  its  way  in  a 
straight  course  and  on  an  even  keel,  cannot  of  course  be 
determined,  for  the  protectionist  movement  had  been 
growing  since  the  year  1872,  owing  to  the  propaganda  of 
the  "Verein  fur  Sozialpolitik "  (Union  for  Social  Politics), 
founded  in  that  year.  But  it  is  safe  to  say  that  the  col- 
lapse of  speculation  due  to  the  inflowing  of  the  French 
milliards  greatly  strengthened  the  forces  of  economic 
reaction. 

Bismarck  himself  put  it  in  this  way:  that  the  introduc- 
tion of  Free  Trade  in  1865  soon  produced  a  state  of  atrophy 
in  Germany;  this  was  checked  for  a  time  by  the  French 
war  indemnity;  but  Germany  needed  a  permanent  cure, 
namely,  Protection.  It  is  true  that  his  ideal  of  national 
life  had  always  been  strict  and  narrow — in  fact,  that  of  the 
average  German  official;    but  we  may  doubt  whether  he 

1  German  State  Paper  of  June  28,  1S84,  quoted  by  Dawson, 
Bismarck  and  State  Socialism,  App.  B. 


172  The  European  Nations 

had  in  view  solely  the  shelter  of  the  presumedly  tender 
flora  of  German  industry  from  the  supposed  deadly  blasts 
of  British,  Austrian,  and  Russian  competition.  He  cer- 
tainly hoped  to  strengthen  the  fabric  of  his  Empire  by 
extending  the  customs  system  and  making  its  revenue 
depend  more  largely  on  that  source  and  less  on  the  con- 
tributions of  the  federated  States.  But  there  was  probably 
a  still  wider  consideration.  He  doubtless  wished  to  bring 
prominently  before  the  public  gaze  another  great  subject 
that  would  distract  it  from  the  religious  feuds  described 
above  and  bring  about  a  rearrangement  of  political  parties. 
The  British  people  has  good  reason  to  know  that  the  dis- 
cussion of  fiscal  questions  that  vitally  touch  every  trade 
and  every  consumer,  does  act  like  the  turning  of  a  kaleido- 
scope upon  party  groupings;  and  we  may  fairly  well  as- 
sume that  so  far-seeing  a  statesman  as  Bismarck  must 
have  forecast  the  course  of  events. 

Reasons  of  statecraft  also  warned  him  to  build  up  the 
Empire  four-square  while  yet  there  was  time.  The  rapid 
recovery  of  France,  whose  milliards  had  proved  somewhat 
of  a  "Greek  gift"  to  Germany,  had  led  to  threats  on  the 
part  of  the  war  party  at  Berlin,  which  brought  from 
Queen  Victoria,  as  also  from  the  Czar  Alexander,  private 
but  pressing  intimations  to  Kaiser  Wilhelm  that  no  war 
of  extermination  must  take  place.  This  affair  and  its 
results  in  Germany's  foreign  policy  will  occupy  us  in 
Chapter  XII.  Here  we  may  note  that  Bismarck  saw  in 
it  a  reason  for  suspecting  Russia,  hating  England,  and 
jealously  watching  every  movement  in  France.  Germany's 
future,  it  seemed,  would  have  to  be  safeguarded  by  all  the 
peaceable  means  available.  How  natural,  then,  to  tone 
down   her  internal   religious   strifes   by   bringing  forward 


The  German  Empire  173 

another  topic  of  still  more  absorbing  interest,  and  to  aim 
at  building  up  a  self-contained  commercial  life  in  the 
midst  of  uncertain,  or  possibly  hostile,  neighbours.  In 
truth,  if  we  view  the  question  in  its  broad  issues  in  the  life 
of  nations,  we  must  grant  that  Free  Trade  could  scarcely 
be  expected  to  thrive  amidst  the  jealousies  and  fears  en- 
tailed by  the  War  of  1870.  That  principle  presupposes 
trust  and  good-will  between  nations;  whereas  the  wars  of 
1859,  1864,  and  1870  left  behind  bitter  memories  and 
rankling  ills.  Viewed  in  this  light,  Germany's  abandon- 
ment of  Free  Trade  in  1879  was  but  the  natural  result  of 
that  forceful  policy  by  which  she  had  cut  the  Gordian  knot 
of  her  national  problem. 

The  economic  change  was  decided  on  in  the  year  1879, 
when  the  federated  States  returned  to  "the  time-honoured 
ways  of  1823-65."  Bismarck  appealed  to  the  Reichstag 
to  preserve  at  least  the  German  market  to  Gentian  in- 
dustry. The  chances  of  having  a  large  export  trade  were 
on  every  ground  precarious;  but  Germany  could,  at  the 
worst,  support  herself.  All  interests  were  mollified  by 
having  moderate  duties  imposed  to  check  imports.  Small 
customs  dues  were  placed  on  com  and  other  food  supplies 
so  as  to  please  the  agrarian  party ;  imports  of  manufactured 
goods  were  taxed  for  the  benefit  of  German  industries,  and 
even  raw  materials  underwent  small  imposts.  The  Reichs- 
tag approved  the  change  and  on  July  7th  passed  the 
Government's  proposals  by  217  to  117:  the  majority  com- 
prised the  Conservatists,  Clericals,  the  Alsace-Lorrainers, 
and  a  few  National  Liberals;  while  the  bidk  of  the  last- 
named,  hitherto  Bismarck's  supporters  on  most  topics, 
along  with  Radicals  and  Social  Democrats,  opposed  it. 
The  new  tariff  came  into  force  on  January  i,  1880. 


174  The  European  Nations 

On  the  whole,  much  may  be  said  in  favour  of  the  im- 
mediate results  of  the  new  policy.  By  the  year  1885  the 
number  of  men  employed  in  iron  and  steel  works  had  in- 
creased by  35  per  cent,  over  the  numbers  of  1879;  wages 
also  had  increased,  and  the  returns  of  shipping  and  of  the 
export  trade  showed  a  considerable  rise.  Of  course,  it  is 
impossible  to  say  whether  this  would  not  have  happened 
in  any  case  owing  to  the  natural  tendency  to  recover  from 
the  deep  depression  of  the  years  1875-79.  The  duties  on 
corn  did  not  raise  its  price,  which  appears  strange  until  we 
know  that  the  foreign  imports  of  com  were  less  than  8 
per  cent,  of  the  whole  amount  consumed.  In  1885,  there- 
fore, Bismarck  gave  way  to  the  demands  of  the  agrarians 
that  the  corn  duties  should  be  raised  still  further,  in  order 
to  make  agriculture  lucrative  and  to  prevent  the  streaming 
of  rural  population  to  the  towns.  Again  the  docile  Reichs- 
tag followed  his  lead.  But  two  years  later,  it  seemed 
that  the  new  com  duties  had  failed  to  check  the  fall  of 
prices  and  keep  landlords  and  farmers  from  ruin;  once 
more,  then,  the  duties  were  raised,  being  even  doubled  on 
certain  food  products.  This  time  they  undoubtedly  had 
one  important  result,  that  of  making  the  urban  popula- 
tion, especially  that  of  the  great  industrial  centres,  more 
hostile  to  the  agrarians  and  to  the  Government  which 
seemed  to  be  legislating  in  their  interests.  From  this  time 
forward  the  Social  Democrats  began  to  be  a  power  in  the 
land. 

And  yet,  if  we  except  the  very  important  item  of  rent, 
which  in  Berlin  presses  with  cruel  weight  on  the  labouring 
classes,  the  general  trend  of  the  prices  of  the  necessaries  of 
life  in  Germany  has  been  downwards,  in  spite  of  all  the 
protectionist  duties.     The  evidence  compiled  in  the  British 


The  German  Empire 


175 


official  Blue-book  on  "British  and  Foreign  Trade  and 
Industry"  (1903.  Cd.  1761,  p.  226)  yields  the  following 
results.  By  comparing  the  necessary  expenditure  on  food 
of  a  workman's  family  of  the  same  size  and  living  under  the 
same  conditions,  it  appears  that  if  we  take  that  expenditure 
for  the  period  189 7-1 901  to  represent  the  number  100  we 
have  these  results: 


Period. 

Germany. 

United  Kingdom. 

1877-1881 
1882-1886 
1887-1891 
1892-1896 
1897-1901 

112 

lOI 

103 

99 

100 

140 

125 

106 

98 

100 

Thus  the  fall  in  the  cost  of  living  of  a  British  working  man's 
family  has  been  40  points,  while  that  of  the  German  work- 
ing man  shows  a  iecline  of  only  12  points.  It  is,  on  the 
whole,  surprising  that  there  has  not  been  more  difference 
between  the  two  countries.^ 

Before  dealing  with  the  new  social  problems  that  re- 
sulted, at  least  in  part,  from  the  new  duties  on  food,  we 
may  point  out  that  Bismarck  and  his  successors  at  the 
German  Chancery  had  used  the  new  tariff  as  a  means  of 
extorting  better  terms   from  the   surrounding  cotmtries. 

>  In  a  recent  work,  England  and  the  English  (London,  1904),  Dr. 
Carl  Peters  says:  "Considering  that  wages  in  England  average  20 
per  cent,  higher  in  England  than  in  Germany,  that  the  week  has 
only  54  working  hours,  and  that  all  articles  of  food  are  cheaper,  the 
fundamental  conditions  of  prosperous  home-life  are  all  round  more 
favourable  in  England  than  in  Germany.  And  yet  he  [the  British 
working  man]  does  not  derive  greater  comfort  from  them,  for  the 
simple  reason  that  a  German  labourer's  wife  is  more  economical 
and  more  industrious  than  the  English  wife."  See,  too,  Professor 
Ashley's  Progress  of  the  German  Working  Classes  (1904). 


176  The  European  Nations 

The  Iron  Chancellor  has  always  acted  on  the  diplomatic 
principle  do  ut  des — "I  give  that  you  may  give" — with  its 
still  more  cynical  corollary — "Those  who  have  nothing  to 
give  will  get  nothing."  The  new  German  tariff  on  agri- 
ciiltural  products  was  stiffly  applied  against  Austria  for 
many  years,  to  compel  her  to  grant  more  favourable  terms 
to  German  manufactured  goods.  For  eleven  years  Austria- 
Hungary  maintained  their  protective  barriers;  but  in  1891 
German  persistence  was  rewarded  in  the  form  of  a  treaty 
by  which  the  Dual  Monarchy  let  in  German  goods  on  easier 
terms  provided  that  the  com  duties  of  the  northern  Power 
were  relaxed.  The  fiscal  strife  with  Russia  was  keener  and 
longer,  but  had  the  same  result  (1894).  Of  a  friendlier 
kind  were  the  negotiations  with  Italy,  Belgium,  and 
Switzerland,  which  led  to  treaties  with  those  States  in  1891. 
It  is  needless  to  say  that  in  each  of  these  cases  the  lowering 
of  the  com  duties  was  sharply  resisted  by  the  German 
agrarians.  We  may  here  add  that  the  Anglo- German 
commercial  treaty  which  expired  in  1903  has  been  extended 
for  two  years;  and  that  Germany's  other  commercial 
treaties  were  at  the  same  time  continued. 

It  is  hazardous  at  present  to  venture  on  any  definite 
judgment  as  to  the  measure  of  success  attained  by  the 
German  protectionist  policy.  Protectionists  always  point 
to  the  prosperity  of  Germany  as  the  crowning  proof  of  its 
efficacy.  In  one  respect  they  are,  perhaps,  fully  justified 
in  so  doing.  The  persistent  pressure  which  Germany 
brought  to  bear  on  the  even  more  protectionist  systems  of 
Russia  and  Austria  undoubtedly  induced  those  Powers  to 
grant  easier  terms  to  German  goods  than  they  would  have 
done  had  Germany  lost  her  bargaining  power  by  persisting 
in  her  former  free  trade  tendency.     Her  success  in  this 


The  German  Empire  177 

matter  is  the  best  instance  in  recent  economic  history  of 
the  desirability  of  holding  back  something  in  reserve  so 
as  to  be  able  to  bargain  effectively  with  a  Power  that  keeps 
■up  hostile  tariffs.  In  this  jealously  competitive  age  the 
State  that  has  nothing  more  to  offer  is  as  badly  off  in 
economic  negotiations  as  one  that,  in  affairs  of  general 
policy,  has  no  armaments  wherewith  to  face  a  well-equipped 
foe.  This  consideration  is  of  course  scouted  as  heretical 
by  orthodox  economists;  but  it  counts  for  much  in  the 
workaday  world,  where  tariff  wars  and  commercial  treaty 
bargainings  unfortimately  still  distract  the  energies  of 
mankind. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  would  be  risky  to  point  to  the  in- 
ternal prosperity  of  Germany  and  the  vast  growth  of  her 
exports  as  proofs  of  the  soundness  of  protectionist  theories. 
The  marvellous  growth  of  that  prosperity  is  very  largely 
due  to  the  natural  richness  of  a  great  part  of  the  country, 
to  the  intelligence,  energy,  and  foresight  of  the  people 
and  their  rulers,  and  to  the  comparatively  backward  state 
of  German  industry  and  commerce  up  to  the  year  1870. 
Far  on  into  the  nineteenth  century,  Germany  was  suffering 
from  the  havoc  wrought  by  the  Napoleonic  wars  and  still 
earlier  struggles.  Even  after  the  year  1850,  the  political 
uncertainties  of  the  time  prevented  her  enjoying  the 
prosperity  that  then  visited  England  and  France.  There- 
fore, only  since  1870  (or  rather  since  1877-78,  when  the 
results  of  the  mad  speculation  of  1873  began  to  wear  away) 
has  she  entered  on  the  normal  development  of  a  modem 
industrial  State;  and  he  would  be  an  eager  partisan  who 
would  put  down  her  prosperity  mainly  to  the  credit  of  the 
protectionist  regime.  In  truth,  no  one  can  correctly 
gauge  the  value  of  the  complex  causes — economic,  political. 


178  The  European  Nations 

educational,  scientific,  and  engineering — that  make  for 
the  prosperity  of  a  vast  industrial  community.  So  closely 
are  they  intertwined  in  the  nature  of  things,  that  dog- 
matic arguments  laying  stress  on  one  of  them  alone  must 
speedily  be  seen  to  be  the  merest  juggling  with  facts  and 
figures. 

As  regards  the  wider  influences  exerted  by  Germany's 
new  protective  policy,  we  can  here  allude  only  to  one;  and 
that  will  be  treated  more  fully  in  the  chapter  dealing  with 
the  partition  of  Africa.  That  policy  gave  a  great  stimulus 
to  the  colonial  movement  in  Germany,  and  through  her  in 
all  European  States.  As  happened  in  the  time  of  the  old 
mercantile  system,  Powers  which  limited  their  trade  with 
their  neighbours  felt  an  imperious  need  for  absorbing  new 
lands  in  the  tropics  to  serve  as  close  preserves  for  the 
mother-country.  Other  circumstances  helped  to  impel 
Germany  on  the  path  of  colonial  expansion ;  but  probably 
the  most  important,  though  the  least  obvious,  was  the 
recrudescence  of  that  "mercantilism"  which  Adam  Smith 
had  exploded.  Thus,  the  triumph  of  the  national  principle 
in  and  after  1870  was  consolidated  by  means  which  tended 
to  segregate  the  human  race  in  masses,  regarding  each 
other  more  or  less  as  enemies  or  rivals,  alike  in  the  spheres 
of  politics,  commerce,  and  colonial  expansion. 

We  may  conclude  our  brief  survey  of  German  con- 
structive policy  by  glancing  at  the  chief  of  the  experiments 
which  may  be  classed  as  akin  to  State  Socialism. 

In  1882  the  German  Government  introduced  the  Sickness 
Insurance  Bill  and  the  Accident  Insurance  Bill,  but  they 
were  not  passed  till  1884,  and  did  not  take  effect  till  1885. 
For  the  relief  of  sickness  the  Government  relied  on  existing 


The  German  Empire  179 

institutions  organised  for  that  object.  This  was  very- 
wise,  seeing  that  the  great  difficulty  is  how  to  find  out 
whether  a  man  really  is  ill  or  is  merely  shamming  illness. 
Obviousty  a  local  club  can  find  that  out  far  better  than  a 
great  imperial  agency  can.  The  local  club  has  every  reason 
for  looking  sharply  after  doubtful  cases  as  a  State  Insurance 
Fund  cannot  do.  As  regards  sickness,  then,  the  Imperial 
Government  merely  compelled  all  the  labouring  classes, 
with  few  exceptions,  to  belong  to  some  sick  fund.  They 
were  obliged  to  pay  in  a  sum  of  not  less  than  about  fourpence 
in  the  pound  of  their  weekly  wages ;  and  this  payment  of 
the  workman  has  to  be  supplemented  by  half  as  much 
paid  by  his  employer — or  rather,  the  employer  pays  the 
whole  of  the  premium  and  deducts  the  share  payable  by 
the  workman  from  his  wages. 

Closely  linked  with  this  is  the  Accident  Insurance  Law. 
Here  the  brunt  of  the  payment  falls  wholly  on  the  em- 
ployer. He  alone  pays  the  premiums  for  all  his  work 
people;  the  amount  varies  according  to  (i)  the  man's 
wage,  (2)  the  risk  incidental  to  the  employment.  The 
latter  is  determined  by  the  actuaries  of  the  Government. 
If  a  man  is  injured  (even  if  it  be  by  his  own  carelessness) 
he  receives  payments  during  the  first  thirteen  weeks  from 
the  ordinary  Sick  Fund.  If  his  accident  keeps  him  a 
prisoner  any  longer,  he  is  paid  from  the  Accident  Fund  of 
the  employers  of  that  particular  trade,  or  from  the  Im- 
perial Accident  Fund.  Here  of  course  the  chance  of 
shamming  increases,  particularly  if  the  man  knows  that  he 
is  being  supported  out  of  a  general  fund  made  up  entirely 
by  the  employers'  payments.  The  burden  on  the  em- 
ployers is  certainly  very  heavy,  seeing  that  for  all  kinds 
of  accidents  relief  may  be  claimed;   the  only  exception  is 


i8o  The  European  Nations 

in  cases  where  the  injury  can  be  shown  to  be  wilfully  com- 
mitted.* A  British  Blue-book  issued  on  March  31,  1905, 
shows  that  the  enormous  sum  of  ;^5,372,i5o  was  paid  in 
Germany  in  the  year  1902  as  compensation  to  workmen 
for  injuries  sustained  while  at  work. 

The  burden  of  the  employers  does  not  end  here.  They 
have  to  bear  their  share  of  Old  Age  Insurance.  This  law 
was  passed  in  1889,  at  the  close  of  the  first  year  of  the 
present  Kaiser's  reign.  His  father,  the  Emperor  Fred- 
erick, during  his  brief  reign  had  not  favoured  the  principles 
of  State  Socialism;  but  the  young  Emperor  William  in 
November,  1888,  announced  that  he  would  further  the  work 
begun  by  his  grandfather,  and  though  the  difficulties  of 
insurance  for  old  age  were  very  great,  yet,  with  God's  help, 
they  would  prove  not  to  be  insuperable. 

Certainly  the  effort  was  by  far  the  greatest  that  had  yet 
been  made  by  any  State.  The  young  Emperor  and  his 
Chancellor  sought  to  build  up  a  fund  whereby  12,000,000 
of  work  people  might  be  guarded  against  the  ills  of  a 
penniless  old  age.  Their  law  provided  for  all  workmen 
(even  men  in  domestic  service)  whose  yearly  income  did 
not  exceed  2,000  marks  (;^ioo).  Like  the  preceding  laws, 
it  was  compulsory.  Every  youth  who  is  physically  and 
mentally  sound,  and  who  earns  more  than  a  minimum 
wage,  must  begin  to  put  by  a  fixed  proportion  of  that  wage 
as  soon  as  he  completes  his  sixteenth  year.  His  employer 
is  also  compelled  to  contribute  the  same  amount  for  him. 
Mr.  Dawson,  in  the  work  already  referred  to,  gives  some 

1  For  the  account  given  below,  as  also  that  of  the  Old  Age  In- 
surance Law,  I  am  indebted  to  Mr.  Dawson's  excellent  little  work, 
Bismarck  and  State  Socialism  (Swan,  Sonnenschein  &  Co.,  1890). 
See  also  the  Appendix  to  The  German  Empire  of  To-Day,  by  "Veri- 
tas" (1902). 


The  German  Empire  i8i 

figures  showing  what  the  joint  payments  of  employer  and 
employed  amount  to  on  this  score.  If  the  workman  earns 
;£i5  a  year  (i.e.,  about  6s.  a  week),  the  sum  of  3s.  3-|d.  is 
put  by  for  him  yearly  into  the  State  Fund.  If  he  earns 
;^36  a  year,  the  joint  annual  payment  will  be  5s.  7^d. ;  if 
he  earns  ;^78,  it  will  be  7s.  a  year,  and  so  on.  These  pay- 
ments are  reckoned  up  in  various  classes,  according  to  the 
amounts;  and  according  to  the  total  amount  is  the  final 
annuity  payable  to  the  worker  in  the  evening  of  his  days. 
That  evening  is  very  slow  in  coming  for  the  German 
worker.  For  old  age  merely,  he  cannot  begin  to  draw  his 
full  pension  until  he  has  attained  the  ripe  age  of  seventy- 
one  years.  Then  he  will  draw  the  full  amount.  He 
may  anticipate  that  if  he  be  incapacitated;  but  in  that 
case  the  pension  will  be  on  a  lower  scale,  proportioned 
to  the  amounts  paid  in  and  the  length  of  time  of  the 
payments. 

The  details  of  the  measure  are  so  complex  as  to  cause  a 
good  deal  of  friction  and  discontent.  The  calculation  of 
the  various  payments  alone  employs  an  army  of  clerks; 
the  need  of  safeguarding  against  personation  and  other 
kinds  of  fraud  makes  a  great  number  of  precautions 
necessary;  and  thus  the  whole  system  becomes  tied  up 
with  red  tape  in  a  way  that  even  the  more  patient  work- 
man of  the  Continent  cannot  endure. 

In  a  large  measure,  then,  the  German  Government  has 
failed  in  its  efforts  to  cure  the  industrial  classes  of  their 
socialistic  ideas.  But  its  determination  to  attach  them  to 
the  new  German  Empire,  and  to  make  that  Empire  the 
leading  industrial  State  of  the  Continent,  has  had  a  com- 
plete triumph.  So  far  as  education,  technical  training, 
research,  and  enlightened  laws  can  make  a  nation  great, 


1 82  The  European  Nations 

Germany  is  surely  on  the  high-road  to  national  and  in- 
dustrial supremacy. 

It  is  a  strange  contrast  that  meets  our  eyes  if  we  look 
back  to  the  years  before  the  advent  of  King  William  and 
Bismarck  to  power.  In  the  dark  days  of  the  previous 
reign  Germany  was  weak,  divided,  and  helpless.  In  re- 
gard to  political  life  and  industry  she  was  still  almost  in 
swaddling-clothes;  and  her  struggles  to  escape  from  the 
irksome  restraints  of  the  old  Confederation  seemed  likely 
to  be  as  futile  as  they  had  been  since  the  year  1815.  But 
the  advent  of  the  King  and  his  sturdy  helper  to  power 
speedily  changed  the  situation.  The  political  problems 
were  grappled  with  one  by  one  and  were  trenchantly 
solved.  Union  was  won  by  Bismarck's  diplomacy  and 
Prussia's  sword ;  and  when  the  longed-for  goal  was  reached 
in  seven  momentous  years,  the  same  qualities  were  brought 
to  bear  on  the  difficult  task  of  consolidating  that  union. 
Those  qualities  were  the  courage  and  honesty  of  purpose 
that  the  House  of  Hohenzollem  has  always  displayed  since 
the  days  of  the  Great  Elector;  added  to  these  were  rarer 
gifts,  namely,  the  width  of  view,  the  eagle  foresight,  the 
strength  of  will,  the  skill  in  the  choice  of  means,  that  made 
up  the  imposing  personality  of  Bismarck.  It  was  with  an 
eye  to  him,  and  to  the  astonishing  triumphs  wrought  by 
his  diplomacy  over  France,  that  a  diplomatist  thus  summed 
up  the  results  of  the  year  1870:  "Europe  has  lost  a  mis- 
tress, but  she  has  got  a  master." 

After  the  lapse  of  a  generation  that  has  been  weighted 
with  the  cuirass  of  militarism,  we  are  able  to  appreciate  the 
force  of  that  remark.  Equally  true  is  it  that  the  formation 
of  the  German  Empire  has  not  added  to  the  culture  and 
the  inner  happiness  of  the  German  people.     The  days  of 


The  German  Empire  183 

quiet  culture  and  happiness  are  gone;  and  in  their  place 
has  come  a  straining  after  ambitious  aims  which  is  a 
heavy  drag  even  on  the  vitality  of  the  Teutonic  race. 
Still,  whether  for  good  or  for  evil,  the  imification  of  Ger- 
many must  stand  out  as  the  greatest  event  in  the  history 
of  the  nineteenth  century. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE    EASTERN    QUESTION 

"Perhaps  one  fact  which  lies  at  the  root  of  all  the  actions  of  the 
Turks,  small  and  great,  is  that  they  are  by  nature  nomads.  .  .  . 
Hence  it  is  that  when  the  Turk  retires  from  a  country  he  leaves 
no  more  sign  of  himself  than  does  a  Tartar  camp  on  the  upland 
pastures  where  it  has  passed  the  summer." — Turkey  in  Europe,  by 
"Odysseus." 

THE  remark  was  once  made  that  the  Eastern  Question 
was  destined  to  perplex  mankind  up  to  the  Day  of 
Judgment.  Certainly  that  problem  is  extraordinarily  com- 
plex in  its  details.  For  a  century  and  a  half  it  has  dis- 
tracted the  statesmen  and  philanthropists  of  Europe;  for 
it  concerns  not  only  the  ownership  of  lands  of  great  intrinsic 
and  strategic  importance,  but  also  the  welfare  of  many 
peoples.  It  is  a  question,  therefore,  which  no  intelligent 
man  ought  to  overlook. 

For  the  benefit  of  the  tiresome  person  who  insists  on 
having  a  definition  of  every  term,  the  Eastern  Question 
may  be  briefly  described  as  the  problem  of  finding  a  modus 
vivendi  between  the  Turks  and  their  Christian  subjects  and 
the  neighbouring  States.  This  may  serve  as  a  general 
working  statement.  No  one  who  is  acquainted  with  the 
rules  of  logic  will  accept  it  as  a  definition.  Definitions  can 
properly  apply  only  to  terms  and  facts  that  have  a  clear 
outline;    and  they  can  therefore  very  rarely  apply  to  the 

i84 


The  Eastern  Question  185 

facts  of  history,  which  are  of  necessity  as  many-sided  as 
human  life  itself.  The  statement  given  above  is  incom- 
plete, inasmuch  as  it  neither  hints  at  the  great  difficulty 
of  reconciling  the  civic  ideas  of  Christian  and  Turkish 
peoples,  nor  describes  the  political  problems  arising  out 
of  the  decay  of  the  Ottoman  Power  and  the  ambitions  of 
its  neighbours. 

It  will  be  well  briefly  to  see  what  are  the  difficulties  that 
arise  out  of  the  presence  of  Christians  under  the  rule  of  a 
great  Moslem  State.  They  are  chiefly  these:  First,  the 
Koran,  though  far  from  enjoining  persecution  of  Christians, 
yet  distinctly  asserts  the  superiority  of  the  true  believer 
and  the  inferiority  of  "the  people  of  the  book"  (Christians). 
The  latter  therefore  are  excluded  from  participation  in 
public  affairs,  and  in  practice  are  refused  a  hearing  in  the 
law  courts.  Consequently  they  tend  to  sink  to  the  posi- 
tion of  hewers  of  wood  and  drawers  of  water  to  the  Mos- 
lems, these  on  their  side  inevitably  developing  the  defects 
of  an  exclusive  dominant  caste.  This  is  so  especially  with 
the  Turks.  They  are  one  of  the  least  gifted  of  the  Mon- 
golian family  of  nations;  brave  in  war  and  patient  under 
suffering  and  reverses,  they  nevertheless  are  hopelessly 
narrow-minded  and  bigoted;  and  the  Christians  in  their 
midst  have  fared  perhaps  worse  than  anywhere  else 
among  the  Mohammedan  peoples. 

M.  de  Laveleye,  who  studied  the  condition  of  things  in 
Turkey  not  long  after  the  war  of  1877-78,  thus  summed  up 
the  causes  of  the  social  and  political  decline  of  the  Turks: 

"The  true  Mussulman  loves  neither  progress,  novelty, 
nor  education;  the  Koran  is  enough  for  him.  He  is 
satisfied  with  his  lot,  therefore  cares  little  for  its  im- 
provement, somewhat  like  a  Catholic  monk;    but  at  the 


1 86  The  European  Nations 

same  time  he  hates  and  despises  the  Christian  raya,  who  is 
the  labourer.  He  pitilessly  despoils,  fleeces,  and  ill-treats 
him  to  the  extent  of  completely  ruining  and  destroying 
those  families,  which  are  the  only  ones  who  cultivate  the 
ground;  it  was  a  state  of  war  continued  in  time  of  peace, 
and  transformed  into  a  regime  of  permanent  spoliation 
and  murder.  The  wife,  even  when  she  is  the  only  one,  is 
always  an  inferior  being,  a  kind  of  slave,  destitute  of  any 
intellectual  culture ;  and  as  it  is  she  who  trains  the  children 
— boys  and  girls — the  bad  results  are  plainly  seen." 

Matters  were  not  always  and  in  all  parts  of  Turkey  so  bad 
as  this;  but  they  frequently  became  so  under  cruel  or 
corrupt  governors,  or  in  times  when  Moslem  fanaticism 
ran  riot.  In  truth,  the  underlying  cause  of  Turkey's 
troubles  is  the  ignorance  and  fanaticism  of  her  people. 
These  evils  result  largely  from  the  utter  absorption  of  all 
devout  Moslems  in  their  creed  and  ritual.  Texts  from  the 
Koran  guide  their  conduct;  and  all  else  is  decided  by 
fatalism,  which  is  very  often  a  mere  excuse  for  doing 
nothing.^  Consequently  all  movements  for  reform  are 
mere  ripples  on  the  surface  of  Turkish  life;  they  never 
touch  its  dull  depths;  and  the  Sultan  and  officials,  knowing 
this,  cling  to  the  old  ways  with  full  confidence.  The  pro- 
tests of  Christian  nations  on  behalf  of  their  coreligionists 
are  therefore  met  with  a  polite  compliance  which  means 
nothing.  Time  after  time  the  Sublime  Porte  has  most 
solemnly  promised  to  grant  religious  liberty  to  its  Christian 
subjects;  but  the  promises  were  but  empty  air,  and  those 
who  made  them  knew  it.     In  fact,  the  firmans  of  reform 

1  "  Islam  continues  to  be,  as  it  has  been  for  twelve  centuries,  the 
most  inflexible  adversary  to  the  Western  spirit  "  {History  of  Servia 
and  the  Slav  Provinces  of  Turkey,  by  L.  von  Ranke,  Eng.  edit.,  p. 
296). 


The  Eastern  Question  187 

now  and  again  issued  with  so  much  ostentation  have  never 
been  looked  on  by  good  Moslems  as  binding,  because  the 
chief  spiritual  functionary,  the  Sheikh-ul-Islam,  whose 
assent  is  needed  to  give  validity  to  laws,  has  withheld  it 
from  those  very  ordinances.  As  he  has  power  to  depose 
the  Sultan  for  a  lapse  of  orthodoxy,  the  result  may  be 
imagined.  The  many  attempts  of  the  Christian  Powers  to 
enforce  their  notions  of  religious  toleration  on  the  Porte 
have  in  the  end  merely  led  to  further  displays  of  Oriental 
politeness. 

It  may  be  asked :  Why  have  not  the  Christians  of  Turkey 
united  in  order  to  gain  civic  rights?  The  answer  is  that 
they  are  profoundly  divided  in  race  and  sentiment.  In 
the  north-east  are  the  Roumanians,  Slavs  by  extraction 
but  ages  ago  Latinised  in  speech  and  habit  of  mind  by 
contact  with  Roman  soldiers  and  settlers  on  the  Lower 
Danube.  South  of  that  river  there  dwell  the  Bulgars, 
who,  strictly  speaking,  are  not  Slavs  but  Mongolians. 
After  long  sojourn  on  the  Volga  they  took  to  themselves  the 
name  of  that  river,  lost  their  Tartar  speech,  and  became 
Slav  in  sentiment  and  language.  This  change  took  place 
before  the  ninth  century,  when  they  migrated  to  the  south 
and  conquered  the  districts  which  they  now  inhabit. 
Their  neighbours  on  the  west,  the  Servians,  are  Slavs  in 
every  sense,  and  look  back  with  pride  to  the  time  of  the 
great  Servian  Kingdom,  carved  out  by  Stephen  Dushan, 
which  stretched  southwards  to  the  ^gean  and  the  Gulf  of 
Corinth  (about  1350). 

To  the  west  of  the  present  Kingdom  of  Servia  dwell  other 
Servians  and  Slavs,  who  have  been  partitioned  and  ground 
down  by  various  conquerors  and  have  kept  fewer  traditions 
than  the  Servians  who  won  their  freedom.     But  from  this 


1 88  The  European  Nations 

statement  we  must  except  the  Montenegrins,  who  in  their 
motmtain  fastnesses  have  ever  defied  the  Turks.  To  the 
south  of  them  is  the  large  but  little-known  Province  of 
Albania,  inhabited  by  the  descendants  of  the  ancient 
Illyrians,  with  admixtures  of  Greeks  in  the  south,  Bul- 
garians in  the  east,  and  Servians  in  the  north-east.  Most 
of  the  Albanians  forsook  Christianity  and  are  among  the 
most  fanatical  and  warlike  upholders  of  Islam ;  but  in  their 
turbulent  clan-life  they  often  defy  the  authority  of  the 
Sultan,  and  uphold  it  only  in  order  to  keep  their  supremacy 
over  the  hated  and  despised  Greeks  and  Bulgars  on  their 
outskirts.  Last  among  the  non-Turkish  races  of  the  Bal- 
kan Peninsula  are  a  few  Wallachs  in  Central  Macedonia, 
and  Greeks;  these  last  inhabit  Thessaly  and  the  seaboard 
of  Macedonia  and  of  part  of  Roumelia.  It  is  well  said  that 
Greek  influence  in  the  Balkans  extends  no  further  inland 
than  that  of  the  sea  breezes. 

Such  is  the  medley  of  races  that  complicates  the  Eastern 
Question.  It  may  be  said  that  Turkish  rule  in  Europe 
survives  owing  to  the  racial  divisions  and  jealousies  of  the 
Christians.  The  Sultan  puts  in  force  the  old  Roman 
motto.  Divide  et  impera,  and  has  hitherto  done  so,  in  the 
main,  with  success.  That  is  the  reason  why  Islam  domi- 
nates Christianity  in  the  south-east  of  Europe. 

This  brief  explanation  will  show  what  are  the  evils  that 
affect  Turkey  as  a  whole  and  her  Christian  subjects  in 
particular.  They  are  due  to  the  collision  of  two  irrecon- 
cilable creeds  and  civilisations,  the  Christian  and  the 
Mohammedan.  Both  of  them  are  gifted  with  vitality  and 
propagandist  power  (witness  the  spread  of  the  latter  in 
Africa  and  Central  Asia  in  our  own  day) ;  and,  while  no 
comparison  can  be  made  between  them  on  ideal  grounds 


The  Eastern  Question  189 

and  in  their  ethical  and  civic  results,  it  still  remains  true 
that  Islam  inspires  its  votaries  with  fanatical  bravery  in 
war.  There  is  the  weakness  of  the  Christians  of  south- 
eastern Europe.  Superior  in  all  that  makes  for  home  life, 
civilisation,  and  civic  excellence,  they  have  in  time  past 
generally  failed  as  soldiers  when  pitted  against  an  equal 
number  of  Moslems.  But  the  latter  show  no  constructive 
powers  in  time  of  peace,  and  have  very  rarely  assimilated 
the  conquered  races.  Putting  the  matter  baldly,  we  may 
say  that  it  is  a  question  of  the  survival  of  the  fittest  be- 
tween beavers  and  bears;  and  in  the  nineteenth  century 
the  advantage  has  been  increasingly  with  the  former. 

These  facts  will  appear  if  we  take  a  brief  glance  at  the 
salient  features  of  the  history  of  European  Turkey.  After 
capturing  Constantinople,  the  capital  of  the  old  Eastern 
Empire,  in  the  year  1453,  the  Turks  for  a  time  rapidly  ex- 
tended their  power  over  the  neighbouring  Christian  States, 
Bulgaria,  Servia,  and  Hungary.  In  the  year  1683  they 
laid  siege  to  Vienna;  but  after  being  beaten  back  from 
that  city  by  the  valiant  Sobieski,  King  of  Poland,  they 
gradually  lost  ground.  Little  by  little  Hungary,  Transyl- 
vania, the  Crimea,  and  parts  of  the  Ukraine  (South  Russia) 
were  wrenched  from  their  grasp,  and  the  close  of  the 
eighteenth  century  saw  their  frontiers  limited  to  the  River 
Dniester  and  the  Carpathians.^  Further  losses  were 
staved  off  only  by  the  jealousies  of  the  great  Powers. 
Joseph   II.    of   Austria   came    near    to    effecting    further 

«  The  story  that  Peter  the  Great  of  Russia  left  a  clause  in  his 
will,  bidding  Russia  to  go  on  with  her  southern  conquests  until  she 
gained  Constantinople,  is  an  impudent  fiction  of  French  publicists 
in  the  year  1812,  when  Napoleon  wished  to  keep  Russia  and  Turkey 
at  war.  Of  course,  Peter  the  Great  gave  a  mighty  impulse  to 
Russian  movements  towards  Constantinople. 


190  The  European  Nations 

conquests,  but  his  schemes  of  partition  fell  through  amidst 
the  wholesale  collapse  of  his  too  ambitious  policy.  Napoleon 
Bonaparte  seized  Egypt  in  1798,  but  was  forced  by  Great 
Britain  to  give  it  back  to  Turkey  (1801-02).  In  1807-12 
Alexander  I.  of  Russia  resumed  the  conquering  march  of 
the  Czars  southward,  captured  Bessarabia,  and  forced  the 
Sultan  to  grant  certain  privileges  to  the  Principalities  of 
Moldavia  and  Wallachia.  In  1806-15  "the  Servians  revolted 
against  Turkish  rule:  they  had  always  remembered  the 
days  of  their  early  fame,  and  in  181 7  wrested  from  the 
Porte  large  rights  of  local  self-government. 

Ten  years  later  the  intervention  of  England  and  France 
in  favour  of  the  Greek  patriots  led  to  the  battle  of  Navarino, 
which  destroyed  the  Turko-Egyptian  fleet  and  practically 
secured  the  independence  of  Greece.  An  even  worse  blow 
was  dealt  by  the  Czar  Nicholas  I.  of  Russia.  In  1829,  at 
the  close  of  a  war  in  which  his  troops  drove  the  Turks  over 
the  Balkans  and  away  from  Adrianople,  he  compelled  the 
Porte  to  sign  a  peace  at  that  city,  whereby  they  acknow- 
ledged the  almost  complete  independence  of  Moldavia 
and  Wallachia.  These  Danubian  Principalities  owned  the 
suzerainty  of  the  Sultan  and  paid  him  a  yearly  tribute,  but 
in  other  respects  were  practically  free  from  his  control, 
while  the  Czar  gained  for  the  time  the  right  of  protecting 
the  Christians  of  the  Eastern,  or  Greek,  Church  in  the 
Ottoman  Empire.  The  Sultan  also  recognised  the  inde- 
pendence of  Greece.  Further  troubles  ensued  which  laid 
Turkey  for  a  time  at  the  feet  of  Russia.  England  and 
France,  however,  intervened  to  raise  her  up;  and  they 
also  thwarted  the  efforts  of  Mehemet  Ali,  the  rebellious 
Pasha  of  Egypt,  to  seize  Syria  from  his  nominal  lord,  the 
Sultan. 


The  Eastern  Question  191 

Even  this  bare  summary  will  serve  to  illustrate  three 
important  facts:  first,  that  Turkey  never  consolidated  her 
triumph  over  the  neighbouring  Christians,  simply  because 
she  could  not  assimilate  them,  alien  as  they  were  in  race, 
creed,  and  civilisation;  second,  that  the  Christians  gained 
more  and  more  support  from  kindred  peoples  (especially 
the  Russians)  as  these  last  developed  their  energies;  third, 
that  the  liberating  process  was  generally  (though  not  in 
1827)  delayed  by  the  action  of  the  Western  Powers  (Eng- 
land and  France),  which,  on  grounds  of  policy,  sought  to 
stop  the  aggrandisement  of  Austria,  or  of  Russia,  by  sup- 
porting the  authority  of  the  Sultan. 

The  policy  of  supporting  the  Sultan  against  the  aggres- 
sion of  Russia  reached  its  climax  in  the  Crimean  War 
(1854-55),  which  was  due  mainly  to  the  efforts  of  the  Czar 
Nicholas  to  extend  his  protection  over  the  Greek  Christians 
in  Turkey.  France,  England,  and  later  on  the  Kingdom 
of  Sardinia  made  war  on  Russia — France,  chiefly  because 
her  new  ruler,  Napoleon  III.,  wished  to  play  a  great  part 
in  the  world,  and  avenge  the  disasters  of  the  Moscow  cam- 
paign of  181 2;  England,  because  her  Government  and 
people  resented  the  encroachments  of  Russia  in  the  East, 
and  sincerely  believed  that  Turkey  was  about  to  become 
a  civilised  State;  and  Sardinia,  because  her  statesman 
Cavour  saw  in  this  action  a  means  of  securing  the  alliance 
of  the  two  Western  States  in  his  projected  campaign 
against  Austria.  The  war  closed  with  the  Treaty  of  Paris, 
of  1856,  whereby  the  signatory  Powers  formally  admitted 
Turkey  "to  participate  in  the  advantages  of  the  public 
law  and  system  of  Europe." 

This,  however,  merely  signified  that  the  signatory 
Powers    would    resist    encroachments    on    the    territorial 


192  The  European  Nations 

integrity  of  Turkey.  It  did  not  limit  the  rights  of  the 
Powers,  as  specified  in  various  "capitulations,"  to  safe- 
guard their  own  subjects  residing  in  Turkey  against  Turk- 
ish misrule.  The  Sultan  raised  great  hopes  by  issuing  a 
firman  granting  religious  liberty  to  his  Christian  subjects; 
this  was  inserted  in  the  Treaty  of  Paris,  and  thereby 
became  part  of  the  public  law  of  Europe.  The  Powers  also 
became  collectively  the  guarantors  of  the  local  privileges 
of  the  Danubian  Principalities.  Another  article  of  the 
treaty  provided  for  the  exclusion  of  war-ships  from  the 
Black  Sea.  This  of  course  applied  specially  to  Russia  and 
Turkey.i 

The  chief  diplomatic  restilt  of  the  Crimean  War,  then, 
was  to  substitute  a  European  recognition  of  religious  toler- 
ation in  Turkey  for  the  control  over  her  subjects  of  the 
Greek  Church  which  Russia  had  claimed.  The  Sublime 
Porte  was  now  placed  in  a  stronger  position  than  it  had 
held  since  the  year  1770;  and  the  due  performance  of  its 
promises  would  probably  have  led  to  the  building  up  of  a 
strong  State.  But  the  promises  proved  to  be  mere  waste- 
paper.  The  Sultan,  believing  that  England  and  France 
would  always  take  his  part,  let  matters  go  on  in  the  old 
bad  way.  The  natural  results  came  to  pass.  The  Christ- 
ians became  more  and  more  restive  under  Turkish  rule. 
In  i860  numbers  of  them  were  massacred  in  the  Lebanon, 
and  Napoleon  III.  occupied  part  of  Syria  with  French 
troops.  The  vassal  States  in  Europe  also  displayed  in- 
creasing vitality,  while  that  of  Turkey  waned.  In  1861, 
largely  owing  to  the  diplomatic  help  of  Napoleon  III., 

>  For  the  treaty  and  the  firman  of  1856,  see  The  European  Con- 
cert in  the  Eastern  Question,  by  T.  F.  Holland ;  also  Debidour,  His- 
toire  diplomatique  de  l' Europe  (.1814-1878),  ii.,  pp.  150-152;  The 
Eastern  Question,  by  the  late  Duke  of  Argyll,  i.,  chap.  i. 


The  Eastern  Question  193 

Moldavia  and  Wallachia  united  and  formed  the  Princi- 
pality of  Roumania.  In  1862,  after  a  short  but  terrible 
struggle,  the  Servians  rid  themselves  of  the  Turkish  gar- 
risons and  framed  a  constitution  of  the  Western  type. 
But  the  worst  blow  came  in  1870.  During  the  course  of 
the  Franco-German  War  the  Czar's  Government  (with  the 
good-will  and  perhaps  the  active  connivance  of  the  Court 
of  Berlin)  announced  that  it  woiild  no  longer  be  bound  by 
the  article  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris  excluding  Russian  war- 
ships from  the  Black  Sea.  The  Gladstone  Ministry  sent 
a  protest  against  this  act,  but  took  no  steps  to  enforce  its 
protest.  The  young  British  diplomatist  Sir  Horace  Rum- 
bold,  then  at  St.  Petersburg,  believed  that  she  would  have 
drawn  back  at  a  threat  of  war.^  Finally,  the  Russian 
declaration  was  agreed  to  by  the  Powers  in  a  treaty 
signed  at  London  on  March  31,  187 1. 

These  warnings  were  all  thrown  away  on  the  Porte.  Its 
promises  of  toleration  to  Christians  were  ignored;  the 
wheels  of  government  clanked  on  in  the  traditional  rusty 
way;  governors  of  provinces  and  districts  continued,  as 
of  yore,  to  pocket  the  grants  that  were  made  for  local  im- 
provements; in  defiance  of  the  promises  given  in  1856, 
taxes  continued  to  be  "farmed"  out  to  contractors;  the 
evidence  of  Christians  against  Moslems  was  persistently  re- 
fused a  hearing  in  courts  of  justice  ^ ;  and  the  collectors  of 
taxes  gave  further  turns  of  the  financial  screw  in  order  to 
wring  from  the  cultivators,  especially  from  the  Christians, 
the  means  of  satisfying  the  needs  of    the  State   and  the 

»  Sir  Horace  Rumbold,  Recollections  of  a  Diplomatist  (First  Se- 
ries), ii.,  p.  295. 

2  As  to  this,  see  Reports:  Condition  of  Christians  in  Turkey 
(i860).  Presented  to  Parliament  in  1861.  Also  Parliamentary 
Papers,  Turkey,  No.  16  (1877). 


194  The  European  Nations 

ever-increasing  extravagance  of  the  Sultan.  Incidents 
which  were  observed  in  Bosnia  by  an  Oxford  scholar  of 
high  repute,  in  the  summer  of  1875,  will  be  found  quoted 
in  an  Appendix  at  the  end  of  this  volume. 

Matters  came  to  a  climax  in  the  autumn  of  that  year  in 
Herzegovina,  the  southern  part  of  Bosnia.  There  after  a 
bad  harvest  the  farmers  of  taxes  and  the  Mohammedan 
landlords  insisted  on  having  their  full  quota.  For  many 
years  the  peasants  had  suffered  under  agrarian  wrongs, 
which  cannot  be  described  here;  and  now  this  long- 
suffering  peasantry,  mostly  Christians,  fled  to  the  mount- 
ains, or  into  Montenegro,  whose  sturdy  mountaineers  had 
never  bent  beneath  the  Turkish  yoke.^  Thence  they  made 
forays  against  their  oppressors  until  the  whole  of  that  part 
of  the  Balkans  was  aflame  with  the  old  religious  and  racial 
feuds.  The  Slavs  of  Servia,  Bulgaria,  and  of  Austrian 
Dalmatia  also  gave  secret  aid  to  their  kith  and  kin  in  the 
struggle  against  their  Moslem  overlords.  These  peoples 
had  been  aroused  by  the  sight  of  the  triumph  of  the 
national  cause  in  Italy,  and  felt  that  the  time  had  come  to 
strike  for  freedom  in  the  Balkans.  Turkey  therefore 
failed  to  stamp  out  the  revolt  in  Herzegovina,  fed  as  it 
was  by  the  neighbouring  Slav  peoples;  and  it  was  clear 
to  all  the  politicians  of  Europe  that  the  Eastern  Question 
was  entering  once  more  on  an  acute  phase. 

These  events  aroused  varied  feelings  in  the  European 

'  Efforts  were  made  by  the  British  Consul,  Holmes,  and  other 
pro-Turks,  to  assign  this  revolt  to  Panslavonic  intrigues.  That 
there  were  some  Slavonic  emissaries  at  work  is  undeniable;  but 
it  is  equally  certain  that  their  efforts  would  have  had  no  result 
but  for  the  existence  of  unbearable  ills.  It  is  time,  surely,  to  give 
up  the  notion  that  peoples  rise  in  revolt  merely  owing  to  outside 
agitators.  To  revolt  against  the  warlike  Turks  has  never  been 
child's  play. 


The  Eastern  Question  195 

States.  The  Russian  people,  being  in  the  main  of  Slavonic 
descent,  sympathised  deeply  with  the  struggles  of  their 
kith  and  kin,  who  were  rendered  doubly  dear  by  their 
membership  in  the  Greek  Church.  The  Panslavonic 
Movement,  for  bringing  the  scattered  branches  of  the  Slav 
race  into  some  form  of  political  union,  was  already  gaining 
ground  in  Russia;  but  it  found  little  favour  with  the  St. 
Petersburg  Government  owing  to  the  revolutionary  aims 
of  its  partisans.  Sympathy  with  the  revolt  in  the  Balkans 
was  therefore  confined  to  nationalist  enthusiasts  in  the 
towns  of  Russia.  Austria  was  still  more  anxious  to  pre- 
vent the  spread  of  the  Balkan  rising  to  the  millions  of  her 
own  Slavs.  Accordingly,  the  Austrian  Chancellor,  Count 
Andrassy,  in  concert  with  Prince  Bismarck  and  the  Russian 
statesman  Prince  Gortchakoff,  began  to  prepare  a  scheme 
of  reforms  which  was  to  be  pressed  on  the  Sultan  as  a 
means  of  conciliating  the  insurgents  of  Herzegovina.  They 
comprised  (i)  the  improvement  of  the  lot  of  the  peasantry; 
(2)  complete  religious  liberty;  (3)  the  abolition  of  the 
farming  of  taxes;  (4)  the  application  of  the  local  taxation 
to  local  needs;  (5)  the  appointment  of  a  commission,  half 
of  Moslems,  half  of  Christians,  to  supervise  the  execution 
of  these  reforms  and  of  others  recently  promised  by  the 
Porte.  1 

These  proposals  would  probably  have  been  sent  to  the 
Porte  before  the  close  of  1875  but  for  the  diplomatic  inter- 
vention of  the  British  Cabinet.  Affairs  at  London  were 
then  in  the  hands  of  that  skilful  and  determined  statesman, 
Disraeli,  soon  to  become  Lord  Beaconsfield.  It  is  im- 
possible to  discuss  fully  the  causes  of  that  bias  in   his 

»  For  the  full  text,  see  Hertslet,  The  Map  of  Europe  by  Treaty,  iv., 
pp.  2418-2429. 


196  The  European  Nations 

nature  which  prejudiced  him  against  supporting  the 
Christians  of  Turkey.  Those  causes  were  due  in  part  to 
the  Semitic  instincts  of  his  Jewish  ancestry — the  Jews 
having  consistently  received  better  treatment  from  the 
Turks  than  from  the  Russians — and  in  part  to  his  staunch 
Imperialism,  which  saw  in  Muscovite  expansion  the  chief 
danger  to  British  communications  with  India.  Mr.  Bryce 
has  recently  pointed  out  in  a  suggestive  survey  of  Dis- 
raeli's character  that  tradition  had  great  weight  with  him.^ 
It  is  known  to  have  been  a  potent  influence  on  the  mind  of 
Queen  Victoria;  and,  as  the  traditional  policy  at  Whitehall 
was  to  support  Turkey  against  Russia,  all  the  personal 
leanings,  which  count  for  so  much,  told  in  favour  of  a 
continuance  in  the  old  lines,  even  though  the  circumstances 
had  utterly  changed  since  the  time  of  the  Crimean  War. 

When,  therefore,  Disraeli  became  aware  that  pressure 
was  about  to  be  applied  to  the  Porte  by  the  three  Powers 
above  named,  he  warned  them  that  he  considered  any 
such  action  to  be  inopportune,  seeing  that  Turkey  ought 
to  be  allowed  time  to  carry  out  a  programme  of  reforms  of 
recent  date.  By  an  irade  of  October  2,  1875,  the  Sultan 
had  promised  to  all  his  Christian  subjects  a  remission  of 
taxation  and  the  right  of  choosing  not  only  the  controllers 
of  taxes,  but  also  delegates  to  supervise  their  rights  at 
Constantinople . 

In  taking  these  promises  seriously,  Disraeli  stood  almost 
alone.  But  his  speech  of  November  9,  1875,  at  the  Lord 
Mayor's  banquet,  showed  that  he  viewed  the  Eastern 
Question  solely  from  the  standpoint  of  British  interests. 
His  acts  spoke  even  more  forcibly  than  his  words.  That 
was  the  time  when  the  dawn  of  Imperialism  flushed  all  the 
«  Bryce,  Studies  in  Contemporary  Biography  (1904). 


The  Eastern  Question  197 

Eastern  sky.  H.R.H.  the  Prince  of  Wales  had  just  begun 
his  Indian  tour  amidst  splendid  festivities  at  Bombay; 
and  the  repetition  of  these  in  the  native  States  undoubtedly 
did  much  to  awaken  interest  in  our  Eastern  Empire  and 
cement  the  loyalty  of  its  princes  and  peoples.  Next,  at 
the  close  of  the  month  of  November,  came  the  news  that 
the  British  Government  had  bought  the  shares  in  the 
Suez  Canal  previously  owned  by  the  Khedive  of  Egypt 
for  the  sum  of  ;i£4,ooo,ooo.^  The  transaction  is  now 
acknowledged  by  every  thinking  man  to  have  been  a 
master-stroke  of  policy,  justified  on  all  grounds,  financial 
and  imperial.  In  those  days  it  met  with  sharp  censure 
from  Disraeli's  opponents.  In  a  sense  this  was  natural; 
for  it  seemed  to  be  part  of  a  scheme  for  securing  British 
influence  in  the  Levant  and  riding  roughshod  over  the 
susceptibilities  of  the  French  (the  constructors  of  the 
canal)  and  the  plans  of  Russia.  Everything  pointed  to 
the  beginning  of  a  period  of  spirited  foreign  policy  which 
would  lead  to  war  with  Russia. 

Meanwhile  the  three  Empires  delayed  the  presentation 
of  their  scheme  of  reforms  for  Turkey,  and,  as  it  would 
seem,  out  of  deference  to  British  representations.  The 
troubles  in  Herzegovina  therefore  went  on  unchecked 
through  the  winter,  the  insurgents  refusing  to  pay  any 
heed  to  the  Sultan's  promises,  even  though  these  were 
extended  by  the  trade  of  December  12th,  offering  religious 
liberty  and  the  institution  of  electoral  bodies  throughout 
the  whole  of  European  Turkey.  The  statesmen  of  the 
Continent  were  equally  sceptical  as  to  the  bona  fides  of 
these  offers,  and  on  January  31,  1876,  presented  to  the 
Porte  their  scheme  of  reforms  already  described.  Disraeli 
1  For  details  of  this  affair,  see  Chapter  XVI.  of  this  work. 


198  The  European  Nations 

and  our  Foreign  Minister,  Lord  Derby,  gave  a  cold  and 
guarded  assent  to  the  "  Andrassy  Note,"  though  they  were 
known  to  regard  it  as  "inopportune."  To  the  surprise 
of  the  world,  the  Porte  accepted  the  note  on  February  nth, 
with  one  reservation. 

This  act  of  acceptance,  however,  failed  to  satisfy  the 
insurgents.  They  decided  to  continue  the  struggle. 
Their  irreconcilable  attitude  doubtless  arose  from  their 
knowledge  of  the  worthlessness  of  Turkish  promises  when 
not  backed  by  pressure  from  the  Powers ;  and  it  should  be 
observed  that  the  "note"  gave  no  hint  of  any  such  pres- 
sure.^ But  it  was  also  prompted  by  the  hope  that  Servia 
and  Montenegro  would  soon  draw  the  sword  on  their 
behalf — as  indeed  happened  later  on.  Those  warlike 
peoples  longed  to  join  in  the  struggle  against  their  an- 
cestral foes;  and  their  rulers  were  nothing  loth  to  do  so. 
Servia  was  then  ruled  by  Prince  Milan  (1868-89)  of  that 
House  of  Obrenovitch  which  has  been  extinguished  by  the 
cowardly  murders  of  June,  1903,  at  Belgrade.  He  had 
recently  married  Nathalie  Kechko,  a  noble  Russian  lady, 
whose  connexions  strengthened  the  hopes  that  he  naturally 
entertained  of  armed  Muscovite  help  in  case  of  a  war  with 
Turkey.  Prince  Nikita  of  Montenegro  had  married  his 
second  daughter  to  a  Russian  Grand  Duke,  cousin  of  the 
Czar  Alexander  II.,  and  therefore  cherished  the  same 
hopes.  It  was  clear  that  unless  energetic  steps  were  taken 
by  the  Powers  to  stop  the  spread  of  the  conflagration  it 
would  soon  wrap  the  whole  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula  in 

1  See  Parliamentary  Papers,  Turkey,  No.  5  (1877),  for  Consul 
Freeman's  report  of  March  17,  1877,  of  the  outrages  by  the  Turks 
in  Bosnia.  The  refugees  declared  they  would  "sooner  drown 
themselves  in  the  Unna  than  again  subject  themselves  to  Turkish 
oppression."     The  Porte  denied  all  the  outrages. 


The  Eastern  Question  199 

flames.  An  outbreak  of  Moslem  fanaticism  at  Salonica 
(May  6th) ,  which  led  to  the  murder  of  the  French  and  Ger- 
man Consuls  at  that  port,  shed  a  lurid  light  on  the  whole 
situation  and  convinced  the  Continental  Powers  that 
sterner  measures  must  be  adopted  towards  the  Porte. 

Such  was  the  position,  and  such  the  considerations,  that 
led  the  three  Empires  to  adopt  more  drastic  proposals. 
Having  found,  meanwhile,  by  informal  conferences  with 
the  Herzegovinian  leaders,  what  were  the  essentials  to  a 
lasting  settlement,  they  prepared  to  embody  them  in  a 
second  note,  the  Berlin  Memorandum,  issued  on  May  13th. 
It  was  drawn  up  by  the  three  Imperial  Chancellors  at 
Berlin,  but  Andrassy  is  known  to  have  given  a  somewhat 
doubtful  consent.  This  "Berlin  Memorandum"  demanded 
the  adoption  of  an  armistice  for  two  months;  the  re- 
patriation of  the  Bosnian  exiles  and  fugitives;  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  mixed  commission  for  that  purpose;  the 
removal  of  Turkish  troops  from  the  rural  districts  of 
Bosnia;  the  right  of  the  Consuls  of  the  European  Powers 
to  see  to  the  carrying  out  of  all  the  promised  reforms. 
Lastly,  the  Memorandum  stated  that  if  within  two  months 
the  three  Imperial  Courts  did  not  attain  the  end  they  had 
in  view  (viz.,  the  carrying  out  of  the  needed  reforms),  it 
would  become  necessary  to  take  "efficacious  measures" 
for  that  purpose.^  Bismarck  is  known  to  have  favoured 
the  policy  of  Gortchakoff  in  this  affair. 

The  proposals  of  the  Memorandum  were  at  once  sent  to 
the  British,  French,  and  Italian  Governments  for  their 
assent.  The  two  last  immediately  gave  it.  After  a  brief 
delay  the  Disraeli  Ministry  sent  a  decisive  refusal  and  made 
no  alternative  proposal,  though  one  of  its  members,  Sir 
»  Hertslet,  iv.,  pp.  2459-2463. 


200  The  European  Nations 

Stafford  Northcote,  is  known  to  have  formulated  a  scheme.* 
The  Cabinet  took  a  still  more  serious  step:  on  May  24th,  it 
ordered  the  British  fleet  in  the  Mediterranean  to  steam  to 
Besika  Bay,  near  the  entrance  to  the  Dardanelles — the 
very  position  it  had  taken  before  the  Crimean  War.^  It 
is  needless  to  say  that  this  act  not  only  broke  up  the 
"European  Concert,"  but  ended  all  hopes  of  compelling 
Turkey  at  once  to  grant  the  much-needed  reforms.  That 
compulsion  would  have  been  irresistible  had  the  British 
fleet  joined  the  Powers  in  preventing  the  landing  of  troops 
from  Asia  Minor  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula.  As  it  was,  the 
Turks  could  draw  those  reinforcements  without  hindrance. 

The  Berlin  Memorandum  was,  of  course,  not  presented 
to  Turkey,  partly  owing  to  the  rapid  changes  which  then 
took  place  at  Constantinople.  To  these  we  must  now 
advert. 

The  Sultan,  Abdul  Aziz,  during  his  fifteen  years  of  rule 
had  increasingly  shown  himself  to  be  apathetic,  wasteful, 
and  indifferent  to  the  claims  of  duty.  In  the  month  of 
April,  when  the  State  repudiated  its  debts,  and  officials  and 
soldiers  were  left  unpaid,  his  life  of  luxurious  retirement 
went  on  imchanged.  It  has  been  reckoned  that  of  the 
total  Turkish  debt  of  ;^T20o,ooo,ooo,  as  much  as  £T^^,- 
000,000  was  due  to  his  private  extravagance.^  Discontent 
therefore    became    rife,    especially    among    the    fanatical 

>  Sir  Stafford  Northcote,  Earl  of  Iddesleigh,  by  Andrew  Lang,  ii., 
p.  181. 

2  Our  ambassador  at  Constantinople,  Sir  Henry  Elliott,  asked 
(May  9th)  that  a  squadron  should  be  sent  there  to  reassure  the  British 
subjects  in  Turkey;  but  as  the  fleet  was  not  ordered  to  proceed 
thither  until  after  a  long  interval,  and  was  kept  there  in  great 
strength  and  for  many  months,  it  is  fair  to  assume  that  the  aim  of 
our  Government  was  to  encourage  Turkey. 

3  Gallenga,  The  Eastern  Question,  ii.,  p.  99. 


The  Eastern  Question  201 

bands  of  theological  students  at  Constantinople.  These 
Softas,  as  they  are  termed,  numbering  some  20,000  or 
more,  determined  to  breathe  new  life  into  the  Porte — an 
aim  which  the  patriotic  "  Young  Turkey  "  party  already  had 
in  view.  On  May  nth  large  bands  of  Softas  surrounded 
the  buildings  of  the  Grand  Vizier  and  the  Sheik-ul-Islam, 
and  with  wild  cries  compelled  them  to  give  up  their  powers 
in  favour  of  more  determined  men.  On  the  night  of  May 
29th-3oth  they  struck  at  the  Sultan  himself.  The  new 
Ministers  were  on  their  side:  the  Sheik-ul-Islam, the  chief  of 
the  Ulemas,  who  interpret  Mohammedan  theology  and  law, 
now  gave  sentence  that  the  Sultan  might  be  dethroned  for 
misgovemment ;  and  this  was  done  without  the  least  show 
of  resistance.  His  nephew,  Murad  Effendi,  was  at  once 
proclaimed  Sultan  as  Murad  V. ;  a  few  days  later  the  de- 
throned Sultan  was  secretly  murdered,  though  possibly  his 
death  may  have  been  due  to  suicide.^ 

We  may  add  here  that  Murad  soon  showed  himself  to  be 
a  friend  to  reform;  and  this,  rather  than  any  incapacity 
for  ruling,  was  probably  the  cause  of  the  second  palace 
revolution,  which  led  to  his  deposition  on  August  31st. 
Thereupon  his  brother,  the  present  ruler,  Abdul  Hamid, 
ascended  the  throne.  His  appearance  was  thus  described 
by  one  who  saw  him  at  his  first  State  progress  through  his 
capital:  "A  somewhat  heavy  and  stem  countenance  .  .  . 
narrow  at  the  temples,  with  a  long  gloomy  cast  of  features, 
large  ears,  and  dingy  complexion.  ...  It  seemed  to 
me  the  countenance  of  a  ruler  capable  of  good  or  evil,  but 
knowing  his  own  mind  and  determined  to  have  his  own 

>  For  the  aims  of  the  Young  Turkey  party,  see  the  Life  of  Midhat 
Pasha,  by  his  son;  also  an  article  by  Midhat  in  the  Nineteenth 
Century  for  June,  1878. 


202  The  European  Nations 

way."  *     This   forecast    has   been   fulfilled   in   the   most 
sinister  manner. 

If  any  persons  believed  in  the  official  promise  of  June 
ist,  that  there  should  be  "liberty  for  all"  in  the  Turkish 
dominions,  they  might  have  been  imdeceived  by  the  events 
that  had  just  transpired  to  the  south  of  the  Balkan  Mount- 
ains. The  outbreak  of  Moslem  fanaticism,  which  at  Con- 
stantinople led  to  the  dethronement  of  two  Sultans  in 
order  to  place  on  the  throne  a  stern  devotee,  had  already 
deluged  with  blood  the  Bulgarian  districts  near  Philippo- 
polis.  In  the  first  days  of  May,  the  Christians  of  those 
parts,  angered  by  the  increase  of  misrule  and  fired  with 
hope  by  the  example  of  the  Herzegovinians,  had  been 
guilty  of  acts  of  insubordination;  and  at  Tatar  Bazardjik 
a  few  Turkish  officials  were  killed.  The  movement  was  of 
no  importance,  as  the  Christians  were  nearly  all  unarmed. 
Nevertheless,  the  authorities  poured  into  the  disaffected 
districts  some  18,000  regiilars,  along  with  hordes  of  ir- 
regulars, or  Bashi-Bazouks ;  and  these,  especially  the  last, 
proceeded  to  glut  their  hatred  and  lust  in  a  wild  orgy 
which  desolated  the  whole  region  with  a  thoroughness  that 
the  Huns  of  Attila  could  scarcely  have  excelled  (May  9th- 
i6th.)  In  the  upper  valley  of  the  Maritza,  out  of  eighty  vil- 
lages all  but  fifteen  were  practically  wiped  out.  Batak,  a 
flourishing  town  of  some  7000  inhabitants,  underwent  a 
systematic  massacre,  culminating  in  the  butchery  of  all  who 
had  taken  refuge  in  the  largest  church ;  of  the  whole  popu- 
lation only  2000  managed  to  escape. ^ 

1  Gallenga,  The  Eastern  Question,  ii.,  p.  126.  Murad  died  in  the 
year  1904. 

2  Mr.  Baring,  a  secretary  of  the  British  Legation  at  Constan- 
tinople, after  a  careful  examination  of  the  evidence,  gave  the  num- 
ber of  Bulgarians  slain  as  "not  fewer  than  12,000  " ;  he  opined  that 


The  Eastern  Question  203 

It  is  painful  to  have  to  add  that  the  British  Government 
was  indirectly  responsible  for  these  events.  Not  only  had 
it  let  the  Turks  know  that  it  deprecated  the  intervention 
of  the  European  Powers  in  Turkey  (which  was  equivalent 
to  giving  the  Turks  carte  blanche  in  dealing  with  their 
Christian  subjects),  but  on  hearing  of  the  Herzegovina 
revolt,  it  pressed  on  the  Porte  the  need  of  taking  speedy 
measures  to  suppress  them.  The  despatches  of  Sir  Henry 
Elliott,  our  ambassador  at  Constantinople,  also  show  that 
he  had  favoured  the  use  of  active  measures  towards  the 
disaffected  districts  north  of  Philippopolis.^ 

Of  course,  neither  the  British  Government  nor  its  am- 
bassador foresaw  the  awful  results  of  this  advice;  but 
their  knowledge  of  Turkish  methods  should  have  warned 
them  against  giving  it  without  adding  the  cautions  so 
obviously  needed.  Sir  Henry  Elliott  speedily  protested 
against  the  measures  adopted  by  the  Turks,  but  then  it 
was  too  late. 2  Furthermore,  the  contemptuous  way  in 
which  Disraeli  dismissed  the  first  reports  of  the  Bulgarian 
massacres  as  "coffee-house  babble"  revealed  his  whole 
attitude  of  mind  on  Turkish  affairs;  and  the  painful  im- 
pression aroused  by  this  utterance  was  increased  by  his 
declaration  of  July  30th  that  the   British  fleet  then  at 

163  Mussulmans  were  perhaps  killed  early  in  May.  He  admitted 
the  Batak  horrors.  Achmet  Agha,  their  chief  perpetrator,  was  at 
first  condemned  to  death  by  a  Turkish  commission  of  inquiry,  but 
he  was  finally  pardoned.  Shefket  Pasha,  whose  punishment  was 
also  promised,  was  afterwards  promoted  to  a  high  command. 
Pari.  Papers,  Turkey,  No.  2  (1877),  pp.  248-249;  ibid..  No.  15 
(1877),  No.  77,  p.  58.  Mr.  Layard,  successor  to  Sir  Henry  Elliott 
at  Constantinople,  afterwards  sought  to  reduce  the  numbers  slaia 
to  3500.     Turkey,  No.  26  (1877),  p.  54. 

>  Pari.  Papers,  Turkey,  No.  3  (1876),  pp.  144,  173,  198-199. 

2  See,  inter  alia,  his  letter  of  May  26,  1876,  quoted  in  Life  aiid 
Correspondence  of  William  White  (1902),  pp.  99-100. 


204  The  European  Nations 

Besika  Bay  was  kept  there  solely  in  defence  of  British 
interests.  He  made  a  similar  but  more  general  statement 
in  the  House  of  Commons  on  August  nth.  On  the  next 
morning  the  world  heard  that  Queen  Victoria  had  been 
pleased  to  confer  on  him  the  title  of  Earl  of  Beaconsfield. 
It  is  well  known,  on  his  own  admission,  that  he  could  no 
longer  endure  the  strain  of  the  late  sittings  in  the  House 
of  Commons  and  had  besought  Her  Majesty  for  leave  to 
retire.  She,  however,  suggested  the  gracious  alternative 
that  he  shoiild  continue  in  office  with  a  seat  in  the  House 
of  Lords.  None  the  less,  the  conferring  of  this  honour  was 
felt  by  very  many  to  be  singularly  inopportime. 

For  at  this  time  tidings  of  the  massacres  at  Batak  and 
elsewhere  began  to  be  fully  known.  Despite  the  efforts 
of  Ministers  to  discredit  them,  they  aroused  growing  ex- 
citement; and  when  the  whole  truth  was  known,  a  storm 
of  indignation  swept  over  the  country  as  over  the  whole 
of  Europe.  Efforts  were  made  by  the  Turcophil  Press  to 
represent  the  new  trend  of  popular  feeling  as  a  mere  party 
move  and  an  insidious  attempt  of  the  Liberal  Opposition 
to  exploit  humanitarian  sentiment;  but  this  charge  will 
not  bear  examination.  Mr.  Gladstone  had  retired  from 
the  Liberal  Leadership  early  in  1875  ^•'^d  ^^^  deeply  oc- 
cupied in  literary  work;  and  Lords  Granville  and  Harting- 
ton,  on  whom  devolved  the  duty  of  leading  the  Opposition, 
had  been  very  sparing  of  criticisms  on  the  foreign  policy  of 
the  Cabinet.  They,  as  well  as  Mr,  Gladstone,  had  merely 
stated  that  the  Government,  on  refusing  to  join  in  the 
Berlin  Memorandum,  ought  to  have  formulated  an  alterna- 
tive policy.  We  now  know  that  Mr.  Gladstone  left  his 
literary  work  doubtfully  and  reluctantly.  1 

»  J,  Morley,  Life  of  Gladstone,  ii.,  pp.  548-549. 


The  Eastern  Question  205 

Now,  however,  the  events  in  Bulgaria  shed  a  ghastly 
light  on  the  whole  situation,  and  showed  the  consequences 
of  giving  the  "moral  support"  of  Britain  to  the  Turks. 
The  whole  question  ceased  to  rest  on  the  high  and  dry- 
levels  of  diplomacy,  and  became  one  of  life  or  death  for 
many  thousands  of  men  and  women.  The  conscience  of 
the  country  was  touched  to  the  quick  by  the  thought  that 
the  presence  of  the  British  Mediterranean  fleet  at  Besika 
Bay  was  giving  the  same  encouragement  to  the  Turks  as 
it  had  done  before  the  Crimean  War,  and  that,  too,  when 
they  had  belied  the  promises  so  solemnly  given  in  1856, 
and  were  now  proved  to  be  guilty  of  unspeakable  bar- 
barities. In  such  a  case,  the  British  nation  would  have 
been  disgraced  had  it  not  demanded  that  no  further  alliance 
should  be  formed.  It  was  equally  the  duty  of  the  leaders 
of  the  Opposition  to  voice  what  was  undoubtedly  the 
national  sentiment.  To  have  kept  silence  would  have 
been  to  stultify  our  Parliamentary  institutions.  The 
parrot  cry  that  British  interests  were  endangered  by 
Russia's  supposed  designs  on  Turkey  was  met  by  the 
unanswerable  reply  that,  if  those  designs  existed,  the  best 
way  to  check  them  was  to  maintain  the  European  concert 
and  especially  to  keep  in  close  touch  with  Austria,  seeing 
that  that  Power  had  as  much  cause  as  England  to  dread 
any  southward  extension  of  the  Czar's  power.  Russia 
might  conceivably  fight  Turkey  and  Great  Britain;  but 
she  would  not  wage  war  against  Austria  as  well.  There- 
fore, the  dictates  of  humanity  as  well  as  those  of  common 
sense  alike  condemned  the  British  policy,  which  from  the 
outset  had  encouraged  the  Turks  to  resist  European  inter- 
vention, had  made  us  in  some  measure  responsible  for  the 
Bulgarian   massacres,    and,    finally,    had   broken   up    the 


2o6  The  European  Nations 

concert  of  the  Powers,  from  which  alone  a  peaceful  solution 
of  the  Eastern  Question  could  be  expected. 

The  union  of  the  Powers  having  been  dissolved  by  Brit- 
ish action,  it  was  but  natural  that  Russia  and  Austria 
should  come  to  a  private  imderstanding.  This  came  about 
at  Reichstadt  in  Bohemia  on  July  8th.  No  definitive 
treaty  was  signed,  but  the  two  Emperors  and  their  Chan- 
cellors framed  an  agreement  defining  their  spheres  of  in- 
fluence in  the  Balkans  in  case  war  should  break  out  between 
Russia  and  Turkey.  Francis  Joseph  of  Austria  covenanted 
to  observe  a  neutrality  friendly  to  the  Czar  under  certain 
conditions  that  will  be  noticed  later  on.  Some  of  those 
conditions  were  distasteful  to  the  Russian  Government, 
which  sounded  Bismarck  as  to  his  attitude  in  case  war 
broke  out  between  the  Czar  and  the  Hapsburg  ruler. 
Apparently  the  reply  of  the  German  Chancellor  was  un- 
favourable to  Russia,^  for  it  thereafter  renewed  the  nego- 
tiations with  the  Court  of  Vienna.  On  the  whole,  the 
ensuing  agreement  was  a  great  diplomatic  triumph;  for 
the  Czar  thereby  secured  the  neutrality  of  Austria — a 
Power  that  might  readily  have  remained  in  close  touch 
with  Great  Britain  had  British  diplomacy  displayed  more 
foresight. 

The  prospects  of  a  great  war,  meanwhile,  had  increased, 
owing  to  the  action  of  Servia  and  Montenegro.  The  rulers 
of  those  States,  unable  any  longer  to  hold  in  their  people, 
and  hoping  for  support  from  their  Muscovite  kinsfolk,  de- 
clared war  on  Turkey  at  the  end  of  June.  Russian  volun- 
teers thronged  to  the  Servian  forces  by  thousands;  but, 
despite  the  leadership  of  the  Russian  General,  Tchemayeff, 
they  were  soon  overborne  by  the  numbers  and  fanatical 
'  Bismarek,  Reflections  and  Reminiscences,  ii.,  chap,  xxviii. 


The  Eastern  Question  207 

valour  of  the  Turks.  Early  in  September,  Servia  appealed 
to  the  Powers  for  their  mediation;  and,  owing  chiefly  to 
the  efforts  of  Great  Britain,  terms  for  an  armistice  were 
proposed  by  the  new  Sultan,  Abdul  Hamid,  but  of  so  hard 
a  nature  that  the  Servians  rejected  them. 

On  the  fortune  of  war  still  inclining  against  the  Slavonic 
cause,  the  Russian  people  became  intensely  excited;  and 
it  was  clear  that  they  would  speedily  join  in  the  war  unless 
the  Turks  moderated  their  claims.  There  is  reason  to 
believe  that  the  Czar  Alexander  11.  dreaded  the  outbreak 
of  hostilities  with  Turkey  in  which  he  might  become 
embroiled  with  Great  Britain.  The  Panslavonic  party  in 
Russia  was  then  permeated  by  revolutionary  elements 
that  might  threaten  the  stability  of  the  dynasty  at  the 
end  of  a  long  and  exhausting  struggle.  But,  feeling  him- 
self in  honour  bound  to  rescue  Servia  and  Montenegro  from 
the  results  of  their  ill-judged  enterprise,  he  assembled 
large  forces  in  South  Russia  and  sent  General  Ignatieff  to 
Constantinople  with  the  demand',  urged  in  the  most  im- 
perious manner  (October  30),  that  the  Porte  should  im- 
mediately grant  an  armistice  to  those  States.  At  once 
Abdul  Hamid  gave  way. 

Even  so,  Alexander  II.  showed  every  desire  of  averting 
the  horrors  of  war.  Speaking  to  the  British  ambassador 
at  St.  Petersburg  on  November  2d,  he  said  that  the  present 
state  of  affairs  in  Turkey  "was  intolerable,  and  unless 
Europe  was  prepared  to  act  with  firmness  and  energy,  he 
should  be  obliged  to  act  alone."  'But  he  pledged  his  word 
that  he  desired  no  aggrandisement,  and  that  "he  had  not 
the  smallest  wish  or  intention  to  be  possessed  of  Con- 
stantinople." ^  At  this  time  proposals  for  a  conference  of 
»  Hertslet,  iv.,  p.  2508. 


2o8  The  European  Nations 

the  Powers  at  Constantinople  were  being  mooted:  they 
had  been  put  forth  by  the  British  Government  on  October 
5th.  There  seemed,  therefore,  to  be  some  hope  of  a  com- 
promise if  the  Powers  reunited  so  as  to  bring  pressure  to 
bear  on  Turkey;  for,  a  week  later,  the  Sultan  announced 
his  intention  of  granting  a  constitution,  with  an  elected 
Assembly  to  supervise  the  administration.  But  hopes  of 
peace  as  well  as  of  effective  reform  in  Turkey  were  damped 
by  the  warlike  speech  of  Lord  Beaconsfield  at  the  Lord 
Mayor's  banquet  on  November  9th.  He  then  used  these 
words:  "If  Britain  draws  the  sword  in  a  righteous  cause; 
if  the  contest  is  one  which  concerns  her  liberty,  her  inde- 
pendence, or  her  Empire,  her  resources,  I  feel,  are  inex- 
haustible. She  is  not  a  country  that,  when  she  enters  into 
a  campaign,  has  to  ask  herself  whether  she  can  support  a 
second  or  a  third  campaign."  On  the  next  day  the  Czar 
replied  in  a  speech  at  Moscow  to  the  effect  that  if  the 
forthcoming  conference  at  Constantinople  did  not  lead  to 
practical  results,  Russia  would  be  forced  to  take  up  arms; 
and  he  counted  on  the  support  of  his  people.  A  week 
later  160,000  Russian  troops  were  mobilised. 

The  issue  was  thus  clear  as  far  as  concerned  Russia.  It 
was  not  so  clear  for  Great  Britain.  Even  now,  we  are  in 
ignorance  as  to  the  real  intent  of  Lord  Beaconsfield's  speech 
at  the  Guildhall.  It  seems  probable  that,  as  there  were 
divisions  in  his  Cabinet,  he  may  have  wished  to  bring 
about  such  a  demonstration  of  public  feeling  as  would 
strengthen  his  hands  in  proposing  naval  and  military 
preparations.  The  duties  of  a  Prime  Minister  are  so  com- 
plex that  his  words  may  be  viewed  either  in  an  international 
sense,  or  as  prompted  by  administrative  needs,  or  by  his 
relations  to  his  colleagues,  or,  again,  they  may  be  due 


The  Eastern  Question  209 

merely  to  electioneering  considerations.  Whatever  their 
real  intent  on  this  occasion,  they  were  interpreted  by 
Russia  as  a  defiance  and  by  Turkey  as  a  promise  of  armed 
help. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  Lord  Beaconsfield  hoped  to 
strengthen  the  pro-Turkish  feeling  in  the  Cabinet  and  the 
country,  he  failed.  The  resentment  aroused  by  Turkish 
methods  of  rule  and  repression  was  too  deep  to  be  eradi- 
cated even  by  his  skilful  appeals  to  imperialist  sentiment. 

The  Bulgarian  atrocities  had  at  least  brought  this  much 
of  good:  they  rendered  a  Turco-British  alliance  absolutely 
impossible. 

Lord  Derby  had  written  to  this  effect  on  August  29th 
to  Sir  Henry  Elliott:  "The  impression  produced  here  by 
events  in  Bulgaria  has  completely  destroyed  sympathy 
with  Turkey.  The  feeling  is  universal  and  so  strong  that 
even  if  Russia  were  to  declare  war  against  the  Porte,  Her 
Majesty's  Government  would  find  it  practically  impossible 
to  interfere."  ^ 

The  assembly  of  a  conference  of  the  envoys  of  the 
Powers  at  Constantinople  was  claimed  to  be  a  decisive 
triumph  for  British  diplomacy.  There  were  indeed  some 
grounds  for  hoping  that  Turkey  would  give  way  before  a 
reunited  Europe.  The  pressure  brought  to  bear  on  the 
British  Cabinet  by  public  opinion  resulted  in  instructions 
being  given  to  Lord  Salisbury  (our  representative,  along 
with  Sir  H.  Elliott,  at  the  Conference)  which  did  not  differ 
much  from  the  avowed  aims  of  Russia  and  of  the  other 
Powers.  Those  instructions  stated  that  the  Powers  could 
not  accept  mere  promises  of  reform,  for  "the  whole  history 
of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  since  it  was  admitted  into  the 
«  Pari.  Papers,  Turkey,  No.  6  (1877). 


2IO  The  European  Nations 

European  Concert  under  the  engagements  of  the  Treaty 
of  Paris  [1856],  has  proved  that  the  Porte  is  unable  to 
guarantee  the  execution  of  reforms  in  the  provinces  by- 
Turkish  officials,  who  accept  them  with  reluctance  and 
neglect  them  with  impunity."  The  Cabinet,  therefore, 
insisted  that  there  must  be  "external  guarantees,"  but 
stipulated  that  no  foreign  armies  must  be  introduced  into 
Turkey.^  Here  alone  British  ministers  were  at  variance 
with  the  other  Powers;  and  when,  in  the  preliminary 
meetings  of  the  Conference,  a  proposal  was  made  to  bring 
Belgian  troops  in  order  to  guarantee  the  thorough  execu- 
tion of  the  proposed  reforms.  Lord  Salisbury  did  not  oppose 
it.  In  pursuance  of  instructions  from  London,  he  even 
warned  the  Porte  that  Britain  would  not  give  any  help  in 
case  war  resulted  from  its  refusal  of  the  European  proposals. 
It  is  well  known  that  Lord  Salisbury  was  far  less  pro- 
Turkish  than  the  Prime  Minister  or  the  members  of  the 
British  embassy  at  Constantinople.  During  a  diplomatic 
tour  that  he  had  made  to  the  chief  capitals  he  convinced 
himself  "that  no  Power  was  disposed  to  shield  Turkey — 
not  even  Austria^if  blood  had  to  be  shed  for  the  status 
quo."  (The  words  are  those  used  by  his  assistant,  Mr., 
afterwards  Sir,  William  White.)  He  had  had  little  or  no 
difficulty  in  coming  to  an  understanding  with  the  Russian 
plenipotentiary.  General  Ignatieff,  despite  the  intrigues  of 
Sir  Henry  Elliott  and  his  staff  to  hinder  it.^  Indeed,  the 
situation  shows  what  might  have  been  effected  in  May, 
1876,  had  not  the  Turks  then  received  the  support  of  the 
British  Government. 

1  Pari.  Papers,  Turkey,  No.  2    (1877),  No.   i;    also,  in    part,  in 
Hertslet,  iv.,  p.  2517. 

2  Sir  William  White:  Life  and  Correspondence,  p.  117. 


The  Eastern  Question  211 

Now,  however,  there  were  signs  that  the  Turks  dechned 
to  take  the  good  advice  of  the  Powers  seriously;  and  on 
December  23rd,  when  the  "full "  meetings  of  the  Conference 
began,  the  Sultan  and  his  ministers  treated  the  plenipo- 
tentiaries to  a  display  of  injured  virtue  and  reforming  zeal 
that  raised  the  situation  to  the  level  of  the  choicest  comedy. 
In  the  midst  of  the  proceedings,  after  the  Turkish  Foreign 
Minister,  Safvet  Pacha,  had  explained  away  the  Bulgarian 
massacres  as  a  myth  woven  by  the  Western  imagination, 
salvoes  of  cannon  were  heard,  that  proclaimed  the  birth  of 
a  new  and  most  democratic  constitution  for  the  whole  of 
the  Turkish  Empire.  Safvet  did  justice  to  the  solemnity 
of  the  occasion ;  the  envoys  of  the  Powers  suppressed  their 
laughter;  and  before  long.  Lord  Salisbury  showed  his 
resentment  at  this  display  of  Oriental  irony  and  stubborn- 
ness by  ordering  the  British  fleet  to  withdraw  from  Besika 
Bay.i 

But  deeds  and  words  were  alike  wasted  on  the  Sultan  and 
his  ministers.  To  all  the  proposals  and  warnings  of  the 
Powers  they  replied  by  pointing  to  the  superior  benefits 
about  to  be  conferred  by  the  new  constitution.  The  Con- 
ference therefore  speedily  came  to  an  end  (January  20th). 
It  had  served  its  purpose.     It  had  fooled  Europe.^ 

The  responsibility  for  this  act  of  cynical  defiance  must  be 
assigned  to  one  man.  The  Sultan  had  never  before  mani- 
fested a  desire  for  any  reform  whatsoever;  and  it  was  not 

>  See  Gallenga  (The  Eastern  Question,  ii.,  pp.  255-258)  as  to  the 
scepticism  regarding  the  new  constitution,  felt  alike  by  foreigners 
and  natives  at  Constantinople. 

2  See  Pari.  Papers,  Turkey,  No.  2  (1878),  p.  114,  for  the  constitu- 
tion; and  p.  302  for  Lord  Salisbury's  criticisms  on  it;  also  ibid., 
pp.  344-345,  for  Turkey's  final  rejection  of  the  proposals  of  the 
Powers. 


212  The  European  Nations 

until  December  19,  1876,  that  he  named  as  Grand  Vizier 
Midhat  Pasha,  who  was  known  to  have  long  been  weaving 
constitutional  schemes.  This  Turkish  Si^yes  was  thrust 
to  the  front  in  time  to  promulgate  that  fundamental  re- 
form. His  tenure  of  power,  like  that  of  the  French  con- 
stitution-monger in  1799,  ended  when  the  scheme  had 
served  the  purpose  of  the  real  controller  of  events.  Midhat 
obviously  did  not  see  whither  things  were  tending.  On 
January  24,  1877,  he  wrote  to  Said  Pasha,  stating  that, 
according  to  the  Turkish  Ambassador  at  London  (Musurus 
Pasha),  Lord  Derby  congratulated  the  Sublime  Porte  on 
the  dissolution  of  the  Conference,  "which  he  considers  a 
success  for  Turkey."  ^ 

It  therefore  only  remained  to  set  the  constitution  in 
motion.  After  six  days,  when  no  sign  of  action  was 
forthcoming,  Midhat  wrote  to  the  Sultan  in  urgent  terms 
reminding  him  that  their  object  in  promulgating  the 
constitution  "was  certainly  not  merely  to  find  a  solution  of 
the  so-called  Eastern  Question,  nor  to  seek  thereby  to  make 
a  demonstration  that  should  conciliate  the  sympathies  of 
Europe,  which  had  been  estranged  from  us."  This  note 
seems  to  have  irritated  the  Sultan.  Abdul  Hamid,  with 
his  small,  nervous,  exacting  nature,  has  always  valued 
ministers  in  proportion  to  their  obedience,  not  to  their 
power  of  giving  timely  advice.  In  every  independent 
suggestion  he  sees  the  germ  of  opposition,  and  perhaps  of  a 
palace  plot.  He  did  so  now.  By  way  of  reply,  he  bade 
Midhat  come  to  the  palace.  Midhat,  fearing  a  trap,  de- 
ferred his  visit,  until  he  received  the  assurance  that  the 
order  for  the  reforms  had  been  issued.     Then  he  obeyed 

>  Life  of  Midhat  Pasha,  by  Midhat  Ali  (1903),  p.  142.  Musurus 
must  have  deliberately  misrepresented  Lord  Derby. 


The  Eastern  Question  213 

the  summons;  at  once  he  was  apprehended,  and  was 
hurried  to  the  Sultan's  yacht,  which  forthwith  steamed 
away  for  the  ^gean  (February  5th).  The  fact  that  he 
remained  above  its  waters,  and  was  allowed  to  proceed 
to  Italy,  may  be  taken  as  proof  that  his  zeal  for  reform 
had  been  not  without  its  uses  in  the  game  which  the 
Sultan  had  played  against  the  Powers.  The  Turkish 
Parliament,  which  assembled  on  March  ist,  acted  with 
the  subservience  that  might  have  been  expected  after 
this  lesson.  The  Sultan  dissolved  it  on  the  outbreak  of 
war,  and  thereafter  gave  up  all  pretence  of  constitutional 
forms.  As  for  Midhat,  he  was  finally  lured  back  to  Tur- 
key and  done  to  death.  Such  was  the  end  of  the  Tur- 
kish constitution,  of  the  Turkish  Parliament,  and  of  their 
contriver.  1 

Even  the  dissolution  of  the  Conference  of  the  Powers  did 
not  bring  about  war  at  once.  It  seems  probable  that  the 
Czar  hoped  much  from  the  statesmanlike  conduct  of  Lord 
Salisbury  at  Constantinople,  or  perhaps  he  expected  to 
secure  the  carrying  out  of  the  needed  reforms  by  means  of 
pressure  from  the  Three  Emperors'  League  (see  Chapter 
XII.).  But,  unless  the  Russians  gave  up  all  interest  in  the 
fate  of  their  kinsmen  and  co-religionists  in  Turkey,  war 
was  now  the  more  probable  outcome  of  events.  Alexander 
had  already  applied  to  Germany  for  help,  either  diplomatic 
or  military;  but  these  overtures,  of  whatever  kind,  were 
declined  by  Bismarck — so  he  declared  in  his  great  speech 
of  February  6,  1888.  Accordingly,  the  Czar  drew  closer 
to  Austria,  with  the  result  that  the  Reichstadt  agreement 

1  Life  of  Midhat  Pasha,  chaps,  v.-vii.  For  the  Sultan's  charac- 
ter and  habits,  see  an  article  in  the  Contemporary  Review  for  Decem- 
ber, i8g6,  by  D.  Kelekian. 


214  The  European  Nations 

of  July  8,  1876,  now  assumed  the  form  of  a  definitive  treaty 
signed  at  Vienna  between  the  two  Powers  on  January  15, 
1877. 

The  full  truth  on  this  subject  is  not  known.  M.  Elie  de 
Cyon,  who  claims  to  have  seen  the  document,  states  that 
Austria  undertook  to  remain  neutral  during  the  Russo- 
Turkish  War,  that  she  stipulated  for  a  large  addition  of 
territory  if  the  Turks  were  forced  to  quit  Europe;  also 
that  a  great  Bulgaria  should  be  formed,  and  that  Servia 
and  Montenegro  should  be  extended  so  as  to  become  con- 
terminous. To  the  present  writer  this  account  appears 
suspect.  It  is  inconceivable  that  Austria  should  have 
assented  to  an  expansion  of  these  Principalities  which 
would  bar  her  road  southward  to  Salonica.^ 

Another  and  more  probable  version  was  given  by  the 
Hungarian  Minister,  M.  Tisza,  during  the  course  of  debates 
in  the  Hungarian  Delegations  in  the  spring  of  1887,  to  this 
effect: — (i)  No  Power  should  claim  an  exclusive  right  of 
protecting  the  Christians  of  Turkey,  and  the  Great  Powers 
should  pronouce  on  the  results  of  the  war ;  (2)  Russia  would 
annex  no  land  on  the  right  (south)  bank  of  the  Danube, 
would  respect  the  integrity  of  Roumania,  and  refrain  from 
touching  Constantinople;  (3)  if  Russia  formed  a  new 
Slavonic  State  in  the  Balkans,  it  should  not  be  at  the 
expense  of  non-Slavonic  peoples;  and  she  would  not  claim 
special  rights  over  Bulgaria,  which  was  to  be  governed  by 
a  prince  who  was  neither  Russian  nor  Austrian ;  (4)  Russia 
would  not  extend  her  military  operations  to  the  districts 
west  of  Bulgaria.     These  were  the  terms  on  which  Austria 

•  Elie  de  Cyon,  Histoire  de  V Entente  franco-russe,  chap.  i. ;  and 
in  Nouvelle  Revue  for  June  i,  1887.  His  account  bears  obvious 
signs  of  malice  against  Germany  and  Austria. 


The  Eastern  Question  215 

agreed  to  remain  neutral ;  and  in  certain  cases  she  claimed 
to  occupy  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.^ 

Doubtless  these,  or  indeed  any,  concessions  to  Austria 
were  repugnant  to  Alexander  11.  and  Prince  Gortchakoff; 
but  her  neutrality  was  essential  to  Russia's  success  in  case 
war  broke  out ;  and  the  Czar's  Government  certainly  acted 
with  much  skill  in  securing  the  friendly  neutrality  of  the 
Power  which  in  1854  had  exerted  so  paralysing  a  pressure 
on  the  Russian  operations  on  the  Lower  Danube. 

Nevertheless,  Alexander  II.  still  sought  to  maintain  the 
European  Concert  with  a  view  to  the  exerting  of  pacific 
pressure  upon  Turkey.  Early  in  March  he  despatched 
General  Ignatieff  on  a  mission  to  the  capitals  of  the  Great 
Powers ;  except  at  Westminster,  that  envoy  found  opinion 
favourable  to  the  adoption  of  some  form  of  coercion  against 
Turkey,  in  case  the  Sultan  still  hardened  his  heart  against 
good  advice.  Even  the  Beaconsfield  Ministry  finally 
agreed  to  sign  a  protocol,  that  of  March  31,  1877,  which 
recounted  the  efforts  of  the  six  Great  Powers  for  the  im- 
provement of  the  lot  of  the  Christians  in  Turkey,  and 
expressed  their  approval  of  the  promises  of  reform  made 
by  that  State  on  February  13,  1876.  Passing  over  without 
notice  the  new  Turkish  constitution,  the  Powers  declared 
that  they  would  carefully  watch  the  carrying  out  of  the 
promised  reforms,  and  that,  if  no  improvement  in  the  lot 
of  the  Christians  should  take  place,  "they  [the  Powers] 
reserve  to  themselves  to  consider  in  common  as  to  the 
means  which  they  may  deem  best  fitted  to  secure  the  well- 
being  of  the  Christian  populations,  and  the  interests  of  the 
general  peace."  ^     This  final  clause  contained  a  suggestion 

«  D6bidour,  Hist,  diplomatique  de  V Europe  (i  814-1878),  ii.,  p.  502. 
2  Pari.  Papers,  Turkey,  No.  9  (1877),  p.  2. 


2i6  The  European  Nations 

scarcely  less  threatening  than  that  with  which  the  Berlin 
Memorandum  had  closed;  and  it  is  difficult  to  see  why 
the  British  Cabinet,  which  now  signed  the  London  Protocol, 
should  have  wrecked  that  earlier  effort  of  the  Powers,  In 
this  as  in  other  matters  it  is  clear  that  the  Cabinet  was 
swayed  by  a  "dual  control." 

But  now  it  was  all  one  whether  the  British  Government 
signed  the  Protocol  or  not.  Turkey  would  have  none  of  it. 
Despite  Lord  Derby's  warning  that  "the  Sultan  would  be 
very  unwise  if  he  would  not  endeavour  to  avail  himself  of 
the  opportunity  afforded  him  to  arrange  a  mutual  dis- 
armament," that  potentate  refused  to  move  a  hair's 
breadth  from  his  former  position.  On  the  12th  of  April 
the  Turkish  Ambassador  announced  to  Lord  Derby  the 
final  decision  of  his  Government:  "Turkey,  as  an  inde- 
pendent State,  cannot  submit  to  be  placed  under  any 
surveillance,  whether  collective  or  not.  .  .  .  No  con- 
sideration can  arrest  the  Imperial  Government  in  their 
determination  to  protest  against  the  Protocol  of  the  31st 
March,  and  to  consider  it,  as  regards  Turkey,  as  devoid  of 
all  equity,  and  consequently  of  all  binding  character." 
Lord  Derby  thereupon  expressed  his  deep  regret  at  this 
decision,  and  declared  that  he  "did  not  see  what  further 
steps  Her  Majesty's  Government  could  take  to  avert  a 
war  which  appeared  to  have  become  inevitable."  ^ 

The  Russian  Government  took  the  same  view  of  the 
case,  and  on  April  7/19,  1877,  stated  in  a  despatch  that, 
as  a  pacific  solution  of  the  Eastern  Question  was  now  im- 
possible, the  Czar  had  ordered  his  armies  to  cross  the 
frontiers  of  Turkey.  The  official  declaration  of  war 
followed  on  April  12/24.  From  the  point  of  view  of  Lord 
»  Pari.  Papers,  Turkey,  No.  15  (1877),  pp.  354-355- 


The  Eastern  Question  217 

Derby  this  seemed  "inevitable."  Nevertheless,  on  May 
ist  he  put  his  name  to  an  official  document  which  reveals 
the  curious  dualism  which  then  prevailed  in  the  Beacons- 
field  Cabinet.  This  reply  to  the  Russian  despatch  con- 
tained the  assertion  that  the  last  answer  of  the  Porte  did 
not  remove  all  hope  of  deference  on  its  part  to  the  wishes 
and  advice  of  Europe,  and  "that  the  decision  of  the 
Russian  Government  is  not  one  which  can  have  their  con- 
currence or  approval."  We  shall  not  be  far  wrong  in 
assuming  that,  while  the  hand  that  signed  this  document 
was  the  hand  of  Derby,  the  spirit  behind  it  was  that  of 
Beaconsfield. 

In  many  quarters  the  action  of  Russia  was  stigmatised 
as  the  outcome  of  ambition  and  greed,  rendered  all  the 
more  odious  by  the  cloak  of  philanthropy  which  she  had 
hitherto  worn.  The  time  has  not  come  when  an  exhaustive 
and  decisive  verdict  can  be  given  on  this  charge.  Few 
movements  have  been  free  from  all  taint  of  meanness ;  but 
it  is  clearly  unjust  to  rail  against  a  great  Power  because, 
at  the  end  of  a  war  which  entailed  frightful  losses  and  a 
serious  though  temporary  loss  of  prestige,  it  determined 
to  exact  from  the  enemy  the  only  form  of  indemnity  which 
was  forthcoming,  namely,  a  territorial  indemnity.  Russia's 
final  claims,  as  will  be  seen,  were  open  to  criticism  at 
several  points;  but  the  censure  just  referred  to  is  puerile. 
It  accords,  however,  with  most  of  the  criticisms  passed  in 
London  "club-land,"  which  were  remarkable  for  their 
purblind  cynicism. 

No  one  who  has  studied  the  mass  of  correspondence  con- 
tained in  the  Blue-books  relating  to  Turkey  in  1875-77  can 
doubt  that  the  Emperor  Alexander  II.  displayed  marvellous 
patience  in  face  of  a  series  of  brutal  provocations  by  Moslem 


2i8  The  European  Nations 

fanatics  and  the  clamour  of  his  own  people  for  a  liberating 
crusade.  Bismarck,  who  did  not  like  the  Czar,  stated  that 
he  did  not  want  war,  but  waged  it  "under  stress  of  Pan- 
slavist  influence."  ^  That  some  of  his  ministers  and 
generals  had  less  lofty  aims  is  doubtless  true;  but  prac- 
tically all  authorities  are  now  agreed  that  the  maintenance 
of  the  European  Concert  would  have  been  the  best  means 
of  curbing  those  aims.  Yet,  despite  the  irritating  con- 
duct of  the  Beaconsfield  Cabinet,  the  Emperor  Alexander 
sought  to  reunite  Europe  with  a  view  to  the  execution  of 
the  needed  reforms  in  Turkey.  Even  after  the  successive 
rebuffs  of  the  rejection  of  the  Berlin  Memorandum  by 
Great  Britain  and  of  the  suggestions  of  the  Powers  at 
Constantinople  by  Turkey,  he  succeeded  in  restoring  the 
semblance  of  accord  between  the  Powers,  and  in  leaving 
to  Turkey  the  responsibility  of  finally  and  insolently  de- 
fying their  recommendations.  A  more  complete  diplo- 
matic triumph  has  rarely  been  won.  It  was  the  reward  of 
consistency  and  patience,  qualities  in  which  the  Beacons- 
field  Cabinet  was  signally  lacking. 

We  may  notice  one  other  criticism:  that  Russia's  agree- 
ment with  Austria  implied  the  pre-existence  of  aggressive 
designs.  This  is  by  no  means  conclusive.  That  the  Czar 
should  have  taken  the  precaution  of  coming  to  the  ar- 
rangement of  January,  1877,  with  Austria  does  not  prove 
that  he  was  desirous  of  war.  The  attitude  of  Turkey 
during  the  Conference  at  Constantinople  left  but  the  slight- 
est hope  of  peace.  To  prepare  for  war  in  such  a  case  is  not 
a  proof  of  a  desire  for  war,  but  only  of  common  prudence. 

Certain  writers  in  France  and  Germany  have  declared 

» Bismarck's  Reflections  and  Reminiscences,  ii.,  p.  259  (Eng. 
ed.). 


The  Eastern  Question  219 

that  Bismarck  was  the  real  author  of  the  Russo-Turkish 
War.  The  dogmatism  of  their  assertions  is  in  signal  con- 
trast with  the  thinness  of  their  evidence.^  It  rests  mainly 
on  the  statement  that  the  Three  Emperors'  League  (see 
Chapter  XII.)  was  still  in  force;  that  Bismarck  had  come 
to  some  arrangement  for  securing  gains  to  Austria  in  the 
south-east  as  a  set-off  to  her  losses  in  1859  and  1866;  that 
Austrian  agents  in  Dalmatia  had  stirred  up  the  Herze- 
govina revolt  of  1875;  and  that  Bismarck  and  Andrassy 
did  nothing  to  avert  the  war  of  1877.  Possibly  he  had  a 
hand  in  these  events — he  had  in  most  events  of  the  time; 
and  there  is  a  suspicious  passage  in  his  Memoirs  as  to  the 
overtures  made  to  Berlin  in  the  autumn  of  1876.  The 
Czar's  ministers  wished  to  know  whether,  in  the  event  of  a 
war  with  Austria,  they  would  have  the  support  of  Germany. 
To  this  the  Chancellor  replied,  that  Germany  could  not  allow 
the  present  equilibrium  of  the  monarchical  Powers  to  be 
disturbed:  "The  result  .  .  .  was  that  the  Russian  storm 
passed  from  Eastern  Galicia  to  the  Balkans."  2  Thereafter 
Russia  came  to  terms  with  Austria  as  described  above. 

But  the  passage  just  cited  only  proves  that  Russia  might 
have  gone  to  war  with  Austria  over  the  Eastern  Question. 
In  point  of  fact,  she  went  to  war  with  Turkey,  after  coming 
to  a  friendly  arrangement  'with  Austria.  Bismarck  there- 
fore acted  as  "honest  broker"  between  his  two  allies;  and 
it  has  yet  to  be  proved  that  Bismarck  did  not  sincerely 
work  with  the  other  two  Empires  to  make  the  coercion 
of  Turkey  by  the  civilised  Powers  irresistibly  strong.  In 
his   speech   of    December  6,   1876,  to  the   Reichstag,  the 

»  Elie  de  Cyon,  op.  cit.,  chap.  i. ;  also  in  Nouvelle  Revue  for 
1880. 

^Bismarck's  Reflections  and  Reminiscences,  ii.,  p.  231  (Eng.  ed.). 


2  20  The  European  Nations 

Chancellor  made  a  plain  and  straightforward  declaration  of 
his  policy,  namely,  that  of  neutrality,  but  inclining  towards 
friendship  with  Austria.  That,  surely,  did  not  drive  Russia 
into  war  with  Turkey,  still  less  entice  her  into  it.  As  for 
the  statement  that  Austrian  intrigues  were  the  sole  cause 
of  the  Bosnian  revolt,  it  must  appear  childish  to  all  who 
bear  in  mind  the  exceptional  hardships  and  grievances  of 
the  peasants  of  that  province.  Finally,  the  assertion  of  a 
newspaper,  the  Czas,  that  Queen  Victoria  wrote  to  Bis- 
marck in  April,  1877,  urging  him  to  protest  against  an 
attack  by  Russia  on  Turkey,  may  be  dismissed  as  an  im- 
pudent fabrication.^  It  was  altogether  opposed  to  the 
habits  of  her  late  Majesty  to  write  letters  of  that  kind  to 
the  foreign  ministers  of  other  Powers. 

Until  documents  of  a  contrary  tenor  come  to  light,  we 
may  say  with  some  approach  to  certainty  that  the  respon- 
sibility for  the  war  of  1877-78  rests  with  the  Sultan  of 
Turkey  and  with  those  who  indirectly  encouraged  him  to 
set  at  naught  the  counsels  of  the  Powers.  Lord  Derby 
and  Lord  Salisbury  had  of  late  plainly  warned  him  of  the 
consequences  of  his  stubbornness ;  but  the  influence  of  the 
British  embassy  at  Constantinople  and  of  the  Turkish 
Ambassador  in  London  seems  greatly  to  have  weakened 
the  force  of  those  warnings. 

It  must  always  be  remembered  that  the  Turk  will  con- 
cede religious  freedom  and  civic  equality  to  the  "Giaours" 
only  under  overwhelming  pressure.  In  such  a  case  he 
mutters  Kismet  ("It  is  fate"),  and  gives  way;  but  the 
least  sign  of  weakness  or  wavering  on  the  part  of  the 
Powers  awakens  his  fanatical  scruples.  Then  his  devotion 
to  the  Koran  forbids  any  surrender.  History  has  afforded 
»  Busch,  Our  Chancellor,  ii.,  p.  126. 


The  Eastern  Question  221 

several  proofs  of  this,  from  the  time  of  the  Battle  of  Nava- 
rino  (1827)  to  that  of  the  intervention  of  the  Western 
Powers  on  behalf  of  the  slaughtered  and  harried  Christians 
of  the  Lebanon  (i860).  Unfortunately  Abdul  Hamid  had 
now  come  to  regard  the  concert  of  the  Powers  as  a  "  loud- 
soimding  nothing."  With  the  usual  bent  of  a  mean  and 
narrow  nature  he  detected  nothing  but  hypocrisy  in  its 
lofty  professions,  and  self-seeking  in  its  philanthropic  aims, 
together  with  a  treacherous  desire  among  influential  per- 
sons to  make  the  whole  scheme  miscarry.  Accordingly 
he  fell  back  on  the  boundless  fiuid  of  inertia  with  which  a 
devout  Moslem  ruler  blocks  the  way  to  Western  reforms. 
A  competent  observer  has  finely  remarked  that  the  Turk 
never  changes;  his  neighbours,  his  frontiers,  his  statute- 
books  may  change,  but  his  ideas  and  his  practice  remain 
always  the  same.  He  will  not  be  interfered  with;  he  will 
not  improve.^  To  this  statement  we  must  add  that  only 
under  dire  necessity  will  he  allow  his  Christian  subjects  to 
improve.  The  history  of  the  Eastern  Question  may  be 
summed  up  in  these  assertions. 

Abdul  Hamid  II.  is  the  incarnation  of  the  reactionary 
forces  which  have  brought  ruin  to  Turkey  and  misery  to 
her  Christian  subjects.  He  owed  his  crown  to  a  recrudes- 
cence of  Moslem  fanaticism;  and  his  reign  has  illustrated 
the  unsuspected  strength  and  ferocity  of  his  race  and 
creed  in  face  of  the  uncertain  tones  in  which  Christendom 
has  spoken  since  the  spring  of  the  year  1876.  The  reasons 
which  prompted  his  defiance  a  year  later  were  revealed  by 
his  former  Grand  Vizier,  Midhat  Pasha,  in  an  article  in  the 
Nineteenth  Century  for  June,  1877.  The  following  passage 
is  especially  illuminating: 

>  Turkey  in  Europe,  by  "Odysseus,"  p.  139. 


222  The  European  Nations 

"Turkey  was  not  unaware  of  the  attitude  of  the  Eng- 
Hsh  Government  towards  her;  the  British  Cabinet  had 
declared  in  clear  terms  that  it  would  not  interfere  in  our 
dispute.  This  decision  of  the  English  Cabinet  was  per- 
fectly well  known  to  us,  but  we  knew  still  better  that  the 
general  interests  of  Europe  and  the  particular  interests  of 
England  were  so  bound  up  in  our  dispute  with  Russia  that, 
in  spite  of  all  the  declarations  of  the  English  Cabinet,  it 
appeared  to  us  to  be  absolutely  impossible  for  her  to  avoid 
interfering  sooner  or  later  in  this  Eastern  dispute.  This 
profound  belief  added  to  the  reasons  we  have  mentioned 
was  one  of  the  principal  factors  of  our  contest  with  Russia."^ 

It  appears,  then,  that  the  action  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment in  the  spring  and  summer  of  1876,  and  the  well- 
known  desire  of  the  Prime  Minister  to  intervene  in  favour 
of  Turkey,  must  have  contributed  to  the  Sultan's  decision 
to  court  the  risks  of  war  rather  than  allow  any  intervention 
of  the  Powers  on  behalf  of  his  Christian  subjects. 

The  information  that  has  come  to  light  from  various 

quarters  serves  to  strengthen  the  case  against  Lord  Bea- 

consfield's  policy  in  the  years  1875-77.     The  letter  written 

by  Mr.  White  to  Sir  Robert  Morier  on  January  16,  1877,  and 

referred  to  above,  shows  that  his  diplomatic  experience 

had  convinced  him  of  the  futility  of  supporting  Turkey 

against  the  Powers.     In  that  letter  he  made  use  of  these 

significant  words:   "You  know  me  well  enough.     I  did  not 

come  here  [Constantinople]  to  deceive  Lord  Salisbury  or 

to  defend  an  untenable  Russophobe  or  pro-Turkish  policy. 

There   will   probably   be   a   difference   of    opinion   in   the 

1  See,  too,  the  official  report  of  our  pro-Turkish  Ambassador  at 
Constantinople,  Mr.  Layard  (May  30,  1877),  as  to  the  difficulty  of 
our  keeping  out  of  the  war  in  its  final  stages  (Pari.  Papers,  Turkey, 
No.  26  (1877),  p.  52). 


The  Eastern  Question  223 

Cabinet  as  to  our  future  line  of  policy,  and  I  shall  not 
wonder  if  Lord  Salisbury  should  upset  Dizzy  and  take  his 
place  or  leave  the  Government  on  this  question.  If  he 
does  the  latter,  the  coach  is  indeed  upset."  Mr.  White 
also  referred  to  the  personnel  of  the  British  Embassy  at 
Constantinople  in  terms  which  show  how  mischievous 
must  have  been  its  influence  on  the  counsels  of  the  Porte. 
A  letter  from  Sir  Robert  Morier  of  about  the  same  date 
proves  that  that  experienced  diplomatist  also  saw  the 
evil  results  certain  to  accrue  from  the  Beaconsfield  policy; 
"I  have  not  ceased  to  din  that  into  the  ears  of  the  F.  O. 
(Foreign  Office),  to  make  ourselves  the  point  d'appui  of  the 
Christians  in  the  Turkish  Empire,  and  thus  take  all  the 
wind  out  of  the  sails  of  Russia;  and  after  the  population 
had  seen  the  difference  between  an  English  and  a  Russian 
occupation  [of  the  disturbed  parts  of  Turkey]  it  would 
jump  to  the  eyes  even  of  the  blind,  and  we  should  dehuter 
into  a  new  policy  at  Constantinople  with  an  immense 
advantage."  ^  This  advice  was  surely  statesmanlike.  To 
support  the  young  and  growing  nationalities  in  Turkey 
would  serve,  not  only  to  checkmate  the  supposed  aggressive 
designs  of  Russia,  but  also  to  array  on  the  side  of  Britain 
the  progressive  forces  of  the  East.  To  rely  on  the  Turk 
was  to  rely  on  a  moribund  creature.  It  was  even  worse. 
It  implied  an  indirect  encouragement  to  the  "sick  man" 
to  enter  on  a  strife  for  which  he  was  manifestly  unequal, 
and  in  which  we  did  not  mean  to  help  him.  But  these 
considerations  failed  to  move  Lord  Beaconsfield  and  the 
Foreign  Office  from  the  paths  of  tradition  and  routine. ^ 

1  Sir  William  White:  Life  and  Correspondence,  pp.  115-117. 

2  For  the  power  of  tradition  in  the  Foreign  Office,  see  Sir  William 
White:  Life  and  Correspondence,  p.  119. 


224  The  European  Nations 

Finally,  in  looking  at  the  events  of  1875-76  in  their 
broad  outlines,  we  may  note  the  verdict  of  a  veteran 
diplomatist,  whose  conduct  before  the  Crimean  War  proved 
him  to  be  as  friendly  to  the  interests  of  Turkey  as  he  was 
hostile  to  those  of  Russia,  but  who  now  saw  that  the  situa- 
tion differed  utterly  from  that  which  was  brought  about 
by  the  aggressive  action  of  Czar  Nicholas  I.  in  1854.  In 
a  series  of  letters  to  the  Times  he  pointed  out  the  supreme 
need  of  joint  action  by  all  the  Powers  who  signed  the 
Treaty  of  Paris;  that  that  treaty  by  no  means  prohibited 
their  intervention  in  the  affairs  of  Turkey;  that  wise  and 
timely  intervention  would  be  to  the  advantage  of  that 
State;  that  the  Turks  had  always  yielded  to  coercion  if  it 
were  of  overwhelming  strength,  but  only  on  those  terms; 
and  that  therefore  the  severance  of  England  from  the 
European  Concert  was  greatly  to  be  deplored.^  In  private 
this  former  champion  of  Turkey  went  even  farther,  and 
declared  on  September  10,  1876,  that  the  crisis  in  the 
East  would  not  have  become  acute  had  Great  Britain 
acted  conjointly  with  the  Powers. ^  There  is  every  reason 
to  believe  that  posterity  will  endorse  this  judgment  of 
Lord  Stratford  de  Redcliffe. 

1  Letters  of  December  31,  1875;  May  16,  1876;  and  September 
9,  1876,  republished  with  others  in  The  Eastern  Question,  by  Lord 
Stratford  de  Redcliffe. 

2  J.  Morley,  Life  of  Gladstone,  ii.,  p.  555. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE    RUSSO-TURKISH    WAR 

"Knowledge  of  the  great  operations  of  war  can  be  acquired  only 
by  experience  and  by  the  applied  study  of  the  campaigns  of  all  the 
great  captains.  Gustavus,  Turenne,  and  Frederick,  as  well  as 
Alexander,  Hannibal,  and  Caesar,  have  all  acted  on  the  same  prin- 
ciples. To  keep  one's  forces  together,  to  bear  speedily  on  any 
point,  to  be  nowhere  vulnerable,  such  are  the  principles  that  assure 
victory." — Napoleon. 

DESPITE  the  menace  to  Russia  contained  in  the 
British  Note  of  May  i,  1877,  there  was  at  present 
little  risk  of  a  collision  between  the  two  Powers  for  the 
causes  already  stated.  The  Government  of  the  Czar 
showed  that  it  desired  to  keep  on  friendly  terms  with  the 
Cabinet  of  St.  James,  for,  in  reply  to  a  statement  of  Lord 
Derby  that  the  security  of  Constantinople,  Egypt,  and  the 
Suez  Canal  was  a  matter  of  vital  concern  for  Great  Britain, 
the  Russian  Chancellor,  Prince  Gortchakoff,  on  May  30th 
sent  the  satisfactory  assurance  that  the  two  latter  would 
remain  outside  the  sphere  of  military  operations ;  that  the 
acquisition  of  the  Turkish  capital  was  "excluded  from  the 
views  of  His  Majesty  the  Emperor,"  and  that  its  future 
was  a  question  of  common  interest  which  could  be  settled 
only  by  a  general  understanding  among  the  Powers.^  So 
long  as  Russia  adhered  to  these  promises  there  could 
scarcely  be  any  question  of  Great  Britain's  intervening  on 
behalf  of  Turkey. 

<  Hertslet,  iv.,  p.  2625. 
225 


2  26  The  European  Nations 

Thus  the  general  situation  in  the  spring  of  1877  scarcely 
seemed  to  warrant  the  hopes  with  which  the  Turks  entered 
on  the  war.  They  stood  alone  confronting  a  Power  which 
had  vastly  greater  resources  in  men  and  treasure.  Seeing 
that  the  Sultan  had  recently  repudiated  a  large  part  of  the 
State  debt,  and  could  borrow  only  at  exorbitant  rates  of 
interest,  it  is  even  now  mysterious  how  his  Ministers 
managed  to  equip  very  considerable  forces,  and  to  arm 
them  with  quick-firing  rifles  and  excellent  cannon.  The 
Turk  is  a  bom  soldier,  and  will  fight  for  nothing  and  live 
on  next  to  nothing  when  his  creed  is  in  question ;  but  that 
does  not  solve  the  problem,  of  how  the  Porte  coiild  buy  huge 
stores  of  arms  and  ammunition.  It  had  procured  300,000 
American  rifles,  and  bought  200,000  more  early  in  the  war. 
On  this  topic  we  must  take  refuge  in  the  domain  of  legend, 
and  say  that  the  life  of  Turkey  is  the  life  of  a  phoenix:  it 
now  and  again  rises  up  fresh  and  defiant  among  the  flames. 

As  regards  the  Ottoman  army,  an  English  officer  in  its 
service,  Lieutenant  W.  V.  Herbert,  states  that  the  artillery 
was  very  good,  despite  the  poor  supply  of  horses;  that  the 
infantry  was  very  good;  the  regular  cavalry  mediocre,  the 
irregular  cavalry  useless.  He  estimates  the  total  forces  in 
Europe  and  Asia  at  700,000;  but,  as  he  admits  that  the 
battalions  of  800  men  rarely  averaged  more  than  600,  that 
total  is  clearly  fallacious.  An  American  authority  believed 
that  Turkey  had  not  more  than  250,000  men  ready  in 
Europe,  and  that  of  these  not  more  than  165,000  were 
north  of  the  Balkans  when  the  Russians  advanced  towards 
the  Danube.^  Von  Lignitz  credits  the  Turks  with  only 
215,000    regular    troops    and    100,000    irregulars    (Bashi 

1  The  Campaign  in  Bulgaria,  by  F.  V.  Greene,  pt.  ii.,  ch.  i.; 
W.  V.  Herbert,  The  Defence  of  Plevna,  chaps,  i.-ii. 


The  Russo-Turkish  War  227 

Bazouks  and  Circassians)  in  the  whole  Empire;  of  these 
he  assigns  two-thirds  to  European  Turkey.^ 

It  seemed,  then,  that  Russia  had  no  very  formidable 
task  before  her.  Early  in  May  seven  army  corps  began 
to  move  towards  that  great  river.  They  included  i8o 
battalions  of  infantry,  200  squadrons  of  cavalry,  and  800 
guns — in  all  about  200,000  men.  Their  cannon  were  in- 
ferior to  those  of  the  Turks,  but  this  appeared  to  be  a 
small  matter  in  view  of  the  superior  numbers  which 
Russia  seemed  about  to  place  in  the  field.  The  mobilis- 
ation of  her  huge  army,  however,  went  on  slowly,  and 
produced  by  no  means  the  numbers  that  were  officially 
reported.  The  British  military  attach^  at  the  Russian 
headquarters.  Colonel  Wellesley,  reported  this  fact  to  the 
British  Government,  and,  on  this  being  found  out,  incurred 
disagreeable  slights  from  the  Russian  authorities.  2 

Meanwhile  Russia  had  secured  the  co-operation  of 
Roumania  by  a  convention  signed  on  April  i6th,  whereby 
the  latter  State  granted  a  free  passage  through  that 
Principality,  and  promised  friendly  treatment  to  the  Mus- 
covite troops.  The  Czar  in  return  pledged  himself  to 
"maintain  and  defend  the  actual  integrity  of  Roumania."  ^ 
The  sequel  will  show  how  this  promise  was  fulfilled.  For 
the  present  it  seemed  that  the  interests  of  the  Principality 
were  fully  secured.  Accordingly  Prince  Charles  (elder 
brother  of  Prince  Leopold  of  Hohenzollem,  whose  candi- 
dature for  the  Crown  of  Spain  made  so  much  stir  in  1870) 
took  the  further  step  of  abrogating  the  suzerainty  of  the 
Sultan  over  Roumania  (June  3). 

>  Aus  drei  Kreigen,  by  General  von  Lignitz,  p.  99. 
2  With  the  Russians  in  War  and  Peace,  by  Colonel  F.  A.  Welles- 
ley  (1905),  ch.  xvii. 
^  Hertslet,  iv.,  p.  2577. 


228  The  European  Nations 

Even  before  the  declaration  of  independence  Roiimania 
had  ventured  on  a  few  acts  of  war  against  Turkey ;  but  the 
co-operation  of  her  army,  comprising  50,000  regulars  and 
70,000  National  Guards,  with  that  of  Russia  proved  to  be 
a  knotty  question.  The  Emperor  Alexander  II.,  on 
reaching  the  Russian  headquarters  at  Plojeschti,  to  the 
north  of  Bukharest,  expressed  his  wish  to  help  the  Rou- 
manian army,  but  insisted  that  it  must  be  placed  tinder 
the  commander-in-chief  of  the  Russian  forces,  the  Grand 
Duke  Nicholas.  To  this  Prince  Charles  demurred,  and  the 
Roumanian  troops  at  first  took  no  active  part  in  the  cam- 
paign. Undoubtedly  their  non-arrival  served  to  mar  the 
plans  of  the  Russian  staff. ^ 

Delays  multiplied  from  the  outset.  The  Russians,  not 
having  naval  superiority  in  the  Black  Sea,  which  helped  to 
gain  them  their  speedy  triumph  in  the  campaign  of  1828, 
could  only  strike  through  Roumania  and  across  the  Danube 
and  the  difificult  passes  of  the  middle  Balkans.  Further, 
as  the  Roumanian  railways  had  but  single  lines,  the  move- 
ment of  men  and  stores  to  the  Danube  vv^as  very  slow. 
Numbers  of  the  troops,  after  camping  on  its  marshy  banks 
(for  the  river  was  then  in  flood),  fell  ill  of  malarial  fever; 
above  all,  the  carelessness  of  the  Russian  staff  and  the  un- 
blushing peculation  of  its  subordinates  and  contractors 
clogged  the  wheels  of  the  military  machine.  One  result 
of  it  was  seen  in  the  bad  bread  supplied  to  the  troops.  A 
Roumanian  officer,  when  dining  with  the  Grand  Duke 
Nicholas,  ventured  to  compare  the  ration  bread  of  the 
Russians  with  the  far  better  bread  supplied  to  his  own  men 
at  cheaper  rates.     The  Grand  Duke  looked  at  the  two 

» Reminiscences  of  the  King  of  Roumania,  edited  by  S.  Whitman 
(1899),  pp.  269,  274. 


The  Russo-Turkish  War  229 

specimens  and  then — talked  of  something  else.^  Nothing 
could  be  done  until  the  flood  subsided  and  large  bodies  of 
troops  were  ready  to  threaten  the  Turkish  line  of  defence 
at  several  points.^ 

The  Ottoman  position  by  no  means  lacked  elements  of 
strength.  The  first  of  these  was  the  Danube  itself.  The 
task  of  crossing  a  great  river  in  front  of  an  active  foe  is  one 
of  the  most  dangerous  of  all  military  operations.  Any 
serious  miscalculation  of  the  strength,  the  position,  or  the 
mobility  of  the  enemy's  forces  may  lead  to  an  irreparable 
disaster;  and  until  the  bridges  used  for  the  crossing  are 
defended  by  tetes  de  pont  the  position  of  the  column  that 
has  passed  over  is  precarious. 

The  Danube  is  especially  hard  to  cross,  because  its 
northern  bank  is  for  the  most  part  marshy,  and  is  domi- 
nated by  the  southern  bank.  The  German  strategist  von 
Moltke,  who  knew  Turkey  well,  and  had  written  the  best 
history  of  the  Russo-Turkish  War  of  1828,  maintained 
that  the  passage  of  the  Danube  must  cost  the  invaders 
upwards  of  50,000  men.  Thereafter,  they  would  be 
threatened  by  the  quadrilateral  of  fortresses — Rustchuk, 
Shumla,  Varna,  and  Silistria.  Three  of  these  were  con- 
nected by  railway,  which  enabled  the  Turks  to  send  troops 
quickly  from  the  port  of  Varna  to  any  position  between 
the  mountain  stronghold  of  Shumla  and  the  riverine  fort- 
ress, Rustchuk. 

Even  the  non-military  reader  will  see  by  a  glance  at  the 
map  that  this   quadrilateral,  if  strongly  held,  practically 

'  Farcy,  La  Guerre  sur  le  Danube,  p.  73.  For  other  malpractices 
see  Col.  F.  A  Wellesley's  With  the  Russians  in  Peace  and  War, 
chaps,  xi.,  xii. 

2  Punch  hit  off  the  situation  by  thus  parodying  the  well-known 
line  of  Horace:   "Russicus  expectat  dum  defluat  amnis." 


230  The  European  Nations 

barred  the  roads  leading  to  the  Balkans  on  their  eastern 
side.  It  also  endangered  the  march  of  an  invading  army- 
through  the  middle  of  Bulgaria  to  the  central  passes  of 
that  chain.  Moreover,  there  are  in  that  part  only  two  or 
three  passes  that  can  be  attempted  by  an  army  with 
artillery.  The  fortress  of  Widdin,  where  Osman  Pasha 
was  known  to  have  an  army  of  about  40,000  seasoned 
troops,  dominated  the  west  of  Bulgaria  and  the  roads 
leading  to  the  easier  passes  of  the  Balkans  near  Sofia. 

These  being  the  difficulties  that  confronted  the  in- 
vaders in  Europe,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  first  im- 
portant battles  took  place  in  Asia.  On  the  Armenian 
frontier  the  Russians,  tmder  Loris  Melikoff,  soon  gained 
decided  advantages,  driving  back  the  Turks  with  con- 
siderable losses  on  Kars  and  Erzeroum.  The  tide  of  war 
soon  turned  in  that  quarter,  but,  for  the  present,  the 
Muscovite  triumphs  sent  a  thrill  of  fear  through  Turkey, 
and  probably  strengthened  the  determination  of  Abdul- 
Kerim,  the  Turkish  commander-in-chief  in  Europe,  to 
maintain  a  cautious  defensive. 

Much  could  be  said  in  favour  of  a  "Fabian"  policy  of 
delay.  Large  Turkish  forces  were  in  the  western  provinces 
warring  against  Montenegro,  or  watching  Austria,  Servia, 
and  Greece.  It  is  even  said  that  Abdul-Kerim  had  not  at 
first  more  than  about  120,000  men  in  the  whole  of  Bulgaria, 
inclusive  of  the  army  at  Widdin.  But  obviously,  if  the 
invaders  so  far  counted  on  his  weakness  as  to  thrust  their 
columns  across  the  Danube  in  front  of  forces  that  could  be 
secretly  and  swiftly  strengthened  by  drafts  from  the  South 
and  West,  they  would  expose  themselves  to  the  gravest 
risks.  The  apologists  of  Abdul-Kerim  claim  that  such  was 
his  design,  and  that  the  signs  of  sluggishness  which  he  at 


231 


2  32  The  European  Nations 

first  displayed  formed  a  necessary  part  of  a  deep-laid 
scheme  for  luring  the  Russians  to  their  doom.  Let  the 
invaders  enter  Central  Bulgaria  in  force,  and  expose  their 
flanks  to  Abdul-Kerim  in  the  Quadrilateral,  and  to  Osman 
Pasha  at  Widdin;  then  the  Turks,  by  well-concerted  moves 
against  those  flanks,  would  drive  the  enemy  back  on  the 
Danube,  and  perhaps  compel  a  large  part  of  his  forces  to 
lay  down  their  arms.  Such  is  their  explanation  of  the 
conduct  of  Abdul-Kerim. 

As  the  Turkish  Government  is  wholly  indifferent  to  the 
advance  of  historical  knowledge,  it  is  impossible  even  now 
to  say  whether  this  idea  was  definitely  agreed  on  as  the 
basis  of  the  plan  of  campaign.  There  are  signs  that  Abdul- 
Kerim  and  Osman  Pasha  adopted  it,  but  whether  it  was 
ever  approved  by  the  War  council  at  Constantinople  is  a 
different  question.  Such  a  plan  obviously  implied  the 
possession  of  great  powers  of  self-control  by  the  Sultan  and 
his  advisers,  in  face  of  the  initial  success  of  the  Russians; 
and  unless  that  self-control  was  proof  against  panic,  the 
design  could  not  but  break  down  at  the  crucial  point. 
Signs  are  not  wanting  that  in  the  suggestions  here  tenta- 
tively offered  we  find  a  key  that  unlocks  the  riddle  of  the 
Danubian  campaign  of  1877. 

At  first  Abdul-Kerim  in  the  Quadrilateral,  and  Osman 
at  Widdin,  maintained  a  strict  defensive.  The  former 
posted  small  bodies  of  troops,  probably  not  more  than 
20,000  in  all,  at  Sistova,  Nicopolis,  and  other  neighbour- 
ing points.  But,  apart  from  a  heavy  bombardment  of 
Russian  and  Roumanian  posts  on  the  northern  bank, 
neither  commander  did  much  to  mar  the  hostile  prepar- 
ations. This  want  of  initiative,  which  contrasted  with 
the  enterprise  displayed  by  the  Turks  in    1854,  enabled 


The  Russo-Turkish  War  233 

the  invaders  to  mature  their  designs  with  little  or  no 
interruption. 

The  Russian  plan  of  campaign  was  to  destroy  or  cripple 
the  four  small  Turkish  ironclads  that  patrolled  the  lower 
reaches  of  the  river,  to  make  feints  at  several  points,  and 
to  force  a  passage  at  two  places — first  near  Ibrail  into  the 
Dobrudscha,  and  thereafter,  under  cover  of  that  diversion, 
from  Simnitza  to  Sistova.  The  latter  place  of  crossing 
combined  all  possible  advantages.  It  was  far  enough 
away  from  the  Turkish  Quadrilateral  to  afford  the  first 
essentials  of  safety ;  it  was  known  to  be  but  weakly  held ; 
its  position  on  the  shortest  line  of  road  between  the  Danube 
and  a  practicable  pass  of  the  Balkans — the  Shipka  Pass — 
formed  a  strong  recommendation;  while  the  presence  of 
an  island  helped  on  the  first  preparations. 

The  flood  of  the  Danube  having  at  last  subsided,  all  was 
ready  by  midsummer.  Russian  batteries  and  torpedo- 
boats  had  destroyed  two  Turkish  gunboats  in  the  lower 
reaches  of  the  river,  and  on  June  22nd  a  Russian  force 
crossed  in  boats  from  a  point  near  Galatz  to  Matchin,  and 
made  good  their  hold  on  the  Dobrudscha. 

Preparations  were  also  ripe  at  Simnitza.  In  the  narrow 
northern  arm  of  the  river  the  boats  and  pontoons  collected 
by  the  Russians  were  launched  with  no  difficulty,  the  island 
was  occupied,  and  on  the  night  of  Jxme  26-27,  ^  ^ol- 
hynian  regiment,  along  with  Cossacks,  crossed  in  boats 
over  the  broad  arm  of  the  river,  there  some  1000  yards 
wide,  and  gained  a  foothold  on  the  bank.  Already  their 
numbers  were  thinned  by  a  dropping  fire  from  a  Turkish 
detachment;  but  the  Turks  made  the  mistake  of  trusting 
to  the  bullet  instead  of  plying  the  bayonet.  Before  dawn 
broke,  the  first-comers  had  been   able  to  ensconce  them- 


234  The  European  Nations 

selves  under  a  bank  until  other  boats  came  up.  Then  with 
rousing  cheers  they  charged  the  Turks  and  pressed  them 
back. 

This  was  the  scene  which  greeted  the  eyes  of  General 
Dragomiroff  as  his  boat  drew  near  to  the  shore  at  5  a.m. 
Half  hidden  by  the  morning  mist,  the  issue  seemed  doubt- 
ful. But  at  his  side  stood  a  general,  fresh  from  triumphs 
in  Turkestan,  who  had  begged  to  be  allowed  to  come  as 
volunteer  or  aide-de-camp.  When  Dragomiroff,  in  an 
agony  of  suspense,  lowered  his  glass,  the  other  continued 
to  gaze,  and  at  last  exclaimed:  "I  congratulate  you  on 
your  victory."  "Where  do  you  see  that?"  asked  Dra- 
gomiroff. "Where?  On  the  faces  of  the  soldiers.  Look 
at  them.  Watch  them  as  they  charge  the  enemy.  It  is  a 
pleasure  to  see  them."  The  verdict  was  true.  It  was  the 
verdict  of  Skobeleff.^ 

Such  was  the  first  appearance  in  European  warfare  of 
the  greatest  leader  of  men  that  Russia  has  produced  since 
the  days  of  Suvoroff.  The  younger  man  resembled  that 
sturdy  veteran  in  his  passion  for  war,  his  ambition,  and 
that  frank,  bluff  bearing  which  always  wins  the  hearts  of 
the  soldiery.  The  grandson  of  a  peasant,  whose  bravery 
had  won  him  promotion  in  the  great  year,  181 2;  the  son 
of  a  general  whose  prowess  was  renowned,  Skobeleff  was 
at  once  a  commander  and  a  soldier.  "Ah!  he  knew  the 
soul  of  a  soldier  as  if  he  were  himself  a  private."  These 
were  the  words  often  uttered  by  the  Russians  about  Sko- 
beleff; similar  things  had  been  said  of  Suvoroff  in  his  day. 
For  champions  such  as  these  the  emotional  Slavs  will  al- 

»  Quoted  from  a  report  by  an  eye-witness,  by  "O.  K."  (Madame 
Novikoff),  Skobeleff  and  the  Slavonic  Cause,  p.  38.  The  crossing 
was  planned  by  the  Grand  Duke  Nicholas;  see  von  Lignitz,  Aus 
drei  Kriegen,  p.  149 


The  Russo-Turkish  War  235 

ways  pour  out  their  blood  like  water.  But,  like  the  captor 
of  Warsaw,  Skobeleff  knew  when  to  put  aside  the  bayonet 
and  win  the  day  by  skill.  Both  were  hard  hitters,  but 
they  had  a  hold  on  the  principles  of  the  art  of  war.  The 
combination  of  these  qualities  was  formidable;  and  many 
Russians  believe  that,  had  the  younger  man,  with  his 
magnificent  physique  and  magnetic  personality,  enjoyed 
the  length  of  days  vouchsafed  to  the  diminutive  Suvoroff , 
he  would  have  changed  the  face  of  two  continents. 

The  United  States  attach^  to  the  Russian  army  in  the 
Russo-Turkish  War  afterwards  spoke  of  his  military  genius 
as  "stupendous,"  and  prophesied  that,  should  he  live 
twenty  years  longer,  and  lead  the  Russian  armies  in  the 
next  Turkish  war,  he  would  win  a  place  side  by  side  with 
"Napoleon,  Wellington,  Grant,  and  Moltke."  To  equate 
these  four  names  is  a  mark  of  transatlantic  enthusiasm 
rather  than  of  balanced  judgment;  but  the  estimate,  so 
far  as  it  concerns  Skobeleff,  reflects  the  opinion  of  nearly 
all  who  knew  him.^ 

Encouraged  by  the  advent  of  Skobeleff  and  Dragomiroff, 
the  Russians  assumed  the  offensive  with  full  effect,  and  by 
the  afternoon  of  that  eventful  day  had  mastered  the  rising 
ground  behind  Sistova.  Here  again  the  Turkish  defence 
was  tame.  The  town  was  unfortified,  but  its  outskirts 
presented  facilities  for  defence.  Nevertheless,  under  the 
pressure  of  the  Russian  attack  and  of  artillery  fire  from 
the  north  bank,  the  small  Turkish  garrison  gave  up  the 
town  and  retreated  towards  Rustchuk.  At  many  points 
on  that  day  the  Russians  treated  their  foes  to  a  heavy 
bombardment  or  feints  of  crossing,  especially  at  Nicopolis 
and  Rustchuk;  and  this  accounts  for  the  failure  of  the 
1  F.  V.  Greene,  Sketches  of  Army  Life  in  Russia,  p.  142. 


236  The  European  Nations 

defenders  to  help  the  weak  garrison  on  which  fell  the  brunt 
of  the  attack.  All  things  considered,  the  crossing  of  the 
Danube  must  rank  as  a  highly  creditable  achievement, 
skilfully  planned  and  stoutly  carried  out;  it  cost  the  in- 
vaders scarcely  700  men.^ 

They  now  began  to  make  a  pontoon-bridge  across  the 
Danube  between  Simnitza  and  Sistova;  and  by  July  2nd 
had  65,000  men  and  244  cannon  in  and  near  the  latter 
town.  Meanwhile,  their  14th  corps  held  the  central 
position  of  Babadagh  in  the  Dobrudscha,  thereby  pre- 
venting any  attack  from  the  northeast  side  of  the  Quad- 
rilateral against  their  communications  with  the  south  of 
Russia. 

It  may  be  questioned,  however,  whether  the  invaders  did 
well  to  keep  so  large  a  force  in  the  Dobrudscha,  seeing  that 
a  smaller  body  of  light  troops  patrolling  the  left  bank  of 
the  lower  Danube  or  at  the  tete  de  pont  at  Matchin  would 
have  answered  the  same  purpose.  The  chief  use  of  the 
crossing  at  Matchin  was  to  distract  the  attention  of  the 
enemy,  an  advance  through  the  unhealthy  district  of 
the  Dobrudscha  against  the  Turkish  Quadrilateral  being  in 
every  way  risky;  above  all,  the  retention  of  a  whole  corps 
on  that  side  weakened  the  main  line  of  advance,  that  from 
Sistova;  and  here  it  was  soon  clear  that  the  Russians  had 
too  few  men  for  the  enterprise  in  hand.  The  pontoon- 
bridge  over  the  Danube  was  completed  by  July  2nd,  a  fact 
which  enabled  those  troops  which  were  in  Roumania  to  be 
hurried  forward  to  the  front. 

Obviously  it  was  unsafe  to  march  towards  the  Balkans 
until  both  flanks  were  secured  against  onsets  from  the 

»  Farcy,  La  Guerre  sur  le  Danube,  ch.  viii. ;  ''Daily  News  "  Corre- 
spondence of  the  War  of  iSjj-jS,  chap.  viii. 


The  Russo-Turkish  War  237 

Quadrilateral  on  the  east,  and  from  Nicopolis  and  Widdin 
on  the  west.  At  Nicopolis,  twenty-five  miles  away,  there 
were  about  10,000  Turks;  and  arotmd  Widdin,  about  100 
miles  farther  up  the  stream,  Osman  mustered  40,000  more. 
To  him  Abdul-Kerim  now  sent  an  order  to  march  against 
the  flank  of  the  invaders. 

Nor  were  the  Balkan  passes  open  to  the  Russians;  for, 
after  the  crossing  of  the  Danube,  Reuf  Pasha  had  orders  to 
collect  all  available  troops  for  their  defence,  from  the  Shipka 
Pass  to  the  Slievno  Pass  farther  east ;  7000  men  now  held 
the  Shipka;  about  10,000  acted  as  a  general  reserve  at 
Slievno;  3000  were  thrown  forward  to  Timova,  where  the 
mountainous  country  begins,  and  detachments  held  the 
more  difficult  tracks  over  the  mountains.  An  urgent 
message  was  also  sent  to  Suleiman  Pasha  to  disengage  the 
largest  possible  force  from  the  Montenegrin  war;  and,  had 
he  received  this  message  in  time,  or  had  he  acted  with  the 
needful  speed  and  skill,  events  might  have  gone  very 
differently. 

For  some  time  the  Turks  seemed  to  be  paralysed  at  all 
points  by  the  vigour  of  the  Muscovite  movements.  Two 
corps,  the  13th  and  14th,  marched  south-east  from  Sistova 
to  the  torrent  of  the  Jantra,  or  Yantra,  and  seized  Bella, 
an  important  centre  of  roads  in  that  district.  This  secured 
them  against  any  immediate  attack  from  the  Quadrilateral. 
The  Grand  Duke  Nicholas  also  ordered  the  gth  corps,  under 
the  command  of  General  Kriidener,  to  advance  from  Sis- 
tova and  attack  the  weakly  fortified  town  of  Nicopolis. 
Aided  by  the  Roumanian  guns  on  the  north  bank  of  the 
Danube,  this  corps  succeeded  in  overpowering  the  defence 
and  capturing  the  town,  along  with  7000  troops  and  no 
guns  (July  1 6th). 


238  The  European  Nations 

Thus  the  invaders  seemed  to  have  gained  a  secure  base 
on  the  Danube,  from  Sistova  to  Nicopolis,  whence  they 
coidd  safely  push  forward  their  vanguard  to  the  Balkans. 
In  point  of  fact  their  light  troops  had  already  seized  one 
of  its  more  difficult  passes — an  exploit  that  will  always 
recall  the  name  of  that  dashing  leader,  General  Gurko. 
The  plan  now  to  be  described  was  his  conception;  it  was 
approved  by  the  Grand  Duke  Nicholas.  Setting  out  from 
Sistova  and  drawing  part  of  his  column  from  the  force  at 
Bella,  Gurko  first  occupied  the  important  town  of  Timova, 
the  small  Turkish  garrison  making  a  very  poor  attempt  to 
defend  the  old  Bulgarian  capital  Quly  7th).  The  liberators 
there  received  an  overwhelming  ovation,  and  gained  many 
recruits  for  the  "Bulgarian  Legion."  Pushing  ahead,  the 
Cossacks  and  Dragoons  seized  large  supplies  of  provisions 
stored  by  the  Turks,  and  gained  valuable  news  respecting 
the  defences  of  the  passes. 

The  Shipka  Pass,  due  south  of  Timova,  was  now  strongly 
held,  and  Turkish  troops  were  hurrying  towards  the  two 
passes  north  of  Slievno,  some  fifty  miles  farther  east. 
Even  so  they  had  not  enough  men  at  hand  to  defend  all 
the  passes  of  the  mountain  chain  that  formed  their  chief 
line  of  defence.  They  left  one  of  them  practically  tmde- 
fended ;  this  was  the  Hainkoi  Pass,  having  an  elevation  of 
3700  feet  above  the  sea. 

A  Russian  diplomatist,  Prince  Tsertelefif,  who  was 
charged  to  collect  information  about  the  passes,  found 
that  the  Hainkoi  enjoyed  an  evil  reputation.  "Ill  luck 
awaits  him  who  crosses  the  Hainkoi  Pass,"  so  ran  the  local 
proverb.  He  therefore  determined  to  try  it;  by  dint  of 
questioning  the  friendly  Bulgarian  peasantry  he  found  one 
man  who  had  been  through  it  once,  and  that  was  two  years 


The  Russo-Turkish  War  239 

before,  with  an  ox-cart.  Where  an  ox-cart  could  go,  a 
light  motmtain  gtin  could  go.  Accordingly,  the  Prince  and 
General  Rauch  went  with  200  Cossacks  to  explore  the  pass, 
set  the  men  to  work  at  the  worst  places,  and,  thanks  to  the 
secrecy  observed  by  the  peasantry,  soon  made  the  pass  to 
the  summit  practicable  for  cavalry  and  light  guns.  The 
Prince  disguised  himself  as  a  Bulgarian  shepherd  to  ex- 
amine the  southern  outlet;  and,  on  his  bringing  a  favour- 
able report,  11,000  men  of  Gurko's  command  began  to 
thread  the  intricacies  of  the  defile. 

Thanks  to  good  food,  stout  hearts,  jokes,  and  songs,  they 
managed  to  get  the  guns  up  the  worst  places.  Then  began 
the  perils  of  the  descent.  But  the  Turks  knew  nothing  of 
their  effort,  else  it  might  have  ended  far  otherwise.  At  the 
southern  end  300  Turkish  regulars  were  peacefully  smoking 
their  pipes  and  cooking  their  food  when  the  Cossacks  and 
Rifles  in  the  vanguard  burst  upon  them,  drove  them  head- 
long, and  seized  the  village  of  Hainkoi.  A  pass  over  the 
Balkans  had  been  secured  at  the  cost  of  two  men  killed  and 
three  wounded!  Gurko  was  almost  justified  in  sending  to 
the  Grand  Duke  Nicholas  the  proud  vaunt  that  none  but 
Russian  soldiers  could  have  brought  field  artillery  over  such 
a  pass,  and  in  the  short  space  of  three  days  Quly  11-14).^ 

After  bringing  his  column  of  11,000  men  through  the 
pass,  Gurko  drove  off  four  Turkish  battalions  sent  against 
him  from  the  Shipka  Pass  and  Kazanlik.  Next  he  sent 
out  bands  of  Cossacks  to  spread  terror  southwards,  and 
delude  the  Turks  into  the  belief  that  he  meant  to  strike 
at  the  important  towns,  Yeni  Zagra  and  Eski  Zagra,  on  the 

>  General  Gurko's  Advance  Guard  in  iSyj,  by  Colonel  Epauchin, 
translated  by  H.  Havelock  (The  Wolseley  Series,  1900),  chap.  ii. ; 
The  Daily  News  War  Correspondence  (1877),  pp.  263-270. 


240  The  European  Nations 

road  to  Adrianople.  Having  thus  caused  them  to  loosen 
their  grip  on  KazanHk  and  the  Shipka,  he  wheeled  his  main 
force  to  the  westward  (leaving  3500  men  to  hold  the  exit 
of  the  Hainkoi),  and  drove  the  Turks  successively  from 
positions  in  front  of  the  town,  from  the  town  itself,  and 
then  from  the  village  of  Shipka.  Above  that  place  towered 
the  mighty  wall  of  the  Balkans,  lessened  somewhat  at  the 
pass  itself,  but  presenting  even  there  a  seemingly  im- 
pregnable position. 

Gurko,  however,  relied  on  the  discouragement  of  the 
Turkish  garrison  after  the  defeats  of  their  comrades,  and 
at  seeing  their  positions  turned  on  the  south  while  they 
were  also  threatened  on  the  north;  for  another  Russian 
column  had  advanced  from  Timova  up  the  more  gradual 
northern  slopes  of  the  Balkans,  and  now  began  to  hammer 
at  the  defences  of  the  pass  on  that  side.  The  garrison  con- 
sisted of  six  and  a  half  battalions  under  Khulussi  Pasha, 
and  the  wreckage  of  five  battalions  already  badly  beaten 
by  Gurko's  column.  These,  with  one  battery  of  artillery, 
held  the  pass  and  the  neighbouring  peaks,  which  they  had 
in  part  fortified. 

In  pursuance  of  a  pre-arranged  plan  for  a  joint  attack 
on  July  17th  of  both  Russian  forces,  the  northern  body 
advanced  up  the  slopes;  but,  as  Gurko's  men  were  unable 
to  make  their  diversion  in  time,  the  attack  failed.  An 
isolated  attempt  by  Gurko's  force  on  the  next  day  also 
failed,  the  defenders  disgracing  themselves  by  tricking 
the  Russians  with  the  white  flag  and  firing  upon  them. 
But  the  Turks  were  now  in  difficulties  for  want  of  food  and 
water;  or  possibly  they  were  seized  with  panic.  At  any 
rate,  while  amusing  the  Russians  with  proposals  of  sur- 
render, they  stole  off  in  small  bodies,  early  on  July  19th. 


The  Russo-Turkish  War  241 

The  truth  was,  ere  long,  found  out  by  outposts  of  the 
north  Russian  forces;  Skobeleif  and  his  men  were  soon 
at  the  summit,  and  there  Gurko's  vanguard  speedily  joined 
them  with  shouts  of  joy. 

Thus,  within  twenty -three  days  from  the  crossing  of  the 
Danube  Gurko  seized  two  passes  of  the  Balkans,  besides 
capturing  800  prisoners  and  13  guns.  It  is  not  surprising 
that  a  Turkish  official  despatch  of  July  21st  to  Suleiman 
summed  up  the  position:  "The  existence  of  the  Empire 
hangs  on  a  hair."  And  when  Gurko's  light  troops  pro- 
ceeded to  raid  the  valley  of  the  Maritsa,  it  seemed  that  the 
Turkish  defence  would  collapse  as  helplessly  as  in  the 
memorable  campaign  of  1828.  We  must  add  here  that 
the  Bulgarians  now  began  to  revenge  themselves  for  the 
outrages  of  May,  1876;  and  the  struggle  was  sullied  by 
horrible  acts  on  both  sides. 

The  impression  produced  by  these  dramatic  strokes  was 
profound  and  widespread.  The  British  fleet  was  sent  to 
Besika  Bay,  a  step  preparatory,  as  it  seemed,  to  steaming 
up  the  Dardanelles  to  the  Sea  of  Marmora.  At  Adrianople 
crowds  of  Moslems  fled  away  in  wild  confusion  towards 
Constantinople.  There  the  frequent  meetings  of  ministers 
at  the  Sultan's  palace  testified  to  the  extent  of  the  alarm; 
and  that  nervous  despot  wavered  between  the  design  of 
transferring  the  seat  of  government  to  Brussa  in  Asia 
Minor,  and  that  of  unfurling  the  standard  of  the  Prophet 
and  summoning  all  the  faithful  to  rally  to  its  defence  against 
the  infidels.  Finally  he  took  courage  from  despair,  and 
adopted  the  more  manly  course.  But  first  he  disgraced 
his  ministers.  The  War  Minister  and  Abdul-Kerim  were 
summarily  deposed,  the  latter  being  sent  off  as  prisoner  to 
the  island  of  Lemnos. 


242  The  European  Nations 

All  witnesses  agree  that  the  War  Minister,  Redif  Pasha, 
was  incapable  and  corrupt.  The  age  and  weakness  of 
Abdul-Kerim  might  have  excused  his  comparative  inaction 
in  the  Quadrilateral  in  the  first  half  of  July.  It  is  probable 
that  his  plan  of  campaign,  described  above,  was  sound; 
but  he  lacked  the  vigour,  and  the  authorities  at  Constan- 
tinople lacked  the  courage,  to  carry  it  out  thoroughly  and 
consistently. 

Mehemet  Ali  Pasha,  a  renegade  German,  who  had  been 
warring  with  some  success  in  Montenegro,  assumed  the  su- 
preme command  on  July  22nd;  and  Suleiman  Pasha,  who, 
with  most  of  his  forces,  had  been  brought  by  sea  from 
Antivari  to  the  mouth  of  the  river  Maritsa,  now  gath- 
ered together  all  the  available  troops  for  the  defence  of 
Roumelia. 

The  Czar,  on  his  side,  cherished  hopes  of  ending  the 
war  while  Fortune  smiled  on  his  standards.  There  are 
good  grounds  for  thinking  that  he  had  entered  on  it  with 
great  reluctance.  In  its  early  stages  he  let  the  British 
Government  know  of  his  desire  to  come  to  terms  with 
Turkey;  and  now  his  War  Minister,  General  Milutin,  hinted 
to  Colonel  F.  A.  Wellesley,  British  attache  at  headquarters, 
that  the  mediation  of  Great  Britain  would  be  welcomed 
by  Russia.  That  officer  on  July  30th  had  an  interview 
with  the  Emperor,  who  set  forth  the  conditions  on  which 
he  would  be  prepared  to  accept  peace  with  Turkey.  They 
were:  the  recovery  of  the  strip  of  Bessarabia  lost  in  1856, 
and  the  acquisition  of  Batoum  in  Asia  Minor.  Alexander 
II.  also  stated  that  he  would  not  occupy  Constantinople 
unless  that  step  were  necessitated  by  the  course  of  events; 
that  the  Powers  would  be  invited  to  a  conference  for  the 
settlement  of  Turkish  affairs ;   and  that  he  had  no  wish  to 


The  Russo-Turkish  War  243 

interfere  with  the  British  spheres  of  interest  already  re- 
ferred to. 

Colonel  Wellesley  at  once  left  headquarters  for  London, 
but  on  the  following  day  the  aspect  of  the  campaign 
underwent  a  complete  change,  which,  in  the  opinion  of 
the  British  Government,  rendered  futile  all  hope  of  a 
settlement  on  the  conditions  laid  down  by  the  Czar.^ 
For  now,  when  the  Turkish  cause  seemed  irrevocably 
lost,  the  work  of  a  single  brave  man  to  the  north  of  the 
Balkans  dried  up,  as  if  by  magic,  the  flood  of  invasion, 
brought  back  victory  to  the  standards  of  Islam,  and  bade 
fair  to  overwhelm  the  presumptuous  Muscovites  in  the 
waters  of  the  Danube.  Moltke  in  his  account  of  the  war 
of  1828  had  noted  a  peculiarity  of  the  Ottomans  in  warfare 
(a  characteristic  which  they  share  with  the  glorious  de- 
fenders of  Saragossa  in  1808)  of  beginning  the  real  defence 
when  others  would  abandon  it  as  hopeless.  This  remark, 
if  not  true  of  the  Turkish  army  as  a  whole,  certainly  ap- 
plies to  that  part  of  it  which  was  thrilled  to  deeds  of  daring 
by  Osman  Pasha. 

More  fighting  had  fallen  to  him,  perhaps,  than  to  any 
Turk  of  his  time.  He  was  now  forty  years  of  age;  his 
frame,  slight  and  of  middle  height,  gave  no  promise  of 
strength  or  capacity;  neither  did  his  face,  until  the  ob- 
server noted  the  power  of  his  eyes  to  take  in  the  whole 
situation  "with  one  slow,  comprehensive  look."  ^  This 
gave  him  a  magnetic  faculty,  the  effect  of  which  was  not 
wholly  marred  by  his  disdainful  manners,  curt  speech, 
and  contemptuous  treatment  of  foreigners.     Clearly  here 

1  Pari.  Papers,  Turkey,  No.  g  (1878),  Nos.  2,  3;  With  the  Russians 
in  Peace  and  War,  by  Colonel  the  Hon.  F.  A.  Wellesley,  ch.  xs. 

2  W.  W.  Herbert,  The  Defence  of  Plevna,  p.  81. 


244  The  European  Nations 

was  a  cold,  sternly  objective  nature  like  that  of  Bonaparte. 
He  was  a  good  representative  of  the  stolid  Turk  of  the 
provinces,  who,  far  from  the  debasing  influence  of  the 
Court,  retains  the  fanaticism  and  love  of  war  on  behalf  of 
his  creed  that  make  his  people  terrible  even  in  the  days  of 
decline.^ 

In  accordance  with  the  original  design  of  Abdul-Kerim, 
Osman  had  for  some  time  remained  passive  at  Widdin. 
On  receiving  orders  from  the  commander-in-chief,  he  moved 
eastwards  on  July  13th,  with  40,000  men,  to  save  Nicopolis. 
Finding  himself  too  late  to  save  that  place  he  then  laid  his 
plans  for  the  seizure  of  Plevna.  The  importance  of  that 
town  as  a  great  centre  of  roads,  and  as  possessing  many 
advantages  for  defence  on  the  hills  around,  had  been  pre- 
viously pointed  out  to  the  Russian  stafif  by  Prince  Charles 
of  Roumania,  as  indeed,  earlier  still,  by  Moltke.  Accord- 
ingly, the  Grand  Duke  Nicholas  had  directed  a  small  force 
of  cavalry  towards  that  town.  General  Kriidener  made 
the  mistake  of  recalling  it  in  order  to  assist  in  the  at- 
tack on  Nicopolis  on  July  14-16,  an  unlucky  move,  which 
enabled  Osman  to  occupy  Plevna  without  resistance  on 
July  1 9th. 2  On  the  i8th  the  Grand  Duke  Nicholas  or- 
dered General  Krudener  to  occupy  Plevna.  Knowing 
nothing  of  Osman's  whereabouts,  his  vanguard  advanced 
heedlessly  on  the  town,  only  to  meet  with  a  very  decided 
repulse,  which  cost  the  Russians  3000  men  (July  20th). 

Osman  now  entrenched  himself  on  the  open  downs  that 
stretch  eastwards  from  Plevna.  As  will  be  seen  by  refer- 
ence to  the  map  on  page  233,  his  position,  roughly  speak- 
ing,  formed   an   ellipse   pointing   towards   the    village    of 

>  For  these  qualities,  see  Turkey  in  Europe,  by  "Odysseus,"  p.  97. 
2  Herbert,  The  Defence  of  Plevna,  p.  129. 


The  Russo-Turkish  War  245 

Grivitza.  Above  that  village  his  engineers  threw  up  two 
great  redoubts  which  dominated  the  neighbourhood. 
Other  redoubts  and  trenches  screened  Plevna  on  the 
north-east  and  south.  Finally,  the  crowns  of  three  main 
slopes  lying  to  the  east  of  Plevna  bristled  with  defensive 
works.  West  of  the  town  lay  the  deep  vale  of  the  little 
river  Wid,  itself  the  chief  defence  on  that  side.  We  may 
state  here  that  during  the  long  operations  against  Plevna  the 
Russians  had  to  content  themselves  with  watching  this 
western  road  to  Orkanye  and  Sophia  by  means  of  cavalry ; 
but  the  reinforcements  from  Sophia  generally  made  their 
way  in.  From  that  same  quarter  the  Turks  were  also  able 
to  despatch  forces  to  occupy  the  town  of  Lovtcha,  between 
Plevna  and  the  Shipka  Pass. 

The  Russian  staflf,  realising  its  error  in  not  securing  this 
important  centre  of  roads,  and  dimly  surmising  the  strength 
of  the  entrenchments  which  Osman  was  throwing  up  near 
to  the  base  of  their  operations,  determined  to  attack  Plevna 
at  once.  Their  task  proved  to  be  one  of  unexpected 
magnitude.  Already  the  long  curve  of  the  outer  Turkish 
lines  spread  along  slopes  which  formed  natural  glacis, 
while  the  ground  farther  afield  was  so  cut  up  by  hollows 
as  to  render  one  combined  assault  very  difficult.  The 
strength,  and  even  the  existence,  of  some  of  Osman's  works 
was  unknown.  Finally,  the  Russians  are  said  to  have  had 
only  32,000  infantry  at  hand,  with  two  brigades  of  cavalry. 

Nevertheless,  Generals  Krudener  and  Schahofski  re- 
ceived orders  to  attack  forthwith.  They  did  so  on  July 
31st.  The  latter,  with  12,000  men,  took  two  of  the  outer 
redoubts  on  the  south  side,  but  had  to  fall  back  before  the 
deadly  fire  that  poured  on  him  from  the  inner  works. 
Krudener  operated  against  the  still  stronger  positions  on 


246  The  European  Nations 

the  north;  but,  owing  to  difficulties  that  beset  his  advance, 
he  was  too  late  to  make  any  diversion  in  favour  of  his 
colleague.  In  a  word,  the  attack  was  ill  planned  and  still 
worse  combined.  Five  hours  of  desperate  fighting  yielded 
the  assailants  not  a  single  substantial  gain;  their  losses 
were  stated  officially  to  be  7336  killed  and  wounded;  but 
this  is  certainly  below  the  truth.  Turkish  irregulars  fol- 
lowed the  retreating  columns  at  nightfall,  and  butchered 
the  wounded,  including  all  whom  they  found  in  a  field- 
hospital. 

This  second  reverse  at  Plevna  was  a  disaster  of  the  first 
magnitude.  The  prolongation  of  the  Russian  line  beyond 
the  Balkans  had  left  their  base  and  flanks  too  weak  to 
stand  against  the  terrible  blows  that  Osman  seemed  about 
to  deal  from  his  point  of  vantage.  Plevna  was  to  their 
right  flank  what  Beila  was  to  their  left.  Troops  could  not 
be  withdrawn  from,  the  latter  point  lest  the  Turks  from 
Shumla  and  Rustchuk  should  break  through  and  cut  their 
way  to  the  bridge  at  Sistova;  and  now  Osman's  force 
threatened  that  spinal  cord  of  the  Russian  communica- 
tions. If  he  struck,  how  could  the  blow  be  warded  off? 
For  bad  news  poured  in  from  all  quarters.  From  Armenia 
came  the  tidings  that  Mukhtar  Pasha,  after  a  skilful  re- 
treat and  concentration  of  force,  had  turned  on  the  Russians 
and  driven  them  back  in  utter  confusion. 

From  beyond  the  Balkans  Gurko  sent  news  that  Sulei- 
man's army  was  working  round  by  way  of  Adrianople,  and 
threatened  to  pin  him  to  the  mountain  chain.  In  fact, 
part  of  Gurko 's  corps  sustained  a  serious  reverse  at  Eski 
Zagra,  and  had  to  retreat  in  haste  through  the  Hainkoi 
Pass;  while  its  other  sections  made  their  way  back  to  the 
Shipka  Pass,  leaving  a  rearguard  to  hold  that   important 


The  Russo-Turkish  War  247 

position  (July  30- August  8).  Thus,  on  all  sides,  proofs 
accumulated  that  the  invaders  had  attempted  far  too 
much  for  their  strength,  and  that  their  whole  plan 
of  campaign  was  more  brilliant  than  soimd.  Possibly, 
had  not  the  14th  corps  been  thrown  away  on  the  un- 
healthy Dobrudscha,  enough  men  would  have  been  at 
hand  to  save  the  situation.  But  now  everything  was  at 
stake. 

The  whole  of  the  month  of  August  was  a  time  of  grave 
crisis  for  the  Russians,  and  it  is  the  opinion  of  the  best 
military  critics  that  the  Turks,  with  a  little  more  initiative 
and  power  of  combination,  inight  have  thrown  the  Rus- 
sians back  on  the  Danube  in  utter  disarray.  From  this 
extremity  the  invaders  were  saved  by  the  lack  among  the 
Turks  of  the  above-named  gifts,  on  which,  rather  than  on 
mere  bravery,  the  issue  of  campaigns  and  the  fate  of  na- 
tions now  ultimately  depend.  True  to  their  old  renown,  the 
Turks  showed  signal  prowess  on  the  field  of  battle,  but  they 
lacked  the  higher  intellectual  qualities  that  gamer  the  full 
harvest  of  results. 

Osman,  either  because  he  knew  not  that  the  Russians 
had  used  up  their  last  reserves  at  Plevna,  or  because  he 
mistrusted  the  manoeuvring  powers  of  his  men,  allowed 
Kriidener  quietly  to  draw  off  his  shattered  forces  towards 
Sistova,  and  made  only  one  rather  half-hearted  move  against 
that  all-important  point.  The  new  Turkish  commander- 
in-chief,  Mehemet  AH,  gathered  a  formidable  array  in  front 
of  Shumla  and  drove  the  Russian  army,  now  led  by  the 
Czarevitch,  back  on  Bella,  but  failed  to  pierce  their  lines. 
Finally,  Suleiman  Pasha,  in  his  pride  at  driving  Gurko 
through  the  Hainkoi  Pass,  wasted  time  on  the  southern 
side,  first,  by  harrying  the  wretched  Bulgarians,  and  then 


248  The  European  Nations 

by  hurling  his  brave  troops  repeatedly  against  the  now 
almost  impregnable  position  on  the  Shipka  Pass. 

It  is  believed  that  jealousy  of  the  neighbouring  Turkish 
generals  kept  Suleiman  from  adopting  less  wasteful  and 
more  effective  tactics.  If  he  had  made  merely  a  feint  of 
attacking  that  post,  and  had  hurried  with  his  main  body 
through  the  Slievno  Pass  on  the  east  to  the  aid  of  Mehemet, 
or  through  the  western  defiles  of  the  Balkans  to  the  help 
of  the  brave  Osman  in  his  Plevna-Lovtcha  positions,  prob- 
ably the  gain  of  force  to  one  or  other  of  them  might  have 
led  to  really  great  results.  As  it  was,  these  generals  dealt 
heavy  losses  to  the  invaders,  but  failed  to  drive  them  back 
on  the  Danube. 

Moreover,  Russian  reinforcements  began  to  arrive  by 
the  middle  of  August,  the  Emperor  having  already  on  July 
22nd  called  out  the  first  ban  of  the  militia  and  three  divi- 
sions of  the  reserve  of  the  line,  in  all  some  224,000  men.^ 

The  bulk  of  these  men  did  not  arrive  until  September; 
and  meanwhile  the  strain  was  terrible.  The  war  corre- 
spondence of  Mr.  Archibald  Forbes  reveals  the  state  of 
nervous  anxiety  in  which  Alexander  II.  was  plunged  at 
this  time.  Forbes  had  been  a  witness  of  the  savage  tenacity 
of  the  Turkish  attack  and  the  Russian  defence  on  the  hills 
commanding  the  Shipka  Pass.  Finally,  he  had  shared  in 
the  joy  of  the  hard-pressed  defenders  at  the  timely  advent 
of  a  rifle  battalion  hastily  sent  up  on  Cossack  ponies,  and 
the  decisive  charge  of  General  Radetzky  at  the  head  of  two 
companies  of  reserves  at  a  Turkish  breastwork  in  the  very 
crisis  of  the  fight  (August  24th).  Then,  after  riding  post- 
haste northwards  to  the  Russian  headquarters  at  Gorni 
Studen,  he  was  at  once  taken  to  the  Czar's  tent,  and  noted 
1  F.  V.  Greene,  The  Campaign  in  Bulgaria,  p.  225. 


The  Russo-Turkish  War  249 

the  look  of  eager  suspense  on  his  face  until  he  heard  the  re- 
assuring news  that  Radetzky  kept  his  seat  firm  on  the  pass. 

The  worst  was  now  over.  The  Russian  Guards,  50,000 
strong,  were  near  at  hand,  along  with  the  other  reinforce- 
ments above  named.  The  urgency  of  the  crisis  also  led 
the  Grand  Duke  Nicholas  to  waive  his  claim  that  the 
Roumanian  troops  should  be  placed  under  his  immediate 
command.  Accordingly,  early  in  August,  Prince  Charles 
led  some  35,000  Roumanians  across  the  Danube,  and  was 
charged  with  the  command  of  all  the  troops  aroimd  Plevna.^ 
The  hopes  of  the  invaders  were  raised  by  Skobeleff's  cap- 
ture, on  September  3rd,  of  Lovtcha,  a  place  half-way  be- 
tween Plevna  and  the  Balkans,  which  had  ensured  Osman's 
communications  with  Suleiman  Pasha.  The  Turkish  losses 
at  Lovtcha  are  estimated  at  nearly  15,000  men. 2 

This  success  having  facilitated  the  attack  on  Plevna  from 
the  south,  a  general  assault  was  ordered  for  September  nth. 
In  the  meantime  Osman  also  had  received  large  reinforce- 
ments from  Sophia,  and  had  greatly  strengthened  his  de- 
fences. So  skilfully  had  outworks  been  thrown  up  on  the 
north-east  of  Plevna  that  what  looked  like  an  unimportant 
trench  was  found  to  be  a  new  and  formidable  redoubt, 
which  foiled  the  utmost  efforts  of  the  3rd  Roumanian 
division  to  struggle  up  the  steep  slopes  on  that  side.  To 
their  4th  division  and  to  a  Russian  brigade  fell  an  equally 
hard  task,  that  of  advancing  from  the  east  against  the  two 
Grivitza  redoubts  which  had  defied  all  assaults.  The 
Turks  showed  their  usual  constancy,  despite  the  heavy  and 
prolonged  bombardment  which  preluded  the  attack  here 
and  all  along  the  lines.     But  the  weight  and  vigour  of  the 

>  Reminiscences  of  the  King  of  Roumania,  p.  275. 
2  F.  V.  Greene,  op.  cit.,  p.  232. 


250  The  European  Nations 

onset  told  by  degrees;  and  the  Russian  and  Roumanian 
supports  finally  carried  by  storm  the  more  southerly  of 
the  two  redoubts.  The  Turks  made  desperate  efforts  to 
retrieve  this  loss.  From  the  northern  redoubt  and  the 
rear  entrenchments  somewhat  to  the  south  there  came  a 
galling  fire  which  decimated  the  victors;  for  a  time  the 
Turks  succeeded  in  recovering  the  work,  but  at  nightfall 
the  advance  of  other  Russian  and  Roumanian  troops 
ousted  the  Moslems.  Thenceforth  the  redoubt  was  held 
by  the  allies. 

Meanwhile,  to  the  south  of  the  village  of  Grivitza  the 
4th  and  9th  Russian  corps  had  advanced  in  dense  masses 
against  the  cluster  of  redoubts  that  crowned  the  heights 
south-east  of  Plevna,  but  their  utmost  efforts  were  futile; 
under  the  fearful  fire  of  the  Turks  the  most  solid  lines 
melted  away,  and  the  corps  fell  back  at  nightfall,  with  the 
loss  of  no  officers  and  5200  men. 

Only  on  the  south  and  south-west  did  the  assailants 
seriously  imperil  Osman's  defence  at  a  vital  point;  and 
here  again  Fortune  bestowed  her  favours  on  a  man  who 
knew  how  to  wrest  the  utmost  from  her,  Michael  Dimi- 
trievitch  Skobeleff.  Few  men  or  women  could  look  on 
his  stalwart  figure,  frank,  bold  features,  and  keen,  kindling 
eyes  without  a  thrill  of  admiration.  Tales  were  told  by 
the  camp-fires  of  the  daring  of  his  early  exploits  in  Central 
Asia:  how,  after  the  capture  of  Khiva  in  1874,  he  dressed 
himself  in  Turkoman  garb,  and  alone  explored  the  route 
from  that  city  to  Igdy,  as  well  as  the  old  bed  of  the  river 
Oxus;  or  again,  how,  at  the  capture  of  Khokand  in  the 
following  year,  his  skill  and  daring  led  to  the  overthrow 
of  a  superior  force  and  the  seizure  of  fifty-eight  guns. 
Thus,  at  thirty-two  years  of  age  he  was  the  darling  of  the 


The  Russo-Turkish  War  251 

troops;  for  his  prowess  in  the  field  was  not  more  marked 
than  his  care  and  foresight  in  the  camp.  While  other 
generals  took  little  heed  of  their  men,  he  saw  to  their  com- 
fort and  cheered  them  by  his  jokes.  They  felt  that  he 
was  the  embodiment  of  the  patriotism,  love  of  romantic 
exploit,  and  soaring  ambition  of  the  Great  Russians. 

They  were  right.  Already,  as  will  appear  in  a  later 
chapter,  he  was  dreaming  of  the  conquest  of  India;  and, 
like  Napoleon,  he  could  not  only  see  visions  but  also  master 
■details,  from  the  principles  of  strategy  to  the  routine  of 
camp  life,  which  made  those  visions  realisable.  If  am- 
bition spurred  him  on  towards  Delhi,  hatred  of  things 
Teutonic  pointed  him  to  Berlin.  Ill  would  it  have  fared 
with  the  peace  of  the  world  had  this  champion  of  the 
Slavonic  race  lived  out  his  life.  But  his  fiery  nature  wore 
out  its  tenement,  the  baser  passions,  so  it  is  said,  con- 
tributing to  hasten  the  end  of  one  who  lived  his  true  life 
only  amidst  the  smoke  of  battle.  In  war  he  was  sublime. 
Having  recently  come  from  Central  Asia,  he  was  at  first 
unattached  to  any  corps,  and  roved  about  in  search  of  the 
fiercest  fighting.  His  insight  and  skill  had  warded  off  a 
deadly  flank  attack  .on  Schahofski's  shattered  corps  at 
Plevna  on  July  30th,  and  his  prowess  contributed  largely 
to  the  capture  of  Lovtcha  on  September  3rd.  War  cor- 
respondents, who  knew  their  craft,  turned  to  follow  Skobe- 
leff,  wherever  official  reports  might  otherwise  direct  them; 
and  the  lust  of  fighting  laid  hold  of  the  grey  columns  when 
they  saw  the  "white  general"  approach. 

On  September  nth  Prince  Imeritinski  and  Skobeleff 
(the  order  should  be  inverted)  commanded  the  extreme 
left  of  the  Russian  line,  attacking  Plevna  from  the  south. 
Having  four  regiments  of  the  line  and  four  battalions  of 


252  The  European  Nations 

sharpshooters — about  12,000  men  in  all — he  ranged  them 
at  the  foot  of  the  hill,  whose  summit  was  crowned  by  an 
all-important  redoubt — the  "Kavanlik."  There  were  four 
others  that  flanked  the  approach.  When  the  Russian 
guns  had  thoroughly  cleared  the  way  for  an  assault,  he 
ordered  the  bands  to  play  and  the  two  leading  regiments 
to  charge  up  the  slope.  Keeping  his  hand  firmly  on  the 
pulse  of  the  battle,  he  saw  them  begin  to  waver  under  the 
deadly  fire  of  the  Turks;  at  once  he  sent  up  a  rival  regi- 
ment; the  new  mass  carried  on  the  charge  until  it,  too^ 
threatened  to  die  away.  The  fourth  regiment  struggled 
up  into  that  wreath  of  death,  and  with  the  like  result. 

Then  Skobeleff  called  on  his  sharpshooters  to  drive  home 
the  onset.  Riding  on  horseback  before  the  invigorating 
lines,  he  swept  on  the  stragglers  and  waverers  until  all  of 
them  came  under  the  full  blast  of  the  Turkish  flames 
vomited  from  the  redoubt.  There  his  sword  fell,  shivered 
in  his  hand,  and  his  horse  rolled  over  at  the  very  verge  of 
the  fosse.  Fierce  as  ever,  the  leader  sprang  to  his  feet, 
waved  the  stump  in  air,  and  uttered  a  shout  which  put 
fresh  heart  into  his  men.  With  him  they  swarmed  into 
the  fosse,  up  the  bank,  and  fell  on  the  defenders.  The 
bayonet  did  the  rest,  taking  deadly  revenge  for  the  mur- 
derous volleys. 

But  Osman's  engineers  had  provided  against  such  an 
event.  The  redoubt  was  dominated  from  the  left  and 
could  be  swept  by  cross-fire  from  the  rear  and  right.  On 
the  morrow  the  Turks  drew  in  large  forces  from  the  north 
side  and  pressed  the  victors  hard.  In  vain  did  SkobelefiE 
send  urgent  messages  for  reinforcements  to  make  good  the 
gaps  in  his  ranks.  None  were  sent,  or,  indeed,  could  be 
sent.     Five  times  his  men  beat  off  the  foe.     The  sixth 


254  The  European  Nations 

charge  hurled  them  first  from  the  KavanUk  redoubt,  and 
thereafter  from  the  flanking  works  and  trenches  out  on  to 
that  fatal  slope.  A  war  correspondent  saw  Skobeleff  af- 
ter this  heartbreaking  loss,  "his  face  black  with  powder 
and  smoke,  his  eyes  haggard  and  bloodshot,  and  his  voice 
quite  gone.  I  never  before  saw  such  a  picture  of  battle."  ^ 
Thus  all  the  efforts  of  the  Russians  and  Roumanians  had 
failed  to  wrest  more  than  a  single  redoubt  from  the  Mos- 
lems; and  at  that  point  they  were  unable  to  make  any 
advance  against  the  inner  works.  The  fighting  of  Septem- 
ber II-I2  is  believed  to  have  cost  the  allies  18,000  men 
killed  and  wounded  out  of  the  75,000  infantrymen  engaged. 
The  mistakes  of  July  31st  had  been  again  repeated.  The 
number  of  assailants  was  too  small  for  an  attack  on  so 
great  an  extent  of  fortified  positions  defended  with  quick- 
firing  rifles.  Had  the  Russians,  while  maldng  feints  at 
other  points  to  hold  the  Turks  there,  concentrated  their 
efforts  either  on  the  two  Grivitza  redoubts,  or  on  those 
about  the  Kavanlik  work,  they  would  almost  certainly 
have  succeeded.  As  it  was,  they  hurled  troops  in  close 
order  against  lines  the  strength  of  which  was  not  well 
known;  and  none  of  their  commanders  but  Skobeleff 
employed  tactics  that  made  the  most  of  their  forces. ^ 
The  depression  at  the  Russian  headquarters  was  now  ex- 
treme.^ On  September  13th  the  Emperor  held  a  council 
of  war  at  which  the  Prince  of  Roumania,  the  Grand  Duke 
Nicholas,  General  Milutin  (Minister  of  War)  and  three 
other  generals  were  present.     The  Grand  Duke  declared 

1  War  Correspondence  of  the  Daily  News,  pp.  479-483.  For 
another  character-sketch  of  Skobeleff,  see  the  Fortnightly  Review 
of  October,  1882,  by  W.  K.  Rose. 

2  For  an  account  of  the  battle,  see  Greene,  op.  cit.,  pt.  ii.,  chap.  v. 

3  General  von  Lignitz,  Aus  drei  Kriegen,  p.  167. 


The  Russo-Turkish  War  255 

that  the  only  prudent  course  was  to  retire  to  the  Danube, 
construct  a  tete  de  pont  guarding  the  southern  end  of  their 
bridge,  and,  after  receiving  reinforcements,  again  begin 
the  conquest  of  Bulgaria.  General  Milutin,  however,  de- 
murred to  this,  seeing  that  Osman's  army  was  not  mobile 
enough  to  press  them  hard;  he  therefore  proposed  to 
await  the  reinforcements  in  the  positions  around  Plevna. 
The  Grand  Duke  thereupon  testily  exclaimed  that  Milutin 
had  better  be  placed  in  command,  to  which  the  Emperor 
replied:  "No;  you  shall  retain  the  command;  but  the 
plan  suggested  by  the  Minister  of  War  shall  be  carried 
out."  1 

The  Emperor's  decision  saved  the  situation.  The  Turks 
made  no  combined  effort  to  advance  towards  Plevna  in 
force ;  and  Osman  felt  too  little  trust  in  the  new  levies  that 
reached  him  from  Sophia  to  move  into  the  open  and  attack 
Sistova.  Indeed,  Turkish  strategy  over  the  whole  field  of 
war  is  open  to  grave  censure.  On  their  side  there  was  a 
manifest  lack  of  combination.  Mehemet  Ali  pounded  away 
for  a  month  at  the  army  of  the  Czarevitch  on  the  River 
Lom,  and  then  drew  back  his  forces  (September  24th).  He 
allowed  Suleiman  Pasha  to  fling  his  troops  in  vain  against 
the  natural  stronghold  of  the  Russians  at  the  Shipka  Pass, 
and  made  no  dispositions  for  succouring  Lovtcha.  Obvi- 
ously he  should  have  concentrated  the  Turkish  forces  so 
as  to  deal  a  timely  and  decisive  blow  either  on  the  Lom  or 
on  the  Sophia-Plevna  road.  When  he  proved  his  incapacity 
both  as  commander-in-chief  and  as  commander  of  his  own 
force,  Turkish  jealousy  against  the  quondam  German  flared 
forth;  and  early  in  October  he  was  replaced  by  Suleiman. 
The  change  was  greatly  for  the  worse.  Suleiman's  pride 
»  Col.  F.  A.  Wellesley,  op.  cit.,  p.  283. 


256  The  European  Nations 

and  obstinacy  closed  the  door  against  larger  ideas,  and  it 
has  been  confidently  stated  that  at  the  end  of  the  cam- 
paign he  was  bribed  by  the  Russians  to  betray  his  cause. 
However  that  may  be,  it  is  certain  that  the  Turkish  generals 
continued  to  fight  each  for  his  own  hand,  and  thus  lost  the 
campaign. 

It  was  now  clear  that  Osman  must  be  starved  out  from 
the  position  which  the  skill  of  his  engineers  and  the  steadi- 
ness of  his  riflemen  had  so  speedily  transformed  into  an 
impregnable  stronghold.  Todleben,  the  Russian  engineer 
who  had  strengthened  the  outworks  of  Sevastopol,  had 
been  called  up  to  oppose  trench  to  trench,  redoubt  to 
redoubt.  Yet  so  extensive  were  the  Turkish  works,  and 
so  active  was  Shevket  Pasha's  force  at  Sophia  in  sending 
help  and  provisions,  that  not  until  October  24th  was  the 
line  of  investment  completed,  and  by  an  army  which  now 
numbered  fully  120,000  men.  By  December  loth  Osman 
came  to  the  end  of  his  resources  and  strove  to  break  out  on 
the  west  over  the  River  Wid  towards  Sophia,  Masking  the 
movement  with  great  skill,  he  inflicted  heavy  losses  on  the 
besiegers.  Slowly,  however,  they  closed  around  him,  and 
a  last  scene  of  slaughter  ended  in  the  surrender  of  the 
43,000  half -starved  survivors,  with  the  77  guns  that  had 
wrought  such  havoc  among  the  invaders.  Osman's  de- 
fence is  open  to  criticism  at  some  points,  but  it  had  cost 
Russia  more  than  50,000  lives,  and  paralysed  her  efforts 
in  Europe  during  five  months. 

The  operations  aroimd  Plevna  are  among  the  most  in- 
structive in  modem  warfare,  as  illustrating  the  immense 
power  that  quick-firing  rifles  confer  upon  the  defence. 
Given  a  nucleus  of  well-trained  troops,  with  skilled  engin- 
eers,  any  position  of  ordinary  strength  can  quickly  be 


The  Russo-Turkish  War  257 

turned  into  a  stronghold  that  will  foil  the  efforts  of  a 
far  greater  number  of  assailants.  Experience  at  Plevna 
showed  that  four  or  five  times  as  many  men  were  needed 
to  attack  redoubts  and  trenches  as  in  the  days  of  muzzle- 
loading  muskets.  It  also  proved  that  infantry  fire  is  far 
more  deadly  in  such  cases  than  the  best-served  artillery. 
And  yet  a  large  part  of  Osman's  troops — perhaps  the 
majority  after  August — were  not  regulars.  Doubtless 
that  explains  why  (with  the  exception  of  an  obstinate  but 
unskilful  effort  to  break  out  on  August  31st)  he  did  not 
attack  the  Russians  in  the  open  after  his  great  victories  of 
July  31st  and  September  11-12.  On  both  occasions  the 
Russians  were  so  badly  shaken  that,  in  the  opinion  of  com- 
petent judges,  they  could  easily  have  been  driven  in  on 
Nicopolis  or  Sistova,  in  which  case  the  bridges  at  those 
places  might  have  been  seized.  But  Osman  did  not  do  so, 
doubtless  because  he  knew  that  his  force,  weak  in  cavalry 
and  tmused  to  manoeuvring,  would  be  at  a  disadvantage  in 
the  open.  Todleben,  however,  was  informed  on  good 
authority  that,  when  the  Turkish  commander  heard  of  the 
likelihood  of  the  investment  of  Plevna,  he  begged  the  Porte 
to  allow  him  to  retire ;  but  the  assurance  of  Shevket  Pasha, 
the  commander  of  the  Turkish  force  at  Sophia,  that  he 
could  keep  open  communications  between  that  place  and 
Plevna,  decided  the  authorities  at  Constantinople  to  order 
the  continuance  of  defensive  tactics.^ 

Whatever  may  have  been  the  cause  of  this  decision  it 
ruined  the  Turkish  campaign.  Adherence  to  the  defensive 
spells  defeat  now,  as  it  has  always  done.     Defeat  comes 

1  A.  Forbes,  Czar  and  Sultan,  p.  291.  On  the  other  hand,  W.  V. 
Herbert  (op.  cit.,  p.  456)  states  that  it  was  Osman's  wish  to  retire 
to  Orkanye,  on  the  road  to  Sophia,  and  that  this  was  forbidden. 
For  remarks  on  this,  see  Greene,  op.  cit.,  chap.  viii. 


,258  The  European  Nations 

more  slowly,  now  that  quick-firing  rifles  quadruple  the 
power  of  the  defence ;  but  all  the  same  it  must  come  if  the 
assailant  has  enough  men  to  throw  on  that  point  and  then 
at  other  points.  Or,  to  use  technical  terms,  while  modem 
inventions  alter  tactics,  that  is,  the  dispositions. of  troops 
on  the  field  of  battle — a  fact  which  the  Russians  seemed  to 
ignore  at  Plevna — they  do  not  change  the  fundamental 
principles  of  strategy.  These  are  practically  immutable, 
and  they  doom  to  failure  the  side  that,  at  the  critical 
points,  persists  in  standing  on  the  defensive.  A  study  of 
the  events  around  Plevna  shows  clearly  what  a  brave  but 
ill-trained  army  can  do  and  what  it  cannot  do  under 
modem  conditions. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  strategy — that  is,  the  conduct 
of  the  great  operations  of  a  campaign — Osman's  defence  of 
Plevna  yields  lessons  of  equal  interest.  It  affords  the  most 
brilliant  example  in  modern  warfare  of  the  power  of  a  force 
strongly  intrenched  in  a  favourable  position  to  "contain," 
that  is,  to  hold  or  hold  back,  a  greater  force  of  the  enemy. 
Other  examples  are  the  Austrian  defence  of  Mantua  in 
1796-97,  which  hindered  the  young  Bonaparte's  invasion 
of  the  Hapsburg  States;  Bazaine's  defence  of  Metz  in  1870; 
and  Sir  George  White's  defence  of  Lady  smith  against  the 
Boers.  We  have  no  space  in  which  to  compare  these 
cases,  in  which  the  conditions  varied  so  greatly.  Suffice  it 
to  say  that  Mantua  and  Plevna  were  the  most  effective 
instances,  largely  because  those  strongholds  lay  near  the 
most  natural  and  easy  line  of  advance  for  the  invaders. 
Metz  and  Lady  smith  possessed"  fewer  advantages  in  this 
respect;  and,  considering  the  strength  of  the  fortress  and 
the  size  and  quality  of  his  army,  Bazaine's  conduct  at 
Metz  must  rank  as  the  weakest  on  record,  for  his  180,000 


The  Russo-Turkish  War  259 

troops  "contained"  scarcely  more  than  their  own  number 
of  Germans. 

On  the  other  hand,  Osman's  force  brought  three  times 
its  number  of  Russians  to  a  halt  for  five  months  before 
hastily  constructed  lines.  In  the  opinion  of  many  author- 
ities the  Russians  did  wrong  in  making  the  whole  cam- 
paign depend  on  Plevna.  When  it  was  clear  that  Osman 
would  cling  to  the  defensive,  they  might  with  safety  have 
secretly  detached  part  of  the  besieging  force  to  help  the 
army  of  the  Czarevitch  to  drive  back  the  Turks  on  Shumla. 
This  would  have  involved  no  great  risk;  for  the  Russians 
occupied  the  inner  lines  of  what  was,  roughly  speaking,  a 
triangle,  resting  on  the  Shipka  Pass,  the  River  Lorn,  and 
Plevna  as  its  extreme  points.  Having  the  advantage  of 
the  inner  position,  they  could  quickly  have  moved  part  of 
their  force  at  Plevna,  battered  in  the  Turkish  defence  on 
the  Lom,  and  probably  captured  the  Slievno  passes.  In 
that  case  they  would  have  cleared  a  new  line  of  advance  to 
Constantinople  farther  to  the  east,  and  made  the  possession 
of  Plevna  of  little  worth.  Its  value  always  lay  in  its  near- 
ness to  their  main  line  of  advance,  but  they  were  not  tied 
to  that  line.  It  is  safe  to  say  that,  if  Moltke  had  directed 
their  operations,  he  would  have  devised  some  better  plan 
than  that  of  hammering  away  at  the  redoubts  of  Plevna. 

In  fact,  the  Russians  made  three  great  blunders:  first, 
in  neglecting  to  occupy  Plevna  betimes ;  second,  in  under- 
rating Osman's  powers  of  defence;  third,  in  concentrating 
all  their  might  on  what  was  a  very  strong,  but  not  an  es- 
sential, point  of  the  campaign. 

The  closing  scenes  of  the  war  are  of  little  interest  except 
in  the  domain  of  diplomacy.  Servia  having  declared  war 
against  Turkey  immediately  after  the  fall  of  Plevna,  the 


26o  The  European  Nations 

Turks  were  now  hopelessly  outnumbered.  Gurko  forced 
his  way  over  one  of  the  western  passes  of  the  Balkans, 
seized  Sophia  (January  4,  1878),  and,  advancing  quickly 
towards  Philippopolis,  utterly  routed  Suleiman's  main 
force  near  that  town  (January  17th).  The  Turkish  com- 
mander-in-chief thus  paid  for  his  mistake  in  seeking  to  de- 
fend a  mountain  chain  with  several  passes  by  distributing 
his  army  among  those  passes.  Experience  has  proved 
that  this  invites  disaster  at  the  hands  of  an  enterprising 
foe,  and  that  the  true  policy  is  to  keep  light  troops  or 
scouts  at  all  points,  and  the  main  forces  at  a  chief  central 
pass  and  at  a  convenient  place  in  the  rear,  whence  the  in- 
vaders may  be  readily  assailed  before  they  complete  the 
crossing.  As  it  was,  Suleiman  saw  his  main  force,  still 
nearly  50,000  strong,  scatter  over  the  Rhodope  Mountains; 
many  of  them  reached  the  ^^gean  Sea  at  Enos,  whence  they 
were  conveyed  by  ship  to  the  Dardanelles.  He  himself 
was  tried  by  court-martial  and  imprisoned  for  fifteen  years. ^ 
A  still  worse  fate  befell  those  of  his  troops  which  hung 
about  Radetzky's  front  below  the  Shipka  Pass.  The 
Russians  devised  skilful  moves  for  capturing  this  force. 
On  January  5-8,  Prince  Mirsky  threaded  his  way  with  a 
strong  column  through  the  deep  snows  of  the  Travna  Pass, 
about  twenty-five  miles  east  of  the  Shipka,  which  he  then 
approached,  while  Skobeleff  struggled  through  a  still 
more  difficult  defile  west  of  the  central  position.  The 
total  strength  of  the  Russians  was  56,000  men.  On  the 
8th,  when  their  cannon  were  heard  thundering  in  the  rear 
of  the  Turkish  earthworks  at  the  foot  of  the  Shipka  Pass, 

1  Sir  N.  Layard  attributed  to  him  the  overthrow  of  Turkey. 
See  his  letter  of  February  i,  1878,  in  Sir  W.  White:  Life  and  Cor- 
respondence, p.  127. 


The  Russo-Turkish  War 


201 


Radetzky  charged  down  on  the  Turkish  positions  in  front, 
while  Mirsky  assailed  them  from  the  east.  Skobeleff  mean- 
while had  been  detained  by  the  difficulties  of  the  path  and 
the  opposition  of  the  Turks  on  the  west.  But  on  the 
morrow  his  onset  on  the  main  Turkish  positions  carried  all 
before  it.  On  all  sides  the  Turks  were  worsted  and  laid 
down  their  arms;  36,000  prisoners  and  93  guns  (so  the 
Russians  claim)  were  the  prize  of  this  brilliant  feat  Qanuary 
9,  1878).! 

In  Roumelia,  as  in  Armenia,  there  now  remained  com- 
paratively few  Turkish  troops  to  withstand  the  Russian 
advance,  and  the  capture  of  Constantinople  seemed  to  be  a 
matter  of  a  few  weeks.  There  are  grounds  for  thinking 
that  the  British  Ministry,  or  certainly  its  chief,  longed  to 
send  troops  from  Malta  to  help  in  its  defence.  Colonel 
Wellesley,  British  attache  at  the  Russian  headquarters, 
returned  to  London  at  the  time  when  the  news  of  the 
crossing  of  the  Balkans  reached  the  Foreign  Office.  At 
once  he  was  summoned  to  see  the  Prime  Minister,  who  in- 
quired eagerly  as  to  the  length  of  time  which  would  elapse 
before  the  Russians  occupied  Adrianople.  The  officer 
thought  that  that  event  might  occur  within  a  month — 
an  estimate  which  proved  to  be  above  the  mark.  Lord 
Beaconsfield  was  deeply  concerned  to  hear  this,  and 
added,  "If  you  can  only  guarantee  me  six  weeks,  I  see  my 
way."  He  did  not  further  explain  his  meaning;  but 
Colonel  Wellesley  felt  sure  that  he  wished  to  move  British 
troops  from   Malta  to  Constantinople. ^     Fortunately  the 

:  Greene,  op.  cit.,  chap.  xi.  I  have  been  assured  by  an  English- 
man serving  with  the  Turks  that  these  numbers  were  greatly 
exaggerated. 

2  With  the  Russians  in  Peace  and  War,  by  Col.  F.  A.  Wellesley, 
p.  272. 


262  The  European  Nations 

Russian  advance  to  Adrianople  was  so  speedy — their  van- 
guard entered  that  city  on  January  20th — as  to  dispose  of 
any  such  project.  But  it  would  seem  that  only  the  utter 
collapse  of  the  Turkish  defence  put  an  end  to  the  plans  of 
part  at  least  of  the  British  Cabinet  for  an  armed  interven- 
tion on  behalf  of  Turkey. 

Here,  then,  as  at  so  many  points  of  their  history,  the 
Turks  lost  their  opportunity,  and  that,  too,  through  the  in- 
capacity and  corruption  of  their  governing  class.  The  war 
of  1877  ended  as  so  many  of  their  wars  had  ended.  Thanks 
to  the  bravery  of  their  rank  and  file  and  the  mistake 
of  the  invaders,  they  gained  tactical  successes  at  some 
points;  but  they  failed  to  win  the  campaign  owing  to  the 
inability  of  their  Government  to  organise  soundly  on  a 
great  scale  and  the  intellectual  mediocrity  of  their  com- 
manders in  the  sphere  of  strategy.  Mr.  Layard,  who 
succeeded  Sir  Henry  Elliott  at  Constantinople  early  in 
1878,  had  good  reason  for  writing,  "The  utter  rottenness 
of  the  present  system  has  been  fully  revealed  by  the 
present  war."  ^  Whether  Suleiman  was  guilty  of  perverse 
obstinacy,  or,  as  has  often  been  asserted,  of  taking 
bribes  from  the  Russians,  cannot  be  decided.  What  is 
certain  is  that  he  was  largely  responsible  for  the  final 
debacle. 

But  in  a  wider  and  deeper  sense  the  Turks  owed  their 
misfortunes  to  themselves — to  their  customs  and  their 
creed.  Success  in  war  depends  ultimately  on  the  brain- 
power of  the  chief  leaders  and  organisers ;  and  that  source 
of  strength  has  long  ago  been  dried  up  in  Turkey  by  ad- 
hesion to  a  sterilising  creed  and  cramping  traditions. 
The  wars  of  the  latter  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  are  of 
»  Sir  William  White:  Life  and  Correspondence,  p.  128.- 


The  Russo-Turkish  War  263 

unique  interest,  not  only  because  they  have  built  up  the 
great  national  fabrics  of  to-day,  but  also  because  they 
illustrate  the  truth  of  that  suggestive  remark  of  the  great 
Napoleon:  "The  general  who  does  great  things  is  he  who 
also  possesses  qualities  adapted  for  civil  life." 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE    BALKAN    SETTLEMENT 

"  New  hopes  should  animate  the  world ;  new  light 
Should  dawn  from  new  revealings  to  a  race 
Weighed  down  so  long,  forgotten  so  long." 

— Robert  Browning,  Paracelsus. 

THE  collapse  of  the  Turkish  defence  in  Roumelia  in- 
augurated a  time  of  great  strain  and  stress  in  Anglo- 
Russian  relations.  On  December  13,  1877,  that  is,  three 
days  after  the  fall  of  Plevna,  Lord  Derby  reminded  the 
Russian  Government  of  its  promise  of  May  30,  1876,  that 
the  acquisition  of  Constantinople  was  excluded  from  the 
wishes  and  intentions  of  the  Emperor  Alexander  II.,  and 
expressed  the  earnest  hope  that  the  Turkish  capital  would 
not  be  occupied,  even  for  military  purposes.  The  reply 
of  the  Russian  Chancellor  (December  i6th)  was  reserved. 
It  claimed  that  Russia  must  have  full  right  of  action, 
which  is  the  right  of  every  belligerent,  and  closed  with  a 
request  for  a  clearer  definition  of  the  British  interests  which 
would  be  endangered  by  such  a  step.  In  his  answer  of 
January  13,  1878,  the  British  Foreign  Minister  specified  the 
occupation  of  the  Dardanelles  as  an  event  that  would  en- 
danger the  good  relations  between  England  and  Russia; 
whereupon  Prince  Gortchakoff  on  January  16,  1878,  gave 
the  assurance  that  this  step  would  not  be  taken  imless 
British  forces  were  landed  at  Gallipoli,  or  Turkish  troops 
were  concentrated  there. 

264 


The  Balkan  Settlement  265 

So  far  this  was  satisfactory;  but  other  signs  seemed  to 
tetoken  a  resolve  on  the  part  of  Russia  to  gain  time  while 
her  troops  pressed  on  towards  Constantinople.  The  return 
of  the  Czar  to  St.  Petersburg  after  the  fall  of  Plevna  had 
left  more  power  in  the  hands  of  the  Grand  Duke  Nicholas 
and  of  the  many  generals  who  longed  to  revenge  themselves 
for  the  disasters  in  Bulgaria  by  seizing  Constantinople. 

In  face  of  the  probability  of  this  event,  public  opinion  in 
England  underwent  a  complete  change.  Russia  appeared 
no  longer  as  the  champion  of  oppressed  Christians,  but  as 
an  ambitious  and  grasping  Power.  Mr.  Gladstone's  im- 
passioned appeals  for  non-intervention  lost  their  effect,  and 
a  warlike  feeling  began  to  prevail.  The  change  of  feeling 
was  perfectly  natural.  Even  those  who  claimed  that  the 
war  might  have  been  averted,  by  the  adoption  of  a  different 
policy  by  the  Beaconsfield  Cabinet,  had  to  face  the  facts  of 
the  situation;   and  these  were  extremely  grave. 

The  alarm  increased  when  it  was  known  that  Turkey, 
on  January  3,  1878,  had  appealed  to  the  Powers  for  their 
miediation,  and  that  Germany  had  ostentatiously  refused. 
It  seemed  probable  that  Russia,  relying  on  the  support  of 
Germany,  would  endeavour  to  force  her  own  terms  on  the 
Porte.  Lord  Loftus,  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Peters- 
burg, was  therefore  charged  to  warn  the  Ministers  of  the 
Czar  Qanuary  i6th)  that  any  treaty  made  separately  be- 
tween Russia  and  Turkey,  which  affected  the  international 
treaties  of  1856  and  187 1,  would  not  be  valid  without  the 
consent  of  all  the  signatory  Powers.  Four  days  later  the 
Muscovite  vanguard  entered  Adrianople,  and  it  appeared 
likely  that  peace  would  soon  be  dictated  at  Constantinople 
without  regard  to  the  interests  of  Great  Britain  and 
Austria. 


266  The  European  Nations 

Such  was  the  general  position  when  ParHament  met  at 
Westminster  on  January  17th.  The  Queen's  Speech  con- 
tained the  significant  phrase  that,  should  hostilities  be  un- 
fortunately prolonged,  some  unexpected  occurrence  might 
render  it  incumbent  to  adopt  measures  of  precaution. 
Five  days  later  it  transpired  that  the  Sultan  had  sent  an 
appeal  to  Queen  Victoria  for  her  mediation  with  a  view  to 
arranging  an  armistice  and  the  discussion  of  the  prelimi- 
naries of  peace.  In  accordance  with  this  appeal,  the  Queen 
telegraphed  to  the  Emperor  of  Russia  in  these  terms: 

' '  I  have  received  a  direct  appeal  from  the  Sultan  which 
I  cannot  leave  without  an  answer.  Knowing  that  you  are 
sincerely  desirous  of  peace,  I  do  not  hesitate  to  communi- 
cate this  fact  to  you,  in  hope  that  you  may  accelerate  the 
negotiations  for  the  conclusion  of  an  armistice  which  may 
lead  to  an  honourable  peace." 

This  communication  was  sent  with  the  approval  of  the 
Cabinet.  The  nature  of  the  reply  is  not  known.  Probably 
it  was  not  encouraging,  for  on  the  next  day  (January  23rd) 
the  British  Admiralty  ordered  Admiral  Hornby  with  the 
Mediterranean  fleet  to  steam  up  the  Dardanelles  to  Con- 
stantinople. On  the  following  day  this  was  annulled,  and 
the  Admiral  was  directed  not  to  proceed  beyond  Besika 
Bay.^  The  original  order  was  the  cause  of  the  resignation 
of  Lord  Carnarvon.  The  retirement  of  Lord  Derby  was 
also  announced,  but  he  afterwards  withdrew  it,  probably 
on  condition  that  the  fleet  did  not  enter  the  Sea  of  Marmora. 

Light  was  thus  thrown  on  the  dissensions  in  the  Cabinet, 
and  the  vacillations  in  British  policy.     Disraeli  once  said  in 

>  For  the  odd  mistake  in  a  telegram,  which  caused  the  original 
order,  see  Sir  Stafford  Northcote,  Earl  of  Iddesleigh,  by  Andrew 
Lang,  ii.,  pp.  111-112. 


The  Balkan  Settlement  267 

his  whimsical  way  that  there  were  six  parties  in  the  Min- 
istry. The  first  party  wanted  immediate  war  with  Russia ; 
the  second  was  for  war  in  order  to  save  Constantinople; 
the  third  was  for  peace  at  any  price;  the  fourth  would 
let  the  Russians  take  Constantinople  and  then  turn  them 
out ;  the  fifth  wanted  to  plant  the  cross  on  the  dome  of  St. 
Sophia;  "and  then  there  are  the  Prime  Minister  and  the 
Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer,  who  desire  to  see  something 
done,  but  don't  know  exactly  what."  ^  The  coupling  of 
himself  with  the  amiable  Sir  Stafford  Northcote  is  a  good 
instance  of  Disraelian  irony.  It  is  fairly  certain  that  he 
was  for  war  with  Russia ;  that  Lord  Carnarvon  constituted 
the  third  party,  and  Lord  Derby  the  fourth. 

On  the  day  after  the  resignation  of  Lord  Carnarvon,  the 
British  Cabinet  heard  for  the  first  time  what  were  the  de- 
mands of  Russia.  They  included  the  formation  of  a 
Greater  Bulgaria,  "within  the  limits  of  the  Bulgarian 
nationality,"  practically  independent  of  the  Sultan's  direct 
control;  the  entire  independence  of  Roumania,  Servia,  and 
Montenegro;  a  territorial  and  pecuniary  indemnity  to 
Russia  for  the  expenses  of  the  war;  and  "an  ulterior  un- 
derstanding for  safe-guarding  the  rights  and  interests  of 
Russia  in  the  Straits." 

The  extension  of  Bulgaria  to  the  shores  of  the  ^gean 
seemed  at  that  time  a  mighty  triumph  for  Russian  in- 
fluence; but  it  was  the  last  item,  vaguely  foreshadowing 
the  extension  of  Russian  influence  to  the  Dardanelles,  that 
most  aroused  the  alarm  of  the  British  Cabinet.  Russian 
control  of  those  Straits  would  certainly  have  endangered 

»  Ibid.,  pp.  105-106.  For  the  telegrams  between  the  First  Lord 
of  the  Admiralty,  W.  H.  Smith,  and  Admiral  Hornby,  see  Life  and 
Times  of  W.  H.  Smith,  by  Sir  H.  Maxwell,  i.,  chap.  xi. 


268  The  European  Nations 

Britain's  connexions  with  India  by  way  of  the  Suez  Canal, 
seeing  that  we  then  had  no  foothold  in  Egypt.  Accordingly, 
on  January  28th,  the  Ministry  proposed  to  Parliament  the 
voting  of  an  additional  sum  of  ;i^6,ooo,ooo  towards  in- 
creasing the  armaments  of  the  country.  At  once  there 
arose  strong  protests  against  this  proposal,  especially  from 
the  districts  then  suffering  from  the  prolonged  depression 
of  trade.  The  outcry  was  very  natural;  but  none  the  less 
it  can  scarcely  be  justified  in  view  of  the  magnitude  of  the 
British  interests  then  at  stake.  Granted  that  the  views 
of  the  Czar  were  pacific,  those  of  his  generals  at  the  seat  of 
war  were  very  much  open  to  question.^  The  long-coveted 
prize  of  Constantinople,  or  the  Dardanelles,  was  likely  to 
tempt  them  to  disregard  official  orders  from  St.  Petersburg 
unless  they  knew  that  any  imprudent  step  would  bring  on 
a  European  war.  In  any  case,  the  vote  of  ;!£6,ooo,ooo  was 
a  precautionary  measure;  and  it  probably  had  the  effect 
of  giving  pause  to  the  enthusiasts  at  the  Russian  head- 
quarters. 

The  preliminary  bases  of  peace  between  Russia  and 
Turkey  were  signed  at  Adrianople  Qanuary  31st)  on  the 
terms  summarised  above,  except  that  the  Czar's  Minister 
now  withdrew  the  obnoxious  clause  about  the  Straits.  A 
line  of  demarcation  was  also  agreed  on  between  the  hostile 
forces:  it  passed  from  Derkos,  a  lake  near  the  Black  Sea, 
to  the  north  of  Constantinople,  in  a  southerly  direction  by 

>  See  the  compromising  revelations  made  by  an  anonymous 
Russian  writer  in  the  Revue  de  Paris  for  July  15,  1897.  The  au- 
thoress, "O.  K.,"  in  her  book  The  Friends  and  Foes  of  Russia  (pp. 
240-241),  states  that  only  the  autocracy  could  have  stayed  the 
Russian  advance  on  Constantinople.  General  U.  S.  Grant  told  her 
that  if  he  had  had  such  an  order,  he  would  have  put  it  in  his  pocket 
and  produced  it  again  when  in  Constantinople. 


The  Balkan  Settlement  269 

the  banks  of  the  Karasou  stream  as  far  as  the  Sea  of  Mar- 
mora. This  gave  to  the  Russians  the  Hnes  of  Tchekmedje, 
the  chief  natural  defence  of  Constantinople,  and  they  oc- 
cupied this  position  on  February  6th.  This  fact  was  re- 
ported by  Mr.  Layard,  Sir  Henry  Elliot's  successor  at 
Constantinople,  in  alarmist  terms,  and  it  had  the  effect  of 
stilling  the  opposition  at  Westminster  to  the  vote  of 
credit.  Though  official  assurances  of  a  reassuring  kind 
came  from  Prince  Gortchakoff  at  St.  Petersburg,  the 
British  Ministry  on  February  7th  ordered  a  part  of  the 
Mediterranean  fleet  to  enter  the  Sea  of  Marmora  for 
the  defence  of  British  interests  and  the  protection  of  British 
subjects  at  Constantinople.  The  Czar's  Government  there- 
upon declared  that  if  the  British  fleet  steamed  up  the 
Bosporus,  Russian  troops  would  enter  Constantinople  for 
the  protection  of  the  Christian  population. 

This  rivalry  in  philanthropic  zeal  was  not  pushed  to  its 
logical  issue,  war.  The  British  fleet  stopped  short  of  the 
Bosporus,  but  within  sight  of  the  Russian  lines.  True, 
these  were  pushed  eastwards  slightly  beyond  the  limits 
agreed  on  with  the  Turks ;  but  an  arrangement  was  arrived 
at  between  Lord  Derby  and  Prince  Gortchakoff  (February 
19th)  that  the  Russians  would  not  occupy  the  lines  of 
Bulair  close  to  Constantinople,  or  the  Peninsula  of  Galli- 
poli  commanding  the  Dardanelles,  provided  that  British 
forces  were  not  landed  in  that  important  strait.^  So  mat- 
ters rested,  both  sides  regarding  each  other  with  the  sullen- 
ness  of  impotent  wrath.  As  Bismarck  said,  a  war  woiild 
have  been  a  fight  between  an  elephant  and  a  whale. 

The  situation  was  further  complicated  by  an  invasion 
of  Thessaly  by  the  Greeks  (February  3rd) ;  but  they  were 
»  Hertslet,  iv.,  p.  2670. 


270  The  European  Nations 

withdrawn  at  once  on  the  urgent  remonstrance  of  the 
Powers,  coupled  with  a  promise  that  the  claims  of  Greece 
would  be  favourably  considered  at  the  general  peace. ^ 

In  truth,  all  the  racial  hatreds,  aspirations,  and  ambitions 
that  had  so  long  been  pent  up  in  the  south-east  of  Europe 
now  seemed  on  the  point  of  bursting  forth  and  overwhelm- 
ing civilisation  in  a  common  ruin.  Just  as  the  earth's 
volcanic  forces  now  and  again  threaten  to  tear  their  way 
through  the  crust,  so  now  the  immemorial  feuds  of  Mos- 
lems and  Christians,  of  Greeks,  Servians,  Bulgars,  Wallachs, 
and  Turks,  promised  to  desolate  the  slopes  of  the  Balkans 
of  Rhodope,  and  the  Pindus,  and  to  spread  the  lava  tide  of 
war  over  the  half  of  the  Continent.  The  Russians  and 
Bulgars,  swarming  over  Roumelia,  glutted  their  revenge 
for  past  defeats  and  massacres  by  outrages  well-nigh  as 
horrible  as  that  of  Batak.  At  once  the  fierce  Moslems  of 
the  Rhodope  Moimtains  rose  in  self-defence  or  for  ven- 
geance. And  while  the  Russian  eagles  perforce  checked 
their  flight  within  sight  of  Stamboul,  the  Greeks  and  Ar- 
menians of  that  capital,  nay,  the  very  occupants  of  the 
foreign  embassies,  trembled  at  sight  of  the  lust  of  blood 
that  seized  on  the  vengeful  Ottomans. 

Nor  was  this  all.  Far  away  beyond  the  northern  horizon 
the  war  cloud  hung  heavily  over  the  Carpathians.  The 
statesmen  of  Vienna,  fearing  that  the  terms  of  their  bargain 
with  Russia  were  now  forgotten  in  the  intoxication  of  her 
triumph,  determined  to  compel  the  victors  to  lay  their 
spoils  before  the  Great  Powers.  In  haste  the  Austrian  and 
Hungarian  troops  took  station  on  the  great  bastion  of  the 
Carpathians,  and  began  to  exert  on  the  military  situation 

»  L.  Sergeant,  Greece  in  the  Nineteenth  Century  (1897),  ch.  xi. 


The  Balkan  Settlement  271 

the  pressure  which  had  been  so  fatal  to  Russia  in  her 
Turkish  campaign  of  1854. 

But  though  everything  betokened  war,  there  were  forces 
that  worked  slowly  but  surely  for  a  pacific  settlement. 
However  threatening  was  the  attitude  of  Russia,  her  rulers 
really  desired  peace.  The  war  had  shown  once  again  the 
weakness  of  that  Power  for  offence.  Her  strength  lies  in 
her  boundless  plains,  in  the  devotion  of  her  millions  of 
peasants  to  the  Czar,  and  in  the  patient,  stubborn  strength 
which  is  the  outcome  of  long  centuries  of  struggle  with  the 
yearly  tyrant,  winter.  Her  weakness  lies  in  the  selfishness, 
frivolity,  corruption,  and  narrowness  of  outlook  of  her 
governing  class — in  short,  in  their  incapacity  for  organisa- 
tion. Against  the  steady  resisting  power  of  her  peasants 
the  great  Napoleon  had  hurled  his  legions  in  vain.  That 
campaign  of  181 2  exhibited  the  strength  of  Russia  for 
defence.  But  when,  in  fallacious  trust  in  that  precedent, 
she  had  undertaken  great  wars  far  from  her  base,  failure 
has  nearly  always  been  the  result.  The  pathetic  devotion 
of  her  peasantry  has  not  made  up  for  the  mental  and  moral 
defects  of  her  governing  classes.  This  fact  had  fixed  it- 
self on  every  competent  observer  in  1877.  The  Emperor 
Alexander  knew  it  only  too  well.  Now,  early  in  1878,  it 
was  fairly  certain  that  his  army  would  succumb  under  the 
frontal  attacks  of  Turks  and  British,  and  the  onset  of  the 
Austrians  on  their  rear. 

Therefore  when,  on  February  4th,  the  Hapsburg  State 
proposed  to  refer  the  terms  of  peace  to  a  Conference  of 
the  Powers  at  Vienna,  the  consent  of  Russia  was  almost 
certain,  provided  that  the  prestige  of  the  Czar  remained 
unimpaired.  Three  days  later  the  place  of  meeting 
was   changed  to  Berlin,  the  Conference   also  becoming  a 


2  72  The  European  Nations 

Congress,  that  is,  a  meeting  where  the  chief  Ministers  of 
the  Powers,  not  merely  their  Ambassadors,  would  take  part. 
The  United  Kingdom,  France,  and  Italy  at  once  signified 
their  assent  to  this  proposal.  As  for  Bismarck,  he  promised 
in  a  speech  to  the  Reichstag  (February  19th)  that  he  would 
act  as  an  "honest  broker"  between  the  parties  most  nearly 
concerned.  There  is  little  doubt  that  Russia  took  this  in 
a  sense  favourable  to  her  claims,  and  she,  too,  consented. 

Nevertheless,  she  sought  to  tie  the  hands  of  the  Congress 
by  binding  Turkey  to  a  preliminary  treaty  signed  on 
March  3rd  at  San  Stefano,  a  village  near  to  Constantinople. 
The  terms  comprised  those  stated  above  (p.  269),  but  they 
also  stipulated  the  cession  of  frontier  districts  to  Servia 
and  Montenegro,  while  Russia  was  to  acquire  the  Rouman- 
ian districts  east  of  the  river  Pruth,  Roumania  receiv- 
ing the  Dobrudscha  as  an  equivalent.  Most  serious  of  all 
was  the  erection  of  Bulgaria  into  an  almost  independent 
Principality,  extending  nearly  as  far  south  as  Midia  (on  the 
Black  Sea),  Adrianople,  Salonica,  and  beyond  Ochrida  in 
Albania.  As  will  be  seen  by  reference  to  the  map  (p.  287), 
this  Principality  would  then  have  comprised  more  than 
half  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  besides  including  districts  on 
the  ^gean  Sea  and  around  the  town  of  Monastir,  for  which 
the  Greeks  have  never  ceased  to  cherish  hopes.  A  Russian 
Commissioner  was  to  supervise  the  formation  of  the 
government  for  two  years ;  all  the  fortresses  on  the  Danube 
were  to  be  razed,  and  none  others  constructed;  Turkish 
forces  were  required  entirely  to  evacuate  the  Principality, 
which  was  to  be  occupied  by  Russian  troops  for  a  space  of 
time  not  exceeding  two  years. 

On  her  side,  Turkey  undertook  to  grant  reforms  to  the 
Armenians,  and  protect  them  from  Kurds  and  Circassians. 


The  Balkan  Settlement  273 

Russia  further  claimed  1,410,000,000  roubles  as  war  in- 
demnity, but  consented  to  take  the  Dobrudscha  district 
(offered  to  Roumania,  as  stated  above),  and  in  Asia  the 
territories  of  Batoum,  Kars,  Ardahan,  and  Bayazid,  in  lieu 
of  1,100,000,000  roubles.  The  Porte  afterwards  declared 
that  it  signed  this  treaty  under  persistent  pressure  from 
the  Grand  Duke  Nicholas  and  General  Ignatieff,  who  again 
and  again  declared  that  otherwise  the  Russians  would 
advance  on  the  capital.^ 

At  once,  from  all  parts  of  the  Balkan  Peninstda,  there 
arose  a  chorus  of  protests  against  the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano. 
The  Mohammedans  of  the  proposed  State  of  Bulgaria  pro- 
tested against  subjection  to  their  former  helots.  The 
Greeks  saw  in  the  treaty  the  death-blow  to  their  hopes  of 
gaining  the  northern  coasts  of  the  ^gean  and  a  large  part 
of  central  Macedonia.  They  fulminated  against  the  Btd- 
garians  as  ignorant  peasants,  whose  cause  had  been  taken 
up  recently  by  Russia  for  her  own  aggrandisement. ^  The 
Servians  were  equally  indignant.  They  claimed,  and  with 
justice,  that  their  efforts  against  the  Turks  should  be  re- 
warded by  an  increase  of  territory  which  would  unite  to 
them  their  kinsfolk  in  Macedonia  and  part  of  Bosnia,  and 
place  them  on  an  equality  with  the  upstart  State  of  Bul- 
garia. Whereas  the  treaty  assigned  to  these  proteges  of 
Russia  districts  inhabited  solely  by  Servians,  thereby  bar- 
ring the  way  to  any  extension  of  that  Principality. 

Still  more  urgent  was  the  protest  of  the  Roumanian 

1  For  the  text  of  the  treaty,  see  Pari.  Papers,  Turkey,  No.  22 
(1878) ;  also  The  European  Concert  in  the  Eastern  Question,  by  T.  E. 
Holland,  pp.  335-348- 

2  Pari.  Papers,  Turkey,  No.  31  (1878),  Nos.  6-17,  and  enclosures; 
L'Hellenisme  et  la  Macedonie,  by  N.  Kasasis  (Paris,  1904);  L.  Ser- 
geant, op.  cit.,  ch.  xii. 


274  The  European  Nations 

Government.  In  return  for  the  priceless  services  rendered 
by  his  troops  at  Plevna,  Prince  Charles  and  his  Ministers 
were  kept  in  the  dark  as  to  the  terms  arranged  between 
Russia  and  Turkey.  The  Czar  sent  General  Ignatieff  to 
prepare  the  Prince  for  the  news,  and  sought  to  mollify  him 
by  the  hint  that  he  might  become  also  Prince  of  Bulgaria, 
a  suggestion  which  was  scornfully  waved  aside.  The 
Government  at  Bukharest  first  learned  the  full  truth  as  to 
the  Bessarabia  -  Dobrudscha  exchange  from  the  columns 
of  the  Journal  du  St.  Petersbourg,  which  proved  that  the 
much-prized  Bessarabian  territory  was  to  be  bargained 
away  by  the  Power  which  had  solemnly  undertaken  to 
uphold  the  integrity  of  the  Principality.  The  Prince,  the 
Cabinet,  and  the  people  unanimously  inveighed  against 
this  proposal.  On  February  4th  the  Roumanian  Chamber 
of  Deputies  declared  that  Roumania  would  defend  its 
territory  to  the  last,  by  armed  force  if  necessary;  but  it 
soon  appeared  that  none  of  the  Powers  took  any  interest 
in  the  matter,  and,  thanks  to  the  prudence  of  Prince 
Charles,  the  proud  little  nation  gradually  schooled  itself 
to  accept  the  inevitable.^ 

The  peace  of  Europe  now  turned  on  the  question  whether 
the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano  would  be  submitted  as  a  whole 
to  the  Congress  of  the  Powers  at  Berlin ;  England  claimed 
that  it  must  be  so  submitted.  This  contention,  in  its  ex- 
treme form,  found  no  support  from  any  of  the  Powers,  not 
even  from  Austria,  and  it  met  with  firm  opposition  from 
Russia.  She,  however,  assured  the  Viennese  Court  that 
the  Congress  would  decide  which  of  the  San  Stefano  terms 
affected  the  interests  of  Europe  and  would  pronounce  on 

»  Pari.  Papers,  Turkey,  No.  30  (1878);  also  Reminiscences  of  the 
King  of  Rouinania,  chaps,  x.,  xi. 


The  Balkan  Settlement  275 

them.  The  Beaconsfield  Cabinet  later  on  affirmed  that 
"every  article  in  the  treaty  between  Russia  and  Turkey 
will  be  placed  before  the  Congress — not  necessarily  for 
acceptance,  but  in  order  that  it  may  be  considered  what 
articles  require  acceptance  or  concurrence  by  the  several 
Powers  and  what  do  not."  ^ 

When  this  much  was  conceded,  there  remained  no  irre- 
concilable difference,  unless  the  treaty  contained  secret 
articles  which  Russia  claimed  to  keep  back  from  the  Con- 
gress. As  far  as  we  know,  there  were  none.  But  the  fact 
is  that  the  dispute,  small  as  it  now  appears  to  us,  was 
intensified  by  the  suspicions  and  resentment  prevalent 
on  both  sides.  The  final  decision  of  the  St.  Petersburg 
Government  was  couched  in  somewhat  curt  and  threaten- 
ing terms:  "It  leaves  to  the  other  Powers  the  liberty  of 
raising  such  questions  at  the  Congress  as  they  may  think 
it  fit  to  discuss,  and  reserves  to  itself  the  liberty  of  accept- 
ing, or  not  accepting,  the  discussion  of  these  questions."  ^ 

This  haughty  reply,  received  at  Downing  Street  on 
March  27th,  again  brought  the  two  States  to  the  verge 
of  war.  Lord  Beaconsfield,  and  all  his  colleagues  but 
one,  determined  to  make  immediate  preparations  for  the 
outbreak  of  hostilities,  while  Lord  Derby,  clinging  to  the 
belief  that  peace  would  be  best  preserved  by  ordinary 
negotiations,  resigned  the  portfolio  for  foreign  affairs 
(March  28th) ;  two  days  later  he  was  succeeded  by  the 
Marquis  of  Salisbury .^  On  April  ist  the  Prime  Minister 
gave  notice  of  motion  that  the   reserves  of  the  army  and 

»  Lord  Derby  to  Sir  H.  Elliot,  March  13,  1878.  Pari.  Papers, 
Turkey,  No.  24  (1878),  No.  9,  p.  5. 

2  Ibid.,  No.  15,  p.  7. 

3  See  the  close  of  the  chapter  for  Lord  Derby's  further  reason 
for  resigning. 


276  The  European  Nations 

militia  should  be  called  out;  and  on  the  morrow  Lord 
Salisbury  published  a  note  for  despatch  to  foreign  courts 
summarising  the  grounds  of  British  opposition  to  the 
Treaty  of  San  Stefano,  and  to  Russia's  contentions  re- 
specting the  Congress. 

Events  took  a  still  more  threatening  turn  fifteen  days 
later,  when  the  Government  ordered  eight  Indian  regi- 
ments, along  with  two  batteries  of  artillery,  to  proceed  at 
once  to  Malta.  The  measure  aroused  strong  differences  of 
opinion,  some  seeing  in  it  a  masterly  stroke  which  revealed 
the  greatness  of  Britain's  resources,  while  the  more  nervous 
of  the  Liberal  watch-dogs  bayed  forth  their  fears  that  it 
was  the  beginning  of  a  Strafford-like  plot  for  undermining 
the  liberties  of  England. 

So  sharp  were  the  differences  of  opinion  in  England,  that 
Russia  would  perhaps  have  disregarded  the  threats  of  the 
Beaconsfield  Ministry  had  she  not  been  face  to  face  with  a 
hostile  Austria.  The  great  aim  of  the  Czar's  Government 
was  to  win  over  the  Dual  Monarchy  by  offering  a  share  of 
the  spoils  of  Turkey.  Accordingly,  General  Ignatieff  went 
on  a  mission  to  the  continental  courts,  especially  to  that  of 
Vienna,  and  there  is  little  doubt  that  he  offered  Bosnia  to 
the  Hapsburg  Power.  That  was  the  least  which  Francis 
Joseph  and  Count  Andrassy  had  the  right  to  expect,  for 
the  secret  compact  made  before  the  war  promised  them 
as  much.  In  view  of  the  enormous  strides  contemplated 
by  Russia,  they  now  asked  for  certain  rights  in  connexion 
with  Servia  and  Montenegro,  and  commercial  privileges 
that  would  open  a  way  to  Salonica.i  But  Russia's  aims, 
as  expressed  at  San  Stefano,  clearly  were  to  dominate 
the  Greater  Bulgaria  there  foreshadowed,  which  would 
>  Debidour,  Hist,  diplomatique  de  l' Europe,  ii.,  p.  515. 


The  Balkan  Settlement  277 

probably  shut  out  Austria  from  political  and  commercial 
influence  over  the  regions  north  of  Salonica.  Ignatieff's 
effort  to  gain  over  Austria  therefore  failed;  and  it  was 
doubtless  Lord  Beaconsfield's  confidence  in  the  certainty 
of  Hapsburg  support  in  case  of  war  that  prompted  his 
defiance  alike  of  Russia  and  of  the  Liberal  party  at  home. 

The  Czar's  Government  also  was  well  aware  of  the  peril 
of  arousing  a  European  war.  Nihilism  lifted  its  head 
threateningly  at  home;  and  the  Russian  troops  before 
Constantinople  were  dying  like  flies  in  autumn.  The 
outrages  committed  by  them  and  the  Bulgarians  on  the 
Moslems  of  Roumelia  had,  as  we  have  seen,  led  to  a  revolt 
in  the  district  of  Mount  Rhodope;  and  there  was  talk  in 
some  quarters  of  making  a  desperate  effort  to  cut  off 
the  invaders  from  the  Danube. ^  The  discontent  of  the 
Roumanians  might  have  been  worked  upon  so  as  still  fur- 
ther to  endanger  the  Russian  communications.  Probably 
the  knowledge  of  these  plans  and  of  the  warlike  prepara- 
tions of  Great  Britain  induced  the  Russian  Government 
to  moderate  its  tone.  On  April  gth  it  expressed  a  wish 
that  Lord  Salisbury  would  formulate  a  definite  policy. 

The  new  Foreign  Minister  speedily  availed  himself  of  this 
offer;  and  the  cause  of  peace  was  greatly  furthered  by 
secret  negotiations  which  he  carried  on  with  Count  Shuva- 
loff.  The  Russian  Ambassador  in  London  had  throughout 
bent  his  great  abilities  to  a  pacific  solution  of  the  dispute 

>  For  these  outrages,  see  Pari.  Papers,  Turkey  (1878),  Nos.  42 
and  45,  with  numerous  enclosures.  The  larger  plans  of  the  Rho- 
dope insurgents  and  their  abettors  at  Constantinople  are  not  fully 
known.  An  Englishman,  Sinclair,  and  some  other  free-lances  were 
concerned  in  the  affair.  The  Rhodope  district  long  retained  a 
kind  of  independence;  see  Les  Evdnements  politiques  en  Bulgarie, 
by  A.  G.  Drandar.  Appendix. 


278  The  European  Nations 

and,  on  finding  out  the  real  nature  of  the  British  objections 
to  the  San  Stefano  Treaty,  he  proceeded  to  St.  Petersburg 
to  persuade  the  Emperor  to  accept  certain  changes.  In 
this  he  succeeded,  and  on  his  return  to  London  was  able  to 
come  to  an  agreement  with  Lord  Salisbury  (May  30th),  the 
chief  terms  of  which  clearly  foreshadowed  those  finally 
adopted  at  Berlin. 

In  effect  they  were  as  follows:  The  Beaconsfield  Cabinet 
strongly  objected  to  the  proposed  wide  extension  of  Bul- 
garia at  the  expense  of  other  nationalities,  and  suggested 
that  the  districts  south  of  the  Balkans,  which  were  peopled 
almost  wholly  by  Bulgarians,  should  not  be  wholly  with- 
drawn from  Turkish  control,  but  "should  receive  a  large 
measure  of  administrative  self-government  .  .  .  with 
a  Christian  governor."  To  these  proposals  the  Russian 
Government  gave  a  conditional  assent.  Lord  Salisbury 
further  claimed  that  the  Sultan  should  have  the  right  "to 
canton  troops  on  the  frontiers  of  southern  Bulgaria";  and 
that  the  militia  of  that  province  should  be  commanded  by 
officers  appointed  by  the  Sultan  with  the  consent  of  Europe. 
England  also  undertook  to  see  that  the  cause  of  the  Greeks 
in  Thessaly  and  Epirus  received  the  attention  of  all  the 
Powers,  in  place  of  the  intervention  of  Russia  alone  on  their 
behalf,  as  specified  in  the  San  Stefano  Treaty. 

Respecting  the  cession  of  Roumanian  Bessarabia  to 
Russia,  on  which  the  Emperor  Alexander  had  throughout 
insisted  (see  page  250),  England  expressed  "profound  re- 
gret" at  that  demand,  but  undertook  not  to  dispute  it  at 
the  Congress.  On  his  side  the  Emperor  Alexander  con- 
sented to  restore  Bayazid  in  Asia  Minor  to  the  Turks,  but 
insisted  on  the  retention  of  Batoum,  Kars,  and  Ardahan. 
Great  Britain  acceded  to  this,  but  hinted  that  the  defence 


The  Balkan  Settlement  279 

of  Turkey  in  Asia  would  thenceforth  rest  especially  upon 
her — a  hint  to  prepare  Russia  for  the  Cyprus  Convention. 

For  at  this  time  the  Beaconsfield  Cabinet  had  been 
treating  secretly  with  the  Sublime  Porte.  When  Lord 
Salisbury  found  out  that  Russia  would  not  abate  her 
demands  for  Batoum,  Ardahan,  and  Kars,  he  sought  to 
safeguard  British  interests  in  the  Levant  by  acquiring 
complete  control  over  the  island  of  Cyprus.  His  final  in- 
structions to  Mr.  Layard  to  that  effect  were  telegraphed 
on  May  30th,  that  is,  on  the  very  day  on  which  peace  with 
Russia  was  practically  assured.^  The  Porte,  unaware  of 
the  fact  that  there  was  little  fear  of  the  renewal  of  hos- 
tilities, agreed  to  the  secret  Cyprus  Convention  on  Jime 
4th;  while  Russia,  knowing  little  or  nothing  as  to  Britain's 
arrangement  with  the  Porte,  acceded  to  the  final  arrange- 
ments for  the  discussion  of  Turkish  affairs  at  Berlin.  It 
is  not  surprising  that  this  manner  of  doing  business  aroused 
great  irritation  both  at  St.  Petersburg  and  Constantinople. 
Count  Shuvaloff's  behaviour  at  the  Berlin  Congress  when 
the  news  came  out  proclaimed  to  the  world  that  he  con- 
sidered himself  tricked  by  Lord  Beaconsfield;  while  that 
statesman  disdainfully  sipped  nectar  of  delight  that  rarely 
comes  to  the  lips  even  of  the  gods  of  diplomacy. 

The  terms  of  the  Cyprus  Convention  were  to  the  effect 
that,  if  Russia  retained  the  three  districts  in  Asia  Minor 
named  above,  or  any  of  them  (as  it  was  perfectly  certain 
that  she  would) ;  or  if  she  sought  to  take  possession  of 
any  further  Turkish  territory  in  Asia  Minor,  Great  Britain 
would  help  the  Sultan  by  force  of  arms.  He,  on  his  side, 
assigned  to  Great  Britain  the  island  of  Cyprus,  to  be  oc- 
cupied and  administered  by  her.     Re    further    promised 

1  Pari.  Papers,  Turkey,  No.  36  (1878).     See,  too,  ibid..  No.  43, 


28o  The  European  Nations 

"to  introduce  necessary  reforms,  to  be  agreed  upon  later 
between  the  two  Powers,  into  the  government,  and  for  the 
protection  of  the  Christian  and  other  subjects  of  the  Porte 
in  these  territories."  On  July  ist  Britain  also  covenanted 
to  pay  to  the  Porte  the  surplus  of  revenue  over  expenditure 
in  Cyprus,  calculated  upon  the  average  of  the  last  five 
years,  and  to  restore  Cyprus  to  Turkey  if  Russia  gave  up 
Kars  and  her  other  acquisitions.^ 

Fortified  by  the  secret  understanding  with  Russia,  and 
by  the  equally  secret  compact  with  Turkey,  the  British 
Government  could  enter  the  Congress  of  the  Powers  at 
Berlin  with  complete  equanimity.  It  is  true  that  news 
as  to  the  agreement  with  Russia  came  out  in  a  London 
newspaper  which  at  once  published  a  general  description 
of  the  Anglo-Russian  agreement  of  May  30th;  and  when 
the  correctness  of  the  news  was  stoutly  denied  by  ministers, 
the  original  deed  was  given  to  the  world  by  the  same  news- 
paper on  June  14th;  but  again  vigorous  disclaimers  and 
denials  were  given  from  the  ministerial  bench  in  Parlia- 
ment.2  Thus,  when  Lords  Beaconsfield  and  Salisbury 
proceeded  to  Berlin  for  the  opening  of  the  Congress  (June 
13th),  they  were  believed  to  hold  the  destinies  of  the 
British  Empire  in  their  hands,  and  the  world  waited  with 
bated  breath  for  the  scraps  of  news  that  came  from  that 
centre  of  diplomacy. 

On  various  details  there  arose  sharp  differences  which 
the  tactful  humour  of  the  German  Chancellor  coiild  scarcely 
set  at  rest.     The  fate  of  nations  seemed  to  waver  in  the 

»  Pari.  Papers,  Turkey,  No.  36  (1878);  Hertslet,  iv.,  pp.  2722- 
2725;   Holland,  op.  cit.,  pp.  354-356. 

2  Mr.  Charles  Marvin,  a  clerk  in  the  Foreign  Office,  was  charged 
with  this  offence,  but  the  prosecution  failed  (July  i6th)  owing  to 
lack  of  sufficient  evidence 


The  Balkan  Settlement  281 

balance  when  Prince  Gortchakoff  gathered  up  his  maps 
and  threatened  to  hurry  from  the  room,  or  when  Lord 
Beaconsfield  gave  pressing  orders  for  a  special  train  to  take 
him  back  to  Calais;  but  there  seemed  good  grounds  for 
regarding  these  incidents  rather  as  illustrative  of  char- 
acter, or  of  the  electioneering  needs  of  a  sensational  age, 
than  as  throes  in  the  birth  of  nationalities.  The  "Peace 
with  honour,"  which  the  Prime  Minister  on  his  return  an- 
nounced at  Charing  Cross  to  an  admiring  crowd,  had  vir- 
tually been  secured  at  Downing  Street  before  the  end  of 
May  respecting  all  the  great  points  in  dispute  between 
England  and  Russia. 

We  know  little  about  the  inner  history  of  the  Congress 
of  Berlin,  which  is  very  different  from  the  official  protocols 
that  half  reveal  and  half  conceal  its  debates.  One  fact 
and  one  incident  claim  attention  as  serving  to  throw 
curious  side-lights  on  policy  and  character  respectively. 
The  Emperor  William  had  been  shot  at  and  severely 
wounded  by  a  socialist  fanatic,  Dr.  Nobiling,  on  Jime  2, 
1878,  and  during  the  whole  time  of  the  Congress  the 
Crown  Prince  Frederick  acted  as  regent  of  the  Empire. 
Limited  as  his  powers  were  by  law,  etiquette,  and  Bis- 
marck, he  is  said  to  have  used  them  on  behalf  of  Austria 
and  England.  The  old  Emperor  thought  so;  for  in  a 
moment  of  confiding  indiscretion  he  hinted  to  the  Princess 
Radziwill  (a  Russian  by  birth)  that  Russian  interests 
would  have  fared  better  at  Berlin  had  he  then  been  steering 
the  ship  of  State. ^  Possibly  this  explains  why  Bismarck 
always  maintained  that  he  had  done  what  he  could  for  his 
Eastern  neighbour,  and  that  he  really  deserved  a  Russian 
decoration  for  his  services  during  the  Congress. 

»  Princess  Radziwill,  My  Recollections  (Eng.  edit.,  1900),  p.  91. 


282  The  European  Nations 

The  incident,  which  flashes  a  search-light  into  character 
and  discloses  the  recherche  joys  of  statecraft,  is  also  de- 
scribed in  the  sprightly  Memoirs  of  Princess  Radziwill. 
She  was  present  at  a  brilliant  reception  held  on  the  evening 
of  the  day  when  the  Cyprus  Convention  had  come  to  light. 
Diplomatists  and  generals  were  buzzing  eagerly  and 
angrily  when  the  Earl  of  Beaconsfield  appeared.  A  slight 
hush  came  over  the  wasp-like  clusters  as  he  made  his  way 
among  them,  noting  everything  with  his  restless,  inscrut- 
able eyes.  At  last  he  came  near  the  Princess,  once  a  bitter 
enemy,  but  now  captivated  and  captured  by  his  powers  of 
polite  irony.  "What  are  you  thinking  of?"  she  asked. 
"I  am  not  thinking  at  all,"  he  replied;  "I  am  enjoying 
myself."  1  After  that  one  can  understand  why  Jew-bait- 
ing became  a  favourite  sport  in  Russia  throughout  the 
next  two  decades. 

We  turn  now  to  note  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin 
Quly  13,  1 878). 2  The  importance  of  this  compact  will  be 
seen  if  its  provisions  are  compared  with  those  of  the  Treaty 
of  San  Stefano,  which  it  replaced.  Instead  of  the  greater 
Bulgaria,  subjected  for  two  years  to  Russian  control,  the 
Congress  ordained  that  Bulgaria  proper  should  not  extend 
beyond  the  main  chain  of  the  Balkans,  thus  reducing  its 
extent  from  163,000  square  kilometres  to  64,000,  and  its 
population  from  four  millions  to  a  million  and  a  half.  The 
period  of  military  occupation  and  supervision  of  the  new 
administration  by  Russia  was  reduced  to  nine  months. 
At  the  end  of  that  time,  and  on  the  completion  of  the 
"organic  law,"  a  Prince  was  to  be  elected  "freely"  by  the 

1  Princess  Radziwill,  My  Recollections,  p.  149. 

2  For  the  Protocols,  see  Pari.  Papers,  Turkey  (1878),  No.  39. 
For  the  Treaty,  see  ibid..  No.  44;  also  The  European  Concert  on  the 
Eastern  Question,  by  T.  E.  Holland,  pp.  277-307. 


The  Balkan  Settlement  283 

population  of  the  principality.  The  new  State  remained 
under  the  suzerainty  of  Turkey,  the  Sultan  confirming  the 
election  of  the  new  Prince  of  Bulgaria,  "with  the  assent  of 
the  Powers." 

Another  important  departure  from  the  San  Stefano 
terms  was  the  creation  of  the  province  of  Eastern  Rou- 
melia,  with  boiuidaries  shown  in  the  accompanying  map. 
While  having  a  Christian  governor,  and  enjoying  the  rights 
of  local  self-government,  it  was  to  remain  under  "the 
direct  political  and  military  authority  of  the  Sultan,  under 
conditions  of  administrative  autonomy."  The  Sultan  re- 
tained the  right  of  keeping  garrisons  there,  though  a  local 
militia  was  to  preserve  internal  order.  As  will  be  shown 
in  the  next  chapter,  this  anomalous  state  of  things  passed 
away  in  1885,  when  the  province  threw  off  Turkish  control 
and  joined  Bulgaria. 

The  other  Christian  States  of  the  Balkans  underwent 
changes  of  the  highest  importance.  Montenegro  lost  half 
of  her  expected  gains,  but  secured  access  to  the  sea  at 
Antivari.  The  acquisitions  of  Servia  were  now  effected 
at  the  expense  of  Bulgaria.  These  decisions  were  greatly 
in  favour  of  Austria.  To  that  Power  the  occupation  of 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  was  now  entrusted  for  an  in- 
definite period  in  the  interest  of  the  peace  of  Europe,  and 
she  proceeded  forthwith  to  drive  a  wedge  between  the 
Serbs  of  Servia  and  Montenegro.  It  is  needless  to  say 
that,  in  spite  of  the  armed  opposition  of  the  Mohammedan 
people  of  those  provinces — which  led  to  severe  fighting  in 
July  to  September  of  that  year — Austria's  occupation  has 
been  permanent,  though  nominally  they  still  form  part  of 
the  Turkish  Empire. 

Roumania  and  Servia  gained  complete  independence  and 


284  The  European  Nations 

ceased  to  pay  tribute  to  the  Sultan,  but  both  States  com- 
plained of  the  lack  of  support  accorded  to  them  by  Russia, 
considering  the  magnitude  of  their  efforts  for  the  Slavonic 
cause.  Roumania  certainly  fared  very  badly  at  the  hands 
of  the  Power  for  which  it  had  done  yeoman  service  in  the 
war.  The  pride  of  the  Roumanian  people  brooked  no 
thought  of  accepting  the  Dobrudscha,  a  district  in  great 
part  marshy  and  thinly  popidated,  as  an  exchange  for  a 
fertile  district  peopled  by  their  kith  and  kin.  They  let 
the  world  know  that  Russia  appropriated  their  Bessarabian 
district  by  force,  and  that  they  accepted  the  Dobrudscha 
as  a  war  indemnity.  By  dint  of  pressure  exerted  at  the 
Congress  their  envoys  secured  a  southern  extension  of  its 
borders  at  the  expense  of  Bulgaria,  a  proceeding  which 
aroused  the  resentment  of  Russia. 

The  conduct  of  the  Czar's  Government  in  this  whole 
matter  was  most  impolitic.  It  embittered  the  relations 
between  the  two  States  and  drove  the  Government  of 
Prince  Charles  to  rely  on  Austria  and  the  Triple  Alliance. 
That  is  to  say,  Russia  herself  closed  the  door  which  had 
been  so  readily  opened  for  her  into  the  heart  of  the  Sultan's 
dominions  in  1828,  1854,  and  1877.^  We  may  here  remark 
that,  on  the  motion  of  the  French  plenipotentiaries  at  the 
Congress,  that  body  insisted  that  Jews  must  be  admitted 
to  the  franchise  in  Roumania.  This  behest  of  the  Powers 
aroused  violent  opposition  in  that  State,  but  was  finally, 
though  by  no  means  fully,  carried  out. 

Another  Christian  State  of  the  peninsula  received  scant 

'  Frederick,  Crown  Prince  of  Germany,  expressed  the  general 
opinion  in  a  letter  written  to  Prince  Charles  after  the  Berlin  Con- 
gress: "Russia's  conduct,  after  the  manful  service  you  did  for 
that  colossal  Empire,  meets  with  censure  on  all  sides"  {Reminis- 
cences of  the  King  of  Roumania,  p.  325). 


285 


286  The  European  Nations 

consideration  at  the  Congress.  Greece,  as  we  have  seen, 
had  recalled  her  troops  from  Thessaly  on  the  understanding 
that  her  claims  should  be  duly  considered  at  the  general 
peace.  She  now  pressed  those  claims;  but,  apart  from 
initial  encouragement  given  by  Lord  Salisbury,  she  re- 
ceived little  or  no  support.  On  the  motion  of  the  French 
plenipotentiary,  M.  Waddington,  her  desire  to  control  the 
northern  shores  of  the  ^gean  and  the  island  of  Crete  was 
speedily  set  aside ;  but  he  sought  to  win  for  her  practically 
the  whole  of  Thessaly  and  Epirus.  This,  however,  was 
firmly  opposed  by  Lord  Beaconsfield,  who  objected  to  the 
cession  to  her  of  the  southern  and  purely  Greek  districts 
of  Thessaly  and  Epirus.  He  protested  against  the  notion 
that  the  plenipotentiaries  had  come  to  Berlin  in  order  to 
partition  "a  worn-out  State"  (Turkey).  They  were  there 
to  "strengthen  an  ancient  Empire — essential  to  the  main- 
tenance of  peace." 

"As  for  Greece,"  he  said,  "States,  like  individuals,  which 
have  a  future  are  in  a  position  to  be  able  to  wait."  True, 
he  ended  by  expressing  "the  hope  and  even  the  convic- 
tion" that  the  Sultan  would  accept  an  equitable  solution 
of  the  question  of  the  Thessalian  frontier;  but  the  Con- 
gress acted  on  the  other  sage  dictum  and  proceeded  to 
subject  the  Hellenes  to  the  educative  influences  of  hope 
deferred.  Protocol  13  had  recorded  the  opinion  of  the 
Powers  that  the  northern  frontier  of  Greece  should  follow 
the  courses  of  the  rivers  Salammaria  and  Kalamas;  but 
they  finally  decided  to  offer  their  mediation  to  the  dis- 
putants only  in  case  no  agreement  could  be  framed.  The 
Sublime  Porte,  as  we  shall  see,  improved  on  the  procras- 
tinating methods  of  the  Nestors  of  European  diplomacy.^ 

>  See  Mr.  L.  Sergeant's  Greece  in  the  Nineteenth  Century  (1897), 


The  Balkan  Settlement  287 

As  regards  matters  that  directly  concerned  Turkey  and 
Russia,  we  may  note  that  the  latter  finally  agreed  to  forego 
the  acquisition  of  the  Bayazid  district  and  the  lands  ad- 
joining the  caravan  route  from  the  Shah's  dominions  to 
Erzeroum.  The  Czar's  Government  also  promised  that 
Batoum  should  be  a  free  port,  and  left  unchanged  the 
regulations  respecting  the  navigation  of  the  Dardanelles 
and  Bosporus.  By  a  subsequent  treaty  with  Turkey  of 
February,  1879,  the  Porte  agreed  to  pay  to  Russia  a  war 
indemnity  of  about  ;£3 2,000,000. 

More  important  from  our  standpoint  are  the  clauses  re- 
lating to  the  good  government  of  the  Christians  of  Turkey. 
By  Article  61  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  the  Porte  boiuid  itself 
to  carry  out  "the  improvements  and  reforms  demanded 
by  local  requirements  in  the  provinces  inhabited  by  the 
Armenians,  and  to  guarantee  their  security  against  the 
Circassians  and  Kurds."  It  even  added  the  promise  "pe- 
riodically" to  "make  known  the  steps  taken  to  this  effect 
to  the  Powers  who  will  superintend  their  application." 
In  the  next  article  Turkey  promised  to  "maintain"  the 
principle  of  religious  liberty  and  to  give  it  the  widest  ap- 
plication. Differences  of  religion  were  to  be  no  bar  to 
employment  in  any  public  capacity,  and  all  persons  were 
to  "be  admitted,  without  distinction  of  religion,  to  give 
evidence  before  the  tribunals." 

Such  was  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  (July  13,  1878).     Viewed 

in  its  broad  outlines,  it  aimed  at  piecing  together  again 

the  Turkish  districts  which  had  been  severed  at  San  Ste- 

fano ;  the  Bulgars  and  Serbs  who  there  gained  the  hope  of 

chap,  xii.,  for  the  speeches  of  the  Greek  envoys  at  the  Congress; 
also  that  of  Sir  Charles  Dilke  in  the  House  of  Commons  in  the  de- 
bate of  July  29-August  2,1878,  as  to  England's  desertion  of  the  Greek 
cause  after  the  ninth  session  (June  29th)  of  the  Berlin  Congress. 


288  The  European  Nations 

effecting  a  real  union  of  those  races  were  now  sundered 
once  more,  the  former  in  three  divisions,  while  the  Serbs  of 
Servia,  Bosnia,  and  Montenegro  were  wedged  apart  by  the 
intrusion  of  the  Hapsburg  Power.  Yet,  imperfect  though 
it  was  in  several  points,  that  treaty  promised  substantial 
gains  for  the  Christians  of  Turkey.  The  collapse  of  the 
Sultan's  power  had  been  so  complete,  so  notorious,  that 
few  persons  believed  he  would  ever  dare  to  disregard  the 
mandate  of  the  Great  Powers  and  his  own  solemn  promises 
stated  above.  But  no  one  could  then  foresee  the  ex- 
hibition of  weakness  and  cynicism  in  the  policy  of  those 
Powers  toward  Turkey,  which  disgraced  the  polity  of 
Europe  in  the  last  decades  of  the  century.  The  causes 
that  brought  about  that  state  of  mental  torpor  in  the  face 
of  hideous  massacres,  and  of  moral  weakness  displayed  by 
sovereigns  and  statesmen  in  the  midst  of  their  millions  of 
armed  men,  will  be  to  some  extent  set  forth  in  the  following 
chapters. 

As  regards  the  welfare  of  the  Christians  in  Asia  Minor, 
the  Treaty  of  Berlin  assigned  equal  responsibilities  to  all 
the  signatory  Powers.  But  the  British  Government  had 
already  laid  itself  under  a  special  charge  on  their  behalf  by 
the  terms  of  the  Cyprus  Convention  quoted  above.  Five 
days  before  that  treaty  was  signed  the  world  heard  with  a 
gasp  of  surprise  that  England  had  become  practically  mis- 
tress of  Cyprus  and  assumed  some  measure  of  responsibility 
for  the  good  government  of  the  Christians  of  Asiatic 
Turkey.  No  limit  of  time  was  assigned  for  the  duration 
of  the  Convention,  and  apparently  it  still  holds  good  so  far 
as  relates  to  the  material  advantages  accruing  from  the 
possession  of  that  island. 

It  is  needless  to  say  that  the  Cypriotes  have  benefited 


The  Balkan  Settlement  289 

greatly  by  the  British  administration;  the  value  of  the 
imports  and  exports  nearly  doubled  between  1878  and  1888. 
But  this  fact  does  not  and  cannot  dispose  of  the  larger 
questions  opened  up  as  to  the  methods  of  acquisition  and 
of  the  moral  responsibilities  which  it  entailed.  These  at 
once  aroused  sharp  differences  of  opinion.  Admiration  at 
the  skill  and  daring  which  had  gained  for  Britain  a  point 
of  vantage  in  the  Levant  and  set  back  Russia's  prestige  in 
that  quarter  was  chequered  by  protests  against  the  methods 
of  secrecy,  sensationalism,  and  self-seeking  that  latterly 
had  characterised  British  diplomacy. 

One  more  surprise  was  still  forthcoming.  Lord  Derby, 
speaking  in  the  House  of  Lords  on  July  i8th,  gave  point  to 
these  protests  by  divulging  a  State  secret  of  no  small  im- 
portance, namely,  that  one  of  the  causes  of  his  retirement 
at  the  end  of  March  was  a  secret  proposal  of  the  Ministry 
to  send  an  expedition  from  India  to  seize  Cyprus  and  one 
of  the  Syrian  ports  with  a  view  to  operations  against 
Russia,  and  that,  too,  with  or  without  the  consent  of  the 
Sultan.  Whether  the  Cabinet  arrived  at  anything  like  a 
decision  in  this  question  is  very  doubtful.  Lord  Salisbury 
stoutly  denied  the  correctness  of  his  predecessor's  state- 
ment. The  papers  of  Sir  Stafford  Northcote  also  show 
that  the  scheme  at  that  time  came  up  for  discussion,  but 
was  "laid  aside."  ^  Lord  Derby,  however,  stated  that  he 
had  kept  private  notes  of  the  discussion;  and  it  is  im- 
probable that  he  would  have  resigned  on  a  question  that 
was  merely  mooted  and  then  entirely  dismissed.  The  mys- 
tery in  which  the  deliberations  of  the  Cabinet  are  involved, 
and  very  rightly  involved,  broods  over  this  as  over  so 
many  topics  in  which  Lord  Beaconsfield  was  concerned. 
'  Sir  Stafford  Northcote,  ii.,  p.  108. 


290  The  European  Nations 

On  another  and  far  weightier  point  no  difference  of 
opinion  is  possible.  Viewed  by  the  hght  of  the  Cyprus 
Convention,  Britain's  responsibihty  for  assuring  a  mini- 
mum of  good  government  for  the  Christians  of  Asiatic 
Turkey  is  undeniable.  Unfortunately  it  admits  of  no 
denial  that  the  duties  which  that  responsibility  involves 
have  not  been  discharged.  The  story  of  the  misgovem- 
ment  and  massacre  of  the  Armenian  Christians  is  one  that 
will  ever  redound  to  the  disgrace  of  all  the  signatories  of 
the  Treaty  of  Berlin ;  it  is  doubly  disgraceful  to  the  Power 
which  framed  the  Cyprus  Convention. 

A  praiseworthy  effort  was  made  by  the  Beaconsfield 
Government  to  strengthen  British  influence  and  the  cause 
of  reform  by  sending  a  considerable  number  of  well-edu- 
cated men  as  consuls  to  Asia  Minor,  under  the  supervision 
of  the  Consul-general,  Sir  Charles  Wilson.  In  the  first 
two  years  they  effected  much  good,  securing  the  dismissal 
of  several  of  the  worst  Turkish  officials,  and  implanting 
hope  in  the  oppressed  Greeks  and  Armenians.  Had  they 
been  well  supported  from  London,  they  might  have 
wrought  a  permanent  change.  Such,  at  least,  is  the  belief 
of  Professor  Ramsay  after  several  years'  experience  in 
Asia  Minor. 

Unfortimately,  the  Gladstone  Government,  which  came 
into  power  in  the  spring  of  1880,  desired  to  limit  its  re- 
sponsibilities on  all  sides,  especially  in  the  Levant.  The 
British  Consuls  ceased  to  be  supported,  and  after  the 
arrival  of  Mr.  (now  Lord)  Goschen  at  Constantinople  in 
May,  1880,  as  Ambassador  Extraordinary,  British  influence 
began  to  suffer  a  decline  everywhere  through  Turkey, 
partly  owing  to  the  events  soon  to  be  described.  The  out- 
break of  war  in  Egypt  in  1882  was  made  a  pretext  by  the 


The  Balkan  Settlement  291 

British  Government  for  the  transference  of  the  Consuls  to 
Egypt ;  and  thereafter  matters  in  Asia  Minor  slid  back  into 
the  old  ruts.  The  progress  of  the  Greeks  and  Armenians, 
the  traders  of  that  land,  suffered  a  check,  and  the  remark- 
able Moslem  revival  which  the  Sultan  inaugurated  in  that 
year  (the  year  1300  of  the  Mohammedan  calendar)  gradu- 
ally led  up  to  the  troubles  and  massacres  which  culminated 
in  the  years  1896  and  1897.  We  may  finally  note  that 
when  the  Gladstone  Ministry  left  the  field  open  in  Asia 
Minor,  the  German  Government  promptly  took  possession ; 
and  since  1883  the  influence  of  Berlin  has  more  and 
more  penetrated  into  the  Sultan's  lands  in  Europe  and 
Asia.i 

The  collapse  of  British  influence  at  Constantinople  was 
hastened  on  by  the  efforts  made  by  the  Cabinet  of  London, 
after  Mr.  Gladstone's  accession  to  office,  on  behalf  of 
Greece.  It  soon  appeared  that  Abdul  Hamid  and  his 
Ministers  would  pay  no  heed  to  the  recommendations  of 
the  Great  Powers  on  this  head,  for  on  July  20,  1878,  they 
informed  Sir  Henry  Layard  of  their  "  final "  decision  that  no 
Thessalian  districts  would  be  given  up  to  Greece.  Owing 
to  pressure  exerted  by  the  Dufaure-Waddington  Ministry- 
in  France,  the  Powers  decided  that  a  European  Commission 
should  be  appointed  to  consider  the  whole  question.  To 
this  the  Beaconsfield  Government  gave  a  not  very  willing 
assent. 

The  Porte  bettered  the  example.  It  took  care  to  name 
as  the  first  place  of  meeting  of  the  Commissioners  a  village 
to  the  north  of  the  Gulf  or  Arta  which  was  not  discoverable 
on  any  map.     When  at  last  this  mistake  was  rectified,  and 

»  See  Impressions  of  Turkey,  by  Prof.  W.  M.  Ramsay  (1897), 
chap.  vi. 


292  The  European  Nations 

the  Greek  envoys  on  two  occasions  sought  to  steam  into 
the  gulf,  they  were  fired  on  from  the  Turkish  forts.  After 
these  amenities,  the  Commission  finally  met  at  Prevesa, 
only  to  have  its  report  shelved  by  the  Porte  (January- 
March,  1879).  Next,  in  answer  to  a  French  demand  for 
European  intervention,  the  Turks  opposed  various  de- 
vices taken  from  the  inexhaustible  stock  of  Oriental  subter- 
fuges. So  the  time  wore  on  until,  in  the  spring  of  1880,  the 
fall  of  the  Beaconsfield  Ministry  brought  about  a  new 
political  situation. 

The  new  Prime  Minister,  Mr.  Gladstone,  was  known  as 
the  statesman  who  had  given  the  Ionian  Isles  to  Greece, 
and  who  advocated  the  expulsion  of  the  Turks,  "bag  and 
baggage,"  from  Europe.  At  once  the  despatches  from 
Downing  Street  took  on  a  different  complexion,  and  the 
substitution  of  Mr.  Goschen  for  Sir  Henry  Layard  at  Con- 
stantinople enabled  the  Porte  to  hear  the  voice  of  the 
British  people,  undimmed  by  official  checks.  A  Conference 
of  the  Powers  met  at  Berlin  to  discuss  the  carrying  out  of 
their  recommendations  on  the  Greek  Question,  and  of  the 
terms  of  the  late  treaty  respecting  Montenegro. 

On  this  latter  affair  the  Powers  finally  found  it  needful  to 
make  a  joint  naval  demonstration  against  the  troops  of  the 
Albanian  League  who  sought  to  prevent  the  handing  over 
of  the  seaport  of  Dulcigno  to  Montenegro,  as  prescribed  by 
the  Treaty  of  Berlin.  But,  as  happened  during  the  Con- 
cert of  the  Powers  in  the  spring  of  1876,  a  single  discordant 
note  sufficed  to  impair  the  effect  of  the  collective  voice. 
Then  it  was  England  which  refused  to  employ  any  coercive 
measures;  now  it  was  Austria  and  Germany,  and  finally 
(after  the  resignation  of  the  Waddington  Ministry)  France. 
When  the  Sultan  heard  of  this  discord  in  the  European 


The  Balkan  Settlement  293 

Concert,  his  Moslem  scruples  resumed  their  wonted  sway, 
and  the  Albanians  persisted  in  defying  Europe. 

The  warships  of  the  Powers  might  have  continued  to 
threaten  the  Albanian  coast  with  unshotted  cannon  to  this 
da}^  had  not  the  Gladstone  Cabinet  proposed  drastic 
means  for  bringing  the  Sultan  to  reason.  The  plan  was 
that  the  united  fleet  should  steam  straightway  to  Smyrna 
and  land  marines  for  the  sequestration  of  the  customs 
dues  of  that  important  trading  centre.  Here  again  the 
Powers  were  not  of  one  mind.  The  three  dissentients 
again  hung  back;  but  they  so  far  concealed  their  refusal, 
or  reluctance,  as  to  leave  on  Abdul  Hamid's  mind  the  im- 
pression that  a  united  Christendom  was  about  to  seize 
Smyrna.^  This  was  enough.  He  could  now  (October  lo, 
1880)  bow  his  head  resignedly  before  superior  force  without 
sinning  against  the  Moslem's  imwritten  but  inviolable 
creed  of  never  giving  way  before  Christians  save  under 
absolute  necessity.  At  once  he  ordered  his  troops  to  carry 
out  the  behests  of  the  Powers;  and  after  some  fighting, 
Dervish  Pasha  drove  the  Albanians  out  of  Dulcigno,  and 
surrendered  it  to  the  Montenegrins  (November-December, 
1880).  Such  is  the  official  account;  but,  seeing  that  the 
Porte  knows  how  to  turn  to  account  the  fanaticism  and 
turbulence  of  the  Albanians, ^  it  may  be  that  their  resistance 
all  along  was  but  a  device  of  that  resourceful  Government 
to  thwart  the  will  of  Europe. 

The  same  threat  as  to  the  seizure  of  the  Turkish  customs- 
house  at  Smyrna  sufficed  to  help  on  the  solution  of  the 
Greek  Question.  The  delays  and  insults  of  the  Turks  had 
driven  the  Greeks  to   desperation,  and  only  the  tirgent 

1  Life  of  Gladstone,  by  J.  Morley,  iii.,  p.  9. 

2  See  Turkey  in  Europe,  by  "Odysseus,"  p.  434. 


294  The  European  Nations 

remonstrances  of  the  Powers  availed  to  hold  back  the  Cabinet 
of  Athens  from  a  declaration  of  war.  This  danger  by  de- 
grees passed  away;  but,  as  usually  happens  where  passions 
are  excited  on  both  sides,  every  compromise  pressed  on  the 
litigants  by  the  arbiters  presented  great  difficulty.  The 
Congress  of  Berlin  had  recommended  the  extension  of 
Greek  rule  over  the  purely  Hellenic  districts  of  Thessaly, 
assigning  as  the  new  boundaries  the  course  of  the  rivers 
Salammaria  and  Kalamas,  the  latter  of  which  flows  into 
the  sea  opposite  the  Island  of  Corfu. 

Another  Conference  of  the  Powers  (it  was  the  third)  met 
to  decide  the  details  of  that  proposal;  but  owing  to  the 
change  of  government  in  France,  along  with  other  causes, 
the  whole  question  proved  to  be  very  intricate.  In  the 
end,  the  Powers  induced  the  Sultan  to  sign  the  Convention 
of  May  24,  1 88 1,  whereby  the  course  of  the  river  Arta  was 
substituted  for  that  of  the  Kalamas. 

As  a  set-off  to  this  proposal,  which  involved  the  loss  of 
Jannina  and  Prevesa  for  Greece,  they  awarded  to  the 
Hellenes  some  districts  north  of  the  Salammaria  which 
helped  partially  to  screen  the  town  of  Larissa  from  the 
danger  of  Turkish  inroads.^  To  this  arrangement  Moslems 
and  Christians  sullenly  assented.  On  the  whole  the 
Greeks  gained  13,200  square  kilometres  in  territory  and 
about  150,000  inhabitants,  but  their  failure  to  gain  several 
Hellenic  districts  of  Epirus  rankled  deep  in  the  popular 
consciousness  and  prepared  the  way  for  the  events  of  1885 
and  1897. 

These  later  developments  can  receive  here  only  the 
briefest   reference.     In   the  former  year,   when   the   two 

>  The  European  Concert  in  the  Eastern  Question,  by  T.  E.  Holland, 
pp.  60—69. 


The  Balkan  Settlement  295 

Bulgarias  framed  their  union,  the  Greeks  threatened  Tur- 
key with  war,  but  were  speedily  brought  to  another  frame 
of  mind  by  a  "pacific"  blockade  by  the  Powers.  Em- 
bittered by  this  treatment,  the  Hellenes  sought  to  push  on 
their  cause  in  Macedonia  and  Crete  through  a  powerful 
Society,  the  "Ethnike  Hetairia."  The  chronic  discontent 
of  the  Cretans  at  Turkish  misrtde  and  the  outrages  of  the 
Moslem  troops  led  to  grave  complications  in  1897.  At 
the  beginning  of  that  year  the  Powers  intervened  with  a 
proposal  for  the  appointment  of  a  foreign  gendarmerie 
(January,  1897).  In  order  to  defeat  this  plan  the  Sultan 
stirred  up  Moslem  fanaticism  in  the  island,  until  the  re- 
sulting atrocities  brought  Greece  into  the  field  both  in 
Thessaly  and  Crete.  During  the  ensuing  strifes  in  Crete 
the  Powers  demeaned  themselves  by  siding  against  the 
Christian  insurgents  and  some  Greek  troops  sent  from 
Athens  to  their  aid.  Few  events  in  our  age  have  caused 
a  more  painful  sensation  than  the  bombardment  of  Cretan 
villages  by  British  and  French  warships.  The  Powers 
also  proclaimed  a  "pacific"  blockade  of  Crete  (March- 
May,  1897).  The  inner  reasons  that  prompted  these 
actions  are  not  fully  known.  It  may  safely  be  said  that 
they  will  need  far  fuller  justification  than  that  which  was 
given  in  the  explanation  of  Ministers  at  Westminster. 

Meanwhile  the  passionate  resentment  felt  by  the  Greeks 
had  dragged  the  Government  of  King  George  into  war  with 
Turkey  (April  18,  1897).  The  little  kingdom  was  speedily 
overpowered  by  Turks  and  Albanians;  and  despite  the 
recall  of  their  troops  from  Crete,  the  Hellenes  were  unable 
to  hold  Phersala  and  other  positions  in  the  middle  of 
Thessaly.  The  Powers,  however,  intervened  on  May  12 
and  proceeded  to  pare  down  the  exorbitant  terms  of  the 


Territory  Ceded 


6tOSL.£SrAaT.LONOOftg 


MAP  OF  THESSALY 


296 


The  Balkan  Settlement  297 

Porte,  allowing  it  to  gain  only  small  strips  in  the  north  of 
Thessaly,  as  a  "strategic  rectification"  of  the  frontier. 
The  Turkish  demand  of  ^Tio,ooo,ooo  was  reduced  to 
^T4, 000, 000  (September  i8). 

This  successful  war  against  Greece  raised  the  prestige  of 
Turkey  and  added  fuel  to  the  flames  of  Mohammedan 
bigotry.  These,  as  we  have  seen,  had  been  assiduously 
fanned  by  Abdul  Hamid  II.  ever  since  the  year  1882, 
when  a  Pan-Islam  movement  began.  The  results  of  this 
revival  were  far-reaching,  being  felt  even  among  the  hill 
tribes  on  the  Afghan-Punjab  border  (see  Chapter  XIV.). 
Throughout  the  Ottoman  Empire  the  Mohammedans  be- 
gan to  assert  their  superiority  over  Christians;  and,  as 
Professor  Ramsay  has  observed,  "the  means  whereby 
Turkish  power  is  restored  is  always  the  same — massacre."  ^ 

It  would  be  premature  to  inquire  which  of  the  European 
Powers  must  be  held  chiefly  responsible  for  the  toleration 
of  the  hideous  massacres  of  the  Armenians  in  1896-97,  and 
the  atrocious  misgovemment  of  Macedonia,  by  the  Turks. 
All  the  Great  Powers  who  signed  the  Berlin  Treaty  are 
guilty;  and,  as  has  been  stated  above,  the  State  which 
framed  the  Cyprus  Convention  is  doubly  guilty,  so  far  as 
concerns  the  events  in  Armenia.  A  grave  share  of  re- 
sponsibility also  rests  with  those  who  succeeded  in  hand- 
ing back  a  large  part  of  Macedonia  to  the  Turks.  But  the 
writer  who  in  the  future  undertakes  to  tell  the  story  of  the 
decline  of  European  morality  at  the  close  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  and  the  growth  of  cynicism  and  selfishness,  will 
probably  pass  still  severer  censures  on  the  Emperors  of 
Germany  and  Russia,  who,  with  the  unequalled  influence 
which  they  wielded  over  the  Porte,  might  have  intervened 
» Impressions  of  Turkey,  by  W.  M.  Ramsay,  p.  139. 


298  The  European  Nations 

with  effect  to  screen  their  co-reHgionists  from  tinutterable 
wrongs,  and  yet,  as  far  as  is  known,  raised  not  a  finger  on 
their  behalf.  The  Treaty  of  BerHn,  which  might  have 
inaugurated  an  era  of  good  government  throughout  the 
whole  of  Turkey  if  the  Powers  had  been  true  to  their  trust, 
will  be  cited  as  damning  evidence  in  the  account  of  the 
greatest  betrayal  of  a  trust  which  Modern  History  records. 


Note. — (Added  to  page  as  revised  for  volume,  July,  1905.)  For 
the  efforts  made  by  the  British  Governm.ent  on  behalf  of  the  Ar- 
menians, the  reader  should  consult  the  last  chapter  of  Mr.  James 
Bryce's  book,  Transcaucasia  and  Mount  Ararat  (new  edition,  1896). 
Further  information  may  be  expected  in  the  Life  of  Earl  Granville, 
soon  to  appear  from  the  pen  of  Lord  Edmund  Fitzmaurice, 


CHAPTER  X 

THE    MAKING    OF    BULGARIA 

"If  you  can  help  to  build  up  these  peoples  into  a  bulwark  of  in- 
dependent States  and  thus  screen  the  'sick  man'  from  the  fury  of 
the  northern  blast,  for  God's  sake  do  it." — Sir  R.  Morier  to  Sir 
W.  White,  December  27,  1885. 

THE  failure  which  attended  the  forward  Hellenic  move- 
ment during  the  years  1896-97  stands  in  sharp  relief 
with  the  fortunes  of  the  Bulgarians,  To  the  rise  of  this 
yoimgest,  and  not  the  least  promising,  of  European  States, 
we  must  devote  a  whole  chapter;  for  during  a  decade  the 
future  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula  and  the  policy  of  the  great 
Powers  turned  very  largely  on  the  emancipation  of  this 
interesting  race  from  the  effective  control  of  the  Sultan 
and  the  Czar. 

The  rise  of  this  enigmatical  people  affords  a  striking 
example  of  the  power  of  national  feeling  to  uplift  the  down- 
trodden. Until  the  year  1876,  the  very  name  Bulgarian 
was  scarcely  known  except  as  a  geographical  term.  King- 
lake,  in  his  charming  work,  Eothen,  does  not  mention  the 
Bulgarians,  though  he  travelled  on  horseback  from  Bel- 
grade to  Sophia  and  thence  to  Adrianople.  And  yet  in 
1828,  the  conquering  march  of  the  Russians  to  Adrianople 
had  awakened  that  people  to  a  passing  thrill  of  national 
consciousness.  Other  travellers,  for  instance  Cyprien 
Robert  in  the  "thirties,"  noted  their  sturdy  patience  in 

299 


300  The  European  Nations 

toil,  their  slowness  to  act,  but  their  great  perseverance  and 
will-power,  when  the  resolve  was  formed. 

These  qualities  may  perhaps  be  ascribed  to  their  Tatar 
(Tartar)  origin.  Ethnically,  they  are  closely  akin  to  the 
Magyars  and  Turks,  but,  having  been  long  settled  on  the 
banks  of  the  Volga  (hence  their  name,  Bulgarian  =  Vol- 
garian),  they  adopted  the  speech  and  religion  of  the  Slavs. 
They  have  lived  this  new  life  for  about  a  thousand  years, ^ 
and  in  this  time  have  been  completely  changed.  Though 
their  flat  lips  and  noses  bespeak  an  Asiatic  origin,  they  are 
practically  Slavs,  save  that  their  temperament  is  less 
nervous,  and  their  persistence  greater  than  that  of  their 
co-religionists.2  Their  determined  adhesion  to  Slav  ideals 
and  rejection  of  Turkish  ways  should  serve  as  a  reminder 
to  anthropologists  that  peoples  are  not  mainly  to  be  judged 
and  divided  off  by  craniological  peculiarities.  Measure- 
ment of  skulls  may  tell  us  something  concerning  the  basal 
characteristics  of  tribes ;  it  leaves  untouched  the  boundless 
fund  of  beliefs,  thoughts,  aspirations,  and  customs  which 
mould  the  lives  of  nations.  The  peoples  of  to-day  are 
what  their  creeds,  customs,  and  hopes  have  made  them; 
as  regards  their  political  life,  they  have  little  more  likeness 
to  their  tribal  forefathers  than  the  average  man  has  to  the 
chimpanzee. 

The  first  outstanding  event  in  the  recent  rise  of  the 
Bulgarian  race  was  the  acquisition  of  spiritual  independ- 
ence in  1869-70.  Hitherto  they,  in  common  with  nearly 
all  the  Slavs,  had  belonged  to  the  Greek  Church,  and  had 
recognised  the  supremacy  of  its  Patriarch  at  Constantinople, 

1  The  Peasant  State:  Bulgaria  in  18Q4,  by  E.  Dicey,  C.B.  (1904), 
p.  II. 

^Turkey  in  Europe,  by  "Odysseus,"  pp.  28,  356,  367. 


The  Making  of  Bulgaria  301 

but,  as  the  national  idea  progressed,  the  Bulgarians  sought 
to  have  their  own  Church,  It  was  in  vain  that  the  Greeks 
protested  against  this  schismatic  attempt.  The  Western 
Powers  and  Russia  favoured  it ;  the  Porte  also  was  not  loth 
to  see  the  Christians  further  divided.  Early  in  the  year 
1870,  the  Bulgarian  Church  came  into  existence,  with  an 
Exarch  of  its  own  at  Constantinople  who  has  survived  the 
numerous  attempts  of  the  Greeks  to  ban  him  as  a  schis- 
matic from  the  "Universal  Church."  The  Bulgarians 
therefore  took  rank  with  the  other  peoples  of  the  Peninsiila 
as  a  religious  entity,  the  Roumanian  and  Servian  Churches 
having  been  constituted  early  in  the  century.  In  fact,  the 
Porte  recognises  the  Bulgarians,  even  in  Macedonia,  as  an 
independent  religious  communit5^  a  right  which  it  does 
not  accord  to  the  Servians;  the  latter,  in  Macedonia,  are 
counted  only  as  "  Greeks."  ^ 

The  Treaty  of  San  Stefano  promised  to  make  the  Bul- 
garians the  predominant  race  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula  for 
the  benefit  of  Russia;  but,  as  we  have  seen,  the  efforts  of 
Great  Britain  and  Austria,  backed  by  the  jealousies  of 
Greeks  and  Servians,  led  to  a  radical  change  in  those  ar- 
rangements. The  Treaty  of  Beriin  divided  that  people 
into  three  unequal  parts.  The  larger  mass,  dwelHng  in 
Bulgaria  Proper,  gained  entire  independence  of  the  Sultan, 
save  in  the  matter  of  suzerainty;  the  Bulgarians  on  the 
southern  slopes  of  the  Balkans  acquired  autonomy  only  in 
local  affairs,  and  remained  under  the  control  of  the  Porte 
in  military  affairs  and  in  matters  of  high  policy ;  while  the 
Bulgarians  who  dwelt  in  Macedonia,  about  1,120,000  in 
number,  were  led  to  hope  something  from  articles  61  and 

^Turkey  in  Europe,  by  "Odysseus,"  pp.  280—283,  297;  The 
Peasant  State,  by  E.  Dicey,  pp.  75-77. 


302  The  European  Nations 

62  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  but  remained  otherwise  at  the 
mercy  of  the  Sultan.^ 

This  unsatisfactory  state  of  things  promised  to  range  the 
PrincipaHty  of  Bulgaria  entirely  on  the  side  of  Russia,  and 
at  the  outset  the  hope  of  all  Bulgarians  was  for  a  closed 
friendship  with  the  great  Power  that  had  effected  their 
liberation.  These  sentiments,  however,  speedily  cooled. 
The  officers  appointed  by  the  Czar  to  organise  the  Princi- 
pality carried  out  their  task  in  a  high-handed  way  that 
soon  irritated  the  newly  enfranchised  people.  Gratitude 
is  a  feeling  that  soon  vanishes,  especially  in  political  life. 
There,  far  more  than  in  private  life,  it  is  a  great  mistake 
for  the  party  that  has  conferred  a  boon  to  remind  the 
recipient  of  what  he  owes,  especially  if  that  recipient  be 
young  and  aspiring.  Yet  that  was  the  mistake  com- 
mitted everywhere  throughout  Bulgaria.  The  army,  the 
public  service,  everything,  v/as  modelled  on  Russian  lines 
during  the  time  of  the  occupation,  until  the  overbearing 
ways  of  the  officials  succeeded  in  dulling  the  memory  of  the 
services  rendered  in  the  war.  The  fact  of  the  liberation 
was  forgotten  amidst  the  irritation  aroused  by  the  constant 
reminders  of  it. 

The  Russians  succeeded  in  alienating  even  the  young 
German  prince  who  came,  with  the  full  favour  of  the  Czar 
Alexander  II.,  to  take  up  the  reins  of  government.  A 
scion  of  the  House  of  Hesse  Darmstadt  by  a  morganatic 
marriage.  Prince  Alexander  of  Battenberg  had  been 
sounded  by  the  Russian  authorities,  with  a  view  to  his 
acceptance  of  the  Bulgarian  crown.  By  the  vote  of  the 
Bulgarian  Chamber,  it  was  offered  to  him  on  April  29 

1  Reclus,  Kiepert,  Ritter,  and  other  geographers  and  ethnologists, 
admit  that  the  majority  in  Macedonia  is  Bulgarian. 


The  Making  of  Bulgaria  303 

1879.  He  accepted  it,  knowing  full  well  that  it  would  be 
a  thorny  honour  for  a  youth  of  twenty-two  years  of  age. 
His  tall  commanding  frame,  handsome  features,  ability 
and  prowess  as  a  soldier,  and,  above  all,  his  winsome  ad- 
dress, seemed  to  mark  him  out  as  a  natural  leader  of  men; 
and  he  received  a  warm  welcome  from  the  Bulgarians  in 
the  month  of  July. 

His  difficulties  began  at  once.  The  chief  Russian  ad- 
ministrator, Dondukoff  Korsakoff,  had  thrust  his  country- 
men into  all  the  important  and  lucrative  posts,  thereby 
leaving  out  in  the  cold  the  many  Bulgarians,  who,  after 
working  hard  for  the  liberation  of  their  land,  now  saw  it 
transferred  from  the  slovenly  overlordship  of  the  Turk  to 
the  masterful  grip  of  the  Muscovite.  The  Principality 
heaved  with  discontent,  and  these  feelings  finally  com- 
municated themselves  to  the  sympathetic  nature  of  the 
Prince.  But  duty  and  policy  alike  forbade  him  casting 
off  the  Russian  influence.  No  position  could  be  more 
trying  for  a  young  man  of  chivalrous  and  ambitious  nature, 
endowed  with  a  strain  of  sensitiveness  which  he  probably 
derived  from  his  Polish  mother.  He  early  set  forth  his 
feelings  in  a  private  letter  to  Prince  Charles  of  Roumania: 

"Devoted  with  my  whole  heart  to  the  Czar  Alexander, 
I  am  anxious  to  do  nothing  that  can  be  called  anti-Russian. 
Unfortunately  the  Russian  officials  have  acted  with  the 
utmost  want  of  tact;  confusion  prevails  in  every  office, 
and  peculation,  thanks  to  Dondukoff's  decrees,  is  all  but 
sanctioned.  I  am  daily  confronted  with  the  painful  al- 
ternative of  having  to  decide  either  to  assent  to  the  Russian 
demands  or  to  be  accused  in  Russia  of  ingratitude  and  of 
'injuring  the  most  sacred  feelings  of  the  Bulgarians.'  My 
position  is  truly  terrible." 


304  The  European  Nations 

The  friction  with  Russia  increased  with  time.  Early  in 
the  year  1880,  Prince  Alexander  determined  to  go  to  St. 
Petersburg  to  appeal  to  the  Czar  in  the  hope  of  allaying 
the  violence  of  the  Panslavonic  intriguers.  Matters  im- 
proved for  a  time,  but  only  because  the  Prince  accepted 
the  guidance  of  the  Czar.  Thereafter  he  retained  most  of 
his  pro-Russian  Ministers,  even  though  the  second  Legis- 
lative Assembly,  elected  in  the  spring  of  that  year,  was 
strongly  Liberal  and  anti-Russian.  In  April,  1881,  he 
acted  on  the  advice  of  one  of  his  Ministers,  a  Russian 
General  named  Ehrenroth,  and  carried  matters  with  a 
high  hand:  he  dissolved  the  Assembly,  suspended  the  con- 
stitution, encouraged  his  officials  to  browbeat  the  voters, 
and  thereby  gained  a  docile  Chamber,  which  carried  out 
his  behests  by  decreeing  a  Septennate,  or  autocratic  rule 
for  seven  years.  In  order  to  prop  up  his  miniature  czar- 
dom,  he  now  asked  the  new  Emperor,  Alexander  III.,  to 
send  him  two  Russian  Generals.  His  request  was  granted 
in  the  persons  of  Generals  Soboleff  and  Kaulbars,  who  be- 
came Ministers  of  the  Interior  and  for  War,  a  third.  General 
Tioharolf ,  being  also  added  as  Minister  of  Justice. 

The  triumph  of  Muscovite  influence  now  seemed  to  be 
complete,  until  the  trio  just  named  usurped  the  functions 
of  the  Bulgarian  Ministers  and  informed  the  Prince  that 
they  took  their  orders  from  the  Czar,  not  from  him.  Chaf- 
ing at  these  self-imposed  Russian  bonds,  the  Prince  now 
leant  more  on  the  moderate  Liberals,  headed  by  Karave- 
loff ;  and  on  the  Muscovites  intriguing  in  the  same  quarter, 
and  with  the  troops,  with  a  view  to  his  deposition,  they 
met  with  a  complete  repulse.  An  able  and  vigorous  young 
Bulgarian,  StambuloflE,  was  now  fast  rising  in  importance 
among   the  more   resolute  nationalists.     The   son  of  an 


The  Making  of  Bulgaria  305 

innkeeper  of  Tirnova,  he  was  sent  away  to  be  educated  at 
Odessa;  there  he  early  became  imbued  with  Nihilist  ideas, 
and  on  returning  to  the  Danubian  lands,  framed  many 
plots  for  the  expulsion  of  the  Turks  from  Bulgaria.  His 
thick-set  frame,  his  force  of  will,  his  eloquence,  passionate 
speech,  and,  above  all,  his  burning  patriotism,  soon 
brought  him  to  the  front  as  the  leader  of  the  national 
party ;  and  he  now  strove  with  all  his  might  to  prevent  his 
land  falling  to  the  position  of  a  mere  satrapy  of  the  libera- 
tors. Better  the  puny  autocracy  of  Prince  Alexander  than 
the  very  real  despotism  of  the  nominees  of  the  Emperor 
Alexander  III. 

The  character  of  the  new  Czar  will  engage  our  attention 
in  the  following  chapter;  here  we  need  only  say  that  the 
more  his  narrow,  hard,  and  overbearing  nature  asserted 
itself,  the  greater  appeared  the  danger  to  the  liberties  of 
the  Principality.  At  last,  when  the  situation  became  un- 
bearable, the  Prince  resolved  to  restore  the  Bulgarian 
constitution;  and  he  took  this  momentous  step,  on  Sep- 
tember 18,  1883,  without  consulting  the  three  Russian 
Ministers,  who  thereupon  resigned.^ 

At  once  the  Prince  summoned  Karaveloff,  and  said  to 
him:  "My  dear  Karaveloff,  for  the  second  time  I  swear  to 
thee  that  I  will  be  entirely  submissive  to  the  will  of  the 
people,  and  that  I  will  govern  in  full  accordance  with  the 
constitution  of  Tirnova.     Let  us  forget  what  passed  during 

'  For  the  scenes  which  then  occurred,  see  Le  Prince  Alexandre  de 
Battenherg  en  Bulgarie,  by  A.  G.  Drandar,  pp.  169  et  seq.;  also 
A.  Koch,  Fiirst  Alexander  von  Bulgarien,  pp.  144—147. 

For  the  secret  aims  of  Russia,  see  Docuntens  secrets  de  la  Politique 
russe  en  Orient,  by  R.  Leonoff  (Berlin,  1893),  pp.  49-65.  General 
Soboleff,  Der  erste  Fiirst  von  Bulgarien  (Leipzig,  1896),  has  given  a 
highly  coloured  Russian  account  of  all  these  incidents. 


3o6  The  European  Nations 

the  coup  d'etat  [of  1881],  and  work  together  for  the  pros- 
perity of  the  country."  He  embraced  him;  and  that  em- 
brace was  the  pledge  of  a  close  union  of  hearts  between  him 
and  his  people.^ 

The  Czar  forthwith  showed  his  anger  at  this  act  of  inde- 
pendence, and,  counting  it  a  sign  of  defiance,  allowed  or 
encouraged  his  agents  in  Bulgaria  to  undermine  the  power 
of  the  Prince,  and  procure  his  deposition.  For  two  years 
they  struggled  in  vain.  An  attempt  by  the  Russian 
Generals  Soboleff  and  Kaulbars  to  kidnap  the  Prince  by 
night  failed,  owing  to  the  loyalty  of  Lieutenant  Martinoff, 
then  on  duty  at  his  palace;  the  two  ministerial  plotters 
forthwith  left  Bulgaria.^ 

Even  now  the  scales  did  not  fall  from  the  eyes  of  the 
Emperor  Alexander  III.  Bismarck  was  once  questioned 
by  the  faithful  Busch  as  to  the  character  of  that  potentate. 
The  German  Boswell  remarked  that  he  had  heard  Alex- 
ander III.  described  as  "stupid,  exceedingly  stupid"; 
whereupon  the  Chancellor  replied:  "In  a  general  way  that 
is  saying  too  much."^  Leaving  to  posterity  the  task  of 
deciding  that  question,  we  may  here  point  out  that  Mus- 
covite poHcy  in  the  years  1878-85  achieved  a  truly  re- 
markable feat  in  uniting  all  the  liberated  races  of  the 
Balkan  Peninsula  against  their  liberators.  By  the  terms 
of  the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano,  Russia  had  alienated  the 
Roumanians,    Servians,   and   Greeks;    so  that  when  the 

1  See  Laveleye's  The  Balkan  Peninsula,  pp.  259-262,  for  an  ac- 
count of  Karaveloff. 

2  J.  G.  C.  Minchin,  The  Growth  of  Freedom  in  the  Balkan  Penin- 
sula (1886),  p.  237.  The  author,  Consul-General  for  Servia  in 
London,  had  earlier  contributed  many  articles  to  the  Times  and 
Morning  Advertiser  on  Balkan  affairs. 

i  Bismarck:  Some  Secret  Pages  of  his  History,  by  Dr.  M.  Busch 
(Note  of  January  5,  1886),  iii.,  p.  150  (English  edition). 


The  Making  of  Bulgaria  z*^! 

Princes  of  those  two  Slav  Principalities  decided  to  take  the 
kingly  title  (as  they  did  in  the  spring  of  1881  and  1882 
respectively),  it  was  after  visits  to  Berlin  and  Vienna, 
whereby  they  tacitly  signified  their  friendliness  to  the 
Central  Powers, 

In  the  case  of  Servia  this  went  to  the  length  of  alliance. 
On  June  25,  1881,  the  Foreign  Minister,  M.  Mijatovich, 
concluded  with  Austria-Hungary  a  secret  convention, 
whereby  Servia  agreed  to  discourage  any  movement  among 
the  Slavs  of  Bosnia,  while  the  Dual  Monarchy  promised  to 
refrain  from  any  action  detrimental  to  Servian  hopes  for 
what  is  known  as  Old  Servia.  The  agreement  was  for 
eight  years;  but  it  was  not  renewed  in  1889.^  The  fact, 
however,  that  such  a  compact  could  be  framed  within 
three  years  of  the  Berlin  Congress,  shows  how  keen  was 
the  resentment  of  the  Servian  Government  at  the  neg- 
lect of  its  interests  by  Russia,  both  there  and  at  San 
Stefano. 

The  gulf  between  Bulgaria  and  Russia  widened  more 
slowly,  but  with  the  striking  sequel  that  will  be  seen. 
The  Dondukoffs,  Soboleffs,  and  Kaulbars  first  awakened 
and  then  estranged  the  formerly  passive  and  docile  race 
for  whose  aggrandisement  Russia  had  incurred  the  re- 
sentment of  the  neighbouring  peoples.  Under  Muscovite 
tutelage  the  "ignorant  Bulgarian  peasants"  were  develop- 
ing a  strong  civic  and  political  instinct.  Further,  the 
Czar's  attacks,  now  on  the  Prince,  and  then  on  the  popular 
party,  served  to  bind  these  formerly  discordant  elements 
into  an  alliance.  Stambuloff,  the  very  embodiment  of 
young  Bulgaria  in  tenacity  of  purpose  and  love  of  freedom, 

»  The  treaty  has  not  been  published ;  for  this  general  description 
of  it  I  am  indebted  to  the  kindness  of  M.  Mijatovich  himself. 


3o8  The  European  Nations 

was  now  the  President  of  the  Sobranje,  or  National  As- 
sembly, and  he  warmly  supported  Prince  Alexander  so 
long  as  he  withstood  Russian  pretensions.  At  the  outset 
the  strifes  at  Sophia  had  resembled  a  triangular  duel,  and 
the  Russian  agents  could  readily  have  disposed  of  the  third 
combatant  had  they  sided  either  with  the  Prince  or  with 
the  liberals.  By  browbeating  both  they  simpHfied  the 
situation  to  the  benefit  both  of  the  Prince  and  of  the 
nascent  liberties  of  Bulgaria. 

Alexander  III.  and  his  Chancellor,  de  Giers,  had  also  tied 
their  hands  in  Balkan  affairs  by  a  treaty  which  they 
framed  with  Austria  and  Germany,  and  signed  and  rati- 
fied at  the  meeting  of  the  three  Emperors  at  Skiernewice 
(September,  1884 — see  Chapter  XII.).  The  most  import- 
ant of  its  provisions  from  our  present  standpoint  was  that 
by  which,  in  the  event  of  two  of  the  three  Empires  dis- 
agreeing on  Balkan  questions,  the  casting  vote  rested  with 
the  third  Power.  This  gave  to  Bismarck  the  same  role  of 
arbiter  which  he  had  played  at  the  Berlin  Congress. 

But  in  the  years  1885  and  1886,  the  Czar  and  his  agents 
committed  a  series  of  blunders,  by  the  side  of  wliich  their 
earlier  actions  seemed  statesmanlike.  The  welfare  of  the 
Bulgarian  people  demanded  an  early  reversal  of  the  policy 
decided  on  at  the  Congress  of  Berlin  (1878),  whereby  the 
southern  Bulgarians  were  divided  from  their  northern 
brethren  in  order  that  the  Sultan  might  have  the  right  to 
hold  the  Balkan  passes  in  time  of  war.  That  is  to  say,  the 
Powers,  especially  Great  Britain  and  Austria,  set  aside  the 
claims  of  a  strong  racial  instinct  for  purely  military  reasons. 
The  breakdown  of  this  artificial  arrangement  was  con- 
fidently predicted  at  the  time ;  and  Russian  agents  at  first 
took  the  lead  in  preparing  for  the  future  union.     Skobeleff, 


The  Making  of  Bulgaria  309 

Katkoff,  and  the  Panslavonic  societies  of  Russia  encour- 
aged the  formation  of  "gymnastic  societies"  in  Eastern 
RoumeHa,  and  the  youth  of  that  province  enrolled  them- 
selves with  such  ardour  that  by  the  year  1885  more  than 
40,000  were  trained  to  the  use  of  arms.  As  for  the  protests 
of  the  Sultan  and  those  of  his  delegates  at  Philippopolis, 
they  were  stilled  by  hints  from  St.  Petersburg,  or  by  de- 
mands for  the  prompt  payment  of  Turkey's  war  debt  to 
Russia.  All  the  world  knew  that,  thanks  to  Russian 
patronage,  Eastern  Roumelia  had  slipped  entirely  from 
the  control  of  Abdul  Hamid. 

By  the  summer  of  1885,  the  unionist  movement  had 
acquired  great  strength.  But  now,  at  the  critical  time, 
when  Russia  should  have  led  that  movement,  she  let  it 
drift,  or  even,  we  may  say,  cast  off  the  tow-rope.  Prob- 
ably the  Czar  and  his  Ministers  looked  on  the  Bulgarians 
as  too  weak  or  too  stupid  to  act  for  themselves.  It  was  a 
complete  miscalculation ;  for  now  Stambuloff  and  Karave- 
loff  had  made  that  aim  their  own,  and  brought  to  its  ac- 
complishment all  the  skill  and  zeal  which  they  had  learned 
in  a  long  career  of  resistance  to  Turkish  and  Russian 
masters.  There  is  reason  to  think  that  they  and  their 
coadjutors  at  Philippopolis  pressed  on  events  in  the  month 
of  September,  1885,  because  the  Czar  was  then  known  to 
disapprove  any  immediate  action. 

In  order  to  understand  the  reason  for  this  strange  re- 
versal of  Russia's  policy,  we  must  scrutinise  events  more 
closely.  The  secret  workings  of  that  policy  have  been 
laid  bare  in  a  series  of  State  documents,  the  genuineness 
of  which  is  not  altogether  established.  They  are  said 
to  have  been  betrayed  to  the  Bulgarian  patriots  by  a 
Russian  agent,  and  they  certainly  bear  signs  of   authen- 


3IO  The  European  Nations 

ticity.  If  we  accept  them  (and  up  to  the  present  they 
have  been  accepted  by  well-informed  men)  the  truth  is  as 
follows : 

Russia  would  have  worked  hard  for  the  union  of  Eastern 
Roumelia  to  Bulgaria,  provided  that  the  Prince  abdicated 
and  his  people  submitted  completely  to  Russian  control. 
Quite  early  in  his  reign  Alexander  III.  discovered  in  them 
an  independence  which  his  masterful  nature  ill  brooked. 
He  therefore  postponed  that  scheme  until  the  Prince 
should  abdicate  or  be  driven  out.  As  one  of  the  Muscovite 
agents  phrased  it  in  the  spring  of  1881,  the  union  must  not 
be  brought  about  until  a  Russian  protectorate  shoiild  be 
founded  in  the  Principality;  for  if  they  made  Bulgaria 
too  strong,  it  would  become  "a  second  Roumania,"  that 
is,  as  "ungrateful"  to  Russia  as  Roumania  had  shown 
herself  after  the  seizure  of  her  Bessarabian  lands.  In 
fact,  the  Bulgarians  could  gain  the  wish  of  their  hearts 
only  on  one  condition,  that  of  proclaiming  the  Em- 
peror Alexander  Grand  Duke  of  the  greater  State  of  the 
future.^ 

The  chief  obstacles  in  the  way  of  Russia's  aggrandise- 
ment were  the  susceptibilities  of  "the  Battenberger,"  as 
her  agents  impertinently  named  him,  and  the  will  of 
Stambuloff.  When  the  Czar,  by  his  malevolent  obstinacy^ 
finally  brought  these  two  men  to  accord,  it  was  deemed 
needful  to  adopt  various  devices  in  order  to  shatter  the 
forces  which  Russian  diplomacy  had  succeeded  in  piling 

1  Documents  secrets  de  la  Politique  russe  en  Orient,  ed.  by  R.  Leon- 
ofE  (Berlin,  1893),  pp.  8,  48.  This  work  is  named  by  M.  Malet  in 
his  Bihliographie  on  the  Eastern  Question  on  p.  446,  vol.  ix.,  of  the 
Histoire  Generale  of  MM.  Lavisse  and  Rambaud.  I  have  been 
assured  of  its  genuineness  by  a  gentleman  well  versed  in  the  politics 
of  the  Balkan  States. 


The  Making  of  Bulgaria  3 1 1 

up  in  its  own  path.  But  here  again  we  are  reminded  of 
the  Horatian  precept — 

Vis  consili  expers  mole  ruit  sua. 

To  the  hectorings  of  Russian  agents  the  "peasant  State" 
offered  an  ever  firmer  resistance,  and  by  the  summer  of 
1885  it  was  clear  that  bribery  and  bullying  were  equally 
futile. 

Of  course  the  Emperor  of  all  the  Russias  had  it  in  his 
power  to  harry  the  Prince  in  many  ways.  Thus  in  the 
summer  of  1885,  when  a  marriage  was  being  arranged  be- 
tween him  and  the  Princess  Victoria,  daughter  of  the 
Crown  Princess  of  Germany,  the  Czar's  influence  at  Berlin 
availed  to  veto  an  engagement  which  is  believed  to  have 
been  the  heartfelt  wish  of  both  the  persons  most  nearly 
concerned.  In  this  matter  Bismarck,  true  to  his  policy  of 
softening  the  Czar's  annoyance  at  the  Austro-German 
alliance  by  complaisance  in  all  other  matters,  made  him- 
self Russia's  henchman,  and  urged  his  press-trumpet, 
Busch,  to  write  newspaper  articles  abusing  Queen  Victoria 
as  having  instigated  this  match  solely  with  a  view  to  the 
substitution  of  British  for  Russian  influence  in  Bulgaria. ^ 
The  more  servile  part  of  the  German  press  improved  on 
these  suggestions,  and  stigmatised  the  Bulgarian  Revolu- 
tion of  the  ensuing  autumn  as  an  affair  trumped  up  at 
London.  So  far  is  it  possible  for  minds  of  a  certain  type 
to  read  their  own  pettiness  into  events. 

•  For  Bismarck's  action  and  that  of  the  Emperor  William  I.  in 
1885,  see  Bismarck:  Some  Secret  Pages  of  his  History,  by  M.  Busch, 
iii.,  pp.  171,  180,  292,  also  p.  335.  Russian  agents  came  to  Stam- 
buloff  in  the  summer  of  1885  to  say  that  "Prince  Alexander  must 
be  got  rid  of  before  he  can  ally  himself  with  the  German  family 
regnant."  Stambuloff  informed  the  Prince  of  this.  See  Stam- 
huloff,  by  A.  H.  Beaman,  p.  52. 


312  The  European  Nations 

Meanwhile,  if  we  may  credit  the  despatches  above  re- 
ferred to,  the  Russian  Government  was  seeking  to  drag 
Bulgaria  into  fratricidal  strife  with  Roumania  over  some 
trifling  disputes  about  the  new  border  near  Silistria.  That 
quarrel,  if  well  managed,  promised  to  be  materially  ad- 
vantageous to  Russia  and  mentally  soothing  to  her  ruler. 
It  would  weaken  the  Danubian  States  and  help  to  bring 
them  back  to  the  heel  of  their  former  protector.  Further, 
seeing  that  the  behaviour  of  King  Charles  to  his  Russian 
benefactors  was  no  less  "ungrateful"  than  that  of  Prince 
Alexander,  it  would  be  a  fit  Nemesis  for  these  ingrais  to  be 
set  by  the  ears.  Accordingly,  in  the  month  of  August, 
1885,  orders  were  issued  to  Russian  agents  to  fan  the  bor- 
der dispute;  and  on  August  12/30  the  Director  of  the 
Asiatic  Department  at  St.  Petersburg  wrote  the  following 
instructions  to  the  Russian  Consul-General  at  Rustchuk: 

"You  remember  that  the  union  [of  the  two  Bulgarias] 
must  not  take  place  tmtil  after  the  abdication  of  Prince 
Alexander.  However,  the  ill-advised  and  hostile  attitude 
of  King  Charles  of  Roumania  [to  Russia]  obliges  the  im- 
perial government  to  postpone  for  some  time  the  projected 
union  of  Eastern  Roumelia  to  the  Principality,  as  well  as 
the  abdication  and  expulsion  of  the  Prince  of  Bulgaria.  In 
the  session  of  the  Council  of  [Russian]  Ministers  held  yes- 
terday it  was  decided  to  beg  the  Emperor  to  call  Prince 
Alexander  to  Copenhagen  or  to  St.  Petersburg  in  order  to 
inform  him  that,  according  to  the  will  of  His  Majesty, 
Bulgaria  must  defend  by  armed  force  her  rights  over 
the  points  hereinbefore  mentioned."  ^ 

The  despatch  then  states  that  Russia  will  keep  Turkey 
quiet  and  will  eventually  make  war  on  Roumania;  also, 
1  R.  Leonoff,  op.  cit.,  pp.  81-84. 


The  Making  of  Bulgaria  313 

that  if  Bulgaria  triumphs  over  Roumania,  the  latter  will 
pay  her  in  territory  or  money,  or  in  both.  Possibly,  how- 
ever, the  whole  scheme  may  have  been  devised  to  serve  as 
a  decoy  to  bring  Prince  Alexander  within  the  power  of  his 
imperial  patrons,  who,  in  that  case,  would  probably  have 
detained  and  dethroned  him. 

Further  light  was  thrown  on  the  tortuous  course  of 
Russian  diplomacy  by  a  speech  of  Count  Eugen  Zichy  to 
the  Hungarian  Delegations  about  a  year  later.  He  made 
the  startling  declaration  that  in  the  summer  of  1885  Russia 
concluded  a  treaty  with  Montenegro  with  the  aim  of  de- 
throning King  Milan  and  Prince  Alexander,  and  the  divi- 
sion of  the  Balkan  States  between  Prince  Nicholas  of 
Montenegro  and  the  Karageorgevich  Pretender  who  has 
since  made  his  way  to  the  throne  at  Belgrade.  The  details 
of  these  schemes  are  not  known,  but  the  searchlight  thrown 
upon  them  from  Buda-Pesth  revealed  the  shifts  of  the 
policy  of  those  "friends  of  peace,"  the  Czar  Alexander  III. 
and  his  Chancellor,  de  Giers. 

Prince  Alexander  may  not  have  been  aware  of  these 
schemes  in  their  full  extent,  but  he  and  his  friends  certainly 
felt  the  meshes  closing  around  them.  There  were  only  two 
courses  open,  either  completely  to  submit  to  the  Czar 
(which,  for  the  Prince,  implied  abdication)  or  to  rely  on 
the  Bulgarian  people.  The  Prince  took  the  course  which 
would  have  been  taken  by  every  man  worthy  of  the  name. 
It  is,  however,  almost  certain  that  he  did  not  foresee  the 
events  at  Philippopolis.  He  gave  his  word  to  a  German 
officer,  Major  von  Huhn,  that  he  had  not  in  the  least  degree 
expected  the  unionist  movement  to  take  so  speedy  and 
decisive  a  step  forward  as  it  did  in  the  middle  of  September. 
The  Prince,  in  fact,  had  been  on  a  tour  throughout  Europe, 


314  The  European  Nations 

and  expressed  the  same  opinion  to  the  Russian  Chancellor, 
de  Giers,  at  Franzensbad. 

But  by  this  time  everything  was  ready  at  Philippopolis. 
As  the  men  of  Eastern  Roumelia  were  all  of  one  mind  in 
this  matter,  it  was  the  easiest  of  tasks  to  surprise  the  Sul- 
tan's representative,  Gavril  Pasha,  to  surround  his  office 
with  soldiers,  and  to  request  him  to  leave  the  province 
(September  i8).  A  carriage  was  ready  to  conduct  him 
towards  Sophia.  In  it  sat  a  gaily  dressed  peasant  girl  hold- 
ing a  drawn  sword,  Gavril  turned  red  with  rage  at  this 
insult,  but  he  mounted  the  vehicle,  and  was  driven  through 
the  town  and  thence  towards  the  Balkans. 

Such  was  the  departure  of  the  last  official  of  the  Sultan 
from  the  land  which  the  Turks  had  often  drenched  with 
blood;  such  was  the  revenge  of  the  southern  Bulgarians 
for  the  atrocities  of  1876.  Not  a  drop  of  blood  was  shed; 
and  Major  von  Huhn,  who  soon  arrived  at  Philippopolis, 
found  Greeks  and  Turks  living  contentedly  under  the  new 
government.  The  word  "revolution"  is  in  such  cases  a 
misnomer.  South  Bulgaria  merely  returned  to  its  natural 
state. ^  But  nothing  will  convince  diplomatists  that 
events  can  happen  without  the  pulling  of  wires  by  them- 
selves or  their  rivals.  In  this  instance  they  found  that 
Prince  Alexander  had  made  the  revolution. 

At  first,  however,  the  Prince  doubted  whether  he  should 
accept  the  crown  of  a  Greater  Bulgaria  which  the  men  of 
Philippopolis  now  enthusiastically  offered  to  him.  Stam- 
buloff  strongly  urged  him  to  accept,  even  if  he  thereby 
still  further  enraged  the  Czar:  "Sire,"  he  said,  "two  roads 

1  The  Struggle  of  the  Bulgarians  for  National  Independence,  by- 
Major  A.  von  Huhn,  chap.  ii.  See,  too.  Pari.  Papers,  Turkey,  No.  i 
(1886),  p.  83. 


The  Making  of  Bulgaria  3 1 5 

lie  before  you :  the  one  to  Philippopolis  and  as  far  beyond 
as  God  may  lead;  the  other  to  Sistova  and  Darmstadt. 
I  counsel  you  to  take  the  crown  the  nation  offers  you." 
On  the  20th  the  Prince  announced  his  acceptance  of  the 
crown  of  a  united  Bulgaria.  As  he  said  to  the  British 
Consul  at  Philippopolis,  he  would  have  been  a  "sharper" 
(jilou)  not  to  side  with  his  people.^ 

Few  persons  were  prepared  for  the  outburst  of  wrath 
of  the  Czar  at  hearing  this  news.  Early  in  his  reign  he 
had  concentrated  into  a  single  phrase — "silly  Pole" — the 
spleen  of  an  essentially  narrow  nature  at  seeing  a  kinsman 
and  a  dependant  dare  to  think  and  act  for  himself.^  But 
on  this  occasion,  as  we  can  now  see,  the  Prince  had  marred 
Russia's  plans  in  the  most  serious  way.  Stambuloff  and 
he  had  deprived  her  of  her  unionist  trump  card.  The  Czar 
found  his  project  of  becoming  Grand  Duke  of  a  Greater 
Bulgaria  blocked  by  the  action  of  this  same  hated  kinsman. 
Is  it  surprising  that  his  usual  stolidity  gave  way  to  one  of 
those  fits  of  bull-like  fury  which  aroused  the  fear  of  all  who 
beheld  them?  Thenceforth  between  the  Emperor  Alex- 
ander and  Prince  Alexander  the  relations  might  be  char- 
acterised by  the  curt  phrase  which  Palafox  hurled  at  the 
French  from  the  weak  walls  of  Saragossa — "War  to  the 
knife."  Like  Palafox,  the  Prince  now  had  no  hope  but  in 
the  bravery  of  his  people. 

In  the  ciphered  telegrams  of  September  19th  and  20th, 
which  the  Director  of  the  Asiatic  Department  at  St. 
Petersburg  sent  to  the  Russian  Consul-General  at  Rust- 
chuk,   the  note  of  resentment  and  revenge  was  clearly 

1  Stambuloff,  by  A.  H.  Beaman,  chap.  iii. ;  Pari.  Papers,  ibid., 
p.  81. 

2  Bismarck:   Reflections  and  Reminiscences,  ii.,  p.  116  (Eng.  ed.). 


3i6  The  European  Nations 

sounded.  The  events  in  Eastern  Roumelia  had  changed 
"all  our  intentions."  The  agent  was  therefore  directed 
to  summon  the  chief  Russian  officers  in  Bulgaria  and 
ask  them  whether  the  "young"  Bulgarian  officers  could 
really  command  brigades  and  regiments,  and  organise  the 
artillery ;  also  whether  that  army  could  alone  meet  the 
army  of  "a  neighbouring  State."  The  replies  of  the 
officers  being  decidedly  in  the  negative,  they  were  ordered 
to  leave  Bulgaria.^  Nelidoff,  the  Russian  ambassador  at 
Constantinople,  also  worked  furiously  to  spur  on  the  Sultan 
to  revenge  the  insult  inflicted  on  him  by  Prince  Alexander. 

Sir  William  White  believed  that  the  volte  face  in  Russian 
policy  was  due  solely  to  Nelidoff's  desire  to  thwart  the 
peaceful  policy  of  the  Russian  Chancellor,  de  Giers,  who  at 
that  time  chanced  to  be  absent  in  Tyrol,  while  the  Czar 
also  was  away  at  Copenhagen.^  But  it  now  appears  that 
the  Russian  Foreign  Office  took  Nelidoff's  view,  and  bade 
him  press  Turkey  to  restore  the  "legal  order"  of  things  in 
Eastern  Roumelia.  Further,  the  Ministers  of  the  Czar 
found  that  Servia,  Greece,  and  perhaps  also  Roumania, 
intended  to  oppose  the  aggrandisement  of  Bulgaria;  and 
it  therefore  seemed  easy  to  chastise  "the  Battenberger" 
for  his  wanton  disturbance  of  the  peace  of  Europe. 

Possibly  Russia  would  herself  have  struck  at  Bulgaria 
but  for  the  difficulties  of  the  general  situation.  How  great 
•these  were  will  be  realised  by  a  perusal  of  the  following 
chapters,  which  deal  with  the  spread  of  Nihilism  in  Russia, 
the  formation  of  the  Austro-German  alliance,  and  the 
favour  soon  shown  to  it  by  Italy,  the  estrangement  of 

>  R.  LeonofF,  op.  cit.,  Nos.  75,  77. 

2  Sir  William  White:  Memoirs  and  Correspondence,  by  H.  Suther- 
land Edwards,  pp.  231-232. 


The  Making  of  Bulgaria  317 

England  and  the  Porte  owing  to  the  action  taken  by  the 
former  in  Egypt,  and  the  sharp  coUision  of  interests  be- 
tween Russia  and  England  at  Panjdeh  on  the  Afghan 
frontier.  When  it  is  further  remembered  that  France 
fretted  at  the  untoward  results  of  M.  Ferry's  forward 
policy  in  Tonquin;  that  Germany  was  deeply  engaged  in 
colonial  efforts;  and  that  the  United  Kingdom  was  dis- 
tracted by  those  efforts,  by  the  failure  of  the  expedition  to 
Khartum,  and  by  the  Parnellite  agitation  in  Ireland — the 
complexity  of  the  European  situation  will  be  sufficiently 
evident.  Assuredly  the  events  of  the  year  1885  were 
among  the  most  distracting  ever  recorded  in  the  history  of 
Europe. 

This  clash  of  interests  among  nations  wearied  by  war, 
and  alarmed  at  the  apparition  of  the  red  spectre  of  revolu- 
tion in  their  midst,  told  by  no  means  unfavourably  on  the 
fortunes  of  the  Balkan  States.  The  dominant  facts  of  the 
situation  were,  firstly,  that  Russia  no  longer  had  a  free 
hand  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula  in  face  of  the  compact  be- 
tween the  three  Emperors  ratified  at  Skiernewice  in  the 
previous  autumn  (see  Chapter  XII.);  and,  secondly,  that 
the  traditional  friendship  between  England  and  the  Porte 
had  been  replaced  by  something  like  hostility.  Seeing 
that  the  Sultan  had  estranged  the  British  Government  by 
his  very  suspicious  action  during  the  revolts  of  Arabi  Pasha 
and  of  the  Mahdi,  even  those  who  had  loudly  proclaimed 
the  need  of  propping  up  his  authority  as  essential  to  the 
stability  of  our  Eastern  Empire  now  began  to  revise  their 
prejudices. 

Thus,  when  Lord  Salisbury  came  to  office,  if  not  pre- 
cisely to  power,  in  June,  1885,  he  found  affairs  in  the  East 
rapidly  ripening  for  a  change  of  British  policy — a  change 


3i8  The  European  Nations 

which  is  known  to  have  corresponded  with  his  own  con- 
victions. Finally,  the  marriage  of  Princess  Beatrice  to 
Prince  Henry  of  Battenberg,  on  July  23,  1885,  added  that 
touch  of  personal  interest  which  enabled  Court  circles  to 
break  with  the  traditions  of  the  past  and  to  face  the  new 
situation  with  equanimity.  Accordingly  the  power  of 
Britain,  which  in  1876-78  had  been  used  to  thwart  the 
growth  of  freedom  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  was  now  put 
forth  to  safeguard  the  tinion  of  Bulgaria,  During  these 
critical  months  Sir  WilHam  White  acted  as  ambassador  at 
Constantinople,  and  used  his  great  knowledge  of  the  Bal- 
kan peoples  with  telling  effect  for  this  salutary  purpose. 

Lord  Salisbury  advised  the  Sultan  not  to  send  troops 
into  Southern  Bulgaria;  and  the  warning  chimed  in  with 
the  note  of  timorous  cunning  which  formed  the  tindertone 
of  that  monarch's  thought  and  policy.  Distracted  by  the 
news  of  the  warlike  preparations  of  Servia  and  Greece 
Abdul  Hamid  looked  on  Russia's  advice  in  a  contrary 
sense  as  a  piece  of  Muscovite  treachery.  About  the  same 
time,  too,  there  were  rumours  of  palace  plots  at  Con- 
stantinople; and  the  capricious  recluse  of  Yildiz  finally 
decided  to  keep  his  best  troops  near  at  hand.  It  appears, 
then,  that  Nihilism  in  Russia  and  the  spectre  of  con- 
spiracy always  haunting  the  brain  of  Abdul  Hamid  played 
their  part  in  assuring  the  liberties  of  Bulgaria. 

Meanwhile  the  Powers  directed  their  ambassadors  at 
Constantinople  to  hold  a  preliminary  Conference  at  which 
Turkey  would  be  represented.  The  result  was  a  declara- 
tion expressing  formal  disapproval  of  the  violation  of  the 
Treaty  of  Berlin,  and  a  hope  that  all  parties  concerned 
would  keep  the  peace.  This  mild  protest  very  inade- 
quately reflected  the  character  of  the  discussions  which 


The  Making  of  Bulgaria  319 

had  been  going  on  between  the  several  Courts.  Russia,  it 
is  known,  wished  to  fasten  the  blame  for  the  revolution  on 
Prince  Alexander;  but  all  public  censure  was  vetoed  by 
England. 

Probably  her  action  was  as  effective  in  still  weightier 
matters.  A  formal  Conference  of  the  ambassadors  of  the 
Powers  met  at  Constantinople  on  November  5th ;  and  there 
again  Sir  William  White,  acting  on  instructions  from 
Lord  Salisbury,  defended  the  Bulgarian  cause,  and  sought 
to  bring  about  a  friendly  understanding  between  the  Porte 
and  "a  people  occupying  so  important  a  position  in  the 
Sultan's  dominions."  Lord  Salisbury  also  warned  the 
Turkish  ambassador  in  London  that  if  Turkey  sought  to 
expel  Prince  Alexander  from  Eastern  Roumelia,  she 
would  "be  making  herself  the  instnmient  of  those  who 
desired  the  fall  of  the  Ottoman  Empire."  ^ 

This  reference  to  the  insidious  means  used  by  Russia  for 
bringing  the  Turks  to  a  state  of  tutelage,  as  a  preliminary 
to  partition,  was  an  effective  reminder  of  the  humiliations 
which  they  had  undergone  at  the  hands  of  Russia  by  the 
Treaty  of  Unkiar  Skelessi  (1833).  France  also  showed  no 
disposition  to  join  the  Russian  and  Austrian  demand  that 
the  Sultan  should  at  once  re-establish  the  status  quo;  and 
by  degrees  the  more  intelligent  Turks  came  to  see  that  a 
strong  Bulgaria,  independent  of  Russian  control,  might  be 
an  additional  safeguard  against  the  Colossus  of  the  North. 
Russia's  insistence  on  the  exact  fulfilment  of  the  Treaty 

>  Pari.  Papers,  Turkey,  No.  i  (1886),  pp.  214-215.  See,  too, 
■ibid.,  pp.  igj  et  seq.  for  Lord  Salisbury's  instructions  to  Sir  William 
White  for  the  Conference.  In  view  of  them  it  is  needless  to  waste 
space  in  refuting  the  arguments  of  the  Russophil  A.  G.  Grandar, 
op.  cit.,  p.  147,  that  England  sought  to  make  war  between  the 
Balkan  States. 


320  The  European  Nations 

of  Berlin  helped  to  open  their  eyes,  and  lent  force  to  Sir 
William  White's  arguments  as  to  the  need  of  strengthening 
that  treaty  by  "introducing  into  it  a  timely  improvement." ^ 

Owing  to  the  opposition  offered  by  Great  Britain,  and  to 
some  extent  by  France,  to  the  proposed  restoration  of  the 
old  order  of  things  in  Eastern  Roumelia,  the  Conference 
came  to  an  end  at  the  close  of  November,  the  three  Im- 
perial Powers  blaming  Sir  William  White  for  his  obstruc- 
tive tactics.  The  charges  will  not  bear  examination,  but 
they  show  the  irritation  of  those  Governments  at  England's 
championship  of  the  Bulgarian  cause.^  The  Bulgarians 
always  remember  the  names  of  Lord  Salisbury  and  Sir 
William  White  as  those  of  friends  in  need. 

In  the  main,  however,  the  consolidation  of  Bulgaria  was 
achieved  by  her  own  stalwart  sons.  While  the  Imperial 
Powers  were  proposing  to  put  back  the  hands  of  the  clock, 
an  alarum  sounded  forth,  proclaiming  the  advent  of  a  new 
era  in  the  history  of  the  Balkan  peoples.  The  action  which 
brought  about  this  change  was  startling  alike  in  its  incep- 
tion, in  the  accompanying  incidents,  and  still  more  in  its 
results. 

Where  Abdul  Hamid  forebore  to  enter,  even  as  the 
mandatory  of  the  Continental  Courts,  there  Milan  of  Servia 
rushed  in.  As  an  excuse  for  his  aggression,  the  kinglet  of 
Belgrade  alleged  the  harm  done  to  Servian  trade  by  a 
recent  revision  of  the  Bulgarian  tariff.  But  the  Powers 
assessed  this  complaint  and  others  at  their  due  value,  and 
saw  in  his  action  merely  the  desire  to  seize  a  part  of  Western 
Bulgaria  as  a  set-off  to  the  recent  growth  of  that  Princi- 

1  Pari.  Papers,  Turkey  No.  i  (1886),  pp.  273-274,  288,  for  Rus- 
sia's policy;    p.  284  for  Sir  W.  White's  argument. 

2  Ihid.,  pp.  370-372. 


The  Making  of  Bulgaria  321 

pality.  On  all  sides  his  action  in  declaring  war  against 
Prince  Alexander  (November  i4tli)  met  with  reprobation, 
even  on  the  part  of  his  guide  and  friend,  Austria.  A  recent 
report  of  the  Hungarian  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  con- 
tained a  recommendation  which  implied  that  he  ought  to 
receive  compensation ;  and  this  seemed  to  show  the  wish  of 
the  more  active  part  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  peacefully  but 
effectively  to  champion  his  cause.^ 

Nevertheless,  the  King  decided  to  carve  out  his  fortunes 
by  his  own  sword.  He  had  some  grounds  for  confidence. 
If  a  Bulgarian  fait  accompli  could  win  tacit  recognition 
from  the  Powers,  why  should  not  a  Servian  triumph  over 
Bulgaria  force  their  hands  once  more?  Prince  Alexander 
was  unsafe  on  his  throne;  thanks  to  the  action  of  Russia 
his  troops  had  very  few  experienced  officers;  and  in  view 
of  the  Sultan's  resentment  his  southern  border  could  not 
be  denuded  of  troops.  Never  did  a  case  seem  more  des- 
perate than  that  of  the  "peasant  State,"  deserted  and 
flouted  by  Russia,  disliked  by  the  Sultan,  on  bad  terms 
with  Roumania,  and  pubhcly  lectured  by  the  Continental 
Powers  for  her  irregular  conduct.  Servia's  triumph  seemed 
assured. 

But  now  there  came  forth  one  more  proof  of  the  vitalis- 
ing force  of  the  national  principle.  In  seven  years  the 
down-trodden  peasants  of  Bulgaria  had  become  men,  and 
now  astonished  the  world  by  their  prowess.  The  with- 
drawal of  the  Russian  officers  left  half  of  the  captaincies 
vacant;  but  they  were  promptly  filled  up  by  enthusiastic 
young  lieutenants.  Owing  to  the  blowing  up  of  the  line 
from  Philippopolis  to  Adrianople,  only  five  locomotives 
were  available  for  carrying  back  northwards  the  troops 
1  Pari.  Papers,  Turkey,  No.  i  (1886),  p.  250. 


322  The  European  Nations 

v/hich  had  hitherto  been  massed  on  the  southern  border; 
and  these  five  were  already  overstrained.  Yet  the  en- 
gineers now  worked  them  still  harder  and  they  did  not 
break  down.i  The  hardy  peasants  tramped  impossibly 
long  distances  in  their  longing  to  meet  the  Servians.  The 
arrangements  were  carried  through  with  a  success  which 
seems  miraculous  in  an  inexperienced  race.  The  ex- 
planation was  afterwards  rightly  discerned  by  an  English 
visitor  to  Bulgaria.  "This  is  the  secret  of  Bulgarian  in- 
dependence— everybody  is  in  grim  earnest.  The  Bul- 
garians do  not  care  about  amusements."  ^  In  that  remark 
there  is  food  for  thought.  Inefficiency  has  no  place  among 
a  people  that  looks  to  the  welfare  of  the  State  as  all  in  all. 
Breakdowns  occur  when  men  think  more  about  "sport" 
and  pleasure  than  about  doing  their  utmost  for  their 
country. 

The  results  of  this  grim  earnestness  were  to  astonish  the 
world.  The  Servians  at  first  gained  some  successes  in 
front  of  Widdin  and  Slivnitza;  but  the  defenders  of  the 
latter  place  (an  all-important  position  northwest  of  Sophia) 
hurried  up  all  possible  forces.  Two  Bulgarian  regiments 
are  said  to  have  marched  123  kilometres  in  thirty  hours  in 
order  to  defend  that  military"  outwork  of  their  capital; 
while  others,  worn  out  with  marching,  rode  forward  on 
horseback,  two  men  to  each  horse,  and  then  threw  them- 
selves into  the  fight.  The  Bulgarian  artillery  was  well 
served,  and  proved  to  be  very  superior  to  that  of  the 
Servians. 

Thus,  on  the  first  two  days  of  conflict  at  Slivnitza,  the 
defenders  beat  back  the  Servians  with  some  loss.     On  the 

»  A.  von  Huhn,  op.  ctt.,  p.  105. 

2  E.  A.  B.  Hodgetts,  Round  about  Armenia,  p.  7. 


The  Making  of  Bulgaria  323 

third  day  (November  19th),  after  receiving  reinforcements, 
they  took  the  offensive,  with  surprising  vigour.  A  talented 
young  officer,  Bendereff ,  led  their  right  wing,  with  bands 
playing  and  colours  flying,  to  storm  the  hillsides  that 
dominated  the  Servian  position.  The  hardy  peasants 
scaled  the  hills  and  delivered  the  final  bayonet  charge  so 
furiously  that  there  and  on  all  sides  the  invaders  fled  in 
wild  panic,  and  scarcely  halted  until  they  reached  their 
own  frontier. 

Thenceforth  King  Milan  had  hard  work  to  keep  his  men 
together.  Many  of  them  were  raw  troops;  their  ammu- 
nition was  nearly  exhausted;  and  their  morale  had  van- 
ished utterly.  Prince  Alexander  had  little  difficulty  in 
thrusting  them  forth  from  Pirot,  and  seemed  to  have 
before  him  a  clear  road  to  Belgrade,  when  suddenly  he  was 
brought  to  a  halt  by  a  menace  from  the  north. ^ 

A  special  envoy  sent  by  the  Hapsburgs,  Count  Kheven- 
huller,  came  in  haste  to  the  headquarters  of  the  Prince  on 
November  28th,  and  in  imperious  terms  bade  him  grant  an 
armistice  to  Servia,  otherwise  Austrian  troops  would  forth- 
with cross  the  frontier  to  her  assistance.  Before  this 
threat  Alexander  gave  way,  and  was  blamed  by  some  of 
his  people  for  this  act  of  complaisance.  But  assuredly  he 
could  not  well  have  acted  otherwise.  The  three  Emperors, 
of  late  acting  in  accord  in  Balkan  questions,  had  it  in  their 
power  to  crush  him  by  launching  the  Turks  against  Philip- 
popolis,  or  their  own  troops  against  Sophia.  He  had  satis- 
fied the  claims  of  honour;  he  had  punished  Servia  for  her 
peevish  and  unsisterly  jealously.  Under  his  lead  the 
Bulgarians  had  covered  themselves  with  glory  and  had 

1  Drandar,  Evenements  politiques  en  Bulgarie,  pp.  89-116;  von 
Huhn,  op.  cit.,  chaps,  x.,  xi. 


324  The  European  Nations 

leaped  at  a  bound  from  political  youth  to  manhood.  Why 
should  he  risk  their  new-foimd  unity  merely  in  order  to 
abase  Servia?  The  Prince  never  acted  more  pmdently 
than  when  he  decided  not  to  bring  into  the  field  the  Power 
which,  as  he  believed,  had  pushed  on  Servia  to  war.^ 

Had  he  known  that  the  Russian  Chancellor,  de  Giers,  on 
hearing  of  Austria's  threat  to  Bulgaria,  informed  the  Court 
of  Vienna  of  the  Czar's  condign  displeasure  if  that  threat 
were  carried  into  effect,  perhaps  he  would  have  played  a 
grand  game,  advancing  on  Belgrade,  dethroning  the  al- 
ready unpopular  King  Milan,  and  offering  to  the  Czar  the 
headship  of  a  united  Servo-Bulgarian  State.  He  might 
thus  have  appeased  that  sovereign,  but  at  the  cost  of  a 
European  war.  Whether  from  lack  of  information,  or  from 
a  sense  of  prudence  and  humanity,  the  Prince  held  back 
and  decided  for  peace  with  Servia.  Despite  many  diffi- 
culties thrown  in  the  way  by  King  Milan,  this  was  the 
upshot  of  the  ensuing  negotiations.  The  two  States 
finally  came  to  terms  by  the  Treaty  of  Bukharest,  where, 
thanks  to  the  good  sense  of  the  negotiators  and  the  efforts 
of  Turkey  to  compose  these  strifes,  peace  was  assured  on 
the  basis  of  the  status  quo  ante  helium  (March  3,  1886). 

Already  the  Porte  had  manifested  its  good-will  towards 
Bulgaria  in  the  most  signal  manner.  This  complete  re- 
versal of  policy  may  be  assigned  to  several  causes.  Firstly, 
Prince  Alexander,  on  marching  against  the  Servians,  had 
very  tactfully  proclaimed  that  he  did  so  on  behalf  of  the 
existing  order  of  things,  which  they  were  bent  on  over- 
throwing. His  actions  having  corresponded  to  his  words, 
the  Porte  gradually  came  to  see  in  him  a  potent  defender 
against  Russia.  This  change  in  the  attitude  of  the  Sultan 
>  Drandar,  op.  cit.,  chap,  iii.;  Kuhn,  op.  cit.,  chap,  xviii. 


The  Making  of  Bulgaria  325 

was  undoubtedly  helped  on  by  the  arguments  of  Lord 
Salisbury  to  the  Turkish  ambassador  at  London.  He 
summarised  the  whole  case  for  a  recognition  of  the  imion 
of  the  two  Bulgarias  in  the  following  remarks  (December 
23,  1885): 

"Every  week's  experience  showed  that  the  Porte  had 
little  to  dread  from  the  subserviency  of  Bulgaria  to  foreign 
influence,  if  only  Bulgaria  were  allowed  enjoyment  of  her 
unanimous  desires,  and  the  Porte  did  not  gratuitously 
place  itself  in  opposition  to  the  general  feeling  of  the  people. 
A  Bulgaria  friendly  to  the  Porte,  and  jealous  of  foreign 
influence,  would  be  a  far  surer  bulwark  against  foreign 
aggression  than  two  Bulgarias,  severed  in  administration, 
but  united  in  considering  the  Porte  as  the  only  obstacle  to 
their  national  development."  * 

Events  served  to  reveal  the  soundness  of  this  statesman- 
like pronouncement.  At  the  close  of  the  year  Prince 
Alexander  returned  from  the  front  to  Sophia  and  received 
an  overwhelming  ovation  as  the  champion  of  Bulgarian 
liberties.  Further,  he  now  found  no  difficulty  in  coming 
to  an  understanding  with  the  Turkish  Commissioners  sent 
to  investigate  the  state  of  opinion  in  Southern  Bulgaria. 
Most  significant  of  all  was  the  wrath  of  the  Czar  at  the 
sight  of  his  popularity,  and  the  utter  collapse  of  the  Russian 
party  at  Sophia. 

Meanwhile  the  Powers  found  themselves  obliged  little  by 
little  to  abandon  their  pedantic  resolve  to  restore  the 
Treaty  of  Berlin.  Sir  Robert  Morier,  British  ambassador 
at  St.  Petersburg,  in  a  letter  of  December  27,  1885,  to  Sir 
William  White,  thus  commented  on  the  causes  that  as- 
sured success  to  the  Bulgarian  cause: 

1  Pari.  Papers,  Turkey,  No.  i  (1886),  p.  424. 


326  The  European  Nations 

"The  very  great  prudence  shown  by  Lord  SaHsbury, 
and  the  consummate  abiHty  with  which  you  played  your 
part,  have  made  it  a  successful  game;  but  the  one  crowning 
good  fortune,  which  we  mainly  owe  to  the  incalculable 
folly  of  the  Servian  attack,  has  been  that  Prince  Alex- 
ander's generalship  and  the  fighting  capacities  of  his 
soldiers  have  placed  our  rival  action  [his  own  and  that  of 
Sir  W.  White]  in  perfect  harmony  with  the  crushing  logic 
of  fact.  The  rivalry  is  thus  completely  swamped  in  the 
bit  of  cosmic  work  so  successfully  accomplished.  A  State 
has  been  evolved  out  of  the  protoplasm  of  Balkan  chaos," 

Sir  Robert  Morier  finally  stated  that  if  Sir  William 
White  succeeded  in  building  up  an  independent  Bulgaria 
friendly  to  Roumania,  he  would  have  achieved  the  greatest 
feat  of  diplomacy  since  Sir  James  Hudson's  statesmanlike 
moves  at  Turin  in  the  critical  months  of  1859-60  gained 
for  England  a  more  influential  position  in  Italy  than  France 
had  secured  by  her  aid  in  the  campaign  of  Solferino.  The 
praise  is  over-strained,  inasmuch  as  it  leaves  out  of  count 
the  statecraft  of  Bismarck  in  the  years  1863-64  and 
1869-70;  but  certainly  among  the  peaceful  triumphs  of 
recent  years  that  of  Sir  William  White  must  rank  very 
high. 

If,  however,  we  examine  the  inner  cause  of  the  success  of 
the  diplomacy  of  Hudson  and  White  we  must  assign  it  in 
part  to  the  mistakes  of  the  liberating  Powers,  France  and 
Russia.  Napoleon  III.,  by  requiring  the  cession  of  Savoy 
and  Nice,  and  by  revealing  his  design  to  Gallicise  the 
Italian  Peninsula,  speedily  succeeded  in  alienating  the 
Italians.  The  action  of  Russia  in  compelling  Bulgaria  to 
give  up  the  Dobrudscha,  as  an  equivalent  to  the  part  of 
Bessarabia  which  she  took  from  Roumania,  also  strained 


The  Making  of  Bulgaria  327 

the  sense  of  gratitude  of  those  peoples;  and  the  conduct 
of  Muscovite  agents  in  Bulgaria  provoked  in  that  Princi- 
pality feelings  bitterer  than  those  which  the  Italians  felt 
at  the  loss  of  Savoy  and  Nice.  So  true  is  it  that  in  public 
as  in  private  life  the  manner  in  which  a  wrong  is  inflicted 
cotmts  for  more  than  the  wrong  itself.  It  was  on  this  sense 
of  resentment  (misnamed  "ingratitude"  by  the  "libera- 
tors") that  British  diplomacy  worked  with  telling  effect 
in  both  cases.  It  conferred  on  the  "liberated"  substantial 
benefits:  but  their  worth  was  doubled  by  the  contrast 
which  they  offered  to  the  losses  or  the  irritation  consequent 
on  the  actions  of  Napoleon  III.  and  of  Alexander  III. 

To  the  present  writer  it  seems  that  the  great  achieve- 
ments of  Sir  William  White  were,  first,  that  he  kept  the 
Sultan  quiet  (a  course,  be  it  remarked,  from  which  that 
nervous  recluse  was  never  averse)  when  Nelidoff  sought  to 
hound  him  on  against  Bulgaria;  and,  still  more,  that  he 
helped  to  bring  about  a  good  understanding  between  Con- 
stantinople and  Sophia.  In  view  of  the  hatred  which  Abdul 
Hamid  bore  to  England  after  her  intervention  in  Egypt  in 
1882,  this  was  certainly  a  great  diplomatic  achievement; 
but  possibly  Abdul  Hamid  hoped  to  reap  advantages  on 
the  Nile  from  his  complaisance  to  British  policy  in  the 
Balkans. 

The  outcome  of  it  all  was  the  framing  of  a  Turco-Bul- 
garian  Convention  (February  i,  1886)  whereby  the  Porte 
recognised  Prince  Alexander  as  Governor  of  Eastern 
Roumelia  for  a  term  of  five  years;  a  few  border  districts 
in  Rhodope,  inhabited  by  Moslems,  were  ceded  to  the 
Sultan,  and  (wonder  of  wonders!)  Turkey  and  Bulgaria 
concluded  an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance.  In  case  of 
foreign  aggression  on  Bulgaria,  Turkish  troops  would  be 


328  The  European  Nations 

sent  thither  to  be  commanded  by  the  Prince;  if  Turkey 
were  invaded,  Bulgarian  troops  would  form  part  of  the 
Sultan's  army  repelling  the  invader.  In  other  respects 
the  provisions  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  remained  in  force 
for  Southern  Bulgaria.^ 

On  that  same  day,  as  it  chanced,  the  Salisbury  Cabinet 
resigned  office,  and  Mr.  Gladstone  became  Prime  Minister, 
Lord  Rosebery  taking  the  portfolio  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
This  event  produced  little  variation  in  Britain's  Eastern 
policy,  and  that  statement  will  serve  to  emphasise  the  im- 
portance of  the  change  of  attitude  of  the  Conservative 
party  towards  those  affairs  in  the  years  1878-85,  a  change 
undoubtedly  due  in  the  main  to  the  Marquis  of  Salisbury. 

In  the  official  notes  of  the  Earl  of  Rosebery  there  is 
manifest  somewhat  more  complaisance  to  Russia,  as  when 
on  February  12th  he  instructed  Sir  William  White  to  ad- 
vise the  Porte  to  modify  its  convention  with  Bulgaria  by 
abandoning  the  stipulation  as  to  mutual  military  aid. 
Doubtless  this  advice  was  sound.  It  coincided  with  the 
known  opinions  of  the  Court  of  Vienna;  and  at  the  same 
time  Russia  formally  declared  that  she  could  never  accept 
that  condition. 2  As  Germany  took  the  same  view  the 
Porte  agreed  to  expunge  the  obnoxious  clause.  The 
Government  of  the  Czar  also  objected  to  the  naming  of 
Prince  Alexander  in  the  Convention.  This  unlooked-for 
slight  naturally  aroused  the  indignation  of  the  Prince ;  but 
as  the  British  Government  deferred  to  Russian  views  on 
this  matter,  the  Convention  was  finally  signed  at  Constan- 
tinople on  April  5,  1886.  The  Powers,  including  Turkey, 
thereby  recognised  "the  Prince  of  Bulgaria"  (not  named) 
as  Governor  of  Eastern  Roumelia  for  a  term  of  five  years, 

1  Pari.  Papers,  Turkey,  No.  2  (1886).  2  Ibid.,  pp.  96-98. 


The  Making  of  Bulgaria  329 

and  referred  the  "Organic  Statute"  of  that  province  to 
revision  by  a  joint  Conference. 

The  Prince  submitted  to  this  arrangement,  provisional 
and  humiliating  though  it  was.  But  the  insults  inflicted 
by  Russia  bound  him  the  more  closely  to  his  people;  and 
at  the  united  Parliament,  where  182  members  out  of  the 
total  300  supported  his  Ministers,  he  advocated  measures 
that  would  cement  the  union.  Bulgarian  soon  became  the 
official  language  throughout  South  Bulgaria,  to  the  an- 
no^^ance  of  the  Greek  and  Turkish  minorities.  But  the 
chief  cause  of  unrest  continued  to  be  the  intrigues  of 
Russian  agents. 

The  anger  of  the  Czar  at  the  success  of  his  hated  kinsman 
showed  itself  in  various  ways.  Not  content  with  inflicting 
every  possible  slight  and  disturbing  the  peace  of  Bulgaria 
through  his  agents,  he  even  menaced  Europe  with  war 
over  that  question.  At  Sevastopol  on  May  19th,  he  de- 
clared that  circumstances  might  compel  him  "to  defend 
by  force  of  arms  the  dignity  of  the  Empire" — a  threat 
probably  aimed  at  Bulgaria  and  Turkey.  On  his  return 
to  Moscow  he  received  an  enthusiastic  welcome  from  the 
fervid  Slavophils  of  the  old  Russian  capital,  the  Mayor 
expressing  in  his  address  the  hope  that  "the  cross  of  Christ 
will  soon  shine  on  St.  Sophia"  at  Constantinople.  At  the 
end  of  June  the  Russian  Government  repudiated  the  clause 
of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  constituting  Batoum  a  free  port.* 
Despite  a  vigorous  protest  by  Lord  Rosebery  against  this 
infraction  of  treaty  engagements,  the  Czar  and  M.  de  Giers 
held  to  their  resolve,  evidently  by  way  of  retort  to  the 
help  given  from  London  to  the  union  of  the  two  Bulgarias. 

The  Dual  Monarchy,  especially  Himgary,  also  felt  the 
«  Pari.  Papers,  Russia  (1886),  p.  828. 


330  The  European  Nations 

weight  of  Russia's  displeasure  in  return  for  the  sympathy 
manifested  for  the  Prince  at  Pesth  and  Vienna;  and  but 
for  the  strength  which  the  friendship  of  Germany  afforded, 
that  Power  would  almost  certainly  have  encountered  war 
from  the  irate  potentate  of  the  North. 

Turkey,  having  no  champion,  was  in  still  greater  danger; 
her  conduct  in  condoning  the  irregularities  of  Prince  Alex- 
ander was  as  odious  to  Alexander  III.  as  the  atrocities  of 
her  Bashi-bazouks  ten  years  before  had  been  to  his  more 
chivalrous  sire.  It  is  an  open  secret  that  during  the 
summer  of  1886  the  Czar  was  preparing  to  deal  a  heavy 
blow.  The  Sultan  evaded  it  by  adroitly  shifting  his 
ground  and  posing  as  a  well-wisher  of  the  Czar,  whereupon 
M.  Nelidoff,  the  Russian  ambassador  at  Constantinople, 
proposed  an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance,  and  went  to 
the  length  of  suggesting  that  they  should  wage  war  against 
Austria  and  England  in  order  to  restore  the  Sultan's 
authority  over  Bosnia  and  Egypt  at  the  expense  of  those 
intrusive  Powers.  How  far  negotiations  went  on  this 
matter  and  why  they  failed  is  not  known.  The  ordinary 
explanation,  that  the  Czar  forbore  to  draw  the  sword  be- 
cause of  his  love  of  peace,  hardly  tallies  with  what  is  now 
known  of  his  character  and  his  diplomacy.  It  is  more 
likely  that  he  was  appeased  by  the  events  now  to  be  de- 
scribed, and  thereafter  attached  less  importance  to  a  direct 
intervention  in  Balkan  affairs. 

No  greater  surprise  has  happened  in  this  generation  than 
the  kidnapping  of  Prince  Alexander  by  officers  of  the  army 
which  he  had  lately  led  to  victory.  Yet  the  affair  admits 
of  explanation.  Certain  of  their  number  nourished  re- 
sentment against  him  for  his  imperfect  recognition  of  their 


The  Making  of  Bulgaria  331 

services  during  the  Servian  War,  and  for  the  introduction 
of  German  mihtary  instructors  at  its  close.  Among  the 
malcontents  was  Bendereff,  the  hero  of  Slivnitza,  who, 
having  been  guilty  of  discourtesy  to  the  Prince,  was  left 
unrewarded.  On  this  discontented  knot  of  men  Russian 
intriguers  fastened  themselves  profitably,  with  the  result 
that  one  regiment  at  least  began  to  waver  in  its  allegiance. 

A  military  plot  was  held  in  reserve  as  a  last  resort.  In 
the  first  place,  a  Russian  subject,  Captain  Nabokoff ,  sought 
to  simplify  the  situation  by  hiring  some  Montenegrin  des- 
peradoes, and  by  seeking  to  murder  or  carry  off  the  Prince 
as  he  drew  near  to  Bourgas  during  a  tour  in  Eastern  Bul- 
garia. This  plan  came  to  light  through  the  fideHty  of  a 
Bulgarian  peasant,  whereupon  Nabokoff  and  a  Montene- 
grin priest  were  arrested  (May  i8th).  At  once  the  Russian 
Consul  at  that  seaport  appeared,  demanded  the  release  of 
the  conspirators,  and,  when  this  was  refused,  threatened 
the  Bulgarian  authorities  if  justice  took  its  course.  It  is 
not  without  significance  that  the  Czar's  warlike  speech  at 
Sevastapol  startled  the  world  on  the  day  after  the  arrest 
of  the  conspirators  at  Bourgas.  Apparently  the  arrest  of 
NabokofE  impelled  the  Czar  of  all  the  Russias  to  uphold  the 
dignity  of  his  Empire  by  hurling  threats  against  a  State 
which  protected  itself  from  conspiracy.  The  champion  of 
order  in  Russia  thereby  figured  as  the  abettor  of  plotters  in 
the  Balkans. 

The  menaces  of  the  Northern  Power  availed  to  defer  the 
trial  of  the  conspirators,  and  the  affair  was  still  undecided 
when  the  conspirators  at  Sophia  played  their  last  card. 
Bendereff  was  at  that  time  acting  as  Minister  of  War,  and 
found  means  to  spread  broadcast  a  rumour  that  Servia 
was   arming   as   if   for   war.     Sending   northwards   some 


332  The  European  Nations 

faithful  troops  to  guard  against  this  baseless  danger,  he 
left  the  capital  at  the  mercy  of  the  real  enemy. 

On  August  2 1  St,  when  all  was  ready,  the  Struma  Regi- 
ment hastily  marched  back  by  night  to  Sophia,  disarmed 
the  few  faithful  troops  there  in  garrison,  surroimded  the 
palace  of  the  Prince,  while  the  ringleaders  burst  into  his 
bedchamber.  He  succeeded  in  fleeing  through  a  corridor 
which  led  to  the  garden,  only  to  be  met  with  levelled 
bayonets  and  cries  of  hatred.  The  leaders  thrust  him  into 
a  corner,  tore  a  sheet  out  of  the  visitors'  book  which  lay  on 
a  table  close  by,  and  on  it  hastily  scrawled  words  implying 
abdication;  the  Prince  added  his  signature,  along  with  the 
prayer,  "God  save  Bulgaria."  At  dawn  the  mutineers 
forced  him  into  a  carriage,  Bendereff  and  his  accomplices 
crowding  round  to  dismiss  him  with  jeers  and  screen  him 
from  the  sight  of  the  public.  Thence  he  was  driven  at  the 
utmost  speed  through  byways  towards  the  Danube.  There 
the  conspirators  had  in  readiness  his  own  yacht,  which  they 
had  seized,  and  carried  him  down  the  stream  towards 
Russian'  territory. 

The  outburst  of  indignation  with  which  the  civilised 
world  heard  of  this  foul  deed  had  its  counterpart  in  Bul- 
garia. So  general  and  so  keen  was  the  reprobation  (save 
in  the  Russian  and  Bismarckian  press)  that  the  Russian 
Government  took  some  steps  to  dissociate  itself  from  the 
plot,  while  profiting  by  its  results.  On  August  24th,  when 
the  Prince  was  put  on  shore  at  Reni,  the  Russian  author- 
ities kept  him  under  guard,  and  that,  too,  despite  an  order 
of  the  Czar  empowering  him  to  "continue  his  journey  ex- 
actly as  he  might  please."  Far  from  this,  he  was  detained 
for  some  little  time,  and  then  was  suffered  to  depart  by 
train   only  in   a  northerly   direction.     He  ultimately  en- 


The  Making  of  Bulgaria  S33 

tered  Austrian  territory  by  way  of  Lemberg  in  Galicia,  on 
August  27th.  The  aim  of  the  St.  Petersburg  Government 
evidently  was  to  give  full  time  for  the  conspirators  at 
Sophia  to  consolidate  their  power.^ 

Meanwhile,  by  military  display,  the  distribution  of 
money,  and  a  Te  Deum  at  the  Cathedral  for  "liberation 
from  Prince  Battenberg,"  the  mutineers  sought  to  per- 
suade the  men  of  Sophia  that  peace  and  prosperity  woiild 
infallibly  result  from  the  returning  favour  of  the  Czar. 
The  populace  accepted  the  first  tokens  of  his  good-will  and 
awaited  developments.  These  were  not  promising  for  the 
mutineers.  The  British  Consul  at  Philippopolis,  Captain 
Jones,  on  hearing  of  the  affair,  hurried  to  the  commander 
of  the  garrison,  General  Mutkuroflf,  and  besought  him  to 
crush  the  plotters.^  The  General  speedily  enlisted  his  own 
troops  and  those  in  garrison  elsewhere  on  the  side  of  the 
Prince,  with  the  result  that  a  large  part  of  the  army  refused 
to  take  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  new  Russophil  Minis- 
try, composed  of  trimmers  like  Bishop  Clement  and  Zan- 
koff.     KaravelofT  also  cast  in  his  influence  against  them. 

Above  all,  StambuloflF  worked  furiously  for  the  Prince; 
and  when  a  mitred  Vicar  of  Bray  held  the  seals  of  office 
and  enjoyed  the  official  counsels  of  traitors  and  place- 
hunters,  not  all  the  prayers  of  the  Greek  Church  and  the 
gold  of  Russian  agents  could  long  avail  to  support  the 
Government  against  the  attacks  of  that  strong-willed, 
clean-handed  patriot.  Shame  at  the  disgrace  thus  brought 
on  his  people  doubled  his  powers ;  and,  with  the  aid  of  all 
that  was  best  in  the  public  life  of  Bulgaria,  he  succeeded  in 

1  A.  von  Huhn,  op.  cit.,  chap.  iv. 

2  See  Mr.  Minchin's  account  in  the  Morning  Advertiser  for  Sep- 
tember 23,  1886. 


334  The  European  Nations 

sweeping  Clement  and  his  Comus  rout  back  to  their  mum- 
meries and  their  undergroimd  plots.  So  speedy  was  the 
reverse  of  fortune  that  the  new  Provisional  Government 
succeeded  in  thwarting  the  despatch  of  a  Russian  special 
Commissioner,  General  Dolgorukoff,  through  whom  Alex- 
ander III.  sought  to  bestow  the  promised  blessings  on  that 
"much-tried"  Principality. 

The  voice  of  Bulgaria  now  made  itself  heard.  There  was 
but  one  cry — for  the  return  of  Prince  Alexander.  At  once 
he  consented  to  fulfil  his  people's  desire;  and,  travelling  by 
railway  through  Bukharest,  he  reached  the  banks  of  the 
Danube  and  set  foot  on  his  yacht,  not  now  a  prisoner,  but 
the  hero  of  the  German,  Magyar,  and  Balkan  peoples.  At 
Rustchuk  officers  and  deputies  bore  him  ashore  shoulder- 
high  to  the  enthusiastic  people.  He  received  a  welcome 
even  from  the  Consul-General  for  Russia — a  fact  which  led 
him  to  take  a  false  step.  Later  in  the  day,  when  Stam- 
buloff  was  not  present,  he  had  an  interview  with  this  agent, 
and  then  sent  a  telegram  to  the  Czar,  announcing  his  re- 
turn, his  thanks  for  his  friendly  reception  by  Russia's 
chief  agent,  and  his  readiness  to  accept  the  advice  of 
General  Dolgorukoff.     The  telegram  ended  thus: 

"I  should  be  happy  to  be  able  to  give  to  Your  Majesty 
the  definitive  proof  of  the  devotion  with  which  I  am  ani- 
mated towards  Your  august  person.  The  monarchical 
principle  forces  me  to  re-establish  the  reign  of  law  (la 
legalite)  in  Bulgaria  and  Roumelia.  Russia  having  given 
me  my  crown,  I  am  ready  to  give  it  back  into  the  hand  of 
its  Sovereign." 

To  this  the  Czar  sent  the  following  telegraphic  reply,  and 
allowed  it  to  appear  at  once  in  the  official  paper  at  St. 
Petersburg: 


The  Making  of  Bulgaria  335 

"I  have  received  Your  Highness's  telegram.  I  cannot 
approve  your  return  to  Bulgaria,  as  I  foresee  the  sinister 
consequences  that  it  may  bring  on  Bulgaria,  already  so 
much  tried.  The  mission  of  General  Dolgorukoflf  is  now 
inopportune.  I  shall  abstain  from  it  in  the  sad  state  of 
things  to  which  Bulgaria  is  reduced  so  long  as  you  remain 
there.  Your  Highness  will  understand  what  you  have  to 
do.  I  reserve  my  judgment  as  to  what  is  commanded  me 
by  the  venerated  memory  of  my  father,  the  interests  of 
Russia,  and  the  peace  of  the  Orient."^ 

What  led  the  Prince  to  use  the  extraordinary  words  con- 
tained in  the  last  sentence  of  his  telegram  can  only  be  con- 
jectured. The  substance  of  his  conversation  with  the 
Russian  Consul-General  is  not  known ;  and  until  the  words 
of  that  official  are  fully  explained  he  must  be  held  open  to 
the  suspicion  of  having  played  on  the  Prince  a  diplomatic 
version  of  the  confidence  trick.  Another  version,  that  of 
M.  Elie  de  Cyon,  is  that  he  acted  on  instructions  from  the 
Russian  Chancellor,  de  Giers,  who  believed  that  the  Czar 
would  relent.  On  the  contrary,  he  broke  loose,  and  sent 
the  answer  given  above.^ 

It  is  not  surprising  that,  after  receiving  the  Czar's  retort, 
the  Prince  seemed  gloomy  and  depressed  where  all  around 
him  were  full  of  joy.  At  Tirnova  and  Philippopolis  he  had 
the  same  reception;  but  an  attempt  to  derail  his  train  on 

'  A.  von  Huhn,  The  Kidnapping  of  Prince  Alexander,  chap.  xi. 
(London,  1887). 

Article  III.  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  ran  thus:  "The  Prince  of 
Bulgaria  shall  be  freely  elected  by  the  population  and  confirmed  by 
the  Sublime  Porte,  with  the  assent  of  the  Powers."  Russia  had  no 
right  to  choose  the  Prince,  and  her  assent  to  his  election  was  only 
that  of  one  among  the  six  Great  Powers.  The  mistake  of  Prince 
Alexander  is  therefore  inexplicable. 

2  Histoire  de  I'Entente  franco-russe,  by  Elie  de  Cyon,  p.  185. 


336  The  European  Nations 

the  journey  to  Sophia  showed  that  the  mahce  of  his  foes  was 
still  unsated.  The  absence  of  the  Russian  and  German 
Consuls  from  the  State  reception  accorded  to  the  Prince  at 
the  capital  on  September  3rd  showed  that  he  had  to  reckon 
with  the  hostility  or  disapprobation  of  those  Governments ; 
and  there  was  the  ominous  fact  that  the  Russian  agent  at 
Sophia  had  recently  intervened  to  prevent  the  punishment 
of  the  mutineers  and  Bishop  Clement.  Few,  however, 
were  prepared  for  what  followed.  On  entering  his  palace, 
the  Prince  called  his  officers  about  him  and  announced 
that,  despairing  of  overcoming  the  antipathy  of  the  Czar 
to  him,  he  must  abdicate.  Many  of  them  burst  into  tears, 
and  one  of  them  cried,  "Without  your  Highness  there  is 
no  Bulgaria." 

This  action,  when  the  Prince  seemed  at  the  height  of 
popularity,  caused  intense  astonishment.  The  following 
are  the  reasons  that  probably  dictated  it:  First,  he  may 
have  felt  impelled  to  redeem  the  pledges  which  he  too 
trustfully  made  to  the  Czar  in  his  Rustchuk  telegram,  and 
of  which  that  potentate  took  so  unchivalrous  an  advantage. 
Second,  the  intervention  of  Russia  to  protect  the  mutineers 
from  their  just  punishment  betokened  her  intention  to 
foment  further  plots.  In  this  intervention,  strange  to 
say,  she  had  the  support  of  the  German  Government, 
Bismarck  using  his  influence  at  Berlin  persistently  against 
the  Prince,  in  order  to  avert  the  danger  of  war,  which  once 
or  twice  seemed  to  be  imminent  between  Russia  and 
Germany. 

Further,  we  may  note  that  Austria  and  the  other  States 
had  no  desire  to  court  an  attack  from  the  Eastern  Power, 
on  account  of  a  personal  affair  between  the  two  Alexanders. 
Great   Britain   also  was  at  that  time  too  hampered  by 


The  Making  of  Bulgaria  337 

domestic  and  colonial  difficulties  to  be  able  to  do  more 
than  offer  good  wishes. 

Thus  the  weakness  or  the  weariness  of  the  States  friendly 
to  Bulgaria  left  the  Czar  a  free  hand  in  the  personal  feud  on 
which  he  set  such  store.  Accordingly,  on  September  7th, 
the  Prince  left  Bulgaria  amidst  the  lamentations  of  that 
usually  stolid  people  and  the  sympathy  of  manly  hearts 
throughout  the  world.  At  Buda-Pesth  and  London  there 
were  ominous  signs  that  the  Czar  must  not  push  his 
triumph  further.  Herr  Tisza  at  the  end  of  the  month 
assured  the  Hungarian  deputies  that,  if  the  Sultan  did  not 
choose  to  restore  the  old  order  of  things  in  Southern  Bul- 
garia, no  other  Power  had  the  right  to  intervene  there  by 
force  of  arms.  Lord  Salisbury,  also,  at  the  Lord  Mayor's 
banquet,  on  November  9th,  inveighed  with  startling  frank- 
ness against  the  "officers  debauched  by  foreign  gold,"  who 
had  betrayed  their  Prince.  He  further  stated  that  all  in- 
terest in  foreign  affairs  centred  in  Btdgaria,  and  expressed 
the  belief  that  the  freedom  of  that  State  would  be  assured. 

These  speeches  were  certainly  intended  as  a  warning  to 
Russia  and  a  protest  against  her  action  in  Biilgaria.  After 
the  departure  of  Prince  Alexander,  the  Czar  hit  upon  the 
device  of  restoring  order  to  that  "much-tried"  country 
through  the  instrumentality  of  General  Kaulbars,  a  brother 
of  the  General  who  had  sought  to  kidnap  Prince  Alex- 
ander three  years  before.  It  is  known  that  the  despatch 
of  the  younger  Kaulbars  was  distasteful  to  the  more 
pacific  and  Germanophil  Chancellor,  de  Giers,  who  is  said 
to  have  worked  against  the  success  of  his  mission.  Such 
at  least  is  the  version  given  by  his  private  enemies,  Kat- 
koff  and  de  Cyon.^     Kaulbars   soon  succeeded  in  adding 

»  ^lie  de  Cyon,  Histoire  de  V Entente  franco-russe,  pp.  177-17S. 


338  The  European  Nations 

to  the  reputation  of  his  family.  On  reaching  Sophia,  on 
September  25th,  he  ordered  the  Hberation  of  the  miHtary 
plotters  still  \inder  arrest,  and  the  adjournment  of  the 
forthcoming  elections  for  the  Sobranje;  otherwise  Russia 
would  not  regard  them  as  legal.  The  Bulgarian  Regents, 
Stambuloff  at  their  head,  stoutly  opposed  these  demands 
and  fixed  the  elections  for  October  the  loth;  whereupon 
Kaulbars  treated  the  men  of  Sophia,  and  thereafter  of  all 
the  chief  towns,  to  displays  of  bullying  rhetoric,  which  suc- 
ceeded in  blotting  out  all  memories  of  Russian  exploits  of 
nine  years  before.i 

Despite  his  menace  that  100,000  Russian  troops  were 
ready  to  occupy  Bulgaria,  despite  the  murder  of  four 
patriots  by  his  bravos  at  Dubnitza,  Bulgaria  flung  back 
the  threats  by  electing  470  supporters  of  independence 
and  unity,  as  against  30  Russophils  and  20  deputies  of 
doubtful  views.  The  Sobranje  met  at  Timova,  and,  dis- 
regarding his  protest,  proceeded  to  elect  Prince  Waldemar 
of  Denmark;  it  then  confirmed  Stambuloff  in  his  almost 
dictatorial  powers.  The  Czar's  influence  over  the  Danish 
Royal  House  led  to  the  Prince  promptly  refusing  that 
dangerous  honour,  which  it  is  believed  that  Russia  then 
designed  for  the  Prince  of  Mingrelia,  a  dignitary  of  Russian 
Caucasia. 

The  aim  of  the  Czar  and  of  Kaulbars  now  was  to  render 
all  government  impossible;  but  they  had  to  deal  with  a 
man  far  more  resolute  and  astute  than  Prince  Alexander. 
Stambuloff  and  his  countrymen  fairly  wearied  out  Kaul- 
bars,   until   that   imperial    agent   was   suddenly    recalled 

1  The  Russophil  Drandar  {op.  cit.,  p.  214)  calls  these  demands 
" remarqueblement  moderees  et  sages"!  For  further  details  of 
Kaulbars's  electioneering  devices,  see  Minchin,  op.  cit.,  pp.  327-330. 


The  Making  of  Bulgaria  339 

(November  19th).  He  also  ordered  the  Russian  Consuls 
to  withdraw. 

It  is  beheved  that  the  Czar  recalled  him  partly  because 
of  the  obvious  failure  of  a  hectoring  policy,  but  also  owing 
to  the  growing  restlessness  of  Austria-Hungary,  England, 
and  Italy  at  Russia's  treatment  of  Bulgaria.  For  several 
months  European  diplomacy  turned  on  the  question  of 
Bulgaria's  independence;  and  here  Russia  could  not  yet 
coimt  on  a  French  alliance.  As  has  been  noted  above, 
Alexander  III.  and  de  Giers  had  tied  their  hands  by  the 
alliance  contracted  at  Skiernewice  in  1884;  and  the  Czar 
had  reason  to  expect  that  the  Austro-German  compact 
would  hold  good  against  him  if  he  forced  on  his  solution 
of  the  Balkan  Question. 

Probably  it  was  this  consideration  which  led  him  to 
trust  to  underground  means  for  assuring  the  dependence 
of  Bulgaria.  If  so,  he  was  again  disappointed.  Stambu- 
loff  met  his  agents  everywhere,  above  ground  and  below 
ground.  That  son  of  an  innkeeper  at  Tirnova  now  showed 
a  power  of  inspiring  men  and  controlling  events  equal  to 
that  of  the  innkeeper  of  the  Pusterthal,  Andreas  Hofer. 
The  discouraged  Bulgarians  everywhere  responded  to  his 
call;  at  Rustchuk  they  crushed  a  rising  of  Russophil 
officers,  and  Stambuloff  had  nine  of  the  rebels  shot  (March 
7,  1887).  Thereafter  he  acted  as  dictator  and  imprisoned 
numbers  of  suspects.  His  countrymen  put  up  with  the 
loss  of  civic  freedom  in  order  to  secure  the  higher  boon  of 
national  independence. 

In  the  main,  however,  the  freedom  of  Bulgaria  from 
Russian  control  was  due  to  events  transpiring  in  Central 
Europe.  As  will  appear  in  Chapter  XII.  of  this  work,  the 
Czar  and  de  Giers  became  convinced,  early  in  the  year 


340  The  European  Nations 

1887,  that  Bismarck  was  preparing  for  war  against  France, 
and  they  determined  to  hold  aloof  from  other  questions, 
in  order  to  be  free  to  checkmate  the  designs  of  the  war 
party  at  Berlin.  The  organ  usually  inspired  by  de  Giers, 
the  Nord,  uttered  an  unmistakable  warning  on  February 
20,  1887,  and  even  stated  that,  with  this  aim  in  view, 
Russia  would  let  matters  take  their  course  in  Bulgaria. 

Thus,  once  again,  the  complexities  of  the  general  situa- 
tion promoted  the  cause  of  freedom  in  the  Balkans;  and 
the  way  was  cleared  for  a  resolute  man  to  moimt  the 
throne  at  Sophia.  In  the  course  of  a  tour  to  the  European 
capitals,  a  Bulgarian  delegation  found  that  man.  The 
envoys  were  informed  that  Prince  Ferdinand  of  Sax?e- 
Coburg,  a  grandson  of  Louis  Philippe  on  the  spindle  side, 
would  welcome  the  dangerous  honour.  He  was  young, 
ambitious,  and,  as  events  were  to  prove,  equally  tactful 
and  forceful  according  to  circumstances.  In  vain  did 
Russia  seek  to  prevent  his  election  by  pushing  on  the 
Sultan  to  intervene.  Abdul  Hamid  was  not  the  man  to 
let  himself  long  be  the  catspaw  of  Russia,  and  now  invited 
the  Powers  to  name  one  or  two  candidates  for  the  throne 
of  Bulgaria.  Stambuloff  worked  hard  for  the  election  of 
Prince  Ferdinand;  and  on  July  7,  1887,  he  was  unani- 
mously elected  by  the  Sobranje.  Alone  among  the  Great 
Powers,  Russia  protested  against  his  election  and  threw 
many  difficulties  in  his  path.  In  order  to  please  the  Czar, 
the  Sultan  added  his  protest;  but  this  act  was  soon  seen 
to  be  merely  a  move  in  the  diplomatic  game. 

Limits  of  space,  however,  preclude  the  possibility  of 
noting  later  events  in  the  history  of  Bulgaria,  such  as  the 
coolness  that  clouded  the  relations  of  the  Prince  to  Stam- 
biiloff,  the  murder  of  the  latter,  and  the  final  recognition 


The  Making  of  Bulgaria  341 

of  the  Prince  by  the  Russian  Government  after  the  "con- 
version" of  his  little  son,  Boris,  to  the  Greek  Church 
(February,  1896).  In  this  curious  way  was  fulfilled  the 
prophetic  advice  given  by  Bismarck  to  the  Prince  not 
long  after  his  acceptance  of  the  crown  of  Bulgaria:  "Play 
the  dead  (faire  mort).  .  .  .  Let  yourself  be  driven 
gently  by  the  stream,  and  keep  yourself,  as  hitherto, 
above  water.  Your  greatest  ally  is  time — force  of  habit. 
Avoid  everything  that  might  irritate  your  enemies.  Unless 
you  give  them  provocation,  they  cannot  do  you  much 
harm,  and  in  course  of  time,  the  world  will  become  accus- 
tomed to  see  you  on  the  throne  of  Bulgaria."  ^ 

Time  has  worked  on  behalf  of  Bulgaria,  and  has  helped 
to  strengthen  this  Benjamin  of  the  European  family. 
Among  the  events  which  have  made  the  chief  States  of 
to-day,  none  are  more  remarkable  than  those  which  en- 
dowed a  population  of  downtrodden  peasants  with  a 
passionate  desire  for  national  existence.  Thanks  to  the 
liberating  armies  of  Russia,  to  the  prowess  of  Bulgarians 
themselves,  to  the  inspiring  personality  of  Prince  Alex- 
ander and  the  stubborn  tenacity  of  Stambuloff,  the  young 
State  gained  a  firm  grip  on  life.  But  other  and  stranger 
influences  were  at  work  compelling  that  people  to  act  for 
itself;  these  are  to  be  found  in  the  perverse  conduct  of 
Alexander  III.  and  his  agents.  The  policy  of  Russia  to- 
wards Bulgaria  may  be  characterised  by  a  remark  made  by 
Sir  Robert  Morier  to  Sir  M.  Grant  Duff  in  1888:  "Russia 
is  a  great  bicephalic  creature,  having  one  head  European, 
and  the  other  Asiatic,  but  with  the  persistent  habit  of 
turning  its  European  face  to  the  East,  and  its  Asiatic  face 

«  Personal  Reminiscences  of  Prince  Bismarck,  by  S.  Whitman,  p. 
179. 


342  The  European  Nations 

to  the  West."  ^  Asiatic  methods,  put  in  force  against 
Slavised  Tartars,  have  certainly  played  no  small  part  in 
the  upbuilding  of  this  youngest  of  the  European  States. 

In  taking  leave  of  the  Balkan  peoples,  we  may  note  the 
strange  tendency  of  events  towards  equipoise  in  the  Europe 
of  the  present  age.  Thirty  years  ago  the  Turkish  Empire 
seemed  at  the  point  of  dissolution.  To-day  it  is  stronger 
than  ever;  and  the  cause  is  to  be  found,  not  so  much  in 
the  watchful  cunning  of  Abdul  Hamid,  as  in  the  vivifying 
principle  of  nationality,  which  has  made  of  Bulgaria  and 
Roumania  two  strong  barriers  against  Russian  aggression 
in  that  quarter.  The  feuds  of  those  States  have  been  re- 
placed by  something  like  friendship,  which  in  its  turn  will 
probably  ripen  into  alliance.  Together  they  could  put 
250,000  good  troops  in  the  field,  that  is,  a  larger  force  than 
that  which  the  Turks  had  in  Europe  during  the  war  with 
Russia.  Turkey  is  therefore  fully  as  safe  as  she  was  under 
Abdul  Aziz. 

An  enlightened  ruler  could  consolidate  her  position  still 
further.  Just  as  Austria  has  gained  in  strength  by  having 
Venetia  as  a  friendly  and  allied  land,  rather  than  a  subject 
province  heaving  with  discontent,  so,  too,  it  is  open  to  the 
Porte  to  secure  the  alliance  of  the  Balkan  States  by  treating 
them  in  an  honourable  way,  and  by  according  good  govern- 
ment to  Macedonia. 

Possibly  the  future  may  see  the  formation  of  a  federation 
of  all  the  States  of  European  Turkey.  If  so,  Russia  will 
lose  all  foothold  in  a  quarter  where  she  formerly  had  the 
active  support  of  three-fourths  of  the  population.  How 
ever  that  m.ay  be,  it  is  certain  that  her  mistakes  in  and 
after  the  year  1878  have  profoundly  modified  the  Eastern 

»  Sir  M.  Grant  Duff,  Notes  from  a  Diary  (1886-88),  ii.,  p.  139. 


The  Making  of  Bulgaria  343 

Question.  They  have  served  to  cancel  those  which,  as  it 
seems  to  the  present  writer,  Lord  Beaconsfield  committed 
in  the  years  1876-77;  and  the  skilful  diplomacy  of  Lord 
Sahsbury  and  Sir  Wilham  White  has  regained  for  England 
the  prestige  which  she  then  lost  among  the  rising  peoples 
of  the  Peninsula, 

The  final  solution  of  the  tangled  racial  problems  of 
Macedonia  cannot  be  long  deferred,  in  spite  of  the  timorous 
selfishness  of  the  Powers  who  incurred  treaty  obligations 
for  the  welfare  of  that  land;  and,  when  that  question  can 
be  no  longer  postponed  or  explained  away,  it  is  to  be  hoped 
that  the  British  people,  taking  heed  of  the  lessons  of  the 
past,  will  insist  on  a  solution  that  will  conform  to  the 
claims  of  humanity,  which  have  been  proved  to  be  those 
of  enlightened  statesmanship.^ 

>  For  the  recent  developments  of  the  Macedonian  Question,  see 
Turkey  in  Europe,  by  "Odysseus"  (1900);  The  Middle  Eastern 
Question,  by  V.  Chirol,  185.  net  (Murray) ;  A  Tour  in  Macedonia,  by 
G.  F.  Abbot  (1903);  The  Burden  of  the  Balkans,  by  Miss  Edith 
Durham  (1904);  The  Balkans  from  Within,  by  R.  Wyon  (1904); 
The  Balkan  Question,  edited  by  L.  Villari  (1904);  Critical  Times 
in  Turkey,  by  G.  King-Lewis  (1904);  Pro  Macedonia,  by  V.  B6rard 
(Paris,  1904);  La  Peninsule  balkanique,  by  Capitaine  Lamouche 
(Paris,  1899). 


CHAPTER  XI 

NIHILISM    AND    ABSOLUTISM    IN    RUSSIA 

THE  HOUSE  OF  ROMANOFF 

Catherine  11. 
(1762-1796.) 

Paul. 
(1796-1801.) 

I  ^  i 

Alexander  I.  Nicholas  I. 

(1801-1825.)  (1825-1855.) 


Alexander  II.         Constantine.       Nicholas.     Michael. 
(1855-1881.) 


Nicholas.       Alexander  III.     Alexis.         Marie.  Sergius.  Paul. 

(Died  in  (1881-1894.)  (Duchess  of     (Assassinated 

1865.)  I  Edinburgh.)    Feb.  17,  1905.) 

Nicholas  II. 
(1894—         .) 

THE  Whig  statesman,  Charles  James  Fox,  once  made 
the  profound  though  seemingly  paradoxical  assertion 
that  the  most  dangerous  part  of  a  revolution  was  the 
restoration  that  ended  it.  In  a  similar  way  we  may 
hazard  the  statement  that  the  greatest  danger  brought 
about  by  war  lies  in  the  period  of  peace  immediately 
following.  Just  as  the  strain  involved  by  any  physical 
effort  is  most  felt  when  the  muscles  and  nerves  resume 
their  normal  action,  so,  too,  the  body  politic  is  liable  to 
depression  when  once  the  time  of  excitement  is  over  and 

344 


Nihilism  and  Absolutism  in  Russia    345 

the  artificial  activities  of  war  give  place  to  the  tiresome 
work  of  paying  the  bill.  England  after  Waterloo,  France 
and  Germany  after  the  War  of  1870,  afford  examples  of 
this  truth ;  but  never  perhaps  has  it  been  more  signally 
illustrated  than  in  the  Russia  of  1878-82. 

There  were  several  reasons  why  the  reaction  should  be 
especially  sharp  in  Russia.  The  Slav  peoples  that  form 
the  great  bulk  of  her  population  are  notoriously  sensitive. 
Shut  up  for  nearly  half  the  year  by  the  rigours  of  winter, 
they  naturally  develop  habits  of  brooding  introspection  or 
coarse  animalism — witness  the  plaintive  strains  of  their 
folk-songs,  the  pessimism  that  haunts  their  literature,  and 
the  dram-drinking  habits  of  the  peasantry.  The  Mus- 
covite temperament  and  the  Muscovite  climate  naturally 
lead  to  idealist  strivings  against  the  hardships  of  life  or  a 
dull  grovelling  amongst  them.  Melancholy  or  vodka  is 
the  outcome  of  it  all. 

The  giant  of  the  East  was  first  aroused  to  a  conscious- 
ness of  his  strength  by  the  invasion  of  Napoleon  the  Great. 
The  comparative  ease  with  which  the  Grand  Army  was 
engulfed  left  on  the  national  mind  of  Russia  a  conscious- 
ness of  pride  never  to  be  lost  even  amidst  the  cruel  dis- 
appointments of  the  Crimean  War.  Holy  Russia  had 
once  beaten  back  the  forces  of  Europe  marshalled  by  the 
greatest  captain  of  all  time.  She  was  therefore  a  match 
for  the  rest  of  the  continent.  Such  was  the  belief  of  every 
patriotic  Muscovite.  As  for  the  Turks,  they  were  not 
worthy  of  entering  the  lists  against  the  soldiers  of  the  Czar. 
Did  not  every  decade  bring  further  proofs  of  the  decline 
of  the  Ottomans  in  governing  capacity  and  military  prow- 
ess ?  They  might  harry  Bulgarian  peasants  and  win  laurels 
over  the  Servian  militia.     But  how  could  that  bankrupt 


346  The  European  Nations 

State  and  its  undisciplined  hordes  hold  up  against  the  might 
of  Russia  and  the  fervour  of  her  liberating  legions? 

After  the  indulgence  of  these  day-dreams  the  disillu- 
sionment caused  by  the  events  at  Plevna  came  the  more 
cruelly.  One  general  after  another  became  the  scapegoat 
for  the  popular  indignation.  Then  the  general  staff  was 
freely  censured,  and  whispers  went  round  that  the  Grand 
Duke  Nicholas,  brother  of  the  Czar,  was  not  only  incom- 
petent to  conduct  a  great  war,  but  guilty  of  underhand 
dealings  with  the  contractors,  who  defrauded  the  troops 
and  battened  on  the  public  funds.  Letters  from  the  rank 
and  file  showed  that  the  bread  was  bad,  the  shoes  were 
rotten,  the  rifles  outclassed  by  those  of  the  Turks,  and  that 
trenching-tools  were  lacking  for  many  precious  weeks. ^ 
Then,  too,  the  Bulgarian  peasants  were  found  to  be  in  a 
state  of  comfort  superior  to  that  of  the  bulk  of  their 
liberators — a  discovery  which  aroused  in  the  Russian 
soldiery  feelings  like  those  of  the  troops  of  the  old  French 
monarchy  when  they  fought  side  by  side  with  the  soldiers 
of  Washington  for  the  triumph  of  democracy  in  the  New 
World.  In  both  cases  the  lessons  were  stored  up,  to  be 
used  when  the  champions  of  liberty  returned  home  and 
found  the  old  order  of  things  clanking  on  as  slowly  and  rust- 
ily  as  ever. 

Finally,  there  came  the  crushing  blow  of  the  Treaty  of 

Berlin.     The  Russian  people  had  fought  for  an  ideal :   they 

longed  to  see  the  cross  take  the  place  of  the  crescent  which 

for  five  centuries  had  flashed  defiance  to  Christendom  from 

the  summit  of  St.  Sophia  at  Constantinople.     But  Britain's 

I  Russia  Before  and  After  the  War,  translated  by  E.  F.  Taylor 
(London,  1880),  chap,  xvi.:  "We  have  been  cheated  by  block- 
heads, robbed  by  people  whose  incapacity  was  even  greater  than 
their  villainy." 


Nihilism  and  Absolutism  in  Russia    347 

ironclads,  Austria's  legions,  and  German  diplomacy  barred 
the  way  in  the  very  hour  of  triumph;  and  Russia  drew 
back.  To  the  Slav  enthusiasts  of  Moscow  even  the 
Treaty  of  San  Stefano  had  seemed  a  dereliction  of  a  sacred 
duty;  that  of  Berlin  seemed  the  most  cowardly  of  be- 
trayals. As  the  Princess  Radziwill  confesses  in  her  Recol- 
lections, that  event  made  Nihilism  possible. 

As  usual,  the  populace,  whether  reactionary  Slavophils 
or  Liberals  of  the  type  of  Western  Europe,  vented  its 
spleen  on  the  Government.  For  a  time  the  strongest 
bureaucracy  in  Europe  was  driven  to  act  on  the  defensive. 
The  Czar  returned  stricken  with  asthma  and  prematurely 
aged  by  the  privations  and  cares  of  the  campaign.  The 
Grand  Duke  Nicholas  was  recalled  from  his  command,  and, 
after  bearing  the  signs  of  studied  hostility  of  the  Czare- 
vitch, was  exiled  to  his  estates  in  February,  1879.  The 
Government  inspired  contempt  rather  than  fear;  and  a 
new  spirit  of  independence  pervaded  all  classes.  This  was 
seen  even  as  far  back  as  February,  1878,  in  the  acquittal 
of  Vera  Zazulich,  a  lady  who  had  shot  the  Chief  of  Po- 
lice at  St.  Petersburg,  by  a  jury  consisting  of  nobles  and 
high  officials;  and  the  verdict,  given  in  the  face  of  damn- 
ing evidence,  was  generally  approved.  Similar  crimes 
occurred  nearly  every  week.^  Everything,  therefore,  fa- 
voured the  designs  of  those  who  sought  to  overthrow  all 
government.  In  a  word,  the  outcome  of  the  war  was 
Nihilism. 

The  father  of  this  sombre  creed  was  a  wealthy  Rus- 
sian  landlord  named  Bakunin;   or  rather,  he  shares  this 

1  Russia  Before  and  After  the  War,  chap.  xvii.  The  Govern- 
ment thereafter  dispensed  with  the  ordinary  forms  of  justice  for 
poHtical  crimes  and  judged  them  by  special  commissions. 


348  The  European  Nations 

doubtful  honour  with  the  Frenchman  Prudhon.  Bakunin, 
who  was  bom  in  1814,  entered  on  active  Hfe  in  the  time  of 
soulless  repression  inaugurated  by  the  Czar  Nicholas  I. 
(1825-1855).  Disgusted  by  Russian  bureaucracy,  the 
youth  eagerly  drank  in  the  philosophy  of  Western  Europe, 
especially  that  of  Hegel.  During  a  residence  at  Paris  he 
embraced  and  developed  Prudhon's  creed  that  "property 
is  theft,"  and  sought  to  prepare  the  way  for  a  crusade 
against  all  governments  by  forming  the  Alliance  of  Social 
Democracy  (1869),  which  speedily  became  merged  in  the 
famous  "  Internationale."  Driven  successively  from  France 
and  Central  Europe,  he  was  finally  handed  over  to  the 
Russians  and  sent  to  Siberia;  thence  he  escaped  to  Japan 
and  came  to  England,  finally  settling  in  Switzerland. 
His  writings  and  speeches  did  much  to  rouse  the  Slavs  of 
Austria,  Poland,  and  Russia  to  a  sense  of  their  national 
importance,  and  to  the  duty  of  overthrowing  the  Govern- 
ments that  cramped  their  energies. 

As  in  the  case  of  Prudohn,  his  zeal  for  the  non-existent 
and  hatred  of  the  actual  bordered  on  madness,  as  when  he 
included  most  of  the  results  of  art,  literature,  and  science  in 
his  comprehensive  anathemas.  Nevertheless  his  crusade 
for  destruction  appealed  to  no  small  part  of  the  sensitive 
peoples  of  the  Slavonic  race,  who,  differing  in  many  details, 
yet  all  have  a  dislike  of  repression  and  a  longing  to  have 
their  "fling."  '  A  union  in  a  Panslavonic  League  for  the 
overthrow  of  the  Houses  of  Romanoff,  Hapsburg,  and 
Hohenzollem  promised  to  satisfy  the  vague  longings  of 
that  much-baffled  race,  whose  name,  denoting  "glorious," 
had  become  the  synonym  for  servitude  of  the  lowest  type. 

'  For  this  peculiarity  and  a  consequent  tendency  to  extremes, 
see  Prof.  G.  Brandes,  Impressions  of  Russia,  p.  22. 


Nihilism  and  Absolutism  in  Russia    349 

Such  was  the  creed  that  disturbed  Eastern  and  Central 
Europe  throughout  the  period  1847-78,  now  and  again  de- 
veloping a  kind  of  iconoclastic  frenzy  among  its  votaries. 

This  revolutionary  creed  absorbed  another  of  a  different 
kind.  The  second  creed  was  scientific  and  self-centred;  it 
had  its  origin  in  the  Liberal  movement  of  the  sixties,  when 
reforms  set  in,  even  in  governmental  circles.  The  Czar, 
Alexander  II.,  in  1861  freed  the  serfs  from  the  control  of 
their  lords,  and  allotted  to  them  part  of  the  plots  which 
they  had  hitherto  worked  on  a  servile  tenure.  For  various 
reasons,  which  we  cannot  here  detail,  the  peasants  were  far 
from  satisfied  with  this  change,  weighted,  as  it  was,  by 
somewhat  onerous  terms,  irksome  restrictions,  and  warped 
sometimes  by  dishonest  or  hostile  officials.  Limited 
powers  of  local  government  were  also  granted  in  1864  to 
the  local  Zemstvos  or  land-organisations ;  but  these  again 
failed  to  satisfy  the  new  cravings  for  a  real  system  of  self- 
government  ;  and  the  Czar,  seeing  that  his  work  produced 
more  ferment  than  gratitude,  began  at  the  close  of  the 
sixties  to  fall  back  into  the  old  absolutist  ways.^ 

At  that  time,  too,  a  band  of  writers,  of  whom  the  novel- 
ist Turgenieff  is  the  best  known,  were  extolling  the  triumphs 
of  scientific  research  and  the  benefits  of  Western  demo- 
cracy. He  it  was  who  adapted  to  scientific  or  ethical  use 
the  word  "  Nihilism  "  (already  in  use  in  France  to  designate 
Prudhon's  theories),  so  as  to  represent  the  revolt  of  the  in- 
dividual against  the  religious  creed  and  patriarchal  customs 
of  Old  Russia.  "The  fundamental  principle  of  Nihilism," 
says   "Stepniak,"   "was  absolute   individualism.     It  was 

'  See  Wallace's  Russia,  2  vols.;  Russia  Under  the  Czars,  by 
"Stepniak,"  ii.,  chap.  xxix. ;  also  two  lectures  on  Russian  aflfairs 
by  Prof.  Vinogradoff ,  in  Lectures  on  the  History  of  the  Nineteenth 
Century  (Camb.,  1902). 


350  The  European  Nations 

the  negation,  in  the  name  of  individual  liberty,  of  all  the 
obligations  imposed  upon  the  individual  by  society,  by 
family  life,  and  by  religion,"  i 

For  a  time  these  disciples  of  Darwin  and  Herbert  Spencer 
were  satisfied  with  academic  protests  against  autocracy; 
but  the  uselessness  of  such  methods  soon  became  manifest ; 
the  influence  of  professors  and  philosophic  Epicureans 
could  never  permeate  the  masses  of  Russia  and  stir  them 
to  their  dull  depths.  What  "the  intellectuals"  needed 
was  a  creed  which  would  appeal  to  the  many. 

This  they  gained  mainly  from  Bakunin.  He  had  pointed 
the  way  to  what  seemed  a  practical  policy,  the  ownership 
of  the  soil  of  Russia  by  the  Mirs,  the  communes  of  her 
myriad  villages.  As  to  methods,  he  advocated  a  propa- 
ganda of  violence.  "Go  among  the  people,"  he  said,  "  and 
convert  them  to  your  aims."  The  example  of  the  Paris 
communists  in  187 1  enforced  his  pleas;  and  in  the  sub- 
sequent years  thousands  of  students,  many  of  them  of  the 
highest  families,  quietly  left  their  homes,  donned  the 
peasant's  garb,  smirched  their  faces,  tarred  their  hands,  and 
went  into  the  villages  or  the  factories  in  the  hope  of  stirring 
up  the  thick  sedimentary  deposit  of  the  Russian  system.^ 
In  many  cases  their  utmost  efforts  ended  in  failure,  the 
tragi-comedy  of  which  is  finely  set  forth  in  Turgenieff's 
Virgin  Soil.     Still  more  frequently  their  goal  proved  to  be 

1  Underground  Russia,  by  "Stepniak,"  Introduction,  p.  4.  Or, 
as  Turgenieff  phrased  it  in  one  of  his  novels:  "a  Nihilist  is  a  man 
who  submits  to  no  authority,  who  accepts  not  a  single  principle 
upon  faith  merely,  however  high  such  a  principle  may  stand  in  the 
eyes  of  men."  In  short,  a  Nihilist  was  an  extreme  individualist 
and  rationalist. 

2  Russia  in  Revolution,  by  G.  H.  Perriss,  pp.  204-206,  210-214; 
Arnaudo,  II  Nihilismo  (Turin,  1879).  See,  too,  the  chapters  added 
by  Sir  D.  M.  Wallace  to  the  new  edition  of  his  work,  Russia  (1905). 


Nihilism  and  Absolutism  in  Russia    351 

— Siberia.  But  these  young  men  and  women  did  not  toil 
for  nought.  Their  efforts  hastened  the  absorption  of 
philosophic  Nihilism  in  the  creed  of  Prudhon  and  Bakunin. 
The  Nihilist  of  Turgenieff's  day  had  been  a  hedonist  of 
the  clubs,  or  a  harmless  weaver  of  scientific  Utopias;  the 
Nihilist  of  the  new  age  was  that  most  dangerous  of  men, 
a  desperado  girt  with  a  fighting  creed. 

The  fusing  of  these  two  diverse  elements  was  powerfully 
helped  on  by  the  white  heat  of  indignation  that  glowed 
throughout  Russia  when  details  of  the  official  pecula- 
tion and  mismanagement  of  the  war  with  Turkey  became 
known.  Everything  combined  to  discredit  the  Govern- 
ment; and  enthusiasts  of  all  kinds  felt  that  the  days  for 
scientific  propaganda  and  stealthy  agitation  were  past. 
Voltaire  must  give  way  to  Marat.  It  was  time  for  the 
bomb  and  the  dagger  to  do  their  work. 

The  new  Nihilists  organised  an  executive  committee  for 
the  removal  of  the  most  obnoxious  officials.  Its  success 
was  startling.  To  name  only  a  few  of  their  chief  deeds: 
on  August  15,  1878,  a  Chief  of  the  Police  was  slain  near 
one  of  the  imperial  palaces  at  the  capital ;  and  in  Febru- 
ary, 1879,  the  Governor  of  Kharkov  was  shot,  the  Nihilists 
succeeding  in  announcing  his  condemnation  by  placards 
mysteriously  posted  up  in  every  large  town.  In  vain  did 
the  Government  intervene  and  substitute  a  military  com- 
mission in  place  of  trial  by  jury.  Exile  and  hanging  only 
made  the  Nihilists  more  daring,  and  on  more  than  one 
occasion  the  Czar  nearly  fell  a  victim  to  these  desperadoes. 

The  most  astounding  of  these  attempts  was  the  explosion 
of  a  mine  under  the  banqueting-hall  of  the  Winter  Palace 
at  St.  Petersburg  on  the  evening  of  February  17,  1880, 
when  the  imperial  family  escaped  owing  to  a  delay  in  the 


352  The  European  Nations 

arrival  of  the  Grand  Duke  of  Hesse.  Ten  soldiers  were  killed 
and  forty-eight  wounded  in  and  near  the  guard-room. 

The  Czar  answered  outrage  by  terrorism.  A  week  after 
this  outrage  he  issued  a  ukase  suspending  the  few  remain- 
ing rights  of  local  self-government  hitherto  spared  by  the 
reaction,  and  vesting  practically  all  executive  powers  in  a 
special  commission,  presided  over  by  General  Loris  Melikoff. 
This  man  was  an  Armenian  by  descent,  and  had  distin- 
guished himself  as  commander  in  the  recent  war  in  Asia, 
the  capture  of  Kars  being  largely  due  to  his  dispositions. 
To  these  warlike  gifts,  uncommon  in  the  Armenians  of 
to-day,  he  added  administrative  abilities  of  a  high  order. 
Enjoying  in  a  peculiar  degree  the  confidence  of  Alexander 
II.,  he  was  charged  with  the  supervision  of  all  political 
trials  and  a  virtual  control  of  all  the  governors-general  of 
the  Empire.  Thereupon  the  central  committee  of  the 
Nihilists  proclaimed  war  a  outrance  until  the  Czar  con- 
ceded to  a  popularly  elected  National  Assembly  the  right 
to  reform  the  life  of  Russia. 

Here  was  the  strength  of  the  Nihilist  party.  By  violent 
means  it  sought  to  extort  what  a  large  proportion  of  the 
townsfolk  wished  for  and  found  no  means  of  demanding 
in  a  lawful  manner.  Loris  Melikoff,  gifted  with  the  shrewd- 
ness of  his  race,  saw  that  the  Government  would  effect 
little  by  terrorism  alone.  Wholesale  arrests,  banishment, 
and  hangings  only  added  to  the  number  of  the  disaffected, 
especially  as  the  condemned  went  to  their  doom  with  a 
calm  heroism  that  inspired  the  desire  of  imitation  or 
revenge.  Repression  must  clearly  be  accompanied  by 
reforms  that  would  bridge  over  the  gulf  ever  widening 
between  the  Government  and  the  thinking  classes  of  the 
people.     He  began  by  persuading  the  Emperor  to  release 


Nihilism  and  Absolutism  in  Russia    353 

several  hundreds  of  suspects  and  to  relax  the  severe 
measures  adopted  against  the  students  of  the  universities. 
Lastly,  he  sought  to  induce  the  Czar  to  establish  repre- 
sentative institutions,  for  which  even  the  nobles  were 
beginning  to  petition.  Little  by  little  he  familiarised  him 
with  the  plan  of  extending  the  system  of  the  Zemstvos,  so 
that  there  should  be  elective  councils  for  towns  and 
provinces,  as  well  as  delegations  from  the  provincial 
noblesse.  He  did  not  propose  to  democratise  the  Central 
Government.  In  his  scheme  the  deputies  of  nobles  and 
representatives  of  provinces  and  towns  were  to  send  dele- 
gates to  the  Council  of  State,  a  purely  consultative  body 
which  Alexander  I.  had  founded  in  1802. 

Despite  the  tentative  nature  of  these  proposals,  and  the 
favourable  reception  accorded  to  them  by  the  Council  of 
State,  the  Czar  for  several  days  withheld  his  assent.  On 
March  9th  he  signed  the  ukase,  only  to  postpone  its  publi- 
cation until  March  12th.  Not  until  the  morning  of  March 
13th  did  he  give  the  final  order  for  its  publication  in  the 
Messager  Officiel.  It  was  his  last  act  as  lawgiver.  On  that 
day  (March  ist,  and  Sunday,  in  the  Russian  calendar)  he 
went  to  the  usual  military  parade,  despite  the  earnest 
warnings  of  the  Czarevitch  and  Loris  Melikoff  as  to  a 
rumoured  Nihilist  plot.  To  their  pleadings  he  returned 
the  answer,  "Only  Providence  can  protect  me,  and  when 
it  ceases  to  do  so,  these  Cossacks  cannot  possibly  help." 
On  his  return,  alongside  of  the  Catherine  Canal,  a  bomb 
was  thrown  under  his  carriage;  the  explosion  tore  the 
back  off  the  carriage,  injuring  some  of  his  Cossack  escort, 
but  leaving  the  Emperor  unhurt.  True  to  his  usual  feel- 
ings of  compassion,  he  at  once  alighted  to  inquire  after  the 
wounded.     This  act  cost  him  his  life.     Another  Nihilist 


354  The  European  Nations 

quickly  approached  and  flung  a  bomb  right  at  his  feet.  As 
soon  as  the  smoke  cleared  away,  Alexander  was  seen  to  be 
frightfully  mangled  and  lying  in  his  blood.  He  could  only 
murmur,  "Quick,  home;  carry  to  the  palace;  there  die." 
There,  surrounded  by  his  dearest  ones,  Alexander  11. 
breathed  his  last. 

In  striking  down  the  liberator  of  the  serfs  when  on  the 
point  of  recurring  to  earlier  and  better  methods  of  rule,  the 
Nihilists  had  dealt  the  death-blow  to  their  own  cause.  As 
soon  as  the  details  of  the  outrage  were  known,  the  old  love 
for  the  Czar  welled  forth:  his  imperfections  in  public  and 
private  life,  the  seeming  weakness  of  his  foreign  policy,  and 
his  recent  use  of  terrorism  against  the  party  of  progress 
were  forgotten;  and  to  the  sensitive  Russian  nature,  ever 
prone  to  extremes,  his  figure  stood  forth  as  the  friend  of 
peace,  and  the  would-be  reformer,  hindered  in  his  efforts 
by  unwise  advisers  and  an  untoward  destiny. 

His  successor  was  a  man  cast  in  a  different  mould.  It  is 
one  of  the  peculiarities  of  the  recent  history  of  Russia  that 
her  rulers  have  broken  away  from  the  policy  of  their  im- 
mediate predecessors  to  recur  to  that  which  they  had  dis- 
carded. The  vague  and  generous  Liberalism  of  Alexander 
I.  gave  way  in  1825  to  the  stern  autocracy  of  his  brother, 
Nicholas  I.  This  being  shattered  by  the  Crimean  War, 
Alexander  II.  harked  back  to  the  ideals  of  his  uncle,  and 
that,  too,  in  the  wavering  and  unsatisfactory  way  which 
had  brought  woe  to  that  ruler  and  unrest  to  the  people. 
Alexander  III.,  raised  to  the  throne  by  the  bombs  of  the 
revolutionaries,  determined  to  mould  his  policy  on  the 
principles  of  autocracy  and  orthodoxy.  To  pose  as  a 
reformer  would  have  betokened  fear  of  the  Nihilists;   and 


Nihilism  and  Absolutism  in  Russia    355 

the  new  ruler,  gifted  with  a  magnificent  physique,  a  narrow 
mind,  and  a  stern  will,  ever  based  his  conduct  on  element- 
ary notions  that  appealed  to  the  peasant  and  the  common 
soldier.  In  1825  Nicholas  I.  had  cowed  the  would-be  re- 
bels at  his  capital  by  a  display  of  defiant  animal  courage. 
Alexander  III.  resolved  to  do  the  like.  He  had  always  been 
noted  for  a  quiet  persistence  on  which  arguments  fell  in 
vain.  The  nickname  "bullock,"  which  his  father  early 
gave  him  (shortened  by  his  future  subjects  to  "bull"), 
sufficiently  summed  up  the  supremacy  of  the  material  over 
the  mental  that  characterised  the  new  ruler.  Bismarck, 
who  knew  him,  had  a  poor  idea  of  his  abilities,  and  summed 
up  his  character  by  saying  that  he  looked  at  things  from  the 
point  of  view  of  a  Russian  peasant.^  That  remark  sup- 
plies a  key  to  Russian  politics  during  the  years  1881-94. 

At  first,  when  informed  by  Melikoff  that  the  late  Czar 
was  on  the  point  of  making  the  constitutional  experiment 
described  above,  Alexander  III.  exclaimed,  "Change  no- 
thing in  the  orders  of  my  father.  This  shall  count  as  his  will 
and  testament."  If  he  had  held  to  this  generous  resolve 
the  world's  history  would  perhaps  have  been  very  different. 
Had  he  published  his  father's  last  orders ;  had  he  appealed 
to  the  people,  like  another  Antony  over  the  corpse  of 
Cassar,  the  enthusiastic  Slav  temperament  would  have 
eagerly  responded  to  this  mark  of  imperial  confidence. 
Loyalty  to  the  throne  and  fury  against  the  Nihilists  would 
have  been  the  dominant  feelings  of  the  age,  impelling  all 
men  to  make  the  wisest  use  of  the  thenceforth  sacred 
bequest  of  constitutional  freedom. 

The  man  who  is  believed  to  have  blighted  these  hopes 

»  Reminiscences  of  Bismarck,  by  S.  Whitman,  p.  114;  Bismarck: 
Some  Secret  Pages  of  his  History,  by  M.  Busch,  iii.,  p.  150. 


35^  The  European  Nations 

was  Pobyedonosteff,  the  procureur  of  the  highest  ecclesi- 
astical court  of  the  Empire.  To  him  had  been  confided 
the  education  of  the  present  Czar;  and  the  fervour  of  his 
orthodoxy,  as  well  as  the  clear-cut  simplicity  of  his  belief 
in  Muscovite  customs,  had  gained  complete  ascendancy 
over  the  mind  of  his  pupil.  Different  estimates  have  been 
formed  as  to  the  character  of  Pobyedonosteff.  In  the 
eyes  of  some  he  is  a  conscientious  zealot  who  believes  in 
the  mission  of  Holy  Russia  to  vivify  an  age  corrupted  by 
democracy  and  unbelief;  others  regard  him  as  the  Russian 
Macchiavelli,  straining  his  beliefs  to  an  extent  which  his 
reason  rejects,  in  order  to  gain  power  through  the  mechan- 
ism of  the  autocracy  and  the  Greek  Church.  The  thin 
face,  passionless  gaze,  and  coldly  logical  utterance  bespeak 
the  politician  rather  than  the  zealot ;  yet  there  seems  to  be 
good  reason  for  believing  that  he  is  a  "fanatic  by  reflec- 
tion," not  by  temperament. 1  A  volume  of  Reflections 
which  he  has  given  to  the  world  contains  some  entertaining 
judgments  on  the  civilisation  of  the  West.  It  may  be 
worth  while  to  select  a  few,  as  showing  the  views  of  the  man 
who,  through  his  pupil,  influenced  the  fate  of  Russia  and 
of  the  world. 

"Parliament  is  an  institution  serving  for  the  satisfaction 
of  the  personal  ambition,  vanity,  and  self-interest  of  its 
members.  The  institution  of  Parliament  is  indeed  one  of 
the  greatest  illustrations  of  human  delusion.  .  .  .  On 
the  pediment  of  this  edifice  is  inscribed,  '  All  for  the  public 
good.'  This  is  no  more  than  a  lying  formula:  Parlia- 
mentarism is  the  triumph  of  egoism — its  highest  expres- 
sion.    .     .     ," 

>  Russia  under  Alexander  III.,  by  H.  von  Samson- Himmel- 
stierna,  Eng.  ed.,  chap.  vii. 


Nihilism  and  Absolutism  in  Russia    357 

"From  the  day  that  man  first  fell,  falsehood  has  ruled 
the  world — ruled  it  in  human  speech,  in  the  practical 
business  of  life,  in  all  its  relations  and  institutions.  But 
never  did  the  Father  of  Lies  spin  such  webs  of  falsehood  of 
every  kind  as  in  this  restless  age.  .  .  .  The  press  is 
one  of  the  falsest  institutions  of  our  time." 

In  the  chapter  " Power  and  Authority"  the  author  hold^ 
up  to  the  gaze  of  a  weary  world  a  refreshing  vision  of 
a  benevolent  despotism  which  will  save  men  in  spite  of 
themselves: 

"Power  is  the  depository  of  truth,  and  needs,  above 
all  things,  men  of  truth,  of  clear  intellects,  of  strong 
understandings,  and  of  sincere  speech,  who  know  the 
limits  of  'yes'  and  'no,'  and  never  transcend  them, 
etc."i 

To  this  Muscovite  Laud  was  now  entrusted  the  task  of 
drafting  a  manifesto  in  the  interests  of  "power"  and 
"truth." 

Meanwhile  the  Nihilists  themselves  had  helped  on  the 
cause  of  reaction.  Even  before  the  funeral  of  Alexander 
IL  their  executive  committee  had  forwarded  to  his  suc- 
cessor a  document  beseeching  him  to  give  up  arbitrary 
power  and  to  take  the  people  into  his  confidence.  While 
purporting  to  impose  no  conditions,  the  Nihilist  chiefs 
urged  him  to  remember  that  two  measures  were  needful 
preliminaries  to  any  general  pacification,  namely,  a  general 
amnesty  of  all  political  offenders,  as  being  merely  "  executors 
of  a  hard  civic  duty";  and  "the  convocation  of  repre- 
sentatives of  all  the  Russian  people  for  a  revision  and  re- 
form of  all  the  private  laws  of  the  State,  according  to  the 
will  of  the  nation."  In  order  that  the  election  of  this 
1  Pobyedonosteff:  His  Reflections,  Eng.  ed. 


358  The  European  Nations 

Assembly  might  be  a  reality,  the  Czar  was  pressed  to  grant 
freedom  of  speech  and  of  public  meetings. ^ 

It  is  difficult  to  say  whether  the  Nihilists  meant  this 
document  as  an  appeal,  or  whether  the  addition  of  the 
demand  of  a  general  amnesty  was  intended  to  anger  the 
Czar  and  drive  him  into  the  arms  of  the  reactionaries.  In 
feither  case,  to  press  for  the  immediate  pardon  of  his  father's 
murderers  appeared  to  Alexander  III.  an  unpardonable 
insult.  Thenceforth  between  him  and  the  revolutionaries 
there  could  be  no  truce.  As  a  sop  to  quiet  the  more 
moderate  reformers,  he  ordered  the  appointment  of  a  com- 
mission, including  a  few  members  of  Zemstvos,  and  even 
one  peasant,  to  inquire  into  the  condition  of  public -houses 
and  the  excessive  consumption  of  vodka.  Beyond  this 
humdrum  though  useful  question  the  imperial  reformer  did 
not  deign  to  move. 

After  a  short  truce,  the  revolutionaries  speedily  renewed 
their  efforts  against  the  chief  officials  who  were  told  off  to 
crush  them;  but  it  soon  became  clear  that  they  had  lost 
the  good-will  of  the  middle  class.  The  Liberals  looked  on 
them  not  merely  as  the  murderers  of  the  liberating  Czar, 
but  as  the  destroyers  of  the  nascent  constitution ;  and  the 
masses  looked  on  unmoved  while  five  of  the  accomplices 
in  the  outrage  of  March  13th  were  slowly  done  to  death. 
In  the  next  year  twenty -two  more  suspects  were  arrested 
on  the  same  count ;  ten  were  hanged  and  the  rest  exiled  to 
Siberia.  Despite  these  inroads  into  the  little  band  of 
desperadoes,  the  survivors  compassed  the  murder  of  the 
public  prosecutor  as  he  sat  in  a  cafe  at  Odessa  (March  30, 
1882).     On  the  other  hand,  the  official  police  were  helped 

'  The  whole  document  is  printed  in  the  Appendix  to  "Step- 
niak's"  Underground  Russia. 


Nihilism  and  Absolutism  in  Russia    359 

for  a  time  by  zealous  loyalists  who  formed  a  "Holy  Band" 
for  secretly  countermining  the  Nihilist  organisation.  These 
amateur  detectives,  however,  did  little  except  appropriate 
large  donations,  arrest  a  few  harmless  travellers,  and  no 
small  number  of  the  secret  police  force.  The  professionals 
thereupon  complained  to  the  Czar,  who  suppressed  the 
"Holy  Band." 

The  events  of  the  years  1883  and  1884  showed  that  even 
the  army,  on  which  the  Czar  was  bestowing  every  care,  was 
permeated  with  Nihilism,  women  having  by  their  arts  won 
over  many  officers  to  the  revolutionary  cause.  Poland, 
also,  writhing  with  discontent  under  the  Czar's  stern 
despotism,  was  worked  on  with  success  by  their  emissaries ; 
and  the  ardour  of  the  Poles  made  the  recruits  especially 
dangerous  to  the  authorities,  ever  fearful  of  another  revolt 
in  that  unhappy  land.  Finally,  the  Czar  was  fain  to  shut 
himself  up  in  nearly  complete  seclusion  in  his  palace  at 
Gatchina,  near  St.  Petersburg,  or  in  his  winter  retreat  at 
Livadia,  on  the  southern  shores  of  the  Crimea. 

These  facts  are  of  more  than  personal  and  local  im- 
portance. They  powerfully  affected  the  European  polity. 
These  were  the  years  which  saw  the  Bulgarian  Question 
come  to  a  climax;  and  the  impotence  of  Russia  enabled 
that  people  and  their  later  champions  to  press  on  to  a 
solution  which  would  have  been  impossible  had  the  Czar 
been  free  to  strike  as  he  undoubtedly  willed.  For  the 
present  he  favoured  the  cause  of  peace,  upheld  by  his 
Chancellor,  de  Giers;  and  in  the  autumn  of  the  year  1884, 
as  will  be  shown  in  the  following  chapter,  he  entered  into 
a  compact  at  Skiernewice,  which  virtually  allotted  to  Bis- 
marck the  arbitration  on  all  urgent  questions  in  the  Bal- 
kans.    As  late  as  November,    1885,  we  find  Sir   Robert 


360  The  European  Nations 

Morier,  British  ambassador  at  the  Russian  Court,  writing 
privately  and  in  very  homely  phrase  to  his  colleague  at 
Constantinople,  Sir  William  White:  "I  am  convinced 
Russia  does  not  want  a  general  war  in  Europe  about 
Turkey  now,  and  that  she  is  really  suffering  from  a  gigantic 
Katzenjammer  (surfeit)  caused  by  the  last  war."  1  It  is 
safe  to  say  that  Bulgaria  largely  owes  her  freedom  from 
Russian  control  to  the  Nihilists. 

For  the  Czar  the  strain  of  prolonged  warfare  against 
unseen  and  desperate  foes  was  terrible.  Surrounded  by 
sentries,  shadowed  by  secret  police,  the  lonely  man  yet 
persisted  in  governing  with  the  assiduity  and  thoroughness 
of  the  great  Napoleon.  He  tried  to  pry  into  all  the  affairs 
of  his  vast  Empire;  and,  as  he  held  aloof  even  from  his 
chief  ministers,  he  insisted  that  they  should  send  to  him 
detailed  reports  on  all  the  affairs  of  State,  foreign  and 
domestic,  military  and  naval,  religious  and  agrarian. 
What  wonder  that  the  Nihilists  persisted  in  their  efforts, 
in  the  hope  that  even  his  giant  strength  must  break  down 
under  the  crushing  burdens  of  toil  and  isolation!  That  he 
held  up  so  long  shows  him  to  have  been  one  of  the 
strongest  men  and  most  persistent  workers  known  to  his- 
tory. He  had  but  one  source  of  inspiration,  religious  zeal, 
and  but  one  form  of  relaxation,  the  love  of  his  devoted 
Empress. 

It  is  needless  to  refer  to  the  later  phases  of  the  revolu- 
tionary movement.  Despite  their  well-laid  plans,  the 
revolutionaries  gradually  lost  ground;  and  in  1892  even 
Stepniak  confessed  that  they  alone  could  not  hope  to 
overthrow  the   autocracy.     About  that  time,   too,   their 

'  Memoirs  and  Correspondence  of  Sir  William  White,  edited  by 
H.  S.  Edwards,  chap,  xviii. 


Nihilism  and  Absolutism  in  Russia     361 

party  began  to  split  in  twain,  a  younger  group  claiming 
that  the  old  terrorist  methods  must  be  replaced  by  eco- 
nomic propaganda  of  an  advanced  socialistic  type  among 
the  workers  of  the  towns.  For  this  new  departure  and  its 
results  we  must  refer  our  readers  to  the  new  materials 
brought  to  light  by  Sir  D.  Mackenzie  Wallace  in  the  new 
edition  of  his  work,  Russia  (1905). 

Here  we  can  point  out  only  a  few  of  the  more  general 
causes  that  contributed  to  the  triumph  of  the  Czar.  In  the 
first  place,  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  common  action 
among  the  proletariate  of  Russia  are  very  great.  Millions 
of  peasants,  scattered  over  vast  plains,  where  the 'great 
struggle  is  ever  against  the  forces  of  nature,  cannot  ef- 
fectively combine.  Students  of  history  will  observe  that 
even  where  the  grievances  are  mainly  agrarian,  as  in  the 
France  of  1789,  the  first  definite  outbreak  is  wont  to  occur 
in  great  towns.  Russia  has  no  Paris,  eager  to  voice  the 
needs  of  the  many. 

Then,  again,  the  Russian  peasants  are  rooted  in  customs 
and  superstitions  which  cling  about  the  Czar  with  strange 
tenacity  and  are  proof  against  the  reasoning  of  strangers. 
Their  rising  could,  therefore,  be  very  partial;  besides  which 
the  land  is  for  the  most  part  unsuited  to  the  guerrilla 
tactics  that  so  often  have  favoured  the  cause  of  liberty  in 
mountainous  lands.  The  Czar  and  his  officials  know  that 
the  strength  of  their  system  lies  in  the  ignorance  of  the 
peasants,  in  the  soldierly  instincts  of  their  immense  army, 
and  in  the  spread  of  railways  and  telegraphs,  which  enable 
the  central  power  to  crush  the  beginnings  of  revolt.  Thus 
the  Czar's  authority,  resting  incongruously  on  a  faith  dumb 
and  grovelling  as  that  of  the  Dark  Ages  and  on  the  latest 
developments  of  mechanical  science,  has  been  able  to  defy 


362  The  European  Nations 

the  tendencies  of  the  age  and  the  strivings  of  Russian 
reformers. 

The  aim  of  this  work  prescribes  a  survey  of  those  events 
alone  which  have  made  modem  states  what  they  are 
to-day;  but  the  victory  of  absolutism  in  Russia  has  had 
so  enormous  an  influence  on  the  modern  world — not  least 
in  the  warping  of  democracy  in  France — that  it  will  be  well 
to  examine  the  operation  of  other  forces  which  contributed 
to  the  setback  of  reform  in  that  Empire,  especially  as  hey 
involved  a  change  in  the  relations  of  the  central  power  to 
alien  races  in  general,  and  to  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Finland 
in  particular. 

These  forces,  or  ideals,  may  be  summed  up  in  the  old 
Slavophil  motto,  "Orthodoxy,  Autocracy,  Nationality." 
These  old  Muscovite  ideals  had  lent  strength  to  Nicholas 

I.  in  his  day;  and  his  grandson  now  determined  to  appeal 
to  the  feeling  of  nationality  in  its  narrowest  and  strongest 
form.  That  instinct,  which  Mazzini  looked  on  as  the 
means  of  raising  in  turn  all  the  peoples  of  the  world  to  the 
loftier  plane  of  Humanity,  was  now  to  be  the  chief  motive 
in  the  propulsion  of  the  Juggernaut  car  of  the  Russian 
autocracy. 

The  first  to  feel  the  weight  of  the  governmental  machine 
were  the  Jews.  Rightly  or  wrongly,  they  were  thought  to 
be  concerned  in  the  peculations  that  disgraced  the  cam- 
paign of  1877  and  in  the  plot  for  the  murder  of  Alexander 

II.  In  quick  succession  the  officials  and  the  populace 
found  out  that  outrages  on  the  Jews  would  not  be  dis- 
pleasing at  headquarters.  The  secret  once  known,  the 
rabble  of  several  towns  took  the  law  into  their  own  hands. 
In  scores  of  places  throughout  the  years   1881   and  1882, 


Nihilism  and  Absolutism  in  Russia     363 

the  mob  plundered  and  fired  their  shops  and  houses,  beat 
the  wretched  inmates,  and  in  some  cases  killed  them  out- 
right. At  Elisabetgrad  and  Kiev  the  Jewish  quarters 
were  systematically  pillaged  and  then  given  over  to 
the  flames.  The  fury  reached  its  climax  at  the  small 
town  of  Balta  ;  the  rabble  pillaged  976  Jewish  houses, 
and,  not  content  with  seizing  all  the  wealth  that  came  to 
hand,  killed  eight  of  the  traders,  besides  wounding  211 
others. 

Doubtless  these  outrages  were  largely  due  to  race-hatred 
as  well  as  to  spite  on  the  part  of  the  heedless,  slovenly 
natives  against  the  keen  and  grasping  Hebrews.  The  same 
feelings  have  at  times  swept  over  Roumania,  Austria,  Ger- 
many, and  France.  Jew-baiting  has  appealed  even  to 
nominally  enlightened  peoples  as  a  novel  and  profitable 
kind  of  sport ;  and  few  of  its  votaries  have  had  the  hypo- 
critical effrontery  to  cloak  their  conduct  under  the  plea  of 
religious  zeal.  The  movement  has  at  bottom  everywhere 
been  a  hunt  after  Jewish  treasure,  embittered  by  the 
hatred  of  the  clown  for  the  successful  trader,  of  the  in- 
dividualist native  for  an  alien,  clannish,  and  successful 
community.  In  Russia  religious  motives  may  possibly 
have  weighed  with  the  Czar  and  the  more  ignorant  and 
bigoted  of  the  peasantry;  but  levelling  and  communistic 
ideas  certainly  accounted  for  the  widespread  plundering — 
witness  the  words  often  on  the  lips  of  the  rioters:  "We  are 
breakfasting  on  the  Jews;  we  shall  dine  on  the  landlords, 
and  sup  on  the  priests."  In  1890  there  appeared  a  ukase 
ordering  the  return  of  the  Jews  to  those  provinces  and 
districts  where  they  had  been  formerly  allowed  to  settle, 
that  is,  chiefly  in  the  South  and  West ;  and  all  foreign  Jews 
were  expelled  from  the  Empire.     It   is  believed  that  as 


3^4  The  European  Nations 

many  as  225,000  Jewish  families  left  Russia  in  the  sixteen 
months  folio  wing.  1 

The  next  onslaught  was  made  against  a  body  of  Christian 
dissenters,  the  humble  community  known  as  Stundists. 
These  God-fearing  peasants  had  taken  a  German  name 
because  the  founder  of  their  sect  had  been  converted  at  the 
Stunden,  or  hour-long  services,  of  German  Lutherans  long 
settled  in  the  south  of  Russia;  they  held  a  simple  evan- 
gelical faith ;  their  conduct  was  admittedly  far  better  than 
that  of  the  peasants,  who  held  to  the  mass  of  customs  and 
superstitions  dignified  by  the  name  of  the  orthodox  Greek 
creed ;  and  their  piety  and  zeal  served  to  spread  the  evan- 
gelical faith,  especially  among  the  more  emotional  people 
of  South  Russia,  known  as  Little  Russians. 

Up  to  the  year  1878,  Alexander  IL  refrained  from  per- 
secuting them,  possibly  because  he  felt  some  sympathy  with 
men  who  were  fast  raising  themselves  and  their  fellows 
above  the  old  level  of  brutish  ignorance.  But  in  that  year 
the  Greek  Church  pressed  him  to  take  action.  If  he  chas- 
tised them  with  whips,  his  son  lashed  them  with  scorpions. 
He  saw  that  they  were  sapping  the  base  of  one  of  the  three 
pillars  that  supported  the  imperial  fabric — orthodoxy,  in 
the  Russian  sense.  Orders  went  forth  to  stamp  out  the 
heretic  pest.  At  once  all  the  strength  of  the  governmental 
machine  was  brought  to  bear  on  these  non-resisting 
peasants.  Imprisonment,  exile,  execution,  —  such  was 
their  lot.  Their  communities,  perhaps  the  happiest  then 
to  be  found  in  rural  Russia,  were  broken  up,  to  be  flung 
into  remote  comers  of  Transcaucasia  or  Siberia,  and  there 

'  Rambaud,  Histoire  de  la  Russie,  chap,  xxxviii. ;  Lowe,  Alex- 
ander III.  of  Russia,  chap.  viii. ;  H.  Frederic,  The  New  Exodus; 
Professor  Errera,  The  Russian  Jews. 


Nihilism  and  Absolutism  in  Russia     365 

doomed  to  the  regime  of  the  knout  or  the  darkness  of  the 
mines. ^  According  to  present  appearances  the  persecut- 
ors have  succeeded.  The  evangehcal  faith  seems  to  have 
been  almost  stamped  out  even  in  South  Russia;  and  the 
Greek  Church  has  regained  its  hold  on  the  allegiance,  if  not 
on  the  beliefs  and  affections,  of  the  masses. 

To  account  for  this  fact,  we  must  remember  the  im- 
mense force  of  tradition  and  custom  among  a  simple  rural 
folk,  also  that  very  many  Russians  sincerely  believe  that 
their  institutions  and  their  national  creed  were  destined  to 
regenerate  Europe.  See,  they  said  in  effect.  Western 
Europe  oscillates  between  Papal  control  and  free  thought ; 
its  industries,  with  their  laissez-faire  methods,  raise  the 
few  to  enormous  wealth  and  crush  the  many  into  a  new 
serfdom  worse  than  the  old.  For  all  these  evils  Russia  has 
a  cure ;  her  autocracy  saves  her  from  the  profitless  wrang- 
ling of  Parliaments;  her  national  Church  sums  up  the 
beliefs  and  traditions  of  nobles  and  peasants;  and  at  the 
base  of  her  social  system  she  possesses  in  the  "Mir"  a  patri- 
archial  communism  against  which  the  forces  of  the  West 
will  beat  in  vain.  Looking  on  the  Greek  Church  as  a 
necessary  part  of  the  national  life,  they  sought  to  wield  its 
powers  for  nationalising  all  the  races  of  that  motley  Em- 
pire. "Russia  for  the  Russians!  "  cried  the  Slavophils. 
"Let  us  be  one  people,  with  one  creed.  Let  us  reverence 
the  Czar  as  head  of  the  Church  and  of  the  State.  In  this 
unity  lies  our  strength."  However  defective  the  argument 
logically,  yet  in  the  realm  of  sentiment,  in  which  the 
Slavs  live,  move,  and  have  their  being,  the  plea  passed  mus- 
ter.    National  pride  was  pressed  into  the  service  of  the 

'  See  an  article  by  Count  Leo  Tolstoy  in  the  Contemporary  Re- 
view for  November,  1895;  also  a  pamphlet  on  The  Stundists, 
with  Preface  by  Rev.  J.  Brown,  D.D. 


366  The  European  Nations 

persecutors;  and  all  dissenters,  whether  Roman  Catholics  of 
Poland,  Lutherans  of  the  Baltic  provinces,  or  Stundists  of 
the  Ukraine,  felt  the  remorseless  grinding  of  the  State 
machine,  while  the  Greek  Church  exalted  its  horn  as  it  had 
not  done  for  a  century  past. 

Other  sides  of  this  narrowly  nationalising  policy  were 
seen  in  the  determined  repression  of  Polish  feeling,  of  the 
Germans  in  the  Baltic  provinces,  and  of  the  Armenians  of 
Transcaucasia.  Finally,  remorseless  pressure  was  brought 
to  bear  on  that  interesting  people,  the  Finns.  We  can  here 
refer  only  to  the  last  of  these  topics.  The  Germans  in  the 
provinces  of  Livonia,  Courland,  and  Esthonia  formed  the 
majority  only  among  the  landholding  and  merchant 
classes;  and  the  curbing  of  their  semi-feudal  privileges 
wore  the  look  of  a  democratic  reform. 

The  case  was  far  different  with  the  Finns.  They  are  a 
non-Aryan  people,  and  therefore  differ  widely  from  the 
Swedes  and  Russians.  For  centuries  they  formed  part  of 
the  Swedish  monarchy,  deriving  thence  in  large  measure 
their  literature,  civilisation,  and  institutions.  To  this  day 
the  Swedish  tongue  is  used  by  about  one-half  of  their 
gentry  and  burghers.  On  the  annexation  of  Finland  by 
Alexander  L,  in  consequence  of  the  Franco-Russian  com- 
pact framed  at  Tilsit  in  1807,  he  made  to  their  Estates  a 
solemn  promise  to  respect  their  constitution  and  laws. 
Similar  engagements  have  been  made  by  his  successors. 
Despite  some  attempts  by  Nicholas  I.  to  shelve  the  con- 
stitution of  the  Grand  Duchy,  local  liberties  remained  al- 
most intact  up  to  a  comparatively  recent  time.  In  the 
year  1869  the  Finns  gained  further  guarantees  of  their 
rights.     Alexander  IL  then  ratified  the  laws  of   Finland, 


Nihilism  and  Absolutism  in  Russia     367 

and  caused  a  statement  of  the  relations  between  Finland 
and  Russia  to  be  drawn  up. 

In  view  of  the  recent  struggle  between  the  Czar  and  the 
Finnish  people,  it  may  be  well  to  give  a  sketch  of  their 
constitution.  The  sovereign  governs,  not  as  Emperor  of 
Russia,  but  as  Grand  Duke  of  Finland.  He  delegates  his 
administrative  powers  to  a  Senate,  which  is  presided  over 
by  a  Governor-General.  This  important  official,  as  a  mat- 
ter of  fact,  has  always  been  a  Russian ;  his  powers  are,  or 
rather  were,i  shared  by  two  sections  of  the  Finnish  Senat3 
each  composed  of  ten  members  nominated  by  the  Grand 
Duke.  The  Senate  prepares  laws  and  ordinances  which 
the  Grand  Duke  then  submits  to  the  Diet.  This  body 
consists  of  four  orders — nobles,  clergy,  burghers,  and 
peasants.  Since  1886  it  has  enjoyed  to  a  limited  extent  the 
right  of  initiating  laws.  The  orders  sit  and  vote  separ- 
ately. In  most  cases  a  resolution  that  is  passed  by  three 
of  them  becomes  law,  when  it  has  received  the  assent  of  the 
Grand  Duke.  But  the  assent  of  a  majority  in  each  of  the 
four  orders  is  needed  in  the  case  of  a  proposal  that  affects 
the  constitution  of  the  Grand  Duchy  and  the  privileges  of 
the  orders.  In  case  a  bill  is  accepted  by  two  orders  and  is 
rejected  by  the  other  two,  a  deadlock  is  averted  by  each 
of  the  orders  appointing  fifteen  delegates;  these  sixty 
delegates,  meeting  without  discussion,  vote  by  ballot,  and 
a  bare  majority  carries  the  day.  Measures  are  then  re- 
ferred to  the  Grand  Duke,  who,  after  consulting  the  Senate, 
gives  or  withholds  his  assent. ^ 

1  A  law  of  the  autumn  of  1902  altered  this.  It  delegated  the 
administration  to  the  Governor-General,  assisted  by  the  Senate. 

2  For  the  constitution  of  Finland  and  its  relation  to  Russia,  see 
A  Precis  of  the  Public  Law  of  Finland,  by  L.  Mechelin,  translated 
by  C.  J.  Cooke  (1889);   Pour  la  Finlande,  par  Jean  Deck;   Pour  la 


368  The  European  Nations 

A  very  important  clause  of  the  law  of  1869  declares  that 
"Fundamental  laws  can  be  made,  altered,  explained,  or 
repealed,  only  on  the  representation  of  the  Emperor  and 
Grand  Duke,  and  with  the  consent  of  all  the  Estates." 
This  clause  sharply  marked  oflf  Finland  from  Russia,  where 
the  power  of  the  Czar  is  theoretically  unlimited.  New 
taxes  may  not  be  imposed  nor  old  taxes  altered  without 
the  consent  of  the  Finnish  Diet;  but,  strange  to  say,  the 
customs  dues  are  fixed  by  the  Government  (that  is,  by  the 
Grand  Duke  and  the  Senate)  without  the  co-operation  of 
the  Diet.  Despite  the  archaic  form  of  its  representation, 
the  Finnish  constitution  (an  ofifshoot  of  that  of  Sweden) 
has  worked  extremely  well;  and  in  regard  to  civil  freedom 
and  religious  toleration,  the  Finns  take  their  place  among 
the  most  progressive  communities  of  the  world.  More- 
over, the  constitution  is  no  recent  and  artificial  creation; 
it  represents  customs  and  beliefs  that  are  deeply  ingrained 
in  a  people  who,  like  their  Magyar  kinsmen,  cling  firmly 
to  the  old,  even  while  they  hopefully  confront  the  facts  of 
the  present.  There  was  every  ground  for  hope.  Between 
the  years  18 12  and  1886  the  population  grew  from  900,000 
to  2,300,000,  and  the  revenue  from  less  than  7,000,000 
marks  (a  Finnish  mark  =  about  ten  pence)  to  40,000,000 
marks. 

Possibly  this  prosperity  prompted  in  the  Russian  bureau- 
cracy the  desire  to  bring  the  Grand  Duchy  into  line  with 
the  rest  of  the  Empire.  On  grounds  other  than  constitu- 
tional, the  bureaucrats  had  a  case.  They  argued  that 
while  the  revenue  of  Finland  was  increasing  faster   than 

Finlande,  La  Constitution  du  Grand  Duche  de  Finlande  (Paris, 
1900)  ;  J.  R.  Danielsson,  Finland's  Union  with  the  Russian  Empire 
(Borga,  1891). 


Nihilism  and  Absolutism  in  Russia     369 

that  of  Russia  proper,  yet  the  Grand  Duchy  bore  no  share 
of  the  added  miHtary  burdens.  It  voted  only  17  per  cent, 
of  its  revenue  for  miHtary  defence  as  against  28  per  cent, 
set  apart  in  the  Russian  Budget.  The  fact  that  the 
Swedish  and  Finnish  languages,  as  well  as  Finnish  money, 
were  alone  used  on  the  railways  of  the  Grand  Duchy,  even 
within  a  few  miles  of  St.  Petersburg,  also  formed  a  cause 
of  complaint.  When,  therefore,  the  Slavophils  began  to 
raise  a  hue  and  cry  against  everything  that  marred  the 
symmetry  of  the  Empire,  an  anti-Finnish  campaign  lay 
in  the  nature  of  things.  Historical  students  discovered 
that  the  constitution  was  the  gift  of  the  Czars,  and  that 
their  goodwill  had  been  grossly  misused  by  the  Finns. 
Others,  who  could  not  deny  the  validity  of  the  Finnish 
constitution,  claimed  that  even  constitutions  and  laws 
must  change  with  changing  circumstances;  that  a  narrow 
particularism  was  out  of  place  in  an  age  of  railways  and 
telegraphs ;  and  that  Finland  must  take  its  fair  share  in  the 
work  of  national  defence.^ 

Little  by  little  Alexander  III.  put  in  force  this  Slavophil 
creed  against  Finland.  His  position  as  Grand  Duke  gave 
him  the  right  of  initiating  laws;  but  he  overstepped  his 
constitutional  powers  by  imposing  various  changes.  In 
January,  1890,  he  appointed  three  committees,  sitting  at 
St.  Petersburg,  to  bring  the  coinage,  the  customs  system, 
and  the  postal  service  of  Finland  into  harmony  with  those 
of  Russia.  In  June  there  appeared  an  imperial  ukase 
assimilating  the  postal  service  of  Finland  to  that  of  Russia — 

'  See  for  the  Russian  case  d'Elenew,  Les  Pretentions  des  Separa- 
tistes  finlandais  (1895);  also  La  Conquete  de  la  Finlande,  by  K. 
Ordine  (1889) — answered  by  J.  R.  Danielsson,  op.  cit.;  also  Ritss- 
land  und  Finland  vom  russischen  Standpunkte  atts  betrachtet,  by 
"Sarmatus"  (1903). 


370  The  European  Nations 

an  illegal  act  which  led  to  the  resignation  of  the  Finnish 
ministers.  In  May,  1891,  the  Committee  for  Finnish 
Affairs,  sitting  at  St.  Petersburg,  was  abolished;  and  that 
year  saw  other  efforts  curbing  the  liberty  of  the  press,  and 
extending  the  use  of  the  Russian  language  in  the  govern- 
ment of  the  Grand  Duchy. 

The  trenches  having  now  been  pushed  forward  against 
the  outworks  of  Finnish  freedom,  an  assault  was  prepared 
against  the  ramparts — the  constitution  itself.  The  as- 
sailants discovered  in  it  a  weak  point,  a  lack  of  clearness  in 
the  clauses  specifying  the  procedure  to  be  followed  in 
matters  where  common  action  had  to  be  taken  in  Finland 
and  in  Russia.  They  saw  here  a  chance  of  setting  up  an 
independent  authority,  which,  under  the  guise  of  inter- 
preting the  constitution,  could  be  used  for  its  suspension 
and  overthrow.  A  committee,  consisting  of  six  Russians 
and  four  Finns,  was  appointed  at  the  close  of  the  year 
1892  to  codify  laws  and  take  the  necessary  action.  It  sat 
at  St.  Petersburg;  but  the  opposition  of  the  Finnish  mem- 
bers, backed  up  by  the  public  opionion  of  the  whole  Duchy, 
sufficed  to  postpone  any  definite  decision.  Probably  this 
time  of  respite  was  due  to  the  reluctance  felt  by  Alexander 
III.  in  his  closing  days  to  push  matters  to  an  extreme. 

The  alternating  tendencies  so  well  marked  in  the  genera- 
tions of  the  Romanoff  rulers  made  themselves  felt  at  the 
accession  of  Nicholas  II.  (November  i,  1894).  Lacking 
the  almost  animal  force  which  carried  Alexander  III.  so 
far  in  certain  grooves,  he  resembles  the  earlier  sovereigns 
of  that  name  in  the  generous  cosmopolitanism  and  dreamy 
good-nature  which  shed  an  autumnal  haze  over  their 
careers.  Unfortunately  the  reforming  Czars  have  been 
v/ithout  the  grit  of  the  crowned  Boyars,  who  trusted  in 


Nihilism  and  Absolutism  in  Russia     371 

Cossack,  priest,  and  knout;  and  too  often  they  have  bent 
before  the  reactionary  influences,  always  strong  at  the 
Russian  Court.  To  this  peculiarity  in  the  nature  of 
Nicholas  II.  we  niay  probably  refer  the  oscillations  in  his 
Finnish  policy.  In  the  first  years  of  his  reign  he  gradually 
abated  the  rigour  of  his  father's  regime,  and  allowed  greater 
liberty  of  the  press  in  Finland.  The  number  of  articles 
suppressed  sank  from  216  in  the  year  1893  to  40  in  1897.1 

The  hopes  aroused  by  this  display  of  moderation  soon 
vanished.  Early  in  1898  the  appointment  of  General 
Kuropatkin  to  the  Ministry  for  War  for  Russia  foreboded 
evil  to  the  Grand  Duchy.  The  new  Minister  speedily 
counselled  the  exploitation  of  the  resources  of  Finland  for 
the  benefit  of  the  Empire.  Already  the  Russian  general 
staff  had  made  efforts  in  this  direction;  and  now  Kuro- 
patkin, supported  by  the  whole  weight  of  the  Slavophil 
party,  sought  to  convince  the  Czar  of  the  danger  of  leaving 
the  Finns  with  a  separate  military  organisation.  A  mili- 
tary committee,  in  which  there  was  only  one  Finn,  the 
Minister  Procope,  had  for  some  time  been  sitting  at  St. 
Petersburg,  and  finally  gained  over  Nicholas  II.  to  its 
views.  He  is  said  to  have  formed  his  final  decision  during 
his  winter  stay  at  Livadia  in  the  Crimea,  owing  to  the 
personal  intervention  of  Kuropatkin,  and  that,  too,  in  face 
of  a  protest  from  the  Finnish  Minister,  Procope,  against 
the  suspension  by  imperial  ukase  of  a  fundamental  law  of 
the  Grand  Duchy.  The  Czar  must  have  known  of  the 
unlawfulness  of  the  present  procedure,  for  on  November 
6-18,  1894,  shortly  after  his  accession,  he  signed  the 
following  declaration: 

".  .  .  We  have  hereby  desired  to  confirm  and  ratify 
»  Pour  la  Finlande,  par  Jean  Deck,  p.  36. 


ZT^  The  European  Nations 

the  religion,  the  fundamental  laws,  the  rights  and  priv- 
ileges of  every  class  in  the  said  Grand  Duchy,  in  particular, 
and  all  its  inhabitants  high  and  low  in  general,  which  they, 
according  to  the  constitution  of  this  country,  had  enjoyed, 
promising  to  preserve  the  same  steadfastly  and  in  full 
force."  1 

The  military  system  of  Finland  having  been  definitely 
organised  by  the  Finnish  law  of  1878,  that  statute  clearly 
came  within  the  scope  of  those  "fundamental  laws"  which 
Nicholas  II.  had  promised  to  uphold  in  full  force.  We  can 
imagine,  then,  the  astonishment  which  fell  on  the  Finnish 
Diet  and  people  on  the  presentation  of  the  famous  Imperial 
Manifesto  of  February  3-15,  1899.  While  expressing  a 
desire  to  leave  purely  Finnish  affairs  to  the  consideration 
of  the  Government  and  Diet  of  the  Grand  Duchy,  the  Czar 
warned  his  Finnish  subjects  that  there  were  others  that 
could  not  be  so  treated,  seeing  that  they  were  "closely 
bound  up  with  the  needs  of  the  whole  Empire."  As  the 
Finnish  constitution  pointed  out  no  way  of  treating  such 
subjects,  it  was  needful  now  to  complete  the  existing  in- 
stitutions of  the  Duchy.  The  Manifesto  proceeded  as 
follows : 

"Whilst  maintaining  in  full  force  the  now  prevailing 
statutes  which  concern  the  promulgation  of  local  laws 
touching  exclusively  the  internal  affairs  of  Finland,  We 
have  found  it  necessary  to  reserve  to  Ourselves  the  ultimate 
decision  as  to  which  laws  come  within  the  scope  of  the 
general  legislation  of  the  Empire.  With  this  in  view.  We 
have  with  Our  Royal  Hand  established  and  confirmed  the 

1  The  Rights  of  Finland,  p.  4  (Stockholm,  1899).  See,  too,  for 
the  whole  question,  Finland  and  the  Tsars,  1 809-1 899,  by  J.  R. 
Fisher  (London,  2nd  ed.,  1900). 


Nihilism  and  Absolutism  in  Russia     373 

fundamental  statutes  for  the  working  out,  revision,  and 
promulgation  of  laws  issued  for  the  Empire,  including  the 
Grand  Duchy  of  Finland,  which  are  proclaimed  simul- 
taneously herewith."  i 

The  accompanying  enactments  made  it  clear  that  the 
Finnish  Diet  would  thenceforth  have  only  consultative 
duties  in  respect  to  any  measure  which  seemed  to  the  Czar 
to  involve  the  interests  of  Russia  as  well  as  of  Finland.  In 
fact,  the  proposals  of  February  15th  struck  at  the  root  of 
the  constitution,  subjecting  it  in  all  important  matters  to 
the  will  of  the  autocrat  at  St.  Petersburg.  At  once  the 
Finns  saw  the  full  extent  of  the  calamity.  They  observed 
the  following  Sunday  as  a  day  of  mourning;  the  people 
of  Helsingfors,  the  capital,  gathered  around  the  statue  of 
Alexander  II.,  the  organiser  of  their  liberties,  as  a  mute 
appeal  to  the  generous  instincts  of  his  grandson.  Every- 
where, even  in  remote  villages,  solemn  meetings  of  protest 
were  held;  but  no  violent  act  marred  the  impressiveness 
of  these  demonstrations  attesting  the  surprise  and  grief 
of  a  loyal  people. 

By  an  almost  spontaneous  impulse  a  petition  was  set  on 
foot  begging  the  Czar  to  reconsider  his  decision.  If  ever 
a  petition  deserved  the  name  "national,"  it  was  that  of 
Finland.  Towns  and  villages  signed  almost  en  masse. 
Ski-runners  braved  the  hardships  of  a  severe  winter  in  the 
effort  to  reach  remote  villages  within  the  Arctic  Circle; 
and  within  five  days  (March  10-14)  529,931  names  were 
signed,  the  marks  of  illiterates  being  rejected.  All  was  in 
vain.  The  Czar  refused  to  receive  the  petition,  and 
ordered  the  bearers  of  it  to  return  home. 2 

1  The  Rights  of  Finland,  pp.  6-7 ;  also  in  Pour  la  Finlande,  par 
J.  Deck,  p.  43.  2  Ibid.,  pp.  23-30. 


374  The  European  Nations 

The  Russian  Governor-General  of  Finland  then  began  a 
brisk  campaign  against  the  Finnish  newspapers.  Four 
were  promptly  suppressed,  while  there  were  forty-three 
cases  of  "suspension"  in  the  year  1899  alone.  The  public 
administration  also  underwent  a  drastic  process  of  russifi- 
cation,  Finnish  officials  and  policemen  being  in  very  many 
cases  ousted  by  Muscovites.  Early  in  the  year  1901  local 
postage  stamps  gave  place  to  those  of  the  Empire.  Above 
all,  General  Kuropatkin  was  able  almost  completely  to 
carry  out  his  designs  against  the  Finnish  army,  the  law 
of  1 90 1  practically  abolishing  the  old  constitutional  force 
and  compelling  Finns  to  serve  in  any  part  of  the  Empire 
— in  defiance  of  the  old  statutes  which  limited  their  serv- 
ices to  the  Grand  Duchy  itself. 

The  later  developments  of  this  interesting  question  fall 
without  the  scope  of  this  volume.  We  can  therefore  only 
state  that  the  steadfast  opposition  of  the  Finns  to  these 
illegal  proceedings  led  to  still  harsher  treatment,  and  that 
the  few  concessions  granted  since  the  outbreak  of  the 
Japanese  War  have  apparently  failed  to  soothe  the  resent- 
ment aroused  by  the  former  unprovoked  attacks  upon  the 
liberties  of  Finland. 

One  fact,  which  cannot  fail  to  elicit  the  attention  of 
thoughtful  students  of  contemporary  history,  is  the  ab- 
sence of  able  leaders  in  the  popular  struggles  of  the  age. 
Whether  we  look  at  the  orderly  resistance  of  the  Finns,  the 
efforts  of  the  Russian  revolutionaries,  or  the  fitful  efforts 
now  and  again  put  forth  by  the  Poles,  the  same  discour- 
aging symptom  is  everywhere  apparent.  More  than  once 
the  hour  seemed  to  have  struck  for  the  overthrow  of  the 
old  order,  but  no  man  appeared.     Other  instances  might, 


Nihilism  and  Absolutism  in  Russia     375 

of  course,  be  cited  to  show  that  the  adage  about  the  hour 
and  the  man  is  more  picturesque  than  true.  The  demo- 
cratic movements  of  1848-49  went  to  pieces  largely  owing 
to  the  coyness  of  the  requisite  hero.  Or,  rather,  perhaps 
we  ought  to  say  that  the  heroes  were  there,  in  the  persons 
of  Cavour  and  Garibaldi,  Bismarck  and  Moltke,  but  no 
one  was  at  hand  to  set  them  in  the  places  which  they  filled 
so  ably  in  1858-70.  Will  the  future  see  the  hapless,  un- 
guided  efforts  of  to-day  championed  in  an  equally  master- 
ful way?  If  so,  the  next  generation  may  see  strange 
things  happen  in  Russia,  as  also  elsewhere. 

Two  suggestions  may  be  advanced,  with  all  diffidence,  as 
to  the  reasons  for  the  absence  of  great  leaders  in  the  move- 
ments of  to-day.  As  we  noted  in  the  chapter  dealing  with 
the  suppression  of  the  Paris  Commune  of  187 1,  the  cen- 
tralised governments  now  have  a  great  material  advantage 
in  dealing  with  local  disaffection,  owing  to  their  control  of 
telegraphs,  railways,  and  machine-guns.  This  fact  tells 
with  crushing  force,  not  only  at  the  time  of  popular  rising, 
but  also  on  the  men  who  work  to  that  end.  Little  assur- 
ance was  needed  in  the  old  days  to  compass  the  overthrow 
of  Italian  Dukes  and  German  Translucencies.  To-day  he 
would  be  a  man  of  boundlessly  inspiring  power  who  could 
hopefully  challenge  Czar  or  Kaiser  to  a  conflict.  The 
other  advantage  which  Governments  possess  is  in  the  in- 
tellectual sphere.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  mere 
size  of  the  States  and  Governments  of  the  present  age 
exercises  a  deadening  effect  on  the  minds  of  individuals. 
As  the  vastness  of  London  produces  inertia  in  civic  affairs, 
so,  too,  the  great  Empires  tend  to  deaden  the  initiative 
and  boldness  of  their  subjects.  Those  priceless  qualities 
are  always  seen  to  greatest  advantage  in  small  states  like 


37^  The  European  Nations 

the  Athens  of  Pericles,  the  England  of  Elizabeth,  or  the 
Geneva  of  Rousseau ;  they  are  stifled  under  the  pyramidal 
mass  of  the  Empire  of  the  Czars;  and  as  a  result  there  is 
seen  a  respectable  mediocrity,  equal  only  to  the  task  of 
organising  street  demonstrations  and  abortive  mutinies. 
It  may  be  that  in  the  future  some  commanding  genius  will 
arise,  able  to  free  himself  from  the  paralysing  incubus,  to 
fire  the  dull  masses  with  hope,  and  to  turn  the  very  vast- 
ness  of  the  governmental  machine  into  a  means  of  de- 
struction. But,  for  that  achievement,  he  will  need  the 
magnetism  of  a  Mirabeau,  the  savagery  of  a  Marat,  and 
the  organising  powers  of  a  Bonaparte. 


END   OF  VOLUME    I 


AMERICAN   HISTORY 

THE  THIRTEEN  COLONIES 

By  Helen  Ainslie  Smith,  author  of  "One  Hundred  Famous  Ameri- 
cans," etc.  2  volumes,  fully  illustrated.  Cloth,  $3.00.  Half  leather, 
gilt  top,  $3.50. 

"  The  books  are  lucid,  direct,  and  simple,  and  will  make  an  excellent  addition  to  any 
historical  library,  condensing  as  they  do,  within  two  volumes,  the  facts  for  which  the 
student  must  ordinarily  search  far." — The  Interior. 

THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA 

By  Edwin  Erle  Sparks,  Ph.D.,  author  of  "The  Expansion  of  the 
American  People,"  etc.     2  volumes,  fully  illustrated.     Cloth,  net  $2.70. 
Half  leather,  gilt  top,  net  $3.20.     (Postage,  30c.) 
This  narrative  traces  the  gradual  evolution  of  a  confederated  Republic 
under  the  laws  of  necessity  ;   acknowledges  that  radical  departures  have 
been  made  from  first  ideals  as  a  result  of  progress  ;  takes  into  constant  con- 
sideration the  underlying  forces  of  heredity  and  environment.     In  brief, 
these  two  volumes  tell  the  story  of  the  United  States.     They  show  how  the 
phrase  "  the  United  States  is''  has  been  slowly  and  unconsciously  evolved 
in  the  process  of  time  from  the  early  practice  of  saying  "  the  United  States 


THE  SOUTH  AMERICAN  REPUBLICS 

By  Thomas  C.  Dawson,  late  Secretary  American  Legation,  Brazil. 
2  volumes,  fully  illustrated.  Cloth,  net  $2.70.  Half  leather,  gilt  top, 
net  $3.20.     (Postage,  30  cts.) 

"  The  book  is  a  worthy  addition  to  a  series  which  has  included  a  number  of  first  class 
monographs  .  .  .  The  author's  English  is  clear  and  direct.  .  .  .  He  uses  excellent 
judgment  in  the  selection  and  arrangement  of  his  materialj  and  he  tells  his  story  as  one 
who  knows  the  story  well  himself  and  who  is  able  to  make  it  plain  to  his  readers.  .  .  . 
Few  works  of  fiction  can  boast  of  more  undiluted  romance  than  can  be  found  in  the  history 
of  South  America." — The  Providence  Journd\.. 

THE  STORY  OF  CANADA 

By  J.  G.  BouRiNOT,  C.M.G.,  LL.D.,  D.C.L.  Fully  illustrated,  with 
maps.     Cloth,  $1.50.     Half  leather,  gilt  top,  $1.75. 

"  Dr.  Bourinot  has  admirably  executed  his  work.  .  .  .  He  has  been  impartial,  sin- 
cere, loyal,  accurate,  and  clear-sighted,  and  his  simplicity  of  style  and  vigor  of  intellect, 
joined  to  the  interest  of  the  subject,  make  the  book  of  exceeding  benefit  and  interest  to  the 
Dominion  of  Canada  and  to  the  British  Empire." — The  Critic. 

THE  STORY  OF  MEXICO 

By  Susan  Hale.  Fully  illustrated.  Cloth,  $1.50.  Half  leather,  gilt 
top,  $1.75. 

"  One  of  the  most  fascinating  of  the  series.  .  .  .  It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  no- 
where else  within  the  same  compass  will  be  found  so  clear,  accurate,  vivid,  and  at  the  same 
time,  so  thoroughly  comprehensive  a  narrative  of  Mexico's  past,  combined  with  a  descrip- 
tion of  her  future." — Boston  Traveller. 

The  above  titles  are  taken  from  the   "Story  of  the   Nations 
Series,"  comprising  74  titles. 
Descriptive  circular  may  be  had  on  application. 


New  York      G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS  London 


The  United  States 

1607-1904 

A  History  of  Three  Centuries  of  Progress 

in  Population,  Politics,  Industry, 

Commerce,  and  Civilization 

By  WILLIAM  ESTABROOK  CHANCELLOR 
and  FLETCHER  WILLIS  HEWES 

In  ten  parts,  each  in  one  octavo  volume,  handsomely  printed  in 
pica  type.  Fully  illustrated,  each,  net,  $3.50  (carriage  25  cents). 
Volumes  sold  separately. 


Some  comments  concerning  the  volumes  now  ready  s 

"  The  initial  volume  establishes  a  high  standard  of  excellence.  The 
authors  have  evolved  a  plan  which  will  secure  for  their  work  a  unique 
position  in  the  long  series  of  American  histories.  Both  men  are  admirably 
fitted  for  their  respective  tasks.  .  .  .  The  volume  at  hand  treats  in  a 
most  thorough  manner  the  subject  of  the  colonization  of  the  North 
American  continent.  .  .  .  Mr.  Chancellor  has  accomplished  with 
striking  success  the  difficult  task  of  putting  fresh  life  into  a  tale  that  has 
been  told  over  and  over  again.  His  language  is  terse  and  vigorous,  and  he 
has  a  dramatic  way  of  presenting  events  which  animate  even  the  dullest, 
most  prosaic  facts.  His  characterizations  are  brief,  but  illuminating.  The 
statistical  work  of  Mr.  Hewes  constitutes  a  most  distinctive  contribution 
to  American  history.  .  .  .  The  numerous  maps,  charts,  and  diagrams 
constitute  an  invaluable  feature  of  the  work." — Newark  News. 

"The  dramatic  style  of  Mr.  Chancellor's  history  and  the  distinctive 
value  of  the  comprehensive  records  presented  by  Mr.  Hewes  concerning 
industry  and  commerce,  should  assuredly  render  this  a  popular  work." — 
San  Francisco  Chronicle. 

"  The  books  are  fully  up  to  the  Putnam  standard  of  book  making.  They 
are  simple,  elegant,  and  durable." — Rochester  Herald. 


Send  for  complete  descriptive  circular 

G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 

New  York  London 


EUROPEAN   HISTORY 


The  Story  of  Germany 

By  Sabine  Baring-Gould,  M.A.,  author  of  "Curious 
Myths  of  the  Middle  Ages,"  etc.  12°.  Fully  illustrated.  Cloth, 
$1.50.     Half-leather,  gilt  top,  $1.75. 

"A  well-written  and  scholarly  history  of  Germany.  .  .  .  Every  page  of  this  admirable 
history  reads  like  a  grand  romance,  and  the  volume  will  be  found  an  invaluable  contribution 
to  our  national  literature." — Chicago  Inter-Ocean. 

The  Story  of  Scotland 

By  John  Mackintosh,  LL.D.,  author  of  "History  of  Civil- 
ization in  Scotland,"  etc.  12°.  Fully  illustrated.  Cloth,  $1.50. 
Half-leather,  gilt  top,  Si. 75. 

"As  a  general  introduction  to  the  study  of  our  national  history  we  commend  this  work.  So 
far  as  it  goes  it  is  thoroughly  reliable  and  candid,  and  its  style  is  interesting.  It  states  facts 
simply  and  correctly,  and  in  these  respects  it  is  a  model  volume  in  a  model  series  of  popular 
histories." — Scotch- A  merican. 

The  Story  of  the  Building  of  the  British  Empire 

The  Story  of  England's  Growth  from  Elizabeth  to  Victoria 

By  Alfred  Thomas  Story,  author  of  "  The  Life  of  John 
Linnell,"  etc.  Two  volumes.  12°.  Fully  illustrated.  Each, 
Cloth,  $1.50.     Half-leather,  $1.75. 

"  Mr.  Story's  volumes  are  the  most  successful  attempt  to  put  all  the  vital  incidents  in  the 
growth  and  development  of  a  great  nation  into  a  convenient  compass  for  the  needs  of  readers 
and  students  of  limited  time  that  has  yet  been  made.  .  .  .  The  work  is  one  of  remarkable 
interest,  and  is  written  with  an  impartiality  and  fairness  wherever  American  topics  are 
treated  which  may  well  serve  as  a  model  for  English  historians." — Boston  Transcript. 

The  Story  of  Mediaeval  France 

From  the  Reign  of  Hugues  Capet  to  the  Beginning  of  the  Sixteenth 

Century 

By  GusTAVE  Masson,  B.A.,  of  Harrow  School,  England. 
12°.     Fully  illustrated.     Cloth,  $1.50.     Half-leather,  $1.75. 

"No  middle-age  history  is  more  fascinating  than  that  of  Feudal  France  ;  and  Mr.  Masson 
has  met  his  subject  with  a  true  appreciation.  Whilst  the  romantic  features  of  that  life  are 
displayed  in  a  vigorous  narrative  of  the  doings  of  court  and  camp,  more  serious  topics  — 
as  the  communal  movements,  scholasticism,  financial  reforms,  the  Parlement  of  Paris,  liter- 
ature, science,  art, — receive  adequate  treatment." — Dial. 

The  Story  of  the  Normans 

Told  Chiefly  in  Relation  to  Their  Conquest  of  England. 

By  Sarah  OrneJewett.    12°.    Fully  illustrated.  Cloth,  |i. 75. 

"  The  habits,  life,  and  history  of  this  race  are  interesting  and  romantic  in  the  extreme,  and 
Miss  Jewett's  pleasing  style  gives  us  a  book  which  is,  therefore,  decidedly  readable.  It  is  a 
fascinating  story  from  beginning  to  end." — Boston  Times. 

The  above  titles  are  taken  from  "  The  Story  of  the  Nations  Series,"  com- 
prising 75  titles.     Descriptive  circular  may  be  had  on  application. 

New  York— G.  P.  PUTNAM'S   SONS  — London 


EUROPEAN   HISTORY 


The  Historical  Development  of  Modern  Europe 

From  the  Congress  of  Vienna  to  the  Present  Time 
By  Charles  M.  Andrews,  Associate  Professor  of  History  in 

Bryn   Mawr  College.      Two  volumes.     Sold  separately.      With 

maps.     8°.     Gilt  top,  each,  $2.50. 

Parti. — From  1815  to  1850.  Part  II. — From  1850  to  1897. 

Student's  Edition.     Two  volumes  in  one,  net,  $2.75. 

"  The  work  is  to  be  commended  both  for  the  accuracy  of  its  scholarship  and  for  its  popular 
mode  of  treatment." —  The  Chu7-chman. 

"  The  work  is  an  important  addition  to  the  literature  of  an  historical  period  complicated  in 
its  many  movements  and  interactions,  and  to  us  of  to-day  near,  important,  and  deeply  inter- 
esting.— Public  Opinion. 

A  History  of  Greece 

By  Evelyn  Abbott,  M.A.,  LL.D.,  Late  Fellow  of  Balliol  Col- 
lege, Oxford.     Three  parts.     8°.     Each  $2.25. 
Part  I. — From  the  Earliest  Time  to  the  Ionian  Revolt. 
Part  II. — From  the  Beginning  of  the  Ionian  Revolt  to  the  Thirty  Years' 

Peace,  500-445  B.C. 
Part  III.— From  the  Thirty  Years'  Peace  to  the  Fall  of  the  Thirty  at 

Athens,  445-403  B.C. 

"It  will  certainly  supply  the  want  of  a  careful  and  thorough  work,  occupying  the  place 
between  the  ordinary  brief  histories  and  the  more  elaborate  works  of  Curtius,  Grote,  Thirlwall, 
and  Mitford."— Prof.  W.  C.  Morey. 

"  A  delightful  book  as  well  for  the  professional  scholar  as  for  the  cultivated  reader." — Prof. 
T.  D.  Seymour,  Yale  Univ. 

A  History  of  the  People  of  the  Netherlands 

By  Petrus  Johannes  Blok,  Ph.D.,  Professor  of  Dutch  His- 
tory in  the  University  of  Leyden.    Translated  by  Ruth  Putnam. 

To  be  completed  in  five  parts.  8°.  Each  fully  illustrated,  to- 
gether with  maps,  $2.50. 

Part  I. — The  Netherlands  from  the  Earliest  Times  to  the  Beginning  of 

the  Fifteenth  Century. 
Part  II. — The  Gradual  Centralization  of  Power  and  the  Burgundian 

Period. 
Part  III. — The  War  of  Independence,  1568-1621. 

"  This  is  the  standard  history  of  the  whole  Netherlands,  and  the  author  may  be  congratu- 
lated on  finding  so  excellent  a  translator.  .  .  .  She  has  saturated  her  mind  with  the 
thoughts  and  general  sweep  of  the  author's  mind,  and  with  that  thorough  mastery  of  the 
language  which  would  enable  her  to  give  a  perfect  literal  translation  she  does  what  is  far  better. 
Shemakes  a  free,  flowing,  yet  thoroughly  representative  version  that  accurately  reproduces  the 
spirit,  the  color,  the  vigor,  and  the  charm  of  the  original."— Z,2V<?r«r_y  World. 

Outlines  of  Roman  History 

By  Prof.  H.  F.  Pelham,  University  of  Oxford.  With  maps 
printed  in  colors.      12°.     $1.75. 

"  It  is  much  fuller  than  outline  sketches  are  apt  to  be  ;  the  plan  is  well  conceived  and  carried 
out,  and  the  author  shows  throughout  a  rare  power  of  grasping  the  most  important  points  and 
exhibiting  them  clearly  and  in  simple  language.  It  is  undoubtedly  the  work  of  a  man  well  ac- 
quainted with  the  best  ancient  and  modern  authorities,  of  one  who  certainly  acknowledges  his 
indebtedness  constantly,  and  yet  does  not  hesitate  to  differ  frankly,  when  he  feels  that  he  must, 
even  from  such  chiefs  as  Mommsen." — The  Nation. 

New  York—  G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SG'tiS  —  London 


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